1 10 48 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/137ca353176d8556499b42313fff95a6.pdf?Expires=1773878400&Signature=tGYowEw-VhdxZwqau4ZFAa3GF06R4g7IvVzY8OowM2QR97Ha8Q-p-PTm1gnxAtHcq%7E-ybPacuLVpgq1PUS9vHrcAwgwgRZ1NRx-osrarsOV5h0NoKlLcole6ys%7EKP7rnbFXJQNwjVJPBN%7E5Q44jXE7dbtPGvbRU8OTebLNmbB73hyqGAlOPDT5aAEYGMT3HEVbGC5oXzDZQTkNOZ9HfOI6mLuiUTS6yukqOHFqPsui39WkHEYPOhxMRW9rPjQWLaZbxj0cObmsPnY9cghBucWl6PAnXfmIoGpLDR%7EGn2WNAjr5VnJe1rXJicQiK589HAvDZ5FeF6Nkb%7ELsOfCbUnag__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 9e06c91647e249534916ac56b7ef6881 PDF Text Text SUBM .ARHJE SAFARI By General M ark W Clark . �$UB1:.ARIIJE SAFARI By General Mark W. Clark By October of 1942, the pressure of TORCH Operation Planning had become so great that all of us at Norfolk House were working literally day and night. V stopped for sleep only when fatigue made further accurate work impossible. Ie I finally told the staff that on Sundays at least, everyone should stay away from the office until 10 AM. Thus, on the morning of Sunday the 17th, when I sauntered in, General Gruenther was the only other officer visible. "There is a hot message here", he said. The message was from Washington. It ·was addressed to General Eisenhower, but it was routine for communications of the highest priority to come·to me as well, at Norfolk House. This was our secret planning headquarters, about two miles away from General Eisenhower's own office at 20 Grosvenor Square. He rarely came to Norfolk House, because his appearance - even incognito might attract the attention of enemy agents, many of whom were then active in London. Ordinarily I went to see him at least three times a day, but there was also a direct telephone line between his desk and mine. Just as I was gulfing through my copy of the message, the phone rang. General Eisenhower was very brief. 11 Come up", he said, "Come right away". Hith that he hung up. I made quick time to Grosvenor Square and walked into Ike's office saying "Well, when do I go 11 • He said 11 probably pretty quick". We sat down to study the message and its implications. The cable from General Marshall had originated with Robert Murphy, then Counselor of ETibassy on Special Mission to French Africa with Headquarters in Algiers and principal figure in the on-the-spot political maneuvers of TORCH, the code name for the North African Operation. The cable stated that General Mast, then French CommandQlr in Algeria, who was our highest and best French contact in IJorth Africa, wanted an American delegation to come immediately to a highly secret rendezvous for conferences which would include an exchange of information. The cable stipulated a 11 senior general officer" as chief of the mission. There was an in1plication that General Giraud might attend the conference, although we knew that he was still in France. General Eisenhower handed me the whole job. · The organization of the trip itself, the selection of my supporting staff, and the widest sort of latitude on what I could say to the French was my responsibility. But I was not to reveal to the French that TORCH was an actuality. Only that North African operations were in the planning stage. To say too much could cost us lives, saying too little would hurt our chances of French collaboration. Enamy discovery or capture of our group could mean irreparable damage to TORCH as well as to ourselves. �It seemed pretty important that Prime Minister Churchill should know what was going on and advise qn the important steps about to be taken, Most of .the weekends leading up to the one of October 17th, General Eisenhower and I had spent at ,Chequers (the country place England provides for her Prime Minister). We had, with difficulty, begged off this weekend for the simple reason that we had· really come to dread the cost in lost sleep of 1 the all-night inquisitions to which the tireless and keen mind of blir. Churchi:IJ invariably subjected us. But fortunately, we knew that he would be at · Chequers now that we needed him in a hurry. I got on the secret phone to Chequers and was answered by General Sir Hastings Ismay, the Prime Minister's militci.ry Aide. "Pug, I've gQt something hot here 11 , I said. ' 11 How hot", Ismay q_uesti(med. 11 Too hot to talk about on the phone. 11 j "Hait a minute while I tell the Prime Minister", he said. lvir. Churchill came on. "Pug tells me you have something hot, what is it? 11 a secret phone.n Then he said, "This is I handed my instrument to Ike. 11We can't talk about it here", Ike replied, Hit I s much too important for that 11 • 11 Very well", said Mr, Churchill., "Come on down here". 11Vve haven't got time", said Ike. "All right", said the Prime Minister a little formally, "is it sufficiently important for me to come back?" Ike said 11Yes 11 and made a date to meet at No. 10 Downing Street late that afternoon. We almost immediately went into planning session. Sending for a French chart of the North African coast, we were pleased to be able to spot a mark intended to indicate a house in exactly the latitude and longitude called for in .the cable, I called together the group that was to accompany me, and for over three hours talked out the details, as well as the imponderables, of our trip. We gave little thought to Darlan. Giraud was our choice for French leadership and that was that. If Darlan had to be dealt with later for the sake of immobilizing the French IJavy, we could handle him. We knew that · a similar conference was being held in Washington., wit~ President Roosevelt, Admiral Leahy and General Marshall, discussing the same questions. We also knew that by this time the Prime Minister and his political and military advisers were doing plenty of talking and thinking about what · might be on our minds, The War Department cable stipulated that the general officer in charge of the mission should be accompanied by one man thoroughly familiar with the details of TORCH Operations; one supply man; one :tJavy man; and one political 2 �expert--- the la,t ,ter, to , pe.ak. f),uent trench. Brigadier General Lyman L. Lem$ nitzer, head t~e Allied ~ore~ Pi~hs Section; Colonel A. L. Hamblen, o~ ~ s'ir±pping and $Upply bxpbrt; Captain Gerald 1Nright of the U. S. Navy who had been our Navy tiaison man since TORCH was started; and Colonel Julius c. Holmest a former State Department officer who headed up our Civil Affairs Branch of the , TORCH plan, seemed to fill these specifications. of Until late afternoon we were hashing over the details of our trip. We would fly to Gibraltar in two Flying Fortresses. The air people pointed out that there was danger in this. No B-17 had ever landed at the Gibraltar field, and we did not know if it could be·done. The party would split into two planes, so that in the event mine was lo~t, General Lemnitzer could carry on for me. From Gibraltar we would be taken to the Algerian coast in a British submarine. The cable was very specific as to how the final rendezvous would be made, a latitude and longitude some 15 miles west of the tiny port of Cherchel was given. On the night of October 21/22 our submarine was to surfqce off the position given; a single, steady, white light would be exhibited from a seaward dormer window of the house if the coasts were clear and the landing should proceed. This light would not be visible from the land side. Unfortunately, nothing was said about what was to be done if we could not make it by airplane and submarine in the short time granted, four days, and we immediately asked Washington to send a secret message to Murphy and his associates, urging them to set up an alternate time of rendezvous if we could not make the October 21 date as specified. By the time General Eisenhower and I were ready to take off for No. 10, we were well briefed on the complex contents of the Murphy cable. It covered a lot more than just the details of the rendezvous. Murphy reported that when he had returned to Algiers from his visit to Washington, he had been asked for a secret interview by the head of the French Intelligence. The interview took place at an isolated spot outside of town to avoid German notice. The French said that both Germctn and Japanese sources had reported the Allies were planning early military operations against Dakar, Casablanca, or both. The Germans were urging the French to take every precaution against this; likewise giving indications tha.t this could constitute a pretext for Axis oocupation of French North Africa. The Germans", Murphy cabled, "appear determined to settle the western Mediterranean issue during the coming weeks and will have the use of the Spanish mainland and of Spanish Morocco for this purpose. Gibraltar is under constant surveillance. In French opinion definite action is not a question of weeks, but of days. The French political situation is extremely delicate and collapse may be expected in as little as ten days. There is no question that the situation in French North Africa is moving fast. Informc,tion indicates the Axis have raised about 100,000 troops along the Tunisian frontier." 11 General Mast, by way of Mr. Murphy, raised another extremely troublesome problem; he suggested the possibility that the French would be better satisfied if the operation would include the occupation of some part of Occupied France by the French Army so that French Resistance fighters could be supplied. This seemed to us impossible from the beginning and we eventually had to talk the French out of it as we finally convinced them on the subject of the supreme command in French North Africa. 3 �Murphy concluded: 11Mast asse:rls we can gain entry practically without , firing a shot through Giraudi$ ~omrtldhdt It is suggested that the u. S. supply an American submarine to piCK up Giraud and his party at night on the French Mediterranean Cost• ti ' When General Eisenhower and I arrived at the Cabinet Room at No. 10 Downing, there was about as dazzling an array of Britain's diplomatic, military and naval brains as I had yet · soon. The Prime Minister's mood, without knowing exactly what was on our minds, was as enthusiastic as a boy with a new electric train. When we read tho cable ho broke into a big grin behind a giant now cigaJ:1. 11 This is groat", he kept saying. We discussed the implications of tho trip at some length with Clement Attlee, Lord Louis Mountbatten, Sir Dudley Pound, and Lord Alanbrooke. :/.rhat Ike wanted was a specific British viewpoint on how much I could tell tho French about TORCH. We knew Giraud would want · an important spot in the command set-up, and I offered, if it would help matters, to step down as Deputy Commander to ' Ike in favor of Giraud. That was rejected. At the end, we told Mr. Churchill, · h2ppy as a detective story fan, tho more fantastic detaiihs of our pians for this secret rendezvous on which the fate of thousands of British, AmericP.n, and French soldiers and sailors might hang. Almost as an after-thought, I asked the Primo Minister if we should wear civilian clothes or uniforms. 11 Do you have civvies", asked Mr. Churchill. "If you have, take thorn along.'.f I eventually left the civilian clothes in the submarine. It would have made things just that much harder had we been picked up without uniforms on shore~ Escorting me to tho door, Mr. Churchill emphasized Britain I s entirely cooperative spirit~ V'Te would have the submarine, destroyer, amphibious airplanes and facilities at Gibraltar which we needed. He has an unaffected way of speaking in ringing phrases at important moments. "The entire resources of the British Commonwealth are at your disposal" he said in parting. 11 1 want to assure you once more how important it will be to get this information and to cut down French resistance; you have my genuine support!" By this time General Spaatz had already laid on the two B-17 1 s with specially-selected pilots. Tho weather people said we had better not try a take-off until morning. We spent the night sleeping very little, but getting a lot of details and equipment together in a minimum of space and weight, Army Finance had scurried around to got money, a thousand dollars in Canadian $5 and $10 gold pieces for possible use in buying our way out of a jam. 11 This is the money of which a considerable part wa.s lost when our small boats over-turned in , in the surf later.) We had no bribing to do, but at the end of tho trip I had only four of the gold pieces I carried left; I purchased them for souvenirs for General Eisenhower, Admiral Cunningham and General Walter Bodell Smith; tho fourth I still carry for a luck piece. We got money bolts for tho whole party and divided up the gold pieces. I had some U, S. dollars along too, but tho whole amount was about $2,000 .:._ not the much larger sum mentioned in news · dispatches, I had been scheduled to leave with General Eisenhower on the morning 4 �of the 18th for an inspectiort tfip bf U.S. Forces training in Scotland. In order to attract no undue attentioh td my mission, General Eisenhower left on his journey as planned• It was not until dusk of the 18th that my four colleagues and I arrived at the 8th Air Force Bomber Base at Polbrook, 73 miles NW of London. I wore Lt. Colonel 1 s insignia on my shoulders when I left London. Even most of the people at head-quarters thought I wc.s on my way to join General Eisenhower in Scotland. 9 The weather was still bad on the evening of the 18th· and the precious hours slipped away while we all wa.:..ted in a tiny barracks, keeping out of sight of personnel on the field so as to attract a minimum of attention. I was plenty keyed up and, although I went to bed, I didn't sleep much. The most disturbing things were the time element and tho difficulty of communications; not only with Murphy, but through him to the French, who might already be- on their way to the rendezvous. I was afraid that if we did not arrive on time, the French would feel badly let down and might question our good faith. I must admit I was also pretty worried about the personal safety of all of us; the whole deal could be a trick. If we fell . into Nazi hands it would be far from pleasant, and, of more importance, jeopardize the whole operation. I had loft a short note behind to be delivered to M rs~ Clark in tho event I would not return. I had carefully gone over procedures with General Lemnitzcr and Colonel Holmes for them to carry on and to do the job if one or more of us dropped out for any reason. A final cable had been received from V Jashington saying that ·11 AGREE", a code name for myself, 11 is to proceed at once with the mission". But nothing was said to allay my gnawing fear that we could not make it in time. I was sleeping at last when they called me about 6:30 A . We had some M breakfast and climbed into the planes for a quick take-off-. General Lcmnitzer was carrying all the secret documents in a henvily weighted tube. I instructed the pilots that under no circumstances was either plane to land in Spain or Portugal. The Bas~ Commander had reccivod·some word about German fighters along the · coast. We didn't have an escort, as possibly attracting too much a.ttention, but tho guns of our two B-17 1 s were fully manned. My ship, 11 The Red Gremlin 11 , piloted by Colonel Tibbits, broke out of the clouds and flew out of sight of earth for three hours. By the time the overcast broke, there was nothing below but open sea. V'Te sighted only one ship, a small sailing vessel · somewhero off Portugal. Even before we had properly identified Gibraltar, Spitfires were shooting up to look us over. General Lewnitzer 1 ~ plane, 11 The Boomerang", went in first and we were all relieved to see the big bomber make it ~afely on Gibraltar's limited strip. One of tho pilots had already climbed out of my plane when tho British rushed up and motioned to everybody to stay inside. They explained that the Gtbraltar field was alway under full observation by German agents in Spain. 11 The runway is only about 300 yards from Spanish territory). The arrival of two B-17 1 s - - the first sent there --- would give tho Nazis enough to think about without their spotting high officers on board. Tho British suggested that we leave our coats and hats; a big car with drawn curtains pulled up as close as possible to the plane and we jumped swiftly into it to be whisked off quickly to the Governor 1 s house, Herc Lieutenant General M ason M acFarlane and some British admirals, including Vice Admiral Collins and tho Commander of British submarines 5 �in the Mediterranean, Captain Be.rney Fawkes, welcomed us. I asked my four · colleagues to stay in their rooms• rho loss seen of any of us on the Rock, the better. I conferred alone With Gerloral M2.cFe.rlane and his naval associates. I have hardly ever beert iess certain of the success of an operational mission in my life; I needed support, but got little encouragement from tho British. The Navy people wore taking a rather dim view of this whole crazy American adventure,. They talked of thick shore patrols, plenty of spotting planes, and a French Navy and airforce bolder than it had been before. What ! needed was someone to say, "Okay, we 1 11 get you in there and get you out too 11 They talked on until I said, 11 Gentlemcn, there is no help for this; we arc going"~ IIJt has been decided by our two governments and I don't intend to call it off"~ The most encouraging person I met at Gibraltar was Lt. - Norman Ambury Auchinlcck Jewel (we called him 11 Bill 11 later), Commander of the submarine HMS SERAPH - one of -the smaller and slower British under-sea boats. He was described to me as 11 a fine youngster with plenty of experience in doing soundings along the Horth African coast". When I aksed to see him, they brought in a handsome young man with plenty of self-confidence. I asked if he knew what this was all about. All they told mo was that I was to take some Americans someplace and land them at night on the African coast", ho said. 11 I explained some of the details. Jewel was pleasantly reassuring: "I am sure we can get you in there and get you off ag2.in 11 • He bucked up my confidence considerably. He told mo he had three British Commandos and four falboots --- little collapsible, wood-framed canvas canoes --- on board. If we wore to arrive at the rendezvous still in day-light and submerged, we would have to got going immediately. At that, Lieutenant Jewel warned, considering the number of hours we would have to run submerged, at very slow speed, he wasn't going to guarantee arrival on timo. I had dispatchod another message to Washington, via Lt. Colonel Eddy, our military representative in the international zone of Tangier, urgently requesting that the reception party wait for us from 9 PM on tho night of the 21st until dawn and that in the event we did not show up on that night, we would attempt a landing on the night of 22/23 ~ Nono of us took very well to the idea of lying close to shore in shallow water where planes could spot even a submerged sub. There was no time to lose. We wanted to leave Gibraltar in the dark, and we didn't want to lose any of tho night and its valuable opportunity for running on the surface. They took us down to the submarine tender, "Maidstone", v1horc we had a drink and dinner in Captain Barney Fawkes r cabin. Tho P-219 · was tied up to tho 11 Maidstonoll. They wero casting off its lines as we arrived aboard. I had never been aboard a submarine before.. I soon realized that · they wore not made for a lanky 61 2 11 man. All tho while I was in tho P-219, I had to bend over e.nd be careful of my head.. Tho officers I quarters, the submarine crow had hospitably given up to their passengers, was just a cubby hold alongside the middle catwe.lk. When I went to tho 11 hoad 11 , I had to literally crawl on all fours. Tho submarine crew, e.lrnost all youngsters, welcomed us cheerfully 6 �aboard. All they knew was that l'Wt; I re going on a screwy mission with some Americans". While we were ttirtning on the surface that night, we passengers spent a lot of time on deck. A British· destroyer led us the first fifty miles, Lt. Jewel artd I, poring over the charts, agreed we couldn't possibly make the renqczvous if we had to run all the trip underwater, We decidsd to try as much as possible on tho surface where we could make 10 to 12 knots compared to only two or three submerged. We would be ready for a crash dive at any time if spotted by an enemy ship or plane. During our first afternoon, the sea slipping smoothly along and sighting nothing, we had a detailed conference with our Commando Officers on embarkation and landing procedures. General plans concerning signals and possible action ashore were studied closely. The submarine would go as close to the beach as possible and survey it by poriscop0 in daylight. Our radio was alert for word from Gibraltar, but apparently nothing had been roe.eived from Murphy on the matter of a secondary rendezvous. In the late afternoon we played some bridge, and at 9:30 PM, when it was fully dark again, Lt. Jewel stopped tho submarine for a rehearsal of falboot embarkation. The sea was choppy. Colonel Holmes and Commando Captain R. P. Livingstone launched their boat first, after practicing stepping into tho frai~ and very tipsy craft on the dry deck. They paddled noiselessly away and from a distance of several hundred yards they tried out the infrared signal light with which we had been supplied. This light cannot be seen by the naked eye but with a proper sort of glass, it becomes a useful signal light. ·The light worked perfectly. Holmes and Livingstone returned to the submarine, with General Lemnitzor and Lt. J, P. Foote trying the next trip. The General got pretty wet but they made it all right. Colonel Hamblen and Captain Wright made it OK as well. Captain Godfrey B. (Jwnbo) Courtney was my small boat pilot and we tried it last. He was the expert on those boats and was in chargo of instructing o.11 of us. With the sme.ll boc1.t exercises complete, the submarine was quickly under way again. I managed to got some sloop this night, in spite of tho stuffy interior of tho subma:dno, but at 6:20 AM., the dive klaxons sounded. Vic were too close to the North African shore to venture running on the surface again in daylight. There was still no word from Gibraltar. I fell back on another bridge game to pass some pretty worrisome hours moving along at · slow speed under the Mediterranean. Our submarine was a rather old typo, and by c.ftornoon tho air within it was warm and lifeless, leaving us inexperienced landsmen f eeling pretty dopey. It was not until tho early morning hours of October 22 that we came in sight of our rendezvous point. We could spot a light in what we thought was the correct locc.tion, but it was too near dawn to risk a landing and we were not sure enough of where we were. We prepared for another day of discomfort in the over-crowded underseas craft. When it was light enough, we ran up a periscope for a few seconds at a time and made sketches of the shore visible from throe to four miles. We 7 �were sure we had our house spotted okay. Soon after daylight two Algerian fishing boats came out and anchored right in front of, 11 our" beach. They worried us, so we moved out to sea slowly. Then a radio came in froo Murphy. We had missed the first night I s rendezvous and I was hoping against hope that word had gotten to the French about our alternative plan. The first 11 flap 11 about this message was when we got hold of a wrong code book. The first word that came out was "police". That gave me a sinking feeling that the people on shore had been detected. We finally decoded the message with great relief. Mr. Murphy understood our difficulty; but had changed my proposal to make the second rendezvous on the night of 23/24, skipping a night to make it two days later. However, to my relief, part 2 of the message said the 11 interested parties have been informed to expect you night of 21/22 and that if no contact then made to expect you night of 22/23 as well. You should assume therefore that you are expected tonight (22nd) and tomorrow night (23rd) 11 • There was nothing to do but stick it out• My feeling of vrnrking against time was by no moans allayed by the knowledge that on this day some units of the TORCH Operation under General Patton were actually on their way from the United States. That left us not knowing whether we were actually expected on the night then approaching, or not until 24 hours later. VJo had another conference· and outlined some special plans for trouble ashore. If we arrived safely, we would signal the fact to the submarine by turning off the guide light. If we wanted to reembark lat,er the same night, we would start it flashing. The submc1.rine would stay off tho beach directly in front of the house tho whole of the first two nights we were ashore. Then, if no radio communication was established, and no word received from shore, the submarine would take a sta~ tion 5 miles off an alternative rendezvouw point a few miles along the coast, staying there for another full 24 hours. If nothing was then hcardJ the SERAPH would return to Gibraltar without us. · As darkness e.pproached, I speculated upon what would happen that night. surfaced as soon a-s it was fully dark; but there was no light showing from the shore. By 10:00 PM I was feeling plenty low with tho prospect of another full day to II sweat it out". Just to keep things going, I bet each of my associ2.tes $10 the light would come on 11 tonight 11 • In case something should be doing later, I decided to get all tho sleep I could. At 10:30 I turned in. 'tfo li.t 12:00 midnight, they cnlled me to say a light was showing from the shore. There was feverish activity on tho submarine getting the small boats on deck, as tho craft pulled shoreward to within a bare two miles from the surf. The er::ibarkation was calm and pretty well organized. We followed tho drill Captain Courtney had worked out for us and counted 11 one - two - three four 11 as one after the other of each boat's occupants arranged his gear and stepped carefully into excatly the right place. If we had not been so keyed up at the time, it would have been pretty laughable thc1.t 11 Jumbo 11 Courtney was the one who capsized his boat and lost his gear. This stalwart Commando was absolutely devastated at this accident 8 �at such a crucial moment. I had to call Arch Hamblen back to swap boats with him while 11 Jumbo" repaired his boat to follow a little later. 1·:e appro2ched the beach in a V formation, Julius Holmes and Livingstone ahead. My boat and the others waited ,about 200 yards off-shore, until, through the darkness over the feathery surf, we saw the letter 11 K11 flashed by a flashlight - - the signal that tho fir3e, boat had made it ashore and all was well. 1'.Te followed, making it pretty dry through a quite moderate surf. For a moment there was no one at all in sight on an embarrassingly wide beach on which we nocturnal arrivals felt very exposed .to unknown danger. There was a steep bluff at the other side of the beach. It was covered with scrub vegetation and knotty olivB trees and on this dark night, looked just plain black. We rushed for the cover of this darkness, carrying our boats and gear. Just as 1Ne reached the edge of the bluff, Bob Murphy and his French associates came down. lJo one showed any light. Murphy said, 11 Welcome to lJorth Africa. 11 I had had a speech all figured out for prompt, and what I hoped, dramatic delivery in French. I was going to say 11 Lafayette, nous sommes arrbr~s pour la deuxi~me foisn. But somehow the whole idea escaped me. What I really did was to puff with relief from the exertion of clambering over the beach and say, "I'm damn gl2d we made it. 11 We climbed quickl2r up a steep and stony path civer the bluff to the house. This ·was a rather typical French colonial villa of red-roofed white stone built around a courtyard, with the main highway to J.lgiers o'nly 30 yards away. Its owner, M. Tessier, had sent his 11.rab se:.''i/'2.nts away so that we would be undisturbed and unreported. It was this act which brought the police to search the house ne1ct day. The servants wore suspicious and told the Cherchel authorities. Tessier was a well-to-do owner of farmlands; a little, aishevcled, and rather frightened-looking Frenchman when I first met him. He was a true patriot and risked his life to let us meet at his house. Later I helped him enter the French Army and arranged for him to be assigned on liaison duty at my Fifth Army Headquarters,whero ho remained and served me well throughout the Italian Campaign. The house was pretty messy by our standards and it certainly was not a very irnpressive setting for a conference of any sort. Gener2.l Mast and his staff were not yet there when we reached the house, and we were told by his representatives that they could not arrive until almost 5:00 JJ~, coming by car from Algiers some 60 miles away. I directed our Commandos to store their falboots in a downstairs room off the courtyard where they would be thoroughly out of sight, and to lock the door to that room. I asked the Co.mrnandos themselves, being British, to keep out of sight, as tho French had made something of a point of this being strictly a Franco-American affair. They were not feeling too friendly toward the English 9 �after the naval attacks at Dakar and :Mers el Kebir. Tessier took me to an upstairs bedroom where an unkempt and much-used bed was awaiting rae. A lot of my doubts of previous days had slipped away and I was relieved enough to sleep a little until 5:00 l1M, when I was called and told that lv iast had arrived • . General 1'fast spoke little English., but said "Welcome to my country 11 • One of the first things he told me was tnat he had once been a Military Attache at Tokyo where he had come to know ap American, Colonel William C. Crane, He wanted to serve with him and I late!' arranged to send this colonel as liaison with Mast. Mr. Murphy, General Mast, and I ate a typical French petit-dejeuner of coffee, bread and jam, and sardines ' in the living-room while we talked military strategy and North Africa. What I could not tellMast, and had to be e:ctromely careful not to reveal any ; slip of the tongue, vms that a TORCH Operation, or anything like it, had actually gotten anywhere beyond the planning stage --- and this with the leading elements of our armada actually at sea. I could not tell him v1hy Horth Afrioa had been selected for the first American offensive in the war. The history of this was that in the previous July, .with two Arnerican divisions already in Northern Ireland and one in England, President Roosevelt had sent General Marshall, AdJniral King, Harry Hopkins, Stove Early and others to London for a conference in which they wer e to specifically demand that U.S. troops get into battle during 19L,2. The group met at Claridge' s for two days of fantastic discussions. The U. s. proposed that, together with the British, we mount a cross-channel operation on the Cherbourg peninsula in the fall of 1942. I was supposed to command the American element of this expedition and there was so much heat on it that we had already sent radios to Washington outlining equipment and special units which vrnuld be needed, when the British Cabinet turned it down cold. Ike and I went to Chequers and the Prime Minister kept saying ovor and over again, 11 no, it isn't France, lJorth Africa is the place". British and l.1merican GHQ had wor}rnd together on planning a Dakar operation. Washington was disappointed but asked, 11 What can you do to give us action this year?" The.Jr did not want tho troops sitting idly around Ireland. V!e discussed Dakar, Casablanca, and points further inside the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean seemed to be increasingly important. Wo wanted to get the pros sure off the British 8th J.rmy by striking at Rommel I s roar. Tho Primo Minister had hammered away at 11 slitting the soft under-belly of the enemy in the Mediterranean". After two grim years of fighting in North J.fr ica and Italy that under-belly didn I t look so soft.· If we had obtained the French data at Chcrchel a bit earlier into our TORCH planning we might have arranged to debark deeper into the Mediterranec=m in addition to the Algerian landings. As it was, this data was successfully used in mounting various small seaborne expeditions from ilgicrs to tho eastward. In hindsight, tho original TORCH landings were not daring enough. VJe could have gotten away with following Mast's sugr estion of striking deep into Tunisia and in so doing might have saved a lot of time, lives, and over-land fighting. Vfo quickly settled down, t'1c three of 'J.2, h,r_r hy, F''_st anr~ myself, to talking details. 1":e put a lot uf t _ imc into 6 .i.scu3 -::_ ::w y:;_' Giraud I d demands th:n:, 10 �French prestige required his being supreme commander of any Allied Force fighting on French soil. I wanted to dodge a commitment on that, one way or another. ' But since Gire.ud did come into our picture and Darlan was quickly eliminated by assassi~ation, the question of alternative French Command did not eventually arise. Neither Darlan 1 s name nor a possible place for him in our plans was mentioned at Cherchel. I was very quickly impressed with East I s sincerity. He certainly sold me on the idea that he was entirely at our disposal and would do everything possible to help us carry out an operation which to him was only a hope. Before we called together our respective staffs, I asked Mast, "with reference to a hypothetical landing 11 , "How would you do it?" I was very pleased that his conception was very close to ours, although it c2,lled for tho South France bridgehead ·which I already know to be impossible. Later when things got hot General M :ast delivered all the goods ho had promised us. He took great personal risk in ordering the French troops defending tho /.1.gerian coast to help the 1-.llies. I consider him a great French patriot. libout 9: 00 JJ : we brought our staffs around tho dining room table in order to have a frank discussion of tho situation. Remembering my instructions not to reveal the facts of tho impending operation, I was in a difficult position. Mast asked how big an h.merican effort could bb nado. I tried to keep a poker face ·while saying that half a million lJ.liod troops could come in and I said thr.t vw could put 2,000 planes in tho air, as well as II plenty of U. s. Havy. 11 Mast was pretty ir,1prcssed. 11Wo actually put 112,000 Americans and British ashore in the first 12.ndings." East suggested that Giraud be picked up in an American submarine as quickly as possible. I was convinced that none of the French realized the imminence of an· operation. Although they knew something was in the works, nothing definite ha.d leaked to them. 1:uch later Hast told me this was precisely the case. Hast said that he was afraid of a German attack on tho French North 1..frica. "If they do attack", said Mast, ttwo will fight immediately, no matter how little we have to fight with. tt Hast said, with what seemed like utter sincerity, that tho French J.rmy would implicitly follow his and Giraud I s orders, with resistance expected only from the French Navy. Hhile we conferred, some lieutenants from Eaat 1 s staff keptwatch out of tho wiridovis and walked periodicc=>.lly around the gardens and patio, keeping an eye out · for interference of any kind. IJo one had appeared by lunchtime when Tessier, with the help of one of the French, cooked chicken with a hot Arab sauce and served it with some rod wine and orrmgos. General M ast was forced to loavc at lunchtime to return to 1.lgiers to tend to his duties as Co.1mnander of the ii.lgorian Division. Before lunch I wanted to stretch and we:1t. 1 )ffC• to th o patio for a • bit. I told one of the French gucJ.rds ::i: should likiJ t,.) c :.,· ·dhac it lo 0ked like aroun-l 11 �the house. He offered to change uniforms with me, I put on his French uniform. 2nd left my hat off whilG I vvalkcd around a bit outsidG the wall and in view of _ the highnay. Fortunately, no car came by during my tour in the garden. During tho early afternoon wo split up into special groups for detailed discussions of various phases of our plans. The French v,ere ready with voluminous written information which :i.ater turned out to be accurate in every respect. They gave us· locations and strengths of troops and Naval units; told us where supplies, including gasoline and ammunition, were stored; related details of airports where resistance would be heaviest and information as to whore airborne troops could s'afely land. I had sc::icl in the morning we would have to get out to thG submarine the folloviing evening, but as conversation piled up after Mast's late arrival, it bcc21;10 increasingly difficult to see how we vrnuld m2,ke it. Furthermore, I had tho surf on that v:ide, flat beach a1,,,ays on my mind. Through the windows I could observe the sea showing more and more whit0 caps as the day wore on. There was a v1indmill near the house whose increasingly raDid clacking told me nudibl:' thc".t a light bree ze was building up into a fresh onshore wind. It 1'/8.S mic~-afternoon vrhon tho phone ranr. . Tessier answered and quickly turned from the instrument yelling, 11 Tho Dolice will be hero in 2. few minutes". Instantly a full-scc1.le French 11 flap 11 broke out. Officers ran in every direction. Some of the Frenchmen changed into civilian clothes with a speed I hf.Ve seen exceeded only by professional quick-change artists. Before I had quite decided whrst ',ms going on, one of Gcnore.l Mast I s officers ran past me, 1 !ith a suitcase in one h2nd, out to his car 11hich iJnmcdiatcly took off in the direction of f.lgiers. Other Frenchmen 1ncnt out the windows and disappeared into the brush along the beach; I ce.n I t sair that I blRmc any one of the, for their· lives would certainly be in. jeopardy if caught. F'in2.llir only Tessier and one French Officer, Murphy and his assist2.nt, Ridgcviay Knight, rcm2.inccl behind. I was feeling prett? deserted, c1.s well E'.S pr etty agitnted as to just whore y.;e could go to esc2pc the police. I knew it would not be se.fc inside the house and I had strong anxiety that some tcllt2.lc object might be left e.round our meeting room by accident. Furthermore, our British Conlfn2ndos wore sleeping upstairs. I flow up tho stci.irs and called them. To their questions, n-:horc shall we go 11 , I said, ,11 T2.kc to the woods on the beach e.nd got the boats out of here --- fast 11 • But there vias no time! Only one, carrying the walkie-talkie, made the beach to 1mrn the SERl.PE of whe.t vms doing. Tessier relocked the · room contr-.ining the bo,tts just 2. s the police car pulled up. Wncrc can we hido 11 , I asked. He motioned <?.11 of us to rush down through c1. trap door in the p2tio into a ,dne cellar. There v,e.s no tiCTe for discussion. : .'G had oi.;,r musette bags with us, stuffed v1ith the incriminating French documents which: if found upon us, would n1akc it prett3r tough" Tessier, his French r-.ssocic,tc, Mt'.rphy police. 12 ~t '"•~ ~~::..5 11~- rcnaincd -risible to th e �It was pitch ble.ck in the sme.11 ccll2r at tho foot of tho steep, open stairway. r :"o could so plainly hoar every word .;t11d · ovcrir novo above us that uc know it v1e.s imperative to keep absolutely sti+l. Tessier, Eurphy o.nd the two others put on 2. good show for the police. They clanked bottles around, sang a little, and were very jovial indeed. It turned out the 1.rab servants had been susDicious about being sent away; then, Hhcn they hclcl seen footprints on th8 beach, th8y hc1cl told the police e.bout it. l~urph,y idcntifiec. hinsclf e.s the iJncricP.n Consul in Algiers. He boldly indicc1.toc1. n little p;i.rty was in progress and that there were women in the upst;i.irs rooms r.nd urged the French Police not to embarrass him. 'To could hc2.r the police tremping 2round looking in corners end behind furniture. Evc r;r ti1i.1c their feet ap_proo.chcd our tre.p door, seven hearts popped into s even throats. I knelt e,t the foot of the stairs with a carbine in my hand. It v1as my intention, if they came do1m the stairs, to try to fight our way clear Y iithout shooting; but all of us were prepared to shoot if it wore necessary. I r1hisporcc1 th?t no one was to fire unless I c'l.id. It might be hours before we would be c1.ble to get through the surf to our submarine, 2nd Rnything we could clo to avoid further police trouble wci.s of the utmost importance. Poor Courtney, ·who he.cl hnd the trouble vii th the over-turned boat tho night before, was seized with 2. coughing fit. He chokerl.. and sputtered in the cl c1.rkncss c.nc~. finally whispered to me, 11 Gencr2.l, I'm afraid I'll choke. 11 I ans1ncrcd, "I'm c1.frc1id you won 1 tl 11 I slipped hi::1 a vmd of chewing gwn on v1hich I had alrce.dy worked for a while. This quieted him~ The police were moving c1.round above us for 2. full h2lf hour. They fine.lly 2greed to go bci.ck to town 2nd check with their chief for further instructions. They "\1cre frankly suspicious 2.ncl the? told Tessier so. Fine.ll;r there v1 2.s quiet up above, but we did not dci.rc move until Lurphy opened. the door ancJ. srdc''., 11 This is Bob. Thcy 1 ve gone, but thcy 111 be b2.ck. 11 11 Ho11 11 long? 11 , I ask eel. Just a little Yihilo, 11 he said, 11 better clee.r the house. 11 · ic got the boats clown to the beach 2nd hicl them in the woods, stc\ying there ourselves, out-of-sight. Cciptain Livingstone h2.c~ m2cdc conta ct Yv ".th the submarine with our i'Ialki etc1.lkic 2.nc1. told them ,·re were ir.. trouble. :.:..2.tcr we learned the~ were pretty r fr.=1.ntic on boc1.rd, but it was jnst dusk and vve could ce.sily see that the we.v,-:; s were too high to t2.kc off in small buats. Tessier and thE- remaining Fl'cnchmen were :.1:c.;·1 · excited too; we were a ."< 13 �terrible liabilit,y to thoJn ~nd there yias nothing thc;r wanted more than to got rid of their ror.,e.ining guests. The ·waves looked impossible, but we had to make a try c1.s it got full dark or risk ruining the whole mission . I decided to make the experiment with Courtney. I lmov1 I wc..s going to be so2.kod, so I stripped to shorts and my OD shirt. It was cold paddling around in tho water . ·:e tried one spot e.nd were ir;unec~iately overturned by 2. wave . I had put my money bolt in my rolledup trousers, not Y1ishing to be 1.Kightod dorm by all that gold in· a turbulent surf and heavy undertow. That I s when the pc:cnts and r.w money - - l ater so notorious in nov1s dispatches --- wore lost. ( I was a,71azcd when we finally landed at 1.lgiors to got those pants back from Murphy all cleaned D.nd pressed. They he.d been picked up on the beach 2.fter our departure; but the gold was never seen again. ) This attempt convinced us that a launching was impossible under present circunstances. 1 :e went back into the woods to wait , posting sentries in each direction . Tho French kept rushing back and forth to the house, but reported th2t nothing had happened there. r:c se;nt one Frenchman to Cherchel with a oocketfull of gold to try to buy or rent a fishing boat to take us out to tho submE'rine. He had no success. The fishermen ~1erc afraicl_ to tc'ko 2. chance on such A mysterious mission even for an,v 2-111ount of money. ''To talked about possible alternative ways of getting off. Somebody proposed f2.lsc p2.pors 2nd c1n automobile ride to SpRnish Morocco; but I vetoed that c1.s too risky. I had told Lt. J cwel that i:10 might have trouble and to stand by in the second rendezvous one mile oe.st on the second night, if we didn 't m2kc it the first. "'o had pretty good radio cont2ct with tho submarine by walkie-talkie, using cocl.od phrnsos. Tho sub was then only a dangerous 3/4 r.1ilo off shore - - 2lmost at tho edge of the bro2.kcrs. This was 2. very dangerous spot, but Jewel was a 11 Can do boy 11 • It was getting toward midnight . The police h2,d not returned; I was cold, ·wot, and alnost naked, to say nothing of being very hungry. Hone of us he.cl h~:d e.nything to cat since Tessier I s impromptu luncheon. I decided to clinb up for a look at tho house and to sec what I could do about some food and possibly a sweater. Tessier 1 "!as ver3' upset. He didn I t want Ge in the house c.nd urged me to get out c1..s quickly as possible. I hold 011t for some brcc1.d and wino , 2. pair of pr,nts, anc~ tv10 of Tessier I s sv-1e2 tors, all uncomfortably tight. I had just sti".rtod to put the brc2.d rncl a couple of bottles of wine under tho sweater when the police arrived 2.gain. Tessier was the c.10st frightened man I had ever seen. He sc'.iCL I dare not use the path but 11 f'lease_. fon God rs sc>,ko, get out of the house 11 , I vms b2.rofoot and my foot 1:wro alro2.dy cut up from tho stones on the path, but I jumped over the ccr.:1cn-c. wall on t o sea-side of tho house and 'd ropped p.s.infully some 10 feet to the po.th over tho bluff, making my v1ay down to tho beach, I groped my viay back tc the ''1-'.iting party about 1:30 ;.,M , C2.pte.in ':right) our Ifa.vy nan, had been E:=i.king a car c: L1 study of tho beci.ch t o sec ii' J_ there ':ms 2.ny plo.cc v1hcro the s1.Lrf WA.':l 2 lit t,J. ; lighter than olsov1hcre . The · subnar:i.no 11as tolling us cvs'!..' -,~ric v1qL·2.e-te.:U-:i.t, th:-> t the? needed a guide l igh':., , 2nd th2.t ncnc v:2.s visible JTofil ',h•; house , it· tt:i.s t.ir2.e tho French reported tho oolicc had gone away ccgain ari:l I sent O".L, ,)f '/ -_o non to mak0 Tessi.or tu:rm on the light in the v1indm1 . He had turned it off Juring the excitement aft E::r the police search. 1 14 �-''c surrounded our little perty like the plainsmen in Covered-'.'Jagon days vith sentries, armed. v1 ith carbines, lying down at all sides. l,t 3 :30 AJ.iI, I felt I could not remain inactive any longer. 1 ,iaybe 2rou c.nd 1 11 , I said to J err,y ,·•right, 11 11 can make it; let Is hc1.vc a tr_y 11 • j,t 4:00 L.E, Knight, Tessier, 2.nd L:urphy all strippec:1. and carried our ,. bo2,t out into the water to try and steady it through the breakers. 1 ·e passed the first one all right, and I heaved a sigh of relief. Just then the second loomc;d up ahead, gleaming just a little in the starlight and. appearing about a hundred feet high. I knocked ·;right I s Navy hat off trying to call his attention to ,hat was coming and he grabbed it in uid-air. '"'e made it and were in the clear after vie had passed the second breaker. The other boats follo, 1 iJJ1,wdiat cl:r, but, 11ithout exce9tion, capsized; our mus et to bags and od brief cases loaded with the secret papers were soaked as were the papers I h2cl stored inside my borrowed sweater. '1Te seemed to be paddling for hours •.·ithout seeing anything before we spotted the loom of the Seraph in the black-.. ness. 1 The others finally arrived; the 12.st bcin6 Haili.mes I boat. A big wave knocked it 2.gainst the side of the submarine and broke the frc:.mework of tho falboot. Colonel Holmes just barely made it up the side as the boat filled e.nd disappeared. Y1ith his musette bag inside it. This was a dangerous clue to leave behind. 1. fe.lboot has e.n E,irpocket et each end which might keep the wreck afloet. It could be washed up on tho beach and either with or without the bag of pc:,pcrs it could ceuse us 2nd ouJ~ associates ci.shore plenty of trouble. ..,orst of e.11, the be'.[ cont?.inec'!. secret letters Murphy ha.d given Holr;ces to deliver in Engl2nd. This would revc2l Murphy I s presence 2t our rendezvous. My anxiety over this materiel possibly being found overshadowed my elEltion Elt h2ving cor,1pletcd the most delicate part of the mission. I nantod to ste.y ,md look around a little, but the sky was already glowing ·with ap'.)roaching de.y, and Lt. Jewell se.id he was most anxious to submerge. !'9 reluctantly went bolovi 2.nd started back tor:ard Gibraltar. no were e.11 soekorl. and exhc=:.ustod; I asked Ltc Jewell, 11 Haven 1 t I heard somcv1here about the British IJavy having a rum rRtion, even on subm1:,rines? 11 Yes, sir, 11 answered the Lieutenant, gencies .11 11 ,ir:ell, 11 I SP.id, ration'?:t nr but on subnc.rines only in emor- think this is c.1.n emergency. lf()E_, sir, 11 se.id Lt. Jewell, the o~~c:.er. 11 11 if · , ,,. t h about a double nm c officer -of sufficient rank will sign :n W;i:..l I do? 11 I askcdo 2 11 I,-, sec;nr;c~ th2-t Twas f, satLc, T,Jrt _ ·y ~for,21 vnitten order fu.t 2. :: :;1;.1.:L(; r1:m P-219 . , 15 . '°:.:. ,-;r, c,,· rc, G:- CJ j} 1.n. I c,:'.t-cally put f'.1/ n21no ::,,:;, co cr .. c1 n.d _r.,a'.:> : -J engeTE of t:.c c: 1 �As the morning wore on, my worry increased. I felt I sLnply had to get a message back to General Eisenhower for relay to Murphy. Much against Lt. Jewell's better judgment, we surfaced long enough to send a coded radio to Gibraltar in which I reported the lost boat and urgently requested Murphy to have the beach searched, The boat and musette bag were never found although my trousers and a light raincoat lost at the same time did later turn up, Throughout the next night we travelled on the surface, and, after drying ourselves off and sleeping a bit, my group devoted themselves to sorting out wet equipment and carefully drying the secret papers in the submarine's engine room, On October 24, being far enough away from the African coast, we ran on the surface again. I sent a radio to Gibraltar asking for one of the two flying boats the Prime Minister had assigned to us to rendezvous as soon as practicable and fly us to Gibraltar. The Catalina picked us up by mid-afternoon and we transferred in falboots, taking off for Gibraltar while Lt. Jewell and his gallant crew gave us a ··· cheer from their deck. I had this cable ready for immediate coding and transmission: Following cable from CLARK TO COM:MAIIDIIJG GEIJERAL EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS LO!IDO!J FOR EISENHOVTERS EYES ONLY. BEGINS. Brief summary of events to date are given below pending more complete details to be furnished on our arrival. It was necessary to stand off rendezvous point for thirty-six hours submerged under water waiting signal to land because had not heard from M CG01:rrAN (MURPHY) as to exact time of meeting. Finally made definite contact with him and weather being favorable we went ashore in four canvas canoes about midnight twenty-second. Held conference with General Mast who represented Genera+ Giraud and five staff officers commencing at 0700 hours on twenty-third. Following general line anticipated by you our discussions are considered satisfactory. · I,1ast is contacting Giraud today. Giraud expected to give definite decision by Tuesday which is anticipated to be favorable. I base this conclusion on their favorable reaction to the size of the force the United States could make available for such an operation. All questions were settled satisfactorily except for the time the French would assume supreme command. My view on this question was submitted to Giraud through Mast for his consideration with the definite understanding that my proposal must yet be confirmed by you. Have obtained extremely valuable intelligence data which will be prepared as soon as I return for immediate radio transmission to commanders concerned. Our operations plans appear to be sound considering discussions and information received. Necessity for our being prepared promptly to occupy Tunisia with airborne units confirmed abundantly. Anticipate that the bulk of thE.. French Army and air forces will offer little resistance whether Giraud assumes leadership in North Africa or not. I promised during conversation with M ast delivery of two thousand small arms with ammunition by submarine at earliest practicable date to vicinity of our landing. Also promised to furnish submarine to bring Giraud from France to North Africa. French insist this eubmarine must be American. Initial 16 �r0sistance by French Navy e.nd coast defenses indicated by naval information which also indicates that t his r e sistance will fall off rapidly as our forces land. Deta iled conferences continued throughout day until 1900 hours when local police int e rvened h2.ving bccomc · suspicious of increased activity in r endezvous nrea. This event brought conforonco to abrupt conclusion. '!hile Frenchmen fl ew in all directions our party hid in empty repeat empty wine colla r of tho house while an argument ensued with tho police. r;e made for woods near beach during lull in conve rsation with police. The ro we awaited favorable surf a nd conditions to permit us to reembark. One boat capsized and was damaged in our first effort to reembark and furth e r attempt was futile in view of high waves. Ren:12.ining in hiding we made 2.nothcr attempt to embark at 0430 on the 23rd. llfter two ha d c apsized at be ach all boats reached subma rine but one was brok en v,hilo boarding subma rine. Except for brief surf acing to send me ssage to Gibraltar r an submerged during daylight hours of 23rd. ·;ith conditions ideal for the transfer to flying boat available morning 24th Gibraltar was a ske d to dispe,tch Catalina to rendezvous with us at sea to expedite r eturn. 1::n1 inform you time and place of arrival in UK. ENDS. Gibraltar offered us a number of pl easures, not the least of them hot baths and the opportunity to bo a little smug with the admiral who had taken such 2, di m vi cvJ of our mission. I had a conference vvith th o British about send ing 2,000 small arms to Gen eral Iviast by subnarinc near our own r endezvous point. " Our B-17 1 s took off for Engl2.nd bt e on the nie;ht of the 24th. On a rrivo.l a ft,cr a rou£h, cold trip, I went directly to Telegr aph Cottage, General Ike I s country plac e , ,-,he re he ,md Bodell Sr.1ith were waiting for me. I gave then a complet e E'.ccount of th o aff a ir. Ike was delighted and phoned the Prine }= inister to tell him tha t I ,-:as ba ck. He asked us both for supper that night. The othe rs wore in London Getting det2ilod messages moving to implement ,v hat vie had lea rned in ilfrica. Generals P2.tton, i,nderson, Fr cdcnclall and Ryder, the field commanders of v.?.rious p2rts of TORCH, wore given det ;-, ilo cl date, as it might affect t h eir units. It v,2.s reassuring to then to knot'! 1/IJe had corroborc1.t ed m uch of our own original int elligenc e v10rk. Th e Prime t:inister 1'JaS bubbling ove r rr ith enthusiasm. 2.s he, Ike a nd I t 2.lked t h ings ov e r 2t a little t able. He made it cle2r that he would have loved t o hc? vc Jll.e,dc such a trip h imself. "' fcvr cl2ys l a ter I wa s summoned to BuckinghEm P2.la ce v;h cre King Ge orge 1 v1cmtcd to t.?,lk v1ith r;i__ c 2bout the trip. Th e d2.te was for 11:30 ;,,M and General Eisenhower was VJ ith me, as the King n.?,nt cd t o bid him goodb7 c before we took off fo r IJorth idric2. via Gibr2,ltar. My pants had already begun to m2.ko history , for the King I s secretary 11hcn introduced to me s2.id, 11 1 know 2.11 about you. You'r e th e one ,,ho mad e the fr bulous trip; didn 1 t y ou get strauL :vd on the beach without y our pants? 11 17 • �We walked down·a long, cold hall. The Palace was even more chilly than most English houses, apparently for fuel conservation reasons. Tho King was waiting for us in a huge room.from which all the chandeliers and pictures had been removed because of bomb damage. King George shook hands and immediately plunged into a discussion of TORCH. He had heard all about my trip and said, "I thoroughly enjoyed tho statement in your cable that you had been forced to hide in an I empty repeat empty wi:.1.a cellar'". Vve talked for 40 minutes, disd.us sing Giraud at some length. The King said, 11 Uo one trusts Darlan 11 • He recc.lled meeting the French Admiral at a luncheon and s2.id he clearly remembered 11 Darlan' s shifty cyes 11 • I was most favorably impressed by King George's grasp of the military picture and the up-to-dateness of his information. I felt he was rather moved when ho finally bade us goodbye and said to each of us in turn, "goodbye, and God speed". T".'hat then remained was to convert the detailed information obtained on this story-book trip into detailed plans and to make it pay off. Hithout exception the data the French gave us turned out to be accurate. Their confidence in us was, I am sure, strengthened by our being able so quickly to come through, ,not only with information, but elso with a far greater opera- · tion than even they had hoped for. From tho American anc1. British viewpoints our few days of tough travelling~ our anxiety when the police raided the rendezvous house, our cold vwt vigil on the 1.frican bee.ch paid off in spectacular terms of lives saved. 1"e·wore much surer of whore v1e were going in North J,frica and how to get there, as well as of how much or little French opposition we would meet and where we would · meet it. There arc a lot of Lmeric2,n and B·citish boys back home with their families too.ay instcc1.d of being buried in North J,frica as a result of General East l'.nd his group of pc1.triots meeting with us at Chorchcl. 18 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Submarine Safari by Mark W. Clark Subject The topic of the resource Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina World War II Operation Torch, 1942 Description An account of the resource An account of the covert mission to North Africa during WWII, known as Operation Flagpole. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived AF Seraph Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1628 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/0055ba5fcd408201773966fb5740eeec.pdf?Expires=1773878400&Signature=Vc3pR%7E2HLUYUJ5xNSR5uv-0DMTlaVZlH8AKtRZWkE1BYfzO9AwSnDIUen4-wb2fz8lzjxtJCZRjxb3vmxYVov%7Eho%7Ea2cbJbZ1dr7BizsCepDXRa6oF2fo8bk22QpILICBfGYExM-dfbVGRCpczkJaR8Fh4p1i4ZdLKIb3dfPe8lkPm%7EhAjSgargNz0WQn2S5QXUXh98U4xPBZTJlkqm1J9kLrXaK-RkHsS7HnxLHQHgg3tkEfXVJ6HE1wyjNhZMpZ5SXdmafMU5z1P176FF8y5hdRu-AwI762CIFkB1ZcsjtKpfl5Pu9HNUJCYlfQgs2SHYpU6dqc8n8PLcfkoP41A__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM d5a1a0daeb417c531e5471677f170f04 PDF Text Text THE CITADEL.~ ~ ARCHIVES AND MUSEUM Q,!~RY OF .'!!'.AR of UNITED STATES ~ GROUNDFORCES in ..TI!§ EUROPAN THEATER OF O E PERATIONS ~ ~ ·- ~ - �f.QREW.Q.!!D This is the story of the II Army Corps and its part in the estab li shment of a Europe an Theater of Operations by the United States Army and of the day-by-d ay development of plans to open a Second Front in Europe. , ✓ This is a Di ary of War, written daily without the considered weighing of what a particular entry might mean in future his- . tory. It ls being written while the tense ls present; not past. W hile it will lack the polish and terseness of post-war sUllilllarization, the crucible of these words will be the heat of Now, not the tempering of Then. It will deal primarily with the activity of United States Ground Forces in Europe--the Infantry, Artillery, Tank Battalions, Mechanized Cavalry and the diverse branche s of land troops under comm.and of Major General Mark Wayne Clark. This prel ude will sketch events that start ed millions of American troops st eaming across the Atlantic in somber grey transports to carry the fight to the enemy. It is a chronology that will show why the decision was made to concentrate the fight in the European theater, with American troo ps holding elsewhere unti l the greatest menace--Hitler and National Socialism--could b e eradicated. How was the decision to concentr ate on Germany and her European satellites reached? What were the plans made and t he conferences held? Why was the II Army Corps selected as the first task force to be s ent to Engl and? How did the invasion plans switch, first from one sector to another ? What were the hopes? The decisions? The results? These facts Ctln best be told in a day-by-day account of events. Not only physical events; but intellectual events. This is a Diary of War, written not only while it is being fought, but also while it is being p lanned. �3 ( ) When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 1942, war became global and the Unit ed States was faced with fighting on far-flun g fronts--Japan through out the Pacific, the East Indies, Australia, India, the Aleutian Isl ands and the seas between; Germany h ad to be fought in Europe, Af'rica, Russia, the Scandinavian countries, the Atlantic and wherever the United States and the other United Nations could come to gr i ps wit h her. 7, A man, fighting at le a st two adversaries, c onc entrates one until he has defe ated him. Then, the time comes to take of the s econd enemy . on care The United States, in the midst of expanding its army and navy and faced with the tremendous problem of supply, not only to its own fighting forces but also acting as the ars enal for Russia, Britain, Chi na and other nations resisting the Axis, had to decide wbich enemy was making the greatest threat to our future and the future of the wor ld. The decision, made in . W ashington, London, Moscow, and, in a lesser degree, in the c apitals of the other United Nations,came after tremendous political, military and diplomatic pressure . It involv ed cooperative decisions between such men as President Rooseve lt, Prime Minister Churchill, Josef Stalin, Generalissimo Chiang-Kai-Shek, Australian Prime Minister Curtin, Ambassadors Lord Halifax, Maxim Li tvinoff, John Winant, Hu Shih, and naval and military men like Admirals Leahy and King and General Marshall and Lord Mountbatten. The decision: Germany and her Eradicate Hitl er that threat ca s trated, turn, with her Alli e s, restoring ord er in the satellites first; . Japan second. and Nat i onal Socialism first. Then, with or made impotent, the United States could to the task of defeating the Japanese and South Pacific and Asia. Sufficient troops were sent to the Japan e se war zone to hold off Nippon ese expansion and to repel threatened inva s ion of Hawaii, Alaska and Australia. The next step, after this decision . wa s made in th e late spring of 194 2, was to start the flow of men and materiel to a spot where prep arations could be made for the Europe an Theater offensive. Speed was of the essence in the sunnner of 1942 because Russia, after pushing the Germans back durin g the preceding winter, was being subjected to terrific Nazi onslaught. Som t h ing had to e be done to relieve the Rus s ians. - 'bpen a Second Front," was the cry, with Russia and Great Britain lea ding the plea. Presid ent Roosevelt pledged that a second front would be opened in 1942. �J W h the decision it made, the next step was to pick the men to ex e cute pl ans. Conferences of titanic importance were held in Wa shington. !All the top-ranking men in the army were c all ed intO' .f,r the deliberations. ,{a..f •• •·' -t ,rt..~ /'t C CIJ,)l<.l:.._ While deliberation Eisenhower officials, reception tne decision on th e European c ~~ n was still under /1~ eneral Clark and ~ ·'Ce eral Dwight D. were dispatched to Engl and to co er with British do reconnaissance work and make preparations for the and training of .American troops in England. It was not until General Glark returned to Washington in early June from Engl and that he realized he was being considered for t he tremendous task of connnanding United States Ground Forces in Europe. He had participated in the command conferences, contributin g his ideas concerning the best man for the job. It was Lieutenant General Lesley J. Mc Nair, comm ande r of the Army Ground Forces and Gene ral elark 1 s commanding officer, who told him his name was among thos e at the to p . A fev1 days lat er, Gener al Marshall called General Cla rk and asked him to arrange an insp ect ion trip to Fort Benning, Camp Jack son and Fort Bra gg where General Marshal l wanted to show Lord Louis Mountbatten and Sir John Dill the state of training of the United States Army. General Clark, as th e officer administering that training as Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces, ac compan ied General Marsh all and his guest s on the air trip. Follo wing the review at Camp Jackson, General Marsh all and his guests went to Pine Needle Lodge , near Pinehurst, N.C. At dinner that night General Clark sat b eside General Marsha ll and, during the meal, the Army Chief of Staff tu rned to General Clark and told him : "We've just about made up our mind to put you in command of our European Ground Forces. It's not 100 percent d efinite yet, though! 11 Elat ed but sobered by th e trem endous re spo nsibilitie s of th e prop osed comm and, General Clark returned to Washingto n. On June 10, 1942, as the general was making preparations for an AirGround demonstration at Fort Benning, General M arshall call ed to tell the general, who, at 46, is one of the youngest Major Generals in the army, t hat the comm and was his! General Clark's planned trip to Fort Benning was cancelled immediately and that afternoon he began forming plans for the establishment of a re vised and enlarged II Army Corp s , wh ich, for the tim e being, was to be his command. Fram the Army Ground Forc e staff, the gene r al sel ected certain key officers. He ac canp anied Gene ral Ei senho wer , th e Euro pean Theater of Operations connnander, to the Wh ite House for a confe r ence wit h Pres id ent Roosevelt and Prime M inist er Churchill. President Roos ev elt out lined what he expected of them. Later, M Churc hill discussed r. the involve d problems confronting th em. �.s ) The d ays that foll9wed were full. Conference after conference; decisio n after decision, and, fina ·lly, on June 12, a trip to Jacksonville, Fla., to assume command of the II Ar.my Corps and confer with officers at Corps headquarters. Until he departed for London on Jun e 23 , General Cl a rk was occupied continually in conferenc e s wit h high army, n avy and gove rnment of f icial s . * * * �( 0 F W h_ R INDIANTOWN GAP, PA., J UNE 23, 1942--The advance echelon of the II Army Corps began gathering at this staging area tod ay to prep are for d eparture on foreign service as a task force. Other advance units are being staged at Fort Dix, N.J. Officers and men plucked from posts throughout the country arrive from morning until late evening. The majority is from Jacksonville, Fla., the old he adquarters of the II Army Corps. Other officers come from post s as far away as California, Kans as , Okla homa, Texas and Louisiana. Most of th e officers, with the exception of those in the Regul ar Army, do not know each other. They are a conglomerate lot, repres ent ing almost every branc h of s e rvice, every age and every rank up to full colonel. 0~ Stories concerning how offic ers of the Corps headquarters were assembled are fantastic. Many of the h igh-rankin g ones were telephoned personally by General Clark. Tak e th e case of Colonel Lec ount Slocum who will be co mm ing of ficer until and the headquarters of t he Corps r ea ch e s its overs e as destination: General Cl a rk put through a long dist ance c all to California where Colonel Slocum was stationed. The ge n eral told him he had a new command but that he couldn't discuss it. "Do you want to go overseas?" the gene ral want to go places or d o you want to push bells asked. "Do you and bu zze rs?" Colonel Slocum was eager to go as soon as possible. Jokingly, General Clark asked him if h e could c at ch a plane East that night. "No, s ir, 11 repli ed the Col onel, "but thin gs re ady to go by tomorro w morning!" "Fine," s aid the gen eral. ne ed sun tans or li ght clothin I d o think "And I can t e ll g ." I could you that have you won't General Clark put through calls to po sts throu ghou t th e country, picking h is key men car efully. When word got around that the general was undertaking a n ew comm and, dozen s of officers phoned or went to him imd asked for a chance to b e un de r him. Here at Indiantown Gap M ilitary Rese rv a ti on officers are quartered in long, wood en barrack s buildings--colonels and li euten ant Colonels in on ~, majors in another, c aptains in a thi rd , and li eutenants in a • fourth. Headqu arters company and the 202nd » Milita ry Police ccrnpany are quartered in t he same section-- Area . ,c~ /.I<,.. s { •'' ~· �7 ) Number 1 of the Indianto wn Gap Reservation. By nightfa ll there are over 100 officers in c amp and everyon e is be ginning to specul ate about where they are go in g , what their mission is going to be and why such a large staff is needed . * * WASHNGTON JUNE 23, 1942 --G eneral *Eis enho we r and Gener al I , Clark, the two men who will plan and l ead the op ening of the Second Fr ont in Europe, depart fr om Bollin g Fi e l d at 9:05 A M for London. The genera ls, flying i n a converted commercial airliner, are accompanied by Colon e l Craig, G-3 for th e European Theater of Qperati ons , whi ch Gener a l Eis enhower wi ll he ad; Cap t a in Lee , General Ei senhower's aid e , and the f ollo win g high -r anking officers of the II Army Corps which will be und e r the colllilland of Gen e ral Clark : Colonel L. W. Rooks, Chi ef of St aff ; Col onel C.L. Adcock, G-4; Colon el C. B. Ferenbau gh, G-3; and Majo r R. A, Hewitt , Sec r etary of the General staf f. The ninth pass enge r i s Staff Sergeant M. Mc Keough. The London-bound party is bid goodbye by General Mc Nair, General Brown , Colonel Pa r ks, Colon e l Christensen and other officers of th e Army Grou nd Force staff of which Genera l Clark h a s bee n Chief of Staff. M s. 9l arlc is also present r at the t akeoff . The plane f lys non-stop to Gande r Lake, Newf ound l and , a major point of de part u re for trans-Atlantic fli ghts t o the Un ited Kingdom. The par ty i s met b y the commanding officer of the field and taken to th e Officers• Club for dinner. At 11:10 PM (GM T), the plane departs from Gander Lak e . Throughout the ni ght the flight is at about 6 1 000 f ee~, over a l ow cloudbank. Nothing is si ghtea • ..ne plane is a sleeper· - ty pe and soon the pass enge r s fall asleep to the stead y droning of the motors. * * INDI AN WN GAP, PA., JUNE 24, 1942--Th e flo w of off icer s and TO men into the sta g ing area continues and t hose men who ha ve their qua rters and orders s t raightened out b egin draw i ng equi pment to f i ll the i r shortages and obtain speci al ite ms needed by a t ask force. Many off i ce rs spend most of the day wi t h th e Financ e or Adjutant General sections , arr ang i ng for pay a ll otments , war bond purc hases , lif e insur ance , will s , powers of attorney and sim il ar matters that should be c l ea red before embarkation. The barrac k s bu il d i ngs in Area 1 ar e filling ing mess we have close to 140 officers . up and by even - ENROUTETO LONDON AIR, JUl-lE 24, 1942- -Th e party arri ves BY at Pre~ ic k , Scot l and , at 11:30 AM (GMT). An hour out of Pr esw ic k it flys over a convoy that i s proceeding, on a zig-zag cour se , in columns . It has th e protection of n aval v esse ls. The plane �A SECRET ) flys into Pre$ick at an altitude of 1, 500 feet and officers observe hutment and troop camps in both Ayr and Pres wick. can Aft er lunching at Pres1vick while the plane is gassed and servic ed, the party picks up a Poli sh pilot-guide and several additional passengers for the flight into London. The departure is at 1:30 GMTand the flight is dovm the Irish Sea and over the Midlands. The ge nerals' party arrives at Northolt Airport at 3 :45 PM to be greeted by Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chi e f of British Combined Command Operations; Major General C.H. Lee, h ead of the U.S. Service of Supp ly in England, and other staff officers of he adquarters, European Theater of Operations (ETOUSA) The pa rty . is taken to the Clari dge Hotel for quartering. * * * INDI ANTOV/N GAP, PA., JUNE 25, 194 2--The news is published tod ay that General Eisenhower has been named comm ander of the European Theater of Operations. Ther e is speculation concerning the opening of a second front to reli eve the Russians. Noth in g is said about General Clark being named corrnnander of the II Army Corps as it must be kept secret as y et. That General Clark will command us is connnon kno wled ge among officers at this staging ar ea . - Drawing of overseas equipment begins in earnest . Officers without pistols are issued Colt .4 5s , 21 rounds of ammunition csr.t~idge clips. They are re-instructed on how to disassemble reassemble the weapon. The equipment of al l any clothin g tha t is the tossed in a salvage heap. first class shape because kinds of conditions. enl isted men is least bit frayed Enl i sted men's it may be used checked or that equipm ent for a lon and and by officers and is too small is must be in g time under al l All enlisted men and practica ll y all officers ordered to this sta ging area h ave report ed. We have about 165 officers now, so many t ha t we have to have double mess s it tings. Headquarte r s of the II Anny Corps will be und er command of Col onel Slocum, Deputy Chi ef of Staff, until we get across. General Clark has gone over by plane with the heads of h is G sections. The news about General Eise nhower said he was alre ad y in London so we presume our Gener al is there too . * * * LOND ON, JUNE 25, 1942--Generals Clark and Eisenho wer spend the morning confer rin g on pl ans for the qu arte ring and training of the II Army Corps, advance unit s of which will soon be leaving the United States. Later, the conference is expanded to include Admira l Stark, commander in chief of U.S. Naval Forces in the European Theater of Operati ons, and General Carl Spaatz, comma nder of the Eigh'lh Air Force (US). The question of an air suppor t comm and for the II Anny Corps �9 ) is discussed with General Spaatz and it is agreed that the Corps should have its own air sup p ort connnand as part of its he ad quarters. Col one l Barker, head of ETOUSAplans and training, discusses with Gene ral Clark future plans for the Army Corps. The General is design a ted to he ad all Army Ground Forces in the European Theater. In the evening General Clark attends a dinner given by Lord Mountbatte n and discusses with him the problems and advantages of combi~ed operations. Follo wing the dinner, the comm ander of the Madagascar expedition gives a lecture detailing the qu ick-breaking and difficult operation. * * INDIANTOWN GAP, PA. , JUNE 26, 1942-- More equ ipm ent is issued today to ge t us ready for debarkation. It inc ludes new-type gas masks, musette bags, canteens, mess kits, compasses, field ~las ·ses, first aid pouches, etc. In addition to the governmen t issue~ officers swamp the post exchanges and quartermaster depots, buying woolen underwear, O.D. shirts, G.I. shoes, lighter fluid, heavy clothing and other articles. We have drawn heavy winter caps and Arctics ( overshoes) . * * ..X· LONDON,JUNE 26, 1942--Officers of ETOUSA and the II Army Corps hold sectional staff conf'.erences. The gener al plan for use of the qorps is outlined to General Clark's staff by Colonel Barker. At an afternoon conference, pl ans for amphibious trainin g in the United Kingdom are discussed and Major Billin gslea tells how amphibious tr a ining is carried on in the British Army. The reception of all advance elements of the II Army Corps is discussed and tentative p lan s are made for their arrival, transportation to temporary areas, and permanent quartering. * * INDIANTO N GAP, PA., JUNE 27, 1942--The quartermasters W are doing a l and office business, hauling truckloa ds of equipment for issu e . Today enlisted men fill in shortages found in their equ i p ment w en it was checked Thursday. h Everyone i s i ss ued a new-type ste e l helmet. Officers draw bed roll s and shelter halves. Pistols are checked and any gun with the sli ghtest fault is called in for repair. foot port will l ., Q uartennasters work until well after midnight stenci lin g lockers and b e d rolls so the y can be t aken tomorrow to the of embarkation. We do not know yet the port from which we sail. we are having one or two officers meetings daily in the mess hall so Colonel Slocum can make spec ial announcem ents or so we can fill out A, G, forms. All officers and men having identification ?::\,lo~.,,. ... .. . ...,."" • t ' /' �10 CJ cards showing regimental numbers or having stamps are ordered to get new ones . Corps or Division * * LONDON JUNE 27, 194 2--The entir e * , staff departs from London headquarters at 9:20 AM to ma ke a reconnaissance of th e Salisbury Plain area, approximately 80 miles southwest of Lond on. The prime purpose of the trip is to l oc ate a command post for the I I Army Corps and to survey the general area where t he Army Corps will be located. Genera l Clark's party arri v es at Britis h headquarters in the Salisbury area about 12 : 30 PM lunc hes wit h members of the British , staff and t hen vi s it s headquarters of the Brit ish V Cor ps . Tenta tive p l ans are made for locatio n of the II Army Corps at Lon gford Castle, about three miles south so uth eas t of Salis bury. Other faciliti es in the c astle area are t empora rily earmarked as quarters for the entire hea:l.quarters. Following c onfe rences with the Britis h , the full staff returns to London, arri vi ng about 7 PM . •)} * * I NDIANTON GAP, PA., JUNE 28 , 1942--The medics have been doing W yoeman work since our arrival here . Eve ry officer and man must be immunized against typhoid, tetanus, yellow fever , typhus and smallpox . The dispensary is crowded fro m morning until night as men wait for their innoculations. The 11"'l ert 11 call is expec ted momentarily so most of the officers and men are takin g advantage of every minut e to be with their famil i e s or e l se make last-minute purchase of items they believe will be sc arce in Engl and. * * * LONDON, JUNE 28 , 1942-- M orning conferences are held to dis cuss yesterday's trip to Salisbury. Tentativ e p.lans a.ce ap 1Jroved for the h ous in g of el ements of the command. General Clark, Colon e l Fe r enbaugh and Colonel Rooks depart on the e v enin g tr a in from London to mak e r econnais sance of the Pl ymouth a re a for su itabl e training f a cilit i es . * * INDIANTO N GAP, PA., JUNE 29, 194 2-- Headqua rt ers of t he II W Army Corps i s ord er ed on the " alert" at 12 :06 PM. We are seeing films on gas war fare and list en ing to a l ectu r e by Colonel Hurns , chemic a l warf ar e officer, when a ll MPs are orqered out . W hen we return to Area 1 from the post theater the " alert " notice is up and the MPs are in a cordon around the camp . ( There are hasty goodbyes between officers and wives who accompanied them here . Then the area is c l eared and no man c an go out side without a writt en permi t from Col onel Slocum . The en tir e atmosphere h a s changed and everything i s sudden l y v e ry �!I ) businesslike and military. Nothing is said about when we will leave for the port of embarkation but we all figure the order should come within the next 24 hours . Strict orders ar e is sued concerning our actions. No one can write, telegraph or t e l ephone . W hen we board the train, a guard will be placed at each end of each car. Windows must remain closed and no papers can be thrown from them. There ·is to be no shouting, s in ging or waving and no signs can b e p.rinted · ~n , the cars. Orders are issued that no liquor c an be tak en aboard the troop transports. At midnight the financ e office is opened and those desiring their June pay collect it. Packing of persona l luggage and musette bags lasts l ate into t he night. * ,,, ~~ PLYMOUTH,ENGLAND, JUNE 29 , 1942- - General Clark, Col onel Rooks and Colonel Ferenbaugh arrive at Plymouth with members of the headquarters, SOS. The group sp e nds the d ay visitin g various service install ations in the area. The general and his party leave Plymou th late by automobile, arriving in Lond on about mid night. Colon e l Adcock, Colonel Ramsey and Major Hewitt, accompanied by Colonel Williruns of the Air Support Comm and, make a detaile d reconnai s s ance of the various proposed troo p in st allations in t he Salisbury area. This pa rt y remai ns overnight at Salisbury. * * * INDIANTOWN .AP PA . , JUNE 30, 1942--Mter G , arising at 5 : 30 and checking in blankets and equipment issued for us e at Ind i an town Gap, we bre ak fast, receive two cold lunches and pull away from c amp in trucks at 7:45. We are driven to a nearby railroad siding where we board a 12-coack Reading Railroad train. At 3:30 PM, after a back - route trip throu gh Pennsylvania and New Jers ey , we arrive at Jersey City and take a ferry to the Brooklyn Port of Embarkation. A lot of interest is evidenced by civili ans as they steel - he~neted , full-packe d troops on the special ferry . When we pull into the port we can count seven transports, all a dull srey color, at the piers. Troo p s are already aboard al l the ships. They crowd the r a ils in solid b:anks. All officers and men w were staged at Indianto wn Gap board ho the s . s . Monterey, formerl y a South Pacific luxur y lin er . Officers are bunked four to six men to a stat e r oom and enlis t ed men are quartered in staterocms, loun ges and on the prom enade deck--every single foot of space seems to be occupied. The ship is teeming with men. From the boat deck of the Monterey we can s ee only one transport that is docked at the opposite pier. It is the Sibonet and she too i s lo aded to the rails with troo ps . l I * * * ..,- �) -- LONDON, JUNE 30, 1942--Conf e rences rel ative to SOS install ations p l anned for t he Plymouth Area are f!eld during the morning by Gener a l Cl ark and Colonels Rooks and Fer en b au gh . General Eisenhowe r and General Clark depart in t he evening for a d i scussion of combin ed ope ra tions wi th Lord M ountbatten. After completin g the more thorough reco nna iss ance of the Sa li s bury Plain district, Col one l Adcock, Colonel Ramsey and Major Hewitt return , to London . * * * ABOARD THE MONTEREY JULY 1, 194 2--At 2 AM of f icers , awake the enlis ted men and check to see if they h ave life belts. Those who haven ' t are i ssued th em on the bo a t deck. It takes two hours to complete th e deta il and by th a t tim e the hatch covers of the Monterey are bein g battened down. The heterogeneous car go --fr om trucks to foot l ockers to f ood -- has been loaded. We pull away frOlll the pier at 4:1 8 AM and head out to sea . Few expec t ed to ge t underway so quickly. The other trans p orts steam out ahead and behind us. When it b ecomes light we are out of sight of shore . The con voy is a marvelous s i gh t! Seven big, grey troops hips moving along wi th a battleship , a cruiser and 20 destroyers for an escort . The troopships are so close tog e th er you can see the men, al l wear i ng lifebelts, lining the rails. Every foot of the decks seems to be covered with khaki -c lad men . ov erhe ad , cruisin g leisurely around the convoy, are two blimps. Sometimes they pass so c lo se we can see the men in the gondo l as . Land based navy planes come and go . The Monte r ey is the l ead starboard f la nk of the fr ont the battlesh i p Texas and the s econd line, about a qua rter p ort s Argent ina (US) , Duchess (British) . In the third line and a t wo-stacker (Dutch). troop transport, running on the line which is made up of our ship, li gh t cruiser Philadelphia. I n the of a mile behind us, are the tr ans of Bedford (British) and Barry i s the Sibonet (US), Maloja (British) · * JULY 1,* 1942 --G eneral Clar k and Gener a l * NORTH ERN IRELA ND, Eisenhower are joined at Pre!ffeick , Scotland, by Colonel Rooks and Colonel Ferenbaugh . The party proceeds b y plane to United States Anny bases in Northern I reland . The group spends the day inspecting troo ps and installations of our V Anny Corps. Americ an and Bri tish tro op s have split into two groups and are go ing through a joint exerc i se . ~eneral ~lark observes th a t U. S. troo ps look fat and pudgy while the Britishers are hard and lean, He dec i des that our ground forces -- those already here and those to come-- must have gruelling training to fit them better for battle . American troops p articipating in today's exercise consist primarily of the 34th Division and the First Armored Divisio n . * * /,, � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, June 23-30, 1942 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from June 23-30, 1942. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1942 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Language A language of the resource English Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/554 Date Valid Date (often a range) of validity of a resource. 1940-1949 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/6e1b58a4d966ecb1883dea2782d50647.pdf?Expires=1773878400&Signature=ZZWihuC%7EHPta2OOjmpujLkxZQzHJTMyEuB5kWaYXX-Xq3dRJVIweOHdO9WBXJm8BgbjP4pKsGLAzdRaevoXx9WveLAvn55wS6QAFimJGRW78wjXGP4cr3fPvhXVs0B8E5p2mVL63NJ%7EVm67iTrIq85MpLeRTxOMxD4Ck9z%7EqNfL5iIVaLbhis4JefT4IwaSKSOByayo14vxGeZhnFvUN5wK4O5OkEQ1vhJiSk-evBCTQTFP2xJooiNynzgUbrk3PKTcrKbx27IL13T0xcMynxvczBt8G4MlH81Fz5J39cIfi8eC7UilVD9y1PzPqkBaW8ZqyuZvEcmdFfYL49-0k7g__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM a506896a4527c294408e6df615de561a PDF Text Text I ;2_ THE CITADEL. ARCHIVES AND MUSEUM ) LONDON, JUNE 30, 1942--Conferences rel ative to SOS installations planned for th e Plymouth Area are }aeld during the mornin g by General Cl ark and Colonels Rooks and Ferenb augh. General Eisenhower and Gener al Clark depart in the evening for a discussion of combined ope ra tions with Lord M ountbatten. After completin g th e more thorough reco nna iss ance of the Salisbury Plain district, Colon e l Adcock, Col one l Ramsey and Major Hewitt return , to London . * * * ABOARD THE MONTEEY, JULY 1, 1942--At 2 AM of f icers R awake th e enlisted men and check to see lf they have life belts. Those who haven't are i ss ued th em on the oo at deck. It takes two hours to complete the detail and by th a t time the hatch covers of the M onterey are being battened down . The heterogeneous car go --from trucks to foot lockers to f ood--h as been loaded. W pull away from the pier at 4:1 8 AM and head out to sea. e Few expected to get underway so quickly. The other transports steam out ahead and behind us. When it becomes light we are out of sight of shore . The convoy is a mar velous sight! Seven big, grey troops h i ps moving along wi th a battleship, a cruiser and 20 destroyers for an escort. The troopships are so close tog ether you can see t he men , all wearing lifeb el ts, lining the rails. Every foot of the decks seems to be covered with khaki-clad men . Overh ead , cruising l eis urely around the convoy, · are t wo blimps. Sometimes they .pass so close we can see the men in the gondolas. Land based navy planes come and go. The Monterey is the lead starboard flank of the front the battleship Texas and the second line, about a qu arter ports Argentina (US), Duchess (British). In the third line and a t wo-stacker (Dutch). troop tran sp ort, ranning on the line which is made up of our ship, light cruiser Philadelphia. In the of a mile behind us, are the tr ansof Bedford (British) and Barry is t he Sibonet (US ), Maloja (British) · / * * * NORTHERN IRELA , JULY 1, 1942--G en era l Clark and General ND Eisenhower are joined at Pre~ ,ffe ick, Scotl and, by Colonel Rooks and Colonel Ferenbaugh. The party proceeds b y pl ane to United States Army bases in Northern Ireland. The group spends th e d ay inspectin g troo p s and in stal l a ti ons of our V Army Corps. Americ an and British tro ops have split into t wo groups and are go in g through a joint exercise. qeneral ~l ark observes th a t U.S. troo ps look fat and pudgy while t he Britishers are hard and lean. He de cid es that our ground forces--those already here and t hose to come--mu st have gruelling tr a ining to fit them better for battle. American troops participating in today's exercise consist primarily of the 34th Division and the First Armored Division. * * -1/' �13 ) Colonel Adcock, Colonel Ramsey and Major Hewitt complete their study of all installations in the Salisbury are a and sub mit reconnnendaticns for the housing of officers and men of the headquarters of the I I Army Corps. * SOMEHERE IN THE ATLANT W IC, JULY 2, 1942--The Monterey , 19,500 gross tons and the largest transport in the convoy, has 5,810 officers and men aboard. In peacetime her full passenger list was 750. There are so many troo p s aboard that there a r e only two messes a day. Enlisted men eat in the ma in dining room and their mess lines ser p entine al l around t he ship's companionw ays. Officers eat in the cabin class dining room, having three sit t ings per mea l. Counting the c r ew and nav al gunners we have over 6, 000 men on board _ The other troop tr an sports . look equally crowded. The convoy commander is Captain J.J . London of the U. S. Navy . This is the Mont erey 1 s first trip in the At l antic . She has already made two conv oy trips to Aust r a lia. W are foll owing e various type zig - zag cours e s, th e entire convoy shifting simul t aneously by synchronized watches. ' ( Captain London exp l ains that the Tex a s is VIith us to protect the transports ag ainst possible Axis raiders. The Philadelphia is assigned primarily to protect th e Texas . Our escort all the way will consist of 22 warships . The blimps l eav e us i n la te afternoon . In case we need any aeri a l scouting done , th e Texas has two pl anes and the Phil adelphia four. From the bridge you c an se e we are s a iling i n the middle of a circl e of destroyers. They rim us completely. The ship's newsp aper starts coming out today but it can carry no dates or marks of i dentification . Nothi ng is to be thrown over the side of t he ship. * * * Colonel Rooks and LO NDON JULY 2, 1942--General , Clark, Colonel Ferenbaugh ar r ive a t 12 : 30 PM by pl ane f r om Nor th Ir eland . The ent i re afternoon is spen t in confer ences with the staff dis cussing plans and problems r e lative to housing units of the Corps he adquar te rs. Anti-airc r aft protection in the vicinity of Cor p s he ad qu a rters i s discu s sed by General Cl a rk and Colonel Bradsh aw, anti - aircraf t offic e r of ETOUSA. They decide to sup p lem ent existing heavy gun defenses in th e Salisbury -C astle area by moving in additional units of Brit i sh ant i- aircraft for increa s ed protection. * * * SOMEHERE I N THE AT NTIC, JULY 3, 1942 --All d ay we move W LA thr ough a pe a- soup fog. None of the other ships in the convoy c an be seen but we hear th eir whistles ev e ry two or thr ee minutes. Few men are on decks since it is cold and clammy with a wispy fog making every thi ng drip . The captain tells u s we are some where off the coast of Nova Scotia . �Iti Just at dusk the fo g lifts briefly and we c an see the en tire convoy. The ves sels are moving a lon g in perfect fo rmat i on, as though t hey h ad hawsers from st e rn to bow . The Philadelphia sends up two scouting plan es . Of the 5 , 810 troops we h ave aboa rd, nine are women--nurses who will be i n the I I Army Cor ps stati ~n ho s pital . * , SALISBURY, ENGLAND JULY* 3, 194 2-- * The entire staff leaves Lond on at 9:00 AM proceeding , to Sa lis bu ry so General Cl ark c an inspect, on the ground, the r ec onnne~dations made conc e rni ng quar tering sites for headquarters of the II Army Cor ps . Gen era l Cl ark app r oves th e reco mmendations made by Colonel Adcock and the SOS is directed to make every effort to improv e existing b ath in g and l a trine fa cilities. The en tir e s t aff rem ains overni ght in Sa lis bury . * * * SOMEHERE I N THE ATL TIC, JULY 4, 1942- -I t is still W AN so fog gy th at you can't s ee 100 fe et . Sh ip l i fe h as settled do w to n rou t ine wit h mess lin es functioning smoot hly unde r of f ice r chec ker s . 11 Each aftern oon we h ave "abandon ship" and "attac k stati on drills . Offic ers and men go to their stations in full e quipm ent, inclu ding stee l helmets, pistol and ammunition, cant eens , lif e belts and gloves (for sliding down rop es i n c ase we h av e to ab an don ship ) . Enl i s ted men go on the promenade deck , from whi ch they would l oad into lifebo ats . The Monterey has ei ght an ti-aircraft guns --. 60 caliber machine guns, water cooled , manned by Mat so n Line personnel. Ther e are two on the stern, Four amidships and two on the bow. our ship a lso h a s four thr ee -in ch gun s, t wo on t he ste rn and t wo in the bow, and a four-inch gun on the stern. * * . * SALISBURY, JULY 4, 194 2- -Th e st aff continues reconnaissance of addi t iona l installations and proposed s ites in the Sa lisbury area . Gener al Clark and Colonel Rooks r e turn to Londo n shortly before n oon a nd hold conferences with ETOUS and British A off icers regardin g improv emen t of all in s tallati ons i n th e area the II Army Cor ps will oc cupy . The r emai nd e r of the staff continu es a det a iled reco nna iss ance of the Salisbury area in sear ch of add i t i ona l housin g . This g r oup returns to London i n th e l ate afternoon. * * SOMEWHERE N THE ATLANTIC, JULY 5, 1942 -- The fo g continues I and it i s reported th at we are going in a hu ge circl e , waitin g for it to c lear so th e destr oye rs can g o into Hali f ax an d "to p off" - - that i s , r eplen i sh th e ir fue l su pp ly so th ey will h ave suff ic ien t in c a se we ge t into a fi gh t . �15 c) Sunday on shipboard is ju s t like any other day except that there are Catholic and Protestant services on the boat de ck . There is little for the enlisted men to do but sleep and rel ax. Everyone i s wondering what port we are going into and tod ay Cap t ain London tells some of the officers that we are due to arrive in Glasgow, Scotland , a week from today which will be July 12. * * *are pushed for the disLONDO, JULY 5, 1942 -- Preparations N positi on of troo p s when they arrive in the British I sles. The main task is to prepare f or their staging in the Salisbury area. A second group of I I Army Corps off i cers arrive from the United Stat es by pl ane. I t inc l udes Colone l C. L . Bertholf, Adjutant Gen eral; Colonel E. B. Howard ; Colonel Francis Markoe , G-1; Major Dan Gilmer, Deputy Chief of Staff; Colonel T. E . Lewis, Artillery Officer, and Lieutenant A. G. Barker, one of General ~lark's aides. They reach London about 6:00 PM . General Clark and General Eisenhower go to Checkers overnight visit with Pri me -Minister Chur chill. for an * is t he ancestral estate CHECKERS, ENG * , JULY * 1942--This LAND 5, of Prime Minister W inston Churchill and when Ge neral Eisenho wer ard Gener a l Clark arrive for their overnight visit the pudgy, affable leader of t he British bounces out to mee t them. He is entirely informal, wearing carpet sli ppe rs and a bag gy smock. The Prime Minister tak es the two American generals dovm a winding path throu gh the woods and the three men sit on a s e cluded bench to talk about the British-Am eric an war effort. Mr. Churchill is in favor of executing GYMNAST,the name for the operation cal l ing for inva sion of the Afric an coast and the t aking of Northwest Africa, as soon as possible. His arguments sho w the cor elation of thought between President Roosev e lt and the British leader since our president favors the same operation. M r. Church i ll believes a Europe an invasion is t oo hazardous at the present time. Bot h Generals Clark and Eisenhower are n on-cOllllnital bec ause they f eel GYMN will detract A ST fro m what they c onside r a qu icker, more direct operat i on- -SL EDGEHAM M ER, the name of the proposed 1942 European inv a sion opeEation , and ROUNDUP,n ame for the largescale Europe an operation in 1943. This would carry the war direct to the Eu rope an continent. Following the talk in the woods, the Prime Minister and two generals go to the old but beautifully decorated house. The Pri me Mini ster , even for cocktails and d.inner , nev e r ch anges out of the smock and bedroom slippers. Other guests at the dinner include Mrs. Churchill and Mrs. Portal, wi fe of the head of the British Air Comma nd. The group di scusses frankly throughout the dinner all secret war plans. The Prime Minister t e ll s the Americ an generals not to wor r y because "my wif e and Mrs. Portal know everytl!ling. " �I (i I / During the d i nner the Prime Minister tells how he went walk i ng alone that afternoon . He met , du ring his strol l, an Eng l ishm an, his wi f e and thei r t h ree ch i ldren . He chatted with the c ouple and final l y aske d them if these three represented a ll their children. The man replied the y did o "Well," the prime minister says , grinn i ng , "I t hink you should have frur . Get busy on that right away!" M . Churchill r chuckles as he fin i shes the story . Af t er dinner the Prime Min i ster A the generals nd go to Mr. Churchill's itudy wher e th e y converse animatedly over a globe and read reports coming in to the Prime Minister. The big news c oncerns movement of a 33 ship convoy to Archange l, Rus s ia , Mr. Churchill i s e l ated when the repo r t comes in that the GermRn battleship Von Tirp it z has been hit by torpedoes fran a Russian submarine . He says he must h ave some good news t o report to h i s people . Later, the r eport on the Von Tir p itz turns out to be false. The Prime Minister tells Generals Cla r k and Eisenhower how t his convoy represents the f i rst r eal attempt to move supp l ies th r ough to Russ i a. Murmansk vir tu ally has been bombed out of exis t e nce. The convoy is accompan i ed almost halfway fro m Eng l and to Arch angel by the entire home f l eet. Because the German fleet is concentrated on the northern co ast of Norway and land - based bombers can attack the convoy, i t · must go on by itself, accompanied only b y des t royers , submar i nes and armed trawlers. ( Only four of t hese 33 ships finally re A Archan gel ) . ch News from the African front isn' t too ~romising as the Pr i me Min ister and the generals discuss war plans, study the globe and read incomin g r ep orts . Romm l is pummeling his way forward into e Egypt . Lat er, the Prime Minis ter and Mrs . Chur ch i l l, t he ir guests , mem bers of the Prime Minister ' s staff A househo l d servants nd attend motion p ictures in the mansion . General Cla rk s it s with Mrs , Chur c hill and Gene ral Eisenho wer is with the Prime M inister, Af t er the show, M . Churchill r introduc es h is staff, made up mostly of officers of the Coldstream Guards , to the two generals . They ta l k abo ut military affairs and the Prime Min ister trots out and returns with the rifl e he used i n the Boer War, Chuck lin g , he goes through a snappy drill with it . After the officers have gone, Mr . Churchill, General Cl a rk and Genera l Eisenhower sit up un t il 3 AM discussing war pl ans . As t hey ta l k about va rious p l ans the Prime Minister v1 ill say : "Have you s een my paper on that?" And he sends f or papers embody ing his p articular ideas on a certain operation. Mr. Churchill is sold on the idea of executing G YMN . He f e els t ha t the British AST Am eric an invas io n can ' t be made against the heavily - fortified and quite heavily-held Frenc h coast , He t hinks something must be done soon to divert German troo p s fro m the hard - press ed Russian fro n t, ......_ · ·- �4llllillliilili ': ~ The two Americ an generals r e tir e at 3 AM and General Clark, reading a book at his bedside whic h t ells about famous p e opl e , including Cromwell , wh o slept in his particular bed, finds it hard to get to sl eep in the p r esence of so much h i st ory. Checkers w ic h is about an ho ur's drive .Bouthwest fro m London , is approxh imately 1, 000 years old •. , After breakf a st , Gene rals Clark and Eisenhower i nsp e ct the Checke rs guard and as the t wo Ameri can officers are going down the lin e , the Prime Min ister, still i n ni ght cl oth es , sticks his head out of a b ed r oom window and hollers: " Ain't t h ey a fine body of men-I" "Ai n't" Churchill ' s fav or ite words. Ge neral 10 : 00 AM . Eis enhower * i s one of Mr . and Ge ner al Cl ark d epar t for * Lon don at * SO MEWHE IN THE ATLANTIC, JULY 6, 1942- - The convoy connnander RE has apparently deci ded to pass Ha li f ax and th e refu e lin g operation . Once aga in we are moving on zig - zag cou r s es a t 15 lmots. At 4: 00 PM we ar e past Cape Rac e and somewhere between Labrador and Newfoundland. La te in the afternoon we s ight small whales. Two of the seven troop tr ansports are no lo nger with us . They are th e Sibonet and the Dutch t wo- st acke r . The :; report edly g ot into Halifax . The Sib on e t wil l not accompany us to the British I sles . She is going to I cel and with speci al troops . The report is t ha t t wo de stroyers h ave dropped back t o convoy the t wo ship s that put into Ha lifax. The weather is cold--46 deg r ee s at 3 : 30 PM. Not many men go on decks . 1'he en li s t ed men ar e divided into two groups for the crossin g . on e group has the use of troop st ate r ooms from noon until midnight; the opp osit e from midnight un t i l n oon . W en one h group has the stateroom, the other has space, with some bunks , on A and B decks . * * * , ~LONDO, JULY 6, 1942 -- General Cl a rk and his staff N are occupied in preparing for reception of the advance ground forces now enroute to Greenock, Scotland, and Liv e rpool, Engl and, in the troop trans po rts . orient The group of Army Corps of f ic ers th at arrived ed by General Clar k as he outl i nes pl ans for yesterd ay are th e future . * SOME HERE I N THE ATLANT W IC, JULY 7 , 1942 -- The med ic s ar e doing t he ir innnunization work again . Enl isted men and officers keep a steady line go ing thr ough t he d i spensar y, form er l y the Monterey ' s writing room . �( Most of the tro ops aboard are engi n eer s. Highest r anking officer on the ~on t er ey is Colon e l Grandy of th e Engin:aers. We have n o combat troops , most of t h is adv ance ec hel on b e i ng supp ly and housekeeping tro ops , constru cti on u n its and some non - fl ying Air For ce personne l. A fe w combat troops were staged at Fort Dix and the report is that a battalion of inf ant r y from the First Divis i on is on ano t he r ship. When we were at In d i anto\m Gap, part of the First Div ision was in Are a 2, n ex t to us. The 16t h and 18t h I nfantry re gimen t s were out on pract i ce marches whil e we were at the sta gi ng area but they did not accompany us out or g o on the alert w hen we did. Officers ,,nd men , real izi ng where we are going to land, are spec ul ating on our t ask and guessing where we wi l l irnvade the c ontin ent . * LONDON JULY 7,* 1942 - - Actual establ * i shmen t of the II Army , Corps Cormn and Post and phys ic al prepa rat ion of troo p areas i n the Salisbury - Tidworth area is started tod ay . Colon e l s Adcock , Ramsey and Ferenbaugh depart for t he area t o sup ervis e work and make all arrangemen t s f or the arrival of troops . Orientation of the newly - arrived off i cers continues. I n the evening, Gene ral Cl ark h a s dinner wit h Aver ill Harriman , on e of President Roosevelt ' s key men on relations with ref ugee gove rn ment s in London and on Lend-Le a se matters with Gre a t Britain. ( * SOM EWHERE N THE ATLANTIC, JULY B, 1942 - -Articl es on English I .American money exchange and on how to id ent ify British army officers appea r in the sh i p I s pap e r today and now everyone knows for certai n that we are going some w here in the British I sles . After da il y fogs we can s ee most of th s till v ery co ld . The been n o sea sickness. rumors and speculatin will be our mi ss i on. since Ju l y 3 , it is p artly clear today and e conv oy ~ for an hour or so a t a time. It is se a is a little r oughe r but a s yet there has The favorite shipb oard pastime is exchanging g about where we are going to camp and wha t The re s eems t o be a gre a t desi re to get going . The quality of the food is excellent . The re are t wo post e xc hanges on board and they are doing a terrific business, pa rt icul ar l y in soap , cigar ette s and toil e t art i cles that the troops figure will be hard to obtain in rationed Eng l and . LONDON JULY 8 * , , concentrate t hr oughou p l ans for arrival of in g work is assigned ( * 1942- - All* officers, * fr an General Clark down , t the day and most of th e night prepa ring tro ops . Recepti on, transportation and quarter to the v arious sections. * * �19 I SOME HEREIN THE ATLANTIC, JULY 9 , 1942 -- The c onvoy has W stepped up its p a ce since we have left the t wo slowest boats benind. W churn alon g a t 17 knots. e It is getting warmer but you sti l l need A field j acke t or a tr en ch co a i <9n deck. The convoy moves a l on g the same generalized z i g- za g courses , l os in g about eight per cent of its mean d i stance, according to Captain Lond on . For the fir st time in almost a week we can again see the destroyers cruising around near t he horizon . * LONDON JULY 9 * 1942 -- The advance * , , staff in the Salisbury area is augmented by the dispatch of Colonels Bertholf , Howard , Markoe a nd Gi lmer who g o down t o assist in preparation for estab lishment of I I Army Cor ps headquarters and the arrival of troops . Gene ra l Clark , Colonel Rooks and Li eut en ant Barker go to Longford Castle to observe preparation of t he Comm and Post . They return i n the af t ernoon. * * SOMIDIHERE N THE ATLAN , JULY 10 , 194 2-- W h ave t wo I TIC e 11att ack station" alarms today. The men go qu ick l y and qu i et l y to their posts . I t was th e first ti me the routine of the sh i p h ad b een chan ged since we l eft Brook l yn. ( Aft er bein g at our st ations for ab ou t 35 minutes, the all - cle ar signal . No expl ana tion is g iven for the it might have be en to prepare th e men psychologically h ave the re al thing. we ge t al Prm but fn case we The second 11attac k statio n " alarm come s about 11 : 00 AM , half an hou r after t he first on e . This tim e office r s and men go to th e ir stations more quickl y and smoot hly . Tro ops come off the decks on th e do uble . The rea s on for the second alarm turns out to be a four - motored British bomber which , despite r a in and l ow scud , flys a round us until about 4 : 00 PM. As she le aves, the bom~e r dips lo w between the Texas and the Phi ladelphi a and ten disappea~s in th e mi s t to ward Ireland . The two " attack since the v oyage star once a p l ane dropped xtarboard stern , then ov er a depth charge . the activity . ( ) station" brought .tp~ t ed . Twice before we a dep t h ch arge about , abou t half an hour Today , for the first first ac tion on our ship h ad s een act i on nearby -h a lf a mile off our l a ter , a destroyer dumped ti me , we were part of * * LO NDON JULY 10, 1942- - Gene ral Cl a * and General Eisenhower , rk hol d sev eral conferences during the day to discuss preparations for the arrival of troops an d to enlarge their pl ans for future operations against the en emy . All efforts ~f the remainder of the staff are concentrated on one thing: making re ady for the arrival of the fi rs t units . ~ * �SO W ME HERE IN THE ATLANTIC, JULY 11 , 1942 - -A British Catalina flying boat joins us ear ly this morning. It is clear and calm -the finest day sine~ we l eft Brooklyn ten days ago. Despite our proximity to l and ther e is not a single "attack alarm" all day . At 6:40 PM we sight land off our starboard--Irelandl Officer s and men crowd th e rails, looking through field glasses . Later , l and appears on our port side and we ' re told we are ente r ing the Irish Sea . About 7:00 PM two Britis h Hurri can e fighters come out to look us over and they dart about overhead for almost two hours . Before leaving us at dusk they dip dovm to about 200 feet and roar between the Monterey and the Texas . Just before dark we sight a British cruiser off our port and she blinks sign a ls to us . Since sighting land there is a more buoyant feelin g aboard sh i p . Everyone is eager to get ashore . *ND TIDW ORTH, ENGLA , JULY * , 1942- - * 11 General Clark accompanies Gener a l Eisenho we r to Ti dworth where they attend a demonstration by Britis h Airborne troops now c ompleting training in this re gion just north of Salisbury . The generals are accompanied by Colone l s Rooks and Lewis . Britain is bu ildin g up her g lider and parachute troops. Following the show , the gener al s confer with British officers at Salisbury. The party returns to London in the aftern o on. Tro op transports bearing advance u n it s of the II Army Cor p s to England will arrive tomor row , so , at 9 : 00 PM, General Qlark , Colonel Rooks and Lieutenant Barker depart for Glas gow by train . * * * GREENOCK,SCOTL , JULY 12 , 1942 -- At dawn the convoy is in AND the Firth of Clyde and we can see land on both sides . I n single file we move up the roadste ad , the Philadelphia le ad in g t he way, follo wed b y the Texas, then us, then th e Argentina , 'fille destroyers brin g up the r ea r . We make quite a flotilla. The channe l is fi l led with ships -- merchantmen , battlesh i ps, cruisers, destroyers and small boats . We pass two British submarines coming in f rom s ea duty . At 11:0 8 AM we drop anchor ju s t off Gr eeno ck . The other three troop tr ansports h ave continued down the Irish Sea to Liv erpoo l and the delayed two - stacker is comin g in here later . Soon after we anchor General Clark, who h as come up from Lond on , boards t he ship from a launc h . He confers on A Deck with high Corps officers and then goes over to th e .l\rgentin a . He returns l a ter for furth e r conferences . !'/l ost of the officer s and men get th e ir first l ook at their Comm anding Gener a l as th e y are linin g 1;ne rail s when ne ar r ives. At 4 : 45 PM small boats be g in remov i ng headquarters of the II Army Corps fro m the Mo nterey . Most of the g roup g oes~ the Gre enock railroa d station dock aboaro the "Maid of Ori!,eans, 11 a ~ �~\ ,_ channel steamer that British troops after 2,000 men a trip. made five t he Battle trips to Dunkerque to ev ac uate of t he Lowlands . She hau l ed At Gre enoc k we board English tr a ins, six men to a compartment. At 9:45 PM, after b ein g s erv ed coffee and cookies by the Red Cross, we pull out for Engl and . Ju st before dark, which doesn 't come until al most midnight , we pass through Gl asgow . The tr ain , as was the Monte r ey , is blacked ou t all night. * * * * . * LO NDON JULY 12 , 1942- - Colon e l Lewi s goes frcm London to , Liver ·pool to mee t th e thr ee ships out of the convoy that put into that Lan ca shi r e por t. Most of th ese are engin eer ing and su pp l y tr oops and an advance detachment of the First Divisi on . Col onel Lewis g eeet s these units for Genera l Cl ark , who, in th e evening, goe s fro m Greenoc k to Liv erp ool. * ENROUTE TRAIN TO TIDV/ORTH JULY 13 , 1942--Our train BY , p asses thrrugh Newcastl e , Kent (which is b ad ly bombed ) and oth er English to w durin g the night. ns We stop at Le icest er at 10:30 AM an d eat food served us on t he station platform by the British . ( At 3:38 PM we arrive at Lugershall and detrain to military mu sic by a British army band. We are taken by trucks and staff cars to 'J.'idworth where we are to b e quartered temporarily while our regular areas ar e being fixed for occupancy. Tempor ary quarters for the Army Corps are ab ou t midway between Andove r and Salisbury. Tidwor th is a permanent British army post so our quarters are fairly good . Off icers are living in Aliwal and Ass aye halls and the men are in barracks nearby . Most of the offic ers and men ge t the i r first ho t baths since lea v i ng I ndi antown Gap two weeks ag o. This area i s fille d with British troops, mostly t ank and airborne u nits . W h in the immediate vicinity it are four RAF airdromes and planes, includin g many to wing glid ers, are overhead co n stantly. By dark, most of us are s e t up in our quarters. * * * LO NDON JULY 13 , 1942- - The staff , compl etes arrangem ent s for recepti on of the newly-arrived troops at Tidworth. Genera l Clark , Col one l Rooks and Li eutenant Barker return to London in t he afternoon from Liv erpool wher e Gene ral Clar k conferred with t he top officer s on each ship. These inclu ded Br i gadier Genera l Roosevelt of the Fi rst Di vis i on . * ( * * TIDVI RTH, JULY 14, 1942 --Th e staff O sections set up their offices today and we begin funct io ning . Chase Nationa l Bank officials come t o chan ge Am rican money into English and to e arrange for t he opening of ban k accounts. We ge t our first chance to write V-Mail and info rm our familes t ha t we h ave arr iv ed s afely. �-~ -~ r' Officers begin making reconn a i ss ance trips so they can familiarize themselves wi t h the area- -L ongfo rd Cast le, Cowes field, The Moat, Newhall and the genera l region in which we will be locat ed . General Clark addressed al l officers of the headquarters of t he II Army Cor ps for th e firs t time t oday . He outlined in genera l the task f ac i ng officers and men under his command. Approximat e l y 180 officers were gathered in a gymnasium when the gene r al arr i ved from London . He s t ood on a long wooden ben ch so all officers might s ee as well as hear him as he gave a genera l picture of wha t pa rt our unit will play i n the war . He told u s we had t he honor of being the first American unit in England pro per an d added that t h i s had cer tai n advantages and disadvan t ages . "You are the advance ec he l on of the American Grou nd Forces in England , f 1b e -said. "There is opportunity for all of you . You a re i n on 'the ground f l oor. 11 General 9lark, after pointing out this advance group is composed of head quarters of th e I I Army Corps, he adquarters company , the 202nd Military Pol ic e and the s econd battalion of the 16th Inf antry of the 1st Division, stressed the need for the advance units to pre sen t a soldierly appearan ce and attitude and give th e British confidence in the American army . Thi s must be done, he added , by being meticulous in dress and military courtesy . "One of th e p aramount things we must show , 11 the ge neral said , is an attitude of cooperation . You are go in g to hear rumors about the British army. You must always r emembe r that we are fighting a common enemy and that that enemy i s promoting propaganda to undermine our faith in each other . 11 11 General Clar k cited examp le s of t h is type of propaganda which he s a id was aimed at division of American and British opinion . He decla red complete coo per ation between ours e lves and the British is imperative . Exp l a i ning the European Theater of Operations , the gene r al said that General Eisenhower , Theat e r Commander, h a s three branches under him : 1--Ground Forces, led by Gene r al Cl ar k; 2- an Air Sup p ort Force , under General Spaatz , and 3--the Serv i ce of Supply , under General Lee . " The ground force is us , " th e ge ner al said . "Before us we have a trem endou s task . It involves toil and sacrifice and oppor tunity." ( General Clark disclosed had been att ending important task of .Americ an and British th a t since his ar r ival in Engl and he confer ences concerning the connnon fo r ces . He praised the British and �said plans were being made th a t he could 11 I can say," the general offensive--not th e defensive! added, 11 not detail that we are as y et . to be on the 11 Army Corps officers, standing at attention, overseas hats in hand, in a semi-circle before their Comm anding General, listen ed att entively as they go t their first d irect indivation of what lies ahead. Because of the Army Corp 1 s i mportance , a large per e entege of those pre sent are field officers. The general explained the necess ity for such a large staff, say~ng a reinforced Cor ps staff was needed and that he had augmented even that bec ause of the nature ani import ance of thetas~ ahe ad . That was the re ason , he continued, that conditions in our commA area nd are so crowded. This area is designed to accomodate about half the number of officers and men t hat wi ll be stationed her e . heturning to the subject of relations with the British and the position of the II Army Corps as the first American task force in England, Gener a l Glark stressed the necessity for exemp lary conduct and soldi e rly appea r ance. He p r a i sed the deportment and dress of British enlisted men and officers and said we, as the advance echelon, must match th em, at least. He poi n ted to the n e ed for saluting and reco gniz in g Br it ish r anks . The general disclosed that eventually the II Army Corps will occupy and contro l the ent ir e Southern Comm nd area . British a troops will be moved out of the entire area af t er our divisions relieve them. · General Slark discussed the problem of drinking and venereal di se a se . He sug gested that Americ an officers by - pa ss th e British custom of officers having cocktails at mid - d ay. Not being used to t h is cu stom , the general said American soldiers could do a better job -- be more alert and use their faculties to greater advant a ge -if they did not drink at le as t until t heir dut i es for t he d ay VJee r discharged . He said British authorities opposed esta blishm ent of prophyilactic stations in to, •ms ne i ghbor i ng military areas and he sa id every possible step must be taken to keep the v en ereal disease rate at the l owest possible level . Regarding l oose talk and rumors, the general said that England , particularly i n the big cities, was filled with enemy agents . Military inform a tion , he declared, should be discussed or exchanged only with responsible and competent offic ers with in reco gn ized units . He pointed out that particular care should be taken about discussing things military in ho t els and railroad trains. As to rumors, he repeated that many were started by enemy propagandists in an effor t to und ermine between Am ricans e ani 11 Britishers the compl ete cooperation that is so vital and neces sary . The general then ann ounced that chiefs of sections of the II �Army Corps would be detailed to go to London on a staggered p lan so that they could confer with section chiefs of General Eisen hower's staff. Other officers, he continued, would hRVe the same opportunity at a later date. General Clark concluded by requesting e a ch man to us e his initi at ive to the fullest extent. "Suggestions are welcome," he announced, "a nd I want every officer to feel free to come to either me or the Chief of staff with any particular prob le m or id ea ." In order that the officers might kno w th e II Army Corps Chief of Staff, General Clark had Colonel Ro oks mount the bench beside him. He then explained that every officer in the headquarters had be en either h and - picked by himself or selected on reconmendations of high - r anking officers . When he concl uded speaking, General Clark requested that each officer pass by so th Rt he and Col om ,l Rooks could meet him. Later , Brigadier General Roosevelt of the First Division stepped into the receiving line. Eac h officer pass e d by and introduced himself to the three men . Gener a l Cl a rk spoke briefly to each man, asking him about his section and his particular interest. * TIDW ORTH, JULY 15, 1942- - More troo ps arrive in the area today. Most of the m are l:!.ngineers, with the 342nd the larg est group , and supply outfits. They are quartered for the most part at North Tid worth . As quarters are fixed up at Longford Castle and Cowesfield, officers begin moving out. Some officers are assigned as liaison men between General Eis enhower's ETOUSA staff in London and Genera l Clark ' s headquarters at the Castle . Reconnaissance of the area will be continued until all officers h ave had an opportunity to loo k over the new quarters and the gener al terrain. On put out men . W e soldiers s aluting Some of we live the he e l s of General Cl nrk's speech, officer patrols are to check on the appearance and military courtesy of our cover a five-mile~ rcle around Tid worth , mRking sure the are neat, are carrying their gas masks and th nt th ey are and being courteous to British off icers and enlisted men . the officer patrols · go out as far as 12 mile s . At ni gh t under blackout condittons. General Cl a rk makes his first talk to enlisted men tod a y , addressing the Second Batta lion of the 16t h Infantry, 1st Division, the advance group of combat tro ops . The 1st Divis ion wa s the first division ov er in the l Rst war and it is fir s t again, Gener a l Clark tells the a t tentiv e men . He tells th em that suc h a record is an honor that he knows they will aive uup to. -- �JS "I know you men want to fight ," the gene ral says . "You 1 re ove r here bec ause you want to f i gh t. And you're go in g to ge t a chance to fight ! 11 The general also d i scusses the v e nere a l d i sease probl em, stressing t .o the men the need of fi tn ess for battle . He advises them also, as the highest p a id soldiers in t he world, to save as much money as possib l e . American sold i ers , he points out , are pa i d from four to five times as much as any oth er so l d i e r in the world. There is hardly anything you can buy here in Eng l and a nd you won't be able to buy anything in c ombat , he tells them . Her e is your ch ance to s av e money . Make out a ll otments or bu y war bonds. Then you wi l l have something to fall back on w hen the war i s over and you return to civ i li an life . I n discussing military court esy , the General tell s t he 1st Division troops that ju s t about every t h in g in England is ration ed . "But," he adds, 11s a lut es aren ' t ration ed . Give lots of them . I don 1 t want you running out of them to ward the end of the week!" The men laugh and then , as he concl udes his t alk , they form a line and pass by t o sh a ke hands with t he ir Commanding General. The gene r a l talks to e a ch man individually . He tells th em, as he tol d the officers, that he wants t he ir id eas and th a t the y should f ee l free to come to him or to Colo nel Rooks wit h su gges tions. It is the general ' s p lan to me et al l th e men under his command , to t ry and know them p ersonally a s far as po ssible, to know how they feel and to instill in them c onf idence and a figh ting spir i t . * TIDV IORTH, JULY 16 , 1942- - Reconnaiss ance of the area we are to occupy i s canp l eted tod.ay by headq u a rters officers. Movements from Aliwal and Assaye ba rr acks incre ase as officers go to the Cast le are a or to Cowesf ield. • American troops be g in marching the roads of Eng l and for the first time as the advance infantry battalion makes an eight mile hik e wit h packs and rifl es . Alrea d y the companies a r e picking up Engl is h mascots -- d ogs predominating. Offi cer patro ls are increased , an afternoon sh ift bein g put on to check our men on dress , military court e sy and whether or not they are carrying their gas masks . The rule is l a i d down that any off ic e r or man must c arFJ his mask if he i s so far from his barracks that h e can't r each the re sp irator in 15 minutes . Tha t time i s se t since th e English have found th ey normal l y have at le a st th at much warning before a r aid . * .:, �( LO NGFORDCASTLE JULY 16 , 1942 --G eneral Cl ark hopes to have , divisions r ep r esenting eve r y segment of the army join together in the continental assault w en i t come s . For that re aso n he expects h to h ave at l e a st t he 1 st Div is ion, which is a re gu lar army outfit; the 36th , a Nationa l Guard division , and th e ??th , composed prin cipally of selectees , with him for the first blow . "I n tha t way, 11 the general exp l a ins, "We1 11 have every comp onent -- Regu l a r Army, Reserves, National Guard and Sel e ctees -joining in the miss i on . I pa r t icul arly wanted t he ??th so that sele c tees wil l realize th at one of th e ir own outfits is getting a chance to fight . 11 The ??th i s one of the Gene r al 's p r oducts- - bui lt f rom the grmn d up by h i m while he was C hief of Staf f of the Army Ground Fo r ces. He cl a ims it is one of the bes t div i sions in t he army . ( General Cl ark ' s hope to h ave the ??th i n th e fi rs t ma jor Eur opean enga g ement was born whil e he was at Camp Jackson , N. C. He had gone there wi th Gener a l Marshall and Lord Mountbatten f or a review. When the ? ?t h Di visio n pass ed , General Clark watched it wi th p r ide and t hen went to Genera l Marsh all and told him he thou ght it would be a fine th in g if a selectee division could be pa rt of the Europe an Task Fo r ce from th e sta rt. Gene ral Cl ark ex plain ed that many selectees s ee med t o f ee l their divisions wer e f ar down the action hierarch y and t h at the Regv.l ar Army and National Guard div ision s would ge t fo rei gn servic e whi l e they would not be called upon but would remain i n the United States . As a mora l e fac t or and because of h i s fait h in the new d i visions , General Cl ar k suggested th at a division made up principa l ly of se l e ct ees be g iven a chance to join the fir s t forc e . General Marshall repli ed he t hough t it was an ex ce llent and asked General Clark, who at the ti me did not know he was to take connnand of th e U.S . Ground Forces in Europe , what div he wruld r ecol!llllend. Gen e ral Cl ark said h i s first cho ic e v,ould the 77th . id ea going i s ion be The general also d iscu ss ed tod ay the possibilit y of brin gi ng over an other regul ar div i sion -- the 3rd , famed Rock of the Marne Division . Li ke the 1s t , it h a s had amphib i ou s t r ain ing . LO NGFORDCAS TLE, JULY 17 , 1942 -- This pictu r esque , h i sto ric castl e thr ee mil es southeast of Salisbury , W ilts h ir e , is the headquar ter s of the II Army Corps and i t will b e until operat ions have progressed to a po i nt whe re we can move onto the continent . ( Here in this five -tu rreted , thr ee - storied mass of s ton e i s the hear t of the Army Corps comm ande d by General Cl ark . Al l offic e s are on the third f l oor . They are converted dr ess in g and bedrocros . �( No army ever had a mor e unusual Command Post . The castle, s e at of the Lord of Radnor, has b een leased by the United States Army. Its construction startfed in l f588thand thtel da te o f thTehkeystone in the cen t er arch in ront o e cas e 1s 15 9 1 • e manor , formerly on th i s s i te , was built in 116 6 but it and the estate were los t through gambling about 1574 by t he l a st of the Serving t ons. It was bought from John We b , the winnin g gambler , b by Sir Edward Gor ge s. His brother, who succeeded him, built the cast l e as a replica of the c a stle of Uranienberg--a trian gle wi th a tow e r on ea ch corn e r and an op en court in the c enter. Later occupants added t wo to wers and built in the ope n court . The building of the ori gin al c a stle was fin ance d thr ough go ld and silver bars t aken off a wrecked Spani sh ga lleon . r1/.,_s \5v The castle is saturated with h i s tory . Sir Oliver Cromwell almost paid wit h J:> li fe when he took it in 1645 . It ha s house d .is k i n gs and dukes and lord s . The c a stle, as it now stands, was canpleted about 1840 . The present Lord Radnor (the sev enth) is living in one s e ction of it, that part being of f limits to army personnel. The Gorg e s so l d the c as tle and Lon gford Par k ,. th e tr emendous meado wed and hilled area surroundin g it , to Sir Edward De s Bouv e ries in 1717. From h i m it h a s de sce nded to the present o¥mer . The Ea r lship was cr eated in 1 765 . Between t he Gorges and t he Radnors, the castle was occupied by the Lords Colerane , the f irst on e of which II choak' d ende avour i ng swa llo w the rump of a Turky . 11 Henry, the s ec ond Lord Col e rane, b rough t stone carv ing s, marbleto pped tab l es and oth e r pieces of art fr om It a ly to embellish the c a stle . Tha t action r esu lted in Longford Castl e being a virtual museum th a t to day .,houses paintings by su ch artists as Ga insborough, Sir Thomas ~ eynolds, Vel azq u ez , Van Dyck and Hol b ien. The ca st l e is set at t he bottom of a di sh-lik e valley . Direct l y be h ind it, eas t ward, f l ows a branch of t he River Avon . This p lacid str eam is re putedly th e f i n est tr out brook i n England . Dire c tly on the south s ide of the ca s tl e is a huge fonn a l gard en which, b ecaus e of the food scarci t y , is now p l anted in onionsi Beside t he front driv e a re l awn tennis court s and farth er fowward is a bro ad meadow i n whic h ho rs es and cows graz e peacefully . What inco ng ru i ty- - between th~ qui e t c a ttl e , down the main l ane approac h ing th e 6a stle, c runoflauged British lorr i es and Ame ic an __ r trucks rumble; overhead, th ere is an occ as ion al Spitfire of Hur ric ane Fighter or a Wh ey Bomber; with in the trim itl but weatherbeaten Ca stle, war plans are b eing made . On the nort t side is a wood. Beneath the tre e s Ni ssen huts (igloos) and tents are ri sin g to house he adquarters troo ps . Su rroun di ng buildings are b ein g re - furbi sh ed so they can quar ter office r s . ( O head quarter s on the t h ird f l oor are reached t h rou gh a ur maze ' of twi st in g halls . In p lac es the walls are thr ee f ee t thick. r c. ...... ~ - �Quite a bcrnb she l terl -- · Offices are being set up along an angular hallway that runs fran the southwes t turret to t he southeast turre t, as follows : Chief of Staff ' s office , und e r Colon e l Rooks; the Commanding Gener a l, General Clark; Secretary of the General Staff, Li eutenant Colon e l Hewitt; G- 3, troop movement and miscellaneous section ; G- 3 , executive office, Colonel Ferenbaugh; G- 2 , cou nt e r intellig ence; G- 2 , map r oom and e x ecutiv e office , Colonel Howard; G- 3 , c l erks and files; G- 3, operations and training sub - section ; Liaison off i ce , Li eutenant Colonel Sloane ; Air Officer , Colone l Gal e ; G-1 , Colonel Markoe; Art i llery Section , enlisted; Artill ery Se c tion , execut i ve, Colonel Lewis; Adjut an t General!s Office , Col one l Be rtho l f . The G- 4 section, und e r Colonel Adcock , is the only one on the right hand side of th e hal l, b e in g oppo site the offic e of th e s e c retary of the Gene ra l Staff . There are sub - offices up in the towers . Other offic es , such as the ant i- aircraft, anti - tank , chap l a in , etc ., ar e out in the hu t s under t he t r ees. The Si gn a l section , tinder Colone l Tully, i s just off the Cas tle foyer on the ground tloor , Code rooms , the t e l ephone swi t ch b oard and other sections are be in g set up in covenien t spo t s wi t hin the Castl e . Some off i cers wi ll have quarters wit h in the Castle itself Oth e rs , inclu d i ng General Clark who is at New Hall, a quarter a mile away , are quarted in buildin gs fairly c l ose by . . of One of the most int eres ting spots in the castle is the court , which is l i ke a foyer wi th a ba l cony surrounding it . Around the b alcony are ijung oil paintings by such famous art i sts as Rubens , Poussin, M eveldt , Franz Hals, Janss ens , Gheeraedt s , Hans Ewouts, ir Zuccaro , Lucas de Heere , Li evens and Van Dyck . There are also knick - knac k cabinets fill ed with miniatures , mos aics , ra re China and other objects of art, This part of the castl e is ope n to officers . Lord Radnor ' s quart ers , in the southwest t ower , have had most of the famous paintings moved in t o them . These irtlude portra i ts of a ll the Lad i es of Radnor. All of them were p a inted by either Sir Thoma s Reynolds , Ga insborough or Hudson . Just off the cou r t balcony is an art sal on that ha s more than a hundred paintings, including one by the fam ed Spaniard, Ve la zquez . The c a st l e was built to be a city within itself . It i nclud e s a chap e l, a hu ge p i ctu re - lined dining hall, billiard and game rooms , a gi ant kitc he n , a nursery tower and sa l ons and chambers too nume r ous to be counted . This , then , is the headquarte r s of th e II Army Cor ps . General Clark sa ys that every tim e a door is opened he expects to s ee an armored knigh t come clankin g toward him 4 * �L6NGFORD CASTLE, JULY 18 , 1942 - -General Cl ark London to at t end conferences that he expects ~o· be important to date . The major to p ic v1ill be ho w and Front will be opened . The general's only companion is Colon e l Hewitt , Sec re tary of the Gen eral Staff . to th areas days. speci le aves for the most when a Second on this trip M ovement of II Army Corps headquart e rs offic er s fro m Tidworth e Cas tle , Cowesfield , The M oat an d other permanent quart er ing incre as e s . General Clark plans on b ein g in London for several The conference, primari l y , will b e betw een Americans . A al del ega tion has arrived from the United States. * LONGFORD CAST LE, JULY 19, 1942 - -Col onel Rooks h as all sections org an i zing the i r offic e s so headquar t ers will be operatin g full blast by th e time Gene ra l Clark returns . Carpenters and electricians are busy putting i n el ec t rical fixtures and getting the offic es in working shape . Telephones are b e in g install ed and map bo ard s hung . On the telephon e system betw een u nits , the Castl e will be known as "Tornado. The other code names are "Te apo t " for Cowes field, t he h ead quarters of the II Army Corps headqua r t er 1 s eng i n eers, and "Trade v1 ind" for Tidworth , our rear echelon . We have a d i rect line i nto "Tempest , " code name for the London he adquarters . A ijizeable s taff of I I Army Corps officers have b een stationed p ermanently i n London to do liaison work with General Eisenhower's staff . The Anny Corps' London staff is und er Col one l Slocum , A'~ 1,Y'f de pu t y Chi ef of Staff . -:i{t '.t S'l'f., r,l,t JL LO FORDCASTLE, JULY 20 1 1942 -- Ear l y t h is morning we have NG our f ir st air ra i d alarm since arr i v al . i'he siren s on the Castle wail about dawn . Other s i rens are gett in g our men up in the other areas . I t is qui te misty and we can s ee no t hing but overhead we can hear t he motors of a few p l anes . Not hi ng hap pens and the al l cl ear comes ab out 6 :4 0 AM. Later we l earn t ha t a German pl ane f l ew ove r Sali sbu r y, apparen tl y on its return f rom bombi ng a more westerly t arge t. Organization work uontinu tis at headquarters . Huge maps of England and the Europe B coa s t along the Engli sh Channel have be en n put up in most of t he offices . The wall s of Genera l Cl ark ' s office are cov ered wi t h maps , inc l ud i ng on e t ha t shows the l oca t ion and makeup of the v arious German un it s al ong the European coast . M ore offi c er s mov e into the Cast l e area as ca r penters f i nish remode li ng work and p l umbers g et toi l et and bath i ng facil i t i es i ns t al led . Not hing defin i t e comes dow concerning n the London conferences . �30 We learn however that Gen eral Marshall, Admir al King, Hopkin s and Stev e Early are over for th e Sec ond Front ence. * * * LO FORD CASTL JULY 21, 1942 --Prep aration s of II Army NG E, Corps headquarters are complete, basically, s o order s ar e i s sued to move th e rest of the officers and enlisted men into their more - tf_l or-less perman en t quarte rs tomorrow. '-" Offic e rs working in head quart e~ s are living in on e of five places : at New Hall, where Genera l Clark and his chiefs of secti on live; in t he Castle itself; at Bothey House and the Agent's House , t wo fairly lar ge bric k buildings near the Cast le, and at The Moat, a brick st ructur e abou t a mile away . Troops of Head qua rt ers Detachme nt and Head qu art er s Company liv e almost in t he shadow of t he Cas tl e . Them men have quarters in brick outbuild in gs , wooden huts and I gloo s. " /,r · r,l - * LO NGFORDCASTLE, JULY 22, 194 2-- Headquarters officers , lo aded do~n wi th l uggage , begin arriv in g soo n af ter dawn to set up in t he ir new qua rt ers . They are hous ed anywhere from two to six men to a r oom. Toil e t facilities are adequate and th er e is plenty of hot water . Officers ri g up t hei r ov cl os e ts, arrange thei r rooms with m rugs and kn ick-kn acks and by noon they h ave t he i r quar t e rs look ing qui i;e homelike . However, th e foot lockers , w ich left us al most a h month ag o, h aven 't sho wn up y e t and most of the of f ice rs and men are short on pe rs ona l things and have run up against a t ough l aund ry problem . Third th i rd floor of the Castle is bus t ling as of ficers and clerks begin f illin g up offices . * * * LO ORDCASTLE, JULY 23, 1942--Headquarters NGF of the II Army Corps be gins to operate on more or less full scale today. Offices of the v arious sections are finally ar r anged and papers begin flowing f rom section t o se ction. Things are b eg i nning to hum. Because th e Cas tl e mess h all--the former dinin g room of lords and l adies -- wi ll seat only app roxi mat el y 70 officers, we h ave double sittings for all me al s : 7 : 00 and 7: 30 for br e akf ast; noon and 12 : 45 PM for lu nch , and 6 : 00 and 6:45 for dinn e r. All offi ces open at 8 :0 0 AM and ope r ate straight through u n til 5 : 30 or 6 : 00 PM. ( Senior and Ju nior Staff Duty Of ficers are ap pointed , sen t r~es are placed around h ea dquarters and we g o on Comm and Post scale. Air r aid instructions come out and to insure our security every -- �31 I officer and man must show his id en tification card when entering headquarters . Plane lookouts are put on a 24-hour watch on the Castle towers and quick -to-c hallenge sentries patrol the area quite heav il y at night . * LONGFORD CASTLE JULY 24 , 194 2--Th e tempo arou nd headquarters , quickens as officers and enlisted personnel get sett le d in the ir sections . I n the afternoon Gene ra l Cl a rk and Col one l Hewitt return from the London confer ences. The general plunges into conferences with various h i gh -r ank i ng officers but he i s goi ng to wai t until tomorrow to d isclose wha t occured regardin g the Seco nd Front p l an . * * * LONGFORD CASTLE JULY 25 , 1942 --G eneral Cl ar k, in a hi gh ly, secret meeting at t ended only by t he e i gh t top - ran ki ng colonels of the II Army Corps, detai l ed today t he world - wide import ance of conf erences he has been att ending i n London since July 17. He disc los ed that the Second Front probably will not be opened until the spring of 1943 . In his map -li ned off ic e , the general told of the arr iv al of an Am rican delegation e desirous of seeing the Western European front open ed in 1942 to take pressure off the Russians . I n cli ppe d sentences he told his officers of the tense arguments for and against offen s ive action on our part this fall. He detailed what occured during the conferences . At int erva l s , Prime M ster ini C hurc hil l wa s consulted . The American delegation , which includes General Marsha Admiral Kin g , chief of U. S . Naval Operations; Harry Hopkins special assistant to President Roosevelt , and Presidential reta ry Stephen Early , came ov er preponderantly in favo r of the Se cond Front this fall . ll; , Sec opening The British comma nd, General Marshall and Gener al Clark realize we are not yet prepared for the continental assault which , under th ff most favorable conditions , will be an extremely hazardous operation. If it callle th i s fall it woul d h ave to be made wi t h an insufficient force th at would lack th e necessary amphib i ou s train ing and complete and proper l and in g equipment . The Second Front decision has bu t it look ed when he departed yes though the attack wi ll come about is returning to London to morrow to not yet b e en definitely made terd ay , the gene r al said , as April 1 , 1943 . Gener a l Clark continue the conferences . "It l ooks as though SLEDGEHA MMER the name of our 1942 , operation , will not take pl ace, 11 the general said . "Inste ad we wil l concentrate, from now on , every minute of the day and night , on prepar i ng for RO UNDUP, our 1943 operation . " 6 �The crux of the entire prob l em is the Russian situation. Everyone fee l s, the general explained, that somethin g should be done to re l ieve German pressu r e on the Russians . An assault on the French coast by combined British and Am ric an forces e could be made to withdraw some German divisions f'rom the Eastern front. The coming four months will be the crucial ones . If Russia c an ho l d on unti l winter se t s in , the pos i tion of the United Nations will be fa i r l y good . When the si:ring of 1943 comes , pl ans and trainin g for the opening of the Second Front will be complete . But , i n the event Russia collapses , Germany will, by next spring , be able to conso l idate and hold wha t she has in Russia and with draw scores of divisions to opp ose the continental inv asion . The point of view of t hose in favor of opening th e Second Front this year is that we may never have an opportunity for invasion th an we have now with Germany putting on a furious Russian dr i ve . When asked for his opi nion, Gen era l Clark said he told the conference that "we can• t go in there with f ea ther dusters . " He explained the problem, as far as his Ground Forces are concerned , from a purely mi l itary point of view . The general outlined a hypothet i cal c as e . ( If we made the assault on September 15, the general told the conference, all we could count on using would be the 34th Division , now i n I reland . I t has had no amphibious training; it lacks anti a ircr af t suppor t ; i t has no tanks . The First Armored Division, also in Ireland, woul dn't be ab l e to g o into the invasi on with all its equi pment . Nor would any of the other un its sche du led to be in the Europe an '!:heate r by that date . Getting the men and e quipment together, the general explained , is a tou gh problem. There is also the all-imp o rtant matter of invasion bo Rts. These, he said , will not •be ready by September 15 . It was decided, tentatively , th a t SLEDG EHAM MER would not take pl u ce . However, Genera l Clark , with General Mars ha ll's approval , hed already cabled the War Depa rt ment asking that the 1st Division be here in complete strength by August 20th. It was decided to let th e ord e r stand , de sp ite the tentative decision. Gener a l Mar shal l said he thou gh t th e 1st Division, whic h has been trained in amphibious work , ought to come over as soon as possible even thou gh it would mean t aking approximately 20,000 SOS troops out of the August convoys. It was decided to alert the 1st Division and several other uni ts , including signal, med ic al and an Eng inee r Boat Brigade . "After four d ays and four nights of conferences during which we studied the globe lookin g for all possible points of attack and figuring wha t we could use, we ag reed that SLEDG EHAM R (the ME 1942 operation) was i mposs ible, 11 Gener al Cla - declared. rk , �33 "I think that probably is the way the decision is going to stand . We must now concentrate all our work on ROUNDUP which is the 1943 operation . I f Russia collapses it is not difficult to see t h at by next sp ring ROUNDUP may be impos s ible of execution , We'll know by October or November , If November comes and the Russi an army is dissipated, the entire pl an must be ch ange d. That would make it possible for Germa ny to d isperse 100 divisions along the inv a sion coast and it ww ld re move the poss ibility of the invasion b eing executed successfully. W would hav e to go somewhere e else. That could be GYMN.AS~,the operation in vo lving inv a sion of the North African coast . 11 The General said the mised the British it would six or seven divisions as to protecting the Southern general said, is at present concern to the British . European Theater of Operations had probuild up a lar ge amphibious force with soon as pos s ible. We are also connnitted Connnand section of England which, the rather lightly held, a fact of gre at Puring the CD nference v1 ith his section chiefs, General Clark stressed several times that "we must put all our ene r gy and plan ning into RO UNDUP. He said he want ed ideas and outlines from all officers on how they thought training could best be carried out and how the invasion might be made . 'Phe general outlined one dram a tic occurence at the London conference . It was w hen he was · asked by General Marshall, Adm iral King and Harry Hopkins what American Ground Forces could d o to alter the situation if f i gh ti ng developed to a point w here the collapse of Russia app eared i mm ent . in Should the war reach such a crucial point, the general re plied, an inva s ion in the vicinity of Cherbourg would have to be executed des p it e the l ack of lan din g equipment and scarcity of American troops w ith amphibious trainin g . We must do everything we can to s ave Russia . The Cher b ourg area--alth ough heavily fortified and held- - would be particularly lo gi cal as an invasi on point bec ause the c:ros sing would be relativ e ly short and, hence, troopl anding boats could be used with gre a ter frequency. The gener a l told the leaders of the second Front conference that he was all in favor of doi ng something if the Hussian s it u at ion is as black as President Roos evelt and other wor l d leaders think it is , However , he added, opening of the Second Front at an early date means that the brunt of the invasion must be borne by the Briti s h since it is someth in g the United States will be able to conti'±bute v ery 11 ttle tow ard until the spring of 1943 . ( Americ an troops that could go into an invasion task th is f al l would h ave little or no a ir sup p ort, insuf f icient ant i - aircraft , automatic weapons or tan ks . Gener al Clark outlined to Admiral King and M Hopkins the time and space factors r, involved in getting American troops re ady for t he European invasi on in 1942 . He told �) the men frankly anything before that Am erican Grou nd Forc es couldn't ea rly October . possibly do An invasi on a r ound Septemb er 15 had be en menti oned and the general said that would be impossible . 1'he 34th Divis i on is shy two brigadier generals . The 1st Armored Divi sion hasn ' t its fu l l equipment . the 1st Division, having just arrived by that date , won't have its materiel . The invasi on would invo l ve long practice to get the divisions, supporting troops and the Navy working as a harmonious team . The general was then asked if this small invasion force could be ready to attack by October 1, He pointed out th is was only 15 days more and that the p roblem was so tremendous that that short amount of time would make littl e d iffer ence . "The British , " ~eneral EHark told his se ction chiefs , "feel we can ' t do anythin g on a l ar ge sc a le this year so that is the way I think the decision will stand . We have only eight to n ine months to prepare for the invasion and tha t is little enough time . Every day counts and we must devote all our energy to prep a rations . 11 ' The general annoo.nced one division -- th e lst - - would arriv e in August , two in September and two i n October . He said mother armored division was necessary and must be brought over as soon as possible. The invasi on divisions , he said , must have two combat teams each . These teams, which would attack the coast side by side , "must have been trained and trained and trained . " "'When we train for this i nvasion, 11 he said , 11the forces must use the same boa t s , the same ai r support , the same automatic weapons that they will use i n the actual inv as i on . They must carry cooiplete equipment -- ammuniti on, gaso line , food, everything. They must rehearse and rehearse again . They must be perfect. " This c an and must be done! 11 The general said amphibious training centers v1ill be established so t he divisions can go directly into t h ose areas and plunge into training immediat e ly . He suggested that the best spot was Northern Ireland. The genera l wants all amphibious training sectors under h is control. He sa i d training would proceed until the J,me r ic an forces , with navy support , crossed the Irish Sea and made a mock attack on the Ayrshire co a st. British forces encamped there would furnish the defense . A merciless criti11J.ue would follow . " Tr aining like declared. "We can 1 t scale and u nless we be trained to a fine feet wet . " have that is what we are sho oting for ," the general do anything unless we have rehearsed on a full are perfect . Every division that comes over must peak and it must be arranged so they get their ... Gene ral Clark speculated all U. S. divisions land on whether it wouldn 1 t be wisest to in Ire l and so the y could go immedi a tely �35 into ri go r ous amphibious tr ain i ng . If this trainin g was carried on in Eng land, German pl anes woul d "smack our pants off and we'd lose our bo ats and men, 11 the general continue d . He s aid this amphibious trai n in g in more i s olat ed Nor th er n I r el and would take three or f'our intensive week s . Graduation would be the "inv as i on " ac ross the Iri sh Sea . Gener al Clark said Adm a l Hallett ir and General Dre w, of the British Navy and Army, were ea g er to ass i st in such tr ain ing. The Genera l said he h ad re qu ested t ha t Col one l "M ke" i O'Daniel, U. S. amphibious expert , be p laced in direct char ge of such tr ain i ng . The initial inv ad in g f'orce wil l have to b e trained on the the ory that it will make a ship - to - shore l and in g . The second wave of troops , goin g over after we h ave a foothold on the continent, should b e ab le t o move fro m shore - to-shore with ships pullin g into docks that probably would be u nde r bombardment , Genera l Cl ark said t he Hi gg ins invasi on boats had no t yet arrived . He a dde d these ve sse ls were not r ea ll y adequate since they cou ld be set afi re with inc endiarie s . The bi g bottl eneck in inva s i on pl ans is in obtainin g t he proper type of l anding craft . The chiefs of s e ction were told that t hey must make persona l reconnaissance of' possible areas f or amphibious trElini ng . This must b e done i mmediat ely , th e ge n eral observed . ¼hen di v isio ns arrive th ey must go thr ough hardening process e s and small un it tr aining . "I want t hem to make 25 - mile marches rep ea t edly , at 11 least once a week , the general said . "This wi l l b e f'ollowed b y amphibious trai ning and finally combined t ra inin g . The general sai d troo ps must be instill ed wit h a f eel i ng of security in their artillery and that pla n s must be made f'or the m to practice with live fire goin g ov e r th e ir heads . Colonel Lewis , a rtill e r y of'ficer , told the ge ne r al t hes e shel ls could be laid dovm with i n bursting range of t he in fan try . Gene r al Cla rk said some of the men woul d get hi t and some woul d be k ill ed but that such tr aining was neces s ary . These al most -r e al "wars" wou ld also brin g Air - Grou nd coope r ati on •. 11 'fh ese men must learn to fight und e r r e a listic cond itions - the y must le arn to dig in, 11 the general said , "Th ey must dig in, by God, ev ery tim e th ey stop. I ' m not being hard - hearted, I 'm do ing th e men a ~avor . bn their toug hness depends t he ir liv es and t he winn in g of th e war . · ( Genera l Cl ark said his chf afs of sec tion s must get to gethe .r and decide t he nature of th e train ing p rogram . He said that today he had seen General Loyd , head of t he British South ern Comm , and and Genera l Creagh, comm ander of' the Hampshi r er,Dorset district, ani th at he had discussed with th em the pr oblems of tr a ining in this area. "I told them ," th e general recounted , "that I want to be as fair as p os s ibl e but th a t tr ai nin g is i mperat ive and noth i ng must stand i n it s way . " �The ~eneral said that when the 1st Division arrives and t akes over the Southern Comm nd ar ea now held by the 38th British A Division , the transfer must take place in an ord erly manner and th a t t he division must make arrangements to billet itself . He said· the British woul d leave "odds and ends of overage troops" to aid in the transition from Britis h to Am ric an protection e . I As to the 1st Division's use, General Clark declared can bet your bottom dollar that the 1s t will be in on the He said he thou gh t the jump - off would come next "you assault. 11 April . Turning to the problem of logistics, the gene r al said the SOS had promised 100 per cent sup po rt in the matter of construct ion and supply . He said he had been a stound ed at the SOS work already done . The pro blem of food, especially when inv as ion comes , wa s discussed a nd General Glark stressed the need for Drat.ions and K rations, the new , concentrated , li ghtwe ight foo d . He s a id that whenever orders were made , they should be made big . "Take anything you ca.l'l ge t , 11 he counselled . "You c an nev er t e ll wha t we are go in g to need. 11 General Littlejohn of SOS wi ll sit ·&n on ration discussions . Returning to the invasi on problem, t he ge ner a l said that troops would h av~ ~o be trained to l and against al l types of ob stacles . He said G- 2 reports show that Germans have t he European coast lined with p i lings, mines , barbed wire and other obstacles . He told of a visit he made to the Dover coast and of a British anti-invasion device whereby oil pipes run dovm to the surface of the channel . In event of invasion, the pipes wi l l pour oil over the waters and it will be i gn it ed as the en emy 's assault boats approach . 11 }':ou can count on all sorts of heinious devices , " he s a id . We must be prepared for anything. You can all start worrying and thinking of the answers to how we are goin g to solve these problems 11 There are many solutions. 11 The problem of distributing troops in the Southem Command was brought up and Colonel Ferenbaugh s aid the limit was 11 divisions in this particular area. He s aid opposition was already being expressed by English residents to the movi ng in of so many troops . Col one l Adcock said a r rangements had been made to put two divisi ons in South Wales. He added th at reconnaiss ance had been made in the Western Command area but t hat there h ad been quibbling between the Br itish officers on our right to survey the area for possible camp and trainin g sites . ( Col onel Ferenb augh said the British are somewhat confused because they h ave to deal with t v1 American uni ts -- the I I Army 0 Corps and sos. He suggested our plans be coordin ated before we appro ach the British with them . . �37 '!'he 1st Division is scheduled to be staged at Tid worth, th en moved down to relieve the 38th British Divis i on in the Poole-Bourn emouth area . The n e xt staging area will be at Oxford where two divisions are scheduled to arrive. General C lark h as f'our ma jor appointm ents to d ay -- with Generals Loyd and Cre agh , sep a rat e ly; wit h Lord Radnor, owner of Longford and our neighbor - host, and Air Vice Marshall and Air Commander Rowle y of the 10th Figh t er Group , RAF. Stephen Earl y was scheduled to visit head quarters at 3 PM but the visit was c ancelled when General Clark wa s requested to be in London for conf'erences at 10 AM tomorrow . * * LO NGFORD CA STLE, JULY 26 , 1942 - -ueneral Clark go e s to London alone to attend the ne w session of the Sec ond Front conference. He does not expect the meetings to last lon g and he has a fe eling that plans h ave been changed. ~ e spi te the fact ation . The plan is to but the d a ys are going won't be int errupted . no half - holid ays or le it is Sund ay, headquarters in i n f'ull operg ive each off i cer and man a day a week off , to be sta gg ered so th e progress of our work There's no time to waste and there will be aves . Before going to London, General Cl ark discusses the necessity of coope ra tion between Air and Ground Forces. lie says he h a s told Gener al Spaatz that it will be n e cessary for the grou..d ~omanue r vO exercise con t rol of close support air op e rations when the invasion comes. To eff e ct this cooperation between Genera l Spaatz and himself, General Clark has sent for Brigad i er General C1 mdee w o will unify the work of the 8th Air Sup p ort Command and the II h Army Corps . General Candee will set up his headqu arters in the vicinity of the Castle so t here wil l b e close contact between air and ground f orces . The general also discuos es that he has definiteiy s ele cted Colonel 0 1 Daniel to he ad the amphibious tr aining program . The Colonel fought in the World War be s ide General Clark who at that time wa s coounanding Com any K of the 11th Inf'antry p Regimen1:,. When General Cl ark wa s wounded by shra pne ~~ . Qglonel 0 1 Daniel took ove r command and won the D. S . ~ in the ~ - For the p a st f'ew months Colonel 0 1 Daniel h a s b e en heading up amphi b ious and comm ando training und e r Gene ral Clark at Gr ound For ce he adq uart e rs in Wash in g ton . The colonel is alrea dy in Engl and and Gene r a l Cl a r k h a s written Gen eral Mc Nair asking that he b e allowed to remain here on grounds that am phibious tr ain i n g over here i s mor e crucial th an si mil a r trainin g in the Stat e s . Col on e l 0 1 Daniel and A dmir a l Bennet of t h e u,, s . Navy ar e leavin g toni gh t on a r econnaissance tour of Scotlan d in sear ch of an amph ibi ous tr ainin g sec t or. The admi ral is ch ar ged with coll e ctin g , rec e iving and training all inva s i on cr aft crews. �General Cl a rk h a s been g iven the responsibility of policing t h e entire Safisbury Plain dist r ict which , until now, has been under Major General Packingham - W lsh. Genera l Clark promotes a Major Ra lph Cooper to a lieutenant colo nel cy and makes him Provost Marsh al. 'l'he ammunition supp ly problem has been worrying the general so he writes Gener al Eisenho we r reco mm ending that there be built up in this the a ter 30 u n its of f i re for all tro op s and that five u n it s of fire , a ll cla ~ses, b e allo t ed to the II Army Corps, from whic h the ~0o-i"ps commander woul d be authorized to expend one - half unit of f ir e for tr aining purpos e s. He points out that e l ements of this Corps arrived in the United Kingdom with out one unit of fire opwer in the ir po s session . General Clark, accompa nied by Gen e ral Ei senho wer , returns from the London conference a t 6:30 PM and the two gener als in spect the mes s e s and barracks and go to the American Red Cross hospit al in Salisbury whic h is being turned over to the United States Army. * * LON GFORD CASTLE, JULY 27, 1942 --I t h a s b een decided that an attack opera t ion on the northwest co ust of Afr ic a wil l be made by next December 11 General Clark announced the de cision t h is afternoon at a secret me etin g with his high -r ankin g officers . This is t he revised de ci sion made at yesterday's conference in London . The special American dele gation is returning home to report to Pr e sident Roosev e lt . The African operation will b e known at TORCHand it supe rs edes t h e earlier G YMNA pl an . An Americ a n Corps, comin g strai gh t ST over frcm the United States, will be l anded in t he vicinity cf: Casablanca, on the west coa s t . Memwhi l e , the British, with America n assistance , will land invasion troops along the Mediterranean coast , bet ween Oran and Biz erte . TORC although H, the 1st Divi s ion i s sche dule d to partici p ate in it, do e s not involv e t he II Army Cor p s directly , Ge neral Clark expl a ins . Comman of this 1942 operation d will be u nd e r General Ei senhower . Gene r al Cl a rk feels cert a in th e operati on will come off -a s scheduled s ince it is what both President Roosev e lt and Prime Minister Churc hill want. It will open~ , as promis ed , a Second Front in 1942. Howeve r , TORCHi s d epend ent on whethe r or not Russia collapse s -this year . If she does , Germany will be free to release air units and ground reinforcements to aid General Romme s campaign . That would materially l' chan ge the plan . Gen e ral Cla rk says th at in te l ligence r eports show that Germany is considerin g an African operation simil a r to tOReH and �that the United Nations have complete data on the German plans, including what air fields are to be t aken and which are the key railroad junctions . The TORCHplan is now bein g put before the American and British gover nments for consideration . It will be taken back to President Roosev elt b y the special mission he sent over - -Gen e ral Marshall , Admir a l Kin g , Harry Hopkins and Steve Early . General Clark told his section chie~s that he had discussed with Prime Minister Churchill an d General Marshall the poss ibility of making TORCHan all - American operati on with our Ground Forces making the assault on both the Mediterranean and west African coasts . The general said this was still a possibility . Planning must be started immediately , he added, on a ship -to-shore landing training program . At present , the plan calls for only one of our I I Army Corps units -- the 1st Division, reinforced by t ank batt ~lions, rutomatic weapons battalions and tank destroyer un its -- to engage in TORCH . "We must go full steam ahead on our plans for executing ROUNDUP the general , 11 declared . " This ca lls for an attack in the spring of 1943 on the French co as t , probably in the vicinity of Le Havre . " He said that American troops , despite th e decision regarding TORCH, would continue to come to the United Kingdom without interference, except just before the time TORCHis finally set for. The general eXPlained it would be i mpossible to move troops here on the normal schedule at the time when t he Navy and conv oy ships would b e engaged in the TORCHoperation . Through October, the general said, troops are t~ 90Jll.~'a~ sc heduled in preparation for ROUNDUP.These includ e the following div is ions , plus sup porting troops - -the 1st, 45th, 4th Motorized, 36th and 77th . Asked if TORCHcorresponded to GYMN AST in the belief that the African landing force would have "friendly resistance" from the French, the general said no , adding that no holds would be barred . General Clark then disclosed that presen t plans call for an over - all supr eme commander of European operations and that General Marshall probably would head it. When he will come over is problematical . The general warned that we still must be prepared to execute SLEDGEHAMMER .it becomes mandatory b eca use of th e Rus s ian p os if ition . While preparing for ROUNDUP he s aid, officers , must also bear in mind the possibility of having to plunge into SLEDGEHAM M ER with whatever forces can be thro wn together for that 1942 invasion plan . Obviously, the genera l explained, if we do SLEDGEHAM M ER, the TORCH operation will be called off. - �General Clark is charged with planning and executing both SLEDGEHAMMER ROUNDUP and and .he tells h is chiefs of section to devote every ounce of energy i npplanning and training fo r that type of operation . The II Army Cor ps will bui.ld up month by month a force that could be c al l ed on fo r this French co a st invasion if the order comes . CPhe genera l said he f elt nothing of an invasion nature would be undert ake n under any c i rcumstance before October 15 . By that time , he continued , we may be able to do something . As runericen forces arrive in the Unit ed Ki ngdom they will be tr a ined and built up f or the in v as i on task . After 60 days they will be considered ready for combat, if needed . By Octob er 15 , General Cl ark says , we would have the 34th and 1st Divisions and th e 1 st Armor ed Divi sion ready to go into an invasion . They would have anti aircr aft , ant i - tank and au t omatic weapons su pp ort . General Clark to l d h is officers th ey must alwaus bear in mind the possibil i ty t hat we will have ct_o q.o somet h ing this yea r. W h this in mind , he said he had , with th e approv al of General it Marshal l, asked the Wa Department r to a l ert certain units and have t h em re wy fo r Augus t convoys. ( The 1st Division is scheduled to sail from the Brooklyn Port of Embarkation on August 2 aboard the Queen Mary . The 1st will come as a complete unit on on e ship , making the trip in five d ays . Also due i n the United Kingdom before August 20 are support in g troo ps , includin g Anti - Airc r af t, two Tank Destroyer Battalions , the 760th Tank Bat talion which will come e quipped with M 4s, another Ta nk Battalion with :M 3s, a Few Field A rtill ery arid Si gna l troo ps and four Eng i neer Am ibious Bri gades . ph By Sept ember 1 arriv e in t he United Battalion , mor e Anti M 4s , t wo ev acuat ion hospit a l outfit and General vlark wants another larg e convo y to Kingdom . I t will includ e an Automatic W eapons - Ar~craf t, another Tank Bat talion equ i pped with hosp it als, a field hospi tal and a sur gi ca l other d e t a ched troops . The general told his cniefs of section to give th e ir off ic ers and men a general background of our problems . He said d ay s of in ac tivity for some officers wa s near i ng an end and th at he knew offic e rs were eage r to ge t busy . I I Army Corps troop~ wi ~~ be coming ove r i n heavily - convoyed tr ansports but t heir fi gh tin g equipment will come over i n slower merchant ships that will ha ve less protection. This , the general adds , migh t result in the loss of some eq uipment . As far as the 1st Division is conc erned , it is essential that the troops and e quipment be here by A gus t 20 . Fast car g o sh ips must b e used u and SOS h a s promised them . uted The decision on whether TORCH or SLEDGEHAM will b e e xec M ER will be made by Septemer 15, the gene ral p redicts . The - �-- 41 entire decision , he emphasizes , depends on the Russian situation . The quest :J, now before forces on und e r his connn:-nd is how th e tr ai ni ing should be carried on and how the inv as i on can b e st be made . ROUNDUP he says, calls , for th e British to land in the Ca l a is area while the II Army Corps wi ll conc entrate on getting ashor e in the River Siene ar ea . I t wi ll be a combi ned assault . Ame ic an r invasi on forces will attac k in re g iment a l combat teams that must be s e lf - cont a ined units that h ave train ed beforehand with all t he equipment they will use in the actu 11. inv as ion . l 11I want each of you to ask yourse lf al L the time : ' How would I I do it ? 1 , tt the general says . 111.Vriat s th e best way to train ? Should the divisions' equipment be sent to Eng l and and th e divisions l anded a t an amphibious trainin g sector for a gruelling course and th en , after gr aduation , go to England and ge t their e quipm ent ? How wouJ.d you do it?" The general says th at Admiral Hewitt of the U. S . Navy has be en as s i gne d to he ad al l inva sion bo a t matters , no matter wha t the si ze of the ships . Admiral Bennet is already here workin g on this phase of the training and he and Col onel 0 1 Dani e l a re go ing to Scotland to make a r eco nn aiss anc e on po ss ible amphibious tr a in in g sites . The 105 - foot inva s i on boats wil l be main tained and navigated by Navy personnel . Small er boats will be procured by th e SOS and ma intained and navigated by our Enginee r Boat Brigades , three of whic h are ready to come over . When the i nv as i on comes , all boats , r ega rdless of size , will be und e r co mma of Gene ral Clark . nd He announces he has asked for 50 per cent mor e boats th an nee de d to take c a re of los ses in t raining and in invasion. The ge neral says he won ' t be satisfi ed until invasion troops can cross 80 miles of the I rish Se a and " at tac k " th e Ayrs h :lr e coast . The 1st Division will h ave to hav e very i ntensive ship - to shore training for either TOR or SLEDGEHAMMER CH . The general says conferences will be held with Lor d Mountbatt en , General Drew , Adm iral Hallett , General Truscott and Colonel 0 1 Dani el to decide h ow to carry out amphibi ous tr a inin g . He says he expects to ha v e four ass au lt divis ions trained in ship - to - shore invasion . The rest will be trained on a shore - to - shore basis , l anding in the boats in which they leav e the British I sles . * The d ay starts out wi t h an air ra id a larm and officers and men hurry out of their quarters and into slit trenches or other type a ir raid she l ter s . They wea~ full e quipment, includin g st ee l helmets and . 45s with c ar~ridge clips ins er t ed . It' s impossible to s e e any activity bec aus e of t he fog but pl anes c an be heard in the distance , The al l clear comes about 45 minutes aft e r the alarm and everyone rushes r avenously to brea kfast . * * * �L\ \ LONGFORD CASTLE, JULY 28 , 1942 - -0 nce again we start the day off with an air raid alarm . It comes sho rt ly befo r e 8 : 00 AM so th e princ i pa l she lt er used is a hal l way in the Castle basement . The wa lls of this p l ace are s o t hic k that i t is fairl y bombproof with t hree f l oors above . The alert is brief, la s ti ng only 20 minutes . General Clark is around head quarters a ll day , cleaning up t h ings that h ave pi l ed up during his absences and ho l ding smal l conf erences c oncerning mat te _rs he h as been u n ab l e to go into until now because of the $econd Front decisions. The gener al s ays he finds himself, in tak i ng over the Southern Comm , in a position and compa r able to that of the of a stat e or the m~or of a city. The same admin istr ation pol i c in g p robl ems are i nvolved . He finds himself con f erring gre a t de a l with civ ili an authorities who must now come to wit h the ir problems. Gen e ra l Cl ark is resp onsi ble for the of everyone i n the d i stric t - - milita r y and non-m i litar y on almost equal footing. ( Br it ish g ove r no r and a him welfare an In li ne wit h t he adv ic e giv en by th e genera l in h i s t alk to the 16th I nfantry ba t talion , an order comes out toda y reco mmending an i mm edfat e campaign to ha ve every offic er and man in the II Anny Corp s al l ot at least 50 percent of his pay and allowances to e i the r h i s family , life in s urance, savin g s bonds and s t amps or to a savin g s bank i n the United States . All c~= anders ar e instructed to appoin t a Defens e Bond Officer for divisions, regiments, battalions and companies . The gen e ra l sug g ests th at connnanders a r ran ge, w n practicable, he to have "a ttractive youn g women" stationed in each battalion area on pay day to sell savings bonds and stamps . The plan is to have ou t fits compete for the best s avings r eco r d . The project , the general says , must be ccrnpleted pr ior to the tim e intensive tr a in in g starts . .,, "'-'· * LO NGFORD CASTLE, JULY 29 , 1942- -General Cl ark , accompanied by his staff and British Major General Dre w, reconnoiter the Cornwa ll ar ea today, examinin g t he App l edor e re g ion as a possib l e amphibious training area . ( A led ore , wit h two an d a ha lf mi les of ha rd , sandy beach , pp gets the tentative a pproval of Gener a l Cl ark . I t is near the mouth of Bristol Channel . All divisions arrivin g from the United States probably will ge t their final amphibious trainin g at a big ba se in North Ir eland but the ge nera l wants to ke ep the d i vis ion s f re sh on amphibious wor k so h e p lans thre e or f our small amphibious sites in South western England and South W es . Ar eas being c ons idered al are at App ledor e and Bowey-Auste l l , in the Corn wall district , and Pembrey and Temby, in South Wales n ear Swansea . �........ 43 ~ ,. This is the way the training of u. s. t r oops arriving in the United KingdC!ll is sche duled to work . Immedia ·tely upon arrival they will go to their staging areas and then into intensive amphibious training cours es . This phase of trainin g will end when they cross about 80 miles of the North Channel and "attack" the Ayrshire Coast . This crossin g , the general says , will be CC!ll ible in par every respect- - weather, sea, boat loadings, supplies--to an English Channel crossing to the Fr ench coast . Gene ra l Cl ark also points out that the North Channel crossin g will test the Navy's ability "to put us down on the ri gh t beach without a hitch." Every divisio n but the 1st Division, which is due to arrive August~ . will go through this amphib i ous training. The divisions will then relieve British divisions and take fu r ther tr aining in which artil l ery will actuall y fi re over the heads of I nfantrym en . I t will be complete combined arms tr a ining with Air and Ground · Fo r ces cooperating as the y wi ll in actual battle. The p resent plan calls for 1 5 U. S . divisions to c ome into the Southern Command area and for t 'llo U.S . Divisions to g o into South '.Vaes. The general l expects to keep the divisions moving from cnmp to camp, taking air support training in one p lace , amphibious in another and combined arms in a third. This wi l l g ive them tcugh marches and pe rfect their orderly movement. It will also keep the Germans guessing as to w her e the divisions are sta tioned. ( The 1st Divisi on will . have special training si nce it must be ready fo r either SLEDGEHAM or TORCH. The others will be MER prepared for ROUNDUP.TORCHwill involve ship - to - shore landin g so the 1st Division must perfect this type of ope r ation. This outf it will also relieve either the 38th or the 77th British divisions . The 38th is in the Poole - Bournemouth area but Gener a l Clark feels that may be too vulnerable for amphibious training because of the danger of German raids. During the past three days the amount of German a ir r e connaissance from Beachey Head to Start Point has increased sixfo ld. There has been intensive reconnaissanc e of ou r entire area and the ge ne r al s ays the Germans apparently ar e lookin g for activity by Am erican troops and attempting to determine if we are bringing up l and in g boats or doing amphibious training . Yesterday a Germa n plane fl ew over the Bulford camp, near Tidworth where we have tr oops, and straf ed cars and pedestr ians. One Britis h sold i er reporte d ly was sho t in the le g . The general believes Divi sL:n r e lieves th e 7 7th Then the 1st could do its remot e from Ge rman bombers ( * · - UJ would be mor e feasible if the 1st Britis h Division in the Cornwall area. amphib .;. us tr ainin g in an are a more o or scoute rs . * * �- t LONGFORD Ci-1STLE, JULY 30 , 1942 -- Gene ral Lee , commander of the SOS, and Brigadier Gener a l Lar kin , ETO Engineer , confer with General Clar k . The Cor ps comm ander out lin es his entire training plan . Units unde r t he commands of Generals Lee and Larkin must do the construction work. All three ge ner als want the gr een li ght so th ey can start wor k i mmedi ately on d ivis ional areas but they must await a cti on from the British and the U.S . Navy. The genera l p l ans on going to London Monday to talk over the ent ir e trainin g pro gr ~m-- particu l arly amphibious - - with Lor d Mountbatten, SOS, U. S . Navy representativ es and officers of the European Theater and the II Army Corps. I n a l etter to General Eisenhower , Gene r al Clark outlines h is t r i p to Appl edo r e , suggests i t would be v a luable for amphib l ous tr a ined divi sions to refresh their t rain i ng in England and proposes a divisiona l area near Appled ore . The gene r al also writes the Theate r Commander that each day , as he lo oks back on informat i on gi ven General Marshall during the recent London co nferen c e , he becanes more horr ifi ed by t he mis -s tatements given to the confer ees . He cit es that General Marshall was told there were eno u gh boa t s for four invasion combat teams . Later, G .ene r al Clark was told only thr ..,e such t eams could be supp lied with boats . Now he has a memora ndum from Colonel Slocum tellin g h i m th ere i s sufficient craft for only t wo such teams. Fac ts , not guesses , General Clark writes, must be the basis of de ci sions and event~ are proving that qu ic k answers that are h Hl f - guesses cannot be tole r ated . He po ints to the impo r tance of cold, hard facts in making decis io ns . We had another air r a i d a l arm today , our third in the pa st fo ur days . It l a sted f r om 2 : 50 to 4 : 05 AM General Clark stresses . the i mportance of every officer and man lea rning to act qu ickly and pro c eeding immediately to his she lt er area or slit trench . W ar e only 22 mi l es from the English e Channel and the genera l sa ys bcmb e rs coul d be over us fast and " knock the place down ." The_ Gennans are based on th e Fr ench coa st and it is only a short flight over he re . Headquarters offic e rs and troo p s are not going to escape the general~s physical cond iti on i ng p r ogram . He plans on prescribing f :le~d exercises in which the Corps will move out and s et up command p osts . This will be done so each secti on can shake down , determi ne exact l y wha t eq ui pmen t it will t ake , ho w much transp ort ation i s needed and how ne c essary mater i a ls must be loa ded . I t wi ll also teach headquarte rs troops on how to bette r camo flauge thems el ves. When the divis i ons move into the district and beg i n t aking the freq u ent 25 mile marches , General Clark plans on hav i ng a few headquarters officers and enl ist ed men make the movement with them for hardening . ( * * �LONGFORD CASTLE, JULY 31, 1942 - - General Clark , accompanied by Col onel Ferenbaugh and Li eutenant Colon e l Dabney of t he II Army Corps plans an d traini ng s ec tion , tour th e Poole - Bournemouth area , on th e Eng li sh Channel west of Southampton , to see if t he section wil l serve ad equate l y as an amphi b ious train ing area for the 1st Div ision . Desp:lt e Br i tish army opinion that the r eg ion i s no t f i t for suc h work , General Cla rk t h inks it h as possibil i t i es . While it is not i dea l, t he gene r al believes amphibious tr aining c an be car~ied on by one r eg iment at a time . Sinc e th e 1st Divisi on has alr ead y had amphibious trainin g , it i s the gene r a l's conviction t hat re gimenta l traini ng wi l l be practical . Use of this area will in vo lv e increas ed dan ge r of Ge rman a ir attack bu t Genera l Clark say s it will h ave heavy Anti-Aircraft prot ection . Units down t he re ar e expe ri en c ed . They shot down fo ur German pla ne s i n the re gio n last n i ght , the Gener al s ays . He pro pos es that two Automat ic Weapons Batt a lion s be stati oned v,it h the 1s t Divi sion and that their weapons be mounted on t h e i nvas i on boats s o th ey c an wor k with r e gimen ~s as they g o thr ou gh their invasi on p r a ctic e·. Them, if t he troops are attacke d while they are training , the aut omat ic weapons will g iv e th em pro t ection and they c an wor k un de r v irt 4a l invasi on cond i t ions . Anot he r reason the ge neral lik es t he Poole-Bournemouth area is because Portl an d Harbor wil l gi ve the 1st Divi sion a chance to practice sh i p -t o-shcr e landing which th e y must know for e it he r SLEDGEHAMMER TORCH or . The general wants to h ave unde r his command four of the six A utomatic Weapons Battalions sche du l ed to ar rive soon . He wants them fo r close - in work with h i s troops . Two of them would be at t ache d to the 1st Division and would r emain permanently so the weapons tro ops and the amphibious in va ders would und er stand ea ch oth er's technique and have comp l e te co nfide nce in each ot her. General Cl ark wants the other t wo batt a lions to be att a che d to the Army Corps as Anti-Aircr a ft Bri gad e h eadq uarters. These t wo units woul d be l oaned out for clos e - in work wit h othe r divisions doing amphibious tr a ining . The rema inin g two battalions would be u nd er the Anti-Aircraft Comm and which is pa rt of the ETO. General Cl ark has b e en opp os ed from the start to the Anti Aircr aft Comma . He claims it sets up anothe r he ad quarte rs th at nd s lo ws th i ngs up , makes oper a t i ons and tr a inin g more involved a nd calls for expe nditu re of v aluable p er s onnel that c ould be used to greater advan tag e in the ETO or the Gr ound Forc es . It brin gs d if fi cu lti es b e cause t he he ad of the Command naturally wants to keep t hes e Autom at i c weapons Batt a l i ons directly unde r him. The gene r al believes t hat preparations for i nvasion and the invasion its e lf sh ould not involv e coo pera t ion b etwee n Grou nd Forces, Navy , Air, Anti - Aircr aft and th e o th e r units. He is con- �( - vinced there should be unity of command over all thes e branch e s so the entire opera t ion will be und e r one man. He is willin g to assume that responsibility and believes he should sinc e he is charged wit h plannin g both SLEDG EHAMER and ROUNDUP M . * * L0NGFORDCASTLE AUG. 1 , 1942- - Follo win g a tour of t he , Pool e -Bournem outh area, Bri g ad ier General Roosevelt and other 1st Division office r s of th e advance echelon call on Ge ne r al Clark to bell him they ar e convinced they can tr a in in that region. It is virtually decided that the 1st Division will set up near Pool e and relieve the 38th British division . The Go ander of the Ground Forc e s discloses mm he is fi gh tin g to h ave compl e te comm and ov er am phibious operations and training . I n a letter to General Eis enhower h e sta t es that sinc e th e Grou nd Force Comm er has "pri mary i nter e st" in the invasion and trainin g and ex e cution, "he should h ave p rimary responsibility an d sho u ld be ch arg ed wit h making r e comm endati on of sites t o th e The a t e r Comma er after coordinating nd wit h th e Navy an d SO co.'llllla S nders . " He declares the Navy "sh ould not direct and supervise thes e train in g c enters, nor app oint the command in g officers ther e of . " "The object of the train i n g ," General Clark writes in ob j ecting to amphibious tr a ining pl a ns outlined in a letter frcm Col onel Barker, "mus t be to enable groun d troops, prop er l y su p port ed, to g e ,:; ashore in prop e r formation and prop e r conditi on to exe cute the assault, This will re quire th e c oordin a t ed action of all elements: boat crews, ground forces , and direct sup p ort aviation . Coordination imp lies unity of command and since th e ground force will make up the major element and will pres ent the ma jor trainin g problem, it is logical that t ha t comm d s h ould b e v e sted in th e an Task Force Comm ander, w ho is in the best position to dir ect t he unified training of h is various e lem ents that go to mak e up the assa u lt. His representativ e should b e in comm and of th e s e tr aining c enters in ord er t o assure that train ing is direct ed in ac c ord ance wi th t h e train i n g pro g ram prescrib ed by th e Task Force Comm er . " and General Clark maintains that the amph ibious force comm ander should be attached , to him both durin g preparation and th e invasion op eration . The I I Army Corps command er writes General Eisenhower th a t he is "perf e ctly willin g to acce p t the responsibility" of running the amphibious cent er s . "I have grave doubts," the letter concludes, "that this combined training will work smoothly if these centers are placed und e r Navy Command. 11 { The general is going to London for conferences M ay with ond Lord M ountbatten, ETOUS Army Cor p s , SOS and Navy offici a ls A, concernin g am phibious training . He plans to outlin e h is plan f or unity of command. He has asked that of f ic e rs be sent who can make decis l ons" and speak for th e ir boss e s. 11 He hopes to get t he entire problem of comma decided so work can go forward. nd � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, July 1-31, 1942 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from July 1-31, 1942. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1942 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Language A language of the resource English Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/555 Date Valid Date (often a range) of validity of a resource. 1940-1949 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/5ef07625e07fa9a1838a2ffd4d81d6f9.pdf?Expires=1773878400&Signature=TRmDCIwVcbWdN9i8pSVfEYL9u0JJ7pjJNu7dMBApt5p1UxxkAiDkGJK2JA4esW74v6GOFVZqks9dMhw3q2xl5QYlQIljri1qdgA1GPsV3ISRn7rWWE7A6c6Vv6VzpSFdLrUz83kceq5KTGDd5tj99%7ELry%7E5IUmMZh-pbNJd0i3WSwBB6flei%7EXK%7E4ArSh9-0R700C3O3usV-y2jQMDuhL2nRaABPNAPOlAl%7EAV9TA-Zx%7E97544bY0Py3AB8RE03t61IjHENhUEjy2omfnaSuEEz7W%7EQ6nKvyyJ%7Ezuice9Io0WCh9cGzYpUQHJ1TiVhGIsFn70OmqaqIhIUY3hDJi3A__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 24c95131a98e6531c4269c6aacb8ed80 PDF Text Text THE CITADEL . , ·" . ".. .· ... , ARCHIVES AND MUSEUM ( vinced there should be unity of command over all thes e branches so the entire operati on will be und er one man. He .is willing to assume that; responsibility and believes he should since he is charged with planning both SLEDGEHAME and ROUNDUP MR . L0NGFORDCASTL , AUG 1 , 1942 -- Following E . a tour of the Poole-Bournem outh area, Brigadier General Roosevelt and other 1st Division officers of th e advance echelon call on General Clark to ]bell h _m they are convinced i they can train in that region . It is virtually decided that the 1st Division will set up near Poole and relieve the 38th British division . •" The Oommander of the Ground Forces discloses he is fighting to have complete command over amphibious operations and t raining . In a letter to General Eisenhower he s tates that since the Ground Force Comm ander has "primary interest" in the invasion training and ex e cution, 'he should h ave primary responsibility and should be charg ed with making recorrnnendation of sites to the Theater Comm er after and coordinating with the Navy and SOS commanders . 11 He declares the Navy "should not direct and supervise these train ing centers, nor app oint the connnanding officers thereof . n The object of the training," General Clark writes in objecting to amphibious training plans outlined in a letter frcrn Colonel Barker, nmus t be to enable ground troops, properly sup p orted, to g et ashore in prop e r formation and proper condition to execute the assault . This will re quire the coordin a ted action of all elements : boat crews, ground forces, and direct sup p ort aviation. Coor dination implies unity of command and since the ground force will make up the major element and will present the ma jor training problem, it is logical that that comm and should be vested in the Task Force Commander, who is in the best position to direct the unified training of his various elemen t s that go to make up the assault . His representative should be in command of these tr aining centers in order to assure that training is directed in accordance with the training program prescribed by the Task Force Comma nder . tt 11 General Clark maintains that the amphibious force cormnander should be attached ~to him both during preparation and the invasion operation. The II Army Corps commander writes General Eisenhower th a t he is 11perfectly willing to accept the responsibilitytr of running the amphibious cente r s . "I have grave doubts, 11 the letter concludes, "that this combined training will work smoothly if these centers are placed under Navy Command. 11 The general is going to London for conferences Monday with Lord Mountbatten, ETOUS Army Corps, SOS and Navy officials A, concerning amphibious training. He plans to outline his plan for unity of command . lie has asked that officers be sent who can make decis i ons" and speak for their bosses . " He hopes to get the entire problem of co m mand decided so work can go forward . �The general, despite his forthrightness and brevity, is exceedingly human. Today he sends out his fir s t "birthday letter to an officer under his command. He plans to send similar letters to each officer when his anniversary arrives. ttere i s a t yp ical one: "Dear . Lieutenant: "Today being your birthday , no doubt your thoughts instinctively will be turn e d to your loved ones at home. W h th e hope of helping it to fill the ~oid caused by your separation, I want to extend my best wishes . "I hope that the combin ed American - British re sources can bring about the destructiom of our common enemy in time for you to be at home on your next birth d ay . "Sincerely, (signed) Mark W. Clark, "Major General, "Commanding . 11 11 11 U. S.A . , * ( L~NGFORDCASTLE, AUG. 2, 1942--The American Red Cross hospital in Salisbury is being turned over to the United States Army for the duration and last night General Clark entertained the nurses, many of w hom are joining th e Army Nurse Cor p s . A few are returning to the United States and officers try and convince them they should remain here and help . The gene ra l says the hospital, past year to take care of pulmonary diseases , must be expanded materially which has been used for the tr ouble and commu icable n fo r our use . The nurses are driven from the hospital to New Hall, the general's quarters, in jeeps chauffered by officers . There are about 35 nurses and 60 officers at the dancing and buffet party . After having Sunday dinner at Cowesfield where our headquar Engineers are quartered, General Clark, accompanied b y Major c.c. Smith, leaves at 1530 for London and conf'erences concerning his having corrm1and over all phases of amphibious training and operations. He plans on talking over the involved problem with General Eisenhower tonight so they can get cleared away for the confer en ces tor11orrov1 . ters I. ON OON ,1 :...:..:. -=.----~- AUG. 3, -~..:::: t 1942 -- General fight to have amphibious training under his will soon go to I reland to pick the training can be started. Clark direct area today won his command . He so construction �48 LJuring a discussi on this mor n ing with General Spaatz and Adm ral Bennett, i General Clark outlined his plan for the settingup and op eration of amphibi ous training areas. W hen Admir al Bennett of the US Navy passed around a paper stating his vie ws on how training should oper ate, General Clark disa greed since Admiral Bennett's ideas were exactly t hose cont a :4l-~d in the plan of Col onel Barker and to which the gener al alrea dy had taken exception. General Eisenhower suggested that Admiral Bennett, General Clark and the gener al's am phibious expert, Colonel O'Daniel, confer and reach an agreement. As soon as the general out l ined his vie ws in det a il, Admir al Bennett agreed to 100 percent coope r ation. He said his sole mission would be to train the boat crews so they can handle, service and navigate the sma ll . craft and put the inva din g forces on the proper beach. Adm ral Bennett accepted Gener al Clark's i suggested North Ireland training location and agreed to get the prop e r craft and submit tp a ining plans. These will be r eported to General Clark's expert who will then give the Navy its instructi ons for proceeding. r At 1500, Generals Clark and Ei s enho wer and Lord Louis Mountbatten mee t wit h repres entatives of the British W Office, ar the British Admiralty, Air Go an d , SOS, ETOUSAand the Ground rmn Forces. After three hours of d iscussion, the grou p accept ed Gener al Clark's rec omm endations on amphibi ous comm and and training methods. A letter was dictated to the British W Office. ar General Clark took 15 of h is own officers to the meeting and, lau~ hingly explains, "I was able to ou tvote them for the first time!' General Clark then made arrang ements fo fly to North Ireland on W ednesday to l ook over the pro p osed train i ng center. He will take Navy officers and members of his own staff with him. Lat e r, General Clark discussed with the British his plan for moving our 1st Division into the Poole area. The British, he says, "bucked a bit" but t h ey acceded when he told them that un less he foll owed t h is plan he would be un able to relieve the British 38th Division, no w holding the re gi on. He added that all the antiinvasion installations in the Pool e area would have to came out so the 1st Division could practice landings on the on ly available hard beach. The Briti8h agreed but said that d ef ense of the area would be his problem. He replied he had no doubt he could solve it. So the Poole area is go ing to be used by the 1st Division. * LONGFOD CASTLE, AUG. 3, 1942--The British R Broadcasting Syst em sends an announcer and technician do w today to make tr ansn criptions of a program that will be broadc ast this coming Sund ay night to the United States. ( Twenty-three enlisted men and two officers particip a te. Half of th em a r e i nt e rvie wed on th e ir r ea c tio n s to Eng l and and the ir �-- 49 - . ~ ✓ '.~. .':.. .... ~ _" , :- . ... :. jobs. The remainder pa rtici pate in a round-table, barber-shop discussion. Parents and friends of the soldiers participat in g will be notified that their men will be on the air. The program, which will be carried by 147 stations in the U.S., is known as "The stars and Strip es in Bri tain. 11 It is shortwaved to New York then rel ayed over longwave. The first big batch of ma il in several evening. Mail from home is so very important * days arrives to everyone. in the * LONGFORD CAST LE, AUG. 4, 1942--Plans for the TORCH(North African) operation are increasing in scope and momentum. and Gene r al Clark is apprehensive that ROUNDUP,which he is charged with planning and executing, may be postponed until 1944, if not indefinitely. That, the general explains, might be a "great calamity." He is alarmed that TORCHwill act as a sponge, taking away from his planned operation the necessary ships to transport his Ground Forces to the United Kingdom to prepare for the contin ental assault. If the TORCHoperation is successful it may take more and more p lan es that would be training to support ROUNDUP;it would take aw:-;_ytroop and car go ships and naval vessels that would pa:-ticipate in the French Coast op eration ; and it might actually take away troops that are scheduled to participate in the opening phases of ROUNDUP. The general is alarmed lest TORCHbe executed at the expense of his mission and that it will leave him with insufficient air power to soften up the French Coast for the assault or without sufficient ships and men to undertake the operation successfully . Two newspapermen and a newspaperwoman come to headquarters today . They are the first to show up since our arrival. The general chats in his office with Myron Berger of the New York Times, Paul Manning of N.E.A. and Maxine Davis of the Saturday Evening Post . He stresses to them the amicability of BritishAmerican troop relations and tells of the problem confronting negro troops arriving in England . Manning is going to do a "profile sketch" of the general w hile Berger i s interested in writing a story about New York men over here- -a "Brooklyn Bum in A e ountry Castle" theme along the lin e s of "A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court." Miss Berger talks to both troops and Salisbury resid ents about the British-Americ an relations . NORTHERN RELAND AUG 5 , 1942- - The major amphibious I , . train ing base for the Army Ground Forces in the European The ater of Operations is tentatively selected tod a y as General q1ark, members -:.t· .- : :.- ~ •. , - . , -. -·-"" "! ':: ..--- �50 ( J of his st a ff area between and Navy pers onnel inspect the North I rish Coast the mouth of Loch Foyle and the Bann River . A United States Army cargo transport picks Genaral Cl ark and h i s party up at the Oa t field RAF airdrome , near Salisbury , and i t t akes off for Ir e l and a t 0806 . We f l y ov er parts of England where p l anes wi th the U. S. blue circle and white star haven ' t been seen be f ore . The sh i p c ar ri es Very lights and a message flasher in case we are challenged . Sev eral times Hurricanes and Spitfires climb up to inspect us, then dart away . The we ather is perfect until we hit the English Coast of the I rish Sea . The beautif u l l y tilled and hedge - b ordered f i e l ds pass beneath us in crazy - quilt patterns of deep greens , l ight browns , pea greens and amber browns . We pass over several a i rdrames and large to w , hitting ns the coast at 0914 . Genera l Clark spends most of his time forward with the pilot and co-pilot . He takes the controls for a while . over the to 7, 000 feet Br adley , drops exactly on our islands and at the bi-motored keep under the Ir i sh Sea we h it heavy ov e r cast and have to climb to keep above it . Finally , the pilot , Captain down through it and we are ov er the Isle of Man, course . At 0956 we are ov er the I rish coastal 1016 we hit the I r i sh coast and thund er along in ship at an altitude of from 800 to 1, 000 feet to low - hanging clouds . For a time we lose ourcourse and find we are fly i ng ov er neutral Eire . I f we had to put do~n we would be interned. We know we are the first U~S. warplane to fly over Eire! F inally , we hit the Atlant i c Ocean and d i scover we are ov er Donegal Bay . W head northwest e over the well-kept I rish farm country and at 1138 we arri v e at an RAF airdrame , Eng l inton, near Londonderry . Genera l Clark is met by Major General Hartle , commander of our Vth Army Corps . We ar e taken immediat e ly by autamobiles to the p~oposed amphibious area , 15 miles away . General Clark ' s party consists of Colonels Ga le , Ferenbaugh , O' Daniel, Dabney and Lieutenant Beard wood . The navy men with us are Command r e w Ansel , operati ons officer under Admi ral Bennett; Lieutenant .c. Com mand e r Shiler , constructi on officer , and Ensign Donovan . The proposed amphibiou s area has 8 1 000 yards of beach with a 25- yard apron of hard packed sand that le ad s back to dunes covered wit h har sh grass and low bushes . The water , Gene r al Clark , finds , is d ee p e noug h for small bo a ts and the are a is so formed that ship-to-shore l andings c ould be p r a cticed . The necessary naval facilities are nearby . Gener a l Clark is highl y p leased with the area and says it is ak in to the ty pe of shoreline that our troops will run into when they attempt eith er SLED GEH.AMN.ER ~r1:tO~UP. At some spots the English , as ant i- invasion defense , hav e installed pilings , pill �( -- boxes and barbed wire. Behind the beach , dunes stretch back until they become matted hillocks that would make goo d defensive positions against beach landings . The genera l stresses that .there is a similarity bet ween the neutralization problem here and the one that troo ps are likely to run into on the French coast . The northwest end of the 8 1 000 yards of practical b ea ch has about 1 , 0 00 yards of cliff where invasi on troo p s will be able to fire ball ammunition as they make their p ractice assaults . The entire area is quite isolated, r e achable only by nar row roads that alrea dy have sentries and tank blocks. The proposed region for landings has a six to eight foot tide . There is a sandb a r across part of the l anding area but General Clark says natural obstacles will make the training area even more valuab l e . North winds will whip the sea up , giving the troo ps practice in both rough and smooth wa ter. General Clark des crib e s the area as II splendid II and he holds innumerable waterside conferences with Colonel O' Daniel , Colonel F erenbaugh and General Hartle . They make tentative plans for bringing in the first unit f or training- probably the 34th, part of General Hartle's Army Corps . After inspecting the are a closely , the party, which is accompanied by Major Rawlins , a British officer on the staff of the North I reland Corrnnand, goes to Coler aine for luncheon. They then g o to the mouth of the Bann River, near the amphibious area, and the Navy experts say the re g ion will be perfect for mooring small invasion craft . The party continues on to Londonderry, second largest city in North I reland, and then returns to the airdrome at 1642 . 11 Our p lane , named tb:.e "Nazdarovia, takes off at 1709 and , before heading for England , we cruise over the a rea we have been inspecting all day on foot . The sandbar is easily seen from the are a and it is marked in on the detailed maps we have with us . ~uring the trip home , members of the general's staff confer with the navy men on a rou gh table b olted to the floor in the t a il of the plane . They sketch tentative installa tion and training plans as we fly over Belfa s t and start across the Irish Se a . Once again the sight of an American plane over the area creates interest . The pilots get inquiry flashes f rom the ground and they reply with their sign al ligh ts . The code le tt er with whic h a friendly cr a ft identifies itself changes every hour; so does the col or of the friendly signal g iven by ~ery lights . l The plane al ights at Salisbury at 1932 and the gener a l and his staff drive to New Hall . The three Naval officers fly back to London. I n an informal meeting with his staff, General Cl ark says the Loch Foyle re gion will su it the amphibio us t r aining purposes fine . Furth er conferences will be held with the Navy and ETO before the first tr aining force is sent in for its s ix to nine week course that is scheduled to conclude with a mock inva sion acro ss 80 miles of the North Channel nith an assault on the Scotti sh Coast . �LO NGFORDCASTLE, AUG. 6, 1942--The strange case of General Char les De Gaulle, tall, somber-faced leader of the Eighting French, was outlined today by General Clark as he recounted a meeting in London with the most enigmatic man of the war to date. f. The British have been reluctant to give De Gaulle any highly secret information concerning their plans and the French Fighter, hoping to find something out, scheduled a conference with General Marshall just before the second Front conferees left London on July 29. The British feel they can't trust De Gaulle because he is so eager to promote his own interests. As he wanted to sidestep General De Gaulle's obvious attempt to circumvent the British and obtain secret plans, General Marshall had Admiral King and Generals Clark and Eisenhower and Brigadier General W.B. Smith attend the conference with De Gaulle in Admiral Kin g 's hotel room. The French general, realizing something was in the wind, wanted to find out about TORCH so he could be in on one of the biggest potential developments of the war. This would add stature to his hoped-for position of being the outstanding French post-war figure. ( General De Gaulle was obviously displeased when he entered the hotel r oom and found that instead of being alone with General Marshall , four other American officers also were p resent. He shook hands limply with them and ignored them throughout the conference. The French general, tall, thin and gaunt, entered the hotel roam with an aide-interpreter who was as drab a s De Gaulle. The Fi ghting French leader shook hands with the officers "with a hand as cold and clammy as a spitoon, 11 General Clark recounted. "It was evident that he wanted a p rivate audience with Gene r al Marshall, that he resented our presence and that he felt General Marshall had let him do w 11 n. Admiral King, in honor of the French general, had ordered a bottle of champagne. A glass was poured for each man p res ent but De Gaulle, who stared icily at everyone but General Marshall, didn't touch his drink. De Gaulle told the Americans he was placing at their disposal the handful of French troops he has in England, French South Africa, New Caled onia, Syria and other possessions. In a deep voice, he told the officers with what joy the Fighting French would welcome the opening of a Second Fr ont. He then asked General Marshall what he could tell him. General Marshall told De Gaulle how America ap p reci a te d the fine work being done by the Free French. Admir al King then made an equally polite but secret-free speech. De Gaulle, obviously impatient and upset, said to General Marshall blu n tly through his interpreter: ( "Tell me about the Second Front plans!" �~ 53 t~ ~ , Once sgain General \Marshall spoke in genera lities, oDlli"tting any reference to specific plans such as TORCH or RO UNDUP Admiral . King again took part of the conversational load off General Marshall . Soon De Gaulle found that he was going to ~et no specific informa tion and told the .Americans that he would' take no more of your time . " He shook hands in the same fish - like way and , followed by his aide , "a stiff automaton who sat there parrotlike , repeating throughout the conference what Gen er al De Gaulle had said," marched out of the hotel room. As soon as De Gaulle had left , General 11 the other officers and said: Isn 1 t that the 11 1 ve t h ing y ou ever seen! They then discussed agreeing that he might have a keen military totally devoid of per s onality or leadership Marshall turned to most pathetic De Gaulle .·s pla ce, mind but tliat he was qual ities. General Clark desc r ibed De Gaulle as: "Absolutely without personality and lacking any personal magnetism . He may be an excellent military expert but it was easy to see why he is the United Nations' problem child." The group agreed that De Gaulle's collaboration and the cooperation of the liberty-lovin g people in France was essential . The revolt must be timed to coincide with our invasion and such plans eventually must be made . { General ~lark , in recounting the meeting with De Gaulle, said there had been discussion concerning how th e British raid on St. Nazarre was timed to coincide with a French uprising . The French rioted and shot German so ld iers and police . When the big commando raid wa s over , The Germans shot hundreds of rioters and made every effort to .crush their spirit . "There's only one good revolt left in the French people," Gen eral Clark says. "It must be carefully timed to come with the opening of the Second Front so it wi ll benefit our operation. W must drop weapons and ammunition by parachutes e to them so they c an be as effective as possible . " . He s a id a tin . 45 gun has been developed extremely effective at other materiel will be pistol that looks like a dime-store toy for su pplying underground armies . It is close range . The guns , amm tion and uni drop p ed with instructions . I n the late afternoon today , Margaret Bourke - White , tre famous Americ Pn woman phot ogr apher, arrives to do series of pictures for Life magazine. She is accompanied by Lincoln Barnett, European news edi~or of Time magazine . Miss BourkeWhite , who has already covered wars in Spain, China and Russia , wants to accompany General Clark ' s forces when the European invasion comes . * * �• ;, ' # ~ ~~~:..~-:!~,.., ~~ .- :~:' " ~: :_•' .. .,· . ( ) LONGFORD CASTLE AUG 7 , 1942 -- Thi r ty - nine newspapermen, , . representing the major United Nations news agen c ies and indiv idual newspapers in Lon~~n, New York , Boston , Kansas City and Chicago , had a mass inte1,view today with General Clark in the lounge room at New Hall . F ollowing a buffet the garden , Then , sitting room , he faced reporters chairs . I n the audience Africans and Australians woul d be "on the record luncheon , the Gen eral was photographed in in a chair at the head of the lounge lounging before him in r ows of folded were Ameri c ans , Br i t i shers , Swedes , South . The general to l d them that ev erything ." Aft er explaining his command and that at pre sent the only troops in England were service units , the general said this area,J\~ ', wou ld soon house "thousan d s up on tho u sands" of fighting tro ops . ''/ t\ "American troops ," the general sa i d , "are not over ·here to sit v,lt~Jl' on their back - ends on the defensive . We' re here t o take the of- f fe n sive , and , the sooner t he better as far as we a r e concerned ." He added that he was sorry but he cou l d say nothihg de f inite about the opening of the Second Fr ont . He exp l ained that his troops would concentrate on amphibious tr a ining and on Air - Ground c ooperation . He told corr e spondents that the troops coming over were among the finest in the United Sta t es and that the train i ng they would receive in Bri tain would be "specialist training for offensive operation . 11 You can draw your ovm assumptions , it will include amphibious training . 11 Junerican troops , he continued , will be toughened up by long o-, marches -- up to 25 miles -- and that infan t ry wi ll learn to advance s~J s l, with artillery fire breaking as close to them as possible . He (~J •' " warned that men would get hurt but that they must learn to have t~~ trust in their supportin g units and work under realistic cond itions . He told British correspondents that he wanted to make his Ground Forces "as hard as the British soldiers wh o are hard , tough and fine . " He said he was certain that present - day U. S . troops are far superior to those of the 1917 - 18 A. E . F . One of the present - day faults of armies , however , is that they are road bound . "They want to ride to battle in trucks , " the general said . "They ' re going to get out of that habit . " The general also dis discussed Anglo - American relations, the p roblems presented by the arrival of negro tr9ops and told the ne wspapermen of rationing problems . ( He thre w the conference open to questions and finally closed it by telling newspapermen he wanted no personal publicity . "I haven't commanded troops in ba t tle yet," th e general told them . "Until I have p roven my fitness , the less said about me the better .,, �( ) Since the general has to prepare to depart for Scotland where he will greet the 1st Division, he has onl y tin 1 f or more picture e taking in the garden before he bids the newspapermen goodbye . The party is then taken to the Cas tle headquarters, ·shown through the section of f ices and the art gallery. The newspapermen then choose what they want to do: inspect officers and troops quarters, interview enlisted men or browse around the headquarters area. They c atch the 1642 train back to London . During the morning, the general meets with Navy Officers an d his Army Corps amphibiou.s exper t s to outline to the m his plans f or amphi biou s training . The Navy and II Army Corps g~p will tour proposed a r eas at Poole , Appledore and in the Cornwall area during the next four days . The gener al , accomp an ied by Colonels Adcock and 1arkoe and Lieu.ten ant Barker, lea ves at 15 45 for Cheltenham to join General Lee who is also making the train trip to Scotland . ( GU.nROO .:£OT.LAND AUG. 8, 1942--The 1st Division , less one Kj , ba t talion of the 16th Infantry which is alre ady at Tidworth, arrives here this morni ng aboard the Queen Mary. The former crack liner , carrying more troops than any ves se l has ever carrie d before, made a six 4 day dash across the Atlantic without any protection exce p t for the first day out of New York and the l ast day out of Scotl and . Generals Clark and Lee g o out to the ship aboard a lighter soon after dawn. As they draw alongside t he troop - cram med trans t port, General ~lark is a stounded at the siz e of "the biggest thing I ever sa w af lo at . " The Q een Mary has 15 ,045 persons u abo ard -the entire 1st Division , less one battalion, and the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion whic h is at t ache d. M en are sleeping everywhere. General Cl ark confers with General Terry Allen, 1st Division co mma der, an d his high~ranking n officers . General Allen reports th at the m orale of the men is high, th at dis cipline has been g ood and that deb a rk ation plans have been perfected. A dang erou.s spots on the voyage, every officer t went below an d stayed alongside his particular outfit. Gener al Clark g oes ash ore wit h th e first li ghter lo a d of troops. At Gurr ock, the 1st Division starts boarding tr a ins fo r the lo ng trip to Tidworth . General Clark watches them board . A Scottish band pl ay s martial music and the Ame rica n Red Cross fu rnishes the of f icers and men with hot tea, sandwiches and cakes . ( The deb a rking from the Queen Mary and the train loading g oes s moothly. Gener a l Cl ark remarks th at the entire movement ttreflects the discipline and mor ale of one of our best divisions . - �~ ~ . : ;,, . --~·~·-~: ;;'"_! ;. - I I ) It is very foggy and rainy but General Clark stands on the docks and moves around the railr oad station from 0700 to 1900 , watching th e debarkation and l oading and talking to the enlisted men and officers . The ge neral says he feels great pride as he watches this t op-notch division , w:.L.thwhich he had been closely associated as former Chief of staff , Army Ground Forces , unload 1·or early combat duty. He has no doubt that the 1st Division will play an important part in the forthcoming fight . LONGFORD CASTLE, AUG. 9 , 1942 -- General Clark returns to II Army Corps headquarters following a night of train riding and an automobile trip to the Castle from Cheltenh am. He immediately plunges into conferences with his sections chiefs regarding reception of the 1st Division at Tidworth . The conferees also discuss plans for getting the 1st into immedi ate training . The conf erences l as t throughout most of the afternoon , then the general, accompanied by some members of the general staff, go to Fyfield Manor, home of Minister of Agriculture and N ~s. Hudson , for tea . Discussion • centers around a proposal that American troops, in small groups, help with the British harve s t and supplement the labor s n orta ges in localities where our troops will be stationed . ( The II Ar my Corps officers and Naval officials touring the proposed amphibious training centers in South ern England report back to the general, concurring in his selections, particularly the Poole area where, tentatively , the 1 s t Division is scheduled to train. W ith the receipt of the report , the general is able to g o ahead with plans for designating the necessary personnel, starting construction and making plans for troop move ment to the variolls centers. A letter concerning this ov er-all amphibious training pro gran , is drafted for dispatch to the Ellrope an Theate 1 of Operations . The . North Ireland base , near Londonderry , ·definitely will be set up and preparations for the less training areas will be started as soon as neces s ary. Another group of Army Corps office r s will fly to North Ireland to do additional reconnaissance and Sllbmit recommendations on the big amphibious base . LONDON AUG. 10 , 1942 -- London newsp apers ran extensive , stories today concerning Ame rican Ground Forces in Engl an d and about Major GeneJ al Clark. The correspondents visited the gen eral's headquarters near SaliSb llr y last Friday . ColTh uent inclllded: London Ti m - "Major Gen er a l Clark ••• has established eshis head quarters in England ••• General Clark, at the age of 4 6, is a vi g orolls leader of striking personality. He impresses one as the typic al de mocratic soldier, a man who rea dily gain s the co nf id en ce of hi s men and inspires them to give their best. Almost his first re mark today, when speaking to a par ty of British and Ameri can correspon - �,?';~;:,~~ ~-'.:. S'l ~>;,. ~~ > -~~ dents was: 'Obviousl y we are not over here to sit back and take the defensive ; if you asked me about the second front , all I will sa y is, 'the sooner the bette r . ' The troops comi ng ov er from the United states a re , he is satisfied, well trained . They are pi cked men, and the tr a ining they do here wi ll be speci a list training for offensive operation, inc lud ing amphibiou.s war fare • •• " \ London Daily 1'.drr or- - 0 ••• Gener al Clark •• • aims to make ev ery one of his men as h ard as the British soldiers --' who are hard , tou gh and fine' •• • He said this yesterday as he sat in one of the rooms of a be a utiful old English castle which is now his headquarters • •• This ta l l , pale, intensel y live and a ctive so l dier is one of the youngest Major Generals in the U. S. Army. He holds one of the key corrunands a nd when the Allies attack in the ry est his responsibili ties will be en ormolls . "The sooner the better as far as we are concerned , ' he said ••• " ( London Daily Express -- " L or General Clurk , deep::voiced 1 6 aj foot 3 inches tall , holding a cor,illl and of the U. s. Ground Forces in the Europe an Theater of Operations , greeted me at his H. Q• in England yesterd ay by saying: "American troops are not over here to tit · on· the if 'oack 1ends on the defensive . W 1 re here to take the e offensive -- the s ooner the better , as fa r a s we are concerned.' ••• This i s a general who will have a great respo n sibility and enormous problems when the Second Front opens ••• i our troops here are well trained- - better than the A.E . F. that went to France in the last war . I know what these troops can do .' •• • " LONGFORD CASTLE A , UG. 10 , 1942- - General Clark leaves in the early morning for London where he is to meet with the Anglo American comm , possibly and to discuss new phases of the TORCH operation. He lunches with General Eisenhower; Major General George R. Pat t on, tank warfare expert , and Lieutenant General Anderson who is with the British Middle East Forces . The general returns to his headquarters late , then has dinner at his New Hall qua rters in honor of Generals Loyd and Creagh. The original PU!POSe of the dinner was to have the British generals meet General Eisenhower , but , as had happened twice before , General Eisenhower , buried with work in London and particu l arly busy because of a l as t-minute war - plan devel opment, is unable to attend , so General Clark entertains the British generals despite the Theater Command t s absence • er . LONGFORD CASTLE AU 11, 1942- - The ent i re picture , G. of Genera l Cl a rk ' s co mman and his p osition d in the war has changed~ He is going to be Deputy Commander- In - Chief of the TORCHoperation~~ will It has been decided that TORC is definitely H on and that it be the big Allied offensive of 1942. The war Department has �cabled that TORCH must no longer be considered to ROUNDUPInstead , TORCHis now a substitute . entire ava~lable res ources of . both the United Britain Will be thrown into TORCH . a minor operation for ROUNDUP. The States and Great "I don't know what is going to happen to the II Ar-rey Corps coill1!1and the geneyal e~lains . "General Eisenhower is being ,~ buried with demands on him. He wants me to be his Deputy Com mander In - Chief on the British~American TORCHexpedition. The question was put up to me as to whether I wanted that job or whether I wanted to sit on a dead fish. " The general ' s decision wa s based on three factors: first , he felt he wanted to do what General Eisenhower wanted hi m to do-- take second comm and of the African expedition· second he did not want to run the risk of sitting the war o~t in a ;elatively inactive theater , despite the fact command of the II Army Corps wollld probably mean promotion to lieutenant general . Third he felt that th e decision was one of a combat or relatively non- ' combat command and he didn't want "to back away from fire . " The proposal that Gener al Clark be made Deputy Commander- In Chief of TORCHwas put up to the Com bined Comm anders meeting in London yesterd ay . General Clark was accepted for the command and a cable so instructing the wa:r Department was sent to Washingt on last night . From now on , general Clark will spend almost all his time in London, building up a staff for his part in the planning and execution of TORCH. The general says it hurts him to think of giving up command of the II Army Corps but that he will be returning to it from time to time . Also, part of the Corps will participate in the Mediterranean Coa st phase of the African invasion so his finger will remain, more or less , on the Corps' pulse . Nothing will be said for the ti m being about the gener al's new job . If sue~ an e announcement were made , the immedi ate query is going to be 'what is h~ g oing to do1" and that wollld not help the security of the TORCHopera ti on. _ f J~ ). Composition of the joint Americ an .British TORCHwill begin immedi ately. It will mean the good officers from the II Army Corps headquarters Theater of Operat ions staff and the Service of has alre a dy begun t-0 consider what men he wants important task . staff to direct .(O ,/ drafting of many ,~, ,1 , the European ( ~~ supply. The general J tf for this allr • Major General George R. Patton will comm and the Am rican e . rmy Corps that will make the African invasion from the Atlantic , l anding in the vicinity of Ca s ablanca . The g eneral praises him hi g hly and tells of his amic able rel ations with General Patton while Gener al Cl ark was Chief of Staff of the Army Groun d Forces . ( Command of the British half of TORCHhas chang ed three times in the p ast four days! The man handlin g the British end of the operation- - and who will be workin g under General ~isenhower who -,w :,.Y.1'>>:~.;. �will be Commander-In-Chief Anderson . ( of TORCH- will - be Lieutenant General At the start , General Auchinleck had complete command of the British !ddd le East campaign . Then it was felt that the load was too great for one man so Lieutenant General Alexander was designa~ ted to assist him. Because of the growin g importance of the African ope r ation, it was then decided to send Lieutenant General W H.E. Gott down to take com . mand of the British 8th Army. However , General Gott•s plane was shot down and he was killed while flying to his new command. British Lieutenant General M ontgomery had been designated to take over active command of the British phases of TORCHbut he was relieved , bec ause of General Gott's sudden death , and assigned to connnand the 8th Army. That left the TORCHassignment open ag a in and it was given yesterday to General .Anderson . "I hope , " smiles General generals won' t be that fast~" { Clark, "that the turnover on Ame rican Because of the TClaCHdevelopment , General Cl a rk confers wit h Colonel Fe renbaugh and orders him to ar r ange for the 1st Division to begin ship-to-shore amphibious training immediately. Parts of the 34th Divis i on , now in North Ireland , must also have this type of training so they can join with the Lst and British for ces in invading the .M editerrane an Coas t of J:i. frica. "This means a com plete chang e in the origin al plans for training of the 1st Division," the general says . ~rt looks as though it won't be able to g o into the Poole area and relieve the British 38th Division. The 1st can't be involved in coast defense respon sibilities if it is g oing to be used in TORCH the end of Octby ober . nHence, I must f i nd ano ther amphibious training site where I cu.n house the 1st Divis -ion and give it ship-to-shore training where it won't be burdened by relieving a Brit ish division. That site proba bly will be the .appledore r egion." During th e day, Genera l Cl a rk g oes to the Southern Com mand headquarters t o tell General Loyd of so m of the sudd en develop 4 e ments and advise him what it is going to mean in the general scheme of having American troops relieve British in the Southern Command area. • Regarding his new -Oob as Deputy Comman der-In-Ohief of the Afri can inva sion, General Clark says he f orsees the necessity of returning to the United states two or three weeks before General Patton's forces are ready to leave fro m the United states for a direct vassa u.lt on the coast near Casablanca. '- r "t'he two operati Atlantic ons (th a t is, the American attack coa st and the Anglo-American attack on the on the �-- 'r ~ ~~ "' ":,,.-~- '=a· yt ..:.. " . . . _.,. . .,, _.,,.,. _ .,. ,.. I / Mediterranean coast) must be synchronized carefully and I must satisfy General Eisenhower and nwself that preparations are going right and that the American attacking force leaving the United states is set to perform its mission . " The general receives a cable f~om the national convention the Military Order of the Purple Heart through which delegates extend him their felicitations . The general , , rep:Lying by letter tells the National Commander of his -a pp reciation, then writes: of , "I am very proud to be able to wear the Purple Heart. I have many wearers of this decoration in my command, all of whom are eager t o get this great allied effort under way. All other members of my command are anxious to get at grips with the enemy in order that we can bring to our country the success it deserves . I am sure that before this affair is over there will be many more candidates for the Milita r y Order of the Purple Heart for we intend to go where the bullets are flying and not sit back here on the defensive . n We see our first German planes this afternoon! Two Focke-Wolfe's come roaring over the Castle Area at 1623 . Almost half our officers and enlisted men are out under the trees takin g gas mask training. The planes, traveling at a terrific speed , go right over our heads but the pilots can't sp ot them because of the folia ge so they miss a prime chance . About two miles from the Castle, the Focke-Wolfe's dump two bombs, one falling near the Salisbury railroad station and the other at the edge of to w . The pilots n machine-gun the streets , hittin g only one military objective , a petrol tank-truck. The Germ.an raid was un~a.al in two ways. First, the planes hedge-ho pped all the way in from the Englis h 0hannel- - 22 miles- without an alarm being turned in until our troops spotted them from the Castle towers. Normally, the English air raid alarm system is very effective . The p lanes we re going so fast th e anti-airc r aft batteries around u s didn't h ave a chance to get their guns in firing position . second, the Germans came in very clear weather. Usually they come over to bomb w hen it is clo udy, even rain y . The barrage balloons in Salisbury weren't up . camp! The first sight of Germans causes * quite a stir around the -r. - LO NGFORD CASTLE AUG 12, 1942 - .:. a rking at top-speed , . w to clear up as much work as possible ·before he leaves for his new post, Gener al Clark prep ar e s to leave his II Army Corps headquarters . He probably wi l l r eturn only infrequently to the Castle e since hi s n ew head quarte r s will be in London . �.. I ,/ II In mid -mor ning he goes to Tidworth to make a wel comin g talk to the 1st Divi sion . However, j ust before he arrives, the division , whi ch has been massed in Ti dworth stadium , is dispersed because the British , j ittery about yesterday's surprise bombing by the Germans, d o not believe so many men should con p,regate in one s pot at the same time . The general , accompanied by General Al l en and Colonel Rooks , tours the 1st Division staging area . Troops, lean and strong looking , are marching back to their quart ers by companies. The ge ner al is pleased with their mora l e and the military bearing of the n ewlyarrived men . W ile at Tidworth , Golon el Ro.oks, who will be c arry i ng h a large share of t he II Army Corps loa d now that General Cl ark has a doub l e-barr e led assignment, gets word t hat t he Pre sid ent has sent his nomination for a bri gadier general ey to the Senate . General Cl ark is delighted . General Cl ark leaves for London at 11 20 to start work on his new task as Deputy Connnander -in-C hief of TORCH I nnnediat e l y , he . goes into conference with General Eisenho wer and finds that the War Department has c ab led back approval of hi s African invasion assi gnment . He al so is to retain command of the II Army Cor p s , at l east for the time being . Foll owing a conference with ETO, SOS, Navy and British officers , the general sets up h is headquarters in Norfolk House . The bare skeleton of a staff is here . Throu gh out t h e afternoon th ere a re con fer ences wit h Genera l Ande rson , the top British officer on TORCH; Brigadier General Jimmy Doolittle , the bomber of Tokyo ; General Lee , and others . Acc ording to General e1 a rk , General Anderson is "very a pp rehensive" about the sa gacity of doin g TORC The crux H. of the invasion is what the French in Tunisia will do . The French are re p orte d to h av e 150 , 00 0 troo p s in the area where the principal ass ault is to be made . In the evening Gen 0ral Cl ark dines wit h General Eis enhower . The working schedule of both generals is terrific . General Clark says he feels as thou gh he is "sit t ing on a th ousand volcanoes." * * LO NDON, AU 13, 1942--Brigadier G. Gener al Doolittle , one of the most fa.'1lous of the "aviation-era" personalities and the man w ho l ed the first bombing raid of Tokyo , is g oing to have charge of United States Air F or c e units that wil l participate in Torch. That decision is made today Commander-in -Chief of TORCH, has hower to make his own decisions , report what is being done to the hower . ( by General Clark, who, as Deputy been gi v en p ower by General Eis en p ick his per s onnel and mer ely Commander -i n-Chief , General Ei sen - Gener a l Cl ark conferred with Doolittle called in to discuss TORCH General Clark . then Asked Doolitt l e : "Who do you t h ink should handle the tiday . The flier outlined the plan air end of this?" was and �( - "That's a pretty tough one to answer , general "Ther e are a lot of goo d men • •• " "Do you think you I re one of them? "Well • •• Yes sir! Doo1i ttle. You•re ' 11 it! I t hi nk I'm Get go ing +" shot said job, 11 Doolittle . 11 the man for back 11 , the the replied gene ral. General Doolittle was flabberg asted at the qui ckness of General Clark's decision . Later that afternoon the general informs General Eisenhower of Doolittle's appointment . Most of the aircraft for TORCHwill cane from the Air Supp ort Command of General Spa atz . Gene ral Clark keeps a racehoFse schedule all day, dashing over to the ,t;u_ropeAn Theater of Operations headquarters twice to talk to General Eisenhower . W hen the general is at Norfolk House, one long conference after another is held in his office while phone men and carpenters wait in the hall outside to complete installation work. The principal conferees are Generals Cl ark , Pat t on , Doolittle, Guenther and Lieutenant General Anderson, Admiral Ramsey and Vice Air Marshall Welsh, the latter three British. General Anderson is doing a lot of bucking . ( An important after-dinner conference is held in the evening . General Clark makes the following statement on opening the meeting . I t is typical of him in its directness and brevity: "I have asked you gent lemen to come here in order to meet you , to let you look me over , and to tell you that I kn ow you crave in.fo rmation . I am probably more c onfused than you are at this moment but hope to get this operation clear in my own mind and be able to make decisions as they are presented to me . "First I want to make it clear that as Deput y Cormnander under Gener al Eisenhower, I have been .given full power by him to make decisions and issue orders in his name . This should facilitate our business . Ple ase let us make it clear now t hat all matter affected to wards operation which you think are decisions for the Comrnander in-Chief are to be taken up with me, ort, in my absence, General Geunther , instead of presenting them to General Eisenhower. "Organization is our first problem . By tomorrow I will have heard eaeh secti on ch ief's requirements for American personnel and will have made decisions as to what officers will be available to them . We have ample talent in the Theater , SOS and Ground Force headqua rters . I have no compunctions about pulling any of these people aw~y from those staffs providing we do not totally disrupt them in so doing . r ,, "I have a little information on decisions made today . I will ask General Geunther to r ead you a cablegram which has been sent to General Marshall . (This cable concerned needed equipment for the Torch operation ~. �I~ I lmow that General directive given him . 'So is sence of instructions from subordinate commanders will on the assumption that the are approved . 11 ( - Anderson is anxious to get a mission and Gener a l Eisenhower . However , in the ab higher le v els , dire c tives for important be prepared and issued to you i nnnediate l y plans presented to General Eisenhower .. "General Anderson - -the two Americ an regimental combat teams which are to be made available to you can be made . At the present time I will take , after discu ss ion with you, the necessary steps to have them reinforced as you desire. We can talk this over at a later time . "Vice- Air Marshall Welsh - -I am prepared your planning set - up . ·r will see you at your to discuss convenience 11 Admiral Rarnsey - - I have talked with Admiral the ground work for an appropriate nav al officer made available to you in this plan . "General Gale - -(British)--I want to talk to you about your ( am sorry set - up . 11 with . you Biery and have laid and staff t> be o I missed you today . I General Patton , the United States expert on tank warfare , is sittin g in on every conference . He will soon return to the United 'States to carry tre plans to General Marshall and beg i n preparing for the final training and departure of American units that will go str a ight from the United States into the TOR operation . CH * ation~ LONDON, AUG 14 , 1942 - -The terrific . pr oblems of and prepar for TORCHbe gi n to cane out in the open today . Because of the lack of equipment for the 1st Division, it app ear s certain that combat teams of the 34th Division, instead t he 1st , will operate in TORCHalongside the British . A difference of opinion is ari sing between American TORCHleaders over use of the American the British Air Force . of and The TORCHplan has been changed. The American invasion force that will come dire c tly over from the United States under General Patton is go ing to attack in the vicinity of Oran, on the Medit erranean , inst ead of at Casablanca , on the Atlantic Coast . The first objective of that force will be to establish beachheads and secure airdromes . General Doolittle's Air Force will be in direct support of the gro und forces under General Patton. The combined Anglo-British force will attack in the Bone-Algiers vicinity . General Clark confers with General Allen of the 1st Division and they decide it probably will be impossible to employ the 1st in TORCHbecause of its late arrival in the United Kingdan and because its equipment is not yet here . As a safeguard flor the possible use �( of the 1st Division , General Clark cables Washington to find out what is holding up the division's equipment and urging that its shipment be speeded . The ~~~th Division, at present in North Ireland under General Hartle, probably will take the spot originally set for the 1st . Regarding the difference of opinion over use of American air units , General Anderson., believing the British-American force landing in the Bone area will be subjected to heavier Axis attack , is dissatisfied with the air support being given him , particularly the light number of bombers . He admits the United States will have enough planes for the Oran operation but he says there will be no U. S. surplus for the British operation at Bone and Algiers . General Clark directs General Anderson and Vice - Air Marshall Welch to get together on the British requests and see if they can ' t provide sufficient air power fran British sources . Generals Clark , Patton and Allen oppose the attempt by the British to divert some of the United States Air Force to the British attack area . "We must not , " General Clark reports to General Eisenhower , "be placed in a position where it will be necessary for us to lessen the chances of success at Oran in order to make up for British deficiencies . After operati onal bases for aircraft have been established in Africa , the command can decide as to the employ ment of both United States and British air units , depending on the situation at that time . " ( I t is decided that there will be separate British gnd United States staffs for the air operations with liaison bein g carried on with the RAF ~ or the United States by General Doolittle , deputy corrnnander of air operations for the entire TORCH operation , and Colonel Vandenburg . The first priority of the operation will be the seizure of airdromes . · General An.de~son is told that one combat team of the 34th will train i n North Ireland for the invasion while the other team will use a base in Scotl and . General Clark phones Gener al Ryder, c~nmander of the 34th Division , and tells him to come to London so he can confer with General Anderson . ( The British report they can handle the problem of transporting both the British and American troops from the Unite d Kingdan to the Mediterranean . Admiral Ramsey says the British have several warships leaving tomorro w for the Mediterranean and he wants to send down six large , motor - powered invasion ba- ges so the -y can be convoyed to a Mediterranean parking spot . General Clark objects vigorously , declaring the movement of the invasion barges at this time will impair the security of TORCH The British . naval official points out that the weather between England and the Straits of Gibraltar is likely to be bad and the sea rough in the late fall and that it would be better for the barges to go now . General Clark rinally agrees to let three of the barges go by tomorro w' s convoy since the British moved two others do wn on a previous . Jllllilifp J ~ "~ - .;;.... . •>i. __ �oc c asion and the movement being si gnif ic ant . of three mi ght not be interpre~ed as A united States Navy dele g ation is instructed t o come from ·washington to Lon don so it c an confer with Admi ral Ramse y and t he British admi ralty about the TORCHproblems . It is r ecommended t hat a U. S. Fla g Office r be sent so h e c an remain h e r e to work with Admiral Ramsey a ft er the de l eg at i on retuns to t he Unite d s ta t es . General Patton is informed that the movement of his invasion force wil l b e und er connnand of the navy f r om the time it embar k s until the men go over th e side to att a ck . * * LONDN, AUG 15 , 194 2- -Because of the sh i pp i n g problem and the O . necessi t y of givin g TORCH ev ery priority , Gene ra l Cl ar k decides today that not more than 50 , 000 t r oop s per mont h will move from the United Stat es to the United Ki ngdom for the next six months . { This figure i s set following di s cussion of the amount of shi p p in g ne c essar y for the supply of Am rican forces e in t h e Bri t ish I s l es w hile TO RCH is in p ro gress . The 50 , 0 00 per month figure is set for Services of Supply p lann i n g purpos e s . I n addition to tak i ng ca r e of General Patton's Al l - Amer ican force in TOR and the U. S. CH contin g ent t hat will b e with General Anderson ' s Brit i sh tr oops i n the Alg i e r s - Bon e area a t ta ck . Details of what suppl y General Patton ' s fo r ce wi ll need wi ll be worked out by his staff w hen he re t ur n s to the United States . Another Br it ain - bound United Stat e s t r oop c om.v i s l eaving oy the United St ates August 19 and i t wi l l include ·7 , 000 additional tr oops for the II Army Corps , These troops will be selected on the basis of their ap pli c ability t o ~ORCH . Colonel 0 1 Daniel reports to General Clark that he can start amphibious trainin g by September 1 but General Cl ark wan t s to c onfer with General Anderson befo r e a def in i t e date i s s e t for the start of training . Gener Rl Clark tells his amphibious expert of the change in p l ans , how the 34th is t aking t h e place of the 1s t Div ision and that one ccmbat te 8m wi ll be tr a ined in North Ireland and the other in Scotland . General Anderson says he is rea dy to take over t rainin g of the infantry combat teams at any time . The United States training c enter will be in Nort h I reland and the othe~ in Scot l and , wi l l be a British - ope r ated base . The Britis h will furnish some of the s t af f and p art of the bo at cre ws for t he North I reland base . Major Carver , military assistant to General I smay of the _ Br itish W Sa b inet , requests ar comments on the cov er plan of TORCH and makes arrangements to brin g over Mr . M ack of the Britis h Mi nistry of Foreign Affa i rs wh o has been app oint ed hea d of the Pol i t ic al Se ction of TO H. He i s to be attached RC to the exped i t ionary for ce plannin g group and will handle plans of a non - military �( nature that will arise in connection with the future ope rat ion. He will be required to make plans for dealing with administrative and other prob lems that will arise in the occupied territory after the opening of operations . Gene ral I smay is aru&:ious to present the vi ews of the American Cormnand to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the British War Office. Ismay says ~he target date of TORCH shou ld not be postponed. Brig adier Mock~ -F erryman , the British staff G-2, tells General Clark he thinks it wruld be unwise to use code names in connection with Algiers , Bone and Oran . He says a code system has been considered impra c tical by the British since many code words would have to be listed and officers would have to be provided with the code in order to carry on their work . Gener al Cl ark agrees and rules that no code words , except TORCH, will .be use d . The Air Support problem raised by the British is being ironed out. Ai r Vice-Marshal We lch has presented an estimate of require ments for the Algiers-Bone operation to the Air Min istry which is at µresent considering it . The streets of London are sprinkled with American soldiers tonight . Many of the newly-landed troops , most of them with the Est IDi:v sien; nhave their i first leaves, since it is a weekend , and they flock to London , gushing out of every train that has come up from the Salisbury-Andover region . ( * L0N N, AUG 16 , 1942- - The British DO . Foreign Office expert who is the politi c al officer on the TORCH staff believes that when the attack comes Vichy will order the French in the North African area to fight "and they undoubtedly will do so . " General Clark instructs the political officer, Mr . Mack , to make the necessary contacts, . arrange for his own personnel and organization and set up an office as part of the TORCH headquarters The organizati )n of TORCHnow sha p es up as follows : the head quarters of the Comm ander -in-C hief will include a combined Anglo American general staff, a c ombined air section and a combined ad ministrative and supply sectlon . The Garmnander - in -C hief in an operation of this scope a annot avoid direct concern in many phases of supply and administration because of the tremendous importance that will lay in both land and sea connnunications. The British are turning over their best man in that field- - Gener al Gale . His deputy will be Colonel E . S . Hughes of the U. S . A. Political , intelligence, supply and be headed by British officers. Americans sonnel and a number of technical services staff rapidly organizing and efficiently ( At the beginning of the operation air staff will head . General working . the following sections will operations, per Clark has this wi ll be dir- . �ect l y subordinate to the Commander - in-Chief: British Army Corrnnn d er , a British Naval Support Commander, British Air Force Commander , American Army Comm ander who will also co umand U. S . Air Units , and the Am ican Naval support er connnander . After the landings have been completed and the operation is well under ·way, a single naval commander might be set up for the entire command . It is also possible that after the initial posi t ion has been consolidated and strategic air uhi ts become available ,. a single air commander may be designated . Either General ~lark or General Eisenhower will go to Gibraltar by air when TOR is r eady to start . They will arrive CH on the date the first convoy passes the strait . When a substantial landing has been effected , the main headquarters group will go south by water and set up either at Algiers or Oran , preferably the first . I n order to avoid the issuance of additional orders for a number of months after TORCH starts , General Clark suggests that General Marshal l revise the southern boundary of the TORCH theater to in c lude Afr i ca down to the equator . The Commmder - in - Chief would then be free to act and control events . After TORCH is solidty underway , a new theater probably will be established and the European Theater will be turned over to another man . Gener al Lee is suggested . The present organization of the European Theater of Operations will remain as it is for the present except that event ually , another officer will be appointed to take General Clark's p lace as head of the II Army Cor ps staff . l As a sidelight , following is an extract f rom a secret message submitted to the British Chiefs of Staff by the commanding general of Gibraltar: "If Gibraltar is made use of on more than a very small scale before operations commence it will be practically impossible to conceal that some form of operation is being mounted . There is no doubt that any evidence in this direction will c ause profound con c ern to the Spanish authorities . I t is urgently desirable that TORCH should not only have initial success but should not lose momentum; other wi se the temptation to the Spaniards , if ·we find ourselves held up or in difficulties, might be too great to resist . I cannot overstress the importance of concealing our objective from the Spanish government and, above all , of reassur ing them convincingly and rapidly should t heir suspicions be aroused . Both the naval base and the air station would go out of cormnission compl e tely and at once should Spain decide to attack . " Generals Clark and Eisenhower decide that every p os sible step will be taken to avoid arousing suspicion in the Gibraltar area . · The hazards are t oo gre~t since the attitude of Spain is of great importance to the success of' TORCH . ( Today is another day filled with c onfe re nces for General Clark . He calls in Genera l Alle u and some members of' the 1st 1Uvi s i on staff and they d iscuss the r e lat iv e availability of combat teams of' t he 1st and 34 t h Divisions . General Marshall has cab l ed �r that all of the lst 1 s equipment has been shi pped and t h at it will all arrive in Engl and befo r e August 20 with the exception of three ships -- one coming the 23rd of August , another the 27th . The third vessel , the William Mc Clay, which h ~s carrying 11 105 1 s, 10 1 s and 24 Self-Propelled 155 p;uns for the first , has run aground off Newfoundland . Replacem ents for these p ieces h ave been expressed to the Port of Embarkation and should reach the 1st Division by August 31 . Colonel Hamblen is to figure when the 1st Divis i on would be ready for training and combat. He says the B~i t ish estimate it will take three weeks to load the vessels for the expe d ition. General Allen requests permission to accompany his co m bat teams if they go with General Anderson's force but General Cl ark is non - corrnnital as yet . Colonel Hamblen estimates the 1st can't be read y before Oct . 7« General Patton will be responsible for both air and ground operations in the sector where his straight-from-America troops are going to attack. General Doolittle , wh o will direct command of the U.S . Air Forces in the operation, has been instructed that air as well as ground will be under Gener al Patton. General Ryder, commander of ~he 34th Division , is down for conf erences and h e tells General Clark he could prepare t wo combat teams from h is division for movement, with equipment , within five days . ( Proper headquarters during the initial stages of TORCH ar e , discussed . General Anderson believes he should be at Gibraltar during the movement of the c onv oy and that he should join his camnand by destroyer or air as soon as a foothold has b e en gained ashore . Gener a l Clark says he must go to Washington and confer with Gener al Patton about mid-Se p tember so that all arrangements can be completed satisfactorily . Brigadier General Truscott, now in England with General Patton, is to remain here temporarily when General Patton goes to the United States. Truscott will repres ent Patton and take care of arrangements at this end. Brigadi e r Gener al Lemnitzer has been made TORCHAnti-Aircraft officer. He will also serve as deputy chief of staff . tleadquarters Combined Operations does not want landing craft used in the invasion to be used in train i ng ._ Under these conditions only one U.S. ccmbat team c an be trained. One British Brigade group will have to be substituted in General Anderson's force . General Anderson indicates he would like a few addit 1. nal U.S . troops in o his contingent, not to be used in an assault role but to indicate 1.,0 the French a more eztensive American par .ticipation in th e Algiers e xp edition than is actually tl'nl.e . Gener a l Ande r son an d General Ryder will be conferring to work out d e t a ils in connection with the movement of the combat team from North Ireland to the British amphibious training area. No landing craft is y e t available in N0 rth Ireland. Communications are pouring back and forth between quarters and the War Departm ent . General Marshall says preparations to meet the October 1 sailing date which, our he adhe is pushing he says , �~-< •~ ap p ears the earliest practicable time. The Navy thinks provide enough f'ighter escort for the Oran force, also the second convoy which will be at sea at the time the landing is made. it can escort i'or original General :Ma.n:shall cables that "there is unanimity of opinion of' Anny of'ficers here (Washington) that the proposed operation appears hazardous to the extent of less than a 50 percent chance for success. This is an immediate And somewhat superfic i al view as we do not know the details of the Britis h carrier support proposed . Also, to what extent are you prepared to meet possibl~ German air assaults launched from Spain or Spanish Morroco. Give me your completely frank view and a similarly frank expression from Patton ." LONDON, AUG. 17, 1942--Generals Cl a rk, Eisenhower and Patton cable General .Marshall that their concensus is that the African 11 Coast ope r ation will be a success i f Spai n remains absolutely neutral and the French offer only token resistance or are so badly divided by internal dis sension and by Allied political maneuvering that the effect of their resistance will be negligible." Suc h conditions, the three generals "more than fair chances of' success. 11 ( agree, would give TORCH "It is our opinion, 11 the generals state af'ter a conference on General Marshall's ()able of yesterday, " that Spain will stay neutral at least during the early stages. We think ther e will be considerable resistance from certain sections of the French and that the Algiers op eration at best will have less than 50 percent chances of success. If Spain enters in the results can be serious. 11 Sufficient naval and air support is imperative. Reports show the French have about 500 planes in Africa. These are not modern but they are superior to the n ormal types on British and .American carriers. Present plans call for 160 Anglo-British naval planes to support the landing. The other planes will have to be land-based at Gibr a ltar. Good weather is going to be a pri me inv a sion factor . The French are reported to .have 14 divisions in French Africa but they are poorly equipped. "If the French make a determined and unified stand," the generals cable General Marshall, "and if they strongly resist the initial l anding, particularly by concentrating the bulk of their forces against either of' the ma jor points , they can seriously interfere with, if not prevent, a landing at the chosen p 0ints. A French concentration of' f'orces would hamper the initial objective of TORCH--seizing control.of the north shore of Africa before Axis reinforcements can be brought up." The possibility of the Spanish army striking, particularly if things do not go on sched ule, must also be considered, the general add. �76 The general set the following up as the Air Force requirements of the Am eric an side of TORCH: two heavy bomber grou p s, two sin g le-en gine fight er groups, two twin-en g i n e fi gh ter groups, one light bombe r-reconnaissance squad, two transport groups. All these units are now in the Unit ed Kingdom or enr oute here. Additional units now in the United Stat e s are req u ired for TORCH as follows: one B-25 bomber group, two B-26 medium-bomber groups, one li ght bomber group. It is imperative, the g ener a l cables, that the air echelon of medium and light bomber groups now i n the United States arrive in the United Kingdom not later tha n October 1. Ground echelons of th e se groups must be included in conv oys from t h e U.S. direct to the TORCH area. They will come ov er with Gen e r a l Pa t ton's forces. General Clark confers with Generals Allen and Ryder. Allen is instruct ed to alert one of his combat teams for prompt movement to the anr phibious tr a ining area. General Ryde r design a tes the 168th Infantry combat team for amphibious tr aining, saying this unit has a strong commande r and excellent personnel. It still h a sn't been definitely decided whether the American combat team operating alongside General Anderson's British army in TORCHwill come from the 1st or the 34th Division. General Cl ark is making every effort to get the lst 1 s equipment off the shi p s in the le Bst possible time. In event the tar get dat e is set back and the equipment has arrived, it is still possible th a t the ccmba t team of the 1st Divi s ion may be substituted for that of the 34th. General Allen is informed that the plans call for units of the 1st Division to go to Inverarary for training as s o on as the 34th Division units vacate. Some personnel from the 1st Divisi .on can be tr a in ed at t he same time a s th e comba t team fro m the 34th Division.Colonel O'Daniel is instructed that he and his staff will g o to Inveraray to assist in training of the 34t h Divis io n. Goilionel Hughes is instructed to get Ryder's combat team moved and the SOS is told to work fast on getting combat equipment for the 1st Division. TORCH operations involving the All-Americ an force und e r Gen eral Patton, proposed comp osition of convoys an d the sehedule of ar ~ival for the various units is gone into during a conference between General Clark and General Patton. The n e ed for hospital ships to accompany the first convoy is stress ed . Gene r al Pa t ton himself pl ans to be on the Admiral's ship and to go as h ore as early as possible. General Clark conf ers again wit h intelligence and politic al section leaders. He tells Mr. Mack that the French should be permitted, in civil ~atters, to retain nominal control, if possible. Mr. Mack sh ould function more or less in the background. Regarding the obtaining of intelligence re p orts from Sp ain, Brigadier Gen era l Mc Clure, our mill tary attache in London, tells General Clark he thinks it would be dangerous to have the attache to M adrid come to London at this time. No decision was reached, p e nd ing G-2 reports. ( The proposed Engl and are going TORCH. amphibious trainin g centers in the Southwest of to be prepa ~ed for use des p ite immedi a te plans for �LONDON, AUG. 18, 1942--Physical g ears that will g et TORCH into action begin to mesh tod ay. orders are issued for the movement tomorrow of a 34th ~ivision comba t team from Ireland to Scotland so it can begin training for the part is is scheduled to take in the North African invasion. General Patton is returnin g to the United States to start thin g s rolling on the training and movement of his All-American force that will move directly from the United Stat e s to the attack are a . I The 34th Division combattearn will be moved by British transportation authorities . It will begin pulling out of its North Ireland base at dawn. The British have ag reed to su pply bread and meat components of the ration while the comb at team is under tr aining, probably six we eks . The 1st Divis kon will remain as an invasion force possibility. Colonel Hughes is working on plans so the 1st will receive its equipment quickly as soon as the car g o boats reach port. Both General Clark and General Eisenhower are eager for General Patton to return to the United States so the desert warfare expert can begin assembling u n its that will be und e r his important comm and . Colonels Larkin and Truscott will remain here for the time bein g to take care of any problems that might arise from this end concerning the American TORCH force . ( Although General Glark now has a command more i mport ant and pressing that his II Army Corps command, which he still retains des p i t e bein g Deputy Corn.,,~ ander-in-Chi e f of TORC it is pos s ible H, that the two jobs may be used . In order to p re p a~e for the p ossible use of the I I Army Corps in th e TO RCH theater, Gener al Clark h a s Colonel Rooks come up f r om Long ford Ca stle to make arrangements for the prompt movement of the Corps staff if necessary. Secrecy is still paramount since not even t he Army Cor p s officer must know of the new development . Colonel Rooks is ins t ructed to pr epare requirements for personnel, equipment and transportation . He is also told that development of the Comb:1ned Trainin g Areas in southern England should continue . Another matter on wh ich the Cor p s must concentrate is the training of the 1st Division, pre pa rin g for i~s possible use in the new the a ter. Lieut. Colonel Ramsey of the I I Army Corps is selected by General Cl a rk as the co mm andant of his new headquarters. He will head up all plannin g in conn e ction with the size, compositi on, location and pr-otection of this h e ad quarters . "Allied Force Headquarters" has been adopted tentatively as its title . Because of its vital position in invasion-pl annin g and the need for security, steps ar e ta ken to make Norfolk House accessible to only those officers connect ed with TORC H. Unusual activity at Gibraltar will cause suspicion so General Cl ark orders Colonel M atejka, the signal officer , to clear ev ery shipment of material to th e fo r tress-islan d thr ou gh him . Quarte r s in Gibr a ltar are g oin g to be v ery cramped and the amount of material ship p ed there must be dispatched strictly on the basis of necessity . �- General Clark believes that the civil government that will be established in North Africa after our landing has been made must be headed by an American, rather than a British er. The general feels it would be un wise for civil affairs to operate under M . r Mack since one of the prime r eas ons for the use of Am erican troops is the anti - British fe eli ng among the French . Admiral Burroughs, the British naval officer who led the much-battered but succe s sful convoy t hrough to beleaguered M alta two weeks ago, comes in to see Gen eral Cl ark. He is a husky, sternlooking man with li ght blue eyes . He tells the general of the tremendous difficulti e s he had moving through the Mediterranean to much -b ombed malta . The Axis starte d bombing and torpedoeing the convoy as soon as it nosed through the Straits of Gibraltar . Admiral Burroughs' flagship was h i t and he got aboard another ship . He lost the aircraft carri e r ~agle and another carrier was damaged . One cruiser was sunk and t wo crippled. ( Of the 14 merchant ships entering the Mediter r anean , five reach ed M alta . The admiral had set a goa l of gett ing half the convoy through but the mission was stil l successful , d~spite the lo sses, b ecau se now Mal ta has enough food to l a st h e r until J anuary. Perhaps by that ti me the Alli es will h ave control of the Mediterrane an . The Germans and It a lians were all set to attack the convoy. They knew it had to come through or the people of Malta would starve . The moon was ri ght for a "black" crossing so the Axis partners were primed for action the moment the convoy got inside the Straits . The general real i zes an air and submarine attack awaits American and British troop ships when they start to execute TORC H• Admiral Burroughs predicts rath er light air resistance as far east as Algiers . He b elieves the princ ipal difficulty--just as it was with his convoy- - will be sub ma1·..i.nes. E-boats , l:le believes, will not be an important factor. Like General Clark, Admiral Bur r oughs believes Gibraltar should be used as little as possible to assemble men and ma teriel for TORCH. This evening General Clark is the dinner gu e st of General Ismay, military advisor to Prime Minister Churchill, at the British general's ap artment. General Ism ay s e ems somewhat apprehensive about TORCH and questi ons General Clark for his reactions . The Prime Minister is sold comple t ely on the sagacity of TORCH The . general's theory about TORCH is, he tells General Ismay: it "We've got our assignment. is unnecessary ." Let's execute it. Discussion of The British Commandos pull another raid on the Fr ench Coast tonight . General Clark had been invited and he asked for the chance to go . But he was told it was too hazardous an operation for a man in his position . Observes the general; Erinning: "I think I'd wel come something as quiet as a conn:nando raid after the firing I'm facing at the office every day!" �( The following is an excerpt Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting Off i ces July 25 , 1942: from held the official minutes of the at the British War Cab i net 11 General Marshall ag r eed that this (Pr ime M nister i Churchill's suggestion tha t the supreme commander of TORCH be an American) would be desirab l e and said that the U. S . would be prepared to fur n ish a Supreme Commander . He had been cons i dering whi ch U.S. troops would be a l located to the operation . The 1st Division now in process of moving to Gr eat Britain could be made available for the operation agains t the North Coast , to furnish the spearhead of the operation under Br itish Command. General Clark , who is the C orps Commander ,, h e re and one of the best Americ an off i cers , might be used with his ' Corps staff if ROUNDUP was abandoned . " * LONDON, AUG. 19, 1942 -- Major d evelopments in preparation for TORCH are piling one on top of the oth e r now as the plan begins to take more definite form . These vital matters are d i sposed of today : ( 1- -The European Theater of Operations is extended to include most of North Africa , or, specifically , all land and adjacent sea area s east of- 20 degrees West Longitude , north of the Tropic of Cancer , and west of 15 degrees ., East Longitude . This decision , cabled from General Marshall , gives the planners of 'fORCH more freedom for operat i ons should they become necessary . 2--The question of air support is becoming more concvete . The The necessary number of U. S .- British planes fo~ TORCH is set at 1,200 craft . The British now are firm as to th e number of aircraft to be us ed and h ave worked out a tent ative plan for their use. The U. S . Air Force for the operation is not definitely set as y e t but a sche du le of requirements has b ee n submitted to Washington . 3- -Colonels Bentley and Vandenberg , and possibly General Hansell, are going to fly to Gibraltar next wee k so the y can inspect facilities for the staging of aircraft . To prevent suspicion, they will wear British uniforms and go in a British plane. General Clark d iscusses with Colon e l Bentley matters concernin g the tr a ining of transport cre ws with the parachute troops th ey will carry. ( 4--Radio propaganda to "soft en upn the French in North ,Africa and make them more receptive toward the Anglo - American task force is discussed . Mr . w. H. B . Mack wants to set up a special station at Gibraltar but General Clar k tell s him that c an not be done fo r security re asons . A new station in Engl and , directing its beam to North Africa , will be ready in about t wo week s , Mr . Mack says . Tµe politic a l advisor on TORCHrequests an American assistant for his own section so the man can be used for production of U. S . propaganda At present the propaganda go ing out is entirely British in its context and approach . . �( 5--General ClaJ:%: General Gale and Mr . Mack agree that planning for the administration of civil affairs in North Africa should be handled by an Am erican and Mr. Mack agree s it should be separate from his political section . The job, General C1a rk says, calls for an American who is well - known in the di p lomatic field . He is forwarding such a request to Washington . 6 - -General Patton completes his London conferences. Upon departure for the United States where he will begin assembling the Oran force, he is given a secret d i rective outlining every phase of TORCH (This paper is so secret . that it will be picked up and inserted in this diary after the TORCH operation is wellunderway . The 1st Division may still have one combat team in TORCH . Colonel Hughes reports to General Clark on the progress being made and General Allen recommends that in addition to the one proposed combat team of the 1st that an anti - aircraft battery and a recon naissance platoon be attached . The 1st Division combat team is not going to draw any equipment from the 34th; its ovm is to be delivered to it as soon as it arrives in the United Kingdom. ( Just what combat teams will be used is not yet definite but a cable is sent to General Marshall stating: "Remembering the tremen dous importance ,of the time factor and the proper sta g e of the moon, it considered highly inadvisable for our conc~ete prepar ations to risk delaying the operation merely in the hope of utilizing the combat team frara the 1st Division rather than the 34th Division . Each day that passes is a day of additional risk with regard to secrecy and secrecy is vital to success . This fact, coupled with the possibility that the enemy may soon possess greater freedom of strategic movement than at present , has led us to intensify efforts to achieve an early execution . " Everything is set for the 34th Division combat team to .move to its training ~area at Inverary, Scotland . Colonel 0 1 Daniel and his staff _leave Lon<lon for the amphibious base tonight . is The question of air operations and personnel is further clar ified . Air Vice - Marshal Welch and General Anderson are worried about bomber support and General Clark assures them that the entire air strength , both American and British, should be regarded as a u n it to be used under the direction of the Commander - in-Chief. However, General Clark . tells Welch that if the British forsee a weakness in the air support for the Bone-Algiers landing they should take nec essary steps to obtain additional craft from British sources before the operation starts . General Clark informs the Britis h officers that General Patton is sacrificing his shi .,ping space- - which me might have used for ground troops- - in order to obtain the necessary air support for his scheduled attack in the Oran re gion . General Clark discusses the air operations command with General Doolittle and General Hansell. Colonel Vandenberg will be Doolittle's Operational Ch ief of Staff and General Hansell will remain at head - �quarters . The use of parachute.troops at Oran is discussed and it is decided tentatively that Colonel Bentley wil l command the air transport squadrons and that Major Yarborough of the II Army Corps will come to Londo n to plan details of the parachute attack . The first troop transport probably will attempt to land on the Oran airport . While it goes dovm, the remaining transports will circle overhead. If the first plane gets in without any serious opposition, the others will l and. If there is any fight , the pilot of the lead paratroop plane is to crash his craft into any enemy planes that might be on the field . Paratroopers in the oth er planes will then bail out and come down fighting . General Clark, able at last to see that TORCH is shapin g up, has Genera l Eisenhower and four other officers to his flat in Hays Mews for dinner. Because of the food shortage situati on , Gene ral Eisenhower brin gs the 'piece de resistance ,' a ham shipped to him from . the United States! 11 * L 'NDON, AUG 20 , 1942- - The shipping . bugaboo -- a major factor in every operation of the war to date--is rising to haunt the planners of TORCH. ( General G1ark is informed by General Gale that the tactical plan for General Anderson 's combined Anglo-American force is not logisti c ally workable in its present form--that the rate of buildup for the operation cannot be met because of insufficient shipping and port data . $fu1s will necessitate a revision of the plan for the Algiers attack~ Since requirements cannot be met, the rate of buildup will have to be reduced. General Gale says this unavoidable reduction w'ill also retard the scheduled movement on Tunis and, thus, incre ase the time available for the enemy to send troops to that area . The second shipping prob l em involves movement of General Pat t on's forces from the United States to Africa. Major General Handy , Ass istant Chief of Staff, Operations Department, who h a s flown he re from Washington for TORCH confe r ences , says Pattons 1 force will be ab le to sail from the United States on Octob er 1 but adds that the Navy will be able to furnish escorts for onl y two convoys at a time . If t h is is true , the rate of buildup for Gener Al Patton ' s troops will be mater ially slowed , the arrival of the reinforcing troop convoy being set back about two weeks . One naval escort will take over Patton's assault force and a second wil l leave a few days later with reinforcements. The original plr-m was for a third escort to bring the bulk of reinforc ements a we ek or so later . But now, the escort taking the original assault group across will have to rush back to start the third convoy -- the major reinforcements -across . This will mean that Patton's landing forces wil l have to wait lo ng,er than expected for reinforcements . ( for A Britain-bound its naval escort convoy left Brooklyn yesterday and plans call to return to the States for use as an escort �in the second Patton group . General Patton ' s opera t ional plan is dependant to a great extent on what escorts the navy can furnish since they must help cover the landing and protect vital mater i el coming in slower mer chant ships . General Clark stresses to General Handy the n e ed for 11firm co mmitments" from Washington on just what naval support will be avai l able for TORCH "The difficulty . of preparing plans without definite knowledge as to when troops are to be available for use in the operation is oPvious, 11 General Clar k declares . Regarding shipment of men and material from the United King dom to the North African ooa st , General Handy sRys that as U. S .Briti sh v esse ls come in from the United States with American troops and su pp lies , the ships will be he ld on this side for use in TORCH . Gener Rl Holmes , director of movements for the British War Office, informs General Clar k that pe rsonnel shipp i ng for 25 , 000 men must be available by September 20 , and that addit i onal shipping must come from the BOLEROpool -- code name for maritime movements b etween the Uni ted States and the United Kingdom . The Am rican groupp].anning e TORCH recommends to Washington that General Holmes ' request be met 11 i n so far as it does not conflict wit h United States requirements ." ( The question of whether the 1st Divis l on or the 34th will suppl y the .Americ an combat team operating with General Anderson at Algiers has boiled down to this : If the equipment for the 1st Div ision c an reach the combat team by about Septembe r 9 , the amphibious training of the 34th will be stopped i mmediate ly and 1st Di vision troops wil l be substituted . Loading tables , now being prepared , will apply to either the 34th or ~he 1st Division combat teams. Training of cadres from both divisions will start next Monday . Convo y s are now enroute to the United Kingdom with the 1st Division's missing equipment, i ncluding replac ements for the guns made unavailable when the Willi:am Mc Kay went aground of.f Newfound land. · General Clar k says amphibious training must end about one month prior to D- day (tentative ly set for Dc tober 15 ) since the British estim a te it will take 12 days_ to load the task force vessels and 18 days to make the voyage to the jump -o ff points . Only one U. S . co~bat team is to be employed at Algiers with General Anderson's force . However , some additional .American troops will be distributed in the Britis h Brigade wh~ch is assaulting alon~side the American combat team . The United Stat.es Ranger Battalion will be used at Bone . General Patton's direct -f rom-America forces will handle the Oran assault alone . l Admiral Ramsey of the British Navy points out the dangers which the Bone force, landing farthest east , is going to face . He expects heavy attack~ both from submarines and airplanes , while the convoy · is enroute to the more easterly part of the M editerranean. He expects , he says , to lose ships . �The a:, m:mando raid on Dieppe, F ranee, is a major topic of con versation aro u nd the "Alli ed Force Headquarters" today . Approximately 50 American 11Rangers 11 were in on the attack vlith Canadians, British and Fighting French . Our 11Rangers 11 stumbled into an enemy convoy that delayed their landin g 20 minutes a~d they suff er ed heavy l osses when t hey hit the sh ore . General C1ark expects only a handful of them to return . Thr ee of our officers went on the raid as observers , includi ng Brigadier General Truscott and Colonel Holsinger . There i s no need to go into details since the press c arries extensive stories . The play g iven the participation of American troops, particularly in U. S . newspapers , causes consternation at the War Dt partment and General Marshall cables General Eisenhower that he thinks there was too much stress on the Ranger angle . 0 ( General Eisenhower cables back that "ev e ry effort is being made to menti::n the matter -o f - fact appearance of American activity in this theater, including early part ici pat ion in air and commando operati , ns . The Dieppe raid communiques were re l eased originally by the Commander of Combined Opera tion s and our following statement merely confirmed the presence of Americ an detachments from one battalion in the expedition . 1 consider absolute censorship cannot be applied to these affairs since casualties are in evitable . Anticipatin g the c e rtainty of early casualties, it ap pe ared wise to me to establish the fact Am erican leadership is present whenever Americ an troops are engaged and that American officers share the risks with their men . There will be no menti on of names unless casualties or decorations are involved. Conf i dentially, it appean s from early reports that the Amer i can contingent in the Dieppe oper ation may have suffered extremely he avily. Almost the ent i re American contingent accompanied an assault force whic h by accident encountered an enemy coastal convoy . Apparently only remnants of this part of the assaulting force escaped ••• 11 * * L·'NDON, AUG. 21 , 1942 -- General Clark, as he watches new and revised reports crossing hls desk regarding the number of avail able invasion and sup ply boats, the restricted North African port . facilities; t h e problems of securing naval escorts and the diffic ulties of supply , s H ys he finds himself becoming more vessimistic ever y day about the advisability of TORCH . ( Two great hazards face t he operat i on : First, t h at Germany will get wind of T08CH and rush troops into Tunisia and Algeria. Second , that once the operation is started Spain will become a belligerent , thus cutting the TORCH group off from supply rrutes . Rommel and his army in Libya already block the way to the Red Sea r oute , and if Spain enters the wRr the str a its of Gibraltar andGtbvm~tar itself will be menaced by the Spa nish with the Mediter ranean sup p ly route virtually useless . �,{ The TORCHf orce would then be marooned in an isolated se c tion , cut off from suppl i es and with the enemy on both sides . I f the op eration is succ e ssful and Tunisia i s taken, the Allies will h ave greater control of the Medite r ranean and Rommel wi l l have greater difficu l ty supp l ying his army . I t will also show Russ i a that the United States and Great Br i tain are trying to do something in 1942 to r elieve the pressure on the Eastern f ront . But , Gener al Clark polnt:::i ou.t , t he Allies will still be a lon g vrn from their .y real objective - - i nvading the contin en t and getting at grips with the bulk of the German army . General Handy discusses with General Clark other objectives in the event TORC is not put into operation H as now planned . Handy recommends as a first alternative the old GJMNAST plan , an attack on Casablanca and Oran , The other alternat i ve is to send United States troops into the Near East to reinforce the British fiP-;11.ting in Egypt . ( Genera l Doolitt l e , who i s flying back to the Unite d States tomorrow , has a fina l conference with General Clark . The air general is concerned about the availab i l i ty of th r ee med i um bombe r groups for TORCH He had counted on the m but now he u nd erstands . Lieutenant General Arnold, commander of the Air Corps , has assigned them i n part to other tasks , Gene ral Doo l ittl e feels , however , that TORCH air _ plans will not be impaired ser i ou sly i f he c an get one of the medium bombardment groups over here by Octob e r 1 . He will dis cuss the matter personally wi th Genera l Arnold in Washington and return to London in a few days . General Truscott , who went on the Dieppe Commando ra i d as an observer , reports to General Clar k that wha t he saw on the French beach mer e ly confirms the teaching that an attack aga i nst a defend ed beach 11is most unli ke ly to succeed u n less it is a compl e te sur prise to the defenders . " He reports that many speci Rl landing craft were lost i n the attack . Gene ral Cl a rk orders an inv e stigation into what effect the Di eppe losses will have on landing craft ava i la b le f or TORCH . The port capacity at Oran has been double - checked by General Lark i n and he reports he i s sat i sfied that the earlier figures - larg e r than the later ones -- are sound for planning purposes . He is going to check them again to be certain nothing has been overlooked before he sends them to General Patton in the United States . Gener al Gale expresses concern about the planning for General Patton's f orce b•1t Genera l Clark tells him that on Patton's sttaff , as wel l as that of U. S . Admiral Hewitt , there are officers who have had c on s i derable experien c e i n p l anning for amphibious operations . I n the evening General Clark and other high - rankin g off i cers , includir1g Generals Eisenh ower and Handy , have dinner at the apart ment of Sir John Dill , highest-ranking general in the British Army and the sen i or off i cer on the combined war plann i ng board that �( meets in Washington . Sir John has returned to London briefly for conferences. General C1ark s ays Sir John is qu it e enthused about TORCH and thinks it will be a wise operation. * * LONDON, AUG 22, 1942- - ~he entire . basic plan for TORCHwas drafted into a secret document today after an almost day-long meetin g at the Grosvenor Square head quarters of ~eneral Eisenhower . This is the way General Clark, t.1.ie Deputy Oomm t-r -in-..: hief of TORCH and , sketches this outline: The i mmediate objective is a combined land, sea and air assault against the Mediterranean Coa ~t of Algeria with a view to the earliest possible occupation of Tunisia and the establishment in French Morocco of a strikin g force that ca n insure control of the Straits of Gibraltar by moving rapidly, if necessary, into Spanis h Moro cco . The red to as tate that the earlier as D- day . the attack ( tentative date of assault is October 15- - hereafter referD- day . General Clark says that "strategy and policy dicthe operation be initiated at the earliest possible date -the better ." That is why October 15 has been designated It is the earliest that all components can be ready for . · The assault and Bone . will take place simultaneously at Oran , . Algiers At Oran, there will be two pre - dawn landin gs , each by a force of approximate l.y one regimental combat team: one in the vicinity of the Gulf of Arzeu , 20 miles east of Oran, and the other at Bay Des Anda l ouses . The aggregate assault force --c omposed entirely of Americans - -will comprise four regimental combat teams and one light armored force. The objective wi ll be to secure the port of Oran and the nearby airdromes at La Senia and Tafaroui . At Algiers , there wi ll be three pre - dawn landings, each by a regimental combat team: one near Sidi Ferruch , 15 miles west of Algiers ; on e near Castiglione, 20 miles southwest of Algiers, and the third near Ain Taya , 11 miles east of Algiers . The aggregate force will be fo ,1r regimental combat teams and their objective will be to secure the port of Algiers and the airdromes at Maison Blanche and Hussien Dey . The Alg i ers force will be composed of one British Division ( the 78th), with one U . s . Regiment l-l combat team (probably l ' from the 34th U. S . Division . The operation will be under the Commanding General of the 78th British Division . C At Bone , there will be a pre - dawn l anding in the vicinity of Cap de Garde , north of Bone , by app roximately one regimental combat team . The Bone force will be made up of one United States "Ranger" battalion with the remainder of the force British. The objective will be to secure the port of Bone and the airdromes near Dozzer ville , six and a ha lf miles south of Bone . �~o r The assumption is by the e nd of the third sup p orting and follow-up be timed for D.4 . that Oran and Algiers will day (D . 3, October 1 8 ) and troops into Or an , Algiers h a ve been captured the movement of and Bone will Troops landin g at Algiers and eastward will then consolidate, with the aid of reinforcements , their positions and prevent a n enemy landin g in Tunisia or westward . A total of six divisions, four infantry and two armored, will be required . These will include the original landing forces . The striking force in Tunisia will be built up by land, s e a and possibly air movement eastward from Algiers and Bone with advance elements starting as qu ic kly as poss ible after they have taken the ports and airdromes . The Oran landing force will consolida te its position in Oran and French Morocc o and build up striki:rg forces that could occupy Spanish Morocco if necessary. This will require seven divis:ons , five infantry and two armored, inclu d in g the ori ginal landing forces . The second conv oy landi ng at Oran will land air forces and an armored division . They will strike west i mmediately to open up communic at ions through Morocco and seize Casablanca from the rear . If the r e is no Fr ench resistance in bulk , t h is convoy might be div e rted , while it is still en:boute to Oran, to Casablanca and thereafter the troop build-up could continue through both ports -Casablanca and Oran. ( The ultimate disposition of all troops in the Northwest African theater wou ld be as foll0ws: on e division to garrision Casablance; another to garrison Oran; one division to k eep communications open between Casabl anca and Oran; one division to form a striking force on the southeast border of Spanish Mor occo, and three divisions to fo ma striking force at the southwest border of Spanish Morocco . After assault units have been brought up to normal strength in men, equipment and supply, the probable rate of build-up for the entire new theater will be: through Algiers, one and a h a lf divis ions per month; Bone , two-thirds of a division monthly; Or an , one division per month, and Casablanca, one division p e r month. TORCH is really divided into two parts --Am erican and Ang loAmerican operations . The All-Americ an force under General Patton is to occupy Oran and French Morocco , maintain communications between Oran and Casablanca, and be rea dy to g o into Spanish Mor occo if necessary. The Angl6-Am e rican force is to occupy Algeria (e xce p t the Oran area) and Tunisia. However, because it has been deemed expedient for political reasons to have all assaults against French North Africa led by Unite d States troops, one U.S. combat team (f rom the 34th Division) is being alloted to the British for · the Algiers assault and the U . S. 11Ran ger 11 battalion that has been assigned to the Britis h for use at Bone will land first . Eventually the British troops participating in TORCH will be relieved by Am ic an," Gener a l Clark er explains . "Since a strong force must be maintained in Great Britain for the defense of the islands as well as to furnish troops for other theaters, it is apparent �( that after a permanent position has be e n reac hed each Br i tish division sent to the New North African front must be replaced by an equivalent American unit . British tro op s are bein g s e nt into the initial invasion and consolidation be c ause we must utilize troops readily available and properl y tr a ined . Of the estimated 13 division r equired for the entire operation , it is contemplated that ap p roximat e ly nine wi ll be American and four British . 11 As to air operations, aviation will provide prote c tion and sup p ort for the initial assault , protect bases an d commu n ications , and su pp ort subsequent ov e rland operations . Carri e r - bas e d planes will sup p ort th e assaults at Oran and Algi e rs until aird r ornes have been se c ured and land - bas e d planes moved in . Fi gh ters for the r e li e f of car r ier - base d fighters will be flown during assault from Gibr a ltar . Bombers will be flown from the Un it ed Kin gd om and the Unit e d States after Afric an bas e s have b ee n secured . ··The re quiremen ts for air sup p ort , 11 says General Cl a rk , so critical to th e success of the operation tha t the provision of necessar ;y air forces must be g iven the h i ghes t priority ." 11 are The mission of American and British nav a l forces will be to safeguar d overseas movem e nt- - from the United States and t ~ e United Ki ngdom , support a nd land military forces for assault , and maintain sea communicat io ns and supply . I n addition to the most important TORC operations H conferenc e to date, Gen era l Cl ark has a number of side meetings du rin g the day. Colon e l Stokes, t he War Department's shipping exper t, breaks down the TORCH water tr ansp ortation prob l em and tel ls t he general that the actua l prob l em doe s not involv e sh i pping for troops or mater i el , but that rather the d i ff icult y li es in t he i nabi lit y of the Na vy t o provide es corts for l ater c envoys that wi l l bring buil d-up troo ps . Wat er movem e nt is a l so go in g to be restricted by cr amped po rt faciliti e s at Oran and Al giers . Th e numb er of combat loaders available i s li mite d but there ar e sufficient for the oper a tion as now plan ned and more cou l d probably b e found if re quired . On the basis of this report , and bec au se S ir John Dill bro ught up the question of' u sing additiona l sh i pping to strengthen TORCH, Genera l Cl ark asks General Anderson whether he would li k e to make an additional landin ~ a~ Phil i pp eville provided troo ps , sh ips and mor e time could be made available . General Ande r s o n favors the plan . Next , General Clark asks Admiral Ramsey to giv .e him a rt firm answer " as to the British Admiralty's c apacity to conV •)y and furnish sea and air support for such an op e ration . Commodore Douglas-Pennant advise ·s General Cla rk t hat a r epo rt is being p re pared by Combin ed Ope ra tion s to show the number of l and i ng craft lo st at LJie ppe and what effe ct these losse~ will have on c raft ass i gned ~o TORCH. The i mportanc e of TORCH and the fact it is becoming the big op era ti on raises the qu est ion of the future of the Service of Supp ly in th e European Theat e r of Operati ons . If ROUNDUP is dro pped , which appears li k ely, the numb er of U. S . Troops we hAd plann ed t o �( receive in the United Kingdom will be greatly reduced . General Truscott believes a corres vo nding reduction in the present plans of SOS expansion should be made , that certain SOS units and personnel should become available for the new North African theater and that General Lee should be so advised . General Clark and General Matejka discuss the possibility of placing the forward echelon of TORCH headquarters on a naval vessel rather than at Gibraltar. Matejka believes Gibraltar must be a link in our system of signal communications and that headquarters should be there during the early phases of the operat lo n . Major Yarborough, parachute specialist of the II Army Corps headquarters , arrives for duty with the new staff. He will work out detailed plans for TORCH parachute op era tions . LONDON AUGUST 23 , 1942 - -It , looks as though an assault on Philippeville , Algeria , will not be included in TORCH. Admiral Ramsay reports to General Clark that neither the ships nor the l anding craft required are available without drawing from other assault convoys or from follow - up convoys . Also , no Naval Air Force could be provided for the Philippeville attack . ( have - General to take Clark r eports the same form t h at suc h an a s sault as that now planned "would against therefore Bone. 11 The Bone landing looks as though it is going to be the toughest landing of the three--Algiers, Oran and Bone . General Anderson reports to Gener a l Clark that , al thoug h heavy loss e s are "inevitable th~ Bone assault must be included in TORCH "Unless . it is , 11 General Anderson de cl ares , "we cannot , in all probability, get to Tun i s in time . " The Bone attack is to be made with U. S . "Ranger" troops who will spearhead a combined Anglo-American attack . General Anderson turns over to General Clark a revision of the Outline Plan for the Eastern Task Force, stating that this study represents what actually can be acccmplished with the means placed at his disposal. "It is not based on guess work as were the earlier drafts , " S RYS General Anderso n who will command the Eastern Task Force that wi ll land at Bone and Algiers and then drive for ·.mnisia . Combined British and American Intelligence reports have an interesting TORCH sidelight in them today . ·.L e i tern reads : ·h "Unconfirmed reports indicate that there are 500 tanks in underground hiding places in western Spanish Morocco and that there is an u nde rground hangar five miles e a st of Te tuan where the It a lians are r ep ortedly assembling planes . 11 General 9lark instructs Major Yarborough to of TORCH with a view to examining all poss101~1vies the effective employment of parachute troops . Organization of General Patt o n's convoy that study every phase offered for vdll bring . = American . ," �troops direct from the States to their assault-jumpoff at Oran is already underway. General Marshall cables that three converted passenger liners which used to be on the New York - Buenos Aires run h a ve been earmarked for the task: the Argentina , the Brazil and t he Uruguay . They are al l about 17,500 gross tons and carry about 5 , 200 troops each. The Argentina was one of the ships in the convoy that came over with head quarters of the II Army Corps . In addition , Gener a l Marshall says the use of nine CB:' go s h ips for the All-Amer ic R. side n of TORCH is also authorized . "No further ships, 11 he adds, 11 can be allocated to you pending clarification of our needs here . " Cables are flowin g back and forth regarding the dispatch of ground and air forces for the air side of TORCH. General Cl a rk is building up the TORCH headquarters organization, bringing in some of his best junior offi cers from headquarters of the II Army Corps. He discusses with Lieut. Col~ Ramsey, the headquarters commandant, the composition of the headquarters security force and movement of headquarters echelons to the African th eate r. They talk over the personnel required to fill key positions . North 'I'he cable requesting an Americ a n to head up civil affairs in Africa once the occupation is underway is sent to Washington . LONDO AUG. 24 , 1942--General N, Anderson is pushing .for the inclusion o.f Philippeville as a fourth point of attack in the TORCH operation. He tells Gener a l Clark that he "can't put on the show 11 without use of an additlonal port . He considers Philippeville, des p ite its hazards, to be the best spot available . The British general's argument is that harbor facilities at Algiers and Bone will not enab le him to _get essenti a l trans p ort and supplies as h ore in time to move his troops into Tunisia to forestall Axis occu pation . He tells Deputy Commander-in-Chief Clark that to cut the strength of his force further would make his mission--a quick drive into Tunisia--impossible of accomplishment . He says he will need more assault ships, more landing craft and additional air suppor ·t if another harbor is incl rded. By using another harbor he main tains he can get sufficient equipment ashore and start his drive eastward on schedule . 1 In discussing the additional means needed .for the Philippeville attack, General Cl ark tells General Anderson that if U.S . troops participated they would go forward with hLm to Tu n is, if he so desired, and would subsist on British rations. General Anderson seems reluctant to accept additional U. S . troops, saying it would involve increased logistical complic a tions. General Clark maintains that the assault on Philippeville should be made--for French reaction reasons--on Philippev ille and that, preferably , it should be a second ccmbat team of the 1st Division. General Anderson is instructed to prepare a report showing the additional means required .for the operation, including shi pp ing and landing e ra.ft . �Generals Cl ar k and Anderson and Air Vice - Marshall Welsh also discuss the possibilities of' an "inside-outside" operation , that is , attacking simultaneously within the Mediterranean and outside at Casablanca . Anderson says this does not alter his problem . He agrees that Oran sho u ld be an all-U . S . operation. He adds that the extensive front--Algiers - Bone- - is too much for one commander to control, particularly since the forces will advance in divergent directions after landing . The Air Vice - Marshall observes that aircraft based on Gibraltar could move to the Casablanca area as read i ly as to Oran if the "inside-outside" operati on is decided upon . Follo wing his conference with the two British of'ficials , General Clark ca l ls in Admiral Bieri of the U. S . Navy and instructs him to study and repor t on the additional naval means required to broaden TORCH. He will consult with Admiral RamsaC and determine the U. S . Navy capabilities for the task . General lark points out that the planners of TORCH are faced primarily with a naval problem 11 . and that no amount of planning on the part of' my staff ,, can pro vide an answer until naval authorities state what they can and wil l do., 11 At a morning conference at Grosvenor Square , a cable from Washington is read to the Anglo-American group planning TORCH. It indicates the U . S . Navy can't aid TORCH to any further extent than it is already committed and that what the navy has promised is not yet definitely earmarked. General Clark says the naval problem "is the root of the ev!lll 1.of' this thing . They won't say what we can have despite the fact President Roosevelt has said that Russian convoys and TORCH must have numbe r one priority . There i s no such thing as two operations having number one priority . One thing alone must be decided upon . 11 He adds that the U . s . Navy "won't pull anything out of the Pacific and somebody ' s got to tell them what they have to do. 11 Later, SOS officials report to equipment for the combat t e am of the in time for the unit to . start training the combat team "will be l'e .asonably General Clark feels these d a tes a r e motor transport has already reached being sent ov e r from North Ireland . General Clark that 1st Division can by September well equipped by "probably optimistic the unit and some the y believ e be delivered 1. They say September 4 . 11 . " Some items are Lieut . Colonel Raft, commander of the 503rd Parachute Bat talion, reports for duty. With Colon e l Bentley and Major Yar borough he will explore all possibilities for the employment of paratroops in TORCH . * ( * * LONDON, AUG. 25 1942- - An urgent from General 6lark out of bed atcablegram and sends him Marsh all routes General 3 A. M. hur r ying to his st . James Squar e office . General Marshall says it is the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washin g ton that �TORCH is contracted too in ambitious scope . for the means on hand and that it should be It has become necessary to prepare a ne w directive ••• because of the limited military forces available , 11 General Marshall cables . "The hazard is too great , especia ll y considerin g the extreme seriousness of the effect on the peoples of occupied Europe, India and China if the United States should fail in its first major operation . " General Marshall says the u· s.• Chiefs . of Staff "are not favorably disposed to the movement of a p proximately an Army Corps to the Mediterranean as recommended . " He instructs General Handy to return to Washington b y the first available plane . General Marshall adds that it will be impossib le to get U. S . Naval units from the Pacific because of the battle of the Solomon I slands which he says 11is going in our favor" but which is still developing . 11 ( This is the new proposal outlined in General Marshall 's cable : that United States forces, probably combat teams of the 1st and 34th Divisions, move into the Agidir - Marrakech -C asablanca-Rabat Fez area in French Moro cco and into Oran-Mostaganein - Mascara area in Algiers; they will c onsolidate and rapidly exploit their attack to complete control of the Frenc h Morocco area; they will move into Spani sh Moro cco only if it is necessary , and make plans to p us h on to Wes tern Al ge ria "to facilitate the extension of effective air and ground attack to the eastward and keep the sea lanes open." The plan would eliminate t he Algiers , Bone and Philippeville landings . It woul d call for control of all of North Afri c a from Rio de Oro to Tunisia so the froces c oul d facilitate air operat ions against enemy forces and installations in the Medite rranean area. It would be an All - American attack and the occupation of Tunisia , at least for the time being , would not be attempt~d . Later , British forces would follow the Americans . The attack would take place at the earliest practicable date and would be accomp lished as rapidly as p ossible. All the American planners ofTORCH innnedia te l y go into conference . Because of the suggestion that the revised plan involve only American troops , there are no British officers included . Only yesterday the British proposed that TORCH be made stronger and on a wider front . Now, General Clark tells his officers , Wash inton proposes that we r edu ce the scale of the attack heretofore planned . Colonel Nevins speaks of the effect of the lim i.ted harb or c apacity of both Oran and Casablanca , bringing out that small and frequent convoys would be required , hence more demands from the U . S . Navy . The entire picture has changed overnight but the ans wer to General Marshall is going back by General Handy . The Marshall cable brings mixed reactions which are finally boiled down to this suggested answer: control The proposed operation of Tunis , the key does locality not offer us a chance to gain in North Africa and the natural �( route for Axis invasion. While our scale of attack would be too weak to impress the French and bring them to our side , it would offer the Axis sufficient excuse and sound military reasons for moving forces into French North Africa . This consideration strongly indicates that military and politi c al sense calls for a strong attack on the broadest possible scale and front . Time and space also favors t he Axis in the subsequent race to gain control of Alg i ers . Full tactical successes at Oran and Casablanca do not insure reasonable prospect for the ultimate strate gical improvement of the position of the United Nati Jns in the Mediterranean North Afri c an theater . Employment of the 1st ~ivisi on with pa rts of the 34th at · Oran , using British ships , is practicable . The TORCHplanners suggest that all forces a t Oran comprise the II Army 'Corps and that General Clark connnand t he ope r ation from the outset . General Patton's forces, in substantially the same force the ,, were orig inally scheduled to use at Oran , sh ould now be used at Casablanca . ( Note must be taken that limited United States Ai.r Forces already in or earmarked for the North African theater would be inade quate for sup p ort of attacks on both Oran and Casablanca without assistance from the Royal Air l''o rce . Also, physical ca p acities of the two ports impose stringent limits on the number of vessels that can be accomodated . The limit for Oran is 25 and for Casablanca , 14 . Gen eral C1ark and his staff agree that they 11are ready and anxious to proceed with any operation directed . 11 They add that there is "" rgent need for an early decision . " u This , substantially back to Gen eral Marshall , is the answer . He will leave General Handy will tomorrow . carry General L2rkin raises the question of what additional service units will be required by the revised pl nn - -if it g oes into effect . The problem of getting the 1st Divis ion re ady is discussed and General Allen is called · up from Tid worth . General Allen informs General Glark that he would be entirely willing to attaQk with two combat teruns fr om the 1st ~ivi sio n , reinforced by one combat team from the 34th Division and detachments fr om the 1st Armored Division , in event TORCH is chan ged . ( In the event the operation now proposed is put into effect , Gene ra l Clark says we must prepare at least two more U.S . combat teams for landin g throu gh the surf. He proposes to keep a c om bat team of the 34th Division in tr a ining until September 12 , then move the 1st Division for training between se:rt ember 14 and 26 . General Anderson says 10 days will be needed for rehearsal of the attack. Ari 'additional c 1st Division combat team may be trained at Roseneath and Toward , England , f rom September 7 to 21 . The ccmbined operations headquarters, ho v1 ever , cannot p rovide cre ws for the additional landin g c r aft in the actual ope r ation . t:... �'""' --. _ General Clark dis cusses the problem of air support Vandenberg ana he says it is obvious that the u. s . Army will not be present in sufficient strength to carry out ings at Oran and Casablanca without assistance from the Force. with Col . Air Force the landRoyal Air The remarkable , irrepressible man that is W inston Churchill is at his best again tonig h t as Generals Clark and Eisenhower dine with him at Number 10 Downin g street . As usual, the effervescent Prime Minister is wearing a smock . His first remark when he enters the room where the t wo American gene ra ls are waiting for him is: "TORCH offers the greatest opportunity in the history of England! It is the one thing that is going to win the war . Pres1d~nt Roosevelt feels the s ame way . W ' re both ready to help in e any way we c an . "We face two battles in TORCH booms out the ," "The first battle is to have no battle . " Prime Minister Mr. Churchill only returned to England yesterday from a 14 , 000-mile trip that took him throu gh the Middle East and to Moscow . He says, if necessary, he is ready to fly to Washington at a moment ' s notice to talk over TORCHwith President Roosevelt 11 This thing must go over , tr he declares. , . He asks the generals what is on their minds and General Clark tells him the greatest ne~d is for someone with the necessary pov1er to make decisions . " We'r e floundering around in a trough of day to-day changes ," General Clark explains . "W must have had ten sets e of det a ils . There have been so many plans that we are dizzy . We1 d / li ke to get one definite plan so we can go to work on it . It's not a military man ' s job to say whether the French will resist or whether Spain will enter the war . The political factors should be handled by politicians ." The Prime Minister promises to get in touch with Presid ent Roosevelt immediately so the set-up can be frozen to one s pe cific task. Mr . Churc hill emphasizes and re - emphasizes that he is 11100 percent for TORCH tr . with a bit there up to Mr . Churchill then tells of his recent conversations in Mosco w Stalin . "We talked very bluntly and s ometimes I had to squirm ," the Prime Minister recounts . "Stalin says the war over has pro v en that the German army isn•t as tou gh as it ' s cracked be . " 111 Why don't you do something, 1 says Stalin . And I have to admit we can't get across the channel. Then I tell him about the TORCHp l an . I tell him we a re go ing to do it . Stalin is disappoin ted that there wi ll be no Second Front in Europe this year . Then , the more he thinks about the North African attack, the more he likes it . " �Mr. Churchill then tells of a huge banquet -- a formal state dinner -- he l d in his honor in Moscow . "I attended it in me smock , " the Prime ~inister grins . " I t hought I'd show them how proleta r ian I wasl 11 Stalin , before he was told in detail about TORCH, kept tell ing the British leader that he "couldn't s ee why your two great nations can't attack . You ' ve got to plunge inl" - On the night before he took off from Moscow, Mr . Churchill was invited to Stalin ' s apartment in the Kremlin . "There'll be just the t wo of us for dinner and we can do a bit of drinking , 11 Churchill says the Russian premier told him . "When I got there , " the Prime Minister continues, "Joe -stt/r,ted uncorking bottles . Af'ter a while he says : ' Let ' s call in Molotov , he I s a good drinker! So we sit up until four o' c lock and talk . At five o'clock I take of f for home . 11 The Prime Minlster also tells how Stalin's 19-year - old , red haired daughter came into the apartment . "And do you know , " says Mr. Churchill ., "she walked right up and kissed the bloke l " ( While the Prime Minister is recounting these stories or else talking about international a.ffairs , he is likely to do unpredictable things . At one point , he gets up, goes over to a c orner and rubs his back up and down on the jutting edge of the wall . " I guess I got them in Egypt , 11 he observes , smiling , and then plumps back into his chair to continue with serious discus s ion . At another point , he rings one of the many bells beside him and the valet comes in . "Change me socks , " he commands , and while he talks to Generals Clark and Eisenhower he holds up one foot after the other while the valet takes off his socks and puts on fresher ones of lighter wei ght . Seeing the Prime Minister eat is an event . When the soup is brought in , he tackles it vigorously . His mouth is about two inches from the liquid; he hunches over the plat e . He eats very noisily , purring and slurping and working the spoon fran mouth to plate so rapidly you c an hardly see it . Scraping the bottom of the dish , he looks up and bawls out lustily : "More soup! 11 Then , he turns to his guests and says : "Fine soup, ain 1 t it!" Gener al Clark and General Eisenhower have a hard time to keep from laughing at the Prime Minister's boylike actions . After dinner ., Mr . Churchi l l and the t wo g enetals get down to a point - by-point discus s ion of TORCH Gener a l Clark outlines . transportation difficulties and soon Mr . Churchill is sunnnoning Lord Lou;s Mountbatten and Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea -Lorcii. . Gener al lark is puzzled by reports made to him that it will take 12 days to combat load TORCHvessels and 18 days to make the v 0yage to assault points . j �( ) Churchill turns the heat on Sir Dudley. "Why is it going take you 18 days to get to this point when it is only go ing to take the Americans 14 days to get to the Theater of Operations from New York? rr Mr. Churchill asks. Sir Dudley says the convoy going to look as though it 'is going to the Midd le East, then suddenly switch b1:i.ck nnd shoot toward the 'Straits of G .ibr al tar says if the 9~v.eP- pilian. were chan ged he could g o more directly the trip would take only 10 days . "Do it.," says the Clark, says triumphantly days alre ady !" Prime Minister , then, turning , "See, I 1 ve saved you eight to is . He and to General p recious Gener al Clark says he wants a direct order tell~ng the TORCH planners that they are going to carry out TORC that they must H, start the operation on a certa in date and that they a r e go ing to occupy certain positions and accomplish certain definite results. This will cut out a lot of red tape and get TORCH on a concrete footin g . The five men talk about the operation until 2 A. M. Mr . Churchill's 11 through ( observations include: I want troo ps pouring into the new area . I want the walls, the ·ceilings -- everywhere ! 11 "The French will g o with us if we are Frenc h can ' t afford to pi:k a loser . " g oing them to come to wi n . But the 11 What about crossing the channel? W ell, I told Stalin ' Why stick your head in the alligator's mouth at Brest when you can go to the Mediterranean and rip his belly! 1 " The men talk about the r ea ction of the North African French to the invaaion. General Clark tells the Prime Minister that he thinks paratroopers sho uld go down with parachutes made of American fla gs and t hat aerial sky-writers shou ld zoom across the heavens writin g : 11Viva France! Lafayette , we are here again-for the second time! 11 As the . conference breaks up at 2 A. M. , Gener al Cl ark tells the Prime Minister that he _ and the oth er TORC pla nners "are H tired of this piddling around . " "Ev ery minute counts," the Deputy Cornmander-in.;..Chief of TORCHdeclares . 111 've spent days talkin g about how we ou gh t 1.e to do this tl in 0 • What we need now is th e green light. " Mr . Churchill ( promises action . �( LONDON, AUG. 26 , 1942--General G1ark tells a combi~ed British .American staff meeting this afternoon that TORCH "is definitely on"' and that it probably will be launched "not later than October 15 . " H~ tells his section chiefs to proceed on that b~sis , concentrating , for the time being , on the inside operation, including Philippeville . To coordinate work, particularly between the British and American G- 3 and G- 4 sections, General Clark ann ounces to the bined staff that a British Deputy Chief of Staff and a British Assistant Be9meta~¥ i of the Gener a l Staff will be added to his personal TORCH staff. com - On the heels of General Marshall's cable and the talk with Prime Minister Churchill , General Marshal l calls in high - ranking officers throughout the day . GenerAl Anderson , wh o is to be called before Mr . Churchill today, is informed, for background purposes , of the g ist of the conversation of last ni ght . General Clark informs General Anderson that the Prime Minister says that November is t o o late and that TORCH must start by mid-October . The two generals discuss how the necess a ry combat teams can be ready to g o into action by October 15 . ( Th e conf ere nce turns into a rou nd -table discussion of how su py ly problems are going to interfere with operat iona l plans. General Gale , Brigadier Benoy and Colonel Philipps , all British supply experts, join the conf ere nce . As usu a l, the chief topic is the difficulty of supplying the exped i tion. Benoy -1 says ·.the e;cbmf b:bp.dld capaod:ty { ··~he ' po:oes at Philippeville _of and Bone fail to meet by some 5 , 000 tons the requirements for troops to be landed and conc entra ted at those points for an advance on Tunis . Th is fi gure, he says , is based on minimum maintenance requirements- food , Ammunition , fuel- - and that it does not include any allowance for reserves or for losses. According to Benoy 1 s calculations, the s hipping deficiency cannot be made up until it is p ossible to establish coa stw ise shippin g from Algiers to the sma ll e r ports . Gene .,..· Anderson al s a ys that under the circumstances it will not be possible for his forces to gegin the i r advance on Tunis by D . 24 . General Anderson seems conservative and cautious. At one point the conversation goes like t h is : Anderson : 11I am left with no reserves , except at Al g iers." 11 Clark Ca n 1 t we ge t it ashore in lighters?" Anderson : 1Lo g istics brin g us to one irrefutable fact : there are no allowances for loss e s; no allowances for delays . The Mission l s extremely dangerous . I might not be able to get stor e s . " Clark "You ' ve g ot to lan d and do the b e st you can. The ~rime Minister says November first would be out of the question and that TORC must start H the middle of Oc t ob er . 11 .Anderson : "In other words, lam, even if I can't advance?" �91 Clark : "That's advance! right . Land and you'll get your chance to u General Anderson agrees that regardless of what date is set for D-day, his ability to advance in t¥Ue to forestall Ax.is occupation of Tunisia is doubtful . General Clark bre aks up the conference by telling the other officers that "the operation is definitely orl' and that "ways and means will have to be found to make it successful ." Before General Handy leaves for Washington, General Clark tells h im of the conversa t ion with Prime Minister Churchill, of Churchill's insistanc e on action by mid - Oc tober a nd how the Prime Mi nister took immediate steps to assist TORCH b y ordering the First Sea Lord to cut down the time re quired for the voyage to the Mediterranean . General Clark points out to General Handy that TORCH planners must be furnished "a definite directive without a moment 1 s unavoidable delay--we are ready to go ahead just as soon as we get the basic decision ." ( General Gale, who felt sli ghted yesterday when the American leaders of TORCH met without the British, is told by General Clark that the Americans received a personal mes sa ge from Gen eral Marshall that required consultation by a few American o ff icers before an answer c ould be sent back to Wash ington . He explains , not only to General Gale but to the l at e afternoon Ang lo - American conference, that the subject matt e r has been turned over to the British Joint- Mission in Washington and that it will reach the joint TORCH planning board in the near future . Gener a l Gale again brings up hi s p r oposal t ha t he be place d on a 1-evel with the Chief of Staff . General Clark explains that or gan izati on for •roRCH will follow the U. S . type and that there will be only one Chief of Staff . However, Gener a l Ga le is to feel free to g o direct to Gener a l Clark anytime he wish e s. General Gale says that will satisfy him . He then s ays the r e is l ack of staff coordin a tion , especially b etween G-3 and G- 4 . Gen e rals Gale and Dewing say they believe tne dirficulty lies in the dif ference b etwee n British and American staff procedure. They feel a British Deputy Ch ief of Staff wou ld ass: i:st in smoothing staff work. General Cl a rk, who , although not h ing has been said yet , f eels that Gener u l Dewing, wh o would out - rank the Am ric 1 Ch ief e m of Staff, wants the job, asks him to submit a name and promises that he will put the ma n in as deputy. Moreover, Ge neral Clark adds , a British secretary might be a dd ed to th e secret ar i at of the General Staff . Cables TORCH sideli administration p rocurement will operate being dis p atched to ght op e rat i ons: the wit hin occupied of radio equipment on once the troops Washington cover a multitude of U. S . is to furnis h funds for civil areas , usin g local Frenc h currency; is asked; W RVe len gt hs that TORCH g o into action are s et . J �,I / ( l LOND , AUG 27 , 1942 -- Despite . t scarcity of time if proper prepara ons are to be made, the pl for TORCH still ls not defin ite . G eral Ma· shall cables Gene ls Clark and Ei~enhower that Pres·· ent Roos e l t appears to ve decided def:l,nitely that t att k on Nor. h Africa be mad exclusively by United State as aulting and Casa / - resident think that 80 , 000 Ampican troo p are necessary lish the rn.!bss n . rt must be large and werful landing or political well as milit y purposes At a conference eneral Marsha , President Ro sevelt saY, he feels a joi land ng , even if d by United St es troops will not suffi • He believe if it is All - American; operation e can , within week after the assa1 t , arrang~ma "'ersso th e will be no c plications con c erning th landing of Br· ish troo to reinforce· e Americans . I n the initi assault , Br· ish naval orces and sh · p i n g would be used . / acco. Gen al Marshall /wh o wire he t wo Amer an g enerals ..i.mmedia tely fo lowing the ·w;(i House te onference , 11s Clark ¢ Eisen I hower hat he is c fu;lnced t President as fully m~ up hi~ mind and intends o dictate" an Al l - Amer.·can TORCH _fle says ~11t if . sue a directiV, is i ssue , the force attacking Oran will be made UR of troops ready in he United ingdom . General Pa_,.t;-ton will ad the Ca blan c a attack . Gener ~l Clark probably l w1Ll be the ommander - n -C hief if TORCH becomes All - American . ( Cabling General Marshall as rapidly as possible , the TORCH leaders say that on l y two combat teams , plus a Ranger battalion , wi ll be ready if the Oran landing is to be made October 15 . The bulk of the attacking force , Generals Clark and Ei senhower , agree will have to come from the United States . They point ~Jt that the British opinion is that such a TORCH operation won't accomplish the real purpose and what is the reason for going at all if we don ' t gain Tunisia . They add that All i ed troops cannot get Tunisia unless __ they do so qui c kly and attack as far east as Bone . They point that Prime Minister Churchill promised last night to strip down his Indian Ocean fleet to assist in TORCH since the American fleet _E- as the Japanese well -engaged in the Solomon Islands battle . ou1 :· ( General C1ark is in conferences all day . General Anderson , saying that he will be able to assault at Algiers and Bone "with prospects of success but without a mobile force to advance , " asks for a new TORCH d i rective . He says the chances of reaching Tunisia in time to defeat German for c es is sli ght , even with Philippeville included . He adds that if there is no Frenc h resist anc e , he may , by requisitionin g local tr an sport , be able to move into Tunisia befo r e 1 s views , his D. 24 . He holds that regardless of the Prime M1 .nister present mission cannot be carried out against resistance . The new dire c tive might , he believes , order him to assault at the selected points , secure airdromes and ports in the vicinity , then move to the east without spe c ifying a date for the accomplishment of the latter objective . �General Clar k asks Anderson when he will have enough trans port to move forward witho u t French assistance and the Britisher replies that when the first follow - up force is in, about D.8, he will be able to move a brigade gro p but the remainder of the force wi ll not be mobile until after arrival of the second follow-up convo y . General Clark tells him that if all p;oes well in the initi al landing at Oran there will be some air transports available to assist him in getting his troops forward . General Anderson says that will be v ery helpful . Accordin g to General Anderson, the First Sea Lord is no w hedging on the 10-d ay fi gure for the sea voyage, pointing out the dan ge r from air attack to a convoy on a course laid near the West Coast of Europe . The Director of Movements is also doubtful that the time for combat loading can be reduced much below 1 2 days as five days is the normal time required for loading one vessel, but not enough berths exist for simul tane _ ous loading of all ships in the convoy . However , Gene ra l Cl ark points out to Anderson , Mr . Churchill has said he is willin g to light the ports at night to expedite loadin g . General . Gale and Colonel Stokes are ship ping si t uation. General Gale says if in the United Kingdom will not have time trip to the United States . I called in to discuss the D- day is early ships now to make another return The top - ranking intelligence officer on TORCH, British Brigadier Mockl er -F erryman , tells General Clark he cannot ag r ee with. t :1ose who think the French in Nort h Afr ica will not resist . He believes firm resistance will be encountered for at least 48 hours . He says the French army in Africa lacks both moral stamina and physi cal means for prolonged resistance . After talking over the proposed organization of the Headquar ters Security Force for TORCH with Colonel Ramsey, General Clark believes.it would be best to take the required reconnaissance unit and infantry battalion from the 1st Armor ed Div ision . Units brought in f r om the U. S . later will repla ce these so they can rejoin the division when it enters the theater . General Clark calls in General Allen and Bri ga dier General Roosevelt and outlines to them the training plans for the 18th Infantry Combat team of the 1st Division which will begin training at Inverary , Scotl and , about September 10 . General Roosevelt says that all special amphibious equipment is being shipped from the States and that it probably will be here by September 15 . A long intelligence report concerning what Washington G- 2 of f icials think will be the re a ction of the Frenc h and Spanish to the Afric an attack is received by General Clark. Excerpts from it include : j �J ( "The Vichy French may try to influence us into Occupied France in order to g ive them some guidance for thei r own action vis - a~vis the Germans 1 or bait us into a German net, or to warn us as to the futility of our effort . There is nothing however to indicate that the Vichy French are other than realists , and they ar e expected to make a d e cision which will put them on the winning side . There is nevertheless a hopeful tone in some French information which su ggests that if u. s . forces go into French territory they sh ould be in sufficient force to impress the local French authorities and t~ hold on at all costs . "With reference to the Free French , there is a slight indic ation that they may know or suspect something about it . xx (Officialis) fully understand the vit al importance of not t e lling them anything with re g ard to future operations . xx x There is a report that the French in North and Northwest Africa are on ed ge . In this c onnection , there is something on this in 11a most reliable source . 11 There is nothing reliable to indicate that the French wi ll assist us anywhere , but on the other hand , much information to indicate that the y will resist . However, emphasis is again laid upon the fact that resistance may be considerably less if they are faced b y a strong and apparently resolute force . "We have no information to indicate that Spain will remain remain aloof or that the Germans will not use the Spanish airfields . In this connection , if Spain stay s out of it , or the Germans do not use their airfields initially , surface u ni ts can reac h certain points in North Africa without effective interception b y Axis air and surface forces . If , however , German Air uses Spa nish airfields , earlier and serious interception of our forces must be expected. If t h is Axis activity from Spain is withheld until after our forces are ashore, the Axis Air might make it very di ff icult for the recently landed forc e s . However, the operation offers considerable hope of success if the Germans are kept out of Spain until a later date . I t would be in error to plan, however , definitely on the Germans staying out of Span is h airfields . If the ope ration is put through , German air and other forces might be sent down toward Spain for purposes of destroying United Nations' forces in the Mediterranean and an opportunity might arise for other United Nati ,ns' forces from England to strike in the German fl ank . " General vlark points of opinion in these views ( out that "there is considerable with those of the Prime Minister difference ." The Washington G- 2 also brings up in its report the subject 11 of 11Cooperat ion with Allies ." I t declares it is of vital importance to thoroughly war game and prac t ice with the British on t h is tubject (coordinat io n of air , ground and armored forces) practice with the British on this subject of coordinati on of the several elements from distant and near bases i n any aspect of the special operation p lanned. This should be thoroughly exam ~ned with the British in London, and as well should be soundly practiced with our naval forces . The coordination and ti ming of the various elements of this �operation give 11 are 3IHL of absolutely vital importance General Clark remarks that these me a pain in the hind end . 11 . platitudes " about coordination II the "It is axiomatic general declares , "that . staff officers in high positions fa; removed from the front , reiterate doctrine which is well kno~ to all of us , but which to put into effect requires considerable time . I n other words , Kroner (Brigadier General Kroner of tre Washington G- 2 staff) is going on record that for an operation of this kind to be successful, coordination of air , ground and mechanized units is essential . We have been preaching this in our training in the states for the past t wo years . W know e it is essential and would do it here , but time do e s~not permit. 11 0 * * * LONDON, AUGUST28 , 1942--Plans for United in TORCHare progressing favorably and the air ing plans for movement of both ground personnel the United States and the United Kingdom . ( _) C States air operations sections are preparand sup plies from Colonel Vandenberg confers with General Clark and the Deputy Commander-in - Chief discusses with him the p ossibility of using various devices to prepare the way for the American landing: sky writing , American flags dropped by parachute and leaflets. Some Spitfir e mechanics have been shipped to the United States to come over with General Patton ' s force . Gasoline supply at first will be by five-gallon cans , later by barrels , and finally by t ankers . Packing of equipment mus t be gin in about two weeks if the date is to be October 15 . Van:lenberg says Generals Arnold , Doolittle and Hansel all agree that we have not more than about one - fourth the air strength supporting the American attack that might profitably be used . They also believe that the British effort is so weak in air support that it is unlikely to succeed in view of the Axis Air Force strength in the Sicily - Sardinia area . Vanderber g says that General Doolittle, with his principal staff officers , plans to go f'rom Gibraltar to La Senia airport just as soon as it bas been captured. In line with air ope r ations , General Anderson , during a conf erence with General Clark , asks if the general would be willing to have American planes land at various point~ including Tunis , on the morning of the attack . He feels that a big bluff might work but points out that American officers landing at Tunis might be made prisoners of war . As a sidelight to this British request , Colonel Vandenberg tells General Clark that the Fighter Command is holding back from the TORCH operation . He says the 9onnnand is "reluctant" to be changed from its present role of escorting bombers to that of ground support in the TORCH operation . General (Hark says this is a matter which will "re quire definite action . " American bombers , accompanied by the flighters , are raiding Occupied France almost daily now . Admi~al Ramsay calls to discuss the readjustment of naval �9 f forces required in order to provide means for the protection of the Philippeville attack . No additional vessels or naval air c raft are available . The British Navy is planning to provide four carriers and t wo auxiliary carriers in the Mediterranean with a total of about 60 to 70 fighting planes in addition to some reconnaissance and a few bombers . Adm~ral Ramsay plans to provide air protection for the forces attacking at Bone and Philippeville up to dark on D . l . At that time , carriers will turn back to assist in covering the attack at Algiers the next morning . The British Admiral feels that the limited support that he co u ld afford for the attacks at Bone and Philip pe ville by naval planes does not justify the risk entailed to the carriers from Axis land - based planes . r ) Admiral Ramsay does not suggest that the Philippeville attack could not be made due to naval li mitations but he does point out that in order to mount the attack , use must be made of special ships no w being converted . These are large vessels of about 20 1 000 tons which lack armored landing craft and which are not of the best type . Crews for the landing c raft will n ot be well trained . He also states that in order to place landin g c ra .t't in condition for oper ations that training would have to cease about 'September 10 . The general tells him such a conditi on cannot poss ibly be agreed to; that the training of the c ombat team s had to be carried through , and that if the landing craft were not in the best shape , that was merely another risk that we would have to accept . General C1ark brings up the possibility of including a fient at Casablanca if the large - scale T ORCH operation g oes on . Admiral Ramsay thinks the idea is sound provided a s 1li table naval co111ering force can be found . In his opinion, the risk involved in brin g ing a l arge convoy into the vicinity of Casablanca without strong naval su pp ort wou ld be great . He feels that more battleships, some c ruisers and a carrier are essential . Gene r al Anderson joins in the discussion and soon a sharp difference of op inion arises betw e en the British general and the Briti sh admirql concerning the use of landing craft prio r to embarkation . Admi ral Ramsay emphasizes the need for c raft overhaul; Gene ra l Anderson the need for training of assault troops . After ;l!dm!L ral Ramsay leaves , Gene r al C lark explains to General Anderson that he is ordering a second reserve comb a t team of the 1st Division into amphibious training . Anderson understands th at he will have the 168th U . S . Infantr y re gime nt at Algiers and the 18th U. S . Infantry at Philippeville . Gen e r a l Ql ark ~rin g s u p the subject of anti - aircraft protection for the regimental combat teams in the assault and on the beach. Gener a l And erson states that none has been provided and that none is required since the land ing would be made at night . He believes A- A weapons on the ships will take ca ~e of the situation u nt il anti - aircraft units can be pu t ashore . He says that in the attack at Algiers some tanks would be used with one of the comb at teams . The C01 manding :1 General of the 78th British Divis ion will g ive Gene ra l Clark details of this attack plan at a later date . �r ( General Cl ark tells General Anae~son that he wants every detail of every plan laid before him and that he intends them fully as the plans develop . minute to go into Satisfactory progress is being made on amphibious training at Inverary , Scotl and . Colonel 0 1 Daniel reports in today to General Clark . Colonel o t Daniel says no provision is being made for anti aircraft support with landin g craft or on the beach, a thing that the general feels must be provided . General Clark tells General Allen that he has no objection to Brigadier General Roosevelt go i ng to inspect the Scotland base but that he must understand clearl y that the training is under British command and that he is not to interfere in any way e Gene ra l Allen is also told that another regimental combat team , the 26th, would g.o into amphibious trainin g and that the 18th U. S . Infantry Regiment combat team will .move to Toward about September 7 for advanced training . The 26th mmfantvw Regime nt team will go to Inverary Sept ember 26 to take over from the 34th Division combat team that will have complet ed its training by then . General Clark explains that in case the American TO RCH plan is put into effect we would need an additional u. s. combat team for the assault- - or, a total of three combat teams at Oran . Other urgent matters that get attention today inc lude discussion of the advance party that will go to Gibraltar by plane, arriving there just before the TORCH convoy gets ready to enter the Straits of Gibraltar ; (Genera l Matejka feels there is no.insur mountable difficulty to providing signal communications at Lribral tar.); organization of the Anglo-ArlBrican rel ati ons in the G-3 section , and formation of a definite staff program to bring out wealmesses or onnnissions that might otherwise be u ndetected until too late . In the evening, Generals ~lark and Eisenhower leave for Prime Minister Churc hi ll's country home at Checkers . They will remain overnight so they can hold lengthy, u disturbed confer ences with Mr . Churchill . . CHECKERS, ENGLAND, AUG 29 , 1942 - -While Generals . Eisenhower and Clark are at the Prime M inis ter 's country estate, an officer courier arrives from London with a secret cooe message of greatest importance . General Marshall cables that President Roosevelt appears to have decided definite l y that the attack on ~orth Africa will be made exclusively with United States troops assaulting at Oran and Casablanca . The President thinks that 80,00 0 American troops are necessary to accomplish the mission . It must be a large and powerful landing force for political as well as military purposes . At a conference �Ci , with General Marshal l, President Roos evelt says he feels a joint landing , even if led by United States troops, will not suffice . He bel i eves if it i s an All - American op e ration he can , within a week , , afte r the assault landing, arrange matters so there will be no com ~ pli cations conce rni ng the l andi n g of British troops to reinforce the .Americans . In the initial assault , British naval and air forces and shipping would be used . General Marshall , who wired t he two American generals i mmed i ate ly following the White House conference , tells Clark and Eisen hower that he is convinced the President "has fully made up h is 11 mind and intends to dictate an All-.American TORCH. He says that if such a directive is issued , the force attacking Oran will be made up of troops already in the United Ki ngdom . General Patton will head the Casablanca attack . General Clark probably will be the Comm nder -i n -C hief a if TORCH becomes All-American . The President , General ma rshall says , apparently is u·riwilling to accept the hazards of a single line of communications through Gibraltar . He does not ag r ee with the British argument that such a TORCH operation will mean the loss of Tunisia and possibly Algeria to the Germans . 'l'he President also bel iev es it is imperative that the United States strengthen its guard of the South Atlantic . Another argument 1V1r Roosevelt . giv e s is that there is not enough naval support for more than two landing points . Genera l Marshall s ays the ~resident expe c ts to convey his decision t o the Prime Minister on Monday and that all information concerning Mr . Roosevelt's stand must be highly secret and that Bri tish must not hear a single word about it. the Fri or to arrival of the cable, Generals Clark and Eisenho wer have spent hours in conferences with the Prime Minister and other British l eaders talkin g over the proposed African operation . Upon their arrival at Ch eckers las t night, the two American genera ls were met by the Prime Min is ter who , as usu al , was wearing baggy, informal clothes . The entire dirmer conversati on revolves around TORCH. Seated around the table are the Prime Minister , General I smay , General Sir Alan Brooke (chief of staff of the British army ), General Clark, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden , Lor d Louis Mountbatten and General Eisenhower . The Prime Minister expresses his enthusiasm concerning TORCH Eden is also . sold on it 100 per c ent . Fo ~-owing l dinner and the showing of motion pie tures, including newsreels of the Die ppe ra i d and the Prime Minister ' s visit in the Mi ddle East . • Afterward the officials go to Mr . Churchill's study where the conversati on continues until 2 AM. The same ground i s covered as was covered at the London conference earlier in the week . General Clark againoutlines the shi i> i ng problems, P transport and naval . At 2 AM., all of the party but Mr . Churchill, Generals Brooke and Cl ark and Foreign Minister Eden retire . C . ~ OJvc,,,..R,,,,, ,\,<JI t / / �1. .. II The Prime Minister suggests that a little f resh air might be in order" after being closeted in the study so the four men go out onto the lawn to walk up and down in the moonlight d iscussing every phase of TORCH. At first , the men walk in twos : the Prime Minister and General Brooke in front and General Glar k and Anthony Eden in the re ar . Eden tells the general he thinks TOPCH is the right operation but that he hasn 1 t yet made up his mind just what the Spanish reaction will be . Since Mr . Churcfiill keeps flinging remarks back over his shoulder , the men fall in a line of four and stride up and down the lawn . They talk until 4 AM . The next morning the First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound , is summoned and the shipping situation is again gone over . Sir Dudley tells the Prime Minister that he does not believe he can reduce the time for loading ships and that iL looks as though the estimate of a 10 - day trip to the Mediterranean is optimistic . When the secret cable arrives b J courier , Prime Minister Churchill , who intimates he has been getting reports from his off~cials in Washington indicating the President is not satisfied with the Anglo-American TORCH plan , is cur i ous but Generals elark and Eisenhower stall him off. He invites them to remain during the afternoon but they both tell him they must return to London . ( While the Marshall cable is go ing to Checkers, General Gruenther, acting Chief of Staff for General Cla rk , c alls a conference of key U. S. members of the Headquarters Staff and orients them so they c an start work with a view to determining the earliest possible date for the operation . 1'hey are caut ioned to be particularly careful not to drop the slightest hint to the British that a chan ge might be made . As soon as Gener a l Clark returns, General Gale a nd Admiral Ramsey come in to fis h for informa t ion. Ramsey has learned scmething through Admiralty channels . General Clark tells them in a gene ral way of the conference at Chec kers and then tells them that the Amer ic an and British governme nts are not yet in agreement on TORCH; that nothing d~finite has been set but that a decision is expected soon . General Clark informs Admiral Ramsey that the Prime Minister wants further examination of the possibility of sec ur ing the n ~val means necessary for simultaneous attacks at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers (t~porarily eliminating operations at Philippeville and Bone . Ramsey states that the British cannot support Algiers and Oran alone . He adds the operation might be done if the U. S . can, in addition to supp ortin g Casablanca , help the British at Oran . The assistance required by the British from the . U. S . Navy for Oran is as follows , Ramsey says : one auxiliary car r ier, 12 destroye r s, 8 combat lo aders complete with landin g craft, 5 car g o carriers and 8 p e rsonnel ships . Admiral Rams ey points out that the attack on Casablanca will re quire stron g er naval support than that now planned for Or an . He considers a covering force, includin g two old battleships, to be essential at Casablanc a . The conclusion is that the proposed three-prong attack is beyond the capacity of the combined navies at this time . �,., 1 ,p:- IC General 01ark is making arrangements to Bring General Ward to London from Northern I reland to work out plans for employment of the First Armored Division at Or an . Tanks that go with the regimental combat teams must be trained with them and Colonel O'D aniel is charged with finding a suitable location for this type of work . The General is also bringing down General Ryder of the 34th Division to discuss the work of the division ' s combat team now in training at Inverary , Scotland . Amphibious training for the l~t Division is discussed with Generals Allen and Barker . General Cl ar k dis c uses the ways and means of getting the maximum training for the regimental combat teams of the 1st Division and the 168th Infantry of the 34th Div ision on the su ppo sition that they will make the attack on October 28 . General Allen recommends moving his entire division to Scotlru1d , saying a large fraction of h is comm end w~ll be under training in that area anyway . General Clark reserves a decision but instructs a reco n naissance party to look for a suitable area for the division in Scotland . General Allen is told that General Roosevelt will not accompany the reconnaissance party . It is now anticipated that most of the equipment for the 1 8thJ i n!ant~y combat team should be in the hands of troops by September 10 and , for the 26th It'antry by Sept vmber 15 . * ( * LONDON, AUG. 30, 1942 -- Despite the indecision and the ne:rve wracking tension of waiting for the men higher up to make up their minds as to what should be done , General Clark continues to hold conferences -- hold them even though he doesn't know what the scope of the plan is goingto be , even though he must speak very carefully with the British , officers who sense that TORCH is in a state of flux Political factors have now become so interwoven with military factors that General Clark and his staff can ' t even guess which way the next jump will be . This , the general hopes, will all be cleared up tomorrow when President Roosevelt is scheduled to send his recommendation or directive to London . A cable is sent to Washington declaring that it is now "evident •th a t the estimated date of October 25 is too optimistic . 11 Assault e quipment for the 1st Divisi on is still ~ar out of reach and it a p pears that certain amounts will not be available befo ~e the middle of September ~ The American generals tell General Marshall that they can 11scarcely attack earlier than the first of November . " The Oran fcrce, tentatively, will be composed of: 1st Infantry Division; one Regimental Combat Teron of the 34th Division ; one composite regiment; a small detachment of armored troops from the 1st Armored Division . Followup troops will come from the United States directly to Africa. The balance of the 1st Armored and the 34th Divisions will be left in the United Kin gdo m. General ~lark points out that the U . S . must bring addition a l ground formations to the United Kingdom . He 11 says this has always been accepted and the length of the convoy from England to the North African theater will make it highly . �I desirable the other compel us new the at to avoid double shipment if it can possibly be done . On hand , the . necessity of an early follow - u p to TORC may H to truce the remainder of these two divisions into the er . 11 General Clark has one visitor with whom he can frankly discuss a problem without having to be troubled as to whether TORCH will be as originally planned or whethe r it will be cot'ined to Oran and Casablanca . The visitor i s Li eut . Colonel W. A. Eddy, USMC U. S . Naval Attache , at Tanger . Colon e l Eddy believes that if the United States alone enters French North Africa there will be a popular uprising to support us . However , he does not bel'ieve this will happen if the British are with us . Groups of guerillas , he says , have been formed in Morocco and Algiers and they are ready to take an active part in any operation started by American forces . Leaders of these groups have been tested for loyalty and , in his opinion , the J would be trustworthy . ( Colonel Eddy supervises the work of 12 contro l officers who are charg·ed with observin g the distribution of materials imported from the U. S . under the North African Economic Aid program . These control officers, ost ens i bl y under the Consul at Algiers, are all army and navy men - -former officers or reserve office rs who are on in act ive - cu ty status . Captain Nochs , now on duty at Algiers, is acquainted intimately with Oran and key peop le in that area . He will come to London for conferences and provide TORCH leaders with a list of the men who should receive le tters from our government at the time the landing is made . Colonel Eddy has conferred with General Patton recently and General Patton has requested -certain action as.Lore at Casablanca as soon as his forces land. This includes rounding up of the German Armistice Commission as soon as American forces go into action . Col,nel Eddy is to confer with Mr . Mack on cert ain pol itic a l aspects of the operation . He will also discuss with General Matejka the use of the Tanger Broadcasting station to t ra nsmit information to our convoys . I General Anderson, as worried as a stenographer with a stork hovering over her house , co , ies in again to ask General Clark just what is going on . He s ays he has heard rumors that U. S . combat teams earmarked for his force may now be used with U. S . forces ~ He insists that he must know of any contemplated action th a t would bring about changes in his plans . He is aware of the proposal to attack at Casa blanca and Oran only . He krows of the unfavorable reaction of the British government . General Clark tells him the::.-·e is nothing more he can tel l him at present ,nd adds that until the British and American governments agree "we might as well not worry over d 0 tails . " General Clark tells the British general that 11the lack of navpl means almost certainly precludes a simultaneous attack at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers . C �IC ( ( Air Vice - Marshall Welsh comes in to discuss the general air plan for TORCHbut General Clark tells him 11we 1 11 have to wait until things are on a finner basis . " Without giving the Britisher any indication of a probable change in pli:m , thi::., General gets his views concerning air support of the Or an - Casablanca operation. He see s no par-c;icu.Lar diff·1culty, believin p- tbe :1 ir plan can be adjus ted to meet any operation finally decided upon. He says he will go ahead with the shipping of crated fip.:hters to Gibraltar. Welsh S8YS he is pleased with the general set-up . In his opinion, the greatest menace to the expeoi tion will be submarines. This will be c ambated by flying-boat patrols based initially at Gibraltar. Later they will be based at Oran and other North African ports . Plans call for anti - submarine aircraft squadrons to move onto North rlfrican bases by D.3 . General Gl a rk confers thrrughout the day with his own officers. The amphibious training program, running on a more-or - less d ~1-toy day basis because of the indecis ion of what will compose the TORCH force , requires almost constgnt revision . The 18 th Infantry Combat team , under present plans, will be moved into the Toward-Roseneath area by September 7 . There will be tvvo landing ships available for training . After the 18th has completed its training at Toward , a combat team from the 1st Armored Division will start its training there, the 18th moving into a tent camp , the loc F.1t ion of wh.Lch has y \.., to be selected t . The 168th Inf ant ry combat team will remain at • Inveraray until September 12 and be followed there by the 26th Infantry which will go into training between September 12 and 15th . General Clark points out to Colonel 0 1 Daniel the necessity for training that will be a re8listic rehearsal for the actual attack . 0 1 Daniel says exercises of this type are provided for . The training in the Toward-Roseneath area as now planned will be under the British. In case an All - American operation is carried out , 0 1 Daniel 1 s staff will take char ge of instruction. Generals Gruenther and Barker and Colonels Hamblen and Nevins are c A lled in to discuss with Gene.ral Clark wha t service units must be obtained additionally for the Oran force. Hamblen mentions a water supply unit, evacuation and surgical hosp ital as of vital importance . Hamblen is instructed to prep ~re a complete list and send a dispatch to Washington listing special equipment re qu irements such as fine-mesh head nets, mos quito repellents and other tropical equipment . Gene ra l Clark says there will be an acute need for qua rter -ton an phibious trucks . The time necessary to get additional service units from the U. S . probably will set the earliest possible date for the at G ack back to the f irst week in Novomber . LONDON, AUG 31 , 1942 -- President . an All - American operation! l The all - important Churchill. It outlines c able is sent the President's Roosevelt wants to keep TORCH this afternoon to Prime Minister plans and arguments but , as �.3lllff: ( yet , the plan for TORCH is not set . President Roosevelt wants ideas of the Prime Minister and Generals Clark and Eisenhower 48 hours . the within The President cables Mr . Churchill that he has considered all TORCHphases and that he .feels "v ery strongly that the initial attacks must be made by an exclus i vely Americ'm ground force sup ported by your (British) Naval and Transport and Air Units . " He says the operation " should be undertak en on the assumption that the French will offer less re sis tance to us than they will to the British . " 11 ! would even go so far as to say I am reasonably sure a simult an e ous landing by the British and Americans would result in full resistance by all Fr ,nch in Africa whereas an i ritial Am rican e land ing without British gpound forces offers a Peal chance that there would be no French resistance or on l y token resistance . I need a week if possible after we land to consolidate the position of both of us by securing the n on- resistance of the French . I sincerely hope I can get this . Then your force can come in to the eastward . I re , lize full well t 11 your landing must be made before at the enemy can get there . It is our belief that German air and parachute troops cannot get to Algiers or Tunis in any large force for at le1rnt t.10 weeks after initi nl attack . Meanwhile your troops would be ashore , we hope , without much op p osition and would be moving eastward . C 11 As to the place of landings it seems to me that we must have a sure and p e rmanent base on the northwest coast of Afr i ca because a single line of communic a tions through t he Strai ts is far too hazardous in the li gh t of our limited joint resources . I propose therefor that: (a) American troops lR nd simultaneously near Casa blanca and near Oran . (b) that they se ek to establish road and rail communication with e a ch other back of the mountains . The distance is little more than 300 miles . This g i ves the enterprise 1., suppl;/ base in Morocco which is outside the Straits and can be used to reinforce and supply the operations in Algiers and Tunis . "The real problem seems to be th 1,t there is not enough cover and combat loadings for more than two landings . I r ea lize it would be far better to hqve three with you handling the one to the East ward a week after we get in . To this end I think we should re - exam ine our resources and strip everyth.mg to the bone to make the third landing possible . 1,/e cnn give up the Russi an convoy temporarilJ' at that time and risk or hold up oth er merchant shippin g . I t is essential of course that all ships now assigned to EisenhoHer for his t wo landin gs remain int :-;ct . Hence t.ne eastward landing must be made on ships not now available to TORCH I will explore . "tHis at our end . Can we not get an answer on this , it ilin 48 hours or less? I wm t to emphasize , however, that under any circumstances one of our landin g s must be on the Atlantic . ( "The directive to the Commander inChief of the operation should be launched at the earliest pract~cable da te . The date should be consistent with the preparation necess ·iry for an operation wit h a �( fair chan c e of success and accordingly it shou l d be determined by the Comm Hnders in Chief . But in no event later than October 30 . I 11 still would hope for October 14 . ( s i gned ) Roosevelt . Genera l C1 ark rushes over to General Eisenhower ' s Grosveno r Square off i ce when the co p y of the President ' s cab l e to the Prime Minister is received . The resu l t rlf this confe- r e:,J;R.~tis a c able 11 back to Washington saying that the chief points/occasioned the concern of the British Chiefs of staff were the omrnission of Algiers from the original attack and th e fact that the assault proposed by the president disposes at least half of its strength on a coast where possibilities of landing are dependent enti r ely upon the weather with the probability th t four out of five days wi ll be u nsuitable for l a nding . Consequently while the British Chie f s of Staff completely shar e the American opin i on as to the importance of Casab l anca and the open.1ng of an auxiliary line of communications , they believe t1 1 at the Casablanca attack should be the one, if p o ss i b l e , that should be made on inv i tation and at al l events should not play too great a part in the first display of over whelming tac ti cal power . 11 ( 11 As a counterproposal , Genera l s Cl a rk and Eisenhower be l ieve the British Chiefs of Staff wi ll suggest something about as follows : that the Br i tish pro v ide all escorting , supporting and other naval crAft poss i ble to the United States wit n the request that the two main American attacks be made at Al g iers and Oran with a smaller U. S . fo r ce ready to attack simultaneous l y at Casablanca . By elim inating the Bone and Philippeville attacks from the present plan , some additional escortinp; vessels and combat l oaders will be c ome available . The Brit i sh cou l d d i spatch to the U. S . a few combat loaders to assist i n making up the Casab l Hnca force under the general plan just des c ribed . It is clear , however , that to provide the necessary nava l strength for g iv i ng reasonable protec t ion to the Casablanca attack , even on a relatively small sc a le , th e U . S . will have to produce a dditional strength to that used by the U. S . nava l pla mers here in making their ca lc ulations . 11 A su g gestion that a British division mirht be placed in Amer ic ,.n uniforms was rejected as involvin g risk of " l aying ourseives open to the charge of bad faith . " The cable to the War Department declares "there is no hope of the F ~rst Division being able to take part in a major expedition from the United Kingdom before October 30 . 11 Generals Eisenhowe r and Clark say 11this is absolutely the most optimistic date upon whic 1:1we c ·rn calculate • 11 The cable , signed by General Eisenhower , concludes : " General Clark and I both believe that every possible chance of in c luding Algiers in the first attack should be explored but we repeat our conviction that this c a n be done only with some additional nava l strength from the United States , wh ich prior investigation has indicated could not be forth com i ng . 11 Before arrival a series of confer ofthe B~~ s md efuti a l cable , ~ 6neral Clark holds e nces . General Larkin is informed he probably will �( head the SOS in the Oran area. Initially, the SOS at Casabla nca will not be unified with that at Oran under one command . General Rooks is cFJ.lled up f rom Lon gford Castle , where he has been heading the II Army Corps as Chief of Staff since Gener Hl Clark came to London . Rooks is told that in c ase the projected U. S. ~lan goes through , he will be designated Chief of Staff of t he Oran Task Force . He remains at Norfolk house to work out the s la te for the task force staff which will be held down to the minimum . General Ryder is calle d ·in and oriented on the proposal for an al l u. s . operation . General Porter is going to be placed in co .irrnHd of the 168th Inf antry comb at team . General Clark discusses n with General Ryder the possible use of th e 34th Division in the follovv - up phase . Rydor is also told that General Clark might take one infantry battalion from his division i'or use as a headquarters security force . I'he c aa.i.- o1' the 135th Inf an try , now in Scotland, is to return to Northern Irel and at once . The 34th, General Ryder says, is considera b ly under strength but replacements will be made from troops enroute to the European Theater of Operations. Once again the 1st Division is having trouble getting the equipment to replace that on the ship that went aground off Newfoundland . Colonel Hughes _ reports that one ship carrying an estima ted 5 , 000 tons of organization equipment for the lst's infantry and artillery uni ts has had. to turn back in mid - ocean . HU f,he s believes the ship is c arrying the ex p r es s shipment which was rushed to New York to replace the equipment that was on the vessel that went aground. Under the ci rcum s tances it is unlikely that ti is e quipment will be in the hands of troops before October 5 . For a D-day of November 5 it would have to be reloaded i rnm edia tel y for shipment to the African th e ater and would not be ava il able to the troops for tr aining purposes . General Gale and Brigadi 6r Benoy advise G·eneral (.;lark that the British War Office wants to s end telegrams tonight dire ctin g move ment of sup ~lies to g o on the first follow-up convoy for the Algiers - Phili ,.1eville-Bone p force . The War Office is willing to hold u.,., the i ssuance of telegrams for the Philippeville and Bone forces , buthas instruct ed General Anderson to release t e l eg rams for the Al g iers equ ip ment . This conference occurs prior to rec e ipt of Mr . Roosevelt's c able and General Clark i_nstructs Brigadier Benoy to request the War Office to "send no telegrams for at least t he next 24 hours , or until fu· ,-, ther advice is g iv en by me . 11 General Gale is told that no "new p lan" directive has been issued and that "work is to continue along the lines indicate d at the last staff confer en ce--Or an , Algiers , Philippeville, Bone . * l , LONp , SEPT . 1, 1942 -- The Britlsh ON are f'inally told tod ay th :it TORCHhas developed a split perso nality; that , as t hings now stand , there are really two plans -- President Roosevelt 's All-Am er ican attack and the combined Anglo -AmGricoo assault that has Prime Minister Churchill as its chief proponent . 'I � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, August 1-31, 1942 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from August 1-31, 1942. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1942 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Language A language of the resource English Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/556 Date Valid Date (often a range) of validity of a resource. 1940-1949 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/d370246a51057ed789d605b963f2427f.pdf?Expires=1773878400&Signature=NShFgh9jDUZhQ64wk0h8sXtcR7nCslUvtR-nINuedd7K5UEROgM4T%7EiayfFEBcAHzn7wI36jfad9zKkKifBS5oNNil4pRXx9rUsPfLrqn7slcxuSVofonzxpU75hRIcKrF4cvO8UdaTzh6oBQyCu-MVEwX%7E1prMTaSXS55CzHryBe0%7EXYZ2m5mFgBb51SKvFlc4s-Imdwogfgk8YEo4coFExl%7EkOzoaxqktUTuQKIu4km7sqrSMNGUPP8tmdmv72tCujBm%7EB1oBSU6NxEvjY1Dm52rXM19ox2i9164Wt37RzmOCdUR2w9pu1%7EmNYLnv8QKWwqmfviPYz%7EkMWmx5zAQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 025c01318bb0c96f8bcd5e69966e332b PDF Text Text THE CITADEL 0 ARCHIVES AND MUSEUM head the SOS i n the Oran area . I nitially , the SOS at Casablanca will not be unif i ed with that at Oran under one com mand . General Rooks is c alled up from Longford Castle , whe re he has been heading the II Army Cor p s as Chief of Staff since Gener r-, Clar k came to 1 London . Rooks is told that in c ase the projected U . S . :gllan g oes through , he will be designated Chief of Staff of the Oran Task Force . He remains at Norfo lk house to work out the s la te for the task force staff which wi ll be he ld down to the minimum . General Ryder is called in and oriented on the p ropos al for an all u.s . operation . General Porter is going to be placed in co ,irrnRnd of the 168th Infantry combat team . General Clark discusses with General Ryder the possible use of th e 34th Division in the follmv - up phase . Ryder is also told that General Clark might take on e infantry battalion from his division for use as a headquarters security force . The caa..1.· 01' the 135t h Inf antry , now in Scotland , is to return to Nort he r n Ireland at once . The 34th , General Ryder says, is considera b l y under strength but replacements will be made from troops enroute to the European Theater of Operations . Once again the 1st Division is having trouble getting the equipment t o replace that on the ship that went aground off Newfoundland . Colonel Hughes _ reports that one ship carrying an estima ted 5 , 000 t ons of or ganization equipment for the lst 1 s infantry and artillery units has had to turn back in mid - oc ean . Huf)les believes the ship is c arrying the expr ess shipment ·which was rushed to New Yor k to replace the equipment that was on the vessel that went aground . Under the ci rcumstances it is unlikely that tl is e qu ipment will be in the hands of troops bef ore October 5 . For a D-day of Nov ember 5 it would have to be reloaded i mmedia tely for shipment to the African th c:ater and wo u ld not be available to the troops for training purposes . General Gale and Brigadi 0 r Benoy advise General ~lark that the British War Of f ice wants to s e nd telegrams ton i ght directing move ment of sup ~lies to go on the first follow - up convoy for the Algiers - Phili ,.1eville-Bone p force . The War Of fi c e is willing to hold U.i,i the i ssuan ce of telegrams for the Philippe vill e and Bone for ces , buthas instruct ed General Anderson to release t e l eg rams for the Alg iers eq u i pment . This conference occurs prior to rec e ipt of Mr . Roosevelt ' s cable and General Clark i _ s true ts Brigadier n Benoy to request the War Office to "send no telegrams for at least the next 24 hours , or until fu· , ther advice is g iven by me . " General Gale is told that no "ne w plan" dire c tive has been issued and that "work is to continue along the lines indicate d at the last staff confer en ce - -Or an , Al g i ers , Philippeville , Bone . l LO~ ON, SEPT . 1, 1942--The British are finally told today th r1t '/ TORCH has developed a split personality; that, as things now stand , there are really two plans -- President Roosevelt 's All-American attack and the comb ined Anglo -Am~rican assault that has Prime Minister Churchill as its chief proponent . �0 11rk assembles General 37 officers , British and .Am ricAn, e in a well - guarded conference room at 10 AM to ~ive them the complete picture on TORCH planning . The top - ranking men sit at- a rough wooden table at the head of which sits General Clark . On h is ri g ht is Lieut . General Anderson , who is scheduled to lead the British effort in TORCH; on General Clar k ' s left is nis Acting Chief of Staff, Brig . Gener a l Gruenther , then comes Admiral Ramsay of the Britis h Navy . The crowded table is studded with top nothc British and Americnn military , naval and air talent . Around the room other officers sit attentively on w~od ~n, folding clIBirs . "Some of you men ar e less confused than ott 1 ers about TORCH, 11 General Cl 1 k says , grinning r . "L e t's all get equally confused ." The officers , all of whom h rwe been on edge because of secrecy and an ever - shifting plan , laugh and the conference is off to a good start . ( I GenerA.l Clark explains that the Americi=m and British govern ments h a ve different conce ~ ts of how the attack on Northern Africa should be made . rte says President Roosevelt feels it is essential that the attack be All - American and that we establish ourselves fully on the northwest c oast , with half our force striking inside the Mediterranean and the other half outside at Casablanca to as s ur e us of an Atlanti c Coast supply port . The Prime Minister , he explains , v1ants to work on TORCH as all the officers now know it -- assaulting Or a n , Algiers , Bone arid , possibly, Ph ilippeville . The general tells the combined s t aff that "differences have developed . 11 The general then reads President Roosevelt ' s cable to Prime Minister Churchill and the me s sa g e that Gen e ral Eisenhower a nd he sent back to the \var Department . He adds that the plan proposed by them--he a vy l a ndin g s at Or an and Algiers and a li ghter l a nd i n g at Casablanca , all wit h American forces -- 11does not me et the President 's request but I think that is what he may propose to the Prime Minister ." Ir this plan is accepted , General Cl s rk says , the force g oing direct to Afri c a from the United Kingdom would make the Algiers assault . General Patton ' s force sailing dire c tly from the United States to Africa would probably do the o~an landin g . The United States , the general adds , " would try to piece to g ether a smaller force for the Casablanca task . " "I think , " General Clark tells the intent men facing him, "that the plan will go throu gh that way . It will affect General Anderson most of all becau se Bone and Philippeville will be out . Algiers , as a Britis h ass a ult , will be out but British troops pro bably will land there later . " ( The General t h en expl a ins that because of these ne w developments Gen e ral Gale , the Britis h sup J ly exp e rt, must postpone the planned loading of any s h ips for the African operati on "because if we load one ship we may have to u n load it a g ain and that wil l tangle things up worse than ever . Until the TCRCH plan is definit e ly set , we will do what plannin g we ing on this basis: �( "We' ll c al l t he President ' s p l a n ' Plan A'--that is, General Patton will attack at Casa blan ca; United States forces now in the United Kingdom will attack Oran, and the operation ·will have the use of Br i tish naval vessels , transports and ai r for ce . The U. S . task force fro m the United Kingdom wil l be c ompos e d of combat teams of the 1st and 34th Divisions and the 1st Armored Division . I am designating Bri gadier General Roo ks as Chief of Staff of the Oran Task Force . The ot he r p lan, e ntailin g All - Amer ic an landings in for c e at Oran and Al giers and the use of a s mall force from the United States at Casablanca , will be known a s ' Plan B . 1 The United Sta tes force from the United Kingdom probabl y will assault at Alg iers, se cu re the port and a i rfi e lds and ~et elbow roo m so Gen eral Anderson ' s B:bi tish force can come in, disembark at po r tside without too great d if f icult y and then start driving to the east for Tunis . The Oran forc e will turn to the w,~st and establish contnct with the fo rce landing at Casabl n ca . "T hat , roughly , is the Admiral Ramsay , can you get additional naval meims will picture as it stands today . Now, us additional information as to what be r equired? " Ramsay --"I gave that data to the British sta ff in the rou~h l ast nigl 1t . I t does not i n~.olv ~ as much additional naval support as we expected ." l Cl a rk -- 11The Prime Minister u nderstands effort is t o be and he asks that the United available . 11 Ramsa y-- 11 And Ca nada too . what the Brit is h naval States make the res t 11 General CHark tells the office rs that he learned l ast night that the Fi ght in g French have in timate d th ey know an op eration is afoot and have declared that u n le ss it is he ~ded b j a French high c anma nd II it is bound to fail . 11 Admiral Ramsay then po i nts out that if either P l an A or B is us ed it "will mean a break - up of what we have a lr eady planned . " He suggests "we use groundwo r k already done" wlth the Amer ic ,n for ce gettmg all ava il ab l e Algiers data f rom the Br iti sh . Cl ark -- "I th:h n k we ought to ac ce pt . It i s my belief will do Oran and t hat Amer ic an forces al r eady hert~ wi ll Algiers if Plan B i s accepted ." th at handle Patton Anderson--"This me a ns our plans will have to be altered com p letel y . If my fo rce is to go in to a port already secured b y the Amer icans , then dr iv e east , i~ enta ils ca mp l ete disrupt i , n of my present plans . 11 ( Ramsa y -- " If Plan B is used wi ll ·the fir st follow - up be British? ' �( Clark- - "I t h ink the first would be British . That would be General Anderson ' s group . It loo k s as though Anderson will have to have h is force on the high s ea s ready to com e in . His p lans will have to be extremel y flexible . The sh ips will not be co mbat load e d . If thin gs g o wrong , Gene ral Anderson and h is force will h 8ve to turn around and g o home . 11 Grue n th e r -- 11Since the President says he wi ll have t o h -,ve a week to pav e the way for the landi ng of British tro ops , won 't a D . 7 followup have to be sub sti tute d for a D . 4? 11 Cl ark- - "That 1 s ri ght!" Vic e Air - Marsha ll Welsh- - nTh is means an ent ire l y different air forc e . It will mean a bigger bomber and fi ghte r for c e s i n ce hea viest attack probably will co me now at Al g i ers . " the Clark--"Th ere 1 s no doubt about it . General Anderson ' s mission will no w be a fighting affair . There 1 11 be need f o r mo re ai r and armored units . Ander son is going to have t o fi ght before he re aches 'l'un 1s •• There will be a re a l b r awl s omewhere between Al giers a nd Tnn is . 11 Rams ay -- "And ( it won 1 t be with Fr e nch; Cl ark - - 11I don ' t n eed to tell pe c ts of this thi n g hold a positi)n Ther ,. ' s no question about it!" all welsh- - n I 1 11 try to work out then s e e what we 'v e g ot . " the and it will be wit h Germ,ms . " of yo u that the military assecondary to the politi ca l . types of a ir f raft we need Cl ar k- - 11It 1 s cer tain we c an ' t move any more l and - based planes into Lribral tar . Capacity is taxed wi t L the Ameri c '-: - Br i tish n planes a lr e ady earmarked 1 or there . Welsh might have to support , CasabLmca You and Va ndenb ar g (Col one l Vandenbe r W of the U. S . Air Fo rce) will have t o work the needs an u. plans ou t . 1 Spit Vandenb c r g- - 11It 91s ." Clark- - 11Spit The remark Welsh --"I geth e r . 11 ( just brings think would be better if we chan g ed Spit . 5 1 s for , as hi g h as laughs you can !" and ea s es the t ,,nsi on of· the I h Hd b e tt e r ge t my p e ople and meetin Vandenb e rg g. to - Clark- - 11Gentlemen , I h a ve g iven you ev e rything I know about TORCH as it no w stands . We have little time and we must wait for a directiv e . If Oran is attacked b y us und d ~ P lan A, the force wil l consist of three infantry comb a t t e ams- - two from the 1st Divis i on and on e f r om the 3 4 th--and one Armored Divisi on unit . I f we attack at Al r;i t-; s we wil l adapt r General Anderson I s plan . 11 "' . . - �..., \09 ( J Thero nference is thrown open to questions nnd General Clark rules that the entire TOPC,{ operation will proceed on Greenwich Mer idi an Time; t e lls ~dm:br al Ramsay th11t a memorandum has already been written concerning censorship , press relations and communica tions for TORCli; tl1at instructions will g o out to have the assault forces avoid , as much as possible , any damage to the ports . Ramsay --" What about the ned D- day? Before you get the Pres id ent ' s October 30 date too fix e d in your minds you ' d better s ee what the moon is doing . There can be no assault or movement through the Straits of Gib r a l tar while the moon is too ful l. " Cl ark -- "As to Octob ur 30 , we first heard day . I a l r0ady know that the moon will be best with t he 5th probably being the best D- day . 11 of that date yester ear l y in November , General Anderson asks that c e rtain members of his TORCH staff II go a lo ne; since it 1 )Ok s as though eventually Al g iers v ill be my base . " He a lso r e co mmends tha t the American l anding force s e iz e the port of Bougie , about 110 mi l es east of Al gie rs . This wou l d gi v e Gen e ral Anderson a se c ond po r t at wh ic h to l and h i s tro op s so he c an begin driving toward Tunis . the ( General Cl a r k is use of 1 3 divisions asked . if the TORCH operation st ill calls for "TORCH now has a complet el y new a1,pre cii:ition nnd it may take more , " the gonerH l replies . "It l ook s as though we are going to have to fight for it and it means we must be stronger ." The Genera l then breaks begins to buzz li ke bees in of the development . up the conference a bott le. Groups and the bare roo m g o into dis cu ss ion Later i n the day , General Cl ark learns that the Prime Mini ste r has answered President Roosevelt ' s cabl e and th11t Mr . Churchill had ag r eed to the Americ a n proposa l . Howe v er , the Prime Minister re it e r ates his des ire that British troops l nnd at Algiers . Gene r als Ward , Ryde-r , Allen and Porter ( who wi ll lead the assault troops from the Unit e. Kingdom ) and Gen 0 ral Rooks , chie f of staff , are c al l ed in to d i s cuss the composition of U. S . forc es that wi ll m(l1 e fr om the British I sles to North Afr ic a . Genera l Truscott is c alled i n to g o over d e tai l s of the Oran attack as it was planned for General Patton ' s forces . General Lemn i tzer , w1:o has been a Deputy Chief of Staff, i s dir v cted to take ov e r the plans and training se c ti0n of TORCH with General Barker r eturning to the European Theater Qf Operations staff . Col onel Nevins is in formed he will be G- 3 of either the Or an or Algie ~ s Task Force . General Le e , head of SOS, has just flown from the United G ,n erH l Cl ark te lls General Lee equipp i ng the 1 st Di vision and and General Styer , SOS offic er uho States , are ori ented on p l ans and he part icularly needs he l p i n o~tgini ng additionalservice u nits �I\ b from the United States . General Lee says he will try to have the equipment for the 1st Division unloaded at the Clyde in order to save time . I f necessa r y , Gener al Clark s ,1.ys he will accept British 25 - pounders as substitute equipment for the U. S . 165- mm howitzers . General Lee is told that i n connection with TORCH service units fall into three categories : those now in the United Kingdom , many )f which are deficient in equipment ; those which must be brought from the U .s ., combat loaded , to accompany the assault force from the United Kingdom; and those which wi ll sail direct from the U. S . to the Afri c an theater . General Styer observes that units in the U. S . should be alerted regardless of the final de ci s i on on TORCH The . problem of organizing SOS in the new theater is discussed at length and key personnel is ~one ov e r . Bad luck is dogging the delayed shipm ent of 1st Division equip- ) ment . Colonel Hambl en reports that in addition to the vessel in origina l 1st Division convoy th a t went on the rocks in Newfo undlan d , the second ship bringing over the repl a c ement shipment was lo st through enemy action . Now, the third ship starting across with the shipment has had to put into Bermuda bec· ;. se of a shifting u car go ! ~,< LQNDON, SEPT. 2 , 1942 - -The weight of political influ ence on military decisions and military commanders is s o great that it stag gers reason . To date , the political angle has had far more influence on TORCH than has the m~litary . The delay - -at le a st the g reat bulk of it -- has resulted from political , not military , implic aticns . I n fact, the basis of TORCH is political , primarily . Both President Roos evelt and Prime Minister Churchill have promised that a Second Front wi ll be opened in 1942 and the North African theater appears to be the only place where it will have a fair chance of success . To date , this diary has s h own from day to day the delays and ch an ges in plans . The succulent parts of cables crossin g the Atlantic have been quoted . Conferences with Prime M nister Churchill hav e been recorded . All these reports couldn't help but make the reader wonder to wh,,t extent the planning of TORCH is political , and to what extent military . He c an , hcw ,vever , draw pretty logical conc.lu s ions . General Clark is drawn out a little today on the political factors that have impeded the planning and ou ic k execution of TORCH It is a subject . he is reluctant to discuss but one that he sho uld include in any diary of war becaus e politics is part of war; it is a major factor in determininp; whether a campai gn is won or lost . It may be the decid~ng factor in TORCH . "For many weeks , 11 says General Clark, "we had r been working on a plan reported to both g ov ernmen ts and one that was approved , apparently , by both of them . The first p lan had almost re a ch ed the . . j �( point where we were ready to go ahead loading for the North African assault when the delays started . During the past weeks we have been more or less dragged around by the necks and every time we m0 ke a move , someone in Washington or London is looking over our shoulder to second guess and rsuggest revisions or changes . "I h1we been told that the President's r E:ply to Prime Minister Churchill is expected tonight and th t indications are that v,e will return , basically , to the plan callin~ for simultaneous attacks on Casablanca, Oran and Algiers . Even now there is nothing to indicate this will be definite although time is closing in and a decision must be made soon if a Second Front is to be opened this year . So much v aluable time has be en lost that we can nev 0r get back or make up . During this hectic period of indecision we have had at le1rnt a half dozen plans before us . Before we could even start laying a foundation for one , we got another . 0 ''~~hy can ' t the commanders decide what they can do , not what they have to do? Ti me is a prime factor in any military operation , yet , those who delay us keep reminding us that TO PCH must be carried out at the earliest possible moment . We must not , we are told , lose any time . However , we ' re still waiting for the mission directive . Don ' t they realize the time factor necessary for getting new planning underway? There is an urgent necessity for time to plan , time to tran , time to assemble for the assault . "All we had had are repeated and repeated distractions . The we wait , the longer it takes to make up minds , make polit ical adjustments and get down to concrete preparations for a TORCH wdl know is de.finite , the less chance we have of security; and with out security we can't get full success . Cables from Washington all emphasize the dire results if TORCH is not successful . Success requires careful planning and ample time but we can't plan until we know definitely what it is we a.re planning for . " 1 mger Developments , particularly in the past three weeks , show the tremendous effect of political considerations on military affairs . The future will sh ow what effect this political factor- - which has wated time and energy and which has brought the introduction of plan after plan -- will have on the execution of the TORCH operation that is finally decided upon . sent ( Intelli@ence the following reports cable come in that Free French to his London headquarters General De Gaulle from Syria: "Americans have planned a landing in North Africa . In con unction with this landing the British were to attack Dakar . Vichy knew about all this and has kept the Germans informed of the plan . Vichy has been deceiving the Americans •• • as they previously deceived the British . I n North Africa the Americans pretended they were acting in accnrd with General De Gaulle's Comite Nationale and so got support of De Gaulle I s supporters in North Africa . This was �( not the case at all . Instead the Americans delayed communications betwe en De Gauilile ' s aP,ents in Nort h Africa and his head nuarters in London so that the real truth would not be known to De Gaulle par tis ins in North Africa . In case of an Am ri can l anding i n North e Africa, Marshal Petain will ord er all Fr 8nch forces to resist ap;gression . The entire French army , air force qnd fleet will obey the ovders. Undoubtedly Germany will t H ke adv nntar,e of this situation to intervene under the color of protecting the French empire. Laval will not declare war at once but will ho l d out in hope of blackm'liling from Ge:nTl any a little help regrading prison e rs of war and food . The id ea of America at first was to invade Europe this year. They tr1en needed the help of Free French forces and so opened negotiations in London . Now they have resumed . thei r form E; attitude r of standoffifshness t oward the Free French. 11 A c a1b:be is sent to the War DepRrtment in Washington tellinr; officers that four sources--Vichy, Gibraltar, Tan g i e rs nnd Washington--h.ave }~ :vefho:v-ted. tuc:the Free French headquarters ::o in London that the y have information concerning an imminent attack in North Africa . These sources state that a ctive opposition will be encountered un less a prominent Frenchman is mdenmif~ed with the operation . All r,✓ports indicate that countries bordering the Mediterranean have a definite suspicion and pe rh ups some knowledge of an imment attack . The serious potentia:tities of such a situation are obvious , " Washington is cabled . The whole matter implies , the cabl e continue , the failure of our efforts to p revent leaka ge involving most secret subjects and su~gests adoption of corrective measures . Plans are being pushed for the or ganiza tion of the Oran Task Force . General Rooks , Chief of Staff of t he operati on, is setting up ley members of h is staff in ijorfolk House . The bulk of th e staff wi~l be built u p after the lan ding . Generals Cl ark and Rooks agree that the Norfolk group now b eing set up und er Rooks should be the advance echelon of the II Army Corps and that officers and men remai ning at Longford Castle sho uld be considered the rear echelon and be subject to call to the Afri c an theater as soon as their movement is feasible . General Clark fe els he should not set up a separate organization for this but rat her should continue to use the II Army Corps as the base designation . The question of a suit able SOS- G- 4 or ganization in the Oran area is brou ~ht up and Genera l Clark decides t hat for the planning phase of the operation General Larkin would be in charge with Colon el Adcock as his assistimt . He sees no need to separate SOS and G- 4 functions in the early phases of the Oran landing . Later, after arrival in the theater , General Larkin will take char ge of the 'SOS in that area and Colonel Adcock will become G- 4 of the Oran Task Force . Air support for TORCH in over. A cable is sent settin g a we 11 - balanced air force for of B-17's intially re qu ired in out that it will be necessary tions out of Eng l and about six case Plan A is decided upon is gone forth agreement as to what will be the operation . Regarding two groups the African theater , the cable points to withdraw these u nits from operaweeks p rior to the date when they �113 have will be employed initially in the theater . These t wo groups three be en carr y ing out suc c essful raids on France for the past wil l weeks . The c ab le alm~ states that U. S . Air For c e headquarters be established initially at Oran . It now appears , from a chart showing the loading of each ship c arrying eq u ipment for the 1st Division and the es timated dates of arr i val , that the bulk of the Divisi on ' s e quipment will not arrive until about September 13 . General Allen is ordered to establish an advanced 1st ~ ivision headquarters in Norfo lk House . It will be ready to ope ra te by noon , Se ptember 5. Other minob ma tte rs have to be disposed of: Colonel Corby , surg ~on in Allied Force Headquart e rs , re commends typhus inoc cula tions for all troops entering the theater and he is told to begin checking records to insure that these shots are given all organ izati )ns prior to departure; Colon e l ·1. G. Sterling of the W ar Cabinet Secretariat suggests the use of code names for towns and r egions in the North African theater and General Clark says he suggested that almost a month ago but that British Intelligence officers advised aga inst it; General Anderson call g to say he is movino.; from Norfolk House to another nearby office but he is going to retain an officer on duty here . General Anderson obviously is displeased at the turn in events. General Clark tells him there is nothing further he can do to advance h is planning until a final decis~on is reached . Anderson is advised to continue p lannin g . ·:l- LONDON SEPT . 3 , 1942--President , Roosevelt cables Prime Minister Churchill and agrees to a tr i p le - l and in g for TORCH From all . indications this i s to be the operation that will be carried out! President Roos-evelt proposes simultaneous landin gs at Ca sablan c a , Oran and Algiers with assault and immediate follow-up troops gen erally as fol~ows: (A) Casablanca , all United States troops : 34 , 000 in the assault and 24 , 000 in the immediate follo w- up to land at a port a lready under American control . (B) Or an , all U. S . troo ps : 25 , 000 in the assrult and 20 , 000 in the immediate follow - up to land at a U. S . held port . (C) Algiers , U. S . and British troops : in the beach landing, 1 0 , 000 U. S . troops follo wed within the hour by British troops to make the l a nding secure, the follow-up to be determined by TORCH 1 s Commander -in - Chief . This follo w-u p would l and at a port i n ships that are non-ro mbat loaded . "Your willingness to coope r ate by agreeing that all initial landings will be made by U. S . ground forces is appreicated , 11 the President cabl es the Prime Minister . "It is true that British par ticipation in the form of nav a l and air support will be disclosed to the defenders early in the operation. However , I do not b e lieve this will ha ve quite the same effect that Britis h forces making the �first beach landing would have . xx x I t will be necessary to use all available combat loaders in the first assault . The assaulting troops , regardless of whether the y are British or Americ an , must seize a por t before follow-u p forces c an be landed . Rega rdless of what troops arrive subsequent to the initial landing , the situation will be the same . " President Roosevelt says the United States can furni sh the following t ro ops : the entire Casablanca force dire c tly from the United St ates; the entire Oran force f Yom the United King d om; 10 , 000 American troops for the Algiers landing from the United Kingdom . "As ~ immediate follo w- u p for c es , 11 the President cable s , " we have one armored division in the U. S . and one armored division in the U . K. (1::D th less elements included in the assau l t echelons) with supportin g and service troops , includi ng ground echelons of air units. L ater , additional infantr y and armored d ivisions can be furnished from the U. S . and the remainin~ U. S . troops in the U .K. c an be made available ." ( Pre s ident Roosevelt says combat loaders ca pab l e of lifting 34 , 000 men wi ll be ready to sail from U . S . ports b ;: October 20 . Transports , other than combat loaders, will be ready to lif t 5 2 , 000 men and there wil l be sufficient c argo vessels to support the per sonnel. In the United Kingdom , he adds , there will be U . S . trans p orts with a personnel lift of 15 , 000 and nine cargo vesEel..s . 11In round 11 numbers, Mr . Roosevelt c ontinues, "the shi pping sh own as availab le in the U. S . i s estimated to be sufficient to move the first , second and third convo ys of the CasabL mca force . " Regarding the nav ,ll that the U. S . "cannot pro this operation in excess p lus all ships which can now bein g done . " p ie ture , the Pres id e nt tells Mr . Churc h i ll vide forces for the escort and support in of t h os e no w available in the Atla n tic be exped ited in readiness for service as is Then , the President continues : "If the operation is to be ex e cuted along the lin es indicated ••• all t h e rem ai ning re quire ments must be furnished from Brit is h sources . As we see it, t h is would mean in general that it will be ne cessar y for you to furnish : ( a) all shi~ping , includi ng combat l oaders , required for the Oran and Algie r s forces exce p t the U. S . sh i pp in g now in the U. K. ear marked for TORCH; (b) the additi mal troops required for the Algiers assault and the follow - up forces , and(€) the naval forces re qu ired for the entire operation less the U . 'S. Naval Force indicated above . " The P resid ent asks the Prime Ministe r to a:> nfirm as so on as possible, "in order that I may continue wit h vi gorous preparations for TORCH at the ear li est pract icable date , " that the U. K. will pr ovide the troop lift, troops , naval forces and shi pp ing noted as n ee ded . The ~resident reiterates that the Comma nd e r - in-Chief "shoul d be directed to exe cut e the operation by the earl:Dest pr ·1 cticable date and th a t t h is date should be fix e d by him . " �l IS ( "I am convinced of the absolute _necessity for an early decision , 11 the President says . "I feel that the operation, as outlined he r ein , i s as far as I c an g o toward meeting your views, and seems to me to be a practical s olution \'v ich retains h the Algiers operation and is sufficiently stron g to be a good risk throughout . " The President says his "latest and best information" fro m North Africa shows that an All - American expediti on "will meet little res istance from the Frenc h Army in Africa . On the other hand , a British co mmanded attack in any phase or with de Gaullist coo peratio n would meet with determined resistance . " He says that maint enance of the French Civil government "is essential to fri endly relations . " He concludes that he is "willing to risk explanation of British troops in Algiers by telling the French that they are not intended to remain in Frenc h territory but that their obj ect is primar ily to march into Axis held Tripoli from the rear . xx x As you and I decided l on g ago , we were to handle the Fr en c h in North Africa , whil e you were to handle the situation in Spain . 11 G:e.neral Clark calls a conference of the Combined Staff at 11 AM and read the telegram from Presid ent Roosevelt . "Wel l, there she is!" he says , concludin g . "We' re almost back where we started from . Patton will handle Casablanca . The Or an force will be made up of two c ombat teams f'rom the 1st Division , one from the 34th Division and it will be sup p orted by the British Navy . At Algiers we 1 11 have one U. S . combat team , a Ranger Battalion and whatever Britis h troops you (turning to General Anderson) decide on . Our problem is still basically the same : mostly n aval , a questi on of where we stand on co mbat leaders , l andin g c raft and the abi lity of the navy to suppor t the l anding . " Ramsey - -" We1 re going to have comb at loader trouble . Arran gemen ts for one landing are per fect . For the other one , one - fourth is v ery good , one - fourth is poor and I just don I t see the other half any,.1he!t'e . 11 United Gale -- "We are Kingdom . 11 now holding Ramsay -- "We1 ve got p ossible . The necessary some t rans - Atlantic shipping our teeth out . Three strong attacks combat loaders just don 't exist . 11 in the are not Clark--" we • re g oing to have to ta ck le it to see what VJ ca n do , e not what we c an 't do . we must determine our maximum mi nimum an d ask the navy and shippin g authorities to supp l y it . " Gale -- "I don ' t believe a short time . " ( the ship resources c an be found in su ch e1 ark -- "C "'n ' t v,J get enough for the initial e assault? We' re going to have to call on SOS to bring over what they have organiz ational loaded . These will be hos v ital and maint ena nc e u n its and supplies mostly . Gen eral Anderson , what will you have for Al g iers? Anderson--"A total of about 29 , 000 troops and one American �I combat team . " Cl ark --" You will keep the 1 68 th ( combat Division) . I hope you will be ready to throw and that they will go down combat loaded . " British I(, Gale -- "Are we still g o in . " e1ark- - "That new one Plan Z ! " figuring was u-1der Plan Wel sh -- "We1 11 need more air sc heme . 11 Cl ark -- "The air move eastward ••• 11 un its on a seven team from the 34th in three brigades day period before the B. I guess we' 11 have to call the under plan at Gibraltar this will than help und e r the General old Anderson Welsh- - 11We1 11 have to have four fighter squadrons at Algiers on c e . We' ll also need t wo bomber support squadrons then build up our stren gth after we have Nor th Af ri can bases . " Anderson--" What about Algiers and the at p lan ••• " Cl ark -- "You go ahead and fi gure on Al giers planned . The BritisL prcb ably will he l p in the at Algiers . " as you •ve always ini-'-ial 0 1,e-,t.tio•1 Ramsay -- " I f we work it r i gh t the U. S . Navy may be ab l e to help cov er the 'Straits . Then we c an do Al p;iers and Oran all right . I think our nav a l forces mip-.,ht be stretched . 11 As the conference breaks up he tells the officers he expects to get later in the day the gist of what the Prime Ministe r will cable back to Hashington in answer to the President . Durin g the day , he calls key officer after key of ficer into his office to dis cuss the pa rticular phase of TORCH invo lved . At~ PM he goes to the War Cabinet Offic es with General Eisenhower . The two American genera ls are ushered into a huge room where Churchill s i ts at a 40 - foot l ,ng table , working . The Prime Minister looks ti red and dishevilled . Soon the office fills with British officers includin g General Sir Alan Br ooke, General I smay , Sir John Dill , Lord Louis Mountbatten , Admiral Ramsay , Sir Dudley Pound -- virtually every high ranking Britisher conne c ted u ith the war effort . The men sit down , dis cu ss the President ' s c able of this morning and confer concerning an answer . After over an hou r of discussion , Churchill says : "Let • s get the c able off now!" He invites Sir Alan Brooke and Generals Ol ark and Eisenhower into the office of one of his secretaries . Together , the four men draft the answer while a stenographer -- the Prime Minister had hol le red for "a shorthand Hr iter"- - pounds it out dire c tly on a type writer as the four men talk over the exact phraseology . They kre ad in the suggestions of all the men who par ticipated in t he conf erence in the outer room . �II 7 The conf'ere b s decided that to do Algiers and Oran p roperly they should have seven combat teams and the combat loade rs to lift this size a force . Only five , as the plan stands, ar e available and there is not hing to improvise with . As to landin g craft , all training wou ld have to stop if the craft were taken away . General Clark su gg ests that the onl y alternative is to "steal from Casa blan c a . Admiral Pound also points out that the United States naval for c e for TORCH rema ins an " X" quantity . He asks that the U . S . state definitely what it has g ot so the British can see what their n avy c a n do to fill the gap s . General Clark sug ges ts t wo points for the cable -- ( 1), tha ·t the U .s . Navy 11get off the p ot 11 and detail what it c an provide, a nd ( 2) that the three landings be made more equal , with the Alg i ers operation being made bi gge r and the Casa blanca one smaller "to give the e ssential appearance of strength at al l vit a l po ints . 11 This President is the way the Roosevelt : Prime Minister ' s c able finally g oes to " W have spent e the day l o oking into the ph y sical possibilities of your ge neral outline . We think that a working plan c a n be mad e on the basis that the emphasis is shifted some what , namely reducing Casablanca by ten or twelve thousand and making up the defi c iencies in the follow - up . These troo ps wit h their combat l oaded ships would g ive sufficient strength inside , i,h ile making the entire assault American . This evens up the three landings and g ives the essential appearance of stren g th at al l vital poi nts . Witho ut such a trans ferenc e there is no hope of blglers on account of the shortage of combat loa ders and landin g c raft . We al l think this would be a blemi sh on the plan . "Tonorrow we suggest that either Gene ra l Clark or General Eisenhower should caj.e ( to Washington) wi th Admiral Ramsay who kno ws the whole transportat io n escort story and th e n aval aspects from our end, and Mountbatten on the lan di n g d e tails ·w hich are cruc i al . The party wou ld r ea ch you Sunday morning . W do not know e here wh at naval forces you are able to supply . Please let this be imparted to Admiral Cunnin gham , who , in view of the import an ce of t he ope ration , we propose to p lac e in naval c o~..mand under the Allied Command er - in-Chief . "Delays due to cha nges a l ready has extended (D- day) three weeks . The Fr ee French have g ot an inkling and they are leaky . Every day saved is p recious . \'le have therefore already order ed work to g o forward on these linBs but of course the deci si on rests with you . ( signed) Churchill ." ) When the Prime Minister a nd the three generals complete draft in g of the telegram , Mr . Churchill turns to them an s sAys: "It ' s great not to argue when you get into a tight p lac e . It makes you appreciate the accord between us . I know we all desire to get the p l a n and get going . " - ' �II8 ( though General Cl ark tells we I re back where t h e -Prime Minister we were t wo months that "it ago . " looks as "That ' s the tragedy of thl. s t h ing . We c ould hRVe settled two months ago , " Mr . Churchil l rep li ecs. 11This is one of the d ifficulties of having our t wo staffs separate d by all those of oce an . 11 cable: keeps Mr . Churchill "The Free l ')Okin g at it tangible miles is quite pleased by one phrase he placed in the Frenc h have got an inklin g and they are leaky . " He it and chuckling ." · After leaving Mr . Churchill 's office , Gene ra ls Eisenhower and Clark go back to Grosvenor Square and send General Marshall a cable detailin~ Churchill's suggestions and declaring that they favor his three - point in v:irtuall y equal strength landin gs if the means c ~n be found . Without the combat lo aders and one combat team from the Casabl anca for ce, Algiers must be abandoned , the y say . Mr . Churchill points out , just as the two Amer ican generals are leavin g , that he has re c eived re c ent cables on the p rogress of the battle in the Middle East . General Alexander of the 8th British Army sends an optimistic report and says he has g ot Rommel in a pocket and that the British have been shelling him all day . 'Says Churchill to General Brooke : "I wonde r if Alec will take the off ensive! 11 The Prime Minister then tell s Generals Eisenhower and Clark that it l ooks as though the North African attack will have to wait until November 10 . "Every wee:k , every day counts , 11 Mr . Churchill says gr i mly . "We don ' t know what is going to ha ppen in Eygp t before we can att a c k North Africa . " Conf e rences during the busy day include the following : Generals Ward and Oliv er of the 1st Armored Divis ion come in to discuss matter s pertaining to use of their unit in TORCH. General Clark tells Gener ~l W ard t h at any units t Rken f r om his co mmand t o form the Headquarters Securit y Force will be returned to him ,·,hen his division enters the theater . There is some discussion as to whether the 1st should retain its M- 3 tanks or exchange them for the newer M- 4s . General Ward feels it wou ld be un•✓vise to make the substitution at this time because of additional training involved . Colonel Hamblen re p orts that it a pp ears that SOS of the European theater will b e unable to maintain a U. S . force in North Africa until such time as the line of communications can be shifted to the U. S . Gener a l Gale makes a sim ilar report . He also outlines the relatively l ,ng time required for the overl and movement of the Al giers force to Tunis under the latest plan . Late at ni gh t, it looks as t h ough neither General ~isenhower of Gener a l Clark wi ll go to wva hington s at present . The y recommend against it to General Marshall , p ointin g out the nec essity for both of them remaining in_:.- ondon un~J~~~J~ is mor e de.finite L . �l 19 ( LONDO SEPT . 4 , 1942--President N, Roosevelt agrees to l essen the Casablanca force and i t look s as thoug h TORCH now is finally shaping up into a definite operation . The President sends the follow ing c able to the Prime Minister : - "I am willing to redu c e the Casablanca force by the number of combat loaders c apable of carrying a force of one r egime ntal comb , t team, a pp roxi ma tely 5 , 000 men . Since a similar reduction was made in ori g inal Oran assault for this releases a tota l of Bri ti sh and U. S . co mba t lo aders f~r some 1 0 , 000 men for use at Al g i ers . As that loc ality has been estimated as the softest sp ot, this combat loaded force ma y be found sufficient wi th whatev r else it is f ound posr-db le to improv is e . "I do not s e e advantage of Eisenhower or Clark c oming over at this time . I know they have heavy and pressi n g responsibilities in organizing slo wly-arrivin g Amer ic an forces and I am sure we have a ful l understanding of their viewpoint . Fur thermore , I do .. want to see Eisenh o wer later on before f ina l takeoff and t wo trips a ppear out of the question . ·'Ve wou ld be r:;ad to see Ramsay and Mount l batten if you wish to se n d them , but I do not desire thnt thei r vi s it shall c ause any delay in reachin g a final de cision . 11 I h op e to c ab l e you tomorrow a l ist of U. S . naval craft wh ich c an be made avai l ab l e fo r th e op e ra ti on . (Si gned ) Roosevelt . 11 Gener a l C1 ark calls the combined TORCH staff into conf eren c e and details the overni ght develo pment s . He tells the officers that at l ast it l ooks ns though the TORCH p l an is definite . "The divergent views of the two governments a r e clo se r to a[!reemen t and it now ap pears likely that one additional combat te~~ from the U. S . will be taken from the Patton for c e r-tnd made av n ilable for the atta ck at Algiers , " the ge ne ral says . "'+,'hat wi l l g ive u s one comb a t team from here , the 16 8th ; one comb at team from the Patton force, and the U. S . Ranger Batta li on for the initial assault on Al giers . 11 Sa y ing that force, whi c h will be fo llo wed u p by General Anderson ' s British troops , will total about 1 1, 000 men, Gene r a l Cl Ark asks Admiral Rams ay if he t h in ks the troops can be lift ed and car ried to Algiers . Ramsay says he thinks they c an be and adds he thinks we might be ab l e to get three combat t eam s through at Al g i ers . " I n that event , 11 says General \Jlark , 11it v10uld be necessar ; to have one Bri tish c ombat team . I t was the President ' s idea that the initi al ass ault at Algiers be made by American troops that would take the p ort and se i ze the airports . Then you (lookin g at General Ander son ) would l a nd and pass through on your drive to 'I'unis . Our information is that there will be li t tle resistance to American troops . I intend to make Ryder ( Gener al Ryder of the 34th Division ) comman der of the Algiers force . I am go in g to bring him here so you t wo c an plan and coor dinate the Algi e rs attack . Oran is set up and ready to go ahead under General Rooks ." Anderson -- 11We 1 d like to have you tak e Cl ark -- 11We 1 d like to v e ry m 1 . Ryder ch Gener a l .c;isenhower has ordere d General Lee sup p ly problem . He I re particularly ,101·ried suppl~es for the attacking ~ over our Algiers p l an . " c an go over it wi th you . up so we can go into the about maintenance and �( Anderson -- "Do you still want the Br it ish br:r gad e g r oup s ?" Cl ark -- "Yes . Beach par>ties for all three combat teams would be highly desirable if your forces are in follow - l>IP floating , re ser v e . Now about t he date . It lo oks li ke Nov embe r 7 . The co nv oy from~he Un ited States probably will sail about October 20 . The assault won 't be any sooner than November 7 , I believe . " Mockler - Ferrym9.n--"Our intelligence operatives say a Sunday would be an i dea l d i- y. The closest 1 Sunday is November 8 . " Cl ark -- 11 'Sunday , eh? They hit Pea -rl Harbor "/elsh - - " I think General Anderson I s forces so they c an l and at bo t h Algiers and Boug i e . " on a Sunday . " should be situated Clark- - 11Ryder 1 s orders ,·•ill permit him to pus h east and tak e Bougie . If he c an get the assistan ce of the French he will push as far east as he is able to go . There are many questions vie a r e p;oing to have to work out . It loo ks as thoup-..,h we are gett in ~ nearer and nearer to gether and closer to a solution . " Aft er General ql a rk outlines what air stren gth appears availab l e for TORC Air Vice Marsha ll Welsh s ays he believes H, the air force at Casablanca i s "frightfully bi p.; in vi ew of the f a ct that a ir oppos i t ion there 'vill be smal l . 11 He asks that an air pool be built up i n Oran so it c an be moved either east or west . Gene:ral Clo.rk says he is going to take every pl ane the U. S . will g iv e to the oper ation and then leave its use u p to the Commander - in - Chief 's dis cretion . Admiral Ramsa y po int s out that a Bri tish to be designated for the naval forces supporting He also speaks of the nece ssity for U. S . naval p aning the U. S . combat t e ams and exp r esses the Navy will brinp; in the necessary personne l to Or an . commande r will have the Oran attack . beach parties accom hope that the U. S . operate the port of After th e c onfer en c e , General Gale tells Gene-r ql Cl ark that the British Quartermaster Genera l "is willlng to p ut at our disposal anythinp: he h as in the way of equ i pment and/or personne l. " He offers to furnish a B:ri ti sh "mov ements officer" for t he Or 1= force an:1 m General Cl a r k a c cepts because it will be helpful in vi ew of the fact that all shipping in volved will be Briti sh . General Gale mentions that the Brit ish Director of Movements will re 1u i re an outline plan by September 15 . Gene-ral Cl ark receives a report that the 168th In fantry c ombat t eam no w training in Scotland " i s not far enour-.,h ad v anced in basic training for the t ask involved . 11 The g ener al orders str engthening of the commmd "from the top d own :' Wit h D- day no w set back , the General rbelieves it mAy be poss i b l e for the 16th I nfantry combat team t o be trained at Inveraray during the pe riod September 25 - 0ctobe r 5 . He tel l s General Lemnit z er , the new G- 3 , that i t i s "most important �I~ ( I for each c cmbat te am to have about five days' training in going over the s ide fr om the c ombat lo ade rs into l. mding cra ft and a c t ually l anding on the beach." This will not involve c ompl ete unload in g of the vess e ls but some of th e heavy e qu i pmen t - -inclu ding g uns and trucks -- must be includ ed in the pract ice exercises . Li eut . Co l -: e l Ramsey returns n frcm a qui c k visit t o Gibral~ar a n d he r epo rts that t he accomodations there are adequate for the advance headquarters of TORCH . Gen e~a l Cl a rk , relaxin g a lit t le a f t e r the h e ctic schedul e h e has be en follo wing for th e pa st thr ee days, r emark s to c onfi d ants what a p le asure it is to v✓0rk u nde r and b e a lon gs ide General E is en ho wer . ( "'l'hj_s wou l d be an almost intolerable situation were it not for my fortunat e , clos e , pe r so n a l re l a ti on sh i p wit h the Supreme Comrnande r,1' he says . "The cooperati on we ha ve is the result of having been old friends for a lon g ti me ; the result of having •.r rked together o before on many , many pr oblems . The r e ' s a definite advantage in having of fi cers vrh o know each oth e r we ll wor kin g together . r t makes the situation much more compa tible and , in th e p r ese n t c ase where we are wo rki n e; s o clos ely together , I kn ow how and w hat 1 Ike 1 thinks a nd says . And he kno ws the same about me . N~ther of us has to worry about wha t the other is doing a nd , ther e for e , c an c on c entrate fully on his own work . It's an ideal team combin at ion and a solid t hi n g to clin g to in he c t ic days li ke t h ose we have just been going throu~h . 11 Odd ly enough , it was General Cl ar k , then a Brigaaier General , wh o suggested to General Marsha ll that Gen er• 1l Eisenhower , then a col onel , would be the ide a l man for the War Dep=i.rtment P l an f" div ision . rt was General Clark who announced, as he was speaking to a wa r games criti qu e in L ouis i ana in 1 941 , that E is enhower , who was sitting in the front row , was a bri gadier ~ene r a l . The t o men have been friends since west Point d ays . Whenever either man has been asked vrho should take a certain .job, each has reco mmended the other . Samuel p olitic TORCH p l an n ers Hoare , British a l implications have received a v ery interesting n ot e from Ambassador to Spain . It discusses certain of the p l an . Sir "The operRtion known as TORCH s eems to me to raise man y pol11 iti cal as we ll as mil it ary problems , " Sir Samue l writes. It s su cc es s or failure may indeed principal l y depend on po li t ic a l develop me nts . With the French attitude in Africa res ts the issue between a hazardous milita ry operation and a p opular movement of liberation , with the Spanish reaction the vit a l secu r ity of' our lines of commun ication . It i s to the Spanish considerations tha t I addres s myself in this note . ( "The t emp tati on to cut our lines of communication will be v ery great . We shall a pp ear to have put our neck between two Spanish knives , and Span is h knives are tradit ionally treacherous . The Germans will be on Gener al 1''r anco 1 s ba c k dinning into his ears : "Now is I! ' �I~ ( 1/ ) your ti me . You c an cut the Allied throat , destroy the naval and air bases at Gibr altar and win a da zz lin g re ward for you r country in North Afric a . 11 Let n o one und e r -r ate the p ower of t h is t emptat io n , or think that because n i ne Spaniards out of ten d o not want war , General Franco mi ght n ot r is k it for the bi ~ stakes that i n t hese ci r cumstances it m ght off er him . He and hi s brother - in - la w made no secret of their wi s h to s ee Germ any wi n the war . What better chance than this could t hey have of expeai ting a German vi c tory ? Spanish help might take on e of t wo forms . Spanish guns , manned by Spanish troops , might fire on the harbor and airdrome of Gibr a ltar and i mmobilize them in a few hours , or German bombers be perm itted to op erate from Sp ani sh territory . I n bot h cases a c ti on migh t be swift and v ery dama gi ng . 11 II Hoare su~ ges t t hat the Allies econ omi call y and p olitic ally must accumulate the mAximum of Spanish go od - will in the ne xt fe w weeks . xx x On the p oliti c al side ,,,e must avoid incid ents of all , kinds that are likely to inflame the Spanish g over nment . Our intelli ge nce organizations must be parti cul arly cautious , and we must keep off p rovo c ative acti nn x x x . 11 He s ays the Allies "must , in addition , be prepared wi th effe c tive sa n ct ions in c ase this policy of goo d - will f ai ls in its effect . t hey must be read y to strike back if Spain dire c tly or indi re ctl y atta c ks them . There should therefore be av a ilable a striking force -- air,sea and land -- to make imrne1:g'ate r eta li ation ag a inst Span is h territor y . u Ho are next suggests that 11we would diminish the danger if we do not rely exclusivel y on the straits for our entrance and e xit and part of the expeditionary force were based on Casablanca and the Atlantic s eaboa rd . 11 "More important s till , " s A.y the British s ambassador , "is t he size of the exp ed iti onary force . It is absolutely essential xx x that i t should be of such strength as to make reasonably sure of some swift success . Any ini tia l fa i lure or fumbling will be alrn o st c er tainly fatal so far as 'Spain is c onc erned . xx x . 11 Hoa r e recormnends thart. t 11a c aref u lly worded de cl a r ati ;n shou l d be made b ,, H. M. p;overn ment and the United States rsoverrn nent , stating t l at we sha ll res pe ct the integrity of Spanish te r ritory.xx x and that nothin g that is b ein g; d')ne prejudi c es Spanish claims R.nd aspi ,,,ati '"lns in the future . x x x 1'urthermovfi , it is most important ' from the Spanish point of v iew , that bothJmili tary aperations and the p oll tic al approa ch to the Spanis h Govern:m-e:o...,ti; Uni .ted States the gov ernment should take the lead . The American Ambassador in Madrid should , I suggest , transmit a persona l messap;e from the President to General Franco ass u ring him of Amerlc tc,n p;ood int -.: tions . x x x n "LaE!tl.y I f 9e l -'c~ut _i_f between now and the dAte of the ope -ratio n , Rommel gains c on siderable victory , or events in Russia permit of a substantial withdrawa l of German divisions to the west , the risk of Spanish co l lus ion with the Germans will be most seriously in c reased . " ( tha t Cab les are pouring the major tactical back and forth now . General features of' TO1,cH "be settled Marshal l suggests immediately . 11 �f ( ) LONDON SEPT . 5 , 1942- - Fifty-six , United States warships have been earmarked for TORCH and Admiral Ramsay is satisfied that the force will be adequate . Arrival of President Hoosevelt's naval strengt h cable to Prime Minister Churchill fills in one part of the TORCH preparations p icture that has been noticeably missing . The President says the maximum number of American that c an be mad e available for TORCH is as follows: one battleship , --tw~ old ba t ttleships, one aircraft carrier , aircraft carriers, (these craf t capable of c arry in g 78 30 dive bombers) , t wo eight -i nch cruisers, three large cruisers ; 40 destroyers , and six fast minesweepers . / naval vess~illS modern two converted fighters and six - inch Al though t hi s list ls not final, Admiral Ramsay says he is satisfied that the American naval force will be strong enough to sup p ort the Casablanca landing . He adds that "by some juggling of available shi pping" the necessar y lifts for seven regimental combat teams can be found for the Oran and Algiers landings . Other s h ips a l so are b e ing located from which troops c an be landed on the beaches sane time after the ass ault . This personnel wi ll use the same landin ~ craft that the first assault troops will have used in g oing as110re . ( General ~l ark is pleased with the way TORCH is now shaping up . At last he feels that the p l anners have their feet on the ground . The only problem still in snarled shape is that of supply . He CRlls in Generals Gale , Lee , Gruenther and Lemnitzer and Colonel Hughes . Gale says that be c ause of the convoy schedule , it will be necessary to sup ~ ort U . S . forces from the United Kingdom with 40 days of supply from this cou..~try . Gale , Lee and Larkin are instructed to confer vii th the British Quartermaster Gene r a l immediately to deter mine what sup€lies may be obtained from the British . Colon e l Hughes , who , General l ark believes , has the best over - all p i cture of the sup p ly situation , es timates that the SOS of the European Theater can. meet food and ammunition re ouirements for 40 days in the No rth African theater . He bas es this estimate on a force of 112 , 000 men . I n addition , Hughes says u p to 20 days of supply can be furnished in many other categories . Lee promises to g ive a 11complete p ic ture " of the :st pply situation on Monday . He says he wi ll call upon the U. S . for s h ip ment of supplies that cannot be obt ained f rom the Bri tish . The main SOS difficu lt y lies in serious shor t ages in a few items, notably spare parts for weapo n s a nd for motor vehicles . These , the general orders, must be obtained from the U. S . as quickly as possible . General Cl ark points out to General Lee that sup _p figures ly must be based on the Tab l e of Basic Allowances since , even if assault u 1its land at a reduced scale , the remainder of their equipment will com e in with fo l low-up conv )ys . ( The routing of supply convoys re quired from the United States to support the Oran and Algiers forces is discussed wtth Colon e l Hamblen . General C lark tells Hamblen that until a lin e of communication is opened direct from theU . S . to the Mediterrane nn , supply shipmentswill be sent to the United Kingdom , thence to North Afr ic a . �( General Ryder flies in from his headquarters in Northern Ireland and is told by General U1ark that he is going to command the Algiers assau l t . He is told the c omposition of his force: his own 168th Infantry combat team , one combat team frcm the Unit ed States (pro babl y a team from the 9th ~ivision) , and one British brigade group . These three units will go down assault loaded . In addition , Ryder will have anot her British brigad e group unit load ed and in floating reserve . Ryder ' s command and the status of General Anderson is a touchy matter . General Dewing comes in to tell General vlark that he believes General Anderson should coJ:rll'l1 the .nlgiers r:i nd force from the outset . Such an arran gement, G0neral v1ark r <.;pi es , is contrary l to the a~ree ment between the two governments that the assault on North Africa will led by Americans . General Ryder will command during the landing oper ation . General Cl ar k tell s 11lm he must work with General Anders on and make use of the plans developed by the British First Army when TORCH called for a combined Anglo - Americ-,1n assault . Qelleral Ryder is setting up a 34th Division TORCHheadquarters at No . 1 Cumberland ~lace, the same building where General Anderson is now located . Gen eral Clark stresses to General Ryder that it is "most important" that he get along well personally with General Anderson "no matter how difficult that may be . •• The status of traJ.ning uf the 168th combat team is discussed with General Hyder . Rep orts cam ng dovm f rom the amphiblous base in Scotland indicate the team needs much mor e prac~~ev. uen~ral Clark telephbnes British General Drew, connn.anding the base, and te l ls him that he proposes to send General Porter to the training area to push the 168'j?;h and that in all probability the unit will remain in train in g until September 20 . General Clark proposes to replace the regi mental exGcu tive, two ba. ttalion corrnna nders and others if necessary . General Dr ew says he feels the situ ation with respect to th e 168th "is not hopeless . " Ryder feels that the Colon e l of the 168th should be retained in coll1mand. One of the most difficult things for a sup erior officer is to change co mmands but Generp..l CJ.ark s ays that personal feelin gs must not enter into decisions that involve such nn important mission and the lives of so many enlisted men . The remainder of' the 34th Division, of which t he 16 8th is a part , and the rest of the 1st Armored Division -- th~t part not par ticipating in the ori g inal assault at Oran - -will be brou gh t into Oran as soon as possible after the assault . Additional Oran forces will be taken fro~ t he United Stat es directly to the North African theater once the operation is under way . However , there is a pos"ib:li that the 29th uivision , which is due to arrive in the United King dome l ate this month u ,1der corrnnand of General Gerow , might be used in the new th , ater, movin~ down to Africa soon after the original assault . Brigadier Vogel comes in to discuss Anglo - Americ•::in co •nmands and is told that after General And er son lands he will take over the Algiers command from General Ryder . The British generals command will include U. S . tro0ps . General Anderson must be prepared to land a~ainst ty �,, opposition at Al giers and Bougie . Brigadi0r Vogel is also told that Admira l Cunningham is ~oing to be N~val Commander -i n - Chief of the combined United States-B rit ish fleets und e r the supreme c ommander of the operntion . Admiral Cunningham is coming ov r from Washing ton to j')in this headtuarters . Admiral Ramsay has ~one to Washington to take over the British Navy end of TORCH over there . Gen~rals Lemnitze r , Oliver and Rooks c ome in to discuss with General v1ark matters pertaining to the Oran Task Force . The y are to l d that Combined Operati n s now re ve rts that land ing c rnft is available for an armored c cmbat team to train at the Nor th I reland amph i bious base . Gener a l Oliv er is pleased , saying this is preferable to ship p i ng his armo r ed Unit to Toward. Oliver is told to go ahead and prepare for training his team i n I re l and . I t now looks as though the 1st Armored c::mbat team will use M- 4 instead of M- 3 tanks . The M- 3s c annot be loaded on the type of assault eq u ipm ent that is go ing to be used on the three Maracaibo type l anding boats that wi ll take the tanks ashore at Oran . M-4 tanks have a l 1wer silhouette and can be lo aded aboard this type of c raft . LONDON SEPT . 6 , 1 942 -- Prime Ministe r Churchill , cables Pres id ent Roosevelt that he feels the TORCH p l an is substantia ll y set and that both nations shou ld go "full speed head" in preparations to execute it . This is the c able he sends Mr . Roosevelt : ( "We ag r ee to the mi litary layout as yo u propose it . We hnve plenty of troops high l y trained for landing . If convenient , they can wear your uniform . The. will be proud to do so . The shipping will be all ri gh t . I have just had your number 184 ( a cable) and it is ev id ent that you too have skinned yours u lv es to the bone . Unless we suffer serious l ,)sses in the assau lt, we consider th at the naval forces now jointly to be p rovided justify us in g oin~ f u ll sp eed ahead with sta ging operations . I am sending Admira l Ramsay with the ag r eement of General Eisenhower ov er at once to furnish Admiral Cun n i ngham with the means of go in g into n a val details with you . I t is i mpe rative now to drive straight ahead and save every hour . I n this way alone shall we realize your strategical design and the only hope of doing anything that really counts this year . We strongly endorse the re quest which we u~derstand Ei senhower has already made to Mar shall that the force you are r eleasing from Casablanca may be sent ov er here complete with its regimental combat team . Kindest regards . 11 (si gned ) W inston Churchill. • Norfolk House is humming and officers are arriving by the score ev ery day . General Rooks has set up the framework of his Or m Task Force and they are working lon g hours making detailed plans . A g r eat m8ny officers of the II Army Corps are being brought up from Long ford Castle . General Ryder is gett in g his Al g ie rs Task Force p;ro up into operation and it is working with General Anderson , mnkinp; the greatest possible use of previous British planning . General Truscott , who was l eft at Norfolk House as a contact officer when General Patton returned to the United States , is integrating the plans of the 0 �Casabl anca force with the plans - being made by the Algiers and Oran gr oups . General Cl ark , gvtti n g reports from a ll three g roups , remarks what a burden it is off his shou l d ers fuo•·ha ve such an able staff . He knows every key man per s onally and knov1s h is capabilities and spec ial ties . General Cl a rk merely makes a daily report to Gener a l Eis en hower . He has been g iv en a free hand to make decisions and he sends out ord e r after ord e r with General Eisenhower ' s name signed . On th e matters of greatest imp ortance , the Command~ r-in - Chi ef and his deputy conf er at either General ' s of fice . Be c ause some uni ts now under co mmand of Ge ne ra l Hartle in Northern Ireland ( the 34th Division and the 1s t brmored Di~ision) will participate in 'T'ORCH General , Clark te l ephones Gener a l Hartle and asks him to come to Lon d on so he c an be oriented on t he plan . Co lo nel Robinette , who will c ommand the 1 st Ar~o r ed co mbat team that will assau lt with the 1s t Div isi on at Or an , is c alled in for a conference . He reports th at he is experiment i ng to determine t he best metl od of landing h is tanks on the Oran b ecich . He is trying out Mara c a ibos and rubber Jontoon eq ipm en t . He believes that whe n the armored unit moves forward fro m the beAchhead it should be con troll ed by the Oran Task Force co mman der rat he r th an by General Al l en who will lead the 1st Division . W ith the radio equ i pment his c ombat team has , dir e ct .commun ic at ion may be established between armored c olum ns and the task force co .rnnR nde r w11 0 may either be afloat or ashore . The ra d ios have a r ange u p t o 1 00 miles . / Wit h the naval p roblem finally shaping up a nd with the v ar i ous task force co rrnnande r s getting their plans in to shape , General Clark turns to the aviation problem . W th Col ,ne l Bentley i he talks over the tra ini ng and empl yment.of transport squadrons and pa rac hute troops . Bentley believes the ent ir e parat roo p attack should be c 0n c entrated on Oran whic h he says is the lo g ical p oint of _atta ck . He thinks the paratr oo p units art.:; of in suffici ent st ren gth to spre ad them in two or t hree p l 9ces . He is inst r uc ted to g iv e General Cl ark a memorandum sh owin~ what transport souadrons and c ommande rs are avnilable and wher0 he wants them trained . General C1 , rk will i ssue necessary ord ers as soo n as he ha s the memorandum . General Cl ark questions Col onel Bentley co nc erning the probab ili ty of cr acking u p trans 1Jorts in the 1 ndings south of Or an . Bent ley s ,ys there v·ill be room for 1 2 transports to r etu rn to Gibral t r . The remaining 20 transports wi ll fly south after the paratroops hiwe jumped . The planes vlill Lmd i n the desert and he is h opefu l that these landin~s c an be made without too grert dam re to the ai r pl,ncs . Gene~al Gilkerson of the 8th Air Force i s c ll ed in to discuss that u ~its part in TORCH. Offe nsive operations a~ainst Germany must be curtailed in order to p repare B- 1 ?s and otrer aircraft r e?dy for African operati ns . The curtailment must start soon . Gene ral Gilker son does not l_ke the co1r1mand setup , saying he f ee ls that for:n8 tion of a new fighter conunand he td( 1uart e rs- - u sing air u ,iits from Genera l Spaatz 1 1''igh t er Co1unand , - is a mistake . He believes the bvst solution '.,o ,1ld be to use the existing fighter command headquarters . He r epo rts that Gener n l Arnold has warned him that our air forces in North _J �~ I ) Africa are liable to face v0ry -strong German air u1its after October High - ranking officer after hi~h-rankinrr officer file, into General Clark ' s office . General Allen has moved a planning group of the 1st Division into Norfolk House to collaborate i-rit', the Oran p.Lanning group . G<n<.:ral Sla~': c lls General Allen and General Andrus, commander of 1st Division artil l ery, in for consultation . He ~oes over the Oran oper•a tion with tnem and certain changes in ls t Di vision commands are discussed . Generals Lemnitzer and Rooks confer with the D vuty Col'lll11ander- in - Chief concen11ng training for the Oran ex pedition . Stress is placed on the trainirig of shore parties th:=it will accom1)any the regimental combat teams . A general de:.:iling with an operation the size and importAnce of TORCH has to deal with a multitude of tl ings , large and smal l. But today General Clark gets the strangest request to date . It comes from Colonel Eddy , the U. S . Naval Attache at Tangier , r orocco , who is currently here for espiona~e CJnference . The memorandwn he sub mits to General Clark deals vlith nine problems . This is the stran~e one: 1 11 1 recommend th t on D- day , ·vhen the landing operations actually begin , I be authorized to arrange for the assassinatirm of U e members of the German Armistice Commission at Casablanca and for any members of the Germr-m or Italian Armistice Commissions who may then be i:r.1;the city of Oran . About twenty of the German Army and Navy office ~s live tog1.ot:1er in a hntel in Casablanca and t ,e assirmments have already been made for this job to men Hho have the demolit1.on materials already in their hands . I micyit add that our principal agent in Casablanca is the father of a boy who was shot a.s a hostaq:e in Paris recently and the father is impatiently awaiting 1)ermission to carry out his assignment ." The general 0 . K. Looks good 11 reads the memornndum, to me . M. 1 . c . 11 then pencils in the margin : , Colonel Eddy 1 s report is fascinating . It details what under cover a~ents will work with landing forces at Casablancn, Oran and Algiers . All of t~ e agents are Americ,ms who have great prestige and remarkable cont~cts in French Africa . Another part of Colonel Eddy ' s report deals 'with plans to destroy key power stations , tunnels and bridges in the areas where the attack will take place . These plans are complete sine~ they were designed in anticipation of Axis aggression . These are the sidelight facets that must be taken ca··e of to prepare for the operation . ' . �LONDON, SEPT. 7. 1942--Six words-- 11We believe it to be satisfactoryil--put the TORCH operation on an all-out. green light basis today as Generals Caark and Eisenhower reply to a revised directive sent them by Gener al Marshall. It states: "The operation will be executed at the earliest possible date. as fixed by the Commander-in-Chief of Allied Froces participating. with the view of accomplising as rapidly as possible these initial. intermediate and ultimate objectives: (1) Landings in the Casablanca area and the Oran-Algi ers area. to be sil]iultaneous if practicable . with the establishment of lodgments in the Casablanca area in French Morocco and in the Oran-Moetaganem-Algiers area in Algiers. (2) Seizure of ports for follow-up forces. (3) Rapid explotation in order to acquire complete control of the area. including French Morocco . Spanish Morocco (if the situation requires) and western Algeria to facilitate extensi on of effective air and ground operations to the eastward. (4) Combined air. ground and sea operations with the view of insuring complete control by the United Nations of the entire North African area from Rio de Oro to Tunisia inclusive and to facilitate air operati ons against enemy forces and installations in the Mediterranean area. 11 I r General Marshall receives the briefest cable to date from his two top generals in the Euro pean Theater. The cable, signed by Genera l Eisenho wer, says: "General C1ark and I have discussed the l anguage of the proposed directive and 11 have nothing to state. We believe it to be satisfacto7y. Lat er the Chief of Operations of the War depart m ent is sent a long cable that says: 11We are now apparently a s sured the. t substantial agreements have been reached and that all preparations can proceed unhampered by uncertainties and changing conditions that heretofore have placed heavy additional burdens upon all pl a nning personnel and troops. I assure the Chief of Staff that we here have at le ast some faint understanding of the tremendous difficulties he has had in bringing about this res ult and that we are h i ghly a pJ reciative and grateful." The Comma der-in-Chief n and his deputy pledge they will ma.~e only i m ative peJ requests and they ask "your complete support in assuring prompt satisf a ction." Every request coming from the the a ter for TORCH l l be based on minimum requirewi ments. The TORCH leaders declare they 11will not tolerate submission to the War Department of requests and requisitions that represent anything more than the bare essentials." They warn that there will be thousands of reque sts for maintenance su~plies, since it is hard to know what the SOS has on hand in the United Kingdom. Everything will be done to avoid duplic ation. Once again General Clark concentrates today on the important air plans involved in TORCH.All air plans will be headed up and coord inated by Air Marshall Welsh. The Britishe r will be air officer on the staff of the Supreme Comma der; n there will be no-over-ell air commander for the operation. Gener al Doolittle will head United States air units and an undesignated R.A.F. officer will head the British units . I Welsh questions, during a l ong conference with Generei Clark. the advis cbili ty of using air tr ansport squadrons for the movement of pe.ratroops to Oran. General Clark agrees with Welsh that the r ap id movement of grou nd forces �\ to Tunis by air in order to beat Axis forces to that key point may be of the greatest importance to the success of the entire undertaking. Welsh says the use of paratroops at Ora.n should be weighed carefully against the possibility of losing many t1·ansports in that opera .tion. Such a result would limit our abilj ty to move ground forces later by air to Tunis or ea.st of Algiers. Welsh reports that he has s~t up a balanced and versatile R.A.F. unit to support both army and navy opera .tions at Algiers. All air ~orce units will be under the Supreme Commander and he will decide how and where bombers, fighters and transports will be used. As soon . as set decisions have been made as to objectives and distribution of the available air power, Welsh will be given a directive and air pla.ns will be coordinated under his supervisi on. This plan will be presented to Air Chief Marshall Portal for his approval insofar as the Briti sh command is concerned. Following the conference with Welsh, Genere.l Clark calls in Colonels Gale and V andenberg. They discuss Welsh 1 s proposals and Vandenberg says he feels Welsh's plan is "char acteristic of the British in that it does not provide sufficient air support for ground troops. Gener al Clark tells hi m that he will go to Port al , if necessary, in order to obtain more air attack support from the R.A.F. but that this will not be done unless we are convinced it is necessary. General Clark emphasizes the necessity for the Br itish and U.S. Army Air Forces to get together and work as a team in the TORCH operation. Whatever the initial distribution of air forces is, Gener a l Clark declares, it must be possible to 11 concentrate for an attack eastward from Algeria. Plans, 11 says the general, 11 must have in view the concentration of air strength in support of ground fore es striving to reach Tunis before the Axis can gain control of that vital area. 11 Vandenberg points out, while the subject of getting more Bri tish bomber support is being discussed, that it will take about nine weeks to tr a.nsfer bomber squadrons from operations in the United Kingdom to operati ons in North Africa. He ad ds that operations of the four U.S. fighter gr oups now in the U.K. mus t stop very soon in order to prepare for movement to the new theater. Welsh also mentioned that British fighter squadrons to be used in TORCH a.re now being prepared for their missions but that U.S. squadrons earmarked for the · same theater are still opera.ting a.cross the English chan nel. Gener al Clark orders pre paration immediately of a directive i:repa .ring the U.S. air force for the African operation. As to the use of para troops, Genere.l Clark proposes to set up an airborne task force under the command of Colonel Bentley. The directive is being prepared and combined training of tr a nsport squadrons with paratroops will be started. Colonels Bentley and Raft and Major Yarborough, all para.tro op experts, are called in and told by G ener al Cls .rk that a single locality should be selected for the _paratroop attack and that Oran a.ppea.1·s to be the logical place. Raff says he will be able to jump about 520 men, using three squadrons of transports. General Clark stresses that Colonel Bentley's command over the paratroops will terminate as soon as the men reach the ground when they will come under the Oran Task Force com anner. m Bentley, who has spent considerable time in North Africa, also recommends that the TORCH a ck be ma.de on Sunday morning. He says that French officers att and many enlisted men habitually leave their stations on Saturday afternoon an d do not return until late on Sunday. He believes resistance would be materia .lly less on Sunday than on a. week day. The probable Sunday is November 8. �\30 1 Another problem that is causing concern is the strength and use of automatic weapons units. Gener al Clark says these units must be integrated into the regimental combat teams which they will support. General Thiel and Colonel Harriman are called in to go over the problem. Harriman says the required number of 90-mm anti-aircraft guns are on hand but that we are still short of automa.t~c weapons. General Thiel agrees to turn over automatic weapons available in the European Theater to the TORCH operation. Genera,l Clark plans to assign two automatic weapons batteries in the assault. A full automatic weapons battalion will be assigned to each armored force combat team. Harriman re ports that automatic weapon s battali.ons are being trained to use their weapons as anti-tank guns. General Allen. when he comes in for conference. is also asked about the automatic weapons situation and he is told that such units will begin training with the combat teams with which they will be in assault. Genera l C1a.rk decides that the remainder of the 34th Division and the 1st Armored Division will follow the assault elements into Or~n. The 29th Division. which will arrive in the U.K. during September might be sent to the African theater. although, at the present time, a plan to bring a division direct from the U.S. seems preferable, the general says. The date when the next division can be brought into Oran will depend not only on the convoy schedule but also on the ability of the SOS to supply additional units in North Africa. ( Colonel Wolf. commanding an Engineer Am phibious Brigade. is told genere ,l that he tentatively pla .ns to use the engineer boa,t brigade at The shore regiment will furnish the beach parties for the Oran force. eral tells Colonel Wolf that he proposes to bring the entire engineer the TORCH operation plans as soon as possible • • • by the Ora.n. The genunit into • LOND N SEPT. 8, 1942-The toughest problem a nd perhaps the crux of TORCH O . is rapidly becoming logistics--getting men. materiel, food to the scene where fighting _stars and tactics come into play. The SOS has no accurate record of what supplies are on hand in the United Kingdom. General Lee says he has unbalance& stocks for only 15 or 20 days use in the North African theater. Be,sed on the convoy schedule it is estimated that 45 days of supply are requir ed for TORCH and that that amount of supply must be in the United Kingdom by October 10 so l oadin g can get underway. Because the supplyon-hand situation is so confused. General Lee and General Clark agree that a cable should be sent immedia tely to the United States asking for shipment of the entire 45-day requirement. 11 This soluti on , 11 says Genera l Cla.rk , "will undoubtedly result in the shipment of many items alr ea dy in the U.K. in sufficient quantities. However, since the SOS does not know exactly what it now has, and there is not sufficient time remaining to find out before taking acti on to obtain supplement ary supplies from the State s , this soluti on appears to be the best open to us. tt General Gale and Colonel Hamblen do not believe such a large shipment can be made from the United States in time for a November 4 D-day and Gale proposes that theAlgiers assault and follow-up conv oys be loaded completely before the loading of the Oran force is started. He esti mated this will give us an additional 13 days to secure our equipment and supplies. No difficulty is anticipated with �obtaining agreement from the Director of Movements and the commander of the First British Army has already agre ed to the plan. Colonels Hamblen and Ross estimate that 25 to 30 cargo vessels would be needed to move the 45-day supply from the United States to the United Kingdom and they doubt that this number of vessels can be assembled without considerable delay. Gener al Styer of the SOS who arrived rec, ently from Washington, proposes that the cable be sent at once and that SOS headquarters in Washington will have to determine what can be done to meet the demand. Styer too doubts that the tonnage requested can reach England by October 10. Lee is told to 11bend every effort toward getting equipment and supplies that are available here in the SOS ready for loading. 11 Genera,l Styer remains behind to talk to General Clark and tells him that his obse rv ations whow that 11no one knows exactly what we have in the way of supplies in the United Kingdom or where they are. 11 He says the ration situation apperas to be well handled. In extenuation, however, he says SOS units are short-handed and adds that operations people, generally speaking, 11do not appreciate the import1rnce or magnitude of supply problems until confronted by a situation such as now exists." General Hartle, now commanding the Vth Army vorps in North Ireland, is brought over to be oriented on TO RCH. General Clark tells Hartle that he might be placed in command of the Oran Task Force, using the II Army Corps staff which is now preparing Oran plans under Genera.l Rooks . The plans for the ea.stwal'd drive to Tunis may be revised if French resistance in Algeria does not materialize . General Anderson is called in and it is decided that troop transports will move into Philippeville and Bougie and unload at dockside if posr,ible. This will expedite unloading of supplies and lessen the distance to be traveled inorder to beat the Nazis into Tunisia. The British Navy has agreed to furnish the extra ships. General Ryder, who will command the initial assault on Algiers, then turn the combined command over to General Anderson, joins the conference and, once again, General C1ark stresses to both officers their command relationship. General Ander son is also informed that the Allied Force Headquarters probably will be in Algiers once the operation has started and the British general intimates that the locality "might be a little small for both headquarters." Gener al C1a.rk JEplies that Algiers is a city of considerable size and that it should be able to hold both Anderson's headquarters and the over-all TORCH head quarters. The possibility of eventual Br itish withdra.wal from French North Africa is also discussed and Anderson says that if all goes well his force probably would be used farther to the ea.st against Rommel, rather than be returned to the United Kingdom. Plans for b8 additional Algiers attackRyder says his Algiers Nava l 11 get along all ti mes. 11 the Algiers assault are well developed, Ryder reports. He asks for 36-foot assault boats since he hopes to use another unit in the -~, Brit ish Commandogroup in which he will insert some U.S. troops. relations with the com~ander of the British 78th Division and the Task Force commander are very pleasant and he adds that he will right with General Anderson, although it is a little difficu lt at Gener vl Clark also dives into the air problem again. He brings in Air Marshal Welsh and Colonel V ande nberg and tells them General Spaatz now understands that his primary task is to get the TO RCH air force ready. Thes e units DTU.st soon be withdrawn from Europe an operations and this brings up the problem of explaining the sudden stopp ag e of that task which been receivin? extensive pub licity. �That knotty task is being turned over to G-2. Both Welsh and Vandenberg understand fully what air operati ons are involved in TORCH and they say they are satisfied. Welsh says he now understands that in addition to the transports to be used in the paratroop attack, ap prxoimately five other squadrons wiil be available in the United Kingdom for later operations in North Africa. That will make a total of 65 trans ~or ts plus those still dip eoperating condition after the initial attack. Welsh suggests the formation of a group of transports under headquarters control that can be used in moving troops and supplies anywher e in the thee ,ter. Detailed maps and mosaics are now being assembled by the G-2 section. The photo map coverage at Algiers is good while th a t at Oran nnd Casablanca are fair. Models have been constructed of some of the beaches with the work in the Algiers area completed. The Oran beach models will be ready by the end of ieptember while those for Casablanca ar e being made in the United States. Excel lent , detailed · photogra phs of these models have been made. They show every detail of the shoreline. Mosaics on a scale of about 1/15,000 will be distributed down to companies and, possibly, pl atoo ns. ( Norfolk house is now throbbing with activity. The rabbit-warren like offices ar e filled with busy officers and men, holding conferences, poring over maps. The tempo of work has been step ped up and lights burn behind blackout curtains until after midnight in many offices, particularly the plans and train ing and the intelligence sections. General Clark hardly has a chance to get up from his desk, so fast do the high-r ankin g officers under him file in for conferences that are shaping up TORCH.At Inverary, Tid wort h, Longford Castle, Cheltenham, Northern Ireland, troops a~e training and brains are working on the task ahead. Generals Clark and Eisenhower dine again with Prime Ministe r Churchill again evening. Mr. Churchill is his old bubbling self and, now thab TORC has taken H final shape, the Prime Minister is eager to 11 get on with the show." He mentions ~ peatedly that he wants the operation to start 11 the earliest at possible date. , • • • LOND N SEPT. 9, 1942- - Although the problem of supply for TORCH still O , is in a confused state, the SOS has begun packing for shipment to North Africa ~ll task force items that are presently available. They will be taken to the ports where vessels will be combat loaded. Items being packed are based upon requisitions from the list a.nd 34th Infantry and the 1st Armored Divisions. The cable that will request 45 days of supplies for the TORCH operation has not yet been dispatched to Washington. General Lee 1 s draft gave the impression that 15 to 20 days of supplies were available from the United Kingdom. General Clark, watching every out-going cable like a hawk and keeping his fingers on scores of section pulses, says this is not an accurate statement of the true situation, hence, he directs clarification of the message. Regarding ships to move the 45-day supply need, General Larkin re ~orts that if 25 ships arrived from the U.S. and accompanied the convoy to North Africa without reloading in the United Kingdom, he might be able to have the supplies in the hands of the tr oops in as little as ten days after its arrival. This would expedite things materially. Colonel Stirling, sedretary of the British War Cabinet, reports to General J �...... I Cle.rk that the Prime Minister 111s pressing the Bri . ish Chiefs of Staff 11 for early t action on TORCH.General Clark is asked what fe .ctors are preventing a. D-d.ay earlier than the tentative first week in November date and the Deputy Supreme commander outlines it thus: Some of these fRctors a.re the non-arrival of equipment for the 1st Division, lack of maintenance supplies, unbale ,nced SOS stocks, the date of arrival of the Algiers force combat team from the United States (October 10), conversion of combat lo ade rs, and completion of auxiliary carriers in the United St ates . Also, the schedule of amphibious training for two regimental combat teams of the 1st Divisions calls for a termina .tion about October 8. I must repeat that we insist upon time for assault rehearsals a.nd we are unwilling to put British soldiers in United States uniforms. 11 11 The British naval support plan .is submitted to General Clark and he comments that 11 acti cally the entire Brit~ ·sh fleet will support the attack in the Mediterpr ranean.11 He describes Admiral Cunningham, who is coming here from the United States to head the naval pa.rt of TORCH,as 11 damn best man the British have. 11 It lo oks the as though aircraft carrier support will be the weakest link in the plan. The Prime Minister has been dabbling with the idea of having a force from Malta attack Tunis at the same time American troops are landing at Algie rs, Oran and Casablanca but his military advisors think such an attack is 11 little a too bold. 11 The Brit ish have proposed that a combined planning staff with army, navy and air re pr esentatio o of both British and Americans be formed. The proposal is typical of r equests that result from the differ ences in American and British staff organization. General Clark declines, saying the proposal, if adopted, would result in partial adoption of British staff procedure which is largely a committee system. The British, he adds, a1·e having some difficulty in understa .nding American staff menhods and for that re ason "procedure has not always been as smooth as it might be. 11 That was why a British Deputy Chief of Staff (Brigadier Whiteley) was included ten days ago in General Cla.rk 1 s headquarters. General Clark explains to Whiteley how, under the American system, a commander presents questi ons for investigation to his genera .l staff and how the staff officer concerned obtains the best inforlllB.tion from ell sources before giving an answer. General Clark says that the decision reached some time ago--t.o follow U.S. staff org anization and procedure-should not be changed. The discrepancy in U.S. and British ranks also causes complications. For inst ance , Colonel Vandenberg points out the Air Marshall Welsh, who will have only three British squadrons under him, corresponds to an Am erican lieutenant general while General Doolittle, commanding the American air effort which will be much larger, is only a Brigadier Gener a l and highly outranked by Welsh. The same difficulty exists in both air and ground commands. General Lemnit zer and Brigadi er Vogel report that General Anderson has put in for the shipping required for his third and fourth follow-up convoys. The total requested is greater than all ship ping availabe for the Mediterranean at the time it is asked for. Gener al Clark tells Lemnitzer that the distribution of the follow-up shipping in the Mediterranean must be spread out for both Algiers and Oran but that Algie rs will hll.ve priority over the Oran force. The general approves for planning purposes the staff recornnendations for supply level~ estimated ammunition expenditure, ga soline and oil consumption and ho spitalization. All classes of supplies will be built up progressively for the total force ashore to not less than the following levels: by D-30--14 day level; D.60--30 day level; D-90--45 day level. �( Movement from North Ireland to the Swansea and Liverpool aree ,s of two boat battalions from the Amphibious Engineer Brig ade is authorized by the General if billets can be found . These units will be going into training for use in the Oran assault. Actual practice in loading and unloading vessels, which can be obtai ned at Liverpool and Sw ansea . will be of great training value and the Gene ral is anxious to get it started. The problem of handling public relations once TORCH gets started comes up for discussion. General Robert Mc Clure is called in and he feels that P.R. officers be placed under the control of G-2. If public relations are pla .ced directly under the Chief of Staff, General Mc Clure feels the c/s will be forced to arbitrate between the conflicting interests of publicity and censorship. If both are placed under G-2, the Chief of Staff will be saved much time and trouble. MAjor Phillips, now a public rele .tio ns officer in the European Theater of Operations, has been recomm ended as P.R.O. for Allied Force Headquarters and General Clark proposes to bring him into the group shortly so policies and plans can be developed , • • • LONDON, SEPT. 10, 1942--Plans for the attack on Oran ar e progressing rapidly. General Allen, whose 1st Division troops will spearhead the assault, tells General Clark he is well satisfied with development of plans for the landing. Small details of the assault are beginning to be developed now. General Allen plans to arrange with the British for reco nnaisse .nce of the Oran beaches by officers of his staff prior to the attack . They will make their survey from subrns.rines. General Clark approves the plan in principal but insturcts Gener al Allen that actual arrangements "must be cleared through me i n view of the possible lass ofi sec urity involved. The British believe that Allen's combat t eams can be put ashore faster as units if companies embark on different ves sel s in the convoy. This, says the Genera l, brings the disadvantage of having companies separated during the voyage and beyond the control of battalion commanders. One complic ati on for the Ore.n task force has a1·isen. General Rooks reuorts that new medium tanks arriving in theU.K. a.re M-3s ra .ther than the planned- M-4s. The M-3s a.re not the right shape for combat boats so unless M-4s are received, light tanks will have to support the Oran combat teams. Geneae.l Clark calls in Colonel Hamblen and discusses the tonnage that can be put asho1·e over the Ore.n beaches in the four or five da.ys the assault convoy will be anchored offshore . The general 1 s Oran staff has figured 11,500 tons to be the maximum, this figure being based on the amount that can be lifted by the ava ile .be l anding era.ft and the physical capacity of beach parties to handle the loads . The possibility of using 11coasters, 11 each of which could ca.r·ry about 1,000 tons with balanced laods, is being investigated. If these "coasters" can be obtained they will make possible the use of add itional facilities at some other small ports in the Oran region. The chief air advisor for TORCH has been che.nged. The British Air Ministry has instructed Air Marshal Welsh to command R.A.F . units supporting the Eastern Task Force (Algiers) and have assigned Air Commodore Saunders to Welsh 1 s old job. The general once again plunges with Welsh into the thorny air support problem. �1 The capacity of the Gibr alta r airport is discussed. Undr:r present plans 250 fighters must leave Gibra.ltar during the first three days. In addition, three fighter souadrons will be needed for loc al defense so must remain at Gib. In addition, th;re will be some aircraft on su bme.1·ine patrol and others for the fleet air arm . General Clark says 11it seems possible that we must reduce our total req u irements somewhnt. 11 Welsh is detailed to determine the maximum airport capaci ty of Gibr altar so it can be determined how the reducti on can be effected. Cra ted Spitfir es can be erected at Gibraltar at the rate of 20 a day so, under present pl ans , this means the work must start not later than D minus 12, or around October 21 . Welsh feels that as the fighters begin to appear at the Gib airdrome, the Axis will be strongly tempted to bomb before the force begins to operate. Present pla .ns calls for 168 American pilots to arrive in Gibraltar by special convoy on D minus 14 and Welsh suggests their arrival might be delayed by having a small detachment test the newly assembled aircraft . General Clark instructs Colonel V andenberg to cable the War Department that final decision as to the employment of the TORCH air force would be made in London . He expl a ins that a large force must not be com mitt ed in advance to the 11 Casablanca operation . 11 0ur air plan must be feexible, 11 says the genend. It must provide f or such contingencies as the failure of our ground force to get ashore at Casablanca , or fo r strong Axis rP.action early in the operation over the Mediterre.ne an coas t with no resistance by the French in the Casablanca ar ea . In any event, we must be prP.pared to mass our air effort to the east where eventually the strongest hostile air forces probably will be met . 11 British Commodore Troubridge tells the gener al that heavy air attacks are not likely outside a radius of about 200 miles from Sardinia . Troubridge has seen a great deal of service in the Mediterranean. The shipment of fighters to Russia is placing a handic ap on TORCH air pl ans . General Lyon says the British have agreed to furn i sh Russia with 200 fighters a month and. because they a re falling behind in deliver ·ies , they have substituted American P-39s , which were in the U.K. enroute to Russia from the Stat es , in place · of British Hurrican e s . Vandenberg r epo rts that 54 P-39s that were in the U.K. are already enroute to Murmansk and that another 220 are either .loading or on their way to ports fo r shipment to Russia. That leaves only 20 P-39s available in the United Kingdom. Vandenberg also r eports that the British could replace the P-39s with Hurricanes for TORCH use but only at the expense of British Fighter S~uadron s already set up for TORCH. The problems of logistics and air support now occupy the Gener a l virtually throughout the entire day . Naval support and troop dispositions have been disposed of and groups are working on them with definite plans and facts before them. General Po1·ter returns from Inver a r e.ry and tells General Cla.rk that he is pleased with the way the 168th Inf a ntry regiment combat tea~ is shaping up. Colonel 0 1 Daniel has been placed in command of the regiment. Porter has-just seen the team go through a night assault exer ci se • • ( • • L~NDON,SEPT. 11, 1942--Two inter est in g TORC H-vit a l d~velopments come up today : (1) Everything possible is going to be done to strengthen the Algiers force, and , (2) An expert tells General C1ark that a Casablanca landing would be possible, because of surf conditions , about one day out of seven. -.P ~ �( General Anderson's request that additional shipping be furnished him to strengthen the Algiers force is discussed at a conference that General Clark holds with Generals G , Gruenther and Lemnitzer, Commordore Douglas-Pennant, ale Brig adiers Vogel and Whiteley and Colonel Nevins. Anderson wants to get into ~hilippeville and Bone as soon as possible to start driving toward Tunis. For this reason he wants the necessa .ry troops afloat close behind him when he first l ands at Algiers. Vogel points out that if Anderson's reque st is met, the British force will be able to move east on Tnnis at an early date but that the Oran t0~ce will be penalized by relative immobility until about D.50. G ale declares that fulfillment of Anderson'srequest will involve more shipping and naval escorts and that such a move would have to be taken up with the Briti sh Admiralty since it would reflect on the world maritime situation. Gener al .Gale asks whether we are prepared to accept reductions at Oran in order to strengthen the Algiers force and General Clark replies "yes, but the extent of the Oran reduction must be given study and General Anderson will not necessarily be given all he requests. 11 Reason for such a decision is that the occupation of Tunis before the Axis can move in is still one of the prime reasons for executing TORCH.General Lemnitzer is instructed to go into Anderson's requet at once to determine equitable distributi on of strength. After that decision is made, General Gale will make a definite proposal to the Admiralty. Proposed modification of the plan will be of no value unless the shipping can be found and the navy can provide the necessary escorts. The expert who brings the disconcerting news about Casablanca is C,V. Clopet, an intelligence officer who has spent 12 years in Casablanca. He says surf conditions along the coast of French Morocco are very unfavorable at this time of year and in his opinion landings will be possible on about one day out of seven. 11 attempted landing on other days, 11 he says, 11may result in disaster." An He suggests daily reports from Casable.nca on general weather and tide conditions . Clopet tells General Clark it would be wise to plan.alternative to landings through the surf, direct attacks at s~.all ports along the Atlantic Coast. In that way, troops could be landed at dockside. He adds that defense of these small ports 11is wea.k kand could be overcome easily." Conversely, the defenses at Casablanca are strong against any attack from the sea. He believes defense there would be vigorous in case of direct attack. He believes there are eight submarines, 14 destroyers and a battleship based at Oran and that this force is ready for action except that the battleship probably would operete at reduced speed. The report by Clopet bears out a point already stressed by General Clark: that the chances are at least one in four that when Patton's force arrives at Casablanca the condition of the sea will be such that a landing won't be possible. That means the Casablanca Task Force will have to lie offshore waiting for the right conditions and meanwhile the Oran and Algiel's attacks will have been made and Casablanca defenses will be on the alert because they undoubtedly will know that a large force is waiting to attack . The time schedule of three simultaneous attacks will be upset. General Spaatz, comm ander of the U.S. Air Force in Br itain , comes in to go over TORCH air problems with General Clark. The air genera.l reports on the difficulties he is encountering in trying to prepare for TORCH , at the same time, and maintain operations against Germany and the occupied European countries. Spaatz �l 37 says that Briti sh Air Me.rshal Slesser is "defi nitely opposed to us using either P-39s or DB-7s 11 in TORCH. The air general believes the United States planners of TORCHshould press the matter and General Clark promises to do so. Air Me ,rshal Welsh reports that the capacity of Gibraltar airdrome will permit 175 fighters to depart on D-day, that 220 planes will be able to clear for North Africa by D plus 4 and 250 very soon thereafter . Late in the day, General Lemnitzer and Brigadier Vogel, completing their study of General Anderson's request for additional forces, recommend that he be allowed a total of 51,000 (7,000 less than requested). General Clark approves the recommendation. This means that at the time of arrival of the third fast convoy, the distribution of troops in the area will be: Algiers, 110,000; Oran 70,000. General Gale is taking the plan to the Admiralty to see whether or not the necessary vessels and naval escorts can be provide d . A staff coordination memorandum comes out today . It places General Lemnitzer in charge of plans and training , making tim responsible for coordinating the Allied Army, Naval and Air Operations Plans and Training staffs. Bri gadier Mockler-Ferryman gets the same type of assignment as hea d of the Allied Intelligence staffs and General Gale is named chief Administrative Officer to coordinate the Aroy, Naval and Air administrative staffs. No G-1 has been named yet. Generals Clark and Etienhower leave overnight conference with Prime Minister officers. ( Ill London late in the ev~ning for an Churchill ~nd high-ranking Brit ish • CHECKERS, ENGLAND,SEPT. •12, 1942--Prime Ministe1· Churchill, des p ite his great eagerness to launch TO RCH at the earliest possible date, agrees after long conferences starting last night that the North African assault will have to be postponed until about · November 15. Mr. Churchill agrees after Generals Ettenhower and Clark and high Britishofficials outline the obstacles in the way of a late October or early November attack. From the tiflle the two genera.ls arrive at Checker£ unt,11 they depart around noon , TORCH--its problems, its shifting plans , its hopes--is almost the sole topic und.er discussion. The two American generals explain the difficulties in getting ammuniti on a nd arms to the United Kingdom in time to get it aboard combat loaded vessels. the stumbling blocke in pl a nning for TORCH air support, shipping space restrictions. The other conferees--Gener a l Sir Ale .n Br ooke, Lord Louis Mountbatten , Lord Leathers (hea d. of the ?War Shi pping Administration), Major Ge neral Holmes (British Director of Movements), Vice Admira l Moore of the Home Fleet, and Colonel Hollis, Secretary to the British Chief of Staff--support are;uments for the postponed date . The shipping problem is growing more acute. After dinner, while the of f icers a1·e conferring with Churchill in his study, a report comes in tha .t seven submarines have attacked a n Allied convoy in mid-Atlantic a nd ten ships have been sunk . It is not known yet whether the convoy was east or west bound. No matter which way it was headed--east with fighting supplies and food or west in virtual ballast--it means ten less shi p s for war shipping end every ship is beginning to count more every day . �I \ The problem of getting airc raft earmarked for Russia re-assigned to TORCH is discussed and Churchill says 11 11 convoy number 18 is now enroute to Russia PQ. and if it goes through successfully Churchill says he 11can 1 t bring myself to tell Joe (Stalin) that there just ain't going to be nc more convoys this year 11 because of TORCH demands. Russian convoy 19 is now being loaded and whether or 11 not it sails depends on the success of 11l?Q. 1~ . If tho convoy. now halfway to Russia and approaching the danger zone where it must face bombardment from land based ple.nes. is "smashed up, 11 the Prime Minister says 11 11 19 will be transl?Q. ferred over to TORCH use. Tha.t change would throw TORCH D-day back to November 15. Lord Leathers reports he has succeeded in :pulling 150 or the 200 P-39s destined for Russia out ob 11 11 19. l?Q. If convoy 19 goes through to Archangel, all the ships frozen in 11 for the winter . That will mean the loss of at tons of shipping that could be used, at least in part , in ister recounts a Russian convoy anecdote that illustrates condition of the British navy. 11 I will have to remain least a quarter-million TORCH The Prime Mfo. brutally the serious , 11 1 don t like to tell you this , 11 Mr. Churchill says to Admire.l Moore. It hurts me more than a little. But when I was in Moscow last month , Joe turned to me, during a discussion of the Russian convoy loss es , e.nd said : 'You have no glory left in the British Navy. Your navy only runs the:: Brit :i.sh convoy halfway to Russia. then turns around and dash es back to England \lh ile the merchant ships get slaughtered . ' St alin is right and imagi ne me having to take that kind of a lashing from Joe. 11 11 ( Churchill asks if some destroyers can't be taken from the Indian Ocean fleet ) to help TORCH.And, the Prime Minister, the old sea dog who was the First Lord of the Admiralty in the First Worl~ War, is told that the British have only seven \ destroyers in the Indian Ocean and that they constitute a force barely le .rge enough to give protection to the rather small fleet operating in that r egio n. The British Navy, General Clark remarks later, "appea rs to be in a hell of a sha pe . 11 , The Prime Minister suggests that to help TORCH the present schedule of a US-UKconvoy arriving every seven days be changed to every ten days. Lord Leathers tells him that would mean the loss of 50 , 000 tons of shipping space per day. Churchill blinks . Every way the conferees turn in an attempt to find a shortcut , the answer comes back inevitably to: D-d.a must be set back ! ,y At one point, Mr. Churchill discusses a report that has just come in to him. It says th e French Governor of Madagascar has just invited the Jppanese to come in and help the French resist British troops who are consolidating their hold on the isla .nd. Says Churchill, bitterly: "There are a certain number of skunks \sho come to the top in skunky times! 11 The night ·conference with the Prime Mihister lasts until 3:15 A.M. when Mr. Churchill, who is notorious for staying pp late since he naps in the afternoons, turns to the weary and worried men and says jauntily: ( 1 guess there's to bed! 11 11 no use keeping you people up late . Yo might as well go u �7 -'-. >';" ( Later , the general along. ( ==s.;;:; - I I Returning to London, General C1ark plup.ges immediately into a series of conferences that last until well into the evening. The snarled SOS situation is gone into again with General Gruenther and Colonel Hughes. Stressing the fa .ct that loa.ding of the Oran force would start Octobe'r t';rJ-eneral C1ark tells Hughes that combat weapons .for the 1st Division must arrive in the United Kingdom by Septembe 26. This is the bare minimum of time for the weapons to be distributed and combat loaded . The general stresses to Colonel H ughes th.at he must make it 11 vividly clear 11 that if the weapons are not here by September 26, the aua.ult teams will have to attack with insufficient arms and ammunition. 11 Mrucethem realize, 11 says General Clark, 11that is something isn't done and done fa .st those men will ve going in virtually with only their bare hands. 11 rell'.8.rks thnt 11 the SOS has let us down badly all the way 11 Brigadier General Craig of the U.S. Air Force goes over the TORCH air problem with General Clark. The chief topic concerns how the R.A.F. and the U.S,A.F. can't get together on how much air support should be given TORCH.Craig is asked to sit in on a conference with Cocm odore Saunders, Colonels Vandenberg and Brigedier Mockler-Feriyma .n. The divergence of opinion on the strength of the air forces results, Sua.nders says , from the fact the Air Ministry is planning a ·more or less abert term view of TORC while the U.S. pla .n is more inclusive. H That accounts for the contemplated U.S. A.A.F, being so strong and the R.~ .•F. relatively weak. The Air MinistDy does not wish to commit , at this date , any more aircraft than are necessary for the seizure of North Africa. If t he attacks are successful , the R.A.F. will rush over more air support so the assault can be continued eastward. On the other hand, the U. S. is not only planning for air support of the initial ass ault and the drive to Tunis , but is also p-eparing for a continued , vigorous, long-range offensive, possibly against Sardinia and Italy. Attempting to find out the exact status of equipment for the Oran Task Force , General Clark instructs General Rooks to detail ten officers to work in cooperati on with the SOS in en attempt to find out what equipment is available and move it to the assault teams as soon as possible . This search will be not only for 1st Division equipment but also for equipment for the 1st Armored Division and the Engineer Amphibious Brigade, all of which will be the spearhead at tackers at Ore.n. General Oliver, commanding the 1st Armored Division, reports to Genere.l Clark on the attack proposed for his force. Because of the type of landing boats available , the 1st Armored will go ashore originally with light tanks. The heavy tank battalions will follow later. Reason for this is that the M-3 tanks with which Oliver's division is equipped will not go in the Maracaibo boats and, not knowing if M-4s, which will go in Ma .re.caibos , will arrive in time~ Oliver's plan is now set and it does not depend on the equipment of heavy tank battalions. General Clark makes one succulent success. It is: remark as he discusses 1s TORCH chances of ''If Spain, as the result of our North African landings, enters the war at the side of Germany and jumps on our back in the Mediterranean , we in TORCH might as well turn in our suits. 11 • .. • I �} LONDON, SEPT. 13, 1942-The question of 'Just how French leaders , military and civil, can best be approached in North Africa when the 11zero hour 11 is near has come up for discussion. Both British and Americ an planners of TORCH feel that a straightforward statement from Pr,sident Roosevelt should be delivered to the authorities at the 11th hour , even as the assault forces are making ready to clamber over the sides of the combat loaded ·ships and start ashore in the dark . The gist of this message should be that the Amsr.ican forces are going to land, that they have but one goal-to beat the Asis into Tunisia , that French territory will not be occupied except to achieve the eastward drive goal and that the cooperation of the French in Norh Mrica is asked. This message \rOuld be delivered by Mr Murphy or some other Amer. ican official who has the respect and trust of the North African French . General Cla.rk believes this plan should be carried even farther . He thinks one of the high comme.nders--either General Eisenhower or himself--should be ready to go to the leading French official should he ask to see the leader of the a ttacking force . General Clax·k thinks the first thi ng the official will do upon being served the Roosevelt message wi 11 be to e.sk to see the expedition I s leader so he can talk with him and get oral assurances of good intent. The leader must be readily available . How to get him into Algeria so he can be ready for conferences is one of the major problems. Should he go in two or thrP-e days ahead of the attack , wear civilian clothes and wait for the 11th hour summons? Should he lie offshore in a small boat , waiting for the signal to rendezvous and be taken ashore? Is the risk offiying in too great? J \ '?hcse a1·e the kind of problems that confront the men workin g on the civil add political end of TORCH while the purely militaiy men go ahead with their tremendous task of planning for the attack . Another problem is to determine how, when and if the na.ve units wl.11 bombard .l from the sea . General Ryder, in discussing the Algiers operation with General. Clark,· says he is convinced the French Navy and coastal defenses are going to go into acti on as soon as the attack begins . He predicts house-to-house fighting in Algiers. "I hope the battleships won't lw.ve to bombard Algiers but if they must, they wil+, 11 General Clark says . He believes the general feeling growing is that t he French army will offer only token resistance . This ass~ption is based partially on reports from Madagascar where resist ance to a British consolidation of position during the pa st three days has been very light . General Ryder is concerned about what General An&erson is going to do with the American e,ssault troops at Algiers after the British force has landed end Anderson takes over cor.una.nd General Cle.rk tells Ryder that he and his troops wil l . be under General Anderson I s command and that 11 will have you until stability he is esta.blished . 11 General Cle.rk hopes to pull the American Alg i ers force back affer the British troops ho,ve landed in strength . The British plens are subject to . approval by Allied Force headquarters and General Clark tells his Algiers Task Force leader that he anticipates no trouble ove r the q_uestion of troop use, . Regarding r~sistance by the Frennh navy and coast defenses, General Cla r k says this hee,dquarters will establish a nd publish a policy to be followed concerning bombardment of French ports . �l [ Comrr.odore Saunders says the Air Ministry opposes diversion of the 33rd Fighter Group (now being ma.de rea dy in the U.S. for shipment to Afx·i ca) fllom the Middle East , for which it was earmarked , to the i\'estern Task Force at C asablanca. General Clark tells Saunders the decision has been made , presumably with the approva l of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington , and that plans call for the group to come across aboard a British aircraft carrier that will accompany the African assault force . The air support picture is clearing slowly. Lord Leathers rep orts that 151 of the P-39s destined for Russia have been recovered from 11 11 19 for TORCH . .PQ. use Treini ng schedules of the 1st Division are discussed with Gener al Allen and Colonel Cof , his Chief of Staff . Loading tables mu.st be ready by September 16 and the 1st Division equipment will start going aboard October 8. As to the amr.iu.nition sup ply, Colonel Co1a, says the 1st Divisi on can fight for a week at Oran but after that time it will have to be replenished, not only with arnruunition , but also with spa.re gun and truck pa,rts . Genera l Allen is told that when the 18th Inf antry combat team completes tr~ining i n Ireland it will not be r e turned to Tidworth . The 1st Division commander is to find out from the British what bivouac areas are available in the north for the 18th when its amphi biou.s tI·aining is com~leted . From the cc~p it will go directly to the combat loaded boets . ( Colonel Vandenberg reports that AirCCommodore Saunders ap~ears to understand the American view-point on TORCH air operations better thon he for merly did. Saunders , however, is not clear on his responsibility in connection with the Casablanca operation. He is told by General Clark that "much of this pl anning must necessarily be 111Etde the United States but the plans are subject to in revision by us . They will not be changed unnecessarily . 11 In the evening , General Clark has Sunday dinner American column ist , and Mrs. Li ppman • • ( • • with Walter Lippman. the �I / ( LONDON, SEPT, lh, 1942--Use of British paratroops to aid General Anderson's drive eastward to seize ftai\is. discussed today and has the enthusiastic approval of Genera l Clark and General rowning, commander of the 1st British P~rachute Brigade, Machinery is set in motion to get the British paratroopers training in Sout~ern England with the 64th Transport Group (American) . General Browning , faced with General Clark's proposal, says that 11 any part or all of my force is ready for such an operation and we will be glad to take part in it. 11 Browning's 1,700 jumpers are trained and ready but the Royal Air Force does not have the paratroop carriers . The 64th , with 40 to 45 planes, is available and arrangements are made to have tne transport group start training with the British chuters by weekend , A unit of U.S. paratroops is already set up to land at Oran. Browning's group w.1.11be used to aid Anderson's force . Once the American :paratroopers bail out over Oran and achieve their mission--seizure of two airports--it will take them two weeks to be r ead y for another operation since they will lose a certain amount cf equjpment and time is required to dry and re-pack their chutes . Use of British 1,aratroopers will obviate this two week delay. Fully-equipped parachute units will be flown into Oran after the airports have been captured , They wil l then be fully prepared to participate in more easterly operations . General Anderson is greatly interested i n obtaining parachute troops and the proposed arrangements will be outlined to him . Colonel Sterling is called i n and he says such rapid action in obtaining the paratroopers might make the British Chiefs of Staff feel they are being 11short-circuited . 11 So, General Clark plans to draft a note stating that he forsees the need of using British paratroops in TORC and that he wants to make U.S. air transports H available for their immediate training and later movement to the theater. General Anderson comes in for a conference and says that he is pleased with what he saw in watching the 168th combat team in an exercise . He also speaks favorably of the 18th Infantry combat team , which is also training in Ireland. Real purpose of Anderson ' s call is to try and induce General Clark to reduce the number of U. S. ve.~icles being taken into Algiers in the early conv oys for use of U.S. signal and headquarters units . Genera l Matejka reports his purpose in taking the units is to have all communications in shape by D. 33, when the Allied Force headquarters is .scheduled to be set upi n Algiers. General C1ark decides to cut the number of sign a l vehicles on the second fast Mediterranean convoy to 25 from the original plan of 62. Gcnera,l Craig. who h..-1.s been sitting as a neutral observer while British and U. S. officials thr as h out the a ir support problem, reports to Gener a l Clark that he believes 11the situation has largely solved itself . 11 He says the directive given to t he Air Com modore appears workable in all respects and that the air appreciation prepared by Saunders will be satisfactory. Craig recommenus taking 11 all air strength possible " on the operation , pointing out the tremend ous distance we will be from our base in the United States compared to the R.A.F, ba ses in Brit a in . It will be relatively easy for the British to call for air reinforcements; it won1 t be so easy for us . A glaring example of lack of coor4ination arises today. General Gruenther reports that a number of signal units needed for theCasablanca force have been erroneously shipped here from the United States . ~NO of the units--the 56th and blst Signal Companies--cannot be replaced in the U, S. in time t o sail with the Casabl anca force . Officers are now trying to use these unite inside the Mediterranean or else find a ship to take them from the U,K. to Casablanca, Such a convoy complication would be 11 :rable, 11 General Clark says. �r Admiral Bennett . U.S. NRval officer in charge of amphibious training. is called in to discuss contemplated withdr awal of the Engineer Amphibious Brigade from his con trol. It is now at Roseneath. The maintenance company, n non- mobile organization that o:,t::erates heavy mechiner y and keeps l anding craft in condition, is particularly needed. Admiral Benne tt says. The Admiral and three members of his staff i s oriented about the huge ramifications of TORCH and he realizes the importance of his task. pointed to ward now-defunct ROUNDUP, s rapidly decreasinge i In vi ew of this, the Admiral says he will not oppose wit hdrawal of t he unit provided it is not done bef ore the amuhibi ous trai ning is more or less completed. G eneral Clark say s the unit probpbiy will not be 9ulled before November 1. Ad.mid. Bennett is told by Genera l Clar k that if the entire amphib ious brigade is needed in TORCH that he would have to take it but that he would not unnecessarily cr ippl e the current traini ng program in Ir eland . Genera l Ryder is ca lled in during the naval conference and he explains that he want s a naval officer to work with him in coordinating naval and military operati~ns during the l anding . Admiral Bennett promis e s to provid e an off i ce r. General Clar ·k i s told that the four naval officers tha t will accompany his advance gro up to Gib r a lt ar on D minus 3 will be Adm ral Bi eri , Captain Wright, i a communic~tions officer and one other off ic er. Admiral Cunningham, t he TORC H naval comm ander • will es t ablish his ba se in Gibr a lt ar a imut the same date. In outlin ing TORCH the navy m , General Cl a.r k tells Admiral Bennett: to en 1 We re now in t he thr oes of child birth. Serious trouble has ar is en over shipping, e.ir support , na.val escort, logistics. These have been great burdens and they are still on our backs . It lo oks , however, as though we have our head s above wate r now. 11 11 ( ' • LONDON, SF.J>T.15 , 1942--As the Targ et Date, cux·rently set as Novembe 4, r d.r ews closer and closer all problems of TORCH,save one- -logistics--seem to be cliiifying sa.tisfactorily . Loom ing ever bigger and bigger as a. threat to the success of the major move to defe a t the Axis is the snarled condition of sup:i,:,ly . General Eisenhower calls in all his high -r E<rJ.dn general toda.y: Generals g Clark . Lee and. Spaatz . He t alks fra.nkly to each of them about the pro~lems , but the re a l reason for the meeting--the r eason for \,h ich Genera l Eisenhower st aged the confer ence - - is to point out to Lee ths ,t the confused situati on on logistics must be clarified immediately . Just how much supply is available in the United · Kingdom for TORCH must be determined quickly and accurately . 11 Thi s thing is going off, definitely, and we'r e going to have to go in their if we have to go in armed with nuts and bolts instet=td of guns an d bullets General Clark declares . uwe•ve all got to realize that an early November date must be met and those boys can't go in their barehanded . " ( ," Later , Gene1·al Lee comes ever to confer with General C1a:rk who tells the SOS general of his 11 ap·prehension over the ability of the SOS to perform its mission . 11 The Deputy Comrr.a ,nder-in-Chief se.ys he r ea lizes how terribly difficult the SOS j ub is and e.dds that his only criticism is that he can ' t get definite answers to specific questions en what the quantities are on vital items-- ammun:ltion . spa.re parts , maintenance su.:p lies--wj thin the United Kingdom a,nd ju.st p what n.ru-st be rushed over from the UnHed Stat e s . �The conference is later joinAO- by Colonels Sa tzmtm and Adcock and Genera ls La1·kin and Gruenther. The group discusses detailed requis i tions which are being submitted to the II Army Corps to cover supplies which should arrive at OrBn on the D-lt convoy fr om the United Kingdom and the D-7 convoy from the United States. A total of 50 .000 tons can be handled by the port of Oran from both convoys and it is therefore im1Je ,tive that Gener al Lee determine whet proportion of this rs 50,000 t ons can be supplied from here so the War Department can be instructed as to the sui-;I)lief> which will have to ae dispatched from the United States direct to Oran on the D-7 convoy . General Lee sa.id he was confident he could furnish the breakdown of the 50 , 000 ton shipments i n the lfvery near future . " General Lee is ~lso instructed to answer categoric a lly questions submitted oy General -Gale ", :1 in a memorandum on 11 Ability of SOS to meet Initial Supply Demands. 11 Gale asks to have a Deputy in his over-el l org anization , an America .n to help him work on the supply bottlenecks that are developing . He says it is i)!q_uite impossible" for hiir. to keep up with all the detdls of planning for the supply of three task forces . Gale , in duscussing U. S. participation in the Algiers force , says he hopes supply requirements for these units can be met from SOS in the United Kingdom. He says he does not , as yet , have complete inforre a tion. ( The problem of giving the 1st Division combat teams the necessary amphibious tr a ining , yet , getting to the troops their fighting equipment is discussed by Genere.l Clark with Genere,l Allen and his Chief of Staff , Colonel Co~ .. Generals Rooks and Lemnitzer also sit in on the conferf-lnce . Genere,l Allen suggests that tte troopb go into training in Scotland, return to Tidworth and get their equipment , then r et urn to Scotland . G eneral Clark vetoes the idea, saying he sympathizes with the division 1 s problem of issue and loading but that he feels strongly that "we shouid take full advantage of all O rtunities ?po to train the regimental combat teams as fully as possible." He rules that a strong cadre , under the second in co mmand remain at Tidworth to µ- epa:re the equipment for shipment and , get it to the port of embcrkation. In that way, the cowbat teams can concentrate on amphibious training without inter~~ption . The TORCH force will load in the Firth of Clyde region . General Ryder and his staff come in to present , to Generals Clark a nd Eisenhower , the new Chief of Staff of Allied Force Headquarters , Brigadier General W B. Smith, and Generals Gruenther Rnd Lemnitzer . detailed e,ccount of how they pl an to assault Algiers . Working in front of huge maps in General Clark 1 s office , the enti1e 'Algieis plan is reviewed . General Clark says it looks "very satisfactory . 11 General Clark has General Ryder rems.in to stress to hir'l 11 that the capture of Algiers and its adjacent airports nmst take complete preced11 ence ove:r nny effort to capture Bougie . General Clark decla1·es that this 11secondc.ry mission , 11 for which a strong demand is made by General Anderson , 11is to be unciertaken only after the capture of the primary objective--the Algiers re,gion. 11 a Sandwiched in between the;;e all-:lmportant cor,ferences are meetings on more minor , but still highly important , matters . Gene r al Matejka reports that the British have agreed to the establishment of a connection on the Gibr1-1 .ltar-London cable . This line will run directly into 20 Grosvenor Sq_us • se a t of the .re European Thcetc r of Operations of the U. S. Army. It will connect directly with the TORCH operati ons room at Gibr altcr . Matejka says the com uuni cations problem at Algiers is lflss troublesome than at Ore.n. Communications with the convoy coming from the States will be th.ro 1.1gr. United States channels as long as possible for security reasons. It will be possible to commu icate with all convoys afloa .t n di:rectly from Gibraltnr . Major Philli:9s is ma.de public rde .tions officer of J �Allied Force Headquarters and instructed by Gent~·el Clark to outline the entire public relations program . He will operate, consecutively , at Norfolk House here , Gibr altar and Algiers . A fe\/ correspondents will be flown to Gibraltar and a limited number will accompany the assault forces . Phili~ps will also outline censorship propose .ls and determine who will be the field P.R . O. s with the Oran and Algiers forces . Du.ring the early phases , he will not have to concern himself with :press relations of the Casable .nca fo r ce since it is coming directly to the attack from the United States . Colonel Snwbridge , the headquarters G-1, has gone into the matter of r~placement~ for the task forces and reports the matter seems sa,tisfactory . • • • LONDON, SEP'EMBR lb , 1942--Robert Murphy, a rawboned, redhee,ded Stete DeE partment career officer who will be the key political man in North Africa prior to and during the initial phases of TORCH arrices under an alias from the United , States to get his final instructi ons before returning to Africa. ( I From t he airport he is whisked to a hideaway where he confers with Genera ls Eisenhower and Clark , Ambassador Winant , Bri gad i er Mockler-Ferryman , Mr. Mack and Averill Harriman . The most startling news brought by Murphy is th at President .Roosevelt has drafted a letter for a,lrnost imm ate delivery to the Fz·ench in edi which he tells them 11we 1 re coming into North Africa at an early date . " The letter 1 of which Murphy has a copy , does not reveal any det a ils . It is cleverly hazy, making it appear that the assault wil l come anywhere from next week to next s1)rir.g . It proposes that French General Gir a,ud be made Commander-1-n-Clief of all troops , with the French naturally included. The President hS~i~ ioy~H-fnein and head up everything--military , political , dvil and monetary . General Clark believes it is "da ngerous to let them know ahead of time a.bout the operation unless we are assured the North African French will come a long with us. If they are going to do so it should be hnndled through diplomatic channels and we should move in immediately . " The general remarks that Murphy 11 has a rattlesnake by the tail. 11 He describes him as a good , keen fellow but lacking in military background . 11 Murphy, who has not been in North Africa fo r several weekA a.nd .who will be returning to the United States so he cap fly to Africa fr om there, believes t he French will resist for only 48 hours and then C!tpitulate to the assaulting force . Murphy feels that upon his return to Africa he con organize groups tha .t can seize coast defense batteries, re,dio anci telegraph stations , new&po,pers, and sensitive points of communications and other key objectives . TORCH G-3 wil l p-epare a list of th~se objectives for seizure or destruction prior to or on D-d.ay. T"nese will list , th~ desired priorit y of destruction . Before the five hour meeting with Mr. Murphy, General Clark ca.11s in Mr. Mack so t hey can go over the poli tical situation. The general pl an to return to Washington within 10 days and he \1ants to t ake back e. complete report on the politic a l phases of TORCH Mr. Mack said he believed President Roosevelt's . message guaranteeing the integrity of French North Africa providing there is no resistance should be nelivered to General Juin, top-ranking general in that region . Mack says that Juin will not have control of the navy and it probably will start shooting. He believes Jui n 1 s reaction . upon receiving the President's note, will be that he has orders to defend and defend he must , or , that he will ask for tiwe to report to his government. Mack believes Murphy can handle Ji~in but that it might be necessary to have a military plenipotentiary standing by so that �either the C0moonder-tn-Chief or his deputy can go to him for consultatioh. maek also suggests i.that Juin might be flown to either General Eisenhower or General , Clark . Murphy, the general stresses, mu.st observe military action very c~os~l! when he returns to Africa a.nd keep Al lied Headquarters fully advised. ~enetal 1...r . Ola.rk points out that some system must be worked out so Murphy can send signals to the fleet to let it know whether or not it should start bombardment to knock out coaste.l batteries and other installations. TORC leaders are .convinced the H attack will not be R suprise. ( The enti:t'e political i:Jhase of TORCH canvassed. Vari ous methods of psyis chological warfare, including the use of airplanes equ ipp ednwith loud speakers , enroloyment of aerial sky writers, use of fireworks and leaflets, are discussed. Th; text of leaflets to bo dropped over Algiers , Oran and Casablanca depends on what President Roosevelt's m essage includP-s. General Cl ark suggests that it might be wise to attach coupons to the leaflets , the coupons to be turned in to some Allied head quarters for rations or cash. Certificates written in Arabic are being prepared to instruct natives who might surround crashed pilots that , if they return them unharmed to American military offici als, they will receive a certain amount of money. General Clark also suggests that booty be stored in warehouses to it can be passed out to native leaders to get their support or SY!l)111B,thy. The air support problem apparently is ironed out satisfactorily, leaving logistics as the only major TORCH hurdle. British and American views on the air operat ion are now harmonious and Air Commodore Sanders proposes to outline the entire di1·ective for final ap1rova ,l . Colonel Vandenberg reports that he and Sa.nders are in 11 full agreement 11 about pl a n strength and uses and that he believes arrangements for the da iv ery of ess enti a l ground supplies to air forces at Oran an~.casablanca are satisfactory. Sanders is told by General Clark th a t he plans to ..ttineral Doolittle at Gibralt a r since the Commander-in-Chief must have an a ir man at his side to advise him as the fighting progresses. Air commanders will be appointed and assigned to the three assa ult forces. ( The supply problem, \-A. time of the essence in deciding it , grows more th and more tangled. An SOS cable on sup ply shortages is held up because the list includes shortages for units not set up for the TORCH force. General Clark says the cable "would only further confuse the alre ady muddled supply situati on." Anyway, the requisition could not be filled in time for TORCH ding which begins loa October 5. Colonel Hughes is told of the instru.c t ions given yesterday to General Lee but Hughes is not cle ar as to wha t Lee is doing about it. Later Colonel Hamblen is called in and Gener a l Cla rk explains that 11 now pl a n to get such we maintenance supplies a s we can from the United Kingdom and ask for shipment of the remainder direct to destination from the United States. This seems desirable even if it r e sults in some overloading of port capacity. There is a possibility a few extra ships involved might be staged at Gibr a l ta r until berths can be found for them in the ports of Elestinati on. 11 ~ Possible use of a British Ma rine outfit, '4l.ich hi!s been sugge sted by the Prim e Minist er, is discuss ed by Gener als Clark and ~ruenther and Brig a dier Whiteley . The British officer is told that it is desirable to get the marines r eady for possible use by D-bO and th a t it would be u sed with artillery and paratro ops t o attack Sa rdinia and Sicily if the oper a tion develops suffi ci ently. When Whiteley shows appr ehensi on about use of the Marines, thi nking they might 11 replace anoth er out f it, Gener a l Clar k tells him they constitute ace i n the hole" and th eir u se is 11 very indefinite." an �7 General Ryder reports that the logistics problem for Algiers seems to be coming along satisfactorily. He is investigating the possible use of British ammunition and spare parts to make up shortages. He is W)rried about the continuity of U.S. command and is told to appoint Gener al Porter as his Deputy Commander so that command would pass to Porter automatica.lly in the assault phase. General Clar k exple .ins that the col7l1!'.e.nd definitely is to be American until General Anderson takes over. Captain Wright of the U.S. Navy comes in to discuss naval matters and says he is convinced the Straits of Gibraltar cannot be kept open if we hold only the south side, General Clark tells him it is the opinion of Sea Lord Pound that some convoys could be put through under those conditions but that if Gibraltar airfield and ha:lbor is bombed early in the operation before we develop enough force to move into Spanish Morocco , the Str aits will be closed and TORCH forces will be dependent on communications over the overland route from Casabl anca to Oron. A plR.n to cover this contingency is being worked out. • General Lemnitzer 1 s G-3 section is instructed today to keep in mind the necessity of preparing alternate plans to meet the following contingencies: closing of the Straits by Axis entry into Spain or hostil ~ action by Bpain herself; Axis or Spanish bombing of Gibr a ltar prior to D-day because 11due to the congested condition of the field all our airplanes might well be destroyed;" what should be done in case weather conditions ~e it impossible to land through the surf; the possibility of c simultaneous attack by British troops from Malta against Tunis on D-day; possible 11Tx,c;Jan Horse 11 tactics that might assist in the B,t tacks . ( • LONDON,SEPTE MBER 17, 1942--To circumv ent , at least partially, some of the ever-more-crucial TORCH supply pro~lems , General Clark rules that equipment held by troops that will not participate in the N0 rth African operation can be taken from them and put in the hand.b of the Oran Task Force . General Rooks is instructe.d to "get whatever you can for the assi,.u lting troops and the more com,l,)lcte the better . " General Larkin is called in to report on the progress being mf!.de in preparation of General Lee ' s supply report--concerning the breakdown of the 50 , 000 tons for the D.l and D.4 donvoys. As usual , the report does nothing but confuse the situation. General Clark tells Larkin that 11th e SOS sin:ply is not fulfilling its obligati ons . 11 He streGses that it is imperative that TORCH planners have a report showing just what is available in the United Kingdom for these h·o initial convoys and what items must be shi9ped immediately from the United States to fill in the ammunition , maintenance and other supply gaps . ( Admira.l Lyster of the British navy, a salty, colorful officer who will comJ?l.and all aircra .ft carriers in the Mediterranean during TORCH,comes in to explein his setup and make three interesting proposals to General Clark . He believes that at least 12 Spitfires should be detailed to be flying over Oran at the time our tro ops land so that they can begin using the two Oran airports just as soon as the Oran force seizes them. He suggests that it would be wiser to lose 12 planes instead of an aircraft carrier and thAt these land-bas ed aircraft will be better able to support ground troops than his can·ier-based plnnes . When the Spits reach -- �Ore.n they will he.ve enough fuel to le st two and ,::,hn:!.f hcurs. If the airports are not taken in that time , the fighter planes will have to land on the desert and trust to luck . Admiral Lyster also recorunends that TORCH lePders te.ke steps to procure an 18-e.cre graveyard on Gibrel tar. He we .nts to 11 ough the dead under" so the area pl for dispersing the 175 planes that will be crowaed on Gib airport ce.n be extended. 11 The living and the dead must make their contribution , " says the Admiral . Although he says he knows he is "getting out of my field, 11 Admiral Lyster propoun ds a theory of 11exploit, exploit, exploit" e.fter the or.ieration star·ts . He says we 11n.1st be ready to exploit the l anc ing and drive eastward at the greotest possible .speed. 11nt all costs . " He believes that troops on Malta--4,000 to 5,000, supported by fighter planes, should move from Ma te. in an attack on Tunis that would be l si¼!)ultaneous with our attacks on Oran, Casablanc a and Algi erE< .He offers to contribute 18 planes that would drop dummy parachutists to divert and confuse the opposition at Algiers . He suggests that it might be wise to etrip some of the bombers and 11stuff them with soldie rs'' so the drH'e to the eastward can be exploited . The Admiral is proceeding tonight to the Firth of Clye where some· of his units will engage in col!!bined operations tr eining and prepare for departu1·e of the huge armada that will make up the TORCH Mediterranean invasion force. ( The staff in Norfolk House is growing constantly. Today the permanent Chief of Sta.ff, Brig ad ier Gener al W B. (Bedel) Smith, reports in and star·ts . operating in the office next tc Genera .l Clark ' s . General Gru.enther becomes Deputy Chief of Staff . Other offices are filling up . Eight geopolitical erperts have arrived from the Unitf .d States . Gener a.l Doolittle returns from a ir plans conferences in Washington and Ger-eral Clark calls him in almost immediately. The air general is pleased with progress but tells General Clark he is going to do some "house cleaning " in his personne l to get stripped for ac tion. Genera .l Clark stresses to Doolittle • \~ho is qu:'.. an individt18list . 11the absolute necessity te for teamwork and cooperation with the British." Doolittle is inst ructed §o go over the TORC air dirPctive H with Air Com modore Sanders . Gener e.l Noce, over from the United States to inspect the J)re : a.redness of p the Engineer Amphibious Brigade, reports to General Clnrk that•!s pleased with the training the unit is receiving . The brigade is going to be used as shore parties and as port batt alions . General Clai·k informs him that he hopes to retain the landing craft used in the assault in the N0 rth African theater and later utilize the boat regiment to operate these cr uft in coastc.l sup~oy movements . l Noce praises the ability of the maintenance company which he says is ahead of the lia.vy in keeping landing ere.ft fit . Gener a l Clark tells him he has decided to leave the maintenance company on its present Joo in Scotland until November when it will pack up and prepare for movement to the T.a.RCH theater . "'c • LONDON SEPTEMBER , 1942-- A convoy crisis arises today to complicate the , 18 al r eady snarled TORCH supply picture and immediately all the resources of General Clark and his big staff a.re thrown into the bre ach to sol ve it. How many "battles " must be fought i n offices before the real battles start ! The U.S . Navy has decided that the maximum number of shi p s it can convoy safe l y from the United States directly to the African theater, arr i ving D- 6 , is 20 . This means el i minati on of the D- 6 convoy that was to carry a.11 t he gasoline �\.½9 that was scheduled for the Oran Air li'orce. A total of 8,000 tons of cargo would be unavailable and it is of vital import a nce . The Navy decision would also eliminate 3,008 aviation signal troo p s and 5,000 II Army Corps personnel. What the cable really means , says Gener al Clar k , "is that the schedule for convoys on whi ch everybody has agreed is all torn up. 11 Colonel Hamblen is instructe d to draft a re ply advising Washington of the seriousness of the situation. Meanwhile, the staff begins looking for a way to circuvent this new crisis . To balance the new and gloomy development on the nightmarish supply probl em, the air problem is straightened satisfactorily now as General Doolittle reports his ap proval of Air Com modore Sanders plan •• And Sanders agrees to enlargement of the plan to include the strategy of having 12 Spitfires circle over Oran so they can use the Oran air fields as soon as they can be seized on the morning of the assault . The possible sacrifice of the Spitfire--which will result if their ga soline run s out before they can la .nd. on the airdromes--is necessary in order to be ready to strengthen th~ weak carri er -borne support. The first of a series of tri-week ly TO RCH 8ombined Staff meetings is held today in Norfolk House and they pro bably will continue from now until the time the staff is re ady to depart, by air to Gibraltar and by ship to Oran and Algiers , for the opening of the _Second Front. { ( General Eisenhower, the Colllli'ander-in-Ch ief , presides at the long, green, cloth - covered tabl e . At his ri gh t sits General Clark, the Deputy Commander, and on his left the Chief of Staff, General Smith. The huge rectangular table , covered with pads and pencils, as htrays and place cards for each officer, is surrounded by every key man in TORC with the exception of General Patto n, head H, of the Western Task Force who is planning the Casablanca assault in the United States. The officers inc lude: British Gene ral Anderson whose task it will be to drive ea stward from Algiers to take Tunis; Air Marshall W elsh, Air Commodore Sanders and General Doolittle, who· will have charge of a ir operati ons ; Admiral Burrough of the British Navy and Captain W right, repr es enting Admiral Bieri of the United States Navy; Gener al Ryder, who will lead the Algiers assault force: General Rooks, at presenting planning the Oran assault that is presently set for the comma d of Major General Hartle , currently n in Ireland; British Genera l Gale, on whose shoulders falls the responsibility of directing supply operations; Brigadi er Mockler-Ferryman, the trim. mustached Briti sh officer who heads TORCH intelligence; Mx· Mack, the political . affairs advisor: and other brigadier generals, brigadiers and col onels who head th e spe ci a l sections in TORCH planning. Most important of these is Brigadier General Lemnitzer, the soft-spoken, blackhaired American who has charge of plans and training for TORCH. Genera l Eisenhower explains that he believes these tri-we ek ly · conf erences will give all of i cers a chance to air their problems , share their views. He explains that Gener a l Clark, after handling org a nization of TORCHsince it was decid ed to make North Afric a the major theater, will be Deputy Comma d er and n fre e of paper w ork once the operati on starts. He explians that General Clark probably will fly into Gibr a ltar three or four days before TORCHis to start and that he (Eisenhower) will be there on the day previous to D-day . . Later, th e Alli ed Force Headquar t ers will be moved to either Algi er s or Oran, de pe nding on conditions but with Algiers preferable. The entire chain of co ffilllc~ is explained nd a nd Gene r a l Ei se nhower .9 oints out that since TORCHi s essentially an all-Am erican opc rati oni' it was deemed wise to have Am ricans fill e the key spots . General Eisenhower wil still re ta in his post as Commander of the Europe a n Thea ter of Ooera tions, designating a depu t y ju s t before he depar t s for Gibraltar. This ret ~ntion �a / of comm nd will make it possible a for TORCHto ha ve priority on any replacements that might be wanted from the United Kingdom. Later, two theaters of operations might be set ~u:p--one for the European Theater and the other for Africa. General Eisenhower tells the British and Americans gathered in the now smoky room that differences in staff pr ocedure have caused difficulti es but that it was thought best to proceed on the American plan. After · he has made a survey of the general situation, Eisenhower asks the Brit ish to bring up any problems they face. General Ande rso n asks for definite commitment of the First British Parachute Brigade to his force. He sa ys it will be invaluable in th e drive to the east. Gene r a l Eisenhower says the para troo p s are too valuable to be co mm itted to a spe cific task so long before the operations starts and says their disposition must be 1 p t flexible e to meet demands that might arise. However , he adds , every effort will be pointed toward aiding Gene ral Anderson's overland drive from Algi e rs to Tunis. f Air Marshall Welsh says the greatest da nger to the TORC convoy is going to H be from submarines and he asks the opportunity of having an anti -submarine air unit bas ed at Oran. He wants to put gasoline and depth charg ( s for this work aboard the Oran convoy but all space on this convoy has already been taken. Ge neral Eisenhower says that a surv ey will be made to determine what sacrifices will have to be made to ge t this anti -sub marine materiel aboard. Wels h also wants to have a squadron of U.S. P-38s based at Gibr a ltar so they can fly to Algiers the morning of the attack to sup9 ort ground troops. He says the Algiers aircraft carriers will be within range of Axis planes based on Sardinia. The P-38s Hould be equi pp ed with belly pe trol tan..1-<:: they could return to Gib ra.l tar. This brings s so up the subject of overcrowding of aircraft at Gibralter and Welsh says present pl a ns call for 175 p1anes on that vulnerable field with a study being made to se e if 200 an't be jamm in, particularly ed if the 18-acre graveyard can be graded and utilized . After discussing a multitude of subjects raised by vari ous phases of TORCH, General Eisenhower breaks up the meeting, calling th e next one for Monday noon. He and General Clark then go into a long conference in Clar k's office. The Deputy Cornnand er has, as he described it, 11 ant s in my pants . 11 He asks if he can't take over command of th e Ora n Task Force. This operat i on is running into the most organiz a ti on and supply snags and Gen er al Clark wants to plunge directly into it . He also wants to be closer to the front when the fighting starts. Gener a l Eisenhower, after long argument, discourag e s him, saying that no one can f ill his present post and th a t he has the most fundamental knowled ge of all officers involved in TORCH. The plans and training secti on is drawing up a lt ernate plans for Patton's Casablanca force in case it is unable to land because of surf A number of alternatives will be pro vided but they probably will call Western Task Force to land inside the Medite rr anean. These plans must by next Wednesday when General Clark plans to leave for Washington to final conf erence on TORCH and take a last l ook at th e org enization of force. ( General conditions. for the be ready have a Patt on's General Doolittle comes in to oppo se Welsh 1 s pro posal th a t an anti-sub air iqu adron be based at Ora n. Doolittle feels th e British are unwilling to make r oom in their own Algie s convoy and want to saddle the Oran group with the equi pment. He also opp oses W elsh 1 s plan to pu t a squadron of P-3 8s on Gibraltar �I I I I~ I ( ; so it can fly to Algiers to sup port tha.t attack. Doolittle says he does not want that many P-38s at Gibraltar bec au se of the danger of a bombing attack, th<tt the P-38s are ha.lf again as big as Spitfires and will take more of th e already crowded aircraft space , a nd the P-38s would ha.veto dtro p their be lly tanks once they got into combat and. hence would not have suf f icent fuel to return to Bibraltar. In evaluating th~ British and Am erican views on air operatio ns, Doolittle points out to Gener al Cla rk that the Am ericans want overwhelming sup~~iority of air sup.l1o while th e British rt want the minimum. He says the British want to bolster their own air sup port by drawing fro m the U. S. force a~d he vigorously opposes such a withdrawal, declari ng the British argument is f alla cious--that each attacking force should su9port itself. After o Jerations have developed , Gener al Clark plans to pool the air support for most ex ped itious use. Strange things develo p in planning warfare and Colon el Wilbur, G-2 on y General Patton's force presents a qu ee r factor tha.t may carry gre a t weight in deter m ining the final assault date •• Wilbur, who has spe nt some ti me and study in North Africa, re ~orts that the Moslem religi on must be taken into consi uer ation since it proh ibits any warfare during the 11th and 12th months. He says November 10 would be the final date to open a campaig n without offending the Moslems . He believes the Axis would propagandize our flaunting of Moslem customs should we attack l ate r than November 10. He re port s great care must be taken to prevent damage to the sacred Moslem cities of Raubat and Sa le. ( A periscopic reconnaissance of the Mediterranean shore prior to D-day now ap~ears practic able . General Gruenth er r epo rts to Gene ral Clark that inv e stigati on sho ws a crew can make sketch es and get valuable photographs. Gruenther also re ports that use of the Royal Marines has be Fn a pp roved and that they are to go into ren ewed tr nining immediat e ly und er direction of Commando officers. The 1st Armored Force, Gruenther says , has given u p insisting on M-4 tanks bec ause it is now too late for them to arrive in time. GenE: ral C1e.rk in:.tructs that a cable be sent to the War Department explaining why the Arm ored Force will ge going over the bea.ch es · in light tanks only. Gener a.l Gale r epo ts that th e 1st Armored can not be loaded at Belf as t bec ause of li mited dock facilit+es. The loading of troops and materiel aill be done at Liverpool. All gear is scheduled to be packed and loaded by October 6. • • • LONDON,SEPTEMBER 19, 1942--The tentative assault date for TORCH has now be en m oved back to November 8. This will be the d.B recommended by Generals .te Clar k and Eisenhower when they confer with Pri u1e Minister Churchill at Checkers Sunday night • { Principal reason for push i ng the proposed date back four days is to give more time f or troo p s to get their equ i pment, more time for loa din g , more time to attempt to get additional ammunition ann spare parts for guns, more time to smooth out kinks in convoy schedules. The delay results pri~.arily from one cause--the problem of logistics . General Clark calls in most of his key officers and all of them a.re plea .sed that they will heve four more highly valuable days to get all phases of TORCH a firmer footing. on �( The dange r ous situati on resulting from yesterday's cable changing the convoy situation is gone into thoroughly with General Holmes , British Director of Mo vements , and Generals Gale and Smith . All agreed that the best thing to do is send Washington a cable saying that the urgent D.6 material must come i n five fast ships to the UK to join the sec ond fast convoy arriving in the Mediterranean from the Unit ed Kingdom. If this is not possible , the U.S. Navy will have to enlarge the fast D.6 conv oy from th e U.S. to Africa , the convoy that the Navy ' wants to limit to 20 shi p s. Gene ral Smith , who was formerly in Washington attending conferences where he learned the Navy's attitude on convoys , tells Gneral Cl a r k he believes the navy , und er the above circumstances , will enlarge the conv oy sine~ it has its protest on the record ana. thus will escape res ponsibility. General Clark says the D.6 supply must be moved into Oran 11 any cost." at General Holme s says the change in D-da,y will make it possible to set back the loading date from Sep tember 26 to 30 and although he maintains that Btill 11tight makes the loauing situation , 11 it gives a margin of safety. He adds it is difficult to plan the convoy until he knows the schedule and ton nage of ships ' co ming from the U.S. to join t he first UK-M editerranean follow-up convoy. Russian convoy "PQ. 11 got through with the loss of only 11 of the 50 ships - 18 a remarkable record . Holmes believes Pri me Minister Churchill will order "PQ.19 11 to sail Sep tember 23. It is Holmes belief that the Prime Minister will then decide to move the target date back to as l ate as November 15 so the 11PQ. 19 11 escort can be used in TORCH . ( General Cl ark learns that the change from a 20 to a 25-day cycle for U.S. convoys to the Medit err a nean will probably mean that conv oys from the U.K. will have to "sweeten " the supplies for U.S. forces at Oran and Algiers . The British believe they can swell their conv oys to take care of this contingency. Holmes points to the necessity of having firm loading plans. He says 18 of the British First Army's ships are aln ;ady loaded in detail but th a t last night he was ordered by the British General Sta f f to restow 15 of th em. If everything goes right, Hol mes is convinced he can have the convoys on schedule for the November 8 date. The convoy cable is ap p roved by General Clar k and it offers two alternatives. 1--se nd five ships to the U. K. so they can fit directly into the second U.K.Medi terr anean conv oy , or, 2--enlarge the conv oy sailing di r ect from the U.S. to Oran . Genera l Clark 1 s cable poin ts out "that the most practical solution ap :;;i ears to be to have the navy enlarge its Oran convoy regardle ss of increased hazard.s, 11 General Al len of the 1st Division retu~ns from an ins pe ction tri p to Scotland and re port s that the 1 8th combat team is excellently trained, with the exception . of one company. The 18th is to move from Toward t o the Glasgow region on Septe m be 21. It will be repl a ced e.t the amphibious training base by the 16th which \;ill have its sp ecial assault training from Sept ember 24 to October 2. The 168th is moving out of the Inveraray base tomorrow and the 26th will take its place . This third combat team of the 1st Division will take amphibious tr aining until Sep tember 30 . Special r econna iss Bnce and Ranger units will get amphibious training in conjunction with the 16th and the 26th regiment al comba.t teams .Allen says postponement of D- day until November 8 will give his troops more time to assemble th eir equipment. He said he has figured from th e start that his division will go into combat only 70 pe rcent equipped bec ause of the supply mudd.le.He adds that his as sa ult troops will go in with 75 mm howitzers and that re se rve battalions will use the 105s . �\ r The Oran f orce set - up is discussed with Generals Rooks and Lemnii zer . :B ece.use of th e lack of shipping space , Rooks i s in s t ruct ed by General Cla r k to use l i gh t transportat i on , el iminating 2 1/2 to n trucks as much as pos cible . The 1st Arrn o1·cd comb team m t be re duced to two light - tank battalions at us and one medium-tank ba;talion b- caus _ of the ballup on ~h1pmen~of M4s. Tiie armored t roo ps wil l have no sup port i ng anti - ai rcr a ft but t his danger will be m nimi zed i by the out f its mobilit y . Lemni t zer is plea sed about moving D-day back four days sin c e he had figured the Oran t r oop s wou~d not get their equipment in time t o st art l oa ui ng October 8 •. General Ryder , who will command the Algiers assault , r epor t s to Genera l Cla r k tha t hi s ammunition situation l ooks f a ir ly good and that he wi ll have sufficient to "get goi ng ." He has enough hand grenades but i s lacking i n anti t ank mi nes . Gene r al Clark t ells him t o see what can be done about obt aining t hem from the British . Sin ce General Clark i s l eaving fo r Washington eit her next Wednesday or Th ursday so he can di scuss the en tir e operati on face - to - fa ce wi t h Wa and Navy r offic i al s and have a f i nal ch eckup on Gene r al Patton's plans and t roo ps , he calls in two se ction heads. General Lemnitzer is i nstructed to draw up alternate plans for t he Pa tton force so they can be u sed in event the surf conditions make it i mpossib l e to eff ec t t he C asablan ca r egi on landing . I n such an event, Patton's for ce probably wi ll hav e to proceed i nt o the Medit erranean . General Clark also want s to r eturn to the St at e s with the gist of al l politic al plans that have been or are being made. Colonel Hol m is preparing this • es ( • • • LO NDON SEPTEMBR 20, 1942--The big ges t individual , E prob lem of TORCH t hat is of su p}l ying the Oran Tas k Force . Casablanca's logi stics are being ha ndled fro m t he Uni t ea Sta te s direct. The Algiers force , made up on Ameican un i ts t uat have r bee n in t he U nited Kingdom since last s prin g and Britis h tro ops t hat can dra w t he ir su ppl y wit hout trouble since t hey are at th e f ount a in head , i s hav in g a far easi er ti m gettin g equipped for the operati on. e General Clark calls in Generals Lar kin and Gruent her and Colonels Adcock, Hamblen and Niblo to go into s pecific Oran pr ob l ems. The ammu i on an d mai nr~t tenance situation is c , nfused , A dcoc k says the Oran a ss ault f orce wi .L go ashore l with f rrLlI' and a half units of fire. There appears to be sufficient arti lle ry ammuniti on for l .L days but the attackers will be short on . 81 mmm ortars since on~y 10 of the 89 mort ars called for in the a ssault ar e availa bl e fr om SO he re. S No pyrotechnics are availab l e so General Cla r k instructs Col onel Adcock , t he Oran G , to procure t he m for t he air corps . -4 ( 1 Adcock, summing up, says t he Oran sup ply situ at i on i s "in a m ess but i f ev eryt hing com thr ough all ri ght we are going to be ab le t o m t t he lo adin g es ee sche du le. W h the exce ption of certain equi pment and su pply , t here i s goin g to it be en ou gh for the atta ckin g force to go in but r epl eni shment of su pply will be ne eded wi t hin a fe w days . " Adcock says t here ar e two dif f iculti es,:iii "pr epa rin g c onvoys for the Oran assa ult : (1 ) it takes four to si x weeks to "marr y up" equi pment wi t h the troops to which it belon gs, and, (2) th e SOS ha s no sch edul es to s how th e status of what is avai l able here and what is coming fro m th e U.S. SO S manife sts do not snow s pecifica l l y what i s on the way . Guns are here but t he fir e c ontrol mechanisms for many of them hav e not ar r ived. That makes the guns us ele s s. A shi p carr yin g these vital gunsi ghts has been sunk in mid-At la ntic. �,~ \ , .,. 1, It develops at the conference that the U.S. and Britis h convoy sched ul es to the M editerranean are not being integrated and that unle s s something i s done , more ships wil l pile up at Oran that the docks can berth. The Britis h sailing sc hedules are fir m and G eneral Clark instructs Colon el Hamblen to draft a cable i nstructi ng c onvoy offici als in Washin gt on to make th eir schedules dovetail wit h the British. Adcock says if Oran gets a su ppl y c cnvoy on D plus six and the Britis h and U.S. schedules are integrated, the lon g- ran ge su ppl y s it uat i on may clarify. Restituti on of the D pl us six convoy wi l l go a lon g way toward solvin g t he Oran suppl y probl em. A lan ky , husky civilian--Culbertwho wil l be Gerera l Patt on 's "on-s hore" man at Casablanca, arrives from Africa. He does not believe that surf condi ti ons are too severe for t he W tern Task Force lan din g . He thinks the gr eat est danger es to the Casablanca force wi ll be the Fr ench navy. He says one crui se r, 50 destro yers and 20 submarines are in the Casab l anca-Dakar re gi on and pr ed ict s t hey wi l l fi ght unless there is s om chan ge in the political e setu p . Cul bert goes into conf ere nces with pol i tical division of f ici al s. He probab l y wiJ.l acco mpany General Clark back to the States so he can ta lk with Patton before retur ning to Casablanca to make int ern a l preparations for th e attack. \ Alternative plans are bein g prepared for G eneral Pat ton in event hi s base plan is thrown off schedule by surf c ondit ion s. General Clar k bel ieves Patton should have several plans to meet an y c ontin gencie s . He might make a direct fr ontal at t ack on the ports, goin g in wit h a l l t he wars hi ps guns blazin g so he can land at docksi de. To pr epare for any eventuality, G eneral Eisenhower shoul d have several plans he can order Pat ton to execute. General Clar k su ggests: Plan X-sta ll for time in hope that the weather will clear wit hin seven day s; Plan Y - proceed to the Oran area an d have th e co m bat-l oaded troo ps land over the beach es, run some of the conv oy to Gibraltar an d s end t he or ganizati onal outfits t o the U. K. Plan Z- - push insi de· the M editerranean to Phil i ppevi ll e, Bone, Bougi e and any ot her availab le ports. Lenuitzer sug gests the entire Pat ton force might i procee d en toto to the U.K. and be r eady to push off at a momen's notice to t attac k Spanis h Mo rocco if neces sa r y . Plans are goin g ahead for the traini ng of Britis h paratroopers. General Clark says "we must exp l oit eve-ry opportunit y t o use parachute or a ir-borne tro ops as s oon after D-day as possi ble . Our readine s s to do so might be of critical i mpo rtance in furt herin g General Anders on's advance." In a ll proba bilit y the 64th U. S. Tra nspor t Group will tr a in wit h t he British paratro oper s . General Clark points out that it is esse nt ia l t o hav e the American pilots and t he Britis h jumpers lhi:a :in j ointl y prior to ac tual operat i ons. Colon el Bentle y is instructed to provi de t he necessary trans port s for suc h tra in in g . Aft er a lon g conf eren ce wi th air and paratro op of f ic er s it is decid ed to t ake t wo c ompanies of Britis h par atroo ps , ab out 250 jumpers, in to Africa s hort ly after D-day . This number can be lifted by one tr anspor t squadron. Res tricti n the mass f ligh t of British paratroo ps to Africa is the s horta ge of gaso line in th at theater for the r eturn f l i ght so t he pla nes ca n haul down more jumper s. Genera l Clark t el l s Ge neral Doolit tle to be pr epar ed to send an addi t i onal tran sport squadron if an urgent situ at i on develo ps . \ The proposal th at a squ adron of ~58s fl y fr om Gibr al tar to Algi ers on D-day has been vetoed but the scheme to have an anti- subma rine air squadron based at eith er Oran or Algi ers is sti ll bein g c , ns i dered s er i ous ly . If it goes in, it wil l mean t he eJ:inination of one fi ghter group but, if c onv oys run into trouble, ant isub marine planes might be of far more val ue than fi ghting planes . j �General Larkin r eports to General Clark that the chan ged tar get date wil l extend the loa din g time four days. He thinks t hi s wil i give the SOS time to to do its loadin g job. Later in the day, General Larkin com to General Cla.rk 1 s es of f ice to indicate that a lot of buck-pas s ing is goin g on in the SOS an d that he wants ·the general to und erstand one of the many rea sons the su p}ly situ ation is so <mfused. Generals Clark, Eisenhower and Smith l eave in the eve ning for Checkers where the y wil l sta y overni ~ht wit h the Pri m M e inister. An i mp ant c onference ort is to be held to m orrow mornin g . * * * I' CHE CKER EN S, GLAND SERTEMBER 1942--November 8 is the date! , 21, , Pri m M st er Churc hil l, apprised of the su ~ply, convoy and gener al TO e ini RCH situation, agrees to exec ution of the North African attack on Novem ber 8. An at t em is going to be made to get General Giroud over to Englan d so t he way pt can be paved for the assault forces to m ove in wit h a m inimum of opposit i on. ( ' M Churchill, expr es s in g disap pointment at the status of TOR and apparent~ r. CH in a ti ght spot because of its shi ppin g complications, is in rare c onvers at ionai form. He wants to know how he is "goin g to tel l Joe" that PQ 19 won't be c om g in through. This, says the Pri m M nister, e i is goi ng to be 11fri ghtful .l. embarra ss in g" y because PQ 18 was a success, with only 15 of the 40,~hips failin g t o rea c l! t he ir destination. He is alarmed that U.S. tro op arrivals in t he Unite d Kingdom wi ll have to be cut down. He now sa ys t hat he can't r ememb ever agge eing to TOR er CH being the bi g oper ation, substit utin g for RO UNDU He now wants to start plan ning P. for JUNIPER-the plan callin g f or an attack on Norway. Churc h ill walks peripateeicall y aroun d th e r oom as he talks. One m oment he i s stridin g in fr ont of the Britis h and Americ an officials and th e next he has hopped onto the heart h of t he fire place and is warmin g his back, ru bbi ng the heat into it with his hands. It 1 s a tou gh ev eni ng and mornin g for t he Ameican r off icers. Lord M ountbatten complains that the U. S. pr m ed to su ppl y smal l landis in g boats and t hat to date onl y e ight have arrived in t he United Kin gdom. Churchi ll believes the Britis h Isle s ar goin g to be t oo li ghtl y defend ed when the a ssa ul t and fol l ow-u p tro ops have gone into the TO H the at er. Next he is pour i ng out RC words on why JUNIPER should be execu ted t his wint er. He need s Nort hern Norw to ay protect t he Russian convoys. The Prime Mini ster debat es out lou d with himself on what to do ab out PQ 19 . If he l ets it go it wi ..1..dela y TORCH l until Novem ber 28. "It's v er y disheartenin g," sa ys the Prime Mini ster, as t hough ta lk in g to hims elf. "I fe el PQ 19 should o thr ough . I j ust can 't te l l Jo e it' s not c oming when his pe ople are bloo dy and dy i ng and holdin g the enemy. PQ 19 i s loaded. I guess I j us t got t a tell Joe ." The Ameican generals s ay not hing but General Clark be l i eves he would l eave PQ 19 set r up r eady to go in ca se anyt hi ng aris es to dela y TO RCH f urther . Genera l Clark in terp r et s Mr. Churchi ll 's r ef ere nce t o TOR not being the CH Sec ond Front opera t ion as a s ly mo by the Pr i m M ve e inister to get JUNIPER star t ed and a s a fulcrum to proce ed la t er on RO DUP He bel i eves Churc hil ~ want s to use UN . Am eric an tro ops at every available point but t hat he i s doi ng i n craf til y by sa ying eac h oper ati ,., is THE major opera tio n. 11We s hou ld be ab l e to rip at n J �(' \ Hitler's mouth (R, UNDUP while we are ri ppi ng 'at hi s bell y (TOR ) CH)," says Churchil l . General Clark believes the real motive of Bhurchi l l is to have TORCH and JUNI PER goi ng at the same time. The conferees, in add i t i on to the Pri m M e inister and the gen erals , inc ~ude Adm iral Cunnin gham, Si r Dudley Pound, Lord Eden, General H olmes and Lord Mo ntbatten. u None of them have say. The Prime M nister is to o ful J. of ideas. The discussion i and naval strate gy a~l over the world. Regarding the buil dup of American troo ps in sugges t s brin gi ng over new U.S. div is i ons (t hose training) without their equipment. They would be and their trainin g would be completed here. They Bri tish divisions. three American Leathers, Ant uony a great dea l to concerns military the United Kin gdom, General Clark with only t he ir 15 weeks basic furnishe d with British equi pment mi< even be fed in with •ht Cburchi L . sa ys he t hinks he W J.l wire Presi dent Roosevelt (" Get a message i off to my boss," is the way the Prime Mini ster puts it) about s om of his ideas. e The Pri m M e inister is elated at the way Russia is fig hti ng . He thinks Stalingrad, where stre et fi ghtin g is now r agin g, wi J.l fal l but he doe· n 't think t ne Russians s wil l crack. When infor med that t he PQ 18 convoy went thr ough so well, Churchill be ams and shouts: "I' 11 bet Joe is droolin g at the mouth over the pac ka ge we delivered to him." / One small incide nt occur s that brin gs out the humanness of the Prime M inister. As the men sit down to dinner, General Cla rk is on the Prime M nis ter 's J.eft. i 1 The butler comes and whispers in the PM s ear and the general overhe ars: "Have you ot y our sh ort s norter card with you , Sir." A s 1 rt s nort er card is a $1 10 bilJ. t ha t trans- Atlan tic air passengers get. If a s u rt sno rt er ca n 't pro duce his au t ographed bi ll , othe r s hort snort ers can co .llect $1 from him. Churc hi i l jumps up fro m his seat and hurries out of the r oom. He re turns , gri nni ng, sits down and then nonchalantly pulJ.S out his bill. "Have a ~l you fe llow s got your s nort s norter cards," he asks trium phantl y . The guests di g wil dly . G eneral Smith is without hi s and it costs hi m $6. Mr. Churchill lau ghs triumphant~y. When General Clark returns he instructs his of f ic ers that November 8 is the dat e "unless somet hin g catastrophic ha ppens and I want J OU to make ever y preparati on f or it on the ba s is th at we ar e g oi ng into action on t hat da t e . TORCH is still the big operati on and it can't be debunked. RetUJ.lling to London in the late afternoon, General Clark finds t hat sh ipp in g authorities in Washington have agreed to send priority items for the D plus 6 TORCH onv oy sent over on from five to seven s hips. General Gruent he r says t hese c s ni ps WiJ.l be able to fit str aigh t into the Bri tish c cnvcy provid i ng t hey are loaded pro perl y . The Britis h are wi l l in g to ta ke the additional ships in th eir convo y . General Ryder re ports on progress in Eastern Assa ult Force plans and he is r athe r opti mist ic. He has built up, because of being in the U.K. longer, a 60-day reserve sup 1, y for the 168th Infantry c ombat team. Jt is all on han d wit h the l exc ept ion of ammuniti on expended w i le the 168t h was t aki ng amphibious training. h He expre sses c onc ern ab out the ammu niti on suppl y for the combat team coming over fro m the U.S. to aid in the Alg iers a ssa ult. It will c ome with 10 units of fire so Genera l Clark instructs 'Ryder to ar ra nge from additional ammuniti on to come from t he SOS of ETO. Ryder inquires concerni ng what the Algi ers forc e will do if �( it · runs in to bad weather arid it can't la nd sinniltaneously wit h t he Oran force. be drawn up to meet t his contin gency . 1m a lt ern at e plan will General Rooks expresses concern ab out the s horta ge of f ire -control equip m ent for t he 1st Divi sion arti l ler y and asks that it be dispatc hed over by air. The equi pment woul d not total a plane load so General Clark sa ys he wi ~l take the matt er up personally when he arrives in W hin gt on. Rooks al so r eports that he now as has a list s howing what shi ps wi l l be available f or the Oran D-day c onvoy and hence he is ab~e to prepare loadin g tables for the Director of M ovem ents. The li st shows that more truc ks than expected can be t ake n. Rooks is enthusiast ic and sa ys that t he onl y t hin g that can now stop t he Oran force is lack of equipment. The air problem is now shapin g up satisfactorily. Ge neral Clark goes over it a gain wit h General Doolittle to stress that nothi ng shoul d be co mmtt ed definit ely i to Casablanca except on order s of t he Com ander-in-C hief. G m ener al Patton will have t he 33rd Fi ghte r Squadron but will get no Spitfires un l ess the 33rd is knocked out of action. Doolit t le is told t hat no paratro ops or hea vy bombers ar e t o go t o Casablan ca initial l y . General Clar k instructs G eneral Lemnitzer to prepar e a list of fjft. h column activities to be underta ken in Africa prior to D-da y . It wi ll s how the prio rity of fift h column missions--assassinations, smizure of forts, ra dio stati ons, public ut i ~i t ies, brid g es, etc.-in eac h of th e assa ult areas. It will be t aken to W sh in gton so M M a r. urphy ca n eva l uate it, ta ke to Africa, t hen infor m co mman ders what can be acco mp lished and what can not. * * * , LONDON SEPTE!IIB 22 , 1942 - - Be c ause of the absence of Generals , ~R Clark and Eis0nhower at Checkers yesterday , the regu l ar General Staff Conference was postponed until today . The new D- day -- Novemb e r 8 -- and rreans of expanding TORCH to make it more certain of suc c ess are discussed . General Eisenhower says November 8 is now the day and that nothing - - not even the Hussian convoys - -will be allowed to stand in the way of TOR CH. The only ossibili ty of chani;i;e will be i f President Roose v elt finds the date objectionable . General Eisenhower declares that the proposal of hiwing troops from Mal ta atta c k Tunis on D- da.y must b e re - exam.Lned . He belie v es such a force might be the deciding bat t a li on in TORCH He says that Admir al Cunningham is c onvinced one . Br itish brigade might make this atta ck whi ch c ou l d either be a direct threat of a fient to draw troops away f rom ot her regions where heavier l andings will be made . " I f th i s th i ng fa i ls , " says General Ei senhower , "Mal ta goes anyway . It 1 s a good samble . 11 The subje c t of the anti - subm ,,rine pa t rol at Oran c omes up again de c lares the problem boils down bas i cal l y to one fa.ctor -- which will ha v e the mor e importan t mission : the anti - sub planes or the fiter squadron it wi ll repla c e . Bo th tasks are highly i mportant . General Cl ark says he believes the best solution is to put both air unit s in and then have the Cormnand3r·- i n - Chief' decide whi ch will use the available av iation gasoline . Other t opi c s that come up at the mee t ing include : the use of �\5 U. S . Navy shore personne l at the port of Oran , coordination of naval air commands under the Commandt r-in - Chief , whether of not a bombing attack on Crete on D- da y wouldn ' t be a good ruse to draw Axis fighters from the Algiers region . \ The meeting , as did the first one , evolves into a roundtable 11 discussion in which the leaders of TORC discuss their problems . General Eisenhower again stress e s that he wants the men to bring their difficulties and ideas to either General Olark or himself . He says there can be no holding back; that there must be complete con fidence and cooperation . He promises to pass the officers ' ideas along to the Prime Minister . { . After' the conf erence , officers who have parti ci pated are called in to discuss particular items brought out in the round - table dis cussion . Commodore Douglas - Pennant gives General Clark a diagramatic view of the naval plan and then the two men plunge into the anti - sub air squadron poser . Douglas-Pennant believes the antl-sub outfit c ould operate with g reater strik:i,ng force if it is based at Oran . After the operation de v elops another anti - sub squadron will go into Algiers . Following this , General Clark calls in Air Marshall Welsh and after the British airman has explained all details of the pro p osed plan , General Cla rk decide a tha t the anti - sub outfit should go into Oran . In order to conserve car g o space and less en the problem of getting fighting equipment across the Oran beaches , Welsh agrees to have the squadron fly in as many depth charges as possib le . The anti - sub squadron and the fighter squadron will both • g o into Oran . However , they will have to share the same gasoline and the Oommander in -Chief wil l de c ide which planes should be in use at what times . Gene na l Larki n and Gruenther confer with General e1 ark conc ern ing what equipment must be loaded aboard the five vessels being rushed from the United States to the United Kingdom to join the British convoy to Oran . The vessels must cane pro perly loaded because they will fall in with the British ships and pro ceed to the Mediterranean almost immec.ua w ly . Unles s SOS gets straightened out on just what ammunition is available in the U. K. , General Cl ark says same of it wi ll have to come over with the five vessels , then taken off and distributed to troops for c ombat loading . I n ord er to be certain the U. S. Army- Navy is set for the Oran operat im , Gener al Cl ark cal ls in Gener al Rooks and Admiral Bennett . Gener al Ola rk stress e s that the car go priority for Oran must be for combat troops and tells Admir al Bennett to coordina te his sup p ly thrmgh Generals Rooks and Lar kin . The Navy will f rnish the Oran shore parties , the beach personnel and the port personnel . The question of what the Oran Task Poree should do if weather prohibits exe cuti on of its operation and Gaptain Wright suggests a landing on the Balearic Islands . An Alternate plan for the Center Task Force will be developed soon . The alternate plan that General Eis enh ower will g ive General Patton in case he runs into Atlantic Ooast difficulties has been boiled down to two possibilities : The first will call for the combat loaded troops to land in the Oran area and the remainder, with the possible exception of eight or ten su pp ly ships that would go into �l Gibraltar , wou ld pro ceed to the United Kingdom; the second p l an would divert t he entire Patton force to the U. K. to c onstitute a "fie se rv e wallo p" for the Commande r-in - Chief , possib l y for an atta c k on Spanish Morocco if ne c essary . The Philippeville , Bone l anding by General Pat t on's force has been dis card ed because of too many pre car iru s angles -- movement into a z one of intense enemy air activity , c on c entration of t oo many n aval ~essles in a small area , possibi li ty of overwhelming enemy resistance . As Gen e r a l Cl ark prepares to l eave tomorrow for Washington , TORCH ap µ eras to be shaping up ev er better . General Gruenther c omes in t o report : 1 - -that the air plan is co mpl etely "buttoned up" and mimeogra i-, ed for distribution; h 2-- d irectiv es have been issued to the Al gi ers assault and at t a c k forces and to the Oran Task Fo r ce; 3-- that General Patton ' s directive for the Ca sa bl an c a mission will b e rea dy later today; 4 - - t ha t the naval p l an i s being put in final form and wil l be read y for d i spat c h to Wash in gton tanorro w w it h General Gl ark . LONDON SEPTEMBER 23 , 1 942 -- As General , Cl ar k c ompl etes fina l de tail s for his trip to the Uni t ed states , he receives a hear tenin g l ast minute re p ort fr om General Lee of the S OS. Lee feels the supp ly si tuat im is much i mpro v ed . He re i; orts that the SOS has unloaded 2 00 , 000 lon g tons of su p p li es and equipment since the first of t he month ani will hand le another 100 , 000 during the remainder of the month . Al thoogh there may be some diffi c ulty in obtaining all ammunition required for the Oran c cmbat c on~ oy , Lee says it l ooks as if this for c e will have enou gh to get by with until D plus six c onvo y fran the United Kingdom is unloaded . the now the Gene r als Gale and Gruenther and Col onel Hamblen are c al l ed in by Gener a l Cl ar k and they too feel that many of TORC s supply H' difficu l ties a:re cl arify in g and that we wi ll b e able, in all ppobability to meet the November 8 date . Transpcr t of the for ward e chelon of Allied Force Head quarters to Gibraltar i s discussed the Air Commodore Sanders and Col onel Gale . General <Har k plans to have U. S . Air TraBsports take the c '.!ll act headqua r ters p g roup . They will be escorted by "Fl y in g Fortress e s . 11 Follo win g establi sbmen t of headquax•te - s at Gibraltar and until it is possible to move the headquarters to either Al g ie r s or Oran , General Clark plans to have t wo or three "Flyin g Fortresses" on call at Gibraltar to p rovid e air trans p ortation on important missions to the North African front . General Glark, who has been working virtually ni ght and day for the past six weeks , clears out of his N 0 r.folk House office at noon for a final pre - Washington conference with General Eisenho wer . Then, fol lo wing lunch at his flat , he becomes "Ci tizenu Clar k as he sh ops for g ifts for his family . The "family side , 11 submerged so comp let e l y und er the "military sj.de 11 for so long, c omes out as the ~ru' ~~-' W: •·· · �( lanky gena:> al jostles with the c ro~s on Regent of silver for his \'life , mofuhe r and mother - in-law for his son and daughter . Street to get gifts and appropo presents Buroened with brief cases, map rolls and a little luggage for the trip to the United States , the gen e ral and the small staff that is accompaning him , le1we Norfolk House at 3: 00 P . M. for Hendon airport and the start of the l ,mg flight . ENRCUTE BY AIR TO UNITED STATES, SEPTEHBER 23 , 194 2 --Th e C-47 c arrying Gener al Slark and his party to Prestwick , Scotland , where they will depgr, t for the United States , takes off f rom Hen don air drome at 3 : 58 PM and heads northwestward over the color ~ul mosai c of the English countryside . The party is made up of General Clark , General Larkin, Colonel Slocum , Li eut . Col . J . P . Eason (a British member of the Allied Force staff) , Lieutenant Beardwood and F . P . Culbert, the undercover man who will direct fifth - c olumn a c tivities at Casablanca . Also i n the plane are Br i gadier General Gilk eson of the Air Cor p s and Li eut . Col . Jackson, an Air Corps off:tcer acting as a c oufier . The p l ane drops in to Prestwick at 6 : 28 PM • ( Off:b ers in the party , and General Cl ark himse lf , take turns watching over the se c ret bagg,:ige which includes a ll directives and plans for TORCH detailed , maps of the operation and half a million dollars in French Moroccan cu rren c y which will be turned over to Gener al Patton • s force for use when it lands . The lobb y of the Prestwick airport is lik e the lobby of GrAnd central station . It is milling with people vho are traveling . There are all types of unf :fiorms . From Prestwick , flights st art not only to the United States and Canada but also to Russia . The airdrome is tremendous and covered with all types of planes . Fo llo wing dinner in the Prestwick mess hall , General Clark's party l ounges around in the lobby, waiti ng for the weather report on c onditions over the Atlantic to come in . Although it has been r alning , the sk i es clear abou t 9 : 00 PM and a satis fac tory re po rt c omes in on ccndi tions over the Atlantic . Lo ading of the huge , four - motored Stratoliner , named the " Comanche , 11 is started and by 1 0 : UO PM General Cl ark ' s party starts going aboard . Because the ship is loaded so heavily with gas oline, three officers have to cr owd up in the c ramped radio and navigation room for the take - off . The U. S .- bound Stratoliner is air - borne at Clark is heading eastward to Washington to make on TORCH - on what has been done and wht=1t will be few weeks before the Sec ond Front is opened . I t 10 34 PM and General a comp let e report done in the final is a tremendous job . By the time enough gas has been burned so the three officers can return to the :i:assengers cabin, the p lan e is well out over the Atlantic , flying through broken clouds under an almost full - moon . Eight bunks are made up and GenerB l Clark ' s part y turns in for the night . �/ ENRUT BY AIR TO UNIT STATES, SEPT O E ED EMBER , 1942- - G 24 enera l Cl ark' s plan e dr ones s te adily on thro ugh brok en clo uds under an a lmost f ull mo ,The s hip, on. which wei ghed 55, 600 pounds at th e tak eoff, i s s cheduled, on t he basis of win d r epor ts , to r ea ch G ander Lake , New foun dl and , in 17 hours . Through th e fli ght th e altitud e averages from 800 to 1,2 00 f eet. By midmo ni ng one of the port motors r of th e four-motored stratolin er has begun to miss and shoot out bla ck smoke . During the morning, G eneral Clark goe s through the huge, wei ghted bri ef cas e to study p~pers on TORCH operati ons that he is t akin g to Wa hing to n. He s also conf ers with Culbert and with Colonel Slocum. At 10: 37 A.M. (East ern War Time), th e coa st of Newfoun dlan d is s ee n through ev er thick ening clouds . The plan e heads for the G ander Lake airport but the weath er has closed in and the pilot, Capt ain Terry, decid es to H d for Presque Isl e , Maine . Befor e r ea chin g ea that airport, th e plane receives reports that th e ceilin g is a lmost zero th ere so Capt ain Ter r y de cid es t o shoot for M ontr ea l. To dat e , no St r ato l in er has b een able to mak a non- stop wes tward hop from Prest wi ck to Montr eal . e As th e big pl ane heads west through rapi dly wors ening weath er , t he carb uerator s on two more engines begin acting up and Captain Terry, with his gas suppl y dimi ni shing, with thr ee of his four motors funct i oni ng ba dl y and with th e weat her getting wo e , looks for an emergency landing fi el d . H spot s a s mall fi el d and, rs e aft er circling th e fi eld, dr ops dmm to a lan ding ma. mushy by t he hea vy rain. de 11 The 11Comanche is greet ed lik e a thin g from Mar:\by ab out thr ee hundr ed Royal Canadian Air Forc e cadets w ar e in tr aining at th e field- -W s or Mills, Qu a:. ho ind ebe The st udent s are taking primary training in Gypsy Mo hs which would fit und r th e t Strato l in er ' s landi ng gear. The tran s- Atl antic pla ne lands at 1 :2 5 PM (EW . T) 0 Fli ght offi cers , s t udent s and m echanics surround th e huge tr ans -Atlantic plane. G enera l Cla r k and his party ar e t aken to th e O f i cer s ' M f ess Hall where t hey cle an up and get r efre shm s . Study of th e pla ne 's mo r s shows t hat thr ee ent to new carbur etor s will have to be flo rm up fr om Was hington befo r e th e pla ne can t ake off. General Clark cal l s G Pneral Marshall by lon g-di stance phone and t el ls him he i s requ es ting th at anoth er Str ato lin er fly in from D al Fi el d , the orv U.S. Air Trans port Comman fi eld in M d ontreal. Vi hen t he weather has cle ar ed, th e se cond Stratolin er com over th e ti ny, es sog gy fi eld. The pilot circles it twice th en comes i n for a l anding. Wh t he en huge pla ne hi ts th e sod, ro cks and mud fly up and both wing f laps ar e badly ri ddl ed wit h hol es . Examinat i on of t he s econd shi p shows that i t has been damag ed to o badl y to tak e off; that re pair s will have t o be made on t he fla ps and it will take hour s . Gener a l Clark th en confer s wi t h Canadi an offici al s wi th t he re sult that he i s lo aned two plan es- - a bi-m otor ed Beechcraft and a bi-motor ed Graumann amphibi an . Es se nti al s ecr et document s and perso nal ba ggage are t aken f r om th e 11 Comanch " and l oaded into the t w R.C.A.F. pl anes for the 75 mil e flight into e o Montreal . General Clark, ri din g in the Beec hcraft, tak es off at 6:01 PM and arriv es at Montr eal at 6: 55 PM Becaus e of th e lig htne ss of th e t wo R. C.A. F. . pl anes , G eneral Clar k mak arrang em es ents to have hi s party f l f into Wa shington aboard two British Hudson Bombers. Aft er eating at th e D orval Airport cafeteri a--an d get t in g such unu sual thin gs ar e or ange juic e , re al coffee, fruit, milk wit h some cre am in it-th e bag gage i s st owed on th e t wo Hudsons. They ar e la te in pr eparing for t he t akeof f and me anwhil e , r eport s come from W s or M ind ills that t he s econd Stratolin er has it s wing fl aps r epa ire d and is rea dy to come in to M re al. If f eas ible, General ont Clark wants to go into W hington ..¥1 th e S r at ol i ner inst ead of i n t he t wo H ons. as uds ) j �W hen the plane, named t he "Cheroke e ," l ands, Captain Parker, the ski pper and the man who flew Admiral Byrd over the pole, says the ship i s capable of going on to Washington so the baggage is tr ansferred from the two Hudsons to the Str atolin er and the Genera l ' s party takes off fr om Montreal at 9 : 59 PM The . flight is extremely smooth and uneventful and the "Cherokee" l ands at Bolling Field, Washington, at 1:46 AM. General Clark and his party are quickly passed through customs and the tr avel weary group spreads throu ghout to wn t o variou s quart ers. General Clark, des pite the lat e hour of arriv al, is m at the army et airport by Mrs. Clark. * ( • ( j � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, September 1-24, 1942 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from September 1-24, 1942. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1942 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Language A language of the resource English Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/557 Date Valid Date (often a range) of validity of a resource. 1940-1949 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/b46841bc704b850c2931905f259b8755.pdf?Expires=1773878400&Signature=c-nU4BURXi1XvX1Q9bg4kyPsXxVj2DRCReY8R-5H8HPyviS3tUbrOHic6%7EimKCv8oXg0uL7AggIiyN-lTcF-Nb1oZTUiQDOiWT2FydHF4MYLxQ0rZf7HiANmZOr4WOqWvlzn0NlIfeSzB24IdGDW6LeTLqB-ORHjGMpo3Fais1hkwUB2Oe4bvvdCHefSJ2nf2dOowL7bfC4eWIp7RijGZ4wOrLsHrmXNBuryM0JZ559w2Z2ryhpk0udF0TY-XYGX7z1KWy9fbU9uBSmPL4onIaKEwTvo1W19fOK5mL5jmN18NVM4%7EXxVPAGdJxsv6djMQW19jZBm-dJj1gf0EdPOwg__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 202965c445fd9ab4ce8a75b083509f5c PDF Text Text \ ) N E OT This is volume tv:· of the W DIARY of ~ General o AR Mark v: . Cla r k . The f i r st volume , c ov ering the pe r iod June 28 to September 24 , 1942 , has been deposited in a sa f e a t the Army ~ar Col~ ege , f as hington , D. C. It is under the custody of Br igadie r Genera l Floyd Parks . Vol ume one will r emain for safeke eping with Genera l Parks or his successo r . It will be del i vered to General Clark on call. In the ev ent of Gener al Clark I s death , the book wil1. r emain unopened and in the V!a College safe unt il the conclusion r of the war . It will then be turned ov er to :i. . Ifar k W. Cl ark , Apartment 726 , Kennedy - V'!arren Jrs Apar tments , 5155 Connecticut Avenue ., NS ., W hin gton , D. C. as ) .( I ; �I\ WASHING SEPT. 25 1942-Reporting TON to the W Department after his transar ) Atlantic Stratoiiner fli ght from London, General Clark i mm ~diately go~s into a long confer ence with Genera l M arshall to outline to the Chi ef of Staff of the United States Army t he current status of TORCH. The November 8 at t ack date is set. General Marshall is hig hl y pleased with t he way things ar e shaping up. General Cla rk gives him a detailed re port of proble m s raised and progress being ma in London. The Deputy Comma der goes minutely over de n the plans of the Algiers and Oran Task Forces. Fro m t he bulging brief cas e t hat vr s a so carefu lly protected on the trip over from London, the general pul l s out paper after pape r and pores over t hem with the top man of t he U. S. P.rm These papers y. inc lude operati onal plans, cover plans, al ternate plans for al l three t ask forc es appreciation of the air and navy situations, surve ys on political and civil af fa i;s. The conf er ence lasts 45 minutes with both Generals Ma rsha ll and Clark exchan gi ng honest opinions on al l phases of TO RCH. General M hall is disturbe d because Ma ars jor General H artle, now com.,andi ng the Vth Arm Cor ps in Ireland, has be en designated, y te m porarily at lea st, as colltl rander of the Oran Task Force. General M arshall wants General Cl ark to comm d an this force, sa ying he doesn't have enough confidence in Hartle. The Chief of Staff dictates a cable to General Eisenhower asking a r evisi on in the Oran comru and but Genera ls Clar k and Handy counsel him to w rite a let t er that Gener al Clark will deliver personally to General Eisenhower when he r eturns to London next week. The let ter te ll s General Eisenho wer that he wi ll give hi m any officer in the United States to command the Oran force "if you ca n 't s ee your way clear to let Clar k \ comm and." This offer includes such of f icers at Lieutenant Generals Mc Nair and )D evers. Put ting a new man in, either as Deputy Comma de r or as he ad of t he Oran n forc e, involves great hazards at so late a date, General Clark explains , tel l ing General IV !arshall that he wo d like to command t he Oran force s ince it wi lj_ be ul made up primarily of his II Army Corps. Follo wing his l engthy conf ere nce wit h Gener al Marshall , General Clar k is next calle d in to discuss TOR with Sec r etar y of W Sti mson. The Secretary is worried CH ar about TOR and is appr ehensive concer nin g what effect i t wi l l have on ROUNDUP CH , t he European i nva s ion that Stimson be l ieves must be executed. The Secretary conf ides that he doesn't feel t ha t Pr ime M ster Churc hi ll 's judgment is sound. M Stimini r. son goes thoroughly into al l an gl es of TORCH h General Clark. He is apprehe ns ive wit ab out the "multitude of suppositions 11 in TO : that Spain wi l .1.re main neutral , RCH that the Nort h Africa n French wil l only put up t oken resi stan ce, th at Germany wil l not m ove into the Spanis h airfields. Secretar y Stimson offers to c ome over to the U nited Kingdom "to give my assistance if you t hink it wi l l do any good . 11 General Clark te ll s him he t hinks suc h a visit would "stimul ate the morale of the men. 11 When General Clark, after givin g the Secretary of W a complete r evie w of TORCH ar , leav es th e Secretary's office, Mr. Stimson shakes han ds and s ays: 11Go bles s you , d my boy. We'r e al l anxious ly waitin g ." The general next goes to the White House for a lu ncheon conference with Harry Hopk J_~~,1, es i dent Roosevelt is on a secret tour of t he nat ion 's defense in dustrie s -Er and he,1 l report to t he presi dent on General Cla r k ' s visit. wil Over a luncheon that las ts two hours, Genera l Clar k gives t he Preside nt 's personal r epr ese ntative a comprehensive vi ew of TOR CH. Hopkins is inter ested particular j_y in the air proble m \ and sa ys that Pres id ent Roosevelt doesn't want European air operation s torn down to o se rio usly by diversion of aircraft to t he North Afric an t heater. He wants t o conti nue extensive bombing raids into Germany and the occupi ed European countries. Hopkin s also s hows gre at i nt ere st i n convoys an<;L -~f ~q~_of_ TORC on Russian conv oys. . tli~ H ~r:f tt ~~ t~ ' nr:~~! & . \ �3 ( The next man to get a ful l report on TORCH Admiral Leahy, President is Rocsevelt 1 s special Chi ef of Staff to coordinate military and naval affair s. Like Hopkins, Admiral Leahy will report on General Clark' s visit to President Roosevelt when the Chief Executive return s from his nat i on-wide tour. After hearing the General's rep ort, Admiral Leafiy expresses himself as "well pleased." Upon his return to his special office at the Operations Division of the W Department, General Clark goes into conference with General Han , head of ar dy operati ons; General Patton, commander of the Casablanca force, and other high ranking officers directly connected with TORCH.W ith the m he goes over special TORC problems, readscables from General Eisenhower, r eports to the Com an derH m in -Chief in London, takes up a multitude of smal l but harassing problems th at are causing apprehen sion. The special office is filled with men, coming to General Clark with problems and with ideas. The confere nces last until evening. Then, Genera l Clark, weary fro m the lon g plane trip and hard l y any sleep, goes t o his W ashington apartment. * W ASHIN GTON,SEPI'. 26, 1942-General M arshall another long conference this morning. The t wo men specific problems suc h as convoys, tro op buildup, is an extremely dif f icult operation but that it is After a rocky start, caused by changin g dates and operation ar e sh~Pmng up splendidly. calls General Clark in for go over TORCH again, discussing supp ly . They agree tbat TO RCH goin g to be done successful ly . su pply problems, plans for the "If the President's conditions (lit t le oppositio n fro m t he Frenc h) are present," says General Clark, 11 are goin g to get away with it. If not, there we is going to be a bloody fi ght • 11 Li eutenant General Some ~ll~ , head of t he sos, is ca lled in and the sup ply rv problem is canvassed thorou ghl y. General Clark explains t hat the great problem in the United Kingdom is that the SOS does not know wbat it has on hand. Gen eral Somerve ll• says tbis re sulted fr om the problem of switchin g so sudde nly fro m BOLERO (U.K. su pply convoys) to TORCH.The shorta ges are bein g ma hp by the de use of five fast freighters that will land i n the United Kingdom so loa ded that they can fit ri ght into the D plus 4 M edit erranea n convoy. Other urge nt ly nee ded items, such as t he missing gun sites for t he ar tillery weapons, are goin g to be flown over. The su pply problem looks as t hough it has been licked but there will stil l be a few s horta ges. They won't be acute unless som ethin g ha ppens to the fol l ow-up convoys. A major item that comes up for dec i sion today is tm pas sinj of comDa d n fro m Navy to Army in the W estern Task Force. General Clark discusses t his fr ank ly wit h Admiral King . The r esu lt is that General Pat t on' s forc e will be under comma d n of Admiral Hewit t of the U. S. Navy fr om t he ti me it leaves the Unite d states lat e in Oct ober until it reac hes the W est Coast of Africa and t he assault starts. The commandwill go from Admiral Hewitt to General Patton at t he point in th e beach assault when the army comma nder tel ..1. the navy chief "I'm prep ar ed to take over." s The U.S. Navy will be prepared to bombard fro m the sea if necessary. Also , it wi l l be alerted to the danger of attack from the Fr ench Fleet. ----. Genera l Pat t on's forc e has set up a tre mendous office in a little-u sed section 2 �4 of t he Mun itions Buildin g. To gain entrance a visitor is double-ehecked at both ends of a corridor. Inside, in several r ooms, thin gs ar e humm g : me clu ste red in n in conferences, men working on maps. General Pat t on's f orce is bein g staged. The 3rd Division, s pecially trained in amp hibious work, has just arrived fro m Camp Roberts, Calif., and is bein g sta ged 50 miles outsi de W ashin gton. The 3rd will sp earhead the W ern Task Force assault, est carr yin g out the sa m role t he 1st e Division will have at Oran and t he 168th Infantry comba tea m wi l l have at Algiers. t General Patton hol ds repeated conferences with General Clark. They go over the altern ate plans Pat t on has in case t he Casablanca re gion lan ding is i mp ib l e. oss They discuss chan ge of command from navy to ar my, the us e of naval bombardment, use of psyc holo gical warfare such as Ame ican flags and f l ares. Every phas e of r t he Casablanca attack is gone into. General Pat to n wants to use parachute tro ops in his operati on and General Clark agrees to ta ke t he matter up wit h General Doolittle when he returns to London. General Clar k lunches with Colonel Donovan and Robert M phy at Donovan's ur home. The subject of 5t h Column activities in .Africa is gone into. The men discuss the feasibilit y of buying off Frenc h naval of f icers to circumvent a fi ght betwee n t he U.S. and Frenc h navies. All agr ee this is an exce ll ent idea and plans are initiated to put it into effect. M urphy be l ieves it can be done. Murphy ask s · permission to run dem olition materials and arms into North .Africa for 5th c ol umn purpos es and General Clark is surprised t hat it hasn't a l rea dy be en done. M urphy re ports that the French beac h patrols are increasin g and that as time goes on it will be ever more difficult to get undercov er ite m as hore. s M phy is given a list of installations ur and establishments to be~ither destr oyed or secured prior to the assault. General Clark sug gests Mur~hy dra w up a diagramatic chart of these points so that he wil l have no lists on his person in case anyt hi ng hap pens. Mu rphy is to let General Ci.ark know which insta ll ations he can take care of prior to the attack hour. The Donovan lunc heon, at whic h t he problems of political and civil secti ons is gone into, lasts t wo hours. Upo his n return to his te m porary office, General Clark again plunges into confer ences principal ~y wit h Generals Handy and Pat t on and members of Patton' s Wes ern T; sk t Force staff. At 5:18 PM General Clark departs from Bol l in g Field for We Point w , st here he is to visit with his son, W illiam, a plebe. M s . Clark and their daughter, r Ann, also make t he trip. Visibi l ity is bad and the air is extr em ely bum . A py t W est Point, the Clark's are me at Stewart Field by their army son. Follo win g t dinner with his family, the general meets some of his son's class mate s. Once a gain-but only for a brief time--Genera l Cl ark is a f am ly man, not a m i ilitar y man. He sta ys overni ght at We Point. st * * * W ASHI GTON,SEPTEMB 27, 1942-For the fir st ti m i n three mo s, General N ER e nth Clark has a day off toda y . And that r esult s only from th e weather. Becaus e of rain and zero visibi l ity, the general's plane is unable to ta ke o~f _f~ om W~st P~i nt f~r the retur~ fli ght to W ashington. So, he spends t he morning vi s itin g wit h his f anu.ly and tourin g the mil itar y academy where he was sc hool ed and where his ~on i s bein g schoole d . In t he afternoon, t he general , Mrs. Clark, An and General Larkin, who also went to the Point to visit his ple ge- son return n to W ashington by t r ain. ' �5 ( During hi s enf orce d abse nc e, General Cla rk ' s temporary Washinl ton of f ice c ontinues to opera te wit h Colonel Slocum, secretary of t he General Staf f , handling incomin g and out goin g cables and participatin g in more mi nor confer enc es. * * * W ASHIN TON SEPTE BER 28 , 1942- - Becau se of t he ur genc y of pr oblems arisin g G , M in London, General Cla r k wi ll begin t he r et urn fli ght t om r ow. Hence, his day or is ja mmed wi th fin al conferences, m ost i mpo rtant of which is his ap pear ance before t he Combined Chief s of Sta ff- the Britis h and Americ an gro up co or dinat in g the war in W hin gton . as The meetin g is held in the Publ ic Health build i ng , acr oss Constitu ti on Avenue fr om t he W and Navy Depar t me ar nts. The c onferen ce i s attended by such war planners as General Marsha l l , Sir J ohn Dill, Admir als Leahy and Kin e, Briti sh Adm al Cunningham. Genera ~ M ir arshall, sit t in g in front of the Unit ed States and Bri tish fl ag s and his own four-st arr ed emblem, presides . The entire TORC plan H is r evi ewed wit h t he outline pla ns dis cu ssed en toto. General Clark i s called upon t o r evi ew t he operation as he an d Gener al Eis enhower s ee it. Admiral Leahy asks Genera l Clark to go ove r t he outline plan wor d by wor d and def end it. This re sults in i t bein g ac c epted wit h only t _r ee m nor rev is io ns . i The c onfere nce lasts over t wo hours wi th l:eneral Clark bearin g t he brunt of the que stionin g . He explains , int er pr ets, disc usse s. TORC is gone into fr om end H to end. W hen the erue l l i ng meetin g i s over, pl anner s of TORCH i n both London , and W shingt on, un derstand each ot her s points of vi ew, t he r easons f or various a dis crepancies in vi ewpoi nts. Th is meetin g is the crux of General Clark 's W ash in gt on visit and when it is fi nis hed the general dec lar es his vi s it has bee n "qu i te successful." The Chiefs of Staff confer ence i s fo ll ov.- by ano t her visit to t he W te ed hi House in whic h r G eneral Clark gives H y Hopkin s a final r eport embodyin g the arr latest develo pments on TOR CH. W hen t he conference i s over , W . Hopkins cal l s ~ the Pres i de nt by t e l eph one , explains to him t ha t General Clark ha s given hi m two r eports and asks Mr. Roosevelt if he wants t he gene r a l to remain until the President returns to Washingt on. " I ' d like to see Clark ," t he president r eplies , "but it return to London at the earliest possible date . Tell him to hi m it is not necessar y f or G eneral Eisenho wer to r etu rn on M arshal ~ has indicated it i s desi ra ble t o get Clark back to as pos s ible ." i s ur gent that he go ah ead . Also t ell my ac count . G eneral London as qui ckly Hopkins explains to t he Pr es i dent that it had be en su ggested G eneral C~ark might fly out by f ast plane , join t te President and return wit h hi m by t rain to W hin gton . as The Presi de nt sa ys t ui s wouJ.d on~y de la y General CJ.ark I s re t urn and that s ince the Deputy Comma r has had lo ng confere nces wit n H nde opkins and Admiral Leahy it wi~J. not be necessar y . "Give Cla r k my warm r egar ds an d my best wis hes ," sa ys Presi de nt Roosevelt . Havin g his cl ea rance fr om President Roosevelt to r eturn to London , t he �'('; •. ·. gene r al hur r i es back to t he W Depart m ar ent for f inal c cnf eren ces wit h Genera l Pa t to n , G ener al Handy , General H l l and hi gh of fic er s i n the W st ern Tas k For ce u e an d SO . After a meet i ng lastin g an hour a nd a half , G S ener a l Clark clo s es hi s t empo ar y of fic e an d goes to ·hi s a part m r ent t o pa ck . Ta keoff for th e retur n f l i ght to London i s s chedule d be t ween 8 :00 and 9 :00 Al to m row . i1 or * * ENR OUTETO LO ON BY AI R, SEPTEM ND BER 29 , 1942- - D y i n get t i ng t he Boe in g ela St r at ol i ner 11Cl:ero kee " read y f or t ake of f del ays the s t art of t he r etur n f l i ght : unt il 12 :47 PEflT. Wh it i s obvio us t he ta keoff wi ll be dela yed , Genera l Cl ark en retur ns t o t he W Depart ment to t ake adva nt a ge of a n extr a hour a nd a half ar wi t h Genera l s Pat t on and Handy . Fina lly t he bi g sh i p i s loa ded a nd re ady a nd G r al Clar k and his s t af f ene wave goodbye t o wel l - wi s r£ r s th at incl ud e Mrs . Cl ar k and G enera l s H andy and Hul l . The pa s sen gers , i n addi t ion t o Gener a l Cla r k , ar e : G ener a l Iar k in , Col onel s Sl ocu..mand Schn ei der (Air Cor ps ) , Lieut. Colo nel Eas on, M or G n aj ree (Avi at i on Si gnal Com pany ) , Capt ai n G irard (Air Cor ps) and Li eutena nt Beardwood. The heavil y-lo aded plane circ l es W shin gt on once af te r i t s t akeof f f ro m a t he Nat i ona l Air port a nd t hen heads out , pa s s i ng over Bal t i m e , N Yo k , or ew r W est Poi nt and up in t o New Engl and . M t of t he gener a l ' s staf f , exhaust ed fro m os t he f our act ion- f i l l ed days in W s hin gt on, sl eep s . The St r at ol in er l ands a t a G nder Lake , New ndlan d , at 8 : 33 PEW or 10 : 03, Newfoundl and t i m G a fou T, e. ander Lake is a tr em endous new air base car ve d out as t he hoppin g of f poi nt for tr an s At .i.a ntic f ligh ts . G eneral Cla r K1 s part y eats at t he Off ic er s ' Me ss, loun ges , rea ds and pla ys pi ng- pong. At 10 : 38 PEW th e gi gant ic, fo ur - m or ed plane , heav il y- l oaded wi t h ga s T, ot olin e , l um bers down t he l ong run way and hea ds out over th e Atl ant i c under a t hr ee-qu art er m . Because of t l:e l oad , t hr ee of f i c er s hav e t o ja m up i n t he oon nos e of t he s hi p s o i t can t ake of f wi th out danger . The s hi p i s comma ded by n Capt a in Nis wander . By m dni ght , a l l passengers ar e a sl eep and t he Stratol i ner i is t lunder i ng st eadi l y a nd wel l over t he Atlan t ic . * ENR UTE TO LO O BY AIR, SEPTEMBER O ND N 30, .194 - By m - m 2id ornin g th e 11Cher ok e 11 i s sailin g i n a v i rtua l vo id - -mist and c lo uds are be l ow obs cur in g t he se a ; ab ove i t i s so c 1. ar t hat t he s ky is pale b l ue . M e ost of t ne pas s enger s cat- nap a nd r ead . Snor tl y aft er no on (B it i s h Ti me) , th e weat h er cle ars a nd wars rd.ps ar e r s ig ht ed . They are in t wo and t hre es . Captain Ni swander comes back to r epor t that t he Adm iral Scheer , G man pocke t - battl eshi p , i s l oose in th e r egio n over whi ch er we ar e f lyi ng . Nisw ander ask s if he can do some r econ naissance . He expl ai ns t hat , i n event he locat es t h ~ r a i der , he can ci r c le it and ra dio its posit i on . "D you know how man plan es s he has on b oar d or how mu h ant i - a ircraft?" o y c as ks G ener al Clar k . "Thi s b i g pl ane woul d be l i ke a l am duck on a mill pond e for t he Sch eer . You' d better head r i ght on towa r d Prest wi ck ." As t ne pla ne drone s on to war d Scot l and , m e war sh i ps are si ghted , in c l udin g a cr u is er t ba t or fir es two s hots as we pass ove tr;t~ r. ;,: A1... mo ,;! ~1w ~ ments later t he Cher oke e passe s 1£, @ . . .It. ·' 1 ' �7 r over a ship to wing tar cets. The warship is only get ting gun practice! At 5:20, Br itish Ti me, t he Stratoliner lan ds at Pre stwick, Scotland . Th7 general has alre ady made arra ngements to get to London ~nd a C-47 t~an spo rt is waitin g on t he bi g fie ld . Baggage is t ransferred a s r apid l y as poss ib le and at 4 :1 9 PM the t wo-motored tra nsp ort ta ~es off for London . $h~'~ loaded to the , ~i ll s havin ~ ta ken t he fr eight off the Stratoliner . I n addi tion to t he transA lant ic party of ei ght , seven other persons who ha ve be en waiting at Prest wic k t for air trans portation to London crowd aboard t he plane . Aft er a routine fli ght down t he I r is h Sea and ac r oss England , t he plane arr ive s over Hendon Airport. Royal Air Force aut rDriti es have r adioed t h~ plane tha t i t can not land because of t he late hour. Ge al Clark has the ra dioman ner answer back that t he plane is com g in despite the f act it is a .1.m dar k and in ost the air port considers i t self closed, be cause of t he blackout , until daylight . The heav i ly laden ship, whic h G eneral Clark has pilot ed part of t he way fr om Scot l and, lands at 6 :48 PM . Genera l Clark is me by General Eisen hower an d t he t wo m lea ve imm t en ediately for London in General Eisenhower 's car so t hey can dis cuss r esul ts of the Washin gt on trip. LONDN OCTOBER 1942--Rea dy to plunge back into on-th e- ground preparations O, 1, for TORCH General Clark is at his Norfolk House office at the r egu l ar 8:50 time , this mornin g and he i mmedat ely cal ls in to p men on his staff to give them a i quick resume of the results of his W ashington trip. At 10 : 00 AM Gener al Ei senho wer comes over to General Cl ark ' s office to c on, tinue the discussion started la st ni ght aft er the general 's arrival. The decision concern ing who will comm and the Oran Task Force must be settled and Major General Ll oyd R. Fredenall , who has been at Jacksonville, Fla., com:nandin g the II Army Cor ps , is dec i ded upon. Later, General Marshall approv es. During t he discu ssion , Air M arshall We sh is cal led i n for consultatio n on t he use of paratroo ps. The l Brit i sher expre sses conc ern over t he use of t he paratro op battal ion s at Oran . He points to the danger of the tro op tra nsp orts bei ng s1 ot down as the y fl y over 1 O ccupied France, enroute by th e shortest r oute t o Oran. So the security of the Oran oper ation won't be menaced, General Clark says he sees no rea s on why the men should jump pr i or to dayligh t; that they coul d jump up to one or two hour s after day li ght. In that way the attack woul d be underway at the time t he troop t ra nsports cut over t he fri nge of Occupied France enro ut e to North Afric a . Adm l Ramsay comes in to go over th e naval command situatio n wit h Genera l ira Clark and, aft er r evie wing an appreciation made by the U. S. Navy of the situ ation, agrees basically with tte entire operation. The ques ti on of havin g naval aviation rehearse with lan d forc es when t hey go thr ough final assault maneuve r s in Scotland fr om Octob er 17 to 21 is brou ght up and Rams says re gula r car rie r-bas ed planes ay ca n be used but that for t he re hearsa l the y will oper ate fr om l and airdrom es so as not t o disturb final prepara tion s aboar d the aircraft carri ers . Ramsay also asks for a directive letting the navy know what it s r e~ponsi bil ities are. This will be done . All naval communications will be cent r alized thr ough Adm iral Cunnin gham and any special in structions will go out , once opera t ions have started , through General Eisen hower. \ �Air Com. ~odore Sanders is called in to discuss the use of parat r oops and he ar.r ees that t hese vital f i ghti ng men s rould be used , if f easible , to "lea pf r og" tro ops to the ea st for the drive on Tunisia. Various command ers are t o be as ked to put in bids on what uses t hey mi _· t have for the a i rborne troo ps and the f ina l h dec i sion on their use will be in the hands of the Com..,and er- i n-Chief. Colonel Caff ey , wro will conL.iand the 39th Regimental Combat Team that will parti ci pate in the Al giers ass aul t alon gs i de the 168th an d the Rangers, ar ri ves f ro m the States -and confers with General Clark . The 39t h is enro ute over by troo p tra nsp ort an d wi l l arrive next week . It will be placed i mmed at ely in t he i a ss ::.. ult convoy . Caffey r epor t s that amphibLu s maneuvers i n th e Stat es brou ght out that t he M rifles , bac kb one weapon of t he Infantry , get rust y an d fai l to -1 f ire if t hey are exposed to salt water spra y . He sa ys a li ght dr essin g of li eht motor oil prev ents corrosio n and non- f i rin g so General Clark or ders t hat t lii s i nfor m ati n be di s s eminated i mmed ately to TOR units . i CH Lieutenant Colon el Stirling c omes in to get a re port on Genera .i. Cla rk ' s W sh i ngt on tr ip so he can car ry it back t o the Britis l:in a Chie fs of Staff . Once a gain , t he genera l covers t he major poin ts rais ed and t he decis ion s made during his f ly in g tri p bac k t o th e States . * * LO NDON OCTOB 2 , 1942- Because Gener al Eisenhower is out i nsp ectin g General , ER Anderson ' s Br itis h tr oops , Genera l Clark presides to day over t he tri - weekly meet i ng of TO H plan ner s i n London . Br iskly , hi t t in g onl y the major ite ms, General RC Clar k revi ews event s that occur ed while he was in W ashin gton . He brings the big joint Br itish-Ame r i can st aff up-to-dat e on TORCH develo pments in London an d W sh a i ngto n, th en as ks t he other officers to br i ng up their proble m s. Admiral Ramsay asks t hat destroye r s be allow ed to go directl y i nto the port s of Algiers and Oran to take f rontal st eps to prevent sabotage to port in sta l la tions or the scut t lin g of vessels at t he harbors ' mout hs . Such an operation would involve no army personne l. Ground troo ps will be goi ng over the bea c hes and encirc l in g the por t s . General Cl ark declar es he be l ieves the de str cyer m ove is a sound pla n an d sa ys he will take it up wit h General Eis enhoVTe in the hope of r gett i ng out su ch a directi ve . Gener al Rooks declares he is sti l l have tr ouble wit h lo gi sti cs - -t hat t here is a ja m p on t he KMS4an d t he KMF4 c onv oys. Because of it , he says t h3 shi pyin g -u wil l be ina dequate to move in part of the 1s t Arm ed Div is i on and part of the or 34t h Divis ion on D pl us 27 . H also r ep orts th at he wi .:.l have a serious ve ni cle e deficiency . This cri s is may be met by a m ove by t he U. S. N avy to increa s e t he num ber of car go ships in t he slow co nvoys to 45 . General Somer.N:'11 r eported to Genera.:. . Clar k in W shl.ngt on tr.aa.t the navy ha d agre ed to suc h enla r gement s and he be .L a _eves t he U. S . Navy wil l agr ee to 55- sh i p convoys- - t he number escorted by t he Brit is ,, Navy- - providi ng a reque st is m de and t he navy cl eared of r espon si bi l ity . a H hour 11- -th e time of at t ack - - f or tr.e West ern Task Force has be en modifie d to give General Pat t on greater la t itude of de c ip ion . W hile t he at ta ck ti m of e t he O an and Al gi er s forces is r 8, Patt on will atta ck on t he 11 ~~fcM~, eber : -" vm No ... ;nt I ·. �9 ti m schedule mos t appropo with surf e day as t he other two assault forces. c onditions, but, if possible, on t he sa m e The fascinati ng subject of 11Cover 11--deliberately puttin g out m is-information to divert and c onfuse t he ene m y-co m up for complete disc ussion tod ay . General es Clar k calls in Bri gadi er M ockler-Ferryman, Li eut. Col. Bevin s , t he Britis h expe rt on TO RCH cover, and General Gruent her. Bevins be lieves t he pl an t o be disse minated to the en emy JIU1 be t hat we plan to attack Italy and Sici l y, This may cau s e st violent sub ma e ac t ivit y in t he M rin editerran ean but it appears to b e th e wis es t cover if we are to hold t he Fr enc h fleet at its Mediterran ean bases an d ke ep Spai n an d Portu gal r e laxed. Genera l Clark asks Bevins how he pla ns to get t h e infor mati on to t he .Ax and Bevins gri ns an d sa ys he has "chan nels," The tr ouble is wit h his job, Bevi ns sa ys, is t hat he JIU1st let trut h leak out most of the ti m e so the ene my 11 ..l be l ieve in me--I 1ve got to build up their fait h i n my underwi groun d sources." It com out t hat General Alexa nde r is goin g t o start a huge es offensive in the M dle Ea.st on October 24 to divert t he enemy, particular ly from id makin g air reco nna issa nce durin g t he period t he assau l t conv oys ar e movin g into po sition. [ Tro ops leaving bot h Engla nd and t he United States wi l l be tol d t ha t t hey are goin g aroun d t he Cape of Good Hope and t hat the y wil l get f urt her infor mati cn c oncern i ng th e ir ta sk after they pa s s t hat point. Ori ginal cover f or t ue Ca s ablanca f orce was to let it l eak out t hat it was goini to a t t ac k t he Dode canes e Is ~a nds, Italian poss es s i ons at the far ea st er n end of t he M editerra nean. Such cov er , say s Bevin s, is not plausib l e since it would t ak e t he Pat t on force wel l in to Decem ber to r eac h t hes e islands. He suggests t hat t he cov er f or t hi s force be t hat it is goi ng to r el i eve t he Britis h i n t he M dd le Ea s t or els e t hat it i s j oini ng t he i at t ack on Ital y . One r eport com in toda y to disturbe an ot he r wise smmoth day . Gener a l Ryder es r eports that the equi , ment of t h e 59th c om bat tea m, whic h is arriv ing here nex t week fr om t he St ates to join t le Al gi ers assa u lt force, is i mp per ly s t owed and ro wi l l have to be r eloa ded. Also, none of t he 59t h 1 s vehic l es ar e wat erpr oof ed . G er al Cia r k ca l l s in Gener a l Gale an d ord ers trat al l poss ib le veh i c les be wat eren proof ed as soon a s t he conv oy arrive s . Lack of wat erpr oofin g m er i als wi 1. be a at l li mi t in g f a ct or. G l e sa ys r el oadin g of t he 59th equipm ent might mena c e the se cur i t y a of TOR but he is l ay in g pl ans to rop e off th at s ection of th e Belf as t docks CH wher e t he loa di ng will take plac e . Gener al G e s ays t he TO al RCH su ppl y sit uati on "lo oks a lri ght " wi t i.1th e exceptio n of ge t t i ng backlo g vehi c l es int o Oran . The US- M edit er rane a n c onvoy , arri vi ll[; at Oran on D pl us 6 , wi ~l r elie ve part of U:e v ehic l e s hor t a ge . The . 40 mmamm uni tion f or Anti-Aircr aft guns i s not suf f ici ent and Gaie r e fc xts t hat he ha s a pr om ise f or 90 , 000 r ounds out of Englan d ' s Oct ober pr oduct io n . This , he es ti mate s, wi ll be enoug h for t he as saul t phas es . Gene r a l Cla rk nex t goes int o t he Pub- ic Rela t io ns se tu p wit h M j or Phi ll i ps . a Fift een cor r esp ondents wi ~~ be i n t ha fi eld by D pl u s 4 : fo ur wi t h t he Easte rn Ta sk Force; s ix wi t h th e Cent er Ta sk Forc e ; thr ee at Gi br a l tar head quart ers, and t wo at t a ched to t he Air Forc e . The W ester n Task For ce i s br i ngi ng over three news men and t wo r ad io m en. I n di s cus s i ng ra dio bro adca s t ers , Philli ps said t wo Ameican r bro adca st er s and one Bri t is her wi il go wi t h th e Ea. t er n For c e . r~n er al Cla r k str es s es s t he a l l - Am ic an as pect of t he er t he f irst v oice t o br oadca st out ope tllI\tt s.as r l -y b �lO of No th Africa must be th at of an A.~erican. There wi ll be no ra dioman wit h the r Oran forc e because of the lack of ra dio fac L .iti es . How ever , recordin g equip m ent pro babl y will go in wit h that ass au lt force. Unl ess t he Si gnal Cor ps provi des phot ogra pher s , one newsreil man wi ll go wit h the Algiers forc e and t wo newsreel men and a st i ll photo graph er wit h t re O an group . r Now that t he execution of TORC is ju st a fract io n over a month away, t hings H are 6oi ng much mo e smoothly . The ba dly - snarled su p~ly s i tuati on i s strai ght ening r out as re por ts pil e up on what i s availab l e in the United Kingdom. Ships are all r eady to leave £or t he Unit ed Kingdom to make up s horta ges a s f ar as poss ib le . Certa in critic al items are bein g fl own over by plane . * * LONDN OCTOBER 1942- -Gener al Mason- M f arlane , civ il and mil itar y govierO, 5, ac nor of Gibra lt ar , sl i ps into London incogni t o to giv e an up-to- the - minute r ep or t t o Gener als Eisenh ower and Clark. The three generals are closeted secretly for an hour as Ma cfar lane r eports on su ch facts as Spanis h r ea ct ion to incr ease a ir and naval acti vit y at t he M terr anean mout h for tress , capa city of t he v ita l Gibra l edi tar air dro m , ar rangements for the be r thing and unloa din g of naval and me rant e rc s hi ps , _assem bly of fi ghte r planes being shipped down by cr ate , activities of agents in both No h Africa and Gibraltar . rt Gener al Ma arlane giv es Gener als Cl ar k and Eis enhower a comp ehensive picture cf r of how TO RCH lo oks to an official w i s sit t in g ri gtrt acr oss t he M no edite r ranean f ro m t he coming theater of action . The gover nor i s quite opti m istic . The sup ply situation c ontinues to bri ghten . Colonel Lewis, artiller y offic er of the Oran Tas k Force, has made a det ailed stud y of- the 105 mmam nition supp ly mu an d th e r eport he gi ves General Clark is very encouraging : 445 , 175 r ounds are av ailabl e . That is 120, 000 ro unds i n excess of what is needed aboard t he D and D plus convoys to Oran . Gener al Lar kin reports that nothin g has developed since he r eturned f rom the U ed States to make th e SOS picture lo ok any different nit and General Hughes, r eturn in g fr om a tour of SOS aepots , says he is optimi stic. Iarkin tells Gener al Clark he is "sat is f ied we are goi ng to m eet the loa din g schedules ." To make pro ~pects even bri ghte r, a f as t ship is l eaving t r~ U. S. O ctober 5 with 2, 500 tons of ammunition to make up various s mr ta ges . Al l this br in gs grea t r elie f t o Gener al Clar k w has be en extremely worried ho ab out logistical pr oblems for t r~ pa st six weeks . A conference after conference t he has had to jack up SOS r epresent at i ves . All t he ti m he re alized the SOS snarl e was not th e fa ult of one man. But he kne w to o t hat som eone ha d to get extremely tou gh if -anyt iu.ng was to be accomplishe d . That theo r y has worked . Plans for t ra ns portin g TORCH dquarters to Gibr altar prior to D-day have hea now c ongeale d . ID:.wE B-17s, f ixed to carry 10 pass engers , wi ll be used in stea d of trans port s . Two ships will go down fiv e days befor e t he assault date ; four on D minus thr ee and t wo on D minus one. Two of these ships wil l r emain at Gibr a lt ar for use of the headquarters staff aft~~ttack is underway . Other person uel wil l go down by boat , arrivin g about H ip.us-· :.w: ""'~Jeral Clar k wil l f ly down a Jiri 9 o T month fr om to m r ow. or ?:: CC · _ ffE . - ----;..;..;;:;;..;;; ~ . ·-.;~ii �I( Now that the major items have been disposed of--place, time and plan of at ta cks ; troop and me rchant c onvoys ; logistics; political affairs; weapons and assault craft ; naval and air strength-a host of more minor subjects aris e daily. Bulked together, they are of infinite importance since every facet of the plan must work to perfection if the assault is to be preponderant l y successful. These are t he types of thin gs ijeneral Clark concerns himse lf wit h primarily today: Making arran gem ents so the Gibr altar-boun d planes wi ll have the general officers well dispe rsed in cas e of accident •• •Deat h to a f ew key men m ght doom i the entire operation • • •British Navy planes must be marke d wit h American insi gi:nia to carr y t he a ppearance of an al l - Ameic an operation to t he f ullest possible r degree • • •Liai s on work is being done so American flyers wil l be able to r ecognize the silhouettes of British warships ••• The 62nd Trans port Group, whic h will be used to leap-frog General Anderson's troops toward Tunisia, is com g in on in sc hedule fro m t he United States •• •The "Offe nsive A ction" paper ha s been drafted to incorporate Britis h and American views and General Clark advises Wa hingt on s that it wil l be publis hed M onday noon un le s s word is heard to the contrary •• • Use of t he Brit i s h Royal Ma rines com up again and General Clar k instructs es General Lemnitzer to have Lord Louis Mo untbatten begin making pl ans for its use in attac kin g Sar dinia, probably about three months after t he No h African attack • • rt •Bids are coming in fro m all task force comma ders as to what t hey t hink t hey n wil l need i n the way of air transports • • .The Com ander -i n-Chief wi ll dec i de late r m to what tasks he will assign t hese paratroop or inf antr y carr yi ng planes • •• The directiv e concerning use of Paratroops at Oran has gone in and it is agr eed that t his unit will attack at 1:00 AM not dawn • . . General Ryde r is having dif f ic ul ty , with Gener al Anderson concernin g turning over of his comma d to the Brit i sh and n over- t he status of civil administration ••• Gener al Cla r k pro m es t o str ai ght en is the matter up and, after conferences, assi gns five more American to the Algiers Task Force civ ili an affairs group • •• The question of a ir cover for the Oran assault forc e comes up again and a reque st is made for six medi um bombers to be base d at Gibraltar rea dy to support the assault • • •General Clark pr omises to ta ke it up with his air officers • •• Because it appears that it will be impossible for int elli gence offic ers to get viaas to go into Switze rland after TORCH gins, Gener al Clark be starts the wheels tur ni ng to get the State Depart men wor king on the visas illL t ~ediate ly •• •The proble m of getting a signa l corps man into North Africa wit h M r. M urplzy- so he can send messages to the attackin g forc es and guid e in the Oran pa.:batroops is causin g concern ••• General Clar k sug gests t he man might be smuggled in at a lon e~y beac h ••• Having the man go in in civilian clot hes ar pears too dan ger ous . Thes e are the kind of questions dealt with thorou ghly because a slip m ight cause untold compli cations. * t hat come up , hour afte r hour . Each must be in one minor item-say use of the radio-- t: CHE CKERS ENGLAND , , OCTOB ER 1942-Pri me M st er Churchi ll summons Ge ini nerals Clar k and Eisen hower to his country esta t e t his evening to go over th e latest TORC devel opments and get a f ace-to -face rep ort fro m Genera l Cla r k on his r ecent H visit to W hington. There have been no changes in the date and plan for TORC but as H t he Pri m M e inister is ea ger to go over the details . He is still worried about the effect of TORCHon the Russian "PQ" con•~~j; !!:J �( The coup de etat of t he evenin g is pul led by Gener al Cla r k . For weeks he has bee n l ookin g wit h lon gi ng eyes at t he Briti sh Aircr aft car rie r now i n th e I ndi an O cean . M e fi ghter cov er i s needed fo r t he Oran Task Forc e and t he pla nes or on the carr i er woul d make up this defici ency . M . Ch hil l i s st r i din g up and down t he r oom, di scu ssin g t he Afric an oper~ , r urc at i on . Occas i onally he hops over th e s tep t o t he fi rep la ce hearth and stands wi th 1 his back t o t he f ir e , w m g and ru bbi ng hi mself . Sudden.Ly he says : 11Is t her e ar in , anythi ng I can do for any of you . 11 The t ime lo oks ap pr opo an d General Cla rk says : 11 Yes , " Mr. Pri me M i st er . How about us i ng t hat Ind i an O in cean car r ier i n TOR ? 11 CH 1 s ro und f ace li ght s up ; 110f c our se , " he booms. "That car r i er ain ' t Mr . Churc t..il l no good all alo ne . " He t el l s G r al I smay to start t he gear s turn i ng to get t he ene car r i er int o t he oper at i on . Gen er al Clar k bel i eves something wi ll now brea k lo ose on the car r i er sit uat ion : i f t he I ndi an Ocean ca r ri er i sn 't r el eased , at lea st an unused car ri er in t he H e om Fl eet wi l l be as sig ned to the O an Tas k For ce . r ( The Pr i m M ni st er i s st il l wor r i ed abo ut mov ng t he bul k of A er i can forces e i i m out of t he Brit ish I sles f or use i n TOi\CH. He wants m e tro ops m or oved i n f ro m t he St at e s to ass i st i n def ens e of t he U t ed Kingdom. He concur s with Gener ul Clark 's ni sug ges tion t hat new divis i ons , t hose wit h onl y th ei r basi c t r a ining , come over and l earn fr om t he groun d up wi t h Br itis h ar ti l le ry equip ment . Because vi rtua lly al l ca rg o ships wi ll be use d t o sup 0 ,or t t he TO RCH f or ces , the Q n M y will be t he uee ar only ship ava ila bl e t o bri ng t r oops over . Thi s blo cks t he mo vement of Ame i can r f i ght i ng equipment , but not f i ghting men, to the U nited K ngdom w l e TOR i s i hi CH i n the devel opi ng phase . As us ual, t he Pri me M nis t er keeps hi s gue sts up unti l a ver y l at e hour . For i th e fi r st t ime Gener al Cl ark r eal.Ly disco ver s t he sa gaci t y of get tin g peop l e t ir ed befor e fac in g the m wit h a prob l em. The car r i er r eques t ca m as the Pri m Minis t er e e w appraa cr.d. g cl os in g ti me. The reque st was ma ps ychol ogica lly and physi ca l ly as n de at pr eci se l y t he ri ght m ent . om General Al exan der is going t o st ar t a bi g pus n i n the M dl e East on O id ctobe r 24 as a cov er f or TO H. M . Chur chill di scus ses t his mo throu g i:_,J_y wi t h Gener a l s RC r ve Cla r k and Eisenho wer • .Ameri an f or ces wi l l be i ncl uded i n t ne bi g at t ack sin ce c t heir emp yment will be a bui ldup for t he a l l - Am lo eric an appear anc e of TO H at RC Algiers , Oran and Casabla nca . Bef or e l eavin g f or Chequer s , General Clar k put s i n a busy Sunday . He cal l s in Gener a l Lee fo r a gener al sur ve y of t he SOS s i tu at ion . Lee estimat es t he SO S wi l l be able to give 90 per cent perf ormance i n the TO RCHoperat io n . He :explai ns t he difficu l ties bar r in g 100 per cent per fo r man and Gener al Cl ark tel ls Lee he ce under st ands perfect l y . The mo e r ecent pr obl ems- -moveme of t he five shi ps comin g r nt over espe ciall y to j oin the Br i t is h M edite r r ane an convoy , lac k of spac e f or t he 59t h combat team car go and simila r 11t h hour devel opm s-- a.re gone into . Lee says ent m e space m be f ound for the 59th when it s sh i ps are re -l oaded . He also t hl.nks or ay addi t iona l car go space - -a.bout 50 deadwei ght to ns per ship - - may be f ound in th e D day vesse ls . He pro pose s to f i ll t ~ - wit t f i eld ration s . As to amm tion , uni · t:fc-RT_;'C)' .. l · ,:. E �13 r_~ fCn\ : 17 E --.~~ffT , ;--"--·-._;;;...:..::.=...! General Lee reports that 500 ,000 °" tons arriv.ed .d.n the U. K. la st month and the SOS has a fairl y good breakdown of the items . Loadin g of some ships f or t he TORCH assault force has started and the SOS chie f says co operat i on with the Br,itis h in loadin g and unloadin g is excellent . General Clar k hopes to get away fro m c onferences and paper work wit hi n a week or so in order to eet in to Scotland for a final look a t the com bat t r oops and for personal ins pect io n of combat loa di ng operations. He in s tructs Gener al Lee t o se t up a s peci al trai n fr om Octo ber 17 to 20th so he ca n get up to th e G gow- River las Clyde area . The De~tuy Com.an der a l s o hopes to get down to Shr iv enbam so he can m look over t he headquarters securit y forc e , now being sta ged ther e . Other conferences held durin g the day concern passa ge of co mma d fr om the n naval corrunander at Oran to t he Task For ce Commande durin g D-day . The same prinr c i ple wi ll a pply t rere a s is bein g applied at Algiers : it wi l L occur at t he poi nt in th e landin g where t he G ound Com r mander fe els he is able to c ontrol t ne s it uat ion asho re and t ells the nav al comma der that he i s r eady to t ak e over . Anot her proble m n tha t c omes up is overloa ding of the Algie rs Assault Forc e and General Ryder is goin g to re- exa mine his load in g tab .tes to s ee wnat non- combat unit s can be dro pi.ed off wit r:out cri pplin g his forc e . I niti al unit s of th e 29t h Divi sio n arrived i n t he U. K. yes terd ay . The rema in der will be ar ri v in g within a week . G eneral Cla r k sc aQ t he pos s i bil it y of s tr ength tS ening weak poi nt s in the assaul t wit h vol unte ers fro m this div ision . * * LON , O DON CTOBER6 , 1942-- Generals Clark an d Eisenho wer arriv e back in London fro m th e Pri me M niste r I s estate at 11 AMand go into i rruediate c onfer ence on i n develo pment s occuring durin g their absence . The Com niand r - in-C hiefs joi nt staff c onf eren ce i s held at Norfo lk House and it gets bri ef er and brief er as t he TOR a ttack date ne ar s and pr oblem after proCH b l em gets a solution . Genera l Eise nhower stress es t he ne ed for "c onst ant vi gil an ce" in pro t ectin g t he securit y of TORC He declare s ttat "extre m measures " s r:ou.1d be H. e ta ken to keep t he at t ack da te and t he assualt poi nts se cr et . In a gener a l revie w of decisi ons yet to be made, Gener al Ei senhower says t ra t he beli eves tro ops s houl d a t tac k wit h di v isiona l insignia on t heir unifor m and tru cks . He be Lie ve s t he s posit ive va l ues - morale , control of troo ps and vehicles - -out weigh the ris ks involv ed-- givin g t he enemy a chance to kn ow ju s t whic h or gan izations a re atta cki ng . The questi on of t he anti - submar i ne patro l for the Casab lan ca force c om up es and the staff agre es it must be come a U. S. r es ponsibi .tit y as soo n after t he attack as possible . Durin& the early phas es , the sub-patrol work wi ll be done by British Catalina f ly in g boats ranging out all t he way fro m !Gibraltar . "I f our navy won 't do somethin g abou t protecting itself , the army wil l have to ," Gener al Eisenhower · co m ents . Air M .n arshal W sh says the Britis h ca n su ppl y on ..c lit ht air cov er fr om el y Gibr a ltar and both Adm al Ramsay and he believe it is i mper ative that t he Casa ir blanc a force have some anti-submarine protecti on. < Gener al Ei s enhower tells the hi~h -ra nkint offtc er f ac in g him around th e conf erenc e t able that the r e has be en "nq- eata9ly-smic J"cJjfl,nge in TOR - -it is eoin g CH 1 along wit h t he sa me speed , the same -4~_t. _-'ff"•'.•E e'ctations • 11 ~ ·_~ . r exp• . _i ' ~ J~.il: ~)J.-UK ;, ·7t., ·., . . :~c~.;J; ..... �( The subjec t gone into most thoroughly is the anti-subm arine patrol , Cap tain W right of the U.S . Navy says t he harbor of Algiers is not suitable as a s ~a1 J.a ne base even after it is in control of Ameri can f orces . He also adds t hat unless planes with sea - searc h equipment ar e used , t he effectiveness of the aircraft in eliminating submarines will be reduced 33 percent . Buildup of the new ai r fo r ce- - the 8th--is discussed and General Doolitt l e sug eests that f or security r eason it should be explained , when questi ons c ome up , that the 8th is bein g built to amplify work of the 12th Air Force whic h is a l ready operatin g actively in the European theater . General Anderson is st i ll worried about his com.:iand particularly , his relation ship to the Ameri can poJ.itical and civ i l officers who wilJ. be stat i oned in the Algiers region to give the appea r an ce of an all - American action . He wants a "c le ar cut" directive so General Clark sc hedules a conference for late afterno on . Admiral Ramsay intro duces a plan calling for a special force to rush into the Al giers harbor , board the ships and pr event any scuttlin g or sabota ge . This f orce , c omposed of about 300 men, preferably Americans , would try to land at docRside in two l arge dest r oyers . Gener al Clark is going to ask fo r volu nte ers f rom the 29th Divisio n for this hardy task . The re quest that the U. S . Navy c onvoy cargo ships is coveys of 55 vessels has been rejected at Washington . The Navy de c lines to f rovide pr otecti on for any convoy larger than 45 s hips , sa yin g it is impossible to prote ct more than t hat number with t ne escorts available . Following the confer ence led by General Eisenhower , General Clar k ca.Ls in various officers to work on problems rai s ed at the Com'!landr - in - Chief 1 s m tin g . e ee After discussion wit h Air M shal v.r l:1and Genera l Doolittle ar els on the anti - sub patrol at Casablanca , a cable to Vl s hi.ngton is drafted statin g the Britis h fl yin g a boats will pick up t he Patton c onvoy on D minus two and that from D minus one to D plus eig ht t wo Ca talinas wil - be over the convoy durin g daylight hours as submarine protection . On D plus f i ve t he 12t I1 Air Force will sup 1aament this l pr otection wit h li m ted -r ange visuaJ. submarine patrol by A20B plan es . Fro m D plus 14 the kr rn Air Force wil l provide moderate-ran ge visual patrol with B25C air y craft . The cable points out this anti-submarine protection is a.nadequate and that the U. S . Navy should make further pr ovisions . General Doolittle reports he has arranged to have 25 Spitfires with 90-gallon belly tanks read y at Gibraltar to back up the Oran att a ck in case anythin g hap pens to the carrier - borne f i ghters . I f the Br itis h air craft carrie r, discussed wit n Pri m Minister Churchil l , is e obtained , the Oran force will have about 50 car r ier-bas ed planes . General M ason-Macfarlane, governor of Gibraltar , renurns for a conf erence prior to his depa:bture to the RG . The route of parat r oops over Spain the ni ght ck be f ore the Oran attack is discussed and M acfarlane believ es it wil l be saf e if the carriers fly at 10 , 000 f eet . Fr om England to the coast of Spain t hey will fly at a v er y l ow altitude to escape the radio detectors in France . Then t hey will climb up to escape the Spanish . They wi ~l nit t he Spanis i. coast at 9 :00 PM , four hours before they are scheduled to attack at Oran , provi ded an H- h our jw np is decided upon . �15" ':;:!• '.,.--.,..c.;;-= .:7 ~ ~lth oug h the Spanis h wi ll ~e and probab ly wil l r eport pre sence of enemy planes over head to Germany, M~ cfarlane does not be l ieve any opposi tion will com fro m Spain . Tr~e have fe w n i ght fig hters . He does not think the Germans will e y fly over Spa in t o intercept the paratro ops . In event a pla ne cras hes , i t prob abl~ won't be discovered until morning , well after the attack . Genera l M acfarlane re ports that the ca pacit y of t he G br a ltar air port is i 350 plan es and he believes requirem ents can be met des ~ite great congest ion . He is satisfied wit h re ports given him by Ge a l Cl ark on the personn el an d naval ner buil dup at Gibr altar. The t wo gener a ls sha ke hands , sa y goodbye and Gener al Clark sa ys : "W l , I'll see you in Gib ab out a mo h fro m to day ! " 11Right , 11 sa ys el nt Ma cfarl ane , and winks. O of the m ne ost difficult problems for t he hi gh militar y ·men in TOR is CH arrangin g political and civil af fa irs deta ils. Since the y ar e mi l itar y men, t hese matters are somewhat forei gn . General Clar k ca lJ.s a conferenc e of a ll men involved in this t ype of work . American per s onnel of this t ype wil l have to be divided in to three parts at Algiers--the "front men" for General An s on ' s eastward der bound force; the "fr ont men" for Briti sh General Clark ' s Algiers base or ganization; and offi cers to giv e an Amer an aspect to the assa u lt of t h:? 11t h and ic 36th British Bri gades . The Civil Affairs people wi l l deal wit h loc a l ordin ances, fi nancaal matters , hirin g of Frenc h labor, relations wit h French poli c e and civi l of f i ci als and kindred non-mil it ary af f airs. Al l dealin s wit h the French wil l be , primarily , t hrough America n offic ers to b ear out the American a sp ect of TOR CH. G ener al Anderso n sa ys t wo Ameica n civi l affa irs experts are not suffi~i ent for his force r so additional personnel wil J. have to be f ound . The qu estion of dis t rib uti ng packa ges of arms to the friendly Fr enc h also com up. Every pre cauti on mu be es st taken to se e that t hese get in t o the ri g ht han ds . This is a problem for the politi ca l section executives . M . KnoI, a state depar t m r ent Algierian expert , sa ys t he youth of North Afri ca wi l l be be hind us no matt er w hat happens . He adds that a great deal of t he su cc ess of TORCH depends on la st-m inu te ne gotiations • tha t M . M phy can c onduct. r ur G eneral Cl ark orders dra ftin g of a comp hens iv e directive re on po~it i cal and civil affai rs . The a dvisabilit y of put ting the political se ction UR der G-3 is discuss ed since t his secti on involv es, in many ca s es , m l ita ry oper ati ons su c h· i a s dem olitions . Gene r al Anderson grows i ncrea s in gly diffic ul t . He is now pr ot esti ng agai n over th e inclusi on of 1100 U. S. veh ic l es in t he Al giers conv oy . General Clark calls in Genera l M atejka and Colonel Ram sey to se e what ca n be done to assau ge Anderson . M atejka agrees to cut t he number of v eh ic le s 25 percent but s ays he is goin g to put up a fi th t t o get t hese ve hicles in the fol J.owing convoys . Col. Ramsey poi nt s out that this means it wi ~l b e D plus 60 before t he Allied Forc e Headquarters i n Al i ers has proper t ransp orta t io n . Admiral Ramsay returns to go over the Air Annex and dec J.ares th e air force reaL .y has three task s: sup1'ort of ground - oops, - pro tect ,ion of ports, pr otecti on of naval vess el s and c onvoys. The navy is _. : ff r ~ _f "prote ct i on of t he f le et . · t· w ,, ~CUIt I ' ' \ �\~ ( The air force, sa ys Ramsay , can't serve t wo mast ers. Gener al Clark makes it clear that th er e must be complete unit y of comma d and decr ee s that t he annex n state flatl y that the air forces ar e under the three Task For ce Com:nanders initial ly and under the Commanderi n-Chief of TO RCHfinal ly . The use of the planes will be determined by t he Force Commanders and/or the Comma der -in-Chi ef, n depend i ng on the situ ation. * * LONDONOCTOBER , 1942- General Cla r k ' s psyc hology on gettin g another , 6 aircraft car r ier out of Pri me M ni st er Churc hill wor ked l i Admiral Ramsay r eport s t o t he D eput y Co!lli nander -i n-Chi ef that an auxiliary carri er has bee n obtained . It is not the one out of t he In dian Ocean, but one t hat was bei ng held bac k by the ;bme F l ett . It ca r ri es 11 pla nes and t 1 wi ll is give the Oran Task Force ap pro ximately 50 fi ghter planes to su pport it in t he assault . A s quadron of Spitfires is also earmarked to f l y t o Oran at dawn, a id wher e t hey can, land on the Oran air port if tak en or els e put down as best they can when t heir fu el gives out. The thi nness of t he O an ai r sup~ort ha s now been r thic kened . () Another major decision reached today is that t he O an paratroo ps will attack r / at H- hour--1 AM ns tead of waiting until dawn. M or Yarboro ugh re por ts thi s --i aj will giv e the par atroo ps three advantages : a greater element of surprise; the use of darkness to c ons oli date t heir positions and colle ct their fi ght i ng equipment, ~nd a chance to dem onstrate t hat the tro ops ca n set down in their s ection despite darkness . Yarbor ough , as ar e al l of the paratroop of f ic ers , is ea ger for t he par atroop chance~ ~eneral C~ark sa ys that one of the bri ghe st spots i n plan ni ng for TORC has been the eagerness for action of the par atroops. Suc h an H 11s hows initiativ attitude e and is one of the fin est t hing s about all t his pla nn- in g whic h at ti mes ha s had its ver y dark si de s , " Ge al Clark tel l s Yarbor ough. ner Yarboro ugh r eports that Bri tis h agen ts wi ll li ght flare s in t he Oran a ir port area to help the paratr oops down to ward their obj ect iv e . He is not worried abou t to o ::rea t a loss of equipment i n t he dark and adds "anyway, we 'v e got enou g~on us to fi ght for 24 hours . General Fre dena l l is due so on t o take over command of the II Corps , whi ch i s t he Oran Task Force . General Hartl e , who had been provi sio naL y set u p for t .ti e c ommand i s r eturnin g to Ire land . Whe TOR gets underway , Hartle will more or , n CH less comm and th e TOR base s ec tion in the United Kingdom. Thus , all hope has CH pa ssed of General Clark commandn g t he Cor 1 s wit h whic h he or i ginal l y came over i s eas . 111 woul d have l ike d nothin · bet t er, 11 says the Deputy Command er-in -Chi ef , 11 but Gener al Ike wouldn I t let me do both -- be Deputy Com :nander to him and have the Corps as well. He t hought t ha t was too much for one man." \ A plan t o have t he assault boats equi pped wit h loud speakers thr ough whic h Frenc h troo ps guard i ng t he Oran and Algiers areas can be infor med that America ns a re making t he lan di ng and tha t no fi ght wit h t he Frenc h i s nece s sary beca use this is a move a gainst t he Axis i s discussed . General Clark wants to get 500 loud speakers for t his use . Gener a l M atejka says t he Si gna l Corps has none i n t he U. K. and the Br itis h are wit hout them. I f t he pl an ap pears f easible , efforts will be made to rus h them over fr om t he St ates. Pe),'fla"psmegapno n~f wil l be used i nstead . ~ \ �l 'l ( Attempting to button up t he operati (n calling fo r a direct as sault on the Algiers and Oran harbors to pr event suuttlin g of or sabota ge to ships , Genera l Clark plans on usin g 400 Infantry volunteers from the 1st Armored Divi sion at Oran and 300 Infa nt r y volunteers fro m t he 34t h Division at Algiers . The Bri tis n wi l l provide about 40 naval techni ci ans at Algiers and the U. S . N avy a s i m ilar number at Oran. This navy personnel will go int 'o the en gine ro oms and hol ds of the s hips to prevent wreckin g of machin e1· or the openin g of sea e ocks . y A dmiral Burrou ghs out lin es the movement and assaul t pla n at a s pecia l meet in g cal l ed by G eneral Clark . The tro ops wil l leave t he Unite d Kingdom aboard cr uisers . They wi ll be transferred to des tr oyers after arrival in the Assau l t Areas . One des tr oyer wi~ ~ drive int o Oran harb or, the other into Al giers . Sold ie rs wi l l se i ze and protec t wharves and ot her har bor facilities . -Naval personn e~ wi l ~ board t he shi ps. Plans are made to get the necessar y troo f s r eady for shi pm ent i n t he D-day conv oy . G eneral Oliver, wro attends the conference, reports that t he 1st Arm ored Combat team that is participatin g i n one of the Oran beac h l andi ggs is now in the Liverpool ar ea and wi ll start lo adin g about October 14 . Durin g t he 16 days the y wil ~ be aboard s hip prior to sailing the y wil l hav e time for rehea r sals . This tea m has not had much opportunit y t o pr ac tic e di sembarkation of t anks . The Maracaibos wil l not be rea dy in time for the rehea r sal. One particularl y heartening piece of news is delivered to General Clark by Admiral Ram say who has received a cable fro m Adm r a l Cunnin gham. It says i t hat agre ement ha s b een reached wit h the U. S . N avy by which Cunnin gham wil l command al l naval forces in t he operation. The U. S. Navy has been prot estin g a gainst a Britis h offic er having comma over U. S. warshi ps . G nd eneral Clark ea geily awaits confirmati on of this news . Bad news c omes in the form of a list of pass engers ki ll ed when a comm ercial / dli pper , enroute to England , crashed the day befo r e yesterday at vot wood , N fdld. It r es ulted in deatn tGotwo TORCH civil affairs section officers and serious injury to a thir d . Hasty searc h must now be made to replac e this person nel. Another pla ne crash , whic n occured in Spain durin g G ra l Clark ' s visit to the United ene State s , could have caused serious , almost f ata l , TO RCH rep ercussions . A plane / f lyi ng to G ibraltar crashed in Spain. The pilot was kil l ed . In hi s pocket was a s ecr et envelo pe containin g TO RCHinfor m ation bein g carried f rom Genera l Clark io G enera l M acfarlane. Thoro ugh investi gation s ,~wed the env elo pe · was not . opened . It was deliver ed to Genera l Ma cfar l ane int a ct ! Air Comm odore Sanders r eport s to Gener a l Clark on th e air build - up at filibraltar. It will be necessary to place in operation four Spitfire squa drons and replace m s for Am ent erican and Britis h losses soon after the operation opens . It has b een a gr eed to have 107 pla nes , crated, go in t o Glbr al tar on K Sl , ar r ivin g M on D-2 or D 1 . Fifty additi ona l plan es wil l arr iv e on D plus 3 . These plane s will be rea dy for flight on D plus 10. Sta ggerin g of a irc ra ft ar riva ls a t Gibra l tar wil l eli m inat e exposur e of too m any aircraft duri ng a li kely per io d of b om dbar m . Comman g offic ers ar e countin g on fair ly heavy air los s es duri ng t he ent din earl y phase s of TOR CH, particularly am ong Am ic an pilots who have had lit t l e or er no co nbat experie nce. · .. .. .. , �1i LO N, O NDO CTOB 7, l.942- - "Each da y I s ee more ev id ence t 11 t we are get t i ng ER a to get her-- get -;: ng bett er or gan i zed . And ea ch <;l.ayI get a li t t l e mo e hope f u l." i r Thus , Gener al Ei senh ower c l oses to day t he r egular t r i - week1.y Comi"tl der ::.inan Chie f Is c onfe r ence . Because a l l i mpor t a nt mat te rs a pparent 1.y ar e f a ir l y weL _ set t led , t he confer ence i s sho r t . M ost of t he quest i ons t hat c om up c onc ern e m e or l e ss minor matt er s . or Lookin g aroun d the b i g, r ect an gul ar c onfere nce table ar ound whi ch si t th e to p men of TG RCh-- Genera l Cla rk on his ri ght , Gener al Ander s on and Adm l ira Ra m say ac r os s t he tab l e; al l t he ar my and navy of f i cer s who have be en pourin g al l th eir ene r gi es into pl ann i ng for t he operatio n- - Gener al Ei s enhower is obviously plea s ed "wit h t he way t hin gs ar e get t i ng bu t t oned up . 11 H says "i t i s ple a s in g e to s ee t he s t a ge t hing s ar e rea chi ng . 11 One of t he m t ers giv ing Gener als Cl ar k at and Eis enh ower par t i cula r pl eas ur e i s t he a ppar ent har m ony c onc ern i ng pl acin g of t he U. S . N aval for c es at Casab l an ca un der Adm iral Cunn in gham. Gener a .L Eisen hower r emar ks t hat 11al .L our pr obl ems a r ~ be i n g an d must be set t le d by t he f u nda m -ntal ru l e of com10n s ense . 11 Genera l Cla r k out .L nes t he l at es t ac com s nment s : t he de c i s ion t o u se port i pli s ei zur e f orc e s at Ora n and Al gie r s ; t he de c ision to have para tr oops at ta ck at O an a t H- h our; redu ct i on by 25 per c ent of t he num r of U. S. vehicles i n th e r be Al gie r s conv oys ; agre em , at l ea st on t his s i de of tbe At l anti c, of t 1e use of ent an t i - submarine pla nes at Casab la nca . One hea rteni ng r ep ort i s made by Gener a l Ei s en hower . He has ju s t c onfe r re d wit h "a c l an de s t i ne per s on whos e na m wi l .L have to rema in se cr et . " This sour ce e r epor t ,_;t hs.t t he It a li a n peopl e ar e rea dy f or peace at any price . lligh It alian gov er nm ent of f i ci al s , t his man sa ys , 11at la s t r ea -1. e t hey ca n 1 t win even if th e iz pr es ent s i de t hey are on win s . " Amei c a ' s pos i ti on , he conti nue s , is get t i ng mor e r popula r in I t aly an d t he I t a.d a ns ar e ea ger t o avoid an t a gonizin g us 11de e p in . t he gr as s r oots • 11 For t hat r eas on no 'Ital i an submari nes ar e at pr es en t or,er ati ng of f th e Atlan ti c s eaboar d . fl W mi ght get a little e quiet Gener a l Eis enhower conc l.Ud . es 11 help f r om t oo Italian s i f t hin gs go ri ght , fl Amo g t he more minor m t ers t ha t c ome up at t oo bri ef c onf ere nce ar e t he n at us e of l ouds peaker s i n t he l andi ng boa t s and t he qu est ion of a pr oc lamati on_t i:iat is t o b e deliv er ed to t he res i de nts of Nor t h Afric a . The .La ter ms be en drafte d t in th e U. S. an d i s i n its fi na l f or m f or di strib uti on by ra dio or pl ane . Gene ra l Lee r eport s t hat bot l: t he Britis h a nd Ame ic an sup pl y peop l e f avor s ta r tin g a r Quart er m st er school in England f or Britis h and Am ic an grou nd , a ir and naval a er pers onne l . At i t , s tud ent s woul d l earn t re difficulties enc ounter ed and mi stak es m e i n su pplyi ng TOR ad CH. 11They wou l d lea r n fr om t he expe ri ence we ar e gett i ng, 11 de c la re s Genera l Gale'. G er a l Eis enh oV1 f avor s su c n a sc hool . en er Genera J. Eis enhower asks eac n off ic er a t t he ta ble if he ha s any ques t io ns or proble m to bri ng up and for t .re fi r st t i je none of t he men ha s an ur g ent mat te r s . t o pr es en t and t he conferen c e bre aks up . I n t he gr i m and t ense bu si ness t he open in g of a Seco nd \ �(9 ( Front, General Clark has a ..L ighter , somewhat 11ro mantic 11 task to day . At fir st lieutenant in his II Corps wants to marry an American nurse s ta tioned near t he Longford Castle headquar ters that has now become the rear ec neion . W hile the lieutenant appears be fo re the s m ng , lanky genera1. to state wny he believes ili the three - month waiting period provided by re gul ations s houl.d be waived , t he nurse, a new en gage ment ri ng on her J eft h3.lld, waits anxiously in an outer office . The genera l will grant t he coup ::.. per m e ission to marr y provi ded t he proper papers are fi 1.ed out . On1. he , as the offic er ' s commanding general , can grant l y th at per mission. Alt 0rnate plans for the TO RC'i task forces are stil1. bein g c ons i dered . General Clark cal ls in General Lemnitzer . Because of the c l1ances of surf con dit ions interferin g, particular att ention is paid to secondary p~a ns for the W estern Task Force . Whether the entire Patton force can be moved into G br a1.tar is a matter i for naval consideration and Britis h officials are inquirin g into it s fea s ibilit y . The W estern fo rce might move in f ull or part strength into the Oran- Nemours area to assis t the Center Task Force . A rajor diffi culty is that t he full strengt h of the two forces can not be adequately su ppli ed t n.r cug h exisiting harbor facilities in the O an area. G-3 will have the finai altern ate plans r eady for sub m r ission by Oct . 12 . They wil ~ be cabled to General Patt on . Info r mation is being ass embled re gar di ng suitable landin g beac nes in Sout nern Spa in. For political and diplom at ic ramifications of such a plan ar e extremely delicate but such a landing , dependent on many conditions, is a possibility . Gener a l Lemnitzer submits ·a paper deai i ng with possible action against Spanish M orocco by the Ryyal Marine Division or other Brit is n forc es . This acti on would take place in event of an atte m to close the Straits pt by eit her Axis or Spanish forces. ~eneral Cl ark believes suc n a plan is i mp acti cable . Believing it may r have some merit , t he Deputy Commaner decides to go into it more t horoughl y . d Organization of t he U. S. SOS and Britis h Line of Communi ations · set - up once c ,,, t he Nort u Afri can theater is establis red is di scuss ed with General G . The t wo ale generals a__ree that chiefs of t he sup I,Jy services s hould be on t he t heater staff l rat her than directly under the commanding general of SOS. It is importa nt th at the British Fir st Army and t he U. S . Fift n Army which is to be cr ea ted after -TOR is developed-be CH free of unn ecessary administrati ve res ponsibility . The field forces mus t be free t o mo wit hout the encumbrances of sup pl y wor r ies. ve Wa terproofin g of 1 1 500 ve hi cles of the 1st Armored Divis ....n com c• bat team is presentin g dif f iculties . All ve hicles must be mo ved to the por ts for loa ding on Octobe r 10 and this does not allow sufficient time for waterproo fin g . Actin g upon the pr oble m im~ediate ly , General Clark cal l s in General Gale who inv esti gates . The vehicles will be moved to t he ort in incr ements during the loadin g period , Oct ober 12 to 21 , and waterproo fin g wil .1.be compl eted at t he dockside by British and Am erican persom1el . Dat es of dep ar ture loom close on the cal endar now. Loadin g of American troop and equipment will. soon be started . The Britis h now recom m end that both Generals Clar k and Ei senhower be at Gibr altar by November 4 since t he leading convoy will enter t he Str a its at dusk of November 5 . If weat her conditi ons at that time are adverse , an i mportant decision wil l. have to be made . * �~<-::-OCTOBER 8, 1942-lf-'~ One month from today TORCH eg ins l b One m.nt h f r om today , i f all goes well , t he Second Fr ont will be opened . , American troops wil l be pouring over the beaches in t he Algiers , Oran and Casablanca areas . American parat r oops wi ~l be battling for seizure of t he O ran ai r dromes . Spec i a l Ame i can f orc es wi ll be rus rn ng the harbors of Oran an d Algie rs . r American and Br itish pl anes will be battling to get ller for control of t he air over Nort h Afr ica . The Ameic an Navy pr obab l y will be fi ghtin g of f the Fr ench Navy r somew here in the vic i ni ty of Casablanca . Almost the entire British Home Fleet wil l be in the Me dite r ranean , esco r ting i n the assault f or ces and probab ly bombarding Algie r s and Oran fro m the sea . It wi l l b e f a cin g the combine d efforts of Itali an an d German submarines and warsh i ps and warplanes . One month fro m today , i f all goes well , t errific ef forts wil l be made along pol i tical lines to turn t he French fr om resistance to assistance . British tro ops · will be r ea c. in g themsel ves of f Alg i ers f or a drive as11ore and a r a2 i d push to y beat the Germans into Tuni s i a . Al lied Force Headquarter s wi ll be operating in Gibraltar , inte gr atin g the ef fo r t of t hree ground fo rc e assaults, t hree a i r units and two f leets ; i t wi ll be direct i ng the st r ate gy of t he fi ght . One mo h fro m tod ay A.merc an and Brit i sh lea ders will begin to know if t he nt i Frenc h in North Afr i ca ar e goin g to res i st ; what t he attit ud e of Spain is , and , if the Germans will use the Nor th African attack an d fli ght of .Al.Lied pl an es across Spain as a pretex t to move into Spain f or ai r operati ons , first a gain st G r altar , later against the Nor th Afr ican coa st . ib One month fro m t oday all the hopes and ap pr ehension s of the past th r ee months will be cr ys tallized , pr obabl y wi thin the s hor t span of t wo or three days . One month fro m today ! So much i n the way of plans and pre parations has be en pac ked into the past fe w months . And, so much r emains to be done in the single, vital month that lies ah ead . * LONDO OCTOBER 1942-- The two gene rals who will l ead the two major Ame N, 8, r ican assa ult fo r ces i nside the Me erranean are pr eparin g to join tne ir t ro ops , dit now being alerted in the Rive r Clyde area of Scotland . Both Generals Ryder , co mmande of the Al giers assault force , and General Allen , commander of the 1st r Division that wi l l spearhead the Oran attack , will l ea-v-e London perman entl y over the weekend . A final r eh earsa l, a command po st exercise to test the attacking troops and their aquipment , wi l l be hel d next week . Then t he men will start loa ding f or departure of the assault convoys . \ �( General Ryder is due to leave Sunday . He still has a few more details ta ke care of before he goes north to join his 168th combat tea m and other that will make the Algiers assault . to troops Generals Clark and Eise nhower will go to Scotlan d , probably on October 17, to witness the rehearsal exercises . About 20 officers will go, including Lord Louis Moun tbatten , the comrri .ando or gan izer . Officer obs er v ers will stay wit h certain units throughout the exercises and will submit r eports . Preparing for the future , plans are alrea dy being drafted concernin g what operations should be undertaken in event Frenc h No th Afri ca , inclu ding Tunisia , r is quickly secured . This plan ning is b eing done both by TORCH dquarters and hea membes of the British War Cabinet . General Clark tel l s Colonel Sterling , sec r r etary of the w cabinet , that such pla ns should inclu de operations a gainst ar Sicily, Sardinia and movements f arther to the east in No rth Africa to hit Rommel fro m the r ear . Reaction to the proposal that troops fro m M alta participate in TORCH attackin g Tunisia - -an idea originally by proposed by Pri m M e inister Churchillis not rec e iving favorable reaction f ro m the Briti sh . The Ma lta garrison is not well -traine d in mobil e warfar e ; it lack s tran sp ort ; it could not supply itself f or m ore than seven days after landing . It looks as thou gh this side ~ig ht pha se of the operation may be abandoned . General Browning , hea d of Britis h paratroops, ca lls on General Clark who tells the Britisher that it now l ooks a s if about 400 of his jumpers can go into the t heater about D plus 2 or 3 . The two generals discuss the pos sibility of bringing al l of Bro wning's troops into the the ater . Browning is ea ger for such an enl argement of the plan but the Britis h are enti rel y dependent on the U. S. for air transports . One Britis h grigade grou p is going by s ea and wil l ar r ive at Al giers four days after the initia l a ss ault. It will ca rry a 100 percent reserve of equipment. This wi ll enable s ix succes s iv e parachut e ba tt alion operations to be car r i ed out toward the east in quick succession . General Clark ord ers th at t hree C-47 squad rons be equipped with Britis h type rack s for droppin g paratroop equi pment so the y can be rea dy to start Brow g ' s men forward . G nin ener al Clark stresses a gain and again 11t he great potential im portance of paratroop-airb orne operations in the North Afri _ can t heater . 11 General Clar k in s turcts General Cra i g to ra dio General Arnold, asking for the us e of a squadron of DC-41 s for a li m ited period . If th e se lar ge tran spo rts ca n be obt a in ed the difficult proble m of moving air force ground personn el into the new th eater will be solved . A host of things are deci ded today th at make the success of TORC look m H ore optimistic . The SOE and Secret Operations Br anch of the OSS are transfer red from the political section to the plans and trainin g section s ince the y are coneerned wit h m ilita ry operations , inclu di ng destruction of m ilitar y installati ons, r emoval of enemy person nel , etc . The Briti sh N avy infor ms G eneral Clark t hat it can obtain the nec ess ary naval pe·rs onnel to ef fect th e direct harbor attack at Oran. General Clark starts th e bal l rol ling to war d or ganization of the Ameican r Fift h Army whic h wil l be cr eated after the Afric an theater is es tablishe d . General Clar k alrea dy has in mind sel ection of many of th e key staff men for this new Army. Arr a ngements ar e made to place t he chiefs of vari ous sup pl y services under t he t hea ter staff , inst ea d of under the com a nding general , SOS. U nofficial wor d is r eceived that the Prime Mini ster has approved the . 11Qff ens ive Action Paper • 11 The Briti sh Jo in t Intel.Ligence commit tr1}1I il\~;§~•·'s,tirl'.~y a. that is quite encoura gin g c onc ernin e t he sec:ity of TORCH . * CHE;.J}t i:J: J _:- �( LONDN O O , CTOBER9, 1942-- 0ne of the five fast vessels rushing equipment s hortages to the United Kingdom s o they can fit strai ght in to the KMS convoy 2 has had to return to the United States because of diffi culties . The news br ings conste r nat i on but a check shows t hat the ship , the Thom Pickney , is car r ying as ca r go that can be replaced f rom that coming over aboard other vessels that left the U. S . on October 3 . They are expe cted to arrive in time fo r the K S2 c onvoy . M The Pickney 1 s load includes gasoline and oil f ,r ground and air forces , bombs and ammunition , maintenance supplies an d so m air corps technical e equip m . ent General Fredena l l , who is to take over comman of the Oran Task For ce and d the II Cor ps , ar r ives fr om the States and goes into immediat e confer ence with General Clark . Freden a ll had r ead the out.line plans so General Clark tal ks over wi th the new com:na.ndr some features e of the Cent er Task Force operation . The comm and and staff or ganizati on of the Al l i ed F orce is explaine d . Fredenal~ will move into his II Cor ps -headqua r ter s in Norf olk Hous e tomorro w. The Comr.:ianderin - Chi ef 1 s r egular staff conferen c e is held at noon and it i s brie f er than ever . General Eis enhower reports that he was asked by General M arsha l l t o give him a terse comm ent on the over - al l aspect of TO RCH and he repl i ed "circumstances c ould hardl y be be t ter . 11 The Comma er- in-C hief an nounces nd that because of the va gar ies of weat her he intends to go into Gibr altar four days me ad of D-day . He says t he "Def ensive Action" pap er is al .J..buttoned up and a pproved ; that alternate plans f or attacks against Sar dinia and Libya if TORC develo ps su cce s sful .J.. are now being prepared . Thirty s ets of lou dspeak ers H y wit h half - mile range have been obtained : 20 for the Al giers f orce and 10 for t re Oran attackers . These wil .J.. used t o sh~ i nf ormat i on to the Frenc h as be the assault boats go s horeward . Provisions must b e made to s end alon g at least 30 Americ ans who speak Fren ch . They will be in the init i al assault boats . 1 The best news announced by General Eis enhower is that two squadrons (24 planes) of Navy PBYs will be available at Casablanca for anti - submarine pat r ol in that area . They wil~ come into Casablanca on D y· an d be assign ed to the -da coastal frontier . The que s tion of plane markings has b een settled , All the planes , b omber s , fi ghters , trans ports , carrier - borne , will b e marked with the U. S. insigmia , with the exception of t re Spitfir es assisting the Algi ers force . The need fo r security is again s t r essed and Gener a l Eis enhow point s out er t he troops who wil l parti c ipate in TORCH"have been exhibitin g surprising accur acy in .knowing where they are going , 11 He says more cover will have to be sp r ead in another direction . The Com.--nan - in - Chief i nsists that al l affected officers der ke ep up with the latest "s had in gs " on cover pl ans . He expresses s atisfa cti on at the Joint Intelligence Com i t t e e ' s r eport on c onditi ons in Afr ica and t he Med m iterranean . The report indicates the enemy knows ver y lit t le of TO . RCH Through each of the Comm ander ' s conf erences , General Cl ark sits at G eneral Eisen hower ' s r ight , fillin g him in on t hin gs he has overlooked , expanding on the Conunnder r6 r emarks when he is asked to . The team - work betwe en Generals a Clark and Eis enhower is magnif icent . Each man sup plements the other and s eems to know wnat is on t he oth er ' s mind . The proble m of coordinating t r ansp,ort~t,:i,.on,.f roir. TPRC ha s come up and the r H Comnd er and his d eputy , following a,I◄ " /½lmira l Ramsay , hold a long · ..y!; - }r ._ . /':·'. StG c· ~ -~ �~:,i ET ;F.Cn _:. ( .... .i··.;. ..;, conference at Grosvno r Square . Br itis h and American opinion over here was that shipping and comnnm at i ons i n the M t er r anean sh ould be c oor dinate d to as sure ic edi f ul l use of all facilities and to pr event any confusion. The sug ges ti on f rom London to W ashin gt on was that a nine - member Br itish - Americ an boar d be s et up , to function in Gibr a l t ar fo r tte f irst three months , t hen to move fo r \rar d into t he theater . It woul d b e kno, n as t he Nor t h Afr i ca n Shippin g Board . General M arshal l cables back t hat he thinks a nine - member boa r d wil l b e t oo unwieldy and r ecom·nends t hat a Chief of Transpo r t a tion be set up und ,;: the Commaner - in-Chief . r d This shipping problem is now foremo s t among the many proble m to be settled . It s has been , amcng other t hin gs , one matte r that has been t ivin g Genera~ Clark a few s l eep less ni ghts . Another problem of gre at c onc ern to Gener a l Clark is ke ep i ng the Straits of G braltar i open i n even t Spain enters t he war . He has begun to propose a plan wher eby Br itish t r oops , includ i ng the much discussed Royal M arines , will b e on the a l ert in the United Ki ngdom, r eady to aai l f or an attack on Spani s h M orocco . I f the need ar ose , these tr oops , und er General Clark ' s plan , would rus h into t he region j ust as soon as the tro ops hips takin g t re in i tia l ass au l t f orces t o t ne M ter r anean could be re - loaded . Cont rol of t re Straits edi i s of t he m ost vital importance bec aµse this might be the only route thro ugh which TOR troops c ould CH be sup plied . Plans f or t he f i nal rehearsals in Scotland prior to t re emb kation of ar t r oops for battle are n ow c omplet e . The assaul t forces wil l go thr ou gh t he i r mock war in the Ri v er Clye r e gion ofi October 19 and 20 . Gener a l Clar k goes over the final trainin g plans and s i tu ation maps wit h G ener al Lem tz er . ni Preparations fo r establishment of a Fift h Army in Afr i ca are goin g for ward . The f eel i ng among ot f,er of f icers is that Gener a l Clark wil .i. head t his army but he s ay s nothing , ind i cates nothing . In a l l probability , after the theater is opened and t he operat i on is well under way , Genera l Eis enh ower wil l r eturn to London to devote al l his energies on the European Theater of Operations , perhaps making pre parations for t he openin g o:f a European front . Colo nel Sawbridge , head of Allied Forc e Hea dquarters personnel secti cn, is in stru ct ed to cabl e Washin gton t he perso1mel requi r ements for Fift h Army Headquart er s . They should be read y for sh ip ment to t re th ea ter by November 15 . Reque sts ar e bein g m de for the a entire army headqu arters , l es s heads of secti ons and principal a ssis t ants , to et her wit h ar my tro ops initially req u ire d . As addit i ona l cove r f or TORCH, it will be allow ed t o dis creetl y slip out that G eneral Eisenhower is returnin g t o the United States for conferences . G 2 has su ggested that the Vl r Department send a cable di r ect in g G•· eral Ei senho wer a n to f ~y back to W ashington . This will provi de good cov er fo r the oper ati on; particula rly :for the Com nder - in-C hi ef ' s departure to Gibral t ar . ma Two ot her matters come up to day to cause discomforture: t he sc heduled arrival of units of the 12th Air Force is not be i ng m and Gener al Clark asks et G ener al Doolittle for nf requent r eport s so we won ' t be und er any misa p,!Je hensi ons r concernin g t he strength of our a ir suppo rt. (General Anderson, who ris es t Very so of ten to bec ome a tic kli s h problem , has protested because he was not c onsulte d before a cut was ma.de in the number of offic ~rs and enlisted men of his com,,1a d n who are to be transported by a ir to Gibr a ltar . An, ~~ ~stment i s b eing made . * :~t CREJ •?·'·.s ~,\ ➔, i~:~:,,, ·, . . .. :;,j~ · ~ ~c; ,\l..;Ll~t~~i!."'!ili-~:lii"· 'rlif.\"~~ �( LONDON, OCTOER 10 , 1942-- Gen;~als Cl ar k and Ei senho wer are goin g to put up B a fi ght f or retenti on of the Nort h African Shi ppi ng Board . General Cl ark hol ds a c onfe ren ce wit u General Ga~e , Colonels Philippe , Hamblen a nd St okes an d t he c onsensus is t mt the m .titar y cannot satisfactoril i y cont rol the nece s s ar y Med iterr anea n shipping wi th out assista ice fr om c ivilia n expe rts. General Gale f eels if the pro pos ed board of nin e is not set up it will b e necessar y for t he Britis h si de to establish , i ndepen den tl y , a bod y similar to th at pro pose d by t he AngloAmerican planners i n London . General Cl ar k informs General Eis enh ower t hat he 11b elieves 11we must explain this m ter to Washingt on more ful ly and adhere to our ori ginal reco mm at enda ti on , except for th e possi ble eliminati on of the civili an cha ir man. 11 He orders that a cable a lon g th ese lines be prepared for dispatc h to Washin gt on . l Two hea rte nin g re ports ar e m ade to General Clark to day . General Gale says t he lo gistics problem is straig hte nin g its e lf out nic el y and that he has no new adminis t r ative problems . 11Everyt hi ng , 11 G le tells the Deputy Comm a ander -i n-Chie f, ~ progr essin g wel l. 11 Genera l Ryder , preparing to l eave to join his Easte rn 1s Task Force tro ops and rea dy t hem for sailin g, re port s t~ General Cl ark that he is 11opti m sti c about the su ccess of my operat ion . I expe ct resistance i at the b eac he s and it is not un.tikely that Ger m ans may be met but the ta sk ap ~ears to be in hand . 11 General Ryder is well pleased vrith t he 59th Regi mental Combat Team and predicts it will " give a good account of itself . 11 This outfit is being made rea dy for assault loa din g at Belf as t . Ryder a lso r epor ts t hat U. S. of fi cers who have been des i gnated to give an Ameican a pr,earance and com•r: r and to the British 11th Brigade G p th at will participate rou in the Algi ers assault have join ed the ir comm . Off ic ers f or t he other participatin and g Britis h bri gade , the 56th , are bein g selected . Genera l Cla rk a ppr oves toda y the a pr lication of El l iot t Roos eve lt , son of ( the president , t o take an active part in TORC G, nera l Doolit t le te l ls t he H. gener al that Roosevelt, a l i eutenant c olonel con1,,andin g the 3rd Prioto gra 1- ic Reh c onnaissance Group , has re que ste d such permission and General Spaatz i s agreeabl e . The squa drons of Roose velt ' s unit wi l ~ ope rat e initial .Ly on se mi-i ndep end ent mi ssions . Late r , t he grou p probabl y can operate dir ectl y under t he gr oup c o:n.·.1 r. ande Another off ic er is pulling out in preparation for TORCH and as the days go by the popilation of Norfol k House wil l drop material Jy . This offic er is Colon el Bentley of Transport Aircraft . He i s goin g to Gi braltar toni ght to instruct navi gators of the squadrons t ta t wil l t ransport Americ an and Bri tis h par atro ops . The trans ports tha t will be used to carry Briti sh troo pers are bein g de ii gnated so spe ci al racks for Britis D equipment can be in s talled. Regardin g fli ght of aircraft to the African theat er, General Doolit t le r eport s to General Clark t hat he f eels i t is all r i ght for transport s to f l y over Span i sh territory but tha t it is ina dvis able for fi ght ers to do so , par t i cularly in dayl i ght . The fi ght ers woul d fl y a lon ger route and be staged at Gibr a ltar to avoid possible int er cept i on ov er Spain that might give the .Axis a chance to i ntervene . Dool it t le is to ta ke the pr oblem up wi th Sand ers since it ap pear s ·that the Briti sh air coa~anders are being biven complete latitude as to th e r outes th ey wil l f .ty t o the th eater . ( The 12th Air Force , bein & is havin g or ~an- �izati onal dif f iculties . The fi ghters a nd heavy bombers ar e in cenerally good sha ~e for active opera ti ons but the li ~ and medium bombers are not u p to stren rt .h.t General Clark ord er s that he be gi ven a b i- weekly re p rt and status chart to keep hi m up-to-date on important chan ge s in preparations of t he new air forc e . Al ternate pla ns for Gener a l Ryder ' s Algiers assau l t force are being prepa red . The possibility of lan din g on b eac he s insi de Algi er s harbo r, within r ange of thre e-in ch coa st defense "'1l.ns is bein g cons i dered . Ryder c oncurs in t he plans , but sa y s naval bomardment of the gun pos i ti ons may cause grea t damage t o A~gi ers . General Clark says that i n hi s opi ni on a naval bomb rdment would be undertaken a on.Ly if t he fire of the co astal bat t er i es is effective and he doubt s if it will be effective be f ore dawn. During darkness , Ryder ' s assault forces may be able to silence the Luns f r om the lan d si de . Plans fo r landin , Br it i sh tro ops in Spanis h M orocco in case it is neces r ary ~e discussed . Admira l Ram y is in a[reement but bel ieves certa in minor adjustsa ments must be made . The fin a l i l an must have the approval of the Adm iralt y and the Wa Office . Regardinf naval matters , Admiral Ram y reports he is st udying r sa Admiral Kin[ ' s directive to the Com ~ander - in-C hi ef of th e Atl anti c Fl ee t c once r nin i the task of the We stern Naval Task Force . No wor d has yet been re c eiv ed as to t he pla n for refuelinl the Casablanca nav a l force , under Adm al Hewitt , ir at Gibraltar in case t ha t is necessary . Admiral Bi eri , who ha s just arrived fro m t he U. S ., repo r ts it might be poss i bl e to refu el thi s fle et by incre ments . Set tlement of this pro bl em, sa y s Genera l Clark , "is one of the most i mportan t whi ch has yet t o be made fir m in our plannin g . " Anoth ~r matter t ra t has yet to be decided is explanatio n , to the Frenc h , of the arriv al of Britis h. troops in strength after t he Alg i er s att ac k is complet ed . M . M k is in st ru cted by G ra l Clark to pr epar e this . Arran gement s r ac ene are c om plete for the droppin g of l eaf let s at Algi ers , O n and Casablanca . If ra additiona l l eaflets are t o be dro~ " ed explainin g the arr iv al of Britis a troops, a dditi onal aircraft wi l l hav e to be set up . Bri gadi er Wh itel~ , who has been De:r uty Chief of Staff of t he Alli ed .t< ce 'or hea dquarter s , is bein g relieved of dut y because of illn ess . This fine offi cer is going to make qui te a hol e in t he staff . General Gale i s t ry i n~ to fi nd a replace m ent as soon as pos sibl e . In the ev enin g, C ~nera l Clark entertains 18 gues t s , ol d fri ends a nd mem bers of his 1917 West Poin t class , at hi s flat in Hays M . Hi gh officers ews are someti mes criti cize d for entertaining in ti mes like these but if the cri ti cs c ould see how an inf or mal party r elaxes a man under freat pres sure hour after h our and day after day they would criticiz e no lon ger . For a f ew hours, G eneral Cl ar k is able to f or g- t t he tre m e endous res _onsibilities of his job, and , for getti ng , f res re n himself for tomorrow when he mus t plunfe once more into r ound aft er r ound of i m portant c onf erences and t he pressure of makin g one crucial dec i sion aft er another . * * �LONDN OCT O , OBER11, 1942- - A brief sum ary of t he message President Roose vel t wil l de.l iver to the Frenc h of Nort h Africa at a well - timed point on D-day is r ec ei ved today fro m Vashingt on . The pr esent pl an cal ~s f or the President to deliver it himself , in French . The t ran scripti ons wi ll be broa dcast in Fren ch fro:n the special, powerf ul sho rt wave st ati on now being set up in England . T,1e sum11ay: r "Our nat i ons ar e friends in the best sense of the word and because the continuation of that fri endship is des ir ab~e I want very simply to t e.1.1 you of c om pelling r easons forci ng me to take ac ti 0n . We have ac curate informati on of Axis i nt entions ta occupy your area at a n early date . Ou action i s essentia.l r in the int eres t of defense of both Nort tt and South Americ a . The sole pur pose is to prevent occupation by the Axis and wit h t he hope t hat t he ar ea s conc erned wi~ l not be devas tated by war . Full assurance i s given t hat moves ar e i n no sha e , manner or form di r ect ed against the government or people of your country or its possess ions i n t he area of spe ci al operations . It is believed that your c ountry wises to avo1d Nazi invasion . It has nothing to f ear fr om the United Nations . " Ceneral Clark , in a lon g c onference with General Gruenther and Colonel Holmes , r evie ws to day the entir e subject of 1 sroc l amations, leaflets and bro adcas ts . All agree that the President I s broadcast s nou.ld be in Fr encl:.. and i n his o'l7Ilv oi ce . The fir st transcri ption should be run at H- hour and c ontinue throueh out t he day and lon ger if necessary. General Patton has requested that the broadca st be timed ,·it n Lis attack but it does not apfear f easible since at ta cks at Oran and A.1giers probably vill st art hours before t he Casablanca assault ancl news of the Mediterranean landings will cert ainly be trans r!litted to Casablanca . Under t '. :lse circ umstan ces , General Cl, r k believes no loss of surprise l wil .1.result be cause of the broadca sts . The President i al proclamation also will be dro p ed i n leaflet f orm and posted in the occupied areas as soon as practicable . Thi s lea f let --in addition to anot ner announcing American intentions and bearing pi c tures of t he U. S . flag and Pr esident Roosevelt- - will be dropped throu ghout the ar eas of assault . Another leaflet , whi cn will expalin arrival of British troops in the theater , is now being prepared . It wil.l be dropped when the Br i tis b troo s start landing . M . Murphy, H r olmes rep cr ts , is cert ainly back in Africa by tnis ti me. He is probably at Algiers . }i'iurply has a dire ctive making him the r,ersonal r e.f-Jresentat ive of President Roose vel t until General Eisenhov1er I s arrival in t~1e t heate r . 1,luphy r is authorized to make hi s cont act s with key peopl e in Nor th Afric a at once . It is possible to co.rumm icate wit h him through a special state department c ode . The quest ion of having Mr. Mack, .head of the politi cal se ct ion , go into the tneater is discussed and Holmes believes it would be a serious mistake s ince Frenc , r eac ti on to a Britis ,1 political chief would be bad . Holmes declares that ';1 rp hy , Colonel M u atthews and himse lf can handle the political situation on the ground to better advantage and that Mr. t!ack should r emain in London to take care of the many pol i tical quest ·.ons that wi ll ~ .ave to be settled at t his end . Because of the deli cac y of t his matte r , General Clark suggests t iiat it h e t aken up with the Prime Ministe r at t ne next confer en ce .he holds wit h Generals ClarK and Eisen hower . j �i~~ ''l',,<',: ·:r:"'1,ffl~) ' ( • ·'. !,I... .. '.'. :i~':-t st~R'EI ·.~,-~ ~z.;~ r. ;, t~f-~:•,~ , Another difficulty wit n Gener al Anderson is ar i sing . Anders on propos es to c ommissi on a Mr. Rabino as a Brigadier i n the Britis h .Army and t ake him along as his financial advisor . Colonel Holmes thinks "t here is more to this than meets t he eye . " He sug gests that if Rabino , a fore ign exc riange expert , goe s into the theater that he be assi gned to the theater staff , not Anderson . The problem of movin g Anderson ' s nine of ficers and three en~i sted men to Gi br al t ar by air is being unsnarled . The British General i s now asking that the y be t ranspo rt ed on , as soon as pos sib l e to Alg i ers f r om Gibralta r . General Clark says it is pos sible that Anderson wi l~ be allowed use of one of the two Bl7s whic h are being stationed at Gibraltar for use of the head qua rt ers staff . / Lieut . Col. Raft , com-ander of the 503rd Parachute Batta lio n uhic h will make t he Oran jump, rep rts on progress bein made to pr epa r e t he para. e lu te fo r ce f or partici pati on i n the operation. Ra.ft says there has been l ost motio n in t he training pro gra m an d he is not satisfied wit h t he ability of th e navigato r s assi gned to the tro op tr anspo rts . Howe , Raft is still ver exceedingly jubilant about his t a sk and i s confident the mis s ion can be ca rri ed out su ccessfully . He r eports t hat British paratroops are having dif f ic ulty j umpi ng wi th British pa ra chut ~s fro m U. S . t ra nspo rts . He thinks i t wi ll be necessary , in operati <ns , for the Britis h j umpers to be equipped wi th American chutes . Gener , l Cl ar k rece i ves to day a copy of the order s rel i ev i ng hi m of comiiiand of the II Corps so he can devot e hi s full time to t he tre riendous job of Deputy Com ander - i n-Chie f . ( Literall y hundreds of i ncomin g and out going messa ges are fl owi ng over G eneral Cl.ark ' s de sk ever y day now. W h t he bi g problems settle d , most of the it cable s concern mo e minor t hings . Some of the m are a stoundin g i n· tha t t hey show r to ju st what infinit es i mal ends preparations must be made. What ab ~ut fl ea powder for t he assault and fol ~ow- up forc es ? Ei ghty seven r ai lro ao locomotives and hundr eds gf fl at car s , tankers , box car s have be en set up for use . in the Africa n t heate r i n 1942 . One hundr ed mo e locomotives wi l ~ be sh i pped over in r 1942 . Wha about pigeons to carry mess age s i n ca se of ra dio dif fic ul ties ? Beac h t gui des at every point where Ameri can troop s wi l l assau~t must b e arran ged f or . Think of the care wit h whi ch these guides must be selected ! They wi l .L s how the attackers the best r outes to a ir fields , oil dumps, co .11J. 1Unicati ons c enters , grou nd and ai r gun empla ce ments . One wrongly - pic ked guide could ap~et the sec urity of the entire landing . Code names and phr ases have been wor ked out for eve ry i mpo nt man, both Ameican and Fre nc h, in t he operation . rta r LONDON, OCTOBER , 1942- -Several knotty pro bl ems come up for disc ussion 12 tod ay at t he Commander-in-Chief ' s regular staff conference: wha t to do about Spanis i1 M orocco if Spa in or the Axis atte m pts t o c l ose t he Straits of Gibra l tar; how to refuel the West ern Naval Task Force at G br altar , if necessary; i what should be done if, for in stan ce , t he Al giers forc e is able to at ta ck on D y -da an d the Oran ~orce isn ' t; how to time President Roose ve ~t ' s bro adcast if weather delays the attack; the de ~ic ate tre at ment that must be devoted to civi l ri ghts and what must be done abo ut se iz ure of French arms, and , reports that G erman planes and men are being c oncent r ated , a ppru:: ~n-~ly for, ,.~s-e .in Nort h Africa . ·"'•t,.·REi _,.i' .. �'. r sr-·Rfi i. c · • '"' , •. ~__ ~'!,_?_;, -s:: . _.•_ ... ~.... ·,.,'·' . ( ·t;.; ''- - There is a new face ·~~ \·,'; ~o~ere:ce ~~~· table tod ay . Ge neral Fredenal.L , wno has a s sumed comman of the II Corps and t ae Oran Task Force, sits in for the fir st d time . Miss in g from the conference is General Ryder who has gone to Scotland to join his Al gie rs Task Force . r,ener al Eisen hower opens the conf eren ce wit h the Spain-Spanis h Mo rocco pro blem . ttif t his thin e goes sour , " he says, "a de c ision must come fro m the hi -_:: hest le ve l (Pr esident Roosevelt and Pri me M nister Churchill) i on what we can do . There would be no possibility of us doing something before D plus 25 . Two Britis .1 div isio ns might help us out . I have written General Ismay tellin g birn what we hope to do . I ' m asking t he British to earmark the Royal Ma nes , one old infantry re gri iment and an armored brigade f or use in Spanish M orocco if necessary. The ear li est date t nis force could start movinf fro m t ne United Kingdom to the M editerranean is D plus 16 . " l The Com-nander-in-Chief t hen brings out that General Patton has sent over a "dange ro us document" in whic h he advocates violent action a [ ainst Spanis h Moroeco i n case he is prevented from landin g on the Casablanca coa st . If such a document s houl d fal l into the hands of Spain or the Axis , Eisen hower says, it would be fatal to the operation s in c e the Axis would use it as a fulcrum to pry Spain into t he war or else as a pretext for moving into Spain for an attack on Gibr al tar and North Africa . Such a document, he c ontinues , is at odds with what Presi dent Roose v elt is tel....in g the French people in his broadcast and it is also dir ectly oi,posed t o the North African proclamation ; si gned by tene r al Eisenhower , that is goin g to be dropped on the beaches and pos te d after the lan ding . "We must t uard to t !:e · utmost against suc h documents , 11 says General. Eisenho wer . "No one must go ashore wit h any documents makin g ref erenc e to possible attacks on Spanis n M orocco or Spain or papers t hat are at variance wit h Pr~sident Roosevelt ' s m ssage or the e proclamation . n mo e r looks fl e et 50 at The sec ond problem --ref uel in g of t he Western NavaL Task Force - - results in a optimistic discussion . Admiral Ramsay reports that de s pi t e difficulties it as t hough Admiral Cuniiingham has favorable hopes of refueling the Ameri can at Gibraltar . Corrunodore Dick says he believes t he ships can be ref ueled a time; hence , by in crements , the fleet c ould get its vit al oil. The ques tion of what to do if weather conditions pr event one of the M editerranean Task Forces from landing while the other is fre e to go in , is disposed of in clear terms . "W e'll have to get ashore where we can," says · Cener al Eisen hower . "There can be no waitint for simultaneous attack . By daylight they are going to know that we are l yin t offshore so we 1 11 have to str i ke wherever we can. There ' s always a possibility , you know, that the situation we f orsee will be r ev ersed : that the Casablanca force will be able to l and and neither the Oran or Algiers forces will have the right conditions . " The proble m of timing President Roosevelt's broadcast to the North African French is brought up next . f eneral Clark assured Adm al Ramsay, the inquirer, ir th at the signal system is set up for the most r apid transmission of messages fro m the theater to London . Transcription tables will be turning and the message ready for broadcast when the signal is given . Once the troops start going over t ne sid es to get in their assault boats , word can be flashe d north for the broadcast to start . One of the chief worries is how the agents ashore--principally M r. Murphy-will be able to get in touch with both the Task Force Com ianders and TORCH :r SECRET -<{ ·-~ \'~il!ll~~ �·sEGRE Theadqua rt ers . C-ene al Clu.rk has gone over this problem time and time again with r General 1Aate jka and the last st ages of coordinating signals have been entered . The question of seizure of French weapons is br ought up by General Anderson . He believes it is imperative that as many Fr ench weapons as possible be seized dur i ng the assault phase , no matter what t he French promise to do . General Eisen hower believes the French should be told to "stack your arms ,fl but he instructs Genera l Clark to draw up specif i c conceptions of what should be done regarding French weafons . This discu ssion leads to the delicate problems of re quisitioning property in the theater and deal in g with French civil officials . After l ong disc ussion of the points involved , a more specific di r ective is asked . The Axis activity cable that has caused anxiety came from Was'.ungton . It said : "Reports indicate many ~ermc.n planes , motor vehicles and stores of gas and oil are being moved to Oran , Casablanca and Algiers from Italy and Sicily , Special German air formations are being tra i ned in Italy ready to move on short notice .fl Brigadier Mo ckler-Ferryman decla r es British Intelligence has no reports to sub stantiate this message . He says that agents in the TORCH theater ar e getting jitter y and that they undoubtedly will magnify things until D-day . flYou can expe ct more such scares ," he adds . P..nother r eport , totally unconfirmed , is that the Germans are massing 100, 000 troops on the border on Tunisia . A dee ision is made that troop transports can fl y over Spain at night but that no combat pla nes are to cross Spanish soil. M . Ma says Foreign ~.iiniste r F.c:len r ck has agreed to the transport crossings . r A final "verbal view fl er TORCH ordered for nett Fri day morning . General is Clark is to make preparations for a two-h our C- in - C meeting at which each Comma.nder , Task Force , Air , Naval , etc. , will give a narrativ e account , in front of maps, of what his mission , hi s troop dispositio n and other sali ent goals are . "This ," says General Eisenhower , "will give us a horizontal orientation of the entire roblem . Each of us will know what the other man is planning to do .fl General Clark is to allot the time for each marp.nd make all ar ran gements for the final conf erence . It wil l be the next to last maj or step before troops and Task Force c ominanders sail. The final exercise wil l be a field mq!leuver in Scotland in which all TORCH r oops , except parachute , wi ll par ticipate . Genera ls Clark t and Eisenhower will witness this exercise . On y four of the scores of important :a ers that have been pre ~ar ed by the l Plans and Traininp section of Allied Force Headquarters r emain unfinished and they are being r usl:ied to completion . General Clar k checks them over today ~ith ffi neral e Lemnitzer . They are : A r mistice Terms, detailed SOE instructions for dr . 'urphy , an operation memoa ndum on CO r !ll!11U!liques and a plan for landin , if necessary , part of the V,est ern Task Force in the Nemours area , near O . Four alternative ran plans have been set up for the Patt?n force. 1-- the entire force wil~ go into Gibralta r ; 2--forc e a landing at Nemours; 3--invade Southern Spain, and , 4--attack Spanish '..!oocco . These ar e in the order of preference . r Admiral Bieri of the U. S. Navy conf ers with General Clark conc erning naval command. He says that flall conc er ned fl novr understand that the Commander-in-Chief can command the Feste rn Naval Task Force eithe r directly or throu~h Admiral Cunningham, Naval officers in charge of shore installations wil l be under the Task Force Commanders; but , in naval matters , they may...deal di r ectly wit h Admiral Cunnin gham. s~CR E I �mj:~:; • I ( • • , •• ,:.~_ ET -S~R ~~ E ' 'l .~ .::..W. OT! Special naval operations in the harbors of Oran and Algiers are also brought up . Bieri is critical of the whole pro j ect but General Clark placat es him when he explains this is a 11Trojan Horse " operation , rather than an assault . The destroyers will go into the two harbors in the hours of darkness , run along~ide the principa l docks and place soldier - guards and naval technicans aboard the tied - up vessels to prevent sabotage which, if successful , could make the harbor useless at . a cr itical time . If the destroyers are fired on by coastal batte r ies , they are to retire . ·Another naval problem that has arisen is apparent friction between Admi als r Ramsay and Bennett concerning division of r esponsibility at Oran and concerning the manner in which Ram say has issued insturctions to Bennett . General Clark , strivin g to keep harmony in the household at a tim e when pressure is on and tempers are likely to be short , arranges to straighten the matt er out . ( Following the C-in - C conf erence , f eneral Anderson confers with General Clark . The Br itish com.mande is informed that Allied Headquarte r s will furnish r him air transportation from Gibraltar to Algiers . General Clark also explains that 59 planes , capable of carrying 800 j um pers , will be available to move British paratroops into the theate r. He impresses on Anderson that all air transports in the theat er are under headquarters control and will not be sub - alloted to Task Force Com anders in advance . These vital aircraft m will be on call , ready to f urnish transpo r t for paratroops or airborne troops according to needs . The Deputy Commander also informs Gener al Browning that 59 C-47s of the 64th Air Carrier Group are being eqipped so they can move his Br itish paratroops to the theate r when the time comes . General Cl ark next takes up the prob l em of w it i ng leaflets r that will explain the pr esence of British t r oops in an operation that started as All - American . Mr. M ack believes it will be wise to impress on the North African Fr ench that there is close U. S.- Briti sh col laboration in the TORCH venture . A r eport on the availability of the tank-carryi~ M aracaibos is made by General Oliver . These craft nrust be r eady fo r loading by sundown October 17 in or der to be ready to sail October 21. One M aracaibo , the Bachaquero , now under repair on the Clyde , may not be ready in time unless it is given a priority. Gener al Clark arran ge s this through Lord Louis Mountbatten . A check has also be en made on the M and M -4 -4A tank situati on in th e U nited Kingdom. Seventy four are here and 26 more are scheduled to arrive . These ar e to be turned over to tl-eneral Oliv er ' s 1st Armored Division . The M -3s now at Tid worth should go to the GH battalions , Gener al Clark believes/ Q O ther matt ers disposed of today by General Clark includ e s election of a Jud ge Advocate Gener~l for the Allied Forc es ; (He is Colon el Richmond . ) plans to head the thr ee propaganda ag encies , OSS, O and PWE under Colon el Holmes WI , w will integrate ho preparation of broadca sts and psychological warfare; and plans for the airplane t r ansportation of headquarters personnel to Gibraltar ju st before D-day . An air-courier service between Gibraltar and the Task Forces and between Gibraltar and London is al s o being arranged. * �.. - 31 LONDON, OCTOBER 1942--'i'he highlight 13, of General Clark I s very - busy day is dinner and a conference with Prime Ivtinister Churchill at Number 10 Dovming Street. Very little is said di r ect l y about TORCH but a contributory action--the big attack that General Alexander is starting in the Middle East on October 24 as a partial cover for TORCH is gone into thoroughly . General Jan Smuts , the 72-year-old South African l eader , has just flo'\7!1 in fr om Cairo to report to the Prime !,!nister i on LIGHTFOOTthe offensive operation , General Alexande r is planning , and find out the latest information on TCRCH The . Bri tish will make an all-out attack on the Germans on October 24 . The Germans have dug into the sand and rock in more or less permanent position . The plan cal ls for a frontal assault patterened after the Fi r st World W strategy , first , ar a creeping artill ery barrage ; sec ond , an infantry assault , that should lead to, three, creation of a hole wid e enourh for armored units to get through and fan out . Ceneral Smuts says the attack is all set ; that the British have air and tank superiority over the German Afrika Korps . Smuts reports that the new leader ship , Alexander , is fine and that it has had an electrifying effect on British t r oops in the M iddle East . Every ef fo r t is going to be made in LIGHTFOOT stress the participation to of American troops . The Prime Minister discusses this with Cenerals Clark and Eisenhower . In reality , the case will be misrepresented because American participation will be very minor , mostly bombers . However, all concerned agree that it is essenti al that Nort h Africa f eel that Americans are par ticipatin1 in all operations . It will be a good buildup f or the American TORC landings and also H good cover for TORCH . The Prime Minister reads several highly sec r et documents captured from the Afrika Korps recently . M arshall Rommel is suffering from ulcers and has returned to Germany . The Germans are frantic for more ammunition and food . From the documents it ap pears that the German supply situation is in bad shape . General Clark asks the Prime 11linister if it isn I t possible that these documents were 11 planted 11 but Mr. Churchill says he ' s certain the 1apers are authentic . Other officers at the conference include Sir Alan Brooke , com.na der of the Imperial n General Staff ; Admiral Curu~ingham, the naval comi!'!ande of TORCH anc Brigadier r , reneral Smith , chief of staff of TORCH . The question of who will take over command in case anythihg hap_i.)ensto General Eisonhovzer or if he returns to England comes up . General Brooke says this has never been questioned : "The com ·1and goes to General Clark ." It appears that General Anderson has raised the question on the basis of seniority and has taken the matter up with r11r Churchill. . Discussion of the com. and was designed to clarify the Prime Ministe r on the matter . The question is cleared once and for all . The Deputy Commandr will take over command Anderson ' s jurisdiction e ; is only in the Algiers region and he is under orders of TORCH headquarters . General Clark ·,ould si gn his orders in the name of the Commander-in-Chief . It also appears that General Anderson int ends to send back batt l e reports direct to M . Churchill . r It is pointed out that th i s may give rise to the issuance of separate communiques . Allied Force headquarters is hoping to send the Pri me Minister complete r epor ts for his information but not for use in communiques . Before goin g to the Prime L1inister I s Of.fici .a.l vrith Generals Eisen - �( hower and Smith , General Clark's day is fi lled with conf erences . The most vital one concerns a Britis h- U. S. naval matter . It hin ges around the wording of the di r ective governi!Jil '_ommandrelations c of the TORCH naval co!Thlla.nder with the U. S. Navy. Admiral Bie ri says the provision conc erning command of subsequent North African convoys was inserted deliberately to insure that U. S. Navy vessels would not be divereted from the convoy duties by orders originating with British Admiral Cunningham . Bieri points out that U. S. naval vessels escorting the D-day convoy will be required for the same duty with subsequent convoys . It is important th at these vessels get back to the U nited States as soon as possible so they can start across with another convoy . After Admiral Bie ri leav es , General Clark calls in Commodore Dick who r epor ts that Admiral Cunnin~ham feels that the paragraph referring to his cont r ol over comm and of subsequent convoys should be removed from the directive . Dick r epor ts Admiral Cunningham has no intention of diverting U. S. naval esco rts. As a r esult of these t wo confer ences , General Clark cables Washington r ecommending deletion of the controversial paragraph . The two U. S . Navy PBY squadrons for anti - submarine air patro l are set . They will be based at Casablanca and be under command of the senio r naval of f i cer in the port . But , operationally , the y will be controlled by the Commander in-Chief in Gibraltar . Al l naval di r ect ives are now pr epared and are ready for issue as so cn as Admiral Cunningham clears them . The directive for ~he Coihmander of the W estern Naval Task For ce must go for w ard without unnecessary delay since that f orc e is scheduled to sail fro m the United States October 24 . The proposed armistice terms have been appr oved and they left today for W ashington by special courier . Two new offic ers , both British , re port in today . One is Brigadier C.S. Sugden who is r eplacing Brigadier Whiteley as a De ty Chief of Staff of A~lied Headquarters . Sugden has r ecently been with troops and prior to that he put in 18 months with the Operations-Planning Group at the Bri tish War Office. The second man is Brigadier W dman- Lus!lington , chie f of staff to Lord Louis Mountil batt en. He is going to Gibr altar with TORCH headqua rt ers and will spend the coming week getting oriented in the G-3 section . A disconcerting memorandumwas turned in late tonight by Colonel Hamblen. Three British ships with a capacity of 13,0 00 t r oops have been sunk . All of them were set to be in cluded in K F3 convoy . One was the Duchess of Bedford , one of M the vessels in the trans - Atlanti c convoy that brought headquarters of the II Corps over la st July . Hamb en r eports tnat there are no reserve ships to move l into the convoy . This loss wil l have to be met someway, possibly by overloading of other ships in the convoy or else use of a larg er vessel , such as the Empress of Scotland . * * * LONDONOCTOB"":R 1942--Boxes and barracks , crates and che sts star t moving , 14, out of Norfolk House in an almost steady stream tod ay . Two and a half ton truc ks back their broad butts up to the curb and enlisted men stow away equipment that is starting the long j ourney to the North African theater . The exodus of office rs and men to the ports of loadin [ has started . Officers come into Ceneral Clark 1 s office to say goodbye and , usual1.y , the fare well salutation is "See you i n Oran" or ni.foet you in Algiersn ••• "Goo dbye and good luck . n The i m:ninency of the huge operation is star~iy appar~~~,l~day at the Commander-in-Chief ' s regular conference. The room is cr ~d~ :~ rge st group to k atthe ~.~C~ ~·~~ l_ �~·! 33 .. . ~ --· . ( date sits in on the discussion . The fin al key man on the TORC sta ff has arrived . H He is Admiral Bunningham of the Briti sh Navy who will head TORCH naval opent:bns. He has ju st arrive d fro m Washington where he was a key man on the Combined Chiefs of Staff board . Admi al Cunningham will be at G altar headquar ter s to advise r ibr Comna.nder- in-Chief Eisenho wer and Deputy CO ,ll""-anderClark dur i ng the critical approach and landing phases of TORCH . All arrangements have been made for two major TORCH matters : th e complete "verbal view 11 conference Friday in which each commander will review what plans he is to execute ,- and , the Monday and Tuesday maneuvers of all TORCH troops in Scotland . Field Marshal Smuts , Prime Minister of South Africa , will attend the Friday conference . General Eisenhower impre sse s on all commanders that either they or a c1ualified representative must be at the meeting to present a comprehensive review of the part men un~er their command will play in TORCH.General Clark has the conference details all worked<out . ·After a brief discussion of the Armistice Terms paper that has already been completed and of wor ding of various No rth African pro cla mations , General Eisenho wer asks 11if any of the rest of you have anyth ing to throw into the pot . 11 He nods to Admiral Cunningham but the Naval Com ander r eports that "things are running smoothly . 11 "Anything bothering you? 11 General Eisenhower asks the question all a.ro1.U1d the table . All he gets are ahakes of the head and 11No, sir. 11 The C~in-C turns to G'eneral Gale , head of supply . 11Sur A , 11 says Eisenhower , 11you have something that ' s ly bothering you . 11 Gale shakes his head . 11The ships are being lo aded. W ' r e having e our little troubles up there on the groun d but none of them is big enough to bring up here . " Air M arshal Welsh then reports th at air problems are being solved an d adds that disposition of the t wo U. S. Navy PBY squ adrons at Casablanca for an ti-sub m arine patrol is satisfactory . Admiral Ramsay r ep orts that Admiral Cunningham and he are leaving on a final inspection tour of TORCH naval units . The maneuvers in Scotland are then discussed . The problem wil~ start at 2 : 00 AMMonday and continu e until sometime l ate Tuesday . A special train is taking high-ranking TORCH planners nor th . It will 'leave Sunday morning and r eturn Tuesday . Generals Eisenhower and Clark must r eturn as they have another conference Tuesday night with the Prime M inister . General Lemnitze r has the enti r e maneuver proble m in final for m. Because none of the conferees has vital m atters in - Chief ' s conference lasts onl y s even minutes . to bring up , the Commander Attempting to so l ve the diff iculty caused by the loss yesterday of three British troop vessUs scheduled to sail in KHF 3, General Clark takes up the problem with General Gruenther . The loss of these three ships through enemy action has r educed the available personnel lift below requirements . This shortage , General Clar k says , can be met in part from Britis h sources . He orders preparatio n of a cable in which a r equest for one U. S. Vessel, with a capacity of 3, 500·men , is made. Another shipping problem has arisen: the British ar e a sking for 25 addi tional car o ships per month from the U. S. The M inistry of Wa Transp ort wants r W ashington to r e-examine the cap acity of the U. S. to carr y out what the MVITegards r as an ear lier agreement . Gener als Clark ~~~:'.\:1 1· ,1: \ , -1ie ? )fµtJ. CTu;.~bel Stokes discus I? the ~\:. RET,·< '.SEC ~r, 'l. ) \,, �( drafting of a cable to adJust the Britis li and U. S. difference of opinion . The W Department has again expresse d disapproval of the London group ' s ar plan for the North African Shipping Board . The final decision is left to Genera l Eisenhower so Gener als Clark , Gale and Admi a.ih Ramsay are goi ng to tr y and work r out the best shipping board solution . Prime M iniste r Churchill now believes that American Naval vessels should be with the British Fleet in the Medite r ranean , He sug gests three ships , preferably cruisers . I f this were done , there woul d be naval ships flying the American f la g in the Mediterranean Naval Task For ce and bear out once mo e the "Am ican angle" r er of TORCH The Brit i sh would substitute . three of their ships in the W estern Naval Task Force . General Clark takes up the matte r with Admirals Bieri and Bennett , both of the U.S . N avy . Admiral Bie r i says such a substitution coul d have been made ealier but such a change now would be serious since the use and dispositi on of U. S. naval vessels has been decided . General Clark sug gests the use of three U. S. destroye r s . The matter will. be presented to Admiral K ing in Wa shington . Monetary arrangeme nts fo r the No th African theater have been made• .American r dollars with a special yellow seal and Br itish pounds stamped with "British Military Authority 11 will be used . This will pr event Ger mans f ro m f loodin 6 the count r y with r egul ar Br itis h and American money and will give additional control to prevent black marketing . The Amer ican dollar will be traded in at 75 francs to the dollar and 300 francs to the pound . The political section of Allied Force headquarters is being eliminated , For the most part it has been inco r porated into the G- 3 section since much of its work involves operations . !:! . !.': r urphy is going to head civil affair,s v1ith Colonel l,l t thews as his deputy . M . iv a r 'ack wil l be used as an adv!bsor to both General Eisenhower and ~ . l:1rphy in matters pertaining 'ir u to political and civil affairs , M , afte r a conference with General Clark , is ack going to have the title of "British Civil Li ason Officer . " It appeals to hi m as "being sufficiently vague to cover any f unctions 11 wither General Cl ark or Gener al Eisenhower might want to assign him to . A proposed plan to have General Ander son ' s Eastern Force a ssault Spanish Mo occo appears impossible . Generals Gale and Lemnitzer report to General Clark r they ar e convinced such an oper ation , which was to have been used only in event host i le r eaction in that area , i s impossible logistically because it could not be suppo r ted through t he port of Ceuta i f the Axis air force is based on air fields in Southern Spain . General Clark directs that work on this al ternative plan continue but that the view advanced wmll be given full consideration before · any decision is r eached that will put the plan i nto ef fect . Gener al Gruenther recommends use of the Geneva Red C oss in the field and r General Clark agrees , Both generals favor meticulous adherence to the provisions of the Geneva Conference in the field and General Clark says this same principle shoul d apply to any instructions issued concerning treatment of war prisoners . A story conce r ning the Prime M i ste r seeps out today . During a r ecent in confere nce , the sub j ect of General Eisenhower ' s new doc came up . General Brooke asked what name the dog had been given and Gener al Clark , knowing that the · anima l was f ar fr om housebroken , said : "Ike calls him Paderewski. 11 General Brooke , naturally , asked why and General Clark repl;i.ed : 11He 1 s the pianist of the l ot . 11 Everyone laughed but the Prime .J~ ip.iste · . r d~r ewski. •pianist . Mr. Churchill shook his head . He never did get th~::.:: j f ECR ,.: E . �35 ,;:· ·SECRET ·. .\?:::. ( . - ·' ·::::·\h;. .~-:i:----';,,;;:;;;..:::){ . Today is General Eise~r ·t·s birttfd~ so in the evening his clos es t frien ds throw a birthday party for hi m at 11G 8neral Ike 1 s 11 retreat outsi de London . The piece de r esistanc e of a hilar io us evening is , ac cor ding to General Clark, an American pi~ce of roast be ef , flo vm over fro m the U. S. by one of General Ei s ennower 1 s acq ua i ntance s . M t of General Eisenhower ' s gifts are item s u seful for fiel d wear . os ,,- LO NDON OCTOER 15, 1942- - 0ne of the 11th hour worries of TORCH disposed , B is of to day when Admir.al Cunningha m informs Gener al Clark that t he W estern Nava l Task Force can be re - fueled at Gibr altar . This news allows Gener al Clark to call in Genera ls Grue nther and Lemnitzer an d proceed furt her with dis cussion of alternative plans since some of these hinged on the possibilit y of re-fuelin g this force . Methc<ls of mis - lea ding t ne Axis to aid TORCH are gone over with Brigadie r Mo ckler-Fe r ryman , Colonel Bevin and lliajor Phill.ips . This calls for news to 11l eak ' out 11 that General Eisenhower i s returning to the United States . This 11cov er 11 visit would come ju st at the time TORCH startin g . Bevin proposes that General Eisen is hower 11accept 11 an Armistice Day speaking en gagement in tne U. S . This c ould be announced or allowed to s eep out through di plomatic channels. General Clark goes over the plan and cle ars a cable 'asking Washington to coor dina te any suc h plan . ( The touchy sub ject of closin g t he po.Liti cal se ction and makin g Mr. Mack a liaison of f ic er is gone into again . General Clark is met iculous in tr eating subjects that involve r elati ons between Britis h and American personnel . M . M k as sures the r ac Deputy Commander in - Chief that the arrang_ement as outlined yesterday is perfectly satisfactory to the Britis h Forei gH Office . It has take n diplomatic handling on several occasions to hand.Le per sonnel matters . This type of work - -a djus ting points of difference between Britis h and Americ an officers , settling questions of s eniority and command--has been handled v,i th the greatest car e by G ener a l Clark . The questi on of American medical personne~ for Algiers is adjusted by G eneral Clark after Col one l Corby , senio r U. S . medical offic er of Allie d For ce Headquarters , points out th at no U. S . medic a l ef fi cers are set up to arrive i n Algiers until KM4 The general i nvestigates . and finds th at no medical offic ers , British or Americ an , wil .L go i nto Alg i ers until t he KM4convo y . General Clark , to re medy tlQs , rules that as the need for medical staff officers is foun d to exist at Algiers prior to the sclBduled arrival dat e , they wi l~ be sen t in by a ir . O course , the f assault forces are be i ng accompan ied by medical r,ersonnel ; but none of it is dir ectly fro m headquarters . An even larger group of office r s and men l eav e London today fo r Scotland , eit her to participate in directing the special pr e-T ORCH maneuvers , or e ls e to supervise loading ·;of ships , now un derway chiefly al ong th e River Ciyde . General Cla r k , preparing fo r a long stay in the war zone where g9od dental facilities may not be available , has his teet h checked over and has one filling . He is also being bothered by a sore - -probabl y ringwor m -und er his le ft arm. The only two times he leaves the office today , ex cept for luncheon , i s to make quick trips to the dentist and the medical dispensary . Because ti m is gro wing s hort and e he will not be in London much longe r, General Clark is having Britis h officer lunch with him at his f lat . Today it was General~tt .· ·affi:f U.ajor Carver , an assistant secretary at the Britis ~ 'Wa r * OfficeT. ' ' ~:-~ s· Cu~r E _, . / �t .. , t' SECREi .: LON , OCTOBER DON 16, 1942- 11We ar e now passin g f rom t he abstract to t he con cr ete phase . Our troop and cargo shi ~s are starting to load . Already some naval units are at sea and can be c onsidered as actively particip a tin g in TO . Our RCH plannin g, for the most part , i s done . I want to stress one tnin g : we must alwa ys be a ggressive . If any man, f rom squa d lea der on up , is ever in doubt about making a decision , he can ' t go fa r v.T ong if he alwa y s does the AG GRESSIV thing! " E In a c onc i se but complete talk , General Eisenhower c los . s today a thre e and a half hour TORCH resume conf erence during whi ch 12 force and/or section lea ders outline the part t hey have playe d or wi l l play in TO RCH Fifty - four office r s . crowd the map-f illed conference r oom. As man after man gets up to detail naval plans , assault plans , air plans , administrative plans , etc ., the officers , all key men in the opening of the Second Front , listen intently . There is no discus sion a s eac h man f inis i~s his outline ; only a quick change of m~p boards before t he next officer outlines the assignment of forces under his control. T1- most e impor tant TORCHconference to date is closed by Gener a l Ei s enhower ' s brief but hard hittin g resume . The conference ' s tone is pitched by Field M arshal Jan Christian Smuts , Pri me M inister of South Africa who is the only "outside " off i cer at the m eeting . The vene r able warrior , occasionally pul l in g his Van Dyke beard with his old and dr yskin hands , speaks qui etly and i m~ ressively : ( "I don ' t have to stress to you the rofoun d i m portance of this operation to t he Alli ed cause . On it hinges a turnin g point in t he war . If you are successfu l -and I know you will be successful--you will give heart and coura ge and hope to the Allied nations and to the occupied and oppressed peoples of the world." Talk ing so quiet l y at ti m that the men in the crowded r oom have to l earn forwar d to es catc h what he is sayin g, t ne Field M arshal decl ares that 11des 1 ite what t he Unit ed States ha s done and is doing in the Pacific , this is your great ef i ort and the entire world will be wat c r~ng . Its execution will bring apir eh ension and f ear to the Axis; hope and coura ge to those who are a l li ed, eit ber openl y or s ecr etly , because of pressure and control , with us . 11 Wh Smuts sits down, there i s not a en sound . General Eisen hower , sit t in g at tln.la center of t he confer ence table bet ween Field M arshal . Smuts and G ener a l Clark , cal .J.. on Admiral Ramsay to outline the s Naval Plan . Throu gh use of c liarts , Admiral Ramsay sho c·s the movement of wars hips and convo ·s to the African Theater. The British naval contribution to TO H is tr em RC endo us . He te l ls what naval vessels ar e already underway and lists the por t s at whic h others are preparing fo r the trip to the M editerr anean . W ith pin fla e s he s hows the po s itions of the convoys on various days before D-day , how they all · reac h the Sim.its of Gibraltar on D minus two so the TO RCH warshi ps and t r oo s hips and su ppl y vessels will enter the hazardous ar ea just as darkness falls . Visual ~y , the conferees can s ee the fast and slow convoys advanc e , enter the M te ..:ranean , edi f ient , re-group and then head for their beac h areas . 11For the na vy , " say s Ramsay, "the war has alrea dy starte d . At this mo ent we have fig htin g s hi ps cnr oute to m Gibraltar . " The Britis h Admiral details how submarines will lead the combat lo ad ed ve s sels to withi n five miles of the coast so the men can start loadin g in the assault boat s . Submarines will also for m a a t rol l in g 11wall 11 to war d t he Eastern end of th e M editerr an ean , goin g in a s far a s bet ween Ital y an d Sicil y . Ramsay, havin g tn e pin flag s m oved relentles s l y fo wiµ:d until. tfiey ar e con cent r at ed before fE . .~.~liV: CBU '· --+• I .;,;~_::!i· ,· =. 1 ~' ~, / �31 ( Algiers , Oran and Casablanca , exp1.ains eac h move. He also c over s final stages of the arrival of the Western Naval Ta sk , the All-Americl:l,n Naval force . Details of the assaults of the Eastern , Center and Western land f orces are next explained , r espectively , by Li eutenant General Anderson , Major Gen.r al Fred endall and Bri gadier General Lemnitzer . Anderson stresses the drive he must make to the east "to beat the Boche into Tunisia . 11 The capture of Algi ers is up to the Eastern Assault For ce f or ce that wi ll be led by Major General Ryder . From there on , Anderson will pick it up , driving toward Tunisia with the great est possible speed . Anderson ' s plan is to move most ra ~i dly along the coast so he can capture Bougie , Philippeville and Bone then m ove on Tunis . He asks that eve r y possible aid be given him-- principally motor and ai r transpo r tation . The assault plan for each of the forces is the same, landin gs wiL . be made on three beaches at ea ch point . The f orces wi ll then enci r cle the city , con c entrating first on capture ·of the ai r dromes and the ports . Gener al Fredendall expla i ns minutely the plan for the Oran assault . As he talks , Brigadier General Rooks , points out details on a huge map. The principal assault will be on Arzu beach . Two of the forces will drive for t he principal airport at which t he .Amer ican parat r oops will already have dropped . The paratroo ers have enough supplies t o hold out for 48 hours . 11V' 1 11 relieve them and have cont 1.·ol of the a irport by e t hat time , 11 Freden da ll predi cts . The plan is outlined down to the last detail , includint such items as where road blocks will be laced , how a vital ridge is to be controlled . ( General Lemnitzer , the TORCH , outlines the ,-este rn Task Force job since G-3 all officers of th at force are in t he United States preparing to sail direct to . Afri ca . Seizure of two airpo r ts is the main task here . One important feature of its attack is the use of a sea train . The main assault , in the Sale - Rabat - Port Lyautey area , wi ll be made by the 3rd Divi sion . Lemnitzer outlines what bridges must be secured , what st r ength is anti c ipated . ~ ·The two head air offi cers - -Air Marshal Welsh who will head the Eastern Air For ce operating at .Algiers , and Brigadier General Doolittle who will head the all - Ame ican Air For ce operating at both O an and in the Casablancaarea- - are the r r next to outline thei r pl anes . Both stress one thing : quick seizure of airpo r ts is essential so car r ie r- based aircraft can be relieved and harder - hit t ing ground based planes can enter the combat . At the start , Algiers , being closer to the Ital i an and Ger man Air For ces , wil l have the st r ongest force . Both forces , at the start , will be made up predominantely of fighter planes with a few dive bombers and regular bombers . The ai r strent,th buildup wi ll come after the major ports have been secured and smaller ports enlarged to accomdate bigger plan es . General Gale then g~es over the administrative plans . The shipping situation is ext r emely tight and loss of any ships before TORCH gets underway will mean a shift in plans , Gale says . He goes through the entire plan of supply buildup . By D plus 45 the plan catls for the forces to have 30 days of supplies ; by D plus 90 , 60 days of supplies. Eventually , it is pla nned that the British tro , ps will be supplied from the United Kingdom and t he U. S. troops from the Unite~ States . Since the latter supply line is longer , shortages for the .American troops will be made up from the United Kingdom. I �'38 _.ECRET ( High l y- involved a l te~~e pian~ pr edicated to meet several possible TORCH s ituations involving weather , politi cal moves, etc ., are outlined by General Lem nitzer . The greatest number of alte r na tives has been set up fo r the Wester n Task For ce which is likely to run i nto weather that wil l prevent a West Coast landing . The major factors cont r olling landi~ of this fo r ce will be weather and what at titude is taken by Spain . The Patton fo rc e may lie of f - shore and wait for bett er sur f conditions , it may move· on and land at Gibraltar , it may be ordered to attack Spanish Mo occo , or , even attack southe r n Spain . As to the Eastern Force , it too r may have to at.tack Spanish Morocco . P.nd, a s General Eisenhower later points out , i f everything goes "c omplete l y sour we may have to call . the whole thing of f . 11 Four m en-C olonel Holmes, Mr. Mack, Wir Matthews and General Lemnitzer - . outline the complicated political , civil and subversive activities that have already been made or that are going to be made. All of them stress the 11 politico military 11nature of TORCH;how political maneuvering can infuence the milit ary picture . 1,1ack predicts that the French Navy and coa s tal defenses will resist st r ongly ; that the French army r es i stance will be 11light , 11 and that the French a ir force pr obably will put up very little fight . Matt hews discourse on civil affairs concern tre technicalities of monetary standards , preparation of 11soft 11proclamations depending on the attitude and hard of the North Afri can French , use of an American 11r ont " f or civil c onta cts . f - During the entire presentation , there is not one word of discussion . As the maps are changed , the men si l ent l y mu l over what they have j ust heard . Occasionl a lly , Genera l s Eisenhower and Cla r k whi s per to eac h othe r . Many of the offi cers make notes . When the entire plan has been outl i ned , General Eisenhower walks to the f ront of the cloth - covered conference table , stands in front of the pin and flag studded map boa r ds and says : 11 planning is now nearly completed and we are arriving .at the superviso r y 0ur stage . In this presen t ation two thing s have been r epeatedly stressed : our first object i ves are -- airports and seapo r ts . These are most vital to t he success of the operation and commanders must be guided by this when seeking obj ectives . our You have seen how exceedingly f le..xible plans are . That flexibility must be kept in the minds of a l l commande s . They Iffilst be imbued with the spirit r of the of fensive i They must keep in communication with the next senio r command r , e f r om platoon up , but when independent action is demanded and when there is no time to await orders , bold offensive a ction must be the rule . 11 11 General Eisenhower then pr aises his staff , saying he had been astounded and greatly pleased by the way the Br itish and Americans had worked into TORCH cooper.,. atively and with a minumumof friction despite a difference in staff structure . He tells them he 1 s not only pl eased with them but th at he is proud of them and he beiieves the staff structure is perfect . As the meeting clos es , a feeling is l eft that a new phase of TORCH has sta r ted , that the 11th hour has come and that plans and preparations are complete . Later , General Clar k remarks that he , who,as Deputy Com nder-in-Chief, ma has had every paper cross his desk and who has sat in on.fvery conference , is 11astounded by the scope and immeasity of this thing . It 1 s siz¢' tirid its importance is stagger ing l 11 0 ~}~fC. RlT :1: ff\tG.tlM~i.w" rrr �39 During the afternoon two important conferences . He calls in Major Schofield , commander of the 60th Troop Carrier G oup that will carry r Ameri can parat r oops to Oran . Gener al Clark tells him that it has bee n dec~d that 36 t r ans~ort s wi l~ be used fo r the job and that the s e planes will revert to contro l of the 12th Air Force when the paratroops have jumped . Schof ield is confident his mission can be acconplished successful~y . He adds that he believes he can land his gr oup "without material l oss " sho r tly after the parat r oops have leaped through the transport doors . General Clark also calls in General Doolittle to impress on him that dispatching of planes f rom the United Kingdom to the African theate r after TORCH develops must go through and ap1-roved by Allied Force headquarters . Doolittle is an i ndividua l ist and a che ck-r ei n mus.t always be kept on him . Col onel Duncan , who com.'18.nds the group of B-1 7s that wil fly headquarte r s offi cers to Gib r altar , is br ought in to see General Clark . Duncan recom.,,ends a daylight flight starting at 1000 f rom southwest Cor nwall . The flight dovm of six· bombers would be in fo r mation , fo r added security , and would arrive shortly before dark of the same day , te ntativeJ_y set fo r D minus 6 . Four of the Flying Fortresses will r eturn the following day to Engl and while two , with outstanding combat crews , wi l l r emain at Gibr a l tar fo r headquarters use or else for combat missions i f r equi r ed . Duncan is apr,rehensive least the ar rival of the hea·,;;quarters staff at the R. A.F . fieJ.cl in Cor nwal l would result in too much publicity . General Clark assures him steps will be taken to c onceal identities . The i nsignia of Genera.ls Clark and Eisenhower and other t op- rank i ng offi cer s wi ll be concealed . ~iv * LO NDON OCTOBIB , 17, 1942-- General Clark is goin,; to ./1.fi ca immediately to r confer with high French leaders , probably General Gir aud and GeneraJ. ·1ast , and , possib.Ly Ad '1iral Darlan ! Tl1is sensational development c o !es ov ernight and it may clia.nge t.:.e entire aspect of TORCH If negotiat10ns . go right , our troops may enter No th Africa r itnout op,1-osition , or , wit •. opJ.,osition from only the French fleet and the coastal bat t er i es . Ev erything hinges on t11e Clark-French confere1ces . Chronologically , tuis is what hap,ens during the day : ~r.._y tr1is morning a cable is received f r om -:asilington . Mr. l',h.tr!-ny wio is , now bacK in Al.,:iers , has conferred wi t11 Frenc.i Army leaders, has told the,.t an Americ an .J..a.nding in Frenc~1 North Afri ca i s planned and , after explaining a..t.J_ we want is to get at the Axis and that we have no designs a__,ainst the French, asks the leader,:; if t, ey \ ould like to confer conceraing entra ,ce of A :::ricc...ntroo,r1s into L,.eir arfla. They say they would so h.trphy got in toucl-:i witn Vashington wnich, in turn , cabled Lonlon . ( Arrival of the cable results in a three and a half hour conference between 1 Genera.ls Eisenhower and Clark and other high-ranking officers of the TORCr staff . 11 T 1c cable fro-n Washington states that a "senior genera..L offic-c:r shou~d c ,,.,duct tne tickJ_ist negotiations . General Clark volunteers and General Eisenho er tells him that the tremendous and difficult job is in his ;~ands. V'ith w11.om Gene""a Clark ; wiJ. negotiate is not k.1ov'Il yet . Dar .J..a.n co-nma.nder in-c def of the Fre.1c armed , · forces , 1ay fly from Vic11.yto Algiers for the conference . General Giraud, hea· of -<'..Frenc gr'11.llldforces in Africa , is already there • ~ .13 thlrd man, . who probably will .1 1 .· E · CRE, �---. ~.-CRET ' i" • be present at the rendezvous v,hether the c .ief confere e is Darlan or Giraud , or botfJ. , is :ajor General ·:a.st , c i.ef of staff of the Frenc:, 19t;, Ar:ny Corps and tne key man in developing French c oL.aboration with the United States . He is also a key man in organizing Frenc1 military and political col.aboration in French Afri ca . General Clark is to hav q wide latitude in dealing with the French . Because Darlan has changed lais co l ors so many tit1es , there is mistrust anc1 General Cl ark is to deal with Giraud if he is in doubt . The entire dealing wil~ take extreme diplomacy . If Darlan and Giraud op~ose each other , Gener~l Cl .rk is to dea.l '7ith Gir aud . However , Darlan has c ont rol of the Frenc;1 navy and the potentcy of this force mus t be re ckoned wi t~ , hence , Darlan must be handled v1it'.1 extreme care . All these , and kindred matters , are gone into minutely during the ~ong conference that lasts throu ghou t the ~or ning . Similar urgent c onferences ar e being held in Washin gton , ,, it President Ro,.sevelt , Admira~ Lea.w an,.. Gen ~ral farsha::...1 r--ert ici:p "" tint:; , a"ld in London , between t he Pri:ne ~:ti ister n and his po.liti cal and mi.iitar y advisors . 1'hen General Clark busts back into his ~or folk ~ouse of fice he starts gener at i ng action . !for .hf ' s cable sti!Jlllated that the conferrin g U. S . · _eneral shoul,· be accoipanied by one man th orou ghly familiar wita details of the O.!:--'eration, one supply man, one navy man and one political expert who can speak Fre nc h fluently . Generdl Clark decides to take General Lemnitzer , head of the Al~iea Force ~-ns section; Colonel Hamblen , the sh i pping and sup 1 ly expert; Ca tain Wrig.1t of the U. S . Navy w .o ~1as been a navy liaison man since TORCB: was started , and Colone- Hol:ies , a former state department career office ~ v,,ho now heads the civi l - po.litical branc,1es of TO:l.C'T These four men confer with General Clark until . late afternoon, plo.nning their strategy , their hazardous entrance to Algeria and how thej" rill rendezvous with .fu.rphy , Mast , Giraud and possibly Darlan . The five officers ..-vilL fly to Gibraltar in t wo F J.yin~ Fortress!:s . T11en t~1ey , probably wil go to the Algerian coo.st in a Pritis 1 submarine . From this t'1ey will go as,or' at nieht in a small boat and rendezvous at some spot not-yet-desienated ,~it '1 'Iurph'' and the party he is bringing. This entire development has a bizar e touc ':1 that out - Oppenheim I s Oppenheim ! Hi'-'hly secret cables are pas ing bet-~ePn Lonclon and Washington by late af t ernoon when General Clark hurries to Number 10 Downing Street for a h stily -called meeting of 11tr Churchill ' s cabin et . At this . meetine , the Pri 1e Minister , Generals Eisen .•ower and Clark and the Bri tis~ cabinet and mi~itary and naval lea~ers go ov r the ent ire plan . Fvery man sees this confercmce as an opportunity to execute TORCHwit h a minimum loss . Newsi-la1,ers today re~ ~rt erori!\., unrest in France and the entirA confer ence and o:Aration may come at a VPry propitious time . The li v es of thousands upon thousands of soldiers , the continued use of scores of British and American warships and hunrreds upon hundreds of planes , the success of TO CH and the future conduct of the war , the start of the doYmfall of the ~azis anc' the Fascists - -all these thin gs and myr iads of inter - re "e.ted subjects could weL 1:.inge on this Algerian rendezvous t1:at Ge1,eral Clar is .,.oin 6 to nIB.ke. 0 0 As the Prime Mini., ter ' s conference breaks ui:, Mr. Churchil.1. tur .'ls to General Clark and sa~·s slowlJ : "Ynu can al~-ays kee1 in minr , C...e.rk, th ut e 1 1::... back you u in whatever you co." Sol -mly , the Britis: Prir. e llin i ster then shakes hand with the lanky, black-haired Al'TlPrican ['.Pne1·E.l vtl"o has suddenly been £)laced in one of the most crucial srots of the war . 1 Back at the off ice , General Clark sets u transportation �YI .'_:_:': .. ' '.. f \ ' . ':~:}\E,( r'.f'IJ, ,,;~ ....,. ·.~E·P. . ( ·t" ·• M•~ . ·ff:;T,'/....,. E '1! '.> to Algeria . If th e w at her i~-,.., ~~af/ •tfi'e'• i iies , ill take off s ometi l'le toni eht . J V. h the four men who are to accompany him , Gener a l Clark pores over inco min g and it outgoin g cables . Replies to W hington must be drafte d wit i infinite as care since one word in a cable di scussin i:: how negoti at ions are :to be handl ed may chanee t he entire t hought of the m ace . ','it h Ca ptain Tri e'1t, "' ess -eneral Clark goe s over t he submarin e set-up . It is a lmost dark when General Cla rk return s to 1: s Hays i,1ew flat. i s Bags must be pac ked . Eac h man in the part y is taking bot h military and civili an clot hes . Five carbines and 40 0 roun ds of 30 caliber ammunition is obtain ed so ea ch m , ill be an ar ,ned . Frenc ;:1Nort h African francs and gold pi eces are sec ured by the finance depart m . General Clark is akin g not on ~y enough money for the pers onal u se of th e ent five men, but also enou eh to buy of f lea cer s if neces sar y and to buy their way out in case they fal l into a trap. In the space of a fe w h ours the s e eventu al i t ies must be pre pared for . Hi gh strung and preoccupied by t 11e hazard ous mi ssion he is to under t ake, Gene.cal Cla rk is unable to relax at h i s fla t s o he drives to Gener & Ei se nh ower I s l country place to carry on furt l1 di s cus s ions . La t er in the eveni ~ , the Air C r~s er re pcrts th at a takeoff durin g the ni ght wi l l be impos s ible; that the fli ght from London to Gibraltar probably won ' t start until l ate to m orrow , or , pos s ibly, M onday morni nc . This is the gist ( of M J,hy ' s cable: ur Vlhen he returned to Algiers , th e head of French intel l ig ence , asked for a secret intervie w. It to ok place at an isolate d s pot . The Frenc h ha d be ·n instructed 7 by Darlan to contac t M phy upon his r eturn from the U. S. Both Ger man and Japanese ur sources have rep orted to the Fren ch that the U. S . is plan ning ear ~y mi1-tary operi ations against Dakar an d/or Casablanca . The Germans have ur ged t he French t o ta ke "eve r y pr ecat.tion" a gainst t his and the Frenc h fe e l this ma c onstitute y a pretext for Axis occupat _on of Frenc h Nor.th Africa . The Frenc h '"enera l staf f is c onvince d of 11im:::n ,:- t 11 Axis a ggr ession in th ,.__ i n region . 11The German s , 11 cabl es i,fu. phy, 11ap: ear r deter mine d t o settle the W estern ;,1editerrane an issue durin g t he c oming weeks , and wi l l have the u s e of Spanis L mainl and an d Spanis h M orocco for t hi s purpose . Gibraltar is under consta nt survei l lance ••• In French opinion defi nite action is not a questi on of weeks but days . '' i.~rp hy rei,nrts the Fr ench politic al situation u is 11extr eme 1y 11 delicate and a collapse may be expected in as little as te n days . "Accordirgl. y , 11 M phy continues , 11Darlan is face d wit Lt a de c i sion ... It a pea r s ur he wil_ L b e willin ,.::t o come to Africa and bring v.it r hi m the Fre nc l. fleet if he , as cor-1ander-in - c hi ef of the Fre nch armed forces can be a s sured of U. S. ability r and willingn e ss t o SUI}Jy l arge sca l e aid , both materi al and econo mic . W i suc h an J l it indic ation , t he1e is strong possibility that D arlan coul d coope r at e , in whic h ca ::; e t he mi.L tar y and nava l forces in Fr enc h Africa wi L,. undoubtedl y obey his comm . 11 i and The French intel 1. gence officers i were sent to M iiri:,hy "for the ,sole purpos e of a dvising me that I may possibl~ re ceive a messa ge from Darlan in Algiers. There is no question that the situation in Fr enc h North Afr ic a is m oving fa st . Inform ation indicates t he Axis have massed ab out 100 , 000 troo 1-• a l ong the Tunisia n fronti er •• 11 s M phy requests imme ate advice 11as to limits I may go in r eplyin e to Dar lan I s ur di repr e s entative who desires to knon : 1- - Are we wit l D arlan? and will~rtera~ !t~c e �( 2-If so , will we be able to do so quickly and on a large sc ale here and/or in Europe? 11 Murphy recommends 11that we encourage Darlan on the basis of securin g his eventual cooperation with Gir aud, •• Dar ian is expected here next week . 11 Murpl:).ysays that General Mast has told him that General Giraud 11desires that he be dea lt wi th instead of Dar lan , who he feels cannot be trusted , but is extremely desi r ous of c l imbing on the band wagon . 11 Mast sa ys the army is loyal to and will be comm anded by Gi raud instead of Darlan; also , that the navy in French North Afri ca would go along with the army . A er his talk with Mast , Murphy transmits f't Mast ' s request for 11i mmediate di spat c h of f i ve American offic er s from Eisen..1-io 1 s wer staff to meet a s imilar number of French officers on October 21 , at a }Oint 150 ki l ometer s west of Algiers . One of these officers is to be a gener a l officer • •Their arrival should be by submarine at night , for a stay of 48 hours in a private house , 11 Mast su ggests the possibility of in c or porating in TORCH tl,e occupation of s ome part of unoccupied France by the French army is they can be supplied by the United States . 0 enerals Clark and Eisennm er went into this proposal today and al thou h it a1 }'ears impossible for the U. S. to su pi,l y i t , a plan is proposed vrhereby three sh i ploads of suppli es would be shippe d by the Britis h . Cab.1. General Marshall es regarding the party lead by General Clark : 11From infonation available here , it wou.1.d seem advisable to dispatch the group of officers from your staff by submarine if possible a s this may result in confi r ming to your satisfaction the Frenc n propos als . 11 ( The question of comman in Fren ch North Africa naturally d comes up and Mast insists that it is politi cal and must be settled in advance . Conferees here think the top Fr enchman, probably Giraud , cou ld be made a Deputy Com nder - in-Chief , Says ma M urphy by cable : n:ir st asserts we can gain entry practica.1.ly without firing a shot a through Giraud ' s com.rnand Mast also stated that Giraud insists . that embassy at Vichy , l~gation at Berne and other possible contacts b e issued instructions that negotiations with Giraud will be routed thr ough other channels , since Giraud wishes to continue his contacts with the U. S. through Mast in Algiers for rea sons of safety .n To get Giraud from Fr ance to North Afri ca , it i s sug gested t hat an American submarine pick Giraud and his party at night on the French Mediterranean c oast . * POLBROOK , ENGLANDOCTOBER 1042--G ener al Clark and his f our key officers , 18, are ready for departure to t he Algerian r endezvous . They arrive at this American bomber base , 73 miles northwest of London, at dusk , prepared to ta ke off whenever the weathe r i s r i ght . J The r endezvous is to take place 15 miles west of Cherchel , Algeria , about i5o kilomete r s west of Al giers . The cable l ocal i zing the rendezvous is fantastic . General Clark will meet the party being brought to the rendezvous by M urphy at an isolated hous e back fr om t he beach . The submar ine t hat will carry General Clark from Gibraltar to the Algi erian coast wi ll approa ch the shore by a b eam throvm by a l ight that cannot be seen f rom the landside . General Clark and his party will go ashore in smal .1. boats i f the weather is pr act ic able . I f not , the rendezvous m ght be held aboard the i submarine of a French war ship . Prime M inister Churchill has arranged it so General Cla r k can have two Sunderland Fly i ng Boats at his disposal if he needs them . I General Cla r k spends the morning General Lemnitze r, Captain W ght and ri �Y3 ( ~ they go over t he plans and huddle _ the woril.:i,;µgof cabl egr ams. Gener al Ei s enon hower depa r ted at 8 : 50 Al~for S66tlan d and th e TOR tro op maneuver s . Nothi ng was CH changed in th e nort hern tri p plans s o onl y a f ew offic er s know t hat Gener al Clar k di d not go; that, in st ead, he is goin g on a hi ghl y s ecr et m ission . By l :ee PM everythin g is cle aned up and t he general goes to his flat to finish hi s scant y pac kin g , writ e his wif e a lett er to be deliv er ed onl y in case he doe s not r eturn ? and arran ge final pers onal det ails of his departure . Cabl es have b een r eceiv ed ' fro m W hin gton sa yin g that 11Agr ee 11 (the code word for Gener al Clar k ) is to proas ce ed wit h his mission . His instructions ar e bri ef, the approac h and confe re nc e with t he Fr ench bein g lef t l ar gel y to his discretion . Time . and time a gain as he does la st-minute things befor e l eaving, General Clar k r em ks : 11'fhis i s f antas t ic--ar r eally fant a sticl" Genera l Clar k and his party depart fr om London in t wo auto m il es at 3 :42 PM ob and arriv e at Polbrook ju s t b efo re dark . Because his i dentity s nould r emain s ecr et , t he ge ner a l t akes alon g lieutenant colon el 1 s · silv er le aves whic h he wi ll be wearin g upon his ar r iv a l at Gibr a ltar . The party is t aken to Air Corps Offic er s' bar r acks for quart ering unti l departur e time, expe ct ed someti me durin g th e ni ght . The weath er i s stil l clou dy . For s ecuri ty rea s ons, the gene r al and his part y eat at a smal l , mome private m ess hal l . The t wo planes are r eady on the fiel d, mere l y awai t ing weat her cl earanc e . ,General Clar k and Colon el H amblen wil l travel to gethe r in the "Red Grem " with Colon el Tib bits as pilot. lin G ener al Lemnitz er , Captain W ght and ri Col onel Ho.:hm wil l tr avel in t he second plan e , th e 11Boom es erang." * * BY FLYINGFORTRESS GIBRAL , OCTOBER 1942-- The two Fl yi ng For tresses TO TAR 19, take off f r om Poleb r ook at 7: 10 AM Pr i or to start of the f light , Gener al Cla r k . l ays down a pol i cy of ac tio n . I f Genera l Clark ' s plane is f orc ed back , must land at s ea or otherw is e de l ayed , Gener a l Lemn tze r , ri din g in the other plane , wil l i cont i nue on t he missio n. U nder no ci rcwnstance is ei t her pla ne to la nd i n Spain or Port ugal . General Lemn t zer i s carr ying a wei ghted tube containing al l the i highly se cre t documents necessary i n this f antasti c m ssion . i The two planes , car rying f ul l combat crews in addition to the specia l passenge r s , nose into an overcast at 600 f eet and fly in it f or half an hour befo r e they come out above the cl oud strat a. After flying above the clouds for three hours , t he weather becomes cl ear and noon and the two planes are over the sea . The "Red Gremli n , 11 car rying Gener al Cla r k , l eads the "Boomerang." Only one ship is seen , a smal l sailing vessel s omewhere off Portugal . The planes sigh t l and at 1 : 50 P:'11 and it r em ains in sight unti l about 5 :1 5 when the peninsud.a of Gibraltar comes into view . As the planes ci r cle Gibr altar , Spitfires come up to look the Flying For tresses over . Captain ·: . S. Connors , pi l oting the "Boomerang, 11 goes in , first , landing at 5 : 50 Pi.i. General Cla r k ' s plane lands at 5 : 56 PU: On the trip . down the office r s rode in the radio compar tments and bombardiers ' seats . As usual , General Clark spends quite some t i me in the co- pilot ' s seat . Both planes need the full length of the Gibr altar airpo r t r unv;ays • The party is met by Colonels Willis and Gaylord of the U. S. ~y Air For ce and the aide to General -'A ason-i'llacFar l ane , governor of Gibr al tar . The party goes immed ately to Governor' s House and , after cleaning up, the i general meets with Governor H Far l ane and hi s advisors . No v10 d has been r ec eived ac r f rom Mr. Murphy concerning the details of the r endezvous . General Clark , eager to push on with the mission , is disappointed . The P, General Cl ark ' s eStECRt f �.. . ( party , General MacFarlane and his group conference , dis cussing all angles of the Lieutenant Je wel , skippe r of the P- 219 , Clark party to its sea-ed ge rendezvous , w hether to pr oceed accor di ng to pl an or decided to put to sea ! and U. S . SOE and OSS officials , go into hazardous miss i on to North Afri ca. the British submarine th at will take the is pr esent . Discussion cent ers around whether to await word from lvfuphy . It is r The group goes by automobiles to the berth of HMSMa idstone, submarine depot ship , for dinner . The fol lowing message is dispatched to Wrurphy via Lieutenant , Colonel Eddy in Tangiers : "To Eddy (most immediate) . a . Refe r enc.e Murphy' s r ecent messages to Y;a~ Department , Washington , please adv i se Nlu phy most im1ediately that X and fo r staff officers as re quested by him intend to rendezvous at point fixed on ni ht Wednesday 21 O ober . b . Reception party should the refore be at rendezvous f ct 2100 hours GMTand be pr epared rema in there till dawn 22nd . c . In event weat r pr events landin g on night 21-22 r equest Mu phy arrange alter-native r plan to conduct conference aboard submarine at time and plac e to be determined by l1iurphy and be cdm~uni cated to X (General Clark) via Gibralta r. d . If neither plan operates on night 21- 22 landing party will attempt landing on night 22- 23 ••• 11 After dinner aboard the r.1aidstone with various British and Ameican officials , r General Clark ' s party boards the P-2 19 with Lieutenant Jewell. The ship gets away i m1edia te ly , at 10 : 15 PM Gibr iUtar Time • The party turns in early . * ABOARD SUBMARINE n IN ,IBDITERR.ANEAN , OCTOBER , 1942-The P-219 sails on the 20 surface . Pre aring for the ordeals that lie ahead , General Clark and his four officers sleep unt:i.l 8 :30 AM In turns ; members' of the party go on deck . The sea . is smooth , the weather fine . The P- 219 steers a zig - zag course to prevent hostile submarines ' fr om firin g torpedoes at it . At 3 :1 5 Pl:! a conference is he_ld to discuss plans for boat rehearsals and landings. Three Commandoofficers , familiar with the little Falbot boats that General Clark and his party will go ashore in , are aboard the submarine . General Clark and his officers , the commandos and the ship ' s officers participate in the conference . The general plan concerning use of arms (ca rbines and Tommyguns) , action ashore , reconnaissance and signals is gone over . The subJ!l8.rine will go as close in-shore as possible and survey the beach with the periscope} Not a word has been receiv ed fro m Gibraltar by the P-219 . Ap1 .arently nothing has ·been heard from Murphy. General Clark and his officers are. eagerly awaiting word . To pass the time , they play bridge in the cramped submarine. At ~: 30 P1A Lieutenant Jewell stops the submarine and the officers who are 1 going ashore rehearse , ih the middle of the Mediterranean , disembarkation from the rol1ing'submarine . Colonel Holnes and Captain Livingstone launch their Falbot first . They paddle noislessly away into the night . From a distance of several hundred yards they try out the infra-red signal light , sending a message from the Falbot to the submarine . The light cannot be seen by the naked eye but with the proper kind of unocular it is visible . This signal is to be used later when the party gets on the beach . It works perfectly and Hofu~es and Linin gstone return to the sub • .SECRET ~ �( ··sEcR - EJ General Lemnitzer and Li~t\te ~~ t, ·Foot e ~ke the next trip . Although this is practice , it isn ' t a 11dry run . 11 The se cond Falbot takes a litt l e water as General Lemnitze fends it off the gun pl at f or m dur ing a high sr.ell . Both men get ~et but stay in the canvas boat . Col onel Hamb en and Captain Y' igh t test the i r Falboat l r out satis f actorily . General Clu.rk and Capt a in Cour tney go last . They make their lau nch i ng smoothly . Courtney is an expert on these boats and has inst r ucted the group r epeated l y on the corr ect ,nay to get into the pre carious lit,le boats . 11over -t he-siden V!ith the mid- :foditerranean exercises: completed , the group goes belo, .. and the P-219 pushes on again . · Soon the men ar e as l eep , the sub moving steadily through a smooth , slight l y moo da led sea . At 6 : 20 Aii the K ,rnns sound :f, I nla and the submari ne , now near i ng the No th African shore , di ves . There is still r no wor d f r om Gibr altar . Y'ha the hell? r-eneral Clar k and th r ee of his officers play t br i dge dur ing t he mo ning as the submar ine nos es s l ow y al ong under the :Jedi te rr l r anean . The air gets rathe r v.ar m and oxygen-l ess . The men, par ticula r ly the army men, f eel dopey . The submarine , by" · · rnoon , i s off the rendezvous point . Lieut enant Jewell t akes the vesse l up so the par ty can look at the r ende zvous house thr ough t he periscope . There is no sign of l i f e l The house is a chateau - type . The \ sub is a m e and a half of f - shor e . The sea is st i ll smoot h and the weather fine and il warm. The depty guage shov:rs 32 feet submerge nce . GeneJ ."al Cl ar k and the othe r of ficers peek through the per i sc ope . Fi r st it is ane l ed up so the sky can be scanned f or planes , then i t is swung ar ound the hor izon fo r ships , fina l ly , i t is concentr ated on the r endezvous house . A te r a fe~ seconds of peeking , the sub drops a f l ittle , then the periscope breaks wate r again and another quick peek t taken . The crew makes sket ches of the beach . Hnabl e to sight any unusual activity , the submarine , stiE . v:-e l unde .,..water , l sneaks a'\7ay to sea again . It goes out ten miles , the Lieute nant Jewel l turns it ar ound at 4 : 30 P:.~ and proceeds sl owly toward shore . The periscope is 1,ut up every f ew minut es f or obse r vation . A l ate l unch of canned tongu , be ets , breL.d and fresh tomatoes is eaten . Then the gr ou~ that .. i l l go ashore shaves fo r the f i r st time since Monday mo ing . The army men, wit h st ubb l y be ar ds , almost l ook l ike th e P-2 19 rn cr ew .. hi ch spo r ts a l ot of f ine gr owths . Prepa r ing to go as l-J. " and ant i cipa t ing a or message from :forphy , the nmsette bags ar e r e- packed fo r landing . The f ol lowing message fi na ll y i s sent to the submarine fr om Gi br alta r : "Most secret and pers onal . From Flag Offi cer Corn anding North Atlanti c Stat i on . Info r mation P r ecei ved tha t mAetin ::-cannot take place on poar d su1k:a:-· ne,..,or ·siufo.ce vesse l but ~must ± t ate . place- as i:, ev i ously arranged . Your par t i es v;ere orig i na l ly exp8cted ni ght Octobe r r 20- 21 up to 0500G . I f not conta cted the n you woul d be exfe c ted on night 23rd . :5 :.IT y part two f oll ows: Par t Two: The interested parties have been i nforme d to expect you night 21- 22 as well and t hat if no contac t made to expect you might 22- 23 . Y;m should < assume the r efo r e that you are expec t ed to nigh t and tomorrow ni ght . " ( Gener al Clark gathe r s hi s me i n t he restri cted conf ines of the submar ine and n out lines the f ollowing pl an fo r t r oubl e asho r e . On sa f e ar r i va l asho r e , the party wil l turn of f the white toward - the - se a li ght that is to guide them in . They will st art it r e-f lashing early Thursday mo ning if they wish to re-emba r k . The submarine r wil l st and of f f r om the bPach , di r ect l y i n f r ont of the house , al l night of the 2122 and 2?- 23 . If no r adio communication is established and no word r eceived fr om shor e , the submarine .will take a station five mil es off Fountain e de Geni e at daylight Saturda y until Sunday mo ning . If stil~ no wor d is r eceived , it will ret urn r to Gibr alta r . �( General Lemnitzer resistributes the gold so that each of the three Commandos has 2 , 000 francs, three $10 and three ~5 gold pieces . General Clark and his four ~ staff officers carry large amounts of gold . The submarine again approaches the ' shore line, g0ing in within two miles but still no signal light appears ! There is now considerable doubt and ar,prehension about the r ende zvous . The group considers whethe r to land despite the absence of a signal li ght but this is finally r ejected . After waiting offshore until 10 : 50 PM the submarine is turned about and , hea~s s~award a gain . General Clar!. turns in, believing theJe will be no landing tonight (Wednesday) . About 11 : 50 AMhe is awakened by ship ' s officer who tell him that a light is now showing at the rendezvous point and that the submarine has turned again and is headed for shore . There is much activity as the eight shore - J'--\ bound officers dress , prepare their kits and get the ~oats on deck through the torpedoe hatch . By midnight , the submarine has stopped and the men and their four boats are ready to debark . * * * ,,~ SECRPTREND~ZVOUS, N'lARCHERCHELALGERIA OCTOBER ~~42--The P- 219 has , , 21[ stopped two miles from the Algerian shore . Captain Livingstone and Colon el Holmes launch their Falbot successfully despite heavy swells . They paddle 50 yards away from the submarine and wait . Genera l Lenmitzer and ,Lieutenant Foot are next . Just after th ey clamber into the Falbot , a swell forces the littl e boat under the hydroplane and the two officers narrowly avert capsi zin g . They paddle out and wait with Livingstone and Holmes . Captain W ght and Colonel Hamblen then embark ri without difficulty . General Clark gets into the Falbot without difficulty but Captain Courtney , who has instructed everyone on how to get into a Falbot without di ffic ulty , gets tangled up with the boat and hydroplane and the Falbot capsizes . General Clark orders Colonel Hamblen to return to the submarine and the Deputy Commander-in-Chief boards Captain V' ght I s Falbot . Courtney , chagrined and ri soaking wet , is f uming on the sub hen the three-Falbot armada starts shor eward . The sea is quite smooth and the going is easy . As the boats approach the beach , Livingstone and Holmes go ahead to r econ.oiter . The Falbots containing General Clark and Wright and Lemnit zer and Foot wait silently 200 yards offshore . From the darkness over the Hissing surf comes the signal--the letter K flashed on a flashh ght - -that Livingstone and Holmes are ashore and all is well. General Clark 1 and Captain Yri ght then beach their boat , followed by General Lemnitzer and Lieut . Foot . 1,ieanwhie, Courtney has r epai red the other Falbot which was damaged slightly l when it capsized . With Ha.ihblen as his passen ger , the Commandoofficer comes dash ing ashore , arriving only a few moments after the third boat . General Clar k 's party is met on the beach by M Murphy and his assistant , r. M Knight . They are accompanied by several French officers , some in uniform , r. some in civilian clothes . After a brief conference at the water ' s edge , it is decided that the America.~ contin gent could not confer and depart before daylight so the submarine is called by r adio and Lieutenant Jewell t ·instructed to bring the P-219 back about 8 :00 P'i Thursday evening . The group then gathers its gear together and heads for the r endezvous house . They carry the boats about 200 yards along the beach and up a steep path to the chateau which is located about 200 feet above the beach . The boats and gear are hidden in the house . The Americans and Fr enchmen have about one hour of genera l di scussion but there is no official talk since Genera l Mast and his staff will not arrive until about 6:00 Jm Hence, . everyone turns in for a few hours rest . · . .Y' �.( The rendezvous house is located on a bluff overlooking the sea . It· is lar ge and r ambling and well-suited for a secret meeting place . It is well isolated . Nearby are woods . There is ample space for the lar ge group that wi ll confer . The rooms and bedding are very dirty and the indications are that the place has not been occupi ed for some time . It is owned by a French patriot . He has told his two Arab 'servants that they will not be needed ; that he will let the m know when they are to return . / At 6 :00 AH General Clark and his party and the French officers v1ho were on the beach are awakened by r.Tr Muphy . Shortly thereafter , Gerteral Mast and Col onel . r Jousse arrive and Generals Clark and Lemnitzer meet them in a reception room and the discus s ion begins . '1ast makes a good impression on General Clark . He impresses him a s "a man who can be relied upon ." Mast , r ight - hand man of General Gir aud who is still in Unoccupied France , says he ttwants an opportunity to go along with the Allies ." Above al.L thi ngs , Mast seems sincere . He proves that sincerity by turning over to General Clark valuable inte l lige nc e c oncer ning disposition of French fo r ces , not only in the Algerian r egio n which Mast commands, but throughout French North Africa . The general ' s impr ession is tha t Gener al M ast is absolutely since r e , capable and completely engaged in sett i ng- up a French government in North Africa under General Giraud . Ma.st willingly pr esents all his plans ih complete detail , revealing maps and supporting pape r s . He gives the concBete impression that he can be trusted completely and will do everything within his power to assist our entry into North Afr ica . The general French No th Afr ica attack plan sug~ested by M r ast parallels that of TORCH close l y that General Lemnitze r remar ks that it looks as thou gh he so might have read a copy of TORCH outline plan . General M ast speaks Engli sh except when he gets to highly technical discussion . Then he is interpreted by either M . Mu r rphy or Colonel Holmes . Mast freely admits that he can do little without the help of the United States , He says he has sufficient men, but no arms . He is short on ammunition , m odern planes , armored vehicles . He has practically no gasoline , In fact , he says he has nothing to prevent Axis occupation of the area r ega rdless of the odds . He paints a pitiful picture of how helpless he is without United States help , He makes no sweeping boasts about what he and his troops can do . At times he seems to be on the verge of tears , particularly when discussing the sparse means he has available to protect French North Africa . /' When the confer ence with General Mast and his staff started , it was decided that both sides would lay all their-cards on the table , that there would be no holdin g back of info r mation , no lies. The parties all agreed . Says General Clark late r, that 1s when I st ar ted 11l;ting like hell. 11 Uast asked how big an American effort could be made. Without batting an eye , General Clark declares that "half a million .American ,&°~ s can come in 11 and adds the strerg,h of the air force v ould be "about ;.tJcq~ ·· . he Deputy Commande- in - Chief also adds that 11there is r plenty of U. S. Navy r eady to go in this thing . 11 M ast is greatly impressed . He sugges ts that General Giraud be br ought to No th Africa from Unoccu~ied France in an r American submarine . None of the French realize the imminency of TORCH they know som~ ; sort of operation is plan ned by the United States but a 1 parently nothing definite has leaked to them . M ' s .great fear is attack by the Ge mans . If such an attack comes, ast r says l.1as , "we will fi ght immediately , no matter what we have to fight with . " t Although Admiral Darlan , head of all French forces , has arrived in Africa , he is not invited to or informed of the conference , Giraud and Darlan have di~~erent views . Neithe r Giraud or Mast would partici ate in negotiations invo l vin g Darlan . JEliRtl ~ �( Mast says he can promise the suppo r t of the French army in North Africa ; that it will impl i citly follow the orde r s of Giraud and himself . He says an American landing in Nor th Africa will have little reaction from the French army and air force . The French navy , however , will resist , says Hast , but the resistance won' t l ast long . When Genera l Clark expl ains that the enti r e basis of the proposed American l anding in Nor th Afr ica is to l aunch a d~ive to the east to fight the Germans, Mast is enthusiastic . He suggests that there ghould be a landing at Bone . This might be done by parat r oops . tiast says he believes the American aratroops could land intact by plane at the Oran ai r port , then push off the next day and drop over Bone . He says the French civil organizations there will act in conc ert with the American troops . From Bone, Mast believes that about 3 , 000 t r oops could rush into Tunis t o a localized area that they could hol d until r einforcements arr ive . General Cl ark asks how the paratroops could l and unmo ested at Oran . Mast ' s ai r officer , l who has already given the American offi cers detailed reports on the dispersion of French air fo r ces and minute f acts concerning airpo r ~~, says French troops in the Oran area "wil l pat them on the back and be glad to We: " What about getting the a ir por t lights on so we can land , quer ies General Clark . "I 1 11 turn them on myself ," repli~s the French air of f ic er. An unopposed par atroop landing would save ten daysthe amount of time it woul d take to r e- pack the chutes and re -~ quip the men. As :111ast outlines how he thinks a North African landing should be made, General Cl ark and his men are astounded by hov; closely ~.;ast' s plan parallels their own. It is identical expect it o,mits the Casablanca attack . Hast says a frontal attack at Casablanca would be suicidal . He turns over to General Clark detailed plans showing how the French navy plans t ,o block harbors . · Mast says the North African French officials must know four days ahead of tne,landing date if they are to make the necessary arrangements for the American troops to come in with a minimum of opposition , Tot knowing some of the TORCH troops are already at ·sea , ;,last says Giraud must be brought over when convenient . Ile says that he can issue instructions to the French arr,1y in North Africa which he says is loyal to him . He asks that his army be furnished with equipment as soon as possible so it can aid in the fighting . General Clark promises to obtain as much equipment as possible . '..last asks that General Giraud be given conmiand of all troops , A merican as wel~ as French , in North Africa and after long discussion General Clark says he believes this command can be given at the appropriate time . Mast wanted the comiand of American troops to pass to Giraud as soon as American feet hit the No th African r beaches . General Clark is convinced by Mast that General Giraud will come to North Africa i1I1Jaediately . Giraud must be informed of the operation by November 4 . An American'submarine for the secret Uediterranean crossing is out of the question but General Clark believes he can get one without difficulty from the British . Mast and ' General Clark draft a letter to Giraud , A reply is expected by October 27. The question of relations with General Juin , commander of cer tain French ground forces in North Africa , is brought up by General Clark , Says General 1,1ast : "P-f-ft , I 111 handle him, just like that l" And he makes a breaking motion with his hands . ( Use of British troops in the operation is brought up . Mast wants the North African landing to be A 11-American . General Clark tells him that is impossible; that because of American commitments in other theaters , there would have to be some ··SE REJ & �, .. .,✓~ o4- JfCRET British naval and air un~ts( Ma.st indicates the Fr ench would be disa.1 ·pointed the British made the propos ed Bone landing . if One of the gravest questions concerning Giraud , 'fast says , is sacrificing the rest of Unoccupied France to the Germans if the French cooperate with the Allies in North Africa . Giraud believes the Germans are preparing to occupy the re mainder of Fr ance ·no matte r what happens . Giraud wants to hold a bridgehead in Southern France through which French forces r esisting an Axis advance into Un occupied France could be supplied by the United Nations . !fast is ,•mrried about Spanish lforocco . He says he has three French di visions along the southern border in case Spain seizes the opportunity to attempt a push southward from Spanish ~orocco . General Mast presents to send to General Giraud . final paragraph pertaining :M urphy makes the translation is to go to General Gir aud a copy of a lett er he has prepared for l1lr. Mup hy r It is satisfacto r y , General Clark says, exc ept for the to com~d . The group wo s over General Mast 's letter . rk from French to English. The approved letter , which immediately by messenger , reads : :I r:u, .,,.,. • lr"-7$A- \ • C tfr ,., 4 (!,, .~ • r "My dear General : "Ref errin g to statements ma.de on several occasions by President Roosevelt and the obligations already assured by the American Government as well of as the British Govern.~ent , I am able to assure you that the r estoration France in its complete independence , in all its grandeur and the extent it possessed before the vrar, in Euro.e as well as overseas , is one of the war aims of the United Nations . "It is understood that French Sovereignty wi ll be reestablished , as soon as possible , in all the territories , continental and colonial, over which the French flae flew in 1939 . "The Government of the United States considers the French nation as an ally and will treat it as such . "I wis h to add that in case of military operations in French territory (either in metropolitan France or in the colonie s) in all cases where French col.1.a.boration wil l be available , Amer an authorities ic will not intervene in any of the affairs whi ch are only in tre province of the national administration or which concern the exe rcis e of French sovereignty . 11Insofar as corrunand is concerned the :Jni ted States Government has no other thought or desire but that mili tary command in the area be placed in French hands at the earliest practicable date . Howeve , during the initial r phase of the operation --th at is , the landing and the establishment of necessa r y bases--it is considered essential that the corrL"Jand not changed be while the operation is in progress . During this period we shall bend every effort to provide French Forces with modern ar ms and equi ment . V. ile French Forces are being thus equipped and organized , the command machine r y can be perfected so as to permit French assumption of the su>re m c orrL nd at the e 11 a appropriate time . Immediately foliowing the landing it woul d facilitate direction of the operation if a French General Officer was a ointed as a Deputy to the Corrunander-in-Chief . (signe d ) Robert D. Hurphy 11 The Deputy Commander (French) post probably would go to Giraud . tater , Giraud would have his position enlarged. 1 1ast is satisfied with the revision of his draft of the let ter to Giraud. �- ECRE T The papers turned over to General Clark by General Mast and his Chief of Staff , Col onel Ger main Jousse , are minute in detail : defense plans , dispostion of troops , loc ation of air units and gasoline stores , what airports are useless in rain y ~eather , harbor defense and blockade plans . A er a fi ve hour discussion , r ft General 'last leaves at 11 AH so He can r eturn to his post in Algiers . So more ~~ detailed discussion can be carried on , the French general leaves behind hi::Vrilivay•af'; and air officers and a special operations of ficer . The discussion is halted at 11 : 30 A1'11 everyone can get out into the sunshine and dry their wet clothine . so The group then lunches , Fourteen people sit "ting down to a meal consisting of chicken (Arab ·style) , beans , Fr ench bread and wine . The meal is cooked and served by French Patriot me~bers . Following lunch detailed discussion of plans begins between A.~e ican and r French officers . The plan presented by General ~! .st is gone over in minute detail . a Colon el Jousse dci:s. most of the talking and explaining with Colonel Holmes and 1 :r. Knight actin g as interpreters . After the tactical plan is dicussed , General Clark and his four staff officers go over the naval and air plans , special operations plans and logistical details . In each case , the French had prepared their detailed plans in writing . These were freely turned over to General Clark . The discussion continues until late afternoon when the meeting , is abruptly ended by the owner of the chateau dashing in to declare that the French police were approaching the house . Ap:r,arently , the Arab serv ants had gone to the· police to report 11queer goings on 11 in the isolated house . ( News of the police turns. the :neeting into turmoil. Colonel Jousse grabs up . his maps and , in a fe w seconds has showed himself a "quick change artist" - -he has chan ged from military to civilian clothes ! Everyone is rushing around the room picking up pape r s and personal effects . It l ooks like a disturbed anthill ! American and French officers are rushing through the house in all directions , gathering up everything and anything that might disclose their presence there . General Clark and the other officers keep their unifo r ms on . They have civilian clothes with them but by putting them on they would technically become spies . General Lemnitzer takes off his military slacks and attempts to get into a pair of oilskins . 'Tuile trying to stuuggle into the oilskins , Lemnitzer loses his .pants . Someone has scooped them up on the run and disappaa r ed with them ! Ifurphy rush es in and suggests that some money might be necessary to buy of f the police . General Lemnitzer , d10 is keeper of the secret papers a~d chancellor of the quite si zable exchequer on the trip , dips into his musette bag to get tl'u y 5, 000 Algerian francs . In his haste to rph get the money in rrur hy ' s hands , he drops several gold pieces on the fl oor and is unable , because of the lack of time , to recov er all of them . By now, it is apparent that the conferees cannot possibly get the boats down to the beach before the police arrive . One boat , which had already been taken out of the house , is quickly replaced inside . In the haste , one end of the Falbot is dropied and it looks as though it might be unfit for the return trip to the ~ubmarine ! The officers decide that i t will be best to hide out in the wine cellar until · the police could be held of , bribed or otherwise disposed of . The entire group , with the exception of the ovmer of the rendezvous house , fil es down to the dirty , odiferous and very small cellar . Ea.ch man is armed with either a carbine or a tom.~ygun and all the kit he can carry. No sooner aBe they in the cellar than the police arrive . As they huddle there in the ~glornn , _they hear the chateau owner �51 ( , ( and the police arguing excitedly in :ifrench. Their runnin g fe et patter on the floor overhead . The officers attempt to keep as quiet as possible . Captain Courtney is seized with a spell of coughing . He ctokes and sputters and seems about to strangle "Genera l , 11 gasps Courtney to General Clark , "I ' m af r aid I wi ll choke . " "I ' m afraid 1T, you WON 11 whispers back General Clark ! 7 Someone finds a bott l e of wine which is consumed quickly . The m inutes drag by~ The men hold their breaths and hang on to their weapons . Afte r about an hour , M urph y reports that he has sent the two French lieutenants , the beach patrol offi c ers who met the American group on the beach , to take care of the police . He urges that the group r emain in the cellar 15 more minutes then come upstai rs . V'hen the time is up , Genera l Clark and his men fi l e upstairs and everyone prepares to get away-- but hastily . All the Frenchman have gone . General Clark later r emarks at the speed with which the Frenchmen moved. "Whe we heard that the French pol.ice were on their n way, 11 recounts the General , 11it was as though someone had tossed 50 loaded skunks on the conference table . That l itt l e air offic er was buzzing around like a machine . I 'm sure he went into the courtyard and j ust plain took off !" The hazardous and bi zarr e conference is over ! The Frenchman have spread to the four wind s . General subjects have been disposed of but several smal l matters remained to be · taken-care of . In the last few minutes of the conference , General Clar k learned that the Nopth African French don ' t quite trust DeGau le but that l they might be willing to bring him in after ·the North African campaign has devel oped ; that Darlan has an appointment wit h Uu rphy on October 28 but the genera l believes Darlan "should be to l d nothing ;" that the French believe any resistance at Algiers "1von1 t last more than three hours ;" that the French North Afr ican army need s all kinds of equipment . In General Clark ' s est imati on, the secret rendezvo us c onference has been a success ! The r aid by the Fr ench polic e came about 6 :00 PM and it is ~ark now. All during the day there has be en a brisk on- shore wind and as the American officers prepare to depa rt they realize that the surf is putting up a steady roar. They are appr ehensive l est they be unable to get through it in the fragi~e boats . After making a last search of the house .6or articles that might have been mis l aid in the late afte r noon scramble , the office r s start fo r the beach . General Lemnitzer almost get s left because he is l ooking for his lost pants and the lost gold . He can find neither . The officers have a difficult time getting thei r four Falbot s dovm the steep and narrow path to the beach . The group is virtually exhausted when it reaches the beach . Afte r a brief conf erenc e on surf conditions , it is decided to atte m to take the Falbots through the six to seven foot high surf . General pt Clark and Captain Livingstone are going to make the attempt ! ( Soon the Deputy Comria.n der-in-Chief of the great Allied offensive is walking ori the beach weari ng nothing but his shirt , socks and short.s . Over this scanty clothin g, General Clark and Captain Livingstone wear their "N1aeWest " life belts . Their boat is shoved to the water ' s edge and , after waitin g for a lull in the waves , the two men dash out through the surf . It is about 9 :00 Pl1. A few feet l from shore the Falbot is caught by an eight-foot wave and cap sizes . General Clark , Captain Livingstone and all their equipment go tumbling throu gh the churning wate r . The re st of the group fears they have been lost and that the Falbot is broken. Choking with sand and water , the two men roll up o~:,:tp. The boat is tth• . �( recovered , intact . General Clark , l ooking like a half-dro¼ned water spaniel , l oses his trousers , shoes and othe r gear that had been either tied or placed loose in the bottom on the Falbot . The group dragg its boats and gear back into a clump of trees . A conference follows and it is decided that any further attempts to get the boats through the sur f tonight wi ll be useless and dangerous . General Clark goes back up the hill to the house to find dry clothes . Unabl e to fin d a towel with with to dry himself , he gropes in a closet and comes up with a fine French linen table cloth . It makes a f ine towe l! CoJ.tneJ. Holmes offers'the general an 11extra 11 pair of pants . They are General Lemnitzer ' s , the ones he lost in the police raid scramble t Holmes explains he "j ust picked them up somewhere ." General Clark finally gets into dry make-s hift clothes . Down on the beach , everything has been dragged back in the bushes and the r emainder of the group is huddled in hiding , waiting . The P- 219 , which has been previously signalled to come in as close to shor e as possible , is within a mil e of the beach . With the special light , Lieutenant Jewell is instructed to put to sea again until the surf quiets or until it is apparent Genera l Clark 's group wil l have to wait another day . The French civilians aiding the American in getting away are now frantic . They are scared since capture unr-er the circumstances would mean their liv es . They urge the Clark party to leave . In the meantime , the French police return to.the mysterious chateau . General Clark is there alone . Rather than retire again to the stuffy wine cellar , he gets out of a windo\~, jumps over a wall and sprints for the beach , in his stocking feet l The sprint is through the woods, over rocky paths and dmm a sandbank . He joins ·the re st of his group and they settle domi to wait and plan . ( ,~ON THE BEACH NEARCHERCHEL , ALGERIA OCTOBER 1942- -General Clark decides , 23, to try and buy a trawler or any kin d of power boat to.get his party to the sub marine but all efforts fai l. Someone produces another bottle of ~ .ine and the tired , tledra ggl ed grou p disposes of it in their little cul-de-sac . At intervals , officers go to the beach to inspect the surf . It seems to be quieting . About 1: 30 AfAeveryone but General Lemnit zer and the three Commandos who , remain to guard the boats and equipment , return to the chateau for food and r est . It is decided to wait until about 4 :00 .P..'.'.1 , the hst possible minute if the Falbots are to reac h the submarine before dawn, before making the final decision on whether to attempt to get away today . While waiting on guard , General Lemnitzer notices ,that the surf is quieting . During the period from 1 : 30 to 4 :00 AM there are , · several false alar~s-there are mysterious Arabs in the vicinity , the police a.Ile returning a~ain . All prove groundless but they are nerve m-acking . At 4 :00 t:.· . Gene al Clark and the rest of the party return to the beach hidea• ·:ay . The situation is surveyed . During his guard period , Gener al Lemnitzer found a spot along the beach where the surf seemed especially placid . It is finally decided to make another embarkation attempt , despite the cost : it seems hopless that the group can launch four Boats successfully without losing some personnel ~nd a lot of e~uipment . However, indications are that the place is exceedingly- "hot " and General Clark and his party , if they remain , may at any moment be seiz~by the police who micht return in greater strength . Al~ equipment that is not absolutely necessary is jettisoned . This inc~udes the tom 11yguns , carbines and radio , The boats must be as light as possible . General Clark and Captain mright are to make the first atte~pt . It is decided that four SE~RE T � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, September 25 - October 22, 1942 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from September 25 to October 22, 1942. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1942 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Language A language of the resource English Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/803 Date Valid Date (often a range) of validity of a resource. 1940-1949 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/b5a05a992cfe8065be850f7778499679.pdf?Expires=1773878400&Signature=A5d6fN3bzny4i6magSywRT8DDbmgoghNP8pO0iiR%7EGTYNeSdEaeLIj2eFb%7EvaGFtA5mkiTASp%7EFxy8iyLzcMX217680ZnbRU05V6UxNG2yVC-d%7EmDBsVZPsYEAU-EMH46hoSMzMLo3grmD2bXKCYDcJg9D6SXjr%7EoQDLOVyRb5fAKi9%7EO2zWizy24w8LIp-pClMn3S0aaG9aFZIK9b5CgF-wJy9cQDR1R8DABJkvrpA%7Eo3AhYWxXR4PaaGt0zy9muK6bPzsq5Xsx5CoH0-q2TwTNUbk%7EBwjCrY31NFAi0eeHuaSrxzdTYuCZ4aBHhl5qxuVhKQodEyBAINxtFKJjPg__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 2a4d49da7651f5cb457a0cb5cb59c005 PDF Text Text ( recovered , intact . General Clark , l ooking like a half-dro¼ned water spaniel , l oses his trousers , shoes and othe r gear that had been either tied or placed loose in the bottom on the Falbot . The group dragg its boats and gear back into a clump of trees . A conference follows and it is decided that any further attempts to get the boats through the sur f tonight wi ll be useless and dangerous . General Clark goes back up the hill to the house to find dry clothes . Unabl e to fin d a towel with with to dry himself , he gropes in a closet and comes up with a fine French linen general an 11extra 11 table cloth . It makes a f ine towe l! CoJ.tneJ. Holmes offers'the pair of pants . They are General Lemnitzer ' s , the ones he lost in the police raid scramble t Holmes explains he "j ust picked them up somewhere ." General Clark finally gets into dry make-s hift clothes . Down on the beach , everything has been dragged back in the bushes and the r emainder of the group is huddled in hiding , waiting . The P- 219 , which has been previously signalled to come in as close to shor e as possible , is within a mil e of the beach . With the special light , Lieutenant Jewell is instructed to put to sea again until the surf quiets or until it is apparent Genera l Clark 's group wil l have to wait another day . The French civilians aiding the American in getting away are now frantic . They are scared since capture unr-er the circumstances would mean their liv es . They urge the Clark party to leave . In the meantime , the French police return to.the mysterious chateau . General Clark is there alone . Rather than retire again to the stuffy wine cellar , he gets out of a windo\~, jumps over a wall and sprints for the beach , in his stocking feet l The sprint is through the woods, over rocky paths and dmm a sandbank . He joins ·the re st of his group and they settle domi to wait and plan . ( ,~ON THE BEACH NEARCHERCHEL , ALGERIA OCTOBER 1942- -General Clark decides , 23, to try and buy a trawler or any kin d of power boat to.get his party to the sub .ine and the marine but all efforts fai l. Someone produces another bottle of ~ tired , tledra ggl ed grou p disposes of it in their little cul-de-sac . At intervals , officers go to the beach to inspect the surf . It seems to be quieting . About 1: 30 AfAeveryone but General Lemnit zer and the three Commandos who , remain to guard the boats and equipment , return to the chateau for food and r est . , the hst possible minute if the Falbots It is decided to wait until about 4 :00 .P..'.'.1 are to reac h the submarine before dawn, before making the final decision on whether to attempt to get away today . While waiting on guard , General Lemnitzer notices ,that the surf is quieting . During the period from 1 : 30 to 4 :00 AM there are , · several false alar~s-there are mysterious Arabs in the vicinity , the police a.Ile returning a~ain . All prove groundless but they are nerve m-acking . At 4 :00 t:.· . Gene al Clark and the rest of the party return to the beach hidea• ·:ay . The situation is surveyed . During his guard period , Gener al Lemnitzer found a spot along the beach where the surf seemed especially placid . It is finally decided to make another embarkation attempt , despite the cost : it seems hopless that the group can launch without losing some personnel ~nd a lot of e~uipment . four Boats successfully However, indications are that the place is exceedingly- "hot " and General Clark and his party , if they remain , may at any moment be seiz~by the police who micht return in greater strength . Al~ equipment that is not absolutely necessary is jettisoned . This inc~udes the tom 11yguns , carbines and radio , The boats must be as light as possible . General Clark and Captain mright are to make the first atte~pt . It is decided that four SE~RE T �( f~!~~ 1 .e ~a--.. ~\·._- lt, ~ffl"D ·\.~ ok/ -. of th e French offic ers a.nd civilians s t ill with the Clark party will~e into the surf and assist in the launching . These Frenchmen are sti ll frantica y tr:rin g to get the Americans away and are willing to make almost any sacrifice After careful preparation and r ehearsal , General Clark and Captain Wright start through the surf . Their Falbot bounces and teeters but soon they are beyond the breakers and headed f or the submarine ,hich , having again been su.~1oned, uas standing by a mile at sea . General.Lemnitzer and Lieutenant Foot make the next attempt . They discard all kit and equipment except the infra-red equipment that is necessary to locate the submarine and LeL'lnitzP. 1 s musette bag which contains all notes on the conference r and the highly-valuable papers turned over by General ;fas t and Col onel Jousse . The J )i-> musette bag is tied to a cross - arm of the Falbot . The sea is a little rougher for f'\~~ the seco nd l aunc hing . After \,aiting fo r severc.l large waves to come in , Lemnitzer t,r, and Foot , assisted by the fou.r frantic Frenchmen , make a dash through the surf . ~ ' t A t r emendous wave hits them ! Over goes the Falbot . The tvo officers , the Falbot , cJ.P their equip:2ent comes tumbling through the surf . Lemnitzer and Foot are half .. " drov:ned because the under:tov: prevents ther1 from get ting on their feet , even ,:hen _,_he water ..:.s shallow enot:gh for the!:1 to stand . When Lemnitzer finally gets on his f eet , the Falbot , carried by a big vmve, hits him in the back , knocking hi;;i do·.m again . Everyone feared the keel of the boat had been broken but exam:i.naticn sho\7S that while damaged , it can still be used ! '1t • The Falb ot is turned over , the water :rjoured out , ,..-hat gear :~s left is r earranged . Lemnitzer and Foot , still coughing ur v,ater and sand , are ready to push out again . Speed is es~ential because of the im~inency of da\m . The second atte~pt goes successfully , although tr.ice the Fal bot nearly capsize s and the boat is onequarter filled with ,1ater and several of her ribs are broken . The tvro of.Licers have difficulty ke~ping the crippled craft headed into the tremendous swells . After paddling for half an hour , unable to see General Clark and Captain 17right w o are so:newhere a.'lead , they try- thP infra - r ed detector and locate the submarine . Back on the beach , Colonel Hol;!les and C&.pt in Criurtney and Colonel HaJllblen a and Captain Livingstone make precarious surf launchings but their t10 Falbots come ric..ing through. None of the eight men is dry \',hen he boards the submarine . The a l l-important l!!Usette bag carri ed by General Lemnitzer is soggy and in bad shape . An envelope containing gol d pieces has broken open and apLarently many coins vere lost when the Falbot capsized . "oot of the n··.m have cu.ts and bruises and their clothes are torn and soaked . The Falbot .of Colonel 1folmes and Ca tain Courtney j ams -~~ against the submarine , has its back broken , jacknifes and sinks . Colonel Holmes musette bag , containing all his clothes , gold and personal equirment goes to the bottom . Three of the four boats , all except the one hancled by General Clark and Captain 17r ight , capsized·while going through the surf . The eight men go into the innards of the submarine to dr~- off and get r.arm . A bottle of r "J.D. broken out and disapr,ears in no time flat . Tn a few mooents the is Klaxon sounds for diving and at 6 : 00 A· the P-219 submerges , goes dovm to 90 feet and proceeds at 3 1/2 knots for Gibraltar . General Clark and nis rarty soon fall a!l eep . They awake at 2 : 30 PI1. The air is hot and ext r emely bad . The entire landing group has severe headaches ; They are a sorry - lookin g lot--lon g V'hiskers , hungry , bleary-eyed and mo than a little re banged up . Equipment brouGht aboard the submarine is r e-check ed and it is di ecovered that a letter that '..iurphy had given to Bones to take to Gibraltar for mailing was lost ,;hen the Falbot broke up . These boats have a small air chamber at each end and there is a possibility the boat--and the letter--will be picked up on the beach. A ter d~~at: • f the advisability ott;~ti. ._....._'°""~ __ .· t) . '!Ii!!!...-, • . l �)\?t ( :~\fJ\~~t::,ir ,,1·•,,i''l'> t of breaking radio silenc e , General Clark orders that the subm arin e surface iately (about 5 :00 Pf!) and send the fol l o-r.ringmessage to Gibraltar : i mm ed- 11Im,itediate •o FOCNAS (Flag Officer Com;anding North Atlantic Station) . 0 eration completed . Amreturning throu gh position A 2330 A/23 position B 2~00 A/24 arriving Gibraltar 0830 A/25 . Request you have planes r eacly for eccrly departur weather permitting . Request you notify 111lc Gowan (code for Murphy) that letters he handed Julius (Holmes) were lost when his canoe broke up . They \,ere in weighted musette bag which may have fallen out . Canoe m~y have floated inshore . Search of beach should co!!llnence im.'!lediately . 11 Having dis~atched these two messages , the submarine again submerges to 90 feet and proceeds on its electric motors . General Clark plays bridge with Holmes, Wright and Lemnitzer . Later , the following message is received from FOCNAS : 11Your 1417 and your 1420 acknowledged . Destroyer from 11U11 patrol will rendezvous "ith you in 115 degrees EUROPA at 0645 A/25 and escort you into harbor . 16 Aircro.ft for onward journey arranged 1740 A/23. 11 The P-219 surfaces at 6 :45 ?11 and everyone feels better . out . General Clark and his officers go on deck and spend over sea water and shaking sand out of their clothes . Returning to officers sort out their wet equipment and clothes and lay out dry . * Clothes are dried two hours squeezing the wardroom , the the secret papers to * ENROUTE GIBRALTAR SUBTi!P.RINE. FLYINGBOAT OCTOBER , 1942--.After TO BY AND , 24 discussing and preparing a rough draft of a cablegram informing London and~ ashing-ton of the success of his mission, General Clark turns in , sleeping until 9:00 AJ. After break.fast and a couple of rubbers of bridge , General Clark goes up into the conning tower , finds the sea fairly smmoth and decides to cable Gibraltar asking f or a flying boat to sreed the return tri • Cables General Clark : "Consider weather conditions ideal for transfer to Sunderland . Request you have Sunderland rendezvous soon as practicable . My position course and speed 1100 36° 4 1 N of 41 1'\"l 254° 11 knots . 11 General Clark goes back to the diversion of bridge until Gibraltar informs the submarine that a Catalina Flying Boat ~•ill rendezvous v,ith the submarine . The party begins packing . ~ .~ost of the clothing has been hanging in the engine room to dry . The plane is sighted at 2 :45 PM and the Falbots and baggage are moved on.deck . The three Commandooffices are remaining aboard the submarine . Generals Clark and Lemnitzer , Colonels Hamblen and Holmes and Captain Wright say goodbye and move across the gap of water to the big plane . As they board the Catalina , the entire crew of the submarine is on deck and they give General Clark and his four staff officers a 11Hip-Hip-Hooray 11 as the Catalina takes off for Gibraltar at 3 : 15 Pi!. The British submarine crev1, particularly Lieutenant Jewell , were magnificent throughout the long and hazardpus trip . Gibraltar is sighted at 4 :40. The Catalina lands in the harbor and General Clark and his party go ashore in an R. A.F. launch . Cars take the group to Government House for tea . General !.1acFar lane is told of the m ission I s details and the followin ; cable is sent to London: �S5 ( r "FoLowing f or Com;nanding Gener al mropean Theate r of O erations Lendon, 1S f r o11CLARK or EISENHO','SR. eyes onl y . BEG-IESPending more c omplete details to be f f urnished on our arrival following is brie f summary of events to date . Due to not having heard f rom i;c Gowan as to exact time of meeting ,:e stood off rendezvous point 36 hours submere;ed ,,aiting signal to land . Definite contact finally established ahd with favorable weather vre l anded i n four canvas canoes about midnight 21722nd . Conference General '.la.st r e1i e~ent i ng Gener&l Giraud and f ive staff of.:('icers r com ·enced 0700 "hours on 22>nd Discussions considered satisfactory . and followed generc:1.l lines anticipated by you . Giradd being contacted today by ':fast . Definite decision by Giraud expe cted by Tuesday . .Anticipate it wi.1. be fav or able . I base ... this on thei r f avor able rAaction to the st r ength of the fo r ces U .s . could ::,ut into su ch an operatio n . All questions settled satis f a cto r ily exeert time of assumption of supreme cmmnand by Fren ch . Uy vien on this submi tted to Giraud through ,last or fiis conside r ation with def inite unde r standing that my proposal had yet to b~ con irmed by you . Extremely valuable inte l ligen ce data obtained and will be vr epar ed upon my re tu r n f or i -'!l:lediate r adio transm i ssion to Co"X1anders concerned . From discussion and informat i on r eceived our plan for oper ations a1~ears to be sound . The nec essity our being prepared to occupy Tunisia prompt l y with ai r bor ne units abundantly confirmed . Thether Gir aud assumes l eadership in Nor th Afr i ca or not anti cipate the bulk. of Fr ench a r my and air fo rc es wil l offer li tt l e r esistan ce . During conver sation with Mast I pr omised del i very of two t housa nd small arms with ammu nition by sub marine to v i cini ty of our land in g at earli est pr act ic able date . Al so promised sub ma ine which Fr ench insist must be Ame ican to br ing Gir aud from Fran ce to North r r Africa . Naval info r mation indicates initial r esistance by French Navy and coast defc,nses 'rhic>: wil.L fall off r a.1idly as our f orc es l and . Detailed conferences continued throughout day until 1900 hours vrhen inte r vention by local police r:ho ha.d become suspicious of inc r eased activity in r endezvous area brought confe r ence to abrupt conclusion . Fr ogs f l e~ in all di r ections and our party hid in empty R~F~AT empty v,ine cellar in house whi l e ar gument wit h police ensued . After t, o hours during lull i n conversations with poli c e we made our vray to woods near beach v:here v•e awaited favorable surf conditions to per mit r e- er.ibarkation . First effo r t to r eemb k resulted ar in capsizine; and damage to one boat . Further effo r t futile in vieu of high waves . i-:-er emained in hid in g unt i l 0430 on 23r d when another attempt was made. All boa t s r eached submar ine after two had capsized at bea ch and one vras br oken w e boarding submar ine . Ran submer ged during day l ight QOUXS of 23r d exce~t fo r hil br i ef sur f acing t o s end message to Gibr a l ta r . With ideal conditions £or trans f er to fly i ng boat avai l able mo ning 24th G;i.bralt ar was r equested to disp ot ch Catalina"Lto r rendezvous wi th us at sea to expedite r eturn . TTill advise time and pl a ce of arrival in P,K. ENDS" . General Clark and h i s f our of fi c ers get their fir st bath in a wee1 . (This doesn ' t c ount unwanted dunks in the :ledi te rr anean l ) Later , furthe r conf erences are he l d with Gener a l ·~acFarlane ; Vic e Admi al Si r Edttard Co:lins , co~~anding the r No th Atlant i c and the man v,ho made the P- 219 available , and other British officers . r Thi s is f ollowed by a dinner at whi ch General r.:acFarlane is host . This breaks up at . 8: 58 P'1 so the gr oup can lis t en to the 9 o ' cl ock news . General Alexander is atta cking in the Middl e East a ccor ding to plan l Anothe r of the first active phases of TOR has s t ar ted ., Duri ng l ater dis cussion , General Clark is told of an attempt CH the I t alians have made to bomb Gibralta r. Thr ee pl anes made the attack but had to dr op a l l the ir bombs i n Spain or in the wate r . The s.anish are very angry . One Italian plane was br ought dovm by a.ck- a.ck. Remembering his promise to General ' last , Gori-eral Clark has a conference with a Br itish naval office r v·ho has been .s"lu6 lin~ guns into Africa and France . Arrangements are made for the snv to furnish 2000 weapons to mast from Gibr altar stocks . General Lemnitzer collects 16 , 500 Algerian EC �5c, f r anc s fro?l .c1embers of the Cla r k party to cove!' gun delivery expenses . Cl arke inst r ucted to pr oceed with his smug ling , dealing directly , i th ·;r . ·rurphy . is Gen,:,ral Ia.cf arlane then offe r s to show- G<me:a l Clark and his J:.iarty 11'fhe Rock 11 r so , at 10 : 0J F: the group sta r ts out in two cars . Tt is an impressive and th r illing drive up the narrovi , b,isting r oad to the 1 , 200 foot top . General ·.1ac r lt..n, , Fa dise;usted with the timidity of his dr ive r , takes the wheel himself and it is a wild ride . :3ecause of a dmaged br idge , the pa r tJ finishes t'ie cl i mb on f oot . General iacFar 1ane takes a nasty fall but by l u ck is unin j ur~ · • Fr o'TI 11T1:J.e Rock 11 Gener al 11 11 Clark goes di r ectly to the ai r por t . The 11Red G eulin r a nd the Boomer ang II " are waitinc; , Ba [:;gage is stowed aboa r d the two f lying fo r tresses and the pa r ty takes off at 15 minut es afte r midnight . ➔:- TO 10',TDON FLYI1G FOPTR'.'"8, OCTOBER , 1942 -- The fir.;t BY 25 tr.o hours of the f light ar e pl ea s ant . The of~i cers lounge around ~1:J.erever c onvenien t and doze . Bad ·,reathe r c o11es two hours out of Gibra l ta r. I ce beg in s f or:..1ing on the wings and Lieutenan t Col onel Ti bbits beg in s cli 1cb nG so the 11Red Gremli n 11 can avoid it . i The ai r i s very r ough and ext r e.".!ely c ol d . Generc:.l Cl ark , Col onel Hamblen and Colone l Grun the r (pic ked up in Gib r al t ar ) huddle togethe r , shar i ng the war mth of each other ' s bodies , The temperature i s be l ow O degrees centigrade . The 11Boomerang IP' is having the s a,ne dif f ic u lt y- - f l ying at l .L 000 feet with ze r o visibi.Lity , . The Ent;lish c oast i s sighted at 6 : 30 A· . 'f'he ,eathe r gets v;armer and the air smoother . General Clark ' s plane gets l ost and does not arrive at Poleb r ook ,mtil 8 : 52 Al . The second plane , coming straight to the fiel ' , lands at 8 : 26 ;" . Ther e is a.nxiet.r ,·:hi l e General Cl·crk I s pla::1e is charted . Sou1,· m it gets over th e English chan nel and finall.,r come into Polebrook from the Northuest instead of the South . Afte r breakfast at the Poleb r ook Officers ' clab , GP-nera.l Clark d8parts in his car f or London at 10 : 50 Af1 During the long r ide back , he dozes . . Irrued i ate l y upon his r eturn , C'ene,,.al Cla r k calJ.s General Eisenho-r :er , then 1 s hideout drives out . to the Co.~ and er-in-Chief for a t v.·o and a half hour conference dur ini:; , hich he details his trip . One of the greatest di f f.:.cultie-s in dealing with General ~1ast ;as Gener al Cla.rk I s inst r u ctio n s that hE: was to indicate only what the TJnited States crpJJ) do , not ,··hat it was GOINGto do . 'l'his had to be kei:,t upper most in mind at all times and it 7ade the General ' s ta~k complicated and extre mely difficu l t at times . For instance , v:hen General ·'ast asked that certain thj ng s be done v;hen the Ameri.can army cc 10 in , C'enera l Clark had to b0 adroit in his ans wers and .nake no unf'lt.lfillable pro!!lise;:; since s·c;.ch chang, ::,, at such a late datc--i",ith some uni ts already at SPa , ,. ere i :i ,ossible . '"h8t Ge1rral 'c.st la::.d down th e I'r 1.ch plans for occupyim ; Frenc11 Africa , General Clark had to b e car ef ul that h E ;a.v" no indication that, the . S . alrec.dJ had. def:.nl te plans . He was abl e , ho, .ever , to shov; hov. v;hat he had to '"'r :, F'"'/"\P"'P-Dplans differed fro:n thos e of th e Fr ench . The parallel in the rr. S . anr' FrE'nch plans was astonishin~ . '71.en General .~ast pointed out General Ciraud 1 s plan of establish i ng a bridgehead in southern Fronce so the Fr ench could resist German moves into ~noc cupied France , General Clark had to move with great care . '-Iow could he make any pr omises v,hen the North African operation-the movement of cowat troops to the ar ea--z;as al r c&.rl~ laun ched . r ./l..fter conferring with General Eisenhov;er , General House office so he can talk to Prime ~'inister Churchill l!r . Churchil~ is extremely pleased . He invites Genera ceneral , exh<uste·~ , has to refuse in favor of slee.l:' . -;~ VV\/ * Clark r eturns to his Norfolk over the scraT'lbler tele hone . ~ l a.rt qin ner but the ,., �51 ( LONDONOCTOB~R , 1942- - "The Great .American Eagle 11 (Prime Minister Church', 26 ill 1s nickname f or General Clark) has just r eturned from a very important and highly su ccess f ul mission , sars General Eisenhovrer , opening the regular Comr:iander i n- Chie f I s meeti ng . "He' s going to tell us abcu.t it . n Thus , General Clark takes over the meeting today and spends the next ha lf hour outlining in detail hi s discussions in Algie r s with General l.Iast and his staf f . He leaves out al l the t r avel details and the humo ous anecdotes , confining r himse lf ent ir ely to the serious details . Ever y man around the big conference table l istens intently . Air Ma sha ll V,"elsh and Gener al Doolittle r beam v,hen General Clar k te l ls of having details of the di sposition and strength of the French Air For ce , the condition of airfields and the disposition of gasoline . Admiral Cunnineham is highly pleased that the general has r eturned with detailed plans on how the French navy intends to block the habbo r s ; this will greatly facilitate prevention of this by the special harbor task forces . General Clark goes thoroughly into all phases of his mission . Even General Anderson bea!:ls v1hen he hears of the plan to land parat r oops at Bone to facilitate Creneral Anderson I s d;rive to the east . Yihen the general has f inished his out l ine , there are no questions and General Eisen hower br eaks up the meeting . Afterwa r d , the office r s crowd around to get details concer ning how the t ri p was made. Few of fi cer s knew the nature or the destination of Gener a l Cl ar k 1 s t r ip . I t was a cl osely guarded secret . General Clark plunges immediately into conferences concerning an attack at Bone . He calls in Generals Gale and Gruenthe r and Colonel Stirling . They begin discussing the possibility of altering plans of the F.,astern A sau~t Force so it can l and at least part of its strength at Bone . The initial Bone landing probably will be f rom the air , by paratroops . General Clark explains that 11certain key Frenchmen in North Africa -- !.1ast and possibly General Giraud -- \'1ill have to be taken into our confidence by D-4 so they may have time to issue necessary insturctions to their commands. 11 The Deputy Com,~ander in - Chief next takes up with General Gale the proposal that French forces in Unoccu ied France be su vlied so they can resist the German move into that area- - a move that 1ast says Giraud believes is inevitable when the North African theater opens . Giraud wants to hold a bridgehead in Southern France through which the United Nations wi ll supply the French atriots . Gale believes the question of su lJlying these f or ces is one of pr iorities , ra+.her than alternate plans . Obviously , shipring diverted to Southe r n France would delay the buildup of TORCH r oops and supplies in No th Africa . t r 0 General Clark recom.nends that a French section be set up in Allied Force headquarters to foster development of French military poTier in North Africa . qe suc:ests that the officer to head this section Ltlght be found among Frenchmen now serving in the British army . The Deputy Co:n;iander instructs Gale that , in view of his pro,nises to General Mast , 500 tons of shmpping space per convoy is to be reserved to carry goods required by t'1e French civil population in North Africa after K~m3. f Only one of General Clark 1 s man? conferences today docs not concern developments resulting from his North African coup . Lieutenant General ·;!organ , com ander ,:2 of the British 1st Corps and the man who is heading the nev,ly-cr eated ~1ortheri1 Task Force ( which is to be ready to invade Spanish \orocco if necessary) , c01,1es in to discuss his problems . B:e _;_spreparing his forces , wl-iich will include the Royal ',iarines , as fast as pos ;;ible . Like the Center Task Torgan is having Stu �53 tank troubles . The l&rge Churchil s are noi., suitr.ble for th<; Lwa.sio!l task . or _;an says he can-"· mdertake his task Hithout tanks but beli"'V"'S the at;! acking force "probabl.1 .ould lose face i!l the eyes of the Sp~inards " if they do not have ar~aored eq_uip!nent . General Cle.rk tel -s ·;organ tha.t General , :ast Luor rn .1i u the.t ed three French native :i.:.visions are dispersed along the so u thr>r:c. Spanis' 'forocco border anrl if the '.Jort:".lern Task Froce s·1ould have to attack Tangiers , both French and America11 forces v,ould assist him by b.dva:1.cing fro·n the south anc: ea,t . LONDO~:rOCTOBER27 , 1942 -- B oth General ''tar shall and Lieutenant , hower are reco1~ nending G<?neral Cl~rlc for the Distinguished SPrvice Horth African 'nission t G-enera.l Cl_r\:: 1 s .four staf~ ofL icers are also put Q. for decqrations . The success of the highly hazardous mission hi~h i-:raise fro-n botr1 London u._1c',..,ashington , C-eneral i;_;i enr :edal for his go ·n_; t.o , e has brouuht i:1ord is received latb toda;y that General Giraud , on the basis of , ord brought to hi:11 by a special courier , is eager to go to ~Torth Africa an~ dL,cuss the French.American colJ.aboration furt11er . Fe ap_rov~s , tentatively , the principles a.1:;Teed to by Generals Clark and '.last , but is ar:aiti!lg ,rrlt+en com1unication from ·;r . 'iv.r~~hy and General :.;ast before civing his whole-hearted apJoval. ( Captain ·-right is returning to Gibraltar to take cor:rn,.nd of the P-219 and proceed to a rendezvous in Southern France to pick ·_lp General Girl..Lld and. take hir~ to 1forth Africa . The entire sche.ne is v,orking beautift~lly . '"'r'L;;ht ,vill a,:;-ait f1..,rther inst.,..uctions fron ·urph.; before taking the I:ritidt subr.1~;.ri:1e o;;..t of "ibr a.ltar . The ,.,ossible chan ge in plans for th . use of p~.r&troo1:s--as e a result of General Cle.rk 1 s confe nee v,ith G~ne:;.·al :ast and the possibility of in _1 ding c...n air assault o!l Bone--occasions a large confere!lce in C-eneral Cl~rlc 1 s office . ~ttendin~ are -~lr Vice 'Iarshal Sanders , Gene:ra.L GrQenther , Doolit-"le anr" :::..emnitze'"', Colonels Bentley and Raft and .1ajor Yarborough . " General 1a: t , 11 sa:·s Gem,ral CL,.rk , 11ho.s assured us th1t para.troops will not be re:...isted at the Oran ancl Bo:i.e airports . The ~urpose of this meetbg is to discuss means of getting paratroops into Bone as soon as possible . Obviously , we must have al tern"'.ti ve pJ.ans ; one to be used in case of unexpected resistance , and one in the ,,vent of free entrance . The first has been pre~x,.red in detail ; the second will be . re ared at once . 11 It i decided that if the loaded air transports can be lundec at La Senia air.[)ort , noar,Orwi , without resistance , they fill be refu,7ldd and rea ·y ~o proceed so they arrive at Bone early on r :.:lu one . The paratroops wil.1. not jump ·.t Bone unless conditions make it necessary . The pur ~ ;ose is to conserve the parachute battalion for a jillllp to seize the air~ort near ~unis . The ~roblem of anti-aircraft defense at "qone &nd an aviation gasoline su_p,ly cu.us e s concArn , Later , General ;_ Anc1erson , v,'10 wiL. i1ave the responsibility of airborne 01Jerations e1:i.st of Algiers, is called in . He thi::ucs that by D plus one he might be able to provide the transports with some fighter escort . L'lder on is concerned about both the anti - aircraft and petrol s 1ortage at Bone . ne expects to get 1-Jetrol into the ;.:..rea by :'.:1Jlus five. Automatic anti-aircraft weapons could be trans::-orted to Bone by s.ir • .Air ·:arshal ,·;elsi1 and General Anderson both urge that 10 of the air trans.90rts allotec to the 12th Air force be used for this purpose . Ge~eral Clark objects to reducing the size of the l:?th ' s tra•1sports and reco111aends that this A*A e,.;'1ipP1ent be flm-rr1 .:.n by British bo,:ibers . :··elsh prmises to make an effort i:i. that direction . SECRE T �:¥-~ 59 fil!Bn And rson feels that with French' cooperation it will. be unnecessary for him to rush British paratroops into the Bone area. He prefers to have the British jill!lpers make a single move from Algiers directly to the airdrome at Bizerte . ije thinks this strategy can be pulled on D plus 5 . He plans , at the same time , to have the re-fueldd r;. S. transports drop the U. S. paratroo s over the Tunis airdrome . All the planes woul d then return to Al eie r s , possibly to fly up ai r borne infantry . General Clark ' s plan of long - ago -- having paratroop and airborne un!h "leapfrog " ts toward Tunis - - appears to now be wor king out . Seizure of Tunis is one of the key aims of TOR and each day it looks more feasible . CH 0 ( ~ General Clark lunches today with Prime 'Unister ChurchiL at Number 10 Down ing St r eet , the "G eat American Eagle II giv i ng :. r Churchill a complete report on r T. the Nor th African mission . Churchill listens av i dly and cl u cks his approva l. The dro.matic nature of the m ssion apl-'eals to the Prime 'Ainister I s imagination . The i report over the scrambler telephone on Sunday night j ust served to \Zhet :i'!r Church . ill ' s appetite •. He compliments the Deputy Com.1a.nde in - Chreef on the way in which ·he carried out his mission . ( A gene ·al discussion of TOR ai r problems is held in General CL .rk I s office . CH The confe r ees are Air Ma shal ¥.'elsh , Gener~ls Smith , Doolittle , Lemnitzer , Gruenther r and Cr a i g and Vice Air i'l1arshal Sanders . Doolittle is concerned about the slo" rate in which he claims Sp~tfi r es are being made r eady at Gibraltar . Welsh and Sanders say pr ogr ess is being made on s chedule . Doolittle is concerned about the lack of tie for testing the air f raft and installing armament following their erection . Doolittle argues for stronger air sup~ort at Casablanca but Genera~ Cl&-k tel1.s hi m that the North African conversations "r esu l ted more than ever in a t r end toward st r ength to the east and our plans must per mit us to shift the weight of our air forces in that direction very early if we are to be welcomed by the French . In order to furnish air sup}.Jot fo r the Northern Task Fcrce , General Doo~ittle plans r on forming a small self - sustaining air force composed of one bomber squadron , one fighter squadron and two transpo r t squadrons . They will be based at Port Lyautey so they will have ready access to General ;'/lorganI s fo r ce to the north . The French plans and intelligence reports that General Clark obtained in Alger ia have been translated and are being distributed to the proper sections . The c ompleteness of them , and thei r terrif i c value to TORCH operations , are astound ing . The value of General Clark ' s t ri p c oul d never be estimated . Even if things . went wrong , TORCH in a vastly impr oved c onditions because of the intel l igence is brought back . General Clark has instructed General Gale to expedite action on General Mast ' s request that we su:-ply French troops in Southern Fran ce . The pr oblem of colored troops in England is growing . Difficulties have been present since their arrival i n the United Kingdom last sum~er . General Doolittle reports "growing lack of dis cipline among colored service units . " He cites a case of aggr avated assault on a white office :r by a colored soldier . General Clark tells ( Doolittle that the Eu:o npean Theater of Operatio ns "will back up the actions of w ~, r Courts ~fartial , even to the extent of ap1,,roving the death sentence in such cases . 11 It is regretab l e that army offi cials , preparing for a great of fensive , should have t o concern themselves , and aevote precious time , to the col or ed problem . General ~• ) c. Clark believes that an equal per c entage of color troops should go overseas . 1~ J1 C ( After disposiu.g of a number of smaller matters - including the ~uestion of auxiliary U. S. troops to augment the Royal r.!arine division and establislunent of an 8 .0. E. mission in Nor th Africa-General Clark goes to dinner with Mrs . Roos evelt . The president I s wife _ /s currently visiti~g England . '1. >,... # ~ECRET- �LONDON, OCTOBW,R 28, 1942--The British submarine, under com'"'land of Ca tain right of the U.S. 1lavy, left Gibraltar at 8:00 P;.: last night for the Gulf of Lyon where it will ick up General Giraud, the French general who is the key man in French collaboration in TORCH. Giraud wil_ be taken to North Africa to be oriented on plans and so.he can issue instructions paving the way for American entry. The following cable is received early today from General Marshall: TIT"e are fol�owing with great interest and considerable sus ense the negotiations going on with respect to Kingpin (Giraud) and Flag ole (Mast). If the results vre hope for are attained it will make an interesting page in hL, tory. I am in com- lete accord with your (Eisenhover 1 s) views as to decorating for Clart and his arty. Give him my thanks for his courageous and able erformance of a hazardous task. 11 Final re arations for TORC are being buttoned u fast now. Generals Clark and Eisenhower and 52 other officers will leave for Gibr �ltar ..londay evening to set up the AL..ie d Force Headquarters from which TORCH wil..1. be directed in its early hases. The final Com.antler-in-Chief's meeting is held this morning. To conclude it, General Eisenhmrnr declares: "This is our final meeting. All of us will be away from here by early next week. Admiral Cunningham has already gone to take naval command. I hope that our next meeting is held in Algiers-and soon! I am ho ef'ul that Allied Force Head­ .__1uarters will be out of Gibraltar by D lus two or D lus three. Later, we ho e to make French North Africa our springboard for carrying on o erations elsewhere. The French, if they go along with us, are going to be the bosses in North Africa while we go to fight else"\',here. 11 1 can't possibly express to you my gratitude for the fine work all of you have done. I ap reicate it more than I can say. Fro.n the ver start I have been aware of a great and fine devotion from all of you, The work you have done has been highly successful. Given a fair break on submarine activity and the weather, TORCH is in-a success. This success wil� be due to this grou and I am grateful to each and every one of you, 1 1 One of the most int�resting developments at the final TORCH conference is a re ort from Admiral Ramsay on submarine charting. He declares thats otting shows that IC.ml, already well at sea, might run across a submarine 11 but, otherwise, everything in normal." The convoys are all rocveding according to schedule. They and the naval units are a �,roaching the Straits of Gibraltar at varying s eeds so they will arrive more or less simultaneously at the Struits. Each convoy is getting complete re orts on Axis submarine locations and activities. General Ei.enho 'er tells the conferenee that "there is every indication that Genere1.l Giraud intends to go along with us, 11 Hast, Giraud and other trusted French officials will be told on November 4 that TORCH is about ready to start. This wil� give them the necessary four days to ave the 'l'iay for the entrance c-,f American troops. Giraud is sticking to his re�uest for a Southern France bridgehead and the Prime Minister believes everyting possible should be done to get sup lies to the French in Unoccupied France. As a matter of military economy, says General Eisenhower, 11 we must give people in a osition to fight something to fight with. 11 He declares that fighting in Southern France "must be a develo ment, rather than an added feature, of TORC'R". 11 The drive must be to the east and where possible the effort will dovetail with French plans. To expedite invasion of Tunisia, lans • e Sousse area, which are being promulgated to land a small force from · 1 �( can be successful.~y held by a small gro'.1p. General Anderson asks what the French consider as the best possible time an Allied arm.r could get into Tunis . General Clark declares that the French pointed out to him nthe great necessity of getting in fast - -before the Boche . " He says the French hope is to have Allied troops in by D plus 2 or D plus 3 . Certain civil patriots , out - numbered by people favo r ing the Axis , wil~ have to hide in the hil~s until the Allied troops arrive . Help from Malta plus the actic ,n of British and American paratroops might speed the date , says General Cl~rk. General Anderson replies that he 11can 1 t get anything into Bone from the SC?auntil D plus 5. 11 General Clark terminates the discussion by declaring : "The Fr0nch want speed all the v.ay through . 11 A humorous u-able , resulting from General Clark I s r>forth African trip , arrives · from Murphy. It says : "Inform X (General Clark) that police incident at end of meeting proves to have been in..ocuous a ccording to investigation but our friends (the French confe r ees) regret exeeedingly that end of party ' s stay was so uncomfortable , Inf'orm X that he has not lost his pants nor his co~t mut he will find them here clean and pressed on his return . " Al.L arrangements for the North African expedition have be at Gibraltar , the remainder outlines the entire set-up to ( 30- odd war correspondents-., o are to acconpany the been completed . Four of these corres_ ondents v,ill with the task fnrces . •~ jor Phi lips , the PRO , General Clark . It has now been decided to send a message to Admiral Godfroy, co~,andin~ the Frenc~ squadron ~t Al~xandria , on D-day informing him of the landing and pointing out to him that there are no designs on French territory. Godfroy is believed to be friendly to the Allied cause . Tv•o messages probably wil: be delivered to the French Admir<-1.l one by a Britis'i naval official , &nd the other by an American state department officer . The problem of obtaining equipment for the French comes up again . It is r,eneral c1~.rk 1 s belief that both the Br~tis,., and ':.S . govern::ients sho'"ld both quickly determine what they can furnis 1 in the v:ay of military sup: lies and stirping a.nd how soon it can be maae available . 11Tt is obvious , 11 says the De: utJ Commander- in-Chief , 11that eqr.ipment and shipping set u1J for T0RCH!Ill1st not be diverted . Vnether or not equipment obtained for the Fr-=-nch is . to be put into Southern France or North Africa is a mat~ er for coTir.,anddecision at the time • 11 General Clark ::ia.1--,,,s one oint clec:.r constantly in hfa discussions . v;ith officers "It ar,1-ears to ;ne, 11 h"' says , "that it is ver,: important that re r1o not let the possibility of French non-resistance r,eaken our lans for active combat in the theater in case things do not go in the ,1ay we hope for 111 These are other problPms that cone up during the day : (1) The paratroo carrier force must know by 5 : 00 P!~ on liovember 7 v,hether or not the C-4 7s are to take off for Oran. The ships must be off by th&.t time in ordio,.. to reach their objective by H-hou.r (1 :00 A~!{)) . General Clc.rk is setting u~ 11a definite signal" for this vital information . A premature takeoff of the parm.troors wouJc1be disastrous since they c.:..nnot be r.:;ca.l.led because of hPavy lea.ding . (2) The ~rorthern Task Force is having tank and shipr,ing troubles. Gener&.l Clark orders the use of lighter ValentinG knks instead of Chu.rchil2.s . c__ rtain taken fro::! the shipSEtiR E t : �;w ; 1 -,,g 1Jj]JJ_ff ( Russian convoys so loadlng can star_t . t hips returning fro:n "ort: Africa nill t~en take the place of the vessels remov8d from the Russian convoys . (5) C'ene~al Pn<:terson is concerned over a letter declaring we might be able to su;. l~ the. ~.e.1.ta r force h,,r. air by D plus 5 . General Clark :r;hones General I::::~!ay and asks him. to , of our capability of suppl;r the .ia~ta force. by air , c.nd 11lee.ve out any reference stress the ne9d for this force to be accompanied by the m~.ir:ru.:n P?ssibl~ nu ..1ber of days of su~ply . (4) .Anderson is also alarmed .about a cut rn the K..!F5an~ X.'!1"4,, convoys proposed bJ the Br:L tish Director of ..1ovements. General Clark ana he a~ree that they ,,ill fight any r eductions . n In the c;venin:-;, Gener~l Clark attends the first shov. since ~is arri':"al in al!'!ost four 1:'lonths ago . ri th three friends he ~e~s ~ musica:, revi~ '\'-,.. ttThe Dancing Years . tt The general gets increasingly o timistic as D aay a:r:,1,roachP.., • He' s in fine spirits , des1~it,e terrific responsibilities anc long ho;irs of work . England -x- -!!- LONDONOCTOBER , 1942- -General Clark has an audience tod~y with Xing , 29 George VI. General Eisenlio- er and he go to Buc}·in:;hao Palace together at 11 : 50 A'I . The invitation v:aG issued by the King wl10 wanted to say goodbye to the two tor-ranking A..1erican generals before their departure for ?orth Africa , via Gibr altar , ( The generals are ushered into the huge brornstone palace , only four blocks from Norfolk House , and taken to the office of the king ' s secretary . "hen introduced to 'Genertl Clark , the mo.ndeclare: "I know all abo· t you . You' re the one that took that fabulous trip . Didn 1 t you get stranded on the beach r,ithout your pants? n Generals Clark and Eisenhor-er are conducted dov:n a lon g, cold hall. The palace , probably for fuel con.,ervation reasons , was chilly except in the section that was apparently the king ' s portion . The generals are ushe red into a huge room. All the chandeliers and pictures have been removed but it is still an attractive , well - furnished room . A small fire is burning in a fireplace . King George , i.n unifo r m v,ith the insignia of a field marshal on his shoulders--a wreath and a crown--shakes hands with the two Americans and invites them to sit down. King George immediately goes into a discussion of TOP.CHHe is th oroughly . familiar with the pending operation . The king told General Clark he had heard "all about your trip to Africa and I thorough.q enjoyed the statement in your cable that you had been for eed to hide in an "empty REPEATempty wine celJ.ar , tt He compliments General Clark on tta task well done , tt The discussion , which lasts 40 minutes , then turns to General Giraud and Admiral Darl an . The king declares emphatically that 11no one trusts Darlan . tt He then recounts meeting Darlan at a luncheon a few years ago and how his greatest remembrance was 11Dar lan 1 s shifty eyes . 11 Plans for the generals ' departure and for development of the North African theater are then discussed , King George appears to have a complete grasp of the military picture . Aptarently he is briefed often on developments . He expresses concern over the Axis submarine concentrations in the TORCH area . He wantsrto know what troops are participating and what American units will remain in England to assist in defPnse of the British Isles , The 40 minute talk is almost entirely military . �General Clark is surprised by the king's appearance. He had always imagin�d him as a nan of at least average heigh't. Instead, the king is of small stature. He carries hi"lself , ell and has a pleawing personality. The kin,; at one or two points had some difficulty s eaking. He has a habit of holding his hand over his mouth a great deal of the time. Only o ce or twice does he stutter. This comes when the king is excited or showing emotion. It strikes hi� as he bids the two American �enerals farevell. He falters as he says: "Goodbye and God speed. n A cablegram from General Eisenho ·er to General ,.�arshall concerning command of the 5th Arny, scheduled to be set u in North Africa, is dis atched to Tiashing­ ton today. ffif initial stages of o eration proceed as favorably as no� seems possible, it may become quickly necessary to establish a direct coordinating agency for all American forces involved, n the cablegral!l says. 11 1 am planning, in these circumstances, to use General Clark for the purpose and have already selec­ ted, from officers now available to me, key members of an army staff. In antic­ ipation of this development, it will be necessary for the army headquarters now being organiz ed in the United States to sail at a moment's notice at any time after November 15. I request that all preparations be perfected so that if it becomes deeirabi-e- to ship this headquarters on an early convoy in 1.ieu of some other unit of similar size, this can be done uic kly ••• , 11 General Clark sends the following coll)..-"'lendations today to the four staff officers who accom anied him on the North Africa.n tri: (General Lemnitzer, Colonels Holmes an Hamblen and Captain mright) "l. I desire to take this oprortunity to commend you for the manner in which you carried out your im ortant art in our recent mission to Jorth Africa. Vlhen you volunte red for this assignment I was particularly leased, since your intimate knowledge of the details of the o eration made it highly desirable that you should be present and participate in the conference ith the French re resen­ tatives. n2. Under the adverse and sometimes hazardous conditions that we encountered, your efficiency and hieh morale--although no more than I would have ex ected under the circumstances--made your assistance and presence invaluable to me. "5. In recognition of your able and courageous conduct I have recommended to the Com�ander-in-Chief that you be awarded an a �ropriate decoration. This re­ commendation has been ap roved by him and has been transmitted to the War Depart­ ment. I am happy to inform you that General Marshall in a radio to the Com,nander­ in-Chief, dated October 28, says: "I am in complete accordance with your views c1.s to decorating Clark and his party." He also sent his thanks v.hich I now transmit to you, for without your fine assistance our mission could not have been com­ pleted.11 The general also sends letters to Sir Dudley Pound, first Sea Lord, praising the uork of the crew of the P-219 and particularly Lieutenant .Je\'l·ell, and to Lord Louis Mountbatten, thanking him for the s lendid service of the three Com­ mandos. Although preparations for TORCH are com lete and the amount of work has slacked off pending tleparture of Generals Clark and Eisenhower, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief has several important conferences during the day. Commodore Douglass-Pennant reports on the location and submarines in relation numb!E'C, · �~fCRE J .... to the TORCH convoys . KME' has now passed the danger area where a sub was lurking -1 yeste r day . The Aquitania , car rying troops , is straggling but is in no dange r . Two · cargo vesse l s in anothe r convoy have had to turn back because of shifting loads . The weather has been extreBely rough but the Admiralty is satisfied with the way the convoys are moving . The greatest fear , and there is a slight ,novement indicating such , is that the Axis is going to concentrate submarines in the Western ;iiediterranean ~ Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman is called in to give Gener al Clark an estimate of the Axis ' ability to move t r oops into Tunisia . Before launching of the British Eight Army' s offensive , now underway in Egypt , it was esti ated that 2, 000 airborne t r oops per day , up to between 15 , 000 and 20 , 000 , could be transfe r red to Tunisia . Recent heavy l osses to Axis shipping in the li',astern Mediterranean , " says the British Intelligence officer , have led to greater dependence being placed upon obtaining supplies by ~i r transport . This had reduced the number of air carriers . So f ar as is known there are no German ai r bor ne troops in Sicily at present . Receatly about 8, 000 airbo r ne troops , bel i eved Italian , arrived in Tripoli . They are , repo r tedly , without heavy equipment . Mockler - Ferryman tel-s General Clark he believes th~t if we are su ccessful in putting our aibo nne forces on the Bize r te and Tunis aird r omes early in the operation , the Axis will attempt to invade this ar ea vii th their airborne troops . ( General Anderson ' s alarm over the propose d cut in KM5and KM4l oads is into next by General Clark . Colonel Hamblen reports this has resulted from optimistic estimates as to the number of vehicles that could be accomodated ships . A letter · is sent to General Ismay asking that "ever:- effort be made the British to provide additional vessels . " gone overlyon the by A broadcas t scheduled to be made over B.B. C. on October 51 by Admiral Stark is causing concern . It makes favorable references to the de Gaullists and r,1r. Matthews reports this probably will not b~ well received in the TORCH area . Conversely , ~.:at thews feels sudden cancellation of thA speech might jeopardize security . General Clark informs :Jatthews he will take the matter up immediately and that the broadcast can either be cancelled or modified . i,leans to take care of this will be found . * LONDONOCTOB~R , 1942-The inevitable , 50 lull has arrived , All of theD-day , convoys--personnel and supply - -are ~ell at sea . Al~ naval groups and escorts are underway . Most of the officers in Norfolk House have departed . The only business that can be conducted now concerns future operations , General Clark is in his office throughout the morning but during the afternoon , tired of peripatetically pacing his office and filled with nervous energy , takes a drive . The report on activities of Axis submarines is still good . None of the convoys has been attacked yet . Final arrangements are made for departure of Generals Eisenhower and Clark and their staffs . A special train will leave London at 7 : 50 P.~ Sonday for Bournemouth where the group will go by car to the airport from which they will depart , sometime early Tuesday , for Gibraltar . General Clark ' s only important conference of the day is with General Smith , his chief of staff . He orients Smith concerning arrangements made with regard to make-up of the Royal 'farine Divisi ij r~~ will be a major part of the Northern ~tfifir .f �~1¥,;:-u Task Force . Gener al Clark points out that the United States me rely agreed to r einforce the Royal Ma nes with additional ri combat tnits such as tanks and artiller y . Throueh some error , the Bri tish had figure·d on the "J. S. providing service or maintenance units . The question of a staff for the Fifth American army is also taken up . Genera l Clark tells Smith that the slate of key per sonnel should be published soon and commanding -officers c oncerned informed so they can be prepared for the withdrawal of certain personnel fr om their comma ds . General C~ark tells General n Smith that he would l ike to have Colonel Bowmanas his Army Engin eer . The skeleton of the army staff has already been agreed upon . * * LOHDONOCTOBER , 1942--J.rrangements have been made to transport , 51 antiaircraft wea~ons to Algie rs to strengthen this type of protection there . P.fter days of conferences and searchil'.lg by both British and American units , Air . 1arshal Welsh rerorts to General Clerk that the wee.pons can be taken in by British bombers . Thus , another , and j ust about the fina~ organizaticnal problem of TORCH is disposed of. The A- A carriers will r eturn to Gibraltar without refuelini:; . V'elsh is leaving for Gibraltar tomorrov . General Clark praises him for his arduo s wo rk. From Gibraltar , the Air }.1arshal will move to Algiers TTi Genera l th Anderson . Br itish aircfaft v;ill be available for this move. General Clark tells ~elsh that if the operaticn goes as planned , the two American B-1 7s and Welsh 1 s British plane can leave Gibr altar, via Oran for Algierr under fiehter escort . mels h reports that 154 Spitfires arrived safely at Gibr altar yeste-rd1.y . He brings the general a heartening r eport : The Br~tish Secr etary of State reports that "Ger man authorities arparently do not yet knm7 of our movements or intentions . 11 1 The problem of what to do with th e carrier transports iL case the aratroops are unable to take off from England because of bad weather enroute or a.t C n is ra taken up by General Clark v~ith Generals Doolittle and Craig , If the paratroops departure is delayed' after D plus 3 , departure airdromes will be ov ,rloaded , General Clark orders that the transports be r0turned to their home stations in event they cannot move out by n0on of D ;lus 3 . ·Such action ~1ill entail only a 24-hour delay in the subsequent movement of the pa·achute force to the theater. 0 The desirability of complimentary action by the 8th (European Theater) and the 12th (African Theater) Air Forces is brought up . Operations of the 8th will be facilitated if it is possible for squadrons to move to airdromes in TORCH theater when condition are un:ii'avorable for their r eturn to the tr , K. Thus , the 8th could strike at Europe from African bases during the English winter , noted for its poor f lying weathe r . A great deal of General Clark 1 s time , during this 11th hour waiting period , is devoted to planning for the Northern Task Force that General Mo rgan is heading . General Morgan 1 s directive from the British Viar Office contemplates employment of his force in Spanish Moocco only . General Clark says the staff is considering r possible use of the Northern Task Force in other areas , for example , Sicily , in case there is no Spanish intervention . Morgan says he is "eage r to get . into the s '10w in any locality . 11 He wants the Wa Office to broaden his directive . General r Clar k promises to look into the matter . �The Northern Ta.,k Force is goine to have difficulty gettin; into the theater at an early date . The earliest possible date of S a..11.ish forocco attack has been estimated at D plus 45 . The c.vailability of shipping is causine the bottleneck . Pri e Minister Churc:iilJ ii:: um:illinG i"o have vesseJ.s set up for Russian convo.y PQ-19 tmloaded in order that they may be ready for use by General Eorga11.1 s force . Llthough General Clc::rk has argued 11~·, should nu.ke evAry effort to set the date forward rather than accept a delay , 11 i t ct.PJ.,ears that , because of circumstt..nces sur r ounding shippin 6 , that the rort\wrn Task Force my not be r eady to sail from the United Kin~dom 1 1".l.til about n plus It ~:ill use :::hips that have already ""!ade one trip to the North African th o.t'x . ·or,~an is a .. are of the n. Gd for early action . The crm: is that vre must have r"asonabl~ control of th" Stri..its of ~ibra~tar as soon as possible . "3 . General 11orean asks General Clark if there ,1il I be any rE'stricticns by his head,::;uar ters in the use of 12t.L Air Forc e elem"',nts assigned to his co!'!I.ID.and . General Clark assures him that such forces -will have no strings attc.ched to then . C)teps are nov. being taken to !lrovide ·.1organ with an air staff and a political section . ·,.s. Need f or astro - navigato r s for the 64th Tr oop Carrier gr oup is brought to the gf.meral 1 s attention by Air VicP - 'arshal Sanr'ers enc' General Craig . The Air 1inistry is unable to furnish 25 navigato r s with the :r;-oc;_uestod qua_i f icc:tions . T .ese !'!!en i ... navi 6 o.te the gro11p tr.ns.1 orting Britis.c .1.. to the theater . 1 arc:.troops Tl:e Brit i sh have 25 "dea.c' r e ckoning " navigato r s . General Cl2,rk sets out im: ediate ... y to solve the i:iroble:: an, 1 fin0.:s the prop r n .vi;ator , get in~ the fro the 8th Air Force . General _,.arc'! connanding the 1st Arnored Division , r ,., orts to r:eneral Clt.rk. , _ The division , Jess detachments enroute -to 'orth /1.frica fo r the TO?C..f attack , i;:, nou in the Liverpool area . V:ard rer.orts the t tro of the remaining tank battalions are equi ... ed itith H-4 tanks; 11 the third -. .i.th :- 3s . '.1.he division is no-; cettine 1•)5-:n;n l! . f" . a1i-:u.nition v:hi ch will great y increase eff~ct iveness of the field artillery as anti - tan.."!{ r.eapons "l'ihen the outfit moves into action . 1n the evening , General Clark goes to Genera l Eisnnho r ' s outside-London retraat. There the tvio gene r als r ela."'{ and discuss the long-rilanned and nm7 in .inAnt operation . * LON'!)')H 1-JOV:C:ffi"t"2 1942 -- A disturbing , 1, cable arri ves this evening from ;r , '1urphy in :forth Africa . Gene:..·1:t.l · f.±:u:aud wiL .. not be a.bl e to leave Frr:..nce until Novenber 20 . reneral ·ast asks postponenent of TORCi-fl General Clark dashes to Worfo l k Bouse from his fl:?..t and r eads "The ::::isenho,rer-Kin~pin (Giraud) messenger returned last reporti11£; . thi:..t is is utterly i1possible for Kincpin to depart at earliest . Flac;pole ( 'ast} ::;up. orts tl-iis vie,1 , "I have ha.d severo.l hours heated discussion ':1ith Flapole ar:i. convinced we sh0uld yield on date . 11I a,~ telecrs.])hin~ the President reco.!l 1endation as I am vlithout favorable French High Com.T.c..nJ iL .. be a catac;trophe . , unpleas~11t as .:. n:..y be involvinr; t t ec.micc.l ni~ht until this nessage : from :½rseil.Les Uovember 20th at en:l. of 1::hich convinc'"d 'T'he '-elaJ 1 T that "'ORCH of t· ..o weeks _1! i.snorant �! i ECR tT _, 1 i..., insi~nlficant com_. >c..red with result involving serious o) •.o::;ition of Fr.,.,nch c.rillJ ..t r{o J to our l:1-1ding . . . t . ' .m 11 Flagr.·ole points out thr.t no •v.:1-rning of our im 1.1nen a tt ac k v.a~ 6 1 ven n ... b vr t~ ~•!,1 /. 0 that at least thre'"' or Clark at conference on October 22nd whichled him to believe four 1,:e •ks 'C{as available . 11')ur •. re..;ent ro~JO::::ition he sug::,ests anmmts to an ultimatu= of hostile action . ~·e 1:mst eive Kin; . ·-Ln a reasonc.ble time to prapo.:•e not mere.Ly his d.e. a.rture but Fr~nch resistance .:..:1 ··orthern France to designa.te his ref,lace ae~1t which un doubtedly will be nelat+age dP Ta:c.' igny c.nd arrange numerous .letails. These simr,l;y cannot be acco::.1 .)li::::hed in fcur d&:·s . 11 Cingrin does not sb.a!'e opinion tho.t :.xis intervention is :?renc·1 rorth iur:i.cQ ii: :.'!l!"'•:_nfmt Be b~lieves . des;ral·le operatio:1 .::or ..s is c. co':',btnecl -uropcan and African operation in f ,il.::. cooperation betv:een An"}ric&n an' Frenc:h fore 3G but he ic · il ... 0 to yield if ·ve fo.,~"'t on Africa!l operati":i in r.01 , -:;ranted he :.s eiven a reasonabls time to m~k h.:..s r-re ar~tions . 11 1 sugr;est ~-our ~1ost serious ccns::.d.,ra"-ion of this question as it seems to me that :..,, you are to accept Kingpin as a partner he i. entitle1 to three 1.eeks 1 notice ." 0 General CL.rk is furi"' s . He thinks th t ',urphy is knuckl.i.:ng dovm. to Fr":1c 11 prsss:rre . He .,aces his office and dictates this cable draft to a stenogra . ber : 11It s inconcc.:.vable tha'.; Tur.,hJ• could possibly recou.ond such a delo..,r •,vith 11 inti::iat.e knov:leclge of the oper-tion ~.., end t:10 • resent locatio::-1 of troo.:s ::.nd c )nvr,y:::; d'lo .t . · It is like ise inc "ncciva.ble ··o Ir.e that o-..rr ..ier"' fc.ilur~ tv c .. :1cedec to such der.1&.:1ds have bet.::1 ·:1u,:e 1uld result o.S i:i h_"L1~ t:10 French :orth Africc:.n Arv ne""t us uit'.1 ::;,,,ri01..1so. positin:.1 , Si1ch opr os.Ltion for the reu on stated ,muld -a'lount to &. c' uble - cross by ..:ast . 1 Cc!Il'lO~Jelie-re t'lat he v ould ie3I"ade himself to this e::-:t _ . '"l.eco-:1"1end .t :rov (Ce.1er J. ~rsh2.l) advise lur.hy h.:..s s:1;:; ested actinn is entirely out of the i;ue..,t.ion and impracticable; that we will rroceed to exec 1 1te this o.1eration more deter'ali."1ed than ev _r to blazt O'lr vmy c.s'i.ore . rL3 :nould be directed to tell '.ast. tl-iat we are cor:1in,t; as r,l· nn~d; tlw.t al nell and th'3 Horth J..frican Army cun 1 t sto . us and if he uses the inf or ,2.tion already fv.rnished hi n on tne o. erat.i.on c1,S to ti'!le of its e::-:ecut ~on to our disadvant&.:::;e, either by r..Jgroupint:': J.iis troo~-s to more effectively stop us; by disse;ninatir.,; the confidentia.'.. information !lur,r:>hyhas intru~rt.ed to him; or other,ise betra:ring our ca1.c..,e · e 1 11 ht.ns him hie;her than a. kite , he!l ·1e r;et c.shorc . 11 P..fter the "'eneral 1 s draft :i.s gone oyer , the follo\1ine is s1mt to -as' L'1gtrin: 11Tt is inconceivable that ··cGrman (":-:rph_·) can r~cor.:1:.1 s·,,;.ch a delay \"ith Nl his inti "late 1mr- ledP'e of the oper::tion a..'1d the 1,Tesent location of troops cdcl 1 convo:·s aflo&t . It is lik"l,1ise incor.ceivable to :ne thct ot.r uLre :'ailure ~0 crncecie to sucll d2·:1a..ridsas h:ive be n ma•2e w01:.ld result in hav in.; the French rorth P.frican army .neet us v;i th :::er lous op 1 osi tion . neco"IL1end the President ad,1ise "cr-o, t:.!l i'!lW'!diatCJly that his sug1:.,stnc'l actinn ·s utterly i 1possible in vim. of pre.::ent adv~nced state of o~,e 'a.tion , &.ml tl:"'t r:e .:il proceed to ex8cute thi.s operation with ,!lo~·e determi.'lati ~n tha.1 ever . ·:_ sr.ould also be directed ,10t to divul:;:e on Novr 1ber 4th the exact date of the operation unle'1G co:nplete coo •.1ero.tion by Fl~.[;.JOl"' :.s a. ·ured . Subm:.i.rine r!ill re iain available for the r:resent . (rr 1e sub com ·a..'1dcd bJ Capto.in \"ri_;ht that is l:,in 6 off the Sulf of Lyons) v il not ~fy 1crrov:an ,~·he.:i it becones necessary to i7lthdrav.r . 11 0 This new development is handled by Gener~l Clark alone since Gener::;,l ~isenhm1er c n .ot be locate • It ,.:.1 not change any o::the pbns . But it naturally nilL bring a lot of a_ .::,,rehension . �:SECRET . I' ' ( ; ,I. General Clark hol ds a fi nal conference toda y with most of the section heads with whom he has been \ror ki ng so closely for the past several we .ks . The high-ranking officers sit around the Deputy Commander' s desk in a seni-circle . Present are : Generals Cruenther , Craig , Lemnitze r and Gale ; Bri gadiers '1ockl er Ferryman , i1c ;lillan and i'!hite l ey ; Colonels Vandenbur g , Holmes, Sti rl ing and Hamblen, Commodore Douglass - Pennant and ~. Matthews . Ir. 1 Vle ar e approaching the end of our harmonious collabor ation ," says Genera l Clark . 11At noon tomorrow I am l eaving Norfol k House . It has been a pr ivilege and a pleasurP to work with all of you . I brought you in today to giv e you a last m inut e survey of developments (th e conf er ence occured hours befor e the :.-'lurphy cable) so you wil l kno~ the status of things . Tomorrow I will be in c onference most of t he aft ernoon with the Prime Einist er . This probably will be my last meeting with all of you . As you know t he last part of TORCH planning ha.s been lar gely politi cal : att empts to pave the way for our Nor th Afri can landing and an attempt to get General Giraud out of France . 11 "All the data on these political developments had been sent to Generals Ryder and Fr ende ndall so that they can r evise , a s practica ble , plans f or their l andings at O n and Algiers . I know they are going to want to go in with guns ra firing . l.e IIIUS impress on them the political t deve lop ments that have occured since their departure . " l General Cl ark turns to Douglass-Penr1ant and t elJ_s him : 11I want to board the sh i ps that Generals Ryder and Fredendall ar e on when these vessels go through the St r aits . Is it possible? 11 Douglass - Pennant says it v.ill be diffi cult but he thinks it can be arranged through Admiral C unningham . General Cl ark says it is imperative that the two Task Forc e generals have the l atest background . Information has been r ecei v ed that Gener al Nogues , governo r gene r a l of French Ho rocco , a1parently isn 't going to take a stand r egarding American collaboration. The De,01ty Com. .:ander discusses this and is told that it will be possible to go to Fez, ar rest Nogues and put a sympathetic office r in his place , just before H hour . Departure of GPneral Giraud from France has bePn held up 48 hours because of r epor ts of a Br itish fleet in the .Iedite rranean. Druglass - Pennant say the :w is only one large Briti sh ship in the r egion . Aprarently , it htcs been mistaken for a fleet ! General Clark repor ts to his group that the weather in the TORCH region has been tmusually bad during the pa st few days but that the storm front is moving east . "Tfaybe after this sto r m we will get a good br eak in the weathe r, " says the general . He reports that 18 more transport planes have been promised from the TJ.S. and that the ai r transrort i-, obl em is looking mo e optimistic . He te l ls the r r officers that the Germans in Afric a ap_arently are attempting to locate the short wave radio through which ·ruri:hy is coITL:runicating Vii Gibre,ltar cc.nd for that th , reason , 1iurphy will remain silent for the next two days except in ca ... of emergency . e ( One of the toughest problems facin g Allied Forc e headquarters is to meet the r equest to supply arms through the Southern France bridgehea d General Giraud plans on having when the Germans sweep into Unoccupied France . Because of lo gis tical prob lems , it will be impossible to suJply this materiel . There i~ unsuffi cient time and General Clark says nothing can be done abOL1t gett in g this equipment in at the present time. After the No th African situation r @i!. arifies , General Clark believes certain artillery and am:rrunition can be ship 1 e,= fro m Nort~: Afri ca to Southern France. The French are to be told that it is impossible to send the supplies into Southern France for at lea r t ETwecl<s . tw~stdf �ECR EI~ One clcvelopm,nt has occured in :forth Africa since renere.l Cl· rk I s secret rendezvous the. t ha proven the faith of General •· st and his staf~ . The French _,eneral I s air officer has be n made commandant &t faison Blanche ·.:..irr,ort . That is where the paratroops are to land ann the air officer is the one· o proaised h , ould switci1 on the airport light::: at the r•roper tim n it., my o n h~.nd . " 0 Gener· 1 1·ast has sent , thro12g:1 1•- .r 1 !:_:•i."lstr1~ctioni: on hm P .ne sho,,ld be , at ... acb:d. 'T'he landi!-i_; assa lt should be- ..1a~-- against a ,oint le:; <~lomP.t?rs northwest of ?0:10 . >-ie str sses that the rort of Pone must be tb.k~n fro th<> rear. r: neral Cl~_rk asks 7ockler-Fcrr~rman for an e•.al-t;ation of :&st rs r co ~ .1enr:la t.ion a!ld the ::?rj_tish TntelEgence Officer shakes his head and says : "' " 1 ... 1 j ar,t hrve 0 to take the Bone suggestion at its face value . ..a:::t also lnfor .. .., ':.' RC':I LJuders that a Colonel Lorteer has tronised to 1:;ive the PJne:::-ic,.ns na friendj_y rece tion 11 at Sici Firouch . 'w.et implores thc.t if "an e::-:cited lrab II fires d ring the landine thc:.t the Anerico.ns are to ;,e.y no attention . :a..,t also r.::..1<..., that l l.i.ai::on offic r be sent to hi::: 19th army hec.dqua::-...er::: at Algier~ , 0 "Th t r s the dopf' u::.--o d~ te , rr says ,..."'neral C ark . t of -;; u knm-: the curr"'nt statu::: of things . 1 just 11 T.u.nted to let al} Brigadier ~ockle-~-Ferrym&.n then bring~ u~ the subject f a u.111'Il;;rp ruch1.J.,e drop on "'icily . The Bri tich wo.nt to droJ durn ies on ,, ,ninr:.s ~ 11to create &l rm .. unr! possibly br:.n~ part of the It~li .n fleet scurrying to Sici~y , 11 "'his , ill reel ·ire t'1e use of only onv Lib rator :::o the General tells .!oc!:ler-Ferrymu. to inform the Bri tis~. tl1 .... thPy ca!1 • roce d . !mot 1er . est ion th t is broub t U,i-, t .:..s the s1nug.__.Ln::; the promised 2 , 00 ".'lea. ons to :' orth r:.r~ica , Al though General of Cl"l_rk ma-"e arran.c;ement., for t1'1is ~-hp,n he vms in Gibralt r , no v:ord hb.S be n rei:! .:ived concern in; the del.i.ver;r of :.he ,.ea. onr. 1 Co· nodore Do· '"'l ss-Pennant makes a report on subm&rine ac ivi tie • 'I11e situat · on is excellent . 0ne v .r·:r sr.ial.1. convoy · P. ears to be bein 6 shacm,ed '· y a lone sub but the ~... is ap::-arentl:r knm-rn noth!n~ about the other larcer convo.'s. All the convoys are ahead of schedule bec,.use of the northern gale thc.t has driven them fas-Vthc.n planned . The sea has be""n ro"~h and a lot of the troops undoubtedly have 1 een seasick . One convoy--K .PZ--i" 36 hours ahAa cf sc edule and is mastini:- t.i'lle by cr-.dsing in thP- vicinity of the P.zores . rr :Fl is Hastin[ 70 miles . The auxiliary aircraft carrier nasher has lost on° en.0 ;ine e.nd nov· has a top speed of only 13 knots but th.Ls \"ill not inter.f'-rwith its e1'1plo;,-,ent in TORr.1 • ':'.'he bt.t lt>shi, Furious has arrived ::.t Gibr ...lb.r .:ind lc....'1.d"'d s"'veral Ep:..tfir~s . :.dniral C.;nninc: 1 am and his staff are safely into Gibrc.J. tar . mhe I'r ~ tich navy estimutE..s that 2s Ger"'lan sub!:larines ere in the reditern.ne ~1. :s ;i-t , ther_ are no indic::.tion:c. -:.1~t th y are concentrati.'1~ in the ~·e:::tern n' o:: +t ~el. . 1 One hehl'tenin._; r _ "•+--.L:~.d.:..cn.tive of th<> securit-,,r of 70RC;I--:'..::: that c. Fr nch 11stu.ff':d c.Y.1vo;rl:1<..s j":s:. lef+ ,..a::::a'.)l.:.::1.cu Da ar. Tt is for it_1 a .nition . 11 L~rnt no.nt Solon"::. Raft ""nd. ·:::..jor Yarborou__;·- co c L-: for a final di~~u. sion of pc:.ratro,p o,er::.tio~::; . Ra.ft sug.::;est:::: SU';J~S7, Lhi,~ b.; c1~i.1~ 10 tr::.!1 _art, t e h .J-1uc...rt ~~ c.nd one ~0· ,::'2:1~· :1is ba::.talio!1 co';:.l be move.: from Oran to Bone of on D-d,.y . ,.,'1.is force cou:d jlnp if nece::::sary b'.lt .ould ex;'ect to lWl' on :.he Bone ~ir. ort i~1 the tr::..ns_ ort.., . The • l:,nes '\70'lld return im edie • e l;,r to Oran and brin~ u enGi1ecrs .ni infantrr to reli:v-0 the ~aratroor,::: fer oth r missi0n,. 0 Colon3l Gale re orts th&.t the Flyiag Fortresues are set up to ue.art from t'1e Bournemout::i area early Tuesd&.y mor."ling . Fifty-five .,ersons ar schec.uled to fly to the Gibraltar headquarters , Tr.o of the six Fortresses vii l. remain at Gib raltar . .,~ SECRET -- �<r]O- ( LONDON - BOURNEW'UTq , NOVE! 1BER 1942--Gene r als Clark and Eisenhower , preparing 2, to leave for their command post on Gibraltar , pay a final visit today to Prime ',iinister Churchill . Mr. Churcl1ill is ebullient . The drive by Alexander in Egypt , has begun to click and the British forces are advancing and causing Ront'lel, who has returned to the battlefront from Germany, to re - gr~up his forces. Second reason for the Prime 'Hnis t er I s jub lila tion is the movement of convoys . "rfot a single submarine nor any enemy aircraft has been sighted . Ap_arent~y, the Axis knows nothing of the move. The two generals lu.11chwith the Prime Minister at Number 10 Downin& Street and most of the conversati on revolves around TORCH ~Jr. Churchill is briefed on . la.st - minute developments . Be is not particularly perturbed about the Giraud-ffa.st reaction to a landing in the near future . Like General Clark , he believes Giraud is bluffine and that he wil 1 fall in lin e when he sees how r esol~te the Americans are . ately TThenth e two American generals leave the British bids them farewell . His on~y com:'lent concerning "Go <lbye, good luck and God bless Pri!Ile '~iniste r affectionthe imr.'1inent operation is : you ! 11 General Clark remains at his Norfolk House of fice until noon . During the morning he holds a few quick conferences concerning la st-minute cables from Washington . He also goestto Grosvenor Square for an hour 1 s conference with General Eisenhower . Fol~owing the luncheon and conference with the Prime Minister , the Deputy Conrnander- in - Chief returns to his flat , to pack and prepare for departure. At 6P ,!.1 a fe w clos e friends of the Genera l go to Hays '1ews for a fare wel l . drink . After the small cocktail party , the general drives to Addison Road statlon to board the special train that is taking the 54 officers and t ~o enlisted men to Bournemouth where they will be driven to Hurn airdrome , a British station , to take six American Flying Fortresses f or Gibr altar . The train has been pulled into a little-used station and the _ place is well - guarded by British bobbies and British and American military ~-olice . Ea.ch of f icer and man is checked through the grilled gates leading to the trainyard , Then they are esco r ted to the 11- car t ra in . It is a-strange sight . The only lights a.re :flickering coa l- oil lamps ; there is a semifog . The train is comp letely blacked out . Inside most of the officers are sitting in a club car , British and Americans sitting side - by-side along the walls with a long refreshment table running down the middle . The development of f reindships , and resultant close col l abor ation , between the Br itish and American members of the TORCH staff , has been surprisingly fast and pleasing to General Clark . That this close personal collaboration has resulted is shmvn in the mixture of officers along the conference table . ( The train departs from London at 7: 37 P~~ and dinner is served aboard . Just before the departure an important cablegram is received . Giraud , informed that plans can 1 t be postponed until November 20 , has agreed to come out of Unoccupied France 1 He will be picked up by the submarine that has been v,aiting off the Gulf of Lyons so lon g . This means that Giraud might not get into No rth Africa until a few hours before-or possibly after-H-hour . General Clar k is tre~end usly pl eased . At 11: 23 P:,1the special train , going by the code '17rd ALIVE and moving with o only brief and infrequent stops , the train arriv es in Bournemouth . The pass enge rs wil be awakened when it is ti me to drive to the airdrome . ~ SECBE ._.:i1 .. l~~;~~r:1l1~.G :::~~: •;:;lr~'.l~t �( BOURNEMOUTH , NOVEMBER 1942- - Everyone is - LONDON 3, 3:45 AM Breakfast is served aboard t he train at 4 : 15 . period of waiting . The weather at Bournemouth is clear fr om Gibralt ar are tha t the visib il ity there ·is almost about our taking of f today . awakened by batmen at and then begins a long and col d but reports zero . Ther e i s doubt Because the stand i ng tra i n will menace se cur i ty and since Axis raids over the Southern coast are f re quent , the t rai n r obably will be moved elsewhere . At 6 : 45 AM another weather r eport i s received from Gibraltar . A takeoff today , woul d be inadvisable . Then come:; the prob l em of what to do v1i the train and th t he Al l i ed Force headqu ar ters of ficers . The f easibility of tak i ng them to Sali sbury and hav i ng them whil e away their time in the old Castle headquarters of General Clark is considered b~ Genera l s Eisenhower and Clark must be somewhere where they can keep fully info r med on TORCH developments . The train has a scrambler te l ephone that can be pl ugged in anywhere but it is finally decided to return to London, with as many off i cers as poss i ble remaining on the train . A takeoff late tonight or early tomorrow if hoped fo r . At 7: 12 Addison Road pr ime r eason Gibraltar as passing throu at Gibraltar AH the special train starts the return trip to London, arriving at station at 10 : 52 . Disappointment at not getting off is great . The is that time is of the es sence ; the headquarters should get to soon as possible since the first convoy--going to Algiers - -will be 5h the St r aits on the night of November 5-6 . Continued bad weather will bring serious complications . ¥Then the train arrives in London, General Clark proceeds imillediately to his flat . Al~ office r s are requested to remain away from Norfolk House and Grosvenor Square . By mid- afternoon , al~ officers are to phone and find the time the train is scheduled to depart . General Cl ark confers with General Eisenhower at his hotel room. No vital cables have ar r ived , The convoys still apparently are traveling undetected . The British navy is astounded at the success of the convoys r movements . The Axis appears to be in the dark about TORCH With the exception of . the three ships on which the cargo shifted , the convoys have gone forward without a hitch . The weather report in mid-afternoon is more dismal than ever , Takeoff tonight or tomorrow morning is im ossible . General Clark and his officers \7il~ have to wait in London another 24 hours , They are as impatient as fire horses that have heard the bell and can ' t get hitched to the wagon. * * * LONDO:N.,.BOURNEM:OUTH 4, 1942--Unable to stand the inactivity , 11TOVE!:'IBEq after so many hectic weeks and ti r ed of waiting in his flat , the General goes to Norfolk house to ~o through the incoming and outgoing cables and confer with General Smith who is remaining in London to imgrate cables and take care of rear echelon matters . The convoys are still proceeding without incident . Everything , except the weather at Gibraltar , is good . ( In mid-afternoon , a Gibraltar weather report comes in and indications are that the takeoff can be ma.de tomorrmr morning . The special train is to leave Addison Road station at 9 : 00 PM General Clark confers again with General 'Risen. hower . There has been no word on whether or not the submarine has · succeeded im gettin Giraud out of Southern France , The convoys are still undetected . -- �r The sarne scene as two ;:iights ago in r pcated at Addiso:i Roa station . The quiet checkin.; in of officers by tte ..,tation guards ••• the flicl-'-erin y-allor. la:ips beside the blacked-out coaches •.• the officers seated in the cl:b car . At 9 : 09 Pi , the special train pulls o·,.1t a 6ain for Bourne.:1outh . Ag1;..i!l. J.inner is , served aboard . Everyone retires early since a takeoff "ltlSt come today if the pro ...-Jeri:reparations are to be made at Cibral tar , The F ... ying Fortresses '\':ill take off if there is the slightest hope of getting through . The train is n aring Bourneoouth at midnieht . 0 , ENROUTE GIBRALTAR FLYING FORTl.ESS 1IOV..,. TO BY , J3?R 5 , 1942--Everyone aboard the special train is a-:-;akened at 4 : 15 :: : • .:':.ft r breakfa.,, t , the baggaee is taken off and loaded into trucks anr· cars at t':ie Bourner.1outh Sou.th station . The take-off is scheduled for davm . It is raining steadily and is quite col1 . Hardl;r a eood morninz for the huge !)lanes to get off the R. A.F. :::.irdro::ie at Hurn , eight miles from Bournemouth . The cars and trucks GTope dorm the mudd~ roads in a1 ebony night . '"hen the lon~ convoy crrives at H~rn , tha ~otors of the six Fortresses are already turninf; over . 'l'he cars C.."l.d trucks are numbered and they drive to the J..,lanes ":i th corrPS.._Joncing numbers . /}eneral Clar'' and his party are ridin 6 in plan.e number 2--the Boomerang IT , +he same sh.;.p that +ook General Le"'.'.nitzer to Cibra2.tar a..d return for th: fc..:-i'"'d'forth !_fr ica:1 +ri:, 'l'J.ie p::..lot 5..::;Captain '".,..,. Connors . ':'lL baggage i~ sto=ed a'board quickly but ::.. L .,omet.:. _..t) be.'..'oru th.J t tak,)off . mh':l oth:r ::'i"li planes .i.n the Cibraltar ,a bou.'1d gro1..p are disp€rt::ed around th:: 1:)lack a..."l.d ·--1.rfi-ld . ,~l ,_ +,hat can be :::een of th'3:J is the.i.r glo ..,.in.z exhaus+ .... ro. Th party in G~n--ru.l Clark 1 .., pt..rt:r board the Boomeran RidL.:i_, in th~ raJio compart 1<>nt are General Clar~ , C lone ls Gale and Turner (a::..r fore ) • T •.:. ~ ·tenc..nt BeardFood and Ctaff 2ergea.'1t Cnc.ney ride in the ship 1 .., ,10s , · i th tile, bombardier and navigator . 0 0 , The plane beurin the De1- 1.t:· r'o;-i;:ander-:,;n-Cr.:;_c:: takes off from Hurn at c A:'21 L ·, three m.i.nute::: aft<>r t½.e 11F •d r.reml,_n 11 \ .ich is car ... ~yi.1; General :isenho· er . In ::ivent of accident , thi;, purconnel ha~ teen distrib•1ted in the s~-"- planes so no key :::ien are in the SE..."!le >'ortre::.s . It i~ rainin::; hccrd; U,e c~ilint:; : ., 1..hout 208 feet . The Boomeran; ro....rs own the tarmac , takes off ea&i"J , circles the field once antl at 8:26 cro!.)S9s the southern ~ol...~t of "':n~la:nJ t ... , ~.1.... eads v12st out ;,ast lanr'is end . It c0!1tinues to rain for two hm..'.r.... '"' _. c .; Lins is so lo\'; . that Con 1or::: l:eeps the :Jl&_'1.e bdween 200 :..nd 500 feet . ~ i::: also ...,revents the plane I s moto-s bein~ p.i.cl:::ed;_;_p the radio detectors by in Occupied France . i.t a.bout 10 : 30 :-.•~the ceilin;:; lifts :::.nd.c.boat t.~o 'lliles to the ri,.,ht c.nother Portre:::::: is si;:;ht9d . ':'he noolleran;; th9n hea i." ::,o,:th , • .1!'-~j.ng <--long smoothly -until the coast of Spain is sighted at 11 : 18 :. •. 7\,. Fortress crosses scores of small fis► :.;.n; boat::: and tiny 3~c.nish end Port 11::;-1n~~frs~ghter:::. Except when crossin& bay::. , t1:le Fortre:::::: rcmins tv:o to three miles off th9 .cpani:::h alld Portu[;U-a..,e coa"'ts . About 2 : 00-P'· , -:.lo other Fortre:::ses l..rC ::.::.0 h ...... , flyir.1.; t·-o r:iilP::: to _~ the cast, The Poo:-:~2·a_ ls cr:.1:Lsin'-' along stew:iil;· at lf;0-160 miles an hour. It .. 0 ic rrakin[; good tj b ~ ing aided b:;r a tail\. ind. 0 1 ;:. \ , General Clark ' s • 7 £.n':l I.J6.:::::esthrou.c:l. the Btrc..:.t:: of r.i':;raltc.r at 11 :10 follo.:.:.n:: on the t&..:.l of u.- t·, o othGr Fortrc:::se::.. Non" of OT ccn'!OJS b.a:., been sigh".:.ed dur:~n"' the tr::..1 , wince i-C r&.n close to ths co· :-:t of ":Jropc . !t n, �SECRET· ( .1.: ::''J m~, the :S oI!lE:ran<., begin::; circling th':l Rock of Gibraltar . The :::hip c&11::. in to t'1e r'frr1:.ltar air _. .,ort ar.C: _;_~tel:- that it vill r!:a.ke the m.:mbrr tlir6c la::::;lng . There ar'"' f.: ve plar..es in the b.ir , -;ncludinc Br:::L:ish fichters that fl;y 1~ to loo'.:. "S ;:ysr . l"c a.re just ;·re .&rir:. to st;.:..rt ln for i_h) l:.ir.dini · htn t .. o.t:'~'.!:'1 at:...,. ,~ officer \'W-n::. all plane::: that a ":i'ello .. &lertn i., on ~nd tht..t all alrcraf· ' :::t remain aloft . 0 Inside the Poor:1cran 0 , 1:.. horn :::ound.: and all ci1-Jnncr:::lee.~ their n.c.chir.c ~~n..> T!i.e:r take 6..:tn ::.. . t[_t..:..01 ~.1 cas c1!,s..,.,_:, ... '""' a::.rcra:t appec.1:·. Soon the vir ~2 fill ed rrith fie;hter plc.nes , S; itfir ,s , l-J'urricane::: and the clo\i 2-nd 110 1., a.ircrc..ft ca.rr:i.Fr biplane::; . ri,hc.--o')o~erw.. 0 circles th<J Rock . The hc.::-bor _;_~f.:..lled ·--ith a 11 k::..nd:::of ship:::--nava.l , r'e~chant and sea.rlanes . There h . a trt:: endou::: concentration , a :'rime bombin~ ob j ~ctive . !.Lo , f\:.bral-:,~r ain,ort i:: crammed nith &irplanew , al 110:::t, .:... to Tiing . f'e:.1e:r-c.l Clar; . 1 s :: la..'1e circles 'o for ovEr c.n hour before +.J:,e t..lert P:1d::. ':':ien it is t_;_v~n clear ...ncc to hm·· . Con;. or::: noses the plane c.o-.;r. ..a..,t tbe ...ost publicized .:.'~ce of the f a.'!lous 11Rock . 11 The -::.r ~ort .:..r short anc1. e:.tends out into the bc.y behind Gibraltar . On hi::: fir:::;t +r~", Coru ors believes he i::: couine do7m tc f&r c~m:n tl e r"'m.&y so he rul .... the 1 7 z.ne i...~ fron s i '.J 20 feet uid I e circli:, the Roel again . 'T'he scconc: l andine is made at c;: ::" P' . C'eneral Cl&rk +akes a car L ...,;;,(intely to Government Fouse . General "'iscnho' ..er Is plane has 1::.lre;;.cy land"'J. • .Soon al:. the plane::; bu.t one are in . '!'he si:.th For+::-ess hat.: to turn bac:~ be c ~use of motor trouble . It contains, aTJong other;:, , G-enera::. Lemnizter ant.' "eneral Doolittle . It ril::. continue to r.ibralt&r ·1-0 Jorrc·.1 if the ; ea ther is GOOd r-Pneral ''acon - '~acFar l~ne , ~overnor of Gibraltar . , , alcome::: General Clark at Gov~rn:-.1ent House , After t a , the high-ranking officers and Genen.l '1acFa:•lane confer. C'ne ~terestir.f:> cc.ble has come in froD nr,.hy . It f ollous : 11 General Juin, French :forth l..fr .:.ca:1 commandPr , asked me to call last eveniq; . In order to remain in clo::.er li~ison .-.hich he f&lt ";;;.s neces&c:.ry, h"' decignuted for that r--u·poso tv;o of f ic"rs of his staff . Cr ..c-. of hi..: convcrs&.tion \,b._ tha:.. >''hilP. he hopes a.Dy rOi, ocation wil::. coTJe from the Germans at '.:hich time he r ou l d ask for :~erican r..id , he has crclers to defend Frc1-ch Lfr:.._ca at all cost,._, so that v:e should not ,.:iake the 12istake of uttacking b0ca1..se he \ ould. have to give orders to oppo:::e 'J.S . T mentioned thc.t ·t::1..Lsdid not .., e!!l 10 .:..cal since Ger .. ,.:., occJ.pios e mo:::.t of France but thr..t ·;:e would e.~pect I're1sch ir.vita.tion lf ·.w ever ca. 1e here i::i force . Juin said he discussed eventua:. Ame~ican aid ···lth Ad::iiral l'arl sn who ad mitted "his desire e:·pre:::sed to Ldmiral Leahy in 19.<1.lfor the :r. S . to tall:k to him when we are able to provide l arge scale assistance but that he hac. no com.:..tcents to ::ia:, at this tL." . 11 1 J 1in 1 s rr-2, Col. Chre·tien , C[.lled this ,norning confirming his supe r ior ' s conversation ancl sb.iJ they would. be g lad to r eceive a competent hie;h rankin 0 army officer to discuss technical m.atte rs r lative to Fr&nco-A.~erican military co,ieration ~hich ne:::sage T pror.rised to convey . "Alt-hou.zh not lo okin e for immediate in tervention botl J uin and Chretien exrressed concern ov, r A.x pl.e.ns for thls area and tl .e~ did not indicate i::: immediate anxiety concernin[; our own plans. 11 0 None of the gene ral s is r;orried about Juin 1 s attitude . -.ith Girc.ud and Last in the picture , Juin can be taken care of by them. }.s East • romis d General Clark , 11 J uin ? Pfft--T take care of hi~ j ust like that . 11 ECRE T. . I ~ . . ... Ir\ �( After dinner at Gover!lr.lent House, \':here he is staying , General Clark goes to his Gibraltar office . It is located right under the Rock and i s reached , after getting by two guards , bJr a 500 yard tunnel bored straight into the Rock from the naval yard side. The offices have been he'l'm from the Rock itse1£ . Spanish workmen are still clearing away the rubble and they present a security problem . Generals Eisenho~e r and Clark share the same office . Space is at a premiw.1, as many as seven high ranking officers being in the same 9 by 10 room . At 10 : 00 P'I Allied Force headquarters on Gibralt ,ar_,is opened . r 1ashin 6ton and London have been informed . V'hat a command post ! Under 500 feet of solid rock , reachable only by a long lighted tunnel . 1 3efore midnight the first TORCH convoy , heading far inside the ;Jedi terranean for the Algiers assault , is passing through- the blackness of the Straits. The North African attack is almost r eady to start ! General Clark goes back to Government House shortly befo r e 11 Pl\l. * * GIBRALTARNOVEMBER 1942--At da,m , part of the British navy has slipped , 6, out of the Gibraltar harbor. Several warships , including two of the four aircraft carriers , have gone to join the first convoy that snealced through into the i.iedi terranea.n . General Clark eoes to his office under the Rock at 8 :45 PJ.~and immediately holds a l ong conference with General Eisenho'\Yer. The Commander and Deputy Co!ll..c~der are concerned chiefly with the Giraud problem. Nothing has been heard yet from the submarine as to whether the French General has been evacuated from Southern France . The new headquarters , despite its cramped quarters , is functioning smoothly . The r abbit-warren offices along the twisting halls cut, through snlid rock are swarming with officers and men. Cables are coming and going . Of immedd'.ate concern is communications so General Matej ka is called in to outline plans for transmitting messages not only from Gibraltar to London ~here they will be sped along to rashington , but also headquarters communi9ations with the three task forces . Later , Admiral Cunningham has a long conference with the two generals leadin g the North African effort . At 11 : 00 AM General Cl ark goes to Government House for a general conference , , It is held in a sitting room overlooking a palm-tree filled yard . General Eisenhower presides . In addition the confe r ees inc~ude Admiral Cunningham, General Uason '1acFarlane , .Air '~arshal f'elsh , .t_dmiral Bieri , General .Anderson , Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman , Com'"'lodoreDick and Colonel Slocum . The first sub j ect that is brought up is , as General Eisenhower puts it , "the confusion of ideas on treatment of the Spanish . " The fear is that the French will attempt to take Spanish Morocco and sque eze the Am,Hican forces into helping them by antagonizing the Spanish . Giraud and Hast must have it mace plain that any move against the Spanish will not be countenanced, ~ashington also recom ends a policy of bluff toward the Spanish to keep the m in line but TORCH leaders believe this is unwise . General Eisenho, ..er is willing to "buy the Spanish off if necessary . -~-·--~-~-~-- �'75 ( The second problem is the handling or Giraud . It will be impossible to contact the pick-up submarine before tonight . The problem is how to get Giraud to Africa before D-day . General Eisenhower sug 6ests that a flying boat pick up the Frenc h general and fly him to Algiers . The plane would have the French tri-c clor painted on it and would be "a gift to Giraud . " An amphibious plane is not available so it appears a seaplane will have to pick up Giraud, fly him to Gibraltar . He would then be t r ansferred to a land plane , also painted with the French flag , and flovm to Algiers . Not wanting to confer with Giraud because he fears a conference on "conditions and rules , " General Eisenhower will pr etend he is stil l in London. General M ason- M acfarlane will meet him at the airport , hand him a letter from General Eisenhower and then speed him on to Algiers . General Clark sugeests that a French plane might be flown from North Africa to Gibra l tar to take Giraud to ,Algiers . Says General Eisenhower : "That ' s a good idea . I hadn ' t tho ught of that !" Then comes discussion of what if Giraud should balk on paving the way for the American landing either after he boards the submarin e or after he reaches Gibraltar . Admiral Cunningham laughs : "He' s thrown his coat over the fence . He will do what he ' s to l d ." An attempt is going to be made tonight to get in touc with Giraud . He will be asked to outline his order to the French N orth t.frican. It wi l l be expanded her e . If Giraud isn ' t r eached , the order will be fut out under his name anyway. "There ' s not mu Gir aud can do but go along with us ," ch comm ents General Clark . In event the sea is rough and the seaplane can ' t land , Giraud will come to Gibraltar by sub then be flovm to Algiers , arriving about D plus one ~ ne:tt Monday. The delay in his arrival wil1. be ci rcumvented by dispatch of a message to the French North Afr icans from him, or alleged l y from h~ . . J ( • One bit of disconcerting news comes in today . The swells in the Casablanca area are reac hing a msnthly peak . On Sunday , the day of attack , they will be f rom eight to ten feet high - -too severe for small boat landin gs . For ecasts show that the fi r st day that a landing can be made will be November 12 ! A decision on what to do with the Western Task Force probably wi ~l hltve to be made. Regarding this area, a group of French officers has ap~roach ed American consular officials and indicated they are "ready to coni'er . 11 TORCH plann ers are a bit wary . They are convinced the Casablanca force pr obably won' t play along but that the French at the Mediterranean ports will . It ap ears certain the French navy and coastal batteries wil: resist . Admiral Cunningham reports that the British Navy is set to crush this opposition in the lfoditerranean . General Clark comme ts n that the French navy will soon realize that "it has no place to go but out and no place in North Africa to return to once the battle starts. " Neutralization of the coastal batteries --ill have a priority status . If necessary , the navy wiL bombard them . The submarine situation is still "extraordinarily good" rep rrts Admiral Cunningham but K''Ji'2 · is now being shadowed and th e phenominal luck of not a ship lost might not hold. Shift of the Al.i.ied com and headquarters m to Algiers is brought up . General Eisenhower announces that General Clark will go in as soon as pos sible "because I must have someone who can act for me without having to conf er with ~e or get my opinions ••• This shows the extraordinary importance of having a deputy. I ' ve j us t had to have him . 11 General Clark probably will fly to Oran first to find out £irs£fuand the shape of American paratroops so he can report at Algiers , later in �( the day whether the par at roopers are ready to move forward . General Eisenhower wi ll remain at Gibraltar "f or some days 11 since it will be the point to which all commanders will r eport . General Ander son then brings up the question of moving anti-air craft equipment to Algi ers and Bize r te . The British equipment that was to have been fl ovm up is not r eady . General Clark says that about 24 50 caliber machine guns can be se nt up f rom Oran . Anderson , who r eports that the Germans have rut more bomber s on Sar dinia re cently , l ooks r elieved . late r, he becomes embroiled with Admiral Cunningham concerning the speJd of his movement e&stward to Bone and Algiers . Cunningham says he doesn ' t think it is going to be too difficult "since I ' ll give you a hand f rom the sea at Bone if you need it . 11 So that the commande s of the task forces may have full comprehension of r the scope of pol itical deve l opments regardi ng Gir aud and Mast , a pouch is to be delivered on shi1board tonight to General Fredendall as his convoy gets through the Straits . The same material will be radioed in code to Generals Ryder and Patton . The Co!lli~anderin-Chief ' s conference is to be held daily at Government House . It is to be patte r ned after the Norfolk house tri-week ..y conference at which gener al problems will be discussed . Upon his return to the office in the RBck, General Clark confers with Air l<!asha l 7!elsh concernint; his air movement to r Al giers . The general would l ike to move up on D-day and wants to be pre.ared to do so , taking a small staff with him . r.elsh believes it will be impossible . There will be tv.o Flying For tresses and ~i r !,1arshall -:''elsh says that the British are furnishing two Hudson bombers to transport up the staffs of Wels and General And~ son . The four planes , ossibly augmented by a f lying boat , will have a r cov.er of fighte r planes . The si::th Flying Fortress , ".7hich failed to r:w.kcthe fliGht from :::n.:;land yest9rdaJ , arrives lat3 this afternoon . It he.d q'.1::.te a flight . Thirty .nile., off the northwest corner of Spain it ·-:as attacked by three German J-188s . ~ch of the pla..ries, apparently at the end of a patrol and rannin& short of gas , attacks the big plane once . The co- ilot is shot in the shoulder . Another machine gun bullet goes through the glassed-in nose , narrowly missing Mr. '1a.ck. The third shot is through the tail . The plane , among others , included Generals Le.mitzer and Doolittle . The reason it didn ' t get a»ay yesterday was that its hydraulic braking system failed . The following cable is sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff summarizing the day ' s wo k : r in Washington , "To date plan has developed acco r ding to schedule . Principal preoccupation of moment is detai l ed plan for transporting Kingpin (Giraud) to Africa in time for him to assume French leadership in advance f H- hour and issue proclamation tending to r educe probability of ijeneral resistance . Assuming that Kingpin is now aboard submarine , am planning tentatively to transfer him to seaplane on Saturday with later transfer to land plane at Gibr~ltar which will take him to Algiers or some other spot of his selection . In view of tremendous value of minutes and in order to prevent interminable conferences here revolvin 6 around inconse~uential details I an VTiting letter to Kin;pin which ~ill be delivered to him here by General Clark . Letter purports to co~e fro~ London where I am preslli!led to be held by bad weather . The letter nerely reiterates Presidential promises and urGes irrL~ediate f~r; ~;~:~:~:~I. j~!1t[/i:if .: ·,. "\ �( departure of Kingpin to North Africa ,:rith aid of Americans . Letter has concurrence of senior British and American assistants . Plan is necessarily dependent upon good weather and u_on concurrence of Kin~pin when he has been contacted. 11 Today I was shown information by Governor of Gibraltar which bears directly upon attitude of Spain , and particularly c'·ncern of that country as to any foreien intervention in French '1orocco. At ·1y request he undertook to see that this message 1.as transmitted to co-:ibined chie:'s of staff . W''eather today generally favorable throughout region exce t that sv:ells on western coast continue to b~ difficu l t . However, we have received some intimation that we will be v:elcomed in sraall ports , excluding Casablanca and LyauteJ, and may expect so~e assista.~ce fro~ individual French officers and units in cutting off and sur ounding main orts . 11 For the next few days consider it of vS¾tal importance that channels of sisnal cormnunication between London and this headquarters work at maximum effectiveness • • • (~e might need) instant communication ••• "I intend sending Clark by ai r with a very small nucleus staff to Oran and then to Algiers on D-day if possible so that urgent operational decisions may be given on the ground and thus I hope to avo d any delay in prosecuting the advance eastwards . " "'lord is received late today that the French have 11d<>finite information • •• that two heavily laden escorted large convo ~ have left Gibraltar ." The second rs convoy sneaks through the Straits tonight . Still no enemy action against any of . the convoys t ( Attempts are made tonight to coillllltL~icate with Captain ~right 1 s submarine but there is only silence . Ap1arently General Giraud· has not yet been taken aboard . That , however , does not account for the sub ' s silence since it surfaces at night . Removal of Giraud is the only detail of TORCH that is not going according to plan . And, at this cruci al hour , when political considerations are paramount , Giraud 1 s cooperation is of great importance . This is the text North Africa: of the proposed te s t of Giraud ' s message to the French in 0fficers , ..:non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the Army of Africa : For 2 years you have scrupulously applied the conditions of the arnistice not withstanding the r epeated violations co:msitted by our adversaries . "Today Germany and Italy wish to occupy North Africa . America anticipates them and assures you of its loyal and disinterested suprort . We are prohibited fr om neglectitlg this unhoped for opportunity of recovery . "I reswne my place of combat among you . "I ask your confidence and you have mine . "le have only one devotion--France , one aim--victory. Remember that the Army of Africa holds in its hands the destiny of France . " 11 Whether it will be dispatched Giraud . depends on developments in the movement of When TORCH opens it is likely that certain sources will maintain that opening of the North African front does not solve the problem of helping Russia ; that it does not constitute the promised Second Front . Along this line , reports c•me in that the Germans have moved 70 planes fro~ the Russian front , including 10 from :~!~~~d~i~~l;~om Norway and 30 from the Front . They are being ,,ca,Ef~~;~~~.~rn * --,t.)f'i !:;~~~~~~ * �1 GIBRALTARNOVENJBER 1942- - 0ne of our combat-±oadea~vessels--the , 7, Thomas Stone , yarrying a combat team plus some field artillery units--has been torpedoed about 500 miles east of Gibral tar l The vessel , taking 1590 men and 520 cfficers to Algiers for the H-hour assault , has had her propeller and steering gear torn away. She is badly cripped and the troops wil l be unable to j oin in the assault . Since they will lie helpless until tugs can arrive , she wil~ be at the mercy of enemy bombers and submarines . Vessels are or dered to her assistance but the remainder of the convoy must continue on . Her f ate is uncertain . Lose of the combat team is serious but it will not affect the decision to attack as scheduled . General Clark impatiently awaits further reports on damage to the Thomas Stone . The second disquieting piece of news of the day before the attack is that no word has been received from the P-219 . '.nhat has hap1;ened to the ·submarine and whether or not Giraud has been successfully embarked from Unoccupied France is unknomi . These are missing convoy that ly bul ging are the two major developments as the day starts . •~ore naval vessels from Gibraltar harbor when dawn comes. They have 'joined .the second passed through the Straits l ast night . Gibraltar airdrome is literal with planes . The only open space is the runway. - The Giraud and torpedoe d ship deve l opments occupy General Clark during the early morning . Then, at 11 o ' clo ck he goes to Government House for the Com. iander in-Chief1s conference . The same two prob l ems occupy most of the discussion . General Eisenhower points out that to r pedoeing of the Thomas Stone has meant the loss of landing craft , as well as the use of the combat team , 1 .Another attempt to cont ac t the submarine scheduled to pick up Giraud is to be made this afternoon at 2 o ' clock . V:hether a message is received wi l l determine what action is to be taken regarding Giraud ' s proclamation to the ~forth African French. If Giraud doesn ' t show up , the responsibility of French cooperation will rest on 'Jast . Discussion centers on whether ':last should say he is acting in the name of Giraud . This is discarded as a poor idea since , if Giraud is still in France , he will probably be executed as a traitor . General Clark tells the group that Mast promised he would "act on his mm" if anything slipped concerning Giraud ' s arrival . Some of the high-ranking officers doubt if , in view of developments , :.last will be willin g to carrJ through . Says Admi al Cunningham: "He must . r He' s gone too far to draw back . 11 If Giraud gets out , General Eisenhower says that a cable can be sent to '1ast instructing him that "Giraud requests you to say and do as follov:"s . 11 General Eisenhower believes if the operation eoes off successfully without Giraud , he ' ll be chafing at the bit to get over and into the show and he ' ll be easier to handle than tho~h ho was in on TORCH H our . r.eneral Clark at -h says he v:ill await the hoped -f or 2 Pr! contact with the submarine before cabling 'furphy how to proceed v;ith .fast . The question of com"!unicating with the three Task Forces prior to H-hour is brought up , General "G;isenhowerwants to check with them but Admiral Cunningham says any com.nmication will be caught by detectors "and their positions wilJ. become known. 11 Instructions are that the Task Forces are to inform headquarters by 3: 50 P'! if anything has gone askew and they can ' t proceed with their tasks. If anything has happened that headquarters knows of that vill delay the attack , this is to be comnrunicated to ;,• fEt;::,:\:;: by 4 : 30 l"I . No news will ·.·:·"::~~F· t,:: · . be good �( news . W hethe r or not the paratroops are to take off fro m England for the Oran lan ding must be indicated this afternoon . If they are to land at H-h our , they I!Iast take off around 5 : 30 PT1 if th ey are to go in at davm, they VTill take off ; about 10 : 30 or 11 PM. One cr ui ser with the Algiers forc e is now heading eastward as fast as possible . Late today it is to send out a message in which it will report itself as a Fr ench f r ei ghte r . The r e ort will be that it has sighted heavy Al lied forc es . In this way, it is hoped to divert Axis air and naval units to the east end of the Mediterranean . General Anderson tells th e co~£eren ce that 11e as soon as possible so h~ can "sens e the possibilities to Bone . General Clark point s out that he has made Air Ma rshal \'!el sh and himself , and their smal.L staf at noon tomorrow if Algie r s is secured . 11The entire this aft ern oon, 11 says General Clark . feels he must get to of making a quick all arrangements for fs , to l eave here by plan wil: be wo ed rk Al giers move Anderson , plane out by Bri gadier "ocklcr -F errynan reports that intelligence data. indicates tho Fr ench 11don 1 t know y-et what is going to hap en . 11 The ships in the 'lediterranean have been inte rpr eted as 1 falta conv0;i-s. Admi al C r unningham sa!-s later r eports ar e tha t the French and the Axis believe the ships are going to attack Sicily or the Italian mainland . General Eisenhower says he is surpr ised that there have been no bo!:lbin6 raids on ribraltar because of the concentration of Ghip_ing and aircr&.i't . The air o:'ficers explain it is beca1 se of Gibr altar 1 "' e~~t e:ie range from r .P.xis bases . The final rep r r t is that the French navy ap:_..,arently is not alc.r.ned and is makin~ no unusual moves. General Sisenho~er closes the conference, to meet a gain tomorrow Hif there is time , 11 by repor'ting on the Allied attack in the 'a ddle Eas_t. It is going sp l endid l y . General Alexander is advancing , has captured 20 , 000 Ji.xis prisoners and 350 tanks. The advance is going even better than ex ected . 1 Returning to his of fice m1der the Rock of Gibraltar , rene:-al Cl'rk finds cable fro.11 the :f'.Taval "'lander of the 3::..stern Task Forc e . It says : 11If I an Co to carry any success in o eratirn TORCH r.iust leave TJ.s. s. Thomae Stone in 37 , , north 0001 .rest at 1200/2. Am zivin:; her anti-sub!n arin° :rrotection only . Ship is in no r'!anger . of sinking . Request im "ediate instructions . 11 The staff is elated . The troops , unless they are bombed, should be sa±'e . The Naval Co.r.ander is to l d to proceed . a 1 s submarine . Lt 2 : 25 P'.: a baffEng messa~e is r eceived from Capt~':lt 11 It says : Task .;one . Radio failing . " It is believed that the confusion results fr om garbled transmission of th e 11g;" that it should read : 11Task done ••• 11 If so , that means C'iraud is aboard the P-219 ! There is nothing to do but Y!ait and hoe that that assun tion is correct . In less than an hour another ~essa~e is receivP • Giraud has been pi cked up fro:11 the sub:'""a!'.:..ne a fl:rirr.; boat . He is proc e"'dinG by to Citr&..ltar ! There "1":il.1 no r:ay in vhi ch he can r ef.ch Afr: ca toni;:;ht so General:: be Clar k and Eisenl10' er will confer Tiith r.i:::i in their tunnel office and try and convince him to issue a statement r;hich will be sent to London for broadcast to North Africa . General C'iraud , a tall , unshaven , hol lor.-checked l!lan in civilian clothes , arrives at headquar+ers at 4 :03 p-· end ::..s taken irn'!lediately to the office th&t the Com. cr and his D, puty share . Captain 1rright , bearded. but grin._in;; , ·i.: vrith 'Jand Giraud . �,( Generals Clark and Eisenho':!er , T.i th Colonel !Iolmec fo r an interpreter , begin their conference . The r~d light bulb above their door flashes on , c:u-nifyinG no one is to enter . A £,'Uard is placed outside the door . General Clark dashes off fro;;1 ti.:ie to time to get docur:!ents . !.n u-:;ent cc.blc hc.s 6one to ,...Ta...,hl.r..bton informinu the Co:...-:bin<Jd Chisf::, of Ste.ff that the c:.11 im 0rtant conferr:mce is --..~nder-:.c.y. H 6 : 42 P~r another r..escage is sent from the rock-he'. "!l roo ... '-lwr the three encru.l:: e.nd th_ interpr"t-r ar" cnnferrir..b . It sayc : "Confer"'nc" ,ith KingpL-1, ""isnn,;:rhc·,er and Clark still in pr o,..;ress . ~in 6pin 1.,ill not broc.dcast ::.tatement until after he reaches ~rorth !.frica . Details for tra . sporting hir:c ther not ;r t completed . " 1"henever Gi=mer"'l Clar 1: co::1cs br::.cfl;; Ol'.t of the of. ice , he shakes his head and ::.-P~ his forehead . Long arc-urnent is alco bein;; consu.'Ilcd concerning the comnand relc.tionship . \ 0 0 0 Thile the conference is going on the "warning ord r 11 that TORCHis goinG on as .,chec.rled is issued at 5 : 21 P'..~ Ho 1-:-orc has be<>n received ! . fro!!! -Lhe Task Forcrs to declare th at a lanciing looks inadvisable . Si:nilo.rly , notr.ing to delay TOPCF ha::, cropped ur here . The order rEads : 111'Tarning order . f!- hol'.l' co nf irr.ied November 8 . For Ea::;t and Center 5 100 hou r s , G'IT, f or '~est about 0450 hour::: • .1-"..cknor-,ledge . Urgent , Fr om Eisenho':7er for !.BFOR ( London) " Orders ref:ardin 6 t elease of the f irst . TOR corrll:n.miq_uecome out . The com:.nmique will be relea::;ed in .,..,.asl.ington at 9- P:: CB , Eastern 'l"'ar Time . The instructions continue : "Relec>.se cor.1.:!uni~ue m.1.mber one in London and begin TOR broac:casts CH in accordance ,;ith (im:tructions) . Acknm_rledge . Ur~ent . 0 I( '\7ith all three men looking haggard , the conference bet, een Genera.ls Cirau.d , Eisenho: er and Clark ends at 7: 00 pr: . It has lasted just over '-.hr·'c h01,:rs ! Giraud , who :net General :,Iason- .1acfarlane j ust as the meeting was starting , goes to the nove nn o:,;' s house for dinner . CenerLls Clark and Eisenho'l"e r, v,ho have hc..d their bed r olls and er~onal kits Javed into their tunnel headquarters so they can spend the ni 6ht there , 6 0 to Vice Admir al Ste1.a.r t-Browne 1 s for a quick dinner . B:eadquru;:ters is trP.nend'")'!J.sly busy . The cables are flor.ing in at a terr:.:.fic rate . One cab l e that has just co:ne in carries exceptionall,, bood nerrs . The surf in the Casablanca area has dropped . The cable oa;rs : "Observations 7 .. ave .iber show 'noderate sea , but no definite S"i':ell. 'I'en foot v;aves fro:n east ol:t of Strait appear to hr.ve nullified sv.ell. Believe ··ehedia and Fedala (,,.:here ···estern Task For ce landings will come) viL have choppy sea with s,,elJ four to six feet hi 6h , This condition predicted fro,n 10 P'' 7 ,rovember until 8 : 00 .'': : 9 Nove:_1ber. Pro.. tected area at Fedala should shor· three foot ,1aves ." If this is true , the Patton f or ce TI ill be able to go in on schedule' ! ' Following dinner , and the r eason Cenerals Clark and ~isenho-:rer ate r--lse'l7here than Govern"llent House v;as because Genera.l ~:acfa.r l ane r an into a 1:1atter of protocol on deciding v·hether to seat General Giraud or Gener a l Eisenhower on his right . Rather than bring an embal:'rasing moment since relations ~ith Giraud are decidedly str a ined after the conference , the two American generals eat elsewhere . Genera l Clark returns to the office with General Eisenhower a t 9 : 50 Fi and the confe r ence is r esuned . Thines go f rom bad to Vlo se . Gir aud wa nts top c r d . He intimates he has been double-c r ossed , tha t he didn 1 t knovr TOR was so imminent . An aide , . CH going brie f ly into the confe r ence c oom he ar s Gen eral Clark tell Colonel Holmes to inte r pr et the f ollowing to the Fr ench General : nvre would l ike the Honorable Gener al to know that the time of his use f ulness to the Ameri cans f or the r esto r ation of the glory that i"IaS onc e France is NOW We do not need you after tonight l II That is . a l l h e cat ches before leaving the r oom again . l7) �( The second conference between Giraud and the two American generals last another hour and then breaks up . It has not gone well . Giraud , ap.arently , is not going to go along . The Frenchman returns to Government House for the night . He probably will do a lot of thinking before he goes to sleep . He vdll know that tonight French North Africa is being attacked. With developments , a return to France for him probably woul d mean trial as a traitor and death. But he still f eels that he should have cow.and ; that he should lead an effo r t planned and executed by Americans and British . Arparently he is putting his personal ambitions and interests above those of the France he professes to want to liberate from the Axis . As he leaves , General Clark tells Colonel Holmes to interpret : "If you don ' t go along , General Giraud , you 'r e going to be out in the snov, on your ass !" The text of the col!ll"Unique being released at 1 J.J! (from no~. on the time in this diary will be G eenv,rich Time) is as foll01~s : "United States Army , Navy and r Air Forces started landing operations during the hours of darkness this morning at numerous points on the sh◊res of French North Africa . The operation v,as made necessary by the increasing A.'Cis menace to this territory. ·teps have been taken to give the French people , by radio and leaflets , early information of the land ings . There combined operations of United States forces were supported by units of the Royal Navy and RAF and follm,ed by parties of British troops . , 11 Lieutenant General Dvl'ight D. Eisenhower of the United States A:rmyis Com.,!U:).nder-in-Chiefof the Allied Forces. rr C Reports are coming in from agents in No th Africa . The raod bet1',een Bone r and Bougie has been mined . The S. S. Janine has been "bombed" in the Eastern Mediterranean . This is probab.Ly the fake French ship the British cruiser is r eporting on to divert the Axis . Or, it could be that the Axis has made a mis take , bombing a. French ship that it thought was allied since the attack came j ust before dusk . The Eastern Task Force is informed that guides are set to be on the beaches . The combat team aboard the torpedoes Thomas Stone was a battalion f rom the 39th R. C.T . The "tunnel" headquarters is throbbing uith activity as midnight approaches . By novr, the assault forces have gone over the sides of their shi sand are moving toward the shore in the darkness . General Clark begins to circulate around the hall. He explains further what hap.erred with Giraud . The Frenchman wanted to assume complete command within 48 hours . General Clark continues: "We both told him that he didn ' t have the means to assume the command. I told him repeatedly that he had not conttibuted a thing to the initial success of the operation yet we were willing to bring him into it . Ike and I batted back and forth . I ' d argue with him for some time . And then , weary , I ' d nod to Ike and he rd start v. ·orking on him . Giraud remained adamant . Ti hat about the prestige of Giraud? " the Frenchman nould ask . •Vhat V',ould the French people think of .' me; what about my family . r I told him it shouldn ' t make much difference whether he was governor of North Africa or general of the armies . After all , he made none of the preparations . After hours of talking it was obvious that it was useless , that we. were getting nowhere . I think Giraud is waiting to see how things come out . He' s going to sit tight and if we are successful he ' ll come aro~md in 48 hours or so and say that he ' ll go into North Africa. He was very solicitous to me. He told me he would make me a Deputy Commander ~e offered to make him a l virtual king in North Africa , offered him money to build up his defenses and strengthen his army, He dem red , To hell with him 111 ur * �( GIBRALTARNOVE'lBER8 (D-DA) , 1942-Th e 39th R.C.T ., its ship torpedoed as , y it proceeded toward Algiers for the assault , has started to sho r e--150 miles --i n its motor driven landing craft t This is r eport ed shortly after midnight by the tugs that went to the Thomas Stone to give it assistance . The decision was made by the regim enta l commander. Apparently the American troops were not content to sit on the crippled ship . They preferred to go ashore. They won' t lmow exactly where they are landing but they ar e going in t General Clark grins at their pluck . Generals C4rk and Eisenhower labor perfecting the draft of a cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington outlining what occured in the conference with Giraud . Then , they sit down to listen to a shortwave broadcast of the President ' s message on a special radio that has been rigged up in the office of the two generals. General Gruenther briefs the four newspapermen attached to headquarters on last-minute developments . In all probability , no reports wil~ come back from the assault forces until about dawn. This is the message that Generals Eisenhorrer and Clark eooperati vely draft for the Combined Chiefs of Staff in V'ashington : "Six hour conf erence between .American Eagle , (Clark) , Kingpin (Giraud) and the Allied Commandr -in-Chi ef has just terminated . At beginning of conference, e Kingpin refused to iss ue any statement that could be broadcast tonight either fro m here or from London or r.ash in gton. He stated that he has already authorized General ~fast to make a statement in his name fro'TI Algiers tomorrow morning some hours after the lan ding and that no other word from him was desi rabl e or pecessary . He specifically insisted that no radios emanating from either national capital or from Allied Headquarters should connect his nar.ie in any v;ay with this operation . "At end of conference Kingpin flatly declined to participate in operation except as Allied Supreme Com ander in a position in which he v1 ould be completely independent to car y out his own strategic and tactical conceptions. :.Ioreover , he insi~ted that this position must be given to him at once . He stated categorically that by November 10th all forces then ashore must come under his·control and that thereafter all forces in North P...frica v,ould have to come under his command upon debarkation . He stated that the present Allied ColilTilander-in-Chief could retain control of base and administrative arrangements near the ports and take care of arrival of reinforcements , including supplies , but that he (Kingpin) ~ould make all decisions respecting the tactical and strategical em loyment of the -groops. It was explained to him over and aver again that the Allies hope to turn over command of this region to the French at the earliest possible moment and that in the meantime every effort would be ~ade to assist him in organizing and equipping his forc es . But it was ointed out that until the Allied Force can be well established in North Africa , there is no possibili t~r of the two governments disrupting the present present cor.r.iand and staff arrangements that have been so laboriously developed for the control of large Ground, Air and Naval formations . It was further explained that since the plan was already in the process of e::ecution there were measures now going for ward , includin; mov'3ment of convoys, the lRnding of troops and the assigru:ient of tactical objectives , that could not be chan~ed over night without the creation of great confusion and uncertainty . These circumstances prevent imr:iediate change in command and staff . In response to questions , he was assured that he would be recognized promptly as f!ilitary and Civil head of all French aff&irs in North P..f ica and that the Allies would assist him in developing.forces that he could employ as he saw fit, even to re-entering FrancA from the South and engaging the Germans in battle there . He is obsessed ~;§ECRE ~;; ::.~ -T _:-=-..-- �\ ( with the idea of moving immediately into France and implied that if he were made Commander, he woul d promptly use the enti e Air Force coming into North Africa in neutralizing Sardinia and in trans or ting troops into South·,rn France and transfer the fighter and bomber units to airfields in Southern France. Both the Eagle and I urged him to go along with us · temporarily on the basis previously outlined and under all the assurances that the President has made respecting French sovereignty and territorial integrity . Vie pointed out that eventual command has already been pro;nised him but that as a soldier hew uld realize that the establishment of secure bases and development of land and sea com.'l'lUllications would require several weeks at least. To all this he was com letely deaf ; nothing matters to him except ersonal command and he would not accept any promises of close collaboration and consulatation in the ordering of tactical and strategical enterprises . He even indicated that as Commandr-in-Chief e he could not be responsible to the CornbimitChi efs of Staff but that it would be my responsibility to deal with them , particularly in obtaining necessary reinforcements and su lies f r om the Allied govern.ments , after -which he alone would direct their employment-- whether in North Africa , in Sardinia , in Sicily or in France. Alt hough it was laboriousl y pointed out that the Al lied Com.mander-in Chief did not possess autho rity to create an echelon of comnand that would be superior to hi mself and that any such arrangement would have to be previously approved by the two governments , Kingpin stated that he could not accept the delay in volved . rt ingpin was no of guaranteeing non-resistance • in our Kat ta cks.said that , therewould not possibility attem his to do so . He seems to assume tonight and make any t however, that we will get ashor e and that thereafter he wo uld appear in Algiers in the uniforu of a French general and take cora~and. nHe v:as told that 'n our view the first great service he could render the Allied cause was to insure that we would encounter no o rositi n in landing so that al l forces and surplies ~ould be available for use against the com,~on enemy rather than against French.~en. It was suggested also thet his neA"t great seruice \,ould be the organizing of the Army , Navy and Air Force in North Africa in such a way as to make it a formidable fighting machine for assistance in freeing France . 11 During hour I s recess in the conference , I conferred with principal sub\ , ordinates , particularly Cunningham, concerning Kingpin ' s demands . Admiral Cunningham labelled them as preposterous and unreasonable in current circu.11stances . In my anxiety to keep Kingpin with us , even though it is too late for hDn to assist us in the role in which we especially desired him. I conceded every point he made except that only I must remain directly responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for operation of the Allied Force u..~til different arrangem ents could be made with the consent of the two government s. I even went so far as to state that I would support his ambition to command the forces here as quickly as he had completed the great Civil.and IAilitary organizational task in North Africa and he could place in the field arui organized Frencl1 force of any respectable size. He replied that his organizational task would be completed in t wo days repeat two days during which time he ,-;ould devote himself to the civil and military population and local leaders. He would , therefore , assume com.~and at that time as he had already planne . I careful 1 y explained that his proposal would make me resonsible to him on the one hand and on the other- to the two governments , which are providing all the resources and dictating the major strategy. He seemed totally unable to grasp the point that I could not be res onsible to two entirely separate agencies , whose views , respecting im"1ediate and primary objectives in the theater , do not remotely agree . I �tr.As a final word , he stated that he 17ould be. a spectator in the affair. He would not interfere v;ith our plans or operations but y;ould not take part in them and would not authorize the use of his na,'lle in any way in connection there~.ith. "This is the way the matter stands and we are proceeding ·.vith the execution of plans . w.iy i11pression , shared by the Eagle and Cunnini;:;ha:n is that Kingpin is , pla.yin,g for time . Knowing that there v.ill be some French resistance and that he is deternined not to lay himself open to the charg e of bein:; in any wa,r re.:;ponsible for the sheddi~ of French blood , he realizes that ho can do nothin.:.; ..~th respect to the la.n.dine ::..tself and cc:ill gain no credit from it , :i- ..1atter hm: successful. Consequently he is choosi. g to '.-:ait to see what hap. <=\nS His .n,3thod . of gaining time is to insist u on a point which as a soldier 'le is ,:~ 11 a...-.a.re the Allies cannot accept at this 11oment. If ,rn are generally successful tonight ,1e v;il · not be surpris"'d to find him more concil .,tory toCTorrov: morning since it must be obvious to him that in every v;ay we are trying to make hin the bi:; .nan in the re/;ion and give hLn a definite personal influence and l eadership in un-• ning the war . Incidentally , he categorically denies any knouledge of the ten million f~ancs request upon which ~e sent that a'llount to Colonel Schor. . ·~ut 'le says that Beaufort is an honest men and TTill spend the money toward fighting Germany . "Eagle and I are bitterly disa pointed , principally because of the help Kin.::;pin could have rend ered excert for his int ense personal ambition and ego and because v1e knei7 that the Combined Chief.., of Staff and the ·two governments were counting strongly on hi rn for constructive assistance . "Latest nev1s that ~re have been able to gather from Uorth '..fri c . indicates that v1e ma.7 expect considerable resistance whic)'i , if true , shows that 'last , opr,rating in the name of Kingpin , has not been very effectiv e . The Chief of Sta.ff of the Oran division has j ust reported , throu 6 h ~dy , that thei n plans have been discovered and that an intense alert is being conducted ." FLASH: 0238 . The Ea stern Task Forcer ports su ccessful. Landings have been made on the three says is : 11Tomboy A'RC 11 . in . Their beaches ! Flash : 0319. captured . that Generals The Western Clark Task Force and ~isenho~e r arc reports Sidi e lat ec . ~veryth:~g a::;sault has been the brief ~essage ~l~ Fer uch has been is goin; fine . Flash : 0322 . The Center Task Force reports that landings at t,.o beaches , kno'\'/Il. in operations as 11yn and 11Z11, wer e successful , "th e latt er unopposed . 11 1:fonews ,,ret frolII X. No firing yet Sea. ~mooth . Condition ideal. 11 Flash : 0332 . Landing 11::-:11 beach successful. Center Task Force) for u.nloading . 11 Shirs proceedin;; in shore I (From One garbled me,.,sage is r eceived from the Oran Force (Center) • It says : La.ndings unop1osed . Broken xx x shooting began . Do not start a fight unless you have to xx x • 11 11 l General Clark is ho ..,,ing in and out of his of,..ice , moving up and dov.n the hall fro o of fice to office . 11"e l l , " he grins , 11she lo oks retty good ! 11 �~ •"11"'.;' "~'1~:.; . if:f'."fi 1 . ~ · :~: :s~cn~Et ~t ";.1..,; -. ..~l ~ ( I j -' . , .;,, I, v ;r..f:..'\l,.'lt1'4t°'1'-• ~ i., The generals , who have alrea dy sent a cable to i'! shington reporting a on the fine reports from Mg±ers , send the fol l o~ing cable to ~'ashington regarding Oran : "Landings on all three beaches effected -:,ithout o osttion . Ships roceeding toward shore to complete unloading . No word yet f ro~ '~estern Task Force which is scheduled to begin landing in about five minutes ." Com.,1entsGeneral Clark as he waits for the Royal Navy to deliver more bulletins : "This is kind of like waiting fo r :eeturris ~1 coL1nin on electi,,n night ." tn ; Adrliral Cunningha..~ is the colorful character in the rock-hewn tun~el . He has taken of f hi s coat with so much gold braid and so nany decorations . He is wearing a white turtle - necked sweater and rubber boots in which his dark navy trousers are tucked . An air raid alarm sounds at Gibraltar at 4 : 52. Soon th e guns start firine and the 500 Jard long tunnel is filled i::ith people , so;Je in nightclo.Lhes . It is reported that three ene::iy planes are over the peninsula. . The din of the antiaircraft guns is terrific . The all - clear comes at 5: 09 . ~o bombs have been dropped on Gibraltar . General fason-~tacfarlane comes to visit the two generals and they discuss the Giraud conferences . Then the two generals take off their shoes and lie down in the con.ion office on canvas cots . At 5: 45 , General Fredendall radios that the "landing continues unopposed . 11 Algiers is silent . There is still nothing f rom the Patton f orce . The generals continue to catnap . · First contact with the Western Task For ce comes at 556 when Admiral Hewitt , com.nanding the nava l effort there , radios tha t the "operation is proceeding on schedule . A report comes in on the 39 paratroop planes that left England about 11 P'A. Two of them have made f orced landings , presumably in Spain . A third one is at Gibraltar ai rdrome . The Paris radio makes no mention of the North African attack in its early morning broadca st . Later , Vichy announces that D lan and Juin ar are directing the Navy and P.rmy The Vichy radio claims heavy bombardment of . Oran and Aleiers with attempted landing in Algiers harbor . The French say that al l have been repulsed . It is announced that Petain will reply to President Roosevelt later in the day . At 0642 a radio comes in reporting that the force attacking Oran harbor is facing fire . from batteries . TheRoyal Navy reports an 11 un1rn.m.n " vessel 12 miles av,ay at Oran . The French navy has lain quiet during the night but there might be naval fireworks today . There is no word on the paratro ops but six Spitfires with American markings were sent up from Gibraltar to escort the jumpers into Or~n. FLftSH: 0745--Th e J,l gi ers force , under General Ryd r , reports that ' 'aison Blanche airport has been captur ed . This ~as a prim e goal . Ryder also reports that air reconnaissance also shows that all bridges are i~tact in his area . ( From the Naval c~nter Task Force comes a report at 7: 45 that the Brilliant has sunk an enemy vessel (the type was not given) . Still no r eally definite word from the l7estern Task Force but Admiral Hewitt ' s message about two hours ago indicated the troops were going ashore . General Clar~ , whose code name in Gibraltar has be en his first name so he is ca l led "General Mark, " sifts through the handwritten messages that are cascading fa ster and faster over his desk . General Fredendall reports that both Ranger l andings in Oran were "unop~osed . 11 However, there is 11heavy f ighting fo r Turton hi l l battery . ·.~aracaibos beached but unloading .ECRET l �i;;i,.,i~• t · 80 not started yet . Consid erab l e a.position in Bluff (Oran) harbor. Our naval insh or e patrols engaged by shore batteries , " All indications are that the heavy going is at Oran with General Fredendall 1 s Center Task Force facing the heaviest opposition . He report s a litt l e lat er that his forces have ca 1 tured Cupton battery . The first direct wor d conc ernin g the Western Task Force is r eceived j ust before 0800 . It says "Plan A" being carried out . This was one of the three landing plans in th e Rabat-Sale r egion . At 0815 the commander of the naval unit at Oran reports : "Have intercepted French S . S. Jamaique escaping from Oran . Ahears to be fu l l of troops • .Am es cortin g her into Arzeu , 11 Another r epor t comes i n that the Oran airport is on fi re ; extent of damage, eithe r to buildings or runways , is not known. At 0939 , Genera l Ryder reports in that he is , with :1ast s help , moving to captur e Darlan , currently in Algiers , and take the I'renchman "into protective custody ." The only wor d from the paratroopers comes via the navy at Oran . The paratroopers ' observation pla..ne is circlin~ in the vicinity . 1'\1iat effect the airdrome fire Tiill have on the plan to l and in the planes so a quick takeoff to the east could be effected is not yet known, At 0930 , the Vichy radio announced that Petain , in reply to President Rooseve lt ' s message regardine reason for the North Afr ican attack , said : "There i s no j ust ificat ion in this attack . V'e will defend the Empire against any aggressor • .. That is the ord er I giv e you ... n antain disci pl ine and calm . " ( The crack Britis h battleship Rodney radi os : "Intend to engage ta r get P. 0950 . " This means the Rodney is moving up to fir e her 16 inch guns at coastal batteries defending Algiers . At 10 : 17 , General Fr edendall r eport s that his I1~ar bos dere acai discharged by 0800 , The X-force i s in contact with the French at Louriiier:.. At 1013 Genera l Eisenhowe r sends the following cable to the Combined Chiefs of St aff in V1ashington : 11Am makin g one more effo rt to dra i Kingpin into fold. Rimm I intend to r epe at my readiness to r ecogni ze and su port Kingpin as l eader of the Fr ench effort to save North Afric a and restore France , to recognize him further as the senior Allied officer in the r egio n with all honors due to him in su ch position , to cons ult him constantly in all st rat egical matters and to cooperate wit h him to f ullest extent . Also to do my best to help equip his troops , The only point on which I cannot give way is that the Combined Chiefs of Staff are my iwmediate command supe ri or and that any agreement be t ween him and me must omit the stipulations: that he can issue operat ional or ders to me. " After dispatch of the cable , Gener als Clark and Eisenhower l eave their tunnel headquarters for the fir st time since last evening . They go to Government House v1here they will conf er with Gir aud . ·:eanwhile , this message is dispatched to General Fredendall at Oran : "Clark with small gro..ip will leave Gibraltar by air tomorrov, or as soon there after as practicable for Algiers where he nill establish advance J...FHQ. Brief stop will be mac'leat Oran for conferencA with you at airport . Acconpanying wili be Con ,anding Genera l , British First Army, each with small group staff officers , Party wil l travel in three B-17s and 3 Hudsons with fighter escort . Fssential that as soon as a suitable airfield in your area is under control you specify its location and time when landing can be effected . " A naval scrap in deve lo ping in the 'lediterranean between British and French forces . The British rep - rt heavy damage to three French destroyers while one of _SECREJ �( the British shi 1')s has a hit in the shellroom , which if f l ooded . The naval repo r ts he e~pects to get the damage under contro l. commander By mid-morning it appears that everything i s going about as anticipated in TORCH French naval units and navy - manned batteries . are resisting and from secondhand info r mation it ap,_,ears that Patton may be havin 6 some trouble on air fields . Information f rom the Task Forces is meager but no questions are being asked of force commanders because of not wanting to worry them at this stage by demanding reports . 'i'Te do knorr that vre are fairly solidly ashore at Algiers and Oran o.nd that the ~estern Task Force began as scheduled . At Algiers we had to sink a French destroyer attempted to escape and captured a French ship attempting to leanefl Oran . The Oran airport that is burning is L~arll Senia . General Fredendall reports "hangar at L~ai)l Senia hit and burning , numerous aircraft in air and ground destroyed ." This is followed by a report stating that light anti-aircraft as well as heavy at both La Senia and Tafara 0 ~erdromes . The prime objective at Oran was the taking of~ Tafara . The report continues : 110ur paratroops aircraft observed fl ying over Grande Scbkra . About 20 . xx x Others se~n landing at 0800 . ro military traffic qbserved on roads nor th south of Grande Sebkra . ( P.t 105 7 General Ryder , at Algiers , is asked to "rush .,i tL1ation report . Pc.re d ondi tions s 1.li table arrival Anderson . 11 r fe,1 seconds later , tho intelligence section intercepts two messages f om the French Air Forcr- Si 6nal . The first , sent from Safi at 0930 says : 117S !ll!!l and 155 mmhave been captured . Aerodrome peri:niter hoing defended by three tanks . 11 The gvns ore ot:r caliber . s'..p_.:arently , they are .burs . The second '!lessage , se::it at 0952 , 'says : 11'.fa.ison Blanche and B.Lida aerodromes have been captured by the enem;y. 11 Looks like the Algiers force is really going strong l ,..h- Sr.fi r, 1 •ort ::;:10•;:: t:iat "·"'n-..:r::..lP;...tton ' s i'orce--or c.t lea.st p.:rt of 't-h.as land~~ ! r. short \"hile later !. '~1irc.l Bem.ett rei.,orts that the French v.a.rship Cc.:::abknca "sortied a!'ld attacked o-c.r force . " l"hat happened dl:,rini:, the at tu.cl: i:: not cor:t"'lunicated . ':'he folloning r.1essage is received froL, General "R,;dcr: "} '.airal Darlan nou .in Algiers . An -~M':lericc.n detachment i' ill report to Flau,ole c·~ast) at da·:m or shortly thrreafter . They have been instructed to take Darla.."1 ir..to protective custody ,·. .it'- utmost diplo::m.cy. Req_uest ~•our active cooperG..tion. 11 It is revealed tod~y that Ceneral Giraud , upon c.i·rival at the tunnel head½..iarters , asked the [;nerican t;Pnen.ls to tr ..ns:.iit a message for him to ..:a.st. T11i::.nas done i:!III'lediatel;j,. In it , he told :Ia:::t he ha~ arrived in Gibraltar and aked. him to 11take steps to broadcast my order cf the das for c.11 French :-:or~h Africa . 11 After the ill-ctarred conf renc e , the French 6 ener 1 ,,as re::ii~dcd tlw. t the mes::&cc had been dis.atched six hours previously. Generr 1 ::isenhov.er as 1wd him if he ,. anted to recall it . Giraud thei: dictated anothPr nessage to rast : "If rroclamation has not yet gone ol'..t do not ~ t,blish it . " flm,ever , this messa.::e co-..:1-: not be sent beca'1so +,he receivi!lg station i::-as not on the i:..ir. Lt oroo today , two hours after the assa1.,.1t , contact still hadn ' t be established ! Ciral,d ' ::: . ,roclP.:::a.ti"n ::mst hs.ve gone thr01.1t,h! 0 ( vess since 0 : rr.port is r,::,ceived that the shiI the Brilliant su."lk v:as the FrRnch escort La "urprise . The Eastern J\Taval Task Force sends in the first long report the o1 1eration stc.rted 11 hO\.:rs ago . It reads : "Priendl~• reception at Sidi ·, , ,· -· . -·ee, - f.l = ~=·• \ �( Fe r ri :ch . I,andings on Lp~ les , Beer , Char lie ( the code na'lles for the thr ee beaches ',ihere Ryder I s forc,.,s assaulted) sectors . Pro 6 r E'::. 0 r.i th delaJ . Land~il~ 1echsin anical transports at Beer due to defect in I-ms Ennerdale . T"'eather call:' . Local fog . fhipping closP ir.shore at all se:ctors . •:o enemy air at tack ~•9t . CarrLr aircraft operatir.:; . P-w-pose not cm.r.,letcd . '!"'.S rrokc.. (destroyer in ;.;pecial harbor assau l t) in harbor at 0615 . landed troops , \:.,nco·.mtered resistac1ce , r..o uC1.,ttleJ . (mea.l'ling none of the shi s moor ed in Jllgiers harbor \'lere scuttled) . One French subr.1arine left harbor dived in bay . Aircraft attacked . No hits . ;!"o bombardrrent called for . 0.m casualties : K~S t:alcoL'! boiler hit , can steam 14 lmots closed . No enemy mines f01.i...-1d.'aison Blanche (airport) • ca.:,turecl." Comnrunication \7ith the Algiers force is good . One radio r eports : "Dana.Ge South ~:ati neglibible . Our troops cannot enter •rorth . Can bo m bing support be Given on West Mati time required 1300 hours . Confirm . " Giraud has come around l He is going to cooperate and go into French :1orth Africa ! ! This res~lts from the t~o hour conference Generals Eisenho~er and Clark had n-ith hi.n at Government House from 1050 to 1250 . The follov:ing cab l e is dispatched to '.1u:rhy : "After convs>rsations ... he~e v,ith Kingpin , we are in cor1plete ag r eement. Desire that French aircraft previously r equested be sent to Gibraltar i"i thout dela; to take him to Algiers . Acvise ti':le of arrival and type of • ,lane . " It looks as though General Clark doped it out right . Giraud ~as stall:ng for ti,ne to s e hov, successful the attack last night v:as going to be . The follo\n.ng situation re~crt has just been received from the East~rn Task Force . It is now exactly 12 hours since TOPCHbet;an . 111.Lth Brigade have Fo"l.Jca , Kolea and Castiglione . Advanced t r oops on Kolea .,..- lida road . ' :aison Blanche B aerodrome captured . 1:atefor battery negotiating truce . No further nei;;s of Beer landing . 11 / The following cable is sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in ~ashington re garding Gir aud . "Have j ust c on c luded gent l emens agreement vTith Kingpin that is entirely acceptable to me and is fully compatible TTith my direct subordination to the Combined Chiefs of Staff . The basis of the agre,ment is exact l y what I offered Kingp i n throughout the long con:ference of yesterday . I recogn.:.ze him as the leader m' the effort to prevent Axis aggression in North Africa , the Commander in Chief of all French forces in the region and the governor of the area . As Com:iander-in-Chief of the Allied America.'1 British forces I will cooperate r:i th him to the fulle..:t possible extent and rill ,;or~c in closest collaboration =ith hi m1 "No later than t cmor ro\'.r Kingpin will l"'ave for J.~rica to do his ut nost to stop a l 1 resistance to ..i.s and to begin organizing the French forces for e;arloyment against the ~~is . ~bile there will u..l'ldoubtcdly be future difficulties because of personalit;r I an confident that t' i.., agreement represents a great step in adva'1cing our interests here a.l'ld a:n truly delight~d that r:e \7ere able to bring it about . "Present at the final conference v,ere General Clark , ".dmiral Cunningha.1 , r eneral •ta cFar lane and the Co:m:iandF>r-in-Chief ." ( FolloVTing n.rc the notes General Clark w.de during th9 successf1.,l C'ir'tud conference at Government '-l"o:.1Se 11'-Tothing to do with Fizhtin:; : FrJnch .• ,u,c;;prvsents 1 :ian v110 defends Fr ench ·forth LfrLca •• •Does not ':ant to co::i.':land ia Lib.,ra .. . Set up small 'J.S . -Frcn ch-British gener3.l head'-1'..larters ••. =ants lac"' for qu.:.ck victory-no unity of cor1:1and, but b;r cooperation •.. Set up Ciraud as C-in-C \ 1 . A. and Gov . and Ike as C-in-C A. Force to cone to supr,ort hi';! in his gre·:t effort , 0tc ., ,ill '!looperate but not u..Yid'"'r his co:n."land• • ,V-ould not press joint control early--18 hou~s-8 days , etc - -it 1 s pr inciple onlv strivi s for ••. Gom:u..nder of forces in .. ~ECR .--E~ T ' •ii \ �:, _et· ET~ rs ( i'1 battle should be m.n on ground v,ho ho.s! D'eat6..,t :-1.eans (;;&.1.1eral ::tateCTent), however in great battle i'or defense of NL altl 11"111;h . S. troop.., c.re b1.;.ll: ,-ould not insist T" , on ,, . ~. co:, &.'11 but i'muld wark on basis of coope ation ... 1<ingpin ,-ants to kl.1or: , ho'n' this cooperat_;_on would be obtained , by ,;;hL.t sta::f procedure •• . ~e ent , small battle-one com.!'.nnd grand bnttle--cooperati'le ; co r.i.:.1and Lots of brief lies a.head-••• ~ sa 10 as a half' interest in a i"'ife . Ike uill run out on me and l eave me sleeping I).~' ( 6 :7i t 11 this bi;; Fr og .• . 1~1)..in a;;reeraent--:::;ome minor adju1::tments to w.ke- - ::nentioned h~s siLlilar sct-'p--f.ingpin a..'1dgovcrn~nt in Bel 6 iu:.1; look at rcwll.ltsl •.• Leader ~O~ ~~ of effort to fr ee Africa and save France . T'le hcl by coope"ation . 11 At 14 1 5, General Cla.r': returns to C'ovar:i=1ent House to r est . -Since r.eneral Cl:::r 1 : gave u~ h..:.s roo!:l to Genaral Gir:mrl , he has ~ o bed. '{e ' s 6 oing to trade off wit'"l General Eisenhower in using Genera.l Tke ' s bed. "'he 6 ~nera.l 7,ill take tbe ni1:;ht trick in the tun.,el if nothin.., unforseen happens . 'mother review of situation goes out to the Co1..tbined Chif'fs of Staff . It d -a.ls r .:..x.rily th the l?.ck of · ne,s from the '"':estern Task Force . Only t,.,;o r eports have be '. r eceived . The latest m is that the landing at Fedala 17as proceeding v,..:.t'-1 littl~ rc.Gista...'1cc and that batteries on Chir1vi Point has been silenced . Tafaraoui airfield , the importa~t base near Oran , has j u..,t berm ca: Jtured . Twenty four fritfires are dL .atched , with kraerican pilots , for the airdrome . Gibraltar airport is thinning out some··,hat as plcnes , piloted for the ~ost part by .t'...nericans , clear out for the three attacked areas • The vreather is bad , rainy ,;i th a little ::og and a lm'! c e ilin.; . v,l The Orc.n force sends in a sparkling report at 1500, Tt reads : "1 6 CT (combat tea~) has reachPd Tc_ 'acta on "Sast and holds Fl:::lr"".S on South, little or:i osit.:.on . .... 18 CT approaching nt . Clo-:.d . French fightlnr; dela:,ri:::ig action . 26 CT he.::; captured .tin-el-Turk • .4.r_rnored col:!bat com.1a.>1derB has captured and reduced Tc.faraoui itirfield . The cooperation and sc1 ::,ort furnished by Com .odore Troubridge and "Ro;:ral ~favy has been splendid. The TT. S . .il.rhiy and the Ro:·al :Iavy are going to _ton1 . 11 At 1642 this report coirre., from the "Sa.stern T'orce : 11Friendly reception Ap. le Beer beaches particularly such opposition mostly naval. Part sixth Cornandos landed near Admir~lty bJ misto.ke two landing craft destroyed atte~pting to reach proper beach . Casualties not knom1 . They are no,: containing Pear . Broka got thro·cigh (garb or) boom to dock b1:..t 'la.lcolm r.as sev rely da.:ia ed by coast defenses casuL.ltiAs U.s . troops one officer 10 :1en dead . Thirteen seriously i:::ijured . '.':ati batteries subjected to naval bombardment . Nord bombed but has not surrendered . Pec:.r-:mir-1,rca cont_~nues to resist . Third btn 59 ::neeting resistance at Fort De r~eau . Three tanks encountered damaging some of our trucks . Air re orts ne 5ativc on da~age to r oa ds and bridges . Petrol dump at La Chiffa. appears OK One Vichy . plane shot dovm. at Elida early but later reception friendly , Blic1.t.. and Yiaison Blanch e captured and ready for planes . 11 0 The battalion of the 59th that •·.as a.board the torpedoe Thomas Stone and whlch decided to try and go 150 miles to shore nnd land as best theJ could , has l anded t TheJ ~ere accompanied by one destroyer . The daredevi l combat tea~ bot wet and a couple of boats capsized but they ca::ic through to ef~ect a successful b_nding sor.:."' dista..vice west of Algiers . There are no details . The "'estern Task Force finally makes a fairly cqmplete report. It follo11s: All assault waves succeeded in landing . Safi port and town captured by assault . 'Ieav-.:r art.:.llery fir"!d from shore batter .I.es against coverning forc particularly after caylight . Again , landing forces overcame (the batteries) . Jatterie · Fedala silenced . :,aval sortie searchinb fro,.1 2 crt.is ~r& destro:yers and 8/ ' 1 s . ]eavy naval engagement still in progress . T-Iostile AA fire has ceased at Fed,.lc •• Al 1 assault troops ashore at Lyautey • •• 11 11 0 ~ECRET �General Clark returns to hi..:, 1J 'f1d,.,.r-tr la-Ilock head 4 uarters at 202"i. He has slept four hours and pl:1.."'lges tac'c i h to his TTork with zest. :he situation has becor.i.e quieter s::.nce dark and fe,:er cables a:;:e co,.1ine in. Lt 2110 LTJcric&.n and British ne~spapermen assigned to Allied Force Hea,quarters troop into the eeneral office . They are nev;s hungry so General C1ark has a 6reed to tell them that the advance headqu.arters is moving up to Al 6 iers to:aorrow . Then he 0..-::plains the inclusion of [iiraud in the North !c.frican plans and pro,ni;:,es that a cor:uunique concerning Gira. 1d 1 ,ill be released tomorro1. • ':aj or Ph.i.lli •.,s the:1 revails on the general to tell the story of his Nort.h . ...frican esca]:-ladc via plan-submarine-falbot and flyini; boat . F' '.ile the newsmen chuck.le , and General Clar'c la1.. 1[;}1s too as he tells it , the story of the r.:ast conversations is pieced to.;ether . It nill be rel~ased at a later date , probably soon after the f'ira1.1d story co.Jr--s out . In the midst of the press conferencb , Ceneral Chrk ' s phone rings . ;.rter tal 1cing for a few moments , he tells the nm:s,ncn the biggest ne,:s of TORCH to datG . 's 1 Algiers has surrenderP.d ! '!'his is the text of Generu.l Rycer 1 s r.iessage : 11 French authorities ceased firin..; at conclusion of conference . ¥'e occupied city starting 1900Z 8th . All firing must cease our side . r·e ,:ill occupy uL. fortificat.!..ons in h<i.rbor starting dm·m to,.1orro ' . 11 The nei:s is flashed to the United States and the rest of the rrnrld b;r the th ee news ag ncie::,-A? , "'P and nm. The conference ends when Gimeral ·~ason-'.acFarlane .ticks his hEad in the door . Genera] .. Clark had. asked the Governor of Gibraltar to hc.ve a h"lart-to-hca.rt talk with his 6 uest--C'eneral Gir0.ud - -tonight after dinner and ':ason- :acFarlane has come to report . r.eneral Clark probably will confer in Algiers toL1orro,; with Ad.'!L.ral Darlan . 1e wanted to have Cirauc' som1ded out on :1hat would be his attitude if Darle..n r:nnc brcr~ ht into the picture in excha.~g~ for turning over the FTench fleet . lason-::acFarlane sa:,--s that Giraud grudgingly said a place might be found for Darlan if such a prize as the fleet could be obtained but that he (Giraud) hasn ' t much faith or a great deal of regard for Darla.~ . P.fter this conference , Gene,..al Cl.e.rk , who probably ,1ill n.ke off c.bout 0900 tomorrow· for , lsiers, v::.a Oran, goes back to Government House for the ni~ht. 1 0 ~ r''"'"''RJ ~-.'"'-_";_ er~...,,.., :i::-F , "'.".--~h ..,.i.t a~ion • ~ de•. r • d sai .:....,f~ -~v= ctor•: :-- v"' · nt+c .. t' a_ a... tici~ c:t ---.1 rs. l'b. C i. .....r' ; tr'.l e. d .., :· 1 [..~ d nen 'le r turrr~ : t 0900 to i::: offic t .1 .... +:. :::.::..!:! ..;:.onJ ::.. ric-r of 1 :' r:::,:::t&.r. •.-::, 11 ,... (' --est 0 r .. Tes!: Force he.::: E'fO.,,.t<'d t:.[,t c..a "Si.~V'):C: :::..1cc~ JP,d in ........ '-'' II T e >r'i •'lerican •av: i::: sti l fi .t~ n1-.,the Fr .. c. ·• -'r.1- off' J le ·.tr:: c.nd :... _::.r::: to b •• do· r, E'.~c · · P.?:.t -;/. Tn the center, · t 0r • , + e thr .... cc ·b::i.t t s. ::: of t· e 1st c n·,_-,;_~.:..o~·r drivin· fo:c-·:::.rc. st::.c.:li: e-.· t .r.:.. :i co1:..l of 'i\f&r:101.:.::. &irfiPld. h:...:: be€ r •o.c 1<>d r.tl t.::..':en•• Th re;:-.:..:: ::til. no ' 0rd fro. t c r,aratroors Lt "ran 'ut c.ir obs£r,·1.1.tir-n s o s 30 o.la'18::: -rou .ded o•• t 1e n :-re cf b. dr~· lo. ·c .::..b0~-t. 20 .:..· "'S c st of Ora: •• Ti11::re i:: :.o .::..ctivitJ c.b".:.t th'"' pkn..,s bu.-i-tra.c 'C ~::. ..:..n~c..-, .1 cu, J;:,t t : ra-i-roo.s he.ve ceen pie cd up by tr.:;.n·.0rt.::..ti ~ of one of our c .. bc..J~ tea";::. ':'l".l zit-..:t:...t'on at :U"'ier~ is exec J.ent 'i+ t.c Or!:• he:vy op_0s:.ti n co::'.in fro tl c co' st2. batteries in Al;ier::: baJ. 1 0 !101·1 t e hi •n g~ound i 'Slci.:i.c.t y est of .. lgi'.:'r • Thero h:::.s b s.xrc,r'ic ~tre0t fi ,.ti..c:, Qenerr.. Cl r r:..s ,00d cc.use to be satisfied.. i-!i:: r c i tico-~i itarr tr i. t0 .. icr.s h~~ • u:..: ;.• ic c.iv .i.rlen ·:::--rr> ist.::.,1c0 1:.. been li-:7ht. J 0 r I' n r ~ r-irc:ucl has t::.k •! off MCR.,Eftr -1;,!iis 1~1:-:;.i.er~. "e!l-:::r 1 CJ. ..r: .:..lJ ~~~d:;J!:,:;;f :;;f.I,:· ' '. �cont ·nue the conferences -;it'. the Frec-.ch ge •.erc.: at the l' L~ierian capita~~ . 1'.fte r coing through the ~c.r y rr;or!'ling rerorts [.lld holding a fina:;. c onference v.ith Generu. :Cisenho':·er , Gcnor'll C~~crk goes to Govcrn.'ner.t Fouse o.nd pac~cs . Fol oning a quic~~ trip back to the tunnel fo r docu.-nents , the genera.I drives to Cibraltar aircl.ro:ie , i...r iving there at l0S8 ; Eefore tr..e t\,o planes t: ....t a.~e L •·in~; the .Alz;.or.:.ca.1.;:. the advance headei_·.a.rters t.o :.l.;iers of c:..re loaded , t:1e ;~._,-t er ho.s .. closed in . Al1 i'"'.l,:nediate tc.i.kPoff ii:: i~,o...,~ib-e so , after r1oto<;ra 1 hs of t,._,e r;enera ... have been taken b side t.r1e 11R8d Gremlin ," the pc.rty goes to an R . . F . Nissen hut for lunch . The ,· e.athe r is still nasty but it is deciaed to to.ke off to assure reaching Algiers before dark . The "Red Gre□J.i,1 , 11 wit:1 Ge.:1er 1 Cl&.rk, Co:: :odor Diel· , Colone '.Tol ,e,:,, rfajor ~Teacha-,, Liet·tenb.Ilts Bear ch-ood and 1erril1 , and Stc:.~f Serzeart C.1a. E::, 1:..s passe.nzt.rc , takes off from Gibra.2..tar" at 1239 . It .:.s fol J.o·:red bJ the "Boo:acrf.n;:,11 and ;:;evcrel S_itf.:.res . Over t:10 "editerr:.nes.n e , the t··o F..1.y..l.n__, fortres::es and their 13 escor+ in_; f.:.c.,:nte s rendezvous and sti..r" for !.lgiers . ':'he r:roup flies r from 50Jtto 70J f e<=>t v:-ith eieht Spits on the , frica side and five, on the north flank . The n o::iera:.;_, is so close i.e can si,e the ,.•ilots and !_:.7.ll1IlersCeneral . Clark op8ns the panel top over the radio room and , in go;; les an:? ht.let , sticks his heac_ out . to watch the f J.ieht . ~ e ar.., buckL.g a strone head\iind , the sea is cha py and we are fl.ying t1:irou1,:1 br oke CJ.cuds . 0 ( ( 1.t 1519 Africa is sighted on the starborad front quarter . rre are soon over a rt.cn;;e of brov,n , barren hills . A coasta fo;:; S':"'"'eps in and the t,10 bo bers and I:: fi__,!1te s sxi " over the cu~ .mlus . At .1-542 al of the S it'.: but one fa:'..J. a1my , to lool:: for la!1ding places . '.!:'hey a e runnings ort on 1:;as. Algiers , a nass of rrhi te buildings huddled a l ong a. crescen+ -st.aped ba,; , is siehted at 1.605 . The fo:; has disappeared . At 1614 we are over !~aison '"'lanche airport . "'he S:~it are landing so the t\10 bomber s , with hours of gas left , circle t:1e lar ..;e, planefilled field . ,~t 1652 v·e stLrt i:i. for our lanr'in~ , t::ie "Boomerang" ctil. circling so it can follow us in . Just &.s we are ,.:;::.iding in vre are informed thD.t German pl::.nes are ir. the vicinity and that as so"n as the s 1 i:r, sto~s rol. ing we are to get out &ntl find cover - - l eave the barzage and ersonu::. equip~ent . The pas sense s and crew quit the 11Red Grl-.nlin II quickly . Overhea · , flying in echelon , are 12 planes - -Geroar. Junkers 88s . Instead of r unning to cove r rre walk across t ..e field , heads t i~ ed back , ,.. tching tLe planes ,,\ic. have alread;,, crosse~ the field at about 6 , 0_,Q feet . i:-·e can hear tbe po□ o:ns thlt - thu.rJr,ing fro:.~ the shi ,_.s in the ha r t or . ls we fle,· over ue ,oted how cro 1·rded the harbor was with no.val and coIDiercial craft . Soon the uck ack is puf. ine black bc..lJ.s 011m pl.:m0s . around the (°}er· They break formation and start diving for the hr.bbor . Tvrn appear to have been hit . ::e·:t comes the dull punz of bo::!bs . "eneral Cl.: rk a:1d his party ar- stil" stand:.r:.g in the open vmtching . The ack ack is still going up as thP- · p&rt:r gets into British Bren gun carriers t,o start the ,trip into Algiers . ·•e1::1, hi le , Spitfires have been ro&.ring off 'raison Blancl 1 e in pt.ruist of the Germans . Just as the Bren gwt carr--iers a.re abo-nt to start , r'-enera. Ch.rk standing up in t:.s front of the fir ..t carrier , one of the J u.nkers , a.i,crPntl.,· crit ... by flak , is just south of the ~i-rdromr> •·ith two Spits on its -UU:. The ler· t. Americe.ns and Br i tis on the ground are cheerin;; and s 1outing as the lead Spit closes the gar between itself a.nc"'the C'er:1a.1 plane . Soon it is :firing , fir::. t from direct y behind the Junkers ' tail and then co:ning up under its bely , The plane I s notors begin s:,noking . ~ean,:.ile , all the ground 0-uns hr.ve opened ur on the G';)rman. The c.ir i f ful ~ of flak anc' t y,acer bullets . T'1e Junkel's is t\.rough . The Spits fall av'ay anq i11 search of other :rrey . Bvt the fire from the ground go ·~_ CR8 . E ~: .. ~k:'''~" �continues . rrhe J ankers is c irc ling the field . A..__.rently i t i s go i n:; to tr;,, and c land 0:1. 1.:a.i.son BlanchA ! ..... ecause of the int"nsi t: of [;round fi r e it can I i., . Tt cr ashes about ha..:..f a ::iiiie f ro12 the field , se:1.di.1_; up _:reat columns of dust . The caravan headed by Gener 2.l Clark heads f or Alg i ers . German planes are still bombing the harbor . A solid v,al .J. of ack - ack fire i s bc:in;:: _ut up . The orgng e balls of f ire lor,k li ke strings of de c o:-&.t ve lights . Gener al Cl- r k &r1' hi.:, pa r ty have i ...lun_;<>d f ro 1 a q 1iet rout i ne f i ght into t.1e thic 1~ of enemy a ction . C'uns are bon lni ng on al sic es and occ asio nally there is t 1,e ift m:,,,ing of bo 1b., landln:; . J ust u as t}1e Caro.van i s c:oine alongside the airdro:Je , a stick of th r ee bo:nbs f alls on t' ,e field , one of them 100 feet frcm the 11Red Cr em...in ' s 11 tail ! Abo·1t half\:ay into .Algiers , a Cer::1an lane di r ec t J over the hec.ds of General CL. r k ' s c onvoy i s hit b.r fl ak . It beg i ns to burn , shouinc a dull _:low i n the f ast-darken i UG sky . I t pl~ts r'o":m from abou t 4 , 0JO f eet . The Junkers is heaQed directly toward our l in e of five Br en gun c ar ri er s . Legs ar e alre~dy over the side of the carriers and eyes are look i ng f or c ove r hen -bhe J,m'-ers eY1Jlodes at abou t 1, 0 JO feet . I t ... fs into p i ec es wi t h a bl i nding f l ash . The uf r ear half of the fu s ela g e tr:ists gr otes q_ely doffm, burning b r ight l',Y The r est u , of it plunc;es st r a i gb.t do>:m None of th,, Cerme.ns has esc"",Jed . The v-rec1<a.~e b.:::ids . abo.1.t a quarter of a _,L.e f r o:n the Cl .r :,Cconvoy . The C'a ,P-e.l or ders the carrie r s to pr oceed ancl th9 convey moves on th r ough flocks of A abs w o are fleeinJ r A..1.gle s r wi t:1 a fm bclongL1.:;s on thei r ba cks . The pa r ty goes to t he Betel St . Geor ge . 'l'he mim:te the general gets into the lobb~r of the big hotel over l ookin. the harbo r he finds that all is not v1el in Algiers . The armistice is on an::' .·,l gie r s i s mor e or less peacefu l but the ol d question of c om Je.nd L.nd the ·rivo. lr y bet·,.een Gir aud and Dar l an , 1•;11.o in Algiers , has come t'P • 'T'he FrPnch11en hc.v,., been clamo ris in_, for !)roml~e,s . r'9neral R:·der 'l.&.c stallccd t. e :1 off as best he co ld ··er.c:.:..n General Clark I s arriva l. R~rdor, hag~ard and er.:...:i , t~r:-is the t r ,:d0us task ove r to r,ene r ;_,:;_ Clerk . Before ea.t:.n., a ve r y late dinn9 r, the "sfn.'.t~· Co. :::.:1.a.cr-in-Ci1ief holds a conference at v.hich the c-i.;.rrent si tuution is sketched for him . He then a.rran. es a conferenc:i ,,ith Admiral DarlLm , (;eneral Juin , 1 'D'.irc.l Fim. ard and othe r Fr~nch officers tomorro~ . They ref~se to have Giraud ; r ~c-nt . ~he c.:..t~ation is extremely co:1plicated and filled Y,ith potential dyna'.:lite . Gener · 1 CL...rk ' s only c o:n:1ent :;hen he r eturns 1 to his 11 T"h"'- t a ness ! '"1y so l die:!:'s h_.ve to get in things to be f0ucht -- r!od it ' s a,;ful ! ! 11 room is : l ike this when there are i'/a.rs Beca 11 se of the tense s it uation , c~ l onel Slocum holc;s a secret meeting ,.ith the off i cers co::!1 i.sing hea('y_uarters :r e.nd instrvcts tl.en to r emain in the hotel an'.i kee1 th'3 i r thin;;s pac':ed for r q· i d mov9me:.t until further ord rs . No one is to go out unarmed . Late r , Lieutemint Bea:---d,,·oodreturns to 1aison Bla.ncno airport fo r ba.:;_,age and learns t' at the Junke r s that era.shed near t':1e field did not c :-tch f i r e and that a l l four 1embers of the ere , ere taken I risoner . nne suff"rec a. br ken leg . T:1e plane cane here from Si c il.- to bo::ib shi • • i:.1,Z L. t' e ...ort of ~• -, ., H '.LGIPQC' W'V"' 'P'.E _._n "• 2--Gene c.l Cls.r k I s current , , job is al .ost entir"ly political. : 1 ric ..!,s t r o":i:,s, - ·'l't so!!le British , ar co,:s("I · dat i n _. t emselves .:.n the Algiers region . /lthour1i. there h:..:: be ~1 no armi:::J ic0 at Oran , the f ighting has virutally ceased . At .,abat-Sale-Lyautey , ho,·,ever , r<eneral p~ tt on 1 ~ fore i.:; ttil i meet.:.n_; s01ne resistance b'.lt the:· situ,.tion . l".c,ner~, Cl r 1- Is ai:r. 0 i£e1 e· t �· (EQUAL ( 1 CR,EI ~ .. i~~~pWlt: RET is to end--throur-h aE,Teement .-::.th th~ French--all fightinu in :"rench ''.orocco anc ) :.l~erio. so t'1at :::lritish and Arriericar. troor ~ can • ush ea t to get into 'l'uni:3ia c..1d, .. flYent,!c.l , co!!!c::, to ~ips v-i th th€:' Pocho • . ith t:1is in i:1inc:' the lan\r fur.vric&n Gen"r 1 , '1OrP ,rim - faced thc.n f"'"TCr ' ' .zets o-1t of ' is ba"!,tlr .::r ss and in-Lo h::.s bi=::st dr :: to nert D.:::.rl~.n.:::.ndhi:::: co.-1.fidar.t::::. ThP --~tin. is n-:.F :._n cc ~m~-1~ roo-1 of±: the foy r of th<- s: . 0.eorc~ hot 1 • .I.'or 0ff0c+ , rpn,:;ral Clark has ovsr a ,. l~ +,o">n of inf[ ntryr.1en outs · de the hot0l. rr11,3roorr 100\:2 o't!t on _ pe&ceful g&rd<-. , filled v1ith flm ~rs anC palm tre:"s . 'T'1e conference roon: is in direct con.,-r ..,t . Th0:r-=-i: ~ strc.ined fc lin~ . 0 er -rc'l r 1 -r 1{ cits at the hec:.d of tho table . On hi;:; left is /.dmirc..~ Darhn; on his ri_;ht , 0 eneral J'.in . /lso rrcsent '.r"' 'r . ''.l.T ...1-lJ, v'.o i to a'":t as inter~rE'tPr ; Cnlonel Holm.es, C.s. tain 1-:-ri;ht , Com odore "ick , Lie rtcnant 3eardro"d .. and +te follm in: I're ••c,. o:"ficers in i; -'_+ion to "'arlan : 'avy--l7ice Admir"l d 1 "sc· :fro 1oreu.u, :.'.ariti .. corr;:..nc":r of the ~th re ion ; \'ice ;.d::iira..,_ Fen2 ..:--d lf: , socr"t~_ry-:;'"ln"'r:tl of +he North African govcrn"lent ; Rear.::Ad irs.l Dut-1·,e ➔ , f of cabin t +<' T''lrJ _n; q..,o_r ~'\.d::iirr.l Fcboul ""'c+or ::::lerl'oz , c ief of st.s.:f of t1,-.o J1t:, ..Lriti·'e r_,;i".1 ; _..;::;:,r--G"'neral Jl'i:i:., co"! ·nd r - in-chief 0f forc':'s in l'lorth ..!'..fric ; 0 -en<.:r 1 V,::o , com :.ncer of t' e 1°t':1 '1i.itnry ltz re: .. -,n; rr-neral ) de Brie· dP '.::t>·rc: Chief of :t ... z., ff to r.er.. r·1l Juin ; ir - -"'-sn~ru: ,, n'.i.;<"l , ~1_pe:r .i.or Co 1 .a:Yl: :1t of Air .;n ]'forth Africa . m11eFrench o.v,., 1. sl:'.al ww::.r: of honor .:..n t·1, cou nt~•ard . The 1TI.eeting starts at 08S5 . Darlan is a ::;tub1 ~· , :iart•y-bsld "l&n , it¾ lizht , -mtery-lookin~ e:;•es . Hii: !:i".n:· ,..,. is friendJ:• . /. t' confP-rt" , i:.Ll',r'l_in::; th" Deputy Cou.::umdcr-_:_n Chj ::, c.rc ~a-:..: r:eneral Clarl~ ti:fS.s -~c 'r . 7)(,.,~c; . r·., 0 ..,,_ , c1n t o .... ~ira 1 Dar 1an t,._ nt:)cessiv~' o +' co~irJ.; _,;._~a..::...0.1,t! o• .,_hS'1l';. ~d .· ·+ · • ' · ' 1 ,'t{ ·""::l.J. .. 1~e ... ~.,. -...8 h:1vc ·:ork tri :,. to m~et the corn-~on 0ne..,- . T::; he re~d:· to ar:,iistice? rt ,:ill cov-:r e_l] French !forth J~frlcc... It ic 0scE:~tia: +r~ut -,te stop thio ~ &stc of ti"'~--- a.1d blcod . I ... JO;u~ --I . T'".3 ::;i rn +,h: tor-:1s of the 0 '.'.)c.rlen T ::.n-::: r .. ::,u-:ic of th,.., o.r.:_i:::t::.cc t;;r ..s to Viel-:.,; . L:-·,c.l n ..:: ubs:-nt from '!idh:· , "'here ,,_;_11be no :r-;;rl~· ...nt_;_-,4:-h, r,,..,'::1cil of :·.1.nl::t rs me:t::i thi.., afternoon . Clark TJo yo-:.:.und ·ri::t&nd that diI lo_:m.+ rela-'- ions bstv,c-en F:.c..nce and the le Tnit c:.ftates he.v~ uee::1 brobn off it'l"!! the ...a.t 24 hou~,:.,, narlan "'1'er i.., no official stc..tc'llent or conf.:.r'.TI&tlnn of this ru_ tt 1r, bi...t I ,·ant to ::::eJ hostilities storired us cron .:..., ...ossible. I hLve been cive::1 ::tr ict ord.e.,,::: to enter i~~t o :10 ::1 got in ti,..,ns unti T h:....verccc:'.. ved orc<ers fro .._ n tail". or the C 11::i.ci of ini -ters. ; ... 1 J a::,soci +,(,::;~nd I fe ho:::ti iti~::: t.r~ fruitl~~.., . Clark I am n ~otiatin~ I am not rer~red .i.·~h you &.:::co. 'ill ~~r of t ·v· troo _1~ on the- £..Tou.nd . ncr do I pro ...ose to a,c.it anu• furt' r · ord from Vid1· , Darl:::.n f. ~ Clark I rant to 6ovrrn':'.ent. 1 !!!&. s:e it clec.r I c&.n simply t:.G.t I a.'ll nc-t r.cre i!l c.. cs. .. acity obey the ordorr of P,tain. Thrn I ;-•ill h:-ve -i;o br,.,u 1• of::: ::l"'zotia.-i;lon::, and dcc.1 , lt!. wl o cu.n act . . : - - ·c ···•,., , -:-· RG'!';;r ,~~ " .. . . of the FrE.nch s0 one �9Y f) DJ\:l. .A·: Tt i::. ,. to you to ·:.,"' ,' c.t v .,,, · "'' ••..., n ce,_,~~:·;; '~ Vou h&.ve .Jhe guarc:?::.tee of secu vit.,r here in JJ.,,ien: . - "~iors ('PnK : hC 1~ed Vic· :r to c i ve Vh&.t ynu • ro . oce ic not thirt:r i..., th:::.n t .c-.J• ~i l ·' e fr:-, cl. tr'"'" .•~ t' rou.i '.:,o ..,~ct our co .. on e. ae' y ? resist I },Qve T-' e ""_ • 02 .... ible . c.. s er -'-o y ·ur to:c. I · i" l en· t L ~ Le ::;c"n coni'er"'ncc &.f in r:ir:.utes . I uncersta ._ 'f, d ·· hat l c.s ha:;-. encd . .. . ....! <., 'l'hi;.. ;i:, im.o::; i 1 ~.o. It ':i l '"' c"..lstor";;· I hoxe you u.nC:erctc..!•~· . • ,... 1n1 : ... ~ e,t;c~+8 '.,it 1 GO .en~.!.E: . n co,...sr.r., ...0 re'l, in .,·0..1 in . :co.Jectocl e '."'ust ·1ove ec:.;::+ I _1,....0,_,c· , to '1 C[ ..... i ~~U.C' orr'cr~ :,0 + 1.,,, J..r J. • -3 C~ .- ~ro1,1 not t&.ke +' o ~'lr.:e ::., . s as you have tt..ke1:. hsrP ,.i t' 1 out +he a •.•,.cova2. te of Vi c:·,y? 17hy cau I t ;;•0u c~o the same thing i n ot:.er pc. t::.. of :~orth .P.:fric a . DART fl\J: ) rnhe sttua· ' ion i s (if.'.:'erent . CI /\BY: rhat 6.. c·· er c'o you ex . e,ct to '--'et fro!!'. Vichy in vie•. r,f re latio •. ::.. 'Z o"' t • ~evcrc .. co I'ARLAJ• I am c.,iv.:;.n Pek.in ,,,~-o,rin i c::,. th ..t it L st:; .,L' ·' o co .-:·· inue : 0 '10:::ti .i+ i es i,,.,r • I urGed e..cce. ta. ce of ,. e tormc . 1 a confident tbat Pet2,in v:i 11 2.grec . CIAHK: That is fine , but do ~·ou U11.derstc.nd t · at ,-e cam.ct sF : ere , h i lc [;C'vcrn.":le. a r e &.nc. :-::ni ::;ter ·s cebc .. ? If t::; i te :.,'~e !..ci1dr::.:. ·::i 11 :1ot iss u e inc· ' ruct · ons for tre cessation of ';.ostilit i :cs, I 1.--ill ~o to Gener.,..l Girt.tc' . T.re il 1 ci ..,IT. the ter~Js o.,... i~sue t '1e necessar~T orderc . r_d DLn I a .. not cert-1,;. n the tro r-s ..i" l obe;r , mhi::: . il " 1 l os., r,f 1ere tL.e &ml -~her ',.i ' e rinre :iuht i nu. .fl;.T: 0r..ly ...e .n th f.re you so ::'Te of t e decision fror.1 1ich:· ? Petctin 11.ac :: read:• i.r.forncc1. Pre::.i20nt ....,or scvclt tb.at he co.1::-,ir·ers our l1,;.n:i.n_ a_, res;:,ion . ,.: If ~•ru ti.ink Pete.in ·,.i 1 agree ':'.ith you thc..t ho:::·'ilit i , nm:::t cease '\'by c&.nI t JOU i ssue that orc'.cr no· ? C ~,,ll' : DLPLli.lT : I c£..11 + as::,wc 1 in the i. 1eciate ·':ie re:: o.1s1.o:.. i t for ::..uch &i.1 orr'cr . It -:ruld occ·: . c.ticn of Southern_ I".cv,nce by the Ger11.~rns . r...,LU t CTARK: --re a l agr c concer'1i1:. 6 t 1e 6-r 0.t d2.neer of .J: e occu . a· ion of Souttcrn France , but it v:il] r.ot be becc.use of -i:.:1is order . r· at you are doine no,: "!Cc:,n.srr:ore kL:.. ing of French and .lbericans . I J. resu:::c you ':nm· t'· at Oran is alread;y in our honds . Thi:: all boils dm:n to one question . Are you going to :,le.y ith the Vich:T governr.ient or 0 0 0 1 0 �SECRET) ' ', ith us?? Clark+,-, , ien thi:: que::::ticn i. to 11 be al::r • t . 11) :::;. ·it to .\J.r _•.y for -- .:.nter,retr:.tion , Gen r:.l - DAF ,AN : I a sir~r:ly bcun" b:r c... oath of fie."' ii:y to tv, ·ar~ha:.. t o 0bcy i:::; orde ...... I C<.:.n 1 t tf:.kP t e re:: . onsiril i t.,r o-f: c.,ivin._, ~-· C' ·• • 0 c e' 0 hostil i ties . T" i:: i• i:l-,,. ti e ;1e.. l ean on our in c .i m t i cn s and not on ol.l!' oraG..~ • You "'re unr'°er c.. mim,,, tion . 1Ter is a o~. ori:uni ~ y for all Fl· •nc hr:1e::n ·e to ral y ~!ld , in t' e ...:.. . TTero i :s y0ur l"" c c.nce . r :::t CLARK: I a~ ' i lins t o send Ln ur · nt r ecsL 0 e to ..:2.r:::ha~ P8k, · 11, recorru en· ·. 1. c.n armi:::;ticc for A ~ic1 •s &n croc.:co . DAR JU•: 0 c r ARK : np:p ,A : You h::we &h ·eady done thc.t . I have not d; ne so in ::::. cific + er ns . ,..,LttJ'K: e ~~ven • t ti"'1' . T a. i.....c:..~~~ rt ...... f~irm. l~-- :"'r ... Lmn ---!1 u tc :1 1c A:1ericans n~Vtc '. e Sc.J':!eintE;rA..:t:::: at h &rt u.nd '1Ul'C fir•'1tinv 11;11onour~elv8s , 1.a.::,ting t.ine . I knm· that t c Ad ·r a l c •• +s--d e_ r'o in 1is hear"' - -to sto . t'1 i s f i chting betneer. our troc : . . c c,, , ant tc- do t·w s:..'Ile th i ne- [ nr' , e r-u::t cet r.n orricr for ce::cn.H"n of ostllii. i :: t i::; mor:1ing . ~ c :.~vc the m :::.ns. e Lav ,;_ , ;,._n i ce.. o.!"d Eritish tro -S ir.. French I:or,J.:.h Afri c a . ·re huve t e ::1 ·.1.s of ~c;t... i ng i.1. th.l rr:m c . ur .,r c.nc: mu.Y~~ t hi:: tLc b ...se from hi.ch i .e cc:m r; i nto i Frc.r-c e . fm±bi IJkm:zn;;:bn:n Ho . ...nybor'ly cm1 fc.il to jo i n u: in L-n v1 o eraticn that can ::i an i,. i b~rati n of Fr.::.nce is a"' .. in. t m., "nc!er~ tE. 1c.i.1 ·. DARUJ--l' I a co;11 1~tc Jin : . acc orc ~rit· l,,C t u:1til I hea1· fr'"'m Pct,.5n . ClA.;X : DAF Girc.ud ' ill ::::ien the ;-our 1,oint tcr. ::; of tl cf vL,, but I cti .L c ..... 1t ar•-.:i::::tico . !irnud hus no auttor i t~r i n orocco ·n r :;:rou s ..~ L .'-- la , hE:"re nn.rrez is i r.. c ~r._,e. ,.,,t' I \7('Ulc'l iJr 4 Vic y . f - ~: 1 j_:: i n c .•ur or in :1 :. ,..1c;: aoe to e cB.11 + ut u ~Ji,J-h ...c.y . e rc.ve see •• ' t r' 1ny ant b"'fore . :-ou into rot ct.iv cu. to-~This can•· ot ;:;o on . I '· i~l 'mve to tci: 1;it~1out co "'11.Ulic~tion. ··re ', i ll 'avo to do bu.in ~ 1itb .,_ e coum.nc. r,_, on t .. e _'!'ound . 'LA' ": 0 :!)J\RLA''T The c.r r :f is : e ~.i 1 ma! DA} JiJT: I st i 1 ni th it 1.s oas~· {"Uld :.. ke five i ':le, . l,,S • o. siblP "'li:::mt'.3s · ith !"'~ .,. ET) 0 - for ::h.f you . , :'or dLcucsion • �l /~ec_ :·· s _Et R (E lRMLl.l!?~~C~EY Q~::: ) ( C ARK : You undE"rst&ud +.l.t no ore i.., to cave h rE or coir'1.l.nicaticn \,ith c.n,,,,-on° out::;id9 , (.At t i· oint Cknc::.·al R;r· er ca me in to re. ort that at a cer•: E,:n barre.ckJ a ca. t&.ir:. ras ,:"ni::: to the CC' i·0 coz:!I'k,ndin_: and. "·o 1 1 hi t:.:..t c111.Lc v c s ['rmisticE" · s ~i/nec' the bsr""ack: ni J be bot1bc.d. Gcmer.:.l Clark scr.t :2y4 ::,r ~.:d a Fr'"'nC l :cn0n .. tC' c..irc•1c· t ic ,,u1, l;.o+' ti-" Fr nc~ e..d A.: ric,. .. i · commr...nL'cr (·~1i·~e .!'.dmirB.~ rarJ.r...n ::..nc':.it sto.ff ···ere ccnfcrrine . r'f"ncrE..::;_ Clc.rk ~-acr>c" anc1 qo ..m •the lobby of the St Geo::.·,se:fote • "'he other .America .• ·,:<ff";c ers cit"Jred. c:.bou".:, t'.e cr,v.rt.,· .rr +c .,., · :s·..ire t'1at no"o of ,,:'1e lr. rr_..cner, ·.. -:~.tout t'rou._;h tJ:.n ~ ir.C:.c·,;;,) i.t <'\" .. n: t e A!l':lric~n-French : confer~nce resumed.) 1·a11 :~ou e.cce. t t is ordc::-?( -,.., laic.' do•n a C".Y f it ,n t e kb --l, In s11bstance i:. S:'.i t .at the Jm:r-ric-1~ .i. l not t~ 1c .i~ r-t:.-fu::..al tc r c ,.;;.re G. 1 im ediut0 ur ictic , t K.t furtnP,r bat-' le ill bu f1-•if-, ess nr· ,_ .. t b or,c.. i· .l flo'7 . ·•") ~,.u,t::.. to t.81 ··.r,:1a~ F tB.in +iw.t as a re..,'l; 01 1:..,htin~ t 1 y ,~ou d • :::obab "',/ ~OS9 AfricE . He .m,ts to C"J' ::,n r\0st~ :.i, i 'E 1.. ·· t ~e c:..n at itur e of con . lP.to r.E.u-cr J.ity . ) l'.1'.RLAN : CIJ'.Rl( : ' ·it I -...~nt is orctrr;:; ·'o -~,c trr0.s . fo\..."'J.AN: 'J'he.1 I Tiill c.ss an ordnr to Juir. , Nog-.,.,z, TlLrr0:::;, tt. Ai!•frrcr- , and the c.,.vy (Darlan then be ins ,; ri ~in_, ·::.'le ~ssc . .., a .... . ci1v ctu.L i:, ions cf G"Jn"r<i..L Clc.rk -::_.., di~ so . ) he GLARK: Under our in::..tructic--ns e.:J.Cc co:... ::i.nrier ar 1ictic ::i . 'T'h sc off leers v,il_ neGotiate conce!'ne · . C'•en ra.l Putton ,,,iJ.l ,.,t-t , .i.th to n:i.r . n .. en t:ieJr c':lase firing they 1 i 1 territor y. I'ARLAN: \~hat about Tunisia? il de::ci e L t8r s o.:f ·i:r ~ witu U ~ Fl'f re • coll1Il,u.l1l ox·s Ge 1 r ~ "fo..,uez ~.nc off, r t r ente,.· into -Lc.r .., for t11.- \ ,..ol~ Tr.ere·, i:.-:.. be no hostii.iti .., to Jl.r_,,-ric·ns "·l1 -re? D!:....., AN: T'1E'n t .uest ic,n of t-h':l ::tatus of "!irau comes 1 •• ( ,... .1 ra.l r::.ar·c a c red t '1e.t t' i::.. v cn1ld be r'is,. o~ed of after t f lght.:.~.u h-:d been sto,:-. ed .) ClLllC : ~nat C'in.ud ·:rar.."s .i.::; to he .• Frc.r..ce in t ..i~ l:-if., ..,..,, u1 &.n • t lf"rc .i:=: ... roc-'U for ever~•one . Rleht no' .. I .:... tr~rin tc s·,0 •.1 th' fiufu.tin 5 • DAPLAi:' "o g11 E:, .ay '1e:::;itate on th8 vt. ic...ity cf t1i.., orc.:;1• if : : to hi • ,..1--1c..t r.re ,·:e e(in 0 to do a.bout " IL-~? it i..: raC:iood CLfa..:'K: Let . -:J see tie order fir::..t . ("" 9 order t,ivec c:.l l:..n<.l ~E'a, (...,nc,. , Lir forces in 'Jo tn Africa orc"ers to cea firir.~ al [.in..,t A1ericc • troo ~ s u . on receir t o• t 1P. order a,.d to retu1·n +o thei r br ~ ~ : r r' ob3erve strict 'i.eutr it:,- . Dr...rlc:.n:-..aJ3 t>at he t1..''es ·::. t.: res~oasib1 .. i,.., for Ncrt1 Africa in +,:1e na1e of tl'e arda, thc.t t·1e ,.resent r.· cit r./ coi:: ur., ers 1·et£:.in co::i..iand, anc' tll&.t ro.Lit·jc£..: -.r d'mini~tr· '·ivc. ._,,~uorit.ic' ,--i:.:. ''e . <in uncl1an _ed . :•!o chunuc cu.n J:-e ·,7ith J'.l.!'l&.n1 s ordc.r for th 1 rr,fent . The order 'i--Ll ._,o to ,Ji;-· . , o 'Uez, nrec,€..1. ar.. t e , 0 - L> - """"' �Admi.,,,L s cor.::.a 'ine .... int .. three l reas . CLAH.K ':'his will stand unle::is oth<or1 ise c.ia.nged by t •.e Allied Co,.,.. : .:.nderin-C 1ief . It may be necc ~~'--r. lEtcr to me'' c' ·~n.,es t=nC.:for thu.t reu::,un 1 I huve asked • ou to insert "for th8 • rE ,.:;eu-• 11 You understanc that there are sol'!l<:i British tr .. s , ',ut tnat aJ 01 · her.i &re unde~· Am r::.cu.r. s·J.1re11!e comnand . D!LltLAH: "'hen I i'li 1 change ii to .Arle1 icL troor,s or t'1eir Allin • riGht . CLARK: All DARLAN ·~hat dis)osi tion will be made of the French gensr&l:., v:.o dLobe:·ed. : orders. I mee.n ~~c''"+ an<' t· ..c thArs . I t inl: they shoulc.. be Liven no French mili tar~- corn: and . CLARK: That I , E' to c.iscuss .nt is one of the thin.:s , it:. A lmirE..~ Dar~an . !:'ARIAN: I don ' t .~·ant to +.reat r·ith those l"len. It i"' in yo1.1r orTi inter st to a.cr-o"'t;.a t I ca •• 1 t toler tP thr>ioe men not obP-yin ~ my orders . Tne oth0r officers dc,n 1 t ,.ant them t" have c::.n:rtinb to c1 o ,dth French C Or"~ .n.nf • ts I un crsta.cd CLM1K: It ink I can h:mdle t1is soon a .. d invcsti'--'ate . ·it , .,-cu do not ,·a!-i-'-these men under your cor""1and? \ r-A_PAN: Yes l :, . You had better res~nte,1. .ut them in :::.omesafe ~l. .... ce. Th y c.rf' bitter·:{ 0 I don 1t ·,mderstand . '.!:hey he 1..~ s ::,o ·mch . Hov,evE::r I c'o un cr:::,tt..nd , 'll' re.::, .L:+,.,, a::;a:· n t their L+ .... o' eying nrders . . . t ,..... 1., 'Se t ,.,. ore' ers -' c cea -'3 ''!ostili ties a;.·c cc:..rried out . orr'er is not v:crt:. t' 8 ._,e.. :.t is -;ritten or on 1:..nl9ss car:deC::. ou·: . C 'PJ< : y DAR• : ~1 What about '~he qu"3stion of tra.nsmittinc orderc . They ni 1 t,O by our 1 lane with one of your officers ar,0 one of ours. L o. 1 ~ii."on ; ··;p c·a .. corr 1·micate tha"L the orc1e .is c0rdn.c; a .• tuat in •! :~ ,..,'"antime ho ·-'-- .i, ies are to be cea. ed, • end.ii.~ recei. t o: t:.er.1. i The French L.re shootin[, do·:.n our • lanes ev ryti'.'1•· they ta'~e off in ·:orocco. C!JD!( : i-•nwrrrAL: I am sur. riced.. What about t'1e French C PJlK: Pe nill Pe are in accord ·1 ith thL .,risoners /OU h&ve taken? __;ive t:1cr.1 al back. 17e don ' t ,ant 5 - SECRE (EQUA\.S B~ITl5H MOST segET) ID9i:hod of tn.r.Ls"J:..ssion . any French .. rison rs . �(", ·in~• +his discussion ·r• 'i.r ...l Darlan h<-r'i finish the text of th,:, ore.er ,a;:;sage . It hE.d bevn a.mended so that the die ocii..ions of m- s in t:.e handr, of French troops pc :.i....a b to loco..1. iL.'IlericLn co ,t.rn:. •rs.) ( General Ryder returmd anc' said that a C r;tain ~f tne, - 68+ Inf·c.r.try 1 Hent to the colonel in the barracks before mE'ntione,1 t..r ~ o .... , h11 that if c m t 1e terms of the o.rmir tice v:-ere not agree( to hP \ robt..1:)_y ' ou.d. have to bomb. " The Fre!lch colono:::. a •• 1:.r0nt.1y misunclerstood. T,,o othPl .,~.'1~.Lar inci ients haii occl.rred. e.n( Genera:. Fyder v.ent out to set+le tilem. ''.\-i<; f"ne. draft of "' P nr-"er r:-iessaee v,&.::i z ne over anci Genera~ C-crk a. proved it. It is to be .ut into"final form a.nd dL 1 atched iri::eC:Lt--Y • AL. ,le cc,nfer .... ., . f-+, the cori.f"'rerce rocm ri th ti:1e excr. tion of Adm.ira.1. Dar c:--:i, f',enera~ CJLr 1', and • ir . Muri 1:.y the inter. reter • , rn the privc.t" confore!:lce ith fid ..1ira ... Dar: .n , '3neraJ. c:.urk ½.uestion: the Fr nch"!a.11 cone rning the flc ,t r.e controlc . T\,.r.... is va 6-ue and .. il an 1J1.al:E: no hints or commitments . He inf~;1s r.cneral Cle. Y , m,ever , that he has peronal~y issued order~ to the French fleet to be ,re.~red to 1ove on short notice should the Germ:.n"' enter unoccupied France •• e .:;tates omPhatico.l1y that 11under no circumstances wil the fl8ct fal" intc Germn.n hands . 0 F0 1 o ing ic the tr:.rn:l~.-ti 0 n of D::::.rl_..,:: orde,.. tor-. , ,-.~"s JuL~, J\fo c:.~:, 6 ;Jarr" ('1°\:'..'.lisia), (' '1Pr 2.. ~-=-nci6:.2.. ~cl,'! !_=.__!.:c;::; 'ich,.__; ., ·:ore:::::~ ::C'1:· !)or; __ , .. co. ~.s..1~il.1c Ioroc:n , ,..,:. ab .:..~ca '"T'i;_nis"!.'" , .,...:;:-cctiv:J ~... : '' 1 --=n,;age"'e:.1+..., ~ ing been fulfil.::eJ "--' +· e t bodJ "'.)&:~ le beco ...ln~ u:e: .... / "'r~ ~---- u..:._ to :..1 tho 1::.:: !:3[.. ~.d ri~ for~~~ in "-"W i::. ....... ~, .ica 1cir !.fri .... t::, cc:...:: a _, .:'i~ht (;.,,.6!:..=--~st for-:-~ tJf !'J":!,...-~ ~nd -':, f~o~1 ~.,,., ...,\..,i;.,.:.pt thi:: o:' ..er c.11d. of to !"c·:u=!l to tc o"b~srv(., """"trict~:::.1.10,1trl... .. lit:,, .... ":2--!n .. .'~l;;er·~~ c....uj ..!crocco C;o~ c..nJ.e., ... .. ~-i 1-Chic.P ..,.ll '1..ltt~c11~-"l·,r8::::;::.n ... lic..:, ... r,n itl-- local .:~-1 .,, Co c..~..::..,..c0 ... th ..r.:.c ub~ect of tsr1w for -~11J s-..is)ens:.0~1 of ho::;til:!.+ics. "3--I c.ssume a...tthor ~·•y O', c,.. '··or'.;h · frica. i.n +,~e n<.1.':13 ".:.he '"'.ar.:.,hal. of '!:hP pr Jsent ::;en.:.nr officers retain thelr co11.--'Lnr'is l.nd Lhe :ro .:. t.;.cal ::i.nd ad.-:,.:..ni:::tr~ttv-v Or[;anizatio:.- ..... r '.l:..ln i.1 fore€'. To chanc:;E:. ..:.1. bJ 1.1c.d, ..:. 0-rt a. fres:1 order fro::1 " . ' 11 4--!111 ;risoners on eac:1 .,.:.. " wi.1.1. be e·{c lc...~sed. " -::. 1 .1. To ec:. edi te t· 1e ar ,i. tic es in the Oran and JI.isle s re, ions, tr ..e order It ·.,ill be d-:Jlivcred to the affected co:-' t:iders to'llorrov. by cour.i.ers so that the authentici .. y !on't be in douht . Le rad"oed. Fol.o-inf this conference which takes the entire morning , Gtneral Clark ~ends the fol.1.oriini:- cable : tJust conc .... i lengthy conference ude with Dar h.n and hir cohorts. >-le r atedly refused to acce;:t tern::; of :ir1Jif'tice rec.son lack of c.uthority fro:'.! Vic .,_; [ dcm~nded he sif,n them to i!:lc.L-:.ir all !fort.1 l.i'ri.ca anrJ. . e sta.te 1 ••e:. • ou.~ b..., taken into custodJ if he refu.,ed nr" furtl-ier ne2"otic:;tion ,ould be .ith ~iraud. ,n:e final : y ap•3ed •·o i::::::,ue c.1e &.n c.·der to 1;..l" the :rour. ' , ir and naval force;:; in "ort.h !.frict.. , .;_1c •1dL1.; or occo ·e:ri Tunis:.a to c isc 1.ti::--.,~ehoctil.~L.:.e, .:.... e:~at0::y. T V hi.r sig:ic--3. order to c<r.h C01 :..n Ar anr' it is boine dis. c..tched our V ~ tl-i Fre_1ch C't ff Officer., :.od :·, Frc. 1ch 0 • r s·· Ri;-er~-33 (EQUALS BRITISH MOSTS!::CrlET) �( con "!.'.::ndsr:J \""ho'could be rv ..... ched b;r t--1- .J·.one w.,o h::.ve been co~ ..:anic:ited w;_ th incl~din; those in Tunis . 11Later arran,_;ed confe y._ncc q, 1.nderson ,;·i th I"r,:.ncL. co-:i ......... n ers to :aci1.i tatc h l ;: .L.'lo. osed ::iove .::mt b:r ::cu. toni:;ht _ to Jon° , 3ou ie 2.nr' "~:.. j elli. Dar lc.n obvio 1 1:::l~r ,le.yin::; for •.. 0\7er . k.st •.ic;.1t co.rf rred ,Yit!l l".:..r ·1d a.'1d a__,::..inthis morni.'l.; . r'ir.::.,ld rey_uested DarlG. ..... o confer ,.it. hi:.'1. '!::be latter refused b..:.t T h::..ve ar r .. 'l_,-d for the t-o to conf r v:it:1 me at 1500 tod·y . Darlun at St. r-eor_;,c .:here T a,·, . '4e is not in our cu::,tody but '1e ha,_ ..-;:..vsnm1 1:J.is ·..ord not to leave . 11 Pel.:. ve i:i. viP.\ o: 1 i;: order to sto.i:, r3si t&nce h" should not be ph.,r::::..cc.11:, rectrained i,t pr __ se!lt . I b .. ter ,:isc·1::.::"'d a.lon:) "':'ith I\:..rlan t'12 .u 0 -tion cf ".:.h-3 l .... . 'V .. • ,..,1·· •ro, C''.,,., "V ,-,~+c th'~ 1~ ·"trr t'-in•1_ .lT•..., ·ro ,.., "C"" J.!J_, t I no • h· 11' •"'t ,_ t..i. V i..,\,;,l,.., ,l,..-.. .. .._,,1,.,,,,._.., ,._,...., '--"" f tuo K.i.n_,p.i.?1s but hope to 7;.:_grrlc o"Jt of it so::1ihov:. I I doe•~,.,d ::..tof ut,noct imrortance to do a!lyt' ·..'l - to sec'..lre c....1 ori.l-.)r ·hich rwuld be ob-r:Jd to c ,. se hostilities ev_ryu' ern Tfave not 3.nn0...:.nccu thl::; (T1ar1Ln 1 s order) ov::r +re r&dio so as not t.o +,ip 0' .. 11.c.nd the r 3r7 ...n~ . 11 1.r to = ~ i...-...L..1.., ~..i.. ....... 0 <-...., ..I. -...i P..k:i.nto the ren.:ral ' s co. fcronce with d •ir ,l DarlL ... , Co·1r:odore Die'. , "l Eritis".l ~rb.va.l li ...L,on to ,~l i3d :_-3ad1.ue.rter::i, sends t.11."'foL.o· in.,: :nessa L0 !.d.,ira.l Cun.1ingha"l : "Clar:~ &.sb, .... to _;ive ;ou :.;;r i ,_:.:,res~io:::1., Firs- !'ou..nd e . f.[,..., :Je"'n "'ained b·..... .,itv.E.tio!l rril.- obviously t not bP ...,ati..sfactory till :,l1ole hearted coopeT'&tion obtained . Lc.rge n;imber of fr.-.nch d.lren.dy out to hcl but T)arlan clique ~··il need -::... inJ . Thi., is in h:mr'!. narkn tc' . still ho::,tile to us (Pri tish) and in lees er de 0 Tc ~ to L'Ilc.r::.cc.ns but concidcr he se-c ~ osi t.:.on gone .:..n Fr:..ncc c.r.d -;-;ishcs to control fro .. •rort:-1 Africo. • T tnink he L, 6 cn"J.ine thc..t he r,ill not let Fre.1cli. fleet fall i:1to Ger :1u.· '.l.:..ndsbut ·· l~ 7 r.10\'e the:J. or..ly in 11;.st emergency . It is i:1tended to contb.ue ,,orkb.g on this z.s also question of ::a:1dr .i.a s'i 1.,adro:1. Cl~l: ·ms nc..g:-iific~nt . 0t...r :P"'iso!lE r., neglected local l~· bi.lt nm: rele,. ed . :: x .: ,'.ir defense ::io"t i:1;,,pirin; . 11 0 " 1 .Another senst..tional develo .J' 11:mt occurs i:::1the c.fternoon . '~u.rshc.l Peto.in .... has f::..red !.d::u.ra l narlan c::.::;head of th "'rench ar.:1ed forces and ha::: a.. r,ointod General :ro_;ues , the _1:.:.lita.ry gover!lor of :'.:!-enc' ·•orocco , as h~.s successor . C-enen l CL.r'· .::o-s to see .Adniral flc.rlc.n. ~-1-: find.s hi .., 11lookin_, like c. c je.cted lit·~le _;i._; 11 ""'arlan re,;Jorts thect Petain r,e.;, also rejected . t '1e forth Afr;.,ca ur·.11stice tor 1s . t;encral Clc.. tells .r': Darla!l that 11 Petc..i..n is the mouthr,iece of q.i.tler . 11 nc.rlc..n r3plies that there if. notl:i:'lr; h~ C~-· do bu revoke the crder he sii;:i,ed t'.is .:ior.nin:; a:i.d ·.-:-:1ic'~ hc.s Lee:: d.i.sria.tcheJ to the forces . · :'l~plies General C]c..r1(! "...,.0·1 1r·3 !lOt ·0L'lo t0 rr";ol:e an~r ors.er !" 0 -:ys nc::,rlc..n ll'T'h-~ , J : !!lust b_ tc...kc:. _ prLo.,ller • 11 Golo.Ll Slocw ... later plc.c'"'s ho pla.too:i.;:, ..... ,.l the. ro'. ho~nc of 1.d~:irG.l -rren'ar(l, ·h- --~ .l\.d::1ira.l Jc:.rh.n ·· .:.11 sta,{ . "'h-' lo.st thin~, r.,:,ncral Cla.rk tells Ad..:irc.l nc:..rlt...n: 11tl o', ' s your chtLce tc gst th Fr-!lch fl--et ! " Repli0s _·_d·niral D.:..rlan dcjectedlJ : 11T+ ' s net .:., :'13et ; T ": ..)Ge.1r_::..:.evoc. . 11 'e adds that 11 Peta.in "has told all the corr.:u:nders to fi,--:hL. '.fter th::..., conf"r0nce a.'1c:1. before -oi.1; to one ,·:ith r.enerals rira.ud , J .1.in, X:ovltz and :cdi al , r :moral Cl:..rk checks o.. ::..nd fi:i.d.;:; thG.t ·'h:i French co.1.a.1d"'r.,, have obeyed nr.?.rlan ' s conr:c:..nd ;:.,.ndhave p .,ou.;ht o.r!ni.,,tice::, ! 0 0 • 0 0 The conferl:nC"' '..ith the Franch gener ~ s is held at J:uin ' s· h"'c.dqur .. rter::, , The other ,.lliod officers beside t;eneral Clark are. Captti.in ,··ri...,'it , Co;n. odore Dlck , Colonel Holmes c.nd "r . ·rur~h;; . The firin of Darlan is die.cussed . The Cenorc-ls report the~r h::i.ve j.ist received infor.!ki.ti ~n thnt the Ger .:k'mS arc c.bout to invade Unoccu:Jied France . Says ,... ir&ud , sadly : '" e are a.t the end of our ro)c . 1,'hat an appc.lling situation . It is ti!Ile for· the French to get together and it is 0 SECRET / �100 _, 0'"' ror• on~··bi' 1 i· t · -f.o b....., to U ",, r .;,.,d ,_...,'vc 'orth :s1·ic1-. ! " r _.. ~ ·,~t Lrc..l Clerk Frcnc 11 mat· r , " th,m ..· " -"'ts tl.,::.t G.:.r:md ;::ud "~r u..1 .,et to,::cthcr . "'Phi:: L -L. cc • .,_ n . ,, c::._7s tlL Deput,; Co .c.n ::.·-i::1 -Ch :i you .... t ·or';: out :;c··r ,..ire. d toG:tL t~:·:..._, the Lrvc.~1.on of ::nocc• .. ::. .l Frc.nc t ~ d ·... D~::.·l n : i-t· r_:J "'':l .;eneru.l se:r..::ls the fol ,..,..:.c.""cabL to r ..::1 r:: . ..l.~ ( ,.,l..,i. ,._U"- J. ~- - .,J V V ..., ...,c.,,. (..i. ... !. ·A ";t t ca ' 8) ... :ia.11.,; .i..1all i"r ol: to ~C:~ ·...:.r .., -' 0 ........ to • o ... . '"'.__r h1,.· j .st r c_iveJ r fire " b ,'l'L ~tl,r a ~ ,ct..,c. 1.,.ndtold ': t1'1.~.t n · ~ ord. of hosti it.:.-~ , Juin . _ . r ~ ..t . Tr p • ..:.t hi-: to .:...,_uc .~J.c • "r' !' , ". t::._ .,ti.t d t ...t U.'1 L; :.:1st b1.:c0__ a pr .:.so.Lr . T tol-:i '1i . t .~.t to n i . 1edi +,,l;· tool;: ste _ to ...l:..c .. _.,, _,1ard c.rot.:i:.~ .!.h :1.:. 1~1-.\.:.!1 '.-le .1 ,• ord of honor ~· c.t he ..ould r ::iot r vo 1c_ the 0rc ..r . '::'' L c!1-~1z d. situu.ti·n brunt ne Kin"'.in ho im;:iediatel,/ S"a!"ted' 'c;.n_, T,in if h 01.1ld .l a;y alon; ,,it11. i-,._1, · pl ,# 1,ith nL.rle...-:.·' o ord r· the:. Fr-nc :l fl , t h_r" • n-r8 re ••l;ec:_ th::..t __., rdsr. oul ef':.'.'ect. ~ · :.E ·1..for c:..s'u,d · h:i.~. a. • l a to t:1e F::-enc • fl at he cou ... net . ~ :i-:.'.'t d t.1e i th Ju::.., an. ':::.!lL .:.n t.t 0 ... ' out their sit ..~t.:.ou . 'Jo.it c;;.n , d .1~rc..LFcdf{.--c.. ~: ~ nd o::Dc..r ...., c .1 ~l:'\c . hJ to cti:tc , lc 1 t ord had j us,. beun received tk t the Ger .c.n.., ,ere c.b0ut to occu ~ unoccu. ::."d Fr _nee . ,Y Darlc.n ,:;-Latud that if t'1is 1".~rc.; tµtj: .1nd he r celv d vc ·ificcl.t.:.on he 01.:ld i ;nore ··ar~:1l..l Petain's o··d r f:.r in:; '•i.J c.nC:'. ould fe ___ r--ieved of f i_rL:1 r ~,or..;.· r .., .. po_~ ._,,i''Ji lt, . -r-e h&s ~skt.:d ·:..h!!t I co .. -Lo 1:_~ 1101..L..., au'--"-into.1.1i ht to di ce· s..., 1 '· ~ . ' . . ,... t . ,;, + . ~ ,.,at + ,.;ers11-n u d _ng c....,,, o,l):i.ion o~ th "l s _.... ' •1 .. I ::: '3 h J. ::i ~ si1r.1 - c..n on ., nav.:..l ... ;.•-'-,:::;, Jic c.n..::. .,....r.:.::;:.ti:.~ • . j..:ut rvturned from 180 .. conf-rencl: · ·th 1 an ·• ·..., .J ::.n, V::oeltz and endi .1 , t.1e la.tt r thr-- bein -trcn~; nc.rl_1 1Jort ___ • n 'h n the h ..ard of the • ossible G':r ..an.,r entr, into Coi...th 1·n rri:..nco th ir diff .:_1cec be a...l'l _.'11~. : told th .. th·.;..t I ,a~ to see ..... irt..l °!"'\o.rl~ 'f.ith ::.. to a .. :n .os:o.:.::iilii. r that h ,old c.hci s ~t · ·'·h&.t - h:v no .. .Jr C a:. o::i..... th.,, au :Jr c..tl.,,. c,r a. . o~ L1~ r ia • ~ove r---==;., • '"' .,_, :1.n Ul.., r · rt.. ::.i. ~c&.~ . • ( thi:.t it i.., t. for Fr .::::~1 .l to o"t tob n r :...1d d ,f nd ort.. lfric~, • •rnis ',&.S t l b ,st ne· ·s ~ 1:iar'ltodc.J . .:.s1: ee~ yo r 1 _ t on tc!lt.:. 2., ne .t r _ ort ... 11 .1·i..,a.J. a ked me for a confer,nce tod--:.r .in ho,.)u of ·orkin"' o..1t d~tu.il. shoul · Fr nch .. ir :nit::; co:"le he.1. ,. ro . Fr ~nc u . o.. occ·1.·c.tion . I a~ bad::. ir. need o~ an ric.,_n ir Of ::.c r . f r .1-r ~l 6L ... t!-:. n re.., __t d th ser·.,.:.cu_ of rk n) .. :'.. iers Ra - .:.0 tv" · • ··nd r our ~ontrol . .J.SO rac..io stu' ion c.t ~uc .... t .s :. ich il ly • r'1.:.t ID/ re. • .i..' collL ru..'1.:.ca. tion ·;;ith ., ou co .. enc.:. .,.; to 1or:::-o n0 .1 I ho., ... ~ver ,,rth.Ln3 (iUiet here tonight . Scattered , enemy ! . .:.r activity of dhori, ci.li.ration .it;~ n~ ative results ••• " T J. _. 1 "Y' .J · -~ r , G !!er"': Cl".rk conff'r::: c..,ain \ ith -arl_n cone rr.in,.; th urgent y_uestion of th .. Frenc .. fl<> t . ..c.-.or·ing to Io.rle:n , the fl + is r.o outside Toulo:!1 a c:..i+:5..n~ orders . "":ez~..l3 e .,;_1 direct t11e fl get to """c...i-'-to n Jo· n tl1P _,..lli .J" as coon ::..::: t•1e Ce.·mans enter ·noc cu. ied Fra::ce but not b-::.'or~ . C' ne-· l C r ~ :m_ est~ the ~EGRET �\o l ( fle t go to Gibraltar to refuel bec&.USP of the congestion in North African ports c..nd the politics..L threat from uncertc..in elements in the French fle t if U1ey enter French colonial ports . The gE'neral suggests the fle t r:rocecd to the Unit d States so negotiations concerning its use co ld be carried on . nhe F ench are very anti - ~ritish and Dar l an balks at having the fl eet go into Gibraltar . The bi~ questi n .u-iark concerning the French fleet is ,,hether it ',il_ obey Dt.rlan 1 s or ders . 1 0 b • e __ Ld 631§' [I . a sr 5 ~. 7 ., , JThc general r eceives toni 6 ht the COi,.r of "" Cc.ble from General ':&.rshall to General :isenhov er . '::"t i::c. rs : "'l'he Chief of "taL a;;- :-oves the aT.arding of the 1 distinguished servic, med&.l to Clc.rk Qnd the Legion of '.erit to the offic :rJ accor:ipan:'il1f.; hi;n . Th-:; a-·ard to Clark ,1ill be held -~1p'..illtil th--- ;:;itw:.tio::1 Cu"' Ls ,;:r.:. n "!or~ s...-,ecifical~.t •• , n Th.:.s is the text of the a .'a.rd: 11 "aj er Gen rc.l tt :ark ,. • Clark , 0-5309 , :.:r'°:iJ the U:i.itec~ Ste.te::: , h&.s been the Deput~· Co.i'T!c...'rl.dcro!: in - Ch::."f of th"' Al ..ied : orces sic1ce its inc ptio.1 . Th or.-;a:1.izan.; and planning f phase of t.1is o,.J~ ation is no· successf 1l y cancluc'ed . 1)urin,::; this i!:lportant period he_Tas :l:a. be l y responsitlc r for i :i orta.1t · ork that . as bein--; carried on . •'..s a relater pL..rt of this activity he s 1 1ccessfully erformed a r:1.ost important and hir,hly secr0t ..is.,ion . This !,lission , o -ether '.7ith the orr.:o.ni::.lns ~d p1annin:; of the 1~-~or .:;ortion of the orere.+ ions , ,;as of creat 1::1 ot>tr..nce to the ... U!1ited .':ta tee . This \.as a .-osi tion of t::,Tec. responsibili t tJ , and. the maimer of carr~ri .:; 01:..t t ·1a assign!!lent ·,-as of the hig;ie::t order . It is rec om Pnded that th Distinguished fc,..vice edal be c.,.-1:..rdedto ''.c.~or f'._,,1crr..l ·:ark ,~. CL.rk ··•ith th folL0~;in:; citc.tion : iaj r r.enc::.•3.l :ark·· . Sl:.rk , 0- 5::: 9 , ,:...,_y of the U:1.itcd Stat1;.;s , for distin;:'1ish8d ce~v .:.ce to the 1bi ted Stat s .;r 7 ln :::.. od tion of 1 gr", t r ::_ mLibilit:,r c.;:; Do, --..:t., Co1·1ende -in-Chief of ths •.1.~.:..cd force di-:=i.n.:; its ...eriod of or _;c.nization c.nu. e,___ •._,lo:rment . 1fo .:;..,::;urcd this of:.:ice i:1 the sw.-'cr of 1c 4'=, and U-1rou~'~ 'is 0-i;;.t;:;tc.ndinz ability in or;:;anizin__, :..:.ndpkn in:; th::oAe~ct~ ~ns of t,1ic force , ha s~ccacc~ul y ~rc~"~~d thi~ ~r~wni~~tion ~or the im:'ort:..nt J::J.icsion to ..L-ic it hc.s been assigned . '.c :r.::rt of th3 duties of t_hc De ... uty Cc c.nde::.· o= t:1i::: ..,- oi.: hs ~ crfo:::-nec. ~ u.:.. .... '.l,; sec et and "'Ost i ...ortCJ1t m ::;:::;ion Thro•,;:! h:~c C"UC,:. .:.cuol.:c Lad~:r .,hi _ c..r.d out ..t2.:ndin:; abili t:,r thi:: "'"llS succe~"'ful y co::._l"''·ed . ·re org~n::.zuc. a .. d::. ·nin::.:::te:::-cd. ,.11e :1°c€:::Sa!'~' pro ··run °-:.0 brin,; ti,n troo ,.::: of t!1...t o:::-.;:...nizatl0!1 to ::..hi;; ::t::.tc of' tra::. .. ·ng und co-r:bc.t cffic ~ ! ... ... c...tid;i_.:; been l: .. c~ , rf_,el~,. r ..... "!'!.).;:~le for ~or.-' _1~ th:? t .... ::_ cJ_icc.l .,. -le.ii_, for th ~s ,-,:: +:1.s ... t!'OO,.::; :...g:...i:1::tth Jn ...:..e~ of th~ ·r.1itcc: C't:...t ., • HL r -L8tc .. nd.in~ c.b.i.li t:--h:...s "!:C.~chit1 o~ i!1c~ti ...:..bl.3 "~-c. to t:1.., ser~ric0 . u U$ 1 0 0 0 rr·y, t o cn.blc.:: ::..re r:;ce::.-red at c.. t.:..2c.· hen f'":1cr.:::.l Cl:...rlc c&:.1onl:· ~ivu th. n ~ '-!uic!: .:;l:::::1ce n--. r r: Lri t 1""'.) vor:. .. c~ "hi 6 hl~--cnr ... ·1 ::::•d J;olit~~::...2. !3it"'t"'".;rin -:..nd . f it .:.2 i.l +ou.. ::-o+ for ~ ~-W1 ·.11.oi .... Jilitnry . TT~ i: :...lt£ --nu.tt.,;l,,J~sg1.13t-C. , +hv ... ' ~h 1 1 :'1.u. . TI·1t ~~t ::. .. C ?l.... !~ '.).a.-... o:.:,.J .... . obj--c+:.."l'I"~ :.•: ~r ... 1(!~ J'!llJ _ __,+ .: - ... u~ J ~ , ...... ... er(, 4-.:.~ ... ,·ore' '--lon , th&.t ~1-:io~r :..:1-:.. ', h l_f· ,; t,.., , ::.nr, -t c;.-, -- +~ , th-=3dr.:....._,_ th_ +u 4· , ~::.t.J .~,...,~,., • [: '·}1""r.,.,, "r ~...,,.__·~...... r ...r'lr-:r 1 _n·,-·::> :_h, r ..... 1---- ~: .. C.~t d . l ~ J; ..... ,. ·. ECRET S , � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, October 23 - November 10, 1942 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from October 23 to November 10, 1942. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1942 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Language A language of the resource English Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/804 Date Valid Date (often a range) of validity of a resource. 1940-1949 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/3c98f9ea80275a8a1acffbd93d270364.pdf?Expires=1773878400&Signature=qsnroi6XxzUHYiXAwOlgFebkI5dnpkyCyJiKXm3iK5sNfkl%7EooINNHdqmFTMEk9z1sBYhfrURlkBwRYR9NXP84MzC3X-f4eSWsARXN2Mj01PCL3WqhBb4dALOHLFBcI6aanbV4bTofpFgnNAQUJTuFm04B6tXQA9kU0pMfUIavwdtKPhe1h5klrJL9Lnsu%7EQGrRF-nqatt5so8J4s-LbptrrASL%7EU%7EU7gLjZpB-5IWUe2s5NFULW3ryKzStyXehDGbaXhz3d%7Ee%7EPcAXP%7E0wcWUeMyAwBAoC5Yud6%7E2a6z7DrSUEOucLE6ZTJnPIqdCL2RMYulH45LDPuWYrxvKmO8g__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 33d2f07b08fce4b0640af878e8ab2e5c PDF Text Text \ 0:2 -- P'T?"' 'r- ( n__ }+ '..;,i, ./r. hc.ve told -..i. rcpcc.tec.ly .... ·'-'• + urou -i:..:::it to free F'r2.1 _, 11 ~c.;;.; .... Gcr.srcJ r'fo.rk , ".,-nu h-ve given u::: no vi:::ibl- ..:_ :lcc.tion •• or ccc; :::ion i:i ., -~pert 1 0f U"' or +ho 'l .l. d l"....._ . T'-"'r"' ~ .... t···o ""' r:l _.,;;._.. !,1-..,. ..,,,. r,,c,c, e ••l;.o.J J -f"\U ,.,~~ ...,<..,.,.,._ rlp-,0 .-. t.,..,,t-,, J '['".;.. .11-:,- l -:-1-,r ...._,_, u.;__......_..,, 0 tl-i '.lli:;d c.._11~: fir::t , bJ' sill:!ffioni:1,; th- Fr-11c· 1 flee+ +o c. ~rcr t'1 l'.frican ,_ port , a 1d , ::~co~1.', LJ c:::-d.::i,_ th Go·;::::.·nor of Tuni~.:.c.. to r ~i:::t inv· .... n b., i f'1 r .C..1...l " O ._,. '..,I · 1,.,--. ,.. 1 0 hi 0 4 i,.., - ,._ ..; c..l. V • \: of l1i:: di2:1i8:::..~ l..t/ .. Lr~J 1&l Pctci ...1, h"' l. ....not CS-.+ ~... tht.t 11C.n~ or::1r.-:-._ .... J. u.:..-:n "...i:;::(., ·: ll I be obc~•::C:.• " "ro~.'\ er , he t 1 .s nensr-.:i.l Clc.r.~ thct he he.::; hc:.d r::ord fro . Vich:;r to the effect tl-i .... the Fr •.1.c..fl :;t is stil - in Tcu2.on .:..id. ~ ~::: order2 to t 8C ..~t.1.:..,: i-L:elf ::..::-t i: thr ...~tcn'3C: b~r r.e!'nrn :ei3ll.r'. i ne ::;3.:,~a fcelh; t.µcti:.~ G. that h'3 the fleet ,•·:.::.l never f""ll into C'c::.·:.u:..1.. :::ic..nC:::1:~n-r::.l CL.rk L,0L1t:: o::.t ,~h::,:!:: . "t1::._ r-cr11e._1 mili:.ar:- ~' chi..e ::ioves ,~it:. th~ J r.•~cw rr~..:.C:it., , ~ n:'.)lo~·ir,. pan ..tr(h .1.- , t 6 tc.n1:s ~.nd mech ni::; ,d ~c,1.1.:.~J J • " tr L.:d2 th~•" t~---· ...• ::.-.. ""c..::.· '!:.hc.t ,".:--· fl •... . 1 ' 1 11 noi. b ~ble to :::c"-4·~\~c ~i ~,. "~:i r.. irdd:ti,n , " Cen8rQl C.L~ri: c:ec ~r : , sCt~:~:,~i::. ... o: tl1c flr--et · 11 1 b .... ~c:. ...... .... t t:'.!._. ~: ~'-'-:.. ... Al""..:_...., .:-ch:....., c..wL.i.:i .... t'.i.-..,r,..;,rr...:... v..S t ........ 1 T~ tl1 c:... cr;:: ......r ... .i. c".. c:L or.(!::; -:h_:'2.~ t co--..,.1(: ;.. 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You a,_ ..o .... hu.vc ::;o.!..ution t nnd::;, victor;: i~ k::ir' . ll 1"1:..::-l·::::ak s hi~ hce,J l:!.."ld SC.~~ ~1sc believ ~ J··i:1 c.. ::1- :J:c:-lc.n ar ~ j ~ ...t stallin-; . Fcnc.rd dro;s hi::: h ::ds ir. :::. hor~l,,,ss gesture . "Tb· t ' ~ .:1.ot tr, c . I s" vu.r it. You c.re ,_-:...1..C il:.n , ./0u u.T$ blinr:. . 1' Ji.:.~:J. -::11011~3 been ur~1....::.n~:.c:.tydl:,.. .. , , ..... · n~rl, n +,.Lrn +o ~"' •1""' l Cl ,.,,.·_J , '\.·:1.·t1·_ _-:.,.,.., ''D' ,,,,,, ,,.. ' ~ Q-.· ~-a. -J I..;r ..... ['At this Cl~rk to vhi::per 0 (.4 ( _.. ' L,,i. .a..,.l,,.J,. • ....... " .... c;..\. o.) ':\.. Ju.in--nr a::.:. ;·~itl:..Y')U t' . Cl:::.r'--l' o . "ou 1 re not ! 11 .Tvin-- 11 1 a"l i Penc.rd--llYt .... it ~.th -:/'"'''. 11 anr:: you ·.-.:.1 :::.vc the facti n..., , cld.~cl toce• 11..:r '' ! CL.:,rL--ll"o·.1 are not ovir(; :'a::;t cn-:,ug.1 to !:c;::p the Ger'llD.l'i.S ::re, comi..i.z .:.:!to Tu.11.:.~in. .,.. ·· i:. r;ct c. co~:-..o::-i:lcr ~o i"il . ~ •. rr.:.rc:1 ~.:. 1 us . I E"w'tlco·; J.1;'; c:::t.s..bli sh t to c.. ·dlit~r;:r :;overn,;,cnt . ('' ·tu:;,•:-hy)--Tell 't:a3:-.l th&t unls::s t!lcy cl ci.-.:c-to go .... long , i t:1 us rie:1t nm' UrJ E..re tl:iroug:. and I ' .: ... rep .. re.d to lac the::i und r arrtJ t . " Juin--"!.11 -..e a.st for i::- a sus::,::e:i.s:.cn cf th'3 Tunl::: orde:- 11ntil .'o;;ues Cl rk--""o l · e don ' t rA;O .1i::_ P~tajr. ' s orders t:nle:::s he ec±::i along wl ti 1s . n Juin-- "I think h ~~OtZues ,-.:.11 :::.cc". t ycia- ter,:i::: . 1• D.::.rlcn--"I ask ~·ou o reccnsi'l ..--·ill be i.ortk,hile • 11 ( n.nd r;e do.J.' t recoi;nize :::.rrives . 1' r ani Y'<-.i'.:.until !:o:;t,e~ c.:-riv-s . T think it Clark-- 11:'o . Nogues' arrival i::; in no we.,, con_ ected, ith t ds . Th::'•~ c. lot of :::us: i cic::1s a.bout a lot of people! 11 ( Dc.r l&n L., +,._a:ng the sl:ip.., of •.,~ito rc..pcr into sl:irc ds . ) r �( DurLs.n-- 11 "'o.:' • Yc'..l '"il: be atvolutel., ~J!'ltil th~n I cc.. 1 4 t..scu...11f'_J.":l .... rcsro!1c.:~tli cl ~ft ,rno n a.ft :: this z., 11 e:.. not ._;oln~ to th~ n.r- t.:.r-~. - don It r •co .1.:.2 T yo1 ( o.rl:-.1) -..ftcr a:·d . " r:.: rk-- J ln-- If Jo~,1.. s C:lrrk-- 11 r..:.n:1· lll is .::;o.:.r"o 1:,, t::_ to t ... ~ co ..:~ r i tn ., o 1 not e~ t.:.r...-::; •. ,.. , ill 0 1' o •.r n +.,, • 1 r , 11 ,i.-.'.."~r., co ..:ia!1 hi ... " 0 Sl rk , turnlnt:: to D:.i.rL...n--nr ~1Lve rlceivec. :'."'rP~~ fl' t h i: tak . ,, no •CTorJ. about -.:1· t cticn th,_ Do.rlc.n--n -~ mes c"'e a rec :...,rP.c.· Lbout :o la. ,t ni~:.t at Toulon . '.ar::: .:.lJ.e , a::: occt. . i8d b~ t:1e f"' rr!'.R.'1S i::: 001·r...:.~ -~1 _.nc. I h<::.vi:; c:,iv0d no r • l~· . Cr.hl.:.ng r ~ s ~ ri,osr.ibl~ !lo~ . ; a ..L-it.:..!l,;_> t.. r· ~::.o :'ror2 t!1€ fl ~---t. '1 for Cl r::--""o ynu under::,t-nc: ~r-r".r co •' rc:Lio .. in th ::: ecurP thf' fl .... ::or et fi~ht thL t y;:x,:u:. o:..ition it.. u::: e., n riot on ..... on ",r u _ .,_ e.ga.:.n:::.t th~ 'J-9rm-m: b t , Lo .:.!101....r c.b.:. _;_J to '1 i·"'? T)&rl~n--tr"T9;... : 'L.....'t')..:l~r::t&!L: --cll . J,t.: , ... ... te~,.,r ~. !10 lon~J,r in 0 on h" il of '..,h J.. c..d.~ of tll 0 S'1UcJ.:ircn 'I . c:~. t-n·l. ....,c:.i·l-n--"'bout Cltrk--"' il t.) -1 o 1 clo~k." r;i.raud be th ·•:::?n fi.r~·' ~-!'1Ft!1--n~•.c r ,. ~lt th9 , nd . co J p opl,.... r. ·ou . 11 c.:;.rk--n~·ho .:. n .,o r r,nd . ho ,.n:.t d r"\t::L.... ::ov..,~n f3nt . n .. s ., t in . o r .:.1 b Jecic it th 0 ·"a~=~~:?.--n: ..1 .. t co!l'""'""lt .it1 6 0 d "!:,o.,·o 1 ...nle::;_, thL. Juin-- 'T·1 --:t:' is 1 ( /ogu,~. 1~ ·, .:.t.1 th" c.:...,t • . I ·ng Cl::.::-k-- 11'Ih·:m lss·1 (l, ~1co J -r 0 • .. cn- co not .1, J..:1 po ~.... on,::. C!"' . 11 a.r:t to h lr . " ordic>r::: to resi~t, th:- r, rrr..:..n:::n . / ("'' ..:.s :::tc.rt., of: anoth-=-r vole n:...c outbl2' t free. c'"1.. -'-o ,.:!'~ ·1y . -::.3 '!'c, '.n --~citodly . .._,:....ir.. 'mir-J.l F nar.. alks -...:.rto th':) .1ea,' of t:1e tt..ble to tel G :1ere:.l Cl .. : wt.it . Yo1.. .1....ve cv"'rybody tit~1 ./o-:..:. :: s c~r i t1 11' T1in then turn., o .. r:( . Cc:1. rs.l c::.rk . -Ie i::, ::,c 'Yd !!e can i!c.. rcE;:,r :::i.t .,t.:.L . • ---/s h i., ace .. ., 1 of 'lsloJ.:.lty b) G"r.. r~l Cl::.rk :' .,o::" in1icu.ti o~., SECRET icsu Lh crJ,.,_r to �( 1 the t r oops , T ron 1 t ac cuse you o"!: dir. i oye.lt;,r . I j ut Ce,;.n understand t the attitude you tako - -s~yin[; .1ou \7&.nt to fight the C''·rm&ns an then cancellinJ an or der that gave you the op.._ ortuni ty to f ight th , • 11 .Juin --" Gi.rauc1 ha;:; ag r eed to be your militc .. t....::visor . I ;-... ry nt to help Cl rk - - 11::': 1 .1.l sr>e G<'mc al Giraud . If r he ag r ees to have you it him . 11 is alricht ··1it.h 1le • II J uin -- 111 1 ,:i not beiTIG treated r.:.gh t. 11 11:, ""'en'.:r..3 +o Cl:...:--- iL:. vrl[;lish --'' Yot1.are :·.1uking a ~!li::::t&kc You ,·,:i_l spoil , . 11 evcrythln:-: . : Dt rlan-- rr1io i::: c:;oing to coL'l..anC." 1 Cl r~ -- 11'.:.'ho s'.1.r,ren.e ccrrL.an~ ·.il l. ter . 11 be .h.mc~•ic..... T • .:.1 S"ttle th9 French com- r.i.&nc'.0r:., Jt,i:-i - -PI ~ug_ est th t Gir.:,ud be, th" ; 11.dthat I co:n-iand J.:l[;eria . 11 resi Cl rk -- 110kay , if ~·ou •,ill t the G 'I' _,_'J..,'' . Juin -- 11:ro,· or after ( mi li·~ar;; i s~ue the order the meeti~? co!!! :::.nd.'" from n.... to k:...r EL,orte . to the com:.:i.nr-'ers in Tuni:3iu to 11 C::i.r 1 :- - 11I mean no·, l I 1ve to l d :,•ou T 1 ve ha--! ir.for1,1:.i.~icn th:::.t the G rm... plE.n ns to lc...nc.'in Constantine anrJ. Setif . ''cur futu r e .i t h us de:;:,enC'.S ·.,hether you d.o on this or r.o+ ! 11 J uin -- 11This put::: me in a hell Cl£.rk- - 11I 1:no·. it lut J uL1- - "Bllt the hell of a s ...ot • 11 / .} I ' m in a ·.1orse srot . 'l'he r,e:c-::1 .:.re movin.; ns of it i., that 1,, .,,. . 11 Nogues is m;r co,:r1anc ·r . 11 Cl· r k--"'Ns ·;ytl~ing de ends on ·~hetl.er u-o-ugo to t e l ephone now &nd tell your co"! .an'iers to resist . I ll'!ean this .fro:.! the bot+o.1 of my h~a:--t . T 'ill se:nd cpla.ne to chec!~ on ·;hether th':1 or d r .:.sr ho!1ed w. ' ·1hether it L being obey~cl . " Clcr\{ --" Revokc the ord r e.nd t13L th~rn to r,si...t . If ~•o·.1 hold Const&.ntln\> airpor+ , :;_1d Sctif , I ,,ill guara.nLe ei.at I \ ill send r,lanes in th:rc ::. ~'.,c:d.:.;:;.LlJ .. to helf . 11 Juin- If ;,'Ou send the pla.'1.es nobody ,,ill 11 CL rk -- "I insist Ger:Jc.n:::. 11 Juin - - 111 nant tl1:o.t you to talk bother hone the com~anders to Darla..'1. 11 .:rou. 11 i:m:iedi ate~y t6 resi.:,t the �( (, hilo Darlan and Juin o.re out of the ro om, r- ne~a.l Cl rk strides up c.nd dovm pc.st the head of the table . !.<.1irc.l Fenarc' is t-~-e._·-ing it .1im to wait until Nogues arriv~l be.fore he ~O('S c.n:r:.ting drasti c . HYou 6 n ' + m11. rstand the internal si tuatio:.1 , 11pleuds Fenard. . 11 v :-yone L behind :::'arl n . :f you wil ,.ai t you will hse everyona ·.ti.th you . If not , you .i.11 ups t the aL_ 1 e cu.rt . 11 ') Cl f'rk -- 11 , and if I "·:.it , L1 ad ition to r-,1 s , 1 1 1.,__ Yes h-ve r, rs&ns on top of t, .,. The.: c.rs:.- i lding u1- r .sista.11ce . '"l'r l n , Juin a:id th!:? r est of then bu ,.ant to t cro· 1 Giraud out . I 1 'll going to sti ck by ~ i r t ld . if Juin cioesn I t issue the ordors no-r- I will wait· :or the!!! to co_nfer witn .Iogu3s any-1ay . Sti::._ , I am not sure o are 2y frien~'., . n 0 -Fenard --11""'l you are bl.ind . "ou are 1c;n I a.:1 sure of it ! " if you d.nn 1 t tru::;t making a nistake ;' :::c.k ., k •.o .. that • the st~nd an " takL"lg ls · ~-.,,.;--;+· ~ ~ -1_ c...r n~ i;e,_ +.--d,., in;; ""o""-~•1 11~ .!l l; enc r ..... Cl~ k • l'r•,, n Uv., COTililc..11 .~.r +v - 1~ ~ . F cn&r db egins P1ea a· th<:>friendly Frenc.'l , dr ir1:.l , ,. ho has d0c::.c..red ~ _ r1e""lctistratcd he L ,. i tn c... , 1r' 11 matter ·.-,hc.t har,_en:::.. 10Sc.rs General Cl rk : 11 c&n 1 t that he ,·:i..L bacl: ~d .io ~ afford to ::ia'rn c:.n;-,- takes. . Tie stakes are too :1ibh . 11 Jar lL!.Il and J1..in then .:ii return . ( Juin-- 11 r...ave just chec::ed . In "'unL , r.encral :3arr:i: is cove-ring the r· lro..:..ds . 1 He ::o.ys he eot orrr:rs fro::: Vidhv yesterd(;;..,· not to re::,i.,t th8 G3::.~m ... r.,:,, ·re t,l1ought I ,:as a prisoner , I told hi.:i th.c..t if the G<irmc.ns attc..ck , he is to r esist . '' Cl ~rk--Su J.~ o:::e the Ger!'.!ans cor.ie o:i the airpo:::ts . "''nm. tr.en? Juin --" :.s yo 1.i 1 :!_0'\. , they are alrea{"./ on some airport., mve at c..cL_d but BarrE. b.c..-.~ order::: fror:i ' 7 ::..d ;, . n h CL.r:~-- 11 the C,crma.ns come on to a.not:1er air,>ort If r esis·L • 11 Juin-- . '.:.'"10 I! :'r0nch are the Frencl, should going to 11 . " Ycs Generc:i.l Clr.rlc then instruct:::; i.dmirc.:;. D.:..r e..r. t1mt he t 1ill G..il' it tl1e mect::.n: l with No~'nes before ric.1d!1 6 a decision . The Deputy Com and.er then ::;hc:):es lu:.nds ..1th the Fr .mch"len 'and leaves the room . ~!e h&s &.lrt6. 'y orc".ered thc.t the French nu.v&.l staff , occupyin:; a lr.r _;0 part of the Hotel 0 t . r aor 6 v, be out bJ C tt:rdav· noon so t:1<" r icans c ?n take the ent.:.re structure o·v r l :J .> [Follo· in, l:mch , th gen~r&l ho l ci.s 3. ;'r(.ss corSer-:mce: 'l"'ith ur.:.tish 5nd Jm r.icc.:.'1 corrcspo21:lPnts . HA c .. :jlc...ir:: +1-..~-t, fer the ~ ~ Ll1~ .., Cl.' h he....., tT., !1c.d :1i'"'" ... :1c _r:: f·.111 yri J·,:1 th~ _ _iolitical iitua. ... :iion ; tha-~ :_ is .,ealinz r .:.th ~ v8ral L!3l)::.ro.nt..., ~ !'or :po-., r; J/1Lt ht. definitcl,, ~'"' 6 0..:..__,to .i::;e Cc.ncrc.l r..:.rc..:~ "b::ct..u..::e ,.e ...r c r::.a..:.n he ,.::.11 .fi~ht alor:c~siJc , .$ • TltJGU.rcling 11,, :18 is necotiutinG . v.1.:.th"'c.rl&. , r' 0r ..Jr&l .. .L 1t Clarlc "'Y.:})lLit;,c, t~c.--~ altl:.o .._.): h- II 0-:.ilC.::.1. . --t nyt:1inz re.st Darlo.r. , II th I'ri:..n_h c aclm::.ral llhas ths a.'..r anr.: n:.vJ· solic.l.1 t_:1.ind hi._ anr' they G.r £.1~ .:..u"'.:..:_t ~.:.rauC::. . I 1 v...; h[;.d to .Jl:...; · lJvh Du-lc.rr beci:..use hs .:..lc::ic:h-.., J~hc po·:.Jr to ::.top all ho:::.t::.lit::.e.: anc~ ~.:. u::; ""'c.l ;::up,.or'.:,. ,.,hi::; >:ill sL.ve u:: G.,..e t futnre effort . }'.J goc..l ::.eto ve 1 ~ECRET �I lO \ get narla:1 , ,...:.'r&ud a.nC::. l..2. the fo.ctionc together in hcr.,10:1.;• 11 ne tl1-n _;_nforra::: the ne,1:::~-.'.lper~ '1. • r>~.dlo !!'.en t:u.t :::.'arlc.n hu.s ::,ent instructions -:.o t __ Frcr..ch flc ,t to -:J l c:.vc f;r~'"clc T!'l"t·O~O1.itt..n . cr ts :..,r ::-roceed to ifricL for r:::fuelin.; ~o it c_n proce) ., to tr_ T\1i•~ed C'tates so ne 6 oti'.:.t::. on fc-r it::: us2 c'"r.. be ctc.r 4 ::d . 11 He tell:.; t':e'"' c.bout rcvo l:r... ion of th,,. orc½::r to ':'~ii'" ' ~· con c.n r::: an rc::i·r'r::, : 11_,..., :i·o·.1c&.n ::, c , .,. h£..ve ..,o:" wi'1ealthy bed C" .x:.::::ior.s." P~caa..,e th- po itic 1 i·~·A·-:.ion _;_::; still .:elic&.te , n'ltlli:..1t; is to be . 1ri:ated 1.'.l1-l:.il &ccorc1. i::; r -:cr.ec: T'\a_·lc..n ur. or is Jt..iler· . rrY01.1 l sa· . today th~ ~:ivul al of e..llout ::_5 :1::. 102.ced it:1 ::::.1 .l:'.. 2.:: . ::: .• ni troo:;:; , " r.'"'!1~·al Slc.r' C"nc1udes. ",..iii~ r:::.lces n:~- :;.::.:1,.-, .. uch :::tro ••~c :· v..:. th the F:?:ench. 11 0 1 in ~1i:::ron:. hile th€: F::er..c11I!Lnc ·· toe th 0 r to t!'~ ~~d.r c..ch tn ac;rA'"'~ , r nc,~-1 ~l.:.r}:, . ·~~:~ r.ru.~cr ~sa~h:'..~ .. .... -it ~r.:..v.:.:a~ ~~:icl:: ~:.~t ~ he.s besn rP ,uisit:.oncd , b0es out to v~, _;_J~ troo:--.: . P,,, • .as~ -cts t!1e 39th combc:.t "':,~c·n c...~c'. ccnfcr:: .i. ,_ Colnn~l C--t ::,.,-.,~ i::1-: gentrc..l .,..1.:.02.+ ... :hs :i.1on . in1 ..., conc,3rn:_:10 the fight.:..n.~ th~~r J.~t;_c.:. J. )!'tci:. .:.4' ' .. the:r c..r 6 ':?tti!l[; fr:;C ~: ½_UCTttSr.A:J~ ::e .., o .. · later rc:r.c.r::::; ho- rr-fre::: 1ing it · ::: ·to eL o·,t c.r.i-n: troo)s aci!l , T+, is rl~o hsc.rtr-n-ir:~ to ~ _ ::,o 'l' ny r2.'.;'"-c., c..r.Ld b ~ c:i:-t.,--look:'.. l~ 'n"'ric·:1 ~old:. '1..:: ~tc.tio::~-::= CTf"\ .... , -~1:.~c.:.t:,.. :.... ; _ ti.. ... ... b·~2:: r1r'"'t:r::.""~ .:..:,....!l ;., .. c.: ." Carr ..... ...... __ :..:o "":)l~ ch ~1 --m:bl,,. J.:.o 1.ait 'i"i:::-'-ly 3 1 0 C<u - ... :o ore.t:..::-~, ~ ~ ... .:. .... :.~L.,,_crtl,.). 1--~!c~u~::. h~ .... c:.:ri"l'..r c..~.:. ... 1~£ncL .... _ :,h n ~r ....l;)i::tl.:.1 ... -:ht..-J. cCl ..... o_t . i:.) ~ -. 2- Pr .... 8i( t Roos?~r..1-t l1E. ....~:...:, l :-1s-·\ ....l ~l __ ' s no,... .... .. r:: ~n t:.f"'l!l to "th ~ ~1:.,,,t.; JvO becor1-:: ~ T .:.~'..:.ten'::1t Ge:! ~-: l! l 0 ..... ·r·~--r .. dL"'l : r , -'- c:1tirs "£..~~·J-: .1~ ... 1.c8 ;:tc.:'f:.-:....bo1t nin" mc:!--i[. al ... r-Led. ~hey L..r t0Jacco1 _an7're; •• -wl Cl rk to :.i [schedu ..::djco:1f~r~nc::: at 2100 ;-•::.:,11Dc.rlc.::1., No0 ,-~ , r.iro , -, st a:!d t'rl otiir-r Fr nch ,_., t'.:'11.esrc· ., r .r cod ap anC:. :.l · c:::.rin.., s.:.c., ar:::;:, , ....,o s .:.n - ~J.:!:) to ti1- hot :. ::.ob'.): ,,it:1,.. :i i:..l CL,rk . The r::-2ncll].2n b.re 2.lr0c :' +L~r ·1 ~O[;U ::: r.nd Jarl:::.n asl~ Ge.. r::..l Clar::S. for t.. s--. :i:rc.t ~ .cor..fcr ..• cc . 1 Cir~ ~, ·· 1 io ms'.:>, n ~- lon" ·.~olf ~11 ale>'J.C &tw1ds ~n ·'·h~ bac>_:rcund b,; !-ii :: :.: . , [·e 1"0 1<:_ "l...:.r ed'J L1 inJ., ~::. r ·' r e; .• l' .:.:1, t r ':l;.91'" J r,~_ . -':.r.'..Jt Ho....,u::::i,.; t (, Co ·n er - ::.n-Ch.i b:· ret(in 1 ;o o;d0r a~ thr-.+, .s :::uc ., '1 ~-- ent.:.tlcd. to & . r::.v .... tEcon::er ':J.CC . C.Pncr:::.l Clc;.r! look::;c,;Nogu8::: l2ter:;.lJ in tl. ./' :.,tra::.....,:rt.cn;:;to !2l::: 1 fi,..n 7 "o"'uen tt "' ol,, ct..,,._,"'r.- rot r 1.,o·::1i - clth-::r :1~or ~~- " lo • -"ull h9i,.ht ·Jc,.,'.i ::::::.y::: - ·-c1 • • "Tel ...,.. .... 11 Pet.:.in ! ':'hi.., nci{.0.: Eo;ue,::: t-i.1k ' ... d., c.:!: ·.2 :c.:; , .:..l:::.v , r :::~-• 7 C•[.rk so::: ... into the c"t.11- conference room -it:1 D[..,rlc...1 O .J.e:...en-· '.r . '- .r:;.-,h., The r _t of , . the office:.·:: , both AJrtc-ric~n and F: e1,ch , .,tzw" or s:.t around .:._1 t:.e lol::1:;.~r. E'o~in louc: vo::.c s are coming from the roo.c: , [·l:"ost c..L tlie talk is French . Occanional-. Ge:aeral Cl .r ' s de ,p voice comes +,hrou;b. the dou r a.nC:: ·· 1 7 • T' er.. the Frcnch-nen are off a_cain , shou+ing excitedlJ .J • .fter an h ell' of tLis , 0 irc:1<2, · no h,;:; bc.,n 7 ob'ov t~ 1 '- ' ,. to~"........,, 0·.1.. ~1.·++;,., I- .1.,-.. ,, ...... 1 ·, ... ,.,.. ......, · ~ --1 o'h-r' o· ..., 1 ." - -"-o•.L ,,.,"r .....u., bir -'-'l' o·'l,.r ...., ..., v-.,1. ... v .... vJ.:..._ .J c..,....;,.,..i.\..J...L•v -~.... ..., -.. _ ...... l,! v ...... .,,, F'rcnch~r-::, -.s .:r:..·.rit0d i:i . T:e :~---:o. t:... .,.."":.'j, ("\~ "'..i:~e 0r r- .. :J c/o-:h. ?:~hrr:e::. l""!t· ..... ...... h.: ,rc.1C: '1e is !"_nr11'"'~:~ .:-i.Loui., !1i: fut-u.rc ..i)O::.itio ...... P-,:, renc..r:-..1Cl--r~ 11a:: :--rrv--~..:.:-d tc ."' ! ... ot 1 let hir.! do :1 • .,...,h(;r.irc .. r :'t-d !l t .... th:: ~... , 1 + L.e other t,,o Fi, .. r.... (.,("\ r-~h ... -· ... .:-t.:.c..1./ t 1r ... .L_, · .,,, , ..,c1 ...rol r .... Y"r--al ,.,,r.,.,,,...£".,·1"'.., .1. · ("1,,..11 .. .....,_...,+r-i .i",..:r . ~-.. 1, ......, .. ,_ .. ,...., n.-.-1n ·-.., - 0 .............. :J .......... ~--;....,.- L ....__ --~...,(;,,. ...... .. "'_ _" ... i1 0 1 ::: i,..., 1 1 0 J ~ ...... ........1 "',. Ou• '-- .... .--... ... 0 ~ J.J. c1 •• .1. -! • 1 .., ...,...,...,..,J. ,;,,-.,v ,.. CO..:..-"" 'fr'~.'!!'"u • ·'- • .... .... -1 • ... ........ ..1 .i. - -~"!.. rq~r-::.---~~=-·r ""n Cc.";'J.: ~ ..d. n~1:. ... lw.J. .... ~ 1_~7: .... t~"'! ~r ..J..!':="'~~ rcca. .. ... .... b :t ... , -I,_,, · .........nt 1 1 ,, 1 1 1"' l:~.-:L,;:; the hc..v to-~ .... . nw~ th-~~ 11 (1 :.......... ~ _, . ... ~ ..,,j ·- ·i ..... .. l: __ I Z'J ..i ... J.t./~ .......... ._. .... .... .., -.J • t T + :.._...,,__.__o::; 1 .... ..,. • --'- ..... l ...,Q_ ~ .... ... ,v re£' thi .... . (',. ...... , ~-:!.. r1 ~ : wr 1 i,..., /"'- ",....~.,, ~ ~, 'r,..., , told t!1, . ~.h... "...:.1· tr..2~.i ~ov r .......... .. .. ..t. i J �\\\ .• r - b~ -':,G,,... t:·-1..:..... Lo o. .i -t.:.c 11.,,i.,J. + _• .., 1• + ~., Jl.., .a..J.l ....... ,h cu1t ~ lr _ _ 1 :1 .:.c+ur i ~tc..r.J -t-J to .... L Tt i ... no I lr C fer ,l II ( ... L u...,: o.'..11,, 0 _., .... .. ..... .1..--· T' J. ...' . l' ~ Lr" - •...,; +v ~ 1 .1. .... . u +, lJ "'!i:r~t lat r , ,.,e.-ivral CL . ·_,:: .::.~ ret 1r:1"' to tho cor.f rE-.. c roo:n ""'.1d th ~r~ti· · hs.s b .,en uo ~.1.(""on ..... .... ub idcs . ..... ~ft(,.c..... 7inut':s J t, r 1 ..,he confe r ees 1 conci c··-::.. '"h on<' one tlv-":. loo~Cl the bR.si:. ui·~ pleased is '}cn"lral Cl. :rk . Iis ofL.cPI' _ .ll in be :i.nd him nr' alk +.o their •. section o" the hoteLft.hrourh a dark , b istin roaJ y- co·;rt,rc,r - . - :i · ..•,.. .1.00·.1 , ,., c.1t .,..r1 Cl .... _,.... :.r.:. fl.: to ½. · 1;: ;-.., ·..., Jl'ious o:'fic:::- ~: '''T'h~ Fr .•c.1-~ . + ..:c:.·: t'1,;.,- Cd.11 02:' -t, ..:.s t:u..1_; tit . T J vv given th8,1 unt:~ ... t o.10rro to r O ~0: I " ;..'..r C:. n u.11( r I .:;o.:...'l[; b _j . (' d.1 .· '-' 1 '· • II to rri,, tr ::1of-~ -'-fmT· ~" -·,., ··-'t'-~-r, 7 _ ...,:i ___.t,r • .'..::''..c . ot u"' , to ::>.l,_ ·.cf.. .1 u·. _r .i. ., •• I_ 0 t: O .1 - r--t.-, + o!l; ... :,o _r"o 01 -· 0 ..'.:'ro r:.:.1,r .... '_1+1,-. ; ~--:c • b_ ~ I., 1 -· . to -r ./ ("1 ,.,1 r 'c b ,....i.-,_..., t· .. .• c b .1;:1 r ..., "'O CLO .... _, r J0 '1 • ,r "o r,, _...., ...... ::..~i l r , Q·~-C c- , ••o (' l l , s. •t ... ... r' be r,... l-._.: c. ·- + ion .. ' -'- '.) :_ _ __,2, .J\J 1:.. ~.,. t C. , ... w -· / ., -1- ir..c c: 1 c.t "~.Tl .1 1' .'..~ vh. r , '' i .......:>v . J..: ........l.r,.. .:; _1 ,r V -· _ f II ._, l • TT ",.. ½ ·lk 0 •, ..., ,..1,,;-- - I 1 C~J .... , ~O nr T""'.: c ....... '" '"''-1 .:.11 . r -J c_ -..y or .• J _ ., ""- J. ... ., -l ....... -I..!~ . i- c.r,:."· .• L .I.J.u .t r ,o .,., -L.,...,:_,,. .. r-.:.t·'-.. . , 1'(' o'-•l.:.z .• _·,,l c,: .,..:, +,""\ r· , r n~ . ~ -~ ... Q~ • -l- p.,, 0.11,, .,,.1- .. .1. +· 0r ·L::_ r ..., . v\.. r' i.. ·11 1-.. .. ~- ..., ,.. }'L _ ....... ...._,r ~.c v • v J l':"'" • , . l L.-:: -~h ' i l • I' , r-t.:..:.. r~d 1.:_v·~l.., -'..,.:.....to .. tc~- ~ 1 ,1.. · ~t<;. µit~l..,.~:..o .. rt/ ... .i.. . __ <':.•a.n - .~ >r _ .j t "~.., 1::. ,vu. e. ::: L... '....u ~ _,_ .:.1 .1. •• ' '-- Fr :_c~ (..,,._: .. _.,.~r · ~~- .. ~ ~ i ..... .,.... c......... p[...-1 ...:~ :o-L~ r .J..1,...,_r-l iov..., _ or ' ..... ... rvtl.-<.." to ...,,, .. ()rol.!co. [rt ··- ·~l · .. ·- ,1- L:'!ut :· ......... Jv:11,--'-::,_, ... :!lnn ......... , ..... "'"' ...... .. .,.::_1 o:- tree ..... ~ 4o".:.•4u +..! .. l,,.o,1;0_1 of __ g+':. ·· . c . re..;) ~ u li ... ~.0-.:1 .ror t....-cl ..:..· -L: '01,..• ·~.:..:..?.. ' ,. ... .... , -1. 1...., G"" - ~ .. :... -c ,_,:vel_ ...c: _ ..... ... o.... , -~: ...,..,, __ '... [..~r .. v JO ~ o_. 1 r. .. 1 "'I .1. :..:... -r,t,.): o... "".r ..... .L .1. i..,:,. ..... • .LI"\ o"t'9·· -.,,... . ... TT' ... ~~1-, . c ... + '1. _ • Pl .. ~r ... · ...: --~t ... .. r: ,_.-,... r,1 ...... :,... .. "" .i. .1. _c:c _,:= .,._;. ,..,"r ..... flJ. . ,...,, . ...,"-.i '-ro0.,. .....- . ro~=..., ' .. .:...... .. _, .....,oi .L. ·SECRET ., .c L. -·, .. . . ~ o~c.....u.r.......... n.__, �~t;f;". [\ ~ ~:\(ECRET . S -~-------- ,PF, t"'R"' "J:'RTT) •r' :·ovT"'"')TC>-q ' 194'2--lf'T'h::.~ •'-'-/ 1.:- r'r.i.1.L,; -~:p1~,. '1, ti le c.. ·l :.u .... 1 °l ....-.1-- ~ l I 1 :£'[..i..,:' "b~➔ o....... ~ ~ ho,..--,,. :c ... ~ ~ c:,V ·--•o to L- '- l_ v:•,/ ~--.,:r.:'or •lo,; Tt ~.L.-rJ·s o-t ·'' 1: -... -.1.0.1...-;h: -:,h lut)ri~ .. ......u- ,tJ .., - , ~ ...... ~ran·~ IJ1o.., :..o"' a....... .i. :, bole": f.:.c~ tJ.._-~ t..1. ounc'"' thi:.., :nornin 6 th.:..t 't"n ro.l r1'-:,--!{ :1.;;.~ , bE-~n --"-d~ '-- :::...i.2t.tn~.•.t r en_ -.::..1. ,.,.1.t r• ::,1. ".:..l ClcJ"k r3fus ~ to : .:t ~h~ th.i.rd stc:r o.• e::c.1 s:.1.oQ:'...:. -:....nt::.lh r h2.~ offic:. .. l co:'li'::.r""!~t.i.on . i,..; Ds..rl~ , 'o~":.L.):: ........ an~ r' · rc.;...1d arc &.~~i!l i:-i co!'lfe2-- .... , o.tt .. ... c rr,t.::..ng to . o~ 1 01.:t ~ ir i ... :C:.::..<-2...i,..,rob:..,~ ~:~d ~ :;ol·-.t:.o:i to t:1~ :..nvol,.. ~ n.:.t"-.!~t.:.on":n ~ C[..bl3 ... __ . to ,.,e~erc:.l !:.he ... , rJ.u.:ra.l Cl:..r::, '"'o ..:i..;l.:.k:. r.ouues ~v\...n ~.1orc.. r th:..n r...c. doc...., "L2 t ',""&. 1{ 1 i:,;; Jt ::..-i C~-~cr::.oos nO,)L ~ , / :.n olC:. t r ..1 k.10'7.1 i,E:.11 b., :1.i.mc.w.1d , rr h.:.u ol"' friE::..1., ,.,t,;n,::i:·, l'T 1 . 11 :Tog-....t. C ,_ .... 0 c............ Clr,....L.. "l::J a ·r:-,('I•~ . " "·!1 n tl1'J , ... ..... u.. -::c ..., , c l..2. , ... '":.~s'-"u'::.u r"~~ived ..... ,,ibrc..:::.ta.::. t·,_, cieco!!.'!er..,0E'l~'.:h t. .:.t .:..::. G~bl-C.: tr.n.., 1::.usion. It..:. 1. 1 t . It "ans "Jello·. bellied con of u. b..i.tcl·1 Clark ho..s £..b;::;oL,tely no v.s0 ." fo:: ~ro..;ue.::~ 1+ , l..'..k' Dar:::.'---1 ..i.t look::: c... thct~.:;L :L . ..:. , iht lLVt; to i·L-:i alono '...:.. th ' . 11_ "1. -1-·- =~.J To provide for evcntt:Z.li t.:.e;;,, General Clc.rk ca.lL i::1 Ge:-ie"al R:·d r t~1rl tel .s hi~ "o r·..:t &.l his troo .~:: on th [;.l"'rt i. event of trn"'J.ble . Tf th:; negot.:. + ..:.::m.., fc::..::.l +'1.s:~ .1.~./ be fi...;hti..~ a.ud thl.3 •-.Pr.:.cc:-.1 troo_;_.., .::.:...,pcrsed c:::;;il., aroc.L'1d.th~ , .... _ Llg.i. .., E..r ""' J.1Ustbe rt:;::;.dy to fieht. Little inc.i.d •.,:L.., h1c.vebeen c.ris.i.n.c; duilJ . t.r,otn r co ,~., up this norning . Fir"' ..., :::"rench ~en:&J.&..,c fighters &.re :...~ch~· , ~n for •. , ~::. the s:-: 1. t. .... •.ard +he.t has surroun:il3d the :'..uto.r:h.t.i.c Tele .._ .:.onci F·.ch, •. o-·u- , ~ ... 1c....l~ ..d...uar-Ler..:i. Lat('.'.r, " .n~cl1ine gi....n~o:np&n/· come~ en~ b&ii21s ettl:1c 119c .P 1 its cuns .i.n front of our :ner ::. ~.! gi.:.ard . ne·d r ::.s ordered to CO-:.....!lt,rc.ctth::.~ ..0\ • c Ge.1 r" l Clrrk orJcrs .J .::.:-.to :::-~port to :-:.~ • 0 , 1.... ~ ..dc_r.1., , r_n,"c..l 'Tog-Ee::,a .ear::, 2.. _:l go G .:.nto a con_~ r .1c, .:.n "on~-~.:.1 Clc.rk co:.1'.:LLd hr•+~l 1:):)d.roo::1-of.f::.c::: ·o.;-...::.:::s •• t::. &. last . ,~1:. _inLr~.. ·i.,i:..:::: r,. .1 rc..l Cl&rk iL:1 b .... :\:>r l'! vc_:,. iri-~o thtJ ·co!'l.f:r .... !1.c .:.t:1 :'l-rl::...n [...!.1G.r,.i.r.:...ud r.'1h'3 .l.,uttl,.Cc... ...... r . n . _.. nd 1 .., lE. r.:.~ a J ..c.:.$.:.on r;r"zt b reacl...,"lc: tl1 ....Frf~... 1: , 1c:l!.i.~n rrn"'st co .... .... th~::.r ".i.f.:"~r..... ........ :_;ot. . r-_c , or th_.."/" 1:1'il c...1-.be ..... II..&.1 ~t dus~oU" a..i.1'., c.. .. 1.~_1:..tu.rv 0v r ... .._nt, '"'Jt~bliµ:J,...,- . ~11~n 11,. 0 Ju.:.n r ... port...,. T:r.J. ...L~C.)rtc....:.n 4h ... , r ..- ere..: Clr..rk t~l~s :1.:.. <.,..toutt!1c ""'·'-'-i?: 0 up no tcr o:: ~:~ .. Fr~r!Ch :nc.ch:L_ec:;t:..'1 ...-".::.nJ ~/ orders hL. to :rn.v~ it r~ ..1ovcd .i..r ed.:..... co t'--J.,. JiHn e&y::, it i.., all a ~1istc:..!rnc.nd hur:·ies ;_;.":ayto h~.ve th~ co;:1 c..n., r~t..~:rn~c...to 2:t::, '!Jarr&ckr: . The hzl out::,.i.de the ..:~nerQl I s roo'.1 is filled . Gira 4, , '.dI.'lirul ::-'en&.rr'l var .;.ous , lu.,..,cr officials c.11.;. Briti::;h Gcn£rc:..l . .ndE-~son. "'he gE-nerc. cr.l.!.::; in the ':r.i.t:.::/ r ~ '10 r-J. orts tha-::. r...:.s o)crc. ·;:,io::i "...oth'3 ea::t is -:;oinc , 1:. 'oue :1u.s i:>Jen C:iv-3, / !)0m0e,J out, thJre is no dam~.;e . There h:,s been a tori .:'.o a~t .... en ,....oc,[;i- bllt t' r ... ck c.re no cam:w.lt.i.ec • Lnti-aircraft reinforce:'.l&nts ht.v _ c.,rrived a"~ bot:1 non~ d..1d B,.>.,""'..:.e . On batta.:::..;.o 1 of th_ 3Pt;1 Er.i.·0lsh 3ri~&.de n. s !oved from B01.1&::.c 8et..:.f to to ··,.olJ th~ a::.rJ.~~o,_ ~nc: rcvent r:E;r-::c.nlondinge . '.not'1c::r bat"-alioi __ •. of tlL ~'-'-me outfit has arrive 1 ,2,t Jon to re,plc.ce th3 ba,..tu.Eon 1noved to fetif . Seven Italie,n tran~ •.Jort ~')le.nRs h .ve landed at ~1 Alouine , in ,.,.t.'-!l.i.s.i.aOne h,,ndred ten It, lian . trucks have oved to k Goulette . ':'·o ba+tc..l::.ons of r,c:.:-.1:.:.tns :1t.ve 1ove~ to ··u.cor , north ,est of :Sizerte . 11:'here are ind.:.cation::, thP,y are 6 oini; to .:ic:~t o,. . ,os ~t on ~ro ... thP- French . The t rn generals go over • lans to "love r.::.rc.troops up . "ira-:....d. comes .:..n to be as.sured 0hc..t General Cl rk is s·ti2. tc.c:.ing :1im. ~~dmir'-2. :." ut..rr.::~.uu-i:..., to ..,sure G-e'.'.ler·:::. Clc..rk that he thinks things o.r 6 0.:.ng to v;-ork o-:.::."~ ::;c.tisfr.ctoril.,· . j (!:'. ) · Fina) , ::..tis ti!':9 for Grneral c1~ '~o driv .. rk to 2.1.son Planch" to .J t 2nP.r...l ::-'i '1"· ·3r . F.s -~har.kf ~l , - leav A.l th cro·~c ' h 11 w"'1d i;o ,s to th. airrlro •. • J·.,;::t as r, n "ral Cl1:..r:c s convo., , co 1:::-;os0rl fo"r pa~~ 01; r ;:: rs &nd t ro load~ of ' oP .... arm-ct .old:. rs pack d i.'1 p_eps , r n :.~c..1~L .1:10• '.);r-J•• pl~'1 l::.'1rl.r . T,~.-e c:.-i.'1 r J « CRET J �I\ 3 r lFlyin::; Fortr'3sses o.nd a sqm:..dron of TT . c . n_39 fi 0 hers [.rrive .::i':11.ll taneous :". G~ner· ls Cl r 1{ and =iserl!',o ·1er c.:.::c;. · .iiral C1.:!111inzhc. a.rive be.ck to .J..gL~rs to;;0th2r , . .. ) J the Dcpu~y c~:,--;and r -~r.:.nging ~~- Co:!L"!l~r.d:r-~n ~hitf and th?- Nc;.Yal Co~ :r.n~.::r 1.? to 1 date d·1r:.11.[; ~-L 18 b.~o::wter r:.r- • T~ LS c.P.c~dPt.;,that Ge•. ~&1 Clc .. ...Ll ·.,r..1..-: rk 1:,0 1 er,. th. Fr• ...ch"lcn fir~t and that l'en r· 1 -i:::cnho .::.1.1. .... b cul~ d into th conth f .... renc , roo.:1• 0 •.rr:.ving c.t the hot~l , +hn thr'°" .. ,n have lunch a.nC: juct as t' .., c..r" f.::.r.i...,hing v.rord is broU£ht that the Frc.,'1Ch of1ici£..l.: \.:.nt to .,ee General Clark . ':he.,- hav0 reac:1ed e1...'1a~reemsnt . Gene:·al Glar':C t..,o ., to see them . ,..,h.:.s is ths ~ ,ree.-.mt th y have reached:} ~ ~ ,,. · ~ ~ 'JJ ~ P"'..I, T)&.r · .:..1 h3b.<:th" civil and oli t.::.c&l govern:nent lc..n ;he- present gov"'rnors of : French ··orocco--·fo ucs ; 1.lecria -C hatttol ; &nd Tunisia--Estev'"" f ill remain in their posts . r ira.ud is to hl"a ·' the French -~"'ed Forc .... , recrui ti~ s ""n ar uy to fight &t t: ... ;:;;iL of ths l1.. ll.::_3s. He is to be giv"'n a freo r in to 6 et 'I,; olu.'1teers fro,:1 the "' regular Frenc11 .:.rmy. For the time bein,_, , Giraud rs a. _.ointl:lent wiL .. not be annou..'lced for ~oliticc..l reQsons . Says General Clark , after th3 plan h~s been ~utlined to 0 1:i , : "You have reacheq c.n ac·ord that• .i.11 as~ist al Al ied forces in Lfricc.. . I knm·. it has be'Jn difficult for you c..nd for :ne to ucljust our difference::; . I b.p,...reciate your cooperation and your hP::.p at this time . ·.row ,"e can co ahead w"1ited in OJI' pl:m of defE.at.:.ng ::.he :~.is , r'3storing F:.. nee a.l'ld re .... toring _;Jeace. .d,.1ira: Darlan wil hoa. up the ...r itical and civil end of the Gov rn:.ient of :forth Afric..,_, ""hi.:; .:.1_ bring compl ite co pe::-ation and accord '.it~ t'1e ;,11 ::.:-' forCAS . mhroi.:..,: r- ~a ral .. r .:..ruud you -~ill as~ist uc in our ?orth 1'..fr.i.cc..ncaml)(!ign . .ll:niro.l Darlan .i.11 coo .... orate so thr.t French forces --.i.11 ·efend. French Porth .'.fr · ca . 'T0 rill u3e his .influence to &ssem.ble all availabL ':leans for :wl .:.ng us . 0 • I.\ ,~,, thr c;oYPrnors at . resent im:tal" 'd •,il rern1in o.t the.i.r C 3n ~l ,... ::.raud ""::..1 b ~nno11nc... as h ... d L.~ of &11 :::'r-::nc'.tur:1ed :~orces in fortL. . frica. , C r'.e.in o'.:.h,r .;~....,rc..l s_ue,rJtion.., , il~ b' ta 1w11 lfl lat r . Th'..3 C"nc2rn ~ ½.ui ~.:. g , orgi:..nizat.:. ti1 -E- d coordLLtin: .. •. :rr ..ch ~.itc that w.i.11 f.:...:;ht at our ::ic:.". "'o fac.:..:i'.c..' ~ our or~- v..t.::.ns,frcnch troop.., in st atec;ic r,ositions Y,ill vacate -':.heir f.:.cili t.:..es , o ;nakc .,.,oomfor . s . I look ~ o .id ..iral Di:..r la:: for 3.i._;na:~'.lI'E. the permanent a.r.n.i.sJ~ic.... ter;r.s . ...E. , il of i: ork up _. '. -~ t::..i.l:.; of this .::::-:n.::.stic later . I propose .101. to bring .:..n t.he Co--: '!and"r-in-ChLf , (!;_n rt..l ~icenhovrnr . rr J. c territorial o~-t-;:... · t c;.:: a. :--. ... opr:_ate t.:..v, P~for·, GE;ner::..l ~iscnho•·•er is bro1.....ght in and introduced to t,l. thr "'rench off.i.ccr., , :J.d;niral Dv.rlan 3tu.te:: he is ::igni:ng ths accord "wit1,.1the obje tive o::: defeo.ti ..;:; the Ger -:c.r..s"'nd returning Franc" to her for:rrer • l:::..c". rr Ge.1~r~ 1 Eisenho·"er , c.fter shakin_; hand::- ,ill all the officer.., , says : "General Ch .:-';: tel~s ::1e you have reu.c~1er1 co.:r;:--lete accor O • •• hc.t ,;ou propose is co .:p:>tel:r c.cce ~ -table to :ne. From this de..,- on .. d1:!irc.l Darla.1 Lcc;~3 the Frc11c l'orth li'.,..:'..cc. state . :'.:n this c...t i tude I am su ...,. '1 ,orted b~· President Ro sevelt . an;; C + '-il:: 0 'iave ;,;e-1;. be •rnrke.i out . P.0preser.:'.:,ing me is General Clark , .10 speaks for · to ...-:.ch detail:: as yo,, .nd h3 a:::r~-- on \~iL. be ai ... roved ir.. detail by O1..1r hoc.· ..,,.ur.rter.:; Lnd O.,'.I'goverrr1ents . •1e al::.. ...ust c.gree to ;ut ".:.oget!ler al: !!!'3 n.J to hip th.., G-er1:1r.nc . returr:.in.; to Glbr"-ltar 'iit:1in the hour. 1 apolozize for the br.i.efnc::.: of'::· ::Y.-ci . ~hank you for your coo ere. tion .:...."1d t for joining us in ~cac:i.:.n.:; .::L.'1ucrt...e . _1+ • " r.pu_.,..c:..ls Clu-k c:..'1d Eisenho ;-:er then ::;:.::kc hands. c.i around and de:;xirt for the &ir• port . The Fnmch:··1en re!llc.in in session to discus::; liaison ~ th the Allies and to 01.:tlitL their .t-'roblemc . (Generals ~isenho· .• r :..nd Cl .,..k and .,C..'Ilirt..ls "rlun e.nd Cun iinuha a!'P ~ hotogrc::.. h'-'d b~r !le\' sr,:.:.per c::id ""Ovie 1 0 • 'Z,a.rn 1 �\ l Lj IJ.t ·aison Pl.1nch air . ort , .1'"' c.._:ia rr:1en and ,.hoto 6 ra. hrr;:: are \7ai t ·ni for 1 Generals -:.:.~ nhor 1r c.nd Clc:.rL. ~1. ce the Co .. u:.ci ...-.:..•-Chief ..u::t. ci • c.rt for G.:.b.• raltc.r l :,ediatel~r if th~y ar to land befor_ dark , ther:i are no intervim sJ General Clc.r 1-c is to e~pL.J.i:.:. t~~ &ccord to the journc.· ist.., :1 .1 h r t.Lr.,~ ~o hL hof 1. crrh on y c ·• _ ~0.1.7 is ,.,h,:,n G ::1cral ~.:.~ ...ho '3r ,. .:.n::: th third ~ 'var on G n ;ral C 'rk r..., sho,.ild r-- ..1ov::_nghim from ...,aj or g encrc,,l t 0 li :tenant ,Z;E.:nerc"l. :=.~- ~_;_ nho r ~ a::; t'"' • i.ns on th:: ::;tart rh.:.:!. Cc.. r:..s cl::.ck : trT 1vc J-een c.itL.g c. l<'ni "-.:. - ',o c.0 t · ~~ , 1..~--:.- I hope I ,.,.i.n on -:.~1ef o'.12:'th :::-:.e.r 1 i;,en ,:t .... :i:::en 1101,er tc.kes off a •• • . ! l §e11:;;~ 1 Cl·.rk returns to hi., hotel . mhP. i81J...,:c...:!. :::til~ in::;lst::; on V'-&.rin_~ t c stc.rs J...11til h ~.,t.rs d.:.:·ect fro:11 the ...cr Depart~wnt of h.:.s ~ro·-:10tion 0 T \.µ Genercl Clark sketches, c..t his pre::;::; co::.1fcrenc , +'.e ;rcssure that v:as brotJ£ht to b ;;.r before th Frcnchr:1°n reached en accord . IP t: •.•1 t-lls the neu::;:::cn of the D.::..rlan-Girc:ud setc_2 . 11T fe.:!.t , 11 e:q.,lained General Cl.::-rk, "lf they r,scre not c.11 to.;e+her there 01, :C. be re ,., .re .ssion::; t1:J." =ouE . t detract fro, the .Jain effort-[;eL in.'.; into Tanisiu. ar..::. co=lng to gri .. ..., ....erever ,.o;::.:il: -,"', ::. the !~ .:.::: n ·fe , , t:. • o. pluins tlu.t Fre::1c!1 troo!)s cre alre1..d. rq isting C.:rm"- nt:t~r in 4 o · orth JJ:'r.::.ci.l, •This tre 1endous -1. is 01:e ~ tep to,;-.s.rC::ocr col.__,_boration ,' '1.:: continue::: . ~· -e· ...re ._;oln~ to att :i • t to shi;: in food for the A:..:;eric.n civiJ ..:. .n~ ,.n ~ -rovid" them ··::.th things that tre Gc-rmn.n end Ita ::..an P.rmi,..,tice com i:::::;io!l...,,-;ere tlking .... ·::~·y fro:::. the':1 c.ild sr.i •. ::.:1b to the::..:- O\.n co 11..'1+-.:. ~• T\1rl n i,.., , in~ on +he r1:.dio to a.;.1no·~1c the c:ccor~ . The f":ncl:J,; P.•• : r~ al ju'· il~nt an,.:i kLscd sach ot!-:.cr on the che:cl:. 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J.1 . ,J r, fcr h _+ 1 "rt .,_ ~(.) .,. .............. ,C ~o T':..rl~ -•• " ....,!"• TI + ~ T • u ,.. t" --.. :. r-n ... r ..... r:w1. '-. ,c . + 'f"\ ..... :T_..~ u11cor; !1 ii' .... T' • -., l () : __ .. r t·i -. _ ... o ..... fr.r ,. .... n ,.. .:..n._ "r ) -J ·+ .... f• ---. ..:.t rri+or,; .....+ L .. or ,+ 4 +. 1,.,,_Q...... ,.1. -1-- ,,. en ~o:::...' o. 0rt -.)+ ~i..... r _ .._ n " ,.. .t ,.. ' ➔ ,r ... + r ::.. . "l , r' l ~ +· . ,... .., + ...... .. • , T"l-r·l,.. .1 ,..,.. - ) • • - · ... ,f.. • r " + ➔ ~ '-- + + 1. ,.... : m ... . 1 )) �133 SECRET r (" ,· k ' t ~ts C -., ht:> r ~. . ,.'-' .i. ~.... - ... , ., J.. • ,. ... . 7 ... - ' ' - ) .... ,, ... .... ,, ... ... r: - -....._,.~ , , C , 1 ' ... I - 0 , ' ., 1 1 l , _, ~ J . ., ..., ... " , !I' • ... . ~· "l•~ T >1::.1., . . ... ...- ..., ' a r .I. t 'I �(~y SECRET ~ . ·1 ' - + C..t.~ ~l ~· •·r I! ~ -c., .· ·-.' " . ...., •· t ... ( , .. "'.l: ·~~ . '! . .. ,,,... ,., ~- ) .. ., ,... < . .I.~ . ' .. ' I •o ,.,, -' .., ... :::'I) I' ,.. .... 'l (' .,, ... .. ' =. . .., ·~ ... . - '7 ... L ~ , ,... ' . _., ., u ,., .. , r • •- .. '" ! ,,. ... r c.. .'. -1-' ,.. . .- .r --"-u ,., f , Tonight, It read s : '--~ General Cla rk lets ... ,} w c •• II •' ' . ~ ~c, .- ·- ti , l u • . . <> ,, r his hair do.n in c.. let te r to G-..;ner1 Ei se nho wer . 1 �"D ear Ike : nA t ached her eto i s th e sig ned copy. of t he agre ement wit h Dar l a. ••• I t hought t n you might wi sh t o send t his on to the W Depart ment . ar "Rec eiv ed your l ett er about GCM I t natur ally tr ouble s me because I know i t . has trou bl ed you . I m ubt sa y th at I th in k s om of th e boys in W i ngto ~ ar e get e ash ting unduly al armed ab out small matt er s . The onl y t hi ng th at has gone to t he pr e s s is what has gone out thr ough your hea dquart er s . It seems to m t hat th e boys bac k i n e W sh in gton coul d do better to f ac ilit at e out wor k her e r ath er t han to bot her us with a suc h uni mp ant tr i pe . (This r efe r s to W ort ashi ngton obje ction s to cer t ai n s ect ions of stori es conc erni ng Genera l Cl ar k ' s Afri can r endezvous t r i p) The stor y of our vi s it her e was one t ha t naturally appea le d t o th e pr ess . They built i t up and m agni f ied it ju st as you woul d expec t t hem to do . Every i ndi cation t hat I have r ece i ved and ot her peopl e th at I have tal ked to th i nk th at it was a svrn s tory ••. ll nr knm7 the hell you have been tak i ng , si tt i ng i n th at damn t.mn el , but don't thin k I haven 't ha d my share of it her e . I hav e neve r gone th ro ugh tenda y s lik e t his befor e in my l i fe , but I must say that vi are now obta i ni ng the best combin atio n of e r e sult s th at I t hink wer e pos., i bl e t o squeeze out of the dir ty mess we f ound here . I don ' t m nd maki ng deci s io ns -- you know that - - but i t i s doubl y har d when y ou m i ake th em knowing th at t hey are anot her ' s ra;ponsi bil ity . I hav e not once ask ed y ou to com over her e , for I t hought t hat was your decis io n , but I do want you to knoow e th at when you do com it will cert ain l y be a gr eat r eli ef t o m . I think t ha t th e e e ti me has come ..he n you sh oul d be her e . '.lost of the communicat i ons are bE:: , tween you and me and tha t will al l be eli minated wit h your arr iv al. " I am del i ght ed th at you f ee l a s 1. do a oout cutt i ng down t he s i ze of the sta f f. I r ead t he W Depart m ar ent ra 4i ogram on th e f or mation of the Fi f t h Army I don 1 t . know how you f ee l ab out it , but I t hin k- as Gener al M arshal l sug gest ed- - t ha t t he Am ca n tro ups her e shoul d be all headed up under one ar my and t hat pla ns be m eri aae by t hat army f or the ir ar r iv al and tr aining for it s next of f ensi ve m s s io n . i 11 W t h r ega r ds to t he r actio bro ad cas t , I am gl ad not to have to ap 1- r. It i s i .ea quit e a bur den , but I tot al ly dis agr ee wit h t he dec i s ion t hat sen i or of fice r s sh oul d not appear . A fter all , th e pe ople back home want to know f r om autho r it ative sour ces _how t he ir boy s are getti ng alo ng . There se ems t o be t oo m any pe opl e afr ai d th at senior of f i ce r s ar e getti ng t oo much publi ci t y . I will t el l you more about th at v;hen I see you . 11 I can I t tel l you how gr and your -_ upp ort has be en dur ing t hi s try i ng ti me. s Your whol e- hea rt ed an d com ete back i ng has been t he one th i ng t hat ha s ke pt me pl fro m goi ng j ust a li tt le bi t sc r ewy. "I r ath er t hi nk W sh i s s omewha of an ol d "dodo . " I don' t th i nk he has the el t zi p and "do i t now sp iri t" to get the maxi mumr es ults out of the t ool s he ha s avail abl e . J i mmy Dooli tt l e and I keep µ-oddi ng hi m i n th e hinde nd every day and ur gin g m e action . or "As for A er son , he has been doi ng all ri ght , but I di d t hi n..'k: s m sage na hi es of November 21 ( sa yin g French su pport was weak) , whi ch appa r ently went to ever ybody fr om th e Ki ng down , showed a l itt l e s i gn of weakness . Hoveve r , he is i n a : t ough spo t and h as har d de ci s i ons to ;nake . V: had lunch to ge th er to day and I ur ged e hi m to push on as soon as he coul d , at the same time m ainta i nin g· s ome control until he f ound m e about the enemy disp os i t i ons and strength . or "As Ever, (signed) Wa n e . " y * ,C" f �Rf (,T W J.Pi.ct, . f' ~ ct .,_• i.tC rf ;.., , r r -· ~r 1....: r · J.' ,, r, T" .... c, .,_ r :n cu ... ' .ir 1 t .. )) .:..i- .. u r .,_ u -· j .. oc l C C: • ':! -l- \ r f0r c J r_ ~' 01 ...i J,.'--r' - ,"-'- ') " lL .., J_ -· ~;. .., ., •L ..,_, .., to l;rr ., l ,_ dc--~t , l ., f") re .. .+ <'-;. v _'-!: . l "'.,....,., t .1.... 1 ~ . ,,,. .,_o :? -· vh "\ tur .. ' .:.r.'-' 0 C c: \ . l~J.l~ rLr. J- ~t j_n 1" !"; ~ 0 t n ,h'' 11 r C c.... ~t ,..,~.1.l (' yr ,_ .., ..,..-i.;rit..:.~ ;. .- ri:: .. f o. _;_ J...:. r ' .... JI ' �\ 3'1 f.ovTnnr (' •• , rt..:.. t'oi~~ ••, dm.:.r"" .'friC£..i1S CU' LIIlite for d lo., r-'coo. rat .it. t e1r· , c:f ...,r nc fore n' • "f, ... y1 -for .., C: •. ~vlatiL-~ .',-rt Cf O n.i.tE..ci 2t.:::..tf.. CCJ ::_11.frico, • b"-"i... +;... , the v-ork of r -nitir. J all French! Jn, ic : a 1 crid rta::.C.:.n:_ im, t,..,_ ' v ..~- a..:.fiic ........ for t if Fr 1c ' i ~ v ~ n Fr,ncu1~ •• c nce.,rnin 0 +:1¥ in-L,r "- a t. e "'cor, or'.. W1l ni o. . ::1 11 "'· n tru..., t the T'ni -~ St&. "':.es ~ov r.r..,nt ~.... r ~u .:.zE.J. ..c... , ~ u~, · .r t t of t..1Eo r s . t to be c "Cte_: .:.n t:....c., trug~L :, int .:.c f:;· _.,c .'.:'ric Fr ncnm n the i 1,ression 1,.1at t. c i:.u-L!.or:Lt~ of t w C icf u n ' it -ain i., r on .• 'tL k.i.n sine r" l:,· ~(':J.I'.,' T\... ..... 1r r a:r. · iru ( lg. d) ~ vie·. ... v ' l str, tr f&.ced , .i.th a tough deci...ion t i:::; Colonel~ "iv-=: •• in' '"'cot+ it dev lo.,...., +tr,t G r ;r• l. CL;.r 1• n qner_,, 1 'l 1::. v ;1 ., ·.J Tun.:._ front ian i_~µ .L m • ..,, c. c ..:.., b-..:.ng rmor '). ",_, t ~ Can b~ n.:. • • 'l-... .. or d .u.C .• t of Cl tan.- ld "'· • ecc. • U.u f&. ~ 11lOVC~ _ -~. n pnr+ ,.., . 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J.o.ro.cr,-'-itt ..... ..........c_ --T"l~-·rµ C ·~l, ' r... o ....· .....0f ,.., ..... ::...1n1:.., r' ~ + .. 11¥' "'r t b ~.e· =---. '._.c.,..___c.,cJ , 1 .i. J -.d. .,,. ha., ord:.r..,cl anot:.. ,r c --.~• it". 1 1-J .... ., "'~ t1... .... r J ·' f (""I "d / .,..1 ' + , • • , J ~- Io .. , .1., r l + • "-1- .. _r,,...._i, :r+~ ..;..., r' •• • 2. "l • ,... {;.~r'.r' r • r rt .I,. " .. \, ..... .!..br .,,. r ... n . "' ,. ,I .!' C • ' 7('\ .v. .' ' ,1 --• fr-r V .., ,.. -- ." -1- .... 1 ... 1-. ,-.. n.!.i.\,, I -1- r ... 1, ' .... ·~ ·~ .. t ' \ .l ,_ 4. ' . ,1..0, - .> , �r LJ.J.r.c.} t. ALGIERS,NOVEMBER 1942-The decision o:f Frehch 'Nort.h Africa and· Governor 24, General Boisson to fall in at Darla.n's side and range itself' vlith the Allies is featured today on the radio and in the press. A dmiral Darlan makes the announc ement, saying that both Boisson and General Barrau, commander in chie:f o:f French ground, air and sea forces in West Africa, join the other "eminent men"-Giraud, Nogues and Governor Chatel-in the decision to fight the Axis and liberate France. The touchy [and intricate situation is beginning to cila.rlfy and prove that General Clark's decision, to play along with Darlan bec ause he i s the only man w has suf'ficient ho _ following to help us, was right ;_J At General Cl.ark's invitation, · Admiral Darlan comes to the Deputy Comander's m office this morning to confer, for the second time, with General Eisenhower . The Commander-in-Chief' wants to send a joint American-French mission to Dakar to confer with Boisson but Darlan persuades the Americans that it w ill b e better to have Boisson come to Algiers first. He probably wil l arrive eiiher Friday or Saturday. Darlan is told that his plan for drawing Admiral Robert at M artinique into the alliance bas received the approval , of Washington. The French a< uniral also proposes that something be done to aid French Somaliland which has been under blockade. Such a move, says Darlan, would have two results: it would give the Allies additional ports, a.nd, it would get foodstuffs and supplies to the hardpressed populace. Darlan is asked to sub~t a memorandumthat will be for vr rded. to both the War and State Departments. a The next problem that is brought up by Darlan concerns the Frenc h North Africa youth organization headed by Van Hecht. Darlan says he is worri ed about these independent groups. [Says General Clark: "Do you want them drafted in the army and broken up? They were friendly to our cause and they should not be put under commanders that might be prejudiced against them.] Darlan is instructed to talk with Giraud and Van Hecht to see w hat sort o:f a solution can be worked out. A serious racial and business problem exists in French North Africa between the 7,0 00,0 00 Arabs and 150 1 000 Jews. The Jews, naturally, are jubilant about the Allied landing and the Arabs, although not anti-Allies, ere reacting. They insi st, in the medium of an Arab slogan, that: "Jews are a nece ssity you can't get along without," Darlan reports. They feel they have been exploited by the Jews in the past and they want to be assured that "Jev1s will not be allowed to run public affairs." Darlan is instructed to proceed with great care so as not to disturb racial mass es. General Eisenhower suggests that Darlan assure the populati on that he will "conduct the affairs of North Africa on a liberal and enlightened basis and in accordance with principles on which the French Republic was founded." Darla.n's first step will be to begin a proces s of the restoration of property and individual rights to suppressed minorities. This move will go for w ard "as fast as conditions of .Arab prejudic es and suspicisions will permit :' The government th at Darlan will head as high com is s ioner m is discussed and it is decided that in addition to a council of mini sters, th at will include Giraud, Michelier and heads of the territories, it will have a consultative body of private citizens to advise in all civic and economic problems . With Darla.n's consent, the ))r btocol signed yesterday is changed slightly so the wording throughout makes it re ad "the Unit ed States and her allies." The British asked for inclusion of the "and her allies" provision s. Darlan agrees, saying he bad assumed tba.t was the meaning. The French admiral then brings up the question of Fr ench merchant shipping. He wants to be sure that suf'ficient ships will be provided to supply Fr ench Africa; that the ships won' t be div erted els ewhere. Darlan is told that shi ppin g w ill be done by a sy stem of allotments 11and on any agreement involving ship ping you will have the ful l right to have your views considered-you wi ll get a fair and s quare deal." French coasta l ships will continue to work in French African waters. �\39 SECRET General Eisenhower praises Darlan as the conference is closing. He tel l s him that every eff'ort is being made to set up the admiral as the top man "and everything you have done proves that you are going down the line with us. riBecause of your pesition in the Vichy government," says Gener al Eisenhower who has seen the letter that Darlan wrote General Clark as a re-sult of President Roosevelt's message, "you are unpopular in the United States. Nevertheless, I have told our governments to let us alone; that we know more about the existing situation. So, they have of'ficially accepted everything we have done. [Y01.1 enough of a politician are to know that we have troubles because of the right we are fighting for-free speech and a free press J If you head an enlightened liberal government in action the antipathy toward you wil l change." Darlan nods and ap pears pleased. [He bows toward General Clark, then General 11 Eisenhower: "I like to do business with y01.1, he smiles. You give good and clear 1 opinions and you get things done. S [Lat er, Air Marshal Welsh is called in because of General Eisenh ower I s "grave concern over the lack of adequate night air defenses." General Ike saw his first air raid and,~ the first time in ,his life, faced enemy f'ire last night. The raid was quite heavy, with much dive bombing, and it lasted throughout the night. The bombing_is slowing up unloading and causing loss of equipment and hindering the use of air fields. A Beau fighter squadron is being ordered to Algiers from the Middle Fast. It will have good night f'ighting equipment, inc l uding enemy plane finders. Welsh also asks that a torpedo bomber squadron be sent to Malta to operate against .Axis ship ping that is moving to Tunisia -;, · " General Anderc: n reports back from the f'ront that he is not getting cooperation o f."rommany French civil officia .ls in the east ern section who, he declares, seem to be pro-Axis. Darlan is sending bis representatives to eastern Algeria to straighten out the situation. Gener als Clark and Eisenhower fe el that some arrests would buck up the populace who are pro-Ally but afraid to show themselves because of the stand of the officials. The situation in the ea st is developing _ according to plan. Anderson is moving up his units for the feeler push. The line is virtually set in the north. It runs, roughly, from Dj Abiad on the north, through Dj Sebla-Medjez El Bag, to El Arouz on the south of General Anders on's northern sector. In the southern sector under General Giraud ' s comman , contact has been established only at principal d roads, at Pichon, Sbei tla and Gafsa. The Germans and Italians apr..:aar to have about 10,000 combat troops • . Genera l Clark orders Colon el Hamblen to see about more orderly establishment of headquarters. A roximat ely 70 of'ficers and 560 enlisted men are due to arrive Thurs fp day by cruiser f'rom Gibraltar and already the Hotel St. George is crowded . In midafternoon, K S3 comes pulling into Algiers, once again crowding the harbor and making M it a prime objective for Axis bombers. Generals Clark and Eisenhower go out to look ·at a vil l a and decide to move into it this afternoon. It si t s near the crovm of the ridge that overlooks the harbor. The villa on the hill, lacking, for the present, both gas and water, is occupied tonight by Generals Clark and Eis enhov,er. Reason for the lack of w ater is that a bomb landed near the villa last night, rupturing the mains. Gene al Clark is keeping r his apartment-off'ioe in the St. George until his offices on the secon d flo or are ready for occupancy . More ot'ficers arrive from Gibraltar today by plane and the st. George's accomodations are bulging. Because of heavy r&.in, ther e is no bombing tonight. * * * �SFr. E ALGIERS,NOVE M BER 25, 1942-The British First Arm has started pushing its y way cautiously forward in the north of Tunisia and, as yet, bas not run into any serious opposition. The 78th division (British) commandpost has been pushed up to M edjez- El-Babl This is almo;t unbeli evable since the German outpost line was re ported to have been there yesterday. Reports coming bac k fro m the now -develo pin g front are sparse. There is no news from the s out hern front where the Fr ench, reinforced by American troops, are schedu l ed to merely hold and prevent a German flanking movement. General Clark had and then going overland the area and the flight small part y, inc l uding up in Beau Fighters. planned on flying to the fr ont today, landing at Constantine from there, but the weather is extremely bad throughout is called off and tentatively scheduled for t omorr ow. A General Eisenhower and Air M sha l W ar elsh, wil l make the trip A general conference on air plans and problems is held. Our bombers bl a sted Bizerte yesterday, 45 Flying Fortresses participating. All of them returned, four slightly riddled with cannon fire. A drive to move more fighters closer to the front is decided on. General Doolittle and Air Marsha l W h are instructed to get els together 11a.nd a pply the maximumair pressur e ." Small airfields in Ea.stern A lgiers are to be improved as soon as possible so bombers, now extended to the limit to reach Sardinia, can go after Italy pro per and other Axis-held points. General Czaig is to be the air force of'fice:r at Allied Force Headquarters, working with General Doolittle and W elsh, then r eporting to Generals Eisenho wer and Clark. Elctensive publ i city is going to be given concerning our air raids on Bizerte, Tunis and other points so the residents of Algiers and French Nort h Af'rica wil l know that the Axis is getting retributi on-plus for bombing Algiers and that we are paving the way, with bombs, for an all-out ground attack. Next comes the problem of ship ping, and CommodoreMorse (British Offic er i n charge of the port of Algiers) and civil af f airs and shi pping experts are called to General Cla rk ' s of fice. The plan is to move French ship ping out~ North Afri can harbors as s oon as possible to give more berthing facilities to Allied ships bringing in sup plies. ~The shi pping experts say five French shi ps are i n c ondition to sail to the United States and two to the U nited Kingdom. To relieve congest i on, the ship pin g ex~ rts toy with the idea of m oving m ost of the Fl-ench shi ps to D akar. General Clark re'jects the plan saying "the y can I t go to Dakar until we know where French West Af'rica stands; to date only an announcement of pr i nciple has been made." It is decided that t he shi ps that are capable will be send to Gibraltar, in "escrow, 11 to relieve the ports. General Eis enhower declares that Darlan wi ll agree "since he is playing ball with us and is sufficiently in our pockets. ~e•ve promised him a square deal and he 'll get it. The French are to be allowed coasta l. shi pping as l ong as it does not interfere with military water movements.1'0ne Special Fl-ench gegetable , oi l carrying shi p is to be allowed to go to Dakar and the minimum ec onomic needs of French Nort h Af:rica are going to be met to improve the lot of the natives and show the m that our occupation is bringing advantages denied them under German-dominated control from Vichy. \ General Clark next disposes of an urgent problem here in Algiers. Air rai d of f icials ·have had itchy and nervous fingers with the result that the air raid sirens have wai l ed w hen there was no immediate danger. Thi s has result ed in the stevedores dro pping _ everything and scurrying for cover. A slow-down in th e critical unloa ding of ships has resulted . Genera l Clark instructs Colonel Slocum and t he civil aff airs of f icers to halt this time - wasting. This subject was br ought up when Admiral Burro ughs, commaner of the Eastern Naval force, ma a brief call to Gener al d de Clar k 's of f ice. ~ 1 �B With battle imminent in Tunisia, it is decided to issue a proclamation to French North Africa explaining the situation and declaring that "the military must have first priority.it This is to obviate overcrowding _of rail and wire communications and to provide a fulcrum to work against elements that are not cooperating .as they should. This lack of cooperation seems strongest in eastern Algeria. The fear is that passive resistance will turn into active thwarting of our efforts should Anderson's drive to the east go wrong. - The situation regarding French West Africa will be settled later this week. Governor General Boisson and members of his staff are due in Algiers Friday for discussions with Generals Eisenhower and Clark and Admiral Darlan. L the Dajmr if deal is cinched, General Clark believes it will stop some of the "beefing" still coming from London and Wa hingt'on concerning the French North Africa-Darlan agnees ment.J · rGeneral Clark moves today to his Deputy Commander-in-Chief's office whi ch is close to the Commander-in-Chief's, Chief of Staff''s and Secretary of the Genaral Staff's of£ices. The general has a bed rig ged up in his room, behind curtains, so he can nap at the St. George Hotel on particularly crucial nights. The job of moving the staff, growing daily, into the hotel is terrific. It h.a.s been handled so badly that General Clark orders Colonel Hamblen to take charge and "make a comprehensive layout." An underground emergency headquarters, particularly for the Signal Secti on, is also ordered prepared. ) After Darlan and Boisson have worked out an understan ding here regarding Dakar and French W est Africa, a mixed group of French and Americans will go to the vital 1 point to conclude the deal . The French insist on "dealing with America.ns. 11 The attitude toward the British is one of distrust. ~stablishment of a more direct air route from North Africa to the United States will also be discussed. l,Other developments during the day: orders go out to protect the lines of communications in French Morocco and Western Algiria ••• this results from a trip by illieuienant Colonel F.ddy to Tangiers during which he noted that only scattered French soldiers were guarding strategic bridges ••• Another part of the headquarters staff arrives • . •It inc l udes Generals Gruenther and Lemnitzer.- •• A cruiser load will arrive t omoITov,and Admiral Cunningham is scheduled to come in by air ••• The first clipping from-the United States concerning General Clark's secret mission, ·via submarine to North Africa, arrives -Btta the new group and the play the story got . ~~~ ~ * * * ALGIERS,NOVEMBER 1942-The day goes beautifully, 26, both on the .front and back here at headquarters. In fact, the advance in Tunisia goes so well that General Clark is a little apprehensive, fearing that "Anderson is moving too fast and is getting too extended." Already advance units are at Mateur, about 50 klhlometers from Bizerte, and a tank outfit ha-s reached Dj_edeida, only 22 kilometers from Tunisl L Most of the action today is at Djedeida. Two conflicting reports come in . The air force reports that it sent both fighters and bombers over the Tunisian · town in the morning "destroying all German planes on the airdrome and the wireless station." Then comes a report from the armored column which says its guns destroyed 40 Garman planes. "One thing looks certain," says General Clark. "W just plain smacke4 hall e out of the Boche up· there." All is quiet in the southern sector. General Anderson's advance started the night of November 24-25. Ander son' s plan was to make Tebourbe and Ma.teur hi s obj_ectives, then drive northeastward for Bizerte. General. Clark believes Tunis should be knocked out i'irst, in view o.f developments, and that then the squeeze toward the northeast corner of Tunis, driving out the Germans and Italiam. \ j �Fearing that Anderson might find himself in a bad position because of his possible over-extension, General Clark orders greater speed in bringing up General Oliver ' s armored outfit to aid the Allied drive. Also, 26 tanks are ordered up from the Casablanca area. Near Sbeitla, farther to the south o£ Alierson's advance, P-58s from Youks Les Bains airport did ground strafing, claiming the destruction of 20 vehicles in an armored column, and the destruction of two of four officers• sedans on the road near Gabes. To aid the attack and give the Allies complete air superiority, air officials arrive at Algiers from Malta and the Middle East. General Brereton, commanding U.S. air units in the Middle East; Air Marshal l'edder, head of the R.A.F. in the Middle East, and Air Vice Marshal Park from Malta confer vd.th Generals CJ.ark and Eisenhower and British and American air officer u here. Forces from Malta and the Middle East are to participate in the air attack on Tunisia . The plan is for the planes from Malta and the Middle East to concentrate on ports, 1articularly Tunis and Bizerte, while the air force from here will drive on Axis-held airdromes and aid in the ground advance. The air officers are left together to work out the details. The Axis forces in Tunis are to "be smacked from b'O sides" by the Allied air units. General Giraud comes in to confer with Generals Clark end Eisenhower and he is tremendously pleased with the way things are going. Giraud's urgent and repeated plea to General Cl.ark for air superio~ity ·has been met-in force and in a hurryl · Relations with Giraud are excellent and they are ever - improving with Da.rlan. The touching letter that Darlan wrote General Clark has been sent to both Washington and London and today Prime Minister Churchill, who, apparently, was the most upset by the Darlan deal, radios back that Darlan is on the "bandwagon" and tells Generals Clark and Eisenhower to "pat him on the back for me." Darlan now feels he should confer with Degaulle representatives but General Clark tells him to postpone any such meeting "until a ~ mere appropo time." Darlan is now concentrating his efforts on two objectives: getting Admiral Godfrey to turn over that part of the French fleet at Alexandria,. and, lining up the visit, scheduled no,f for .saturday, of Governor General Bois son of French · W est Africa. · General Clark is informed py Darlan that General Boisson and General Barrau, the latter commander in chief of armed forces in French West Africa, have agreed, on the basis of reports brought back to them at Dakar by the three emissaries Boisson sent to Algiers, that they will place themselves at Darla.n's disposition. "As a better comprehension of the true situ ! tion in North Africa becomes apparent to the French W est African authorities," says General -Clark, "I am convinced that we ce.n obtain our objectives by friendly negotiation. Darlan points out that the adhesion of Fr ench West Africa is of great importance to our commoneffort. It includes a vast reservoir of manpower; it is the source of a large producti on of lubricants and colonial products; thfir is _stationed at Dakar important element ;an of the French navy, inclu ding the Riahelieu which D arlan suggests be s ent to the United States for completion in an American shipyard. The armed forces inc l ude 75,000 men and six groups of aviation." [,. Nj,1 \ Lieutenant Colonel Raf't"has flown back f r om the south ern Tunisian £ront and he gives General Clark an inspiring picture of the American action there. He tells how the paratroopers drove into Gafsa, were driven out, re-assembled and then drove the Germans out . He tells how mobile 75s destr oyed German tanks and of the courage and r esourcefulness of this American unit so far removed f'rom everyone else. Raft has French troops under his command, giving him a total of about 2,500 men.; He has G �• <" r T . J<:~• ~t,, )Y 3 ( \ , ' been directing the movement of both American and French troops, instructing a Fr ench general on how to deploy his men1 The paratroopers are going to be drB.wn back and replaced by American infantry, r einforced. But Raft, who has done a terrific job, asks, and is granted, the right to stay in the Gafsa area with a Tanlc Destroyer Battalion. Raft reports that the French are fighting with him in great spirit. To illustrate the feeling of Fr ench civi l ians in the frontal area, Raft says th at when his outfit came back and recaptured Gafsa one girl came up, hugged him and said: "Are you married? If you aren't, I want to marry you1" Jack Thompson, a rep c. ~ter who went up with the paratroopers also returns and says that Raft "is like God to those people up there." Before Raft leaves Generei.l Clark ' s office, he has been promoted to a full colonelcy, the silver eeg}9s being pinned over his dusty silver leaves. J Raft is wearing several French regimental insignias, handed over to him by the enthused French soldiers. ' The French shipping problem, gone into so extensively yesterday, is shaping up well. General. Clark says the French "are showing a most cooperative attitude and are clearly desirous of getting their ships into service as rapidly as possible~The following accord has been reached: l-The High Collllllisariat for French Africa retains and holds under its own management the ton nage required for (1) the transport of troops requested by General Giraud between French West Africa and French North .Af'rica upon ap proval of the CommandingGeneral , Allied forces; (2) the maintenance of indispensable economic traffic between French We Africa and French North Africa; st (3) North African coastal ship ping will be maintained on as feasible a sch edule as practicable; (4) the desination of certain ships now in French North African harbor s is agr eed t o but certain ones to proceed t o Dakar "only upon clarification of the situat i on t her e ." l These are other developments during the day: It has been determined t hat the Axis is drop ping "Booby bombs" over the Algiers area. These ar e flashlights, pencils, wallets and other devices that explode when picked up. They have also be en drop ping puncture triangles on airport rw1ways ••• General Wavell asks from India th Rt key officers who planned TO RCH be sent to him so t hey can contribute their experience to the planning of an invasion to regain Burma• •• Once again the weather is bad, raining_ heavily mo of the day, and there is no bombing ••• The general's st trip to the front is again postponed and he begins scouting the possibility of dr i ving up to the fro11t • • •Tonight, the cruiser from Gibraltar begins unloading and more officers and enlisted men flock to the St. Geerge Hotel headquarters • •• Genera l Clark is fairly comfortably s et up in his villa now••• Colonel Slocum has be en instructed to begin laying ground work for activation of the 5th American arr-v ••• General Clark is to have command of th i s but General Eis enhower now indicates th at his Deputy Command er-in-Chief is indispensable ••• Nothing is definite yet, however. * * * ALGI RS NOVEMBER 1942-The Gerlll8.nshave enteridg Toulon and re ports E , 27, reachin g Allied Force headquarters are that the French fleet is being scuttled. Of hi s own volition, Admiral Darlan sends the follo wing message in the clear to the fleet, then dispatches the original to General Clark: "Once again the Germans brea k th eir word and occupy Toulon. I urge the hi gh seas fle et to leave and make for Ora.n where they will be received as friends by the Alli est" But Darlan's plea, and the unceasing efforts of General Clark to get the French fl eet seem in vain. Lat e tonight, fragement ary re ports in dicate the French sent -to �SECRET the bottom, with colors flying, what ships there were at Toulon. The Allies will not get it, but, neither with Germany who needs it much ·norse. For us, it may not be so ill a wind. These ma be the results: y France has lost the last ca.rd she could play against the Germans-holding out the fleet as bait f or amnesty; our chances of getting remnants of the French fleet in Alexandria, Dakar and Martinique are increased greatly; units of the British fleet that have been tied up watching the French fleet least it move, will now be freed for other duty; German occupation of the la.st unoccupied remnant of Metropolitan France will r eact against the Axis and, in theeyes of those who have been frowning upon the North African alliance, the stand and stature of Darlan will increase, making the lot of General Clark that mu.ch easier. This morning, Admiral Darlan, who has been informed of Prime Minister Churchill's revised attitude toward him and who has also been told that treatment for his infantile paralysis stricken son will be admini stered at Rabat, Frenc h M orocco, sends the following note to General Clark: "My dear General: "I think you most heartily for your great kindness in placing the necessary means at my disposition to transport my sick son to Rabat. "I should be grateful if you would thank Colonel Holmes for the great services he has rendered me on this oeoasion. "Would you be good enough to tr ansmit to the Governor of Gibraltar my sincere thanks for the proposal you transmitted to me to have my son taken to Gibraltar. "Please accept, my deal General, the expressicn of my high consideration and sincere wishes. (signed) F. Da.rlan. 11 The difference between the British and American attitudes toward Darlan is starkly illustrated by a cable received by Mr. Mack, foreign affairs liaison officer fro~ the British to Allied Force Headquartars, from the British Foreign office. Mack is instructed as follows: "there is no need for you to pay a formal call on Darlan, though there is equally no reason why you should avoid meeting him. You will also no doubt maintain informal relations with French officials as may be necessary. Consul General will conduct official business with French authorities. He need not pay a formal call on Darlan, though if Darlan wishes to see hi1n he should respond.••" Compare this with the free and easy relaticns between General Clark and Darlan! .. Reports from the front are obscure. Because of continued bad weather that makes flying i:npossible, Generals Clark and Eisenhower decide to leave at 0900 tomorrow by armored car for the front so they can observe first-hand the conditions. This is the most comprehensive report that comes back today: "Attack on .o.,zerte expected 28 November with pos sible use of parachutists. No report on exact situati on around Mateur and Djideida. General situation obscure but resistance not believed severe. Mark Six tanks (German) estimated as 12 to 20 encountered last night vicinity of Djideida. Tanks mount 88 mmgun. Germans executed demolitions of bridge at Taboura. 56th Rrigade exact progress unknown. Has encountered ene~ tanks." The air attack against Axis-held poritions of Tunisia is on from both sides. Bombers and f'ighters from Algeria -are supporting the Allied advance and bombing airports. The first report comes in from the Allied air force operating from the Middle East and Malta. The Tunis docks were bombed last night with 55,000 pounds or high explosives. Hits were scored on petrol dumps, buildings, railway instal- �The generals go east-southeast via Seti£ and Constantine, heading for Guelma w here General Anderson's commandpost is reported to be. The trip is through br own, barren country . The roads are good. Just before entering Constantine, a six-yearold Arab boy- darts out in front of one of the reconnaissance cars and is killed~ It gets dark when the column is 60 kilometers east of Guelma and the la st two hours or the trip are driven in a complete blackout. The road, humpbacked and of well-w.o11n macadam, is slick with dew. All the cars in the convoy are skid ding and finally one of the heavy armored recons slides into the ditch, injuring three men. The two men most seriously injured are put in the baggage truck and the convoy cautiously cree ps into Guelma. In the town, the generals are guided to the hom of a Mr. e Spring, American consul who has come to Guelma from Tunis with the entry of the Germans. Having eaten small lunches while driving, the group eats dinner. General Anderson has moved his colllm!Uld post to Soule Ahras, farther east, so the generals decide to spend the night with Spring and continue in the morning. A British medical major takes the two injured men to a hospital and then l eaves for the ditched recon to look after the less seriously injured men. General Eisenhower obtains a bed but General Clark and Colonel Slocum throw their bedding rolls on cots downstairs. The ~ds bivouac around outside the house . During the trip to Guelma., little military activity was seen . Enroute a few c onvoys were passed, including part of the 6th Armored Ini'antry (American), part of General Oliver's force which General Clark ordered up to aid General Anderson. This unit, becaus e of enemy air reconnaissance, is on a night march and its disc i pline and apperance is excel l ent . While the two top generals are making their way to the front, the r e are important developments at Algiers. Governor General Boissons arrives from French West Africa, and Governor General Nogues is coming from Frenc h M orocco . M eanwhile, arrangements are being made to set up the m ssion that w l visit Dakar fol l owing i il the conferences here. The fol l owing message is received today from Secretary of W Stimson: nwant ar to convey my admiration and appreciation of your (cable to General Eisenho wer) mast er1y conduct of the campaign thus far as wel l as my best wishes for your success in Tunisia. I know it wil l be a tough pull but I am confident that you wil l tlu>roughly succeed." Another congratulatory message has been received £rom the Inter-Am erican def' ense ·board in W ashington. It says: "The Int er-Americ an D ense Board, realizing ef the beneficial results of the campaign in North Africa on the security of the We stern Hem isphere, wishes to express respect£ rand adiniration of the Commanders of the All ied Force i n North Ai'rica and sends its commendations to the Chi efs of the American Armed Forces x x x for the brilliant planning, preparati on and execution of one of t he m ost spl endid campaigns in the history of the world." This is the military situation as of tonight: Bone was under continuous bombing from midnight to 0530. One destroyer bad l y holed. Off Djidjel l i, one petrol carrier sunk. At Tebourba l4 out of 17 German tanks were destr oyed when they atte mp ted a counter-attack. At Djedeida, the 11th Brigade is "clearing up the town" .but lost four tanks by enemyAre ~ outskirts. Bombers called to attac k enemy column r etiring from Djedei da but column gone when planes arrived so they bombed Bizerte shi p1in g. Brid ges at Tebourba and Djedeida destr oyed but repairable. It appears that half the enemy is retiring toward Tunis and the ot her .half toward Sousse . M any stores and materi als abandoned or bun1t by enemy. Axi s air effort on reduced over-al l scale but operatin g in large formations . The Germans are fighting a stubborn retreat but our progress is stea dy . * * * �SO AHRAS-AIDIERS, UIC NOVEMBER 1942-The American generals arrive at General 29, Anderson's commandpost in mid-morning. It is at Laverdure, about six miles west of Souk Ab.ras. The three generals immediately go into conf'erence at the British general's simple and- rustic headquarters. Enroute to the command post, the generals encountered Colonel Darryl Zanuck who reported to them that we did not control the air and that there was dissatisfaction by both British and Americans. Anderson reports that he is satisfied with the air situation; that arrival of more AJ.lied air units has counteracted the dive bombing and strafing the troops were subjected to during earlier stages of the drive to the east. He then outlines in detail the disposition of troops under his commandand reports that he "is pleased with the way things are going." It is decided to move more air and line of comrmmications troops to the front. Communications between the First Army and Al.Lied Force Headquarters has been far from satisfactory. The military situation is that the Axis forces are fighting a rearguard action but that our drive for Tunis and Bizerte is steady. Because of the arrival in Algiers of General Boisson and the importance of pending conferences concerning the status of Dakar and French West .Africa, it is decided to turn around and proceed back to Algiers as rapidly as possible. General lisenhower is a bit under the weather, having developed a bad cold. The conf'erence with General Anderson lasts only an hour. During that time, Colonel Slocum has been talking with Anderson's staff. The 580 llli.le drive back to AJ.giers is started at 1100. In order to move rapidly, the slower armored reconnaissance cars are left behind, to proceed at their safest speed. The armored staff car and two jeeps head for home, pausing only a few times. The final 180 miles are covered after dark but to make time blackout is disregarded. As the cars speed through small Arab towns, jittery air raid precauti on officials blov their whistles and wave their arms. The cars ke ep g9ing with everyone shouting: "Am ericaines." The protest of the gendarmes amount to naught.It is close to midnight when the party returns. Some members have bad sun and windburns. On the return trip the generals• sma·ll convoy passed mile after mile of half-tracks and trucks moving to the front. These were part of General Oliver's command, the tanks having gone up by rail. Their road discipline is good. Back at Algiers, the following cable has been sent :from Secretary of State Hull to General Eisenhower: "The planning and launching of the North .African campaign constitutes one of the most brilliant chapters in our military history and I extend to you and to the army personnel participating my sincere congratulations on a job weL. done. This highly successful operatioo is a real contribution toward final viotory." This is the military: situation for the day: 55 B-17s bombed Bizerte airdrome and docks successfully. Ten enemy aircraft destroyed, two probabl.es, seven damaged. We lost two planes. No fig _ ter sup port because of mud. 17 British Bisleys attaoked h Bizerte airdrome successful l y last night without l.oss. Bone was attaoked heavily during the night with "losses suffered by both sides." British parachutists were drop ped from 44 6-47s near Pont Du Fahs, 55 miles southwest of Tunis at 1100 today. The planes reported a sucoessf'ul drop but what happened. after the chutists hi t the ground is not known. On the basis of a message sent back by Generals Eisenhower and Clark the north quay of Bizerte harbor wil.l be bombed tomorrow. Informati on from Anderson is meager. The 56th Infantry brigade was scheduled to reach a point about 10 miles northwest of Mateur early today. The 11th Brigade is bel.ieved moving :from Teboura to\Vard Mateur. Our tank losses have been relatively light. The remainder of the U.S. armored force has reached Souk .Ahras by road. Colonel. Raff rep orted by �I . . telephone this afternoon that there are no enemy forces between Kairoaun and Tebessa. The airdrome at Gafsa will be ready for use in two days. Governor Boisson holds a preliminary conference today with Admiral Darla.n and governor indicates that he will "cooperate fully" with Darlan and the Allied forces. is prepared, he says, to enter into an agreement which wilJ_ gi've us the facilities of French North Af'rica that we desire. The general tenor of the conversation was that French West Africa will be in the war with us "en bloc." Mr. Murphy. The French West African a, Two new moves are on the griddle. One calls for an invasion of Spanish Morocco if conditions-require it. The situation concerning this hot spot is far from good. The Spanish there are making repeated protests about planes flying over Tangiers f4I1d indicating they might be looking for a pretext to move into the Sebou river region. Undoubtedly they are being agitated by Axis agents. The second move is a drive against Sardinia. It is requested that "planning and preparations be pressed so that n o til)18 will be lost when the decision is made. 11 * * * .A.LJ}!ERS, NOVEMBER 1942-Three problems-increased 50,air activity over the eastern i'ront, preparations for the conference with Governor General Boisson and the ever-more delicate situation in Spanish Morocco-occupy General Clark throughout the day. General Eisenhower is ill with a cold at his villa so the Deputy Commander's day is more hectic than usual. On the basis of discussions with General Anderson, the following air operations for the next 48 hours are decided upon following a conference in General Clark's office with Air Marshal Welsh, Major General (just promoted) Doolittle, Air Vice Marshal Sanders, General Craig and others. Eighteen Bisleys will crack Bizerte airdrome tonight. Tor.iorrow 18 Flying Fortresses, aocoL. anied by l.8 P-58 Fighters, p will attack Tunis airdrome. Eight B-25s, on their first mission and to be accom})-: anied by 12 P-58s i'rom Youks, will · bomb Gabes. At nig _t, 18 Bisleys · will bomb the h airdrome at Tunis. The day' after tomorrow, 18 B-l7s and 18 fighters, will go after Bizer t e airdrome again. Eight B-26s will bomb 1nis airdrome accompanied by 12 fighters. Again 18 Bi sleys will attack Bizerte Wednesday night. It is also decided to ask for the servies of Air Marshal Tedder i'rom the Middle East. The theory is that Tedder, with a great deal of practical experience, can aid the air drive tremendously during the coming critical tYFoweeks in Tunis. Welsh doesn't seem to have the drive or the pra ctical experience necessary. Tedder, who was here for conferences last week, has returned to the Middle East. Regarding the situation in regard to French West Africa, Darlan, Boisson andNogues are now in meetings at which they are straightening out their indifidual differences. In the words of General Clark; nwe are letting them have their own cat and dog fight among themselves. ·Both Boisson and Nogues have demands that they must work out with Darlan. Tomorrow, Darlan, Boisson and Nogues wili have a pre liminary meeting with Mr. Murphy and Colonel Holmes. When the time is r i pe, we will go into confer ence to conclude the deal.' ~ The matters of principle are to be discussed here with all specific arrangements left for consummation in Dakar with a speci al mission that has been dispatched from Washington. It is hoped that a general statement of position can be secured from Boisson before he returns to Dakar. The specific agree ment wo uld be consumated at the capital of French West Africa. General Clark feels it v1 ould be unwise to send Boisson back to D akar "trit hout attempting to reduce the commonunderstanding to writing ••• " �A score of radios come in today concerning the increa sing l y tense situation in Span ,iah Morocco. Almo any move can be expected in the Sebou and frontier st areas. The Bri tish consul general at Tangiers rep ort s that "the £act that the areas have not yet been occupied by American troops is arousing commnet among Spanish circ l es at Tangier xx x inclined to interpret this as tacit acknowledgement of Spanish claim to Sebou region. 11 The region is fuL . of enemy agents who are inciting the Moorish leaders. Repeated protests are coming in concerning flights of American planes over Spanish Morocco. P.J.1 these cascading facts disturb General . Clark. He calls General -Patton at Casablanca and orders him to come to Algiers tomorrow f'or conference. A move might have to be made at a moment's notice. One cable explains the situation: "Indications that Spanish Moroccan Army may be planning sudden move south of Sebou River have been further em hasized by objection of f high commissioners to U.S. Charge d'Affaires, Tangier, over flights of Am erican planes acr oss Spanish territory. Token occupation by American troops of French Moroccan territory north of Sebou river recommended by military atta.che Tangier to prevent a possible Spanis h occupati on that area. Considerable discussion reported among Spaniards over advisability t l~ir occupations this territory ••• 11 The rapid advance into Tunis has slowed down. The report from the fr~nt says: Ground operation remained on a reduced scale today and wil l continue to do so until present sc ale of enemy air ef'fort can be reduced. (This step was ta.ken today by General Clark. He also sent Welsh to the front to conf'er with Anderson). I (Anderson ) have agreed with Welsh to the steps required to acheive this end in air and plans being prepared with object destroying enemy aircraft on ground and denying the m use certain airfields. 11th Infantry Brigade in contact with enemy on western outskirts of Djedeida and on southwest slopes of steep escarpment which divides main val l ey Djedeida and Mateur. They require short period in which rest and reorganize before they f'it to continue offensive. Same applies to 56 Infantry Brigade who failed capture very pronounced feature comm anding valley through which they must advance toward Mateur . Blade force remains in central reserve and provides offensive patrols one or which today destroyed two enemy tanks. The u.s. tank unit is concentrating in the general area south of line Medje to El Bab-Beja. The 56th Reconnaissance Regiment and parachute battalion are operating offensively over vride area n~b of general line Oudna-Massioault both of which occupied by enemy. Air· activity on reduced scale thro.ugh out day. Successful bombing raid carried out against enemy occupying Djedeida. Our fighter squadrons re i nforced to limited ext ent . " 11 General Clark ' s entire afternoon is filled with catching up on t he hundreds of cables that have come i n during his two day absence at the front. He's literally buried under papers through out the day. At one point ha exclaims: "The hel l this isn't a paper war and who said our communications weren ' t working. Just look at t hi s stuf'ftn * * * ALGERS, DECEMBER 1942-General Clark is decorated by General Ei senhower I l, today with the Distinguished Service Meda l l The decoration cer emon is held, in bright Mediterranean morning sunlig ht, on y a second story porch of the St. George Hotel. The citation is read by Colonel Davie of AG and then Genera l Eisenhower pins the medal on his Deputy Commander's tunic. The event is photogra phed by both still and motion picture cameras. High ranking officers, including the four other of f icers who accompanied General Clark on the submarine - r endezvous trip and who are to rec-eive their Legion 0£ M erit decorations soon, st and behi nd in a semi-circle centered on a color guard and t he U.S. flag. �S GRET n l -:)0 There's quite a drama.tic story behind this morning's decoration cere~ ony- -a story that few know and a story stretching back 25 years. After General Clark was wounded in France during the fir st World War and following his release from the base hospital., he was sent to the G-4 section of the Fir st Army. C-enral De W e itt was his section head . General Clark was in charge of supplyin g troops in the Argonne s ection. He had to select railheads, round up the supplies and se e that t hey moved on schedule to the active sector. Just before the war ended, General 1IDe W itt recommended Clark to be a major, at the age of 21 . He also ' wrote a let t er r ecomm ending Clar k for the Distinguishe d Service Medal, saying he "knew of no one more deserving." When the Second Army was formed, General Bullard asked for Clark to be executive officer of: the G-4 section but he stayed with De 'i,itt . The substitute sent in General Clar k' s place got the D.S. M and Genere,l Clark knew "fro m com . parison of my work that I was entitled to the Distinguished Servic e M edal." The stor y then leaps the years to 1955 when General De T Yitt, th en in the Phi lippines, wrot e the W Department to the effect that he had had lots of time to ar ref:lect on Clar k 's work and that one of his gre at regrets was that his r ecommendation of the D.8 .M. for the young officer had never been consumated. Again, ,he wrote Cl ark a marvelous reco mm endation and citation . The recomm endat ion went before t he board ma times but ther e was no action. Durin g the "lean years" of the 1930s, ny many D.S.M. 1 s were awarded for administrative jobs and, again, §enera~ Clark was r ecomme nded, t hi s time by his Corps commaner . Clark f elt that he didn't w d ant a D.S.M. in that fashion . Again the story bounds ahead-this time to the off:ice of General Y .arshall just before Genera l Clark went overseas last July . After saying gooHbye and just as he star t ed to leave , Genera l Clark was stop ped by General Mar-shall. "Your wor k as Chief of Staf'f of the Arm Ground Forc es has been outstanding , " Genera l Marshall y said . Your plannin g of t he army buildup alone is a feat entitling you to the D is tingu i s hed Service M edal. I have recomm ended you on more than one occasion but for reasons I can ' t give you at the present time, the decoration has not been ma . de This st ory runs through th e Genera.l ' s mind as he stands in the warm sunli ght being decorated by the award he has coveted--and which he has earned-for s o long. It t ook almost a quarter of a century until tbl,re, final l y, it bangs on hi s chestl The Spani s h M orocco situation demands almost all of General Clar k 's attention toda y. I t begins to look as thoug h he wil l go to Oran to take char ge of it and to form the Fifth Army, first army of th i s war to be formed out side the limit s of the U nite d Stat es. Fol l owing discussi on wit h Gener a l Clark and various key perso nnel , includ i ng politic al experts of the U.S. and G eat Brit ain, General Eis enhow se nds· r er t he f'ol l.owing cable to Gener al Marshall: "Indication of increa se d Axis subversive activit y in th e r egion of Spani sh Mo ro co and evid ence of some Axis concentration s al ong the Pyren ee s bor der have r convinced me that complete c oor di nation of prepar ation in that r egion mu t be s acheive d at once. To accompli sh t he necessary coor dination, I int end, as U. S. Theater comman er, i mm d ediate l y to estab li sh t he U. S. Fi.fth Army wit h Lieut enant General Clark in command He will act ually es tab l ish hi s headquart er s at Oran as . soon as cur r ent activity . here wil l permit but, in t he m eant ime, wil J. take activ e char ge of coor dinati ng di spos i t i ons and pr eparat i ons in the cent1·al and western ar eas . This wi l l compe his ear ly r elief as Deputy C- in-C but I f eel that th i s can l b e done on my oYmaut hor it y as A llied C- in-C and wi thout r ef erence t o the Co mbined Chiefs of Staf f . Request ra dio confirma t i on . " General Pat t on arriv e s fl-om Casabl anca short l y af t er noon and G ener al Clark �l5 1 spends most of the remainder of the day in conference with the Commander of the Western Task Force. Since a large nUJ1Derof troops have been drawn from the Oran region to give added strength to Genertl Anderson's force fighting in Tunisia, any units that might be used to occupy the Sebou River region or take action against any Spanish Moroccan moved must come f'rom General Patton's command. He recommends use of the Third Division. General Patton is staying over until tomorrow. Mr. Murphy and Colonel Holmes meet today with High Commissioner Darlan and Governor Generals Boisson and Nogues. They report back that the Frenchmen are . getting their dif'ferences settled and that Boisson does not want to return to Dakar without some kind of a written statement from the American officials. Murphy says Boisson is ready "to go along with us." The situation at the fronts British, American and French troops are driving to separate the Axis force. OUr troops are about 15 miles f'rom Tunis and about 22 from Bizerte. They are forging ahead but the rapid advance is slowing down because the Axis troops are now getting concentrated in a tight corner~ British · and American paratroops have been drop f ed about 50 miles south of Tunis to thwart either reinforcements coming up or else to heckle a retreat. Air activity continues over the entire Tunisian area with bombings and fighter sorties against ground troops. Daylight bombing raids were made against Bizerte, Sousse and Gabes. Om- forward units are maintaining strong pressure on the enemy's position in the vicinity 0£ Mateur and Djedeida. In Southeastern Tunisia numerous patrols, including French, have damaged enemy installations. a wedge between Tunis and Bizerte ) (Note: Henceforth, this diary will not deal with matters in such detail. The general's days are filled with innumerable conferences on every conceivable kind of subject. To conserve time and space, only the highlights will be hit.) Late tonight General Clark is informed that Washington bas ap proved his headat the earliest possible date, the Fifth United States Armyl He will go to Oran, probably, at the earliest paa.cticable date. ing, * * * ALGIERS, DECEMBER 1942-"Authority 2, is granted you to activate Fifth headquarters designating Lieutenana General Clark ~s the A:rmyCommander." Army This is the message that is received f'rom General Marshall and the message that will start General Clark on a new tangent with a new command. He begins laying the groundwork. He bas already decided on his key officers: Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Al Gruenther; G-1, Lieutenant Col onel Frank Markoe; §-2, Colonel F.ddie Howard; G-3, Colonel Art Nivens; G-4, Colonel 11Addie" Adcock; Air Officer; Colonel Guy Gale; Adjutant General, Colonel Cheney Bertholf; Headquarters Com andant m Lieutenant Colonel C.C. (Smitty) Smith. The general in order to concentrate on ' training and tactics and avoid being buried in pape; work, plans on a streamlined headquarters. General Clark wants to have his headquarters several kilometers west of Oran so he can be near an airfield and away from interruptions that would impede him in Oran proper. At Oran, he plans to have a base section under General Larkin to handle mo~t o£ the paper work. Colonel Smith is flying_ to Oran tomorrow to meet Colonel Nivens and search for a site for Armyheadquarters. The general orders the above key personnel--plus Colonel TommyLewis who, probably, wil l be the Artillery Officer - to report to him here f'rom Oran. It probably will be ten days before the general starts formation of headquarters. \., � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, November 11 - December 1, 1942 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from November 11 to December 1, 1942. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1942 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Language A language of the resource English Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/805 Date Valid Date (often a range) of validity of a resource. 1940-1949 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/3d9db8695c8017fba02db3c0e9828601.pdf?Expires=1773878400&Signature=HHXQnqsPg2%7ENFr%7Ed5J7th1UvCUc-NcdYBFetKI6RDpIeucQ-ZoVirNArWM9LD8hDXKOTuoj6ztQPl-Ob7KgjpqVPkxI986nhtHHAhmR2WXlXAbIGnRwEuEtYfBQK9oAncc0%7E8ZwiJcCiUbq%7Ed-lu5M%7E-jnQ2udzO6g3gQKPSle5ZAEV%7E5y%7EkJ4gK1Iw4O2sfyWP9fE0DinCzPpM7q6xTB5Oh-NS3E-Y257oQhjLD9ud1sW6UpmuWVrW38NjSaVrrMqen8tIRKTx6Cy0YaXv8FTwof0acI-fjS00Bfy2jvDFCshV9zdGDj9O37quS4rrV6mRPEpI8paqQ%7EAkYNaPTTg__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM b262e4106bed56fb9f632c462062e71a PDF Text Text ' l 51 t spends most of the remainder of the day in conference with the Commanderof the Western Task Force. Since a large nuni>er of troops have been drawn from the Oran region to give added strength to Gener~l Anderson's force fighting in Tunisia, any units that might be used to occupy the Sebou River region or take action against any Spanish Moroccan moves must come from General Patton's command. He recommends use of the Third Division. General Patton is staying over until tomorrow. Mr. Murphy and Colonel Holmes meet today with High Commissioner Darlan and Governor Generals Boisson and Nogues. They report back that the Frenchmen are getting their differences settled and that Boisson does not want to return to Dakar without some kind of a written statement from the American officials. Murphy says Boisson is ready "to go along with us." The situation at the front, British, American and French troops are driving a wedge between Tunis and Bizerte to separat~ the .Axis force. OUr troops are about 15 miles f'rom Tunis and about 22 from Bizerte. -They are t'orging ahead but the rapid advance is slowing down because the .Axis troops are now getting concentrated in a tight corner. British . and American paratroops have been drop 1-, about 50 miles ed south of Tunis to thwart either reinforcements coming up or else to heckle a retreat. Air activity continues over the entire Tunisian area with bombings and fighter sorties against ground troops. Daylight bombing raids were made against Bizerte, Sousse and Gabes. Our forward units are maintaining strong pressure on the enemy's position in the vicinity o£ Mateur and Djedeida. In Southeastern Tunisia numerous patrols, including French, have damaged enemy installations. ) The {Note: Henceforth, this diary will not deal with matters in such detail. general's days are filled with innumerable conferences on every conceivable kind of subject. To conserve time and space, only the highligpts will be hit.) Late tonight General Clark is informed that Washington bas approved his headat the earliest possible date, the Fifth United States Armyl He will go to Oran, probably, at the earliest pa.a.cticable date. ing, * * * A:WIERS, DECEMBER 1942-"Authority 2, is granted you to activate Fifth Army headquarters designating Lieutena~ General Clark ~s the Army Commander." This . is the message that is received from General Marshall and the message that will start General Clark on a new tangent with a new command. He begins layin~ the groundwork. He bas already decided on his key officers: Chief of Staf'f, Br ...gadier General Al Gruenther; G-1, Lieutenant Colonel Frank Markoe; §-2, Colonel F.ddie Howard; G , Colonel Art Nivens; G-4, Colonel nAddie" Adcock; Air Officer; -3 m C?lonel Guy Gale; Adjutant General, Colonel Cheney Bertholf; Headquarters Comandant Lieutenant Colonel c.c. {Smitty) Smith. The general in order to concentrate on ' training and tactics and avoid being buried in pape: work, plans on a streamlined headquarters. General Clark wants to have his headquarters several kilometers west of Oran so he can be near an airfield and away from interruptions that would impede him in Oran proper. At Oran, he plans to have a base section under General Larkin to handle most o£ the paper work. Colonel Smith is .flying to Oran tomorrow t o meet Colonel Nivens and search for a site for Army headquarters. The general orders the above key personnel--plus Colone l Tommy Lewis who, probably, will be the Artillery Officer-to report to him here from Oran. It probably wil l be ten days before the general starts formation or headquarters. \.. �There are two fundamental reasons for this delay: 1--German resistance and counter-attacks in Tunisia have slowed down the Allied advance and General Clark wants to see the campaign succe ssful or assured of success before he drops his Deputy Commander-in-Chief job and turns to his commandof the Fifth U.s. Army; 2-The situation concerning Spanish Morocco doesn't look too good and the general wants to be at Allied Force Headquarters to help integrate any plans. Regarding the Spanish Morocco situation, French agents there report that "German troops are to disembark in force on the 5th of December at Melilla and on many other points on the Spanish Moroccan coast in accord preparatory measures are being t aken by Spanish beginning December 1 ••• " This coupled with continuing reports that Spanish Morocco is casting covetous eyes on the Sebou river area and that in Spain proper authorities do not seem to be taking firm steps to resist ; German invasion in event .that troops building up on the French side of the Pyrenees smash across the border into Spain. · ' General Patton, on the basis of these reports, confers with General Clark who tel l s him to alert the 3rd Division far possible use in the Sebou river region. General Nogues, here for the conferences with Darlan and Boisson, urges \oken occupation o£ the Sebou river region and promises aid from French troops. General Patton flies back to French Morocco this afternoon. · These are other developments during the day: the first draft of an agreement that Darlan and Boisson propose concerning French West Africa is submitted. With the exception of certain provisions involving French merchant ships at Dakar, it is substantially what Generals Eisenhower and Clark want. The text of the agreement is to be gone over and hof es are that a final draft will be approved by both sides tomorro,T. Darlan has now formed what he calls a "French Imperial Federation" but it is being pointed out to the High Collllllissioner that "no act" of the military in North Africa "can recognize any particular government setup except such a provisional one as is locally necessary for the prosecution of military operations." _ ••• Two French submarines that escaped from Toulon have landed in North Africa and wil l figg tta t the side of the Allies ••• Rear Admiral Del.aye, French naval attache to Spain, has put himself under the orders o£ Darlan ••• A huge ceremony is held in downtown Algiers commemorating the French-British-American personnel that died in our Narth African operation. W reaths are laid by General Eisenhower, Admiral Im-lan and Admiral Cunningham. General Clark remains at headquarters, working ••• Admiral Darlan gives a luncheon in honor of Governor General Bois son. General Clark attends. Later, he says that he personally likes Darlan although he doesn't agree with the vagaries of his checkerboard political career ••• In the evening, the Frenchmen are guests at an Anglo-American-French ' cocktail party at the St. George Hotel. General Clark, seeing Admiral Darlan and General Giraud conversing like old buddies, steps in to congratulate them. "It I s fine to see you two such good friends again," says General Clark. Says Darlan: "We are friends and we consider you a great friend and think a lot of you1 11••• After the cocktail party, General Clark, Captain Wright, Colonel Holmes, Maj or Meacham and Lieutenant Beardwocd go to the harbor for dinner aboard H.M.S. Stork, a British destroyer commandedby Comman Brewer ••• It is a der fine, jovial evening with CommanderBrewer predicting in his toast to General Clark that the young American general "is destined to go far and hold even more important commands before this war is over." \ , / . This is the military situation: The Axis counterattacks in the Teboura area and losses are heavy on both sides. When midnight comes, the line, substantially, is as it was at midnight last night. Three infantry companies £ram the Mth division are ordered up to the front from Algiers. The Blade force, in the center of the line, retreated under enemy pressure but General Oliver's American armored ) �~C' l53 fl[ I•. force came in to close the breach. General .Anderson is quite upset and is coming to Algiers for conferences. He is perturbed over air and supply problems. The Germans are employing tanks and dive bombers and the fighting is somewhat confused with no definite front line. By nightfall, the American tank outfit had cleared up the situation in the Tebourba area and all enemy tanks withdrew northwards leaving only a few sniping troops behind. Of'fensive operations against Tunis, planned for tomorrow, have had to be postponed pending reorganization of forces. General .Anderson sends in the following radio late tonight: "I must acquaint you with the situation as I now see it. Three main factors govern it, namely, administration, enemy air action and enemy rate of reinforcement. Administration: So far I have intentionally disregarded normal administrative requirements -in order to try and wi.~ the race to Tunis and Bizerte. Result is both army and air force are now stretched to limit with precarious communication and no reserve supply forward. If I cannot reach Tunis and Bizerte soon I must therefore go on defensive until administration reswrces are reorganized and built up. Enemy air action: My advance has been temporarily halted owing almost entirely to heavy scale of enemy dive bombing and ground strafing. For geographical reasons our Air Force must be strained to counter this threat and cannot maintain a suf'ficient ef f ort for very long. If I cannot reduce enemy air effort by capturing and holding Tunis or Bizerte soon I must withdraw so as to be under an umbrella which can be maintained with less strain . Enemy rate o:f reinforcement: Whether or not I can capture and hodd Tnnis o Bizerte soon or must withdraw under adequate air cover will depend in end on rate of e:raemy reinforcements. From the information available to me, enemy has already and can continue to reinforce far more rapidly than I can. But since I am not satisfied with that sources of informati cn are suocificiently complete to enable me to make such an important decision I request immediate visit by Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman to give and explain forecast of enemy strength and rate of subsequent reLllf'orcements. 11 t I * * I \1.C,:. • ). ~ V 1¥ ' ._ * AI.GIERS, Dl!."CEMBER1942-General Anderson arrives back f'rom his headquarters 5, near the front and a real council of war ensues. Anderson reports that he is stymied for the time being, citing the arguments listed in the radio received from him last night. This meeting is attended by Generals Clark and Eisenhower, the air generals, supply officers and all those directly connected with air, tactics or supply. It is decided to halt the push, build up air and ground strength and then start a new offensive about December 9. General Clark says, following the conference, that the delay "results partly from the fact that our air can't keep going at the terrific pace it has been keeping. We haven't got operating airdromes far forward and we need more air supplies. The Boche is operating his air from fixed bases and our fixed bases are almost 500 miles from the front." General Clark believes General Anderson made tactical mistakes. He thinks ~\ the British general should have concentrated his attack on isolating 'l\.mis. Also, he made frontal attacks instead of enveloping attacks and as a result lost a lot of tanks. The lines of comrrrunioaticn, says General Clark, were "chuck-s.-block" and from all appearanees the logistics were not good. "However," he adds, " ::. tis a l ways easy to sit back, af'ter a thing has been done, and say how you would have done it." \ Until the renewed attack, our force in Tunis will try to hold its present position, drawing back slightly in spots to higher ground. Night bombing will be carried on on extensive scale with the prime object the ports. The naval force, which is already operating or£ Tunisia, will continue to go after Axis ship ping that is bringing up reinforcements and supplies. A British naval force of cruisers �)5 L/ ) and destroyers engaged a southbound Axis convoy last night between Sicily and Bizerte. The convoy scattered. Four merchants ships, two of which appeared to be transports, and three destroyers were left burning wrecks. The British naval force suffered no casualties of damage. The great fear, of coorse, is that the Axis buildup will be as fast as ours and that no advantage will have accnued to us by December 9. The bombing and naval patrols will attempt to prevent such an occurence. In reviewing the disposition of General Anderson's troops, General Clark feels that he committed his paratroops and two commandogroups too early-getting all his means into the battle bei'ore the ti.me v1as ripe. "A military reserve should always be saved :for a ti.med concentrated wallop. You can 1t commit everything piecemeal!" Roughly, the f'ront line tonight runs as follows: The north anchor, with the excepti cn of the commandogroups to the east, starts at St. Jefne and runs northeast; it then bulges to the west in front of .Mateur, runs through Dj Skkkak, then bulges again to the west in front of Chouigui (where the 11th Brigade position was penetrated), to the west outskirts of' Djedeida, through St. Cyprian and· to its southern anchor, Khedlia. The paratroops, under Colonel Ra.ff', attacked Faid just before dusk .tonight and took the town which is far to the south of the regular line. In mid-af'ternoon, f."ollowing receipt of approval from the Combined Chiefs of Staff' in Washington, it is decided to move occupationary troops into the Sebou river region. Part of an armored unit is ordered to move into the hotbed area. Also, precautionary moves are made in case of any counter action. The 47th regimental combat team, less one battalion, begins marching from Spfi to Port Lyautey. The 3rd division is enroute to the Rabat area. General Clark plans on flying to Oran the day after tomorrow for a conference -with Generals Fredendall and Patton. Generai Morgan, who has been in England organizing the Northern Task Force which is to go into Spanish Morocco if' necessary, will also fly to Oran for the conference. The three task force · generals and Lieutenant General Clark will coordinate their plans. Although he is "getting itchy" to org_anize the Fifth Army that he will head, General Clark today concentrates almost all his time on matters not germaine to the Fifth Army. However, he arranges for a meeting here in -the near future with his four "G-section" heads and the Adjutant General. They will make preliminary plans for activation of the army and welding of the Center and Western Task forces into one unit that will be under the Fif'th Army. General Clark, in addition to being charged with training the Firth Army and planning for the next major operation against the Axis, will also have the knotty problem of equipping the French troops in North A:frica so they can defend their own soil and relieve American and British troops for other operations. The shipping agreement with the French is signed today. It is a "provisional agreement" that 11does not prejudice in any way subsequent negotiations • •• " One of the immediate beneficial effects is that French ships now cluttering up key unloading ports - principally Algiers-will be cleared otit. The other French agreement, concerning the future status or French North Africa, appears that it wil l concede to the Allies all facilities and naval and military cooperatiqn. · * * SECRET * �[55" ALGIERS,DEeEMBER 1942-The situation at the front has become more stabil4, ized today. Except for the air, there is only scattered activity as both sides start to reorganize. The badly-mauled 11th (Britisl) Infantry Brigade withdraws slightly in the center of the line, near Chouigui, to take defensive advantage of high ground. The bombing of Bizerte and Tunis is going on night and day with direct hits on the dockyards and workshops reported. Visual air reconnaissance shows no shipping present in the harbors of Sousse and Sfax. Thirteen enemy aircraft have been destroyed and eight of ours are missing. The airdrome at Tun:i,s was also bombed. General Anderson asks for more units or detachments from the 54th Division to be sent up to protect his lines of communication but he is informed that "the number of combat troops in the Algiers area have been reduced to a point where further reduction would jeopardize security of the area. General Giraud is requested to make available to Anderson ttat the earliest possible date" French troops equivalent to one regimental combat team or British brigade group to assist in protection of lines of com raunication. General Ryder, eager for action, is ready to move some more of his troops toward the front when the decision regarding retention of the 54th division is reached. The situation should improve by the day after tomorrow when another large convoy, including combat troops, is scheduled to arrive in Algiers. As a precautionary measure, General Fredendall is instructed "to alert one infantry battalion combat team with motors necessary for combat." It is to be ready to move by road and rail to Algiers on short notice. The situation regarding Spanish Morocco is essentially static. However, General Clark will go to Oran within the next day or two for conferences with Generals Morgan, Patton and Fredendall. He is mere~ awaiting definite wor that M organ has departed from England before he, accompanied by naval and air force officers i'rom Algiers, goes to Oran. Physical formation of the Fifth Arroy that General Clark will commandis depended on two things: clarification of the situation on the Tunisian front and procurement of a headquarters sight. Regarding the latter, Colonel Nevins reports by phone today that reconnaissance of the Oujda area, ·west of Oran, is "very favorable" with necessary office and bil l eting space, acceptible communications and a good airfield nearby. It has now been decided that General C1ark, as commander of the Fifth Army, will conduct amphibious training for the next big military move. A cable comes from Washington today indicating that certain officials want to send Mayor LaGuardia of New York to North Africa to head the civil affairs section. Gene-ral Eisenhower bats the suggestion down, but hard, in words like this: "no individual re8ardless of personal qualifications could serve at this time as head of my civil section except a man that has lived through the 'hectic experiences of the past few weeks ••• At this minute we have a real battle on our hands and our military problems all the way from Tunisia to Morocco are inextricably mixed up with our relationships with and help we receive from local military, naval and political officers. Our best chance of solving these problems is to keep together the team with which we have been operating to date ••• n In the afternoon, with business rather slack, General Clark drives out into t ~ country and goes £or a long hike 11to work off steam." He is quite perturbed about the situation regarding Tunisia saying "if things go really wrong the effect will come back through French North Africa like an electric current and we will have serious trouble all along the line." * * 8 * \ �AWIERS, DECEMBER 1942--A radiogram is received today from the War Depart5, ment in Washington proposing that General Clark return to England to be the chief American military advisor to--and cheekrein on-Prime Minister Churchill. He would hold this job in addition to commandof the Fifth United States Army. General Marshall is worried about control of: the Prime Minister. He has talked the situation over with Sir John Dill and the two officers believe that General Clark should return to London juat as soon as he can get the Fifth Army organized. General Clark would return to North Africa frcm 1 time to time to check up on the Fif'th Army buildup and training. Says General Clark concerning this sudden new move: 11 I don't want this politico-military liaison job with the Prime Minister but I pleased that I have been asked to take it. It is my desire to commandthe Fifth Arrrry and be with troops. I don't v,ant to be stuck 'in a relatively idle political spot. In a job like that I would have nothing but grief. I would have no com and. m If I went to London I couldn't really commandthe Fifth Army. The situation would be impossible • "After watching events in Tunis--and the situation up ihere is f'ar from goodI am convinced of two things. First, American generals should commandAmerican troops and they shouldn't be tossed in piecemeal under British Commandas they have been in this Tunisian campaign. Second, North Africa is NOTa theater from which we can de l iver any crushing blow to the Axis. Attacks against Sardinia and Italy would be costly unless coupled with Allied attacks from other directions. What we have to do is build up a force to cross the channel and strike straight at the Germans while the Russians are striking from the other side, while we strike north from here. We've got to do this if it takes until 1952 to do itl "I have told General Eisenhower that sooner or later we must organize an American army to attack the Axis, that if we continue to put American troops under British commanda bad U.S. public Df)&ction will occur. ._,_ · "Regarding the War Department proposal concerning me, General Eisenhower has . sent word back that General Smith (Major General W.B. Smith, Chief of Staf'f of Allied Headquarters) should be sent back t o England to talk with Mr. Churchill as often as necessary. General Hartle would be left in England as Deputy Commander of the European Theater of Operations." am \ This is the cable that General Eisenhov,er sends General Marshall: "I realize importance of keeping Agent (Churchill) informed on tangled and constantly changing political and military situation. I cannot concur at th i s time in solution requiring fr equent presence of Agree (Clark) in Floor (London). Organization of Fifth Maxim (Army) is most important from two standpoints of which only one is safety of communications. The other is early development of a thoroughly trained striking force under American commandwhich may be needed at any time. Agree most suitable for this task because of organizational, training and planning qualif'ications, and knowledge of a broad situation. Concerte problems at a head quarters 500 miles -to westward will gradually lessen his intimate knowledge of intricate questions at this headquarters and make it increasingly dif'ficult for hi m to serve successfully at Floor in capacity indicated. In addition until we have won present phase of campaign I may need ~ree for special emergency mis sions at any time. 11 better A solution from m standpoint woul.d be to have Chirp (Smith) spend one y week out of each three in Floor or i£ necessary every alternate week, which can be arranged vd thout serious dislocation of work here. Consequently I shall inform Chirp from here that before leaving Floor he may reassure Agent by stating that he will constantly be prepared to return there on short notice and in any event will return once each three weeks if' desired. To supplement this system I am directing 6hirp \ �/5'7 to bring dow here for indoctrination n Brigadier General E.S . I!ugBs••• By bringing Hughes dov,n here about once am .nth thereafter we would have permanent link in Flo or while intermittent visits by Cbrip back to Floor should compl etely satisfy situation ••• 11 Geners.l Clar k is going to fly westward to m or1~o . He must rendezv ous at Oran w with British Lieutenant Gener al Morgan, coiilmander of the Northern Task Force, to make vital decisions regarding Fifth Army control and Bri tish participation in any oper ations that might affect Spanish M orocco. , P.lso, he wants to go to Oudjda to look over the headquarters suggested for his i irth Army. He plans on leavin g ear l y to m orrow. Steps have already been taken to neutra l ize any Spanish M oroccon move . The s fir st battalion of the 19th Engineers is protecting key railroad and hi ghway points in the Sebou river region, going there from the Oran area. From the Casablanca region has gone the 50th Infantry less two battalions to occupy vital airfields adjacent to Spanish M orocco. Action on the Tunisian front is confined largely to bombing raids and fighte~ sweeps. On the ground both sides are digging in and getting reor ganized. Our new push is still scheduled to start December 9. The only region where there is any concented action is around Tebourba. The enell\Yattacks with infantry supported by tanks and dive bombers. Allied forces have been regrouped on the heights dominating ~ebourba but some German and Ita l ian mechanized and infantry units have entered the -eastern outskirts of the town. General Clark is extremely worried about the situation on the fi'ont and plans on going up there next week as soon as he caµ finish his work in Oran and Oudjda. There is still criticism of the Darlan deal. The DeGaullists ar e vigorously fanning t he flames of discontent. Darlan communicates today the text of a statement he has just made before his "Imperial Council." The gist is that when ·Petain was fr ee to make decisions he appointed Darlan as his eventual substitute and succe ssor designate by a constitutiona l act of Febru..ary 9, 1941. He annuled this act on November 19~ 1942, "under pressure from the Germans who had occupied the whole of France since Nov-eber ll. 11 Darlan does not consider this annulment valid and considers equal l y m invalid any enactment since Petain's abdication. Petain having solenmly protested against the occupati on of France on November 11 wluch he considered a breach of the armistice had always under German pr essure passed all powers other than constituti~nal to the head of the government marking thus in advance that he did not wish to associate himself with decisions which might be taken b y a government deprived in practice of its fi'eedom of decision. The "Imperial Counci l," accepting these conditions, "freely decided," .Darlan reported, "to consider Darlan as the Marshal's substitute, freely chosen by him11 and agreed to place themselves under his authority. "We have all admitted," Darlan r eports, "that the Marshal 1'18.S stil .J. our chief but that, as he is moral l y a prisoner, we are exerc i sing aut hority in Africa in his name. I consider that this is the first directing princi pl e that should apply." If members of the council bad not decided to unite "under the aegis of the Marshall, Africa would today be the theater of a violent ci vil war between Petain's partisans and the Gaullists, between the Moslems and the Bews, and the army, Davy and air forces would have r efused to fight in order not to be false to their oath of allegiBlice. 11 Regarding the DeGaull ists, Darlan said "none of us approves the past acts of the Gaullists and we do not wish to have any relations with those who have fought against France and do not recognize the M arshal as their chief . On the other hand , they par t icipate in their own way in the struggle against the commonenemy. In these conditions I consider that we sh culd ignore them, not support t.hem, not attac k them. If some of the m under stand that it is ind i spensable to remake the local �1 5~ unity of the empire and join us, it is my view that we should not reject them. It will be for the French people when !'reed, and f'or them alone, to determine after the war the constitutional organization which it wishes to have and to designate the chief who is to be in command. So far as I am concerned my task will end with the libe r ation of the territory." The object of' the African f'ederation, Darlan declared, "is the representation of France beside the Allies in the present oonflict ~and the resumption &f of economic life and the preparation of f'uture union with Metropolitan France and the rest of the empire." * * * .AffiIERS-OUDJDA-ORAN, DECEMBER 1942-General Clark and his party take off from 6, Maison Blanche airport · at 0755 for Oran. He travels in a C-47 (paratroop carrier) and his party is made up of Generals Doolittle and Gruenther, Colonels Zanuck, Slocum and Barker, Major Tittle and Lieutenant Beardwood. The two-motored plane lands at Tafaraoui airdrome, outside Oran, at 0955. It bas a fighter escort of two Spitfires since it has no fighting weapor:s. At Tafaraou.i the general meets Generals Fredendall and Rooks and learns that General Morgan has not yet arrived and might not reach Oran until tomorrow. So, dropping part of the party and picking up General Cannon, Colone l Nivens, L:i.eutenant Colonel Smith and Major Viale, a French interpreter, be takes off at 0959 for Oudjda, the proposed headquarters of the Fifth Armywhich is just inside French Morocco. The C-47, named the "Miss-Ark," arrives at Oudjda at 1048 and after some delay the party goes into the tovm situated in a flat plain. While waiting for the transportation to town to arrive, General Clark talks with officers or the observation-light bombardment outfit stationed at the airdrome and with company commanders or the 50th Infantry who have moved in to hold the field against possible enemy parachutists or planes. General Clark is taken into by General Beucler, sub-division Oudjda. The French are extremely General Clark. It is composed of Oudjda is at the Mayor's office. side. Oudjda, about eight miles from the good dirt airport, French commander in the area, and the Mayor of friendly. An honor guard is at the airport to honor French Air Corps ground troops. The first stop in An honor guar d of the Foreign Legion is posted out- The proposed Fif'th Army headquarters is a girl's school and the general is extremely pleased by the layout, not only of headquarters, but of a trpop bivouac area just at the edge of town and the Hotel Terminus which would be used for the overflow of officers and staff sections. General Clark decides the layout meets his needs and indicates that the Fifth Army will have its headquarters at Oudjda. The party takes off from Oudjda at 1544 and arrives at Tafarou.i at 1426, goi ng immediately into Oran for a late luncheon. During the afternoon, General Clark confers with operations officers of the Center Task Force concerning what it can do if events necessitate a move into Spanish Morocco. It "is decided that the 1st Division could start moving overland to capture Melilla within 48 hours. The greatest fear is that the Germans, with Spanish help, might force the closing of the Straits of Gibraltar, making even longer the lines of supply of the force in Tunisia and bottling up priceless shipping within the Mediterranean. It is decided that troops from both the Western and Center Task forces cou l d start moving into Spanish Morocco even though it would be weeks be f ore General Morgan's Northern Task Force could make an amphibious landing in the northern section of Spanish Morocco. Whether to inform the French of the plan so they could be prepared to help is discussed but General Clark declares that not one word must leak to them for security reasons. Gener a l Morgan bas suggested that either the 1st Divis i on might b e moved to SEGBET \ l 1 �ET England to l).oin the Northern Task Force or that it make a water invasion in the Ceuta-Tetuan region. General Clark rejects both ideas, saying the only feasible thing, because of the lack of ship ping and landing era.ft and the necessity of keeping a fairly strong garrison at Oran, is an overland invasion if it is necessary. The general orders that work be started immediately on the stocking of vital airports within close striking distance of Spanish Morocco. Following this conference, the general orders tl~e movement of an anti-aircraft unit from the Oran area toward the Tunisian front. Then he goes into an iiulormal huddle with the nucleus of his Fifth Army ~ staff,- most of which is coming from the II Corps, stationed at Oran. He tells them that he has decided to set the headquarters up at Oudjda just as soon as possible. He plans on keeping the staff as small as possible • General Morgan, accompanied by General Candee of the U.S. Air Corps, · arrives from London just at dark. Following dinner, an informal conference is held with Generals Clark and Morgan heading the discussion concerning what should be done about Spanish Morocco. During the day a cable has been received fro m the British Chiefs of Staff stating: "Time has come to make a firm decision about Backbone (the Spanish Morocco operation). Even if we were to starting mounting it tomorrow or next day, it could not be launched until D- plus SG;. ••• If we do not start mounting it at once, it could not be mounted until next convoy cycle. In that event, it could not be launched until long a.f'ter the D plus 60 date. We therefore propose that Backbone should be definitely abandoned. Do you agree?" In viev, of Spanish developments and a possibility that the straits might be closed, General Clark does not agreel Both he and ~eneral Morgan feel the plan should continue with preparations being made for American troops from the Oran and Casablanca areas to move overland on Spanish Morocco if necessary and the British continuing to prepare for a north coast invasion. When informed that the Fifth American Army is about to be formed under General Clark's commandw ith headquarters at Oudjda, General Morgan is pleased and declares General Clark should .head the operation since he is much closer to the scene. General Clark declares he isn't so sure "that a bastard baby isn't being forced on me." It is decided to continue the discussion tomorrow morning after the arrival of respresentatives of the Western Task Force. The situation on the Tunisian front is relatively unchanged. The U.S. Armored combat outfit under General Oliver counter-attacked in the El Guessa region and regained high ground. The badly lacerated Blade force is being relieved by the Sixth British Armored division. There is air activity along the entire front ' from Bize~te to Faid with the score being about even. * * * ORAN-ALGIERS, DECEMBER 1942-A conference concerning possible future action 7, Spanish M orocco is held in the Grand Hotel, Oran, this morning. Presiding before 52 officers, including Generals Fredendall, Doolittle, Morgan and others, General Clark says the meeting has been called "to see what we can do to assist in the Backbone operation." Representatives of the Western Task Force will not arrive until later • General Morgan then briefs the situation as he sees it. against The great fear is that enemy action will close the Straits of Gibraltar. Morgan had original l y planned on landing one division in the Tetuan area and another division at Tangiers. But, because closing of the straits would prevent the Tetuan bound force from moving through, Morgan' s plan has now boiled down to landing a d~vision to as sault �SEGRE Ibo ' Tangiers. Like General Clark, he believes the Center Task Force should m'ove overland or else try a "series of end runs"up the Spanish Moroccon coast with what landing craft available. He declares his British troops could not land in Spanish Morocco until 40 days after they get the green signal. "The best news I have received," says General Morgan, "is that you are organizlllg a Fifth American Army and that General Clark is going to commandit. This means that logically the center of gravity of the Spanish Moroccon affair has shifted from the United Kingdom to the Fifth Army. Or, as Gener8,l Clark says, "the bastard baBy has passed" to him. I feel now that the British troops constitute a reserve that can be called upon but that can't deliver within 40 days. We are itching _to come. If an attempt is made to close the Straits this will be the most vital operation on the globe." General Morgan then outlines the need for air support and says that he agrees with General Clark that this air support, except naval planes that would support his northern landing, should come from the 12th Air Force through the Fifth Army. He then points out that the Spanish, to date, have reacted favorably-even more favorably than bad been hoped for-to our landings in North Africa. However, if things go wrong in Tunisia, the entire picture might change in an hour. ( General Clark then outlines his plan. "A lot of people in North .Africa and Spanish Morocco are sitting on the fence. We would have to act swiftly if things went wrong. If the Straits should be closed what could we do? The Center and Western Task forces would be prepared to act immediately since it would be foolish to time our acti cn with a landing by General Morgan. We will start developing plans for moving the 1st Division overland with the first goal the taking of Melilla. Western Task Force troops und.er General Patton YJIUld start moving up from the Southwest, driving for Tangier. W would e do the very best we could, laying on air action from the fields we ~re now stocking and reinforcing. In that way we would draw forces down and make General Morgan1 s landing that much easier. The French are itching £or a chance to go into Spanish Morocco but I ioubt the wisdom of taking them into our confidence at this time. They could best be used after the operation is underway to protect our lines of communication. Regarding air, I am setting up a Fifth Army air support command. It would draw from the 12th Air Force and I would decentraliz e it as needed to- Generals Patton and Fredendall .• I believe General Morgan should go ahead with his planning on this basis. If need be, the Fifth Army will start the operation alone and wait for you to come in as soon as you can. I am going to take a small staff of the Fifth Army back to Algiers to start drawing up directives for Generals Fredendall and Patton. We will begin our ple.rutlng immediately. General Doolittle then explains the air setup, saying over 400 aircraft will be available to General Clark's Fifth Army. The main air bases will be at Casablanca and Oran but the fighting fields will be strung along in front of the Spanish Moocqoa r borde r . The Jlifth Army air support commandwill be under Colonel Rask, General "'lark announces, and when the commanding general calls for plan es they will come immediately under oon 1a.ndof the Fifth Army. General Clark is also going to investi gate the use u! of American paratroops in Spanish Morocco if.' necessary. W hen it is learned that General Patton's represenatatives are going to be late in arriving in Oran, General Clark breaks up the meeting and goes into a smaller one with his small Fifth Army staff. Heads of the various sections are ordered to pack and proceed to Oran this aft ernoon. General Gruenther, who will be General Clark' ·s Chief of Staff, begins issuing the necessary orders and integrating things so the small group can begin preliminary meetings in Algiers tomorrow. W ord finally co:nes through that the Patton group will not arrive until afternoon s o General Clark deci des to proceed to Algiers, leaving behin d instructions for the We stern Task Force repres- ..ir . \)~ J, f �entatives to proceed to Algiers. General Clark's plane takes of:f from La Senia airport, on the outskirts of Oran, at 1302. A second plane is taking the other officers from Tafaraoui to Oran. The plane bearing Generals Clark, Doolittle, Gruenther and other officers arrives at Maison Blanche at 1454. General Morgan is proceeding from Oran into Algiers later in the afternoCiJn so the Spanish Morocco situation can be discussed with General Eisenhower. Upon arrival at Maison Blancha, General Clark goes immediately into Algiers to confer with the Commander-in-Chief. He outlines the decisions reached at Oran and is then told that things are not going well at the front. • ' The enemy attacked again at 0900 today, throvring in infantry and tanks in the vicinity of El Guessa. After considerable fighting the position was held by the American Armored outfit under General Oliver. About llOO another German column attacked from the southeast and General Oliver ordered a battalion to attack from the south. Before the battalion arrived the Germans had in ttalled 88 mmguns at the southern end of the El Guessa feature and the battalion was repiilsed with the loss of five tanks and four guns. Fighting on the El Guessa feature was fairly heavy thro-.ighout the day 1 with fairly heavy losses. Half of El Guessa was in our hands and half in the enemy_s. Anderson is extremely worried. He wants to delay his planned December 9 attack. General Clark is ordered to leave for the front early tomorrow to do some 1nore of his now getting famous trouble-shooting. Air activity was general over the front again today. Heavy fighting between the armored formations was the principal ground action of the day. Although Genera .LClark has been too occupied with other . things to keep his finger on the pulse of the political situation, one development has occured that, to keep continuity in the diary, must be recorded. An accord has been reached with Governor I General Boisson of French W est Africa and he is returning to Dakar to hol d further, l more detailed conf'erences with representatives from the United States. * · * ' AIGIER S-SETIF-AIN SEYNOUR, DECEMBER 1942-"The troubleshooter" B, starts for the Tunisian front at 0600 in a driving rain. So the trip can be made at a fast clip, General Clark is accompanied only by one jeep that carries two armed men, bed rolls and field rations. The general's only companion is his aide, Major Meacham. The general's PacY...ard rolls steadily on without stopping. Cold lunchesr,re eaten on the fq. The two-vehicle convoy is re-gassed at Setif and pushes on through Constantine and Gu.alma without stopping. By dark, a£ter 12 hours of steady driving, the general is about 12 miles sh9rt of Ain Seynour, headquarters of the First British Army. The rB,in, which has been falling in sheets all day, is now complicated by fog. It is almost impossible to see with blackout lights so General Clark gets out and strides in front of the car, the driver follo,ring the way by watching the dim lights on th~ general's leggin~. The small group arrives at General Anderson's headquarters at 1910 and the American and British generals immediately go into conf'erence. Anderson reports he has given orders to vrithdraw to a new defense line. He is extremely pessimistic about the situation. The rain has been so heavy that some tanks and trucks have "mushed in" and cannot be moved. General Clark demands that General Anderson's withdrawal orders be withdrawn temporarily until he can go closer to the front and determine the situation. The entire disposition of troops is gone over and once, during the talk, General Clerk is offered a Scotch highball. He refuses it saying: "I have too much work to do. This tactical situation is a mess and it is no time for a drink1 11 After conversing for an �hour with Anderson, General Clark calls General Eisenhower and tells him he has cancelled the withdrawal order pending further check tomorrow. The weather is restricting air activity on both sides. It is estimated that Axis forces in Tunisia now total about 52,000 compared to approximately 40,000 for the AJ.lies. A new convoy that includes several thousand British troops has arrived at AJ.giers and the men are being shuttled forward. While General Clark is in conference the enlisted men are given a hot meal and put in a room with a fireplace so they can thaw out. His conference with Anderson finished, General Clark has dinner with the British general and members of his staff. Following the dinner, the general and "Meach" put their bed rolls on cots in the room of Anderson's Chief · of Staff, Brigadier McNabb, who has gone to the front. General Clark then goes into conference with Colonels Walsh and Bentley of the U.S. Air Corps. Walsh heads the bombing commandand both he and Bentley report that there is "certain friction" at the front between American and British forces. This corrobora.~es reports that have been coming back to AJ.lied Force Headquarters. Another of the reasons that General Clark has gone to the front is to arrange a system whereby American troops · will be put under American command. The general, however, does not intend to bring this up with General Anderson until tomorrow. General Clark tuns in at 2200. I * * * AIN SEYNOUR-SOUICKHEMIS-GU EL ELMA,DECEMBER 1942-After arising at 0615 and 9, breakfa sting, Generals Clark and Anderson drive together toward the front with the jeep ~ollowing General Anderson's car. The destination is Geneial Allfrey's British 5th Corps headquarters near Souk El Khemis. Enroute the general sees the first real signs of war-trucks that have been strafed and bombed, wreckage along the way, a bridge (near Ghardimaou) that is out. The strategic airdrome of Souk El P.rba is passed and it is a sea of mud full of marooned planes. During the trip, General Clark asks General P.nderson ii he has considered having the Navy make an attack on Bizerte under the protection of land-based planes and in harmony with a land assault. The Britisher says the idea "had never occured to me. 11 A little later General Clark proposes the idea that paratrDopers from Malta operate at Sfa.x in cooperationg with Allied hoops to cut the Axis north-south supply line. Again Ander son says he had never thought of this strategy. General Clark remarks later to Meacham that "Anderson doesn't seem willing to search for new ideas or new methods." On the way up, General Clark suavely prepares the way for one of his important missions: getting American troops under American command. He is very convivial and has Anderson in a fine mood. ' At 1045, the general arrive at the old house where General Allfrey has his headquarters. A conference starts immediately between the American and two British generals. Later they are joined by General Barre, heading French forces in the sector, and still later by General Oliver who commands the American armor ed unit. The entire tactical situation is reviewed and it is decided that a slight withdrawal to stronger defensive positions is most feasible ~ The Weather is still lousy. The conference lasts until 1245 and as it nears its blose General Clark broaches the subject of putting American units under American commandinstead of havin g them in the battle willy-nilly 11It is my belief," under various British organizations. explains General Clark , "that . American troops being sent to the Tunisian area in both large and ·small units should be grouped under American coilllllB.Ilders far as possible to assure their maximumuse as along trained lines. Surprisingly, General Anderson agrees read i ly to the proposition which General Clerk has thought all alon g would be "tough to put over. 11 Says General Anderson: "You tell General Eisenhower that hereaft er American units coming up will be grouped, as far as the tactical situation will permit, under American comnanders. 11 , Regarding the question of the slight withdra~l of troops to stron~er defensive �(~ 3 positions, such action is urged by the commanders in the field. Anderson has tentativezy set a renewed offensive for two '\11eeks henc e, around Christmas. Following the lengthy conference, all the generals lunch together on field rations. Once again a bottle of whiskey is brought out and once again General Clark declines. He declares he can't see the theory of drinking "with such tremendous stakes and such serious propositions before us." Generals C;Lark and Anderson drive back to the ~·irst Army headquarters at Ain _ Seymour following lunch a.ild arrive there at . '.Il.615. The American general quickly transfers to his Oltll car and departs, in rain, slush and fog, .for Guelma. Just at dark he arrives alt the home o£ M. Baran.gar whose home he stayed at the last time he was in Guelma. A cocktail party for Allied sympathizers is on when the general arrives. One of the guests, Uadame Tomasini, wife of a wounded French officer, insists that she must talk privately with him concerning pro-Axis elements. She even suggests that he might sleep in her ro01nt The general bails out quickly, agreeing to confer with her in a less compromising room. She keeps the general up late, telling him there is "declining confidence among French of£icers in general in the ability o£ the Allied Forces to defeat the Axis in Tunisia;" generally French officers are not for us, but the enlisted men are although the later 11are somewhat discouraged by non-receipt of America."1equipment. 11 She declares that Generals Juin, Barre and Mendigal "cannot be relied upon." She gives the general a list of "dangerous characters" but he remarks later that her report . l'llight be based on personal bias. During thi R conference the re is great hub-bub outside the Baranger house. It is reported that lights are being flashed to signal German bombers. Cars in front of the house are dispersed and the guard is instructed to be especiall-.1 on the alert throughout the night. * * * GUEIMA-ALGIERS, DECEMBER 1942-Following breakfast with the Barangers, General 10, Clark heads baclc for Algiers. It is still rainy and disagreeable. One thing along the way disconcerts General Clark. He notes that "as I travel through the towns and villages there is less enthusiasm on the part of the populace for Allied troops than I witnessed on previous trips . The general and his little party lurohes beside the road, cooking augmented Army C. !"ations over a small, self-built fire. The general makes the soup. An Arab, dirty and ragged and hungry looking, comes by on his ass and watches the meal preparation. The general gives the Arab a can of corned beef, smiling and remarking: "For God's sake remember that you have to take the can off bet'ore you eat the stu.ff'l" The Arab bows and grins. The drive home, through rain, is tiring and monotonous. At one point, the general, who prefers air travel to all else, remarks "what a waste of time riding in a car is." Som he can no longer stand the pace. He takes the wheel himself and drives the final 175 miles into Algiers at breakneck . speed • .~riving at 1.845, he reports immediate ly to General Eisenh~er concerning his mission. The plan to put American troops under American canmanders has been arranged "peaoet'ully without hurting the prima. donna•s (Anderson's) feeling," General Clark says. This will solve many probl.ems of eonummications and supply and we can back our troops directly with American air. I've put it over, now we've got to fight it through!" While General Clark has been away the nucleus of the Fifth Army has set itself up in _the Hotel Alexandria, 150 yards away from Allied Force Headquarters in the Hotel St. George. More personnel has arrived and directives to Generals Patton and Fredendall are being prepared and preliminary organization started. Another development is the preparation of plans calling for an assault on Sardinia. In a report to the Combined \ ' �~fGR J Chi efs of Staff in Washington, General Eisenhower reports that the earliest possible attack date, with everything going right, would be March 50, 1945. 'l'he assault force, as set up tentatively, would include the Northern Task Force now being assembled in the United Kingdom by General Morgan. For security reason, the entire assau l t force would start from the U.K. but air cover would come from North Africa. * * * AffiIERS, DECEil(BER 1942--General Clark plu.11ges immediately today into the plan 11, of putting American troops in Tunisia under American conmiand. He calls a conf erence of high-rankL-rig ofricers, including Generals Gruenther, Lemnitzer, Rooks, Gale, Spaatz, Doolittle Craig and Brigadier Whiteley. The units are to be put under American command/ as soon as possible so they can contribute as all-American units to the renewed Tunisian drive when it comes. Plans are made for greater coordination of the air effort and for strengthening, with men and supplies, the American units already at the front, particularly General Oliver's armored combat commandthat suffered both tank and personnel losses in repulsing the Germans. In the afternoon, General Clark has a lengthy conference with Brigadi er General W.B. Smith who will succeed him as Deputy Comiuander-in-Chief under General Eisenhower when General Clark moves to Oudjda to assume command of the Fifth Unite d States Army. General Smith, who was in London during early phases of the North African campaign, has just arrived in Algiers from the United States where he went for a quick consultation. General Clark brings General Smith up to date on all the diverse problems confronting him. Another caller is General Mast who, a.t last, is wearing his French general's uniform., after being incognito because of his work with General Clark prior to the landing. Mast, who has been acting as a liaison officer with Allied Force Headquarters, is scheduled to take another command. General Clark's faithful II Corps Chief of Staf~, General Rooks, has been transferred to the AFHQ G-5 section to take it over when Gener al Lemnitzer leaves to take an anti-aircraft command. group Clark looks going Gener al Gruenther is now getting the Fifth Army staff integrated. The advance will drive to Oudjda tomorrow to begin setting up headquarters. However, General and his staff will not go dovm until the Tunisian situation clarifies. So it as though activation of the Fifth ArriJY will not start for two weeks. Cables are to Washington concerning the dispatch of headquarters personnel and equipment. With one exception, the front in Tunisia is quiet. Axis troops attacked Medjez El Bab with 40 tanks and an infantry battalion. The enemy was repelled with a loss of 18 tanks. All military and naval positions in Bizerte and Ferryville were occupied by A:ii'3 without French resistance leading to the belief that the Axis does not trust the French troops that have been manning them. There have been some moves to the south and Allied forc ~s take steps to counteract any Axis effort to make a flank assault from the South. A decision has been reached regarding Backbone (the Spanish Morocco plan) and General Clark, as head of the Fifth U.S. Army, will have the command. General Morgan's force is to keep plans for the operation up to date and prepare to execute them upon the call of General Clark. The Center and Western Task Forces will be prepared to advance overland into Spanish Morocco with "such resources as are available at the time." Regarding General Clark the directive says: "The 6olll!llaildingGeneral, Fifth U.S • .Army, will com."!la.Ild forces alloted to the all operation and will be responsible for the preparation of plans. He will issue planning directives to Center, Western and Northern Task Forces and to the 12th Air Support Co rnand. (Admiral Cunningham), under the Allied Commander-in-Chief, will direct the operations of the Naval Forces. He will designate a Naval ComtM.nder for the Northern ) \ �Naval Task. Force to act with the CommandingGeneral, Northern Task Force, and will also designate a naval representative to H.Q. Fifth U.S. Army·to take part in the preparation of the general plan." A ra.1i1egram, from General Anderson to British General Gale (who has just arrived frO!ll Lqndon), is received today and is wortcy of inclusion: "All other protests having failed, 11 says Anderson, "I appeal to you to stop the flagrant misuse of in finitely precious railway flats to carry quant iti es of semi-broken down French motor cars. My administrative situation is precarious in the extreme and a continuance of this criminal misuse of scanty rolling stock is equivalent of enemy sabotage. Juin agrees with me but I am told this traffic results from some agreement made by AFHQ. I cannot protest too emphatically at the continuance of this scandal which may well have disastrous results •• •" Notes fleneral Clark on the radio: 11A sign of weakness, writing for the record1" · * * * ALGI RS, DEC E EMBER 12, 1942-A fantastic war sidelight occurs in Algiers harbor today. Axis swimmers, apparently brought close in by a submarine, paddle into the harbor during the night and attach 11limpets 11 to several cargo and nava l vessels. These limpe t s are time bombs that e.re "leached" to the vessels. None of them explodes before the discovery is me.de. Nine of the human tor pedoes are captured! Two small vessels are run aground on the beach when inuninent explosion is feared. General Clark pops up with a hot Fifth Armyidea today and the following cable \ is dispatched to Washington. "Consider that it would have an extremely whol.esome morale effect if token South American army units, both ground and air, could be sent into the French M oroccan area for assignment to the F:i.1thunited States Army. Their presence in that area, it i.s believed, would.have a. fine ei'fect on our relations with the Spanish. If' the State Department concurs in this suggestion we feel that perha ps a battalion of Brazilian infantry and perhaps ten or twelve Braz'Ilian flyers, to be incorporated into our air units in that area, wo uld be a cheap way of producing th e results we seek. Some senior American officer, perhaps as high as Bri gadier General, might well be incorporated as a. li aison officer at the headquarters of theFifth Army. Should i, be deemed advisable to have other token South American units, e. composite force up to an infantry regiment could easily be accomodated. Formation of such a Iatin American Legion would be a great stimlllus to Iatin .Americans; giying them a direct contri.bution to the United Nation's war effort. We could handle the Legion's shipment s,nd supply. Your (General Marshall's) views on this would be a ppreciated. 11 Another council£ war is held today as General Anderson comes bac-k from the front to report and seek advice. The m eeting is atten ded by Generals Eisenho~er, Clark, Spaatz, ' Smith, Air Marshals Tedda.rand W elsh and other key officers. It is decided to launch the renewed drive in Tunisia on December 20. The conference covers supply problems, replacement of lost supplies, relief of certain front line units, strength of enemy tank units and kindred matters. Anderson states that it will take about a week to refit the First '1rmy. The British Com:nander says that his worst problem is organization of railways and transportat ion. General Eisenhower tells Anderson that it is his "primary function" to work out the logisitical problems, leaving direction of the actual fighting to General Allfrey. Anderson and British General Gale are instructed to work out the supply problem. Anderson declares he has "a 5G-50 chance of success if I can get up seven to 10 days of supplies." It is also decided to further integrate air and ground action. U.S. Air Forces at the front will be put under Air Commodore .. . . Lawson of the R.A.F. who commands the Eastern Task Force Air Force. . I \ �"It would be inexcusable," says General Eisenho wer, "for those concerned not to be able to get together and work out a sound plan within a week. I favor doing anything, anywhere with anybody to get the job done. Better communications must be provided to those running the tactical battle. If everyone does his part and the weather is good, we will win the battle. We must hold and we must take our objective. As all of us go af'ter this job for the next week, let us put our best brains and our hearts to it. Let us test and retest our methods and equipment to insure success. We must not lose the battle by misunderstanding." General Clark makes several suggestions. He wants to make a two-way attack on ' Sfax as a ~iverting move and to out north-south Axis communications. He proposes to drop approximately 800 British and American paratroops at the southern coastal point and time this with a light la.."lding of troops from Malta. He says, also, that more I guards must be put on the vital su pply railroad into the combat area. The Deputy \ Commander is to take this up with Generals Giraud and Ma.st since he believes this type of duty can be undertaken by French troo ps. It is decided to move up the entire remainder of' the 18th re gimental combat team, part of the 1st Division now in the Oran area, so it can join in the December 20 attack. A£ter the conference, General Clark returns to his office and strides up and down the small room, punctuating his walk occasionally by stop ping in front of his situation map and studying it intently. "It seems," he says, "that we are doing all we can but surely there is some way we can make our attack even more powerful." Then he starts pacing again. The general is quite disturbed about the Tunisian situation. General Clark wants to move up all the available armored outfits in the North African I area and crack the Axis with one all-out effort to drive them from Tunisia. 1 The Darlan situation, as far as Washington and London are concerned, is still a stop-gap thing for which they are making apologies. A frank talk has been had with Darlan and the French High Commissioner declar es he has "no intention of trying to extend his political inf l uence." He again promises "complete cooperation in the military effort and in any other way the United States might deem ap propriate." He adds that "only a free French people can select their future leaders." After rainy, stormy . weather for five days, it is clear today. At the front, things are quiet with the exception of bomber activity. Our Flying Fortresses and Bisleys go af'ter Tunis and Bizerte on an accelerated scale, scoring hits on docks at both places. There is little fighter activity because of the muddy conditions of the advanced and crude fields. Four ships are sunk by naval vessels in the passage between Sardinia and Tunis. Taking advantage of the sunlight, General Clark moves his of'fice out on the . roofless porch during mid-day. * * * ALGIERS,DECEMBER 1942--General Clark concentrates 15, on t wo things today: getting more armored units to the front and moving up French troops to protect lines of ' communication. It is decided to alert the re~inder of the 1st Armored Division that is at Oran and make it rea dy for movement to the front, probably starting Tuesday. To bring lower commanders up to date on the situation in general, the Deputy Commander calls in Generals Ryder, Caffey, 0 1 Daniel and Porter and with them pores over the Tunisian front map. The general came to work prepared to take an hour off during the morning to go to church but there is too much business to be expedited immediately and he has to bypass worship. The general contin ues to work on the possible use of paratroops at Sfax and starts Generals Lemnitzer and Gruenther working on the plan that he has been formulating. �• --- l General Mast is called in concerning French protection of the lines of communication and General Clark achieves the following: Two companies of regular French inf'antry is to be moved from Algiers to the Constantine area immediately; one battalion If Territorial Infantry will be moved from Oran to the C0nstantine area as soon as transportation :is available; 5,600 Donairs (individual guards) will be enlisted in the Oran and Algiers areas for line of communications duty. The entire line of communications is going to be inspected by a senior French of.ficer to improve defense at critical points. This action of General Clark's will result in releasing ' a certain ' number of Allied troops for front line duty and will bring more manpower along the road and rail routes between Algiers and the front. · There is light and brief ground contacts along the front at diverse points today but nothing o£ a large scale develops. Flying Fortresses make a heavy bombing attack on Bizerte. A report is made today to General Marshall on the status o£ the Fifth Army. A headquarters and headquarters company is being formed. Further key officers are being sent for. "Clark," says the radio, ''has assembled nucleus of Fi.fth Army staff at Algiers planning Backbone operation and coordinating activities of the Western and Center Task Forces. It is planned that Headquarters Fifth Army be established at Oudjda in eastern Morocco where facilities are being prepared. Orders constituting the Army will be issued tomorrow, but formal activation will not take place until Tunisian situation clarifies somewhat. Until Army is activated Clark will remain as Allied Force Deputy Commander-in-Chief. ''J Fearing that . the DeGaullist are forcing the Darlan issue, a radiogram is sent to the Combined Chief s of Staff in Washington explaining "the Degaulle following here is .small and among Army and Navy officers there is a definite anti-DeGaulle sentiment which should not be underestimated. Obviously, we have not been able to discuss publicly the reasons for developments, our desire to consolidate our military situation, and our erforts to obtain immediate cooperation of French W est Africa." It is also pointed out that pro-Axis organizations are being disintegrated and that suspicious groups and persons are under close surveillance ••• Control of the FrancoSpanish frontier is .being undertaken. At present it is not satisfactory, but we expect a steady improvement in the situation there. Due to the nature of the terrain and :ts length there is travel across this frontier ••• We frankly admit that the political situation here is most confused and very dif:f'icult. You will continue to get disturbing reports of various kinds. Our whole effort is to keep the situation under su££icient control to enable us to fight a battle ••• To push the mil itary operation, every means available to the authorities have be en placed at our disposal." / Arrangements are completed today to supply French forces 11in close cooperation Bl;ldactively engaged in operations against the common ·enemy suc h weapons, equipment, . supplies and materiel as may be available from reserves ••• provi ded transfer will assist operations in progress or imminent." t Gener~l Clark, feeling _ confined by spending so much-time in his office, breaks away in the middle of Sunday afternoon to hike in the hills behind El Biar ,. P.s he strides over the fields, muddy from recent rains, he stears away from military talk and chats about his family, fishing and similar topics. He confides that he is considering retiring as soon as the war ends. General Patton, who has been at the front for the past four days, returns to headquart ers at dusk and a long conference between Generals Clark and Eisenhower and the armored general starts. Patt on wants to have an American sector at the front with · an all American effort divorced from the British. He wil l make a complete re port tomorrow. At 8:45, General Clark, , alree,dy an hour and 45 minutes, late, join s the crew of tke P-219 and officers on the famed submarine trip for dinner and an evening of reminiscing J _______ * * * t �ALGIERS, DECEMBER 1942-"lfith War Department authority, 14, the United States Fifth Army is hereby constituted and allocated to the command of the Commander-inChief, Allied Force, North Africa, and will be activated at the proper time by the CommandingGeneral, Fifth Army. "Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, AUS, is designated Commander, United States Fifth Army. Upon activation of the Fifth Army he will, with the concurrence of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, North Africa, be relieved as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force." Thus rea ds the order that is issued today. However, General Clark's move to Oudjda and actual activation of his army looks farther away than ever this morning. The move cannot be made until the s_ ituation in Tunisia is beginning to clear up and it is getting more disturbed day by day. General Clark is spending almost all his time now on the tactical situation. Says he, following another long conference with General Pat ton: "This situation is a mess. General Oliver's armored outfit is almost useless. In withdrawing they passed the only available bridge across the Medjerda River ill their area because the bridge was under light artillery fire. They continu ed up- ' river on the south side near Mendjez Ell.Bab and soon their vehicles bogged dovm. The stuff piled up like it was stampeded. There was no high command. The outfit lost 600 out of its 800 half-tracks, all but five of its 58 self-propel.led 75 1 s and all but about 20 of its 110 tanks. We are in bad shape and I don't know just ' what we can do. These vehicles are badly mired in. I don't see how we can attack on December 20. W may have to retreat to high ground and wait two or three months. I'd like to e draw all American troops from under General Anderson and place them in an All -American sector. Oliver's outfit should never have been placed so close to the front. A lot of serious mistakes have been made on the Tunisian front." If possible, the attack is still going on as scheduled December 20. More stuff is being moved up from the Oran area to the front. The plan is to have the 56th British Brigade hold the north flank in front of Mateur. The terrain there can be easily dominated and it is wild and will be difficult for the Axis to infiltrate. The 78th British Division will drive forward from the M edjez El Bab area toward Tebourba and Djedeida. The rest of General Oliver's outfit will start m oving up from the Oran area tomorrow. 1t comprises about 5,000 men and 70 fresh tanks. It is hoped that the mired down veh i cles can be pulled out and fixed up for renewed battle. The 6th Armored will push forward to the south of the 78th Division. The attack will be thoroughly coordinated with the Air Force. Says General Clark, as he explains the plan to General Patton: "This is to be our big drive. If it fails we will have to withdraw to the high growid, hold defensive positions and build up for two or three months. The affect of such a move, not only behind the front in North Africa but in spots throughout the world, is obvious. Then we would have to try a new ~lan: two sectors, the British in the north and the American in the south with the Americans carrying the offensive when we are ready to attack again." General Patton gives General Clark a comprehensive report on tactics. He says "the Germans are not h olding a line anywhere. They secure initiative by powerful attack, properly timed, thus c ompelling the Allies to conform and thereby depriving the Allies of the initiative ••• The Boche move with tanks in a large 1V1 formation with infantry and artillery insi de the wings of the 1 V'. Having moved the infantry and artillery into an effective position, the tanks swing off to a flank and either move back to cover the infantry and artillery or else move to the flank and attaclc in conjunction with the infantry and artillery ••• The German infantry will not stand close ) �------~-- .. -----------------------------~--- SfGR T " • :l attack, at least the infant.ry in the Tunis sector ••• The Germans use close air support which comes down in eaact cooperation with their infantry and tank attack. 11 Regarding British tactics, Patton say.s: f'They seem to favor holding low ground, leaving high ground to the enemy. Frequently their positions are in front rather than behind rivers ••• They conceive of the tank as a defensive weapon and employ it in the front line as an anti-tank gun. They still believe that one should fight tanks with tanks. They have, so far as I can see, no intelligence from the air ••• They do not support the tanks with armored infantry ••• 11 General Patton also reports that Germans have short wave sets on the same wavelengths as ours and listen to our orders; that two mobile anti-aircraft vehicles should be with every tank company; that there should be at least two battalions of mobile AAvehicles with every division. Patton declares that our line of communications to the front "is not being used to more than 10 percent of its capacity." He says that British supply movements halt at night; suggests that winding poritions of the road be blocked off and a system of one way traffic be instituted; recommends that foot and oattie ~ traffic be curbed; asks that an American contractor be br~ught over to supervise maintenance of the roads. Alinost all of the general 1 s cont'erences, except for a brief one in the afternoon with ue Fifth Army Staff, concern the situation at the front and hmv it can be improved. Cables are going out to the Center Task Fcrce, ordering up various units, getting replacements and materiel. The General cont'ers with Generals Rooks, Gruenther and Lemnitzer to coordinate the move-up. This radio goes out to General Anderson who has returned to his headquarters at the front: 111 feel sw::e from our conversations that you understand that I do not wish to interfere in any way in any tactical dispositions you deem necessary ••• At a time when tis very important to conserve our resources for offensive operations, while the position is important to future offensive operations, we can not afford to have troops exposed and cut off in indefensible situations." In the evening General Clark is host at his villa to Captain Fawkes of the Maidstone and Lieutenant Jewell of the P-219, two British naval officers who made his trip to North A.frica in the sub~rine possible. * * ALGIERS,DECEMBER 1942-The date for the renewed Al.lied drive in Tunisia 15, is re-set today for December 24. General Clark is spending all his .time on the problem of strengthening the ofi'ensive thnu.st and today he completes arrangements for use o£ the 601st Tank Destroyer battalion, a potent outfit that is in the Oran area. Tanks have been playing an all-important role on the Tunisian front and this tank destroyer unit will be of inestimable value. Allied commanders report that the most effective weapon possessed by the .Axis in Tunisia is their 88mmanti-tank gun that is used both against tanks and personnel. The 601st will be attached to General Oliver's force. In addition to the tank destroyer battalion, the follovTing units are also attached to General Oliver to strengthen him and give him~ sizable American command: the 18th Regimental Combat Team, the first battalion of the 56th Field Artillery (155mmguns), Compan C of the 15th Armored Regiment (light tanks), 12 "Sher manu y tanks, four 105mmhowitzers from the cannon companies of the 16th and 26th infantry regiments and .200 infantry r eplacements. The 18th RCTbivouacs in the El P.rba re gion, just south of Algiers, overnight and then moves on. · �170 SEGR T /, . General Anderson radios back from his British First . Army headquarters at the fr ont that he will have sufficient ammunition for "seven days of hard fightine, but it will be hand to mouth thereafter." The petrol and rations supply has built up to nine days. 11All this depends on the uninterrupted flow of material by al l routes," Anderson cables, adding he is pointing for December 22 as the target date. Ey necessity there will be limited fighting during the period up to the target date. The attacking force will consist of the British 78th and 6th Ar1qored Divisions and two United States combat teams, with proper corps and army staffs. It will be possible to replace casualties but impossible to relieve or withdraw formations until further formations arrive from the United Kingdom or the United States. From all indications the Axis is digging in, pr eparing a defensive triangle the corners o£ which are Tunis-St. Cyprien-Djedeida . Outposts are at Tebourba-MassicaultChouigui. Enemy patrols are met at several points in the center and south sectors during the day but there is little ground activity. We are concentrating on bombing Bizerte, Tunis and La Goullette. Supr,lies and troops are moving up to the front in preparation for the assault that will either mean driving the .Axis out~ Tunisia or else waitin g two to three months while our side, and the enemy's, brings in reinforcements. It is raining again, almost torrentially. But the moves to the front continue. At least the v,eather is cutting down enemy reconnaissance flights. The 18th RCT moves out of El Arba during the day depriving General Clark of a hoped-for opportunity to go out and visit it. Admiral Darlan has his first press conference today and issues a statement, sent over by Pr esident Roosevelt, in which the High Comissioner of French Africa m declares 11I seek no assistance or support for any personal ambitions." Perhaps this action by Darlan will bring a decrease in the amount of sniping that is being done from Washington and London and by the piqued followers of DeGaulle. "Once France and the French Empire is free from the Axis yoke," says Darlan, "the Frenclm people themselves wil l decide freely the form of government and national policy they desire." * * * AI.GIER, DECEMB 16, 1942--Every effort is being b ent to get more fighting men S ER and fighting equipment to the front. A final conference concerning use of American units is held this morning before Major General Oliver leaves for the front to rejoin his growing command. Oliver spends almost an hour with General Clark going over the disposition and proposed strategy. General Anderson is now bucking the plan to have .American troops commaxied by American officers at the front. This despite the agreement he manif es ted to General Clark when the Deputy Commandervisited the front last week. General Clark is irked, saying "apparently Anderson's promises mean nothing." General Eisenhoner is holding tight and Oliver goes back to his troops in the field with the understandin g that he will command them and determin e , as ,f ar as feasible, their dtsposition and use. Another situation has arisen that is di sconcerting . General Giraud has order ed an entire French M occoan division into the Tunisia front ar ea. This will complicate or an already difficult supply problem and, as General Clark points out, "it is possi ble that these tr oops might be needed alone the Spanish M oroccon border." It is impossible to -censure Giraud slnce his motive, however short sighted, is to increase the number of troops in the forward ar ea. General Smith is dispatched to discuss th e situation wit h the Fr ench commander and to try and persuade him that the division is not needed. \ �\ '7i ,,. g % An answer has been received to General Clark's idea that a Latin American Legion e formed as a "token" unit in the North African theater. General M.arshall cables hat the idea possesses "considerable merit as a contribution to Inter-American relations" but "for the time being" presen:ts "too many practical disadvantages." It is suggested that a small group of Latin American subordinate commanders and staf"f officers be sent to Fif'th by headquarters "in the near future for orientation and preparation of plans ••• After suitable period these commanders could return to United States and make final preparations £or movement of their units overseas." Declaring "there is nothing I can do now but sit and worry while the uni ts move up tp the front," General Clark makes preparations to depart tomorrow by airplane £or Oran and Oudjda. He wants to make a more thorough reconnaissance of the area where his Fif'th Army will be located and to visit in person the proposed amphibious training area near Nemours, west of Oran. He will ~lso coni'er with General Fredendall concerning Backbone plans providing the move into Spanish M orocco is necessary. The s~til.ation in both Spain and Spanish Morocco appears quiet although labor battalions in Spanish _ Morocco are being called to military service and another class has been called up in Spain. "Next week," says General Clark, "I'll be terrifically busy with the immin,mt off ensive and the tremendous problems that are bound to arise. I plan on going to the . front. This is my only opportunity to work on Fifth Army matters." He is going to take several members of the Army staf"f with him s ince the trip is also going to be a personnel hunting mission • . Once again the front is quet Bave for light patrol activities on both sides. Flying Fortresses again bomb the already hard hit harbors of Tunis and Bizerte while B-26s attack the Tunis _irdrome. Both types of missions are reported successful. a General Anderson radios back that he and Air M arshal Welsh will bisit forward units tomorrow "to agree on a general plan for the employment of strategic bomber effort to assist the land battle." General Anderson promis es to have his plan of battle and suggestions for air sup port ready in three day~. * * * ALGIERS-OUJDA, DECEMBER 1942-General Clark talces off for his proposed 17, Fifth Army headquarters at 0855 in a Flying Fortress. He is accompanied by Colonels , , Howard and Lewis and Major Meacham. Arriving at Tafaraoui airdrome (Oran) at 1042, General Clark confers with Lieutenant Colonel Hewitt of the II Corps and decides, after learning that the Oujda airport is dry enough to land on, to continue to the inland town where Fifth Army headquarters are being set up. Except for the runways Tafaraoui is a sea of gooey mud, so muddy that a jeep has to back up -to the Flying Fortress' door so General Clark can get directly out of the plane into the vehicle. The general's plane then takes off at ·lll5 for Oudja and, after having difficulty in locating the field, lands at 1215. The party is taken to the Hotel Terminus, • assigned to rooms and then taken to lunch. Lieutenant Colonel Smith and Major Porter have already begun to s et up the headquarters. Following lunch, General Clark inspects the area where Fifth Army headquarters enlisted men will be bivouaced. He plans on sending Colonel Bowman, Army F.ngineer, to Oujda as soon as possible to take care of construction. Approximately 10 Nissen huts will be erected and plans will be started for the erection of barracks buildings. The general then gows to the girl's school that is going to be his headquarters. He tentatively outlines where his various sections will be placed. Returning to the Hotel Terminus, General Clark confers with General Patton who �y: l D has . flown to Oujda from Casablanca. General Clark declares that General Nogues, governor general of French Morocco, is supporting the Allied on the surface but that he appears to be working against us beneath the surface. He says Radio -M a.roe is broadcast:i.ng news "detrimental to our cause." General Patt on denies it and asks for specific examples. General Clark promises to furnish them through ~i lton Eisenhower, General Ike's brother who is with the Office of War Infor inaticn. General Clark intimates that the Western Task Force is not being firm enough in dealing with political control measures. The two generals then discuss attack operations in the Casablanca area and certain officers are recommended for decoration. Returning to the subject of Nogues, General Clark tells General Patton: "If anyone is caught double-crossing us, we want the details so General Eisenhower and I can act, taking the matter up with Darlan to get the guilty party relieved." This conference, which lasts until 1645 when General Patton departs for Casablanca, is attended also by Colonel Howard and Lieutenant Colonel Black of General Patton I s staff. General Clark then calls General Eisenhower and tells him he will be returning Algiers tomorrow. The Fifth Army commander then walks from the hotel to the school headquarters for further discussions with Colonel Smith concerning al l ocation of office space. to High officials of the Oujda region are invited to dinner with General Clark tonight. The most colorful character present is the Pasha of Oujda, a colorfully garbed patriarch complete with turban, long cloak and sandals. The hem of his garment is kissed by the Moslem devout as he walks along. The dinner is also ·attended by General Beucler, commanding French general of the Oujda area; M. Caillat, Chef de la Region; M. Laurans, mayor of Ou{jda; M. Guillemin, comptroller for the Pasha; Colonel Joppe, commanding the Fjft,h French regiment, and Colonel Harkel, Chief of staff to General Beucler. The Pasha is a friendly gent. During his conversation with General Clark he tells the American general of his personalmortage of tea and the general promises to send him some. All American officers in the region attend the dinner, including Lieut. Col. Sladen, comma.'11.ding 1st battalion the of the 50th Infantry, which is protecting Oujda airport, and Colonel Monohan of th e Air Corps. ~ The situation at the front is relatively unchanged as the Allies bring up men and supplies for the impending battle. In the tight northern Tunisian corner held by the Axis, extensive bombing attacks are carried out • .An American patrol in Southern Tunisia surprises and captures more than 20 Italian patrolers. Admiral Fenard has returned from a conference at Alexandria with Admiral Godfr oy, commanding units of the French fleet in haven there, and he reports that Godfroy is willing to go along with the Allies providing there is no plan to toss Admiral Darlan out assoon as circumstances will permit. General Giraud is demanding a single command on the Tunisian front and believes that he, being senior and experienced, should have the command. He says the French have 40,000 men in the region. General Eisenhower says he cannot agree to the proposal. However, some arrangement will have to be made to increase Giraudis stature. * @) * * �1 ~3 E C ,. E~li..11., tis h Bri , ., r", .- ,·..- ,.. T .,,.- OUJDA-ALGIERS, DECEMBER 1942--Followin g breakfast and an ins pection tour 18, of the third battalion of the 30th Infantry, which is dispersed ar9und the Oujda airport to prevent Axis paratroop or plane landings, Lieutenant General Clark and his party take off in their Flying Fortress for Algiers. The general, having commanded a company of the 30th Infantry earlier in his military career, has a soft spot for the Third Division infantry regiment. The Fortress takes off at 0955. The flight back to Allied Force Headquarters at Algiers is more eventful than usual. The weather is rainy and bumpy. After flying at altitudes as high as 10, 250 feet, the pl ane is taken out over the Mediterranean where it dro ps as low as 150 feet. Landing at Maison Blanche, the general goes directly to headquarters for a conference with General Eisenhower, arrivin g at the St. George just after noon. It has been decided that General Anderson wil l have full command over all troops now poised on the Tunisian front for the remwed ass ault aimed at driving the Axis out of North Africa. General Eisenhower has ruled that it is up to Anderson to run the entire thing and that he will decide when and where what troops wil l be used. General Clark regrets the move, feeling that all the American troo ps should be under American commandto L~sure their proper and full employment. The Deputy Commander-in-Chief feels a firm stand shoul d have been taken against Anderson in the matter of command. The various outfits that are moving to the front for attachment to General Oliver's all-American "Combat Command 11 wil l now be B directly under Anderson. General Clark is eager to institute "an American ar my with .American sup pl y and American control." M ovement of troops and supplies to the front is proceeding on schedule. However, the thin g is bein g com plicated by General Giradd 1 s decision to bring up th e First M oroccon Division. Units of this command, piled inside and outside alcohol burnin g busses, move noisly through Algiers today. Principal activity at the front centers around the air force but an outpost line has been establish ed and ther e are increasingly aggressive patrols. The air force bombed and smashed the railroad connecting northern and southern ~isia but General Clark is doubtful of the effect. "It means that Axis materiel and men can't go to the south," he muses. · "That means a buil dup of strength in the northern sector where we are going to attack." Enemy shi ppin g at Bizert e and Tunis is hit hard durin g the day and naval units sink t wo enemy trans ports s outhbound to Tunisia. General Clark's rapi d-fire confer ences cover the se subjects: orderin g Colonel Bowwm, Corps of Engin eers , to go to Oujda to start construction of Fifth Army facilities; a report from General 0 1Daniel who is ju st back from the front; a decision to equip the French with eight 75s and four 57mmself-propelled guns . that will come from an American Tanlc Destroyer battalion; mo vement of th e 70th Tank batta l ion to Tebessa to protect the ri ght fl ank being held by Colonel Raff; troubl e caused by the fi l in g of a dispatch by a Life corre spondent detailin g how we organized th e North African Fifth column; discussion of the vulnerabi l ity_ to Ax parais troop attack of the a irfield at Youks-l es- Bains and a decision by Genera,l Clark to insist that French troops under take such defense; a r eport on t he status of veh ic les at the front tha t sho~s t he weakness in half-tracks and tanks (a s hortage of 78 li ght and 50 medium tanks) and anti-tank and ar tillery weapons (a shorta ge of 59 57mm, 75mmand 105mmguns) and the r eport shows that heavy :figh tin g equipment is most badly needed and that the equip me on hand , ba dly in need of overhau l, is nt not equal to the Ger man @ql!iipmentit must f ace . * , r �SE CRET E1111t Bri tish /,\ C "':f' 'ils ' ( .,.. AffiIERS, DECEMBER 1942--General Clark has a long, comprehensive confer19, ence with General Giraud today concerning the employment of French troops along the s outhern end of the Tunisian front and how these French units can be strengthened by supplyin g them with a small amount of American equipment. A possible French assault against Sfax is discussed but the generals agree that it will not be possible because of~th e present strength on the south flank. French forces are to be ready to attac 1 ·n the Pont Du Fahs area on December 26 in conjunction with the British-America assault. Their first goal will be to secure a line of departure from Pont Du Fahs to- Med jez El Bab. They are to commence preliminary operations in that sector tomorrow. General Giraud feels the British should execute a si m ilar preliminary action to seiz e the hi gh ground north of Medjez El Bab in the vicinity of Chouigi. Thirty enemy tanks have entered Pichon but French forces hold high ground surrounding the town. Giraud is ordering an attack by infantry and artil l ery, with American air support, to destroy the enemy. Generals Clark and· Giraud go extensively into the pending push and Giraud says the French objective when troo ps attack in conjunction with the British First 11:rmy on the northern front will be Zahgouan. General Clark promises to obta in the following to help Giraud's forces: one anti-tank company to General Juin in the forward area, additional anti-aircraft (50 caliber) units, eleven additional modern U.S. airplanes so the number available in the Gafsa area to the French wil~ be 25, 1,0 00 rifles, carbines or tommyguns for use by the French on the left of the British First Army. Certai...l'l other equi .1,, ment is to be turned over to the French in the Oran and A]giers areas. Organization of the Fifth Armyunder General Clark is next discussed. Giraud feels that in event of hostilities with Spain the first action should be to strike Spanish air and tank concentrations with our fighters and bombers. Giraud f ee ls that once Bizerta is captured there will be no more threat from Spain. It is Giraud's belief that three divisions, plus air forces, should be available to the Fifth AJ;myand that the troops should be disposed at F· ··, Oujda and M eknes. Forces north of the Sebou river shoul d be light French lmits. Air forces should be disposed at Fez, Oujda and La Senia (6ran). Like General Clark, the famed French general feels there should be separate sectors at the front. He proposes three: the United States on theri gfil, French in t the center and British on the left. He believes that strengthening of the south flank will counter any possible movement by Rommel's Afrika Korps to the Northwest after it has pas s ed the bend o£ the Gulf of Tripoli. Such a disposition would also make possible an offensive thrust against Rommel. The sequence of military events, Giraud believes, should be: first, seizure o£ Tunis 'ii.; second, clean up Tunisia southward fro m Tunis and destr oy Romm third, liquidate Bizerta. el; ( The dif f icult diplomatic pr oble m resulting from General Gir aud's orderi ng of the First M oroccon division to the Tunisian front is plunged into by General Clark. It is too late to countermand the order so t he American general politely expl ains that it would make supply and disposition problems much easier if General Giraud would keep Allied Force Headquarters posted on what he plans to do. Girau d then says he plans on ord er i ng the fol lowing forces north from Dakar: six Senegalese battalions, thre e batta l ion s of th e Foreign Legion and four motorized recon naissance squadrons . General Clar k says al l these forces, excep t t he Foreign Legbn battalion s , must re main in French M orocco. The Legionnai r es wil l g o to Oran to r epla ce battalions moved from that ar ea to th e front. _,;,,:; ·SE CRET Etiwlj,., tit.i~l\ • l . h\G: " ·,~ i E E<... T \ �SEC t RE E~1wls Br iti sh t.vj tf ' si:CRET The ticklist question of Nogues is also bro ught up. Giraud tells General that he has faith in th e Governor General of French rA orocco. General Clark is of the opinion that Nogues is "trick y and weak . 11 General Patton is ordere d to full control over Radio Ma. roe. If it is found that Nogues is double-crossing, Clark believes it will "fa l l to my lot to go to Mo rocco and dismiss him. 11 ( 1 '75 Clark still take Genera l General Anderson has come back fro m the front to r eport that he i s suspicious of some members of Gener al Barr e ' s (French) staff . He reports certain "leaks " in the front l in e area . The m ayor of Constantine is going to be seized , Anderson repo r ts that arrival of new units , r eplacements and suppl ies is going fo r war d. Rain is hampering , s omewhat, preparatjons fo r the offensive . Gr ound actio n at the front tod ay consists of cont inu ing pat r ols by both sides . Two Germans dressed in ~merican uniforms are captured. One enemy mo tar posi t io n in front of the 78th Division is eliminated. r On the south flank a st ro ng Ame ican pat r ol captures r 50 Italians at M akr..assy . Alli ed bombing operations go on unabated , extending from Ga.bes on the south to Bize r ta on the nor t h . The naval base at Bizer ta is hit. P.nAxis ai r port eight miles northeast of Dj edeida is hit and the fi r e from burning Axis planes is visible 20 miles . One of the lessons lea rn ed to date on the Tunisi an f ro nt is that our troops are not as wel l supplied with light anti-airc r aft guns as is the enemy. This ha s resulted in heavy di ve-bo mbing of our t roo ps and , when put in efi'ect against troops f acing fire for the first time , it has a bad effect on moral e . It ls recomm ended that all combat formations g o forward equipped with gr eater anti - aircraft fire. 11All personnel must be indoctrinated with the conviction that the best defense against a l ow flying pla ne is a well dire cted and int ense volume of fire from every available weapon. A host of officers arrive today from bot h England and the U ted states . The ni -group includes thr ee high -r anking offic ers that Gener al Clark has ordered for his Fifth Army Headquarters : 03r i::; i adier General Fre derick A. Blesse , M edical Office r; Br i gadier General Di ck Mo an , Chief Sign al Offi cer , and Colonel J oseph P. Sullivan, r Quartermaste r. ,~- * AffiIERS, DECEiW3 20 , 1942-- A pl an whereby Admiral Darl an- -necessary but E11 emb arrassing- -c an be ease d out as Hi gh Fr ench Com issioner in North Afr ic a and be m replaced by General Giraud i s hit upon tonigh t/a.l'ttf/ ~t;11etwo 1 high French off i cials confer with him, on another matte r, at his Villa on the hill overloo king the harbor of Algiers. This is t he general 's plan : "As I see it , 11 he says , 11we wil l be in a position to diploll'Etically rid ourselves of Darlan as soon as we take Tunisia. ~e n thi s is accomplished I thi nk we should go direct to Darlan and tell him that 11our countries (the United States and Great Brita in) j ust won't stomach you . 11 Darlan then would be told that in the interest s of Fr ance , himself and the other U nited Nations he sh ould quietly pas s · out of th e pictur e . He would be given enough mo ney to give him security fo r life and the right to go wherever he chose, even to the Unit ed States where he might t ake his crippl ed son t o W arm Springs , Ga., fo r i nf antil e paralysis tr eat m ent. I n the meantime Giraud would be developed to tak e over Darlan ' s high commissioner j ob . 11 J 1 would b e perf ectl y delight ed , 11 continu es General Clark , "to begin under cover negotiation s with Gira ud . W hen the deal was com eted we could turn to the politpl ici ans , la ugh and say this was t . e plan we had in our minds al l the time ; that th i s h SE JZ:J: C-~ . Equ(lls Briti:i\i /.\,:;"L ~ <,i£ T \ '{ -\ �SEC T RE ( 1,0 Et:iu Brit ish h\O c- S _t"r, T als T was a subtle arrangement by a couple of amateur army officials to build up Giraud until he was able to tak e over the job . As we have explained before , th e Admiral was only an expedi ent because he was th e only man who coul d keep the internal situation quiet while we strove to drive the Axis out of Tuni sia and th e remainder of Afr ica . As soon as that job was done we pl anned to take care of Darla n . 'l'his should make th e b:iggest news yet and would smooth over al l the trouble that has resulted from the Adm al 's ascendancy - -am necess ary asendancy-to ir power . W e'll g et out a lot of other people, in clu din g General Nogues. Governor Genera l Chatel of Algeria is nov being pr epared for the skid s . 11 1 The r eason for the visit of Admiral Darlan and General Giraud to th e ge nera l s ' vil la is their apprehension concerning the arrival in North Afr ica of one of DeGaulle's ge nerals . The general wants permis s ion to run fre e in Frenc h Africa t o determine Gaul lis t sentiment . Darlan and Girau d oppose this and th ey have arrest ed him. Darlan 1 Giraud and the Gaullist got to gether this afternoon and toni ght th e t w high French leaders come to th e vill a to t ell Gener als Eisenho wer and Clark o that the y want DeGaulle ' s man removed f r om Afr ica. The decl ar e that his presence here is detri menta l al t hough the y claim there is little Gaullist senti me nt. General Clark feels "no useful pu.ppose ca n be s erv ed by having a GauiHist here since his pr esence is bound only to st i r up f eeling • 11 Another conference is to be held tomorro:.v regardin g removal of the Gauulist. ( Anothsr extremely difficult military decision is in t he makL~ . General Clark g is considering bringing the 3rd Division up fro m the Frenc h ~orroco re g ion for use in an offensive aimed at ta king Sfax and Gabes and cr ackin g the southe r n sector of t he Tunisian front . It would make the Axis defense problem doubl y difficu l t and would di vert troops fro m the northern front . However, th e spectre of a blowup in Spanish Moocco or Spain i s stil l i mmine and the questio n is i f it would be r nt wise to withdraw this crack division from th e r egio n where it could begin a nor th ward advanc e into Spanish M orocco. Genera l Clark is considering ta ki ng commad of n t hi s south ern Tunisian f r ont if it is decided to make an al l - out drive th ere . "If we can I t crack th e Axis defense line s i n the North , " sa ys General Clark , 11we 1ve got to break th em in the south where th ey are softer . I bel ieve another strong division should be sent to Afr ica imme diately from the United Sta tes . " Along these same , lines a cable arrives saying that the Germans are de claring th at the U nited States has desi gns on Spain and Spanish territory. Thi s is usual l y the pr opaganda prelude to a Germany invasion. General Anderson holds further c onferences today and he declares there is sufficient supply and men to justify an offensive "about Christmas ." He adds that it 11shoul d afford us a fair chance of succe ss but the big factor will be the weather . " There has been some improvement i n the supply situ at ion in the for w ard area and troo ps and materiel are moving to ward the battl ef r ont acco r di ng to schedule. There is vi gor ous patrol activi t y at the front but no large scale fightin g . The weather is cutting do,m th e effectiveness of reconnaissa nce sweeps and bom ber mis s ions. In north er n and central Tunisia we are cont inuing to consolidate our positions . The mayor of Constantine is be~ng remo~ed1from office by Darlan after he is convinced that the mayor 's inf luence has been used against the Allies. Chatel is going to be deposed just as soon as a qualified replacement fo r the governor generalship can be found . The French North African mis sio n that is heade d by General Betho uard is leaving sh ortly for W hing ton to see about getting equipment as for th e French army . General Clark attends church again toda y, going to the Holy Trint y Church of Algiers with his two aides , lll j or M ram and ~ a eac tenant Beard wood. I n th e afternoon he walks in th e hil l s *with Gener al ! * E eR--" sE :" ,w,, i \ 0 1'1~ M OS f SBCRE.T tl h \ �SECRE t ( \ '7'7 tqua ls ·Briti~h A'\OS • l , T T AffiIERS, D MBER ECE 21, 1942-Th e minor crisis cau sed- by the arrival in North Africa of General Dastier , General DeGaulle ' s representative , is disposed of in rapid time. The Fi ghting French general is t o depart tomorro w for the U ted ni Kingdom. In cabl i ng the Com bined Chie fs of Staf f , General Eis enhovier decla r es : His (Dastier 1 s) ap paren t intention was to make an extensive survey of the countr y , its political sentiment and its present c onditi on. In additi on he talked about the tran sfer here of Free Fre nch Forces, now in t he M dle East, and id des ir ed to discuss fut ure strat egy for inv as ion of Europe . These last t wo r easo ns appear so ac ademic at th e moment that only the fir st seems to represent to Giraud and others here his r eal pur pose . In spite of the bad atmosphere so cr eated I feel t hat some smal l start may have bee n made in the tas k of pro moti ng mu ua l undert standing • •• I am now ur gentl y advised by General Gir a.ud to av oid allowing Dastie r visit to be unduly pr olo nged because b oth General Giraud and I hav e i mpo ant rt forces engaged in a critica l venture and ev er ythi ng that might tend to weaken and di st urb the r ear is of vit al coreern t o us ••• W ar e try in g to make a sy ste m wor k e her e which is admittedly full of defects fro m every standpoint , both at home and here. W know that many petty and even some prominent off i ci als all over No th e r Afr i ca are either st radd ling th e fence or are actual l y anta gonistic •• •There i s no question that serious r eve r ses to us would be intensified in effe ct because of tr c~bl e in the rear and in the i nt er io r ••. You can under stand how earnestly we are se ekin g to pr event internal fr i ction, at l east until th e diffi cult probl em in Tunisia can be solved • •• Because of these th ings I have dec i ded that since the bas ic pur poses of his mission have been acco mp lish ed General Dast i er will return to Lorrlon pro mptly •• •Dastier spoke very enthu si asti ca lly of his talk with Gir aud • •• This r evie w is submitted because I anticipate that Dastier might possibly alle ge ••• that he was not given full opportunity for carrying out al ~ the things in Nor th Afr ica he was directed by DeGaulle to do. The fac t is that his intent ion s during t hi s trip far exceeded anything that anyone her e c on;id ered wise as a f.irst step in the i ntricate but highly desir able business of composing diffe renc es between the two Fr ench camps • • • " 11• •• ~ he above is quoted at such le ngth to show what disturbing influences are ente r ing into the work of General Clar k and other top-r anking officers. The political situa tio n still occu pies a great deal of time and occupies it at a time when a lar ge-scale m ilitar y mov is ab out to be made--a time when it would facile itate things if all energies cou l d be dev oted to the military push , not the po litical one. A great deal of Gener al Clark's day is spent in consultation with Generals Rooks and Gruenther at intervals. rhey stand before the situation map in the general 's off ice and discuss pos sible moves and countermoves. This is a very difficult ti me f or General Clark. He's like an expectant fa the r outside the delivery roo m do or. The 11push 11 is th e 11baby 11 and he anxiousl y av,aits its de l ivery . 11This waitingwait ing--wa iting; it's getting on my nerves," says the ge nera l and ducks out for an hour's hike in the hills to let off steam and to t hink over, in the open air, possibl e steps that might be taken t o further insur e success of the imm nent drive. i C Meanwhile, General 0 1 Daniel leav es fo r the coast al area west of O n to look ra over possible sites for amphibious training exeecises of th e Fi fth Army On his . r ece nt tr ip to Oujda th e gene r al did not hav e sufficient time for this amphibious r econnai ssance . Instead he hurried back to his Algiers hea dquarte r s t(i) work further on planni ng of the coming drive on Tunis . Suppl y of "to ken equipment " to units of the French army i s proceeding satisfacto r ily ::} * * [=fluuh B!"ithh l-rQ_~r,:cr:i:T .. ' ,./ �SECR ET . 1 '73 E<4weil itish MO-:: i <.;;, s Br :.u:;r ALG IERS, DEC ER 22, 1942--General Clark is now convinced that a strik ing , EMB not a mere holdin g force sh ould be built up along the Southern Tunisia front for employment against Ax forces in the Sfax-Sousse area. This f orce, if the is general 's pl an r eac hes fr uitio n, should be read y to st r ike soon aft er the first of the year . Gener al Clark want s to move appro ximat ely 10,00 0 American troops equipped wit h grea t strength in ant i -tank and ant i -aircr aft weapons i nto the region to support and assist Fre mh troops alread y in th e r egio n. ( There wo uld be two r ea sons for this move. First, it would separat e Ax is forces hold ing the coas t of Tunisi a and make suppl y of the south ern force more diffic ult, and , se c ond, it would drive a wedge bet ween th e bulk of the Axis forc es in Tunis ia and t he sout hern region where it now appears t hat Romme might l be headi ng for for a last st and . The harried Afrik a Korp s i s now retre ating befor e the Bri ti sh Eighth Army and news re por ts tod ay sa y t hat there ar e "i ncreas1s ing sign s th at Rom,11el troop s int end to cross into Tunisi a f or a fi nal st and in the battle of Africa . 11 Says Genera l Clark: "That would be t he worst thing th at coul d haupen to us ." Gen~ral Clark believes that this Southern Sector should be an American French aector with the French on the north flank and the American on the south. An American general would be the over-all commander with General Juin command ing the Fr ench troops but under orders from the American commander of the Southern Sector. The 10,000 American troops that General Clark proposes to put in the region would be commanded by an American ~jor general. \~ J One of t he bugs in thi s proposed pl an is that Gener al Anderson has reversed himself agai n and now believes th at all Amer ca n t r oops at t he front, even i thos e s outh of the Fr ench-Brit ish comman li ne he ear li er agre ed upon , should d come under his order s . This deve lopment, in vi ew of Genera l Anderson 's agreement to a collt and di vi ding li ne, irks Genera l Clark wh does n 't appreciate General ~ o Anders on's "switc hing t actics ." Ano ther matt er tha t comes up to day is the U. S. Navy 's proposal to set up a M editerranean amphibious force tha t would functi on under th e Commander-in-Chief . General Clark ppposes such a mo ve, as does Admiral Cunning ham, with whomthe Deputy Comma nder confer s . Both General Clark and the Naval Commade r r ec ommed n n that the U. S. Navy suspend action until the prop osa l has more study . Both men beli eve that es tablis hmen of th e amphibi ous force in t he Medite rranean --un der t which units of the Fifth Arm would train-ne eds the pr i or concurrence of the y Combined Chie fs of Sta.ff. One of the shi ps due in here today in a fast convoy from th e U ted Kingdom ni is torp edoed 20 mil es f ro m Oran. I t is c arryi ng the fir st shi pment of nurses and WAA to Algi ers. All personn el on shipboard gets away bef ore the vessel , the Cs St r ath Allan, goes dovm i n flam es among exploding ammun on in her holds. The iti vessel is al s o car rying seve r al packages enroute to General Clar k from London. Generals Lemnitzer and Porter return from a survey trip to the front and report that units and materiel are arriving on schedule. The attack date is se t for December 24 . Although th e ground is still wet , it is drying out . Our bombers and fi ghters are carrying out extensive raids. Ground activi t y i s limited to patrol s . Reports indicate that the Axis is mass ing a small force in the vicinity southeast of Medjez El Bab, apparently to carry out a flanking movement from the s outh. Under plan s for the attack , General Oliver's combat conmand will be in reserve and should be able to deal with this Axis forc e if it strikes . * St:CR!::T Ec11tds British MOST 5EC'<(T , \ �SECR ET ""a ls British MOST ALGIERS, DECEMBER 1942--General Clark's 23, day is held with French ~eneral Giraud, the two in the Deputy Commander's office discussing the French troops and concerning French cooperation r :c.. . " most important conference of the generals spending over an hour Tunisian operation as it affects and command. General Clark explains his proposal for a strong southern sector and Giraud is enthusiastic . He says he has 56,000 French troops in the sector which he commands. General Clark then proposes that the number of American troops in that region be built up to 8 1 000. Be promises, and follow~ ~up, to send a Tank Destroyer battalion to Colonel Raff . This outfit will 1 i f General Juin. General Ems enhower, who is going to the forward areas tomorrow, is going to discuss with General Anderson a plan whereby several American tanks will be transferred to the French sector to give it greater striking power. General Clark also wants to send a battalion of the 168th Infantry (US) into the S-uthern Sector as part of the buildup. General Clark's great desire is still to get 10,000 American troops up into the French sector but the lack of transportation probably will restrict any rapid movement. ,~ab ( Fl 1tJ General Eisenhower and General Giraud are to confer further , concerning the proposal when they meet at Le Kef within the next two days. It is also proposed that the French put commando-type troops on the left flank of the British--on the Med iterranean side to prevent any Axis e•velopments or action from the sea. It is also General Clark's idea that Anderson should send a detachment down t hethe line dividing the French and British commands so he can protect the French-American left flank. The conference bwtween Generals Clark and Giraud is affable as usual. There is a frank interchange of ideas and neither gen eral holds anything back. The planned assault tanorrow-for which all efforts have been building up for the past 10 days-is being postponed 48 hours due to weather conditions. Torrential rains have b nen falling over the entire reeion. Airfields close to the front are bogged down and fight operations from them are impossible. Heavy weather is restricting bombing operations from the fields with runways farther from the Tunisian border. If tanks, armored vehicles and trucks took to the fields they vrottl.d mire down. Hence, the scheduled attack is impossible and a provisional 48 hour extension is set. Strength of Allie d troops in the forward area is approximately 80,000--combatant and non-combatant. Several other items come up today: Admiral Darlan reports he is hoping for an early decision on permitting the French warship Richelieu, now at Dakar, to proceed to the United States for completion in an American shipyard ••• A cable is sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff asking if the plan proposed by General Clark--an operation against Sfax or Sousse-goes into effect if the force could be supplied once it is in the area from either Libya or Malta ••• Generals Ma.st and Bethouart, both of whom played leading roles in pavitlfi the way for the successful American landing , have been reinstated by Darlan 1without prejudice ••• Bethouart, who is now enrcute to Washington to see about getting military supplies for the French army, has bee~ promoted from Brigadier to hlajor General and a promotion for Mast is in the mill. ( :S i t~l General Clark is the guest of Admiral Darlan at a formal luncheon today at the High Commissioner's villa. It gay affair. The relationshp �SECR ET E'.m mls R i;.i tisl·1 Mo- ( r-r=c , r between General Clark and ~a .r lJar Ian 1.s cln~·of 11.ncres.s1.ng cordial 1.ty . The ' general declares that Darlan has kept every promise . During the luncheon , Darlan tu r ns to General Clark and r emarks : "Tanor row the Axis press will say I gave t his luncheon fo r you because you had a gun pointed at me. " To which General Cl ark replies : "I f the rest of the luncheons were as good as this I would get my gun out every week. " Dar lan chuck l es . T . , . Following the luncheon Genera l Clark puts out a feeler concerniP..g the Darlans geavling oFrenc.ImltEnica to make way for a High Commissioner more ac ceptable to London and Washing t on . "I think it woul d be fine , n says the General to M s . Da lan , r r if you could take your son t o W arm Spr ings fo r treatment . " Mrs. Dar lan r eplies that she thinks that would be sp l endid . "And, " continues General C1a. k , 11I think r it could be arranged for the Admi al to go too i f he chooses . 11 Dar lan, surpr i singly , r nods his head and indicates it would be accep t able . "I'd li ke to tu r n j:,his thi~ over to General Giraud , " says D arlan . nHe likes it here and I don 1 t . 11 J * ALGIERS DECEMBER 1942- - Adm al J ean Fra ncois D lan, , 24, ir ar :~iss i oner in Fr ench Nor th Afr i ca , is ass assi nat ed t oday l High Fr ench Com- The @ t , bul gyJ eni gma i c Fren ch pol i t ic i an-sai lor i s shot th r ough the hor t face and ches t as he i s ente r i ng his offic e at the summer~~a}ace f ol lowing a la te lun ch. The assass i n i s a 22-yea r-ol d U nive r s i ty pr t1essor who i s arrested immediately . By midnight it stil l has not been learned if the murder was insti gat ed by t he Axis or some pol iti cal cl i que or what, exactly , was the assassi n' s motive . H true name has not been le ar ned. is Info r med by M Murphy of the shootin g, General Clark , accompanied by a r. stro nger guard than usual ~ goes to the summe palace , \just down the hill fr om the r St . Geor ge Hotel headquar ters .] Ther e he learns that Admi al Darlan has been r us hed r to the hospital . Going to the hospital , the Deputy Commande finds that the r French High Commissioner died enroute . He goes into a room and s ees D arlan l ying dead upon a bed . (,._ news of the assassinati on was br ought to hea dquarte r s when The it was virt ually ~ese r ted of gener al office r s .} General Eisenhower is driving t oward the f ront . @eneral Smith is out briefly. General Gruenth er is at Fifth Army Headquar ters :J Gener al Clark handles the problem alone . He or ders that all Ame ican and British troops in North Africa be alerted. r Sol diers away f rom thei r outf i ts are or dered to r eturn immediately and stand by . Instructions go out to Generals Patton and Frede ndall and all British Comm anders that th eir troops must b e read y f or emergency use . The guard at Allied For ce Headquarters is inc r eased and a guard is placed ar ound t he home of mr. Murphy. General Clar k then cables al l concer ned- -General M arshal l , Gener al Eisenho wer , the Combined Chiefs of St aff in W i ngt on and th e Britis h Chief s of Staff. ,AlJ ash this is done be f ore Gener al Clark hurries away to see Darlan . This is the radio that goes to Gener al Eise nhower at Constantine : 11At 5 : 45 PM this date young civiliaim of French nationali t y ent ered Dar lan 1 s office and succ eeded in firing several r evolver shots , f our of whi ch took effect . He is in hospital . His condition as yet undeterm i ned. Am lea ving wit h Mu rpey for hospital im.11 ediately. Details late r. 11 The same message , substantia l l y , is s ent to Wa shington and London~ ( At the hos pital General Clark finds A dmir als M oreau and BergeXe . Both men ar e shocked and excited. The declar e th at General Nogues should be called in immediately. General Clark says that no such action will be tak en; that fo r th e time being Nogues wo ' t even b e told of D an's death . The i mmeiate r eaction is n arl d that th er e will be no publicity . At t h! os,1 a r"~ ner al Clark , from looks and '""' - - _, �181 SEC RET ;,h~ some of ( gestures and remarks General c:&.q.~&r i~~ i ~it1 ~s o~ 1 "think Darlan's death is part of ·a plot by us." [Later he with the French secret ser.rl.ce and his G-2 ofi'icers and a where1:7 documents might be "found II on the killer showing qe~~ the French discusses the crime plan is discussed that he was a German . -General Clark is personally shocked by Admiral Darlan 1 s. death.Q'._ersonally he had always liked the man. Darlan had filled his many obligations and promises to @.e erals Clark and Eisenhower and other All ied officers [with whom he had conn ferred. ] The;e had been ~g indication that Darlan was not sincere. I • • • Repercussions of the admiral I s death can lead almost anyw here. Wha will the DeGaullists t do? What perverted tangent will .Axis propaganda take? Vl'hocan fill the void caused thl?ough Darlan's death General Clark doesn't look for any serious unrest but he thinks a few groups "~ake advantage of the opportunity to cause disorder. 11 As he looks at the d~ad French lead er, the General thinks of t wo statements Darlan made to h:i.mat the luncheon yesterday: "Tomorrow the Axis press will say .l. gave tnis luncheon for you because you hRd a gun pointed at me. 11 ••• 11I'd like to turn this thing over to General Giraud. He likes it here and I don 1 t. 11 The assassin Whe the admiral n the waiting room opened fire with into his office. before the killer obtained a pass and got into the palace while Darlan was out. came down a hall with his aide, t he murderer stepped out of and just as Darlan was turning into his office, the murderer a . 25 caliber gun. Darlan, hit twice, fell through the doorway. His aide jumped on the assassin and was shot twice in the legs was overpowered. Returning to the hotel, General C1ark sends the f ollo wing message to General Eisenhower: 11Ha:ve just return ed from hospit a l. Darlan is dead . Bergeret and Moreau arrived while I was there. TheiP first reaction was to send for Nogues immediately. I have instructed Murphy to tell them to do nothing for the prese nt, not even to notify Nogues. Suggest you bring Giraud back with you immediate ly ." This cable goes to General Marshall: ~ t er a conference with Gener als. Smith, M c Clure, Gruenther and others: 11Darlan dead. W have i mposed rigid censorship. e Request all possible restrictions to prevent leak from London or Washington . iii e are communicati ng with Eisen..~ower and Giraud who are now at the front and asking them to return Al giers immediately. All alerted her e and in ta sk forces but no i mmediate trouble expected. W ill Xeep you advised." [o ffice r s are pouring in and out of Gener al Clark I s of fi ce ;-1 After a conference with General Clark, Mr. Murphy sends this cable to Secretary Hull and the Combined Chiefs of Staff: 11Enroute from his office where assassination occured to M aillot hospital Darlan died as result of the attack •• Sat approximately 4:00 PM. In the absence of General Eisenhower from city General-Clark and I accompanied by General Bergeret called at hospital to pay our respects to the deceased. Apparently one of the four revolver bullets pierced thorax and lun g probably causin g death. Other bullets struck head and jaw;)I inquired of Darlam 1 s assistant, General Bergeret , what immediate steps would be taken regarding maintenance of local authority. He is calling a council of local officials and requesting Gener al Giraud to return from the Tunisian front for this purpose. Department will b e kept informed of developments. Assassi n is young man of 22 years who in preliminary interview gives the name of M and , stated to be a college instructor. or He is now unde:n interrogation. Results wil l be telegraphed." :' ·,-' SECRET ·--\' 1 �SECR T 182 Eeiuul s Follo wing a long conference, it is decided that it would be unwise to withhold the news of D arlan ' s death. The general sends the following cable to London and Washington : 11It is apparent that it will be impossible to conceal news of Darlan's death longer. ~e anticipate that announcement will be made over Axis radio with eve r y pos sible effort to imply assassination at in stigation of A l.J.ies or Free French. W believe it is highly desirable to anticipate e this move by an announcement tonight by the Fr ench over Radio Algiers and Radio Maroc so framed as to give th e affair an Axis tinge. Suggest you have thes e stations monitored in United States and United Aingdom for re-broadcast. Time of broadcast will be given t o you later. Do you concur . Immediate reply requested as matter of gre at urg ency." After further discussion of the Darlan affair , Ld uring which re p~rts come in that there is a renewal of street sniping in Algiers and steps are taken to cou nteract it, J General Clark decides that he cannot wait for an ans wer fro ,n W shington a r egarding re lease of D arlan's death. He cables W hington and London: 11News as Darlan ' s death spreading rapidly here. Have authorized immediate bro adcast by Radi o M aroc and Radio Algiers ." The announcement 1vil.J. be a s follows : "Admiral Darlan, High Com miss ioner in French Africa , was assassinated this afternoon shortly after 3 o'clock on arriving in the offices of the High Commissariat at Algie rs. The assassin fired several revolver sho±s of whi ch t wo took effect on the admiral who dies shortly afterwards while being transp orted to the hospital . The assassin was arrested on the spot. Co~plete order rei gns in Algiers notwithstanding general indignation caused by th s event. The examinati on of the murderer is now taking place . It is not yet known fro ,n preliminary inve stigation of the assassin whether the assassination was of German or Italian inspiration." - ' ( Comman ders and troops , many of w hom were pulled away fro m planned Christmas Eves , are informed, about 9 : 00 PM that the "stand to is occasioned by the assassination of Darlan by a Fr enchman. Assass in in custody . Further announcement via Radio Alger and M aroc . " O ders also go out to fl y all flags at half mast r to m r ow in me oriwn for Darlan . or m @ eneral Clark, who had planned on Christmas cocktails with his closest f r iends and a Christmas Eve dinn er at the villa of Gener al Smith , finally clears out of his office at 10 PM for a quick dinner and a return to work that piles up during his absence. Prime M inister Churchill cables that he "hopes that blame will be placed upon Germans and their agents • 11 General Clark also learns that the British Med iterranean Fleet is due in Algiers tomorrow and he feels that under the cir cumstances it shouldn ' t show up . He confers with Admi al Cunningham who agrees r to ke ep the fleet at s ea J ~ '1 / I"" LLate in the evening the general gets in touch with Gener al Eisenhower after grea t difficulty . The general will return tomorrow. General Giraud is going to fly back from the front. General Eisenhower later radios "you were quite right in abso l utely r ejecting prime YBSO (m B eaning Nogues) . Consider Kingpin (Giraud) only possibili ty." After conferences, General Clark final ly returns to his villa for the ni ght , leaving the office about 2 :00 A l'A. Later, the following cable is received from Admiral Leahy in W ashingt on: "We concur in your action of immediately relea sing news of Darlan 1 s death by ra dio fro m French M orocco and Algiers • • " The general is also informed that President Roosevelt "desires that no announcement b e made reference Darlan's successor ." At the front the weat her is worse. There has been a landslide on the road between Bougie and the fron t . The area is a mass of mud. The offensive will have to be delayed even longer than anticipated. * * ·SEC RET �SEC RET E11uls Briti,sh MO : T SEC a lo3 L -;- ALGIERS DECE BER , M 25, 1942-- Events pi le in up ra pid-fire order on this most un-Christmasy of Christmases. General Clark's most important conference of the day is with Genera l Giraud, the lan."lcy, dour-faced Frenc h military hero who flies back from the front because of Darlan 1 s assassination. G ener al Clark t ells Giraud th at the Allied Commandwants him to succeed Darlan as French High Commissioner for Nort h Africa . Girau d balks and says that his wish is to comm and all troo ps , French, Bri tis h and American , on the Tunisian front. Gener al Clark be l ieves Gir aud is tryirg to do some horse tradin g; th at the French General will accept lea ders hip of the High Com isariat . m Other highlight events : 'ehe assassin now giv es the name of "Bonny Chapel i er" and says he was acting on hi s ow account , "inspire d by hatred of M hal Petain n ars and Adm iral Darlan 1 s policies. A French military tribunal finds the assassin guilty and decrees his exe cution for tomorrow mo rnin g •••• Admiral D arlan's funeral is to be held tomorro w and all hi gh-rankin g British and Americ an personnel , in cluding General Clark , will attend ••• General Eisenho wer ret urns in late afternoon from the front and General Clark .outlines al l the developments ••• General Nogues arrives from French M orocco 'and says bluntly that 11the onl y solution I see is that provided by the leaders hip of Giraud. 11 The assassin was interrogated throughout the night. Afte r admittin g that the first name he gave was false ar:rl saying his true name was 11Bonny Chapelier ," he said that he had not com here from France as he had claim ed earli er but that e he is a native Al gerian of French nationality. Following i solat ed re ports of sniping , all i s apparentl y quiet . Ther e is no visible agitation on t he part of the North African population . ( Despite working half th e night , Gener al Clark is at his office at 8 :00 AU to plunge into further conferences. Reports come in from th e front that 11due to continual rain there wil .L be no hope of an immedi at e attack on Tuni s . 11 This permits t he Deputy Comman to concentrate all his energies on events arising f r om der D arlan's assassination. M. M r urph y r epor t s on a conference he has ju s t held with Genera l Berge ret , Deputy High Commissioner . Si nce Nogues was notified to proc eed to Algiers , Governo r General Boisson of French W est Afr ica is ra di oed to pr oceed here as soon as possible. Bergeret discloses that D an si gned a secret ordinance arl on December 2 whic h prov ided that in case of ilia inabi l ity or abse nce of t he Hi gh Commissioner his functi ons would be assumed by Genera l Nog ues, but t hat if the inabi l it y was of long dur at i on th e Imperial Counci l would cho ose a pers on who would "definite i y exerc ise the functions of High Commi sioner. Ber geret said that th e s Imper ia l Committee con sistin g of Gener al Gir aud , Bergeret , Boisson , ~ogues and Chatel con st i tutes the l ega l in strumen t for the composition of ~hate ver r egi m may e 1 be established . Ber geret asks N l.UI'phys "personal opinion 11 on what sh oul d be done and M phy r eports to General Cl ark th a.t he tol d him : that Genera l Gir aud i s the ur only possible ch oice and that he felt th at 11now is the ti me of definitely bre aki ng with the noti on th at legality as provi ded by Vich y l egi slatio n i s nec essa ry to assure the function i ng of a r egime established in Nort h Africa for the pro secution of the conL~onw eff ort. The Deputy High Comm s i oner al so pr oposes as a s ol ution ar is that the Comte de Par s be calle d to head a ·:orth Af ric an government which would cont emplate the estab li shment of a council of w h the Comte de Paris would be hic Presi de nt. Gener al DeGau e woul d be in vited to act as vice pr -·s i dent and Gener a l ll Gir aud wou l d r etain command of the ar m fo rc es . Both Gener al Clark and r.i r phy ed u feel th at the Allied forc es should un equivocally insist th at Gir aud assume , a.t le ast pr ovi sional ly , th e r es ponsibilit y of both civil ar:rl military govern ment in French A r ic a and be as sisted by a committ ee of about six persons who would be sel f ecte d follo win e conf er enc es bet ween Fr 1 mch , Ameican s and Br iti sh . r 8~CRET Equals British MO ST SE CRET \ �SECRET ( i3Y E11ual Bijtish M O ST SEC RL ~ :s Gener al Clark expl a in s t hes e thin gs to General Gir aud when the .Fr enchman r et urns fro m th e f r ont. Gira ud us es every fulcru m of ar gument to in sis t th at he b e g iv en mili tary comm and of troo ps at th e f ront. He t ell s Gener al C1ark t.h..a if t he i s bi g enough to be High Commss io ner of No th Afr ic a he is b i g enough to i r conm1a the 'l unisi an bat t lefi el d . Repli es Gener al Clar k: 11The tv;o-- politic a l and nd mili t ar y--don't mix . It's i m poss ible. W can' t put you i n com e mand of Briti sh and Ameic an t r oops . A hi gh Fr ench comma woul d be u.nacce pt i bl e even t hough we know r nd of your hi gh abilit y . " The De!:' y Commader i s cert ain t hat Gira ud , w has asked ut n ho so oft en f or the hi gh m ilit ar y command is just shad ow-b oxi ng a nd t hat he will , com aro und and acc ept t he Hi gh Comm s ion er sh i p soon . Anothe r c onf ere nce i s to e is be held to m ro w. or 1 Nogue s c onf er s with M M phy and t he St ate Depar t me of f ici al r eport s ba ck r. ur nt t o Gener al Cl ar k th at the Fr enc h gener al believ es Gir aud shou l d b e made High Comms sion er and th at t his shoul d be foll owed as soon a s pos si bl e with a r econi cili ation bet ween North Afr i can Fre nch aut horities and th e Fr ench Nat i onal Com m te e i n London. H suggest s t hat Gener al Catr oux woul d be an excelle nt ass i sit e tan t to Gir au d . Nog ues say s he ha s no am i on or des ir e t o assume No h Afric an bit rt l eaders hi p . He declar es t hat in hi s ca pacit y as Resid ent Genera l of Fre nch icl orocco he will g iv e ~hol eheart ed su ppor t to t he A ed war eff or t . lli · ( In the even i ng , · t he High Commssa ri at i ss ues th e fol lo wi ng com uni q_e : 11The i m u cour t m tial of the 19t h M a:b ilita ry D istric t m too ay at 6 : 00 PM t o tr y t he et assass in of Admir al D an . The court ma al condemne t he assass i n to dea th arl rti d and s ent ence will be carr ie d out to m row mo or rnin g . The assass in, who was caught i n t he act , made a com ete confessio n. He i nsi st ed tha t he acted without acc om pl plic es . The assassin , whose nam i s be in g kep t secr et fo r r ea sons of nati onal e s ecur i t y , was of Fren ch nati onality . The inq u ir y r evea l ed that his mot her is It a l i an and i s now liv ing in It a l y . Sever al l et t ers between th e a s sa s sin and his mother wer e s eized , but t heir conte nts thre w no light on the ca s e or the act ua l circ umst ances of th e cri me. 11 Befor e g oing t o Admi a l Cunningham ' s vi l l a fo r Ch i s tmas di nne r, Gener al r r Cl ar k di scusses need fo r an at ta ck on t he Sout hern Tunisi an f ron t . Hi s l ong 1 fi nger ban gs on the ma in hi s off ic e and he decla r es : 11Ther f3 s the pla ce ( strikp ing points al ong th e s out hern sector befo r e Sfa.x and Gabes }l It' s t he only pl ace w e we can cr ack i t. 11 He t hen decl are s t hat he hopes to get away f ro m Allied her Forc e Headquar te1 ·s i n l ess than aweek . Stra nge l y enough, l at e toni ght a r ad io com in f ro m Colone l Raf f i n t he s out hern se ctor t hat say s t hat 13 enemy sh i ps es ar e unlo ading in Sfax in a grea t hur ry . A b001i ng at t ack agains t t he shi ppi ng i s b pl anned for to morro w. A s t r ent h r epor t bas c om in f r om t he fro nt and it shows e a gran d t otal of Alli ed Gr~ .md Troops in t he r egi on of 67, 500-- 35, 000 Br it i sh , 16 , 000 American and t he re main der allie d troo ps-Fr ench, Bri t i sh and Am ic an- er guar di nglin es of cummunication. Pl anes now in opera tion again st Tunisi a ar e : 375 Ame i can a nd 261 Br i ti sh . r As a si delight to a hect i c day , the Fi ft h A rmy bri ngs out i ts dir ecti ve conc ern ing t he Spanish M orocc on operat ion (Backbone II) . The di r ect i ve goes to the Center , W estern and Nor the rn Task Forc es and t he XI I Air Supp0rt Comma d, n al l of whi ch wil l be under Genera l Clark 's commad. The No t hern Forc e woul d make n r an amphibious l anding near Tangi er s ; the Cent er' s obj ect iv e woul d be t he capture of M elil la and t he W ester n For ce would drive nor thw?,rd f r om Fr ench M occo pr oor ceeding as ra pidl y a s pos sible . The Nor the r n Forc es at t a ck woul d c ome 4 0 day s afte r t he Cente r and Weste rn For ces , alr eady i n Af r i ca whi l e t he Nor t her n For ce i s i n England , wer e alr eady in action . SECRET Eej als tritish u MOS T S~CREl --------~ �~{:"SECRET ( E11uals British M9ST . ~ r-:•'.;-;:RPT AWIERS DECE BER , M 26, 1942--General Gira ud is selected as High Commissioner of Fr ench Africa, Darlan's assassin is executed by a firing squad , the Combined Chiefs of Staff are informed that the planned assault on the Tunisia n f ront is off and might not occur fo r more than a monthl These are the highlights of a hectic day that starts off with the first air raid in over two weeks. French gene rals Giraud and Nogues confer with Generals Eisenhower and Clark during the morning. Giraud agrees to become high commissio ner but he still puts up his constant cr y that he should l ead all troops on the f ront. Later in the day the Fr ench Imperial Counci l meets and appoints Giraud as A dmiral Darlan 1 s successor . The follo wing cable is sent to th e Combined Chiefs of Staff : "For reasons of public security and in the interest of the comm war effort, we have on had further conversations with of f icials today regarding their desire to establish a loc al authority at the earli est possib l e moment. The general consensus favored the appointment of General Henri Giraud to assume both civil and militar y authority i n Fre nch North and W est Africa . There was a meetin g at 4 PM this afternoon of the counc il created at the be ginning of this month which is now composed of Giraud , Governor General Boisson , Gener al Bergeret , Governor Chatel and Resident General Nogues. They unanimously decided to ap point Giraud as High Commissioner in French Africa and Commander-in-Chief of all French forces . This decision takes effect immediately ••• This solution ••• appears from here to be the , onl y practicable one . I r ecommend that we be authorized to lend to General Giraud our pr actical support in this ta sk. 11 General Clark is pleased but his pleasure turns to apprehension later in the evening w hen a cable arrives from W ashington sayin ~ that Giraud should be "appointed provisionally " by General Eisenhower as Hieh ~Commissioner . This is contrary to all premises on which we have been oper ating since the Alli ed Forces landed. Fr ench civil and constitutional government was to be maintained as far as pr acticable. Generals Eisenhower and Clark go into a huddle at the villa they share . If Gira ud is to be 11ap J,Ointed provisionall y 11 there is likely to b e tr ouble . ' Troops will have to be alerted again and it is possible that virtual m artial law wil l have to exist. Apparently the cable declaring that Giraud should be appointed provisi onally was s ent from Washington before the ra dio saying he had been s elected by the French Imperial Council arrived there. Another r adio arrives from W ashington while the Commander ad the Deputy Commander-in-Chief ar e ste wing. It gi ves full approval to Gira ud selection by th e councill General Clark is elated as he turns in late. Chronologicall y , the day starts with an a i r raid during whic h f our bombs are dropped and mines so,m in Algiers harbo r. One bomb drops in a truck -0ompany, demolishing several trucks , killing one guard and injuring othe r s . A dawn, t Dar lan's assassin i s executed. After a short s es sion in his office, Geimeral Clark goes , at 8:4 5 AM to the Catholic cathedral in A gie r s to attend the , l funeral of Admiral Darla n . The cask et, in fron t of th e altar on a dias , is dra ped with the French fl ag . On top is the admiral's fap; The American and Bri tish del egation sits on the left side of the cathedral. Generals Eisenhow er and Clark and A dmiral Cunningham sit in the front ro w. On the ri ght side , in the front row, sits M adames Darlan and Fenard and behind them the hi gh-ranking French officials-&irau d , Nogues, Cnatel and others . llhen the 55 minute s ervice ends , the casket is carrie d out to the street and of ficial photo graphs are tak en . Ruffl es and flourishes and the Fr ench national anthe m are played as D arlan's body is loaded into the hearse . The funeral cortege, including the Americans, then proceeds to th e summ palace w er here be t ween honor guard s of trsreRt:T arried E-.u British MOST SEr:RFT als \ �"'!'!•,.,....--- SECRET . ( E11wals British MOST SEC. ._, French , American and Br itish soldiers and plac ed on a dias in th e The t r oops then pas s in revie w befor e the fune ra l bier . Foll owin g guests file past the casket, each one making t he sign of t he cross Admiral D arlan ' s casket is then plac ed in a small chap el aqpinin g and the Ameican officers r return to Allied Force .Hedquart ers . a palace grounds. this, all with a baton . the palace The afternoon is spent wrestling with th e gro win g problem at the front. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are informed that there is "no hope of immediate attack on Tunis due to continued rains . Methodica l infantry advance may be possible later. Am att empt•ing to or gan iz e and maintain a force to operate agg r essively on the sou th ern flank. " General Clark tell s confidant s that an inten se effort is be ing made "to try and force Ameican troop s into t he South ern Sector," t aki ng r them away from General Ander so n ' s North ern command. I t is General Clark ' s fee ling that American troop s s houl d be under com.mandof a m who r ealizes specif an ically what our troops are trained fo r , what their equipment is capabl e of and the methods by which they should be committ ed to battle for maximum use . He be li eves th ere should be a northern Britis h se ctor and a sou t hern French-American sector under American command. "There is goin g to be gre at di sa ppoint ment in our country when General Eisenho wer's message ar r ives telling the Combined Chiefs of Staff that not hi ng aggressiv e can be done in Tunisia for a coup l e of m hs , ·" Gener al Clark says . ont "Ike is af r aid of a cr isis with the Brit i sh . I feel we nD.lt get Ame ican troops s r unde r American commanders . I am going to confe r with General Gir au d tomorrav to see if he has got aey t roops in there wi th capabili t ies and equ ipment to go on the of i 'ens iv e . I expect to go to M occo as soon as pos sib le , ma or ybe wit hin a week. I f I had t o pull an operati on against Spanis h M orocco to m row al l I would have done or to prepare for i t is a map study . There aren ' t enough troops i n the Center and West ern Task Forces to make my hand stro ng . Once the situation here i s st rai ght ened out I will hea d straight to Oujda and start wor king out the Fif th A my r pr oblems . " 11 O smal l operati on on th e Sout hern Tuni sian front is to be carr ie d out ne tonight , Ameic an paratroops ar e to jump 28 miles nort h of Sfax to destroy a r r ai lroa d brid ge and thus br eak both rail supply lines to Axi s forc es in Southern Tunisia and one of the lin es supp l ying Rommel' s hard-pressed Afr i ka Ko s . At rp 2200 word is r eceived that the paratroops have jumped over their objectiv e . W ord is not expected soon of what opposition th ey meet an d wbat they accomplish . * * SECRET '· �. SECRET ( Eq uals British /,\O ...,r --.. ... (,L'.. i::: '"-~cr:r:y ALGIER DECEMBER 1942-The plan to move more American tro ops into S, 27, the Southern Sector of the Tunisian front so it can become an active, aggr essi ve theater moves forward rapidly today. Follov1ing a conference with General Anderson, who has been called back from the northern sector for consultatio n, orders go out for several units to leave General .Anderson's command and proceed to the south. These units include Combat CommandB, General Oliver's mechanized force that has already seen so much action. General Clark's day is jammed with conferenc es . Durin g the morning he has several sessicns with Generals Rooks, Smith and Gruenther concerning the is suin g of orders returning the American units to American command and brin gi ng up additional American troops from the r eserve areas. At 11 :30 AMhe goes to General Eisenhower 1 s office for a conference with the Commandr-in-Chief e and General Giraud, the French High Commissioner. The talk centers chiefly around the proposal to make the southern sector the active front. Ther e is little need to discuss the political change caused by Darlan's as sassination. Giraud has slipped into the new spot quietl y and ther e seems to be little reacti on among the populace. Giraud says he has 56 ,000 French tro ops in the front area but that they are poorly equip ped. They know the re gion well and that would make up partially for their poor weapons. This disadvantage will also be made up in part by our supplying the better French units with more modern equipment. ( A small-sized council of war is held in General Clark's office in the afternoon. General O rlando (Pinky) W ard, commander of the 1st Armored Division, has just r eturned from the front. General Clark proposes to place W ard in command of Ameican troo ps in the South ern Sector and ho~es eventually to have a r corps--probab ly the II Army Corps, whose present headqua rt ers is Oran--at the Southern Front. A cable is sent to W ashington proposin g that the nucleus of the 6th Army Corps proceed from th e U.S. to Africa by air immediately 11in anticipation of the probability th at Ameican Forces will be employed in the r Tebessa area." The number of troo ps to be involv ed in th e Southern Secto r has not been determined but it is believed a corps headquarters will be neces sary . If the II Corps moves up to the Tebessa area, the VI Corps would ta ke over in the Oran area. Additional personn el of the VI Corps would come over from the St ates in the next t wo fast conv oys . General Clerk lays definite plans to activate the Fifth Army and move to Oujda on J anuary 4. The smal l staff now operating here would be gin moving down January 2 . Gener al Smith has been worked into details of t he pr oble m here and as Chief of Staff of Allied Force Headquarters he will assume the bur dens that have b een carried so long by General Clark. That will give the ComJ nanding General of the Fifth Army a chance to ge t orga nized , make further plans for poss ible operations against Spanish M orocco an d do org anizati onal wor k in get ting troops up to the Tebessa ar ea . He is intensely eager to de1rote all his energies to the Fifth Army task. General DeGaulle sends the following cable tod ay to General Gir aud : "The Algiers murder is a pointer and a most definite warni ng ; a pointer to the state of exasperation into which the tra gedy of France has ca st the mind and soul of the French people; a warning of the incalcu la bl e conse quences inevitably resultin g from the lack of natio nal authorit y in the midst of the gr ea test national crisis of our history. It is mo e than ever necessary th at this r national authorit y should be establish ed . I propose, Gener al , th at you should meet me as s oon as possible on Fr ench soi l, either in Alger ia or in Chad, in ·SECR E , . ... ---; ,..... ... -~-~ ' ----~~------ �. SEC RET Eeiuals· ~ltfh ·r11osr c. ·B s s_:-· ( 1 order to study how to gr oup under one central provisional authority all the French forces both within and without the country and all French territories capable of continuing the struggle fo r the liberation and salvation of France. " The message is delivered to Giraud at his c onfe r ence with Generals Clark and Eisenhower . Giraud is lukewarm, saying he will take DeGaulle 1 s suggestion "under advisement." Rap}Jroacbment between the two men is possible but Gir aud be li eves a meeting with DeGaulle would be "premature at this time . " Washington and London have suggested that additional , more complete comnruniques r egarding Darlanrs assassin be issued . The fo l lowing reply goes out : "Communiques substantially full and truthful ••• Assassin twentish named Bonnier De La Chappelle was unive r sity student here f r om France since June . H used two false names . Mother It a l i an Jewess . Claims no affiliation ad any party and insisted to priest act his oVJnand without accomplices . Viewed from here it seems that our prompt issue of com rmmique with a suggestion of Axis responsibility has been sufficient to place Axis on defensive . Jmy further explanation may seem as an answer to counter charges . Not proposed follow up from here any Axis propaganda on this subject . " General Giraud is congratulated on his selection as French High Commissioner. Reports from both the United States and the United Kingdom indicate Giraud is highly acceptable in all quarters . General M arshall cables that 11nev15 of your selection to head the people of North Africa in our commoneffort to crush the Axis and restore freedom to France has been received with great satisfaction by the Army of the United States • •• Your suc cession to the post of High Commiss ioner of North Africa greatly strengthens our confidence in the ultimate victory." C The Tunisia n front line has been straightened out by German action in moving small units forward in the Southe r n Area , thus eliminating the curve toward the Tunisian coast in the center of the line. A move is made to protect the Sbeitla area which will be essential to the American-French forces if sup plies and troops are to be assembled for operations against Sfax . Tt is recommended that infantry an:1 artillery units of Combat CommandB be moved up to the Sbeitla ar ea now held by the French and Colonel Raff's com posite force . 1t is beli~ved that any present move of armored units into the area would tip the Germans off that the attack on Tunis has been postponed and that a thrust at Tebessa is being prepared . Raff ~nd the French hold strong defensive positions. * * ALGIERS DECEMBER 1942-A three hour conference with General Giraud- , 28, the most comprehensive and satisfying that General Clark m held with aey as Fr ench official - highlights an ineensely busy day for the Deputy Commander inChief . He goes with an interpreter to the French general's villa at 11 : 50 AM and it is afte r 5: 50 PMwhen he departs for Allied For ce Headquarters . Upon startin g the conference , Giraud tells General Clark that there are two questicns he wants to discuss . First , the problem of command and , second , the pr?b l em of tactics , l ogistics and general strategy on the Tunisian campai;n . Regarding command General Clark spe nds 15 minutes expla i ning to Giraudthat , an agreement was reached between British and American officials long before the African campaign was launched vmreby General Eisenhower was to be Com.~ander in-Chief but that British General Anderson was in charge of operations in Tunisia. General Clark proposes the following soluti on : make the Southern Front the active theater ; that the Americans send one battalion of Combat CommandB to the Sw.thern Front to support the French ; dispatch another battalion up f r om Oran . General Clark then asks Gi raud point blank whether he would be . ~~ ·SECRET �,, Equ al• ~:~M~~;SCCRET te will.ing to place French troops under G~neral Anderso n I s commad . 11 The French n general ' s answer is an emphatic 11no . 11 Giraud says he talked to £nderson yeste rday about changing the military strategy b~cause of the weather and mud. He reports he told Arcerson that any move forward at this time must be made in the south against Sfax and that it could best be done by the American and Fr ench . Giraud says Anderson concurred in the idea but said such an attack could not come until the end of January . Giraud claims this is too late ; that such an attack must take pla ce by January 5, or 10th at the latest . 1 General Gi r aud then suggests to General Clark that he take COIIlilland the of Southern Sect or; that the tall, rangy , young Ame rican gene ral lead the drive against Sfax . Says Giraud : 11I have the utmost confidence in your ability and jud gment and I would not hesitate to place Fr ench troops under your command " . As Giraud finishes this declaration of faith he is leaning forwa rd looking at General Clark . The French hero tells the Deputy Commander that he was with both Generals Anderson and Eisenhower at a meet ing near the front and that he had · told Anderson that he thought the role of the Br it ish fl:rmy should be defensive . operations on the nor th at least until the terrain was fit for fighting . Gener al Clark is in full accord on this strategy of defense in the nort h and off ense in the south . Because of the supply problem and thin communications, General Clark sa ys he doubts if the attack aimed at Sfax coul d start before January 10 . After br ief c1iscussio n , General Giraud says he feels a target day of the 15th would be satisfactory. Regarding his taking command of the Southern Sector , General Clark tells Giraud that Gener al Eisenhower wants hi to or ga niz e the Fifth American Army at Oujda . Says Giraud sharply : 11The west is not important today. The Tunisian front oper at ion must take precedence over all else . 11 Repl ies Genera l Cla r k : "I am not likely to be given the Southern front com mand . W ould you be will ing to put General Juin under 8.llll. Ame ican ArTTr;f r Corps comm a.nder-- say either Generals Ward of Fredendall? 11 General Giraud replies that he would have no objection but that he would prefer General Clark to all others . The t wo generals the n discuss the problem of getting two American armor ed battalions and a regiment of infantry into position to strike at Sfax . Following that the French and American general examine what strength would be needed to hold Sfax once it was taken . Another move to take Gabes so they could hol d the bottleneck there against any attempt by Rommel to push northward . Giraud reco m mends concentrati on of all efforts, initially on Sfax, saying that the operation should start early because at presen t the area is held by Italians with l i t tle German suppor t . Indications ar e that the Germans are preparing to move in more German infantry units into the ar ea west of Sfa x . The Gabes corridor is only eight ki lomet ers wide and the area to the southwest is mountainous and could not possibly be used by Axis tanks . Giraud next brings up the problem of supplying troops in the Sfax area and asks if they couldn't be supplied from the sea . General Clark says he has already discussed this with Admi al Cunningham and the Naval Commander says such a plan r can be only partl y fulfilled by the navy . Part of the supply will have to be carried over the narrow gaqge railway and in trucks . It is also possible that vital materiel can be flown in in small amounts . Giraud says that after Sfax is taken then provisions must be made to hold Gabes . When the corr id or is protected from assault, then the force can strike northward f r om Sfax . By that ti me the ground in the nor ther n sector wil~ have dried and a joint offensive , Americans an~ French in t~ e . South and British in ~~~r'-Y be unde r taken to drive the Axis out of Tunisia.. ::)t_~K t'.l Ec,ua British M O~T SECR ls ET ~ �1 ·SEC ET R 1 1 General A nderson arrive i\ "l° ch J: f ~i~ Ta~ ='tbi[ T Pi:rN .;$ point and the French, British and Ameican gen er als go into a tria,,t:gular discus sio n . First to come r up is a suggestion that the Briti sh mo a bat t alion into the ar ea on its r ight ve flank so that Colonel Raff ' s paratroop unit can be used for the job it was especial l y trained for . General Clark feels that Raff 's tr oops should now move south to protect the r ight f lank of the Southe rn Secto r. Anderson says he believes Raff should be r eli eved by Ameic an , not Br iti sh, t r oops . r The group then goes to a late luncreon . A s l ight diplomatic cris is comes up duri ng the meal. General Giraud de clar es that there is "lack of control' on th e part of Briti sh In t ell i ge nce office r s over certain informaticn they are compili ng . Giraud says he cons ide r s "certain action s of the Br itish Secr et service ar e ini m ical to Fr ance . 11 Follo wing luncheon Generals Clark, Gir aud and Anderson take up the matter of command Gener al Clark purposely create s a sit . uation whereb y its discussion is inevit able because he fe els that an open and straightforward appraisal should tak e place wit h all the Allies re present ed . I Anderson outlines his posit ion. He says tha t , 1, he is not the Command erin-Chief of operations in Tuni sia but merely acti ng as the agent of the Commander-/ in-Chi ef , and , 2, from a practical point of view he has control of operations of British , French and American tr oops on the front because only his 1st British Arm has the communicatio ns , tr ans por t ation and staf f personn el "to coord i nate y an operation of t hi s char acter." General Clar k disagrees but not too forcefully . General Giraud tells Ander s on plainl y that any Br it i sh control ove r Fr ench forces at this time is impossible . "I must take cognizance, 11 says Gir aud , 11of the fr ame of m nd of my t r oops and s ome of my officers . You must r emembe th at not long r ago the French fought the British in Syria. M any of my men have not for gotten what the Br itish did to the French navy at M s- El- Kebi r and Dakar . It is not er desirable to put French troo ps und er British command at t his time . I do not share this sentiment but y ou must r ecognize that it exists. I want you to understand that this is not a que sti on of personalities . General Juin and you ar e workin g in friendly and effectiv e cooperation but it nrust be r ecognized that ther e is the impediment of a ps ycholo gi cal factor at pr esent between t he Fren ch 11such army and Br itish command.11 General Giraud says that therefore a solution, 11 Gener al as an A me rican commad , must be considered and found . n A r son says nde t his is th e first time he has bee n told of this feel ing on the part of the French but that he had r eali zed there was "so me slight drawback to r ela ti ons " but he didn't know why . "I feel , 11 contin ues the British General , "th at is deplorable as we are novl allies to ge th er. 11 General Giraud smiles . "After the Sfax ope r ation has been su ccessf ully completed, after Frenc h t roo ps hav e ac heived victory with the Ameicans and the Br itish sup port in the north , then, 11 sa ys Giraud, "it wi ll r be ti me to discuss a sup r eme command. Then it will be easy to launch an attack in the nort~ against Tunis and Bi zerte and put all thr ee units ynder your command. " i In the meantime , General Clark explains, General Anderson will turn the Nort hern Sector into a defensive area . After the Sfax operat i on is achieved "t hen th e proble m of a command under you can be easily solved. 11 Ger.era l Gir aud see ms to have dropped the idea of his taking supr eme comman . He sa ys he sees d himself "at the side of General Eise nhower , not as his equal but as aE eff ec tive supporter." General Clark holds two conf erenc es with the key membe s of his Fift h Army r staff today . The first , in the mo rnin g, is to inform them that the move to Oujda is imminent and that advance unit s probably will leav e Algiers January 2 . The second, calle d following the Giraud conference and a long meeting between Genera ls \ I �19I SECRtt : uals Britu ) 1 i, 1( ,- y _ , .• r Clark and Eisen hower , is to t ell the Fifth ./1. group t ha t it might possibly rmy be sent eastward instead of westwa r d t o wor k on the Sfax operation . Things are in a hecti c state of flux and General Clark , when he goes home after an exhausting day of conferences, is n' t certain whic h way he is g oing to jump-eastward or westwa r d . I * ALGIERS DECEMBER , 1942- -General , 29 enti r e Southern Tunisian front t Cla rk is give n command today of the He will comma d all t roops, Ameican and French , south of the line of den r ma.rkation agreed upon between Generals A nderson and Gir aud some time ago . This line runs from Sousse , on the Tunisian coast , straight back through Ksour , Alge r ia . It ' s southern boundary will extend into Tripolitania , to the r ear of Rommel's r et r eating Afr ika Korps . 'l'he decision to put General Clark in command of this vital be the offensive secto r comes after a mo rnin g of conferences . It at a meeting solely between Generals Clark and Eisenhov,er in the Chief 1s offi c e . General Clark r etu rn s sobe rl y to his office and takin g over the Southe rn Secto r . Giving me this command was the decision eve r made i n my behalf . 11 sector that will is topped off Commander-in declares : " I'm most crucial The gene ral now plans on movine his Fifth A my Headquarte r s to Tebessa , r on the Southe rn Front , instead of to Oujda , near the Alge r iam,...French M oroccan border . The headquarters will be stripped to the bare essentials necessary for handling a zone of combat and fo r bringing up the neces sary men and materie l from the r ear areas . Because the offensive must get underway soon if the drive on Sfax is to be made while the opposition is predominantly Italian, General Clark plans on flying to Tebessa tomorr ow to look the situation over on the ground . He will go up with General Spaatz and Colonel Howard, the Fifth Army G- 2 . In all probability , General Eisenhowe r and All i ed Force Headquarters will be moved to Constantine to be closer to both t he British Fi r st A rmy, holdine the North Secto r unde r General .Anderson , am the U ed States Fi fth Army, nit which will be on the offensive in the Southern Secto r under Genera l Clark . During the afte r noon General Clark calls conference afte r conference to in st r uct his key men on the changed plans and start them driving toward the goal of launching the attack on Sfax befo r e January 15 . Because he plans a smal~ but st ro ng staff, General Clark wil~ make certain personnel chan ges . His Air Service Commandofficer will be General Crai g . Gener al Clark will have both groun d and ai r troops under him. Because the problem of transportation and communication is so acute in the urrler-developed southern and eastern se ction of Algeria , General Clark puts the pressure on his G-4 , Colonel Adcock , and on both General Matejka , AFHQChief Sigr.a l O fficer, and General li! ran, Fifth o A my Signal Office r. Every available r conveyance is going to be used to get fighting men and fighting materials ready and available for action . The genera l is cracking orders ri ght and left . "Hell , Addie ," he says to Adcock , "nobody ' s thought about using camels dovm there in the south . They don ' t use wat er and the y don't need much food . If we could get camel pack trains started they soon could be hauling in a 100 tons of stuff or so a day . Every ton is goi ng to count . W hile you are seeing about trucks ~nd narrow-guage railroa ds , you'd bette r inqui re into the camel situation . " This is only an example , and a poor one , of the way General Clark searches for every possible means t ~ j~ ,l ve a ~ · r esult . Ee uses his imagination but is still practical. .:)t.l...R ET ---- E~uu British MOST SECPl=T ls �SEC T RE E11u als British MOST ~: c., _ 1 General Cla r k knows not defeatism . If a thing looks impossible , he has a stock r eply that is sometimes curt : 11We1 11 find the means somehow." And somehow he al ways does . During the day he dashes over twice to the Fifth A rmy hea dquarters . His staff officers, who have been conc entrating on plans for Backbone and obtaining personnel and supp li es for a full Arrrryhead quarters, must now change their perspective ent ir ely . The dr ive on Sfax wi l .i be the immediate problem , the occupation of Gabes to dominate the corridor throu gh whi ch Rommel will retreat if he is going to make a la st African stand with Axis troops in Tunisia will be the second consideration. W oven in with this must be measures to pre vent an attack f ro m the · north when Sfa."'{is taken. The general hl.'l.sa tactical appreciation conference with Generals Smith and Gr uenther . General Eisenhower comes to General Clark ' s ofi'ice t wice during the late after noon to discuss ideas . The ene r gy of the entire headquarters is being tbrO\m into the new development . General Allen of the 1st Division arriv es in Al gie r s and is told of the sudden shift in plans . General Vl , who left here early ard this morning to do road r econnaissance in the Southern Sector , is reached by phone late at night and told guardedly that new plans are afoot and arrangements are made for him to sta rt wor king on the new problem . Fur ther steps must be taken to turn over more equipment to the best troops in the Southern Sector and to bring up new Ame i can units from the Western and Center Task Forces . r * * ALGIERS HELEPTE-FERIANA -T , DECEMBElt , 1942-Follov iin g last-minute 30 conferences with his Chief o§ Staff , General G uenthe r, and delay at the airport r awaitin g weathe r reports,holds up General Clark's departure for the Southern Sector until 1108 . He takes off in General Spaatz' Flying Fortress . The Kew commander of the Southern Sector has only General Spaatz and Colonel Howard. Guns are out of the slides and portholes as soon as the B-17 is airborne . As the plane heads east , General Clark watches the ground intently , studying the road network over which much of the supply for his Fifth Army and Fr ench troops under him wil~ move. The plane lands at 1305 at Thelepte airfield . The field is tremendous and in excellent condition in spite of r ain. It could be developed into a first-class airdrome . Al though it has no runways, General Bl ackburn of the U. S. Air Corps , commanding the field , says it is the finest all - weather one he has ever seen . It has natural drainage. A the airport, t General Clark is met by Frenc h General s Velvert and Blac kburn . Pilots working out of the field are operating in the Gabes-Gafsa re gion . 'l'he ai r drome is held only by a platoon of parat ro ops and General Clark decides the strategic area is too lightly held . General Clark and his party are driven four kilometers into Feriana and there he comers uith Colonel Raff on the gene ral situation in the secto r . W hen Raff is finished , General Velvert exp lains the situation as it re gards the Fr enc h army in the region. Afte r hearing the two men, General Clark says he wil.i. send one armored infantry battalion and a bat talion of tanks to the vicinity of Feriana . These will r eport to Raff who is going to be placed in command of all American troo ps in the vicinity of Feri ana. General Clark says that orders will be issued taking Raff and his far-flung troops, some as far away as Pichon, out from under French control. General Blackburn report s that he has had to dispatch some of his air units to the north on coIIL~andof Genera l Anderson. Buttonin g up his southern sector tighter , General Clark says such demands must be discontinued. During the visit he decorates Colonel Raff with the Si lver Star for "ga llantry in action . ·SECRET Eq,.rn Britis h MOST SECRET ls �i\/· ·, : ( \9 3 CRE T General Clark and his ~ t~i ~~gki/'tS? e,:b o~~ ijGJost of the 5rd battalion of the 26th InfantriJ . He finds that the discipline of the men is sloppy and orders that s teps be taken imm ediately to correct the fault . A 1552 the t general r etur ns to Thelepte and takes off for Algiers . As Genera l Clark sees it, his big ges t pro blem in the souther n s ecto r is going to be logistics . The countr y is quite mountainous . Feriana is at an altitu~e of 4 , 000 feet . Roads lea di ng into this Southea st A ger ian r egi on are l few and twisting . The railroad serving most of it is narrow gua ge while the coastal railroad is standa r d. Genera'i Clark be gi ns to weigh the transportation factors . The Flying For tress l ands at M aison Bla nch e just befo r e dark and the ge neral hurri es to Allied Forc e Headquarters and r eports to General Eisenho wer . M eanwhile , General Fr ede ndall , commande of the II Corp& arrives from O an r r with seve ral members of his staff, including fou r who se rved in the II Corps unde r General Clark- - Colo re l Tully and Li eutenant Colonels Hewitt, W ilson and Talcot t . The new situation is explained to the II Corps group. General Clark says he is se nding a Headquarte r s and a Signal Officer to Tebes sa immediate l y to arrange fo r the new South er n Secto r headquarte r s . "W e've got to move fast because that situation is moving fast as hell up th er e and we can 1t l et anyone ge t the jump on us . I 'm going to move troo ps in as r apid ly as possible . They will be thro wn in as soon as they can be sup ported logistically . Part of Combat Com,'lla. B is going to eo into the sector tomorrow ni ght . They will take si x nd days of supp lie s in with them and we have to w ork out their followin g supply problems . I think we can transport part of our suppl y go Phillipevil l e by wate r , the n move it to Batna by rail. FrO\n there we will truck it . I 'm also se riou s about my propos al that we se e what can be done with camel trains. We are going to have to get every ounce of cap acity we ca n sque eze out . 11 ( Late tonight 16 pers ons accused of plotti ng the death of Admiral Darlan are seized . The death of Darlan has caused little chan ge in the Fr ench civil and military groups . The cooperation of the French authorities continues excellen t and such r ealignments as may result are expec t ed tm i mp rove the si t uation. The period now seems to be a period of consoli dation. General Giraud ha s r adio ed General DeGaull e that he b el ieves the t wo ge nerals should hold a confer enc e but that he does not believe the ti me is yet ripe . * ALGIERS DECEMBER 1942-- General Clark calls on General Gira ud ea rl v , 31, toda y to ac quaint the Frenchman with the sudden deve lopments concernin g the ~ propos ,xJ. activati on of the Sout hern Front . Gener al G iraud , who sees General Clark at 8 :45 AMbeca use th e High Commissi oner is goin g to the front to see French troops , is deli ght ed when he learns that the Deputy Corruna. - in - Chi ef nder has been appointed to com mand the Southern Sector and l ead the driv e agai nst Sfax . ( Genera l Clark explains that one difficulty arrivin g ari sin g from this decision is the problem of placing General Juin 1 s com~and under an American general. Giraud says he believes the f ront f r om Pont du Fahs t o Pichon sho ul d be kept under the com mand of Juin since , because of t er ra in, it can be nothin g but a defensive area . This , argues Giraud, will r elieve General Clark of the wary and allo w him to conc entrate on offensive operations fa.tt her south . The Fr ench general agrees th at al l Frenc h units bet ween Pic hon and Beri ana will come_direct ~y under the orders of the Ameic an commande Thes e French troops r r. are led by Generals Koeltz and Volvert . This 150 kilo met er l ong area between Pic hon and Fer iana would be the offe si ve front and Giraud de cl ares t hat "such a larg~ fr~nt should absorb al~ t he ener gie s ?f t he gene r al com-na ndin g t he oper ation. ""f!!:, \·" · :: : . t . :E,i'. h fi@~ J: ~ t \ �W-:£\1;)"".' ~i[ CRE ( E11als Briti sh / ,\O:.T .s:c u Giraud urges that the British in the nor th carry on strong action during the Southern Secto r bui ld-u p period 11to keep enemy units fully occupied" but that this action should not con s ist of any concerted offen sive on the north. The center section , unde r Juin , would also connive to exert constant pressure . General Cl ark emphasizes th at the sector under Juin must "hold at al.L costs and protect my left flank . 11 General Clark , on this basis , says he has no st r ong objection to J uin commanding the Pont-<iu - Fahs - Pichon r egion . Giraud says that Allied For ces have cont ro l since Juin is under the or ders of General Eisenhower and therefo r e must integrate his action i n the center with those in the Southern Sector. The subject of the 25 P-40s that General Clark obtained for French forces then comes up . Gir aud said he had pla.~ned to use these fighte r planes in the Feriana area but that he felt that now it is to become an Ameican offensive r secto r that the French operated American planes should be use d more to the north to assist Juin . General Clark agr ees but succes sfully tacks on the provision that these planes be available to the Southe rn Secto r when the operation fi r st.gets underway and at othe r crucial periods i f necessary . Next the matter of supply comes up and General Giraud promises to turn over to General Clark the use of an addit i onal train and a half dai ly on the narrow gua.ge r ailroad ser ving the r egion. Two and a half trains a day are already at American disposal . When the interview ends, 'Gene~al Giruad leaves for the fron t andGeneral Cl ark r eturns to his office in the St . George hotel. ( Reports of an air r aid on Casabla nca come in during the mornin g . Twelve to 15 enemy plares , believed to have flown down from Southe rn France in a "token" rai d , dr op 300 , 500 and 1 , 000 pound bombs but do no great damage . Sixty civi~iB.11s are killed . The on~y army casualties are 11 wounded . Reports also come in concernin g the paratroops that were drop~ed t wo ni ghts ago on the railroa d between Tunis and Sousse . The chutists dropped three mi~es f r om the bridge they were to deooli sh and were surrounded by Germans . Three American soldiers and an officer escaped and got back to f r iendly te r ritory . Another tactical event heightens the day . Two German glmrs land 16 mil es south of Feriana and anothe r is found far to the rear , near Setif . A bridge on the Feriana-Gafsa r ai l way is b l ovm up but it is soon fixed and nine German airborne soldiei ·s are captured. Thi s is the onl y unusual activity of the day . Rain is still pouring over the battle area and operat io ns are restricted to patrols and some light she l lin g . Late r in the day , afte r General Clark has held further conferenc es concerning takin g commarrl of the Southern Sector, the entir e s ituation changes agai n . A radio is received from General Marshall which approves General Clark 1 s ap pointment t o the field command but which then adds that he believes a subordinate, either General Patt on or Fredendall , should command the South ern Sector so General Clark can concentrate on or ganizin g the Fifth Army and plannin g the operation against Spanish M orocco . He prefer s that the comman der of the Fifth Arm move to Oujda "so he can devote his ful.1 time to the Spanish y situation. 11 ( Gener al Clark, al ways eage r for duty with combat troop s , is dis appointed yet sees the soundness of General Marshall 1 s re asoning. Howe er , he ha s fought v thro ugh his belief that American troops should be r emoved from British comma d . n 111 knew, 11 says General Clar k , 11th at that was the ri ght thing to do. I have bee the prime mover in s eeing that the It under Gener al Ander- Southe ~:CRrT t ~Jll als U s~1t A\O~:f '''sr:r '"'-1 t �S ECRET 'Equo British /,\0 : T ~:r •rls son 1 s control . I d like to show what American troops can do under their own commanders and just what could be done on the Southern front . I knew al~ along that this sector did not call fo r an Army commander. It calls fo r a reinfo r ced di vi sion or a Corps at the most . As I was getting this thing going I was takin g over General Fr edendall 1 s II corps in r eality . The Wa Department r saw it the same way so I am going to or ganize the army and Gene ral Fredendall is going up to command the Southern Secto r with his II Cor ps staff . My sele ction was merely a matter of per sonalities as far as the Southern Secto r was conce r ned . Ike wanted me to do it and my ta.king com and was what General Gir aud m sought . The Wa Depar tment 1 s plan is sound i nasmuch as the secto r is pr imarily r an operation involving a r einforced armored di vision . That is the way the thing is going t o stand and I am going to Oujda in about a week to devote myself to the double-barreled job of organizing the army and get~irg down to brass tacks on preparing fo r Spanish Mo occo . 11 r 1 ( Alt hough Genera l Clark has a sore throat and a touch of flu , he remains at his office until after 7 PM despite the fa ct it i s New Year ' s eve . * * ALGIERS J ANUARY 1948-The crack of r ifle shots , the rattle , 1, of machine guns , the swift orange arcs of anti - aircraft shells fi r ed by Bofor s guns and the hootin g of the whistles of merchant and naval vessels welcomes in the New Year. Ther e is little levit y . A smal l , quiet party is held at the general ' s villa . ( General Clark viO ks a normal day, payin r, no attention r to the fact that it is a holida y . He is at his office by 8 : 30 AH and plun ges into the two problems at hand : getting mo America re units into the Southe rn Sect or and making preparations fo r activation of the Fifth Army and the move to Oujda . Gener al Clark ' s army is to be activated January 4 . The Spanish situation and moves he wust make into Spani sh Mo rocco in event of trouble occupy the general ' s thoughts . "Just put yours elf in Hi tler ' s place and figure out what he and his genera l staff are thinking , " says th e general. "Our move into N th Africa surp r ised them . Their move into U or noccupied. France was designed to countera ct us and protect that vulnerable flank from inva sion . Greate r de f ense steps have been taken i n Italy . One weak spot--one place where we could get in wi t hout too much difficulty - -remains . That is Spain. "Naturally , Hitler is lookin g fo r a pla ce where he can st rik e to hurt us t hf'! most . The greatest harm that could occur is that the Straits of Gibr alta r would be closed to us . Hitle r wants to ke ep us off the continent at any cost and he knows that t he whole Ibe r ian peninsul a lies bare ; that we cou ld probably get in , as things stand , without much of a scrap . You hear people say that Hit l er isn ' t showing much st ren gth in the air . He' s holdin g back for somethi ng and it might very logically be Spain or Spanish i,I rocco . W must prepare as fast o e as possible to meet this eventuality . Spanish M ncco is already overr un with or Axis agents . I don ' t think Hitler is prepared to pull anything on the Ibe r ian peninsula now but he probably has it in his mind . He can ' t use troops offensively on the Russia n f r ont until May so he may try an Iberian peninsula. move before that time . 11 General Fredendall has r eturned br iefly to O an to get the move□ent of his r headquarters to Tebessa sta rte d . Orders are going out puttin g all types of units :SEC RET r lHH:i.5 I r. 1h • ·• · , 1,: /1$l1 • 1 •,,... -- ----~ , , ~~ ~ �C E T 2 · ish /.·'O' T ,r:cR ~ on the alert for movement into the Southe rn se : tor --: An r ppreciat io n of RommelIs plans," r eceived today from the British Eighth Army whi ch is pursuing the Afr ika Korps in Tripru.itania. It r eport s that Romme.Lnowhas 11the tendency to look over l his shoulde r . " "Now that Tripoli is no longer an effective supply port," the r epori, continues, "Rommel is lar gel y dependent upon supp lies overland and by li ghter from Tunisia. If a Allie d threat to the Sfax -Bab es area were to deve lop , and if the Axis fo r ces in Tunisia r equ ire help to count er it , he might fe el compelled to dispatch a protect ve fo rce to assist in the defense of th at area whi ch is vital to his supplies • •• 11 General DeGaull e has r adioed General Giraud that he does not believe "that the effective reunion of the whole Empir e and of all available French effort , associated with resistance in France itself , should be delayed for a moment ••• I am convinced that only a provisional central French authority, based on a national association fo r the 1- osecution of the war , is capable of guaranteeing r direction of the French effort, the maintenance intact of French sovere gnty a rd the just repre sen tation 0£ France in for eign lands • 11 Giraud, who has told DeGaulle that he t hinks the present time is not appropo for a meetin g , is asked to reconsider a meeting at Fort Lamy Brazzaville , or Bei i r ut . The general confers throu ghout the day wit h Generals Eisenhower , G uenther , r Rooks and Smith , primarily , and the ta lk is devoted to one of two things : the opening of an offensive in the Southe rn Secto r and activation of the Fifth Army to begin pr eparat ions for possible moves in Spanish Mo rocco . * -l(· ALGIERS JANUARY , 1943--The directive , 2 for oper atio n 11Satin"-the South er n Tunisian offensive-is completed and delivered today to General Fredendall. Thus, General Clark I s plan to kee 1 the drive against the Axis rolling instead of wait J ing for weather to make the Northern Sector usable goes into gear . Ameican troo ps r will operate under American command. General Clark, inte grati ng the plans , facilitating movement towar d the front of fresh troops , particular ly from the O ran region, spends most of the day orienting General Frectendall and members of his II Corps staff . Troops that will make the Southern Tunisia offensive are being assembled in the Constantine-Souk Ahras - Souk El Arba re gio n. During assembly they are char ged wit h protecting the lines of communication . Then , moving under cover of darkness to give 11Satin 11 every pos sible element of surprise, the troops wil l move into the Tebessa-Sbeitla -Feriana region f ro m whence they wil~ start their push . The date is se t , tentatively, for January 20 but the battle will start sooner if possibl e . The objective is to cut communications between Tunisia and Tripol itania . The. 11 Satin 11 force is to seize and hold Sfax and/or Ga es . As an alternative, l::r th e force can also operate di r ectly against Sousse . In addition to the American units that are moving to the front from rear a-eas , General Fred endall will also have command over Combat CommandB which is moving down fr om the north, th e force that is already in the Southern Secto r under Colo nel Raff and Fr enc h troops in the r egion with the exception of General Juin 1 s force in the Pichon region. A Br itish paratroop briga de is also being moved down to carry out special offensive missions. Backbone of the assault will be the 1st Arrnored Division under General Ward. General Clark confers lenghily with General Ward today. The other comple te unit will be the 26th Regimental Combat team. Because of com.munications and supply difficulties this is all the troops that can be safely moved into the Southern Sector . 4-, 4 .... -c; ~., ~ ,..;... '<.- 4<L?"-"", ,O c ,-.,,.- 7 , ~- ,q._--,_~~ .x.&., ~ ·SEC RET �··'SECRET . Ec11.rn Btlti::h /.\0 '.~ ls T ( .s :cpr-;- Because of the urgency of getting things ro l ling on "Satin, " General Clark has little time to devote today to Fi fth ArTI\Y matters . Section heads ar e busy helpin g General Fredendall 1 s staf f members who arrive during the day f r om Oran. General Cl ark confe r s with Generals Doolit t le and Spaatz conc ernin g integration of air sup port for the Southern Sector offensive . G r al Eisenhower drops into ene General Clark's Qffice occasional ly to discuss the progre ss of the new move. Additional units of the Fifth Army leav e Alg ie r s by m otor this mo nin g for r 0uj da . It i ncludes more personnel and some record s . M ore personnel wil~ be dis patched M onday and Tuesday . If things settle dovm on "Satin," General Clark now plans to fly over to Oujda on We dnesda y , the day after the Fifth .A:rmy activis ated . Four more Axis agents ar e exe cuted in Algie rs t oday , al l for sabota gin g r ailroa d facilities . The group picked up in connection wit h the plot on Darlan ' s life are in protective custo dy . General Clark says that quite a terrorist gang has be en uncovered and one of thetr plans call ed for assassination of Giraud . Further precauti onary steps are taken to protect Giraud and Generals Eisenhower and Clark . * * I ALGIERS JiANUARY, 1942- -"I hate to turn my back on the Sout hern Secto r , .5 and head west to organize the Fift h Army but it ' s ju st a matter of my having too much r ank for the front line job , :r General Clark , obvio usly , is pertubed t ha t he is goi ng to Oujda, away instead of toward the action , Because of "Satin's" imm my and since he originally ine iniatiated the plan and did the spadework, Gener al Clark is still devotin g most of his time to pre parati ons fo r the oper ation . I \ Tro ops are moving steadily toward the "Sati n" area . So much military traffic is goin g between Oran and Al gie r s that a contro l system has been wor ked out between 0rl ea nsvi lle and Algie rs . During the latter stages of the trip the convoys are get ting fighte r cover in case c.f enemy harrassment . Units that have not yet sta r ted m ovin g are being ale rt ed and motor t ran sp or t is being taken f ro m the WesterlDl Task Force to aid the mo vement whi ch is being made by ro ad , rai l arrl wat er (the latte r to Bone and Bougi e) . Ther e is one sta r tling development during the day . Colonel Raff calls General Clark f r om Fer iana to r eport that 40 Ger man tanks surrounded the gar r ison at Fondouk , seven miles sout heast of Pichon , isolating one battalion of French in fant r y , one battery of French artillery and one squad ro n of Frenc h motor ized cav alry . General Cla r k tells Raft to dispatch his tank dest r oyer battalion to dis lodge the Germans . Both Gafsa , in the southern secto r , ar.d Bone, in the nort h, ar e attacked by bomber s . Our activity in the air is heavier and more successful than it has been in weeks . Flying For tresses , esco r ted by P- 58s , atta cked Tunis with accurac y . The 20 For ts and their escort were atta cked by about 50 Axis planes . The B-17s knocked down 17 and our fighters got two mo re, In exchange for 19 enemy planes we lost but six . D ocks ad a mili tar y camp at Sousse and a ai ~way brid ge between Sousse and Sfax were also attacked by us . C General Clark spends most of his day in conferences concering the Souther n Sector operat io n . General Fredendall , wor king to perfect his plans for th e offensi ve , comes twice to General Clark's office to go over the situatio n . Once again bus ine ss prevents General Clark from going to church . He comes to the office expecti ng to go to the Holy Tr i nit y Church of Algie rs bMP. F.~~ s pile up on ~ him and weekly wor ship is impossible . · A'<t. I ~C:\ .. Eeiuals British MO ST SECRET fl \ �SECRE T ( Eeiu als Brifi :;h M O-:.r ,t;~Lt I . Late in the afternoon his Fifth Army staff confers with the general cer ning final plans fo r the move to Oujda . ~ost of the staff wil~ depart morrow morning by plane . W hile the conference is going olll,.,General Clark his first order as 6ommand ing General of the Fifth Army. It is t he ord er ati ng the Fifth Army. It will be published tomor r ow. con to si gns activ - Before go .,_g to his villa following a busy Sur.day , General Clark paces the n floor of his office and declares : "I want you to understand why I am goi!ls to Oujda i r~tead of f orward to Tebessa to hea d this Southern offe nsive . •W hen the question of who would command 1 Satin 1 came up it was obvious that it was either a division or barely a Cor ps com and . The job could be done by a good , aggressive m division commander. I wanted that command and I want ed it ba d . I was overcom e by my desire to ham.l e the thing beca us e I felt so close to it . D espite 1 Ike 1 s 1 objections I put over my plan to put t he Southe r nr,Sector under the Fifth Arm y and under my command. That would have meant that in reality I was commanding a r einfo r ced division and that I didn 1 t even have a Corps b etvreen m and the div e ision . It was n ' t pr acticabl e . I hate to turn my back on the thin e but I 'v e got too much rank. So, 1 1 11 go to Oujda W ednesda y ." * * ALGIERS J ANU 4, 1942-The 1"ifth United States Army is activated , ARY and put under the command of Lieutenant G eneral Clark . today Tflis is the fir st U ed States Army to be activated nit overseas in W orld ·11ar II . The other four Unite d States Armies are within the continental limits of the United St ates . The elements of General Clark ' s command are the W este r n and Center Task For ces (commanded, r espec tively , by Generals Patt on and Fr ede ndall ) less troops attached to the M editerranean and Altan ti c Base Sections (SOS troops ) . Th .. basic or gani zation of the Fifth Army i s comprise d , inital ly , of the I A mo r red Corps, in French M orocco; the II ArmyCor ps , in Al geri a; and the XII Air Support Command The te rr ito r ial r esponsibi lit y of Gener al Clark ' s ar my is , initially, . the area of French Mo occo and Al ger ia west of a north - south line throu gh r O eans vill e inclusive . General Clark is r esponsbi l e in this ar ea for all matters rl involving relationships with local civil of ficial s. He has discipl i nary juris dict ion over all parts of his ar ea excep t within aceas actually occupried by 12t h Air Force troops and areas actual l y op~upi ed by SOS commands. General Clar k is r espo nsible fo r all administrative functions normally devo l vin e on an Army Commande, r The initi al mis sion of the Fifth Army is : to prepa r e a striking force of at least one infant r y divisi on and one armor ed division for amphibious operations; to insure integrity of al l ter itory of French M occo and Alge ria within its or ar ea; to coope r ate wi t h French Civi l and M litary autho r ities in or ganizin g i and equip ving and training French forces and in preserving law and or de r; to prepare plans and execute special ope ation s . l Another part of the small } ifth Army hea dquarters departs this mo nin g by r plane for Oujda . General 0 1Daniel , .who wil l handle amphibious training ope r ations , re port s back to General Clark following a r econnaissance through the Fifth Army area . He r ecomme d s that amphibious training n be carried on at Arzeu beach , just west of O an . It ap pears to be the only suitab le be ach inside the M r editerranean for carr ying on this type of tr aining without interruption . Thr oughout the day the ge ner al discusses several organization matt er s with Fift h Army staff members but still his eyes , primar il y , ar e on facilitating movem t'l1t-,of tr o-2P. into the s Southern Sect or for the coming offensive. .:)t.C T Rt. EqlJ!als Bri tish f/\OS T 5,...: r \ ( �~ CRE T { \ Ettuuls British / ·•.::x: ::.. .T :r Preparations to expedite movement of sup ply into the region are perfected. The British First Army is prepar ed to transport certain supplies into Tebessa and help move them forward to advanced depots . It is found that port space at Philippeville and Bone is adequate to handle supplies for Satin . Capacity of the meter guage rail system is adequate for the ope r ation . The bottlenecks that may delay movement of equipment to the southern sector from the coastal points are lack of sufficient port labor , · lack of labor at transfer points and insufficient motor transport . Camel trains do not a1pea r feasible since it takes two camels to transport one ton per mile per day . Convinced that the greatest danger to Satin is lo gistics , General Clark bears dovm on this matter . With part of his ~ifth Arm staff and with General Fredendall 1 s II Cor ps y staff closin g up their temporary headquarte r s in late afternoon to move to Tebessa , General Clark ducks out of his office to again hike in the hills with M L Ball and Lieutenant Beardwood . No~ that the move to Uujda is set and aj r the Satin plan is developing and awaiting only the movement of troops and supplies into position , General Clark is chaf f ing at the bit to get going . Because of a touch of flu , the leaves his office at 6 : 30 PM earli er than , usual , to go to his villa . * ( ALGIERS ,JANUARY 1943-- As of 1:00 AMtoday the United States Fifth Army , 5, becomes a physical , tan gible unit of the United States Armed Forces . It 1 s formation and activation is announced by General Eisenhower to the press and in radios to the W Department , headquarters ar in London, and various forces of the North African theater . General Clark spends most of his final day at Al lied Force Headquarters turning over details he has been handling as De~uty Com.:ia.nde in - Chief to rM ajor General W B. Smith, AFH Chief of Staff . The ideas and p~ans that the . Q Deputy Com nder has had in the back of his mind are t r ans m ma. itte d to Gener al Smith in a long conference in General Clark 1 s of fice . During the day various officers, many of them who have been associated close ly for months with General Clark, come in to say goodbye and wish the ComJJander of the Fifth Army good luck . Interspersed through the day are conferences conc ern in g "Satin . 11 Units are moving satisfactorily to the front by rail , road and sea . Despite the imminency of his move and the problems it brings , the general still is keeping his finger on the pulse of the coming Southern Secto r offensive . The only out - of-the-ordinarJ visitor of the day is H arold M M c illen , Great Britain 1 s new diplomatic envoy to North Africa . M Mil len will make his headquarters c in Algiers and wor k in cooperation with Al lie d Force Headquarte rs . One of the general ' s last jobs as he quits the Deputy Com:nander-in-Chief's office to r eturn to his villa and supervise the movement of his per sonal effects to Oujda. is to write the following letter to Gener al Eisenhower : "Dear Ike : "In leavin g for my new com.1a.nd I want to tell you how deeply I I , app r eciate all you have done for me. You have brou ght abou t all the success that has come to me during the past fe w mo ns . nt �~60 E141.rnls Brifi:.l, / ( \c,-~ ,--r,..,,. , r;T - . - ,t.:.I "I want you to know that to have served under you during the preparation and con duct of t he North Afr ican operati on has been one of the greatest privile ges whic h could come to any s ol ocier . "Althou gh I had known you inti mately for the past quarter of a century and had always admired you and your abi~ity , it was onl y during the stress of the past seven months tha t I r eally , fully coM prehended the de pth and strength of your character . Your examples of leadership and character have set for me a goal whic h I some day hope to reac h . Your understanding and consideration for your subordinates has endeared you to all of us . " I hope you will consid er my going as only temporary and know that stand ready and anxious to serve you in any capa city in order to bring you the success which you deserve . "Sincer ely , (si gned) W ayne . " I In the eveninR General 'l<;isenhower has a. farewell part y at the villa th e Com::ia.nderand Deputy Commander have sha red. All the to p-ran king officers with whom General has been associated for the past several months ar e there . His goin g to Oujda to take command of the ~·ifth Army means the end, at least for the ti me being , of these close associations with such officers as General s Eisenhower , Rooks , Hamblen, Sawbridge and others with whom he has confe rred daily ever since he left II Army Corps neadquarters in Salisbury last August 12 and went to Norfolk House , London, to be gin workin g on the No rth Afric an operation . ( The move to m orrow brings to an end the second phase of the gene ra.l ' s career ove rseas in the past seven months. The first ended on August 12 when he left II Army Corps head quarters and moved into th e Deputy Commandership of America ' s biggest effort to date in the war. That his organizati on overseas of the II Corps was sound was proven by the way it acquitted its elf as the Center Task Force in the North African operation . The thorou ghnes s of his work as Deputy Commander of 11Torch 11 was proven by the success of the tremendous operation . Now he turns to taking over command of th e first United States Army or gani zed overseas in the current war . May the V for Fifth Army also stand for a V for victory l * * � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, December 2, 1942 - January 5, 1943 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from December 2, 1942 to January 5, 1943. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1942 1943 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Language A language of the resource English Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/806 Date Valid Date (often a range) of validity of a resource. 1940-1949 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/4231ef35475cf7225b0d909c8da624b6.pdf?Expires=1773878400&Signature=Wdnfj8EkLiMWDJ527ir-bPdJgW2jTnRJeihgq5YOpnsYcAJ1aoN2iK1s7S3yqtae8dYMbFihoTbeS4vAuUNOyiDmVEGa5u-20kgcGqUxdR7dh7kdzAVFRtyl%7E6nhyDRa0sTVhQWzfx8SMinHocKAo3LzJtSAsN4bhlklckbTPjRoNV3mEtAC1T1BymR3k3b9STf0z0aPKtGwmSV2-7hI3st%7EPXdhljiCzxW2KLTpKh8RrUIxvNvcbQdVj-OX5glMNIaKnkMKtKa5GxqK6rxYNSiQTPxClzUuaolRAF-f7uTPPifmApYcAky-caaS8tzQnihabRTuoasNrqW8%7Egtcag__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 76a10ef5b5b072f818fe7865c3f7166b PDF Text Text f NOTE This is volume three of the War Diary of Lieutenant General Mark w. Clark. The first volume, covering the period June 28 to September 24, 1942, has been d eposited, in care of Brigadier General Floyd Parks, at the Army War College, Washington, D.C. The second volume, covering the period September 25, 1942, to January 6, 1943, is in the possession of First Lieutenant Jack B. Beardwood, aide-de-camp to General Clark. L Clas�ification cane lei o• changet to. .... .• .... ...... / by authori t;r of,(;� 1,..-, r- r,;y.. ,/. -� .. "i, J '-- e >1 ,,,--i / ...0 11P, ((f'-!:1 J.� .� ,J/ /YT a YI• (IV, tl�rl<.. �his post as AU:HERS-ORAN, JANUARY 6, 1945--Genera.C , Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Force and turning from a highly success­ ful job in the past to the difficult task of organizing an army and preparing it for some mission in the future, leaves Algiers at 8:25 AM for Oujda. His convoy is composed of his Packard, a jeep and an bul.1et proof Damlier. The general rides in the lead car with Colonel Sullivan, the Fifth Army Qu.arter­ master. While the general's party is trave.iing the CQast road because the Fifth Army Commander wants to re-visit the house where he met with French offic­ ials when he made his secret African rendezvous last October, the reaainder of the Fifth Army group departing from Algiers today goes west by the inland route. The general's convoy arrives at the rendezvous house, about 10 kilometers west of Cherchel, Algeria, at 10:40 AM. The house, the owner has reported previously to the general, has been under sir'leillance for the past two and a half months. When the convoy arrives, it pulls up on the highway near the house and General Clark sends his aide, Lieutenant Beardwood, up to see if anyone is home or on guard. The house, on a bluff overlooking the sea, is vacant, all the shutters being closed. The general must have made a wild dash when the police raided the house the second time. The wal.L over which he leaped is over four feet high and the bank down which the general plunged is rock and tree strewn and has a pitch of about 60 degrees. Unable to see the owner, General Clark orders the convoy to proceed. Lunch is eaten at the side of the road, four ki.iometers wast of Tenes. General Clark cooks his own soup over a canned heat fire. The convoy then pushes on. Du.ring mid-afternoon the general gets tired of being a passenger so he gets into the driver's seat of his Packard and the pace of the convoy increases. Oran is reached at 5:27 PM and the general and. his party go directly to the Grand Hotel, now the headquarters of the Mediterranean Base Section since ·departure of the II Corps to the front. General Clark confers with General Larkin, commander of MBS, concerning cooperation between the Base Section and the Fifth Army. General Ryder, who has moved back to Oran to undertake its protection now that General Fredendall has moved out with his corps, also .confers with General Clark who explains the new command and geographical jurisdiction now that the Fifth Army is activated. The general and his party remain overnight at the. Grand Hotel. -'* ORAN-OUJDA, JANUARY 7, 1945--At 7:42 AM General Clark's convoy pulls out on the last leg of the trip to Oujda and Fifth Army Headquarters. The twisting road over the mountains between Oran and Oujda is driven in a steady, cold rain. During the latter stage of the trip, the general's caravan passes convoys of United States trucks moving �astward from Casablanca and other parts of French Morocco. Some of the truck columns are parked along the road whi�e tne drivers eat or sleep. General Clark stops beside one of them and talks to the lieutenant leading the column. The general warns that the trucks must be dis­ persed farther apart since they are too close toge�her in event of strafing or bombing by enemy planes. The general arrives at his Fifth Army headquarters at 12:48 PM, going directly to his villa which is on one corner of the rambling grounds of a girl's school which is being turned into headquarters for the genera�'s new com,nand. The villa is a two-story salmon pink home. It has already been pre­ p's.red for the general I s occupancy. The e��{�¾. --��.t.S., . ?.:_),?,t�. lµ�cheon then goes _ ��v to his office. It was formerly the off'ice of the director of the school. The office, with a curved, windowed wall on one side, overlooks the dirt courtyard around which are low, white school buildings which contain other Fifth Army sections. After a brief meeting in his office with some of his section heads, General Clark makes a tour of headquarters. He visits the various offices and talks with officers and enlisted men. He flabbergasts eniisted men by going up to them, sticking out his hand and saying: "I'm Clark." At 5:30 PM the genera.1. has principal members of his staff to his villa for a get-together. The gene.ra.L and 29 officers listen to President Roosevelt I s message to Congress. Quiet and sober-faced, General Clark and his men sit and stand around the living room of the villa listening to the President's talk. When the broadcasts ends, General Clark proposes two toasts, the first to the President of' the United States and the second: "To the Fifth Army, the new baby. 'May she play a vital role in the victory that the President has predicted." The officers all raise their glasses and drink solemnly. General Clark eats dinner at his new home. * * * OUJDA, FRENCH MOROCCO, JANUARY 8, 1943--Determined to get off on the right foot and build the fifth Army on a sound foundation that will instill a vigorous esprit de corps and "a desire to participate," General Clark makes a reconnais­ sance of Oujda and its environs today to see how enlisted men are set up. ( "I'm working on the same princip.1.e I worked on at Salisbury," says General Clark. 11 I want to get this thing started properly so the men will have the keenest desire to participate. They must have pride in themselves if they are to have pride in their army. We're starting here from scratch and we don't want any strikes on us before we start swinging." General Clark finds that some colored troops are sleeping in pup tents in the mud. He also finds that there is no recreation for the men. As soon as he returns to headquarters, General Clark takes these steps: from the Mediterranean base section at Oran he orders motion picture projectors and film; the battalion of the 50th Infantry which is stationed in the vicinity of the Oujda airport is to get films and equipment from Casablanca; pyramidal tents, lumber and other construction supplies are ordered from Oran so the troops can move out of the mud and get into floored tents with double-deck bunks. The venereal disease rate in this section is extremely high so the general orders that two houses of prostitution--rigidly inspected by medical officers-­ be set aside for the exclusive use of American troops. Sentries will be posted outside to keep all non-Americans out and sentries will be posted outside other houses to see that no American enter them. The general orders that prophylactic stations be established within the two American houses and that every man coming out have treatment whether he wants it or not. The general �lephones the G-1 section in Algiers and asks that magazines, newspapers and other day room items be sent down immediately. He calls in his G-1 and his Engineer Officers to get them going on personne� and construction matters. He also confers several times with General Nevins, his G-5 who is Acting Chief of Staff pending the arrival of General Gruenther who has gone to Casablanca before coming to Fifth Army Headquarters. The general's great desire is to keep his command tactical, not administrative. �( 11:15 AM French officials of the Oujda region call on· to formally welcome him. It is a group that the general has met on his two previous organizational visits to Oujda. The group is headed by General Beucler, French commander of the Oujda region. It inc.Ludes the 11 chef de la. region 11 and the mayor of Oujda. They profusely welcome the general and he, in turn, exchanges pleasantries with them. Fifth Army officers are living in the school dormitory and in hotels around Oujda. General Clark also makes preparations for what little leisure they will have. An �fficers' club is to be fixed up in one of the school buildings. A theater for officers and enlisted men is being converted from a gymnasium. A 30-nurse hospital is ordered down from Oran. The weather at Oujda at this time of year is chilly and rainy. There are several bad colds. Colonel Howard, Fifth Army G-2, had to remain behind temporarily in Algiers because of t he f.Lu. Anno1mcement on the radio and in the press of formation of the FifthArmy under command of General Clark has brought varied propaganda repercussions. The reaction is most violent in Italy where the news is used to key up the Italians to look to their coasts against possible invasion. The Italians re­ call that General Clark paved the way for invasion of Africa and infer that such a move can happen again. The Germans say little. Apparently the story was widely played in the United States. The general receives a personal radio­ gram from his family and his mother congratulating him on his new command and sming him their best wishes and love. The general believes that announcement of the formation of the Fifth Army will result in a demand in the United States for the new organization to get into action. "I think," explains the general, "that now that it is knmm in the States that there is a Fifth U.S. Army in Africa that the public will demand that it be given a sector. That will also be the desire of the War Department. 11 Hence, the general believes that annou.ncement of the army's form­ ation might lead to its early use in battle. This, then, demands an all-out effort on every officer's and man's part to elevate himself and his organization to the highest possible standard in the shortest possible time. In order to know his key officers better, General Clark plans on having one or two to his villa each evening for dinner. Tonight he has General Blesse, Medical Officer, and 11'1a.jor Ed Ball, an aide who is also working in the Air Section. The general is also going to re-institute his II Corps plan of writing birthday letters to each officer under his command. An unusual incident occurs tonight outside the general's villa. An attempt is made by someone to scale the fence around the villa. The three guards scare him before they can fire a shot. The guard's flashlights pick up two men, apparently French soldiers, across the street. The man attempting to scale the fence has on an Arabs cloak and hood. He runs around the corner of a nearby mud wall before the guard's can shoot. General Clark orders another guard in the region of the house and in­ creased vigilance. * * OUJDA, JANUARY 9, 1945-- 11 Remember--our one purpose in life is to make this Fifth Army an effective fighting machine. All our efforts must be pointed toward that one goall" �( 5 sllifiiit'IY " Thus, General Clark of the Fifth Army. Approximately 90 nasium to hear the address of their coat over his field uniform, stands address the men. When he enters the him. . v1!1come to the officers officers sit on benches in a bare gym­ commanding general. General Clark, a short behind an unfinished wooden table to room, al� the officers stand and salute "I have assembled you here this afternoon to give you some of my ideas so you can be guided in your work," says General Clark. 11 I want you to know what my ideas are about certain things and some of my peculiarities•.. I am mighty proud to command this new American baby, and I hope that you are proud to be with the only American army that is in active being outside of the con­ tinental United States. Don't worry for one minute for fear we are going to sit here in Oujda and not get into this fight. Just sit tight and put in every minute of every possible day in order that you will be ready to do the job which will come to us in a short time ••• "We are starting everything brand new in the Fifth Army. Our ideals and standards shoulg be just as high as we can make them•••Some of you may wonder why I selected ujda for a center. I did it from a map, knowing donditions which I will give you in a few minutes. I found that it was centrally located, with a good airfield, good road, railroad and signal communications. It is in the center of my area of responsibility-the area extends from Orleansville to and inc�uding Casablanca. An ther reason why I selected this place is be­ cause there are no politicians here. Those who are here will be taken care of by Colonel Saltzman, who will do all of the dirty work as far as I am con­ cerned. Be courteous with the civilians and French military with whom you come in contact. When they show that they are not really cooperative, I will get tough with them, but give them the benefit of the doubt." The commanding general then outlines the mission of the Fifth Army (already included in this diary) and continues: 11We have got a job with many demands but our princi�l one is to get organized and to get your sections in shape so that we can move pronto. I am organizing this headquarters at a little over half of its authorized strength. We don't want to get so unwieldy that it will be dif­ ficult to move when the time comes. We are authorized in the T/0 to set up 228 officers. We are going to organize with 154 •••We are supposed to have 508 enlisted men and we are starting out with 156. Bear in mind that each section chief is operating at reduced strength and using personnel so he can move out and function practicably in the field." General Clark then declares that the heads of special staff sections--such as Quartermaster, Engineer, Signal, etc.--must travel throughout the Fifth Army area "so they can forsee difficulties that might arise." He demands prompt action on all requests made on the Army from either higher or lovrer echelons. He declares that he has "a peculiar way of doing business direct with subor­ dinates. The general then discusses military courtesy, uniforms, plans for selecting a Fifth Army insignia, the need for cooperation within the army head­ quarters and with the First Armored Corps and the 6th Corps, two principal units at present under the Fifth Army. He declares he will not tolerate ex­ cessive drinking and that strict disciplinary measures will be taken to curb it. He tells of the dangers of venereal disease and explains the steps being taken to cut its inroads to the minimum. He orders that each officer and man in each section have half a day a week off and that he spend that tine getting exercise so he will be in the best possible physical condition. �'is to get ready just as "The one purpose we have, i1 declares the genera , fast as we can for the field. Each of us must concentrate on making the Fifth Army an efficient fighting machine just as rapidly as possible." As he did when he took over the rl Army Corps, General Clark asks that officers who have not met him come forward after his speech. They form a line and pass before him. He questions each one briefly. ( This is the list of chiefs of general and special staff sections of the Fifth Army as it is organized by its commanding general, Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark: Chief of Sta.if Brig. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther Secretary General Staff Major Ira W. Porter Asst Chief Staff, G-1 Lieut. Col. Francis A.Markee Asst Chief Staff, G-2 Colonel Edwin B. Howard Brig. Gen. Arthur S. Nevins Asst Chief Staff, G-5 Asst Chief Staff, G-4 Colonel Clarence L. Adcock Adjutant General Colonel Cheney L. Bertholf Artillery Colonel Thomas E. Lewis _Engineer Colonel Franko. Bowman Chemical Colonel Maurice E. Barker Signal Brig. Gen. Richard B. Moran Air Colonel Guy H. Gale M edical Brig. Gen. Frederick A. Blesse Quartermaster Colonel Joseph P. Sullivan Civil Affairs Colonel Charles K. Saltzman Public Relations Major Kenneth W. Clark Provost Marshal Colonel Charles R. Johnson Headqrts Commandant Lieut. Col. C. CQburn Smith General Clark plans on leaving O ujda tomorrow for a week to 10-day trip through the western region of the area. he commands. First, he will go to Casa­ blanca where he will join his Chief of Staff, General Gruenther, and confer with Major General Patton, commander of the Western Task Force and the I Armored Corps. There has been some enemy action already in be General 1 s area of command. Twenty Axis parachutists �ere dropped at Nouvion, 50 miles east of Oran, appar­ ently to carry on sabotage work. Some of them have been rounded up. It is report­ ed that some of them were dressed in civi�ian clothes. On the Tunisian front there has been scattered activity. Between Beja and Mateur Al�ied troops took a hill, then lost it to the Germans. There have been skirmishes between patrols. Troops tha.t will participate in the Southern Sector offensive are moving into the area. The enemy appears to be moving more German troops into this region to sup�ort the Italians. Enemy interest in the sector is indicated by steady patrol activity. As of today, Ganeral Patton's Western Task }orce is· inactivated and his I Armored Corps is reactivated. General Clark has Colonel Chapin and illajor Meacham to his villa for dinner and afterward he goes to the new motion picture theater, the same gymnasium where he spoke in the afternoon, to find a fairly recent film being shown and the hall crowded with officers and men. * * �( ET ( / , - 45--Because of the OUJDA AND CASABLANCA, JANUARY 10 through '°: n} need for secrecy and General Clark 1 s intense and fast-moving activity, thee TJ-/ diary of the past week IIU1st be condensed into one long instalLment. / President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, General Marshall, Admiral King, members of the British cabinet and other dignitaries, including General Giraud, High ColllI'lissioner of French Africa, are meeting in Casablanca to determine two things: (1) thA French governmental and military leadership for all French possessions in Africa, and (2) future conduct of the war against Germany, Italy and their satellites. General Clark made preparations for the arrival of the Allied leaders and participated in various conferences connected with both of the principal subjects under discussion. Flyin� in a B-25, General Clark, unaccompanied by any officers, leaves Oujda at 8:48 AM January 10 for Casablanca. He plunges, on his arrival, into preparations for the arrival in Casablanca by stratoliner of President Roose­ velt, General Marshall, Admiral King and members of their staffs. Extensive security precautions must be taken and the general confers with the secret service. Casablanca anti-aircraft protection must be increased. Housing must be found for all the dignitaries. A speciai air raid shelter is built for the president. Ramps must be built at important points so they President can be removed from the airplane, so he can reach the quarters that have been set aside for him. Since the President, Prime Minister and members of their parties are coming into the area commanded by General Clark, he must make all the preparations. He spends January 10, 11, 12, 15 and part of 14 at Casablanca conferring with General Patton, members of the secret service, supervising all preparations for the arrival of the President and the Prime Minister on tneir highly secret trip. During this time his headquarters at Oujda continues with Fifth Army organizaticnal work. Troops of the 54th division are dispersed at key points throughout the eastern section of General Clark's command area and division headquarters are set up at Tlemcen, 90 miles west of Oran. On orders from General Clark, General Ryder and General Dawley, the latter co!Il!Ilander of the VI Army Corps which is now coming overseas to come under General Clark's command and be stationed at Oran, come to Oujda. There is a possibi�ity that the President may inspect American troops as far west as Algiers and make one of his principal calls at Oujda. Hence, the two major generals are alerted in case they have to �ake the necessary security and construction preparations. General Clark gets back to his Oujda headquarters in mid-afternoon on January 14, flying in from Casablanca in the B-25. Once again he travels alone. He tells no one at headquarters what is going on since the greatest secrecy must be observed regarding the important pending conferences. Working 16 to 18 hours a day, the General keeps a rapid-fire schedule. This despite his having a touch of dysentry which causes great inconvenience. Finding that things are progressing smoothily, General Clark only remains at his new headquarters until January 17 when he gets a hurry-up call from General �arshall to come to Casablanca at once, President Roosevelt wants to talk to him. General Eisenhower confers with General Clark at the Oujda airfield on the morning of January 15. General Clark mnforms the Allied Commander-in-Chief about preparations made at Casablanca and reports on how the Fifth Army is forming. After conferring more than an hour on the wind-swept airport, General osevelt and Eisenhower continues on to Casablanca to re ort.. General Uarshall. �( During his absence at Casablanca, the general has received two interesting letters, one from Admiral Cunningham, Britain's most venerated sea-dog, and from General Eisenhower. Writes Cunningham: 11 My dear Clark: How nice of you to write to convey your best wishes for my birthday. Thank you very much indeed. I am indeed sorry I did not see yvu to wish you luck and say what I hope will be only au revoir. It is good of you to express your pleasure at aur association. Be�ieve me when I say that I have found it an exhilarating and joyous experience to be so closely ass­ ociated with the American Army. Vie ov:e you personally a debt of gratitude for the great trouble you have always taken to ap�reciate and meet our point of view. That the forces of two countries, who, though they have basically the same viewpoint, nevertheless have different ideas on military organisation, should have fused to happily and with so little friction is a very happy augury for the future. All best wishes to the �ifth Army, under your command, when its chance comes it wil�, I know, give a fine account of itself. Perhaps some day we of the Royal Navy may be privileged to take part in some great enterprise with you. It is what we all hope. My grateful thanks again and with all best wishes for the future. Yours very sincerely, (signed) .Andrew Cunningham. 11 General Eisenhovrer 1 s let er results from the Commander-in-Chief's sub­ mission of tne bi-yearly efficiency report on General officers. Writes General Eisenhower: #Dear General Clark: In making out your current efficiency report, I.am impressed by the feeling that it is impossible for me, on an official form, to express my real appreciation of your splendid work for the past several months. You have performed brilliantly as Deputy, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces and in accordance with my highest expectations, based on intimate acquaintanceship with you and with your record covering the pa.st quarter of a century. Even beyond this, there have been certain instances in which your tact, breadth of vision and clear understanding of basic issues have astonished me. At this critical time, I regret very much losing your services in your former capacity but, due to my anxiety to have the W.S. Fifth Army organized quickly and prepared for combat without delay, I feel that your greatest sphere of usefulness is as its Commander. I know you will do a grand job. Most Sincerely, (signed) Dv1ight D. Eisenhower. 11 To this formal letter, General Eisenhovrnr attaches the following longhand note: "Dear Wayne: I made this commendation in semi-official form so that I could file a copy with your record. (signed) D.E. 11 The Fifth Army Chief of Staff, General Gruenther, arrives at Oujda to take up his duties on the afternoon of January 15. The Chief of Staff has been at Casablanca for the past week integrating and putting into effect various plans for the Anglo-British-French conferences. General Le!Ill1.itze:r., .. �I.'rJ.Y�i?- a :r· ·:�·::�:; ��;�::�\:.::: ·. �!;��r,.; �r !,.�-,,:,,· ::,;�,:.,,, . _ _. Ettuals British MOST SECRC.. T ( ( on January 15 to take up Acting Chief of Staff duties. General Nevins, who has been fulfilling that spot temporarily, moves over to head his ov.rn G-5 section. Despite his dysentry, General Clark spends all of January 15 and 16 in his Fifth Army Headquarters office. On January 15 two of the general's 11 submarine trip buddies, 11 Captain Wright and Colonel Holmes phone from the airport to say they are passing through. The general has them come in for lunch and then he sends Captain Wright back to Casablanca to act as liaison officer from the army to Admiral King. Colonel Holmes flies the other direction--to Algiers. The general holds frequent conferences with Generals Gruenther and Lerrmitzer to button up Fifth .Army problems. Determined to get his �ifth Army morale started on the highest possible plane, the general instructs the special service 6fficer and Red Cross officials attached to Fifth Army to get entertainment programs into effect immediately. On Januaty,i6:vthe general has two principal callers, General Maurot, head of all police in Algeria, and General Dawley, VI Corps commander. General �aurot gets the first official ceremony at Fifth .Army Headquarters. When he arrives, he receives flourishes and inspects a special guard lined up in the courtyard near General Clark's office. Maurot 1 s visit is one of courtesy. The visit of General Dawley is strictly business. In addition to explaining to the Corps coU)Illander the,setup and mission of the Fifth Army, General Clark gives Dawley anc'insight into what is going on at Casblanca and alerts him to the fact that Presiden� Roosevelt might make an inspection tour of a greater part of the Fifth Army area. During the afternoon the general inspects the Fifth Army station hospital and comes away predicting it will be one of the most modern and best hospitals in North Africa. In the evening General Clark has General Blesse, the Medical Officer, and the head nurse and senior duty nurse to his villa for dinner. The first case of color trouble arises in the evening v,hen a negro in a quarter­ master company shoots and kills a sergeant in a signal co�pany. The negro con­ fesses and is to be tried by a general court martial • .An urgent call from General Marshall sends General Clark hurrying back u Casablanca on January 17. He departs from Oujda airport at 10:52 .AM. Once more, he goes alone. Arriving at Casablanca, General Clark is met at the airport by General Marshall who tells h.un that President Roosevelt wants to talk to him about the North African political situation. President Roosevelt is lying on his bed when the lanky, black-haired lieutenant general enters the room. The President asks for a blow-by-blow account on political events that took place in Algiers following the general's arrival there on November 9. The general teJ.ls the whole story and President Roosevelt remarks that much of the informaLion never got back to Washington. The President never knew, for instance, that Gereral Clark had at one point placed Darlan 1 under protective custody and surrounded his house with \ a guard. The President indicates that he had been led to believe that Darlan had been dealt with timidly and he is pleased when he learns that General Clark dealt hard with the Admiral. The President tells the general that it had been his plan to establish a military government in French North Africa. Mr. Roosevelt then asks General Clark's opinion of General Giraud. The president says he has heard that Giraud is not too strong and that at times his attitude is not cooperative. General Clark tel.ls the president that he believes he has been mis-informed. The young general tells the president that Giraud has to be treated tough and that when the law is laid dovm to him that he is cooperative. The general declares that in his estimation Giraud stands head and shoulders above the other Frenchmen who seek power in North Africa. He asks the President to see Giraud and judge the man for himself. The president agrees to do so and General Clark goes to get the French general while Hr. Roosevelt prepares to meet him. Together, the .American and the French general g o to Mr. Roosevelt I s ouarters • �/0 {� At first, the three men try to conduct their conversations in F'rench. The president speaks the language but not well enough for the detailed discussions so an interpreter is called in. President Roosevelt explains what he has in mind: The plan calls for three top-ranking Frenchmen in Africa. Giraud to head ,the military with General DeGaulle as second-in-command and a third man, not yet de­ termined, to head the political end. President Roosevelt vaguely mentions getting 11 someone 11 out of France or Switzerland. He grins at General Clark and asks him, jokingly, if he is ready to take another secret submarine trip. The plan also calls for all French African possessions--Martinique, French Equatorial Africa, Djibouti, etc.--to come under the one po.Litical head to form a more or less 11 solid front 11 French African empire. Giraud is de.Ligh ted ,nth the idea. He ex­ changes views with the president and General Clark. Giraud is to have discussions with Prime Minister Churchill and members of the British cabinet follo�ing his talk with President Roosevelt. The American delegation and the.British are at odds over Giraud and DeGau�le. The president favors Giraud as the top military man while the British, who have been playing closely with DeGaulle, want to put the Fighting French leader in command. The matter is very touchy. l ' o.-J ;;/ General Clark is to accompany Maull� to Prime Minister Churchill's if possible. The Roosevelt-Giraud talk lasts half an hour and it is a euccess. Upon leaving the President I s quarters, General Clark accompanies General Giraud R,.. to the Prime Ministers. But upon reaching theie Giraud is taken in tow by a Pr�( British delegation and General Clark is quietly and diplomatically barred. [t "Jl." is what he had expected. During the rest of the afternoon he confers with Gen- {)., eral Marshall and the secret service concerning the P resident's desire to make '\c,va, troop inspections as far east as Algiers. The secBet service opposes the plan vt,-.; and will so inform the president. General Clark confers well into the night -•\ with military and naval leaders who are discussing along whe.t lines the war should nov, be conducted. No plan has jelled as yet. Incidentally, there are .,V 1 reports that the Southern Tunisian offensive planned by the II Corps is to be �d postponed. ,.01 J t� t ,'-..,. I_: t.# ff ,ft- On the morning of January 18, General Clark, who spent an hour alone with the President yesterday, is called again .to the President 1 s study. The two men discuss Giraud and the. President declares that he now shares General Clark 1 s faith in Giraud's strength and ability. Attempts are being made to get DeGaulle to join the conference but the Fighting French leader is playing cagyy. The President asks General Clark how he fared yesterday in his attempt to go with�... �11� to the British conference. 1'he general reports what happened and hoo embarrassing the incident was. The President replies that that is what he ex­ pected. The general then brings up the matter of the president 1 s inspection of American troops and, in view of the secret service 1 s.s-,and, suggests that the President could see the same thing if he wouid visit troops in the Port Lyautey district. General Clark outilnes what he has .in mind. It calls for the President to ride through the troop areas in a jeep. The President is delighted with the idea and gives his approval. Following the discussion, the general, who has become an avid 11 short snorter 11 hound asks the President to sign his bill. This the President does, kidding the general and tellin� him ths.t he must keep his signature secret lest he be pestered by other II short snorters. 11 All in all, general Clark spends a total of t-;10 hours with the President on Jamary 17 arrl 18, one hour and a half of this the President and the general were entirely by themselves. After lunchin� with several dignitaries, includin� Prime i1inister, Churchill, General Clark takes off for Oujda again and arrives there at 4 :4ci P1i on January 18. He confers immediately with General Grueti.th er regarding F:ifth Army matters that have arisen during his brief absence. �r .�,' ·:c·:li�'.ftf'a y'·to leave at OUJDA, JANUARY 19, 1-. \I notice for the west again if he is called, but not expecting a call until tomorrow, General Clark devotes his time to two matters: those dealing with the Fifth Army and ideas for the President's inspection trip to Fifth Army units. Every possible pre­ caution must be taken. The general orders that fighter planes patrol the air over the various regions as the President passes through. He investigates also the military protocol of the President's visit, the rending of honors, the matter of salutes and ruffles. He must make provisions for the press which is being allowed to accompany the President but not print anything until the Pres­ ident has returned safely to the United States. The president will review troops in the vicinity of Lyautey. Unless he receives an earlier call, Gene1'al Clark plans to fly to tne region tomorrow to personally see that all is in readiness for the President's visit. Mr. Roose­ velt is to lay a wreath on a cemetery containing bodies of American war dead of the African campaign. ( Two British officers have arrived at headquarters to be attached to General Clark's staff. One is Captain John A. Grindle of the Royal Navy and the other is Lieut. Col. G.P.L. Weston. Both men are to cooperate in planning for Backbone II, the operation that is to take place against Spanish MoDDcCo ih vvent the Straits of Gibraltar are closed or the &ermans enter Spain. The headquarters is building up now. During the afternoon, General Clark meets new officers who have arrived since he made his address of welcome to the Fifth Army. There are about 30 of them and they file into his office in bunches. He tells them, substantially, the same things he told officers upon his arrival-that the Fifth Army has a vital mission, that it is not going to sit idle in Oujda, tha.t he expects high morale and an intense effort. He is introduced to each man and speaks briefly with each one. The situation on the Tunisian front remains unchanged. Ground and air patrols are being made daily by eac h side. The axis is reported now to have ap­ proximately 65,000 troops in Tunisia. The Fifth Army is daily moving some of its units forward. The 1st Division is now enroute to the front. A few changes in dispotion are being made in the Fifth Army area. An Invasion Training Ce nter has been set up at Arzew Beach, just Bast of Oran and Brigadier General 0 1 Daniel is commanding officer of this center which will prepare units for ampnibious operations that the Fifth Army undoubtedly will engage in when the next major move is made. During the afternoon, General Clark, over his dysentry, goes for a hike in the plain cou.�try just outside Oujda. On the way he visits the Fifth Army Quartermaster and Finance Sections which are in a school two blocks away from the college that is the Hea.:i.quarters of the Fifth Army. General Clark is becoming increasingly restless and peripatetic. Following dinner with Colonels Howard and Lewis at his villa, he goes alone on an inspec­ tion tour of the security of his headquarters. He finds two loopholes in the plan and immediately issues corrective orders. He plans to leave early tomorrow for Port Lyautey. * C * �I d( OUJDA-PORT LYAUTEY-CASABLANCA, JANUARY 20, 194:3--Ground fog along the Atlantic Coast in the Port Lyautey region postpones General Clark 1 s scheduled takeoff to the west for almost two hours this morning. As he waits for word that the weather has cleared, the general works nervously in his office, dis­ posing of Fifth Army problems and jotting dovm notes in longhand on how he can improve the review the President is to make of American troops. Clearance comes by mid-morning and the general's B-25 takes off at 9:57 AM · for Port Lyautey. Once there, the general begins going over the ground step by step, checking minute item after minute item personally to be certain that all goes like clockwork tomorrow. The general finds that many details that should have been buttoned up are still dangling loose. One of General Clark 1 s funda­ mental policies is to be thDrough. 11 I 1 ve found, 11 says the general, "that even though you issue orders you can 1 t just assume that they will be ca:eried out. You've got to satisfy yourself personally. In the current case I had given specific orders to five major generals and I found that certain slips had oc­ cured. The men who get along in the army, the men that rise, are the men that are thorough. Campaigns are won or lost through thiroughness. 11 ( The general drives over the entire route in inverse order to the way in which President Roosevelt will travel it tomorrow. He. checks every unit that is to be inspected. He makes sure that wreaths are ready for placing on the graves of American and French dead, he checks the mess that is to be served the pres­ ident and finds, to his consternation, that a turkey dinner is planned. This is changed so the meal will consist of the ration normally scheduled for the day. If the President is going to see troops in the field and how they fare, it is General Clark's theory that the eating routine should n·ot be varied or made unusual. At one spot the general finds that the President is to meet heroes of the �estern Task Force at a spot onlv 50 yards from the Port Lyautey-Casablanca highway. The site of this ceremony is moved back 150 yards for security reasons. General Clark has to double-check the security of the route, not only ground security but protection from the air. General Clark goes over the lineup of cars, the proceedure whereby commanding generals wil� meet the president and ride in a jeep with him as Mr. Roosevelt reviews the various divisions, arrangements for a tow truck to carry extra gas and mechanics in case of car trouble, making sure that a special jeep with a handrail is ready for the president, assuring that proper arrangements are made to get.the President lifted into the jeep. By night, General Clark has covered and checked the entire route from Port Lyautey to Casablanca. Upon his arrival there he suddenly rea�izes that he has made no provisions for colored troops to be inc�uded in the review. He calls in Genera� Patton who says that he believes there is not sufficient time t� 'J to make the arrangements. "It must be done, 11 dec�ares General Clark. "Do it c personally even if you have to get on a horse and gallop 100 miles if necessary., �� General Clark confers well into the night. First, in a long conference with C_f General Marshall, the }ifth Army Commander goes over tomorrow's trip mile by V, mile. He has had maps made showing how troops willitB lined up, where the Pres- t.>-1 �, ident wil� get out of the grey armored Dam�ier (General Clark 1 s own car which 1,..,I jda) and into the special jeep. Then he goes into has been driven over from Ou conference with the Secret Service to go over the review plan point by point. Guards will be posted around the entire area and pursuit planes will cover the region to be certain that there can be no attacks from the air. All is set for the review ,;hen the general turns in about 2:00 AM. G\ * �1 �\3 CASABLANCA-PORT LYAUTEY-MEHDIA-OUJDA, JANUARY 21, 1945--Everything is set for President Roosevelt to leave on his inspection tour and the caravan pulls out for the drive northward at 9:20 A''1. Two motorcycles lead the entourage, fol.10wed by a jeep in which rides a colonel thoroughly familiar with th� route. Next comes the Da.mlier with only the President and General Clark riding in·�thc back seat. Jeeps in front and behind the Damlier are filled with Secret Service men. All in all, the column includes 15 cars, despite General Clark's plan to hold the convoy to a minimum. Other cars contain Presidential Secretary McIntyre, Averill Harriman, Harry Hopkins, General Patton, President Roosevelt's naval and military aides and newspapermen and stiL. and motion picture cameramen. The convoy has an air cover umbrella as it moves northward. General Clark is questioned closely by the President who, the general finds, has a most inquiring mind. Because of conferences urrlerway in Casablanca and because of the desire to hold the size of the convoy down, General Marshall and Admiral King and their staffs do not make the trip. Neither do any of the British officials, including Prime Minister Churchill. The convoy includ�s the special­ fixture jeep into whicn the President will be transferred at the various points where he is to inspect troops. General Clark is with the president from 9:00 AM until 5:00 PM without any break. Upon reaching Rabat, the column turns off the main highway, the President is transferred to the special jeep and part of the review begins. Four flourishes are played for the President, General Harmon, commanding the 2nd Armorec Division, is introduced to the President and gets into the jeep. The president sits in the front withihe driver. In the back seat are a secret service man, General Clark and General Harmon. So questions can be answered, Genel'al Clark has the commanding officer of each unit reviewed ride in the jeep directly behind the President. All vehicles and men of the 2nd Armored are lined up, �s the Pres­ ident's jeep drives by within a few feet of the front rank, each of the vehicles crews follow the jeep with their eyes. When the President has reviewed the 2nd Ar�ored, General Har�on gets out of the jeep, General Anderson, com.1118.nder of the Srd Infantry Division in i�troduced to the President and takes Harmon's seat. The bani plays four ruffles and flourishes and the President inspects from the jeep, the 3rd Division which is lined up in this order: 7th Infantry Regiment, 15th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division Artillery, 10th fueineer battalion, 756 Tank Battalion, 3rd 1Aedical Battalion, 3rd (·artermaster Battalion, two platton of the 3rd Reconnaissance troop and the division artillery band. It is a snap y day for a review. A 40-mile a.'11 hour wind is bloNing, standing the flaqs and division colors out smartly. Crossing the Lyautey highway, the genera� next takes tne President to noon mess (main dish ham) and to receive the heroes of the Western Task Force. The President is seated at a mess table anc each of the heroes co,aes by to be in­ troduced. Each man carries the citation n.e received. The President shakes hands and chats. It is obvious that the President is enjoying himself thoroughly. Be eats with relish out of a regular enlisted man's mess kit. 7 ,hen the meal is over, the President calls General Clark to one side. 11 Mav I have my mess kit as a souvenir?" asks the President. "I'll have it put in the Smithsonian Institute. 11 General Clark hurries awa,, but the mess kits are alrea y being washed and have been mixed up. 11Give me any mess kit, canteen cup and service, 11 says the peneral. He takes one back to the President and Mr. Roosevelt has it put aside so he can take it back to the United States. �( Following ness, the Presidential convoy moves out again. General Clark has been appr�nensive lest the colored troops not be present for review but as the car swings off the highwav, General Clark spots the troops lined up. 11 I 1 ve ar­ ranged for y ou to see sone of the colored troops we have over here, · :r. Pres­ ident, 11 savs General Clark. He e',cplains that the troops v,ere not ori P'inall, scheduled for the review and that there inciusion was a last-minute decision on his part. The President repliAs that he was glad the colored troops were not overlooked and he inspects them closer than any of the other units, having the jeep no only pass in front of the front line but between ranks and benind as well. Next the 60th Regimental Combat team, which played a big role in the victory of the Western Task Force, is reviewed. General Eddy is introduced to the President by General Clark, the ruffles and flourishes are played and the President makes a thorough inspection. The troops are snappy and look in fightin� trim. They are proud and erect. General Clark remarks later that this is one of the finest reviews he has ever seen. After the president inspects them from tne jeep, the 60th RCT passes in revie'7, bands playing, flags snap1-ing in the brisk wind. The presidential party then goes to tn"::! fort near 1Jefihia so the president can see the scene of some of the bitterest fighting in the African campai�n. This fort was stormed and captured by tne 60th. The President, quest­ ioning General Clark constant.Ly, rides over the battlefield and then goes to the cemetery where American and French troops are buried. .hile a band plays and while the President watches from the jeep, General Clark and the president's naval aide carry a huge wreath up and place it at the base of the flagpole in the American ceme.t�ry,. · Then the President I s jeep moves around the end of the cemetery to the section occupied bv Frencn dead. Here the 1fir.reatn laying ceremony is repeated, with General Clark and the aide carrying up the wreath while the President watches. 1 The scene of this ceremon" is one overlooking the Atlantic Ocean from a bluff. The fort and its site is an historic spot, dating.back to the time before Christ. Following the v.rreath laying ceremony, the prnsidei\t I s ,jeep is dr:L ven to a promitory overlooking the battlefield and a colonel commanding the assault describes to the president how the battle progressed. Thi� ends the almost day­ long review. The President declares it has been marvelous. He is de:i.ighted and enthused. The timinis and performance has worked out to perfection. There have 'been no incidents. General Clark explains to the President that he is within a snort distance of his plane and that he would like to fJ.y back to Fifth Army Headquarters before dark because there is much work to be done. The President agrees to the proposal and thanks the Fifth Army Com,ander for the review. \ For local purposes and for the French press, it is to be announced that all the excitement in the area--the blocked off roads, the guards, th� protective planes--,,as caused by a review held in honor of the con1:·11ander of the new Fifth American Army, Lieutenant General Clark. It will not be announced that Pre3ident Roosevelt has been in Africa until he returns safely to 'V1ashington. l Favored by a strong tailwind, the general's B-25 arrives back at Oujda at 4:26 PM. He returns immediately to his office to confer with General Gruentner and to prepare for uninterrupted concentration on Fifth Army affairs. In al.L ppo­ bability he will inspect various units under his command. The President is sched­ uled to start the return flight to the States tomorrow. Sti.Ll in the balance is future conduct of the war. "Satin" has be,,n postponed and the Southern Sector is fa±ily quiet. .�i, * �[..(i, �·,- ��\, ;;-:.�,: . :<\;\�·- ; ,:;, ' . * �15 OUJDA, J.IUIUARY 22, 1945--Axis troops in the center of the Tunisian line have started an offensive and they advance 20 miles down tro vallies in the Pont du Fahs-Bou Arada region. The opposition is French and it is falling· back. The British First flrmy is being re-grouped near Bou .Arada for a move souti1vrard on the Ccr11an-Italians north flank. American units in the Southern Sector are beinP,; moved to reinforce Sbeitla and '1aktar. Tactical.Ly, General C.lark has nothin� to do with the Southern Sector since his units that have been sent up there come, tacticallv, under Al.lied Force Headquarters and II Corps. However, he watches the situation close.Ly. Major General Ryder, 54th Division commander who now has his headquarters at Tlemcen, comes to Fifth Army headquarters for a conference with General Clark. Part of the 155th Infantry, of the 54th, is moving to .P.rzew to start training at the Invasion Training Center that has been set u1, under General 0 1 Daniel. Other uriits are also to move in to take training. Part of the Fifth Army's order is to prepare one infantry division and one armored division for use in am.t1hibious v:arfare. General O I Daniel has already set this important Fifth Army Training center up. Generals Clark and Ryder discuss Fifth Army problems during a conference prior to lunch and duriri..g lunch v.rnen General Ryder is the guest of the Fifth Army commander at his villa on the fringe of the school grounds. Other conferences during the day involve two lengthy ones V!ith General Gruenther re�arding officer assignments and troop training and buildup. The general is to inspect all troops in the Oujda area tomorrow. The Fifth Army Finance Officer, Colonel Lindner, arrives and confers nith General Clark. Colonel Robinson has arrived and is mace Fifth Army Anti -Aircraft officer. General Clark, bent on getting the Fifth Army discip.Line off to a good start, calls in an Air Corps captain who has been found guilty of intoxication and }Uts him on the carpet. After the hectic days at Casablanca and in the Port Lyautey region, today is a mild day for the general as he works on details of syncronizing orpaniz­ ation of his new command. In the evening he has two armv nurses and ./lajor Meacham and Lieutenant Beardwood at his villa for dinner. -xOUJDA, JANUARY 23, 1943--The Axis push in the center of the Tunisian line has been shoved from a standstil.L to retreat througn the use of American troops rushed in to come under French Command. To counteract the drive, three American battalions--one of Armored Infantry, one Field Artillery and one Medium Tank-­ are moved in to help the harrassed French. Before the day is over the Germans and Italians have been driven back ten miles. Things are developing fast in Tripolitana where the British Eighth Army has Rommel on the run. The British are on the outskirts of Tripoli. More and more it looks as though Rommel is backing up toward Tunisia to make a juncture with General Kesser.Ling's Tunisian force for a last stand in North Africa. General Clark makes a thorough inspection tour today of Fifth Army uni�s in the Oujda area. Nothing escapes his attention as he has commanding officers of the various units show him through quarters, kitchens and offices. He makes in­ numerable recommendations concerning military courtesy� quarters arrangements; �( Safety factors, including sandbags, slit trenches and reinforcement of old buildings in which troo�s are quartered or supplies are stored; troops in pup tents are to be quartered in pyrarrddal tents; insufficient bread is being received so General Clark notes that bakery platoon must be brought to Oujda from Oran. He checks the venereal disease rate and finds it good with the white troops but a trifle high among. colored soldiers. There are now about 7,000 U.S. troops in Oujda and its immediate environs. The Gi:neral visits Headquarters and Headquarters Company, the 71st and 251st Signa� Companies, the 343rd Engineers, Company L of the 22nd Quartermasters (colored), the 52nd Station Hospital barracks, the Quartermaster Depot, the 443rd Anti-Aircraft Detachment and quarters and kitchens within his own head­ quarters enc�osure. He orders that Major Jackson be made Post Commandant of the Old Oujda Airport where a majority of the troops is quartered. The general looks at shower rooms, latPines, storerooms. He personally checks the guns and crews of two anti-aircraft guns in the vicinity of Fifth ArJJty headquarters. ( General Larkin, commander of the Mediterranean Base Section at Oran, arrives at noon with his Chief of Staff, Colonel Leavy. Following lunch, Generals Clark, Larkin and Gruenther confer lengthily on Fifth Army supply probLems. The port of Nemours, on the coast almost due north of Oujda, is to be opened so certain portions of the supplies can be trucked in from the closer port and so the region won't be cut off from the main eastern supply base at Oran in case the railroad or the roads to Oran are bombed or sabotaged. General Larkin is also told to dispatch the bakery platoon to Oujda. General Larkin remains overnight since he is to hold further conferences with General Gruenther and Colonel Adcock, the Fifth Army G-4. General Clark works at his office until quite late in the evening. The colored soldier who confessed the murder of the white sergeant is to be tried at a General Courts Martial and there is mounting' feeling among the colored troops. Fifty soldiers in Company L, 22nd Quartermasters, have signed a pet­ ition asking that the case be investigated further before the tria.J.. starts on Monday. The men sent their petition direct to headquarters, not going through channels and failing to let their commanding officer know. General Clark is wary of a colored-white race feeling arriving and he confers with General Gruenther; Colonel Jonnson, the provost marshall, and Captain Burns, C.O. of the colored outfit. The .courts martial is to go on as schedu�ed on Monday. Preliminary hearings snowed that the colored soldier got his rifle after a white soldier ordered him out of a bar. The colored soldier then came back and shot the wrong man. From experience in the States and in Englanc., the general has found just how careful�y the coloBed soldier problem must be handled. �- * OUJDA, JANUARY 24, 1943--Generals Giraud and DeGaulle have agreed to join forces� This is the welcome new.s that comes through late this afternoon from Casablanca. Giraud and DeGaulle have been in conference and they have composed their differences. This will be of inestimable benefit in solidifying French sentiment in North .Africa and it will strengthen the hand of French military leadership since behind it now will be the two leadi rg Frenchmen not in Axis hands--Giraud and DeGaulle. General Clark is deLighted with the news. Minister Murphy is flying here tomorrow from Casablanca to report to General C�ark on details of the poutical conferences dovm there. �111 ( General Clark straightens out during the morning the mechanics of his relationships witn General Nogues, governor general of French Morocco, con­ cerning liaison with the French and the Fifth U.S. Army and conduct of civil. affairs. General Nogues has written asking how his military and civil officia.J.s should be distributed to work in greatest cooperation with General Clark whose commam.dr · area includes most of French Morocco. In a conference with Gener·al Gruenther and Colonel Sa]tzman, civili affairs officer, it is decided by General Clark that the French Moroccan military mission be split three ways: part of it being sent to Oujda, another part being attached to General Patton 1 _s I Armored Corps, and the third working with General Wilson's Mediterranean Base Section. /Any negotiations between General Clark and General .L'iogues will be handled through Colonel Saltzman 1 s office directly with Nogues 1 headquarters at Rabat. General Clark wilJ. send a liaison office to Rabat to work in con­ junction with Nogues' staff on military and civil matters. One of General Clark's many jobs as commander of the Fifth Army is to build up the supply of modern arms for the French North African army. Prior to establishment of the Fifth Army and movement of General Clark into Frencn Morocco, Nogues was working exclusiveJ.y with General. Patton. In the afternoon, in company with Generals Lemnitzer and Nevins and Colonels Adoock and Bertholf, General Clark drives to Nemours, on the Mediterranean c�ast to reconnaissance tho roads over whic.r1 sup};lies from Nemours to Oujda wiJ.l flow. The trip northward is made via Marnia and Nedroma. The road is narrow and twist­ ing and wil.L be fit for on.Ly one way truck traffic. Nemours harbor is small. but four or five ships could berth there. The return trip is by way of Martimprey. Part of tnis road is capable ofl two-way truck traffic but, from Nemours to Martimprey,:±t is narrow, hence one-way traffic will have to be put in effect pnce the port of Nemours becomes a supply area. The drive is made in a heavy rain. After checking in at his office and hearing the good news concerning Giraud and DeGaulle, the general goes to his villa and has the group that ac­ companied him on his trip for dinner. * * OUJDA, JANUARY 25, 1943-Bob Murphy, United States Minister to North Africa, arrives for conferences w±th General Clark and the word he brings from Casablanca concerning relations between Giraud and DeGaulle is not as cheering as first incomplete reports. DeGaulle finally agreed to meet in Casablanca with Giraud but the barrier that arose was the question of command. General Clark's observation, after lis­ tening to Murphy's report is that DeGaulle 11 acted like a spoiled child. 11 The leader of the Fighting French felt like he was being made a 11 second fiddle" to Giraud. After President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill has intervened, the two Frenchmen agreed to issue a joint announcement along the lines that they had conferred and that they both had one aim: winning of the war and restitution of France. That is as far as the honeymoon of Giraud and DeGaulle has gone. ·Es­ tablishment of the Giraud-DeGaulle team as directors of the French miJ.itary is at least temporarily delayed because DeGaulle won 1 t take what he terms a second­ ary position. Main reason for Murphy 1 s visit is to work out details of French-American civil affairs liaison in French Morocco. Murphy is accompanied to Fifth Army Headquarters by Frederick P. Culbert, U.S. consul at Casablanca and the State �(3 ( Department official who rode back to Washington with General Clark last September. The plan reached by General Clark, General Gruenther and Colonel· Saltzman yes­ terday is discussed and approved. Saltzman is to go to Rabat tomorrow for dis­ cussions with General Nogues to facilitate Franco-American coope�ation in both the miiitary and civil affairs fields. Peyrouton has succeeded Chatel as Governor General of Algeria, thus effect­ ing a recommendation of Genera� Clark that Chatel be relieved, primari.Ly for lack of capacity to fill the job. Chatel is now going to Lisbon to work with the Red Cross. General Eddy's 9th Division is ordered out of tne Rabat-Sale-Port Ly�utey region today for movement to the front. Rommel is fast backing up toward the Tunisian-Tripolitanian front and it looks like the major North African battle will occur somewhere in the Satin region. The 9th Division has been part of the F'ifth Army. It will now pass to control of AFHQ and move into the Constan­ tine area. An Air Artillery Observation base, under the Fifth Arrrry, has been estab­ lished at Sidi Bel Abbes, home of the Foreign Legion, and General Clark plans to fly there tomorrow in one of the litT,le Piper Cub planes such as is being used to observe artillery fire. He also plans to fLy to Chanzy so he can bbserve both from the air and ground this new method of observation. The tiny planes are designed to dash up, observe, then dash dovm before enemy planes can get them. They land at a very low speed ( 58 miles an hour) and can put dovm a.Lmost anywhere. An Officers' Club is opened this evening near the Fifth Army Hear quarters mess and General Clark, accompanied by Mr. Murphy and Mr. Culbert, formally opens it. Afterward he has Murphy and Culbert and a few of his staff officers to his villa for dinner. Murphy remains in the General's villa overnight. * * * ODJDA, JANUARY 26, 1943--With Ro:mmel on the run and with the back frinp;e of his ret.reatinf Afrika Korps almost to the Tunisian border, matters are comin"' to a head in the !forth African tLeater. In al.L probabi.J.ity the show­ dovm in going to come in the Southern Sector vrhere the 11 Satin 11 force has been '! oncentrated. An afternoon phone call changes all of General Clar.K's p.Lans for tornorrow. Instead of going to Sidi Bel Abbes and Cha.nzy to see the Air 01::mrvation School and Fieict Artil.J.ery firing, he will leave for Algiers to�orrow as soon as it is light. General Eisenhover has called him there for conferences which vlill no doubt cover the immediate operation crystallizing in the Southern Sector and long-range war plans agreed upon at Casab..1.anca. ( The 34th Division, which moved from Algiers to Tlemcen in conjunction vrith activation of the Fifth Army, has novr been a.Lerted for movement to the front. This will put almost all the striking force of the Fifth Army in the forward area. General Clark, after receiving the call from General Eisenhaver, confers with General Gruenther. General N evins, Fifth Army G-3, vrili accomp1;,.ny General Clark to Algiers tomorrow. �l� ( During the afternoon, General Clark takes aavantage of sunnv rather to �et out of his office for a hike in the country outside Oujda. 'These hikes have become his me1 hod of letting off steam. �.forph;v and Culbert left this morning for Algiers and the general's day has been spent sole�y with matters concerning the Fifth Army-further organization, supply of eouip­ ment to the French, status of French units manning coast defense batteries. Tonight announcement is made of the visit of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Casablanca. It is z:e_r...orted that "they have reached a complete agreeme t o the offer$ive campaign. There prime objective was to draw as much weight as possible off the Russian Arrnv by engaging the enemy as heavily as possible. General Giraud and General DeGaulle also met at Casablanca and announced their agreement, and in a joint official statement they$aid, •we have met, we have talked, and vre have registered our entire agreement on the ends to be acheived, which are the liberation of France and trium1-n of human liberties by the total defbat of the enemy. This end will be attained by the union in i"Tar, of all Frenchmen fighting side by side with all their Allies.• Stalin was invited to take part in the conference but was unable to leave Russia because of the offensive which he is directing. Prime Minister Churchill said it was the most important conference he had ever attended. President Roosevelt said that the elimination of Ge1!1Illan, a.nd Japanese power is our aim, ara this means, 'unconditional surrender by Germany, Italy and ) JapanL 1 The President explained that this does net mean the destruction. of the Axis countries and people, but the destruction of their philosophy of · hate and fear and their subjugation of other people. The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain have been in conference since January 14." General Ciark dines alone tonight and retires ear�y because of his schedu.1..ed early departure tomorrow. * OUJDA-ALGIERS, ID.OOJARY Z7, 194.3-Flying in his B-25, General Clark leaves tor General Eisenhower's headquarters at Algiers at 9:18 AM. Upon arrival there af't.r a routine flight, he goes directly to Allied Force Headquarters for a preliminary conference with General Eisenhower. Rommel is fast backing toward a last-sU1nd in Southern Tunisia. Al:ready some of his troops are occupying the Mareth line, a set of fortifications built in Southern Tunisia by the French prior to 19.39•40. Eventually, command over the British Army that has fought its way forward from Egypt, through Libya and almost through Tripolitania, and the British-American-French forces in Tunisia must be wider one head so that there can be concerted action to drive the Axis out of Africa. A meeting in the near future between the American and British leaders--Alexander, Montgomery, Anderson, Eisenhower, Clark and othera-nst be held. Also, the tactical plan along which the �tle must proceed will have to be crystallized. These are the things that Generals Clark and Eisenhower diecuss. Details will 1118 disclosed later in the diary. General Clark remains overnight in Algiers. * * * �( ALGIERS-OUJDA, JANUARY 28, 194.3••Following an early-morning conference w.ith General Eisenhower and returning to his Fifth Army Headquarters knowing that he is liable to be called back to Algiers at any ti.me,·General Clark takes off trom Maison Blanche airdrome at 8:48 AM for Oujda. Atter bucking a slight headwind, the B-25 puts down at Oujda at 10:54 AM. General Patton, commanding the I Armored Corps at Casablanca, is enroute to Oujda tor conferences with General Clark and his plane lands half an hour later. At headquarters, General Clark explains to General P.._.tton the recent developments and the results of his conference with General Eisenhower. Patton is instructed to be ready to go to Algiers at a moment's notice. General Clark is to call Patton as soon as General Eisenhower issues the BU111mons for the con­ ference. General Clark is accompanied back from Algiers b;y Brigadier General Kreuger, Air Corpe, and Patton, Gruenther and Kreuger lunch with General Clark at his villa. The chances or Backbone having to be executed grow eliJllller and slimmer. With the 34th Division already enroute to the front, General Clark orders today that the VI Corps, under General Dawley, take over Backbone II planning problems from General Ryder's division. Dawley is to move his headquarters out ot Oran into the Tlemcen district. Oran is already the he...,dquarters of the Mediterranean Base Section, under General Larkin, and having two cownands in the same city might cause complications. During the afternoon, General Art Wilson, commander of the Atlantic Base Section at Casablanca, visits General Clark and the Fifth Army Commander discusses with the ABS chiet suppl7 pro­ blems as they etf'ect units in the western half of his command area. General Clark also has a conference with Major Yarborough, the young paratroop officer who worked on Torch invasion planning, and the general agrees to send the promising officer back to the States for a larger command with either para­ troops or an airborne division. It has now been agreed that the dollar-tranc exchange rate will be low­ ered from 75 to 50 francs to the dollar. General Clark has his finance officer, Colonel LindBr in to discuss mechanics of the change. Officers and men are to H paid for the month of January at the rate of 75 trancs to the dollar. All back pay and allowances up to February 1 will also be paid at the old exchange. * * * OUJDA, JANUARY 29, 1943--General Eisenhower makes a hurry-up telephone cail. today that he is coming to Oujda to visit Fifth Amy Headquarters and confer with General Clark hilt, after General Clark has gone to the airport to greet him, word comes through that the flight has been cancelled because one or the engines or General Eisenhower's B-17s is not functioning properly. General Clark has two important conferences today. The first is with General Doolittle and it concerns use of the XIIth Air Support Command, which is attached to the Fif"th .Army. General Clark points out the need of pertecting ground-air support technique and cautions General Doolittle that there mustn't be too auch "robbing of units" in the Fifth Army area. General Clark stresses one ot his strongest conviction ot modern battle--the necessity for perfect teamwork between air and ground forces. The second important conference is with General Gruenther and the two British liaison officers attached to the Fifth Aray-Captain Grindle or the Royal Navy and Lieut. Colonel Weston, sent down �Briti:.h MOST SECRET ( ( as contact man between General Morgan's Northern (Backbone) Task Force and General Clark. Grindle and Weston are flying to Gibraltar tomorrow tor con­ ferences with General Mason-Macfarlane, governor of Gibraltar. Although the need tor executing Backbone appear less and less likely, General Clark de­ clares: "Execution of this move ia in our lap. Despite the tact it doesn't look like Backbone will be necessary, we muet be ready. I don't think we are going to have to put thie plan into effect but we can't sit around and, if the need arises, have nothing but our bare hands to fight it with. We are still drafting up plans to meet the various contingencies. Movement of front line troops out of our area only complicates our problem." Among other things that are to be discussed with General llason-1.!acd"arlane are the training of Gibraltar troops in North Africa so they will have room to maneuver and the use of Gibraltar commandos and troops in conjunction with General Morgan's force in event it is used to attack Spanish Morocco. The court record on the Ricks murder case goes to the general today tor review. To confidants he reviews his reactions to this black-white cue. He \ is disappointed with the verdict--lite imprisonment at hard labor. He feels that it was a case of "clear, cold-blooded murder--premeditated�" However, Ricks was provided with a clever defense counsel, "the best 1n North Africa," and "we gave him every break." "I debated a long time," says the general, "on whether I should censure the court but I found that I could not under military law. Th• verdict had to be unanimous and although the court found Ricks guilty, not all or them believed he should be executed. The death sentence would hav. been tough on Ricks and I would have liked to have seen it because it would have had a saluto17 effect, not only on American troops, but also on the natives and French who do not value life as highly as we do. The case was full or dynamite because of the black and white problem. We went to great lengths to see that a full record of the case was compiled and that the court was made up of people without color prejudices. It was a good court but it disappointed me a little." General Clark certifies life imprisonment at hard labor for Ricks and orders the transcript senl along to Allied Force Head­ quarters. Other matters that come up during the day concern recreation tot Fi£th Arr,sy troops and the general has a long conference with American Red Cross representatives who have been assigned to his army. The general is fanatic about aeeing that the enlisted man has diversion for the hours when he is of'f duty. Good recreation keeps a soldier happier and more fit for battle. Colonel Saltzman returns from a civil affairs tour to the west and reports back that Gener�l Nogues, governor-general of French Morocco, will be coming to Oujda February l to pay a formal call on General Clark and to inspect French troops. The general initiates plans tor a joint lmerican-French review. * * * OUJDA, JANUARY J0,.1943-Conferences with French officials occupy the general throughout the. morning. First comes the new Chef de la Region, M. Bouyssi, General Nogues civil representative in the Oujda district. Bouyssi succeeds 14. Caillat, the little monocaled Frenchman that General Clark felt was weak and on whom there had been reports that he had pro-Axis leanings. The second caller is French Brigadier General Boisseau, commander of the O.r�Mt military· district. Boisseau is accompanied by General Dawley, �( commander of the VI Army Corps whose headquarters.is being moved into the district. Use or French troops in guarding lines of communications and in manning coastal batteries ia discussed betm,en the French general and the two American generals. Brigadier General Caffey, commanding the 39th Infantry Regiment or the 34th Division, visits Fif'th Army headquarters for final discussions with various officers. Caffey is leaving immediately for the Tunisian :front sinoe the 34th Division, under General Ryder, is being moved into the Southern Sector. Work of the Fifth Army is concentrated now on issuing orders and see­ ing tha t � of its units move toward the front. A steady stream or orders pass out to units, down even to companies, to be alerted for prompt movement eastward. General Clark has now bad four airplanes attached to him so hex and his officers can move to various points in French North Africa with alacrity. In addition to the B-25 which the general has been using so much of late, there is a Flying Fortress and two C•53s, the work-horse cargo carriers that are now doing such a tremendous job in moving men and materiel throughout the theater. In the afternoon the general goes for a long hike with his G-1, Colonel Markoe. * * * OUJDA, JANU:\RY Jl, 194.3•-Another officer commanding a French sub-division in General Clark's Fifth Army area comes today to confer with the Army Com­ mander. He is Brigadier General Richards, commanding the Tlemcen district. General Clark goes over the problem of French units guarding lines of com­ munications. Richards district extends to the border of Spanish Morocco, hence, hia troops must be particularly on the alert. The day has a Spanish-Spanish Morocco tinge. Colonel Hohentb.al, United States military attache in .lla.drid, reports in to General Clark for consult­ ation. Hohenthal is of the opinion that Spain bas but one objective--to remain neutral. He does not look for trouble and he feels that Germany will exert pressure without avail on Spain and that the Axis is already too ex­ tended to make any military move against Spain. Hohenthal1s report coincides with confidential information being sent to North Africa by Allied ambassadors and ministers in Spain. The liklihood 0£ Backbone going into execution grows lwss and less but General Clark, despite the loss of thousands of troops ear­ marked for Backbone, keeps pushing on preparation of plans for moving into Spanish Morocco if' the need arises. Plans are constantly being changed be• cause of the shift of fighting troops to Tunisia. General Clark remarks that if the troop movement eastward continues at its present tempo, "we'll have to go into Spanish Morocco with truck drivers, nurses and staff officers." ( Continuing his reconnaissance of the country surrounding OuJda, General Clark drives to Berguent, a town on the fringe of the desert, 50 miles south of Oujda. Enroute he passes one of the largest coal mines in the region and the mine that is supplying much ot the coal being used by railroads in the eastern half of French Morocco. the country that the general passes through is partially desert and for the first time camels are seen. There are also partridges and other game birds and the general's finger itches to get on a shotgun trigger. In the evening, General Clark attends a party in honor of his G-3, General Nivens who is going to Allied Force Headquarters to do special planning work. A new Fifth Army G•.3 is now being considered. * * �( OUJDA, FEBRUARY 1, 1943--This compact French Moroccon town has its first military review today as General Clark and General Nogues, Governor General of French Morocco, inspect troops along the Rue de France and then watch American and French soldiers pass by in review. General Nogues, making his initial call at General Clark's Fifth Army head­ quarters, arrives at the Oujda airport and is taken to the American general's headquarters at the girls' school. General Clark meets Nogues at the gate and they inspect jointly two platoons of Company C of the 30th Infantry. An American army band plays the ruffles and flourishes for Nogues and the martial music as General Nogues looks over the American troops. The two generals then go to the Fifth Army Commander's office and confer about mutual problems for half an hour before going to the downtown section. ( Arriving at the city square, the French and American generals are paid honors and, after the two national anthems are played, they pass, side by side, before American and French troops lined up along four blocks. The curbs are lined with school children waving French and American flags, with Arabs in all manner of dress, with French civilians and American officers and men. As the two generals walk before the troops there are cries of "Vive la France" and "Vive Les Etats Unis. 11 They are shouts of "Vive le general Clark!! and several shouts for DeGaulle. After walking in front of the troops, Generals Clark and Nogues go to the reviewing stand in :f'ront of the city hall. There American and French officers and Arab leaders are gathered to watch the review with the two generals. Following the American colors and the American band comes the 1st battalion of the 30th Infantry which is located in the Oujda area. Then comes the colorfully garbed band of the 5th Marocains, dressed in brilliant red knickers and with many of the bandsmen playing high-toned native woodwinds. The regiment's standard includes strands of human hair. Following the French band comes the 5th Marocains, composed mostly of native North African troops carrying rifles with long, slender bayonets. The rear of the parade is brought up by some troops of the Foreign Legion. This outfit, with the trad­ itional Foreign Legion hat from which a white sun-veil trails down the back, includes men from almost every country--swarthy men, fair men, men with beards. They are a colorful lot, ma:roning in a slow, measured cadence. After the troops have passed in review, Generals Clark and Nogues walk back through cheering crowds to the offices of the Chef de la Region. The crowd claps and shouts. Nogues walks along looking neither to left or right� General Clark salutes occasionally and looks in all directions. The two generals are followed up the street by members of their staffs. Almost the entire afternoon is spent at a luncheon given in General Nogues 1 honor. Like all French luncheons, the eating process is long and heavy and leaves the guests feeling lethargic. ( One touchy problem is brought to the General today. At Casablanca, a CIO worker has been belligerent with army and navy authorities. He has been found guilty and a sentence at hard labor has been reconunended. Because of the union nature of the case, General Clark discusses it with the Judge Advocate of the I Armored Corps who has come to Fifth Army headquarters with the papers. General Clark is following one policy with regard to any actions impeding military matters or reflecting on the U.S. Army: be tough and set, :f'rom the start, an example that will discourage further breaches of conduct. * ·X- �( ( OUJDA-SIDI BEL ABBES-CHANZY-BEDEAU-OUJDA, FEBRUARY 2,,, 1943--Making his first use of a Field Artillery Observation plane--little Piper Cub "puddle jumpers 11 --General Clark flies today to Sidi Bel Abbes, home of the Foreign Legion and the spot where the Field Artillery pilots are training for action at the front. The general has had his npuddle jumper 11 rigged up with a loud speaker, so, before leaving Oujda, he circles headquarters and issues in­ structions from air to ground. Flying at about 400 feet, the general tells his aides that he will circle headquarters on his return and order his car to go to the airport. As the little planertnrns and heads east for Sidi Bel Abbes, the general shouts down: "Mighty fine looking headquarters you have there!n The loudspeaker, which could be used to issue orders to units in the field, is easily heard. After visiting the Artillery Observation training center at Sidi Bel Abbes, the general flies to Chanzy and the headquarters of the 13th Field Artillery. He is impressed by the morale and work of the officers and men despite the fact they are training under rather adverse conditions. From Chanzy he goes to Bedeau where batteries are having firing practice. He watches the firing from both the air and ground. Following regular firing, General Clark asks for demonstration of time fuse-air burst fire. This calls for the shell to burst 30 to 50 feet above the ground so it can spray its shrapnel into trenches. During the entire demonstaration, the artillery fire has been whining over the General's head. One of the time fuse-air bust shells falls dangerously close to the general and his party. Everyone but the general hits the dirt; he ducks one shoulder and leans away. Later, he tells how in that one brief moment of fire his mind flashed back to 24 years ago to France and the time he was wounded by Shrapnel. Following the demonstration, General Clark flies back to Chanzy for a conference �ith General Crane at the 13th Field Artillery Brigade head­ quarters, then heads for Oujda in the Piper Cub. Over hea�quarters, the plane drops down and the general bav:ls out that he wants his car sent to the Old Airport (which had been named, without the general 1 s knowledge, Clark :f'ield--a name that the general quickly declared taboo) • The voice from the air causes so much consternation at headquarters that tY:o other cars are sent out in addition to the general's ovm Packard! In the evening, General Clark and high-ranking members of his staff are dinner guests of the Pasha of Oujda, Moslem leacer of the district. The dinner is at the Pasria I s ornate home, deep insiae the n_Iedina, 11 native quarter of Oujda. The guests sit cross-legged on hassocks before lw. tables. 'Ii:1e gene:cal sits at one low-table r.;ith six other guests. The Pasna does not eat; he circulates amon::; the guests ,:-hile they feast. Ho···ever, his favorite son is seated at the general I s table. The menu is prodigious. First itein is a huge pigeon pie--cooked in a dish as big as a disnpan. One pie is p t on each of the tables and the gu.ests, eating in Arab fashion witnout cutlery, dip their fingers into their section of the mutual�y-munched pie and knuckle do· n to eatint,:,;. The coursesthat folJ.or, are a.1..most ·,lrlbelievable: a ';:hole roast mutton, glazed and well-done, from Ymicn the guei:,ts pluck c.uoice pieces; b a:ted tur:Cey with delicious nut dressing; baked chicken stuffed i.ith olives and seasoned with .ft.rab condiments; broiled mutton anc:. vegetables; meat balls immersed in a delicious sauce t. at is so .wt thot it burns ti1e general's fingers wnen he dips his hand in; then comes ncous-cou.s, 11 a favorite Arab dish that is made up of mutton, baked cnicken, and all kinds of vegetables underneath a mound of moist round m�t..J.. ·- then follows bowls ···.<:1 1 11 (. .C ., �( of fruit; trELys of deliciv11s cakes made with honey; .Arab mint tea, and ps.steries made like gazelle norns and sea shells. �fo lic�uor is served at the meal; only 1mter. Betneen courses .A.rab servants bring around bo,;ls of water and hand towels so they guests can wash their greasy fingers. Food tht..t is left over is taken out so the Pasha's wives (plural) and Arab leaders hovering about can eat. This is the most unusual dinner that the general has ever attenaed. The Pasha doesn't speak French too well so a three connered conversation goes on: Arabac to Fr8nch to English; Eng-ish to French to Arabic. * OUJDA-ALGI�:�S-OLJDA , FEBRUARY 3, 1943--General Clark �aits impatiently-­ working in his office--until he hears that Gene1 al Patton, who will acco,1pany him to Algiers, has taken off fro� Casablanca. Then he dasnes to Ou�da air­ port and as soon as General Patton lands, the tv10 American gener&l Is c 1..imb into General Clark I s Flying Fortress and take off' at 10:15 p_ i for Algiers. General Clark spends only an hou.r and a half at Algiers, conferring with General Fisenhower at both the Allied Force Heac1 q_uarters in the St. Georee Hotel.and at General Ike's villa. General Montgomery is comint:; to Algiers for tactical conferences as it becor.1es more and more obvious that the showdmm with the ._xis is going to come, probably, in Southern '1\:nisia. General Clark says nothing about details of the conference. He returns to Oujda at 4:51 Pll, confers briefly at the field with General Patton 11ho continues on to Casablanca and then returns to his headouarters. 'l'hc Fifth Army's new G-3, Colonel :.:alcolm Kamnerer--has reported in for duty, re­ placing General Nevins. P.nother interesting development is that Backbone, the operation calline for Fifth Army and British acticn should the Germans go into Spain or SpanisD , 1orocco or should any attempt be mac:e to close the Straits of Gibraltar, v.rill be considered passe as of 11Iarch 1. The chances of an;r such move look less and less and General {organ's force, preparing in the United :i(ingdom for Backbone, must be released for another job. The 9th U.S. Division, located in the Rabat-Port Lyautey region and one of the units scned.uled for use in case of Backbone I s execution, is to move to the front by r,iarcn 1. The Fifth Army's mission of being ready to execute Backbone looks less and less likely. Lieut. Col. r·eston, British officer sent to C.enerc-.1 Ch.rk as a liaison link between the Fifth krmy and Gene1·al Morg&.n I s force, is going to return to England. * OUJDA, FEBRUARY 4, 1943-·Plans discussed at Casablanc� by President Roose­ velt, Prime Minister Churchill, Generals Marshall, Eisenhower, Clark and other American and British officials are now beginning to congeal into action. Im­ portant conferences are being planned at Algiers and they will include dis­ cussions between military leaders in North Africa and the Middle East. These two fighting groups must eventually be pooled under one military command. General Clark begins laying plans £or returning to Algiers and continuing on for a tour of the front line area. General Clark limits his discussions con­ cerning future plans to conf'erences with General Gruenther, his Chief of Staff. Details will be recorded in the diary as they unfold. Colonel Malcolm Kammerer, who used to be with General Clark in the II f �' tis.h. MOSJ SECRET �1 Army Corps in England, is name G-3 section bead, succeeding General Nivens. He arrives at headquarters today to confer immediately with General Gruenther concerning Backbone and the Invasion Training Center which is beginning to operate at Arzew, just east of Oran. Backbone plans that had been drawn up for the 34th Division are to be turned over to the VI Army Corps. General Clark today adde Captain Reagan Houston to his aide staff, releasing Major Meacham to the Civil Affairs section. General Clark's day is filled primarily with conferences with section heads and coordinating orders for movement of troops to the front. A large force is being built up in the Southern Sector. The British Eighth Army is well past Tripoli now and the Afrilca Korps is installing itself along the Mareth Line. The Germans and Italians are being compressed into an ever 8JD8.ller area along the coast of Tunisia. The Tunisian front remains baeically the same, American-French-British forces having re­ gained the Ousseltia Valley where the Axis pushed forward 20 miles in mid­ January. Air tt,ctivity continues on a heavy scale now that the weather has improved. Sfax and Gabes are now being bombed with the same regularity and severity as Tunis and Bizerte in the north. The Firth Array' has its first American road show tonight with Martha Raye as the featured performer. General Clark attends the hour-long show at the Paris theater and later accompanies the motlon picture star to the Officers• Club at headquarters. * * * OUJDA, FEBRUARY 5, 1943•-General Clark, for some unexplained reason, cancels today his planned trip to the front. It appears now that a huge planning conference will be held in Algiers. General Clark says nothing but messages indicate that such a meeting-with Generals Alexander and Montgomery attending--is in the wind. General Clark's day is fairly quiet and, because of a sore throat, he returns to his villa in late afternoon. The major conference of the day is held with Colonels Kammerer and Beam. The latter: heads the ICith Air Support Command which is part of the Fifth Army. Coordination of air and ground units in event Backbone must be executed and the use of air support in training operations at Arzew are gone into thoroughly. In the evening, General Clark attends a dinner at the home of General · Beucler, commander of French troops 1n the Oujda district. * * * OUJDA, FEBRUARY 61 1943--The North African Theater of Operations, United States Ai1my (NATOUSA) is organized today with General Eisenhower in command. He relinquishes the European Theater or Operations (ETOUSA) to Lie�tenant General Andrews. General Clark explains that the European theater is now to become pri• marily an air activity theater with increasing bombing activity over Germany. Hence, an Air Ccirpa general has been put in charge. llATOUSA becomes the primary theater of war as far as operations against Gemmany and Italy are concerned. General Clark's Fifth Army now comes under NATOUSA. ;N:\t1t11\ff}}},.,\?if :; ;f:?-:XttJf t;,'\';f,e: ... quuls British MOST SECRET �( During the morning, General Clark, following several invitations, goes horseback riding with General Beucler. For the first time, the commanding general of the Fifth Army appe�rs at headquarters in riding britches and boots. He rides for an hour with the French officer who is an expert horse­ man. The general, who has not ridden for some time, returns to his office slightly on the sore side. Brigadier General Moses, G-4 of the War Department, arrives from Wash­ ington oh a tour of the North African theater. He confers EPtd lunches with General Clark who, following luncheon, calls his supply and quartermaster sections together for an afternoon-long meeting with General Moses on pro­ blems that have arisen in Africa. Moses gets a full report on how the supply situation is working in General Clark's army, bow particular local problems of supply have been met and where the greatest difficulties lie for an army in an actual theater of operations. Moses leaves in late afternoon. General Clark's desire or having more and better recreation for his enlisted men is fulfilled tonight when an army orchestra, ordered by the general and organized here in the past two days, plays for an enlisted men's dance at the Red Cross club. General Clark attends and leads the grand march. Instead of withdrawing to the sidelines, he dances most of the e"tJen.tng. It has been difficult to find partners for the enlisted men since there are few French girls in Oujda that speak English. The dance is crowded and the stag line in long. General Clark mingles with the enlisted men, talking to them, finding out what they are thinking and the problems that they face. * * * OUJDA, FEBRUARY 7, 1943--Major General.Matt Eddy, commander of the Ninth United States Infantry Division, dri�s to Oujda today from his head­ quarters in the Rabat area for conferences with General Clark. Eddy's div­ ision has been alerted tor movement to the Tunisian front on March 1 and the problems arising with that move are gone into. The Ninth Division holds a key spot in current plans for Backbone and General Clark cautions EddJt that he must be prepared to execute his plans "right until the moment you begin mov­ ing out. We can't relax our vigilance or our training.'' General Clark, because of the cold that has been bothering him tor several days, cancels a scheduled trip to the Berkane region northwest of Oujda. Instead, he goes to the infirmary, has his throat painted and goes to his villa for the afternoon. The general plans a two-day' visit to the Invasion Training Center tomorrow and Tuesday and he does not want to have to cancel it since the Center is now in the midst of organization and it is imperative that General Clark see the arrangements before troops begin mov­ ing in to start specialized training in amphibious operations. The general plans on flying to La Senia airport at Oran and then going by car to the Invasion Training Center. * * * �f OUJDA-.Ai�ZEW-PORT AUX FOULES, FEBRUARY 8, 1943--The Fifth Army's Invasion Training Center, where part of the American troops in North Africa will be put through a gru_A�l:i}lg two-week course that will prepare them further for amphibious landings, is�inspected closely today by General Clark. One of the Fifth Army's missions is to prepare at least two divisions for amphibious warfare and General Clark goes to the Arzew area to determine how organization of the Invasion Train­ ing Center, under command of Brigadier General 0 1 Haniel, is proceeding. Accompanied by Captain Grindle, British navy liaison officer to the F:ifth Army; Colonel Sullivan, Fifth Army Quartermaster, and Lieutenant Beardwood, General Clark takes off for La Senia (Oran) airport at 1014 AM. The Flying Fort­ ress lands at 1051 after a smooth flight and the general's party leaves immediately for General O'Daniel's headquarters at Port Aux Poules, a beach resort eight miles east of Arzew. There, General Clark is met by General Dawley, commander of the VI Corps, and General 0 1 Daniel. Following luncheon at General 0 1 Daniel 1 s villa overlooking the sea, General Clark and his party and special staff officers who are attending school at the Invasion Training Center go to Arzew, board LCMs (Landing Craft Motor) and go out into the Gulf of Arzew to watch amphibious jeeps launched. Far out in the bay, the steel ramps of the LSMs arc let down and the jeeps roll on their wheels o£t, the ramps, nose into the water and become steady little boats capable of carry").f'our men and some equipment.• Three of the sea-going jeeps circle the LSMs and two of them scramble back on board again. The steam-operated ramp on the LSM on which General Clark is rising fails to work properly and the cable breaks when the motor can't be stopped. The jeep has to go ashore through the surf. General Clark observes that hand-operated ramp winches would be more practicable since jam-ups are less likely and the steam winches are· noisy and under combat conditions would be a give-away on the craft's position �hen landing under cover of darkness. From the Gulf of Arzew the party drives to a training section five miles west of Arzew. Here bluffs and hills rise sharpl� from the sea, making it possible to fire live ammunition from the landing craft. From a nearby cliff, General Clark and the officers watch an LCM move toward the beach firing an 81 nnn mortar that attempts first to lay the shells on the beach (to wipe out any opposition that might be there) and then back on the hills to harrass enemy troops that might be coming down the draws. Because of the rough sea, it is difficmlt to be accurate because of the bounce of the pitching craft. Despite the waves, the mortar is fairly accurate. Following demonstration with the 81 mm weapon, the same LCM comes ashore firing a 37 nnn anti-tank gun mounted in the landing craft's bow. Once again the pitching of the waves makes accuracy difficult but the gun fires shells quite close to its surfline targets. General Clark has a ringside seat for the firing demonstratiohs. ( Following the firing exhibition, another landing craft moves close ashore with an engineer demolition crew. A tank barrier has be�n erected at the surf line and six men have been ordered to destroy a section of it so tanks could get througu. A large rubber boat is launched froM the landing craft and the men go ashore through the surf with their demolition materials. The boat pitches and tosses and the men debark from it in the surf at waist level. While two hold the boat, the other four attach "Bangalor Torpedoes" to the tank barrier. These torpedoes are long lengths of pipe filled with time-fuse explosives. After placing their charges, the men decide they can not get back through the surf with their boat and drag it around into a protected cove. General Clark goes down to the waterline later to coMpare the surf with that he had to go through in a Falbot �( MOST SECRET when he made his submarine trip to Africa last October. The waves are not nearly so high. After a five minute wait, the charge attached to fou.r sections of the tank barrier goes off with a roar, sending chunks of metal and barbed wire high into the air. A huge gap is torn in the barrier that was imbedded in concrete. The demolition crew then goes to another section of the beach to blow, with saddle-type charges of TNT, three huge blocks of concrete erected as tank traps. Following this exhibition, the general and his party return to the port of Arzew to inspect an LCT (Landing Craft Tanlc) and to go aboard the Queen Emma, a British combat loader that has been loaned to the Invasion Training Center for a month. Enroute back to General 0 1 Daniel 1 s headquarters, a mock-up invasion training area is inspected. Here the various types of landing craft have been sketched out on the ground and from them troops can go through dry runs on how to debark from all types of landing craft. One of the mock-ups is of an LCI (Landing Craft Infantry) which is capable of carrying approximately 400 soldiers 12,000 miles for an assault. There are a few of this type craft in the African theater but at present they are at ports in the forward area. General 0 1 Daniel 1 s headquarters is located in beach homes at the surnner resort of Port Aux Foules. General Clark visits them and inspects the bivouac area in the hills behind where 10,000 troops at a time could be accomodated. This area is not yet being used since the full-scale Invasion Training Center program is not yet underway. At present, staff officers from the Fifth Army, divisions and regiments are watching training cadres work. Following that re­ corunendations will be made and cadres for training infantry and armored units will be set up to instruct outfits that will come in later for training. In addition to ma.king recommendations, the staff officers now at the Training Center will return to their units, build mock-ups and instructs their troops in loading and landing fundamentals before they ever reach the center for actual work on the ground. One Infantry Combat Team and one Armored Combat Command will be trained during each 10 day to two-week period. General Clark is pleased with the progress that has been made in getting this all-imrorant Fifth Army job underway. Hov1ever, he makes certain reconnnendations and stresses the necessity for air-ground cooperation in amphibious landings and takes steps to move up personnel and equipment from his XIIth Air Support Command. General Clark has dinner at General O'Daniel 1 s villa and remains there overnight. * * * of PORT AUX POULES-OUJDA, FEBRUARY 9, 1943--A demonstration/the work done by beach parties in an amphibious landing is ma.de this morning before General Clark and the staff officers attending the Invasion Training Center. Standing on a dune overlooking a broad stretch of beach between Arzew and Port Aux Foules, General Clark watches the rudiments of an invasion landing acted out before him. Offshore lie landing craft. At 9:30 the LCM containing the beachmaster ch�gs in to the beach, lets dovm its ramp and the beachmaster and two communications men come ashore to reconnaissance the beach, make sure they have hit the correct point and signal back for the next wave to hit the beach. The landing craft are superb. They are brought in through the surf and virtually to the surf line. Dovm come the ramps; put pour the troops, then the landing craft, powered by 500 horsepower motors, back away and put out to sea (in a full landing, back to the combat loader) for another load of men or mat­ eriel. The second wave includes initial elements of the shore party plus an · . .:i\ 'j,\f�:)t�I-.,;: �·t .. ·· · -·-- .. tr ca:f is MOST SECRET �( ( amphibious jeep that, after running dovm the ramp, circles out behind the breaking waves to measure the depth of the water and mark obstacles or sand bars. The third LSM contains a deisel-povrered bull dozer (because deisel engines need less water-proofing than gasoline operated machines) that comes ashore to scrape out a road over which tanks and trucks could move over the sand to the harder earth and roads back from the beach. The bulldozer also pulls three sledges loaded with chicken wire and steel-barred mats. While the bulldozer scrapes the roadway, the beach party, which has grown by now with the addition of road-laying crews, slit trench diggers and security troops, lays dovm the mats parallel to the beach so the vehicles that are already moving ashore can find a solid base on which to move. The road being scraped by the bulldozer is also laid with these mats. A full compliment of troops is not used for the demonstration but it proves with what timing and precision the shore parties must work. General Clark goes dovm onto the beach to inspect the work and to confer with General Wolfe, commanding the Engineer Amphibious Brigade that is attached to the Invasion Training Center. General Clark discusses engineer strength and assignment with General Wolfe in an attempt to determine just what the ratio of the shore party should be to each Regimental Combat Team. Satisfied that the Invasion Training Center is located in a fine area and off to a good start, General Clark and his party drive to La Senia airport and take off at 12:03 PM for Oujda in the general's Flying Fortress. He arrives at Angad airport, Oujda at 12:35. Following lunch he confers with his Chief of Staff, General Gruenther, concerning Fifth Army problems arising during his brief absence and concerning improvements that must be made at the Invasion Training Center. General Clark notes that more adequate clothing must be obtained for the beach parties since their coveralls and leggings are not practicable for the work. Rubberized and possibly zippered clothing must be secured. Lieutenant General Mason-MacFarlane, governor of Gibraltar, is to Bly to Oujda tomorrovr to confer with General ClarkJ•• colonel Louis Ford has been named Ordnance Officer of the Filth Army •• The nomination or General Clark's Chief of Sta.rt, General Gruenther, bas gone to the Senate for a major generalcy••• In the evening, Generals Clark, Gruenther, Lemnitzer and Colonel Saltzman are dinner guests of M. and Mme. Husson ••• Husson is secretary general to the Chef de la Region. * * * OPJDA, FEBRUARY 10, 1943•-General Mason-Macfarlane arrives at General Clark's headquarters this e"t.lening and the most important part of the Firth Army's Commander's PflCked day is getting all information possible on operation Backbone so he can discuss its ramific&tions with the round-shouldered governor of Gibraltar. t Calling in his Chief of Staff and heads of those sections most concerned with the Spanish Moroccan project, General Clark goes over the plans in detail. Because of the varying number of ways the affair could break, the G-3 section is preparing five different sets of plans to meet five possible contingencies: start of hostilities before March 1 and use of General Morgan's Northern Task Force; start of hostilities art.er Match 1 and, consequently, no use of General Morgan's force; fighting the campaign with a strong American force; fighting with an American force further weakened by movement of troops to the Tunisian front, and waging the campaign almost exclusively with French troops supported by special American units. ··· · ";)$111·\J.. �uuls British MOSl SECRET �31 "The worat thing that could happen," says General Clark, "is that this thing would break on us within the next 18 days. Nobody thinks it is going to happen and it has been decided to shoot the works in Tunis with everything we can lay our hands on. We are keeping a minimum or troops back here in the area where we would have to jump off if the Spanish situation broke and the Straits of Gib­ raltar were threatened. If we had to order the Northern Task Force to go into o�ration it would take 47 days before they could make their landing in the Tangi•rs region. We can call on that force until March 1. Afier that date, the shipping being held for that force must be released and Morgan's force prepared for another operation. Despite all these things and the growing belief that we will never have to execute Backbone, we mustn't take the attitude that the plans are in the air. We could find ourselves in a hell of a shape. We've got to push, push, push on this thing and be ready for a?JiY'thing." General Clark is told that the plans of the I Armored Corps are due tomorrow and that those of the VI Corps will be in by February 15. After a discussion of air-ground cooperation, Colonel Beam declares that he \\OUld like to have as soon as possible a list of the air objectives in the order of their importance. The XIIth Air Support Command of the Fifth Army has power to draw from the Xllth Air Force the units that the Fifth Army requires for an operation. Colonel Adcock reports that the supply problem does not present great difficulties and that Caeablanca. would be the main supply base for Backbone. ( The principal matter that must be taken up with General Mason-Macfarlane is the gearing or operations from Gibraltar with those of the force that would strike northward by land and with General Morgan's force that, if called upon before March 1, would come by sea t"rom the United Kingdom. Certain Spanish coastal guns must be put out of action by Commandos operating from Gibraltar. A plan bas also been conceived whereby Commandos would land in the Tangiers region, secretly hidden overnight and then go into operation :f'rom the landside to silence guns a few hours before Morgan's force would hit the beaches. General Clark returns the 6hef de la Region's courtesy call today, calling on M. Bouyssi at his regional headquarters. The American general and the French civil official discuss local sanitation and where cooler quarters can be found for American troops when the sweltering summer months come. $ummer bivouac areas are now being reconnaissanced in the Tlemcen district, in the mountains between Oran and Oujda. Pictures or General Clark and his section heads are taken today and, immediately thereafter, the general has his portrait taken in his office sitting before the three flags now ranged in a group behind his desk-­ the American Flag, the Fifth Army flag and the general's standard of rank, the tw:-.e white stars of a lieutenant general on a background of red. General Maeon­ Macfarlane,does not arrive at the Oujda airport until 6 PM. General Clark is there to greet him. A band and a platoon of well-groomed soldiers pay the govennor honors before he gets into General Clark's oar and rides to his villa for dinner and the night. * ( * * OUJDA, FEBRUARY 11, 1943-..Suffering from a combination cold and a touch of something akin to ptomaine poisoning, General Clark remains at his villa under care of a doctor and nurse today. Throughout the night he is quite ill and Col. Bruce orders him to remain in bed for the . .ne or two. �-...• .. . . .. �Because of the general's illness, General Mason-Macfarlane confers with General Gruenther and then, just as he is leaving Oujda, the governor of Gib­ raltar, calls on General Clark who is in bed. Soon after General Mason-llac takes off, Rear Admiral Hall of the U.S. Navy arrives. He conf"ers briefly with the general at his villa and then has the bulk of his discussions with General Gruenther. Hall is to do special naval planning in connection with future oper­ ations. It is announced tonight that all Allied troops in Africa--the two British Armies, American troops and the French forces-have been put under the supreme command of General Eisenhower who is being promoted to a full general. This is to be the new setup under which the drive will be made to throw the Axis out of the little fringe of Tripolitania and the coastal region of Tunisia where the German-Italian forces are now hemmed. General Eisenhower, commander-in-chief; General Harold Alexander, who has been commanding the army of the Middle East, aa deputy commander-j.n-chie.f; comma.nder-for-a.ir, Air Marshall Teddar; naval commander, Admiral Cunningham; commander of the Middle Eastern Force, succeed­ ing Alexander, General Henry Maitland Wilson; commander of the British First Army and all French troops, General Anderson. The announcement of the supreme command for Korth Africa is made by Prime Minister Churchill is a speech to the House or Commons. Staff officers from the army of the Middle East are now arriving in Algiers for a council of war that will start Saturday. This was the conference that General Clark was to have attended but illness will now prevent him doing so. It is likely that the council, after meeting in Algiers, will fly to Tripoli for further conferences prior to the big push aimed at driving Rommel and Von Arnim and their armies out of Africa. * * * OUJDA, FEBRUARY 12, 194.3-...0eneral Clark is much improved today. The war horse is pawitjg his foot a.gain and in mid-afternoon he issues orders that a plane is to be ready to fly him to the war conferences early Mond�y morning. Although he remains in bed all day he keeps in contact with his office and in the late afternoon has sev.eral officers, including Generals Gruenther and Moran, in. The general's Flying Fortress is to le�ve Oujda tomorrow for the Algiers conference. It will carry Generals Patton, who is flying up from Casablanca, and Lee, head of the Swrtiee of Supply who is in the African theater from the United Kingdom; Colonels Lewis and Beam, artillery and air support section heads of the Fifth Army, and Captain Grindle, British naval liaison officer to the Fifth Army. Oujda will turn into a Mecca tomorrow as four generals-Major Generals Patton and Lee and Brigadier Generals Larkin and Wilson--f.ly here for conferences with General Clark. By nightfall, General Clark is quite chipper again and is planning on returning to his office at least briefly tomorrow. * * * �33 OUJDA, FEBRUARY 13, 1943--0ujda becomes like Mecca today as four generals call on General Clark. The Fifth Army Commander, still weak from his illness, goes to his office in mid-morning. He decides that he will not go east for the special conference that American and British officers will attend next week in Tripoli •. Generals Patton and Lee and Colonels Lewis and Beam ,1111 attend the conference and report back to General Clark. This conference is going to out­ line the lessons that the British Eighth Army learned while it was fighting Rommel's forces in Libya and Tripolitania. Conferences concerning conduct of the war against the Axis in Africa are now being held in Constantine where General Alexander, deputy commander-in• chief under General Eisenhower, is establishing his new headquarters. Generals Patton and Lee, who were to have flown to Tripoli with General Clark, confer with the Fi£th Army commander on the pending conference. Two other points, in addition to the conference discussion, are disposed of at the Clark-Patton-Lee meeting. There have been reports that Brigadier General Wilbur has had an unauthorized interview with El Glaoui, the Pasha of Marrakech. Patton declares that this is not true and General Clark agrees to straightend the record on it. Patton also asks that not all tanks be taken away from his Western Morocco region for use at the front. He requests that he be allowed to retain 15 of them. Lee, head of SOS, ETOUSA, is going to the Tripoli conference to learn of supply problems that the British Army faced in its 1100 mile drive. ( Following their conference with General Clark, Patton, Lee, Lewis and Beam, accompanied by Captain Grindle, the British Navy officer who is going to Algiers to undertake special planning work, take off in the general's Flying Fortress. The two other generals conferring today with General Clark are Brigadier Genearals Larkin and Wilson, heads of MBS and ABS, rewpectively. A Service of Supply for NATOUSA is being organized and it is probable that Larkin will head it. The question of Larkin's suecessor at Oran is discussed and in all likelihood the post will go to Larkin's Chief of Staff, Colonel Edmund H. Leavy. General Wilson discusses a personal matter with General Clark. He wants the general's advice on whether he should take a job with NATOUSA at Algiers or remain as head of the Atlantic Base Section. General Clark tells him to stay at A1BS and that he will try to get command of a division for Wilson. General ClRrk returns to his villa at 4 PM and, after resting, spends the · evening with Lieut. Col. Bruce and Major Ball. Patrol activity only, coupled with air bombardment, is occuring along the front. The only unusual activity was a raid on the Gafsa area by U.S. Rangers who captured or killed 35 Italians while losing only one of their men. Rain has again mired down the northern sector. Both sides are building up troops in the areas immediately behind the lines and the showdown fight is coming to a head now that the Allied command has been settled and the French North Africa forces are coorelating plans with the British Eighth Army. * * * OUJDA, FEBRUARY 14, 194.3--General Lemnitzer, General Clark's Deputy Chief of Start, relinquiehes his position today so he can move to the Constantine area to take active command of the. ....-· ·-· 34th_C ·ery Brigade (anti-aircraft) • f ;, • ••"! �( General Lemiitzer will be succeeded by Colonel Adcock who has been Fifth Army G-4. Adcock's successor has not yet been selected. General Clark goest to his office on the regular schedule this morning and he !.ssfeeling�his·"gliliself again. During the morning he confers with Generals Gruenther and Lemnizter and Colonels Adcock and Robinson (Fifth Army Anti-Aircraft officer) concerning anti-aircraft protectioh of the Oujda area, movement of the 34th Brigade to Constantine and the change in staff necessitated by Lemnitzer's Iieparture. A great part of the morning, however, is taken to dispose of papers that piled up during his illness. He calls in various officers for consultation. In the afternoon, General Clark, accompanied by Col. Bruce and Cap�in Roberts and two nurses that the general takes along so they can get out of Oujda and see the surrounding country, makes a reconnaissance of the deep gorge connecting Tafouralt �d Berkane, both northwest of Oujda. The trip, through rugged, beautiful country and over narrow, twisting roa.ds, takes the greater part of the afternoon. In the evening the general attends a farewell .party for General Lemnitzer. The husky, quiet officer who is leaving has been close to General Clark since days back at the Army War College. Lemnitzer is a member of the close-knit f+ve-man expedition that came to Africa last October to pave the way for the successful execution of TORCH. General Clark hates to see "Lem" go but the big Brigadier has been chaffing to get into the field with troops. ( * * * The folliwing cable has been sent to General Eisenhower concerning hie promotion to a full generalcy and his taking command of the entire African theater: "The officers and men of the Fifth Army rejoice in the news of your well deserved promotion to the grade of General. They join me in extending sincereet congratulations. We are proud to have the opportunity of serving under your able leader.ship. Clark." * * * OUJDA, FEBRUARY 15, 1943--Toda.y is a day of diverse activity for General Clark as he addresses Military Police officers who have just arrived in Oujda with an NJ> company, confers with Colonel Carruth who has come over to make an engineering inspection for the Army Ground Forces, decides to finally let the French in partially on Backbone pltina, releases prisoners from the guard house and inspects virtually all installations in the Oujda area. The general tells the MP officers that they and their men must set a high dieciplinary sh.ndard for the Fifth Army headquarters area. "Your MPs," says the general, ''must set a high standard for courtesy. They must not be a gestapo. Morale and the entire feeling and a.ppaarance of an area rests to a great extent on the conduct of the military police. I want your men and your camp to be models that ather troops will try and emulate. To gin the MPs and espirit de corps, the general has ordered that they will wear pure white helments, white leggins and white glovee. The men are already on posts allwer town and they look splendid. Th� general gives the MP officers advice on how to police the area.. A 10 PM curfew has been set for �jda. ,·:,,,,<�- �35 ( Col Carruth, Enginaer of the 2nd Army, comes to General Clark's Office with Colonel Adcock, the new Deputy Chief of Staff of the Fifth Army. He is making a eurvey of conditions and problems in Arica and he confers lengthily with General Clark and Adcock. Believing that the time is ripe and that the French should be brought in on Backbone plans as far as possible, General Clark sends a radio to General EisenhoweF asking confirmation of his decision to bring the matter up with French General Juin who is to call at Fifth Army headquarters on February 20. French units would be used primarily to guard lines of communication should the advance into Spaniah Morocco be necessary. It insufficient American troops were available shou+d Backbone go into effect, special French units would join the u.s. troops on the front lines. ( A proposal that General Clark mad• in Algiers last December is beginning to bear fruit. General Gomez of Brazil is to come to North Africa in response to the general's idea that Latin-American countries put a token force in this theater. Mexican army officials are also planning a reconnaissance trip. Form­ ation of Service of Supply, NATOUSA, ia announced today and Brigadier General Larkin is to command with Colonel Ford as his Chief of Staff. Ford is being released a• Ordnance Officer of the Fifth Army and Colonel Urban Niblo, who waa General Clark 1s Ordnance Officer when he commanded the II Army Corps in England ii to be th• new Fifth Army Ordnance chief. Succeeding Larkin as commanding general of the Mediterranean Base Section is Colonel FA Heavey. Another development of the day is that movement of the 9th Infantry Diviaion, commanding by General Eddy and which is part of th• Fifth Army, has completed mpvement from the Port Lyaut.y area to the Oran-Tlemcen region. Duriag the afternoon Geneaal Clark makes a thorough inspection of all troops and areas in the Oujda region . He is accompanied by Lieut. Colonel Smith, headquarters commandant. The Fifth Arm:, commander makes innumerable recommendations--oiling of roads that are already becoming dusty as the days become hotter and drier, landscaping improvements for various areas, taking over for use by the MP company of certain small houses just being completed, obtaining more sandbags for the slit trenches that have been dug in case of air raids. Checking on the guard house in the headquarters company area, General Clark goes over the confinement records of four men and orders that they be brought to his office. He interviews each one separately and then orders that the remainder of their sentences be suspended. "It is my belief," says the general, "that a confined man is useless and that unless his crime is too great he should be released so he can do his part. Confinement of men on more or l••• minor offenses means a great loss of man hours and every man hour is important in an active theater." In the evening, following his practice of having his headquarters officer• to his villa informally, General Clark has Colonels Barker and Micklewaite, his Chemical and Judge Advocate officers, to his home for dinner. Ta• general plans to fly to Guercif tomorrow in a Piper Cub to inspect 30th Infantry regiment units in that area. ( * * * �( OUJDA-GUERCIF .. TAOURIRT-OUJDA, FEBRUARY 16, 194.3--General Clark's Chief of Staff, General Gruenther, becomes a Major General; the Commanding General of the Fifth Army vieits units of the 30th Infantry regiment in the Guercif­ Taourirt region; the Germans make a.n 18-mile deep break-through in front of Sbeitla. but by nightfall they have been driven back eight miles. These are the major happenings of the d� o Following early morning conferences with Mr. Schott, new U.S. consul to Oran, and with Colonel Ford ,rho is going to Algiers to undertake his new job, General Clark takes off from the old Oujda airport at 9:23 AM in a Piper Cub artillery observation plane. He arrives a.t Guercif in an hour and.20 minute� and ie met by Colonel Rogers, commander of the 30th. With Colonel Rogers and Lieut. Col. Bernard, commanding the battalioh.-in the Guercif area, General Clark tours the battalion area in a jeep. One case of typhu3 has been reported in the Guercif area and medical officers are working on the case and planning a de-lousing program for fear the highly communicable disease will spread to American troops. Brigadier General Simone, commander of French troops in the Guercif sub-division area, and two of his staff officers also accompany the Fifth Army general on his inspection tour. General Clark finds that the Amer­ ican troops are well set up except for entertainment and he decides to order a projector and fichm to Guercif as soon as he return3 to Oujda. ( General Clark is the luncheon guest of Colonel Roger� and French officials of the region, including General Simone, are also invited. Following luncheon, the Fifth Army commander reviews a �all detachment of French troops. At 1:10 ?M, the general takes otf for !aourirt lllld lands there at 1:45. Another bat• ta.lion of the 3oth 1 leaa one company that is in training at the Invasion Training Center, is encamped around Taourirt and Col. Dahlman, commander of this battalion, conducts General Clark on a tour of the bivouac areae. The general then takes off for Oujda in the " puddle jumper" plane and arrives there at 4:1+2 PM. The...O•rma.n break-through was made in th• center or th• Southern Sector by about .30 tanks. Some of our artiliery positions were overrun. Reconnaia­ aance show• about 70 tanka in reserve and the Germana, apparently in a feint• ing movement, have about 70 vehicles moving toward Gafsa. By nightfall, American troops in the region have th• situation under control and they have driven the Axia forces back eight miles. Notification comes through that General Gruenther 1 e promotion to a aajor generalcy has been approved by the senate so General Clark has a small congratula.tory party at his villa at 6:00 PM. While many of th• 1'�ifth Army Staff officers look on, General Clark pins the second atar on his Chief of Staff saying: 1tit 1 & a real pleasare to put this on you, Al, and I hope I will be putting stars on some of these other officers ,before long." The general then has Colonel Howard and Majors Balla and Meacham for dinner. * * ; * OUJDA, FEBRUARY 17, 194.3--The Axis bas launched a sizable drive in the aouthern sector, bulging their front to include Gafsa. For the first time since the Tunisian campaign atarted, the line is radically changed as the Germans and Italians aend tanks, motorized equipment and dive bombers against American troops around Gafsa. The enemy is also occupyi!]g Sidi Bou Zid,_ northeast or Gafaa, threatening Sbeitla and the strategic Thelep� airfiela near Feriana.. �l This develepnent cauaes General Clark great concern, particularly in view of predictions he made over two months ago and because of his request--declined by the War Department--to take command of the southern sector and strike before the Axis could get troops into position or before Rommel could back his way into Tunisia to join his harrassed forces with those of Von Arnim. 11 .lor a long time," the general says, "I had predicted tha'tiRommel would at­ tempt to make a juncture with Axis forces in Tunisia. I began to worry about it early last December while Rommel was retreating before the British Eighth Anny' in Libya. It was constantly and habitually assumed by G-2 at Allied Force Head­ quarters in Algiers that Rommel was incapable of making such a long retreat and an effective fusing of his forces with those in Tunisia. I couldn't understand why Mockler-Ferryman (G-2, AFHQ) figured this was impossible and he said Rommel lacked sufficient transportation and gasoline. "What was apparent to me and what I predicted has happened. Rommel has Joined his forces and the fight now is going to be long and hard. "You will also recall my lone campaign to get American troops out of the noJ'thern sector, where they were under British colllll8lld 1 and into the southern sector oder a consolidated American coJIIJll8.D.d. This was finally done and I pro­ pesed that our units be gathered under one command and made ready to drive a wedge into the Gabes-Sfax area to prevent Just the thing that has happened. I asked to take that command. Arter much discussion with "Ike" (General Eisen­ hower) he made such a request to the War Department. It was turned down because the command was not big enough for an Army and because or the job that might have to be done along the Spanish Morocco border. As a result, as you will re• call, the II Corps was assigned to the task and General Fredendall took over the planning of "Satin," the proposed southern sector drive. "Logistics experts said the road and railroad in the southern region wouldn I t support the pl.an I had in mind. They said all that could be supported was the lat Armored Division and one regimental combat team plus some service units; that that was all the Constantine-Te�ssa railroad could stand. I told Ike I could put five times that number of troopa in there and support them. I had gone to the region. I had studied the situation. I knew it could be done. Now it has been done. "The force assembled under the. II Anay Corps was to have started a drive on Gabes by January 20. It was all set to go and then it was called off. This decision, I under•tand, was reached at a conference held between Generals Alexander and Eisenhower. Alexander, I am told, urgee that the attack be delay­ ed so a drive by the American force and the Eighth Army could be coordinated. While we were getting set for this, Rommel did what I predicted he would--he got his forces out of Tripolitania and into Southern Tunisia and he consoli­ dated his position. "The Germans now have taken Ga.fsa. They are attacking to take all the high ground and they are getting the key terrain. They have pushed in at Faid and Sidi Bou Zid. They- have a strong defensive line and they have a key airport at Gafsa that can be a fol'!lidable threat to our flank. We will push them out but we are going to have to do it the hard way and at a great cost in lives and equipment. �33 ( 11 If we ha4 attacked on January 20 we could have pushed our torces--if we had used everything at haad--all the way to Gabes. Then we could have blocked the Gabes corridor and prevented Rommel from joining his forces with those in Tunisia.; could have prevented the very thing that is happening now. "We bad many artillery positions overrun yesterday and we lost a lot of men and guns. The result is that the 9th Division Artillery is now being moved to the front under forced march. Dive bombing at the front has been particul­ arly heavy and we have to find the solution to that if we are to take the in­ itiative. u ( Weather interferes with the general's planned schedule today. There is a slight coating of snow on the ground at dawn and during the day there is a fine, cold, penetrating rain. John Jay Mc Cloy, an assistant Secretary or War, was scheduled to arrive at Fifth Army headquarters during the afternoon but all planes, both incoming and outgoing, are grounded. One of the general'a callers is Colonel Henderson of the 4th Motorized Division who is touring North Africa as an Anny Ground Force observer. The main conference of the day is with General Gruenther, Colonel Adcock and Col. Robinson (Fifth Army Anti­ Aircraft officer}. With General Clark they go over revised Backbone plans. Because of the movement of the 9th Division and the likelihood of further troops being drawn out of the Fifth Army area, French troops will have to play a more important role in the operation if it has to be executed. General Clark places a long distance call to Major General Harmon, commanding the 2nd Armored Division, and orders him here from the Rabat region for confer­ ence tomorrow. In late afternoon General Dawley arrives at Fifth 11:rmy head­ quarters and confers with General Clark before heading back to his new VI Corps headquarters between Tlemcen and Oran. * * * OUJDA, FEBRUARY 18 1 1943-•The Axis drive in the Southern Sector con­ tinues on a large scale and by night we have lost Sbeitla., Ferio.na and the splendid natural airport at Thelepte, and Kasserine. American troops, who were to have anchored in a defense line in the low range of hillts running roughly from Feriana and the south, through Sbeitl.a. 1 and then toward Pichon, are unable to dig in ao they back up to the higher range running behind Kasserine. Early morning reports are that we have lost 108 tanks but a revised report later in the day sets the figure at about 150. This is a tremendous leas and General Clark is extremely worried. The only comper,isation is that the British Eighth Army is moving forward 1ovarf the Tunisian-Tripolitanian border, having taken Ben Gardane, in Tunisia, and driving toward Medinine. RollJJlel apparently is getting elbow room in Southern Tunisia, withdrawi11g his troops northward for a probable stand against the British Eighth Army in the Gabes corridor, a 15 mile wide area flanked by the sea on the east and a tremendous marsh area on the west. l In mid-afternoon reports come in that British-operated Sherman tanks have been thrown in with the 1st Armored Division. French troops are also being mixed in. The 34th Division is half attached to the II Corps and half with the French. The situation is pretty snarled. �( General Clark is "very much worried" about the situation in Southern Tunisia, "particularly about this inter-mingling of units." He declares that it can "well foretell disaster. 11 "It has alw� been the theory-..and I have hammered and preached it--that our units DlUSt be kept intact so they can fight as they have been trained to fight, as a coordinated team. When we mix up our units and when we keep them fighting as battalions or even smaller, they are not capable of self-sustainment or of coordinated action. There is· a very close comparison between one of our fighting units and a football team. You can't throw in a British "tackle" or a French "end" and expect him to know the signals or even play the game the way you play it. Inter-mingling of units could be fateful." Because of the situation at the front, General Juin cancels his sched­ uled conference here Saturday with General Clark. Weather conditions--heav,y and continuous rain--cancel two other planned conferences of the general: one with Assistant Secretary of War Mc Cloy and the other with Major General Harmon. Work of the Fifth Army during this front line crisis is concentrated on alert­ ting units under its control for rapid movement to the front. Replacements in men and materiel must be rushed up. Artillery of the 9th Division is already underway and the demand today is for more self-propelled 105 mm howitzers. f \ Unless some unforseen thing rises, General Clark now plans to le�ve Oujda on February 23 on a trip that will take him to conferences with General Nogues and the Sultan of Morocco at Rabat, with Generals Patton and Wilson at Casablanca and on to Marrakech to look over the possibility of making that his headquarters for a proposed command post exercise. Outline plans for Backbone are buttoned up today u General Clark goes •ver the draft with Generali Gruenther and Colonels Adcock and Robinson. Another conference is held with Colonel Howard, Fifth Arm:, G-2, concerning counter intelligence corps work and Lieut. Col. Parsons, head of CIC for the Fifth Army, and four of his officers, two in uniform and two in civilian clothes, talk this phase of intelligence work over with the general. General Clark receives good personal news today, being informed by letter that his old boss at Army Ground Forces in Washington--General McNair--is coming to Africa on an inspection trip. In the evening the general relaxes by playing ping pong with members of his staff and then has Col. Sullivan, his Quarter­ aaster, as his dinner guest. * * * OUJDA, FEBRUARY 19, 1943•-The situation at the front improves today but it still is cause for great concern. The Axis is consoiidating its position and we are digging in along the arc of hills behind Feriana-Kasserine-Sbeitla. The enemy tries two feelers; fails in both. One is an attack in the Pichon area but it is repiilsed. The second is a drive by 20 to .30 German tanks against the pass leading from Kasserine to Tebessa but the Germans are driven off. General Clark spends much anxious time going over the situation reports and consulting the large maps on his office walls. The defensive position taken by the American-French-British troops is strong. However, the southwest end of the line is in flat plain country and Rommel, if he doesn't have to leave too much behind to protect the Gabes corridor from the advance of the Eighth Arm:, may tr,y to encircle the southwest end of the line. General Clark �YO ( believes that the Eighth Army 11 will save the day. 11 It is on the move toward the cottidor and a trenendous battle undoubtedly will ts.lee place there. The general situation is still very dangerous. General Clark receives a report from the II Corps on men and materiel losses and they are high, particularly in the vital Medium tanks. In late afternoon, despite continued bad weather, General Patton, Vice Admiral Kirk and General Clark's three Fifth Army officers--Colonels Lewis, Beam and Kammerer return from Tripoli where they attended the conference on lessons learned in fighting Rommel's Afrika Korps. General Clark confers with General Patton and Admiral Kirk and then dines with them at General Gruenther•s villa. Patton and Kirk remain overnight at General Clark's villa. The Spanish Consul in Oujda, the Marquis of Orelleana Vieja, calls on General Clark and as a result the consul, who is going to Spanish Morocco, is going to arrange a meeting somewhere near the French-Spanish Morocco border between General Clark and General Orgaz, top-ranking General in Spanish Morocco. The general also prepares today for two eventualities--his going to the front and the possibility that at least part of the summer will be spent in this region. Regarding the first, he is havinf4 an armored scout car rigged up with special seats and guns so he can go rig��to the front lines if necessary; on the second, he orders a reconnaissance made of the mountainous area between Oran and Oujda so that troops can be moved to a cooler region if necessary. It is of interest to record in this record that of the 85 graduates of General Clark's class at West Point (1917) who have remained in the army to date, at least 32 are now general officers. At least 21, and probably more since all the "makes" are not up to date, are brigadier generals; 10 are major general, and one, General Clark, is a lietitenant general. It is also unusual that General Clark, youngest man in his ciass, was the second member of the 1917 group to become a brigadier general,; the first to become a major general; and the only one, to date, who is a lieutenant general. At the Point, General Clark finished in approximately the middle of his cl.ass. * * * OUJDA, FEBRUARY 20, 1943--The Assietant Secretary of War, John ;J. Mc Cloy, arrives at Fifth Army Headquarters today and,after lunching with General Clark at his villa, he reviews, in company with General Clark, two platoons of in­ fantry that have been drawn up as a guard of honor in the s chool courtyard just outside General Clark's office. Rain, which has been falling for the past three days, is pelting down but Mr. Mc Cloy makes a very thorough inspection. Following a long conference in the commanding general's office, during which Mr. Mc Cloy introduces members of the staff that accompanied him to North Africa on a survey trip tor Secretary of War, General Clark and the Assistant Secretary of War go to a seminar at which officerB recapitulate what they learned at the Eighth Army conference in Tripoli. l Colonel Kammerer, General Clark's G-3, gives an over-all view of the conference to which the Fifth Army officers flew in a Flying Fortress. He says the reaction of the Italians in Tripolitania to British entry has been passive; that German efforts to block the harbor were only partially success­ ful and that 3,000 tons of cargo are being unloaded�� Tripoli daily. General ·r,,it,Ui!if:}\':\;,iU'f'!�1lir' {{, !;, lA.tf: ' •. t.�ill\!<....: l\'.i: t ,'.�> T �Yl . I ( Montgomery impreseed the American officers and Kammerer outlines the British general's theories. (Note how many coincide with those of General Clark). 1-­ There must be a concentration of effort in any operation •••never break units dol'fll to less than a division; 2--In executing offensives always keep the enemy moving •••never let him slow you down between his strong points; 3--Cooperation between ground and air units is vital•••air power tops the list in explaining the 8Uccess of driving Rommel 1,400 miles in 13 weeks; 4--Morale: troops must have confidence in all subordinates and they must know that it is our theory never to extend a force beyond its capabilities; 5--I am against all paper work•••give oral orders only unless a written order ie absolutely necessary; 6--0perate with a firm base, or, in other words, a good reservesince it in­ spires the confidence that is necessary among front line troops; 7--Replace­ ments: don't send them in by driblets••• I never substitute less than an entire brigade •••pull the old ou�fit back and put the replacements in behind the lines; 8-�Every army should be composed of 50 percent infantry troops who 11 lmow how to kill in the moonlight;" 9-Mines are a weapon rather than an obstacle •••we will find the road to Berlin saturated with mines. During the Ti:ipoli conference, which lasted three days, various units showed by map and sandtable what they did in various operations. They showed, to officers from the Fifth Army, NATOUSA, British First Army, AFHQ and sub­ ordinate wiits the lessons they learned in one of the fastest military drives in history. Following Kammerer•s talk, Colonel Beam, F ifth Army's XIIth Air Support Command chief, explains how the Royal Air Force operated in conjunction with the desert drive. Three w�eks prior to October 23, when the offensive started, the air force concentrated on wrecking axis supplies. They bombed ports; they shot up motor convoys and trains. Then, three days prior to the attack, the air force, concentrating its punch, made terrific drives--sometimes with up to 1,000 sorities in a day.,-against Axis airdromes with the result that by October 23 there was little German air opposition. The final day before the attack no Axis planes were allowed to cross into the territory were every­ thing was being assembled for the 9:40 PM zero hour o Planes also kept up night patrols over the enemy areas with the result that the Afrika. Korps got little sleep in the 72 hours prior to the attack. The Eighth Army drive proved that air strength will not replace ground strength but that it extends, widens and adds punch to the offensive effort. Once the drive was underway, ground troops prepared rude airdromes and then engineers came up to improve on them. Montgomer;y followed one air-ground rule. He would not let his troops advance b$yond their air cover. When his air units moved forward, then his ground forces could move a.gait).. Also, he never tried a mission that his air and ground forces couldn't accomplish as a team. With effective air-ground con­ tact, Montgomery made the final decisions on what missions the air would undertake. "There can't be two captains on one team," explains Beam. "Mont­ gomery commanded both air and ground as he had to. Another air-ground theory of the Eighth Arrrry is mass your aviation where it will do the most good. Don't dissipate it in a lot of little missions. The crucial phase of the Eight A-rrrry attack--that of cracking the El Alamein line between the Quattara Depression on the South and the Mediter­ ranean on the Horth--is explained by Lt. Col. Hansborough of the Fifth Army Artillery Section. Artillery had to punch tm hole through the strongly fortified, strongly held line so that infantry and armored units could pour �( ( through to develop the situation and start backing the Axis force up. The Eighth Army had 408 25-pounders and 48 medium guns for the artillery oper­ ations on the Northern Flank where the attack was to be made. At 9:40 PM all the guns opened up with a concentration of fire on spots that had been seledted and ranged through reports from patrols and through use of aerial photographs. After this concentration of fire• a rolling barrage covering 4 1000 yards was started. There was one gun for each 27 yards of front. Be­ cause the terrain was without landmarks, the artillery was also used to guide troops, concentrations of fire being laid down at points where the troops were to start their advance and where they were to send it. Bofor guns, shooting their familiar orange balls, were used as "sidelines" so the troops knew v1here their flanks were. mn the first 24 hours of the attack, from 9:40 PM October 23 to 9:40 �M October 24, the artillffy laid down a total of 3,328 tons of shells. This did not include bombs dropped by planes on special objectives. During the next week during mop-up and consolidation of position, the artillery fire was lighter but during the 24 hours of November 2/3, when the final break through was made, 2,184 tons of shells were fired by the artillery. This operation proved several theories of the Eighth Army. 1--The importance of the centralized control of artillery; in this case, through each Corps Commander; 2--concentration of fire on specific targets by divisions and regiments; 3--that the reports of patrols cannot be depended upon unless they are verified by aerial photography; 4--the advantages of using time fuzes to inflict heavy casualties in enemy trenches. Following the reports by the three officers, General Clark addresses the packed assembly roo11. "Reports of this kind," says the genoral,"wlll help to get us better prepared to take our place at the battlefront when the time comes. This attack by the Eighth Army was timed with the opening of our North African attack on November 8. I remember being at Chequers visiting the Prime Minister with General Eisenhower when Mr. Churchill received word from General Alexander that he could not open the Middle East drive until October 23 /24. The Prime Minister didn't want to wait that long but General Eisenhower and I said we thought that, timing was abou:b right. We felt that the offensive would be rolling about right about the time we came ashore in Africa and tht1t it would influence considerably the feeling of neutral countries. 11 How well I remember the first time I saw General Montgomery. General Eisenhower and I had gone to the United Kingdom on a special tour last June and we went to an army training problem that General Montgomery was conduct­ ing. We were in his headquarters and, when General Eisenhower lighted a cig­ arette, I noted a change in Montgomery's manner. I was told later that that was the first time a junior officer had ever smoked :in Montgomery rs presence. Later I heard this story a.bout Montgomery and smoking. A lieutenant colonel was riding with Montgomery in his car�and pulled out a cigarette. Tapping it on his case, the colonel turned to Montgomery and said: "Do you mind if I smoke, sir. 11 Montgomery looked at him coldly and said; "Certainly not ••• 11 The colonel lighted a match and almost had it to the tip of the cigarette when Montgomery shouted: "BUT NOT IN HERE!!" ( Turning to Mr. !le Cloy who :ts sitting in the front row of the assembly room, General Clark explains that his Fifth Army is six weeks old today, that it is being built up and developed so it can be ready for action on 8l\Y front. Mc Cloy then responds that he is in North Africa 11 to glean information so I can go back and give you further support." �( The seminar lasts almost two hours. General Clark then asks section heads and principal officers to his villa where a reception is held in honor of Mr. Mc Cloy. Afterward Mc Cloy is General Clark!s dinner guest and remains overnight at the general's villa. In the evening they talk over details of the negotiations General Clark conducted with Admiral Dar­ lan and Mc Cloy requests a full report for the War Department records cover­ ing from the time the General first met with Darlan in Algiers until the Admiral's assassination on Christmas Eve, 1942. Mr. Mc Cloy and the general also go over the situation on the Southern Front. We are holding now along the line given yesterday. General Clark receives a personal letter from General Eisenhower today and it sqys, in part: n •••You can't realize how deeply I appreciated the message of the Fifth� (concerning his promotion to full general) and even more how happy I was to receive your pencil written note ••• "There are things I have told you several times verbally and which I now want to put in \Triting in an effort to make sure that you can never let any doubt enter your mind on this particular score. It is that never for one second have you lost an atom of the great confidence I have always placed in you, nor has there ever been any diminution in the deep feeling of freindship I have held for you for so many years. "You will never know how close I came within the past few days when the pressure on me was very, very drastic indeed to call upon you once more to come and help out when I found it impossible to be in three distinct places at ones. Ther� is no one on whom I depend more nor to whom I look with greater confidence to render great services to our cause in this war. "I earnestly hope that you will take this letter literally and without any mental reservations. Nothing would be a greater tragedy to me than to come to bel ieve that the close feeling of partnership with you, that I have so long depended upon, could be weakened'":t'n''any' 1sl:lght� res�ct. As Ever, (signed) � Ike. * * * OUJDA, FEBRUARY 21, 1943--Following a reconnaissance of Fif'th Army head­ quarters with General Clark, Mr. Mc Cloy and his party depart for Oran and an inspedtion of the Mediterranean Base Section, leaving OUjda in mid-morning. l On the Central-Southern front the Axis has tried to push again rut only one slight penetration is made--slightly up the Kasserine pass, just north­ west of Kasserine. The situation is still grave but reinforcements of men and guns are arriving at the front and things don't look too pessimistic. Part of the 168th Regimental Combat beam is isolated just east of Sidi Bou Zid, com­ pletely cut off from the rest of the Allied Forces. This force, led by Colonel Drake, is reportedly running short on water, food and ammunition. It is 35 miles inside the German lineal General Clark spends much time in front of the maps and charts in his room, figuring moves, checking on the supply of troops. He is peripatetic throughout the day, going over to the Chief of Staff's office, checking in at various a-sections. In the afternoon he goes for a long hike with General Blesse, Fifth Army Medical officer. In the evening he dines at his villa with Generals Gruenther, Blesse and Moran. * * �( OUJDA, FEBRUARY 22, 1943--The snarled situation on the Tunisian front, with the Germans having now made a tremendous bulge in the central-south section of the line until it includes Gafsa, Sbeitla, Kasserine and now threatening Tebessa itself, worries General Clark incessantly. I am much disturbed, and have been for some timc, 11 explains the General, 11 about the situation at the front. It is absolutely apparent that there is a horrible mixture of American, British and French units in all three corps of the British Fir�t Army. It now begins to look like a war of detachments. American troops are all mixed in with soldiers of the British and French armies. this is absolutely contrary to our tactical doctrines, to the very foundation on which our army is built. 11 "We teach an� we depend upon divisions as the smallest independent unit of combined arms, the smallest unit capable of fighting an"independent action. All our training has been to fight each division as a team. It has always been stressed that it should not be used raggedly and haphazardly in piecemeal attacks, in piecemeal commitments to action. Dn toe Tunisian front now we have separate regiments in which the American, British and Frrnch are all r.iixed up. By thi� action, I feel that we mo.y have lost all opprotunity for offen­ sive action and it is my incr�asing belief that there will only be one result: there will be one tell of a bloody struggle before we throu the German3 and Itali�1s out of Tunisia. 11 I \ "As this thing develops I �e tha}, Rommel is going to be able to block for some time the ad,mnce of the British Eighth .A.rmy from the south. With all our troops mixed up in the central region, with the lo3ses we have incurred in materiel and men, we will be unable for �ome tiir'e to launch an offensive with the power needed to clear Tunisia o "General Eisenhower is going to have to move more troo::;>s to the front. With the situation as precarious as it is up there, he can't afford to leave troops back here in French Morocco and Western J lgeria. He's got to decide .. whether the Spanish Moroccan situation back here is going to blow up or whether he must move almost all he 1 :s got up to Tunisla. Ike has got to take a chance and he's going to do it. I believe the Jrd Division and other fighting unit3 back here will be moved up. Such a move will make further planning on the SprJ1ish Moroccon situation U3eless. The status of the Fifth Army ae a planning and training unit, and its employment against Spanish Morocco if necessary, won't mean anything. It will be worthless. "Things couldn't be a.n a worse mess than they are nov,. I fe'-'l, and I have always felt, that the co�.mand setup and the haphazard use of troops on the Tunisian front has never been right. I've said so often, preached it so often-­ the American Army represent"'d on the Tunisian front must conte.in only American troops under American command!" { Qt,neral Clark explains that his new Ordnance Officer, Colonel Niblo, who reports in today from the front where he was Ordnance Officer with the II Corpts, ha3 told him that the 168th Regimental Combat T"'run (American) was cut off without ammunition, food or water near Sidi Bou Zid and that he (Niblo) personally heard General Fredendall issue orders for the 168th to �urrender. This combat team, which 3hould be a di�tinct fighting unit, had a lot of hit and miss units attached to it, Niblo reports • • . ,J��!t:\-: eili;.;}"' .. .) ·�t\�\t ; �wgft'i . �L\5 � General Clark i:s staggered °h'J the n 3urrendert1 order. orders to !urrender," declares the Fifth Army Commander. 11 I will never bsue Newspaper clippings that the general has received �how that inaccurate reporting back in the States has, in at lea:st one instance, placed General Ulark 1 s Fifth American Army "within 300 miles of General Montgomery" of the Briti:sh Eighth Army. This disturbs the general greatly since it leads to the impre:ssion that he is directing fighting on the Central Tuni�ian front. "After having asked to command that sector," General Clark says, "I have always felt a little bitter that our Fifth Army front and sphere of action couldn't be a. positige thing; that we couldn't be up front." General Clark b�lieves that one of the reasons for General Eisenhower's letter of two days ago was that the Commander-in-Chief knew how General Clark must feel, being back here organizing anC:arrny--�eeing more and more army unite detached and moved to the front--and not getting any of it into action under his commruid. A new command system has been set up and it gives General Alexander tac­ tical command at the front. The Britisher is directing from a newly organized 18th Army Group headquarters at Constantine. Of the long list of officers in this new command !etup, only three are American: General Eisenhow�r as Com­ mander-in-Chief; General Spaatz, holding a dolVtl-the-list air command, and General Fredendall, comm anding the II Corps. The setup is very predominately British. ( The Axis makes slightly de�per penetr�tions today, taking Kasserine Pass and fanning out into the v..lley. There has been some fighting around Thala. The 9th u. S. Division has set up its command post near Tebessa and it is scheduled to relieve the 1st Division. General Clark has many conferences during the day, most of them concerned with the movement of troops to the front. The number or troops directly under the Fifth Arr.1y is decl'ea�;ing each dq. Genera.l Clark is scheduled to leave early tomorrow on a. three or four dq trip to the West. First he will go to Rabat to confer with General Nogue3 and moet the Sultan of Morocco; then he will go to Casablanca for conference� with Generals Pattonand Wi13on, then he will fly south to Marrakech to look over the site ier· possible use in conducting a Comma.nd Poet Exercise next week. * * * OUJDA-RABAT-CASABL.-iNCA, February 23, 1943--Generc:..l Clark dep...rts from Oujda at 9:00 AM in his Flying Fortress for an inspection and good will tour that has been arranged by his Civil Affairs section and the staff of French General Nogues. On the first leg of the trip he is accompanied by Generals Gru�nther and Beucler, Colonels Saltzman and Herckel, Major Ball and Sergeant Chaney. At 16:45, General Clark is met at Sale airport by a guud of honor con­ sisting of 13 scout cars and motorcycle escorts of the 82nd Reconnaissance Battalion and a band, all from the Second Jrmored Division. Lined up to re­ ceive the General are: Am�rican generals Patton, Keyos, Campbell, KingmQ.!l and Wilbur; French General Nogues; hi! Commandant of Troops, General Lascroux; �E t11 ( ·\:;i:i\>;,l\.r-· �'·l1;1tith· MOST ·· Y6 SECk1- 1 <2 o. Q..Q., thf per,d of his Uilitar:r C· binet, Colonel Iinttej Delqq1.1�; \. -· i:::,t' RPsidence r ey,pr; the Fermrnent Secrqtary of Nnt�onal .J0,fnn2e, Cor"'' ndant r�ora"'llon, Pnd Carta.in Blanckaert, Nogues' aide. After greet1nGS ar'P. exchanged, ru -N'l °' r,nd flourishes are given by tre band, the Jtrr $-rangl0d Brnn8r r 1, ·�rrsei 1 les rlayed, and the gua ·d of honor · nsy ectC>d by Gern')ral Cl."rY accom:ranie.c by Gener" ls } 8tton ard 1\for,ues. 0 1 The entire party then rroceeds to R:--bat anc3 the reridence or the Resident Gener:-1 Nogue.,, o" French �·orocco. As t,} e convoy rc1.sses L10. qua.re, [' guard of rrounted Spahis i_, rjcked ur, le11clinn: r colorful con�r�st to the dr"'' p2·:11t or:> the iu�mored ·cout cars. }',t tc e entr:-mce to the re::i.dence n. ;"orocc�n drurn n 1d bugln corrs grc,ets th8 pc1rty 2 s it J roceods 1JT' the broar• skirs to the me.in er>trance. Tbe "'tc::-ir"' enc'! 'l1�ro�ci1 to tr"' mail1 l.?::.l 'Te lined wit,h nr>tiv;:, troors ;n flo'v­ ing red unifor,,1s, turbans and bri_�},t sashes, all with muskets at rresent arn1s. General Clark is receiver1 by Gener1::.l "tfogues in t.he r1rn,vil1G rooJ"'l of' thP r"'�:aence wl1er8 he anr various remb"'r · o "' the rn.rty confer �nformally. Gener"l Cl"rk is concernerl ith fr quel1t refer")nces T'l"'d� to the .:,eriousne s of the Spanisb situr.tion. 1• 1 0 At 11:00 the rarty le"ve� the ·r>sidence for th-) Sult2n's l-"lace rnd enroutP dr�ves yast arinzing con�rrsts of riodcrn buildinc;s r>nd anciP.nt ru'ri.:;, f'VidencP o" the civi:.i::mVon ex:i st�ng be.,,.e lon - be"'or") the tine 'o" Christ. Out sire trP \'l[' 11 . ·hich surrounds t} e Ju::..tc .n rs } rlace c.nc1 courtyr rr '3 guarc' s o:: native troops wl- ich ljned tre n.rrroacl, to the �·or'ish Gateway. Inside the c.:i 1 j s r large 'lUadr�nsle or r1echouar, an open field a.prroximrtely 1/2 nile squnre, ith the slaves 1 1u'1rters on one side "nd a rrivate riosque r here the 3, .ltrn goes to , rc1y each Friday rn,1 a rrivate school f'or his clii.ldren with the imJ-re"'sive back�md_ of' th 0 ..:;nlt"n's Irlace ..-dominating the scene on the other. ·o ( v(vl , '"Y'-' �-<.r� ,� .... , cP' · � �,<'\50-, A'3 Gener�l Fogw3s and Gener"l Clnr' c rroach the entr"nce to tbe r�,lece, the way is flanked by guar·' of !'1ountt3d SFHS in tl"P.ir colorful red, '-:t8 r-n,· blue ·1,n5.forrns on sr lendid Arr-bj�n l-1orses q;-.rl,u; erl .. ccording tc c "'10� - hroun, "bl c' ;:,nd dayple gray. Ne;:irest to the entrnnce r.re the Sult· n I s l!J 1 �uarr1 "oir L"ncers, 'resenting tr.e rost colorf'ul "'ffEYTf'nce of r>ll with their beeutiful horsw' "nrl lances decorat0d with s·.r,,amers of red, wri+,e rrr' ?1.'een, indicrting thPir or9:Lni­ zation, Th8 :mti�e } nrsonnel o f' t·1� s giwrd are pi ther slrves or decen��n.!lts o" sla.VPS of t1·1e 3ultrn. �a,..}1 hr>s a larc:e silYe,., rini:-· in his r-ii:,-J-,t er r. In front of' thA grt� js -t:-110ing Si t<n ·r1eri, Chof ·P Irotocol, or th0 ,3ult"",rs Secretary- of' '"tri+.e, in ·· :bi+.e robe srnilir>g, f'riP-dly, read7 to receivP the t·-:o G":!ne"'r�ls. Ju:-t in "'ront o "' the Sf-;Cr�tPry tle t.,o 'xP'1PrriJs s-:lut,,, :-,3 thP ;u1t�n 1 s &.m (iuard ;'foir km' ' lrys first tre _kr S:rariile, �c11ner, t:ben tlie T'arsei.llPse �nd f'i-nn.lly tl•e "<'roe can 'i::tional Anther.. 0i I''ar'"eri t• 8'1 ,c:;r·"' ..,ts th G 1e ·r 1� .., nc" their accor1r anyinr; offi.cers an· concluct.� them throu�l' G'l i nt"rior court yrrc' linr>r' ·iith servants of the palacP dressed in their finP.1t rPi:;, l i.a. A lt1.r<Y0 cloor is ente-""=>0, c:.;1r:' +,he 1 "'rty i , condnctec' throu -;h orientr 1 spl(=moor, over beautiful car· ets �nd past vast, P-laborate rj':'ces of �-rniture "nd +'inally 1.1rsteir· to the rrA""Pnce of the Sultan. 1 1 0 1 The trrone room is not large, but ;s r ber-uti+'nl e"XaT"rl� of Eo-roccan 11-rchi­ tecture, with.columns, Poorish t1rche3 enc" c1e1ic"te ''os�ics re,.,..·ndful o.p illustra­ tions f'rorri cl1il 'PC'Oc' boo' s o f' the 11Arcb "'.nn Hights tr . ,..,ri.0 ...,11ltc n, ....,idi r·o'1arv:id Ben r:oulay You3s3f, staDds to rece-i ve l i.s euest"' in -<'ront of the t},�c"'1e. 1:re is ,,_ med­ ium, Jull, tir· .... '-appe�ring nan, h,-1£' s� -·ling, about 35 yorrs olc, 1001 i-.,r,; "or all "'!S des ler lx '!ly i""I m�erl o +' a the •orld like an "':a Jt S 'rl� ' �;�,\:-:(:. r> -'. r.�� l\fi'\::•,,;.',,,,,,._.;c,·.:·.. � ?�:t,:". 01)'.l\ ;:::'.f<'r,./,:,.�,?.,'. 't:';:\�i�,1.:.· . ..,',.;, ":.� � �ttl\\jr,\(f\ fi�ii �-·:\ .. ��,, British MOST - SECRJ;.t �( shave anc' dl'"'SSGd Uf for GenPrrJ. Clark ton:irs Dbov"> ' 1m. r After rll the o"fice"..:: h:vA h8er: r ceiv"d, th,., rrinciy:al of' L'icers are sAatP.d on th'; lnft of th<> Sul -'- , '1 in fa.rt:"' l_;" lt chairs br·llianLly upholstered. Gerer.,l Clark ·,.; fir.3t, 0-,1en Ge-'1nr·rl 'fog'l"'S, Gene:c�: 'xru@nthe ·, GP.:i:1 ral Lc.scroux a11. • n"ine o+,her rar'lrin� office ..... � o" tlwJ C01"1bin°cl s-':,�fPs. ,., e le sor of"icers sta'10 Al.,ind thes• clairs, "nc·n-,. towar-'\s tre :31 lt: n. Ac:::o s +,1,,,, "'0011, fccin"'. tb8 vis-itr,rs, are the me:-,berc o(' th8 0111 um I s cabinet. The 1TiziAcs, likr-> t11P. Counsellor .J, rre on he.nd, oll brre"ooted :is they o..,.,e not rerJ"'1itt0c1 to wear shoe'> �n the 1rr >'t'J.C'8 of His �·� jo,..ty • 1 1 .:· f' , 'Tl • ...,tandJ 1etor0 the ...,'1ltrn, <', cinn' Ge�er�l Cl r'r, r.11c' will act cs -':, e 3ulb.n Is int ,r1 reter. Gene,,,ri.l Cl r,,_.. e r 11s for r:0J onAl Sn.l t.zma.n to intE'rrret for hi!Tl. Si r".-.l11J"1GT'i a, rn,•rs to 1,e a )(>lJ.t 65 year.s olrl' S1 lc'Ve' rourteons ['n(� sriling c.n frleal inte:rpretPr ·i� th Colonol Saltzmr 11 an ahle r,ounte.....1 art. Gen"rr.l Clar1<- ('"qresses ri3 n.prrecict·on "or tlie srlendfrl r ce:;ti nn, Por tl-e honors ::(vnn him anrl. f'or +he "rinrcny r0ce::-,tirn t.@ Am"'�·can troops h:>ve rAce{yed in i·orocco. He r�ys ra.rticulrr t"'ibutP to t e Fae !2 (1 Oujo� \'l!'O re sr�rs he Vf'l11es as a cood "'riPnd. Fe 1 ores f'or � furtherance of th0 frieJ:1d� y relc1.tinns1 ip h.,,t, '"' ,n 1'8 Jnlkn, smiling fa:intly, a :riervous • ..ritch to the :'iftr Army a 1d the J'v1oroccens. his shoulde•·s anc heo.d "11 ·ilP tal'\rinG, tre, tirs of hiS f'-insers ('i!' st toget dr then v,it}, l 1mrl::, clasred encl ·n c. rlr.:c.sn.11.t r.iood, cont:r:osted to his Psual rc>.tl-or su::..len attitude, r•rlies, ffmh� m0rico.ns lave f0llOY1e· thn, r"tl to the r·oroccans ec"rts, a·-id .:,incl" ·1/ t ra tr he :c 00n .r>ollov1ed, there c� n h-, no d ifficulties. 11 Ge;1eral .,.,ece�VE'<1 Clar1r pDys tr"h,te to G-<::nAral -roeuP.'1 811r' t("'\ t,hp h.; £:; coorr:r t·on h..,,' <"rom hiT11 nr1 L..:.,) stcf+>. Tre S lltan sper-1rs, rnd suave clc 3i. Ma"lmeri intn"rrets, thrt thn Sultr·1 is aw"re o+> the firT'l bonrl'"' o" "riend11si1 '.ih�c} hav� lonr cvided ., ')et\,e(m th8 Fr•mc'. arid the Am"?rica:'1.3 and feels that soon, with t e ro,. occa11.,, they will form an unbreakable trirr.Yirate. It c.1evelor s later that the Sultan h:;.,d r ctually inferred that 1 e he:d tl.P- ArrtPr · c8.n:::: in higher estee)Tj than t'1P :'rc11cl:, but his Jec­ retary was too diplomatic to convey hL, exact nor.ds to the GcnPral in th'3 presence o: 'reneral '�agues c: nrl his ,taff. (' 111 1 1 ( 1 As tho audience ends, the Jultr n motions for the ·r..hrp:.'l, t�r to b"·r.13 l' i'l1 thP- deeor..,tion :l1ic'1 l e ·s to conf0r 1'r on "enr--ro 1 Clc1rk. 'T'l1e '":.ultnri steps dmm from h ·.., ckis rnd th0 G1=>ni:>rrl steps be�ore Mm. re ::!..A�n::; fE"r ov8r as th11 little ::ultan ::;1 �: I s the sash over 1 is shou::!..der and to rin on tl e medal 1 · on o<' tl e Grrnd Croix Louis sari .P.laoui te whicl is the r · s;hest orrler r 11c� before \JhosP, rembr>rs lions quake r-nd foxes cra::11 i•1 the:.r rolAs. Tre visitors !:,len f"'SS by tre S1 1ltan, sha.lr"ng his ha:>1d. 'acr back.; "ro tre roo , ;:,tarring, strnding at rtteri·\ion �i,n hawing stiffly three tiT1.es, rfll P V·' zi.ers .,.,c 1 av,, 1'P-f l· ce tl ei.r shoes ['t ti n top o<' t},e stcirs, :mcl accomrc:.n;r tl-P. visitors to the grr1unr1 s of the p-1lacP.. As t'- ,E"�tJ urt ·r· rL , le� ½" lerves th=i · iloorvmy to the palace c.'1d s+,nrt::i across the inr �... 1..1es i � 1 ...,· • rr11 �ri, ·+ . .., 0r, t d by the thriJ.l ing strains Gen°r-1l CL r\, G.,,, .1.t:l 11ro Q of the Sul tan Is ovm Black Guard Lancers Band playing "The Yanks Are Coming. 11 The party then proceeds back through the streets of Rabat to the Residence of the Resident General. It is preceded and followed by a mounted Spahi guard riding stiffly at attention. 1 Once again at the pa.lace of the Resident General, the party proceeds past the welcoming band through the ranks of the native guards and into the foyer, where they are received by the General and Madame Nogues. After the informal reception, the guests gather in the beautiful patio which opens out onto a balcony overlooking the f0rmal garden. U. S. Counsellor-General Do��\�l,-�/};{ti�bat joins the group here. t-.� E,GR!J:}: · · .,-.,·..- ·"6"'\li • . i,,,:i��fiii;.\�'.'." �Y3 E ( After cocktails, the guests are conducted to the banquet hall. Each of the forty guests is seated at his place in accordance to rank, with General Clark on the right of Madame Nogues and in the center of the table facing the salon. A delicious luncheon is served by native servants in the standard time of forty­ five minutes, which is always the procedure at the palace. Afterwards, coffee and liquers are served upstairs and in Madame Nogues 1 living room which, from the balcony, overlooks the beautiful white city of Rabat with its minarets and mosques standing out in bold relief with the background of the blue Atlantic. It is related that the residence was built by Marshal Lyautey in 1924 and remains practically the same as it was during his regime. General Clark has numerous short conferences with various French officials, many of whom refer again to the seriousness of the Spanish situation. Apparently they are much more concerned about this than about the progress of the battle in Tunisia. After the party leaves the residence at 2:00 P.M., an extensive tour is made of the modern city of Rabat. The tour ends in the ol<l city, the Casbah des Oudaias, which dates from the early part of the 11th century. The party is met at the gate to the Casbah by the Pasha of Rabat Si Abderrhama.n Mohamed Bargache and various Arabian notables. Another colorful Spahi guard flanks the entrance to a building set in the corner of the wall. Servants stand at the entrance with trays of dates and small bowls of sour milk in which fingers are dipped before taking the fruit. t, After shaking hanos with the assembly of Arabian notables, General Clark is oon­ oucted over heavy oriental rugs, which are laid especially for the occasion, and up into a tower which overlooks the historic river, Boure Greg, which separates the military city of Rabat and the seafaring town of Sale. On the right is the ancient Islamic College, which was the old Naval Academy of the Barbar � pirates. After enjoying the view, the party goes through an ancient garden into the Cafe des Oucaias and out into a patio overlooking the river. Here was a small modernized Berber orchestra to greet the guests and play until it is time to leave. The various guests sit around the little courtyard relaxed in the warm sun and drink the ever-present Arabian mint tea, which is served on all occasions. After a few minutes, General Clark takes leave of General Nogues and, accompanied by General Lascroux and a few other staff officers, proceeds to the airport at Sale. Once again, in the B-17 General Clark with Colonel S:i.ltzman, Major Ball and Sergeant Chaney proceeds to Casablanca. General Gruenther returns to Oujda. At Casablanca the party is met by cars and taken to the villa shared by General Patton, General Keyes and other st&ff off.Leers. )inner is served informally and, after a short conference between General Clark and General Patton, the various members of the party proceed to bed. * * ( * Casablanca-Marrakech, February 24, 194;3 - After breakfast General Clark, Colonel Saltzman and Major Ball drive to visit the headquarters of the Atlantic Base Section. General �ilson is away, but General Clark talks with Colonel Tate and Colonel Barth concerning conditions in the Casablanca area and the progress of supplies and facilities for handling them. The General then returns by car to General Patton's villa, passing on the way the Anfa Hotel and the various villas which recently became historic by the meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill in Casa­ blanca. General Clark proceeds to the 199th TD Battalion bivouac area. Lt. Col. Maxwell A. Tincher, commanding, is interviewed concerning his motor carriage 3" gun M-10 equipment which has just arrived and · oon be seeing action on the :\��rlt�·:·.�\.:;{{,w.·"-rt.,... ,�t-.:e. >.:·. ¥ 1:: �� : �\!�]it:·,:t�;ftf:·� MOST SECfr-T 1 ·:��.t�... 1 �Y9 ( Tunisian front. A demonstration is made of its maneuverability, and the General thoroughly inspects the vehicle, its armament and gets first hand information concerning its operation. General Cl�rk then returns to the villa where he picks up Colonel Barth who will accompany him on an inspection of the docks and of the French battleship, Jean Bart. At the ship, the General is met by Admiral Barthes who accompanies him aboard where Admiral Ronarch receives him. The customary pipes are blown and ruffl�s and flour­ ishes sounded. A complete tour of the ship is made. It is learned that the ship was struck by six shells and three or four bombs in the engagement which took place on the first day of our North African Operation. The General asks Admiral Ronarch if he fired back during the battle, and the Admiral replied, "Yes, with everything I had.n The General inquires whether he was successful in hitting anything. The Admiral says he was not. General Clark replies: "'That is too bad! You have my sympathy.� The Admiral smiles wistfully and volubly expresses his thanks. After the inspection, the General returns to the villa where he meets N:r. Culber� and Colonel Saltzman and confers with them concerning civil and political affairs in North Africa. The General is emphatic that he does not want any situations to de­ velop without his knowledge. He wants each problem listed, studied and analyzed --the problem of prisoners in the banns of the French, free masonry, the Jewish question, and all matters of that kin� which are possible sources of trouble. He talks of the �panish situation and relates his surprise that most of the concern of the French officers concerns possible trouble from there. He emphasizes again and again that he wants to be completely informed about all of these various situations so there won't be any danger of their blowing up unexpectedly. After lunch the General and his party leave for the airport. Taking off at 2:20 again in the B-17, the party arrives at Marrakech airport at 3:00. As the plane circles the field, it is apparent that a large guard of honor is awaiting the general's arrival. Damaged hangar roofs and huge scrap piles filled with wreckage of French airplanes is evidence of the effectiveness of the six Navy dive bombers in action on November 8 and 9. The plane lands, and, after taxiing a few minutes, s tops at what the pilot presumes is the proper place. The General and his party get out of the plane and find, to their amazement, that the pilot has been led up to an inconspicuous spot behind the hangar and far away from the reception party. The officers scramble back aboard the ship, the engines are started and the plane taxis over and down a lane made by French airplanes and to the proper place in front of the officers assembled to receive the General. The imposing array of welcoming officers is headed by General Martin, Chef de la Region of Marrakech, his Adjutant, General le Diberder; the commandant of the field and various other staff officers. The guard of honor consists of a battalion of regular French troops, a company of Spahi guards and the regular guards of the air­ field. After reviewing the guard, General Clark and General Miirtin proceed to a reviewing simd. The entire guard of honor marches by, led by the Spahi Band dressed in their traditional costumes of red, blue and white. After the review, the party drives into Marrakech. ( The streets are lined with literally thousands of Arabs from the city and country who have come to pay honor to the American general and General Nogues who has rejoined the party. The main street is flanked by Spahis, Senegalese, Chasseurs, Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts and school children, all of whom have turned out for the great occasion. In the most advantageous places, and in great numbers along both sides of the street, are "dolls" which consist of the finest dresses and clothing, �. oles in the rough semblance of a brilliant shawls and capes draped �( human figure. Some actually have faces painted on clothes which protrude above the shoulders of the garments. These �dolls" are held high in the air by the slaves of the wealthy Arabs who in this way have their wives, who are never per­ mitted to �ppear in public, represented. The richer the clothing, the more powerful and influent,i..al is the ;irab whose wives are so represented. At the gate of the ancient c�sbah, the party dismounts and walks down through the Souks, or shopping area, which is a mass of small streets, narrow passages, lined on each side with little shops from which smiling Arabs display their wares. Everything·imaginable is on display spices, herbs, meats in various forms of Preshness and decay, jewels, silverware, tapestries, leather goods, rugs, pottery and everything for which Moroccan shops are famous. In the center of the Casbah, the General and his party are greeted by the He&d of the famous University of Marrakech, and the party is conducted into its interior. There is a large court­ yard with an intricately carved square frieze which runs around the upper portion of the wall, which is said to be over 400 years old. From this university, which is called Medersa Ben Youssef, come the lawyers, notaries, clerks, teachers whose entire learning is based on the Koran. The party then retraces its steps through the S ouk el Khemis and into the native square which is packed solid with trabs assembled for the occasion. Native bands are playing weird music on instruments resembling small kettles, tom toms and long brass trumpets. General Clark, General Martin, the Mayor of the City and other officials go into a hotel and up through some winding stairs to the roof of the building, where they can look down on the seething mass of humanity below. The native orchestras continue their weird noises with renewed vigor. A snake charmer comes forward. A juggler starts his performance, and a little farther down the cleared space a magician produces and causes to disappear an amazing quantity of eggs. Dancers start a wild barbaric ste�; to the cadence of the strange music. As the orchestras grow louder ann the crowds show interest, the snake charmer be­ comes almost frantic in his endeavors to attract attention, opening the mouth of the large snake he rakes the fangs across his forehead, causing blood to stream down over his eyes. He crams his mouth with grass and pours forth a dense smoke, kisses his pets and places their heads in his mouth. It is explained that by long association with these snakes and frequent bites from them, he has beoome immunized against their venom. After watching this incredible scene for some time, the party drives away from the square of Dejemaa el Fnah, which attracts visitors in normal times from all over the world, and goes to the r.asino - a large building almost finished before the war began but that has not been completed. General Clark in­ spects it thoroughly, as a possible rest and recreation buildine for American soldiers. The group then return through the Mellah, or Jewish city, where there are many smiling faces and 11 V for Victory" siens displayed to the Americans. In a few moments the cars arrive at the Bahia, the Resident General's palace while he is in Marra.leech. ,It is one of his five in Morocco. The party is conducted through courtyards and passages of this residence. It is noted that the outer courtyard is always common and unimpressive because the Koran teaches that wealth and luxury must be concealed. The General and Mrs. Nogues receive General Clark in the foyer and lead the way to the roof, on which tea is 5erved in the brilliant African sun. Overlooking the entire city, a scene unfolds which could never be forgotten. The white buildings, graceful minarets, the dominating Mosque of Koutoubia which has two sisters, one in R�bat and the other in Seville, Spain, with the high snowcovered mountains of the greater Atlas range in the background. After a few �5( ( pleasant moments visiting Tlith the Nogues, the Gen · and his accompany officers, tog�ther with those of General Nogues 1 staff, leave. General Ckrk, Colonel SB.ltzman, Major Knight and Major Ball go by car to the Villa Saadia, also known as Taylor ViJ.la, \Vhere Kenneth '='enctar, U.S. vice-consul resides when in Marrakech. Here they meet Minister Murphy, per­ sonal representative of President Roosevelt, and John 0 1 Boyle, lend-lease re­ presentative, who is leaving for V"ashington tomorrow. After resting, the General and his party and Mr. Pendar, drive to the palace of the Pasha of Marra­ kech, the fabulous Si el Hadj Tbs.mi Glaoui. At the Pas.ha I s they are joined by General Nogues, Madame Nogues and various French officers. The �ash is waiting to receive his guests in the inner courtyard. After greeting each in turn, he directs them to a small room where coctails are served from an American bar. He then leads them to the room in which the diffa will be served. The guests are seated'on couches on the floor in circles around low tables made of beautifully carved wood. The Pasha, General Clark, General and Madame Nogues are seated at the right of the room, with the rest in small groups exteming over to the left wall. As soon as the guests are seated, black slaves in beautifully em­ broidered wl:.ite costumes bring in the food. First is a bowl of soup which is eaten with carved wooden spoons. The rest of the courses, except one, must be eaten with three fingers of the right hand alone. Mutton, vegetables,pastries, fowl, fish, curried sweets and fruits are served in an amazing and overwhelming series. As soon as the lengthy meal is completed, the Pasha rises and conducts his guests to another room. ."s coffee and liq-eurs are served, a strange noise begins outside in the patio which, we are told, means the Pasha's nancing girls are approaching. I\ The dancing girls appear clothed in heavy robes, highly decorated and em­ broidered.· They are also bedecke0 with bracelets, rings and other ornaments. \ A man saws away on the stringed instrument, while one girl seated on the floor beats a strange rhythm on an iron plate which gives a metallic clanging sound, The rest of the girls sing while one, the prima donna, does her <lance. The singj�g and music soun<l like a combination of female tobacco auctioneers with a background of a fire engine on the way to a three-alarm fire. The dancing seems to be a combination of palsy, St. Vitus dance and a mild form of the latest jitterbugging. Two groups of girls danced and sang - one being the Berbers or f-heriats from the hills around Marrakech, and the other, Arabians from the plains. Th� songs and dances are supposed to be allegorical to tradi­ tions of the tribes of these people,,but they were so old no one knows their true meaning. After the dances are completed the guests thank the Pasha. General Clark and his party return to Pendar 1 s villa. * * * �MARRAKECH-TIZNET-AGADIR•MARRAKF.CH, FFBRUARY 25, 1943--Ceneral Clark, accompanied by his ovm officers ancl General Nogues, takes off at 9 :30 AM in a C-47 for a flight southward. After a beautiful flight that includes vistas of sea and mountains, the C-47, slightly more than an hour out of Marrakech, lands at Tizmet •. General Clark gets out of the plane, which has taxiea up in front· of the guard of honor, and with General Nogues, is greeted by General Chatras, Commandant of the Sub-Division of Agadir, which includes Tiznet. Much to his surprise, he is met by an old friend Colonel John Thomas Taylor, for­ mer Secretary of the American Legion. Hearing that the General was on his way to T iznet, Colonel Taylor has delayed his departure so that he can be present on his arrival and has distributed small paper American flags which school children along the streets are waving. Both infantry and mounten roops form the honor guard. After honors have been played and an inspection is ma.de by the two Generals, they review troops. First come the Ifrand dressed in black uniforms, then the Goulimiens dressed in white followed. by Tiznet troops in black and white striped robes, and finally the Gouins dressed in khaki, from the mountains. With the infantry reviewed, the cavalry, lined up at the £ar end of the airport, charges at a gallop across the field in front of the reviewing officers. First came the Spahis riding at full gallop with sabres drawn, then mounted Senegalese troops, the horse Gouins and last of all the Partisans who are not regular soldiers but simply join up for a special occasion and a few days' pay. The party then proceeds towards the walls of the town. Tiznet is the only city in North hfrica which is entirely contained within its walls. It is typically Arabian, and the entire European population con­ sists of a bare 400 people. The General is taken on an inr,pection trip of the water supply, a quick tour of the city and a walk through the Souk. In a small shop he admires a native ornament, and on a signal from General Nogues, his aide purchases it • . The General then is driven to the residence of Colonel Chevroton for luncheon. After coffee and liqueurs have been served, the dancing girls enter the room accompanied by their strange music which never ceases or varies its queer cadence. One of the girls teps forward and in a sing-song voice recites what is supposed to be a fable. Various native tunes are then played and finally comes very dis­ tinctly the chorus of 11\"'e are the Guys from the Navy" mixed in with the same old rhythm and background of the Arabian music. Each dancer is then introduced to the assembled guests, and after shaking hands with each, kisses her own hand as evidence of the honor done her. The dance then resumes with two e�perts giving special attention tc the two ranking generals. rhe dance consists mainly of a series of amazing belly bumps which it is hart to believe can be so effectively done without ropes and pulleys. At the end of the entertainment, the guests are driven to the airport. After a 30 minute flight, the C-47 lands at Agadir. The ship taxiis up before the inevitable guard of honor, and General Clark and General Nogues are met by the local commander, General Chatras, his staff and the staff of the French Aviation School operating il>n the field; also, a feVI American officers who are here at the rest center and a few RAF pilots from the anti-submarine pH.trol squadron which is operating from this field. After the customary honors, the party is �53 driven into town. and on the way passes literally acres of donkeys and scrubby little mountain horses which have been left here by their masters who are in town to see and render homage to the great American and French Generals who are visiting. tt the edge of town the local Pasha, Si Lassen Tamri, with his advisers, greets the General. It is an impressive sieht, with the great hill in the back­ ground on which reposes the walled Casbah, the fortification built in the 17th century by the Portugese and in the foreground the wide boulevard of the town, lined with the colorful native crowds. After greetings have been exchanged, the entire party proceeds to the re­ viewing stands wl.ich consists of chairs placed on brillianty colored oriental carpets. General Clark, General Nogues, General Chatras and the Pasha stand facing the brilliant blue sea, while the troops pass by in review. As the General takes his position, there are many cries from the crowd of 11 Vive L 1 Americain", and 11 V for Victory" signs waved by enthusiastic onlookers. First in the review comes a band accompanied by Senegalese Bugle and Drum Corps. Then come the staff of­ ficers of the post, Spahis, Senegalese, Legionnaires and native troops in a dazzling procession of cclor. < After the review, the party is driven up a winding road to the fortified Casbah. General Cl::,rk examines an old gun, relic of the days of the Barbary pirates, wr.ich is in sharp contrast to the modern anti-tank guns he has inspected earlier on the trip. Plans are shovm him of the harbor and a brief description is given him of the developments they hope to make in the future. Jt the present time it is only large enough to accommodate a destroyer and a few small fishing era.ft. An air corps major explains his mission in Agadir, wLich is to establish a rest camp for the air corps. The party then nescends to the residence of General and Madame Ch�tras, for tea. The General and his party return to the airport and take off in the G-53 for Marrakech. F.nroute, the plane passes over the high Atlas mountains, some of the peaks towering up into the clouds 9,000 to 10',000 feet and high above the. flight of the plane which is following a pass between two ranges. At altitudes as high as 7,000 and 8,000 feet up in the mountains, cliff dwelling tribeo of Berbers are seen, from whence come the rugs and silverware which are seen on dis­ play in the shops of the Souks. In 45 minutes the plane lands again at Marrakech. The entire party, including General Nogues and his interpreter is driven to Pendar 1 s villa where cocktails are served. At 8:30, General Clark, Colonel Saltzman, Mr. Murphy, Mr. nendar, Major Knight and Major �all an<l Captain Noble arrive at the Hotel de la· Mamounia for the dinner which is given for General Clark by General and Madame Nogues. During and after the dinner, the General has an opportunity to get further information concerning various situations in this territory. His office�s con­ fer with various French officials present, and one subject discussee is the establishment of French-American Clubs, operated by French civilians, for the entertainment of American troops. Shortly after the dinner, the General and his party return to Pendar's villa. ( * * * � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, January 6 - February 25, 1943 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from January 6 to February 25, 1943. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1943 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Language A language of the resource English Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/825 Date Valid Date (often a range) of validity of a resource. 1940-1949