2 10 45 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/5e4b2d6bfae79d0dbe56af00615e0814.pdf?Expires=1789603200&Signature=uax3hoHy4D0JCscTA6w365nchC3Ud%7EO3ErBjhJ488h3BttpNr0qb-b0lge2ibRPgW5RllxfNWapei9pUBWW-UvjJqr0vUKSra7iWlnf8LOQRTDK%7EOKUIOqDj09ofc8HLjz7qmsBlO9PkvMg4QP1JdymYS1UwWP7NZkiX4sZYSw1tkIPFvGJsQ-1R0PmmFoDAl32c4Q4rP0558te-0j-wgI42r4boAFCmpTfQ6i0KV5KjemehKH3M7rfCRgxkYgwPJE25%7EQ9px%7E6v2Ll7gf63eCstZ7J3qGSTQvDlO79Cv-fcELDDqrwyyCimJCN5sSbdBenxES7Q5owBvqBORXU%7EiQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 7565d5e03153e0cc15eb71b193493fc2 PDF Text Text T 'HE CITADEL. ARCHIVES AND MUSEUM '-- HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL SMITH-YOUNG TOWER SAN ANTONIO. TEXAS. October 7, 1941 Dear Wayne: All major units are at home stations - or practically so and, thank the Gods of War, we had no tie-ups in getting them there! It I s now ti e for those double scotches, so you ' d better come down to this sector for a day or so. The re-classification business goes awfully slowly, but or a bomb shell hits us we're going to have a new first team on this club, ere long. we're doing the best we can, and unless a hurricane I wonder whether or not you can yet predict the probable future station of the 104th Anti-tank Battalion -- now assigned to one of the Anti-Tank Groups in Carolina. If, at any time, it should become apparent to you that the battalion will not come back to Fort Sam Houston, let me know by radio. We need the barracks it used to occupy. Orders were issued t o send you Po rter; also the Artillery Officer was changed according to your request. I hope that gang works out well! The Second Division is giving me a guard of honor. I'm completely overcome , particularly because of the cordiality of the invitation, even after I demurred. I've always been on the other end of such things, and I hope to hek I don't fall over my own feet! But durned if the prospect doesn't scare me more than would an order to go charge Hitler 's l egions 1 Love to Renie and regards to the gang! As ever Brig . General M. W. Clark General Headquarters Army War College Washington, D. C. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Correspondence Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President. This online collection features his correspondence. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/58 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Mark W. Clark, October 7, 1941 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Eisenhower, Dwight D. (Dwight David), 1890-1969 United States—History, Military—20th century. Correspondence Description An account of the resource Eisenhower tells Clark about minor changes in command Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Eisenhower, Dwight D. (Dwight David), 1890-1969 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1941-10-07 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1862 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/509b2cfa3f57dcf574804046e1ce9f3f.pdf?Expires=1789603200&Signature=QpoD4-GX3jrDRvf63HKD3ZJCqNhVOB0TtidaEDafgvpnWuFoEddB5g9ub%7EirbK8BSiC7oZBrWM5DdXlVRGqA72ZykdTbY9VSQKqthtxV9r%7Ep33B3muWqiTJkSJH%7EpDFqUsTLem4cZ4s8VbF3Lip5-LcsVSMX86W5ep8tvGnFq4-ocs%7EFFWI9fGXWWFyBXpt4D0QiKZ74kPiq-eyEPMnuEVMN4GnZuo0XOce3KIUo69628gXfzHKuY6BwQ8SxyAZwxQI7xxThRb%7EvjWwwbtlmtYkGIhYpwclRfdfdLB818-oRk4rfgPYEMfO1FTmoc8O2-66gYO6nfLgc61twR6OIEw__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM a34e49794b7a8a8ee6792e06bfa819be PDF Text Text THE CITADEL. ARCHIVES AND MUSEUM - COPY .i.ISH JOil1T ST 'ISSi m of t he Combined hiefs of Staf f asbington 10t h June, 1942 I,y dear General 1 I have just cane from the Combined hief s of $ta.ff Meeting at wilJ.oh General Marshall made t. o announcement of your new appointmmt and I am hastening to of fer you 11\Y' most sincere oongra'bllationa. I hope you will not think it out or plaoo 1£ I tell you t hat if I had been allowod to select from l the officers I have cane in contact with the two Generals td. t h whom I would most like to work in the great &vs to come, I .should have selected General F,isenhower and yourself. The knowledge that you have been sel.ooted literally alters my lihole out.look in the operati ons ,ve are going to undertake . ? mv I know we w1ll succeed one hundred per cent. Yow.·s sincerely, ( Signed) ·or General !J. 'll. Clark, A1"llU ar Coll.ego, ashington, D. - COPY c. 0 Louis Mountbatten" � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Correspondence Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President. This online collection features his correspondence. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/58 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Letter from Louis Mountbatten to Mark W. Clark, June 10, 1942 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American United States—History, Military—20th century. Correspondence Mountbatten, Louis Description An account of the resource Letter from Louis Mountbatten congratulating Clark on his new appointment. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mountbatten, Louis Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Museum and Archives Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1942-06-10 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1863 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/425bb205f5ac2dc2dbbfd22a4a587b95.pdf?Expires=1789603200&Signature=pGCglicN9FCrU0ZqlTPcGO1UlXAM8oj4Ghro7RKOQgppwrmley45yBrXRXJHyath%7EOrnHcgRIazDcfmVpO%7EMUgKhKAMZDzP0DK-SQN3%7EeZNd3%7E0apLkegUlCzzVEoYUkB1ks0SeLCyRGAyGRvZeraA7Z9bQ6%7EYzaJTqtjYaW4vM03ncNick%7E-mnRzjSTz-eyrfqfimltYHlLEzpSaI2hBfhFDHb4Y0wKXTLqj3ozUe9oKC6U7VLNOJsc3SPBzCToSI9GkKoTh1GkcijsMYAaVER8Jdcqv3Lf7C3rY40HbIw0DyKoCZ4paZ64m-PhPa0lUVSJ1c7giI4v%7EJFjpJqwIA__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 11d5dfe4d9f806c95bc95fad3cd5409d PDF Text Text THE CITADEL. ARCHIVES AND MUSEUM nq. f/r;1 :)l Diviaion, Lo'llit' , June 9, 1939. LT COL ti D J?:I.SEffltO.'lfa:t n!F OM~ VICTOR.IA MANniA PI srut.,a ' MAJOR G,;J El.JJ.. .ash., � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Correspondence Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President. This online collection features his correspondence. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/58 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Radiogram from Maj. Gen. Sweeney to Eisenhower, June 9, 1939 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Eisenhower, Dwight D. (Dwight David), 1890-1969 United States—History, Military—20th century. Correspondence Description An account of the resource Major General Sweeney responds on Clark's behalf regarding school for Eisenhower's son. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Sweeney, Charles W. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1939-06-09 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1860 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/0055ba5fcd408201773966fb5740eeec.pdf?Expires=1789603200&Signature=ZlrAjhYhhKK27kOdkB4VjymW2%7Esy62%7EUMa4ZZKLHWbJ-s%7EkOTZrcTOFLeuuYWboEc56av0bOkj5Tb4EknriXcJgvSB5ZFhekHzhrkPR4QI6RZAH08konddYlMANJRGYupwrtM3xJmgY5-3VAvrrniUxaf5dZuADt9dqV6M9ibM%7ELvsUWOK-6jUaqhiB5LYRa8zY84iC3KStvl1tOW%7EQS6VhNd1Gumt4V6Q3h8551ibNnRDUF0vSor8wVi2cP6l6ApmX03%7EJ%7EL1SkqN1t%7EN3QBPr5k0u9nquBotxfx1IHOgCkFNgv%7EQgqnAwUShrYR-yzQSBWHFv63UtAg%7E4MhdiTSQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM d5a1a0daeb417c531e5471677f170f04 PDF Text Text THE CITADEL.~ ~ ARCHIVES AND MUSEUM Q,!~RY OF .'!!'.AR of UNITED STATES ~ GROUNDFORCES in ..TI!§ EUROPAN THEATER OF O E PERATIONS ~ ~ ·- ~ - �f.QREW.Q.!!D This is the story of the II Army Corps and its part in the estab li shment of a Europe an Theater of Operations by the United States Army and of the day-by-d ay development of plans to open a Second Front in Europe. , ✓ This is a Di ary of War, written daily without the considered weighing of what a particular entry might mean in future his- . tory. It ls being written while the tense ls present; not past. W hile it will lack the polish and terseness of post-war sUllilllarization, the crucible of these words will be the heat of Now, not the tempering of Then. It will deal primarily with the activity of United States Ground Forces in Europe--the Infantry, Artillery, Tank Battalions, Mechanized Cavalry and the diverse branche s of land troops under comm.and of Major General Mark Wayne Clark. This prel ude will sketch events that start ed millions of American troops st eaming across the Atlantic in somber grey transports to carry the fight to the enemy. It is a chronology that will show why the decision was made to concentrate the fight in the European theater, with American troo ps holding elsewhere unti l the greatest menace--Hitler and National Socialism--could b e eradicated. How was the decision to concentr ate on Germany and her European satellites reached? What were the plans made and t he conferences held? Why was the II Army Corps selected as the first task force to be s ent to Engl and? How did the invasion plans switch, first from one sector to another ? What were the hopes? The decisions? The results? These facts Ctln best be told in a day-by-day account of events. Not only physical events; but intellectual events. This is a Diary of War, written not only while it is being fought, but also while it is being p lanned. �3 ( ) When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 1942, war became global and the Unit ed States was faced with fighting on far-flun g fronts--Japan through out the Pacific, the East Indies, Australia, India, the Aleutian Isl ands and the seas between; Germany h ad to be fought in Europe, Af'rica, Russia, the Scandinavian countries, the Atlantic and wherever the United States and the other United Nations could come to gr i ps wit h her. 7, A man, fighting at le a st two adversaries, c onc entrates one until he has defe ated him. Then, the time comes to take of the s econd enemy . on care The United States, in the midst of expanding its army and navy and faced with the tremendous problem of supply, not only to its own fighting forces but also acting as the ars enal for Russia, Britain, Chi na and other nations resisting the Axis, had to decide wbich enemy was making the greatest threat to our future and the future of the wor ld. The decision, made in . W ashington, London, Moscow, and, in a lesser degree, in the c apitals of the other United Nations,came after tremendous political, military and diplomatic pressure . It involv ed cooperative decisions between such men as President Rooseve lt, Prime Minister Churchill, Josef Stalin, Generalissimo Chiang-Kai-Shek, Australian Prime Minister Curtin, Ambassadors Lord Halifax, Maxim Li tvinoff, John Winant, Hu Shih, and naval and military men like Admirals Leahy and King and General Marshall and Lord Mountbatten. The decision: Germany and her Eradicate Hitl er that threat ca s trated, turn, with her Alli e s, restoring ord er in the satellites first; . Japan second. and Nat i onal Socialism first. Then, with or made impotent, the United States could to the task of defeating the Japanese and South Pacific and Asia. Sufficient troops were sent to the Japan e se war zone to hold off Nippon ese expansion and to repel threatened inva s ion of Hawaii, Alaska and Australia. The next step, after this decision . wa s made in th e late spring of 194 2, was to start the flow of men and materiel to a spot where prep arations could be made for the Europe an Theater offensive. Speed was of the essence in the sunnner of 1942 because Russia, after pushing the Germans back durin g the preceding winter, was being subjected to terrific Nazi onslaught. Som t h ing had to e be done to relieve the Rus s ians. - 'bpen a Second Front," was the cry, with Russia and Great Britain lea ding the plea. Presid ent Roosevelt pledged that a second front would be opened in 1942. �J W h the decision it made, the next step was to pick the men to ex e cute pl ans. Conferences of titanic importance were held in Wa shington. !All the top-ranking men in the army were c all ed intO' .f,r the deliberations. ,{a..f •• •·' -t ,rt..~ /'t C CIJ,)l<.l:.._ While deliberation Eisenhower officials, reception tne decision on th e European c ~~ n was still under /1~ eneral Clark and ~ ·'Ce eral Dwight D. were dispatched to Engl and to co er with British do reconnaissance work and make preparations for the and training of .American troops in England. It was not until General Glark returned to Washington in early June from Engl and that he realized he was being considered for t he tremendous task of connnanding United States Ground Forces in Europe. He had participated in the command conferences, contributin g his ideas concerning the best man for the job. It was Lieutenant General Lesley J. Mc Nair, comm ande r of the Army Ground Forces and Gene ral elark 1 s commanding officer, who told him his name was among thos e at the to p . A fev1 days lat er, Gener al Marshall called General Cla rk and asked him to arrange an insp ect ion trip to Fort Benning, Camp Jack son and Fort Bra gg where General Marshal l wanted to show Lord Louis Mountbatten and Sir John Dill the state of training of the United States Army. General Clark, as th e officer administering that training as Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces, ac compan ied General Marsh all and his guest s on the air trip. Follo wing the review at Camp Jackson, General Marsh all and his guests went to Pine Needle Lodge , near Pinehurst, N.C. At dinner that night General Clark sat b eside General Marsha ll and, during the meal, the Army Chief of Staff tu rned to General Clark and told him : "We've just about made up our mind to put you in command of our European Ground Forces. It's not 100 percent d efinite yet, though! 11 Elat ed but sobered by th e trem endous re spo nsibilitie s of th e prop osed comm and, General Clark returned to Washingto n. On June 10, 1942, as the general was making preparations for an AirGround demonstration at Fort Benning, General M arshall call ed to tell the general, who, at 46, is one of the youngest Major Generals in the army, t hat the comm and was his! General Clark's planned trip to Fort Benning was cancelled immediately and that afternoon he began forming plans for the establishment of a re vised and enlarged II Army Corp s , wh ich, for the tim e being, was to be his command. Fram the Army Ground Forc e staff, the gene r al sel ected certain key officers. He ac canp anied Gene ral Ei senho wer , th e Euro pean Theater of Operations connnander, to the Wh ite House for a confe r ence wit h Pres id ent Roosevelt and Prime M inist er Churchill. President Roos ev elt out lined what he expected of them. Later, M Churc hill discussed r. the involve d problems confronting th em. �.s ) The d ays that foll9wed were full. Conference after conference; decisio n after decision, and, fina ·lly, on June 12, a trip to Jacksonville, Fla., to assume command of the II Ar.my Corps and confer with officers at Corps headquarters. Until he departed for London on Jun e 23 , General Cl a rk was occupied continually in conferenc e s wit h high army, n avy and gove rnment of f icial s . * * * �( 0 F W h_ R INDIANTOWN GAP, PA., J UNE 23, 1942--The advance echelon of the II Army Corps began gathering at this staging area tod ay to prep are for d eparture on foreign service as a task force. Other advance units are being staged at Fort Dix, N.J. Officers and men plucked from posts throughout the country arrive from morning until late evening. The majority is from Jacksonville, Fla., the old he adquarters of the II Army Corps. Other officers come from post s as far away as California, Kans as , Okla homa, Texas and Louisiana. Most of th e officers, with the exception of those in the Regul ar Army, do not know each other. They are a conglomerate lot, repres ent ing almost every branc h of s e rvice, every age and every rank up to full colonel. 0~ Stories concerning how offic ers of the Corps headquarters were assembled are fantastic. Many of the h igh-rankin g ones were telephoned personally by General Clark. Tak e th e case of Colonel Lec ount Slocum who will be co mm ing of ficer until and the headquarters of t he Corps r ea ch e s its overs e as destination: General Cl a rk put through a long dist ance c all to California where Colonel Slocum was stationed. The ge n eral told him he had a new command but that he couldn't discuss it. "Do you want to go overseas?" the gene ral want to go places or d o you want to push bells asked. "Do you and bu zze rs?" Colonel Slocum was eager to go as soon as possible. Jokingly, General Clark asked him if h e could c at ch a plane East that night. "No, s ir, 11 repli ed the Col onel, "but thin gs re ady to go by tomorro w morning!" "Fine," s aid the gen eral. ne ed sun tans or li ght clothin I d o think "And I can t e ll g ." I could you that have you won't General Clark put through calls to po sts throu ghou t th e country, picking h is key men car efully. When word got around that the general was undertaking a n ew comm and, dozen s of officers phoned or went to him imd asked for a chance to b e un de r him. Here at Indiantown Gap M ilitary Rese rv a ti on officers are quartered in long, wood en barrack s buildings--colonels and li euten ant Colonels in on ~, majors in another, c aptains in a thi rd , and li eutenants in a • fourth. Headqu arters company and the 202nd » Milita ry Police ccrnpany are quartered in t he same section-- Area . ,c~ /.I<,.. s { •'' ~· �7 ) Number 1 of the Indianto wn Gap Reservation. By nightfa ll there are over 100 officers in c amp and everyon e is be ginning to specul ate about where they are go in g , what their mission is going to be and why such a large staff is needed . * * WASHNGTON JUNE 23, 1942 --G eneral *Eis enho we r and Gener al I , Clark, the two men who will plan and l ead the op ening of the Second Fr ont in Europe, depart fr om Bollin g Fi e l d at 9:05 A M for London. The genera ls, flying i n a converted commercial airliner, are accompanied by Colon e l Craig, G-3 for th e European Theater of Qperati ons , whi ch Gener a l Eis enhower wi ll he ad; Cap t a in Lee , General Ei senhower's aid e , and the f ollo win g high -r anking officers of the II Army Corps which will be und e r the colllilland of Gen e ral Clark : Colonel L. W. Rooks, Chi ef of St aff ; Col onel C.L. Adcock, G-4; Colon el C. B. Ferenbau gh, G-3; and Majo r R. A, Hewitt , Sec r etary of the General staf f. The ninth pass enge r i s Staff Sergeant M. Mc Keough. The London-bound party is bid goodbye by General Mc Nair, General Brown , Colonel Pa r ks, Colon e l Christensen and other officers of th e Army Grou nd Force staff of which Genera l Clark h a s bee n Chief of Staff. M s. 9l arlc is also present r at the t akeoff . The plane f lys non-stop to Gande r Lake, Newf ound l and , a major point of de part u re for trans-Atlantic fli ghts t o the Un ited Kingdom. The par ty i s met b y the commanding officer of the field and taken to th e Officers• Club for dinner. At 11:10 PM (GM T), the plane departs from Gander Lak e . Throughout the ni ght the flight is at about 6 1 000 f ee~, over a l ow cloudbank. Nothing is si ghtea • ..ne plane is a sleeper· - ty pe and soon the pass enge r s fall asleep to the stead y droning of the motors. * * INDI AN WN GAP, PA., JUNE 24, 1942--Th e flo w of off icer s and TO men into the sta g ing area continues and t hose men who ha ve their qua rters and orders s t raightened out b egin draw i ng equi pment to f i ll the i r shortages and obtain speci al ite ms needed by a t ask force. Many off i ce rs spend most of the day wi t h th e Financ e or Adjutant General sections , arr ang i ng for pay a ll otments , war bond purc hases , lif e insur ance , will s , powers of attorney and sim il ar matters that should be c l ea red before embarkation. The barrac k s bu il d i ngs in Area 1 ar e filling ing mess we have close to 140 officers . up and by even - ENROUTETO LONDON AIR, JUl-lE 24, 1942- -Th e party arri ves BY at Pre~ ic k , Scot l and , at 11:30 AM (GMT). An hour out of Pr esw ic k it flys over a convoy that i s proceeding, on a zig-zag cour se , in columns . It has th e protection of n aval v esse ls. The plane �A SECRET ) flys into Pre$ick at an altitude of 1, 500 feet and officers observe hutment and troop camps in both Ayr and Pres wick. can Aft er lunching at Pres1vick while the plane is gassed and servic ed, the party picks up a Poli sh pilot-guide and several additional passengers for the flight into London. The departure is at 1:30 GMTand the flight is dovm the Irish Sea and over the Midlands. The ge nerals' party arrives at Northolt Airport at 3 :45 PM to be greeted by Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chi e f of British Combined Command Operations; Major General C.H. Lee, h ead of the U.S. Service of Supp ly in England, and other staff officers of he adquarters, European Theater of Operations (ETOUSA) The pa rty . is taken to the Clari dge Hotel for quartering. * * * INDI ANTOV/N GAP, PA., JUNE 25, 194 2--The news is published tod ay that General Eisenhower has been named comm ander of the European Theater of Operations. Ther e is speculation concerning the opening of a second front to reli eve the Russians. Noth in g is said about General Clark being named corrnnander of the II Army Corps as it must be kept secret as y et. That General Clark will command us is connnon kno wled ge among officers at this staging ar ea . - Drawing of overseas equipment begins in earnest . Officers without pistols are issued Colt .4 5s , 21 rounds of ammunition csr.t~idge clips. They are re-instructed on how to disassemble reassemble the weapon. The equipment of al l any clothin g tha t is the tossed in a salvage heap. first class shape because kinds of conditions. enl isted men is least bit frayed Enl i sted men's it may be used checked or that equipm ent for a lon and and by officers and is too small is must be in g time under al l All enlisted men and practica ll y all officers ordered to this sta ging area h ave report ed. We have about 165 officers now, so many t ha t we have to have double mess s it tings. Headquarte r s of the II Anny Corps will be und er command of Col onel Slocum, Deputy Chi ef of Staff, until we get across. General Clark has gone over by plane with the heads of h is G sections. The news about General Eise nhower said he was alre ad y in London so we presume our Gener al is there too . * * * LOND ON, JUNE 25, 1942--Generals Clark and Eisenho wer spend the morning confer rin g on pl ans for the qu arte ring and training of the II Army Corps, advance unit s of which will soon be leaving the United States. Later, the conference is expanded to include Admira l Stark, commander in chief of U.S. Naval Forces in the European Theater of Operati ons, and General Carl Spaatz, comma nder of the Eigh'lh Air Force (US). The question of an air suppor t comm and for the II Anny Corps �9 ) is discussed with General Spaatz and it is agreed that the Corps should have its own air sup p ort connnand as part of its he ad quarters. Col one l Barker, head of ETOUSAplans and training, discusses with Gene ral Clark future plans for the Army Corps. The General is design a ted to he ad all Army Ground Forces in the European Theater. In the evening General Clark attends a dinner given by Lord Mountbatte n and discusses with him the problems and advantages of combi~ed operations. Follo wing the dinner, the comm ander of the Madagascar expedition gives a lecture detailing the qu ick-breaking and difficult operation. * * INDIANTOWN GAP, PA. , JUNE 26, 1942-- More equ ipm ent is issued today to ge t us ready for debarkation. It inc ludes new-type gas masks, musette bags, canteens, mess kits, compasses, field ~las ·ses, first aid pouches, etc. In addition to the governmen t issue~ officers swamp the post exchanges and quartermaster depots, buying woolen underwear, O.D. shirts, G.I. shoes, lighter fluid, heavy clothing and other articles. We have drawn heavy winter caps and Arctics ( overshoes) . * * ..X· LONDON,JUNE 26, 1942--Officers of ETOUSA and the II Army Corps hold sectional staff conf'.erences. The gener al plan for use of the qorps is outlined to General Clark's staff by Colonel Barker. At an afternoon conference, pl ans for amphibious trainin g in the United Kingdom are discussed and Major Billin gslea tells how amphibious tr a ining is carried on in the British Army. The reception of all advance elements of the II Army Corps is discussed and tentative p lan s are made for their arrival, transportation to temporary areas, and permanent quartering. * * INDIANTO N GAP, PA., JUNE 27, 1942--The quartermasters W are doing a l and office business, hauling truckloa ds of equipment for issu e . Today enlisted men fill in shortages found in their equ i p ment w en it was checked Thursday. h Everyone i s i ss ued a new-type ste e l helmet. Officers draw bed roll s and shelter halves. Pistols are checked and any gun with the sli ghtest fault is called in for repair. foot port will l ., Q uartennasters work until well after midnight stenci lin g lockers and b e d rolls so the y can be t aken tomorrow to the of embarkation. We do not know yet the port from which we sail. we are having one or two officers meetings daily in the mess hall so Colonel Slocum can make spec ial announcem ents or so we can fill out A, G, forms. All officers and men having identification ?::\,lo~.,,. ... .. . ...,."" • t ' /' �10 CJ cards showing regimental numbers or having stamps are ordered to get new ones . Corps or Division * * LONDON JUNE 27, 194 2--The entir e * , staff departs from London headquarters at 9:20 AM to ma ke a reconnaissance of th e Salisbury Plain area, approximately 80 miles southwest of Lond on. The prime purpose of the trip is to l oc ate a command post for the I I Army Corps and to survey the general area where t he Army Corps will be located. Genera l Clark's party arri v es at Britis h headquarters in the Salisbury area about 12 : 30 PM lunc hes wit h members of the British , staff and t hen vi s it s headquarters of the Brit ish V Cor ps . Tenta tive p l ans are made for locatio n of the II Army Corps at Lon gford Castle, about three miles south so uth eas t of Salis bury. Other faciliti es in the c astle area are t empora rily earmarked as quarters for the entire hea:l.quarters. Following c onfe rences with the Britis h , the full staff returns to London, arri vi ng about 7 PM . •)} * * I NDIANTON GAP, PA., JUNE 28 , 1942--The medics have been doing W yoeman work since our arrival here . Eve ry officer and man must be immunized against typhoid, tetanus, yellow fever , typhus and smallpox . The dispensary is crowded fro m morning until night as men wait for their innoculations. The 11"'l ert 11 call is expec ted momentarily so most of the officers and men are takin g advantage of every minut e to be with their famil i e s or e l se make last-minute purchase of items they believe will be sc arce in Engl and. * * * LONDON, JUNE 28 , 1942-- M orning conferences are held to dis cuss yesterday's trip to Salisbury. Tentativ e p.lans a.ce ap 1Jroved for the h ous in g of el ements of the command. General Clark, Colon e l Fe r enbaugh and Colonel Rooks depart on the e v enin g tr a in from London to mak e r econnais sance of the Pl ymouth a re a for su itabl e training f a cilit i es . * * INDIANTO N GAP, PA., JUNE 29, 194 2-- Headqua rt ers of t he II W Army Corps i s ord er ed on the " alert" at 12 :06 PM. We are seeing films on gas war fare and list en ing to a l ectu r e by Colonel Hurns , chemic a l warf ar e officer, when a ll MPs are orqered out . W hen we return to Area 1 from the post theater the " alert " notice is up and the MPs are in a cordon around the camp . ( There are hasty goodbyes between officers and wives who accompanied them here . Then the area is c l eared and no man c an go out side without a writt en permi t from Col onel Slocum . The en tir e atmosphere h a s changed and everything i s sudden l y v e ry �!I ) businesslike and military. Nothing is said about when we will leave for the port of embarkation but we all figure the order should come within the next 24 hours . Strict orders ar e is sued concerning our actions. No one can write, telegraph or t e l ephone . W hen we board the train, a guard will be placed at each end of each car. Windows must remain closed and no papers can be thrown from them. There ·is to be no shouting, s in ging or waving and no signs can b e p.rinted · ~n , the cars. Orders are issued that no liquor c an be tak en aboard the troop transports. At midnight the financ e office is opened and those desiring their June pay collect it. Packing of persona l luggage and musette bags lasts l ate into t he night. * ,,, ~~ PLYMOUTH,ENGLAND, JUNE 29 , 1942- - General Clark, Col onel Rooks and Colonel Ferenbaugh arrive at Plymouth with members of the headquarters, SOS. The group sp e nds the d ay visitin g various service install ations in the area. The general and his party leave Plymou th late by automobile, arriving in Lond on about mid night. Colon e l Adcock, Colonel Ramsey and Major Hewitt, accompanied by Colonel Williruns of the Air Support Comm and, make a detaile d reconnai s s ance of the various proposed troo p in st allations in t he Salisbury area. This pa rt y remai ns overnight at Salisbury. * * * INDIANTOWN .AP PA . , JUNE 30, 1942--Mter G , arising at 5 : 30 and checking in blankets and equipment issued for us e at Ind i an town Gap, we bre ak fast, receive two cold lunches and pull away from c amp in trucks at 7:45. We are driven to a nearby railroad siding where we board a 12-coack Reading Railroad train. At 3:30 PM, after a back - route trip throu gh Pennsylvania and New Jers ey , we arrive at Jersey City and take a ferry to the Brooklyn Port of Embarkation. A lot of interest is evidenced by civili ans as they steel - he~neted , full-packe d troops on the special ferry . When we pull into the port we can count seven transports, all a dull srey color, at the piers. Troo p s are already aboard al l the ships. They crowd the r a ils in solid b:anks. All officers and men w were staged at Indianto wn Gap board ho the s . s . Monterey, formerl y a South Pacific luxur y lin er . Officers are bunked four to six men to a stat e r oom and enlis t ed men are quartered in staterocms, loun ges and on the prom enade deck--every single foot of space seems to be occupied. The ship is teeming with men. From the boat deck of the Monterey we can s ee only one transport that is docked at the opposite pier. It is the Sibonet and she too i s lo aded to the rails with troo ps . l I * * * ..,- �) -- LONDON, JUNE 30, 1942--Conf e rences rel ative to SOS install ations p l anned for t he Plymouth Area are f!eld during the morning by Gener a l Cl ark and Colonels Rooks and Fer en b au gh . General Eisenhowe r and General Clark depart in t he evening for a d i scussion of combin ed ope ra tions wi th Lord M ountbatten. After completin g the more thorough reco nna iss ance of the Sa li s bury Plain district, Col one l Adcock, Colonel Ramsey and Major Hewitt return , to London . * * * ABOARD THE MONTEREY JULY 1, 194 2--At 2 AM of f icers , awake the enlis ted men and check to see if they h ave life belts. Those who haven ' t are i ssued th em on the bo a t deck. It takes two hours to complete th e deta il and by th a t tim e the hatch covers of the Monterey are bein g battened down. The heterogeneous car go --fr om trucks to foot l ockers to f ood -- has been loaded. We pull away frOlll the pier at 4:1 8 AM and head out to sea . Few expec t ed to ge t underway so quickly. The other trans p orts steam out ahead and behind us. When it b ecomes light we are out of sight of shore . The con voy is a marvelous s i gh t! Seven big, grey troops hips moving along wi th a battleship , a cruiser and 20 destroyers for an escort . The troopships are so close tog e th er you can see the men, al l wear i ng lifebelts, lining the rails. Every foot of the decks seems to be covered with khaki -c lad men . ov erhe ad , cruisin g leisurely around the convoy, are two blimps. Sometimes they pass so c lo se we can see the men in the gondo l as . Land based navy planes come and go . The Monte r ey is the l ead starboard f la nk of the fr ont the battlesh i p Texas and the s econd line, about a qua rter p ort s Argent ina (US) , Duchess (British) . In the third line and a t wo-stacker (Dutch). troop transport, running on the line which is made up of our ship, li gh t cruiser Philadelphia. I n the of a mile behind us, are the tr ans of Bedford (British) and Barry i s the Sibonet (US), Maloja (British) · * JULY 1,* 1942 --G eneral Clar k and Gener a l * NORTH ERN IRELA ND, Eisenhower are joined at Pre!ffeick , Scotland, by Colonel Rooks and Colonel Ferenbaugh . The party proceeds b y plane to United States Anny bases in Northern I reland . The group spends the day inspecting troo ps and installations of our V Anny Corps. Americ an and Bri tish tro op s have split into two groups and are go ing through a joint exerc i se . ~eneral ~lark observes th a t U. S. troo ps look fat and pudgy while the Britishers are hard and lean, He dec i des that our ground forces -- those already here and those to come-- must have gruelling training to fit them better for battle . American troops p articipating in today's exercise consist primarily of the 34th Division and the First Armored Divisio n . * * /,, � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, June 23-30, 1942 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from June 23-30, 1942. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1942 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Language A language of the resource English Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/554 Date Valid Date (often a range) of validity of a resource. 1940-1949 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/6e1b58a4d966ecb1883dea2782d50647.pdf?Expires=1789603200&Signature=LpxwORgyJJaMvvUnlrFJ3BzDwtvQPbHefYQy79PLA%7E26lNTGqpQQuevN0yipWe8N8EgJGGgc-%7EZ2yoHkDKQxE6pxsTZz0PtNx3BA2mcsrK7M3PuzlucGwhymyJmvSD74iCEmAdHsqVAC46gTLjJwcRk1YJAuWfvSqvtZAzPnPVsWsh0LH%7E5vQXjjSygVcr89E16SJfrWgBeuChSanyjK-fAJXzn7ITJFyFuBmlnXG7GqTomnV2NaixcuIznjREYBnFpq6vKfI97M6IpKeKuzhtPAkia-rJi5L3rNwllblPKwL%7EnqzEWaQ-Kd3jgTY%7E2%7EkiS0RRKBIEhZAqnZfrCuYQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM a506896a4527c294408e6df615de561a PDF Text Text I ;2_ THE CITADEL. ARCHIVES AND MUSEUM ) LONDON, JUNE 30, 1942--Conferences rel ative to SOS installations planned for th e Plymouth Area are }aeld during the mornin g by General Cl ark and Colonels Rooks and Ferenb augh. General Eisenhower and Gener al Clark depart in the evening for a discussion of combined ope ra tions with Lord M ountbatten. After completin g th e more thorough reco nna iss ance of the Salisbury Plain district, Colon e l Adcock, Col one l Ramsey and Major Hewitt return , to London . * * * ABOARD THE MONTEEY, JULY 1, 1942--At 2 AM of f icers R awake th e enlisted men and check to see lf they have life belts. Those who haven't are i ss ued th em on the oo at deck. It takes two hours to complete the detail and by th a t time the hatch covers of the M onterey are being battened down . The heterogeneous car go --from trucks to foot lockers to f ood--h as been loaded. W pull away from the pier at 4:1 8 AM and head out to sea. e Few expected to get underway so quickly. The other transports steam out ahead and behind us. When it becomes light we are out of sight of shore . The convoy is a mar velous sight! Seven big, grey troops h i ps moving along wi th a battleship, a cruiser and 20 destroyers for an escort. The troopships are so close tog ether you can see t he men , all wearing lifeb el ts, lining the rails. Every foot of the decks seems to be covered with khaki-clad men . Overh ead , cruising l eis urely around the convoy, · are t wo blimps. Sometimes they .pass so close we can see the men in the gondolas. Land based navy planes come and go. The Monterey is the lead starboard flank of the front the battleship Texas and the second line, about a qu arter ports Argentina (US), Duchess (British). In the third line and a t wo-stacker (Dutch). troop tran sp ort, ranning on the line which is made up of our ship, light cruiser Philadelphia. In the of a mile behind us, are the tr ansof Bedford (British) and Barry is t he Sibonet (US ), Maloja (British) · / * * * NORTHERN IRELA , JULY 1, 1942--G en era l Clark and General ND Eisenhower are joined at Pre~ ,ffe ick, Scotl and, by Colonel Rooks and Colonel Ferenbaugh. The party proceeds b y pl ane to United States Army bases in Northern Ireland. The group spends th e d ay inspectin g troo p s and in stal l a ti ons of our V Army Corps. Americ an and British tro ops have split into t wo groups and are go in g through a joint exercise. qeneral ~l ark observes th a t U.S. troo ps look fat and pudgy while t he Britishers are hard and lean. He de cid es that our ground forces--those already here and t hose to come--mu st have gruelling tr a ining to fit them better for battle. American troops participating in today's exercise consist primarily of the 34th Division and the First Armored Division. * * -1/' �13 ) Colonel Adcock, Colonel Ramsey and Major Hewitt complete their study of all installations in the Salisbury are a and sub mit reconnnendaticns for the housing of officers and men of the headquarters of the I I Army Corps. * SOMEHERE IN THE ATLANT W IC, JULY 2, 1942--The Monterey , 19,500 gross tons and the largest transport in the convoy, has 5,810 officers and men aboard. In peacetime her full passenger list was 750. There are so many troo p s aboard that there a r e only two messes a day. Enlisted men eat in the ma in dining room and their mess lines ser p entine al l around t he ship's companionw ays. Officers eat in the cabin class dining room, having three sit t ings per mea l. Counting the c r ew and nav al gunners we have over 6, 000 men on board _ The other troop tr an sports . look equally crowded. The convoy commander is Captain J.J . London of the U. S. Navy . This is the Mont erey 1 s first trip in the At l antic . She has already made two conv oy trips to Aust r a lia. W are foll owing e various type zig - zag cours e s, th e entire convoy shifting simul t aneously by synchronized watches. ' ( Captain London exp l ains that the Tex a s is VIith us to protect the transports ag ainst possible Axis raiders. The Philadelphia is assigned primarily to protect th e Texas . Our escort all the way will consist of 22 warships . The blimps l eav e us i n la te afternoon . In case we need any aeri a l scouting done , th e Texas has two pl anes and the Phil adelphia four. From the bridge you c an se e we are s a iling i n the middle of a circl e of destroyers. They rim us completely. The ship's newsp aper starts coming out today but it can carry no dates or marks of i dentification . Nothi ng is to be thrown over the side of t he ship. * * * Colonel Rooks and LO NDON JULY 2, 1942--General , Clark, Colonel Ferenbaugh ar r ive a t 12 : 30 PM by pl ane f r om Nor th Ir eland . The ent i re afternoon is spen t in confer ences with the staff dis cussing plans and problems r e lative to housing units of the Corps he adquar te rs. Anti-airc r aft protection in the vicinity of Cor p s he ad qu a rters i s discu s sed by General Cl a rk and Colonel Bradsh aw, anti - aircraf t offic e r of ETOUSA. They decide to sup p lem ent existing heavy gun defenses in th e Salisbury -C astle area by moving in additional units of Brit i sh ant i- aircraft for increa s ed protection. * * * SOMEHERE I N THE AT NTIC, JULY 3, 1942 --All d ay we move W LA thr ough a pe a- soup fog. None of the other ships in the convoy c an be seen but we hear th eir whistles ev e ry two or thr ee minutes. Few men are on decks since it is cold and clammy with a wispy fog making every thi ng drip . The captain tells u s we are some where off the coast of Nova Scotia . �Iti Just at dusk the fo g lifts briefly and we c an see the en tire convoy. The ves sels are moving a lon g in perfect fo rmat i on, as though t hey h ad hawsers from st e rn to bow . The Philadelphia sends up two scouting plan es . Of the 5 , 810 troops we h ave aboa rd, nine are women--nurses who will be i n the I I Army Cor ps stati ~n ho s pital . * , SALISBURY, ENGLAND JULY* 3, 194 2-- * The entire staff leaves Lond on at 9:00 AM proceeding , to Sa lis bu ry so General Cl ark c an inspect, on the ground, the r ec onnne~dations made conc e rni ng quar tering sites for headquarters of the II Army Cor ps . Gen era l Cl ark app r oves th e reco mmendations made by Colonel Adcock and the SOS is directed to make every effort to improv e existing b ath in g and l a trine fa cilities. The en tir e s t aff rem ains overni ght in Sa lis bury . * * * SOMEHERE I N THE ATL TIC, JULY 4, 1942- -I t is still W AN so fog gy th at you can't s ee 100 fe et . Sh ip l i fe h as settled do w to n rou t ine wit h mess lin es functioning smoot hly unde r of f ice r chec ker s . 11 Each aftern oon we h ave "abandon ship" and "attac k stati on drills . Offic ers and men go to their stations in full e quipm ent, inclu ding stee l helmets, pistol and ammunition, cant eens , lif e belts and gloves (for sliding down rop es i n c ase we h av e to ab an don ship ) . Enl i s ted men go on the promenade deck , from whi ch they would l oad into lifebo ats . The Monterey has ei ght an ti-aircraft guns --. 60 caliber machine guns, water cooled , manned by Mat so n Line personnel. Ther e are two on the stern, Four amidships and two on the bow. our ship a lso h a s four thr ee -in ch gun s, t wo on t he ste rn and t wo in the bow, and a four-inch gun on the stern. * * . * SALISBURY, JULY 4, 194 2- -Th e st aff continues reconnaissance of addi t iona l installations and proposed s ites in the Sa lisbury area . Gener al Clark and Colonel Rooks r e turn to Londo n shortly before n oon a nd hold conferences with ETOUS and British A off icers regardin g improv emen t of all in s tallati ons i n th e area the II Army Cor ps will oc cupy . The r emai nd e r of the staff continu es a det a iled reco nna iss ance of the Salisbury area in sear ch of add i t i ona l housin g . This g r oup returns to London i n th e l ate afternoon. * * SOMEWHERE N THE ATLANTIC, JULY 5, 1942 -- The fo g continues I and it i s reported th at we are going in a hu ge circl e , waitin g for it to c lear so th e destr oye rs can g o into Hali f ax an d "to p off" - - that i s , r eplen i sh th e ir fue l su pp ly so th ey will h ave suff ic ien t in c a se we ge t into a fi gh t . �15 c) Sunday on shipboard is ju s t like any other day except that there are Catholic and Protestant services on the boat de ck . There is little for the enlisted men to do but sleep and rel ax. Everyone i s wondering what port we are going into and tod ay Cap t ain London tells some of the officers that we are due to arrive in Glasgow, Scotland , a week from today which will be July 12. * * *are pushed for the disLONDO, JULY 5, 1942 -- Preparations N positi on of troo p s when they arrive in the British I sles. The main task is to prepare f or their staging in the Salisbury area. A second group of I I Army Corps off i cers arrive from the United Stat es by pl ane. I t inc l udes Colone l C. L . Bertholf, Adjutant Gen eral; Colonel E. B. Howard ; Colonel Francis Markoe , G-1; Major Dan Gilmer, Deputy Chief of Staff; Colonel T. E . Lewis, Artillery Officer, and Lieutenant A. G. Barker, one of General ~lark's aides. They reach London about 6:00 PM . General Clark and General Eisenhower go to Checkers overnight visit with Pri me -Minister Chur chill. for an * is t he ancestral estate CHECKERS, ENG * , JULY * 1942--This LAND 5, of Prime Minister W inston Churchill and when Ge neral Eisenho wer ard Gener a l Clark arrive for their overnight visit the pudgy, affable leader of t he British bounces out to mee t them. He is entirely informal, wearing carpet sli ppe rs and a bag gy smock. The Prime Minister tak es the two American generals dovm a winding path throu gh the woods and the three men sit on a s e cluded bench to talk about the British-Am eric an war effort. Mr. Churchill is in favor of executing GYMNAST,the name for the operation cal l ing for inva sion of the Afric an coast and the t aking of Northwest Africa, as soon as possible. His arguments sho w the cor elation of thought between President Roosev e lt and the British leader since our president favors the same operation. M r. Church i ll believes a Europe an invasion is t oo hazardous at the present time. Bot h Generals Clark and Eisenhower are n on-cOllllnital bec ause they f eel GYMN will detract A ST fro m what they c onside r a qu icker, more direct operat i on- -SL EDGEHAM M ER, the name of the proposed 1942 European inv a sion opeEation , and ROUNDUP,n ame for the largescale Europe an operation in 1943. This would carry the war direct to the Eu rope an continent. Following the talk in the woods, the Prime Minister and two generals go to the old but beautifully decorated house. The Pri me Mini ster , even for cocktails and d.inner , nev e r ch anges out of the smock and bedroom slippers. Other guests at the dinner include Mrs. Churchill and Mrs. Portal, wi fe of the head of the British Air Comma nd. The group di scusses frankly throughout the dinner all secret war plans. The Prime Minister t e ll s the Americ an generals not to wor r y because "my wif e and Mrs. Portal know everytl!ling. " �I (i I / During the d i nner the Prime Minister tells how he went walk i ng alone that afternoon . He met , du ring his strol l, an Eng l ishm an, his wi f e and thei r t h ree ch i ldren . He chatted with the c ouple and final l y aske d them if these three represented a ll their children. The man replied the y did o "Well," the prime minister says , grinn i ng , "I t hink you should have frur . Get busy on that right away!" M . Churchill r chuckles as he fin i shes the story . Af t er dinner the Prime Min i ster A the generals nd go to Mr. Churchill's itudy wher e th e y converse animatedly over a globe and read reports coming in to the Prime Minister. The big news c oncerns movement of a 33 ship convoy to Archange l, Rus s ia , Mr. Churchill i s e l ated when the repo r t comes in that the GermRn battleship Von Tirp it z has been hit by torpedoes fran a Russian submarine . He says he must h ave some good news t o report to h i s people . Later, the r eport on the Von Tir p itz turns out to be false. The Prime Minister tells Generals Cla r k and Eisenhower how t his convoy represents the f i rst r eal attempt to move supp l ies th r ough to Russ i a. Murmansk vir tu ally has been bombed out of exis t e nce. The convoy is accompan i ed almost halfway fro m Eng l and to Arch angel by the entire home f l eet. Because the German fleet is concentrated on the northern co ast of Norway and land - based bombers can attack the convoy, i t · must go on by itself, accompanied only b y des t royers , submar i nes and armed trawlers. ( Only four of t hese 33 ships finally re A Archan gel ) . ch News from the African front isn' t too ~romising as the Pr i me Min ister and the generals discuss war plans, study the globe and read incomin g r ep orts . Romm l is pummeling his way forward into e Egypt . Lat er, the Prime Minis ter and Mrs . Chur ch i l l, t he ir guests , mem bers of the Prime Minister ' s staff A househo l d servants nd attend motion p ictures in the mansion . General Cla rk s it s with Mrs , Chur c hill and Gene ral Eisenho wer is with the Prime M inister, Af t er the show, M . Churchill r introduc es h is staff, made up mostly of officers of the Coldstream Guards , to the two generals . They ta l k abo ut military affairs and the Prime Min ister trots out and returns with the rifl e he used i n the Boer War, Chuck lin g , he goes through a snappy drill with it . After the officers have gone, Mr . Churchill, General Cl a rk and Genera l Eisenhower sit up un t il 3 AM discussing war pl ans . As t hey ta l k about va rious p l ans the Prime Minister v1 ill say : "Have you s een my paper on that?" And he sends f or papers embody ing his p articular ideas on a certain operation. Mr. Churchill is sold on the idea of executing G YMN . He f e els t ha t the British AST Am eric an invas io n can ' t be made against the heavily - fortified and quite heavily-held Frenc h coast , He t hinks something must be done soon to divert German troo p s fro m the hard - press ed Russian fro n t, ......_ · ·- �4llllillliilili ': ~ The two Americ an generals r e tir e at 3 AM and General Clark, reading a book at his bedside whic h t ells about famous p e opl e , including Cromwell , wh o slept in his particular bed, finds it hard to get to sl eep in the p r esence of so much h i st ory. Checkers w ic h is about an ho ur's drive .Bouthwest fro m London , is approxh imately 1, 000 years old •. , After breakf a st , Gene rals Clark and Eisenhower i nsp e ct the Checke rs guard and as the t wo Ameri can officers are going down the lin e , the Prime Min ister, still i n ni ght cl oth es , sticks his head out of a b ed r oom window and hollers: " Ain't t h ey a fine body of men-I" "Ai n't" Churchill ' s fav or ite words. Ge neral 10 : 00 AM . Eis enhower * i s one of Mr . and Ge ner al Cl ark d epar t for * Lon don at * SO MEWHE IN THE ATLANTIC, JULY 6, 1942- - The convoy connnander RE has apparently deci ded to pass Ha li f ax and th e refu e lin g operation . Once aga in we are moving on zig - zag cou r s es a t 15 lmots. At 4: 00 PM we ar e past Cape Rac e and somewhere between Labrador and Newfoundland. La te in the afternoon we s ight small whales. Two of the seven troop tr ansports are no lo nger with us . They are th e Sibonet and the Dutch t wo- st acke r . The :; report edly g ot into Halifax . The Sib on e t wil l not accompany us to the British I sles . She is going to I cel and with speci al troops . The report is t ha t t wo de stroyers h ave dropped back t o convoy the t wo ship s that put into Ha lifax. The weather is cold--46 deg r ee s at 3 : 30 PM. Not many men go on decks . 1'he en li s t ed men ar e divided into two groups for the crossin g . on e group has the use of troop st ate r ooms from noon until midnight; the opp osit e from midnight un t i l n oon . W en one h group has the stateroom, the other has space, with some bunks , on A and B decks . * * * , ~LONDO, JULY 6, 1942 -- General Cl a rk and his staff N are occupied in preparing for reception of the advance ground forces now enroute to Greenock, Scotland, and Liv e rpool, Engl and, in the troop trans po rts . orient The group of Army Corps of f ic ers th at arrived ed by General Clar k as he outl i nes pl ans for yesterd ay are th e future . * SOME HERE I N THE ATLANT W IC, JULY 7 , 1942 -- The med ic s ar e doing t he ir innnunization work again . Enl isted men and officers keep a steady line go ing thr ough t he d i spensar y, form er l y the Monterey ' s writing room . �( Most of the tro ops aboard are engi n eer s. Highest r anking officer on the ~on t er ey is Colon e l Grandy of th e Engin:aers. We have n o combat troops , most of t h is adv ance ec hel on b e i ng supp ly and housekeeping tro ops , constru cti on u n its and some non - fl ying Air For ce personne l. A fe w combat troops were staged at Fort Dix and the report is that a battalion of inf ant r y from the First Divis i on is on ano t he r ship. When we were at In d i anto\m Gap, part of the First Div ision was in Are a 2, n ex t to us. The 16t h and 18t h I nfantry re gimen t s were out on pract i ce marches whil e we were at the sta gi ng area but they did not accompany us out or g o on the alert w hen we did. Officers ,,nd men , real izi ng where we are going to land, are spec ul ating on our t ask and guessing where we wi l l irnvade the c ontin ent . * LONDON JULY 7,* 1942 - - Actual establ * i shmen t of the II Army , Corps Cormn and Post and phys ic al prepa rat ion of troo p areas i n the Salisbury - Tidworth area is started tod ay . Colon e l s Adcock , Ramsey and Ferenbaugh depart for t he area t o sup ervis e work and make all arrangemen t s f or the arrival of troops . Orientation of the newly - arrived off i cers continues. I n the evening, Gene ral Cl ark h a s dinner wit h Aver ill Harriman , on e of President Roosevelt ' s key men on relations with ref ugee gove rn ment s in London and on Lend-Le a se matters with Gre a t Britain. ( * SOM EWHERE N THE ATLANTIC, JULY B, 1942 - -Articl es on English I .American money exchange and on how to id ent ify British army officers appea r in the sh i p I s pap e r today and now everyone knows for certai n that we are going some w here in the British I sles . After da il y fogs we can s ee most of th s till v ery co ld . The been n o sea sickness. rumors and speculatin will be our mi ss i on. since Ju l y 3 , it is p artly clear today and e conv oy ~ for an hour or so a t a time. It is se a is a little r oughe r but a s yet there has The favorite shipb oard pastime is exchanging g about where we are going to camp and wha t The re s eems t o be a gre a t desi re to get going . The quality of the food is excellent . The re are t wo post e xc hanges on board and they are doing a terrific business, pa rt icul ar l y in soap , cigar ette s and toil e t art i cles that the troops figure will be hard to obtain in rationed Eng l and . LONDON JULY 8 * , , concentrate t hr oughou p l ans for arrival of in g work is assigned ( * 1942- - All* officers, * fr an General Clark down , t the day and most of th e night prepa ring tro ops . Recepti on, transportation and quarter to the v arious sections. * * �19 I SOME HEREIN THE ATLANTIC, JULY 9 , 1942 -- The c onvoy has W stepped up its p a ce since we have left the t wo slowest boats benind. W churn alon g a t 17 knots. e It is getting warmer but you sti l l need A field j acke t or a tr en ch co a i <9n deck. The convoy moves a l on g the same generalized z i g- za g courses , l os in g about eight per cent of its mean d i stance, according to Captain Lond on . For the fir st time in almost a week we can again see the destroyers cruising around near t he horizon . * LONDON JULY 9 * 1942 -- The advance * , , staff in the Salisbury area is augmented by the dispatch of Colonels Bertholf , Howard , Markoe a nd Gi lmer who g o down t o assist in preparation for estab lishment of I I Army Cor ps headquarters and the arrival of troops . Gene ra l Clark , Colonel Rooks and Li eut en ant Barker go to Longford Castle to observe preparation of t he Comm and Post . They return i n the af t ernoon. * * SOMIDIHERE N THE ATLAN , JULY 10 , 194 2-- W h ave t wo I TIC e 11att ack station" alarms today. The men go qu ick l y and qu i et l y to their posts . I t was th e first ti me the routine of the sh i p h ad b een chan ged since we l eft Brook l yn. ( Aft er bein g at our st ations for ab ou t 35 minutes, the all - cle ar signal . No expl ana tion is g iven for the it might have be en to prepare th e men psychologically h ave the re al thing. we ge t al Prm but fn case we The second 11attac k statio n " alarm come s about 11 : 00 AM , half an hou r after t he first on e . This tim e office r s and men go to th e ir stations more quickl y and smoot hly . Tro ops come off the decks on th e do uble . The rea s on for the second alarm turns out to be a four - motored British bomber which , despite r a in and l ow scud , flys a round us until about 4 : 00 PM. As she le aves, the bom~e r dips lo w between the Texas and the Phi ladelphi a and ten disappea~s in th e mi s t to ward Ireland . The two " attack since the v oyage star once a p l ane dropped xtarboard stern , then ov er a depth charge . the activity . ( ) station" brought .tp~ t ed . Twice before we a dep t h ch arge about , abou t half an hour Today , for the first first ac tion on our ship h ad s een act i on nearby -h a lf a mile off our l a ter , a destroyer dumped ti me , we were part of * * LO NDON JULY 10, 1942- - Gene ral Cl a * and General Eisenhower , rk hol d sev eral conferences during the day to discuss preparations for the arrival of troops an d to enlarge their pl ans for future operations against the en emy . All efforts ~f the remainder of the staff are concentrated on one thing: making re ady for the arrival of the fi rs t units . ~ * �SO W ME HERE IN THE ATLANTIC, JULY 11 , 1942 - -A British Catalina flying boat joins us ear ly this morning. It is clear and calm -the finest day sine~ we l eft Brooklyn ten days ago. Despite our proximity to l and ther e is not a single "attack alarm" all day . At 6:40 PM we sight land off our starboard--Irelandl Officer s and men crowd th e rails, looking through field glasses . Later , l and appears on our port side and we ' re told we are ente r ing the Irish Sea . About 7:00 PM two Britis h Hurri can e fighters come out to look us over and they dart about overhead for almost two hours . Before leaving us at dusk they dip dovm to about 200 feet and roar between the Monterey and the Texas . Just before dark we sight a British cruiser off our port and she blinks sign a ls to us . Since sighting land there is a more buoyant feelin g aboard sh i p . Everyone is eager to get ashore . *ND TIDW ORTH, ENGLA , JULY * , 1942- - * 11 General Clark accompanies Gener a l Eisenho we r to Ti dworth where they attend a demonstration by Britis h Airborne troops now c ompleting training in this re gion just north of Salisbury . The generals are accompanied by Colone l s Rooks and Lewis . Britain is bu ildin g up her g lider and parachute troops. Following the show , the gener al s confer with British officers at Salisbury. The party returns to London in the aftern o on. Tro op transports bearing advance u n it s of the II Army Cor p s to England will arrive tomor row , so , at 9 : 00 PM, General Qlark , Colonel Rooks and Lieutenant Barker depart for Glas gow by train . * * * GREENOCK,SCOTL , JULY 12 , 1942 -- At dawn the convoy is in AND the Firth of Clyde and we can see land on both sides . I n single file we move up the roadste ad , the Philadelphia le ad in g t he way, follo wed b y the Texas, then us, then th e Argentina , 'fille destroyers brin g up the r ea r . We make quite a flotilla. The channe l is fi l led with ships -- merchantmen , battlesh i ps, cruisers, destroyers and small boats . We pass two British submarines coming in f rom s ea duty . At 11:0 8 AM we drop anchor ju s t off Gr eeno ck . The other three troop tr ansports h ave continued down the Irish Sea to Liv erpoo l and the delayed two - stacker is comin g in here later . Soon after we anchor General Clark, who h as come up from Lond on , boards t he ship from a launc h . He confers on A Deck with high Corps officers and then goes over to th e .l\rgentin a . He returns l a ter for furth e r conferences . !'/l ost of the officer s and men get th e ir first l ook at their Comm anding Gener a l as th e y are linin g 1;ne rail s when ne ar r ives. At 4 : 45 PM small boats be g in remov i ng headquarters of the II Army Corps fro m the Mo nterey . Most of the g roup g oes~ the Gre enock railroa d station dock aboaro the "Maid of Ori!,eans, 11 a ~ �~\ ,_ channel steamer that British troops after 2,000 men a trip. made five t he Battle trips to Dunkerque to ev ac uate of t he Lowlands . She hau l ed At Gre enoc k we board English tr a ins, six men to a compartment. At 9:45 PM, after b ein g s erv ed coffee and cookies by the Red Cross, we pull out for Engl and . Ju st before dark, which doesn 't come until al most midnight , we pass through Gl asgow . The tr ain , as was the Monte r ey , is blacked ou t all night. * * * * . * LO NDON JULY 12 , 1942- - Colon e l Lewi s goes frcm London to , Liver ·pool to mee t th e thr ee ships out of the convoy that put into that Lan ca shi r e por t. Most of th ese are engin eer ing and su pp l y tr oops and an advance detachment of the First Divisi on . Col onel Lewis g eeet s these units for Genera l Cl ark , who, in th e evening, goe s fro m Greenoc k to Liv erp ool. * ENROUTE TRAIN TO TIDV/ORTH JULY 13 , 1942--Our train BY , p asses thrrugh Newcastl e , Kent (which is b ad ly bombed ) and oth er English to w durin g the night. ns We stop at Le icest er at 10:30 AM an d eat food served us on t he station platform by the British . ( At 3:38 PM we arrive at Lugershall and detrain to military mu sic by a British army band. We are taken by trucks and staff cars to 'J.'idworth where we are to b e quartered temporarily while our regular areas ar e being fixed for occupancy. Tempor ary quarters for the Army Corps are ab ou t midway between Andove r and Salisbury. Tidwor th is a permanent British army post so our quarters are fairly good . Off icers are living in Aliwal and Ass aye halls and the men are in barracks nearby . Most of the offic ers and men ge t the i r first ho t baths since lea v i ng I ndi antown Gap two weeks ag o. This area i s fille d with British troops, mostly t ank and airborne u nits . W h in the immediate vicinity it are four RAF airdromes and planes, includin g many to wing glid ers, are overhead co n stantly. By dark, most of us are s e t up in our quarters. * * * LO NDON JULY 13 , 1942- - The staff , compl etes arrangem ent s for recepti on of the newly-arrived troops at Tidworth. Genera l Clark , Col one l Rooks and Li eutenant Barker return to London in t he afternoon from Liv erpool wher e Gene ral Clar k conferred with t he top officer s on each ship. These inclu ded Br i gadier Genera l Roosevelt of the Fi rst Di vis i on . * ( * * TIDVI RTH, JULY 14, 1942 --Th e staff O sections set up their offices today and we begin funct io ning . Chase Nationa l Bank officials come t o chan ge Am rican money into English and to e arrange for t he opening of ban k accounts. We ge t our first chance to write V-Mail and info rm our familes t ha t we h ave arr iv ed s afely. �-~ -~ r' Officers begin making reconn a i ss ance trips so they can familiarize themselves wi t h the area- -L ongfo rd Cast le, Cowes field, The Moat, Newhall and the genera l region in which we will be locat ed . General Clark addressed al l officers of the headquarters of t he II Army Cor ps for th e firs t time t oday . He outlined in genera l the task f ac i ng officers and men under his command. Approximat e l y 180 officers were gathered in a gymnasium when the gene r al arr i ved from London . He s t ood on a long wooden ben ch so all officers might s ee as well as hear him as he gave a genera l picture of wha t pa rt our unit will play i n the war . He told u s we had t he honor of being the first American unit in England pro per an d added that t h i s had cer tai n advantages and disadvan t ages . "You are the advance ec he l on of the American Grou nd Forces in England , f 1b e -said. "There is opportunity for all of you . You a re i n on 'the ground f l oor. 11 General 9lark, after pointing out this advance group is composed of head quarters of th e I I Army Corps, he adquarters company , the 202nd Military Pol ic e and the s econd battalion of the 16th Inf antry of the 1st Division, stressed the need for the advance units to pre sen t a soldierly appearan ce and attitude and give th e British confidence in the American army . Thi s must be done, he added , by being meticulous in dress and military courtesy . "One of th e p aramount things we must show , 11 the ge neral said , is an attitude of cooperation . You are go in g to hear rumors about the British army. You must always r emembe r that we are fighting a common enemy and that that enemy i s promoting propaganda to undermine our faith in each other . 11 11 General Clar k cited examp le s of t h is type of propaganda which he s a id was aimed at division of American and British opinion . He decla red complete coo per ation between ours e lves and the British is imperative . Exp l a i ning the European Theater of Operations , the gene r al said that General Eisenhower , Theat e r Commander, h a s three branches under him : 1--Ground Forces, led by Gene r al Cl ar k; 2- an Air Sup p ort Force , under General Spaatz , and 3--the Serv i ce of Supply , under General Lee . " The ground force is us , " th e ge ner al said . "Before us we have a trem endou s task . It involves toil and sacrifice and oppor tunity." ( General Clark disclosed had been att ending important task of .Americ an and British th a t since his ar r ival in Engl and he confer ences concerning the connnon fo r ces . He praised the British and �said plans were being made th a t he could 11 I can say," the general offensive--not th e defensive! added, 11 not detail that we are as y et . to be on the 11 Army Corps officers, standing at attention, overseas hats in hand, in a semi-circle before their Comm anding General, listen ed att entively as they go t their first d irect indivation of what lies ahead. Because of the Army Corp 1 s i mportance , a large per e entege of those pre sent are field officers. The general explained the necess ity for such a large staff, say~ng a reinforced Cor ps staff was needed and that he had augmented even that bec ause of the nature ani import ance of thetas~ ahe ad . That was the re ason , he continued, that conditions in our commA area nd are so crowded. This area is designed to accomodate about half the number of officers and men t hat wi ll be stationed her e . heturning to the subject of relations with the British and the position of the II Army Corps as the first American task force in England, Gener a l Glark stressed the necessity for exemp lary conduct and soldi e rly appea r ance. He p r a i sed the deportment and dress of British enlisted men and officers and said we, as the advance echelon, must match th em, at least. He poi n ted to the n e ed for saluting and reco gniz in g Br it ish r anks . The general disclosed that eventually the II Army Corps will occupy and contro l the ent ir e Southern Comm nd area . British a troops will be moved out of the entire area af t er our divisions relieve them. · General Slark discussed the problem of drinking and venereal di se a se . He sug gested that Americ an officers by - pa ss th e British custom of officers having cocktails at mid - d ay. Not being used to t h is cu stom , the general said American soldiers could do a better job -- be more alert and use their faculties to greater advant a ge -if they did not drink at le as t until t heir dut i es for t he d ay VJee r discharged . He said British authorities opposed esta blishm ent of prophyilactic stations in to, •ms ne i ghbor i ng military areas and he sa id every possible step must be taken to keep the v en ereal disease rate at the l owest possible level . Regarding l oose talk and rumors, the general said that England , particularly i n the big cities, was filled with enemy agents . Military inform a tion , he declared, should be discussed or exchanged only with responsible and competent offic ers with in reco gn ized units . He pointed out that particular care should be taken about discussing things military in ho t els and railroad trains. As to rumors, he repeated that many were started by enemy propagandists in an effor t to und ermine between Am ricans e ani 11 Britishers the compl ete cooperation that is so vital and neces sary . The general then ann ounced that chiefs of sections of the II �Army Corps would be detailed to go to London on a staggered p lan so that they could confer with section chiefs of General Eisen hower's staff. Other officers, he continued, would hRVe the same opportunity at a later date. General Clark concluded by requesting e a ch man to us e his initi at ive to the fullest extent. "Suggestions are welcome," he announced, "a nd I want every officer to feel free to come to either me or the Chief of staff with any particular prob le m or id ea ." In order that the officers might kno w th e II Army Corps Chief of Staff, General Clark had Colonel Ro oks mount the bench beside him. He then explained that every officer in the headquarters had be en either h and - picked by himself or selected on reconmendations of high - r anking officers . When he concl uded speaking, General Clark requested that each officer pass by so th Rt he and Col om ,l Rooks could meet him. Later , Brigadier General Roosevelt of the First Division stepped into the receiving line. Eac h officer pass e d by and introduced himself to the three men . Gener a l Cl a rk spoke briefly to each man, asking him about his section and his particular interest. * TIDW ORTH, JULY 15, 1942- - More troo ps arrive in the area today. Most of the m are l:!.ngineers, with the 342nd the larg est group , and supply outfits. They are quartered for the most part at North Tid worth . As quarters are fixed up at Longford Castle and Cowesfield, officers begin moving out. Some officers are assigned as liaison men between General Eis enhower's ETOUSA staff in London and Genera l Clark ' s headquarters at the Castle . Reconnaissance of the area will be continued until all officers h ave had an opportunity to loo k over the new quarters and the gener al terrain. On put out men . W e soldiers s aluting Some of we live the he e l s of General Cl nrk's speech, officer patrols are to check on the appearance and military courtesy of our cover a five-mile~ rcle around Tid worth , mRking sure the are neat, are carrying their gas masks and th nt th ey are and being courteous to British off icers and enlisted men . the officer patrols · go out as far as 12 mile s . At ni gh t under blackout condittons. General Cl a rk makes his first talk to enlisted men tod a y , addressing the Second Batta lion of the 16t h Infantry, 1st Division, the advance group of combat tro ops . The 1st Divis ion wa s the first division ov er in the l Rst war and it is fir s t again, Gener a l Clark tells the a t tentiv e men . He tells th em that suc h a record is an honor that he knows they will aive uup to. -- �JS "I know you men want to fight ," the gene ral says . "You 1 re ove r here bec ause you want to f i gh t. And you're go in g to ge t a chance to fight ! 11 The general also d i scusses the v e nere a l d i sease probl em, stressing t .o the men the need of fi tn ess for battle . He advises them also, as the highest p a id soldiers in t he world, to save as much money as possib l e . American sold i ers , he points out , are pa i d from four to five times as much as any oth er so l d i e r in the world. There is hardly anything you can buy here in Eng l and a nd you won't be able to buy anything in c ombat , he tells them . Her e is your ch ance to s av e money . Make out a ll otments or bu y war bonds. Then you wi l l have something to fall back on w hen the war i s over and you return to civ i li an life . I n discussing military court esy , the General tell s t he 1st Division troops that ju s t about every t h in g in England is ration ed . "But," he adds, 11s a lut es aren ' t ration ed . Give lots of them . I don 1 t want you running out of them to ward the end of the week!" The men laugh and then , as he concl udes his t alk , they form a line and pass by t o sh a ke hands with t he ir Commanding General. The gene r a l talks to e a ch man individually . He tells th em, as he tol d the officers, that he wants t he ir id eas and th a t the y should f ee l free to come to him or to Colo nel Rooks wit h su gges tions. It is the general ' s p lan to me et al l th e men under his command , to t ry and know them p ersonally a s far as po ssible, to know how they feel and to instill in them c onf idence and a figh ting spir i t . * TIDV IORTH, JULY 16 , 1942- - Reconnaiss ance of the area we are to occupy i s canp l eted tod.ay by headq u a rters officers. Movements from Aliwal and Assaye ba rr acks incre ase as officers go to the Cast le are a or to Cowesf ield. • American troops be g in marching the roads of Eng l and for the first time as the advance infantry battalion makes an eight mile hik e wit h packs and rifl es . Alrea d y the companies a r e picking up Engl is h mascots -- d ogs predominating. Offi cer patro ls are increased , an afternoon sh ift bein g put on to check our men on dress , military court e sy and whether or not they are carrying their gas masks . The rule is l a i d down that any off ic e r or man must c arFJ his mask if he i s so far from his barracks that h e can't r each the re sp irator in 15 minutes . Tha t time i s se t since th e English have found th ey normal l y have at le a st th at much warning before a r aid . * .:, �( LO NGFORDCASTLE JULY 16 , 1942 --G eneral Cl ark hopes to have , divisions r ep r esenting eve r y segment of the army join together in the continental assault w en i t come s . For that re aso n he expects h to h ave at l e a st t he 1 st Div is ion, which is a re gu lar army outfit; the 36th , a Nationa l Guard division , and th e ??th , composed prin cipally of selectees , with him for the first blow . "I n tha t way, 11 the general exp l a ins, "We1 11 have every comp onent -- Regu l a r Army, Reserves, National Guard and Sel e ctees -joining in the miss i on . I pa r t icul arly wanted t he ??th so that sele c tees wil l realize th at one of th e ir own outfits is getting a chance to fight . 11 The ??th i s one of the Gene r al 's p r oducts- - bui lt f rom the grmn d up by h i m while he was C hief of Staf f of the Army Ground Fo r ces. He cl a ims it is one of the bes t div i sions in t he army . ( General Cl ark ' s hope to h ave the ??th i n th e fi rs t ma jor Eur opean enga g ement was born whil e he was at Camp Jackson , N. C. He had gone there wi th Gener a l Marshall and Lord Mountbatten f or a review. When the ? ?t h Di visio n pass ed , General Clark watched it wi th p r ide and t hen went to Genera l Marsh all and told him he thou ght it would be a fine th in g if a selectee division could be pa rt of the Europe an Task Fo r ce from th e sta rt. Gene ral Cl ark ex plain ed that many selectees s ee med t o f ee l their divisions wer e f ar down the action hierarch y and t h at the Regv.l ar Army and National Guard div ision s would ge t fo rei gn servic e whi l e they would not be called upon but would remain i n the United States . As a mora l e fac t or and because of h i s fait h in the new d i visions , General Cl ar k suggested th at a division made up principa l ly of se l e ct ees be g iven a chance to join the fir s t forc e . General Marshall repli ed he t hough t it was an ex ce llent and asked General Clark, who at the ti me did not know he was to take connnand of th e U.S . Ground Forces in Europe , what div he wruld r ecol!llllend. Gen e ral Cl ark said h i s first cho ic e v,ould the 77th . id ea going i s ion be The general also d iscu ss ed tod ay the possibilit y of brin gi ng over an other regul ar div i sion -- the 3rd , famed Rock of the Marne Division . Li ke the 1s t , it h a s had amphib i ou s t r ain ing . LO NGFORDCAS TLE, JULY 17 , 1942 -- This pictu r esque , h i sto ric castl e thr ee mil es southeast of Salisbury , W ilts h ir e , is the headquar ter s of the II Army Corps and i t will b e until operat ions have progressed to a po i nt whe re we can move onto the continent . ( Here in this five -tu rreted , thr ee - storied mass of s ton e i s the hear t of the Army Corps comm ande d by General Cl ark . Al l offic e s are on the third f l oor . They are converted dr ess in g and bedrocros . �( No army ever had a mor e unusual Command Post . The castle, s e at of the Lord of Radnor, has b een leased by the United States Army. Its construction startfed in l f588thand thtel da te o f thTehkeystone in the cen t er arch in ront o e cas e 1s 15 9 1 • e manor , formerly on th i s s i te , was built in 116 6 but it and the estate were los t through gambling about 1574 by t he l a st of the Serving t ons. It was bought from John We b , the winnin g gambler , b by Sir Edward Gor ge s. His brother, who succeeded him, built the cast l e as a replica of the c a stle of Uranienberg--a trian gle wi th a tow e r on ea ch corn e r and an op en court in the c enter. Later occupants added t wo to wers and built in the ope n court . The building of the ori gin al c a stle was fin ance d thr ough go ld and silver bars t aken off a wrecked Spani sh ga lleon . r1/.,_s \5v The castle is saturated with h i s tory . Sir Oliver Cromwell almost paid wit h J:> li fe when he took it in 1645 . It ha s house d .is k i n gs and dukes and lord s . The c a stle, as it now stands, was canpleted about 1840 . The present Lord Radnor (the sev enth) is living in one s e ction of it, that part being of f limits to army personnel. The Gorg e s so l d the c as tle and Lon gford Par k ,. th e tr emendous meado wed and hilled area surroundin g it , to Sir Edward De s Bouv e ries in 1717. From h i m it h a s de sce nded to the present o¥mer . The Ea r lship was cr eated in 1 765 . Between t he Gorges and t he Radnors, the castle was occupied by the Lords Colerane , the f irst on e of which II choak' d ende avour i ng swa llo w the rump of a Turky . 11 Henry, the s ec ond Lord Col e rane, b rough t stone carv ing s, marbleto pped tab l es and oth e r pieces of art fr om It a ly to embellish the c a stle . Tha t action r esu lted in Longford Castl e being a virtual museum th a t to day .,houses paintings by su ch artists as Ga insborough, Sir Thomas ~ eynolds, Vel azq u ez , Van Dyck and Hol b ien. The ca st l e is set at t he bottom of a di sh-lik e valley . Direct l y be h ind it, eas t ward, f l ows a branch of t he River Avon . This p lacid str eam is re putedly th e f i n est tr out brook i n England . Dire c tly on the south s ide of the ca s tl e is a huge fonn a l gard en which, b ecaus e of the food scarci t y , is now p l anted in onionsi Beside t he front driv e a re l awn tennis court s and farth er fowward is a bro ad meadow i n whic h ho rs es and cows graz e peacefully . What inco ng ru i ty- - between th~ qui e t c a ttl e , down the main l ane approac h ing th e 6a stle, c runoflauged British lorr i es and Ame ic an __ r trucks rumble; overhead, th ere is an occ as ion al Spitfire of Hur ric ane Fighter or a Wh ey Bomber; with in the trim itl but weatherbeaten Ca stle, war plans are b eing made . On the nort t side is a wood. Beneath the tre e s Ni ssen huts (igloos) and tents are ri sin g to house he adquarters troo ps . Su rroun di ng buildings are b ein g re - furbi sh ed so they can quar ter office r s . ( O head quarter s on the t h ird f l oor are reached t h rou gh a ur maze ' of twi st in g halls . In p lac es the walls are thr ee f ee t thick. r c. ...... ~ - �Quite a bcrnb she l terl -- · Offices are being set up along an angular hallway that runs fran the southwes t turret to t he southeast turre t, as follows : Chief of Staff ' s office , und e r Colon e l Rooks; the Commanding Gener a l, General Clark; Secretary of the General Staff, Li eutenant Colon e l Hewitt; G- 3, troop movement and miscellaneous section ; G- 3 , executive office, Colonel Ferenbaugh; G- 2 , cou nt e r intellig ence; G- 2 , map r oom and e x ecutiv e office , Colonel Howard; G- 3 , c l erks and files; G- 3, operations and training sub - section ; Liaison off i ce , Li eutenant Colonel Sloane ; Air Officer , Colone l Gal e ; G-1 , Colonel Markoe; Art i llery Section , enlisted; Artill ery Se c tion , execut i ve, Colonel Lewis; Adjut an t General!s Office , Col one l Be rtho l f . The G- 4 section, und e r Colonel Adcock , is the only one on the right hand side of th e hal l, b e in g oppo site the offic e of th e s e c retary of the Gene ra l Staff . There are sub - offices up in the towers . Other offic es , such as the ant i- aircraft, anti - tank , chap l a in , etc ., ar e out in the hu t s under t he t r ees. The Si gn a l section , tinder Colone l Tully, i s just off the Cas tle foyer on the ground tloor , Code rooms , the t e l ephone swi t ch b oard and other sections are be in g set up in covenien t spo t s wi t hin the Castl e . Some off i cers wi ll have quarters wit h in the Castle itself Oth e rs , inclu d i ng General Clark who is at New Hall, a quarter a mile away , are quarted in buildin gs fairly c l ose by . . of One of the most int eres ting spots in the castle is the court , which is l i ke a foyer wi th a ba l cony surrounding it . Around the b alcony are ijung oil paintings by such famous art i sts as Rubens , Poussin, M eveldt , Franz Hals, Janss ens , Gheeraedt s , Hans Ewouts, ir Zuccaro , Lucas de Heere , Li evens and Van Dyck . There are also knick - knac k cabinets fill ed with miniatures , mos aics , ra re China and other objects of art, This part of the castl e is ope n to officers . Lord Radnor ' s quart ers , in the southwest t ower , have had most of the famous paintings moved in t o them . These irtlude portra i ts of a ll the Lad i es of Radnor. All of them were p a inted by either Sir Thoma s Reynolds , Ga insborough or Hudson . Just off the cou r t balcony is an art sal on that ha s more than a hundred paintings, including one by the fam ed Spaniard, Ve la zquez . The c a st l e was built to be a city within itself . It i nclud e s a chap e l, a hu ge p i ctu re - lined dining hall, billiard and game rooms , a gi ant kitc he n , a nursery tower and sa l ons and chambers too nume r ous to be counted . This , then , is the headquarte r s of th e II Army Cor ps . General Clark sa ys that every tim e a door is opened he expects to s ee an armored knigh t come clankin g toward him 4 * �L6NGFORD CASTLE, JULY 18 , 1942 - -General Cl ark London to at t end conferences that he expects ~o· be important to date . The major to p ic v1ill be ho w and Front will be opened . The general's only companion is Colon e l Hewitt , Sec re tary of the Gen eral Staff . to th areas days. speci le aves for the most when a Second on this trip M ovement of II Army Corps headquart e rs offic er s fro m Tidworth e Cas tle , Cowesfield , The M oat an d other permanent quart er ing incre as e s . General Clark plans on b ein g in London for several The conference, primari l y , will b e betw een Americans . A al del ega tion has arrived from the United States. * LONGFORD CAST LE, JULY 19, 1942 - -Col onel Rooks h as all sections org an i zing the i r offic e s so headquar t ers will be operatin g full blast by th e time Gene ra l Clark returns . Carpenters and electricians are busy putting i n el ec t rical fixtures and getting the offic es in working shape . Telephones are b e in g install ed and map bo ard s hung . On the telephon e system betw een u nits , the Castl e will be known as "Tornado. The other code names are "Te apo t " for Cowes field, t he h ead quarters of the II Army Corps headqua r t er 1 s eng i n eers, and "Trade v1 ind" for Tidworth , our rear echelon . We have a d i rect line i nto "Tempest , " code name for the London he adquarters . A ijizeable s taff of I I Army Corps officers have b een stationed p ermanently i n London to do liaison work with General Eisenhower's staff . The Anny Corps' London staff is und er Col one l Slocum , A'~ 1,Y'f de pu t y Chi ef of Staff . -:i{t '.t S'l'f., r,l,t JL LO FORDCASTLE, JULY 20 1 1942 -- Ear l y t h is morning we have NG our f ir st air ra i d alarm since arr i v al . i'he siren s on the Castle wail about dawn . Other s i rens are gett in g our men up in the other areas . I t is qui te misty and we can s ee no t hing but overhead we can hear t he motors of a few p l anes . Not hi ng hap pens and the al l cl ear comes ab out 6 :4 0 AM. Later we l earn t ha t a German pl ane f l ew ove r Sali sbu r y, apparen tl y on its return f rom bombi ng a more westerly t arge t. Organization work uontinu tis at headquarters . Huge maps of England and the Europe B coa s t along the Engli sh Channel have be en n put up in most of t he offices . The wall s of Genera l Cl ark ' s office are cov ered wi t h maps , inc l ud i ng on e t ha t shows the l oca t ion and makeup of the v arious German un it s al ong the European coast . M ore offi c er s mov e into the Cast l e area as ca r penters f i nish remode li ng work and p l umbers g et toi l et and bath i ng facil i t i es i ns t al led . Not hing defin i t e comes dow concerning n the London conferences . �30 We learn however that Gen eral Marshall, Admir al King, Hopkin s and Stev e Early are over for th e Sec ond Front ence. * * * LO FORD CASTL JULY 21, 1942 --Prep aration s of II Army NG E, Corps headquarters are complete, basically, s o order s ar e i s sued to move th e rest of the officers and enlisted men into their more - tf_l or-less perman en t quarte rs tomorrow. '-" Offic e rs working in head quart e~ s are living in on e of five places : at New Hall, where Genera l Clark and his chiefs of secti on live; in t he Castle itself; at Bothey House and the Agent's House , t wo fairly lar ge bric k buildings near the Cast le, and at The Moat, a brick st ructur e abou t a mile away . Troops of Head qua rt ers Detachme nt and Head qu art er s Company liv e almost in t he shadow of t he Cas tl e . Them men have quarters in brick outbuild in gs , wooden huts and I gloo s. " /,r · r,l - * LO NGFORDCASTLE, JULY 22, 194 2-- Headquarters officers , lo aded do~n wi th l uggage , begin arriv in g soo n af ter dawn to set up in t he ir new qua rt ers . They are hous ed anywhere from two to six men to a r oom. Toil e t facilities are adequate and th er e is plenty of hot water . Officers ri g up t hei r ov cl os e ts, arrange thei r rooms with m rugs and kn ick-kn acks and by noon they h ave t he i r quar t e rs look ing qui i;e homelike . However, th e foot lockers , w ich left us al most a h month ag o, h aven 't sho wn up y e t and most of the of f ice rs and men are short on pe rs ona l things and have run up against a t ough l aund ry problem . Third th i rd floor of the Castle is bus t ling as of ficers and clerks begin f illin g up offices . * * * LO ORDCASTLE, JULY 23, 1942--Headquarters NGF of the II Army Corps be gins to operate on more or less full scale today. Offices of the v arious sections are finally ar r anged and papers begin flowing f rom section t o se ction. Things are b eg i nning to hum. Because th e Cas tl e mess h all--the former dinin g room of lords and l adies -- wi ll seat only app roxi mat el y 70 officers, we h ave double sittings for all me al s : 7 : 00 and 7: 30 for br e akf ast; noon and 12 : 45 PM for lu nch , and 6 : 00 and 6:45 for dinn e r. All offi ces open at 8 :0 0 AM and ope r ate straight through u n til 5 : 30 or 6 : 00 PM. ( Senior and Ju nior Staff Duty Of ficers are ap pointed , sen t r~es are placed around h ea dquarters and we g o on Comm and Post scale. Air r aid instructions come out and to insure our security every -- �31 I officer and man must show his id en tification card when entering headquarters . Plane lookouts are put on a 24-hour watch on the Castle towers and quick -to-c hallenge sentries patrol the area quite heav il y at night . * LONGFORD CASTLE JULY 24 , 194 2--Th e tempo arou nd headquarters , quickens as officers and enlisted personnel get sett le d in the ir sections . I n the afternoon Gene ra l Cl a rk and Col one l Hewitt return from the London confer ences. The general plunges into conferences with various h i gh -r ank i ng officers but he i s goi ng to wai t until tomorrow to d isclose wha t occured regardin g the Seco nd Front p l an . * * * LONGFORD CASTLE JULY 25 , 1942 --G eneral Cl ar k, in a hi gh ly, secret meeting at t ended only by t he e i gh t top - ran ki ng colonels of the II Army Corps, detai l ed today t he world - wide import ance of conf erences he has been att ending i n London since July 17. He disc los ed that the Second Front probably will not be opened until the spring of 1943 . In his map -li ned off ic e , the general told of the arr iv al of an Am rican delegation e desirous of seeing the Western European front open ed in 1942 to take pressure off the Russians . I n cli ppe d sentences he told his officers of the tense arguments for and against offen s ive action on our part this fall. He detailed what occured during the conferences . At int erva l s , Prime M ster ini C hurc hil l wa s consulted . The American delegation , which includes General Marsha Admiral Kin g , chief of U. S . Naval Operations; Harry Hopkins special assistant to President Roosevelt , and Presidential reta ry Stephen Early , came ov er preponderantly in favo r of the Se cond Front this fall . ll; , Sec opening The British comma nd, General Marshall and Gener al Clark realize we are not yet prepared for the continental assault which , under th ff most favorable conditions , will be an extremely hazardous operation. If it callle th i s fall it woul d h ave to be made wi t h an insufficient force th at would lack th e necessary amphib i ou s train ing and complete and proper l and in g equipment . The Second Front decision has bu t it look ed when he departed yes though the attack wi ll come about is returning to London to morrow to not yet b e en definitely made terd ay , the gene r al said , as April 1 , 1943 . Gener a l Clark continue the conferences . "It l ooks as though SLEDGEHA MMER the name of our 1942 , operation , will not take pl ace, 11 the general said . "Inste ad we wil l concentrate, from now on , every minute of the day and night , on prepar i ng for RO UNDUP, our 1943 operation . " 6 �The crux of the entire prob l em is the Russian situation. Everyone fee l s, the general explained, that somethin g should be done to re l ieve German pressu r e on the Russians . An assault on the French coast by combined British and Am ric an forces e could be made to withdraw some German divisions f'rom the Eastern front. The coming four months will be the crucial ones . If Russia c an ho l d on unti l winter se t s in , the pos i tion of the United Nations will be fa i r l y good . When the si:ring of 1943 comes , pl ans and trainin g for the opening of the Second Front will be complete . But , i n the event Russia collapses , Germany will, by next spring , be able to conso l idate and hold wha t she has in Russia and with draw scores of divisions to opp ose the continental inv asion . The point of view of t hose in favor of opening th e Second Front this year is that we may never have an opportunity for invasion th an we have now with Germany putting on a furious Russian dr i ve . When asked for his opi nion, Gen era l Clark said he told the conference that "we can• t go in there with f ea ther dusters . " He explained the problem, as far as his Ground Forces are concerned , from a purely mi l itary point of view . The general outlined a hypothet i cal c as e . ( If we made the assault on September 15, the general told the conference, all we could count on using would be the 34th Division , now i n I reland . I t has had no amphibious training; it lacks anti a ircr af t suppor t ; i t has no tanks . The First Armored Division, also in Ireland, woul dn't be ab l e to g o into the invasi on with all its equi pment . Nor would any of the other un its sche du led to be in the Europe an '!:heate r by that date . Getting the men and e quipment together, the general explained , is a tou gh problem. There is also the all-imp o rtant matter of invasion bo Rts. These, he said , will not •be ready by September 15 . It was decided, tentatively , th a t SLEDG EHAM MER would not take pl u ce . However, Genera l Clark , with General Mars ha ll's approval , hed already cabled the War Depa rt ment asking that the 1st Division be here in complete strength by August 20th. It was decided to let th e ord e r stand , de sp ite the tentative decision. Gener a l Mar shal l said he thou gh t th e 1st Division, whic h has been trained in amphibious work , ought to come over as soon as possible even thou gh it would mean t aking approximately 20,000 SOS troops out of the August convoys. It was decided to alert the 1st Division and several other uni ts , including signal, med ic al and an Eng inee r Boat Brigade . "After four d ays and four nights of conferences during which we studied the globe lookin g for all possible points of attack and figuring wha t we could use, we ag reed that SLEDG EHAM R (the ME 1942 operation) was i mposs ible, 11 Gener al Cla - declared. rk , �33 "I think that probably is the way the decision is going to stand . We must now concentrate all our work on ROUNDUP which is the 1943 operation . I f Russia collapses it is not difficult to see t h at by next sp ring ROUNDUP may be impos s ible of execution , We'll know by October or November , If November comes and the Russi an army is dissipated, the entire pl an must be ch ange d. That would make it possible for Germa ny to d isperse 100 divisions along the inv a sion coast and it ww ld re move the poss ibility of the invasion b eing executed successfully. W would hav e to go somewhere e else. That could be GYMN.AS~,the operation in vo lving inv a sion of the North African coast . 11 The General said the mised the British it would six or seven divisions as to protecting the Southern general said, is at present concern to the British . European Theater of Operations had probuild up a lar ge amphibious force with soon as pos s ible. We are also connnitted Connnand section of England which, the rather lightly held, a fact of gre at Puring the CD nference v1 ith his section chiefs, General Clark stressed several times that "we must put all our ene r gy and plan ning into RO UNDUP. He said he want ed ideas and outlines from all officers on how they thought training could best be carried out and how the invasion might be made . 'Phe general outlined one dram a tic occurence at the London conference . It was w hen he was · asked by General Marshall, Adm iral King and Harry Hopkins what American Ground Forces could d o to alter the situation if f i gh ti ng developed to a point w here the collapse of Russia app eared i mm ent . in Should the war reach such a crucial point, the general re plied, an inva s ion in the vicinity of Cherbourg would have to be executed des p it e the l ack of lan din g equipment and scarcity of American troops w ith amphibious trainin g . We must do everything we can to s ave Russia . The Cher b ourg area--alth ough heavily fortified and held- - would be particularly lo gi cal as an invasi on point bec ause the c:ros sing would be relativ e ly short and, hence, troopl anding boats could be used with gre a ter frequency. The gener a l told the leaders of the second Front conference that he was all in favor of doi ng something if the Hussian s it u at ion is as black as President Roos evelt and other wor l d leaders think it is , However , he added, opening of the Second Front at an early date means that the brunt of the invasion must be borne by the Briti s h since it is someth in g the United States will be able to conti'±bute v ery 11 ttle tow ard until the spring of 1943 . ( Americ an troops that could go into an invasion task th is f al l would h ave little or no a ir sup p ort, insuf f icient ant i - aircraft , automatic weapons or tan ks . Gener al Clark outlined to Admiral King and M Hopkins the time and space factors r, involved in getting American troops re ady for t he European invasi on in 1942 . He told �) the men frankly anything before that Am erican Grou nd Forc es couldn't ea rly October . possibly do An invasi on a r ound Septemb er 15 had be en menti oned and the general said that would be impossible . 1'he 34th Divis i on is shy two brigadier generals . The 1st Armored Divi sion hasn ' t its fu l l equipment . the 1st Division, having just arrived by that date , won't have its materiel . The invasi on would invo l ve long practice to get the divisions, supporting troops and the Navy working as a harmonious team . The general was then asked if this small invasion force could be ready to attack by October 1, He pointed out th is was only 15 days more and that the p roblem was so tremendous that that short amount of time would make littl e d iffer ence . "The British , " ~eneral EHark told his se ction chiefs , "feel we can ' t do anythin g on a l ar ge sc a le this year so that is the way I think the decision will stand . We have only eight to n ine months to prepare for the invasion and tha t is little enough time . Every day counts and we must devote all our energy to prep a rations . 11 ' The general annoo.nced one division -- th e lst - - would arriv e in August , two in September and two i n October . He said mother armored division was necessary and must be brought over as soon as possible. The invasi on divisions , he said , must have two combat teams each . These teams, which would attack the coast side by side , "must have been trained and trained and trained . " "'When we train for this i nvasion, 11 he said , 11the forces must use the same boa t s , the same ai r support , the same automatic weapons that they will use i n the actual inv as i on . They must carry cooiplete equipment -- ammuniti on, gaso line , food, everything. They must rehearse and rehearse again . They must be perfect. " This c an and must be done! 11 The general said amphibious training centers v1ill be established so t he divisions can go directly into t h ose areas and plunge into training immediat e ly . He suggested that the best spot was Northern Ireland. The genera l wants all amphibious training sectors under h is control. He sa i d training would proceed until the J,me r ic an forces , with navy support , crossed the Irish Sea and made a mock attack on the Ayrshire co a st. British forces encamped there would furnish the defense . A merciless criti11J.ue would follow . " Tr aining like declared. "We can 1 t scale and u nless we be trained to a fine feet wet . " have that is what we are sho oting for ," the general do anything unless we have rehearsed on a full are perfect . Every division that comes over must peak and it must be arranged so they get their ... Gene ral Clark speculated all U. S. divisions land on whether it wouldn 1 t be wisest to in Ire l and so the y could go immedi a tely �35 into ri go r ous amphibious tr ain i ng . If this trainin g was carried on in Eng land, German pl anes woul d "smack our pants off and we'd lose our bo ats and men, 11 the general continue d . He s aid this amphibious trai n in g in more i s olat ed Nor th er n I r el and would take three or f'our intensive week s . Graduation would be the "inv as i on " ac ross the Iri sh Sea . Gener al Clark said Adm a l Hallett ir and General Dre w, of the British Navy and Army, were ea g er to ass i st in such tr ain ing. The Genera l said he h ad re qu ested t ha t Col one l "M ke" i O'Daniel, U. S. amphibious expert , be p laced in direct char ge of such tr ain i ng . The initial inv ad in g f'orce wil l have to b e trained on the the ory that it will make a ship - to - shore l and in g . The second wave of troops , goin g over after we h ave a foothold on the continent, should b e ab le t o move fro m shore - to-shore with ships pullin g into docks that probably would be u nde r bombardment , Genera l Cl ark said t he Hi gg ins invasi on boats had no t yet arrived . He a dde d these ve sse ls were not r ea ll y adequate since they cou ld be set afi re with inc endiarie s . The bi g bottl eneck in inva s i on pl ans is in obtainin g t he proper type of l anding craft . The chiefs of s e ction were told that t hey must make persona l reconnaissance of' possible areas f or amphibious trElini ng . This must b e done i mmediat ely , th e ge n eral observed . ¼hen di v isio ns arrive th ey must go thr ough hardening process e s and small un it tr aining . "I want t hem to make 25 - mile marches rep ea t edly , at 11 least once a week , the general said . "This wi l l b e f'ollowed b y amphibious trai ning and finally combined t ra inin g . The general sai d troo ps must be instill ed wit h a f eel i ng of security in their artillery and that pla n s must be made f'or the m to practice with live fire goin g ov e r th e ir heads . Colonel Lewis , a rtill e r y of'ficer , told the ge ne r al t hes e shel ls could be laid dovm with i n bursting range of t he in fan try . Gene r al Cla rk said some of the men woul d get hi t and some woul d be k ill ed but that such tr aining was neces s ary . These al most -r e al "wars" wou ld also brin g Air - Grou nd coope r ati on •. 11 'fh ese men must learn to fight und e r r e a listic cond itions - the y must le arn to dig in, 11 the general said , "Th ey must dig in, by God, ev ery tim e th ey stop. I ' m not being hard - hearted, I 'm do ing th e men a ~avor . bn their toug hness depends t he ir liv es and t he winn in g of th e war . · ( Genera l Cl ark said his chf afs of sec tion s must get to gethe .r and decide t he nature of th e train ing p rogram . He said that today he had seen General Loyd , head of t he British South ern Comm , and and Genera l Creagh, comm ander of' the Hampshi r er,Dorset district, ani th at he had discussed with th em the pr oblems of tr a ining in this area. "I told them ," th e general recounted , "that I want to be as fair as p os s ibl e but th a t tr ai nin g is i mperat ive and noth i ng must stand i n it s way . " �The ~eneral said that when the 1st Division arrives and t akes over the Southern Comm nd ar ea now held by the 38th British A Division , the transfer must take place in an ord erly manner and th a t t he division must make arrangements to billet itself . He said· the British woul d leave "odds and ends of overage troops" to aid in the transition from Britis h to Am ric an protection e . I As to the 1st Division's use, General Clark declared can bet your bottom dollar that the 1s t will be in on the He said he thou gh t the jump - off would come next "you assault. 11 April . Turning to the problem of logistics, the gene r al said the SOS had promised 100 per cent sup po rt in the matter of construct ion and supply . He said he had been a stound ed at the SOS work already done . The pro blem of food, especially when inv as ion comes , wa s discussed a nd General Glark stressed the need for Drat.ions and K rations, the new , concentrated , li ghtwe ight foo d . He s a id that whenever orders were made , they should be made big . "Take anything you ca.l'l ge t , 11 he counselled . "You c an nev er t e ll wha t we are go in g to need. 11 General Littlejohn of SOS wi ll sit ·&n on ration discussions . Returning to the invasi on problem, t he ge ner a l said that troops would h av~ ~o be trained to l and against al l types of ob stacles . He said G- 2 reports show that Germans have t he European coast lined with p i lings, mines , barbed wire and other obstacles . He told of a visit he made to the Dover coast and of a British anti-invasion device whereby oil pipes run dovm to the surface of the channel . In event of invasion, the pipes wi l l pour oil over the waters and it will be i gn it ed as the en emy 's assault boats approach . 11 }':ou can count on all sorts of heinious devices , " he s a id . We must be prepared for anything. You can all start worrying and thinking of the answers to how we are goin g to solve these problems 11 There are many solutions. 11 The problem of distributing troops in the Southem Command was brought up and Colonel Ferenbaugh s aid the limit was 11 divisions in this particular area. He s aid opposition was already being expressed by English residents to the movi ng in of so many troops . Col one l Adcock said a r rangements had been made to put two divisi ons in South Wales. He added th at reconnaiss ance had been made in the Western Command area but t hat there h ad been quibbling between the Br itish officers on our right to survey the area for possible camp and trainin g sites . ( Col onel Ferenb augh said the British are somewhat confused because they h ave to deal with t v1 American uni ts -- the I I Army 0 Corps and sos. He suggested our plans be coordin ated before we appro ach the British with them . . �37 '!'he 1st Division is scheduled to be staged at Tid worth, th en moved down to relieve the 38th British Divis i on in the Poole-Bourn emouth area . The n e xt staging area will be at Oxford where two divisions are scheduled to arrive. General C lark h as f'our ma jor appointm ents to d ay -- with Generals Loyd and Cre agh , sep a rat e ly; wit h Lord Radnor, owner of Longford and our neighbor - host, and Air Vice Marshall and Air Commander Rowle y of the 10th Figh t er Group , RAF. Stephen Earl y was scheduled to visit head quarters at 3 PM but the visit was c ancelled when General Clark wa s requested to be in London for conf'erences at 10 AM tomorrow . * * LO NGFORD CA STLE, JULY 26 , 1942 - -ueneral Clark go e s to London alone to attend the ne w session of the Sec ond Front conference. He does not expect the meetings to last lon g and he has a fe eling that plans h ave been changed. ~ e spi te the fact ation . The plan is to but the d a ys are going won't be int errupted . no half - holid ays or le it is Sund ay, headquarters in i n f'ull operg ive each off i cer and man a day a week off , to be sta gg ered so th e progress of our work There's no time to waste and there will be aves . Before going to London, General Cl ark discusses the necessity of coope ra tion between Air and Ground Forces. lie says he h a s told Gener al Spaatz that it will be n e cessary for the grou..d ~omanue r vO exercise con t rol of close support air op e rations when the invasion comes. To eff e ct this cooperation between Genera l Spaatz and himself, General Clark has sent for Brigad i er General C1 mdee w o will unify the work of the 8th Air Sup p ort Command and the II h Army Corps . General Candee will set up his headqu arters in the vicinity of the Castle so t here wil l b e close contact between air and ground f orces . The general also discuos es that he has definiteiy s ele cted Colonel 0 1 Daniel to he ad the amphibious tr aining program . The Colonel fought in the World War be s ide General Clark who at that time wa s coounanding Com any K of the 11th Inf'antry p Regimen1:,. When General Cl ark wa s wounded by shra pne ~~ . Qglonel 0 1 Daniel took ove r command and won the D. S . ~ in the ~ - For the p a st f'ew months Colonel 0 1 Daniel h a s b e en heading up amphi b ious and comm ando training und e r Gene ral Clark at Gr ound For ce he adq uart e rs in Wash in g ton . The colonel is alrea dy in Engl and and Gene r a l Cl a r k h a s written Gen eral Mc Nair asking that he b e allowed to remain here on grounds that am phibious tr ain i n g over here i s mor e crucial th an si mil a r trainin g in the Stat e s . Col on e l 0 1 Daniel and A dmir a l Bennet of t h e u,, s . Navy ar e leavin g toni gh t on a r econnaissance tour of Scotlan d in sear ch of an amph ibi ous tr ainin g sec t or. The admi ral is ch ar ged with coll e ctin g , rec e iving and training all inva s i on cr aft crews. �General Cl a rk h a s been g iven the responsibility of policing t h e entire Safisbury Plain dist r ict which , until now, has been under Major General Packingham - W lsh. Genera l Clark promotes a Major Ra lph Cooper to a lieutenant colo nel cy and makes him Provost Marsh al. 'l'he ammunition supp ly problem has been worrying the general so he writes Gener al Eisenho we r reco mm ending that there be built up in this the a ter 30 u n its of f i re for all tro op s and that five u n it s of fire , a ll cla ~ses, b e allo t ed to the II Army Corps, from whic h the ~0o-i"ps commander woul d be authorized to expend one - half unit of f ir e for tr aining purpos e s. He points out that e l ements of this Corps arrived in the United Kingdom with out one unit of fire opwer in the ir po s session . General Clark, accompa nied by Gen e ral Ei senho wer , returns from the London conference a t 6:30 PM and the two gener als in spect the mes s e s and barracks and go to the American Red Cross hospit al in Salisbury whic h is being turned over to the United States Army. * * LON GFORD CASTLE, JULY 27, 1942 --I t h a s b een decided that an attack opera t ion on the northwest co ust of Afr ic a wil l be made by next December 11 General Clark announced the de cision t h is afternoon at a secret me etin g with his high -r ankin g officers . This is t he revised de ci sion made at yesterday's conference in London . The special American dele gation is returning home to report to Pr e sident Roosev e lt . The African operation will b e known at TORCHand it supe rs edes t h e earlier G YMNA pl an . An Americ a n Corps, comin g strai gh t ST over frcm the United States, will be l anded in t he vicinity cf: Casablanca, on the west coa s t . Memwhi l e , the British, with America n assistance , will land invasion troops along the Mediterranean coast , bet ween Oran and Biz erte . TORC although H, the 1st Divi s ion i s sche dule d to partici p ate in it, do e s not involv e t he II Army Cor p s directly , Ge neral Clark expl a ins . Comman of this 1942 operation d will be u nd e r General Ei senhower . Gene r al Cl a rk feels cert a in th e operati on will come off -a s scheduled s ince it is what both President Roosev e lt and Prime Minister Churc hill want. It will open~ , as promis ed , a Second Front in 1942. Howeve r , TORCHi s d epend ent on whethe r or not Russia collapse s -this year . If she does , Germany will be free to release air units and ground reinforcements to aid General Romme s campaign . That would materially l' chan ge the plan . Gen e ral Cla rk says th at in te l ligence r eports show that Germany is considerin g an African operation simil a r to tOReH and �that the United Nations have complete data on the German plans, including what air fields are to be t aken and which are the key railroad junctions . The TORCHplan is now bein g put before the American and British gover nments for consideration . It will be taken back to President Roosev elt b y the special mission he sent over - -Gen e ral Marshall , Admir a l Kin g , Harry Hopkins and Steve Early . General Clark told his section chie~s that he had discussed with Prime Minister Churchill an d General Marshall the poss ibility of making TORCHan all - American operati on with our Ground Forces making the assault on both the Mediterranean and west African coasts . The general said this was still a possibility . Planning must be started immediately , he added, on a ship -to-shore landing training program . At present , the plan calls for only one of our I I Army Corps units -- the 1st Division, reinforced by t ank batt ~lions, rutomatic weapons battalions and tank destroyer un its -- to engage in TORCH . "We must go full steam ahead on our plans for executing ROUNDUP the general , 11 declared . " This ca lls for an attack in the spring of 1943 on the French co as t , probably in the vicinity of Le Havre . " He said that American troops , despite th e decision regarding TORCH, would continue to come to the United Kingdom without interference, except just before the time TORCHis finally set for. The general eXPlained it would be i mpossible to move troops here on the normal schedule at the time when t he Navy and conv oy ships would b e engaged in the TORCHoperation . Through October, the general said, troops are t~ 90Jll.~'a~ sc heduled in preparation for ROUNDUP.These includ e the following div is ions , plus sup porting troops - -the 1st, 45th, 4th Motorized, 36th and 77th . Asked if TORCHcorresponded to GYMN AST in the belief that the African landing force would have "friendly resistance" from the French, the general said no , adding that no holds would be barred . General Clark then disclosed that presen t plans call for an over - all supr eme commander of European operations and that General Marshall probably would head it. When he will come over is problematical . The general warned that we still must be prepared to execute SLEDGEHAMMER .it becomes mandatory b eca use of th e Rus s ian p os if ition . While preparing for ROUNDUP he s aid, officers , must also bear in mind the possibility of having to plunge into SLEDGEHAM M ER with whatever forces can be thro wn together for that 1942 invasion plan . Obviously, the genera l explained, if we do SLEDGEHAM M ER, the TORCH operation will be called off. - �General Clark is charged with planning and executing both SLEDGEHAMMER ROUNDUP and and .he tells h is chiefs of section to devote every ounce of energy i npplanning and training fo r that type of operation . The II Army Cor ps will bui.ld up month by month a force that could be c al l ed on fo r this French co a st invasion if the order comes . CPhe genera l said he f elt nothing of an invasion nature would be undert ake n under any c i rcumstance before October 15 . By that time , he continued , we may be able to do something . As runericen forces arrive in the Unit ed Ki ngdom they will be tr a ined and built up f or the in v as i on task . After 60 days they will be considered ready for combat, if needed . By Octob er 15 , General Cl ark says , we would have the 34th and 1st Divisions and th e 1 st Armor ed Divi sion ready to go into an invasion . They would have anti aircr aft , ant i - tank and au t omatic weapons su pp ort . General Clark to l d h is officers th ey must alwaus bear in mind the possibil i ty t hat we will have ct_o q.o somet h ing this yea r. W h this in mind , he said he had , with th e approv al of General it Marshal l, asked the Wa Department r to a l ert certain units and have t h em re wy fo r Augus t convoys. ( The 1st Division is scheduled to sail from the Brooklyn Port of Embarkation on August 2 aboard the Queen Mary . The 1st will come as a complete unit on on e ship , making the trip in five d ays . Also due i n the United Kingdom before August 20 are support in g troo ps , includin g Anti - Airc r af t, two Tank Destroyer Battalions , the 760th Tank Bat talion which will come e quipped with M 4s, another Ta nk Battalion with :M 3s, a Few Field A rtill ery arid Si gna l troo ps and four Eng i neer Am ibious Bri gades . ph By Sept ember 1 arriv e in t he United Battalion , mor e Anti M 4s , t wo ev acuat ion hospit a l outfit and General vlark wants another larg e convo y to Kingdom . I t will includ e an Automatic W eapons - Ar~craf t, another Tank Bat talion equ i pped with hosp it als, a field hospi tal and a sur gi ca l other d e t a ched troops . The general told his cniefs of section to give th e ir off ic ers and men a general background of our problems . He said d ay s of in ac tivity for some officers wa s near i ng an end and th at he knew offic e rs were eage r to ge t busy . I I Army Corps troop~ wi ~~ be coming ove r i n heavily - convoyed tr ansports but t heir fi gh tin g equipment will come over i n slower merchant ships that will ha ve less protection. This , the general adds , migh t result in the loss of some eq uipment . As far as the 1st Division is conc erned , it is essential that the troops and e quipment be here by A gus t 20 . Fast car g o sh ips must b e used u and SOS h a s promised them . uted The decision on whether TORCH or SLEDGEHAM will b e e xec M ER will be made by Septemer 15, the gene ral p redicts . The - �-- 41 entire decision , he emphasizes , depends on the Russian situation . The quest :J, now before forces on und e r his connn:-nd is how th e tr ai ni ing should be carried on and how the inv as i on can b e st be made . ROUNDUP he says, calls , for th e British to land in the Ca l a is area while the II Army Corps wi ll conc entrate on getting ashor e in the River Siene ar ea . I t wi ll be a combi ned assault . Ame ic an r invasi on forces will attac k in re g iment a l combat teams that must be s e lf - cont a ined units that h ave train ed beforehand with all t he equipment they will use in the actu 11. inv as ion . l 11I want each of you to ask yourse lf al L the time : ' How would I I do it ? 1 , tt the general says . 111.Vriat s th e best way to train ? Should the divisions' equipment be sent to Eng l and and th e divisions l anded a t an amphibious trainin g sector for a gruelling course and th en , after gr aduation , go to England and ge t their e quipm ent ? How wouJ.d you do it?" The general says th at Admiral Hewitt of the U. S . Navy has be en as s i gne d to he ad al l inva sion bo a t matters , no matter wha t the si ze of the ships . Admiral Bennet is already here workin g on this phase of the training and he and Col onel 0 1 Dani e l a re go ing to Scotland to make a r eco nn aiss anc e on po ss ible amphibious tr a in in g sites . The 105 - foot inva s i on boats wil l be main tained and navigated by Navy personnel . Small er boats will be procured by th e SOS and ma intained and navigated by our Enginee r Boat Brigades , three of whic h are ready to come over . When the i nv as i on comes , all boats , r ega rdless of size , will be und e r co mma of Gene ral Clark . nd He announces he has asked for 50 per cent mor e boats th an nee de d to take c a re of los ses in t raining and in invasion. The ge neral says he won ' t be satisfi ed until invasion troops can cross 80 miles of the I rish Se a and " at tac k " th e Ayrs h :lr e coast . The 1st Division will h ave to hav e very i ntensive ship - to shore training for either TOR or SLEDGEHAMMER CH . The general says conferences will be held with Lor d Mountbatt en , General Drew , Adm iral Hallett , General Truscott and Colonel 0 1 Dani el to decide h ow to carry out amphibi ous tr a inin g . He says he expects to ha v e four ass au lt divis ions trained in ship - to - shore invasion . The rest will be trained on a shore - to - shore basis , l anding in the boats in which they leav e the British I sles . * The d ay starts out wi t h an air ra id a larm and officers and men hurry out of their quarters and into slit trenches or other type a ir raid she l ter s . They wea~ full e quipment, includin g st ee l helmets and . 45s with c ar~ridge clips ins er t ed . It' s impossible to s e e any activity bec aus e of t he fog but pl anes c an be heard in the distance , The al l clear comes about 45 minutes aft e r the alarm and everyone rushes r avenously to brea kfast . * * * �L\ \ LONGFORD CASTLE, JULY 28 , 1942 - -0 nce again we start the day off with an air raid alarm . It comes sho rt ly befo r e 8 : 00 AM so th e princ i pa l she lt er used is a hal l way in the Castle basement . The wa lls of this p l ace are s o t hic k that i t is fairl y bombproof with t hree f l oors above . The alert is brief, la s ti ng only 20 minutes . General Clark is around head quarters a ll day , cleaning up t h ings that h ave pi l ed up during his absences and ho l ding smal l conf erences c oncerning mat te _rs he h as been u n ab l e to go into until now because of the $econd Front decisions. The gener al s ays he finds himself, in tak i ng over the Southern Comm , in a position and compa r able to that of the of a stat e or the m~or of a city. The same admin istr ation pol i c in g p robl ems are i nvolved . He finds himself con f erring gre a t de a l with civ ili an authorities who must now come to wit h the ir problems. Gen e ra l Cl ark is resp onsi ble for the of everyone i n the d i stric t - - milita r y and non-m i litar y on almost equal footing. ( Br it ish g ove r no r and a him welfare an In li ne wit h t he adv ic e giv en by th e genera l in h i s t alk to the 16th I nfantry ba t talion , an order comes out toda y reco mmending an i mm edfat e campaign to ha ve every offic er and man in the II Anny Corp s al l ot at least 50 percent of his pay and allowances to e i the r h i s family , life in s urance, savin g s bonds and s t amps or to a savin g s bank i n the United States . All c~= anders ar e instructed to appoin t a Defens e Bond Officer for divisions, regiments, battalions and companies . The gen e ra l sug g ests th at connnanders a r ran ge, w n practicable, he to have "a ttractive youn g women" stationed in each battalion area on pay day to sell savings bonds and stamps . The plan is to have ou t fits compete for the best s avings r eco r d . The project , the general says , must be ccrnpleted pr ior to the tim e intensive tr a in in g starts . .,, "'-'· * LO NGFORD CASTLE, JULY 29 , 1942- -General Cl ark , accompanied by his staff and British Major General Dre w, reconnoiter the Cornwa ll ar ea today, examinin g t he App l edor e re g ion as a possib l e amphibious training area . ( A led ore , wit h two an d a ha lf mi les of ha rd , sandy beach , pp gets the tentative a pproval of Gener a l Cl ark . I t is near the mouth of Bristol Channel . All divisions arrivin g from the United States probably will ge t their final amphibious trainin g at a big ba se in North Ir eland but the ge nera l wants to ke ep the d i vis ion s f re sh on amphibious wor k so h e p lans thre e or f our small amphibious sites in South western England and South W es . Ar eas being c ons idered al are at App ledor e and Bowey-Auste l l , in the Corn wall district , and Pembrey and Temby, in South Wales n ear Swansea . �........ 43 ~ ,. This is the way the training of u. s. t r oops arriving in the United KingdC!ll is sche duled to work . Immedia ·tely upon arrival they will go to their staging areas and then into intensive amphibious training cours es . This phase of trainin g will end when they cross about 80 miles of the North Channel and "attack" the Ayrshire Coast . This crossin g , the general says , will be CC!ll ible in par every respect- - weather, sea, boat loadings, supplies--to an English Channel crossing to the Fr ench coast . Gene ra l Cl ark also points out that the North Channel crossin g will test the Navy's ability "to put us down on the ri gh t beach without a hitch." Every divisio n but the 1st Division, which is due to arrive August~ . will go through this amphib i ous training. The divisions will then relieve British divisions and take fu r ther tr aining in which artil l ery will actuall y fi re over the heads of I nfantrym en . I t will be complete combined arms tr a ining with Air and Ground · Fo r ces cooperating as the y wi ll in actual battle. The p resent plan calls for 1 5 U. S . divisions to c ome into the Southern Command area and for t 'llo U.S . Divisions to g o into South '.Vaes. The general l expects to keep the divisions moving from cnmp to camp, taking air support training in one p lace , amphibious in another and combined arms in a third. This wi l l g ive them tcugh marches and pe rfect their orderly movement. It will also keep the Germans guessing as to w her e the divisions are sta tioned. ( The 1st Divisi on will . have special training si nce it must be ready fo r either SLEDGEHAM or TORCH. The others will be MER prepared for ROUNDUP.TORCHwill involve ship - to - shore landin g so the 1st Division must perfect this type of ope r ation. This outf it will also relieve either the 38th or the 77th British divisions . The 38th is in the Poole - Bournemouth area but Gener a l Clark feels that may be too vulnerable for amphibious training because of the danger of German raids. During the past three days the amount of German a ir r e connaissance from Beachey Head to Start Point has increased sixfo ld. There has been intensive reconnaissanc e of ou r entire area and the ge ne r al s ays the Germans apparently ar e lookin g for activity by Am erican troops and attempting to determine if we are bringing up l and in g boats or doing amphibious training . Yesterday a Germa n plane fl ew over the Bulford camp, near Tidworth where we have tr oops, and straf ed cars and pedestr ians. One Britis h sold i er reporte d ly was sho t in the le g . The general believes Divi sL:n r e lieves th e 7 7th Then the 1st could do its remot e from Ge rman bombers ( * · - UJ would be mor e feasible if the 1st Britis h Division in the Cornwall area. amphib .;. us tr ainin g in an are a more o or scoute rs . * * �- t LONGFORD Ci-1STLE, JULY 30 , 1942 -- Gene ral Lee , commander of the SOS, and Brigadier Gener a l Lar kin , ETO Engineer , confer with General Clar k . The Cor ps comm ander out lin es his entire training plan . Units unde r t he commands of Generals Lee and Larkin must do the construction work. All three ge ner als want the gr een li ght so th ey can start wor k i mmedi ately on d ivis ional areas but they must await a cti on from the British and the U.S . Navy. The genera l p l ans on going to London Monday to talk over the ent ir e trainin g pro gr ~m-- particu l arly amphibious - - with Lor d Mountbatten, SOS, U. S . Navy representativ es and officers of the European Theater and the II Army Corps. I n a l etter to General Eisenhower , Gene r al Clark outlines h is t r i p to Appl edo r e , suggests i t would be v a luable for amphib l ous tr a ined divi sions to refresh their t rain i ng in England and proposes a divisiona l area near Appled ore . The gene r al also writes the Theate r Commander that each day , as he lo oks back on informat i on gi ven General Marshall during the recent London co nferen c e , he becanes more horr ifi ed by t he mis -s tatements given to the confer ees . He cit es that General Marshall was told there were eno u gh boa t s for four invasion combat teams . Later, G .ene r al Clark was told only thr ..,e such t eams could be supp lied with boats . Now he has a memora ndum from Colonel Slocum tellin g h i m th ere i s sufficient craft for only t wo such teams. Fac ts , not guesses , General Clark writes, must be the basis of de ci sions and event~ are proving that qu ic k answers that are h Hl f - guesses cannot be tole r ated . He po ints to the impo r tance of cold, hard facts in making decis io ns . We had another air r a i d a l arm today , our third in the pa st fo ur days . It l a sted f r om 2 : 50 to 4 : 05 AM General Clark stresses . the i mportance of every officer and man lea rning to act qu ickly and pro c eeding immediately to his she lt er area or slit trench . W ar e only 22 mi l es from the English e Channel and the genera l sa ys bcmb e rs coul d be over us fast and " knock the place down ." The_ Gennans are based on th e Fr ench coa st and it is only a short flight over he re . Headquarters offic e rs and troo p s are not going to escape the general~s physical cond iti on i ng p r ogram . He plans on prescribing f :le~d exercises in which the Corps will move out and s et up command p osts . This will be done so each secti on can shake down , determi ne exact l y wha t eq ui pmen t it will t ake , ho w much transp ort ation i s needed and how ne c essary mater i a ls must be loa ded . I t wi ll also teach headquarte rs troops on how to bette r camo flauge thems el ves. When the divis i ons move into the district and beg i n t aking the freq u ent 25 mile marches , General Clark plans on hav i ng a few headquarters officers and enl ist ed men make the movement with them for hardening . ( * * �LONGFORD CASTLE, JULY 31, 1942 - - General Clark , accompanied by Col onel Ferenbaugh and Li eutenant Colon e l Dabney of t he II Army Corps plans an d traini ng s ec tion , tour th e Poole - Bournemouth area , on th e Eng li sh Channel west of Southampton , to see if t he section wil l serve ad equate l y as an amphi b ious train ing area for the 1st Div ision . Desp:lt e Br i tish army opinion that the r eg ion i s no t f i t for suc h work , General Cla rk t h inks it h as possibil i t i es . While it is not i dea l, t he gene r al believes amphibious tr aining c an be car~ied on by one r eg iment at a time . Sinc e th e 1st Divisi on has alr ead y had amphibious trainin g , it i s the gene r a l's conviction t hat re gimenta l traini ng wi l l be practical . Use of this area will in vo lv e increas ed dan ge r of Ge rman a ir attack bu t Genera l Clark say s it will h ave heavy Anti-Aircraft prot ection . Units down t he re ar e expe ri en c ed . They shot down fo ur German pla ne s i n the re gio n last n i ght , the Gener al s ays . He pro pos es that two Automat ic Weapons Batt a lion s be stati oned v,it h the 1s t Divi sion and that their weapons be mounted on t h e i nvas i on boats s o th ey c an wor k with r e gimen ~s as they g o thr ou gh their invasi on p r a ctic e·. Them, if t he troops are attacke d while they are training , the aut omat ic weapons will g iv e th em pro t ection and they c an wor k un de r v irt 4a l invasi on cond i t ions . Anot he r reason the ge neral lik es t he Poole-Bournemouth area is because Portl an d Harbor wil l gi ve the 1st Divi sion a chance to practice sh i p -t o-shcr e landing which th e y must know for e it he r SLEDGEHAMMER TORCH or . The general wants to h ave unde r his command four of the six A utomatic Weapons Battalions sche du l ed to ar rive soon . He wants them fo r close - in work with h i s troops . Two of them would be at t ache d to the 1st Division and would r emain permanently so the weapons tro ops and the amphibious in va ders would und er stand ea ch oth er's technique and have comp l e te co nfide nce in each ot her. General Cl ark wants the other t wo batt a lions to be att a che d to the Army Corps as Anti-Aircr a ft Bri gad e h eadq uarters. These t wo units woul d be l oaned out for clos e - in work wit h othe r divisions doing amphibious tr a ining . The rema inin g two battalions would be u nd er the Anti-Aircraft Comm and which is pa rt of the ETO. General Cl ark has b e en opp os ed from the start to the Anti Aircr aft Comma . He claims it sets up anothe r he ad quarte rs th at nd s lo ws th i ngs up , makes oper a t i ons and tr a inin g more involved a nd calls for expe nditu re of v aluable p er s onnel that c ould be used to greater advan tag e in the ETO or the Gr ound Forc es . It brin gs d if fi cu lti es b e cause t he he ad of the Command naturally wants to keep t hes e Autom at i c weapons Batt a l i ons directly unde r him. The gene r al believes t hat preparations for i nvasion and the invasion its e lf sh ould not involv e coo pera t ion b etwee n Grou nd Forces, Navy , Air, Anti - Aircr aft and th e o th e r units. He is con- �( - vinced there should be unity of command over all thes e branch e s so the entire opera t ion will be und e r one man. He is willin g to assume that responsibility and believes he should sinc e he is charged wit h plannin g both SLEDG EHAMER and ROUNDUP M . * * L0NGFORDCASTLE AUG. 1 , 1942- - Follo win g a tour of t he , Pool e -Bournem outh area, Bri g ad ier General Roosevelt and other 1st Division office r s of th e advance echelon call on Ge ne r al Clark to bell him they ar e convinced they can tr a in in that region. It is virtually decided that the 1st Division will set up near Pool e and relieve the 38th British division . The Go ander of the Ground Forc e s discloses mm he is fi gh tin g to h ave compl e te comm and ov er am phibious operations and training . I n a letter to General Eis enhower h e sta t es that sinc e th e Grou nd Force Comm er has "pri mary i nter e st" in the invasion and trainin g and ex e cution, "he should h ave p rimary responsibility an d sho u ld be ch arg ed wit h making r e comm endati on of sites t o th e The a t e r Comma er after coordinating nd wit h th e Navy an d SO co.'llllla S nders . " He declares the Navy "sh ould not direct and supervise thes e train in g c enters, nor app oint the command in g officers ther e of . " "The object of the train i n g ," General Clark writes in ob j ecting to amphibious tr a ining pl a ns outlined in a letter frcm Col onel Barker, "mus t be to enable groun d troops, prop er l y su p port ed, to g e ,:; ashore in prop e r formation and prop e r conditi on to exe cute the assault, This will re quire th e c oordin a t ed action of all elements: boat crews, ground forces , and direct sup p ort aviation . Coordination imp lies unity of command and since th e ground force will make up the major element and will pres ent the ma jor trainin g problem, it is logical that t ha t comm d s h ould b e v e sted in th e an Task Force Comm ander, w ho is in the best position to dir ect t he unified training of h is various e lem ents that go to mak e up the assa u lt. His representativ e should b e in comm and of th e s e tr aining c enters in ord er t o assure that train ing is direct ed in ac c ord ance wi th t h e train i n g pro g ram prescrib ed by th e Task Force Comm er . " and General Clark maintains that the amph ibious force comm ander should be attached , to him both durin g preparation and th e invasion op eration . The I I Army Corps command er writes General Eisenhower th a t he is "perf e ctly willin g to acce p t the responsibility" of running the amphibious cent er s . "I have grave doubts," the letter concludes, "that this combined training will work smoothly if these centers are placed und e r Navy Command. 11 { The general is going to London for conferences M ay with ond Lord M ountbatten, ETOUS Army Cor p s , SOS and Navy offici a ls A, concernin g am phibious training . He plans to outlin e h is plan f or unity of command. He has asked that of f ic e rs be sent who can make decis l ons" and speak for th e ir boss e s. 11 He hopes to get t he entire problem of comma decided so work can go forward. nd � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, July 1-31, 1942 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from July 1-31, 1942. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1942 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Language A language of the resource English Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/555 Date Valid Date (often a range) of validity of a resource. 1940-1949 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/5ef07625e07fa9a1838a2ffd4d81d6f9.pdf?Expires=1789603200&Signature=mSRrVhERNqudcF9mVsH-A-hyYquOTTEBIkOc8w1D1zqOsPO0-2sO49a8o25E5if-onjaaazY51kq2hu6dttDBeK7dpF%7Ere6dcNbfWjNv2DpCzNVy3oTqdfzmSX6XwofuOGewL4Vywy%7EjGYQlAvM1foYmqc3fjraO-B%7El7K9Lxss-p1iIyjFuD8FztU616UuGyvCjf8ptIf%7EII8-%7EA9YkCBUOS4gVT2nvmzWfsas8NiP8%7EWLT%7EIWMxr%7EqO9XtBdIHxrZLkwXwcAidtuJWewuJKw6wiG5QaskKdJHP36iN9qxzfYKecmwCEZ6NBPuGXwkeRQkDHHvmf7eKivuH286ZuQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 24c95131a98e6531c4269c6aacb8ed80 PDF Text Text THE CITADEL . , ·" . ".. .· ... , ARCHIVES AND MUSEUM ( vinced there should be unity of command over all thes e branches so the entire operati on will be und er one man. He .is willing to assume that; responsibility and believes he should since he is charged with planning both SLEDGEHAME and ROUNDUP MR . L0NGFORDCASTL , AUG 1 , 1942 -- Following E . a tour of the Poole-Bournem outh area, Brigadier General Roosevelt and other 1st Division officers of th e advance echelon call on General Clark to ]bell h _m they are convinced i they can train in that region . It is virtually decided that the 1st Division will set up near Poole and relieve the 38th British division . •" The Oommander of the Ground Forces discloses he is fighting to have complete command over amphibious operations and t raining . In a letter to General Eisenhower he s tates that since the Ground Force Comm ander has "primary interest" in the invasion training and ex e cution, 'he should h ave primary responsibility and should be charg ed with making recorrnnendation of sites to the Theater Comm er after and coordinating with the Navy and SOS commanders . 11 He declares the Navy "should not direct and supervise these train ing centers, nor app oint the connnanding officers thereof . n The object of the training," General Clark writes in objecting to amphibious training plans outlined in a letter frcrn Colonel Barker, nmus t be to enable ground troops, properly sup p orted, to g et ashore in prop e r formation and proper condition to execute the assault . This will re quire the coordin a ted action of all elements : boat crews, ground forces, and direct sup p ort aviation. Coor dination implies unity of command and since the ground force will make up the major element and will present the ma jor training problem, it is logical that that comm and should be vested in the Task Force Commander, who is in the best position to direct the unified training of his various elemen t s that go to make up the assault . His representative should be in command of these tr aining centers in order to assure that training is directed in accordance with the training program prescribed by the Task Force Comma nder . tt 11 General Clark maintains that the amphibious force cormnander should be attached ~to him both during preparation and the invasion operation. The II Army Corps commander writes General Eisenhower th a t he is 11perfectly willing to accept the responsibilitytr of running the amphibious cente r s . "I have grave doubts, 11 the letter concludes, "that this combined training will work smoothly if these centers are placed under Navy Command. 11 The general is going to London for conferences Monday with Lord Mountbatten, ETOUS Army Corps, SOS and Navy officials A, concerning amphibious training. He plans to outline his plan for unity of command . lie has asked that officers be sent who can make decis i ons" and speak for their bosses . " He hopes to get the entire problem of co m mand decided so work can go forward . �The general, despite his forthrightness and brevity, is exceedingly human. Today he sends out his fir s t "birthday letter to an officer under his command. He plans to send similar letters to each officer when his anniversary arrives. ttere i s a t yp ical one: "Dear . Lieutenant: "Today being your birthday , no doubt your thoughts instinctively will be turn e d to your loved ones at home. W h th e hope of helping it to fill the ~oid caused by your separation, I want to extend my best wishes . "I hope that the combin ed American - British re sources can bring about the destructiom of our common enemy in time for you to be at home on your next birth d ay . "Sincerely, (signed) Mark W. Clark, "Major General, "Commanding . 11 11 11 U. S.A . , * ( L~NGFORDCASTLE, AUG. 2, 1942--The American Red Cross hospital in Salisbury is being turned over to the United States Army for the duration and last night General Clark entertained the nurses, many of w hom are joining th e Army Nurse Cor p s . A few are returning to the United States and officers try and convince them they should remain here and help . The gene ra l says the hospital, past year to take care of pulmonary diseases , must be expanded materially which has been used for the tr ouble and commu icable n fo r our use . The nurses are driven from the hospital to New Hall, the general's quarters, in jeeps chauffered by officers . There are about 35 nurses and 60 officers at the dancing and buffet party . After having Sunday dinner at Cowesfield where our headquar Engineers are quartered, General Clark, accompanied b y Major c.c. Smith, leaves at 1530 for London and conf'erences concerning his having corrm1and over all phases of amphibious training and operations. He plans on talking over the involved problem with General Eisenhower tonight so they can get cleared away for the confer en ces tor11orrov1 . ters I. ON OON ,1 :...:..:. -=.----~- AUG. 3, -~..:::: t 1942 -- General fight to have amphibious training under his will soon go to I reland to pick the training can be started. Clark direct area today won his command . He so construction �48 LJuring a discussi on this mor n ing with General Spaatz and Adm ral Bennett, i General Clark outlined his plan for the settingup and op eration of amphibi ous training areas. W hen Admir al Bennett of the US Navy passed around a paper stating his vie ws on how training should oper ate, General Clark disa greed since Admiral Bennett's ideas were exactly t hose cont a :4l-~d in the plan of Col onel Barker and to which the gener al alrea dy had taken exception. General Eisenhower suggested that Admiral Bennett, General Clark and the gener al's am phibious expert, Colonel O'Daniel, confer and reach an agreement. As soon as the general out l ined his vie ws in det a il, Admir al Bennett agreed to 100 percent coope r ation. He said his sole mission would be to train the boat crews so they can handle, service and navigate the sma ll . craft and put the inva din g forces on the proper beach. Adm ral Bennett accepted Gener al Clark's i suggested North Ireland training location and agreed to get the prop e r craft and submit tp a ining plans. These will be r eported to General Clark's expert who will then give the Navy its instructi ons for proceeding. r At 1500, Generals Clark and Ei s enho wer and Lord Louis Mountbatten mee t wit h repres entatives of the British W Office, ar the British Admiralty, Air Go an d , SOS, ETOUSAand the Ground rmn Forces. After three hours of d iscussion, the grou p accept ed Gener al Clark's rec omm endations on amphibi ous comm and and training methods. A letter was dictated to the British W Office. ar General Clark took 15 of h is own officers to the meeting and, lau~ hingly explains, "I was able to ou tvote them for the first time!' General Clark then made arrang ements fo fly to North Ireland on W ednesday to l ook over the pro p osed train i ng center. He will take Navy officers and members of his own staff with him. Lat e r, General Clark discussed with the British his plan for moving our 1st Division into the Poole area. The British, he says, "bucked a bit" but t h ey acceded when he told them that un less he foll owed t h is plan he would be un able to relieve the British 38th Division, no w holding the re gi on. He added that all the antiinvasion installations in the Pool e area would have to came out so the 1st Division could practice landings on the on ly available hard beach. The Briti8h agreed but said that d ef ense of the area would be his problem. He replied he had no doubt he could solve it. So the Poole area is go ing to be used by the 1st Division. * LONGFOD CASTLE, AUG. 3, 1942--The British R Broadcasting Syst em sends an announcer and technician do w today to make tr ansn criptions of a program that will be broadc ast this coming Sund ay night to the United States. ( Twenty-three enlisted men and two officers particip a te. Half of th em a r e i nt e rvie wed on th e ir r ea c tio n s to Eng l and and the ir �-- 49 - . ~ ✓ '.~. .':.. .... ~ _" , :- . ... :. jobs. The remainder pa rtici pate in a round-table, barber-shop discussion. Parents and friends of the soldiers participat in g will be notified that their men will be on the air. The program, which will be carried by 147 stations in the U.S., is known as "The stars and Strip es in Bri tain. 11 It is shortwaved to New York then rel ayed over longwave. The first big batch of ma il in several evening. Mail from home is so very important * days arrives to everyone. in the * LONGFORD CAST LE, AUG. 4, 1942--Plans for the TORCH(North African) operation are increasing in scope and momentum. and Gene r al Clark is apprehensive that ROUNDUP,which he is charged with planning and executing, may be postponed until 1944, if not indefinitely. That, the general explains, might be a "great calamity." He is alarmed that TORCHwill act as a sponge, taking away from his planned operation the necessary ships to transport his Ground Forces to the United Kingdom to prepare for the contin ental assault. If the TORCHoperation is successful it may take more and more p lan es that would be training to support ROUNDUP;it would take aw:-;_ytroop and car go ships and naval vessels that would pa:-ticipate in the French Coast op eration ; and it might actually take away troops that are scheduled to participate in the opening phases of ROUNDUP. The general is alarmed lest TORCHbe executed at the expense of his mission and that it will leave him with insufficient air power to soften up the French Coast for the assault or without sufficient ships and men to undertake the operation successfully . Two newspapermen and a newspaperwoman come to headquarters today . They are the first to show up since our arrival. The general chats in his office with Myron Berger of the New York Times, Paul Manning of N.E.A. and Maxine Davis of the Saturday Evening Post . He stresses to them the amicability of BritishAmerican troop relations and tells of the problem confronting negro troops arriving in England . Manning is going to do a "profile sketch" of the general w hile Berger i s interested in writing a story about New York men over here- -a "Brooklyn Bum in A e ountry Castle" theme along the lin e s of "A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court." Miss Berger talks to both troops and Salisbury resid ents about the British-Americ an relations . NORTHERN RELAND AUG 5 , 1942- - The major amphibious I , . train ing base for the Army Ground Forces in the European The ater of Operations is tentatively selected tod a y as General q1ark, members -:.t· .- : :.- ~ •. , - . , -. -·-"" "! ':: ..--- �50 ( J of his st a ff area between and Navy pers onnel inspect the North I rish Coast the mouth of Loch Foyle and the Bann River . A United States Army cargo transport picks Genaral Cl ark and h i s party up at the Oa t field RAF airdrome , near Salisbury , and i t t akes off for Ir e l and a t 0806 . We f l y ov er parts of England where p l anes wi th the U. S. blue circle and white star haven ' t been seen be f ore . The sh i p c ar ri es Very lights and a message flasher in case we are challenged . Sev eral times Hurricanes and Spitfires climb up to inspect us, then dart away . The we ather is perfect until we hit the English Coast of the I rish Sea . The beautif u l l y tilled and hedge - b ordered f i e l ds pass beneath us in crazy - quilt patterns of deep greens , l ight browns , pea greens and amber browns . We pass over several a i rdrames and large to w , hitting ns the coast at 0914 . Genera l Clark spends most of his time forward with the pilot and co-pilot . He takes the controls for a while . over the to 7, 000 feet Br adley , drops exactly on our islands and at the bi-motored keep under the Ir i sh Sea we h it heavy ov e r cast and have to climb to keep above it . Finally , the pilot , Captain down through it and we are ov er the Isle of Man, course . At 0956 we are ov er the I rish coastal 1016 we hit the I r i sh coast and thund er along in ship at an altitude of from 800 to 1, 000 feet to low - hanging clouds . For a time we lose ourcourse and find we are fly i ng ov er neutral Eire . I f we had to put do~n we would be interned. We know we are the first U~S. warplane to fly over Eire! F inally , we hit the Atlant i c Ocean and d i scover we are ov er Donegal Bay . W head northwest e over the well-kept I rish farm country and at 1138 we arri v e at an RAF airdrame , Eng l inton, near Londonderry . Genera l Clark is met by Major General Hartle , commander of our Vth Army Corps . We ar e taken immediat e ly by autamobiles to the p~oposed amphibious area , 15 miles away . General Clark ' s party consists of Colonels Ga le , Ferenbaugh , O' Daniel, Dabney and Lieutenant Beard wood . The navy men with us are Command r e w Ansel , operati ons officer under Admi ral Bennett; Lieutenant .c. Com mand e r Shiler , constructi on officer , and Ensign Donovan . The proposed amphibiou s area has 8 1 000 yards of beach with a 25- yard apron of hard packed sand that le ad s back to dunes covered wit h har sh grass and low bushes . The water , Gene r al Clark , finds , is d ee p e noug h for small bo a ts and the are a is so formed that ship-to-shore l andings c ould be p r a cticed . The necessary naval facilities are nearby . Gener a l Clark is highl y p leased with the area and says it is ak in to the ty pe of shoreline that our troops will run into when they attempt eith er SLED GEH.AMN.ER ~r1:tO~UP. At some spots the English , as ant i- invasion defense , hav e installed pilings , pill �( -- boxes and barbed wire. Behind the beach , dunes stretch back until they become matted hillocks that would make goo d defensive positions against beach landings . The genera l stresses that .there is a similarity bet ween the neutralization problem here and the one that troo ps are likely to run into on the French coast . The northwest end of the 8 1 000 yards of practical b ea ch has about 1 , 0 00 yards of cliff where invasi on troo p s will be able to fire ball ammunition as they make their p ractice assaults . The entire area is quite isolated, r e achable only by nar row roads that alrea dy have sentries and tank blocks. The proposed region for landings has a six to eight foot tide . There is a sandb a r across part of the l anding area but General Clark says natural obstacles will make the training area even more valuab l e . North winds will whip the sea up , giving the troo ps practice in both rough and smooth wa ter. General Clark des crib e s the area as II splendid II and he holds innumerable waterside conferences with Colonel O' Daniel , Colonel F erenbaugh and General Hartle . They make tentative plans for bringing in the first unit f or training- probably the 34th, part of General Hartle's Army Corps . After inspecting the are a closely , the party, which is accompanied by Major Rawlins , a British officer on the staff of the North I reland Corrnnand, goes to Coler aine for luncheon. They then g o to the mouth of the Bann River, near the amphibious area, and the Navy experts say the re g ion will be perfect for mooring small invasion craft . The party continues on to Londonderry, second largest city in North I reland, and then returns to the airdrome at 1642 . 11 Our p lane , named tb:.e "Nazdarovia, takes off at 1709 and , before heading for England , we cruise over the a rea we have been inspecting all day on foot . The sandbar is easily seen from the are a and it is marked in on the detailed maps we have with us . ~uring the trip home , members of the general's staff confer with the navy men on a rou gh table b olted to the floor in the t a il of the plane . They sketch tentative installa tion and training plans as we fly over Belfa s t and start across the Irish Se a . Once again the sight of an American plane over the area creates interest . The pilots get inquiry flashes f rom the ground and they reply with their sign al ligh ts . The code le tt er with whic h a friendly cr a ft identifies itself changes every hour; so does the col or of the friendly signal g iven by ~ery lights . l The plane al ights at Salisbury at 1932 and the gener a l and his staff drive to New Hall . The three Naval officers fly back to London. I n an informal meeting with his staff, General Cl ark says the Loch Foyle re gion will su it the amphibio us t r aining purposes fine . Furth er conferences will be held with the Navy and ETO before the first tr aining force is sent in for its s ix to nine week course that is scheduled to conclude with a mock inva sion acro ss 80 miles of the North Channel nith an assault on the Scotti sh Coast . �LO NGFORDCASTLE, AUG. 6, 1942--The strange case of General Char les De Gaulle, tall, somber-faced leader of the Eighting French, was outlined today by General Clark as he recounted a meeting in London with the most enigmatic man of the war to date. f. The British have been reluctant to give De Gaulle any highly secret information concerning their plans and the French Fighter, hoping to find something out, scheduled a conference with General Marshall just before the second Front conferees left London on July 29. The British feel they can't trust De Gaulle because he is so eager to promote his own interests. As he wanted to sidestep General De Gaulle's obvious attempt to circumvent the British and obtain secret plans, General Marshall had Admiral King and Generals Clark and Eisenhower and Brigadier General W.B. Smith attend the conference with De Gaulle in Admiral Kin g 's hotel room. The French general, realizing something was in the wind, wanted to find out about TORCH so he could be in on one of the biggest potential developments of the war. This would add stature to his hoped-for position of being the outstanding French post-war figure. ( General De Gaulle was obviously displeased when he entered the hotel r oom and found that instead of being alone with General Marshall , four other American officers also were p resent. He shook hands limply with them and ignored them throughout the conference. The French general, tall, thin and gaunt, entered the hotel roam with an aide-interpreter who was as drab a s De Gaulle. The Fi ghting French leader shook hands with the officers "with a hand as cold and clammy as a spitoon, 11 General Clark recounted. "It was evident that he wanted a p rivate audience with Gene r al Marshall, that he resented our presence and that he felt General Marshall had let him do w 11 n. Admiral King, in honor of the French general, had ordered a bottle of champagne. A glass was poured for each man p res ent but De Gaulle, who stared icily at everyone but General Marshall, didn't touch his drink. De Gaulle told the Americans he was placing at their disposal the handful of French troops he has in England, French South Africa, New Caled onia, Syria and other possessions. In a deep voice, he told the officers with what joy the Fighting French would welcome the opening of a Second Fr ont. He then asked General Marshall what he could tell him. General Marshall told De Gaulle how America ap p reci a te d the fine work being done by the Free French. Admir al King then made an equally polite but secret-free speech. De Gaulle, obviously impatient and upset, said to General Marshall blu n tly through his interpreter: ( "Tell me about the Second Front plans!" �~ 53 t~ ~ , Once sgain General \Marshall spoke in genera lities, oDlli"tting any reference to specific plans such as TORCH or RO UNDUP Admiral . King again took part of the conversational load off General Marshall . Soon De Gaulle found that he was going to ~et no specific informa tion and told the .Americans that he would' take no more of your time . " He shook hands in the same fish - like way and , followed by his aide , "a stiff automaton who sat there parrotlike , repeating throughout the conference what Gen er al De Gaulle had said," marched out of the hotel room. As soon as De Gaulle had left , General 11 the other officers and said: Isn 1 t that the 11 1 ve t h ing y ou ever seen! They then discussed agreeing that he might have a keen military totally devoid of per s onality or leadership Marshall turned to most pathetic De Gaulle .·s pla ce, mind but tliat he was qual ities. General Clark desc r ibed De Gaulle as: "Absolutely without personality and lacking any personal magnetism . He may be an excellent military expert but it was easy to see why he is the United Nations' problem child." The group agreed that De Gaulle's collaboration and the cooperation of the liberty-lovin g people in France was essential . The revolt must be timed to coincide with our invasion and such plans eventually must be made . { General ~lark , in recounting the meeting with De Gaulle, said there had been discussion concerning how th e British raid on St. Nazarre was timed to coincide with a French uprising . The French rioted and shot German so ld iers and police . When the big commando raid wa s over , The Germans shot hundreds of rioters and made every effort to .crush their spirit . "There's only one good revolt left in the French people," Gen eral Clark says. "It must be carefully timed to come with the opening of the Second Front so it wi ll benefit our operation. W must drop weapons and ammunition by parachutes e to them so they c an be as effective as possible . " . He s a id a tin . 45 gun has been developed extremely effective at other materiel will be pistol that looks like a dime-store toy for su pplying underground armies . It is close range . The guns , amm tion and uni drop p ed with instructions . I n the late afternoon today , Margaret Bourke - White , tre famous Americ Pn woman phot ogr apher, arrives to do series of pictures for Life magazine. She is accompanied by Lincoln Barnett, European news edi~or of Time magazine . Miss BourkeWhite , who has already covered wars in Spain, China and Russia , wants to accompany General Clark ' s forces when the European invasion comes . * * �• ;, ' # ~ ~~~:..~-:!~,.., ~~ .- :~:' " ~: :_•' .. .,· . ( ) LONGFORD CASTLE AUG 7 , 1942 -- Thi r ty - nine newspapermen, , . representing the major United Nations news agen c ies and indiv idual newspapers in Lon~~n, New York , Boston , Kansas City and Chicago , had a mass inte1,view today with General Clark in the lounge room at New Hall . F ollowing a buffet the garden , Then , sitting room , he faced reporters chairs . I n the audience Africans and Australians woul d be "on the record luncheon , the Gen eral was photographed in in a chair at the head of the lounge lounging before him in r ows of folded were Ameri c ans , Br i t i shers , Swedes , South . The general to l d them that ev erything ." Aft er explaining his command and that at pre sent the only troops in England were service units , the general said this area,J\~ ', wou ld soon house "thousan d s up on tho u sands" of fighting tro ops . ''/ t\ "American troops ," the general sa i d , "are not over ·here to sit v,lt~Jl' on their back - ends on the defensive . We' re here t o take the of- f fe n sive , and , the sooner t he better as far as we a r e concerned ." He added that he was sorry but he cou l d say nothihg de f inite about the opening of the Second Fr ont . He exp l ained that his troops would concentrate on amphibious tr a ining and on Air - Ground c ooperation . He told corr e spondents that the troops coming over were among the finest in the United Sta t es and that the train i ng they would receive in Bri tain would be "specialist training for offensive operation . 11 You can draw your ovm assumptions , it will include amphibious training . 11 Junerican troops , he continued , will be toughened up by long o-, marches -- up to 25 miles -- and that infan t ry wi ll learn to advance s~J s l, with artillery fire breaking as close to them as possible . He (~J •' " warned that men would get hurt but that they must learn to have t~~ trust in their supportin g units and work under realistic cond itions . He told British correspondents that he wanted to make his Ground Forces "as hard as the British soldiers wh o are hard , tough and fine . " He said he was certain that present - day U. S . troops are far superior to those of the 1917 - 18 A. E . F . One of the present - day faults of armies , however , is that they are road bound . "They want to ride to battle in trucks , " the general said . "They ' re going to get out of that habit . " The general also dis discussed Anglo - American relations, the p roblems presented by the arrival of negro tr9ops and told the ne wspapermen of rationing problems . ( He thre w the conference open to questions and finally closed it by telling newspapermen he wanted no personal publicity . "I haven't commanded troops in ba t tle yet," th e general told them . "Until I have p roven my fitness , the less said about me the better .,, �( ) Since the general has to prepare to depart for Scotland where he will greet the 1st Division, he has onl y tin 1 f or more picture e taking in the garden before he bids the newspapermen goodbye . The party is then taken to the Cas tle headquarters, ·shown through the section of f ices and the art gallery. The newspapermen then choose what they want to do: inspect officers and troops quarters, interview enlisted men or browse around the headquarters area. They c atch the 1642 train back to London . During the morning, the general meets with Navy Officers an d his Army Corps amphibiou.s exper t s to outline to the m his plans f or amphi biou s training . The Navy and II Army Corps g~p will tour proposed a r eas at Poole , Appledore and in the Cornwall area during the next four days . The gener al , accomp an ied by Colonels Adcock and 1arkoe and Lieu.ten ant Barker, lea ves at 15 45 for Cheltenham to join General Lee who is also making the train trip to Scotland . ( GU.nROO .:£OT.LAND AUG. 8, 1942--The 1st Division , less one Kj , ba t talion of the 16th Infantry which is alre ady at Tidworth, arrives here this morni ng aboard the Queen Mary. The former crack liner , carrying more troops than any ves se l has ever carrie d before, made a six 4 day dash across the Atlantic without any protection exce p t for the first day out of New York and the l ast day out of Scotl and . Generals Clark and Lee g o out to the ship aboard a lighter soon after dawn. As they draw alongside t he troop - cram med trans t port, General ~lark is a stounded at the siz e of "the biggest thing I ever sa w af lo at . " The Q een Mary has 15 ,045 persons u abo ard -the entire 1st Division , less one battalion, and the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion whic h is at t ache d. M en are sleeping everywhere. General Cl ark confers with General Terry Allen, 1st Division co mma der, an d his high~ranking n officers . General Allen reports th at the m orale of the men is high, th at dis cipline has been g ood and that deb a rk ation plans have been perfected. A dang erou.s spots on the voyage, every officer t went below an d stayed alongside his particular outfit. Gener al Clark g oes ash ore wit h th e first li ghter lo a d of troops. At Gurr ock, the 1st Division starts boarding tr a ins fo r the lo ng trip to Tidworth . General Clark watches them board . A Scottish band pl ay s martial music and the Ame rica n Red Cross fu rnishes the of f icers and men with hot tea, sandwiches and cakes . ( The deb a rking from the Queen Mary and the train loading g oes s moothly. Gener a l Cl ark remarks th at the entire movement ttreflects the discipline and mor ale of one of our best divisions . - �~ ~ . : ;,, . --~·~·-~: ;;'"_! ;. - I I ) It is very foggy and rainy but General Clark stands on the docks and moves around the railr oad station from 0700 to 1900 , watching th e debarkation and l oading and talking to the enlisted men and officers . The ge neral says he feels great pride as he watches this t op-notch division , w:.L.thwhich he had been closely associated as former Chief of staff , Army Ground Forces , unload 1·or early combat duty. He has no doubt that the 1st Division will play an important part in the forthcoming fight . LONGFORD CASTLE, AUG. 9 , 1942 -- General Clark returns to II Army Corps headquarters following a night of train riding and an automobile trip to the Castle from Cheltenh am. He immediately plunges into conferences with his sections chiefs regarding reception of the 1st Division at Tidworth . The conferees also discuss plans for getting the 1st into immedi ate training . The conf erences l as t throughout most of the afternoon , then the general, accompanied by some members of the general staff, go to Fyfield Manor, home of Minister of Agriculture and N ~s. Hudson , for tea . Discussion • centers around a proposal that American troops, in small groups, help with the British harve s t and supplement the labor s n orta ges in localities where our troops will be stationed . ( The II Ar my Corps officers and Naval officials touring the proposed amphibious training centers in South ern England report back to the general, concurring in his selections, particularly the Poole area where, tentatively , the 1 s t Division is scheduled to train. W ith the receipt of the report , the general is able to g o ahead with plans for designating the necessary personnel, starting construction and making plans for troop move ment to the variolls centers. A letter concerning this ov er-all amphibious training pro gran , is drafted for dispatch to the Ellrope an Theate 1 of Operations . The . North Ireland base , near Londonderry , ·definitely will be set up and preparations for the less training areas will be started as soon as neces s ary. Another group of Army Corps office r s will fly to North Ireland to do additional reconnaissance and Sllbmit recommendations on the big amphibious base . LONDON AUG. 10 , 1942 -- London newsp apers ran extensive , stories today concerning Ame rican Ground Forces in Engl an d and about Major GeneJ al Clark. The correspondents visited the gen eral's headquarters near SaliSb llr y last Friday . ColTh uent inclllded: London Ti m - "Major Gen er a l Clark ••• has established eshis head quarters in England ••• General Clark, at the age of 4 6, is a vi g orolls leader of striking personality. He impresses one as the typic al de mocratic soldier, a man who rea dily gain s the co nf id en ce of hi s men and inspires them to give their best. Almost his first re mark today, when speaking to a par ty of British and Ameri can correspon - �,?';~;:,~~ ~-'.:. S'l ~>;,. ~~ > -~~ dents was: 'Obviousl y we are not over here to sit back and take the defensive ; if you asked me about the second front , all I will sa y is, 'the sooner the bette r . ' The troops comi ng ov er from the United states a re , he is satisfied, well trained . They are pi cked men, and the tr a ining they do here wi ll be speci a list training for offensive operation, inc lud ing amphibiou.s war fare • •• " \ London Daily 1'.drr or- - 0 ••• Gener al Clark •• • aims to make ev ery one of his men as h ard as the British soldiers --' who are hard , tou gh and fine' •• • He said this yesterday as he sat in one of the rooms of a be a utiful old English castle which is now his headquarters • •• This ta l l , pale, intensel y live and a ctive so l dier is one of the youngest Major Generals in the U. S. Army. He holds one of the key corrunands a nd when the Allies attack in the ry est his responsibili ties will be en ormolls . "The sooner the better as far as we are concerned , ' he said ••• " ( London Daily Express -- " L or General Clurk , deep::voiced 1 6 aj foot 3 inches tall , holding a cor,illl and of the U. s. Ground Forces in the Europe an Theater of Operations , greeted me at his H. Q• in England yesterd ay by saying: "American troops are not over here to tit · on· the if 'oack 1ends on the defensive . W 1 re here to take the e offensive -- the s ooner the better , as fa r a s we are concerned.' ••• This i s a general who will have a great respo n sibility and enormous problems when the Second Front opens ••• i our troops here are well trained- - better than the A.E . F. that went to France in the last war . I know what these troops can do .' •• • " LONGFORD CASTLE A , UG. 10 , 1942- - General Clark leaves in the early morning for London where he is to meet with the Anglo American comm , possibly and to discuss new phases of the TORCH operation. He lunches with General Eisenhower; Major General George R. Pat t on, tank warfare expert , and Lieutenant General Anderson who is with the British Middle East Forces . The general returns to his headquarters late , then has dinner at his New Hall qua rters in honor of Generals Loyd and Creagh. The original PU!POSe of the dinner was to have the British generals meet General Eisenhower , but , as had happened twice before , General Eisenhower , buried with work in London and particu l arly busy because of a l as t-minute war - plan devel opment, is unable to attend , so General Clark entertains the British generals despite the Theater Command t s absence • er . LONGFORD CASTLE AU 11, 1942- - The ent i re picture , G. of Genera l Cl a rk ' s co mman and his p osition d in the war has changed~ He is going to be Deputy Commander- In - Chief of the TORCHoperation~~ will It has been decided that TORC is definitely H on and that it be the big Allied offensive of 1942. The war Department has �cabled that TORCH must no longer be considered to ROUNDUPInstead , TORCHis now a substitute . entire ava~lable res ources of . both the United Britain Will be thrown into TORCH . a minor operation for ROUNDUP. The States and Great "I don't know what is going to happen to the II Ar-rey Corps coill1!1and the geneyal e~lains . "General Eisenhower is being ,~ buried with demands on him. He wants me to be his Deputy Com mander In - Chief on the British~American TORCHexpedition. The question was put up to me as to whether I wanted that job or whether I wanted to sit on a dead fish. " The general ' s decision wa s based on three factors: first , he felt he wanted to do what General Eisenhower wanted hi m to do-- take second comm and of the African expedition· second he did not want to run the risk of sitting the war o~t in a ;elatively inactive theater , despite the fact command of the II Army Corps wollld probably mean promotion to lieutenant general . Third he felt that th e decision was one of a combat or relatively non- ' combat command and he didn't want "to back away from fire . " The proposal that Gener al Clark be made Deputy Commander- In Chief of TORCHwas put up to the Com bined Comm anders meeting in London yesterd ay . General Clark was accepted for the command and a cable so instructing the wa:r Department was sent to Washingt on last night . From now on , general Clark will spend almost all his time in London, building up a staff for his part in the planning and execution of TORCH. The general says it hurts him to think of giving up command of the II Army Corps but that he will be returning to it from time to time . Also, part of the Corps will participate in the Mediterranean Coa st phase of the African invasion so his finger will remain, more or less , on the Corps' pulse . Nothing will be said for the ti m being about the gener al's new job . If sue~ an e announcement were made , the immedi ate query is going to be 'what is h~ g oing to do1" and that wollld not help the security of the TORCHopera ti on. _ f J~ ). Composition of the joint Americ an .British TORCHwill begin immedi ately. It will mean the good officers from the II Army Corps headquarters Theater of Operat ions staff and the Service of has alre a dy begun t-0 consider what men he wants important task . staff to direct .(O ,/ drafting of many ,~, ,1 , the European ( ~~ supply. The general J tf for this allr • Major General George R. Patton will comm and the Am rican e . rmy Corps that will make the African invasion from the Atlantic , l anding in the vicinity of Ca s ablanca . The g eneral praises him hi g hly and tells of his amic able rel ations with General Patton while Gener al Cl ark was Chief of Staff of the Army Groun d Forces . ( Command of the British half of TORCHhas chang ed three times in the p ast four days! The man handlin g the British end of the operation- - and who will be workin g under General ~isenhower who -,w :,.Y.1'>>:~.;. �will be Commander-In-Chief Anderson . ( of TORCH- will - be Lieutenant General At the start , General Auchinleck had complete command of the British !ddd le East campaign . Then it was felt that the load was too great for one man so Lieutenant General Alexander was designa~ ted to assist him. Because of the growin g importance of the African ope r ation, it was then decided to send Lieutenant General W H.E. Gott down to take com . mand of the British 8th Army. However , General Gott•s plane was shot down and he was killed while flying to his new command. British Lieutenant General M ontgomery had been designated to take over active command of the British phases of TORCHbut he was relieved , bec ause of General Gott's sudden death , and assigned to connnand the 8th Army. That left the TORCHassignment open ag a in and it was given yesterday to General .Anderson . "I hope , " smiles General generals won' t be that fast~" { Clark, "that the turnover on Ame rican Because of the TClaCHdevelopment , General Cl a rk confers wit h Colonel Fe renbaugh and orders him to ar r ange for the 1st Division to begin ship-to-shore amphibious training immediately. Parts of the 34th Divis i on , now in North Ireland , must also have this type of training so they can join with the Lst and British for ces in invading the .M editerrane an Coas t of J:i. frica. "This means a com plete chang e in the origin al plans for training of the 1st Division," the general says . ~rt looks as though it won't be able to g o into the Poole area and relieve the British 38th Division. The 1st can't be involved in coast defense respon sibilities if it is g oing to be used in TORCH the end of Octby ober . nHence, I must f i nd ano ther amphibious training site where I cu.n house the 1st Divis -ion and give it ship-to-shore training where it won't be burdened by relieving a Brit ish division. That site proba bly will be the .appledore r egion." During th e day, Genera l Cl a rk g oes to the Southern Com mand headquarters t o tell General Loyd of so m of the sudd en develop 4 e ments and advise him what it is going to mean in the general scheme of having American troops relieve British in the Southern Command area. • Regarding his new -Oob as Deputy Comman der-In-Ohief of the Afri can inva sion, General Clark says he f orsees the necessity of returning to the United states two or three weeks before General Patton's forces are ready to leave fro m the United states for a direct vassa u.lt on the coast near Casablanca. '- r "t'he two operati Atlantic ons (th a t is, the American attack coa st and the Anglo-American attack on the on the �-- 'r ~ ~~ "' ":,,.-~- '=a· yt ..:.. " . . . _.,. . .,, _.,,.,. _ .,. ,.. I / Mediterranean coast) must be synchronized carefully and I must satisfy General Eisenhower and nwself that preparations are going right and that the American attacking force leaving the United states is set to perform its mission . " The general receives a cable f~om the national convention the Military Order of the Purple Heart through which delegates extend him their felicitations . The general , , rep:Lying by letter tells the National Commander of his -a pp reciation, then writes: of , "I am very proud to be able to wear the Purple Heart. I have many wearers of this decoration in my command, all of whom are eager t o get this great allied effort under way. All other members of my command are anxious to get at grips with the enemy in order that we can bring to our country the success it deserves . I am sure that before this affair is over there will be many more candidates for the Milita r y Order of the Purple Heart for we intend to go where the bullets are flying and not sit back here on the defensive . n We see our first German planes this afternoon! Two Focke-Wolfe's come roaring over the Castle Area at 1623 . Almost half our officers and enlisted men are out under the trees takin g gas mask training. The planes, traveling at a terrific speed , go right over our heads but the pilots can't sp ot them because of the folia ge so they miss a prime chance . About two miles from the Castle, the Focke-Wolfe's dump two bombs, one falling near the Salisbury railroad station and the other at the edge of to w . The pilots n machine-gun the streets , hittin g only one military objective , a petrol tank-truck. The Germ.an raid was un~a.al in two ways. First, the planes hedge-ho pped all the way in from the Englis h 0hannel- - 22 miles- without an alarm being turned in until our troops spotted them from the Castle towers. Normally, the English air raid alarm system is very effective . The p lanes we re going so fast th e anti-airc r aft batteries around u s didn't h ave a chance to get their guns in firing position . second, the Germans came in very clear weather. Usually they come over to bomb w hen it is clo udy, even rain y . The barrage balloons in Salisbury weren't up . camp! The first sight of Germans causes * quite a stir around the -r. - LO NGFORD CASTLE AUG 12, 1942 - .:. a rking at top-speed , . w to clear up as much work as possible ·before he leaves for his new post, Gener al Clark prep ar e s to leave his II Army Corps headquarters . He probably wi l l r eturn only infrequently to the Castle e since hi s n ew head quarte r s will be in London . �.. I ,/ II In mid -mor ning he goes to Tidworth to make a wel comin g talk to the 1st Divi sion . However, j ust before he arrives, the division , whi ch has been massed in Ti dworth stadium , is dispersed because the British , j ittery about yesterday's surprise bombing by the Germans, d o not believe so many men should con p,regate in one s pot at the same time . The general , accompanied by General Al l en and Colonel Rooks , tours the 1st Division staging area . Troops, lean and strong looking , are marching back to their quart ers by companies. The ge ner al is pleased with their mora l e and the military bearing of the n ewlyarrived men . W ile at Tidworth , Golon el Ro.oks, who will be c arry i ng h a large share of t he II Army Corps loa d now that General Cl ark has a doub l e-barr e led assignment, gets word t hat t he Pre sid ent has sent his nomination for a bri gadier general ey to the Senate . General Cl ark is delighted . General Cl ark leaves for London at 11 20 to start work on his new task as Deputy Connnander -in-C hief of TORCH I nnnediat e l y , he . goes into conference with General Eisenho wer and finds that the War Department has c ab led back approval of hi s African invasion assi gnment . He al so is to retain command of the II Army Cor p s , at l east for the time being . Foll owing a conference with ETO, SOS, Navy and British officers , the general sets up h is headquarters in Norfolk House . The bare skeleton of a staff is here . Throu gh out t h e afternoon th ere a re con fer ences wit h Genera l Ande rson , the top British officer on TORCH; Brigadier General Jimmy Doolittle , the bomber of Tokyo ; General Lee , and others . Acc ording to General e1 a rk , General Anderson is "very a pp rehensive" about the sa gacity of doin g TORC The crux H. of the invasion is what the French in Tunisia will do . The French are re p orte d to h av e 150 , 00 0 troo p s in the area where the principal ass ault is to be made . In the evening Gen 0ral Cl ark dines wit h General Eis enhower . The working schedule of both generals is terrific . General Clark says he feels as thou gh he is "sit t ing on a th ousand volcanoes." * * LO NDON, AU 13, 1942--Brigadier G. Gener al Doolittle , one of the most fa.'1lous of the "aviation-era" personalities and the man w ho l ed the first bombing raid of Tokyo , is g oing to have charge of United States Air F or c e units that wil l participate in Torch. That decision is made today Commander-in -Chief of TORCH, has hower to make his own decisions , report what is being done to the hower . ( by General Clark, who, as Deputy been gi v en p ower by General Eis en p ick his per s onnel and mer ely Commander -i n-Chief , General Ei sen - Gener a l Cl ark conferred with Doolittle called in to discuss TORCH General Clark . then Asked Doolitt l e : "Who do you t h ink should handle the tiday . The flier outlined the plan air end of this?" was and �( - "That's a pretty tough one to answer , general "Ther e are a lot of goo d men • •• " "Do you think you I re one of them? "Well • •• Yes sir! Doo1i ttle. You•re ' 11 it! I t hi nk I'm Get go ing +" shot said job, 11 Doolittle . 11 the man for back 11 , the the replied gene ral. General Doolittle was flabberg asted at the qui ckness of General Clark's decision . Later that afternoon the general informs General Eisenhower of Doolittle's appointment . Most of the aircraft for TORCHwill cane from the Air Supp ort Command of General Spa atz . Gene ral Clark keeps a racehoFse schedule all day, dashing over to the ,t;u_ropeAn Theater of Operations headquarters twice to talk to General Eisenhower . W hen the general is at Norfolk House, one long conference after another is held in his office while phone men and carpenters wait in the hall outside to complete installation work. The principal conferees are Generals Cl ark , Pat t on , Doolittle, Guenther and Lieutenant General Anderson, Admiral Ramsey and Vice Air Marshall Welsh, the latter three British. General Anderson is doing a lot of bucking . ( An important after-dinner conference is held in the evening . General Clark makes the following statement on opening the meeting . I t is typical of him in its directness and brevity: "I have asked you gent lemen to come here in order to meet you , to let you look me over , and to tell you that I kn ow you crave in.fo rmation . I am probably more c onfused than you are at this moment but hope to get this operation clear in my own mind and be able to make decisions as they are presented to me . "First I want to make it clear that as Deput y Cormnander under Gener al Eisenhower, I have been .given full power by him to make decisions and issue orders in his name . This should facilitate our business . Ple ase let us make it clear now t hat all matter affected to wards operation which you think are decisions for the Comrnander in-Chief are to be taken up with me, ort, in my absence, General Geunther , instead of presenting them to General Eisenhower. "Organization is our first problem . By tomorrow I will have heard eaeh secti on ch ief's requirements for American personnel and will have made decisions as to what officers will be available to them . We have ample talent in the Theater , SOS and Ground Force headqua rters . I have no compunctions about pulling any of these people aw~y from those staffs providing we do not totally disrupt them in so doing . r ,, "I have a little information on decisions made today . I will ask General Geunther to r ead you a cablegram which has been sent to General Marshall . (This cable concerned needed equipment for the Torch operation ~. �I~ I lmow that General directive given him . 'So is sence of instructions from subordinate commanders will on the assumption that the are approved . 11 ( - Anderson is anxious to get a mission and Gener a l Eisenhower . However , in the ab higher le v els , dire c tives for important be prepared and issued to you i nnnediate l y plans presented to General Eisenhower .. "General Anderson - -the two Americ an regimental combat teams which are to be made available to you can be made . At the present time I will take , after discu ss ion with you, the necessary steps to have them reinforced as you desire. We can talk this over at a later time . "Vice- Air Marshall Welsh - -I am prepared your planning set - up . ·r will see you at your to discuss convenience 11 Admiral Rarnsey - - I have talked with Admiral the ground work for an appropriate nav al officer made available to you in this plan . "General Gale - -(British)--I want to talk to you about your ( am sorry set - up . 11 with . you Biery and have laid and staff t> be o I missed you today . I General Patton , the United States expert on tank warfare , is sittin g in on every conference . He will soon return to the United 'States to carry tre plans to General Marshall and beg i n preparing for the final training and departure of American units that will go str a ight from the United States into the TOR operation . CH * ation~ LONDON, AUG 14 , 1942 - -The terrific . pr oblems of and prepar for TORCHbe gi n to cane out in the open today . Because of the lack of equipment for the 1st Division, it app ear s certain that combat teams of the 34th Division, instead t he 1st , will operate in TORCHalongside the British . A difference of opinion is ari sing between American TORCHleaders over use of the American the British Air Force . of and The TORCHplan has been changed. The American invasion force that will come dire c tly over from the United States under General Patton is go ing to attack in the vicinity of Oran, on the Medit erranean , inst ead of at Casablanca , on the Atlantic Coast . The first objective of that force will be to establish beachheads and secure airdromes . General Doolittle's Air Force will be in direct support of the gro und forces under General Patton. The combined Anglo-British force will attack in the Bone-Algiers vicinity . General Clark confers with General Allen of the 1st Division and they decide it probably will be impossible to employ the 1st in TORCHbecause of its late arrival in the United Kingdan and because its equipment is not yet here . As a safeguard flor the possible use �( of the 1st Division , General Clark cables Washington to find out what is holding up the division's equipment and urging that its shipment be speeded . The ~~~th Division, at present in North Ireland under General Hartle, probably will take the spot originally set for the 1st . Regarding the difference of opinion over use of American air units , General Anderson., believing the British-American force landing in the Bone area will be subjected to heavier Axis attack , is dissatisfied with the air support being given him , particularly the light number of bombers . He admits the United States will have enough planes for the Oran operation but he says there will be no U. S. surplus for the British operation at Bone and Algiers . General Clark directs General Anderson and Vice - Air Marshall Welch to get together on the British requests and see if they can ' t provide sufficient air power fran British sources . Generals Clark , Patton and Allen oppose the attempt by the British to divert some of the United States Air Force to the British attack area . "We must not , " General Clark reports to General Eisenhower , "be placed in a position where it will be necessary for us to lessen the chances of success at Oran in order to make up for British deficiencies . After operati onal bases for aircraft have been established in Africa , the command can decide as to the employ ment of both United States and British air units , depending on the situation at that time . " ( I t is decided that there will be separate British gnd United States staffs for the air operations with liaison bein g carried on with the RAF ~ or the United States by General Doolittle , deputy corrnnander of air operations for the entire TORCH operation , and Colonel Vandenburg . The first priority of the operation will be the seizure of airdromes . · General An.de~son is told that one combat team of the 34th will train i n North Ireland for the invasion while the other team will use a base in Scotl and . General Clark phones Gener al Ryder, c~nmander of the 34th Division , and tells him to come to London so he can confer with General Anderson . ( The British report they can handle the problem of transporting both the British and American troops from the Unite d Kingdan to the Mediterranean . Admiral Ramsey says the British have several warships leaving tomorro w for the Mediterranean and he wants to send down six large , motor - powered invasion ba- ges so the -y can be convoyed to a Mediterranean parking spot . General Clark objects vigorously , declaring the movement of the invasion barges at this time will impair the security of TORCH The British . naval official points out that the weather between England and the Straits of Gibraltar is likely to be bad and the sea rough in the late fall and that it would be better for the barges to go now . General Clark rinally agrees to let three of the barges go by tomorro w' s convoy since the British moved two others do wn on a previous . Jllllilifp J ~ "~ - .;;.... . •>i. __ �oc c asion and the movement being si gnif ic ant . of three mi ght not be interpre~ed as A united States Navy dele g ation is instructed t o come from ·washington to Lon don so it c an confer with Admi ral Ramse y and t he British admi ralty about the TORCHproblems . It is r ecommended t hat a U. S. Fla g Office r be sent so h e c an remain h e r e to work with Admiral Ramsey a ft er the de l eg at i on retuns to t he Unite d s ta t es . General Patton is informed that the movement of his invasion force wil l b e und er connnand of the navy f r om the time it embar k s until the men go over th e side to att a ck . * * LONDN, AUG 15 , 194 2- -Because of the sh i pp i n g problem and the O . necessi t y of givin g TORCH ev ery priority , Gene ra l Cl ar k decides today that not more than 50 , 000 t r oop s per mont h will move from the United Stat es to the United Ki ngdom for the next six months . { This figure i s set following di s cussion of the amount of shi p p in g ne c essar y for the supply of Am rican forces e in t h e Bri t ish I s l es w hile TO RCH is in p ro gress . The 50 , 0 00 per month figure is set for Services of Supply p lann i n g purpos e s . I n addition to tak i ng ca r e of General Patton's Al l - Amer ican force in TOR and the U. S. CH contin g ent t hat will b e with General Anderson ' s Brit i sh tr oops i n the Alg i e r s - Bon e area a t ta ck . Details of what suppl y General Patton ' s fo r ce wi ll need wi ll be worked out by his staff w hen he re t ur n s to the United States . Another Br it ain - bound United Stat e s t r oop c om.v i s l eaving oy the United St ates August 19 and i t wi l l include ·7 , 000 additional tr oops for the II Army Corps , These troops will be selected on the basis of their ap pli c ability t o ~ORCH . Colonel 0 1 Daniel reports to General Clark that he can start amphibious trainin g by September 1 but General Cl ark wan t s to c onfer with General Anderson befo r e a def in i t e date i s s e t for the start of training . Gener Rl Clark tells his amphibious expert of the change in p l ans , how the 34th is t aking t h e place of the 1s t Div ision and that one ccmbat te 8m wi ll be tr a ined in North Ireland and the other in Scotland . General Anderson says he is rea dy to take over t rainin g of the infantry combat teams at any time . The United States training c enter will be in Nort h I reland and the othe~ in Scot l and , wi l l be a British - ope r ated base . The Britis h will furnish some of the s t af f and p art of the bo at cre ws for t he North I reland base . Major Carver , military assistant to General I smay of the _ Br itish W Sa b inet , requests ar comments on the cov er plan of TORCH and makes arrangements to brin g over Mr . M ack of the Britis h Mi nistry of Foreign Affa i rs wh o has been app oint ed hea d of the Pol i t ic al Se ction of TO H. He i s to be attached RC to the exped i t ionary for ce plannin g group and will handle plans of a non - military �( nature that will arise in connection with the future ope rat ion. He will be required to make plans for dealing with administrative and other prob lems that will arise in the occupied territory after the opening of operations . Gene ral I smay is aru&:ious to present the vi ews of the American Cormnand to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the British War Office. Ismay says ~he target date of TORCH shou ld not be postponed. Brig adier Mock~ -F erryman , the British staff G-2, tells General Clark he thinks it wruld be unwise to use code names in connection with Algiers , Bone and Oran . He says a code system has been considered impra c tical by the British since many code words would have to be listed and officers would have to be provided with the code in order to carry on their work . Gener al Cl ark agrees and rules that no code words , except TORCH, will .be use d . The Air Support problem raised by the British is being ironed out. Ai r Vice-Marshal We lch has presented an estimate of require ments for the Algiers-Bone operation to the Air Min istry which is at µresent considering it . The streets of London are sprinkled with American soldiers tonight . Many of the newly-landed troops , most of them with the Est IDi:v sien; nhave their i first leaves, since it is a weekend , and they flock to London , gushing out of every train that has come up from the Salisbury-Andover region . ( * L0N N, AUG 16 , 1942- - The British DO . Foreign Office expert who is the politi c al officer on the TORCH staff believes that when the attack comes Vichy will order the French in the North African area to fight "and they undoubtedly will do so . " General Clark instructs the political officer, Mr . Mack , to make the necessary contacts, . arrange for his own personnel and organization and set up an office as part of the TORCH headquarters The organizati )n of TORCHnow sha p es up as follows : the head quarters of the Comm ander -in-C hief will include a combined Anglo American general staff, a c ombined air section and a combined ad ministrative and supply sectlon . The Garmnander - in -C hief in an operation of this scope a annot avoid direct concern in many phases of supply and administration because of the tremendous importance that will lay in both land and sea connnunications. The British are turning over their best man in that field- - Gener al Gale . His deputy will be Colonel E . S . Hughes of the U. S . A. Political , intelligence, supply and be headed by British officers. Americans sonnel and a number of technical services staff rapidly organizing and efficiently ( At the beginning of the operation air staff will head . General working . the following sections will operations, per Clark has this wi ll be dir- . �ect l y subordinate to the Commander - in-Chief: British Army Corrnnn d er , a British Naval Support Commander, British Air Force Commander , American Army Comm ander who will also co umand U. S . Air Units , and the Am ican Naval support er connnander . After the landings have been completed and the operation is well under ·way, a single naval commander might be set up for the entire command . It is also possible that after the initial posi t ion has been consolidated and strategic air uhi ts become available ,. a single air commander may be designated . Either General ~lark or General Eisenhower will go to Gibraltar by air when TOR is r eady to start . They will arrive CH on the date the first convoy passes the strait . When a substantial landing has been effected , the main headquarters group will go south by water and set up either at Algiers or Oran , preferably the first . I n order to avoid the issuance of additional orders for a number of months after TORCH starts , General Clark suggests that General Marshal l revise the southern boundary of the TORCH theater to in c lude Afr i ca down to the equator . The Commmder - in - Chief would then be free to act and control events . After TORCH is solidty underway , a new theater probably will be established and the European Theater will be turned over to another man . Gener al Lee is suggested . The present organization of the European Theater of Operations will remain as it is for the present except that event ually , another officer will be appointed to take General Clark's p lace as head of the II Army Cor ps staff . l As a sidelight , following is an extract f rom a secret message submitted to the British Chiefs of Staff by the commanding general of Gibraltar: "If Gibraltar is made use of on more than a very small scale before operations commence it will be practically impossible to conceal that some form of operation is being mounted . There is no doubt that any evidence in this direction will c ause profound con c ern to the Spanish authorities . I t is urgently desirable that TORCH should not only have initial success but should not lose momentum; other wi se the temptation to the Spaniards , if ·we find ourselves held up or in difficulties, might be too great to resist . I cannot overstress the importance of concealing our objective from the Spanish government and, above all , of reassur ing them convincingly and rapidly should t heir suspicions be aroused . Both the naval base and the air station would go out of cormnission compl e tely and at once should Spain decide to attack . " Generals Clark and Eisenhower decide that every p os sible step will be taken to avoid arousing suspicion in the Gibraltar area . · The hazards are t oo gre~t since the attitude of Spain is of great importance to the success of' TORCH . ( Today is another day filled with c onfe re nces for General Clark . He calls in Genera l Alle u and some members of' the 1st 1Uvi s i on staff and they d iscuss the r e lat iv e availability of combat teams of' t he 1st and 34 t h Divisions . General Marshall has cab l ed �r that all of the lst 1 s equipment has been shi pped and t h at it will all arrive in Engl and befo r e August 20 with the exception of three ships -- one coming the 23rd of August , another the 27th . The third vessel , the William Mc Clay, which h ~s carrying 11 105 1 s, 10 1 s and 24 Self-Propelled 155 p;uns for the first , has run aground off Newfoundland . Replacem ents for these p ieces h ave been expressed to the Port of Embarkation and should reach the 1st Division by August 31 . Colonel Hamblen is to figure when the 1st Divis i on would be ready for training and combat. He says the B~i t ish estimate it will take three weeks to load the vessels for the expe d ition. General Allen requests permission to accompany his co m bat teams if they go with General Anderson's force but General Cl ark is non - corrnnital as yet . Colonel Hamblen estimates the 1st can't be read y before Oct . 7« General Patton will be responsible for both air and ground operations in the sector where his straight-from-America troops are going to attack. General Doolittle , wh o will direct command of the U.S . Air Forces in the operation, has been instructed that air as well as ground will be under Gener al Patton. General Ryder, commander of ~he 34th Division , is down for conf erences and h e tells General Clark he could prepare t wo combat teams from h is division for movement, with equipment , within five days . ( Proper headquarters during the initial stages of TORCH ar e , discussed . General Anderson believes he should be at Gibraltar during the movement of the c onv oy and that he should join his camnand by destroyer or air as soon as a foothold has b e en gained ashore . Gener a l Clark says he must go to Washington and confer with Gener al Patton about mid-Se p tember so that all arrangements can be completed satisfactorily . Brigadier General Truscott, now in England with General Patton, is to remain here temporarily when General Patton goes to the United States. Truscott will repres ent Patton and take care of arrangements at this end. Brigadi e r Gener al Lemnitzer has been made TORCHAnti-Aircraft officer. He will also serve as deputy chief of staff . tleadquarters Combined Operations does not want landing craft used in the invasion to be used in train i ng ._ Under these conditions only one U.S. ccmbat team c an be trained. One British Brigade group will have to be substituted in General Anderson's force . General Anderson indicates he would like a few addit 1. nal U.S . troops in o his contingent, not to be used in an assault role but to indicate 1.,0 the French a more eztensive American par .ticipation in th e Algiers e xp edition than is actually tl'nl.e . Gener a l Ande r son an d General Ryder will be conferring to work out d e t a ils in connection with the movement of the combat team from North Ireland to the British amphibious training area. No landing craft is y e t available in N0 rth Ireland. Communications are pouring back and forth between quarters and the War Departm ent . General Marshall says preparations to meet the October 1 sailing date which, our he adhe is pushing he says , �~-< •~ ap p ears the earliest practicable time. The Navy thinks provide enough f'ighter escort for the Oran force, also the second convoy which will be at sea at the time the landing is made. it can escort i'or original General :Ma.n:shall cables that "there is unanimity of opinion of' Anny of'ficers here (Washington) that the proposed operation appears hazardous to the extent of less than a 50 percent chance for success. This is an immediate And somewhat superfic i al view as we do not know the details of the Britis h carrier support proposed . Also, to what extent are you prepared to meet possibl~ German air assaults launched from Spain or Spanish Morroco. Give me your completely frank view and a similarly frank expression from Patton ." LONDON, AUG. 17, 1942--Generals Cl a rk, Eisenhower and Patton cable General .Marshall that their concensus is that the African 11 Coast ope r ation will be a success i f Spai n remains absolutely neutral and the French offer only token resistance or are so badly divided by internal dis sension and by Allied political maneuvering that the effect of their resistance will be negligible." Suc h conditions, the three generals "more than fair chances of' success. 11 ( agree, would give TORCH "It is our opinion, 11 the generals state af'ter a conference on General Marshall's ()able of yesterday, " that Spain will stay neutral at least during the early stages. We think ther e will be considerable resistance from certain sections of the French and that the Algiers op eration at best will have less than 50 percent chances of success. If Spain enters in the results can be serious. 11 Sufficient naval and air support is imperative. Reports show the French have about 500 planes in Africa. These are not modern but they are superior to the n ormal types on British and .American carriers. Present plans call for 160 Anglo-British naval planes to support the landing. The other planes will have to be land-based at Gibr a ltar. Good weather is going to be a pri me inv a sion factor . The French are reported to .have 14 divisions in French Africa but they are poorly equipped. "If the French make a determined and unified stand," the generals cable General Marshall, "and if they strongly resist the initial l anding, particularly by concentrating the bulk of their forces against either of' the ma jor points , they can seriously interfere with, if not prevent, a landing at the chosen p 0ints. A French concentration of' f'orces would hamper the initial objective of TORCH--seizing control.of the north shore of Africa before Axis reinforcements can be brought up." The possibility of the Spanish army striking, particularly if things do not go on sched ule, must also be considered, the general add. �76 The general set the following up as the Air Force requirements of the Am eric an side of TORCH: two heavy bomber grou p s, two sin g le-en gine fight er groups, two twin-en g i n e fi gh ter groups, one light bombe r-reconnaissance squad, two transport groups. All these units are now in the Unit ed Kingdom or enr oute here. Additional units now in the United Stat e s are req u ired for TORCH as follows: one B-25 bomber group, two B-26 medium-bomber groups, one li ght bomber group. It is imperative, the g ener a l cables, that the air echelon of medium and light bomber groups now i n the United States arrive in the United Kingdom not later tha n October 1. Ground echelons of th e se groups must be included in conv oys from t h e U.S. direct to the TORCH area. They will come ov er with Gen e r a l Pa t ton's forces. General Clark confers with Generals Allen and Ryder. Allen is instruct ed to alert one of his combat teams for prompt movement to the anr phibious tr a ining area. General Ryde r design a tes the 168th Infantry combat team for amphibious tr aining, saying this unit has a strong commande r and excellent personnel. It still h a sn't been definitely decided whether the American combat team operating alongside General Anderson's British army in TORCHwill come from the 1st or the 34th Division. General Cl ark is making every effort to get the lst 1 s equipment off the shi p s in the le Bst possible time. In event the tar get dat e is set back and the equipment has arrived, it is still possible th a t the ccmba t team of the 1st Divi s ion may be substituted for that of the 34th. General Allen is informed that the plans call for units of the 1st Division to go to Inverarary for training as s o on as the 34th Division units vacate. Some personnel from the 1st Divisi .on can be tr a in ed at t he same time a s th e comba t team fro m the 34th Division.Colonel O'Daniel is instructed that he and his staff will g o to Inveraray to assist in training of the 34t h Divis io n. Goilionel Hughes is instructed to get Ryder's combat team moved and the SOS is told to work fast on getting combat equipment for the 1st Division. TORCH operations involving the All-Americ an force und e r Gen eral Patton, proposed comp osition of convoys an d the sehedule of ar ~ival for the various units is gone into during a conference between General Clark and General Patton. The n e ed for hospital ships to accompany the first convoy is stress ed . Gene r al Pa t ton himself pl ans to be on the Admiral's ship and to go as h ore as early as possible. General Clark conf ers again wit h intelligence and politic al section leaders. He tells Mr. Mack that the French should be permitted, in civil ~atters, to retain nominal control, if possible. Mr. Mack sh ould function more or less in the background. Regarding the obtaining of intelligence re p orts from Sp ain, Brigadier Gen era l Mc Clure, our mill tary attache in London, tells General Clark he thinks it would be dangerous to have the attache to M adrid come to London at this time. No decision was reached, p e nd ing G-2 reports. ( The proposed Engl and are going TORCH. amphibious trainin g centers in the Southwest of to be prepa ~ed for use des p ite immedi a te plans for �LONDON, AUG. 18, 1942--Physical g ears that will g et TORCH into action begin to mesh tod ay. orders are issued for the movement tomorrow of a 34th ~ivision comba t team from Ireland to Scotland so it can begin training for the part is is scheduled to take in the North African invasion. General Patton is returnin g to the United States to start thin g s rolling on the training and movement of his All-American force that will move directly from the United Stat e s to the attack are a . I The 34th Division combattearn will be moved by British transportation authorities . It will begin pulling out of its North Ireland base at dawn. The British have ag reed to su pply bread and meat components of the ration while the comb at team is under tr aining, probably six we eks . The 1st Divis kon will remain as an invasion force possibility. Colonel Hughes is working on plans so the 1st will receive its equipment quickly as soon as the car g o boats reach port. Both General Clark and General Eisenhower are eager for General Patton to return to the United States so the desert warfare expert can begin assembling u n its that will be und e r his important comm and . Colonels Larkin and Truscott will remain here for the time bein g to take care of any problems that might arise from this end concerning the American TORCH force . ( Although General Glark now has a command more i mport ant and pressing that his II Army Corps command, which he still retains des p i t e bein g Deputy Corn.,,~ ander-in-Chi e f of TORC it is pos s ible H, that the two jobs may be used . In order to p re p a~e for the p ossible use of the I I Army Corps in th e TO RCH theater, Gener al Clark h a s Colonel Rooks come up f r om Long ford Ca stle to make arrangements for the prompt movement of the Corps staff if necessary. Secrecy is still paramount since not even t he Army Cor p s officer must know of the new development . Colonel Rooks is ins t ructed to pr epare requirements for personnel, equipment and transportation . He is also told that development of the Comb:1ned Trainin g Areas in southern England should continue . Another matter on wh ich the Cor p s must concentrate is the training of the 1st Division, pre pa rin g for i~s possible use in the new the a ter. Lieut. Colonel Ramsey of the I I Army Corps is selected by General Cl a rk as the co mm andant of his new headquarters. He will head up all plannin g in conn e ction with the size, compositi on, location and pr-otection of this h e ad quarters . "Allied Force Headquarters" has been adopted tentatively as its title . Because of its vital position in invasion-pl annin g and the need for security, steps ar e ta ken to make Norfolk House accessible to only those officers connect ed with TORC H. Unusual activity at Gibraltar will cause suspicion so General Cl ark orders Colonel M atejka, the signal officer , to clear ev ery shipment of material to th e fo r tress-islan d thr ou gh him . Quarte r s in Gibr a ltar are g oin g to be v ery cramped and the amount of material ship p ed there must be dispatched strictly on the basis of necessity . �- General Clark believes that the civil government that will be established in North Africa after our landing has been made must be headed by an American, rather than a British er. The general feels it would be un wise for civil affairs to operate under M . r Mack since one of the prime r eas ons for the use of Am erican troops is the anti - British fe eli ng among the French . Admiral Burroughs, the British naval officer who led the much-battered but succe s sful convoy t hrough to beleaguered M alta two weeks ago, comes in to see Gen eral Cl ark. He is a husky, sternlooking man with li ght blue eyes . He tells the general of the tremendous difficulti e s he had moving through the Mediterranean to much -b ombed malta . The Axis starte d bombing and torpedoeing the convoy as soon as it nosed through the Straits of Gibraltar . Admiral Burroughs' flagship was h i t and he got aboard another ship . He lost the aircraft carri e r ~agle and another carrier was damaged . One cruiser was sunk and t wo crippled. ( Of the 14 merchant ships entering the Mediter r anean , five reach ed M alta . The admiral had set a goa l of gett ing half the convoy through but the mission was stil l successful , d~spite the lo sses, b ecau se now Mal ta has enough food to l a st h e r until J anuary. Perhaps by that ti me the Alli es will h ave control of the Mediterrane an . The Germans and It a lians were all set to attack the convoy. They knew it had to come through or the people of Malta would starve . The moon was ri ght for a "black" crossing so the Axis partners were primed for action the moment the convoy got inside the Straits . The general real i zes an air and submarine attack awaits American and British troop ships when they start to execute TORC H• Admiral Burroughs predicts rath er light air resistance as far east as Algiers . He b elieves the princ ipal difficulty--just as it was with his convoy- - will be sub ma1·..i.nes. E-boats , l:le believes, will not be an important factor. Like General Clark, Admiral Bur r oughs believes Gibraltar should be used as little as possible to assemble men and ma teriel for TORCH. This evening General Clark is the dinner gu e st of General Ismay, military advisor to Prime Minister Churchill, at the British general's ap artment. General Ism ay s e ems somewhat apprehensive about TORCH and questi ons General Clark for his reactions . The Prime Minister is sold comple t ely on the sagacity of TORCH The . general's theory about TORCH is, he tells General Ismay: it "We've got our assignment. is unnecessary ." Let's execute it. Discussion of The British Commandos pull another raid on the Fr ench Coast tonight . General Clark had been invited and he asked for the chance to go . But he was told it was too hazardous an operation for a man in his position . Observes the general; Erinning: "I think I'd wel come something as quiet as a conn:nando raid after the firing I'm facing at the office every day!" �( The following is an excerpt Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting Off i ces July 25 , 1942: from held the official minutes of the at the British War Cab i net 11 General Marshall ag r eed that this (Pr ime M nister i Churchill's suggestion tha t the supreme commander of TORCH be an American) would be desirab l e and said that the U. S . would be prepared to fur n ish a Supreme Commander . He had been cons i dering whi ch U.S. troops would be a l located to the operation . The 1st Division now in process of moving to Gr eat Britain could be made available for the operation agains t the North Coast , to furnish the spearhead of the operation under Br itish Command. General Clark , who is the C orps Commander ,, h e re and one of the best Americ an off i cers , might be used with his ' Corps staff if ROUNDUP was abandoned . " * LONDON, AUG. 19, 1942 -- Major d evelopments in preparation for TORCH are piling one on top of the oth e r now as the plan begins to take more definite form . These vital matters are d i sposed of today : ( 1- -The European Theater of Operations is extended to include most of North Africa , or, specifically , all land and adjacent sea area s east of- 20 degrees West Longitude , north of the Tropic of Cancer , and west of 15 degrees ., East Longitude . This decision , cabled from General Marshall , gives the planners of 'fORCH more freedom for operat i ons should they become necessary . 2--The question of air support is becoming more concvete . The The necessary number of U. S .- British planes fo~ TORCH is set at 1,200 craft . The British now are firm as to th e number of aircraft to be us ed and h ave worked out a tent ative plan for their use. The U. S . Air Force for the operation is not definitely set as y e t but a sche du le of requirements has b ee n submitted to Washington . 3- -Colonels Bentley and Vandenberg , and possibly General Hansell, are going to fly to Gibraltar next wee k so the y can inspect facilities for the staging of aircraft . To prevent suspicion, they will wear British uniforms and go in a British plane. General Clark d iscusses with Colon e l Bentley matters concernin g the tr a ining of transport cre ws with the parachute troops th ey will carry. ( 4--Radio propaganda to "soft en upn the French in North ,Africa and make them more receptive toward the Anglo - American task force is discussed . Mr . w. H. B . Mack wants to set up a special station at Gibraltar but General Clar k tell s him that c an not be done fo r security re asons . A new station in Engl and , directing its beam to North Africa , will be ready in about t wo week s , Mr . Mack says . Tµe politic a l advisor on TORCHrequests an American assistant for his own section so the man can be used for production of U. S . propaganda At present the propaganda go ing out is entirely British in its context and approach . . �( 5--General ClaJ:%: General Gale and Mr . Mack agree that planning for the administration of civil affairs in North Africa should be handled by an Am erican and Mr. Mack agree s it should be separate from his political section . The job, General C1a rk says, calls for an American who is well - known in the di p lomatic field . He is forwarding such a request to Washington . 6 - -General Patton completes his London conferences. Upon departure for the United States where he will begin assembling the Oran force, he is given a secret d i rective outlining every phase of TORCH (This paper is so secret . that it will be picked up and inserted in this diary after the TORCH operation is wellunderway . The 1st Division may still have one combat team in TORCH . Colonel Hughes reports to General Clark on the progress being made and General Allen recommends that in addition to the one proposed combat team of the 1st that an anti - aircraft battery and a recon naissance platoon be attached . The 1st Division combat team is not going to draw any equipment from the 34th; its ovm is to be delivered to it as soon as it arrives in the United Kingdom. ( Just what combat teams will be used is not yet definite but a cable is sent to General Marshall stating: "Remembering the tremen dous importance ,of the time factor and the proper sta g e of the moon, it considered highly inadvisable for our conc~ete prepar ations to risk delaying the operation merely in the hope of utilizing the combat team frara the 1st Division rather than the 34th Division . Each day that passes is a day of additional risk with regard to secrecy and secrecy is vital to success . This fact, coupled with the possibility that the enemy may soon possess greater freedom of strategic movement than at present , has led us to intensify efforts to achieve an early execution . " Everything is set for the 34th Division combat team to .move to its training ~area at Inverary, Scotland . Colonel 0 1 Daniel and his staff _leave Lon<lon for the amphibious base tonight . is The question of air operations and personnel is further clar ified . Air Vice - Marshal Welch and General Anderson are worried about bomber support and General Clark assures them that the entire air strength , both American and British, should be regarded as a u n it to be used under the direction of the Commander - in-Chief. However, General Clark . tells Welch that if the British forsee a weakness in the air support for the Bone-Algiers landing they should take nec essary steps to obtain additional craft from British sources before the operation starts . General Clark informs the Britis h officers that General Patton is sacrificing his shi .,ping space- - which me might have used for ground troops- - in order to obtain the necessary air support for his scheduled attack in the Oran re gion . General Clark discusses the air operations command with General Doolittle and General Hansell. Colonel Vandenberg will be Doolittle's Operational Ch ief of Staff and General Hansell will remain at head - �quarters . The use of parachute.troops at Oran is discussed and it is decided tentatively that Colonel Bentley wil l command the air transport squadrons and that Major Yarborough of the II Army Corps will come to Londo n to plan details of the parachute attack . The first troop transport probably will attempt to land on the Oran airport . While it goes dovm, the remaining transports will circle overhead. If the first plane gets in without any serious opposition, the others will l and. If there is any fight , the pilot of the lead paratroop plane is to crash his craft into any enemy planes that might be on the field . Paratroopers in the oth er planes will then bail out and come down fighting . General Clark, able at last to see that TORCH is shapin g up, has Genera l Eisenhower and four other officers to his flat in Hays Mews for dinner. Because of the food shortage situati on , Gene ral Eisenhower brin gs the 'piece de resistance ,' a ham shipped to him from . the United States! 11 * L 'NDON, AUG 20 , 1942- - The shipping . bugaboo -- a major factor in every operation of the war to date--is rising to haunt the planners of TORCH. ( General G1ark is informed by General Gale that the tactical plan for General Anderson 's combined Anglo-American force is not logisti c ally workable in its present form--that the rate of buildup for the operation cannot be met because of insufficient shipping and port data . $fu1s will necessitate a revision of the plan for the Algiers attack~ Since requirements cannot be met, the rate of buildup will have to be reduced. General Gale says this unavoidable reduction w'ill also retard the scheduled movement on Tunis and, thus, incre ase the time available for the enemy to send troops to that area . The second shipping prob l em involves movement of General Pat t on's forces from the United States to Africa. Major General Handy , Ass istant Chief of Staff, Operations Department, who h a s flown he re from Washington for TORCH confe r ences , says Pattons 1 force will be ab le to sail from the United States on Octob er 1 but adds that the Navy will be able to furnish escorts for onl y two convoys at a time . If t h is is true , the rate of buildup for Gener Al Patton ' s troops will be mater ially slowed , the arrival of the reinforcing troop convoy being set back about two weeks . One naval escort will take over Patton's assault force and a second wil l leave a few days later with reinforcements. The original plr-m was for a third escort to bring the bulk of reinforc ements a we ek or so later . But now, the escort taking the original assault group across will have to rush back to start the third convoy -- the major reinforcements -across . This will mean that Patton's landing forces wil l have to wait lo ng,er than expected for reinforcements . ( for A Britain-bound its naval escort convoy left Brooklyn yesterday and plans call to return to the States for use as an escort �in the second Patton group . General Patton ' s opera t ional plan is dependant to a great extent on what escorts the navy can furnish since they must help cover the landing and protect vital mater i el coming in slower mer chant ships . General Clark stresses to General Handy the n e ed for 11firm co mmitments" from Washington on just what naval support will be avai l able for TORCH "The difficulty . of preparing plans without definite knowledge as to when troops are to be available for use in the operation is oPvious, 11 General Clar k declares . Regarding shipment of men and material from the United King dom to the North African ooa st , General Handy sRys that as U. S .Briti sh v esse ls come in from the United States with American troops and su pp lies , the ships will be he ld on this side for use in TORCH . Gener Rl Holmes , director of movements for the British War Office, informs General Clar k that pe rsonnel shipp i ng for 25 , 000 men must be available by September 20 , and that addit i onal shipping must come from the BOLEROpool -- code name for maritime movements b etween the Uni ted States and the United Kingdom . The Am rican groupp].anning e TORCH recommends to Washington that General Holmes ' request be met 11 i n so far as it does not conflict wit h United States requirements ." ( The question of whether the 1st Divis l on or the 34th will suppl y the .Americ an combat team operating with General Anderson at Algiers has boiled down to this : If the equipment for the 1st Div ision c an reach the combat team by about Septembe r 9 , the amphibious training of the 34th will be stopped i mmediate ly and 1st Di vision troops wil l be substituted . Loading tables , now being prepared , will apply to either the 34th or ~he 1st Division combat teams. Training of cadres from both divisions will start next Monday . Convo y s are now enroute to the United Kingdom with the 1st Division's missing equipment, i ncluding replac ements for the guns made unavailable when the Willi:am Mc Kay went aground of.f Newfound land. · General Clar k says amphibious training must end about one month prior to D- day (tentative ly set for Dc tober 15 ) since the British estim a te it will take 12 days_ to load the task force vessels and 18 days to make the voyage to the jump -o ff points . Only one U. S . co~bat team is to be employed at Algiers with General Anderson's force . However , some additional .American troops will be distributed in the Britis h Brigade wh~ch is assaulting alon~side the American combat team . The United Stat.es Ranger Battalion will be used at Bone . General Patton's direct -f rom-America forces will handle the Oran assault alone . l Admiral Ramsey of the British Navy points out the dangers which the Bone force, landing farthest east , is going to face . He expects heavy attack~ both from submarines and airplanes , while the convoy · is enroute to the more easterly part of the M editerranean. He expects , he says , to lose ships . �The a:, m:mando raid on Dieppe, F ranee, is a major topic of con versation aro u nd the "Alli ed Force Headquarters" today . Approximately 50 American 11Rangers 11 were in on the attack vlith Canadians, British and Fighting French . Our 11Rangers 11 stumbled into an enemy convoy that delayed their landin g 20 minutes a~d they suff er ed heavy l osses when t hey hit the sh ore . General C1ark expects only a handful of them to return . Thr ee of our officers went on the raid as observers , includi ng Brigadier General Truscott and Colonel Holsinger . There i s no need to go into details since the press c arries extensive stories . The play g iven the participation of American troops, particularly in U. S . newspapers , causes consternation at the War Dt partment and General Marshall cables General Eisenhower that he thinks there was too much stress on the Ranger angle . 0 ( General Eisenhower cables back that "ev e ry effort is being made to menti::n the matter -o f - fact appearance of American activity in this theater, including early part ici pat ion in air and commando operati , ns . The Dieppe raid communiques were re l eased originally by the Commander of Combined Opera tion s and our following statement merely confirmed the presence of Americ an detachments from one battalion in the expedition . 1 consider absolute censorship cannot be applied to these affairs since casualties are in evitable . Anticipatin g the c e rtainty of early casualties, it ap pe ared wise to me to establish the fact Am erican leadership is present whenever Americ an troops are engaged and that American officers share the risks with their men . There will be no menti on of names unless casualties or decorations are involved. Conf i dentially, it appean s from early reports that the Amer i can contingent in the Dieppe oper ation may have suffered extremely he avily. Almost the ent i re American contingent accompanied an assault force whic h by accident encountered an enemy coastal convoy . Apparently only remnants of this part of the assaulting force escaped ••• 11 * * L·'NDON, AUG. 21 , 1942 -- General Clark, as he watches new and revised reports crossing hls desk regarding the number of avail able invasion and sup ply boats, the restricted North African port . facilities; t h e problems of securing naval escorts and the diffic ulties of supply , s H ys he finds himself becoming more vessimistic ever y day about the advisability of TORCH . ( Two great hazards face t he operat i on : First, t h at Germany will get wind of T08CH and rush troops into Tunisia and Algeria. Second , that once the operation is started Spain will become a belligerent , thus cutting the TORCH group off from supply rrutes . Rommel and his army in Libya already block the way to the Red Sea r oute , and if Spain enters the wRr the str a its of Gibraltar andGtbvm~tar itself will be menaced by the Spa nish with the Mediter ranean sup p ly route virtually useless . �,{ The TORCHf orce would then be marooned in an isolated se c tion , cut off from suppl i es and with the enemy on both sides . I f the op eration is succ e ssful and Tunisia i s taken, the Allies will h ave greater control of the Medite r ranean and Rommel wi l l have greater difficu l ty supp l ying his army . I t will also show Russ i a that the United States and Great Br i tain are trying to do something in 1942 to r elieve the pressure on the Eastern f ront . But , Gener al Clark polnt:::i ou.t , t he Allies will still be a lon g vrn from their .y real objective - - i nvading the contin en t and getting at grips with the bulk of the German army . General Handy discusses with General Clark other objectives in the event TORC is not put into operation H as now planned . Handy recommends as a first alternative the old GJMNAST plan , an attack on Casablanca and Oran , The other alternat i ve is to send United States troops into the Near East to reinforce the British fiP-;11.ting in Egypt . ( Genera l Doolitt l e , who i s flying back to the Unite d States tomorrow , has a fina l conference with General Clark . The air general is concerned about the availab i l i ty of th r ee med i um bombe r groups for TORCH He had counted on the m but now he u nd erstands . Lieutenant General Arnold, commander of the Air Corps , has assigned them i n part to other tasks , Gene ral Doo l ittl e feels , however , that TORCH air _ plans will not be impaired ser i ou sly i f he c an get one of the medium bombardment groups over here by Octob e r 1 . He will dis cuss the matter personally wi th Genera l Arnold in Washington and return to London in a few days . General Truscott , who went on the Dieppe Commando ra i d as an observer , reports to General Clar k that wha t he saw on the French beach mer e ly confirms the teaching that an attack aga i nst a defend ed beach 11is most unli ke ly to succeed u n less it is a compl e te sur prise to the defenders . " He reports that many speci Rl landing craft were lost i n the attack . Gene ral Cl a rk orders an inv e stigation into what effect the Di eppe losses will have on landing craft ava i la b le f or TORCH . The port capacity at Oran has been double - checked by General Lark i n and he reports he i s sat i sfied that the earlier figures - larg e r than the later ones -- are sound for planning purposes . He is going to check them again to be certain nothing has been overlooked before he sends them to General Patton in the United States . Gener al Gale expresses concern about the planning for General Patton's f orce b•1t Genera l Clark tells him that on Patton's sttaff , as wel l as that of U. S . Admiral Hewitt , there are officers who have had c on s i derable experien c e i n p l anning for amphibious operations . I n the evening General Clark and other high - rankin g off i cers , includir1g Generals Eisenh ower and Handy , have dinner at the apart ment of Sir John Dill , highest-ranking general in the British Army and the sen i or off i cer on the combined war plann i ng board that �( meets in Washington . Sir John has returned to London briefly for conferences. General C1ark s ays Sir John is qu it e enthused about TORCH and thinks it will be a wise operation. * * LONDON, AUG 22, 1942- - ~he entire . basic plan for TORCHwas drafted into a secret document today after an almost day-long meetin g at the Grosvenor Square head quarters of ~eneral Eisenhower . This is the way General Clark, t.1.ie Deputy Oomm t-r -in-..: hief of TORCH and , sketches this outline: The i mmediate objective is a combined land, sea and air assault against the Mediterranean Coa ~t of Algeria with a view to the earliest possible occupation of Tunisia and the establishment in French Morocco of a strikin g force that ca n insure control of the Straits of Gibraltar by moving rapidly, if necessary, into Spanis h Moro cco . The red to as tate that the earlier as D- day . the attack ( tentative date of assault is October 15- - hereafter referD- day . General Clark says that "strategy and policy dicthe operation be initiated at the earliest possible date -the better ." That is why October 15 has been designated It is the earliest that all components can be ready for . · The assault and Bone . will take place simultaneously at Oran , . Algiers At Oran, there will be two pre - dawn landin gs , each by a force of approximate l.y one regimental combat team: one in the vicinity of the Gulf of Arzeu , 20 miles east of Oran, and the other at Bay Des Anda l ouses . The aggregate assault force --c omposed entirely of Americans - -will comprise four regimental combat teams and one light armored force. The objective wi ll be to secure the port of Oran and the nearby airdromes at La Senia and Tafaroui . At Algiers , there wi ll be three pre - dawn landings, each by a regimental combat team: one near Sidi Ferruch , 15 miles west of Algiers ; on e near Castiglione, 20 miles southwest of Algiers, and the third near Ain Taya , 11 miles east of Algiers . The aggregate force will be fo ,1r regimental combat teams and their objective will be to secure the port of Algiers and the airdromes at Maison Blanche and Hussien Dey . The Alg i ers force will be composed of one British Division ( the 78th), with one U . s . Regiment l-l combat team (probably l ' from the 34th U. S . Division . The operation will be under the Commanding General of the 78th British Division . C At Bone , there will be a pre - dawn l anding in the vicinity of Cap de Garde , north of Bone , by app roximately one regimental combat team . The Bone force will be made up of one United States "Ranger" battalion with the remainder of the force British. The objective will be to secure the port of Bone and the airdromes near Dozzer ville , six and a ha lf miles south of Bone . �~o r The assumption is by the e nd of the third sup p orting and follow-up be timed for D.4 . that Oran and Algiers will day (D . 3, October 1 8 ) and troops into Or an , Algiers h a ve been captured the movement of and Bone will Troops landin g at Algiers and eastward will then consolidate, with the aid of reinforcements , their positions and prevent a n enemy landin g in Tunisia or westward . A total of six divisions, four infantry and two armored, will be required . These will include the original landing forces . The striking force in Tunisia will be built up by land, s e a and possibly air movement eastward from Algiers and Bone with advance elements starting as qu ic kly as poss ible after they have taken the ports and airdromes . The Oran landing force will consolida te its position in Oran and French Morocc o and build up striki:rg forces that could occupy Spanish Morocco if necessary. This will require seven divis:ons , five infantry and two armored, inclu d in g the ori ginal landing forces . The second conv oy landi ng at Oran will land air forces and an armored division . They will strike west i mmediately to open up communic at ions through Morocco and seize Casablanca from the rear . If the r e is no Fr ench resistance in bulk , t h is convoy might be div e rted , while it is still en:boute to Oran, to Casablanca and thereafter the troop build-up could continue through both ports -Casablanca and Oran. ( The ultimate disposition of all troops in the Northwest African theater wou ld be as foll0ws: on e division to garrision Casablance; another to garrison Oran; one division to k eep communications open between Casabl anca and Oran; one division to form a striking force on the southeast border of Spanish Mor occo, and three divisions to fo ma striking force at the southwest border of Spanish Morocco . After assault units have been brought up to normal strength in men, equipment and supply, the probable rate of build-up for the entire new theater will be: through Algiers, one and a h a lf divis ions per month; Bone , two-thirds of a division monthly; Or an , one division per month, and Casablanca, one division p e r month. TORCH is really divided into two parts --Am erican and Ang loAmerican operations . The All-Americ an force under General Patton is to occupy Oran and French Morocco , maintain communications between Oran and Casablanca, and be rea dy to g o into Spanish Mor occo if necessary. The Angl6-Am e rican force is to occupy Algeria (e xce p t the Oran area) and Tunisia. However, because it has been deemed expedient for political reasons to have all assaults against French North Africa led by Unite d States troops, one U.S. combat team (f rom the 34th Division) is being alloted to the British for · the Algiers assault and the U . S. 11Ran ger 11 battalion that has been assigned to the Britis h for use at Bone will land first . Eventually the British troops participating in TORCH will be relieved by Am ic an," Gener a l Clark er explains . "Since a strong force must be maintained in Great Britain for the defense of the islands as well as to furnish troops for other theaters, it is apparent �( that after a permanent position has be e n reac hed each Br i tish division sent to the New North African front must be replaced by an equivalent American unit . British tro op s are bein g s e nt into the initial invasion and consolidation be c ause we must utilize troops readily available and properl y tr a ined . Of the estimated 13 division r equired for the entire operation , it is contemplated that ap p roximat e ly nine wi ll be American and four British . 11 As to air operations, aviation will provide prote c tion and sup p ort for the initial assault , protect bases an d commu n ications , and su pp ort subsequent ov e rland operations . Carri e r - bas e d planes will sup p ort th e assaults at Oran and Algi e rs until aird r ornes have been se c ured and land - bas e d planes moved in . Fi gh ters for the r e li e f of car r ier - base d fighters will be flown during assault from Gibr a ltar . Bombers will be flown from the Un it ed Kin gd om and the Unit e d States after Afric an bas e s have b ee n secured . ··The re quiremen ts for air sup p ort , 11 says General Cl a rk , so critical to th e success of the operation tha t the provision of necessar ;y air forces must be g iven the h i ghes t priority ." 11 are The mission of American and British nav a l forces will be to safeguar d overseas movem e nt- - from the United States and t ~ e United Ki ngdom , support a nd land military forces for assault , and maintain sea communicat io ns and supply . I n addition to the most important TORC operations H conferenc e to date, Gen era l Cl ark has a number of side meetings du rin g the day. Colon e l Stokes, t he War Department's shipping exper t, breaks down the TORCH water tr ansp ortation prob l em and tel ls t he general that the actua l prob l em doe s not involv e sh i pping for troops or mater i el , but that rather the d i ff icult y li es in t he i nabi lit y of the Na vy t o provide es corts for l ater c envoys that wi l l bring buil d-up troo ps . Wat er movem e nt is a l so go in g to be restricted by cr amped po rt faciliti e s at Oran and Al giers . Th e numb er of combat loaders available i s li mite d but there ar e sufficient for the oper a tion as now plan ned and more cou l d probably b e found if re quired . On the basis of this report , and bec au se S ir John Dill bro ught up the question of' u sing additiona l sh i pping to strengthen TORCH, Genera l Cl ark asks General Anderson whether he would li k e to make an additional landin ~ a~ Phil i pp eville provided troo ps , sh ips and mor e time could be made available . General Ande r s o n favors the plan . Next , General Clark asks Admiral Ramsey to giv .e him a rt firm answer " as to the British Admiralty's c apacity to conV •)y and furnish sea and air support for such an op e ration . Commodore Douglas-Pennant advise ·s General Cla rk t hat a r epo rt is being p re pared by Combin ed Ope ra tion s to show the number of l and i ng craft lo st at LJie ppe and what effe ct these losse~ will have on c raft ass i gned ~o TORCH. The i mportanc e of TORCH and the fact it is becoming the big op era ti on raises the qu est ion of the future of the Service of Supp ly in th e European Theat e r of Operati ons . If ROUNDUP is dro pped , which appears li k ely, the numb er of U. S . Troops we hAd plann ed t o �( receive in the United Kingdom will be greatly reduced . General Truscott believes a corres vo nding reduction in the present plans of SOS expansion should be made , that certain SOS units and personnel should become available for the new North African theater and that General Lee should be so advised . General Clark and General Matejka discuss the possibility of placing the forward echelon of TORCH headquarters on a naval vessel rather than at Gibraltar. Matejka believes Gibraltar must be a link in our system of signal communications and that headquarters should be there during the early phases of the operat lo n . Major Yarborough, parachute specialist of the II Army Corps headquarters , arrives for duty with the new staff. He will work out detailed plans for TORCH parachute op era tions . LONDON AUGUST 23 , 1942 - -It , looks as though an assault on Philippeville , Algeria , will not be included in TORCH. Admiral Ramsay reports to General Clark that neither the ships nor the l anding craft required are available without drawing from other assault convoys or from follow - up convoys . Also , no Naval Air Force could be provided for the Philippeville attack . ( have - General to take Clark r eports the same form t h at suc h an a s sault as that now planned "would against therefore Bone. 11 The Bone landing looks as though it is going to be the toughest landing of the three--Algiers, Oran and Bone . General Anderson reports to Gener a l Clark that , al thoug h heavy loss e s are "inevitable th~ Bone assault must be included in TORCH "Unless . it is , 11 General Anderson de cl ares , "we cannot , in all probability, get to Tun i s in time . " The Bone attack is to be made with U. S . "Ranger" troops who will spearhead a combined Anglo-American attack . General Anderson turns over to General Clark a revision of the Outline Plan for the Eastern Task Force, stating that this study represents what actually can be acccmplished with the means placed at his disposal. "It is not based on guess work as were the earlier drafts , " S RYS General Anderso n who will command the Eastern Task Force that wi ll land at Bone and Algiers and then drive for ·.mnisia . Combined British and American Intelligence reports have an interesting TORCH sidelight in them today . ·.L e i tern reads : ·h "Unconfirmed reports indicate that there are 500 tanks in underground hiding places in western Spanish Morocco and that there is an u nde rground hangar five miles e a st of Te tuan where the It a lians are r ep ortedly assembling planes . 11 General 9lark instructs Major Yarborough to of TORCH with a view to examining all poss101~1vies the effective employment of parachute troops . Organization of General Patt o n's convoy that study every phase offered for vdll bring . = American . ," �troops direct from the States to their assault-jumpoff at Oran is already underway. General Marshall cables that three converted passenger liners which used to be on the New York - Buenos Aires run h a ve been earmarked for the task: the Argentina , the Brazil and t he Uruguay . They are al l about 17,500 gross tons and carry about 5 , 200 troops each. The Argentina was one of the ships in the convoy that came over with head quarters of the II Army Corps . In addition , Gener a l Marshall says the use of nine CB:' go s h ips for the All-Amer ic R. side n of TORCH is also authorized . "No further ships, 11 he adds, 11 can be allocated to you pending clarification of our needs here . " Cables are flowin g back and forth regarding the dispatch of ground and air forces for the air side of TORCH. General Cl a rk is building up the TORCH headquarters organization, bringing in some of his best junior offi cers from headquarters of the II Army Corps. He discusses with Lieut. Col~ Ramsey, the headquarters commandant, the composition of the headquarters security force and movement of headquarters echelons to the African th eate r. They talk over the personnel required to fill key positions . North 'I'he cable requesting an Americ a n to head up civil affairs in Africa once the occupation is underway is sent to Washington . LONDO AUG. 24 , 1942--General N, Anderson is pushing .for the inclusion o.f Philippeville as a fourth point of attack in the TORCH operation. He tells Gener a l Clark that he "can't put on the show 11 without use of an additlonal port . He considers Philippeville, des p ite its hazards, to be the best spot available . The British general's argument is that harbor facilities at Algiers and Bone will not enab le him to _get essenti a l trans p ort and supplies as h ore in time to move his troops into Tunisia to forestall Axis occu pation . He tells Deputy Commander-in-Chief Clark that to cut the strength of his force further would make his mission--a quick drive into Tunisia--impossible of accomplishment . He says he will need more assault ships, more landing craft and additional air suppor ·t if another harbor is incl rded. By using another harbor he main tains he can get sufficient equipment ashore and start his drive eastward on schedule . 1 In discussing the additional means needed .for the Philippeville attack, General Cl ark tells General Anderson that if U.S . troops participated they would go forward with hLm to Tu n is, if he so desired, and would subsist on British rations. General Anderson seems reluctant to accept additional U. S . troops, saying it would involve increased logistical complic a tions. General Clark maintains that the assault on Philippeville should be made--for French reaction reasons--on Philippev ille and that, preferably , it should be a second ccmbat team of the 1st Division. General Anderson is instructed to prepare a report showing the additional means required .for the operation, including shi pp ing and landing e ra.ft . �Generals Cl ar k and Anderson and Air Vice - Marshall Welsh also discuss the possibilities of' an "inside-outside" operation , that is , attacking simultaneously within the Mediterranean and outside at Casablanca . Anderson says this does not alter his problem . He agrees that Oran sho u ld be an all-U . S . operation. He adds that the extensive front--Algiers - Bone- - is too much for one commander to control, particularly since the forces will advance in divergent directions after landing . The Air Vice - Marshall observes that aircraft based on Gibraltar could move to the Casablanca area as read i ly as to Oran if the "inside-outside" operati on is decided upon . Follo wing his conference with the two British of'ficials , General Clark ca l ls in Admiral Bieri of the U. S . Navy and instructs him to study and repor t on the additional naval means required to broaden TORCH. He will consult with Admiral RamsaC and determine the U. S . Navy capabilities for the task . General lark points out that the planners of TORCH are faced primarily with a naval problem 11 . and that no amount of planning on the part of' my staff ,, can pro vide an answer until naval authorities state what they can and wil l do., 11 At a morning conference at Grosvenor Square , a cable from Washington is read to the Anglo-American group planning TORCH. It indicates the U . S . Navy can't aid TORCH to any further extent than it is already committed and that what the navy has promised is not yet definitely earmarked. General Clark says the naval problem "is the root of the ev!lll 1.of' this thing . They won't say what we can have despite the fact President Roosevelt has said that Russian convoys and TORCH must have numbe r one priority . There i s no such thing as two operations having number one priority . One thing alone must be decided upon . 11 He adds that the U . s . Navy "won't pull anything out of the Pacific and somebody ' s got to tell them what they have to do. 11 Later, SOS officials report to equipment for the combat t e am of the in time for the unit to . start training the combat team "will be l'e .asonably General Clark feels these d a tes a r e motor transport has already reached being sent ov e r from North Ireland . General Clark that 1st Division can by September well equipped by "probably optimistic the unit and some the y believ e be delivered 1. They say September 4 . 11 . " Some items are Lieut . Colonel Raft, commander of the 503rd Parachute Bat talion, reports for duty. With Colon e l Bentley and Major Yar borough he will explore all possibilities for the employment of paratroops in TORCH . * ( * * LONDON, AUG. 25 1942- - An urgent from General 6lark out of bed atcablegram and sends him Marsh all routes General 3 A. M. hur r ying to his st . James Squar e office . General Marshall says it is the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washin g ton that �TORCH is contracted too in ambitious scope . for the means on hand and that it should be It has become necessary to prepare a ne w directive ••• because of the limited military forces available , 11 General Marshall cables . "The hazard is too great , especia ll y considerin g the extreme seriousness of the effect on the peoples of occupied Europe, India and China if the United States should fail in its first major operation . " General Marshall says the u· s.• Chiefs . of Staff "are not favorably disposed to the movement of a p proximately an Army Corps to the Mediterranean as recommended . " He instructs General Handy to return to Washington b y the first available plane . General Marshall adds that it will be impossib le to get U. S . Naval units from the Pacific because of the battle of the Solomon I slands which he says 11is going in our favor" but which is still developing . 11 ( This is the new proposal outlined in General Marshall 's cable : that United States forces, probably combat teams of the 1st and 34th Divisions, move into the Agidir - Marrakech -C asablanca-Rabat Fez area in French Moro cco and into Oran-Mostaganein - Mascara area in Algiers; they will c onsolidate and rapidly exploit their attack to complete control of the Frenc h Morocco area; they will move into Spani sh Moro cco only if it is necessary , and make plans to p us h on to Wes tern Al ge ria "to facilitate the extension of effective air and ground attack to the eastward and keep the sea lanes open." The plan would eliminate t he Algiers , Bone and Philippeville landings . It woul d call for control of all of North Afri c a from Rio de Oro to Tunisia so the froces c oul d facilitate air operat ions against enemy forces and installations in the Medite rranean area. It would be an All - American attack and the occupation of Tunisia , at least for the time being , would not be attempt~d . Later , British forces would follow the Americans . The attack would take place at the earliest practicable date and would be accomp lished as rapidly as p ossible. All the American planners ofTORCH innnedia te l y go into conference . Because of the suggestion that the revised plan involve only American troops , there are no British officers included . Only yesterday the British proposed that TORCH be made stronger and on a wider front . Now, General Clark tells his officers , Wash inton proposes that we r edu ce the scale of the attack heretofore planned . Colonel Nevins speaks of the effect of the lim i.ted harb or c apacity of both Oran and Casablanca , bringing out that small and frequent convoys would be required , hence more demands from the U . S . Navy . The entire picture has changed overnight but the ans wer to General Marshall is going back by General Handy . The Marshall cable brings mixed reactions which are finally boiled down to this suggested answer: control The proposed operation of Tunis , the key does locality not offer us a chance to gain in North Africa and the natural �( route for Axis invasion. While our scale of attack would be too weak to impress the French and bring them to our side , it would offer the Axis sufficient excuse and sound military reasons for moving forces into French North Africa . This consideration strongly indicates that military and politi c al sense calls for a strong attack on the broadest possible scale and front . Time and space also favors t he Axis in the subsequent race to gain control of Alg i ers . Full tactical successes at Oran and Casablanca do not insure reasonable prospect for the ultimate strate gical improvement of the position of the United Nati Jns in the Mediterranean North Afri c an theater . Employment of the 1st ~ivisi on with pa rts of the 34th at · Oran , using British ships , is practicable . The TORCHplanners suggest that all forces a t Oran comprise the II Army 'Corps and that General Clark connnand t he ope r ation from the outset . General Patton's forces, in substantially the same force the ,, were orig inally scheduled to use at Oran , sh ould now be used at Casablanca . ( Note must be taken that limited United States Ai.r Forces already in or earmarked for the North African theater would be inade quate for sup p ort of attacks on both Oran and Casablanca without assistance from the Royal Air l''o rce . Also, physical ca p acities of the two ports impose stringent limits on the number of vessels that can be accomodated . The limit for Oran is 25 and for Casablanca , 14 . Gen eral C1ark and his staff agree that they 11are ready and anxious to proceed with any operation directed . 11 They add that there is "" rgent need for an early decision . " u This , substantially back to Gen eral Marshall , is the answer . He will leave General Handy will tomorrow . carry General L2rkin raises the question of what additional service units will be required by the revised pl nn - -if it g oes into effect . The problem of getting the 1st Divis ion re ady is discussed and General Allen is called · up from Tid worth . General Allen informs General Glark that he would be entirely willing to attaQk with two combat teruns fr om the 1st ~ivi sio n , reinforced by one combat team from the 34th Division and detachments fr om the 1st Armored Division , in event TORCH is chan ged . ( In the event the operation now proposed is put into effect , Gene ra l Clark says we must prepare at least two more U.S . combat teams for landin g throu gh the surf. He proposes to keep a c om bat team of the 34th Division in tr a ining until September 12 , then move the 1st Division for training between se:rt ember 14 and 26 . General Anderson says 10 days will be needed for rehearsal of the attack. Ari 'additional c 1st Division combat team may be trained at Roseneath and Toward , England , f rom September 7 to 21 . The ccmbined operations headquarters, ho v1 ever , cannot p rovide cre ws for the additional landin g c r aft in the actual ope r ation . t:... �'""' --. _ General Clark dis cusses the problem of air support Vandenberg ana he says it is obvious that the u. s . Army will not be present in sufficient strength to carry out ings at Oran and Casablanca without assistance from the Force. with Col . Air Force the landRoyal Air The remarkable , irrepressible man that is W inston Churchill is at his best again tonig h t as Generals Clark and Eisenhower dine with him at Number 10 Downin g street . As usual, the effervescent Prime Minister is wearing a smock . His first remark when he enters the room where the t wo American gene ra ls are waiting for him is: "TORCH offers the greatest opportunity in the history of England! It is the one thing that is going to win the war . Pres1d~nt Roosevelt feels the s ame way . W ' re both ready to help in e any way we c an . "We face two battles in TORCH booms out the ," "The first battle is to have no battle . " Prime Minister Mr. Churchill only returned to England yesterday from a 14 , 000-mile trip that took him throu gh the Middle East and to Moscow . He says, if necessary, he is ready to fly to Washington at a moment ' s notice to talk over TORCHwith President Roosevelt 11 This thing must go over , tr he declares. , . He asks the generals what is on their minds and General Clark tells him the greatest ne~d is for someone with the necessary pov1er to make decisions . " We'r e floundering around in a trough of day to-day changes ," General Clark explains . "W must have had ten sets e of det a ils . There have been so many plans that we are dizzy . We1 d / li ke to get one definite plan so we can go to work on it . It's not a military man ' s job to say whether the French will resist or whether Spain will enter the war . The political factors should be handled by politicians ." The Prime Minister promises to get in touch with Presid ent Roosevelt immediately so the set-up can be frozen to one s pe cific task. Mr . Churc hill emphasizes and re - emphasizes that he is 11100 percent for TORCH tr . with a bit there up to Mr . Churchill then tells of his recent conversations in Mosco w Stalin . "We talked very bluntly and s ometimes I had to squirm ," the Prime Minister recounts . "Stalin says the war over has pro v en that the German army isn•t as tou gh as it ' s cracked be . " 111 Why don't you do something, 1 says Stalin . And I have to admit we can't get across the channel. Then I tell him about the TORCHp l an . I tell him we a re go ing to do it . Stalin is disappoin ted that there wi ll be no Second Front in Europe this year . Then , the more he thinks about the North African attack, the more he likes it . " �Mr. Churchill then tells of a huge banquet -- a formal state dinner -- he l d in his honor in Moscow . "I attended it in me smock , " the Prime ~inister grins . " I t hought I'd show them how proleta r ian I wasl 11 Stalin , before he was told in detail about TORCH, kept tell ing the British leader that he "couldn't s ee why your two great nations can't attack . You ' ve got to plunge inl" - On the night before he took off from Moscow, Mr . Churchill was invited to Stalin ' s apartment in the Kremlin . "There'll be just the t wo of us for dinner and we can do a bit of drinking , 11 Churchill says the Russian premier told him . "When I got there , " the Prime Minister continues, "Joe -stt/r,ted uncorking bottles . Af'ter a while he says : ' Let ' s call in Molotov , he I s a good drinker! So we sit up until four o' c lock and talk . At five o'clock I take of f for home . 11 The Prime Minlster also tells how Stalin's 19-year - old , red haired daughter came into the apartment . "And do you know , " says Mr. Churchill ., "she walked right up and kissed the bloke l " ( While the Prime Minister is recounting these stories or else talking about international a.ffairs , he is likely to do unpredictable things . At one point , he gets up, goes over to a c orner and rubs his back up and down on the jutting edge of the wall . " I guess I got them in Egypt , 11 he observes , smiling , and then plumps back into his chair to continue with serious discus s ion . At another point , he rings one of the many bells beside him and the valet comes in . "Change me socks , " he commands , and while he talks to Generals Clark and Eisenhower he holds up one foot after the other while the valet takes off his socks and puts on fresher ones of lighter wei ght . Seeing the Prime Minister eat is an event . When the soup is brought in , he tackles it vigorously . His mouth is about two inches from the liquid; he hunches over the plat e . He eats very noisily , purring and slurping and working the spoon fran mouth to plate so rapidly you c an hardly see it . Scraping the bottom of the dish , he looks up and bawls out lustily : "More soup! 11 Then , he turns to his guests and says : "Fine soup, ain 1 t it!" Gener al Clark and General Eisenhower have a hard time to keep from laughing at the Prime Minister's boylike actions . After dinner ., Mr . Churchi l l and the t wo g enetals get down to a point - by-point discus s ion of TORCH Gener a l Clark outlines . transportation difficulties and soon Mr . Churchill is sunnnoning Lord Lou;s Mountbatten and Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea -Lorcii. . Gener al lark is puzzled by reports made to him that it will take 12 days to combat load TORCHvessels and 18 days to make the v 0yage to assault points . j �( ) Churchill turns the heat on Sir Dudley. "Why is it going take you 18 days to get to this point when it is only go ing to take the Americans 14 days to get to the Theater of Operations from New York? rr Mr. Churchill asks. Sir Dudley says the convoy going to look as though it 'is going to the Midd le East, then suddenly switch b1:i.ck nnd shoot toward the 'Straits of G .ibr al tar says if the 9~v.eP- pilian. were chan ged he could g o more directly the trip would take only 10 days . "Do it.," says the Clark, says triumphantly days alre ady !" Prime Minister , then, turning , "See, I 1 ve saved you eight to is . He and to General p recious Gener al Clark says he wants a direct order tell~ng the TORCH planners that they are going to carry out TORC that they must H, start the operation on a certa in date and that they a r e go ing to occupy certain positions and accomplish certain definite results. This will cut out a lot of red tape and get TORCH on a concrete footin g . The five men talk about the operation until 2 A. M. Mr . Churchill's 11 through ( observations include: I want troo ps pouring into the new area . I want the walls, the ·ceilings -- everywhere ! 11 "The French will g o with us if we are Frenc h can ' t afford to pi:k a loser . " g oing them to come to wi n . But the 11 What about crossing the channel? W ell, I told Stalin ' Why stick your head in the alligator's mouth at Brest when you can go to the Mediterranean and rip his belly! 1 " The men talk about the r ea ction of the North African French to the invaaion. General Clark tells the Prime Minister that he thinks paratroopers sho uld go down with parachutes made of American fla gs and t hat aerial sky-writers shou ld zoom across the heavens writin g : 11Viva France! Lafayette , we are here again-for the second time! 11 As the . conference breaks up at 2 A. M. , Gener al Cl ark tells the Prime Minister that he _ and the oth er TORC pla nners "are H tired of this piddling around . " "Ev ery minute counts," the Deputy Cornmander-in.;..Chief of TORCHdeclares . 111 've spent days talkin g about how we ou gh t 1.e to do this tl in 0 • What we need now is th e green light. " Mr . Churchill ( promises action . �( LONDON, AUG. 26 , 1942--General G1ark tells a combi~ed British .American staff meeting this afternoon that TORCH "is definitely on"' and that it probably will be launched "not later than October 15 . " H~ tells his section chiefs to proceed on that b~sis , concentrating , for the time being , on the inside operation, including Philippeville . To coordinate work, particularly between the British and American G- 3 and G- 4 sections, General Clark ann ounces to the bined staff that a British Deputy Chief of Staff and a British Assistant Be9meta~¥ i of the Gener a l Staff will be added to his personal TORCH staff. com - On the heels of General Marshall's cable and the talk with Prime Minister Churchill , General Marshal l calls in high - ranking officers throughout the day . GenerAl Anderson , wh o is to be called before Mr . Churchill today, is informed, for background purposes , of the g ist of the conversation of last ni ght . General Clark informs General Anderson that the Prime Minister says that November is t o o late and that TORCH must start by mid-October . The two generals discuss how the necess a ry combat teams can be ready to g o into action by October 15 . ( Th e conf ere nce turns into a rou nd -table discussion of how su py ly problems are going to interfere with operat iona l plans. General Gale , Brigadier Benoy and Colonel Philipps , all British supply experts, join the conf ere nce . As usu a l, the chief topic is the difficulty of supplying the exped i tion. Benoy -1 says ·.the e;cbmf b:bp.dld capaod:ty { ··~he ' po:oes at Philippeville _of and Bone fail to meet by some 5 , 000 tons the requirements for troops to be landed and conc entra ted at those points for an advance on Tunis . Th is fi gure, he says , is based on minimum maintenance requirements- food , Ammunition , fuel- - and that it does not include any allowance for reserves or for losses. According to Benoy 1 s calculations, the s hipping deficiency cannot be made up until it is p ossible to establish coa stw ise shippin g from Algiers to the sma ll e r ports . Gene .,..· Anderson al s a ys that under the circumstances it will not be possible for his forces to gegin the i r advance on Tunis by D . 24 . General Anderson seems conservative and cautious. At one point the conversation goes like t h is : Anderson : 11I am left with no reserves , except at Al g iers." 11 Clark Ca n 1 t we ge t it ashore in lighters?" Anderson : 1Lo g istics brin g us to one irrefutable fact : there are no allowances for loss e s; no allowances for delays . The Mission l s extremely dangerous . I might not be able to get stor e s . " Clark "You ' ve g ot to lan d and do the b e st you can. The ~rime Minister says November first would be out of the question and that TORC must start H the middle of Oc t ob er . 11 .Anderson : "In other words, lam, even if I can't advance?" �91 Clark : "That's advance! right . Land and you'll get your chance to u General Anderson agrees that regardless of what date is set for D-day, his ability to advance in t¥Ue to forestall Ax.is occupation of Tunisia is doubtful . General Clark bre aks up the conference by telling the other officers that "the operation is definitely orl' and that "ways and means will have to be found to make it successful ." Before General Handy leaves for Washington, General Clark tells h im of the conversa t ion with Prime Minister Churchill, of Churchill's insistanc e on action by mid - Oc tober a nd how the Prime Mi nister took immediate steps to assist TORCH b y ordering the First Sea Lord to cut down the time re quired for the voyage to the Mediterranean . General Clark points out to General Handy that TORCH planners must be furnished "a definite directive without a moment 1 s unavoidable delay--we are ready to go ahead just as soon as we get the basic decision ." ( General Gale, who felt sli ghted yesterday when the American leaders of TORCH met without the British, is told by General Clark that the Americans received a personal mes sa ge from Gen eral Marshall that required consultation by a few American o ff icers before an answer c ould be sent back to Wash ington . He explains , not only to General Gale but to the l at e afternoon Ang lo - American conference, that the subject matt e r has been turned over to the British Joint- Mission in Washington and that it will reach the joint TORCH planning board in the near future . Gener a l Gale again brings up hi s p r oposal t ha t he be place d on a 1-evel with the Chief of Staff . General Clark explains that or gan izati on for •roRCH will follow the U. S . type and that there will be only one Chief of Staff . However, Gener a l Ga le is to feel free to g o direct to Gener a l Clark anytime he wish e s. General Gale says that will satisfy him . He then s ays the r e is l ack of staff coordin a tion , especially b etween G-3 and G- 4 . Gen e rals Gale and Dewing say they believe tne dirficulty lies in the dif ference b etwee n British and American staff procedure. They feel a British Deputy Ch ief of Staff wou ld ass: i:st in smoothing staff work. General Cl a rk, who , although not h ing has been said yet , f eels that Gener u l Dewing, wh o would out - rank the Am ric 1 Ch ief e m of Staff, wants the job, asks him to submit a name and promises that he will put the ma n in as deputy. Moreover, Ge neral Clark adds , a British secretary might be a dd ed to th e secret ar i at of the General Staff . Cables TORCH sideli administration p rocurement will operate being dis p atched to ght op e rat i ons: the wit hin occupied of radio equipment on once the troops Washington cover a multitude of U. S . is to furnis h funds for civil areas , usin g local Frenc h currency; is asked; W RVe len gt hs that TORCH g o into action are s et . J �,I / ( l LOND , AUG 27 , 1942 -- Despite . t scarcity of time if proper prepara ons are to be made, the pl for TORCH still ls not defin ite . G eral Ma· shall cables Gene ls Clark and Ei~enhower that Pres·· ent Roos e l t appears to ve decided def:l,nitely that t att k on Nor. h Africa be mad exclusively by United State as aulting and Casa / - resident think that 80 , 000 Ampican troo p are necessary lish the rn.!bss n . rt must be large and werful landing or political well as milit y purposes At a conference eneral Marsha , President Ro sevelt saY, he feels a joi land ng , even if d by United St es troops will not suffi • He believe if it is All - American; operation e can , within week after the assa1 t , arrang~ma "'ersso th e will be no c plications con c erning th landing of Br· ish troo to reinforce· e Americans . I n the initi assault , Br· ish naval orces and sh · p i n g would be used . / acco. Gen al Marshall /wh o wire he t wo Amer an g enerals ..i.mmedia tely fo lowing the ·w;(i House te onference , 11s Clark ¢ Eisen I hower hat he is c fu;lnced t President as fully m~ up hi~ mind and intends o dictate" an Al l - Amer.·can TORCH _fle says ~11t if . sue a directiV, is i ssue , the force attacking Oran will be made UR of troops ready in he United ingdom . General Pa_,.t;-ton will ad the Ca blan c a attack . Gener ~l Clark probably l w1Ll be the ommander - n -C hief if TORCH becomes All - American . ( Cabling General Marshall as rapidly as possible , the TORCH leaders say that on l y two combat teams , plus a Ranger battalion , wi ll be ready if the Oran landing is to be made October 15 . The bulk of the attacking force , Generals Clark and Ei senhower , agree will have to come from the United States . They point ~Jt that the British opinion is that such a TORCH operation won't accomplish the real purpose and what is the reason for going at all if we don ' t gain Tunisia . They add that All i ed troops cannot get Tunisia unless __ they do so qui c kly and attack as far east as Bone . They point that Prime Minister Churchill promised last night to strip down his Indian Ocean fleet to assist in TORCH since the American fleet _E- as the Japanese well -engaged in the Solomon Islands battle . ou1 :· ( General C1ark is in conferences all day . General Anderson , saying that he will be able to assault at Algiers and Bone "with prospects of success but without a mobile force to advance , " asks for a new TORCH d i rective . He says the chances of reaching Tunisia in time to defeat German for c es is sli ght , even with Philippeville included . He adds that if there is no Frenc h resist anc e , he may , by requisitionin g local tr an sport , be able to move into Tunisia befo r e 1 s views , his D. 24 . He holds that regardless of the Prime M1 .nister present mission cannot be carried out against resistance . The new dire c tive might , he believes , order him to assault at the selected points , secure airdromes and ports in the vicinity , then move to the east without spe c ifying a date for the accomplishment of the latter objective . �General Clar k asks Anderson when he will have enough trans port to move forward witho u t French assistance and the Britisher replies that when the first follow - up force is in, about D.8, he will be able to move a brigade gro p but the remainder of the force wi ll not be mobile until after arrival of the second follow-up convo y . General Clark tells him that if all p;oes well in the initi al landing at Oran there will be some air transports available to assist him in getting his troops forward . General Anderson says that will be v ery helpful . Accordin g to General Anderson, the First Sea Lord is no w hedging on the 10-d ay fi gure for the sea voyage, pointing out the dan ge r from air attack to a convoy on a course laid near the West Coast of Europe . The Director of Movements is also doubtful that the time for combat loading can be reduced much below 1 2 days as five days is the normal time required for loading one vessel, but not enough berths exist for simul tane _ ous loading of all ships in the convoy . However , Gene ra l Cl ark points out to Anderson , Mr . Churchill has said he is willin g to light the ports at night to expedite loadin g . General . Gale and Colonel Stokes are ship ping si t uation. General Gale says if in the United Kingdom will not have time trip to the United States . I called in to discuss the D- day is early ships now to make another return The top - ranking intelligence officer on TORCH, British Brigadier Mockl er -F erryman , tells General Clark he cannot ag r ee with. t :1ose who think the French in Nort h Afr ica will not resist . He believes firm resistance will be encountered for at least 48 hours . He says the French army in Africa lacks both moral stamina and physi cal means for prolonged resistance . After talking over the proposed organization of the Headquar ters Security Force for TORCH with Colonel Ramsey, General Clark believes.it would be best to take the required reconnaissance unit and infantry battalion from the 1st Armor ed Div ision . Units brought in f r om the U. S . later will repla ce these so they can rejoin the division when it enters the theater . General Clark calls in General Allen and Bri ga dier General Roosevelt and outlines to them the training plans for the 18th Infantry Combat team of the 1st Division which will begin training at Inverary , Scotl and , about September 10 . General Roosevelt says that all special amphibious equipment is being shipped from the States and that it probably will be here by September 15 . A long intelligence report concerning what Washington G- 2 of f icials think will be the re a ction of the Frenc h and Spanish to the Afric an attack is received by General Clark. Excerpts from it include : j �J ( "The Vichy French may try to influence us into Occupied France in order to g ive them some guidance for thei r own action vis - a~vis the Germans 1 or bait us into a German net, or to warn us as to the futility of our effort . There is nothing however to indicate that the Vichy French are other than realists , and they ar e expected to make a d e cision which will put them on the winning side . There is nevertheless a hopeful tone in some French information which su ggests that if u. s . forces go into French territory they sh ould be in sufficient force to impress the local French authorities and t~ hold on at all costs . "With reference to the Free French , there is a slight indic ation that they may know or suspect something about it . xx (Officialis) fully understand the vit al importance of not t e lling them anything with re g ard to future operations . xx x There is a report that the French in North and Northwest Africa are on ed ge . In this c onnection , there is something on this in 11a most reliable source . 11 There is nothing reliable to indicate that the French wi ll assist us anywhere , but on the other hand , much information to indicate that the y will resist . However, emphasis is again laid upon the fact that resistance may be considerably less if they are faced b y a strong and apparently resolute force . "We have no information to indicate that Spain will remain remain aloof or that the Germans will not use the Spanish airfields . In this connection , if Spain stay s out of it , or the Germans do not use their airfields initially , surface u ni ts can reac h certain points in North Africa without effective interception b y Axis air and surface forces . If , however , German Air uses Spa nish airfields , earlier and serious interception of our forces must be expected. If t h is Axis activity from Spain is withheld until after our forces are ashore, the Axis Air might make it very di ff icult for the recently landed forc e s . However, the operation offers considerable hope of success if the Germans are kept out of Spain until a later date . I t would be in error to plan, however , definitely on the Germans staying out of Span is h airfields . If the ope ration is put through , German air and other forces might be sent down toward Spain for purposes of destroying United Nations' forces in the Mediterranean and an opportunity might arise for other United Nati ,ns' forces from England to strike in the German fl ank . " General vlark points of opinion in these views ( out that "there is considerable with those of the Prime Minister difference ." The Washington G- 2 also brings up in its report the subject 11 of 11Cooperat ion with Allies ." I t declares it is of vital importance to thoroughly war game and prac t ice with the British on t h is tubject (coordinat io n of air , ground and armored forces) practice with the British on this subject of coordinati on of the several elements from distant and near bases i n any aspect of the special operation p lanned. This should be thoroughly exam ~ned with the British in London, and as well should be soundly practiced with our naval forces . The coordination and ti ming of the various elements of this �operation give 11 are 3IHL of absolutely vital importance General Clark remarks that these me a pain in the hind end . 11 . platitudes " about coordination II the "It is axiomatic general declares , "that . staff officers in high positions fa; removed from the front , reiterate doctrine which is well kno~ to all of us , but which to put into effect requires considerable time . I n other words , Kroner (Brigadier General Kroner of tre Washington G- 2 staff) is going on record that for an operation of this kind to be successful, coordination of air , ground and mechanized units is essential . We have been preaching this in our training in the states for the past t wo years . W know e it is essential and would do it here , but time do e s~not permit. 11 0 * * * LONDON, AUGUST28 , 1942--Plans for United in TORCHare progressing favorably and the air ing plans for movement of both ground personnel the United States and the United Kingdom . ( _) C States air operations sections are preparand sup plies from Colonel Vandenberg confers with General Clark and the Deputy Commander-in - Chief discusses with him the p ossibility of using various devices to prepare the way for the American landing: sky writing , American flags dropped by parachute and leaflets. Some Spitfir e mechanics have been shipped to the United States to come over with General Patton ' s force . Gasoline supply at first will be by five-gallon cans , later by barrels , and finally by t ankers . Packing of equipment mus t be gin in about two weeks if the date is to be October 15 . Van:lenberg says Generals Arnold , Doolittle and Hansel all agree that we have not more than about one - fourth the air strength supporting the American attack that might profitably be used . They also believe that the British effort is so weak in air support that it is unlikely to succeed in view of the Axis Air Force strength in the Sicily - Sardinia area . Vanderber g says that General Doolittle, with his principal staff officers , plans to go f'rom Gibraltar to La Senia airport just as soon as it bas been captured. In line with air ope r ations , General Anderson , during a conf erence with General Clark , asks if the general would be willing to have American planes land at various point~ including Tunis , on the morning of the attack . He feels that a big bluff might work but points out that American officers landing at Tunis might be made prisoners of war . As a sidelight to this British request , Colonel Vandenberg tells General Clark that the Fighter Command is holding back from the TORCH operation . He says the 9onnnand is "reluctant" to be changed from its present role of escorting bombers to that of ground support in the TORCH operation . General (Hark says this is a matter which will "re quire definite action . " American bombers , accompanied by the flighters , are raiding Occupied France almost daily now . Admi~al Ramsay calls to discuss the readjustment of naval �9 f forces required in order to provide means for the protection of the Philippeville attack . No additional vessels or naval air c raft are available . The British Navy is planning to provide four carriers and t wo auxiliary carriers in the Mediterranean with a total of about 60 to 70 fighting planes in addition to some reconnaissance and a few bombers . Adm~ral Ramsay plans to provide air protection for the forces attacking at Bone and Philippeville up to dark on D . l . At that time , carriers will turn back to assist in covering the attack at Algiers the next morning . The British Admiral feels that the limited support that he co u ld afford for the attacks at Bone and Philip pe ville by naval planes does not justify the risk entailed to the carriers from Axis land - based planes . r ) Admiral Ramsay does not suggest that the Philippeville attack could not be made due to naval li mitations but he does point out that in order to mount the attack , use must be made of special ships no w being converted . These are large vessels of about 20 1 000 tons which lack armored landing craft and which are not of the best type . Crews for the landing c raft will n ot be well trained . He also states that in order to place landin g c ra .t't in condition for oper ations that training would have to cease about 'September 10 . The general tells him such a conditi on cannot poss ibly be agreed to; that the training of the c ombat team s had to be carried through , and that if the landing craft were not in the best shape , that was merely another risk that we would have to accept . General C1ark brings up the possibility of including a fient at Casablanca if the large - scale T ORCH operation g oes on . Admiral Ramsay thinks the idea is sound provided a s 1li table naval co111ering force can be found . In his opinion, the risk involved in brin g ing a l arge convoy into the vicinity of Casablanca without strong naval su pp ort wou ld be great . He feels that more battleships, some c ruisers and a carrier are essential . Gene r al Anderson joins in the discussion and soon a sharp difference of op inion arises betw e en the British general and the Briti sh admirql concerning the use of landing craft prio r to embarkation . Admi ral Ramsay emphasizes the need for c raft overhaul; Gene ra l Anderson the need for training of assault troops . After ;l!dm!L ral Ramsay leaves , Gene r al C lark explains to General Anderson that he is ordering a second reserve comb a t team of the 1st Division into amphibious training . Anderson understands th at he will have the 168th U . S . Infantr y re gime nt at Algiers and the 18th U. S . Infantry at Philippeville . Gen e r a l Ql ark ~rin g s u p the subject of anti - aircraft protection for the regimental combat teams in the assault and on the beach. Gener a l And erson states that none has been provided and that none is required since the land ing would be made at night . He believes A- A weapons on the ships will take ca ~e of the situation u nt il anti - aircraft units can be pu t ashore . He says that in the attack at Algiers some tanks would be used with one of the comb at teams . The C01 manding :1 General of the 78th British Divis ion will g ive Gene ra l Clark details of this attack plan at a later date . �r ( General Cl ark tells General Anae~son that he wants every detail of every plan laid before him and that he intends them fully as the plans develop . minute to go into Satisfactory progress is being made on amphibious training at Inverary , Scotl and . Colonel 0 1 Daniel reports in today to General Clark . Colonel o t Daniel says no provision is being made for anti aircraft support with landin g craft or on the beach, a thing that the general feels must be provided . General Clark tells General Allen that he has no objection to Brigadier General Roosevelt go i ng to inspect the Scotland base but that he must understand clearl y that the training is under British command and that he is not to interfere in any way e Gene ra l Allen is also told that another regimental combat team , the 26th, would g.o into amphibious trainin g and that the 18th U. S . Infantry Regiment combat team will .move to Toward about September 7 for advanced training . The 26th mmfantvw Regime nt team will go to Inverary Sept ember 26 to take over from the 34th Division combat team that will have complet ed its training by then . General Clark explains that in case the American TO RCH plan is put into effect we would need an additional u. s. combat team for the assault- - or, a total of three combat teams at Oran . Other urgent matters that get attention today inc lude discussion of the advance party that will go to Gibraltar by plane, arriving there just before the TORCH convoy gets ready to enter the Straits of Gibraltar ; (Genera l Matejka feels there is no.insur mountable difficulty to providing signal communications at Lribral tar.); organization of the Anglo-ArlBrican rel ati ons in the G-3 section , and formation of a definite staff program to bring out wealmesses or onnnissions that might otherwise be u ndetected until too late . In the evening, Generals ~lark and Eisenhower leave for Prime Minister Churc hi ll's country home at Checkers . They will remain overnight so they can hold lengthy, u disturbed confer ences with Mr . Churchill . . CHECKERS, ENGLAND, AUG 29 , 1942 - -While Generals . Eisenhower and Clark are at the Prime M inis ter 's country estate, an officer courier arrives from London with a secret cooe message of greatest importance . General Marshall cables that President Roosevelt appears to have decided definite l y that the attack on ~orth Africa will be made exclusively with United States troops assaulting at Oran and Casablanca . The President thinks that 80,00 0 American troops are necessary to accomplish the mission . It must be a large and powerful landing force for political as well as military purposes . At a conference �Ci , with General Marshal l, President Roos evelt says he feels a joint landing , even if led by United States troops, will not suffice . He bel i eves if it i s an All - American op e ration he can , within a week , , afte r the assault landing, arrange matters so there will be no com ~ pli cations conce rni ng the l andi n g of British troops to reinforce the .Americans . In the initial assault , British naval and air forces and shipping would be used . General Marshall , who wired t he two American generals i mmed i ate ly following the White House conference , tells Clark and Eisen hower that he is convinced the President "has fully made up h is 11 mind and intends to dictate an All-.American TORCH. He says that if such a directive is issued , the force attacking Oran will be made up of troops already in the United Ki ngdom . General Patton will head the Casablanca attack . General Clark probably will be the Comm nder -i n -C hief a if TORCH becomes All-American . The President , General ma rshall says , apparently is u·riwilling to accept the hazards of a single line of communications through Gibraltar . He does not ag r ee with the British argument that such a TORCH operation will mean the loss of Tunisia and possibly Algeria to the Germans . 'l'he President also bel iev es it is imperative that the United States strengthen its guard of the South Atlantic . Another argument 1V1r Roosevelt . giv e s is that there is not enough naval support for more than two landing points . Genera l Marshall s ays the ~resident expe c ts to convey his decision t o the Prime Minister on Monday and that all information concerning Mr . Roosevelt's stand must be highly secret and that Bri tish must not hear a single word about it. the Fri or to arrival of the cable, Generals Clark and Eisenho wer have spent hours in conferences with the Prime Minister and other British l eaders talkin g over the proposed African operation . Upon their arrival at Ch eckers las t night, the two American genera ls were met by the Prime Min is ter who , as usu al , was wearing baggy, informal clothes . The entire dirmer conversati on revolves around TORCH. Seated around the table are the Prime Minister , General I smay , General Sir Alan Brooke (chief of staff of the British army ), General Clark, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden , Lor d Louis Mountbatten and General Eisenhower . The Prime Minister expresses his enthusiasm concerning TORCH Eden is also . sold on it 100 per c ent . Fo ~-owing l dinner and the showing of motion pie tures, including newsreels of the Die ppe ra i d and the Prime Minister ' s visit in the Mi ddle East . • Afterward the officials go to Mr . Churchill's study where the conversati on continues until 2 AM. The same ground i s covered as was covered at the London conference earlier in the week . General Clark againoutlines the shi i> i ng problems, P transport and naval . At 2 AM., all of the party but Mr . Churchill, Generals Brooke and Cl ark and Foreign Minister Eden retire . C . ~ OJvc,,,..R,,,,, ,\,<JI t / / �1. .. II The Prime Minister suggests that a little f resh air might be in order" after being closeted in the study so the four men go out onto the lawn to walk up and down in the moonlight d iscussing every phase of TORCH. At first , the men walk in twos : the Prime Minister and General Brooke in front and General Glar k and Anthony Eden in the re ar . Eden tells the general he thinks TOPCH is the right operation but that he hasn 1 t yet made up his mind just what the Spanish reaction will be . Since Mr . Churcfiill keeps flinging remarks back over his shoulder , the men fall in a line of four and stride up and down the lawn . They talk until 4 AM . The next morning the First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound , is summoned and the shipping situation is again gone over . Sir Dudley tells the Prime Minister that he does not believe he can reduce the time for loading ships and that iL looks as though the estimate of a 10 - day trip to the Mediterranean is optimistic . When the secret cable arrives b J courier , Prime Minister Churchill , who intimates he has been getting reports from his off~cials in Washington indicating the President is not satisfied with the Anglo-American TORCH plan , is cur i ous but Generals elark and Eisenhower stall him off. He invites them to remain during the afternoon but they both tell him they must return to London . ( While the Marshall cable is go ing to Checkers, General Gruenther, acting Chief of Staff for General Cla rk , c alls a conference of key U. S. members of the Headquarters Staff and orients them so they c an start work with a view to determining the earliest possible date for the operation . 1'hey are caut ioned to be particularly careful not to drop the slightest hint to the British that a chan ge might be made . As soon as Gener a l Clark returns, General Gale a nd Admiral Ramsey come in to fis h for informa t ion. Ramsey has learned scmething through Admiralty channels . General Clark tells them in a gene ral way of the conference at Chec kers and then tells them that the Amer ic an and British governme nts are not yet in agreement on TORCH; that nothing d~finite has been set but that a decision is expected soon . General Clark informs Admiral Ramsey that the Prime Minister wants further examination of the possibility of sec ur ing the n ~val means necessary for simultaneous attacks at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers (t~porarily eliminating operations at Philippeville and Bone . Ramsey states that the British cannot support Algiers and Oran alone . He adds the operation might be done if the U. S . can, in addition to supp ortin g Casablanca , help the British at Oran . The assistance required by the British from the . U. S . Navy for Oran is as follows , Ramsey says : one auxiliary car r ier, 12 destroye r s, 8 combat lo aders complete with landin g craft, 5 car g o carriers and 8 p e rsonnel ships . Admiral Rams ey points out that the attack on Casablanca will re quire stron g er naval support than that now planned for Or an . He considers a covering force, includin g two old battleships, to be essential at Casablanc a . The conclusion is that the proposed three-prong attack is beyond the capacity of the combined navies at this time . �,., 1 ,p:- IC General 01ark is making arrangements to Bring General Ward to London from Northern I reland to work out plans for employment of the First Armored Division at Or an . Tanks that go with the regimental combat teams must be trained with them and Colonel O'D aniel is charged with finding a suitable location for this type of work . The General is also bringing down General Ryder of the 34th Division to discuss the work of the division ' s combat team now in training at Inverary , Scotland . Amphibious training for the l~t Division is discussed with Generals Allen and Barker . General Cl ar k dis c uses the ways and means of getting the maximum training for the regimental combat teams of the 1st Division and the 168th Infantry of the 34th Div ision on the su ppo sition that they will make the attack on October 28 . General Allen recommends moving his entire division to Scotlru1d , saying a large fraction of h is comm end w~ll be under training in that area anyway . General Clark reserves a decision but instructs a reco n naissance party to look for a suitable area for the division in Scotland . General Allen is told that General Roosevelt will not accompany the reconnaissance party . It is now anticipated that most of the equipment for the 1 8thJ i n!ant~y combat team should be in the hands of troops by September 10 and , for the 26th It'antry by Sept vmber 15 . * ( * LONDON, AUG. 30, 1942 -- Despite the indecision and the ne:rve wracking tension of waiting for the men higher up to make up their minds as to what should be done , General Clark continues to hold conferences -- hold them even though he doesn't know what the scope of the plan is goingto be , even though he must speak very carefully with the British , officers who sense that TORCH is in a state of flux Political factors have now become so interwoven with military factors that General Clark and his staff can ' t even guess which way the next jump will be . This , the general hopes, will all be cleared up tomorrow when President Roosevelt is scheduled to send his recommendation or directive to London . A cable is sent to Washington declaring that it is now "evident •th a t the estimated date of October 25 is too optimistic . 11 Assault e quipment for the 1st Divisi on is still ~ar out of reach and it a p pears that certain amounts will not be available befo ~e the middle of September ~ The American generals tell General Marshall that they can 11scarcely attack earlier than the first of November . " The Oran fcrce, tentatively, will be composed of: 1st Infantry Division; one Regimental Combat Teron of the 34th Division ; one composite regiment; a small detachment of armored troops from the 1st Armored Division . Followup troops will come from the United States directly to Africa. The balance of the 1st Armored and the 34th Divisions will be left in the United Kin gdo m. General ~lark points out that the U . S . must bring addition a l ground formations to the United Kingdom . He 11 says this has always been accepted and the length of the convoy from England to the North African theater will make it highly . �I desirable the other compel us new the at to avoid double shipment if it can possibly be done . On hand , the . necessity of an early follow - u p to TORC may H to truce the remainder of these two divisions into the er . 11 General Clark has one visitor with whom he can frankly discuss a problem without having to be troubled as to whether TORCH will be as originally planned or whethe r it will be cot'ined to Oran and Casablanca . The visitor i s Li eut . Colonel W. A. Eddy, USMC U. S . Naval Attache , at Tanger . Colon e l Eddy believes that if the United States alone enters French North Africa there will be a popular uprising to support us . However , he does not bel'ieve this will happen if the British are with us . Groups of guerillas , he says , have been formed in Morocco and Algiers and they are ready to take an active part in any operation started by American forces . Leaders of these groups have been tested for loyalty and , in his opinion , the J would be trustworthy . ( Colonel Eddy supervises the work of 12 contro l officers who are charg·ed with observin g the distribution of materials imported from the U. S . under the North African Economic Aid program . These control officers, ost ens i bl y under the Consul at Algiers, are all army and navy men - -former officers or reserve office rs who are on in act ive - cu ty status . Captain Nochs , now on duty at Algiers, is acquainted intimately with Oran and key peop le in that area . He will come to London for conferences and provide TORCH leaders with a list of the men who should receive le tters from our government at the time the landing is made . Colonel Eddy has conferred with General Patton recently and General Patton has requested -certain action as.Lore at Casablanca as soon as his forces land. This includes rounding up of the German Armistice Commission as soon as American forces go into action . Col,nel Eddy is to confer with Mr . Mack on cert ain pol itic a l aspects of the operation . He will also discuss with General Matejka the use of the Tanger Broadcasting station to t ra nsmit information to our convoys . I General Anderson, as worried as a stenographer with a stork hovering over her house , co , ies in again to ask General Clark just what is going on . He s ays he has heard rumors that U. S . combat teams earmarked for his force may now be used with U. S . forces ~ He insists that he must know of any contemplated action th a t would bring about changes in his plans . He is aware of the proposal to attack at Casa blanca and Oran only . He krows of the unfavorable reaction of the British government . General Clark tells him the::.-·e is nothing more he can tel l him at present ,nd adds that until the British and American governments agree "we might as well not worry over d 0 tails . " General Clark tells the British general that 11the lack of navpl means almost certainly precludes a simultaneous attack at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers . C �IC ( ( Air Vice - Marshall Welsh comes in to discuss the general air plan for TORCHbut General Clark tells him 11we 1 11 have to wait until things are on a finner basis . " Without giving the Britisher any indication of a probable change in pli:m , thi::., General gets his views concerning air support of the Or an - Casablanca operation. He see s no par-c;icu.Lar diff·1culty, believin p- tbe :1 ir plan can be adjus ted to meet any operation finally decided upon. He says he will go ahead with the shipping of crated fip.:hters to Gibraltar. Welsh S8YS he is pleased with the general set-up . In his opinion, the greatest menace to the expeoi tion will be submarines. This will be c ambated by flying-boat patrols based initially at Gibraltar. Later they will be based at Oran and other North African ports . Plans call for anti - submarine aircraft squadrons to move onto North rlfrican bases by D.3 . General Gl a rk confers thrrughout the day with his own officers. The amphibious training program, running on a more-or - less d ~1-toy day basis because of the indecis ion of what will compose the TORCH force , requires almost constgnt revision . The 18 th Infantry Combat team , under present plans, will be moved into the Toward-Roseneath area by September 7 . There will be tvvo landing ships available for training . After the 18th has completed its training at Toward , a combat team from the 1st Armored Division will start its training there, the 18th moving into a tent camp , the loc F.1t ion of wh.Lch has y \.., to be selected t . The 168th Inf ant ry combat team will remain at • Inveraray until September 12 and be followed there by the 26th Infantry which will go into training between September 12 and 15th . General Clark points out to Colonel 0 1 Daniel the necessity for training that will be a re8listic rehearsal for the actual attack . 0 1 Daniel says exercises of this type are provided for . The training in the Toward-Roseneath area as now planned will be under the British. In case an All - American operation is carried out , 0 1 Daniel 1 s staff will take char ge of instruction. Generals Gruenther and Barker and Colonels Hamblen and Nevins are c A lled in to discuss with Gene.ral Clark wha t service units must be obtained additionally for the Oran force. Hamblen mentions a water supply unit, evacuation and surgical hosp ital as of vital importance . Hamblen is instructed to prep ~re a complete list and send a dispatch to Washington listing special equipment re qu irements such as fine-mesh head nets, mos quito repellents and other tropical equipment . Gene ra l Clark says there will be an acute need for qua rter -ton an phibious trucks . The time necessary to get additional service units from the U. S . probably will set the earliest possible date for the at G ack back to the f irst week in Novomber . LONDON, AUG 31 , 1942 -- President . an All - American operation! l The all - important Churchill. It outlines c able is sent the President's Roosevelt wants to keep TORCH this afternoon to Prime Minister plans and arguments but , as �.3lllff: ( yet , the plan for TORCH is not set . President Roosevelt wants ideas of the Prime Minister and Generals Clark and Eisenhower 48 hours . the within The President cables Mr . Churchill that he has considered all TORCHphases and that he .feels "v ery strongly that the initial attacks must be made by an exclus i vely Americ'm ground force sup ported by your (British) Naval and Transport and Air Units . " He says the operation " should be undertak en on the assumption that the French will offer less re sis tance to us than they will to the British . " 11 ! would even go so far as to say I am reasonably sure a simult an e ous landing by the British and Americans would result in full resistance by all Fr ,nch in Africa whereas an i ritial Am rican e land ing without British gpound forces offers a Peal chance that there would be no French resistance or on l y token resistance . I need a week if possible after we land to consolidate the position of both of us by securing the n on- resistance of the French . I sincerely hope I can get this . Then your force can come in to the eastward . I re , lize full well t 11 your landing must be made before at the enemy can get there . It is our belief that German air and parachute troops cannot get to Algiers or Tunis in any large force for at le1rnt t.10 weeks after initi nl attack . Meanwhile your troops would be ashore , we hope , without much op p osition and would be moving eastward . C 11 As to the place of landings it seems to me that we must have a sure and p e rmanent base on the northwest coast of Afr i ca because a single line of communic a tions through t he Strai ts is far too hazardous in the li gh t of our limited joint resources . I propose therefor that: (a) American troops lR nd simultaneously near Casa blanca and near Oran . (b) that they se ek to establish road and rail communication with e a ch other back of the mountains . The distance is little more than 300 miles . This g i ves the enterprise 1., suppl;/ base in Morocco which is outside the Straits and can be used to reinforce and supply the operations in Algiers and Tunis . "The real problem seems to be th 1,t there is not enough cover and combat loadings for more than two landings . I r ea lize it would be far better to hqve three with you handling the one to the East ward a week after we get in . To this end I think we should re - exam ine our resources and strip everyth.mg to the bone to make the third landing possible . 1,/e cnn give up the Russi an convoy temporarilJ' at that time and risk or hold up oth er merchant shippin g . I t is essential of course that all ships now assigned to EisenhoHer for his t wo landin gs remain int :-;ct . Hence t.ne eastward landing must be made on ships not now available to TORCH I will explore . "tHis at our end . Can we not get an answer on this , it ilin 48 hours or less? I wm t to emphasize , however, that under any circumstances one of our landin g s must be on the Atlantic . ( "The directive to the Commander inChief of the operation should be launched at the earliest pract~cable da te . The date should be consistent with the preparation necess ·iry for an operation wit h a �( fair chan c e of success and accordingly it shou l d be determined by the Comm Hnders in Chief . But in no event later than October 30 . I 11 still would hope for October 14 . ( s i gned ) Roosevelt . Genera l C1 ark rushes over to General Eisenhower ' s Grosveno r Square off i ce when the co p y of the President ' s cab l e to the Prime Minister is received . The resu l t rlf this confe- r e:,J;R.~tis a c able 11 back to Washington saying that the chief points/occasioned the concern of the British Chiefs of staff were the omrnission of Algiers from the original attack and th e fact that the assault proposed by the president disposes at least half of its strength on a coast where possibilities of landing are dependent enti r ely upon the weather with the probability th t four out of five days wi ll be u nsuitable for l a nding . Consequently while the British Chie f s of Staff completely shar e the American opin i on as to the importance of Casab l anca and the open.1ng of an auxiliary line of communications , they believe t1 1 at the Casablanca attack should be the one, if p o ss i b l e , that should be made on inv i tation and at al l events should not play too great a part in the first display of over whelming tac ti cal power . 11 ( 11 As a counterproposal , Genera l s Cl a rk and Eisenhower be l ieve the British Chiefs of Staff wi ll suggest something about as follows : that the Br i tish pro v ide all escorting , supporting and other naval crAft poss i ble to the United States wit n the request that the two main American attacks be made at Al g iers and Oran with a smaller U. S . fo r ce ready to attack simultaneous l y at Casablanca . By elim inating the Bone and Philippeville attacks from the present plan , some additional escortinp; vessels and combat l oaders will be c ome available . The Brit i sh cou l d d i spatch to the U. S . a few combat loaders to assist i n making up the Casab l Hnca force under the general plan just des c ribed . It is clear , however , that to provide the necessary nava l strength for g iv i ng reasonable protec t ion to the Casablanca attack , even on a relatively small sc a le , th e U . S . will have to produce a dditional strength to that used by the U. S . nava l pla mers here in making their ca lc ulations . 11 A su g gestion that a British division mirht be placed in Amer ic ,.n uniforms was rejected as involvin g risk of " l aying ourseives open to the charge of bad faith . " The cable to the War Department declares "there is no hope of the F ~rst Division being able to take part in a major expedition from the United Kingdom before October 30 . 11 Generals Eisenhowe r and Clark say 11this is absolutely the most optimistic date upon whic 1:1we c ·rn calculate • 11 The cable , signed by General Eisenhower , concludes : " General Clark and I both believe that every possible chance of in c luding Algiers in the first attack should be explored but we repeat our conviction that this c a n be done only with some additional nava l strength from the United States , wh ich prior investigation has indicated could not be forth com i ng . 11 Before arrival a series of confer ofthe B~~ s md efuti a l cable , ~ 6neral Clark holds e nces . General Larkin is informed he probably will �( head the SOS in the Oran area. Initially, the SOS at Casabla nca will not be unified with that at Oran under one command . General Rooks is cFJ.lled up f rom Lon gford Castle , where he has been heading the II Army Corps as Chief of Staff since Gener Hl Clark came to London . Rooks is told that in c ase the projected U. S. ~lan goes through , he will be designated Chief of Staff of t he Oran Task Force . He remains at Norfolk house to work out the s la te for the task force staff which will be held down to the minimum . General Ryder is calle d ·in and oriented on the proposal for an al l u. s . operation . General Porter is going to be placed in co .irrnHd of the 168th Inf antry comb at team . General Clark discusses n with General Ryder the possible use of th e 34th Division in the follovv - up phase . Rydor is also told that General Clark might take one infantry battalion from his division i'or use as a headquarters security force . I'he c aa.i.- o1' the 135th Inf an try , now in Scotland, is to return to Northern Irel and at once . The 34th, General Ryder says, is considera b ly under strength but replacements will be made from troops enroute to the European Theater of Operations. Once again the 1st Division is having trouble getting the equipment to replace that on the ship that went aground off Newfoundland . Colonel Hughes _ reports that one ship carrying an estima ted 5 , 000 tons of organization equipment for the lst's infantry and artillery uni ts has had. to turn back in mid - ocean . HU f,he s believes the ship is c arrying the ex p r es s shipment which was rushed to New York to replace the equipment that was on the vessel that went aground. Under the ci rcum s tances it is unlikely that ti is e quipment will be in the hands of troops before October 5 . For a D-day of November 5 it would have to be reloaded i rnm edia tel y for shipment to the African th e ater and would not be ava il able to the troops for tr aining purposes . General Gale and Brigadi 6r Benoy advise G·eneral (.;lark that the British War Office wants to s end telegrams tonight dire ctin g move ment of sup ~lies to g o on the first follow-up convoy for the Algiers - Phili ,.1eville-Bone p force . The War Office is willing to hold u.,., the i ssuance of telegrams for the Philippeville and Bone forces , buthas instruct ed General Anderson to release t e l eg rams for the Al g iers equ ip ment . This conference occurs prior to rec e ipt of Mr . Roosevelt's c able and General Clark i_nstructs Brigadier Benoy to request the War Office to "send no telegrams for at least t he next 24 hours , or until fu· ,-, ther advice is g iv en by me . 11 General Gale is told that no "new p lan" directive has been issued and that "work is to continue along the lines indicate d at the last staff confer en ce--Or an , Algiers , Philippeville, Bone . * l , LONp , SEPT . 1, 1942 -- The Britlsh ON are f'inally told tod ay th :it TORCHhas developed a split perso nality; that , as t hings now stand , there are really two plans -- President Roosevelt 's All-Am er ican attack and the combined Anglo -AmGricoo assault that has Prime Minister Churchill as its chief proponent . 'I � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, August 1-31, 1942 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from August 1-31, 1942. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1942 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Language A language of the resource English Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/556 Date Valid Date (often a range) of validity of a resource. 1940-1949 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/d370246a51057ed789d605b963f2427f.pdf?Expires=1789603200&Signature=j0mfUvvRDYOwhDR8hcP7FRwHYMArBXxyJk9us75aD-fU4Rl0o%7ElUChnblaCJE1NgfWfUpEF6YXbRkUPv1jAOMKldRBRgIl0TsrWWb3Lrxj9svhLnzgXPKAC0bPkSU%7ESfx8hyPDEQ2TkIjnxdiZe4kDZ-PeqRuMt-ipzvSJCzpuWEU89zptt1dCfnm%7EQ6xnJbn-oJ1mISwlS7pcY1doqQESA2I42372ikjCRzCuvUvgfa7ol5Hyq7fzVytqm1kE5tncBlpHrygnbappLQCja9qq2-JJP1pzMlIMsQnL%7Eplqry-yCvGGY8ntszvBEuRYITawRoP2iW6J0i9K3DG4FcSg__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 025c01318bb0c96f8bcd5e69966e332b PDF Text Text THE CITADEL 0 ARCHIVES AND MUSEUM head the SOS i n the Oran area . I nitially , the SOS at Casablanca will not be unif i ed with that at Oran under one com mand . General Rooks is c alled up from Longford Castle , whe re he has been heading the II Army Cor p s as Chief of Staff since Gener r-, Clar k came to 1 London . Rooks is told that in c ase the projected U . S . :gllan g oes through , he will be designated Chief of Staff of the Oran Task Force . He remains at Norfo lk house to work out the s la te for the task force staff which wi ll be he ld down to the minimum . General Ryder is called in and oriented on the p ropos al for an all u.s . operation . General Porter is going to be placed in co ,irrnRnd of the 168th Infantry combat team . General Clark discusses with General Ryder the possible use of th e 34th Division in the follmv - up phase . Ryder is also told that General Clark might take on e infantry battalion from his division for use as a headquarters security force . The caa..1.· 01' the 135t h Inf antry , now in Scotland , is to return to Nort he r n Ireland at once . The 34th , General Ryder says, is considera b l y under strength but replacements will be made from troops enroute to the European Theater of Operations . Once again the 1st Division is having trouble getting the equipment t o replace that on the ship that went aground off Newfoundland . Colonel Hughes _ reports that one ship carrying an estima ted 5 , 000 t ons of or ganization equipment for the lst 1 s infantry and artillery units has had to turn back in mid - oc ean . Huf)les believes the ship is c arrying the expr ess shipment ·which was rushed to New Yor k to replace the equipment that was on the vessel that went aground . Under the ci rcumstances it is unlikely that tl is e qu ipment will be in the hands of troops bef ore October 5 . For a D-day of Nov ember 5 it would have to be reloaded i mmedia tely for shipment to the African th c:ater and wo u ld not be available to the troops for training purposes . General Gale and Brigadi 0 r Benoy advise General ~lark that the British War Of f ice wants to s e nd telegrams ton i ght directing move ment of sup ~lies to go on the first follow - up convoy for the Algiers - Phili ,.1eville-Bone p force . The War Of fi c e is willing to hold U.i,i the i ssuan ce of telegrams for the Philippe vill e and Bone for ces , buthas instruct ed General Anderson to release t e l eg rams for the Alg iers eq u i pment . This conference occurs prior to rec e ipt of Mr . Roosevelt ' s cable and General Clark i _ s true ts Brigadier n Benoy to request the War Office to "send no telegrams for at least the next 24 hours , or until fu· , ther advice is g iven by me . " General Gale is told that no "ne w plan" dire c tive has been issued and that "work is to continue along the lines indicate d at the last staff confer en ce - -Or an , Al g i ers , Philippeville , Bone . l LO~ ON, SEPT . 1, 1942--The British are finally told today th r1t '/ TORCH has developed a split personality; that, as things now stand , there are really two plans -- President Roosevelt 's All-American attack and the comb ined Anglo -Am~rican assault that has Prime Minister Churchill as its chief proponent . �0 11rk assembles General 37 officers , British and .Am ricAn, e in a well - guarded conference room at 10 AM to ~ive them the complete picture on TORCH planning . The top - ranking men sit at- a rough wooden table at the head of which sits General Clark . On h is ri g ht is Lieut . General Anderson , who is scheduled to lead the British effort in TORCH; on General Clar k ' s left is nis Acting Chief of Staff, Brig . Gener a l Gruenther , then comes Admiral Ramsay of the Britis h Navy . The crowded table is studded with top nothc British and Americnn military , naval and air talent . Around the room other officers sit attentively on w~od ~n, folding clIBirs . "Some of you men ar e less confused than ott 1 ers about TORCH, 11 General Cl 1 k says , grinning r . "L e t's all get equally confused ." The officers , all of whom h rwe been on edge because of secrecy and an ever - shifting plan , laugh and the conference is off to a good start . ( I GenerA.l Clark explains that the Americi=m and British govern ments h a ve different conce ~ ts of how the attack on Northern Africa should be made . rte says President Roosevelt feels it is essential that the attack be All - American and that we establish ourselves fully on the northwest c oast , with half our force striking inside the Mediterranean and the other half outside at Casablanca to as s ur e us of an Atlanti c Coast supply port . The Prime Minister , he explains , v1ants to work on TORCH as all the officers now know it -- assaulting Or a n , Algiers , Bone arid , possibly, Ph ilippeville . The general tells the combined s t aff that "differences have developed . 11 The general then reads President Roosevelt ' s cable to Prime Minister Churchill and the me s sa g e that Gen e ral Eisenhower a nd he sent back to the \var Department . He adds that the plan proposed by them--he a vy l a ndin g s at Or an and Algiers and a li ghter l a nd i n g at Casablanca , all wit h American forces -- 11does not me et the President 's request but I think that is what he may propose to the Prime Minister ." Ir this plan is accepted , General Cl s rk says , the force g oing direct to Afri c a from the United Kingdom would make the Algiers assault . General Patton ' s force sailing dire c tly from the United States to Africa would probably do the o~an landin g . The United States , the general adds , " would try to piece to g ether a smaller force for the Casablanca task . " "I think , " General Clark tells the intent men facing him, "that the plan will go throu gh that way . It will affect General Anderson most of all becau se Bone and Philippeville will be out . Algiers , as a Britis h ass a ult , will be out but British troops pro bably will land there later . " ( The General t h en expl a ins that because of these ne w developments Gen e ral Gale , the Britis h sup J ly exp e rt, must postpone the planned loading of any s h ips for the African operati on "because if we load one ship we may have to u n load it a g ain and that wil l tangle things up worse than ever . Until the TCRCH plan is definit e ly set , we will do what plannin g we ing on this basis: �( "We' ll c al l t he President ' s p l a n ' Plan A'--that is, General Patton will attack at Casa blan ca; United States forces now in the United Kingdom will attack Oran, and the operation ·will have the use of Br i tish naval vessels , transports and ai r for ce . The U. S . task force fro m the United Kingdom wil l be c ompos e d of combat teams of the 1st and 34th Divisions and the 1st Armored Division . I am designating Bri gadier General Roo ks as Chief of Staff of the Oran Task Force . The ot he r p lan, e ntailin g All - Amer ic an landings in for c e at Oran and Al giers and the use of a s mall force from the United States at Casablanca , will be known a s ' Plan B . 1 The United Sta tes force from the United Kingdom probabl y will assault at Alg iers, se cu re the port and a i rfi e lds and ~et elbow roo m so Gen eral Anderson ' s B:bi tish force can come in, disembark at po r tside without too great d if f icult y and then start driving to the east for Tunis . The Oran forc e will turn to the w,~st and establish contnct with the fo rce landing at Casabl n ca . "T hat , roughly , is the Admiral Ramsay , can you get additional naval meims will picture as it stands today . Now, us additional information as to what be r equired? " Ramsay --"I gave that data to the British sta ff in the rou~h l ast nigl 1t . I t does not i n~.olv ~ as much additional naval support as we expected ." l Cl a rk -- 11The Prime Minister u nderstands effort is t o be and he asks that the United available . 11 Ramsa y-- 11 And Ca nada too . what the Brit is h naval States make the res t 11 General CHark tells the office rs that he learned l ast night that the Fi ght in g French have in timate d th ey know an op eration is afoot and have declared that u n le ss it is he ~ded b j a French high c anma nd II it is bound to fail . 11 Admiral Ramsay then po i nts out that if either P l an A or B is us ed it "will mean a break - up of what we have a lr eady planned . " He suggests "we use groundwo r k already done" wlth the Amer ic ,n for ce gettmg all ava il ab l e Algiers data f rom the Br iti sh . Cl ark -- "I th:h n k we ought to ac ce pt . It i s my belief will do Oran and t hat Amer ic an forces al r eady hert~ wi ll Algiers if Plan B i s accepted ." th at handle Patton Anderson--"This me a ns our plans will have to be altered com p letel y . If my fo rce is to go in to a port already secured b y the Amer icans , then dr iv e east , i~ enta ils ca mp l ete disrupt i , n of my present plans . 11 ( Ramsa y -- " If Plan B is used wi ll ·the fir st follow - up be British? ' �( Clark- - "I t h ink the first would be British . That would be General Anderson ' s group . It loo k s as though Anderson will have to have h is force on the high s ea s ready to com e in . His p lans will have to be extremel y flexible . The sh ips will not be co mbat load e d . If thin gs g o wrong , Gene ral Anderson and h is force will h 8ve to turn around and g o home . 11 Grue n th e r -- 11Since the President says he wi ll have t o h -,ve a week to pav e the way for the landi ng of British tro ops , won 't a D . 7 followup have to be sub sti tute d for a D . 4? 11 Cl ark- - "That 1 s ri ght!" Vic e Air - Marsha ll Welsh- - nTh is means an ent ire l y different air forc e . It will mean a bigger bomber and fi ghte r for c e s i n ce hea viest attack probably will co me now at Al g i ers . " the Clark--"Th ere 1 s no doubt about it . General Anderson ' s mission will no w be a fighting affair . There 1 11 be need f o r mo re ai r and armored units . Ander son is going to have t o fi ght before he re aches 'l'un 1s •• There will be a re a l b r awl s omewhere between Al giers a nd Tnn is . 11 Rams ay -- "And ( it won 1 t be with Fr e nch; Cl ark - - 11I don ' t n eed to tell pe c ts of this thi n g hold a positi)n Ther ,. ' s no question about it!" all welsh- - n I 1 11 try to work out then s e e what we 'v e g ot . " the and it will be wit h Germ,ms . " of yo u that the military assecondary to the politi ca l . types of a ir f raft we need Cl ar k- - 11It 1 s cer tain we c an ' t move any more l and - based planes into Lribral tar . Capacity is taxed wi t L the Ameri c '-: - Br i tish n planes a lr e ady earmarked 1 or there . Welsh might have to support , CasabLmca You and Va ndenb ar g (Col one l Vandenbe r W of the U. S . Air Fo rce) will have t o work the needs an u. plans ou t . 1 Spit Vandenb c r g- - 11It 91s ." Clark- - 11Spit The remark Welsh --"I geth e r . 11 ( just brings think would be better if we chan g ed Spit . 5 1 s for , as hi g h as laughs you can !" and ea s es the t ,,nsi on of· the I h Hd b e tt e r ge t my p e ople and meetin Vandenb e rg g. to - Clark- - 11Gentlemen , I h a ve g iven you ev e rything I know about TORCH as it no w stands . We have little time and we must wait for a directiv e . If Oran is attacked b y us und d ~ P lan A, the force wil l consist of three infantry comb a t t e ams- - two from the 1st Divis i on and on e f r om the 3 4 th--and one Armored Divisi on unit . I f we attack at Al r;i t-; s we wil l adapt r General Anderson I s plan . 11 "' . . - �..., \09 ( J Thero nference is thrown open to questions nnd General Clark rules that the entire TOPC,{ operation will proceed on Greenwich Mer idi an Time; t e lls ~dm:br al Ramsay th11t a memorandum has already been written concerning censorship , press relations and communica tions for TORCli; tl1at instructions will g o out to have the assault forces avoid , as much as possible , any damage to the ports . Ramsay --" What about the ned D- day? Before you get the Pres id ent ' s October 30 date too fix e d in your minds you ' d better s ee what the moon is doing . There can be no assault or movement through the Straits of Gib r a l tar while the moon is too ful l. " Cl ark -- "As to Octob ur 30 , we first heard day . I a l r0ady know that the moon will be best with t he 5th probably being the best D- day . 11 of that date yester ear l y in November , General Anderson asks that c e rtain members of his TORCH staff II go a lo ne; since it 1 )Ok s as though eventually Al g iers v ill be my base . " He a lso r e co mmends tha t the American l anding force s e iz e the port of Bougie , about 110 mi l es east of Al gie rs . This wou l d gi v e Gen e ral Anderson a se c ond po r t at wh ic h to l and h i s tro op s so he c an begin driving toward Tunis . the ( General Cl a r k is use of 1 3 divisions asked . if the TORCH operation st ill calls for "TORCH now has a complet el y new a1,pre cii:ition nnd it may take more , " the gonerH l replies . "It l ook s as though we are going to have to fight for it and it means we must be stronger ." The Genera l then breaks begins to buzz li ke bees in of the development . up the conference a bott le. Groups and the bare roo m g o into dis cu ss ion Later i n the day , General Cl ark learns that the Prime Mini ste r has answered President Roosevelt ' s cabl e and th11t Mr . Churchill had ag r eed to the Americ a n proposa l . Howe v er , the Prime Minister re it e r ates his des ire that British troops l nnd at Algiers . Gene r als Ward , Ryde-r , Allen and Porter ( who wi ll lead the assault troops from the Unit e. Kingdom ) and Gen 0 ral Rooks , chie f of staff , are c al l ed in to d i s cuss the composition of U. S . forc es that wi ll m(l1 e fr om the British I sles to North Afr ic a . Genera l Truscott is c alled i n to g o over d e tai l s of the Oran attack as it was planned for General Patton ' s forces . General Lemn i tzer , w1:o has been a Deputy Chief of Staff, i s dir v cted to take ov e r the plans and training se c ti0n of TORCH with General Barker r eturning to the European Theater Qf Operations staff . Col onel Nevins is in formed he will be G- 3 of either the Or an or Algie ~ s Task Force . General Le e , head of SOS, has just flown from the United G ,n erH l Cl ark te lls General Lee equipp i ng the 1 st Di vision and and General Styer , SOS offic er uho States , are ori ented on p l ans and he part icularly needs he l p i n o~tgini ng additionalservice u nits �I\ b from the United States . General Lee says he will try to have the equipment for the 1st Division unloaded at the Clyde in order to save time . I f necessa r y , Gener al Clark s ,1.ys he will accept British 25 - pounders as substitute equipment for the U. S . 165- mm howitzers . General Lee is told that i n connection with TORCH service units fall into three categories : those now in the United Kingdom , many )f which are deficient in equipment ; those which must be brought from the U .s ., combat loaded , to accompany the assault force from the United Kingdom; and those which wi ll sail direct from the U. S . to the Afri c an theater . General Styer observes that units in the U. S . should be alerted regardless of the final de ci s i on on TORCH The . problem of organizing SOS in the new theater is discussed at length and key personnel is ~one ov e r . Bad luck is dogging the delayed shipm ent of 1st Division equip- ) ment . Colonel Hambl en reports that in addition to the vessel in origina l 1st Division convoy th a t went on the rocks in Newfo undlan d , the second ship bringing over the repl a c ement shipment was lo st through enemy action . Now, the third ship starting across with the shipment has had to put into Bermuda bec· ;. se of a shifting u car go ! ~,< LQNDON, SEPT. 2 , 1942 - -The weight of political influ ence on military decisions and military commanders is s o great that it stag gers reason . To date , the political angle has had far more influence on TORCH than has the m~litary . The delay - -at le a st the g reat bulk of it -- has resulted from political , not military , implic aticns . I n fact, the basis of TORCH is political , primarily . Both President Roos evelt and Prime Minister Churchill have promised that a Second Front wi ll be opened in 1942 and the North African theater appears to be the only place where it will have a fair chance of success . To date , this diary has s h own from day to day the delays and ch an ges in plans . The succulent parts of cables crossin g the Atlantic have been quoted . Conferences with Prime M nister Churchill hav e been recorded . All these reports couldn't help but make the reader wonder to wh,,t extent the planning of TORCH is political , and to what extent military . He c an , hcw ,vever , draw pretty logical conc.lu s ions . General Clark is drawn out a little today on the political factors that have impeded the planning and ou ic k execution of TORCH It is a subject . he is reluctant to discuss but one that he sho uld include in any diary of war becaus e politics is part of war; it is a major factor in determininp; whether a campai gn is won or lost . It may be the decid~ng factor in TORCH . "For many weeks , 11 says General Clark, "we had r been working on a plan reported to both g ov ernmen ts and one that was approved , apparently , by both of them . The first p lan had almost re a ch ed the . . j �( point where we were ready to go ahead loading for the North African assault when the delays started . During the past weeks we have been more or less dragged around by the necks and every time we m0 ke a move , someone in Washington or London is looking over our shoulder to second guess and rsuggest revisions or changes . "I h1we been told that the President's r E:ply to Prime Minister Churchill is expected tonight and th t indications are that v,e will return , basically , to the plan callin~ for simultaneous attacks on Casablanca, Oran and Algiers . Even now there is nothing to indicate this will be definite although time is closing in and a decision must be made soon if a Second Front is to be opened this year . So much v aluable time has be en lost that we can nev 0r get back or make up . During this hectic period of indecision we have had at le1rnt a half dozen plans before us . Before we could even start laying a foundation for one , we got another . 0 ''~~hy can ' t the commanders decide what they can do , not what they have to do? Ti me is a prime factor in any military operation , yet , those who delay us keep reminding us that TO PCH must be carried out at the earliest possible moment . We must not , we are told , lose any time . However , we ' re still waiting for the mission directive . Don ' t they realize the time factor necessary for getting new planning underway? There is an urgent necessity for time to plan , time to tran , time to assemble for the assault . "All we had had are repeated and repeated distractions . The we wait , the longer it takes to make up minds , make polit ical adjustments and get down to concrete preparations for a TORCH wdl know is de.finite , the less chance we have of security; and with out security we can't get full success . Cables from Washington all emphasize the dire results if TORCH is not successful . Success requires careful planning and ample time but we can't plan until we know definitely what it is we a.re planning for . " 1 mger Developments , particularly in the past three weeks , show the tremendous effect of political considerations on military affairs . The future will sh ow what effect this political factor- - which has wated time and energy and which has brought the introduction of plan after plan -- will have on the execution of the TORCH operation that is finally decided upon . sent ( Intelli@ence the following reports cable come in that Free French to his London headquarters General De Gaulle from Syria: "Americans have planned a landing in North Africa . In con unction with this landing the British were to attack Dakar . Vichy knew about all this and has kept the Germans informed of the plan . Vichy has been deceiving the Americans •• • as they previously deceived the British . I n North Africa the Americans pretended they were acting in accnrd with General De Gaulle's Comite Nationale and so got support of De Gaulle I s supporters in North Africa . This was �( not the case at all . Instead the Americans delayed communications betwe en De Gauilile ' s aP,ents in Nort h Africa and his head nuarters in London so that the real truth would not be known to De Gaulle par tis ins in North Africa . In case of an Am ri can l anding i n North e Africa, Marshal Petain will ord er all Fr 8nch forces to resist ap;gression . The entire French army , air force qnd fleet will obey the ovders. Undoubtedly Germany will t H ke adv nntar,e of this situation to intervene under the color of protecting the French empire. Laval will not declare war at once but will ho l d out in hope of blackm'liling from Ge:nTl any a little help regrading prison e rs of war and food . The id ea of America at first was to invade Europe this year. They tr1en needed the help of Free French forces and so opened negotiations in London . Now they have resumed . thei r form E; attitude r of standoffifshness t oward the Free French. 11 A c a1b:be is sent to the War DepRrtment in Washington tellinr; officers that four sources--Vichy, Gibraltar, Tan g i e rs nnd Washington--h.ave }~ :vefho:v-ted. tuc:the Free French headquarters ::o in London that the y have information concerning an imminent attack in North Africa . These sources state that a ctive opposition will be encountered un less a prominent Frenchman is mdenmif~ed with the operation . All r,✓ports indicate that countries bordering the Mediterranean have a definite suspicion and pe rh ups some knowledge of an imment attack . The serious potentia:tities of such a situation are obvious , " Washington is cabled . The whole matter implies , the cabl e continue , the failure of our efforts to p revent leaka ge involving most secret subjects and su~gests adoption of corrective measures . Plans are being pushed for the or ganiza tion of the Oran Task Force . General Rooks , Chief of Staff of t he operati on, is setting up ley members of h is staff in ijorfolk House . The bulk of th e staff wi~l be built u p after the lan ding . Generals Cl ark and Rooks agree that the Norfolk group now b eing set up und er Rooks should be the advance echelon of the II Army Corps and that officers and men remai ning at Longford Castle sho uld be considered the rear echelon and be subject to call to the Afri c an theater as soon as their movement is feasible . General Clark fe els he should not set up a separate organization for this but rat her should continue to use the II Army Corps as the base designation . The question of a suit able SOS- G- 4 or ganization in the Oran area is brou ~ht up and Genera l Clark decides t hat for the planning phase of the operation General Larkin would be in charge with Colon el Adcock as his assistimt . He sees no need to separate SOS and G- 4 functions in the early phases of the Oran landing . Later, after arrival in the theater , General Larkin will take char ge of the 'SOS in that area and Colonel Adcock will become G- 4 of the Oran Task Force . Air support for TORCH in over. A cable is sent settin g a we 11 - balanced air force for of B-17's intially re qu ired in out that it will be necessary tions out of Eng l and about six case Plan A is decided upon is gone forth agreement as to what will be the operation . Regarding two groups the African theater , the cable points to withdraw these u nits from operaweeks p rior to the date when they �113 have will be employed initially in the theater . These t wo groups three be en carr y ing out suc c essful raids on France for the past wil l weeks . The c ab le alm~ states that U. S . Air For c e headquarters be established initially at Oran . It now appears , from a chart showing the loading of each ship c arrying eq u ipment for the 1st Division and the es timated dates of arr i val , that the bulk of the Divisi on ' s e quipment will not arrive until about September 13 . General Allen is ordered to establish an advanced 1st ~ ivision headquarters in Norfo lk House . It will be ready to ope ra te by noon , Se ptember 5. Other minob ma tte rs have to be disposed of: Colonel Corby , surg ~on in Allied Force Headquart e rs , re commends typhus inoc cula tions for all troops entering the theater and he is told to begin checking records to insure that these shots are given all organ izati )ns prior to departure; Colon e l ·1. G. Sterling of the W ar Cabinet Secretariat suggests the use of code names for towns and r egions in the North African theater and General Clark says he suggested that almost a month ago but that British Intelligence officers advised aga inst it; General Anderson call g to say he is movino.; from Norfolk House to another nearby office but he is going to retain an officer on duty here . General Anderson obviously is displeased at the turn in events. General Clark tells him there is nothing further he can do to advance h is planning until a final decis~on is reached . Anderson is advised to continue p lannin g . ·:l- LONDON SEPT . 3 , 1942--President , Roosevelt cables Prime Minister Churchill and agrees to a tr i p le - l and in g for TORCH From all . indications this i s to be the operation that will be carried out! President Roos-evelt proposes simultaneous landin gs at Ca sablan c a , Oran and Algiers with assault and immediate follow-up troops gen erally as fol~ows: (A) Casablanca , all United States troops : 34 , 000 in the assault and 24 , 000 in the immediate follo w- up to land at a port a lready under American control . (B) Or an , all U. S . troo ps : 25 , 000 in the assrult and 20 , 000 in the immediate follow - up to land at a U. S . held port . (C) Algiers , U. S . and British troops : in the beach landing, 1 0 , 000 U. S . troops follo wed within the hour by British troops to make the l a nding secure, the follow-up to be determined by TORCH 1 s Commander -in - Chief . This follo w-u p would l and at a port i n ships that are non-ro mbat loaded . "Your willingness to coope r ate by agreeing that all initial landings will be made by U. S . ground forces is appreicated , 11 the President cabl es the Prime Minister . "It is true that British par ticipation in the form of nav a l and air support will be disclosed to the defenders early in the operation. However , I do not b e lieve this will ha ve quite the same effect that Britis h forces making the �first beach landing would have . xx x I t will be necessary to use all available combat loaders in the first assault . The assaulting troops , regardless of whether the y are British or Americ an , must seize a por t before follow-u p forces c an be landed . Rega rdless of what troops arrive subsequent to the initial landing , the situation will be the same . " President Roosevelt says the United States can furni sh the following t ro ops : the entire Casablanca force dire c tly from the United St ates; the entire Oran force f Yom the United King d om; 10 , 000 American troops for the Algiers landing from the United Kingdom . "As ~ immediate follo w- u p for c es , 11 the President cable s , " we have one armored division in the U. S . and one armored division in the U . K. (1::D th less elements included in the assau l t echelons) with supportin g and service troops , includi ng ground echelons of air units. L ater , additional infantr y and armored d ivisions can be furnished from the U. S . and the remainin~ U. S . troops in the U .K. c an be made available ." ( Pre s ident Roosevelt says combat loaders ca pab l e of lifting 34 , 000 men wi ll be ready to sail from U . S . ports b ;: October 20 . Transports , other than combat loaders, will be ready to lif t 5 2 , 000 men and there wil l be sufficient c argo vessels to support the per sonnel. In the United Kingdom , he adds , there will be U . S . trans p orts with a personnel lift of 15 , 000 and nine cargo vesEel..s . 11In round 11 numbers, Mr . Roosevelt c ontinues, "the shi pping sh own as availab le in the U. S . i s estimated to be sufficient to move the first , second and third convo ys of the CasabL mca force . " Regarding the nav ,ll that the U. S . "cannot pro this operation in excess p lus all ships which can now bein g done . " p ie ture , the Pres id e nt tells Mr . Churc h i ll vide forces for the escort and support in of t h os e no w available in the Atla n tic be exped ited in readiness for service as is Then , the President continues : "If the operation is to be ex e cuted along the lin es indicated ••• all t h e rem ai ning re quire ments must be furnished from Brit is h sources . As we see it, t h is would mean in general that it will be ne cessar y for you to furnish : ( a) all shi~ping , includi ng combat l oaders , required for the Oran and Algie r s forces exce p t the U. S . sh i pp in g now in the U. K. ear marked for TORCH; (b) the additi mal troops required for the Algiers assault and the follow - up forces , and(€) the naval forces re qu ired for the entire operation less the U . 'S. Naval Force indicated above . " The P resid ent asks the Prime Ministe r to a:> nfirm as so on as possible, "in order that I may continue wit h vi gorous preparations for TORCH at the ear li est pract icable date , " that the U. K. will pr ovide the troop lift, troops , naval forces and shi pp ing noted as n ee ded . The ~resident reiterates that the Comma nd e r - in-Chief "shoul d be directed to exe cut e the operation by the earl:Dest pr ·1 cticable date and th a t t h is date should be fix e d by him . " �l IS ( "I am convinced of the absolute _necessity for an early decision , 11 the President says . "I feel that the operation, as outlined he r ein , i s as far as I c an g o toward meeting your views, and seems to me to be a practical s olution \'v ich retains h the Algiers operation and is sufficiently stron g to be a good risk throughout . " The President says his "latest and best information" fro m North Africa shows that an All - American expediti on "will meet little res istance from the Frenc h Army in Africa . On the other hand , a British co mmanded attack in any phase or with de Gaullist coo peratio n would meet with determined resistance . " He says that maint enance of the French Civil government "is essential to fri endly relations . " He concludes that he is "willing to risk explanation of British troops in Algiers by telling the French that they are not intended to remain in Frenc h territory but that their obj ect is primar ily to march into Axis held Tripoli from the rear . xx x As you and I decided l on g ago , we were to handle the Fr en c h in North Africa , whil e you were to handle the situation in Spain . 11 G:e.neral Clark calls a conference of the Combined Staff at 11 AM and read the telegram from Presid ent Roosevelt . "Wel l, there she is!" he says , concludin g . "We' re almost back where we started from . Patton will handle Casablanca . The Or an force will be made up of two c ombat teams f'rom the 1st Division , one from the 34th Division and it will be sup p orted by the British Navy . At Algiers we 1 11 have one U. S . combat team , a Ranger Battalion and whatever Britis h troops you (turning to General Anderson) decide on . Our problem is still basically the same : mostly n aval , a questi on of where we stand on co mbat leaders , l andin g c raft and the abi lity of the navy to suppor t the l anding . " Ramsey - -" We1 re going to have comb at loader trouble . Arran gemen ts for one landing are per fect . For the other one , one - fourth is v ery good , one - fourth is poor and I just don I t see the other half any,.1he!t'e . 11 United Gale -- "We are Kingdom . 11 now holding Ramsay -- "We1 ve got p ossible . The necessary some t rans - Atlantic shipping our teeth out . Three strong attacks combat loaders just don 't exist . 11 in the are not Clark--" we • re g oing to have to ta ck le it to see what VJ ca n do , e not what we c an 't do . we must determine our maximum mi nimum an d ask the navy and shippin g authorities to supp l y it . " Gale -- "I don ' t believe a short time . " ( the ship resources c an be found in su ch e1 ark -- "C "'n ' t v,J get enough for the initial e assault? We' re going to have to call on SOS to bring over what they have organiz ational loaded . These will be hos v ital and maint ena nc e u n its and supplies mostly . Gen eral Anderson , what will you have for Al g iers? Anderson--"A total of about 29 , 000 troops and one American �I combat team . " Cl ark --" You will keep the 1 68 th ( combat Division) . I hope you will be ready to throw and that they will go down combat loaded . " British I(, Gale -- "Are we still g o in . " e1ark- - "That new one Plan Z ! " figuring was u-1der Plan Wel sh -- "We1 11 need more air sc heme . 11 Cl ark -- "The air move eastward ••• 11 un its on a seven team from the 34th in three brigades day period before the B. I guess we' 11 have to call the under plan at Gibraltar this will than help und e r the General old Anderson Welsh- - 11We1 11 have to have four fighter squadrons at Algiers on c e . We' ll also need t wo bomber support squadrons then build up our stren gth after we have Nor th Af ri can bases . " Anderson--" What about Algiers and the at p lan ••• " Cl ark -- "You go ahead and fi gure on Al giers planned . The BritisL prcb ably will he l p in the at Algiers . " as you •ve always ini-'-ial 0 1,e-,t.tio•1 Ramsay -- " I f we work it r i gh t the U. S . Navy may be ab l e to help cov er the 'Straits . Then we c an do Al p;iers and Oran all right . I think our nav a l forces mip-.,ht be stretched . 11 As the conference breaks up he tells the officers he expects to get later in the day the gist of what the Prime Ministe r will cable back to Hashington in answer to the President . Durin g the day , he calls key officer after key of ficer into his office to dis cuss the pa rticular phase of TORCH invo lved . At~ PM he goes to the War Cabinet Offic es with General Eisenhower . The two American genera ls are ushered into a huge room where Churchill s i ts at a 40 - foot l ,ng table , working . The Prime Minister looks ti red and dishevilled . Soon the office fills with British officers includin g General Sir Alan Br ooke, General I smay , Sir John Dill , Lord Louis Mountbatten , Admiral Ramsay , Sir Dudley Pound -- virtually every high ranking Britisher conne c ted u ith the war effort . The men sit down , dis cu ss the President ' s c able of this morning and confer concerning an answer . After over an hou r of discussion , Churchill says : "Let • s get the c able off now!" He invites Sir Alan Brooke and Generals Ol ark and Eisenhower into the office of one of his secretaries . Together , the four men draft the answer while a stenographer -- the Prime Minister had hol le red for "a shorthand Hr iter"- - pounds it out dire c tly on a type writer as the four men talk over the exact phraseology . They kre ad in the suggestions of all the men who par ticipated in t he conf erence in the outer room . �II 7 The conf'ere b s decided that to do Algiers and Oran p roperly they should have seven combat teams and the combat loade rs to lift this size a force . Only five , as the plan stands, ar e available and there is not hing to improvise with . As to landin g craft , all training wou ld have to stop if the craft were taken away . General Clark su gg ests that the onl y alternative is to "steal from Casa blan c a . Admiral Pound also points out that the United States naval for c e for TORCH rema ins an " X" quantity . He asks that the U . S . state definitely what it has g ot so the British can see what their n avy c a n do to fill the gap s . General Clark sug ges ts t wo points for the cable -- ( 1), tha ·t the U .s . Navy 11get off the p ot 11 and detail what it c an provide, a nd ( 2) that the three landings be made more equal , with the Alg i ers operation being made bi gge r and the Casa blanca one smaller "to give the e ssential appearance of strength at al l vit a l po ints . 11 This President is the way the Roosevelt : Prime Minister ' s c able finally g oes to " W have spent e the day l o oking into the ph y sical possibilities of your ge neral outline . We think that a working plan c a n be mad e on the basis that the emphasis is shifted some what , namely reducing Casablanca by ten or twelve thousand and making up the defi c iencies in the follow - up . These troo ps wit h their combat l oaded ships would g ive sufficient strength inside , i,h ile making the entire assault American . This evens up the three landings and g ives the essential appearance of stren g th at al l vital poi nts . Witho ut such a trans ferenc e there is no hope of blglers on account of the shortage of combat loa ders and landin g c raft . We al l think this would be a blemi sh on the plan . "Tonorrow we suggest that either Gene ra l Clark or General Eisenhower should caj.e ( to Washington) wi th Admiral Ramsay who kno ws the whole transportat io n escort story and th e n aval aspects from our end, and Mountbatten on the lan di n g d e tails ·w hich are cruc i al . The party wou ld r ea ch you Sunday morning . W do not know e here wh at naval forces you are able to supply . Please let this be imparted to Admiral Cunnin gham , who , in view of the import an ce of t he ope ration , we propose to p lac e in naval c o~..mand under the Allied Command er - in-Chief . "Delays due to cha nges a l ready has extended (D- day) three weeks . The Fr ee French have g ot an inkling and they are leaky . Every day saved is p recious . \'le have therefore already order ed work to g o forward on these linBs but of course the deci si on rests with you . ( signed) Churchill ." ) When the Prime Minister a nd the three generals complete draft in g of the telegram , Mr . Churchill turns to them an s sAys: "It ' s great not to argue when you get into a tight p lac e . It makes you appreciate the accord between us . I know we all desire to get the p l a n and get going . " - ' �II8 ( though General Cl ark tells we I re back where t h e -Prime Minister we were t wo months that "it ago . " looks as "That ' s the tragedy of thl. s t h ing . We c ould hRVe settled two months ago , " Mr . Churchil l rep li ecs. 11This is one of the d ifficulties of having our t wo staffs separate d by all those of oce an . 11 cable: keeps Mr . Churchill "The Free l ')Okin g at it tangible miles is quite pleased by one phrase he placed in the Frenc h have got an inklin g and they are leaky . " He it and chuckling ." · After leaving Mr . Churchill 's office , Gene ra ls Eisenhower and Clark go back to Grosvenor Square and send General Marshall a cable detailin~ Churchill's suggestions and declaring that they favor his three - point in v:irtuall y equal strength landin gs if the means c ~n be found . Without the combat lo aders and one combat team from the Casabl anca for ce, Algiers must be abandoned , the y say . Mr . Churchill points out , just as the two Amer ican generals are leavin g , that he has re c eived re c ent cables on the p rogress of the battle in the Middle East . General Alexander of the 8th British Army sends an optimistic report and says he has g ot Rommel in a pocket and that the British have been shelling him all day . 'Says Churchill to General Brooke : "I wonde r if Alec will take the off ensive! 11 The Prime Minister then tell s Generals Eisenhower and Clark that it l ooks as though the North African attack will have to wait until November 10 . "Every wee:k , every day counts , 11 Mr . Churchill says gr i mly . "We don ' t know what is going to ha ppen in Eygp t before we can att a c k North Africa . " Conf e rences during the busy day include the following : Generals Ward and Oliv er of the 1st Armored Divis ion come in to discuss matter s pertaining to use of their unit in TORCH. General Clark tells Gener ~l W ard t h at any units t Rken f r om his co mmand t o form the Headquarters Securit y Force will be returned to him ,·,hen his division enters the theater . There is some discussion as to whether the 1st should retain its M- 3 tanks or exchange them for the newer M- 4s . General Ward feels it wou ld be un•✓vise to make the substitution at this time because of additional training involved . Colonel Hamblen re p orts that it a pp ears that SOS of the European theater will b e unable to maintain a U. S . force in North Africa until such time as the line of communications can be shifted to the U. S . Gener a l Gale makes a sim ilar report . He also outlines the relatively l ,ng time required for the overl and movement of the Al giers force to Tunis under the latest plan . Late at ni gh t, it looks as t h ough neither General ~isenhower of Gener a l Clark wi ll go to wva hington s at present . The y recommend against it to General Marshall , p ointin g out the nec essity for both of them remaining in_:.- ondon un~J~~~J~ is mor e de.finite L . �l 19 ( LONDO SEPT . 4 , 1942--President N, Roosevelt agrees to l essen the Casablanca force and i t look s as thoug h TORCH now is finally shaping up into a definite operation . The President sends the follow ing c able to the Prime Minister : - "I am willing to redu c e the Casablanca force by the number of combat loaders c apable of carrying a force of one r egime ntal comb , t team, a pp roxi ma tely 5 , 000 men . Since a similar reduction was made in ori g inal Oran assault for this releases a tota l of Bri ti sh and U. S . co mba t lo aders f~r some 1 0 , 000 men for use at Al g i ers . As that loc ality has been estimated as the softest sp ot, this combat loaded force ma y be found sufficient wi th whatev r else it is f ound posr-db le to improv is e . "I do not s e e advantage of Eisenhower or Clark c oming over at this time . I know they have heavy and pressi n g responsibilities in organizing slo wly-arrivin g Amer ic an forces and I am sure we have a ful l understanding of their viewpoint . Fur thermore , I do .. want to see Eisenh o wer later on before f ina l takeoff and t wo trips a ppear out of the question . ·'Ve wou ld be r:;ad to see Ramsay and Mount l batten if you wish to se n d them , but I do not desire thnt thei r vi s it shall c ause any delay in reachin g a final de cision . 11 I h op e to c ab l e you tomorrow a l ist of U. S . naval craft wh ich c an be made avai l ab l e fo r th e op e ra ti on . (Si gned ) Roosevelt . 11 Gener a l C1 ark calls the combined TORCH staff into conf eren c e and details the overni ght develo pment s . He tells the officers that at l ast it l ooks ns though the TORCH p l an is definite . "The divergent views of the two governments a r e clo se r to a[!reemen t and it now ap pears likely that one additional combat te~~ from the U. S . will be taken from the Patton for c e r-tnd made av n ilable for the atta ck at Algiers , " the ge ne ral says . "'+,'hat wi l l g ive u s one comb a t team from here , the 16 8th ; one comb at team from the Patton force, and the U. S . Ranger Batta li on for the initial assault on Al giers . 11 Sa y ing that force, whi c h will be fo llo wed u p by General Anderson ' s British troops , will total about 1 1, 000 men, Gene r a l Cl Ark asks Admiral Rams ay if he t h in ks the troops can be lift ed and car ried to Algiers . Ramsay says he thinks they c an be and adds he thinks we might be ab l e to get three combat t eam s through at Al g i ers . " I n that event , 11 says General \Jlark , 11it v10uld be necessar ; to have one Bri tish c ombat team . I t was the President ' s idea that the initi al ass ault at Algiers be made by American troops that would take the p ort and se i ze the airports . Then you (lookin g at General Ander son ) would l a nd and pass through on your drive to 'I'unis . Our information is that there will be li t tle resistance to American troops . I intend to make Ryder ( Gener al Ryder of the 34th Division ) comman der of the Algiers force . I am go in g to bring him here so you t wo c an plan and coor dinate the Algi e rs attack . Oran is set up and ready to go ahead under General Rooks ." Anderson -- 11We 1 d like to have you tak e Cl ark -- 11We 1 d like to v e ry m 1 . Ryder ch Gener a l .c;isenhower has ordere d General Lee sup p ly problem . He I re particularly ,101·ried suppl~es for the attacking ~ over our Algiers p l an . " c an go over it wi th you . up so we can go into the about maintenance and �( Anderson -- "Do you still want the Br it ish br:r gad e g r oup s ?" Cl ark -- "Yes . Beach par>ties for all three combat teams would be highly desirable if your forces are in follow - l>IP floating , re ser v e . Now about t he date . It lo oks li ke Nov embe r 7 . The co nv oy from~he Un ited States probably will sail about October 20 . The assault won 't be any sooner than November 7 , I believe . " Mockler - Ferrym9.n--"Our intelligence operatives say a Sunday would be an i dea l d i- y. The closest 1 Sunday is November 8 . " Cl ark -- 11 'Sunday , eh? They hit Pea -rl Harbor "/elsh - - " I think General Anderson I s forces so they c an l and at bo t h Algiers and Boug i e . " on a Sunday . " should be situated Clark- - 11Ryder 1 s orders ,·•ill permit him to pus h east and tak e Bougie . If he c an get the assistan ce of the French he will push as far east as he is able to go . There are many questions vie a r e p;oing to have to work out . It loo ks as thoup-..,h we are gett in ~ nearer and nearer to gether and closer to a solution . " Aft er General ql a rk outlines what air stren gth appears availab l e for TORC Air Vice Marsha ll Welsh s ays he believes H, the air force at Casablanca i s "frightfully bi p.; in vi ew of the f a ct that a ir oppos i t ion there 'vill be smal l . 11 He asks that an air pool be built up i n Oran so it c an be moved either east or west . Gene:ral Clo.rk says he is going to take every pl ane the U. S . will g iv e to the oper ation and then leave its use u p to the Commander - in - Chief 's dis cretion . Admiral Ramsa y po int s out that a Bri tish to be designated for the naval forces supporting He also speaks of the nece ssity for U. S . naval p aning the U. S . combat t e ams and exp r esses the Navy will brinp; in the necessary personne l to Or an . commande r will have the Oran attack . beach parties accom hope that the U. S . operate the port of After th e c onfer en c e , General Gale tells Gene-r ql Cl ark that the British Quartermaster Genera l "is willlng to p ut at our disposal anythinp: he h as in the way of equ i pment and/or personne l. " He offers to furnish a B:ri ti sh "mov ements officer" for t he Or 1= force an:1 m General Cl a r k a c cepts because it will be helpful in vi ew of the fact that all shipping in volved will be Briti sh . General Gale mentions that the Brit ish Director of Movements will re 1u i re an outline plan by September 15 . Gene-ral Cl ark receives a report that the 168th In fantry c ombat t eam no w training in Scotland " i s not far enour-.,h ad v anced in basic training for the t ask involved . 11 The g ener al orders str engthening of the commmd "from the top d own :' Wit h D- day no w set back , the General rbelieves it mAy be poss i b l e for the 16th I nfantry combat team t o be trained at Inveraray during the pe riod September 25 - 0ctobe r 5 . He tel l s General Lemnit z er , the new G- 3 , that i t i s "most important �I~ ( I for each c cmbat te am to have about five days' training in going over the s ide fr om the c ombat lo ade rs into l. mding cra ft and a c t ually l anding on the beach." This will not involve c ompl ete unload in g of the vess e ls but some of th e heavy e qu i pmen t - -inclu ding g uns and trucks -- must be includ ed in the pract ice exercises . Li eut . Co l -: e l Ramsey returns n frcm a qui c k visit t o Gibral~ar a n d he r epo rts that t he accomodations there are adequate for the advance headquarters of TORCH . Gen e~a l Cl a rk , relaxin g a lit t le a f t e r the h e ctic schedul e h e has be en follo wing for th e pa st thr ee days, r emark s to c onfi d ants what a p le asure it is to v✓0rk u nde r and b e a lon gs ide General E is en ho wer . ( "'l'hj_s wou l d be an almost intolerable situation were it not for my fortunat e , clos e , pe r so n a l re l a ti on sh i p wit h the Supreme Comrnande r,1' he says . "The cooperati on we ha ve is the result of having been old friends for a lon g ti me ; the result of having •.r rked together o before on many , many pr oblems . The r e ' s a definite advantage in having of fi cers vrh o know each oth e r we ll wor kin g together . r t makes the situation much more compa tible and , in th e p r ese n t c ase where we are wo rki n e; s o clos ely together , I kn ow how and w hat 1 Ike 1 thinks a nd says . And he kno ws the same about me . N~ther of us has to worry about wha t the other is doing a nd , ther e for e , c an c on c entrate fully on his own work . It's an ideal team combin at ion and a solid t hi n g to clin g to in he c t ic days li ke t h ose we have just been going throu~h . 11 Odd ly enough , it was General Cl ar k , then a Brigaaier General , wh o suggested to General Marsha ll that Gen er• 1l Eisenhower , then a col onel , would be the ide a l man for the War Dep=i.rtment P l an f" div ision . rt was General Clark who announced, as he was speaking to a wa r games criti qu e in L ouis i ana in 1 941 , that E is enhower , who was sitting in the front row , was a bri gadier ~ene r a l . The t o men have been friends since west Point d ays . Whenever either man has been asked vrho should take a certain .job, each has reco mmended the other . Samuel p olitic TORCH p l an n ers Hoare , British a l implications have received a v ery interesting n ot e from Ambassador to Spain . It discusses certain of the p l an . Sir "The operRtion known as TORCH s eems to me to raise man y pol11 iti cal as we ll as mil it ary problems , " Sir Samue l writes. It s su cc es s or failure may indeed principal l y depend on po li t ic a l develop me nts . With the French attitude in Africa res ts the issue between a hazardous milita ry operation and a p opular movement of liberation , with the Spanish reaction the vit a l secu r ity of' our lines of commun ication . It i s to the Spanish considerations tha t I addres s myself in this note . ( "The t emp tati on to cut our lines of communication will be v ery great . We shall a pp ear to have put our neck between two Spanish knives , and Span is h knives are tradit ionally treacherous . The Germans will be on Gener al 1''r anco 1 s ba c k dinning into his ears : "Now is I! ' �I~ ( 1/ ) your ti me . You c an cut the Allied throat , destroy the naval and air bases at Gibr altar and win a da zz lin g re ward for you r country in North Afric a . 11 Let n o one und e r -r ate the p ower of t h is t emptat io n , or think that because n i ne Spaniards out of ten d o not want war , General Franco mi ght n ot r is k it for the bi ~ stakes that i n t hese ci r cumstances it m ght off er him . He and hi s brother - in - la w made no secret of their wi s h to s ee Germ any wi n the war . What better chance than this could t hey have of expeai ting a German vi c tory ? Spanish help might take on e of t wo forms . Spanish guns , manned by Spanish troops , might fire on the harbor and airdrome of Gibr a ltar and i mmobilize them in a few hours , or German bombers be perm itted to op erate from Sp ani sh territory . I n bot h cases a c ti on migh t be swift and v ery dama gi ng . 11 II Hoare su~ ges t t hat the Allies econ omi call y and p olitic ally must accumulate the mAximum of Spanish go od - will in the ne xt fe w weeks . xx x On the p oliti c al side ,,,e must avoid incid ents of all , kinds that are likely to inflame the Spanish g over nment . Our intelli ge nce organizations must be parti cul arly cautious , and we must keep off p rovo c ative acti nn x x x . 11 He s ays the Allies "must , in addition , be prepared wi th effe c tive sa n ct ions in c ase this policy of goo d - will f ai ls in its effect . t hey must be read y to strike back if Spain dire c tly or indi re ctl y atta c ks them . There should therefore be av a ilable a striking force -- air,sea and land -- to make imrne1:g'ate r eta li ation ag a inst Span is h territor y . u Ho are next suggests that 11we would diminish the danger if we do not rely exclusivel y on the straits for our entrance and e xit and part of the expeditionary force were based on Casablanca and the Atlantic s eaboa rd . 11 "More important s till , " s A.y the British s ambassador , "is t he size of the exp ed iti onary force . It is absolutely essential xx x that i t should be of such strength as to make reasonably sure of some swift success . Any ini tia l fa i lure or fumbling will be alrn o st c er tainly fatal so far as 'Spain is c onc erned . xx x . 11 Hoa r e recormnends thart. t 11a c aref u lly worded de cl a r ati ;n shou l d be made b ,, H. M. p;overn ment and the United States rsoverrn nent , stating t l at we sha ll res pe ct the integrity of Spanish te r ritory.xx x and that nothin g that is b ein g; d')ne prejudi c es Spanish claims R.nd aspi ,,,ati '"lns in the future . x x x 1'urthermovfi , it is most important ' from the Spanish point of v iew , that bothJmili tary aperations and the p oll tic al approa ch to the Spanis h Govern:m-e:o...,ti; Uni .ted States the gov ernment should take the lead . The American Ambassador in Madrid should , I suggest , transmit a persona l messap;e from the President to General Franco ass u ring him of Amerlc tc,n p;ood int -.: tions . x x x n "LaE!tl.y I f 9e l -'c~ut _i_f between now and the dAte of the ope -ratio n , Rommel gains c on siderable victory , or events in Russia permit of a substantial withdrawa l of German divisions to the west , the risk of Spanish co l lus ion with the Germans will be most seriously in c reased . " ( tha t Cab les are pouring the major tactical back and forth now . General features of' TO1,cH "be settled Marshal l suggests immediately . 11 �f ( ) LONDON SEPT . 5 , 1942- - Fifty-six , United States warships have been earmarked for TORCH and Admiral Ramsay is satisfied that the force will be adequate . Arrival of President Hoosevelt's naval strengt h cable to Prime Minister Churchill fills in one part of the TORCH preparations p icture that has been noticeably missing . The President says the maximum number of American that c an be mad e available for TORCH is as follows: one battleship , --tw~ old ba t ttleships, one aircraft carrier , aircraft carriers, (these craf t capable of c arry in g 78 30 dive bombers) , t wo eight -i nch cruisers, three large cruisers ; 40 destroyers , and six fast minesweepers . / naval vess~illS modern two converted fighters and six - inch Al though t hi s list ls not final, Admiral Ramsay says he is satisfied that the American naval force will be strong enough to sup p ort the Casablanca landing . He adds that "by some juggling of available shi pping" the necessar y lifts for seven regimental combat teams can be found for the Oran and Algiers landings . Other s h ips a l so are b e ing located from which troops c an be landed on the beaches sane time after the ass ault . This personnel wi ll use the same landin ~ craft that the first assault troops will have used in g oing as110re . ( General ~l ark is pleased with the way TORCH is now shaping up . At last he feels that the p l anners have their feet on the ground . The only problem still in snarled shape is that of supply . He CRlls in Generals Gale , Lee , Gruenther and Lemnitzer and Colonel Hughes . Gale says that be c ause of the convoy schedule , it will be necessary to sup ~ ort U . S . forces from the United Kingdom with 40 days of supply from this cou..~try . Gale , Lee and Larkin are instructed to confer vii th the British Quartermaster Gene r a l immediately to deter mine what sup€lies may be obtained from the British . Colon e l Hughes , who , General l ark believes , has the best over - all p i cture of the sup p ly situation , es timates that the SOS of the European Theater can. meet food and ammunition re ouirements for 40 days in the No rth African theater . He bas es this estimate on a force of 112 , 000 men . I n addition , Hughes says u p to 20 days of supply can be furnished in many other categories . Lee promises to g ive a 11complete p ic ture " of the :st pply situation on Monday . He says he wi ll call upon the U. S . for s h ip ment of supplies that cannot be obt ained f rom the Bri tish . The main SOS difficu lt y lies in serious shor t ages in a few items, notably spare parts for weapo n s a nd for motor vehicles . These , the general orders, must be obtained from the U. S . as quickly as possible . General Cl ark points out to General Lee that sup _p figures ly must be based on the Tab l e of Basic Allowances since , even if assault u 1its land at a reduced scale , the remainder of their equipment will com e in with fo l low-up conv )ys . ( The routing of supply convoys re quired from the United States to support the Oran and Algiers forces is discussed wtth Colon e l Hamblen . General C lark tells Hamblen that until a lin e of communication is opened direct from theU . S . to the Mediterrane nn , supply shipmentswill be sent to the United Kingdom , thence to North Afr ic a . �( General Ryder flies in from his headquarters in Northern Ireland and is told by General U1ark that he is going to command the Algiers assau l t . He is told the c omposition of his force: his own 168th Infantry combat team , one combat team frcm the Unit ed States (pro babl y a team from the 9th ~ivision) , and one British brigade group . These three units will go down assault loaded . In addition , Ryder will have anot her British brigad e group unit load ed and in floating reserve . Ryder ' s command and the status of General Anderson is a touchy matter . General Dewing comes in to tell General vlark that he believes General Anderson should coJ:rll'l1 the .nlgiers r:i nd force from the outset . Such an arran gement, G0neral v1ark r <.;pi es , is contrary l to the a~ree ment between the two governments that the assault on North Africa will led by Americans . General Ryder will command during the landing oper ation . General Cl ar k tell s 11lm he must work with General Anders on and make use of the plans developed by the British First Army when TORCH called for a combined Anglo - Americ-,1n assault . Qelleral Ryder is setting up a 34th Division TORCHheadquarters at No . 1 Cumberland ~lace, the same building where General Anderson is now located . Gen eral Clark stresses to General Ryder that it is "most important" that he get along well personally with General Anderson "no matter how difficult that may be . •• The status of traJ.ning uf the 168th combat team is discussed with General Hyder . Rep orts cam ng dovm f rom the amphiblous base in Scotland indicate the team needs much mor e prac~~ev. uen~ral Clark telephbnes British General Drew, connn.anding the base, and te l ls him that he proposes to send General Porter to the training area to push the 168'j?;h and that in all probability the unit will remain in train in g until September 20 . General Clark proposes to replace the regi mental exGcu tive, two ba. ttalion corrnna nders and others if necessary . General Dr ew says he feels the situ ation with respect to th e 168th "is not hopeless . " Ryder feels that the Colon e l of the 168th should be retained in coll1mand. One of the most difficult things for a sup erior officer is to change co mmands but Generp..l CJ.ark s ays that personal feelin gs must not enter into decisions that involve such nn important mission and the lives of so many enlisted men . The remainder of' the 34th Division, of which t he 16 8th is a part , and the rest of the 1st Armored Division -- th~t part not par ticipating in the ori g inal assault at Oran - -will be brou gh t into Oran as soon as possible after the assault . Additional Oran forces will be taken fro~ t he United Stat es directly to the North African theater once the operation is under way . However , there is a pos"ib:li that the 29th uivision , which is due to arrive in the United King dome l ate this month u ,1der corrnnand of General Gerow , might be used in the new th , ater, movin~ down to Africa soon after the original assault . Brigadier Vogel comes in to discuss Anglo - Americ•::in co •nmands and is told that after General And er son lands he will take over the Algiers command from General Ryder . The British generals command will include U. S . tro0ps . General Anderson must be prepared to land a~ainst ty �,, opposition at Al giers and Bougie . Brigadi0r Vogel is also told that Admira l Cunningham is ~oing to be N~val Commander -i n - Chief of the combined United States-B rit ish fleets und e r the supreme c ommander of the operntion . Admiral Cunningham is coming ov r from Washing ton to j')in this headtuarters . Admiral Ramsay has ~one to Washington to take over the British Navy end of TORCH over there . Gen~rals Lemnitze r , Oliver and Rooks c ome in to discuss with General v1ark matters pertaining to the Oran Task Force . The y are to l d that Combined Operati n s now re ve rts that land ing c rnft is available for an armored c cmbat team to train at the Nor th I reland amph i bious base . Gener a l Oliv er is pleased , saying this is preferable to ship p i ng his armo r ed Unit to Toward. Oliver is told to go ahead and prepare for training his team i n I re l and . I t now looks as though the 1st Armored c::mbat team will use M- 4 instead of M- 3 tanks . The M- 3s c annot be loaded on the type of assault eq u ipm ent that is go ing to be used on the three Maracaibo type l anding boats that wi ll take the tanks ashore at Oran . M-4 tanks have a l 1wer silhouette and can be lo aded aboard this type of c raft . LONDON SEPT . 6 , 1 942 -- Prime Ministe r Churchill , cables Pres id ent Roosevelt that he feels the TORCH p l an is substantia ll y set and that both nations shou ld go "full speed head" in preparations to execute it . This is the c able he sends Mr . Roosevelt : ( "We ag r ee to the mi litary layout as yo u propose it . We hnve plenty of troops high l y trained for landing . If convenient , they can wear your uniform . The. will be proud to do so . The shipping will be all ri gh t . I have just had your number 184 ( a cable) and it is ev id ent that you too have skinned yours u lv es to the bone . Unless we suffer serious l ,)sses in the assau lt, we consider th at the naval forces now jointly to be p rovided justify us in g oin~ f u ll sp eed ahead with sta ging operations . I am sending Admira l Ramsay with the ag r eement of General Eisenhower ov er at once to furnish Admiral Cun n i ngham with the means of go in g into n a val details with you . I t is i mpe rative now to drive straight ahead and save every hour . I n this way alone shall we realize your strategical design and the only hope of doing anything that really counts this year . We strongly endorse the re quest which we u~derstand Ei senhower has already made to Mar shall that the force you are r eleasing from Casablanca may be sent ov er here complete with its regimental combat team . Kindest regards . 11 (si gned ) W inston Churchill. • Norfolk House is humming and officers are arriving by the score ev ery day . General Rooks has set up the framework of his Or m Task Force and they are working lon g hours making detailed plans . A g r eat m8ny officers of the II Army Corps are being brought up from Long ford Castle . General Ryder is gett in g his Al g ie rs Task Force p;ro up into operation and it is working with General Anderson , mnkinp; the greatest possible use of previous British planning . General Truscott , who was l eft at Norfolk House as a contact officer when General Patton returned to the United States , is integrating the plans of the 0 �Casabl anca force with the plans - being made by the Algiers and Oran gr oups . General Cl ark , gvtti n g reports from a ll three g roups , remarks what a burden it is off his shou l d ers fuo•·ha ve such an able staff . He knows every key man per s onally and knov1s h is capabilities and spec ial ties . General Cl a rk merely makes a daily report to Gener a l Eis en hower . He has been g iv en a free hand to make decisions and he sends out ord e r after ord e r with General Eisenhower ' s name signed . On th e matters of greatest imp ortance , the Command~ r-in - Chi ef and his deputy conf er at either General ' s of fice . Be c ause some uni ts now under co mmand of Ge ne ra l Hartle in Northern Ireland ( the 34th Division and the 1s t brmored Di~ision) will participate in 'T'ORCH General , Clark te l ephones Gener a l Hartle and asks him to come to Lon d on so he c an be oriented on t he plan . Co lo nel Robinette , who will c ommand the 1 st Ar~o r ed co mbat team that will assau lt with the 1s t Div isi on at Or an , is c alled in for a conference . He reports th at he is experiment i ng to determine t he best metl od of landing h is tanks on the Oran b ecich . He is trying out Mara c a ibos and rubber Jontoon eq ipm en t . He believes that whe n the armored unit moves forward fro m the beAchhead it should be con troll ed by the Oran Task Force co mman der rat he r th an by General Al l en who will lead the 1st Division . W ith the radio equ i pment his c ombat team has , dir e ct .commun ic at ion may be established between armored c olum ns and the task force co .rnnR nde r w11 0 may either be afloat or ashore . The ra d ios have a r ange u p t o 1 00 miles . / Wit h the naval p roblem finally shaping up a nd with the v ar i ous task force co rrnnande r s getting their plans in to shape , General Clark turns to the aviation problem . W th Col ,ne l Bentley i he talks over the tra ini ng and empl yment.of transport squadrons and pa rac hute troops . Bentley believes the ent ir e parat roo p attack should be c 0n c entrated on Oran whic h he says is the lo g ical p oint of _atta ck . He thinks the paratr oo p units art.:; of in suffici ent st ren gth to spre ad them in two or t hree p l 9ces . He is inst r uc ted to g iv e General Cl ark a memorandum sh owin~ what transport souadrons and c ommande rs are avnilable and wher0 he wants them trained . General C1 , rk will i ssue necessary ord ers as soo n as he ha s the memorandum . General Cl ark questions Col onel Bentley co nc erning the probab ili ty of cr acking u p trans 1Jorts in the 1 ndings south of Or an . Bent ley s ,ys there v·ill be room for 1 2 transports to r etu rn to Gibral t r . The remaining 20 transports wi ll fly south after the paratroops hiwe jumped . The planes vlill Lmd i n the desert and he is h opefu l that these landin~s c an be made without too grert dam re to the ai r pl,ncs . Gene~al Gilkerson of the 8th Air Force i s c ll ed in to discuss that u ~its part in TORCH. Offe nsive operations a~ainst Germany must be curtailed in order to p repare B- 1 ?s and otrer aircraft r e?dy for African operati ns . The curtailment must start soon . Gene ral Gilker son does not l_ke the co1r1mand setup , saying he f ee ls that for:n8 tion of a new fighter conunand he td( 1uart e rs- - u sing air u ,iits from Genera l Spaatz 1 1''igh t er Co1unand , - is a mistake . He believes the bvst solution '.,o ,1ld be to use the existing fighter command headquarters . He r epo rts that Gener n l Arnold has warned him that our air forces in North _J �~ I ) Africa are liable to face v0ry -strong German air u1its after October High - ranking officer after hi~h-rankinrr officer file, into General Clark ' s office . General Allen has moved a planning group of the 1st Division into Norfolk House to collaborate i-rit', the Oran p.Lanning group . G<n<.:ral Sla~': c lls General Allen and General Andrus, commander of 1st Division artil l ery, in for consultation . He ~oes over the Oran oper•a tion with tnem and certain changes in ls t Di vision commands are discussed . Generals Lemnitzer and Rooks confer with the D vuty Col'lll11ander- in - Chief concen11ng training for the Oran ex pedition . Stress is placed on the trainirig of shore parties th:=it will accom1)any the regimental combat teams . A general de:.:iling with an operation the size and importAnce of TORCH has to deal with a multitude of tl ings , large and smal l. But today General Clark gets the strangest request to date . It comes from Colonel Eddy , the U. S . Naval Attache at Tangier , r orocco , who is currently here for espiona~e CJnference . The memorandwn he sub mits to General Clark deals vlith nine problems . This is the stran~e one: 1 11 1 recommend th t on D- day , ·vhen the landing operations actually begin , I be authorized to arrange for the assassinatirm of U e members of the German Armistice Commission at Casablanca and for any members of the Germr-m or Italian Armistice Commissions who may then be i:r.1;the city of Oran . About twenty of the German Army and Navy office ~s live tog1.ot:1er in a hntel in Casablanca and t ,e assirmments have already been made for this job to men Hho have the demolit1.on materials already in their hands . I micyit add that our principal agent in Casablanca is the father of a boy who was shot a.s a hostaq:e in Paris recently and the father is impatiently awaiting 1)ermission to carry out his assignment ." The general 0 . K. Looks good 11 reads the memornndum, to me . M. 1 . c . 11 then pencils in the margin : , Colonel Eddy 1 s report is fascinating . It details what under cover a~ents will work with landing forces at Casablancn, Oran and Algiers . All of t~ e agents are Americ,ms who have great prestige and remarkable cont~cts in French Africa . Another part of Colonel Eddy ' s report deals 'with plans to destroy key power stations , tunnels and bridges in the areas where the attack will take place . These plans are complete sine~ they were designed in anticipation of Axis aggression . These are the sidelight facets that must be taken ca··e of to prepare for the operation . ' . �LONDON, SEPT. 7. 1942--Six words-- 11We believe it to be satisfactoryil--put the TORCH operation on an all-out. green light basis today as Generals Caark and Eisenhower reply to a revised directive sent them by Gener al Marshall. It states: "The operation will be executed at the earliest possible date. as fixed by the Commander-in-Chief of Allied Froces participating. with the view of accomplising as rapidly as possible these initial. intermediate and ultimate objectives: (1) Landings in the Casablanca area and the Oran-Algi ers area. to be sil]iultaneous if practicable . with the establishment of lodgments in the Casablanca area in French Morocco and in the Oran-Moetaganem-Algiers area in Algiers. (2) Seizure of ports for follow-up forces. (3) Rapid explotation in order to acquire complete control of the area. including French Morocco . Spanish Morocco (if the situation requires) and western Algeria to facilitate extensi on of effective air and ground operations to the eastward. (4) Combined air. ground and sea operations with the view of insuring complete control by the United Nations of the entire North African area from Rio de Oro to Tunisia inclusive and to facilitate air operati ons against enemy forces and installations in the Mediterranean area. 11 I r General Marshall receives the briefest cable to date from his two top generals in the Euro pean Theater. The cable, signed by Genera l Eisenho wer, says: "General C1ark and I have discussed the l anguage of the proposed directive and 11 have nothing to state. We believe it to be satisfacto7y. Lat er the Chief of Operations of the War depart m ent is sent a long cable that says: 11We are now apparently a s sured the. t substantial agreements have been reached and that all preparations can proceed unhampered by uncertainties and changing conditions that heretofore have placed heavy additional burdens upon all pl a nning personnel and troops. I assure the Chief of Staff that we here have at le ast some faint understanding of the tremendous difficulties he has had in bringing about this res ult and that we are h i ghly a pJ reciative and grateful." The Comma der-in-Chief n and his deputy pledge they will ma.~e only i m ative peJ requests and they ask "your complete support in assuring prompt satisf a ction." Every request coming from the the a ter for TORCH l l be based on minimum requirewi ments. The TORCH leaders declare they 11will not tolerate submission to the War Department of requests and requisitions that represent anything more than the bare essentials." They warn that there will be thousands of reque sts for maintenance su~plies, since it is hard to know what the SOS has on hand in the United Kingdom. Everything will be done to avoid duplic ation. Once again General Clark concentrates today on the important air plans involved in TORCH.All air plans will be headed up and coord inated by Air Marshall Welsh. The Britishe r will be air officer on the staff of the Supreme Comma der; n there will be no-over-ell air commander for the operation. Gener al Doolittle will head United States air units and an undesignated R.A.F. officer will head the British units . I Welsh questions, during a l ong conference with Generei Clark. the advis cbili ty of using air tr ansport squadrons for the movement of pe.ratroops to Oran. General Clark agrees with Welsh that the r ap id movement of grou nd forces �\ to Tunis by air in order to beat Axis forces to that key point may be of the greatest importance to the success of the entire undertaking. Welsh says the use of paratroops at Ora.n should be weighed carefully against the possibility of losing many t1·ansports in that opera .tion. Such a result would limit our abilj ty to move ground forces later by air to Tunis or ea.st of Algiers. Welsh reports that he has s~t up a balanced and versatile R.A.F. unit to support both army and navy opera .tions at Algiers. All air ~orce units will be under the Supreme Commander and he will decide how and where bombers, fighters and transports will be used. As soon . as set decisions have been made as to objectives and distribution of the available air power, Welsh will be given a directive and air pla.ns will be coordinated under his supervisi on. This plan will be presented to Air Chief Marshall Portal for his approval insofar as the Briti sh command is concerned. Following the conference with Welsh, Genere.l Clark calls in Colonels Gale and V andenberg. They discuss Welsh 1 s proposals and Vandenberg says he feels Welsh's plan is "char acteristic of the British in that it does not provide sufficient air support for ground troops. Gener al Clark tells hi m that he will go to Port al , if necessary, in order to obtain more air attack support from the R.A.F. but that this will not be done unless we are convinced it is necessary. General Clark emphasizes the necessity for the Br itish and U.S. Army Air Forces to get together and work as a team in the TORCH operation. Whatever the initial distribution of air forces is, Gener a l Clark declares, it must be possible to 11 concentrate for an attack eastward from Algeria. Plans, 11 says the general, 11 must have in view the concentration of air strength in support of ground fore es striving to reach Tunis before the Axis can gain control of that vital area. 11 Vandenberg points out, while the subject of getting more Bri tish bomber support is being discussed, that it will take about nine weeks to tr a.nsfer bomber squadrons from operations in the United Kingdom to operati ons in North Africa. He ad ds that operations of the four U.S. fighter gr oups now in the U.K. mus t stop very soon in order to prepare for movement to the new theater. Welsh also mentioned that British fighter squadrons to be used in TORCH a.re now being prepared for their missions but that U.S. squadrons earmarked for the · same theater are still opera.ting a.cross the English chan nel. Gener al Clark orders pre paration immediately of a directive i:repa .ring the U.S. air force for the African operation. As to the use of para troops, Genere.l Clark proposes to set up an airborne task force under the command of Colonel Bentley. The directive is being prepared and combined training of tr a nsport squadrons with paratroops will be started. Colonels Bentley and Raft and Major Yarborough, all para.tro op experts, are called in and told by G ener al Cls .rk that a single locality should be selected for the _paratroop attack and that Oran a.ppea.1·s to be the logical place. Raff says he will be able to jump about 520 men, using three squadrons of transports. General Clark stresses that Colonel Bentley's command over the paratroops will terminate as soon as the men reach the ground when they will come under the Oran Task Force com anner. m Bentley, who has spent considerable time in North Africa, also recommends that the TORCH a ck be ma.de on Sunday morning. He says that French officers att and many enlisted men habitually leave their stations on Saturday afternoon an d do not return until late on Sunday. He believes resistance would be materia .lly less on Sunday than on a. week day. The probable Sunday is November 8. �\30 1 Another problem that is causing concern is the strength and use of automatic weapons units. Gener al Clark says these units must be integrated into the regimental combat teams which they will support. General Thiel and Colonel Harriman are called in to go over the problem. Harriman says the required number of 90-mm anti-aircraft guns are on hand but that we are still short of automa.t~c weapons. General Thiel agrees to turn over automatic weapons available in the European Theater to the TORCH operation. Genera,l Clark plans to assign two automatic weapons batteries in the assault. A full automatic weapons battalion will be assigned to each armored force combat team. Harriman re ports that automatic weapon s battali.ons are being trained to use their weapons as anti-tank guns. General Allen. when he comes in for conference. is also asked about the automatic weapons situation and he is told that such units will begin training with the combat teams with which they will be in assault. Genera l C1a.rk decides that the remainder of the 34th Division and the 1st Armored Division will follow the assault elements into Or~n. The 29th Division. which will arrive in the U.K. during September might be sent to the African theater. although, at the present time, a plan to bring a division direct from the U.S. seems preferable, the general says. The date when the next division can be brought into Oran will depend not only on the convoy schedule but also on the ability of the SOS to supply additional units in North Africa. ( Colonel Wolf. commanding an Engineer Am phibious Brigade. is told genere ,l that he tentatively pla .ns to use the engineer boa,t brigade at The shore regiment will furnish the beach parties for the Oran force. eral tells Colonel Wolf that he proposes to bring the entire engineer the TORCH operation plans as soon as possible • • • by the Ora.n. The genunit into • LOND N SEPT. 8, 1942-The toughest problem a nd perhaps the crux of TORCH O . is rapidly becoming logistics--getting men. materiel, food to the scene where fighting _stars and tactics come into play. The SOS has no accurate record of what supplies are on hand in the United Kingdom. General Lee says he has unbalance& stocks for only 15 or 20 days use in the North African theater. Be,sed on the convoy schedule it is estimated that 45 days of supply are requir ed for TORCH and that that amount of supply must be in the United Kingdom by October 10 so l oadin g can get underway. Because the supplyon-hand situation is so confused. General Lee and General Clark agree that a cable should be sent immedia tely to the United States asking for shipment of the entire 45-day requirement. 11 This soluti on , 11 says Genera l Cla.rk , "will undoubtedly result in the shipment of many items alr ea dy in the U.K. in sufficient quantities. However, since the SOS does not know exactly what it now has, and there is not sufficient time remaining to find out before taking acti on to obtain supplement ary supplies from the State s , this soluti on appears to be the best open to us. tt General Gale and Colonel Hamblen do not believe such a large shipment can be made from the United States in time for a November 4 D-day and Gale proposes that theAlgiers assault and follow-up conv oys be loaded completely before the loading of the Oran force is started. He esti mated this will give us an additional 13 days to secure our equipment and supplies. No difficulty is anticipated with �obtaining agreement from the Director of Movements and the commander of the First British Army has already agre ed to the plan. Colonels Hamblen and Ross estimate that 25 to 30 cargo vessels would be needed to move the 45-day supply from the United States to the United Kingdom and they doubt that this number of vessels can be assembled without considerable delay. Gener al Styer of the SOS who arrived rec, ently from Washington, proposes that the cable be sent at once and that SOS headquarters in Washington will have to determine what can be done to meet the demand. Styer too doubts that the tonnage requested can reach England by October 10. Lee is told to 11bend every effort toward getting equipment and supplies that are available here in the SOS ready for loading. 11 Genera,l Styer remains behind to talk to General Clark and tells him that his obse rv ations whow that 11no one knows exactly what we have in the way of supplies in the United Kingdom or where they are. 11 He says the ration situation apperas to be well handled. In extenuation, however, he says SOS units are short-handed and adds that operations people, generally speaking, 11do not appreciate the import1rnce or magnitude of supply problems until confronted by a situation such as now exists." General Hartle, now commanding the Vth Army vorps in North Ireland, is brought over to be oriented on TO RCH. General Clark tells Hartle that he might be placed in command of the Oran Task Force, using the II Army Corps staff which is now preparing Oran plans under Genera.l Rooks . The plans for the ea.stwal'd drive to Tunis may be revised if French resistance in Algeria does not materialize . General Anderson is called in and it is decided that troop transports will move into Philippeville and Bougie and unload at dockside if posr,ible. This will expedite unloading of supplies and lessen the distance to be traveled inorder to beat the Nazis into Tunisia. The British Navy has agreed to furnish the extra ships. General Ryder, who will command the initial assault on Algiers, then turn the combined command over to General Anderson, joins the conference and, once again, General C1ark stresses to both officers their command relationship. General Ander son is also informed that the Allied Force Headquarters probably will be in Algiers once the operation has started and the British general intimates that the locality "might be a little small for both headquarters." Gener al C1a.rk JEplies that Algiers is a city of considerable size and that it should be able to hold both Anderson's headquarters and the over-all TORCH head quarters. The possibility of eventual Br itish withdra.wal from French North Africa is also discussed and Anderson says that if all goes well his force probably would be used farther to the ea.st against Rommel, rather than be returned to the United Kingdom. Plans for b8 additional Algiers attackRyder says his Algiers Nava l 11 get along all ti mes. 11 the Algiers assault are well developed, Ryder reports. He asks for 36-foot assault boats since he hopes to use another unit in the -~, Brit ish Commandogroup in which he will insert some U.S. troops. relations with the com~ander of the British 78th Division and the Task Force commander are very pleasant and he adds that he will right with General Anderson, although it is a little difficu lt at Gener vl Clark also dives into the air problem again. He brings in Air Marshal Welsh and Colonel V ande nberg and tells them General Spaatz now understands that his primary task is to get the TO RCH air force ready. Thes e units DTU.st soon be withdrawn from Europe an operations and this brings up the problem of explaining the sudden stopp ag e of that task which been receivin? extensive pub licity. �That knotty task is being turned over to G-2. Both Welsh and Vandenberg understand fully what air operati ons are involved in TORCH and they say they are satisfied. Welsh says he now understands that in addition to the transports to be used in the paratroop attack, ap prxoimately five other squadrons wiil be available in the United Kingdom for later operations in North Africa. That will make a total of 65 trans ~or ts plus those still dip eoperating condition after the initial attack. Welsh suggests the formation of a group of transports under headquarters control that can be used in moving troops and supplies anywher e in the thee ,ter. Detailed maps and mosaics are now being assembled by the G-2 section. The photo map coverage at Algiers is good while th a t at Oran nnd Casablanca are fair. Models have been constructed of some of the beaches with the work in the Algiers area completed. The Oran beach models will be ready by the end of ieptember while those for Casablanca ar e being made in the United States. Excel lent , detailed · photogra phs of these models have been made. They show every detail of the shoreline. Mosaics on a scale of about 1/15,000 will be distributed down to companies and, possibly, pl atoo ns. ( Norfolk house is now throbbing with activity. The rabbit-warren like offices ar e filled with busy officers and men, holding conferences, poring over maps. The tempo of work has been step ped up and lights burn behind blackout curtains until after midnight in many offices, particularly the plans and train ing and the intelligence sections. General Clark hardly has a chance to get up from his desk, so fast do the high-r ankin g officers under him file in for conferences that are shaping up TORCH.At Inverary, Tid wort h, Longford Castle, Cheltenham, Northern Ireland, troops a~e training and brains are working on the task ahead. Generals Clark and Eisenhower dine again with Prime Ministe r Churchill again evening. Mr. Churchill is his old bubbling self and, now thab TORC has taken H final shape, the Prime Minister is eager to 11 get on with the show." He mentions ~ peatedly that he wants the operation to start 11 the earliest at possible date. , • • • LOND N SEPT. 9, 1942- - Although the problem of supply for TORCH still O , is in a confused state, the SOS has begun packing for shipment to North Africa ~ll task force items that are presently available. They will be taken to the ports where vessels will be combat loaded. Items being packed are based upon requisitions from the list a.nd 34th Infantry and the 1st Armored Divisions. The cable that will request 45 days of supplies for the TORCH operation has not yet been dispatched to Washington. General Lee 1 s draft gave the impression that 15 to 20 days of supplies were available from the United Kingdom. General Clark, watching every out-going cable like a hawk and keeping his fingers on scores of section pulses, says this is not an accurate statement of the true situation, hence, he directs clarification of the message. Regarding ships to move the 45-day supply need, General Larkin re ~orts that if 25 ships arrived from the U.S. and accompanied the convoy to North Africa without reloading in the United Kingdom, he might be able to have the supplies in the hands of the tr oops in as little as ten days after its arrival. This would expedite things materially. Colonel Stirling, sedretary of the British War Cabinet, reports to General J �...... I Cle.rk that the Prime Minister 111s pressing the Bri . ish Chiefs of Staff 11 for early t action on TORCH.General Clark is asked what fe .ctors are preventing a. D-d.ay earlier than the tentative first week in November date and the Deputy Supreme commander outlines it thus: Some of these fRctors a.re the non-arrival of equipment for the 1st Division, lack of maintenance supplies, unbale ,nced SOS stocks, the date of arrival of the Algiers force combat team from the United States (October 10), conversion of combat lo ade rs, and completion of auxiliary carriers in the United St ates . Also, the schedule of amphibious training for two regimental combat teams of the 1st Divisions calls for a termina .tion about October 8. I must repeat that we insist upon time for assault rehearsals a.nd we are unwilling to put British soldiers in United States uniforms. 11 11 The British naval support plan .is submitted to General Clark and he comments that 11 acti cally the entire Brit~ ·sh fleet will support the attack in the Mediterpr ranean.11 He describes Admiral Cunningham, who is coming here from the United States to head the naval pa.rt of TORCH,as 11 damn best man the British have. 11 It lo oks the as though aircraft carrier support will be the weakest link in the plan. The Prime Minister has been dabbling with the idea of having a force from Malta attack Tunis at the same time American troops are landing at Algie rs, Oran and Casablanca but his military advisors think such an attack is 11 little a too bold. 11 The Brit ish have proposed that a combined planning staff with army, navy and air re pr esentatio o of both British and Americans be formed. The proposal is typical of r equests that result from the differ ences in American and British staff organization. General Clark declines, saying the proposal, if adopted, would result in partial adoption of British staff procedure which is largely a committee system. The British, he adds, a1·e having some difficulty in understa .nding American staff menhods and for that re ason "procedure has not always been as smooth as it might be. 11 That was why a British Deputy Chief of Staff (Brigadier Whiteley) was included ten days ago in General Cla.rk 1 s headquarters. General Clark explains to Whiteley how, under the American system, a commander presents questi ons for investigation to his genera .l staff and how the staff officer concerned obtains the best inforlllB.tion from ell sources before giving an answer. General Clark says that the decision reached some time ago--t.o follow U.S. staff org anization and procedure-should not be changed. The discrepancy in U.S. and British ranks also causes complications. For inst ance , Colonel Vandenberg points out the Air Marshall Welsh, who will have only three British squadrons under him, corresponds to an Am erican lieutenant general while General Doolittle, commanding the American air effort which will be much larger, is only a Brigadier Gener a l and highly outranked by Welsh. The same difficulty exists in both air and ground commands. General Lemnit zer and Brigadi er Vogel report that General Anderson has put in for the shipping required for his third and fourth follow-up convoys. The total requested is greater than all ship ping availabe for the Mediterranean at the time it is asked for. Gener al Clark tells Lemnitzer that the distribution of the follow-up shipping in the Mediterranean must be spread out for both Algiers and Oran but that Algie rs will hll.ve priority over the Oran force. The general approves for planning purposes the staff recornnendations for supply level~ estimated ammunition expenditure, ga soline and oil consumption and ho spitalization. All classes of supplies will be built up progressively for the total force ashore to not less than the following levels: by D-30--14 day level; D.60--30 day level; D-90--45 day level. �( Movement from North Ireland to the Swansea and Liverpool aree ,s of two boat battalions from the Amphibious Engineer Brig ade is authorized by the General if billets can be found . These units will be going into training for use in the Oran assault. Actual practice in loading and unloading vessels, which can be obtai ned at Liverpool and Sw ansea . will be of great training value and the Gene ral is anxious to get it started. The problem of handling public relations once TORCH gets started comes up for discussion. General Robert Mc Clure is called in and he feels that P.R. officers be placed under the control of G-2. If public relations are pla .ced directly under the Chief of Staff, General Mc Clure feels the c/s will be forced to arbitrate between the conflicting interests of publicity and censorship. If both are placed under G-2, the Chief of Staff will be saved much time and trouble. MAjor Phillips, now a public rele .tio ns officer in the European Theater of Operations, has been recomm ended as P.R.O. for Allied Force Headquarters and General Clark proposes to bring him into the group shortly so policies and plans can be developed , • • • LONDON, SEPT. 10, 1942--Plans for the attack on Oran ar e progressing rapidly. General Allen, whose 1st Division troops will spearhead the assault, tells General Clark he is well satisfied with development of plans for the landing. Small details of the assault are beginning to be developed now. General Allen plans to arrange with the British for reco nnaisse .nce of the Oran beaches by officers of his staff prior to the attack . They will make their survey from subrns.rines. General Clark approves the plan in principal but insturcts Gener al Allen that actual arrangements "must be cleared through me i n view of the possible lass ofi sec urity involved. The British believe that Allen's combat t eams can be put ashore faster as units if companies embark on different ves sel s in the convoy. This, says the Genera l, brings the disadvantage of having companies separated during the voyage and beyond the control of battalion commanders. One complic ati on for the Ore.n task force has a1·isen. General Rooks reuorts that new medium tanks arriving in theU.K. a.re M-3s ra .ther than the planned- M-4s. The M-3s a.re not the right shape for combat boats so unless M-4s are received, light tanks will have to support the Oran combat teams. Geneae.l Clark calls in Colonel Hamblen and discusses the tonnage that can be put asho1·e over the Ore.n beaches in the four or five da.ys the assault convoy will be anchored offshore . The general 1 s Oran staff has figured 11,500 tons to be the maximum, this figure being based on the amount that can be lifted by the ava ile .be l anding era.ft and the physical capacity of beach parties to handle the loads . The possibility of using 11coasters, 11 each of which could ca.r·ry about 1,000 tons with balanced laods, is being investigated. If these "coasters" can be obtained they will make possible the use of add itional facilities at some other small ports in the Oran region. The chief air advisor for TORCH has been che.nged. The British Air Ministry has instructed Air Marshal Welsh to command R.A.F . units supporting the Eastern Task Force (Algiers) and have assigned Air Commodore Saunders to Welsh 1 s old job. The general once again plunges with Welsh into the thorny air support problem. �1 The capacity of the Gibr alta r airport is discussed. Undr:r present plans 250 fighters must leave Gibra.ltar during the first three days. In addition, three fighter souadrons will be needed for loc al defense so must remain at Gib. In addition, th;re will be some aircraft on su bme.1·ine patrol and others for the fleet air arm . General Clark says 11it seems possible that we must reduce our total req u irements somewhnt. 11 Welsh is detailed to determine the maximum airport capaci ty of Gibr altar so it can be determined how the reducti on can be effected. Cra ted Spitfir es can be erected at Gibraltar at the rate of 20 a day so, under present pl ans , this means the work must start not later than D minus 12, or around October 21 . Welsh feels that as the fighters begin to appear at the Gib airdrome, the Axis will be strongly tempted to bomb before the force begins to operate. Present pla .ns calls for 168 American pilots to arrive in Gibraltar by special convoy on D minus 14 and Welsh suggests their arrival might be delayed by having a small detachment test the newly assembled aircraft . General Clark instructs Colonel V andenberg to cable the War Department that final decision as to the employment of the TORCH air force would be made in London . He expl a ins that a large force must not be com mitt ed in advance to the 11 Casablanca operation . 11 0ur air plan must be feexible, 11 says the genend. It must provide f or such contingencies as the failure of our ground force to get ashore at Casablanca , or fo r strong Axis rP.action early in the operation over the Mediterre.ne an coas t with no resistance by the French in the Casablanca ar ea . In any event, we must be prP.pared to mass our air effort to the east where eventually the strongest hostile air forces probably will be met . 11 British Commodore Troubridge tells the gener al that heavy air attacks are not likely outside a radius of about 200 miles from Sardinia . Troubridge has seen a great deal of service in the Mediterranean. The shipment of fighters to Russia is placing a handic ap on TORCH air pl ans . General Lyon says the British have agreed to furn i sh Russia with 200 fighters a month and. because they a re falling behind in deliver ·ies , they have substituted American P-39s , which were in the U.K. enroute to Russia from the Stat es , in place · of British Hurrican e s . Vandenberg r epo rts that 54 P-39s that were in the U.K. are already enroute to Murmansk and that another 220 are either .loading or on their way to ports fo r shipment to Russia. That leaves only 20 P-39s available in the United Kingdom. Vandenberg also r eports that the British could replace the P-39s with Hurricanes for TORCH use but only at the expense of British Fighter S~uadron s already set up for TORCH. The problems of logistics and air support now occupy the Gener a l virtually throughout the entire day . Naval support and troop dispositions have been disposed of and groups are working on them with definite plans and facts before them. General Po1·ter returns from Inver a r e.ry and tells General Cla.rk that he is pleased with the way the 168th Inf a ntry regiment combat tea~ is shaping up. Colonel 0 1 Daniel has been placed in command of the regiment. Porter has-just seen the team go through a night assault exer ci se • • ( • • L~NDON,SEPT. 11, 1942--Two inter est in g TORC H-vit a l d~velopments come up today : (1) Everything possible is going to be done to strengthen the Algiers force, and , (2) An expert tells General C1ark that a Casablanca landing would be possible, because of surf conditions , about one day out of seven. -.P ~ �( General Anderson's request that additional shipping be furnished him to strengthen the Algiers force is discussed at a conference that General Clark holds with Generals G , Gruenther and Lemnitzer, Commordore Douglas-Pennant, ale Brig adiers Vogel and Whiteley and Colonel Nevins. Anderson wants to get into ~hilippeville and Bone as soon as possible to start driving toward Tunis. For this reason he wants the necessa .ry troops afloat close behind him when he first l ands at Algiers. Vogel points out that if Anderson's reque st is met, the British force will be able to move east on Tnnis at an early date but that the Oran t0~ce will be penalized by relative immobility until about D.50. G ale declares that fulfillment of Anderson'srequest will involve more shipping and naval escorts and that such a move would have to be taken up with the Briti sh Admiralty since it would reflect on the world maritime situation. Gener al .Gale asks whether we are prepared to accept reductions at Oran in order to strengthen the Algiers force and General Clark replies "yes, but the extent of the Oran reduction must be given study and General Anderson will not necessarily be given all he requests. 11 Reason for such a decision is that the occupation of Tunis before the Axis can move in is still one of the prime reasons for executing TORCH.General Lemnitzer is instructed to go into Anderson's requet at once to determine equitable distributi on of strength. After that decision is made, General Gale will make a definite proposal to the Admiralty. Proposed modification of the plan will be of no value unless the shipping can be found and the navy can provide the necessary escorts. The expert who brings the disconcerting news about Casablanca is C,V. Clopet, an intelligence officer who has spent 12 years in Casablanca. He says surf conditions along the coast of French Morocco are very unfavorable at this time of year and in his opinion landings will be possible on about one day out of seven. 11 attempted landing on other days, 11 he says, 11may result in disaster." An He suggests daily reports from Casable.nca on general weather and tide conditions . Clopet tells General Clark it would be wise to plan.alternative to landings through the surf, direct attacks at s~.all ports along the Atlantic Coast. In that way, troops could be landed at dockside. He adds that defense of these small ports 11is wea.k kand could be overcome easily." Conversely, the defenses at Casablanca are strong against any attack from the sea. He believes defense there would be vigorous in case of direct attack. He believes there are eight submarines, 14 destroyers and a battleship based at Oran and that this force is ready for action except that the battleship probably would operete at reduced speed. The report by Clopet bears out a point already stressed by General Clark: that the chances are at least one in four that when Patton's force arrives at Casablanca the condition of the sea will be such that a landing won't be possible. That means the Casablanca Task Force will have to lie offshore waiting for the right conditions and meanwhile the Oran and Algiel's attacks will have been made and Casablanca defenses will be on the alert because they undoubtedly will know that a large force is waiting to attack . The time schedule of three simultaneous attacks will be upset. General Spaatz, comm ander of the U.S. Air Force in Br itain , comes in to go over TORCH air problems with General Clark. The air genera.l reports on the difficulties he is encountering in trying to prepare for TORCH , at the same time, and maintain operations against Germany and the occupied European countries. Spaatz �l 37 says that Briti sh Air Me.rshal Slesser is "defi nitely opposed to us using either P-39s or DB-7s 11 in TORCH. The air general believes the United States planners of TORCHshould press the matter and General Clark promises to do so. Air Me ,rshal Welsh reports that the capacity of Gibraltar airdrome will permit 175 fighters to depart on D-day, that 220 planes will be able to clear for North Africa by D plus 4 and 250 very soon thereafter . Late in the day, General Lemnitzer and Brigadier Vogel, completing their study of General Anderson's request for additional forces, recommend that he be allowed a total of 51,000 (7,000 less than requested). General Clark approves the recommendation. This means that at the time of arrival of the third fast convoy, the distribution of troops in the area will be: Algiers, 110,000; Oran 70,000. General Gale is taking the plan to the Admiralty to see whether or not the necessary vessels and naval escorts can be provide d . A staff coordination memorandum comes out today . It places General Lemnitzer in charge of plans and training , making tim responsible for coordinating the Allied Army, Naval and Air Operations Plans and Training staffs. Bri gadier Mockler-Ferryman gets the same type of assignment as hea d of the Allied Intelligence staffs and General Gale is named chief Administrative Officer to coordinate the Aroy, Naval and Air administrative staffs. No G-1 has been named yet. Generals Clark and Etienhower leave overnight conference with Prime Minister officers. ( Ill London late in the ev~ning for an Churchill ~nd high-ranking Brit ish • CHECKERS, ENGLAND,SEPT. •12, 1942--Prime Ministe1· Churchill, des p ite his great eagerness to launch TO RCH at the earliest possible date, agrees after long conferences starting last night that the North African assault will have to be postponed until about · November 15. Mr. Churchill agrees after Generals Ettenhower and Clark and high Britishofficials outline the obstacles in the way of a late October or early November attack. From the tiflle the two genera.ls arrive at Checker£ unt,11 they depart around noon , TORCH--its problems, its shifting plans , its hopes--is almost the sole topic und.er discussion. The two American generals explain the difficulties in getting ammuniti on a nd arms to the United Kingdom in time to get it aboard combat loaded vessels. the stumbling blocke in pl a nning for TORCH air support, shipping space restrictions. The other conferees--Gener a l Sir Ale .n Br ooke, Lord Louis Mountbatten , Lord Leathers (hea d. of the ?War Shi pping Administration), Major Ge neral Holmes (British Director of Movements), Vice Admira l Moore of the Home Fleet, and Colonel Hollis, Secretary to the British Chief of Staff--support are;uments for the postponed date . The shipping problem is growing more acute. After dinner, while the of f icers a1·e conferring with Churchill in his study, a report comes in tha .t seven submarines have attacked a n Allied convoy in mid-Atlantic a nd ten ships have been sunk . It is not known yet whether the convoy was east or west bound. No matter which way it was headed--east with fighting supplies and food or west in virtual ballast--it means ten less shi p s for war shipping end every ship is beginning to count more every day . �I \ The problem of getting airc raft earmarked for Russia re-assigned to TORCH is discussed and Churchill says 11 11 convoy number 18 is now enroute to Russia PQ. and if it goes through successfully Churchill says he 11can 1 t bring myself to tell Joe (Stalin) that there just ain't going to be nc more convoys this year 11 because of TORCH demands. Russian convoy 19 is now being loaded and whether or 11 not it sails depends on the success of 11l?Q. 1~ . If tho convoy. now halfway to Russia and approaching the danger zone where it must face bombardment from land based ple.nes. is "smashed up, 11 the Prime Minister says 11 11 19 will be transl?Q. ferred over to TORCH use. Tha.t change would throw TORCH D-day back to November 15. Lord Leathers reports he has succeeded in :pulling 150 or the 200 P-39s destined for Russia out ob 11 11 19. l?Q. If convoy 19 goes through to Archangel, all the ships frozen in 11 for the winter . That will mean the loss of at tons of shipping that could be used, at least in part , in ister recounts a Russian convoy anecdote that illustrates condition of the British navy. 11 I will have to remain least a quarter-million TORCH The Prime Mfo. brutally the serious , 11 1 don t like to tell you this , 11 Mr. Churchill says to Admire.l Moore. It hurts me more than a little. But when I was in Moscow last month , Joe turned to me, during a discussion of the Russian convoy loss es , e.nd said : 'You have no glory left in the British Navy. Your navy only runs the:: Brit :i.sh convoy halfway to Russia. then turns around and dash es back to England \lh ile the merchant ships get slaughtered . ' St alin is right and imagi ne me having to take that kind of a lashing from Joe. 11 11 ( Churchill asks if some destroyers can't be taken from the Indian Ocean fleet ) to help TORCH.And, the Prime Minister, the old sea dog who was the First Lord of the Admiralty in the First Worl~ War, is told that the British have only seven \ destroyers in the Indian Ocean and that they constitute a force barely le .rge enough to give protection to the rather small fleet operating in that r egio n. The British Navy, General Clark remarks later, "appea rs to be in a hell of a sha pe . 11 , The Prime Minister suggests that to help TORCH the present schedule of a US-UKconvoy arriving every seven days be changed to every ten days. Lord Leathers tells him that would mean the loss of 50 , 000 tons of shipping space per day. Churchill blinks . Every way the conferees turn in an attempt to find a shortcut , the answer comes back inevitably to: D-d.a must be set back ! ,y At one point, Mr. Churchill discusses a report that has just come in to him. It says th e French Governor of Madagascar has just invited the Jppanese to come in and help the French resist British troops who are consolidating their hold on the isla .nd. Says Churchill, bitterly: "There are a certain number of skunks \sho come to the top in skunky times! 11 The night ·conference with the Prime Mihister lasts until 3:15 A.M. when Mr. Churchill, who is notorious for staying pp late since he naps in the afternoons, turns to the weary and worried men and says jauntily: ( 1 guess there's to bed! 11 11 no use keeping you people up late . Yo might as well go u �7 -'-. >';" ( Later , the general along. ( ==s.;;:; - I I Returning to London, General C1ark plup.ges immediately into a series of conferences that last until well into the evening. The snarled SOS situation is gone into again with General Gruenther and Colonel Hughes. Stressing the fa .ct that loa.ding of the Oran force would start Octobe'r t';rJ-eneral C1ark tells Hughes that combat weapons .for the 1st Division must arrive in the United Kingdom by Septembe 26. This is the bare minimum of time for the weapons to be distributed and combat loaded . The general stresses to Colonel H ughes th.at he must make it 11 vividly clear 11 that if the weapons are not here by September 26, the aua.ult teams will have to attack with insufficient arms and ammunition. 11 Mrucethem realize, 11 says General Clark, 11that is something isn't done and done fa .st those men will ve going in virtually with only their bare hands. 11 rell'.8.rks thnt 11 the SOS has let us down badly all the way 11 Brigadier General Craig of the U.S. Air Force goes over the TORCH air problem with General Clark. The chief topic concerns how the R.A.F. and the U.S,A.F. can't get together on how much air support should be given TORCH.Craig is asked to sit in on a conference with Cocm odore Saunders, Colonels Vandenberg and Brigedier Mockler-Feriyma .n. The divergence of opinion on the strength of the air forces results, Sua.nders says , from the fact the Air Ministry is planning a ·more or less abert term view of TORC while the U.S. pla .n is more inclusive. H That accounts for the contemplated U.S. A.A.F, being so strong and the R.~ .•F. relatively weak. The Air MinistDy does not wish to commit , at this date , any more aircraft than are necessary for the seizure of North Africa. If t he attacks are successful , the R.A.F. will rush over more air support so the assault can be continued eastward. On the other hand, the U. S. is not only planning for air support of the initial ass ault and the drive to Tunis , but is also p-eparing for a continued , vigorous, long-range offensive, possibly against Sardinia and Italy. Attempting to find out the exact status of equipment for the Oran Task Force , General Clark instructs General Rooks to detail ten officers to work in cooperati on with the SOS in en attempt to find out what equipment is available and move it to the assault teams as soon as possible . This search will be not only for 1st Division equipment but also for equipment for the 1st Armored Division and the Engineer Amphibious Brigade, all of which will be the spearhead at tackers at Ore.n. General Oliver, commanding the 1st Armored Division, reports to Genere.l Clark on the attack proposed for his force. Because of the type of landing boats available , the 1st Armored will go ashore originally with light tanks. The heavy tank battalions will follow later. Reason for this is that the M-3 tanks with which Oliver's division is equipped will not go in the Maracaibo boats and, not knowing if M-4s, which will go in Ma .re.caibos , will arrive in time~ Oliver's plan is now set and it does not depend on the equipment of heavy tank battalions. General Clark makes one succulent success. It is: remark as he discusses 1s TORCH chances of ''If Spain, as the result of our North African landings, enters the war at the side of Germany and jumps on our back in the Mediterranean , we in TORCH might as well turn in our suits. 11 • .. • I �} LONDON, SEPT. 13, 1942-The question of 'Just how French leaders , military and civil, can best be approached in North Africa when the 11zero hour 11 is near has come up for discussion. Both British and Americ an planners of TORCH feel that a straightforward statement from Pr,sident Roosevelt should be delivered to the authorities at the 11th hour , even as the assault forces are making ready to clamber over the sides of the combat loaded ·ships and start ashore in the dark . The gist of this message should be that the Amsr.ican forces are going to land, that they have but one goal-to beat the Asis into Tunisia , that French territory will not be occupied except to achieve the eastward drive goal and that the cooperation of the French in Norh Mrica is asked. This message \rOuld be delivered by Mr Murphy or some other Amer. ican official who has the respect and trust of the North African French . General Cla.rk believes this plan should be carried even farther . He thinks one of the high comme.nders--either General Eisenhower or himself--should be ready to go to the leading French official should he ask to see the leader of the a ttacking force . General Clax·k thinks the first thi ng the official will do upon being served the Roosevelt message wi 11 be to e.sk to see the expedition I s leader so he can talk with him and get oral assurances of good intent. The leader must be readily available . How to get him into Algeria so he can be ready for conferences is one of the major problems. Should he go in two or thrP-e days ahead of the attack , wear civilian clothes and wait for the 11th hour summons? Should he lie offshore in a small boat , waiting for the signal to rendezvous and be taken ashore? Is the risk offiying in too great? J \ '?hcse a1·e the kind of problems that confront the men workin g on the civil add political end of TORCH while the purely militaiy men go ahead with their tremendous task of planning for the attack . Another problem is to determine how, when and if the na.ve units wl.11 bombard .l from the sea . General Ryder, in discussing the Algiers operation with General. Clark,· says he is convinced the French Navy and coastal defenses are going to go into acti on as soon as the attack begins . He predicts house-to-house fighting in Algiers. "I hope the battleships won't lw.ve to bombard Algiers but if they must, they wil+, 11 General Clark says . He believes the general feeling growing is that t he French army will offer only token resistance . This ass~ption is based partially on reports from Madagascar where resist ance to a British consolidation of position during the pa st three days has been very light . General Ryder is concerned about what General An&erson is going to do with the American e,ssault troops at Algiers after the British force has landed end Anderson takes over cor.una.nd General Cle.rk tells Ryder that he and his troops wil l . be under General Anderson I s command and that 11 will have you until stability he is esta.blished . 11 General Cle.rk hopes to pull the American Alg i ers force back affer the British troops ho,ve landed in strength . The British plens are subject to . approval by Allied Force headquarters and General Clark tells his Algiers Task Force leader that he anticipates no trouble ove r the q_uestion of troop use, . Regarding r~sistance by the Frennh navy and coast defenses, General Cla r k says this hee,dquarters will establish a nd publish a policy to be followed concerning bombardment of French ports . �l [ Comrr.odore Saunders says the Air Ministry opposes diversion of the 33rd Fighter Group (now being ma.de rea dy in the U.S. for shipment to Afx·i ca) fllom the Middle East , for which it was earmarked , to the i\'estern Task Force at C asablanca. General Clark tells Saunders the decision has been made , presumably with the approva l of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington , and that plans call for the group to come across aboard a British aircraft carrier that will accompany the African assault force . The air support picture is clearing slowly. Lord Leathers rep orts that 151 of the P-39s destined for Russia have been recovered from 11 11 19 for TORCH . .PQ. use Treini ng schedules of the 1st Division are discussed with Gener al Allen and Colonel Cof , his Chief of Staff . Loading tables mu.st be ready by September 16 and the 1st Division equipment will start going aboard October 8. As to the amr.iu.nition sup ply, Colonel Co1a, says the 1st Divisi on can fight for a week at Oran but after that time it will have to be replenished, not only with arnruunition , but also with spa.re gun and truck pa,rts . Genera l Allen is told that when the 18th Inf antry combat team completes tr~ining i n Ireland it will not be r e turned to Tidworth . The 1st Division commander is to find out from the British what bivouac areas are available in the north for the 18th when its amphi biou.s tI·aining is com~leted . From the cc~p it will go directly to the combat loaded boets . ( Colonel Vandenberg reports that AirCCommodore Saunders ap~ears to understand the American view-point on TORCH air operations better thon he for merly did. Saunders , however, is not clear on his responsibility in connection with the Casablanca operation. He is told by General Clark that "much of this pl anning must necessarily be 111Etde the United States but the plans are subject to in revision by us . They will not be changed unnecessarily . 11 In the evening , General Clark has Sunday dinner American column ist , and Mrs. Li ppman • • ( • • with Walter Lippman. the �I / ( LONDON, SEPT, lh, 1942--Use of British paratroops to aid General Anderson's drive eastward to seize ftai\is. discussed today and has the enthusiastic approval of Genera l Clark and General rowning, commander of the 1st British P~rachute Brigade, Machinery is set in motion to get the British paratroopers training in Sout~ern England with the 64th Transport Group (American) . General Browning , faced with General Clark's proposal, says that 11 any part or all of my force is ready for such an operation and we will be glad to take part in it. 11 Browning's 1,700 jumpers are trained and ready but the Royal Air Force does not have the paratroop carriers . The 64th , with 40 to 45 planes, is available and arrangements are made to have tne transport group start training with the British chuters by weekend , A unit of U.S. paratroops is already set up to land at Oran. Browning's group w.1.11be used to aid Anderson's force . Once the American :paratroopers bail out over Oran and achieve their mission--seizure of two airports--it will take them two weeks to be r ead y for another operation since they will lose a certain amount cf equjpment and time is required to dry and re-pack their chutes . Use of British 1,aratroopers will obviate this two week delay. Fully-equipped parachute units will be flown into Oran after the airports have been captured , They wil l then be fully prepared to participate in more easterly operations . General Anderson is greatly interested i n obtaining parachute troops and the proposed arrangements will be outlined to him . Colonel Sterling is called i n and he says such rapid action in obtaining the paratroopers might make the British Chiefs of Staff feel they are being 11short-circuited . 11 So, General Clark plans to draft a note stating that he forsees the need of using British paratroops in TORC and that he wants to make U.S. air transports H available for their immediate training and later movement to the theater. General Anderson comes in for a conference and says that he is pleased with what he saw in watching the 168th combat team in an exercise . He also speaks favorably of the 18th Infantry combat team , which is also training in Ireland. Real purpose of Anderson ' s call is to try and induce General Clark to reduce the number of U. S. ve.~icles being taken into Algiers in the early conv oys for use of U.S. signal and headquarters units . Genera l Matejka reports his purpose in taking the units is to have all communications in shape by D. 33, when the Allied Force headquarters is .scheduled to be set upi n Algiers. General C1ark decides to cut the number of sign a l vehicles on the second fast Mediterranean convoy to 25 from the original plan of 62. Gcnera,l Craig. who h..-1.s been sitting as a neutral observer while British and U. S. officials thr as h out the a ir support problem, reports to Gener a l Clark that he believes 11the situation has largely solved itself . 11 He says the directive given to t he Air Com modore appears workable in all respects and that the air appreciation prepared by Saunders will be satisfactory. Craig recommenus taking 11 all air strength possible " on the operation , pointing out the tremend ous distance we will be from our base in the United States compared to the R.A.F, ba ses in Brit a in . It will be relatively easy for the British to call for air reinforcements; it won1 t be so easy for us . A glaring example of lack of coor4ination arises today. General Gruenther reports that a number of signal units needed for theCasablanca force have been erroneously shipped here from the United States . ~NO of the units--the 56th and blst Signal Companies--cannot be replaced in the U, S. in time t o sail with the Casabl anca force . Officers are now trying to use these unite inside the Mediterranean or else find a ship to take them from the U,K. to Casablanca, Such a convoy complication would be 11 :rable, 11 General Clark says. �r Admiral Bennett . U.S. NRval officer in charge of amphibious training. is called in to discuss contemplated withdr awal of the Engineer Amphibious Brigade from his con trol. It is now at Roseneath. The maintenance company, n non- mobile organization that o:,t::erates heavy mechiner y and keeps l anding craft in condition, is particularly needed. Admiral Benne tt says. The Admiral and three members of his staff i s oriented about the huge ramifications of TORCH and he realizes the importance of his task. pointed to ward now-defunct ROUNDUP, s rapidly decreasinge i In vi ew of this, the Admiral says he will not oppose wit hdrawal of t he unit provided it is not done bef ore the amuhibi ous trai ning is more or less completed. G eneral Clark say s the unit probpbiy will not be 9ulled before November 1. Ad.mid. Bennett is told by Genera l Clar k that if the entire amphib ious brigade is needed in TORCH that he would have to take it but that he would not unnecessarily cr ippl e the current traini ng program in Ir eland . Genera l Ryder is ca lled in during the naval conference and he explains that he want s a naval officer to work with him in coordinating naval and military operati~ns during the l anding . Admiral Bennett promis e s to provid e an off i ce r. General Clar ·k i s told that the four naval officers tha t will accompany his advance gro up to Gib r a lt ar on D minus 3 will be Adm ral Bi eri , Captain Wright, i a communic~tions officer and one other off ic er. Admiral Cunningham, t he TORC H naval comm ander • will es t ablish his ba se in Gibr a lt ar a imut the same date. In outlin ing TORCH the navy m , General Cl a.r k tells Admiral Bennett: to en 1 We re now in t he thr oes of child birth. Serious trouble has ar is en over shipping, e.ir support , na.val escort, logistics. These have been great burdens and they are still on our backs . It lo oks , however, as though we have our head s above wate r now. 11 11 ( ' • LONDON, SF.J>T.15 , 1942--As the Targ et Date, cux·rently set as Novembe 4, r d.r ews closer and closer all problems of TORCH,save one- -logistics--seem to be cliiifying sa.tisfactorily . Loom ing ever bigger and bigger as a. threat to the success of the major move to defe a t the Axis is the snarled condition of sup:i,:,ly . General Eisenhower calls in all his high -r E<rJ.dn general toda.y: Generals g Clark . Lee and. Spaatz . He t alks fra.nkly to each of them about the pro~lems , but the re a l reason for the meeting--the r eason for \,h ich Genera l Eisenhower st aged the confer ence - - is to point out to Lee ths ,t the confused situati on on logistics must be clarified immediately . Just how much supply is available in the United · Kingdom for TORCH must be determined quickly and accurately . 11 Thi s thing is going off, definitely, and we'r e going to have to go in their if we have to go in armed with nuts and bolts instet=td of guns an d bullets General Clark declares . uwe•ve all got to realize that an early November date must be met and those boys can't go in their barehanded . " ( ," Later , Gene1·al Lee comes ever to confer with General C1a:rk who tells the SOS general of his 11 ap·prehension over the ability of the SOS to perform its mission . 11 The Deputy Comrr.a ,nder-in-Chief se.ys he r ea lizes how terribly difficult the SOS j ub is and e.dds that his only criticism is that he can ' t get definite answers to specific questions en what the quantities are on vital items-- ammun:ltion . spa.re parts , maintenance su.:p lies--wj thin the United Kingdom a,nd ju.st p what n.ru-st be rushed over from the UnHed Stat e s . �The conference is later joinAO- by Colonels Sa tzmtm and Adcock and Genera ls La1·kin and Gruenther. The group discusses detailed requis i tions which are being submitted to the II Army Corps to cover supplies which should arrive at OrBn on the D-lt convoy fr om the United Kingdom and the D-7 convoy from the United States. A total of 50 .000 tons can be handled by the port of Oran from both convoys and it is therefore im1Je ,tive that Gener al Lee determine whet proportion of this rs 50,000 t ons can be supplied from here so the War Department can be instructed as to the sui-;I)lief> which will have to ae dispatched from the United States direct to Oran on the D-7 convoy . General Lee sa.id he was confident he could furnish the breakdown of the 50 , 000 ton shipments i n the lfvery near future . " General Lee is ~lso instructed to answer categoric a lly questions submitted oy General -Gale ", :1 in a memorandum on 11 Ability of SOS to meet Initial Supply Demands. 11 Gale asks to have a Deputy in his over-el l org anization , an America .n to help him work on the supply bottlenecks that are developing . He says it is i)!q_uite impossible" for hiir. to keep up with all the detdls of planning for the supply of three task forces . Gale , in duscussing U. S. participation in the Algiers force , says he hopes supply requirements for these units can be met from SOS in the United Kingdom. He says he does not , as yet , have complete inforre a tion. ( The problem of giving the 1st Division combat teams the necessary amphibious tr a ining , yet , getting to the troops their fighting equipment is discussed by Genere.l Clark with Genere,l Allen and his Chief of Staff , Colonel Co~ .. Generals Rooks and Lemnitzer also sit in on the conferf-lnce . Genere,l Allen suggests that tte troopb go into training in Scotland, return to Tidworth and get their equipment , then r et urn to Scotland . G eneral Clark vetoes the idea, saying he sympathizes with the division 1 s problem of issue and loading but that he feels strongly that "we shouid take full advantage of all O rtunities ?po to train the regimental combat teams as fully as possible." He rules that a strong cadre , under the second in co mmand remain at Tidworth to µ- epa:re the equipment for shipment and , get it to the port of embcrkation. In that way, the cowbat teams can concentrate on amphibious training without inter~~ption . The TORCH force will load in the Firth of Clyde region . General Ryder and his staff come in to present , to Generals Clark a nd Eisenhower , the new Chief of Staff of Allied Force Headquarters , Brigadier General W B. Smith, and Generals Gruenther Rnd Lemnitzer . detailed e,ccount of how they pl an to assault Algiers . Working in front of huge maps in General Clark 1 s office , the enti1e 'Algieis plan is reviewed . General Clark says it looks "very satisfactory . 11 General Clark has General Ryder rems.in to stress to hir'l 11 that the capture of Algiers and its adjacent airports nmst take complete preced11 ence ove:r nny effort to capture Bougie . General Clark decla1·es that this 11secondc.ry mission , 11 for which a strong demand is made by General Anderson , 11is to be unciertaken only after the capture of the primary objective--the Algiers re,gion. 11 a Sandwiched in between the;;e all-:lmportant cor,ferences are meetings on more minor , but still highly important , matters . Gene r al Matejka reports that the British have agreed to the establishment of a connection on the Gibr1-1 .ltar-London cable . This line will run directly into 20 Grosvenor Sq_us • se a t of the .re European Thcetc r of Operations of the U. S. Army. It will connect directly with the TORCH operati ons room at Gibr altcr . Matejka says the com uuni cations problem at Algiers is lflss troublesome than at Ore.n. Communications with the convoy coming from the States will be th.ro 1.1gr. United States channels as long as possible for security reasons. It will be possible to commu icate with all convoys afloa .t n di:rectly from Gibraltnr . Major Philli:9s is ma.de public rde .tions officer of J �Allied Force Headquarters and instructed by Gent~·el Clark to outline the entire public relations program . He will operate, consecutively , at Norfolk House here , Gibr altar and Algiers . A fe\/ correspondents will be flown to Gibraltar and a limited number will accompany the assault forces . Phili~ps will also outline censorship propose .ls and determine who will be the field P.R . O. s with the Oran and Algiers forces . Du.ring the early phases , he will not have to concern himself with :press relations of the Casable .nca fo r ce since it is coming directly to the attack from the United States . Colonel Snwbridge , the headquarters G-1, has gone into the matter of r~placement~ for the task forces and reports the matter seems sa,tisfactory . • • • LONDON, SEP'EMBR lb , 1942--Robert Murphy, a rawboned, redhee,ded Stete DeE partment career officer who will be the key political man in North Africa prior to and during the initial phases of TORCH arrices under an alias from the United , States to get his final instructi ons before returning to Africa. ( I From t he airport he is whisked to a hideaway where he confers with Genera ls Eisenhower and Clark , Ambassador Winant , Bri gad i er Mockler-Ferryman , Mr. Mack and Averill Harriman . The most startling news brought by Murphy is th at President .Roosevelt has drafted a letter for a,lrnost imm ate delivery to the Fz·ench in edi which he tells them 11we 1 re coming into North Africa at an early date . " The letter 1 of which Murphy has a copy , does not reveal any det a ils . It is cleverly hazy, making it appear that the assault wil l come anywhere from next week to next s1)rir.g . It proposes that French General Gir a,ud be made Commander-1-n-Clief of all troops , with the French naturally included. The President hS~i~ ioy~H-fnein and head up everything--military , political , dvil and monetary . General Clark believes it is "da ngerous to let them know ahead of time a.bout the operation unless we are assured the North African French will come a long with us. If they are going to do so it should be hnndled through diplomatic channels and we should move in immediately . " The general remarks that Murphy 11 has a rattlesnake by the tail. 11 He describes him as a good , keen fellow but lacking in military background . 11 Murphy, who has not been in North Africa fo r several weekA a.nd .who will be returning to the United States so he cap fly to Africa fr om there, believes t he French will resist for only 48 hours and then C!tpitulate to the assaulting force . Murphy feels that upon his return to Africa he con organize groups tha .t can seize coast defense batteries, re,dio anci telegraph stations , new&po,pers, and sensitive points of communications and other key objectives . TORCH G-3 wil l p-epare a list of th~se objectives for seizure or destruction prior to or on D-d.ay. T"nese will list , th~ desired priorit y of destruction . Before the five hour meeting with Mr. Murphy, General Clark ca.11s in Mr. Mack so t hey can go over the poli tical situation. The general pl an to return to Washington within 10 days and he \1ants to t ake back e. complete report on the politic a l phases of TORCH Mr. Mack said he believed President Roosevelt's . message guaranteeing the integrity of French North Africa providing there is no resistance should be nelivered to General Juin, top-ranking general in that region . Mack says that Juin will not have control of the navy and it probably will start shooting. He believes Jui n 1 s reaction . upon receiving the President's note, will be that he has orders to defend and defend he must , or , that he will ask for tiwe to report to his government. Mack believes Murphy can handle Ji~in but that it might be necessary to have a military plenipotentiary standing by so that �either the C0moonder-tn-Chief or his deputy can go to him for consultatioh. maek also suggests i.that Juin might be flown to either General Eisenhower or General , Clark . Murphy, the general stresses, mu.st observe military action very c~os~l! when he returns to Africa a.nd keep Al lied Headquarters fully advised. ~enetal 1...r . Ola.rk points out that some system must be worked out so Murphy can send signals to the fleet to let it know whether or not it should start bombardment to knock out coaste.l batteries and other installations. TORC leaders are .convinced the H attack will not be R suprise. ( The enti:t'e political i:Jhase of TORCH canvassed. Vari ous methods of psyis chological warfare, including the use of airplanes equ ipp ednwith loud speakers , enroloyment of aerial sky writers, use of fireworks and leaflets, are discussed. Th; text of leaflets to bo dropped over Algiers , Oran and Casablanca depends on what President Roosevelt's m essage includP-s. General Cl ark suggests that it might be wise to attach coupons to the leaflets , the coupons to be turned in to some Allied head quarters for rations or cash. Certificates written in Arabic are being prepared to instruct natives who might surround crashed pilots that , if they return them unharmed to American military offici als, they will receive a certain amount of money. General Clark also suggests that booty be stored in warehouses to it can be passed out to native leaders to get their support or SY!l)111B,thy. The air support problem apparently is ironed out satisfactorily, leaving logistics as the only major TORCH hurdle. British and American views on the air operat ion are now harmonious and Air Commodore Sanders proposes to outline the entire di1·ective for final ap1rova ,l . Colonel Vandenberg reports that he and Sa.nders are in 11 full agreement 11 about pl a n strength and uses and that he believes arrangements for the da iv ery of ess enti a l ground supplies to air forces at Oran an~.casablanca are satisfactory. Sanders is told by General Clark th a t he plans to ..ttineral Doolittle at Gibralt a r since the Commander-in-Chief must have an a ir man at his side to advise him as the fighting progresses. Air commanders will be appointed and assigned to the three assa ult forces. ( The supply problem, \-A. time of the essence in deciding it , grows more th and more tangled. An SOS cable on sup ply shortages is held up because the list includes shortages for units not set up for the TORCH force. General Clark says the cable "would only further confuse the alre ady muddled supply situati on." Anyway, the requisition could not be filled in time for TORCH ding which begins loa October 5. Colonel Hughes is told of the instru.c t ions given yesterday to General Lee but Hughes is not cle ar as to wha t Lee is doing about it. Later Colonel Hamblen is called in and Gener a l Cla rk explains that 11 now pl a n to get such we maintenance supplies a s we can from the United Kingdom and ask for shipment of the remainder direct to destination from the United States. This seems desirable even if it r e sults in some overloading of port capacity. There is a possibility a few extra ships involved might be staged at Gibr a l ta r until berths can be found for them in the ports of Elestinati on. 11 ~ Possible use of a British Ma rine outfit, '4l.ich hi!s been sugge sted by the Prim e Minist er, is discuss ed by Gener als Clark and ~ruenther and Brig a dier Whiteley . The British officer is told that it is desirable to get the marines r eady for possible use by D-bO and th a t it would be u sed with artillery and paratro ops t o attack Sa rdinia and Sicily if the oper a tion develops suffi ci ently. When Whiteley shows appr ehensi on about use of the Marines, thi nking they might 11 replace anoth er out f it, Gener a l Clar k tells him they constitute ace i n the hole" and th eir u se is 11 very indefinite." an �7 General Ryder reports that the logistics problem for Algiers seems to be coming along satisfactorily. He is investigating the possible use of British ammunition and spare parts to make up shortages. He is W)rried about the continuity of U.S. command and is told to appoint Gener al Porter as his Deputy Commander so that command would pass to Porter automatica.lly in the assault phase. General Clar k exple .ins that the col7l1!'.e.nd definitely is to be American until General Anderson takes over. Captain Wright of the U.S. Navy comes in to discuss naval matters and says he is convinced the Straits of Gibraltar cannot be kept open if we hold only the south side, General Clark tells him it is the opinion of Sea Lord Pound that some convoys could be put through under those conditions but that if Gibraltar airfield and ha:lbor is bombed early in the operation before we develop enough force to move into Spanish Morocco , the Str aits will be closed and TORCH forces will be dependent on communications over the overland route from Casabl anca to Oron. A plR.n to cover this contingency is being worked out. • General Lemnitzer 1 s G-3 section is instructed today to keep in mind the necessity of preparing alternate plans to meet the following contingencies: closing of the Straits by Axis entry into Spain or hostil ~ action by Bpain herself; Axis or Spanish bombing of Gibr a ltar prior to D-day because 11due to the congested condition of the field all our airplanes might well be destroyed;" what should be done in case weather conditions ~e it impossible to land through the surf; the possibility of c simultaneous attack by British troops from Malta against Tunis on D-day; possible 11Tx,c;Jan Horse 11 tactics that might assist in the B,t tacks . ( • LONDON,SEPTE MBER 17, 1942--To circumv ent , at least partially, some of the ever-more-crucial TORCH supply pro~lems , General Clark rules that equipment held by troops that will not participate in the N0 rth African operation can be taken from them and put in the hand.b of the Oran Task Force . General Rooks is instructe.d to "get whatever you can for the assi,.u lting troops and the more com,l,)lcte the better . " General Larkin is called in to report on the progress being mf!.de in preparation of General Lee ' s supply report--concerning the breakdown of the 50 , 000 tons for the D.l and D.4 donvoys. As usual , the report does nothing but confuse the situation. General Clark tells Larkin that 11th e SOS sin:ply is not fulfilling its obligati ons . 11 He streGses that it is imperative that TORCH planners have a report showing just what is available in the United Kingdom for these h·o initial convoys and what items must be shi9ped immediately from the United States to fill in the ammunition , maintenance and other supply gaps . ( Admira.l Lyster of the British navy, a salty, colorful officer who will comJ?l.and all aircra .ft carriers in the Mediterranean during TORCH,comes in to explein his setup and make three interesting proposals to General Clark . He believes that at least 12 Spitfires should be detailed to be flying over Oran at the time our tro ops land so that they can begin using the two Oran airports just as soon as the Oran force seizes them. He suggests that it would be wiser to lose 12 planes instead of an aircraft carrier and thAt these land-bas ed aircraft will be better able to support ground troops than his can·ier-based plnnes . When the Spits reach -- �Ore.n they will he.ve enough fuel to le st two and ,::,hn:!.f hcurs. If the airports are not taken in that time , the fighter planes will have to land on the desert and trust to luck . Admiral Lyster also recorunends that TORCH lePders te.ke steps to procure an 18-e.cre graveyard on Gibrel tar. He we .nts to 11 ough the dead under" so the area pl for dispersing the 175 planes that will be crowaed on Gib airport ce.n be extended. 11 The living and the dead must make their contribution , " says the Admiral . Although he says he knows he is "getting out of my field, 11 Admiral Lyster propoun ds a theory of 11exploit, exploit, exploit" e.fter the or.ieration star·ts . He says we 11n.1st be ready to exploit the l anc ing and drive eastward at the greotest possible .speed. 11nt all costs . " He believes that troops on Malta--4,000 to 5,000, supported by fighter planes, should move from Ma te. in an attack on Tunis that would be l si¼!)ultaneous with our attacks on Oran, Casablanc a and Algi erE< .He offers to contribute 18 planes that would drop dummy parachutists to divert and confuse the opposition at Algiers . He suggests that it might be wise to etrip some of the bombers and 11stuff them with soldie rs'' so the drH'e to the eastward can be exploited . The Admiral is proceeding tonight to the Firth of Clye where some· of his units will engage in col!!bined operations tr eining and prepare for departu1·e of the huge armada that will make up the TORCH Mediterranean invasion force. ( The staff in Norfolk House is growing constantly. Today the permanent Chief of Sta.ff, Brig ad ier Gener al W B. (Bedel) Smith, reports in and star·ts . operating in the office next tc Genera .l Clark ' s . General Gru.enther becomes Deputy Chief of Staff . Other offices are filling up . Eight geopolitical erperts have arrived from the Unitf .d States . Gener a.l Doolittle returns from a ir plans conferences in Washington and Ger-eral Clark calls him in almost immediately. The air general is pleased with progress but tells General Clark he is going to do some "house cleaning " in his personne l to get stripped for ac tion. Genera .l Clark stresses to Doolittle • \~ho is qu:'.. an individt18list . 11the absolute necessity te for teamwork and cooperation with the British." Doolittle is inst ructed §o go over the TORC air dirPctive H with Air Com modore Sanders . Gener e.l Noce, over from the United States to inspect the J)re : a.redness of p the Engineer Amphibious Brigade, reports to General Clnrk that•!s pleased with the training the unit is receiving . The brigade is going to be used as shore parties and as port batt alions . General Clai·k informs him that he hopes to retain the landing craft used in the assault in the N0 rth African theater and later utilize the boat regiment to operate these cr uft in coastc.l sup~oy movements . l Noce praises the ability of the maintenance company which he says is ahead of the lia.vy in keeping landing ere.ft fit . Gener a l Clark tells him he has decided to leave the maintenance company on its present Joo in Scotland until November when it will pack up and prepare for movement to the T.a.RCH theater . "'c • LONDON SEPTEMBER , 1942-- A convoy crisis arises today to complicate the , 18 al r eady snarled TORCH supply picture and immediately all the resources of General Clark and his big staff a.re thrown into the bre ach to sol ve it. How many "battles " must be fought i n offices before the real battles start ! The U.S . Navy has decided that the maximum number of shi p s it can convoy safe l y from the United States directly to the African theater, arr i ving D- 6 , is 20 . This means el i minati on of the D- 6 convoy that was to carry a.11 t he gasoline �\.½9 that was scheduled for the Oran Air li'orce. A total of 8,000 tons of cargo would be unavailable and it is of vital import a nce . The Navy decision would also eliminate 3,008 aviation signal troo p s and 5,000 II Army Corps personnel. What the cable really means , says Gener al Clar k , "is that the schedule for convoys on whi ch everybody has agreed is all torn up. 11 Colonel Hamblen is instructe d to draft a re ply advising Washington of the seriousness of the situation. Meanwhile, the staff begins looking for a way to circuvent this new crisis . To balance the new and gloomy development on the nightmarish supply probl em, the air problem is straightened satisfactorily now as General Doolittle reports his ap proval of Air Com modore Sanders plan •• And Sanders agrees to enlargement of the plan to include the strategy of having 12 Spitfires circle over Oran so they can use the Oran air fields as soon as they can be seized on the morning of the assault . The possible sacrifice of the Spitfire--which will result if their ga soline run s out before they can la .nd. on the airdromes--is necessary in order to be ready to strengthen th~ weak carri er -borne support. The first of a series of tri-week ly TO RCH 8ombined Staff meetings is held today in Norfolk House and they pro bably will continue from now until the time the staff is re ady to depart, by air to Gibraltar and by ship to Oran and Algiers , for the opening of the _Second Front. { ( General Eisenhower, the Colllli'ander-in-Ch ief , presides at the long, green, cloth - covered tabl e . At his ri gh t sits General Clark, the Deputy Commander, and on his left the Chief of Staff, General Smith. The huge rectangular table , covered with pads and pencils, as htrays and place cards for each officer, is surrounded by every key man in TORC with the exception of General Patto n, head H, of the Western Task Force who is planning the Casablanca assault in the United States. The officers inc lude: British Gene ral Anderson whose task it will be to drive ea stward from Algiers to take Tunis; Air Marshall W elsh, Air Commodore Sanders and General Doolittle, who· will have charge of a ir operati ons ; Admiral Burrough of the British Navy and Captain W right, repr es enting Admiral Bieri of the United States Navy; Gener al Ryder, who will lead the Algiers assault force: General Rooks, at presenting planning the Oran assault that is presently set for the comma d of Major General Hartle , currently n in Ireland; British Genera l Gale, on whose shoulders falls the responsibility of directing supply operations; Brigadi er Mockler-Ferryman, the trim. mustached Briti sh officer who heads TORCH intelligence; Mx· Mack, the political . affairs advisor: and other brigadier generals, brigadiers and col onels who head th e spe ci a l sections in TORCH planning. Most important of these is Brigadier General Lemnitzer, the soft-spoken, blackhaired American who has charge of plans and training for TORCH. Genera l Eisenhower explains that he believes these tri-we ek ly · conf erences will give all of i cers a chance to air their problems , share their views. He explains that Gener a l Clark, after handling org a nization of TORCHsince it was decid ed to make North Afric a the major theater, will be Deputy Comma d er and n fre e of paper w ork once the operati on starts. He explians that General Clark probably will fly into Gibr a ltar three or four days before TORCHis to start and that he (Eisenhower) will be there on the day previous to D-day . . Later, th e Alli ed Force Headquar t ers will be moved to either Algi er s or Oran, de pe nding on conditions but with Algiers preferable. The entire chain of co ffilllc~ is explained nd a nd Gene r a l Ei se nhower .9 oints out that since TORCHi s essentially an all-Am erican opc rati oni' it was deemed wise to have Am ricans fill e the key spots . General Eisenhower wil still re ta in his post as Commander of the Europe a n Thea ter of Ooera tions, designating a depu t y ju s t before he depar t s for Gibraltar. This ret ~ntion �a / of comm nd will make it possible a for TORCHto ha ve priority on any replacements that might be wanted from the United Kingdom. Later, two theaters of operations might be set ~u:p--one for the European Theater and the other for Africa. General Eisenhower tells the British and Americans gathered in the now smoky room that differences in staff pr ocedure have caused difficulti es but that it was thought best to proceed on the American plan. After · he has made a survey of the general situation, Eisenhower asks the Brit ish to bring up any problems they face. General Ande rso n asks for definite commitment of the First British Parachute Brigade to his force. He sa ys it will be invaluable in th e drive to the east. Gene r a l Eisenhower says the para troo p s are too valuable to be co mm itted to a spe cific task so long before the operations starts and says their disposition must be 1 p t flexible e to meet demands that might arise. However , he adds , every effort will be pointed toward aiding Gene ral Anderson's overland drive from Algi e rs to Tunis. f Air Marshall Welsh says the greatest da nger to the TORC convoy is going to H be from submarines and he asks the opportunity of having an anti -submarine air unit bas ed at Oran. He wants to put gasoline and depth charg ( s for this work aboard the Oran convoy but all space on this convoy has already been taken. Ge neral Eisenhower says that a surv ey will be made to determine what sacrifices will have to be made to ge t this anti -sub marine materiel aboard. Wels h also wants to have a squadron of U.S. P-38s based at Gibr a ltar so they can fly to Algiers the morning of the attack to sup9 ort ground troops. He says the Algiers aircraft carriers will be within range of Axis planes based on Sardinia. The P-38s Hould be equi pp ed with belly pe trol tan..1-<:: they could return to Gib ra.l tar. This brings s so up the subject of overcrowding of aircraft at Gibralter and Welsh says present pl a ns call for 175 p1anes on that vulnerable field with a study being made to se e if 200 an't be jamm in, particularly ed if the 18-acre graveyard can be graded and utilized . After discussing a multitude of subjects raised by vari ous phases of TORCH, General Eisenhower breaks up the meeting, calling th e next one for Monday noon. He and General Clark then go into a long conference in Clar k's office. The Deputy Cornnand er has, as he described it, 11 ant s in my pants . 11 He asks if he can't take over command of th e Ora n Task Force. This operat i on is running into the most organiz a ti on and supply snags and Gen er al Clark wants to plunge directly into it . He also wants to be closer to the front when the fighting starts. Gener a l Eisenhower, after long argument, discourag e s him, saying that no one can f ill his present post and th a t he has the most fundamental knowled ge of all officers involved in TORCH. The plans and training secti on is drawing up a lt ernate plans for Patton's Casablanca force in case it is unable to land because of surf A number of alternatives will be pro vided but they probably will call Western Task Force to land inside the Medite rr anean. These plans must by next Wednesday when General Clark plans to leave for Washington to final conf erence on TORCH and take a last l ook at th e org enization of force. ( General conditions. for the be ready have a Patt on's General Doolittle comes in to oppo se Welsh 1 s pro posal th a t an anti-sub air iqu adron be based at Ora n. Doolittle feels th e British are unwilling to make r oom in their own Algie s convoy and want to saddle the Oran group with the equi pment. He also opp oses W elsh 1 s plan to pu t a squadron of P-3 8s on Gibraltar �I I I I~ I ( ; so it can fly to Algiers to sup port tha.t attack. Doolittle says he does not want that many P-38s at Gibraltar bec au se of the danger of a bombing attack, th<tt the P-38s are ha.lf again as big as Spitfires and will take more of th e already crowded aircraft space , a nd the P-38s would ha.veto dtro p their be lly tanks once they got into combat and. hence would not have suf f icent fuel to return to Bibraltar. In evaluating th~ British and Am erican views on air operatio ns, Doolittle points out to Gener al Cla rk that the Am ericans want overwhelming sup~~iority of air sup.l1o while th e British rt want the minimum. He says the British want to bolster their own air sup port by drawing fro m the U. S. force a~d he vigorously opposes such a withdrawal, declari ng the British argument is f alla cious--that each attacking force should su9port itself. After o Jerations have developed , Gener al Clark plans to pool the air support for most ex ped itious use. Strange things develo p in planning warfare and Colon el Wilbur, G-2 on y General Patton's force presents a qu ee r factor tha.t may carry gre a t weight in deter m ining the final assault date •• Wilbur, who has spe nt some ti me and study in North Africa, re ~orts that the Moslem religi on must be taken into consi uer ation since it proh ibits any warfare during the 11th and 12th months. He says November 10 would be the final date to open a campaig n without offending the Moslems . He believes the Axis would propagandize our flaunting of Moslem customs should we attack l ate r than November 10. He re port s great care must be taken to prevent damage to the sacred Moslem cities of Raubat and Sa le. ( A periscopic reconnaissance of the Mediterranean shore prior to D-day now ap~ears practic able . General Gruenth er r epo rts to Gene ral Clark that inv e stigati on sho ws a crew can make sketch es and get valuable photographs. Gruenther also re ports that use of the Royal Marines has be Fn a pp roved and that they are to go into ren ewed tr nining immediat e ly und er direction of Commando officers. The 1st Armored Force, Gruenther says , has given u p insisting on M-4 tanks bec ause it is now too late for them to arrive in time. GenE: ral C1e.rk in:.tructs that a cable be sent to the War Department explaining why the Arm ored Force will ge going over the bea.ch es · in light tanks only. Gener a.l Gale r epo ts that th e 1st Armored can not be loaded at Belf as t bec ause of li mited dock facilit+es. The loading of troops and materiel aill be done at Liverpool. All gear is scheduled to be packed and loaded by October 6. • • • LONDON,SEPTEMBER 19, 1942--The tentative assault date for TORCH has now be en m oved back to November 8. This will be the d.B recommended by Generals .te Clar k and Eisenhower when they confer with Pri u1e Minister Churchill at Checkers Sunday night • { Principal reason for push i ng the proposed date back four days is to give more time f or troo p s to get their equ i pment, more time for loa din g , more time to attempt to get additional ammunition ann spare parts for guns, more time to smooth out kinks in convoy schedules. The delay results pri~.arily from one cause--the problem of logistics . General Clark calls in most of his key officers and all of them a.re plea .sed that they will heve four more highly valuable days to get all phases of TORCH a firmer footing. on �( The dange r ous situati on resulting from yesterday's cable changing the convoy situation is gone into thoroughly with General Holmes , British Director of Mo vements , and Generals Gale and Smith . All agreed that the best thing to do is send Washington a cable saying that the urgent D.6 material must come i n five fast ships to the UK to join the sec ond fast convoy arriving in the Mediterranean from the Unit ed Kingdom. If this is not possible , the U.S. Navy will have to enlarge the fast D.6 conv oy from th e U.S. to Africa , the convoy that the Navy ' wants to limit to 20 shi p s. Gene ral Smith , who was formerly in Washington attending conferences where he learned the Navy's attitude on convoys , tells Gneral Cl a r k he believes the navy , und er the above circumstances , will enlarge the conv oy sine~ it has its protest on the record ana. thus will escape res ponsibility. General Clark says the D.6 supply must be moved into Oran 11 any cost." at General Holme s says the change in D-da,y will make it possible to set back the loading date from Sep tember 26 to 30 and although he maintains that Btill 11tight makes the loauing situation , 11 it gives a margin of safety. He adds it is difficult to plan the convoy until he knows the schedule and ton nage of ships ' co ming from the U.S. to join t he first UK-M editerranean follow-up convoy. Russian convoy "PQ. 11 got through with the loss of only 11 of the 50 ships - 18 a remarkable record . Holmes believes Pri me Minister Churchill will order "PQ.19 11 to sail Sep tember 23. It is Holmes belief that the Prime Minister will then decide to move the target date back to as l ate as November 15 so the 11PQ. 19 11 escort can be used in TORCH . ( General Cl ark learns that the change from a 20 to a 25-day cycle for U.S. convoys to the Medit err a nean will probably mean that conv oys from the U.K. will have to "sweeten " the supplies for U.S. forces at Oran and Algiers . The British believe they can swell their conv oys to take care of this contingency. Holmes points to the necessity of having firm loading plans. He says 18 of the British First Army's ships are aln ;ady loaded in detail but th a t last night he was ordered by the British General Sta f f to restow 15 of th em. If everything goes right, Hol mes is convinced he can have the convoys on schedule for the November 8 date. The convoy cable is ap p roved by General Clar k and it offers two alternatives. 1--se nd five ships to the U. K. so they can fit directly into the second U.K.Medi terr anean conv oy , or, 2--enlarge the conv oy sailing di r ect from the U.S. to Oran . Genera l Clark 1 s cable poin ts out "that the most practical solution ap :;;i ears to be to have the navy enlarge its Oran convoy regardle ss of increased hazard.s, 11 General Al len of the 1st Division retu~ns from an ins pe ction tri p to Scotland and re port s that the 1 8th combat team is excellently trained, with the exception . of one company. The 18th is to move from Toward t o the Glasgow region on Septe m be 21. It will be repl a ced e.t the amphibious training base by the 16th which \;ill have its sp ecial assault training from Sept ember 24 to October 2. The 168th is moving out of the Inveraray base tomorrow and the 26th will take its place . This third combat team of the 1st Division will take amphibious tr aining until Sep tember 30 . Special r econna iss Bnce and Ranger units will get amphibious training in conjunction with the 16th and the 26th regiment al comba.t teams .Allen says postponement of D- day until November 8 will give his troops more time to assemble th eir equipment. He said he has figured from th e start that his division will go into combat only 70 pe rcent equipped bec ause of the supply mudd.le.He adds that his as sa ult troops will go in with 75 mm howitzers and that re se rve battalions will use the 105s . �\ r The Oran f orce set - up is discussed with Generals Rooks and Lemnii zer . :B ece.use of th e lack of shipping space , Rooks i s in s t ruct ed by General Cla r k to use l i gh t transportat i on , el iminating 2 1/2 to n trucks as much as pos cible . The 1st Arrn o1·cd comb team m t be re duced to two light - tank battalions at us and one medium-tank ba;talion b- caus _ of the ballup on ~h1pmen~of M4s. Tiie armored t roo ps wil l have no sup port i ng anti - ai rcr a ft but t his danger will be m nimi zed i by the out f its mobilit y . Lemni t zer is plea sed about moving D-day back four days sin c e he had figured the Oran t r oop s wou~d not get their equipment in time t o st art l oa ui ng October 8 •. General Ryder , who will command the Algiers assault , r epor t s to Genera l Cla r k tha t hi s ammunition situation l ooks f a ir ly good and that he wi ll have sufficient to "get goi ng ." He has enough hand grenades but i s lacking i n anti t ank mi nes . Gene r al Clark t ells him t o see what can be done about obt aining t hem from the British . Sin ce General Clark i s l eaving fo r Washington eit her next Wednesday or Th ursday so he can di scuss the en tir e operati on face - to - fa ce wi t h Wa and Navy r offic i al s and have a f i nal ch eckup on Gene r al Patton's plans and t roo ps , he calls in two se ction heads. General Lemnitzer is i nstructed to draw up alternate plans for t he Pa tton force so they can be u sed in event the surf conditions make it i mpossib l e to eff ec t t he C asablan ca r egi on landing . I n such an event, Patton's for ce probably wi ll hav e to proceed i nt o the Medit erranean . General Clark also want s to r eturn to the St at e s with the gist of al l politic al plans that have been or are being made. Colonel Hol m is preparing this • es ( • • • LO NDON SEPTEMBR 20, 1942--The big ges t individual , E prob lem of TORCH t hat is of su p}l ying the Oran Tas k Force . Casablanca's logi stics are being ha ndled fro m t he Uni t ea Sta te s direct. The Algiers force , made up on Ameican un i ts t uat have r bee n in t he U nited Kingdom since last s prin g and Britis h tro ops t hat can dra w t he ir su ppl y wit hout trouble since t hey are at th e f ount a in head , i s hav in g a far easi er ti m gettin g equipped for the operati on. e General Clark calls in Generals Lar kin and Gruent her and Colonels Adcock, Hamblen and Niblo to go into s pecific Oran pr ob l ems. The ammu i on an d mai nr~t tenance situation is c , nfused , A dcoc k says the Oran a ss ault f orce wi .L go ashore l with f rrLlI' and a half units of fire. There appears to be sufficient arti lle ry ammuniti on for l .L days but the attackers will be short on . 81 mmm ortars since on~y 10 of the 89 mort ars called for in the a ssault ar e availa bl e fr om SO he re. S No pyrotechnics are availab l e so General Cla r k instructs Col onel Adcock , t he Oran G , to procure t he m for t he air corps . -4 ( 1 Adcock, summing up, says t he Oran sup ply situ at i on i s "in a m ess but i f ev eryt hing com thr ough all ri ght we are going to be ab le t o m t t he lo adin g es ee sche du le. W h the exce ption of certain equi pment and su pply , t here i s goin g to it be en ou gh for the atta ckin g force to go in but r epl eni shment of su pply will be ne eded wi t hin a fe w days . " Adcock says t here ar e two dif f iculti es,:iii "pr epa rin g c onvoys for the Oran assa ult : (1 ) it takes four to si x weeks to "marr y up" equi pment wi t h the troops to which it belon gs, and, (2) th e SOS ha s no sch edul es to s how th e status of what is avai l able here and what is coming fro m th e U.S. SO S manife sts do not snow s pecifica l l y what i s on the way . Guns are here but t he fir e c ontrol mechanisms for many of them hav e not ar r ived. That makes the guns us ele s s. A shi p carr yin g these vital gunsi ghts has been sunk in mid-At la ntic. �,~ \ , .,. 1, It develops at the conference that the U.S. and Britis h convoy sched ul es to the M editerranean are not being integrated and that unle s s something i s done , more ships wil l pile up at Oran that the docks can berth. The Britis h sailing sc hedules are fir m and G eneral Clark instructs Colon el Hamblen to draft a cable i nstructi ng c onvoy offici als in Washin gt on to make th eir schedules dovetail wit h the British. Adcock says if Oran gets a su ppl y c cnvoy on D plus six and the Britis h and U.S. schedules are integrated, the lon g- ran ge su ppl y s it uat i on may clarify. Restituti on of the D pl us six convoy wi l l go a lon g way toward solvin g t he Oran suppl y probl em. A lan ky , husky civilian--Culbertwho wil l be Gerera l Patt on 's "on-s hore" man at Casablanca, arrives from Africa. He does not believe that surf condi ti ons are too severe for t he W tern Task Force lan din g . He thinks the gr eat est danger es to the Casablanca force wi ll be the Fr ench navy. He says one crui se r, 50 destro yers and 20 submarines are in the Casab l anca-Dakar re gi on and pr ed ict s t hey wi l l fi ght unless there is s om chan ge in the political e setu p . Cul bert goes into conf ere nces with pol i tical division of f ici al s. He probab l y wiJ.l acco mpany General Clark back to the States so he can ta lk with Patton before retur ning to Casablanca to make int ern a l preparations for th e attack. \ Alternative plans are bein g prepared for G eneral Pat ton in event hi s base plan is thrown off schedule by surf c ondit ion s. General Clar k bel ieves Patton should have several plans to meet an y c ontin gencie s . He might make a direct fr ontal at t ack on the ports, goin g in wit h a l l t he wars hi ps guns blazin g so he can land at docksi de. To pr epare for any eventuality, G eneral Eisenhower shoul d have several plans he can order Pat ton to execute. General Clar k su ggests: Plan X-sta ll for time in hope that the weather will clear wit hin seven day s; Plan Y - proceed to the Oran area an d have th e co m bat-l oaded troo ps land over the beach es, run some of the conv oy to Gibraltar an d s end t he or ganizati onal outfits t o the U. K. Plan Z- - push insi de· the M editerranean to Phil i ppevi ll e, Bone, Bougi e and any ot her availab le ports. Lenuitzer sug gests the entire Pat ton force might i procee d en toto to the U.K. and be r eady to push off at a momen's notice to t attac k Spanis h Mo rocco if neces sa r y . Plans are goin g ahead for the traini ng of Britis h paratroopers. General Clark says "we must exp l oit eve-ry opportunit y t o use parachute or a ir-borne tro ops as s oon after D-day as possi ble . Our readine s s to do so might be of critical i mpo rtance in furt herin g General Anders on's advance." In a ll proba bilit y the 64th U. S. Tra nspor t Group will tr a in wit h t he British paratro oper s . General Clark points out that it is esse nt ia l t o hav e the American pilots and t he Britis h jumpers lhi:a :in j ointl y prior to ac tual operat i ons. Colon el Bentle y is instructed to provi de t he necessary trans port s for suc h tra in in g . Aft er a lon g conf eren ce wi th air and paratro op of f ic er s it is decid ed to t ake t wo c ompanies of Britis h par atroo ps , ab out 250 jumpers, in to Africa s hort ly after D-day . This number can be lifted by one tr anspor t squadron. Res tricti n the mass f ligh t of British paratroo ps to Africa is the s horta ge of gaso line in th at theater for the r eturn f l i ght so t he pla nes ca n haul down more jumper s. Genera l Clark t el l s Ge neral Doolit tle to be pr epar ed to send an addi t i onal tran sport squadron if an urgent situ at i on develo ps . \ The proposal th at a squ adron of ~58s fl y fr om Gibr al tar to Algi ers on D-day has been vetoed but the scheme to have an anti- subma rine air squadron based at eith er Oran or Algi ers is sti ll bein g c , ns i dered s er i ous ly . If it goes in, it wil l mean t he eJ:inination of one fi ghter group but, if c onv oys run into trouble, ant isub marine planes might be of far more val ue than fi ghting planes . j �General Larkin r eports to General Clark that the chan ged tar get date wil l extend the loa din g time four days. He thinks t hi s wil i give the SOS time to to do its loadin g job. Later in the day, General Larkin com to General Cla.rk 1 s es of f ice to indicate that a lot of buck-pas s ing is goin g on in the SOS an d that he wants ·the general to und erstand one of the many rea sons the su p}ly situ ation is so <mfused. Generals Clark, Eisenhower and Smith l eave in the eve ning for Checkers where the y wil l sta y overni ~ht wit h the Pri m M e inister. An i mp ant c onference ort is to be held to m orrow mornin g . * * * I' CHE CKER EN S, GLAND SERTEMBER 1942--November 8 is the date! , 21, , Pri m M st er Churc hil l, apprised of the su ~ply, convoy and gener al TO e ini RCH situation, agrees to exec ution of the North African attack on Novem ber 8. An at t em is going to be made to get General Giroud over to Englan d so t he way pt can be paved for the assault forces to m ove in wit h a m inimum of opposit i on. ( ' M Churchill, expr es s in g disap pointment at the status of TOR and apparent~ r. CH in a ti ght spot because of its shi ppin g complications, is in rare c onvers at ionai form. He wants to know how he is "goin g to tel l Joe" that PQ 19 won't be c om g in through. This, says the Pri m M nister, e i is goi ng to be 11fri ghtful .l. embarra ss in g" y because PQ 18 was a success, with only 15 of the 40,~hips failin g t o rea c l! t he ir destination. He is alarmed that U.S. tro op arrivals in t he Unite d Kingdom wi ll have to be cut down. He now sa ys t hat he can't r ememb ever agge eing to TOR er CH being the bi g oper ation, substit utin g for RO UNDU He now wants to start plan ning P. for JUNIPER-the plan callin g f or an attack on Norway. Churc h ill walks peripateeicall y aroun d th e r oom as he talks. One m oment he i s stridin g in fr ont of the Britis h and Americ an officials and th e next he has hopped onto the heart h of t he fire place and is warmin g his back, ru bbi ng the heat into it with his hands. It 1 s a tou gh ev eni ng and mornin g for t he Ameican r off icers. Lord M ountbatten complains that the U. S. pr m ed to su ppl y smal l landis in g boats and t hat to date onl y e ight have arrived in t he United Kin gdom. Churchi ll believes the Britis h Isle s ar goin g to be t oo li ghtl y defend ed when the a ssa ul t and fol l ow-u p tro ops have gone into the TO H the at er. Next he is pour i ng out RC words on why JUNIPER should be execu ted t his wint er. He need s Nort hern Norw to ay protect t he Russian convoys. The Prime Mini ster debat es out lou d with himself on what to do ab out PQ 19 . If he l ets it go it wi ..1..dela y TORCH l until Novem ber 28. "It's v er y disheartenin g," sa ys the Prime Mini ster, as t hough ta lk in g to hims elf. "I fe el PQ 19 should o thr ough . I j ust can 't te l l Jo e it' s not c oming when his pe ople are bloo dy and dy i ng and holdin g the enemy. PQ 19 i s loaded. I guess I j us t got t a tell Joe ." The Ameican generals s ay not hing but General Clark be l i eves he would l eave PQ 19 set r up r eady to go in ca se anyt hi ng aris es to dela y TO RCH f urther . Genera l Clark in terp r et s Mr. Churchi ll 's r ef ere nce t o TOR not being the CH Sec ond Front opera t ion as a s ly mo by the Pr i m M ve e inister to get JUNIPER star t ed and a s a fulcrum to proce ed la t er on RO DUP He bel i eves Churc hil ~ want s to use UN . Am eric an tro ops at every available point but t hat he i s doi ng i n craf til y by sa ying eac h oper ati ,., is THE major opera tio n. 11We s hou ld be ab l e to rip at n J �(' \ Hitler's mouth (R, UNDUP while we are ri ppi ng 'at hi s bell y (TOR ) CH)," says Churchil l . General Clark believes the real motive of Bhurchi l l is to have TORCH and JUNI PER goi ng at the same time. The conferees, in add i t i on to the Pri m M e inister and the gen erals , inc ~ude Adm iral Cunnin gham, Si r Dudley Pound, Lord Eden, General H olmes and Lord Mo ntbatten. u None of them have say. The Prime M nister is to o ful J. of ideas. The discussion i and naval strate gy a~l over the world. Regarding the buil dup of American troo ps in sugges t s brin gi ng over new U.S. div is i ons (t hose training) without their equipment. They would be and their trainin g would be completed here. They Bri tish divisions. three American Leathers, Ant uony a great dea l to concerns military the United Kin gdom, General Clark with only t he ir 15 weeks basic furnishe d with British equi pment mi< even be fed in with •ht Cburchi L . sa ys he t hinks he W J.l wire Presi dent Roosevelt (" Get a message i off to my boss," is the way the Prime Mini ster puts it) about s om of his ideas. e The Pri m M e inister is elated at the way Russia is fig hti ng . He thinks Stalingrad, where stre et fi ghtin g is now r agin g, wi J.l fal l but he doe· n 't think t ne Russians s wil l crack. When infor med that t he PQ 18 convoy went thr ough so well, Churchill be ams and shouts: "I' 11 bet Joe is droolin g at the mouth over the pac ka ge we delivered to him." / One small incide nt occur s that brin gs out the humanness of the Prime M inister. As the men sit down to dinner, General Cla rk is on the Prime M nis ter 's J.eft. i 1 The butler comes and whispers in the PM s ear and the general overhe ars: "Have you ot y our sh ort s norter card with you , Sir." A s 1 rt s nort er card is a $1 10 bilJ. t ha t trans- Atlan tic air passengers get. If a s u rt sno rt er ca n 't pro duce his au t ographed bi ll , othe r s hort snort ers can co .llect $1 from him. Churc hi i l jumps up fro m his seat and hurries out of the r oom. He re turns , gri nni ng, sits down and then nonchalantly pulJ.S out his bill. "Have a ~l you fe llow s got your s nort s norter cards," he asks trium phantl y . The guests di g wil dly . G eneral Smith is without hi s and it costs hi m $6. Mr. Churchill lau ghs triumphant~y. When General Clark returns he instructs his of f ic ers that November 8 is the dat e "unless somet hin g catastrophic ha ppens and I want J OU to make ever y preparati on f or it on the ba s is th at we ar e g oi ng into action on t hat da t e . TORCH is still the big operati on and it can't be debunked. RetUJ.lling to London in the late afternoon, General Clark finds t hat sh ipp in g authorities in Washington have agreed to send priority items for the D plus 6 TORCH onv oy sent over on from five to seven s hips. General Gruent he r says t hese c s ni ps WiJ.l be able to fit str aigh t into the Bri tish c cnvcy provid i ng t hey are loaded pro perl y . The Britis h are wi l l in g to ta ke the additional ships in th eir convo y . General Ryder re ports on progress in Eastern Assa ult Force plans and he is r athe r opti mist ic. He has built up, because of being in the U.K. longer, a 60-day reserve sup 1, y for the 168th Infantry c ombat team. Jt is all on han d wit h the l exc ept ion of ammuniti on expended w i le the 168t h was t aki ng amphibious training. h He expre sses c onc ern ab out the ammu niti on suppl y for the combat team coming over fro m the U.S. to aid in the Alg iers a ssa ult. It will c ome with 10 units of fire so Genera l Clark instructs 'Ryder to ar ra nge from additional ammuniti on to come from t he SOS of ETO. Ryder inquires concerni ng what the Algi ers forc e will do if �( it · runs in to bad weather arid it can't la nd sinniltaneously wit h t he Oran force. be drawn up to meet t his contin gency . 1m a lt ern at e plan will General Rooks expresses concern ab out the s horta ge of f ire -control equip m ent for t he 1st Divi sion arti l ler y and asks that it be dispatc hed over by air. The equi pment woul d not total a plane load so General Clark sa ys he wi ~l take the matt er up personally when he arrives in W hin gt on. Rooks al so r eports that he now as has a list s howing what shi ps wi l l be available f or the Oran D-day c onvoy and hence he is ab~e to prepare loadin g tables for the Director of M ovem ents. The li st shows that more truc ks than expected can be t ake n. Rooks is enthusiast ic and sa ys that t he onl y t hin g that can now stop t he Oran force is lack of equipment. The air problem is now shapin g up satisfactorily. Ge neral Clark goes over it a gain wit h General Doolittle to stress that nothi ng shoul d be co mmtt ed definit ely i to Casablanca except on order s of t he Com ander-in-C hief. G m ener al Patton will have t he 33rd Fi ghte r Squadron but will get no Spitfires un l ess the 33rd is knocked out of action. Doolit t le is told t hat no paratro ops or hea vy bombers ar e t o go t o Casablan ca initial l y . General Clar k instructs G eneral Lemnitzer to prepar e a list of fjft. h column activities to be underta ken in Africa prior to D-da y . It wi ll s how the prio rity of fift h column missions--assassinations, smizure of forts, ra dio stati ons, public ut i ~i t ies, brid g es, etc.-in eac h of th e assa ult areas. It will be t aken to W sh in gton so M M a r. urphy ca n eva l uate it, ta ke to Africa, t hen infor m co mman ders what can be acco mp lished and what can not. * * * , LONDON SEPTE!IIB 22 , 1942 - - Be c ause of the absence of Generals , ~R Clark and Eis0nhower at Checkers yesterday , the regu l ar General Staff Conference was postponed until today . The new D- day -- Novemb e r 8 -- and rreans of expanding TORCH to make it more certain of suc c ess are discussed . General Eisenhower says November 8 is now the day and that nothing - - not even the Hussian convoys - -will be allowed to stand in the way of TOR CH. The only ossibili ty of chani;i;e will be i f President Roose v elt finds the date objectionable . General Eisenhower declares that the proposal of hiwing troops from Mal ta atta c k Tunis on D- da.y must b e re - exam.Lned . He belie v es such a force might be the deciding bat t a li on in TORCH He says that Admir al Cunningham is c onvinced one . Br itish brigade might make this atta ck whi ch c ou l d either be a direct threat of a fient to draw troops away f rom ot her regions where heavier l andings will be made . " I f th i s th i ng fa i ls , " says General Ei senhower , "Mal ta goes anyway . It 1 s a good samble . 11 The subje c t of the anti - subm ,,rine pa t rol at Oran c omes up again de c lares the problem boils down bas i cal l y to one fa.ctor -- which will ha v e the mor e importan t mission : the anti - sub planes or the fiter squadron it wi ll repla c e . Bo th tasks are highly i mportant . General Cl ark says he believes the best solution is to put both air unit s in and then have the Cormnand3r·- i n - Chief' decide whi ch will use the available av iation gasoline . Other t opi c s that come up at the mee t ing include : the use of �\5 U. S . Navy shore personne l at the port of Oran , coordination of naval air commands under the Commandt r-in - Chief , whether of not a bombing attack on Crete on D- da y wouldn ' t be a good ruse to draw Axis fighters from the Algiers region . \ The meeting , as did the first one , evolves into a roundtable 11 discussion in which the leaders of TORC discuss their problems . General Eisenhower again stress e s that he wants the men to bring their difficulties and ideas to either General Olark or himself . He says there can be no holding back; that there must be complete con fidence and cooperation . He promises to pass the officers ' ideas along to the Prime Minister . { . After' the conf erence , officers who have parti ci pated are called in to discuss particular items brought out in the round - table dis cussion . Commodore Douglas - Pennant gives General Clark a diagramatic view of the naval plan and then the two men plunge into the anti - sub air squadron poser . Douglas-Pennant believes the antl-sub outfit c ould operate with g reater strik:i,ng force if it is based at Oran . After the operation de v elops another anti - sub squadron will go into Algiers . Following this , General Clark calls in Air Marshall Welsh and after the British airman has explained all details of the pro p osed plan , General Cla rk decide a tha t the anti - sub outfit should go into Oran . In order to conserve car g o space and less en the problem of getting fighting equipment across the Oran beaches , Welsh agrees to have the squadron fly in as many depth charges as possib le . The anti - sub squadron and the fighter squadron will both • g o into Oran . However , they will have to share the same gasoline and the Oommander in -Chief wil l de c ide which planes should be in use at what times . Gene na l Larki n and Gruenther confer with General e1 ark conc ern ing what equipment must be loaded aboard the five vessels being rushed from the United States to the United Kingdom to join the British convoy to Oran . The vessels must cane pro perly loaded because they will fall in with the British ships and pro ceed to the Mediterranean almost immec.ua w ly . Unles s SOS gets straightened out on just what ammunition is available in the U. K. , General Cl ark says same of it wi ll have to come over with the five vessels , then taken off and distributed to troops for c ombat loading . I n ord er to be certain the U. S. Army- Navy is set for the Oran operat im , Gener al Cl ark cal ls in Gener al Rooks and Admiral Bennett . Gener al Ola rk stress e s that the car go priority for Oran must be for combat troops and tells Admir al Bennett to coordina te his sup p ly thrmgh Generals Rooks and Lar kin . The Navy will f rnish the Oran shore parties , the beach personnel and the port personnel . The question of what the Oran Task Poree should do if weather prohibits exe cuti on of its operation and Gaptain Wright suggests a landing on the Balearic Islands . An Alternate plan for the Center Task Force will be developed soon . The alternate plan that General Eis enh ower will g ive General Patton in case he runs into Atlantic Ooast difficulties has been boiled down to two possibilities : The first will call for the combat loaded troops to land in the Oran area and the remainder, with the possible exception of eight or ten su pp ly ships that would go into �l Gibraltar , wou ld pro ceed to the United Kingdom; the second p l an would divert t he entire Patton force to the U. K. to c onstitute a "fie se rv e wallo p" for the Commande r-in - Chief , possib l y for an atta c k on Spanish Morocco if ne c essary . The Philippeville , Bone l anding by General Pat t on's force has been dis card ed because of too many pre car iru s angles -- movement into a z one of intense enemy air activity , c on c entration of t oo many n aval ~essles in a small area , possibi li ty of overwhelming enemy resistance . As Gen e r a l Cl ark prepares to l eave tomorrow for Washington , TORCH ap µ eras to be shaping up ev er better . General Gruenther c omes in t o report : 1 - -that the air plan is co mpl etely "buttoned up" and mimeogra i-, ed for distribution; h 2-- d irectiv es have been issued to the Al gi ers assault and at t a c k forces and to the Oran Task Fo r ce; 3-- that General Patton ' s directive for the Ca sa bl an c a mission will b e rea dy later today; 4 - - t ha t the naval p l an i s being put in final form and wil l be read y for d i spat c h to Wash in gton tanorro w w it h General Gl ark . LONDON SEPTEMBER 23 , 1 942 -- As General , Cl ar k c ompl etes fina l de tail s for his trip to the Uni t ed states , he receives a hear tenin g l ast minute re p ort fr om General Lee of the S OS. Lee feels the supp ly si tuat im is much i mpro v ed . He re i; orts that the SOS has unloaded 2 00 , 000 lon g tons of su p p li es and equipment since the first of t he month ani will hand le another 100 , 000 during the remainder of the month . Al thoogh there may be some diffi c ulty in obtaining all ammunition required for the Oran c cmbat c on~ oy , Lee says it l ooks as if this for c e will have enou gh to get by with until D plus six c onvo y fran the United Kingdom is unloaded . the now the Gene r als Gale and Gruenther and Col onel Hamblen are c al l ed in by Gener a l Cl ar k and they too feel that many of TORC s supply H' difficu l ties a:re cl arify in g and that we wi ll b e able, in all ppobability to meet the November 8 date . Transpcr t of the for ward e chelon of Allied Force Head quarters to Gibraltar i s discussed the Air Commodore Sanders and Col onel Gale . General <Har k plans to have U. S . Air TraBsports take the c '.!ll act headqua r ters p g roup . They will be escorted by "Fl y in g Fortress e s . 11 Follo win g establi sbmen t of headquax•te - s at Gibraltar and until it is possible to move the headquarters to either Al g ie r s or Oran , General Clark plans to have t wo or three "Flyin g Fortresses" on call at Gibraltar to p rovid e air trans p ortation on important missions to the North African front . General Glark, who has been working virtually ni ght and day for the past six weeks , clears out of his N 0 r.folk House office at noon for a final pre - Washington conference with General Eisenho wer . Then, fol lo wing lunch at his flat , he becomes "Ci tizenu Clar k as he sh ops for g ifts for his family . The "family side , 11 submerged so comp let e l y und er the "military sj.de 11 for so long, c omes out as the ~ru' ~~-' W: •·· · �( lanky gena:> al jostles with the c ro~s on Regent of silver for his \'life , mofuhe r and mother - in-law for his son and daughter . Street to get gifts and appropo presents Buroened with brief cases, map rolls and a little luggage for the trip to the United States , the gen e ral and the small staff that is accompaning him , le1we Norfolk House at 3: 00 P . M. for Hendon airport and the start of the l ,mg flight . ENRCUTE BY AIR TO UNITED STATES, SEPTEHBER 23 , 194 2 --Th e C-47 c arrying Gener al Slark and his party to Prestwick , Scotland , where they will depgr, t for the United States , takes off f rom Hen don air drome at 3 : 58 PM and heads northwestward over the color ~ul mosai c of the English countryside . The party is made up of General Clark , General Larkin, Colonel Slocum , Li eut . Col . J . P . Eason (a British member of the Allied Force staff) , Lieutenant Beardwood and F . P . Culbert, the undercover man who will direct fifth - c olumn a c tivities at Casablanca . Also i n the plane are Br i gadier General Gilk eson of the Air Cor p s and Li eut . Col . Jackson, an Air Corps off:tcer acting as a c oufier . The p l ane drops in to Prestwick at 6 : 28 PM • ( Off:b ers in the party , and General Cl ark himse lf , take turns watching over the se c ret bagg,:ige which includes a ll directives and plans for TORCH detailed , maps of the operation and half a million dollars in French Moroccan cu rren c y which will be turned over to Gener al Patton • s force for use when it lands . The lobb y of the Prestwick airport is lik e the lobby of GrAnd central station . It is milling with people vho are traveling . There are all types of unf :fiorms . From Prestwick , flights st art not only to the United States and Canada but also to Russia . The airdrome is tremendous and covered with all types of planes . Fo llo wing dinner in the Prestwick mess hall , General Clark's party l ounges around in the lobby, waiti ng for the weather report on c onditions over the Atlantic to come in . Although it has been r alning , the sk i es clear abou t 9 : 00 PM and a satis fac tory re po rt c omes in on ccndi tions over the Atlantic . Lo ading of the huge , four - motored Stratoliner , named the " Comanche , 11 is started and by 1 0 : UO PM General Cl ark ' s party starts going aboard . Because the ship is loaded so heavily with gas oline, three officers have to cr owd up in the c ramped radio and navigation room for the take - off . The U. S .- bound Stratoliner is air - borne at Clark is heading eastward to Washington to make on TORCH - on what has been done and wht=1t will be few weeks before the Sec ond Front is opened . I t 10 34 PM and General a comp let e report done in the final is a tremendous job . By the time enough gas has been burned so the three officers can return to the :i:assengers cabin, the p lan e is well out over the Atlantic , flying through broken clouds under an almost full - moon . Eight bunks are made up and GenerB l Clark ' s part y turns in for the night . �/ ENRUT BY AIR TO UNIT STATES, SEPT O E ED EMBER , 1942- - G 24 enera l Cl ark' s plan e dr ones s te adily on thro ugh brok en clo uds under an a lmost f ull mo ,The s hip, on. which wei ghed 55, 600 pounds at th e tak eoff, i s s cheduled, on t he basis of win d r epor ts , to r ea ch G ander Lake , New foun dl and , in 17 hours . Through th e fli ght th e altitud e averages from 800 to 1,2 00 f eet. By midmo ni ng one of the port motors r of th e four-motored stratolin er has begun to miss and shoot out bla ck smoke . During the morning, G eneral Clark goe s through the huge, wei ghted bri ef cas e to study p~pers on TORCH operati ons that he is t akin g to Wa hing to n. He s also conf ers with Culbert and with Colonel Slocum. At 10: 37 A.M. (East ern War Time), th e coa st of Newfoun dlan d is s ee n through ev er thick ening clouds . The plan e heads for the G ander Lake airport but the weath er has closed in and the pilot, Capt ain Terry, decid es to H d for Presque Isl e , Maine . Befor e r ea chin g ea that airport, th e plane receives reports that th e ceilin g is a lmost zero th ere so Capt ain Ter r y de cid es t o shoot for M ontr ea l. To dat e , no St r ato l in er has b een able to mak a non- stop wes tward hop from Prest wi ck to Montr eal . e As th e big pl ane heads west through rapi dly wors ening weath er , t he carb uerator s on two more engines begin acting up and Captain Terry, with his gas suppl y dimi ni shing, with thr ee of his four motors funct i oni ng ba dl y and with th e weat her getting wo e , looks for an emergency landing fi el d . H spot s a s mall fi el d and, rs e aft er circling th e fi eld, dr ops dmm to a lan ding ma. mushy by t he hea vy rain. de 11 The 11Comanche is greet ed lik e a thin g from Mar:\by ab out thr ee hundr ed Royal Canadian Air Forc e cadets w ar e in tr aining at th e field- -W s or Mills, Qu a:. ho ind ebe The st udent s are taking primary training in Gypsy Mo hs which would fit und r th e t Strato l in er ' s landi ng gear. The tran s- Atl antic pla ne lands at 1 :2 5 PM (EW . T) 0 Fli ght offi cers , s t udent s and m echanics surround th e huge tr ans -Atlantic plane. G enera l Cla r k and his party ar e t aken to th e O f i cer s ' M f ess Hall where t hey cle an up and get r efre shm s . Study of th e pla ne 's mo r s shows t hat thr ee ent to new carbur etor s will have to be flo rm up fr om Was hington befo r e th e pla ne can t ake off. General Clark cal l s G Pneral Marshall by lon g-di stance phone and t el ls him he i s requ es ting th at anoth er Str ato lin er fly in from D al Fi el d , the orv U.S. Air Trans port Comman fi eld in M d ontreal. Vi hen t he weather has cle ar ed, th e se cond Stratolin er com over th e ti ny, es sog gy fi eld. The pilot circles it twice th en comes i n for a l anding. Wh t he en huge pla ne hi ts th e sod, ro cks and mud fly up and both wing f laps ar e badly ri ddl ed wit h hol es . Examinat i on of t he s econd shi p shows that i t has been damag ed to o badl y to tak e off; that re pair s will have t o be made on t he fla ps and it will take hour s . Gener a l Clark th en confer s wi t h Canadi an offici al s wi th t he re sult that he i s lo aned two plan es- - a bi-m otor ed Beechcraft and a bi-motor ed Graumann amphibi an . Es se nti al s ecr et document s and perso nal ba ggage are t aken f r om th e 11 Comanch " and l oaded into the t w R.C.A.F. pl anes for the 75 mil e flight into e o Montreal . General Clark, ri din g in the Beec hcraft, tak es off at 6:01 PM and arriv es at Montr eal at 6: 55 PM Becaus e of th e lig htne ss of th e t wo R. C.A. F. . pl anes , G eneral Clar k mak arrang em es ents to have hi s party f l f into Wa shington aboard two British Hudson Bombers. Aft er eating at th e D orval Airport cafeteri a--an d get t in g such unu sual thin gs ar e or ange juic e , re al coffee, fruit, milk wit h some cre am in it-th e bag gage i s st owed on th e t wo Hudsons. They ar e la te in pr eparing for t he t akeof f and me anwhil e , r eport s come from W s or M ind ills that t he s econd Stratolin er has it s wing fl aps r epa ire d and is rea dy to come in to M re al. If f eas ible, General ont Clark wants to go into W hington ..¥1 th e S r at ol i ner inst ead of i n t he t wo H ons. as uds ) j �W hen the plane, named t he "Cheroke e ," l ands, Captain Parker, the ski pper and the man who flew Admiral Byrd over the pole, says the ship i s capable of going on to Washington so the baggage is tr ansferred from the two Hudsons to the Str atolin er and the Genera l ' s party takes off fr om Montreal at 9 : 59 PM The . flight is extremely smooth and uneventful and the "Cherokee" l ands at Bolling Field, Washington, at 1:46 AM. General Clark and his party are quickly passed through customs and the tr avel weary group spreads throu ghout to wn t o variou s quart ers. General Clark, des pite the lat e hour of arriv al, is m at the army et airport by Mrs. Clark. * ( • ( j � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, September 1-24, 1942 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from September 1-24, 1942. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1942 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Language A language of the resource English Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/557 Date Valid Date (often a range) of validity of a resource. 1940-1949 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/b46841bc704b850c2931905f259b8755.pdf?Expires=1789603200&Signature=lypwY8GTbdfviJ1E%7EppPbcIloHx26WyIXnG5L9fRZ7zjAMN9YCOdWlFXEM49EVdyrhWRCsYWPDjIc03Y0lrvZcWzr%7EJFW0QGjmNn3dBgTykGXUbm66LR6pL2TXucVa1qsHsz15BmRzI2gFHwbjp0EG-KYwYJYQzPxP%7E72KQE5jfNgmAhbhIrs3HYmFFRSpGLk92yQcn87N8qV-M-qMBiyvVldAFeBOe6lk8eSxO4X94FW0BOKK9KZ-wwuQEiv-KMw7DUvBN4%7E1strap1vElImonWrmZtfQg5UgKuUS2YTZanYPKP8cl0QvMhuE6mfuzKme3lxHfStMnuSlS2XHuTrw__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 202965c445fd9ab4ce8a75b083509f5c PDF Text Text \ ) N E OT This is volume tv:· of the W DIARY of ~ General o AR Mark v: . Cla r k . The f i r st volume , c ov ering the pe r iod June 28 to September 24 , 1942 , has been deposited in a sa f e a t the Army ~ar Col~ ege , f as hington , D. C. It is under the custody of Br igadie r Genera l Floyd Parks . Vol ume one will r emain for safeke eping with Genera l Parks or his successo r . It will be del i vered to General Clark on call. In the ev ent of Gener al Clark I s death , the book wil1. r emain unopened and in the V!a College safe unt il the conclusion r of the war . It will then be turned ov er to :i. . Ifar k W. Cl ark , Apartment 726 , Kennedy - V'!arren Jrs Apar tments , 5155 Connecticut Avenue ., NS ., W hin gton , D. C. as ) .( I ; �I\ WASHING SEPT. 25 1942-Reporting TON to the W Department after his transar ) Atlantic Stratoiiner fli ght from London, General Clark i mm ~diately go~s into a long confer ence with Genera l M arshall to outline to the Chi ef of Staff of the United States Army t he current status of TORCH. The November 8 at t ack date is set. General Marshall is hig hl y pleased with t he way things ar e shaping up. General Cla rk gives him a detailed re port of proble m s raised and progress being ma in London. The Deputy Comma der goes minutely over de n the plans of the Algiers and Oran Task Forces. Fro m t he bulging brief cas e t hat vr s a so carefu lly protected on the trip over from London, the general pul l s out paper after pape r and pores over t hem with the top man of t he U. S. P.rm These papers y. inc lude operati onal plans, cover plans, al ternate plans for al l three t ask forc es appreciation of the air and navy situations, surve ys on political and civil af fa i;s. The conf er ence lasts 45 minutes with both Generals Ma rsha ll and Clark exchan gi ng honest opinions on al l phases of TO RCH. General M hall is disturbe d because Ma ars jor General H artle, now com.,andi ng the Vth Arm Cor ps in Ireland, has be en designated, y te m porarily at lea st, as colltl rander of the Oran Task Force. General M arshall wants General Cl ark to comm d an this force, sa ying he doesn't have enough confidence in Hartle. The Chief of Staff dictates a cable to General Eisenhower asking a r evisi on in the Oran comru and but Genera ls Clar k and Handy counsel him to w rite a let t er that Gener al Clark will deliver personally to General Eisenhower when he r eturns to London next week. The let ter te ll s General Eisenho wer that he wi ll give hi m any officer in the United States to command the Oran force "if you ca n 't s ee your way clear to let Clar k \ comm and." This offer includes such of f icers at Lieutenant Generals Mc Nair and )D evers. Put ting a new man in, either as Deputy Comma de r or as he ad of t he Oran n forc e, involves great hazards at so late a date, General Clark explains , tel l ing General IV !arshall that he wo d like to command t he Oran force s ince it wi lj_ be ul made up primarily of his II Army Corps. Follo wing his l engthy conf ere nce wit h Gener al Marshall , General Clar k is next calle d in to discuss TOR with Sec r etar y of W Sti mson. The Secretary is worried CH ar about TOR and is appr ehensive concer nin g what effect i t wi l l have on ROUNDUP CH , t he European i nva s ion that Stimson be l ieves must be executed. The Secretary conf ides that he doesn't feel t ha t Pr ime M ster Churc hi ll 's judgment is sound. M Stimini r. son goes thoroughly into al l an gl es of TORCH h General Clark. He is apprehe ns ive wit ab out the "multitude of suppositions 11 in TO : that Spain wi l .1.re main neutral , RCH that the Nort h Africa n French wil l only put up t oken resi stan ce, th at Germany wil l not m ove into the Spanis h airfields. Secretar y Stimson offers to c ome over to the U nited Kingdom "to give my assistance if you t hink it wi l l do any good . 11 General Clark te ll s him he t hinks suc h a visit would "stimul ate the morale of the men. 11 When General Clark, after givin g the Secretary of W a complete r evie w of TORCH ar , leav es th e Secretary's office, Mr. Stimson shakes han ds and s ays: 11Go bles s you , d my boy. We'r e al l anxious ly waitin g ." The general next goes to the White House for a lu ncheon conference with Harry Hopk J_~~,1, es i dent Roosevelt is on a secret tour of t he nat ion 's defense in dustrie s -Er and he,1 l report to t he presi dent on General Cla r k ' s visit. wil Over a luncheon that las ts two hours, Genera l Clar k gives t he Preside nt 's personal r epr ese ntative a comprehensive vi ew of TOR CH. Hopkins is inter ested particular j_y in the air proble m \ and sa ys that Pres id ent Roosevelt doesn't want European air operation s torn down to o se rio usly by diversion of aircraft to t he North Afric an t heater. He wants t o conti nue extensive bombing raids into Germany and the occupi ed European countries. Hopkin s also s hows gre at i nt ere st i n convoys an<;L -~f ~q~_of_ TORC on Russian conv oys. . tli~ H ~r:f tt ~~ t~ ' nr:~~! & . \ �3 ( The next man to get a ful l report on TORCH Admiral Leahy, President is Rocsevelt 1 s special Chi ef of Staff to coordinate military and naval affair s. Like Hopkins, Admiral Leahy will report on General Clark' s visit to President Roosevelt when the Chief Executive return s from his nat i on-wide tour. After hearing the General's rep ort, Admiral Leafiy expresses himself as "well pleased." Upon his return to his special office at the Operations Division of the W Department, General Clark goes into conference with General Han , head of ar dy operati ons; General Patton, commander of the Casablanca force, and other high ranking officers directly connected with TORCH.W ith the m he goes over special TORC problems, readscables from General Eisenhower, r eports to the Com an derH m in -Chief in London, takes up a multitude of smal l but harassing problems th at are causing apprehen sion. The special office is filled with men, coming to General Clark with problems and with ideas. The confere nces last until evening. Then, Genera l Clark, weary fro m the lon g plane trip and hard l y any sleep, goes t o his W ashington apartment. * W ASHIN GTON,SEPI'. 26, 1942-General M arshall another long conference this morning. The t wo men specific problems suc h as convoys, tro op buildup, is an extremely dif f icult operation but that it is After a rocky start, caused by changin g dates and operation ar e sh~Pmng up splendidly. calls General Clark in for go over TORCH again, discussing supp ly . They agree tbat TO RCH goin g to be done successful ly . su pply problems, plans for the "If the President's conditions (lit t le oppositio n fro m t he Frenc h) are present," says General Clark, 11 are goin g to get away with it. If not, there we is going to be a bloody fi ght • 11 Li eutenant General Some ~ll~ , head of t he sos, is ca lled in and the sup ply rv problem is canvassed thorou ghl y. General Clark explains t hat the great problem in the United Kingdom is that the SOS does not know wbat it has on hand. Gen eral Somerve ll• says tbis re sulted fr om the problem of switchin g so sudde nly fro m BOLERO (U.K. su pply convoys) to TORCH.The shorta ges are bein g ma hp by the de use of five fast freighters that will land i n the United Kingdom so loa ded that they can fit ri ght into the D plus 4 M edit erranea n convoy. Other urge nt ly nee ded items, such as t he missing gun sites for t he ar tillery weapons, are goin g to be flown over. The su pply problem looks as t hough it has been licked but there will stil l be a few s horta ges. They won't be acute unless som ethin g ha ppens to the fol l ow-up convoys. A major item that comes up for dec i sion today is tm pas sinj of comDa d n fro m Navy to Army in the W estern Task Force. General Clark discusses t his fr ank ly wit h Admiral King . The r esu lt is that General Pat t on' s forc e will be under comma d n of Admiral Hewit t of the U. S. Navy fr om t he ti me it leaves the Unite d states lat e in Oct ober until it reac hes the W est Coast of Africa and t he assault starts. The commandwill go from Admiral Hewitt to General Patton at t he point in th e beach assault when the army comma nder tel ..1. the navy chief "I'm prep ar ed to take over." s The U.S. Navy will be prepared to bombard fro m the sea if necessary. Also , it wi l l be alerted to the danger of attack from the Fr ench Fleet. ----. Genera l Pat t on's forc e has set up a tre mendous office in a little-u sed section 2 �4 of t he Mun itions Buildin g. To gain entrance a visitor is double-ehecked at both ends of a corridor. Inside, in several r ooms, thin gs ar e humm g : me clu ste red in n in conferences, men working on maps. General Pat t on's f orce is bein g staged. The 3rd Division, s pecially trained in amp hibious work, has just arrived fro m Camp Roberts, Calif., and is bein g sta ged 50 miles outsi de W ashin gton. The 3rd will sp earhead the W ern Task Force assault, est carr yin g out the sa m role t he 1st e Division will have at Oran and t he 168th Infantry comba tea m wi l l have at Algiers. t General Patton hol ds repeated conferences with General Clark. They go over the altern ate plans Pat t on has in case t he Casablanca re gion lan ding is i mp ib l e. oss They discuss chan ge of command from navy to ar my, the us e of naval bombardment, use of psyc holo gical warfare such as Ame ican flags and f l ares. Every phas e of r t he Casablanca attack is gone into. General Pat to n wants to use parachute tro ops in his operati on and General Clark agrees to ta ke t he matter up wit h General Doolittle when he returns to London. General Clar k lunches with Colonel Donovan and Robert M phy at Donovan's ur home. The subject of 5t h Column activities in .Africa is gone into. The men discuss the feasibilit y of buying off Frenc h naval of f icers to circumvent a fi ght betwee n t he U.S. and Frenc h navies. All agr ee this is an exce ll ent idea and plans are initiated to put it into effect. M urphy be l ieves it can be done. Murphy ask s · permission to run dem olition materials and arms into North .Africa for 5th c ol umn purpos es and General Clark is surprised t hat it hasn't a l rea dy be en done. M urphy re ports that the French beac h patrols are increasin g and that as time goes on it will be ever more difficult to get undercov er ite m as hore. s M phy is given a list of installations ur and establishments to be~ither destr oyed or secured prior to the assault. General Clark sug gests Mur~hy dra w up a diagramatic chart of these points so that he wil l have no lists on his person in case anyt hi ng hap pens. Mu rphy is to let General Ci.ark know which insta ll ations he can take care of prior to the attack hour. The Donovan lunc heon, at whic h t he problems of political and civil secti ons is gone into, lasts t wo hours. Upo his n return to his te m porary office, General Clark again plunges into confer ences principal ~y wit h Generals Handy and Pat t on and members of Patton' s Wes ern T; sk t Force staff. At 5:18 PM General Clark departs from Bol l in g Field for We Point w , st here he is to visit with his son, W illiam, a plebe. M s . Clark and their daughter, r Ann, also make t he trip. Visibi l ity is bad and the air is extr em ely bum . A py t W est Point, the Clark's are me at Stewart Field by their army son. Follo win g t dinner with his family, the general meets some of his son's class mate s. Once a gain-but only for a brief time--Genera l Cl ark is a f am ly man, not a m i ilitar y man. He sta ys overni ght at We Point. st * * * W ASHI GTON,SEPTEMB 27, 1942-For the fir st ti m i n three mo s, General N ER e nth Clark has a day off toda y . And that r esult s only from th e weather. Becaus e of rain and zero visibi l ity, the general's plane is unable to ta ke o~f _f~ om W~st P~i nt f~r the retur~ fli ght to W ashington. So, he spends t he morning vi s itin g wit h his f anu.ly and tourin g the mil itar y academy where he was sc hool ed and where his ~on i s bein g schoole d . In t he afternoon, t he general , Mrs. Clark, An and General Larkin, who also went to the Point to visit his ple ge- son return n to W ashington by t r ain. ' �5 ( During hi s enf orce d abse nc e, General Cla rk ' s temporary Washinl ton of f ice c ontinues to opera te wit h Colonel Slocum, secretary of t he General Staf f , handling incomin g and out goin g cables and participatin g in more mi nor confer enc es. * * * W ASHIN TON SEPTE BER 28 , 1942- - Becau se of t he ur genc y of pr oblems arisin g G , M in London, General Cla r k wi ll begin t he r et urn fli ght t om r ow. Hence, his day or is ja mmed wi th fin al conferences, m ost i mpo rtant of which is his ap pear ance before t he Combined Chief s of Sta ff- the Britis h and Americ an gro up co or dinat in g the war in W hin gton . as The meetin g is held in the Publ ic Health build i ng , acr oss Constitu ti on Avenue fr om t he W and Navy Depar t me ar nts. The c onferen ce i s attended by such war planners as General Marsha l l , Sir J ohn Dill, Admir als Leahy and Kin e, Briti sh Adm al Cunningham. Genera ~ M ir arshall, sit t in g in front of the Unit ed States and Bri tish fl ag s and his own four-st arr ed emblem, presides . The entire TORC plan H is r evi ewed wit h t he outline pla ns dis cu ssed en toto. General Clark i s called upon t o r evi ew t he operation as he an d Gener al Eis enhower s ee it. Admiral Leahy asks Genera l Clark to go ove r t he outline plan wor d by wor d and def end it. This re sults in i t bein g ac c epted wit h only t _r ee m nor rev is io ns . i The c onfere nce lasts over t wo hours wi th l:eneral Clark bearin g t he brunt of the que stionin g . He explains , int er pr ets, disc usse s. TORC is gone into fr om end H to end. W hen the erue l l i ng meetin g i s over, pl anner s of TORCH i n both London , and W shingt on, un derstand each ot her s points of vi ew, t he r easons f or various a dis crepancies in vi ewpoi nts. Th is meetin g is the crux of General Clark 's W ash in gt on visit and when it is fi nis hed the general dec lar es his vi s it has bee n "qu i te successful." The Chiefs of Staff confer ence i s fo ll ov.- by ano t her visit to t he W te ed hi House in whic h r G eneral Clark gives H y Hopkin s a final r eport embodyin g the arr latest develo pments on TOR CH. W hen t he conference i s over , W . Hopkins cal l s ~ the Pres i de nt by t e l eph one , explains to him t ha t General Clark ha s given hi m two r eports and asks Mr. Roosevelt if he wants t he gene r a l to remain until the President returns to Washingt on. " I ' d like to see Clark ," t he president r eplies , "but it return to London at the earliest possible date . Tell him to hi m it is not necessar y f or G eneral Eisenho wer to r etu rn on M arshal ~ has indicated it i s desi ra ble t o get Clark back to as pos s ible ." i s ur gent that he go ah ead . Also t ell my ac count . G eneral London as qui ckly Hopkins explains to t he Pr es i dent that it had be en su ggested G eneral C~ark might fly out by f ast plane , join t te President and return wit h hi m by t rain to W hin gton . as The Presi de nt sa ys t ui s wouJ.d on~y de la y General CJ.ark I s re t urn and that s ince the Deputy Comma r has had lo ng confere nces wit n H nde opkins and Admiral Leahy it wi~J. not be necessar y . "Give Cla r k my warm r egar ds an d my best wis hes ," sa ys Presi de nt Roosevelt . Havin g his cl ea rance fr om President Roosevelt to r eturn to London , t he �'('; •. ·. gene r al hur r i es back to t he W Depart m ar ent for f inal c cnf eren ces wit h Genera l Pa t to n , G ener al Handy , General H l l and hi gh of fic er s i n the W st ern Tas k For ce u e an d SO . After a meet i ng lastin g an hour a nd a half , G S ener a l Clark clo s es hi s t empo ar y of fic e an d goes to ·hi s a part m r ent t o pa ck . Ta keoff for th e retur n f l i ght to London i s s chedule d be t ween 8 :00 and 9 :00 Al to m row . i1 or * * ENR OUTETO LO ON BY AI R, SEPTEM ND BER 29 , 1942- - D y i n get t i ng t he Boe in g ela St r at ol i ner 11Cl:ero kee " read y f or t ake of f del ays the s t art of t he r etur n f l i ght : unt il 12 :47 PEflT. Wh it i s obvio us t he ta keoff wi ll be dela yed , Genera l Cl ark en retur ns t o t he W Depart ment to t ake adva nt a ge of a n extr a hour a nd a half ar wi t h Genera l s Pat t on and Handy . Fina lly t he bi g sh i p i s loa ded a nd re ady a nd G r al Clar k and his s t af f ene wave goodbye t o wel l - wi s r£ r s th at incl ud e Mrs . Cl ar k and G enera l s H andy and Hul l . The pa s sen gers , i n addi t ion t o Gener a l Cla r k , ar e : G ener a l Iar k in , Col onel s Sl ocu..mand Schn ei der (Air Cor ps ) , Lieut. Colo nel Eas on, M or G n aj ree (Avi at i on Si gnal Com pany ) , Capt ai n G irard (Air Cor ps) and Li eutena nt Beardwood. The heavil y-lo aded plane circ l es W shin gt on once af te r i t s t akeof f f ro m a t he Nat i ona l Air port a nd t hen heads out , pa s s i ng over Bal t i m e , N Yo k , or ew r W est Poi nt and up in t o New Engl and . M t of t he gener a l ' s staf f , exhaust ed fro m os t he f our act ion- f i l l ed days in W s hin gt on, sl eep s . The St r at ol in er l ands a t a G nder Lake , New ndlan d , at 8 : 33 PEW or 10 : 03, Newfoundl and t i m G a fou T, e. ander Lake is a tr em endous new air base car ve d out as t he hoppin g of f poi nt for tr an s At .i.a ntic f ligh ts . G eneral Cla r K1 s part y eats at t he Off ic er s ' Me ss, loun ges , rea ds and pla ys pi ng- pong. At 10 : 38 PEW th e gi gant ic, fo ur - m or ed plane , heav il y- l oaded wi t h ga s T, ot olin e , l um bers down t he l ong run way and hea ds out over th e Atl ant i c under a t hr ee-qu art er m . Because of t l:e l oad , t hr ee of f i c er s hav e t o ja m up i n t he oon nos e of t he s hi p s o i t can t ake of f wi th out danger . The s hi p i s comma ded by n Capt a in Nis wander . By m dni ght , a l l passengers ar e a sl eep and t he Stratol i ner i is t lunder i ng st eadi l y a nd wel l over t he Atlan t ic . * ENR UTE TO LO O BY AIR, SEPTEMBER O ND N 30, .194 - By m - m 2id ornin g th e 11Cher ok e 11 i s sailin g i n a v i rtua l vo id - -mist and c lo uds are be l ow obs cur in g t he se a ; ab ove i t i s so c 1. ar t hat t he s ky is pale b l ue . M e ost of t ne pas s enger s cat- nap a nd r ead . Snor tl y aft er no on (B it i s h Ti me) , th e weat h er cle ars a nd wars rd.ps ar e r s ig ht ed . They are in t wo and t hre es . Captain Ni swander comes back to r epor t that t he Adm iral Scheer , G man pocke t - battl eshi p , i s l oose in th e r egio n over whi ch er we ar e f lyi ng . Nisw ander ask s if he can do some r econ naissance . He expl ai ns t hat , i n event he locat es t h ~ r a i der , he can ci r c le it and ra dio its posit i on . "D you know how man plan es s he has on b oar d or how mu h ant i - a ircraft?" o y c as ks G ener al Clar k . "Thi s b i g pl ane woul d be l i ke a l am duck on a mill pond e for t he Sch eer . You' d better head r i ght on towa r d Prest wi ck ." As t ne pla ne drone s on to war d Scot l and , m e war sh i ps are si ghted , in c l udin g a cr u is er t ba t or fir es two s hots as we pass ove tr;t~ r. ;,: A1... mo ,;! ~1w ~ ments later t he Cher oke e passe s 1£, @ . . .It. ·' 1 ' �7 r over a ship to wing tar cets. The warship is only get ting gun practice! At 5:20, Br itish Ti me, t he Stratoliner lan ds at Pre stwick, Scotland . Th7 general has alre ady made arra ngements to get to London ~nd a C-47 t~an spo rt is waitin g on t he bi g fie ld . Baggage is t ransferred a s r apid l y as poss ib le and at 4 :1 9 PM the t wo-motored tra nsp ort ta ~es off for London . $h~'~ loaded to the , ~i ll s havin ~ ta ken t he fr eight off the Stratoliner . I n addi tion to t he transA lant ic party of ei ght , seven other persons who ha ve be en waiting at Prest wic k t for air trans portation to London crowd aboard t he plane . Aft er a routine fli ght down t he I r is h Sea and ac r oss England , t he plane arr ive s over Hendon Airport. Royal Air Force aut rDriti es have r adioed t h~ plane tha t i t can not land because of t he late hour. Ge al Clark has the ra dioman ner answer back that t he plane is com g in despite the f act it is a .1.m dar k and in ost the air port considers i t self closed, be cause of t he blackout , until daylight . The heav i ly laden ship, whic h G eneral Clark has pilot ed part of t he way fr om Scot l and, lands at 6 :48 PM . Genera l Clark is me by General Eisen hower an d t he t wo m lea ve imm t en ediately for London in General Eisenhower 's car so t hey can dis cuss r esul ts of the Washin gt on trip. LONDN OCTOBER 1942--Rea dy to plunge back into on-th e- ground preparations O, 1, for TORCH General Clark is at his Norfolk House office at the r egu l ar 8:50 time , this mornin g and he i mmedat ely cal ls in to p men on his staff to give them a i quick resume of the results of his W ashington trip. At 10 : 00 AM Gener al Ei senho wer comes over to General Cl ark ' s office to c on, tinue the discussion started la st ni ght aft er the general 's arrival. The decision concern ing who will comm and the Oran Task Force must be settled and Major General Ll oyd R. Fredenall , who has been at Jacksonville, Fla., com:nandin g the II Army Cor ps , is dec i ded upon. Later, General Marshall approv es. During t he discu ssion , Air M arshall We sh is cal led i n for consultatio n on t he use of paratroo ps. The l Brit i sher expre sses conc ern over t he use of t he paratro op battal ion s at Oran . He points to the danger of the tro op tra nsp orts bei ng s1 ot down as the y fl y over 1 O ccupied France, enroute by th e shortest r oute t o Oran. So the security of the Oran oper ation won't be menaced, General Clark says he sees no rea s on why the men should jump pr i or to dayligh t; that they coul d jump up to one or two hour s after day li ght. In that way the attack woul d be underway at the time t he troop t ra nsports cut over t he fri nge of Occupied France enro ut e to North Afric a . Adm l Ramsay comes in to go over th e naval command situatio n wit h Genera l ira Clark and, aft er r evie wing an appreciation made by the U. S. Navy of the situ ation, agrees basically with tte entire operation. The ques ti on of havin g naval aviation rehearse with lan d forc es when t hey go thr ough final assault maneuve r s in Scotland fr om Octob er 17 to 21 is brou ght up and Rams says re gula r car rie r-bas ed planes ay ca n be used but that for t he re hearsa l the y will oper ate fr om l and airdrom es so as not t o disturb final prepara tion s aboar d the aircraft carri ers . Ramsay also asks for a directive letting the navy know what it s r e~ponsi bil ities are. This will be done . All naval communications will be cent r alized thr ough Adm iral Cunnin gham and any special in structions will go out , once opera t ions have started , through General Eisen hower. \ �Air Com. ~odore Sanders is called in to discuss the use of parat r oops and he ar.r ees that t hese vital f i ghti ng men s rould be used , if f easible , to "lea pf r og" tro ops to the ea st for the drive on Tunisia. Various command ers are t o be as ked to put in bids on what uses t hey mi _· t have for the a i rborne troo ps and the f ina l h dec i sion on their use will be in the hands of the Com..,and er- i n-Chief. Colonel Caff ey , wro will conL.iand the 39th Regimental Combat Team that will parti ci pate in the Al giers ass aul t alon gs i de the 168th an d the Rangers, ar ri ves f ro m the States -and confers with General Clark . The 39t h is enro ute over by troo p tra nsp ort an d wi l l arrive next week . It will be placed i mmed at ely in t he i a ss ::.. ult convoy . Caffey r epor t s that amphibLu s maneuvers i n th e Stat es brou ght out that t he M rifles , bac kb one weapon of t he Infantry , get rust y an d fai l to -1 f ire if t hey are exposed to salt water spra y . He sa ys a li ght dr essin g of li eht motor oil prev ents corrosio n and non- f i rin g so General Clark or ders t hat t lii s i nfor m ati n be di s s eminated i mmed ately to TOR units . i CH Lieutenant Colon el Stirling c omes in to get a re port on Genera .i. Cla rk ' s W sh i ngt on tr ip so he can car ry it back t o the Britis l:in a Chie fs of Staff . Once a gain , t he genera l covers t he major poin ts rais ed and t he decis ion s made during his f ly in g tri p bac k t o th e States . * * LO NDON OCTOB 2 , 1942- Because Gener al Eisenhower is out i nsp ectin g General , ER Anderson ' s Br itis h tr oops , Genera l Clark presides to day over t he tri - weekly meet i ng of TO H plan ner s i n London . Br iskly , hi t t in g onl y the major ite ms, General RC Clar k revi ews event s that occur ed while he was in W ashin gton . He brings the big joint Br itish-Ame r i can st aff up-to-dat e on TORCH develo pments in London an d W sh a i ngto n, th en as ks t he other officers to br i ng up their proble m s. Admiral Ramsay asks t hat destroye r s be allow ed to go directl y i nto the port s of Algiers and Oran to take f rontal st eps to prevent sabotage to port in sta l la tions or the scut t lin g of vessels at t he harbors ' mout hs . Such an operation would involve no army personne l. Ground troo ps will be goi ng over the bea c hes and encirc l in g the por t s . General Cl ark declar es he be l ieves the de str cyer m ove is a sound pla n an d sa ys he will take it up wit h General Eis enhoVTe in the hope of r gett i ng out su ch a directi ve . Gener al Rooks declares he is sti l l have tr ouble wit h lo gi sti cs - -t hat t here is a ja m p on t he KMS4an d t he KMF4 c onv oys. Because of it , he says t h3 shi pyin g -u wil l be ina dequate to move in part of the 1s t Arm ed Div is i on and part of the or 34t h Divis ion on D pl us 27 . H also r ep orts th at he wi .:.l have a serious ve ni cle e deficiency . This cri s is may be met by a m ove by t he U. S. N avy to increa s e t he num ber of car go ships in t he slow co nvoys to 45 . General Somer.N:'11 r eported to Genera.:. . Clar k in W shl.ngt on tr.aa.t the navy ha d agre ed to suc h enla r gement s and he be .L a _eves t he U. S . Navy wil l agr ee to 55- sh i p convoys- - t he number escorted by t he Brit is ,, Navy- - providi ng a reque st is m de and t he navy cl eared of r espon si bi l ity . a H hour 11- -th e time of at t ack - - f or tr.e West ern Task Force has be en modifie d to give General Pat t on greater la t itude of de c ip ion . W hile t he at ta ck ti m of e t he O an and Al gi er s forces is r 8, Patt on will atta ck on t he 11 ~~fcM~, eber : -" vm No ... ;nt I ·. �9 ti m schedule mos t appropo with surf e day as t he other two assault forces. c onditions, but, if possible, on t he sa m e The fascinati ng subject of 11Cover 11--deliberately puttin g out m is-information to divert and c onfuse t he ene m y-co m up for complete disc ussion tod ay . General es Clar k calls in Bri gadi er M ockler-Ferryman, Li eut. Col. Bevin s , t he Britis h expe rt on TO RCH cover, and General Gruent her. Bevins be lieves t he pl an t o be disse minated to the en emy JIU1 be t hat we plan to attack Italy and Sici l y, This may cau s e st violent sub ma e ac t ivit y in t he M rin editerran ean but it appears to b e th e wis es t cover if we are to hold t he Fr enc h fleet at its Mediterran ean bases an d ke ep Spai n an d Portu gal r e laxed. Genera l Clark asks Bevins how he pla ns to get t h e infor mati on to t he .Ax and Bevins gri ns an d sa ys he has "chan nels," The tr ouble is wit h his job, Bevi ns sa ys, is t hat he JIU1st let trut h leak out most of the ti m e so the ene my 11 ..l be l ieve in me--I 1ve got to build up their fait h i n my underwi groun d sources." It com out t hat General Alexa nde r is goin g t o start a huge es offensive in the M dle Ea.st on October 24 to divert t he enemy, particular ly from id makin g air reco nna issa nce durin g t he period t he assau l t conv oys ar e movin g into po sition. [ Tro ops leaving bot h Engla nd and t he United States wi l l be tol d t ha t t hey are goin g aroun d t he Cape of Good Hope and t hat the y wil l get f urt her infor mati cn c oncern i ng th e ir ta sk after they pa s s t hat point. Ori ginal cover f or t ue Ca s ablanca f orce was to let it l eak out t hat it was goini to a t t ac k t he Dode canes e Is ~a nds, Italian poss es s i ons at the far ea st er n end of t he M editerra nean. Such cov er , say s Bevin s, is not plausib l e since it would t ak e t he Pat t on force wel l in to Decem ber to r eac h t hes e islands. He suggests t hat t he cov er f or t hi s force be t hat it is goi ng to r el i eve t he Britis h i n t he M dd le Ea s t or els e t hat it i s j oini ng t he i at t ack on Ital y . One r eport com in toda y to disturbe an ot he r wise smmoth day . Gener a l Ryder es r eports that the equi , ment of t h e 59th c om bat tea m, whic h is arriv ing here nex t week fr om t he St ates to join t le Al gi ers assa u lt force, is i mp per ly s t owed and ro wi l l have to be r eloa ded. Also, none of t he 59t h 1 s vehic l es ar e wat erpr oof ed . G er al Cia r k ca l l s in Gener a l Gale an d ord ers trat al l poss ib le veh i c les be wat eren proof ed as soon a s t he conv oy arrive s . Lack of wat erpr oofin g m er i als wi 1. be a at l li mi t in g f a ct or. G l e sa ys r el oadin g of t he 59th equipm ent might mena c e the se cur i t y a of TOR but he is l ay in g pl ans to rop e off th at s ection of th e Belf as t docks CH wher e t he loa di ng will take plac e . Gener al G e s ays t he TO al RCH su ppl y sit uati on "lo oks a lri ght " wi t i.1th e exceptio n of ge t t i ng backlo g vehi c l es int o Oran . The US- M edit er rane a n c onvoy , arri vi ll[; at Oran on D pl us 6 , wi ~l r elie ve part of U:e v ehic l e s hor t a ge . The . 40 mmamm uni tion f or Anti-Aircr aft guns i s not suf f ici ent and Gaie r e fc xts t hat he ha s a pr om ise f or 90 , 000 r ounds out of Englan d ' s Oct ober pr oduct io n . This , he es ti mate s, wi ll be enoug h for t he as saul t phas es . Gene r a l Cla rk nex t goes int o t he Pub- ic Rela t io ns se tu p wit h M j or Phi ll i ps . a Fift een cor r esp ondents wi ~~ be i n t ha fi eld by D pl u s 4 : fo ur wi t h t he Easte rn Ta sk Force; s ix wi t h th e Cent er Ta sk Forc e ; thr ee at Gi br a l tar head quart ers, and t wo at t a ched to t he Air Forc e . The W ester n Task For ce i s br i ngi ng over three news men and t wo r ad io m en. I n di s cus s i ng ra dio bro adca s t ers , Philli ps said t wo Ameican r bro adca st er s and one Bri t is her wi il go wi t h th e Ea. t er n For c e . r~n er al Cla r k str es s es s t he a l l - Am ic an as pect of t he er t he f irst v oice t o br oadca st out ope tllI\tt s.as r l -y b �lO of No th Africa must be th at of an A.~erican. There wi ll be no ra dioman wit h the r Oran forc e because of the lack of ra dio fac L .iti es . How ever , recordin g equip m ent pro babl y will go in wit h that ass au lt force. Unl ess t he Si gnal Cor ps provi des phot ogra pher s , one newsreil man wi ll go wit h the Algiers forc e and t wo newsreel men and a st i ll photo graph er wit h t re O an group . r Now that t he execution of TORC is ju st a fract io n over a month away, t hings H are 6oi ng much mo e smoothly . The ba dly - snarled su p~ly s i tuati on i s strai ght ening r out as re por ts pil e up on what i s availab l e in the United Kingdom. Ships are all r eady to leave £or t he Unit ed Kingdom to make up s horta ges a s f ar as poss ib le . Certa in critic al items are bein g fl own over by plane . * * LONDN OCTOBER 1942- -Gener al Mason- M f arlane , civ il and mil itar y govierO, 5, ac nor of Gibra lt ar , sl i ps into London incogni t o to giv e an up-to- the - minute r ep or t t o Gener als Eisenh ower and Clark. The three generals are closeted secretly for an hour as Ma cfar lane r eports on su ch facts as Spanis h r ea ct ion to incr ease a ir and naval acti vit y at t he M terr anean mout h for tress , capa city of t he v ita l Gibra l edi tar air dro m , ar rangements for the be r thing and unloa din g of naval and me rant e rc s hi ps , _assem bly of fi ghte r planes being shipped down by cr ate , activities of agents in both No h Africa and Gibraltar . rt Gener al Ma arlane giv es Gener als Cl ar k and Eis enhower a comp ehensive picture cf r of how TO RCH lo oks to an official w i s sit t in g ri gtrt acr oss t he M no edite r ranean f ro m t he coming theater of action . The gover nor i s quite opti m istic . The sup ply situation c ontinues to bri ghten . Colonel Lewis, artiller y offic er of the Oran Tas k Force, has made a det ailed stud y of- the 105 mmam nition supp ly mu an d th e r eport he gi ves General Clark is very encouraging : 445 , 175 r ounds are av ailabl e . That is 120, 000 ro unds i n excess of what is needed aboard t he D and D plus convoys to Oran . Gener al Lar kin reports that nothin g has developed since he r eturned f rom the U ed States to make th e SOS picture lo ok any different nit and General Hughes, r eturn in g fr om a tour of SOS aepots , says he is optimi stic. Iarkin tells Gener al Clark he is "sat is f ied we are goi ng to m eet the loa din g schedules ." To make pro ~pects even bri ghte r, a f as t ship is l eaving t r~ U. S. O ctober 5 with 2, 500 tons of ammunition to make up various s mr ta ges . Al l this br in gs grea t r elie f t o Gener al Clar k w has be en extremely worried ho ab out logistical pr oblems for t r~ pa st six weeks . A conference after conference t he has had to jack up SOS r epresent at i ves . All t he ti m he re alized the SOS snarl e was not th e fa ult of one man. But he kne w to o t hat som eone ha d to get extremely tou gh if -anyt iu.ng was to be accomplishe d . That theo r y has worked . Plans for t ra ns portin g TORCH dquarters to Gibr altar prior to D-day have hea now c ongeale d . ID:.wE B-17s, f ixed to carry 10 pass engers , wi ll be used in stea d of trans port s . Two ships will go down fiv e days befor e t he assault date ; four on D minus thr ee and t wo on D minus one. Two of these ships wil l r emain at Gibr a lt ar for use of the headquarters staff aft~~ttack is underway . Other person uel wil l go down by boat , arrivin g about H ip.us-· :.w: ""'~Jeral Clar k wil l f ly down a Jiri 9 o T month fr om to m r ow. or ?:: CC · _ ffE . - ----;..;..;;:;;..;;; ~ . ·-.;~ii �I( Now that the major items have been disposed of--place, time and plan of at ta cks ; troop and me rchant c onvoys ; logistics; political affairs; weapons and assault craft ; naval and air strength-a host of more minor subjects aris e daily. Bulked together, they are of infinite importance since every facet of the plan must work to perfection if the assault is to be preponderant l y successful. These are t he types of thin gs ijeneral Clark concerns himse lf wit h primarily today: Making arran gem ents so the Gibr altar-boun d planes wi ll have the general officers well dispe rsed in cas e of accident •• •Deat h to a f ew key men m ght doom i the entire operation • • •British Navy planes must be marke d wit h American insi gi:nia to carr y t he a ppearance of an al l - Ameic an operation to t he f ullest possible r degree • • •Liai s on work is being done so American flyers wil l be able to r ecognize the silhouettes of British warships ••• The 62nd Trans port Group, whic h will be used to leap-frog General Anderson's troops toward Tunisia, is com g in on in sc hedule fro m t he United States •• •The "Offe nsive A ction" paper ha s been drafted to incorporate Britis h and American views and General Clark advises Wa hingt on s that it wil l be publis hed M onday noon un le s s word is heard to the contrary •• • Use of t he Brit i s h Royal Ma rines com up again and General Clar k instructs es General Lemnitzer to have Lord Louis Mo untbatten begin making pl ans for its use in attac kin g Sar dinia, probably about three months after t he No h African attack • • rt •Bids are coming in fro m all task force comma ders as to what t hey t hink t hey n wil l need i n the way of air transports • • .The Com ander -i n-Chief wi ll dec i de late r m to what tasks he will assign t hese paratroop or inf antr y carr yi ng planes • •• The directiv e concerning use of Paratroops at Oran has gone in and it is agr eed that t his unit will attack at 1:00 AM not dawn • . . General Ryde r is having dif f ic ul ty , with Gener al Anderson concernin g turning over of his comma d to the Brit i sh and n over- t he status of civil administration ••• Gener al Cla r k pro m es t o str ai ght en is the matter up and, after conferences, assi gns five more American to the Algiers Task Force civ ili an affairs group • •• The question of a ir cover for the Oran assault forc e comes up again and a reque st is made for six medi um bombers to be base d at Gibraltar rea dy to support the assault • • •General Clark pr omises to ta ke it up with his air officers • •• Because it appears that it will be impossible for int elli gence offic ers to get viaas to go into Switze rland after TORCH gins, Gener al Clark be starts the wheels tur ni ng to get the State Depart men wor king on the visas illL t ~ediate ly •• •The proble m of getting a signa l corps man into North Africa wit h M r. M urplzy- so he can send messages to the attackin g forc es and guid e in the Oran pa.:batroops is causin g concern ••• General Clar k sug gests t he man might be smuggled in at a lon e~y beac h ••• Having the man go in in civilian clot hes ar pears too dan ger ous . Thes e are the kind of questions dealt with thorou ghly because a slip m ight cause untold compli cations. * t hat come up , hour afte r hour . Each must be in one minor item-say use of the radio-- t: CHE CKERS ENGLAND , , OCTOB ER 1942-Pri me M st er Churchi ll summons Ge ini nerals Clar k and Eisen hower to his country esta t e t his evening to go over th e latest TORC devel opments and get a f ace-to -face rep ort fro m Genera l Cla r k on his r ecent H visit to W hington. There have been no changes in the date and plan for TORC but as H t he Pri m M e inister is ea ger to go over the details . He is still worried about the effect of TORCHon the Russian "PQ" con•~~j; !!:J �( The coup de etat of t he evenin g is pul led by Gener al Cla r k . For weeks he has bee n l ookin g wit h lon gi ng eyes at t he Briti sh Aircr aft car rie r now i n th e I ndi an O cean . M e fi ghter cov er i s needed fo r t he Oran Task Forc e and t he pla nes or on the carr i er woul d make up this defici ency . M . Ch hil l i s st r i din g up and down t he r oom, di scu ssin g t he Afric an oper~ , r urc at i on . Occas i onally he hops over th e s tep t o t he fi rep la ce hearth and stands wi th 1 his back t o t he f ir e , w m g and ru bbi ng hi mself . Sudden.Ly he says : 11Is t her e ar in , anythi ng I can do for any of you . 11 The t ime lo oks ap pr opo an d General Cla rk says : 11 Yes , " Mr. Pri me M i st er . How about us i ng t hat Ind i an O in cean car r ier i n TOR ? 11 CH 1 s ro und f ace li ght s up ; 110f c our se , " he booms. "That car r i er ain ' t Mr . Churc t..il l no good all alo ne . " He t el l s G r al I smay to start t he gear s turn i ng to get t he ene car r i er int o t he oper at i on . Gen er al Clar k bel i eves something wi ll now brea k lo ose on the car r i er sit uat ion : i f t he I ndi an Ocean ca r ri er i sn 't r el eased , at lea st an unused car ri er in t he H e om Fl eet wi l l be as sig ned to the O an Tas k For ce . r ( The Pr i m M ni st er i s st il l wor r i ed abo ut mov ng t he bul k of A er i can forces e i i m out of t he Brit ish I sles f or use i n TOi\CH. He wants m e tro ops m or oved i n f ro m t he St at e s to ass i st i n def ens e of t he U t ed Kingdom. He concur s with Gener ul Clark 's ni sug ges tion t hat new divis i ons , t hose wit h onl y th ei r basi c t r a ining , come over and l earn fr om t he groun d up wi t h Br itis h ar ti l le ry equip ment . Because vi rtua lly al l ca rg o ships wi ll be use d t o sup 0 ,or t t he TO RCH f or ces , the Q n M y will be t he uee ar only ship ava ila bl e t o bri ng t r oops over . Thi s blo cks t he mo vement of Ame i can r f i ght i ng equipment , but not f i ghting men, to the U nited K ngdom w l e TOR i s i hi CH i n the devel opi ng phase . As us ual, t he Pri me M nis t er keeps hi s gue sts up unti l a ver y l at e hour . For i th e fi r st t ime Gener al Cl ark r eal.Ly disco ver s t he sa gaci t y of get tin g peop l e t ir ed befor e fac in g the m wit h a prob l em. The car r i er r eques t ca m as the Pri m Minis t er e e w appraa cr.d. g cl os in g ti me. The reque st was ma ps ychol ogica lly and physi ca l ly as n de at pr eci se l y t he ri ght m ent . om General Al exan der is going t o st ar t a bi g pus n i n the M dl e East on O id ctobe r 24 as a cov er f or TO H. M . Chur chill di scus ses t his mo throu g i:_,J_y wi t h Gener a l s RC r ve Cla r k and Eisenho wer • .Ameri an f or ces wi l l be i ncl uded i n t ne bi g at t ack sin ce c t heir emp yment will be a bui ldup for t he a l l - Am lo eric an appear anc e of TO H at RC Algiers , Oran and Casabla nca . Bef or e l eavin g f or Chequer s , General Clar k put s i n a busy Sunday . He cal l s in Gener a l Lee fo r a gener al sur ve y of t he SOS s i tu at ion . Lee estimat es t he SO S wi l l be able to give 90 per cent perf ormance i n the TO RCHoperat io n . He :explai ns t he difficu l ties bar r in g 100 per cent per fo r man and Gener al Cl ark tel ls Lee he ce under st ands perfect l y . The mo e r ecent pr obl ems- -moveme of t he five shi ps comin g r nt over espe ciall y to j oin the Br i t is h M edite r r ane an convoy , lac k of spac e f or t he 59t h combat team car go and simila r 11t h hour devel opm s-- a.re gone into . Lee says ent m e space m be f ound for the 59th when it s sh i ps are re -l oaded . He also t hl.nks or ay addi t iona l car go space - -a.bout 50 deadwei ght to ns per ship - - may be f ound in th e D day vesse ls . He pro pose s to f i ll t ~ - wit t f i eld ration s . As to amm tion , uni · t:fc-RT_;'C)' .. l · ,:. E �13 r_~ fCn\ : 17 E --.~~ffT , ;--"--·-._;;;...:..::.=...! General Lee reports that 500 ,000 °" tons arriv.ed .d.n the U. K. la st month and the SOS has a fairl y good breakdown of the items . Loadin g of some ships f or t he TORCH assault force has started and the SOS chie f says co operat i on with the Br,itis h in loadin g and unloadin g is excellent . General Clar k hopes to get away fro m c onferences and paper work wit hi n a week or so in order to eet in to Scotland for a final look a t the com bat t r oops and for personal ins pect io n of combat loa di ng operations. He in s tructs Gener al Lee t o se t up a s peci al trai n fr om Octo ber 17 to 20th so he ca n get up to th e G gow- River las Clyde area . The De~tuy Com.an der a l s o hopes to get down to Shr iv enbam so he can m look over t he headquarters securit y forc e , now being sta ged ther e . Other conferences held durin g the day concern passa ge of co mma d fr om the n naval corrunander at Oran to t he Task For ce Commande durin g D-day . The same prinr c i ple wi ll a pply t rere a s is bein g applied at Algiers : it wi l L occur at t he poi nt in th e landin g where t he G ound Com r mander fe els he is able to c ontrol t ne s it uat ion asho re and t ells the nav al comma der that he i s r eady to t ak e over . Anot her proble m n tha t c omes up is overloa ding of the Algie rs Assault Forc e and General Ryder is goin g to re- exa mine his load in g tab .tes to s ee wnat non- combat unit s can be dro pi.ed off wit r:out cri pplin g his forc e . I niti al unit s of th e 29t h Divi sio n arrived i n t he U. K. yes terd ay . The rema in der will be ar ri v in g within a week . G eneral Cla r k sc aQ t he pos s i bil it y of s tr ength tS ening weak poi nt s in the assaul t wit h vol unte ers fro m this div ision . * * LON , O DON CTOBER6 , 1942-- Generals Clark an d Eisenho wer arriv e back in London fro m th e Pri me M niste r I s estate at 11 AMand go into i rruediate c onfer ence on i n develo pment s occuring durin g their absence . The Com niand r - in-C hiefs joi nt staff c onf eren ce i s held at Norfo lk House and it gets bri ef er and brief er as t he TOR a ttack date ne ar s and pr oblem after proCH b l em gets a solution . Genera l Eise nhower stress es t he ne ed for "c onst ant vi gil an ce" in pro t ectin g t he securit y of TORC He declare s ttat "extre m measures " s r:ou.1d be H. e ta ken to keep t he at t ack da te and t he assualt poi nts se cr et . In a gener a l revie w of decisi ons yet to be made, Gener al Ei senhower says t ra t he beli eves tro ops s houl d a t tac k wit h di v isiona l insignia on t heir unifor m and tru cks . He be Lie ve s t he s posit ive va l ues - morale , control of troo ps and vehicles - -out weigh the ris ks involv ed-- givin g t he enemy a chance to kn ow ju s t whic h or gan izations a re atta cki ng . The questi on of t he anti - submar i ne patro l for the Casab lan ca force c om up es and the staff agre es it must be come a U. S. r es ponsibi .tit y as soo n after t he attack as possible . Durin& the early phas es , the sub-patrol work wi ll be done by British Catalina f ly in g boats ranging out all t he way fro m !Gibraltar . "I f our navy won 't do somethin g abou t protecting itself , the army wil l have to ," Gener al Eisenhower · co m ents . Air M .n arshal W sh says the Britis h ca n su ppl y on ..c lit ht air cov er fr om el y Gibr a ltar and both Adm al Ramsay and he believe it is i mper ative that t he Casa ir blanc a force have some anti-submarine protecti on. < Gener al Ei s enhower tells the hi~h -ra nkint offtc er f ac in g him around th e conf erenc e t able that the r e has be en "nq- eata9ly-smic J"cJjfl,nge in TOR - -it is eoin g CH 1 along wit h t he sa me speed , the same -4~_t. _-'ff"•'.•E e'ctations • 11 ~ ·_~ . r exp• . _i ' ~ J~.il: ~)J.-UK ;, ·7t., ·., . . :~c~.;J; ..... �( The subjec t gone into most thoroughly is the anti-subm arine patrol , Cap tain W right of the U.S . Navy says t he harbor of Algiers is not suitable as a s ~a1 J.a ne base even after it is in control of Ameri can f orces . He also adds t hat unless planes with sea - searc h equipment ar e used , t he effectiveness of the aircraft in eliminating submarines will be reduced 33 percent . Buildup of the new ai r fo r ce- - the 8th--is discussed and General Doolitt l e sug eests that f or security r eason it should be explained , when questi ons c ome up , that the 8th is bein g built to amplify work of the 12th Air Force whic h is a l ready operatin g actively in the European theater . General Anderson is st i ll worried about his com.:iand particularly , his relation ship to the Ameri can poJ.itical and civ i l officers who wilJ. be stat i oned in the Algiers region to give the appea r an ce of an all - American action . He wants a "c le ar cut" directive so General Clark sc hedules a conference for late afterno on . Admiral Ramsay intro duces a plan calling for a special force to rush into the Al giers harbor , board the ships and pr event any scuttlin g or sabota ge . This f orce , c omposed of about 300 men, preferably Americans , would try to land at docRside in two l arge dest r oyers . Gener al Clark is going to ask fo r volu nte ers f rom the 29th Divisio n for this hardy task . The re quest that the U. S . Navy c onvoy cargo ships is coveys of 55 vessels has been rejected at Washington . The Navy de c lines to f rovide pr otecti on for any convoy larger than 45 s hips , sa yin g it is impossible to prote ct more than t hat number with t ne escorts available . Following the confer ence led by General Eisenhower , General Clar k ca.Ls in various officers to work on problems rai s ed at the Com'!landr - in - Chief 1 s m tin g . e ee After discussion wit h Air M shal v.r l:1and Genera l Doolittle ar els on the anti - sub patrol at Casablanca , a cable to Vl s hi.ngton is drafted statin g the Britis h fl yin g a boats will pick up t he Patton c onvoy on D minus two and that from D minus one to D plus eig ht t wo Ca talinas wil - be over the convoy durin g daylight hours as submarine protection . On D plus f i ve t he 12t I1 Air Force will sup 1aament this l pr otection wit h li m ted -r ange visuaJ. submarine patrol by A20B plan es . Fro m D plus 14 the kr rn Air Force wil l provide moderate-ran ge visual patrol with B25C air y craft . The cable points out this anti-submarine protection is a.nadequate and that the U. S . Navy should make further pr ovisions . General Doolittle reports he has arranged to have 25 Spitfires with 90-gallon belly tanks read y at Gibraltar to back up the Oran att a ck in case anythin g hap pens to the carrier - borne f i ghters . I f the Br itis h air craft carrie r, discussed wit n Pri m Minister Churchil l , is e obtained , the Oran force will have about 50 car r ier-bas ed planes . General M ason-Macfarlane, governor of Gibraltar , renurns for a conf erence prior to his depa:bture to the RG . The route of parat r oops over Spain the ni ght ck be f ore the Oran attack is discussed and M acfarlane believ es it wil l be saf e if the carriers fly at 10 , 000 f eet . Fr om England to the coast of Spain t hey will fly at a v er y l ow altitude to escape the radio detectors in France . Then t hey will climb up to escape the Spanish . They wi ~l nit t he Spanis i. coast at 9 :00 PM , four hours before they are scheduled to attack at Oran , provi ded an H- h our jw np is decided upon . �15" ':;:!• '.,.--.,..c.;;-= .:7 ~ ~lth oug h the Spanis h wi ll ~e and probab ly wil l r eport pre sence of enemy planes over head to Germany, M~ cfarlane does not be l ieve any opposi tion will com fro m Spain . Tr~e have fe w n i ght fig hters . He does not think the Germans will e y fly over Spa in t o intercept the paratro ops . In event a pla ne cras hes , i t prob abl~ won't be discovered until morning , well after the attack . Genera l M acfarlane re ports that the ca pacit y of t he G br a ltar air port is i 350 plan es and he believes requirem ents can be met des ~ite great congest ion . He is satisfied wit h re ports given him by Ge a l Cl ark on the personn el an d naval ner buil dup at Gibr altar. The t wo gener a ls sha ke hands , sa y goodbye and Gener al Clark sa ys : "W l , I'll see you in Gib ab out a mo h fro m to day ! " 11Right , 11 sa ys el nt Ma cfarl ane , and winks. O of the m ne ost difficult problems for t he hi gh militar y ·men in TOR is CH arrangin g political and civil af fa irs deta ils. Since the y ar e mi l itar y men, t hese matters are somewhat forei gn . General Clar k ca lJ.s a conferenc e of a ll men involved in this t ype of work . American per s onnel of this t ype wil l have to be divided in to three parts at Algiers--the "front men" for General An s on ' s eastward der bound force; the "fr ont men" for Briti sh General Clark ' s Algiers base or ganization; and offi cers to giv e an Amer an aspect to the assa u lt of t h:? 11t h and ic 36th British Bri gades . The Civil Affairs people wi l l deal wit h loc a l ordin ances, fi nancaal matters , hirin g of Frenc h labor, relations wit h French poli c e and civi l of f i ci als and kindred non-mil it ary af f airs. Al l dealin s wit h the French wil l be , primarily , t hrough America n offic ers to b ear out the American a sp ect of TOR CH. G ener al Anderso n sa ys t wo Ameica n civi l affa irs experts are not suffi~i ent for his force r so additional personnel wil J. have to be f ound . The qu estion of dis t rib uti ng packa ges of arms to the friendly Fr enc h also com up. Every pre cauti on mu be es st taken to se e that t hese get in t o the ri g ht han ds . This is a problem for the politi ca l section executives . M . KnoI, a state depar t m r ent Algierian expert , sa ys t he youth of North Afri ca wi l l be be hind us no matt er w hat happens . He adds that a great deal of t he su cc ess of TORCH depends on la st-m inu te ne gotiations • tha t M . M phy can c onduct. r ur G eneral Cl ark orders dra ftin g of a comp hens iv e directive re on po~it i cal and civil affai rs . The a dvisabilit y of put ting the political se ction UR der G-3 is discuss ed since t his secti on involv es, in many ca s es , m l ita ry oper ati ons su c h· i a s dem olitions . Gene r al Anderson grows i ncrea s in gly diffic ul t . He is now pr ot esti ng agai n over th e inclusi on of 1100 U. S. veh ic l es in t he Al giers conv oy . General Clark calls in Genera l M atejka and Colonel Ram sey to se e what ca n be done to assau ge Anderson . M atejka agrees to cut t he number of v eh ic le s 25 percent but s ays he is goin g to put up a fi th t t o get t hese ve hicles in the fol J.owing convoys . Col. Ramsey poi nt s out that this means it wi ~l b e D plus 60 before t he Allied Forc e Headquarters i n Al i ers has proper t ransp orta t io n . Admiral Ramsay returns to go over the Air Annex and dec J.ares th e air force reaL .y has three task s: sup1'ort of ground - oops, - pro tect ,ion of ports, pr otecti on of naval vess el s and c onvoys. The navy is _. : ff r ~ _f "prote ct i on of t he f le et . · t· w ,, ~CUIt I ' ' \ �\~ ( The air force, sa ys Ramsay , can't serve t wo mast ers. Gener al Clark makes it clear that th er e must be complete unit y of comma d and decr ee s that t he annex n state flatl y that the air forces ar e under the three Task For ce Com:nanders initial ly and under the Commanderi n-Chief of TO RCHfinal ly . The use of the planes will be determined by t he Force Commanders and/or the Comma der -in-Chi ef, n depend i ng on the situ ation. * * LONDONOCTOBER , 1942- General Cla r k ' s psyc hology on gettin g another , 6 aircraft car r ier out of Pri me M ni st er Churc hill wor ked l i Admiral Ramsay r eport s t o t he D eput y Co!lli nander -i n-Chi ef that an auxiliary carri er has bee n obtained . It is not the one out of t he In dian Ocean, but one t hat was bei ng held bac k by the ;bme F l ett . It ca r ri es 11 pla nes and t 1 wi ll is give the Oran Task Force ap pro ximately 50 fi ghter planes to su pport it in t he assault . A s quadron of Spitfires is also earmarked to f l y t o Oran at dawn, a id wher e t hey can, land on the Oran air port if tak en or els e put down as best they can when t heir fu el gives out. The thi nness of t he O an ai r sup~ort ha s now been r thic kened . () Another major decision reached today is that t he O an paratroo ps will attack r / at H- hour--1 AM ns tead of waiting until dawn. M or Yarboro ugh re por ts thi s --i aj will giv e the par atroo ps three advantages : a greater element of surprise; the use of darkness to c ons oli date t heir positions and colle ct their fi ght i ng equipment, ~nd a chance to dem onstrate t hat the tro ops ca n set down in their s ection despite darkness . Yarbor ough , as ar e al l of the paratroop of f ic ers , is ea ger for t he par atroop chance~ ~eneral C~ark sa ys that one of the bri ghe st spots i n plan ni ng for TORC has been the eagerness for action of the par atroops. Suc h an H 11s hows initiativ attitude e and is one of the fin est t hing s about all t his pla nn- in g whic h at ti mes ha s had its ver y dark si de s , " Ge al Clark tel l s Yarbor ough. ner Yarboro ugh r eports that Bri tis h agen ts wi ll li ght flare s in t he Oran a ir port area to help the paratr oops down to ward their obj ect iv e . He is not worried abou t to o ::rea t a loss of equipment i n t he dark and adds "anyway, we 'v e got enou g~on us to fi ght for 24 hours . General Fre dena l l is due so on t o take over command of the II Corps , whi ch i s t he Oran Task Force . General Hartl e , who had been provi sio naL y set u p for t .ti e c ommand i s r eturnin g to Ire land . Whe TOR gets underway , Hartle will more or , n CH less comm and th e TOR base s ec tion in the United Kingdom. Thus , all hope has CH pa ssed of General Clark commandn g t he Cor 1 s wit h whic h he or i ginal l y came over i s eas . 111 woul d have l ike d nothin · bet t er, 11 says the Deputy Command er-in -Chi ef , 11 but Gener al Ike wouldn I t let me do both -- be Deputy Com :nander to him and have the Corps as well. He t hought t ha t was too much for one man." \ A plan t o have t he assault boats equi pped wit h loud speakers thr ough whic h Frenc h troo ps guard i ng t he Oran and Algiers areas can be infor med that America ns a re making t he lan di ng and tha t no fi ght wit h t he Frenc h i s nece s sary beca use this is a move a gainst t he Axis i s discussed . General Clark wants to get 500 loud speakers for t his use . Gener a l M atejka says t he Si gna l Corps has none i n t he U. K. and the Br itis h are wit hout them. I f t he pl an ap pears f easible , efforts will be made to rus h them over fr om t he St ates. Pe),'fla"psmegapno n~f wil l be used i nstead . ~ \ �l 'l ( Attempting to button up t he operati (n calling fo r a direct as sault on the Algiers and Oran harbors to pr event suuttlin g of or sabota ge to ships , Genera l Clark plans on usin g 400 Infantry volunteers from the 1st Armored Divi sion at Oran and 300 Infa nt r y volunteers fro m t he 34t h Division at Algiers . The Bri tis n wi l l provide about 40 naval techni ci ans at Algiers and the U. S . N avy a s i m ilar number at Oran. This navy personnel will go int 'o the en gine ro oms and hol ds of the s hips to prevent wreckin g of machin e1· or the openin g of sea e ocks . y A dmiral Burrou ghs out lin es the movement and assaul t pla n at a s pecia l meet in g cal l ed by G eneral Clark . The tro ops wil l leave t he Unite d Kingdom aboard cr uisers . They wi ll be transferred to des tr oyers after arrival in the Assau l t Areas . One des tr oyer wi~ ~ drive int o Oran harb or, the other into Al giers . Sold ie rs wi l l se i ze and protec t wharves and ot her har bor facilities . -Naval personn e~ wi l ~ board t he shi ps. Plans are made to get the necessar y troo f s r eady for shi pm ent i n t he D-day conv oy . G eneral Oliver, wro attends the conference, reports that t he 1st Arm ored Combat team that is participatin g i n one of the Oran beac h l andi ggs is now in the Liverpool ar ea and wi ll start lo adin g about October 14 . Durin g t he 16 days the y wil ~ be aboard s hip prior to sailing the y wil l hav e time for rehea r sals . This tea m has not had much opportunit y t o pr ac tic e di sembarkation of t anks . The Maracaibos wil l not be rea dy in time for the rehea r sal. One particularl y heartening piece of news is delivered to General Clark by Admiral Ram say who has received a cable fro m Adm r a l Cunnin gham. It says i t hat agre ement ha s b een reached wit h the U. S . N avy by which Cunnin gham wil l command al l naval forces in t he operation. The U. S. Navy has been prot estin g a gainst a Britis h offic er having comma over U. S. warshi ps . G nd eneral Clark ea geily awaits confirmati on of this news . Bad news c omes in the form of a list of pass engers ki ll ed when a comm ercial / dli pper , enroute to England , crashed the day befo r e yesterday at vot wood , N fdld. It r es ulted in deatn tGotwo TORCH civil affairs section officers and serious injury to a thir d . Hasty searc h must now be made to replac e this person nel. Another pla ne crash , whic n occured in Spain durin g G ra l Clark ' s visit to the United ene State s , could have caused serious , almost f ata l , TO RCH rep ercussions . A plane / f lyi ng to G ibraltar crashed in Spain. The pilot was kil l ed . In hi s pocket was a s ecr et envelo pe containin g TO RCHinfor m ation bein g carried f rom Genera l Clark io G enera l M acfarlane. Thoro ugh investi gation s ,~wed the env elo pe · was not . opened . It was deliver ed to Genera l Ma cfar l ane int a ct ! Air Comm odore Sanders r eport s to Gener a l Clark on th e air build - up at filibraltar. It will be necessary to place in operation four Spitfire squa drons and replace m s for Am ent erican and Britis h losses soon after the operation opens . It has b een a gr eed to have 107 pla nes , crated, go in t o Glbr al tar on K Sl , ar r ivin g M on D-2 or D 1 . Fifty additi ona l plan es wil l arr iv e on D plus 3 . These plane s will be rea dy for flight on D plus 10. Sta ggerin g of a irc ra ft ar riva ls a t Gibra l tar wil l eli m inat e exposur e of too m any aircraft duri ng a li kely per io d of b om dbar m . Comman g offic ers ar e countin g on fair ly heavy air los s es duri ng t he ent din earl y phase s of TOR CH, particularly am ong Am ic an pilots who have had lit t l e or er no co nbat experie nce. · .. .. .. , �1i LO N, O NDO CTOB 7, l.942- - "Each da y I s ee more ev id ence t 11 t we are get t i ng ER a to get her-- get -;: ng bett er or gan i zed . And ea ch <;l.ayI get a li t t l e mo e hope f u l." i r Thus , Gener al Ei senh ower c l oses to day t he r egular t r i - week1.y Comi"tl der ::.inan Chie f Is c onfe r ence . Because a l l i mpor t a nt mat te rs a pparent 1.y ar e f a ir l y weL _ set t led , t he confer ence i s sho r t . M ost of t he quest i ons t hat c om up c onc ern e m e or l e ss minor matt er s . or Lookin g aroun d the b i g, r ect an gul ar c onfere nce table ar ound whi ch si t th e to p men of TG RCh-- Genera l Cla rk on his ri ght , Gener al Ander s on and Adm l ira Ra m say ac r os s t he tab l e; al l t he ar my and navy of f i cer s who have be en pourin g al l th eir ene r gi es into pl ann i ng for t he operatio n- - Gener al Ei s enhower is obviously plea s ed "wit h t he way t hin gs ar e get t i ng bu t t oned up . 11 H says "i t i s ple a s in g e to s ee t he s t a ge t hing s ar e rea chi ng . 11 One of t he m t ers giv ing Gener als Cl ar k at and Eis enh ower par t i cula r pl eas ur e i s t he a ppar ent har m ony c onc ern i ng pl acin g of t he U. S . N aval for c es at Casab l an ca un der Adm iral Cunn in gham. Gener a .L Eisen hower r emar ks t hat 11al .L our pr obl ems a r ~ be i n g an d must be set t le d by t he f u nda m -ntal ru l e of com10n s ense . 11 Genera l Cla r k out .L nes t he l at es t ac com s nment s : t he de c i s ion t o u se port i pli s ei zur e f orc e s at Ora n and Al gie r s ; t he de c ision to have para tr oops at ta ck at O an a t H- h our; redu ct i on by 25 per c ent of t he num r of U. S. vehicles i n th e r be Al gie r s conv oys ; agre em , at l ea st on t his s i de of tbe At l anti c, of t 1e use of ent an t i - submarine pla nes at Casab la nca . One hea rteni ng r ep ort i s made by Gener a l Ei s en hower . He has ju s t c onfe r re d wit h "a c l an de s t i ne per s on whos e na m wi l .L have to rema in se cr et . " This sour ce e r epor t ,_;t hs.t t he It a li a n peopl e ar e rea dy f or peace at any price . lligh It alian gov er nm ent of f i ci al s , t his man sa ys , 11at la s t r ea -1. e t hey ca n 1 t win even if th e iz pr es ent s i de t hey are on win s . " Amei c a ' s pos i ti on , he conti nue s , is get t i ng mor e r popula r in I t aly an d t he I t a.d a ns ar e ea ger t o avoid an t a gonizin g us 11de e p in . t he gr as s r oots • 11 For t hat r eas on no 'Ital i an submari nes ar e at pr es en t or,er ati ng of f th e Atlan ti c s eaboar d . fl W mi ght get a little e quiet Gener a l Eis enhower conc l.Ud . es 11 help f r om t oo Italian s i f t hin gs go ri ght , fl Amo g t he more minor m t ers t ha t c ome up at t oo bri ef c onf ere nce ar e t he n at us e of l ouds peaker s i n t he l andi ng boa t s and t he qu est ion of a pr oc lamati on_t i:iat is t o b e deliv er ed to t he res i de nts of Nor t h Afric a . The .La ter ms be en drafte d t in th e U. S. an d i s i n its fi na l f or m f or di strib uti on by ra dio or pl ane . Gene ra l Lee r eport s t hat bot l: t he Britis h a nd Ame ic an sup pl y peop l e f avor s ta r tin g a r Quart er m st er school in England f or Britis h and Am ic an grou nd , a ir and naval a er pers onne l . At i t , s tud ent s woul d l earn t re difficulties enc ounter ed and mi stak es m e i n su pplyi ng TOR ad CH. 11They wou l d lea r n fr om t he expe ri ence we ar e gett i ng, 11 de c la re s Genera l Gale'. G er a l Eis enh oV1 f avor s su c n a sc hool . en er Genera J. Eis enhower asks eac n off ic er a t t he ta ble if he ha s any ques t io ns or proble m to bri ng up and for t .re fi r st t i je none of t he men ha s an ur g ent mat te r s . t o pr es en t and t he conferen c e bre aks up . I n t he gr i m and t ense bu si ness t he open in g of a Seco nd \ �(9 ( Front, General Clark has a ..L ighter , somewhat 11ro mantic 11 task to day . At fir st lieutenant in his II Corps wants to marry an American nurse s ta tioned near t he Longford Castle headquar ters that has now become the rear ec neion . W hile the lieutenant appears be fo re the s m ng , lanky genera1. to state wny he believes ili the three - month waiting period provided by re gul ations s houl.d be waived , t he nurse, a new en gage ment ri ng on her J eft h3.lld, waits anxiously in an outer office . The genera l will grant t he coup ::.. per m e ission to marr y provi ded t he proper papers are fi 1.ed out . On1. he , as the offic er ' s commanding general , can grant l y th at per mission. Alt 0rnate plans for the TO RC'i task forces are stil1. bein g c ons i dered . General Clark cal ls in General Lemnitzer . Because of the c l1ances of surf con dit ions interferin g, particular att ention is paid to secondary p~a ns for the W estern Task Force . Whether the entire Patton force can be moved into G br a1.tar is a matter i for naval consideration and Britis h officials are inquirin g into it s fea s ibilit y . The W estern fo rce might move in f ull or part strength into the Oran- Nemours area to assis t the Center Task Force . A rajor diffi culty is that t he full strengt h of the two forces can not be adequately su ppli ed t n.r cug h exisiting harbor facilities in the O an area. G-3 will have the finai altern ate plans r eady for sub m r ission by Oct . 12 . They wil ~ be cabled to General Patt on . Info r mation is being ass embled re gar di ng suitable landin g beac nes in Sout nern Spa in. For political and diplom at ic ramifications of such a plan ar e extremely delicate but such a landing , dependent on many conditions, is a possibility . Gener a l Lemnitzer submits ·a paper deai i ng with possible action against Spanish M orocco by the Ryyal Marine Division or other Brit is n forc es . This acti on would take place in event of an atte m to close the Straits pt by eit her Axis or Spanish forces. ~eneral Cl ark believes suc n a plan is i mp acti cable . Believing it may r have some merit , t he Deputy Commaner decides to go into it more t horoughl y . d Organization of t he U. S. SOS and Britis h Line of Communi ations · set - up once c ,,, t he Nort u Afri can theater is establis red is di scuss ed with General G . The t wo ale generals a__ree that chiefs of t he sup I,Jy services s hould be on t he t heater staff l rat her than directly under the commanding general of SOS. It is importa nt th at the British Fir st Army and t he U. S . Fift n Army which is to be cr ea ted after -TOR is developed-be CH free of unn ecessary administrati ve res ponsibility . The field forces mus t be free t o mo wit hout the encumbrances of sup pl y wor r ies. ve Wa terproofin g of 1 1 500 ve hi cles of the 1st Armored Divis ....n com c• bat team is presentin g dif f iculties . All ve hicles must be mo ved to the por ts for loa ding on Octobe r 10 and this does not allow sufficient time for waterproo fin g . Actin g upon the pr oble m im~ediate ly , General Clark cal l s in General Gale who inv esti gates . The vehicles will be moved to t he ort in incr ements during the loadin g period , Oct ober 12 to 21 , and waterproo fin g wil .1.be compl eted at t he dockside by British and Am erican persom1el . Dat es of dep ar ture loom close on the cal endar now. Loadin g of American troop and equipment will. soon be started . The Britis h now recom m end that both Generals Clar k and Ei senhower be at Gibr altar by November 4 since t he leading convoy will enter t he Str a its at dusk of November 5 . If weat her conditi ons at that time are adverse , an i mportant decision wil l. have to be made . * �~<-::-OCTOBER 8, 1942-lf-'~ One month from today TORCH eg ins l b One m.nt h f r om today , i f all goes well , t he Second Fr ont will be opened . , American troops wil l be pouring over the beaches in t he Algiers , Oran and Casablanca areas . American parat r oops wi ~l be battling for seizure of t he O ran ai r dromes . Spec i a l Ame i can f orc es wi ll be rus rn ng the harbors of Oran an d Algie rs . r American and Br itish pl anes will be battling to get ller for control of t he air over Nort h Afr ica . The Ameic an Navy pr obab l y will be fi ghtin g of f the Fr ench Navy r somew here in the vic i ni ty of Casablanca . Almost the entire British Home Fleet wil l be in the Me dite r ranean , esco r ting i n the assault f or ces and probab ly bombarding Algie r s and Oran fro m the sea . It wi l l b e f a cin g the combine d efforts of Itali an an d German submarines and warsh i ps and warplanes . One month fro m today , i f all goes well , t errific ef forts wil l be made along pol i tical lines to turn t he French fr om resistance to assistance . British tro ops · will be r ea c. in g themsel ves of f Alg i ers f or a drive as11ore and a r a2 i d push to y beat the Germans into Tuni s i a . Al lied Force Headquarter s wi ll be operating in Gibraltar , inte gr atin g the ef fo r t of t hree ground fo rc e assaults, t hree a i r units and two f leets ; i t wi ll be direct i ng the st r ate gy of t he fi ght . One mo h fro m tod ay A.merc an and Brit i sh lea ders will begin to know if t he nt i Frenc h in North Afr i ca ar e goin g to res i st ; what t he attit ud e of Spain is , and , if the Germans will use the Nor th African attack an d fli ght of .Al.Lied pl an es across Spain as a pretex t to move into Spain f or ai r operati ons , first a gain st G r altar , later against the Nor th Afr ican coa st . ib One month fro m t oday all the hopes and ap pr ehension s of the past th r ee months will be cr ys tallized , pr obabl y wi thin the s hor t span of t wo or three days . One month fro m today ! So much i n the way of plans and pre parations has be en pac ked into the past fe w months . And, so much r emains to be done in the single, vital month that lies ah ead . * LONDO OCTOBER 1942-- The two gene rals who will l ead the two major Ame N, 8, r ican assa ult fo r ces i nside the Me erranean are pr eparin g to join tne ir t ro ops , dit now being alerted in the Rive r Clyde area of Scotland . Both Generals Ryder , co mmande of the Al giers assault force , and General Allen , commander of the 1st r Division that wi l l spearhead the Oran attack , will l ea-v-e London perman entl y over the weekend . A final r eh earsa l, a command po st exercise to test the attacking troops and their aquipment , wi l l be hel d next week . Then t he men will start loa ding f or departure of the assault convoys . \ �( General Ryder is due to leave Sunday . He still has a few more details ta ke care of before he goes north to join his 168th combat tea m and other that will make the Algiers assault . to troops Generals Clark and Eise nhower will go to Scotlan d , probably on October 17, to witness the rehearsal exercises . About 20 officers will go, including Lord Louis Moun tbatten , the comrri .ando or gan izer . Officer obs er v ers will stay wit h certain units throughout the exercises and will submit r eports . Preparing for the future , plans are alrea dy being drafted concernin g what operations should be undertaken in event Frenc h No th Afri ca , inclu ding Tunisia , r is quickly secured . This plan ning is b eing done both by TORCH dquarters and hea membes of the British War Cabinet . General Clark tel l s Colonel Sterling , sec r r etary of the w cabinet , that such pla ns should inclu de operations a gainst ar Sicily, Sardinia and movements f arther to the east in No rth Africa to hit Rommel fro m the r ear . Reaction to the proposal that troops fro m M alta participate in TORCH attackin g Tunisia - -an idea originally by proposed by Pri m M e inister Churchillis not rec e iving favorable reaction f ro m the Briti sh . The Ma lta garrison is not well -traine d in mobil e warfar e ; it lack s tran sp ort ; it could not supply itself f or m ore than seven days after landing . It looks as thou gh this side ~ig ht pha se of the operation may be abandoned . General Browning , hea d of Britis h paratroops, ca lls on General Clark who tells the Britisher that it now l ooks a s if about 400 of his jumpers can go into the t heater about D plus 2 or 3 . The two generals discuss the pos sibility of bringing al l of Bro wning's troops into the the ater . Browning is ea ger for such an enl argement of the plan but the Britis h are enti rel y dependent on the U. S. for air transports . One Britis h grigade grou p is going by s ea and wil l ar r ive at Al giers four days after the initia l a ss ault. It will ca rry a 100 percent reserve of equipment. This wi ll enable s ix succes s iv e parachut e ba tt alion operations to be car r i ed out toward the east in quick succession . General Clark ord ers th at t hree C-47 squad rons be equipped with Britis h type rack s for droppin g paratroop equi pment so the y can be rea dy to start Brow g ' s men forward . G nin ener al Clark stresses a gain and again 11t he great potential im portance of paratroop-airb orne operations in the North Afri _ can t heater . 11 General Clar k in s turcts General Cra i g to ra dio General Arnold, asking for the us e of a squadron of DC-41 s for a li m ited period . If th e se lar ge tran spo rts ca n be obt a in ed the difficult proble m of moving air force ground personn el into the new th eater will be solved . A host of things are deci ded today th at make the success of TORC look m H ore optimistic . The SOE and Secret Operations Br anch of the OSS are transfer red from the political section to the plans and trainin g section s ince the y are coneerned wit h m ilita ry operations , inclu di ng destruction of m ilitar y installati ons, r emoval of enemy person nel , etc . The Briti sh N avy infor ms G eneral Clark t hat it can obtain the nec ess ary naval pe·rs onnel to ef fect th e direct harbor attack at Oran. General Clark starts th e bal l rol ling to war d or ganization of the Ameican r Fift h Army whic h wil l be cr eated after the Afric an theater is es tablishe d . General Clar k alrea dy has in mind sel ection of many of th e key staff men for this new Army. Arr a ngements ar e made to place t he chiefs of vari ous sup pl y services under t he t hea ter staff , inst ea d of under the com a nding general , SOS. U nofficial wor d is r eceived that the Prime Mini ster has approved the . 11Qff ens ive Action Paper • 11 The Briti sh Jo in t Intel.Ligence commit tr1}1I il\~;§~•·'s,tirl'.~y a. that is quite encoura gin g c onc ernin e t he sec:ity of TORCH . * CHE;.J}t i:J: J _:- �( LONDN O O , CTOBER9, 1942-- 0ne of the five fast vessels rushing equipment s hortages to the United Kingdom s o they can fit strai ght in to the KMS convoy 2 has had to return to the United States because of diffi culties . The news br ings conste r nat i on but a check shows t hat the ship , the Thom Pickney , is car r ying as ca r go that can be replaced f rom that coming over aboard other vessels that left the U. S . on October 3 . They are expe cted to arrive in time fo r the K S2 c onvoy . M The Pickney 1 s load includes gasoline and oil f ,r ground and air forces , bombs and ammunition , maintenance supplies an d so m air corps technical e equip m . ent General Fredena l l , who is to take over comman of the Oran Task For ce and d the II Cor ps , ar r ives fr om the States and goes into immediat e confer ence with General Clark . Freden a ll had r ead the out.line plans so General Clark tal ks over wi th the new com:na.ndr some features e of the Cent er Task Force operation . The comm and and staff or ganizati on of the Al l i ed F orce is explaine d . Fredenal~ will move into his II Cor ps -headqua r ter s in Norf olk Hous e tomorro w. The Comr.:ianderin - Chi ef 1 s r egular staff conferen c e is held at noon and it i s brie f er than ever . General Eis enhower reports that he was asked by General M arsha l l t o give him a terse comm ent on the over - al l aspect of TO RCH and he repl i ed "circumstances c ould hardl y be be t ter . 11 The Comma er- in-C hief an nounces nd that because of the va gar ies of weat her he intends to go into Gibr altar four days me ad of D-day . He says t he "Def ensive Action" pap er is al .J..buttoned up and a pproved ; that alternate plans f or attacks against Sar dinia and Libya if TORC develo ps su cce s sful .J.. are now being prepared . Thirty s ets of lou dspeak ers H y wit h half - mile range have been obtained : 20 for the Al giers f orce and 10 for t re Oran attackers . These wil .J.. used t o sh~ i nf ormat i on to the Frenc h as be the assault boats go s horeward . Provisions must b e made to s end alon g at least 30 Americ ans who speak Fren ch . They will be in the init i al assault boats . 1 The best news announced by General Eis enhower is that two squadrons (24 planes) of Navy PBYs will be available at Casablanca for anti - submarine pat r ol in that area . They wil~ come into Casablanca on D y· an d be assign ed to the -da coastal frontier . The que s tion of plane markings has b een settled , All the planes , b omber s , fi ghters , trans ports , carrier - borne , will b e marked with the U. S. insigmia , with the exception of t re Spitfir es assisting the Algi ers force . The need fo r security is again s t r essed and Gener a l Eis enhow point s out er t he troops who wil l parti c ipate in TORCH"have been exhibitin g surprising accur acy in .knowing where they are going , 11 He says more cover will have to be sp r ead in another direction . The Com.--nan - in - Chief i nsists that al l affected officers der ke ep up with the latest "s had in gs " on cover pl ans . He expresses s atisfa cti on at the Joint Intelligence Com i t t e e ' s r eport on c onditi ons in Afr ica and t he Med m iterranean . The report indicates the enemy knows ver y lit t le of TO . RCH Through each of the Comm ander ' s conf erences , General Cl ark sits at G eneral Eisen hower ' s r ight , fillin g him in on t hin gs he has overlooked , expanding on the Conunnder r6 r emarks when he is asked to . The team - work betwe en Generals a Clark and Eis enhower is magnif icent . Each man sup plements the other and s eems to know wnat is on t he oth er ' s mind . The proble m of coordinating t r ansp,ort~t,:i,.on,.f roir. TPRC ha s come up and the r H Comnd er and his d eputy , following a,I◄ " /½lmira l Ramsay , hold a long · ..y!; - }r ._ . /':·'. StG c· ~ -~ �~:,i ET ;F.Cn _:. ( .... .i··.;. ..;, conference at Grosvno r Square . Br itis h and American opinion over here was that shipping and comnnm at i ons i n the M t er r anean sh ould be c oor dinate d to as sure ic edi f ul l use of all facilities and to pr event any confusion. The sug ges ti on f rom London to W ashin gt on was that a nine - member Br itish - Americ an boar d be s et up , to function in Gibr a l t ar fo r tte f irst three months , t hen to move fo r \rar d into t he theater . It woul d b e kno, n as t he Nor t h Afr i ca n Shippin g Board . General M arshal l cables back t hat he thinks a nine - member boa r d wil l b e t oo unwieldy and r ecom·nends t hat a Chief of Transpo r t a tion be set up und ,;: the Commaner - in-Chief . r d This shipping problem is now foremo s t among the many proble m to be settled . It s has been , amcng other t hin gs , one matte r that has been t ivin g Genera~ Clark a few s l eep less ni ghts . Another problem of gre at c onc ern to Gener a l Clark is ke ep i ng the Straits of G braltar i open i n even t Spain enters t he war . He has begun to propose a plan wher eby Br itish t r oops , includ i ng the much discussed Royal M arines , will b e on the a l ert in the United Ki ngdom, r eady to aai l f or an attack on Spani s h M orocco . I f the need ar ose , these tr oops , und er General Clark ' s plan , would rus h into t he region j ust as soon as the tro ops hips takin g t re in i tia l ass au l t f orces t o t ne M ter r anean could be re - loaded . Cont rol of t re Straits edi i s of t he m ost vital importance bec aµse this might be the only route thro ugh which TOR troops c ould CH be sup plied . Plans f or t he f i nal rehearsals in Scotland prior to t re emb kation of ar t r oops for battle are n ow c omplet e . The assaul t forces wil l go thr ou gh t he i r mock war in the Ri v er Clye r e gion ofi October 19 and 20 . Gener a l Clar k goes over the final trainin g plans and s i tu ation maps wit h G ener al Lem tz er . ni Preparations fo r establishment of a Fift h Army in Afr i ca are goin g for ward . The f eel i ng among ot f,er of f icers is that Gener a l Clark wil .i. head t his army but he s ay s nothing , ind i cates nothing . In a l l probability , after the theater is opened and t he operat i on is well under way , Genera l Eis enh ower wil l r eturn to London to devote al l his energies on the European Theater of Operations , perhaps making pre parations for t he openin g o:f a European front . Colo nel Sawbridge , head of Allied Forc e Hea dquarters personnel secti cn, is in stru ct ed to cabl e Washin gton t he perso1mel requi r ements for Fift h Army Headquart er s . They should be read y for sh ip ment to t re th ea ter by November 15 . Reque sts ar e bein g m de for the a entire army headqu arters , l es s heads of secti ons and principal a ssis t ants , to et her wit h ar my tro ops initially req u ire d . As addit i ona l cove r f or TORCH, it will be allow ed t o dis creetl y slip out that G eneral Eisenhower is returnin g t o the United States for conferences . G 2 has su ggested that the Vl r Department send a cable di r ect in g G•· eral Ei senho wer a n to f ~y back to W ashington . This will provi de good cov er fo r the oper ati on; particula rly :for the Com nder - in-C hi ef ' s departure to Gibral t ar . ma Two ot her matters come up to day to cause discomforture: t he sc heduled arrival of units of the 12th Air Force is not be i ng m and Gener al Clark asks et G ener al Doolittle for nf requent r eport s so we won ' t be und er any misa p,!Je hensi ons r concernin g t he strength of our a ir suppo rt. (General Anderson, who ris es t Very so of ten to bec ome a tic kli s h problem , has protested because he was not c onsulte d before a cut was ma.de in the number of offic ~rs and enlisted men of his com,,1a d n who are to be transported by a ir to Gibr a ltar . An, ~~ ~stment i s b eing made . * :~t CREJ •?·'·.s ~,\ ➔, i~:~:,,, ·, . . .. :;,j~ · ~ ~c; ,\l..;Ll~t~~i!."'!ili-~:lii"· 'rlif.\"~~ �( LONDON, OCTOER 10 , 1942-- Gen;~als Cl ar k and Ei senho wer are goin g to put up B a fi ght f or retenti on of the Nort h African Shi ppi ng Board . General Cl ark hol ds a c onfe ren ce wit u General Ga~e , Colonels Philippe , Hamblen a nd St okes an d t he c onsensus is t mt the m .titar y cannot satisfactoril i y cont rol the nece s s ar y Med iterr anea n shipping wi th out assista ice fr om c ivilia n expe rts. General Gale f eels if the pro pos ed board of nin e is not set up it will b e necessar y for t he Britis h si de to establish , i ndepen den tl y , a bod y similar to th at pro pose d by t he AngloAmerican planners i n London . General Cl ar k informs General Eis enh ower t hat he 11b elieves 11we must explain this m ter to Washingt on more ful ly and adhere to our ori ginal reco mm at enda ti on , except for th e possi ble eliminati on of the civili an cha ir man. 11 He orders that a cable a lon g th ese lines be prepared for dispatc h to Washin gt on . l Two hea rte nin g re ports ar e m ade to General Clark to day . General Gale says t he lo gistics problem is straig hte nin g its e lf out nic el y and that he has no new adminis t r ative problems . 11Everyt hi ng , 11 G le tells the Deputy Comm a ander -i n-Chie f, ~ progr essin g wel l. 11 Genera l Ryder , preparing to l eave to join his Easte rn 1s Task Force tro ops and rea dy t hem for sailin g, re port s t~ General Cl ark that he is 11opti m sti c about the su ccess of my operat ion . I expe ct resistance i at the b eac he s and it is not un.tikely that Ger m ans may be met but the ta sk ap ~ears to be in hand . 11 General Ryder is well pleased vrith t he 59th Regi mental Combat Team and predicts it will " give a good account of itself . 11 This outfit is being made rea dy for assault loa din g at Belf as t . Ryder a lso r epor ts t hat U. S. of fi cers who have been des i gnated to give an Ameican a pr,earance and com•r: r and to the British 11th Brigade G p th at will participate rou in the Algi ers assault have join ed the ir comm . Off ic ers f or t he other participatin and g Britis h bri gade , the 56th , are bein g selected . Genera l Cla rk a ppr oves toda y the a pr lication of El l iot t Roos eve lt , son of ( the president , t o take an active part in TORC G, nera l Doolit t le te l ls t he H. gener al that Roosevelt, a l i eutenant c olonel con1,,andin g the 3rd Prioto gra 1- ic Reh c onnaissance Group , has re que ste d such permission and General Spaatz i s agreeabl e . The squa drons of Roose velt ' s unit wi l ~ ope rat e initial .Ly on se mi-i ndep end ent mi ssions . Late r , t he grou p probabl y can operate dir ectl y under t he gr oup c o:n.·.1 r. ande Another off ic er is pulling out in preparation for TORCH and as the days go by the popilation of Norfol k House wil l drop material Jy . This offic er is Colon el Bentley of Transport Aircraft . He i s goin g to Gi braltar toni ght to instruct navi gators of the squadrons t ta t wil l t ransport Americ an and Bri tis h par atro ops . The trans ports tha t will be used to carry Briti sh troo pers are bein g de ii gnated so spe ci al racks for Britis D equipment can be in s talled. Regardin g fli ght of aircraft to the African theat er, General Doolit t le r eport s to General Clark t hat he f eels i t is all r i ght for transport s to f l y over Span i sh territory but tha t it is ina dvis able for fi ght ers to do so , par t i cularly in dayl i ght . The fi ght ers woul d fl y a lon ger route and be staged at Gibr a ltar to avoid possible int er cept i on ov er Spain that might give the .Axis a chance to i ntervene . Dool it t le is to ta ke the pr oblem up wi th Sand ers since it ap pear s ·that the Briti sh air coa~anders are being biven complete latitude as to th e r outes th ey wil l f .ty t o the th eater . ( The 12th Air Force , bein & is havin g or ~an- �izati onal dif f iculties . The fi ghters a nd heavy bombers ar e in cenerally good sha ~e for active opera ti ons but the li ~ and medium bombers are not u p to stren rt .h.t General Clark ord er s that he be gi ven a b i- weekly re p rt and status chart to keep hi m up-to-date on important chan ge s in preparations of t he new air forc e . Al ternate pla ns for Gener a l Ryder ' s Algiers assau l t force are being prepa red . The possibility of lan din g on b eac he s insi de Algi er s harbo r, within r ange of thre e-in ch coa st defense "'1l.ns is bein g cons i dered . Ryder c oncurs in t he plans , but sa y s naval bomardment of the gun pos i ti ons may cause grea t damage t o A~gi ers . General Clark says that i n hi s opi ni on a naval bomb rdment would be undertaken a on.Ly if t he fire of the co astal bat t er i es is effective and he doubt s if it will be effective be f ore dawn. During darkness , Ryder ' s assault forces may be able to silence the Luns f r om the lan d si de . Plans fo r landin , Br it i sh tro ops in Spanis h M orocco in case it is neces r ary ~e discussed . Admira l Ram y is in a[reement but bel ieves certa in minor adjustsa ments must be made . The fin a l i l an must have the approval of the Adm iralt y and the Wa Office . Regardinf naval matters , Admiral Ram y reports he is st udying r sa Admiral Kin[ ' s directive to the Com ~ander - in-C hi ef of th e Atl anti c Fl ee t c once r nin i the task of the We stern Naval Task Force . No wor d has yet been re c eiv ed as to t he pla n for refuelinl the Casablanca nav a l force , under Adm al Hewitt , ir at Gibraltar in case t ha t is necessary . Admiral Bi eri , who ha s just arrived fro m t he U. S ., repo r ts it might be poss i bl e to refu el thi s fle et by incre ments . Set tlement of this pro bl em, sa y s Genera l Clark , "is one of the most i mportan t whi ch has yet t o be made fir m in our plannin g . " Anoth ~r matter t ra t has yet to be decided is explanatio n , to the Frenc h , of the arriv al of Britis h. troops in strength after t he Alg i er s att ac k is complet ed . M . M k is in st ru cted by G ra l Clark to pr epar e this . Arran gement s r ac ene are c om plete for the droppin g of l eaf let s at Algi ers , O n and Casablanca . If ra additiona l l eaflets are t o be dro~ " ed explainin g the arr iv al of Britis a troops, a dditi onal aircraft wi l l hav e to be set up . Bri gadi er Wh itel~ , who has been De:r uty Chief of Staff of t he Alli ed .t< ce 'or hea dquarter s , is bein g relieved of dut y because of illn ess . This fine offi cer is going to make qui te a hol e in t he staff . General Gale i s t ry i n~ to fi nd a replace m ent as soon as pos sibl e . In the ev enin g, C ~nera l Clark entertains 18 gues t s , ol d fri ends a nd mem bers of his 1917 West Poin t class , at hi s flat in Hays M . Hi gh officers ews are someti mes criti cize d for entertaining in ti mes like these but if the cri ti cs c ould see how an inf or mal party r elaxes a man under freat pres sure hour after h our and day after day they would criticiz e no lon ger . For a f ew hours, G eneral Cl ar k is able to f or g- t t he tre m e endous res _onsibilities of his job, and , for getti ng , f res re n himself for tomorrow when he mus t plunfe once more into r ound aft er r ound of i m portant c onf erences and t he pressure of makin g one crucial dec i sion aft er another . * * �LONDN OCT O , OBER11, 1942- - A brief sum ary of t he message President Roose vel t wil l de.l iver to the Frenc h of Nort h Africa at a well - timed point on D-day is r ec ei ved today fro m Vashingt on . The pr esent pl an cal ~s f or the President to deliver it himself , in French . The t ran scripti ons wi ll be broa dcast in Fren ch fro:n the special, powerf ul sho rt wave st ati on now being set up in England . T,1e sum11ay: r "Our nat i ons ar e friends in the best sense of the word and because the continuation of that fri endship is des ir ab~e I want very simply to t e.1.1 you of c om pelling r easons forci ng me to take ac ti 0n . We have ac curate informati on of Axis i nt entions ta occupy your area at a n early date . Ou action i s essentia.l r in the int eres t of defense of both Nort tt and South Americ a . The sole pur pose is to prevent occupation by the Axis and wit h t he hope t hat t he ar ea s conc erned wi~ l not be devas tated by war . Full assurance i s given t hat moves ar e i n no sha e , manner or form di r ect ed against the government or people of your country or its possess ions i n t he area of spe ci al operations . It is believed that your c ountry wises to avo1d Nazi invasion . It has nothing to f ear fr om the United Nations . " Ceneral Clark , in a lon g c onference with General Gruenther and Colonel Holmes , r evie ws to day the entir e subject of 1 sroc l amations, leaflets and bro adcas ts . All agree that the President I s broadcast s nou.ld be in Fr encl:.. and i n his o'l7Ilv oi ce . The fir st transcri ption should be run at H- hour and c ontinue throueh out t he day and lon ger if necessary. General Patton has requested that the broadca st be timed ,·it n Lis attack but it does not apfear f easible since at ta cks at Oran and A.1giers probably vill st art hours before t he Casablanca assault ancl news of the Mediterranean landings will cert ainly be trans r!litted to Casablanca . Under t '. :lse circ umstan ces , General Cl, r k believes no loss of surprise l wil .1.result be cause of the broadca sts . The President i al proclamation also will be dro p ed i n leaflet f orm and posted in the occupied areas as soon as practicable . Thi s lea f let --in addition to anot ner announcing American intentions and bearing pi c tures of t he U. S . flag and Pr esident Roosevelt- - will be dropped throu ghout the ar eas of assault . Another leaflet , whi cn will expalin arrival of British troops in the theater , is now being prepared . It wil.l be dropped when the Br i tis b troo s start landing . M . Murphy, H r olmes rep cr ts , is cert ainly back in Africa by tnis ti me. He is probably at Algiers . }i'iurply has a dire ctive making him the r,ersonal r e.f-Jresentat ive of President Roose vel t until General Eisenhov1er I s arrival in t~1e t heate r . 1,luphy r is authorized to make hi s cont act s with key peopl e in Nor th Afric a at once . It is possible to co.rumm icate wit h him through a special state department c ode . The quest ion of having Mr. Mack, .head of the politi cal se ct ion , go into the tneater is discussed and Holmes believes it would be a serious mistake s ince Frenc , r eac ti on to a Britis ,1 political chief would be bad . Holmes declares that ';1 rp hy , Colonel M u atthews and himse lf can handle the political situation on the ground to better advantage and that Mr. t!ack should r emain in London to take care of the many pol i tical quest ·.ons that wi ll ~ .ave to be settled at t his end . Because of the deli cac y of t his matte r , General Clark suggests t iiat it h e t aken up with the Prime Ministe r at t ne next confer en ce .he holds wit h Generals ClarK and Eisen hower . j �i~~ ''l',,<',: ·:r:"'1,ffl~) ' ( • ·'. !,I... .. '.'. :i~':-t st~R'EI ·.~,-~ ~z.;~ r. ;, t~f-~:•,~ , Another difficulty wit n Gener al Anderson is ar i sing . Anders on propos es to c ommissi on a Mr. Rabino as a Brigadier i n the Britis h .Army and t ake him along as his financial advisor . Colonel Holmes thinks "t here is more to this than meets t he eye . " He sug gests that if Rabino , a fore ign exc riange expert , goe s into the theater that he be assi gned to the theater staff , not Anderson . The problem of movin g Anderson ' s nine of ficers and three en~i sted men to Gi br al t ar by air is being unsnarled . The British General i s now asking that the y be t ranspo rt ed on , as soon as pos sib l e to Alg i ers f r om Gibralta r . General Clark says it is pos sible that Anderson wi l~ be allowed use of one of the two Bl7s whic h are being stationed at Gibraltar for use of the head qua rt ers staff . / Lieut . Col. Raft , com-ander of the 503rd Parachute Batta lio n uhic h will make t he Oran jump, rep rts on progress bein made to pr epa r e t he para. e lu te fo r ce f or partici pati on i n the operation. Ra.ft says there has been l ost motio n in t he training pro gra m an d he is not satisfied wit h t he ability of th e navigato r s assi gned to the tro op tr anspo rts . Howe , Raft is still ver exceedingly jubilant about his t a sk and i s confident the mis s ion can be ca rri ed out su ccessfully . He r eports t hat British paratroops are having dif f ic ulty j umpi ng wi th British pa ra chut ~s fro m U. S . t ra nspo rts . He thinks i t wi ll be necessary , in operati <ns , for the Britis h j umpers to be equipped wi th American chutes . Gener , l Cl ar k rece i ves to day a copy of the order s rel i ev i ng hi m of comiiiand of the II Corps so he can devot e hi s full time to t he tre riendous job of Deputy Com ander - i n-Chie f . ( Literall y hundreds of i ncomin g and out going messa ges are fl owi ng over G eneral Cl.ark ' s de sk ever y day now. W h t he bi g problems settle d , most of the it cable s concern mo e minor t hings . Some of the m are a stoundin g i n· tha t t hey show r to ju st what infinit es i mal ends preparations must be made. What ab ~ut fl ea powder for t he assault and fol ~ow- up forc es ? Ei ghty seven r ai lro ao locomotives and hundr eds gf fl at car s , tankers , box car s have be en set up for use . in the Africa n t heate r i n 1942 . One hundr ed mo e locomotives wi l ~ be sh i pped over in r 1942 . Wha about pigeons to carry mess age s i n ca se of ra dio dif fic ul ties ? Beac h t gui des at every point where Ameri can troop s wi l l assau~t must b e arran ged f or . Think of the care wit h whi ch these guides must be selected ! They wi l .L s how the attackers the best r outes to a ir fields , oil dumps, co .11J. 1Unicati ons c enters , grou nd and ai r gun empla ce ments . One wrongly - pic ked guide could ap~et the sec urity of the entire landing . Code names and phr ases have been wor ked out for eve ry i mpo nt man, both Ameican and Fre nc h, in t he operation . rta r LONDON, OCTOBER , 1942- -Several knotty pro bl ems come up for disc ussion 12 tod ay at t he Commander-in-Chief ' s regular staff conference: wha t to do about Spanis i1 M orocco if Spa in or the Axis atte m pts t o c l ose t he Straits of Gibra l tar; how to refuel the West ern Naval Task Force at G br altar , if necessary; i what should be done if, for in stan ce , t he Al giers forc e is able to at ta ck on D y -da an d the Oran ~orce isn ' t; how to time President Roose ve ~t ' s bro adcast if weather delays the attack; the de ~ic ate tre at ment that must be devoted to civi l ri ghts and what must be done abo ut se iz ure of French arms, and , reports that G erman planes and men are being c oncent r ated , a ppru:: ~n-~ly for, ,.~s-e .in Nort h Africa . ·"'•t,.·REi _,.i' .. �'. r sr-·Rfi i. c · • '"' , •. ~__ ~'!,_?_;, -s:: . _.•_ ... ~.... ·,.,'·' . ( ·t;.; ''- - There is a new face ·~~ \·,'; ~o~ere:ce ~~~· table tod ay . Ge neral Fredenal.L , wno has a s sumed comman of the II Corps and t ae Oran Task Force, sits in for the fir st d time . Miss in g from the conference is General Ryder who has gone to Scotland to join his Al gie rs Task Force . r,ener al Eisen hower opens the conf eren ce wit h the Spain-Spanis h Mo rocco pro blem . ttif t his thin e goes sour , " he says, "a de c ision must come fro m the hi -_:: hest le ve l (Pr esident Roosevelt and Pri me M nister Churchill) i on what we can do . There would be no possibility of us doing something before D plus 25 . Two Britis .1 div isio ns might help us out . I have written General Ismay tellin g birn what we hope to do . I ' m asking t he British to earmark the Royal Ma nes , one old infantry re gri iment and an armored brigade f or use in Spanish M orocco if necessary. The ear li est date t nis force could start movinf fro m t ne United Kingdom to the M editerranean is D plus 16 . " l The Com-nander-in-Chief t hen brings out that General Patton has sent over a "dange ro us document" in whic h he advocates violent action a [ ainst Spanis h Moroeco i n case he is prevented from landin g on the Casablanca coa st . If such a document s houl d fal l into the hands of Spain or the Axis , Eisen hower says, it would be fatal to the operation s in c e the Axis would use it as a fulcrum to pry Spain into t he war or else as a pretext for moving into Spain for an attack on Gibr al tar and North Africa . Such a document, he c ontinues , is at odds with what Presi dent Roose v elt is tel....in g the French people in his broadcast and it is also dir ectly oi,posed t o the North African proclamation ; si gned by tene r al Eisenhower , that is goin g to be dropped on the beaches and pos te d after the lan ding . "We must t uard to t !:e · utmost against suc h documents , 11 says General. Eisenho wer . "No one must go ashore wit h any documents makin g ref erenc e to possible attacks on Spanis n M orocco or Spain or papers t hat are at variance wit h Pr~sident Roosevelt ' s m ssage or the e proclamation . n mo e r looks fl e et 50 at The sec ond problem --ref uel in g of t he Western NavaL Task Force - - results in a optimistic discussion . Admiral Ramsay reports that de s pi t e difficulties it as t hough Admiral Cuniiingham has favorable hopes of refueling the Ameri can at Gibraltar . Corrunodore Dick says he believes t he ships can be ref ueled a time; hence , by in crements , the fleet c ould get its vit al oil. The ques tion of what to do if weather conditions pr event one of the M editerranean Task Forces from landing while the other is fre e to go in , is disposed of in clear terms . "W e'll have to get ashore where we can," says · Cener al Eisen hower . "There can be no waitint for simultaneous attack . By daylight they are going to know that we are l yin t offshore so we 1 11 have to str i ke wherever we can. There ' s always a possibility , you know, that the situation we f orsee will be r ev ersed : that the Casablanca force will be able to l and and neither the Oran or Algiers forces will have the right conditions . " The proble m of timing President Roosevelt's broadcast to the North African French is brought up next . f eneral Clark assured Adm al Ramsay, the inquirer, ir th at the signal system is set up for the most r apid transmission of messages fro m the theater to London . Transcription tables will be turning and the message ready for broadcast when the signal is given . Once the troops start going over t ne sid es to get in their assault boats , word can be flashe d north for the broadcast to start . One of the chief worries is how the agents ashore--principally M r. Murphy-will be able to get in touch with both the Task Force Com ianders and TORCH :r SECRET -<{ ·-~ \'~il!ll~~ �·sEGRE Theadqua rt ers . C-ene al Clu.rk has gone over this problem time and time again with r General 1Aate jka and the last st ages of coordinating signals have been entered . The question of seizure of French weapons is br ought up by General Anderson . He believes it is imperative that as many Fr ench weapons as possible be seized dur i ng the assault phase , no matter what t he French promise to do . General Eisen hower believes the French should be told to "stack your arms ,fl but he instructs Genera l Clark to draw up specif i c conceptions of what should be done regarding French weafons . This discu ssion leads to the delicate problems of re quisitioning property in the theater and deal in g with French civil officials . After l ong disc ussion of the points involved , a more specific di r ective is asked . The Axis activity cable that has caused anxiety came from Was'.ungton . It said : "Reports indicate many ~ermc.n planes , motor vehicles and stores of gas and oil are being moved to Oran , Casablanca and Algiers from Italy and Sicily , Special German air formations are being tra i ned in Italy ready to move on short notice .fl Brigadier Mo ckler-Ferryman decla r es British Intelligence has no reports to sub stantiate this message . He says that agents in the TORCH theater ar e getting jitter y and that they undoubtedly will magnify things until D-day . flYou can expe ct more such scares ," he adds . P..nother r eport , totally unconfirmed , is that the Germans are massing 100, 000 troops on the border on Tunisia . A dee ision is made that troop transports can fl y over Spain at night but that no combat pla nes are to cross Spanish soil. M . Ma says Foreign ~.iiniste r F.c:len r ck has agreed to the transport crossings . r A final "verbal view fl er TORCH ordered for nett Fri day morning . General is Clark is to make preparations for a two-h our C- in - C meeting at which each Comma.nder , Task Force , Air , Naval , etc. , will give a narrativ e account , in front of maps, of what his mission , hi s troop dispositio n and other sali ent goals are . "This ," says General Eisenhower , "will give us a horizontal orientation of the entire roblem . Each of us will know what the other man is planning to do .fl General Clark is to allot the time for each marp.nd make all ar ran gements for the final conf erence . It wil l be the next to last maj or step before troops and Task Force c ominanders sail. The final exercise wil l be a field mq!leuver in Scotland in which all TORCH r oops , except parachute , wi ll par ticipate . Genera ls Clark t and Eisenhower will witness this exercise . On y four of the scores of important :a ers that have been pre ~ar ed by the l Plans and Traininp section of Allied Force Headquarters r emain unfinished and they are being r usl:ied to completion . General Clar k checks them over today ~ith ffi neral e Lemnitzer . They are : A r mistice Terms, detailed SOE instructions for dr . 'urphy , an operation memoa ndum on CO r !ll!11U!liques and a plan for landin , if necessary , part of the V,est ern Task Force in the Nemours area , near O . Four alternative ran plans have been set up for the Patt?n force. 1-- the entire force wil~ go into Gibralta r ; 2--forc e a landing at Nemours; 3--invade Southern Spain, and , 4--attack Spanish '..!oocco . These ar e in the order of preference . r Admiral Bieri of the U. S. Navy conf ers with General Clark conc erning naval command. He says that flall conc er ned fl novr understand that the Commander-in-Chief can command the Feste rn Naval Task Force eithe r directly or throu~h Admiral Cunningham, Naval officers in charge of shore installations wil l be under the Task Force Commanders; but , in naval matters , they may...deal di r ectly wit h Admiral Cunnin gham. s~CR E I �mj:~:; • I ( • • , •• ,:.~_ ET -S~R ~~ E ' 'l .~ .::..W. OT! Special naval operations in the harbors of Oran and Algiers are also brought up . Bieri is critical of the whole pro j ect but General Clark placat es him when he explains this is a 11Trojan Horse " operation , rather than an assault . The destroyers will go into the two harbors in the hours of darkness , run along~ide the principa l docks and place soldier - guards and naval technicans aboard the tied - up vessels to prevent sabotage which, if successful , could make the harbor useless at . a cr itical time . If the destroyers are fired on by coastal batte r ies , they are to retire . ·Another naval problem that has arisen is apparent friction between Admi als r Ramsay and Bennett concerning division of r esponsibility at Oran and concerning the manner in which Ram say has issued insturctions to Bennett . General Clark , strivin g to keep harmony in the household at a tim e when pressure is on and tempers are likely to be short , arranges to straighten the matt er out . ( Following the C-in - C conf erence , f eneral Anderson confers with General Clark . The Br itish com.mande is informed that Allied Headquarte r s will furnish r him air transportation from Gibraltar to Algiers . General Clark also explains that 59 planes , capable of carrying 800 j um pers , will be available to move British paratroops into the theate r. He impresses on Anderson that all air transports in the theat er are under headquarters control and will not be sub - alloted to Task Force Com anders in advance . These vital aircraft m will be on call , ready to f urnish transpo r t for paratroops or airborne troops according to needs . The Deputy Commander also informs Gener al Browning that 59 C-47s of the 64th Air Carrier Group are being eqipped so they can move his Br itish paratroops to the theate r when the time comes . General Cl ark next takes up the prob l em of w it i ng leaflets r that will explain the pr esence of British t r oops in an operation that started as All - American . Mr. M ack believes it will be wise to impress on the North African Fr ench that there is close U. S.- Briti sh col laboration in the TORCH venture . A r eport on the availability of the tank-carryi~ M aracaibos is made by General Oliver . These craft nrust be r eady fo r loading by sundown October 17 in or der to be ready to sail October 21. One M aracaibo , the Bachaquero , now under repair on the Clyde , may not be ready in time unless it is given a priority. Gener al Clark arran ge s this through Lord Louis Mountbatten . A check has also be en made on the M and M -4 -4A tank situati on in th e U nited Kingdom. Seventy four are here and 26 more are scheduled to arrive . These ar e to be turned over to tl-eneral Oliv er ' s 1st Armored Division . The M -3s now at Tid worth should go to the GH battalions , Gener al Clark believes/ Q O ther matt ers disposed of today by General Clark includ e s election of a Jud ge Advocate Gener~l for the Allied Forc es ; (He is Colon el Richmond . ) plans to head the thr ee propaganda ag encies , OSS, O and PWE under Colon el Holmes WI , w will integrate ho preparation of broadca sts and psychological warfare; and plans for the airplane t r ansportation of headquarters personnel to Gibraltar ju st before D-day . An air-courier service between Gibraltar and the Task Forces and between Gibraltar and London is al s o being arranged. * �.. - 31 LONDON, OCTOBER 1942--'i'he highlight 13, of General Clark I s very - busy day is dinner and a conference with Prime Ivtinister Churchill at Number 10 Dovming Street. Very little is said di r ect l y about TORCH but a contributory action--the big attack that General Alexander is starting in the Middle East on October 24 as a partial cover for TORCH is gone into thoroughly . General Jan Smuts , the 72-year-old South African l eader , has just flo'\7!1 in fr om Cairo to report to the Prime !,!nister i on LIGHTFOOTthe offensive operation , General Alexande r is planning , and find out the latest information on TCRCH The . Bri tish will make an all-out attack on the Germans on October 24 . The Germans have dug into the sand and rock in more or less permanent position . The plan cal ls for a frontal assault patterened after the Fi r st World W strategy , first , ar a creeping artill ery barrage ; sec ond , an infantry assault , that should lead to, three, creation of a hole wid e enourh for armored units to get through and fan out . Ceneral Smuts says the attack is all set ; that the British have air and tank superiority over the German Afrika Korps . Smuts reports that the new leader ship , Alexander , is fine and that it has had an electrifying effect on British t r oops in the M iddle East . Every ef fo r t is going to be made in LIGHTFOOT stress the participation to of American troops . The Prime Minister discusses this with Cenerals Clark and Eisenhower . In reality , the case will be misrepresented because American participation will be very minor , mostly bombers . However, all concerned agree that it is essenti al that Nort h Africa f eel that Americans are par ticipatin1 in all operations . It will be a good buildup f or the American TORC landings and also H good cover for TORCH . The Prime Minister reads several highly sec r et documents captured from the Afrika Korps recently . M arshall Rommel is suffering from ulcers and has returned to Germany . The Germans are frantic for more ammunition and food . From the documents it ap pears that the German supply situation is in bad shape . General Clark asks the Prime 11linister if it isn I t possible that these documents were 11 planted 11 but Mr. Churchill says he ' s certain the 1apers are authentic . Other officers at the conference include Sir Alan Brooke , com.na der of the Imperial n General Staff ; Admiral Curu~ingham, the naval comi!'!ande of TORCH anc Brigadier r , reneral Smith , chief of staff of TORCH . The question of who will take over command in case anythihg hap_i.)ensto General Eisonhovzer or if he returns to England comes up . General Brooke says this has never been questioned : "The com ·1and goes to General Clark ." It appears that General Anderson has raised the question on the basis of seniority and has taken the matter up with r11r Churchill. . Discussion of the com. and was designed to clarify the Prime Ministe r on the matter . The question is cleared once and for all . The Deputy Commandr will take over command Anderson ' s jurisdiction e ; is only in the Algiers region and he is under orders of TORCH headquarters . General Clark ·,ould si gn his orders in the name of the Commander-in-Chief . It also appears that General Anderson int ends to send back batt l e reports direct to M . Churchill . r It is pointed out that th i s may give rise to the issuance of separate communiques . Allied Force headquarters is hoping to send the Pri me Minister complete r epor ts for his information but not for use in communiques . Before goin g to the Prime L1inister I s Of.fici .a.l vrith Generals Eisen - �( hower and Smith , General Clark's day is fi lled with conf erences . The most vital one concerns a Britis h- U. S. naval matter . It hin ges around the wording of the di r ective governi!Jil '_ommandrelations c of the TORCH naval co!Thlla.nder with the U. S. Navy. Admiral Bie ri says the provision conc erning command of subsequent North African convoys was inserted deliberately to insure that U. S. Navy vessels would not be divereted from the convoy duties by orders originating with British Admiral Cunningham . Bieri points out that U. S. naval vessels escorting the D-day convoy will be required for the same duty with subsequent convoys . It is important th at these vessels get back to the U nited States as soon as possible so they can start across with another convoy . After Admiral Bie ri leav es , General Clark calls in Commodore Dick who r epor ts that Admiral Cunnin~ham feels that the paragraph referring to his cont r ol over comm and of subsequent convoys should be removed from the directive . Dick r epor ts Admiral Cunningham has no intention of diverting U. S. naval esco rts. As a r esult of these t wo confer ences , General Clark cables Washington r ecommending deletion of the controversial paragraph . The two U. S . Navy PBY squadrons for anti - submarine air patro l are set . They will be based at Casablanca and be under command of the senio r naval of f i cer in the port . But , operationally , the y will be controlled by the Commander in-Chief in Gibraltar . Al l naval di r ect ives are now pr epared and are ready for issue as so cn as Admiral Cunningham clears them . The directive for ~he Coihmander of the W estern Naval Task For ce must go for w ard without unnecessary delay since that f orc e is scheduled to sail fro m the United States October 24 . The proposed armistice terms have been appr oved and they left today for W ashington by special courier . Two new offic ers , both British , re port in today . One is Brigadier C.S. Sugden who is r eplacing Brigadier Whiteley as a De ty Chief of Staff of A~lied Headquarters . Sugden has r ecently been with troops and prior to that he put in 18 months with the Operations-Planning Group at the Bri tish War Office. The second man is Brigadier W dman- Lus!lington , chie f of staff to Lord Louis Mountil batt en. He is going to Gibr altar with TORCH headqua rt ers and will spend the coming week getting oriented in the G-3 section . A disconcerting memorandumwas turned in late tonight by Colonel Hamblen. Three British ships with a capacity of 13,0 00 t r oops have been sunk . All of them were set to be in cluded in K F3 convoy . One was the Duchess of Bedford , one of M the vessels in the trans - Atlanti c convoy that brought headquarters of the II Corps over la st July . Hamb en r eports tnat there are no reserve ships to move l into the convoy . This loss wil l have to be met someway, possibly by overloading of other ships in the convoy or else use of a larg er vessel , such as the Empress of Scotland . * * * LONDONOCTOB"":R 1942--Boxes and barracks , crates and che sts star t moving , 14, out of Norfolk House in an almost steady stream tod ay . Two and a half ton truc ks back their broad butts up to the curb and enlisted men stow away equipment that is starting the long j ourney to the North African theater . The exodus of office rs and men to the ports of loadin [ has started . Officers come into Ceneral Clark 1 s office to say goodbye and , usual1.y , the fare well salutation is "See you i n Oran" or ni.foet you in Algiersn ••• "Goo dbye and good luck . n The i m:ninency of the huge operation is star~iy appar~~~,l~day at the Commander-in-Chief ' s regular conference. The room is cr ~d~ :~ rge st group to k atthe ~.~C~ ~·~~ l_ �~·! 33 .. . ~ --· . ( date sits in on the discussion . The fin al key man on the TORC sta ff has arrived . H He is Admiral Bunningham of the Briti sh Navy who will head TORCH naval opent:bns. He has ju st arrive d fro m Washington where he was a key man on the Combined Chiefs of Staff board . Admi al Cunningham will be at G altar headquar ter s to advise r ibr Comna.nder- in-Chief Eisenho wer and Deputy CO ,ll""-anderClark dur i ng the critical approach and landing phases of TORCH . All arrangements have been made for two major TORCH matters : th e complete "verbal view 11 conference Friday in which each commander will review what plans he is to execute ,- and , the Monday and Tuesday maneuvers of all TORCH troops in Scotland . Field Marshal Smuts , Prime Minister of South Africa , will attend the Friday conference . General Eisenhower impre sse s on all commanders that either they or a c1ualified representative must be at the meeting to present a comprehensive review of the part men un~er their command will play in TORCH.General Clark has the conference details all worked<out . ·After a brief discussion of the Armistice Terms paper that has already been completed and of wor ding of various No rth African pro cla mations , General Eisenho wer asks 11if any of the rest of you have anyth ing to throw into the pot . 11 He nods to Admiral Cunningham but the Naval Com ander r eports that "things are running smoothly . 11 "Anything bothering you? 11 General Eisenhower asks the question all a.ro1.U1d the table . All he gets are ahakes of the head and 11No, sir. 11 The C~in-C turns to G'eneral Gale , head of supply . 11Sur A , 11 says Eisenhower , 11you have something that ' s ly bothering you . 11 Gale shakes his head . 11The ships are being lo aded. W ' r e having e our little troubles up there on the groun d but none of them is big enough to bring up here . " Air M arshal Welsh then reports th at air problems are being solved an d adds that disposition of the t wo U. S. Navy PBY squ adrons at Casablanca for an ti-sub m arine patrol is satisfactory . Admiral Ramsay r ep orts that Admiral Cunningham and he are leaving on a final inspection tour of TORCH naval units . The maneuvers in Scotland are then discussed . The problem wil~ start at 2 : 00 AMMonday and continu e until sometime l ate Tuesday . A special train is taking high-ranking TORCH planners nor th . It will 'leave Sunday morning and r eturn Tuesday . Generals Eisenhower and Clark must r eturn as they have another conference Tuesday night with the Prime M inister . General Lemnitze r has the enti r e maneuver proble m in final for m. Because none of the conferees has vital m atters in - Chief ' s conference lasts onl y s even minutes . to bring up , the Commander Attempting to so l ve the diff iculty caused by the loss yesterday of three British troop vessUs scheduled to sail in KHF 3, General Clark takes up the problem with General Gruenther . The loss of these three ships through enemy action has r educed the available personnel lift below requirements . This shortage , General Clar k says , can be met in part from Britis h sources . He orders preparatio n of a cable in which a r equest for one U. S. Vessel, with a capacity of 3, 500·men , is made. Another shipping problem has arisen: the British ar e a sking for 25 addi tional car o ships per month from the U. S. The M inistry of Wa Transp ort wants r W ashington to r e-examine the cap acity of the U. S. to carr y out what the MVITegards r as an ear lier agreement . Gener als Clark ~~~:'.\:1 1· ,1: \ , -1ie ? )fµtJ. CTu;.~bel Stokes discus I? the ~\:. RET,·< '.SEC ~r, 'l. ) \,, �( drafting of a cable to adJust the Britis li and U. S. difference of opinion . The W Department has again expresse d disapproval of the London group ' s ar plan for the North African Shipping Board . The final decision is left to Genera l Eisenhower so Gener als Clark , Gale and Admi a.ih Ramsay are goi ng to tr y and work r out the best shipping board solution . Prime M iniste r Churchill now believes that American Naval vessels should be with the British Fleet in the Medite r ranean , He sug gests three ships , preferably cruisers . I f this were done , there woul d be naval ships flying the American f la g in the Mediterranean Naval Task For ce and bear out once mo e the "Am ican angle" r er of TORCH The Brit i sh would substitute . three of their ships in the W estern Naval Task Force . General Clark takes up the matte r with Admirals Bieri and Bennett , both of the U.S . N avy . Admiral Bie r i says such a substitution coul d have been made ealier but such a change now would be serious since the use and dispositi on of U. S. naval vessels has been decided . General Clark sug gests the use of three U. S. destroye r s . The matter will. be presented to Admiral K ing in Wa shington . Monetary arrangeme nts fo r the No th African theater have been made• .American r dollars with a special yellow seal and Br itish pounds stamped with "British Military Authority 11 will be used . This will pr event Ger mans f ro m f loodin 6 the count r y with r egul ar Br itis h and American money and will give additional control to prevent black marketing . The Amer ican dollar will be traded in at 75 francs to the dollar and 300 francs to the pound . The political section of Allied Force headquarters is being eliminated , For the most part it has been inco r porated into the G- 3 section since much of its work involves operations . !:! . !.': r urphy is going to head civil affair,s v1ith Colonel l,l t thews as his deputy . M . iv a r 'ack wil l be used as an adv!bsor to both General Eisenhower and ~ . l:1rphy in matters pertaining 'ir u to political and civil affairs , M , afte r a conference with General Clark , is ack going to have the title of "British Civil Li ason Officer . " It appeals to hi m as "being sufficiently vague to cover any f unctions 11 wither General Cl ark or Gener al Eisenhower might want to assign him to . A proposed plan to have General Ander son ' s Eastern Force a ssault Spanish Mo occo appears impossible . Generals Gale and Lemnitzer report to General Clark r they ar e convinced such an oper ation , which was to have been used only in event host i le r eaction in that area , i s impossible logistically because it could not be suppo r ted through t he port of Ceuta i f the Axis air force is based on air fields in Southern Spain . General Clark directs that work on this al ternative plan continue but that the view advanced wmll be given full consideration before · any decision is r eached that will put the plan i nto ef fect . Gener al Gruenther recommends use of the Geneva Red C oss in the field and r General Clark agrees , Both generals favor meticulous adherence to the provisions of the Geneva Conference in the field and General Clark says this same principle shoul d apply to any instructions issued concerning treatment of war prisoners . A story conce r ning the Prime M i ste r seeps out today . During a r ecent in confere nce , the sub j ect of General Eisenhower ' s new doc came up . General Brooke asked what name the dog had been given and Gener al Clark , knowing that the · anima l was f ar fr om housebroken , said : "Ike calls him Paderewski. 11 General Brooke , naturally , asked why and General Clark repl;i.ed : 11He 1 s the pianist of the l ot . 11 Everyone laughed but the Prime .J~ ip.iste · . r d~r ewski. •pianist . Mr. Churchill shook his head . He never did get th~::.:: j f ECR ,.: E . �35 ,;:· ·SECRET ·. .\?:::. ( . - ·' ·::::·\h;. .~-:i:----';,,;;:;;;..:::){ . Today is General Eise~r ·t·s birttfd~ so in the evening his clos es t frien ds throw a birthday party for hi m at 11G 8neral Ike 1 s 11 retreat outsi de London . The piece de r esistanc e of a hilar io us evening is , ac cor ding to General Clark, an American pi~ce of roast be ef , flo vm over fro m the U. S. by one of General Ei s ennower 1 s acq ua i ntance s . M t of General Eisenhower ' s gifts are item s u seful for fiel d wear . os ,,- LO NDON OCTOER 15, 1942- - 0ne of the 11th hour worries of TORCH disposed , B is of to day when Admir.al Cunningha m informs Gener al Clark that t he W estern Nava l Task Force can be re - fueled at Gibr altar . This news allows Gener al Clark to call in Genera ls Grue nther and Lemnitzer an d proceed furt her with dis cussion of alternative plans since some of these hinged on the possibilit y of re-fuelin g this force . Methc<ls of mis - lea ding t ne Axis to aid TORCH are gone over with Brigadie r Mo ckler-Fe r ryman , Colonel Bevin and lliajor Phill.ips . This calls for news to 11l eak ' out 11 that General Eisenhower i s returning to the United States . This 11cov er 11 visit would come ju st at the time TORCH startin g . Bevin proposes that General Eisen is hower 11accept 11 an Armistice Day speaking en gagement in tne U. S . This c ould be announced or allowed to s eep out through di plomatic channels. General Clark goes over the plan and cle ars a cable 'asking Washington to coor dina te any suc h plan . ( The touchy sub ject of closin g t he po.Liti cal se ction and makin g Mr. Mack a liaison of f ic er is gone into again . General Clark is met iculous in tr eating subjects that involve r elati ons between Britis h and American personnel . M . M k as sures the r ac Deputy Commander in - Chief that the arrang_ement as outlined yesterday is perfectly satisfactory to the Britis h Forei gH Office . It has take n diplomatic handling on several occasions to hand.Le per sonnel matters . This type of work - -a djus ting points of difference between Britis h and Americ an officers , settling questions of s eniority and command--has been handled v,i th the greatest car e by G ener a l Clark . The questi on of American medical personne~ for Algiers is adjusted by G eneral Clark after Col one l Corby , senio r U. S . medical offic er of Allie d For ce Headquarters , points out th at no U. S . medic a l ef fi cers are set up to arrive i n Algiers until KM4 The general i nvestigates . and finds th at no medical offic ers , British or Americ an , wil .L go i nto Alg i ers until t he KM4convo y . General Clark , to re medy tlQs , rules that as the need for medical staff officers is foun d to exist at Algiers prior to the sclBduled arrival dat e , they wi l~ be sen t in by a ir . O course , the f assault forces are be i ng accompan ied by medical r,ersonnel ; but none of it is dir ectly fro m headquarters . An even larger group of office r s and men l eav e London today fo r Scotland , eit her to participate in directing the special pr e-T ORCH maneuvers , or e ls e to supervise loading ·;of ships , now un derway chiefly al ong th e River Ciyde . General Cla r k , preparing fo r a long stay in the war zone where g9od dental facilities may not be available , has his teet h checked over and has one filling . He is also being bothered by a sore - -probabl y ringwor m -und er his le ft arm. The only two times he leaves the office today , ex cept for luncheon , i s to make quick trips to the dentist and the medical dispensary . Because ti m is gro wing s hort and e he will not be in London much longe r, General Clark is having Britis h officer lunch with him at his f lat . Today it was General~tt .· ·affi:f U.ajor Carver , an assistant secretary at the Britis ~ 'Wa r * OfficeT. ' ' ~:-~ s· Cu~r E _, . / �t .. , t' SECREi .: LON , OCTOBER DON 16, 1942- 11We ar e now passin g f rom t he abstract to t he con cr ete phase . Our troop and cargo shi ~s are starting to load . Already some naval units are at sea and can be c onsidered as actively particip a tin g in TO . Our RCH plannin g, for the most part , i s done . I want to stress one tnin g : we must alwa ys be a ggressive . If any man, f rom squa d lea der on up , is ever in doubt about making a decision , he can ' t go fa r v.T ong if he alwa y s does the AG GRESSIV thing! " E In a c onc i se but complete talk , General Eisenhower c los . s today a thre e and a half hour TORCH resume conf erence during whi ch 12 force and/or section lea ders outline the part t hey have playe d or wi l l play in TO RCH Fifty - four office r s . crowd the map-f illed conference r oom. As man after man gets up to detail naval plans , assault plans , air plans , administrative plans , etc ., the officers , all key men in the opening of the Second Front , listen intently . There is no discus sion a s eac h man f inis i~s his outline ; only a quick change of m~p boards before t he next officer outlines the assignment of forces under his control. T1- most e impor tant TORCHconference to date is closed by Gener a l Ei s enhower ' s brief but hard hittin g resume . The conference ' s tone is pitched by Field M arshal Jan Christian Smuts , Pri me M inister of South Africa who is the only "outside " off i cer at the m eeting . The vene r able warrior , occasionally pul l in g his Van Dyke beard with his old and dr yskin hands , speaks qui etly and i m~ ressively : ( "I don ' t have to stress to you the rofoun d i m portance of this operation to t he Alli ed cause . On it hinges a turnin g point in t he war . If you are successfu l -and I know you will be successful--you will give heart and coura ge and hope to the Allied nations and to the occupied and oppressed peoples of the world." Talk ing so quiet l y at ti m that the men in the crowded r oom have to l earn forwar d to es catc h what he is sayin g, t ne Field M arshal decl ares that 11des 1 ite what t he Unit ed States ha s done and is doing in the Pacific , this is your great ef i ort and the entire world will be wat c r~ng . Its execution will bring apir eh ension and f ear to the Axis; hope and coura ge to those who are a l li ed, eit ber openl y or s ecr etly , because of pressure and control , with us . 11 Wh Smuts sits down, there i s not a en sound . General Eisen hower , sit t in g at tln.la center of t he confer ence table bet ween Field M arshal . Smuts and G ener a l Clark , cal .J.. on Admiral Ramsay to outline the s Naval Plan . Throu gh use of c liarts , Admiral Ramsay sho c·s the movement of wars hips and convo ·s to the African Theater. The British naval contribution to TO H is tr em RC endo us . He te l ls what naval vessels ar e already underway and lists the por t s at whic h others are preparing fo r the trip to the M editerr anean . W ith pin fla e s he s hows the po s itions of the convoys on various days before D-day , how they all · reac h the Sim.its of Gibraltar on D minus two so the TO RCH warshi ps and t r oo s hips and su ppl y vessels will enter the hazardous ar ea just as darkness falls . Visual ~y , the conferees can s ee the fast and slow convoys advanc e , enter the M te ..:ranean , edi f ient , re-group and then head for their beac h areas . 11For the na vy , " say s Ramsay, "the war has alrea dy starte d . At this mo ent we have fig htin g s hi ps cnr oute to m Gibraltar . " The Britis h Admiral details how submarines will lead the combat lo ad ed ve s sels to withi n five miles of the coast so the men can start loadin g in the assault boat s . Submarines will also for m a a t rol l in g 11wall 11 to war d t he Eastern end of th e M editerr an ean , goin g in a s far a s bet ween Ital y an d Sicil y . Ramsay, havin g tn e pin flag s m oved relentles s l y fo wiµ:d until. tfiey ar e con cent r at ed before fE . .~.~liV: CBU '· --+• I .;,;~_::!i· ,· =. 1 ~' ~, / �31 ( Algiers , Oran and Casablanca , exp1.ains eac h move. He also c over s final stages of the arrival of the Western Naval Ta sk , the All-Americl:l,n Naval force . Details of the assaults of the Eastern , Center and Western land f orces are next explained , r espectively , by Li eutenant General Anderson , Major Gen.r al Fred endall and Bri gadier General Lemnitzer . Anderson stresses the drive he must make to the east "to beat the Boche into Tunisia . 11 The capture of Algi ers is up to the Eastern Assault For ce f or ce that wi ll be led by Major General Ryder . From there on , Anderson will pick it up , driving toward Tunisia with the great est possible speed . Anderson ' s plan is to move most ra ~i dly along the coast so he can capture Bougie , Philippeville and Bone then m ove on Tunis . He asks that eve r y possible aid be given him-- principally motor and ai r transpo r tation . The assault plan for each of the forces is the same, landin gs wiL . be made on three beaches at ea ch point . The f orces wi ll then enci r cle the city , con c entrating first on capture ·of the ai r dromes and the ports . Gener al Fredendall expla i ns minutely the plan for the Oran assault . As he talks , Brigadier General Rooks , points out details on a huge map. The principal assault will be on Arzu beach . Two of the forces will drive for t he principal airport at which t he .Amer ican parat r oops will already have dropped . The paratroo ers have enough supplies t o hold out for 48 hours . 11V' 1 11 relieve them and have cont 1.·ol of the a irport by e t hat time , 11 Freden da ll predi cts . The plan is outlined down to the last detail , includint such items as where road blocks will be laced , how a vital ridge is to be controlled . ( General Lemnitzer , the TORCH , outlines the ,-este rn Task Force job since G-3 all officers of th at force are in t he United States preparing to sail direct to . Afri ca . Seizure of two airpo r ts is the main task here . One important feature of its attack is the use of a sea train . The main assault , in the Sale - Rabat - Port Lyautey area , wi ll be made by the 3rd Divi sion . Lemnitzer outlines what bridges must be secured , what st r ength is anti c ipated . ~ ·The two head air offi cers - -Air Marshal Welsh who will head the Eastern Air For ce operating at .Algiers , and Brigadier General Doolittle who will head the all - Ame ican Air For ce operating at both O an and in the Casablancaarea- - are the r r next to outline thei r pl anes . Both stress one thing : quick seizure of airpo r ts is essential so car r ie r- based aircraft can be relieved and harder - hit t ing ground based planes can enter the combat . At the start , Algiers , being closer to the Ital i an and Ger man Air For ces , wil l have the st r ongest force . Both forces , at the start , will be made up predominantely of fighter planes with a few dive bombers and regular bombers . The ai r strent,th buildup wi ll come after the major ports have been secured and smaller ports enlarged to accomdate bigger plan es . General Gale then g~es over the administrative plans . The shipping situation is ext r emely tight and loss of any ships before TORCH gets underway will mean a shift in plans , Gale says . He goes through the entire plan of supply buildup . By D plus 45 the plan catls for the forces to have 30 days of supplies ; by D plus 90 , 60 days of supplies. Eventually , it is pla nned that the British tro , ps will be supplied from the United Kingdom and t he U. S. troops from the Unite~ States . Since the latter supply line is longer , shortages for the .American troops will be made up from the United Kingdom. I �'38 _.ECRET ( High l y- involved a l te~~e pian~ pr edicated to meet several possible TORCH s ituations involving weather , politi cal moves, etc ., are outlined by General Lem nitzer . The greatest number of alte r na tives has been set up fo r the Wester n Task For ce which is likely to run i nto weather that wil l prevent a West Coast landing . The major factors cont r olling landi~ of this fo r ce will be weather and what at titude is taken by Spain . The Patton fo rc e may lie of f - shore and wait for bett er sur f conditions , it may move· on and land at Gibraltar , it may be ordered to attack Spanish Mo occo , or , even attack southe r n Spain . As to the Eastern Force , it too r may have to at.tack Spanish Morocco . P.nd, a s General Eisenhower later points out , i f everything goes "c omplete l y sour we may have to call . the whole thing of f . 11 Four m en-C olonel Holmes, Mr. Mack, Wir Matthews and General Lemnitzer - . outline the complicated political , civil and subversive activities that have already been made or that are going to be made. All of them stress the 11 politico military 11nature of TORCH;how political maneuvering can infuence the milit ary picture . 1,1ack predicts that the French Navy and coa s tal defenses will resist st r ongly ; that the French army r es i stance will be 11light , 11 and that the French a ir force pr obably will put up very little fight . Matt hews discourse on civil affairs concern tre technicalities of monetary standards , preparation of 11soft 11proclamations depending on the attitude and hard of the North Afri can French , use of an American 11r ont " f or civil c onta cts . f - During the entire presentation , there is not one word of discussion . As the maps are changed , the men si l ent l y mu l over what they have j ust heard . Occasionl a lly , Genera l s Eisenhower and Cla r k whi s per to eac h othe r . Many of the offi cers make notes . When the entire plan has been outl i ned , General Eisenhower walks to the f ront of the cloth - covered conference table , stands in front of the pin and flag studded map boa r ds and says : 11 planning is now nearly completed and we are arriving .at the superviso r y 0ur stage . In this presen t ation two thing s have been r epeatedly stressed : our first object i ves are -- airports and seapo r ts . These are most vital to t he success of the operation and commanders must be guided by this when seeking obj ectives . our You have seen how exceedingly f le..xible plans are . That flexibility must be kept in the minds of a l l commande s . They Iffilst be imbued with the spirit r of the of fensive i They must keep in communication with the next senio r command r , e f r om platoon up , but when independent action is demanded and when there is no time to await orders , bold offensive a ction must be the rule . 11 11 General Eisenhower then pr aises his staff , saying he had been astounded and greatly pleased by the way the Br itish and Americans had worked into TORCH cooper.,. atively and with a minumumof friction despite a difference in staff structure . He tells them he 1 s not only pl eased with them but th at he is proud of them and he beiieves the staff structure is perfect . As the meeting clos es , a feeling is l eft that a new phase of TORCH has sta r ted , that the 11th hour has come and that plans and preparations are complete . Later , General Clar k remarks that he , who,as Deputy Com nder-in-Chief, ma has had every paper cross his desk and who has sat in on.fvery conference , is 11astounded by the scope and immeasity of this thing . It 1 s siz¢' tirid its importance is stagger ing l 11 0 ~}~fC. RlT :1: ff\tG.tlM~i.w" rrr �39 During the afternoon two important conferences . He calls in Major Schofield , commander of the 60th Troop Carrier G oup that will carry r Ameri can parat r oops to Oran . Gener al Clark tells him that it has bee n dec~d that 36 t r ans~ort s wi l~ be used fo r the job and that the s e planes will revert to contro l of the 12th Air Force when the paratroops have jumped . Schof ield is confident his mission can be acconplished successful~y . He adds that he believes he can land his gr oup "without material l oss " sho r tly after the parat r oops have leaped through the transport doors . General Clark also calls in General Doolittle to impress on him that dispatching of planes f rom the United Kingdom to the African theate r after TORCH develops must go through and ap1-roved by Allied Force headquarters . Doolittle is an i ndividua l ist and a che ck-r ei n mus.t always be kept on him . Col onel Duncan , who com.'18.nds the group of B-1 7s that wil fly headquarte r s offi cers to Gib r altar , is br ought in to see General Clark . Duncan recom.,,ends a daylight flight starting at 1000 f rom southwest Cor nwall . The flight dovm of six· bombers would be in fo r mation , fo r added security , and would arrive shortly before dark of the same day , te ntativeJ_y set fo r D minus 6 . Four of the Flying Fortresses will r eturn the following day to Engl and while two , with outstanding combat crews , wi l l r emain at Gibr a l tar fo r headquarters use or else for combat missions i f r equi r ed . Duncan is apr,rehensive least the ar rival of the hea·,;;quarters staff at the R. A.F . fieJ.cl in Cor nwal l would result in too much publicity . General Clark assures him steps will be taken to c onceal identities . The i nsignia of Genera.ls Clark and Eisenhower and other t op- rank i ng offi cer s wi ll be concealed . ~iv * LO NDON OCTOBIB , 17, 1942-- General Clark is goin,; to ./1.fi ca immediately to r confer with high French leaders , probably General Gir aud and GeneraJ. ·1ast , and , possib.Ly Ad '1iral Darlan ! Tl1is sensational development c o !es ov ernight and it may clia.nge t.:.e entire aspect of TORCH If negotiat10ns . go right , our troops may enter No th Africa r itnout op,1-osition , or , wit •. opJ.,osition from only the French fleet and the coastal bat t er i es . Ev erything hinges on t11e Clark-French confere1ces . Chronologically , tuis is what hap,ens during the day : ~r.._y tr1is morning a cable is received f r om -:asilington . Mr. l',h.tr!-ny wio is , now bacK in Al.,:iers , has conferred wi t11 Frenc.i Army leaders, has told the,.t an Americ an .J..a.nding in Frenc~1 North Afri ca i s planned and , after explaining a..t.J_ we want is to get at the Axis and that we have no designs a__,ainst the French, asks the leader,:; if t, ey \ ould like to confer conceraing entra ,ce of A :::ricc...ntroo,r1s into L,.eir arfla. They say they would so h.trphy got in toucl-:i witn Vashington wnich, in turn , cabled Lonlon . ( Arrival of the cable results in a three and a half hour conference between 1 Genera.ls Eisenhower and Clark and other high-ranking officers of the TORCr staff . 11 T 1c cable fro-n Washington states that a "senior genera..L offic-c:r shou~d c ,,.,duct tne tickJ_ist negotiations . General Clark volunteers and General Eisenho er tells him that the tremendous and difficult job is in his ;~ands. V'ith w11.om Gene""a Clark ; wiJ. negotiate is not k.1ov'Il yet . Dar .J..a.n co-nma.nder in-c def of the Fre.1c armed , · forces , 1ay fly from Vic11.yto Algiers for the conference . General Giraud, hea· of -<'..Frenc gr'11.llldforces in Africa , is already there • ~ .13 thlrd man, . who probably will .1 1 .· E · CRE, �---. ~.-CRET ' i" • be present at the rendezvous v,hether the c .ief confere e is Darlan or Giraud , or botfJ. , is :ajor General ·:a.st , c i.ef of staff of the Frenc:, 19t;, Ar:ny Corps and tne key man in developing French c oL.aboration with the United States . He is also a key man in organizing Frenc1 military and political col.aboration in French Afri ca . General Clark is to hav q wide latitude in dealing with the French . Because Darlan has changed lais co l ors so many tit1es , there is mistrust anc1 General Cl ark is to deal with Giraud if he is in doubt . The entire dealing wil~ take extreme diplomacy . If Darlan and Giraud op~ose each other , Gener~l Cl .rk is to dea.l '7ith Gir aud . However , Darlan has c ont rol of the Frenc;1 navy and the potentcy of this force mus t be re ckoned wi t~ , hence , Darlan must be handled v1it'.1 extreme care . All these , and kindred matters , are gone into minutely during the ~ong conference that lasts throu ghou t the ~or ning . Similar urgent c onferences ar e being held in Washin gton , ,, it President Ro,.sevelt , Admira~ Lea.w an,.. Gen ~ral farsha::...1 r--ert ici:p "" tint:; , a"ld in London , between t he Pri:ne ~:ti ister n and his po.liti cal and mi.iitar y advisors . 1'hen General Clark busts back into his ~or folk ~ouse of fice he starts gener at i ng action . !for .hf ' s cable sti!Jlllated that the conferrin g U. S . · _eneral shoul,· be accoipanied by one man th orou ghly familiar wita details of the O.!:--'eration, one supply man, one navy man and one political expert who can speak Fre nc h fluently . Generdl Clark decides to take General Lemnitzer , head of the Al~iea Force ~-ns section; Colonel Hamblen , the sh i pping and sup 1 ly expert; Ca tain Wrig.1t of the U. S . Navy w .o ~1as been a navy liaison man since TORCB: was started , and Colone- Hol:ies , a former state department career office ~ v,,ho now heads the civi l - po.litical branc,1es of TO:l.C'T These four men confer with General Clark until . late afternoon, plo.nning their strategy , their hazardous entrance to Algeria and how thej" rill rendezvous with .fu.rphy , Mast , Giraud and possibly Darlan . The five officers ..-vilL fly to Gibraltar in t wo F J.yin~ Fortress!:s . T11en t~1ey , probably wil go to the Algerian coo.st in a Pritis 1 submarine . From this t'1ey will go as,or' at nieht in a small boat and rendezvous at some spot not-yet-desienated ,~it '1 'Iurph'' and the party he is bringing. This entire development has a bizar e touc ':1 that out - Oppenheim I s Oppenheim ! Hi'-'hly secret cables are pas ing bet-~ePn Lonclon and Washington by late af t ernoon when General Clark hurries to Number 10 Downing Street for a h stily -called meeting of 11tr Churchill ' s cabin et . At this . meetine , the Pri 1e Minister , Generals Eisen .•ower and Clark and the Bri tis~ cabinet and mi~itary and naval lea~ers go ov r the ent ire plan . Fvery man sees this confercmce as an opportunity to execute TORCHwit h a minimum loss . Newsi-la1,ers today re~ ~rt erori!\., unrest in France and the entirA confer ence and o:Aration may come at a VPry propitious time . The li v es of thousands upon thousands of soldiers , the continued use of scores of British and American warships and hunrreds upon hundreds of planes , the success of TO CH and the future conduct of the war , the start of the doYmfall of the ~azis anc' the Fascists - -all these thin gs and myr iads of inter - re "e.ted subjects could weL 1:.inge on this Algerian rendezvous t1:at Ge1,eral Clar is .,.oin 6 to nIB.ke. 0 0 As the Prime Mini., ter ' s conference breaks ui:, Mr. Churchil.1. tur .'ls to General Clark and sa~·s slowlJ : "Ynu can al~-ays kee1 in minr , C...e.rk, th ut e 1 1::... back you u in whatever you co." Sol -mly , the Britis: Prir. e llin i ster then shakes hand with the lanky, black-haired Al'TlPrican ['.Pne1·E.l vtl"o has suddenly been £)laced in one of the most crucial srots of the war . 1 Back at the off ice , General Clark sets u transportation �YI .'_:_:': .. ' '.. f \ ' . ':~:}\E,( r'.f'IJ, ,,;~ ....,. ·.~E·P. . ( ·t" ·• M•~ . ·ff:;T,'/....,. E '1! '.> to Algeria . If th e w at her i~-,.., ~~af/ •tfi'e'• i iies , ill take off s ometi l'le toni eht . J V. h the four men who are to accompany him , Gener a l Clark pores over inco min g and it outgoin g cables . Replies to W hington must be drafte d wit i infinite as care since one word in a cable di scussin i:: how negoti at ions are :to be handl ed may chanee t he entire t hought of the m ace . ','it h Ca ptain Tri e'1t, "' ess -eneral Clark goe s over t he submarin e set-up . It is a lmost dark when General Cla rk return s to 1: s Hays i,1ew flat. i s Bags must be pac ked . Eac h man in the part y is taking bot h military and civili an clot hes . Five carbines and 40 0 roun ds of 30 caliber ammunition is obtain ed so ea ch m , ill be an ar ,ned . Frenc ;:1Nort h African francs and gold pi eces are sec ured by the finance depart m . General Clark is akin g not on ~y enough money for the pers onal u se of th e ent five men, but also enou eh to buy of f lea cer s if neces sar y and to buy their way out in case they fal l into a trap. In the space of a fe w h ours the s e eventu al i t ies must be pre pared for . Hi gh strung and preoccupied by t 11e hazard ous mi ssion he is to under t ake, Gene.cal Cla rk is unable to relax at h i s fla t s o he drives to Gener & Ei se nh ower I s l country place to carry on furt l1 di s cus s ions . La t er in the eveni ~ , the Air C r~s er re pcrts th at a takeoff durin g the ni ght wi l l be impos s ible; that the fli ght from London to Gibraltar probably won ' t start until l ate to m orrow , or , pos s ibly, M onday morni nc . This is the gist ( of M J,hy ' s cable: ur Vlhen he returned to Algiers , th e head of French intel l ig ence , asked for a secret intervie w. It to ok place at an isolate d s pot . The Frenc h ha d be ·n instructed 7 by Darlan to contac t M phy upon his r eturn from the U. S. Both Ger man and Japanese ur sources have rep orted to the Fren ch that the U. S . is plan ning ear ~y mi1-tary operi ations against Dakar an d/or Casablanca . The Germans have ur ged t he French t o ta ke "eve r y pr ecat.tion" a gainst t his and the Frenc h fe e l this ma c onstitute y a pretext for Axis occupat _on of Frenc h Nor.th Africa . The Frenc h '"enera l staf f is c onvince d of 11im:::n ,:- t 11 Axis a ggr ession in th ,.__ i n region . 11The German s , 11 cabl es i,fu. phy, 11ap: ear r deter mine d t o settle the W estern ;,1editerrane an issue durin g t he c oming weeks , and wi l l have the u s e of Spanis L mainl and an d Spanis h M orocco for t hi s purpose . Gibraltar is under consta nt survei l lance ••• In French opinion defi nite action is not a questi on of weeks but days . '' i.~rp hy rei,nrts the Fr ench politic al situation u is 11extr eme 1y 11 delicate and a collapse may be expected in as little as te n days . "Accordirgl. y , 11 M phy continues , 11Darlan is face d wit Lt a de c i sion ... It a pea r s ur he wil_ L b e willin ,.::t o come to Africa and bring v.it r hi m the Fre nc l. fleet if he , as cor-1ander-in - c hi ef of the Fre nch armed forces can be a s sured of U. S. ability r and willingn e ss t o SUI}Jy l arge sca l e aid , both materi al and econo mic . W i suc h an J l it indic ation , t he1e is strong possibility that D arlan coul d coope r at e , in whic h ca ::; e t he mi.L tar y and nava l forces in Fr enc h Africa wi L,. undoubtedl y obey his comm . 11 i and The French intel 1. gence officers i were sent to M iiri:,hy "for the ,sole purpos e of a dvising me that I may possibl~ re ceive a messa ge from Darlan in Algiers. There is no question that the situation in Fr enc h North Afr ic a is m oving fa st . Inform ation indicates t he Axis have massed ab out 100 , 000 troo 1-• a l ong the Tunisia n fronti er •• 11 s M phy requests imme ate advice 11as to limits I may go in r eplyin e to Dar lan I s ur di repr e s entative who desires to knon : 1- - Are we wit l D arlan? and will~rtera~ !t~c e �( 2-If so , will we be able to do so quickly and on a large sc ale here and/or in Europe? 11 Murphy recommends 11that we encourage Darlan on the basis of securin g his eventual cooperation with Gir aud, •• Dar ian is expected here next week . 11 Murpl:).ysays that General Mast has told him that General Giraud 11desires that he be dea lt wi th instead of Dar lan , who he feels cannot be trusted , but is extremely desi r ous of c l imbing on the band wagon . 11 Mast sa ys the army is loyal to and will be comm anded by Gi raud instead of Darlan; also , that the navy in French North Afri ca would go along with the army . A er his talk with Mast , Murphy transmits f't Mast ' s request for 11i mmediate di spat c h of f i ve American offic er s from Eisen..1-io 1 s wer staff to meet a s imilar number of French officers on October 21 , at a }Oint 150 ki l ometer s west of Algiers . One of these officers is to be a gener a l officer • •Their arrival should be by submarine at night , for a stay of 48 hours in a private house , 11 Mast su ggests the possibility of in c or porating in TORCH tl,e occupation of s ome part of unoccupied France by the French army is they can be supplied by the United States . 0 enerals Clark and Eisennm er went into this proposal today and al thou h it a1 }'ears impossible for the U. S. to su pi,l y i t , a plan is proposed vrhereby three sh i ploads of suppli es would be shippe d by the Britis h . Cab.1. General Marshall es regarding the party lead by General Clark : 11From infonation available here , it wou.1.d seem advisable to dispatch the group of officers from your staff by submarine if possible a s this may result in confi r ming to your satisfaction the Frenc n propos als . 11 ( The question of comman in Fren ch North Africa naturally d comes up and Mast insists that it is politi cal and must be settled in advance . Conferees here think the top Fr enchman, probably Giraud , cou ld be made a Deputy Com nder - in-Chief , Says ma M urphy by cable : n:ir st asserts we can gain entry practica.1.ly without firing a shot a through Giraud ' s com.rnand Mast also stated that Giraud insists . that embassy at Vichy , l~gation at Berne and other possible contacts b e issued instructions that negotiations with Giraud will be routed thr ough other channels , since Giraud wishes to continue his contacts with the U. S. through Mast in Algiers for rea sons of safety .n To get Giraud from Fr ance to North Afri ca , it i s sug gested t hat an American submarine pick Giraud and his party at night on the French Mediterranean c oast . * POLBROOK , ENGLANDOCTOBER 1042--G ener al Clark and his f our key officers , 18, are ready for departure to t he Algerian r endezvous . They arrive at this American bomber base , 73 miles northwest of London, at dusk , prepared to ta ke off whenever the weathe r i s r i ght . J The r endezvous is to take place 15 miles west of Cherchel , Algeria , about i5o kilomete r s west of Al giers . The cable l ocal i zing the rendezvous is fantastic . General Clark will meet the party being brought to the rendezvous by M urphy at an isolated hous e back fr om t he beach . The submar ine t hat will carry General Clark from Gibraltar to the Algi erian coast wi ll approa ch the shore by a b eam throvm by a l ight that cannot be seen f rom the landside . General Clark and his party will go ashore in smal .1. boats i f the weather is pr act ic able . I f not , the rendezvous m ght be held aboard the i submarine of a French war ship . Prime M inister Churchill has arranged it so General Cla r k can have two Sunderland Fly i ng Boats at his disposal if he needs them . I General Cla r k spends the morning General Lemnitze r, Captain W ght and ri �Y3 ( ~ they go over t he plans and huddle _ the woril.:i,;µgof cabl egr ams. Gener al Ei s enon hower depa r ted at 8 : 50 Al~for S66tlan d and th e TOR tro op maneuver s . Nothi ng was CH changed in th e nort hern tri p plans s o onl y a f ew offic er s know t hat Gener al Clar k di d not go; that, in st ead, he is goin g on a hi ghl y s ecr et m ission . By l :ee PM everythin g is cle aned up and t he general goes to his flat to finish hi s scant y pac kin g , writ e his wif e a lett er to be deliv er ed onl y in case he doe s not r eturn ? and arran ge final pers onal det ails of his departure . Cabl es have b een r eceiv ed ' fro m W hin gton sa yin g that 11Agr ee 11 (the code word for Gener al Clar k ) is to proas ce ed wit h his mission . His instructions ar e bri ef, the approac h and confe re nc e with t he Fr ench bein g lef t l ar gel y to his discretion . Time . and time a gain as he does la st-minute things befor e l eaving, General Clar k r em ks : 11'fhis i s f antas t ic--ar r eally fant a sticl" Genera l Clar k and his party depart fr om London in t wo auto m il es at 3 :42 PM ob and arriv e at Polbrook ju s t b efo re dark . Because his i dentity s nould r emain s ecr et , t he ge ner a l t akes alon g lieutenant colon el 1 s · silv er le aves whic h he wi ll be wearin g upon his ar r iv a l at Gibr a ltar . The party is t aken to Air Corps Offic er s' bar r acks for quart ering unti l departur e time, expe ct ed someti me durin g th e ni ght . The weath er i s stil l clou dy . For s ecuri ty rea s ons, the gene r al and his part y eat at a smal l , mome private m ess hal l . The t wo planes are r eady on the fiel d, mere l y awai t ing weat her cl earanc e . ,General Clar k and Colon el H amblen wil l travel to gethe r in the "Red Grem " with Colon el Tib bits as pilot. lin G ener al Lemnitz er , Captain W ght and ri Col onel Ho.:hm wil l tr avel in t he second plan e , th e 11Boom es erang." * * BY FLYINGFORTRESS GIBRAL , OCTOBER 1942-- The two Fl yi ng For tresses TO TAR 19, take off f r om Poleb r ook at 7: 10 AM Pr i or to start of the f light , Gener al Cla r k . l ays down a pol i cy of ac tio n . I f Genera l Clark ' s plane is f orc ed back , must land at s ea or otherw is e de l ayed , Gener a l Lemn tze r , ri din g in the other plane , wil l i cont i nue on t he missio n. U nder no ci rcwnstance is ei t her pla ne to la nd i n Spain or Port ugal . General Lemn t zer i s carr ying a wei ghted tube containing al l the i highly se cre t documents necessary i n this f antasti c m ssion . i The two planes , car rying f ul l combat crews in addition to the specia l passenge r s , nose into an overcast at 600 f eet and fly in it f or half an hour befo r e they come out above the cl oud strat a. After flying above the clouds for three hours , t he weather becomes cl ear and noon and the two planes are over the sea . The "Red Gremli n , 11 car rying Gener al Cla r k , l eads the "Boomerang." Only one ship is seen , a smal l sailing vessel s omewhere off Portugal . The planes sigh t l and at 1 : 50 P:'11 and it r em ains in sight unti l about 5 :1 5 when the peninsud.a of Gibraltar comes into view . As the planes ci r cle Gibr altar , Spitfires come up to look the Flying For tresses over . Captain ·: . S. Connors , pi l oting the "Boomerang, 11 goes in , first , landing at 5 : 50 Pi.i. General Cla r k ' s plane lands at 5 : 56 PU: On the trip . down the office r s rode in the radio compar tments and bombardiers ' seats . As usual , General Clark spends quite some t i me in the co- pilot ' s seat . Both planes need the full length of the Gibr altar airpo r t r unv;ays • The party is met by Colonels Willis and Gaylord of the U. S. ~y Air For ce and the aide to General -'A ason-i'llacFar l ane , governor of Gibr al tar . The party goes immed ately to Governor' s House and , after cleaning up, the i general meets with Governor H Far l ane and hi s advisors . No v10 d has been r ec eived ac r f rom Mr. Murphy concerning the details of the r endezvous . General Clark , eager to push on with the mission , is disappointed . The P, General Cl ark ' s eStECRt f �.. . ( party , General MacFarlane and his group conference , dis cussing all angles of the Lieutenant Je wel , skippe r of the P- 219 , Clark party to its sea-ed ge rendezvous , w hether to pr oceed accor di ng to pl an or decided to put to sea ! and U. S . SOE and OSS officials , go into hazardous miss i on to North Afri ca. the British submarine th at will take the is pr esent . Discussion cent ers around whether to await word from lvfuphy . It is r The group goes by automobiles to the berth of HMSMa idstone, submarine depot ship , for dinner . The fol lowing message is dispatched to Wrurphy via Lieutenant , Colonel Eddy in Tangiers : "To Eddy (most immediate) . a . Refe r enc.e Murphy' s r ecent messages to Y;a~ Department , Washington , please adv i se Nlu phy most im1ediately that X and fo r staff officers as re quested by him intend to rendezvous at point fixed on ni ht Wednesday 21 O ober . b . Reception party should the refore be at rendezvous f ct 2100 hours GMTand be pr epared rema in there till dawn 22nd . c . In event weat r pr events landin g on night 21-22 r equest Mu phy arrange alter-native r plan to conduct conference aboard submarine at time and plac e to be determined by l1iurphy and be cdm~uni cated to X (General Clark) via Gibralta r. d . If neither plan operates on night 21- 22 landing party will attempt landing on night 22- 23 ••• 11 After dinner aboard the r.1aidstone with various British and Ameican officials , r General Clark ' s party boards the P-2 19 with Lieutenant Jewell. The ship gets away i m1edia te ly , at 10 : 15 PM Gibr iUtar Time • The party turns in early . * ABOARD SUBMARINE n IN ,IBDITERR.ANEAN , OCTOBER , 1942-The P-219 sails on the 20 surface . Pre aring for the ordeals that lie ahead , General Clark and his four officers sleep unt:i.l 8 :30 AM In turns ; members' of the party go on deck . The sea . is smooth , the weather fine . The P- 219 steers a zig - zag course to prevent hostile submarines ' fr om firin g torpedoes at it . At 3 :1 5 Pl:! a conference is he_ld to discuss plans for boat rehearsals and landings. Three Commandoofficers , familiar with the little Falbot boats that General Clark and his party will go ashore in , are aboard the submarine . General Clark and his officers , the commandos and the ship ' s officers participate in the conference . The general plan concerning use of arms (ca rbines and Tommyguns) , action ashore , reconnaissance and signals is gone over . The subJ!l8.rine will go as close in-shore as possible and survey the beach with the periscope} Not a word has been receiv ed fro m Gibraltar by the P-219 . Ap1 .arently nothing has ·been heard from Murphy. General Clark and his officers are. eagerly awaiting word . To pass the time , they play bridge in the cramped submarine. At ~: 30 P1A Lieutenant Jewell stops the submarine and the officers who are 1 going ashore rehearse , ih the middle of the Mediterranean , disembarkation from the rol1ing'submarine . Colonel Holnes and Captain Livingstone launch their Falbot first . They paddle noislessly away into the night . From a distance of several hundred yards they try out the infra-red signal light , sending a message from the Falbot to the submarine . The light cannot be seen by the naked eye but with the proper kind of unocular it is visible . This signal is to be used later when the party gets on the beach . It works perfectly and Hofu~es and Linin gstone return to the sub • .SECRET ~ �( ··sEcR - EJ General Lemnitzer and Li~t\te ~~ t, ·Foot e ~ke the next trip . Although this is practice , it isn ' t a 11dry run . 11 The se cond Falbot takes a litt l e water as General Lemnitze fends it off the gun pl at f or m dur ing a high sr.ell . Both men get ~et but stay in the canvas boat . Col onel Hamb en and Captain Y' igh t test the i r Falboat l r out satis f actorily . General Clu.rk and Capt a in Cour tney go last . They make their lau nch i ng smoothly . Courtney is an expert on these boats and has inst r ucted the group r epeated l y on the corr ect ,nay to get into the pre carious lit,le boats . 11over -t he-siden V!ith the mid- :foditerranean exercises: completed , the group goes belo, .. and the P-219 pushes on again . · Soon the men ar e as l eep , the sub moving steadily through a smooth , slight l y moo da led sea . At 6 : 20 Aii the K ,rnns sound :f, I nla and the submari ne , now near i ng the No th African shore , di ves . There is still r no wor d f r om Gibr altar . Y'ha the hell? r-eneral Clar k and th r ee of his officers play t br i dge dur ing t he mo ning as the submar ine nos es s l ow y al ong under the :Jedi te rr l r anean . The air gets rathe r v.ar m and oxygen-l ess . The men, par ticula r ly the army men, f eel dopey . The submarine , by" · · rnoon , i s off the rendezvous point . Lieut enant Jewell t akes the vesse l up so the par ty can look at the r ende zvous house thr ough t he periscope . There is no sign of l i f e l The house is a chateau - type . The \ sub is a m e and a half of f - shor e . The sea is st i ll smoot h and the weather fine and il warm. The depty guage shov:rs 32 feet submerge nce . GeneJ ."al Cl ar k and the othe r of ficers peek through the per i sc ope . Fi r st it is ane l ed up so the sky can be scanned f or planes , then i t is swung ar ound the hor izon fo r ships , fina l ly , i t is concentr ated on the r endezvous house . A te r a fe~ seconds of peeking , the sub drops a f l ittle , then the periscope breaks wate r again and another quick peek t taken . The crew makes sket ches of the beach . Hnabl e to sight any unusual activity , the submarine , stiE . v:-e l unde .,..water , l sneaks a'\7ay to sea again . It goes out ten miles , the Lieute nant Jewel l turns it ar ound at 4 : 30 P:.~ and proceeds sl owly toward shore . The periscope is 1,ut up every f ew minut es f or obse r vation . A l ate l unch of canned tongu , be ets , breL.d and fresh tomatoes is eaten . Then the gr ou~ that .. i l l go ashore shaves fo r the f i r st time since Monday mo ing . The army men, wit h st ubb l y be ar ds , almost l ook l ike th e P-2 19 rn cr ew .. hi ch spo r ts a l ot of f ine gr owths . Prepa r ing to go as l-J. " and ant i cipa t ing a or message from :forphy , the nmsette bags ar e r e- packed fo r landing . The f ol lowing message fi na ll y i s sent to the submarine fr om Gi br alta r : "Most secret and pers onal . From Flag Offi cer Corn anding North Atlanti c Stat i on . Info r mation P r ecei ved tha t mAetin ::-cannot take place on poar d su1k:a:-· ne,..,or ·siufo.ce vesse l but ~must ± t ate . place- as i:, ev i ously arranged . Your par t i es v;ere orig i na l ly exp8cted ni ght Octobe r r 20- 21 up to 0500G . I f not conta cted the n you woul d be exfe c ted on night 23rd . :5 :.IT y part two f oll ows: Par t Two: The interested parties have been i nforme d to expect you night 21- 22 as well and t hat if no contac t made to expect you might 22- 23 . Y;m should < assume the r efo r e that you are expec t ed to nigh t and tomorrow ni ght . " ( Gener al Clark gathe r s hi s me i n t he restri cted conf ines of the submar ine and n out lines the f ollowing pl an fo r t r oubl e asho r e . On sa f e ar r i va l asho r e , the party wil l turn of f the white toward - the - se a li ght that is to guide them in . They will st art it r e-f lashing early Thursday mo ning if they wish to re-emba r k . The submarine r wil l st and of f f r om the bPach , di r ect l y i n f r ont of the house , al l night of the 2122 and 2?- 23 . If no r adio communication is established and no word r eceived fr om shor e , the submarine .will take a station five mil es off Fountain e de Geni e at daylight Saturda y until Sunday mo ning . If stil~ no wor d is r eceived , it will ret urn r to Gibr alta r . �( General Lemnitzer resistributes the gold so that each of the three Commandos has 2 , 000 francs, three $10 and three ~5 gold pieces . General Clark and his four ~ staff officers carry large amounts of gold . The submarine again approaches the ' shore line, g0ing in within two miles but still no signal light appears ! There is now considerable doubt and ar,prehension about the r ende zvous . The group considers whethe r to land despite the absence of a signal li ght but this is finally r ejected . After waiting offshore until 10 : 50 PM the submarine is turned about and , hea~s s~award a gain . General Clar!. turns in, believing theJe will be no landing tonight (Wednesday) . About 11 : 50 AMhe is awakened by ship ' s officer who tell him that a light is now showing at the rendezvous point and that the submarine has turned again and is headed for shore . There is much activity as the eight shore - J'--\ bound officers dress , prepare their kits and get the ~oats on deck through the torpedoe hatch . By midnight , the submarine has stopped and the men and their four boats are ready to debark . * * * ,,~ SECRPTREND~ZVOUS, N'lARCHERCHELALGERIA OCTOBER ~~42--The P- 219 has , , 21[ stopped two miles from the Algerian shore . Captain Livingstone and Colon el Holmes launch their Falbot successfully despite heavy swells . They paddle 50 yards away from the submarine and wait . Genera l Lenmitzer and ,Lieutenant Foot are next . Just after th ey clamber into the Falbot , a swell forces the littl e boat under the hydroplane and the two officers narrowly avert capsi zin g . They paddle out and wait with Livingstone and Holmes . Captain W ght and Colonel Hamblen then embark ri without difficulty . General Clark gets into the Falbot without difficulty but Captain Courtney , who has instructed everyone on how to get into a Falbot without di ffic ulty , gets tangled up with the boat and hydroplane and the Falbot capsizes . General Clark orders Colonel Hamblen to return to the submarine and the Deputy Commander-in-Chief boards Captain V' ght I s Falbot . Courtney , chagrined and ri soaking wet , is f uming on the sub hen the three-Falbot armada starts shor eward . The sea is quite smooth and the going is easy . As the boats approach the beach , Livingstone and Holmes go ahead to r econ.oiter . The Falbots containing General Clark and Wright and Lemnit zer and Foot wait silently 200 yards offshore . From the darkness over the Hissing surf comes the signal--the letter K flashed on a flashh ght - -that Livingstone and Holmes are ashore and all is well. General Clark 1 and Captain Yri ght then beach their boat , followed by General Lemnitzer and Lieut . Foot . 1,ieanwhie, Courtney has r epai red the other Falbot which was damaged slightly l when it capsized . With Ha.ihblen as his passen ger , the Commandoofficer comes dash ing ashore , arriving only a few moments after the third boat . General Clar k 's party is met on the beach by M Murphy and his assistant , r. M Knight . They are accompanied by several French officers , some in uniform , r. some in civilian clothes . After a brief conference at the water ' s edge , it is decided that the America.~ contin gent could not confer and depart before daylight so the submarine is called by r adio and Lieutenant Jewell t ·instructed to bring the P-219 back about 8 :00 P'i Thursday evening . The group then gathers its gear together and heads for the r endezvous house . They carry the boats about 200 yards along the beach and up a steep path to the chateau which is located about 200 feet above the beach . The boats and gear are hidden in the house . The Americans and Fr enchmen have about one hour of genera l di scussion but there is no official talk since Genera l Mast and his staff will not arrive until about 6:00 Jm Hence, . everyone turns in for a few hours rest . · . .Y' �.( The rendezvous house is located on a bluff overlooking the sea . It· is lar ge and r ambling and well-suited for a secret meeting place . It is well isolated . Nearby are woods . There is ample space for the lar ge group that wi ll confer . The rooms and bedding are very dirty and the indications are that the place has not been occupi ed for some time . It is owned by a French patriot . He has told his two Arab 'servants that they will not be needed ; that he will let the m know when they are to return . / At 6 :00 AH General Clark and his party and the French officers v1ho were on the beach are awakened by r.Tr Muphy . Shortly thereafter , Gerteral Mast and Col onel . r Jousse arrive and Generals Clark and Lemnitzer meet them in a reception room and the discus s ion begins . '1ast makes a good impression on General Clark . He impresses him a s "a man who can be relied upon ." Mast , r ight - hand man of General Gir aud who is still in Unoccupied France , says he ttwants an opportunity to go along with the Allies ." Above al.L thi ngs , Mast seems sincere . He proves that sincerity by turning over to General Clark valuable inte l lige nc e c oncer ning disposition of French fo r ces , not only in the Algerian r egio n which Mast commands, but throughout French North Africa . The general ' s impr ession is tha t Gener al M ast is absolutely since r e , capable and completely engaged in sett i ng- up a French government in North Africa under General Giraud . Ma.st willingly pr esents all his plans ih complete detail , revealing maps and supporting pape r s . He gives the concBete impression that he can be trusted completely and will do everything within his power to assist our entry into North Afr ica . The general French No th Afr ica attack plan sug~ested by M r ast parallels that of TORCH close l y that General Lemnitze r remar ks that it looks as thou gh he so might have read a copy of TORCH outline plan . General M ast speaks Engli sh except when he gets to highly technical discussion . Then he is interpreted by either M . Mu r rphy or Colonel Holmes . Mast freely admits that he can do little without the help of the United States , He says he has sufficient men, but no arms . He is short on ammunition , m odern planes , armored vehicles . He has practically no gasoline , In fact , he says he has nothing to prevent Axis occupation of the area r ega rdless of the odds . He paints a pitiful picture of how helpless he is without United States help , He makes no sweeping boasts about what he and his troops can do . At times he seems to be on the verge of tears , particularly when discussing the sparse means he has available to protect French North Africa . /' When the confer ence with General Mast and his staff started , it was decided that both sides would lay all their-cards on the table , that there would be no holdin g back of info r mation , no lies. The parties all agreed . Says General Clark late r, that 1s when I st ar ted 11l;ting like hell. 11 Uast asked how big an American effort could be made. Without batting an eye , General Clark declares that "half a million .American ,&°~ s can come in 11 and adds the strerg,h of the air force v ould be "about ;.tJcq~ ·· . he Deputy Commande- in - Chief also adds that 11there is r plenty of U. S. Navy r eady to go in this thing . 11 M ast is greatly impressed . He sugges ts that General Giraud be br ought to No th Africa from Unoccu~ied France in an r American submarine . None of the French realize the imminency of TORCH they know som~ ; sort of operation is plan ned by the United States but a 1 parently nothing definite has leaked to them . M ' s .great fear is attack by the Ge mans . If such an attack comes, ast r says l.1as , "we will fi ght immediately , no matter what we have to fight with . " t Although Admiral Darlan , head of all French forces , has arrived in Africa , he is not invited to or informed of the conference , Giraud and Darlan have di~~erent views . Neithe r Giraud or Mast would partici ate in negotiations invo l vin g Darlan . JEliRtl ~ �( Mast says he can promise the suppo r t of the French army in North Africa ; that it will impl i citly follow the orde r s of Giraud and himself . He says an American landing in Nor th Africa will have little reaction from the French army and air force . The French navy , however , will resist , says Hast , but the resistance won' t l ast long . When Genera l Clark expl ains that the enti r e basis of the proposed American l anding in Nor th Afr ica is to l aunch a d~ive to the east to fight the Germans, Mast is enthusiastic . He suggests that there ghould be a landing at Bone . This might be done by parat r oops . tiast says he believes the American aratroops could land intact by plane at the Oran ai r port , then push off the next day and drop over Bone . He says the French civil organizations there will act in conc ert with the American troops . From Bone, Mast believes that about 3 , 000 t r oops could rush into Tunis t o a localized area that they could hol d until r einforcements arr ive . General Cl ark asks how the paratroops could l and unmo ested at Oran . Mast ' s ai r officer , l who has already given the American offi cers detailed reports on the dispersion of French air fo r ces and minute f acts concerning airpo r ~~, says French troops in the Oran area "wil l pat them on the back and be glad to We: " What about getting the a ir por t lights on so we can land , quer ies General Clark . "I 1 11 turn them on myself ," repli~s the French air of f ic er. An unopposed par atroop landing would save ten daysthe amount of time it woul d take to r e- pack the chutes and re -~ quip the men. As :111ast outlines how he thinks a North African landing should be made, General Cl ark and his men are astounded by hov; closely ~.;ast' s plan parallels their own. It is identical expect it o,mits the Casablanca attack . Hast says a frontal attack at Casablanca would be suicidal . He turns over to General Clark detailed plans showing how the French navy plans t ,o block harbors . · Mast says the North African French officials must know four days ahead of tne,landing date if they are to make the necessary arrangements for the American troops to come in with a minimum of opposition , Tot knowing some of the TORCH troops are already at ·sea , ;,last says Giraud must be brought over when convenient . Ile says that he can issue instructions to the French arr,1y in North Africa which he says is loyal to him . He asks that his army be furnished with equipment as soon as possible so it can aid in the fighting . General Clark promises to obtain as much equipment as possible . '..last asks that General Giraud be given conmiand of all troops , A merican as wel~ as French , in North Africa and after long discussion General Clark says he believes this command can be given at the appropriate time . Mast wanted the comiand of American troops to pass to Giraud as soon as American feet hit the No th African r beaches . General Clark is convinced by Mast that General Giraud will come to North Africa i1I1Jaediately . Giraud must be informed of the operation by November 4 . An American'submarine for the secret Uediterranean crossing is out of the question but General Clark believes he can get one without difficulty from the British . Mast and ' General Clark draft a letter to Giraud , A reply is expected by October 27. The question of relations with General Juin , commander of cer tain French ground forces in North Africa , is brought up by General Clark , Says General 1,1ast : "P-f-ft , I 111 handle him, just like that l" And he makes a breaking motion with his hands . ( Use of British troops in the operation is brought up . Mast wants the North African landing to be A 11-American . General Clark tells him that is impossible; that because of American commitments in other theaters , there would have to be some ··SE REJ & �, .. .,✓~ o4- JfCRET British naval and air un~ts( Ma.st indicates the Fr ench would be disa.1 ·pointed the British made the propos ed Bone landing . if One of the gravest questions concerning Giraud , 'fast says , is sacrificing the rest of Unoccupied France to the Germans if the French cooperate with the Allies in North Africa . Giraud believes the Germans are preparing to occupy the re mainder of Fr ance ·no matte r what happens . Giraud wants to hold a bridgehead in Southern France through which French forces r esisting an Axis advance into Un occupied France could be supplied by the United Nations . !fast is ,•mrried about Spanish lforocco . He says he has three French di visions along the southern border in case Spain seizes the opportunity to attempt a push southward from Spanish ~orocco . General Mast presents to send to General Giraud . final paragraph pertaining :M urphy makes the translation is to go to General Gir aud a copy of a lett er he has prepared for l1lr. Mup hy r It is satisfacto r y , General Clark says, exc ept for the to com~d . The group wo s over General Mast 's letter . rk from French to English. The approved letter , which immediately by messenger , reads : :I r:u, .,,.,. • lr"-7$A- \ • C tfr ,., 4 (!,, .~ • r "My dear General : "Ref errin g to statements ma.de on several occasions by President Roosevelt and the obligations already assured by the American Government as well of as the British Govern.~ent , I am able to assure you that the r estoration France in its complete independence , in all its grandeur and the extent it possessed before the vrar, in Euro.e as well as overseas , is one of the war aims of the United Nations . "It is understood that French Sovereignty wi ll be reestablished , as soon as possible , in all the territories , continental and colonial, over which the French flae flew in 1939 . "The Government of the United States considers the French nation as an ally and will treat it as such . "I wis h to add that in case of military operations in French territory (either in metropolitan France or in the colonie s) in all cases where French col.1.a.boration wil l be available , Amer an authorities ic will not intervene in any of the affairs whi ch are only in tre province of the national administration or which concern the exe rcis e of French sovereignty . 11Insofar as corrunand is concerned the :Jni ted States Government has no other thought or desire but that mili tary command in the area be placed in French hands at the earliest practicable date . Howeve , during the initial r phase of the operation --th at is , the landing and the establishment of necessa r y bases--it is considered essential that the corrL"Jand not changed be while the operation is in progress . During this period we shall bend every effort to provide French Forces with modern ar ms and equi ment . V. ile French Forces are being thus equipped and organized , the command machine r y can be perfected so as to permit French assumption of the su>re m c orrL nd at the e 11 a appropriate time . Immediately foliowing the landing it woul d facilitate direction of the operation if a French General Officer was a ointed as a Deputy to the Corrunander-in-Chief . (signe d ) Robert D. Hurphy 11 The Deputy Commander (French) post probably would go to Giraud . tater , Giraud would have his position enlarged. 1 1ast is satisfied with the revision of his draft of the let ter to Giraud. �- ECRE T The papers turned over to General Clark by General Mast and his Chief of Staff , Col onel Ger main Jousse , are minute in detail : defense plans , dispostion of troops , loc ation of air units and gasoline stores , what airports are useless in rain y ~eather , harbor defense and blockade plans . A er a fi ve hour discussion , r ft General 'last leaves at 11 AH so He can r eturn to his post in Algiers . So more ~~ detailed discussion can be carried on , the French general leaves behind hi::Vrilivay•af'; and air officers and a special operations of ficer . The discussion is halted at 11 : 30 A1'11 everyone can get out into the sunshine and dry their wet clothine . so The group then lunches , Fourteen people sit "ting down to a meal consisting of chicken (Arab ·style) , beans , Fr ench bread and wine . The meal is cooked and served by French Patriot me~bers . Following lunch detailed discussion of plans begins between A.~e ican and r French officers . The plan presented by General ~! .st is gone over in minute detail . a Colon el Jousse dci:s. most of the talking and explaining with Colonel Holmes and 1 :r. Knight actin g as interpreters . After the tactical plan is dicussed , General Clark and his four staff officers go over the naval and air plans , special operations plans and logistical details . In each case , the French had prepared their detailed plans in writing . These were freely turned over to General Clark . The discussion continues until late afternoon when the meeting , is abruptly ended by the owner of the chateau dashing in to declare that the French police were approaching the house . Ap:r,arently , the Arab serv ants had gone to the· police to report 11queer goings on 11 in the isolated house . ( News of the police turns. the :neeting into turmoil. Colonel Jousse grabs up . his maps and , in a fe w seconds has showed himself a "quick change artist" - -he has chan ged from military to civilian clothes ! Everyone is rushing around the room picking up pape r s and personal effects . It l ooks like a disturbed anthill ! American and French officers are rushing through the house in all directions , gathering up everything and anything that might disclose their presence there . General Clark and the other officers keep their unifo r ms on . They have civilian clothes with them but by putting them on they would technically become spies . General Lemnitzer takes off his military slacks and attempts to get into a pair of oilskins . 'Tuile trying to stuuggle into the oilskins , Lemnitzer loses his .pants . Someone has scooped them up on the run and disappaa r ed with them ! Ifurphy rush es in and suggests that some money might be necessary to buy of f the police . General Lemnitzer , d10 is keeper of the secret papers a~d chancellor of the quite si zable exchequer on the trip , dips into his musette bag to get tl'u y 5, 000 Algerian francs . In his haste to rph get the money in rrur hy ' s hands , he drops several gold pieces on the fl oor and is unable , because of the lack of time , to recov er all of them . By now, it is apparent that the conferees cannot possibly get the boats down to the beach before the police arrive . One boat , which had already been taken out of the house , is quickly replaced inside . In the haste , one end of the Falbot is dropied and it looks as though it might be unfit for the return trip to the ~ubmarine ! The officers decide that i t will be best to hide out in the wine cellar until · the police could be held of , bribed or otherwise disposed of . The entire group , with the exception of the ovmer of the rendezvous house , fil es down to the dirty , odiferous and very small cellar . Ea.ch man is armed with either a carbine or a tom.~ygun and all the kit he can carry. No sooner aBe they in the cellar than the police arrive . As they huddle there in the ~glornn , _they hear the chateau owner �51 ( , ( and the police arguing excitedly in :ifrench. Their runnin g fe et patter on the floor overhead . The officers attempt to keep as quiet as possible . Captain Courtney is seized with a spell of coughing . He ctokes and sputters and seems about to strangle "Genera l , 11 gasps Courtney to General Clark , "I ' m af r aid I wi ll choke . " "I ' m afraid 1T, you WON 11 whispers back General Clark ! 7 Someone finds a bott l e of wine which is consumed quickly . The m inutes drag by~ The men hold their breaths and hang on to their weapons . Afte r about an hour , M urph y reports that he has sent the two French lieutenants , the beach patrol offi c ers who met the American group on the beach , to take care of the police . He urges that the group r emain in the cellar 15 more minutes then come upstai rs . V'hen the time is up , Genera l Clark and his men fi l e upstairs and everyone prepares to get away-- but hastily . All the Frenchman have gone . General Clark later r emarks at the speed with which the Frenchmen moved. "Whe we heard that the French pol.ice were on their n way, 11 recounts the General , 11it was as though someone had tossed 50 loaded skunks on the conference table . That l itt l e air offic er was buzzing around like a machine . I 'm sure he went into the courtyard and j ust plain took off !" The hazardous and bi zarr e conference is over ! The Frenchman have spread to the four wind s . General subjects have been disposed of but several smal l matters remained to be · taken-care of . In the last few minutes of the conference , General Clar k learned that the Nopth African French don ' t quite trust DeGau le but that l they might be willing to bring him in after ·the North African campaign has devel oped ; that Darlan has an appointment wit h Uu rphy on October 28 but the genera l believes Darlan "should be to l d nothing ;" that the French believe any resistance at Algiers "1von1 t last more than three hours ;" that the French North Afr ican army need s all kinds of equipment . In General Clark ' s est imati on, the secret rendezvo us c onference has been a success ! The r aid by the Fr ench polic e came about 6 :00 PM and it is ~ark now. All during the day there has be en a brisk on- shore wind and as the American officers prepare to depa rt they realize that the surf is putting up a steady roar. They are appr ehensive l est they be unable to get through it in the fragi~e boats . After making a last search of the house .6or articles that might have been mis l aid in the late afte r noon scramble , the office r s start fo r the beach . General Lemnitzer almost get s left because he is l ooking for his lost pants and the lost gold . He can find neither . The officers have a difficult time getting thei r four Falbot s dovm the steep and narrow path to the beach . The group is virtually exhausted when it reaches the beach . Afte r a brief conf erenc e on surf conditions , it is decided to atte m to take the Falbots through the six to seven foot high surf . General pt Clark and Captain Livingstone are going to make the attempt ! ( Soon the Deputy Comria.n der-in-Chief of the great Allied offensive is walking ori the beach weari ng nothing but his shirt , socks and short.s . Over this scanty clothin g, General Clark and Captain Livingstone wear their "N1aeWest " life belts . Their boat is shoved to the water ' s edge and , after waitin g for a lull in the waves , the two men dash out through the surf . It is about 9 :00 Pl1. A few feet l from shore the Falbot is caught by an eight-foot wave and cap sizes . General Clark , Captain Livingstone and all their equipment go tumbling throu gh the churning wate r . The re st of the group fears they have been lost and that the Falbot is broken. Choking with sand and water , the two men roll up o~:,:tp. The boat is tth• . �( recovered , intact . General Clark , l ooking like a half-dro¼ned water spaniel , l oses his trousers , shoes and othe r gear that had been either tied or placed loose in the bottom on the Falbot . The group dragg its boats and gear back into a clump of trees . A conference follows and it is decided that any further attempts to get the boats through the sur f tonight wi ll be useless and dangerous . General Clark goes back up the hill to the house to find dry clothes . Unabl e to fin d a towel with with to dry himself , he gropes in a closet and comes up with a fine French linen table cloth . It makes a f ine towe l! CoJ.tneJ. Holmes offers'the general an 11extra 11 pair of pants . They are General Lemnitzer ' s , the ones he lost in the police raid scramble t Holmes explains he "j ust picked them up somewhere ." General Clark finally gets into dry make-s hift clothes . Down on the beach , everything has been dragged back in the bushes and the r emainder of the group is huddled in hiding , waiting . The P- 219 , which has been previously signalled to come in as close to shor e as possible , is within a mil e of the beach . With the special light , Lieutenant Jewell is instructed to put to sea again until the surf quiets or until it is apparent Genera l Clark 's group wil l have to wait another day . The French civilians aiding the American in getting away are now frantic . They are scared since capture unr-er the circumstances would mean their liv es . They urge the Clark party to leave . In the meantime , the French police return to.the mysterious chateau . General Clark is there alone . Rather than retire again to the stuffy wine cellar , he gets out of a windo\~, jumps over a wall and sprints for the beach , in his stocking feet l The sprint is through the woods, over rocky paths and dmm a sandbank . He joins ·the re st of his group and they settle domi to wait and plan . ( ,~ON THE BEACH NEARCHERCHEL , ALGERIA OCTOBER 1942- -General Clark decides , 23, to try and buy a trawler or any kin d of power boat to.get his party to the sub marine but all efforts fai l. Someone produces another bottle of ~ .ine and the tired , tledra ggl ed grou p disposes of it in their little cul-de-sac . At intervals , officers go to the beach to inspect the surf . It seems to be quieting . About 1: 30 AfAeveryone but General Lemnit zer and the three Commandos who , remain to guard the boats and equipment , return to the chateau for food and r est . It is decided to wait until about 4 :00 .P..'.'.1 , the hst possible minute if the Falbots are to reac h the submarine before dawn, before making the final decision on whether to attempt to get away today . While waiting on guard , General Lemnitzer notices ,that the surf is quieting . During the period from 1 : 30 to 4 :00 AM there are , · several false alar~s-there are mysterious Arabs in the vicinity , the police a.Ile returning a~ain . All prove groundless but they are nerve m-acking . At 4 :00 t:.· . Gene al Clark and the rest of the party return to the beach hidea• ·:ay . The situation is surveyed . During his guard period , Gener al Lemnitzer found a spot along the beach where the surf seemed especially placid . It is finally decided to make another embarkation attempt , despite the cost : it seems hopless that the group can launch four Boats successfully without losing some personnel ~nd a lot of e~uipment . However, indications are that the place is exceedingly- "hot " and General Clark and his party , if they remain , may at any moment be seiz~by the police who micht return in greater strength . Al~ equipment that is not absolutely necessary is jettisoned . This inc~udes the tom 11yguns , carbines and radio , The boats must be as light as possible . General Clark and Captain mright are to make the first atte~pt . It is decided that four SE~RE T � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, September 25 - October 22, 1942 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from September 25 to October 22, 1942. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1942 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Language A language of the resource English Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/803 Date Valid Date (often a range) of validity of a resource. 1940-1949 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/b5a05a992cfe8065be850f7778499679.pdf?Expires=1789603200&Signature=fYeWqizr8EUONDY4NIpHC5xmXEODhYvE0P3cRO4Y-qmWujDpuz5YrHKpPq16iJIA64tB3T2ij52oerckhI9%7EtnfczYlSu6UIDROESZEvCUlefKSOvzjuJUSlo5MtHWcR6p%7Ev6GuvX-IK4ZIwdC5k-AxTyFQpyT-wCSId%7E0UAaFRYRHulvhZQDozynI9zMS2V6dFpDrm2jwbMkbkyYOBgumFtAvY9NltBxqYZxVOi%7EZNeFdVEIx1iPPw-BrrBPmYIwYSZNjLpxUfNMZk8LYfDwuELwi40rLClrH86pjwp29FJYw8BsNH9W5PvQFqBUijIzTXcc%7EOw2Vu%7ETYfV9HdEyQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 2a4d49da7651f5cb457a0cb5cb59c005 PDF Text Text ( recovered , intact . General Clark , l ooking like a half-dro¼ned water spaniel , l oses his trousers , shoes and othe r gear that had been either tied or placed loose in the bottom on the Falbot . The group dragg its boats and gear back into a clump of trees . A conference follows and it is decided that any further attempts to get the boats through the sur f tonight wi ll be useless and dangerous . General Clark goes back up the hill to the house to find dry clothes . Unabl e to fin d a towel with with to dry himself , he gropes in a closet and comes up with a fine French linen general an 11extra 11 table cloth . It makes a f ine towe l! CoJ.tneJ. Holmes offers'the pair of pants . They are General Lemnitzer ' s , the ones he lost in the police raid scramble t Holmes explains he "j ust picked them up somewhere ." General Clark finally gets into dry make-s hift clothes . Down on the beach , everything has been dragged back in the bushes and the r emainder of the group is huddled in hiding , waiting . The P- 219 , which has been previously signalled to come in as close to shor e as possible , is within a mil e of the beach . With the special light , Lieutenant Jewell is instructed to put to sea again until the surf quiets or until it is apparent Genera l Clark 's group wil l have to wait another day . The French civilians aiding the American in getting away are now frantic . They are scared since capture unr-er the circumstances would mean their liv es . They urge the Clark party to leave . In the meantime , the French police return to.the mysterious chateau . General Clark is there alone . Rather than retire again to the stuffy wine cellar , he gets out of a windo\~, jumps over a wall and sprints for the beach , in his stocking feet l The sprint is through the woods, over rocky paths and dmm a sandbank . He joins ·the re st of his group and they settle domi to wait and plan . ( ,~ON THE BEACH NEARCHERCHEL , ALGERIA OCTOBER 1942- -General Clark decides , 23, to try and buy a trawler or any kin d of power boat to.get his party to the sub .ine and the marine but all efforts fai l. Someone produces another bottle of ~ tired , tledra ggl ed grou p disposes of it in their little cul-de-sac . At intervals , officers go to the beach to inspect the surf . It seems to be quieting . About 1: 30 AfAeveryone but General Lemnit zer and the three Commandos who , remain to guard the boats and equipment , return to the chateau for food and r est . , the hst possible minute if the Falbots It is decided to wait until about 4 :00 .P..'.'.1 are to reac h the submarine before dawn, before making the final decision on whether to attempt to get away today . While waiting on guard , General Lemnitzer notices ,that the surf is quieting . During the period from 1 : 30 to 4 :00 AM there are , · several false alar~s-there are mysterious Arabs in the vicinity , the police a.Ile returning a~ain . All prove groundless but they are nerve m-acking . At 4 :00 t:.· . Gene al Clark and the rest of the party return to the beach hidea• ·:ay . The situation is surveyed . During his guard period , Gener al Lemnitzer found a spot along the beach where the surf seemed especially placid . It is finally decided to make another embarkation attempt , despite the cost : it seems hopless that the group can launch without losing some personnel ~nd a lot of e~uipment . four Boats successfully However, indications are that the place is exceedingly- "hot " and General Clark and his party , if they remain , may at any moment be seiz~by the police who micht return in greater strength . Al~ equipment that is not absolutely necessary is jettisoned . This inc~udes the tom 11yguns , carbines and radio , The boats must be as light as possible . General Clark and Captain mright are to make the first atte~pt . It is decided that four SE~RE T �( f~!~~ 1 .e ~a--.. ~\·._- lt, ~ffl"D ·\.~ ok/ -. of th e French offic ers a.nd civilians s t ill with the Clark party will~e into the surf and assist in the launching . These Frenchmen are sti ll frantica y tr:rin g to get the Americans away and are willing to make almost any sacrifice After careful preparation and r ehearsal , General Clark and Captain Wright start through the surf . Their Falbot bounces and teeters but soon they are beyond the breakers and headed f or the submarine ,hich , having again been su.~1oned, uas standing by a mile at sea . General.Lemnitzer and Lieutenant Foot make the next attempt . They discard all kit and equipment except the infra-red equipment that is necessary to locate the submarine and LeL'lnitzP. 1 s musette bag which contains all notes on the conference r and the highly-valuable papers turned over by General ;fas t and Col onel Jousse . The J )i-> musette bag is tied to a cross - arm of the Falbot . The sea is a little rougher for f'\~~ the seco nd l aunc hing . After \,aiting fo r severc.l large waves to come in , Lemnitzer t,r, and Foot , assisted by the fou.r frantic Frenchmen , make a dash through the surf . ~ ' t A t r emendous wave hits them ! Over goes the Falbot . The tvo officers , the Falbot , cJ.P their equip:2ent comes tumbling through the surf . Lemnitzer and Foot are half .. " drov:ned because the under:tov: prevents ther1 from get ting on their feet , even ,:hen _,_he water ..:.s shallow enot:gh for the!:1 to stand . When Lemnitzer finally gets on his f eet , the Falbot , carried by a big vmve, hits him in the back , knocking hi;;i do·.m again . Everyone feared the keel of the boat had been broken but exam:i.naticn sho\7S that while damaged , it can still be used ! '1t • The Falb ot is turned over , the water :rjoured out , ,..-hat gear :~s left is r earranged . Lemnitzer and Foot , still coughing ur v,ater and sand , are ready to push out again . Speed is es~ential because of the im~inency of da\m . The second atte~pt goes successfully , although tr.ice the Fal bot nearly capsize s and the boat is onequarter filled with ,1ater and several of her ribs are broken . The tvro of.Licers have difficulty ke~ping the crippled craft headed into the tremendous swells . After paddling for half an hour , unable to see General Clark and Captain 17right w o are so:newhere a.'lead , they try- thP infra - r ed detector and locate the submarine . Back on the beach , Colonel Hol;!les and C&.pt in Criurtney and Colonel HaJllblen a and Captain Livingstone make precarious surf launchings but their t10 Falbots come ric..ing through. None of the eight men is dry \',hen he boards the submarine . The a l l-important l!!Usette bag carri ed by General Lemnitzer is soggy and in bad shape . An envelope containing gol d pieces has broken open and apLarently many coins vere lost when the Falbot capsized . "oot of the n··.m have cu.ts and bruises and their clothes are torn and soaked . The Falbot .of Colonel 1folmes and Ca tain Courtney j ams -~~ against the submarine , has its back broken , jacknifes and sinks . Colonel Holmes musette bag , containing all his clothes , gold and personal equirment goes to the bottom . Three of the four boats , all except the one hancled by General Clark and Captain 17r ight , capsized·while going through the surf . The eight men go into the innards of the submarine to dr~- off and get r.arm . A bottle of r "J.D. broken out and disapr,ears in no time flat . Tn a few mooents the is Klaxon sounds for diving and at 6 : 00 A· the P-219 submerges , goes dovm to 90 feet and proceeds at 3 1/2 knots for Gibraltar . General Clark and nis rarty soon fall a!l eep . They awake at 2 : 30 PI1. The air is hot and ext r emely bad . The entire landing group has severe headaches ; They are a sorry - lookin g lot--lon g V'hiskers , hungry , bleary-eyed and mo than a little re banged up . Equipment brouGht aboard the submarine is r e-check ed and it is di ecovered that a letter that '..iurphy had given to Bones to take to Gibraltar for mailing was lost ,;hen the Falbot broke up . These boats have a small air chamber at each end and there is a possibility the boat--and the letter--will be picked up on the beach. A ter d~~at: • f the advisability ott;~ti. ._....._'°""~ __ .· t) . '!Ii!!!...-, • . l �)\?t ( :~\fJ\~~t::,ir ,,1·•,,i''l'> t of breaking radio silenc e , General Clark orders that the subm arin e surface iately (about 5 :00 Pf!) and send the fol l o-r.ringmessage to Gibraltar : i mm ed- 11Im,itediate •o FOCNAS (Flag Officer Com;anding North Atlantic Station) . 0 eration completed . Amreturning throu gh position A 2330 A/23 position B 2~00 A/24 arriving Gibraltar 0830 A/25 . Request you have planes r eacly for eccrly departur weather permitting . Request you notify 111lc Gowan (code for Murphy) that letters he handed Julius (Holmes) were lost when his canoe broke up . They \,ere in weighted musette bag which may have fallen out . Canoe m~y have floated inshore . Search of beach should co!!llnence im.'!lediately . 11 Having dis~atched these two messages , the submarine again submerges to 90 feet and proceeds on its electric motors . General Clark plays bridge with Holmes, Wright and Lemnitzer . Later , the following message is received from FOCNAS : 11Your 1417 and your 1420 acknowledged . Destroyer from 11U11 patrol will rendezvous "ith you in 115 degrees EUROPA at 0645 A/25 and escort you into harbor . 16 Aircro.ft for onward journey arranged 1740 A/23. 11 The P-219 surfaces at 6 :45 ?11 and everyone feels better . out . General Clark and his officers go on deck and spend over sea water and shaking sand out of their clothes . Returning to officers sort out their wet equipment and clothes and lay out dry . * Clothes are dried two hours squeezing the wardroom , the the secret papers to * ENROUTE GIBRALTAR SUBTi!P.RINE. FLYINGBOAT OCTOBER , 1942--.After TO BY AND , 24 discussing and preparing a rough draft of a cablegram informing London and~ ashing-ton of the success of his mission, General Clark turns in , sleeping until 9:00 AJ. After break.fast and a couple of rubbers of bridge , General Clark goes up into the conning tower , finds the sea fairly smmoth and decides to cable Gibraltar asking f or a flying boat to sreed the return tri • Cables General Clark : "Consider weather conditions ideal for transfer to Sunderland . Request you have Sunderland rendezvous soon as practicable . My position course and speed 1100 36° 4 1 N of 41 1'\"l 254° 11 knots . 11 General Clark goes back to the diversion of bridge until Gibraltar informs the submarine that a Catalina Flying Boat ~•ill rendezvous v,ith the submarine . The party begins packing . ~ .~ost of the clothing has been hanging in the engine room to dry . The plane is sighted at 2 :45 PM and the Falbots and baggage are moved on.deck . The three Commandooffices are remaining aboard the submarine . Generals Clark and Lemnitzer , Colonels Hamblen and Holmes and Captain Wright say goodbye and move across the gap of water to the big plane . As they board the Catalina , the entire crew of the submarine is on deck and they give General Clark and his four staff officers a 11Hip-Hip-Hooray 11 as the Catalina takes off for Gibraltar at 3 : 15 Pi!. The British submarine crev1, particularly Lieutenant Jewell , were magnificent throughout the long and hazardpus trip . Gibraltar is sighted at 4 :40. The Catalina lands in the harbor and General Clark and his party go ashore in an R. A.F. launch . Cars take the group to Government House for tea . General !.1acFar lane is told of the m ission I s details and the followin ; cable is sent to London: �S5 ( r "FoLowing f or Com;nanding Gener al mropean Theate r of O erations Lendon, 1S f r o11CLARK or EISENHO','SR. eyes onl y . BEG-IESPending more c omplete details to be f f urnished on our arrival following is brie f summary of events to date . Due to not having heard f rom i;c Gowan as to exact time of meeting ,:e stood off rendezvous point 36 hours submere;ed ,,aiting signal to land . Definite contact finally established ahd with favorable weather vre l anded i n four canvas canoes about midnight 21722nd . Conference General '.la.st r e1i e~ent i ng Gener&l Giraud and f ive staff of.:('icers r com ·enced 0700 "hours on 22>nd Discussions considered satisfactory . and followed generc:1.l lines anticipated by you . Giradd being contacted today by ':fast . Definite decision by Giraud expe cted by Tuesday . .Anticipate it wi.1. be fav or able . I base ... this on thei r f avor able rAaction to the st r ength of the fo r ces U .s . could ::,ut into su ch an operatio n . All questions settled satis f a cto r ily exeert time of assumption of supreme cmmnand by Fren ch . Uy vien on this submi tted to Giraud through ,last or fiis conside r ation with def inite unde r standing that my proposal had yet to b~ con irmed by you . Extremely valuable inte l ligen ce data obtained and will be vr epar ed upon my re tu r n f or i -'!l:lediate r adio transm i ssion to Co"X1anders concerned . From discussion and informat i on r eceived our plan for oper ations a1~ears to be sound . The nec essity our being prepared to occupy Tunisia prompt l y with ai r bor ne units abundantly confirmed . Thether Gir aud assumes l eadership in Nor th Afr i ca or not anti cipate the bulk. of Fr ench a r my and air fo rc es wil l offer li tt l e r esistan ce . During conver sation with Mast I pr omised del i very of two t housa nd small arms with ammu nition by sub marine to v i cini ty of our land in g at earli est pr act ic able date . Al so promised sub ma ine which Fr ench insist must be Ame ican to br ing Gir aud from Fran ce to North r r Africa . Naval info r mation indicates initial r esistance by French Navy and coast defc,nses 'rhic>: wil.L fall off r a.1idly as our f orc es l and . Detailed conferences continued throughout day until 1900 hours vrhen inte r vention by local police r:ho ha.d become suspicious of inc r eased activity in r endezvous area brought confe r ence to abrupt conclusion . Fr ogs f l e~ in all di r ections and our party hid in empty R~F~AT empty v,ine cellar in house whi l e ar gument wit h police ensued . After t, o hours during lull i n conversations with poli c e we made our vray to woods near beach v:here v•e awaited favorable surf conditions to per mit r e- er.ibarkation . First effo r t to r eemb k resulted ar in capsizine; and damage to one boat . Further effo r t futile in vieu of high waves . i-:-er emained in hid in g unt i l 0430 on 23r d when another attempt was made. All boa t s r eached submar ine after two had capsized at bea ch and one vras br oken w e boarding submar ine . Ran submer ged during day l ight QOUXS of 23r d exce~t fo r hil br i ef sur f acing t o s end message to Gibr a l ta r . With ideal conditions £or trans f er to fly i ng boat avai l able mo ning 24th G;i.bralt ar was r equested to disp ot ch Catalina"Lto r rendezvous wi th us at sea to expedite r eturn . TTill advise time and pl a ce of arrival in P,K. ENDS" . General Clark and h i s f our of fi c ers get their fir st bath in a wee1 . (This doesn ' t c ount unwanted dunks in the :ledi te rr anean l ) Later , furthe r conf erences are he l d with Gener a l ·~acFarlane ; Vic e Admi al Si r Edttard Co:lins , co~~anding the r No th Atlant i c and the man v,ho made the P- 219 available , and other British officers . r Thi s is f ollowed by a dinner at whi ch General r.:acFarlane is host . This breaks up at . 8: 58 P'1 so the gr oup can lis t en to the 9 o ' cl ock news . General Alexander is atta cking in the Middl e East a ccor ding to plan l Anothe r of the first active phases of TOR has s t ar ted ., Duri ng l ater dis cussion , General Clark is told of an attempt CH the I t alians have made to bomb Gibralta r. Thr ee pl anes made the attack but had to dr op a l l the ir bombs i n Spain or in the wate r . The s.anish are very angry . One Italian plane was br ought dovm by a.ck- a.ck. Remembering his promise to General ' last , Gori-eral Clark has a conference with a Br itish naval office r v·ho has been .s"lu6 lin~ guns into Africa and France . Arrangements are made for the snv to furnish 2000 weapons to mast from Gibr altar stocks . General Lemnitzer collects 16 , 500 Algerian EC �5c, f r anc s fro?l .c1embers of the Cla r k party to cove!' gun delivery expenses . Cl arke inst r ucted to pr oceed with his smug ling , dealing directly , i th ·;r . ·rurphy . is Gen,:,ral Ia.cf arlane then offe r s to show- G<me:a l Clark and his J:.iarty 11'fhe Rock 11 r so , at 10 : 0J F: the group sta r ts out in two cars . Tt is an impressive and th r illing drive up the narrovi , b,isting r oad to the 1 , 200 foot top . General ·.1ac r lt..n, , Fa dise;usted with the timidity of his dr ive r , takes the wheel himself and it is a wild ride . :3ecause of a dmaged br idge , the pa r tJ finishes t'ie cl i mb on f oot . General iacFar 1ane takes a nasty fall but by l u ck is unin j ur~ · • Fr o'TI 11T1:J.e Rock 11 Gener al 11 11 Clark goes di r ectly to the ai r por t . The 11Red G eulin r a nd the Boomer ang II " are waitinc; , Ba [:;gage is stowed aboa r d the two f lying fo r tresses and the pa r ty takes off at 15 minut es afte r midnight . ➔:- TO 10',TDON FLYI1G FOPTR'.'"8, OCTOBER , 1942 -- The fir.;t BY 25 tr.o hours of the f light ar e pl ea s ant . The of~i cers lounge around ~1:J.erever c onvenien t and doze . Bad ·,reathe r c o11es two hours out of Gibra l ta r. I ce beg in s f or:..1ing on the wings and Lieutenan t Col onel Ti bbits beg in s cli 1cb nG so the 11Red Gremli n 11 can avoid it . i The ai r i s very r ough and ext r e.".!ely c ol d . Generc:.l Cl ark , Col onel Hamblen and Colone l Grun the r (pic ked up in Gib r al t ar ) huddle togethe r , shar i ng the war mth of each other ' s bodies , The temperature i s be l ow O degrees centigrade . The 11Boomerang IP' is having the s a,ne dif f ic u lt y- - f l ying at l .L 000 feet with ze r o visibi.Lity , . The Ent;lish c oast i s sighted at 6 : 30 A· . 'f'he ,eathe r gets v;armer and the air smoother . General Clark ' s plane gets l ost and does not arrive at Poleb r ook ,mtil 8 : 52 Al . The second plane , coming straight to the fiel ' , lands at 8 : 26 ;" . Ther e is a.nxiet.r ,·:hi l e General Cl·crk I s pla::1e is charted . Sou1,· m it gets over th e English chan nel and finall.,r come into Polebrook from the Northuest instead of the South . Afte r breakfast at the Poleb r ook Officers ' clab , GP-nera.l Clark d8parts in his car f or London at 10 : 50 Af1 During the long r ide back , he dozes . . Irrued i ate l y upon his r eturn , C'ene,,.al Cla r k calJ.s General Eisenho-r :er , then 1 s hideout drives out . to the Co.~ and er-in-Chief for a t v.·o and a half hour conference dur ini:; , hich he details his trip . One of the greatest di f f.:.cultie-s in dealing with General ~1ast ;as Gener al Cla.rk I s inst r u ctio n s that hE: was to indicate only what the TJnited States crpJJ) do , not ,··hat it was GOINGto do . 'l'his had to be kei:,t upper most in mind at all times and it 7ade the General ' s ta~k complicated and extre mely difficu l t at times . For instance , v:hen General ·'ast asked that certain thj ng s be done v;hen the Ameri.can army cc 10 in , C'enera l Clark had to b0 adroit in his ans wers and .nake no unf'lt.lfillable pro!!lise;:; since s·c;.ch chang, ::,, at such a late datc--i",ith some uni ts already at SPa , ,. ere i :i ,ossible . '"h8t Ge1rral 'c.st la::.d down th e I'r 1.ch plans for occupyim ; Frenc11 Africa , General Clark had to b e car ef ul that h E ;a.v" no indication that, the . S . alrec.dJ had. def:.nl te plans . He was abl e , ho, .ever , to shov; hov. v;hat he had to '"'r :, F'"'/"\P"'P-Dplans differed fro:n thos e of th e Fr ench . The parallel in the rr. S . anr' FrE'nch plans was astonishin~ . '71.en General .~ast pointed out General Ciraud 1 s plan of establish i ng a bridgehead in southern Fronce so the Fr ench could resist German moves into ~noc cupied France , General Clark had to move with great care . '-Iow could he make any pr omises v,hen the North African operation-the movement of cowat troops to the ar ea--z;as al r c&.rl~ laun ched . r ./l..fter conferring with General Eisenhov;er , General House office so he can talk to Prime ~'inister Churchill l!r . Churchil~ is extremely pleased . He invites Genera ceneral , exh<uste·~ , has to refuse in favor of slee.l:' . -;~ VV\/ * Clark r eturns to his Norfolk over the scraT'lbler tele hone . ~ l a.rt qin ner but the ,., �51 ( LONDONOCTOB~R , 1942- - "The Great .American Eagle 11 (Prime Minister Church', 26 ill 1s nickname f or General Clark) has just r eturned from a very important and highly su ccess f ul mission , sars General Eisenhovrer , opening the regular Comr:iander i n- Chie f I s meeti ng . "He' s going to tell us abcu.t it . n Thus , General Clark takes over the meeting today and spends the next ha lf hour outlining in detail hi s discussions in Algie r s with General l.Iast and his staf f . He leaves out al l the t r avel details and the humo ous anecdotes , confining r himse lf ent ir ely to the serious details . Ever y man around the big conference table l istens intently . Air Ma sha ll V,"elsh and Gener al Doolittle r beam v,hen General Clar k te l ls of having details of the di sposition and strength of the French Air For ce , the condition of airfields and the disposition of gasoline . Admiral Cunnineham is highly pleased that the general has r eturned with detailed plans on how the French navy intends to block the habbo r s ; this will greatly facilitate prevention of this by the special harbor task forces . General Clark goes thoroughly into all phases of his mission . Even General Anderson bea!:ls v1hen he hears of the plan to land parat r oops at Bone to facilitate Creneral Anderson I s d;rive to the east . Yihen the general has f inished his out l ine , there are no questions and General Eisen hower br eaks up the meeting . Afterwa r d , the office r s crowd around to get details concer ning how the t ri p was made. Few of fi cer s knew the nature or the destination of Gener a l Cl ar k 1 s t r ip . I t was a cl osely guarded secret . General Clark plunges immediately into conferences concerning an attack at Bone . He calls in Generals Gale and Gruenthe r and Colonel Stirling . They begin discussing the possibility of altering plans of the F.,astern A sau~t Force so it can l and at least part of its strength at Bone . The initial Bone landing probably will be f rom the air , by paratroops . General Clark explains that 11certain key Frenchmen in North Africa -- !.1ast and possibly General Giraud -- \'1ill have to be taken into our confidence by D-4 so they may have time to issue necessary insturctions to their commands. 11 The Deputy Com,~ander in - Chief next takes up with General Gale the proposal that French forces in Unoccu ied France be su vlied so they can resist the German move into that area- - a move that 1ast says Giraud believes is inevitable when the North African theater opens . Giraud wants to hold a bridgehead in Southern France through which the United Nations wi ll supply the French atriots . Gale believes the question of su lJlying these f or ces is one of pr iorities , ra+.her than alternate plans . Obviously , shipring diverted to Southe r n France would delay the buildup of TORCH r oops and supplies in No th Africa . t r 0 General Clark recom.nends that a French section be set up in Allied Force headquarters to foster development of French military poTier in North Africa . qe suc:ests that the officer to head this section Ltlght be found among Frenchmen now serving in the British army . The Deputy Co:n;iander instructs Gale that , in view of his pro,nises to General Mast , 500 tons of shmpping space per convoy is to be reserved to carry goods required by t'1e French civil population in North Africa after K~m3. f Only one of General Clark 1 s man? conferences today docs not concern developments resulting from his North African coup . Lieutenant General ·;!organ , com ander ,:2 of the British 1st Corps and the man who is heading the nev,ly-cr eated ~1ortheri1 Task Force ( which is to be ready to invade Spanish \orocco if necessary) , c01,1es in to discuss his problems . B:e _;_spreparing his forces , wl-iich will include the Royal ',iarines , as fast as pos ;;ible . Like the Center Task Torgan is having Stu �53 tank troubles . The l&rge Churchil s are noi., suitr.ble for th<; Lwa.sio!l task . or _;an says he can-"· mdertake his task Hithout tanks but beli"'V"'S the at;! acking force "probabl.1 .ould lose face i!l the eyes of the Sp~inards " if they do not have ar~aored eq_uip!nent . General Cle.rk tel -s ·;organ tha.t General , :ast Luor rn .1i u the.t ed three French native :i.:.visions are dispersed along the so u thr>r:c. Spanis' 'forocco border anrl if the '.Jort:".lern Task Froce s·1ould have to attack Tangiers , both French and America11 forces v,ould assist him by b.dva:1.cing fro·n the south anc: ea,t . LONDO~:rOCTOBER27 , 1942 -- B oth General ''tar shall and Lieutenant , hower are reco1~ nending G<?neral Cl~rlc for the Distinguished SPrvice Horth African 'nission t G-enera.l Cl_r\:: 1 s .four staf~ ofL icers are also put Q. for decqrations . The success of the highly hazardous mission hi~h i-:raise fro-n botr1 London u._1c',..,ashington , C-eneral i;_;i enr :edal for his go ·n_; t.o , e has brouuht i:1ord is received latb toda;y that General Giraud , on the basis of , ord brought to hi:11 by a special courier , is eager to go to ~Torth Africa an~ dL,cuss the French.American colJ.aboration furt11er . Fe ap_rov~s , tentatively , the principles a.1:;Teed to by Generals Clark and '.last , but is ar:aiti!lg ,rrlt+en com1unication from ·;r . 'iv.r~~hy and General :.;ast before civing his whole-hearted apJoval. ( Captain ·-right is returning to Gibraltar to take cor:rn,.nd of the P-219 and proceed to a rendezvous in Southern France to pick ·_lp General Girl..Lld and. take hir~ to 1forth Africa . The entire sche.ne is v,orking beautift~lly . '"'r'L;;ht ,vill a,:;-ait f1..,rther inst.,..uctions fron ·urph.; before taking the I:ritidt subr.1~;.ri:1e o;;..t of "ibr a.ltar . The ,.,ossible chan ge in plans for th . use of p~.r&troo1:s--as e a result of General Cle.rk 1 s confe nee v,ith G~ne:;.·al :ast and the possibility of in _1 ding c...n air assault o!l Bone--occasions a large confere!lce in C-eneral Cl~rlc 1 s office . ~ttendin~ are -~lr Vice 'Iarshal Sanders , Gene:ra.L GrQenther , Doolit-"le anr" :::..emnitze'"', Colonels Bentley and Raft and .1ajor Yarborough . " General 1a: t , 11 sa:·s Gem,ral CL,.rk , 11ho.s assured us th1t para.troops will not be re:...isted at the Oran ancl Bo:i.e airports . The ~urpose of this meetbg is to discuss means of getting paratroops into Bone as soon as possible . Obviously , we must have al tern"'.ti ve pJ.ans ; one to be used in case of unexpected resistance , and one in the ,,vent of free entrance . The first has been pre~x,.red in detail ; the second will be . re ared at once . 11 It i decided that if the loaded air transports can be lundec at La Senia air.[)ort , noar,Orwi , without resistance , they fill be refu,7ldd and rea ·y ~o proceed so they arrive at Bone early on r :.:lu one . The paratroops wil.1. not jump ·.t Bone unless conditions make it necessary . The pur ~ ;ose is to conserve the parachute battalion for a jillllp to seize the air~ort near ~unis . The ~roblem of anti-aircraft defense at "qone &nd an aviation gasoline su_p,ly cu.us e s concArn , Later , General ;_ Anc1erson , v,'10 wiL. i1ave the responsibility of airborne 01Jerations e1:i.st of Algiers, is called in . He thi::ucs that by D plus one he might be able to provide the transports with some fighter escort . L'lder on is concerned about both the anti - aircraft and petrol s 1ortage at Bone . ne expects to get 1-Jetrol into the ;.:..rea by :'.:1Jlus five. Automatic anti-aircraft weapons could be trans::-orted to Bone by s.ir • .Air ·:arshal ,·;elsi1 and General Anderson both urge that 10 of the air trans.90rts allotec to the 12th Air force be used for this purpose . Ge~eral Clark objects to reducing the size of the l:?th ' s tra•1sports and reco111aends that this A*A e,.;'1ipP1ent be flm-rr1 .:.n by British bo,:ibers . :··elsh prmises to make an effort i:i. that direction . SECRE T �:¥-~ 59 fil!Bn And rson feels that with French' cooperation it will. be unnecessary for him to rush British paratroops into the Bone area. He prefers to have the British jill!lpers make a single move from Algiers directly to the airdrome at Bizerte . ije thinks this strategy can be pulled on D plus 5 . He plans , at the same time , to have the re-fueldd r;. S. transports drop the U. S. paratroo s over the Tunis airdrome . All the planes woul d then return to Al eie r s , possibly to fly up ai r borne infantry . General Clark ' s plan of long - ago -- having paratroop and airborne un!h "leapfrog " ts toward Tunis - - appears to now be wor king out . Seizure of Tunis is one of the key aims of TOR and each day it looks more feasible . CH 0 ( ~ General Clark lunches today with Prime 'Unister ChurchiL at Number 10 Down ing St r eet , the "G eat American Eagle II giv i ng :. r Churchill a complete report on r T. the Nor th African mission . Churchill listens av i dly and cl u cks his approva l. The dro.matic nature of the m ssion apl-'eals to the Prime 'Ainister I s imagination . The i report over the scrambler telephone on Sunday night j ust served to \Zhet :i'!r Church . ill ' s appetite •. He compliments the Deputy Com.1a.nde in - Chreef on the way in which ·he carried out his mission . ( A gene ·al discussion of TOR ai r problems is held in General CL .rk I s office . CH The confe r ees are Air Ma shal ¥.'elsh , Gener~ls Smith , Doolittle , Lemnitzer , Gruenther r and Cr a i g and Vice Air i'l1arshal Sanders . Doolittle is concerned about the slo" rate in which he claims Sp~tfi r es are being made r eady at Gibraltar . Welsh and Sanders say pr ogr ess is being made on s chedule . Doolittle is concerned about the lack of tie for testing the air f raft and installing armament following their erection . Doolittle argues for stronger air sup~ort at Casablanca but Genera~ Cl&-k tel1.s hi m that the North African conversations "r esu l ted more than ever in a t r end toward st r ength to the east and our plans must per mit us to shift the weight of our air forces in that direction very early if we are to be welcomed by the French . In order to furnish air sup}.Jot fo r the Northern Task Fcrce , General Doo~ittle plans r on forming a small self - sustaining air force composed of one bomber squadron , one fighter squadron and two transpo r t squadrons . They will be based at Port Lyautey so they will have ready access to General ;'/lorganI s fo r ce to the north . The French plans and intelligence reports that General Clark obtained in Alger ia have been translated and are being distributed to the proper sections . The c ompleteness of them , and thei r terrif i c value to TORCH operations , are astound ing . The value of General Clark ' s t ri p c oul d never be estimated . Even if things . went wrong , TORCH in a vastly impr oved c onditions because of the intel l igence is brought back . General Clark has instructed General Gale to expedite action on General Mast ' s request that we su:-ply French troops in Southern Fran ce . The pr oblem of colored troops in England is growing . Difficulties have been present since their arrival i n the United Kingdom last sum~er . General Doolittle reports "growing lack of dis cipline among colored service units . " He cites a case of aggr avated assault on a white office :r by a colored soldier . General Clark tells ( Doolittle that the Eu:o npean Theater of Operatio ns "will back up the actions of w ~, r Courts ~fartial , even to the extent of ap1,,roving the death sentence in such cases . 11 It is regretab l e that army offi cials , preparing for a great of fensive , should have t o concern themselves , and aevote precious time , to the col or ed problem . General ~• ) c. Clark believes that an equal per c entage of color troops should go overseas . 1~ J1 C ( After disposiu.g of a number of smaller matters - including the ~uestion of auxiliary U. S. troops to augment the Royal r.!arine division and establislunent of an 8 .0. E. mission in Nor th Africa-General Clark goes to dinner with Mrs . Roos evelt . The president I s wife _ /s currently visiti~g England . '1. >,... # ~ECRET- �LONDON, OCTOBW,R 28, 1942--The British submarine, under com'"'land of Ca tain right of the U.S. 1lavy, left Gibraltar at 8:00 P;.: last night for the Gulf of Lyon where it will ick up General Giraud, the French general who is the key man in French collaboration in TORCH. Giraud wil_ be taken to North Africa to be oriented on plans and so.he can issue instructions paving the way for American entry. The following cable is received early today from General Marshall: TIT"e are fol�owing with great interest and considerable sus ense the negotiations going on with respect to Kingpin (Giraud) and Flag ole (Mast). If the results vre hope for are attained it will make an interesting page in hL, tory. I am in com- lete accord with your (Eisenhover 1 s) views as to decorating for Clart and his arty. Give him my thanks for his courageous and able erformance of a hazardous task. 11 Final re arations for TORC are being buttoned u fast now. Generals Clark and Eisenhower and 52 other officers will leave for Gibr �ltar ..londay evening to set up the AL..ie d Force Headquarters from which TORCH wil..1. be directed in its early hases. The final Com.antler-in-Chief's meeting is held this morning. To conclude it, General Eisenhmrnr declares: "This is our final meeting. All of us will be away from here by early next week. Admiral Cunningham has already gone to take naval command. I hope that our next meeting is held in Algiers-and soon! I am ho ef'ul that Allied Force Head­ .__1uarters will be out of Gibraltar by D lus two or D lus three. Later, we ho e to make French North Africa our springboard for carrying on o erations elsewhere. The French, if they go along with us, are going to be the bosses in North Africa while we go to fight else"\',here. 11 1 can't possibly express to you my gratitude for the fine work all of you have done. I ap reicate it more than I can say. Fro.n the ver start I have been aware of a great and fine devotion from all of you, The work you have done has been highly successful. Given a fair break on submarine activity and the weather, TORCH is in-a success. This success wil� be due to this grou and I am grateful to each and every one of you, 1 1 One of the most int�resting developments at the final TORCH conference is a re ort from Admiral Ramsay on submarine charting. He declares thats otting shows that IC.ml, already well at sea, might run across a submarine 11 but, otherwise, everything in normal." The convoys are all rocveding according to schedule. They and the naval units are a �,roaching the Straits of Gibraltar at varying s eeds so they will arrive more or less simultaneously at the Struits. Each convoy is getting complete re orts on Axis submarine locations and activities. General Ei.enho 'er tells the conferenee that "there is every indication that Genere1.l Giraud intends to go along with us, 11 Hast, Giraud and other trusted French officials will be told on November 4 that TORCH is about ready to start. This wil� give them the necessary four days to ave the 'l'iay for the entrance c-,f American troops. Giraud is sticking to his re�uest for a Southern France bridgehead and the Prime Minister believes everyting possible should be done to get sup lies to the French in Unoccupied France. As a matter of military economy, says General Eisenhower, 11 we must give people in a osition to fight something to fight with. 11 He declares that fighting in Southern France "must be a develo ment, rather than an added feature, of TORC'R". 11 The drive must be to the east and where possible the effort will dovetail with French plans. To expedite invasion of Tunisia, lans • e Sousse area, which are being promulgated to land a small force from · 1 �( can be successful.~y held by a small gro'.1p. General Anderson asks what the French consider as the best possible time an Allied arm.r could get into Tunis . General Clark declares that the French pointed out to him nthe great necessity of getting in fast - -before the Boche . " He says the French hope is to have Allied troops in by D plus 2 or D plus 3 . Certain civil patriots , out - numbered by people favo r ing the Axis , wil~ have to hide in the hil~s until the Allied troops arrive . Help from Malta plus the actic ,n of British and American paratroops might speed the date , says General Cl~rk. General Anderson replies that he 11can 1 t get anything into Bone from the SC?auntil D plus 5. 11 General Clark terminates the discussion by declaring : "The Fr0nch want speed all the v.ay through . 11 A humorous u-able , resulting from General Clark I s r>forth African trip , arrives · from Murphy. It says : "Inform X (General Clark) that police incident at end of meeting proves to have been in..ocuous a ccording to investigation but our friends (the French confe r ees) regret exeeedingly that end of party ' s stay was so uncomfortable , Inf'orm X that he has not lost his pants nor his co~t mut he will find them here clean and pressed on his return . " Al.L arrangements for the North African expedition have be at Gibraltar , the remainder outlines the entire set-up to ( 30- odd war correspondents-., o are to acconpany the been completed . Four of these corres_ ondents v,ill with the task fnrces . •~ jor Phi lips , the PRO , General Clark . It has now been decided to send a message to Admiral Godfroy, co~,andin~ the Frenc~ squadron ~t Al~xandria , on D-day informing him of the landing and pointing out to him that there are no designs on French territory. Godfroy is believed to be friendly to the Allied cause . Tv•o messages probably wil: be delivered to the French Admir<-1.l one by a Britis'i naval official , &nd the other by an American state department officer . The problem of obtaining equipment for the French comes up again . It is r,eneral c1~.rk 1 s belief that both the Br~tis,., and ':.S . govern::ients sho'"ld both quickly determine what they can furnis 1 in the v:ay of military sup: lies and stirping a.nd how soon it can be maae available . 11Tt is obvious , 11 says the De: utJ Commander- in-Chief , 11that eqr.ipment and shipping set u1J for T0RCH!Ill1st not be diverted . Vnether or not equipment obtained for the Fr-=-nch is . to be put into Southern France or North Africa is a mat~ er for coTir.,anddecision at the time • 11 General Clark ::ia.1--,,,s one oint clec:.r constantly in hfa discussions . v;ith officers "It ar,1-ears to ;ne, 11 h"' says , "that it is ver,: important that re r1o not let the possibility of French non-resistance r,eaken our lans for active combat in the theater in case things do not go in the ,1ay we hope for 111 These are other problPms that cone up during the day : (1) The paratroo carrier force must know by 5 : 00 P!~ on liovember 7 v,hether or not the C-4 7s are to take off for Oran. The ships must be off by th&.t time in ordio,.. to reach their objective by H-hou.r (1 :00 A~!{)) . General Clc.rk is setting u~ 11a definite signal" for this vital information . A premature takeoff of the parm.troors wouJc1be disastrous since they c.:..nnot be r.:;ca.l.led because of hPavy lea.ding . (2) The ~rorthern Task Force is having tank and shipr,ing troubles. Gener&.l Clark orders the use of lighter ValentinG knks instead of Chu.rchil2.s . c__ rtain taken fro::! the shipSEtiR E t : �;w ; 1 -,,g 1Jj]JJ_ff ( Russian convoys so loadlng can star_t . t hips returning fro:n "ort: Africa nill t~en take the place of the vessels remov8d from the Russian convoys . (5) C'ene~al Pn<:terson is concerned over a letter declaring we might be able to su;. l~ the. ~.e.1.ta r force h,,r. air by D plus 5 . General Clark :r;hones General I::::~!ay and asks him. to , of our capability of suppl;r the .ia~ta force. by air , c.nd 11lee.ve out any reference stress the ne9d for this force to be accompanied by the m~.ir:ru.:n P?ssibl~ nu ..1ber of days of su~ply . (4) .Anderson is also alarmed .about a cut rn the K..!F5an~ X.'!1"4,, convoys proposed bJ the Br:L tish Director of ..1ovements. General Clark ana he a~ree that they ,,ill fight any r eductions . n In the c;venin:-;, Gener~l Clark attends the first shov. since ~is arri':"al in al!'!ost four 1:'lonths ago . ri th three friends he ~e~s ~ musica:, revi~ '\'-,.. ttThe Dancing Years . tt The general gets increasingly o timistic as D aay a:r:,1,roachP.., • He' s in fine spirits , des1~it,e terrific responsibilities anc long ho;irs of work . England -x- -!!- LONDONOCTOBER , 1942- -General Clark has an audience tod~y with Xing , 29 George VI. General Eisenlio- er and he go to Buc}·in:;hao Palace together at 11 : 50 A'I . The invitation v:aG issued by the King wl10 wanted to say goodbye to the two tor-ranking A..1erican generals before their departure for ?orth Africa , via Gibr altar , ( The generals are ushered into the huge brornstone palace , only four blocks from Norfolk House , and taken to the office of the king ' s secretary . "hen introduced to 'Genertl Clark , the mo.ndeclare: "I know all abo· t you . You' re the one that took that fabulous trip . Didn 1 t you get stranded on the beach r,ithout your pants? n Generals Clark and Eisenhor-er are conducted dov:n a lon g, cold hall. The palace , probably for fuel con.,ervation reasons , was chilly except in the section that was apparently the king ' s portion . The generals are ushe red into a huge room. All the chandeliers and pictures have been removed but it is still an attractive , well - furnished room . A small fire is burning in a fireplace . King George , i.n unifo r m v,ith the insignia of a field marshal on his shoulders--a wreath and a crown--shakes hands with the two Americans and invites them to sit down. King George immediately goes into a discussion of TOP.CHHe is th oroughly . familiar with the pending operation . The king told General Clark he had heard "all about your trip to Africa and I thorough.q enjoyed the statement in your cable that you had been for eed to hide in an "empty REPEATempty wine celJ.ar , tt He compliments General Clark on tta task well done , tt The discussion , which lasts 40 minutes , then turns to General Giraud and Admiral Darl an . The king declares emphatically that 11no one trusts Darlan . tt He then recounts meeting Darlan at a luncheon a few years ago and how his greatest remembrance was 11Dar lan 1 s shifty eyes . 11 Plans for the generals ' departure and for development of the North African theater are then discussed , King George appears to have a complete grasp of the military picture . Aptarently he is briefed often on developments . He expresses concern over the Axis submarine concentrations in the TORCH area . He wantsrto know what troops are participating and what American units will remain in England to assist in defPnse of the British Isles , The 40 minute talk is almost entirely military . �General Clark is surprised by the king's appearance. He had always imagin�d him as a nan of at least average heigh't. Instead, the king is of small stature. He carries hi"lself , ell and has a pleawing personality. The kin,; at one or two points had some difficulty s eaking. He has a habit of holding his hand over his mouth a great deal of the time. Only o ce or twice does he stutter. This comes when the king is excited or showing emotion. It strikes hi� as he bids the two American �enerals farevell. He falters as he says: "Goodbye and God speed. n A cablegram from General Eisenho ·er to General ,.�arshall concerning command of the 5th Arny, scheduled to be set u in North Africa, is dis atched to Tiashing­ ton today. ffif initial stages of o eration proceed as favorably as no� seems possible, it may become quickly necessary to establish a direct coordinating agency for all American forces involved, n the cablegral!l says. 11 1 am planning, in these circumstances, to use General Clark for the purpose and have already selec­ ted, from officers now available to me, key members of an army staff. In antic­ ipation of this development, it will be necessary for the army headquarters now being organiz ed in the United States to sail at a moment's notice at any time after November 15. I request that all preparations be perfected so that if it becomes deeirabi-e- to ship this headquarters on an early convoy in 1.ieu of some other unit of similar size, this can be done uic kly ••• , 11 General Clark sends the following coll)..-"'lendations today to the four staff officers who accom anied him on the North Africa.n tri: (General Lemnitzer, Colonels Holmes an Hamblen and Captain mright) "l. I desire to take this oprortunity to commend you for the manner in which you carried out your im ortant art in our recent mission to Jorth Africa. Vlhen you volunte red for this assignment I was particularly leased, since your intimate knowledge of the details of the o eration made it highly desirable that you should be present and participate in the conference ith the French re resen­ tatives. n2. Under the adverse and sometimes hazardous conditions that we encountered, your efficiency and hieh morale--although no more than I would have ex ected under the circumstances--made your assistance and presence invaluable to me. "5. In recognition of your able and courageous conduct I have recommended to the Com�ander-in-Chief that you be awarded an a �ropriate decoration. This re­ commendation has been ap roved by him and has been transmitted to the War Depart­ ment. I am happy to inform you that General Marshall in a radio to the Com,nander­ in-Chief, dated October 28, says: "I am in complete accordance with your views c1.s to decorating Clark and his party." He also sent his thanks v.hich I now transmit to you, for without your fine assistance our mission could not have been com­ pleted.11 The general also sends letters to Sir Dudley Pound, first Sea Lord, praising the uork of the crew of the P-219 and particularly Lieutenant .Je\'l·ell, and to Lord Louis Mountbatten, thanking him for the s lendid service of the three Com­ mandos. Although preparations for TORCH are com lete and the amount of work has slacked off pending tleparture of Generals Clark and Eisenhower, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief has several important conferences during the day. Commodore Douglass-Pennant reports on the location and submarines in relation numb!E'C, · �~fCRE J .... to the TORCH convoys . KME' has now passed the danger area where a sub was lurking -1 yeste r day . The Aquitania , car rying troops , is straggling but is in no dange r . Two · cargo vesse l s in anothe r convoy have had to turn back because of shifting loads . The weather has been extreBely rough but the Admiralty is satisfied with the way the convoys are moving . The greatest fear , and there is a slight ,novement indicating such , is that the Axis is going to concentrate submarines in the Western ;iiediterranean ~ Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman is called in to give Gener al Clark an estimate of the Axis ' ability to move t r oops into Tunisia . Before launching of the British Eight Army' s offensive , now underway in Egypt , it was esti ated that 2, 000 airborne t r oops per day , up to between 15 , 000 and 20 , 000 , could be transfe r red to Tunisia . Recent heavy l osses to Axis shipping in the li',astern Mediterranean , " says the British Intelligence officer , have led to greater dependence being placed upon obtaining supplies by ~i r transport . This had reduced the number of air carriers . So f ar as is known there are no German ai r bor ne troops in Sicily at present . Receatly about 8, 000 airbo r ne troops , bel i eved Italian , arrived in Tripoli . They are , repo r tedly , without heavy equipment . Mockler - Ferryman tel-s General Clark he believes th~t if we are su ccessful in putting our aibo nne forces on the Bize r te and Tunis aird r omes early in the operation , the Axis will attempt to invade this ar ea vii th their airborne troops . ( General Anderson ' s alarm over the propose d cut in KM5and KM4l oads is into next by General Clark . Colonel Hamblen reports this has resulted from optimistic estimates as to the number of vehicles that could be accomodated ships . A letter · is sent to General Ismay asking that "ever:- effort be made the British to provide additional vessels . " gone overlyon the by A broadcas t scheduled to be made over B.B. C. on October 51 by Admiral Stark is causing concern . It makes favorable references to the de Gaullists and r,1r. Matthews reports this probably will not b~ well received in the TORCH area . Conversely , ~.:at thews feels sudden cancellation of thA speech might jeopardize security . General Clark informs :Jatthews he will take the matter up immediately and that the broadcast can either be cancelled or modified . i,leans to take care of this will be found . * LONDONOCTOB~R , 1942-The inevitable , 50 lull has arrived , All of theD-day , convoys--personnel and supply - -are ~ell at sea . Al~ naval groups and escorts are underway . Most of the officers in Norfolk House have departed . The only business that can be conducted now concerns future operations , General Clark is in his office throughout the morning but during the afternoon , tired of peripatetically pacing his office and filled with nervous energy , takes a drive . The report on activities of Axis submarines is still good . None of the convoys has been attacked yet . Final arrangements are made for departure of Generals Eisenhower and Clark and their staffs . A special train will leave London at 7 : 50 P.~ Sonday for Bournemouth where the group will go by car to the airport from which they will depart , sometime early Tuesday , for Gibraltar . General Clark ' s only important conference of the day is with General Smith , his chief of staff . He orients Smith concerning arrangements made with regard to make-up of the Royal 'farine Divisi ij r~~ will be a major part of the Northern ~tfifir .f �~1¥,;:-u Task Force . Gener al Clark points out that the United States me rely agreed to r einforce the Royal Ma nes with additional ri combat tnits such as tanks and artiller y . Throueh some error , the Bri tish had figure·d on the "J. S. providing service or maintenance units . The question of a staff for the Fifth American army is also taken up . Genera l Clark tells Smith that the slate of key per sonnel should be published soon and commanding -officers c oncerned informed so they can be prepared for the withdrawal of certain personnel fr om their comma ds . General C~ark tells General n Smith that he would l ike to have Colonel Bowmanas his Army Engin eer . The skeleton of the army staff has already been agreed upon . * * LOHDONOCTOBER , 1942--J.rrangements have been made to transport , 51 antiaircraft wea~ons to Algie rs to strengthen this type of protection there . P.fter days of conferences and searchil'.lg by both British and American units , Air . 1arshal Welsh rerorts to General Clerk that the wee.pons can be taken in by British bombers . Thus , another , and j ust about the fina~ organizaticnal problem of TORCH is disposed of. The A- A carriers will r eturn to Gibraltar without refuelini:; . V'elsh is leaving for Gibraltar tomorrov . General Clark praises him for his arduo s wo rk. From Gibraltar , the Air }.1arshal will move to Algiers TTi Genera l th Anderson . Br itish aircfaft v;ill be available for this move. General Clark tells ~elsh that if the operaticn goes as planned , the two American B-1 7s and Welsh 1 s British plane can leave Gibr altar, via Oran for Algierr under fiehter escort . mels h reports that 154 Spitfires arrived safely at Gibr altar yeste-rd1.y . He brings the general a heartening r eport : The Br~tish Secr etary of State reports that "Ger man authorities arparently do not yet knm7 of our movements or intentions . 11 1 The problem of what to do with th e carrier transports iL case the aratroops are unable to take off from England because of bad weather enroute or a.t C n is ra taken up by General Clark v~ith Generals Doolittle and Craig , If the paratroops departure is delayed' after D plus 3 , departure airdromes will be ov ,rloaded , General Clark orders that the transports be r0turned to their home stations in event they cannot move out by n0on of D ;lus 3 . ·Such action ~1ill entail only a 24-hour delay in the subsequent movement of the pa·achute force to the theater. 0 The desirability of complimentary action by the 8th (European Theater) and the 12th (African Theater) Air Forces is brought up . Operations of the 8th will be facilitated if it is possible for squadrons to move to airdromes in TORCH theater when condition are un:ii'avorable for their r eturn to the tr , K. Thus , the 8th could strike at Europe from African bases during the English winter , noted for its poor f lying weathe r . A great deal of General Clark 1 s time , during this 11th hour waiting period , is devoted to planning for the Northern Task Force that General Mo rgan is heading . General Morgan 1 s directive from the British Viar Office contemplates employment of his force in Spanish Moocco only . General Clark says the staff is considering r possible use of the Northern Task Force in other areas , for example , Sicily , in case there is no Spanish intervention . Morgan says he is "eage r to get . into the s '10w in any locality . 11 He wants the Wa Office to broaden his directive . General r Clar k promises to look into the matter . �The Northern Ta.,k Force is goine to have difficulty gettin; into the theater at an early date . The earliest possible date of S a..11.ish forocco attack has been estimated at D plus 45 . The c.vailability of shipping is causine the bottleneck . Pri e Minister Churc:iilJ ii:: um:illinG i"o have vesseJ.s set up for Russian convo.y PQ-19 tmloaded in order that they may be ready for use by General Eorga11.1 s force . Llthough General Clc::rk has argued 11~·, should nu.ke evAry effort to set the date forward rather than accept a delay , 11 i t ct.PJ.,ears that , because of circumstt..nces sur r ounding shippin 6 , that the rort\wrn Task Force my not be r eady to sail from the United Kin~dom 1 1".l.til about n plus It ~:ill use :::hips that have already ""!ade one trip to the North African th o.t'x . ·or,~an is a .. are of the n. Gd for early action . The crm: is that vre must have r"asonabl~ control of th" Stri..its of ~ibra~tar as soon as possible . "3 . General 11orean asks General Clark if there ,1il I be any rE'stricticns by his head,::;uar ters in the use of 12t.L Air Forc e elem"',nts assigned to his co!'!I.ID.and . General Clark assures him that such forces -will have no strings attc.ched to then . C)teps are nov. being taken to !lrovide ·.1organ with an air staff and a political section . ·,.s. Need f or astro - navigato r s for the 64th Tr oop Carrier gr oup is brought to the gf.meral 1 s attention by Air VicP - 'arshal Sanr'ers enc' General Craig . The Air 1inistry is unable to furnish 25 navigato r s with the :r;-oc;_uestod qua_i f icc:tions . T .ese !'!!en i ... navi 6 o.te the gro11p tr.ns.1 orting Britis.c .1.. to the theater . 1 arc:.troops Tl:e Brit i sh have 25 "dea.c' r e ckoning " navigato r s . General Cl2,rk sets out im: ediate ... y to solve the i:iroble:: an, 1 fin0.:s the prop r n .vi;ator , get in~ the fro the 8th Air Force . General _,.arc'! connanding the 1st Arnored Division , r ,., orts to r:eneral Clt.rk. , _ The division , Jess detachments enroute -to 'orth /1.frica fo r the TO?C..f attack , i;:, nou in the Liverpool area . V:ard rer.orts the t tro of the remaining tank battalions are equi ... ed itith H-4 tanks; 11 the third -. .i.th :- 3s . '.1.he division is no-; cettine 1•)5-:n;n l! . f" . a1i-:u.nition v:hi ch will great y increase eff~ct iveness of the field artillery as anti - tan.."!{ r.eapons "l'ihen the outfit moves into action . 1n the evening , General Clark goes to Genera l Eisnnho r ' s outside-London retraat. There the tvio gene r als r ela."'{ and discuss the long-rilanned and nm7 in .inAnt operation . * LON'!)')H 1-JOV:C:ffi"t"2 1942 -- A disturbing , 1, cable arri ves this evening from ;r , '1urphy in :forth Africa . Gene:..·1:t.l · f.±:u:aud wiL .. not be a.bl e to leave Frr:..nce until Novenber 20 . reneral ·ast asks postponenent of TORCi-fl General Clark dashes to Worfo l k Bouse from his fl:?..t and r eads "The ::::isenho,rer-Kin~pin (Giraud) messenger returned last reporti11£; . thi:..t is is utterly i1possible for Kincpin to depart at earliest . Flac;pole ( 'ast} ::;up. orts tl-iis vie,1 , "I have ha.d severo.l hours heated discussion ':1ith Flapole ar:i. convinced we sh0uld yield on date . 11I a,~ telecrs.])hin~ the President reco.!l 1endation as I am vlithout favorable French High Com.T.c..nJ iL .. be a catac;trophe . , unpleas~11t as .:. n:..y be involvinr; t t ec.micc.l ni~ht until this nessage : from :½rseil.Les Uovember 20th at en:l. of 1::hich convinc'"d 'T'he '-elaJ 1 T that "'ORCH of t· ..o weeks _1! i.snorant �! i ECR tT _, 1 i..., insi~nlficant com_. >c..red with result involving serious o) •.o::;ition of Fr.,.,nch c.rillJ ..t r{o J to our l:1-1ding . . . t . ' .m 11 Flagr.·ole points out thr.t no •v.:1-rning of our im 1.1nen a tt ac k v.a~ 6 1 ven n ... b vr t~ ~•!,1 /. 0 that at least thre'"' or Clark at conference on October 22nd whichled him to believe four 1,:e •ks 'C{as available . 11')ur •. re..;ent ro~JO::::ition he sug::,ests anmmts to an ultimatu= of hostile action . ~·e 1:mst eive Kin; . ·-Ln a reasonc.ble time to prapo.:•e not mere.Ly his d.e. a.rture but Fr~nch resistance .:..:1 ··orthern France to designa.te his ref,lace ae~1t which un doubtedly will be nelat+age dP Ta:c.' igny c.nd arrange numerous .letails. These simr,l;y cannot be acco::.1 .)li::::hed in fcur d&:·s . 11 Cingrin does not sb.a!'e opinion tho.t :.xis intervention is :?renc·1 rorth iur:i.cQ ii: :.'!l!"'•:_nfmt Be b~lieves . des;ral·le operatio:1 .::or ..s is c. co':',btnecl -uropcan and African operation in f ,il.::. cooperation betv:een An"}ric&n an' Frenc:h fore 3G but he ic · il ... 0 to yield if ·ve fo.,~"'t on Africa!l operati":i in r.01 , -:;ranted he :.s eiven a reasonabls time to m~k h.:..s r-re ar~tions . 11 1 sugr;est ~-our ~1ost serious ccns::.d.,ra"-ion of this question as it seems to me that :..,, you are to accept Kingpin as a partner he i. entitle1 to three 1.eeks 1 notice ." 0 General CL.rk is furi"' s . He thinks th t ',urphy is knuckl.i.:ng dovm. to Fr":1c 11 prsss:rre . He .,aces his office and dictates this cable draft to a stenogra . ber : 11It s inconcc.:.vable tha'.; Tur.,hJ• could possibly recou.ond such a delo..,r •,vith 11 inti::iat.e knov:leclge of the oper-tion ~.., end t:10 • resent locatio::-1 of troo.:s ::.nd c )nvr,y:::; d'lo .t . · It is like ise inc "ncciva.ble ··o Ir.e that o-..rr ..ier"' fc.ilur~ tv c .. :1cedec to such der.1&.:1ds have bet.::1 ·:1u,:e 1uld result o.S i:i h_"L1~ t:10 French :orth Africc:.n Arv ne""t us uit'.1 ::;,,,ri01..1so. positin:.1 , Si1ch opr os.Ltion for the reu on stated ,muld -a'lount to &. c' uble - cross by ..:ast . 1 Cc!Il'lO~Jelie-re t'lat he v ould ie3I"ade himself to this e::-:t _ . '"l.eco-:1"1end .t :rov (Ce.1er J. ~rsh2.l) advise lur.hy h.:..s s:1;:; ested actinn is entirely out of the i;ue..,t.ion and impracticable; that we will rroceed to exec 1 1te this o.1eration more deter'ali."1ed than ev _r to blazt O'lr vmy c.s'i.ore . rL3 :nould be directed to tell '.ast. tl-iat we are cor:1in,t; as r,l· nn~d; tlw.t al nell and th'3 Horth J..frican Army cun 1 t sto . us and if he uses the inf or ,2.tion already fv.rnished hi n on tne o. erat.i.on c1,S to ti'!le of its e::-:ecut ~on to our disadvant&.:::;e, either by r..Jgroupint:': J.iis troo~-s to more effectively stop us; by disse;ninatir.,; the confidentia.'.. information !lur,r:>hyhas intru~rt.ed to him; or other,ise betra:ring our ca1.c..,e · e 1 11 ht.ns him hie;her than a. kite , he!l ·1e r;et c.shorc . 11 P..fter the "'eneral 1 s draft :i.s gone oyer , the follo\1ine is s1mt to -as' L'1gtrin: 11Tt is inconceivable that ··cGrman (":-:rph_·) can r~cor.:1:.1 s·,,;.ch a delay \"ith Nl his inti "late 1mr- ledP'e of the oper::tion a..'1d the 1,Tesent location of troops cdcl 1 convo:·s aflo&t . It is lik"l,1ise incor.ceivable to :ne thct ot.r uLre :'ailure ~0 crncecie to sucll d2·:1a..ridsas h:ive be n ma•2e w01:.ld result in hav in.; the French rorth P.frican army .neet us v;i th :::er lous op 1 osi tion . neco"IL1end the President ad,1ise "cr-o, t:.!l i'!lW'!diatCJly that his sug1:.,stnc'l actinn ·s utterly i 1possible in vim. of pre.::ent adv~nced state of o~,e 'a.tion , &.ml tl:"'t r:e .:il proceed to ex8cute thi.s operation with ,!lo~·e determi.'lati ~n tha.1 ever . ·:_ sr.ould also be directed ,10t to divul:;:e on Novr 1ber 4th the exact date of the operation unle'1G co:nplete coo •.1ero.tion by Fl~.[;.JOl"' :.s a. ·ured . Subm:.i.rine r!ill re iain available for the r:resent . (rr 1e sub com ·a..'1dcd bJ Capto.in \"ri_;ht that is l:,in 6 off the Sulf of Lyons) v il not ~fy 1crrov:an ,~·he.:i it becones necessary to i7lthdrav.r . 11 0 This new development is handled by Gener~l Clark alone since Gener::;,l ~isenhm1er c n .ot be locate • It ,.:.1 not change any o::the pbns . But it naturally nilL bring a lot of a_ .::,,rehension . �:SECRET . I' ' ( ; ,I. General Clark hol ds a fi nal conference toda y with most of the section heads with whom he has been \ror ki ng so closely for the past several we .ks . The high-ranking officers sit around the Deputy Commander' s desk in a seni-circle . Present are : Generals Cruenther , Craig , Lemnitze r and Gale ; Bri gadiers '1ockl er Ferryman , i1c ;lillan and i'!hite l ey ; Colonels Vandenbur g , Holmes, Sti rl ing and Hamblen, Commodore Douglass - Pennant and ~. Matthews . Ir. 1 Vle ar e approaching the end of our harmonious collabor ation ," says Genera l Clark . 11At noon tomorrow I am l eaving Norfol k House . It has been a pr ivilege and a pleasurP to work with all of you . I brought you in today to giv e you a last m inut e survey of developments (th e conf er ence occured hours befor e the :.-'lurphy cable) so you wil l kno~ the status of things . Tomorrow I will be in c onference most of t he aft ernoon with the Prime Einist er . This probably will be my last meeting with all of you . As you know t he last part of TORCH planning ha.s been lar gely politi cal : att empts to pave the way for our Nor th Afri can landing and an attempt to get General Giraud out of France . 11 "All the data on these political developments had been sent to Generals Ryder and Fr ende ndall so that they can r evise , a s practica ble , plans f or their l andings at O n and Algiers . I know they are going to want to go in with guns ra firing . l.e IIIUS impress on them the political t deve lop ments that have occured since their departure . " l General Cl ark turns to Douglass-Penr1ant and t elJ_s him : 11I want to board the sh i ps that Generals Ryder and Fredendall ar e on when these vessels go through the St r aits . Is it possible? 11 Douglass - Pennant says it v.ill be diffi cult but he thinks it can be arranged through Admiral C unningham . General Cl ark says it is imperative that the two Task Forc e generals have the l atest background . Information has been r ecei v ed that Gener al Nogues , governo r gene r a l of French Ho rocco , a1parently isn 't going to take a stand r egarding American collaboration. The De,01ty Com. .:ander discusses this and is told that it will be possible to go to Fez, ar rest Nogues and put a sympathetic office r in his place , just before H hour . Departure of GPneral Giraud from France has bePn held up 48 hours because of r epor ts of a Br itish fleet in the .Iedite rranean. Druglass - Pennant say the :w is only one large Briti sh ship in the r egion . Aprarently , it htcs been mistaken for a fleet ! General Clark repor ts to his group that the weather in the TORCH region has been tmusually bad during the pa st few days but that the storm front is moving east . "Tfaybe after this sto r m we will get a good br eak in the weathe r, " says the general . He reports that 18 more transport planes have been promised from the TJ.S. and that the ai r transrort i-, obl em is looking mo e optimistic . He te l ls the r r officers that the Germans in Afric a ap_arently are attempting to locate the short wave radio through which ·ruri:hy is coITL:runicating Vii Gibre,ltar cc.nd for that th , reason , 1iurphy will remain silent for the next two days except in ca ... of emergency . e ( One of the toughest problems facin g Allied Forc e headquarters is to meet the r equest to supply arms through the Southern France bridgehea d General Giraud plans on having when the Germans sweep into Unoccupied France . Because of lo gis tical prob lems , it will be impossible to suJply this materiel . There i~ unsuffi cient time and General Clark says nothing can be done abOL1t gett in g this equipment in at the present time. After the No th African situation r @i!. arifies , General Clark believes certain artillery and am:rrunition can be ship 1 e,= fro m Nort~: Afri ca to Southern France. The French are to be told that it is impossible to send the supplies into Southern France for at lea r t ETwecl<s . tw~stdf �ECR EI~ One clcvelopm,nt has occured in :forth Africa since renere.l Cl· rk I s secret rendezvous the. t ha proven the faith of General •· st and his staf~ . The French _,eneral I s air officer has be n made commandant &t faison Blanche ·.:..irr,ort . That is where the paratroops are to land ann the air officer is the one· o proaised h , ould switci1 on the airport light::: at the r•roper tim n it., my o n h~.nd . " 0 Gener· 1 1·ast has sent , thro12g:1 1•- .r 1 !:_:•i."lstr1~ctioni: on hm P .ne sho,,ld be , at ... acb:d. 'T'he landi!-i_; assa lt should be- ..1a~-- against a ,oint le:; <~lomP.t?rs northwest of ?0:10 . >-ie str sses that the rort of Pone must be tb.k~n fro th<> rear. r: neral Cl~_rk asks 7ockler-Fcrr~rman for an e•.al-t;ation of :&st rs r co ~ .1enr:la t.ion a!ld the ::?rj_tish TntelEgence Officer shakes his head and says : "' " 1 ... 1 j ar,t hrve 0 to take the Bone suggestion at its face value . ..a:::t also lnfor .. .., ':.' RC':I LJuders that a Colonel Lorteer has tronised to 1:;ive the PJne:::-ic,.ns na friendj_y rece tion 11 at Sici Firouch . 'w.et implores thc.t if "an e::-:cited lrab II fires d ring the landine thc:.t the Anerico.ns are to ;,e.y no attention . :a..,t also r.::..1<..., that l l.i.ai::on offic r be sent to hi::: 19th army hec.dqua::-...er::: at Algier~ , 0 "Th t r s the dopf' u::.--o d~ te , rr says ,..."'neral C ark . t of -;; u knm-: the curr"'nt statu::: of things . 1 just 11 T.u.nted to let al} Brigadier ~ockle-~-Ferrym&.n then bring~ u~ the subject f a u.111'Il;;rp ruch1.J.,e drop on "'icily . The Bri tich wo.nt to droJ durn ies on ,, ,ninr:.s ~ 11to create &l rm .. unr! possibly br:.n~ part of the It~li .n fleet scurrying to Sici~y , 11 "'his , ill reel ·ire t'1e use of only onv Lib rator :::o the General tells .!oc!:ler-Ferrymu. to inform the Bri tis~. tl1 .... thPy ca!1 • roce d . !mot 1er . est ion th t is broub t U,i-, t .:..s the s1nug.__.Ln::; the promised 2 , 00 ".'lea. ons to :' orth r:.r~ica , Al though General of Cl"l_rk ma-"e arran.c;ement., for t1'1is ~-hp,n he vms in Gibralt r , no v:ord hb.S be n rei:! .:ived concern in; the del.i.ver;r of :.he ,.ea. onr. 1 Co· nodore Do· '"'l ss-Pennant makes a report on subm&rine ac ivi tie • 'I11e situat · on is excellent . 0ne v .r·:r sr.ial.1. convoy · P. ears to be bein 6 shacm,ed '· y a lone sub but the ~... is ap::-arentl:r knm-rn noth!n~ about the other larcer convo.'s. All the convoys are ahead of schedule bec,.use of the northern gale thc.t has driven them fas-Vthc.n planned . The sea has be""n ro"~h and a lot of the troops undoubtedly have 1 een seasick . One convoy--K .PZ--i" 36 hours ahAa cf sc edule and is mastini:- t.i'lle by cr-.dsing in thP- vicinity of the P.zores . rr :Fl is Hastin[ 70 miles . The auxiliary aircraft carrier nasher has lost on° en.0 ;ine e.nd nov· has a top speed of only 13 knots but th.Ls \"ill not inter.f'-rwith its e1'1plo;,-,ent in TORr.1 • ':'.'he bt.t lt>shi, Furious has arrived ::.t Gibr ...lb.r .:ind lc....'1.d"'d s"'veral Ep:..tfir~s . :.dniral C.;nninc: 1 am and his staff are safely into Gibrc.J. tar . mhe I'r ~ tich navy estimutE..s that 2s Ger"'lan sub!:larines ere in the reditern.ne ~1. :s ;i-t , ther_ are no indic::.tion:c. -:.1~t th y are concentrati.'1~ in the ~·e:::tern n' o:: +t ~el. . 1 One hehl'tenin._; r _ "•+--.L:~.d.:..cn.tive of th<> securit-,,r of 70RC;I--:'..::: that c. Fr nch 11stu.ff':d c.Y.1vo;rl:1<..s j":s:. lef+ ,..a::::a'.)l.:.::1.cu Da ar. Tt is for it_1 a .nition . 11 L~rnt no.nt Solon"::. Raft ""nd. ·:::..jor Yarborou__;·- co c L-: for a final di~~u. sion of pc:.ratro,p o,er::.tio~::; . Ra.ft sug.::;est:::: SU';J~S7, Lhi,~ b.; c1~i.1~ 10 tr::.!1 _art, t e h .J-1uc...rt ~~ c.nd one ~0· ,::'2:1~· :1is ba::.talio!1 co';:.l be move.: from Oran to Bone of on D-d,.y . ,.,'1.is force cou:d jlnp if nece::::sary b'.lt .ould ex;'ect to lWl' on :.he Bone ~ir. ort i~1 the tr::..ns_ ort.., . The • l:,nes '\70'lld return im edie • e l;,r to Oran and brin~ u enGi1ecrs .ni infantrr to reli:v-0 the ~aratroor,::: fer oth r missi0n,. 0 Colon3l Gale re orts th&.t the Flyiag Fortresues are set up to ue.art from t'1e Bournemout::i area early Tuesd&.y mor."ling . Fifty-five .,ersons ar schec.uled to fly to the Gibraltar headquarters , Tr.o of the six Fortresses vii l. remain at Gib raltar . .,~ SECRET -- �<r]O- ( LONDON - BOURNEW'UTq , NOVE! 1BER 1942--Gene r als Clark and Eisenhower , preparing 2, to leave for their command post on Gibraltar , pay a final visit today to Prime ',iinister Churchill . Mr. Churcl1ill is ebullient . The drive by Alexander in Egypt , has begun to click and the British forces are advancing and causing Ront'lel, who has returned to the battlefront from Germany, to re - gr~up his forces. Second reason for the Prime 'Hnis t er I s jub lila tion is the movement of convoys . "rfot a single submarine nor any enemy aircraft has been sighted . Ap_arent~y, the Axis knows nothing of the move. The two generals lu.11chwith the Prime Minister at Number 10 Downin& Street and most of the conversati on revolves around TORCH ~Jr. Churchill is briefed on . la.st - minute developments . Be is not particularly perturbed about the Giraud-ffa.st reaction to a landing in the near future . Like General Clark , he believes Giraud is bluffine and that he wil 1 fall in lin e when he sees how r esol~te the Americans are . ately TThenth e two American generals leave the British bids them farewell . His on~y com:'lent concerning "Go <lbye, good luck and God bless Pri!Ile '~iniste r affectionthe imr.'1inent operation is : you ! 11 General Clark remains at his Norfolk House of fice until noon . During the morning he holds a few quick conferences concerning la st-minute cables from Washington . He also goestto Grosvenor Square for an hour 1 s conference with General Eisenhower . Fol~owing the luncheon and conference with the Prime Minister , the Deputy Conrnander- in - Chief returns to his flat , to pack and prepare for departure. At 6P ,!.1 a fe w clos e friends of the Genera l go to Hays '1ews for a fare wel l . drink . After the small cocktail party , the general drives to Addison Road statlon to board the special train that is taking the 54 officers and t ~o enlisted men to Bournemouth where they will be driven to Hurn airdrome , a British station , to take six American Flying Fortresses f or Gibr altar . The train has been pulled into a little-used station and the _ place is well - guarded by British bobbies and British and American military ~-olice . Ea.ch of f icer and man is checked through the grilled gates leading to the trainyard , Then they are esco r ted to the 11- car t ra in . It is a-strange sight . The only lights a.re :flickering coa l- oil lamps ; there is a semifog . The train is comp letely blacked out . Inside most of the officers are sitting in a club car , British and Americans sitting side - by-side along the walls with a long refreshment table running down the middle . The development of f reindships , and resultant close col l abor ation , between the Br itish and American members of the TORCH staff , has been surprisingly fast and pleasing to General Clark . That this close personal collaboration has resulted is shmvn in the mixture of officers along the conference table . ( The train departs from London at 7: 37 P~~ and dinner is served aboard . Just before the departure an important cablegram is received . Giraud , informed that plans can 1 t be postponed until November 20 , has agreed to come out of Unoccupied France 1 He will be picked up by the submarine that has been v,aiting off the Gulf of Lyons so lon g . This means that Giraud might not get into No rth Africa until a few hours before-or possibly after-H-hour . General Clar k is tre~end usly pl eased . At 11: 23 P:,1the special train , going by the code '17rd ALIVE and moving with o only brief and infrequent stops , the train arriv es in Bournemouth . The pass enge rs wil be awakened when it is ti me to drive to the airdrome . ~ SECBE ._.:i1 .. l~~;~~r:1l1~.G :::~~: •;:;lr~'.l~t �( BOURNEMOUTH , NOVEMBER 1942- - Everyone is - LONDON 3, 3:45 AM Breakfast is served aboard t he train at 4 : 15 . period of waiting . The weather at Bournemouth is clear fr om Gibralt ar are tha t the visib il ity there ·is almost about our taking of f today . awakened by batmen at and then begins a long and col d but reports zero . Ther e i s doubt Because the stand i ng tra i n will menace se cur i ty and since Axis raids over the Southern coast are f re quent , the t rai n r obably will be moved elsewhere . At 6 : 45 AM another weather r eport i s received from Gibraltar . A takeoff today , woul d be inadvisable . Then come:; the prob l em of what to do v1i the train and th t he Al l i ed Force headqu ar ters of ficers . The f easibility of tak i ng them to Sali sbury and hav i ng them whil e away their time in the old Castle headquarters of General Clark is considered b~ Genera l s Eisenhower and Clark must be somewhere where they can keep fully info r med on TORCH developments . The train has a scrambler te l ephone that can be pl ugged in anywhere but it is finally decided to return to London, with as many off i cers as poss i ble remaining on the train . A takeoff late tonight or early tomorrow if hoped fo r . At 7: 12 Addison Road pr ime r eason Gibraltar as passing throu at Gibraltar AH the special train starts the return trip to London, arriving at station at 10 : 52 . Disappointment at not getting off is great . The is that time is of the es sence ; the headquarters should get to soon as possible since the first convoy--going to Algiers - -will be 5h the St r aits on the night of November 5-6 . Continued bad weather will bring serious complications . ¥Then the train arrives in London, General Clark proceeds imillediately to his flat . Al~ office r s are requested to remain away from Norfolk House and Grosvenor Square . By mid- afternoon , al~ officers are to phone and find the time the train is scheduled to depart . General Cl ark confers with General Eisenhower at his hotel room. No vital cables have ar r ived , The convoys still apparently are traveling undetected . The British navy is astounded at the success of the convoys r movements . The Axis appears to be in the dark about TORCH With the exception of . the three ships on which the cargo shifted , the convoys have gone forward without a hitch . The weather report in mid-afternoon is more dismal than ever , Takeoff tonight or tomorrow morning is im ossible . General Clark and his officers \7il~ have to wait in London another 24 hours , They are as impatient as fire horses that have heard the bell and can ' t get hitched to the wagon. * * * LONDO:N.,.BOURNEM:OUTH 4, 1942--Unable to stand the inactivity , 11TOVE!:'IBEq after so many hectic weeks and ti r ed of waiting in his flat , the General goes to Norfolk house to ~o through the incoming and outgoing cables and confer with General Smith who is remaining in London to imgrate cables and take care of rear echelon matters . The convoys are still proceeding without incident . Everything , except the weather at Gibraltar , is good . ( In mid-afternoon , a Gibraltar weather report comes in and indications are that the takeoff can be ma.de tomorrmr morning . The special train is to leave Addison Road station at 9 : 00 PM General Clark confers again with General 'Risen. hower . There has been no word on whether or not the submarine has · succeeded im gettin Giraud out of Southern France , The convoys are still undetected . -- �r The sarne scene as two ;:iights ago in r pcated at Addiso:i Roa station . The quiet checkin.; in of officers by tte ..,tation guards ••• the flicl-'-erin y-allor. la:ips beside the blacked-out coaches •.• the officers seated in the cl:b car . At 9 : 09 Pi , the special train pulls o·,.1t a 6ain for Bourne.:1outh . Ag1;..i!l. J.inner is , served aboard . Everyone retires early since a takeoff "ltlSt come today if the pro ...-Jeri:reparations are to be made at Cibral tar , The F ... ying Fortresses '\':ill take off if there is the slightest hope of getting through . The train is n aring Bourneoouth at midnieht . 0 , ENROUTE GIBRALTAR FLYING FORTl.ESS 1IOV..,. TO BY , J3?R 5 , 1942--Everyone aboard the special train is a-:-;akened at 4 : 15 :: : • .:':.ft r breakfa.,, t , the baggaee is taken off and loaded into trucks anr· cars at t':ie Bourner.1outh Sou.th station . The take-off is scheduled for davm . It is raining steadily and is quite col1 . Hardl;r a eood morninz for the huge !)lanes to get off the R. A.F. :::.irdro::ie at Hurn , eight miles from Bournemouth . The cars and trucks GTope dorm the mudd~ roads in a1 ebony night . '"hen the lon~ convoy crrives at H~rn , tha ~otors of the six Fortresses are already turninf; over . 'l'he cars C.."l.d trucks are numbered and they drive to the J..,lanes ":i th corrPS.._Joncing numbers . /}eneral Clar'' and his party are ridin 6 in plan.e number 2--the Boomerang IT , +he same sh.;.p that +ook General Le"'.'.nitzer to Cibra2.tar a..d return for th: fc..:-i'"'d'forth !_fr ica:1 +ri:, 'l'J.ie p::..lot 5..::;Captain '".,..,. Connors . ':'lL baggage i~ sto=ed a'board quickly but ::.. L .,omet.:. _..t) be.'..'oru th.J t tak,)off . mh':l oth:r ::'i"li planes .i.n the Cibraltar ,a bou.'1d gro1..p are disp€rt::ed around th:: 1:)lack a..."l.d ·--1.rfi-ld . ,~l ,_ +,hat can be :::een of th'3:J is the.i.r glo ..,.in.z exhaus+ .... ro. Th party in G~n--ru.l Clark 1 .., pt..rt:r board the Boomeran RidL.:i_, in th~ raJio compart 1<>nt are General Clar~ , C lone ls Gale and Turner (a::..r fore ) • T •.:. ~ ·tenc..nt BeardFood and Ctaff 2ergea.'1t Cnc.ney ride in the ship 1 .., ,10s , · i th tile, bombardier and navigator . 0 0 , The plane beurin the De1- 1.t:· r'o;-i;:ander-:,;n-Cr.:;_c:: takes off from Hurn at c A:'21 L ·, three m.i.nute::: aft<>r t½.e 11F •d r.reml,_n 11 \ .ich is car ... ~yi.1; General :isenho· er . In ::ivent of accident , thi;, purconnel ha~ teen distrib•1ted in the s~-"- planes so no key :::ien are in the SE..."!le >'ortre::.s . It i~ rainin::; hccrd; U,e c~ilint:; : ., 1..hout 208 feet . The Boomeran; ro....rs own the tarmac , takes off ea&i"J , circles the field once antl at 8:26 cro!.)S9s the southern ~ol...~t of "':n~la:nJ t ... , ~.1.... eads v12st out ;,ast lanr'is end . It c0!1tinues to rain for two hm..'.r.... '"' _. c .; Lins is so lo\'; . that Con 1or::: l:eeps the :Jl&_'1.e bdween 200 :..nd 500 feet . ~ i::: also ...,revents the plane I s moto-s bein~ p.i.cl:::ed;_;_p the radio detectors by in Occupied France . i.t a.bout 10 : 30 :-.•~the ceilin;:; lifts :::.nd.c.boat t.~o 'lliles to the ri,.,ht c.nother Portre:::::: is si;:;ht9d . ':'he noolleran;; th9n hea i." ::,o,:th , • .1!'-~j.ng <--long smoothly -until the coast of Spain is sighted at 11 : 18 :. •. 7\,. Fortress crosses scores of small fis► :.;.n; boat::: and tiny 3~c.nish end Port 11::;-1n~~frs~ghter:::. Except when crossin& bay::. , t1:le Fortre:::::: rcmins tv:o to three miles off th9 .cpani:::h alld Portu[;U-a..,e coa"'ts . About 2 : 00-P'· , -:.lo other Fortre:::ses l..rC ::.::.0 h ...... , flyir.1.; t·-o r:iilP::: to _~ the cast, The Poo:-:~2·a_ ls cr:.1:Lsin'-' along stew:iil;· at lf;0-160 miles an hour. It .. 0 ic rrakin[; good tj b ~ ing aided b:;r a tail\. ind. 0 1 ;:. \ , General Clark ' s • 7 £.n':l I.J6.:::::esthrou.c:l. the Btrc..:.t:: of r.i':;raltc.r at 11 :10 follo.:.:.n:: on the t&..:.l of u.- t·, o othGr Fortrc:::se::.. Non" of OT ccn'!OJS b.a:., been sigh".:.ed dur:~n"' the tr::..1 , wince i-C r&.n close to ths co· :-:t of ":Jropc . !t n, �SECRET· ( .1.: ::''J m~, the :S oI!lE:ran<., begin::; circling th':l Rock of Gibraltar . The :::hip c&11::. in to t'1e r'frr1:.ltar air _. .,ort ar.C: _;_~tel:- that it vill r!:a.ke the m.:mbrr tlir6c la::::;lng . There ar'"' f.: ve plar..es in the b.ir , -;ncludinc Br:::L:ish fichters that fl;y 1~ to loo'.:. "S ;:ysr . l"c a.re just ;·re .&rir:. to st;.:..rt ln for i_h) l:.ir.dini · htn t .. o.t:'~'.!:'1 at:...,. ,~ officer \'W-n::. all plane::: that a ":i'ello .. &lertn i., on ~nd tht..t all alrcraf· ' :::t remain aloft . 0 Inside the Poor:1cran 0 , 1:.. horn :::ound.: and all ci1-Jnncr:::lee.~ their n.c.chir.c ~~n..> T!i.e:r take 6..:tn ::.. . t[_t..:..01 ~.1 cas c1!,s..,.,_:, ... '""' a::.rcra:t appec.1:·. Soon the vir ~2 fill ed rrith fie;hter plc.nes , S; itfir ,s , l-J'urricane::: and the clo\i 2-nd 110 1., a.ircrc..ft ca.rr:i.Fr biplane::; . ri,hc.--o')o~erw.. 0 circles th<J Rock . The hc.::-bor _;_~f.:..lled ·--ith a 11 k::..nd:::of ship:::--nava.l , r'e~chant and sea.rlanes . There h . a trt:: endou::: concentration , a :'rime bombin~ ob j ~ctive . !.Lo , f\:.bral-:,~r ain,ort i:: crammed nith &irplanew , al 110:::t, .:... to Tiing . f'e:.1e:r-c.l Clar; . 1 s :: la..'1e circles 'o for ovEr c.n hour before +.J:,e t..lert P:1d::. ':':ien it is t_;_v~n clear ...ncc to hm·· . Con;. or::: noses the plane c.o-.;r. ..a..,t tbe ...ost publicized .:.'~ce of the f a.'!lous 11Rock . 11 The -::.r ~ort .:..r short anc1. e:.tends out into the bc.y behind Gibraltar . On hi::: fir:::;t +r~", Coru ors believes he i::: couine do7m tc f&r c~m:n tl e r"'m.&y so he rul .... the 1 7 z.ne i...~ fron s i '.J 20 feet uid I e circli:, the Roel again . 'T'he scconc: l andine is made at c;: ::" P' . C'eneral Cl&rk +akes a car L ...,;;,(intely to Government Fouse . General "'iscnho' ..er Is plane has 1::.lre;;.cy land"'J. • .Soon al:. the plane::; bu.t one are in . '!'he si:.th For+::-ess hat.: to turn bac:~ be c ~use of motor trouble . It contains, aTJong other;:, , G-enera::. Lemnizter ant.' "eneral Doolittle . It ril::. continue to r.ibralt&r ·1-0 Jorrc·.1 if the ; ea ther is GOOd r-Pneral ''acon - '~acFar l~ne , ~overnor of Gibraltar . , , alcome::: General Clark at Gov~rn:-.1ent House , After t a , the high-ranking officers and Genen.l '1acFa:•lane confer. C'ne ~terestir.f:> cc.ble has come in froD nr,.hy . It f ollous : 11 General Juin, French :forth l..fr .:.ca:1 commandPr , asked me to call last eveniq; . In order to remain in clo::.er li~ison .-.hich he f&lt ";;;.s neces&c:.ry, h"' decignuted for that r--u·poso tv;o of f ic"rs of his staff . Cr ..c-. of hi..: convcrs&.tion \,b._ tha:.. >''hilP. he hopes a.Dy rOi, ocation wil::. coTJe from the Germans at '.:hich time he r ou l d ask for :~erican r..id , he has crclers to defend Frc1-ch Lfr:.._ca at all cost,._, so that v:e should not ,.:iake the 12istake of uttacking b0ca1..se he \ ould. have to give orders to oppo:::e 'J.S . T mentioned thc.t ·t::1..Lsdid not .., e!!l 10 .:..cal since Ger .. ,.:., occJ.pios e mo:::.t of France but thr..t ·;:e would e.~pect I're1sch ir.vita.tion lf ·.w ever ca. 1e here i::i force . Juin said he discussed eventua:. Ame~ican aid ···lth Ad::iiral l'arl sn who ad mitted "his desire e:·pre:::sed to Ldmiral Leahy in 19.<1.lfor the :r. S . to tall:k to him when we are able to provide l arge scale assistance but that he hac. no com.:..tcents to ::ia:, at this tL." . 11 1 J 1in 1 s rr-2, Col. Chre·tien , C[.lled this ,norning confirming his supe r ior ' s conversation ancl sb.iJ they would. be g lad to r eceive a competent hie;h rankin 0 army officer to discuss technical m.atte rs r lative to Fr&nco-A.~erican military co,ieration ~hich ne:::sage T pror.rised to convey . "Alt-hou.zh not lo okin e for immediate in tervention botl J uin and Chretien exrressed concern ov, r A.x pl.e.ns for thls area and tl .e~ did not indicate i::: immediate anxiety concernin[; our own plans. 11 0 None of the gene ral s is r;orried about Juin 1 s attitude . -.ith Girc.ud and Last in the picture , Juin can be taken care of by them. }.s East • romis d General Clark , 11 J uin ? Pfft--T take care of hi~ j ust like that . 11 ECRE T. . I ~ . . ... Ir\ �( After dinner at Gover!lr.lent House, \':here he is staying , General Clark goes to his Gibraltar office . It is located right under the Rock and i s reached , after getting by two guards , bJr a 500 yard tunnel bored straight into the Rock from the naval yard side. The offices have been he'l'm from the Rock itse1£ . Spanish workmen are still clearing away the rubble and they present a security problem . Generals Eisenho~e r and Clark share the same office . Space is at a premiw.1, as many as seven high ranking officers being in the same 9 by 10 room . At 10 : 00 P'I Allied Force headquarters on Gibralt ,ar_,is opened . r 1ashin 6ton and London have been informed . V'hat a command post ! Under 500 feet of solid rock , reachable only by a long lighted tunnel . 1 3efore midnight the first TORCH convoy , heading far inside the ;Jedi terranean for the Algiers assault , is passing through- the blackness of the Straits. The North African attack is almost r eady to start ! General Clark goes back to Government House shortly befo r e 11 Pl\l. * * GIBRALTARNOVEMBER 1942--At da,m , part of the British navy has slipped , 6, out of the Gibraltar harbor. Several warships , including two of the four aircraft carriers , have gone to join the first convoy that snealced through into the i.iedi terranea.n . General Clark eoes to his office under the Rock at 8 :45 PJ.~and immediately holds a l ong conference with General Eisenho'\Yer. The Commander and Deputy Co!ll..c~der are concerned chiefly with the Giraud problem. Nothing has been heard yet from the submarine as to whether the French General has been evacuated from Southern France . The new headquarters , despite its cramped quarters , is functioning smoothly . The r abbit-warren offices along the twisting halls cut, through snlid rock are swarming with officers and men. Cables are coming and going . Of immedd'.ate concern is communications so General Matej ka is called in to outline plans for transmitting messages not only from Gibraltar to London ~here they will be sped along to rashington , but also headquarters communi9ations with the three task forces . Later , Admiral Cunningham has a long conference with the two generals leadin g the North African effort . At 11 : 00 AM General Cl ark goes to Government House for a general conference , , It is held in a sitting room overlooking a palm-tree filled yard . General Eisenhower presides . In addition the confe r ees inc~ude Admiral Cunningham, General Uason '1acFarlane , .Air '~arshal f'elsh , .t_dmiral Bieri , General .Anderson , Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman , Com'"'lodoreDick and Colonel Slocum . The first sub j ect that is brought up is , as General Eisenhower puts it , "the confusion of ideas on treatment of the Spanish . " The fear is that the French will attempt to take Spanish Morocco and sque eze the Am,Hican forces into helping them by antagonizing the Spanish . Giraud and Hast must have it mace plain that any move against the Spanish will not be countenanced, ~ashington also recom ends a policy of bluff toward the Spanish to keep the m in line but TORCH leaders believe this is unwise . General Eisenho, ..er is willing to "buy the Spanish off if necessary . -~-·--~-~-~-- �'75 ( The second problem is the handling or Giraud . It will be impossible to contact the pick-up submarine before tonight . The problem is how to get Giraud to Africa before D-day . General Eisenhower sug 6ests that a flying boat pick up the Frenc h general and fly him to Algiers . The plane would have the French tri-c clor painted on it and would be "a gift to Giraud . " An amphibious plane is not available so it appears a seaplane will have to pick up Giraud, fly him to Gibraltar . He would then be t r ansferred to a land plane , also painted with the French flag , and flovm to Algiers . Not wanting to confer with Giraud because he fears a conference on "conditions and rules , " General Eisenhower will pr etend he is stil l in London. General M ason- M acfarlane will meet him at the airport , hand him a letter from General Eisenhower and then speed him on to Algiers . General Clark sugeests that a French plane might be flown from North Africa to Gibra l tar to take Giraud to ,Algiers . Says General Eisenhower : "That ' s a good idea . I hadn ' t tho ught of that !" Then comes discussion of what if Giraud should balk on paving the way for the American landing either after he boards the submarin e or after he reaches Gibraltar . Admiral Cunningham laughs : "He' s thrown his coat over the fence . He will do what he ' s to l d ." An attempt is going to be made tonight to get in touc with Giraud . He will be asked to outline his order to the French N orth t.frican. It wi l l be expanded her e . If Giraud isn ' t r eached , the order will be fut out under his name anyway. "There ' s not mu Gir aud can do but go along with us ," ch comm ents General Clark . In event the sea is rough and the seaplane can ' t land , Giraud will come to Gibraltar by sub then be flovm to Algiers , arriving about D plus one ~ ne:tt Monday. The delay in his arrival wil1. be ci rcumvented by dispatch of a message to the French North Afr icans from him, or alleged l y from h~ . . J ( • One bit of disconcerting news comes in today . The swells in the Casablanca area are reac hing a msnthly peak . On Sunday , the day of attack , they will be f rom eight to ten feet high - -too severe for small boat landin gs . For ecasts show that the fi r st day that a landing can be made will be November 12 ! A decision on what to do with the Western Task Force probably wi ~l hltve to be made. Regarding this area, a group of French officers has ap~roach ed American consular officials and indicated they are "ready to coni'er . 11 TORCH plann ers are a bit wary . They are convinced the Casablanca force pr obably won' t play along but that the French at the Mediterranean ports will . It ap ears certain the French navy and coastal batteries wil: resist . Admiral Cunningham reports that the British Navy is set to crush this opposition in the lfoditerranean . General Clark comme ts n that the French navy will soon realize that "it has no place to go but out and no place in North Africa to return to once the battle starts. " Neutralization of the coastal batteries --ill have a priority status . If necessary , the navy wiL bombard them . The submarine situation is still "extraordinarily good" rep rrts Admiral Cunningham but K''Ji'2 · is now being shadowed and th e phenominal luck of not a ship lost might not hold. Shift of the Al.i.ied com and headquarters m to Algiers is brought up . General Eisenhower announces that General Clark will go in as soon as pos sible "because I must have someone who can act for me without having to conf er with ~e or get my opinions ••• This shows the extraordinary importance of having a deputy. I ' ve j us t had to have him . 11 General Clark probably will fly to Oran first to find out £irs£fuand the shape of American paratroops so he can report at Algiers , later in �( the day whether the par at roopers are ready to move forward . General Eisenhower wi ll remain at Gibraltar "f or some days 11 since it will be the point to which all commanders will r eport . General Ander son then brings up the question of moving anti-air craft equipment to Algi ers and Bize r te . The British equipment that was to have been fl ovm up is not r eady . General Clark says that about 24 50 caliber machine guns can be se nt up f rom Oran . Anderson , who r eports that the Germans have rut more bomber s on Sar dinia re cently , l ooks r elieved . late r, he becomes embroiled with Admiral Cunningham concerning the speJd of his movement e&stward to Bone and Algiers . Cunningham says he doesn ' t think it is going to be too difficult "since I ' ll give you a hand f rom the sea at Bone if you need it . 11 So that the commande s of the task forces may have full comprehension of r the scope of pol itical deve l opments regardi ng Gir aud and Mast , a pouch is to be delivered on shi1board tonight to General Fredendall as his convoy gets through the Straits . The same material will be radioed in code to Generals Ryder and Patton . The Co!lli~anderin-Chief ' s conference is to be held daily at Government House . It is to be patte r ned after the Norfolk house tri-week ..y conference at which gener al problems will be discussed . Upon his return to the office in the RBck, General Clark confers with Air l<!asha l 7!elsh concernint; his air movement to r Al giers . The general would l ike to move up on D-day and wants to be pre.ared to do so , taking a small staff with him . r.elsh believes it will be impossible . There will be tv.o Flying For tresses and ~i r !,1arshall -:''elsh says that the British are furnishing two Hudson bombers to transport up the staffs of Wels and General And~ son . The four planes , ossibly augmented by a f lying boat , will have a r cov.er of fighte r planes . The si::th Flying Fortress , ".7hich failed to r:w.kcthe fliGht from :::n.:;land yest9rdaJ , arrives lat3 this afternoon . It he.d q'.1::.te a flight . Thirty .nile., off the northwest corner of Spain it ·-:as attacked by three German J-188s . ~ch of the pla..ries, apparently at the end of a patrol and rannin& short of gas , attacks the big plane once . The co- ilot is shot in the shoulder . Another machine gun bullet goes through the glassed-in nose , narrowly missing Mr. '1a.ck. The third shot is through the tail . The plane , among others , included Generals Le.mitzer and Doolittle . The reason it didn ' t get a»ay yesterday was that its hydraulic braking system failed . The following cable is sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff summarizing the day ' s wo k : r in Washington , "To date plan has developed acco r ding to schedule . Principal preoccupation of moment is detai l ed plan for transporting Kingpin (Giraud) to Africa in time for him to assume French leadership in advance f H- hour and issue proclamation tending to r educe probability of ijeneral resistance . Assuming that Kingpin is now aboard submarine , am planning tentatively to transfer him to seaplane on Saturday with later transfer to land plane at Gibr~ltar which will take him to Algiers or some other spot of his selection . In view of tremendous value of minutes and in order to prevent interminable conferences here revolvin 6 around inconse~uential details I an VTiting letter to Kin;pin which ~ill be delivered to him here by General Clark . Letter purports to co~e fro~ London where I am preslli!led to be held by bad weather . The letter nerely reiterates Presidential promises and urGes irrL~ediate f~r; ~;~:~:~:~I. j~!1t[/i:if .: ·,. "\ �( departure of Kingpin to North Africa ,:rith aid of Americans . Letter has concurrence of senior British and American assistants . Plan is necessarily dependent upon good weather and u_on concurrence of Kin~pin when he has been contacted. 11 Today I was shown information by Governor of Gibraltar which bears directly upon attitude of Spain , and particularly c'·ncern of that country as to any foreien intervention in French '1orocco. At ·1y request he undertook to see that this message 1.as transmitted to co-:ibined chie:'s of staff . W''eather today generally favorable throughout region exce t that sv:ells on western coast continue to b~ difficu l t . However, we have received some intimation that we will be v:elcomed in sraall ports , excluding Casablanca and LyauteJ, and may expect so~e assista.~ce fro~ individual French officers and units in cutting off and sur ounding main orts . 11 For the next few days consider it of vS¾tal importance that channels of sisnal cormnunication between London and this headquarters work at maximum effectiveness • • • (~e might need) instant communication ••• "I intend sending Clark by ai r with a very small nucleus staff to Oran and then to Algiers on D-day if possible so that urgent operational decisions may be given on the ground and thus I hope to avo d any delay in prosecuting the advance eastwards . " "'lord is received late today that the French have 11d<>finite information • •• that two heavily laden escorted large convo ~ have left Gibraltar ." The second rs convoy sneaks through the Straits tonight . Still no enemy action against any of . the convoys t ( Attempts are made tonight to coillllltL~icate with Captain ~right 1 s submarine but there is only silence . Ap1arently General Giraud· has not yet been taken aboard . That , however , does not account for the sub ' s silence since it surfaces at night . Removal of Giraud is the only detail of TORCH that is not going according to plan . And, at this cruci al hour , when political considerations are paramount , Giraud 1 s cooperation is of great importance . This is the text North Africa: of the proposed te s t of Giraud ' s message to the French in 0fficers , ..:non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the Army of Africa : For 2 years you have scrupulously applied the conditions of the arnistice not withstanding the r epeated violations co:msitted by our adversaries . "Today Germany and Italy wish to occupy North Africa . America anticipates them and assures you of its loyal and disinterested suprort . We are prohibited fr om neglectitlg this unhoped for opportunity of recovery . "I reswne my place of combat among you . "I ask your confidence and you have mine . "le have only one devotion--France , one aim--victory. Remember that the Army of Africa holds in its hands the destiny of France . " 11 Whether it will be dispatched Giraud . depends on developments in the movement of When TORCH opens it is likely that certain sources will maintain that opening of the North African front does not solve the problem of helping Russia ; that it does not constitute the promised Second Front . Along this line , reports c•me in that the Germans have moved 70 planes fro~ the Russian front , including 10 from :~!~~~d~i~~l;~om Norway and 30 from the Front . They are being ,,ca,Ef~~;~~~.~rn * --,t.)f'i !:;~~~~~~ * �1 GIBRALTARNOVENJBER 1942- - 0ne of our combat-±oadea~vessels--the , 7, Thomas Stone , yarrying a combat team plus some field artillery units--has been torpedoed about 500 miles east of Gibral tar l The vessel , taking 1590 men and 520 cfficers to Algiers for the H-hour assault , has had her propeller and steering gear torn away. She is badly cripped and the troops wil l be unable to j oin in the assault . Since they will lie helpless until tugs can arrive , she wil~ be at the mercy of enemy bombers and submarines . Vessels are or dered to her assistance but the remainder of the convoy must continue on . Her f ate is uncertain . Lose of the combat team is serious but it will not affect the decision to attack as scheduled . General Clark impatiently awaits further reports on damage to the Thomas Stone . The second disquieting piece of news of the day before the attack is that no word has been received from the P-219 . '.nhat has hap1;ened to the ·submarine and whether or not Giraud has been successfully embarked from Unoccupied France is unknomi . These are missing convoy that ly bul ging are the two major developments as the day starts . •~ore naval vessels from Gibraltar harbor when dawn comes. They have 'joined .the second passed through the Straits l ast night . Gibraltar airdrome is literal with planes . The only open space is the runway. - The Giraud and torpedoe d ship deve l opments occupy General Clark during the early morning . Then, at 11 o ' clo ck he goes to Government House for the Com. iander in-Chief1s conference . The same two prob l ems occupy most of the discussion . General Eisenhower points out that to r pedoeing of the Thomas Stone has meant the loss of landing craft , as well as the use of the combat team , 1 .Another attempt to cont ac t the submarine scheduled to pick up Giraud is to be made this afternoon at 2 o ' clock . V:hether a message is received wi l l determine what action is to be taken regarding Giraud ' s proclamation to the ~forth African French. If Giraud doesn ' t show up , the responsibility of French cooperation will rest on 'Jast . Discussion centers on whether ':last should say he is acting in the name of Giraud . This is discarded as a poor idea since , if Giraud is still in France , he will probably be executed as a traitor . General Clark tells the group that Mast promised he would "act on his mm" if anything slipped concerning Giraud ' s arrival . Some of the high-ranking officers doubt if , in view of developments , :.last will be willin g to carrJ through . Says Admi al Cunningham: "He must . r He' s gone too far to draw back . 11 If Giraud gets out , General Eisenhower says that a cable can be sent to '1ast instructing him that "Giraud requests you to say and do as follov:"s . 11 General Eisenhower believes if the operation eoes off successfully without Giraud , he ' ll be chafing at the bit to get over and into the show and he ' ll be easier to handle than tho~h ho was in on TORCH H our . r.eneral Clark at -h says he v:ill await the hoped -f or 2 Pr! contact with the submarine before cabling 'furphy how to proceed v;ith .fast . The question of com"!unicating with the three Task Forces prior to H-hour is brought up , General "G;isenhowerwants to check with them but Admiral Cunningham says any com.nmication will be caught by detectors "and their positions wilJ. become known. 11 Instructions are that the Task Forces are to inform headquarters by 3: 50 P'! if anything has gone askew and they can ' t proceed with their tasks. If anything has happened that headquarters knows of that vill delay the attack , this is to be comnrunicated to ;,• fEt;::,:\:;: by 4 : 30 l"I . No news will ·.·:·"::~~F· t,:: · . be good �( news . W hethe r or not the paratroops are to take off fro m England for the Oran lan ding must be indicated this afternoon . If they are to land at H-h our , they I!Iast take off around 5 : 30 PT1 if th ey are to go in at davm, they VTill take off ; about 10 : 30 or 11 PM. One cr ui ser with the Algiers forc e is now heading eastward as fast as possible . Late today it is to send out a message in which it will report itself as a Fr ench f r ei ghte r . The r e ort will be that it has sighted heavy Al lied forc es . In this way, it is hoped to divert Axis air and naval units to the east end of the Mediterranean . General Anderson tells th e co~£eren ce that 11e as soon as possible so h~ can "sens e the possibilities to Bone . General Clark point s out that he has made Air Ma rshal \'!el sh and himself , and their smal.L staf at noon tomorrow if Algie r s is secured . 11The entire this aft ern oon, 11 says General Clark . feels he must get to of making a quick all arrangements for fs , to l eave here by plan wil: be wo ed rk Al giers move Anderson , plane out by Bri gadier "ocklcr -F errynan reports that intelligence data. indicates tho Fr ench 11don 1 t know y-et what is going to hap en . 11 The ships in the 'lediterranean have been inte rpr eted as 1 falta conv0;i-s. Admi al C r unningham sa!-s later r eports ar e tha t the French and the Axis believe the ships are going to attack Sicily or the Italian mainland . General Eisenhower says he is surpr ised that there have been no bo!:lbin6 raids on ribraltar because of the concentration of Ghip_ing and aircr&.i't . The air o:'ficers explain it is beca1 se of Gibr altar 1 "' e~~t e:ie range from r .P.xis bases . The final rep r r t is that the French navy ap:_..,arently is not alc.r.ned and is makin~ no unusual moves. General Sisenho~er closes the conference, to meet a gain tomorrow Hif there is time , 11 by repor'ting on the Allied attack in the 'a ddle Eas_t. It is going sp l endid l y . General Alexander is advancing , has captured 20 , 000 Ji.xis prisoners and 350 tanks. The advance is going even better than ex ected . 1 Returning to his of fice m1der the Rock of Gibraltar , rene:-al Cl'rk finds cable fro.11 the :f'.Taval "'lander of the 3::..stern Task Forc e . It says : 11If I an Co to carry any success in o eratirn TORCH r.iust leave TJ.s. s. Thomae Stone in 37 , , north 0001 .rest at 1200/2. Am zivin:; her anti-sub!n arin° :rrotection only . Ship is in no r'!anger . of sinking . Request im "ediate instructions . 11 The staff is elated . The troops , unless they are bombed, should be sa±'e . The Naval Co.r.ander is to l d to proceed . a 1 s submarine . Lt 2 : 25 P'.: a baffEng messa~e is r eceived from Capt~':lt 11 It says : Task .;one . Radio failing . " It is believed that the confusion results fr om garbled transmission of th e 11g;" that it should read : 11Task done ••• 11 If so , that means C'iraud is aboard the P-219 ! There is nothing to do but Y!ait and hoe that that assun tion is correct . In less than an hour another ~essa~e is receivP • Giraud has been pi cked up fro:11 the sub:'""a!'.:..ne a fl:rirr.; boat . He is proc e"'dinG by to Citr&..ltar ! There "1":il.1 no r:ay in vhi ch he can r ef.ch Afr: ca toni;:;ht so General:: be Clar k and Eisenl10' er will confer Tiith r.i:::i in their tunnel office and try and convince him to issue a statement r;hich will be sent to London for broadcast to North Africa . General C'iraud , a tall , unshaven , hol lor.-checked l!lan in civilian clothes , arrives at headquar+ers at 4 :03 p-· end ::..s taken irn'!lediately to the office th&t the Com. cr and his D, puty share . Captain 1rright , bearded. but grin._in;; , ·i.: vrith 'Jand Giraud . �,( Generals Clark and Eisenho':!er , T.i th Colonel !Iolmec fo r an interpreter , begin their conference . The r~d light bulb above their door flashes on , c:u-nifyinG no one is to enter . A £,'Uard is placed outside the door . General Clark dashes off fro;;1 ti.:ie to time to get docur:!ents . !.n u-:;ent cc.blc hc.s 6one to ,...Ta...,hl.r..bton informinu the Co:...-:bin<Jd Chisf::, of Ste.ff that the c:.11 im 0rtant conferr:mce is --..~nder-:.c.y. H 6 : 42 P~r another r..escage is sent from the rock-he'. "!l roo ... '-lwr the three encru.l:: e.nd th_ interpr"t-r ar" cnnferrir..b . It sayc : "Confer"'nc" ,ith KingpL-1, ""isnn,;:rhc·,er and Clark still in pr o,..;ress . ~in 6pin 1.,ill not broc.dcast ::.tatement until after he reaches ~rorth !.frica . Details for tra . sporting hir:c ther not ;r t completed . " 1"henever Gi=mer"'l Clar 1: co::1cs br::.cfl;; Ol'.t of the of. ice , he shakes his head and ::.-P~ his forehead . Long arc-urnent is alco bein;; consu.'Ilcd concerning the comnand relc.tionship . \ 0 0 0 Thile the conference is going on the "warning ord r 11 that TORCHis goinG on as .,chec.rled is issued at 5 : 21 P'..~ Ho 1-:-orc has be<>n received ! . fro!!! -Lhe Task Forcrs to declare th at a lanciing looks inadvisable . Si:nilo.rly , notr.ing to delay TOPCF ha::, cropped ur here . The order rEads : 111'Tarning order . f!- hol'.l' co nf irr.ied November 8 . For Ea::;t and Center 5 100 hou r s , G'IT, f or '~est about 0450 hour::: • .1-"..cknor-,ledge . Urgent , Fr om Eisenho':7er for !.BFOR ( London) " Orders ref:ardin 6 t elease of the f irst . TOR corrll:n.miq_uecome out . The com:.nmique will be relea::;ed in .,..,.asl.ington at 9- P:: CB , Eastern 'l"'ar Time . The instructions continue : "Relec>.se cor.1.:!uni~ue m.1.mber one in London and begin TOR broac:casts CH in accordance ,;ith (im:tructions) . Acknm_rledge . Ur~ent . 0 I( '\7ith all three men looking haggard , the conference bet, een Genera.ls Cirau.d , Eisenho: er and Clark ends at 7: 00 pr: . It has lasted just over '-.hr·'c h01,:rs ! Giraud , who :net General :,Iason- .1acfarlane j ust as the meeting was starting , goes to the nove nn o:,;' s house for dinner . CenerLls Clark and Eisenho'l"e r, v,ho have hc..d their bed r olls and er~onal kits Javed into their tunnel headquarters so they can spend the ni 6ht there , 6 0 to Vice Admir al Ste1.a.r t-Browne 1 s for a quick dinner . B:eadquru;:ters is trP.nend'")'!J.sly busy . The cables are flor.ing in at a terr:.:.fic rate . One cab l e that has just co:ne in carries exceptionall,, bood nerrs . The surf in the Casablanca area has dropped . The cable oa;rs : "Observations 7 .. ave .iber show 'noderate sea , but no definite S"i':ell. 'I'en foot v;aves fro:n east ol:t of Strait appear to hr.ve nullified sv.ell. Believe ··ehedia and Fedala (,,.:here ···estern Task For ce landings will come) viL have choppy sea with s,,elJ four to six feet hi 6h , This condition predicted fro,n 10 P'' 7 ,rovember until 8 : 00 .'': : 9 Nove:_1ber. Pro.. tected area at Fedala should shor· three foot ,1aves ." If this is true , the Patton f or ce TI ill be able to go in on schedule' ! ' Following dinner , and the r eason Cenerals Clark and ~isenho-:rer ate r--lse'l7here than Govern"llent House v;as because Genera.l ~:acfa.r l ane r an into a 1:1atter of protocol on deciding v·hether to seat General Giraud or Gener a l Eisenhower on his right . Rather than bring an embal:'rasing moment since relations ~ith Giraud are decidedly str a ined after the conference , the two American generals eat elsewhere . Genera l Clark returns to the office with General Eisenhower a t 9 : 50 Fi and the confe r ence is r esuned . Thines go f rom bad to Vlo se . Gir aud wa nts top c r d . He intimates he has been double-c r ossed , tha t he didn 1 t knovr TOR was so imminent . An aide , . CH going brie f ly into the confe r ence c oom he ar s Gen eral Clark tell Colonel Holmes to inte r pr et the f ollowing to the Fr ench General : nvre would l ike the Honorable Gener al to know that the time of his use f ulness to the Ameri cans f or the r esto r ation of the glory that i"IaS onc e France is NOW We do not need you after tonight l II That is . a l l h e cat ches before leaving the r oom again . l7) �( The second conference between Giraud and the two American generals last another hour and then breaks up . It has not gone well . Giraud , ap.arently , is not going to go along . The Frenchman returns to Government House for the night . He probably will do a lot of thinking before he goes to sleep . He vdll know that tonight French North Africa is being attacked. With developments , a return to France for him probably woul d mean trial as a traitor and death. But he still f eels that he should have cow.and ; that he should lead an effo r t planned and executed by Americans and British . Arparently he is putting his personal ambitions and interests above those of the France he professes to want to liberate from the Axis . As he leaves , General Clark tells Colonel Holmes to interpret : "If you don ' t go along , General Giraud , you 'r e going to be out in the snov, on your ass !" The text of the col!ll"Unique being released at 1 J.J! (from no~. on the time in this diary will be G eenv,rich Time) is as foll01~s : "United States Army , Navy and r Air Forces started landing operations during the hours of darkness this morning at numerous points on the sh◊res of French North Africa . The operation v,as made necessary by the increasing A.'Cis menace to this territory. ·teps have been taken to give the French people , by radio and leaflets , early information of the land ings . There combined operations of United States forces were supported by units of the Royal Navy and RAF and follm,ed by parties of British troops . , 11 Lieutenant General Dvl'ight D. Eisenhower of the United States A:rmyis Com.,!U:).nder-in-Chiefof the Allied Forces. rr C Reports are coming in from agents in No th Africa . The raod bet1',een Bone r and Bougie has been mined . The S. S. Janine has been "bombed" in the Eastern Mediterranean . This is probab.Ly the fake French ship the British cruiser is r eporting on to divert the Axis . Or, it could be that the Axis has made a mis take , bombing a. French ship that it thought was allied since the attack came j ust before dusk . The Eastern Task Force is informed that guides are set to be on the beaches . The combat team aboard the torpedoes Thomas Stone was a battalion f rom the 39th R. C.T . The "tunnel" headquarters is throbbing uith activity as midnight approaches . By novr, the assault forces have gone over the sides of their shi sand are moving toward the shore in the darkness . General Clark begins to circulate around the hall. He explains further what hap.erred with Giraud . The Frenchman wanted to assume complete command within 48 hours . General Clark continues: "We both told him that he didn ' t have the means to assume the command. I told him repeatedly that he had not conttibuted a thing to the initial success of the operation yet we were willing to bring him into it . Ike and I batted back and forth . I ' d argue with him for some time . And then , weary , I ' d nod to Ike and he rd start v. ·orking on him . Giraud remained adamant . Ti hat about the prestige of Giraud? " the Frenchman nould ask . •Vhat V',ould the French people think of .' me; what about my family . r I told him it shouldn ' t make much difference whether he was governor of North Africa or general of the armies . After all , he made none of the preparations . After hours of talking it was obvious that it was useless , that we. were getting nowhere . I think Giraud is waiting to see how things come out . He' s going to sit tight and if we are successful he ' ll come aro~md in 48 hours or so and say that he ' ll go into North Africa. He was very solicitous to me. He told me he would make me a Deputy Commander ~e offered to make him a l virtual king in North Africa , offered him money to build up his defenses and strengthen his army, He dem red , To hell with him 111 ur * �( GIBRALTARNOVE'lBER8 (D-DA) , 1942-Th e 39th R.C.T ., its ship torpedoed as , y it proceeded toward Algiers for the assault , has started to sho r e--150 miles --i n its motor driven landing craft t This is r eport ed shortly after midnight by the tugs that went to the Thomas Stone to give it assistance . The decision was made by the regim enta l commander. Apparently the American troops were not content to sit on the crippled ship . They preferred to go ashore. They won' t lmow exactly where they are landing but they ar e going in t General Clark grins at their pluck . Generals C4rk and Eisenhower labor perfecting the draft of a cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington outlining what occured in the conference with Giraud . Then , they sit down to listen to a shortwave broadcast of the President ' s message on a special radio that has been rigged up in the office of the two generals. General Gruenther briefs the four newspapermen attached to headquarters on last-minute developments . In all probability , no reports wil~ come back from the assault forces until about dawn. This is the message that Generals Eisenhorrer and Clark eooperati vely draft for the Combined Chiefs of Staff in V'ashington : "Six hour conf erence between .American Eagle , (Clark) , Kingpin (Giraud) and the Allied Commandr -in-Chi ef has just terminated . At beginning of conference, e Kingpin refused to iss ue any statement that could be broadcast tonight either fro m here or from London or r.ash in gton. He stated that he has already authorized General ~fast to make a statement in his name fro'TI Algiers tomorrow morning some hours after the lan ding and that no other word from him was desi rabl e or pecessary . He specifically insisted that no radios emanating from either national capital or from Allied Headquarters should connect his nar.ie in any v;ay with this operation . "At end of conference Kingpin flatly declined to participate in operation except as Allied Supreme Com ander in a position in which he v1 ould be completely independent to car y out his own strategic and tactical conceptions. :.Ioreover , he insi~ted that this position must be given to him at once . He stated categorically that by November 10th all forces then ashore must come under his·control and that thereafter all forces in North P...frica v,ould have to come under his command upon debarkation . He stated that the present Allied ColilTilander-in-Chief could retain control of base and administrative arrangements near the ports and take care of arrival of reinforcements , including supplies , but that he (Kingpin) ~ould make all decisions respecting the tactical and strategical em loyment of the -groops. It was explained to him over and aver again that the Allies hope to turn over command of this region to the French at the earliest possible moment and that in the meantime every effort would be ~ade to assist him in organizing and equipping his forc es . But it was ointed out that until the Allied Force can be well established in North Africa , there is no possibili t~r of the two governments disrupting the present present cor.r.iand and staff arrangements that have been so laboriously developed for the control of large Ground, Air and Naval formations . It was further explained that since the plan was already in the process of e::ecution there were measures now going for ward , includin; mov'3ment of convoys, the lRnding of troops and the assigru:ient of tactical objectives , that could not be chan~ed over night without the creation of great confusion and uncertainty . These circumstances prevent imr:iediate change in command and staff . In response to questions , he was assured that he would be recognized promptly as f!ilitary and Civil head of all French aff&irs in North P..f ica and that the Allies would assist him in developing.forces that he could employ as he saw fit, even to re-entering FrancA from the South and engaging the Germans in battle there . He is obsessed ~;§ECRE ~;; ::.~ -T _:-=-..-- �\ ( with the idea of moving immediately into France and implied that if he were made Commander, he woul d promptly use the enti e Air Force coming into North Africa in neutralizing Sardinia and in trans or ting troops into South·,rn France and transfer the fighter and bomber units to airfields in Southern France. Both the Eagle and I urged him to go along with us · temporarily on the basis previously outlined and under all the assurances that the President has made respecting French sovereignty and territorial integrity . Vie pointed out that eventual command has already been pro;nised him but that as a soldier hew uld realize that the establishment of secure bases and development of land and sea com.'l'lUllications would require several weeks at least. To all this he was com letely deaf ; nothing matters to him except ersonal command and he would not accept any promises of close collaboration and consulatation in the ordering of tactical and strategical enterprises . He even indicated that as Commandr-in-Chief e he could not be responsible to the CornbimitChi efs of Staff but that it would be my responsibility to deal with them , particularly in obtaining necessary reinforcements and su lies f r om the Allied govern.ments , after -which he alone would direct their employment-- whether in North Africa , in Sardinia , in Sicily or in France. Alt hough it was laboriousl y pointed out that the Al lied Com.mander-in Chief did not possess autho rity to create an echelon of comnand that would be superior to hi mself and that any such arrangement would have to be previously approved by the two governments , Kingpin stated that he could not accept the delay in volved . rt ingpin was no of guaranteeing non-resistance • in our Kat ta cks.said that , therewould not possibility attem his to do so . He seems to assume tonight and make any t however, that we will get ashor e and that thereafter he wo uld appear in Algiers in the uniforu of a French general and take cora~and. nHe v:as told that 'n our view the first great service he could render the Allied cause was to insure that we would encounter no o rositi n in landing so that al l forces and surplies ~ould be available for use against the com,~on enemy rather than against French.~en. It was suggested also thet his neA"t great seruice \,ould be the organizing of the Army , Navy and Air Force in North Africa in such a way as to make it a formidable fighting machine for assistance in freeing France . 11 During hour I s recess in the conference , I conferred with principal sub\ , ordinates , particularly Cunningham, concerning Kingpin ' s demands . Admiral Cunningham labelled them as preposterous and unreasonable in current circu.11stances . In my anxiety to keep Kingpin with us , even though it is too late for hDn to assist us in the role in which we especially desired him. I conceded every point he made except that only I must remain directly responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for operation of the Allied Force u..~til different arrangem ents could be made with the consent of the two government s. I even went so far as to state that I would support his ambition to command the forces here as quickly as he had completed the great Civil.and IAilitary organizational task in North Africa and he could place in the field arui organized Frencl1 force of any respectable size. He replied that his organizational task would be completed in t wo days repeat two days during which time he ,-;ould devote himself to the civil and military population and local leaders. He would , therefore , assume com.~and at that time as he had already planne . I careful 1 y explained that his proposal would make me resonsible to him on the one hand and on the other- to the two governments , which are providing all the resources and dictating the major strategy. He seemed totally unable to grasp the point that I could not be res onsible to two entirely separate agencies , whose views , respecting im"1ediate and primary objectives in the theater , do not remotely agree . I �tr.As a final word , he stated that he 17ould be. a spectator in the affair. He would not interfere v;ith our plans or operations but y;ould not take part in them and would not authorize the use of his na,'lle in any way in connection there~.ith. "This is the way the matter stands and we are proceeding ·.vith the execution of plans . w.iy i11pression , shared by the Eagle and Cunnini;:;ha:n is that Kingpin is , pla.yin,g for time . Knowing that there v.ill be some French resistance and that he is deternined not to lay himself open to the charg e of bein:; in any wa,r re.:;ponsible for the sheddi~ of French blood , he realizes that ho can do nothin.:.; ..~th respect to the la.n.dine ::..tself and cc:ill gain no credit from it , :i- ..1atter hm: successful. Consequently he is choosi. g to '.-:ait to see what hap. <=\nS His .n,3thod . of gaining time is to insist u on a point which as a soldier 'le is ,:~ 11 a...-.a.re the Allies cannot accept at this 11oment. If ,rn are generally successful tonight ,1e v;il · not be surpris"'d to find him more concil .,tory toCTorrov: morning since it must be obvious to him that in every v;ay we are trying to make hin the bi:; .nan in the re/;ion and give hLn a definite personal influence and l eadership in un-• ning the war . Incidentally , he categorically denies any knouledge of the ten million f~ancs request upon which ~e sent that a'llount to Colonel Schor. . ·~ut 'le says that Beaufort is an honest men and TTill spend the money toward fighting Germany . "Eagle and I are bitterly disa pointed , principally because of the help Kin.::;pin could have rend ered excert for his int ense personal ambition and ego and because v1e knei7 that the Combined Chief.., of Staff and the ·two governments were counting strongly on hi rn for constructive assistance . "Latest nev1s that ~re have been able to gather from Uorth '..fri c . indicates that v1e ma.7 expect considerable resistance whic)'i , if true , shows that 'last , opr,rating in the name of Kingpin , has not been very effectiv e . The Chief of Sta.ff of the Oran division has j ust reported , throu 6 h ~dy , that thei n plans have been discovered and that an intense alert is being conducted ." FLASH: 0238 . The Ea stern Task Forcer ports su ccessful. Landings have been made on the three says is : 11Tomboy A'RC 11 . in . Their beaches ! Flash : 0319. captured . that Generals The Western Clark Task Force and ~isenho~e r arc reports Sidi e lat ec . ~veryth:~g a::;sault has been the brief ~essage ~l~ Fer uch has been is goin; fine . Flash : 0322 . The Center Task Force reports that landings at t,.o beaches , kno'\'/Il. in operations as 11yn and 11Z11, wer e successful , "th e latt er unopposed . 11 1:fonews ,,ret frolII X. No firing yet Sea. ~mooth . Condition ideal. 11 Flash : 0332 . Landing 11::-:11 beach successful. Center Task Force) for u.nloading . 11 Shirs proceedin;; in shore I (From One garbled me,.,sage is r eceived from the Oran Force (Center) • It says : La.ndings unop1osed . Broken xx x shooting began . Do not start a fight unless you have to xx x • 11 11 l General Clark is ho ..,,ing in and out of his of,..ice , moving up and dov.n the hall fro o of fice to office . 11"e l l , " he grins , 11she lo oks retty good ! 11 �~ •"11"'.;' "~'1~:.; . if:f'."fi 1 . ~ · :~: :s~cn~Et ~t ";.1..,; -. ..~l ~ ( I j -' . , .;,, I, v ;r..f:..'\l,.'lt1'4t°'1'-• ~ i., The generals , who have alrea dy sent a cable to i'! shington reporting a on the fine reports from Mg±ers , send the fol l o~ing cable to ~'ashington regarding Oran : "Landings on all three beaches effected -:,ithout o osttion . Ships roceeding toward shore to complete unloading . No word yet f ro~ '~estern Task Force which is scheduled to begin landing in about five minutes ." Com.,1entsGeneral Clark as he waits for the Royal Navy to deliver more bulletins : "This is kind of like waiting fo r :eeturris ~1 coL1nin on electi,,n night ." tn ; Adrliral Cunningha..~ is the colorful character in the rock-hewn tun~el . He has taken of f hi s coat with so much gold braid and so nany decorations . He is wearing a white turtle - necked sweater and rubber boots in which his dark navy trousers are tucked . An air raid alarm sounds at Gibraltar at 4 : 52. Soon th e guns start firine and the 500 Jard long tunnel is filled i::ith people , so;Je in nightclo.Lhes . It is reported that three ene::iy planes are over the peninsula. . The din of the antiaircraft guns is terrific . The all - clear comes at 5: 09 . ~o bombs have been dropped on Gibraltar . General fason-~tacfarlane comes to visit the two generals and they discuss the Giraud conferences . Then the two generals take off their shoes and lie down in the con.ion office on canvas cots . At 5: 45 , General Fredendall radios that the "landing continues unopposed . 11 Algiers is silent . There is still nothing f rom the Patton f orce . The generals continue to catnap . · First contact with the Western Task For ce comes at 556 when Admiral Hewitt , com.nanding the nava l effort there , radios tha t the "operation is proceeding on schedule . A report comes in on the 39 paratroop planes that left England about 11 P'A. Two of them have made f orced landings , presumably in Spain . A third one is at Gibraltar ai rdrome . The Paris radio makes no mention of the North African attack in its early morning broadca st . Later , Vichy announces that D lan and Juin ar are directing the Navy and P.rmy The Vichy radio claims heavy bombardment of . Oran and Aleiers with attempted landing in Algiers harbor . The French say that al l have been repulsed . It is announced that Petain will reply to President Roosevelt later in the day . At 0642 a radio comes in reporting that the force attacking Oran harbor is facing fire . from batteries . TheRoyal Navy reports an 11 un1rn.m.n " vessel 12 miles av,ay at Oran . The French navy has lain quiet during the night but there might be naval fireworks today . There is no word on the paratro ops but six Spitfires with American markings were sent up from Gibraltar to escort the jumpers into Or~n. FLftSH: 0745--Th e J,l gi ers force , under General Ryd r , reports that ' 'aison Blanche airport has been captur ed . This ~as a prim e goal . Ryder also reports that air reconnaissance also shows that all bridges are i~tact in his area . ( From the Naval c~nter Task Force comes a report at 7: 45 that the Brilliant has sunk an enemy vessel (the type was not given) . Still no r eally definite word from the l7estern Task Force but Admiral Hewitt ' s message about two hours ago indicated the troops were going ashore . General Clar~ , whose code name in Gibraltar has be en his first name so he is ca l led "General Mark, " sifts through the handwritten messages that are cascading fa ster and faster over his desk . General Fredendall reports that both Ranger l andings in Oran were "unop~osed . 11 However, there is 11heavy f ighting fo r Turton hi l l battery . ·.~aracaibos beached but unloading .ECRET l �i;;i,.,i~• t · 80 not started yet . Consid erab l e a.position in Bluff (Oran) harbor. Our naval insh or e patrols engaged by shore batteries , " All indications are that the heavy going is at Oran with General Fredendall 1 s Center Task Force facing the heaviest opposition . He report s a litt l e lat er that his forces have ca 1 tured Cupton battery . The first direct wor d conc ernin g the Western Task Force is r eceived j ust before 0800 . It says "Plan A" being carried out . This was one of the three landing plans in th e Rabat-Sale r egion . At 0815 the commander of the naval unit at Oran reports : "Have intercepted French S . S. Jamaique escaping from Oran . Ahears to be fu l l of troops • .Am es cortin g her into Arzeu , 11 Another r epor t comes i n that the Oran airport is on fi re ; extent of damage, eithe r to buildings or runways , is not known. At 0939 , Genera l Ryder reports in that he is , with :1ast s help , moving to captur e Darlan , currently in Algiers , and take the I'renchman "into protective custody ." The only wor d from the paratroopers comes via the navy at Oran . The paratroopers ' observation pla..ne is circlin~ in the vicinity . 1'\1iat effect the airdrome fire Tiill have on the plan to l and in the planes so a quick takeoff to the east could be effected is not yet known, At 0930 , the Vichy radio announced that Petain , in reply to President Rooseve lt ' s message regardine reason for the North Afr ican attack , said : "There i s no j ust ificat ion in this attack . V'e will defend the Empire against any aggressor • .. That is the ord er I giv e you ... n antain disci pl ine and calm . " ( The crack Britis h battleship Rodney radi os : "Intend to engage ta r get P. 0950 . " This means the Rodney is moving up to fir e her 16 inch guns at coastal batteries defending Algiers . At 10 : 17 , General Fr edendall r eport s that his I1~ar bos dere acai discharged by 0800 , The X-force i s in contact with the French at Louriiier:.. At 1013 Genera l Eisenhowe r sends the following cable to the Combined Chiefs of St aff in V1ashington : 11Am makin g one more effo rt to dra i Kingpin into fold. Rimm I intend to r epe at my readiness to r ecogni ze and su port Kingpin as l eader of the Fr ench effort to save North Afric a and restore France , to recognize him further as the senior Allied officer in the r egio n with all honors due to him in su ch position , to cons ult him constantly in all st rat egical matters and to cooperate wit h him to f ullest extent . Also to do my best to help equip his troops , The only point on which I cannot give way is that the Combined Chiefs of Staff are my iwmediate command supe ri or and that any agreement be t ween him and me must omit the stipulations: that he can issue operat ional or ders to me. " After dispatch of the cable , Gener als Clark and Eisenhower l eave their tunnel headquarters for the fir st time since last evening . They go to Government House v1here they will conf er with Gir aud . ·:eanwhile , this message is dispatched to General Fredendall at Oran : "Clark with small gro..ip will leave Gibraltar by air tomorrov, or as soon there after as practicable for Algiers where he nill establish advance J...FHQ. Brief stop will be mac'leat Oran for conferencA with you at airport . Acconpanying wili be Con ,anding Genera l , British First Army, each with small group staff officers , Party wil l travel in three B-17s and 3 Hudsons with fighter escort . Fssential that as soon as a suitable airfield in your area is under control you specify its location and time when landing can be effected . " A naval scrap in deve lo ping in the 'lediterranean between British and French forces . The British rep - rt heavy damage to three French destroyers while one of _SECREJ �( the British shi 1')s has a hit in the shellroom , which if f l ooded . The naval repo r ts he e~pects to get the damage under contro l. commander By mid-morning it appears that everything i s going about as anticipated in TORCH French naval units and navy - manned batteries . are resisting and from secondhand info r mation it ap,_,ears that Patton may be havin 6 some trouble on air fields . Information f rom the Task Forces is meager but no questions are being asked of force commanders because of not wanting to worry them at this stage by demanding reports . 'i'Te do knorr that vre are fairly solidly ashore at Algiers and Oran o.nd that the ~estern Task Force began as scheduled . At Algiers we had to sink a French destroyer attempted to escape and captured a French ship attempting to leanefl Oran . The Oran airport that is burning is L~arll Senia . General Fredendall reports "hangar at L~ai)l Senia hit and burning , numerous aircraft in air and ground destroyed ." This is followed by a report stating that light anti-aircraft as well as heavy at both La Senia and Tafara 0 ~erdromes . The prime objective at Oran was the taking of~ Tafara . The report continues : 110ur paratroops aircraft observed fl ying over Grande Scbkra . About 20 . xx x Others se~n landing at 0800 . ro military traffic qbserved on roads nor th south of Grande Sebkra . ( P.t 105 7 General Ryder , at Algiers , is asked to "rush .,i tL1ation report . Pc.re d ondi tions s 1.li table arrival Anderson . 11 r fe,1 seconds later , tho intelligence section intercepts two messages f om the French Air Forcr- Si 6nal . The first , sent from Safi at 0930 says : 117S !ll!!l and 155 mmhave been captured . Aerodrome peri:niter hoing defended by three tanks . 11 The gvns ore ot:r caliber . s'..p_.:arently , they are .burs . The second '!lessage , se::it at 0952 , 'says : 11'.fa.ison Blanche and B.Lida aerodromes have been captured by the enem;y. 11 Looks like the Algiers force is really going strong l ,..h- Sr.fi r, 1 •ort ::;:10•;:: t:iat "·"'n-..:r::..lP;...tton ' s i'orce--or c.t lea.st p.:rt of 't-h.as land~~ ! r. short \"hile later !. '~1irc.l Bem.ett rei.,orts that the French v.a.rship Cc.:::abknca "sortied a!'ld attacked o-c.r force . " l"hat happened dl:,rini:, the at tu.cl: i:: not cor:t"'lunicated . ':'he folloning r.1essage is received froL, General "R,;dcr: "} '.airal Darlan nou .in Algiers . An -~M':lericc.n detachment i' ill report to Flau,ole c·~ast) at da·:m or shortly thrreafter . They have been instructed to take Darla.."1 ir..to protective custody ,·. .it'- utmost diplo::m.cy. Req_uest ~•our active cooperG..tion. 11 It is revealed tod~y that Ceneral Giraud , upon c.i·rival at the tunnel head½..iarters , asked the [;nerican t;Pnen.ls to tr ..ns:.iit a message for him to ..:a.st. T11i::.nas done i:!III'lediatel;j,. In it , he told :Ia:::t he ha~ arrived in Gibraltar and aked. him to 11take steps to broadcast my order cf the das for c.11 French :-:or~h Africa . 11 After the ill-ctarred conf renc e , the French 6 ener 1 ,,as re::ii~dcd tlw. t the mes::&cc had been dis.atched six hours previously. Generr 1 ::isenhov.er as 1wd him if he ,. anted to recall it . Giraud thei: dictated anothPr nessage to rast : "If rroclamation has not yet gone ol'..t do not ~ t,blish it . " flm,ever , this messa.::e co-..:1-: not be sent beca'1so +,he receivi!lg station i::-as not on the i:..ir. Lt oroo today , two hours after the assa1.,.1t , contact still hadn ' t be established ! Ciral,d ' ::: . ,roclP.:::a.ti"n ::mst hs.ve gone thr01.1t,h! 0 ( vess since 0 : rr.port is r,::,ceived that the shiI the Brilliant su."lk v:as the FrRnch escort La "urprise . The Eastern J\Taval Task Force sends in the first long report the o1 1eration stc.rted 11 hO\.:rs ago . It reads : "Priendl~• reception at Sidi ·, , ,· -· . -·ee, - f.l = ~=·• \ �( Fe r ri :ch . I,andings on Lp~ les , Beer , Char lie ( the code na'lles for the thr ee beaches ',ihere Ryder I s forc,.,s assaulted) sectors . Pro 6 r E'::. 0 r.i th delaJ . Land~il~ 1echsin anical transports at Beer due to defect in I-ms Ennerdale . T"'eather call:' . Local fog . fhipping closP ir.shore at all se:ctors . •:o enemy air at tack ~•9t . CarrLr aircraft operatir.:; . P-w-pose not cm.r.,letcd . '!"'.S rrokc.. (destroyer in ;.;pecial harbor assau l t) in harbor at 0615 . landed troops , \:.,nco·.mtered resistac1ce , r..o uC1.,ttleJ . (mea.l'ling none of the shi s moor ed in Jllgiers harbor \'lere scuttled) . One French subr.1arine left harbor dived in bay . Aircraft attacked . No hits . ;!"o bombardrrent called for . 0.m casualties : K~S t:alcoL'! boiler hit , can steam 14 lmots closed . No enemy mines f01.i...-1d.'aison Blanche (airport) • ca.:,turecl." Comnrunication \7ith the Algiers force is good . One radio r eports : "Dana.Ge South ~:ati neglibible . Our troops cannot enter •rorth . Can bo m bing support be Given on West Mati time required 1300 hours . Confirm . " Giraud has come around l He is going to cooperate and go into French :1orth Africa ! ! This res~lts from the t~o hour conference Generals Eisenho~er and Clark had n-ith hi.n at Government House from 1050 to 1250 . The follov:ing cab l e is dispatched to '.1u:rhy : "After convs>rsations ... he~e v,ith Kingpin , we are in cor1plete ag r eement. Desire that French aircraft previously r equested be sent to Gibraltar i"i thout dela; to take him to Algiers . Acvise ti':le of arrival and type of • ,lane . " It looks as though General Clark doped it out right . Giraud ~as stall:ng for ti,ne to s e hov, successful the attack last night v:as going to be . The follo\n.ng situation re~crt has just been received from the East~rn Task Force . It is now exactly 12 hours since TOPCHbet;an . 111.Lth Brigade have Fo"l.Jca , Kolea and Castiglione . Advanced t r oops on Kolea .,..- lida road . ' :aison Blanche B aerodrome captured . 1:atefor battery negotiating truce . No further nei;;s of Beer landing . 11 / The following cable is sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in ~ashington re garding Gir aud . "Have j ust c on c luded gent l emens agreement vTith Kingpin that is entirely acceptable to me and is fully compatible TTith my direct subordination to the Combined Chiefs of Staff . The basis of the agre,ment is exact l y what I offered Kingp i n throughout the long con:ference of yesterday . I recogn.:.ze him as the leader m' the effort to prevent Axis aggression in North Africa , the Commander in Chief of all French forces in the region and the governor of the area . As Com:iander-in-Chief of the Allied America.'1 British forces I will cooperate r:i th him to the fulle..:t possible extent and rill ,;or~c in closest collaboration =ith hi m1 "No later than t cmor ro\'.r Kingpin will l"'ave for J.~rica to do his ut nost to stop a l 1 resistance to ..i.s and to begin organizing the French forces for e;arloyment against the ~~is . ~bile there will u..l'ldoubtcdly be future difficulties because of personalit;r I an confident that t' i.., agreement represents a great step in adva'1cing our interests here a.l'ld a:n truly delight~d that r:e \7ere able to bring it about . "Present at the final conference v,ere General Clark , ".dmiral Cunningha.1 , r eneral •ta cFar lane and the Co:m:iandF>r-in-Chief ." ( FolloVTing n.rc the notes General Clark w.de during th9 successf1.,l C'ir'tud conference at Government '-l"o:.1Se 11'-Tothing to do with Fizhtin:; : FrJnch .• ,u,c;;prvsents 1 :ian v110 defends Fr ench ·forth LfrLca •• •Does not ':ant to co::i.':land ia Lib.,ra .. . Set up small 'J.S . -Frcn ch-British gener3.l head'-1'..larters ••. =ants lac"' for qu.:.ck victory-no unity of cor1:1and, but b;r cooperation •.. Set up Ciraud as C-in-C \ 1 . A. and Gov . and Ike as C-in-C A. Force to cone to supr,ort hi';! in his gre·:t effort , 0tc ., ,ill '!looperate but not u..Yid'"'r his co:n."land• • ,V-ould not press joint control early--18 hou~s-8 days , etc - -it 1 s pr inciple onlv strivi s for ••. Gom:u..nder of forces in .. ~ECR .--E~ T ' •ii \ �:, _et· ET~ rs ( i'1 battle should be m.n on ground v,ho ho.s! D'eat6..,t :-1.eans (;;&.1.1eral ::tateCTent), however in great battle i'or defense of NL altl 11"111;h . S. troop.., c.re b1.;.ll: ,-ould not insist T" , on ,, . ~. co:, &.'11 but i'muld wark on basis of coope ation ... 1<ingpin ,-ants to kl.1or: , ho'n' this cooperat_;_on would be obtained , by ,;;hL.t sta::f procedure •• . ~e ent , small battle-one com.!'.nnd grand bnttle--cooperati'le ; co r.i.:.1and Lots of brief lies a.head-••• ~ sa 10 as a half' interest in a i"'ife . Ike uill run out on me and l eave me sleeping I).~' ( 6 :7i t 11 this bi;; Fr og .• . 1~1)..in a;;reeraent--:::;ome minor adju1::tments to w.ke- - ::nentioned h~s siLlilar sct-'p--f.ingpin a..'1dgovcrn~nt in Bel 6 iu:.1; look at rcwll.ltsl •.• Leader ~O~ ~~ of effort to fr ee Africa and save France . T'le hcl by coope"ation . 11 At 14 1 5, General Cla.r': returns to C'ovar:i=1ent House to r est . -Since r.eneral Cl:::r 1 : gave u~ h..:.s roo!:l to Genaral Gir:mrl , he has ~ o bed. '{e ' s 6 oing to trade off wit'"l General Eisenhower in using Genera.l Tke ' s bed. "'he 6 ~nera.l 7,ill take tbe ni1:;ht trick in the tun.,el if nothin.., unforseen happens . 'mother review of situation goes out to the Co1..tbined Chif'fs of Staff . It d -a.ls r .:..x.rily th the l?.ck of · ne,s from the '"':estern Task Force . Only t,.,;o r eports have be '. r eceived . The latest m is that the landing at Fedala 17as proceeding v,..:.t'-1 littl~ rc.Gista...'1cc and that batteries on Chir1vi Point has been silenced . Tafaraoui airfield , the importa~t base near Oran , has j u..,t berm ca: Jtured . Twenty four fritfires are dL .atched , with kraerican pilots , for the airdrome . Gibraltar airport is thinning out some··,hat as plcnes , piloted for the ~ost part by .t'...nericans , clear out for the three attacked areas • The vreather is bad , rainy ,;i th a little ::og and a lm'! c e ilin.; . v,l The Orc.n force sends in a sparkling report at 1500, Tt reads : "1 6 CT (combat tea~) has reachPd Tc_ 'acta on "Sast and holds Fl:::lr"".S on South, little or:i osit.:.on . .... 18 CT approaching nt . Clo-:.d . French fightlnr; dela:,ri:::ig action . 26 CT he.::; captured .tin-el-Turk • .4.r_rnored col:!bat com.1a.>1derB has captured and reduced Tc.faraoui itirfield . The cooperation and sc1 ::,ort furnished by Com .odore Troubridge and "Ro;:ral ~favy has been splendid. The TT. S . .il.rhiy and the Ro:·al :Iavy are going to _ton1 . 11 At 1642 this report coirre., from the "Sa.stern T'orce : 11Friendly reception Ap. le Beer beaches particularly such opposition mostly naval. Part sixth Cornandos landed near Admir~lty bJ misto.ke two landing craft destroyed atte~pting to reach proper beach . Casualties not knom1 . They are no,: containing Pear . Broka got thro·cigh (garb or) boom to dock b1:..t 'la.lcolm r.as sev rely da.:ia ed by coast defenses casuL.ltiAs U.s . troops one officer 10 :1en dead . Thirteen seriously i:::ijured . '.':ati batteries subjected to naval bombardment . Nord bombed but has not surrendered . Pec:.r-:mir-1,rca cont_~nues to resist . Third btn 59 ::neeting resistance at Fort De r~eau . Three tanks encountered damaging some of our trucks . Air re orts ne 5ativc on da~age to r oa ds and bridges . Petrol dump at La Chiffa. appears OK One Vichy . plane shot dovm. at Elida early but later reception friendly , Blic1.t.. and Yiaison Blanch e captured and ready for planes . 11 0 The battalion of the 59th that •·.as a.board the torpedoe Thomas Stone and whlch decided to try and go 150 miles to shore nnd land as best theJ could , has l anded t TheJ ~ere accompanied by one destroyer . The daredevi l combat tea~ bot wet and a couple of boats capsized but they ca::ic through to ef~ect a successful b_nding sor.:."' dista..vice west of Algiers . There are no details . The "'estern Task Force finally makes a fairly cqmplete report. It follo11s: All assault waves succeeded in landing . Safi port and town captured by assault . 'Ieav-.:r art.:.llery fir"!d from shore batter .I.es against coverning forc particularly after caylight . Again , landing forces overcame (the batteries) . Jatterie · Fedala silenced . :,aval sortie searchinb fro,.1 2 crt.is ~r& destro:yers and 8/ ' 1 s . ]eavy naval engagement still in progress . T-Iostile AA fire has ceased at Fed,.lc •• Al 1 assault troops ashore at Lyautey • •• 11 11 0 ~ECRET �General Clark returns to hi..:, 1J 'f1d,.,.r-tr la-Ilock head 4 uarters at 202"i. He has slept four hours and pl:1.."'lges tac'c i h to his TTork with zest. :he situation has becor.i.e quieter s::.nce dark and fe,:er cables a:;:e co,.1ine in. Lt 2110 LTJcric&.n and British ne~spapermen assigned to Allied Force Hea,quarters troop into the eeneral office . They are nev;s hungry so General C1ark has a 6reed to tell them that the advance headqu.arters is moving up to Al 6 iers to:aorrow . Then he 0..-::plains the inclusion of [iiraud in the North !c.frican plans and pro,ni;:,es that a cor:uunique concerning Gira. 1d 1 ,ill be released tomorro1. • ':aj or Ph.i.lli •.,s the:1 revails on the general to tell the story of his Nort.h . ...frican esca]:-ladc via plan-submarine-falbot and flyini; boat . F' '.ile the newsmen chuck.le , and General Clar'c la1.. 1[;}1s too as he tells it , the story of the r.:ast conversations is pieced to.;ether . It nill be rel~ased at a later date , probably soon after the f'ira1.1d story co.Jr--s out . In the midst of the press conferencb , Ceneral Chrk ' s phone rings . ;.rter tal 1cing for a few moments , he tells the nm:s,ncn the biggest ne,:s of TORCH to datG . 's 1 Algiers has surrenderP.d ! '!'his is the text of Generu.l Rycer 1 s r.iessage : 11 French authorities ceased firin..; at conclusion of conference . ¥'e occupied city starting 1900Z 8th . All firing must cease our side . r·e ,:ill occupy uL. fortificat.!..ons in h<i.rbor starting dm·m to,.1orro ' . 11 The nei:s is flashed to the United States and the rest of the rrnrld b;r the th ee news ag ncie::,-A? , "'P and nm. The conference ends when Gimeral ·~ason-'.acFarlane .ticks his hEad in the door . Genera] .. Clark had. asked the Governor of Gibraltar to hc.ve a h"lart-to-hca.rt talk with his 6 uest--C'eneral Gir0.ud - -tonight after dinner and ':ason- :acFarlane has come to report . r.eneral Clark probably will confer in Algiers toL1orro,; with Ad.'!L.ral Darlan . 1e wanted to have Cirauc' som1ded out on :1hat would be his attitude if Darle..n r:nnc brcr~ ht into the picture in excha.~g~ for turning over the FTench fleet . lason-::acFarlane sa:,--s that Giraud grudgingly said a place might be found for Darlan if such a prize as the fleet could be obtained but that he (Giraud) hasn ' t much faith or a great deal of regard for Darla.~ . P.fter this conference , Gene,..al Cl.e.rk , who probably ,1ill n.ke off c.bout 0900 tomorrow· for , lsiers, v::.a Oran, goes back to Government House for the ni~ht. 1 0 ~ r''"'"''RJ ~-.'"'-_";_ er~...,,.., :i::-F , "'.".--~h ..,.i.t a~ion • ~ de•. r • d sai .:....,f~ -~v= ctor•: :-- v"' · nt+c .. t' a_ a... tici~ c:t ---.1 rs. l'b. C i. .....r' ; tr'.l e. d .., :· 1 [..~ d nen 'le r turrr~ : t 0900 to i::: offic t .1 .... +:. :::.::..!:! ..;:.onJ ::.. ric-r of 1 :' r:::,:::t&.r. •.-::, 11 ,... (' --est 0 r .. Tes!: Force he.::: E'fO.,,.t<'d t:.[,t c..a "Si.~V'):C: :::..1cc~ JP,d in ........ '-'' II T e >r'i •'lerican •av: i::: sti l fi .t~ n1-.,the Fr .. c. ·• -'r.1- off' J le ·.tr:: c.nd :... _::.r::: to b •• do· r, E'.~c · · P.?:.t -;/. Tn the center, · t 0r • , + e thr .... cc ·b::i.t t s. ::: of t· e 1st c n·,_-,;_~.:..o~·r drivin· fo:c-·:::.rc. st::.c.:li: e-.· t .r.:.. :i co1:..l of 'i\f&r:101.:.::. &irfiPld. h:...:: be€ r •o.c 1<>d r.tl t.::..':en•• Th re;:-.:..:: ::til. no ' 0rd fro. t c r,aratroors Lt "ran 'ut c.ir obs£r,·1.1.tir-n s o s 30 o.la'18::: -rou .ded o•• t 1e n :-re cf b. dr~· lo. ·c .::..b0~-t. 20 .:..· "'S c st of Ora: •• Ti11::re i:: :.o .::..ctivitJ c.b".:.t th'"' pkn..,s bu.-i-tra.c 'C ~::. ..:..n~c..-, .1 cu, J;:,t t : ra-i-roo.s he.ve ceen pie cd up by tr.:;.n·.0rt.::..ti ~ of one of our c .. bc..J~ tea";::. ':'l".l zit-..:t:...t'on at :U"'ier~ is exec J.ent 'i+ t.c Or!:• he:vy op_0s:.ti n co::'.in fro tl c co' st2. batteries in Al;ier::: baJ. 1 0 !101·1 t e hi •n g~ound i 'Slci.:i.c.t y est of .. lgi'.:'r • Thero h:::.s b s.xrc,r'ic ~tre0t fi ,.ti..c:, Qenerr.. Cl r r:..s ,00d cc.use to be satisfied.. i-!i:: r c i tico-~i itarr tr i. t0 .. icr.s h~~ • u:..: ;.• ic c.iv .i.rlen ·:::--rr> ist.::.,1c0 1:.. been li-:7ht. J 0 r I' n r ~ r-irc:ucl has t::.k •! off MCR.,Eftr -1;,!iis 1~1:-:;.i.er~. "e!l-:::r 1 CJ. ..r: .:..lJ ~~~d:;J!:,:;;f :;;f.I,:· ' '. �cont ·nue the conferences -;it'. the Frec-.ch ge •.erc.: at the l' L~ierian capita~~ . 1'.fte r coing through the ~c.r y rr;or!'ling rerorts [.lld holding a fina:;. c onference v.ith Generu. :Cisenho':·er , Gcnor'll C~~crk goes to Govcrn.'ner.t Fouse o.nd pac~cs . Fol oning a quic~~ trip back to the tunnel fo r docu.-nents , the genera.I drives to Cibraltar aircl.ro:ie , i...r iving there at l0S8 ; Eefore tr..e t\,o planes t: ....t a.~e L •·in~; the .Alz;.or.:.ca.1.;:. the advance headei_·.a.rters t.o :.l.;iers of c:..re loaded , t:1e ;~._,-t er ho.s .. closed in . Al1 i'"'.l,:nediate tc.i.kPoff ii:: i~,o...,~ib-e so , after r1oto<;ra 1 hs of t,._,e r;enera ... have been taken b side t.r1e 11R8d Gremlin ," the pc.rty goes to an R . . F . Nissen hut for lunch . The ,· e.athe r is still nasty but it is deciaed to to.ke off to assure reaching Algiers before dark . The "Red Gre□J.i,1 , 11 wit:1 Ge.:1er 1 Cl&.rk, Co:: :odor Diel· , Colone '.Tol ,e,:,, rfajor ~Teacha-,, Liet·tenb.Ilts Bear ch-ood and 1erril1 , and Stc:.~f Serzeart C.1a. E::, 1:..s passe.nzt.rc , takes off from Gibra.2..tar" at 1239 . It .:.s fol J.o·:red bJ the "Boo:acrf.n;:,11 and ;:;evcrel S_itf.:.res . Over t:10 "editerr:.nes.n e , the t··o F..1.y..l.n__, fortres::es and their 13 escor+ in_; f.:.c.,:nte s rendezvous and sti..r" for !.lgiers . ':'he r:roup flies r from 50Jtto 70J f e<=>t v:-ith eieht Spits on the , frica side and five, on the north flank . The n o::iera:.;_, is so close i.e can si,e the ,.•ilots and !_:.7.ll1IlersCeneral . Clark op8ns the panel top over the radio room and , in go;; les an:? ht.let , sticks his heac_ out . to watch the f J.ieht . ~ e ar.., buckL.g a strone head\iind , the sea is cha py and we are fl.ying t1:irou1,:1 br oke CJ.cuds . 0 ( ( 1.t 1519 Africa is sighted on the starborad front quarter . rre are soon over a rt.cn;;e of brov,n , barren hills . A coasta fo;:; S':"'"'eps in and the t,10 bo bers and I:: fi__,!1te s sxi " over the cu~ .mlus . At .1-542 al of the S it'.: but one fa:'..J. a1my , to lool:: for la!1ding places . '.!:'hey a e runnings ort on 1:;as. Algiers , a nass of rrhi te buildings huddled a l ong a. crescen+ -st.aped ba,; , is siehted at 1.605 . The fo:; has disappeared . At 1614 we are over !~aison '"'lanche airport . "'he S:~it are landing so the t\10 bomber s , with hours of gas left , circle t:1e lar ..;e, planefilled field . ,~t 1652 v·e stLrt i:i. for our lanr'in~ , t::ie "Boomerang" ctil. circling so it can follow us in . Just &.s we are ,.:;::.iding in vre are informed thD.t German pl::.nes are ir. the vicinity and that as so"n as the s 1 i:r, sto~s rol. ing we are to get out &ntl find cover - - l eave the barzage and ersonu::. equip~ent . The pas sense s and crew quit the 11Red Grl-.nlin II quickly . Overhea · , flying in echelon , are 12 planes - -Geroar. Junkers 88s . Instead of r unning to cove r rre walk across t ..e field , heads t i~ ed back , ,.. tching tLe planes ,,\ic. have alread;,, crosse~ the field at about 6 , 0_,Q feet . i:-·e can hear tbe po□ o:ns thlt - thu.rJr,ing fro:.~ the shi ,_.s in the ha r t or . ls we fle,· over ue ,oted how cro 1·rded the harbor was with no.val and coIDiercial craft . Soon the uck ack is puf. ine black bc..lJ.s 011m pl.:m0s . around the (°}er· They break formation and start diving for the hr.bbor . Tvrn appear to have been hit . ::e·:t comes the dull punz of bo::!bs . "eneral Cl.: rk a:1d his party ar- stil" stand:.r:.g in the open vmtching . The ack ack is still going up as thP- · p&rt:r gets into British Bren gun carriers t,o start the ,trip into Algiers . ·•e1::1, hi le , Spitfires have been ro&.ring off 'raison Blancl 1 e in pt.ruist of the Germans . Just as the Bren gwt carr--iers a.re abo-nt to start , r'-enera. Ch.rk standing up in t:.s front of the fir ..t carrier , one of the J u.nkers , a.i,crPntl.,· crit ... by flak , is just south of the ~i-rdromr> •·ith two Spits on its -UU:. The ler· t. Americe.ns and Br i tis on the ground are cheerin;; and s 1outing as the lead Spit closes the gar between itself a.nc"'the C'er:1a.1 plane . Soon it is :firing , fir::. t from direct y behind the Junkers ' tail and then co:ning up under its bely , The plane I s notors begin s:,noking . ~ean,:.ile , all the ground 0-uns hr.ve opened ur on the G';)rman. The c.ir i f ful ~ of flak anc' t y,acer bullets . T'1e Junkel's is t\.rough . The Spits fall av'ay anq i11 search of other :rrey . Bvt the fire from the ground go ·~_ CR8 . E ~: .. ~k:'''~" �continues . rrhe J ankers is c irc ling the field . A..__.rently i t i s go i n:; to tr;,, and c land 0:1. 1.:a.i.son BlanchA ! ..... ecause of the int"nsi t: of [;round fi r e it can I i., . Tt cr ashes about ha..:..f a ::iiiie f ro12 the field , se:1.di.1_; up _:reat columns of dust . The caravan headed by Gener 2.l Clark heads f or Alg i ers . German planes are still bombing the harbor . A solid v,al .J. of ack - ack fire i s bc:in;:: _ut up . The orgng e balls of f ire lor,k li ke strings of de c o:-&.t ve lights . Gener al Cl- r k &r1' hi.:, pa r ty have i ...lun_;<>d f ro 1 a q 1iet rout i ne f i ght into t.1e thic 1~ of enemy a ction . C'uns are bon lni ng on al sic es and occ asio nally there is t 1,e ift m:,,,ing of bo 1b., landln:; . J ust u as t}1e Caro.van i s c:oine alongside the airdro:Je , a stick of th r ee bo:nbs f alls on t' ,e field , one of them 100 feet frcm the 11Red Cr em...in ' s 11 tail ! Abo·1t half\:ay into .Algiers , a Cer::1an lane di r ec t J over the hec.ds of General CL. r k ' s c onvoy i s hit b.r fl ak . It beg i ns to burn , shouinc a dull _:low i n the f ast-darken i UG sky . I t pl~ts r'o":m from abou t 4 , 0JO f eet . The Junkers is heaQed directly toward our l in e of five Br en gun c ar ri er s . Legs ar e alre~dy over the side of the carriers and eyes are look i ng f or c ove r hen -bhe J,m'-ers eY1Jlodes at abou t 1, 0 JO feet . I t ... fs into p i ec es wi t h a bl i nding f l ash . The uf r ear half of the fu s ela g e tr:ists gr otes q_ely doffm, burning b r ight l',Y The r est u , of it plunc;es st r a i gb.t do>:m None of th,, Cerme.ns has esc"",Jed . The v-rec1<a.~e b.:::ids . abo.1.t a quarter of a _,L.e f r o:n the Cl .r :,Cconvoy . The C'a ,P-e.l or ders the carrie r s to pr oceed ancl th9 convey moves on th r ough flocks of A abs w o are fleeinJ r A..1.gle s r wi t:1 a fm bclongL1.:;s on thei r ba cks . The pa r ty goes to t he Betel St . Geor ge . 'l'he mim:te the general gets into the lobb~r of the big hotel over l ookin. the harbo r he finds that all is not v1el in Algiers . The armistice is on an::' .·,l gie r s i s mor e or less peacefu l but the ol d question of c om Je.nd L.nd the ·rivo. lr y bet·,.een Gir aud and Dar l an , 1•;11.o in Algiers , has come t'P • 'T'he FrPnch11en hc.v,., been clamo ris in_, for !)roml~e,s . r'9neral R:·der 'l.&.c stallccd t. e :1 off as best he co ld ··er.c:.:..n General Clark I s arriva l. R~rdor, hag~ard and er.:...:i , t~r:-is the t r ,:d0us task ove r to r,ene r ;_,:;_ Clerk . Before ea.t:.n., a ve r y late dinn9 r, the "sfn.'.t~· Co. :::.:1.a.cr-in-Ci1ief holds a conference at v.hich the c-i.;.rrent si tuution is sketched for him . He then a.rran. es a conferenc:i ,,ith Admiral DarlLm , (;eneral Juin , 1 'D'.irc.l Fim. ard and othe r Fr~nch officers tomorro~ . They ref~se to have Giraud ; r ~c-nt . ~he c.:..t~ation is extremely co:1plicated and filled Y,ith potential dyna'.:lite . Gener · 1 CL...rk ' s only c o:n:1ent :;hen he r eturns 1 to his 11 T"h"'- t a ness ! '"1y so l die:!:'s h_.ve to get in things to be f0ucht -- r!od it ' s a,;ful ! ! 11 room is : l ike this when there are i'/a.rs Beca 11 se of the tense s it uation , c~ l onel Slocum holc;s a secret meeting ,.ith the off i cers co::!1 i.sing hea('y_uarters :r e.nd instrvcts tl.en to r emain in the hotel an'.i kee1 th'3 i r thin;;s pac':ed for r q· i d mov9me:.t until further ord rs . No one is to go out unarmed . Late r , Lieutemint Bea:---d,,·oodreturns to 1aison Bla.ncno airport fo r ba.:;_,age and learns t' at the Junke r s that era.shed near t':1e field did not c :-tch f i r e and that a l l four 1embers of the ere , ere taken I risoner . nne suff"rec a. br ken leg . T:1e plane cane here from Si c il.- to bo::ib shi • • i:.1,Z L. t' e ...ort of ~• -, ., H '.LGIPQC' W'V"' 'P'.E _._n "• 2--Gene c.l Cls.r k I s current , , job is al .ost entir"ly political. : 1 ric ..!,s t r o":i:,s, - ·'l't so!!le British , ar co,:s("I · dat i n _. t emselves .:.n the Algiers region . /lthour1i. there h:..:: be ~1 no armi:::J ic0 at Oran , the f ighting has virutally ceased . At .,abat-Sale-Lyautey , ho,·,ever , r<eneral p~ tt on 1 ~ fore i.:; ttil i meet.:.n_; s01ne resistance b'.lt the:· situ,.tion . l".c,ner~, Cl r 1- Is ai:r. 0 i£e1 e· t �· (EQUAL ( 1 CR,EI ~ .. i~~~pWlt: RET is to end--throur-h aE,Teement .-::.th th~ French--all fightinu in :"rench ''.orocco anc ) :.l~erio. so t'1at :::lritish and Arriericar. troor ~ can • ush ea t to get into 'l'uni:3ia c..1d, .. flYent,!c.l , co!!!c::, to ~ips v-i th th€:' Pocho • . ith t:1is in i:1inc:' the lan\r fur.vric&n Gen"r 1 , '1OrP ,rim - faced thc.n f"'"TCr ' ' .zets o-1t of ' is ba"!,tlr .::r ss and in-Lo h::.s bi=::st dr :: to nert D.:::.rl~.n.:::.ndhi:::: co.-1.fidar.t::::. ThP --~tin. is n-:.F :._n cc ~m~-1~ roo-1 of±: the foy r of th<- s: . 0.eorc~ hot 1 • .I.'or 0ff0c+ , rpn,:;ral Clark has ovsr a ,. l~ +,o">n of inf[ ntryr.1en outs · de the hot0l. rr11,3roorr 100\:2 o't!t on _ pe&ceful g&rd<-. , filled v1ith flm ~rs anC palm tre:"s . 'T'1e conference roon: is in direct con.,-r ..,t . Th0:r-=-i: ~ strc.ined fc lin~ . 0 er -rc'l r 1 -r 1{ cits at the hec:.d of tho table . On hi;:; left is /.dmirc..~ Darhn; on his ri_;ht , 0 eneral J'.in . /lso rrcsent '.r"' 'r . ''.l.T ...1-lJ, v'.o i to a'":t as inter~rE'tPr ; Cnlonel Holm.es, C.s. tain 1-:-ri;ht , Com odore "ick , Lie rtcnant 3eardro"d .. and +te follm in: I're ••c,. o:"ficers in i; -'_+ion to "'arlan : 'avy--l7ice Admir"l d 1 "sc· :fro 1oreu.u, :.'.ariti .. corr;:..nc":r of the ~th re ion ; \'ice ;.d::iira..,_ Fen2 ..:--d lf: , socr"t~_ry-:;'"ln"'r:tl of +he North African govcrn"lent ; Rear.::Ad irs.l Dut-1·,e ➔ , f of cabin t +<' T''lrJ _n; q..,o_r ~'\.d::iirr.l Fcboul ""'c+or ::::lerl'oz , c ief of st.s.:f of t1,-.o J1t:, ..Lriti·'e r_,;i".1 ; _..;::;:,r--G"'neral Jl'i:i:., co"! ·nd r - in-chief 0f forc':'s in l'lorth ..!'..fric ; 0 -en<.:r 1 V,::o , com :.ncer of t' e 1°t':1 '1i.itnry ltz re: .. -,n; rr-neral ) de Brie· dP '.::t>·rc: Chief of :t ... z., ff to r.er.. r·1l Juin ; ir - -"'-sn~ru: ,, n'.i.;<"l , ~1_pe:r .i.or Co 1 .a:Yl: :1t of Air .;n ]'forth Africa . m11eFrench o.v,., 1. sl:'.al ww::.r: of honor .:..n t·1, cou nt~•ard . The 1TI.eeting starts at 08S5 . Darlan is a ::;tub1 ~· , :iart•y-bsld "l&n , it¾ lizht , -mtery-lookin~ e:;•es . Hii: !:i".n:· ,..,. is friendJ:• . /. t' confP-rt" , i:.Ll',r'l_in::; th" Deputy Cou.::umdcr-_:_n Chj ::, c.rc ~a-:..: r:eneral Clarl~ ti:fS.s -~c 'r . 7)(,.,~c; . r·., 0 ..,,_ , c1n t o .... ~ira 1 Dar 1an t,._ nt:)cessiv~' o +' co~irJ.; _,;._~a..::...0.1,t! o• .,_hS'1l';. ~d .· ·+ · • ' · ' 1 ,'t{ ·""::l.J. .. 1~e ... ~.,. -...8 h:1vc ·:ork tri :,. to m~et the corn-~on 0ne..,- . T::; he re~d:· to ar:,iistice? rt ,:ill cov-:r e_l] French !forth J~frlcc... It ic 0scE:~tia: +r~ut -,te stop thio ~ &stc of ti"'~--- a.1d blcod . I ... JO;u~ --I . T'".3 ::;i rn +,h: tor-:1s of the 0 '.'.)c.rlen T ::.n-::: r .. ::,u-:ic of th,.., o.r.:_i:::t::.cc t;;r ..s to Viel-:.,; . L:-·,c.l n ..:: ubs:-nt from '!idh:· , "'here ,,_;_11be no :r-;;rl~· ...nt_;_-,4:-h, r,,..,'::1cil of :·.1.nl::t rs me:t::i thi.., afternoon . Clark TJo yo-:.:.und ·ri::t&nd that diI lo_:m.+ rela-'- ions bstv,c-en F:.c..nce and the le Tnit c:.ftates he.v~ uee::1 brobn off it'l"!! the ...a.t 24 hou~,:.,, narlan "'1'er i.., no official stc..tc'llent or conf.:.r'.TI&tlnn of this ru_ tt 1r, bi...t I ,·ant to ::::eJ hostilities storired us cron .:..., ...ossible. I hLve been cive::1 ::tr ict ord.e.,,::: to enter i~~t o :10 ::1 got in ti,..,ns unti T h:....verccc:'.. ved orc<ers fro .._ n tail". or the C 11::i.ci of ini -ters. ; ... 1 J a::,soci +,(,::;~nd I fe ho:::ti iti~::: t.r~ fruitl~~.., . Clark I am n ~otiatin~ I am not rer~red .i.·~h you &.:::co. 'ill ~~r of t ·v· troo _1~ on the- £..Tou.nd . ncr do I pro ...ose to a,c.it anu• furt' r · ord from Vid1· , Darl:::.n f. ~ Clark I rant to 6ovrrn':'.ent. 1 !!!&. s:e it clec.r I c&.n simply t:.G.t I a.'ll nc-t r.cre i!l c.. cs. .. acity obey the ordorr of P,tain. Thrn I ;-•ill h:-ve -i;o br,.,u 1• of::: ::l"'zotia.-i;lon::, and dcc.1 , lt!. wl o cu.n act . . : - - ·c ···•,., , -:-· RG'!';;r ,~~ " .. . . of the FrE.nch s0 one �9Y f) DJ\:l. .A·: Tt i::. ,. to you to ·:.,"' ,' c.t v .,,, · "'' ••..., n ce,_,~~:·;; '~ Vou h&.ve .Jhe guarc:?::.tee of secu vit.,r here in JJ.,,ien: . - "~iors ('PnK : hC 1~ed Vic· :r to c i ve Vh&.t ynu • ro . oce ic not thirt:r i..., th:::.n t .c-.J• ~i l ·' e fr:-, cl. tr'"'" .•~ t' rou.i '.:,o ..,~ct our co .. on e. ae' y ? resist I },Qve T-' e ""_ • 02 .... ible . c.. s er -'-o y ·ur to:c. I · i" l en· t L ~ Le ::;c"n coni'er"'ncc &.f in r:ir:.utes . I uncersta ._ 'f, d ·· hat l c.s ha:;-. encd . .. . ....! <., 'l'hi;.. ;i:, im.o::; i 1 ~.o. It ':i l '"' c"..lstor";;· I hoxe you u.nC:erctc..!•~· . • ,... 1n1 : ... ~ e,t;c~+8 '.,it 1 GO .en~.!.E: . n co,...sr.r., ...0 re'l, in .,·0..1 in . :co.Jectocl e '."'ust ·1ove ec:.;::+ I _1,....0,_,c· , to '1 C[ ..... i ~~U.C' orr'cr~ :,0 + 1.,,, J..r J. • -3 C~ .- ~ro1,1 not t&.ke +' o ~'lr.:e ::., . s as you have tt..ke1:. hsrP ,.i t' 1 out +he a •.•,.cova2. te of Vi c:·,y? 17hy cau I t ;;•0u c~o the same thing i n ot:.er pc. t::.. of :~orth .P.:fric a . DART fl\J: ) rnhe sttua· ' ion i s (if.'.:'erent . CI /\BY: rhat 6.. c·· er c'o you ex . e,ct to '--'et fro!!'. Vichy in vie•. r,f re latio •. ::.. 'Z o"' t • ~evcrc .. co I'ARLAJ• I am c.,iv.:;.n Pek.in ,,,~-o,rin i c::,. th ..t it L st:; .,L' ·' o co .-:·· inue : 0 '10:::ti .i+ i es i,,.,r • I urGed e..cce. ta. ce of ,. e tormc . 1 a confident tbat Pet2,in v:i 11 2.grec . CIAHK: That is fine , but do ~·ou U11.derstc.nd t · at ,-e cam.ct sF : ere , h i lc [;C'vcrn.":le. a r e &.nc. :-::ni ::;ter ·s cebc .. ? If t::; i te :.,'~e !..ci1dr::.:. ·::i 11 :1ot iss u e inc· ' ruct · ons for tre cessation of ';.ostilit i :cs, I 1.--ill ~o to Gener.,..l Girt.tc' . T.re il 1 ci ..,IT. the ter~Js o.,... i~sue t '1e necessar~T orderc . r_d DLn I a .. not cert-1,;. n the tro r-s ..i" l obe;r , mhi::: . il " 1 l os., r,f 1ere tL.e &ml -~her ',.i ' e rinre :iuht i nu. .fl;.T: 0r..ly ...e .n th f.re you so ::'Te of t e decision fror.1 1ich:· ? Petctin 11.ac :: read:• i.r.forncc1. Pre::.i20nt ....,or scvclt tb.at he co.1::-,ir·ers our l1,;.n:i.n_ a_, res;:,ion . ,.: If ~•ru ti.ink Pete.in ·,.i 1 agree ':'.ith you thc..t ho:::·'ilit i , nm:::t cease '\'by c&.nI t JOU i ssue that orc'.cr no· ? C ~,,ll' : DLPLli.lT : I c£..11 + as::,wc 1 in the i. 1eciate ·':ie re:: o.1s1.o:.. i t for ::..uch &i.1 orr'cr . It -:ruld occ·: . c.ticn of Southern_ I".cv,nce by the Ger11.~rns . r...,LU t CTARK: --re a l agr c concer'1i1:. 6 t 1e 6-r 0.t d2.neer of .J: e occu . a· ion of Souttcrn France , but it v:il] r.ot be becc.use of -i:.:1is order . r· at you are doine no,: "!Cc:,n.srr:ore kL:.. ing of French and .lbericans . I J. resu:::c you ':nm· t'· at Oran is alread;y in our honds . Thi:: all boils dm:n to one question . Are you going to :,le.y ith the Vich:T governr.ient or 0 0 0 1 0 �SECRET) ' ', ith us?? Clark+,-, , ien thi:: que::::ticn i. to 11 be al::r • t . 11) :::;. ·it to .\J.r _•.y for -- .:.nter,retr:.tion , Gen r:.l - DAF ,AN : I a sir~r:ly bcun" b:r c... oath of fie."' ii:y to tv, ·ar~ha:.. t o 0bcy i:::; orde ...... I C<.:.n 1 t tf:.kP t e re:: . onsiril i t.,r o-f: c.,ivin._, ~-· C' ·• • 0 c e' 0 hostil i ties . T" i:: i• i:l-,,. ti e ;1e.. l ean on our in c .i m t i cn s and not on ol.l!' oraG..~ • You "'re unr'°er c.. mim,,, tion . 1Ter is a o~. ori:uni ~ y for all Fl· •nc hr:1e::n ·e to ral y ~!ld , in t' e ...:.. . TTero i :s y0ur l"" c c.nce . r :::t CLARK: I a~ ' i lins t o send Ln ur · nt r ecsL 0 e to ..:2.r:::ha~ P8k, · 11, recorru en· ·. 1. c.n armi:::;ticc for A ~ic1 •s &n croc.:co . DAR JU•: 0 c r ARK : np:p ,A : You h::we &h ·eady done thc.t . I have not d; ne so in ::::. cific + er ns . ,..,LttJ'K: e ~~ven • t ti"'1' . T a. i.....c:..~~~ rt ...... f~irm. l~-- :"'r ... Lmn ---!1 u tc :1 1c A:1ericans n~Vtc '. e Sc.J':!eintE;rA..:t:::: at h &rt u.nd '1Ul'C fir•'1tinv 11;11onour~elv8s , 1.a.::,ting t.ine . I knm· that t c Ad ·r a l c •• +s--d e_ r'o in 1is hear"' - -to sto . t'1 i s f i chting betneer. our troc : . . c c,, , ant tc- do t·w s:..'Ile th i ne- [ nr' , e r-u::t cet r.n orricr for ce::cn.H"n of ostllii. i :: t i::; mor:1ing . ~ c :.~vc the m :::.ns. e Lav ,;_ , ;,._n i ce.. o.!"d Eritish tro -S ir.. French I:or,J.:.h Afri c a . ·re huve t e ::1 ·.1.s of ~c;t... i ng i.1. th.l rr:m c . ur .,r c.nc: mu.Y~~ t hi:: tLc b ...se from hi.ch i .e cc:m r; i nto i Frc.r-c e . fm±bi IJkm:zn;;:bn:n Ho . ...nybor'ly cm1 fc.il to jo i n u: in L-n v1 o eraticn that can ::i an i,. i b~rati n of Fr.::.nce is a"' .. in. t m., "nc!er~ tE. 1c.i.1 ·. DARUJ--l' I a co;11 1~tc Jin : . acc orc ~rit· l,,C t u:1til I hea1· fr'"'m Pct,.5n . ClA.;X : DAF Girc.ud ' ill ::::ien the ;-our 1,oint tcr. ::; of tl cf vL,, but I cti .L c ..... 1t ar•-.:i::::tico . !irnud hus no auttor i t~r i n orocco ·n r :;:rou s ..~ L .'-- la , hE:"re nn.rrez is i r.. c ~r._,e. ,.,,t' I \7('Ulc'l iJr 4 Vic y . f - ~: 1 j_:: i n c .•ur or in :1 :. ,..1c;: aoe to e cB.11 + ut u ~Ji,J-h ...c.y . e rc.ve see •• ' t r' 1ny ant b"'fore . :-ou into rot ct.iv cu. to-~This can•· ot ;:;o on . I '· i~l 'mve to tci: 1;it~1out co "'11.Ulic~tion. ··re ', i ll 'avo to do bu.in ~ 1itb .,_ e coum.nc. r,_, on t .. e _'!'ound . 'LA' ": 0 :!)J\RLA''T The c.r r :f is : e ~.i 1 ma! DA} JiJT: I st i 1 ni th it 1.s oas~· {"Uld :.. ke five i ':le, . l,,S • o. siblP "'li:::mt'.3s · ith !"'~ .,. ET) 0 - for ::h.f you . , :'or dLcucsion • �l /~ec_ :·· s _Et R (E lRMLl.l!?~~C~EY Q~::: ) ( C ARK : You undE"rst&ud +.l.t no ore i.., to cave h rE or coir'1.l.nicaticn \,ith c.n,,,,-on° out::;id9 , (.At t i· oint Cknc::.·al R;r· er ca me in to re. ort that at a cer•: E,:n barre.ckJ a ca. t&.ir:. ras ,:"ni::: to the CC' i·0 coz:!I'k,ndin_: and. "·o 1 1 hi t:.:..t c111.Lc v c s ['rmisticE" · s ~i/nec' the bsr""ack: ni J be bot1bc.d. Gcmer.:.l Clark scr.t :2y4 ::,r ~.:d a Fr'"'nC l :cn0n .. tC' c..irc•1c· t ic ,,u1, l;.o+' ti-" Fr nc~ e..d A.: ric,. .. i · commr...nL'cr (·~1i·~e .!'.dmirB.~ rarJ.r...n ::..nc':.it sto.ff ···ere ccnfcrrine . r'f"ncrE..::;_ Clc.rk ~-acr>c" anc1 qo ..m •the lobby of the St Geo::.·,se:fote • "'he other .America .• ·,:<ff";c ers cit"Jred. c:.bou".:, t'.e cr,v.rt.,· .rr +c .,., · :s·..ire t'1at no"o of ,,:'1e lr. rr_..cner, ·.. -:~.tout t'rou._;h tJ:.n ~ ir.C:.c·,;;,) i.t <'\" .. n: t e A!l':lric~n-French : confer~nce resumed.) 1·a11 :~ou e.cce. t t is ordc::-?( -,.., laic.' do•n a C".Y f it ,n t e kb --l, In s11bstance i:. S:'.i t .at the Jm:r-ric-1~ .i. l not t~ 1c .i~ r-t:.-fu::..al tc r c ,.;;.re G. 1 im ediut0 ur ictic , t K.t furtnP,r bat-' le ill bu f1-•if-, ess nr· ,_ .. t b or,c.. i· .l flo'7 . ·•") ~,.u,t::.. to t.81 ··.r,:1a~ F tB.in +iw.t as a re..,'l; 01 1:..,htin~ t 1 y ,~ou d • :::obab "',/ ~OS9 AfricE . He .m,ts to C"J' ::,n r\0st~ :.i, i 'E 1.. ·· t ~e c:..n at itur e of con . lP.to r.E.u-cr J.ity . ) l'.1'.RLAN : CIJ'.Rl( : ' ·it I -...~nt is orctrr;:; ·'o -~,c trr0.s . fo\..."'J.AN: 'J'he.1 I Tiill c.ss an ordnr to Juir. , Nog-.,.,z, TlLrr0:::;, tt. Ai!•frrcr- , and the c.,.vy (Darlan then be ins ,; ri ~in_, ·::.'le ~ssc . .., a .... . ci1v ctu.L i:, ions cf G"Jn"r<i..L Clc.rk -::_.., di~ so . ) he GLARK: Under our in::..tructic--ns e.:J.Cc co:... ::i.nrier ar 1ictic ::i . 'T'h sc off leers v,il_ neGotiate conce!'ne · . C'•en ra.l Putton ,,,iJ.l ,.,t-t , .i.th to n:i.r . n .. en t:ieJr c':lase firing they 1 i 1 territor y. I'ARLAN: \~hat about Tunisia? il de::ci e L t8r s o.:f ·i:r ~ witu U ~ Fl'f re • coll1Il,u.l1l ox·s Ge 1 r ~ "fo..,uez ~.nc off, r t r ente,.· into -Lc.r .., for t11.- \ ,..ol~ Tr.ere·, i:.-:.. be no hostii.iti .., to Jl.r_,,-ric·ns "·l1 -re? D!:....., AN: T'1E'n t .uest ic,n of t-h':l ::tatus of "!irau comes 1 •• ( ,... .1 ra.l r::.ar·c a c red t '1e.t t' i::.. v cn1ld be r'is,. o~ed of after t f lght.:.~.u h-:d been sto,:-. ed .) ClLllC : ~nat C'in.ud ·:rar.."s .i.::; to he .• Frc.r..ce in t ..i~ l:-if., ..,..,, u1 &.n • t lf"rc .i:=: ... roc-'U for ever~•one . Rleht no' .. I .:... tr~rin tc s·,0 •.1 th' fiufu.tin 5 • DAPLAi:' "o g11 E:, .ay '1e:::;itate on th8 vt. ic...ity cf t1i.., orc.:;1• if : : to hi • ,..1--1c..t r.re ,·:e e(in 0 to do a.bout " IL-~? it i..: raC:iood CLfa..:'K: Let . -:J see tie order fir::..t . ("" 9 order t,ivec c:.l l:..n<.l ~E'a, (...,nc,. , Lir forces in 'Jo tn Africa orc"ers to cea firir.~ al [.in..,t A1ericc • troo ~ s u . on receir t o• t 1P. order a,.d to retu1·n +o thei r br ~ ~ : r r' ob3erve strict 'i.eutr it:,- . Dr...rlc:.n:-..aJ3 t>at he t1..''es ·::. t.: res~oasib1 .. i,.., for Ncrt1 Africa in +,:1e na1e of tl'e arda, thc.t t·1e ,.resent r.· cit r./ coi:: ur., ers 1·et£:.in co::i..iand, anc' tll&.t ro.Lit·jc£..: -.r d'mini~tr· '·ivc. ._,,~uorit.ic' ,--i:.:. ''e . <in uncl1an _ed . :•!o chunuc cu.n J:-e ·,7ith J'.l.!'l&.n1 s ordc.r for th 1 rr,fent . The order 'i--Ll ._,o to ,Ji;-· . , o 'Uez, nrec,€..1. ar.. t e , 0 - L> - """"' �Admi.,,,L s cor.::.a 'ine .... int .. three l reas . CLAH.K ':'his will stand unle::is oth<or1 ise c.ia.nged by t •.e Allied Co,.,.. : .:.nderin-C 1ief . It may be necc ~~'--r. lEtcr to me'' c' ·~n.,es t=nC.:for thu.t reu::,un 1 I huve asked • ou to insert "for th8 • rE ,.:;eu-• 11 You understanc that there are sol'!l<:i British tr .. s , ',ut tnat aJ 01 · her.i &re unde~· Am r::.cu.r. s·J.1re11!e comnand . D!LltLAH: "'hen I i'li 1 change ii to .Arle1 icL troor,s or t'1eir Allin • riGht . CLARK: All DARLAN ·~hat dis)osi tion will be made of the French gensr&l:., v:.o dLobe:·ed. : orders. I mee.n ~~c''"+ an<' t· ..c thArs . I t inl: they shoulc.. be Liven no French mili tar~- corn: and . CLARK: That I , E' to c.iscuss .nt is one of the thin.:s , it:. A lmirE..~ Dar~an . !:'ARIAN: I don ' t .~·ant to +.reat r·ith those l"len. It i"' in yo1.1r orTi inter st to a.cr-o"'t;.a t I ca •• 1 t toler tP thr>ioe men not obP-yin ~ my orders . Tne oth0r officers dc,n 1 t ,.ant them t" have c::.n:rtinb to c1 o ,dth French C Or"~ .n.nf • ts I un crsta.cd CLM1K: It ink I can h:mdle t1is soon a .. d invcsti'--'ate . ·it , .,-cu do not ,·a!-i-'-these men under your cor""1and? \ r-A_PAN: Yes l :, . You had better res~nte,1. .ut them in :::.omesafe ~l. .... ce. Th y c.rf' bitter·:{ 0 I don 1t ·,mderstand . '.!:hey he 1..~ s ::,o ·mch . Hov,evE::r I c'o un cr:::,tt..nd , 'll' re.::, .L:+,.,, a::;a:· n t their L+ .... o' eying nrders . . . t ,..... 1., 'Se t ,.,. ore' ers -' c cea -'3 ''!ostili ties a;.·c cc:..rried out . orr'er is not v:crt:. t' 8 ._,e.. :.t is -;ritten or on 1:..nl9ss car:deC::. ou·: . C 'PJ< : y DAR• : ~1 What about '~he qu"3stion of tra.nsmittinc orderc . They ni 1 t,O by our 1 lane with one of your officers ar,0 one of ours. L o. 1 ~ii."on ; ··;p c·a .. corr 1·micate tha"L the orc1e .is c0rdn.c; a .• tuat in •! :~ ,..,'"antime ho ·-'-- .i, ies are to be cea. ed, • end.ii.~ recei. t o: t:.er.1. i The French L.re shootin[, do·:.n our • lanes ev ryti'.'1•· they ta'~e off in ·:orocco. C!JD!( : i-•nwrrrAL: I am sur. riced.. What about t'1e French C PJlK: Pe nill Pe are in accord ·1 ith thL .,risoners /OU h&ve taken? __;ive t:1cr.1 al back. 17e don ' t ,ant 5 - SECRE (EQUA\.S B~ITl5H MOST segET) ID9i:hod of tn.r.Ls"J:..ssion . any French .. rison rs . �(", ·in~• +his discussion ·r• 'i.r ...l Darlan h<-r'i finish the text of th,:, ore.er ,a;:;sage . It hE.d bevn a.mended so that the die ocii..ions of m- s in t:.e handr, of French troops pc :.i....a b to loco..1. iL.'IlericLn co ,t.rn:. •rs.) ( General Ryder returmd anc' said that a C r;tain ~f tne, - 68+ Inf·c.r.try 1 Hent to the colonel in the barracks before mE'ntione,1 t..r ~ o .... , h11 that if c m t 1e terms of the o.rmir tice v:-ere not agree( to hP \ robt..1:)_y ' ou.d. have to bomb. " The Fre!lch colono:::. a •• 1:.r0nt.1y misunclerstood. T,,o othPl .,~.'1~.Lar inci ients haii occl.rred. e.n( Genera:. Fyder v.ent out to set+le tilem. ''.\-i<; f"ne. draft of "' P nr-"er r:-iessaee v,&.::i z ne over anci Genera~ C-crk a. proved it. It is to be .ut into"final form a.nd dL 1 atched iri::eC:Lt--Y • AL. ,le cc,nfer .... ., . f-+, the cori.f"'rerce rocm ri th ti:1e excr. tion of Adm.ira.1. Dar c:--:i, f',enera~ CJLr 1', and • ir . Muri 1:.y the inter. reter • , rn the privc.t" confore!:lce ith fid ..1ira ... Dar: .n , '3neraJ. c:.urk ½.uestion: the Fr nch"!a.11 cone rning the flc ,t r.e controlc . T\,.r.... is va 6-ue and .. il an 1J1.al:E: no hints or commitments . He inf~;1s r.cneral Cle. Y , m,ever , that he has peronal~y issued order~ to the French fleet to be ,re.~red to 1ove on short notice should the Germ:.n"' enter unoccupied France •• e .:;tates omPhatico.l1y that 11under no circumstances wil the fl8ct fal" intc Germn.n hands . 0 F0 1 o ing ic the tr:.rn:l~.-ti 0 n of D::::.rl_..,:: orde,.. tor-. , ,-.~"s JuL~, J\fo c:.~:, 6 ;Jarr" ('1°\:'..'.lisia), (' '1Pr 2.. ~-=-nci6:.2.. ~cl,'! !_=.__!.:c;::; 'ich,.__; ., ·:ore:::::~ ::C'1:· !)or; __ , .. co. ~.s..1~il.1c Ioroc:n , ,..,:. ab .:..~ca '"T'i;_nis"!.'" , .,...:;:-cctiv:J ~... : '' 1 --=n,;age"'e:.1+..., ~ ing been fulfil.::eJ "--' +· e t bodJ "'.)&:~ le beco ...ln~ u:e: .... / "'r~ ~---- u..:._ to :..1 tho 1::.:: !:3[.. ~.d ri~ for~~~ in "-"W i::. ....... ~, .ica 1cir !.fri .... t::, cc:...:: a _, .:'i~ht (;.,,.6!:..=--~st for-:-~ tJf !'J":!,...-~ ~nd -':, f~o~1 ~.,,., ...,\..,i;.,.:.pt thi:: o:' ..er c.11d. of to !"c·:u=!l to tc o"b~srv(., """"trict~:::.1.10,1trl... .. lit:,, .... ":2--!n .. .'~l;;er·~~ c....uj ..!crocco C;o~ c..nJ.e., ... .. ~-i 1-Chic.P ..,.ll '1..ltt~c11~-"l·,r8::::;::.n ... lic..:, ... r,n itl-- local .:~-1 .,, Co c..~..::..,..c0 ... th ..r.:.c ub~ect of tsr1w for -~11J s-..is)ens:.0~1 of ho::;til:!.+ics. "3--I c.ssume a...tthor ~·•y O', c,.. '··or'.;h · frica. i.n +,~e n<.1.':13 ".:.he '"'.ar.:.,hal. of '!:hP pr Jsent ::;en.:.nr officers retain thelr co11.--'Lnr'is l.nd Lhe :ro .:. t.;.cal ::i.nd ad.-:,.:..ni:::tr~ttv-v Or[;anizatio:.- ..... r '.l:..ln i.1 fore€'. To chanc:;E:. ..:.1. bJ 1.1c.d, ..:. 0-rt a. fres:1 order fro::1 " . ' 11 4--!111 ;risoners on eac:1 .,.:.. " wi.1.1. be e·{c lc...~sed. " -::. 1 .1. To ec:. edi te t· 1e ar ,i. tic es in the Oran and JI.isle s re, ions, tr ..e order It ·.,ill be d-:Jlivcred to the affected co:-' t:iders to'llorrov. by cour.i.ers so that the authentici .. y !on't be in douht . Le rad"oed. Fol.o-inf this conference which takes the entire morning , Gtneral Clark ~ends the fol.1.oriini:- cable : tJust conc .... i lengthy conference ude with Dar h.n and hir cohorts. >-le r atedly refused to acce;:t tern::; of :ir1Jif'tice rec.son lack of c.uthority fro:'.! Vic .,_; [ dcm~nded he sif,n them to i!:lc.L-:.ir all !fort.1 l.i'ri.ca anrJ. . e sta.te 1 ••e:. • ou.~ b..., taken into custodJ if he refu.,ed nr" furtl-ier ne2"otic:;tion ,ould be .ith ~iraud. ,n:e final : y ap•3ed •·o i::::::,ue c.1e &.n c.·der to 1;..l" the :rour. ' , ir and naval force;:; in "ort.h !.frict.. , .;_1c •1dL1.; or occo ·e:ri Tunis:.a to c isc 1.ti::--.,~ehoctil.~L.:.e, .:.... e:~at0::y. T V hi.r sig:ic--3. order to c<r.h C01 :..n Ar anr' it is boine dis. c..tched our V ~ tl-i Fre_1ch C't ff Officer., :.od :·, Frc. 1ch 0 • r s·· Ri;-er~-33 (EQUALS BRITISH MOSTS!::CrlET) �( con "!.'.::ndsr:J \""ho'could be rv ..... ched b;r t--1- .J·.one w.,o h::.ve been co~ ..:anic:ited w;_ th incl~din; those in Tunis . 11Later arran,_;ed confe y._ncc q, 1.nderson ,;·i th I"r,:.ncL. co-:i ......... n ers to :aci1.i tatc h l ;: .L.'lo. osed ::iove .::mt b:r ::cu. toni:;ht _ to Jon° , 3ou ie 2.nr' "~:.. j elli. Dar lc.n obvio 1 1:::l~r ,le.yin::; for •.. 0\7er . k.st •.ic;.1t co.rf rred ,Yit!l l".:..r ·1d a.'1d a__,::..inthis morni.'l.; . r'ir.::.,ld rey_uested DarlG. ..... o confer ,.it. hi:.'1. '!::be latter refused b..:.t T h::..ve ar r .. 'l_,-d for the t-o to conf r v:it:1 me at 1500 tod·y . Darlun at St. r-eor_;,c .:here T a,·, . '4e is not in our cu::,tody but '1e ha,_ ..-;:..vsnm1 1:J.is ·..ord not to leave . 11 Pel.:. ve i:i. viP.\ o: 1 i;: order to sto.i:, r3si t&nce h" should not be ph.,r::::..cc.11:, rectrained i,t pr __ se!lt . I b .. ter ,:isc·1::.::"'d a.lon:) "':'ith I\:..rlan t'12 .u 0 -tion cf ".:.h-3 l .... . 'V .. • ,..,1·· •ro, C''.,,., "V ,-,~+c th'~ 1~ ·"trr t'-in•1_ .lT•..., ·ro ,.., "C"" J.!J_, t I no • h· 11' •"'t ,_ t..i. V i..,\,;,l,.., ,l,..-.. .. .._,,1,.,,,,._.., ,._,...., '--"" f tuo K.i.n_,p.i.?1s but hope to 7;.:_grrlc o"Jt of it so::1ihov:. I I doe•~,.,d ::..tof ut,noct imrortance to do a!lyt' ·..'l - to sec'..lre c....1 ori.l-.)r ·hich rwuld be ob-r:Jd to c ,. se hostilities ev_ryu' ern Tfave not 3.nn0...:.nccu thl::; (T1ar1Ln 1 s order) ov::r +re r&dio so as not t.o +,ip 0' .. 11.c.nd the r 3r7 ...n~ . 11 1.r to = ~ i...-...L..1.., ~..i.. ....... 0 <-...., ..I. -...i P..k:i.nto the ren.:ral ' s co. fcronce with d •ir ,l DarlL ... , Co·1r:odore Die'. , "l Eritis".l ~rb.va.l li ...L,on to ,~l i3d :_-3ad1.ue.rter::i, sends t.11."'foL.o· in.,: :nessa L0 !.d.,ira.l Cun.1ingha"l : "Clar:~ &.sb, .... to _;ive ;ou :.;;r i ,_:.:,res~io:::1., Firs- !'ou..nd e . f.[,..., :Je"'n "'ained b·..... .,itv.E.tio!l rril.- obviously t not bP ...,ati..sfactory till :,l1ole hearted coopeT'&tion obtained . Lc.rge n;imber of fr.-.nch d.lren.dy out to hcl but T)arlan clique ~··il need -::... inJ . Thi., is in h:mr'!. narkn tc' . still ho::,tile to us (Pri tish) and in lees er de 0 Tc ~ to L'Ilc.r::.cc.ns but concidcr he se-c ~ osi t.:.on gone .:..n Fr:..ncc c.r.d -;-;ishcs to control fro .. •rort:-1 Africo. • T tnink he L, 6 cn"J.ine thc..t he r,ill not let Fre.1cli. fleet fall i:1to Ger :1u.· '.l.:..ndsbut ·· l~ 7 r.10\'e the:J. or..ly in 11;.st emergency . It is i:1tended to contb.ue ,,orkb.g on this z.s also question of ::a:1dr .i.a s'i 1.,adro:1. Cl~l: ·ms nc..g:-iific~nt . 0t...r :P"'iso!lE r., neglected local l~· bi.lt nm: rele,. ed . :: x .: ,'.ir defense ::io"t i:1;,,pirin; . 11 0 " 1 .Another senst..tional develo .J' 11:mt occurs i:::1the c.fternoon . '~u.rshc.l Peto.in .... has f::..red !.d::u.ra l narlan c::.::;head of th "'rench ar.:1ed forces and ha::: a.. r,ointod General :ro_;ues , the _1:.:.lita.ry gover!lor of :'.:!-enc' ·•orocco , as h~.s successor . C-enen l CL.r'· .::o-s to see .Adniral flc.rlc.n. ~-1-: find.s hi .., 11lookin_, like c. c je.cted lit·~le _;i._; 11 ""'arlan re,;Jorts thect Petain r,e.;, also rejected . t '1e forth Afr;.,ca ur·.11stice tor 1s . t;encral Clc.. tells .r': Darla!l that 11 Petc..i..n is the mouthr,iece of q.i.tler . 11 nc.rlc..n r3plies that there if. notl:i:'lr; h~ C~-· do bu revoke the crder he sii;:i,ed t'.is .:ior.nin:; a:i.d ·.-:-:1ic'~ hc.s Lee:: d.i.sria.tcheJ to the forces . · :'l~plies General C]c..r1(! "...,.0·1 1r·3 !lOt ·0L'lo t0 rr";ol:e an~r ors.er !" 0 -:ys nc::,rlc..n ll'T'h-~ , J : !!lust b_ tc...kc:. _ prLo.,ller • 11 Golo.Ll Slocw ... later plc.c'"'s ho pla.too:i.;:, ..... ,.l the. ro'. ho~nc of 1.d~:irG.l -rren'ar(l, ·h- --~ .l\.d::1ira.l Jc:.rh.n ·· .:.11 sta,{ . "'h-' lo.st thin~, r.,:,ncral Cla.rk tells Ad..:irc.l nc:..rlt...n: 11tl o', ' s your chtLce tc gst th Fr-!lch fl--et ! " Repli0s _·_d·niral D.:..rlan dcjectedlJ : 11T+ ' s net .:., :'13et ; T ": ..)Ge.1r_::..:.evoc. . 11 'e adds that 11 Peta.in "has told all the corr.:u:nders to fi,--:hL. '.fter th::..., conf"r0nce a.'1c:1. before -oi.1; to one ,·:ith r.enerals rira.ud , J .1.in, X:ovltz and :cdi al , r :moral Cl:..rk checks o.. ::..nd fi:i.d.;:; thG.t ·'h:i French co.1.a.1d"'r.,, have obeyed nr.?.rlan ' s conr:c:..nd ;:.,.ndhave p .,ou.;ht o.r!ni.,,tice::, ! 0 0 • 0 0 The conferl:nC"' '..ith the Franch gener ~ s is held at J:uin ' s· h"'c.dqur .. rter::, , The other ,.lliod officers beside t;eneral Clark are. Captti.in ,··ri...,'it , Co;n. odore Dlck , Colonel Holmes c.nd "r . ·rur~h;; . The firin of Darlan is die.cussed . The Cenorc-ls report the~r h::i.ve j.ist received infor.!ki.ti ~n thnt the Ger .:k'mS arc c.bout to invade Unoccu:Jied France . Says ,... ir&ud , sadly : '" e are a.t the end of our ro)c . 1,'hat an appc.lling situation . It is ti!Ile for· the French to get together and it is 0 SECRET / �100 _, 0'"' ror• on~··bi' 1 i· t · -f.o b....., to U ",, r .;,.,d ,_...,'vc 'orth :s1·ic1-. ! " r _.. ~ ·,~t Lrc..l Clerk Frcnc 11 mat· r , " th,m ..· " -"'ts tl.,::.t G.:.r:md ;::ud "~r u..1 .,et to,::cthcr . "'Phi:: L -L. cc • .,_ n . ,, c::._7s tlL Deput,; Co .c.n ::.·-i::1 -Ch :i you .... t ·or';: out :;c··r ,..ire. d toG:tL t~:·:..._, the Lrvc.~1.on of ::nocc• .. ::. .l Frc.nc t ~ d ·... D~::.·l n : i-t· r_:J "'':l .;eneru.l se:r..::ls the fol ,..,..:.c.""cabL to r ..::1 r:: . ..l.~ ( ,.,l..,i. ,._U"- J. ~- - .,J V V ..., ...,c.,,. (..i. ... !. ·A ";t t ca ' 8) ... :ia.11.,; .i..1all i"r ol: to ~C:~ ·...:.r .., -' 0 ........ to • o ... . '"'.__r h1,.· j .st r c_iveJ r fire " b ,'l'L ~tl,r a ~ ,ct..,c. 1.,.ndtold ': t1'1.~.t n · ~ ord. of hosti it.:.-~ , Juin . _ . r ~ ..t . Tr p • ..:.t hi-: to .:...,_uc .~J.c • "r' !' , ". t::._ .,ti.t d t ...t U.'1 L; :.:1st b1.:c0__ a pr .:.so.Lr . T tol-:i '1i . t .~.t to n i . 1edi +,,l;· tool;: ste _ to ...l:..c .. _.,, _,1ard c.rot.:i:.~ .!.h :1.:. 1~1-.\.:.!1 '.-le .1 ,• ord of honor ~· c.t he ..ould r ::iot r vo 1c_ the 0rc ..r . '::'' L c!1-~1z d. situu.ti·n brunt ne Kin"'.in ho im;:iediatel,/ S"a!"ted' 'c;.n_, T,in if h 01.1ld .l a;y alon; ,,it11. i-,._1, · pl ,# 1,ith nL.rle...-:.·' o ord r· the:. Fr-nc :l fl , t h_r" • n-r8 re ••l;ec:_ th::..t __., rdsr. oul ef':.'.'ect. ~ · :.E ·1..for c:..s'u,d · h:i.~. a. • l a to t:1e F::-enc • fl at he cou ... net . ~ :i-:.'.'t d t.1e i th Ju::.., an. ':::.!lL .:.n t.t 0 ... ' out their sit ..~t.:.ou . 'Jo.it c;;.n , d .1~rc..LFcdf{.--c.. ~: ~ nd o::Dc..r ...., c .1 ~l:'\c . hJ to cti:tc , lc 1 t ord had j us,. beun received tk t the Ger .c.n.., ,ere c.b0ut to occu ~ unoccu. ::."d Fr _nee . ,Y Darlc.n ,:;-Latud that if t'1is 1".~rc.; tµtj: .1nd he r celv d vc ·ificcl.t.:.on he 01.:ld i ;nore ··ar~:1l..l Petain's o··d r f:.r in:; '•i.J c.nC:'. ould fe ___ r--ieved of f i_rL:1 r ~,or..;.· r .., .. po_~ ._,,i''Ji lt, . -r-e h&s ~skt.:d ·:..h!!t I co .. -Lo 1:_~ 1101..L..., au'--"-into.1.1i ht to di ce· s..., 1 '· ~ . ' . . ,... t . ,;, + . ~ ,.,at + ,.;ers11-n u d _ng c....,,, o,l):i.ion o~ th "l s _.... ' •1 .. I ::: '3 h J. ::i ~ si1r.1 - c..n on ., nav.:..l ... ;.•-'-,:::;, Jic c.n..::. .,....r.:.::;:.ti:.~ • . j..:ut rvturned from 180 .. conf-rencl: · ·th 1 an ·• ·..., .J ::.n, V::oeltz and endi .1 , t.1e la.tt r thr-- bein -trcn~; nc.rl_1 1Jort ___ • n 'h n the h ..ard of the • ossible G':r ..an.,r entr, into Coi...th 1·n rri:..nco th ir diff .:_1cec be a...l'l _.'11~. : told th .. th·.;..t I ,a~ to see ..... irt..l °!"'\o.rl~ 'f.ith ::.. to a .. :n .os:o.:.::iilii. r that h ,old c.hci s ~t · ·'·h&.t - h:v no .. .Jr C a:. o::i..... th.,, au :Jr c..tl.,,. c,r a. . o~ L1~ r ia • ~ove r---==;., • '"' .,_, :1.n Ul.., r · rt.. ::.i. ~c&.~ . • ( thi:.t it i.., t. for Fr .::::~1 .l to o"t tob n r :...1d d ,f nd ort.. lfric~, • •rnis ',&.S t l b ,st ne· ·s ~ 1:iar'ltodc.J . .:.s1: ee~ yo r 1 _ t on tc!lt.:. 2., ne .t r _ ort ... 11 .1·i..,a.J. a ked me for a confer,nce tod--:.r .in ho,.)u of ·orkin"' o..1t d~tu.il. shoul · Fr nch .. ir :nit::; co:"le he.1. ,. ro . Fr ~nc u . o.. occ·1.·c.tion . I a~ bad::. ir. need o~ an ric.,_n ir Of ::.c r . f r .1-r ~l 6L ... t!-:. n re.., __t d th ser·.,.:.cu_ of rk n) .. :'.. iers Ra - .:.0 tv" · • ··nd r our ~ontrol . .J.SO rac..io stu' ion c.t ~uc .... t .s :. ich il ly • r'1.:.t ID/ re. • .i..' collL ru..'1.:.ca. tion ·;;ith ., ou co .. enc.:. .,.; to 1or:::-o n0 .1 I ho., ... ~ver ,,rth.Ln3 (iUiet here tonight . Scattered , enemy ! . .:.r activity of dhori, ci.li.ration .it;~ n~ ative results ••• " T J. _. 1 "Y' .J · -~ r , G !!er"': Cl".rk conff'r::: c..,ain \ ith -arl_n cone rr.in,.; th urgent y_uestion of th .. Frenc .. fl<> t . ..c.-.or·ing to Io.rle:n , the fl + is r.o outside Toulo:!1 a c:..i+:5..n~ orders . "":ez~..l3 e .,;_1 direct t11e fl get to """c...i-'-to n Jo· n tl1P _,..lli .J" as coon ::..::: t•1e Ce.·mans enter ·noc cu. ied Fra::ce but not b-::.'or~ . C' ne-· l C r ~ :m_ est~ the ~EGRET �\o l ( fle t go to Gibraltar to refuel bec&.USP of the congestion in North African ports c..nd the politics..L threat from uncertc..in elements in the French fle t if U1ey enter French colonial ports . The gE'neral suggests the fle t r:rocecd to the Unit d States so negotiations concerning its use co ld be carried on . nhe F ench are very anti - ~ritish and Dar l an balks at having the fl eet go into Gibraltar . The bi~ questi n .u-iark concerning the French fleet is ,,hether it ',il_ obey Dt.rlan 1 s or ders . 1 0 b • e __ Ld 631§' [I . a sr 5 ~. 7 ., , JThc general r eceives toni 6 ht the COi,.r of "" Cc.ble from General ':&.rshall to General :isenhov er . '::"t i::c. rs : "'l'he Chief of "taL a;;- :-oves the aT.arding of the 1 distinguished servic, med&.l to Clc.rk Qnd the Legion of '.erit to the offic :rJ accor:ipan:'il1f.; hi;n . Th-:; a-·ard to Clark ,1ill be held -~1p'..illtil th--- ;:;itw:.tio::1 Cu"' Ls ,;:r.:. n "!or~ s...-,ecifical~.t •• , n Th.:.s is the text of the a .'a.rd: 11 "aj er Gen rc.l tt :ark ,. • Clark , 0-5309 , :.:r'°:iJ the U:i.itec~ Ste.te::: , h&.s been the Deput~· Co.i'T!c...'rl.dcro!: in - Ch::."f of th"' Al ..ied : orces sic1ce its inc ptio.1 . Th or.-;a:1.izan.; and planning f phase of t.1is o,.J~ ation is no· successf 1l y cancluc'ed . 1)urin,::; this i!:lportant period he_Tas :l:a. be l y responsitlc r for i :i orta.1t · ork that . as bein--; carried on . •'..s a relater pL..rt of this activity he s 1 1ccessfully erformed a r:1.ost important and hir,hly secr0t ..is.,ion . This !,lission , o -ether '.7ith the orr.:o.ni::.lns ~d p1annin:; of the 1~-~or .:;ortion of the orere.+ ions , ,;as of creat 1::1 ot>tr..nce to the ... U!1ited .':ta tee . This \.as a .-osi tion of t::,Tec. responsibili t tJ , and. the maimer of carr~ri .:; 01:..t t ·1a assign!!lent ·,-as of the hig;ie::t order . It is rec om Pnded that th Distinguished fc,..vice edal be c.,.-1:..rdedto ''.c.~or f'._,,1crr..l ·:ark ,~. CL.rk ··•ith th folL0~;in:; citc.tion : iaj r r.enc::.•3.l :ark·· . Sl:.rk , 0- 5::: 9 , ,:...,_y of the U:1.itcd Stat1;.;s , for distin;:'1ish8d ce~v .:.ce to the 1bi ted Stat s .;r 7 ln :::.. od tion of 1 gr", t r ::_ mLibilit:,r c.;:; Do, --..:t., Co1·1ende -in-Chief of ths •.1.~.:..cd force di-:=i.n.:; its ...eriod of or _;c.nization c.nu. e,___ •._,lo:rment . 1fo .:;..,::;urcd this of:.:ice i:1 the sw.-'cr of 1c 4'=, and U-1rou~'~ 'is 0-i;;.t;:;tc.ndinz ability in or;:;anizin__, :..:.ndpkn in:; th::oAe~ct~ ~ns of t,1ic force , ha s~ccacc~ul y ~rc~"~~d thi~ ~r~wni~~tion ~or the im:'ort:..nt J::J.icsion to ..L-ic it hc.s been assigned . '.c :r.::rt of th3 duties of t_hc De ... uty Cc c.nde::.· o= t:1i::: ..,- oi.: hs ~ crfo:::-nec. ~ u.:.. .... '.l,; sec et and "'Ost i ...ortCJ1t m ::;:::;ion Thro•,;:! h:~c C"UC,:. .:.cuol.:c Lad~:r .,hi _ c..r.d out ..t2.:ndin:; abili t:,r thi:: "'"llS succe~"'ful y co::._l"''·ed . ·re org~n::.zuc. a .. d::. ·nin::.:::te:::-cd. ,.11e :1°c€:::Sa!'~' pro ··run °-:.0 brin,; ti,n troo ,.::: of t!1...t o:::-.;:...nizatl0!1 to ::..hi;; ::t::.tc of' tra::. .. ·ng und co-r:bc.t cffic ~ ! ... ... c...tid;i_.:; been l: .. c~ , rf_,el~,. r ..... "!'!.).;:~le for ~or.-' _1~ th:? t .... ::_ cJ_icc.l .,. -le.ii_, for th ~s ,-,:: +:1.s ... t!'OO,.::; :...g:...i:1::tth Jn ...:..e~ of th~ ·r.1itcc: C't:...t ., • HL r -L8tc .. nd.in~ c.b.i.li t:--h:...s "!:C.~chit1 o~ i!1c~ti ...:..bl.3 "~-c. to t:1.., ser~ric0 . u U$ 1 0 0 0 rr·y, t o cn.blc.:: ::..re r:;ce::.-red at c.. t.:..2c.· hen f'":1cr.:::.l Cl:...rlc c&:.1onl:· ~ivu th. n ~ '-!uic!: .:;l:::::1ce n--. r r: Lri t 1""'.) vor:. .. c~ "hi 6 hl~--cnr ... ·1 ::::•d J;olit~~::...2. !3it"'t"'".;rin -:..nd . f it .:.2 i.l +ou.. ::-o+ for ~ ~-W1 ·.11.oi .... Jilitnry . TT~ i: :...lt£ --nu.tt.,;l,,J~sg1.13t-C. , +hv ... ' ~h 1 1 :'1.u. . TI·1t ~~t ::. .. C ?l.... !~ '.).a.-... o:.:,.J .... . obj--c+:.."l'I"~ :.•: ~r ... 1(!~ J'!llJ _ __,+ .: - ... u~ J ~ , ...... ... er(, 4-.:.~ ... ,·ore' '--lon , th&.t ~1-:io~r :..:1-:.. ', h l_f· ,; t,.., , ::.nr, -t c;.-, -- +~ , th-=3dr.:....._,_ th_ +u 4· , ~::.t.J .~,...,~,., • [: '·}1""r.,.,, "r ~...,,.__·~...... r ...r'lr-:r 1 _n·,-·::> :_h, r ..... 1---- ~: .. C.~t d . l ~ J; ..... ,. ·. ECRET S , � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, October 23 - November 10, 1942 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from October 23 to November 10, 1942. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1942 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Language A language of the resource English Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/804 Date Valid Date (often a range) of validity of a resource. 1940-1949 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/3c98f9ea80275a8a1acffbd93d270364.pdf?Expires=1789603200&Signature=igYPBvFsR6PEknzSJjT%7EgrB6oPiHNoJJ9%7E90fq4Hl4MZy0BTcSwItnpo-4agdefrYNzw5XNmKAD8aEFnEVJ2zpbuUH0CdmS8kCow4Hr%7EDRyXZDQ1ejvrX-tEYt3hTrT1%7EbS5sQonQQ-j9ji2qlvZTOOeKlHqch8qJLq81GCE3eTfLVShiXK5b%7ELyAoAgnfVqbrEUgtW4qEXh3P3WE5u6TF3IlKoeHAVySGgc9r8n7lcXOo1lxPzzM09XAZoefWQs2GwrJQvfunyneO4cZUV2vOD6jEMQTy4xPwt4GuMFVSEZ0pASHR7LH-ycncFtvVdWhJcRPBV0Za-Ss2JXmtkjRA__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 33d2f07b08fce4b0640af878e8ab2e5c PDF Text Text \ 0:2 -- P'T?"' 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""~ - ,I ... ... ~.:.1..., clct ... 1:.. t ...... +o 'I .... ~ .,_ , o .......... fore ,... ' r ~-, - .1............... ~ ., 0 co r .,... [.li .. ........ ,_1.L o + co. dJc · r-"nc i, <- +,r 1 or.!J': ~r.:.cc ... ) _.. 11 'or'\-'\('. ... tt~... _r ~.., loc 1 • . (" Y' l J J. .. ? ......... +· _ ,._ .Lt ... ... ll !\1 -· r ' -'""-vi. • 1 Ll . , ..A. \., _,_ ~- ... l.rL r...: J.., • •• 1 ... ,, n' ·- to ::-'c., L "·L.., fir .. u .p r, T -~. .1 .. __ _.,_ .,_ V ~ u• " ' .... l.., -." 1 no troo.~ ~ of • r .:...c~1 --~ o r o .. 1·... L,:O..L ....; !' ~J,.._; it .• ~ r .:r u t 10 , ' ... .,..ic .11 :..arL..... .. ... J'r'._r 'rocJ.µ to_ .. t , h_·_: ~nt th 0 ,~ u.CC~ t 1 il I • u i!l - ~ t + :.· .~J~ C - .l t .h (' " ... of th E'r nch H- "T(...••C ov:!.~~., .:_~ . -~. c+ 1 :!..ri::'\· t ... .. I • __ [..r J.•- v!' .!. .,.. ... ,~ c r .._ .. J. • '... c .! .I J. <-,-, "'ir , 1 T <..... J. . l. ,., i. c ••• II ,..,1 -~ -- p ....... ." Cl: rl:-- - ., ~ U..-.u o.. "'}l -ri_.. ,.. rn, th t (\ r 1. C (; C r. r r ,a_.,_._, or..:. r '1 J. no. -~!1.. h_ .. .. ... &...... _... 1 :1 11 ~...~ -~0 l;:::. :-.... . ci c:::. th t er' r~ to 'o d; ·' h r h \ ) n • f' II ..,oth ,.\... ... :...n rlc • L r ' CY r':......... Cl rk r · :!. • ,0 . , ,Jf...,.t .• ..!Jo.,.....11 ....... ' ....... r r l.--' ((f:1·..,,_ l--..,;\ vol. -- .,_ 1 o - .::!:.:Eco t (', J .1.' l' .......... tc _, l. "I ,._ + ' C ... :r:.. ·', l. ' - t .., ., ·~o Cc. ... 0 - ~l ')J. -- ' ~., , ::.1 . ' :·~1 -•-..:, ··" . J i.1 c.. rn..l 1 h-b r, .! ~ .,.. > nch Tt _:i ....:..t..J. .r "re :-&.: tro - iv~ :t ni~, J.:.." .. l_.., r iG. Cl<-rk-- 11: ocr.k. th-t .,ou ...c·1 order'J tor .. n.: :::::.~+.,.,!.-f :::10t,: C.'.!l con ·r1,.,-r~.1[;_:er,· • 7 ...., . ·::..•:,y -"-h,., Ste b:..i.::b, r..t of a .. ili+•r~ ,OY !' •. ~r..t .::-. ~r •.c . orth __ -1.c_. " J.t .:.n-· C-::,,c ·y v _r .,i)o ;· ·:10 -~l r..r-!:.co ...~ · i+: o :: an-2 h lp. r · il" t :::-r'.1ch ofL .c i ..... , :.o cc.r. .:.:: ::. cn .. cr ... ord r::. · r.' ' 0 h· :::. ::i 1 ... :...1"L...,r: <' L it I ~re .• SECRET · ith u.. ,, �IOC, Cla.::·k--"You ~.TJSt J..~ove ~t . Von !J.U:t i::sae tl1e order to r.,:::-i:::ti ... ~nir{ 1 ·.:..1-- 11,.,h troop::, b,_ld officsrs :.r tr·~·tl"d b~' th:ir consciE:nc,,,s . .. · ~J.th.::r t!P J r"'.:.l ob -.: ths ord_:•s . -n-O_Ll,.a.; ho.Ve chi.;..oso!l ! ou:.,..~nr';: ;J r 11 cl.o noL . Pl. c.c.G Chrk--"Fcr ;rocr ini'cr~ti0r. n·.-:r ;::,;cond co:i.crn;r of -':.roo1s c.r~i-,red this ::1cr:L.,g . Yo1-.he.'.~ ;::; ~n th.:::t thcr" c.re nc·· "''.l...i. i!'l t!1e lurbor . ·~c h~ vc • 0 , 02J ...or_ ~ old.:.·-r~, • .., ful ~r :.r-~ ·.n here no .... "•y.,, hc.i."e l,,,o~t/ ler;,-r F..,for:- co:r/.:2.~ to t.1 J... m~ ting r · ~ .. . tclc:-honcl.. Or:..._1. }r.other co.woy he:.., :.rr:'..ved t!:lcre ·1ith ::.cJ '.):...d itionQ_ trooJ.,s. , I h::,vc th-1 •.1~c.ns to enforce wh::.t 1.0 i,&1:t und I do not i.1t0r.d to tolerate t ·:.:.:::di:lay . 11 !~ :i Durl::.J.'1 nv >tcrd:...~rJ-c:.l ay ... __ roved r.i:r reLJ.ucst t!tS.t :{o::;ue:Jcc"'e here . ,,ra le due in Or.... .:.n l : :::io :.½is ufternoor. anr he shou::.d be here 1:J~,: : 30 . ~~it ~... n 1t::.1 ro 6u s C"nfer:: ~it .... 1 s~and • !]befo::-c yo'J. do any.thin~ drastic • 11 1 :::::, ,. o::nt , 1:::!.ni:::-t Fen rd , ·.-10 ?re...J~c "n:; L ,, comes behind Gene::-~.l l · to ......" ·.1hi~c I>c.rlc.-..n, Jl1in and !1.ll'J.!·.v i .. a. car=J-i.1g en un "... 1_;_.,, tcd ·' hre".-coracr ..c. c~:::ifereEce . FC'n::;.rC:. t':)l•-~ Ger. rc.l Cl'.rk +h,.t he be:.ieves hs is .. ~cing c. bi mist:.. 1ce . 11 vou a.re ;;et tin.; v,hat y01: c.nt if you vi only be a lit ls ::::ore ,. ~tient ~~r · E i +," I- __.. rd. s<:rJr:: "Don ' t s~oil . evor:;t~.a.~J.~. You a,_ ..o .... hu.vc ::;o.!..ution t nnd::;, victor;: i~ k::ir' . ll 1"1:..::-l·::::ak s hi~ hce,J l:!.."ld SC.~~ ~1sc believ ~ J··i:1 c.. ::1- :J:c:-lc.n ar ~ j ~ ...t stallin-; . Fcnc.rd dro;s hi::: h ::ds ir. :::. hor~l,,,ss gesture . "Tb· t ' ~ .:1.ot tr, c . I s" vu.r it. You c.re ,_-:...1..C il:.n , ./0u u.T$ blinr:. . 1' Ji.:.~:J. -::11011~3 been ur~1....::.n~:.c:.tydl:,.. .. , , ..... · n~rl, n +,.Lrn +o ~"' •1""' l Cl ,.,,.·_J , '\.·:1.·t1·_ _-:.,.,.., ''D' ,,,,,, ,,.. ' ~ Q-.· ~-a. -J I..;r ..... ['At this Cl~rk to vhi::per 0 (.4 ( _.. ' L,,i. .a..,.l,,.J,. • ....... " .... c;..\. o.) ':\.. Ju.in--nr a::.:. ;·~itl:..Y')U t' . Cl:::.r'--l' o . "ou 1 re not ! 11 .Tvin-- 11 1 a"l i Penc.rd--llYt .... it ~.th -:/'"'''. 11 anr:: you ·.-.:.1 :::.vc the facti n..., , cld.~cl toce• 11..:r '' ! CL.:,rL--ll"o·.1 are not ovir(; :'a::;t cn-:,ug.1 to !:c;::p the Ger'llD.l'i.S ::re, comi..i.z .:.:!to Tu.11.:.~in. .,.. ·· i:. r;ct c. co~:-..o::-i:lcr ~o i"il . ~ •. rr.:.rc:1 ~.:. 1 us . I E"w'tlco·; J.1;'; c:::t.s..bli sh t to c.. ·dlit~r;:r :;overn,;,cnt . ('' ·tu:;,•:-hy)--Tell 't:a3:-.l th&t unls::s t!lcy cl ci.-.:c-to go .... long , i t:1 us rie:1t nm' UrJ E..re tl:iroug:. and I ' .: ... rep .. re.d to lac the::i und r arrtJ t . " Juin--"!.11 -..e a.st for i::- a sus::,::e:i.s:.cn cf th'3 Tunl::: orde:- 11ntil .'o;;ues Cl rk--""o l · e don ' t rA;O .1i::_ P~tajr. ' s orders t:nle:::s he ec±::i along wl ti 1s . n Juin-- "I think h ~~OtZues ,-.:.11 :::.cc". t ycia- ter,:i::: . 1• D.::.rlcn--"I ask ~·ou o reccnsi'l ..--·ill be i.ortk,hile • 11 ( n.nd r;e do.J.' t recoi;nize :::.rrives . 1' r ani Y'<-.i'.:.until !:o:;t,e~ c.:-riv-s . T think it Clark-- 11:'o . Nogues' arrival i::; in no we.,, con_ ected, ith t ds . Th::'•~ c. lot of :::us: i cic::1s a.bout a lot of people! 11 ( Dc.r l&n L., +,._a:ng the sl:ip.., of •.,~ito rc..pcr into sl:irc ds . ) r �( DurLs.n-- 11 "'o.:' • Yc'..l '"il: be atvolutel., ~J!'ltil th~n I cc.. 1 4 t..scu...11f'_J.":l .... rcsro!1c.:~tli cl ~ft ,rno n a.ft :: this z., 11 e:.. not ._;oln~ to th~ n.r- t.:.r-~. - don It r •co .1.:.2 T yo1 ( o.rl:-.1) -..ftcr a:·d . " r:.: rk-- J ln-- If Jo~,1.. s C:lrrk-- 11 r..:.n:1· lll is .::;o.:.r"o 1:,, t::_ to t ... ~ co ..:~ r i tn ., o 1 not e~ t.:.r...-::; •. ,.. , ill 0 1' o •.r n +.,, • 1 r , 11 ,i.-.'.."~r., co ..:ia!1 hi ... " 0 Sl rk , turnlnt:: to D:.i.rL...n--nr ~1Lve rlceivec. :'."'rP~~ fl' t h i: tak . ,, no •CTorJ. about -.:1· t cticn th,_ Do.rlc.n--n -~ mes c"'e a rec :...,rP.c.· Lbout :o la. ,t ni~:.t at Toulon . '.ar::: .:.lJ.e , a::: occt. . i8d b~ t:1e f"' rr!'.R.'1S i::: 001·r...:.~ -~1 _.nc. I h<::.vi:; c:,iv0d no r • l~· . Cr.hl.:.ng r ~ s ~ ri,osr.ibl~ !lo~ . ; a ..L-it.:..!l,;_> t.. r· ~::.o :'ror2 t!1€ fl ~---t. '1 for Cl r::--""o ynu under::,t-nc: ~r-r".r co •' rc:Lio .. in th ::: ecurP thf' fl .... ::or et fi~ht thL t y;:x,:u:. o:..ition it.. u::: e., n riot on ..... on ",r u _ .,_ e.ga.:.n:::.t th~ 'J-9rm-m: b t , Lo .:.!101....r c.b.:. _;_J to '1 i·"'? T)&rl~n--tr"T9;... : 'L.....'t')..:l~r::t&!L: --cll . J,t.: , ... ... te~,.,r ~. !10 lon~J,r in 0 on h" il of '..,h J.. c..d.~ of tll 0 S'1UcJ.:ircn 'I . c:~. t-n·l. ....,c:.i·l-n--"'bout Cltrk--"' il t.) -1 o 1 clo~k." r;i.raud be th ·•:::?n fi.r~·' ~-!'1Ft!1--n~•.c r ,. ~lt th9 , nd . co J p opl,.... r. ·ou . 11 c.:;.rk--n~·ho .:. n .,o r r,nd . ho ,.n:.t d r"\t::L.... ::ov..,~n f3nt . n .. s ., t in . o r .:.1 b Jecic it th 0 ·"a~=~~:?.--n: ..1 .. t co!l'""'""lt .it1 6 0 d "!:,o.,·o 1 ...nle::;_, thL. Juin-- 'T·1 --:t:' is 1 ( /ogu,~. 1~ ·, .:.t.1 th" c.:...,t • . I ·ng Cl::.::-k-- 11'Ih·:m lss·1 (l, ~1co J -r 0 • .. cn- co not .1, J..:1 po ~.... on,::. C!"' . 11 a.r:t to h lr . " ordic>r::: to resi~t, th:- r, rrr..:..n:::n . / ("'' ..:.s :::tc.rt., of: anoth-=-r vole n:...c outbl2' t free. c'"1.. -'-o ,.:!'~ ·1y . -::.3 '!'c, '.n --~citodly . .._,:....ir.. 'mir-J.l F nar.. alks -...:.rto th':) .1ea,' of t:1e tt..ble to tel G :1ere:.l Cl .. : wt.it . Yo1.. .1....ve cv"'rybody tit~1 ./o-:..:. :: s c~r i t1 11' T1in then turn., o .. r:( . Cc:1. rs.l c::.rk . -Ie i::, ::,c 'Yd !!e can i!c.. rcE;:,r :::i.t .,t.:.L . • ---/s h i., ace .. ., 1 of 'lsloJ.:.lty b) G"r.. r~l Cl::.rk :' .,o::" in1icu.ti o~., SECRET icsu Lh crJ,.,_r to �( 1 the t r oops , T ron 1 t ac cuse you o"!: dir. i oye.lt;,r . I j ut Ce,;.n understand t the attitude you tako - -s~yin[; .1ou \7&.nt to fight the C''·rm&ns an then cancellinJ an or der that gave you the op.._ ortuni ty to f ight th , • 11 .Juin --" Gi.rauc1 ha;:; ag r eed to be your militc .. t....::visor . I ;-... ry nt to help Cl rk - - 11::': 1 .1.l sr>e G<'mc al Giraud . If r he ag r ees to have you it him . 11 is alricht ··1it.h 1le • II J uin -- 111 1 ,:i not beiTIG treated r.:.gh t. 11 11:, ""'en'.:r..3 +o Cl:...:--- iL:. vrl[;lish --'' Yot1.are :·.1uking a ~!li::::t&kc You ,·,:i_l spoil , . 11 evcrythln:-: . : Dt rlan-- rr1io i::: c:;oing to coL'l..anC." 1 Cl r~ -- 11'.:.'ho s'.1.r,ren.e ccrrL.an~ ·.il l. ter . 11 be .h.mc~•ic..... T • .:.1 S"ttle th9 French com- r.i.&nc'.0r:., Jt,i:-i - -PI ~ug_ est th t Gir.:,ud be, th" ; 11.dthat I co:n-iand J.:l[;eria . 11 resi Cl rk -- 110kay , if ~·ou •,ill t the G 'I' _,_'J..,'' . Juin -- 11:ro,· or after ( mi li·~ar;; i s~ue the order the meeti~? co!!! :::.nd.'" from n.... to k:...r EL,orte . to the com:.:i.nr-'ers in Tuni:3iu to 11 C::i.r 1 :- - 11I mean no·, l I 1ve to l d :,•ou T 1 ve ha--! ir.for1,1:.i.~icn th:::.t the G rm... plE.n ns to lc...nc.'in Constantine anrJ. Setif . ''cur futu r e .i t h us de:;:,enC'.S ·.,hether you d.o on this or r.o+ ! 11 J uin -- 11This put::: me in a hell Cl£.rk- - 11I 1:no·. it lut J uL1- - "Bllt the hell of a s ...ot • 11 / .} I ' m in a ·.1orse srot . 'l'he r,e:c-::1 .:.re movin.; ns of it i., that 1,, .,,. . 11 Nogues is m;r co,:r1anc ·r . 11 Cl· r k--"'Ns ·;ytl~ing de ends on ·~hetl.er u-o-ugo to t e l ephone now &nd tell your co"! .an'iers to resist . I ll'!ean this .fro:.! the bot+o.1 of my h~a:--t . T 'ill se:nd cpla.ne to chec!~ on ·;hether th':1 or d r .:.sr ho!1ed w. ' ·1hether it L being obey~cl . " Clcr\{ --" Revokc the ord r e.nd t13L th~rn to r,si...t . If ~•o·.1 hold Const&.ntln\> airpor+ , :;_1d Sctif , I ,,ill guara.nLe ei.at I \ ill send r,lanes in th:rc ::. ~'.,c:d.:.;:;.LlJ .. to helf . 11 Juin- If ;,'Ou send the pla.'1.es nobody ,,ill 11 CL rk -- "I insist Ger:Jc.n:::. 11 Juin - - 111 nant tl1:o.t you to talk bother hone the com~anders to Darla..'1. 11 .:rou. 11 i:m:iedi ate~y t6 resi.:,t the �( (, hilo Darlan and Juin o.re out of the ro om, r- ne~a.l Cl rk strides up c.nd dovm pc.st the head of the table . !.<.1irc.l Fenarc' is t-~-e._·-ing it .1im to wait until Nogues arriv~l be.fore he ~O('S c.n:r:.ting drasti c . HYou 6 n ' + m11. rstand the internal si tuatio:.1 , 11pleuds Fenard. . 11 v :-yone L behind :::'arl n . :f you wil ,.ai t you will hse everyona ·.ti.th you . If not , you .i.11 ups t the aL_ 1 e cu.rt . 11 ') Cl f'rk -- 11 , and if I "·:.it , L1 ad ition to r-,1 s , 1 1 1.,__ Yes h-ve r, rs&ns on top of t, .,. The.: c.rs:.- i lding u1- r .sista.11ce . '"l'r l n , Juin a:id th!:? r est of then bu ,.ant to t cro· 1 Giraud out . I 1 'll going to sti ck by ~ i r t ld . if Juin cioesn I t issue the ordors no-r- I will wait· :or the!!! to co_nfer witn .Iogu3s any-1ay . Sti::._ , I am not sure o are 2y frien~'., . n 0 -Fenard --11""'l you are bl.ind . "ou are 1c;n I a.:1 sure of it ! " if you d.nn 1 t tru::;t making a nistake ;' :::c.k ., k •.o .. that • the st~nd an " takL"lg ls · ~-.,,.;--;+· ~ ~ -1_ c...r n~ i;e,_ +.--d,., in;; ""o""-~•1 11~ .!l l; enc r ..... Cl~ k • l'r•,, n Uv., COTililc..11 .~.r +v - 1~ ~ . F cn&r db egins P1ea a· th<:>friendly Frenc.'l , dr ir1:.l , ,. ho has d0c::.c..red ~ _ r1e""lctistratcd he L ,. i tn c... , 1r' 11 matter ·.-,hc.t har,_en:::.. 10Sc.rs General Cl rk : 11 c&n 1 t that he ,·:i..L bacl: ~d .io ~ afford to ::ia'rn c:.n;-,- takes. . Tie stakes are too :1ibh . 11 Jar lL!.Il and J1..in then .:ii return . ( Juin-- 11 r...ave just chec::ed . In "'unL , r.encral :3arr:i: is cove-ring the r· lro..:..ds . 1 He ::o.ys he eot orrr:rs fro::: Vidhv yesterd(;;..,· not to re::,i.,t th8 G3::.~m ... r.,:,, ·re t,l1ought I ,:as a prisoner , I told hi.:i th.c..t if the G<irmc.ns attc..ck , he is to r esist . '' Cl ~rk--Su J.~ o:::e the Ger!'.!ans cor.ie o:i the airpo:::ts . "''nm. tr.en? Juin --" :.s yo 1.i 1 :!_0'\. , they are alrea{"./ on some airport., mve at c..cL_d but BarrE. b.c..-.~ order::: fror:i ' 7 ::..d ;, . n h CL.r:~-- 11 the C,crma.ns come on to a.not:1er air,>ort If r esis·L • 11 Juin-- . '.:.'"10 I! :'r0nch are the Frencl, should going to 11 . " Ycs Generc:i.l Clr.rlc then instruct:::; i.dmirc.:;. D.:..r e..r. t1mt he t 1ill G..il' it tl1e mect::.n: l with No~'nes before ric.1d!1 6 a decision . The Deputy Com and.er then ::;hc:):es lu:.nds ..1th the Fr .mch"len 'and leaves the room . ~!e h&s &.lrt6. 'y orc".ered thc.t the French nu.v&.l staff , occupyin:; a lr.r _;0 part of the Hotel 0 t . r aor 6 v, be out bJ C tt:rdav· noon so t:1<" r icans c ?n take the ent.:.re structure o·v r l :J .> [Follo· in, l:mch , th gen~r&l ho l ci.s 3. ;'r(.ss corSer-:mce: 'l"'ith ur.:.tish 5nd Jm r.icc.:.'1 corrcspo21:lPnts . HA c .. :jlc...ir:: +1-..~-t, fer the ~ ~ Ll1~ .., Cl.' h he....., tT., !1c.d :1i'"'" ... :1c _r:: f·.111 yri J·,:1 th~ _ _iolitical iitua. ... :iion ; tha-~ :_ is .,ealinz r .:.th ~ v8ral L!3l)::.ro.nt..., ~ !'or :po-., r; J/1Lt ht. definitcl,, ~'"' 6 0..:..__,to .i::;e Cc.ncrc.l r..:.rc..:~ "b::ct..u..::e ,.e ...r c r::.a..:.n he ,.::.11 .fi~ht alor:c~siJc , .$ • TltJGU.rcling 11,, :18 is necotiutinG . v.1.:.th"'c.rl&. , r' 0r ..Jr&l .. .L 1t Clarlc "'Y.:})lLit;,c, t~c.--~ altl:.o .._.): h- II 0-:.ilC.::.1. . --t nyt:1inz re.st Darlo.r. , II th I'ri:..n_h c aclm::.ral llhas ths a.'..r anr.: n:.vJ· solic.l.1 t_:1.ind hi._ anr' they G.r £.1~ .:..u"'.:..:_t ~.:.rauC::. . I 1 v...; h[;.d to .Jl:...; · lJvh Du-lc.rr beci:..use hs .:..lc::ic:h-.., J~hc po·:.Jr to ::.top all ho:::.t::.lit::.e.: anc~ ~.:. u::; ""'c.l ;::up,.or'.:,. ,.,hi::; >:ill sL.ve u:: G.,..e t futnre effort . }'.J goc..l ::.eto ve 1 ~ECRET �I lO \ get narla:1 , ,...:.'r&ud a.nC::. l..2. the fo.ctionc together in hcr.,10:1.;• 11 ne tl1-n _;_nforra::: the ne,1:::~-.'.lper~ '1. • r>~.dlo !!'.en t:u.t :::.'arlc.n hu.s ::,ent instructions -:.o t __ Frcr..ch flc ,t to -:J l c:.vc f;r~'"clc T!'l"t·O~O1.itt..n . cr ts :..,r ::-roceed to ifricL for r:::fuelin.; ~o it c_n proce) ., to tr_ T\1i•~ed C'tates so ne 6 oti'.:.t::. on fc-r it::: us2 c'"r.. be ctc.r 4 ::d . 11 He tell:.; t':e'"' c.bout rcvo l:r... ion of th,,. orc½::r to ':'~ii'" ' ~· con c.n r::: an rc::i·r'r::, : 11_,..., :i·o·.1c&.n ::, c , .,. h£..ve ..,o:" wi'1ealthy bed C" .x:.::::ior.s." P~caa..,e th- po itic 1 i·~·A·-:.ion _;_::; still .:elic&.te , n'ltlli:..1t; is to be . 1ri:ated 1.'.l1-l:.il &ccorc1. i::; r -:cr.ec: T'\a_·lc..n ur. or is Jt..iler· . rrY01.1 l sa· . today th~ ~:ivul al of e..llout ::_5 :1::. 102.ced it:1 ::::.1 .l:'.. 2.:: . ::: .• ni troo:;:; , " r.'"'!1~·al Slc.r' C"nc1udes. ",..iii~ r:::.lces n:~- :;.::.:1,.-, .. uch :::tro ••~c :· v..:. th the F:?:ench. 11 0 1 in ~1i:::ron:. hile th€: F::er..c11I!Lnc ·· toe th 0 r to t!'~ ~~d.r c..ch tn ac;rA'"'~ , r nc,~-1 ~l.:.r}:, . ·~~:~ r.ru.~cr ~sa~h:'..~ .. .... -it ~r.:..v.:.:a~ ~~:icl:: ~:.~t ~ he.s besn rP ,uisit:.oncd , b0es out to v~, _;_J~ troo:--.: . P,,, • .as~ -cts t!1e 39th combc:.t "':,~c·n c...~c'. ccnfcr:: .i. ,_ Colnn~l C--t ::,.,-.,~ i::1-: gentrc..l .,..1.:.02.+ ... :hs :i.1on . in1 ..., conc,3rn:_:10 the fight.:..n.~ th~~r J.~t;_c.:. J. )!'tci:. .:.4' ' .. the:r c..r 6 ':?tti!l[; fr:;C ~: ½_UCTttSr.A:J~ ::e .., o .. · later rc:r.c.r::::; ho- rr-fre::: 1ing it · ::: ·to eL o·,t c.r.i-n: troo)s aci!l , T+, is rl~o hsc.rtr-n-ir:~ to ~ _ ::,o 'l' ny r2.'.;'"-c., c..r.Ld b ~ c:i:-t.,--look:'.. l~ 'n"'ric·:1 ~old:. '1..:: ~tc.tio::~-::= CTf"\ .... , -~1:.~c.:.t:,.. :.... ; _ ti.. ... ... b·~2:: r1r'"'t:r::.""~ .:..:,....!l ;., .. c.: ." Carr ..... ...... __ :..:o "":)l~ ch ~1 --m:bl,,. J.:.o 1.ait 'i"i:::-'-ly 3 1 0 C<u - ... :o ore.t:..::-~, ~ ~ ... .:. .... :.~L.,,_crtl,.). 1--~!c~u~::. h~ .... c:.:ri"l'..r c..~.:. ... 1~£ncL .... _ :,h n ~r ....l;)i::tl.:.1 ... -:ht..-J. cCl ..... o_t . i:.) ~ -. 2- Pr .... 8i( t Roos?~r..1-t l1E. ....~:...:, l :-1s-·\ ....l ~l __ ' s no,... .... .. r:: ~n t:.f"'l!l to "th ~ ~1:.,,,t.; JvO becor1-:: ~ T .:.~'..:.ten'::1t Ge:! ~-: l! l 0 ..... ·r·~--r .. dL"'l : r , -'- c:1tirs "£..~~·J-: .1~ ... 1.c8 ;:tc.:'f:.-:....bo1t nin" mc:!--i[. al ... r-Led. ~hey L..r t0Jacco1 _an7're; •• -wl Cl rk to :.i [schedu ..::djco:1f~r~nc::: at 2100 ;-•::.:,11Dc.rlc.::1., No0 ,-~ , r.iro , -, st a:!d t'rl otiir-r Fr nch ,_., t'.:'11.esrc· ., r .r cod ap anC:. :.l · c:::.rin.., s.:.c., ar:::;:, , ....,o s .:.n - ~J.:!:) to ti1- hot :. ::.ob'.): ,,it:1,.. :i i:..l CL,rk . The r::-2ncll].2n b.re 2.lr0c :' +L~r ·1 ~O[;U ::: r.nd Jarl:::.n asl~ Ge.. r::..l Clar::S. for t.. s--. :i:rc.t ~ .cor..fcr ..• cc . 1 Cir~ ~, ·· 1 io ms'.:>, n ~- lon" ·.~olf ~11 ale>'J.C &tw1ds ~n ·'·h~ bac>_:rcund b,; !-ii :: :.: . , [·e 1"0 1<:_ "l...:.r ed'J L1 inJ., ~::. r ·' r e; .• l' .:.:1, t r ':l;.91'" J r,~_ . -':.r.'..Jt Ho....,u::::i,.; t (, Co ·n er - ::.n-Ch.i b:· ret(in 1 ;o o;d0r a~ thr-.+, .s :::uc ., '1 ~-- ent.:.tlcd. to & . r::.v .... tEcon::er ':J.CC . C.Pncr:::.l Clc;.r! look::;c,;Nogu8::: l2ter:;.lJ in tl. ./' :.,tra::.....,:rt.cn;:;to !2l::: 1 fi,..n 7 "o"'uen tt "' ol,, ct..,,._,"'r.- rot r 1.,o·::1i - clth-::r :1~or ~~- " lo • -"ull h9i,.ht ·Jc,.,'.i ::::::.y::: - ·-c1 • • "Tel ...,.. .... 11 Pet.:.in ! ':'hi.., nci{.0.: Eo;ue,::: t-i.1k ' ... d., c.:!: ·.2 :c.:; , .:..l:::.v , r :::~-• 7 C•[.rk so::: ... into the c"t.11- conference room -it:1 D[..,rlc...1 O .J.e:...en-· '.r . '- .r:;.-,h., The r _t of , . the office:.·:: , both AJrtc-ric~n and F: e1,ch , .,tzw" or s:.t around .:._1 t:.e lol::1:;.~r. E'o~in louc: vo::.c s are coming from the roo.c: , [·l:"ost c..L tlie talk is French . Occanional-. Ge:aeral Cl .r ' s de ,p voice comes +,hrou;b. the dou r a.nC:: ·· 1 7 • T' er.. the Frcnch-nen are off a_cain , shou+ing excitedlJ .J • .fter an h ell' of tLis , 0 irc:1<2, · no h,;:; bc.,n 7 ob'ov t~ 1 '- ' ,. to~"........,, 0·.1.. ~1.·++;,., I- .1.,-.. ,, ...... 1 ·, ... ,.,.. ......, · ~ --1 o'h-r' o· ..., 1 ." - -"-o•.L ,,.,"r .....u., bir -'-'l' o·'l,.r ...., ..., v-.,1. ... v .... vJ.:..._ .J c..,....;,.,..i.\..J...L•v -~.... ..., -.. _ ...... l,! v ...... .,,, F'rcnch~r-::, -.s .:r:..·.rit0d i:i . T:e :~---:o. t:... .,.."":.'j, ("\~ "'..i:~e 0r r- .. :J c/o-:h. ?:~hrr:e::. l""!t· ..... ...... h.: ,rc.1C: '1e is !"_nr11'"'~:~ .:-i.Loui., !1i: fut-u.rc ..i)O::.itio ...... 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J.t./~ .......... ._. .... .... .., -.J • t T + :.._...,,__.__o::; 1 .... ..,. • --'- ..... l ...,Q_ ~ .... ... ,v re£' thi .... . (',. ...... , ~-:!.. r1 ~ : wr 1 i,..., /"'- ",....~.,, ~ ~, 'r,..., , told t!1, . ~.h... "...:.1· tr..2~.i ~ov r .......... .. .. ..t. i J �\\\ .• r - b~ -':,G,,... t:·-1..:..... Lo o. .i -t.:.c 11.,,i.,J. + _• .., 1• + ~., Jl.., .a..J.l ....... ,h cu1t ~ lr _ _ 1 :1 .:.c+ur i ~tc..r.J -t-J to .... L Tt i ... no I lr C fer ,l II ( ... L u...,: o.'..11,, 0 _., .... .. ..... .1..--· T' J. ...' . l' ~ Lr" - •...,; +v ~ 1 .1. .... . u +, lJ "'!i:r~t lat r , ,.,e.-ivral CL . ·_,:: .::.~ ret 1r:1"' to tho cor.f rE-.. c roo:n ""'.1d th ~r~ti· · hs.s b .,en uo ~.1.(""on ..... .... ub idcs . ..... ~ft(,.c..... 7inut':s J t, r 1 ..,he confe r ees 1 conci c··-::.. '"h on<' one tlv-":. loo~Cl the bR.si:. ui·~ pleased is '}cn"lral Cl. :rk . Iis ofL.cPI' _ .ll in be :i.nd him nr' alk +.o their •. section o" the hoteLft.hrourh a dark , b istin roaJ y- co·;rt,rc,r - . - :i · ..•,.. .1.00·.1 , ,., c.1t .,..r1 Cl .... _,.... :.r.:. fl.: to ½. · 1;: ;-.., ·..., Jl'ious o:'fic:::- ~: '''T'h~ Fr .•c.1-~ . + ..:c:.·: t'1,;.,- Cd.11 02:' -t, ..:.s t:u..1_; tit . T J vv given th8,1 unt:~ ... t o.10rro to r O ~0: I " ;..'..r C:. n u.11( r I .:;o.:...'l[; b _j . (' d.1 .· '-' 1 '· • II to rri,, tr ::1of-~ -'-fmT· ~" -·,., ··-'t'-~-r, 7 _ ...,:i ___.t,r • .'..::''..c . ot u"' , to ::>.l,_ ·.cf.. .1 u·. _r .i. ., •• I_ 0 t: O .1 - r--t.-, + o!l; ... :,o _r"o 01 -· 0 ..'.:'ro r:.:.1,r .... '_1+1,-. ; ~--:c • b_ ~ I., 1 -· . to -r ./ ("1 ,.,1 r 'c b ,....i.-,_..., t· .. .• c b .1;:1 r ..., "'O CLO .... _, r J0 '1 • ,r "o r,, _...., ...... ::..~i l r , Q·~-C c- , ••o (' l l , s. •t ... ... r' be r,... l-._.: c. ·- + ion .. 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[rt ··- ·~l · .. ·- ,1- L:'!ut :· ......... Jv:11,--'-::,_, ... :!lnn ......... , ..... "'"' ...... .. .,.::_1 o:- tree ..... ~ 4o".:.•4u +..! .. l,,.o,1;0_1 of __ g+':. ·· . c . re..;) ~ u li ... ~.0-.:1 .ror t....-cl ..:..· -L: '01,..• ·~.:..:..?.. ' ,. ... .... , -1. 1...., G"" - ~ .. :... -c ,_,:vel_ ...c: _ ..... ... o.... , -~: ...,..,, __ '... [..~r .. v JO ~ o_. 1 r. .. 1 "'I .1. :..:... -r,t,.): o... "".r ..... .L .1. i..,:,. ..... • .LI"\ o"t'9·· -.,,... . ... TT' ... ~~1-, . c ... + '1. _ • Pl .. ~r ... · ...: --~t ... .. r: ,_.-,... r,1 ...... :,... .. "" .i. .1. _c:c _,:= .,._;. ,..,"r ..... flJ. . ,...,, . ...,"-.i '-ro0.,. .....- . ro~=..., ' .. .:...... .. _, .....,oi .L. ·SECRET ., .c L. -·, .. . . ~ o~c.....u.r.......... n.__, �~t;f;". [\ ~ ~:\(ECRET . S -~-------- ,PF, t"'R"' "J:'RTT) •r' :·ovT"'"')TC>-q ' 194'2--lf'T'h::.~ •'-'-/ 1.:- r'r.i.1.L,; -~:p1~,. '1, ti le c.. ·l :.u .... 1 °l ....-.1-- ~ l I 1 :£'[..i..,:' "b~➔ o....... ~ ~ ho,..--,,. :c ... ~ ~ c:,V ·--•o to L- '- l_ v:•,/ ~--.,:r.:'or •lo,; Tt ~.L.-rJ·s o-t ·'' 1: -... -.1.0.1...-;h: -:,h lut)ri~ .. ......u- ,tJ .., - , ~ ...... ~ran·~ IJ1o.., :..o"' a....... .i. :, bole": f.:.c~ tJ.._-~ t..1. ounc'"' thi:.., :nornin 6 th.:..t 't"n ro.l r1'-:,--!{ :1.;;.~ , bE-~n --"-d~ '-- :::...i.2t.tn~.•.t r en_ -.::..1. ,.,.1.t r• ::,1. ".:..l ClcJ"k r3fus ~ to : .:t ~h~ th.i.rd stc:r o.• e::c.1 s:.1.oQ:'...:. -:....nt::.lh r h2.~ offic:. .. l co:'li'::.r""!~t.i.on . i,..; Ds..rl~ , 'o~":.L.):: ........ an~ r' · rc.;...1d arc &.~~i!l i:-i co!'lfe2-- .... , o.tt .. ... c rr,t.::..ng to . o~ 1 01.:t ~ ir i ... :C:.::..<-2...i,..,rob:..,~ ~:~d ~ :;ol·-.t:.o:i to t:1~ :..nvol,.. ~ n.:.t"-.!~t.:.on":n ~ C[..bl3 ... __ . to ,.,e~erc:.l !:.he ... , rJ.u.:ra.l Cl:..r::, '"'o ..:i..;l.:.k:. r.ouues ~v\...n ~.1orc.. r th:..n r...c. doc...., "L2 t ',""&. 1{ 1 i:,;; Jt ::..-i C~-~cr::.oos nO,)L ~ , / :.n olC:. t r ..1 k.10'7.1 i,E:.11 b., :1.i.mc.w.1d , rr h.:.u ol"' friE::..1., ,.,t,;n,::i:·, l'T 1 . 11 :Tog-....t. C ,_ .... 0 c............ Clr,....L.. "l::J a ·r:-,('I•~ . " "·!1 n tl1'J , ... ..... u.. -::c ..., , c l..2. , ... '":.~s'-"u'::.u r"~~ived ..... ,,ibrc..:::.ta.::. t·,_, cieco!!.'!er..,0E'l~'.:h t. .:.t .:..::. G~bl-C.: tr.n.., 1::.usion. It..:. 1. 1 t . It "ans "Jello·. bellied con of u. b..i.tcl·1 Clark ho..s £..b;::;oL,tely no v.s0 ." fo:: ~ro..;ue.::~ 1+ , l..'..k' Dar:::.'---1 ..i.t look::: c... thct~.:;L :L . ..:. , iht lLVt; to i·L-:i alono '...:.. th ' . 11_ "1. -1-·- =~.J To provide for evcntt:Z.li t.:.e;;,, General Clc.rk ca.lL i::1 Ge:-ie"al R:·d r t~1rl tel .s hi~ "o r·..:t &.l his troo .~:: on th [;.l"'rt i. event of trn"'J.ble . Tf th:; negot.:. + ..:.::m.., fc::..::.l +'1.s:~ .1.~./ be fi...;hti..~ a.ud thl.3 •-.Pr.:.cc:-.1 troo_;_.., .::.:...,pcrsed c:::;;il., aroc.L'1d.th~ , .... _ Llg.i. .., E..r ""' J.1Ustbe rt:;::;.dy to fieht. Little inc.i.d •.,:L.., h1c.vebeen c.ris.i.n.c; duilJ . t.r,otn r co ,~., up this norning . Fir"' ..., :::"rench ~en:&J.&..,c fighters &.re :...~ch~· , ~n for •. , ~::. the s:-: 1. t. .... •.ard +he.t has surroun:il3d the :'..uto.r:h.t.i.c Tele .._ .:.onci F·.ch, •. o-·u- , ~ ... 1c....l~ ..d...uar-Ler..:i. Lat('.'.r, " .n~cl1ine gi....n~o:np&n/· come~ en~ b&ii21s ettl:1c 119c .P 1 its cuns .i.n front of our :ner ::. ~.! gi.:.ard . ne·d r ::.s ordered to CO-:.....!lt,rc.ctth::.~ ..0\ • c Ge.1 r" l Clrrk orJcrs .J .::.:-.to :::-~port to :-:.~ • 0 , 1.... ~ ..dc_r.1., , r_n,"c..l 'Tog-Ee::,a .ear::, 2.. _:l go G .:.nto a con_~ r .1c, .:.n "on~-~.:.1 Clc.rk co:.1'.:LLd hr•+~l 1:):)d.roo::1-of.f::.c::: ·o.;-...::.:::s •• t::. &. last . ,~1:. _inLr~.. ·i.,i:..:::: r,. .1 rc..l Cl&rk iL:1 b .... :\:>r l'! vc_:,. iri-~o thtJ ·co!'l.f:r .... !1.c .:.t:1 :'l-rl::...n [...!.1G.r,.i.r.:...ud r.'1h'3 .l.,uttl,.Cc... ...... r . n . _.. nd 1 .., lE. r.:.~ a J ..c.:.$.:.on r;r"zt b reacl...,"lc: tl1 ....Frf~... 1: , 1c:l!.i.~n rrn"'st co .... .... th~::.r ".i.f.:"~r..... ........ :_;ot. . r-_c , or th_.."/" 1:1'il c...1-.be ..... II..&.1 ~t dus~oU" a..i.1'., c.. .. 1.~_1:..tu.rv 0v r ... .._nt, '"'Jt~bliµ:J,...,- . ~11~n 11,. 0 Ju.:.n r ... port...,. T:r.J. ...L~C.)rtc....:.n 4h ... , r ..- ere..: Clr..rk t~l~s :1.:.. <.,..toutt!1c ""'·'-'-i?: 0 up no tcr o:: ~:~ .. Fr~r!Ch :nc.ch:L_ec:;t:..'1 ...-".::.nJ ~/ orders hL. to :rn.v~ it r~ ..1ovcd .i..r ed.:..... co t'--J.,. JiHn e&y::, it i.., all a ~1istc:..!rnc.nd hur:·ies ;_;.":ayto h~.ve th~ co;:1 c..n., r~t..~:rn~c...to 2:t::, '!Jarr&ckr: . The hzl out::,.i.de the ..:~nerQl I s roo'.1 is filled . Gira 4, , '.dI.'lirul ::-'en&.rr'l var .;.ous , lu.,..,cr officials c.11.;. Briti::;h Gcn£rc:..l . .ndE-~son. "'he gE-nerc. cr.l.!.::; in the ':r.i.t:.::/ r ~ '10 r-J. orts tha-::. r...:.s o)crc. ·;:,io::i "...oth'3 ea::t is -:;oinc , 1:. 'oue :1u.s i:>Jen C:iv-3, / !)0m0e,J out, thJre is no dam~.;e . There h:,s been a tori .:'.o a~t .... en ,....oc,[;i- bllt t' r ... ck c.re no cam:w.lt.i.ec • Lnti-aircraft reinforce:'.l&nts ht.v _ c.,rrived a"~ bot:1 non~ d..1d B,.>.,""'..:.e . On batta.:::..;.o 1 of th_ 3Pt;1 Er.i.·0lsh 3ri~&.de n. s !oved from B01.1&::.c 8et..:.f to to ··,.olJ th~ a::.rJ.~~o,_ ~nc: rcvent r:E;r-::c.nlondinge . '.not'1c::r bat"-alioi __ •. of tlL ~'-'-me outfit has arrive 1 ,2,t Jon to re,plc.ce th3 ba,..tu.Eon 1noved to fetif . Seven Italie,n tran~ •.Jort ~')le.nRs h .ve landed at ~1 Alouine , in ,.,.t.'-!l.i.s.i.aOne h,,ndred ten It, lian . trucks have oved to k Goulette . ':'·o ba+tc..l::.ons of r,c:.:-.1:.:.tns :1t.ve 1ove~ to ··u.cor , north ,est of :Sizerte . 11:'here are ind.:.cation::, thP,y are 6 oini; to .:ic:~t o,. . ,os ~t on ~ro ... thP- French . The t rn generals go over • lans to "love r.::.rc.troops up . "ira-:....d. comes .:..n to be as.sured 0hc..t General Cl rk is s·ti2. tc.c:.ing :1im. ~~dmir'-2. :." ut..rr.::~.uu-i:..., to ..,sure G-e'.'.ler·:::. Clc..rk that he thinks things o.r 6 0.:.ng to v;-ork o-:.::."~ ::;c.tisfr.ctoril.,· . j (!:'. ) · Fina) , ::..tis ti!':9 for Grneral c1~ '~o driv .. rk to 2.1.son Planch" to .J t 2nP.r...l ::-'i '1"· ·3r . F.s -~har.kf ~l , - leav A.l th cro·~c ' h 11 w"'1d i;o ,s to th. airrlro •. • J·.,;::t as r, n "ral Cl1:..r:c s convo., , co 1:::-;os0rl fo"r pa~~ 01; r ;:: rs &nd t ro load~ of ' oP .... arm-ct .old:. rs pack d i.'1 p_eps , r n :.~c..1~L .1:10• '.);r-J•• pl~'1 l::.'1rl.r . T,~.-e c:.-i.'1 r J « CRET J �I\ 3 r lFlyin::; Fortr'3sses o.nd a sqm:..dron of TT . c . n_39 fi 0 hers [.rrive .::i':11.ll taneous :". G~ner· ls Cl r 1{ and =iserl!',o ·1er c.:.::c;. · .iiral C1.:!111inzhc. a.rive be.ck to .J..gL~rs to;;0th2r , . .. ) J the Dcpu~y c~:,--;and r -~r.:.nging ~~- Co:!L"!l~r.d:r-~n ~hitf and th?- Nc;.Yal Co~ :r.n~.::r 1.? to 1 date d·1r:.11.[; ~-L 18 b.~o::wter r:.r- • T~ LS c.P.c~dPt.;,that Ge•. ~&1 Clc .. ...Ll ·.,r..1..-: rk 1:,0 1 er,. th. Fr• ...ch"lcn fir~t and that l'en r· 1 -i:::cnho .::.1.1. .... b cul~ d into th conth f .... renc , roo.:1• 0 •.rr:.ving c.t the hot~l , +hn thr'°" .. ,n have lunch a.nC: juct as t' .., c..r" f.::.r.i...,hing v.rord is broU£ht that the Frc.,'1Ch of1ici£..l.: \.:.nt to .,ee General Clark . ':he.,- hav0 reac:1ed e1...'1a~reemsnt . Gene:·al Glar':C t..,o ., to see them . ,..,h.:.s is ths ~ ,ree.-.mt th y have reached:} ~ ~ ,,. · ~ ~ 'JJ ~ P"'..I, T)&.r · .:..1 h3b.<:th" civil and oli t.::.c&l govern:nent lc..n ;he- present gov"'rnors of : French ··orocco--·fo ucs ; 1.lecria -C hatttol ; &nd Tunisia--Estev'"" f ill remain in their posts . r ira.ud is to hl"a ·' the French -~"'ed Forc .... , recrui ti~ s ""n ar uy to fight &t t: ... ;:;;iL of ths l1.. ll.::_3s. He is to be giv"'n a freo r in to 6 et 'I,; olu.'1teers fro,:1 the "' regular Frenc11 .:.rmy. For the time bein,_, , Giraud rs a. _.ointl:lent wiL .. not be annou..'lced for ~oliticc..l reQsons . Says General Clark , after th3 plan h~s been ~utlined to 0 1:i , : "You have reacheq c.n ac·ord that• .i.11 as~ist al Al ied forces in Lfricc.. . I knm·. it has be'Jn difficult for you c..nd for :ne to ucljust our difference::; . I b.p,...reciate your cooperation and your hP::.p at this time . ·.row ,"e can co ahead w"1ited in OJI' pl:m of defE.at.:.ng ::.he :~.is , r'3storing F:.. nee a.l'ld re .... toring _;Jeace. .d,.1ira: Darlan wil hoa. up the ...r itical and civil end of the Gov rn:.ient of :forth Afric..,_, ""hi.:; .:.1_ bring compl ite co pe::-ation and accord '.it~ t'1e ;,11 ::.:-' forCAS . mhroi.:..,: r- ~a ral .. r .:..ruud you -~ill as~ist uc in our ?orth 1'..fr.i.cc..ncaml)(!ign . .ll:niro.l Darlan .i.11 coo .... orate so thr.t French forces --.i.11 ·efend. French Porth .'.fr · ca . 'T0 rill u3e his .influence to &ssem.ble all availabL ':leans for :wl .:.ng us . 0 • I.\ ,~,, thr c;oYPrnors at . resent im:tal" 'd •,il rern1in o.t the.i.r C 3n ~l ,... ::.raud ""::..1 b ~nno11nc... as h ... d L.~ of &11 :::'r-::nc'.tur:1ed :~orces in fortL. . frica. , C r'.e.in o'.:.h,r .;~....,rc..l s_ue,rJtion.., , il~ b' ta 1w11 lfl lat r . Th'..3 C"nc2rn ~ ½.ui ~.:. g , orgi:..nizat.:. ti1 -E- d coordLLtin: .. •. :rr ..ch ~.itc that w.i.11 f.:...:;ht at our ::ic:.". "'o fac.:..:i'.c..' ~ our or~- v..t.::.ns,frcnch troop.., in st atec;ic r,ositions Y,ill vacate -':.heir f.:.cili t.:..es , o ;nakc .,.,oomfor . s . I look ~ o .id ..iral Di:..r la:: for 3.i._;na:~'.lI'E. the permanent a.r.n.i.sJ~ic.... ter;r.s . ...E. , il of i: ork up _. '. -~ t::..i.l:.; of this .::::-:n.::.stic later . I propose .101. to bring .:..n t.he Co--: '!and"r-in-ChLf , (!;_n rt..l ~icenhovrnr . rr J. c territorial o~-t-;:... · t c;.:: a. :--. ... opr:_ate t.:..v, P~for·, GE;ner::..l ~iscnho•·•er is bro1.....ght in and introduced to t,l. thr "'rench off.i.ccr., , :J.d;niral Dv.rlan 3tu.te:: he is ::igni:ng ths accord "wit1,.1the obje tive o::: defeo.ti ..;:; the Ger -:c.r..s"'nd returning Franc" to her for:rrer • l:::..c". rr Ge.1~r~ 1 Eisenho·"er , c.fter shakin_; hand::- ,ill all the officer.., , says : "General Ch .:-';: tel~s ::1e you have reu.c~1er1 co.:r;:--lete accor O • •• hc.t ,;ou propose is co .:p:>tel:r c.cce ~ -table to :ne. From this de..,- on .. d1:!irc.l Darla.1 Lcc;~3 the Frc11c l'orth li'.,..:'..cc. state . :'.:n this c...t i tude I am su ...,. '1 ,orted b~· President Ro sevelt . an;; C + '-il:: 0 'iave ;,;e-1;. be •rnrke.i out . P.0preser.:'.:,ing me is General Clark , .10 speaks for · to ...-:.ch detail:: as yo,, .nd h3 a:::r~-- on \~iL. be ai ... roved ir.. detail by O1..1r hoc.· ..,,.ur.rter.:; Lnd O.,'.I'goverrr1ents . •1e al::.. ...ust c.gree to ;ut ".:.oget!ler al: !!!'3 n.J to hip th.., G-er1:1r.nc . returr:.in.; to Glbr"-ltar 'iit:1in the hour. 1 apolozize for the br.i.efnc::.: of'::· ::Y.-ci . ~hank you for your coo ere. tion .:...."1d t for joining us in ~cac:i.:.n.:; .::L.'1ucrt...e . _1+ • " r.pu_.,..c:..ls Clu-k c:..'1d Eisenho ;-:er then ::;:.::kc hands. c.i around and de:;xirt for the &ir• port . The Fnmch:··1en re!llc.in in session to discus::; liaison ~ th the Allies and to 01.:tlitL their .t-'roblemc . (Generals ~isenho· .• r :..nd Cl .,..k and .,C..'Ilirt..ls "rlun e.nd Cun iinuha a!'P ~ hotogrc::.. h'-'d b~r !le\' sr,:.:.per c::id ""Ovie 1 0 • 'Z,a.rn 1 �\ l Lj IJ.t ·aison Pl.1nch air . ort , .1'"' c.._:ia rr:1en and ,.hoto 6 ra. hrr;:: are \7ai t ·ni for 1 Generals -:.:.~ nhor 1r c.nd Clc:.rL. ~1. ce the Co .. u:.ci ...-.:..•-Chief ..u::t. ci • c.rt for G.:.b.• raltc.r l :,ediatel~r if th~y ar to land befor_ dark , ther:i are no intervim sJ General Clc.r 1-c is to e~pL.J.i:.:. t~~ &ccord to the journc.· ist.., :1 .1 h r t.Lr.,~ ~o hL hof 1. crrh on y c ·• _ ~0.1.7 is ,.,h,:,n G ::1cral ~.:.~ ...ho '3r ,. .:.n::: th third ~ 'var on G n ;ral C 'rk r..., sho,.ild r-- ..1ov::_nghim from ...,aj or g encrc,,l t 0 li :tenant ,Z;E.:nerc"l. :=.~- ~_;_ nho r ~ a::; t'"' • i.ns on th:: ::;tart rh.:.:!. Cc.. r:..s cl::.ck : trT 1vc J-een c.itL.g c. l<'ni "-.:. - ',o c.0 t · ~~ , 1..~--:.- I hope I ,.,.i.n on -:.~1ef o'.12:'th :::-:.e.r 1 i;,en ,:t .... :i:::en 1101,er tc.kes off a •• • . ! l §e11:;;~ 1 Cl·.rk returns to hi., hotel . mhP. i81J...,:c...:!. :::til~ in::;lst::; on V'-&.rin_~ t c stc.rs J...11til h ~.,t.rs d.:.:·ect fro:11 the ...cr Depart~wnt of h.:.s ~ro·-:10tion 0 T \.µ Genercl Clark sketches, c..t his pre::;::; co::.1fcrenc , +'.e ;rcssure that v:as brotJ£ht to b ;;.r before th Frcnchr:1°n reached en accord . IP t: •.•1 t-lls the neu::;:::cn of the D.::..rlan-Girc:ud setc_2 . 11T fe.:!.t , 11 e:q.,lained General Cl.::-rk, "lf they r,scre not c.11 to.;e+her there 01, :C. be re ,., .re .ssion::; t1:J." =ouE . t detract fro, the .Jain effort-[;eL in.'.; into Tanisiu. ar..::. co=lng to gri .. ..., ....erever ,.o;::.:il: -,"', ::. the !~ .:.::: n ·fe , , t:. • o. pluins tlu.t Fre::1c!1 troo!)s cre alre1..d. rq isting C.:rm"- nt:t~r in 4 o · orth JJ:'r.::.ci.l, •This tre 1endous -1. is 01:e ~ tep to,;-.s.rC::ocr col.__,_boration ,' '1.:: continue::: . ~· -e· ...re ._;oln~ to att :i • t to shi;: in food for the A:..:;eric.n civiJ ..:. .n~ ,.n ~ -rovid" them ··::.th things that tre Gc-rmn.n end Ita ::..an P.rmi,..,tice com i:::::;io!l...,,-;ere tlking .... ·::~·y fro:::. the':1 c.ild sr.i •. ::.:1b to the::..:- O\.n co 11..'1+-.:. ~• T\1rl n i,.., , in~ on +he r1:.dio to a.;.1no·~1c the c:ccor~ . The f":ncl:J,; P.•• : r~ al ju'· il~nt an,.:i kLscd sach ot!-:.cr on the che:cl:. F ··;a:-- c:;_"2t a Ill"lJ..1;· rE:.Ul1l rd I 0 0 m '1t.t c..bo1.:t the French fl,:,_ t? ~ E.11, ~arlrn L :r;,~~ +:i!.:.g the L I'liJ.~l.l of th"' fl_,.,-: ...t '::o·lon to come -'-o •.fr::.c:1., E.::-t :.,'r ·,l.r:::h::.l , , c:•• :-ent y, ht.., crd r,c.. oths:;_· :...,c. ··_ st'..ll hc..ve ho,cs . ·c. k!'!o-- ,here: it i.., c.::1 ·:1~t it L doin__;. ':'hGer :::m::: a.r'J holding be.ck on entcr.::.ng Toulon b ec:: ,..., of the fr nch fl"c-:. . m:1vy .::..r:: J tl.:.ckering for j__ :::'enI t forr;E:t th.:.t if th:: Fr ":J.c • brin.; th~ fleet .._,. o··+ u.11 th~ French ·n i.i.J. France "il b0 k"'l.d~r terrific o~"" ...,~0:1. T!1e fl$.tt (.;f"'\ ·.a. ::. -/'>e :... th,.., frenc., 1 "11 r .., 1 st c&rd . Vou ask '"h.'1.t the r-l.ction ill be in th€" c<+s.t'-'.., to otT ru:vin~ ~.::..rl:::...i. t:.~ ·.•. i.cJ.,l.. 'l - 0~ u "' + 1.:r.~ " ...... +b~t n,,.,.,7,., "1 ~ '"r ; ""' vc;.;.nd ..., ;:-.'::fi.!.., th Jo ~r_:.,r_ "lo controls the lc.. ... , ..,;E. a .. d a.:..r fores::::. ''...hctl:1 r or no-L ,Jo ~:1::.n:c ., d n· '·' ~u, ',o ,.,.,. 1-:i -; •• +h.., ~,..o,.,~r "re.' "1" • ,.,,, ,,,..1.· ~..:... r:t\,,_;.J -, ..J v ... ,.,. 1..,lF., \..' .,_ •"'\...> . l \. \ u. rr-!- J 11 a" +h= 0,.. sJ -f ... ctio!'!::; tog th_r . ·: i,., -!:,h- onl., ~.:.. +:1 W'J d fcrc_.., .. OJ.~ o'J v' • - h...d to ,1l .., ""long · ith h.i. .• L·.. 1inut-r;, c:.~o I ·.:c...,.., in.:cr •.• tl:.at l.e.r:::h:..l P JtaL ::.."'6 ivi1,; o·-.r ~d c.ccord hi;:: bl':':::.:.:.r.._; Da!"lcr.. and th r ~t of hi..: ru J.J. :..r tLmur..d:i' .,1. ~-La::::xl. . _! J, 1..· ~...,. -' • ..,._ T _,1,. - n .i..,...,.._ • 1- ... ..,, • • ...,_....,l-1""4 1- - J.4...o. "-' r ""' 1 .. (,.,,.-•..4 ~--4!..r1.. ,..J • ...,_ :: ........ • ~• ..1._ 0 ~'T • ...... 1 r -'- 01_1,ld h:..v ."T 1 · _1n :::oon r ._ ~ ..lt 1 i _ ,.d G,_ i:.. ·· ·cl') 'rr:d into th C'0:r~.c...c,.., .. n .:.nto th-3:::o to.r::; . fol~t.:.c:: th 1 b CS.v I co~ 1·...... -'T +h'ir:c' I ...1UCC 'Q· c.. ~ (':_ n 1 + ... c..nl., · • + v c,.,..J.J,.\ .... '-'• to mv"' to no:-1·:; abo"J.t d.:.::,::.ide!lt f<...c io:1..., r'lr:..·~i.d hn.s the com.lctr .. . :::i.:J;.ort of tl'L : ne··ic;...r..::,'nt , hu.vc.. to · orl:. hi .:.n ;::lo :.., ... z:rlan u:::.riI bclicv, thE..t th ,. o_.. le ll !10" b'J ,".!litf'"'.ld for t:::s d .... fe~s.., c: 'J"'n:9t:1 ... ..i..ric~ . mh..,oc •" ..... fo·L.X ~ t h __ bCt,Il "\,..( diffic·,i+ L cau~~ e ru:.ve ha\ -:.o r'..:.~.iJ our trocr,$ to live c.n ap. cc.ru.nc"' o:: -~c ztren;;th . 1 o hs.1?110.d l:1°p lookL,; 'u<--c: o\ Er 01.-:r :::ho-:.tl..::~::- ts ...-:;.o:i: to tl"- ~rent.to ins to i::.h,...:c..::.L a...~d?t.n.:.ci~ . 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J.1 . ,J r, fcr h _+ 1 "rt .,_ ~(.) .,. .............. ,C ~o T':..rl~ -•• " ....,!"• TI + ~ T • u ,.. t" --.. :. r-n ... r ..... r:w1. '-. ,c . + 'f"\ ..... :T_..~ u11cor; !1 ii' .... T' • -., l () : __ .. r t·i -. _ ... o ..... fr.r ,. .... n ,.. .:..n._ "r ) -J ·+ .... f• ---. ..:.t rri+or,; .....+ L .. or ,+ 4 +. 1,.,,_Q...... ,.1. -1-- ,,. en ~o:::...' o. 0rt -.)+ ~i..... r _ .._ n " ,.. .t ,.. ' ➔ ,r ... + r ::.. . "l , r' l ~ +· . ,... .., + ...... .. • , T"l-r·l,.. .1 ,..,.. - ) • • - · ... ,f.. • r " + ➔ ~ '-- + + 1. ,.... : m ... . 1 )) �133 SECRET r (" ,· k ' t ~ts C -., ht:> r ~. . ,.'-' .i. ~.... - ... , ., J.. • ,. ... . 7 ... - ' ' - ) .... ,, ... .... ,, ... ... r: - -....._,.~ , , C , 1 ' ... I - 0 , ' ., 1 1 l , _, ~ J . ., ..., ... " , !I' • ... . ~· "l•~ T >1::.1., . . ... ...- ..., ' a r .I. t 'I �(~y SECRET ~ . ·1 ' - + C..t.~ ~l ~· •·r I! ~ -c., .· ·-.' " . ...., •· t ... ( , .. "'.l: ·~~ . '! . .. ,,,... ,., ~- ) .. ., ,... < . .I.~ . ' .. ' I •o ,.,, -' .., ... :::'I) I' ,.. .... 'l (' .,, ... .. ' =. . .., ·~ ... . - '7 ... L ~ , ,... ' . _., ., u ,., .. , r • •- .. '" ! ,,. ... r c.. .'. -1-' ,.. . .- .r --"-u ,., f , Tonight, It read s : '--~ General Cla rk lets ... ,} w c •• II •' ' . ~ ~c, .- ·- ti , l u • . . <> ,, r his hair do.n in c.. let te r to G-..;ner1 Ei se nho wer . 1 �"D ear Ike : nA t ached her eto i s th e sig ned copy. of t he agre ement wit h Dar l a. ••• I t hought t n you might wi sh t o send t his on to the W Depart ment . ar "Rec eiv ed your l ett er about GCM I t natur ally tr ouble s me because I know i t . has trou bl ed you . I m ubt sa y th at I th in k s om of th e boys in W i ngto ~ ar e get e ash ting unduly al armed ab out small matt er s . The onl y t hi ng th at has gone to t he pr e s s is what has gone out thr ough your hea dquart er s . It seems to m t hat th e boys bac k i n e W sh in gton coul d do better to f ac ilit at e out wor k her e r ath er t han to bot her us with a suc h uni mp ant tr i pe . (This r efe r s to W ort ashi ngton obje ction s to cer t ai n s ect ions of stori es conc erni ng Genera l Cl ar k ' s Afri can r endezvous t r i p) The stor y of our vi s it her e was one t ha t naturally appea le d t o th e pr ess . They built i t up and m agni f ied it ju st as you woul d expec t t hem to do . Every i ndi cation t hat I have r ece i ved and ot her peopl e th at I have tal ked to th i nk th at it was a svrn s tory ••. ll nr knm7 the hell you have been tak i ng , si tt i ng i n th at damn t.mn el , but don't thin k I haven 't ha d my share of it her e . I hav e neve r gone th ro ugh tenda y s lik e t his befor e in my l i fe , but I must say that vi are now obta i ni ng the best combin atio n of e r e sult s th at I t hink wer e pos., i bl e t o squeeze out of the dir ty mess we f ound here . I don ' t m nd maki ng deci s io ns -- you know that - - but i t i s doubl y har d when y ou m i ake th em knowing th at t hey are anot her ' s ra;ponsi bil ity . I hav e not once ask ed y ou to com over her e , for I t hought t hat was your decis io n , but I do want you to knoow e th at when you do com it will cert ain l y be a gr eat r eli ef t o m . I think t ha t th e e e ti me has come ..he n you sh oul d be her e . '.lost of the communicat i ons are bE:: , tween you and me and tha t will al l be eli minated wit h your arr iv al. " I am del i ght ed th at you f ee l a s 1. do a oout cutt i ng down t he s i ze of the sta f f. I r ead t he W Depart m ar ent ra 4i ogram on th e f or mation of the Fi f t h Army I don 1 t . know how you f ee l ab out it , but I t hin k- as Gener al M arshal l sug gest ed- - t ha t t he Am ca n tro ups her e shoul d be all headed up under one ar my and t hat pla ns be m eri aae by t hat army f or the ir ar r iv al and tr aining for it s next of f ensi ve m s s io n . i 11 W t h r ega r ds to t he r actio bro ad cas t , I am gl ad not to have to ap 1- r. It i s i .ea quit e a bur den , but I tot al ly dis agr ee wit h t he dec i s ion t hat sen i or of fice r s sh oul d not appear . A fter all , th e pe ople back home want to know f r om autho r it ative sour ces _how t he ir boy s are getti ng alo ng . There se ems t o be t oo m any pe opl e afr ai d th at senior of f i ce r s ar e getti ng t oo much publi ci t y . I will t el l you more about th at v;hen I see you . 11 I can I t tel l you how gr and your -_ upp ort has be en dur ing t hi s try i ng ti me. s Your whol e- hea rt ed an d com ete back i ng has been t he one th i ng t hat ha s ke pt me pl fro m goi ng j ust a li tt le bi t sc r ewy. "I r ath er t hi nk W sh i s s omewha of an ol d "dodo . " I don' t th i nk he has the el t zi p and "do i t now sp iri t" to get the maxi mumr es ults out of the t ool s he ha s avail abl e . J i mmy Dooli tt l e and I keep µ-oddi ng hi m i n th e hinde nd every day and ur gin g m e action . or "As for A er son , he has been doi ng all ri ght , but I di d t hi n..'k: s m sage na hi es of November 21 ( sa yin g French su pport was weak) , whi ch appa r ently went to ever ybody fr om th e Ki ng down , showed a l itt l e s i gn of weakness . Hoveve r , he is i n a : t ough spo t and h as har d de ci s i ons to ;nake . V: had lunch to ge th er to day and I ur ged e hi m to push on as soon as he coul d , at the same time m ainta i nin g· s ome control until he f ound m e about the enemy disp os i t i ons and strength . or "As Ever, (signed) Wa n e . " y * ,C" f �Rf (,T W J.Pi.ct, . f' ~ ct .,_• i.tC rf ;.., , r r -· ~r 1....: r · J.' ,, r, T" .... c, .,_ r :n cu ... ' .ir 1 t .. )) .:..i- .. u r .,_ u -· j .. oc l C C: • ':! -l- \ r f0r c J r_ ~' 01 ...i J,.'--r' - ,"-'- ') " lL .., J_ -· ~;. .., ., •L ..,_, .., to l;rr ., l ,_ dc--~t , l ., f") re .. .+ <'-;. v _'-!: . l "'.,....,., t .1.... 1 ~ . ,,,. .,_o :? -· vh "\ tur .. ' .:.r.'-' 0 C c: \ . l~J.l~ rLr. J- ~t j_n 1" !"; ~ 0 t n ,h'' 11 r C c.... ~t ,..,~.1.l (' yr ,_ .., ..,..-i.;rit..:.~ ;. .- ri:: .. f o. _;_ J...:. r ' .... JI ' �\ 3'1 f.ovTnnr (' •• , rt..:.. t'oi~~ ••, dm.:.r"" .'friC£..i1S CU' LIIlite for d lo., r-'coo. rat .it. t e1r· , c:f ...,r nc fore n' • "f, ... y1 -for .., C: •. ~vlatiL-~ .',-rt Cf O n.i.tE..ci 2t.:::..tf.. CCJ ::_11.frico, • b"-"i... +;... , the v-ork of r -nitir. J all French! Jn, ic : a 1 crid rta::.C.:.n:_ im, t,..,_ ' v ..~- a..:.fiic ........ for t if Fr 1c ' i ~ v ~ n Fr,ncu1~ •• c nce.,rnin 0 +:1¥ in-L,r "- a t. e "'cor, or'.. W1l ni o. . ::1 11 "'· n tru..., t the T'ni -~ St&. "':.es ~ov r.r..,nt ~.... r ~u .:.zE.J. ..c... , ~ u~, · .r t t of t..1Eo r s . t to be c "Cte_: .:.n t:....c., trug~L :, int .:.c f:;· _.,c .'.:'ric Fr ncnm n the i 1,ression 1,.1at t. c i:.u-L!.or:Lt~ of t w C icf u n ' it -ain i., r on .• 'tL k.i.n sine r" l:,· ~(':J.I'.,' T\... ..... 1r r a:r. · iru ( lg. d) ~ vie·. ... v ' l str, tr f&.ced , .i.th a tough deci...ion t i:::; Colonel~ "iv-=: •• in' '"'cot+ it dev lo.,...., +tr,t G r ;r• l. CL;.r 1• n qner_,, 1 'l 1::. v ;1 ., ·.J Tun.:._ front ian i_~µ .L m • ..,, c. c ..:.., b-..:.ng rmor '). ",_, t ~ Can b~ n.:. • • 'l-... .. or d .u.C .• t of Cl tan.- ld "'· • ecc. • U.u f&. ~ 11lOVC~ _ -~. n pnr+ ,.., . Cla.rk ' .Lrcc t:.·V·J .:.11 t (' .it _n r&l , + • J ar "" 1... ....., rificin <,.(!- • ro:.,1 • of " ,,r · • :n na,., t' oug.1t to ch ~cv Lo bs up to t · 1 front . :. ., -c-~~ ~ u ~o~~ to ~ 0 t 'Jo·-- d <l af".: rroon, ColonGl Po'-'.., r ,. ort~ t'1 t n r r _-,_r-. V tr ...... ,..._r.1-.- &J.lC:. t t ... a.1 ........ ~. nr. t:1 • V .Lh for 't, d + ~v r .,_ c., : ....: ... 0 0 rE, r, i!l_. .- ' \..,,...., ...._ J.TC VC " ..,tart inu their &t ." C<..., O~l frr·, re [d'..,&..., tcmbcr- &nd !::" fichtcr ... \L'"- to .ve m '3 the tr ..:.ib -1~ ~+ .1g·ers itself, i ... ~-·or ....• •o·'a., l G t/::.. r · .....~rf ")re :t ),,.I &. rro foj_• .., L ~on· -i,i •.:_-+~.o ~ r Sl ...rl\.: nr t, 'v 1 ..:.t·1.:.nco .• t" Jl t:.c.1. 11 vt+inu r,,i~ ci ~ch~: l~.., 2.., r.iic t 1 -- fl toUC-4. 1.,0 it ,r..., 7" C ctr o. Cl rl o!' :.L ':"t'. Tnf·nt.·,, .fl<'.. o zi n ... &.n P.1 "'O c:..- ·1b .• c.n+.:.- ;re afL fcur 37.mn nti-t&nk ,.. + P½.u.:...! nu::': ~ cf " :-..... ...i. J.o.ro.cr,-'-itt ..... ..........c_ --T"l~-·rµ C ·~l, ' r... o ....· .....0f ,.., ..... ::...1n1:.., r' ~ + .. 11¥' "'r t b ~.e· =---. '._.c.,..___c.,cJ , 1 .i. J -.d. .,,. ha., ord:.r..,cl anot:.. ,r c --.~• it". 1 1-J .... ., "'~ t1... .... r J ·' f (""I "d / .,..1 ' + , • • , J ~- Io .. , .1., r l + • "-1- .. _r,,...._i, :r+~ ..;..., r' •• • 2. "l • ,... {;.~r'.r' r • r rt .I,. " .. \, ..... .!..br .,,. r ... n . "' ,. ,I .!' C • ' 7('\ .v. .' ' ,1 --• fr-r V .., ,.. -- ." -1- .... 1 ... 1-. ,-.. n.!.i.\,, I -1- r ... 1, ' .... ·~ ·~ .. t ' \ .l ,_ 4. ' . ,1..0, - .> , �r LJ.J.r.c.} t. ALGIERS,NOVEMBER 1942-The decision o:f Frehch 'Nort.h Africa and· Governor 24, General Boisson to fall in at Darla.n's side and range itself' vlith the Allies is featured today on the radio and in the press. A dmiral Darlan makes the announc ement, saying that both Boisson and General Barrau, commander in chie:f o:f French ground, air and sea forces in West Africa, join the other "eminent men"-Giraud, Nogues and Governor Chatel-in the decision to fight the Axis and liberate France. The touchy [and intricate situation is beginning to cila.rlfy and prove that General Clark's decision, to play along with Darlan bec ause he i s the only man w has suf'ficient ho _ following to help us, was right ;_J At General Cl.ark's invitation, · Admiral Darlan comes to the Deputy Comander's m office this morning to confer, for the second time, with General Eisenhower . The Commander-in-Chief' wants to send a joint American-French mission to Dakar to confer with Boisson but Darlan persuades the Americans that it w ill b e better to have Boisson come to Algiers first. He probably wil l arrive eiiher Friday or Saturday. Darlan is told that his plan for drawing Admiral Robert at M artinique into the alliance bas received the approval , of Washington. The French a< uniral also proposes that something be done to aid French Somaliland which has been under blockade. Such a move, says Darlan, would have two results: it would give the Allies additional ports, a.nd, it would get foodstuffs and supplies to the hardpressed populace. Darlan is asked to sub~t a memorandumthat will be for vr rded. to both the War and State Departments. a The next problem that is brought up by Darlan concerns the Frenc h North Africa youth organization headed by Van Hecht. Darlan says he is worri ed about these independent groups. [Says General Clark: "Do you want them drafted in the army and broken up? They were friendly to our cause and they should not be put under commanders that might be prejudiced against them.] Darlan is instructed to talk with Giraud and Van Hecht to see w hat sort o:f a solution can be worked out. A serious racial and business problem exists in French North Africa between the 7,0 00,0 00 Arabs and 150 1 000 Jews. The Jews, naturally, are jubilant about the Allied landing and the Arabs, although not anti-Allies, ere reacting. They insi st, in the medium of an Arab slogan, that: "Jews are a nece ssity you can't get along without," Darlan reports. They feel they have been exploited by the Jews in the past and they want to be assured that "Jev1s will not be allowed to run public affairs." Darlan is instructed to proceed with great care so as not to disturb racial mass es. General Eisenhower suggests that Darlan assure the populati on that he will "conduct the affairs of North Africa on a liberal and enlightened basis and in accordance with principles on which the French Republic was founded." Darla.n's first step will be to begin a proces s of the restoration of property and individual rights to suppressed minorities. This move will go for w ard "as fast as conditions of .Arab prejudic es and suspicisions will permit :' The government th at Darlan will head as high com is s ioner m is discussed and it is decided that in addition to a council of mini sters, th at will include Giraud, Michelier and heads of the territories, it will have a consultative body of private citizens to advise in all civic and economic problems . With Darla.n's consent, the ))r btocol signed yesterday is changed slightly so the wording throughout makes it re ad "the Unit ed States and her allies." The British asked for inclusion of the "and her allies" provision s. Darlan agrees, saying he bad assumed tba.t was the meaning. The French admiral then brings up the question of Fr ench merchant shipping. He wants to be sure that suf'ficient ships will be provided to supply Fr ench Africa; that the ships won' t be div erted els ewhere. Darlan is told that shi ppin g w ill be done by a sy stem of allotments 11and on any agreement involving ship ping you will have the ful l right to have your views considered-you wi ll get a fair and s quare deal." French coasta l ships will continue to work in French African waters. �\39 SECRET General Eisenhower praises Darlan as the conference is closing. He tel l s him that every eff'ort is being made to set up the admiral as the top man "and everything you have done proves that you are going down the line with us. riBecause of your pesition in the Vichy government," says Gener al Eisenhower who has seen the letter that Darlan wrote General Clark as a re-sult of President Roosevelt's message, "you are unpopular in the United States. Nevertheless, I have told our governments to let us alone; that we know more about the existing situation. So, they have of'ficially accepted everything we have done. [Y01.1 enough of a politician are to know that we have troubles because of the right we are fighting for-free speech and a free press J If you head an enlightened liberal government in action the antipathy toward you wil l change." Darlan nods and ap pears pleased. [He bows toward General Clark, then General 11 Eisenhower: "I like to do business with y01.1, he smiles. You give good and clear 1 opinions and you get things done. S [Lat er, Air Marshal Welsh is called in because of General Eisenh ower I s "grave concern over the lack of adequate night air defenses." General Ike saw his first air raid and,~ the first time in ,his life, faced enemy f'ire last night. The raid was quite heavy, with much dive bombing, and it lasted throughout the night. The bombing_is slowing up unloading and causing loss of equipment and hindering the use of air fields. A Beau fighter squadron is being ordered to Algiers from the Middle Fast. It will have good night f'ighting equipment, inc l uding enemy plane finders. Welsh also asks that a torpedo bomber squadron be sent to Malta to operate against .Axis ship ping that is moving to Tunisia -;, · " General Anderc: n reports back from the f'ront that he is not getting cooperation o f."rommany French civil officia .ls in the east ern section who, he declares, seem to be pro-Axis. Darlan is sending bis representatives to eastern Algeria to straighten out the situation. Gener als Clark and Eisenhower fe el that some arrests would buck up the populace who are pro-Ally but afraid to show themselves because of the stand of the officials. The situation in the ea st is developing _ according to plan. Anderson is moving up his units for the feeler push. The line is virtually set in the north. It runs, roughly, from Dj Abiad on the north, through Dj Sebla-Medjez El Bag, to El Arouz on the south of General Anders on's northern sector. In the southern sector under General Giraud ' s comman , contact has been established only at principal d roads, at Pichon, Sbei tla and Gafsa. The Germans and Italians apr..:aar to have about 10,000 combat troops • . Genera l Clark orders Colon el Hamblen to see about more orderly establishment of headquarters. A roximat ely 70 of'ficers and 560 enlisted men are due to arrive Thurs fp day by cruiser f'rom Gibraltar and already the Hotel St. George is crowded . In midafternoon, K S3 comes pulling into Algiers, once again crowding the harbor and making M it a prime objective for Axis bombers. Generals Clark and Eisenhower go out to look ·at a vil l a and decide to move into it this afternoon. It si t s near the crovm of the ridge that overlooks the harbor. The villa on the hill, lacking, for the present, both gas and water, is occupied tonight by Generals Clark and Eis enhov,er. Reason for the lack of w ater is that a bomb landed near the villa last night, rupturing the mains. Gene al Clark is keeping r his apartment-off'ioe in the St. George until his offices on the secon d flo or are ready for occupancy . More ot'ficers arrive from Gibraltar today by plane and the st. George's accomodations are bulging. Because of heavy r&.in, ther e is no bombing tonight. * * * �SFr. E ALGIERS,NOVE M BER 25, 1942-The British First Arm has started pushing its y way cautiously forward in the north of Tunisia and, as yet, bas not run into any serious opposition. The 78th division (British) commandpost has been pushed up to M edjez- El-Babl This is almo;t unbeli evable since the German outpost line was re ported to have been there yesterday. Reports coming bac k fro m the now -develo pin g front are sparse. There is no news from the s out hern front where the Fr ench, reinforced by American troops, are schedu l ed to merely hold and prevent a German flanking movement. General Clark had and then going overland the area and the flight small part y, inc l uding up in Beau Fighters. planned on flying to the fr ont today, landing at Constantine from there, but the weather is extremely bad throughout is called off and tentatively scheduled for t omorr ow. A General Eisenhower and Air M sha l W ar elsh, wil l make the trip A general conference on air plans and problems is held. Our bombers bl a sted Bizerte yesterday, 45 Flying Fortresses participating. All of them returned, four slightly riddled with cannon fire. A drive to move more fighters closer to the front is decided on. General Doolittle and Air Marsha l W h are instructed to get els together 11a.nd a pply the maximumair pressur e ." Small airfields in Ea.stern A lgiers are to be improved as soon as possible so bombers, now extended to the limit to reach Sardinia, can go after Italy pro per and other Axis-held points. General Czaig is to be the air force of'fice:r at Allied Force Headquarters, working with General Doolittle and W elsh, then r eporting to Generals Eisenho wer and Clark. Elctensive publ i city is going to be given concerning our air raids on Bizerte, Tunis and other points so the residents of Algiers and French Nort h Af'rica wil l know that the Axis is getting retributi on-plus for bombing Algiers and that we are paving the way, with bombs, for an all-out ground attack. Next comes the problem of ship ping, and CommodoreMorse (British Offic er i n charge of the port of Algiers) and civil af f airs and shi pping experts are called to General Cla rk ' s of fice. The plan is to move French ship ping out~ North Afri can harbors as s oon as possible to give more berthing facilities to Allied ships bringing in sup plies. ~The shi pping experts say five French shi ps are i n c ondition to sail to the United States and two to the U nited Kingdom. To relieve congest i on, the ship pin g ex~ rts toy with the idea of m oving m ost of the Fl-ench shi ps to D akar. General Clark re'jects the plan saying "the y can I t go to Dakar until we know where French West Af'rica stands; to date only an announcement of pr i nciple has been made." It is decided that t he shi ps that are capable will be send to Gibraltar, in "escrow, 11 to relieve the ports. General Eis enhower declares that Darlan wi ll agree "since he is playing ball with us and is sufficiently in our pockets. ~e•ve promised him a square deal and he 'll get it. The French are to be allowed coasta l. shi pping as l ong as it does not interfere with military water movements.1'0ne Special Fl-ench gegetable , oi l carrying shi p is to be allowed to go to Dakar and the minimum ec onomic needs of French Nort h Af:rica are going to be met to improve the lot of the natives and show the m that our occupation is bringing advantages denied them under German-dominated control from Vichy. \ General Clark next disposes of an urgent problem here in Algiers. Air rai d of f icials ·have had itchy and nervous fingers with the result that the air raid sirens have wai l ed w hen there was no immediate danger. Thi s has result ed in the stevedores dro pping _ everything and scurrying for cover. A slow-down in th e critical unloa ding of ships has resulted . Genera l Clark instructs Colonel Slocum and t he civil aff airs of f icers to halt this time - wasting. This subject was br ought up when Admiral Burro ughs, commaner of the Eastern Naval force, ma a brief call to Gener al d de Clar k 's of f ice. ~ 1 �B With battle imminent in Tunisia, it is decided to issue a proclamation to French North Africa explaining the situation and declaring that "the military must have first priority.it This is to obviate overcrowding _of rail and wire communications and to provide a fulcrum to work against elements that are not cooperating .as they should. This lack of cooperation seems strongest in eastern Algeria. The fear is that passive resistance will turn into active thwarting of our efforts should Anderson's drive to the east go wrong. - The situation regarding French West Africa will be settled later this week. Governor General Boisson and members of his staff are due in Algiers Friday for discussions with Generals Eisenhower and Clark and Admiral Darlan. L the Dajmr if deal is cinched, General Clark believes it will stop some of the "beefing" still coming from London and Wa hingt'on concerning the French North Africa-Darlan agnees ment.J · rGeneral Clark moves today to his Deputy Commander-in-Chief's office whi ch is close to the Commander-in-Chief's, Chief of Staff''s and Secretary of the Genaral Staff's of£ices. The general has a bed rig ged up in his room, behind curtains, so he can nap at the St. George Hotel on particularly crucial nights. The job of moving the staff, growing daily, into the hotel is terrific. It h.a.s been handled so badly that General Clark orders Colonel Hamblen to take charge and "make a comprehensive layout." An underground emergency headquarters, particularly for the Signal Secti on, is also ordered prepared. ) After Darlan and Boisson have worked out an understan ding here regarding Dakar and French W est Africa, a mixed group of French and Americans will go to the vital 1 point to conclude the deal . The French insist on "dealing with America.ns. 11 The attitude toward the British is one of distrust. ~stablishment of a more direct air route from North Africa to the United States will also be discussed. l,Other developments during the day: orders go out to protect the lines of communications in French Morocco and Western Algiria ••• this results from a trip by illieuienant Colonel F.ddy to Tangiers during which he noted that only scattered French soldiers were guarding strategic bridges ••• Another part of the headquarters staff arrives • . •It inc l udes Generals Gruenther and Lemnitzer.- •• A cruiser load will arrive t omoITov,and Admiral Cunningham is scheduled to come in by air ••• The first clipping from-the United States concerning General Clark's secret mission, ·via submarine to North Africa, arrives -Btta the new group and the play the story got . ~~~ ~ * * * ALGIERS,NOVEMBER 1942-The day goes beautifully, 26, both on the .front and back here at headquarters. In fact, the advance in Tunisia goes so well that General Clark is a little apprehensive, fearing that "Anderson is moving too fast and is getting too extended." Already advance units are at Mateur, about 50 klhlometers from Bizerte, and a tank outfit ha-s reached Dj_edeida, only 22 kilometers from Tunisl L Most of the action today is at Djedeida. Two conflicting reports come in . The air force reports that it sent both fighters and bombers over the Tunisian · town in the morning "destroying all German planes on the airdrome and the wireless station." Then comes a report from the armored column which says its guns destroyed 40 Garman planes. "One thing looks certain," says General Clark. "W just plain smacke4 hall e out of the Boche up· there." All is quiet in the southern sector. General Anderson's advance started the night of November 24-25. Ander son' s plan was to make Tebourbe and Ma.teur hi s obj_ectives, then drive northeastward for Bizerte. General. Clark believes Tunis should be knocked out i'irst, in view o.f developments, and that then the squeeze toward the northeast corner of Tunis, driving out the Germans and Italiam. \ j �Fearing that Anderson might find himself in a bad position because of his possible over-extension, General Clark orders greater speed in bringing up General Oliver ' s armored outfit to aid the Allied drive. Also, 26 tanks are ordered up from the Casablanca area. Near Sbeitla, farther to the south o£ Alierson's advance, P-58s from Youks Les Bains airport did ground strafing, claiming the destruction of 20 vehicles in an armored column, and the destruction of two of four officers• sedans on the road near Gabes. To aid the attack and give the Allies complete air superiority, air officials arrive at Algiers from Malta and the Middle East. General Brereton, commanding U.S. air units in the Middle East; Air Marshal l'edder, head of the R.A.F. in the Middle East, and Air Vice Marshal Park from Malta confer vd.th Generals CJ.ark and Eisenhower and British and American air officer u here. Forces from Malta and the Middle East are to participate in the air attack on Tunisia . The plan is for the planes from Malta and the Middle East to concentrate on ports, 1articularly Tunis and Bizerte, while the air force from here will drive on Axis-held airdromes and aid in the ground advance. The air officers are left together to work out the details. The Axis forces in Tunis are to "be smacked from b'O sides" by the Allied air units. General Giraud comes in to confer with Generals Clark end Eisenhower and he is tremendously pleased with the way things are going. Giraud's urgent and repeated plea to General Cl.ark for air superio~ity ·has been met-in force and in a hurryl · Relations with Giraud are excellent and they are ever - improving with Da.rlan. The touching letter that Darlan wrote General Clark has been sent to both Washington and London and today Prime Minister Churchill, who, apparently, was the most upset by the Darlan deal, radios back that Darlan is on the "bandwagon" and tells Generals Clark and Eisenhower to "pat him on the back for me." Darlan now feels he should confer with Degaulle representatives but General Clark tells him to postpone any such meeting "until a ~ mere appropo time." Darlan is now concentrating his efforts on two objectives: getting Admiral Godfrey to turn over that part of the French fleet at Alexandria,. and, lining up the visit, scheduled no,f for .saturday, of Governor General Bois son of French · W est Africa. · General Clark is informed py Darlan that General Boisson and General Barrau, the latter commander in chief of armed forces in French West Africa, have agreed, on the basis of reports brought back to them at Dakar by the three emissaries Boisson sent to Algiers, that they will place themselves at Darla.n's disposition. "As a better comprehension of the true situ ! tion in North Africa becomes apparent to the French W est African authorities," says General -Clark, "I am convinced that we ce.n obtain our objectives by friendly negotiation. Darlan points out that the adhesion of Fr ench West Africa is of great importance to our commoneffort. It includes a vast reservoir of manpower; it is the source of a large producti on of lubricants and colonial products; thfir is _stationed at Dakar important element ;an of the French navy, inclu ding the Riahelieu which D arlan suggests be s ent to the United States for completion in an American shipyard. The armed forces inc l ude 75,000 men and six groups of aviation." [,. Nj,1 \ Lieutenant Colonel Raf't"has flown back f r om the south ern Tunisian £ront and he gives General Clark an inspiring picture of the American action there. He tells how the paratroopers drove into Gafsa, were driven out, re-assembled and then drove the Germans out . He tells how mobile 75s destr oyed German tanks and of the courage and r esourcefulness of this American unit so far removed f'rom everyone else. Raft has French troops under his command, giving him a total of about 2,500 men.; He has G �• <" r T . J<:~• ~t,, )Y 3 ( \ , ' been directing the movement of both American and French troops, instructing a Fr ench general on how to deploy his men1 The paratroopers are going to be drB.wn back and replaced by American infantry, r einforced. But Raft, who has done a terrific job, asks, and is granted, the right to stay in the Gafsa area with a Tanlc Destroyer Battalion. Raft reports that the French are fighting with him in great spirit. To illustrate the feeling of Fr ench civi l ians in the frontal area, Raft says th at when his outfit came back and recaptured Gafsa one girl came up, hugged him and said: "Are you married? If you aren't, I want to marry you1" Jack Thompson, a rep c. ~ter who went up with the paratroopers also returns and says that Raft "is like God to those people up there." Before Raft leaves Generei.l Clark ' s office, he has been promoted to a full colonelcy, the silver eeg}9s being pinned over his dusty silver leaves. J Raft is wearing several French regimental insignias, handed over to him by the enthused French soldiers. ' The French shipping problem, gone into so extensively yesterday, is shaping up well. General. Clark says the French "are showing a most cooperative attitude and are clearly desirous of getting their ships into service as rapidly as possible~The following accord has been reached: l-The High Collllllisariat for French Africa retains and holds under its own management the ton nage required for (1) the transport of troops requested by General Giraud between French West Africa and French North .Af'rica upon ap proval of the CommandingGeneral , Allied forces; (2) the maintenance of indispensable economic traffic between French We Africa and French North Africa; st (3) North African coastal ship ping will be maintained on as feasible a sch edule as practicable; (4) the desination of certain ships now in French North African harbor s is agr eed t o but certain ones to proceed t o Dakar "only upon clarification of the situat i on t her e ." l These are other developments during the day: It has been determined t hat the Axis is drop ping "Booby bombs" over the Algiers area. These ar e flashlights, pencils, wallets and other devices that explode when picked up. They have also be en drop ping puncture triangles on airport rw1ways ••• General Wavell asks from India th Rt key officers who planned TO RCH be sent to him so t hey can contribute their experience to the planning of an invasion to regain Burma• •• Once again the weather is bad, raining_ heavily mo of the day, and there is no bombing ••• The general's st trip to the front is again postponed and he begins scouting the possibility of dr i ving up to the fro11t • • •Tonight, the cruiser from Gibraltar begins unloading and more officers and enlisted men flock to the St. Geerge Hotel headquarters • •• Genera l Clark is fairly comfortably s et up in his villa now••• Colonel Slocum has be en instructed to begin laying ground work for activation of the 5th American arr-v ••• General Clark is to have command of th i s but General Eis enhower now indicates th at his Deputy Command er-in-Chief is indispensable ••• Nothing is definite yet, however. * * * ALGI RS NOVEMBER 1942-The Gerlll8.nshave enteridg Toulon and re ports E , 27, reachin g Allied Force headquarters are that the French fleet is being scuttled. Of hi s own volition, Admiral Darlan sends the follo wing message in the clear to the fleet, then dispatches the original to General Clark: "Once again the Germans brea k th eir word and occupy Toulon. I urge the hi gh seas fle et to leave and make for Ora.n where they will be received as friends by the Alli est" But Darlan's plea, and the unceasing efforts of General Clark to get the French fl eet seem in vain. Lat e tonight, fragement ary re ports in dicate the French sent -to �SECRET the bottom, with colors flying, what ships there were at Toulon. The Allies will not get it, but, neither with Germany who needs it much ·norse. For us, it may not be so ill a wind. These ma be the results: y France has lost the last ca.rd she could play against the Germans-holding out the fleet as bait f or amnesty; our chances of getting remnants of the French fleet in Alexandria, Dakar and Martinique are increased greatly; units of the British fleet that have been tied up watching the French fleet least it move, will now be freed for other duty; German occupation of the la.st unoccupied remnant of Metropolitan France will r eact against the Axis and, in theeyes of those who have been frowning upon the North African alliance, the stand and stature of Darlan will increase, making the lot of General Clark that mu.ch easier. This morning, Admiral Darlan, who has been informed of Prime Minister Churchill's revised attitude toward him and who has also been told that treatment for his infantile paralysis stricken son will be admini stered at Rabat, Frenc h M orocco, sends the following note to General Clark: "My dear General: "I think you most heartily for your great kindness in placing the necessary means at my disposition to transport my sick son to Rabat. "I should be grateful if you would thank Colonel Holmes for the great services he has rendered me on this oeoasion. "Would you be good enough to tr ansmit to the Governor of Gibraltar my sincere thanks for the proposal you transmitted to me to have my son taken to Gibraltar. "Please accept, my deal General, the expressicn of my high consideration and sincere wishes. (signed) F. Da.rlan. 11 The difference between the British and American attitudes toward Darlan is starkly illustrated by a cable received by Mr. Mack, foreign affairs liaison officer fro~ the British to Allied Force Headquartars, from the British Foreign office. Mack is instructed as follows: "there is no need for you to pay a formal call on Darlan, though there is equally no reason why you should avoid meeting him. You will also no doubt maintain informal relations with French officials as may be necessary. Consul General will conduct official business with French authorities. He need not pay a formal call on Darlan, though if Darlan wishes to see hi1n he should respond.••" Compare this with the free and easy relaticns between General Clark and Darlan! .. Reports from the front are obscure. Because of continued bad weather that makes flying i:npossible, Generals Clark and Eisenhower decide to leave at 0900 tomorrow by armored car for the front so they can observe first-hand the conditions. This is the most comprehensive report that comes back today: "Attack on .o.,zerte expected 28 November with pos sible use of parachutists. No report on exact situati on around Mateur and Djideida. General situation obscure but resistance not believed severe. Mark Six tanks (German) estimated as 12 to 20 encountered last night vicinity of Djideida. Tanks mount 88 mmgun. Germans executed demolitions of bridge at Taboura. 56th Rrigade exact progress unknown. Has encountered ene~ tanks." The air attack against Axis-held poritions of Tunisia is on from both sides. Bombers and f'ighters from Algeria -are supporting the Allied advance and bombing airports. The first report comes in from the Allied air force operating from the Middle East and Malta. The Tunis docks were bombed last night with 55,000 pounds or high explosives. Hits were scored on petrol dumps, buildings, railway instal- �The generals go east-southeast via Seti£ and Constantine, heading for Guelma w here General Anderson's commandpost is reported to be. The trip is through br own, barren country . The roads are good. Just before entering Constantine, a six-yearold Arab boy- darts out in front of one of the reconnaissance cars and is killed~ It gets dark when the column is 60 kilometers east of Guelma and the la st two hours or the trip are driven in a complete blackout. The road, humpbacked and of well-w.o11n macadam, is slick with dew. All the cars in the convoy are skid ding and finally one of the heavy armored recons slides into the ditch, injuring three men. The two men most seriously injured are put in the baggage truck and the convoy cautiously cree ps into Guelma. In the town, the generals are guided to the hom of a Mr. e Spring, American consul who has come to Guelma from Tunis with the entry of the Germans. Having eaten small lunches while driving, the group eats dinner. General Anderson has moved his colllm!Uld post to Soule Ahras, farther east, so the generals decide to spend the night with Spring and continue in the morning. A British medical major takes the two injured men to a hospital and then l eaves for the ditched recon to look after the less seriously injured men. General Eisenhower obtains a bed but General Clark and Colonel Slocum throw their bedding rolls on cots downstairs. The ~ds bivouac around outside the house . During the trip to Guelma., little military activity was seen . Enroute a few c onvoys were passed, including part of the 6th Armored Ini'antry (American), part of General Oliver's force which General Clark ordered up to aid General Anderson. This unit, becaus e of enemy air reconnaissance, is on a night march and its disc i pline and apperance is excel l ent . While the two top generals are making their way to the front, the r e are important developments at Algiers. Governor General Boissons arrives from French West Africa, and Governor General Nogues is coming from Frenc h M orocco . M eanwhile, arrangements are being made to set up the m ssion that w l visit Dakar fol l owing i il the conferences here. The fol l owing message is received today from Secretary of W Stimson: nwant ar to convey my admiration and appreciation of your (cable to General Eisenho wer) mast er1y conduct of the campaign thus far as wel l as my best wishes for your success in Tunisia. I know it wil l be a tough pull but I am confident that you wil l tlu>roughly succeed." Another congratulatory message has been received £rom the Inter-Am erican def' ense ·board in W ashington. It says: "The Int er-Americ an D ense Board, realizing ef the beneficial results of the campaign in North Africa on the security of the We stern Hem isphere, wishes to express respect£ rand adiniration of the Commanders of the All ied Force i n North Ai'rica and sends its commendations to the Chi efs of the American Armed Forces x x x for the brilliant planning, preparati on and execution of one of t he m ost spl endid campaigns in the history of the world." This is the military situation as of tonight: Bone was under continuous bombing from midnight to 0530. One destroyer bad l y holed. Off Djidjel l i, one petrol carrier sunk. At Tebourba l4 out of 17 German tanks were destr oyed when they atte mp ted a counter-attack. At Djedeida, the 11th Brigade is "clearing up the town" .but lost four tanks by enemyAre ~ outskirts. Bombers called to attac k enemy column r etiring from Djedei da but column gone when planes arrived so they bombed Bizerte shi p1in g. Brid ges at Tebourba and Djedeida destr oyed but repairable. It appears that half the enemy is retiring toward Tunis and the ot her .half toward Sousse . M any stores and materi als abandoned or bun1t by enemy. Axi s air effort on reduced over-al l scale but operatin g in large formations . The Germans are fighting a stubborn retreat but our progress is stea dy . * * * �SO AHRAS-AIDIERS, UIC NOVEMBER 1942-The American generals arrive at General 29, Anderson's commandpost in mid-morning. It is at Laverdure, about six miles west of Souk Ab.ras. The three generals immediately go into conf'erence at the British general's simple and- rustic headquarters. Enroute to the command post, the generals encountered Colonel Darryl Zanuck who reported to them that we did not control the air and that there was dissatisfaction by both British and Americans. Anderson reports that he is satisfied with the air situation; that arrival of more AJ.lied air units has counteracted the dive bombing and strafing the troops were subjected to during earlier stages of the drive to the east. He then outlines in detail the disposition of troops under his commandand reports that he "is pleased with the way things are going." It is decided to move more air and line of comrmmications troops to the front. Communications between the First Army and Al.Lied Force Headquarters has been far from satisfactory. The military situation is that the Axis forces are fighting a rearguard action but that our drive for Tunis and Bizerte is steady. Because of the arrival in Algiers of General Boisson and the importance of pending conferences concerning the status of Dakar and French West .Africa, it is decided to turn around and proceed back to Algiers as rapidly as possible. General lisenhower is a bit under the weather, having developed a bad cold. The conf'erence with General Anderson lasts only an hour. During that time, Colonel Slocum has been talking with Anderson's staff. The 580 llli.le drive back to AJ.giers is started at 1100. In order to move rapidly, the slower armored reconnaissance cars are left behind, to proceed at their safest speed. The armored staff car and two jeeps head for home, pausing only a few times. The final 180 miles are covered after dark but to make time blackout is disregarded. As the cars speed through small Arab towns, jittery air raid precauti on officials blov their whistles and wave their arms. The cars ke ep g9ing with everyone shouting: "Am ericaines." The protest of the gendarmes amount to naught.It is close to midnight when the party returns. Some members have bad sun and windburns. On the return trip the generals• sma·ll convoy passed mile after mile of half-tracks and trucks moving to the front. These were part of General Oliver's command, the tanks having gone up by rail. Their road discipline is good. Back at Algiers, the following cable has been sent :from Secretary of State Hull to General Eisenhower: "The planning and launching of the North .African campaign constitutes one of the most brilliant chapters in our military history and I extend to you and to the army personnel participating my sincere congratulations on a job weL. done. This highly successful operatioo is a real contribution toward final viotory." This is the military: situation for the day: 55 B-17s bombed Bizerte airdrome and docks successfully. Ten enemy aircraft destroyed, two probabl.es, seven damaged. We lost two planes. No fig _ ter sup port because of mud. 17 British Bisleys attaoked h Bizerte airdrome successful l y last night without l.oss. Bone was attaoked heavily during the night with "losses suffered by both sides." British parachutists were drop ped from 44 6-47s near Pont Du Fahs, 55 miles southwest of Tunis at 1100 today. The planes reported a sucoessf'ul drop but what happened. after the chutists hi t the ground is not known. On the basis of a message sent back by Generals Eisenhower and Clark the north quay of Bizerte harbor wil.l be bombed tomorrow. Informati on from Anderson is meager. The 56th Infantry brigade was scheduled to reach a point about 10 miles northwest of Mateur early today. The 11th Brigade is bel.ieved moving :from Teboura to\Vard Mateur. Our tank losses have been relatively light. The remainder of the U.S. armored force has reached Souk .Ahras by road. Colonel. Raff rep orted by �I . . telephone this afternoon that there are no enemy forces between Kairoaun and Tebessa. The airdrome at Gafsa will be ready for use in two days. Governor Boisson holds a preliminary conference today with Admiral Darla.n and governor indicates that he will "cooperate fully" with Darlan and the Allied forces. is prepared, he says, to enter into an agreement which wilJ_ gi've us the facilities of French North Af'rica that we desire. The general tenor of the conversation was that French West Africa will be in the war with us "en bloc." Mr. Murphy. The French West African a, Two new moves are on the griddle. One calls for an invasion of Spanish Morocco if conditions-require it. The situation concerning this hot spot is far from good. The Spanish there are making repeated protests about planes flying over Tangiers f4I1d indicating they might be looking for a pretext to move into the Sebou river region. Undoubtedly they are being agitated by Axis agents. The second move is a drive against Sardinia. It is requested that "planning and preparations be pressed so that n o til)18 will be lost when the decision is made. 11 * * * .A.LJ}!ERS, NOVEMBER 1942-Three problems-increased 50,air activity over the eastern i'ront, preparations for the conference with Governor General Boisson and the ever-more delicate situation in Spanish Morocco-occupy General Clark throughout the day. General Eisenhower is ill with a cold at his villa so the Deputy Commander's day is more hectic than usual. On the basis of discussions with General Anderson, the following air operations for the next 48 hours are decided upon following a conference in General Clark's office with Air Marshal Welsh, Major General (just promoted) Doolittle, Air Vice Marshal Sanders, General Craig and others. Eighteen Bisleys will crack Bizerte airdrome tonight. Tor.iorrow 18 Flying Fortresses, aocoL. anied by l.8 P-58 Fighters, p will attack Tunis airdrome. Eight B-25s, on their first mission and to be accom})-: anied by 12 P-58s i'rom Youks, will · bomb Gabes. At nig _t, 18 Bisleys · will bomb the h airdrome at Tunis. The day' after tomorrow, 18 B-l7s and 18 fighters, will go after Bizer t e airdrome again. Eight B-26s will bomb 1nis airdrome accompanied by 12 fighters. Again 18 Bi sleys will attack Bizerte Wednesday night. It is also decided to ask for the servies of Air Marshal Tedder i'rom the Middle East. The theory is that Tedder, with a great deal of practical experience, can aid the air drive tremendously during the coming critical tYFoweeks in Tunis. Welsh doesn't seem to have the drive or the pra ctical experience necessary. Tedder, who was here for conferences last week, has returned to the Middle East. Regarding the situation in regard to French West Africa, Darlan, Boisson andNogues are now in meetings at which they are straightening out their indifidual differences. In the words of General Clark; nwe are letting them have their own cat and dog fight among themselves. ·Both Boisson and Nogues have demands that they must work out with Darlan. Tomorrow, Darlan, Boisson and Nogues wili have a pre liminary meeting with Mr. Murphy and Colonel Holmes. When the time is r i pe, we will go into confer ence to conclude the deal.' ~ The matters of principle are to be discussed here with all specific arrangements left for consummation in Dakar with a speci al mission that has been dispatched from Washington. It is hoped that a general statement of position can be secured from Boisson before he returns to Dakar. The specific agree ment wo uld be consumated at the capital of French West Africa. General Clark feels it v1 ould be unwise to send Boisson back to D akar "trit hout attempting to reduce the commonunderstanding to writing ••• " �A score of radios come in today concerning the increa sing l y tense situation in Span ,iah Morocco. Almo any move can be expected in the Sebou and frontier st areas. The Bri tish consul general at Tangiers rep ort s that "the £act that the areas have not yet been occupied by American troops is arousing commnet among Spanish circ l es at Tangier xx x inclined to interpret this as tacit acknowledgement of Spanish claim to Sebou region. 11 The region is fuL . of enemy agents who are inciting the Moorish leaders. Repeated protests are coming in concerning flights of American planes over Spanish Morocco. P.J.1 these cascading facts disturb General . Clark. He calls General -Patton at Casablanca and orders him to come to Algiers tomorrow f'or conference. A move might have to be made at a moment's notice. One cable explains the situation: "Indications that Spanish Moroccan Army may be planning sudden move south of Sebou River have been further em hasized by objection of f high commissioners to U.S. Charge d'Affaires, Tangier, over flights of Am erican planes acr oss Spanish territory. Token occupation by American troops of French Moroccan territory north of Sebou river recommended by military atta.che Tangier to prevent a possible Spanis h occupati on that area. Considerable discussion reported among Spaniards over advisability t l~ir occupations this territory ••• 11 The rapid advance into Tunis has slowed down. The report from the fr~nt says: Ground operation remained on a reduced scale today and wil l continue to do so until present sc ale of enemy air ef'fort can be reduced. (This step was ta.ken today by General Clark. He also sent Welsh to the front to conf'er with Anderson). I (Anderson ) have agreed with Welsh to the steps required to acheive this end in air and plans being prepared with object destroying enemy aircraft on ground and denying the m use certain airfields. 11th Infantry Brigade in contact with enemy on western outskirts of Djedeida and on southwest slopes of steep escarpment which divides main val l ey Djedeida and Mateur. They require short period in which rest and reorganize before they f'it to continue offensive. Same applies to 56 Infantry Brigade who failed capture very pronounced feature comm anding valley through which they must advance toward Mateur . Blade force remains in central reserve and provides offensive patrols one or which today destroyed two enemy tanks. The u.s. tank unit is concentrating in the general area south of line Medje to El Bab-Beja. The 56th Reconnaissance Regiment and parachute battalion are operating offensively over vride area n~b of general line Oudna-Massioault both of which occupied by enemy. Air· activity on reduced scale thro.ugh out day. Successful bombing raid carried out against enemy occupying Djedeida. Our fighter squadrons re i nforced to limited ext ent . " 11 General Clark ' s entire afternoon is filled with catching up on t he hundreds of cables that have come i n during his two day absence at the front. He's literally buried under papers through out the day. At one point ha exclaims: "The hel l this isn't a paper war and who said our communications weren ' t working. Just look at t hi s stuf'ftn * * * ALGERS, DECEMBER 1942-General Clark is decorated by General Ei senhower I l, today with the Distinguished Service Meda l l The decoration cer emon is held, in bright Mediterranean morning sunlig ht, on y a second story porch of the St. George Hotel. The citation is read by Colonel Davie of AG and then Genera l Eisenhower pins the medal on his Deputy Commander's tunic. The event is photogra phed by both still and motion picture cameras. High ranking officers, including the four other of f icers who accompanied General Clark on the submarine - r endezvous trip and who are to rec-eive their Legion 0£ M erit decorations soon, st and behi nd in a semi-circle centered on a color guard and t he U.S. flag. �S GRET n l -:)0 There's quite a drama.tic story behind this morning's decoration cere~ ony- -a story that few know and a story stretching back 25 years. After General Clark was wounded in France during the fir st World War and following his release from the base hospital., he was sent to the G-4 section of the Fir st Army. C-enral De W e itt was his section head . General Clark was in charge of supplyin g troops in the Argonne s ection. He had to select railheads, round up the supplies and se e that t hey moved on schedule to the active sector. Just before the war ended, General 1IDe W itt recommended Clark to be a major, at the age of 21 . He also ' wrote a let t er r ecomm ending Clar k for the Distinguishe d Service Medal, saying he "knew of no one more deserving." When the Second Army was formed, General Bullard asked for Clark to be executive officer of: the G-4 section but he stayed with De 'i,itt . The substitute sent in General Clar k' s place got the D.S. M and Genere,l Clark knew "fro m com . parison of my work that I was entitled to the Distinguished Servic e M edal." The stor y then leaps the years to 1955 when General De T Yitt, th en in the Phi lippines, wrot e the W Department to the effect that he had had lots of time to ar ref:lect on Clar k 's work and that one of his gre at regrets was that his r ecommendation of the D.8 .M. for the young officer had never been consumated. Again, ,he wrote Cl ark a marvelous reco mm endation and citation . The recomm endat ion went before t he board ma times but ther e was no action. Durin g the "lean years" of the 1930s, ny many D.S.M. 1 s were awarded for administrative jobs and, again, §enera~ Clark was r ecomme nded, t hi s time by his Corps commaner . Clark f elt that he didn't w d ant a D.S.M. in that fashion . Again the story bounds ahead-this time to the off:ice of General Y .arshall just before Genera l Clark went overseas last July . After saying gooHbye and just as he star t ed to leave , Genera l Clark was stop ped by General Mar-shall. "Your wor k as Chief of Staf'f of the Arm Ground Forc es has been outstanding , " Genera l Marshall y said . Your plannin g of t he army buildup alone is a feat entitling you to the D is tingu i s hed Service M edal. I have recomm ended you on more than one occasion but for reasons I can ' t give you at the present time, the decoration has not been ma . de This st ory runs through th e Genera.l ' s mind as he stands in the warm sunli ght being decorated by the award he has coveted--and which he has earned-for s o long. It t ook almost a quarter of a century until tbl,re, final l y, it bangs on hi s chestl The Spani s h M orocco situation demands almost all of General Clar k 's attention toda y. I t begins to look as thoug h he wil l go to Oran to take char ge of it and to form the Fifth Army, first army of th i s war to be formed out side the limit s of the U nite d Stat es. Fol l owing discussi on wit h Gener a l Clark and various key perso nnel , includ i ng politic al experts of the U.S. and G eat Brit ain, General Eis enhow se nds· r er t he f'ol l.owing cable to Gener al Marshall: "Indication of increa se d Axis subversive activit y in th e r egion of Spani sh Mo ro co and evid ence of some Axis concentration s al ong the Pyren ee s bor der have r convinced me that complete c oor di nation of prepar ation in that r egion mu t be s acheive d at once. To accompli sh t he necessary coor dination, I int end, as U. S. Theater comman er, i mm d ediate l y to estab li sh t he U. S. Fi.fth Army wit h Lieut enant General Clark in command He will act ually es tab l ish hi s headquart er s at Oran as . soon as cur r ent activity . here wil l permit but, in t he m eant ime, wil J. take activ e char ge of coor dinati ng di spos i t i ons and pr eparat i ons in the cent1·al and western ar eas . This wi l l compe his ear ly r elief as Deputy C- in-C but I f eel that th i s can l b e done on my oYmaut hor it y as A llied C- in-C and wi thout r ef erence t o the Co mbined Chiefs of Staf f . Request ra dio confirma t i on . " General Pat t on arriv e s fl-om Casabl anca short l y af t er noon and G ener al Clark �l5 1 spends most of the remainder of the day in conference with the Commander of the Western Task Force. Since a large nUJ1Derof troops have been drawn from the Oran region to give added strength to Genertl Anderson's force fighting in Tunisia, any units that might be used to occupy the Sebou River region or take action against any Spanish Moroccan moved must come f'rom General Patton's command. He recommends use of the Third Division. General Patton is staying over until tomorrow. Mr. Murphy and Colonel Holmes meet today with High Commissioner Darlan and Governor Generals Boisson and Nogues. They report back that the Frenchmen are . getting their dif'ferences settled and that Boisson does not want to return to Dakar without some kind of a written statement from the American officials. Murphy says Boisson is ready "to go along with us." The situation at the fronts British, American and French troops are driving to separate the Axis force. OUr troops are about 15 miles f'rom Tunis and about 22 from Bizerte. They are forging ahead but the rapid advance is slowing down because the Axis troops are now getting concentrated in a tight corner~ British · and American paratroops have been drop f ed about 50 miles south of Tunis to thwart either reinforcements coming up or else to heckle a retreat. Air activity continues over the entire Tunisian area with bombings and fighter sorties against ground troops. Daylight bombing raids were made against Bizerte, Sousse and Gabes. Om- forward units are maintaining strong pressure on the enemy's position in the vicinity 0£ Mateur and Djedeida. In Southeastern Tunisia numerous patrols, including French, have damaged enemy installations. a wedge between Tunis and Bizerte ) (Note: Henceforth, this diary will not deal with matters in such detail. The general's days are filled with innumerable conferences on every conceivable kind of subject. To conserve time and space, only the highlights will be hit.) Late tonight General Clark is informed that Washington bas ap proved his headat the earliest possible date, the Fifth United States Armyl He will go to Oran, probably, at the earliest paa.cticable date. ing, * * * ALGIERS, DECEMBER 1942-"Authority 2, is granted you to activate Fifth headquarters designating Lieutenana General Clark ~s the A:rmyCommander." Army This is the message that is received f'rom General Marshall and the message that will start General Clark on a new tangent with a new command. He begins laying the groundwork. He bas already decided on his key officers: Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Al Gruenther; G-1, Lieutenant Col onel Frank Markoe; §-2, Colonel F.ddie Howard; G-3, Colonel Art Nivens; G-4, Colonel 11Addie" Adcock; Air Officer; Colonel Guy Gale; Adjutant General, Colonel Cheney Bertholf; Headquarters Com andant m Lieutenant Colonel C.C. (Smitty) Smith. The general in order to concentrate on ' training and tactics and avoid being buried in pape; work, plans on a streamlined headquarters. General Clark wants to have his headquarters several kilometers west of Oran so he can be near an airfield and away from interruptions that would impede him in Oran proper. At Oran, he plans to have a base section under General Larkin to handle mo~t o£ the paper work. Colonel Smith is flying_ to Oran tomorrow to meet Colonel Nivens and search for a site for Armyheadquarters. The general orders the above key personnel--plus Colonel TommyLewis who, probably, wil l be the Artillery Officer - to report to him here f'rom Oran. It probably will be ten days before the general starts formation of headquarters. \., � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, November 11 - December 1, 1942 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from November 11 to December 1, 1942. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1942 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Language A language of the resource English Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/805 Date Valid Date (often a range) of validity of a resource. 1940-1949