1 10 1 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/137ca353176d8556499b42313fff95a6.pdf?Expires=1777507200&Signature=Squ-C-NigwZPIbevSgP2Bhehm6QW1a7KWMt8p2H4xx2tRpNBMuZI6MN48VmsH682GbposXomJn6JCChejXDjnnaHaiCeZUTurxBUCgzRqbWm88tix5aAAcvKx2fmPCDmj1BVdmtr7QbbEcB6b01ymSHZB2XSlKSbc7Be0euKzHQrxevtkKcF-B5SZdSB-w5zrl%7EO0xTFeQvjxDMBOon4if88NRz68-TUOsHEUJcadgLzY%7EIq-YPo97jpiwpRMX8tzHEnTQO2FbQ-KAqVwrc0z8M-YvSEcnIWWVNy5ZPX9TkI3Gx-E0IqWKG-VigRadQp74O5hR%7EUPyDakJigfUeuaA__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 9e06c91647e249534916ac56b7ef6881 PDF Text Text SUBM .ARHJE SAFARI By General M ark W Clark . �$UB1:.ARIIJE SAFARI By General Mark W. Clark By October of 1942, the pressure of TORCH Operation Planning had become so great that all of us at Norfolk House were working literally day and night. V stopped for sleep only when fatigue made further accurate work impossible. Ie I finally told the staff that on Sundays at least, everyone should stay away from the office until 10 AM. Thus, on the morning of Sunday the 17th, when I sauntered in, General Gruenther was the only other officer visible. "There is a hot message here", he said. The message was from Washington. It ·was addressed to General Eisenhower, but it was routine for communications of the highest priority to come·to me as well, at Norfolk House. This was our secret planning headquarters, about two miles away from General Eisenhower's own office at 20 Grosvenor Square. He rarely came to Norfolk House, because his appearance - even incognito might attract the attention of enemy agents, many of whom were then active in London. Ordinarily I went to see him at least three times a day, but there was also a direct telephone line between his desk and mine. Just as I was gulfing through my copy of the message, the phone rang. General Eisenhower was very brief. 11 Come up", he said, "Come right away". Hith that he hung up. I made quick time to Grosvenor Square and walked into Ike's office saying "Well, when do I go 11 • He said 11 probably pretty quick". We sat down to study the message and its implications. The cable from General Marshall had originated with Robert Murphy, then Counselor of ETibassy on Special Mission to French Africa with Headquarters in Algiers and principal figure in the on-the-spot political maneuvers of TORCH, the code name for the North African Operation. The cable stated that General Mast, then French CommandQlr in Algeria, who was our highest and best French contact in IJorth Africa, wanted an American delegation to come immediately to a highly secret rendezvous for conferences which would include an exchange of information. The cable stipulated a 11 senior general officer" as chief of the mission. There was an in1plication that General Giraud might attend the conference, although we knew that he was still in France. General Eisenhower handed me the whole job. · The organization of the trip itself, the selection of my supporting staff, and the widest sort of latitude on what I could say to the French was my responsibility. But I was not to reveal to the French that TORCH was an actuality. Only that North African operations were in the planning stage. To say too much could cost us lives, saying too little would hurt our chances of French collaboration. Enamy discovery or capture of our group could mean irreparable damage to TORCH as well as to ourselves. �It seemed pretty important that Prime Minister Churchill should know what was going on and advise qn the important steps about to be taken, Most of .the weekends leading up to the one of October 17th, General Eisenhower and I had spent at ,Chequers (the country place England provides for her Prime Minister). We had, with difficulty, begged off this weekend for the simple reason that we had· really come to dread the cost in lost sleep of 1 the all-night inquisitions to which the tireless and keen mind of blir. Churchi:IJ invariably subjected us. But fortunately, we knew that he would be at · Chequers now that we needed him in a hurry. I got on the secret phone to Chequers and was answered by General Sir Hastings Ismay, the Prime Minister's militci.ry Aide. "Pug, I've gQt something hot here 11 , I said. ' 11 How hot", Ismay q_uesti(med. 11 Too hot to talk about on the phone. 11 j "Hait a minute while I tell the Prime Minister", he said. lvir. Churchill came on. "Pug tells me you have something hot, what is it? 11 a secret phone.n Then he said, "This is I handed my instrument to Ike. 11We can't talk about it here", Ike replied, Hit I s much too important for that 11 • 11 Very well", said Mr, Churchill., "Come on down here". 11Vve haven't got time", said Ike. "All right", said the Prime Minister a little formally, "is it sufficiently important for me to come back?" Ike said 11Yes 11 and made a date to meet at No. 10 Downing Street late that afternoon. We almost immediately went into planning session. Sending for a French chart of the North African coast, we were pleased to be able to spot a mark intended to indicate a house in exactly the latitude and longitude called for in .the cable, I called together the group that was to accompany me, and for over three hours talked out the details, as well as the imponderables, of our trip. We gave little thought to Darlan. Giraud was our choice for French leadership and that was that. If Darlan had to be dealt with later for the sake of immobilizing the French IJavy, we could handle him. We knew that · a similar conference was being held in Washington., wit~ President Roosevelt, Admiral Leahy and General Marshall, discussing the same questions. We also knew that by this time the Prime Minister and his political and military advisers were doing plenty of talking and thinking about what · might be on our minds, The War Department cable stipulated that the general officer in charge of the mission should be accompanied by one man thoroughly familiar with the details of TORCH Operations; one supply man; one :tJavy man; and one political 2 �expert--- the la,t ,ter, to , pe.ak. f),uent trench. Brigadier General Lyman L. Lem$ nitzer, head t~e Allied ~ore~ Pi~hs Section; Colonel A. L. Hamblen, o~ ~ s'ir±pping and $Upply bxpbrt; Captain Gerald 1Nright of the U. S. Navy who had been our Navy tiaison man since TORCH was started; and Colonel Julius c. Holmest a former State Department officer who headed up our Civil Affairs Branch of the , TORCH plan, seemed to fill these specifications. of Until late afternoon we were hashing over the details of our trip. We would fly to Gibraltar in two Flying Fortresses. The air people pointed out that there was danger in this. No B-17 had ever landed at the Gibraltar field, and we did not know if it could be·done. The party would split into two planes, so that in the event mine was lo~t, General Lemnitzer could carry on for me. From Gibraltar we would be taken to the Algerian coast in a British submarine. The cable was very specific as to how the final rendezvous would be made, a latitude and longitude some 15 miles west of the tiny port of Cherchel was given. On the night of October 21/22 our submarine was to surfqce off the position given; a single, steady, white light would be exhibited from a seaward dormer window of the house if the coasts were clear and the landing should proceed. This light would not be visible from the land side. Unfortunately, nothing was said about what was to be done if we could not make it by airplane and submarine in the short time granted, four days, and we immediately asked Washington to send a secret message to Murphy and his associates, urging them to set up an alternate time of rendezvous if we could not make the October 21 date as specified. By the time General Eisenhower and I were ready to take off for No. 10, we were well briefed on the complex contents of the Murphy cable. It covered a lot more than just the details of the rendezvous. Murphy reported that when he had returned to Algiers from his visit to Washington, he had been asked for a secret interview by the head of the French Intelligence. The interview took place at an isolated spot outside of town to avoid German notice. The French said that both Germctn and Japanese sources had reported the Allies were planning early military operations against Dakar, Casablanca, or both. The Germans were urging the French to take every precaution against this; likewise giving indications tha.t this could constitute a pretext for Axis oocupation of French North Africa. The Germans", Murphy cabled, "appear determined to settle the western Mediterranean issue during the coming weeks and will have the use of the Spanish mainland and of Spanish Morocco for this purpose. Gibraltar is under constant surveillance. In French opinion definite action is not a question of weeks, but of days. The French political situation is extremely delicate and collapse may be expected in as little as ten days. There is no question that the situation in French North Africa is moving fast. Informc,tion indicates the Axis have raised about 100,000 troops along the Tunisian frontier." 11 General Mast, by way of Mr. Murphy, raised another extremely troublesome problem; he suggested the possibility that the French would be better satisfied if the operation would include the occupation of some part of Occupied France by the French Army so that French Resistance fighters could be supplied. This seemed to us impossible from the beginning and we eventually had to talk the French out of it as we finally convinced them on the subject of the supreme command in French North Africa. 3 �Murphy concluded: 11Mast asse:rls we can gain entry practically without , firing a shot through Giraudi$ ~omrtldhdt It is suggested that the u. S. supply an American submarine to piCK up Giraud and his party at night on the French Mediterranean Cost• ti ' When General Eisenhower and I arrived at the Cabinet Room at No. 10 Downing, there was about as dazzling an array of Britain's diplomatic, military and naval brains as I had yet · soon. The Prime Minister's mood, without knowing exactly what was on our minds, was as enthusiastic as a boy with a new electric train. When we read tho cable ho broke into a big grin behind a giant now cigaJ:1. 11 This is groat", he kept saying. We discussed the implications of tho trip at some length with Clement Attlee, Lord Louis Mountbatten, Sir Dudley Pound, and Lord Alanbrooke. :/.rhat Ike wanted was a specific British viewpoint on how much I could tell tho French about TORCH. We knew Giraud would want · an important spot in the command set-up, and I offered, if it would help matters, to step down as Deputy Commander to ' Ike in favor of Giraud. That was rejected. At the end, we told Mr. Churchill, · h2ppy as a detective story fan, tho more fantastic detaiihs of our pians for this secret rendezvous on which the fate of thousands of British, AmericP.n, and French soldiers and sailors might hang. Almost as an after-thought, I asked the Primo Minister if we should wear civilian clothes or uniforms. 11 Do you have civvies", asked Mr. Churchill. "If you have, take thorn along.'.f I eventually left the civilian clothes in the submarine. It would have made things just that much harder had we been picked up without uniforms on shore~ Escorting me to tho door, Mr. Churchill emphasized Britain I s entirely cooperative spirit~ V'Te would have the submarine, destroyer, amphibious airplanes and facilities at Gibraltar which we needed. He has an unaffected way of speaking in ringing phrases at important moments. "The entire resources of the British Commonwealth are at your disposal" he said in parting. 11 1 want to assure you once more how important it will be to get this information and to cut down French resistance; you have my genuine support!" By this time General Spaatz had already laid on the two B-17 1 s with specially-selected pilots. Tho weather people said we had better not try a take-off until morning. We spent the night sleeping very little, but getting a lot of details and equipment together in a minimum of space and weight, Army Finance had scurried around to got money, a thousand dollars in Canadian $5 and $10 gold pieces for possible use in buying our way out of a jam. 11 This is the money of which a considerable part wa.s lost when our small boats over-turned in , in the surf later.) We had no bribing to do, but at the end of tho trip I had only four of the gold pieces I carried left; I purchased them for souvenirs for General Eisenhower, Admiral Cunningham and General Walter Bodell Smith; tho fourth I still carry for a luck piece. We got money bolts for tho whole party and divided up the gold pieces. I had some U, S. dollars along too, but tho whole amount was about $2,000 .:._ not the much larger sum mentioned in news · dispatches, I had been scheduled to leave with General Eisenhower on the morning 4 �of the 18th for an inspectiort tfip bf U.S. Forces training in Scotland. In order to attract no undue attentioh td my mission, General Eisenhower left on his journey as planned• It was not until dusk of the 18th that my four colleagues and I arrived at the 8th Air Force Bomber Base at Polbrook, 73 miles NW of London. I wore Lt. Colonel 1 s insignia on my shoulders when I left London. Even most of the people at head-quarters thought I wc.s on my way to join General Eisenhower in Scotland. 9 The weather was still bad on the evening of the 18th· and the precious hours slipped away while we all wa.:..ted in a tiny barracks, keeping out of sight of personnel on the field so as to attract a minimum of attention. I was plenty keyed up and, although I went to bed, I didn't sleep much. The most disturbing things were the time element and tho difficulty of communications; not only with Murphy, but through him to the French, who might already be- on their way to the rendezvous. I was afraid that if we did not arrive on time, the French would feel badly let down and might question our good faith. I must admit I was also pretty worried about the personal safety of all of us; the whole deal could be a trick. If we fell . into Nazi hands it would be far from pleasant, and, of more importance, jeopardize the whole operation. I had loft a short note behind to be delivered to M rs~ Clark in tho event I would not return. I had carefully gone over procedures with General Lemnitzcr and Colonel Holmes for them to carry on and to do the job if one or more of us dropped out for any reason. A final cable had been received from V Jashington saying that ·11 AGREE", a code name for myself, 11 is to proceed at once with the mission". But nothing was said to allay my gnawing fear that we could not make it in time. I was sleeping at last when they called me about 6:30 A . We had some M breakfast and climbed into the planes for a quick take-off-. General Lcmnitzer was carrying all the secret documents in a henvily weighted tube. I instructed the pilots that under no circumstances was either plane to land in Spain or Portugal. The Bas~ Commander had reccivod·some word about German fighters along the · coast. We didn't have an escort, as possibly attracting too much a.ttention, but tho guns of our two B-17 1 s were fully manned. My ship, 11 The Red Gremlin 11 , piloted by Colonel Tibbits, broke out of the clouds and flew out of sight of earth for three hours. By the time the overcast broke, there was nothing below but open sea. V'Te sighted only one ship, a small sailing vessel · somewhero off Portugal. Even before we had properly identified Gibraltar, Spitfires were shooting up to look us over. General Lewnitzer 1 ~ plane, 11 The Boomerang", went in first and we were all relieved to see the big bomber make it ~afely on Gibraltar's limited strip. One of tho pilots had already climbed out of my plane when tho British rushed up and motioned to everybody to stay inside. They explained that the Gtbraltar field was alway under full observation by German agents in Spain. 11 The runway is only about 300 yards from Spanish territory). The arrival of two B-17 1 s - - the first sent there --- would give tho Nazis enough to think about without their spotting high officers on board. Tho British suggested that we leave our coats and hats; a big car with drawn curtains pulled up as close as possible to the plane and we jumped swiftly into it to be whisked off quickly to the Governor 1 s house, Herc Lieutenant General M ason M acFarlane and some British admirals, including Vice Admiral Collins and tho Commander of British submarines 5 �in the Mediterranean, Captain Be.rney Fawkes, welcomed us. I asked my four · colleagues to stay in their rooms• rho loss seen of any of us on the Rock, the better. I conferred alone With Gerloral M2.cFe.rlane and his naval associates. I have hardly ever beert iess certain of the success of an operational mission in my life; I needed support, but got little encouragement from tho British. The Navy people wore taking a rather dim view of this whole crazy American adventure,. They talked of thick shore patrols, plenty of spotting planes, and a French Navy and airforce bolder than it had been before. What ! needed was someone to say, "Okay, we 1 11 get you in there and get you out too 11 They talked on until I said, 11 Gentlemcn, there is no help for this; we arc going"~ IIJt has been decided by our two governments and I don't intend to call it off"~ The most encouraging person I met at Gibraltar was Lt. - Norman Ambury Auchinlcck Jewel (we called him 11 Bill 11 later), Commander of the submarine HMS SERAPH - one of -the smaller and slower British under-sea boats. He was described to me as 11 a fine youngster with plenty of experience in doing soundings along the Horth African coast". When I aksed to see him, they brought in a handsome young man with plenty of self-confidence. I asked if he knew what this was all about. All they told mo was that I was to take some Americans someplace and land them at night on the African coast", ho said. 11 I explained some of the details. Jewel was pleasantly reassuring: "I am sure we can get you in there and get you off ag2.in 11 • He bucked up my confidence considerably. He told mo he had three British Commandos and four falboots --- little collapsible, wood-framed canvas canoes --- on board. If we wore to arrive at the rendezvous still in day-light and submerged, we would have to got going immediately. At that, Lieutenant Jewel warned, considering the number of hours we would have to run submerged, at very slow speed, he wasn't going to guarantee arrival on timo. I had dispatchod another message to Washington, via Lt. Colonel Eddy, our military representative in the international zone of Tangier, urgently requesting that the reception party wait for us from 9 PM on tho night of the 21st until dawn and that in the event we did not show up on that night, we would attempt a landing on the night of 22/23 ~ Nono of us took very well to the idea of lying close to shore in shallow water where planes could spot even a submerged sub. There was no time to lose. We wanted to leave Gibraltar in the dark, and we didn't want to lose any of tho night and its valuable opportunity for running on the surface. They took us down to the submarine tender, "Maidstone", v1horc we had a drink and dinner in Captain Barney Fawkes r cabin. Tho P-219 · was tied up to tho 11 Maidstonoll. They wero casting off its lines as we arrived aboard. I had never been aboard a submarine before.. I soon realized that · they wore not made for a lanky 61 2 11 man. All tho while I was in tho P-219, I had to bend over e.nd be careful of my head.. Tho officers I quarters, the submarine crow had hospitably given up to their passengers, was just a cubby hold alongside the middle catwe.lk. When I went to tho 11 hoad 11 , I had to literally crawl on all fours. Tho submarine crew, e.lrnost all youngsters, welcomed us cheerfully 6 �aboard. All they knew was that l'Wt; I re going on a screwy mission with some Americans". While we were ttirtning on the surface that night, we passengers spent a lot of time on deck. A British· destroyer led us the first fifty miles, Lt. Jewel artd I, poring over the charts, agreed we couldn't possibly make the renqczvous if we had to run all the trip underwater, We decidsd to try as much as possible on tho surface where we could make 10 to 12 knots compared to only two or three submerged. We would be ready for a crash dive at any time if spotted by an enemy ship or plane. During our first afternoon, the sea slipping smoothly along and sighting nothing, we had a detailed conference with our Commando Officers on embarkation and landing procedures. General plans concerning signals and possible action ashore were studied closely. The submarine would go as close to the beach as possible and survey it by poriscop0 in daylight. Our radio was alert for word from Gibraltar, but apparently nothing had been roe.eived from Murphy on the matter of a secondary rendezvous. In the late afternoon we played some bridge, and at 9:30 PM, when it was fully dark again, Lt. Jewel stopped tho submarine for a rehearsal of falboot embarkation. The sea was choppy. Colonel Holmes and Commando Captain R. P. Livingstone launched their boat first, after practicing stepping into tho frai~ and very tipsy craft on the dry deck. They paddled noiselessly away and from a distance of several hundred yards they tried out the infrared signal light with which we had been supplied. This light cannot be seen by the naked eye but with a proper sort of glass, it becomes a useful signal light. ·The light worked perfectly. Holmes and Livingstone returned to the submarine, with General Lemnitzor and Lt. J, P. Foote trying the next trip. The General got pretty wet but they made it all right. Colonel Hamblen and Captain Wright made it OK as well. Captain Godfrey B. (Jwnbo) Courtney was my small boat pilot and we tried it last. He was the expert on those boats and was in chargo of instructing o.11 of us. With the sme.ll boc1.t exercises complete, the submarine was quickly under way again. I managed to got some sloop this night, in spite of tho stuffy interior of tho subma:dno, but at 6:20 AM., the dive klaxons sounded. Vic were too close to the North African shore to venture running on the surface again in daylight. There was still no word from Gibraltar. I fell back on another bridge game to pass some pretty worrisome hours moving along at · slow speed under the Mediterranean. Our submarine was a rather old typo, and by c.ftornoon tho air within it was warm and lifeless, leaving us inexperienced landsmen f eeling pretty dopey. It was not until tho early morning hours of October 22 that we came in sight of our rendezvous point. We could spot a light in what we thought was the correct locc.tion, but it was too near dawn to risk a landing and we were not sure enough of where we were. We prepared for another day of discomfort in the over-crowded underseas craft. When it was light enough, we ran up a periscope for a few seconds at a time and made sketches of the shore visible from throe to four miles. We 7 �were sure we had our house spotted okay. Soon after daylight two Algerian fishing boats came out and anchored right in front of, 11 our" beach. They worried us, so we moved out to sea slowly. Then a radio came in froo Murphy. We had missed the first night I s rendezvous and I was hoping against hope that word had gotten to the French about our alternative plan. The first 11 flap 11 about this message was when we got hold of a wrong code book. The first word that came out was "police". That gave me a sinking feeling that the people on shore had been detected. We finally decoded the message with great relief. Mr. Murphy understood our difficulty; but had changed my proposal to make the second rendezvous on the night of 23/24, skipping a night to make it two days later. However, to my relief, part 2 of the message said the 11 interested parties have been informed to expect you night of 21/22 and that if no contact then made to expect you night of 22/23 as well. You should assume therefore that you are expected tonight (22nd) and tomorrow night (23rd) 11 • There was nothing to do but stick it out• My feeling of vrnrking against time was by no moans allayed by the knowledge that on this day some units of the TORCH Operation under General Patton were actually on their way from the United States. That left us not knowing whether we were actually expected on the night then approaching, or not until 24 hours later. VJo had another conference· and outlined some special plans for trouble ashore. If we arrived safely, we would signal the fact to the submarine by turning off the guide light. If we wanted to reembark lat,er the same night, we would start it flashing. The submc1.rine would stay off tho beach directly in front of the house tho whole of the first two nights we were ashore. Then, if no radio communication was established, and no word received from shore, the submarine would take a sta~ tion 5 miles off an alternative rendezvouw point a few miles along the coast, staying there for another full 24 hours. If nothing was then hcardJ the SERAPH would return to Gibraltar without us. · As darkness e.pproached, I speculated upon what would happen that night. surfaced as soon a-s it was fully dark; but there was no light showing from the shore. By 10:00 PM I was feeling plenty low with tho prospect of another full day to II sweat it out". Just to keep things going, I bet each of my associ2.tes $10 the light would come on 11 tonight 11 • In case something should be doing later, I decided to get all tho sleep I could. At 10:30 I turned in. 'tfo li.t 12:00 midnight, they cnlled me to say a light was showing from the shore. There was feverish activity on tho submarine getting the small boats on deck, as tho craft pulled shoreward to within a bare two miles from the surf. The er::ibarkation was calm and pretty well organized. We followed tho drill Captain Courtney had worked out for us and counted 11 one - two - three four 11 as one after the other of each boat's occupants arranged his gear and stepped carefully into excatly the right place. If we had not been so keyed up at the time, it would have been pretty laughable thc1.t 11 Jumbo 11 Courtney was the one who capsized his boat and lost his gear. This stalwart Commando was absolutely devastated at this accident 8 �at such a crucial moment. I had to call Arch Hamblen back to swap boats with him while 11 Jumbo" repaired his boat to follow a little later. 1·:e appro2ched the beach in a V formation, Julius Holmes and Livingstone ahead. My boat and the others waited ,about 200 yards off-shore, until, through the darkness over the feathery surf, we saw the letter 11 K11 flashed by a flashlight - - the signal that tho fir3e, boat had made it ashore and all was well. 1'.Te followed, making it pretty dry through a quite moderate surf. For a moment there was no one at all in sight on an embarrassingly wide beach on which we nocturnal arrivals felt very exposed .to unknown danger. There was a steep bluff at the other side of the beach. It was covered with scrub vegetation and knotty olivB trees and on this dark night, looked just plain black. We rushed for the cover of this darkness, carrying our boats and gear. Just as 1Ne reached the edge of the bluff, Bob Murphy and his French associates came down. lJo one showed any light. Murphy said, 11 Welcome to lJorth Africa. 11 I had had a speech all figured out for prompt, and what I hoped, dramatic delivery in French. I was going to say 11 Lafayette, nous sommes arrbr~s pour la deuxi~me foisn. But somehow the whole idea escaped me. What I really did was to puff with relief from the exertion of clambering over the beach and say, "I'm damn gl2d we made it. 11 We climbed quickl2r up a steep and stony path civer the bluff to the house. This ·was a rather typical French colonial villa of red-roofed white stone built around a courtyard, with the main highway to J.lgiers o'nly 30 yards away. Its owner, M. Tessier, had sent his 11.rab se:.''i/'2.nts away so that we would be undisturbed and unreported. It was this act which brought the police to search the house ne1ct day. The servants wore suspicious and told the Cherchel authorities. Tessier was a well-to-do owner of farmlands; a little, aishevcled, and rather frightened-looking Frenchman when I first met him. He was a true patriot and risked his life to let us meet at his house. Later I helped him enter the French Army and arranged for him to be assigned on liaison duty at my Fifth Army Headquarters,whero ho remained and served me well throughout the Italian Campaign. The house was pretty messy by our standards and it certainly was not a very irnpressive setting for a conference of any sort. Gener2.l Mast and his staff were not yet there when we reached the house, and we were told by his representatives that they could not arrive until almost 5:00 JJ~, coming by car from Algiers some 60 miles away. I directed our Commandos to store their falboots in a downstairs room off the courtyard where they would be thoroughly out of sight, and to lock the door to that room. I asked the Co.mrnandos themselves, being British, to keep out of sight, as tho French had made something of a point of this being strictly a Franco-American affair. They were not feeling too friendly toward the English 9 �after the naval attacks at Dakar and :Mers el Kebir. Tessier took me to an upstairs bedroom where an unkempt and much-used bed was awaiting rae. A lot of my doubts of previous days had slipped away and I was relieved enough to sleep a little until 5:00 l1M, when I was called and told that lv iast had arrived • . General 1'fast spoke little English., but said "Welcome to my country 11 • One of the first things he told me was tnat he had once been a Military Attache at Tokyo where he had come to know ap American, Colonel William C. Crane, He wanted to serve with him and I late!' arranged to send this colonel as liaison with Mast. Mr. Murphy, General Mast, and I ate a typical French petit-dejeuner of coffee, bread and jam, and sardines ' in the living-room while we talked military strategy and North Africa. What I could not tellMast, and had to be e:ctromely careful not to reveal any ; slip of the tongue, vms that a TORCH Operation, or anything like it, had actually gotten anywhere beyond the planning stage --- and this with the leading elements of our armada actually at sea. I could not tell him v1hy Horth Afrioa had been selected for the first American offensive in the war. The history of this was that in the previous July, .with two Arnerican divisions already in Northern Ireland and one in England, President Roosevelt had sent General Marshall, AdJniral King, Harry Hopkins, Stove Early and others to London for a conference in which they wer e to specifically demand that U.S. troops get into battle during 19L,2. The group met at Claridge' s for two days of fantastic discussions. The U. s. proposed that, together with the British, we mount a cross-channel operation on the Cherbourg peninsula in the fall of 1942. I was supposed to command the American element of this expedition and there was so much heat on it that we had already sent radios to Washington outlining equipment and special units which vrnuld be needed, when the British Cabinet turned it down cold. Ike and I went to Chequers and the Prime Minister kept saying ovor and over again, 11 no, it isn't France, lJorth Africa is the place". British and l.1merican GHQ had wor}rnd together on planning a Dakar operation. Washington was disappointed but asked, 11 What can you do to give us action this year?" The.Jr did not want tho troops sitting idly around Ireland. V!e discussed Dakar, Casablanca, and points further inside the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean seemed to be increasingly important. Wo wanted to get the pros sure off the British 8th J.rmy by striking at Rommel I s roar. Tho Primo Minister had hammered away at 11 slitting the soft under-belly of the enemy in the Mediterranean". After two grim years of fighting in North J.fr ica and Italy that under-belly didn I t look so soft.· If we had obtained the French data at Chcrchel a bit earlier into our TORCH planning we might have arranged to debark deeper into the Mediterranec=m in addition to the Algerian landings. As it was, this data was successfully used in mounting various small seaborne expeditions from ilgicrs to tho eastward. In hindsight, tho original TORCH landings were not daring enough. VJe could have gotten away with following Mast's sugr estion of striking deep into Tunisia and in so doing might have saved a lot of time, lives, and over-land fighting. Vfo quickly settled down, t'1c three of 'J.2, h,r_r hy, F''_st anr~ myself, to talking details. 1":e put a lot uf t _ imc into 6 .i.scu3 -::_ ::w y:;_' Giraud I d demands th:n:, 10 �French prestige required his being supreme commander of any Allied Force fighting on French soil. I wanted to dodge a commitment on that, one way or another. ' But since Gire.ud did come into our picture and Darlan was quickly eliminated by assassi~ation, the question of alternative French Command did not eventually arise. Neither Darlan 1 s name nor a possible place for him in our plans was mentioned at Cherchel. I was very quickly impressed with East I s sincerity. He certainly sold me on the idea that he was entirely at our disposal and would do everything possible to help us carry out an operation which to him was only a hope. Before we called together our respective staffs, I asked Mast, "with reference to a hypothetical landing 11 , "How would you do it?" I was very pleased that his conception was very close to ours, although it c2,lled for tho South France bridgehead ·which I already know to be impossible. Later when things got hot General M :ast delivered all the goods ho had promised us. He took great personal risk in ordering the French troops defending tho /.1.gerian coast to help the 1-.llies. I consider him a great French patriot. libout 9: 00 JJ : we brought our staffs around tho dining room table in order to have a frank discussion of tho situation. Remembering my instructions not to reveal the facts of tho impending operation, I was in a difficult position. Mast asked how big an h.merican effort could bb nado. I tried to keep a poker face ·while saying that half a million lJ.liod troops could come in and I said thr.t vw could put 2,000 planes in tho air, as well as II plenty of U. s. Havy. 11 Mast was pretty ir,1prcssed. 11Wo actually put 112,000 Americans and British ashore in the first 12.ndings." East suggested that Giraud be picked up in an American submarine as quickly as possible. I was convinced that none of the French realized the imminence of an· operation. Although they knew something was in the works, nothing definite ha.d leaked to them. 1:uch later Hast told me this was precisely the case. Hast said that he was afraid of a German attack on tho French North 1..frica. "If they do attack", said Mast, ttwo will fight immediately, no matter how little we have to fight with. tt Hast said, with what seemed like utter sincerity, that tho French J.rmy would implicitly follow his and Giraud I s orders, with resistance expected only from the French Navy. Hhile we conferred, some lieutenants from Eaat 1 s staff keptwatch out of tho wiridovis and walked periodicc=>.lly around the gardens and patio, keeping an eye out · for interference of any kind. IJo one had appeared by lunchtime when Tessier, with the help of one of the French, cooked chicken with a hot Arab sauce and served it with some rod wine and orrmgos. General M ast was forced to loavc at lunchtime to return to 1.lgiers to tend to his duties as Co.1mnander of the ii.lgorian Division. Before lunch I wanted to stretch and we:1t. 1 )ffC• to th o patio for a • bit. I told one of the French gucJ.rds ::i: should likiJ t,.) c :.,· ·dhac it lo 0ked like aroun-l 11 �the house. He offered to change uniforms with me, I put on his French uniform. 2nd left my hat off whilG I vvalkcd around a bit outsidG the wall and in view of _ the highnay. Fortunately, no car came by during my tour in the garden. During tho early afternoon wo split up into special groups for detailed discussions of various phases of our plans. The French v,ere ready with voluminous written information which :i.ater turned out to be accurate in every respect. They gave us· locations and strengths of troops and Naval units; told us where supplies, including gasoline and ammunition, were stored; related details of airports where resistance would be heaviest and information as to whore airborne troops could s'afely land. I had sc::icl in the morning we would have to get out to thG submarine the folloviing evening, but as conversation piled up after Mast's late arrival, it bcc21;10 increasingly difficult to see how we vrnuld m2,ke it. Furthermore, I had tho surf on that v:ide, flat beach a1,,,ays on my mind. Through the windows I could observe the sea showing more and more whit0 caps as the day wore on. There was a v1indmill near the house whose increasingly raDid clacking told me nudibl:' thc".t a light bree ze was building up into a fresh onshore wind. It 1'/8.S mic~-afternoon vrhon tho phone ranr. . Tessier answered and quickly turned from the instrument yelling, 11 Tho Dolice will be hero in 2. few minutes". Instantly a full-scc1.le French 11 flap 11 broke out. Officers ran in every direction. Some of the Frenchmen changed into civilian clothes with a speed I hf.Ve seen exceeded only by professional quick-change artists. Before I had quite decided whrst ',ms going on, one of Gcnore.l Mast I s officers ran past me, 1 !ith a suitcase in one h2nd, out to his car 11hich iJnmcdiatcly took off in the direction of f.lgiers. Other Frenchmen 1ncnt out the windows and disappeared into the brush along the beach; I ce.n I t sair that I blRmc any one of the, for their· lives would certainly be in. jeopardy if caught. F'in2.llir only Tessier and one French Officer, Murphy and his assist2.nt, Ridgcviay Knight, rcm2.inccl behind. I was feeling prett? deserted, c1.s well E'.S pr etty agitnted as to just whore y.;e could go to esc2pc the police. I knew it would not be se.fc inside the house and I had strong anxiety that some tcllt2.lc object might be left e.round our meeting room by accident. Furthermore, our British Conlfn2ndos wore sleeping upstairs. I flow up tho stci.irs and called them. To their questions, n-:horc shall we go 11 , I said, ,11 T2.kc to the woods on the beach e.nd got the boats out of here --- fast 11 • But there vias no time! Only one, carrying the walkie-talkie, made the beach to 1mrn the SERl.PE of whe.t vms doing. Tessier relocked the · room contr-.ining the bo,tts just 2. s the police car pulled up. Wncrc can we hido 11 , I asked. He motioned <?.11 of us to rush down through c1. trap door in the p2tio into a ,dne cellar. There v,e.s no tiCTe for discussion. : .'G had oi.;,r musette bags with us, stuffed v1ith the incriminating French documents which: if found upon us, would n1akc it prett3r tough" Tessier, his French r-.ssocic,tc, Mt'.rphy police. 12 ~t '"•~ ~~::..5 11~- rcnaincd -risible to th e �It was pitch ble.ck in the sme.11 ccll2r at tho foot of tho steep, open stairway. r :"o could so plainly hoar every word .;t11d · ovcrir novo above us that uc know it v1e.s imperative to keep absolutely sti+l. Tessier, Eurphy o.nd the two others put on 2. good show for the police. They clanked bottles around, sang a little, and were very jovial indeed. It turned out the 1.rab servants had been susDicious about being sent away; then, Hhcn they hclcl seen footprints on th8 beach, th8y hc1cl told the police e.bout it. l~urph,y idcntifiec. hinsclf e.s the iJncricP.n Consul in Algiers. He boldly indicc1.toc1. n little p;i.rty was in progress and that there were women in the upst;i.irs rooms r.nd urged the French Police not to embarrass him. 'To could hc2.r the police tremping 2round looking in corners end behind furniture. Evc r;r ti1i.1c their feet ap_proo.chcd our tre.p door, seven hearts popped into s even throats. I knelt e,t the foot of the stairs with a carbine in my hand. It v1as my intention, if they came do1m the stairs, to try to fight our way clear Y iithout shooting; but all of us were prepared to shoot if it wore necessary. I r1hisporcc1 th?t no one was to fire unless I c'l.id. It might be hours before we would be c1.ble to get through the surf to our submarine, 2nd Rnything we could clo to avoid further police trouble wci.s of the utmost importance. Poor Courtney, ·who he.cl hnd the trouble vii th the over-turned boat tho night before, was seized with 2. coughing fit. He chokerl.. and sputtered in the cl c1.rkncss c.nc~. finally whispered to me, 11 Gencr2.l, I'm afraid I'll choke. 11 I ans1ncrcd, "I'm c1.frc1id you won 1 tl 11 I slipped hi::1 a vmd of chewing gwn on v1hich I had alrce.dy worked for a while. This quieted him~ The police were moving c1.round above us for 2. full h2lf hour. They fine.lly 2greed to go bci.ck to town 2nd check with their chief for further instructions. They "\1cre frankly suspicious 2.ncl the? told Tessier so. Fine.ll;r there v1 2.s quiet up above, but we did not dci.rc move until Lurphy opened. the door ancJ. srdc''., 11 This is Bob. Thcy 1 ve gone, but thcy 111 be b2.ck. 11 11 Ho11 11 long? 11 , I ask eel. Just a little Yihilo, 11 he said, 11 better clee.r the house. 11 · ic got the boats clown to the beach 2nd hicl them in the woods, stc\ying there ourselves, out-of-sight. Cciptain Livingstone h2.c~ m2cdc conta ct Yv ".th the submarine with our i'Ialki etc1.lkic 2.nc1. told them ,·re were ir.. trouble. :.:..2.tcr we learned the~ were pretty r fr.=1.ntic on boc1.rd, but it was jnst dusk and vve could ce.sily see that the we.v,-:; s were too high to t2.kc off in small buats. Tessier and thE- remaining Fl'cnchmen were :.1:c.;·1 · excited too; we were a ."< 13 �terrible liabilit,y to thoJn ~nd there yias nothing thc;r wanted more than to got rid of their ror.,e.ining guests. The ·waves looked impossible, but we had to make a try c1.s it got full dark or risk ruining the whole mission . I decided to make the experiment with Courtney. I lmov1 I wc..s going to be so2.kod, so I stripped to shorts and my OD shirt. It was cold paddling around in tho water . ·:e tried one spot e.nd were ir;unec~iately overturned by 2. wave . I had put my money bolt in my rolledup trousers, not Y1ishing to be 1.Kightod dorm by all that gold in· a turbulent surf and heavy undertow. That I s when the pc:cnts and r.w money - - l ater so notorious in nov1s dispatches --- wore lost. ( I was a,71azcd when we finally landed at 1.lgiors to got those pants back from Murphy all cleaned D.nd pressed. They he.d been picked up on the beach 2.fter our departure; but the gold was never seen again. ) This attempt convinced us that a launching was impossible under present circunstances. 1 :e went back into the woods to wait , posting sentries in each direction . Tho French kept rushing back and forth to the house, but reported th2t nothing had happened there. r:c se;nt one Frenchman to Cherchel with a oocketfull of gold to try to buy or rent a fishing boat to take us out to tho submE'rine. He had no success. The fishermen ~1erc afraicl_ to tc'ko 2. chance on such A mysterious mission even for an,v 2-111ount of money. ''To talked about possible alternative ways of getting off. Somebody proposed f2.lsc p2.pors 2nd c1n automobile ride to SpRnish Morocco; but I vetoed that c1.s too risky. I had told Lt. J cwel that i:10 might have trouble and to stand by in the second rendezvous one mile oe.st on the second night, if we didn 't m2kc it the first. "'o had pretty good radio cont2ct with tho submarine by walkie-talkie, using cocl.od phrnsos. Tho sub was then only a dangerous 3/4 r.1ilo off shore - - 2lmost at tho edge of the bro2.kcrs. This was 2. very dangerous spot, but Jewel was a 11 Can do boy 11 • It was getting toward midnight . The police h2,d not returned; I was cold, ·wot, and alnost naked, to say nothing of being very hungry. Hone of us he.cl h~:d e.nything to cat since Tessier I s impromptu luncheon. I decided to clinb up for a look at tho house and to sec what I could do about some food and possibly a sweater. Tessier 1 "!as ver3' upset. He didn I t want Ge in the house c.nd urged me to get out c1..s quickly as possible. I hold 011t for some brcc1.d and wino , 2. pair of pr,nts, anc~ tv10 of Tessier I s sv-1e2 tors, all uncomfortably tight. I had just sti".rtod to put the brc2.d rncl a couple of bottles of wine under tho sweater when the police arrived 2.gain. Tessier was the c.10st frightened man I had ever seen. He sc'.iCL I dare not use the path but 11 f'lease_. fon God rs sc>,ko, get out of the house 11 , I vms b2.rofoot and my foot 1:wro alro2.dy cut up from tho stones on the path, but I jumped over the ccr.:1cn-c. wall on t o sea-side of tho house and 'd ropped p.s.infully some 10 feet to the po.th over tho bluff, making my v1ay down to tho beach, I groped my viay back tc the ''1-'.iting party about 1:30 ;.,M , C2.pte.in ':right) our Ifa.vy nan, had been E:=i.king a car c: L1 study of tho beci.ch t o sec ii' J_ there ':ms 2.ny plo.cc v1hcro the s1.Lrf WA.':l 2 lit t,J. ; lighter than olsov1hcre . The · subnar:i.no 11as tolling us cvs'!..' -,~ric v1qL·2.e-te.:U-:i.t, th:-> t the? needed a guide l igh':., , 2nd th2.t ncnc v:2.s visible JTofil ',h•; house , it· tt:i.s t.ir2.e tho French reported tho oolicc had gone away ccgain ari:l I sent O".L, ,)f '/ -_o non to mak0 Tessi.or tu:rm on the light in the v1indm1 . He had turned it off Juring the excitement aft E::r the police search. 1 14 �-''c surrounded our little perty like the plainsmen in Covered-'.'Jagon days vith sentries, armed. v1 ith carbines, lying down at all sides. l,t 3 :30 AJ.iI, I felt I could not remain inactive any longer. 1 ,iaybe 2rou c.nd 1 11 , I said to J err,y ,·•right, 11 11 can make it; let Is hc1.vc a tr_y 11 • j,t 4:00 L.E, Knight, Tessier, 2.nd L:urphy all strippec:1. and carried our ,. bo2,t out into the water to try and steady it through the breakers. 1 ·e passed the first one all right, and I heaved a sigh of relief. Just then the second loomc;d up ahead, gleaming just a little in the starlight and. appearing about a hundred feet high. I knocked ·;right I s Navy hat off trying to call his attention to ,hat was coming and he grabbed it in uid-air. '"'e made it and were in the clear after vie had passed the second breaker. The other boats follo, 1 iJJ1,wdiat cl:r, but, 11ithout exce9tion, capsized; our mus et to bags and od brief cases loaded with the secret papers were soaked as were the papers I h2cl stored inside my borrowed sweater. '1Te seemed to be paddling for hours •.·ithout seeing anything before we spotted the loom of the Seraph in the black-.. ness. 1 The others finally arrived; the 12.st bcin6 Haili.mes I boat. A big wave knocked it 2.gainst the side of the submarine and broke the frc:.mework of tho falboot. Colonel Holmes just barely made it up the side as the boat filled e.nd disappeared. Y1ith his musette bag inside it. This was a dangerous clue to leave behind. 1. fe.lboot has e.n E,irpocket et each end which might keep the wreck afloet. It could be washed up on tho beach and either with or without the bag of pc:,pcrs it could ceuse us 2nd ouJ~ associates ci.shore plenty of trouble. ..,orst of e.11, the be'.[ cont?.inec'!. secret letters Murphy ha.d given Holr;ces to deliver in Engl2nd. This would revc2l Murphy I s presence 2t our rendezvous. My anxiety over this materiel possibly being found overshadowed my elEltion Elt h2ving cor,1pletcd the most delicate part of the mission. I nantod to ste.y ,md look around a little, but the sky was already glowing ·with ap'.)roaching de.y, and Lt. Jewell se.id he was most anxious to submerge. !'9 reluctantly went bolovi 2.nd started back tor:ard Gibraltar. no were e.11 soekorl. and exhc=:.ustod; I asked Ltc Jewell, 11 Haven 1 t I heard somcv1here about the British IJavy having a rum rRtion, even on subm1:,rines? 11 Yes, sir, 11 answered the Lieutenant, gencies .11 11 ,ir:ell, 11 I SP.id, ration'?:t nr but on subnc.rines only in emor- think this is c.1.n emergency. lf()E_, sir, 11 se.id Lt. Jewell, the o~~c:.er. 11 11 if · , ,,. t h about a double nm c officer -of sufficient rank will sign :n W;i:..l I do? 11 I askcdo 2 11 I,-, sec;nr;c~ th2-t Twas f, satLc, T,Jrt _ ·y ~for,21 vnitten order fu.t 2. :: :;1;.1.:L(; r1:m P-219 . , 15 . '°:.:. ,-;r, c,,· rc, G:- CJ j} 1.n. I c,:'.t-cally put f'.1/ n21no ::,,:;, co cr .. c1 n.d _r.,a'.:> : -J engeTE of t:.c c: 1 �As the morning wore on, my worry increased. I felt I sLnply had to get a message back to General Eisenhower for relay to Murphy. Much against Lt. Jewell's better judgment, we surfaced long enough to send a coded radio to Gibraltar in which I reported the lost boat and urgently requested Murphy to have the beach searched, The boat and musette bag were never found although my trousers and a light raincoat lost at the same time did later turn up, Throughout the next night we travelled on the surface, and, after drying ourselves off and sleeping a bit, my group devoted themselves to sorting out wet equipment and carefully drying the secret papers in the submarine's engine room, On October 24, being far enough away from the African coast, we ran on the surface again. I sent a radio to Gibraltar asking for one of the two flying boats the Prime Minister had assigned to us to rendezvous as soon as practicable and fly us to Gibraltar. The Catalina picked us up by mid-afternoon and we transferred in falboots, taking off for Gibraltar while Lt. Jewell and his gallant crew gave us a ··· cheer from their deck. I had this cable ready for immediate coding and transmission: Following cable from CLARK TO COM:MAIIDIIJG GEIJERAL EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS LO!IDO!J FOR EISENHOVTERS EYES ONLY. BEGINS. Brief summary of events to date are given below pending more complete details to be furnished on our arrival. It was necessary to stand off rendezvous point for thirty-six hours submerged under water waiting signal to land because had not heard from M CG01:rrAN (MURPHY) as to exact time of meeting. Finally made definite contact with him and weather being favorable we went ashore in four canvas canoes about midnight twenty-second. Held conference with General Mast who represented Genera+ Giraud and five staff officers commencing at 0700 hours on twenty-third. Following general line anticipated by you our discussions are considered satisfactory. · I,1ast is contacting Giraud today. Giraud expected to give definite decision by Tuesday which is anticipated to be favorable. I base this conclusion on their favorable reaction to the size of the force the United States could make available for such an operation. All questions were settled satisfactorily except for the time the French would assume supreme command. My view on this question was submitted to Giraud through Mast for his consideration with the definite understanding that my proposal must yet be confirmed by you. Have obtained extremely valuable intelligence data which will be prepared as soon as I return for immediate radio transmission to commanders concerned. Our operations plans appear to be sound considering discussions and information received. Necessity for our being prepared promptly to occupy Tunisia with airborne units confirmed abundantly. Anticipate that the bulk of thE.. French Army and air forces will offer little resistance whether Giraud assumes leadership in North Africa or not. I promised during conversation with M ast delivery of two thousand small arms with ammunition by submarine at earliest practicable date to vicinity of our landing. Also promised to furnish submarine to bring Giraud from France to North Africa. French insist this eubmarine must be American. Initial 16 �r0sistance by French Navy e.nd coast defenses indicated by naval information which also indicates that t his r e sistance will fall off rapidly as our forces land. Deta iled conferences continued throughout day until 1900 hours when local police int e rvened h2.ving bccomc · suspicious of increased activity in r endezvous nrea. This event brought conforonco to abrupt conclusion. '!hile Frenchmen fl ew in all directions our party hid in empty repeat empty wine colla r of tho house while an argument ensued with tho police. r;e made for woods near beach during lull in conve rsation with police. The ro we awaited favorable surf a nd conditions to permit us to reembark. One boat capsized and was damaged in our first effort to reembark and furth e r attempt was futile in view of high waves. Ren:12.ining in hiding we made 2.nothcr attempt to embark at 0430 on the 23rd. llfter two ha d c apsized at be ach all boats reached subma rine but one was brok en v,hilo boarding subma rine. Except for brief surf acing to send me ssage to Gibraltar r an submerged during daylight hours of 23rd. ·;ith conditions ideal for the transfer to flying boat available morning 24th Gibraltar was a ske d to dispe,tch Catalina to rendezvous with us at sea to expedite r eturn. 1::n1 inform you time and place of arrival in UK. ENDS. Gibraltar offered us a number of pl easures, not the least of them hot baths and the opportunity to bo a little smug with the admiral who had taken such 2, di m vi cvJ of our mission. I had a conference vvith th o British about send ing 2,000 small arms to Gen eral Iviast by subnarinc near our own r endezvous point. " Our B-17 1 s took off for Engl2.nd bt e on the nie;ht of the 24th. On a rrivo.l a ft,cr a rou£h, cold trip, I went directly to Telegr aph Cottage, General Ike I s country plac e , ,-,he re he ,md Bodell Sr.1ith were waiting for me. I gave then a complet e E'.ccount of th o aff a ir. Ike was delighted and phoned the Prine }= inister to tell him tha t I ,-:as ba ck. He asked us both for supper that night. The othe rs wore in London Getting det2ilod messages moving to implement ,v hat vie had lea rned in ilfrica. Generals P2.tton, i,nderson, Fr cdcnclall and Ryder, the field commanders of v.?.rious p2rts of TORCH, wore given det ;-, ilo cl date, as it might affect t h eir units. It v,2.s reassuring to then to knot'! 1/IJe had corroborc1.t ed m uch of our own original int elligenc e v10rk. Th e Prime t:inister 1'JaS bubbling ove r rr ith enthusiasm. 2.s he, Ike a nd I t 2.lked t h ings ov e r 2t a little t able. He made it cle2r that he would have loved t o hc? vc Jll.e,dc such a trip h imself. "' fcvr cl2ys l a ter I wa s summoned to BuckinghEm P2.la ce v;h cre King Ge orge 1 v1cmtcd to t.?,lk v1ith r;i__ c 2bout the trip. Th e d2.te was for 11:30 ;,,M and General Eisenhower was VJ ith me, as the King n.?,nt cd t o bid him goodb7 c before we took off fo r IJorth idric2. via Gibr2,ltar. My pants had already begun to m2.ko history , for the King I s secretary 11hcn introduced to me s2.id, 11 1 know 2.11 about you. You'r e th e one ,,ho mad e the fr bulous trip; didn 1 t y ou get strauL :vd on the beach without y our pants? 11 17 • �We walked down·a long, cold hall. The Palace was even more chilly than most English houses, apparently for fuel conservation reasons. Tho King was waiting for us in a huge room.from which all the chandeliers and pictures had been removed because of bomb damage. King George shook hands and immediately plunged into a discussion of TORCH. He had heard all about my trip and said, "I thoroughly enjoyed tho statement in your cable that you had been forced to hide in an I empty repeat empty wi:.1.a cellar'". Vve talked for 40 minutes, disd.us sing Giraud at some length. The King said, 11 Uo one trusts Darlan 11 • He recc.lled meeting the French Admiral at a luncheon and s2.id he clearly remembered 11 Darlan' s shifty cyes 11 • I was most favorably impressed by King George's grasp of the military picture and the up-to-dateness of his information. I felt he was rather moved when ho finally bade us goodbye and said to each of us in turn, "goodbye, and God speed". T".'hat then remained was to convert the detailed information obtained on this story-book trip into detailed plans and to make it pay off. Hithout exception the data the French gave us turned out to be accurate. Their confidence in us was, I am sure, strengthened by our being able so quickly to come through, ,not only with information, but elso with a far greater opera- · tion than even they had hoped for. From tho American anc1. British viewpoints our few days of tough travelling~ our anxiety when the police raided the rendezvous house, our cold vwt vigil on the 1.frican bee.ch paid off in spectacular terms of lives saved. 1"e·wore much surer of whore v1e were going in North J,frica and how to get there, as well as of how much or little French opposition we would meet and where we would · meet it. There arc a lot of Lmeric2,n and B·citish boys back home with their families too.ay instcc1.d of being buried in North J,frica as a result of General East l'.nd his group of pc1.triots meeting with us at Chorchcl. 18 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Submarine Safari by Mark W. Clark Subject The topic of the resource Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina World War II Operation Torch, 1942 Description An account of the resource An account of the covert mission to North Africa during WWII, known as Operation Flagpole. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived AF Seraph Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1628