2 10 16 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/c5b896450960d606a68b88eeb1b188f9.pdf?Expires=1787184000&Signature=HrfDIUr5Yrq8PUDGi%7ErPPZEHKnZ2k3IlkKoCHCk0G3RrwsMsfaB432%7EUjUU3-jWQimpf6XtmW0RALi1fiVFof%7EGnhT9ofC3Gjy8Wu51jYoD8zK1ukGY41O3Pq7AB-ClJOF2BkVVJFLZbLGWTnVPBxcz8qCCiLnebDUTFa3hJ7j6eytdxXbbDPZqlUV7o7Z%7Ey8tamFl4xRnLCktdtUHEZcT14B7xG1g8bQ3GpufDHk5SqKVIZoNIKpLfDOMYDVWekU-VapBFeum7AWU1vrfpcHwf8HM80ufahDrHEy4HrnxHfO9zAz%7EAtUS5WKnZLfVgv07OCRZDh3162UEbMtosYww__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM f9e8392380b959ea1cbec2e5966b76c7 PDF Text Text lOJ few shells irito th" French today, killing severril ""leJ"lbers of the Brosset Division). I told Colonel Kanu".'1er1'r to advise General Juin thr--t I would present an outline of the plan to you. I 1.mderstnnd that 'Napoleon I Brnnn and his planners are in a lull at the monent, and I am sure thtt they will be r,ore than ea~er to play with this latest scheme. . "General Juin still has Cf.FRANO as his obj,•,ctivee He .h1:1s no evidence of any weakening of' the enemy resistance in that sector. If, however, it should collapse and the ~ighth Arny proceed up th('! valley b"'lfore the French crossed into the ~ighth Army zone, General Juin will stop the lrd DIA and place it in corps reserve. He is going to place the Brosset Division in cor:rs reserve tomorrow anyho-v,. The Vrench would then have two divisions advr.ncing to the northwest, the Dody Division in tbe direction FASTENA-GASTRO DEI VC'LCESI, and the 4th Dt,J in the direction VALLE CX'RSA-PROSSEDI. *'I feel tfo,.t ev~rything is progressi"lg satisfactorily on this front. I regret that the K~yes attack could not be r,ade e11rlier, but I believe t,,,,at his 4q-hour balt was necessary in view· of the scattered condition of his two divisions. fersonall:r I have r,y doubts whether ½.e will be able to attack from SONirrNO on the riorning of the 26th as he nov plans. If. he estimates thAt the attack requires two RC'.::''s attacking simultaneously, I am almost certain that he cannot do j_t at thr-d:, tjme. He ~vill submit his rlan tomorrow, and as soon as it arriVAS I she.11 forward it to you. 11 ! just talked to Walsh, Eighth .Ari~y, to bring to his attention the erratic artillery fire of the Cenadians. H, has pronisl'ld to take y,roMpt corrective action, and ha.s requested that I convey sincere regrets to the French. It is true that the Canadfan armor has re11ehed the 1i'F.LFA RIVER. However, tht'l Boche still holds on to A'WINO., and Ge11eral Leese is incEned to believe that the enemy will delay at AJU:~•TO as long as possible, 1:1nd will th,..n ease out via the CASTRO CnLO-RC'CCASSCCA ROAD to the north,1est. Walsh is not at all certain thc-,t the Eightr, Army can prevent t'ds I"\ove. He says th1Jt the tanks are having hard going in the MELFA VALLEY, arid tht>t ""a:1y of then are bogged dovm. 11 The total number of prisoners taken dm·ing this operation as of ele...ren o'clock this evening is 10,715, of' which 2,350 have been taken by Eighth Army a nt"i the rerrainder by Fifth Army. * * * Al\TZIO--HAY 25, 1944-=GenerR 1 ClPrk left · his co:mJ'lland post at 08"30 to go to VI Corps where he conferrerl briefly with General Truscott conc~rning the progress of the VI Corps attack end possibility of div~rting th~ 45th, 34th and 36th Divisions to attack in a northv1esterly d1rection towerd V·~lletri and to its south, while at the same t"me the 3rd Divisioa, Spec:L-~l Service Force continue north to Valmontone, ti1e 1st Arriored Division to support both athtcks with its bulk going to the attack toward Vl'llletri. He ret'Ened to the Fifth Arny Advrmce comrn.11.nd post where he conferred briefly with Generl'l.1 Brann and left iMMediately for the v:i cinity of J3orgo Grappa where he was to see the overland juncture of II Corrs and bridgehead forces. H<'! was Pccortpanied by about 25 correspondents and photogrA.phers. '!'he ,juncture of the bridgehead forces witt tre main Fifth Army front was a momentous occasion. It. occurred fourteen days r->fter the main Fifth Army front was lal.lllch"d on the 11th of May. �[03 ? t. Gtmeral Clark return~d to the Fifth Army comriand post where he conferred with General Brann concerning the continued VI Corps .<tttack tomorrow. General Keyes a:r-rived at the Fifth Army advance command post fror, the bridgehead overland, hav:inp; come in his .jeep frort his con..111and post northeast of Terracina. The purpose of General Kl'lyes visit was to djscuss the irrm1.immt r>1ove of the II Corps to the bridgehead. General Clark also discussed with General Keyes the progress ~,a.de by the 85th and 88th Divisions. Immediately after General Key~s left, Gen_ ral CJ:9rk flew back to the Fifth e Army forward comnand post in t 11e vicinity of San r,1arco to confer with General G:ruenther. This was his first visit b~ck to confer witP his Chief of Staff since·his movement up here on May 22nd. At ?030 Gen~ral Truscott and his Chief of Staff, Colonel c~rleton, came to confer with General Clar Jr, Gen~rnl Brann and Colont-'l Howarcl concerning the VI Corps attack tor-iorrovr morning. Details of this Ptta.ck are covered in the cable sent to General Gruenther. A"'ter Genernl Truscott 1eft,Generril Clark worked on f!dministrative matters, conferred bri~fly with General Brann and retired. Anotrl"!r exanple. of ho"' slow th,. British react to the offensive spirit occurred whim Brigadier Good body, Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for British troops, said that the two British Divisions woulcl be unable ·co srift positions and participate in tre attack tomorrov1 'l)ecause tl-iey required 72 hours to move one brigade. General Clarl< orderl'!d, nevertl-ieless, that they take over from the 45th a SM.all pPrt of their front and be rrepared to f'ollow up VI Corps Pdvances to the northwest. The Frisoner of War report showed 9,018 Fi,..tr Arif prisoners as hi:iving been,) taken since the beginning of tl--ie presert al1-011t offensive. Qeneral Gru~nth.er this morning sent the following memorand1m to General Clark: 11 I have been push:i.nt; the communique subject since early tl:is rnornjng. It went to General Alexancle:r for decision ff 1c I received a CPll back a few :minutes ago that Generi'l1 Alexander desired that the co:r.,r.,uniqu"'! be issued simultan~ously at 1400 hou:n today. Trarcling states t1'nt ris rePso,n for thr>t tim..- was to prevent Ue 1cillinP, of last night 1 s co""" unique 'l i ch was releasnble on tre radio "or th~ f'5rst t:l"'!e at a:rproxhmtely 10:30 tris morning. An earli"'r rl"leA.se would prtictic8lly eliminate trose stories.. \ 1 0 11 I a,,.. l"!nclosinr; copies of th~ Co"1munique as chPnged. Grme:;_~21 Alexanfer \ felt tl~t th, comr-1.miriue as word,a,d by you gnve the jl"lpression t1'at lFrr;e forces ) ht:1d jo:nef-, wh~reas }1e desired thPt tli~ inl.tj:11 rel"ase should indic~te th1' joj.nup of patrols only. \.,.__,/ 11 ';:'h"' last sentence referrins to th1' 1 Hazarrfomi sea rout1's 11 was del"t'"'d beCPuse of en Pgreement w:i th ':.he "'fovy. Harding says thnt the '!Pvy desire8 to issue --tts own cor1nmiques. I arg,1ed ar;rdnst· that on the fsroun 1 thPt this comnm-nique wo_ ld get the big rlay and that you ~anted to sM the "!avy ;et credit. He u said he would take up the r1atter with Aclmiral Cunningram but he was quit" certain �that the Navy would not agree. If there is a change in this I shall let you know. "The report which we h::ive from II Gorps is that the jluicture was made by elements of the 91st Recon Squ.adror. nr.c1 a B:ritish Squadron in the LITTORIA area. J-i:' that is true I sugg""st that you authorize r---~ to give that inforraa- tion to AAI so that the British correspondents here can give a little pl11y to tr.e British side." 'l'he special press CO"'"'illlique 1'mnouncing the juncture of the two elements of Fifth Army is quoted below: "Patrols fro 7i~th Army I'8in front rnade contact with patrols from Fifth Arriy alHed bridgehead force in the early morning of 25 May. This brings to a cl:t:r.iax tht"' spectacular advance of Fifth Arm,v· of rqore than sixty miles in only fourteen cays. Th"'l dranatic juncture of these patrols occ 1_xrred a few niles southeas+, o i:- the bridgehead on the cof' stal highvtay- running between TT'.JL1ACrTA and A~'ZIO. Thus ~i,ftl Arny have t""Stablisht"il. lane corsrmication -riith the bricg1~'het'ld for the first tj I:'~ sirce tt"' li-mdi-'lg ~1hich was made on 22 Januery~ 1 0 "The. troops -"'ron th, ;".a" n +'ront, c-v~rcorrint:: rowerf1.:.: ene ..y r1'sistance, , hmre "cm,-,-}--,t their wa, r forwarc1 rell"ntlessly s~ nee tl e nip-ht of 11-12 May over sc:"!e of' the r·ost d:1 fficult t('>rrain of the wrole Italial'"l campaign. L 11 The troors of th~ br-tdr;eh"tvi ha~re broken tl,ro"J.gh :he porerful defenses bu:_l:. by the <'lnemy +,o rrevent tr~ br:trlgei1ea.d force · rarticipating in our Pdvance f"roM the main front. 11 The followinr; importa11t course of the day: essages v,ere received an<~ disp::•tch~d dur·inr:; the Clark to Gruenth,er. RN 14°2. 11 'fon that we have joinl'ld up, ,s2re restrictions on 'S'l.iscelfa.neons individ1.1als visiting this area apply. The one 1~oute we now ha- e te'!"porarily repaired will riot stand other than. essential traf?ic.. Do not rermit ""'iscellan~ous activiti_,..s to pile in here in rrl"r[lratio"'l for oar advance to Rol1ile. Fe n11st control trat verv car·e!'uJ.lv. 'To i ndi vj d 1als to co·,e in l,y car, air or sea without prior ari:roval from ne. 11 0 Clar}-- to Keyes. R;'J 1494. 11 I desire to cc""'m.end in 1 irr,h~st t"')-r,s tre -=,,->gnifjcent op('Jrn.tions of yo1•r co :"1and since thl"J beginnin,.; of tre rresent offensi·.re on r~ay lltl by vi' ich it cs effected Ue ,;unction 0f Fi-"'th Arm~" "lain +>o:c'ces aPl'l the Fifth Ar,y b"'achhead trocps. You hve ~:r~cuted tl,ie nission w1 th sur"'rlative ar;i;re.,,siv1'ness ~~rr•r-tn~; the fi1ht w5trout rause to a clo-:;gec' r,nd deterndn~d erL''lY, re1 elling prornrtly his re1 eu.t~d count~rattacks a"ld r~fusing to 1.e r::iela.," ,c' ('r ob;;;trL --ted. by his strong defe:rsive pot'tions, by the fatigue of your troops, by his mines and demolitions or by the difficult terrain over, which your continuous advance has been conc.uct"'cl· ::;:n driving rim back fron :;:.osH:ion to rosition you have '"'lade hi111 ray a heavy price in casualties and pr~_soners . This brilliant aC.'/an~e wLich rms ~en exec,rted co:r-:-:iruousl~~ and persiste'1tly :'or 14 days r~ 1 :;__~es~nts a :;reat victory for the rifth Ar"'-Y a-1d e;an not fail to have a najor effect r.ot onl._-r upon the Allied ca~raign in Italy but upon the whole we.r against Ger·1nn7. :I'le:oasA. conv~y ,..y conrretulations to all �l OJ the rersonnel of' vour co '111.d as e, 1 as t' "" e;q. r~ sio"1 your sp1""'1d~cl rm~ts ~n trt" Y,jfth Arr,.y. " o: . . . J rride in ra i~g Clark to J 1in. R'I :1-1-~·.'.5 . 11 : rave j•1st c'ispc,,tched to Ge11.~n-al r"yA; a rr.es sage of con7·at·1lat..:.o,,.,s on t. e r:rilliant op~rftions by hie ~r:.,..re has been ~ffe'1te:i a junction witl J.,} e F~.fth Ar .•Y beac'.1head Porces . I wis :.c, congro.tulate you and the Fr~rch T,",:;q: edj tiom ry Corrs rm t1 f'l • r if~ cert n-rnner in wl ich si'l,;e +:.} e e ,jrn;l..1, , of 01.u- present dr~ve on '"ay 11th you vave car:~ied out yow.· offersive w1 i.c • .as arle :ross~ble +'1is union o" Ue Fifti- ArB:y·forces . In your raJ hl a.,cl cc 11.t~ r. 1ous advar.ce 011 'ha e attacked continuously, stea~ily dr~ ..-::..r , ac' · the e.1e.• "lot •ithstAnai• 1; his s't~'on o.ef""~sive rosit,j ons s:i:,d ~n sn:.te o: t ,e c · ff:i-::mlt cmntA.i11.o• . .s no• n+.-r-.r t: rol_ ,'r- wl.ic' you 'ia,r h£.d to acvarce . You l:.ave rei.•mJ.,l~esly forced h~m to pay a !1eavv toll of his for n"s in t '10•1st"n'1s o"' c&sualti.!"s an<l p~:: so" ,rs . FLase trar:=.rr i+, ·::,o all the ti-•1')01 s o your 00 • a iri ry co11. ,rEtnlPtions on t' ir . Hlorous echieve, P!r.ts •hich heve cortr·· bu.ted ir snci- g-::- .at ensure to tl , FL'tl A,. r I s vi n":.or: t1nd to our rrcgr--ss -1-owar +: e libers.+io11. of Frr-.nce . T f'. err rrou~ trat tre r:·1•n:.ch r::xrier1 • tiona.ry Co,,.::-'E' j s part of l1e Fift Arr:iy. 11 J r:::e.rk to Gruenther . R'r h 2?. 11 Ju.'lction took rlace tli::s or-ciin 6 nt 1('10 lours on Anzio-rn,..rraci.11c road ~b, 'l+. 1 or iles n"rth ent c,.. norgo GrepJx't by r ::- Corr s f'm,•c-, ~0nsistJ•1g 0f "'lenents of tte 4"t .....,ng.;neer Regiml"11-':. and o" the 01st Recon:-1a.;ssance SquPdron a11c! :;;, tEisk fo:;,·ce L·orn t: e '1eachhead under co '1rd of' Co avid·r Officer nf 36tr. "::m(neer •..- · "'11t :'l.rc ,nc: ld-lnr, :r. : :. . ta"l1 r c""'stroyer e ....t"r:i11mts anc' e1e ents of tr,- recc,rp-1a.issru1ce wit of t:,e 1st Br-:.tish ·Division. Arr1.. n ,e t'::"lts seti..sfactory. 11 1-;- 7 Clark to· Gr11~:dher . R'T 1513 . 11 H8v.-. di.rect"'d I Cor-ps to a4:.tac}· PS f'ol~ovrs rrior to "loon to crro • 31"' Ji · s~ or. e11f' JpeciE>l Sf'lrv.; c~ Force rush ~ igorously fro Cori Arl"!a on a lY-10>1.t,.Yr~ j a Arte-ra, ..,}er ents l , 1 st ftr:""lored ·Di vj sion i:r1 s·1rport . 14th ard /;5th I,~ isionsa,+,tack north:vest, folk• ed by 36th Ji vision echelc11.""c'1 tor.; ,1-it reer . Obj.active r::<lr,e rn'1nin, fro CrupolJon"' ...>tt"tjon to La:riuvio . 1")t'I- o,... 34·::.h, t?S s·tu<>tion warrants , to be nrert1.rl"!t' to tur11 i,,., tc a":.ta~l- i, i ,h :rou'ld 11orth of .-11e+,r-t <'rom e::;t, bur~ of lf't Armored Divi sio:-1 in sur;ort o"' tris Attack to nort}wl"!st. B• "tisr rf'llievj11.g 45th fivis:cn sout,r of road r1:ir .... -·...,,.,; ti-roun;:r Carano. B:rHisr Ilivis::.ons to ½e rr~pc'lr""d to f'ollov.r ur as I Cor· s advancfl\s to rort,i,,w~st . Have tolc1 '9rnrn to ;,,, ,... st,i ,Fte rossib' lity of drorr.;~, 'iO<'.tth i~ Co:.li Ll'iziali nr~a ""<'rn:·n, 27th. A.;r 17.ill ]:'re,bab,y object, nu to r1~•-c cn:rid·tions . C'tl ""1-~s.., will br~r S09th in ovf'lrl['"O. or bv boet. Aho1 1t SOO p. so11 ,r"' .J:.~J. .!' in C1 ste1·nr . 0 1 DaniP:!.. t,,11:3 " tris ~ven·rg tl: at Ppp·ox.;r.nt""l 100 more tal fl\U 11 ,t Tl'?er. Cist~rri•1 e11r1 Cori. 3rd n~vis'cn rrEct~callr on i.b; o"1iectives ore r"ld t •o . S;reciA.l Sl"!r·.rice F·orce on three. 1st Ar ored1 PA.d toup-,r r,-oinr; jn the dirl'\ction of ""lletr:i . I r launching t'1"1 s new !l.tfa,ck w1tl 1111 sreed J'ORsi1'le in <'rd~r o ta},;~ t>dYDnuige of ~ r•tns ot our "rlvance an 1 in 0rder to ov~rwhe:1n tl1e enemy i.n v.l:-Pt I11'lY bt'l r ·erion·lized conditio"l at ti1e . tresel"t til'i e . Vcu can assure G .. "ral Alexen<ler t:rrt tr::s ~ s a'1 all- out attrck . I e Fre shoot ·11~ tl e works . " , __ 1 1 • I r Gru~nt er to Ac'I anM CJ . ::rn 1~5. ''Troop Carri.""r Cor ar.:'I r•rorts tr..nt ht"!a .r fla'• r,,13.l·~s 1"Prb0rour;r >1rop i.mrractic<ibl"' f'o:r ?Sth . G--in"'r[ll Cannon will a' e t"1orou~i- study o" flak situF.tio11 to arrow ~n cr"ler to settle confl·· ctinC;s . ' 1 Gru,..ntl-ier to Advance GP . R'J 7~12 . "Assu e trat no decisi.on has been roached ooncerninCT ~srac"ute ~ ou. I" • ,~ ,rronr, ae ine ur,rently.' -------.;. �~ As of this e •P-in~ ther" have been 1,357 casu.nlties Fon~ Fifth Ar~y for ces on tr."! 1)eecrihead s-i hce ti1e 1ep;inning of tre all-out offensi e '!ay ?J, 1944. Durini:: t t same reriod o" time 2, 633 prisoners of war have been tak"n in this sa"' sector . * * * ANZIO--!¾.Y 26 , 1q44--0rer1,,tiol"s Instruction #?4 1.e.s issu."d today. This dire cts I Gorps to attack to_ thi-. north!!est, c:;e~ z-= n , the rrl'lni-.:.."Rl line Lanmrio - Ca. poleo e station and fro thri.t r: r'•rPl line rress on vigorously toward Rome. The attack, as outlini-.d in this Or-.r~tions Instruction, div~rts part of the VI Corps force i'.'1. a new trr 1st northwest tol"mrd Rone . Th~ att'lck toward Valmontone still continu•s a.s in t¾e ori inal rlan Btfi'I~ALO . 1 At r915 General Clr>rk left with BrigP"li..er Goodbodv and his British aide, C1mtnin Lnnrson for tl e 1st 3:ritisr ~1ivision where he conferred with r-t ,adie.r Loewen ~nd General Gregson-Ellis, Connander of the 5tr British Division. mhe · toric o~ discussion was t:be f8rt that the 31:itiqr Div~si s w~ll play i..n tl.e attack . T!1ey are to .r>.ssif:t tl-e attn.ck 11 rusl in,:,; ~orward stro.,,_,~ co. oct petrols a11d increased fir"'s 8lo:'1~ the entire rront. Bott ~jvisions will conform to tre advance of "tre Divisions on treir ri ht . Gtmeral Clark return~d to tr e co1"111n:nd i:ost nt 1030 and hed a press conferenc~ at wricl-- ,~ or-ien-l;ed t:1e rress on the new Attack to kke :rlace later this orn~n ,. He exrlA.~n~d to thel'! that !;r is attR.clc ,as a direct threat towartl Rol'!e a:>1d tru 1 t it would e push"'d vigorously - that it WPS an all-out 2ttack and th<it h"' was shootirr, the wo1~'rs. Gt'!nl'lrt,.l ClPrlr brou rht out thf!t the German was in a bad rosition f>.nd thPt tr 1 s n""w attaC'k was launched so tbnt we do not lose nny impetus to t!-1" ,, ins already rnc>de by tr'e brid ,!'!head ~orces. ':'his attack pusr ing YJ.o.,,.th rest c~n r,ain for u11 tre hi.11h r;round 110~·th and soutl1 of Velle tri wl-iich would force the G~r:--ia:1s to withdraw fro. tr e entire area to the northwest and v :rus}1.inr1 vigor usly northward towRrd Rol"le ,e rd.r,ht craclc a svdtcb rosi tion which we knov1 to bl"! prep:'1red bet een Lake Albano Md tl-e Tiber. The press as'ked se eral questions whic:1 Gen,.,ral CJ.Fr', ansvr'"'r""d frnnkly and to the point . At 1115 Gen-,ral Devers t=irri V1'd by cub t>nd CE' ., i 1'di:>tely COJ1U'l4nd post . General Clnrk orjented General Dev~rs on and what he contenplr-ited to do as t11e ::>tt1:1 c1,(" todny rrowessed . le+'t tod4y Pt noo:>1 and ~ent direct tot~ VI CorTs co~-and post Clark 1 s to G""n!'!r~l events to date Gen~ral Dev ,:l's at Conca. General Clc--rk cmf""rrer1 with G~neral Brnnn Pnd stud.:.ed rrogress of the b~ttle in the •arly f8~t of tre a.:'ternoon and at three o'clock left for the co.Mand rost of the 45th and 1st Armored Di i~ions . !Ie discussed with tPese Division CoriManders -l;le siturtion at t eir i ..; ::ate fronts ~c" ::..eRrned first hand how the attack as pror,ressi".l.g . He r~turn•d to the co 1a11d post at 1745. Highli :hts of t:., Fifth Ar .y 1 s pror;ress toc-iy were thrt reco-rnpissance eleJ"lents had r~acPed Art.,na. Th"' 14t~, 45th and 1st J'rmored Divisions read made r,;ains or abo1 1t ,., ,ooc yarc s to tl1~ 11orthwest. T "' '3rd ;)i 1.sion anc1 Special Cervi.ce Force w~re also :--•.1shing northw,,rd. r:1-, ents o~ the '3J~d :Ci-vision were just sout.1 of. Artena . On the TI Corrs ~"ront the hir:h P,"round to the i'lest of J irerno was t.... <i.ken bv th!'! 139th In+>antry. We had r/1\connf'i•~s nee ra.trols in Sezze. In �lt 1,_ l.P the French sector some advances were Made , ,sr"lcially on the right where ele ments had passed through San Giovanni to the north . On the 1!:igrith Arf'l'y sector two bridgeheads have been established ncross the Melfa River , and tank units were rushing out to the northwest . The following important messages of the da;::r are quoted below: Clark to Gruenther . ·RU 8124. "Represent strongly to S-"ville the fact that ten cases occ11rred yesterday where.our ai:- ~ttricked our own troops in the bridgehead area . Brann ;1as offered a solution. Flease see that imr1ediate steps are takl'!n to correct th is d:lffi culty. Last night at about 7: 00 P . r.,. , eigl1t f' - 40 • s attacked 3rd Division colullln 1)e'0ween Cisterna and Cori, killing three and wounding twelve . Those ,.,,is sions 'nhich do not check in with our forward control nust keep clear, ~,ust give this place a wide herth. 11 Leese to Clark. WT 2609. "This is a great day for the Fifth Army so finely er.r-ned . On behalf oft):-,~ "":ighth Army I most heartily congratulate you and your troops . 11 Clark to Leese . RN 8170 . tions . Hany thanks . n 11 Deepl;r appreciate your raessage of congratula- General Gruenther sent General Clark t1'e following memorandum at noon today: "General Alexander arrived here at 11:15 this morning and reriained cbout twenty minutes . He was acconpanied by Lerm1,itzer . He ask~d if he could drive toward ':'-:-:RRACI'JA , and I told him 'certainly, Sir' $ Iie is i'Tell pleased with A.. f'l C. the entire situ.c'ltion, and was w:,ost compliFentary in his references to the Fift,hl. Army and to you. T explained the plan of today ' s atta.ck in the bridgehead as outlined in your radio, and as :1"urtrier amplified by yon while you were here yesterday. General Alexander agreed that the plan is a 1sood one. He stated, 1 I am for any line of' action which tre Arr·J Conw,nnder believes will offe:r a chance to continue his present success 1 • Ahout five l'.'.'linutes later he said, 'I am sure that the Army Co:mr1ander will continue to push toward Valmontone, won't he'? I \:now th.t he npprecfrtes tre r'portance of.' e:iining the 1-igh ~01.U1d just south of Artena . As soon as he captures that he ~ill be absolutely safe. 1 I assured him that you had that situation thoroughly in "'lind, and that he could de .. l');r. pend upon you to execute a viigorous plan with all the :!"ush in th~ world. I am certain that he left w:Jt}-i no r:1.ental reservations as to the wisdom of your attack. He stated that if you are able to capture the hieh .c;round north of Velletri it, would put the enemy at a serio11s disadvantage, and would practically insure the success of tl1e bridgehead attack . He j_s looking forward to his visit to the bridi;ehead tori,_orrow . 11 .i/-. "Joe Cannon called to find out the status of' the parachute drop . I advised him that Plan 1 B' was definitely off, and that you hnd SlL"IW!oned Yarborough for a cor"'"'rl'mce to c'eterrnine tte f'easibilit;r of a dr<?r in the Coli Lazzoli area . ---Joe is .,...ost eager for a dror . He sup;z~sts, A.s did St-'lville yesterday , a drop north of Rome . I told him that you had given tru:t Fiatter careful consider~tion, but at tMs noment such a mission see, s inadvisabb . Joe said that he was "1 �going to keep thinking of other possible missfons, And thl"t he vrould probably be offering lousy su~gestions :rorn time to time. I told hi~ to go ahead because you were always glad to recei-ve new ideas. 11 General Clark later in the afternoon replied to the abov-e memorandun as follows: 11 Your 1?20B memorandw. of the ?6th has just been handed to rne. I hope you have been able to tell General Alexander by t:tis V'Tie thPt we have Artena and are no doubt pusriing well on towards Vnl;,,ontone. I did not deter from sending a strong -;:...orce in that direction in compliance with his instructions. The other advance is going well. I am a. little confused as to vihether the enemy is going to ""ake a stfl.nd on the prep..,red f'OSition running east and west through Velletri. Ee must, or lose considerable of his force. "I visited the British Corinnanders this morning and urged thern to in= creased effort. I b"lieve there is only a shell in front of tbern. "Devers spoke to me th:i.s rnornjng about the parachute drop. ·I told him I was not going to be stampeded into a 1 two-bit I effort under Plan B in the vicinity of r1ount Malaina. It would contr:ibute nothing, in my opinfon, and just satisfy sor,,e of these birds who wnnt to see somebody drop~ Besides, the nir screamed 1 flnk 1 at that point. I would like them dropred on the Colli Laziali, but I can ir.',a.gine how far I will get witl~ the flak holler. Yarborough has been here, an<l I have told hiM of _my desires. They are studying it. ttrn would b'°' I can do zation. head and my opinion, to drop the handful of ~rachutists, 500, nortr of Rorie perfectly futile. I will dror thent when the situn.tion dictBtes and some good by the e:xrenditure of at least a part of that 4'-ine organiIf son"tring does not show ur soon, I will bring them "nto the bridgeuse thel"' as ground troops. T told Ile'V';l!)!'S all of this.tt Clark to Gruenther. RV 8165. 11 VI Corps just re:rorts bornb:Jnis of our tank units in the Artena area wi tM.n t:he 111st two hours. This is seriously affecting morale of our troops. They report oth~r instances have occurred today. I insist that air units wro CA.n not :identify our troops k"'lep out of this area. Please take drastic 2ction to see that this is done. 11 / At 5:30 this evening General Gruenther dispatched the following menorandum to Gent"!ral Clark: 11 I am very much disturbed to learn that the air is bombing our own troops \ again. I got in toucr with Ge"leral Sr>ville imrnedfr,tely, end he is taking every possible :ri.eans to see that such jncidents do not recur. He has forbidden all air to enter the line included between t:be following linits: Bomb line Valmontone - Fighway 6 to Rome; thence down LMa Ror1a; along the coast to the bomb · line. According to the 4 nstructions he has issued no planes will or,erate in that area except the control bv AGORif, "J"'icD is the forwrrd control in the bridgehead area.. 11 G"lnera.1 Sairille is very eager to get further details of' the Artern1 bonibing. He is thorou~1ly cooperetive in atteT1J.rt:ing to avoid it, but I get the impression that he <loesn 1t 1mo"' 'V:at to do in addition to th"l instructions he has already laid down. �t09 11 General Keyes has just left here. Fis attack in the Sezze area is going very well, and there is at least e reasonl'!ble chance that he will be on the Sezze heights by e11rly riorning. We are "'10W rla"Ylning to have General Crittenberger take over coy1rnand at 280001. · e shall know by noon tomorrow whether or not the transfer at that time is practicable, but as far as I can tell nmv it is quite feasible. Generel Keyes, will have a small advance party at your headquarters by ~ o I clock in tl,e morning in order to be oriented on the operation wMch YOU des1.re to hrw"' him 1Lndertake. 11 Your 1530 memorandum just arrived. We are rill very rleased over the pro.:;ress ,wM ch the bridgehead attack is n:'lking. "Genl'Jral S2ville f .. els thPt there is a reasom:ible chance th~t the bombing of Artena was done by an ACCR 11T mtssion. 11 Gruenther to ClPrk. R:lf 18'7. n-•aville has cancelled all Pi.neapple mission south of' Hir;hvnly 1 and Hi~hway 5, and issued orders to close down Acorn~ This is from 5: 30 memo. 11 The total casualties in the beachhead from th·e opening of the present attack to mid!J-ight tonight 1'.mount to 3,579 American a11d 199 British. Gen1'ral Juin today issued the following Order of the Day to his troops: 11 With thl"\ end of the first phase of the offensive T.Jr"rked by the total defeat of' the cnemiy who opposed us and by the Junction of all Fifth Arri.y Forces, I salute piouslv our r:;lorious ·dead, ,,.,110se n.<=tnes today, ,join in the Legnnd, tJ,ose many H~roes of our rnce wr o fell on Italian soil during the centuries of hj_story. "I express my sn.tisf'action encl grrititude to t"be troops stpffs and services who carried -'rnto battle so '1Uch courrge, faitr, intelligence and abnegation. "Rivaling with audacity, tJ.,e units o+> the Fr<"'nch E:x11editionary Forces sue .. cessfully cracl,:ed two strongly organized ene:rny positions and fought continuously and without rest side by side witr our gel lant Allies. "A deep advance wMch has already attained /,,,5 kilor,eters several ene-rny Divisions annihilated, "lore than 4,000 rrison~rs (of wrich there were 110 officers), and nuch "10re jri:rortant enemy mnteriel CR.ftlJI·ed, sue}" is th~ result, to date, of the ~J'ictory gained by the F.F..C. The echo of this vi;:tory, charged with hope so'mr'ed in the her,.rt of all r'renchme:'1 and elevrted the B.dmiration of the Allied Co"lllanders. "Another phase, ,rr:tch will tn.ke us fnr is now openinp;; the F .E.C. will continue to 1 1old hi.P,h tre> proud colors w1,ose Appearence on Mou'1t 1Majo I terrified the Gnrman and signaled his i'etreat. "For1vard always forward. 11 T1'""; HC'HR. ()V LIB~'l'I0>;,T IS '-IEAR. 11 �l1 0 A'"ZIO- -·•\V:- '27, ·19/+4-..farly -':.:bis rorn1ng 'ontill'.3 :;-lA.nes flew ov6:..' th,, port ar8a a.nd 0.rorr0.cl sol"le bo~bs . C""fice1·s ann "'18n. rtayi nf! thP c~ stle urstairs were -f'0rce{ do"ll into t 1 1e tunnel. The a;)..ert last11c:'l f'or a..,0ut Pn 1 our . Ge11eral Clar', arc-se early ancl stt'c "ed rro resc- made "'Y t:10 1,eachhe c1 +>crces durinr; tre Tl~ ,~t . There were i"lany v·sitors to trP col"''T!a'1r' post today. First to arriw, wps .Go-'1°rr,J. 'foce, G-3, .AFHQ. Be conferred vr'th Gene:N,l C Prk ,r' efly, w110 oriPnted him rr. t: e situation, and then left to visit frort li~e di.visions. A'"te:,.~ GenerPl •roce left, G~r8rf'l Sn,•·tlle caJ"B in to c'H sc'lSf' with General Clr:ci tre ~rci.<lerts wl'" d1 c-ccurred ir -rrl- ic'1 C'U~ tr.oors r.!ld beer. bC'mbed by our ovm aircra..:t. A bor. 1 ~110 wil: )e Astabl isrnd short of wr :::.c. forward .cm1t:col ca'1not Ni:rn~ t n11y bcnibing sorties. After GenArr 1 J,,,ville left Gen8ra:.s Jo11·1pon £rd Fur,A cr;1Je t, co'1..f'er witr. Genert>l Clark refcr,mce t e O'!';U}."'l'tion rf' Ro"'!? b. tl e F:i.ftl1 A1•y,y. GenPr~l Clnr'l- ~~ntE'd t0 or-tent tl1 eP1 1uic'.klv ""1r1 ra,re tl1em rre1 ared to accoFpany him -into Rc:ne s0 tl Rt re cou~_d ··Y'!mediate1_v re-''er 2."l ,Ptters 0-r ti,.,, city f'dniin-1 strfl.tior. tot er. AftP-r Gonr~~ls Johnson ['nd qumq 1e~t, General Gammell, Chi~f of Staff t0 Genern.l 'Hlson, CI {C "'editerr~n'3an Tl:9<1.ter, arrived to vi. it t. e two British Div::.s::'..011s in Fifth A.rry Pr>d tc corfer briE'fly with GP,nPrl"l Clark. ~e Wf!S acco~pan-led by rigRniPr mronpson. At 101(' General fl.lexander prrived Pccr'"'~nind by Gorerrl GP non aYJ.d Bri.gad i.er 1 •cirreri.n~. General ClA.rk or:· entBd GBnerr- 1 Alexann.er a11.cl Ge'."leral Ca"l't'lon 1Jriefly on events to dP.te at tl:-E' 1,eccl ead front, and the party left , imnedj ately' b•r jeep for tre VI Corr<'! c0"':mand no'1t rere tl.ey con''erred with GenP.ral 'T'ruscott . From tr e VI Corps cor>1mRnrl ,-~st the rarty ;ent to Cisternn . Tre to,m vas comrJ etely 'l~eclred and in s am'-ilo. • Abandoned arc destroyed GerTan 0quirnent were strem on the roarlsi'.ies, , ·' ,.,T".mu..."li.tion wt>s abPndonen . Tre scrme WBS t;,,'J;'~cal of' many areas f'rom 1,1c:b thP Gflrman hfl9 bee11 driven by t '1e Fift1 Army. From c:ster'iR t' e rart went to tre 45th Division comT".and post to rliscuss tl e sitwtion on tre:r front. Fror- the 4Sth I..ivision cor"'lft.no rost tre YJ.ext stop was the 1st Armored D~vi.sior vrrere Generc-1s Ckr'I" and. Alexander discussed w.;t1, GenAral PPr,.,,on thA 1st f\I'Jrlored e"forts rdnce tl e beac head Pt tack e ,an. The 1st J'lrmored was in thP rrocess of regroupinr, foinr, back into rear areas in rrerPrA.tion "'or an all-out attac1:: next 'kmdey to:ward Rome. Fror the 1st Armored com.mand post the rarty went to tre: 5th British Division and frori there to the 1st British Divjsion . ~eneral 'lexander an➔ h~s rerty left iT'1111ediPtely upon treir r8turn to tre Fi.ft Army adw nee com11and rost +>or AAI Headquarters in c~serta. GenP,rr,l 1 Cl1'1.r1r c P,cide>d to. i'ly bPc' k t ,8 iftr Arrv corlr'end post in t fl vicinity of San •rarco in order to d::: scuss with his Chief of Staff , Gen8ra~ Grui=mther , 1.m:rorta:"lt mritters concerning the II uorr,s a11.d Frm,c}, Corps "rents. He wished to discU~8 in pnrti cu1t"r w~ tr GP-neral Juin tr e rossil)ilities of send~n~ up a Fren-JJ.1 Division to tl e beE!ci he11d to assist ·i.n rushin~ on into Rome. Re also wi=mted to P.xpeditP. f' move111en-f; of r::: Cor-rs to tre beac1'.hevd f'roT'1t "in cr der to utilize II Corps Headqu.:"'rters in a drive towi.rd Rone . He intends to fly back tonorrow T11orn-1.nr, P"'ter these d.! <Jcussions take pltice . ~ ~ �ll l Hir:hlights of todAy 1 s battle progress were HS f ollons: Limited P dvances were rrede by the 45th and 34th vivisions Pgainst determined GermPn resistance . The 36th Division had relieved the 1st Arnored :-Jivision, and the 3rd Division had rushed "1ore of lts units up into tre _~.rten.a area. A new task force was formed, called Shepherd T2.sk Force, wliicb coi-i.s:i.sted of the 15th Infantry less one battalion and with one b;:ittalion of med.i.um hmks . Its mission is to attack vigorously tovrard. Valmontone and seize and hold that locH.li ty. On the II Corns f'ront Sezze had been occup7ed and rdvrinces were made to the hi.gh r,round. further to the northeast. In the French sector, although prof:;ress was slow, some advances were made . On the Bighth Army front the 5th Canadian Brigflde hr d tA.ken Geprano and was pushinc• forward on a new objective to tre northeast called Pofi. The seizure of Ceprano by the Canadians will relieve to some extent pressure on the French r:l1ht flAnk rlong the Sacco River o General Clark's notes on today's Pctivities are as follows: "As I have often indicf'ted, the direction of etteck assigned me for the Anzio effort vm.s in the direction of Cori - Valmontone . This w2s due to a long-standin~ , pre-conceived idea by Alexander , instigated by his Chief of Staff, Hardin~. It was based on the false -premise that if Route //6 were cut at ValmontonP a German Army would be annihilated . Tris is ridiculous, for many roads lead to tl-,e north +'ram Arce, '7rosinone and in between. I was forced into this attack, but it had a 6ood feature in thrt it took Cisterna and gr:ive us the o½servation in Ue area of Cori. If the going became tough on Valmontone I could shif't the weir•ht of my attack to the northwest . ::xactly this has happened . All German troops "ithdrawing from tl--e Cisterna area have taken a position between Velletrj and Va lmontone . This area has been reinforced from tl e Britisl" ,"est flanl· ~rea and b;· t½.e Her:mi->n Goerin~ Dj_vision. Once we advanced to Valmontone it would be difficult to turn west ~n road via Route #6. Cornri,.mications alone would r1ai:e this impracticable . I therefore directed VI Corps, as indicated in Operations In"ltruction.#24, which is quoted below. The attack is pro':;I"essin~ slowlyo We will hreak the Fnction Line to wrich he is withdraw:i· . .,., and 1rre will ca.pture Rome. It i.s just a question of time now . 0 , . t1The j1mction of the two forces day before yesterday was a grand event for the Fifth Army. It completed a si.xty- mile drive through the mountains by II Corps with two newt:' . S . Divisions . I had to be on hand for tre official Junction . It meant more to me thrin anything since our success P.t SPlerno . I have now ordered II Corps into the beachhead with ' t} e view of putting t,"O corps into the attack with an all-out drive to capture the Colli Laziali area w}ich mean:c:: the early fall of Ro,,,e . It will be desperate figJ,ting , but I must maintain the impetus of 011:r attack and take advantage of the remornlized, shatterecl condition of the enemy. Fifth Army alone has captured over 10,000 prisoners in two weeks , kill0d ano wounded as many and destroyed great qu;e,ntities of enemy equipment. The enemy will have diffic11lty mriking a deterMined sta11d wHh l1is hodge- podge mixture of units against the trrust of the Fifth l\.rmy. 0 11 1st Armored Division ' s efforts were not success.ful yesterday, due to great resistance Mouth of V9lletri and poor tank terrein. Truscott has put 36th Division in ~ts place , regroupinr, Harmon in order to c1rive in the 45th �l l 2. Division sector wrere the terrain is better. ThPt shoul1 t~ke plRce tomo~row P.nd lT\PY break th0 c~mel' s back. nr _ave continually telked with my British Co...,,,.,.an.ders in an e-f'fort to en~r~ize trP.~ ~~to Pn Attack. There i9 Po P~tac left in them. Tre 5th Division· is poorly led by Ge~ern.l GrP, ,9on-"";ll is. :re h~s no oNensive 1yd.rit . Brit;Pd-· er ;,oewen, wlio has iust 1nen put in co:r.rnpn<l o-" t 11e J:st Division is better, alt 1oup:h new <>nc: yo,mg. I f'TT\ sure l-ie dll rus:-1 fo:t""Tard witr :iore vigor. 11 1 Import~nt nessa ,es of the day Freas follovs: General Gruenther this r,iorninr; dispr>tched the following nemorandum to General Cl~rk: "Four dPys p ,o I took up A.t;Pin with AAI the question 0:f speed:lng up the arr:vBl of tre J.<'1l8nce of tle Qlst Pivision. I vas advised that they are still scheduled to Pr~ive rere ~hout June 15, ann that this date can not be adv~nced. Yesterday: spoke to GenerPl AlRXP~der E'~out it, and hP, sai<l r.e certPinly agreed that we needP,d it row on' th<>t he woulr do everytl-dn he could to get it. Last rie1 t re sent a !'lessage to Al.,.,HQ !"""'kb, "!:.re request. :::: Gfoke to G~inel aho11t it 1est nir,ht anc' he saii t! Pt --1;1 e instructions fron the Combined C' ;efs of Ste.-i--"" conc0,rninc- tre cover r ln~ 1 ere so de"i11ite t}'f't le r1oes not soe how it ~n ossibly 1:-e r ade evailr-hle to us Ft t' ·is t5m 0 • All o-" t rt, I believe, is 1baloney 1 • I su,;eqt tl-iet you tak~ the ~atter up wit~ GAner~l , Alexander todny and A.lso dt: 'foce anrl Gn1mel. Inc.; rlentr,lly, L"'nmitzer st::-tes that it is his uncerstandirrr thFt the balance of tl e 91st vill not leave forth Africe 11..11--l;il June 15; :!n fnct he is 1ui.te cnrt~in of thE!t. Hovever our -inforrztion :is t½at it will arri. ve here Junn 15. 11 G8ner? 1 De·:ers ca 11 ed 1 ti st n.; rt to 8tate th, t ' e shall get -:. e 517th Parachute RCT as or:: t(~E.lly plenned, but t-i-Ft o'IT ~eq'1est fo.,.. tl:o 5"i0th Glirler Bn eni the '551st Ferachute ~"l will ½e d.; rPpproved. I tMnk th=it these units are to be tr~in"'d for 7tl Ar~y use. I suggest t Ft you Plso <li~cuss this nQtter wi. tb ./1 le:xander, Gm,mel t:ind i'oce. P. s you ~; 11 reme"'lber t:ra 517th "'s e :ng ,ive:'1 ,o us to 0btain P :rnri..o 1 of h:1.ttl e-qier :nnce. "t seems to Me tb1t the sarre ar"1.L'ilent ~roulrl 1.1n-r.l for t1-- ~ S5Ctr f'n -J. t' o '.>5lst. 11 GenAi."a1 Ale:ia>nc'er ,~ 1"' derf'rt c::h0rt:.y <ifte,.. ! ~ s c,"lf'eri=:rce. Le.I"" estiT"'atec:: tl--iPt tl1e der 01 rtl're t,•,.,,, will be 10 o 1 cloc·'"• Cannon will be v:,·t1 1 i!'1 bu-s it haa not -yet be3!' c'eci.rlerl -i-:r f>t P,r or '10 4; ~1[,rr"'rir-<; vrill be ··1 -tlin Jcirty. "I ta""',.P,d to 'i~rhorou a'1t Idr~s 1':'"""oor Ct>.,..rie:r Cor"lf11d) .,-este""'ri<i.7 f'f,errioon Pbout tJ:-e, Coll:i kzzol· dror. '!'le' ~re cP.rt1.11.n:y "lot ent1,·1c;'=<:i.sti.c o er t e ros ... ect 0"' dror~i.r , ·ln t 1Pt area. "I ha e just veri ,.iP.d t' ~t de}x'r Africa f' ho·1-t -Ju"'e 15th. 11 1 -ir~ ff'te. L8rr. i.s ri '1t. ThRY sail .p,,.o:-, •rort A report rrom G-? today nulTl~er~d the rrisoners as 0-P ?100 ~6 r~ '1,850 taken by Fifth Arn;~ R•y' 3,?lt tn -,n y =·i ,hth Arny. As o.p '100n today 1,B43 Amr,r~.car bat+, 1 e cas·ta lt~ '"'S been ad,itted to osr~tf'-~ ~n t e rz·o are&. . ~ · ·. ' . ,c •< .. . ~ ... .. . _ F'1C rs "l~ B:--itish ave �1 l3 Gei19ral Clari.. this afternoon sent the followinc T'."enorandum to General Gruenther: ttGertainly hav-e bee·'1 bomb rdec=t with hrass h.0o.ts today. Believe ::e have st:::a~ r;hte'1erl out tl'e nir contro,1 9rsy with S8ville . He will tell you, of course . tiave he'ln all aro'r.'lrl tbe fro:1t »r:ltl1 Alex, and l e see'!"ed neetly f please.:: er"1 ,,e·('y flatteri''lf; i r H s rci:rn::ir 1:s of Fift1,, Army., I a skec1 },im to } prod t!-1.e two BrH:l sh Div~ sio:rs, ahic) 1~"'! did. le ere making prc,-;ress with 34t:1 a 1d 45tr. . '1:'re.r nig1·t cc '1Cei'7'!lt'llur 00 on tr8ir Carnroleone JtPtion Laninrio objef!tive toni 11t hit l1P~re ._;us+, seen Faul Faschal ur forwarc' , and he t½.inJ.s not . T' ,1~e :l s st:::-ong opposi tior, ,: n tre wad dies ..,rom machine gux1s , self- propcllec Y'lOU'1ts . Trcse are p9r: ar s d9la;v:nr- dc,t,wh"'lents ,+ile the mai'1 h')cly r;oes back tc tle T'nction Lin,~. The rressure 1,y 34th and 45th st..o"J.l:l out-;riaY19 1 1vc,r tie G9r,"12ns -'11 :'ron+. 0:' t' e :st and 5th '"'1~-ttis 1 :8ivisio·'13 . 1st ~r~ t · .J, is pus:.::.11..-r on in confcrmit.l ith Birdie I s ndvance . 1 0 4 l 1 0 11 Just received your not-3 rc,com.11end:5n~ ··nlease of II and VI Corps . What ·i 1s1-,irrscl :fuJl" recor-mendation·1 I :,a7e had it in :mind and intenJ to do it, 1-m-i-, I ju::t wonderc,d : f bJ any cLrnce JeVf'lrs Lad discussed it. Tte :Jecretary of Har all·eady announced the II Gorps, so Keyes is al1 eady ir. t~1e clear . .,,ruscott I s nane 'ms l-ieen released as co:r:n1andin~ a forr-1ation, and as soon as h~ Las r:m1pleted a phase of his attack .,.. intend to corT1E:md him and the 'ifI COl],S and ther announce it, but I do no;:, t0el that his o::.s.rpl.oits 1 12.ve 1 188!" sufficiently outstandh:, yet to warrart +hat coT'lmondation. Yo·u. know 1 ha7e always waited 1.n1til soret} ::ng l:'as reall,t happened before : conne'·1d . Incicle11tally, I discussed with Alexander the releasing of ..:..loan and Coult:r vcitl t' 8 :numbers r/: their divisions . Follow up . It wo,1ld be a great 11oost for training norP.le in the 0tates . 1 1 > HAn1 letting Don cori.e do,vr1 fo1~ h.is Sat111~c1a~r n::.r+~t . Ile will be bac]{ i.n tl'e 111orn~ ng. I may conceivably "'ly down lrater l',u.t rrobably v·ill not . There 'is notl ~ng oim; on l er") of a sensational nature . 11 C' Drniel 1s Affort to cut ac1·oss to Valnontone h8s been held up , due to some clean5n~ up of 'Jocl,e in tL., Arte11a area . ]e l"opes tc send the 15th In<''antry, less one ,1.s.tt&li·'J,1., and witl1 a 1:xitt.alion o-P tan-;cs, td 1 s and eri6 i \ 1ers, to c11t tre roed to Valmo"ltone to11ie;ht . It will a lmzardous task . ½e t1: have ',een 't'ery leni~nt in perr-,~ t ting r eople to cone ur here . I spol~e +:.o Alex "'bou4:. it and said 1e must TT'a; nte ir. tl e rr-lnciple th.ot no one ca'1. -:;ome witl:cut n1y 11.utLo:city. ,!hen th· bi,; 2.ttac'lr is on here for Rone, I will +;ry to s1 ut dcwn except for Alex if he ins:: sts on coning . HHeve ordered Johnson and Hu.me to bring their gan,:, up . As the time shortens 1,ef'ore our ent:r-ance to Romo, I rmst h2ve 8ccess to those people ns questiors cone up . Tliey will nove t 1 0i:;:· 7,00C stront:, outfi.t ir. to an area des: ::,1ated by Brann, yresu.rnably e.round Li ttoria . "fith Don away tl is evening, I will stay here and may fly down tomor~ row and get a swim. H G·ffriern.1 Juin today issuec tr·e follovd·11; ;11emorand1:u;; to bis cownanders: fl �l l4 111. The G2rerRl Corr.'01rncFng I"re 11ch Expect-· +.ionary Corps 'ms been shocked by the compla;11ts made by 1• • ".G . relAtive to tl""' attitude of certain elements o+' ..-:irPncL Troops toward the Italian popui:-.,+,ion in the course of our recent advFnce . Acts of br5 p,ndar,n have bee11 cc"'lmitted . Armed roo Jery and rape hl've rous-sc~ the people vko 7 i ve in forward areas and Wl7 o are cot1plaining l-i+,terly to tre Lill fod autror:1..,_ iAs . Tl'-ere is cause of course to make allovrances f'or exaggeration, but sue) fncts rim the risk of d-'Lscr9dit~ --:r:; an army Fhicl: is composed pr:iJ"'larily of Colonial troors . · 11 2 .. How8V'er strong 0 11r :eelinr;s 17ay he ar,ainst a nation F 1 ich treache rously betrayed France, we must m8:n~Pin an attitude c~ di~nity. T 18 :-'rend~ army hes gain9d the respect of e~:eryore on the Ital:._an battlefield . It should be easy to cement t>is rerutatfon by adopting a correct E'_ttitude in ,1 con.::pered country toward n. people who are experiencing at tris ~10111e 01t t1'8 t'1ost terrP)] e horrors of Y!ar .<>nd •rhose lot is pitiable in the e:,res o:: our ollies w} o are charged w:it':1 the edmin5_stretive resronsibility. 11 3 . Divisional Oor.-illm.nclers nnd the Commandinr, Ge 1eral of tre Gouns will take forthwith all tJ--.e necessary sters wrich are required to rut an erirl to all acts w}i.ic11 are detrimr-mtal to tr e morr le ri.nd :,l,e di ';lli ty of the v:tctor . 11 1 Operations Instruction #24, issued yesterday, is quoted below: 11 1. The enemy forces orrosirg the beachhend offensive in the CI3TER 1•TA CrYJ.I Area hl've been decisively defeated . The ber,clthead and main :!:'ifth Army forces :bave _joinerl . Tr.e. overwhelming success of the current bc..,ttle mr 1:es it possilJle to continue Operation BUFFALO with powerful forces and to launeh a new attack alonrt, t:1e most direct route to RNiE. 1!2 . 'Jot later than 261200:S J'Iay, VI Corps will attack to seize initi.nlly the 1;eneral line LAUF\TIO - C:' Il'CLEff\JE Station an¢1 from that general line press on vigorously on RC' •E . PlaPs +'or this operation ,d.ll include an attack (on Army Crder) generally +'rom the area of LA\TfJVIO to s9ize tl'e COLLI LAZIALI mmmtain mass . Boundar:1 es : Boundary between VI Corrs and 1 Inf'antry Division (Br) F g193OO ,_ r 010310 - F 892334. ether oundPries no change . 11 3. 1 Infentry Division (1'.3r) will by first Eght 26 May relieve the 179th Infantry Regiment . Acturi.l time at ,,,, ich 1·espons~bility :t'or thi:3 sector will pass to 1 Infantry Di vision (Br) by agreerrent betwP.en Di vision Comr-1anders concer11ed . lhen VI Corps attack is launched, 1 Infantry Division (Br) will as = slst the P.ttP.ck by push:ini; forward strong combat patrols and by j_ncrePsed fires alonrs the e 11tire front . As VI Corps attack advrmces , 1 Infantry Division (Br) will co'1form with the a<~vance . 11 4. 5 Infantry Division (Br) in its present zone of action will assist �\l5 the attack by pushing forward strong combat pntrols and increased fires along the e~tire front. 5 Infantry Division (Br) will conform to the advance of l Infantry Division (Br) • 11 * * A1TZIC ... -MAY 28, 1944--After conferrinr; with Genera.l GruentJ,-,er during the morning at his forward command post at Stm T1arco, General ClPrk flow brwk to hi~_ advance comr1and post in the vicinity of Anzio and arrived there at 1430. , He went into an immediate conference with General Brann concerning the continuation of the attack from the old bridgehead ::ront. II Corps comm1:md post has already been movec1 and is now located about tr.ree and a half mjles northeast of Cisterna. II Corps will take over the 3rd Division Reinforced, Special Service ,;,orce and the 85th Division, 1.1'.J'hich will be moved up immediately with other attachments. The attacr,wmt order is quoted below. II Corps will be charged with the responsibility of attacking northward through Valmontone and attaining the hish ground in that vicinit:r, thereby cutting Highway ,¥6 and preventinrs its use by the Gerrr.ans. It will then cha.n~e its direction of attack to the northwest toward Rone, seizing tind holdin1; the high ground 1mown as the Colli Laziali and then continuing northwest toward Rome. The VI Corps , will attack in the morning, employing the 1st Armored Division and pushing its attack to the northwest and south of the La~o Albano ~rea towarc Rome. At th5 s moment what the German reaction will be is not definite. Genr'lral Clark's intentions are to push these attacks vigorously so that their thrusts go to the north and south of Rone respectively, thereby isolating and bypassing the city itself. 'fuether or not the German intends to fjght in the streets of Rome is not lrnovm . It is improbable, however, thPt he will do this. General Keyes came to his advance corimand post to confer with General Clark concerning the new operations that II Corps will rmdertake. After supper General Clnrk flew back by cub to hfa forward comrriPnd post to confer with General Gruenther. He will hPve Generr, 1 Juin at his comr1and post there tomorrow at nine o'clock to discuss the movement of a French Division to the ,1ew II Corps front to assist in the attack toward Rome. General Clark also will discuss with General Cannon while there his contemrlated use of the 509th Parachute Battalion. He was very upset by a suggested plan of General Cannon to use the 509th Faracrute Br.tt2lion in a crop to assist the ad .. vance of the Br~tish Eighth Army. General Clark wishes to ta.lk with General Cannon concernin~ this and frustrate any notions wldch have been o:r might be taken to use the 509th Parachute Battalion in a fruitless and westeful mf,nner. General Brann has been working on plans for a ,"1rop of this battalion north of Rome but tl-e tine has not arrived yet where such a drop is feasible., The rJ' Corps ha.s taken over the old II Corps front and for the time being• after the 85th is attached to the II Corps, will have only th~ SB-th Division. The 91st Division, :Vhen it arrives in Italy, will be moved up under IV Corrs control. Highlights of' today's battle pro~ess were as follows: The 34th and 45th Divisiohs had moved forvrard about tr;o miles. This forward movement enabled the British to tnke C8rroceto on their north flank . Pl?.rts of the Unction Line have already been pierced by this attack. Velletri is not yet in our hands. �On tl-e north of the VI Corps f'rcnt the '3rd )iv~"lion 1md Spec':il Service Force ha e pushP-d Pbou+ r1ile ::iorth o+' Artenc. On t1ie IV Corps .-f'ront tl.e 88th Division conti..nued :lts attack northwest thro 1gl' tre nounteinous terrrin. The French were rushin~ steadil northwest and r.ad kkAn Villa S. Stefano and Y,iount '1iserno. The,- hrd also occupied Crstro Dei Volsci and 1bunt :Jero south of tre ('1>1'lcc0 River. '.:.'he EiGhtr Arny rr:ade some a:i:vrnces ',vest of Ceprrno. 1 Important messa;es of the d~y are as follows: General Juin tod, y sent tre followin nemora.nclum to Generrll Clark: 11 T1·e U::ip;l tr /i.rmy ..,s crossed t' e Lir:i 11iirer Pnd -ts c1.eboucrin towar•1s Frosino11e. Liaison 'BS been estAhlisl1Ad w-i_tr t e Anzfo Br-idgehead Forces. T1 e ~irst ~r~se of tPe battle 0f ItPly is nor ondin~. nrn a very ahort whilf', should we cc,ntinue on the same several axes, a l:=irge number of' d"'visions will f'ind tlemselves l'1P'3sed in front of Rome, or, in ot <"r words, on an extrenel nPrrow f':ro11t, poor in col"l!l'unicr-tions. 11 TrP.re+'orc, it is irnrort~ nt t'l-i t f'rom no·, on everyone I s mission be clei:1rlT cletcrr-ined i.tl 111 t' e "r?menori.;: of the Army i=ind the Army gr-ours o;err-11 P1aneuver; other ise, ti--0.re would 1--ie "the risk- of a te .... ft-le congestio11. o:: ~t~norari0s which 1 ould cri·ise f:' coTiplete 1"'-c1· o_,., po•1er nf"r'inMt l'n eneny ,·hose onl ~ 8illl is to ~r in ti.'!TJe. ri A 0 clecision rust t eref ere be nit1de soon. 11 Concern:n.-, the (j_.,.,., 'it -l"ollom-s t' e sc•ut½ern ba11k of t1 e -iricco from S,,-vi l'-i_o,ranni to r~ount 3iserno. Tomorrow t:1e CEF will bP in front of Ceccano and therP- buttressin, itself towards the west nf"E'inst the AYJ.zio fm:•ces anC: the Fourth T• . J. Arrv '":orps ' ill only be able to ·ait for the Eir,;btl-- Army axed on roari 16. "Orders hn e been ,brer for tr e 2~tl i'i'hic srould 1 ea.d tre CEF west of the .,,,r·or:iinon":! ljne of corrr"1mication between rrossedi and Tor-acella. 11 It lws not bAen -noss':.blo to moJre rlAns for t' e ?9+,b and PS tLi11 ,s now stnnd onlv P. secondPry oreration ~-s eing thou-r}1t of w ich would hve ns its goal t. e freei"lg o+' t '.e road Jri ·erno-r1ontelanj co. 11 IYJ. riy opinion jt would be desirable tl1 '1t from Frosinone on tl e left, of tlie '"::i~ th Army +,ake t!-.e rrerPrBl direction Sub8:1co-Rieti.-Terni ard t:bFt the left of the CJ,;? orient itsel:' on t' e axis frossedi-G1'lvignano-Tivoli Pnd "'rom there FPJ-:e tts way to Ve 3abine J--il:!..s . 11 : tl 1 A see the followin~ ad~rintr ,es i.n t is a~rection: "l. Should there e a lest battlA f'or Rome in t'l-ie gap of Velmontone c:;;:r,' couB t'ien be used -l"cr a n.rmkin, Pction erist of Vnlmontone. Ti'or tre fo :J owi11, O},era-1;~ ons rnd the y-ro ,ressior tmwrds the north, j1e G'•'?' uouJ<i t'bus nnd itnelf agnin in its ·10·,,n,'ll nos.;+,ion in tle nourtains 11 2. a,;,, . . �to tl·e east of the Tiber. 11 As of midnight toniePt the total battle casualtiAs since the opening of tre offensive fron tbe Anzio area amount to 4,458 AMorican ~nd 357 Britisl:i. Frisoners of war since tre beginnin; of the all-out offensive on the night of 11-12 Hay- total 11,030 ta1rnn by Fii'tl:: ,Army and 3,2Q5 tA.ken by Eighth Army. * * * A!JZIC-~MAY 29, 191.4--General Clrrk flew bl'lck from Ms forward cof"mand post at Ban ·t<i.rco to his ad.v<1nce co!""rr.ard post :'it Anzio r-t eleven o 1 clock. .t11s mornin, was s:rent co11:t'erri.nr; ,,1.::th Ge'1.Crr> 1 C'rrne"'1th<ir, ]1~ s Chief of Staff, General Juin, Fwmch Corps Cor,mander-, 1:1nd '1en.ernl Alexnno.er. Upon J:iis return to the ad,r nee crrnmand rost, '1e received 3ent<>r::i.l 1 ilson, CorinPnd:i.n; Ge-1er~l of IRS, concernin~ move:n1ent of the bAse section Dfter Ro1'1e is taken. · /\fter Gener.<il Wilso 1, he rec~i ed Colonel Gray, his JAG, a1d reviewerl ten ~en8rHl court martial cases. After lunch Generfl Cl?rk receiv0d v~ce Air •~rrshl"l D'Albie.c, Deputv to Ge"\1,,,,...,,1 Cannon of TAF. ::n mid-rfternoon Generrl Cln.rlr left by jeep for the advance command r,ost of' thP, lst Arrored :JiYision where he cijscussed prorress o-f' tPe tanv battle. Forward elenents of tPe tPnxs had arrived at a line just beyond Valle .Ariccia and Cnmroleone. Tenk losses have been rat.er heavy. mhe proir.ress of' the tn."1i-s h1d been steP.dy a:rd f8ster t} an the infant,.,.y l"nd l1r-rl nrorrresserl A. considerable rlistrnce tieyon--1 the ~nf.,,ntry. General Clar1r was very ?r.cdous t•.rt tlie _.nfn.ntry elemerits 0+: tl e 45th and '34tr 7i dsio1s 1-:,e pus' ed .('orwar·d, o~cupy imc'! hold tl'e H ) TOU110 alrerdy tPken by the tan'rn. J'e d-1 scusc:;ed rri. th G0,11errl rl"rmon ruture ~ctions nnr t?nl:- tLrusts to the rorth,·rest. On his way bl:'c',. fror: t 1e 1st Armored Division cormf'.nii rost General Clnrk otorped General T.JutJ.:,r, ,..erutv Corp~ Commander, VI Corps, Pnd discussed t11e pushin of i'lf2.ntry elements up to the Osco..r Line. Fe also sto·c,ped General Fasc 11al, Assista:'lt Division Commn.nder of the 45th ::Ji-.rj sion, who was r;o-;n~ forward to see Gern~r,l Har!"lon, and talked wi..tl-i ri-rn n.1:>out this same '~atter. General Clnr::<: returned to Ms comri.anrl post at fi, e o I clock a.mi found his Chief of Staff, Ge'1eral Gruentrer, ~,ho 1rn.d flovm up -"rom the i'orwArd commri.n<l post at San ~rco. GeDer::i.l ClFrk :.ren tent into imnodir:te conference with Gn.:rf!rDls Mruscott, Keyes, Gruenther 8Pd Br"'-nn. Tris conference wF:s called to coordinate a cortinm,tio:".1 o+" the attacl< by II and V'I Corr s. This attack involves additional , ttacJ,mEmts to tbe II Corps t::iken "1~om tre IV Corps +"ront. The order issued to cover these attacrr.ents is quoted below: 11 1. Eff'ective on i.ssurrption of' comrand ~n new II Corrs zone of Pction, the follovrinr, units r.re re1iev-ed from f'ttrc ment to VI Corrs and nre attached to II Corps: 3rd Tnfi·ntry Ji.vision 4L~lst A..4.A AW Bn (ST) 6olst Tank :Jestrover Battalion Howze Task •orce 13t~ Arnored Reg~ment (- lst nnd 2d Bns and Ren Go) �118 Det 16th Armored =n~:neer Battalion Det 47th Armored Medical Battalion 751st Tank Battalion (-Companies A and D) Company A, 805th Tank Destroyer Batta.lion 84th Chemical BAttalion (Htz)(- Companies Band C) 1st Special Service Force 463rd Pr>.rachute FA Battalion (- BHtt8ries C and D) 24 Army Field Regiment, R.A. 36th FA Battalion (155mm Gun) Det (one 8 11 gun), 698th FA Batt1:1.lion ?. E+'fective 2900018 May, the following units ?re relie'1ed from attachment to IV Corps anc1 are attach2d to II Corps: 11 760th Tank Battalion 776th Tank Destroyer BA.ttalion 105th A.u.A AW Battalion (SP) 2d Chm'1ical Battalion (r-rtz) Headquarters and Headqunrters Battery, 6th FA Group 59th Armored FA Battalion ( 105mm SP) 93rd Armored FA Battalion (105mm SP) 11 3. Effective on arrival ft TfZ'O, the following units ere att['ched to II Corps. 361st ROT 361st Infantry Regiment q16th FA BattaHon Company A, 316th Medical Battalion Company A, 316tr Engin9er Battalion 517th RCT 517th 1 arachute Infantry Regiment 460th Parachute FA Battalion 596th Airborne Engineer Company 11 4., Effectbre on assumption of command in new zone of action, the following units are attached to II Corps: 91st Reconnaissance Squadron (- one Troop) Headqm1 rters and Headquarters Battery, 36th FA Group 932d FA Battalion (8 11 :riow) 937th FA Battalion (155mm How)". Important messages of the day are as follows: General Gruenther sent tle follouing memorandun to General Clr1rk in tbe early afternoon: itGeneral Hn.rding just called up ~rom Eirsl1t1' Army 'N1C and str1ted that the Commnnder-in-Chief has no 1 considered carefull:r your proposal for the French to ndvance on "'erentiro, anC: thence '1.orthwest nlonr FicJ--.vff'Y 6 to..mrd Valrriontone., He weJ comes vOill' proposal to advarice on :'.i'erentino, but }1e c'esires to rqake it 0 �clePr t½f't the F'iftr Armv -u"'t Jree:r t1 e Ferentino - Vvl~ontone Ro<><l clec.r for t' e use of th~ ~:.(!bth "-rrv. I tole' Yard~ nr; ~ '°t "'s "EJr P s - could "'ee , t .is hd t' e e"fect o-r co"1pletely nullif. in w' ,,t GenerP.l A:exawler "d tolr" you this '"'10rni11 ,. i-Ie rer-li-ed, 1 -o, tl-r>t i'3 not true . He ,•_11 be 7er,y r,lPd to 1 9Ye tl-e Fre11cl1 l'lnvrnce on F'ere~tino. He conc:;ide-•·s t,h.-.t ~uc [l :,o--e wou~d 1 p• e the e ,...f'ect o, '_elrh1 ~i 'it ! rm alo11F . But ' e noes in ... ist tht thR ro"'d from ,.,erent~no to 'J'l"lmonto'1.P. muc:. remfl;n c,e"r for t' e "3j ,:htr Prny. Ctl er 1ise it rri. t ',e irro"sible to ,..,r·11, t' e .,.,i ht' Army ~o "'enr ~n t 0 bPttle :'or J.ome. 1 1 e srent ten m·11utes ar 1..·~rin; t P. r,a+ter bee)-' pffl fortl, l:>ut F~rding, in tre nf'.me or Gn•1err 1 ! le""ffindP..,.., stood f; rm. Fe d.: d, 0 eve.,.., Rdd t :! s statement: 1 If the Fi·"tl /rTY\Y -ts ble to cr.,.,,turP. VrJ.n1011tone, GerP.r"l /llexmr"er ,...,1t'orizes t e ~.: ftl- /lrmv to '1se r::.rr} · ay 6 i.11 the c0rti.mmt.;on of its attack on RoT'ie . IIe will +, e"l d.;vert t' e ~ir;l•t tirmy <>-!:; Vri.lr.·1'"'tor0 tor1nrc' !Flestri::1.P f'nd Tbroli. 1 1 0 "As soon as General Ht:.rc.; ,,g 'm1rr u:r T ce llAd C· rpmtier v:r' •c, of course, does not likfi tl e i.del'l of '10t ">e.;11 <>blA t,.., me T-iir-1 w::v (,. >-Ie in turn ,rro,osen . trat t 1 e T<'renc ½e allo•vecl to rroceed towE'rds ...,0.renti.no .?nn n',ter c· yturfn 1<1erenti110 tle'1 cl'O'>S }.; h 'a.r 6 ..,~rl flrlvPnce to•rprds 1-'llestri.na ,,,.:t'-out usinr,; l'.fi ;hv"l.r 6. PA "(\Y3 t nt G,~"l"'rrl Juin rJll ;"l'OlsiP"'l ,lDl'PY\tee t ,.,t 'e CPU J.<9er aheod of t18 Rrit.;st-. I:" Grmerpl Ale"":ander rP ,,,i.,.11 "ir ;n ·.::_:: dec'qi.o-'l t:b-,t vre !"Ust keep t'1e Fm-.qrtino- rpl"'o"l-:.one ror,d '!lear ~ c oubt erv ,..,uc t Pt • 9 nill allov tbe ""renc "to move no1·t <Y·.r0r "'i.l"'' WA,' 6. m•,e "'r·e11.c' r,,; 11 '1.0t j "Sue tl-e order ""'or t 1 ie Ferqntino adw 1co until to11· · t, so no ac~u~1 hnrm .<1s been d0'1e y0t. T t' jn'· t'v•t you s' oulrl direct r'1e '-,,... mn1 8 P •.,., 1orous -re"uest to be ril .,_ovrect to cont~ nu8 witl-i the plan " i c' tras Putho.,...ized b. Grmer.?l ~1P-xa.-ric1 er thj"' I"'orninP,. I sral1 a";~ i. t f'U'-S' er vord from you. 0 nlrn tc execute t e Ferent ·no acvf'nce 011 t' e norni'1 of '31 ~r-.y. GerArel FPrdin" c:tr>tes t _Ft ~t Arrnv est-im~te th,.,t tier rill capture ""rosinone tor: · t. T '; FrP>1C "lay t <1t t i.s i:_:, r11. nnt 1s::~stic nrd urn1<1rrrnted esti!"'l.te. ·1 nT 1 e Freno· 1 Gruent er t0 kod . i. ~· -;r-i ~tel"·. 11 h 1654. 11 Pove 0·1e tank 1-i::itt.,:,l'on -":;. or-1 1i're:rc 0 Gr1.'ent'8r to llood. . n~T liS55 . 11 Tirir,.,..o'1 n<"ecs ~o Frobebl·; v-'11 'n-.,.e tc tf' 1 'e L'rom 752nc' Bi:-tt~lion. 11 tDr'r to Anzio crews -i'Jl.TlJE)d·titely. GruAnth9r to 7lood . R"1 2q . 11 :s~ ue orde1·s f' ssignin om RCT ~8th Di v:i sion to '.::'I Cor"'s . Tt1'1t r,ove ,-;t1-,out c'l0lrpr. ,.,ell IV Corps t rt b~l,:nce of' di•rision :ess on7 RCT wi.11 fo11o-· soon . 11 Gruent er to -ood . •t:"i 1656. 11 "otif Frenc CPlled . ...,urt' "r rl.etni.ls w' en I retur"l toni ,;' t . 11 t' nt Ferent-ino attnc1---- is cr.n- Gruentl er to Clrrr 1r . R'J ')16. 11 149t RCT rer-cl • tr move . li ll issue order on belnnce o-r 'iv' sio-1 less one RCT tomorrov, . ?0 tan1 er •'vs vill. be t' ~re by noon ,. ""'uesdri Y' or else . m~n1,. battn lion :7ill bA •·ent ··it'.0·1t riel,, • 11 Gruenther to ClA.rk. Rr 7g5q . be sent to Anz · o ;:i_r,;in Pt t is t"rie . c-~errnnent . n~no r o 110'10 . 11 11 Gen.8ral Juin 1 esi..res He c~n riot iust·Lf'y tl f't ~rd Di~r·is~on not t1--.,, -l:;r"11ci,..er to his �\JD Genert:'l Qruent' ,1ir,11t ton-: ri:tt. "?l' sent t' e follori.'1rr Fer.-or'3ndum to Ge'1Ar;:il Cl11rk Pt r-:id- 11 1 te1ep' on8cl Gf'n ~r~::. Juin tonir -: <1.11.d tolcl J,-,-":m of our extrene di.sflproint""ent w' e'1 you le9rn8d tl: 'lt G·=mer"l A. lexm1der lrd r·econc,i.dered '1is e".rlier decisio'1 to pernr't t e f'dw1 nee of thP F'rencl Corrs_ in tl e dirnctior.. of :'8rentino, and t 3nce nort',,ve"'t 10,..•tii o ~ ~-: · · "'Y t6. I exr lni"led t0 t· nt your rl2n nov, is for tiie rime 'Jorrs to arl. •~nee to tre nort vrest v1itl in its rreset1t z0re, A'l'J.d ti-·~t PS 1con ns jt 9rr::ves 1n ~• e :-irec sout1 P-r>rit of' VPlmonton,c!, you ,·ill, i.n rill rrc )A hi. l i_+, ", PrrPn e 1,y rok or 11 crook to ' PVe it cross T-I~ "; "Ia,~ 11:6 o.n<l to cssi9t the Pttric'· of ti e 1: : Cory" nort est frc·::11 VPlT1ontone - boundf-r r or no boundflr;v. Go.,,nrel ,Juin "lbbd t',et r8 ,·ps T"Oc,t un rp to leArn t "t t' e su estion for t'1a F re1ti110 A.dvttnce }<>( ~9er rE''ecterl, '1,t +,:r,.-.t P. rould rusr 811 out in tb'> direction i.ndicated b. you, an~ t 'lt yo1 1 cou1c. .cest · rsured t' Pt you ill rec9.: e lOC''"j rerforr""'lt;e nror11 +;"" ...,renc' Corps. u 'h~, 1 0 ed t0 '·. Uvt jt' ~'e "re' '1lnr ia no"! jn pror,ress fr tle fnzio area, rou ne"'t it -'Mnernti.ve to 'a·•e •n1ot""r Civision ti-ere :. ""''3di ... tel:v -'.n af.di.tio'1 to + o qi:,tl r,nrJ. the 8%h, botl of w1 _. c' noulrl re co!:lrni tt"d "'it in the next roew dnys. I tolrJ ·n t}" t you v,ere reluct.,nt tc '1rinf up nr,<' in t] e question cf t' e s 1f't o.(> the 1rd nrA, ,ut +,' rt you "'e~t +,' n necessit r for it so .c;rert t 9t ;rou must no·, roriRVJ' t' e request to h<>ve lt ~e.,+ tC' t 1 e 11r_. ,1ce 1 eP'l v1i th all po~s~ ble <"need. "'"told l·'r- t' nt vou ?Ylt~cir"ted, ·it' -:,•9 one P:",jor rttRck nmrr in yro~ress a'1d tl e ot 1 er nbont to he 1 "1 nr:',erl, ~• Pt -rou 'cu1r1 100n "Ve t' e :r-iost ur o-rt need frr a11oth0r divisi.on. I rlso t0l' 1 1-'m t .,t you 7ere brinGing -''1 all srrre prrt 1 eleI'l8;1ts t --t :vo·J. coulrl po sib:;_v r··'1r', · nclud~n~ t' e J 11r~c' ute RCT t'nd the RCT of t>J.e 01st r-.:•rision, -tn order t0 -ive tro necessvr ~ ,,e-' ,-'. t to t' e ..,ttrick. I f'urt'I· er strtecl +, nt .,. rns mn·e t Rt the ':..eCe"'~~t r for ar:. <-dditional Ji.vision to hP. 'P.ld 1 <I ,;S in rrmy resP.rve W'S ev-ident to irn. f"' 5 tr11 I P.'CTlil 0 ,t ' ~ is br' ~ "Grmerr-1 J·1in repl'.ed t 1 ,,t re \ rnted you tn know tl nt hi'> lo ~1t,~ to . ou U111_uer::tioY1et1., .,nd t 1 Rt 1 P m·1ld pers0r 7 ly ~ i1.;:8 very nu"!. to do , ou r f', vor. (" ~ ;;o 1ever, e loes not fee1 ti t hE' co11lcl ro"'si.1,1 v- justify t· e trans:er cf a divi~tis~_on to l is n-o:crrmrr t, nf' i=>ci~lly "n •• ~ w ('.., t o r• f'u1f'l r,.f' Ge.,crnl Alr.>X1"•1r,er to nccert rour S'l; ·,sted Ptnenver for t o AI!Jflovn10 11 c,r:, th1 ""rJ c' Corrs. ·re f'ur-' t' ~r Pddeci tl t the O er:=itio:'1 1l~ich r'8 ~cl ciu ,est0c1 -:'or t' '3 'rend Corr 3 ~·ns R mo""t P znrdous op9r<iti.on, "'n' t} "t t1 ° Car ,s stoo11 ri ·oo,' c· f'!l.Ce of su"'fering heaY'"' c11suriltil)S in tl ~t orierTt·i o'1. I11 sr:ite of it3 cl~ ~ficulty, ho•mv'1r, t e ..,r9nc' FerP. ri.-, in- +.o "18 ':E' +,} js Sf'Cri:':'. ce 'n ord"'r to f1n•t' r J.; E' ;\lli0.c cnuse. •fo "'.<i:;.d, 'I ,i-ut rlo not ro0el tl t ~ coul~ ever exrlfi'1 t'e t~•q,,,.."or r,f' t':~ c'ivision to e11otr.:ir "ro:--it ~ n vir>1/IJ' of' the r8jection of: t' ~s n"'turf!l , r lo ;ical ren uv ,r. I ccnro"' crnc·.n- ·n ·'tn ~ra.,.,s"'er 'mlo2s an nxt·e. e emer e11cy e-·~ets, ard I do 'lot bnlieve 4:.' nt t' ,r8 ~ s ::;1 c' a s.;tun+,i.on <>t tbis t.:.m1=;. 1 0 0 1 0 ""'" n e t:r-' .' t" et 'o 7 d of' KPmnerer to secU1·e f'u:;:·t 1 ".' c:'etri.7.., ~, '1C'r·n:n rfll. Juir 1 n rn,ctio'1, ½t·t t•,.,,...e is P hri 1 , •p:-'lc .;r.. rro~··"sJ -nr':.. rr,·p ·~ot 8"''1 "ble "-,c telk to 4 ~-1t. lo ev'3r, ~".!r ~.P-1~.'1 IDA tlrt c-r t' n r'de t o t e cub fie lri +,~1. '3 F"r-,~; !l ~f'tnr . S r.'"'"'t-i '1 r' ;;' you, :},r:-,:,1 l .Jui:n qvrre "S JC, '<,l bt tl nt Ge,_,_..,rrl ~. 7 r-"{""rider roul.rl [CCe'"t o·rr ,..::'OJ .... : . ·re 9 ,rir.r ~:ncicn"-,-ion ··11 , c> n rnrsn.t·· or t• rt ' e '(') i · • ',e mor-;+, Prnoy~r·, i.f 'e r1ce·1 pr' ,- t· ···n- :om, · E"CPUSe 'e ')el:· vec' +,'<it t, e i. ~U"l YA.9 mucl ·~r-rtr-r +, "'1 f' ro7·"ti.c<il 0'18. ·e ..,r· !:,'nt 'o +' 1· 't, rolitic~::. mn.t-':;"'rs 9 Ol' 7 r' ',1, l"c· ottPl"l rt t :is "!r"t·'cnl ~··s'3 oft e (}A, --~n r �battle . 11 Althou,;'· '1-e'ler21 Juin t'lesi:~es v ,r • n1.e; 1 to ''"'0:1 d d et;, c' in; R di vision to be se'1t to t e Anzio f're2, : :1."3 ? "nii~8.tion evirl r-esrect for :rou 'Te so ~TGf't trr-t 1 e v6 ll ,.,e8 1 ,en :1 f' _ :rou r8.i se tl1e "'."Oint .., ·a in. I "'.m '7illing to 1·,n ~;er r r-;ood s-Lzed sum thPt if yol'. s' ould say, 1G,-,,, 'l'Pl Ju::..:1., T l rve •i-·en .rou R.n opportuni_.} t·· to 0:;q~-r:;2s -·our v"ew "n t 1 is rrtter, rnd T respect your judgr1Pnt very rruch; :-•o,e,er;ue situ,,tion :ls so critical thet: arn no"r COF;Jelled to or·er you to tlj sm1d tbe rl.bdsion 1, S-on"ff•al J·1ir: would stn.te, PTery , ell , I a.Pt P goori solr'.ier; . z_ I s"1all cooperate 1 • "r sur;,.,;estj 0:1. iR thPt you J_et the natter 2ir1r1er ::'or another \\uti da~-r. Tl,e roads to II Gon)s '"::..11 1:.18 ··rstt;r vrell cmvested f'or t>e next tJnree days 0n r} o•, ujt 1 tt~e r1ov-e;:nent of the ~5tl· and tr e :C:Str T'i j sions, tre tm,.1': 1 1 ')rtta1 f1~0F1 tl e rJ Corps . lion , end t' e 2rtill,...r:--· ,attDlions v'.:: c}· ore beino; tr1r1sferrer I'.:' torn.o-rrow ni '-.t you still feel trnt ;rou must ha Ye the :7renc' di ,r-i sion, I em coDfident tl at you -vill be able to get, it . 1 1 1 "I t[l_lkGd to rr~rd:in.,. tonif,},t 2.nc~ ex-plained to hhn tl.flt you felt it would be very di "f~ cu 7-t, to GtErt t)· e :::'renci,., Corrs to1"ard Fe1~ent ino , r nrl then stor it ri s soor, PS it p' o•-r"ld any te 1.c1 enc. • to cross V:i r;h1vey 46. Be safr1 "'.e 1mc1 erstood t1'at v difficnl ty. He f 1 1Tt: .--.r "teted tht n 1~r2rentl;sr General '\loxanc'er >1."d not unr'er - 1 i~ stood ,'four proposal wl:-en JOU -':,al~:ed i'd t: , ~~m tM.s :r:r1ornjnr:;. I told hin thPt was ~,,Jv&-' 1."erv 3trPnr;e to me , ~)<:>cause I was present ·ihen you tr JJcr:ir'l. to Gener2 l .!',lexrinder , P-nd .,. ·ot the cecired im:rres~io 1., ,..rm1 l i. -:;tenin · to your ccnv,3rsation, that there was a 1efini te meet.:: ·1.p- of t 1,e :1ind,s . 11 ,,,p •f 1 1 As of midn:ir;l't toni:;rt A111ericPn forces in tLe Anzio are2 r.P."!e quffered 5,116 battle casur-lti9S rnd hnve coptured 4, 97'6 prisoners since t' e open:1ng of tr.e of fensive on the 111orn:i np; of the ?3rd of May. * * * A'{ZIO--T".1-\Y 30 , 194/4,--Genr-ir<i.l Clar:V A.rose erirl,r, stuc1 :ied the dispatd 1 es on bd,tle pror:re~s and conferred Tl tL ,.,is G-3 , GenerP 1 Bre.nn. 1-fo P lso work0d on H 1-Temorif.l Day speech which was given rit tl,e ·retbmo cernetery. !~t eleven o 1 clock GenerP.l Ch.rk -,ont to tJ~e Nettuno ceneter:r w>ere a very- i:wpressive Tvler10rie,l Day ceremony vms hold . 'ince there are :'iritisl. en,' Canadirn nead in t"'e cei, ,:;terJ·, 1:)ot:1 tLe A:r-ierican end 0ritish f1R.gs ~rere carried , and botb n::itional a:1tlv~ms nere played . One enlisted m2-.n per company and one officer per reg:' ·aent of A,-,ericrin troops were assen1 )led rt the ceneter~· . T>is :: ncluded trcors frof' all tl~e divisions , as well as ot}-,r,r ~ttacherl m1its; sud as , medical , orc1 n.'1nc0 , 7_11.Brterf'!rister and engin' ers . Altore:etl1er tl·ere Fere 1,etvrnen 400 and 500 rerso ..,s re;:;resent•inrr all uni ts in thA Fift' Arrrv TxirticipPting on t'·,is front . T1~e Britisl' IncrPme•1t Pnd a snPll body of men fmd offj cers , ,,,,1,0 vere headed by i,h;jor Gener"l Gregson- Bllis, Cor'nAnder of the 5th Britisl . T)ivision , vmre fll9o present. Taps was blovm Pnd a f:i ring souE.d dired three ·1olle;rs over t} e ,raves . fter tl-ie cl'r>rlai.11 1 s blessin;; , Gene 1 "Tas :htroduced b~r Gen0ral Truscott , Commnnder of' t} e VI Corps, a.nrl gtive ra l Cl2.r { a ver ~ inspiri:·1e; speech wJ-iicl is quoted 'oelovr: 11 This is ~lgmorial f,ay , wtich , as ;rou 2.11 1:110 1 , is dedicated to tJ- e riernory of our -"irthtinr.; rersonnel who have given their lives to their beloved country. At all our otLer cemeteries here in Italy ,ve .-:ire likewise payini; tribute to our nen vrho h8Ye given t 1,eir all in order thit t11 e :?iftli Arm? night continue to advance . 1 ... �'IT' js i~ fl da;u· ch cee:rly tou~h~s tl e he,,rts o::: r>ll of us r>s •e stand before t 1 ,ese V<J.lia11t men restin : erA . I want you to fcel , as I do , ti-flt t' is is r10t a noMent of sad 11ess no,,. sorrow but rather a t·"le o-f in,p:Lr 0 tior.. to 8pur us on to the t2.sk '11 ich ! ns been S"'t :'or us . le s 11ould use their r-spirPtions [l'1d fi,.,1t·inf sni.r-tt to drive u::; ""orv:arcl PS J'\m~.ricr1 np PVe ehays done in tl e re.st 8.:1.d 2cs r1;n o::' t e :-'iftri Ar: y 1 <'-,e c_one in Tb 1. for ti- e T ast nine months at Sal9rno , Rt 'fripl9s , across t: e iJcltm.'no , a.lonP- t c Gflrio;liano ::i.nd in t he Anzio ber,chhead • .lit 1 Gorl ' s 1 elp vm &all c3.I':ry on t' A tasJr w' jc' the:, began . 11 A li \tl9 r:iore t an fo·rr- r-iontl s ago A1liAd troors care Bcroc s the beriches 11ot f'pr rom tri s sa,cred 011.rid . -.-:;- Rr si11~e tb,t t ·nr, t 1·A ""'i:'tr Arny troops in tl-e '\.nzio beochl•e11d 'mve been n C( nstent l'nd f'"r:iovc t:breP.t to t'•e e:1erv 1 s l.:.1rns of comrnmicotion. '1' 1 e · r"' ·e ""'l!l, red 'l.:n imrortrint role i.n tl e strnteey of the succe9s-':'nl crimpPi';Tl we are no· r cnnr'uct~ '1 ,. Tl1.o:=ie pl o lo'"lt treir lives ~n t} e 1)each1eed s~nce tbt 1,-:ind;no; 1.1.:ca rest"'n · · FJre, r>nrl it .is to -1-; er" ttiflt "e Df\Y tribute t -i S d!'l:- . Others 'nve l Ucil-ed C'll "';drst t' l f"10T"Y , anc' d 11r"'n- -:-1-e interve.l the beac'1her>c hrs ~ssed into 1··istory vi..tl t e join~n-; of tre two :':Lft' Arm:1 fronts on "p;r 0 '5tb... le • · e '1uilt ur o-.ir streno-t' , rin<'l we r•J.'e no'· r--nr.i;" t;ed in P ,-;refit o"fe 11si 1e th1t is pvn:i s' i~n- rinc cle9troyin1" tre eneP1y 1 s hest troops . I'-: ft! Army soldiers fror. tl c main 'ront 1 PVe nlready joined i..n t 1 e qttr>d: on Rone . "Our Fi-l'tl Army h-is b"'en e Tiio'1 er "'or ot! ~r .Allied victories t.·<>t Eire to cone . Curs hl's bo8-1 ~;rul.- 311 Alli8tl Prn7 . Men w. o 1-;--·-ve c 1 erished ::1ibr;rty and "reedor-, n.s 1-i fe itself , h::-ve cnf'!e fron. many rarts of t'. , orlc... to form t 1 ~ s r~,-,1 t~n; te.,-,,..,_ 1:lore jn ·-t l;v. 0vr '"lritish and c~"l.edian Fiftl· Army comrPn-ions rest heJ~E' "'J or.-;side of tl P:: r Americ.<>n -:.em rne tes . L · i·ewise t 1 rl.e.<>.q of our eP 1 1e 1.P nt 'l.'rench forces lie ::. n otl er cerietqrif's · n :tr> ly. 0 0 11 '1'!1is success:'ul o"frmsbre las rer,resent--:i,' "u 11 cooperri.tion of .Allied -f'igl t n forcAs on t 1e 7_:ird. nr rl ser-- 2"1.rl in tl e n ir . (;i1r Nrvy nr,t4 J...ir Forces hnve ~up portPd us T"1<J.'1"1:f'5 ceritly d.ur:ng ou:c curre,1t 01 ~r, tfons . "You men o.c, the Fift> nrmy '.ri.ve overcr,nr soMe c: the rost diff:..cult obstacl"'ls ih. n~litary on8rFtions . You ccrne 11.cro<1s m~les of sen to la.no rt Jr lerno against,, s-1:rongl.- e11trenc-'ec1 Pnem:,-. You l"'ve crossecl rj_1p,r•s ::,nr' fcur-'t .rour w2.~r over mou'1t"inous terrr--i,1 . Yo·1 "Ve ,.•ti-stood t1~ ri o::.~3 0f s1ow, r:-i.::..n r>nd r~·1d . You k':.Ye ,.,,,,r shed n"tur:o 1 cA""'Anse ros it' 0•1s , · t. fe r-l'r[' :1 ls :in t' E" 1 istor o? v•ar<'are . You i ave c'L''1e t· ese t' i:!'1..,.s ,.,·trout t· oufht of y,~rsonrl aa cri -fi ce beca1 1se ·,n :,ve 11.ovm t rt it is onl.r ori.r v·ctorious "r'"'re"! t Pt ~11 restC're P worlrl. 11here hu.m8n 1-Jein ,s crn 1.'ve ·n riece.c , :_-,eace rnd l:.arpiness ~•"'t ti eir "'ellow men . 1 ·, 1 7e strnd non on-:.' e t 1 res: '-old o:: Ro e . Before mri:::i.r C1""S lE1ve pi:issed 1e shB 11 ',r;e "reod t' ~ s :!'-·rst o" t} 1 Euro'r)er 1 crp:' tals .:'ror hzi. dom-i_n"tion . 111 "I ¥ill '10w '"'lr,ce t} is vrreatl on ·•~: {n lloued "'Tounr'l ·~',tl t' e r;,.ed ;e to t',ese me-1 w1 ,o ~_je be::ore us thr>t tl e .,ifth Arry sl•ri.11 co'1t-°nue t· e fi •'1t ·,: i:-:re the• 7_eft off , w'th tre;1· srjr·itc-; rs our ,lide, till v'r>tor;v- 1s rnll'', . " After t e Amori"l Service, Gener...,l Clark returned to '; s cor"l,rc' ro"'t r,!ld work'id in · · s o:"f ice ·mtil [' bo'1t 1_ 430 . 1 Ie co11.f erred br·' c-fl •-it' Ge11err 1 Jrann 2'1c' 1 e~t by c-,1b fol' II Co"''t:'3 field to c, '1fer i7:itl Gen°r..,l K~JP,s . '·hile v1itGeneral he ~es ,, ~ rent un fol"rrrd to t' n 1rrl. J:i, isirm 2,n<l Speci..c 1 Jervice 'orce �a . illr i , area ,. As soon 8S tl e 85th Division is moved in, tre II Corrs wil l continue the attack toward Vr>lmontone to the north and north,mst . The 85th Division ,:ill close tonight, a,nd the 8-ttack T•ill tn.l.,;:e rlace the followin,; morning . Hhile up forward GenerP.1 Clark was told by General Frederick, Special Service Force Commander , t hat last night the:' hnd received the hea·J'iest l7 ostile sl'elling of t 1 1e entire carnpr.ign. General Clark returned to bis comme.nrl post e.t 1610 where he vm.s met by Gener<' 1 Gruenther , l is Chief of Str ff, who flew up from the forward command post . Gen2rals Clark, Gruenther 2nd Brann went i.nto immediate conference concernin"' tre aJl- out effort to be mr->de d1..u~inr; tl e ne:x-t three da;rn . These dri~rs 'Till be critical end will require bitter :Pi ,}"ting. As soon as our forces advance A.nd tBke tl,e bir,:J, --rounr 1.aiovm as the Colli Laziali , the GermPn rlill be for c ed to withdraw north of Rome , becamJe we will comm1=1nd all of tbe high 1;round overlookinp; tJ-ie city and tJ.ie routes tlv~reto . ·c-:very indice.tion turns to tre fact t hat the Germai1 vrill bitterly resist 01.ir ;c1ttrcks to gf1in tl-iis commnnding terrain . 1 1 \fter the con:'.:erence Crenernl Cln.rk hnd supper Pnd retired to 1-ds room 1Yhere he worked until 110 retired to his nuarters . Fighlii:;hts of today ' s battle proGress yrere sl:Lgbt advHnces by· our rirmor wi tt t:,e infantry following up r:md hol riing the ,:;round taken by the ;:,rmor since yesterdav 1Yhcm the attac1, wes renewed . The gains n;:ac1e by VI Corps r,re,.,tl;f fa ciUt ated the British 1st Dic_rJsion I s move up on tl-1 eir left flank . The British 1st Di"ision was ,..,racticnlly in Hne witL the VI Corps rc':lv:nnce elenents . The 5t} Bri tisr Divis ion , Low ever , was still meldn/~ slmr rro,Tf'ess and hr d not conformed r:rith VI Corps ;r,0_vnnces . There ~,rere no outptnnding grins on the II Carris or IV Corr,s fronts . On tl'e IV Corps ,~·ront one battnlion of tl·•e 151st hrd e.dYenced f'.8 .,..nr es :·font8 SempervisB. , ren.c'. jnt; further to tbe nortl::rest on tl'e high ground. north of Sezze . The Frend· rid'il'Pnced up slightly past Ceccano . :'.::;lenents o:'.:' tre lritish 13ir;htb. Army hPd rished rhout D mile p:1 st }offi. The 88th Jbrision , less a combat team , rill be moved up to II Corpn front tonir·;>t end tomorrow . Tts wei;;ht 1crill be th.ro'''n in on whatev er corns front is i:; needed most. At tbis tirt1e no decision ns to where it will be employed has been nrde . The Ar my Commander dictat ed t1--,e follo,'finc notes todc.y "or :nclusion diary: v1orri9s ta"'✓e r1ot!1i!1o; to do ~t} t~ e j_rTI_''J--diElte battle . Tl~.,:\f . -,_re riatu.re. 1 ~7il1 nPr:1e ,l1er1 i:ri ()l'd81~ of t:-19 t1~ou'-;le tl ey ceuse ~10 . ur_ort o:-: F! 1· olit~ cal i11 1 in 1· 1 _ !!T'irst , ti1e T;r··tis1 1 ..,.,.,.,., tl r.i.r F,le 0"1 ;:.cr 18, rict1-ritl-•st0nc;,i-·t1; Ale~::e.nfer' s co}1st2.11t [~~~: 311.ra~1ce to 1:1e tI'Pt l1or19 :~ s 5.n t:.o sectur of t 11e Fl/tl Arrr"". ~! ~v· '10.~·e 11ra1r1 t e Arm:, bound"r. · sout 1 o: :lo1-1te ;/-6 ju.st to tl 0 out:=,·'drts· of J.om~ and tl-iel1 V'•~erod it to t e --- 0I·t! " r:11 e "M:i_r;]·t}, f\r~vi..:r "'.i:1.S ...:une littl0 ~ ~_[_:L.tinb . ... :t ::as lPcked e.r; T0s,sivrm.ess 2.n" railed in it,3 ;:,cert in t 1 is conb511ed Allied effort. '"et , m.·· e-Pfort to ,1:litcr t' eir boundnr:-· east "",et v,:t-~J- "· rr-r~-:· ·ntl:::.c< t:' n; tl d~ tl e 1 tl ,....~~ ArLT/ rnust ~,e.rt-~ cir)nte : ; 11 -l:-}1e l>P.~ttle Zor Rorie . 1 1 1 1 0 nSe er rrl , T" I'renc' Corp 3 -is ½ein:; i inc; ec: out . A :rore ga.11:mt fi ,, ,ti-n_~ orr;a'"' iz2.tio·, nev:ir 9-Xis+:.ed , .;et n,.r o~f:r fc,r -t to attE.c1r :;:'t;::c2.nt1no , :,-ro··idi:1i it • could use T{oute ,16 to the y:est , was 1roroptl;i tm ·1ec. dovm. GeYJera1. /.le"':c:,c' er in r1-tcate-:~. t}"Pt,-; vJ01.1lc~ l\e --_eli;lted ~01~ Y'1e tr:· tn,1:e :,1e;r,qn_t:i110 to -:P.C~Llitp,_te t~ e 1 �l14 u ,t r: t' RO.vc 11-::~ <:,,.. t't o "":::_ ;' ~1 lr :, ,,t t" ,.,t qf~ ➔r .; ~: .. .;_ · t, to~rt !"".1 trc,o_ ·_11 u : t'1 o.n ti ; ~~ct t~~~, 1 r•a,, tr t, - 10 r':.i Of 1~ t 1 ~ r-on,~ 3 i • r_·/ l r{ cor fJ .,.. t r0 . ,..• Cor1s, P,.,te.,· ta1:-1. ):---r:+,--·ro, wild 1)e t'l-~rt, LT "or~· ="l,:cs in dT r:::..11, -'-,o ' :, J•1-:r. TT-, -;,_, c ~o of tc :_rnc' •. r,l_f'" '"lts () ~ t 1 (' i. •' t l\:..-r1 • )·"' 1 1 :,:. t.i. e r1;1 s "c:- ""' to yiol~t0 bet 1"' .L , • ,l0v,.,,',r 1 • ·r,tru'"·t·' s, ,0 0 . " ')A."':.tl , or to 1,r~ , , , r of · '",.:v~sio·1 ~nto ", '; A>1z-io E'~'8f'l. :'m· IO ..,::rlc P,''" ~ .,oitt,,tio:"l 1",e ·r 0•1 o~ r ~nor· ccir. -::orps. •I, to ~_rl. r '3 l i · ovl':rill'l0"l"v , ulJ e "st --~E::i..uc-tant t > et 1se:nt ·':,ct' '1 1.-,ttr,r ...,c"':,'.:;ion. - CFllecl o~::: ':.. "'er"nJc•no rtti:ic 1r an:. <>n directi1•' ·.m, ,j-!:;' i'1 ,~,, :c 'Jt:·~c-tecl mo•u,-tnin zo:-1·, o:v1 }jo-1-)inrro -1,,,re th0 Tl"om+ain roPS: r-AMcres Ro·1te ,'/:6. - t', 1, br ::.·i ' t C)~., inert c1o"'l9in, ,::i_ 71 I slon () T"r I ~ r.to -r.:_ 1 t 1 :-,,-.-,, "l'"l"l., USl11'p Route 'f6 .q_nr' rut rirr: 'n rr u nort 1 rer-d9d. ... er· Ro ·e. T "eel t"' ,re : . . , so ~ _...,c: inr-i.tion on +: e 1 ".rt c,f Alexan 'cl" tn conrnPnce flli~or , -~s •~: ·1 tl 1 n1,... : rth~ ~::,,e ij,1c1· cr"'j-ions t,l-;:,t , ~ .: -; r ... r,.; J F1'1 ""'t.. t,p C 1d"l ' to c ~·ds :to· :) ·h it encl O" -C' P , ::; 1- ,,.rot....1Ct ~ 1::. t' e Colli .J.' Z. f1 l i f 1'')!1 • 1'8 is iron~. T B~r:r· c·ft8 t' 0 ~ni,.or-':,<1r,~e c.," t· ~, i , tqrrf1in "nl1 r.[l-.:-e ,.:.rectn,d [l .. l of ~ r f1Ubor li.-::-tes to tr·-~ ~-!:;. '1 "'""~nr1er ·i ' nr-ri•.:c' tr rt I ' ,., "e Sf' ½otl" rreC: · .i.s l1°rccti e -1-0 'lt.t..<i.~·,. Valrie ,to,r. e.. ... net C.:0.,..,e so. I ,, rn tre ?rd ~i-•isio>1 pc' ,;;ec·c11 '"'er"::lce rorc~ yr~~,·rel to ett1=1c 1< int' Pt directio:'1 es soon PS : c2·n. ·r,t t',e ~5t' Dj ,.,.~ sion ... 1 -its lcrt t-:, sup 'o_·t it. ':'l'e Di,.; sion does :v1ot c0rTlete itc; r-0ve rntil toni.,l·t. , ·~;1: F1tt1;1c1 +,,p "ollo~·i1· ·orrin. V::-1<: r-crto.,.,8 ::·1: t' P. l -· ' -round to -'-,' P ~a~t , nnc' to +; 1 ;rest .:s so "'tro , 1-r r, ld r u:1 ·r -1-,., e1ery 1s •'lir c'~f8>1--:e or•J_:/on tb t i,o ,rncl er' c'"v:.s1o"l +r ";'r, orJ..;: -1010 •ou lr: r n"t w:i. ·tl c' j ::m.s-1- o:.". 11 'h :5r. 0 -~_,t' "T jwt f 0.1)0. to "'ruc-ocott, FPl•ro,1, ,rl"'l"''l, ::nrl ~c <"•ier tote,, t e- I ET rlisr.rp0i_:rt d ~·-·t 1 t~oir 0+:'·"or~s toc1f'. - ti-rt OE' er tnc T"Ore 'n-s of Rll-out r-tteci, C!Ourl~cl .;t1 t' P rttr->c'• to·y~ ' t C"' t' 8 ,l'>tl "'~-·isio:'1 MYJ.r 1 ,~+, t}p '1ttPck SC c-d·1l_.-..,' t' "3 foJ.10 rjr : "'Or,1:r; r:· tl l IT -::errs T1[ - ~.,..., c" tJ:-:;_c, ' 0, ~ GermF '1 :t-Os·_-1:,io 1 in tJ--.~ Col.lj -,n.zi::i.l:i "'re11.. I ' · -·e lU'.,.Pil t; er to Tflrter e-"'fo..,.ts tonorrow ri. 'l 1 t' ---:i next dn,r. .,. <l'\t': , ttr c Pel tl e 1st -.:r--: tisl )i :iir,ion to t' e • I C0r1 s n,-,•· t'1Ft ~,,.. r Pr, out o"' t· .-u· c'efenni e 1·ole. To attnc 1 t'" 5tr ·;ri-1-,,;:;1', :i· ::i"i.or to t' e •r: Corrs ~oul - bf> 7 ik-e ·:.·r-ir , r- poor ,"'l:!1 "' d;rt sr:lrt. Tre r r e r o of~oni ve . nc:.. ·.nrtio 'l.S. - bR lie·re t' l "'t ..,.,..~ +,is' Di• is~ 0:r. . 'ill 1 "lr' or j t S001Jl"' to 1 "Ve ~ts tri.l up. 1 <C eV':"vt} :n, T 11f'-·o into t,' ::'s 0A.ttl~, • oy-·:'1 to cr<ic 1r t 1 -:_ro l· .y it nece"sr\.I' for Ye'1·:nlr•··-., to srit: drr hotl o-f: ris i:irri ·es to t e north of ·1or-ir • "'l e Gerr·..,-1 i. r <i 1 .:~.o; r eterri.a()d ef'fort to SP v0 F.0 .e. M',ere rre irid:"cn~io1s tl~t l1e ~., :rour:Jrr, i.n re:iJYorcer'Ants fro"'! t'e north. If I do rot Cl"c· t· ·s position in tlrP.e or f'our fr-s I ~,p.- l-;-,·e tc- re-orgnyize, ?<i.it fr,r tl-iE' >' ·} t' Army ::mc1 ,o ['t it 17it', n coorr'-"r/'tecl ~ttncl,- • )ot' Mrr.iies, but I fear -the c~.me rPs11 1.ts -rror ~"1. );-ti \rmy. ..,.t rill rot p11t in its full e~fo1--t, for i-1:. never ras. 11 11 .,. <11" ~:row:in }>O<iit.:.0'1. '\'J1 icr- l'dlJ :"'k'l1 'C T r 1 AAI tc Hl 8o"lcerne'i - "I 0-2''20. •r 1 i.le (;T'JC •relco 'W ~o IT " .... opoq.-,} th.t 'I:C s'·or-:.cl r'le--:elor on 'rr-tion° ro:-t' o-'" ~.iv,r ).ACCO c"ir cted on Ferent:i.110 n.nc' rot<'l"l ~t 1~_11 be TO'>Si 1)1~ to yut it ·,..-:,o 3f::'ect he CP"lrot ..,,,.ree to rllot ti,e :~oad Fercnt:iro-'J~l~onto·,,, to Fi~t, Arrrvu'11A,s or until ;t beco ""S clA:=-<r t.';:,t r,;i 't>-t 0 �Army "!ill not be required to cooperr>te in Your Pttack on the VAlmontone line . In this case he will be prepar9d to reconsider matter . Road Valr ontone-Rome is ro"rever allotted to Fi.c,th Army. 11 0 Gruenther to Clark. R'T ?1~. "General Devers called. Corps corrimancl post "md then proceed by- jeep to Tforma area. ,,,',ether or not he will f,8t to your command post. 11 qe will fly to IV They do not lmow Gern•ral Gl<>rk sent General Gruenthsr the f'ollowinr; m9morendum at noon --':,odn;v: 11 The action taken by AA I rtoes not surprise me. I r,,nticip,:,ted it. Do not raise the question of the boundar.v between Ei%;}1th and Fifth Armies beyond Valmontone ~mt watch it ver·· cRrefully when t} e question does come up, so t:r-ot it is not dravm absolu+,el;r alonp; the north edge of Route //6. I would say thAt it should ~o from Valmontone to Palestr~nP 11nd Palestrina to the Ti:i.c;hth i\rmy. Valmontone will haVP to be used jointly. From fR.lr-istrj_na it shou1d go the most direct route to Tivoli, ":i ,.,in~ me an opportunity to mPneuver to the north of Route 11 6 as we appro1:ich Rome . I must have the road that ~oes trrough Casal Santambro~io at q166. :rn other .-,orr1s, t} ere is no eycuse for their runnin-; the 1,oundarv too close to '!tome . 11 With regard to the Frencr, I w~ 11 defer any .r.iction on tnkin~ a French Dision. Fo'vever, ha'te directed ti-.is morn-i np; thrt t½.e '7rench tnJce ower, with one corrJbat team or whatever they feel is necessary, 88th Division positions north of Se'3ze so I can brinE: the 88th Di vision :in for tl e final attack. VJ 11 H:<J.Ve just JM.de a talk out Pt the ceremony. affa.ir . It Wf'l.s 1uite rm imnressive "I do not blnme you .c>or ettinP.; a little provoked in talking to 1fording with reference to t},.e ½oundary. AppA.rently- the tacticn.l si t1.wtion is not dictatinr; the decisions . " L As of ei~ht o t clock t'.llis wrenino; ~llied forces in the Anzio area had suffered 6147 battle casualties and captured 4615 prisoners clurini:; tl-ie recent offens: ,e. * * * A~JZI0-- Hli.Y 31, 1944-- At 0930 General Clarl, held a rress conference . T'1is is ti1e third press con:'erence t~1Pt Genernl ClA.r:V has hAld since the day before t' e offensive stA.rted on the 11th o+' May. It was an off-t1~e-record talk for 1'1. back~-r01md for tl .e correspondents for the next pht=ise of tbe fi<)"hting . General ClArk e:;..,'J)lained ho··r h8 hnd Pttached ti..,e 1st British Division °to the VI Corps, ,c,;i-<rinr; it the 1st l\rmored, 1+5tl, 34t:r, J6tl and 1st Brjtisb Divisions . VI Corps will Pttack northwest toward RoT'le, its rj l\°ht te..kinf the hi<;h €{round 1movm As the Colli lazial:i and its left proceed:i n~ directl:v northwest toward RoY'le . On the rip;ht of VI Gorps, II Corps V'ith t},e 85th, '3rd Di-.risions and Special "';ervice Force . The 85th Division is to attack tomorrow morning northwest wHh the high ~ou.nr' ih the vic~nity of 1occa Priora as its initial objective . ':'he 3rd Division and :;pecial 3ervice Force will spearhead_ ".lorth to the ri~l-i r,;rolmd nP st VRlmonto"le nnd cut 'ioute ,%. General Cl8rk emphasized that 0 �t 1 is Ptt"'':),,. doPs not hrve Rone pc; ~ ::.s rrili'"ry objective b·1t to kill :?nd anni' ill:1.te as "'J,ny o-" the Qqrmc1.ns as po,::;sible on our -F'ront. He SPid t}nt re did not, owever ,' lose si · t of t 1e fp ct -1- pt, :.}•e c; tv of Rone Mifl t be /' ined ,, s fl rAs•1lt of t' :l c:; Pttn.ck-. •·any -iuesti ons 'r,re r>sked by tl e corresroY" 'e>1ts wi ; ch Ge 1r=irPl r:lF,r', P"1Sv"ered <ts ·"r::i11.kl,r P s e CC'"' 1 ,:;. So-me '7ere di.rect'":ld concerni 11.. the occ11rnt-l0n of Rope [Pd y w1 nt trOOT'<::!. G<>11ernl c1,,-rk SB 'd thPt le could not sa.,,- l '"'t troor:i mule" ente.,,. ~;rst, t ,t -Lt r'e-,endod r,n wrich ones drove t} e ::<rdest. As to T;:i 1-t' l:\.rmy troops, t} rt would he P r ecision r,~rie y A.AI. Ger-?ral '::lnr 1 nar·e it un ·erstooc: th"t ns "Etr l'lc; t'h0 City of Rcme itse:..f w1:1 c; concArvv~d, re was not interA sted e""c8-rit to secure t' 1 e c · ty, am' A.S soon fl s ti rt •vie b,qer r'J.o:>1P, he ryrmld +>pn ' is .('orr;es out to tie nortl east .<ind , est for fu"t er -~J.sres. A-Pter -1-,''"' l'ress con ... -:ire"l.ce, Ge11errtls Ca11.non find ~avi 1-ln CRr-e ur tr- cc•1.f'er wi.t' G9r-erf'1 "!li-cir1' Cl"'rcer>1'n,.. t 9 ['ir suprort ,,~ en to t1 e rP''18"'7ed Ptt;:,c"l( • bo'1t noon Ge-1e1">l Cl"rk tele,' o'1ed /}9'1.er;:,l rr,,.,1"cctt "no. c: ·.3cussed vdtl 'dm -:,' A situntio'"l. /18 ~t '10V' "'X:1 stPr' • Fe c'irecteC:. Gem,ral nr'lSCott to ·i e hi'1 ci-v·hi_or11l ccr.r'lc""l'lers 4n n.c1d.'tio11"l s} ot in t!"le Prr~. :'-om no, on for t1 e neY.t "''3w r1q ; ,,13 need to mus+.er I'll our efforts "ln' ~nush tre r>tbick -v1..,.or0-,slT. He also r'Hr0cted t A.t t 11e I1 Cory-::, attA.ck by t''"' ri-5t1 D.:. 1.sion hR 'f90ded up. 'I'he attE'~k W"l. "re ...,d at '1,,cut 11+00 '01rrs +, is n".l.9rv:.0or, q">' ~ts 10c1yrncf' '--is ·,1ro ,.C9'1 '9G. ·r. co -~o.,. ·tr it1 +,' c-se t:'de ..,y -1:l"' 16th Ji ·i3 4 on on. its le~"t. Pt 1330 'orl W8S r9c-'3ived ':-,,,A+,+' A Britis 'Pc' occu1iec 'i'ros·nor,0. No res··~trn0e ""'1 P11.r:o-mtsred, 1--,1t ,ill -:.r-ci "hrid·es 0re ''lo'", ,,,,,1 t'e +oin ·.q,s 'eriv·1· ..,,·'1nd. At 1430 ';.e11°-~q1 K,y0s err., to r:o:rf,r 't' (}eYl,rfl r;:rr}-. t +,J is +, imA 'e <'ccic' 'c.' t' ...,t t' '3 1"t' n~ Yi<"'iO"', lw,s rre co· bnt +,eRm, w::is to be attAc 1 cd to I: ~orrs ,, c' wo 1lrl JU fl -its r-ttec>' 0'1 t' '3 (1,5t' 1 s ,,-: t .(':flnk nC'rt 11 lP:rd. 1 G-=1r0rr>l ClqJ~i,-, aft r co1n9r-r''1 -'t' GPYlPra~ B""'<1'1n l'r;n, +, ': hster r~rt r "~9rno0r ... ~;:"u d q '1'3W (hprr.ti0">1'1 ::-n"'tr·1ctio'1 '?5 . c' i<J ,..,10t"i h"'lo, • ftc,r ,u !"Jr It. Col. IJln.r', bro 1:t ·11 ~::r. :i·orman c" t e c·~cfl o "r~burc.. o·""' t e 1 •• 1~Nhts o"' t' A h s '-attle rrr)"T0S9 W8.S "-_,' A 8izure 0f T<"lrt o""' t'.e,-: b \.ro· rs -f;he Cnll-'_ Lrz·,.::.-: 1""J, t,;.:s ~")t D"'~jsion. So. 0 ;-i'1s ,,.,re 1"'1",·e in t· '3 Fr';r-c s.:ictor it' 3"_0~ ', 1t .,tgac: • r,YTe ,:; to ~, e ·1.o.,..t 1 rnt. r;,• 0 ..,:;.~en~' we:;.~0 ·r::pPri en""' j 1 ' i 1. SOJl" ~ ~ ' b:i i1C8S' y +, ter re 1. stR nee' 9 S" (,cir 11 ":t'Oi"'i ti eir r :_ t J'."'lRnlr r0---t, of t 1 e r ~co ~i "f'er. •T.' r011r Ga'1er.q_j_ Clark 1 a notes or. +, 9 1 '1., 1 s r> cti • :.ties '""'o llow: 1 I Co~J3 attPc:k is no~ uri, ')oi~ · ell today, I1Aet:.n "ri~y st:.rr resis-':,fnce. 1st Ar"'o.,..nd has '7::-de very little '1eadway. '.:" "l. Ar tired, '1eed mH-:'1t9'-Y"'Cf-, ard e,:c'3 '3 in ' A.r/assed by Sr- 1 s fro". t e ' ~ ·' Tci11.r i souj' o ·: Lake Albano. Truscott is r1lli~ ... , '3 1:C"1or ack tor-' 'i:, ., eav" 1 , .i.; , -· 1fa'1t" .:n a'1d i ·i 1; ~"' ,18S , is full Di · .1 > , t 1 - ush ,..orwm-d.. 0 ~ 0 0 "Doc .,rder an ~.q_de no 1 rr,~ess tc, 'ay. T' t' e 3"J"':. i ·s::.011 shou:rl assL·t i""1 tor>ll'row. 3 -''lank:'.n, . 0 ~!'lent, '., \lr 11':er o-!: n.l\:,r 'a.3 , cn0 ,1ell. "'}0,1.~rA.l ,loan ~l'l~,9 ~:'1 i=m riJ.l ',ye rll ·'s ~8t' J;v-i.s'_on ,sse"'lb:ed 1 ) dPyli '-: to::-'o~row. It i, tirec1, , l t : 1•.:.11 ':.L.row :t into ,)ri.:;tJe ·n .1., e II Go'fs sect01~, f'eE'l~1 t· 2t : 'Ill' ·t 1 l"'3 evfr ounc--. ; . , r e"~r · • r Cn.nmU'3u')' r._, .,vl--i, "'.;'me. .,_ ,. _ r "'' �. +. · + ' • ",--,5 , It ,uill attack to +.he north. I ,.,J1,e issue d Op:ira..,ions I ns0ruc-c,1on Jr. t octay, tell -in.,. rrr su1,-)ordi·::ate com,vrnders tLr-it t'.Y~::.~ fi::·st "1issio,.., Pfter takin~ the 1~::: p 11- ~ou..;d in t'·\e Colli LaziRli areP is to r'l_estroy t: e enem;r on our frO',t vrl ile 'at the :oame tine setting- up 3. task force under General Frederick to move east on Fi ;hvmy !J6 to disrupt and destroy the en ,my movin[; out from in front o" the 'SightJ- Arm~' Hnd the Frenc'" -;-;,g~prljtiorw.r;,;r Corrs. llJl.pparentl." the -.::: --ft' J\rr:1, -, hei11.,; rror ded fron tl e Frime Hinist r down, is srordn,r; a little :-'lore 0neri:~Y• It 'ms f:1nally taken 7 rosinone. The, enem;,t hacl evccunted .. 1 1:r, 0 11 1"1here is rmc'i p.~essure uron r1e, alt} oug,., it is not bein to 'ave -::: r;'1tl: ,\rny -:_n on tl e bntt1e +'or Rol'7e. 0 Pf plied direct- HJ am worri("'d about t 119 future of the 'Frenc'~ "Sxpeditionary Corps. ~Jitb the restrictio".!.s t}rt Alexancbr ;•2s r,l1°ced upon rne, their zone of action is narro 11:_n'~ llOVm to noth~ nr;. I :,opA to squeeze t'1.em nort1• of IIi r;h,•r9.7 /6 in t e attac;, on Rome. It pro'xi.bl::r 111ill 1Je violr:mtl:r o"posed by AAI. 11 I am ettackinn- across ia ;hway ."6 tomorrow to tal,e Vn.lmontone Hnd some of the hi} rmmd to t'~e north. :: must take t' is hi,r,t -o;round j_f I Pm to naintain myself F>.t Vr-ilm...,ntone. I rather 1,elieve thnt tbe decision will come in the II Gor:;:,s fro,,.,t and t/ r•t I qa;r 1.Jreal, t} :rough triere. T·1e next two d-:iys !!'Till tell t½e tale. 11 GenerPl C1?.rk today issued tne follo 1~in~ operF>tions order to 5t1 British Division: 11 1. 5 Infantry Division (Br) will attaclr wH'·out , elay to Cf'lfture t: e 1 line Hill 104 (756434.) - RJ 751427 - Hill 103 (751419) - fRATICA J1I •:rtHE (73L,1). F' en nbove line las been secured, mqloitf1tion f0rwrrd will be nPde wit} all possible speed to secure t'. e folloninr: objectb1 es: a. Are8 et bend in ro1:d 71.5504. b. Road ;n 8J'."ea_ :;755. ' c• Road between 615531+ and 585515 . .Sreed in e:xyloitinrr forwc'rd to sec1JTe t} e lrtter t1::ree objectives j_s esse:ntjnl in order to: a. 'f'TPFP. before Destroy nn;r enemy remn.ininrr between tl e 1+2 Nortl~ing and 7.iver ey can cro"'s t' e river. t: b . Freve:vit t1 e enem:,. on 5 Infa,,tr;ir '>i-,j_ sion (Br) front from ,·it; dra,ring to tl e norU1 ef:I st to rnm the s,, itc' line runninp rpproYinntely norti,_ west - sou-f:;keast 1Jet,vee:1 88/,.4 - 7158 . "3. Effecti~re et once, t' e '10undrry betwee·1 5 Infa•,tr;;·· Division (Br) and VI Corps ( 1 Inf'E1ntr:r Division (Br) will be: .,.nclusive to VI Corps road A''TZ:'.:O - AIBP.I'JO to RJ 865326 - t: Ance �railwr--~r bed to track jlJnction '3?3154 - Sci.ddle 806367 - Hill 55 (80?374) CR 786391 :1..nclusi~re m 11 62 (7973~1) exclusi ~·e ;:,pm~ 801377 RJ 771/+47 - llJ 737536 - RJ 738564 - RJ 7051=i89 . "i" . 5 Infar-tr, Divisior- (Dr) 17ill be respc-~s' hle f'or rrotection of t 1 e left +'1211}: c,,.. , and r:1P.intP~ 1inD" crntPct Fit ' , 1 ::r:r.f'antr;r Division (Br) on t eir rirl t . 1 11 5. Fo~nts o·"' junction bet·,een l a,,,d 5 Infantr:· Divisions (Br) 2re: a. Cros.sroads 78739?. c. Crossroads 7711+!+7 . e. RJ ri37s32 . C\ erfltio·~s :rnstruction =1ssuec1 tode./· e.1s0, reacls PS follovJs: Fi"tl i'.rri:r +:'orces re ''.lO~' ·'n ro"'~tio·1 to :!_p il"C' ,,, rt cs ~,,,t,e~cid,d to 1-ie t• '3 -"'~nal ,. · r• se of' our or0rat::.o•· s Bo.st cf RO'~ . 1 June VI Corrs will str=.Je 0"1+, ~1it'• Pll +-; eir "'orces in cortixrmtior of t' sir successes of t 1 e rr'st O cl2c_~s . II CorJ s -.~111 lPPnc' a ren offens::1'e "ron :lta rresent rosi tio~1s . 11 tt:1sio~1 o:~ t 1 'JSe !~1ttt?c: s ls +,o cr·us' t, ~ :?01irtee~t} Gorr~e...'\'" !11.... F:r foci "1,.: o'J.r A'TZ.,.O ?nrces rc,.:i t,o P:T lo:i t 1,~' al1 ro ,s: 1.10 neans o'f'""l7 orr,or·tunit . trs r'estro - corirlet,31~· t; p ""1.P'7.:f 1 '1 .forces B.1",' ~Pt"'r~ el. '!'o accor0 1 lis 1 t js , -t_t is d_r'3cted t~et : u1. 0 1 II Corps 'V~ll : A:'."t,-,r · f'';:·np secv.red t' 1e :-i--;;1, R;r01.md nort:, of Vl\LJ;r,·r'C'NE , blocked all traff~c tlrour:;' 7.ol1 te j ti'irl "ecurer' -:, 1 f't ~"Tt c" COLL!: L..ZIALI t '3:t lies nit1in ~ts zon9 J '~o :,rt;}a.red on Armf Crder to yt1rsne and rnnili lr.te G-err'a'1 :'orces w!tl dra .~n[r nort' west a•y" ''Jill se"ld 1 t,rd · itt-ing mobile r-Ol"CGS 11.D 'er ••.• roro11s le2.der _;: J1 --~ p Route 6 on r-:rCI:'J'P10 to C/'lJ tur-=i o:c ciesti--ot.~ a11- c;_1e:mlt -~c:.-·:le~; \ ~t'-.d~a'tI5_rz ·~ror~ 1:: o :rcr1ts '-~~ ~=-r,t A.J'r·:- an0 a. 1 1 1;'1 rer1c~ 1 ,-:Jcpeditionar:~ CoI"I s. :,;. VI Gory s wj 11 : ::-"'ectu e -1::.' 11.t y.art o:' COLL= I,,.t. ZIAL~ b Hs zone 0:' act5_o•· and dri··e -'"'orrmrr ,,;'t' tl P; utnost ·,reed t0 Cllt t 1 e routes o: ,-it1-,"TeW£,l of -~ner·,u· forc'l'.)s -':,1 rou,:,·' 1:C lli: anc' t· en -'-rn°n stron"; f0rces c;ou-'-,' ,·est to pv,n_i'. 5 late t'. e e'1ern; ap;a:11'.lst t' e ,..,TB1°R :'.::i ·rer . Lo-1/ :.. n.n-:e rrt:p_lery ilJ. te used to interdict an:-" cro0si"l"' sites b'T vi' ic} +, 1 0 ene~.- ''a,' rittemrt to VIitrdr-m c:,r t 1 e rn-nER Rj_ rer to +j-- e "Test • 0 1 0 �Fress +>orwarc1 s,-j r;orousl,.' 'rit">in t'•eir zo110 of action to secure t'e 'ig c-ro1.md in t'e ·,ricinit;r of 3Errrr (G 1ri44), protect t:e r::1.-;'t flank of .,..I '.Jorps arid ;,' '.c nt' ArT1,,- ard fpcilitate t· 6 B.l1.-ance of ,.:~_i:-' t' Army. 1 d. 5 :::nfantr:, Di· ision (nr) will: 0 rress :::'orwarc: rn.1:i.cJl; towards t' 8 TIE' :r. Riv"ff tc c11t off e.11c. destroy sner-;' forces t' et · E!Ve b1=,en turr;ed sout1 ~:" t\e ,rr Gol'I s . ArtilJ.~ry - -· , . , t ule will he ,,:er t ·,rc-:)LL f.crwara in oroer t o . n·ercJ.Cv cror3s1,.,g sir,es over +' J. ... • • ' 11 ?. . Defr ils on sec+,ors ol resror s:; bil~ t~- for seizing t e anc:. ac.-vPnce to t' e rort' later. 11 Cb.rl- to G-r1 1.ent1 er . JJr 1714. HJJ,2 Pnc? 143 prog:ressinc satic:fcctoril;r on ~:onte ArtPmiso on t' ejJ_' first oi.-.jective in +,'··e -vidn::_ty of 9646. 85t' f~,·i8ion junped o·nf et l I.:'., occupied. Lar:lBno 0J48. Tell Juin: understand ' is situn:l::.ion. Will jur1p off tonorrovr r;ornine; rriti 3rd Di vision and ::ipec:.1.11 .;,erv--: ce :'orce tl~ occupy ~ ir 1 ground j· ,rnediatel, · nort 1• of Vnlmont,one . Sloan is '-er,=i . Fis di··: sion wil.1 be 0 s,;enbled ')~r d.n;rl:ir:; t tomorrow morn:~ng . Re sure ;1·011 ~,ate' qu,=ist:i.on of bou.,.'1.dPr:,. fro"' Vr lr10rtone northwest . 11 0 Gener-al Clark toc1r.· sent t 1 e followin~ menorandul'l t0 GenerP.l Grmwt er: 11 I 1 ave c1ecid9cl to comr:.t t: e 88t' Di~1 ision in t' e II Corps w'·ere one cor~bat +e1;r,, Rlreo.r::r is . 'T'here is 1_uite /:'. ger bet reen t' e 3rd 8I'C1 t' e '";8th :Ci-visions . 88th will attack tomorro'i ~Ln t1·rt [;Pp gener.,lly· nort: • ::: 1 c-ve directed Keyes tc set up a tas'lc +>orce 1mder :::'rederir!k; a fast 1·itting , mobile llnit '7:.t' ris ..:>pecfo.l Service Force, TD I s am' tt=:inks to rroceed east along t?.oute /!6 as soon ns we cnn t;et on to it . Its nif'sion is to ('estroy, discm.u~age , disrupt, disorganize, Pno P.n:r ot\er d's you t' ink of, r-ny enemy forces in t' Pt area opposino- Eig:.t: Army or F-SC . .... I kn.o"' of no "ro.,· to emrloy tLe ,:\8t 1 Division better. If I rut lv in the VI Go11,s t' ere "muld 'PVe :-iee11. P 1assage of ti~e 1 i_nc')s, nd it vould e time - consur1ing . ''it. t} e success of t' e ::St' Division '?.nc t, e vvr:,y 85t' is goinp-, I p,yn c0.,,"ir,c0cl t' Pt is t' e t' in; to do . 0 •0 11 I i,,,...,.e iflsued an OI w~ ~ c: instructs Ke;Tes to set up ti is Frm'ierick Task Force rnc1 c1irects tie tvm c0rrs P.nd 5t Di-ision, P.fter Colli LP zj_ri.li is cPp turec1, to r'estroy t' e l4t: Arn;r in our :'.:'ront . In otl•,Tc worc1 s, t} --it is our 1 P :i.ssior, r"t'er t 1 .<in '-:Justinp; into Rone . You rrill get a cop:· rronrtl;r. 11 : cert?inl:r will feel 1 ,etter ,,,1-e11 tie F'':C pus1 e,s up r•8st Po 1te LPn.ico, for 1'1 en 1• 1e rittacl: wit' t' e 3rd Div:i s5.on a1:1.d >pecial ,..,,ervice Force our wl1 ole rir-' t flank is open excert for t! e 91st R,conneissance . 11 1 GenerP l Gri.entr er disr,ntc1 ed t'. 8 follo"rin_u neI'lor 0 nchm to Gr-nerrl C1Pr1 r: 11 1. ! i'PYe bnen r1.prlyin2; a '.l;e'"1+;le sqt1eeze on ?'SC , stressing t' e vittc1l contribution t' ev- cPn ffl::e i_n connection Fit' t 1 VAJPC7>frr ,]E Gtt? ck if t'"e:r ·e ct>r> W'.nn-o.;e some' O''! to r-rnt t1 ere in time . �11 ? . Gennr<J.1 Juin is becor-,ing fea:t'f'u.2. t.,rt you mPJ be e:xrecting too mud from 'im, so , e '. ,-,cl Colonel Zellar teleplone tl is Dorn:..r·n; to say: 1Generc\l Juj_n believes t} 0t ,·m Pre nxrectinP, Frenc: Gorrs to buttress Genera.I Keyes I riglrt . Genera.I Juin is exceedingly Anxious tl:,t,t '"8 not count on '. is sup:;ort w'•9n, in fact, 1·e will be unable to be in lin,3 wit'. Gener,1 Ye:ms by tl1 e mornjng of 1 June . 1 At present t'e Frenci li11e r1ms as ::ollows: 'T'he 1 eft is secured on CARPI'1JETO and tbe right is from three to fom· kilometers nortl-- of C:CCCA "JO . 1 1 The terrain is difficult and the Frenc:1 Corps is still neeti:nr; u:it,- 2.prred.a11le resistance . .)\oulil t 1·i·'1.F"S continue R.S ,eJJ. as t' e:r "'re going now they would need about U•ree na·rs to '')e in a position to cehoucJ,, in tl•e GAv:rrmANO area . In ot 1 er words, FEC can prob2bly be t 1 ere eit, er in tie eveninp; of ~ June or :mornini:; of 3 June . Should resistance sti "fen the date 'muld ',e correspon<lirn,:ly JB.ter. 1 1 0 Colonel Zeller P r;n in :i.nsisted on Generrl ,Tuin I s desire to make sure ti1a.t Gex"~rr.l Clark does not court on :bim in connection '"it t, 1 e Keyes o-oerRtion in an p.rea yr,. ere ' e cr-.n not possibly be 0t t' e time of t~e sc:1eduled orerati.on (1 June) . "3 . ':::'h~ news of t} e ,mccess of' tle ?nd Battalion, 111,?nd In-fan try h:1s caused all o:f' us to turn landsprings . 11 Clnrk to Gruentl 8r . rn 1706. 11 'l'wo regiments of 16t' novr on Honte Artemiso . 1:.iav-e 01.rectec' 85tla Djvision to atbc 1r along;side of '36t} . Attack s1 ould be launc: eel by ? r. •~. It will r;o for t',e ; ig' r:round in tre -r;icini ty of 99. 5 49 . 5 Pnd to t. e nort up to r.Tount Ceraso . IIPve triPd to speed up <' 1 Da.niel 1 s a.ttP.ck to t' e 'ig'. P,r01md north of VRlmontone, :)ut it rrobr>bly can not get off earlier t 11an duJ'.'ing tk.e n::ig' t . T½.e lfovrze Force reinforced will fill t'. e &;ap hetween U e !:5"5tl and '3rd Divisions. Still sticky in tl .e h'1.mnri.o area ~ 88t'1 less one CT will he in Army reserve until I see w'•ere t}rn ~oinP, is F!ood . It may be in tl e II Corps. T:Jhere r-ire t' e Frenc~? }us} t' em up w:1 t: all possible speed . '' General Clark tlis evening sent t'e following memorandum to General GruenthPr: AttPc1 ed is rm HdditionPl cormmmigue vrl ici., cr.J'Je out t1-is evening and w':i.c evoked some co::-:i.nent from t' e rress, rerticulnrl•r t 10 e vrriters for t1 e morn:i nP' n:npers in t'·e States. The,- claim t' Pt t;-"ere is Hn excellent story for ti e BritisJ,-. papers but not one vrorc;. '1B vin,c- been said about the lend battle on t},e Fiftr .~rmy front. They ]'.ad not' :nf" to ·,rite r:.bout. C'f course, I realize t 111>t ,;:i..,en t} ey put t' e special cor r,nu,irrne out on tl e joininr, up of t} e '"r:ldp;eheod ·f'orces ti·e lritisl mi';ht rve rid t 1-e same comrlP:int : ad '"'e 1 ad lritisb not troons in tl e ;joir,-up . 11 1 10 1 �11 Ti is ½rinv,s T"\e to a suggestion •v' 1 ic• you 111iP-,ht discuss informally first 'Nit'· Lem, nnd thnt is th9t d11.dng tl1ese tense tj mes w' An t}·e siturtion is moving rapic1 ly, ever-" afternoon b:,r t 1 rr-ee o I cloclc tbere r-J .o-',t crnne out an addition to ti,,e on-tr,e-record br>clrgrounc in 1,il icl:i they could mention such items as our c1mtu1·e of t' e ' ia;b P;round bnck of Velletri. Tkm.t is a tremendously important" 10nnouncement, n,nd b= getting ere in mid-rifternoon it gives the morni np; newspaper corresrondents Pn opportunit:r to get t'·eir copv b::-.ck in time for first-pafse U. ' • publicA.tion. 11 Flease do not start a controversY ,ret, but first !ave Lem look into it and see wl·,:,t cr>n be done. It soui1ds reasonable to me. inp:s seem to be r:oin,:,; well t"j s evenin,:,;. Brnie I s tanks ore coming rrtey are 1:111 in and need a rest. His inf Pntry wi 11 stn;--r in, and ~P ~les 1rno Doc 11.yder "'rill pus1 on to:morrov'. T1-eir attack, ':rit' trose of t} e II Corps And 36t1 Di vision, ma;w begin to .a:et decisive results. I prPY it does. 11 11 T' out. The addjtionnl CO""lr,uni(l_ue mentioned in the above memorandum is quoted belovr: 11 Tbe enemy continues to f2,ll beck undP.r pressure of our nd-vandng Bigbth Arm;sr forces "ft icr are astride ½ip-1w1a~ 6 on P broad front ;:ind h<1ve reac1-oed t~e outskirts of :r;'rosinone. 11 troors Tt may no1;1 be stPted ti·t?t P b£1tt2 lion of tl e Black Ha tel was e.monr, the wi ic•· made tl,e originP 1 hridge 1 ead [icrorn the Rapj_do. 11 11 Fip·1 +,9rs and lir,1 t 1 XJmbers founc:. onem: flPk exceptio:nall7 li,o:ht tooRy as thev bonbed rmd stro feel troops, bivouac arAas, gnn posit ions and enem7 l eld tovms in t' e bittle nre~s. No r10venent of enel"'' traffic was seen in the bPttle and Rome areas. nvP.rhavrks, T}nmder 11olts, Inwders nnd Bostons drorped 1-nmdreds of toI1.s of bo111bs on troors, isnns and bj YOUc".c areas near Albano, W' ic1' we.s rractics lly covered in smoke by bombinl!,. 11 Soutl west of Velletri T ·•underholts bombed nnd set fires in the town of Lanuvio. In tie Rome narsl·•p,llinf ~mr·c1s tJ:oe · strafed a locomotive nnd left it , • ournJng. II As of midnj gt t tonight the da:r 1 s battle casualties amounted to 633 men in the Anzio area, with a total of 1811- rrisorers taken. * * * ANZI0--,TTPIS 1, lq/-1-4--At 0800 General Clark \"e1t dovm to tl'e port nrea to vmlcorne tbe '361st RCT wl-:i c1 was lP.nding in LCI I s from t' e Naples oreri. Re met Colonel Bro['dlow, t'1e Regimental Cornms:r1.der, and wptc} ed so111.e of t} e troops debark. At 0900 3rlgadier Gooclbod:' came in to sr, • ,o;•-iodb;we to GenerPl Cl0rk. He is leav-inn· to join 'is Prmored brip;['ide. He hrs been wit' VI Corrs for tr.e pst ten weeks , and just recently Cf!me to t1 e AdvPnce Fift'. Arr1y Corrr110nd Jost AS Britisr M 1visor to t: e Army Comm:mder. Genernl Glrrk co11.ferred ,':'reouentl:v with Generr-1 Brnnn, : is G-3, for tl e re- �rnainrler of tt e morning, we.tel inf closely t1,,e bRttle ~rogTess rnAcle b:· II and VI Corps. He called General 'T'ruscott, GenerPl ~,ogles ~md General 'f,-,lker on occasions to P"et first hPnn_ in:"ormation on ti-,eir progress. I At noon Gener,.,l Gruentl er flew up from t 1 ·e forwr-rd con'nl:'lnd rost to confer wit' General ClBr}r. He, GenerPl Clark and Generr-1 Brann remained in con.eoerFmce for about 1 nlf an 1 our. 11_fter tl is conference General Clr.rk received lTajor Green- rilkinson of t} e ~ip;}'.th Army. Ee was sent up by General Leese to explain t' at j_f trie ?iftl· /1.rrry W"S ;:,ble to teke Ror1e witl- out assistance from tl e -r;ii:::;' tr Army·, t1 e ~-; ~l U A.rmy woulc continue its attacks further to t' e nort' of Rone in t' e d~irection of Tivoli. J\t 1400 General Bl'rr, G;;l.ief of Steff for General Devers, came to visit General CL•1rk • •After General Barr tr d left, Geri eral Clr, r l" 'vvent up to see Genernl Truscott at 1 is VI Corrs corJ11P:1d post. Later on in t e ;:,fternoon ; e received Generals Brads'·-aw and 1.amey. Fe discussed wit 1 Ge 11eral Brn.csbi.v1 anti-aircr~ft 1 matters. l\.fter supper Ge:ner<il ClPrk conferred 1·1:i.t"' 1 is G-.3, Gener81 Brann. f urinc-' t' i.s conference ..,e made rl~one cells to General :-_::pgles, Generril Ryder, Ge11eral };eyes ancl General 'f'ruscott. Ee vrr.nted to empbPsize wit'. Pll of l'!is subordinate commanders t11e necessit.r for an R 11-out offend v-e tomorrow - that tomorrow was critical - t 1 rt t' e;' '"'t:id to r,us 1 to t"'e l:init rmc '.'re nj ght crnck t)·e Boe' e defensive line. 1 :Ug1 liP..:hts of today's rrogress were t' P entrance -; nto Tfelletri of %t1' Di vision troor,s in tle lrtter ~9rt of t1 e ,.,.;:,ternoon. 7- e 34t: And 45t:- nade little ri,...or:ress. ':' 1 e 85th D5,dsion h,.,d reac1 ed rronte Crstel Laccio. T' is hs put t,,.,em just si,,ort of their injtial objectiYe, Pou:nt Ceraso. Tl e 88th Division in its attHck to t' 'e northvest ad-.rnced about a r1ile 0nd n. '-a1f. T 1a.e 3rd Division 'he.d cut Hip-lw:ay /!6 just en.st of VA lmonto11e and 3peciR.l Ser-vice Ti'orce troops were pus 1 ing eastw~.rd clown Route ?6. T• e 'Frenc' · ave mPde some PdYr>nces to t1 e no·ct'. 1"est. T}•e 3rd DJA will pass t'."rougl t 1 e /,.tL ;)~,TM at J'ionte LPnico. On t1°e r;;i1:;' t1 P.rrr,7 ,..ront :Sritisl reco1·mnissrn1ce units were just s'•ort of "'erentino. Tl'eir Ac1 --;r,nr::e :,es not bc:;en ver:r rPT~ r" t' rou,:l out the camrx:iip;n and has not ke1t rince vit1 Fif't~ _'\.rE1y r,clvances t'rouo·'out t~e bettle. :mportant messB.ges o:f' the day are quoted as follow.s: Devers to Cli:,rk. R"T F53358. "Included in a messnge .c>rom Gemeral · e:r·s1 all to Generr,l DeY0rs r-0.s t' 9 follonin,· nesSPf:;9 icl we } '-'Ye been asked to 1 trs. ' 1 pRss to you. m, is was oontained in messPfe "-4407'2 of 31 May. Pr 1 all and I greatl,. arprec 0 rite your Pction onc1 messages refr-irding Alle-1 'lro·m. You ,,_,.,_ve been '"10st t' oufrtfnl W'cl cons1rlerrte, dosrite our tri:,PJ.endous resporsibil:ities at t: e r1oment I• I! 1 1/ 0 0 AG'il\Jt to Clark • .1:J ,;,53437. ":·'.Rrk • Cl,rk, Lt. Gen., f"'rn,e•1.ent HpJoint"1.ent Brigt1c'l-'.er Gener::il, Rog,1lar -irn\,., renk from 1 ,:3epte'11.her 41 P1nounced Tera 1, 7iDS'"' ''110, dP..tAc1 31 ''Tay ad...-ises AG"\JAR. 11 Gener .l Slar1 t· is efterrioon c,ent tl 9 follo•"'"n: rnessa,:;e to G0,1errl 0 Gn, e:1t: 9r: "I 1 .ave .iust rotl1.rned +'rom t8.lk~_ng ··r"t1 mrusc.ott. I wo"L..lc~ "'Ot let "'in �)33 .,. ul1 0·1t ':,' r Prrl ir'"' 45-':.' ~ -· •;'. Gio'i. tr ri. -· t' OT( :: +;, ' l UY•(' b tru.c'r +,' ro 1.o; Cj qt,,....,...,,.., u.,,. to 1re1' etr·, ,,, i£"' ~ ,-, 'c··~r i+ ~('Jt.urpr' n+:., ""'C' ?ebruc· it ·n 11 rev :·'. rP.ctio 1 t0 r-"ro ! tc t1 '"' 1 rt 1'ff,s +,. .,.-1:. I":' "''1.t v1 i +} 1.rn i. 1"-: ,:,v ontire F --: '1i0r. :lO'T "Uj, · 0'3 ,d +:.o 1) :r. 'esn0rc:.n ~l, ..ltric-1:. .. , ..; t 0 OT'0::".,., 9ir:esli·nr ir +,1 "' "'r · ' i. s· o ";_:' r>'1c' .1.,1- 0, :4t to t e rest - 8. 71 i 11. c. rb=i d - v---ry screwv r 1d err _;__nro',',1- ,1F> ~-•0]11 ~; p ;_(';J'-' tir:l'~ ,.,r ,1e. -;: -'{ .,Hi., c.~-tz/'.' . ~m to +R'·A +' o ". ,'7t' ~rom t' e 4S-':,' , rio-8 :. :, ' · +.rrc1· + w' ' t tr +; r- 'lell-==,tr-: r r Hl r,...erfre to • eve u tc t n, .-s·. e ,t 'n:.: ·r 1 letr-: -· fl c"..<Jf'r. I •ill "'all tc.,,. • · 1 t. -t -1 s '11' rcur.ckd. Conplnd. ·•ri.t: t' 's, t' e e•1-l:,ir~ ..,,,)tl n-:_y-:si011. to Fttt=10' a, soon rs 7P1l~tr" f,Ps fror r·o 1te ~rte iE:io t'u9 11r •t'P;st, r0~ii.wnt, dreRst, or -qc,rca r.:. ;n.f<J.. '.:'' i.£' • ·p-' t 'e c<ei:!i.3ive, c~.d 70 w;ll ,lo ·+,. L tc, 7(: 1 ·L :-- ,;nr, rli:3Fno~_rtPd in 1 " .. i<;' ....,j"lg r.c> t' {' 4'.>t ' 34+; a.11rl ls-:-.. Ar· or0C:. :.st ,'i~;. c,r~d · s nE' 10 to -o in toror.,..ow - r·1st wait 'l--ioi) ,r 0 4 'o''rs. It 'rd t· ·rt - P:_ '""rs Josterfr:· 9~ccrc.ing -'-,c, "'ruscott. Ri'P,[' p t ;r' 0 iT1,l10J.::,,...; 1 11 [,-.re. EJ,'3 juJt ccir..., 11. + Pt +, e • '.:>t' :rr"'artry i-a s ..,1t Route 'I"> just eG.st of Valr.iontone. Spec::!rl 0erl":ce :'01·c1; :s ta ;E"mt to ~t flY0 JUJ.,tirr; sr:rl::.. L'Lo in i+.. 'J;(j ... ,1~ 00""1B • ~ r,{' icles p:_•J ..,,e,, ro...-:.ng out of "alironto.,,.e ~o •~- .,ost 1:.cl,"r 9 ,;rr.c"',.. e • ."t' "'rr,C:"tt, .~ r ,11est~f t,i,+, ~..t. Col.=)()~ .'lr,, ~re. 11 : ~n-.av.try. ~·ririnrF1 r"--1.;;. ·".,, ,-':.. ..:.iee w i=t .0_1 Cfl.1 le abo1.1t riasiY1-; ./,eele hfc 1 -l-;c. t'E' 0t·+,n Jr r trr:'...1, - ~c.,0. 'l'r·1sc0tt 11lso tors rir, ['11 TBF i.-L 00ror,, t 12t }'p_.:non rtn' " 11 r1k fll,m <io 11.c..t ri;et alon ~ ~t f'll . j do "10t Vlf'ff':. -l-;c, ' 1rt f\.llP.r.. :t ..,,n~ , tc. , ; j 1rso;"a:. dif.. , c,A ·':,j'3s. T•r-rrnc,r. c'oe3 net tru~+,. ·m, Pn" - cleSS :t is ::.CG ""~'SD. 1r,r<ir6 A.• 9'18~.f{8 -':.c T';c"8i:c t rm... ,' n~Tr:•,iA, as}i- t 'in in' a C'l'YJ. use .iur.kAllo~l ir.. V. t1~r:i.· ~ 1p: job. "TE'l'!'lOri i:n,C:. r-I":.lE'C',tt recc, 1 :1.d ti <it Jol(. r l r'o ·ztl, 00 ,mf-1'1.L'ing t'" lJt' tr r~e1 ..,A/J' •nt, t:- 1 P, • ~,,~e. fC'lO '31.', +• 8 U• ..,.. ~, "nr :st Cl'l qn e"'rc" A.11:;e. : 3,, ....... Lt ...,:.,u ·\r-!.:, 1 . . . UY) 1-Lt ~Pl... ~. 1-Ie r'" el11. l'j''lc -1-,n:•L • -v· sio:,, Po to }"pr~1or ....,n C'L ' ~r -. -'it 1 - 1 1 :s, 0 1 1 ""') 'r 11 - srr'rn to "J[lYe 'l,:, f';'• ·'r 'el} Y'J•) '"'[e"l.i.t<'CP, J,,,:} zs·J~Pte 'l,rard uf t.1'3 Lnt:'on of P"r_.t "~on -1-,·~ee Frere' i:vtsjc,nR.J. Co ~<1•,C:.ers. le 'l=l.i.il i" T nnu:i.r' s: Pct '-• , a -~e'1,;,"'f;e ~fJ i.r ' + ~ +'err al reque1t, '-J ,,0·1~11 r,,,'-'o +,' 1 1Fir ~ ,par+, ,n l t a,y' r,Jc,ue..:;t ['} 1 re •rl, C:itPtion t''i ,9P-n. 'lo not ·i.rtenc" tr .L".JCO ~~ lG. Jui~1 ancl IJe~•ont'1"' 1 )F':l't f'f,a · 1. , nti l l'"t01° :-(oI"e · .'13 +'r lion, sc } l8n.Jn e11.d r ·.cf'dio i.n r1 't"t8.r.ie to ~T\nc·tt;A, req ior +ir CJ 1 i:-·c o . . .L' 890 SL flt I r1F"' m7Dlil t· ,m ,,_,<'.\_"'o"•e .L; z _'rf--1".!1 :o in aP-ri·1 -"c-r t',.,, 'bc-stl. 1 ,,f ::c 1e. c·tr-1:.i.ons wi .1 fo 1 lo,,. 1' 2/ ., 1 1. 7r\rv:}. llGene.1·al Alem:i-..l"J.er ex 1-;,-:,rn l·ts,... i lSUl.slP' -=in['h · x l.mdqr, ri_ i. 1r, l''=:ld ro--ir' t1 :_:_ · ,' Arr:-. 1\ l l <iY-A'l CC' ~'Ad J'•')[l_(" c,tPrti.nr, r+, .. J ?.G3/1--1l. Pore ,..o,_lo s.' 1 11~1pnt' er t0 :;1F1r1-::. order +,o 1: 1 -1-:, P~d ' 18 P'•'lv' '}rr•,nt J.' 1., r, • J E'"./., ;, A'l"C8 I", ..1..., ,, ;+, 'Y' to ., 0' 1\.1.•r •• • u nr "'~y e~1t' ... r tc ~: ''\:, 1 Cle rls • / ) :::.. i. RJ. -1J A. 1(,. R~ 1'Roac' 11.t ,~ . . t, RJ" Pt "773 tc 1 . USAC o s-~, ~'. n'T "rm~-_::, l,~~11 .. ~ 70( J.. " 6-3!,"'l t0 , r. 0 '7()()?. P ) .L1 u 11 G0r0.r"l '1 '~rrl o·rS 1~vC' nl,,t'.""" >~Ur olri to 'r. ,·1c 1 ·rr.til Ar,1,'. .,~J·o. II J" ..... ir( r:iy :1 _.:' --c hJ . "' ,; �l3L\ in -~iew of estirn<1tec1 strnn:-it' of '3nemu- in '!ri lP1ontone nre~. l r>rd:; ng stronf in ·,elief it is uns01mc to ,·j_·-a Fif't' Arn - red ror,1 but 1 believe , -om case is so loE;ic.ol t' rt -ou ce.n ,"orce ;_t tl rou.•,.., Generr1 Ale~carider . i'"rdim~ st;:,tes t'.. at 1:-' }2J c!str~na l_irt'_ ri:round s' onld b0 s-'::.unbl:·,o- bloc'"" s~tu['.tion can be reYie1·1erl Again vrit 1 nury,ose of 1:llo1T-':•c '"i'i+>t 1 i\rF ·- to exterr' to Y10rt' into t: rt 2rea . r1ore . 11 1 1 1 Gr11ent: er to Sl~n•k . J:l,r 7904 . 11 Generril Juin still feels it irn.perBtive ·"or Fi.,-.t 1 Arr~ r to V-'3 Jlrcl: lin0 b01mdrr:r. Fe 9H;'7"S ,UeXPJ1 er prorosal is little bettPr i;,1 an gr,~er. 1-immrlp•·· r «.nd 'rs r;rept c:i S/1.c'-Vanta ge of rreventj ng Frenc' mq7.euver so esse;1ti<il. to success . It v•ill force Frenc' troors to r:arade in front of lalestrina Tieivl ts w ile Britis' are still ten rrUes to reer . }Ie unrlerstrnds tl.ot you ''lill -nrob8bl.r aut' orize 1 i:m to t2ke Palestrina Hei,,;kts reg:?rdless of bourihry ½ut of 1ecessit:,- fOU will be f'orced to iss1 .e t' Pt order too late to ena Jlo ..,r,''l1C1 to swing wide . 'Tore . " 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 Gruent' er to Clark. }FT 7905 . n-~a-ve ju it tal 1 ed to T:21°dini=; P g:,in. He believet, t 1 at 1\le:r~:i.ncAr n;:v ~l.'" to see , ·0 11 Friday 2.:c-ternoon or '-i8tU1·d.a;r morning . I vfill advise ''OU la.i-,nr tcrc".. ;::d t . In view o"' tl At visit , I r ,co1:1nend ··ou accept Alexander bo1mdfirr t0nJgl.t wit1 out nrotest. .::.:iturtion existLw w11 en 'e arrives mav give o,·c:itioral vein·' t to your nri::tment . F.orr1ing states t 11r.t if -present Fi~t· A.rT1y attncl· s' onld bo g dovm Alexander will re:vert to orifl'~nal bouncRr;r to Higl w1:1:, 6 to Ti;:' ::;:'-t1 Army acv.once af'ter rerrouring_ lnunc}comb5ned :?i Pt' Arm_; !"JJ1d '}i p;1 t} attack. n Gruent' er to Clar}- . RN ~42 . "Your. appo:Intment r- s rpi•manent gTade Brige d:er GenerAl tc date from 1 Septem1 er 43 :,,mounced -"n ·t,,-,r DepPrtment srecial orders . Congratulntions . 11 Clar}: to Gri1ent1 er 4 R1'J /,,_6 . 11 ,'\:;,preciate your d-t.+"ficult job on tLe boundaI will 8Ccert Alexnnder 1 s proyiosBl alt· our";' it dor,s not i:o;ive me t 1 e necesst:i.r,r room to !"Fneu··er Juin. :=11clicrate t' ,et to 1 im but t' ri t I ,·rill acco17pJ.ish my mission wit in Lis restr · cted area . mell J 11in t:_e decision 1 as bPen l11:<Jde . Rave l im re:,ort to ne 8t rr;r er ~ P.re at 1000 om's tomorrow riornin~ if convenient. 1.Rdio ~'11A, and ' 8 '•ill be net . 85t now on Cc1stel LPccio at 00.5 52 . 5 continuin1; on to north-rest . Tell rarding we 9re ~lread;v- 2cross route 6 and ; ore to sta;r , Lenee revArsi.on to orirrinal boundar.r we ore will not be nece•~sar:". I ray ,ard tonio-} t . 11 r:r. 1 1 1 * * * ATTZIO-- Jtnf~ ;? , 1'144~-General Cla.rk tallr:ed over t 1 e pi one to Generals Truscott and 'fplJcer earlv t' is r1or:nin['" to GMpl asize t' et sr0ed is important; thpt tre attPc 1, toclr>.J must be rus ed to its limit . At 0'110 le rent b ,iAep to tnlk to the '31Slst RCT, vrelcoming tl em to Fift Army and e:x:plr infog to t em the importantpart t1 e 17 vroul 1. rlr:,- in t' is PTeat Fifth Army drive . T' .e RGT is compossd of t' e 116th FA Battalion, Coi"lprn:r A, 31f-it• Pnf(neArs and GompPny A, '316tr :red~ cal Battalion . At 1030 General ,Juin Prriv8d 1w cub irom ·is HePdq_uPrters for a conference wit 1 Gen0rcl GL"1r1c . .At l?J0 GenPrPls Alexenc"er ;one. H,,,rc!ing arrived. At 16!}5 General Glrirk ~lsiw to II Corps conmrnd post for P conf'erence 211.d also flew o-ver Ve battfofi9ld in is cub . After supr:er GenerP.l ClRrv.: rnd GenerPl Brann, i,,is G- 3, discussed tJ..e new 1-lOtmdPrv 1Jetween :'<'EC nnd II Corps . Br1ttle pro£,;ress i:i.nd toclay 1 s e· ents 0 e included in t: e Armv Co,.,,,mPl'lrler t s notes and tl e important messoges ~toted ~elow : 0, 11 �Ge:r.ern. l Clerk ti,,is mornin~ dictated the following notes for inclusion in his di.nry: \ "Am greatly c'!ist:'ppointed in Truscott I s attPck. His :rroposnl lPst night to rne to move 45tr Di;,::i sior. out o" the line rnd swing it Pround to Velletri was fantastic. I nut} orized ore conbat team to il.o tM. s job, and it is not vet in the P. ttpck. 'T'he "l.ttPck o+> the 36th Division f'rom r;onte Artemisio and Rocca di rPpa we. s delayed until 0030 .nnd then werilrened by tbP conf'usion of units in Velletri. I am greatly disappointed. I hrve directed Truscott to have the 1st Armored D-'vlsion rerdy on one hour's notice to ·l:ie thrown in when the seI'!bleDce of n break occurs. This is a rr>ce f',-;_;ninst time, v ith my subordinates failing to np1°reciate hm" close t};e decision will be. Two Germen Division9 !>re on the WH;7 dovm, wrich mill, o:= cour~e, swny tlie tide if they cone in before we tA..'ke the Colli Laziali. 1 "T hr,ve had Juin flown here tod1P to speed hiil' up ta, debouch on Route 6 1''ith his 3rd DIA and tl,en turn toward 1 alestrina and Cav~ • . GenerPl Alexander will -,1ot ·"'ive rrie thrit Mi:i;h terrr-in so essential to protect his ·"lank. "II Corps is mrikin/J' prop;ress. I l-r1 vc directed Fredericl<:: 1 s exrloitrtion "'orce noving east on Route 6 to fricil:itate the debouchment of the French Corps, "or I need thefr "reip;ht bedly on my right. 1 "General 1\leXA.nder and Ge:1eral Hr>rding co!"le to see me rt one o I clock. I will tell therri plP.inly ,'hat .,. think of the restrictions they rre rJ,,cing upon me in order to rti ve ,,: ighth Prmy the posit ion in t:be battle for Rone. 11 Follo,,dng Genern.l Alexancler's visit., General Clar1{ dictated t:be following: "Generals • lexRnder nnd 1{1"rding lave come to see me. They were '}Uite r,eek. I expected more of' rm Prgument f'_fter hrivinq; receiv?d certain word from General Gruenther toaay to t},e effect thnt re regerded l{ardin!; 1 s qotives with suspicion. 'ihen Alexander st"'rted tc tell TD9 thPt -if' riy Ptt"'ck didn 1t r.;o h8re not to ''Jorry; thtt ·h"" rm li• bring the ole ..,...'iiehth /,_rrny in, I told tim thrt my rttack w,"'S going, thr,t I w?.s putting t 1e French north o·"' Route rl6, that I rrobobly would be f'orced to t;:ike the 1'igh P;rotmc in tre· vicinit,r of Ialestrino becnuse I could 6-j.,.,.. not rely upon the ';ig;hth Army to be there wl- en I nseded them. I told him thnt ~\ 'l · the bPttle wo11ld 11ecessitate doing it. He said to go r:.ght ahead. I snid I ~ "1 t" would clear out o? thPt Ei..ghtl-. Army area vrl-,en tbe Britisb ca.ire along to tAke over t}ei. r respo,,silJiHty. I "ltK1e it ver· rlain to him th"'t 1-ie was sandwicring "'!Y French Corps in nortl., o-: Route ~6 nnd tr ere rrnuld :1e no room f'or the 7:ighth 'rr1:v in Ve Vrilrnontone <>rep. I ·-ent to the T'l<'P so thr.t there could be no misunderstRnr1~ng nnd pointed out ex"'ctly my underst011c"ing of' the red J ~ne b01.mdt,ry · rl'i ch f¼ru0nth9r hrs bRe:n d~ scussing rdt]:, Hardin,:,-. t-: < 1111.. 1 f HAlAxaYJ..c:er ;:iro;--..cAed conpletely in my sche'Tie c"' menemrer for tre II Corps.' r-1a1;dinc,, WP s m,=,ek rs <=i nouse. ...,_ "',"ith reference to the publicity on Ro'1e, thev left "'J'iti~ ne P copy of the followin'1'. letter (quote letter). I ,,,r.ceed to "t 911d r11>de it plain tl1 at when troops entered How'! :r "muld radio 1Fi f'th Arrriy troops :bPve entered Ron e 1 , ancl Ale,cancler 8PTeed that he v1onlc1 release it qjr11l-'-~ 11Rou<Jly ..,11 over tl0 e rorl:1 on mv say so. T lPter nould determine exActlv ,,,1 rt 'mit ,,.eacl,ed tJ,-,9re "'irst c 1cl -,r~uld so a 1mo1mce thnt. 11 ~ 1 1 Ii,. ~ •t �'T'he dir9c+,ivA from A.AI regn.rdirg rress reler,ses uron t1-ie capt-ure of Rome, 1"1,c,nti0'1ed aboV8, ~:..s quoted below: nrn orcle:c;\ + u •':!D~.n_u..,e tl1.8,t the ::,9v1s o·r"I th.e c2. .rtl1.J..~9 of Ro ...1e is L.i0-vic~ led c ue re~ri_rd to s~m.ultP'Y'IJ~ous 1~elease tLe f·o1 - in a sat~ s:fPc.cf~o=~~?" v-r12~riner '\Vit 1 1 1 lovri11g proceuvre ~,il 7- 'he -i.o.orte.-1. C<o 1sor stops rill be in:' tiated .f'o:, tl -. ::..t:. anc will 1Je o~errt::_ ve 1mtil covo:c ed b~, - releas9 h3r on reco::--cl •:r cLgrounds . n 1. 1 1 t:_rnir<; 0 ~ This ITrJ will 1-:ie guided 1,y you t:1.roughout the :xi.ttle rs to the .L:1~ release..:~ o: t; '3 f\.~')0 110 1~J:r 0'1 1,..1?-corC bt1 cl~r::ro1.Jn~se ·,ro i11Pntion vrill 1 'e 81loned of t;1s rrr\,-, rr:':,j_orialit.i, f'ormrtion, division er 1.mit wl -'Lcl1 ertsrs ]( :"~ first 1 mtil relensed b:- on record ,x,c:-g-I'otmd . 'u'",3quently e.11 co1 ~- H:i.11 1,e cu~ referr:.'rc; to any other unit other tl e..n the onP rel eased . Co·"n.·ln-1 "r, • Ge:-ernl Fift> A.rr-,;i" will inforn trjs TrQ as soon f's possible which fornation , un:'it etc., shoulc: ')e rnle~1 sed in co::.--,n0ctiov1 \ it: H?,. first e11tr:r ~.nto ~r,1'·rr~ . n 3., A speciP.l cor. 71.mi me vrill be issued sir·ultPnAousl.1 :ln London, t shj,~pto::--, ;"1_rlc'le r;Pst, AI"T!), PY'.C:c 1-ocrlly in :tt::,.ly r~no-,c_ndnt; th:cit ncrs is riori in 0 A11:ec h,'1:rir1 s . ':11.-~s cor1r 11r1~-011P wil1 1·v3 issl1ed Els 0On :·s tl..e Connanr.~nf; Cfe11e1 re.l ?iftr Ar~y c ecii:'es t1,2t T--7 -is su,..f-'~c·i 0ritly in our :-~nrl s P 1_0 ccnld not 1.L.11.der· Any circ1 1I·1.str,11.ces )8 retFw:ll'>'Jd }tl e tJn.er1:r. (1n re core~ l1r·.C 1 "" "rOl ri' anC_ 1 7-ec 1 :n tl e l'10r1·1rtl \/ia:r . t~ 0 3~f -~c~ !:._l CO":rr l?]l~ r~u8 ;iil1 be f1rrc 1I bey ; ill 9r1tviPte ::.'ror L 2 AA: and wil:c 1•e r0lee s0c' throur;l l ublic n,e1rtio·13 c::2· 1nels to r 11 co1.1cernsd sts:t'":; t},e tiI"c: tt / "d tle :;.~.-:;lePse ~s ,aY1ctio11ed . 1 0 1 -r- 1 ''4. t~l--':.k,u/ t'. o 'rorrlinP, of t';e 1-it=J.c1·gro'Pc. or t:.o sp9cie1 corrn1n~_q1..'e i'r!f:'Y be , {;l~e"Jd ·0v 7iftic Army arc' t' is I' 1 it ";•ill not 1,e pe.ssed by FiftL .Prny to t'1e tress cl·'. rect . u I:mpor-c2.r.t vessages of the day a.re 2 s ·'.:'ol1ows: G0 nere.1 '.}ruonthAr se t t},e .r-ollorri:1g rrci,,1or2nc1un to G9nArrl Clr>.rJ, tris norninr:: "Your mess[• ge (iic: not r,•et to :1e tmtil 1: 30 tr:Ls morn:· "'lg so I did not call '}•:lrETPl ;f'l1~d--tn..,. or GerPr/<J_ ,Tuin 11t t},,·,t hour ., :-: hr.d alerte,' Gm1errl Cr rr entier to ti.~ rrobnhility th;:,t yon vmu:lc 1•1P.nt Gererr.l Juin ,·t Anzio at lG:OO l\ . ;·. this '"101"~inp;. T h2ve om~ y,eople try 4 _ng to get I' r.:"11er9r to co.,,':'irn nou. �Tlny r.,..e ~:oinr: to rut 01.,.t P SJ 0c-ir-l 1on tl-,-: record 1 :-01.er e "t "b01:t lSOO tocay. '""'1°·· 'l w:l 11 ,o'•e t' e ")n"i'' r_p- 2rnrs fer 1 J·n,, but ::: t' .;n}• t'1"·:; it i'1r:-11msatisf'r-ctory p·:-rqnge ,t~rt. A"": '1as P ru:;__e thPt tr.e cC'nrun .. 1w ::,_nc;': C'1. tr 9 record mn~_;erif' 1 will close "'t noon, i.e . , evnrts ur unt:i 1 ncion • • OW0V";r, they rf'rely r:itjcr to ,I.' rt t'rin li: it, 1 1:1t t}li.s t.;'"'J.P, ~h1rer~'1.; ·1sod -tt 9.S PYJ. exc·-1rie, .:.t .'.'oms . I hn.d Lel"" .,__,ry t(: cr.rri~e ~'1ru1n,r~r v, b,1t witr 10 luck . - cljd no~~ c'l:.~~ f· rclln; bec~use - co'1r;~c'ered it irrrpro,,rir>te to T""tf',r~ [)Jl ir, 1ll8 0~ t,1ic-- C~Se. 0 ~'e c<qJrs +;. 1 1"t G,.,,er:il Ale'>~9.n, Pr h"s ir:1 ·os"cl tle tFel VP, O I clock ti,-,,9 "'...:i.n't ',P,(''lUS'"' 0-. ROT' 'l et·J:;9 T;"'t'1 '1 • ~i ;' tr ~r ;" to ! rve lr·l:.0 c ph•Y-os ·~1c> ·n: 'eri tr9,' '1,,,ve ,,,ot r-.lw,,~rs bee11. tco "'ecure . ·.,:e ,-1.,rJ.t''l t1~~ tl8 •r.-,r,,tri r91.8E'Sa ~ulc: }-'>W~ 1"'1 to 1.<>Vf' 8-GY'9rP::.. Alp"'rr/er ' " "rrrovr 1 . llLem :u<J'!- c..,1_::._,c1. 0 tc,lc1 L~·rn tc t91.?'0, ro n111·tl .-r --icti.o:'1 . .~tl tr is PX('8l i1=mc~ he},ind r,1e -- be 1.; ev0 I 1 11 1:-e "'ble +,o r nc... :.e t1, 1 1en er se F3E'~~. sf'" ctc,r~ ly ,. .Hl do it ,7~t' out '::P'lS~r~ A "·1ss . At PPY rqtn 1 1 r ·ive :i-1-; ~;,p r•rocl olc' col}9r,e t-r•y. It.,. 1 0 0 11 ::- nn do~-~ 11 ~Ad O"lG'l" YOU.I' -nro7vtion. You 0ertPinly r'lrned it. 11 ti~I to Al7 Co•1cerned . R" "'t 1115 . 11 Ger11·('l fl')XP'l'er r'"''1 r8Ci)j7"cl thP 1 1 l "'V8 rece·'. v0c. t'ie "ollo' iri[' ~esf'ollo ·ir.,. "'"'S"l"t'{P "ror, Gen'1rl'l f:i_}i:-011: 1 1 rer . sar,;e ·ro7 GEnerP.l isT1ro .,,eP-i~s. Battle h,~YJ.ninP' in TtP.ly or. :•::-;r l:' l1~s rJ.rePdy ,·rC't:;r~rnsed f,9,r 0 >1ou·1 to cl,..sJed E'S c mr:-j0r A.llied vi.ctory. r"'fi.c"rs rn' ot:1fir r""l' s o·" ~11 ,._} re~ s~·-vicee cn l of• all }lE'rticiratiris=: n..,tio:vial .;t-'."''1 11:=>ve r0acon tr f'eel ;":i. "Ud of t;w f'"J''Vice they r"ve rf',rder8d tr-e co~10:1 C'1U'1e . C0.,..t11inly t11jr ur.ol9 co.·,ari is roud of tr.en . Ile:=i.se ,o;ive ny rersorial "'elici.ta-l:;for~ to t'1'} Cor':r11JrU~rs o": all three C:"!rvices. bnc.s . I !'<'IV<") repl-;Ad ~r ~b:> nollou:lnr: t~'Y•r.is. 1ei:;:rs. er, 1 Ah.-,p' of e:_::. rc'1'reo QC> the tl:c·Ae S"''·v~ces -:ie-"Vi"l~ ·YJ.-;;L~ ~:,.,,lit~rr"n <tr t.r'£'Rtr0 I -::-'1!'1''1-~ you or your "'elic'btions .<>nd Prrr,:,c~;:,t,ior. o ... -:r"'ir e~fort in tr e F"'sent b<>ttle. ~ve17one ~l'J. f;fertt i-ieart nYJ.d deter!"linn.d f'·'.nic;h onf thn CPIDfl"i[;n , Tl~e f-':rst pl'"Se of nl., ch.\ PS 'JC' snccesci ' ..1:1_ tmd~r VCPu· ccrJn"nc· l"'st :rer:r. 'nc,c;!'' 0 ,A 1 Genor('l rrrucmtr.-r S"nt tl0 .::'ollo·•ir,;todt=>y: enorrrc:.1u1 to rP.,.erE"l :1'1 riid-mornini:i; ''1 . I t11ll(0c1 to Ger,Prr>l 'fr-rrli:'1F' "'!""[11,n r few TlrJ onts (''";O . Ge110r"l flcxnric '"-'r hes 'ec'J.ed to 2'l'1fOrir t 1,e tnn0·mceront o+' .Lr,.,, "18U bounlnry until r,...ter :ii q cov,_ ... _re:'1"e ,, · tr you. Hn['r1'·hilo T ,,, ve '10t ifieo U e Fre11.cl~ of Ge11.""'rti.l ~lexander 1s tentr-tive oec~sion so t~Pt +,reir O'f'errt::or.s cnn 'ie concltcted in tre lirht o' +r,·t in~c,r1~<1t.,_on. ~ou, of course, ,,,ill "':Ve c'etc,iled iYJ.f'tructiors t0 G"'lri"TPJ Juir. vl•en you see l in tl is mc,rn:rg . Jn my c''<1cuss~ors witl' irprd~rig +,}e J01nt •rp not f'ettl0c' to ,.•ve us ]:l, -t l " :,o lcl me reP 1 ly amou,,tec! t},e ..-r-=e•1 boundr rv l>ey0ncl. tbe 'T' i vc li rrer . tot'"s: "'h,t Fll d' t, 3 r>r<>p to -1,l e :--rt r f th, roe' 1 ·De rtr.,,,-t-.;_np ,ri_t½ the Ii ,:l •rpy 6 roFd jul"'c-l;io:-1 ·-oPlC' he cv~i. 7 ,,11le +o us . In :: 1 "tPr di ,cuss::.on 1 e jrcl-icBti=>cl tkt ~;igl,tJ,1 Army w0ul<l :'1PCd s re ror>d'l -'-;o tre 1e':'t 0~ the r;reen line �_,vl e 019:""Elt· .. 7 · _,_ 1.OTlA._ 1·0n1.c:::,.r9renvS O ~ .._, e -r.i•r-1-,. JAr,.,..·r lt- ,., d been"' t·,..-"~ed • I took ,, ~ 1.,r I'.'. ofl J ,:,.L-' -that -i-,c- ner..n thl"t, he "rris prer-u·.:.1g " 'PG~e c;o ·!:,J-.-:-t t:1e Eighth frny bourdrry cculd ,1fl sriStnd clo'1'1l' townrd t:19 ori[":im:il on' Pt suer time PS r:ip-1 t be exr-=erH i:-rt "'er '.iP"l~t· Arey. I djn rot ,'iYl rflr0j11 g c1o::'1 on tH_s roint bec,.,use t't tl'·e time 'he brouP-l·t it ur- ::: ·mew t: --t Ge'1ert1l Ale:xrnr'er n>..s going to see you +,oday, Pnd :r f'elt thRt it VTas n ratter t11r>t you coul'l 30,ttle quite ersil y wit:~ him as yo 1r co'1 'e:rerc1-; developed . : rry he e'1+;:·rely wrong in estir.rtino- r9rclir>" 1s ;ntention in tl-:i f' rnrtter but I r>m incl.;neC:: to regf'rd hi"l motive w-i_tl; •·usric·ion . 'fril·e my o"'inion for v1hrt 1t rP.y be rort''l . .L' 1 n3 . vn1e1 I tol(l TT~-;_•"i11P- ti-js morn.;nr tb=it the AleXcnrler bounr'<iry does not r-.;ve vo11 the n-,cessai·y room to TW'1E"1Ver tre T-'re11cl1 he +,cld rn th!'t GenerPl AleJmnder ray ru ·ge"t [lt t1--1P. con{'erenc8 tod<:i.:, tl-wt ~le T're'1ch Gorrs t!'J<:e ()Ver some o:' tl'e nreP. ~.on occup.:.Ad by II Corrf' .;'1 thP vicin~tv of v~Ln J::.'( -C . 'T'l is s}ift ·muld P,T'"lble t'1e II Corpri to co"lcentrri.tP P. h:,!J.v:lPr ef~ort in tl,e ::-tte.ck on '::olli LE'z:.flli . re furtl,er strted tr--it -1-; i_,, rrrri11-;e"1t'nt r-~ ,c;ht enr'ble vou to const.:.tute an Arry reserve ,,hicr •rou.Ld ~er!"lit you to hPve cont'nuity o-n ntt11c'c. I [''lSUl'ed l'i.I'!l t1 ,.,t you T ere nt..11.r aw::i.re o:" t 11e imrortPYJ.Ce of' C1-1f't11rjw tle Colli lFziPli ;"'ea·;:.ur8 nrd Urt you 11ere :;ush:n: th;:,t Pttack rd th alJ. o,.. ti,e vi ~oi- vou t assess . "IA ,~urther sbted th, t G•;nernl A::.eXBncler consj derHd t,' 1at , f' 1 tl-iough our trooT.>s l r"/8 '1."de a J "'netrntion of tl e er.eriy de fsr"'e ;-,osi.tio11 , ·t } rs not y9t bee"! (eer ,,...,_OUP"1 to ~1'..sure tl1.c-t 4:.l:-'3 enemy ,1ill not be Pbl.e to sel'l ·t o·n"' • : ~nterrrP-t d t',js ...,i1 ... se 0 • ~l·e diocus-:;ion PS an rttA"1pted .,..,e:r talk on t1e necessit·..r ~f e.xrloit.;ng c11rrent S'lccesses in t17.e Cori Laz-'al i erea . 7 mn cr,11"'-idert t'1rit ;,rou ·.rill be :>ble to 'l1r'ke en ader,uate pref' 1=mtRt:i.on on +,l is ;i1b5"lct 1 /!'e"l Gerierr 1 J\le,canc' er arrives . 0 0 11 4. I told you lnst nir'l t trlf't G2:-1.err-i 1 Al8XFnder w.ill rrobMbly A.rri V':l "'bout 12 : 30 n . ri . too.:ciy. : <>rc'U.nr; now st,.,tes th~t Generrl U9XFr er is hr>ving SO""A Polish di.f'+'1.c·1.lt11-;s Pr.d th'1t l'is arri.v<>l 'rill rrobr,hly be clelnyAd . :re bas -:~ve:1 an -;TA s:10rtly r>:t9r 1:00 r .m T shell k"e:r in cny,stant touch ,fith . ldm, bec,.,use I rep li.ze how this lmcertnin arrivrl ti::''e "Till t 4_e yoG to your o 'f~ ce . -r ,·ill send you a nl.? sl. -~· ~ inute - c:m g:i ve you .?-. 111ore ·i ntelli r;ent esti. w-2te . 11 0 Ge:rierrl Clrrk sent tl-,e +'ol 1.ovr~ng ne111or1>n<lW1 to Gener, 1 r..rt..enthsr this qfter11.oon : "Received yo·rr r',rr:or11r. :u-1 of ::.015 h'JUJ'S encl 1·rr-<1 ,.,.7_,Mr1 : rr>cl. :5t ')P.fore Alex and Fn•rlinf" Prri ved . A'1 sn0r es ":.l e,f CF:'1P. 1 l!PVe Al PX tl e situRtiot1 , ,r} icl rle1?s8c< M.n gree.tly, ard he indicrted conrlete "Ccod 1?nr1 P.Y1thusiN1m 1it'1 ri:v emrloyme11t of II Corr3 , r,ar+.ic·J.1.rr·l y , A.nd o:" +,: e effort of the "'"1th Pivision ·in the VI Gor:is . r.:re rrtrer ~'1<l: ctitec'1 V1"'-+:, i" I did riot ;,,rih:i 11 ro of tri s ~1ot to •r0rry, thrt t,},e ~;iphtr frri.v "'oul1 <>gc~in C()re tn r·r rescu"l . I let t~1 P"1 lrve :lt pl,ntv rt -!:,l1Pt-ti"18 . I tol~ then t} rt J} l'IG_ 'hr r Ju:in lerR , WPS rutt"'ne; }1im in e11.1:,t o+' V:1 lnontone <ind nort' of R011te ·16, t;irt le •· oul<l trlre the h-' wJ-, -~L•011.rc" in the Palestrina ernP 1:-ecriw·e +}-,e Jritish 1 :oulrl n"t be tr ere . Tie ::;a-:d 1 ri_u~te rill r~ght 1 jus~ so-:" got out o+' th3 wFy :i.n thRt Rrea wlien trey did come un . He su-;r·ested I us9 the I'rench nflrt w2 r soutr of R011te t6 . I to 1.d h-i m "I ,oul.d rt8 0. mv mm corps bounrl-"l.r-i "~ "c; tri.P sit urtion r"eve:.oJfi<:'l '-,,lt thr-~, qssuredly the Fri:mch rro""bly could rele 0 9e -':.re ?rd D:ivision to me for oth0~· use . 1 1 �139 11 '.::'hP~r as:V.-ed "'IY r-rrrovF>J. on a IRC relee.se on the rews of Rome. I quite arrr0ed Tiiti1 lt pnc,_ nrir,e tre 111.tin tl:'At 0'1. "'IV \'lord to t} em they would relerise 1hnt :. '1'11red f'or. 1 11 Ju::..n v•as t·11e n.nd tr.oroughly tmd0.rstoof.. my rosition. I told Mm ~·e uould conf:irn my instructions to hiT'l in an CI and th t as re found it necessary to go nortl: into tre Br-i_tisl' sFictor l,e ould do so in accordance with t 11e si tun.tion. "fart of tl' e 7t:1 In..fantry is goin~ t0 ?ttr:-c1r PPlest:d.no t'ris ;,fternoon. AnotbAr lx>ttelion is go:ng to .:-ttac1 Cnve. "'hey rire cl_ose to t ose two roi:1ts Pow. Howze ras been directed on t:re road junction on ~.oute J1,S at 01.,.. 5 5 5. 7. ~en I t h10w d en h"' ni 11 get there, hut s ,e no rearw11 uby he sboulc' not be t1'ere by :1ovr. ~in.lker I s two re,:,·mo11ts iu.n.,..ed o,..f frir Racer; J.; I flrr t½.is norn" ng f't rbo 1 1t 0()30, and they l:rd '""'de slovr rrop-ress accord::r.,; to t'·e ::.Pst rerort, du"' to difficult terrain. Heve i'u:t +,H~ed rith r-r,ruscott who .Jays ·;alker -· s con~ident he rill rePc1 ½_js obj~ctive • .,. ½ore '1e i'1 rir,l,t. Still stjcky witr tre '34th and !/>th. 1-re1TM prepElred tr go bflck in wl1 qn the 4'5th hr:is nc.Vfmcec:1 ri little bit fnrt:""'r• "'1 ere 1 s too much +'fr:inr corfre; fror ~t. 11 T ?ddresserl tl-e '361st Conbat r"enm t} is r10rr. ·nr·. H2ve about decided to £!~.ve -;:,} en tc Luci,m to be ·n a ce-f'enr;j ve role ·11ortr of Velletri while tre r:bole 36ti1 poes 011 its vray. "'hrt leaves =8 ~p;r :in Fi.tr. Jon, Chr-ncy F.nd Fal as riy l\_rrrv reserve. , ., 11 Sure will be p.:lrd w}f'l"' we p.;et tof$etbr.ir. It ,d 11 ei.ve r1e an orrort1 mitv tc, n!'ly you the '10 w~li cb yo'l 'lPY I owe you flnd w' ich I, as a cif~Di .:ied rer,,1a11ent Ge~er2l, could not 11:ford to c<eny. IJm1 l P s consnnted to ½e riy aide P fter tr e vmr ,: en 1-" ,.,.oes b.<1 ct to heinf a rer~~rent I~jor. Keep up th ;cor ucrk! 0 11 F. S. I LPve jmrl, reBd ·•nrc1.:-~· 1 s directive to ··,e - tuhject, -ress RP leP ses - Cart ure of Ro"'1e - Ar. send · np; you a cor. - of it. You cnn l r:, ve [' corv Il1f'c'e "or ;vourse 1 :::· nno retur 1 this vre tc me. You T,rj 11 riote in f'BTt>P_;-.caph ld i e P"'nounces that 1fl.o~·,e is ro r ~J,. Alliec.. Lnnds 1 • } 9rpgi'1.phs b and c rAad I Cur P.dvancec< eleren+ s I etc. I 2 s1':ed LnrdinF anrl ;\ 7 c:irender i.:' ~.;hey meant thflt tl1e '11'1"'1e o:f the /Jrrv ·vras not to be rAle.0 s,t', anc they "aid 1 0h, no I fine told rr thet ·, woulri. send in a stt.te"10nt to th~ effect t'l-i.nt adw rce elerte11ts of the ';>j ftr Arr-y nre nou j n Romo, A.l1l' lA.ter, Ror '1 is 11r1vr in F · fth Arr1y r111nfs. The r ni.--rPed t},1t Fi t1-, !'lrriy vroulc-1 be used. roTrever, in this rar,r yoll no+,e they cn.re+',1Jly flVo:~c tlP use o!' 1:::-'ift: Arrry 1 n.ml ,r,v 1Allies 1 • You en 11_ r. rclinr . ; rL"": •d.iP+,Bly, tell him :- r' on I t "'r-rree to -!-;his rcrer .. . ; tb regflrd to rrir8g:rqrl 1, nnl9"'S +,hey nre, -'.1::.~n/'; to ·nclur'e in +J:9ir stn~omrnt t 11rt t' e advrnce 0ler"';nts 1,elonr, to Fi :'tr· Arr1y. Yo·, ':row I don 1t l nve m1...ch cc:rfj/ence jn :iim re1d wulr r.ot ')e surr:ri.sed ·1 f tl-ey oPJitted tl-e .:-i"'tli Arny. ""'Kl -!;}is ~)oi_v;'- clear +,o •1;.,,; tl[t TTrnr. Fi"th Army nfvcnce elA"19i'ts e-rpror-c-r, er.tP.r a'1d SF'C'll'~ R0,..,, e '"1e giv011 t'1e full credit :'..n t',e ~irst stRtenrrnt rr,d no orriittinr, Fi "tL Arr)". 0 1 0 · 11 ~ou •il::. P.l"'o ..,cte n ~9.rr ;rql? it i='f'Yf 1 rc "1"':rit5or w:ill 'e elloved oft'~ A:::•rl'T, r'l.tior lity ••.•.•.•• until r ler ed b_r r,~ t' E rec01nrl ½ c 1 ;ronrd'. ·•,,,· n ~1U'e thPt 1h')11 ::- •o-,d t:ier1 t"'E" +'~.Y' "t ·r ~orr-Ptior r 3 ' o·• -1-1 n ., ncor- · 0 0 0 1 �bac,:ground anc1 sb.te t'e:;ri. J,-:ly th.rt Arosr:'. C' 1 ,,::;,_e,,,e:1ts · e:~" t: e :ir-,-+;, t:1"y be -twm +,1 e crPd;t. 11 :t. Cl.81+ to Gru0 nthor. T " tlf>r~c~al · , :cv~LCe Force' 0. t to Colle Ferro. Too'• 200 pri.,0•1f-r.; w " bAve jc ~ v • 'rencl_ t' ·r ,. T9" l Juin to us} ~ e·•or+,spbnrt 'it'1 r Jl ~r00 l ·11i R.0•1' 0 () tcvrrrrl. VPl.1110,1tone. •Te tcrw lr ,,.., le:.r E "ert : ned~Ptely. ,., '"'V"l .1..<i.'·0r ••o mt CPr9.so ..,'1, F~or0 1-::,t· oen 0'; rr' 00 erst_· bs rrC::. 0354 rc.,..tri::1 s. ~5t>1 i'Tl 1es or ~ro'i1 +; "".'9 on Lr ..o tP''Ylcla 0.456 "':-o::-·i ·rt. :1nn8n':.s 351 Pnc' 1,,99 astrirJo :lout,:;'> bPtW""'n ()') EYi.c' C,~ 8a-,t·rgs. TPn 1 'S be1- j11.' -i-; -:n. :f-;qve d-t..rectod Troyes -i-,0 rus', · "'st v~ c-nrourl:~ ,i.lc"~ "'cute 6 tc'7orro • r•rve citor<'.3: '3rcl :5":·'"'~o'.'1 1 _.. ~usr on CPve A. r" r~:ns ...,ri·· . . . ill :et '3rd cort··nuc 4:.'1'lt. 1 0 Clfr1 • 4io l"'r1...~ntlor. l' 55. •r•r.,ve ':Ve1 ,,,>l CIT' to "\TT Cor1 s to hld "irn he se "rtr- -~t("'"'i ·1 01 ld.le Y'>th "d*!7C8S. ~St 1 [T ro--~r-"tely 1., ~-f'way Ero ... tl~re to Roccn I•: }A.pi.• ''o"'e ~o --;"'"':. '".l•no:1 ·n PP.;ri..11. tono-r•:..·ovr if 4')t: r'1W'nces. ,t:icky the:ce to 'ay. J <:ive ~01,1 r C"Pr": 11.0', to -<11-e any 11'(.:r-c rB pests 1 withort rrr R,1t' or~ty. ,:1rn I r 1 ' -"o= the.i r:iref':ter, yo1... tel: ·:.,: 3m T want trcr a:r prove(. ·tr r•ques4:.s 11ill ~e fe r nrc: far )Gt\ "E'n . J"' e .cr1y not reir norcod i'' ~-,,v·t 16 ro·u·s ·i:J. 1°or'"' tc crt"'!'- '1~n h,re. If 1," :.s "e~11?0rced ,1 ii::. err c:. \-' :"l arrywe.y. 11 0 ~ 'J:u1 r·al Gru.entLer ..,c :. t1·e folloni_ng r omorandnr to Ge~1or11l ClPrk late t):iis evening: 11 ·1any thanks for yo'IT 1520 r:,er;-:o tM s c'ate. of your corference -:r.i. th Alo:>."Ul'lc1er nm Hr :n1 'ne. It ga"'c'1 ' r ,_::(; :rL ·t. T :tc-' ·.:.. - "Len brought rie a cop:r of tre ' rress role:,se--copture of Ror,e I rarer tl·is Pfternoon. :rt is quite n coincidence t1 2t I raised the sane c::uPstion: 1· There is riftr ArP1y r:.~ntioned? ' Le~1 has s:5.J"Ce ndvised re th:ot the Fifth Array refere'1ce w~ 11 1')e T"'ndA. 1beyonc1_ t, n sh~dc' · of E doubt 1 • Ye says tht Paimvarin-,; 1·/I'ote tre raper, e·1d was a bit dizzy--not m<'llicious --at the time. L9r ~ s qui tc certr, in thrt tr.e lett0r hri s G1 renlv gon0 out, but he i3 ch0c1<inr,. I can 1t get F2rd:i n(l' no1 T, bi1t ~ sl1nll talk to him later toni~ht or first thin[ in tri=, rnorn:'nr: concerning tr is rmtter . 11 Fard1ni:; cellPd r~e sh,rtly a.(>t0r t'e returnnd fror H.r Anz:1 o vis~t rnd str>tef th.nt GenPr1:,l Alexander hrc1 notrj nq but the } : vhest rrEJ~ se :'or the v;r~y in ,,.,HcJ~ t 11e Anz··o or"'rntjons are 1,ciritt co"'ducted. Ve 3t:-'ted it \··t1 suer a s~ncere tonn thrt I :>m certein hP r-eprt w}rt Lo "kid . l'o" could ::i.t 1Je c,trer'Yi.se? To'1~ght :- a'r~ reell7 most opt·ir'!:istic . ~ t}in}--tkt tr9 success ,•,.ich ne h9ve )wd vesterday r>rid torlay has "11 rkcd tre t1rrninr: rofo.t ~:n tl~in bf'ttle. For ri:• p.-,,rt I ['m th~011~ 1~"' r~y }-['tin tre 'l:i.1~ r,nr' vellin- 17 Tip Mp roorey '. ··110th9r T an unrhf'L:r optin~ st:i c or not, tle nAxt feu do -,,, ~·~ 11 tell. JTorr0ver , I rust tell ;ro11 t'. 2t I '"'"'Ve r,b,ol1 tte Cr'11f'i,1 ,:mce tl·,,t you b,ve d~rectec1 the bPttle ·n n r1astorful fashion . I 1;:no·.. th· t G"rr-rn rA;i.1~f'orcomm1ts ar0 on tl e vm-r nrd j t :ls 'Y'O..,r>bly a tcuch-rnd-go •;•tt:r ,, tl r tlA' ":..lJ. rrriv9 in tine or not . Fo•1ever , n7 r:onn~r is on ~.?r1· · 9Jrne Gon"'lrPl Clt:,r'= first, 111st trd alnavs, and I rm only one of tlousarcls who ere ;:,inp~ng yo1Jr yrr>:'se. :: note vd th pl,-,asure thPt the 1st Arr.ored Di vii=;ion is r bout reM':r tc, go bac1( 'n tJ~o 0 ray. "?ro:-1 t'lis detrch,d t'lP.d inaderiu:=i.te observri.tion rost I nm �J:,op·· ng tb=1t th0 cc nclitions "rill be suer as to "'[Irr rt y0l1r :---uttinr Harmon in on tl c richt fl;:,nk . I feel thr>t -· s ,1}1 er0 ,rnin c11n 11 'mch the kr.ockout blou . 111 e-;.7'."ect to f'ly to our n ,,~ c0r'""Fnd }'O,t tnno~·row ev9ni.n · nbout 8:00 rrovj r1.ed co' rn.m-i crit-' ans are F<'•r'dn~ et that tine . e sb:i l l h_.-,ve everytr:'vict -'n rearl:'ness for ',ou by noon on Su,vic'n7. Yonr v, n nill :'_e[lve SPtnr dfl" P1orninr;, Pnd sllonld be instrlled ·n.ot later thnn 7 : 00 tor1orro 7 evenjng. \'9 s1- all Rll be mrn:it haprr to be to1ether o::;;ein. It has been a rather he ctic t"TTie but our 11gony hRs been noth-'nry conp;:-rec1 to yours . 1 11 T note th t you :u•e hu~lding ur a defense :'n connection w:th the py-:""·:mt o+' th1:1t '10 bet . I 1-:no'T tkt it ust be c,wbarr[iss;ng tc- ;;ou to contenp1tte t',e nonotonous refJ'ularH,y ·-rr,icl marks tl~e success of rlnost fill of •w P,Amblin': venturDs . In ~ 1 is ccse I r-u.~t ric1nit that I r:=>c' P v:i!'tuti.l c:.nch . Hitl• the F1ith Prrn:r C['I1f"'i.gn r,oing so 'ell ~t was .;n<wit""bJ.0 tl,,,t you s}•ould 1·,e conf~ rned prior to Ju"lc? 15th , so :rrc con scit=mce really botlvTs ne . I 1 11 .. te 1 l ~rou ·-rhPt we'll do . Orie of Colonel ru.nt~nf,-ton 1 s friends brought a J'l'lCh:-p.;e ;ve-=itcrdr-r sa~dnrt, ' I ' ve brourht soT 1 0 linuor for Generl:'1 Cl::irk and you '. ''h0.p I orn:med the fPC 1 :cge I fourd t}.-,c-t tl-~re ,... ere three bottles of bourbon . 1 ror1 1101 1 in +l'f~ ~wrld can ,,e divide up t}u·ee bottles anoru5 t•"'o people? ~,fter cons:.derable coi;itation I hnre "rr·· ved rt U 1e solution tb1t one ½ottle ~-rill go tr you , one bottle njll cto to ne (a:_;:,:=-;, :tt h~s n.lrord;t bee-,1 c( nsur.1ed ! ) rind tre t 1 ird bottle vdll he 11s0d "'or c cel9brat7 on- -let I s say on f'-onr:a~r n:l ,.,.ht , then "e ' 11 cancel all bo~s . Ho'' about it?" * * * A'TZTO--,JTPP. 3, 19/.;,L,.-- Aft er sturl~·inG bP.t,tle rerorts [Ind crrfcrring w:th Gene ral Brann , Gerern.l CJ.ar 1' left to visit e.11 di. v:sion coI1!'le.ri(1ers of the VI Corvs . At 0010 he 3tor,J eel at the lot Arl'lored :Jivision conFmd rost r:rd tall:ad v :lt}1 General :I8r111on . Gen0ral Hr>;rmon he.d "SSer1 bled his unj t cori1Yn' ers arcl '"Jas prep"r8d on ver-r short notice to coI11nit },j_c; di vj sion on the left of t}1e /,5th Divj_sion sector . Generr 1 Clrrl· disc11ssecl his r 1r ns c nc1 emrhrisized with Ge 11cr2l r:'rron He necessity -ror ri;,,-rensiveness , tl 1 "t t,nr1 ry ·,p~ th"' clry th;-t ·~o mu'1t TTP 1"9 nn all- out ef'fort lv:if orP tl 8 Bocl e co ult' br' n 'I UJ l,~::; re i1:."orcemcnts . Aft0r .b8 7 e+'t t is cor rnncl rost h:., "ent to tJ10 !~5th D~ vision COFman.rl. rost p·'>( t:11)-0<'1 •;Ur Grneral Br ;r;les . } e [ [;l' in er rhr si?:ec1 the n0ces1=:d ty of ~-us1,,ini:.~ all - out , bri.nging out, th~ fact t1crt jt, was ;mperFtivR thrct t}·e :1.dvn.nce CC'ntinue to +1 9 1orthrrest. Fro.,, the ., :;th i1ivision commr,,-y:i rost ~10 ,-,e.-1t to tlw Cf o.c> the 'ii.th Di vision -here J-e conferred ni th Ge'1er£' 1 Ryder :=i.nd ::ipr·in enpk1s, zod tb:~ nece--;sitv ..,or nn all -out attrck toce_y. The rords wern v;;,rv c',,sty, f"1C t,} r,r<; ,.,:,s rnuch !trtillcir;,r ·f'~rirg throughout tb0 division arert·s . 7 :'ron t},e 111-th I'ivision GP he rroc8er]ed irr.""ediritely to trc 16th Div:i.sion rost norti·, of VelletrL T'nrout~ to tr P, -;:6th Di vision ttere 1,ms "'Virlence of nucl· clestrnction of Boche rr.et0r" '".ll. Bocl"A Pnrmnition mis left ,'long t}'e ron(1s-' de , rnd tr ere "'ere ,tj 11 so-·1e G-ernnn deivl tr",t rP<.:i not been dis posed o"". At th" Y)th Division corr•''"'Pnc post h'=l trilked · jt,11 Ger,er"l 'r,l1 ~er concern-inc• th~ 8Xcell8nt •Tof'!'CSP t 1 1rt Ve ·~6th Division hN1 rrde . "}1ey hed secm·ed pr act icri lly tre entire sout11err, ::--ortj on of the Co111 Laz~ r li and r ere pus 1·ing ahee.d to t.11e north~;est . He enphr,sized ;:'.th GenF!rPl FPlkt?r the comror;·nd 1 �necessity of rushing ahead vir,orously and at the sano ti.."le ·wiping out all Boche pockets of resistance between Lave Albano and L ke de 'fomi. Gencm=il Clnrk then rroceeded from the 36th Division co!'lm~nd y:ost back to his cvm cor1ma.vid rost at Fett1m.o. Be arrived thArc nt obout 1330 and conferred brjefly Tith Generr,l Barr, Chief' of Staff to General Devers. At 1430 GenerP-1 Sevill9 caF!e in to see him and talk about tbe air effort that was being "lade. Tac R had reported heavy GPrrnan '"1thdrmw1s to t1,e northwest toward Rome. Our artillery fouJ'ld rany lucrative trrgets on '-{j ghvmy #6 and plnced nurderous co:"lcentrat-ions on c0pn;Aste;d Gorr<-r, traffic on th"t Mr-,h my. The ~ gl-'ter hornhers rnre also ",rking on thi"' tr1:.'''fic. After GenerPl Savil19 left, Ge'leral Clrir;r cor+>crred i.1i+, his G-1, G::rv,or;:11 BrPnn, for the balP.nce of tl e afternoon. 1 Colo'1el Clr>1' 1 , Fift!, Ar-my l RO, CR.me in on sever::i 1 occ8:1io.,.1s to corf er with Ge:r8ral CJrr 1• reference on-tJ1 9-record hncb:::round cOTrr u..n.i me:=- to bo role1: s9d ~nr n 1 so to ...,~ 'ce arrcnP-e:-r-9nts for r 11otot',--raph3rs [ind c, rresponde'lts to acconpan;r qeJ'1f"'>i'r> 1 C1Pr1· -into 1.or.ir> 1,;hen the Fiftr Arr1y enters the city. After surror Go''i?ral Cl['r' · con+>erred son8 r,oro w~u, his G-3, General '9rann, and Ms G-?, Color el Hana.rd. Ge,1ernl Cl_prk was a little Pnrehensi ve "'bout th0 right nortl ern flr>n 1,. of' II Corrs, and he taU·od \"~th Generel Y.oyes on several occasions concernin?- t},is r;-atter. He wanted General Keyos to be co,~tinuall y m'l11re o ... tbis threat. BA al.Jo tr 11':ed vrj t, G "'Oral Gruenth,.,,r and ··anted tl c Frenc}- Corrs to s1oed up t}1 e 1rd DIA to add Pdditionrl ,rei1.:(1t to t'ri s t}-!re;:-t to tr e nort), f1Pnk. 0 1 1 I-Tigr]j d1ts of torlay 1 s bEittl9 rros=rress indicr-te thPt tl e p-ercrrl brerikthrough t0nard :,.ome vfit}, all of t}'e Colli L."l.zia1i in our lwnds a"ld the Bocbe in a prec['rious rosition. He still offered cons~ derc>ble resistrnce :in the /+5th and ~4th rnvision sectors sout}, of L.-=1ke AJ.bc no. 'f'here wa,; tre y-rob_ .,_1,il~t" thrit t>1 0 encny 1 s commu11ica.tion syst0-m had fDiled co:rny1etely and thrt these isol2.ted i:r,i~oups in the south vmre U..""l[1rmre o-f' t• is brePk-through to t' o north o•" LaJro AJ.b0no. Tndicctions are that tl is resistance on the noutl wil1 witrdra':i- tonid·t r-nd trvt our o,dvnnce to Rol'""e .rill be fast. Important messages 0f tho day Pre as ro11o,,,s: AAI to All Concerned. W-J O.?851. 11 To enable Fiftl· Army t(' dovelor its operatio'1S in trA Prea. west o:' Vn J.Jnor:.tone the inter-arr(, bcund['ry , i 11 be r,oved '1ortrwerds to t''A fo1.loniri:; i:ren0ral line inclusive Fiftr Arrny ro;,d junction 2634q2 exclus 4 ve Fift), Arr-:r rc::id jru1ction 2':,?L.82 exclusive Fifth Army ro::1-d Fnliano - Csve - F· e:.::trfori - GPll ~ ceno - Ro::i/l junction cnorn2. Fi.-:.'tr /-rr:yv,ill howr;ver hnve tnrninf" rji:;}·t 011 rc,rrl C·vo - In1-1strina GP 11; cr-,no till "":ighth Army troors ree ch tb~ c~vc 1.rct1 \7t An th1t roPd ui11 poss to complete c0c1trol of "'ir;rth ftrny. If CG, F 4 +'t}, P,.rm'r f-in,'s : imself unPble to drive thA ener.w off th0 Colle I!"lziali fe;:,tu.,..e c1l,r.;11g the next few da;,rs h~ ·-•ill rer,ort tl'iS fc>ct b-· most imr~0d' "t'-1 s:: p,nal to ti is reN qm,rters reronti.,.r; to Eig},th Ar'"!Jy. In th.'."t P.VeY,t ~i~},th Army Fill trlrP. over the front dmn to the originrl tn+,0.r-Arl'ly boimdrn~,,,. fl'1.C1 " coribfr,~d r-tt1" cl' by botr Arr'l"' es ,1ill be ctP "'ed. I:1 1:1ny ovon.t wheri the '"''19ry hr· s 1)e<>n north of tro roPd 1lome - Tivoli t} e origi.,.11A.l ~nter frny bound ry "ill be ro·n.,.tituted to "mal,le r~ r.;rth Arny to r1['~ ntriin its form,,,tions in th,,,ir 110v"11ce northvmrr's." 1 �Gruenthor to Clark. R'I 361g. "Your instructions delivered to DeMontsabert by Juin. Jrd DIA has eler1P.nts 011 re ilror d bet, ·een 15 and "0 castings. Repu 1 s~d strong counter fl ttack f'rori east on M Ii sso but lost 5 ligl,t tr- nks . AdVl1nce rrill be res·tnod 1:1t first 1 :i F;rt to ,r>rd Valno:rtone to nnk0 co'1t;:-,ct with 0 1:raniAl. 11 Gcnr,ral Gruontrer tr-is mornjng sent the followinf r.1nr1or;:,ndum to General CLnrl-s: 11 AAI received the follo"ing telegr, rn from AFHQ tris nornin.c!': 1ItequAst li.£ s been r.r de bv r oli sr' Co:t1tG;-:ir,der-in-Chief in London ancl indorsed by GIGS that a d~trchTient of the II Polish Corps p1rticiprte in tl~e Emtr;,.r into Rome. Please conf:irn th,t rtecessary action "fill be tn.ken 1 • I told u~rding that you werA not planning on any formal entry into Rorie; thrit you were r,..~marily conc'3rned w-:th the r,,il1.ta.r7 situn.tion, and thrt suer entrance o:£' troops into RomG ns ··rill talre rlrce ·'fill 1,e dictated b:r the tactical situPtion. I also told him thrt 7hen it cPrie to tre ri.uest:_on of r,uerding Ror1e thnt you will rut part of An An:erj can dj_vision tbere so that tl e necessflr:,r transrortf'tion and other facilities which HAT0USA cannot rrovic'le will be avail~ble to tre Area ConnPnder of Ro~e; trat it is your pl~n to also rttach to t},is force a battalion of "'rencr troors and a oottalion of British trriors. AAT rrefers thn.t tl is battalion be t1;1um f'ro!'l 1st f'ivision if rracticable. tJprding is not insistent . Advise Don if you concur '30 tJ:-pt on"' can be tent~tively earmarked . 0 npardj ng strted thrt your J'll'-1'1 is exr.ctly in Pccordance with General Alexanr'er Is desires . Hovrever, J-io ½elieven thrt Ger,eral Alexander has in mind a formal parade o:f' allied tr0op3 at sone later dnte. Fe conteripli-tes a ceremony similnr to the one vrrich vms held in Tunis. The r~rade there was held about a wee 1r a.f'tor Tunis was captured. I told Farding tri['t I would p;:iss tris informntion on to you. 11 Hy recoy,T"',:indDtion is thrt you jnstruct r:ie to tell A.A.:. that you definitely do not desire to l1 ave any r1isce llPneous detr> chments ( the Ind inns enr1 the ~revr Ze11lcinc1ers ,;jll f'lso put their bids in, T an sure) entBr·YJ.g Rome during +re early days; that if General Alexander c,esires a formal rarade some days after Ro"!e is cartured th.,t you will subrdt a pl;:,n vrl'ich rill rrovide for the inclusion of allied troops.n General Cln.r:V rerl; cd to General Gruenthor I s memorrndum as follons: "Sure enjoyed your note of 1030 I.·-. ve..,terda~r pre dion 1 t enjoy so ruch your one of' this Forninr r£~:f'erenco the T'or1;. See if ;,rou crin -:et me a courle of thou.sand Swedes to rnn tl,rcugb t}0. ,~coos :h1 Rome, then I'll be :,11 set. You roli tely tell t},er 1 th,t T 11r not "'reminr; the tri.cti CP 1 entrn.nce of troops jnto Rome. God and the 13oche ::re dictPting tl;::,t. : wouldn't lcnou wrere the hell to plt anybody to ~et t 11ere first, the chPnces :ire so even 11etween VI rnd II Co..,y;s :vitr m:r mon-,y iust ::i. shade on II Corps. Tell Alexa:rrler I co11e11r in his idea to bwe e big pri=ide about i=i weal· ll"ter, but 1 et I s p;et through ar..d exr lo1 t our success to t1-ie nortr r>nd Civiteveccl ia before re thinv- of rarndes. �Also , tell Pt1rding and Alex if necJssary and Lem to please shut off jmportnnt f j remen who want to run up here as soon es the capture of Rome is irrnninen.t . I insist ths.t I be f' sked fir st . I don't want to cause l'my more trouble nnd kno'.'r you CR.n do it diplornntically. 11 Got it SP.Wed up a million :rer cent g11Prn 11tAed tb::it the first comrmnique which :indicates troops ~ n t'be outskirts of Rone :includes tbe stPtement that the;,r are Fifth Arr~;r troops. Also , the first stA.tement tb2t they have occupied Ron"'l must include Fiftl Army. I ',vill ste.ke everyt:bing I have got in cor>1batting any ne.rrov-minded individual who will not :=igree to tlis . 0 1'Tfow , in order that vou can yell 1 uhoopee 1 , the news is great . I hPve just come f'rol:l visiting ever:v division in the VI Corps up on the high ground north 0f Vclletri with Walker and all. over . 7/elker hP.s the high ground at Rocca Di Fe.pa firm. Ee is continuing the attack in the cUrection of Rone from Hnrino . One of Ms battalioris should now be firn betueen t:be two lakes on H. Gent iles . Howze tas1{ force is on Route 1/6 under Ti'rederick nith two batfo.lions of infantry and 100 tanks nbout ;phere the 97 easting crosses Highway 1/6. 85tb Division is abreast of J6th Division. A French battalion is in Falostrino and a French battalion in Cave . The 1.rill is here, and I have just i•:;sued instructions to all of my subordinate cor,nnnders to rursue relentlessly and destroy the enemy and not think of Rome . 'T'here is still tough figliting , parM cularly on the front of the !,5th Division. Harmon is in the act of being corrritted no'7. Flease do not com1m1nicAte tM.s over-optiJ11i'3tic news to AAI under :my circ1 mstl'lnces; on the other licnd, indicate we rire rnaJdng ourselves firm on the high ground on bot}, sides of Rocca Di l'l"rn and thPt the Fov,ze Force is pusring out on Route -/i6 against oprosition. Let them know I consider the goini:; satisfP ctory, but you knovr hov, rerred ur they get, l'!rd I mriy be a little overl;r OJit:i.mj stic myself . 11 By all Jlleans come to the new command rost knight if it is hwnanly possible . I will fly over and meet you there . If communications 2re in it will be f::'i ne to hflve you there . If ,.re sho ld enter tre out skirts of Rome tomorrow, remeriber you Pre to go vd tr> r1e . 11 11 Remenber the young bu 11 vrho j tunned the fence? Re 11, I t 11 g: ve you tr1e :tlO and drink both bottles of booze if tM..s i1orks out like I think it will . " t}, is General Gruenther sent Gem,rnl Clnrk the following memor,?ndu,'TI at 1615 rours D fternoon: "The Command rest hr.i s gone to ,hell . 'fo one is doing 2.ny wor1r here tr is eSternoon . .4.11 semblr>nce of ,~focipline has broken dmm. Although the G-3 Vfor Roor1. r,urposely shovm only a noder;:itely conservative 1,icture , every pilot-ever,rone in fact--vrho has cc.rte from A'TZIO since 10:00 o 1 cloc1r tris norning has brought back a prd.r of' pants full of snts with the result th;:it this unsuppressiblc wave of optimism l'nd exrect.Dncy hP s swept t1~roug} the headqurrters . I try to wear a loni:; +>8ce riyself but I Pm hevirw H devil of a time dojng so. 'w picture to FPrding hPs been: •The condition is favorable . Generrl Clrrk is quite happy mth the situr-tion but he vdll make no rredictions . His big Prnbition is to kill Germrns and then more Gcrmrms . 1 General Alexander made several complimentary stPtements in his r.1orn~ng conference ebout the way you Pre conducting t:re bettle . �"Yonr 11.15 lettP.r just rirrived. It cont1c1ir1s suer verv fine ne rs th"t I ':lP.lfi 1hly goinr, to ceep it to T'i;fSAli". I quite q,;ree l:"~th you tl1"'t H j s "i nadvisabl9 to rns3 on r>ny of that inform::ition to AAI yet. DI'1 11 'l'he directive on rress release wl ich :rou discussed nith Geri 0 rr>l l-fr•rd:tn~ yesterd~v ,..Rs r~ceiwid here officiall;r this nornjn1:;. Lem hrid told me lPst evening th"t he "m.s quite sure it had Plre:::>dy beer> i ssu0,d in the f'orn sho·•:n to vou. T hrv'3 p tl oro,ir;hJ.y cler:r undcrstr:nding ·•it:li Gen0rril Pr:rd-'ng thAt any cor~rr.1-mique wM er i e; j c;suP.d rnnouncj nr- the entry of Fift:l'' A:r'f'ly troops :l nto n0 1 ~ or into the outsldrts of Jl.O'E will g:i ve cr'3dit to Fifth Army. Hrrd:ing stntes thfl.t he l'"S r-iwm :instructions to tl is ef'""'ect to '1n.ini-rr-ri.ng. :r hrive co'1f'i:rm d. thrcu ;J. Lem thflt " c}~ instructioris have bPen i su c'1, l'H"'C1 th,,t there i, r.o evidence o<' D'1:v t~ndcmcy to g::p the Fifth Ar1n:r in Hs our o"' triumph. The com:nmique writers, ;nclui4inr: Goneral '"upper, Arnric"'n t'RO at •TAT0USA, aro tr;v-inP" their hr>nd at r> few dri.ft cor·,.,unjques this 8fternoon. They will be suhmitted to us -Por our co,..,mff•1.to. At tJ,is v:ri ting three J-i,we heen suggested: 1 1 0 1, (2) R.rT"' ?.i\LLS "'O FITTP ARl'Y "Len teJ.ls r,e thFt there rire Plso soverr-1 lon~er v9rsions -in tl e rnill. '!'he ehove e:xpmplPs v~ s 1pl :i zo rin unexp~ctedly r.opid entry. Lem thinJrs u,,.,t i_t j s ~r1rrob,.,ble thr>t sucb a sho,...t flas!1 ,ffill he issu0d. T ri:ove sent you P l"lessat:;8 sw•p;estinP" t},"t Ven O]Frk rrepare P drrift. Len sa:vs thrit such a drnft will 1,e "BlCO""'?d by AA1. You riny rest "'""·~u:recl trat it wil) be tioorougl·ly vmr 1~8d over, by everyone in the HeAdqu...,rters ns rell rs by the AFR~ cro rd, but it won't do any },arm to rut in our idePs and it rir>y do some good. 1 Pfrrdinr- st,,tes tl~"t ;,rou rm.r count on Ge,..,errl Alexr>rtder 1s PulJ cooperation in 1:eepirg visiting husv-hod7 brass hats +>rom tl e R( f"E areP.. I PT'l ~onvinceo Uwt he Hill do evor:rtMng he can to cnntrol this l"love:"ent. Yesterd:-,y, for examr:J.'3, ;v-our ver,r close .c,r-irmd., on-re f''t~D, sent p stn.+'f officer to AAJ mith lll'gent request th,1t the staf"./" off.; c0r bB allovrerl -1:.o enter RC ~!F. shortly fl "'t~ its capture in order to select sdtf-lble 0,..f'jc9 "nd livinr- 9cc01-:r'"od11tjo1'1s +>or the crrc r=n staff• The 0ffic0r CHJ'18 pr9p'."•red tc l"lOVe to RC''E ir "'1edit>tely. rr~rd:ng sent him 1:-Eclr to tT'J T.J~S •r'tr a 1 no sottp 1 Ri'\Svrer flnd r1e hrsn 1 t been herrd ~rorn sin8e. Of co'.irse t 1 ere 11re go~n<; to be lervs, hocruse the rressure of VPrious ind~vidua1s tr;r~ng to enter vd.11 be terri.,,.;c. vo,;ever, I belfove thrt tle sitll.3,tion is gen°re.lly rretty "ell unrler control. As a ,r\f'tter of ~ntr:,re.st, th"" Greek Arm;l has npr l:i ed for rermission to c• c:nn n Greek detr er nent for the ~ ni ti.- 1 occupr1tion o:' P 'IE. As I told you ~ n my letter tJ, is r orn~ ng th~re is "OV' a thorough meeting of tl e mi.nc1 s at AAI that no detr>crir'lents of Greeks, I oles, IndiPns, New Zef:l.lrmr'ers, 0r what-nots will enter Rome until tLe f'orrml t,:irade is rield. Gen°rrl Alexi:mc1 er will consult •rou concern-' n<; the -"'orMnl l f-lrnde. A ft-3r I sent you ny morn;nc- letter he mPcle tbe remPrk: rrn1,e formal n-...,r11d.e May not ta 1,o r)pce untjl as lrte as t"'O '1 ePkS rifter the Cc'Tture of"<('"'";. I am convinc~d tt"t the dr>te must rlepe'1d eritirclv on tr·c tPctic~l ~jtu tion. 1 I v.nora- t}Pt t1,,is er-resses ,r01ir roin+. o" view exe ctly, A.nil .,. do rct believe th~t ·r8 shRll li...,ve :-,ny trr-uble on th8t score. 0 0 1 0 1 11 I expect to 7 ePve here 1:w c11b at about 7 :00 o I clock tonj P'ht. I 1 11 tele- ��phone you as so0n r-s I arrive trier'). Jt is quite ro""s.;ble, of cnurse, thr.it .'.'lt the last rrdnute I rn'Y r1ecide not to CC>'""8 if I feel th,<>t I PPl n0eded ],ere. 11 Clar, to Gruenther: iJ 57 . "In .'.'ln OI today l'lm setting ur 3rd Di v5 sion less one coTrJ.1-iat terom ,,,.,.jth the ,..,rench battRlion you }'PVC designrt9rl rlus one British brttalion from th<=J 1st British Division 11s tr1e troops to garr~ son Rome. Both seprate hottRlions 'Till b<=J ottnched to the 3rd Division and all under the command of Johnson . He has been notified . J lease inform Brnnn o+"' tre bat talion selected ½y French to <=JntAr Rone. 11 General CL~rk sent the +"'ollowinp; menorwdmn to Genc--rrl Gruenther ,iu'3t 1)efore <ljnner this even"ng: "A Lt . Col. Olson, rr. S . , from AAI h,.,s rrrived r-t ny J-endqwrtors with five Yugoslavian officers vritl' ~:1structio:1s fror'l Brigndier P'!Pnn0ring thrt they rre to tour th'3 front. ''hy A.TI I not cons1 ·ltecl, an" -rhy "rP. peor1e thrust upon ir1e ·•t such 1'1"'1 im1 prropriatA tine? They brouf"ht, food And bl."nvets w1.tr them and ""'rP- told to sta:r as long PS they 'Fished . Due to the hectic sto.te of traffic Pnd tl'e munber r·"' M.en. involved, I am unR.½le at tM s time to p::irnit these officers to wP.,,Hfor rt '-rill tl rou;rh my ·'\--,r,rrd r-rea. This throws t ·e burden o<' findjnr sleepj"'11". flccorioclet 1 ons .. or tris mo½ t>'> well E's r~~edinr, thPr.1. 11 ':ou roust m;:,}re it clear to Jhnnr➔rjn<; thrt h9 has no hl...sjrwss tc, do tliis rrithont 1ett~np; l'le 1rno"', a.. 111:icl he s 1:ec mo, ~ '""Oulr; r;ro~ntly hnve t 1.rn"d it '1.d do '\TD as tl A nost inr>ppropriate tfrn trrt :f l'tlo l o.(' to bn.ve tl 0111 CC'I:Je here. Tre r;rst +,ri'nr; you 1"110''' +,1,e claiM ·ill be tht tl'e Yu17oslr-:virins ''er0 trie first to ont9r Rr•me . 0 1 TTJ ar, 1;oing to tell Lt. Col. C'1son trr>t r1e can look f-'rounc1 the old 1-JriC.ge- herc t'rea t 'is evenin.r, <i. ' ,.,13 v•ill tr" to [ ccomod;:ite trer r-orr1"'r lrce, hut I 11 'tot P'1thorize then to r-c forvmrc . nf my Any "'ref' r-t tl ; s tiI'le. 11 '7~ Cl:=irk to Gruenth-,r. 11"T 53. 11 Referenc,:i MI ·o. ')851 on ass; r;ri:1 ng nff" bouncl11T'ies, rlArse not:ify AAT thc1t I rn hrtpf'"T to str-te that Fi+'tJ, rmy occurios the lnl"k: of Colli Laz5 ali t Lus rif'kinc:- it unnecessr1ry for AAI to re~:nstnte the old ho1mdPrv as indj ctcited . n Gruenther to ClRr"k. RT 3643. "Rardinp- w<1nts to vnow whetber time hns ~rAlso to i"'1struct these resistrmce groups by radio broRdcast tonight • 11 rived to drop 1eRflets to resistance groups in Rome . Gem'lral GlPrk gave the "go ahead 11 sigmil to tris request imrnedL tel~r. Gruen+,her to ClArk. R~-r 3644. 11 AleX13.nder desires to relea3e srecial comrnuniq11e no1"1 th"'t Ji_fth Arny tr"ops hPve broken tl·rough enony d9fenses l"lnd flre appro:::i chinp; outskirts of Rorne. Do you concur? Rerly. n Gencrr-1 Clark denied tbis request ;:,11d sent tre follo•,,ing rrorosal: "Fifth ,rmy troops hrwe hro rnn through the G<=Jwan deferses southeast of Ror1e in sever11.l plrces . Fi "th Army troops 11.o~' occupy t. e bulk of' Colli LA.ziali wriich doni.nrites tre <1t'T'rnPCh8S to Ro"le. 11 Total battle C8surlties since the openin~r of the Anzio o"'fensive rrmou..YJ.t':ld to C'J,1q5 A"ler~cr>n 11.nc: 1,001 British. ��sri::m1n'JSTA--JTJNE I+ , l '1L~4- -Goneral Cla.rk left s.t 0830, a ccor,1prmied by Generf' 1 Brann, l"is G- 3 , and tvro Rides , Lt . Col. Draper and Cartain kmpson, for Rone . Colonel /Jlar}- and renresentatives of tho nress and GJC personnel nlso accompanied him. 'T'he rest of the convoy, wM.ch rnov~d from Nettnno vir-i Cisterna, Velletri , Artena , Valmontone and nort}1 1·;est on EiD",lnrn.y ;!J6, consisted of two rr>11ored C-"rs and six jeeps . About five mjles :f'rori Rome General Clerk Met GenerPl }<,:eyes on the roeo, and the co"'!voy continued to the outskirts of Rome. Just nrior to arriving qt, the outskirts of th9 city, General Jlrrk ,'1et General Ii'redorick of' the Sreci:-i.l Service Vorce ,-rho alread:r hPd elerne11ts jn the Pester'") 'Jdge of tl e c.;ty. The Gsrmflns }wd a11.ti-tank q;,1:J.s 0~d r>bout ?00 infantry w110 were opposing our entrance :"nto the city. The resi..stance o"'fered WPS stron.P' 01101J;=;h to delflv additionPJ elonents from going into the city. There wa,:; shP.rp fighting in spots, and it wes Avir1 ent tlKt the entrance into Rome tociay would not be rossible. 7 VI Corps, on tl· e left, had made "'9me PdVP11ces past LR go Albano, but the II Corps had pushed wel 1 to the north ·rest e 1c1 ''ere on the outskirts of Rone. Elements of the 3rd Divisio11 and 88th Division ,· er9 waiting outside and were clerloying to pusl out tJ,e enennr pcc 1"ets of' resistlince '71 ich "rere orgr-rnized in the outskirts . GenPral i";lrrl' p0rsonally ··nsrected t:be frc'1t-line elements thPt ,rere rus1~ing into tl)e cit:v. Snall arrs f':ire was plainly hen.rd, and tlere rere ,;till snipers in t:re vicin-i ty. F0ws pl,otographers Rnd wr-r correspondents took pictures of GenPrril Glark, General Frederick r,nd Ge11er11l Ye;res discussing the opposition conf'ronting our troops Antering the city. 0 0 1 The French hP.d made satisfactory advr-i.nces to the :north of II Gorps and were in a posi..tion to protect the Army's right flr:mk . The exact locatfo1ts of units is not exPctl:v lmovm . The advance command post r1oved f'rom Anzio and joim,d th8 forward con:'land post, ct Sermoneta . CoJ1nunications with front l 7ne divisions is lackinp;, due to their raphl advances. }Iovrever, it is lJelieved thet b;-:r morn~ ng vre 1'7ill undoubtedl~v have rost of our advanc8 elements in t:re c:i ty. General Clerk flew hwk :f'rol'1 the outskil~ts of Rome bY cub a1,,d landed et his cub rdrfield at the new conrnana post . He immedj 2 tely went into conference with Ge11eral Gruenther ,n >:d nade his plan for his entrance into Rome tomorrow. rracticr:. lly tr1 e same arrangel'lents thn.t 'Tere ',et up for today will be CflPried out tomorrow . u • * c...., * * SERMliP,TA --JUN1~ 5, 1944--General Clark left his cov1mand post at SermonGta at 0730 fly bv cub to Rome . At Rone he met the following convoy •,rhich loft the comma:nd post at 0530 this morning: Gen0rals Johnson and Hume in one ,jc~ep, General Beucler and Colonel Britten in anotJ,Ar, three pl,ot,ographers and Colonel Clark, r1n, two counter-intelligence officers 8nd an officer of the G- 2 Section, two armored cars and four of the Gen"'rnl I s personel guards. ' l' to ~' 1 '· As soon 11s General Gle.rk lnnded tJ,e cc,nvoy started out and entered the City of Rome . Th,.w entered on Route #6 and proceeded rast tbe Coliseum to the Campidoi;lio and up to Capitoline Fill . From there the convoy rode through w,rious str:ets in Rome and were accla.irv=id by the :i.nhsbitants who lim,d the streets , wav1.ng f'J.Bgs, cheering and entrusiasticelJ.y rrel_comir,r; GererF'l ClRrk, tl~e Army Gori:rnanoer , t0 the ci t;-:r. The scene '"as rem:iniscent of Arri st ice Day in 1918. mhe crowd seemed carried e.way 1r 1 t:r <1motjon cnr" was hysterj cally hn.pry. ��~ 1-t e I>'t .. ~;)- ¼ rr-r ....-v r ,.J,' H, 1: ?( ~,~ ~ " ql ~~ ~~~~l --~~ v-r»- ~ yr-~ ~ 1 u.Qr-~ /i;;. ib- P "¢. ~t\ At 1010 GenorRl Cl0r 1, r'9t his Cor'f' Co"lrl8'11'1 Prs r-t Cnritoljvie Hill in the . ~ OS f.l'eadquRrters ,.,, icl-' "7ere in thP To"m ·1 p11. At t!-'"s reet:inp; "ere Gennrrls ~~ 1 'rro'1c ott , Yn~r.es a'1d (}r>n rP l J.uin . P,ach one ri~cussed } is situetion prr1 roint~ed~ out the artvances nnde b'T t1'0ir +,roops . All bridges across the "'iber had been ~ secured n11.c1 adv, •1ces rr>d bnen rricle r .,,.ff' miles .,cro"'s tre ri,mr . ThA Fron.ch Corps l'"<l been rkcef1 jn a r1 , "fic1 1lt ..--.ositj on in th"t triey rir>cl bi~en +'creed off ut(l'J:i•m.y 1/:t; +>or ro·rar,,mts of tl oir tronps . TMs s.; tnrtion ·as A llev;a ted by req11iri;1<; II Corrs to clef1.r th~ir ror>d·., b;-r to!"orro"l' .('or use of th0. Ti'rerich Corf':.:- . "'he ol<l ½onndriries botve<Jn 'ighth and Fift1 Army "ent into ,f.c>ect , •},j ch f'"VG F 4 rth q,w S to t} P, -r;; rl tr Ar"IYJV r "'ter Fift1 Arny troops hfl, f'"' ssed tlie·~r trf'op-. thrm O'h +1 P city nnd on •~he c-tr"'r sjde of tl 1 0 Ttber . r<1ny r:boto graph0.rs nrid vmr corre:=ipo"a•=mts 1·mr,9 rr0s,..nt talc'nr rictures on tl':is ri~toric mPeti'1a; o.,.. <1"''1"'r9l Clrr1' r>11 • his Corps CorTr.irinrers in HoTfle. 0 AftPr tl'e conf'err=mce on Cr-ritol.:ne Fill Ge,:,r.rrl Clrrk ::i:rd rd s Coe.TS Comrvnrl:rs 1e11+, tc t:bc, -r::"c3l cior rotel ·'~c,re f19y,,,ral Glor\:. v;-ill set up ri terpora ~ r•r C("·nand post 1mt~ 1 t}->9 ar'lv.s:r1ce COT1."'f'l1rl 1'0:"t is set ur "Il the v~ 1111 Srvoia . }- 1/ "'he fol 1.ouj ~g wgre th=J l1incheon '""'1?sts of' t110 Co.,.,,rrnrl.; ng Grneral : Geri0rFls ~}°' ,.,, Keyes , .Tuin, Johnson , Hure , Beucl9r , Rrnnn , Cr1rpe'1ti0.r , Gruenther, Bro·m end /' Colonels Brj ..,ten , Kn.m~"'rPr <1nr ::)r3p~r. Aft0r l11ncl1 GonPr01 CfarJ· rl" scusned ~j1 edrl.:n· s-1-r,.,ti..vc nritters ~d_th Genrirp,J.s Hm 1 e ~md Jol~nson . Ge"1ArPl Jobnson ill )I be mil"tr>rv c"rnrPi-ic'or of th9 dty, ;:1nd Genr,ral Hurne is I'ifth Army Ar·G o"fjcnr . /)'/ 'f'l,e :;-ror1lens r-f' trkj n g OVPr -':,hn ['( J:'l~_n~strPt:1on of thP cit;r "Till t)") r:,any; feed ~ in; tre civili•n1~ , get ti:ni:; uti.litiP.s in order, recrr>rition,il +'pciljt"cs +'or tr 0 o:;-'1 rnd o+'ficP-r s . All of -1:,~ese ·roble;rnq 1 ·Are 0•:c;cn-:;sed. '(} 1 1 1 At five O I clock G9J:'(~rP 1 Clrr'· .c,7 el b,, C1' tr r.i9 CO"'"':' c' ro'"t 8t S rmonet~ A,nd di"'cti.rised ; 4J1 1 is Chief of ctr,"~ thi "'OVcmw1t 0f' h:: s c0-rrn11. :;-ost from q,~rmrnetP to Ro..,e . It rill talre rlrce ~n -1-re ·•0r nerir +'1,t.lU'e, -rob·1hly t}>e dr> v 11 -<'ter tcriorrC'V' . 0 1• r.rigl•l i~hts of th., hatt1e rroF;ress centered r>ro,,nc1 e] enientc; hr v~vig "P c;sed c5t:r ::incl Vie estri 1li.M' -,,11t c,f' l' 1 )rir'i-;el'e:0 d c,, +J~e 0th r ""de . L~-'-tle n.1=>tr~L, 0 ' 4ib"l -+;roop ""0v0~ 0rnts were 1 TO'm 0r PXPCt rositiore; . • 0 1 ever , it 1nis r>scertn.in'"-'d thr1t th,~y rrd "dva11ced aho11t trro r~ J.es I rist 4;110 city. Thi:: dav in i tseJ f rri s 8 ,,orinnto11s m 0 pnc' ,.. 0'"Te '"'rted "11 e>1orrou'1 v~ ctory +'or the •if>t), A.rrv-y •·11 ich h,d hrvm so Fbly led 1,y Geryirnl r:a~r1r . Tres;cient Roosevelt crnveyen } :.s rers,mril C"ngrnt11l"Vo...,·'"' to G1=moral Cl:,,rk jn P verv sincere rianner , str-i.t: nr- thn.t t}·e AnAr5 ca n reople -,ere V9r7 PJ.•nt9+'uJ. for t'· is rnornr-r tnus "'Ve>1t in t,]:v, Cf ftUre o':° :1.omr; . ~;:--.::·011,c:l the 0 G- 1 todn,r r"3rorted t:re fc llo,,,rinr; crisu<1lty f'ipures for the orerc1tion: Yilled in nctjon founded 1 "i '1Sing 'T'otfl 1 1.. , L.68 ?l , 045 ? , J~?2 V ?7, 035 GrnAral H"rding s9nt tJ:,e :'ollow-inp- r:emorflndmn to Grmern 1 (:lr:irk to af'f[lirs •;.:-+:,], the V,tican: j_th rogrird '1 "'h8 C-:ln-'.:!, AAI hns r0ceived tr9 'ol.loyr~n,... ,.,ror. Ami • It js rass0d to yo,, .,..or such ['ction as van r1n7 C"Yk,ider rlesirri.bl9 or 110cess,,,ry. �•VaticB.n Aut,},orities hrv8 Axrressed r,nxi9ty over ir1tervrl thrt will elarse hetween Gerrir>n PV'1CU<"tion n.nr1 'lli8d occup1 tio"' of Rf '"E. Thwr stress rece-::it;r for efft•li.0::t rossible ,1 9Spfltch of smf'll All::ed force to s"r 0·1 Hself r>t central roi11.t of town. They believe such action -,,ou1d rlel"'onstr?t,e irrirenclinr; Allied control rnd '1dministrr-tion, and serve to rvert d:1 sorderG. 'H. "• J\nbr s::irdor sur-~0sts errl;r r:esture of resrect to Vrticrin ···ould ~e "'ir,l 1.7 n-•'yrecjnterl, for ~rstrnce i.., British Pnd J\T"'9ric::>n officers could bri trihC?n ~iv l im rinc his Arri.eric"n c0lle;:.r;i1e P s soon n.s JO"'Sible to see Cr"rd~rn1l Secr,")to.r;r r.f' Strto, ~n ,,rcer tr cr,nvey l""essr-i_ge from All.;ed Cor1nrmrlers to tr.A rope, and to info~·m Vrticr>n Autloriti,,,s of contemrl[lted A1 lied rier>res (r1oves?) i.n c011.11~ction ·;rith J.( J'E . 111 * * n,-1i~--Jl;'IE 6, l 0/i-L~--Gerier~l Clr,rlr r9tnrn°d to Ro=8 ':r cub r fter confcrrint; the r:reatPr rrxt of t•,e T'lorn~riP- ,7ith liic; Chief of 3t..,""f, G.-::nerel Grw=mt'her. re "ms arconrf'nied by r'iS G-3, Gen ,r[,11 "lr::,nn' arirl Colon8l )? ltzrrfln anc'l C!'lne directly tC' trP ~~'"celsior '"hAre; corys 1irison o"ficers l'rd rerorted 'vith 7, test in"'ormntio-r.. on tlie rror;ress of th--ir ~ort s Pcro,s t ,p, :riv9r. P.dv, ce r-lPP"ents had :rPPCh"'d P Doin+ "bout trelw~ 1'1il8s_rpst 4-,110, citY, Fr_intri:ring contr>ct r.ind in sor<: c11ses h"v;n(1' cr•nsidernble resiC"t~YJ.ce tc tl,e~r f'dv::mces. GA"1PrPl Clerk cr-·1.f'err')CT r•,t,h h1s G-1, Gen9rP1 Brann, Genercol Johnson, Co •1'JAnr1er of -'-,) 0 city o+> Rone, C:P'l.d f}p· er,.,1 r11m0 , hi.~ Fift!:' Army A'~G officer. Colonel Tully of the '"ili trry RP il, ay S0,rv; ce r0:r,,ort0d to 'renerPl ClPrl< ancl qtntec' t},f>t reconriaisfTncA 1artiPS bd nlrerrl;v flrrivl"ld ~n t1 1 e city P"ld 11 AY'n str,rting tor1orrow to rut ··nto onAr:ition tl e r::,, 7 .rwds. Colonel Tu1ly r8C0r'"' nded tl rt hi9", Triority hr> J""ade PS "'r'on ~s possible to orfmin': the r~ilror-ds from !Wzio to Rol'Y'e. In abo11t 11 nol"t}1 ro · lro110 7_: nAs continn~d from the G~rj r;liano to t 9 Ro,.,.c rrea couln '1-)e comr leted. · 1 1 0 1 G<"'rerfll 1<,.,:res, II Co~ps So"=Pndcr, c[lr,1"' to ~P,e G<=>n~rfll Clnrk e:r1d di.-;cussed '"'Tith 1'"!'1 +,h'3 c;itn.,,tio11 o"l. his corJ,3 ...rort. Ge·-iaral 0 1 J'lniFl1, Co=lllE'nrler of the 1rcl Div~ sion, Plso cnl"e !;o er i-"er "it}, Gem,ral Clrr1·. Bis riv:i 1io11 hr.s l'ttnn.red f' Frencl t'nd Brjtisr brtt~lion "'or r:r--.rr' r,onin-; .+J1e dJ,y. Th8 site +'or the new ro::.-t in t],e Vjlla q;cvoi'< hrrl l,eeri ric'lreri, rinr1 ~tPrtin'; iPJJ\'18d:.r-tel;:r ~,itr rreprrPtio-1s -for tl,.e Y"!ovcment of trie ric'lvr,nce 9ln• ents of the conrrnc1 r ost tor·orro· • COT"Jl'J.PJ"'0 tre lfeMlri,un.rtl"lrs CoririPnr1,9.'1t ·1qs G8nAral Cl,,r'· bad as dhiner ruests Gem~rrls Johnson 11lly. * * :'Dr~ F11.r11r; 11.nc' Colonel * ROTE--JU' ; 7, lqM~--Gcn"'rPl ';lr,rk -x n-"0rr"d 1 rith Genrrril Brllnn, his G-1, .-,tn 'yin.a; pro,c,-ress T"'Pcle 'h,r c-u~ trooi s 1orth o ... Ror-0. llr1 v,nces Yl9re r?J ic1 • Civitavecc~,i_<, on '"'le cot<st l·2e1 +>allen to our trnor s, and they ·Are r1rnhi~~ rri.st t},is jnpo:"'+,Pnt rort nrea. /It 1010 Gen0rrl C1Pr 1, /'111(1 h.;s G-3, Gow,r,il Brc nn, lef't by ,ieep to vjsit IT Co,..ps rnrl. VI Corr'> wr8re t,}·e•r cc'l."'r-rrec'l ·jt,1-, erch Gorrs Com'1"nder and r0vie '<3rl +r" '1itu"ti0n on ~bc.ir .('rent. I rior to re+,urnini; to t: 9 .,,xcelsior, +J-1 ey c:topred rt the non c0T'lnrnd rost rt Yillri c•,voir wl icli ·'lp~• being �set up tcdny. After Gen"r.nl Clnr returrP.d to tf'p i'YJ. to conf',.~r i"iti-, hiM. II Corrs ancl VI Corps "PTj 11 ccme in wi.tl1 :'ranch Corrs oY\ its ri grt. II and VI for a lonr- ti..rie, VI Corrs l·n.v.;np; b9en "n since thn ; 0tol, G0n0,r['l Truscott cr"'le ru7 l ou.t, :-ind IV Co-1"} s ,1ill Cor~,s hf'Ve been in brttle 1.nndinr- ;:it, Salerno. G0,n0r.'lJ. Gr119nthr>r Prrivcd from t,1-ie for,r9rc1 copr>f:lncl post rit Serrnonetn and hn.d lunch v,ith Ge'1er;ql ci..,rl,;. Gener8l m.nte, the G-4, Plso +'lew up on sur,ply ,..,,,n-tters. "'h0 rar:id 11rhr"'nces of tho Arny 1'.?Ve extenr<ed our '>urply lin"'s, rrk..,king the suppl r rrohlem di 'ficult but not w1t} out .n solution. 3urrlj0s ··•ill be brcu<?"ht into Anz~ o n11d trucked ur to tr9 front, nnd in th, nenr f 1 1tm~e sor:,e nrill be tRkm from lfriples to r.::1vit;:iveccL.ir- and brou~ht forw rel ovr-rlr1 nc +'ror:1 therA. Tre des tr, "tion of the rri ilrou1~ b~r tr e GeTI"rns will rrr-1m it :'. nr,oss i blc to extend Ue railroad 1-inns i7'I"'Pdirtelv up to the PttFcri~o; -<"ront from the renr nrec1. ~•n. io,,. G9.,.,·,..r-l Greri;so 1-,.,llj "l of' tl A Stri Rrit,j s\ rivisio', Cf'rn0 :i.n t0 sn,y f'Ood1:>;re to Ge110 r:ol Clrr~:. r•;s Djvi<:ion ... ill be detrcr'ed -<>ror,,, Fj4"tr l.rrw and r,:.1..Pcecl under cnrJ~r0l cf 4.. I. 1 Ge110.rc1ls ,To 10 1son A.rc1 F1me cri:r.e in ·ust r,rior to luncr m.r1 r-i "'cussed .,.,,iF!tt~rs riertoininr; "'::.o t}v:- ci-sv o::' Ro"1c w~ th Generrl Cl."rk. GenPrPl Furi.e hrs arranp-ed for R visit to t},f~ Vaticm1 torriorroT witl, Pore J ius XII. mhe /1udj once "'ill tck-e plri.ce at n-i..ne o I c1ocl• in the • ort'i.nr:. 1 At noon DAW i. 11.:_;tructio11s rP.ceivod -"'rori AAI HeE1dqur-rters required tre Arry tr rusr <'~,rwircl rA.r-ic:'ll~r rmd c::eize r, li'1<; r1ur:''1,: AP.st-west trrou£,11 ris2... Th:is d1rective is quoted below. r, Ge11erals Clar Gru~mtlrr a11.rl Rrf'.nn n·1 "'c1i-:1sed the I!'"rr.P.r j r. wt· i.c" tli:Ls direceive ,;;oul.o be ca-ri8d out. It req,lires f'nri->'t nnd nggressive rirrs·1it to trke dvantage of' t1 e • ·eav,med G~rni:in ,1ho fr rithrrawing rP-ricly to tre rortr. 0 Arol'nd f<,ur o 1 c1ocl: Gc;neral Crittcsnberger ri 1rl. GenorRl Cr, . . P. err" to confer "i.th Ge'leral Clr>rk rA+'erence th, rr Corrs takirf" over bot}~ the II rncl 'II Corrs fr('"\nts. GenAraJ. Cb:rk rlmmc,d tn tPJr0 tre l.5th ';ivision out c.,.. t:re line a>1d place it in Army res~rve. All Divisio~s ,.,ill ·,e given ~' ch'U'ce t0 tn 1c'" nlv;:,nt1:1f"e 0:f t',13 new rAst center ·r' : cl1 yrill be set ur ~11 Rol"le • It .-rill he ablA to ta1·e CPre o-1" <'Ver lC,OOO soldi0rs Pt a tirv~. ~rou,1d -"ive o 1 cloc1: G rerril "pc.,.,<>rlBne o-" ACC came in ~~o co•1.,.er .,;_+,}-, +,J...e Arrw Corr:.ander. Ju ,t rri.or to d~ rner GenPrf'l Cl r 1• 'Y'P,C"iV"-'d pn A er..\c,-,ri '1()1"'9D •rho h,'lG. rrrriod r.n It91-l__;:,n, r,drrse ·u,..c} esa de Bon-Is. '1ro ...,rintGd to "~et Gen"'rl'l J. CJ.0r}· r>11.c1 c<'>1':7'Ptul[lte 1-:lim on 'his "hilit;r as v great nilitar:r leader. 0 0 ri., For dinner Ge11.orl'll CL<lr1· ]:-,pd Generi:>ls Sulliwn, his T~ o-"'ficnr 8....,d ':'cte, G-1+, ris p-,1ests in ac'ldition to hjs r0~ 1 lPr r1ess. A.AI to A11 Co>1c0r'1ed. "?_H O?OOCJ. 11 ':'he ener,iy hn s h~en r;rer,tly v.ren 1'ened. by tre _,..if"ht:i nn; since 11 I!ay c:nrl ::.;J non tl orc,ur;•1l;r ,1 4 sor'".'.'l'lized. I'e is certr inly in no position rt rres0nt t, l111 nci1 /1 s~ri.oun cmmter ettrick. re ..,~ 11 ccrtinue to su,..f"')r n9r~ ously d11r-inr his r"trert fror rttackr, b,, 0ur 8 :Lr -l'orces £inc' adv, ncir,r• c0lurnns. 1 �l :> I THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY ***** From tra Gennan viewpoint it is incomprehensible why the 34th Division on the evening or 7 Jtme and the F.irst Armored Division on the evening of 9 June were withdrawn from the front. Whatever were the reasons, it is sure they all accrued to the benefit of the Gennan high cormnand. ***** The middle am the east wing of the A:rm:, was forced back further during the period 12-14 June due to the superiority or the enemy. As a result of the commitment of the 26th .Armored Division and parts of the 3rd Arraored Group or the 4th Parachute Division, in the area of the 356th Division, it was possible to hold the Orvieto Bridge open long enough far all units of the XIV ~ored Corps and its attachments to reach the western shore o£ the Tiber. Qrvieto itself was lost on the 14th of J~• The French Expeditionary Corps, newly committed, and at present on both sides of the Bolsener Lake, which at the beginning of the Allied May offensive had so distinguished itself and so greatly contributed to the first successes, was now not so overpowering. This can probably be attributed to the fact that the Corps lmew that in the not. far distant future they would be withdrawn for the invasion of Southern France and that they wanted to con"Berve their power for use in combat in their homeland. This is psychologically self evident, but it is questionable if it was necessary or suitable to relieve the .American ___ j II Army Corps by the French Expeditionary Corps. *** ** Signed/ Wolf Hauser Major General • �Rode u~J in jee, •-:i:,'1 ':en. Gruentber (Catholic)--saw priest walking across street who carre up an1 said in '"::rglish "'"elcome to R.ome. \',hat can : do for you? 11 1rfuere is Capotiline 1 il1? 11 ' 111J'e are certainly proud of the A·· er.icar. 5th Army. ?,y name is 11 !y nar.,e is Slark'' m"'l1at di.i you say your name was?" -- - -" Little crowd had iathered. A youn~ rran on bike. Priest toid people i~ :talian it w~s Clark. The young man ,zot on his b-ike and a.::inounced all the v~y along to the crowds that it was Clark. Dig crowds, ;;;reat excitement, 0 irls, flowers in muzzles, et«. Jeep got stuck in crOYrds dowr by usscl.i.ni 1 s baL uJ'.. TLe:: wen:, t1:J Cap , ill --r1s;uc...i.,,r tl1e:re. It :s ~~r,ind '1eif ,..olossiewn--cit:r :~:::l} :,r. to1J, \":as a-~et.:.11~ corps commanders there. -··as the :Jlace wl ere '1eneral Roberto ...,er.civcnto--[reat cooperator--held forth. Pounded on door--finally ope:ied a c-rack--::talian __,eneral came out--great patriot on American side. T }IOTEL EXCELSI0R: , ere somevrhat. afraid of :err-.an traps, and investigated before they went tl-iere. It had been .:esselring I s hdos. took over as 5th ar ~ !'es-:. center for officers. took over 1Lsso 1 s sports forum for erlistcd men--2O buildings-indoor and outdoor pools, one upsta~_rs on second floor with slidin_; ceiling 1· asso 's special pool. 3-4- square blocks '.Jig. "very sol:iie!' -vrho .?artici?ated in the long drive for Rome vrc_1,1 __,et several days furlough in Rome. At the Sxcelsicr Clc,r1< v;er t in the bedroom o~ ~he suite--knelt riown t" s'3.y _?::'ayers, th_:__rJdn'"' :e Y,9.s , 1 0'1e. ~'elt a hand on hi.s shou Jer. Gen. Jo·1in in bathroom said "I just lid t•.e sar:1e tl-iins. 11 Glark-s hclqs. ··1ever in b 11i1Jin..:,s d•,r ir:__, the -rrar. :~::J:IUO: 'Jer2r ucll i,r._Jresse<l--rather youn'"', concerneJ about wife and children who 17ere in Switz. 'Sx1)res[ •1 rezt ._,ratit 1de .for liberation of Rome without darr.ac.;e • .1antecl to cooperate. 0 1 PCP'"': Jrove up tc Vatican :..n jeep and G.I. clothes. Swiss ,1uards, etc. ?ope wa::-ited to see Clar 1c alone--711 ch lrr,pressed--::>ope ove:r:·wLE:.1-ied. wLti: '---'ratitc:.dde-eYt6nded invita.t·i rm to all sold.iers to visit hirn--'::la:rl{: said w-o..:ild make arran ements-•T)c•p ~e smr tr-er.: every da:r--tho·1sards of tl-em. 11 ::::: ·m..ierstard your hdqs. will be :1ere in Rome. ]ow lont r::..11 you tc tr'-.i.K here?" I ar f'ear:'ul it will brin re percuss Lons from the Germans." Clark diJ riot think so, bit couldn't help it ar.-:;,··way. Pope ,asked if Clark ad ha i any contacts witr the Russians--dic11 1 t krow ar..ythin...r except they were £'i.;htint, like mad. "li'xpressed at one time reat concern over communism. Two or tl rce clays later wdnt to see Pope a<->ain. Still wor1:·ied about hdqs. bein.::; in Rome. how v;as tre bnt.+,le .;cir.g--our locat:..on-when WJ uld w-e move? Story about Pope thinkin.; American soliders didn't likl him. Rt. Rev. , ans.· .. alter s. Carroll, secretariat of state, vatkan city, had been liason man with t 11e 5th ., l}. thro..1gh the figLting 11;, throurn ~taly. 0 0 0 June 9-story about Clark's narrow escape in a plane -inspecting Sevida. Vegg-5...?J., wtich had just been captm.•ed. It was the port of Ror & , _nd needed for s .19plies, which t:1c.l previc., s\>- haJ -to be 'Jrougl.t '.iYJrland all t,he re. ~r.::,::- "aoles. He and pl.lot Jo .• lookir,1;:; out w'~er :=;u :den c:-.:.sL. :.a.i run iato cabie suboo:ntir.~· bar-::•a:-re balloon w; icl:. had. ju13t been put up. uas leaYin.;, cable slidin__, alon:, etc: .;~cku pulled throttle wide open, cable tiroke. shut off ..1otor and gli1ed intv o v7'1eatfiel:i. Plare tJroke tl:e cable. Sur.)rl.s~r,g t:iat tM lethal device under eacn a'olloon o.iJ.11 1t go off. Probably because tLe3· were :,oin6 slowly and in a li__,rt ?lane. i?robably circled around cabl3 tow or t".ree tirr.es. r~all~a:r.s or southern fra."lce, etc. Toid :l.rsl'-811 ::e ·.ad .:.nte,:-1:'ated team sj--.ich t.::i.o. dE. velopeJ the L3.rd --.vay. 'J-ermans were smas1~., :.tc. air S'.;"~rt w.:m.Jerful. Sasr"i wr0r__, t.o break up this -!:.earn m:cn it ·ras ---◊i . . , s, , ~11. T'lk;c.d a0out landing .i.n southern /ranee ar, · w0:1 ~"'red r::y it ·--~S:IALL: �Td:S :?IFTH ~P..:.("'.[ 'S •.'!HERE ''Y. Hr.ART IS - by Irving Ber lin (Introduced in the overseas edition of "This is the Army" Verse: I met her in f· merica about a month ago She asked me if ~ 1 d give her love to a certain GI Joe . She said when he returns I 1 11 be his bride I asked her where he was and she replied: Chorus: Not the First, not the Second, not the Third, not the Fourth , But the Fifth Army ' s where my heart is . Ee 1s somewhere on a beachhead which must be lots of fun. I can see him in a bathing suit basking in the sun . From a cute signorina he's been learning to talk like a real native of Rome. She I s a very tasty dish, but my baby 11 :Io capish" til the Fifth Army comes home . Chorus: Not the First, not the Second, not the Third, not the Fourth , But the Fifth Army 1s vm.ere my heart is . Vfo landed in Salerno and kept right on the go, As we fought our way through Napoli into Anzio . ~ile by mile we've been soldiering The hard way it s eerns On the road leading to lror..e . And wit r1out a single doubt There ' ll be things to shout about ~vb.en the Fifth Army comes home . • �To take full advantage of this situ,,tion Eighth Arny vrill ac1wmce TTj th a 11 possible sreed dire ct 0 11. tl"e general areR F isR - LuP ca (?) - r istoia. Armies vrill T1aintain gener:.:, 1 contP ct on their inner flanks but will not "'ait on each othr}rs advPnce. Eneny resistance will 11e by t'R.ssed vfrerever possible in order to reach above vitPl 11reAs quickly. Ei~l1 th Army vd.11 be respons'ble for any protection that may be necessary on its right flrmk. 11 11 '.l'o save transportl'ition resources r>nd bridging rrRt9rinl 5 Corps will not f'ollow up t1"e ,3nemy on tl~eir "'ront. If the Pdvrnce of Eighth Army f'eils to fo-rce the onemy tc abr,ndon An conn r olish Corps will be novod form:ird later on Eio:hth Armys rear Prmy ,:,astern axis to take Arcona from thP \'Jest. "CJ ITC aut' orizes Arm7 Cornnenders to te1(e extrAJ11e r5 :' 1 to secure the vital <s strHtegic p,.reas nentio-r-:ecl in paragraph 2 rbove before tLe enemy cPn reorg;:,nize or he reinforced . 11 * Hr1 r'.!E--,JU'1E 8, 10Mi---T>;f"rly tl,is rnorn~np; tho liaison o-"'ficer from Eig;hth Arny CHITtG in -;rith a personal nessPge Prom General Leese to Generrl Clrr1c, askinr rermission to use t}·e road Vall,erano-Viterbo-F,acborep-io. 'I'h1s request by the 'i;j r-ht:b Arr,y moPnt the virtur 1 stoppR ge of II Corrs sector upon relieving II Corps j n the~ r zone of action . Gen oral Cl&rk Is reply' yrh_j_c} is riuotod belorr' 0~ covers h:i:s answer to GenPral Leese's request. At Ofil,O General Clnrk, accompan:iec1 by Gen.r'rals Gruenther, Jo],nson, Hun1e Beucler, and Colo11el:; Rri tten And R;ran 'ryent to tho Vatic,"n where tlrn:r htd an i:n1die11ce w~th Pope nus XII. Gen?rel Clnr1r hac1 a :::;erarr>.te -!ntArview ,.,-jth the rope :f'irst and tren ~ntroduced tho ctrer menbers of }1is ye,rty to the Pope. D11r1np: his -interview with the Fop:, tl'e latter aslrnd Gereral Clr}.~lr to 3end a messar:e to }resident Roosevelt express::'.np: to Mn l is most sincere regard. :F'roll' the ,Ta ticnn Gener,, l Clarl' proceeded inl'lod:; ate ly tc h :is neF cor:imanc1 po st et the 'lilla SAvoia . 0 Shortly Pfter Ms nrrival here General .Alexander flnw ur frori Caserta to see General Clark:. He was accorir,::,ni0d by Generrl Robertson, his G-4. Gen"'ral Clark d:i scussed with Genernl Alexander the Eighth Army's request to use a road in II Corr,s sector r-md othsr ml:ljects leading to th9 fu:rtl~er offorn=:ive northward as well as natters concerrdni? llor:e. 0 At l/;,30 Gener8.l Ckrk had a fecorrtion cererrior1y Rt his new cor1r1end post. Du.ring- this decoration cerenony Genr,ral A1.exr,nder presented t} 0 Conf'l.Pnd of the B/'lth to Ge'1Prn ls Juin and Xey""s in t}ie nr->me of Eis r12.,jest;v Kj_ng George VI of Englc.nd. Ge:rnrnl C1Pr1, thi:m rreseYJ.ted two r,edals o'' ronor, one to Ifc. Knappenberger of tre 10th Infantry Regfr,ent Plnd Staff Sgt. Huff of the 50Qth Faracr,ute Bf'ltt::ilion. He also rresented Legion of r 1orits to Ge-re.rel Dod;r, General flrosset o.:nd Gensra.l Carrentier. Legion of nerj_ts were a1so rreeiented to Gene..,,..A.1s '1 r->rtin, Sulliv<>n rmd other officers and er,lj st0d men of tl 1 e :r1rt}1 Arny ::'taff. In ri ddi t ion., DSC I s, one DFC, one 3oldier' s :kldal r~nd enc Brcnze Star ,·,ero also presentod tc o:f'ficers and sold·ers of his comne.nd. The ceremony was q 1 dte i· 0pressive. A compos~te ?'oup of' two Al'lericr,n, one ' 1'rer1ch and one British plPtoon coriros"ld the revj_0v7~n~; troops. '·'rench, British and Jq.,,ericen .,...lPf;S were included· in th0 cclor vuerd, "nd all thTne national c1ntherm were 0 er 1 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, May 25-June 7, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from May 25-June 7, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1634 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/0803cdcf198496288e9f02707583f7c2.pdf?Expires=1787184000&Signature=kD9BQwdScZd4sbuAq7YWbn1dX5DP3s4c9G6am59Js3jdPY0dJfIzz2WD3DaneH6I2r4xiQAeJyU1f1utRSQr6oxvTcDViXDkA8EOWIXIjqXFpaKGQz2xL5P4xJizyX7sFuYFqI5hit5qBAsrcUgb3wRLxAxZBJwkC1Q46PhE8YaAOebqtFql4n2MXmOq0QcRdKEewpHoaKpd5N6%7EtgM%7ExMKNXbn2Swy%7E0OHYDn2hKn%7EyKBocv37KnufE5xal6HeBhBDiZ8FXOvYaXPFxocGbpikLqYzJrsxj2javBz-ZqIKWCcujWfo2GBCv-pGobgGqGMoiOiVqp%7EkBT1KS8bnnzA__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 14e5d7e5190f13b6f3bf4d7e39b5fbf5 PDF Text Text To take full advantage of this situ,,tion Eighth Arny vrill ac1wmce TTj th a 11 possible sreed dire ct 0 11. tl"e general areR F isR - LuP ca (?) - r istoia. Armies vrill T1aintain gener:.:, 1 contP ct on their inner flanks but will not "'ait on each othr}rs advPnce. Eneny resistance will 11e by t'R.ssed vfrerever possible in order to reach above vitPl 11reAs quickly. Ei~l1 th Army vd.11 be respons'ble for any protection that may be necessary on its right flrmk. 11 11 '.l'o save transportl'ition resources r>nd bridging rrRt9rinl 5 Corps will not f'ollow up t1"e ,3nemy on tl~eir "'ront. If the Pdvrnce of Eighth Army f'eils to fo-rce the onemy tc abr,ndon An conn r olish Corps will be novod form:ird later on Eio:hth Armys rear Prmy ,:,astern axis to take Arcona from thP \'Jest. "CJ ITC aut' orizes Arm7 Cornnenders to te1(e extrAJ11e r5 :' 1 to secure the vital <s strHtegic p,.reas nentio-r-:ecl in paragraph 2 rbove before tLe enemy cPn reorg;:,nize or he reinforced . 11 * Hr1 r'.!E--,JU'1E 8, 10Mi---T>;f"rly tl,is rnorn~np; tho liaison o-"'ficer from Eig;hth Arny CHITtG in -;rith a personal nessPge Prom General Leese to Generrl Clrr1c, askinr rermission to use t}·e road Vall,erano-Viterbo-F,acborep-io. 'I'h1s request by the 'i;j r-ht:b Arr,y moPnt the virtur 1 stoppR ge of II Corrs sector upon relieving II Corps j n the~ r zone of action . Gen oral Cl&rk Is reply' yrh_j_c} is riuotod belorr' 0~ covers h:i:s answer to GenPral Leese's request. At Ofil,O General Clnrk, accompan:iec1 by Gen.r'rals Gruenther, Jo],nson, Hun1e Beucler, and Colo11el:; Rri tten And R;ran 'ryent to tho Vatic,"n where tlrn:r htd an i:n1die11ce w~th Pope nus XII. Gen?rel Clnr1r hac1 a :::;erarr>.te -!ntArview ,.,-jth the rope :f'irst and tren ~ntroduced tho ctrer menbers of }1is ye,rty to the Pope. D11r1np: his -interview with the Fop:, tl'e latter aslrnd Gereral Clr}.~lr to 3end a messar:e to }resident Roosevelt express::'.np: to Mn l is most sincere regard. :F'roll' the ,Ta ticnn Gener,, l Clarl' proceeded inl'lod:; ate ly tc h :is neF cor:imanc1 po st et the 'lilla SAvoia . 0 Shortly Pfter Ms nrrival here General .Alexander flnw ur frori Caserta to see General Clark:. He was accorir,::,ni0d by Generrl Robertson, his G-4. Gen"'ral Clark d:i scussed with Genernl Alexander the Eighth Army's request to use a road in II Corr,s sector r-md othsr ml:ljects leading to th9 fu:rtl~er offorn=:ive northward as well as natters concerrdni? llor:e. 0 At l/;,30 Gener8.l Ckrk had a fecorrtion cererrior1y Rt his new cor1r1end post. Du.ring- this decoration cerenony Genr,ral A1.exr,nder presented t} 0 Conf'l.Pnd of the B/'lth to Ge'1Prn ls Juin and Xey""s in t}ie nr->me of Eis r12.,jest;v Kj_ng George VI of Englc.nd. Ge:rnrnl C1Pr1, thi:m rreseYJ.ted two r,edals o'' ronor, one to Ifc. Knappenberger of tre 10th Infantry Regfr,ent Plnd Staff Sgt. Huff of the 50Qth Faracr,ute Bf'ltt::ilion. He also rresented Legion of r 1orits to Ge-re.rel Dod;r, General flrosset o.:nd Gensra.l Carrentier. Legion of nerj_ts were a1so rreeiented to Gene..,,..A.1s '1 r->rtin, Sulliv<>n rmd other officers and er,lj st0d men of tl 1 e :r1rt}1 Arny ::'taff. In ri ddi t ion., DSC I s, one DFC, one 3oldier' s :kldal r~nd enc Brcnze Star ,·,ero also presentod tc o:f'ficers and sold·ers of his comne.nd. The ceremony was q 1 dte i· 0pressive. A compos~te ?'oup of' two Al'lericr,n, one ' 1'rer1ch and one British plPtoon coriros"ld the revj_0v7~n~; troops. '·'rench, British and Jq.,,ericen .,...lPf;S were included· in th0 cclor vuerd, "nd all thTne national c1ntherm were 0 er 1 �\ 55 ,played at the conc7 usion of the cerenony. Af+,er retr1rn-tnp; -f'rom t!- e decorPtion ceronmy, Genort>l Clrrk, rAving sP:ld goodbye to Genere 1 Alexender, 1crent to t}1 e l ort11 l io whore }10 reviewed a h., ttalion +'ron tl"e Duke of' '';ellinr:~ton 1 s 1.egi1"'1snt r:1 ,.'ch is attachxl to thA 1rd Division RS garrison trnors of RcE1A . This h=sttalion rassed by a sm,-,11, hastilycorstructed rev:lewing stand_ wl ich W['S erected for General Clark. LeaclJnp, the battRlfor> ·,m.s a ScottisJ~ Fife aJtd Druri Corps . After Ger1eral Clrrlr hrid reviowec1 t}- is b::=1tt0 lion he wr s met by Colonel Fisk ,.f t11e ACC and v,P.s cnnducted on or hom~ 1 r, si p;ht-see-·,..,g· trir of Ror1.e at tl'e <;nd of v•l,:l ch he vm.s taken to lrince TJnh3rto I s } !"lrtee in tl~e iUir:l.nel. Tris vj sit w~t,J-, fr:ince "mh:orto, v+o is no"r Iirmten::,nt Gs11oral of the "~e2,lm, lPstecl for n.hout 1/0 PD hour. Gennral C1Ar1' proceeded irnr-ec'iatel;r brc1, to his cor>:n2nd post Fhere he worked on ad.min:' strative n2tters r>.nd studied latest battle reports . JT:i.gbl.; gbts · 0 r> tl1 e kttlo fTorrr3~s tor Py Fee, a furtl 1 •'r rushing to tlvo rorth of all elements of t}P Fifth and Eighth Arr,1ies . To date tho:ir edvance hes met VJ" th very little oprosition . J.occnna5_ssance "-ilr-w,ents h2ve proceeded consirlerably a}:ea.d of the rpin hod:ies f'D(' are "'ell to tbe north ge:n9re,lly in Pn east- ,rest line through Viterbo . General Clark today received a cor:irr.tmicPtion from GenerA 1 Leese asking tr Pt "':-ie;hth Arn;r elements be peTir1itted to use the ro[ld V11llerano - Viterbo - Bsgnoregio. He rerlied to General Leese as follows: 11 T hPve your lfa_:i son officer here vr:l th your last ,nessag,~. I see no solution excert to hri l t n'y II Corps in pln.ce rind po.rmit you to use the ror·d VAIL' :RANO R,J J.,,,94'?211-, eastern route through VJTPJrnr. - BAG"·JQDr.:GIO 1.348. An intolerrble ~itu21 tion would dev9Jop if both Yir 1anan I s "'orce and J:eyes I II Corrs troor,s reachec1 tl'·e road .junction Pt f+0./4221,, as tho·r ::>re rir:)()ut to, at the sAme tiP1e end .;f both Pttempted to use the roPd 1erid"ir,e- .~rom thnt roe.d junction to VJrr>ERBO. 11 Klrkman, Y'eyes nnd n:r rorreGentatjve hrve b9er, torsether. ~ lBve just talked vrith Yirkman on t1-1e pJ~one , :ond also to Keyes , 1=1rcl told them both that Yeyes "'ill halt in rlace. Yirknan '•ill be p:iven the road VALJX::RAN'O - VIT:~I?.BO PS ;rou desire, hit I do beseecl- 7011 -t:.o speed up Y:i:r1°T"!rn I s use of thrt rs rmch ro s po·0•sihle so th,,,t II Corrs can r,:et c:cing :in rompli"nce rd.U1 our directive to ,·,ush vigor ously to the r.rrth . T hope '"irkman cm f~ nd suppl', rc•utes rfter he he's pass0d his comh'lt elements throue;h VI,,.,·~RBC v:rhich will tfl1(0 him on roM1 s to the east, thereof . 11 Do not feel disturbed tl1 8t you rove bothered me. I ,·ant you to 1'no,· 011r interest is to fac:il:itete ,;,l,ir,ping th: Boche in his demoreHzc,r1 conditjon , re gnrcJess nf who does H . I ·"'ill arprec3Pt0 it if :rou "!"•ill h2 ve Yirkman keer Ye3res advised '1J~en he "rill. terminn.te his use of' 1r1.,., ;nnr . 11 General Leose re:rliGd to General Clark as follows: 11 . TharJ: ;mu for seeinp: Green- 1 :ilk:inson tbi~ norninr; and for your' ~elp.ful reply. 11 1 u.nd0rstand thrt A..4.I hf'1Ve issued rm order , asking you to help us to get ��to Orvieto. "I am sure that our noves Jceep ePst of any suprl;y routes of yours. The only renl difficulty seems to be Vi terbo, find on the 50,000 r1ap there nre two red roads - one movinn• ea.st of it and one nest. So I do hope ,:re can reach ar,;:reenent over th is. 11 It seems to me so terribly important for us bot]~ to drive on, wr ~ le the GerJ11ans Pre split jn tvro anrl before he brings dovm the expected further divisions fror.1 the north. And p, s I saic' in rny last letter, it ,,,ill s:we da;:rs if B Corrs cnn operate west of the Tiber. "As soon as I get the 'Tnrvi - Orv:ieto road clear - we '"rill of course s"dtcl, our supply PXis back to the route east the Tiber. A rnpid advRnce to nrvioto will do '"'!Ucr· to help clenr this area - and I hore we sliall !'1.ake rrogress 'vith 1~ Corps to 1711rds Terni - which wj_l1 help at the other P.nd. 0= HHith many apologies for giv5ng you tr is trouble - and my most ePr:ne st hopes thr,t ,ye mR;T cooperate togethr:ir in t'·is problem, to gain positfons ,·,herefrom we can both nnintain the impetus of ;rour p;rent "'dvance on Rome. fl * * * R0 11E--JU'JE 9, 191✓+--General Ckrl• received Gerieral HpcFarlane of ACC at nine o'clock. After GFnorel rracFnrlane left, he conferrAd V'5.th GenerPl Grurmther bis Chief of Staff. I1e ''!BS ver:v enxious to go and cnnf'er nith G,=iner1:1l Harmon, Coni~'"nder of' tbe 1st Armored Di~ sion, but telephone commun:icetions "mre out. - Our units ::ire r,ush'ng so fast to tr•e north thnt 11s forward r1 e2dq1mrters advance 1t :is clJ "f-; cult to mai"ltr.in sati sfR ctorv telephone comrnmj c• tion. It was not lmtil Rfter llmch that }'is cub pilot, nhjor TTalJr..er, inforP1sd him that J,e cnul,1 tri lre him to th1 1st !\.r"lored Divis ion cub field which Yras very close to t.he commpnd :nost. Gener0l Glrrk +,h::Jn flew to the 1st Armored Div,; sion comrnan.d post whire hA conferred 0·,ith GenerA l HPrmon conc0rning t}·,e situr1 tion on his front. Armored reconnaisscnce elmnents had r,assed t}'rough Vj_tc.rbo, 2_nd the city '7as now an 2ur h::-:nds. -a,~;... t.-~~J... ,2.,.:,.t:tL fo-.l:- .t:-;Jf "}~ J.<M ~~ t;. 4 ~~ - 13..~ "3 V4 2-v-ti#4 ~ - 1.,J,,J- O'"W',\ .e,.....t.~ - () .....+ f.-...,..1 'ti After leH,rinr: Ge'.1.8ral Hr>rnon 1 s comrn1::m,-1 post, Gener;::,l Cla:r+ flew OV8r Civit.svecchia to insnect the r,ar1,or jnstaJlPtions and terrein surrounr1 ing the area. ''hil,:i flying ow,r +,} e 112rhor, M,., rlr>ne bit Ft bRrrF,ge h"lloon 1 rire wl 1 ch might hrve ended in ri. ver;r ser:ious r ccident. ,,,he lx1r b r,ttached to trie bnrrage bRlloon did not exrlor'1e, 0 nd the T,].r,ne hed r;re 0 t c!inf'iculty in breakinr: P''!P~· :f'rori tl 0 "'~rp ,,J,5 ch ,,,as i.,el,1 triut h:,r th0, buoyn.ncy of the -inflr<ted belloon. 0 0 Generr-1 C1Pr1, 1anr1 ec1 nt I i-"tori0 Pir""ield wl-icb is close to bis corin.3.nd post s.t Phout 1730. AftPr he landed, be ccnferr,:,d hr~ ~"'fly "'ith GonPrFi1 Wilson, Cor· r1>1nder n.o IBS, rrl:1 0 hen. j1x1t Prriv'9d back frorri Rmns to fly br<ck to Hap19s. GenorPl t'filson •·rj_'"hod to d'scuss "Titl, him briefly P'rted:it:ious means of routine; surr,ljes to di .r:isions vrho Fore edw,nc"r:g so re:~cllv to tl1e north. r:re ,-ranter: to send true}: corvoys dir9ctly to t,roors from Anzio by-passing llrrny clumps. Gen,"r~l Slar1- told b:hn to ,;ork closely V'ith his G-4, Generel Trte, PYJ.cl sol•rn the rrnblem. 1 0 A new bound.~ry has bc=ien °:et between II nnd VI Corr,s today. TM s bon1dr•ry �'..ill b0co•n.e on 11 Jtme tJ.8 botmdrry betv1een Frend, Corrs r nd JV Corrs r'fter II n°1d 1TJ Gorps l~Ft,re been reU9Ved . Battln nrocTer;g tor1qv "-i:rcls rmr troors -in rossession of VitF~r1:io and '2'Pr~111L"Y1.n . 01.n"' p(1·vrrce to tl-1~9 nortr ,,1ns 1J,qen r8.J):i_r1_ nnc' Yins de 11eloued into the pursuit sbQ'.A . The Gorr1P.ns are fp llin~ bac 1c rPridly. nurin·· the ''1.0on hour GAneral Clerk cr;nf9rred ,·,-ith ·-~T . Tucker , n. WP.r corresyio11l(mt, ir}10 ".sv.:Jd for in-'. onrir--tion concerning his nurUence '.·?ith the rope . Generq 1 Clark rern:i ttPd nr . muc1mr to "ri~·it8 ur hi!-, Purlience witb the Pope . Col . Clark, 10 is rublic R9lntio 1s l "'ficer, submitted it, to tre V..,ticrn for 2p:orovel r-mc1 rmbsequAntbr reler.sed it to Ari,=,ricrin corresponfents. '1'he ::interview , as de:'3cribed by General Clark , ,~as submitt"'d to the F'ope who approved it pract ically as ,7Titten and autroriz9d its release to the corre,,pondents . 0 The P'tO Corrim1-mique releasing Gener~l Clnrl;: 1 s interview quot8d below: 11 'T'hB follow:ing r1ay be f!ttr:ibutcd to General ClnrJ<-, but 11it}1 the Pope is may not be quoted d3.rectly: Hir-hlic:hts of the "nterview of' Ge11er1:'l Clrr\: ·-,,.; th the Pope, P June, follow: 11 1. Generc> 1 Ck.r1: was deeply impressed, as were oth~r members of his staff , Ar1"lr:i can, British 8nc1 French officers, .,,~ th trsi interviei:r with His Holiness . The rope "ms ~ntGrested in all mankinn;, regardless of' nPtionnlit,r, rn.ce or creed. It wn.s the Tape ' s interest to J,9J.p nny onn "rho ",as in difficulty. 11 11 2 . r2he Pope e:xpresc;ed streot Sf'tisf'action i"'itJ-, the sreed wj_t}, ·+jch the Allied ,Jil:itar;,r GOi.rernnent rwcl elre:,dy mP.de rre:rwrator;r relief arrrngements in cooperation rith the relief ag,mci "'S of' the Vr-itican. n3 . 'T'h0, Fop9 renhi~ seed ·Iith GeYierr,l Cl•cs1~\: at ,r,.ceat length on his visit to Amer:' ca , hou lovely Arier~ en TTns, how mv:ielfish "ere its peopl,:,. The Pope spoke 0 1" hi, vjsit in LotF' :slanr1, and of ri" f:1-tght to the ·est .Gorst. "4. The rope !1S 1rnd Genertll Cl.Rr> tc, C'""'•ve:r his warri regf'lrds Pnd :•·j ;,h0s to !'resident 1foosevelt . f fter the ~nterview , GenPral Glr.r1'" sent :c ce½l,,,. to the ?resident, to cnnvey the Fope ' :, messer;e . "5 . As Gener,.,l Gl'-"rk rras rbont to leave, rin attendPnt tclr1 tl•e Fop0 that th=)re ,~ere 800 Fi.,..th Arriy solc'iers nn~ tin~ in nne of' the rcons o:'.:' th,1 Vrtic:on, hopinp; to 3ee the } ope . t lthoncrh Uce I or:e had ni~ny engqg,3rnents, he ir1Y~0d:t~tely renl:ied thct },o "'ould see tl..,em. General Cl,,,.rk ~mJ-i.cated to Fis EoJj_ness · h t a .,..,1easure :;t, was tJ:--,-,t he WP s takfr,g so rnucb of' his ti:'le to s,~e our Fi "tr Arn·v Allied mm", .c>or the Fopo hr>.s seen r1~ny troops ra:x1 p;ivc,n them his bless;ng. 11 " 0 0 Ge111'3ral ClPrk received a letter ""rom G'=)n9ral Dev,,,rs toc~ny v,' t}1 regard to Fi+'th Arm:v troops f'or other or,srntions . IIis rerly is quoted belor1: t,l,r-, 'Ti thdra1-ml o!' �\ 53 11 Your letter of .Tune l+th hns bPen received, and J. v,ent to tell you ho= deeply I apprec~ ate the 1-:ind t1 ~ 1r,;s you say of' tl,e F'ifth Arny. Your message '"·ill be ['pfr8ciroted b:,r 8Ver·sr riember of the :F'i""tb Arrw. :.': can ass11re you thrt ''e will k3ep up ou.,,. relentless rressure :\ga:iJ:1c:t t},9 '"lnemy and fight him ,=ireever ""re f':' nd him in strenp;th. 1 11 In rmticipntion of oth --r req11ireT'le11ts, T hr,d ordered iJI Corpt:1 rel.; eved by TV Gorps effective noon Jurv':! 11th . An;r tine 2ftm"' t1--i;:;t hcmr FePdquqrters and Headqw1rtP.rs Conpany, vr COJ'.'f3, is c,vailn.blc, for movement elseuhore. I am leav·' ng Butler w: t}, YI Corps HeadquPrt8rs. You }::no· l·on highly I regard him , but I hf've no im.."!l.edinte job in sicht . I am attach:ing the li.i+?nd Infsntry to Doc B.yder 1 s D::vision and c'ill riut Rare;r as an extra Brigndior in that Division . I hr,ve been 1meble to f-i nrl P suitable job for T. K. Brown. If there ; s no assif\'n,·~ent for him in the:! ,)eventh Army I s1w;gest thrt re ')e rerorted to tr;e '.lar Denm~t:rnent P s o.va ilable -!:or 2 rn:iw P ssignne:nt . He has hc,en :i.n the tbeatre sj nee Februer;r ? , J_q/,/t 11.nr' he 11"' s done well. He was '·ith the '~8th Dj vision clurinp; its recent B.dv<1nce "rom tho CradgJ.:iano 'liver . I believe he will bo of p;reat v11.luc in a new djvision. "L!-5th Division is out o'"· the line . 3rd Division is likerrise out but is n0eded fnr r> ,,rMle lonr;er in Rone to holp control the situetion here . /4.5th Division can go at n.ny time you want it . I g;:i.ther th2t t1'e 36th Division hris been selected as tlie third division hecause a requo st v;as received from your hendquarters to desi,0;nate two nembers of the 1 6th Division staff to go to U. K. :: had u.nderstood that you 'ryanted ,'8 to select the third division, but if you want either the ? ')th or the qlst T shall h'l ve no objection . IIo1Yever I should like to "know of the decision soon . n In this conn°ction Genornl Clark wrote the fol1owin,,; to Ger1eral Ryder: nr am attachinr t11'1 .442nc'l Inrantrr to tho "34th Division. Hm; long I will keep it there , I do not 1 --no''', but I have no o+,h0r plru1.s than to leave j t with you for the time be:; ng . You liave h2d such success in hr.ndling the othGr H.A.w11iian- r,.r18r"ic.sn 11nit tbnt I feel qu:_ te secure ~n rlacing it in your good hinds . "I hcve 7rigadier r'reY1err,J. :-l:• rr:r nho is assirr,nr-'d to tr e FF't}, ;1rrny. I },eve no job for him . I Pm asrdgnj_nr; him to :~our TJ:'.vj sion :sc, a.ri extre '3G . Fe "'ill not bA the Assistant Division ConrPnr1 er ')Ut will be sn e-;::tra on-' "or you te use PS you see fit , '"12.rticula.rly l.n view of the fact that :you will 1-T ve four regir1.ents . T desire yon to cooperate -i_n tl is matter ')7 riaking use of him , wl:,ich will r;5 ve hi· eYperience wl'.'en I do need r,r10thr,r .Assistont J1i vision Corimr>nder. 0 0 11 You have done P errand job, n:nd J Qm looldng forward to see;ng you real soon . If In response to a request by th'! rope, General Clnrl- sent the follm;"ng nessRge to the ]resident: 11 It ""Vas my rleRsure yesterday to he received hy the Popo v1ho asb"d , bout you Pnd •·equested r1e to convey to you J-,is bless~•-,g and vrr,rm- regarc;s. He reculled ,rith pleasure bis visit with you Pt Hyde rark . FP. expressed s2tisf,. ction at tre way Allies aro distri' utin.p: fooc'l in Rone e.rea . He is of course greatly c'istressecl over tl,e horrors of' rar . Fe appeared t0 oe :in eYcelle:nt heelth. u �l59 ROME-•JUNE 10, 1944--The General spent the day in his van conferring with mem• bers or his starr and in the afternoon proceeded to the Excelsior Hotel. Late in the afternoon General .Clark gave a reception at which approximately fiftymembers of his staff were present. The General spent the night at the hotel. * * * ROME--J'tJNE 11, 1944--At 1000 in the morning General Clark drove to the Church or Santa Maria degli Angeli in the Piazza Esedra where he attended a solemn high mass or thanksgiving for the fall of Rome. This high mass was celebrated by Chaplain Ryan with a French military chaplain as Deacon and an English military chaplain as Sub-Deacon. Cardinal Tiesserand, Librarian of the Vatican, was present, as were all general officers of the Fifth Arrrry. Nearly all French Generals and high British officials, members of the diploma.tie corps of the United Nations accredited to the Holy See were present and were introduced to the Army Commander. Approximately 10,000 officers and enlisted men of the Firth Army attended this mass. General Clark then returned to his command post where he had lunch with General Juin. General Gruenther and Colonel Saltzman were present with Captain W alters acting as interpreter. General Juin then left and the General received a number of visitors in the afternoon, among them Colonels Gray and Bruce, General Shekerjien and Colonel Barker, General Mason MacFarla.ne and Sir Noel Charles, British High Commissioner of Italy. The General then visited his new villa, accompanied by Lt. Berenson and returned to the command post. General Clark today sent the following letter to General Crittenberger, Commanding General of IV Corps: "I am delighted that tomorrow you will assume command, with your IV Corps, of activities of the Fif'th Army on our west flank. It is my desire that you push the pursuit of the enemy with the utmost vigor. He must not be permitted to regroup. Please do not use 34th Division at this time. It must have at least a week's rest unless some emergency requires its use, in which case please advise me of your intentions. "Intend assigning to you in about two days the 517th Parachute Regiment fresh from the United States. This will give you five regiments plus reconnaissance elements and auxiliary troops. I assume that you will employ the bulk of your strength in the western part of your sector while using a task force in the eastern part of yom- sector, thereby maintaining close contact with French Expeditionary Corps. Perhaps I am wrong in these assumptions. Please advise me earliest of your plans. Will see you soon." * * * ROJil!:--JtJNE 12, 1944-Arter breakfast General Clark drove to the command post of the IV Corps and conferred there with General Crittenberger and his Chief of Staff. General Clark then drove to the cub strip where he met General Wilson, Commanding General of the Peninsular Base Section and conferred briefly with him. General Clark then returned by cub to his command post in Rome and spent the afternoon and evening in conferences with various staff officers. �General Clark this afternoon dictated the following notes for inclusion in his diary: "From time to time I have received indications that the German might, when pressed sufficiently hard, employ gas. Realizing that his best op~tunity to do so would be when large numbers of troops were compressed into a small area like our Anzio bridgehead, I directed before the attack there that all troops carry their gas masks. Also brought into the Anzio area protective clothing, boxes unlabeled, and stored them with the knowledge of but a few officers. "Real:i.zing that it would be very foolish for the Boche to use chemicals but that he might be forced into it by a fanatic Hitler, I gave instructions to my two Corps Commanders in contact yesterday that they would require all troops in contact with the enemy to carry gas msks. I told them this must be done quietly with no written orders of issue, and they both thoroughly understood. I called General Shekerjien and Colonel Guild, my Chemioal Officer, and asked for advice on protective clothing, my idea being to keep it in forward dumps readily available; told them that I had ordered 'troops in contact to carry the gas masks but that others in rear areas would not be required to do so but must have them so they oould get them between thirty minutes and an hour. These Chemical Warfare officers agreed with the measures I am taking. "One of the projects closest to my heart;· upon the capture of Rome, was to secure adequat. rest center faeili ties f'or both officers and enlisted men. e I StL'llmoned all my activities connected with these and directed that .suitable places be found immediately and started up. Th~gsollni Forum has been taken over for enlisted men and starts receiving 2;roo-enlisted men tomorrow. The Excelsior Hotel has been taken over and is receiving officers now. I told both Generals Robertson and !la.cFarlane what I was doing, e.nd neither interposed any objection but apparently they went to work on Alexander who has indicated that he wants no rest center facili.t ies in Rome. Neither MaeFarlane nor Robertson had the guts to tell me but casually mentioned it to my General Johnson who, tmder me, is the Rome Area Commander. General Harding is here today, and I told him what I had heard and for him to tell General Alexander that if he interposed objections to these rest centers I would resent it deeply; that they were already started, their establishment had been published to the troops and that the men who captured Rome at great cost of life should have these facilities, and I intended to continue them. I made it as strong as I could, and Harding understood the seriousness with which I view Alexander's attempt to close them. "Yesterday an officer came here from AFHQ with regard to list. They had indicated by numer:f.cal designation some uni ts involved. I protested; saying that the numerical designation me; that I will make available any troops desired, but I must ing. This has been agreed to by NATOUSA and AAI. "Am glad to get VI Corps out of the line. ANVIL troop which would be must come from do the select- It was the most difficult corps rrr:, staff had to work with, for Truscott is not a cooperator, nor is his Chief of staff. As a result of the1.r Anzio experiences, the whole gang have become a gang of prima donnas. I would sooner release that corps before any others. �"Gave certain instructions to Crittenberger by letter yesterday as quoted in yesterday's diary and confirmed them today during my visit to his sector. He appeared to have the situation well in hand." * * * ROME-•JUNE 13, 1944--General Clark spent the morning at his van and after lm1ch General Robertson called and conferred at some length with General Clark. After General Robertson's departure, General Clark drove to the Foro .Mussolini where he made a speech a.nd opened the enlisted men's rest center there. He was accompanied to this by Generals Gruenther, Brann, Poydenot and Colonels Britten and Saltzman. The General then visited the installations at the rest center accompanied by Colonel Bertholf and went for a short swim in Mussolini's pool. General Clark then returned to the command post and shortly thereafter proceeded to his villa where he had dinner, having as his guests Generals Gruenther, Brann and Saltzman. After dinner General Clark proceeded to the Grand Hotel where he pinned the stars of a Major General on the Commanding General of the 3rd Division, John w. 0 1Daniel and the eagles of a full colonel on Colonel Johnson, Chief of Starr of the same division. General Clark's notes on the day's activities are as follows: "There has been considerable discussion by British senior officers concerning the Fifth Army Rest Centers. Knowing there would be this pt"ejudice, I told Alexa.mer, Harding, Robertson and MaaFarlane of my intentions. I told them immediately after I entered Rome so that if there were objections I could be advised. They did not challenge me, but I heard rumbling of their disfavor which finally appeared in orders which have never come to me. I told Harding that I heard orders were being issued denying me this pt"ivilege and that if such orders were issued without my having a chance to discuss the subject with the Commander-in-Chief, I would resent it deeply, and it would cause me great embarrassment~ SU1"e enough, the orders have been issued denying the right to have rest centers in Rome. "When I heard this, I sent for Robertson and gave him my views very forcibly. He assured me that the Commander-in-Chief had no idea of embarrassing me nor of changing what I have done for the time being. I am continuing to run my rest centers and w;l.11 not give them up without a terrific mttle. The order also prescribed that no enlisted men can come in town at night. I have challenged that and issued orders that my men can stay in until eleven o'clock and will not be severe on those who remain in over night." * * * ROME-JUNE 14, 1944--During the morning the General conferred in his van with vs.rious staff' officers, and he continued this into the early afternoon. Later in the afternoon the Army Col!'.!Jn8.nder went to his villa where he had dinner and played bridge after supper, having as his guests General Gruenther, Colonel Porter and Captain Jones. Major Roberts also called and discussed the pictorial history of the Fifth Army with General Clark. The General spent the night at his villa. �ROHE--JUNE 15, 1944-After breakfast the General drove to the 45th Division command post west of Rome where he was received by General Eagles. The General then proceeded to the area of the 157th Infantry where he presented battle streamers to the guidons or the 2nd Batte.lion of that Regiment. The General then drove back to Rome. During the ,afternoon the General co~erred with officers of his staff in his van and at 1630 General Juin called and conferred with General Clark, Captain Walters acted as interpreter during this meeting. The two Generals discussed at some length the General's per· sonal future, General Clark stating that he would speak of it to General Marshall in his forthcoming visit. General Juin seemed a little bitter at his fate and said he expected. to retire to his farm. General Clark told him how much he appreciated the fine cooperation and the work of the French Expedi• tions.ry Corps and General /uin in particular and how eager he was that that cooperation should continue. General Juin then left and General Clark attended a party given in his honor by the British Increment on the occasion of their departure from Fifth Army Headquarters. At this party General Cl.ark was presented with a table and engraved plaque by the British Increment. General Clark dictated the following notes this afternoon for inclusion in his diary: "I have known, of course, for many months of the impending ANVIL Opera-tion. I have known of it for I was its commander for a long time. It was indicated to me that the VI Corps with the 3rd, 36th and 45th Divisions, which I nominated, would go as soon AS we bad captured Rome. I had planned, of course, on it and am prepared to release them immediately. I also knew that the French Expeditionary Corps would leave me. I Assume that the Combined Chiefs of Staff ma.king these decisions know what they are doing and if ANVIL is launched feel that it will contr1bute much to the invasion and the second front more than our continued effort in Italy. I am convinced that the CCS are wrong, for they ma.de their decision to prepare for this operation without realizing the great success the Fifth and Eighth Armies were to ha-ve in Italy. The' morale of the Fifth Army is sky high. The Boche is defeated, disorganized and demoralized. Now is the time to exploit the success. Yet, in the middle of this success I lose one Corps Headquarters and five divisions - three immediately and two within another two weeks. In other words, to prepare for the eventuality of ANVIL they are sacrificing a great victory here. It just doesn't make sense. I am convinced that the Fifth Army, with its present means, with its high esprit and with a great victory under its belt can march into France overland sooner than any amphibious operation can be started. "The depressing part of this is the case of General Juin. He is a superlative commander and leader. He has performed magnificently in combat, has cooperated 100% with me, and we each have mutual admiration and respect for the other, as do all our troops. This egotistical DeGaulle, impelled by ambitions and guided by political feuds, is ca.sting Juin aside. Juin has heard nothing f'rom his government, but he has received indications as to his fate. He and his whole_staff are depressed. His state of mind is bound to reflect on the battle, so again we are losing the battle we have won so dearly. "General Marshall is coming Monday to see me. I will spare no words in �telling him of this deplorable situation which now confronts the Fifth Army and its French troops. "I have direeted Juin to keep on pushing as hard as he can, forgetting the clouds which threaten him and that I am sure that things will work out soon. He has promised to do so. "This evening I attended a farewell cocktail party given by the British officers who have served on my staff so long and so loyally. They brought up the enlisted men who had made up a ca.rd table out of metal from a German plane and the wood and glass from materials taken from the battlefield. It is beautifully engraved, and I appreciate the sentiment it expresses." Captain Walters, aide to the Army Commander, was the interpreter at General Clark's conferenoa with General Juin, and he made the following notes: "General Clark received General Juin in his van in the Fifth Army command post at the Villa. Snvoia in Rome today at 1645. General Gruenther, the Chief of Staff, and Captain Walters, the interpreter, were the only other persons present. General Clark began by stating that he had received some information that he wanted to impart to General Juin. He stated that he had been informed that two divisions were to be withdrawn from the FEC for use in other operations. He stated that he had seen General Devers earlier in the afternoon and had endeavored some definite information concerning this from hiin but that General Devers did not have anything definite on it. General Clark stated . that he did not believe that a definite decision had been taken regarding the carrying out of these operations but that he believed that a definite decision to prepare for them had been taken. General Juin indicated that he had had indications of something or the sort. General Clark then stated that two or the Frenoh Divisions were to be withdrawn from the line and sent to Naples where they would pass under the operational control of the u. s. Seventh Army. "At this point General Gruenther specified that they would be infantry divisions, and that this would exclude the mountain divisions. General Juin stated that he had not had any instructions and that naturally he would have to communicate this information 'to General DeGaulle. General Juin expressed strong disapproval of the idea and stated that this would be tantamount to withdrawing four divisions, as when the FEC arrived on the Appenines, the two divisions would be tired and would have to be withdrawn to rest and that there would be no units to replace them and this would be equivalent to withdrawing the whole FEC. General Clark heartily concurred and stated ths.t he thought it was shameful. He stated that he also would lose some American units as he had already been notified or the withdrawal of the VI Corps, the 45th Division, the 3rd Division end the 36th Division and other supporting units whose phased withdrawal date he would be notified of later. He then told General Juin that one or the French Divisions was to be withdrawn on June 24th and the other one in the first week in July. General Juin reluctantly stated that he could do this . and then discussed with General Clark the details of movement. "General Clark expressed his regret that art.er this great victory in Italy they be not allowed to exploit it fully and thought the whole thing shamef'ul, he added that he had tried to obtain more details but had been as yat unsuccessful. 1Very secret' comented General Juin drily. General Clark stated �that some definite decision would have to be reached soon. He then stated that he was getting the 9ls.t Division from the u. s. and possibly the 92nd. General Juin stated again that ~e would have to notify General DeGaulle for after all, in the final anal:,sis, it was his (Juin 1 s) government that controlled the troops. He stated that he had heard rumors to this effect some time ago and bad written General DeGaulle expressing his opposition. General Clark then stated that he believed that General De Lattre de Tassigny had been designated as Commnder of the French lmits in this operation. General Juin nodded and asked w hether there would be a French Army. General Gruenther, stated that he did not think so at the beginning but that there probably would be later. General Gruenther also asked whether there were any other French troops available. General Juin stated that there were not to his knowledge, there had been a Third Corps, but it had been dissolved. He stated, however, that it might be reconstituted, as 'after all, the:, have got to hRve Army Corps'. "General Clark then told General Juin in great confidence that General Marshall would arrive in Ital:, shortly, perhaps Sunday- or Monday, and that he was coming from a visit to General Eisenhower. General Clark added that he would bring General Marshall to visit General Juin at his headquarters, or if General Marshall did not have time, General Juin could see him at General Clark's headquarters. General Clark stated that he thought that until he had spoken to General Marshall that they (He and General Juin) should continue to push on just the way they bad in the past along the established bolmdarias. He stated that he knew that the proposed withdrawal of troops would leave the FEC with too wide a sector and that he would also find his American elements in the same position and that in consequence he would have to ask General Alexander to reduce his sector in conformity with his capacity to advance. General Juin stated thRt he also felt that this would be necessary as all he would have left would be two divisions and the Goums. ? "General Clark then told General Juin thBt General Alexander did not yet even know of this decision, and that he (General Clark) had just spoken to General Harding about it. General Juin expressed his surprise at this and asked whence came the information. He was told that it came from AFHQ and General Clark added that even General Wilson was opposed to it. General Juin stated that in his opinion it was a great pity that a tentative operation against the Mediterranean ooe.st of France in perhaps September, should paralyze the exploitation of a great victory now. General Clark stated that he believed that General Eisenhower was holding this other operation in case he needed it. General Juin replied that this precaution would ca.use us to lose the battle or Italy, and that it was too bad as it was in the 'plains of the Po' that we must destroy the German reserves. General Juin stated that there the enemy would have diffioulty in supplying his troops due to the passes in the mountains. General Juin stated that history would judge this decision severely-. General Clark agreed emphatically and stated that he had protested, but that now as a good soldier he would obey orders and release the units as requested. General Juin commented cryptiea.11:, 'well, events will turn out as they do'. He repeated once more that he would have to tell General DeGaulle about this decision, and stated once more that this was a 'be.d plan'. �"General Clark then stated tha.t General Carpentier had given him to understand that General Juin would not serve under General De Lattre. General Juin shrugged his shoulders and stated 'No, it would be impossible'. General Cl.ark then stated to General Juin that if they were allowed to con• tinue they would get to France, Berlin or anywhere else thRt they would buy them a ticket to faster than anyone else. General Juin agreed. He further said that he wouldn't stay with two divisions, but would turn over the command, perhaps to Larminat who had a big staff. 'I will retire to my farm' he said. 'I'll buy a farm alongside of your_• said General Clark. s General Clark further stated that he had not given up fighting and would talk to General Marshall and tell him that we wanted General Juin alongside of us as our relations had always been very close and most friendly. General Ju1.n said that they should do what was possible against the plan but not to worry about it; that they were interested in him, and General Clark added that in. war personalities do co'llllt. "General Clark then stated that it was too be.d that the exploitation of this great viatory should be interfered with by politics and so forth, adding that General DeGaulle saw this operation as the quickest way back to France, with consequent liberation of a portion thereof. General Juin nodded his head in agreement. General Juin then said that he would always be happy that he had fought the Germans in Italy with General Clark and he had fought a war of movement, and that this was all a General could dream of. General Clark then stated that he felt that until he had seen and spoken with General Marshall they proceed e::matly as before along the newly established bo'tllldaries. General Gruenther then stated thRt these bo'tllldaries would go into effeat at 0800 tomorrow morning. General Juin agreed. "General Juin then asked some questions concerning motor transportation that he desired to have to move some of his troops, and General Gruenther stated that unfortunately motor transportation was causing a minor crisis. He stated that three hundred trucks had been borrowed from the -45th Division to move supplies but that the trucks had to be returned today. General Juin, who had an appointment for a ptrade then rose to leave and was accompanied to his ear by General Clark and the two Gem,rals parted cordially." * * * ROME-..JUNE 16, 1944--General Clark spent the morning in his van, conferring with various staff officers and taking care of an accumulation of administrative matters. In the afternoon Generals Keyes and Harmon called on the General to discuss the pending assault of the 1st Armored Division. General Clark today received the following letter from General Crittenberger: "I am taking this means of reaching you because of the pi-esent i.mcartainty in telephone connections. "The 36th Division as you know, has been fighting continuously now since it broke out of the ANZIO beachhead May 23rd. Since the capture of ROME, it has advanced more than eighty miles, and still has considerable fight left in �it. However, with a view to maintaining the present impetus of the advance, the relief of the 36th Division by the 34th Division, sometime in the future, deserves consideration. The 34th Division has benefited much from its stay in the rear area since June 9th. By June 23rd it will have ha,d two weeks of refttting, rehabilitation and recuperation. Therefore, it should be ready sometime next week to replace the 36th Division. The exact date of such a passage of lines will depend to a great extent on the situation at that time, particularly with reference to the hostile strength which we may or may not find in our immediate front. "In the meantime, the 1st Armored Division has been directed to be prepared to reenter active operations on June 18th under command of this Corps. As a result of a conference this morning with Harmon, it would appear that the 1st Armored Division, if it is to be used, could start its narch up to the front by separate Combat Commands either Sunday or Monday, June 18th or 19th, closing in the forward area the night of June 2oth or 21st. If there is no greater urgency resulting from the hostile situation than now exists, this "'rmored march forward might be delayed until Monday the 19th, in which case the division would be closed up here by Wednesday night, June 21st. "In considering plans for the employment of the 1st Armored Division and after consultation with Harmon, I am of the opinion that once we break through whatever hostile resistance we may find on the GROSSETO - ORVIETO line, the lat Armored Division reinforced by some additional reconnaissance, self-propelled artillery and infantry might be shot forward through the gA,p made by the infantry, and with a fair chance or making rapid progress to the NORTHWEST. It would be the plan for the armored advance to be made in two or more columns on roads inland from the coast, where it is believed there will be fewer demolitions. As the advance to the NORTHWEST gains momentum, sharp hooks down hill toward the coast might very well result in cutting off hostile troops along Highway 1. "Following the 1st Armored Division and also on at least two or more roads, would be the 34th Division, which by that time could employ the Japanese ROT and also the 517th Airborne ROT. "Such a plan would be bold, and should increase the tempo of the advance. In order to succeed, preparations for it should be made in the greatest detail, and coordination should be as near perfect as possible. This means that the French Corps on our right, informed of the plans, might find it possible to make corresponding gains by closely following our armor in their own zone. Also it might be possible to incorporate in the plan a short quick amphibious operation as you described. "In event it is not desirable to employ the 1st Armored Division at this time, it would then appear appropriate to relieve the 36th Division by the 34th Division sometime during the period Jmie 21st - 24th, again depending largely on the hostile situation on our front; and continuing the employment of a mobile, hard-hitting force in the right of the IV Corps zone. This mobile force might be made up of one Mechanized Reconnaissance Squadron, one infantry ROT, one battalion of self-propelled artillery, one tank ba.t talion, and engineers, etc. If the hostile resistance does not increase as we advance northward, it would be reasonable to expect that such a plan would �result in an advance at approximately the same rate as that of the American troops since crossing the TIBER. "The above plans in tentative form are submitted to you for your consi• deration. Within the next day or so, I hope to be able to see you and learn of yo'ID." desires." The following cable was received today from General Alexander: "l. I fully realize that the withdrawal of divisions as ordered by AFHQ from your command at this stage must create considerable difficulties for you. At the same time we should lay ourselves open to a very serious charge of impeding the overall war effort if we continued to press for the retention of formations which in my opinion we cannot fully employ during the present phase of operations. "2. When we have captured Florence and Leghorn and have driven the enemy back to the Rimini - Pisa line we shall I consider be in a strong position to press for the return of all the divisions you are now being asked to release to enable us to complete the destruction of the enemy's armed forces in Italy by another all out offensive. I have already represented this view strongly to the SAC-in•C and will continue to do so. I am also urging that the instructions for the release of the second French division should be mod1.fied so that that formation will not in any case have to begin to leave the battle area before 8 July. By- that time a decision may have been taken which will render the move back of the second French division unnecessary. "3. Pending a decision on the proposals for future operations which I have made to SAC-in-C I must ask you to meet the requirements of AFHQ as regards releases, except in regard to the second French division, and at the same time to press on with the pursuit of the enemy and the capture of Leghorn as fast as you possibly can with the forces that remain with you. No action to effect the release of the second French division during the first week of July will however be taken without reference to me personally." General Clark replied to General Alexander as follows: "I am in agreement with the views expressed in your MA 1421 with regards the ultimate retention of Fifth Army formations now scheduled for relief. I am afraid, from reading your message, that Harding misunderstood me yesterday and carried back to you the thought that we needed urging as a result of these withdrawals. I can ass'ID."e you that the Fifth Army will continue to push forward with the same determination and vigor which has always characterized its operations, and this in spite of the scheduled relief or units. "The point I tried to make to Harding was the disgraceful manner in which Juin is being treated, which has cast a cloud of doubt over his headquarters, and which, I am afraid, may dim the enthusiasm and ardor with which the French have always fought under Fifth Army command. I conferred with Juin last evening and made it cl8f\r to him that the all-out advance continues. "I am glad you have taken steps to hold the 2nd French Division at least until July 8th. That will help." �TUSCANIA-JUNE 17, 1944-•After breakfast General Clark flew to IV Corps and visited that organization as well as the 36th Division, retm-ning thereafter to his villa in Rome where he hRd lunch. Arter lunch the General drove to the Hotel Excelsior where he conferred with General Ryder and Colonel Bruce. The Army Commander then retm-ned to the villa where he had supper with some of his staff officers. The command post today was moved from the Villa Savoia to the town of Tuscania, 72 miles north of Rome. * ~A Jf i.?~ :r rr1:. ~ * * T._USCANIA--JUNE 18, 1944--After breakfast General Clark drove to Littorio airport where he met, upon their arrival, Generals Marshall, Devers, Handy and Colonel McCarthy and also saw General Arnold prior to his departure with General Cannon. The whole pa.rty then drove ~round from the airport to the new Firth Army command post in the vicinity of Tuscania where they proceeded to the reception hut. Here General Marshall was introduced to the Divisional and Corps Commanders, both American and French. General Marshall then gave a short orientation talk and refreshments were served. General ~~shall then pinned the Distinguished Service Medal on Generals Juin, Sloan, Coulter, . 7 Eagles and o•Daniel. General Clark then presented to General Marshall other officers of his staff and Section Chiefs. The party then left by car and drove to the IV Corps command post where they were received by General Crit-· tenberger. Changing to jeeps, the party drove forward to the ,6th Division where they were received by General Walker. The party then visited forward elements in the vicinity of Grosseto, returning to the 36th DiVision cub strip. From there General Clark flew back to the. command post at Tuscania and the other members of the party retm-ned to Rome. · /- * * * TUSCANIA-•JUNE 19, 1944-General Clark spent the morning at his command post conferring with his staff officers, and after lunch he went by car to the command post of the French Expeditionary Corps to confer with General Juin. General Juin was out visiting his divisions, had not yet retm-ned, and the Anny Commander c0nferred instead with General Carpentier, General Juin 1 s / Chief of Staff. General Carpentier received General Clark and showed him through General Juin 1 s trailers, Captain Walters acting as interpreter. General Clark, also accompanied on this trip by General Gruenther, discussed with General Carpentier the effects that the removal of service units for Operation ANVIL would have on the operations of the French Expedjtionary Corps. Generals Clark and Carpentier also spoke at some length regarding General Juin 1 s personal future, and General Carpentier explained that while Juin and De Lattre de Tassigny were of the same class ~t military school, Juin had always been senior, and he had always been promoted before De La.ttre. This would make it impossible for Juin to serve under De Lattre. General Carpentier stated that General Juin had been about to send him (Carpentier) to Algiers to see DeGaulle when General Juin had received news of DeGaulle's impending visit and had decided to wait until then to see what the futm-e held for him. General Carpentier apologized profusely for General Juin's absence, and General Clark returned to his command post where he spent the remainder of the afternoon and evening working on administrative papers. . ��GeneTal Clark today dictated the following .notes for inclusion in his diary, "Yesterday I met General Marshall and General Arnold at Littorio field in Rome. I drove with General Marshall for two and a half hours to my com• _ mand post. · During that time he oriented me completely on the Pacific y, situation and Eisenhower's cross-channel operation. He wanted me to know ~ the complete background and what the big picture looked like in order to receive from me my recommendations for future operations in Italy. Eisenhower ✓i is most anxious that a landing take place in southern France--ANVIL-•as soon \ 1 )~ as possible, preferably early July, with the mission of cutting across France d t" 1 /'I to capture the port of Bordeaux in order that additional troops can be ,,.,(. t' brought in from the United States. Knowing Alexander's views - that all ;' JJ;jl') 11 Firth Army resources and Eighth Army push on in Italy into the Po Valley - I /~, .t,., wanted to get General Marshall and General Eisenhower's views before stating r f my own, Once I knew that it was all-out on Ike• s part to land in southern France, I threw my weight in that direction, for I knew I couldn't change it. tt"'I told General Marshall that taking troops from me now for ANVIL threw a . crimp into the victorious advance of this army. I just wanted him to under/~'./,./, stand it. I told him that with my Fifth Army complete and without the Eighth if t./v Army I could go across the mountains at Florence into Bologna - that I knew ,j f}7 A the Eighth Army could not do it without the Fifth Army. r 1' /VY ~ "I told General Morshall ~retire rather than servein which Juin was the disgracerul manner ~~~ being handled and that he would under DeLattre de Tassigny. General Marshall asked me why Juin 1 s FEC couldn 1t make the landing in France, backed up by an American airborne division, all under Patch's command initially and using u. s; landing era.ft and augmented by certain u. s. service and auxiliary troops. His fln•ther suggestion being that all u. s. · troops be left in the Fifth Army until we entered the continent - that he ~ ~"?'_,.;-- would demand tha.t Juin command the landing of French troops rather than De _,_JJ- \:,I, tattre de Tassigny o:i:i the basis that they needed a battle-proven leader such t ·'« ✓ as Juin - that once the landing had been effected, DeGaulle could place a Jf 6 'f. French Army in the field under the· commander he named when the time seemed ~ :~ appropriate - that then all U. s. Divisions in the Mediterranean would follow ~v into southern France and go into the Seventh Army. At that time a group of Q" "\ ~ arm1.es would be set up under American command to control the U. s. and Frencl\ ,:r-t"' Arrrry'. I told him I believed that was a solution whereby he could have his "cake and eat it too". However, the French are not fully trained at landing and it might not work out. Nevertheless, I am full out in support of Ike's desire for this landing, knowing that we will follow in at an early date. ~ . , r_ "Already demends for service units, auxiliary troops and artillery are being made upon me in addition to the VI Corps, and I have instructed my staff to give them everything as fast as we can and speed up this next operation. "This will be a great blov, to Alexander, who wants to keep the American and French troops, knowing that they will fight and preserve his reputation, for we made it for him by the conduct of the Firth Army in the last battle for Rome. His Eighth Army contributed absolutely nothing but grief for him. I must tell Alexander thet in the light of these withdrawals, he must have the Eighth Army carry the ball from now on; that he must give the Fifth Army �l "7 o a narrow sector of responsibility commensurate with its means and that we will conform until such time es all troops a.re taken out. This will never work, I lmow, for Eighth Army is incapable or carrying the ball. "General Marshall was high in his praise and gratitude for the conduct of the Fifth Army." * * * TUSCANIA-JUNE 20, 1944-General Juin arrived in the morning and conferred with General Clark, Captain Walters acting es his interpreter. General Clark and General Juin conferred at s~me length on the withdrawal of service units for the ANVIL Operation from the French Corps. Genera.l Clark assured General Juin that after these withdrawals he would give careful study to the service units remaining and would distribute them in such a manner as to support four divisions he hoped to keep in the line - two French and two American. General Clark then informed General Juin that he had previously discussed General Juin's personal future with General Marshall and stated that General Mershall had expressed great admiration for General Juin. Juin said he was mst grateful but that victory end not personalities was his main interest and begged General Cl8rk not to bother about him. General Juin left, and General Clark remained in his van during the afternoon and conferred with various of his staff officers. Genere.l Alexander arrived dur5ng the course of the afternoon and conferred with the Army Colllill8.llder. General Clark's notes for today follow: "I received yesterday an appreciation from General Alexander for the Firth and Eighth Armies to cross the Appenines and capture ,Bologna. The study was based upon Firth Army retaining all its troops and not losing any to ANVIL-a very improbable situation. However, a zone running generally northeast from Florence towards Bologna. was given as the most desirable terrain over which to make a penetration of the mountains and capture Bo• logna. and enter the Po Valley. Practically all of the favore.b le terrain zone was given to the Eighth Army as was Bologna and the principal road that Fifth Army was to use to approach Bologna was ta.ken away from it five miles from the city. Fifth Army was then assigned the role of turning to the west in the Po Valley end protecting the flank of the British Eighth Anny as it went into the Valley· of the Danu\>e. Later, Firth Army was authorized to attack into Germany through the Brenner Pass. The pla.n was so lopsided that it was ridiculous. "I telephoned to Harding and told him that an appropriate assignment had not been given the Fifth Army. He told me he would come up and did so, · bringing Alemnder with him. We thrashed the thing out. I told Alexander the Firth Army should advance into France over the mountains rather than remain idle in the Po Valley. He agreed. They also reluctantly indicated they would change the boundaries between Armies crossing the mountains so as to run jt through the middle of Bologna. I told him a little competition between armies would be a go9d thing. �111 "The rest of the discussion dealt with the merits of ANVIL versus the Po Valley Operation. That decision rests in the hands of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and it is disgraceful that some word has.not yet been received, for the pulling of troops away from Fifth Army to mount ANVIL is seriously affecting my ability to move north. I am convinced that ANVIL will be put on, and in order that Fifth Army in some capacity get into the French picture under Eisenhower I have directed that all units of the Fifth Arm? be turned over to the ANVIL Operation as rapidly as possible." * * * TUSOANIA--JUNE 21, 1944--General Clark spent the morning in his van taking care of accumulated paper work and at eleven o'clock received Ambassador Murphy and Mr. Offie and had them to lunch. After lunch Messrs. Murphy and Offie left, and Genere.l Livesay, Commanding General of the 91st Division, called on General Clark. Generals Keyes and Shekerjian also called on the Commanding General during ·the afternoon. In the late afternoon General Clark went fishing on Lake Bolsena with Colonel Saltzman, Major Riggs and Lieutenant Berenson and returned in time to have dinner with these officers. General Clark today sent the following letter to General Harmon, Commanding General of the 1st Armored Division: "I was very muoh disturbed to learn yesterday that your representative introduced at an air•gro,md conference at Fourth Corps Headquarters · a memorandum purporting to represent your views on the ability of the Air to furnish close support to an armored di vision. While I have not seen a · copy of the memorandum I understand that you requested that no attempt be made by the Air to furnish close, support to your division. "I talked to your Chief of Staff, Colonel Dewey, this morning and he assures me that you are in thorough agreement with the procedure which Saville is attempting to perfect, and that it will have your wholehearted cooperation. I ·sincerely hope that Dewey has correctly represented your attitude. I consider that the introduction of your memorandum at yesterday's meeting was most unfortunate. It was certainly not conducive to the development of the close relations which must exist between the air and the ground elements if we are to have effective close air support. "I strongly urge that you personally see General Saville at your earliest convenience in order to correct any erroneous impression which may have been created by your note. Please understand that Saville has not com• plained about your memorandua. However, from my long a~sociation with him I know that it can not help but have a harmful effect. That situation must be cleared up as soon as possible. "I hope to see you within the next day or two. General Crittenberger tells me that your plans are in excellent shape, and I am looking forward to the usual fine performance from your division." �TUSCANIA--JUNE 22, 1944•-In the early part of the morning General Clark new to IV Corps Headquarters and conferred there with General Crittenberger, returning late in the morning to the command post. Arter lunch the ambulance donated by the Mornings of Diversion Club .(the money for which was raised through the efforts of Mrs. Clark) was brought up for the General's inspection and photographed. The General oonferred with staff officers during the afternoon and conferred with Colonel Kirkwood. Later in the afternoon the Army Commander saw General Rooks, Deputy Chief of Starr, AFHQ, and conferred with him at length regarding various operational matters. * * * TUSCANIA-JUNE 23, 1944--During the morn1ng General Clark held a conference of his staff officers in the conference hut, discussing rnB.tters he was to take up later in the morning in his conference with General Alexander at AAI Headquarters. Immediately after this conference, General Clark flew to AAI Headquarters at Frasca.ti accompanied by Generals Gruenther, Brann and Tate. The General's car met him at Frasca.ti after the conference, and General Clark drove to Rome immediately after the meeting, spending the evening and night at his suite in the hotel. * * * TUSCANIA--JUNE 24, 1944-General Clark remained in the hotel today, conferring with various city administration and MinOT officials concerning the handling of various civic problems entailed in the administration of the City of Rome. During the afternoon General Brann arrived and conferred with General Clark. The General gave a dinner in his private dining room in the hotel for Generals Tate, Brann, Lewis, Bradshaw and Colonels SaltzrnB.n, Nygaard, Tully, Captain Walters and other guests. * * * TUSCANIA-JUNE 25, 1944--General Clark remained in his suite at the hotel, taking up administrative matters with his G-J, General Brann. In the a:f'ternoon General Clark visited Marshal Smuts a.t the Grand Hotel and had tea there. Marshal Smuts introduced General Van Ryneveld, his Chief of Staff, and other officers of his staff and his two sons who are acting as his aides. Marshal Smuts then recalled the last time he had seen General Clark in London in preparation for the landings in North Africa. General ClArk stated that he recalled that meeting with great pleasure and satisfaction. General Smuts congratulated General Clark on the fine achievements of the Fifth Army, stating that he had been the tower of strength. General Clark then stated that the fine showing maoe by the two new di visions i.n the Fifth Army, the 85th and 88th, had, he felt, had a most beneficial effect on the new American di visions waiting for the invasion in England. These two di visions hed shown that the new American divisions were more than a match for the German veterans. Marshal Smuts replied that he had heard that the new American divisions had acquitted themselves very well in Normandy, and he was sure that this morale factor had played a considerable part in their success. Marshal Smuts stated that he had visited the Normandy front with Prime Minister Churchill and had found that visit most satisfactory, and everything proceeding �exceedingly well. He stA.ted that losses had been far below expectation. MB.r shal Smuts stated that the fall of Cherbourg would have a most far-reaching effect. General Clark concurred, stating that it would then be possible to bring fresh divisions direct from the United States. General Clark also added that it has been our experience here in Italy that the Germans had lost the art of the counter attack. They have launched counter-attacks piecemeal. General Clark recalled that at Anzio on one occasion the Germans staged an attack with six divisions using two battalions of each division. He stated thet he believed this was due to manpov,er conservation. Marshal Smuts expressed his admiration for the stand ma.de on the beachhead under most trying conditions. General Clark then stated that although he was losing divisions here in Italy, he was doing everything possible to help General Eisenhower's opera• tion. Marshal Smuts stated that he felt that the campaign in Italy had been of very great value to the success of OVERLORD, both a.s regards morale and material factors. 1 General Clark then drove directly to the Littorio airport and returned to his ·command post where he had dinner. During the dinner he informed Sergeant Holden that he was returning to the United States tomorrow morrdng on a furlough. General Juin today issued the following memorandum regarding the attitude or French soldiers toward Italian civilians: Certain Commanding Officers of American Units which were attached to during the offensive, have · been very d5sagreeably impressed by the attitude of some of our men toward the Italian population. They have complained about it to the Commanding General, Fifth Army. t•1. F.E.c., "2. Unfortunately, it is exact that a certain amount of regrettable incidents have occurred. The Commanding General, F. E. c., is aware of the drastic measures taken by the l~ge unit commanders in compliance with instructions issued to that effect (memo 5911 CEF/1 dated 27 May 1944). He is aware also of the efficiency of these measures. "3. However, these additional complaints require that Commanders of all echelons do not decrease in any way their surveillance. It must particularly apply to small isolated detachments." * * * TUSCANIA--JUNE 26, 1944--The General spent the morning in his van taking care of accumulated paper work. At 1100 the Soviet Ambassador to the French Committee of National Liberation and Member of the Advisory Council to Italy, Mr. Alemnder·Bogomolov, and the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Mr. Vidia• sov, called and were received by the General in his van. At 1130 the General, accompanied by the Ambassador and the Secretary of the Embassy, proceeded to the cub strip where a decoration ceremony was held. Ambassador Bogomolov presented Soviet awards to two Fifth Army officers, and General Clark presented American decorations to a number of other officers and enlisted men. General Clark, the Ambassador and the SecretRry of the Embassy then returned to the command post and had lunch. After lunch the Soviet officials departed and General Clerk conferred at some length with General Brann. �General Lenmitzer called in the afternoon to confer with General Clark. Colonel Gray also called to discuss some court martial cases, an~ later in the afternoon the theater cha.plain, Chaplain Beebe, accompanied by Chaplain Ryan, Fifth Army Chaplain, was rece:tved. General Clark today sent the f'oll<>wing letter to General Eisenhower: "I know you are busy these days and don't have time for long letters, so this will be short. "We are all pulling f'or you and tremendously pleased with your progress to date. Hope we can help. You are the only one who knows how we best fit into the big picture, so get a decision and tell us what is wanted. You can rest assured you will get our full support. Lack of decision now is slowing us up and not helping you. You know you can have every single unit I have, and they will leave here the minute the request is made. I have told my staff to give you the best we have, but don't forget the rest of us, if you take _most of my outfit, for we want to get back with you and wind this thing up as fast as possible. "Thanks f'or your radio. We were all delighted with it. "Secured, through Hap Arnold, a C-54 to send twenty of' my oldest people back home for two weeks with their families. Al headed the list, and officers and men are now enroute. "Best of regards to Bedel." * * * TUSCANIA••JlJNE 27, 1944-•In the morning General Clark flew in his L•5 to IV Corps. He spent the morning a.t IV Corps and returned to his command post at 1400. At 1500 General Donovan of OSS called and was received by General Clark. The Army Commander spent the rest of the afternoon in his van and conferred with various staff officers. * * TUSCANIA-•J'UNE 28, 1944•-General Clark spent the morning in his van taking ca.re of a large a.mount of paper work that had accumulated. Shortly after 1300 Major General Henry, USA, Ret., arrived by air and had lunch with General Clark. General Henry arrived alone and left after lunch with General Keyes. General Clark conferred with General Brann after this meeting. Shortly after 1800 General ChBrles DeGaulle arrived, accompanied by his Chief of staff, General Marie Emile Bethoua.rd, and General Juin and several other officers. All of the party except General DeGaulle and Gene• ral Clark went to the hut. General DeGaulle and General Clark went to the Army Commander's van and conferred there with Captain Walters acting as interpreter. After exchanging greetings, General Clark expressed to General DeGa.ulle his admiration forN the magnificent part p~yed by the French troops �l15 in the victorious advance or the Fifth Army and stated ths,t they had earned a well-deserved share of that victory. General Clark recalled that the last time he had seen General DeGaulle, the French General had said "You must win a victory", and, added General Clark, "Now we have won it". General DeGaulle stated that victory had now been won and still another one had been won when the forces that had been in the bridgehead broke out. General DeGaulle then discussed the ANVIL Operation. He stated that the French had agreed to the campaign in Ital1 but had always felt that af• ter the Battle of Rome they would like to fight in France. He said he believed this was quite natural, and he felt General Clark would understand this feeling. General Clark stated that he understood it but believed that in the case of the ANVIL Operation speed was of the essence. General DeGaulle replied that the plan did not seem to be too speedy, and although it had been somewhat accelerated recently, it was still quite far off. General Clark then asked General DeGaulle how soon he intended to withdraw the two remaining French Divisions. General DeGaulle sta.ted that he did not know and that it depended largely upon the ANVIL Operation but that if the order came to withdraw them it would have to come very quickly. General Clark then stated that with what would be left or the Fifth Army he did not believe that we could m-oss the mountains. General DeGaulle agreed that he did not think this was possible either. General Clark then expressed the belief that General Wilson might try both operations ••••• ANVIL and the continuation of the pursuit in Italy. General DeGaulle stated that he did not think both operations could be carried out successfully, and General Clark conc~red in this. . General DeGaulle then stated that he was taking the liberty of asking General Clark some personal questions because they were of great interest to the French. He asked him what part he personally would play in the ANVIL Operation. General Clark replied that he felt that eventually all the American troops here would be put into the ANVIL Operation. He stated that be believed initially there would be the Seventh Army, commanded by General Patch, and the ·French troops would constitute eventually a French Army and that they would probably be formed into an Army Group but who would command this he did not definitely know, and General DeGaulle nodded without replying. General Clark then stated that he would like to ask General DeGaulle a question but did not want to give the appearance of interfering in any way. He'stated that he felt sure that General DeGaulle knew the great esteem in which we held General Juin. General DeGaulle stated that he was aware of this fact and that he personally had a great regard for General Juin, but he said, "As you must lrnow, I wanted to give General Juin his chance in Italy, . and he has certainly taken magnificent advantage of his chance. We also have General De Lattre de Tassigny, and we want to give him his chance also. We only have one Army, and it is a small one, but I am sure that within a few months we will be able to give both of them a command worthy of them. As the operation progresses we will be able to build up our forces so that they will both have a command befitting their ability." General· Clark then asked whether he was going to take General Juin out of Italy immediately, and General ,DeGaulle replied quickly, "Oh, no! He will �remain here as long as he has troops fighting and after that I will take him with me for a while". General DeGaulle hinted but did not state plainly his preference for General Juin over General DeLattre de Tassigny-. He added that he felt sure that the ANVIL Operation would be carried out, in which General Clark concurred - the latter stating that he desired to do everything possible to help General Eisenhower. General DeGaulle then stated that he believed that after the landing things would go quite rapidly, adding "The Germans are very tired". · General DeGaulle spoke of his visit to Normandy, stating that things were going quite well there and gave the impression that he was very satis- fied with his visit to the western front. General DeGrulle then stated that he intended to present some decorations tomorrow to some American Generals and hoped General Clark could be present, adding that he hoped to have the honor of pinning a decoration on General Clark. General Clark added that he would be very proud and pleased to be there. The two Gene• rals then left the van together and went to the hut where they joined the other members of the party. On the way over General Clark asked General DeGaulle in French whether he did not expect to go to the United States very soon - some time in July. General DeGaulle stated that probe.bly that would be the ease, but he was very vague about the date. Shortly thereafter General DeGAulle and his party left for the French Expeditionary Corps. General Clark then had dinner with Mr. DeRochmont of the MARCH OF TIME and Carl Mytlans of LIFE, after which he retired to his van. * * * TUSCANIA--JUNE 29, 1944-In the early morning the General remined in his van and at 0930 took off in his L-5 and flew to the French Expeditionary Corps field at Sasso Ombrone. The General drove from the field to a parade ground where he was decorated by General Charles DeGaulle with the Plaque of Grand Officer of the Legion of Honor (This plaque belon~s to 88-year old General Priowc and was borrowed for the ceremony, being returned e.fterwards by General Clark). At the same time General Clark was decorated with the Croix de Guerre with a Palm. The General then expressed his regrets to General DeGaulle at being unable to remain for lunch and flew in General Juin 1s plane from the parade ground back to Sasso Ombrone. He proceeded from there to IV Corps in his own plane and conferred with General Crittenberger. Ge~eral Clark then proceeded to his villa at Mirina di Grosseto. He took a quick dip and then returned to his command post. * * * T~SCANIA--JUNE 30, 1944--General Clark spent the morning in his van conf'erririg with General Brann, Colonel Smith, Colonel Bruce and Colonel Lee, the new Finance Officer. At 1030 General Alexander, accompanied by his Chief of Staff, General Harding, arrived by air and conferred with General Clark. They departed shortly thereafter and returned to AAI by air. At 1130 Generals F,aker, Cannon and Saville arrived by air and lunched with General Clark, conferring with him ·during the lunch hour. They left �• early in the afternoon, and at 1330 General Clark took off for the 85th Division command post at Castel Porziano near Rome where he decorated personnel of that division. Upon the completion of the ceremony General Clark returned to the command post by air and spent the remainder of the afternoon in his van conferring with various officers of his staff, including Generals Brann and Moran and Colonel Bruce • General Clark today sent the following letter to General Crittenberger, Commanding IV Corps: "l. There are elements of eight German divisions on the of Fifth Army. It is estimated that the combined strength of sions equals a.bout. that of three divisions of full strength. that the intention of the enemy is to create maximum delay on defensive position. present front these diviIt is clear every suitable "2. Through the splendid efforts of your Corps it appears to me that you are in a position to break through to the ARNO River with great speed and with luck you might secure a bridgehead over that difficult military obstacle and seize the hill mass east of PISA. The high ground north of the GECINA River between the roads CECINA-PISA and POMARANCE•POMEVERA is the critical terrain feature that you must seize to assure the rapid success of this operation. "3. To accomplish this break through I believe that you should make your main effort on your left with the 34th Division and the 442nd RCT. I plan on withdrawing the 361st RCT from your command within the next day or two. I will replace it•with the 362nd RCT on or about July 2 but desire that you use this fresh combat team with the 34th Divjsion rather than the 1st Armored Division. I think the operations for the past few days have shown that armor is not appropriate for exploitation forces and that we can accomplish more with infantry in this type of terrain. I believe the 1st Armored_with its organic infantry only should be employed on the right of the , 34th Division to conform to the movements of that Division and protect its flank. I propos.e directing FEC to conform to the movements of your Corps. "4. I would like your comments on the suggested operation as soon as possible." General Crittenberger replied to the above this evening, and his letter is quoted below: . "In compliance with your request for comments on the contents of your letter which was received tonight the following are submitted: . "1. It is hoped that the further advance of the IT Corps to the ARNO River may be continued with speed and effectiveness. "2. The possibility of a rapid advance to the Northwest with the subsequent securing of a bridgehead over the ARNO is recognized. To that end, plans ere being executed to seize the critical terrain features between the CECINA-PISA and POMERANCE-PONTEDERA roads. In this oonneotion every effort �is being made to facilitate the rapid advance of the IV Corps. Subsequent plans for the crossing of the ARNO and securing of the hill mass East of PISA are the subject of the minutest study by this headquarters in view of the importance of 'this pending operation. "3. Only this morning, plans were well underway for e quick thrust around the hostile flank and rear by a task force composed of infantry with some armor. However, the developments duri ng the last twenty-four hours have made this unprofitable inasmuch as elements of the 1st Armored Division mov~d up to the CECINA River and crossed it to the North last night. "4. Your desire to accomplish a break through to the North is well understood by all ranks of this command who are devoting their greatest effort to this mission. When the 362 RC'l' is made available, it will be attached for initial combat experience to the 34th Division to make that effort. Following what I believe to be your desires, both the 34th Division and the 1st Armored Division will drive to the North with the latter conforming to the movement of the former. In this advance it is hoped that the FEC on the right will be able to conform to the pace of this Corps. "5. The ARNO River presents a difficult obstacle but not one thnt is by any means insurmountable in the attack and crossing of the rlver. It is believed that two :i.nfantry divisions should be employed. Ma.y we therefore expect that a second infantry division, possibly the 88th Division because of its expE".rience, be made available for that operation. With this fresh division, it is felt that our plan to seize the objective North of the ARNO as indicated by you, will be entirely successful." � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, June 8-30, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from June 8-30, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1635 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/4cefb8b0b9433d9d5ddd23d13a77c0f9.pdf?Expires=1787184000&Signature=UGKXefNw7KxFpGFQVLx-qpuUYdTpmtKkWQBsA-uKEMbJ3GBmwrAItlYos8xQKV2vogfFvWZ-4-0BKLr5xFtDT1bsYmglyX%7EVxcfhsUpIMAGftO6sFD-XAz5G-sA8jjvQBGtzipYRt34HSphOsvTpvBK241IClSPfDIQTNQb6gKGBui80ip7HSPz48BTs4cjvrOmBaGyDS2uLmEREhN4D6baQsToUcl7syuoxlR5zrNCrR0EkGT4j%7EEh%7ESjvbfoPY6fe98bj%7E3jbKx6ymF2D%7ECbgsvt9Zt45CNc1lD012JSCdQsGU3TSGkgUxNG%7E6i-jFSWufjy0a%7EyKP-TidmoZczg__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 4196cc5fadfb3aeaa86ef165df57df78 PDF Text Text \ This is Velume VIII of the Wa:r Diary of Lieutenant General Mark w. Clark. Volume I, covering period 28 June, 1942 to Sep- tember 24, 1942; Volume II, covering period 25 September 1942 to 5 January 1943; Vol,me III, covering period 6 January 1943 to 6 June 1943; and Volume IV, covering period 7 June 1943 to 29 August 1943, are held in safekeeping at the Army War College, Washington, D. c. Volume V, covering period August .30, 1943 to December 31, 1943; and Volume VI, covering period January 1, 1944 to March 31, 1944; and Volume VII, covering period 1 April 1944 to 30 June 1944 are being held in safekeeping in the Com• manding General's safe. --------.. ' �ROCCASTRADA--JULY 1, 1944--The General spent the early part o~ the morning conferring with some of his staff officials, including Colonels Saltzman, Smith and Bruce while preparations were being ma.de to move the command post. At 1000 General Clark, accompanied by Colonel Saltzman, flew to the General's villa at Marina di Grosseto and spent the remainder of the day there. General Clark also spent the night there. The command post was moved today to the vicinity of Roccastrada. * * * ROCCASTRADA-•JULY 2, 1944--The General spent the day at his villa at Marina di Grosseto conferring there with Colonel Saltzman, ~is Deputy Chief or staff, and other officers of his staff. In the afternoon General Clark returned to the new command post in the vicinity of Roecastrada and there received several staff officers, among them General Brann, Colonel Saltzman, General Hume and Colonel Smith, his G-2. * * * !.9CCASTRADA-•JULY 3, 1944--Early in the morning today General Clark drove to the 34tfi Division command post in the vicinity of Gecina and conferred there with General Crittenberger, IV Corps Commander, and Genera.1 Ryder, Commanding General of the 34th Division, and various members of their staffs. He discussed forthcoming operations with them and the progress of the fight• ing then taking plaoe. He also disaussed with them the detPils of the forthcoming visit of Secretary of War Stimson and arranged with them that a good show of artillery be put on for the Secretary in the vicinity of the command post and also arranged for the Secretary to drive,past an infantry battalion on the road. General Clark stated that he did not want them in anyway to interfere with the tactical operations because of the visit of Secretary Stimson, and they stated that this could be arranged without in any way interfering with the carrying out of operations. General Clark left the 34th Division command post and drove forward to the fork of Highway #1 at San Pietro in Palazzi north of Cecina and about two miles from the German lines. General Clark also spoke to a number of soldiers of the 34th Division and returned through Gecina. The Army Com• mander stopped in Cecina and spoke to a number of Italian partisans there. \ They were wearing red stars and other communistic insignia and greeted the . \ General with clenched fist salutes. The leader of these partisans was a very small club-footed man, and he informed the General that there were 29 partisans in Gecina. General Clark asked them whether they had killed very many Germans, and they stated that they had but were unable to give the number. General Clark then asked them how many partisans there were between Gecina and Livorno, and they stated iibout 200 and that they were under the command of a Captain Testa who was operating out or Marina di Cecina. General Clark then thanked them for the aid the partisans have been giving the Allied forces a..nd stated that he believed Livorno would soon be taken. The partisans agreed that it should be liberated soon. The General then asked them if they needed anything, and they replied that they did - that they were trying to bury the dead and essure the policing of the city. They requested some medical suppli.es and food 1 and the General stated that he would send an officer up to look into ~he matter. The Army Commander then ��drove off, and the partisans presented arms in an amateurish vray. General Clark then proceeded to the 34th Division cub strip near Bolgheri and returned by air to the Firth Army command post. The General then received General Hume, Colonel Smith and Major Roberts and shortly thereafter proceeded to his villa by air, where he gave a reception for a number of officers of his staff. After the buffet supper General Clark returned to his command post and rP-tired early. * * * ROCCASTRADA--JULY 4, 1944-•The General spent the morning in his van conferring with his staff and taking care of accumulated paper work. Shortly after lunch the General took off and flew to Rome where he met Secretary Stirn• son at the station and attenc~ed a flag-raising ceremony, returning there• after by L-5 to his command post. In addition to Colonel Saltzman, General Clark had as his dinner guests Captain Walters and Lieutenant Pedley. * * * ROCCASTRADA-JULY 5, 1944-•This morning the General had a conference with General Brann, Colonel Saltzman, Lt. Col. Clark and Lieutenant Berenson, at which time plans for the arrival of the Secretary of War were discussed. At 1130 the General departed for Siena, accompanied by Generals Brann and Beucler. He arrived at the airport at Maligns.no and drove to the Excelsior Hotel in Siena.. There he met General Carpentier and then went for a sightseeing tom- or Siena.. He visited Chigi Palace and ,ms shov.rn over the pa.lace by Prince Chigi himself and then returned to the Excelsior where he met General Juin and lunched with him, Generals Carpentier, Brann, Beucler, Hume, and Major Noiret. The General also met General DeMontsabert who took his leave of the General. General Clark congratulated him on the fine work done by the 3rd DIA. General Clark then visited the to,m hall with General Juin who showed him some paintings of historical interest. General Clark then returned to the airfield and took off for the command post. Upon his arrival at the command post the General conferred with General Saville and Colonel Tully. The General this evening entertained General Brann, Colonel Saltzman, Lt. Col. Porter, his two aides and several other guests at dinner and then retired early in the evening to his van. * * * ROCCASTRADA-•JULY 6, 1944--General Juin arrived at the command post at 0845 and was met by Generals Clark, Brann and Saville in the conference hut. Generals Clark, Brann and Saville walked from the hut to the airfield to meet Secretary Stimson who arrived at 0915 with General Kirk, Chief Surgeon; General Sm-les, War Department PRO; Mr. Bundy, Special Assistant to the Sec• retary; and Lt. Col. Kyle, ADC to Mr. Stimson. The rarty drove from the field to the hut where General Clark gave Mr. Stimson a short briefing of the current Fifth Army tactical situation. Shortly thereafter General Clark called for all Chiefs. of Sections who were brought into the hut and introduced to Mr. stimson and his party these l/\ ��, ·/. ~ • (1,,JCN ~· / .J tr fr ~ ~ t JY"c ...t •) } ~ r. ~ / t;l() ,r" ..,, tlf / ~ H ~ ;.,,-:\ ,l_ ty/~'1 <~~.,'~._' rt~- ~ ;t ~, ,s:,,r tr?"/' l 1/ ~ c,J"h / · /fr,;, ✓ .,,- c(' .. ,,,,,. ~ 1 ~ t ✓ ,.,,.,.J'[ t Y., ✓ ,,Le) ~ ; . f i._Pt,.fT /' AA/Y I ') 3 r Officers. ~.,_,.,t<.. <..~f ~ CI I" ,,.,,. J /~ j,r :( r {}F . V f', ;A ;, General Clark, Mr. Stimson and pa.rty ·left the hut for the airfield where they took off in L-5 planes at 0956 for the 34th Division. Mr. Stimson flew in General Clark's plane, piloted by Major Walker, and General Clark was flown by Lieutenant Holle. The party was escorted by eight Spitfires. Immediately upon landing at the 34th Division cub strip near Bolgheri the party proceeded to the 8th Evacuation Hospital where they were received by Lt. Col. Drash and General Martin, Fifth Anny Sm-geon. The Secretary visited some of the wards and spoke to the wounded. The party then retm-ned to their cars and proceeded to the road junction north of Gecina at San Pietro in Palazzi where they were met by Generals Crittenberger and Ryder. From there they proceeded to visit field artillery batteries and then left for the 34th Division command post where General Ryder presented officers of his staff and discussed the situation with the Secretary of War and General Clark. The party then had lunch and drove back to the 34th Division cub strip from where they took off for the Fifth Army command post. Arriving at the Fifth Army command post field at 1400, the party imme• diately transferred into Mr. Stimson's C-47 and departed for Tarquinia airport at 1405. Enroute General Clark talked at length with Mr. Stimson, Mr. Bundy and General Sm-les. Arrjving at W5 at the airport in Tarquinia the party was met by General Keyes, General SloR.n, GenerAl Livesay and Gener11l Coulter. An honor guard of the 351st ROT of the 88th Division rendered the customary ruffles and flom-ishes. General Sloan introduced Colonel Champany, Commanding Officer of the 351st RCT, to Mr. stimson and General Clark. General Clark, Mr. Stimson and. General Sloan rode in the first jeep, followed by a large party in jeeps, and reviewed the troops, after which Mr. Stimson spoke brjefly to the officers and men of the 351st. At 1455 Mr'. Stimson said goodbye to General Clark, and he and his party departed at 1500 from Tarquinia airport. General Clark talked for about ten minutes with GeneraJsKeyes, Coulter, Livesay and Sloan and departed by L-5 at 1510 for the villa at Marina di Grosseto where he swam for .about an hom-, retm-ning by L-5 to the command post at Roccastrada. at 1715. * * * ROCCASTRADA-JULY 7, 1944--General ClPrk spent the morning in his van and shortly before lunch received General Devers. He conferred with Genera.l Devers who remained for lunch with General Clark. The General spent the afternoon in his van, taking ca.re of administrative matters and conferrjng with officers of his staff. * * * ROCCASTRADA--JULY 8, 1944--After breakfast the General flew by L•5 to the 88th Division command post in the vicinity of Poma.ranee and there decorated Colonel Champeny, Commanding Officer of the 351st Infantry Regiment, with the Distinguished Service Cross. From there General Cl.ark flew to the 34th Division command post where he conferred with General Ryder and decorated the cotnM.ander of the 133rd Infantry Regiment, Colonel Schildroth, with the Distinguished Service �Cross. General Clark then flew to his villa at Marina di Grosseto and went for a short swim. He then returned to the command post and conferred with a number of his staff officers • . General Clark today sent the following letter to General Devers: "Confirming our conversation this morning, I am furnishing you herewith my estimate of the capabilities of the Fifth Army to cross the Appenine position alongside of the Eighth ArTrty in order to exploit in the PO VALLEY. I am writing this letter personally to you, for it contains certain information and statements which obviously would serve no useful rurpose if they were brought to the attention of our British Allies. I, therefore, request that you handle them in this confidential manner. I will furnish AAI a separate letter giving my views on this subject. "When units now on the ANVIL troop list, are removed from the Fifth Army (and I estimate that all will have left by August 1st) there will be remaining in the Fifth Army the following major units: 2 - Corps headquarters (each with Hq. Co. MP Platoon, Signal Bn and Hq. and Hq 4 - 1 - 4 2 2 - 2½ 3 5 - 51 - Btry Corps Artillery) Infantry Divisions Armored Division 155 Howitzer M-1 Battalions 155 Gun M-1 Battalions Signal Battalions Engineer Regiments, Combat Engineer Regiments, General Service Tank Destroyer Battalions Tank Battalions 4.2 Mortar Battalion (Chemical) "Service units to support the above force in the contemplated offensive action against the prepared PISA-RIMINI line are inadequate to the extent indicated bel,ow: 1 - Engineer Maintenance Co. 2 - Engineer Bridge Cos. 1 - Chemical Maintenance Co. 12 - Surgery Teams 8 - Truck Cos. 1 - Engineer Depot Co. (less 2 platoons) 1 - Field Hospital 3 - Shocks Teams 4 - Mule Pack Cos. (Italian) 1 - Graves Registration Co. "As you know, the Fifth Army is meeting increased resistance along its'\ present front. There are nine German Divisions opposing Fifth Army at the } present time, three of which are the new ones brought into Italy from the German strategic reserve. These enemy divisions are the equivalent of approximately Jt u. s. divisions. The 88th Division is being committed to battle tomorrow and all of the 91st Division will be committed within five days. The 1st L Armored Division is being withdrawn within the next two days after �5 rather heavy losses in leaders and in equipment. I plan to reorganize this division as soon as it is withdrawn. It will take a.bout three weeks for the reorganization. The present mission of IV Corps is to drive rapidly to the ARNO RIVER. FEC is to conform to the advance of the IV Corps, protect its flank and maintain contact with Eighth Army. I hope the situation will permit a rapid crossing of the ARNO without pause, and plan to accomplish this crossing and seize a bridgehead if I consider it possible without extremely heavy losses. If however, the enemy elects to defend in strength in the ARNO and the Eighth Army is not abreast of my troops, it may be necessary to stop when I reach the ARNO. If I am forced to stop, FEC will be withdrawn for ANVIL and the-entire situation will have to be reviewed. If I am fortuna.te enough to force a crossing of the ARNO, secm-e the high ground northeast of PISA, a period of at least fifteen days will be required to rest the troops, bring in replacements and build up supplies using the port of LEGHORN as a base for the attRck into the PO VALLEY. "In order for the Fifth Army to participate in this PISA-RI:MINI attack with reasonable chances of success, the following requirements should be met: a. in Additional trained combat units should be made ava.ila.b le the Fifth Army area by August 1, 1944, as follows: 92nd Infantry Division (colored) 3 - mnginner Battalions (Cgrnbat) 1 - 4.2 Mortar Battalion (Chemical) l - Battalion FA 8" Howitzer 1 - Battalion FA 240mm Howitzer 2 - FA Gp Hq and Hq Btrys , ]2. An appropriate and greatly reduced sector for the crossing of\ the APPENINF.,S must be assigned Fifth Army - this sector to be a one-corps J front with two divisions plus in the attack, three infantry divisions assigned to the corps with one armored and one infantry in Army reserve. The ~~ 92nd Division will be used to protect IEGHORN and Fifth Army's left flank. ,,,. As I told you this morning I will employ the 92hd Infantry Division (colored) in appropriate combat. I do not feel that it is wise to count on its offensive ability in a slugging mtch with the Germans to the same extent as a ; white division. You can rest assured that I will give it every opportunity to develop its full 10m offensive power if it has the inherent capability of doj_ng so. "The object of crossing the APPENINES is to go into the PO VALLEY, and exploi.t our success there by capture of the key centers such as VERONA, MILA.N, TURIN, GENOA and LA. SPEZIA. Arter occupation of these points, to be prepared, depending upon the over-all picture, to push either with both armies into the VALLEY of the DANUBE or to split armies, the Fifth turning to the west over the MARITIME ALPS to assist the Allied effort in France. "There is every indicPtion that the Germans will prepare the APPENINE position in depth and attempt to hold it to the last man. The Fifth Army effort, with only four infantrz divisions available, will be costly and without doubt will lea~ese divisions ""f n~pli'B~furth.er effort without rest after the PO VALLEY is reached. It is, therefore, necessary that additional �/ u u. s. divisions be brought from the United States with their appropriate sea.le of reinforcing auxiliary and service troops and be ma.de available for battle in the Fifth Army by the dates indicated below: First division Second division Third division - September 1, 1944 - September 15, 19Lil+ - October 1, 1944 "In order that chances of success of the Fifth Army's Appenine effort may be increased, adequate air support, both close and strategic, must be ma.de available. "On the logistic side, we cannot count on the railroad to supply the Fifth Army. It will be 31 July before the railroad reaches GROSSETO. This is roughly 100 miles away. Supply must be through ports. PIOMBINO can be used to support the Army until it. reaches the RIMINI - PISA line, provided 25 unloading craft are left at.that port. When this line is reached, it will take at least two weeks to · build up supplies to support the at ta.ck. LEGHORN port must be developed prior to the attack on the RIMINI - PISA line. Fifth Army must be assured necessary supplies and replacement equipment from Base depots to support its operations. As the line extends northward from the RIMINI - PISA line, additional truck units will be required to move supplies from Army depots over the APPENINES to truckheads in support of forward troops. "I he.ve had considerable experience, as you know, in having Bt-itish troops under my colllI!la.nd. A natural solution, which will be suggested by General Alexander, will be to build the Fifth Army up by a Bt-itish corps. Naturally this must be accepted if the Cpmbined Chiefs of Staff desire to go back to the complex situation which existed during the time that the 10 Corps we.s in the Fifth Army. My r.ecommendation is against using British combat troops in the Fifth Army~ If the decision is to leave the Fifth Army in the Italian set- // up, every effort should be made to make it an all-American Army. JI "I fully realize the extreme importance of exerting pressure e.gainst the enemy in every conceivable :place. Certainly Italy is one where the pressure should be kept up if it is humanly possible. There is doubt in my mind that the Eighth Army will be able to era.ck the PISA - RI?vITNI line without the as• sistance of the Fifth Army, and I mean a Fifth Army composed of American divisions. The Fifth Army should not, under any conditions, be put in a position where it has in.a dequate means to accomplish its assigned mission. If we Rre) to go along into the PO VALLEY we must be given the tools to do the job. I have indicated above my minimum requirements. I fully appreciate that ANVIL is the main effort. I believe tha.t the decision to execute -ANY.llc..was .wi§e and I feel that all u. S. means 1n the Medrterranean should be used to back it up. Now if we are to do the APPEND~ job as well as ANVIL, additional mea.ns are necessary. Given these needs, I assure you the Fifth Army will go where it is directed. • "In conclusion, I recommend that if the additional U. S. troops as indi- ~ ca.tad above are not made available at· the time specified, the Fifth Army not be directed to cross the APPENINES and that it be removed from Italy a.s fast as it can be assimilated in the ANVIL sector of opera.t ions. Under such a condition, �1 by an all-out effort of the British, I believe they have the means to . contaJ the German divisions now in Italy." * 7 1 * * ROCCASTRADA--JULY 9, 1944•-The General spent the morning in his van conferring with Colonel Smith, his G-2; Colonel Robinson, Commanding Officer of the 34th AAA Brigade; and General Bra...,m, his Acting Chief of Staff. At about 1130 General Clark, accompanied by Colonel Saltzman, drove to his villa at Marina di Grosseto. The General had lunch there and spent the anernoon with a number of ·guests. A buffet supper was served, after which the General returned to the command post by car. * * ROCCASTRADA--JULY 10, 1944--The General spent the morning in his van conferring with officers of his staff and at 1000 hours decorated Colonel Kidwell, Executive Signal Officer, with the Legion of Merit. Colonel Kidwell is leaving Army Headquarters a.nd returning to the United States. u At 1145 Ambassador Myron C. Taylor, personal envoy of the President to the Holy See, and Mr. Tittma.n, Charge d'Affairas to the Vatican arrived and lunched with the General. The General received them in the hut and discussed the tactical and strategic situation with them as well as the over-all war situation. After lunch these officials left with General Hume, and General Clark spent the remainder of the afternoon in his van. General Clark today received the following letter from General Truscott: V "I am deeply grateful to you for the sentiments expressed in your letter dated June 21st relative to the VI Corps and to myself. I hardly need tell you that leavj.ng the Fifth Army was for me and for VI Corps very much like uprooting an old oak tree - not an easy thing to do. We will always remember the consideration we received at your hands and the hands of your staff at all times and we will always be deeply grateful for the complete and invaluable support which we always received. That this corps accomplished anything is due to the complete support given it by you and your staff. "At the present moment, these sentiments are rather underscored, so far as I am concerned. Breaking into a new operation with the experience we have had presents so many difficulties because of the necessity for establishing new relationships with those who have not had similar experience. However, personal relationships are extremely pleasant and I feel confident that all problems will be solved to our mutual satisfaction. "Remember me to Al Gruenther and Don Brann and the other members of your staff. With all best wishes for your continued success and the hope that I shall have the pleasure of serving with you again in the not too distant future, I run." The Army Commander today wrote the following letter to Mr. Robert Murphy: �"Your letter or June 29th with its enclosed copy of a letter to Alexander has been received. I would say that the stand ta.ken by the State Department is sound and one that can be carried out. I am particularly interested in the rest center problem, for, as you know, I hRve maintajned the position that the officers and men of the Firth Army who fouf,;ht, died and bled to capture that city have the right to visit it. I have arranged for them to do so by the establishment of Fifth Army Rest Centers. I have done all in my power to see that the discipline is correct. Natl.ll"ally, at the beginning there were some minor difficulties which were to be expected under the circumstances. The behavior of my men has been splendid. I intend to insist that these rest center facilities be maintained. "I understand, and I may be wrong, that Mr. Kirk reported this situation to the State Department. Do you know anything about it? I took the matter up with the Secretary of War when he was here, explained my position fully, and Mr. Bundy, who was with him, assured me that the Secretary approved of my views 100%. "Next time you are.up this way T want to talk to you; have a little question about Italian decorations. Please do not discuss this with anyone until you see me. ttKnow you are always welcome, so come on up and pay us a real visit." * * * ROCCASTRADA--JULY 11, 1944--Af'ter breakfast General Cl.A.rk flew to the 34th Division airfield where he was met by General Ryder. He proceeded to the 135th Infantry Regiment where he pinned the eagles of a full colonel on the Regimental Commander, Lt. Col. Ashton H. Y.anhart. General Clark then proceeded to the 91st Division command post where he conferred with Generals Crittenberger and Livesay. He then returned to the Fifth Army command post by .air, spending a short time in his van and later flying to his villa at Marina di Grosseto. There he went for a short swim, after which he returned to his command post and conferred with officers of his staff, including General Brann, Colonel Saltzman and Colonel Bertholf. *· * * ROCCASTRADA--JULY 12, 1944--The General conferred in the early morning with General Brann and Colonel Saltzman and then proceeded to the air strip where a promotion ceremony was held for fifty officers of his headquarters, including Colonel Bruce, Colonel Smith, Lt. Colonel Vlalker a.nd Captain Lemaux. Shortly after the conclusion of the promotion ceremony, General Gruenther and his party returned from a short visit to the United States and was received on the field with a guard or honor by General Clark. The band played "The Gang's All Here" as the General received his Chief of Starr. General Clark returned to the confer~nce hut with General Gruenther and shortly thereafter Generals Alexander and Harding arrived for a conference with the Army Commander and his Chief of Staff a.long with General Lemnitzer, General Alexander's American Deputy Chief of Staff. �9· In the afternoon General Clark worked on administrative matters and conferred with various staff officers, including Generals Gruenther; Howard, Bradshaw and Hume. * * * CECINA--JULY 13, 1944-•In the morning General Clark flew to TV Corps to confer with General Crittenberger, returning later to the col"ll'll8.nd post where he conferred with Gener~ls Gruenther, Brann and Howard. In the afternoon the Army CoMlltander flew to Rome while his connnand post was being moved to the vicinity of Cecina. He was accompanied by Generals Gruenther, Brann and Lewis and Colonel Saltzman. The party was met at the airport by General Johnson who escorted them to the Hotel Excelsior. Immediately upon their arrival at the hotel, Generals Clark and Gruenther went into immediate conference with Mr. Murphy in General Clark's suite. General Hume all'lo called on General Clark late in the afternoon. At eight o'clock General ClPrk, accompanied by Generals Gruenther, Brann, Lewis and Colonel Saltzman went down to a dinner given by General Hume. Among the guests were Mr. Myron Taylor, Mr. Robert Murphy, General Hume and several important military and civilian Italian guests. General Clark sent thA following letter to General Alexander regarding the capabilities of Fifth Army: 11 1. Confirming our conversation yesterday morning I run furnishing you herewith my estimate of the capabilities of the Fifth Army after LEGHORN is captured and our troops occupy the high ground South of the ARNO River. 11 2. When units now on the ANVIL troop list are removed from the Fifth Army (and I estimate th8i all will have left by August 10) there will be remaining in the Fifth Army the following major units: 2 - Corps Headquarters (each with Hq Co, MP Platoon, Signal Bn and Hq and Hq Btry, Corps Artillery) 4 - Infantry Divisions 1 - Armored Division 4 - 155 Howitzer M•l Battalions 2 - 155 Gun M-1 Battalions 2 - Signal Battalions 2½ Engineer Regiments, Combat 3 - Engineer Regiments, General Service 5 - Tank Destroyer '98.ttalions 5 - Tank Batta.lions 1 - 4.2 11 Mortar Battalion, Chemical 11 3. As you know the 34th, 88th and 91st Infantry Divisions are ~t present heavily engaged and are progressing, but very slowly. In fa.ct, increased resistance indicates it may be necessary that I commit the 85th Infantry Division in order to secure IEGHORN. At best, after the capture of LEGHORN and the high ground South of the ARNO, 3 of my U.S. Infantry Divisions will be tired and in need of rest. The 1st Armored Division is now �\0 . in the process of being withdrawn from the battle for a complete reorganization which will require 3 weeks to a month to complete. Several units of this Division must remain committed to battle until our immediate objectives are gained. This may delay the reorganization of this unit. "4. After the capture of LFnHORN and the high ground South of the ARNO River by the Fifth Army and FLORENCE by the Eighth Army, it will, as you steted yesterday morning, be necessary to review the entire situ,ation in order to decide what the futtn"e operations of your forces will be. In order for Fifth Army to participate in any further offensive operations after the capture of the immediate objectives, the following requirements should be met: a. Additional trained combat and service units should be mde available in the Fifth Army area at least a week before the offensive is initiated as follows: (1) Combat Units. 3 1 1 l l (2) - Engineer Battalions, Combat 4.2 11 Mortar Battalion, Chemical Battalion FA, 811 Howitzer Battalion FA, 240nnn Howitzer FA Group, Headquarters ano Headquarters Battery Service Units. l - ~ngineer Maintenance Co 2 - Engineer Bridge Cos 1 - Chemical lblintenance Co 12 - Surgery Teams 8 - Truck Cos l - Graves Registration Co 1 - Engineer Depot Co (less 2 platoons) 1 - Field Hospital 3 - Shock Teams 4 - Mule Pack Cos (Italian) ]2. An appropriate and great~v reduced sector for offensive operations North of the ARNO must be assigned Fi:fth Army - this sector to be a one Corps front with two plus Infantry Divisions in the attack, one Infantry Division in Corps reserve and 1 Armored and 1 Infantry Division in Army reserve. 5. If the enemy defends in strength on the ARNO River, a crossing in the zone of action of the Fifth Army would be a most difficult end costly operation. The river within this zone is a serious obstt-icle and the high ground East of PISA appears almost impregnable to frontal attack or close-in envelopment. In my opinion operations by Fifth Army to cross the ARNO River must be secondary to major attack by the Eighth Army to capture ~~ount Albano and the bigh ground east of FLORENCE. rnce over the ARNO, the att:=i.ck should be continued 'llithout priuse direct ag1dnst enemy positions on the RIMINI - PISA line. The continuation of the attack, once the ARNO is crossed, is considered necessary because the flat , terrain imnediately North of the river is dominated by the heights along which enemy prepared positions are known to exist. �ll "6. Please note that I have stated my capabilities and requirements for additional supporting troops for a ~ Corps front. If it becomes necessary that in addition to this offensive front I hold defensively additional ground, my requirements of course will be increased accordingly. It is highly desirable that I have thP- 92nd Infantry Division (Cld) awiilable prior to any offensive a.gainst the RIMINI - PISA line. If this Division is available when the offensive is launched, an appropriate assignment for it would be to hold defensively on my left flank and protect the Port of IEGHORN. There is every indication that the German will prepare the RIMINI - PISA line in depth and attempt to hold it to the last man. An attack by the Fifth Army with only 4 Infantry Divisions available will be costly and without doubt will leave these Divisions unable without rest to progress after reaching the PO Valley. It is, therefore, requested that at least two U. s. Infantry Divisions in addition to the 9?nd Infantry Division be brought from the U.S. with appropriate auxiliary and service troops and be made availr-1ble for battle shortly after the major offensive agpinst the RIMINI - PISA line is launched. "7. Unfortunately I have little infornation on the supply situ,:ition from command channels but I have been informed through administrative channels that the supplies for future offensive operntions of Fifth Army are to be furnished on the basis that Fifth Army conducts an active defense. If this is true, it will have a most adverse effect upon any future operations. 11 8. I fully realize the extreme importance of exerting pressure against ' the enemy in every conceivable place. Certainly Italy is one place where it should be kept up if it is humanly possible. I fully appreciate that_Operation AWIL is the main effort and that such Mediterranean resources as 08.n be employed effectively there should be used to support it. However, in view of the weakened position of Fifth Army, additional means and a reduced sector are necessary. Given these means and a more narrow front, I a~sure you Fifth Army will do its share in conducting any operation you may direct. 11 * * * CECINA--JULY 14, 1944--At 1030 this morning the General conferred with Mr. Murphy, and the General asked he and Mr. Offie to visit the Fifth Army command post and also accompany him to the French Expeditionary Corps in the afternoon. General Cl~rk also conferred durin~ the morning with General Brann and Colonel / / Saltzman. The party left Rome for the new co~nd post at Cecina, arr1ving there Pt 1400. General Clark, Mr. Murphy anaMr. Offie had lunch at the command post and departed for French Corps at Siena at 1615. J..;,~ ~(}, The~ arty arrived at f,1a.lignano airport at 1645 and met with Generril Ale:xan/ f~(der who was already on the field. Genernl Clark then drove to the Piazza del Q_Or- ?a.mpo in Siena where he was greeted by General Juin. Shortly thereafter General Alexander arr5ved. The three Gener8ls then took post, and the national anthems of Great Britain, United States, Soviet Russia and France were plnyed. The three Generals then reviewed the French troops massed in the square. The party then proceeded to the terrace of the Municipio where Generals Juin and Alexander made short speeches. General Clark chatted briefly with General Juin, General Carpentier, Mr. Bogomolov and other dignitar:ies. The General then went down to the second story of the building wpere the ' representatives of the various quarters of Siena dressed in their medieva! costunes performed the flag dance in �his honor. General Clark then returned to the airport and took off for the command post. The Genere.l had dinner with Messrs. Murphy, Offie and Genernl Gruenther shortly after his return a.nd rP-tired to his van after conferring briefly with Mr. Murphy. * * * CECINA--JULY 15, 1944--At 1030 Air Vice Marshal Dickson, Commander of the Desert Air Force, arrived and conferred with Generals ClP.rk and Gruenther in General Clark's van. General Clark then said goodbye to Mr. Henry Griffir1, AP photographer who was to leave shortly for another theater. At 1130 M9.jor Generals Pritchard and Bolte reported for duty with Fifth Army and conferred briefly with General Clark, remaining to have lunch with the Army Commander. After lunch the General worked on important papers in his van until the arrival of General W ilby, Superintendent of the Military Academy at West r oint, at 1715. General Clark talked at length with General Wilby and then retired to M.s van where he had dinner alone before retir:tng for the evening. The following are the important messages of the day: Fifth Army to AAI. RN 69f!:7. "l. This hea.dqtwrters is considerably disturbed over the implications of paragraph three of AFHQ message FX 136700. We have made every effort to release promptly all units required by Seventh Army and will continue to do so regerdless of the effect on our operations. AFHQ message appears to have been dispatched without rAference to previous messages on same subject. "2. 501 Truck Battalion is attl'lched to PBS in Naples and not under Fifth Army control. 501 Field Hospital was authorized by AFHQ FX 70378 July 9 to arrive Naples by 30 July. It will arrive there by that date. 806 Signal Batta.lion was authorized by AFHQ FX 70478 July 9 to leave Fifth Army by July 20. It will be dispatched so es to arrive Naples by that date. 1st Battalion 201 Pioneers will arrive Naples by July 17. It had not been ordered previously because AFHQ number 67534 ordered one bl'!ttalion (blank) pj_oneers. This headquarters suP,gested (our 3073' July 8th) use of 2/8 or 4/8 Pioneers due in Naples for FEC's. No reply was received. 323 Gestion de subsistence authorized to close Naples on 30 July by AFHQ FX 70378 July 9. It will arrive by that date. It is needed here to feed French until major units a.re relieved. Groupe d 'Artillerie of 4 DMM has been ordered to accompany Gourns to Corsica. It is awaiting e_ vail.Pbility of craft to carry it from Civitavecchia. See our 7680 July 131400. 101 Engineer Regiment and three sections, 521 Traffic Regula.ting Group �l3 are expected to close Naples area not later than 17 July. "3. The su~gestion to use Headquarters II Corps to replece FEC will not solve any of the difficulties created by withdrawal of units referred to in AFHQ 136700. Headquro-ters II Corps has already been stripped. of essential corps service troops including signal battalion in order to continue IV Corps operational. If u. s. troops had been available this headquarters would have furnished them to FEC. 422 Evacuation Hosr1tal departed 13 July." Cl.B.rk to Devers. RN 6994. "Although there is a.t present no vacancy for a Major General in the Fifth Army, in view of Gener~l Eisenhower's recommendation, I shall be pleased to have Major GenerEil William c. McMahon assigned to Fifth Army as an extra genert1l officer. I have knovm General Mctt3.hon for many years and I have formed a high estimAte of his ability. If assigned to Fifth Army I shall probably use him as a special assistant for eyes only missions pending occurrence of a suitable vacancy." General Clark today sent the follovdng letter to General Ju.in: 11 1. It is absolutely imperative that the units referred to in our radio Po. 3132 (101st Engjneer Regiment; 3 Platoons Regula.trice Routiere 521; 1st Battalion 201 Regiment Pioneers), dated 14 July 1944, Rrrive in the Naples area not later than 17 July 1944. Similarly 806/1 Signal Company and 806/3 Signal Company must arrive in the Naples area not leter than 20 July 1944. 11 2. If the removal of these units from your comMand makes it impossible for you to execute the offensive mission which has already been assigned to you, you are authorized to assume the defensive. 11 3. My instructions from higher headquarters wjth respect to the dispatch of the above mentioned units are so definite thE1t their movement can be delayed no longer. I regret, more than you will ever knov,, the necessity of depriving you of means which mPy be crjtically necessary to enable you to accomplish your mission. However, I ~m sure thAt you will realize that our failure to meet the prescribed dates may prejudice in a most serious manner future operations which might have a djsastrous effect on the outcome of the entire war. I run certain that I can count on your whole hea.rted coopere.tion in this matter." * * * CECINA--JULY 16, 1944--At 0830 General Clark bade goodbye to General Wilby and worked on adninistrt=ttive mntters in his van until the arrival at lll5 of Lt. Gen. Giles, Chief of Staff to General Arnold of the Army Air Forces; Major General John E. Hull, Assistant OperPtions Officer of the War Department; Major General Clayton Bissell, G-2 of the War DepP-rtment; and Major General Franko. D. Hunter, of the 1st Ai.r Force. GenerRl Cl~rk greeted these officers with an honor guard and then briefly oriented them on the tacticel situa.tion on the Fifth Army front. The party then drove to the cub strip and took off for IV Corps command post, arriving at the landing strip south of Saline at l'J.40. General Crane, IV Corps Artillery Officer, greeted the party and guided �them to the IT Corps command post situated two miles northeast of Laiatico. General Crittenberger and members of his staff greeted the party, tmd the Corps Commander gHve a short briefing of the situation to General Clark and guests. The party had lunch while being briefed e_ the IT Corps command t post and left IV Corps for the 88th Division, arriving there at 1305. They were met by General Sloan and members of his staff, and briefed on the situation on the Division front. Upon their departure from 88th Division, General Sloan received a message that German column was moving along a road north from Palaia, and General Clark assured him that he would have immediate action taken. Enroute to IV Corps cub strip General Clark sent a message to General Gruenther as follows: 11 At 1315 German column 5,000 yPrds long moving north from Palaia.. Get Hansborough busy. 11 Arriving at the IV Corps cub strip the r,a.rty took off for Gecina airport to join their C-47, while General Clark return9d to the cub strip Ht his command post. Upon his return to the Fifth Army command post, the General went for a quick dip in the sea behind the corunand post and returned to his van where he conferred with Generals Gruenther and Brann and Colonel Saltzman. He then had supper and attended a movie in his conference hut before retiring to his van for the evening. General Clark today sent the following cable to General Devers: RN 7711. "General Prjchard will assume command of 1st Armored Division on 18 July. General Harmon can be released for return to United States immediately. I understand that there was some comment in War Department as to reason for reliefs of Harmon and Ryder. As you Jmow they were releRsed at your suggestion jn order to return to United States Division Commanders with battle experience. I hope that you will make it perfectly clear to War Derartment that I have been reluctant to lose these officers and that I strongly recommend each of them to be a Corps Commander." On June 19th when General Clark called at the French Expeditionary Corps and spoke to General CPrpentier, as well as on June 20th when General Juin visited General Clark, General Carpentier on the former occasion and General Juin on the latter occasion had stated that they had received orders that certain supporting units were to be withdravm for Operation ANVIL. At that time General Clark had stated that he would do his best with what supporting units were left over to assist the French in the difficulties in which they would find themselves due to the lack of signal and engineer personnel particularly. On July 15th Fifth Army received a message from AFHQ, FX 136700, regarding the ,•fithdrawal of these supportjng units. General Cl?rk sent a message to AAI informing them that every effort had been made and would be rnBde releasing units for Seventh Army. • On the evening of the 15th at about eight o'clock GenerAl Carpentier, Chief of Staff of the French Corps, called and asked to speak to General Gruenther. Generel Gruenther was in the hut attending a, movie and cmne to the aides tent vrhere, with Captain Walters acting as interpreter, he discussed the withdrawal of these units with General Carpentier. General CP.rpentier stated that ��· r1·1/ 2 upon the withdrawal of these units the French ~ i t i : y Corps could n ~ l longer continue its offensive mission and requested permission to go on the / defensive. General Gruenther stated that if this was the case permission v1 s granted. Carpentier replied thet orders would be given to tha.t effect but that nevertheless the French would attempt to take adva.ntage of any local conditions which might develop. He then stated that these units would be withdrawn from the line the following day end would be in Naples on July 19th (after the deadline set by AFHQ). General Gruenther then asked him if it would not be possible to have these units in Naples by the 17th, and GenerA.l Carpentier stated that this would be impossible - that they would be there on the evening of the 19th. General Gruenther then urgently requested that every effort be mHde to expedite the departure of these units, and General Carpentier promised to do this. General Carpentier then also stHted that a letter had been sent from General Juin to General Clerk stating these facts in ,,riting and that the letter should reach us shortly. In this letter General Juin stated that against his will he was compelled to stop the a.dvance of the 4th mm and the 2nd DIM and establj_ a defensive situation ,mtil relieved by the 8th Indian sh Division. * * * CECINA--JULY 17, 1944-General Clark flew to the 34th Division and returned just before lunch. After lunch he received the militery attaches to the French Provisional Government. These attaches were as follows: Lt. Col. Ebbesen, Norway; Maj. 1!ontjoie, Belgium; Lt. Col. Pamanes, 1~exico; Maj. Cayo, Peru; Col. Colocotronis, Greece • . The General later conferred with General Gruenther in hjs van and then went to the beach where he received General Mast, Resident General of Tunisia. Generals Lewis, Tate, Gruenther, Horan joined the rarty at the beach and later had dinner with General Clark. * * * CECINA--JtTLY 18, 1944--Immediately after breakfast the General attended a formation and guard of honor for General t1ast, Resident General of Tunisia, who then left by car for the French Expeditiomiry Corps. General Clark, at the same time, pinned 2nd Lieutenant bars on two we.rrar1t officers of his headquarters; Chief �Warrs.nt Officer Wandel of the Quartermaster Section, and Warrnnt Officer ( j'g) Hughes of the Ordnance Section. Shortly thereafter the Army Commander drove to the ~4th Division where he conferred with General Ryder and proceeded from there to the 363rd RCT. At regimental headquarters General Clark was briefed by Colonel Magill. After a mort briefing General Clark in his jeep drove towards the front lines to observe a battalion of the 363rd on their way into the line. The General spoke to the battalion commander, several of the officers and enlisted men as they marched up the road going into battle, encouragin~ them to drive on to Leghorn. Colonel Walker landed on the road for instructions from General Clark. General Clark instructed him to fly back to the 34th Division cub field to wait for him. The Army Commander then visited the command post of the 135th RCT of the 34th Division where he was briefed hy the Regimental Commander. General Clark told the regimental commander of the 135th Infantry that he had just visited the 363rd RCT who vrere well on the road to Leghorn and that it was a race to the finish as to which one would enter the city f:irst. General Clark then returned to the command post of the 14th Division where he conferred with General Ryder with whom he reviewed the situation as he saw it. He then took off for the 34th Division cub strip and flew back to his command post. In the afternoon the General remained in his van working on administrative matters. At about 2030 General Ryder called on the phone to advise thet elements of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron had reached the outskirts of Leghorn. General Clark today sent the following cable to General Alexander: Ov.J-( -J 1', r' ,v JI RN 7031. "I have examined carefully the question of continued pressure by the French raised in your 1504 to General Juin. I instructed Juin to release units specified in AFHQ BX 13670 on dates prescribed even if their withdrawal would force French to adopt defensive role. General Juin decided that removal~ of these units and character of resistance on French front made it necessarv to assume defensive vdth provision for follow up of any enemy withdrawe,l with light forces. I consider that Juin is doing all he is capable of accomplishing. The Army Commander today received the follow:ing letter from General Devers: "Reference your cable 7711 of 16 July, I do not know who your informant was but any statement that there was so~e comment in the WP..T Department as to the relief of Harmon and Ryder is loose talk. Both of these officers were highly recommended for corps commands with your concurrence, and General M "rshall has been so informed. "I do not consider the position you suggested for Major General McMahon justified. However, I have informed Eisenhower that I could use him in a staff position as a. brigadier general. If Eisenhower approves, I will assign him as Deputy Chief of Staff, NATOUSA. "For your :information, the following cable, classi.f ication secret, wa.s re. ceived from GenerAl Marshall today: �At my suggestion, General Eisenhovrer released in series the names of Corps Commanders and then Division Commanders whose Units have been identified. It h~i_s created very favorable publicity here at home with considerable \'Vriteups on each ind:ividua.l. He has now agreed to my suggestion to have General Bradley propose every few days the name of some Unit Commanr er, Company, Battalion or Regiment, whose organization has done especially well in some current operation. 1 'This will be released in the Theater as Pn item of news, referring specifically to Commander, Organization, end incident. Further, Theater Public Relations will send Wa:r Department Public Relations a detailed account of the specific opere,tion in order that more extensive writeups can be managed on this side than are acceptable over communication channels from the Theater. 'Please institute such procedures in your Theater but due to smaller size of your United States Forces, rele,,ses as frequent as indicated Pbove would not be appropriate.• I rropose to institute this procedure just as soon as possible and would welcome riggestions from you." , + , 11 ~~ ~r'" i'tc ~ 9 9'y o ', 0 LJ~ "'1 .t ;;~~*~; ~ ~r' lr c,q 1V ki \ * CECINA--JULY 19, 1944--General Clark left the command rost at 0630. and flew to ,, the 34th Division cow.mand post where he stopred for a moment and then flew on to a road northeast of Livorno. He landed on the road and rroceeded into town J in a jeep and spent part of the morning looking over the city ot' ,Livorno which had fallen to American troops. In Livorno he spoke to General Williamson end also to a number of the reporters and cameramen. The General then return~d to his plane on the road and took off, circling over the port of Livorno, examin~ng the conditions in the harbor. The General returned to the command post at 1010 and went immediately to General Gruenther's office, where he met General Chidlow, executive Officer to General Saville of XII TAC; and Air V:i.ce Marshal Dickson, Corr.manding the Desert Air Force. At 1300 Generals Juin, Carpentier, Sevez, Beucler and Keyes arrived for lunch. A guard of honor was held for General Juin and his party. General Clark gave a lunch for the above French o~ficers and guests and also had General Gruenther, General Brann, Colonel Saltzman, Colonel Kammerer and Lt. Col. Porter as additional g"Uests. After lunch General Clark presented General Juin and other general officers of his staff with letters of farewell. General Juin was greatl3r moved by General Clark's letter, embraced him and expressed his gratitude for the many kind things General Clark had to say and his sorrow on leaving General Clark's command. The French departed from Army Headquarters at 1500. Afterwards Generals Clark and Gruenther drove to Castj_glioncello to look at �the proposed new Fifth Army rest center. The party was met by Colonel Smith who showed General Clark several villas, one of whjch General CL~rk picked for his use in the near future. He then rettn'ned and retired to his van. General Clark sent General Marshall the following cable today: RN 7740. "As requested by you when you were here in June I have taken measures to increase publicity given Jepanese-American troops. 442 Infantry will be mentioned in connection with capture of Leghorn. 100th Battalion will be used to garrison Leghorn. Also, in accordance with your suggestion to General Gruenther, I have today awarded War DerBrtment citation to 100th Battalion for distinguished service in Leghorn campnign. Release of that award will be made to press July 20th." General Alexander cabled General Clark as follows: RN UA.1519. "My heartiest congratulations to you and your fBmous IV Corps whose brilliant fighting during these last days has led to the capture of the port of Leghorn." General Alexander sent General Clerk the following letter with regard to future operations of the Allied Armies in Italy: 1. Nmv that the skill and hard fighti.'1.g of your troops has resulted in their reachin~ the ARNQ at P0NTEDERA anr to the east of thAt place, the time has come to decide how the task of driving the enemy back to the GOTHIC line on that part of the front west of FLORENCE can best be divided between the two armies, and what the inter-P.rmy boundary north of the ARNO should be. 11 "2. As you know my intention is to proceed with the destruction of the enemy's armed forces in ITALY. The next step to that end must I consider be to drive the enemy back to the GOTHIC line as quickly as po-::sible, so tha.t we can bring that line under fire; interfere with further work on it; and obtain detailed information about it prepAratory to an attack. 3. As I have also previously explained, I intend to penetrate the GOTHIC line roughly between DICOMANO and PISTOIA. In fact the general areas of which these two places are the centres will form the outer pivots of the attack. It is therefore essential to secure them quickly, especially the very important road centre of PISTOIA. Once that place is f'jrmly in our hands the front between it and the west coast can become defensive, provided of course that the high ground north east of PISA, which I refer to hereafter as f,1DNI'E PISANO, is also held by us to cover the approaches to the port of LEGHORN. 11 "4. From a stud;r of the map it has struck me that unless the enemy holds the line of the ARNO very weakly, in which case I hope you may be able to rush THE MTNTE PISANO feature, an attempt to force the passage of the ARNO west of POtn'EDERA would be both difficult and costly. I therefore suggest that the best way of developing operations across the ~"i.NO would be to force a passage somewhere betw en EMPrLI and PONTEDERA, and then to develop two thrusts, one on PISTC'IA and the other on LUCCA which would have the effect of turning any enemy positions on the high ground south of those two places. Possession of PISTOIA and LUCCA would give us control of a good lateral road and a line on which we would 0 �\9 constitute a sound defensive flank whereby to economise troops for our offensive against the GOTHIC line. rworeover the line of the ARNO between PONTEDERA and the west coast could be held vT:ith comparatively few troops, while the bulk of the forces available were concentrated for offensive operations to secure PISTOIA and LUCCA. "5. Apart from the fact that Eighth Army alrearly have a very long front to hold, and will have as much as they can do with the forces at their disposal to drive the enemy back to the GOTHIC line between the east coast and PISTOIA, the configuration of the country really makes the area between a general line from LASTRA - PRATO to the west coast one tactical area, and separate from the area to the east. It would therefore suit me best from every point of view, if as your next task you could undertake the capture of PISTOIA and LUCCA, and the establishment of a defensive front on that general line. 11 6. I fully realise how much your army has been reduced in strength, ) and I have made a personal request to the Supreme Allied Commander verbally and in writing to supply the supporting and ancillary uni ts you have asked J for, and to accelerate the arriw1l of 92 Div and the Brazilian division. So far I have received no specific reply but I understand that the first R.C.T. of the Brazilian division has already arrived in ITALY, and that another R.C.T. is expected shortly. 11 7. I also realise and deeply apr..reciate the fact that three out of your four remaining infantry divisions have had a great deal of heavy fighting, and that ycur armoured division is in the process of reorganisation. At the same time I feel that the enemy is in no stete to launch a serious counter-offensive, and that on defensive parts of our line we can and must accept the risk involved in reducing our front to little more than a line of observation backed up by mobile reserves. If you agree that that will be possible on the line of the ARNO between POH TEDERA and the sea, I have A feeling myself that it will leave you sufficient troops to force the passage of the ARNO east of FONI'EDERA, and to capture the very important road centres of PISTOIA and LUCCA, thereafter establishing a defensive front between PISTOIA and the sea. 11 8. I should very much like your army to play a part in the attack on the GOTHIC line by launching an attack on that position in the area north of PISTOIA in conjunction with Eighth Army's attack further east. I realise however that we cannot make plans for that stage of the campaign until we can foresee more ~clearly in what strength you will be when ycur troops reach the GOTHIC line. "9. For the present J would be most grateful if you would examine fully whether you think you can, with your present forces, undertake the capture of PISTOIA and LUCCA. If you think ycu can then I suggest that the inter-army boundary should be re-drawn so as to make the town of tDNTELUPO, the hill mass MYNTE ALBANO, and the city of PISTOIA inclusive to you, at any rate until we see how your operations north of the ARNO develop, and whflt your losses in the recent fighting have been. 1110. I have put these problems on paper to enable you to consider them fully before we discuss them. If it will be convenient to ycu I should like to come to your H.Q. about 1100 hrs to-morro~ 20 July to settle the matter. Will you please let me know if that will suit you. Meantime I am confident �you will do all you can to secure the pass~ge of the ARNO, end to press on north of that river irrespective of boundaries. It is of supreme importance I am s'l.ll'e to go all out to get PISTOIA and LUCCA before the enemy can recover from the heavy blows you have given him in the fighting of the past few days. By to-morrow the situation may of co'l.ll'se have developed f'l.ll'ther, and other factors may have been introduced. I will however come and see you in any case to discuss future plans unless I hear from you that tomorrow is not convenient to you." * * * CECINA--J1JLY 20, 1944--Today General Crittenberger arrived a.t 0945 and conferred with Generals Clark, Gruenther, Brann and Tate, using the G-3 situation and tactical ma.ps to clarify his points. Gem~ral Cri ttenberger left at 1030, and shortly thereafter Generals Alexander, Harding and Lerrmitzer arrived to confer with the Army Commander and key members of his staff. This conference continued until 1210 when General Bolte, new Commander of the 34th Division, arrived and was introduced to General Alexander and party just prior to their departure. The General lunched with Generals Bolte and Brann and then worked on important military dispatches d'l.ll'ing the entire Rfternoon. At dinner this evening General ClPrk entertained Generals Gruenther, Sullivan and Colonel saltzman for dinner and efter dinner saw Pathe and Paramount newsreels of the Fifth Army's triumphant entry into Rome which were brought back from the States by General Gruenther. General Clark this afternoon dictated the following notes for inclusion in his diary: "The following letter on future operations was received from Genert:tl Alexander yesterday with the request that he see me today. (Letter referred to in the preceding sentence wa.s quoted in yesterday's diary). "When General Alexander came, I told him of the situa+,ion with regard to Fifth Army troops after the capture of Leghorn; namely, that the three infantry divisions, the 34th, 91st and 88th were somewhat used up, particulPrly the 34th, as results of the last three weeks' battle. I told him I would take on the mission he requested of the Fifth Army; namely, to cross the ARNO River and as a first phase, preliminery to crossing the Appenines, to capture the line PISTOIA to LUCCA. "General Alexander's letter to me in no way indicPted the intentions of the Eighth Army. I made it plain that the old French sector would be occupied in the next two days, but British Eighth Army troops must rush up and sec'l.ll'e for the Fifth Army a line of departure for crossing of the river in the EMPOLI - SIGNIA area - that there were absolutely no American troops avPileble now to do this job. He agreed to this. As a further requisite to Fifth Army's attack across the ARNO, I made it plain that Eighth Army must have already captured FLORENCE and be prepared to attack abreast of Fifth Army to occupy the area from DIC0MANO to PISTOIA exclusive. In other words, Eighth Army must skirt the high ground north of FLORENCE and towa.rds PISTOIA as Fifth Army cro,· ses �between EMPOLI and SIG NIA. He agreed to tli is. "I told him that I had a dirty job ahead of me yet in cleaning out the pocket between the caml north of LEGHORN and the river near PISA. This must be done immediately or work on rehabilitating the port will be hampered by all types of enemy fire. I have di.rected IV Corps to do this job with the 34th and 91st Divisions. I ha.ve spoken to General Bolte, who will take command of the 34th Division tomorrow, and he feels thAt his Division, reinforced with the 363rd CT, has that capability. IV Corps has been somewhat remiss in failing to start this task sooner, for I had repeatedly given direct orders to Crittenberger that 34th Division was not to be rermitted to be drawn jnto I.EGHOR~ but after its capture to rush up into LEGHORN within its sector. This, I am afraid, Ryder has failed to do. "As to the future zone of action of Fifth Army a.cross the Arpenines, this will depend upon the stPte of my troops when I reach my first objective on the PISTOIA - LUCCA line. "General Keyes I corps 111ill relieve IV Corps within the next fj ve days in order to tackle this next job. 1 will be unnble to cross the AROO in force until my troops have had about two weeks' rest. This, in my opinion, will be before Eighth Army is ready to do its share of the job. 11 "I told General Alexander, and I had rrev:ously notified my staff, that \ every improvisation possible would be resorted to in order to m~ke up deficiencies in the Fifth Army. These include use of Italian troops where practicable, the use of tanks, TD 1 s and anti-aircraft as supporting artillery, the use of British artillery and engineers. I do not want British divisions, / for they do not fight like American troops. \ I realize that this next phase of the operntion will be a difficult \ one for the reduced Fifth Army, but I feel it should go on and that we should contribute our worth in view of the pressure wrich is being put on the enemy 1 from all directions. He is fighting under severe hendicaps. Fis morale is t low. The end of the war approaches in my opinion. We must take chances and pound him from all directions. I am heartily in favor of continuing on with the means at my disposal. 11 "I told General Alexander of General Devers I prognostication of the date of reaching the Po. He agrees with me that it is lack of battle experience and understanding on Devers' part. It is pure crystal gazing." General Clark sent General Devers the f ollovring letter today: "I have your two letters of July 17th and lgih. T"fith reference to the July 17th letter, most of the subjects contained therein are comrond matters which I look to General Alexander for solution. He is fully aware of my minimum requirements and will make every effort to obtain them. After knowjng what means will be a.vaiJFble to the Fifth Army, I will be better able to inform him of our capabilities. It is natural, from where you are you �can not know exactly what we need and whPt we do not need. For example, your \ statement that we have adequate artillery to support my army in the offensive contemplated is incorrect. I have alrea.ay arranged with General Alexander to get the additional artillery required to do the job. 11 With reference to conservation of supplies, I assure you that I and my staff are fully allergic tu this necessity. "With reference to the German wea1mess, we who have been in close contact with him in battle are well able to evaluate his defensive ability. It rather surprised me that you should urge the Fifth Army on to bolder action, for we have always demonstrated just that in our many months of campt=dgning and our willingness to tackle things on an "adhocll basis. You need have no worry on these scores. "I am wondering upon what you base your statement thet the Allied Armies will be on the Fo River by August 15th. Certainly it can not be based upon the facts as we know them in the field. When General Alexander was here today, at which time we decided upon future orerations, I e.sked him if by any chance you could have obtained this date from him. He was as surprised as I am and was in complete agreement with me that no such schedule as you have in mind is ca.pa.ble of accomplishment. He thought perhaps you had seen the old estimetes which he submitted to General Wilson based on conditions, none of which are present at this time. "With reference to the publicity on comm~mders of subordinate units, I think it is a fine idea to release the n~mes of smaller unit commanders, together wjth the successful job they have accomplished. We have done that in the past and are prepared to send stories on to your headquarters on any schedule which may seem desirable. I will discuss this further with my PRO and give you additj_onal comnents. lfSawbridge told me of your decision on Grogan. I regret this exceedingly, for I do not know why you are exceptionally interested in officers I desire on my personal staff, particularly when they have demonstrated their ability as Grogan has, and when their transfer here is agreeable to the VIar Dep::irtment. Surles is anxious that he get a break with a combat unit after his long service in the W Department and is glad to exchange with my man Clark. I rear quest that you reconsider this rratter. 11 * * * CECINA--.nJLY 21, 1944--The General conferred in the early pecrt of the morning with staff officers in his van and at 1000 decorated a number of French officers with the Bronze Star at a ceremony hald at his command post. After the ceremony the General received the officers in his hut ;:ind lAter conferred with Generals Gruenther, Keyes and Ryder, all of whom rern,~ined for lunch. After lunch General Clark pinned 1st Lieutenant bars on his Aide-decamp Lieutenant Robert L. Berenson. Shortly thereafter GenerAl ClP-rk flew to Rome in his C-47, accompanied by Generals Brann, Bradshaw and Colonels Saltzman an<l Bruce. l ) �Operations Instruction #29 was issued today A.nd is quoted below: 11 1. When Fifth Army troops have rePched the ARNO River across the entire Army zone of action, anoth9r phPse of operations will be concluded. 11 2. The mission of Allied Armies in Italy continues to be the destruction of the enemy's forces in Italy. Future operations to accomplish this mission are divided into rrwses, the first of which is to drive the enemy back to the G0THIC Line and the second, to penetrate that line roughly between PISTOIA and DICOMA.NO. 11 3. Operations to drive the enemy back to the GOTHIC Line will begin after Eighth Army has captured FLORE1'JCE and reached the ARNO River West of FLORENCE. Fifth Army's mission in this operation will be to force a crossing of the ARNO River with its main effort generally in the vicinity of NDNTELUPO, capture M. ALBANO and secure PISTOIA and LUCCA. Simultaneous with Fifth Army's attack, Eighth Army will capture the high ground generally Earth and Northwest of FLORENCE. The proposed bounda.ry between Armies for this operation is stream and road junction 637695 - CR 633739 - thence Rout~ 66 to CR 601770 - thence 60 Easting grid. Fifth Arny will take over that part of its new sector now held by Eighth Army after Eighth Army reaches the ARNO River. 11 4. Instructions for the second phase - the penetration of the GOTHIC Line - will be issued later. 11 5. It is d:rected that Headqunrters II Corps relieve Headquarters IV Corps without felay. Date and hour when Commanding General, II Corps will assume responsibility for IV Corps zone of action will be determined between Corps Commanders and reported to this Headquarters twenty-four hours before effected. Assignment and attachm0.nt of troops will issue in sepl:'rate orders. rr6. Pending movement of troops into positions for attack, the entire Fifth Army zone will be the responsibility of II Corps. Decision will be made at a later date whether or not it is advisable to relieve II Corps of responsibil:i.ty for a portion of the Vlestern part of the Fifth Army sector. "7. It is est1mated that the D day for operr-tions to cross the ARNO will be between 5 August and 10 August. In prepnrPtion for this attack, it is directed that every effort be ~ade to rest the troops. To accomplish this, it is desired that forward positions be held with the absolute minimum strength, using troops other than those of our dlvisions wherever possible. If requested, the infantry of the 1st Armored Division and the 39th Engineer Combat Regiment can be m=ide aw>ilable to fP.cilitate the resting of infantry units. Tanks and tank destroyers will be sited as artillery as far as possible. The tanks of the 1st Armored Division mRy be mde available if desired on completion of present reorganization and maintenance period. "8. II Corps will rcr:-epare the necessary plRns for the first phase attack and submit same to this Headquarters as soon as practicable. "9. IV Corps will make every effort to expedite the completion of 34th Infantry Division's present mission in order to facilitate the early �relief of this unit. As soon as the Division has reached the ARNO River, it will be relieved and :r:ass to Army control. 11 * * * CECINA--JULY 22 , 1944--General Clark returned to the Fifth Army oommand post from Rome at 1700, had dinner with General Brann and Colonel Smith before retiring. The two following messPges were received today from French Corps: 11 At the time when staff of CEF ceases to exist are renewing our feelings deepest sorrow to be separated from staff Fifth Army with which have been in closest cooperation in atmosphere of friendship and trust dur5ng over 6 months. Common victory has indefectibly sealed links of mutual liking formed during this campaign . Will never forget material Find morRl help you gave so heartily to our work. Are forming wishes of neeting you again soon. Rendezvous for final victory of both our countries closely associated. Long live Fifth Army. Long live the United Sfotes of Arrerica. 11 "The present message - last to be delivered to Buffon by Annibal - is carrying to you once more tokens of friendship. Au revoir, Sir, may God one day restore this splendid Franco-American team, on the rath to victory respectfully yours." * * * CECINA--JULY 23, 1944--The General left the conmand post for Castiglioncello in the morning where he spent the morning reading, swimming nnd resting. At 1600 hours the General received twenty-five guests in his beach villa for a swimming party and buffet supper. The guests included most of his Section Chiefs and ten guests from the 8th Evacuation Hospital. * * * CECINA--JULY 24, 1944--General Clark spent the entire morning reading and swimming. At 1500 hours in the afternoon General Brann and Colonel Saltzman arrived at the villa for a short swim and supper. * * * CECINA--JULY 25, 1944--The General left the villa at eight o'clock for the command post, arriving at 0830. At 0945 Generals Clark and Gruenther left for a naturalization ceremony at the rear echelon. General Clark spoke to 90 enlisted men and l nurse after they had been administered the Oath of Naturalization by Mr. Horrell, American Vice Consul in Naples, congratulnting them and rraising them for the way in which they had earned their citizenship. After the ceremony the General returned to the oomma.nd post. ArchMshop Spellman arrived at the oommnnd post at noon tmd was greeted by General Clark. Generals Clark and Gruenther, Archbishop Spellman talked in General Clark's van for an hour after which they lunched in GenerAl Clark's mess, the other members of the Archbishop I s party, Colonel O1Keefe and Major Moran and �Colonel Ryan, Fifth Army Chaplain, lunching with them. The archbishop presented General Clark with a letter he had brought from President Roosevelt. After lunch General Clexk took off for the villa at Castiglioncello where he had as his dinner guests in the evening General Brann and Colonel Saltzman. * * * CECINA--J1JLY 26, 1944--General Clark spent a quiet day resting, swinrrning and reading at his beach villa. Colonel W ood, Commanding Officer of the 38th Evacuation Hospital, another officer Pnd three nurses came for a swim and dinner with the Army Commander. General Tate sent the following memorandum to the Chief of Staff today with regard to the allocation of ammunition: 1. The limited administrRti ve means availa.ble to Fifth Army in the fu- ) ture will not support the actions contemplated for IV Corps in paragraphs 4 ~ / and g. Operating Instructions !v'\unber 30, dated 24 July 1944, and at the same time carry out the action contemplated for II Corps, as outlined in paragraph 5 of this Operating Instruction. There axe not sufficient Service troops; notably, Signal and Engineers, to support an A.dvance on a two-corps front. Also, the future supply of Artillery ammunition makes it necessary that fires be concentrated on a narrow front. Strict allocation of ammunition is to be applied by SOS, NATOUSA beginning l Au,,~ust. We cannot expect Pn increase in monthly P.rmnunition allocations in view of priorities estabHshed for other operations and the limited production output in the United States. NATOUSA and SOS, NATOUSA have stressed this point. 11 2. Adm.i.nistratively (Service troops and supplies), Fifth .Army now has \ only sufficient means to support ow~ corps of three divisions--two divisions operating offensively, including pursuit, with one division in reserve. Artillery ammunition supply in the future will not be sufficient to continue the heavy artillery concentrations employed in the pa.st in support of adwmcing troops." 11 The following , report on conditions in Livorno was received from General Hume soon after the city's occupation by Allied troops: "l. First AMG officer, Major Carl Kait, Civil Affairs Officer, 34th Division, entered Livorno v,:i th adve.nce patrols of infantry troops at 0630 hours 19 July 1944, and establ:i.shed military government at 0700 hours at the temporary headquarters of the Committee of NRtj_ onal Liberation in Ardenza. "2. Preliminary surveys were oomrnenced at once, in cooperation wjth officials of the Committee of National L:i.beration, to determine the prhnary necessities of the remaining population of the city. It was estimated on questioning civic offfoers that only 35,000 constituted the population of Livorno, a. city which usually numbered 138,000 persons. 11 3. At 1100 hours Brig. General Edgar Erskine Hume, Senior Civil Affairs Officer, Fifth Army, his ADC, and Ma,jor Elmer N. Holmgreen, designated as Civil Affairs Officer to replace Major Knit when he moves forwRrd '"itJ-1 the d:ivision, entered the city of Livorno and, after a reconnaissance of conditions within �the city limits, went to Ardenza to rreet with Major Knit and the officials of the Committee of National Liberation. n4. It was discovered, on conversatj on with Avv. Adolfo Agus, Secretary General of the Commune and acting mayor, thPt three-fourths of Livorno, comprising the area around the port and extending inlend, had been evacuated of civiliHns by the Germans in November and had been designated the "Zona Nera", or "Black Zone" by them. This section was blocked off by demolition of houses around the line of de:rmrcation in such a way as to make streets impassable. Barbed wire had also been erected, and signs posted in German and Italian warning civilians not to enter. No civilian had been in the Black Zone in almost a year and had no idea what conditions existed there. Committee of 1-rational Lfberation officials said the area had been mined for many months and was said to be the most heavily mined area in all of Italjr. "5. It was decided to keep the evacuated zone free of civilians until such time as military A.uthorities permit reoccupatfon, but that the name "Black Zone" was not to be applied. Although retreating Germ,<>ns had taken down the warning signs in the hopes that Allies ~~uld disregard the blockades and enter the mined areas, Committee of National Liberati.o n men had printed posters in English and Italian which they had affixed around the perimeter of the zone. They had also prepared an extensive map of mined areas. "6. The majority of civilians thrown out of their homes by the Germans had fled to the Provinces of Pisa and Lucca, and it was thought probftble that they would attempt to move back into the city, thus creating a serious traffic and refugee problem. Consequently, AMG officers dn-ected the Carabinieri into the city to prevent the return of the tovmspeople until such time as permission should be extended by military authorities. The Committee of National Liberation volunteered to send messengers to nearby communities to advise Livorese to remain in their temporary quc'lrters until they should be allowed to return, and posters were put up forbidding the return of civilian f11milies. 7. The food situation is not acute, PS supply now exists for at least three days and 200 gre"ms per day of bread had been distributed to the remain;. ing population, so that no particular problem exists. Ration cards ere sufficient until l August 1944. Major Ka1t reported that enough grain for ten days is in the warehouses, and that a saw mill is being converted for grinding the grain into flour. The Alimentazione system of food distribution had been functioning efficiently until two days before the Allied occupation. 11 8. Greatest ANG problem discovered was the lack of water, for two of the three city aqueducts bringing water are in territory still in German hands. These two water lines are not operating, and the remai.ning acqueduct has been severely damaged. There is no acute suffering for lack of drinking water, as cisterns and wells are still supplyi.1:g the population with their minimum needs. Not enough water exists for washing and other uses, hm'Tever. The .last water Il'.ain was blown up five days ago. The city engineer of Livorno has promised an adequate supply of water from the remaining water line within several days, end MJG engineer officers Pre working with him to effect this as soon as possible. 11 "9. General health conditions are excellent, being in keeping with the minimum of good water supply. Some 450 patients are under trei:ttment in the �large Ciano Hospital which has 11 cr,pa.city of from 1500 to 2000 beds. When the Germans evacuated the city, they took much hospjtal equipment, including bedding Rnd linen, tlS well as surgim~l jnstruments, microscopes, P1edicines, etc. Chlor1.nation is planned for the cistern and well water now being used by the civilians. Uo enemy or Allied wounded were found to be jn the hospitals. 10. The city itself has suffered from shelling find bombjng, a.nd all brj_dges were mined ti.nc'i blown up before the Alljed ontry, trius hindering transportation a.s r1ell as repair of water lines, for m11ny pipe conduits were affixed to the bridges. 11 11. Fublic order was satisfactory, in spite of the fact thPt the only city police force, The Republican Gw.rd, left Livorno with the retree.ting Germans. A force or 150 AMG CArP-binieri hes been te.ken into the city by M~G. There is also an American Military unit engegecl in Military Police duties. The Civic Police Chief nnmed by the Committee of NPtional Liberation said several hundred Carabinieri were in hiding and shortly would return to their posts. They will be vetted by C. I. C. 11 12. All remaining stores Pnd shops were opened and looted by the Germans before they left the city. When the Germans had taken what they wanted, they turned the Fascists loose in the shops and took motion pictures to show how well they were treating their coll,qborators. This report was made by the Committee of l!ational Liberation. 11 13. All banks Rnd post offfoes were closed twenty days ago, and it was said that many of the funds were hidden from the GerTWns. AHG Finance Officers !118de an immediPte reconnaissance with a view to opening the benks as soon as possible. 11 "14. As most of the active Fascj sts And Fascist collPborators left the city on 20 June, only a minor political problem exists. The Committee of National Liberation recommended the keeping in office of Avv. Agus, for fourteen years a civj_l servant and Secretary General of the Commune. He is now acting as Mayor in the absence of other appointments. A committee was named prior to the Allied entry, consisting of a city engineer, publfo hoolth officer, firemen, civil works officer, etc., to assist AMG officers, and both ~ ajor Kait and Major Holmgreen have been working with them. A fine spirit of .' collaboration and assistnnce has been discovered and put to good use by Allied M ilitar~r Government. Appointments remain to be rmde of Prefect, Federale and Permanent Mayor, for all such officials left w:ith the Germns. "15. Telephones and electricity Pre not functioning, although it is believed thet the;T can be 1.n operation in several weeks. All tE'lephones were disconnected ,r,nd the apparatus removed by the Germans last fall, but noserious damage was done to the main offices. 16. The prj sonars in thP jails were removed to Fisa, thus ~ivjng no problem to AMG such as was found in }Tap lf'ls ru1d Rome where the GermAns released all civil offense prisoners to rrey on the cormnun:i.ty. 11 11 17. In sumrnar;r, the sit1mtion in Livorno is not as serious as has been found in other c1ties of similar populations. Flans arc already in oreration �to halt the possible move of refugees back to the city, and AMG officers speciaB zing in the various Public >relfare and Utilities are on the. scene to assist the city in returning to normal. "18. The representatives of the 'Patriots I and 'Partisans I are numerous and wh:..le they offer every assistAnce individually a.nd collectively, it is feared that they may Cl'l.use trouble in not being willing to surrender their arms. The;r were promised certificntes of merit ~md expressed pleRsure at this. Such documents are way ov0 rdue and hP.d not arrived by the day the city was occupied." * * * CECINA--JULY ?7, 1944--The Genernl left his villa and drove to the command post where he conferred briefly with his st~rr officers. At 1015 he drove to Vada where he conferred a War Department citation upon the 100th Battalion composed of Hawaiian-American troops of' Japanese descent and Also decorated Sergeant OhAtP of th:i s unit with the Distinguished Service Cross. In a brief speech at the cererrony, General Clark ,varned against the belief that the Germans are about to throw in their cards and cited the recent stubborn fighting as proof thAt there is still fight left in tr e Boche. General Persons accompanied General Clark to the ceremony and reme.ined there when the General returned. The Army Comman(1 er returned to his command post !'lnd spent the Afternoon in the area. Admiral 'forse, Flag Officer We .,,tern Italy, camP. to ~ee General Clarl<: and talk rnatters over with him. The remainder of the 11fternoon was spent in a series of staff oonferences. Ju"lt before dinner the Army Commander went for a short dip at the beach ..-.i_ th Colonel Saltzm~m and returned in time to have r1inner with Archbishop Spellman. Following dinner General ClPrk conferred with GenerHls GruenthAr a.nd Brann before ret 4 ring for the evening. * * * CECPJA--JULY 28, 19/+4--In tJ:,e early rert of the morning Genera.1 Clark went over thFJ prepnrations for the visit of King George VI and then went out to the RAF field near Cecina. At 1110 the King arrived by plane accmnpanied by General Alexander. A review of RAF rersonnel was held at the field and the party then proceeded down the road lined with troops to the Fifth Army cub strip and airport. Here General Clark, accompanied by the King and General Alexander, trooped the line of soldiers massed there for the occasion. At the conclusion of' the playing of The Star Spangled Banner, which marked the end of the ceremony, the party proceeded into the connnand post to the area immedfately adjoining General CJ.Ark's van. The Kini:,; then took his place in the receiving line with GenE~rals Clark B Alexander, and GenerJ:11 .nd Clark presented all of his genAral officers and section chiefs to King George. British personnel in Fifth A:rmy HeadqUBrters were also rresented to the King as well as the press. The King then :i.nvested General Clark vrj th the K.nighthood of the British Empire and Generals Gruenther and Keyes es CompPnions of the Bath. The King and Gener::i.l Clark then entered the GenerAl I s van f'or a sJ:, ort ��~ G IL ; / ~ Q; e;"" -# I ~ ; 9 ,r-~/>p,. ,,l.,.., talk and were joined by General Alexander a few minutes later. The three conversed brfofly and then came out of the wm and sat down to lunch. They were joined at lunch by Archbishop Spellwan and Generals Gruenther, Grittenberger and Keyes. After lunch the Gimeral accompanied the Kjng to his plrme and saw him of'f, returning subsequently to his comrri~nd post. He then conferred vrith General Gruenther, bade farewell to the Archbishop and then proceeded to his villa at Castiglioncello where he spent the remainder o-f' the afternoon, returning late in the even:ing to his oommand post. General Clark today received the followin~ cablo. from the King of EnglPnd: "I sincerely thank you for my enjoyable visit to your heAdqunrters todey. It was indeed ~" pleasure to me to see detachments from units which h1we so dist5nguished themselves in this theatre of war. V/ill you please convey my good wishes to all ranks under your col"'!mand. 11 * * * CECINA--JULY 29, 1944--Genera.1 Clar'\r rece:ived Mr. Schoninger, m,tional Cor:mPnder of' the VP-terans of Foreif$!1 W:--rs who conferred w;th him for three-quarters of an hour in his van. Following the dep?rture of Mr. Schoninger, GenerAl Sosnko~ski, Polish Commander-in-Chief, arrived Pccomp~nieo by Lt. Col. Szympnski, American Liaison Officer with the Polish Corps, Pnd Hajor Miszke and Lt. Lubanski. These f;Uests had lunch with General Clark. In the afternoon the Axmy Co:mrne.nder conferred with Genernls Gruenther Pnd Brann. Colonel r.~cM::,hon, classmAte of the General, called on the Army Commander in the 8-f'ternoon. Lily Pons, well known f"etropoljtan Orera artist, and her husbrmd, Orchestra Leader Andre ¥ostelanetz who ro-e m~k.ing a tour in the Fifth Army areP, called to pay their respects to the Army Commander. Generel Cl,irk received them in the hut and spoke with them at some length. Miss Ions then sang "Estrellita" for the General and his guests. The re.rty, consisting of those mentioned previously and General GruP.nther, Colonel r~cMahon, General Hume, Colonel S8ltzman, Lt. Col. Porter, Lt. Col. Clflrk, Cartain Walters and Lieutenant Berenson, then had d~nner in the General's mess hut. General Clark went for a short swim in the early evenin~ before retiring to his van for the night. General Cle..rk replied to King George's cable of yesterday as follows: "The Fifth Army jg most apprec 'aMve of tre sj gn.1-11 bonor which your Majesty bestowed upon it by visiting its command post yesterdriy. Your Mt1.jesty' s grPcious message is being colllJ'l'lunicated to all troops of the Fifth Axmy 1md will be deeply appreciated. Your f-'!ajesty may rest a.ssured that vre will neither rest nor relax in our efforts until the col"'lmon foe is decisively defeated." There has been a great deal of question as to the roqsibility and pra.cticabilit:r of the enemy's using the Tower of Pisa as an obserw:1 tion rost. Following are a few memoranda submitted to the Army CommF!nder on the subject: ��Report from General Crittenberger, IV Corps Co111mander, reads as follows: "The following facts regi:irding the report thrit the enemy has been using the Tower of Pisa as an OP are submitted for your inform11tion: 11 1. Lieutenant Colonel Long st~tes he wns J11isquoted in the •sters and Stripes•. 11 2. Observers with field glasses were seen by two officers in the tower on the Mornjng of July 25. Although a close observation has been kept on the Tower sjnce then, no further observers heve br>en seen in it, and it is considered quite po~sible thAt the observers origj_naJ.ly sighted mPy have been in civilian clothes. 11 3. A partisan yntrol last night (July '27/28) crossed the river jnto Pisa and reported only 40 to 50 Germans in that rart of town. "4. Brige.dier General Raymond E. s. Williamson, Commr-mding troops in \ south Pisa, does not believe it a.avant11geous for us to shell the Tower at tre present time. 11 5. The IV Corps Artillery Commander, Br:i. ge.d ier General W. C. Crane, investigated the observations of the 77th Artillery Group, 34th Division Artillery, 91st Division Artillery, Air OP' s and 15th Field Observation Battalion, and found from them no definite innication thrt the Tower is being used as an OP this morning. Two field artillery observers only, have within the ra st few days noten unidentifiable persons in the Tower. "6. According to General Crane, the Tower is in no ""ense an essential artillery OP, as there are !"!any points both within and without the city from which better results could be obtained. 11 7. I have been in the Pisa area every da.y for the last three days during which visits there has been no unusual hostile shelling. In ~Act, during the times I was there not n single Germfln artillery shot was heard. Although there have been three oott~lions of our infantry in the fire,,, one in the town rind the other two outside but within range of GermPn artillery, none had received concentrations at the time of my last visit. "8. The casualty report for troops in the area is as follows: Ml! 26 July 27 July 28 July KIIJ,F.D 2 0 1 WOUNDED 3 4 7 "9. This Headquarters is in close i:>nd const1mt touch with the sitw,tion:J Nothing hrts occurred so far to justify shelling the Tower of Pisa. If in my opinion, shelling the Tower subsequently becomes justified for military reasons I shall so recommend. 11 G-3 prepared the following memorandum on this same subject: �3l 11 1. On July 25, 2 Germans with binoculars were seen in the tower by 2 officers. ('T'he nt=1mes of these officers are bejng secured by IV Corps). The tower has been kept under close observation And no one has been seen in there since that time. 11 2. Col. Ladue sttites thnt IV Corps hBd instructed 34th Inf Division concerning restrictions of' firing on Lea.ning Tower of PISA. 34th Inf Division felt there was no necessity for fjre. The feeling in Task Force Williamson is thBt it is not necessary to shell PISA. Yesterday• s CflsURlties: 1 killed, 3 wounded (TFW). IV Corps does not believe there is any reason to change their policy. 11 3. Col. Ladue further stated there is no ~sis for believ~ng the toTTer if used as an observation post, would cause fire And resulting casualties any more than the use of hip;h buildings or the high terrain to the Northeast. At :rresent there hns been no lmovm casualties from fire thet could be attributed to observational control of fire from the tower. "4. The story in Stars and Stripes WAS written by an enlisted man on the staff of Stars and ctrires by the name of Al Cohen. This man writes human interest stories and jnterviews given are personel only and neither Division, Corps, nor Army have any control over them. The field censor with Stars and Stripes is final authority on what is rrinted. Col. Lang was ~isquoted by Stars and Stripes - he did not see any observers in the tower. (Written stA.tements to this effect are bejng secured by IV Corps). 11 5. Partisan parties into PISA across river think Germans heve eVRCUPted J)flrt of the town and estimate only 20 to 30 remain. Gerrmns are still to the East and West of town. 11 6. Col. Burrill 1 s report on arty reaction is being prepRred. 11 7. Reco!'lmend that any decision to shell or bomb PISA Pincl/or the tower be deferred unMl further evidence is P.Vailv.ble to ind~ c~te the military necessity for so doing. 11 A.s The report of Colonel Burrill, referred to in paragraph 6 Pbove, is quoted follows: 11 1. All the field artillery forward observers, Air OP's and TD forward elements in the IV Corps were in~tructed at 0()()0 hours, this mornjng, to observe high buildings in Pisa, especielly the Tower, with the o~ject of determining whether or not the GermHns were using them P.S observation posts. "2. At 1600 hours, today, All observers, except two, reported toot they had seen no evidence of buildings in Pisa being used as observation posts. 11 3. Two observers reported thAt they hl'ld seen unidentified people in the Tower of Pisa during the course of the day. Their rerorts a.re in no way conclusive evidence of occupation of the building as an OP by the Germrns. The detailed reports of these two observers are as follows: ~- A forward observer from the 125th FA Bn stPted th~t he sl'!,w some �movement Rt one of the win<foY'S in the Tower but could not tell whether or not they were civiliPns or military personnel. The observer was stationed At 123627 and was using field glasses. b. A forvrard observer from the 347th FA Bn, using a BC scope at a distance of-600 yards from the Tower saw unidentified people in the building between 1300 and 1400 hours. He also reported that something resembling w:ire could be seen on the outside of the Tower. 11 4. Lt. Col. Casey, Artillery Section, WEts orderAd to rroceed to the farthest forward TD OP to determine whether or not observRtion from buildings in Pisa was troubling our foremost elements. He mPnaged to contact an outrost position at C. Ghignoli BadiP at 15-6?.5. He states that there Pre two church steeples nearly as high as the To1•rer Pnd mtrny buildings in the tov,rn thr>t could be used as good OPs. He observed the buildings continuously for a reriod of four hours ;:ind could see no indication that they were being used. He stated that the troops contacted on the outpost line djd not believe that the Germ,ms were observing from the tovm but that they were utilizing the hill mflss to the northeast for obserw.tion posts. 11 5. Captain Wilson, /lrtillery Section, was sent to the outpost line and got as far north ass. Lorenzo alle Corti, about 1000 yards due east of Lt. Col. Ca.sey's position. His report is su,bstantiFilly the same as Lt. Col. Casey's. 11 6. I flew in an L-5 along the Arno River from CepronA over Iisa to the sea.. I saw no indication of any milita.ry installPtions, such as wjre, radios, observing instruments or personnel on any of the buildings. The country around Pisa is very flat and the only worthwhile observ8tion from a military view point is the hill mass northeast of the town of Pisa. 11 7. I had 11 conference with General Crnne, Artillery CoJ111nander, IV Corps. He stated that he does not believe the Germ:ins hPVe installed observation posts in Pisa but believes that they t=ire f:111 located on the hill ll'aSS northeast of the town. He :further reported that he hqs received no reports of locations of enemy guns, supplies or targets in the tovm. He further st11ted thrt he does not believe it would be worthwhile, from the inform:i.tion he now has, to f:ire on buildings in Pisa.. 11 8. The Deruty Chief of Staff, IV Corps, stated thPt both officers quoted in the Sta.rs and Stripes claim that they were misquoted by the rerorter Pnd both claim that they have no evidence to rrove thRt . the Ger!l'f?ns Pre using buildings in the town of Pisa. as observation posts. tt9. From my investigation I have arrived at the following conclusions: §.• The build:ings in the town of Pisa. vrould not be good observation posts. ]2. The Germans have not installed rermanent obserwtion posts in the town. There may be a few scattered OPs Ill8nned by Ttr>lian Fascists or German infantry units to overlook the imrnedia.te front in their vicinity. ,Q. " I �,g. Thet the main observation posts are installed on the high, 1."ooded mountain nF.Rs to the northeast. 10. Recommendations: ~• That the buildings in the tovm of Pisa be not teken under fire by our Rrtillery. ]2. That IV Corps be instructed to keep continual observ11tion on the town and immediately report any in0ication of German OP instAlletions. c. That the hill mass to the northeast o.,. the town be searched by air OP observers, Tac?R pilots and ground observers for fORsible locations of OPs. g. That if it is decided to fire artillery in Pisa, 4 t be coordinated with a heavy air bomb8rdment so that the entire tovm is leveled. If one high build 4 ng is demolished by artillery, the Gernnns h11ve Access to many others that would serve as just as good an OP. In other words, if the decision is made to knock out OPs in Pisa, the entire town would have to be leveled. 11 The Engineer report on this subject is quoted below: "In reply to your verbal reqrest, the following roints in nnd rround FISA (see ettached Maps) appear from a study of me.rs and air rhotos to be suitable O.P's, looking to the south and southwe~t for the enemy. This HeadqUPrters has no infornation on sites which are l'lctually beinp: used by the enemy. I. II. III. Q096658 •••••••••••••••••••• C1:ithedrel w:i th high dore. Q097658 •••••••••••••••••••• Museum with belfry. Q698658 •••••••••••••••••••• Leaning Tower of Fisa. These three, buildings are in an east-west line tind A.re of approxinfitely equal heights, four stories higher than any other building in PISA. There are numerous four and five story bujldings in PISA that line the north bank of the ARNO River. Buildings of equr.l hei~hts on the south bank neutralize any effective observation. IV. There fire numerous small hills in the PISANO HILLS tru:it may The best of these is rt Q208635. LA ROCCA is an old fortress on a rock ci:ir of M. VERRUCA with Pn elevation of 1824 feet." be used as O.P 1 s. * * * CECINA--JULY 30, 1944--In the mornjng General Clark conferred with various of his staff officers. At 1430 in the afternoon the General rent with General Gruenther and other of his staff officers to the speci~l concert given at Fifth Army Headquarters by Lily Pons and Andre Y:ostele.netz with the 1st Armored Division Band. After the concert, which lasted About rn hour end a half, Generals Clark and Gruenth8r "'nd Colonel SaltzM~n drove to the General's villa at Castiglioncello. GenerA.1 Lewi,., Colonel Burrill and Colonel �Q'Brien came for a swim and for dinner. After dinner Genertils Clark and Gruenther went to a dance given by the WACS at th9 Enlisted Men's Rest Camp Villa at Ca.stip;lioncello. He spoke to 1'18.ny of the WAC officers Pnd enlisted WACS , srendini:; ~bout three-qul'l.rters of an hour Pt the party. At about ten o'clock the Generr 1 returm~d to his commend post. * * * CECJNA--JULY 31, 1944--General Clark left the cormn11nd post at nine o 1 clock, accompAnied by General Lewis, arrivjn~ ~t LorenzPno cub strip at 0910 where he was met by General Rutledge. After cnni'erring briefly with Genf'.ral Rutledge, the Army Commtmder proceeded to Task Force 45 where he was oriented on the situation. He then c'lrove from Task Force 45 command post to IV Corps, arriving at 1030. The General spent about half an hour at this point conferring with General Crittenberger, IV Corps Corr,r,pnder. GenerAl Cl/'lrk then left for Task Force Raml'ly v,here he srent fifteen minutes, After '.'rbich he rroceeded to 10 AGRA in the vicinity of Cevoli. He was r.iet by Brigadier r•axwell and conferred with him for About fifteen minutes. The General drove to the IV Corps cub strip from which roint he flew to the II Corps eub strip. Generrl Cll:irk lunched at II Corps with Generel Keyes end returned to his command post by air at 1400. The General oonferred et 16o0 hours with Generals Gruenther and He.rding for about half l'l.n hour. Shortly thereafter the General went for a swim, conferring upon his return wjth Gereral Moran. Colonel St1-unps of the Milita.ry Academy at 11fest Point, Colonel McMahon and Captain Cfay, son of r::ajor General •Clay, had dinner with General ClRrk this evening. G-3 today issued PLA.N ARNO which is a camoufmge plan to conce:::il the movement of troops and to give the impression of a defensive build-up in the west rather than an offensive build-up in the east flank. The plan in full is quoted below: "1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this pl1:in js to gn.in surrrise by Fifth Army in its attack agA inst the ARlJO River line. 11 2. RBSFONSTBILITY. Within Corps zones, Corps Commanders e.re responsible for the execution of this plan. Between the Corps and Army rear boundaries Unit Connnanders are respondble within assigned areas. CamouflBge troops have been attached to Corps to give technicHl advice and assistance . Full use will be made by Corps and separate Unit Commtinders of the advice of the Army Staff. This particulrirly applies to the Army Engineer, Artillery and Signal Officers and to Camouflage and PRU experts. 3. GP.HERAL FLAN. The general plan is to gRin surprise hy concealing the transfer of units from present locations to new areas preparatory to the attack, by giving the impression of a build up of the West rather tran the East flank and by creating the impression of a defensive rather thnn an offensive attitude. 11 11 4. DETAILED 1!• Reliefs. PLA.N. �(1) Routine reliefs will continue in the same manner as now carrje d out. (2) Reliefs incident to the atteck will be executed w:ith the utmost secrecy. The following steps will be taken: (a) (b) (c) b. Reliefs will be imne at night. Ch,-'1nges in gun positions will be kept to a minimum, and when made, will be thoroughly camouflaged prior to daylight. Hormal sounds and activity will be maintained durjng reliefs. This vtill necessitate such measures as moving heavy noise making equipment while artillery concentrations are fired and Making reliefs in small j_ ncrements. r,,~ovement of Units. (1) (2) Hovements to jndicate a build up of the left flank will be made during daylip;ht. (3) c. !1ovement of troops to new areas preJ)(lratory to the attack will be made as far as possible at night without lights except lights may be used in rear of Corps light lines unless red alert blackout restrictions are in effect. Direction and other signs indicflt:ing movement and location of units will not be displa.yed. Signal Comrmmications. (1) (2) d. "'formal radio activity will be maintained in an area from which a unit has moved by leaving sufficient radio equipment and personnel to simulate routine operations. Radio silence will be I'laintained in the new location. Artillery. (1) Corps Cor.unimders will coordinate Rrtillery a.ctivity to insure th~t there is no general increase in the volume of artillery fire on Corps fronts, (except to repel a counter attack). Artillery in battle positions prior to receipt of this order w ill continue to expend a normal number of' rounds per day. (2) Division artillery not in position by 1 August will he gradually moved forward into position. (3) M ovements to new positions will be made at a.s lAte a �date as possjble. (4) (5) Registration from new bA.ttle positions will be limited to one (1) gun per battalion 11.t HS late 8 . date Rs po~sible. The remainder of the guns will not fire unless srecifically authorized by Corps Coml"nders to rerel R counterr:ittack. (6) Battalion::; now in attack positions will register one (1) gun daily starting 1 August. This will in no way restrict normal registration. (7) New gun positions and neV'r ammunition dumped in bc-1ttery rositions will be carefully camouflaged. In old positions camouflage will be left in plD ce and activity will be sjmulated. (8) Reconnaissance parties will be restricted to essential personnel. (9) e. Units now in rest areas will move directly to their firing positions. Advice and assistance in soun0-and-flash simulation at dummy positions will be obtained from the Army Engineers. Administrative Moves and Installations. (1) (2) Camouflage of dumps in, and in rear of II Corps zone, will be such as to T'laintain the same appearance as on 1 Auisust. Dumps in rea.r of IV Corps, especially along Highway 1, will be made to show a gradual build up. The advice of the ftrmy Engineer will be secured in this connection. (3) When possible, newly constructed roads to dumps, artillery pos1tions and other similar installations will be built along covered routes. (4) f~ Adminj strati ve moves which jndica.te changes in location of troops will be made at night without lights except thr..,t lights may be used in rear of Corrs light lines except during red alert. Hospitals will be displaced forward of rresent positions at the latest possible tine prior to D-day. Control of Civilians. (1) Civilians will not be allo Med to pass through our positions to the Germans. (2) Civilian movement in Corps areas will be restricted to the minimum. (3) Civilians who interfere with operations will be evacUPted. �g. General Security Measures. (1) All personnel w:i.Ll be thoroughly instructed in security measures. (2) Operational plans will not be divulged to anyone who does not need such information to carry out his assigned mission. This is espec:t ally applicable to tj_me, date and place of attack. (3) Corps Commanders will decide when units will be br1.efed on the details of the operation. h. Smoke. IV Corps will maintain a smoke screen between LEGHORN a.nd the PISANO Hill Hass to aid in creating the impression of Rctivity on the left flank and to keep observed artillery fire from IEGHORN. i. PRU. Fifth Army FRU will photograph the entire Fifth Army zone on 1 August or as soon thereafter as possible and will repeat two or three times between then and D-day. Results of interpretatton vd.11 be furnished to Corps and to the Army Engineer. The latter will then advise Corps Engineers 2nd Army units as to cnmouflage r:ieasures which should be taken to conform to this plan. j. Camouflage Projects. No major c11mouflage rrojects, other than routine maintemmce of old artillery Bnd unit positions, will be unrertaken without consulting the Army Engineer to insure that Corps plPns conform to the general Army plan. This particularly applies to the use of sreciBl dummys and of sound-and-flash simulation on a larger scale th1rn routine simulation of 11ctivity at old positions. k. Patrols. (1) Patrolling by front liw::, units will not be increr-sed. (2) Reconmdssances in force will not be undertPken without approval of this Headquarters. (3) When a unH is relieved from front line duty for movemFmt to a new location for the attack it will leave sufficient rersonnel to conduct patrolling in the old sector. 1. m. 5. Preliminary Attacks. No rreljmjnpry attac"k:s will be mrde without tipproval of this Headquarters. Present Defensive rosjtions. In order to create the impression of a defensive attitude present defensive positions will be improved by continuing digging in of weapons and preparing foxholes and laying wire and dummy mines. SUPPLIES. Additional ctimouflage materials necessary to execute this plan may be obtained from Army dumps. Requisitions for this materifl 1 will be submitted to the Army Engineer." �CECINA--AUGUST 1, 1944--At ten o'clock a decor11tion ceremony was held at the command post at which General Clark pinned the Distinguished Service Medal on General Tate and the Legion of Merit on General Brann. Three other officers were decorated with the Bronze Star and sixty six men of the 61st MP Company were awarded the Good Conduct Medal. After the decoration ceremony Generl'11 CJ.Ark received General GaT'lI1lell, Chief of Staff to General l':ilson, and oonferred with him for about an hour in his van. During the afternoon the General mrked on administrl'ltive mtters requiring his attention and later in the a.fternoon went to his bee.ch villa accompanied by Colonel Sal tzm~n And Lieutenant Berenson. The lull oontj nues along the Fifth Army sector of the front wj_th patrols from both sides µ:-ob:ng the Arno Line as wBjor elements of the Fifth Army continue to move eastward in preperation for the Arno crossing. * * * CECINA--AUGUST 2,-1944--Gencral Clark spent a quiet mornjng at his villa in Castiglioncello with Colonel Saltzman. General Bolte came for lunch and a swim. General Clark rested after lunch and in the late afternoon GenerP.1 Gruenther and his aide, Lieutenant Bajenow, Pnd two other guests came for dinner. * * * CECINA--AUGUST 3, 1944--Gereral Clark spent a quiet morning at his villa swimmin~ and reading. The General returned to his oommancl rost after lunch where he conferred with General Pritchard of the 1st Armored Division and several of his staff o.i:>ficers. At 1900 hours General Clar:k- v1ent to "Accent on Fun", a stage show starrjn~ Jack Haley ~md Mary Brfan, after which the General gave a btL:fet supper for the entertainers plus eighteen of his ste~f officers. General Clark today received the following ~ble from GenerAl Devers regarding the change in Fifth Army PRO : 11 In view of important assignment, will you pleA se order Colone 1 Clark, PRO, to report to this headquarters not lrtter than the 6th? I assurie that there is a second in command who cAn carry on for you until Grogan arrives." * * * CECINA--AUGUST 4, 1944--The General spent a quiet morning in his van conferrin~ with General Keyes, II Corps Commander, at noon and durinr, lunch. In the early arternoon General Royal, carrying~ ~essage from Assist~nt Secretary of War McCloy to General Cl~k, arrived at the command post and, together v:ith General Tate, called on General Clark. At 1600 Air Vice Marshal Dickson, Commander of the Desert Air Force, CP.me to discuss a:i.r support problems .,.ith General Clark. Shortly after the Air Vice larshal' s departure, Genernl Clark 11nd Gener1:1 l Brann went down to GenerP-1 �Clark's beach for a quick dip before dinner. General Clark had as dinner guests, in addition to the regular me:r1bers of his mess, Gener~l Brann and Lt. Col. Porter. The Army Cormnander conferred br1efly with these officers after dinner and retired to his van early in the evening. * * * CECINA--AUGUST 5, 1944--General Clark spent a large pn.rt of the day in his van working on an accumulation of papers requiring his personal handling. During the course of the day the Army Commander conferred with General Elliott, AFHQ Engineer, who was accompanied by General Bowman, Fifth Army Engineer. General Larkin, SOS NATOUSA, also called to see General Clark and discuss various supply problems with the Fifth Army Commanding General. At 1600 Generals Alexander, Hardj.ng and Lemnitzer, who were scheduled to arrive at 1530, arrived and conferred with General:3 Clark, Gruenther, Brann and Howard in the conference hut. These officers departed shortly after 1630, and the Army Commander departed immediAtely for his beach villa, accompanied by Colonel Saltzman. * * * CECINA--ATJGUST 6, 1944--General Clnrk spent the entire day at his beach villa at Castiglioncello working on papers and resting in the sun. There was little activity at the command post today, the front being relAtively quiet. AFHQ today sent the following cable to the War Department with regard to additional battle stars for the Italian campaign: Battle participation award is subject. See your W71734, 28 July 1944. This headquarters agrees on date proposed, termination of first campaign on 21 January 44, second campaign to start on 22 January. Request that later consideration be given to award of third star for servjce in Anzio beachhead where conditions were exceptionally difficult and hazardous." 11 * * CECINA--ATJGtJST 7, 1944--General Clark returned from his villa at the beach at 1100 this morning. Major General Harrison, Chief of Procurement and Distribution in the Office of the Signal Officer, Washington, D. C., called with General Moran on General Clark. Major General Rooks arrived at lunchtime and had luncheon with Generals Clark and Gruenther. After lunch General Clark conferred with General Rooks for hAlf an hour in his van. At 1530 General Leese, Eighth Army Commander, arrived and conferred with General Clark for one hour in the General's van. At 1630 Colonel Sarnoff, Signal Corps, former Presjdent of RCA, called on General Clark with General Moran and conferred for li.alf an hour with the Army Commander at which time General Clark asked Colonel Sarnoff to accompany him on an inspection tour of front line units tomorrow. �General Clark today sent the following letter to Generril Devers regard- ing the release of sw,11 unit commenders to the rress: "As I e:xpL-.,ined to you in my letter of July 20th, we have already in operation jn Fifth Army a system for the release of units And their commanders, as su,rrgested by Gimernl Marshall in his July 18th ce ble to you. Under the existin~ a.rrt=u,gement, when I determJne thf't a unit end its corn.mander should be released I obtain a clearr,nce from the AFW1 Chief Press Censor. A story of the mer:itorious actions of the selected unit and its commander is then :prepared by my PRO. A copy of the story, carryj ng an advance release date, :is sent to AF'HQ so tl,at it may be distributed to the rress representatives a.t AFHQ ancl other points in the thePter at the same time that it is given to rress representatives servjng ~t Headquarters Fifth Arny. Copies of all released mater:l i:,l 2re P-lso for"Iarded to the :· rr DepPrtj,lent througl1 AFHQ for additional use by the Bureau of Public Relntions. 1 11 Your PRO called Gruenther triis r1ornfrg and lnd:i cated that the foregoing arrengement is setisfactory to your he2dquarters. "I run having rE1ler-tse JTI,;'lterivl prepAred on three units nov· -- two regiments and a battnlion - ... which will reacri you wj_thin a few dAys. I rlan to rrn.ke a sjmilar release each week. 11 Operations Instruction 1tJl, J.ssued today, reads 1'1S follows: 11 1. ~• The mission of the AlH ed t,rmfos continues to be the destruction of the enemy armed forcf'ls jn Italy. ]?. Fifth tirny has developed the enemy rositions alonr, the ARNO River and in pr8pAratj on for the attac1r contfoues the movement and resting of its troops as outlined in O.I~ •s 2() 8nd ".JO, which instructions contjnue in effect until D-Day of tJ-,:i.s order. _g. Eighth 1\rmy cont::inues operations to secure tl,e Mgl, ~ound north and northwest of FLORSNCR and therenfter, sj multAneously '"Ti th Fifth Army's t:>ttack, to attrclr to the north and north,"est Pnd secure the h~ gh PToun<l northeAst of rRATA. 11 2.. Within jts new zone of e,ction Fif'th Prmy, on D-Day, :ria'tdng its nain effort on the ri~ht, attacks with Corps abreast, II Corps on the right, to force a. crossing of tbe ARNO River and t>r1vance to the north and northvrest. Vlithin its zone of Fl.ction II Corrs v1ill: • (1) Force a cror~sing of the J\JlNO River in the vicjnjty of J't' liTBLUPO. (2) Coordfnating jts effor-t V"ith that of 13 Corrs, capture riff. ALBA,,,JO and secure the arfm vfoinity Hill 493 (Q 4781). (3) Subsequently, be prepnree1, on Army order, to attAcY to the northwest from the FUCECCHIO - PONTE DI '".ASINO Prep and secure M. PISANO. For this oper<"tion, the 1st Armored Divj sion and the 3/~tb Infantry Division wjl1 be T'lPde avP ilable.. I ]..Hn8 will he coord j n1=1ted with IV Corps ano chenge in inter-corps boundary for such an operation will be re- �l-f{ co:mmPnded. Direct communicPtion for rlannjng rurposes is authorized between II Corrs, 1st Jsrmored 1ivision and 34th Division. (4) !hintain contact vrth enemy forces and b0 rrerrired, at any time pfter the successful completion of the M. ALBANO operation, to follow up a withdrawl action vdth all possible speed. ( 5) Protect the right flank of Fifth Army. (6) Maintain contact vrith Eie:hth Army. ]2. Within jts zone of ~ction IV Corps will: (1) In conjunction with the TI Corps foitfol attack, sirnulPte crossing of the ARNO in the t1rea FO'ITEDERA - CASCI"TA. Frotect the left flank of Fifth Arm_y. Hain't.c"l.in contact with II Co:rrs. Jaintain contAct by ratrol l'lction nnd be rrepnred, at nny time a-f'ter the in~tial attack of II Corps, to follow up any enemy TI1thdrawal with all possible speed • t=.: (2) (3) (4) .£. Army Reserve: (1) 34th Division will be att8ched to II Corrs by sepPr~te orders at the prorer tj me. : ending such orders, present instructions on coastlll :ratrol t>.nd alert of units for possible movement to IV Corps area reri!'in in effect. (2) It j_ planned to make the /~2d RCT (less AT Co) Pvailrble s to IV Corr,s when tre 1st Armored Division is withdravm. (3) 37oth RCT (92d Division) wilJ be J11Rcle avriilable to IV Corrs on arrjval in t~e Army area, estimc~ted 2bout 20 August. 4. Instructions -f'or coordint>tion of nrtillery fires will be i ·~sued sepArl9.tely. 5. Boundaries: ~• J"nter-Corrs: No change • Tentative Inter-Army - Effective D"."Day: All ··nclusive to Ei~hth Army, FnCCAS'T'RAnA - thence Route 73 to LA COLO'JNA road junction Q 706089 - thence road to COLLE DE V~L D1F:L8A - thence Route 68 to FOGGIBONSI - thence rll inclusive to Fifth Army, roe<'! junction Q 676352 - thence road to road junction Q 656380 road ,junction Q 663389 - road junction 698420 - '710456 - 680500 - crossror,cl Q 6q2528 - thence road to q 675580 - crossroad to CERBJ\IA (Q 6855q2), where roP.d junction ,vill be cormnon to bnth armies - q 7:?0630 - junction of R. rrIBRONE with R. ARNO at Q 636696 - thence R. OMBRONE to roriero (Q 6374 - thence rord to Q 570820 - thence north along 57 Easting Grid. .£2• 6. D-Day: Irepnratiohs will be oosed on 19 Aui:;ust; conf1rm..,tion leter. 11 �42 CECINA--ATTGUST 8, 1941~--General Cle.rk took off, accompPnied by Colonel Sar .. noff, at 0845 in the morninP,', proceed:1ng to II Corps, IV Corps find 91st Division. He arrived at the rr Corps strip and was rnet there by Generl'll Crittenberger. He then went to the IV Corps command fost where he conferred with General Crjttenberger who introduced sever~l of his staff members to Colonel Sarnoff. GenerRl Clark also pinned insirrnia of nmk on several IV Corps staff of'fjcers who had been recently promoted. The Army Commander then returned to the cub strip and flew to II Corps where he was met by Genernl Keyes. He conferred at II Corps with General Keyes Pno other Members of his st8ff, introducing them to Colonel Sarnoff. Then, accompanied b:r General Keyes, the pPrty drove to the 91st Division command :rost where Generr-1 Livesay introduced several members of his staff to Colonel Sarnoff. The party then returned to the II Corps cub strip from which point they took off for the Army command post at Cecjna. Immed~fltely upon his arrjval back in the commPnd post, GenerAl Clark had lunch w:ith Colonel Se,.rnoff e.nd then spent the remainder of the l'lfternoon working on important papers in his van. The General had a quiet djnner with the regulrir members of his mess :<>nd retired early to his van for the evening. The following cable was received from AFHQ yesterdPy afternoon: "Secretary of Navy Forrestal will be jn Rome tomorrovr 8 August~ Would If agreeable please a.r vise where and when he should land.u 1 ~ke to fly to you on Wednesday. �43 Genera.l Clark replied to the .ceble mentioned on the preceding page as follows today: "Delighted to see Secretary Navy Forrestal on Wednesday. If he is Able spend most of day here and visit forward elements suggest he arrive 1000 hours . I will arrange suitable itinerary. If his time is more limited sursgest he arrive 1130 hours and reID':l.in here for lunch. In either event he should le.nd on our strip which will take C-47 and is located west of highwe.y #1 and is 11 miles north of Cecina air field and 1 mile south of town of Gecina. Advise plans and number in party. 11 The Brazilian Expeditiona.ry Force has arrived in Italy and is bivouacked inlril ,. the vicinity of Civitavecchia. General Clark sent the following memortmdum to General Gruenther with raga.rd to these troops: 11 1. I have told Captain Walters to have the Division CoJY>Jrtander and RCT Commander, with two additional Brazilian officers , here for lunch on Friday. Wal ters will go in my plane and bring them here. Handling of the Briizilian Expeditionary Force is a very delicate subject and must be done right. I do not wrnt the JRC Training Team tb exercise any training control over these troops . I want Colonel O 'Br1.e_ , with a selected group of assistants , to absorb this JRC n Group and to conduct the necessary training. I do not want all the inspection team to come from the 34th Infantry Division but to be made up of exceptionally well qualified and selected officers from all our j_nfantry divisions. 11 2. As soon Training Group to ing and readiness spection, we will as the RCT has received its equipment, I want the F'ifth Army conduct a thorough inspection to determine the state of trPinfor combat of this RCT. Based upon the results of this inthen prepare our nroper training program. 11 3. Please expedite the setting up of this inspection group in order that I can explain it fully to tte Division Commander when he comes Friday." * * * CECIN'A--AUGUST 9, 1944•-After breakfast General Clark went out to Cec1na airport to meet the Secretary of the Pavy, Mr . Forrestal. However, the Secretary landed by mistake at the command post field. The Gener~l and his Chief of Staff met the Secrete.ry here and took him immedjately to the command post area where they inspected the guard of honor and then rirocoeded to the hut v1here Generr11 Clark oriented the Secretary on pla.ns for future operatjons . The party then returned to the cub strip and took off in L-5 's ,.ma flew to IT Corps where they were net by Generflls Keyes ann Crittenberger an<'l then drove to the 91st Division where they had lunch with GenerPl Livesay. They also visited an artillery position ana then returned to the II Corps cub strip whence they took off and flew to Leghorn. At 1405 the party arrived at the cub fjel~ three miles north of Le~horn where the:,r were met by Generrls Tate, Hume and Rutledge, of the 45th AAA, Captain MRckenz1.~, RN, NOIC of LAg._horn, and Colonel Grogan, new Fifth Army Fublic RelaM ons r·fficer. General CJ.nrk ancl :rarty drove from the cub field to the Navy Fouse in Leghorn where they were briefed by Captnin MPckenzie and General Tate on the conci tion of tl1e rort of Leghorn from the first da.y the Allies entered the rort up to the present date, and future plRns for the . development of the rort. Captain f:Bckenzie stated tbPt by tbe 28th of August there �would be six liberty berths in the rort am'l by the 15th of September there would be twice thAt amount. Captain r1ackenzie explained the tremendous problem of clearing mines and sunken ships in order to make a che.nnel through which vessels could be brought ~nto Leghorn. Generr,:,l TPte discussed the problems of port clenr1'mce, the developr0 ent of dumps and <"erots in the Leghorn arel'l and i:;enerally brfofed General Cll'lrk and the Secretary on the -rroblems with regi3rd to the re storr,tion of light, water, telephone in the city proper. After this fifteen m-inute briefing Generrl Clark, with Secretar;,r Forrestal, CEptain Mackenzie and General Tate 1n one jeep, followed by rort offjcials and staff o"ficers, thoroug},ly inspected tre rort. The part~r stopped at several Britj sh anti-a:ircr2ft b2.tterfos in the rort area, and Gener,:,l Clar}- introduced the Secretary to the commAnding officers. i:.:nroute between the old port of Leghorn ['nd the new, o matter of two miles, a company of the 100th Infantry wr>s forned, and Generr-1 Clnrk rmcl the Secretary reviewed t},e troops ancl :interviewed several of the soldiers who had been decorated. The Generr-1 introduced Secretary Forrestal to the Commanding Officer of the 100th In:f'entry nnd th,·m rroceecled on to insrect the new port of LAghorn. After completing the 1nspection of the port of Le.c;horn, General Rutledge joined the party, rmd they all returned to Leghorn. Genere1 Clark's pnrty cont 4 nued on to the 4Sth AAA ~dtuated on high ground overlooking the frno VaJ ley - fifteen miles from Leghorn. Gener:.:, 1 Rutledge 'i.ntrorluced Secretary Forrestal and General Clark to several of his staff of'ficers and briefed Gw1er~l ClHrk's rarty on the current situetion explaining tbe problems of conversion of artillery troops for use as infantry troops. General Clark ex_rl::dned to Secretary Forrestel his reasons for pu.ttirig AA outfits in the line at this time in order to relieve bis well-deserving infantry di,risions so th::.t they could rest. Aft0r the briefin~ General Clark and Secr, -tary Forrestal returm"d to the cub strip two miles north of Leghorn where they took off for the Fifth Army command post. 0 Upon arrival at the command post, General Clark, Mr. ForrPstal, Captain Roper and stof'f officers went for a swim .. The Genernl entertnined the pa.rty for dinner and conferred after dinner wjt,h the Secretary for an hour before· ret:ir:ing. * * * CECINA--AUGUST 10, 1944--General Ch.rk had breakfast with Secretar;v Forrestal, CA,ptain Roper nnd his staff of'ficers. Due to brd flying weather, Secretary F'orrestal, i"Tho vras due to leave at 0930, could not te1<e off and so General Clark su,,,.gested thHt he visit the 8th Bwcuation Hosp5to.l. The Secretary vfoj_ted this unit with Colonel Bruce and "lCS met by Gener~tl Clark at 12 noon upon hh return to the coilll"!and post. General Le:rnnitzer l'l.rrived at 1200 and lunched with Generril Clark, Secretary 'F'orrestal and others at the comrriand post. After lunch Generrl Ch.rk escorted the Secretary to the airport nnd bade him farev.rell. At 1420 the Army Co:mmander, with Generals Gruenther, Lemnitzer an~ Brann, left l:i;, 1-5 for T.roC Eighth Army for a conference with Generals Alexander, Leese and Harding, returning at 1700 hours. �At lB00 hours Genernls Clerk, Gruenther and Br~nn left for General Cle.rk' s beach villri where they sw:-:im and dined, r~tiring errly in the evening. General (}ruenther submitted the follovring notes ref;r>rding the conference at Ejghth Arrriy Headqur>.rters today: "Last night General Hardini:Y, called to ~my tht1t Generr-1 Alexnnder desired to have a meet~ ng .,..j th the t rm Army Comnanders Pt the Eighth Army TAC Headqurirters at 1700 hours today. He '1tated that L.:irmitzer would be at our l·eadquarters by 9:00 o 1 cloc'k- tJ,-,is morninl! to tell Gener"l Clark of the subject to be di~cussed Pt the conference. He said trnt 1no drastjc chnnge is contemplrted; it will be chiefly a oiscussion concernjng timings 1 • "TM s rnorninp: nt 7:15 Harding called to strite t:rr-t, Gererr:il Alex.'111der now desj red thrit the reetinr.; he held at 1500 hours today, insteRd o-r the 1700-hou:r tiMe rreviou~ly arrnnged. It ,Ps r:,injng very hArd rhen he rhoned, £i.nc1 T told him that Lem should check vr 4 th us before he derrirted, because I was quite certain that our cub f'fold 1..,.ould e unserviceable until at least 10:00 o'clock. "The rain continued to fall 1.mtjl nbout 9:00 o'clock. At 8:3C' Lemnitzer I s aide called to advise that Lem had left A.AI by nuto at S: 15. He reached our headquarters at 11:45. I called Don, and the trree of us rroceeded immediritely to Gern:iral Clark's van. "Lem tol<l us t},at the rlan which Ge11eral Alexander woul<l a; scur,s at the 1500-hour conference tM s aftArnoon v:rould be nlon~ the folJ.owinf!, ljne: The Eiehth Amy attack will jump off on Aurrust 25 e.s rreviously rlanned. P.o"ever, under General A.lexander 1 s new rlan it lill ;crecede the Gttack by Fifth Army rnd 11 Corps from the FLCRF: TCE area. Furthermore, GenerD.1 Alexnnder considers that the attack towaros LUCCA is inndvisPble. G0nerPl Clrrk should be r,reprrE!d to recommend the direction of' ::ittack by F:i!'th 1 rmy northward from tl-ie F IST0TA area, or -"rom the TRATA - FL0RE~rcE rirer-. "This concept :ls an 1-mtirely new one ::.n tvro ir.:rortrmt asrects: First, it clwnr,-es radically tJ->e timin,t; and secondly, it chnn~es the objectives preYiously rrescrj bed for t 1 e Fifth Arrriy. The Secretf'xy of the Favy, lr. Forrestal, ws a r;1-1est oP Ge 1erE1.l Ch.rk 1 s Tihen Lem r-rrived. revertheless, General Clarl{ studied the plan PS tr0roughly as possible, under the circUJTIstances, and left by cub rl~.ne -ror the conference shortly after 2 :00 o I clock. He ms accompanied by Brann, Gruenther and Lermitzer. 1 "We arr-'ived at Genercl Leese's TAC Hea0quarters rromrtly at 3:00 o'clock. (}eneral Leese f;I'eAted General Chrk with the '"'tn.te,.,,ent: 'I am r;bd to see you, Clark. I thought it would be nice if e hnd our meeting in the dell'. Vle foi.md thPt the conference lmd been (lrrr-nged in n very pleasant grove. rresent were: General Alexanc1 er, GererPl Clnrk, Gener(ll Leese, Ge"1er11l Harding, General Lemnitzer, General Gruenther, General I3r nn and L:'eutenant Colonel Kent. General Ale:iroJ'1det opened the :rr0eting with the following surn\ mary: 1 You fire aware of the change in plans wl1ich occurred sever11l days ago whereby the Main attack of the Allied Armies in ItA.ly was shifted to the Adr·iatic coast. I am quite satisfied thPt this is the correct solution. At ) / �4c, the same time jt was dec:i ded thrt Fil"th Army should EJ.ttack to gain the FISTOIA area, and the LUCCA area. Upon further consideration I have decided that the atta.ck to gain the LUCCA area is an error, in that it will dissipate the already reduced resources of the Fifth Army. I have also come to the conclusion that the attack by the II Corps U.S. and the 13 Corps British, as now planned, will be launched Pg8 inst a very strong Germa.n posj_tion,. and that it has little chance of success with the German strengtb disposed as it is nt this time. I believe thrt a better plan is +>or the "Sighth Army IM' in attack on the ADRIATIC Coast to rrecE!<l2. the attack by the Fifth Army and the n Corps in the cent.er. Jt is my idea thnt the ~ighth Army mair:i attack should be launched on August 25 as rreviously planned. The.n the attack in the center by Fifth Army and by 13 Corps should be launched on my order rt a later date - say about September 1st - when the enemy has reduced his strength in the center . In that way we would have a boxer's 'one-two runch'. The direction which the 2ttack by Fifth Arm;iT a.nd 13 Corps shoulr! t,a.ke is a matter for later dj_scussion. I should now like to inquire of the Fifth Army Commander whether he agrees in prindple to my ne\7 plan' • · "General Clark repl:ied: 'General Alexander, I think thnt your change in plans with respect to the timing of the two attacks is sound. If we do not take the PISANO Hill Nhss it will mean that the Fffth Army will have a very long and somewhat exposed f'lrmk alone>' the ARNO River. Hov:ever, I am quite willing to accept that responsj bility. I believe thrt we will be able to hold that front derensively., As to the direction ·in which the attr-ck by the Fifth Army and 13 Corps should be made, I feel that it is essential that the t,zo attacks should be launched as one combined effort. If we attack northwest or northeast from PISTOIA, flnd the 11 Corps attPck nortJ, from F;LORBNCE or FR.A.TA, vre will be separated by a considerable d~ stance, and our .i o:l nt effort will not be mP.de in tr,e nost decisive mirnner. It f'urthermore seems to me that the two forces should be under single opera-tional control. In that way, and in that wtiy only, can '"e strike an effective blow. I believe that the direction of 2ttack should be in the direction FLOR.F.NCE - BOLOGNA. 1 "General Clark further sfoted thnt the increased length of flank under such a plan would rrobably necessitate the use of an additfonal British division along the ARNO in order to rrotect the left flank of the Fifth Army. "General Leese stated that he agreed completely with General Clark; that if Grmeral Clark would only indicate the sector along the ARNO to be held b:r British troops, he would make every effort to make them avr-d lable for that purpose. He furthermore stt1ted thnt he planned to make GenerF>l HcCreery a provisional group commander commandinp the 13 and 10 Corps; tht:1t General HcCreery would be on the same level with General ClFtrk, and that C,ew'!ral Kirkman would 1-ie on a level with General Keyes. Under thf't plan General Clark would deal with General McC:reery as regr-:rds the operations by the 13 Corps. There ITould be ve1~;.,r little need for General Clark to confer 'lldth General 1'"ese, who would have his heA.dquA.rters on the ADRil\TIC side . While General Leese pledged complete coorer~.tj on on severe 1 roints during his talk, he was very ca.reful to avoid any reference to the rlac:L-1.g of Britfah trooyis under Fifth Army command. �"General Clark stA.ted th·t this arrangement would involve many complications; thnt the opnr8tion by thP- II and 13 Corrs wr>.s one wrich must be controlled by one commander. The nrrnngement wherehy General r 1cCreery would be on hand to represent General Leese would at best be compara½le to a 1 half interest in a wife'. General Leese repljnd that h~ understood Generrl Clark's/ point-of-view, and that from a strictly nilitary considerPtion it wrs probably\ correct that the 13 Corps should pa. '3S to tl~P. control of Fifth Army. Hmrever, \ Eighth Army had been split on sever.til occasions, and it was only ,Iith the greatest difficulty Uat General Leese had been able to rebuild a real "'ighth 1 Army esprit. To spl:i.t the Army again at tr-is time vrould undo a grer->t deal of \ the riard vork trrt hRd been spent in welding the Army into a unified group. / He believed that the snmc :i:ractfoal effect could be obtained under the pll:"n ( whicJ,, he a<1voc11ted. He stated that Genernl Clrirk would always be considered \ as the predominant p:1rtner of thE> center force, and thn.t General r,1ccreery would be expected to follow General Clrrk I s "1ishes. He stated thnt instead of considering it ns a case comrnrablf! to havjng a 1 half interest in a wife', he felt that Generel Clark would have at least 1an 85~ interest in the wife. 1 "Gener8l I.eese 1 s fiMl plea was that it was quite i9)ortant that he 'control the ultimate destinies of the d-ivisions of the 'i!ighth A:rrn.y 1 • "General Alexanr'er stated thnt he understoo<l the two points-of-view; trrit it was extremely important tJ,,..,t the matter he dj scussed +"r;,nkly "'ithout either inferiority or superiorit:,, comrlexes, rnc completely •ithout recrimiw,tions. He said that he would tf'lke the r,atter under a<lvj sement and would give a decision on the follo7inr, day. The situation apreAred to him that on the one htmd we hnd a case of cold logical military reasoning, balRnced a~:=d nst a strong psycholop;icnl sentimental vriluf!, which could not be neglected. / I ":::1urjng most of the Leese-Clnr'k-Alexander discussion Gcnerr,l Leese was ly:i ng on the gr01md stretched full length d th his Fms e kimbo behind his head, facing General Clerk and Gener~l Alexander. General Cu,rk mDde his final point by stating: 'General Ale:,mrrler, you have heard my argurrient; you have heard General Leese's. It is a mfltter of considerabl,.., enbarrassment for me to suggest tJ,,at a British corps should rass to commPnd of Fifth Army. I make this recommendation only because it is my sincere belief that it is the onl:,r loP,'ical and correct decision in tr is situn.tion. I shall say no more A.bout it; the decision is yours. I shall cheerfully abide hy any decision which you reach. 1 "Genernl Leese replied: 'I run inclined to believe you ere right. I em ( willing to pass the 13 Corps to your comnand. However, I would like to think \ the matter over for a few hours and let Gener,11 Alexander hwe my recoJ11II1endation in the morning. "General Alexander agreed the.t the delay "rould be sat:i sfactory. "Casual conversation tren took place, during rrich General Leese and Lieutenant Colonel Kent withdrew from the conference. They returned a few minutes later, and General T..,eese Announced: 11 heve decided that for the be:::;t interests of all concerned the 13 Corps should rass to control of the Fifth Army. I am therefore will:inr, that the decjsion should be 1T1nde nov.r, e.nd I reco~mend that 13 Corps pa·~s to Generel ClB.rk's cornnE.nd for tris or,er"'.tion. 1 �"General Alexander r-nnounced thf't sh1ce Pn rgreement hrd been reached on this point, such would be the decision. "General v~ese stnted thnt he desired to have a clenr und-erstPnding that the 13 Corps would revArt to ~iv,hth Army control RS soon as the BOLOGNA area had been reached. GenerPl Clro-k ar1 swered thnt this was entirely jn accord with M.s underst11nc'1fog, and thet he h11d no desire to ret~in control of' the 1_1 Corps indefinitely. Generel Ale:xancler strteil. thrt this rlso was M.s under::,t, nding. "General Alexander rinnounced thn.t 13 Corps would rs ss irnriediately to control of Fifth Army f'or planning rurposes; trat tJ-,e dnte when it would pass completely to Fifth Army control would be 0ecided lDter, but that it would probably be between August 15 and August 18. General Clark had rreviously mentfoned a serious ndministrative difficulty which would confront the Fif'th Army in the new rlt"n of attack in that the rort of L"'"':GH0RN would probably not be operrtive, nor would J-fir,hway 67 be useable. In that event supplies would have to continue to oo received tr-rough the port of PIOMBINO. As the a.ttac1'" yiroceeded over the AFI'E TINF.S this arrengement "OUld involve rn extremely long line of communications, 1hich would rrobcbly requ:ire more trucki:- than those nm-" avnilable to Fifth Army. Pe estimPted that he rrould probably need rbout 200 trucks, and that he saw very little hope of being able to rDise those from Fifth Army sources. GenerPl Alem:inder asked General Hrirding to examine this matter 'lith a view to determining vrhat trucks could be made available for the Fifth Army from British resources • . "General Alexander stated that tre qw:!stion of ooundary between the Fifth vnr'l Eighth Armies should be discussed mutue lly bet'\':een the two Army Commrnders. In case of cHsagreement he would make the decision. 11 Tea vras then served and the meeting rdjou:rned at 1635. "It was my impression that the meeting was A most successful one. Gfmeral Clark h"ndled his case very E>droitly and rresented his argur'1ents in an extremely logical mmner. ,..,hey ··ere "irrefutable. On the other hand, it was quite clear to ne thnt Genernl Leese was T:"'ost cooperative i.n his approach to t1 8 rroblem. He ree.Hzed early that his PrP,Ument was largely sentinenta.l. Fe readily receded from his roc:ition and rledp;ed Generrl Clnrk 100'~ support. As e were ~bout to leave, GenAral ClrrJ.r \''armly thE>nl{ed Gen'3rRl ,eese for hi.s unselfish arpror-c}, to the •roblern. 7 "From this conference there developed a rlFin whicb is fnr more e-"fective t}wn tJ-,e one which hP..d yreviously been decidl'ld upon. The ir; clisadvanta~e in the new plan is the delay. It is too early to ewlmte the advantage 1·1h:i..ch the German will be able to take of that relay." The following ceble was received today from .A.AI Headqurirters~ 1. Confirmjng decisions ~iven v"lrbally b;,r the CrlC tod"'~~ 13 Corps will come 1mder cori.m~,nd Fifth Arny for rlanning 'urroses VlEF 11 AuF:Ust r>nd will rass to comn:and Fifth A:rrny for orerritionfll [n1d FB-i.ntenr,nce :rurposcs between 15 :-ind 1~ Auo;ust rt -i tine to he r1 ecided by rrutur'l f'rrangnment betv1een the ~ Armies. Instructions r~gard:in~ the administrr>tion of 11 Gorps 11 I I I I I �1 when lt passes to orerotionri 1 corrm1"nd of I<'ifth Arny wi:J-1 be issued by CAO later. 11 2. The Inter Army Bound:,ry suggested by this Hq to come into effect ,hen 13 Corps pqsses to operational command Pif th Army is the R 05 Easting Grid 'forth of the r;o North;n~ Grid. Ar1'1ies will s:ign~l tl1eir agreement or comment. 'J'he J ater Army Boundary in ReRr of the BRttle Fr01,t will be settlec1 by direct a; scussion bAtween Arm:i es onc'l rerorted to tr is Headqur.rters." * * * CECINA.--AUGUST 11, 1g44--Genernl Clark returned to his commrnd rost this morning et 1000 hours. He o~fici? lly r.,-eeted Colonel Grognn as his new Fubli c Relations Officer nnd spoke to several of his ste ff officers j n his van. At 1210 Genernl Pascarenras de Poraes, Generr>l Zenobio da Costa, Colonel Limn Brayner and Lt. Col. Freitas of the Brazilian Exped:itfonrr:r ::.-'orce :,rrived rnd were received hr Gen~ral Clnrk with a , 1ard of 1'onor, ofter which they rroceeded to the hut where Gener. 1 Clark oriented them on th~ situt'tion and pres,=mted Vl'lrious mmnbers of his staff and chiefs of section. Following this orientation, Gener:1.l CJ.ark- e-ritortr>.ined the :3:razilian offic( rs l'!t llL'1Ch together with G0nerol C'rruenther, Genert>l Br?nn, Colonel 3nltzr-m.n nnrl Colonel ~TcVa.hon. Captain Wn lters acted ns interpreter. After lunch the Brazilians visitnd the G-2, G-~ and G-4 Sections, af'ter w1 ich thAy took their lea.ve of Gen,cirr-1 Clnr1r anr1 returned to their crunr at Tr.rquinfo. :iJi1r..,ng t .e conversation Ge"eral Clarlr sfoted t}· at he woulr1 do ev.<rr;rtli-1 nr, possible to speA<l the Rrt'.zili::>ns I entry into trie line. "'he~~ replied t:rrt thA~y were ri0st rnxious to get · nto combat as soon t" s rossiLle. GenPro 1 Cl:lr r strited thc,t if th~ war looked as th0ui:;J it rere .., 1xrnt t0 "'nc'l, he :vould sAnci ht' ck sorne trucl{s r-.nd brlnp; up tlie Drazilfrns so tlif't they could r.i;et ~nto t e fiP,"ht before it w?s \ over. ,,,he nr[l zilit1ns inforl'lm, Ge11<:rr 1 Clf'r-1<" trat they exrectec Generr 1 Dutrr, the 11raz11 bn Var r.1in~ ster, tn visit tl· em i.n the ner-.r future. They st:- ted 1_ they •rere very satisfied wi tr tre Wf';r tr e:r vere receiving tJ-,eir equirment and hoped to 8Ve n 7_1 of' it b•r the e:':1d of t1 e coming week. They e.::pressed sr:>tisf8 ct ion at the va-:,r they },~a been treated f.lnc1 spoke wrrrtl.y of t, e genert1.l admiration i.n Brazil of Genernl Cl;,rk. 0 Gemirals Keyes r-.1,rJ Crittenberger arrived r>nd conferred witl1 G'"lrer~l Cbr1, "'or an hour. The Generf'l srent the rest of the afternoon in his van and d-tned with General Gruenther. General Clark to<l."'~Y received the f'o llovring letter from GeYJ.eral Kirhnnn, General rfficer Commanding British 13 Corps: "I saw General Alexcndr➔r today :>nd he and Generrl Loese told re of tl-ie new rl.nns end t1-H1t '.:r Corps •·,as shortly to cone under your coTnT"n.nd. I look fori•m.rd wlth confidence to t! 1 :t.s arrangement o..nd telcorne the oprortunity of fh;ht:ing in close cooperation v:ith your gallant troors. "'J'houi:;h stiD f\t the r:1omer1 t tec},nically under Ej vhth Army, I f'.m of , course entirely .?t your disrosal from now onwarns f'or plflnnh1e; rurposes. �5D Though I am tellinP: the senior members of my stPff and r.w Divisional Conmander s of the new arrangements , I am issuing orders thr>t for the rresent no one else is to l·no'1; I think you will agree th~t it '"ould compromise securit y j_f it was to get about that we were cominis under your commend, as it "rould be an indication to the enemy th1,t the main effort of Eightr .Arr~y was t o be made elsewhere." * * * CECINA.--AUGUST 1 2 , 19/44- -At 0900 General Clark conferred with Generals Gruenther and Brann, studyipr~ or0rn.tional rriaps in front of Gen0ral Clark ' s van, for approxirratel y an hour ., At ten o 1 clock Genern.l Sulliv:m, with GenerPl Ramsay, 11.FHQ and r,rt1.TOUSA 111JwrterrnAster, called on Grmerel Clnrk. Lt. Col. Newton calJ.Pd to say s:i;oodbye to General Cl;c:,rk and vra.s rresented with the Le gion of Merit . General ClBrk also conferred vd.th severe.l ether of l,is staff of'ficers , including Colonel McClain, new Fifth Army Judge Ac~vocate, and Colonel Ryan, Fj fth Army Chaplain.. At 1215 Genernl F:i.rkman, C'·OC 13 Britjsh Corps , i:-,rrived f!ccompr-mied by Brigadiers L"'mbert, Roe , ·7111.tle;r and 1.nJJdey, his G- Ors , QM, Engineer rrnd Sii:p1Pl Officers rospect:i vely. General CL.,rl<: gr-eetea GenerP 1 Yirkman nnd Brigndier ' Lt>mbert end took the~ to his van with General Gruenther whPre they conferred studying operational mars for half an hou-r . After this co,nfer,,nce , Generel Clark escorted General n.rkmr 11 a.nd his . staff to a gua.r,1 of honor for the Brj_ tfah visitors . After tbe f,'Uard of honor General Clark entertained at lunch these British offie er s , several rnembers of ris staff and Gener~ 1 Lemnit zer , who had just arrived at the command rost . General Kirkm..'1.n and st2Sf left at 1445, after which Genernl Clerk rnd Colonel Saltzman left for Gerieral C1Prk 1 s villa at CAstiglioncello . General Clarlc had Genernls Hume, Gruenther, Sullivan Pnd Colonel Saltzne.n for a swim and riupper . General Clark srent the night at the vj_lla . Genere.1 Clark today received the following letter from General Leese : 11 You asked me to ,..,,rite you a short note on the state of tl:e divisions that come to you in 13 CorrJs . n HO 13 CORPS Is an extrernely ef'ficient Corps in every wB.y. General Kirkman is an excellent Corps CoI'lmander; M.s h.,., c kground mil ite.ry 1<novrledge is of a hi':';h order . Fe plans well e.nd his tactic....., 1 ht:',ncling of formations in the field is excellent . mhe dj_visions✓ work ,extremely harmoniously in the Corps . I rove been extremely satisf'ied with 13 Corps as a 1diole throughout the operc.tions . They have borne the brunt of the f'ightjng . 11 6 S. AFHJGA r,J J\Rf~011RED DJV Joined the Bip;hth Army Pt the beginnin? of J1me , a newly f'orried division . It hns fought mflgnificently throup;hout the entire ndvr>nce from ROlE to FLORB?JCE . It has had some 2 , 500 casuelties, including the crisualties (some 700) in the � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, July 1-August 11, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from July 1-August 11, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1637 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/46cce14661b5c808d1801026bc241306.pdf?Expires=1787184000&Signature=ML0lHBfLJQhdHflZ5zdYARY%7ErEI9nGZtXMyFZbZfHzYE69nQefauOm9tDECrRdRUxtSczY3fBfGgz1nRH%7EgDPCH7PLm2CVCDk4WGHDGZ-JikxtPUTMBDVPso3M%7EndoiHnZkhY9J-F0zlRCwnWJf81EyXCEvUPS7rUkbwHU3OGO10MyBSrTiUE1F3rwS%7ED5elUlhrSePE6mJ4a20THEioALi7rwQfbuSSRlVAuHr0rKbrU6pGdlMV-MqNByOT2y4PF-7bS7TquJnihvZ1TZu-ODjk6ZBIeT%7EnArbWm42xSkxnhw0sAaE4ENl1WPbuZxbzmcCROD5VcAtrfETDJwlJlg__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM eeb1374395c5df6fdcd4aa0cdf36f6ca PDF Text Text 5D Though I am tellinP: the senior members of my stPff and r.w Divisional Conmander s of the new arrangements , I am issuing orders thr>t for the rresent no one else is to l·no'1; I think you will agree th~t it '"ould compromise securit y j_f it was to get about that we were cominis under your commend, as it "rould be an indication to the enemy th1,t the main effort of Eightr .Arr~y was t o be made elsewhere." * * * CECINA.--AUGUST 1 2 , 19/44- -At 0900 General Clark conferred with Generals Gruenther and Brann, studyipr~ or0rn.tional rriaps in front of Gen0ral Clark ' s van, for approxirratel y an hour ., At ten o 1 clock Genern.l Sulliv:m, with GenerPl Ramsay, 11.FHQ and r,rt1.TOUSA 111JwrterrnAster, called on Grmerel Clnrk. Lt. Col. Newton calJ.Pd to say s:i;oodbye to General Cl;c:,rk and vra.s rresented with the Le gion of Merit . General ClBrk also conferred vd.th severe.l ether of l,is staff of'ficers , including Colonel McClain, new Fifth Army Judge Ac~vocate, and Colonel Ryan, Fj fth Army Chaplain.. At 1215 Genernl F:i.rkman, C'·OC 13 Britjsh Corps , i:-,rrived f!ccompr-mied by Brigadiers L"'mbert, Roe , ·7111.tle;r and 1.nJJdey, his G- Ors , QM, Engineer rrnd Sii:p1Pl Officers rospect:i vely. General CL.,rl<: gr-eetea GenerP 1 Yirkman nnd Brigndier ' Lt>mbert end took the~ to his van with General Gruenther whPre they conferred studying operational mars for half an hou-r . After this co,nfer,,nce , Generel Clark escorted General n.rkmr 11 a.nd his . staff to a gua.r,1 of honor for the Brj_ tfah visitors . After tbe f,'Uard of honor General Clark entertained at lunch these British offie er s , several rnembers of ris staff and Gener~ 1 Lemnit zer , who had just arrived at the command rost . General Kirkm..'1.n and st2Sf left at 1445, after which Genernl Clerk rnd Colonel Saltzman left for Gerieral C1Prk 1 s villa at CAstiglioncello . General Clarlc had Genernls Hume, Gruenther, Sullivan Pnd Colonel Saltzne.n for a swim and riupper . General Clark srent the night at the vj_lla . Genere.1 Clark today received the following letter from General Leese : 11 You asked me to ,..,,rite you a short note on the state of tl:e divisions that come to you in 13 CorrJs . n HO 13 CORPS Is an extrernely ef'ficient Corps in every wB.y. General Kirkman is an excellent Corps CoI'lmander; M.s h.,., c kground mil ite.ry 1<novrledge is of a hi':';h order . Fe plans well e.nd his tactic....., 1 ht:',ncling of formations in the field is excellent . mhe dj_visions✓ work ,extremely harmoniously in the Corps . I rove been extremely satisf'ied with 13 Corps as a 1diole throughout the operc.tions . They have borne the brunt of the f'ightjng . 11 6 S. AFHJGA r,J J\Rf~011RED DJV Joined the Bip;hth Army Pt the beginnin? of J1me , a newly f'orried division . It hns fought mflgnificently throup;hout the entire ndvr>nce from ROlE to FLORB?JCE . It has had some 2 , 500 casuelties, including the crisualties (some 700) in the �5} 24th Gun.rds Brigade. It }111s lost 105 tr-mks destroyed beyond repair, by enemy_ e.ction. It \"ill be made up to strenf;tJi in men and vehicles; but it must have a rest of 3/4 weeks if 1t is to give of its best ?gFin jn the near future~ If it has the requisite rest it will continue to ½e a mep.;n:ificent fighting machine. '!'hey rre very well commended by Haj. Genert'11 Foole. tt6 BRI'I'TSH AR!T()UPJ~D DIV Has been continuously in action since the beginning of Mey. They have had some 2,000 casualties, ancl have fought extremely ,vell. They should he.ve a short rest if they are to give of thoir best. There is no Commander there at the moment. Brj gadier Andrew Scott is in temrorary corrrrnand. He is on experienced officer, but this is the f:irst time he has hPndled the divfa:ion. A new oorimrmder will be arri vjng shortly. ::;7::. :D:PIIO battle and continued in action to the beginning of \ July, vrhen the:,r were taken out for three weeks I rest. They have had the best rart of J,ooo c1c1sUc'llties. They 1.'rA ::i first-class division and if they a.re not ove:r-t:ired in the next few weeks, will heve extremely good of'.fensive power. Like all Indian troops, they are slovr and deli berr.te, but get there in the end. They are very v1ell commanded by Maj. Generfl l Russell. 11 1 l 1 BR.TI' INF' DIV You will remember this division in the bridgehead. Generol Penney has i:sone home and lms been replnced by Maj. Generr.l Loewen, whom I think you also knew in the bridgehead. 'T'he di vision has had two months' rest out of the line. It hns re-organised and tro.ined 11.nd is in excellent shape* I have had to t;,ke away the 18th Bde Bnd give :tt bPck to tre 1st Armoured Div., where it belongs. It bc"ls been replaced by a new brigPde, tvm of whose battP.lions hr~ve not been in action. This hrigr:de will therefore require battle inoculetion. Until this brigade ms done this, the division must be com'ddered a.s a two-brigade division. 11 \ 1 CA"'JADIAN .I\..RWv TI\.NK BDE Has been :f'i~htinr, on and off since the beginning of r1Py. It therefore should have n sbort rest. It is r first-class brigade, ver;r highly trained; e.clmowledged by all to be the most exnerienced in the Army." * * I * CT~CINA--AUGUST 1.3, 191.4--Genernl Cl11rk left the villa a. 0845, returning to t his comrmnd post. At 1000 hours General Clark, vri th members of his st11ff, attended '.Protestant church services held in the command post area. Genere,l Clark read the scripture. After tl->e service the General returned to M.s villa a.t Castiglioncello ;vith Colonel Saltzman rind speht a. quiet efternoon with members of' his staff. fl.fter supper Generr-1 ClB.rk returned to the co:rummd rost • �CRCINA. --AUGUST 14, 1944--At 0900 GenerPl ClRrk met at t:r,e Fifth Army nirffold Under Secretary of Far Patterson, General Somervell , General Lrrkin and Colonel Connor and four other members of the rarty. General Clark had a guard of honor for the visitors , after which he briefHd the narty on tre current situa tion and future rlans .. At 1000 hours Gene:r1'11 CJ.ark, Sol'lervell, Lar'kJ_ and n Colonel Connor accompanied t:r,e Under Secretary in L- 5' s leaving for the II Corps air strip. 'l'hey were J\'let by General Livesa;r ancl drove to the 361st RCT i"rhere one battalion "taS formed $ After visiting the regimentsl command post the party drove to the qlst Division comr1J.ond post where they 1unched . Generals Keyes and Crittenberger were also rresent. /\.:fter lunch the r,art;v drove to the II Corrs cub str5:p where they left by L- 5 for the Leghorn F'rea . The visitors were met by C',enerals Tate nnd Fume , Colonel Oxx of PBS and Cnptain Hr>ckenzie , 1J0IC Leghorn . General Clark and rarty then rroceeded through the tovm of Leghorn to Favy Fouse where they were briefed by Ca.ptain •Tackenzie on the naval side e.nd Genera,l Tate and Colonel Oxx on the Army side of the development and problems entailed in the operation of the port of Leghorn. Follovring the briefing , General CJprl- and ra,rty inspected tbe port for forty minutes and then proc(~eded to a 240 Jfo,-,,itzer battery of the 697th FA Battalion where they were met by General Rutledge, Commanding Genern.1 of the /;.5th AAA Brigade . Lt . Col. Christian, Cor,manding Officer of the 697th, pointfld out to General Clark and rarty a_ bridge target north of Jisa which they would take under fire ., The ~n fired six rounds for the Under Secretary, after which the ~-rty proceeded on to the 45th AAA Brigade where General Rut ledge briefed General Clark and guests on the current situation. GenerP,1 Clark nnd party left the /;.5th A.ti.A for Leghorn cub strip where they took off in L- 5 ' s for General Clark's Hee.dqur:irters. Generp,J. Clerk anrl Colonel Saltzman went for a swim on the beach nt the command post . After dininl'!, quietly with the regular members of his rness , the General retired for the evening. Today General Cle.rk sent the following ca_ ble to Gener~ 1 Leese: "Date 0001 hours 18 August suggested in your Sll for passA.ge of comr1r->nd of 13 Corps to Fifth Army is agreeable to me . I shall be i1'eljghted to have you address 13 Corps officers on 21 August and also on ony futuro date you may desire . Please consider that you e.nd your staff will be '"elcome to visit the corps at any time . ti General Cl.8 rk ca.bled General Alexander tod11y as follows: "The boundary outlined in your 0-4111-2 will j_mpose a rlefensive burden on 13 Corps which ma;,r seriously hamper the Fifth Army in its offensive mission. I urgently recom111end that the 1xmndnry be placed along the 5 EP sting grid as prevj ously sui:;gested by you so that riaximum forces of Fiftl,, Army can be employed in attack. If additional troops ere ne_de PVAilable as stPted in your message I suggest that they be placed under 10 Corps to assist in its defensive role. Although 10 Corps will be stretched its stntus in that respect will be no worse than IV U. S . Corps . n �53 CECINA--AUGUS'f 15, 1944--F'!r'. & F,'!r's. I'fyron Taylor and Hr. Be Mrs. Harold Tittmann and two sons arrived at General Clark's Headquarters by C-47 at ten o'clock. Generr,.l Clr>.rk greeted the party in his conference hut and generally briefed them on the current situl'ltion e1t the front for appro::d.m-<i.tely hali' an hour, after which the Taylors and Tittmrnns left by cer for Leghorn where General Clark had arranged a visit for them to the port nnd also for them to see a 240 artillery battery fire. 'I'he Generl'll spent the <lay working on administrative matters and conferring with various staff officers. 'l'he Taylors Rnd TittTTlBnns returned to General Clark's Hendqunrters l'lt 16.30 and were met by Generals ClP.rk and Gruenther. They chatted for about an hour. The party left by C-47 for Rome at 17.30a Genernl Beucler came for dinr,er with Generf."ls Clerk, Gruenther, Brann and Colonel Se,ltzman, after which the Genernl. retired to his van. I General Alexander today replied to General ClA.r}·•s cable of yesterday a.s follows: 11 Your 5365 of 1/, August, I hr->ve been lnto the bound1:1ry question very carefully and am afra.id it must stand as laid dovm in my 0.41./42 of 13 August. 10 Corps have got to release 4 Indian Division for Eighth Army's offensive and I am satisfied that they cannot take over More grotmd in consequence., 13 Corrs offensive effort will come later and in my opinion they hnve enough troops to carry out th=dr defensive tasks up to tl1e boundary given in my 0.411}2 and get their fOrmations rested before their offensive can begin.. 10 Corps already have a large number of unbrige_ded units to handle, en.d I am therefore lontr1 to add to their burden in that respect. Moreover even if an additional U..'1it can be found it cannot reac}1 the forward area before the new boundary must become orierative.. These are the reasons why if rm additional unit can be produced I propose to allot it to 13 Corps. I sympe.thise with your dir'ficulties rmd nm sorry I cr»1not accede to your request. However I am telling ~ighth Arrny thd if when their chain of reliefs has been completed they find trm_t 10 Corps ca.n possibly take more ground to their left they must do so in order to release the maximmn number of troops of 13 Cor!:->S for your offensive. I .will keep thnt question under close review. 11 1 General Leese cabled c.s follows today with regard to the cable Genernl Clark sent him yesterday on the subject of 13 Corps: 11 I greatly appreciate your a.greement on these two points. 11 * * * CECIUA--AUGUST 16, 1944--At ms/~5 General Cli:-,_rk bade fe.rewell to Lt. Col. Luther of the G-1 Section rmd p:·esented him w:ith H Legion of ;'erit . At 0900 Generrils Cl.ark and Gruenther left by cub for 13 British Corps command post in the vicinity of San Casciano, apy.;roxirrately ten miles south of Florence. \ The General <lrove to the command post where he was met by GenerB l Kirkman and a small gun.rd of honor. Generals Cla,.rl, and Gruenther conferred with GP.ne-} ral Kirkman for approximately an hour. Gene:r:11 Clark W!"' s anxious to drive ; into Florence, but was ,_, - , , ag, 1 11 ,:,v -it 'y Gm1era1 .i:'\:Lr. rnan 1 "'("Vised • , ,,.+ -~ rr • k · ·, ,)eceuse or r10 t s 0 �between the ratriots rnc1 the 1''ascists the rrevious evening. Generals Clnr'k- and Gruenther flew from 13 Ccrps. cub strip tov;erds Montelupo on the Arno River nnd then east ulon~ the river to Florence. General Cla.rk ci:c-cled the to,7n where he could observe the terra:in around Florence and the situation with regard to l1!'idges in that riren. He then flew to II Corps Headquarters :in the vicinity of Castel Fiorentino v:hcre he and Generr>l Gruent!1er conferred and barl lunch with Gonerr>l Keyes 8..nd r:en.bers of the II Corps staff. After lunch General Clark r0.turned by cub to his cori''"'and rost. General Clar./" enterta:ined a fe '1 "tem'·,ers of M.s st;:iff for dinner, rfter which a novie vms shomi. in the conference hut. General Clark today received the followin£1' letter from Generr-1 Crittenb,=,rger with regard to the ciwtilability of tl·e 1st Armored Division to IV Corrs: 11 1. A atudy of the situr--tion on our front and Ue d1srosition of the troops rresently f'Vailahl9 to r.e for the execution 0f' th~ rrorosed IV Corrs defersive r,ission ;_ncF cates th[it these troops e.re adequr.te. As you lmow they are noTI srread tbinly along the AR~IO River Hne with a frontage of app.·oximntely 7,000 - ~,ooo y,1.rds per battalion. Sh0uld future rlans require any increase in IV Corps frontnge, it sill be YJ.ecessar~ to provide ~clditioPal troors for the IV Corrs in order that a light river screen w,y be er;trhlished., and tJ,at essential :,o1Yile reserves, y-refPrrJ1ly e.r"1or, riry be beld availr-ble. "To attemrt to cover the sixty nile front f'rorl FLORF:l\fCR to tl 1ci ser- -dth trie troors rresently n.vailable to tr1e r Corps wo11ld, in ny op ·n:ton, be drmgerous, ar"J!l rdr;rt possibly· b8 tre cause of SP,rious enbE>rrassmrmt to our :<1rms should ony hostile counter-thrust be na.de :in trij s sector. "3. Assum:i.nr trrt arditional "'nfantry r' J1t be 1,r<'e PVGilnble to us to take over any incre~sed front, th~ need for stron~ nobile reserves becomes more impArative as the front lengthens. To rrovide these strort-; nobile reserves, it is requested tm-.t the 1st Armored Divisi.on be cont1nu.,3d rvrilrble to the IV Corps in the execution of its defensive mission, and not considered for other enployment olsewhere. 11 * * CECHfA--AUGUST 17, 19/j,4--IT"lhe Generrcl srent the with merb0rs of Hs stAff'. Tl'e Army co~1n1.:..,n0er i7ith Colonel •rygc.3rd. The Generri.l hno Generc.1 Division; Colom~l Braun, Chief of Str-iff of the ·1yp.8ard for 8 swim a11d suprer at the villa. * morninr, jn his vt1n conferring left for l':is villfl at 15C'O Bnlte, Cor'J'l..'lndfog the 3/+th 3/~th; rind Colorels l'orter r,rd Generrl Clrrk received t:re followini:; lettP.r from G,merrl Rooks, ::1e uty Chief of Stn ff, i 11 i ed Force Hendqur-rters: 11 GP.n.errl l ·evers, ,iust bPfore 1.e~ving for Corstcr 7est0rdry, c irPcted ~e 1 to ··.Ti.te to you in the ~nterest of eett·inr; the lBading el,:irnents of the g''nd Divisior c.nd the Rraziliavi Division into action as early P s rossiblB. While f I \ �s5 ,I did rot see tr,e rne::;sagP. , jt ,rpears th,t Gener::il Dev.,rs is under rressure from Gener~l i':,rshl' 11 in this rlr'tter. I gather thrt he has exrressec1 to Gc>ner~l Dew~rs the roliticnl ur~ency of' rett-5.r~ tr0se troors into the line anc-1 blooded ri_uickly. Generril Devers , rnc1 J y,remme Flso ''.reneral ;1"rsh1:1ll, are aware of t he unsnt::Lsfactory state of train:ne; of' t1'1e Brt>.zilfan -infr>ntry. rev~rtheless , I believe Gen0:ral P"rshc 1 1 r;11s su~gested thr>t some of tbe required training could be accomplished by givfr1g trern rractical e:xrerience in a quiet sector where they f!re not likely to coP1e to r,rief . "In resrect of the 92nd Divi:::ion , it 1 s len.ding RCT is now in the Narles area , receiving ;ts equipment . It was to r1ove to Civitn.veccl 1a several d,ys n"'o , rmt this arrears to hn.ve been delayed for some reason with which I a.m not -1",-,miliar . I have instructed Drn ·•oce to rush the r,atter and get it up to you as quickly ris possible . 0 11 : shoulc'l be ri:lad to },ear fror1 you , after ;vou hrive had an orrortunity to insrect trPm, of ;vour estim<ite of vlhen you cnn put th"'m in the line to get their initial ha.pti sm of ffre . :fow if I may pass to another subject , I must npologize for our Stnff nction i.n the rin.tter of R Signal 138.ttalion to be ·,j_thrrf'wn frof'.1 your Army. That cable Wfl s r1 i spatched by a .Junior Staff Officer oi' G- 3 ( org) without the 1mow1odr,e of GAnertJ.1 Foster, Gerieral Foce, or myself . 1 Te recently lost the r,ead of th.t sub- section , ColonPl Vittrup, to AFHQ Advr.nce Detachment , '1"1r1 ch rm.y exr lain the very stupid error i-1 a Matter of hj ~hest policy 7:i. thout reference to G- 1 or :.he Chief of Staff . At t},e :-1oment, :priority of available resources has been n:iwm to t'f,e Seventh Prmy ,~or its orerations , as you know, but no such priority hr>s been estrbl:..shed in respect of the Sixth Arrny Group . Thrit is a rn.?tte.c trnt will hrive to be cecided by Generrl m lson and I very much doubt th11t ns betTieen tre orerrtions of' tre Fifth Army nnc'l. the formntion of an Army Group , tht't he ,.,; 11 give 1 r-tority to t'be latter . G has been instructed to CE>ncel the telegram. -3 11 "Drn 11• oce hrs just Cf' lled me to sr;-r th1t the RCT of the 9?nd Division has 1 eft the •rapl<>s aren and is due to close in the Civit.-vecchifl aron between the 1/.,th and 16th of August . "It vms a r,reat pleasure to see you lrist ;rondriy rml to le~rn of your plans for renew~ ng the offensive . i 1y boss went up to see Harding :resterdr.y and returned wjth the inf'orm1=1tion that the XIII Corrs TT8s to be placed under your Comnand . I was sure thrt was the rrorer setup. 11 :at h vll best wishes , 11 Genernl Cln.rJ~ replied to General Rooks as follows: "Your letter of Aur;ust 12th has been received . I ns'1ure you I rm completely in accord w~ th General i'nrshnll 1 s desire to get the Brazilicns and elements of the 92nd Division in combat at tl e earliest practicable r1oment . I have already taken steps to see that this is done . 0 "The Brnzilie.ns should have their equipnent in a day or two . I Y'ill �then move them up this wa.y, give them P couple of weeks' training - they need n:ore than that - and gradually slide them into the defensive sector. "The 370th RCT does not have its equipment. We hope jt will get it by the 25th, when it will be moved into the front line immedfa.tely. "Am gled the removal from Fifth Army of enother s-i gnal battalion has been straiehtened out. I hPted to send the messe.ge I did, but under no conditions can the Fifth Army participate in its forthcoming scheduled attack if this battalion is removed. This same statement Ppplies to the remov8l of any of our coJ11bPt troops. "It was nice to see you. tt General ClPrk today sent the following letter to General Marshall: I delivered to GenerPl Juin the Distinguished Service Medal citation which you siened. Re was 0eeply touched by tris evidence of your esteem. Fe told me that he would,never ce~se to be grateful to you. The enclosed letter from him eloquently portrays his feeling townrd you. I am enclosing a copy cf his letter to me uron the depPrtu.re of the French 1<..:;xpeditionary Corps from Fifth Army conmmnd. General DeGaulle told you of his intent:i on to appoint Ge:ner21 ,Juin as his Chief of Staff. Gcmeral Juin was given th8t assir;nment about two weeks ago, but I tmderstand that he is uhhappy there. .Juin had stated as a conrl:ition to his acceptance of the poe:ition thet he must be free from politj C8 l interference by the SecretFlry of War. Apparently he is not experi.encing this freedom, and he told one of our French "riends the other day th11t he feared he might soon.return to an inactive status. I certai...vily hope tbat he will be able to resolve his difficulties satisfactorily. T condder that his ret5rement from active service at this time would be a great loss to our cause and would represent a serious injustice to an outstanding military leader. 11 11 Until about a week ago, General Ale:xr:rider rmd plannAd that the main attack of the Allied Armies in Italy '':ould be made on 18 Au~st by the Etehth Army on the BCLOGNA - FLffi''.FCE axis, with a secondary ettack by Fifth Army toward PISTOIA. However, the hea~J enemy force in the a.ree. north . of FLmEHCE and the strong enemv positions in that a.rea caused General Alexander to revamp his plan. The new 1,hm is shown schematj crilly on the enclosed map. The Eighth Army w:i 11 -ittacl· on the ADRIATIC Coast on 25 August to strike behind tbe APP'i?.fINE position. Fifth Army will attack at a later date in the d:i_rection FLOR:-:HCE - BOLOGNA when the enemy strengtb in the FLCRr;:NCE aren has been '"eakened suff:i.ciently, either bec:omse of the Eighth Army attac1: or from othnr causes, so as to rerrnit Fifth Army, ,'Tith Hs reduced strength, to d:rive over the mountains to BOLOGNA. 13 Corps (British), under Tieutenant General KirJ~man, has been ~~siip:1ed to the Fifth Army. It consists of the 8th Indian and the 1st British Inf1mtry Divisions, and the 6th South African Armored nnd the 6th Britj sh Armored Divisfons. 'T'he IV Corps w:ill hold defensively the line of the ARNO River from the sea to a point five miles west of FLCREHCE, while the II Corps, consisting of four United Stetes infantry djvisions, and the 13 Corrs "till mass on tJ narrow front just east of FLOR!-;;FCE to attrick over the r101mt~dns toward ll'LOGNA. �51 I shall be :prepPred to attccJr, ~',rhen condjt-j ons arP- rire, on tbree drys' notice aftnr the ,..;i_p-htr /i.rmy jumps off. I ·tl 1_1 use Pritchrrd I s 1st Arr:ored Divisi.on :md the 6th South Africcn Armored D: vision, one combat team of the q?nd Division anci. vRrious odes Pnrl rmds to hold ny 6O-mile defensive fll'l..nk . Altrour;l both Prriorcd cljvisions rust be ernployed defensively in the jnjtial phase, they w~ll not be dispersed unnecessarily, but ,., ill be E'VniL..,ble for rronrt employr'lent in the FO Valley. "The GP.rn:-ins dicl rm extrenely tricrough joh in m-ecking the rort of IBGHORN - T'JU.Ch more effective than in r>ny of our p-ev~ ous rorts. JI'. everthe less the reconstruction wor'k- has rrogressec rrridly enr yesterday th8 first liberty sJ,ip entered the port. i"le have hc(1 no hostile t1 rti llery f1.re in the city during the r,nst ten days althougr it is vrell v.ritriin Gern-m medium ri:::nee nrtillery. The reason for this inrictivity 5s rroh-bly ca.used by our extremely 1 effective c01mterbattery rrogram. Durinf, th8 'tist thirty c ays our heavy artillery (811 Howitzers, 2/+0mJ!l Powi.tzers) has knoc. ed out forty guns in the area north an<l north8PSt of' PLSA. 1Je lose t>J.l of our 8-inch 1u1c' 2LOmm ho·•itzers enrly in Sertember so it i.s :-robnhle trrt tl'e Gernpn r ay res11m,~ the shelling of the rort at that time. 0 "Since the Fifth Army ca:rtured V :GErR J all n. S. divi<;ions hinre X3An rested. "le rre using four r-utonrttic "let'lpon Pr,tjp ircrE> ft bntteries in an infantry role; for the rast two ,,eeks they l1 ave held a ten-mile front nlong tre ARNO River in t:be FISA area. 1fe borromed ~o.,,.tarfl, rnrchine 01.Jns, BAR 1 "' and the nece::;snry rPrlio SE'ts .,..rom the d-ivisj ons \·l~ich have been re~t~ r,g to enable the ,\A batteries to carry out treir 5nfantry missions. An antiaircraft 1-,rigade headquarters, unr' er tl' e conmrind of nrig~.d ~ er G0.,.,,er:-, 1 Rutledge, i.s in comril"nd of tl1j s sector. I likewi 9e co.1verted, d th Gonerr 1 Alex:...'l.nder 1 s rermission, a British AA regfr1ent ~nto j_nfantry, ~1d they "re holdin1 E defensive .,.ront in thie s:.:.re sector. I nm usirg t?n1~ rlestroyers, tank battalions, 1.7 1ritisJ, a"l.d 90mm antiaircraft g-i_m9 to ~urni~h the artillery surirort in tMs area. Altr-0110-}, it is rin i.mT'rov~ sec1 '"'etur it is '-7orkini::; ·;ell, aN1 nll of t},P, rermnnel r-re 8ntl1m,;r-stic over t, ei.r new role. It is prob.'1.ble thrit r-~ter thA ~ntiaircraft ba.ttclions in thei.r infpntry roles li.rve1 hnii closer contPct ,·,-'t11 tlie enemy, I s•1cll recor'!"P.nr' to the ':nr Derartr-ent thl"t cert..,in rer~onnel of tl 1 ese octtnlions s ."l"' receive t:bo Contx'lt I11fantry Badge. Incidentally, our c"011,:i;:bbo:rs are v9ry rrourl of tl1 rit 0adr;e. I con3ide:r tl at ·!jhe award of tre b~dge "nd the e}:trri .,,ay for tr ose ,rho hn.ve errneri it hrs given the infa"l.try a gi"eat lift in morn.le. 'i'he!'e is some sligH; wir:ing f'ror, some of the other hrarches vho feel t:bat they J:,Pvc been di;::,crir1inated r,gainst, but on bn.lrnce T definitely co11s-:c1 er th1.t the mea ur9 ici a ,.,.i ... e one. T 1:im, ho rrever, hrving a study rode now to det9l'rn5ne ·1hat recor"'lcPdntion sJ,oulrl be suhrl.1tted to tre ~.'ar De:r[lrtmP-nt t0 cover the P-11.~ib:ility of infa11trymen who are transferrerl to other brrnches to contin,1e to receive extra }1!:Y. As trri r8gulrtion now reads tre r.,Y continues if a man is transferred to the Collst Artillery and serves at Fort Dliss, Tex.rts, ,;hereas, i.f he is trar,sferred to tl e Divis:i.on Signnl Comy,pny in a front ljne rHvisi_on or to a 4 . 2u Chc!'licril ' 1ortar Batt:ilion in nction the extra pay ceases. 1 0 1 11 Due to a srortage in s.rt:Dlery and engineers caused by w1 thdrc.wals from tl-i.is Ari:iy for the Sout'1r>rn 171'[;.nce or""r~tion, I ½ave borrownrl scme sixty �58 ri·~cellrmeou'1 artillery yjeces from tre 1r~tish, rJ1c rlso t"o battf\lions of Royal Enp-lnABrs. It -is an i.nteresting task vmlr:Un~ tog')ther tl e miscell8;1eous assortm8nt of u'1j_ts 10, in tre Fifth ArM.y. vie are raking excel lent nrov,ress, and I mn cc,nfident t1-u>t ··e ·rill 17ive r' ~oo<l nccount of ourselve'.:l ,rhen we finally rttn.ck. 1 "Judge Patt,e1--r:;on and Gen~ral Somervell 1n~re here yesterday. m ~y were shovm sr-me C'f our activ~ties in tr e f'ront linr:? ru'fHJ s, ~nd botl1 seeJ11ecl greatly rlease1. Genernl Somervell to lr-1 ire of your views rs to the P,r'rly employl'1ent of the '9razilian Comb~t TP8m, nrr the cnmbat ·ean o~ t~n 02nd Division. I can r>SS11I'e you tli.at this r1i:d:,tPr is r9e~.dvinr"; my close per'30nal attention. I "'Pa1 l do everytl1inr; poss-lble to get both of t.}•ese 1 mits into action at ti,e cvrliest rossi le J'loment. The e1uipro•1t t'or th~ 170th RCT of the g:1nd n~vbion vrlll ar~i V9 here A.bout !rn£;Ust 25th. T rl"n to use tJ,,i.s unit in t'1e IV Corps defensive s9ctor r 1itM.n r ue131'· r('tm· its e1uipr1cnt arrives. Lf'tr>r j t 1--ins r"n l'l. suitahlA oprortunity to ol:>tPin ',attle i.nnoculr,tfori in t·1e defensive sector , T sl·all em:rlo:r it 01"' en°ively. "'he Brrzj liPn Co"TIbat 'T'emn ,,,Ii U 110 eriuipr~d s: ortly r,fter Au 0;u,t l~. I am pk cirri; i.t in nn rrer about, f'i"t8en 1"1;1es -:,ehind tl--iFl "rant li.'1e to coJ11plete it.-: trairiing. "' esti~te tk:,t Pr-ter n p9rior:' of Rbout tivo v,p,..,lr~ it 1"ill ,e ro"si.ble to nio·1e it into a rosition in our nefensive '1ect0'1··. :3~sr>d on its p'3rforr:mnce thnre T s1-i.~ 1_1 rletermirie ~~he er>rliest dr-te it "'f'-J be erirlov9d o~fi::ris ively. Hean,rh~ le, somA of the Rrnz-': li!\n of'ficers fl".ld e"'llisted ren i1ill be '"'ent to our front 1 ine units -l"or brttle ·nnocult1tion. T rm ·~ 1rea0y fo1J.o,ri.ng that rrocedure with the c0lored RGT. 11 11 .,.. trust tkt the -nnhlic~ty for the 100th Batt.fl Hon Anet the /~2nd Infantry has b0en sritisf':--ctory to you. The 100th 1lnttPlion :bns nc•"le F T'l~gnifice11t job, a11d ••re Pre vr·ry rroud of it. T consicer it most tmf'ortu.r1rite thr,t rresent A'TTTJL phns crll for Jts -r-erovAl •"rom Fjf'th Ar:~y e11rly in Sertember. TMs battclion bs )ecoine A.:n ~nteP,'.('al part of' the 14th Division, :mrl P stron~ feelinr:; of rrutur,l r<'!s1,9ct Pn<i '"'0I":irt1tion hris ooAn estf'l1J.i9hcd between -'_t, .,-, -id ,Jv"l rr-"1t of' th, ('j_vi s:i on. I re?.li?.e thPt nreration P""'TIL should 'it ve over-r:id;n'?: ,..r·or:lty. For thnt rea"'on I crin tmc1erstand why th'7 44?nd :nfcntry rP.giment sl-1 culrl prom bly be tP ]nm from us. r o,vever, I do feel that the 100th Battalion should ref"Pin ,fith tr e divisj on, iWe:n though i.t is rctufllly ri. :r:u-t of the U;?nd R,-,girient. U dcubtedly flll of these factors ,1ere co11sidereii by the 11/'[t!' t'e~_rtment vrhen the dee~ sion ,.,,, s l'1J'H~e to remove the 1not1-i Bntt1s,lfon -rrom the 14t:b Division. ·evertt1eless, .,. ti-ii~t thr->.t you vrill -f'ordve "'le i.(' I oontinue to bop,'" tl•rt tre South9rn "rPnce orer"'l_tion dll he so success+"ul th:'1.t -tt r'if1Y 11ot be nece~sary to take tre lOoth B<>ttalion after :ill. I wns sorry to see tre ''J.-,r Depqrtr11 ent orgrnizo the Jt>rr'neseAmer:i can battl=ilions ·into a r9giment. It see"Yls to mP th--t •re would get a mucb o/Rater rropaganda effect if they could be employr>d ?S ,-,ey,rrrtte 1::1.,,ttr>lions in as ~any the?ters as possible. m•Je Pre c".eliri;hted with th~ progress thr:.t ,;s 1?ei", mde ~n ff0R"1J\"DY. I believe tl1 'lt the 3outh0.rn Frrnce oreration · j_ll brve r f,1rther r:levnstrting ef'fect upon the enemy. I ho e that it May re~ult in a looseninr; on our "'ront, so thPt the Fifth Army Cfln ret poi.ng <1nd therebv continue our con- �59 tribution to tl1e bi'! ri cture. 11 Genertl ~1c~Tr>.ir I s rlePth rari n o-reat s,,_,ock to mo, for I ht1d ~rorked ::,o clo:::ely "ti th h; m thP.t : ht1d nn excell<mt op1)ort1m:ity to learn first-hand op his outstandh1i:i; q11rliVes. He hrs left tl'e arny 8 soinp- concern in the AJ.~my Ground Forces; T sincerely hopA th,.,t tr :is setup "'ill be continued after the war. Tts size could be nd i'usted to tl1 e streni::;th of the rea ceti.me army. 1 have h[ld nn excellent oprort1.mity here to observe the T.'ro- / duct "1liicl1 it h!l.s developed, and :: o..ri c0nv-ir1ced that tl1 ere js no ·:nr Dep.,r-tr-ent at?mcy •,iy,foh ca11. ta'ke its plr-ce in standrrd"zir.r; and oonrl.ucting j the train:i ni:; of our army afte1:' the war. "I w2s well pleased to learn of G811ernl Stillvell' s promotion. He cert~inly deserved it. To my mind J,e is one of our fjnest +>folrl officers. 11 I learned only a f'ew da,vs "r;o th<>t Allen "9:rovm hrd been awr-rded the Bronze <'.'<tar. ::ill vou rlet1se extend MY conPTntul..,tions to f"rs. ·•..,rshnll,. Tlie of'fici 'll noti fj_crtion has r lready been :'0rwarded to the '.'Iar Department throu~h channels, but for -rer:>r that there may be s0P1e deltiy, I t'TT! enclosing copi.es here,,,ith. "I lwve tak-An -she lj berty of wrjt:i.ng you a rnthAr lonn; J.ettl"lr in order that you nin;}1t 1 mow irst hn.nd of our situ:' tion 1-iere • 11 Operations Jn2truction ,'!32, issued today, reads rs follows: 11 1. This Orer~tions In··tructi..on SU;>9rcedes so riuch of O.I. 's 29, 30 m1d '31 as o ;tlines plans for the Arny attac1< and rrescribes ",t,t9 c1 riissions ' for -;ubord-i_nE'te tmits. 11 2. Allied Armies in Italy :-re rAgroupin·; in prepar~tion for nn assault r:, ~n.inst tre r/'1THIC Line with the m:is sion of c"1 estroyinr, thP- enemy rrned forces in Italy. \ 3. F'if'th Army, within its new zone of n.ction, 1il1 attac1,: on D Day l'lith Corps abreast, ma1·inCl' -its l!k'lin effort in FLffi1="', CE - FC'':'I'Jl.3SIEVE (Q Ol68) arna to: 11 a. In Phase I, secure a bridgehen.d ncross the River ARrm. b. tn fhase II, conduct further orerrtions to t}',e North to penetrate the GOTHTC Line. 4. a. lr Corp_s will: 1) Protect rir,ht flank of Fifth Army. (2) Paintdn con-'-.act with Eiv,rt}, Army a..11.d II Corrs. (3) Facilit2.te the movenent of the 6 SA Armourer! n~ vision to .IV Corps r-i.rea. (<-:ee :rnra, 4c (/{,) below). (4) Arrange muturilly "rith II Corrs for relief of elerients \'est o-1: FLORVJCE and esta.bl:i.shrent of temporary boundary. (See para 4b (1) beloVT). ( 5) Within its zone of action, rrio-r to D J~y, riri intr.in con- �tact ,-,ith the enemy by ratrol r ction rnd be rrepared at nny time to follow up enemy w-'lthdrmml with all possible sreed. (6) Hold present rositions from FLORENCE tnclusive to Ft Q 900704 until passed through by II Carps. Troops in city of P.LOR ,!TC:S will be relieved by sepl'lrr.te order at a later date. (7) In Phase I. (a) (b) (8) b. Force crossing of the ,~t~O River mrkin~ its m~in effort between the II Corps boundary and l-ffITAS ;If:VE . Coordi:ratine its effort ·,ith II Corps, cepture t1nd secure M. GIOVI (q <)51797). In Phase II, be 'Preprired on A:rmy order to continue the attack to tlie "'"orth, astride the roac'I S. PIERO (Q 8589) IHOLA (\I 1833). D:irect CO!'L'-:nmicfltion for planning purposes is a,1thorized bet 7een 13 and II Corps. II Corps, vrill: (1) Relieve 13 Corps units in the sector between tre rresent lJ Corps - II Corp3 boundary and FLORE 1'l"C...-: (exclusive). A nen temporary lxmndf'ry necr Western exits of 7 Lffi~'JCE will be determined by PJutul'tl agreement ,, ith 13 Corps and reported to th is Headqur->rters. Relief v.1.11 be effected not later than 0001B August 20. (2) DesiP,nate one :wT, 88th Division, to be rrep"red, fron bivoun.c area in the general vicinity of 1".f"i'J'/IIONE {Q 50/,.5) (movew=mt from rresent b:i.vouac is not n0cessary) to move, on Army order, to repel enemy oPfensjve action in the IV Corps sector. ROT selected rill rrepare :rl1Jns f'or such nction in coordin-:-tion with IV Corps. Direct oor.wnmication a11thorized. (,) Desi~ate a second RC~, 88th Division and move same to v:icin.:ty il'GFOR'f prior to the movement frow present bivouac of the last RCT, 34th Division. (See pP.xn 5a belo•Y). RCT selected '::i.11 rrepare rl,,..ns in coorr'l:i.nation with IV Corps to move, on krmy order, to repel enemy offensive E>ction in IV Corps sector. Pl,,,ns prepared wj 11 ; nclude rrovisions f'or r1ovenent of one bntti=? lion on ? hours I notice Pnd tre RCT, less one battrlion, on 8 hours' notice. Direct commmica.tion authorized. (4) Within its zone of nction prior to D Day, maintain contact with th9 eneny b;v patrol action and be prept1red flt any time to follovr up enemy vr1 thdravrtl ·7j_U all possible sneed. (5) In Phase I: (a) Cross the raver AR:;O with the main effort bet,IITeen the '":astern outskirts of FLORF.'\JCE and the 13 Corps boundriry. �(b) (6) c. Ca:rture nnd secure P. CALV'i.'ifA (Q 893799), M. SE"l'ARIO (Q 859820) and M. MffiBLLO (Q 776808). In Phase II, be prepared, on Army order, to o:mtinue the attnck to t11e Tforth and f'orth·vest astride 1-Tifshvmy •o. 65, FLCR~UCB - 00100 ,TA . Direct co111nunicr-tion for planning purposes is aut1 orized w;tl· 13 and IV Corps. rr Corns, will: (1) Protect t:be left no.nk of Fffth Army. (2) naintain contact with II Carps. (3) Assume cornro.nd of new sector (See para 8a below) at August 20. 85th Division Qnd attrched troops, less RCT (- 100th Bn and AT Co) :ire a.tt~ched to IV Corps th is rhase of the operation. The M~2d RCT ( - lOoth AT Co) remains under II Corps. (4) Relieve 85th Division and nttachP.d units utilizin~ 6 SA Armoured Division uith ntt~ched troops. Direct comnunication with 13 Corns and 6 SA Arnoured Division is n.uthorized. The 6 SA Arnoured Division is avrilable ?? Au~st. AttRchMent or<lers '!ill issue. Relieve will bA accorrplished by 27 Au,gust. Upon relief, 85th Division ill move under 1>rranger.1ents to 11e ro ne direct with II Corps. (5) In rhase I, in conjunction ith 13 and II Carps attack, simulate ,, crossini:; o.r- the River At1.'TO betvreen r:. :-'ISAIIO r>nd SIGNA (n 6670) wit}, Major emphn.sis f'ocus0d <'t FUCECCHIO (q 1~365) • (See PlP.n AR'IO Two). (6) Vfithin its zone of nction, majn+:.ein contact with tl'e enemy by patrol action nnd be prerared, at Pny tir~ ~fter the in:i.tir 1 attr:ick of 13 CTJ.d II Corp'1, to follow up any enemy withdravml. 0001B 442d -f'or Bn nnd 5. a. 34th Division, attr.chod II Corps by sepnrrte orders this date, will remain on missions risslgned by rrevious directives unt.; 1 mov,0 to II Corps zone of vction, 8t ··bich ti.me i.t is relieve<l o.r- snch m~·ssion.s. b. '37oth RCT, (q2d Division) attriched IV Corrs by seyir>r"'te oriJ.ers this date, vrill he r10VP.d to .r-orwPrd "'reas on rr Corps or<ler, :-:is soon as e11.uipped f estim1'l.tec:1 d11.te 25 Au~st). 6. 0001B D Day - Units vdll be rre-r~red to r-ttrck on 72 hourr,, noti.ce r+>ter AU'!USt 25. 7. Instructions for coordination of ..-rtillerv -fires will 1e is-ue<l sernrt">tely. 8. Bou.nd11.rie s. �r· (1) (2) II Corps - l"3 Corps : (a) Effective 0001~ Pu.eust 20 Fnd until D Doy - Tempor~ry boundPr;v indj crted nbove (See prrn 4b (1)) . (h) ~.!•fBctive D Day - Incl 13 Corps - 8IP."'TA (Q ~3Hs) CAST:LL-'Jft (801!~) - J,t 823/,30 - RJ at GR'<;VE (813/.72) thence incl II Cor:rs s. F0L0 (8757) - I t o00667 Ft 900704. ('Jcrr"": : Fs~ble ronrls .,-lth~n 13 Corps zone of "Ction as prescr:i Jed rerein t're inade1u... te . II Corps i"i 11 gr .. nt l-:, Corps nBcessn.ry running r;i::;hts vjthin its zone . Detoils byngreer'lent Corrs Co~n~nders . ) (3) h. Corps - II Corps (effective OOOlB Au.r01st 20) . Incl II Corps , road U. COLOTI/\ ( ~ 7108) - C0IJ,E Di VAL d 1 ELSA (6630) - P0GGID0;TSI (6835) - RJ 710430 - It 710456 J t 680500 - thence ro'ld to Pt 6755'-'\0 , thence to Cro ssro'ld nt CRR11'1.IA (685592) ·,r,ere road "Till bfl co·rrr10'1 to bot h Corps , thence incl Pl Corps Pt 7?0630 - Ft 6Q0710 BI. "';'TZIO River. Inter-Army -· (e"'fective 0001B August 18) . Incl Fifth Arm;v - ~r,•r.~ S . SAVPIO (Q 151180) - CI rL''";LIJ.. (q 16?8) - Tncl ~ir,hth Army - LI\.TRI'JA ( 1 l !518) - s rau~nro (Q H/43) thence Horth along 15 ,ast.in-;. North of River ARNO . , e Overlay. q• Security - See Flan ARr10 Trro. 10. S · gmls - Issued separately. 11 * * * C'":CI'l'A --ATTGTJS,,, 18, 1944--Gener~l Cl:>rk returned to Ids COf1Tlv"-lnrl. nost at ten o 'clock tl-J.:i 8 P'orni.nr: , oonferred rlth },j s ChiPf of St:uf "'nd tre~ left for Rome ['t 11'30. The GenerRl arr:ived in Ms C- 47 with Gener"l r3rann ['"Y1c1 Colonel Saltznnn , t the Rome 11.irf'ielcl ~t 1245 . The pnrty lunched in the Gern~rnl I s npartment i.n the Excelsior Hotel in Rome . After rest · ng i..n the enrl:v r~rt of' tJ,e Pfternoon , the Ge',er-nl r rove "ronnc1 the city "8.th Ge11er"l Brann a11.d Colonel Saltzrrn . Tlie Ge""nrril ertPrtr-ined a -f'e,·r guests +>or dinner. General Cl.ark today received the following cablegram from AAI Headquarters: "The C-in-C has been informed by British Legation to the Holy See through Commanding General, Rome Allied Area Command that his Holiness the Pope bas expressed his appreciation of the fine example, bearing and conduct of Allied troops in Rome. This reflects greatest credit on all members of Allied Armed Services in Italy, and C-in-C thinks YoU would like to know that he has received such a message." �CEOINA--AUGU&-1' 19, 1944-General Clark le~ Rome at 0845 in his C•47, ar• riving at Fifth Army Headquarters at 0945. At 1110 General Cls.rk and General Gruenther drove to the Cecina airfield to meet Prime Minister Churchill who arrived at 1120 with party, consisting of Lord Moran, per• eonal physician to the Prime Minister; Commander Thomson, ADC to the Prime MinisterJ MB.jor Grimsley, ADC to General Alexander; and the Prbte Minister's personal detective. I General Clark, with the Prime Minister, drove in General Clark's command car from the Cecins. airfield to General Clark's Headquarters. They were greeted enroute by British officers and enlisted men of the Desert Air Force. Upon their arrival at General Clerk's Headquarters a guard of honor we.a held for the Prime Minister and a large attendance of the Fifth Army Headquarters officers and enlisted men were present. At• ter the guard of honor, General Clark brought the Prime Minister to his hut with Lord Moran, Comnander Thomson and General Gruenther, where he briefed Mr. Ch~ohill on the current situation and fut~e plans. Art.er a ten-minute briefing, members of Generel Clark's staff were brought into the hut to be introduced to the Prime Minister. Mr. Ch~chill spoke briefiy to General Clark's assembled staff, congratuls.ting them on the fine record Fifth Army' has set ~ the important role this Army has and will continue to play in the final defeat of the enemy. General Clerk and the Prime Minister then walked to General Clark's van where they conferred alone for ten minutes. While in the van, General Clark presented the Prime Minister with the first British flag to be raised over Rome after the Fifth Army entered the city. Mr. Churchill expressed great appreciation to General Clark for his thoughtfulness and remarked that it would be a great trea~e to him. General Clark and Mr. Churchill then drove off in General Clark's jeep, acoanpanied by Mr. Ch~chill's party and General Gruenther. At 1230 General Clark and the Prime Minister arrived at Vada where they were met by Major General Bolte. Here they reviewed one RCT of' the 34th Division together with composite units of the Brazilian Expe• ditionsry Force, members of the u. s. Army Nurse Corps, members of the Women's Arm,- Corps. Art.er the review Prime Minister Ch~chill gave a ten-minute talk to· the troops. At 1300 Genersl Clark, Mr. Churchill and party left the review site at Vada, arriving at the 34th Division command post at 1310. They were met by General Kirkman, 13 Corps Commander; General Mascarenhas, Brazilian Expeditionary Force Commander; General Keyes, II Corps Com• mander and General Crittenberger, IV Corps Commander. General Bolte, Commanding General of the 34th Division, entertained the party for lunch. Art.er lunch General Clark, Mr. Churchill and party proceeded b7 jeep to Leghorn. Enroute they reviewed the 168th Infantry of the 34th Division, the 134th and 135th Infantries. In reviewing these units, General Clark and Mr. Ch~chill dismounted from their vehicles, trooped the line and talked to many of the officers and doughboys of these regi• ments. ��At 1430 the part,- arrived at Leghorn where the Prime Minister was greeted upon his entrance into the cit,- by many miscellaneous British units from the surrounding areas who stood in formation on either side of the road leadin~ to the port. General Hume joined General Clerk and the Prime l!inister in General Clark's jeep upon their arrival at Leghorn. General Hume pointed out the civil problems and the progress being made in the development or Leghorn. General Clark and party drove directly to the port in Leghorn where they were greeted by General Tate, G-l► of Fi~h >.nr,-, and Captain Mackenzie, Naval Officer in Charge of' Leghorn, and members of' their staffs .. General Clark, Mr. Churchill and pi.rty boarded a Royal Navy patrol boat, and for 45 minutes inspected the pert, Captain Mackenzie and General Tate e:xplaining to the Prime Minister and General Clerk the problems and progress in the developnent of the port of Leghorn. At 1520 General Clark, Prinie Minister Churchill and i:e.rty drove from Leghorn to a 240mm battery of the 697th Artillery Battalion in the vicinity of Nugola, where they were met by General Rutledge. Lt. Col. Christian, Battalion Commander, oriented his auITent situation briefly to the Prime ) \ Minister and General Clark, showing them a bridge target north of Pisa on .,,, which they would fire. Prime Minister Churchill pulled the lanyard firing the first round. Arter the battery fired six rounds, the observation plane reported the target had been hit. General Clark and the Prime Minister then departed by jeep for the Cecina airfield, arriving at 1740. 1 There General Clark bade goodbye to the Prime Minister and his party who departed by C•l~7 for Caserta. General Clark, with General Gruenther, returned to his command post.· General Clark worked on papers for about an hour before leaving for his villa at C&stiglioncello where he dined quietly and retired early. The complete text of Mr. Churchill's speech to Fifth Army troops is quoted below: "General Mark Clark, General Bolte, officers and men of the 34th United States Infantry Division; officers and men of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force; officers and men of the United States negro troops; Americans of' Japanese ancestry and ycur American officers; I greet ycu here this morn• ing with feelings of pride tha.t the honor should have fallen to me to in• spect these units of the Fifth Army, one of the great armies of the United Nations, which are everywhere advancing victoriously upon the roe. "The 34th u. s. Division was first, or among the very first of all the United States troops to leave the new world and carry by their sacrifices and their valor the precious blessing of freedom e.nd justice to the lands enslaved by Hitler's tJ'l"8.!Ul7. That tyranny we shall break. We shall shatter the sources from which its evil powers are derived, which will be so obliterated and blasted that f'or many hundreds of years none will dare to do the like again. "Officers and soldiers, and the representatives of the Women's Artq Corps, Army Nurse Corps, we have here in Italy one of the finest armies in the world. The combination of the Firth Army and of the British Eighth Army bind together tllO veteran armies in a bond of brotherhood and com-adeship �in arms, and in the sense of mrcbing and fighting shoulder to shoulder for a righteous cause. You have done deeds which will long be remembered. The earliest landings in Italy, the long fighting at Anzio beachhead, the battle of the Cassino front, and the capture or Rome and Leghorn• all of these are episodes which have played a. fruitf'ul and an invaluable part in the entire scheme and design or the Allied Armies. No operation oould have been more fruitful in this theater than the work which you have done by drawing awayj ) perhaps two dozen or more divisions dmm into Italy where they have been torn to pieces. You have aided notably and most effectively the great battle now proceeding to its victorious climax on the fields of France. though you have done great deeds in the past, and may well be proud of what has been achieved, I come here to tell you today that greater ventures and greater achievements now lie ahead of you, and that you will be playing con• stantly an absolutely vital pert in the long, hard struggle for whose speedy' end we all strike, and for whose speedy end we all pray. "I wish you • all of you - all the units represented here and the Bra• zilians - 1. wish all of you all good fortune; I wish you God speed; may God bless you ill." * * * CECINA-AUGUS'r 20, 191+4-The General spent a quiet day at his villa. In the evening he entertained members of his staff; including General Gruenther, Colonel Gray, Colonel Eberhard and General Brann. * * * CECINA••AUGU&'T 21, 1944--General Clark le:rt his villa at 0900 for his command post, arriving at 0945. Generals Gruenther and Keyes conferred with the General in his van for an hour. At 1230 Generals Devers and Barr called to see General Clark with General Gruenther. They confe?Ted for approximately thirt7 minutes. General Clark spent a quiet a.:rternoon working in his van, conferring with members of his staff. General Clark today received the following letter from General Alexander: "I bad hoped to come and see you to discuss the coming battle, but yesterday the Prime Minister specially asked me to accompany him on his visit to 13 Corps, and today the C.I.G.s. arrives and will, I expect, keep me fully oc• cupied for a day or two. I am therefore writing instead to make quite certain that we are in full agreement about our plans. "As I think I explained when we le.st met at Oliver Leese's H.Q., our margin of superiority over the enemy is in my opinion suoh thtit we cannot af• ford any detraction from our main effort. That is why I have included in my orders a statement to the effect that Eighth Army is to be given priority where requirements conflict. It is also the reason why I have laid insistence on your simulating preparations for attacks along the whole front from PONTASSIEVE to PONTEDERA, even it that entails some disadvantage from the point of view of your own subsequent operations. I am confident that I can rely on you and all your commanders to carry out that vitally important part �of your task, and to hold the enemy opposite you by continuing to simulate the mounting of a major offensive on a broad front .right up to the time at which you actually latmch your own attack. The longer we can kP,ep the enemy's attention and formations on your front the greater will be the mea• sure of our overall ultimate success. "As regards your own attack I do not intend to ask you to latmch it 1D1til I am convinced that the enemy has been forced into a position in which you will have a really good chance of getting over the APENNINES. I need hardly emphasise the importance of pressing it with the gre~test determination when it is launched. "During the past two days we have had meetings here with the Air Force, including Cannon and his staff, and I run now satisfied that we shall get all the support that they can give us. At the same time, we cannot for obvious reasons hope to have the same amount or support as we did before operations in the South of France began. D •Albiac and Dickson will do everything they can to meet the air requirements for your attack, but at that stage the air support for Eighth Army must continue simultaneously, and they may not always be able to give you all you would like. I will howewr watch this aspect of the matter carefully myself, and I must ask you to accept it at that. "It is, as I am sure you will agree, most important that we should be in full agreement about the way in which these operations are to be conducted, and I hope I can count on your wholehearted adherence to the principles I have laid down in my orders, and which I have amplified in this letter. "I shall certs.inly be seeing you again bef'ore your attack begins, but I want to take this opportunity to wish you and your fine Army ewry success and the best of good luck in our coming battle. The Prime Minister enjoyed his visit to you immensely and was most impressed by all he saw. Thank you very much for making such excellent arrangements for him." General Clark replied to General Alexander's letter as follows: "I have just received your letter of you that I am in complete accord with the the forthcoming operations. I assure you of giving priority to Eighth Army and the tions for an attack ftlong my whole front. out your instructions to the letter. August 21st and hasten to assure way in which you have outlined that I understand the necessity reasons for simulating preparaI have issued orders which carry "I have seen Kirkman and Keyes, and the two of them met this afternoon in order to work out some of the complicated details of their coordinated attack. "Am glad you are arranging additional air to support both the Fifth and Eighth Army attacks. I appreciate that the Eighth Army air support must continue when my attack starts. "Please dismiss from your mind any misgivings you may have as to our �desll'e to push this thing with all our enr,rgy. The only thing I do not like I is the waiting. We are anxious to get going, and the sooner conditions will } permit our attack the better we will like it. I will be ready any time you say the word 1 go 1 • "Devers was here today and proposed taking one of my signal battalions; which I naturally objected to. He had an alternate plan which would take some signal personnel, officers and enlisted men, to whioh I agreed. I can do this without interfering with our forthcoming operation. "I am glad the PriJne Minister was pleased with his visit. It was a great pleasure for us to have him with us, and all the troops were stimulated by his presence. "Please remember me to the C.I.G.S. I hope we may have the pleasure of a visit from him while he is in this area." * * * CECINA--AUGUST 22, 1944--General Clark worked on administrative matters in his van until 10: . 0, at which time he departed by L-5 to visit II Corps and 3 IV Corps, at which points he presented decorations to various members of II and IV Corps. Arriving be.ck at his command post in mid-afternoon, the Army Commander departed shortly thereafter for his villa at Castiglionoello where he took a short swim, returning to his command post later in the evening. General Clark today sent the following cable to General Mascarenhas, Commander or the Brazilian Expeditionary Force: "I send greetings from the officers, the men and the women of the Firth~, to their gallant comrades of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, on the occasion or the second anniversary or Brazil's declaration of war against the German enemy. Fighting shoulder to shoulder with troops of the Fifth Ar'f111' from the United States or America and the British Empire, the Brazilian Forces will play an important pa.rt in the defeat of Hitler and the Nazi war machine. Good luck to every one or you." General Mascarenhas replied to General Clark's message as follows: "Officers and men of Brazilian Expeditionary Force are filled with satisfaction at receiving your greetings on the second anniversary of Brazil's declaration of war on Germany. Your words strengthened us and reaffirmed the sentiments of confidence and friendship which tmite our countries. The soldiers of Brazil are proud to belong to the Fifth Army. They will do all in their power to raise even higher the level of courage and efficiency of the troops under your command. We send to the troops under your oommand and to ow comrades of the Fifth Army our thanks." �A brief SUlftl'll8l7' of' tactical operations for the week ending August 22, 1944 is as follows: The 2nd New Zealand Division sector was taken over by the 85th Division. Fifth Army asSUJ1ed command of 13 British Corps, thereby extending its sector to the Rl5 easting. The 442nd RCT (looth Battalion) ·(attached to the 88th Division) relieved left brigade of 1st British Infantry Division am assumed responsibility for the sector. On all other sectors, regrouping continued. * * * CECINA••ATJGUST 2.3, 1944•-General Clark left at 0845 by L-5 for. 13 Corps where he was met at the 13 Corps cub field by General Kirkman, Corps Comman• der, and .M!ljor General Poole, 6th South African Armored Division Commander. General Cl.erk conferred with General Kirkman and General Poole at the field for f'if'tee1,1 minutes, a.fter which General Clark Bnd ·General Kirkman bade good• bye to General Poole and left for the 1st Infantry Division British where they were met by Ml!ljor ,General Loewen. A guard of honor was held for General Clark. General Clark and General Kirkman conferred for fifteen minutes with veneral Loewen, after which they drove to the 8th Indian Division where the7 were met by General Russell who introduced General Clerk to members of his staff'. General Clark, General Kirkman and General Russell drove by jeep to within a mile of an observation post or the 8th Indian Division where they dismounted from the jeep and walked up the mountain to the OP. Here they could observe the terr.ain to the east towards Pontassieve over which it was proposed that General Russell's 8th Indian Division would attack, and to the west into the valle7 immediately smTounding Florence. While Generals Clark, Kirkman and Russell were at the observation post, it was reported to an officer at the OP that a shell had landed in the road which General Clark had been over appro:ximatel7 five minutes previously. As the road was completely under enemy observation, it can be assumed that the enemy observed the passing · vehicles and opened fire, thinking there might be considerable Allied move• ment on that road. After spending fifteen minutes at the OP, Generals Clark and Kirkman bl.de goodbye to General Russell and proceeded on to the 6th Armored Division British where they were met b7 Major General Murra:, who in• troduced General Clark to members of his staff and entertained General Clark for lunch. During lunch General Hornby, Artiller7 Officer of AAI, arrived and joined General Clark and p,,rt:, for lunch. After lunch General Clark was escorted by General Kirkman to the 6th Armored Division cub field. General Clark then flew to the cub field near Rosigna.no where he was met by Colonel Wood, Commanding Officer of the 38th Evacuation Hospital who escorted him to the hospital. General Clark visited wards where he talked to patients. After visiting the wards, Colonel Wood assembled all members of the hospital staff. General Cl.erk spoke to them, commending them on their fine work and giving them encouragement in remarking that the Fifth Army-would once again be on the move soon. General Clark then returned to his command post by L-5. Upon his arrival at the command post, General Clark, with Colonel Saltzman, went for a swim, after which he dined with the regular members or his mess. * * * ��I CECINA••AUGUSI' 24, 1944--General Clark left at 0900 by L•5 and landed at the 45th AAA cub strip at 0915 where he was met by General Ramey. He then drove to the 45th AAA Headquarters where he was met by General Crittenberger. General Clark spoke to Major Lyle who is returning to the States to accept his nomination to Congress from the state of Tens. General Clark then vi• sited the looth Infantry Battalion and decorated and promoted personnel of this be.tte.lion. General Clark then met General Pritchard, Commander of the 1st Armored Division and visited several be.tta.lion command posts and talked to officers and men of this division, observing their training. General Pritchard entertained General Clark for lunch at the 1st Armored command post. After lunch General Clark visited the 2nd Battalion of the 3':Q.~ Regiment of the_9~nd Division, _pow attached to the 1st Armored Division. General Clark welcomed the .37U1, Regiment to the Fifth Army, and his talk is quoted in full at the conclusion of today's diary. At 1600 General Clark returned by L-5 to his command post and dined with the regular members of his mess. General Clark's speech to the men of the ·37aj{ Regiment was as follows: "Officers and men of the 37oth Regiment of the 92nd Division: I have eome here this morning to welcome you to the Fifth Army and to tell you how genuinely pleased we are to have you, as members of the 92nd Division, in the Fifth Army. "Let me tell you a little about this fine Fifth Army which you have joined. It has been fighting for almost a year at Salerno, Naples, Cassino, Anzio and Rome to the Leghorn-Florence Line. We have captm-ed over 47 ,ooo of the enemy; killed and wounded several times that number, destroyed 10 to 15 German divisions; pursued him for .300 miles through this mountainous telTain, and ha.ve, with severe fighting, beaten him wherever we have found him. The Fifth Army is made up of old and new divisions - new ones like yo'ln"'s - and they have all performed magnificent deeds on this Italian field of battle. "Now to say a few words about your Division. I lmow how carefully you have been trained. I lmow of yo'ln"' fine leadership, of your discipline, and of your proficiency with yom- weapons. You are better equipped than any other army in the world; you have now joined the big leagues. You are with professional fighters, and with your be.ckground of training and your desire to close with the enemy, you have every opportunity before you to JDAke a great name for your 92nd Division. You are receiving the same battle inoculation which has been given to other units of the Fifth Army. You will find that when you meet the German you have notMng to fear from him. In fact, he will be A.fraid of you. You will defeat him and you will annihilate him every place you find him. "You will prove to yourselves that he is inferior to you and that you are superior to him in every way. "What could be a finer setting for an entrance into battle than with the German wobbling on his last legs, with the Allied Forces in France a.11d j �Russia closing in on him, and we ready again to bloody his nose here. Take this opportunity, as I know you will, to cover yourselves with glory. You men of the 92nd Division will be in on the final battle when we oompletel:, crush our enemy and thereby bring victory to our great nation. "Good luck to you and God bless you." General Clark this afternoon sent the following letter to General Leese, Commanding the British Eighth Army: "On the eve of your attack against the Gothic Line I desire to express to you my heartiest good wishes for a great success. The Firth and Eighth Armies have fought side by side for almost the entire length of the Italian Peninsula and all d'l.ll"ing this time the greatest feeling of respect and cooperation have existed between the two forces. Together our Armies struck the first great blows at the continent of Europe. "Now that we have reached the last great enemy bastion in Italy and all preparation has been made, our attack is to be launched. I am certain that the gallant troops of the Eighth Army who bear the initial weight of the as• sault will add to their already glorious history. You may rest ass,n-ed that as always the Fifth Army will give its utmost in its attack. "Best of luck to you, your commanders, and your troops." The Arrq Commander today received the following messa.ge from Field Mar• shal Sir Alan Brooke, British Chief of the Imperial General Staff: "I em so sorry that during my short 48 hours• visit I have been une.b le to call on your headquarters. I should so very much have appreciated the opportunity or meeting you again and of congratulating you personally on the wonderful successes of the Fifth Army. Best of luck and all good wishes for the future." Operations Instruction #33 was issued today and reads as follows: "l. Par 6, O. I. #32, is deleted and the following substituted: D Day - II Corps from present bivouac areas and 13 Corps from rear areas, will be prepared to move into final assembly positions and launch the attaek on 96 hours notice. In the event of heavy rain after movement has been initiated, the Anny Co:rnmander will decide by 1600 hours D - l whether or not the attack will be delayed. "2. Par 8 a (2) is a.mended in accordance with the following: Effective D - 4, II Corps will take oomma.nd of that portion of the II Corps attack sector from the Corps Rear boundary forward to include the assembly areas of the 34th and 91st Divisions and Corps Artillery. Corps Commanders will arrange mutually for a temporary boundary whose left limit will follow appropriate part of the temporary boundary now in effect and whose right limit will follow appropriate part of inter-Corps boundary for the attack. Commanding General, II Corps will notify th is Headquarters result of mutual \ �arrangements and exact hour of assumption of oomma.nd. , Effective D - 2, II Corps will assume ootnm8nd of the forward area. of the II Corps attack sector at whioh time the remainder of the II - 13 Corps attack boundary will come into effect. Corps CoMmanders will arrange mutually for exact hour of change of command and Commanding General, II Corps will notify this Headquarters. 13 Corps troops other than forward screen1.ng elements will be relieved and moved under mutual arrangements to 13 Corps sector. Screening elements will remain in position under temporary operational oommand of II Corps unt\l passe4 through.". ~ ,M" ~ ~ J"-" ' ~ a.-v~~ Co\ -'6 .. J O ~ s~ (> * gef ~ A * -1""-ir 0-0-0 /~' I ~ - ~ u;-crf"' *~ C • ~ etCINA--AUGUST 25, 1944--General Cla.rk left his villa at 1100 for Vada to fh1-! inspect an RCT of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force. Upon his arrival at Y' }! the field, General Clark was met by General Masoarenhas and Captain Walters, '-''-.J" t/'L interpreter. General Clark drove to the reviewing stand where he was greeted 10_ .A by members of General Masoarenhas' staff and members of the Fifth Army staff. - if'/ Af'ter the Brazilian and American national anthems, General Cla.rk, with Gene/4- ral Mascarenhas and General Zenobio, Cornrn:mding the Division, trooped the x ft' 1 line and reviewed the troops. The General then returned to the grandstand, oJ:, at which time he was introduced by General Mascarenha.s to the Brazilian troops. General Clark then gave a ten-minute talk to the Brazilian troops .rV" whioh is quoted in f\111 at the oonclusion of today's diary. The General's \" speech was translated into Portugese by Captain Walters. After General ,~ Clark's speech, Brazilian troops passed in review before the grands~and, ar- 1uty>' ter which General Clark met officers of' General Mi.scarenhas' staff and mem• ' 1:l p.., bers of the Br-azilian Nurse Corps. General Clark and General Mascarenhas ;,,,,then drove to the Brazilian Expeditionary Corps Headquarters where General ~ 1 Clark and members of his staff were entertained for lunch. General Maso~ren' has in a toast at lunch expressed how honored and proud he personally and all Brazilians were that the Brazilian Expeditionary Force oould serve with the Fif'th Army. r t r"1/ Af'ter lunch General Clark bade goodbye and drove to his villa at Castig• lioncello where he spent a quiet af'ternoon swimming and resting. At 1800 General Clark gave a cocktail pi.rty and buffet supper in honor of General Beucler and members of the French mission on the occasion of their departure from Fifth Army. Approximately fifty guests were present, including members of General Clark and General Beucler 1 s staffs. During the evening, betore all guests present, General Clark presented General Beucler with the gift of a carbine and a letter of' farewell. General Clark expressed at this time his deep regret in losing General Beucler and his staff. General Beucler, with deep emotion, bade farewell to General Clark. General Clark's speech to the Brazilians -is quoted below: "General Masearenhas, General Zenobio, officers and men of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, I have oome here this morning to greet you - to weloome you to the Fifth Army - and to tell you how genuinely proud we are to have you by our side. You have joined a fighting organization, the Fi~h Army. I want to tell you something about this Fifth Army that you are a part of at the present time. �· "In a few days, September 9th will me.rk the first anniversary of our landing at Salerno. After Salerno, as you know, we had desperate fighting and defeated the enemy's effort to drive us back into the sea. We then fought up the coast to the great port of Naples. After that we fought our way through mountains, snow, mud and rain and finally landed at the beachhead in Anzio where again we defeated his efforts to drive us out. We won a great victory at Anzio and killed thousands of his troops. At Anzio we were constantly a threat to his flank. This threat, in conjunction with our push of May 11th, finally helped us to liberate the first of the European capitals under Nazi domination. We captured Rome. "We then continued the advance some 200 miles, and now are on the line Pisa - Florence. We captured 47 ,ooo Germans; we wiped out as many more. We annihilated many of his divisions and have defeated him on every field of battle where we have foum him. "Do not think that the Fifth Army is through now. We are just beginning, and you will play a great part - you of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force - in the great victories which are to come. Your presence here today is but another indication of the solidarity of purpose which exists between our two great nations. You represent the cream of the Brazilian Army. You are well led; you have fine leaders in General Masoarenhas and General Zeno• bio. Your junior officers are well trained. You a.re well equipped. With your fighting spirit great days lie ahead for you. "I like what I saw this morning. You mve a look of determination about yau. From what I ha. ve seen of you as I passed through this area you are well disciplined. Do not forget that discipline is a most important factor in the winning of battles. You ere receiving the same battle inoculation course which has been given to other llllits of the Firth Army. You will find that when you meet the German you have nothing to fear from him; in fact, he will be afraid of you. You will defeat him, am you will anni• hilate him every place you find him. You will cover yourselves rlth glory and write a fine, brilliant chapter in the history of your beloved oountry, Brazil. "What could be more appropriate than on this great national holiday of yours, Caxi.as Day, that you should take your pls.ce on the fighting side of the Firth Arrrry, and renew your pledge to destroy your hated enemy. "Great days lie ahead of you. Good luck to you and God bless you." Genertl Clark today replied to Field Marshal Brooke's message of yesterday as follows: "I deeply apprecinte your thoughtful message. I would have been highly honored and extremely pleased to have had you visit Fifth Army and sincerely hope that another opportunity to visit us will present itself before too long." General Leese today replied to General Clark's letter of yesterday as follows: �'73 "We are proud that our 13 Corps is serving under your command and feel sure that they will add to their fine reputation during your advance. "We shall all be watching your own operation confidently and with the greatest interest when the time comes. "I send to you and to the Fifth Army m::, very best wishes. All good luck to you." * * * CECINA-•AUGUST 26, 1944--General Clsrk spent a quiet morning at his villa working. Colonel Bruce came for a swim and lunch. After lunch Generals Gruenther, Brann and Howard arrived with tactical mps and conferred for an hour with General Clark. General Cl.ark left wi. th Generals Gruenther, Brann and Howard for his command post at 1600 hours, and conferred with these officers in front of his van for another hour. The General dined in his mess with the regular members of the mess and retired ear~. General Clark today wrote the following letter to Maj. Gen. Russell, Commanding the 8th Indian Division: "I enjoyed m::, visit with you the other day. It was an extreme pleasure to meet you and have the opportunity to talk with you. "I should like very much to visit you at your headquarters, and to have an opportunity to talk to the troops of your fine Division in the same manner in which I have addressed the troops of the American Divisions of the Fifth Army on the eve of our important battles. I hope it will be possible to arrange fr1r this in the next few days. "May I again express my pleasure at having your Division, and the other fine troops of the lJth Corps with us. I feel sm-e you will add even more to the brilliant record which your troops _ have established throughout the African campaign and here in Italy. "With best wishes, I am" General Clark today sent the following cable to General Eisenhower: "M:r heartiest congratulations on your outstandingly brilliant maneuvers in Northern France which resulted in the liberation of Paris. The whole world is deeply indebted to you for your leadership in this magnificent battle. Please convey my congratulations to Generals Bradley and Patton fr1r the superb job they have done. We of the Fifth Army will continut to do everything in our power to contribute to the final victory." General Cl.ark also cabled General Patch today as follows: "I extend to you my s:incerest congratulations for the successes whioh your troops have achieved in Southern France. Your amazing advances are daily contributing to the doom of the German enemy. Please give m:y best wishes to Truscott and De Lattre de Tassigny." �CECINA-AUGUST 27, 1944--General Lemnitzer and General Gruenther came to con• fer with General Clerk this morning at llOO hours. At 1245 Messrs. Murphy and Of'fie arrived. Before lunch General Cl~.rk spent several minutes alone with Mr. Murphy in conference, after which Generals Cl.P.rk, Lemnitzer, Gruenther, Mr. Murphy and Mr. Off'ie h,id lunch in General Clark's mess. Arter lunch Generals Clark and Gruenther played lridge and went for a swim with Messrs. Murphy and Off'ie. Mr. Murphy told General Clerk he was leaving Friday for Washington, there to take a new assignment. Messrs. Murphy and Offie left for Caserta in General Clark's C-47 at 1730, after which General Clark, with Colonel Saltzman, drove to his villa in Ce.stiglioncello to spend the night. * * * TAVERNELLE-•AUGUST 28, 1944--General Clark moved his coJl'lmand post from Cecinh l to Tevernelle. At 1000 General Cl~.rk flew to a cub field up forward where he was met by General Pritchard and Colonel Ladue. He then drove to the col'lll!l8.nd post of the 1st Battalion of the 37oth Infantry of the 92nd Division. Gene• ral Clark reviewed the troops and presented ten combat infantrymen's hedges, after which he gave a speech of welcome to this battalion, welcoming them to the Fifth Army. After the ceremony General Cle.rk returned by plane to Castiglioncello where he entertained members of his staff for dinner. * * * TAVERNELLE-•AUGUST 29, 1944-•At llOO hours General Cle.rk left by L-5 for the 56th Ewtcuation Hospital where he visited wards, spoke to patients, met mem• bers of the hospital staff and presented Purple Hearts to wounded. The Gene• ral arrived by L-5 at his new comme.nd post cub strip and drove to his headquarters, arriving at 1245. In the afternoon, Mr. Tompkins, newly appointed director of the American Red Cross in Italy, called to see General Clerk. The General spent the rest of the afternoon in his van conferring with various members of his staff. A brief summary of tactical operations for the week ending August 29th is as follO'fls: Normal relief's and regrouping or units continued to be carried out. Active patrolling in defense of their sectors was maintained by II and IV Corps while limited objectives were secured by 13 Corps. * * * TAVERNELIE-AUGUST 30, 1944--At 1000 hours General Clark made two recordings - one for the War Department and one for troops of the Fifth Army commemorating Salerno Day, the full text of which is quoted at the conclusion of today's diary. At 1045 Sir James Griggs, Secretary of State for War, General Alexander, CINC, AAI, Lt. Gen. Weeks of the War Office, General Lemnitzer and Maj. Gen. Theron arrived. General Clark greeted Sir James Griggs with a guard of honor, after which he introduced him to members of the Fifth Army British Increment. General Cle.r.,_ with Sir James Griggs, General Alexander and party, proceeded to the outside of his van where the General oriented them on the �I current Fifth Army situation and proposed plans. Sir James Griggs, General Alexander and part1' left by- car for lJ Corps at 1200. At 1315 Generals Clark and Tate drove to Florence where they were met by General Hume and Colonel McMahon. The Ar'JfrY Commander visited the ?1st Garrison Headquarters (British) where he met Colonel Alston (British), Florence Area Commander, end Brigadier Blucher (British), Commander of Florence Defense Troops. General Cl.ark tom-ed the city, visiting Palazzo Vecchio, Duomo Cathedral and walked over the Ponte Vecchio, where he could observe the enemy demolitions to the approaches to the bridge. Before leaving Florence for his Headquarters, General Clark drove to the Bailey bridge over the Arno under construction by the 337th Engineers and congratulated the men on their fine job. Arriving back at his headquarters in the early evening, the General dined with the reguJAr members of his mess. General Clark sent the follOffing message to Field Marshal Smuts today: "I am particularly pleased and proud to have the 6th South Af'rican Ar- ) mored Division under command or Fifth Army. These gallant troops have played a highly important role in the battles of Italy and have distinguished themselves in their relentless pursuit of the German enemy north or Rome to his present strong defensive positions. I am sure that they will take advantage of future opportunities to add even more glorious pages to their already superb record. It was a great honor for me to have had the opportunity to see :you on the occasion of your recent visit to Italy. The Allied cause has indeed been fortunate in this present war, as in the past, to have had the benefit of your wisdom, com-age and inspiration. I hope that I YM.:Y once again have tho pleasure of meeting you when the final victory, for which we have all striven so long, is ours." * * * TAVERNELIE--AUGUm' 31, 1944-•At 0930 (:'reneral Clark met Major Homer Roberts (negro) or the Public Relations Office, War Department, and Mr. Moss, photographer for colored press, and Lt. Col. Dollard of the Morale Division or the War Department. General Clark briefed them for twenty minutes on the situation mainly with regard to the 92nd Division. He also commented on the fine work colored service units have been doing with the Fifth Arm:, and re• marked on the good discipline generally throughout colored troops under his command. At 1000 hours General Cl.ark was photographed bye. color photographer with Miss Horn and other WACS - these pictures to be used by the War Department. The pictm-es were taken under the supervision of WAC Captain Moilhenny, Public Relations. General CJArk flew to IV Corps at 1200 hours to see General Crittenberger, ret~ning to his command post for lunch at 1300 hom-s. At 1415 General Clark took off in his L-5 for 13 Corps, where he called to see General Kirkman. After spending an hour with General Kirkman, he �new to the II Corps strip at San Casciano where he was met by his jeep and driven to the II Corps command post 1n the vicinity of Impruneta to see Gene• ral Keyes. ~Emeral Clark confe?Ted for half an hour with General Keyes and drove from I Corps comrnand post to his headqoorters, 8.ITiving at 1730. The General dined with the regular members of his mess. The following operational orders were issued today: "1. In view of indicated withdrawal of enemy forces on the Army front, follow up action as directed in O.I. #32 will be initiated without delay. "2. Specifically ~• IV Corps will, prior to first light 1 Sept: (1) (2) ,!?. Reconnoiter 1n force 1n the M. ALBANO and M. PISANO areas employing not less than one company of infantry in each area with the mission of developing the enemy strength in each area. Be prepared to follow up at once in either or both areas if the situation so warrants, using sufficient strength to occupy the hill masses concerned. II Corps will: Conduct strong and active patrolling with a view to developing the enemy strength and disposition in its sector. g. 13 Corps will: Continue active patrolling and follow up any enemy withdrawal within its zone of action. "3. Additional eng:i.neer bridge facilities will be made available to IV Corps by separate message. "4. Necessary artillery support will be coordinated by the Army Artil.. lery Officer." The results of operations during the month or August: A• Ground Forces: Contact was maintained with the enemy throughout the month by agpressive patrol activity on both sides of the ARNO River along the entire front. Artillery, tank and mortar firing was employed to harass and inflict maximum caSUE1lties on enemy personnel and destroy such equipment. Training was carried on in rear areas and infantry units were rested by utilizing other troops to occupy forward positions. Regrouping or forces we.a accomplished under a detailed cover plan devised to screen future intentions from an alert, sensitive enemy. In 13 Corps zone the city of FLORENCE was cleared and a bridgehead secured across the ARNO between FONTASSIEVE and FLORENCE, and an attack was launched up the SIEVE Valley toward the end of the month. �b. Air Force: In direct support of Fifth Army, Desert Air Force planes total of 652 sorties for the month of August. Following the Army Di• rective targets attacked included artillery positions, supply installations, bivouacs and command posts. Bomb damage assessment sholled truit good results were obtained with the minimum effort available. new; * * * TAVERNELLE--sEPl'EMBER 1, 1944-0eneral Clerk left by L-5 at 0900 for the Headquarters of the 6th South African Armored Division, landing at the Castel Fio- ) rentino cub strip. Here, the Army Commander was met by General Poole, Commanding General of the 6th South African Armored Division• . After spending an hour with General Poole, General Clerk flew west along the Arno where he observed elements of the 370th Infantry, 1st Armored Division and 442nd Infantry crossing the Arno River. General Clark landed at a cub strip north of Leghorn where he was met by his jeep and driven to Pisa. Here he was met by General Rutledge who briefed the Arm:, Commander on the current situation in his area. Returning to the cub strip, he took off for his command post, arriving at 1430 hours. General Clerk spent a quiet afternoon in his van conferring with various staff officers. ajor Hunter, of the G-3 Section, and General Moran were guests at General Clark's mess. Art.er dinner Generals Moran, Clark, Gruenther end Major Hunter played bridge. * * * TAVERNELLE-SEP!'EMBER 2, 1944--General Clark spent the day at his headquarters working on administrative matters and conferring with memb0rs of bis staff. He played badminton with General Gruenther in the late afternoon. Brigadier General B. o. Davis (colored) of the Inspector General's Office, Wer DeJ)8.rtment, and Colonel Bertholf dined with General Clerk in his mess. General De.vis is making an inspection tour or negro troops in the European theater. General Clark bade farevrell to Colonel Bertholf who is leaving Fifth Army for a new assignment with the War Department, Washington, D. c. * * * TAVERNELIE•-sEPTEMBER 3, 1944-At 0900 General Clark confen-ed with Generals Gruenther, Brann and Howard. At 1045 Mr. Clement Atlee, Deputy Prime Minister or England, arrived with General Lemnitzer. They were met by General Clark, and a guard of honor was held for Mr. Atlee. After trooping the line, the General escorted the Deputy Prime Minister to his van where he briefed him on the situation on the Fifth Anny front. Mr. Atlee left for 13' Corps at 1200. General Lemnitzer remained and conferred with General Clerk. At 1210 General Alemnder arrived to confer with Generals Clerk, Gruenther and Lemnitzer. Air Vioe flsrshal D1Albiac arrived at 1230 and was asked to join the conference. Generrls Alexander and Lemnitzer left for II Corps at 1300. �Air Vice Marshal D'Albiac lunched at General Cla.rk 1 s mess. General Clark and Colonel Saltzman lef't by L-5 for Pisa, arriving at the Pisa airport at 1330 where they were met by General Crittenberger and General Rutledge. General Clark and party toured the cit,- of Pisa, visiting points of interest, including the Leaning Tower. The General returned to his command post a.t 1730. General Sullivan, Fifth Army Quartermaster, came for dinner. Af'ter dinner the General entertained officers of his staff at a movie in his conference but. * * * TAVERNELLE•-sEPTEMBER 4, 1944-•General Clark went b,- oub at 0945 to visit the 34th Division. Arriving at the Castel Fiorentino cub strip, he was met by General Bolte, Commanding 34th Division, and General Tate, 34th Division Ar• tillery Commander. General Clark decorated seven artillery flying officers with Air Medals. After a short ceremon,-, General Clark and General Bolte drove to the command post of the 168th Infantry where General Clark presented decorations and made combat promotions to officers and men. The General spoke briefiy to the troops, oommend1.ng them on the fine job that the 34th Di• vision has done and briefing them on the part they would play in the coming operations. After the ceremony, General Clark observed the training program of a platoon in attack. General Clark lef't the 168th at 1330, arriving at the 175th FA Battalion where he made four combat promotions. After a short ceremony, General Cla.rk observed a training gun drill. The General then drove to the 133rd Infantry where he presented decorations and made comoot promotions, after which he ob• served training of tank and infantry tactics. General Clark and J:E1,rty then drove to the 135th Infantry where General Clark presented decorations and made combat promotions. The Army Commander spoke briefly to the troops. General Bolte entertained General Clark for lunch at the 34th Division Headquarters .. After lunch General Clark briefed staff officers of the 34th Division on the over-all plan of the 5th and 8th Arm,- attacks, pointing out the important part this division would play in the attack. General Clark then left for the Castel Fiorentino cub strip where he took off by cub for the 91st Division cub strip in the vicinity of San Gimignano. He was met by General Livesay. The Army Comma.nder decorated and promoted field artillery personnel on the cub field. General Clark and General Livesa,- drove to the 348th Field Artillecy Battalion where they observed the training program. Following this, the General drove to the 362nd Infantry where he spoke to a battalion in review and presented decorations and made combat promotions and appointments. General Clark visited the 363rd Infantry where he presented decorations, made comba.t promotions and appointments and spoke to the troops. General Clark then drove to the, 36lst Infantry where he presented decorations, made combat promotions and observed a training exercise consisting of an attack of a fortified position. Leaving the 361st Infantry, General Clark drove to the com• mand post of the 91st Division where General Livesay introduced him to members of his staff. - General Clark spoke briefly to members of the staff, giving the over-all picture of the Fifth and Eighth Army fronts. �General Clark then departed for the 91st Division cub strip, from which point he new be.ck to his headquarters. The General dined quietly with the regular members of his mess. General Kirkman today sent the following note to General Clark: "I have discussed the time of H hour with Maj-Gen. Russell, Commander While it has not been possible to go into the question in detail, I am satisfied that 0200 hours will be suitable. 8 Indian Division. "Should it be necessary to alter this time, I would prefer it to be earlier rather than later." Operations Instruction #34 was issued today and reads as follows: "l. German withdrawal on the Fifth Army front has permitted advances of Fifth Army elements in contact with the enemy. Such advances have therefore accomplished part of the Phase I plan envisioned in o. I. #32. "2. Eighth Army oont1nues the attack to debouch into the PO Valley and advance to the north and northwest. ".3. a. Fifth Army continues its current follow up action to maintain contact in the event of further enemy withdrawals. b. Phase I: Fifth Army attacks on D Day to complete Phase I by securing the general line of the hills M. GIOVI - M. CALVANA - M. SENARIO M. 1,{)RELLO (See Overlay) or such parts thereof as may remain occupied by enemy forces. (NaI'E: Prior to initiation of Phase II, action to capture MONl'I DELLA CALVANA, or parts thereof, will be undertaken with minimum forces if it appears imperative that the hill mass be occupied to facilitate further advance). c. Phase II: Thereaf'ter, Firth Army attacks with the mission of penetrating the GOTHIC Line and debouching into the PO Valley. "4. a. IT Corps will: (1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5) (6) Regroup its forces to hold the M. PISANO and M. ALBANO hill masses with a minimum of troops. Make every effort to withdraw to Corps Reserve as great a portion of the 1st Armored Division as possible. Maintain contact with the enemy and follow up any withdrawal with all possible speed. No advance in strength beyond the line PISTOIA - LUCCA - BAGNO ( U 9977) will be made except on orders from this Headq~ters. Continue to simulate a build up in the M. ALBANO area and on D t 1 demonstrate in the PRATO and PISTOIA areas to indicate an advance to the North and Northwest. Maintain contact w:i.th II Corps. Protect the left flank of Fifth Army. �(7) b. Be prepared in the event of enemy collapse, to advance, with one infantry division, reinforced, on LA SPEZZIA (P 600120). IZ1) Maintain contact prior to D Day and follow up any enemy Corps will: withdrawal. Begin immediate movement forward to attack positions, assuming command of the southern portion of its new sector at 042000B September and of the remainder at o60001B September (See par 8 below for boundaries). 13 Corps elements in forward area of II Corps zone of action after o6oOOlB September pass to operational control of II Corps. (3) Phase I: On D Day, attack to the North and Northwest within its new zone of action to capt~e and secure M. CALVANA (Q 893799) - M. SENARIO (Q 859820) - M. l.DRELLO (Q 776808). Then, if necessary, continue the attack to secure MONTI DELLA CALVANA (or parts thereof) using initially one RCT onl;r. (2) (4) Phase II: On Army order, continue the attack to the North making its main effort along the axis FLORENCE FIRENZtJOLA (L 9006) to penetrate the GOTHIC Line and debouch in the PO Valley. c. lt Corns will: 1) Maintain contact prior to D Day and follow up any enemy withdrawal. (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Cover the movement and assembly of II Corps troops and hold forward positions until passed through by II Corps assault elements or relieved by Army order. Regroup its forces for the D Day attack. Phase I: On D Day, coordinating its effort with II Corps, attack to the North to capt~e and secure M. GIOVI (Q 95rt796). Phase II: On Army order, continue the attack to the North and Northeast along the axis BORGIO S. LORENZO FAENZA to penetrate the GOTHIC .Line and debouch in the PO Valley. To facilitate the advance of II Corps initially 13 Corps will make its ma.in effort on its extreme left. l'mintain contact with II Corps and Eighth Army. Protect the right flank of Fifth A:rmy. "5. It is contemplated the BEF will be attached to IV Corps on or about j 12 September. Attachment orders will issue by this Headquarters. "6. II Corps will prepare plans for the employment of a strong mobile force in an exploitation role to the Northwest on reaching the PO VAlley. For this p~ose the 1st Armored Division will be made availl!ble. Direct communication is authorized for planning purposes. "7. In the event of enemy withdrawal prior to 052400B September, re- �sponsibility for pin-suit in the II Corps attack sector remains with 13 Corps. Effective 06o001B September, this responsibility passes to II Corps. In the event of collapse of enemy resistance, instructions for advance into the PO Valley will be issued by this Headquarters generally in accordance with Excelsior Plan 'A'. "8. Botmdaries: a. (See OVerlay). Effective 042000B September: (1) II - IV Corps: No change. (2) II - 13 Corps: Incl 13 Corps - RJ at GREVE (833472) • thence incl II Corps - s. POLO (870571) - Pt 900667 ·thence incl 13 Corps - Pt 90Cfl04 - Pt 901741 - Pt 903750 Pt 870750 - Pt 870710 - Pt 750710 thence North along 75 Easting. b. Effective 060001B September. (1) I! - IV Corps: No change North to Q 720630 - thence all incl II Corps - Pt Q 750710 - Pt 66o795 - Pt 66o830 Pt 688862 thence along road to L 725100. (2) II - 13 Corps: No change North to Pt Q 903750 thence incl 13 Corps - Pt 916793 - Pt 912808 - thence along T. FISTONA (incl II Corps) to 917870. c. Phase II, effective on Army order: (1) II - IV Corps - No change. (2) II - 13 Corps - Pt 840790 - thence incl II Corps• Pt 838776 - Pt 840790 - thence incl 13 Corps - RJ 845823 - thence incl II Corps - RJ 852845 - Bridge 872889 - RJ 882892 • RJ 911931 - Pt 436 (92596o) Pt m991 - Pt 1171 (L 967030) - Pt 995067 - thence all incl 13 Corps - Pt 1031 (M Ol6o98) - Pt 756 (038124) - Pt 514 (081162) - RJ 138241 - 208302. (NOTE: To facilitate initiation of Phase II, II Corps will clear the road FLORENCE - BORGO s. LORENZO (Q 905885) and the area East of the Phase II bo'lmdary with all possible speed.) "9. D Day - Corps will be prepared to attack at any time after 080001B September. H Hour - LRter. 10. The Army Artillery Officer is charged with necessary coordination of artillery fires. 11 "ll. Security - Plan ARNO TWO, having accomplished its pin-pose, is no longer in effect. Every effort will be made to conceal the direction and strength of Fifth Army's main effort." * * * TAVERNELLE--SEPTEMBER 5, 1944--Genera.l Clark spent the morning in his van conferring with members of his staff. At 1130 he flew to see General Keyes at ��~ ~ p.~e- fib- ~ II Corps where he remained one hour. Upon his return to his command post, he bade farewell to General B. O. Davis. After lunch Generals Clark and Brann and Colonel Saltzman drove to FloUpon their arrival, they went to the Fifth Army Officers• Rest Center at the Hotel Anglo-American. General Clark and // General Brann, with Captain Croft-Murray, AID Fine Arts Division, as guide, went for an hour's sight-seeing tour of the city. rence in General Clark's jeep. At 1700 hours General Clark went to a bridge across the Arno which had just been completed by the 337th Engineers. The General congratulated the officers and men on the fine job they had done and decorated the commanding officer, Colonel Hooper, with the Legion of Merit. After the ceremony at the bridge, General Clark went on a shopping tour with General Brann, General Gruenther, Colonel Saltzman and Lt. Col. Porter. Returning to the hotel at 1830, he entertained members of his staff for dinner and spent the night in Florence. During the week 13 Corps continued to progress in the area north and ~ east of Florence. II and IV Corps maintained their positions along the general line of the river and following a reconnaissance in force crossing operations were begun on the first of September. As the period closed, II Corps was exerting strong pressure all along the Monte Albano mass end IV Corps had occupied Pisa, cleared Monte Pisano and advanced to the general line of the Alto Paschio - Lucca road (including both towns), thence along the Serchio River. * * * TAVERNELLE--SEPTEMBER 6, 1944--Generel Clerk left Florence by car at 0930 and drove to his headquarters, arriving at 1030. The General spent the day in his van working on important papers and conferring with members of his staff. He played bridge in the evening with General Gruenther, Lt. Col. Gray, Judge Advocate General of Fifth Army, and Major Hunter of the G-3 Section. * * * TAVERNELLE--SEPTEMBER 7, 1944•-Generfll Clark spent a quiet day in his van conferring with members of his staff. In the evening Generals Clark and Gruenther, with General Hume, went to dine with Duchess Torriginani. Other guests at dinner were the Duke of Aosta, cousin of the King of Italy', and Admiral Mariano, his aide-de-camp. The General returned to his headquarters after dinner at about 1030. General Clark today wrote the following letter to General Marshall: "In order to keep you informed of certain importBnt conditions in the Fifth Army, I am sending another letter. "The 370th Combat Team of the 92nd Division (colored) has done well in combat. They have had no severe fighting. However, they have had an opportunity to cross the Arno River against slight opposition, take the high �V ground northeast of Pisa and conduct active patrolling against withdrawing enemy elements. Their morale is high. From August 26th to September 4th they had eight killed, seventy-eight wounded and two missing. I "With reference to the Brazilians, I found thBy had much to learn. Their officers were not trained to assume command responsibilities for such items as motor maintenance, sanitation, care of their enlisted men and their equipment. They were woefully lacking in small unit training. I have he.d my best tra:tners - a large group of selected, battle-trained officers and enlisted men from all our divisions - working ori them. We tried to condense their training into a two weeks' period but were forced to extend it to a third week. That third week ends in three days, when they will be put in the line. I intend to give them their battle inoculation in the IV Corps sector in the vicinity of Lucca. Here they will have an opportunity to patrol, to follow up if there is any retrograde movement and to come under the enemy fire. As soon as they have completed this inoculation satisfactorily, I will try to give them an opportunity in our attack. ) "The fate of the Fifth Army is tied up with that of the Eighth Army, which is not progressing any too well at the present moment of writing. They seem to be bogged down on the east coast. They are trying to get off an attack today, and if they put the weight behind it that they have available it might go. I hope to attack about forty-eight hours later. We are all set for the thrust over the mountains toward Bologna. It is ha.rd to wait, for we are quite ready and eager to go. General Ale::mnder is holding the lanyard, and when he pulls it we will be able to jump off with less than twenty-four hours• notice • . "I was distressed to note in recent press stories a statement, attributed to me, that I intend to retire immediately after the war and go fishing. I desire to assure you that I have no such intention. If the retirement story was brought to your attention you may have wondered why a relatively young officer who has received so much in the way of promotion and excellent command assignments in this war should throw away that experience if it can be used. It is my fervent desire that I reJM.in on the active list until I reach the statutory retirement age." The Army Commander today cabled the following to General Ma.scarenhas on the occasion of the Brazilian Independence Day: "General Mascarenhas, officers, men and nurses of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force: On this day when Brazil celebrates the anniversary of its establishment as a free and independent nation, I send you my personal end official greetings, and felicitations of the Fifth Army of which you are a member. "120 years ago today, 7 September 1822, Brazil severed the ties that bound her to Europe and proclaimed her independence. To the citizens of Brazil, this day is as sacred as is the 4th of July to the citizens of the United States of America. �"This year, Brazilian Independence Day finds you far from home. Yours is the first expedition ever to leave your homeland and cross the ocean, to join in the battle against those who would oppress freedom and independence. "Just as your forefathers fought to establish an independent Brazil, so too, you are fighting to restore freedom and independence to other nations of the world. t•we of the Fifth Army rejoice w5th you on this glorious holiday, d~dicated to the independence of Brazil." * * * TAVERNEILE--SEPTEMBER 8, 1944--General Clark ma.den Salerno Day speech recording to be sent back to the War Department. This is quoted in full at the conclusion o~ today's diary notes. Prince Umberto, Lieutenant General of the Realm, the Duke of Aosta and Admiral Pitu-ia.no arrived at noon for lunch, and General Clark held a guard of honor for them. Prince Umberto and pirty left immediately after lunch, and General Clark drove to the Hotel Anglo-American, the Fifth Army Rest Center Hotel, arriving at 1630. General Clark had a conference and dinner for the II Corps Commander, General Keyes, and the 13 Corps Commander, General Kirlanan. A total of eighteen guests were present, including Generals Gruenther; Bolte, Commanding 34th Division; Livesay, Commanding 91st Division; Coulter, Commanding 85th Division; Kendall, Commanding 88th Division and the Chiefs of Staff of these divisions. General Clark briefed the group on the plan of attack. The guests left at 2130, and General Clark returned to his command post, arriving at 2230. General Clark's Salerno Day recording reads as follows: ttJu..qt a year ago, on September 9, 1943, the Fifth Army - with the first American troops to land on the continent of Europe in this war launched the opening assault on Adolf Hitler's impregnable European fortress. "In the year tha.t has elapsed since our landing at Salerno Bay, great things have happened. The German Army, though thoroughly beaten in North Africa and Sicily, was still - a year ago, one of the fighting forces of the world. Almost the entire European continent then was suffering under the German heel. ttBut now - a year after the Fifth Army struck the blow for liberation of Europe - the entire rotten Nazi structure is shaking. The German Army is reeling from attack after attack from the West, the South and the East, from the a.ir and from the sea. Nazi satellites are deserMng the foundering ship. Hitler is striving desperately to hold together his beaten and disspirited people. The Germans today know that the end is approaching, and that it is only a matter of time now before they Fire defeElted. ttThe roe,d for this drrunA.tic turnabout in the fortunes of this war was �paved - in part - here in Italy. Here the joint Allied effort of the Fifth and Eighth Armies proved that Allied troops could land on enemy territory and not only stay there, but press the Germans back. "This drive has cost us heavily in men and materiel. Thousands of American, British and French soldiers lost their lives fighting in Italy, and thousands more were wounded or taken prisoner. From Salerno Bay through Rome and to the North, the Fifth Army was literally fighting its way up hill, over some of the most treacherous battlefields in the war. At all times the enemy was able to select his own ground, with the result that at virtually every stage of the campaign, the enemy was looking dmm our throats. "With a few men he oould - and often did - delay our advanoe by weeks. But in spite of every obstacle, these gallant soldiers of the Italian campaign did advance - across the Volturno and the Garigliano, through the Gusta.v and the Hitler lines; over the Maggiore and Cairo hill masses. The names of Battipaglia, Naples, San Pietro, CA.ssino, Formia, Velletri, Leghorn these are names which will live in the history of warfare; communities, now barely recognizable as such, where Allied soldiers fought gloriously and with surpas<ing courage, so that Fifth Army could go forward. "Anzio was an operation which will stand forever as a monument to the tenacious fighting quality of Fifth Army soldiers. Here, hemmed in on a narrow beachhead by the Nazis best troops, for week after week the beleagured forces withstood massed armored and infantry attacks, incessant air raids and continuous shelling. "The great viotory march of the campaign began May 11, as the Fifth Army on the Garigliano, and the Eighth Army troops further East, broke through German defenses snd drove North. Less than two weeks later the main Fifth Army in the South had jojned the Beachhead forces and together they continued on to Rome - to seize our first enemy capital in the war. Never before in all its tumultuous history had the Eternal City been taken .from the South. / And thA speed with which our forces pressed on, then, to the ·Arno lfiver was perhaps unprecedented. "For what has happened in the year since the Salerno Bay landings, all of us are proud and grateful. To the American, British and French soldiers who made this great Fifth A:rmy victory possible, we give our thanks and undying appreciation. But let us pause a moment in respect to those Americans, who, with their Allied comrades, made the supreme sacrifice in order th~t we might continue on. To them the free world of tomorrow will forever be indebted. Their deeds will never be forgotten. To the soldiers of Salerno now in their homeland or in combat in France, Italy or elsewhere, the Fifth Army renders a salute on this Salerno Day." * * * TAVERNELLE--SEPTEMBER 9, 1944..-At 0900 Maj. Gen. Partiger, AFHQ AA Officer called to see General Clark with General Bradshaw. Air Vice Marshal Dickson of the Desert Air Force arrived at 1230 to see the Army Commander. At 1300 General Clark decorated and promoted some 100 members of his staff. �At 1430 General Clark attended the USO show and concert at his headquarters. At 1500 the Army Commander watched exhibition boxing matches at which he met Joe Louis who was appearing on the day's schedule. At 1445 General Clark drove to the Fifth Army mobile radio station where he was introduced to Lieutenant Carstensen, Manager of the station, and members of the station staff. At 1700 Salerno Day program went on the air, and General Clark gave his Salerno Day speech. At 1730 General Clark gave a cocktail party for 500 officers of his headquarters, at which time he promoted Lieutenant Carstensen to 1st Lieutenant. General Clark shook hands with all members of his staff. After dinner Generals Clark and Gruenther and Colonel Saltzman attended a band concert given by the Grenadier Guards Band, after which General Clark retired. General Clark today received from General Mascarenhas the following reply to his cable of congratulations on Brazilian Independence Day: "I acknowledge receipt of your honorable message, concerning the date of Brazil's independence. "At present we E1re not only allies but true brothers in Arms, united by the same ideals in the struggle against the oppressors of people; your mes• sage demonstrates unmistakeably the bounds of sympathy and friendship as well as the identical sentiments which bind our country to your great country. "I am grateful then to you and to the Fifth Army in both my name and that of my staff for your affectionate expressions of cordiality and friendship which you expressed for our country and our troops." * * * TAVERNEUJE--SEPTEMBER 10, 1944--At 1000 hours the Right Honorable Mr. Amery, Secretary of State for India, Maj. Gen. Burch, Indian Army Lia5son and party arrived to visit General Clark. A guard of honor was held for the party. General Clark briefed lllr. Amery on the current tactical situation, after which the Secretary of State for India. and party left for 13 Corps. At 1115 Genera.ls Alexander, Harding and Lenmitzer arrived for a conference which lasted approximately one hour. Air Vice i~rshal Dickson arrived shortly thereafter for lunch with the Army Commander. After lunch ·General Clark flew to IV Corps where he decorated General Crittenberger, Corps Commander, with the Distinguished Service Medal. General Clark returned to his headquarters at 1700, played badminton with General Gruenther and dj_ned with the regular members of his mess. The Army Commander today received the followj_ng cable from General Alexander: "Confirming recent decisions g1.ven by C-in-C verbally, Fifth Army will develop their operations with a view to launching their maih attack on the Gothic Line on 13 September or as soon as possible efter. Meantime Eighth �Army will drive enemy north of the MArana. River and be prep~red to lFl.unch their main attack against the enemy position running southwest from Rimini approximately '24 hours A ter Fifth Army launch their attack on the Gothic .f Line. Fifth Army will signal the date of their main attack direct to Eighth Army repeated this headquarters imMediatel~ it is firrn. "Priority for air support is given to Fifth Army up to end inclusive 15 September, but C-in-C looks to Fifth Army to restrict demands to the essential minimum for 14 a.nd 15 September. In that WAY C-in-C hopes that sufficient air resources will be available to meet the essential requirements of both Armies on those two days. Priority for air support subsequent to 15 September will be decided later by C-in-C according to the way in which the sit'UE!tion develops." General Leese, CoMma.nding Eighth Army, sent the following cable to General ClP.xk today: "My very best wishes to you and the Fifth Army for a great success in your forthcoming operation. I look forward to our joining hands in the Po Valley. The best of luck." * * * TAVERNELLE-•SEFTEMBER 11, 1944--At 0830 Generals Clerk and Brann flew to the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in the vicinity of Vada. The P.:rrny Commander was met at the airfield by General Mascarenhes, Commanding General of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, and Colonel Brisach and Captain Walters, Fifth Army liaison officers. General Clark observed a training program, visiting ROT Headquarters where he was met by General Zenobio, Commander of the 6th Brazilian Combat Team. With Generals Mascarenhas and Zenobio, Generals Clark and Brann visited artillery battalion headquarters and infantry ba.ttali.on command posts where they observPd combat training. The Arrrry Comander returned to his headquarters at noon and at 1230 Lieutenant General Anders of the Polish Corps, with General Lenmitzer and Lt. Col. Szymanski, Polish Liaison Officer, arrjved for lunch. A guard of honor was held for General Anders. General Clark spent the afternoon in his van following the departure of General Anders, working and conferring with members of his staff. * * * TAVERNELLE-..SEPTEMBER l?, 1944--General Clf'l.rk flew to Florence et 0800 and was met by Colonel Smith, Headquarters Commandant, Colonel Hooper of the 337th Engineers and drove to see the site of the proposed new command post in the park in Florence. At 0830 General Clark drove in his jeep to the II Corps Headquarters in the vicinity of Pratolino where he was met by General Keyes with members of the II Corps staff and General Coulter. General Clark presented General Keyes wUh the Oak Leaf Cluster to the Silver Star. General Clark then spoke to the II Corps staff, telling them how confident he was of the prospects of the battle. General ClRrk then drove with Generals Keyes and Coulter to the 338th Infantry command post. Gene• ral Clark spoke to several of the officers and men. He then drove to the 91st Division command post where he was met by General Li.v esay who br:i efed �him on the current situ1'tion. The Army Commander then drove to the II Corps a.rtill"ry observation post in the vicinity of Snn Piero where he could observe mountain features rmd terrain of the Gothic Line to which the 85th and 91st Di~ visions were committed. He also could observe fighter bomber missions working on objectives just ahead of our front line troops. General Clark then drove to Florence to the II Corps cub strip where he took off for his headquarters. L I At 1230 the Anny Commander held a press conference and lunch for forth newspaper corresrondents. General Clerk briefed them on the plan of his attack a.nd what we could expect. After lunch General Clark returned to his van where he rested and worked during the A.fternoon. General Sullivan, General Hardig~, of the Office of the QuartermA.ster General, Genervl Chidlnw, Air Vice Marshal Dickson were guests of the General for dinner. During the week ending September 12, 1944, determin"d, aggressive y:etrol work was successful in maintai.ninp; contact as the enemy genernlly withdrew to_ his Gothi) position and our troops i;;ained considerable ground north of tbe Arno River. The attack by II Corps to penetrate the Gothic Line was launched "nd wns neveloping favorably ns the period closed. · * * TAVERN'"~LLE--SF.FTEMBER 13, 1944--General Clark flew to the II Corps cub strip in the vicinity of Pratolino, arr:iv:ine at ninl"! o'clock. He was met by Colonel Wil• lems, Chief of Staff of II Corps, and briefed on the current situation. The Army Comman<ier then drove to the 1st British Infantry Division where he was met nnd briefed by '·~ajor General Loewen. The Army Commander then drove to 13 Corps Headqua.rtl'!rs where he conferrt'ld with ~neral Kirkman. After 13 Corps General Clark visited the 8th Indian Division, where he wRs met and briefed by C~nernl Russell. Ee then drove to II Corps Headquarters where he tA.lked to Colonel Forter, Corps Deputy Chief of Staff . The General then drove to the 85th Division where he conferred with General Coulter and from here :ent·to the 34th Division where he lunched with General Bolte. After lunch the Army Commander drove to the 91st Division to confer with GenP.rtl.l 11.veso.y. General Clark then drove to Florence where he took off in his L-5 from the II Corps cub 3trip for his command post. The General dined quietly with the rl"gulnr memb"'rs of his mess. * * * FLOR~NCE--SEPTEHBE~ 14, 1944--General Clark moved his command post this morning to Florence. Frior to the move of the commRnd post, the Genernl se.w members of M.s staff. in his van. Maj. G<"'!n. Nace, G-1 of AFHQ, arrived at 1030 and conferred with General Clark for hnlf an hour. General Clark then took off by L-5 for the 1st Armored Division in the vicinity of Alto r>aschio. He was met nnd conferrt'ld with Genernls Crittenberger and Pritchnrd. After oonferrlng a.n hour, the Army Cornma.nder flew to Florence, arriving nt 1230, and lunched .nt the Anglo-American Hotel. After lunch General ClPrk flew to the II Corps air strip in the vicinity of San Piero. General Clark visited the 85th and 91st Divisions, met and talked with Generals Keyes, Coulter And Lives~y tind return~d to the hotel at 1700 hours, din:i.ng with Colonel Saltzrum and other guests. �FLORENCE--SEPTEMBER 15, 1944--General Clark arrived at his new headquarters in Florence at 0900. The Army Commander flew to the II Corps cub strip in the vlcinity of San Piero where he was met by his jeep and driven to the 85th and 91st Division command posts and II Corps Headquarters where he conferred with Generals Coulter, Livesay and Keyes. The Army Commander returned to his headquarters at 1630, dined w:i.th regule.r members of his staff and retired early. General Clark today cabled General Devers as follows: "I urgently request that in forwarding to the War Department current recommendations for promotion to the grade of general officer you follow my priorities. Your disregard of my recommendation in the case of Jay has embarrassed me considerably. The officers whom I recommend have served under my direct command and under the close observation of Corps Commanders, and we know exactly the priority in which these officers should be promoted. Your selection of Jay, .who was the last man on my list, has created a. difficult situation for me and for the II Corps Commander. If you are unable agein to follow my priorities I request that my views be sent with yours to the War Department. I urgently recommend that Colonel Niblo be included in the next list. You will remember he was approved by the War Department several months ago. He is the most deserving man in the Fifth Army for promotion. 11 The Army Commander cabled the following congratulatory message to General Kirkman today: "I am delighted w:tth the progress which has already been made by 13 Corps. Please accept my gratitude for the substantial contribution by your troops to the Fifth Army attack. 11 * * * FLCRF.NCE--SEPTEMBER 16, 1944--General Chirk conferred w:tth Genera.ls Gruenther, Brann and Howard in front of Ms van at 0830 this morning before leaving by L-5 for the II Corps cub strip in the vicinity of San Fiero. Here he was met by his jeep and visited the 34th, 91st and 85th Divisions. The General confe?Ted with Generals Kirkman, 13 Corps Commander; Keyes, II Corps Commander; Bolte, 34th Division Commander; Coulter, 85th Division Commander; and Livesay, 91st Division Commander. General Clark returned to his command post at 1730 and dined with the regular members of his mess. * * * FLORENCE--SEPTEMBER 17, 1944-eAfter the 0830 conference with Generals Gruenther, Brann and Howard, General Clark attended church services at 1000 hours. He spent the rest of the day in his\ van working on papers and conferrjng with members of his staff. At At 1900 Grassi, General 1730 he called on the Umberto Colleti's for tea with General Gruenther. General Clark d1ned at the home of Mr. & Mrs. Arturo Grassi. Mrs. an American lady from Indianapolis, is a mutual frjend of many of and Mrs. Clark's friends. �FLORENCE--SEPTEMBER 18, 19/44--After the conference at 0830, General Clark took off by L-5 for San Fiero. He was met by General Keyes and ~riven to the 85th Division where he talked with General Coulter. Following this conference, he drove to the 91st Division to see General Livesay and then to the 34th Division to see General Bolte. General Clark returned to the command post for lunch and spent the ti.fternoon in his van. This evening the General dined with the regular members of his mess. General Clark today sent the following message to General Mascarenhas: "Upon a previous occasion, when welcoming the Brazilian Expeditionary Force to the Fifth Army, I remarked th,it we expected grea,t things of an organization which displayed such ability and enthueiasm in training. "The performance of the BEF during its in1tial commitment to combat \ \ in a Fifth Army sector indicates that our expectations will be justified. Your troops, under your leadership, entered the line confidently, seized the ini.tiative, and moved forward with determination, occupying successive \ key terrain features in the course of their initial advance. "Despite the presence of demolitions and heavily mined areas and of hostile observation from commanding heights which permitted the foe to direct artillery fire against. men of the BEF, your troops went resolutely forward. Not only has the BEF started out in combat with a commendable spirit, but it has already shown ability to coordinate its operations with adjacent troops, indicating good leadership ana sound knowledge of combat technique. "Within a matter of hours after L."l.11nching your first attack, you captured the town of Massarosa. I am confident the.t this is but the first of many military objectives which subsequent operations will list as 'captured by the Brazilian Expeditionary Force 1 • 11 * * * FLORENCE•• SEPTEMBER 19, 1944--After the 0830 morning conference with his Chief of Starr, G-2 and G-3, General Clark saw Air Vice Marshal Dickson in his van to bid him farewell. At 1000 hours Mr. Antonini, Vice President of the A, F. of L., Mr. George Boldanzi, Vice President of the C. I. o., Messrs. Thomas O'Brien, Lanthor of the British Trade Union Congress, Colonel Smith, Director of Labor Sub-Commission ACC Rome, \~jor Siccula, British officer with the Labor Sub-Commission ACC Rome, and Major Grimsley, ADC to General Alexander, crune to see General Clark. General Clark oriented them briefly on the current situation, after which the British Labor representatives drove to 13 Corps, and Mr. Antonini and Mr. Boldanzi drove up to the cub strip in the vicinity of San Fiero where they met General Clark who flew in after spending fi~teen mjnutes enroute from his cormnand post with General Kirkman of 13 Corps. General Clark and party then dro,re to the command post of the 85th Division on Mount Altuzzo where they were met by Generals Keyes and Coulter. After a short briefing by General Coulter, the party proceeded up the mountain to an observation post overlooking the town of Barco and the terrain north toward Firenzuola. On the summit of Mount Altuzzo, which had only been taken the day before, there were still a great many dead Germans and fantastic devastation to be seen. ��9( Artillery fire could be observed and targets were in clear vie\v. General ClA.rk E!.nd party then droYt'! to the II Corps strip :in t~e vicjnity of San Piero, stopping enroute to eat K rations near a prison~r of war enclosure. General Clark, with an interpreter, jnterviewed several of the Gr.rm~n rrisofll'!rs. The General then flew to an a:ir strip north of Pisa •vhere he was met by General Cr1ttenberger, after which he visited the 45th AAA Headquarters and decorated General Rutledge with the Legion of r,nerit. He then drove to the Brazilian Expeditionary Force Headquarters where he talked with Generals Mascarenha.s and Zenobio. He returned by plane to his c0mmand post at 1700. General Clark gave a birthday party for Colonel Saltzman at the AngloAmerican Hotel. Gen~rals Gruenther, Brann, Moran, Colonels Wood and Saltzman and six other euests were rresent for dinner. The progress of the bA.ttle for the week end:tng Septemb~r 19th 5s as follows: Excellent progress was rrade along the entire front. The enemy position was weakened on the r-i ght as our forces drove a deep wedge into the heavily defended Gothic Line, CApturing the strong points - Mount Altuzzo and Mount Patrone in the Apennine wall, and accelerating the drive toward the Firenzuola area as the period closed. On the left, contact with the enemy was mro ntained 1rn unrelenting pressure forced his outposts further north ge_ nerally beyond the 90 northingil The Sixth CoMbat Team of' the Brazilian Bxpedi tiorw,r_y For_ e enteri,d the lin..,. nort c of Pisa as the ~irst South American troops fign~ing on overseas soil. * * * FLORE~ICE--SEJ,TEMBER 20, 1944•-General Chldlaw came to see C'reneral Cuirk jrnrnedit=i.tely following his staff conference this morning. At 1100 General Alexander and Mr. Oliver Littleton, Minister of Production oP Great Britain, arrived, and a guard of honor was held. General Clark briefed Mr. Littleton on the sitUPtion and conferred with General Alexander. Generals Alexander n.nd ClPrk, Mr. Littleton and General Chidlaw then drove from Gener~l Clark's Headquarters to the command post of the 85th Division where they were met by Generals Keyes, Coulter and Kendall. Generals Alexander, Clark and Coulter drove to an observation post on the SUJnmit of !fount Altuzzo. Enroute Generals Clark and Coulter rointed out terrain features nnd ~enerally oriented General Alexander on tte situation. On the summit of Altuzzo, Colonel Grogan, with severnl newspaper reporters, appeared and interviewed Generals Clark, Alexan::ler and Wir. Littl~ton. Enroute to Florence, General Clark and re.rty stopped in the field for a K ration lunch. Returning to Fifth Army Headquarters rt Florence at 1530, General Alexander and Mr. Littleton left immediately for AAI Headquarters at Siena.. General Clark spent most of the a~ternoon in his van and went to the AngloAmerican Hotel for a hot oo.th and returned for supper at his command post. * * FLORENCE--SEFTE11!3I:R 21, 1944--Imrnediately follovr.i.ng the 0830 conference this morning General Clark saw Maj. Gen. ~. C. Conch, Engineer General, AFHQ, with General Bowman, Fifth Army Eng:i neer, in his van. The r~st of the morning the General spent working on papers and conferring wjth VArious members of his staff. �After lunch Gl'!neral Cl~rk, with General:') Gruenther a.nd Hume, drove to Pis• tois. where they made a. sight-seeing tour of t},e city, after wti ich they drove to Montecatani wherl'! they 5nspected a suggested rest c11mp for Fifth Army personnel. The General returned to }1is headquarters nt 17'~0 and dined wit} GenerAl Brann in Florence. General Clark today issued the f ollovring directive to his subordint"te commanders: "1. Fifth Army operations in the PO ~,alley may fnll into two quite different types of action. The first of these possible or1erations is based on the assumption that Fifth Anny will debouch in the PO Valley in the vicinity of I~10LA while major German formations are still engaged with the Eighth Army generaJly Rast of CESENA (M 6007). The second is based on the assumption thRt the enemy troops now facing Eighth Army on the East oot'lst w.ithn.raw from that area prior to the time Fifth Army debouches into the !MOLA area. 11 2. Assumption 1. a. General - It is no 1 most probable that the 88th Infantry Di vision of II Corps, operating on the FIRE iztrOLA - !MOLA rood, will be the first Fifth Army division to break out into the PO Valley. Units of 13 Corps, operating on the right of this division, should break out shortly after the 88tr Infantry Division. 13 Corps plans call for the debouchment of units of this Corps generally in the vicjnity of FAENZA. It appears from terrain studies thet the best defensive position against a n thdrawal of G"JrmA.n forces facing Eighth Army would be gen~ra7ly along the LAfvOrJE River to the confluence River RF,NO and VALLI Di COMACCHIO. If units of II Corps thnt ha.ve d.ebouched in the IM01A are.-i. are in contact gen~rally along t}, is selected line, it may be necessary for 13 Corps to debouch f'rom its present maJn axis by lateral roads North nnd West of FAf~UZA. As rapidly a.s tJ-,is Corps can be debouched, it sl1ould be employed in tl e right sector of this possible defensive position. b. IT Corps tasks. (1) If GermAn troops A.re still facing the Eighth Army, generally East of C'ESE'•TA, it is important that II Corrs i111P1ec'iiately estnblfoh a bRse in the vicinity of rr:nLA and rom that base dispntcl , forces as far East as possible to ~in contact with the re,:ir of the German elements, demolish roo.ds and cover other Fift}, Army units that must be immedjptely sent out to take rositions across the maj_n highways to prevent the withdrawal of German forces. The forces required for this operation depend entirely upon enemy forces engaged with the Eiehth Army but plans should be ma.de to debouch at lea.st two U. s. D:i.v:isions heavily reinforced with artillery, tanks and tank destroyer units as rapidly as possible a.nd rresent pla.ns should include the adjustment of our forces now in contact to make possible tl,e early release of additional infantry units to sup}'ort the 88th In.,.antry Division when it-oomes out into the valley. The total number of u. s. troops thPt CA.n be broup)lt forward to reinforce troops engaged in this opl"lration will rlepend to a grent extent upon the condjtion of the road over which sup:rlie s must be moved. (2) As soon as possible after U. s. forces have come out into the PO Valley ;n the vicinity of IMOLA, a task f'arce will be immediately dispatched to the vicinity of' BOLOG 1A. his task force must include tanks, tank destroyers �and self-propelled artillery (Ind be sent there with the mission of blocking the routes of wi thdrl'l.vtal of nny German f'orces facing the center of the Fifth Arrrry forces. (3) 0 ome forces will have to be dispatched as far as FERRARA as protectjon against enemy troors threatening the left and rear of Fifth Army units fncin~ East. c. 13 Corps task: (1) Depend1ng on the situ~tion when advance units reach the FA'EtrZA areR, debouch into the PO Valley either directly North of FAENZA or sideslip to the left over lateral roads North and W est of FAENZA. (2) Occupy the :rj ght sector of the Lf\.MONF, line. 3. Assumption 2. a. General - In the event the enemy ~rmed forces now engaged on Eighth Army front have disengPged and withdrawn prjor to the deboucM.ng of Fifth Army forces into the PO Valley, Fifth Army will advance as rap-:dly as possible to the North to cross the FO River with the mission of securing T'!A11JT0l!A and 'mRO',TA and preventing the· movement of enemy f'orces Eastward. In tM.s cA.se, II Corps will: (1) Upon debouching into the ro Valley in the vicin:tty of IMOLA immediately send a task force to the OOLOCPTA area to block the routes of wj thdrawal of any German i'.' orces f'acing the left and center of the Fifth Army forces. This force must include tanks, tank destroyers and self-propelled arti111'ry. (2) Continue the attack, seizing crossings over the :ro River between BORGOFCF.TE and SBRMIDE. (3) Capture WUOVA and ,!El.O'TA. (4) Tnke up initial defensive positions along the Rivers mncro and •,lTZA. ( 5) Employing necessary minimum f9rces, refuse its left flank South of the PO River generally along the River E~TZA. (6) Be prepnred to exploit to the West. (7) Maintain contact with Eighth Army. b. !lO'!'E: All plans :made will be based on employment of not more than three infantry divisions and one Armored division. c. l '3 Corps will, after debouching into the PO Valley, revert to Eighth Army at a time to be announced later. There nriy be some delay in moving the 6 South African Armoured Division from IV Corps a.rea and returning it to 13 Corps but it wil] be accomplished at the Mrliest practicable opportunity. 4. Under either assumption IV Corps will: a. Continue to advance to the iJorth. b. Release 6 South African Armoured DiVisio:1 to 13 Corrs at the earliest opportunity. �c. Prot"'ct Fifth Army left flank. d. Maintain contact with II Corps." General Alexander today wrote General Clark as follows: \ "I have just heard that having cleared up the FORTtTNATO ridge, lea.ding troops of Eighth Army have reached RIMINI and the 1,1i.RRECHIA river with little or no opposition. Leese I know intends to launch the 'Jew Zealand Div and 5 Canadian Armd Div to follow up as soon as he can get bridgeheads across the river. As l Br Armd Div have b~en heavily engaged and have had considerable losses, the launchinF-; of N.Z. Div and the Canadinn Armd Div will leave Eighth Army without any fresh armoured formation to sustain their advance, which they will neii,d more than ever now that 90 P.G. Div has bngun to aprea.r on their front. I am therefore extremely anxious to as•}emble an arnoured division in reserve behind Eighth Army as quickly as possible. "I had originally l1oped that it would have Div over the mounta:ins to join in the battle in roads so hea:rily demolished I think it will now by the East coast, where they will also he most and reinforce, or go through the lfew Zealanders been possible to pasr; 6 .Armd the PO Valley, but with the be quicker to move them round suitably ple.ced to follow up and Canadians. "I realise that you too will be hard rressed for reserves, but as the battle hns d!'lv"'loped I think Kirkman should be able to do all that is possible on his front to assist your battle with l Br and ~ Ind Div. In fA.ct I feel sure he will not be able to maJntain all of those two divisions forward. As the front loosens up, which it shovrs signs of doing now, it looks very much a.s if 6 Arrnd Div will be 11.utomntically pinched out anyhow. Moreover I doubt if the armoured bri1:ytde is making any useful contribution to the battle now. "What I woulrt like therefore is to begin to move 6 Armd Div over to the East coast, startinP, with the armoured brigade and Div H.Q. as soon as Eighth Army can assemble the tr,msporters which will takl'! a few days, nnd following with 61 Inf Bile as soon as Kirkman can release it without detriment to your battle. 1 Gds nde which you hnve already very nobly released for 10 Corps could then re;join its divfoion in the F.ast c0c:'1.st sector as soon as tre enemy really begins to pull out on 10 Corps front, of which there r,re signs this morning. "I would like r, Armd Div H.Q. to be relea.sed At l'lbout the same time as the armoured brigade so that they can organise the move of the division and its assembly ln the Eastern sector, and I ~uggest that g Inrl Div could wHhout any diC'ficulty take over command of 61 Inf Bde as long as th;it formation rema.ins in th!'l line. "I me know out the me Know should be very grateful if you would examine these proposals and let as cioon as you can if you agree in principle. '"he staff can then work details. I shall be in all day so rerhaps you will ring me up and let what you think as soon a.s you have had time to examine the problem. "As you know, I am most anxious to avoid doing anyt'bing thvt would j_n any �95 way pre,judice your battle, but I run sure you will agree thr>t it will be to ev~ryone 1 s ndvantnge if we can get another ~rmoured division into reRerve during the course of the next week or so and into country where it can be used, and this seems to me to be the best rim quickest way of a.chievin~ that object. "I nm delighted to hear tlrnt your lea.ding troops are acrof-1s the SA""ITERllJO river. They have done mal;!lificently. All the best of' good luck today." * * FLOR'ENCE--SEJ'TEMBER 22, 1944--General Clark flew to the II Corps cub strip at San Fiero where he was met by his jeep and driven to the 85th Division command post i.n the vlcinity of Barco on Mount Altuz?..o. Here he wr,s met by Generals Keyes ~nd Coulter and conferred with them for B. short time. From thf'l coMmand post of the 85th Division, General ClElrk cPlled General Gruenther to order f'iP,hter bomber missions on thrM targ..,ts northwe"'t of Firenzuola. Thirty mi nut es lat~r General Clark could observe the bombers perform:ing their missions. Gen"rnl Brann arrived at the 85th Division Heedquarters and joiMd Generals Clark, Keyes and Coulter in oonference. Gen~rals Clro-k and Keyes then dro~e to an observntion post overlooking the valley of Pirenzuola where they could observe the enemy held hill features of Mount Bene, Freddi, Sasso Di Castro to the northeast, Canda to the north and La.fine to the northv,e 3t, as well as enemy and our mortar and artillery fire. Genernl Clark then left General Keyes and drove to the 88th Division in the vicinity of San F'ellegrino, just three mil"s southea.st of Firenzuola where he met and conferred with General Kendall. General Kendall stressed his rroblem of supply for the 349th and 350th Regiments, all of which had to be transported by nru.le on twelve-hour runs. Generi::1 Clnrk returned to the fi.-,ld at San Piero where he return"'d by L-5 to his com:r.iand post in Florence. Mr. Amberg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Vfar; Brigadier Gener,:il Greenbaum, Executive to the Under Secretary of War; Lt. Col. Knowles, Office of the Secretary of War; and Col. Mricon, clnssmate of GenerRl ClArk :>t West Point and also of the TTnder Secreta.ry of War I s Office, were the General's guests for dinner. * * FLORE??CE--SEPTET1BER 23, 1944--Following his 0830 conference this morning, General Clark conferTed for half an hour with !i'aj. Gen. Almond, Comnanding General of the 92nd Division. The Army Commander flew in his L-5 to the cub strip at San Piero at ten o'clock where he was met by Mr. Amberg, General Greenbaum, and Colonels Macon, Knowles and Grogan. Mr. Amberg t'lnd General Greenbmlm drove v~ith GenerRl Chi.rk in his jeep to the 85th Division in the vicinity of' Barco on 1."ount Altuzzo. Enroute GenerPl Cli:irk pointed out terrain features Rnd enemy fortifica.tions which the Fifth Army had overcome. At 85th Division headquarters General Coulter briefed General Clark and party on the current situation, after which General Cl.l'.lrk took the party to �an observation post overlooking the vn1ley of Firenzuola, pointing out key terrain features held by the enemy. Enemy artillery could be observed, as well as our artillery. Genernl ClA.rk returned to the cub strip at San Fiero, where he took off for his headquarters in Florence. The General spent the afternoon in his van, conferrinP, with members of his sta.ff. At 1730 n,1r. Amberg, General C'.rreenbaum and Colonels Macon, Grogan and Knowles came to say goodbye to General Cl.Rrk. After havinP, dinner with the regular members of his ness, General Clork took an hour's walk wjth General Gruenther and Colonel Saltzman and retired early to his van. General Clnrk cabled Genernl Uexnnder ns follows toda.y: "This heanquarters has been a.dvised that disembarkAtion of remainder of Brazilian Di vision will take place at Naples because Navy objects to Leghorn for reasons which are not clear. I urgently recommend that strong representations be mede to have these troops unloaded at ti,ghorn. Training can then be supervised- by my headquarters and entry into battle will be expedited by at least two or three weeks." * * * FLORE'flTCE--SEP.rEimER 24, 1944--Genere.l Clark remained in his van today, working on administrative matters ro1d conferring wj th VA.rious members of his stPff. In the evening h"' din~d with General Gruenther, Colonel SaltzmA.n and Mr. & Mrs. Grassi in his mess at the oomffl!3-nd post and then snw a movie in his conference hut. General Alexander today sent the following cable to General Wilson regarding the disembA.rluttion of the BraziliA.n Division at Naples: "I understand thRt for naval rensons disembA.rkA.tion of remn:inder of BrA.zilian Division is pl nned to take place at ~aples instead of Leghorn. It is most :important to get this division up quickly to oomplete its training under Clark and to get it into battle at earliest opportunity. As you know my mArgin over the enemy is narrow. By disembarking this division at Leghorn it will affect the hattl~ two to three weeks sooner and this mAY make all the difference. Incicl1imtally this would avoid serious loss in maintemnce tonnage causen by a rail move. I hope th~t you will be able to arrange mtters accordingly with C-in-C ~led. 11 General Leese sent General ClArk the following congratulatory cable today: 11 ~any congratulations to you and your Fifth Army on your great achievement in breaking throUP,h th!' mountains. The best of luck and may we join up soon." * * * FLOREl{GE--SEf'TF.JIDER 25, 1944--Follo,,ing his 0830 conference, the Army Commander remained at his oommand post all day to<1ay, working on an accumulation of papers and conferring with his staff. �In the afternoon he received ~nerAls Chidlaw and Cannon And discussed with them the employment or the Strntegic and Tactical Air Fcrces in support of Fifth Anny operations. The General dined with the regular members of his ness and retired to his van early in the evening. General Clnrk today replied to General Leese' congratulatory cable of yesterday as follows: 11 I deeply apprecinte your CP.ble of oonp:ratulrttions. The ta"'k of Fifth Army was made much easi"'r by th" splendid accomplishments of the court1geous troops of Eighth Army." * * FLORRNCE--SFJTEMRFR 26, 1944--GenerAl ClErk srent the mornfop; working in his van. At 1::no General Dutra, Brazilia.n Minister of War; Gimeral Mascarenhas, Commanding the Rrazili.a.n Expeditionary Force; General 7,enobio, CoillI!l1lnding the Brazilian Regimental Combat Team; Colonel Machado, Secretary to the Brazilian Minist•r or War; Maj. Gen. Wooten, Commanding TJ. s. Army Forces, South Atlantic; Brig. Gen. Kroner, n. s. Military Attache to Brazil arrived and were greeted by General Clark. A guard of ho~or was held for Generrl Dutra and party. General Clark then briefed General Dutra and other guests on the current Fifth Army situation. Generttl. Clark expressed to General Dutra the great honor and privilege for the Fifth Army to have Brazilinn troops fight1ng by their s:i.de. General Clnrk entertained Genernl Dutr~ and p>.rty at a buffet lunch in his conferl'!nce hut. r.~ny members of Genernl Cl:>rk' s staff were present. After lunch Genera.l Clnrk bade goodbye to Genern.l Dutra and party and spent a quiet afternoon in his van. In the evening the General dined with the regular members of his mess nnn retired early to his van. A summary of operations for the week ending September ?6th is as follows: Fifth Army cont:i nued its offensive to brenk through the enemy's defl"lnse positions and debouch into the IO Valley. TI Corps committed the 88th Division on the right and succeeded in breaching the Gal'IHC Line, seizing key features on the Tforth slopes of the APF. 1TI'ITNF: watershed, and, assisted by 13 Corrs attack on the rii:;ht, was threatening to slash cor,munications 11nd plug the escare routes of en.-,my forces engaged before F!jphth Army to such an extent that numerous counterattacks were being hurled recklessly across our front. The enemy was frantically shifting troops pi.ece-meal from qujeter sectors in nn effort to slow further progress toward the end of the period. On the left JV Corrs troops continued to aggressivelv r~trol, rn._q1ntaining oontact wjth the enemy, closel•r folloVJinf; up w~~ thdrawals along its front nnd attacking at some oints to gain local oryjectives and drive the enemy ~urther North. The 1st Armored Division(-) was detached from IT Corps P.nd rlaced on an alert status, under Arm~ control, for possible use in a rapid e:xrloitntion role. General Clar~ received the followin~ message today from General Alexanrler's Headquarters: �11 General Alexander has received the following messt-,ge from General Wilson: 'Please accept f'o:r Yourself and convey- to General Clark and General Leese my oongratufations on the operations of the rast week~ which hRve r1t least resulted in the brea.king of the Gothic Line and have pt!'lved the wav for further great victories. The skill and speed with which the Eighth Army was regrouped once more completel~, surprised Kesselring. This fl"l.ct and the determinrition of the advance resulted in the earlv breAch of the enemv 1 s most easterly defences and coupled with the bitter fighting which follows has forced him to use up more and more of his reserves on that flank. 'T'he determined ottA cks the Ameri• can and British troops of the Fifth Armv in most difficult country have now breached the Gothic Line at its strongest rlace and Fifth are ready to push forward into the plains. All this reflects the grePtest credit on the leader• ship of commanders, but it cnuld onlv hl"lve h~en achieved as a result of the grMt courage tmd skill displayed by officers e,nd other ranks. I hope that the crossin~ of the Rubicon will leed, as with a f'A.mous commander in the past, to decisive }Tictorv and the destruction of Kesselring' s Army. 111 * FLOR~NCE ... -SEPTBI'!BER 27, 1944--Following the conference, Genernl Clark flew at 0900 to the II Corps cub strip in the vicinity of Scarperia where he was met b;r Generals Dutra, Wooten, froner, Mascarenhas and Ke;ves. General Clark, with General Dutra and Ma.jor v:alters his interpreter, drove over Mount Altuzzo I ass. General Clark pointed out terrain features to G.neral Dutra, explainin~ the enemy defenses and relnting the difficult task in eaining this ground. He then drove to an OF overlook:tn~ the vane,, of Firenzuoln. ;.Jhere General Chi.rk pointed out to General fiutra and other 1s11ests the mountain featm·es over which 1'~ifth Army troops wer~ not" fiP,hting. Enem~v as well as Fifth Arm;r artiller;v fire and nllied fi~hter bomber missions oould be observed rrom the OP. General Clark then bade Bt)odbYe to General Dutra and pl'l!'ty and drove in his jeep down a roa<'l entirely under- enemy observation. to the 85th Division, two miles east of Fir"nzuol/3. where he conferr"'d with General Coulter. Having srent half an hour with General Coulter, General ClArk then d.rove to the 88th Division in the vicinity of San rellegrino where he was met by General Kendall, Acting Division Commander, and was briefed on the current sitootion. General Clark lunched with General Kendall at his headquarters. After lunch General Clark drove to the 88th Divis1.on cub strip two miles north of Ti':irenzuola where he was rnet b:v his cub plane, nnd he flew back to his headquarters jn Florence. The (}eneral dined with the regular members of his mess and spent a qujet evenjng in bis van. Genenil Clark toda.~, replied to General Wilson's cable of yesterday as follows: General Alexander has conveyed to me your congratul~tions on the operations of' the past vreek. I deeply appreciate your kind message and hope that we may shortlv 'succeed in destroving. the German armies in Italy." 11 * I �FLOREN'CE--SEFTEMBBR 28, lq/+4--Aftt'!r the early morninP, cxrnft'!rence Gl"!neral Clark flew to see General oole of the 6th South Afr:t can Armored Division, returning for lunch at his headqWlrters. G"'neral Almond, Comnnnding Genernl of the 92nd Division, luncht'!d with G1mera1 Clark. The Genl'!ral spent the af'ternoon in his van. He conferred for ::in hour with )fajor Gent'!rnl ~'looten, Commc.nding U. S. Arn1y Forces in the South f,tlantic. At 1600 Mr. Eown.rd of r-mc, who was givinP, his fi..rst Army Hour rndio broadcast from Florence tonight, came to see General Clark. The Gen~ral briefed Mr. Howard on the current ?ifth Army sitmtion. The Gt'!nernl d-1 ned quietl:r with the r~gulEi.r members of his mess this evening and retired earl:v to his mn. General ClArk received the following cable from General Leese upon his departure from command of the ~ighth Army: ''I ~.m so sorry that time is too short for me to see you to say goodbye before lea,rin~. I haw, i;reatlY ttppreciated our corrHal coo:reration throughout the carnrai~ and hope we mav m"!et again in another theater. The very best of luck to :vou. Hv hest 11ishes to Al Gruenther." * * * FLORF.NCE--SEFTBMBER 29, 1944--The General spent the entire day, following his earlv mornine confert'!nce, in his van working on administrative ml'1tters and conferring wjth various staff officers. In the afternoon General CL~rk went to the Anglo-American Hotel for a hot bath, after which he entertained Generals Gruenther, Sullivan, Bradshaw and Colon!'!ls Saltzman and Nygaard for a drink. Generals Clnrk and Gruenther, with Colonel Saltzman, dined with flr. anrl Mrs. A.rturo Grassi at t},eir home in Florence. General Cl.Rrk today replied to General Leese' message of ~,esterday as follows: "Your message deeply appreciated. I nm very sorry to see you leave. I have enjoved and apprecfated our nnr.;ocfrtion in this .joint campaign. Good luck in ~rour new assignment. 11 General Clark today received th~ following letter from Lt. Gen. Harding, Chief of Staff, AAI, regarding Allien Occupation of '1estern Italy: "Referenee this Feadqunrt~rs letter v1A/5Y, of 11 Serternber. "1. APJ1row1.l has now been given b;v A.F .H.Q. to the rroposals in Jf:1ra- graph 7 (a) & (b) • . 2. As regards the quecition of the attitude to be Pdopted towarns the VFtrious poHMc~l rArti.es in We<1tern Itttl:V, the Supreme Allied Commander has directed thAt the poli?Y of the A!lie~ Corym~nd will be to suprort the ~uth~rjty of the Government of Signor Bonomi which incluAes r~presentrtives of the six· 11 �loo principal parties in the State . because it is pursuing a policy effort, and in internal affairs and influences. ~he Government tion of the future constitution people are in a position freely The Allies are supporting this Government of ma.ximum Italian pt1rticipation in the war is pledged to the abolition of Fascist methods is also pledged to postponement of the quesof Italy until such time as the whole Italian to express their opinion. "It should be pointed out to the various political elements in Western Italy thtit it is their duty to cooperate to the full with the Allied Mj litro-y Government officials, who will seek to restore civil administration and public services; and that they will be expected to refrain from any political or industrial action which would hinder military operations, or undermine the position of the Italie.n Government · of Signor Bonomi. This will not prevent free expression of political opinion to the ex.tent which considerntions of securjty allow. "Contact between the political leaders of Western Italy and the Italian Government should be encouraged." * * FLORENCE--SEP'I'EMBER 30, 1944--'J'he General spent the · early part of the morning in h:ls van. At 1000 ,hours the Army Comr,1ander held a press conference for forty newspaper correspondents in his conference hut. General Clark explained to the coITespondents his future pl8ns and the prospects of the battle.· The General placed particular stress on the fine air support he has had and explained in detail to the corrfl}spondents the "Rover_ J2e" set-up. After the conference, General GJ;:i.rk talked to many o.,. tlie cor1~esponden-fs. Lt. Col. McCreary, PRO of MAF, told General Clark that his orientation on air-ground support was the clearest and most concise exrlanation he had ever heard and that he would mke a full report to ~neral Eaker on General Clark's press conference. 17 After lunch General Clark d.ro ve to 13 Corps in Bol'go Lorenzo. Enroute, he met General K~yes who joined him in his jeep. Generals Clerk, Kirkman and Keyes conferred for an hour in General Kirkm,m 1 s van, after which General Clark drove back to his oommand post 1n Florence. Brigadier and Mrs. Stayner and Brigadier Divers came to dinner with G~neral Clark this evening. Operations for the month of September may be summarized as follovrs: ~ • Ground Farces: A crossing in force all along the ARNO West of FLORENCE was begun to maintain contt1.ct at the beginning of the month as 13 Corps continued to gain ground rorth and Northeast of the city. Elements of II Corps ~ssed through the left of 13 Corps but enemy defensive positions were not fully developed nor a full-scale attack lt1.unched for severnl dnys until the 85th Div was committed on the right flank . While outer defenses of the GOTHIC Line were cracked and a penetration shortly begun a determj nedly fighting enemy made excellent use of rpugh terrain to prevent a rapid Pdvance or break-through. Strongpoint after strongpoint was taken but each successive feature was just as stubbornly defended though perhaps not as heavily fortified as the main positions . M. CALVI and M ALTO were captured but the form.tdable mass of M GAZZARO M' FAGGIO - M CAS'T'BL GTTERRINO lay ahead . M. ALTUZZO was won but the heights of M PRATmlE and M ACUTO next had to be scaled. FIREl!ZUOLA, Northeast of FUTA 1 ��l O[ PASS, '.'fas occupied but the twin pea.ks M FRF.DDI - M BENI and M GOGIOLA, M CANDA a.nd M CnLORETA surrounding it to thf"l North also had to be cleared. The 88th Div was employed on the riP,ht flank to drive toward !MOLA and reached M BAT"'IGLIA where repeated counterattacks and stiffened enemy resistance m,:,de further adv~nce verv difficult. The weiP,ht of the attack then shifted from the axis of the FIRF.NZUOLA - IMOLA Rood to Route 65 directed on BOLOGUA. M CA IDA was outflanked and :later secured, all these key features end m.'9.ny others were in our hnnds with the ~dvance continuing to rush forward as the period closed. 13 Corps relieved elements of II Corps, taking over the zone occupied on the right by the 88th Div, while continuing to attack Northeast l'l.long its front nnd genernlly conforming to the ma.in advance. In IT Corps sector PISA was occupied and the fKlt~ PISANO hill nnss cleared when the period opened. During the month ~·nilTE ft.IJ3A'N'O and the important tovms of PISTOIA, LUCCA and VIAREGGIO were ceptured. IV Corps continued to engAge light enemy forces by aggressive patrol action and constant forward rz-essure along jts entire front and preptJred to a.ssist the main effort by a strong P.dvnnce up the PRATO BOLOrrNA Road. ~he first BraziliAn troops to fight overseas entered the line in a sector near the coast durinR September. ]• Air Supwrt: A totel of 11~ mi~sions or 7416 individual sorties •~ere flown durin1; the rionth of September in direct support of Fifth Army operations on virtually every oonceivable type of rern.merative target. Despite much poor weather and ba.d visibility very ~ood results w~re obtl'lined. A total of 129 missions, 638 sorties, wer('! handled by "Rover Joe" on c~ll targ.ets request-) "'d by forward units for close support with excellent results f!nil much vriluable . time saved. . . ..R. 4 "-Qw--'t ; - . ~ -:lo q~ ~ t- ~r i.;'-' * ·~~~--~~- 'Pt., * * FLOR.ENCE--OCTOBER 1, 1944--General Cl~rk left his command. post shortly Rfter hi.s early morning conference and flew into the Futa Fass, lPnding on the road on Route #65 where he was met by his jeep nnd driven to the 91st Division in the vicinity of Sru1ta. Lucia. General Clark also visited the 85th and 34th Divisions. At 1/..30 General Clrirk met GenerRls Alexander, Harding and Lernnitzer on Route .%5 . The General returned to his command post at 16oO hours and entertain-,d members of his staff in the conference hut with n movie. General Cl.ll...rk today received the folJowini; messAge from General rv~cCreery upon his assumption of command of F.ighth Army: ",1'any thnnks for your kind message. It will be a great pleasure to me to work i.n the closest cooperation with Fifth Army during our r>dw.nce. 11 * * * FLORENCE--OCTOB'SR 2, 1944--Generals Cnnnon, Lernnitzer And Chidlfl.w came for bren'kfast this morninr,- and conferred w1th General Clark. The G"nerel spent the morning in his va.n ,,vorking on papers and conferring with rnembr-rs of his staff. General Yroner called to see General CL~r'k at 1500 hours and conferred � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, August 12-September 30, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from August 12-September 30, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1638 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/d9130c69de7bfa9caab36912eaca26d4.pdf?Expires=1787184000&Signature=H9Gu4wrj5Qydgz9EYVjVUPXUe9tJV7zmf8BNBHYPpFIpHHEmM7%7EvSyLyR9N72TCLCCihBVM6sgWaKNvj-kk8xB4Pz1N9Ume2o9sZP9TjxoE0vC8pVHOonZwWQT2TdWWUbmx1fGDTDBKhfZ%7EyQ39Ag1WMIF026w8iG6uin3lFW%7ETYXhm3f8nUXJ9id797gBQ4qFsneCO0Py2jCNEZckUq5sQ6brNKlViNE6JHMlhlTuqjC64Tzk8FSUStZj7tTuDDfRq7FdiZSAy7qGMMZE9aq5sisGyK12WBFWImyNRPzuOsfroAELepJqbJbq9pc%7Ei0MUsJg8Zx6bOvARegF1ZWIg__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 8f79b7cff236a9838e462678d6719f64 PDF Text Text l O[ PASS, '.'fas occupied but the twin pea.ks M FRF.DDI - M BENI and M GOGIOLA, M CANDA a.nd M CnLORETA surrounding it to thf"l North also had to be cleared. The 88th Div was employed on the riP,ht flank to drive toward !MOLA and reached M BAT"'IGLIA where repeated counterattacks and stiffened enemy resistance m,:,de further adv~nce verv difficult. The weiP,ht of the attack then shifted from the axis of the FIRF.NZUOLA - IMOLA Rood to Route 65 directed on BOLOGUA. M CA IDA was outflanked and :later secured, all these key features end m.'9.ny others were in our hnnds with the ~dvance continuing to rush forward as the period closed. 13 Corps relieved elements of II Corps, taking over the zone occupied on the right by the 88th Div, while continuing to attack Northeast l'l.long its front nnd genernlly conforming to the ma.in advance. In IT Corps sector PISA was occupied and the fKlt~ PISANO hill nnss cleared when the period opened. During the month ~·nilTE ft.IJ3A'N'O and the important tovms of PISTOIA, LUCCA and VIAREGGIO were ceptured. IV Corps continued to engAge light enemy forces by aggressive patrol action and constant forward rz-essure along jts entire front and preptJred to a.ssist the main effort by a strong P.dvnnce up the PRATO BOLOrrNA Road. ~he first BraziliAn troops to fight overseas entered the line in a sector near the coast durinR September. ]• Air Supwrt: A totel of 11~ mi~sions or 7416 individual sorties •~ere flown durin1; the rionth of September in direct support of Fifth Army operations on virtually every oonceivable type of rern.merative target. Despite much poor weather and ba.d visibility very ~ood results w~re obtl'lined. A total of 129 missions, 638 sorties, wer('! handled by "Rover Joe" on c~ll targ.ets request-) "'d by forward units for close support with excellent results f!nil much vriluable . time saved. . . ..R. 4 "-Qw--'t ; - . ~ -:lo q~ ~ t- ~r i.;'-' * ·~~~--~~- 'Pt., * * FLOR.ENCE--OCTOBER 1, 1944--General Cl~rk left his command. post shortly Rfter hi.s early morning conference and flew into the Futa Fass, lPnding on the road on Route #65 where he was met by his jeep nnd driven to the 91st Division in the vicinity of Sru1ta. Lucia. General Clark also visited the 85th and 34th Divisions. At 1/..30 General Clrirk met GenerRls Alexander, Harding and Lernnitzer on Route .%5 . The General returned to his command post at 16oO hours and entertain-,d members of his staff in the conference hut with n movie. General Cl.ll...rk today received the folJowini; messAge from General rv~cCreery upon his assumption of command of F.ighth Army: ",1'any thnnks for your kind message. It will be a great pleasure to me to work i.n the closest cooperation with Fifth Army during our r>dw.nce. 11 * * * FLORENCE--OCTOB'SR 2, 1944--Generals Cnnnon, Lernnitzer And Chidlfl.w came for bren'kfast this morninr,- and conferred w1th General Clark. The G"nerel spent the morning in his va.n ,,vorking on papers and conferring with rnembr-rs of his staff. General Yroner called to see General CL~r'k at 1500 hours and conferred �with him for an hour. Generals Lernnitzer And Cannon, after ri trip to the forward areA., cs.lled to see GenerAl Clark for a few minutes before they returned to Siena.. The General d:ined with the regulrr membern of his J!'ess, and after ninner played bridge with General Gruenther, Colonel Gray and Major Hunter. * * * FLOREHCE-..OOTOBER 3, 1944--General Clark, nft"'r his 0830 oonference, flew to the 91st Division cub strip in the vicinity of San Fiero, where he was met by his jeep and driven throu~h the Futa Pass up Rout,e #65 to the 91st Division CI- located in Fietra.mala, where he conferred with General Livesny. After oonfening with General Livesay, G"!nerA.1 Clark drove to ffonp;hi<loro which the q1st Division had taken from the enemy the day before. There General Clark got his first view of the Po Valley and the snow-capped Alps in the distPnce. GenerAl Clark spoke to m,my of the men of the 3r12nd and 161rd Infantry Regiments, congratulat-/ ing them on their fine accomplishments. He storpa,d at the regimental oommand posts of these t,,-o outfits, ooMmand~d by Colonel Cotton and Colonel Mangill respect1. vely. /i l In Monghidoro General Clark stopped at n collecting stntion \mere he spoke to many of the wounded men who ht'!d just been brought in from the ba.ttl"lfleld. He then returned to the 91st Division cub field and took off in his L-5 for his Headquarters in Florence. At MJO hours General Dutra, Brazilian Minister of War, came with Generals Kroner and Wooten to bid goodbye to General Clark. A guard of honor was held for General Dutra. General Clark presented General Dutra with the gift of a carbine. Genernls Clark and Gruenth~r dined out with friem.s in Florence. A summary of oi:;erations for the week ending October 3, 1944 is as follows: 'l'he direction of' the ma.in attack was shifted from the axis of the Fii.ENZUOLA IMOLA road to Route #65 on RGLOG\TA. Relief of II Corps units on the right was being accomplished by elements of lJ Corps as II Corps attack to the North was continuing to ma~e sntisfnctory progress despite adverse weather conditions t>nd stiff resistance ns t}e period closed. IT Corps was advancing well along the PRA'l'O - BOL0<1°t'UI. Road nnd Northwest towarc1s PIF.VF:PF.LAGO wb ile vigorously pa.trolling along the entire front. * * FLORE1TCE--OC"'OBER 4, 1944--'T'h"' General i:ipent the entire day in his van. General Almond, Commanding General of the Q2nd Division, crone to see General Clark. · In the evenin~ General Cl.ro-k was greatly elat~d by the capture of Mount ~ ~1enere, the last high ground before the Po Valley. Genl'lrA-1s Clnrk and Gruenthe: \ attended the Antiaircraft Pnrty given by General Bradshaw at a villa in Florence. General Clark remained until 1030, at which time he return....d to his oomrnand post. �General Clark today received the follo,ving reply to his request for naval gunfire support: "All cruisers at present fully employed ~md Jater required for projected events. "One may be Availllble a.t a Jater date but not accertahle to operate in water between '7 - 10 fathoms wtthout necessary S\-veeping which is not at J res• ent poc.isible with Mine sweeping force available. 11 * * * FLOR-;;;tTCE--OOTOBER 5, 1944--General ClP.rk saw Lt. Col. Gre.y, Fifth Army Judge· Advocate, this morninR shortly after his 0830 conference. At 1100 hom-s General Savin, French representative to the Allied Control Commission in Italy, calleo to see General Clark. General Clark spent the afternoon in his van conferring with members of his staff. The Army Commander presented the Bronze StAr to Colonel Lyles of the G-1 Section who was le1:i.ving today for the United States. In the evening Generals Clark, Gruenther and Colonels Saltzman ~nd Porter attended the play 11 0Ver 21 11 at the rear echelon theater. Operations Instruction #35 was issued today and reAds as follows: n1. The nim of the Allied Armies, which have now penetrntt'!d the GO'T'HIC Line positions, continues to be the destruction of enemy forces in Italy. F.ighth Army cc1>1tinues the attack against forces opposing it on the Adr:5 atic coast. ' Fifth Army, upon the successful accornpl:i shrnent of its current operntions, will debouch into the PO Valley on a wide front, generally extending from ,just V1est of BOLOGNA Enstward to the vicinity of FAEWZA. At the same tjrne, elements of Fifth Anny on the Mediterranean coast flre :in position to capitalize on enemy withdrawal in that area. 11 2. It is still necessary to consider two different types of r-ction for the Fifth Amy forces which reach Highway 9, the BOLOGNA - FARNZA road: a. Assumption 1: Enemy forces still rema.in facinp.; Eighth Anny in the pocket formed by VAIJ,E DI er MACCHIO ~md the APF.t:itJINBS. b. Assi.JJm)tion 2: Enemy forces have withdrawn from t r is pocket and the main forces of Fifth and Eighth Armies A.re in contact. "3. Under e:Ither assumption, when Fifth Army troops first debouch on H:i ghway 9, the i.mmeqia.te oreration will he to e stabl:i sh a bridgehead in the FlOLOG~JA area (See overlay) of suffic:i ent sizl'! to cover the buildup of· sup... plies and the exits of' the roads through which these suprli"s must oome. Fif'th Army f0rces on the nediterranea.n will rush on GRNOA and FARHA in order to destroy any enemy rear guards remaining in thos" are1,.s anri op~n a rort and road to the Vnlley throw:;h ,-vhich supplies must come for subsequent or~rations • �in Western TtEily. 11 4. After establishment of the BOLOG~m. bridgehead: a. Unr'er A<lsnmption 1, Fifth Army troops which r~ach the Valley will push on rapidly, ma.king their main effort towards FE~RARA in order to block the withd:rawt-il of ent,my forces "rom the VALIE DI C0H.ACCHIO pocket. At the s~t'! time, elements '\'ill turn f'est -"ron the bridg~riead rnd push out nlong H:ighwny q towe.rds PAR?'!A to block the withdrawal of any enemy forces "'till facing J Corps. Sinultaneously, elem!'!nts debouching on Highway g in t'he D'OLA. - FAJ.:N7,A area will force the ent'lmy -into unfavorable terrciin v:hich will necessitate his withdrawal through FERRARA. ]2. Hnder Assumption 2 9 Fifth Anny units which reach tre Valley, usin~ light forces, will mnint8in contnct w:i.th the ,.nemy to c'leterrnine his intentions. Reconnaiss·•nce eJ.,ments wil 1. be d'irected Westwards tcwPrcls JAR.HA and ~orth to the PO, advancinr; only whJre r~sistrmce j s l~g 1t ti.nd m1nir.rum forces need be employ"d• ·'la.jor units of the forces rlebouching in the V~lley will be prepared to Rtta.ck from th hridp:ehead on Army order. If the enemy v.itl1r1rt:1w to the ''orth bn.nk of the PO, reconnaissance ,·111 devl'llop the rivl'lr to rletermine suitable cro"'sing sites. Fifth Arny's ,~ ssion contemrlates securing "A ~rroVA ar,d 7EB.G' 1 A a,rter t"!rossing in the area between BORC'iOF(I'{T}.; and CSTIGLIA but Engineer sturlies indicate that, At this season or the year, sue 1 a crossing is likely to r,e impracticable with equipnent available. It r.ay e nocessary to seek anoth"'r area. .,,he rl'lsults of f'urth~r studies v:ill be J11ade lmo"m ns they become avaiLqble. 11 5. Detailed missions under Assumntion 1: a. (Enemy still in pocket). 11 Corps will: (1) Screen the right flank of Il Corrs elements directed on FEF.RARA, relieving II Corps troops which nPy be rerrorming this mission j f they have de1nuchfl!id 1"irst into the Valley. (2) Advance rapidly to destroy enemy "'arces within :t ts zone of action. (3) Gain co11tact with the left elements of Eighth Army's main forces. b. II Corps, employing a maximum of one 1:irmored di vision nnd three infantry divisions, will: (1) 'Establish a hridge~ad in the ICLOCHJA area (SM over]py). (;,) rush rRpidly on FERRARA to block the with,}rmval o: enemy forces opposing Ei~hth Army and destroy them. (3) Protect its own flanks unti 1 relieved by adjacent elerients. c. Army tr.oops: (1) 6 S0uth Africr>n Armoured Division will: (a.) Assume responsibility for thr-t portion of the bridgehead i/est of OOLOGNA (SM Overlay), relieving II Corps troops which may bl"! perforn:i.ng this mission if they have debouched f:i.rst into the Valley. (b) FrotMt the left fl~nk of' II Corps' farces rr.oving on FRR.RARA. �to5 (c) Tu'T"n ""!est on the genernl nxis of Highway 9 nnd push rapidly towards Fl\RMA. to block the withdrawal of any "'nemy forces reJM.ining in the AFENNI~~s. (2) 1st Armored Division, staging forward as rar,idly as the situPtion rermits, will prep~re plans ror employment under II CorJlS in an exploitation role with the forces direct ...d on FF.RRARA. "6. Detailed missions under Assumption 2: (Enemy wi thdravm from pocket). a. 13 Corps may revert to Eighth Amy~ ortly ~fter r~ntact between Fifth anrl Eighth Armies is gained in the Vall,y. b. c. 11 '7 . IT Corps.~: (1) Establish a bridgehead in the BOLOGNA area (9ee overlay). (?) Using li~t forces, push ri-connaissance el--~ ts forward towards the PO Rjver to maintain oontact with the enemy rnd detorm;ne 1 ~e plan of action. (3) Tn the event the enemy withdrnws to the Jorth b0nk of the PO, conduct reconnaissance .,.or crossing sites ''lhi ch will facilitate the advance on "lAN"'OVA and VERONA . (4) Be prepared on Army order to resum"' the attaclr in fO'l"ce. Armif tromOP§,: 6 South African Armoured Di vision will push reconnaiss:ince towards PARf'fA to determ:ine enemy resistance anCi to gain contact vith IV Corps. (2) 1st Armored Division v1ill stage f'orward ns rapidly ::is the situation p"'rr:dts to the IDLOGNA bridgeheri.d where it will be initially in Army reserve. (1 Under e1 th•~r a R"Umptl on, a. rr Corps will: Push forward to seize nnd/or occupy 1,.\ SI-EZIA and AULLA. ·b. Subsequ"'nt ly, send forces to open the roads IA Sf H ~ZIA - GEHOA ancl AULLA - FARMA. c. Gain contact with 6 South African Armoured Division in the PARMA d. Mop up any enemy elern--nts r!'lmaining in its nrea of op'°!rations. area. 11 8 . 01mdaries: * Later, depending on the situPtion. 11 * * FLORENCE--Qcr"OBF.R 6, 1944--Follo,,ing the early morning conference, General Clark drove in his ,jeep to Lofano, stopping enroute at II Corps Hea.dquarters to talk to General Keyes. General Pritchard, Commanding General of the 1st Armored Division, was also there and conferred with General Clark . After conferring with these two comna.nders for ha.lf an hour, General �Clerk drove to th~ 85th Division in the vicinity of Carpinaccio where he lunched with Gl"!neral Coulter a.nd members of his staff. After lunch the General drove to the 91st Division, one mile oouth of Honghidoro. General Livesay joined General Clark :in his ,jeep, and they drove to the comma.nd post of the 362nd Infantry where G"neral Cla.rk decorated Colonel Cotton, Commanding Officer, with a Legion of Merit, and made a combat appointment to Sergeant Brooks to 2nd Lieutenant. General Clark then drove back to his headquarters in Florence, and en.. route met General K~yes and talked for a few minutes. General Cla.rk dined out with General Gruenther and Colonel Sal tzrnan. '1"he Arrrr:, CoMmander today sent the following calSle to General Devers regarding replacements: "Infantry replacement situa.tion in Fifth Army is so critically serious that current operation may be l'¼ndangered. Supply of infantry replacements and infantry overstrength in divisions only sufficient to maintain divisions at T/0 strength through 9 or 10 October. Losses in my four infantry divi• sions during pa.st five days have averaged 550 i::er day over and above returns to units. Heavy fighting continues with enemy appro-ently rushing all a.vailabl~ forces to halt our advance on BOLOGNA. W ithout additional repbcements infantry strength of the four infantry divisions will be reduced by approximately 5,000 for each ten days of fighting after 10 October. Infantry rifle compani•!S will thereby be reduced so seriously as to crePte an extreme opera! tional ha.ndicapG All divisions have been engaged in heavy fighting 23 to 26 days under anverse weather conditions. Continuous supply of infantry replacements is imperative. This situation has already been presented orally to your headquarters. I urgently requ~st thitt it be brought to the immediate attention of War Department as a rrattt,r of operational emergency. 11 \ Regarding the above cable, General Alexander sent the following cable to General Gammell who was at SHAEF at the time: "Grateful if you would show Fifth Army signal number 8839 (above) of 6 October regard.:ing n. S. infantry replacements to Genero.l Alexander and ask him to discuss with SAC-in•C any further possible action to support General Clark's request." General Clark today received the following memorandum from General Mar- shall: am 5.nclosing pages 10 to 14 of the Surgeon's statement regarding the prevention of loss of manpower from psychiatric disorders. I am taking this direct method to reach you because I know how deeply immersed you Rre in the conduct of actual operations a.nd their log.i sties as well as relRted administrative matters. Please. read these }'Ages. 11 I tir ha.ve formed no conclusions myself except thRt I am much impressed with whatever can be don,, to break the Atra.in of too long employment of the individual in active operati.ons. \ \ �11 I nm sending these same pages to Eisenhower in France and to 'lacArthur. 11 The Army Commander today replied to G~neral Marshall's memorandum as follows: "Thank you f'or your memorandum of 22 September. I have read with great interest the Surgeon Genernl's report which discusses the prevention of the loss of ma.npm,er froM psychiatric disorders. "The p:roblP-ms involved in psychiatric casualties mve been of great concern to me since l1lst winter. The i.ncidence of manpower loss from psychiatric causes began to be felt in Ja.nURry, when the oomh=it forces availt=tble to the Fifth Army were so limitl'ld thnt i_ was necesaa.ry to keep infantry units in the t line for very extended periods. As you will remember, our assaults against the fortifications in the mountainous Cassino region were made with divisions which became materi~lly understrength and could be given little respite as we pressed forward on our mission. As a. result, our casualties from psychintric causes were fairly high. 11 A similar situation confronts us to day in our current offensive in the Apennines. My troops have been m gotiating the most difficult mountainous terrain we hav~ hRd to face in Italy, involving the bitterest fighting since we landed at Salerno. As you know, I have four American inf ntry divisions in the II Corps and they are making the main attack on Bologn_'l.. We are attacking on a broad front against heavy resistance, and it has been necessary to keep all four <livisions constantly in line. Our only chance to rest t},e troops is within the divisions th~mselves, where we utilize every opportunity to pull out a battalion or a regiment 1henever thn.t is possible. ':'he decision which hns faced me is onf'! of halting our attack in order to rest, or of pushing on in an all-out effort to g~in our objectives before winter catches us in the Apennines and thus contribute to the shortening of the war. To me th~re is only one answer to that choice, and I am proud to be ~ble to tell you th~t the Fifth Army troops rmve :made sif?'}ifica.nt advances ev,,ry day for more thnn two weeks. The enemy is movin~ every unit he can make avai lrtble to the II Corps front in order to halt our pro~ess. Speed on our part is abr-'.olutely essentie.l. That action is especially necessary when one realizes that the gighth Army has been practically stopped in its tracks for the pti st ten days. 1, "I _ not yet know the answer to the psychiatric rroblem, but you w:ty rest do assured T shall continue to study it.. It apy-ears clear from tre report which you sent me, which was based largely on Fifth Army experience, that susceptibiBty to psychiatric breakdown is directly related to length of time in combat. I shall continue tn tA,ke every practjcable met-isure to give my troops tre opportunity for rest. At tho present Hrre we are operating tv·o rest centers for enlisted men, one in Rome and the other in Florence, and they have been extrerrx,ly beneflcie.1 to the thousands of Fifth Army soldiers who have visited them. "You will be interested to lmow thiett in spite of our si,vere fighting under extremely ndverse weuther conditions, we have hqd few psychjatric casualti"s \ sjnce our attack on the Gothic Line began. I attribute this condition largely to the hieh morale of our troops. Although the Gflrman is still fighting well, our men know thPt we can whip him wh,,rever we rind him, :mr' that lmowledge buoys them over many difficulties wh:ich might oth-,rwise nrrear insurmountable. I �realize, o~ course, that the strAin on the individual must be eased soon, nnd I hope that some reHef will be possible. "No doubt you have rend the ne ssages sent to the War Departrrent by ~rATOUSA outlining the critic~l shortage of Infantry replacements for the Fifth Army. 'JA'T'o·rsA has available for Fifth Army only 2,200 inf'antry replrc,.,ments, an<l th1'y have n/ivised us that no further shipments P.re oontemplated from the U. s. I now have n slight ov~rstr~ngth in each di vision, but if the present caswu ty rate continues (net loss 500 per day ) the f'i.c;hting stren!Y,th of my four divi\ sions will be down to T /o strength nbout October 10th. Thereafter, the four infantry divisions will be re0uced in strength Rbout 5,000 infantrymen every ten days of f'iP;htin~. This !"'cans that each rlfle compnny will be reduced, on the average, Aboul; 40 men every ten days of combat. Such n reduction represents ~ serious op4'ra.tional handicap which will be most difficult to overco'l'1.e. Three of my divisions have been in the line '?4 days, the fot:rth 16 days. Naturally the men are becoming tired. I oon9ider -it absolutely essenti~l that we receive a conUnuing supply of infantry rern cer:ients or else we sr all be in grav" danger of' being unA. lr- to accomplish our Mission. For yo·u· informntion, the casualtiM in the four infantry divisions since 3epten1ber 10 ha.ve been 9,000 ba'Jtle and '"",1~00 non-battle--a total of 16,L;00. "The Brazilian troops hn.ve given a i:pod account of themselves in their lim::.ted de,..~naive role. The:, have hnd 45 battle Ct'sual tiP-s thus far, ond have learned a great deal. ~~neral Dutra expressed r;reat sat~sfaction with tre wny the "3razilia.ns have en handled by us. You rriay have 11ot::.ced Yihere I plrced him in commnnd of the \V!"!st.ern sector f'or e few days. He derived a g.ri,at thrjll from that assignment. 'T'h,. balanne of tl1ii, division will start unloading in Leghorn on October 10th. 11 ,,,he 370th RCT of the g2nd Division hns been in line in ::i. quiet sector on the western flank f'or 5 weeks. I l~ve placed General Almond in oommnd of a \ task forM consistin~ of the 170th RGT and an American-Br:i tish AAA force nith I I the mission of atta.~king along the western coast to carture HASSA and to advrmce to tl-ie northwest in order to hold every Gerwm r,lement in tbat area. The attack jumped off this ~orning. I'll hove a good idea of the offensive capabilities of the color'"!d troops within a few days. ~,sed on treir rerform,mce in the defensive phase I anticipate th-it they will do an average @on job, but not up to the standard of "lhite troops. 11 I have ju~t he~..rd over the radio of your arrival in France. I am s~nd ing thi.s letter to you tr·ere in order that you may know of our sitm tion. I sincerely hope that you will come here and ray us a visit. It would mean a lot to all of us in the Fifth Arrny, and only can one understand our real si tuntion by see'in~ it. I consider the fi'{hting we have had for the past month as difficult as any in Fiftr Amy experience. Mhe 1~en have rerformed miracles in crossing the Apennines. There is nuch good you could do for us by A. short visit, nnd perhnps we can show you Bologna. 11 * * * FLORE~CE--OCTOBF.R 7, 1944--Genernl Cl-,..rk he1d his 0830 conference tr, is morning, following which he snw Dr. Peter Odegard, Assistant to the Secretary of' the �\ 09 "'rea.sury; Mr. Harbold Thomas, Chcirmn of the WPr Advertj sing Council; Frrink Isbey, Chairman of the Y1nr Finance Division. Genernl ClA.rk or:tenten these eentlemen briefly on the cm-rent Fifth Amy situation. Tli~ Generd s~nt the rernni nder of the day oonferrinf'{ 1i th various staff members, dining in the evening witb the regu1Fr members of his 1:1ess and retiring early to his van. * * FLOR'S1ifCE--OCTOBER 8, 1944--General Clnrk was ronfin~ tn his v:,n tcxlny with a head cold. The Generl'll spent most or the day taking care of an accw.ulation of paper work and conferring on the phone vri th his various subordinate conunAnders. General Cl,"1rk today received the follow.i ng cable from GenerAl Vasiliev: "I oongra.tulnte you with the reward of the Soviet Government which decorated you with the Order of Suvarov, f:ir st class for your · outstanding military work in conducting operations of the Allied troops in Italy in the struggle against Hitlerite Germany. Wish further successes." * * FLORENCE--OOTOBER 9, 1944--Th~ Army Commander was still oonfined to his van todny. However, the General din confer with Lt. Gen. Lloyd, GOC of London District and the Brigade of Guri.rds. The r~mainder of the day was spent in conferences and Rdministrati.ve work. General Clc'U'k dictated the followin~ random notes for inclusion in his dia.ry: "The first plan o-f' GenerRl Alexanner was that Fifth and T:ighth Armies crack the Gothic Line at the saMe time, side by side, from Florence to Bologn,-.1 trnd slightly to the east thereof \7here the mountaj ns are not as yTecipitous as in the west. '1eneral Leese, ]mowing the wenkened condition of l' ifth Army due to its losses to Seventh Army and knowing that Fifth Army would cnrry the ball as usual and beinr, rnrticularl;r v,ell trai~d for mountain +>j_ghting, decided that Eighth Army could not attempt this crossing of the rnonntnins. Alexander agreed and shifted the Eighth Army to the east. A me~t.ing was held 1-1t Leese I s headquarters on Aurrust 10th where this nt'lw plan was discussed. I aP,reed, but when Alexander tol<l me I ,vas to crack over the mountains ru.one with 13 British Corps in the Bologna area cooperatinp;, I deMnded thnt 13 Corps be E> ssigned to Fifth Army. I Jmew full well th:i.t it would be of no offensive vnlue to me, but if T wns to mnke the rmin wallop over the mountains I could not be 11 cooperAtin~" with a British force immediately 11.djncent to me find 100 miles from its oommnnder. Leese objected but finally gave in, a.nd 1'3 Corrs was assigned to me. It has been of littl~ value to me since. "Hy ori~innl in.en wns to m1'lke my direction of nttack g "'nerally from Flo'.l'"ence to Bologna, but due to the fact that I env1'loped the Altuzzo resistance by an effort through Mount Acute to the north, I found weakness and rushed to get Mount La Fine and Mount Battar,lia. This proved a ~rent thrert to tb e �\ \0 Germans, as it P,O.Ve ne a secondary route to move on in the directj.on of Imola. I might have sent two divisions thr,t way, had I had more troops [ind h~d the rains not interfered. The Firenzuola - Cast~l ael Rio ro~d has been under water since the heavy rains came on many occasions. At one time during the past two or three days it has been 4-l· feet under water, and we were forced to supply our troops to the north nnd bring back our wounded by a cable thrown over the river . "It hns always been apparent with the bad weather that I must stick to t},e main road, Route #65; it being a two-vmy, all-weather rord to Bologna. J "I hnv~ re~eived little support in this orera.tion from AFHQ, particularly Devers and his cohorts. Devers, due to his dual capncity,- has diverted troops badly needed in thls theater r'or his own use in France, guided entirely by a selfish interest, in my opinion. The Japanese-American troops should never hnve b~en taken. He tried to tA.ke all my heavy artillery, and only throur.;h the greatest rrotest throup;h Wilson was his plan circumvented. No, I am confronted with a shortage of replacements. In t:br~e days f'roM now there will be no infantry replacements availnble for Fifth Army, and I will lose from my four infantry divisions approxi.mitely 5,000 infantry for ev(')ry ten dr>.ys. It is inconceivable how such a disgraceful situation could confront a oomriander in the heip;ht of his battle when success is almost at hnnd after weeks of i:r,reat sacrifice and brilliant fighting. After all, I was directed across the Apennines but am not backed up in many respects. I feel thnt the American side of AFHQ has no interest in thj_s operation, have failed to sup:rort it and the true facts are not known in the War Dep(lrtment. In desperation, I am rndioing direct to Eisenhower, appealing for him to take over Seventh Arrrzy- requirements in order thnt some 5,000 infa'1try replncements now in the t,!-,eater but wr.ich Devers has earmarked for himself can e released to ~e. ' I I I 11 In the midst of my battle I received a letter froM General Ml"rshn.11 on psychirrtric cases, quoted in full in the diary notes of October 6th, indicating 1 the necessity of resting troops. rt is hnrd to see hmv I can rest my troops when J have f'our attacking divisions. I have attacked w:i. th them every day for a month and will do so for another month. We must take the consequences. I ha.ve had 10,000 casu.'31ties in this month. There is no &oice for me but to go on. I would not consider any other f,8th. It would be frightful to even consider stoppin~ in the Apennine Mountains for the winter. My only opportunity for resting troops is to rotate regiments with in divisions rmd batte.lions within regiments. I consider a fresh regiment now one thnt has hnd four nights• rest in this pouring rain in the mountains. "I am movin.g my command post into the mountains, notv,d thstanding the attendant difficulty in communication. I must get my headqur-irters set up with all its attendtmt faciHties in the mountains where they will aprreciate the ha.rdships bei..ng enn.ured by the other troops. I must also be as close to Bologna as possible when the reak-through does occur. "I have the South African Division on my left. Althour;h they indicate that they are more like the Americans than the British, they fight exactly like th~ British. 'T'hey got kicked off of ~~ount Stl:l.nco last night. It was vital that ~e hold it. They kept a ooy up on the mountain in order to rest the remainder of their troops. We don't do th~t. The 1st British Division �got ki ck"d of'f' Mount Ceco f 0r the same reason - a boy doing P.. man I s job. They th1n1< nothinlY of i t. A gln.nce at the mar will show hov far b""hind they art" on eac}, flank to the main American effort . The Americans hA.ve carried the ball every inch of the way in this battle, dragging the British troops on their flank up by their boot straps . ·ote the Ei~hth Army ' s irn.ct ivity for days upon days . They relieved Leese nnd put in a washout lik!'! M cCreery. He is a f eather duster type . I hPd him under r1y command for eight months . F.e held the ball on eve~r occasion. Vie nre exreriencjn~ the sn.me kind of fightin~ by RighU Army as w~s eirr1enced nll throua;j, the battle for Rome . 'T'hey were nlways miles ..,i:,~ nd, le:wi.nr.; my ri P,ht f'lrink unrrotect1a.d . They ha.ve verv T'Oor leadership. It is not the !"'en, -"or .;ndiv · aually they are brave an<l will fight co1 lectively i r mnde to clo so . General Alexander exercises absolutely no lnl'luence over the F.ighth Army. He :is not a driv"'r and is un.1.ble to make them go into an all- out attack. "I hnve P bout three kilomt"!ters to go and T _ will have tre last of tre hi~h a,round . When +,J:iis ·is secure I know J 1vill go into tJ-,e Fo 7alley, althouP'h it m:'1.y tnke r1e a little tirre to rest my troop:; for the f'inn.l drive . :-1ue to BrltiGh in,<>ctivi ty on tre Big},tJ:, Ar'f'ly -"ront , sev~-ral divi sions have bMn takt'!n away .f'rom that n.rer, and brou~ht to oprose me . Still thl'l -::i1hth Army does not nttac~ . I I I I v "I have wdtten to Gen!'lral r::1.rsliall 1rrr,ently r~q111'!stinr, th<1t he come here from France . I hn.VP- told h.: m th~t ]_--,,. Ctln l'lot be~in to realize the condi..tlons whicJ:, confront us without sedng trem. I hope to be nbl~ to cti..scuss tr,e,iter -problems with him w Jn he comes . ""here ~ s no excuse f'or hrivin~ a. 'IA"'OTTSA, an P.FU1 , ~ COJ'l"'11U'1ication ::>..o'l.e nnrl r,n AAI. I r.01 ,1-<1 e9tim~te thrt 50,ono military snuls :ire tied up tn trese actjyities con+ ,ributin~ 7 ittl,.. to the t,tl~ . ..!'!Ver were so few commA.nded by so many. 0 '"!y re'1uests ~o G neral C nnon f'or m"di.um air suprort hnv~ been r.,.f'used rereatedly. I have mn.de '10 iS'3U~, but yesterdny whim I received the follow~ n~ letter +"rom Gereral F~ker I went to bat . ' One or two of my o-Pficers were rresent at your rress co..,f~rence y"r;terdn.y and hnve told r'l!'! of t},. v~ry -Pj ne thi'lf"'J you h•c~ to st'ly about Chidlaw ~nd A.ir coorerntion in .c;eneral. ile rpprecinte wh:-it yo'-1 said t>n<l you cn.n rt":st assurerl tl-i~t y:iu will CO"ltinue to r-t all th"' a::r support we 'h.r>ve, inclt.ding the :1~diums anr'l. Vie H~avies ~s re1uired . 1 I am r'eli ,.htec1 that Chi0lnw is wrrkin~ nut so well . I hav rr.ce"'t confidence in riim 'J~C"'use, thou.qi not as exr-erienced ns Cannon a.nd Sriville, e is V1'ry l,ri !ht '1.n ' R 1ert and I "el t h" ha, su-l'f tciert under study of t11P. (,ld boys to e ~hle to do an effective n.:-1d satisfactory .job . ' ' T tr:at Ca nnon has moved be.ck over to tr is sire , I am sure you ftr"' going ow to :;,,t their undivided a.tt~ntion lmt i , by 1.;han ~"', you sh0,1lct get s-1;,uc 1c at any tire n."ld -"~Al you ne.,d more air l1elp, be c;ure to let me know . ' Give "7 ',i,st to Al l}ruent ,..r ar1c' A.11 your rardworkini-:; my el'lrn"st conrvatulatior1s on your 1·t,cent successes . 1 oys, and accept ��medium and entire fi~hter bomber a:i.r ~ffort he brought into the battle in clos~ support of my troops for our final attacli:: towards Bologna. Ia.mas= sured by Eaker thrit I will f;et this support, rmd Ale:x."'8.nrler has guaranteed to bnck up my requ"!!st. 'T'here is the constant reluctance of' most Air Corps commanders to use anythin~ 9ut fi~hter bombers in support of a battle. They resent any ~ound comrnrmder indicating any possihle employment of air. 'T'here is no question but that after the war there will be a sepnrate air force, and 1myone who hucks this "Villi. have his head cut off. 1 Jev!'\r will air forces be S'1bordinated to - g.r-ound conrnand. Un:::.ty of command, in my opinion, is lost -"orever. It is a i:;reat mistnke., 'T'hfll British bwe tl'lught us that bPd lesson. r could write for hours on the lack of cooperation by the Royal Navy in support of my ~ound efforts since Royal 1-Tavy forces in the Mediterranean came under Adm:iral ,Tohn CunninP,ham. His cousin coop1'ra.ted, but this man has stood on his poop deck end rl'lf'rained from ever doing anythinrt, th~t wns not accordinr; to the .best interests of the ~ravy. I hav• asked for n.aval gunfir;(, support on my west coast. It has been r~fused re~atedly, yet the Eighth Armv has it all the t:i.me." , * * * TRAV8RSA--OCTOBER 10, 1944--After the norning confer~nce, ~nerPl Clark decorn.ted ~;l~.jor Kendall, of the G-3 Planning Section, with the Bronze Star. r.1a,jor Kendall is return:i.ng to the Stl.3.tes for a new P.ssignment. Gi•meral Clar'k :<ilso bade g;oodbye to P.r:i.gadier Stayner, Chief of the Brjtish Incr~iment, who is being transferred to the Ei1:;hth Army. Lt. Gen. Clark, Brij;ish, Chil.'Jf Administrative Officer of 1\FHQ, ar:r:i.ved at 0930 and conferred with Genern1 Clark. 'i'oday G1•meral Clark moved his cormnand post to Traversa_ in the heert of the Apennines. (}l"neral Clari- srent the night 1:1t the Hotel Anglo-Americnn with Colonel Saltzman. 'T'he summery of battle progress for the week endini.; October 10th is ns fol- ct_~ tr~-' lows: -...... &i,\.~•·w,, 11 'i'he d1·ive continued r'luring the week against very d~~rm:inl.'!d t"!nemy resi~tance and hrmdicapped by unfavorable 1venther e0nditions, but_at the close our most adwmced elements were f'j ghting in the vicinity of J,<vergn~ astride H:rghway #65 less than fifteen miles from Bologna. 13 ~ . s s u m e d responsibility for the zone on the rip;ht of II Corps borderlng the Firenzuola-Imola. road, .<md :<irmored elements were assisting the main effort by pushing north on the left of Tr Corps. Re!Y,roupin~ of IV Corps units was completed and attack launched in the coastal sector. * * * TRAVERSA-... CCTOBER 11, 1944-.. r..enernl Clark arrived flt his new command post at 1230 and spent +,h~ nfternoon in his van. In the evening he din~d with the rei:sul:-i.r memb..,rs of his mess. �TRA"IJ'TI:RSA--0C'T'0BER 12, 1944--General Clark drove to Loia.no and enroute picked up General Keyes. The Army Commander and General Keyes <lrove to an OP north of Loiano where they could obtain a fine view of terrain f~atures. Artillery and fighter bomber missions could be observed. Gener1-1l Clark made special reference to Mount 'xrtmde to the northeast, which is the last importrmt high terrain feature before the Fo Valley. Generals Clark and Keyes then drove on through Loiano to a point on Route 65 just south of Sabbioni wher"' th~y could observe 11ount Rumici and r1ount Castellari on which the troops of the Qlst Division were fighting. Generals Clark and Keyes observed a heavy bomber missi on (npproxirnr-t~ly 200 B-17' s) flying townrds ob,jl"lctives in the Bologna area a.nd although they could not see the targets, they could hear bombs explode and observe clouds of smoke in the distance. General Clark then returned to his oommand post for lunch. Major General Peterson, Inspector Genl'!r~l, l'fo.r DepPrtment; Brigadier General Clarkson, In~ctor General of NATOUSA; fi'ajor General Sdwards, Deputy to General Eaker; Lt. Col. Van Zsso, Inspector General I s 0f'fice, War Deprirtment, arrived for lunch. Aft.•n" lunch Genernl CU"Jrk, with General leterson in his jeep, and Genernls Edwards, Clnrkson and Col. Van Esso follov,,in((, drove over the sa.me road t,hn.t General Ch.rk hnd passed this morning. Genernl Clark pointed out to General Peterson and oth"r of'ficers key terrrlin features. There was a great deal of air Activity, heavy and fighter bombers, ltl1 afternoon. General ClRrk and party returned to the Fifth Army c0mm<:i.nd rost where General Cl.,rk entertained the perty in his conferenee hut e. few minutes br,fore they took off by car for Florence. * * ~R~~r:;;nsA-~OO~OBER 13, 1944--General Cl~rk spent the entire day in his VRn today. At 1730 the Army Commander met with 1,lajor Neville, ed:i:tor of the Stars and Stripes and four reporters in hi"! conf ere nee hut and presented to J\'fajor Neville the Fifth Army Plaque and Clasp. General Brann came for dinner. Brann played cards. * After dinner, Generals Clark, Gruenther and * * ~B.AVSRSA--0C~0BER 11~, lQ4/¥- After the 0830 conference General Clark saw Major Brant of the 8th ;;;;vacuation Hospital, an ear, nose and throat specialist. 0 Maj. Gen. Royce, Air Corps with 6th Army Group; Maj. Gen. Walsh, with the American Air Force j_n Russia; and General Chidlavr, of the XII Fighter Commrind, came for lunch vrith G-,neral Clark. Before lunch General Clark oriented the Genera.ls on the Fifth Army sitmtion. Generals Royce and '1 1Jalsh left directly after lunch for Florence. At 1700 Genera.1 Clark held a conference with General Kirkman, 13 Corps Commander; General Keyes, IT Corps CoMnander; Lt. Col. Freston, G-1 of 78th Division; Lt. Col. Beggs, G-3 of 88th Division; Col. Willems, Chief of Staff of 1 �II Corps; Col. Porter, Derut:v Ch:ief of Staff of II Co?T, s; G1'nernl Gruenther and General Brann. A.fter the conf'"'r1mce General Clrci.rk served tea in the con .. ference hut to his F;tiests. Following are minutes of the conference mentioned above: nGeneral Howar(l gave th~ enemy dispositions opposite the most 11ctive sector of the Fifth Army front, and said that enemy infantry in this area were estimated as totaling 72 battalions with 16,200 men. "The Army Commander said that the Germans had been massing their troops to meet the main Fifth Army drive, which has now rrogressed for 50 of the 60 miles \ from FLORENCE to BOLOGNA. l 11 He said that at the present time the Fifth Army contains 133,000 U., s. troops and 152,000 British troops; thRt the II Corps has been making the main Fifth Army effort; thAt in the current offensive, which has been going on for more than a month, u. S. troops have sustain!'!d 13,082 bnttle crsualties in the four TT. S. infantry divisions \mich are available and A.11 engaged, while British troops hav" susto.ined 2,451 battle cas1»1lties in the same period; toot the four American divisions in the period ha:ve taken '7,087 prison~rs, while the British and South l.frican troops have captureo 596 prisoners. Be sl'l.id tha.t ther("l had been and coulii be no let-up in the attack which has been going on day and night. It has boien possible to attack without pause due to replacements which have been ava.ilable to the A?1'ler:tcan di visions up to the present tj me. The 9Upply of replacements >'rill run out on 15 October. From then on it is esti-mated that losses in the four u. S .. divis:i.ons will occur at a rate of 500 infan• trymen, net, per day. No more repl.eicements are expected for arproximately twenty days, which means that 10,000 infantry losses in twenty days ere Pnticipated. "The Germans have been engaged in sideslippinF; their divlsions from ot,her\ . ) parts of the front to meet our main attack~ "There has been little advance in the 13 Corps sector, vrhere admittedly the terrain was difficult. Sim:1.18.rly, we have made little advimce in the vicinity of LJVF.RGNANO. "General Clrci.rk said that General Alexander had assigned the 78th British Division to the Fifth Arrrry, saying thrt it must fight in an all.,.out attack and not be merely leaned up against the enemy; however, the Army ComM<'!nder thinks it better not to mix a British division with the TT. s. divisions in the u. S. sector, but to leave the 7~th Division with the 13 Corps f'or use in the latter's sector. · "Troops of the 1st Armored Division have been given a sector in the line to be occupj.ed by :its infantry. Most elements of the 34th Division 8re now coming out of the line, to return in a few· days to the attrcick. At that time an attack will be made in the TT. S. sector with five TJ. s. diitisions abreast, disposed as follows from west to east: elements of the 1st Armored Divisj on; 91st Division; 34th Division (two combat teams); 85th Div-:i.sion; and the 88th Division. "The Army Cor1mander said he did not believe thnt the 13 Corps would be a.ble to make a. breakthrough to the northeast and thP.t even if this were possible such �a.n operation could not be supported, in his op:i.nion.. Accordingly, he d:irected a new boundary between the 13 Corps and II Corps, and directed thRt the 1st British Division be moved northwest toward the 7~h Division sector. 11 '1'he four TJ. S. infantry divisions will oontinue their attack horth as long as they ar~ able. Meanwhile, the 13 Corps will conduct operations to provide a strong defensive flank. A critical and current objective in these operations would be the taking of M. SPADURO. 'rhe 13 Gorps should take over GESSO; it should make its ma.in effort on its extreme left next to the II Gorps, which will make th~ main Fifth Army effort. "The .Army Commander invited C'zen"'ral Kirkman to state his reactions and to bring up any dif'ficulties he foresaw. General Kirkman said he saw none, but mentioned thnt in sideslipping divisions to the northwest it is difficult to move mules except by taking them on roads to the rear and then doubling back to the front. General Clark said that the G-ermans had accomplished the same thing, and that means should be found for overcoming this difficulty. "General Kirbnan agr~ed that the Army Commander I s plan was the best one availt.1.ble. "General Keyes made no comment. 11 * * TRAVP':RSA-...QCTORER 15, 1944--The General nttended the usual oonference at 0830 tld s morning and. at 1030 bade farewell to four WACS of the Fifth Army WAG. T'latoon who "'.re leaving for home, two on rotation and two on temporary duty. At noon the Maharajah of 1 atiala a..rrivfld with his ADC, 8nd a fsU.t:trd of honor was held. At 1230 Alexander Kirk, Ambassa.dor to Itnly; a.nd 1\/fr. Cnrmel Of fie, American J'olitical Arlvisor to AJi'HQ; Mr. Horn, Ass:istrnt to Ambassador Kirk, arr1ved, and n 1;Uard of honor was held. Gen"ral Clark briefed the rnharaja.h, Ambassador ¥irk and other gu~sts on the Fifth Army situntion. General Clark exr11'1ined to the 1 hhara,jah his satisfaction with the splendid performance of the IndJan troops under his command. The Mnharajah presented General Clark ,v:5 th a letter from General Auchinleck, Comrnander-in-Gh1.ef :in Indfa, which General Clark read aloud to the assembled ~ests. Genl!lral Cl. rk entertained the Maharajah, his aide, Messrs. Kirk, Offie, Horn and Brigadier Divers for lunch in his mess hut. The guests left directly after lunch. 0 r General Clark WA.S still having trouble with his throat And retired to his van where he spent a quiet e,1ening. He, however, held a. movie for his staff office:rs in his conference hut., General Alexander today radioed General Eisenhower as follows regarding the replacement situ~tion: RN 942., 11 I know you rer:dise and apprecirite what we have done And rire doing here to keep German divisions from being transferred to the western front, but the time h11s now arriv""d when my armies will not be able to oontinue the o+>fensive much longer. 'T'his is mostly due to the fact that all di visions are very �tired and completely lack rresh replacements. Esrecially is tl is the case with Americ n Fifth Army. I have done everything through officin] cknnels to get r,aplacements, bu.t I hA.ve not succeeded. !vi'y :last chrince is to appeal to you personally. Anytl--iine you can do to help Clark will 1)e to our mutual ndw.mtage. Lemnitzer has left today by air for General Devers' Headquarters with full details of Chrk I s requirements." General Clark today dictated the following random notes for :inclusion in his dfary: "Further ..2.U..!!"&.le c~ents: l't,r efforts to br:i ng to th!" o ttenti on of the Har Dep~rtment my replacement situ.0 tion appirently w"'re futile. I am positive trnt Devers never properly represented my case to General Eisenhower. I am continuin~ to attack with ny four U. s. in+~~mtr:r divisions. They have had over 13,000 battle casualtie~ jn approximately one month. They hnve attacked every day. My only alternative is to discontinue the attack and remf' in in tl•e Apennine r·ountni.ns for the winter. Sue], a. solution is entirely unsatisfactory to me. Besides, my directive sends me to Bologna. Germ~n r~inforcenents ~rom tre Ei~hth Army front continu" to nood i..n front of my II Corps. Eighth Army does !lnthin~ to stop :it. Whl"rea.s the British strength i.n the Fifth Army is 152,000, as nga.inst TT. S. strength of 133,000, their b:"ttl~ casua.lties Wt"re 2,451 as against TT. S. casualties of 13,032 for the period 10 September to 13 October. Tlurin~ this s~,me period the TT. s. troops ~.ptured 7,og7 pr:isont'!rs, ns rgninst British rrison~rs a:r.iounting to 5, q86. ,.,,hese _figures indicate who is doi.nft the fighting. With tJ"1e present <le~ee of resistance the II Corps is encountering and with no repl~cements :wailabl~ "or nr:rroxirntely 20 days, the outlook i.s for me to lose at the rate of 500 per day a~ proximately 10,000 more infantry out of these four divisio'<s. J am faced with the necessity of r-lmost destroyi.n1-7, the future usefulness of four infantry divisions. "There was n. solution wrich T r.resentec1 to General Devers in the following radiograms: 8839, dated 6 October 1944: 'Infantry rerlrcement situA.tion in Fifth Army is so critically serious th~t current o~r~tion may b~ end?ngered. Supply of jnfantry replr>cen~nts rmd infant.•7 overstrength fo divisions only sufficient to maintain rlivisions nt T/0 streneth throuf'sh q or 10 October. Losses in iny four infantry divisions during pnst "ive days h .ve riverai:r,ed SSO per day over and above returns to units. Heavy fighting continues with enemy aprrrently rusld.nr, all avPilable forces to r1 a1t our advanc~ on BOLOG1-TA. W:ithout nddi tional r~placements ~ nf'antry strenf{'.:;h of the f'our i. nfnntry di vis .i.ons will be redu~ed by approxj"'ri.t!"!ly 5,000 +"or ePch ten drys o.r fighting after 10 October. Inf'antry rifle ccrr~pan.ies will there'~:, be reduced so c;eriously as to create an extreme operationnl handicap. All di visions lave b"en engnged in heavy f'ightin~ 23 to 2t, days un1ler adverse we,ither conditions. Continuous supply of infantry replrcements js imp rative. This siturtion has already been presented orally to your 1,eadquarters. T urgently request th,,t it be brougrt to the immed fa.te :i.ttention of War DeJ)<.,rtl'lent as f" IT' tter o+> opern.tional emeri:;ency. 1 11 'lN' 11 R',T 8937, dat~d 9 October 1944: 1Sripnent schedule infantry rey,lr--cements contained j_n VA'T'C'tTSA F35i¼S provides rel1ef early ro•,ember hut v•ill not alleviate criticA.l sPorta~~ j n :present vital battle r·o,.. '1ologna. 1.'.::::ti r,['t~ PJY four infantry Givisions will be 1own to assir,ned 'T'/0 str~nr.rth by October 14 and �\ I '7 that infantry srorta~e b:r rovemb"'r L:;t will 1)e ~,ooo. I urgently reco:rrrnend thnt ~ ~T0TTSA shipm .nts no•¥ scheduled for 3e·rn-rith Arny be r~lt'!nsed +.o FiftlA:rmy iMmediPtely. If these <1hipml'!nts htc1ve Plready 1-iMYJ. m"'l.de, J r.:tron~ly urge trat you procur~ 3,000 infantry r~rla.cerP-nts from SITAEF and ship them by air or f'ast wnter t.rRnsrortation to ...,iftt Army at r.prljest possi l" date. 1 11 Genernl 11 :1.'I Devers rir;plied as follows: FJ554/+, cleta,d 7 October 1944. 1Conffrn:inP, conVl"!rsation :vi t}, Colonel '\7erner today the following is sumnary of' ':7ar I:eJ)flrtnl"nt 1 s r ply to our teletype insistenc"' thrit Octo"J""r E>'1d "o'J"!mber i.nf'antry replrceT'!ents '.JJ shipped to us. "Decision t0 sMr no ;nfan.L,r;-, rt'lplr: ceronts g inst your Octob~r and 'Tovemher req11isitions ms h sed on rollowinCI' fnctors: (a) 11,000 v Jr"tren,crth in infantry rHvisions whlcr must e a sor :ied 1r,1c not r"!f l"";~ec1 • U~) ,.::.,000 general a:=;siP;nment enlisted m~n on }'Pnn in the tJ,ea:tor including 21 ,000 inf~mtry. Thes" figures RS of 1 Sept JTihe:·. CP sual ty roports do not ~ 1dicnte l.'1.i'G~ lo::;ses tc t,1,,.., tr'"'!f'..te1· since th ,n. ...rippinE; for r r,J.acements is not avai 1P 1Jle to now, any larf~e nu.ql1"!r to "JATO prior to 1 ~·ovemb~r. Fron your uessnge it is E1ssum.-ii t11P~, f'ftl'.lr that tir-" ETO will supply Sewmth Army a.YJ.cl VTill :"'nrtuisition r .plncements t:,~r~for. Alti10U~'1 v e do not accept tie di>ta presented in your "'\TIC as justification "or CC'ntj nuinr, r.-rlrcernent requirements e ar" s .ippinr, lv,000 infantr;r ri,:r lacemen ts on UG.:3 58 on bnsis of o~rational ,.mergency .- W:m t <lesti.n.ntion do you 1leair,; "or tr ece L~,000? Flease ans11er now. Request you su mit y cr>blf'OJ de~!'liled jnst~"icr-tion on which v1 can plan your continuinp_: replacel"i"mt requir~r ents . 11 1 t11Your gg39 of <i Octoher rersonPl to Devers \ as repeated ver ·atiJ'l to Vfo:r D ·F" rtment )Y teletyr,-l"l . 11 ' ''R?{ FJ5845, datr?d S October 1°44. '.Su•,sequ"'!nt to our FJ5'544 to you, reference repbcements, WF!r Dep['rtment hvs reconsider"'r1 tinr chinged its decision. 11le have cable t},is norning parP.phrA.s"cl ris "o llows: "Regardinf; the acditiom,.l sl-iipm•nts of -lnf'nntry rfl'Jsulting from coni>~rl'lnce o,.. n October, shipments will je wde as follows: '!'he l+,000 rerlf'lcenents cor1mitted jn tr at conference are cnncelll'ld. In t~ t"!jr stead ''le nre rihipping during October '5,300 as f'ollows: UGS 57, 1, '300; trGF 16, ?,?00; 'C'GS 5g, 1,800. ,,SOO of t>1ese s:rould arr'i ve on or before 2 iTovenber. le cr-i n furnj sh 7, 500 infnntry in addition to the 5,300 departing in Octobt')r, the 7,300 to arrive in tl eater durin~ last t~n days of Nover·ber, provided sh ipnent of equipment n.nri supplies can he c'efl'lrrl'\<l by you to m,'Jke q}lippim; ~r-ce :w'1.ilnbl~ for tr;e '7,500 replac!"!m,.,nts. If the .-dditionl"l 7,500 are n"eder' i:tive us c1estinations ilesi"t-"'Jd and numbers to h~ -:;~mt to e~ch. i'le are ~nr'envoring ~t once to obttiln "rom '":MO a f·ty-m dt'te <is to when they wi.11 take ov"":r r"'nronsibiljty for replacements to the Seventh Army''. 11 'We a.r" havinr; ?nd '"'.IX C(mf'er"'nce "Vi th 1 frir D'°'~rtr·ent oq1 SJOA and clnd fy the situation "urther, but t'1e sh i.pmt':lnts now rror.ise1l rri.<i terinlJ.y improve the picture.' 11 R'l'{ :Xl7/i,C/O', dated 10 Octohi•·r 19//+. 'Fully apprecfr•te situ~tion v;i th rerp-,ct 1·~rlncements 3flwmth Army is worse -tr an trnt oonfr0nt;ng Fifth Arny 9' nee Seventr Army's divisions arl" o.Jready we11 b~low T/o str~mi;th. Jn vie v of Co,,,,,h'ned Chi-.,fs ot' Staff priority to DRN'i'O'T Oper;;.tion, I c,o not �feel justi fi"'d in r"lel'ts; nf; to you the shipments set up for Seventh Army. However, I am asking ETOUSA vrheth"'r it is ready to tflke over ~t tbis time the replacement support of the Seventh Army -instead of rs of' l.Yovember 1944. If' it is ~,bl~ to do so, T will thl'ln cancel all f'urther shipments to Sewmth ~rmy frorn 1lAT(Y(TSA nfter the D /, 60 convoy except for R'T'U 1 s. 1 11 Tnstead of carrying the ball with force to Eisenhower rind representing my picture, Gi,neral D~vers has misrepresent"'ld the facts, in my opinion. The only solution wr:s to give me the two or three thous11nri r~lacements in Itnly which he hnd eRrmarked for th" Seventh Army, calling upon F,fa enho,yer to furnish Seventh Army rephcements. Without doubt they are PVnilable in the UK or F-r>ance. I ha.ve likewise reported triis situation to th,, Inspector Gen~rr,1, Gen~:ral Peterson, when he visited rere. I indicnt"'d it in a letter to General Vo.rshall, but he WP..S trnvellini?.; in France, and I have no wny of knowing if he i:; aware of trie si twtion. I t:>Jll "I have telephoned to General Alexaro er today to give him the si tuntion. confirming it 1n another ra.cliogram which is quoted below: 11 'R.~J 9002, d;q.ted 15 October J.Q44. 'Confirming m;r conversation with you tM s mornini:;, I consider it is important thnt you renliz "l situation in Fifth Army concerning infnntry r~placement shorta~e.. My four jnfantry divisions were reduced to sHghtly below strenc,th in .;nfantry on 13 October. Approxima.tely 500 usable infantry repl<"cements expected within next three dRys. Shipment of 2200 sched:uhd tn arrive Naples f'rom States on 28 October with 1300 mor" on I+ TITovember. B"liev-e October 28 F.troup can be pla.ced in line tibout 2 Povember. By thP.t date I estimatP my four d-ivisions will be short 8,000 infantrymen which means shortage of' 75 men per rifl~ company. This r~duced strength during critical period facing Fiftb Army rtlll seriously lm1er the operational ef'ficirmcy of my divisions. '<.:ven when ? ,200 r~placements arr:i ve :i.n errly November thl!':y will have,. ;to be absorbed by divisions which a.re al ... ready well diluted by new men. l'or exnmple, 91st Divi<Jion hc~s received 1,200 replacem,mts 13jnce Septemh,r 13, bulk of which have gone to infantry rif'le companies. "'In :ny rnessR.ge 8937, dated 9 October, to Genera.I Dever':!, I ureemtly ~ r!'lcommend\"1d thl'lt sh5.pments of" rl"lpla.cements from Naples for Seventh Army b-., diverted to Fi f'th Army but my requinst W?S not favornbly considered. I feel that if nenernl r.:isenhower ret'tlized the urg,mcy of tr is lTl,"1 tter and the influence it may have on M.s battle he might be able to furnish iffi1'1edi.Ptf':ly the 3,000 infantry replacements which I re'luested in my 8937 from SllAEF sources., I recommend thnt you present such a request to him. t nr have also intima.ted to Alexander that I am oontinuing the !'ttrick but. thnt if he pllllrm1ts W.ighth Army to sit on its tail with at least f'our British divisions out in reserv~ not attacking, I Jl18.y be u!1'ei.ble to go on. I told h:i.m he must require 1action by the !i~i1;hth Army which will keep the ;?f\th and 20th German Panzer Divisions on F.:ighth Army front. If they too come in against my II Gorps, I will probably be st,0pred. V "Yesterday I sent for Kirkmnn, Keyes rmd representatives of the 78th and Inasmuch as :Kirkman' s Corps has contributed rracM ca.lly nothing offensively to my battle and :in spite of my repeated screams -f'or at- 88th Divisions. �tack without ::mccess, J h,,ve dl"cided to utlliz,.. B Corps almost in a deflllnRive role, l;I'ttdually tnking over :mo holdin~ key terrtln features wrich the Americnn troops ce.ptur"", i.n order thr,t I cnn r:n ss tr·.- Arri"'1"ictm troops who will fight f'or the clecisive hlo~7 on a narrow front. I minced no words r>t this conference. I E;ave them the er sualty and prisoner -rigures and my rep]p cement situation as indic.'l.ted above. .,. told thrim tht'!y hnd to get into the battle in a more effecti1re wny. It is ahsolutel3r nppallinP,, anr1 only one crin know the situation who comm.ands British troops, thRt they wilJ. not att!'!ck ngf{I'essively and in ~-n ru.1-out manner, nor will th"'Y take the cr>sunlties. It is thf.l snme old manpower proposition and brittle weariness thnt n:f'fects thn entire -l"ighting m chine of the "3ritish F,mpjre. "After having tl'l.ken the Li vergtino escarnment feature, which w'4c s rui extremely touish nut to crt1.ck, the Formiche feature and the 578 Hill Mass, I have three more important terrain features to takl'!; namely, /')55, 62'2 ana Mount Grande. I htive recirled to ooncentrate on thest"! nne rit a time - put all my fi~hter bomber support on ,.,22 tomorro Y-, mass ,:ill tl-1e nrtilJ ery, ~ploy all the infantry 1vhich I ce.n rossibly brim{ to beP....r on it rind over rhelm and hold th~t feature. J will then next divert my nttention to Grttnd"'• W~th reference to air, I SJ!l p,ettini:; fine cooperation f'rom Ger."'lr['l Ch:idlnw. In -l'act, Ira El'l.k!"!r ,ma Cannon came in effectively to support me with th!"! Tcctic 1 and Strs.tegic Air Forces. I sent CFtnnon a mesSc'lge of appreci..-'"' tion wh i.ch is quoted below: "RN t.,297, dated 11 Oc+.ober 1944. 'Desire to express to you my appreciation of splendid air support of our operations yesterday. }le~se convey my thanks to General Enker 1 • "As an item to indicrttl'! furth"'!r lP ck of understan<ling of tl>f, Itllli.il'ln C11m•) pai~, all brou~ht n.bout, in my opinion, by Gen..,ral Devers' misrepresentP.tion of our picture, every gun of my heavy artill~ry is bein~ tAken away on the 17th to 1;0 to France." * * TRA'RRSA--OCTOBF.R lt>, 1944--FolJ.owing the 08'30 con-rerence, the General srent most of the morning :i.n hi.A vnn working on tidministrri.tive rm t.:ters. GenAra.l Alexander n.rrived ~t 1?15 "'ml conferred wit.h G~nerals Cl:eirk and Gruenther, a.ftl'!r wh:i.ch Grmeral Clr->rk entl'!rtrdn"d Gener"'l Alex:1.nder, Tiajor Grh1sley, his ide, for l1mch. Grm.,.rnl AlexFtnc~r J.t,,-f't <'11r,.Jctly nfter lu11ch. At 1710 ('~nernl Goodmnn of r-r;rBARK ,ma (l.enernl rrrite, with Colonl"!l l,lcCrnry, SOS N'A'1'0TTSA, called to see General Clr-rk. General Cl ..,rk hriefed Genernl Goodman on the current Fifth Army situ.,,tion aril ,xplained his greri.t sntisfaction in the wey the supply o-r his nrrny h"'S been handled. Colonel f'c hhon was the G,.neral 's JsU1'St -ror dinner t}, is evening. Gt'!nernl Clark tonif.:rht dictated the followinP, randoM notes for inclusion in his dj ary: �TIWe have indications tht!.t, the 2tSth Panzer Division is coming over from Eighth Army front. Already one regiment f'rom the 2Qth Prnzer Grenl'!.dier Division a.s com"' -l"rom tre ~; grth Army front to our front. It is perfectly disgraceful - tre im cti vi ty of ti'" T•:ighth Army. There is no will to -l"ight indice.ted. Over the phone yesterday I trl<l AleX23nder tl l"t 1 c id not understand how }1e could k4'ep four infantry divisions and one R.rr11ored division :in rest'!rve behind tr·e Eighth Army rt l'l critical time Hke this when the Fifth Army is fip;hting witr evl'lry m~m. Fis Fmswers were evt'lsiv~ but to tre effect that } e would job Mccreery. He did, t'lnd McCrMry rhoned m"', but th"'r"' was nothin~ I could say to r~ccreery. The l oles are to attrick on t'he left fll'lnk of Eigrth Army. I requested tha.t they SP'ed up t},eir attack, even if to the extent of makin:::; daylight movements in order to n.ttrnct tl--e 2!Stb Frmzer Division to it. There is no question in my mind but tliA.t 'Sj ghth Army and AAI as well will do "'verythinf; i.n their poY1er to bring 21':,tr h•nzer Division nnd 29th Panzer Division to my rront in order to give l<~ 1F;htl Arr,i.: tr e oprortunity to advance. If Finyone is to advJ1.nce into tr.e Fo ~hlley, th y much pre.f'er that) t11e Brjtisr Eiehth Army gi,t the cr~dit, ratr er thr-m the Fifth Army. 11 AleX!!.nder is coming to see me t noon, and lth1ugh I can indict3te ny disnppo:i.ntnent on the bck of activity by t}'e Eighth Arrri,y, T g~t nowhere. Vle are caught in the British Empir~ macJ,in/0!, ~nd to try to speed t''em ur rroduces no results. 0 11 ! sent r:tnotr1'r rl'l.diogr~m to Alemnder on r"'rl~cements, anrl le has ~ppi,a.led to ,isen 0"'1er. It is too lr:,te, for wl en t},ey sPipred t}ie last r~rJFcements out or Ttaly !>or France 1•1e missed tre boat. It is anott1er indiCllltion of AFHQ failing to back up the Fifth Army in its most critical situation in the Apennine Vountains. I run even nov1 confronted with curtA.iling n.rtillery runrnmition,) lO"i Fow·tz""r, bt">ca.use of lnck of credi.ts be~n~ ,..urnish1'd Fifth Arrny "or the next mont~ or two. "I m g'l"!'!atly disn.ppoi.nted in the 34th Division. The attPck of tre 135th on Monterumici is evidence ~f th~ir l~ck or will to slug it out as the new d5.visions ~r" do:i.ng. Gener~l Bo1te is a. surerior leader, but he h s inr erited a dise::-sed division; diseRsed bee, uc1e of the F'lmpering General Ryder gave it. I did not know this, nltl ou~,- I Wl'I.S soT:lewhn.t suspicious o:' it at tJ,e time Ryder left. "'here nre m:'\ny old m~n in the 34th Division who '.M.ve een witr it overse~s f'or t,.,o "l.nd a. half years. They ar~ h ttle-wise and btt+,le-weary. Tris \ is the di vision vrhich ras lonr' clamored to e sent :bome. T} e,y do not undersfarnd w y trr.v should be required to -<'ight one battlt'I after ~nether. Their small unit lenders ar""l poor, and it is a TM.jor tPsk -l"or P Division Co~nander and one or two ~ood leaders to crange tr e wl ole division. New men entering Vt'°! diYision as replncernl"!nts jmmedi~tely succumb to tris disease. I would relieVI"! hnr ~rt f'rom t1 e com>nl"l1<1 of the 135t}I Inr-l'!ntr:r except tJ,-,..,t I have no one to tnke his pltice. Fe r1i.s fn_iled miserably .in his l'!ttack on Mont"'rumici. I h.~ve evidence tbnt the 168th li'k-.ewise } tis no zip. The bt-st regiment in t• e division is tr~ 133rd, i:1nd this i ci onl:, 1 ecause Colonel r11un, wro is ,. nritural born leaoer, ras een put in command. As soon a.s this battle is over, I must take steps to clean rouse in thnt outfit,. 11 * * �TRAVF:RSA--OCT0ilr.R 17, lq44,--Tre Gen"ral ru:in is usunl 0810 conference-and at 1)00 went tvith his personal pl'ysician, r~~jor rA.nt, to the 8th Ev~cu~tion Fosrital flor X-r~ys of his ~rest, throat and teeth - a.11 of wl'ich \Vere nega- tiv~. TJ:,e Arm.r Cornti.nder spent t],e rest of the day in liis van and had Major rP.nt as' is dinn~r rruest in the evening. A suml"l1'l"Y of t} e battle progress for the week ending October 17, 1944, ollowa: is as Continued ~ains W(!lre made, alt',ough every effort to f!dv~nce w,i,s i--.itterly cont"'ste bv } eavr concentr, tion of en~m'V -i-orces. Rel L-f's And regrouping of cert in units wrs carried out by II Corp~ and 13 Corf'9• In Ii/ Corps sector enemy contact was maintain~d bv active pa.trolling and surre a.dvt>nce was achieved townr s "assP and Castel Uuovo. Gener11l Cbrk dictated the following materia.l for inclusion in ris diery: "Tl· e ?9ti Div·ision is ::i.11 coming to our froat. Eighth Armv could not hold it. '1e received a severe counter-~ttl"ck frori it in the Belmonte Pren \ toda v w' ere- tl " le!!ni 111 batt, lion of t1 e "!..1'3rd In.f'aT1tr~r had advanced to l;11st night. Our position wns held in spite of t e cou.--It.er-nttr:1ck. He r:. y be able to get through wi tr ·',' ,.dd"'d ?9tr Division, h1~ 'i ~ is touc'1 and go. General Fowl'!rcl ht:1s just rhoned i"e thr,t it looks as thougl 90 Ligr t is coming over from tl ~ Ei~r,th Ar11v fror+. TM_q is about more than we cPn htrndle. Our "Y" servj ce rns :ind::crted t· "' lead' n~ at talion fa now l".lnroute and will go into the Grande n.r~n. W attack th•t tomorrow. I o.m nf'raid tl is indicates thttt ·+) .- r.-at o~ the division will come. This see:,s more thm we can stanil.. "Eightr Army is not attncking, nnd, although trey are mE>king a feeble effort wit11 the Polis} Corps wl ich was scr"'dul"'d for attack tonight artd which I rad reperitedl,r urged be made l'lt nn earlier dnt", T receiv~u inc1icPtions f:rom General Gru"nth~r, a./"'ter his talk 'Vith General Farding, that the Folish Corrs was ~oing to again postpone its attack. This is outrageous and again indicl'.'ltes to me that Ei.grtr Army And AAI are perfectly willing to 'have tie additional German divisions come my vray in ordt",r to permit Eighth Army to ~Ake an adv~nce nt my expense. 0 "I telephoned to Gen!"!ral Alexander and told 1-iiin I understood t},ere was a dela:r in the folish Corps attack. re told me probablr there vwuld e bec~use it vrns r _inin~ over tr ere. : told rim it i ad een r11ining l'ere for a month, yet we a.ttacked every de:r and ever~, nigl t nnd tl 1 at someL'Ody b1tj. to \ \ make a cfocision as to wr etrer l e wrrnted us to ~o on, and if so t},e Zi.ghth Army must attack. I received the usual apologetic r,.rlies - no satisfaction no action. He finall,v said, 10f course, if "OU think you had better stor the attack, ~'OU do so 1 • There is no guido.nce from above. He will not tell the Zighth Arny to attr- ck. He will not tell the roles, so it is up to ?"le to carry on as '!,est I ca.n. I told him I would not stop, but there is a limit to our endurance And it soon will be renched if 3ighth Arrey does not show some signs of tictivity. re told l"l" he would re-study tJ,,e s::tuation in the morning and get in touch witl-1 me. In the me"1.ntime, we v:ill conti"1ue to attack." ' ��TRAVERSA--OCTOPER 18, 1944--F'ollowing tre 08'30 conference, Gener 1 Clark was interviewed Ht O ?30 y lillia1'l King of AF and Jack Bell, rerres-,nting the i~inmj Herald, Akron p,..ncon-JourMl A.nd the Detroit Free Pres"'. G"!nertl ClPrk left b:r jeep at 1130 for II Corrs FeadqU!.lrters in the vie· nity of Piamaggio . At II Corps General Clark net Gener ls Ke·res, C nnon, L1'mnitzer and Chidlaw . General Keyes entertained Gener:-.1 Cl~rk a.nd the other ofric~rs for lunch . General Clark then drove to the 91st Division two mil~s sout, of Loia.no where he conferred with Gen,.,ra.l Lives~y. The Army Conr:iander then drove mrer terrible roads to the 34th Division in the vicinity of Quin,::ano where he conferred with General Bolte. From tl,e 34th Division General Clnrlr drove to t1"e 85th :)ivision in the vioinlt r of Gragimo, where he conferred with Gener 1 Coulter, Division Commander. The Arm,r CoIT.1mt1.nder decorat1'd Colonel O1Hughi,s, CoT"'llt nding Officer of' the 337th I11fantr.·•, with tr e Legion of Merit. He !'.lso deco:rc.ted Colonel nruss, Corr,r,1a.nding Offic'""r of the 752nd Tank Datta.lion, with the Legion of Merit. i\t this s1~ll ceremony Genernl Clnrk oon,ended the 85th Division for their magnificent ~ccompl1 shments in t eir difficult battle. The Armv CommRnder U 1l"!n returned by jeep to his cor.unn.>1cl post, arriving at 1800 hours . He dined dth the reguh.r members of his mes'3. General Clark today received the following cable frorr Gl'"neral Imtr~ , Drazi litm 1 inister of w~...r: "In a fl"!w d:i -rs I will he ag:rl.n in Br zj_l, trucing with me the pleasant memory of h~ving been in your company. I take thin opportunity to thank you for the many personal favors you have shown me ~nd the party which ac- companied me . " * * * TRA1TERSA- -CCTOBER 19, 1944-.-General Clark attended his regular 0830 conference this morning ~nd shortly thereafter , at 0930, R"'rresentative Bdith 7-Jourse Rogers , Congres'Jwoml'l.n from t!assachusetts, arrived w·ith CoM.rrander Mutter and Colonel Forsythe of the Surgeon's Office NATOUSA, Captain Whnrton, Fifth .4rmy Hurse Director , and General Martin, F:i.fth Army Surgeon. General Clark briefed Congresswoman Rog"rs :vho showed great interest in the Genernl I s difficulties in eetting repL~cemen:ts. She offered to do nnything she could to help. A decoration ceremony was held at General Clark ' s h"adquarters shortly thereafter at which General Clti1rk decorated the following members of his staff: The followin~ received the Legion of Merit: Lt. Col. Thomas A. Lane , Col. Kenneth P . Zitzma.n, T/Sgt . Glen L. Wilson, T/Sgt. John C. Hrunmond, WOJG Basil 1 . Bodge, Maj . Elmer N. Holmgreen, Col. Stanley Grogan; the following received the Air Medal: Capt. Michael J . Strok, Lt . Col. John T. Walker, 2nd Lt . Raymond H. Porter , 2nd Lt . c~.rl A. Bio,rgman, 2nd Lt . !alter A. Holle . Generl'll Aaron Bradshaw received the British CBE, tmd the Bronze Star was pinned on Captain Paul Savary and Cnrtain ,James F. Graha.m. �\2 3 The General spent the afternoon in his van. came for dinner . * * Genl",ra.ls Brann and Lewis * TRAVERSA--CCTOBBP.. 20, 1941~--Gener 1 Clnrk left his oomma.nd post at 0840 fer his cub strip in F:irenzuola where he left by L-5 for the 92nd Division three miles south of Viaregeio . It was a flight of a hnlf an hour, and a ftne clear dti.y which enabled. the Gen~ral to observe the Alps to the north, Corsica to the west and the coast of France to the northwest . At 0945 the General landed at the 92nd Division cub strip south of Viareggio r,here he was met by Generals Crittenr.ierger ~ntl Almond . GenerP.l CJ.Erk and party drove to the command post of the 92nd Division in Viareggio. A guard of honor was held for Generul ClP.rk, consisting of one company from the 370th Regiment . G-.n~ral Clro-k decorated the following with the Silver Star: Capt . Allen L. Johnson, 2nd Lt . Millard L. Sullivan and s/sgt. Charles J . Patterson. Colonel Sherman, Regimental ComJMrrler , was rresented with the Bronze Star as were also Ca.pt . Jesse E. Jarman, Jr ., 1st Lt . John W Log11.n, . T/Sgt ~ J:1-rion G. mans nnd T/sgt. Frnnk 1hisonnt . Major Lor'-"nze , G- 2 of the 92nd Division, and Major Mac'iillie, G- 1+ of the 92nd Division, were both promoted to the grade of Lt . Colonel. The General then spoke briefly to the officers and men, congratulating them on the:ir fine ecco:r1plishments and explnininr, briefly the big picture and the important part they were playing in it. After the ceremony, General Chrk gr"'eted General Fhscarenhtis anr1 members of his Brazilian staff, and together the part ;r were oriented on the current situation in the 92nd Division area by the Division G 3, '~jor Shepard . - General Clnxk then drove with Gener~l Almond to en OP in the vicinity of Pietra Santa . From the OP Gen,..,ral Clark could plnjnly obs"-'rve ~~ount Gau.a.la , the immedi<'te objective of the 370th Infantry, and to the northwest the city of Passa , which is still held by the enemy. From the OP General Clr-rk and party returnf'!tl to the 02nd Division Headquri.rters where General Almond entertained Generals Clark, I~ascarenhns , Crittenberger and :rrr.mbers of the 92nd Division staff for lunch . Genl"ra.l Clc-:trk spoke briefly at the luncheon p rty tellin'; how proud he was to hr,ve the 92nd Division in the Fifth Army and how for tu.rr1te the Division wns in hPving such a fi.ne leader as Gen"'ral Almond . After lunch General Clro-k bRde goodbye to General Almond and his staff and drove with Gen"rnl r.rascarenhas and. Gereral Crittenberger to the staging area of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, two miles northwest of Pisa , wh~re he wns isreeted by a. guard of honor . General ,la.scarenh.'ls introduced Generrl Clark to staff members of the t ro new regiments of the Ih'a.zilian Expe<litionary Force . General Cle.rk trooped the line , reviewin~ 11, 000 newly- arrived Brazilian troops . After trooping th!'? line , Gen"""r'al Clerk ,:iro•re ·'.n hi"' jeep past the troops agnin and wns greeted enthusiastically by Brazilians singing their r1!leimental sonis . General GlPrk, accompanjr>d by Generals '1ascarenha.s and Crit tenberger , drove to the Pisn airport where he took off in his 105 for the Florence airport to meet GernJral Eaker . Upon ro~rivin~ ~t the field, Generrl Clnrk rnt Congresswoman Rogers and �l2 Y her :rnrty who ,.,ere nbout to take off for Gnserta rfter Dn extended tour of the Fifth Army sector. Genernl Chrk br-ide goodhye to Congres"'"omnn Rogers and her p:l'lrty and then ioinJd General Eak"'r in his C-53 where he oonferred for three quarters of an hour . General Clr-rk b11de goon bye to r.reMral Eaker ~nd left in his L--5 for the Firenzuola cub strir, arrivlng at his oommrmd post at 1700 hours. The General dined r.i th thA regular members of h:i..s rre ss rind r~tired enrly to his van for the evening. General CL,,rk dictat~d the folloV'r.ine notes for inclusion in his dfary: "I hnd quite a frank b.lk vr.i th General Bak ,r today in his plPne at Florence. I told him that we h~.d received no backing from Devers, and described the replacernt"lnt sit~tion to him, which he lmew about. J wanted him to get this 1nform~tion back to the Str-.tes. He is returning for a few days' visit. "From information he brought rre, Generals White r-md S wbridge, wrile at \ Devers' P'eadqunrters, sent i.nformation fo Eisenhower •rl- ich made it a.ppe:eir as though our casualties had been entirely too hea ry here. In th-is oonnP,ction, see Devers rndio to me E' nd my reply to him, both of which ('re quotAd elo 1. One only has to see this country, ronlize the mission, the ferocity of the fighting and tre degree of enem:r resistt>nce to undersknd it cnn not be do11e \'lithout hen-vy loss~s. 11 "Following is Genernl t·evers radio of 19 Dctober "'nth rc:gm-d to rer ]✓.,-. cements: 'I have ·juc"t seen your rtlported dnily crsunlty list. Suggest you rest a division or rAgiments '\'dthin Ft division ns is being done here, as yot.r casualty rate will break dovm Pny replncAment system. Fnve stopped any replrcements coming to Fr~nce ns of' October 15 rnd ~m trying to s~cure ro~ SHAEF 3,000 replt>ce~ ,nts, to ~e ...lo·m to :rou 'y nir nurn:i.shed by AAI. Your rro lem is one of usin•"; .?vt1·:.lr1 le troops to best Ddvrntage 11n1~ is th~ sa..'T!c rro 1~m you hr,d lrist FebrU,~ry.' "General Clark repli •d ris follous: 1 Yom· rrrlio ooncerning rerlncements inrHcr>tes r lack o" nrr-recirtion of our tnctic~l sitmtion, the t.-errPin, enemy resistPnce .-.,nd my mission. •,nfortTu"V"tel. • .rou '-,-,v,... ,-wt bP.en t' ½le to visit th· s f'ront in ap1,:--otlmotcly two months. I h1we b~"'n keenly aware of my crisua.lty rate and I hn.ve taken every rossibl ✓ opportunity to rAst regiments within div:isions consist"'nJ., w.tth Lhe urgP-ncy of my m·:ssion. ,..,1· ✓ rotation of regiments within di visions end battalions within rE'lgfr. nts is L1.bltu~lly prec+,iced in Fifth Army. In spite of these measures my casu[lltfos have 1~l"'et1 11ir,h because we are engag~d in Rn all-out. effort to c'l.estroy Kesselr::.ng 1 s Arm:i es so th~t they can not apyier>r :igainst Genertil 'j;"'isenhowor. E1emy is rushing a.11 available r~inf'orcements to meet •:;_s nnd lock us in the mount~ins for the winter. We r-ust nttack 'Vith all possibl vigor and t..hnt is ex.."C~ly ..,mt l:,h~ Fi.-"th Army is aoing. Our success no -r hnngs i.n th" bcll'!.nce, i•nc: our r,rowing l:runntry shortr~~e m y prove the decisive hnndicap. General AlP-xame1' took up directly with General Eisenhower c reques-1~ f'or 3,000 replr>cements. Generel Eisenho"er hns not:if:i ed us th·1 t they nre avaiL-"lbl0, r>nd m-rn.ngcments "l'~ under ,wy to fly all or r:irt of them to this theater, balonce to cone by wrter. I regret that you d:i.d not SM ..-i..t to release to Fifth Army the Seventh Arrw repl~ cel'lents ; n �I,ATOUSA Depot as requested in ny radio 89,7, dated October o. m:id you done so ond arrnrw:ed for Seventh Army supply from SHAEF sources it would have saved r:iueh tiFJe and obviated necessity of shipring replncepcnts fr-om Ifoly to France n.nd shipment bnck of "n equivalent number to Itnly. 111 * TRAV::::P..SA--CCTOBER 21, 1944---The weathl'lr tod8y wns 1.'S follO\rn: clouds throughout the day nnn rains in the lc1.te afternoon. / * ~3cnttered Shortly a.fter his early Fiorntng <Xmference the Amy Commrin::ler left by jeep for Firenzuoln. where he met General 1 irkmAn, 13 Corps Commarrler, nnd Briga.dier Lambert, Brigadier Generr::l Staff of 13 Corps. Gener1=tl l(irkmnn join1'd Genert-1 CJ.nrk in his jeep, and together they drove to the '78th British Division Main Headqunrters in Castel del Rio. There, Lt. Col. Preston, Division G-1, met G<,r..P!rnls Clark, Kirkmr>n and Brigadier V1 Tiber-t rind oriented them brfofly on the Division's cm·rent situation, nfter which Generals C1r1rk, Kirl::man an.d Brigadi,•r La:r.1bert drovo to the 78th Di vision Advnnce Hl2 in the vicinity of San Apollinare. TMs Hea<iqu,.,rters servl'?s 7Hth Division both as a TAC Headquarters nnd a.s nn OP and is urrler enemy obsl'lrvrtion. 'i'l·ere, General Clark was grMt"'d '·)y Brignd1.er Arbuthnot, Acting GOC, 78th Division, who explained brfofly trl"J currP-nt situation. Brigadier Arbuthnot, Tith Gererals ClRrk, }'j.rkman and Brigadier L'lmbert, viewed tr. e terrain from the OP, and Brig- dier Arbuthnot pointed out their objectivo hill features of i.1onte Spaduro, r~onte Del Vero, '"onte Slntn. and Monte Penzola to the norther st. . The Brigadier also pointed out n fin, view of Ivlonte Grrurle to the north in the 88th Divi ion sector. Il Genernl Clnrk bade goot'l1)ye to General Kirkman, Brigadier l.r:.mbert nnd rigadier Arbuthnot nnd drove in his jeep to the 88th Division oorrunand post in the vicinity of Villa di Sasserono wher~ he was met by Brigadier Genernl Kendall, ActinP, Division CorrirnRn::ler of tho gs-th Division. Genernl Cl.n.rk n.nde a combat promotion to 1st Lt. Dr>vid L. m.lson of the 351st :Tnfantry, pronoting him to the grade of Captain. Mer:ibers of the Division staff mre present at the promotion ceremony, and General Clark sroke briefly to them, telling them the outstanding .., chievenents the R8th Division h,_-, ve accomy lished in the Battle of the Apennin~s. Genf'}rnl Cl.'.':rk lunched ,-,~th Genert'l Kerrlall and members of his staff. Gcn".lnJ. Kend~.11 told Gener. 1 Clnrk that he hnd lost nine battalion cormnand ers in recent operations - three killed, two wo1mcted, one captured and three in hospitals. After lunch, Gener, 1 Clqrk oonferred with Gen~rn.l Kerrlall in his vnn for half an hour, after "rhich they drove to the regimentA.l command post of the 340th Infantry in the vicinity of Monte <1rande. Colonel Crmvror ,, Comm".l.ndin.1 Officer, rP-viewed his current situation with General Clnrk n.nd pointed out to the General the dffficulties he! W8.s having, due to the shortage of personnel. Colonel Crawford stA.ted th.nt in recent operations h~ hnd lost between three and four hundred enlisted men and forty of'ficers, including his three battalion commanders. Officer A.nd HCO replacements were not avtiih•ble, nnd h~ was running dry of oi"ficer ond ~JCO leaders to promote to h:i.[11er grades. Gen ~r~l CJrrk assured him th..,t reph.cenents were forthcomine rmd err.ph11sized th.nt, where possible, Colonel �Crawford should appoint good rrco I s to commission~d grac'i.es. Gen er- 1 Cl.., rk, wlth Gen~ral Kendall, then <"rove to the 35oth Infantry rngimental corunend post, where General Clark pt•esented the DSC to Colonel }ry, Regimental Comm~nder, in the rresence of sever~l members of his staff. Gen~rn.l Clark spoke to Colonel lt'ry and ris staff, telling trmn of th~ !TI1'lgnificent job they had been do~ng and how fortut1t1te they ,.,ere to hnve such a fine lender as Colonel Fry. Genl'!r~l Clr,,rk, 1:i th Genr>ral Kt<!rr:1 nll, drove then to the 351st Infantry Regiment, now jn reserve. GenP.rr,l Clark conferred briefly with Colonel Chnmpeny, Regimental Cof'Jmander, a:-'ter which Gr:neral Clark bade gt)odbye to General Kendall and Colonel Chrmpeny and returned to his oornmand post by jeep over Route 6520, the 88th Division supply route. General Clark dined w~ th the regulnr members of his shortly thereafter. * l'1' ss and retired * TRAVERSA--OCT0BER 22, 1944--The weather tcxlny was as f'ollows: and fog all day. * Light rains Gen..,rfll ClEirk did not ettend the 0830 conference th is morning but conferred in his van with Gen~r:ils Gruenther, Brann tind Howard. !\.t 1000 hours the A:rmy Comr,nnder met with General ffr-cGruder, G-4 of !1A""0tTS.A, Genernl Gruenther and Gener:-il "'ate, Fifth Army G-4, in his oon·"erence hut. At 1100 hours General Clnrk left by j"'ep with Captnin '~n Dyke, South African Linison for Headquarters of the 6th South African Armored D:!vision in the vicinity of Castiglione, arr1vin~ Rt 1230 hours. General GL.,rk wns met by Genernl Poole, GOG of the Jivision; Colonel De,,e.lf, Conrn~nding Cor1bat Comnand D of' th~ 1st !lxmored Division, now 1-1tfoched to the 6th South African Armored Djvision a.nd on their left flrmk; c.nd Colonel Eaggs, G-1 of the Division. Colonel Dewey ask9d Grmerril Clnrk for some infnntr;,r help, and Generrl Cl:1r 1 : told him he would try to get him a battalion of infantry as soon as possible. Gener 1 ClPrk conferrl"ld for hrilf .,n hour w·tri Genl"rnl Poole in GeMr"ll Pool~ 1 s van. GenersJ. Poole then entertrd n"l<l Gen0rr-l Cl,.rk nnd Colonel Dewey for lunch at his headquarters. Just hefore lunch, Generr·l Clrr}- explained to G,1nernl Poole's staff tJ,e over-nll picture on the Fifth Arm:r f'ront, pointing_ out the important pArt the f1th South Africi:m Armored Di vision were plPying in the battle. Genernl Clark p:-esented G~ner~l roole with a p8ir of the new U. d. Army issue shoe packs. Due to the low clouds and drizzly rriin, Goner"'l Poole could not show General Cl.,rk the hill features over wli:tch the 6th South Armored were fighting which could be observed fror1 Genern.l Poole I s He.<idquRrters on a clenr day. During the discussions betv een General Cll'rk nnd Gen':lr?l Poole, General Poole recor.mended trf!t Brjgn_dicr Cljve, Commandinr; the 24th Gu:=irds Brig1:de, be rel 1evad. Gnnernl Poole also re1111"sten more nir rhoto cover ge rnd nir support U' possible. Gen<?ral 1 oole also "'"-T'ressP,d his thr>nks to Gener:-1 CJ:,rk for nrrangin · to release to the 6th South A:rican Armored J)j vision one nrule �company. At 11~15 Genern.l Cl.,rk br-de ~oodbye to Generr.tl Poole and Colonel Dewey n.nd drove to the bend'1u"'rtArs of the 1st l\rmored Division in SFln Anr1rea. · Upon Ms arrivn.l, General ClPrk w, s riet by Generril Pritchard r>nd his Ch:i.ef of StPff, Colonel Howse. Gener11l Cl-1.rk, before an ass ,mbl~a group of the 1st Armored Division staff rresented 1st Lt. Rowe •ith .the D~Btinguished Service Gross. G.,nerr-1 Cbr also rresented L~gion of' Mer:i.t awards to Lt. Col. rovming, nrdnance Officer of the 1st ArMored Division, and ~t. Col. Edwin Russell, Comm.,nding Officer o" the 31st Recon. The General also mn.de the following rromotions: Sgt. Swri.rtzlnnder ot' t}-,p,, 1st "'nn"k Bnttnlion to 2nd Lic,uten'lnt, Sgt. Fuglett 0f the 14th Arrnoren ""'ttalion to ?nd Lieutenant, Cript. 1 /hitsit of the 701st Tank Destroyl'!r Bnttrili.on to Pnjor, ?nd L:t.-:uten~nt Pntter o+"' the 1st Tank Battalion to 1st Li'"lui;enn.nt, ;'.'nd Lfoutenant Riley of the 1st Armored EP I lntoon to 1st Lieuteiw nt. After the ceremony Gener.21 Clark spoke briefly to the stn -rr of the 1st Armored Division, col"1J1ending them on the fine _job tt e:r are doing in their defensive role a..."'l.d thrit h.., hoped shortly t},ey •vould be able to get sol"le reA.1 armored ~ction. Gen-..:r['.1 Cb.rk, v1ith Genert;l Pritchard and Colonel HoV1se, then confer:red in General Prit C:bnrd I s office. Gt""nAral Pritchard. requested ' Genernl Clr,r 1 c to Sl'Jnd Colonel J'owse to F'rnnce f'or ['nroximately ten d3ys to sturly armored tactics :i.n France. Genl'!rnl Cl~k agreed. Afti,r conferring il'ith Genernl FrHcha.rd for h,ilf nn hour, Gentirnl Clnrk too· of'f in his j~er over tr,e miserr>ble San Andrea - feJ.m"'ggio ro..,d to Route 65 nnd then bnck to his benr1qunr·ters. The G"'nernl arrived bAck nt his headquarters at 1730 and ht1.d "our ~uests for dinner, after w~ich he enterta~n~d Members of his striff at 8 Movie in hjs conference hut . * * * TRAilr:RSA--OCT0BE"R. 23, 1944--The we11thl'lr today wt>s overcast, cle"ring towar·d th~ l~te a~ternoon. GP-nernl Gl:'lrk spent the mornin~ i.n his van vrorking ::1nd conferring with members of' M8 stnff. At l:.>00 bours Lt . Col. Grr-y, Armv .TACr, c1>me to confer with Genern.l Clrirk. At 1600 hours G"'tl~ral Cl,,rk left f'or FlorPrice with Colonel Saltzrnnn and his AlC. Enroute to Florence, the Generrl met Gener!"l_l Lemnitzer :1ho a5 on his wa::r up to Army Headquarters. (}~n .r".l Glrir'l< t,-11{:ed to Gen~rrl L"'lrinttzer "or t"YJ. Minutes on the ro~c', and tren continut'ld on to the Fit"'th Arm:, Officer's Rest Fotel in Florence. At 1~10 (}"'!neral CL,,rk entertl'lined for cocktails ~/Ir. & Mrs. Guthrj e YcCljntock (Katherine r,ornell), Er. Bri:m /1.herne, l.liss rncy rnd :mother rnem,r of the cast of "'T'he Barretts of Wimpole Street 11 now rlaying for }'ifth rmy troops, and !1isees Elli, Logan anci ::Ulriney, , lso onterfoining Firth Amy ~ roops. ('ren~ral Cl<ir d-tned with Colonel Saltzoen 'l.nd his ADC, retu.cninfs shortly therer-tfter to 1is comru'md post j n mrnv~rsa. �i'R.AVF:RSA--OCTORBR 24, 1q44• ..t}i,ner11l Clark },ad hj_s usual 08JO conf"rence t:r.:.s morning, rit which General Lemnitzer was also rresent. At 1000 hourr:; ri;r. rancis I. ~ratthews, Supreme Knight of the Knigrts of Colut'\bus, cti.lled wit:i G•n~rnl Gruenther to see t'1•en'"'.!rnl Cll'l.rk in the con-<'erence hut. Gen,..rnl Cl"'.rk oriented 'r. ifRtthews on the cnrrent ifth Arey situation. At 1?30 r1r. Basil O'Connor, Chnirmm of +,he Red Cross, .. nshington, D. G.; Robert Allen, ~Tice Cba1rmnn of tre R~ Cross ; r.1:r. Sterling Tomrkins, Delegate o" th~ Red Crans in l, shiiv-;ton; Mr. Vf. W. Jeff,..rson, D:irector of' Ci. vilfon W!il' -:'lelief in the ttalfon ,,,h,..nter; n•lr. R ymond Healy, D·:rector of' Facilities in the Italian Theater; and Th:-. James ""e, ls, R"!gional Director of' t're It linn Theat"!r were G.-n"'rnl Cl~rk I s lund1Mn guests. Before lunch General Clnrk revie red the tacticnl situation on the Fifth Army front. 'r. G~me:.~a1 Cl.s-,r' · srent n qu.:.et rf'tel"noon 1n h's vrui until 1600 rours, at which t'i.me h1' l~r0 - _ to TI Corps HeAdqU:"rters in 'Dif-J•1nggio whi-re he conf err~d for three quart~rs of an hour with Gen":r:<'ll K,oyes. "'he Army Comrnnnder returned to his headquaFters ~t 1730 and entertained two rNests or 1inner, retir_i "lf; eE!rly to his VA.n. A surnwi.ry of battle rrogress +~or t},e week endinE; October 24, 1944 indicat~s +h~ followin~: Steady 1 ut cilo"1 advances ci:mt.;nued to 1-)e m,"¼de along the lin.., o" the main / effort in II Corrs, t1:tth flPnk uni.ts in 1J Corps ~nd () SA Armd :)iv seizing control of such tmportnnt ·"'eatur~s as M 3J Attmo on t:i,e right nnd Hill 826 and M / TEm.1nrr: on the left. The oo mmanding f eatur~ of M GR.A'[:; in r-i.~ht I of II ~ Corps sector v:as seized and "urth..,r .<1dvaYJ.ces rnt1d~ towArds Route 9 ir tr e FO Vtil ley. 'T'h"'J s~verely--f'ought for M rr~1r,~0·rrB feature El'l_st of Fi gr1wP.y 65 in tre left sector of n Corrs fell to our troors nenr th"'J end of the period. Enemy resistance cont· m1"'Jd •,tiff -in froi1t or the mP.in effort l'li tl~ many severe counter attacks bei~~ rerulsed . In the r1 Corrs sector activ~ rntrols continued to maintain contRct witt1 ~nerny el"m"'nts, with no indications of enetn:v withdrawal in sector front. -tr"" * * * ,..,RAV'!-::RSA--0'.;l'l'OBER 25, 1944- -The yreather today was rniny r-ind cold. G~nerR.1 Chrk n~t"'Jnr1ec Ms 0830 conference rnrl at 1000 hours drove cio m Route 't~5 to th~ junction of Route #~5 nnd the Imola ron~ wrere r.e met Lieutenant General Jfolfo_rney, T'a,jor Gen"'r<Jl ' 1ill"r Yihite, G-1 ·iATC'TTSA. G~'tlernl Cl~rk, with General r~c'Tarney, dro~.-e over the Altuzzo mountain pn.ss. Rnroute (1-{'nernl Clnrk poi-•1ted out key terrain features r-nd enemy forti-f'ications . ,,,h" ptirty arrived at Arm:, Feaclqunrters at 12?.0. G-n""rl'lls Grul"!n~her, Ft>r<'lin,:, Lemnitzer, Cannon rnd Chitll~w ret Generl'l nc·,:arnev, and then C'r~n~ral Cl11rk brit'lred General ·rcr--Tarney on t're over-nll. picture on 'Sighth n.nd Fi-l"'th Armv fronts, r fter which the ent5-r~ f'll'\v 1'!10 lunch. At l/~00 hours Gen,ral A1ex,nc'er :--rriv~d, at'--1 +,re entire f{roup co"t"errer• in th"' co>1'"er nee l ut. n~nerr1ls J\.l<"lxar.r er, rnrcinP:, LPrmitz"r nnn Cannon left at 1530, ~nd rr~n ,rals 'Jlr,rk n.nd r•c•·arney co-rif'erreil ~loYJ~ in the hut until 1700. �Gener al Clrrl.;: entt-rt aint'ld Ge11r,rals Nc"rarnt"ey "nd White for dinner . ral !'c·rarnr-y spent the n~ ,;ht in G~neral Cbrk I s ~est van . * * Gene- * ✓ 6 , 1944--The weather today was very poor with a heavy rain falling durin~ the entire course of the day. TRAVERSA--OCTOBER In the no;rning General Clark, witJ-, Gen~rals M cNarney and White , drove to II Corps where they were ~et by GenerPls Keyes ano Prit ch~rd ~nd members of the II Corps staff . General Keyes briefed tre JY.rty on tbe current situation . The pnrty tr en drove to tl-e 91st Division, wJ-,ere they met and conferred with General Li vesay. The Army Cornmi:mder and y:-arty returned to t1"e FiftJ-, Army command post direct from t:be 91st Division, arriving back at noon . Genersls McNarney and Vfhite departed shortly after lunch , and General Clark spent the remainder of the afti,rnoon in his van , working on a.dministrative roo.tt~rs and conferring with v,irious staff officers . In tbe evenini:; the GenAral had Generals Brarm A.nd Lewis for dinner . Gener al Clark today received th~ following memorBndum from his G- 3 with regard to resting, refitting And training Fifth .4rr.ny troops: " I. In order ments Absorbed a.nd be rested to areas accomplishing this 1. that Fifth Army troops be rested, re- equipred and rerhicegiven soJ'lle tr,dning, it is necessary to move t he units to "'ell bl'l.ck from tJ-,e front line . There are two met:bods of project . To move out complete divisions to rest areas. a. AdvantaCTes . (1) When o+'fensive operRtions are resuned , there would be availAblA possibly two divisions - with all personnel rested and best rrepared far a strong attack. (2) This method would give more flexibility to any plan to resume the attack. b. Disadvantages . (1) II Corps zone of responsibility is so wide and the enemy ~lon~ tbis ~rent is so strong th~t it is Most difficult to cover this zone witr two tired divisions . f2) All +>our of our infantry divisions are very tired . I believe that if any complete division, or even all of the infantry of a division , is withdrawn , it would 4ffect adversely the morale of the divisions left in line . ✓• mo move infantry regiments or battnlions and an appropriate percentage of othar units of all divisions in turn to rest areas. �a. "II. Advantages. (1) The enemy can be more easily led to believe that we ro-e in strength across his f'ront. This, it is hoped, will cause him to continue his withdrawal from in front of Eighth Army. (2) By leavin~ all divisions in line, tre responsihili t;v of th"} generl'l.1 zones they now control will be much easier th1m it ,vould be if two divisions held the entire sector. (3) W are in better position to follow up any e enemy withdrawal with parts of all divisions forward. Location of rest areas. 1. Our troops are both physically and mentally tired of fighting. They need :rest, but trey- ,ilso m~ed recreation, tre opportunity to walk on a sidewalk, see picture shows nnd relax. 2. Troops in rest areas must be under heavy tents or in buildings. AFHQ hRS recently announced the policy of using buildinrrs for troops whenever possible to save tentage. I am informed tha.t several thousand men can be put in build-lngs in f1 0~ECA'T'INE. It may be possible to find additional housing in PIS'T'OJA or FLCR'SNCE. 3. Any rest areas selected in high ground will be very cold and muddy. In addition, my bivouac personnel can not find any area into which a large number of troops can be concentrated in a tent caMp, except the FI'.1I'OIA - PRATO - SESTO area. 4. Troops bivouaced astride Route 65 interfere with the movement of supply trains and their w,hicles running out on to 65 carry so much mud on to the road that a ~eat number of men w.ill be required to keep it clear. 5. Class I, II and III supply dumps ::ire in the FLCRENCE area. heaV;r maintenance repair stores nre in the FLORENCE area. All 6. mhe a.dditional time requ:ired to move troops from their forward position to the FLOR.ENCE area over that require-d to move trem to some pl."!ce along 65 South of FU'J'A PASS is only a matter of a few },ours. This is more than compensated for by the fact that tr- e troops in rest areas will be very near Rll supply and JM.intennnce establishments. "III. Timing. 1. The date on which Fift1, Ar_my resumes its offensive to capture B0LOGNA must oepend to a great part on the German oper~tions during the next few dayfl. UnM.l Eighth Army carries approximately ebrt':last of CASTJi:L S. PIETRO, and, until some G'1rman strength is withdrawn f'rom our front, I do not believe we liave t},e capability of capturinE.; BOLOGNA. It is estimated t}•pt our troops, after a short rest, will be capnble of Pn effective attack for A. yeriod of about 8 to 10 days. Ava.ilabb nrnmunition will not support a strong a.ttnck �l 31 for a longer period. 2. It aprears t:ra.t once we begin resting our troops, it is to our t:idvantage to rest ns long as possible, cont~ngent on tre date Eighth Army is to cease opRrations to prepare +'or tr P,j_r next commitment. I will, of course, be~in at once to plan for a resumption of tre attack, but trese plans must be revised daily in accord with Gi?rma.n action. The only tring that rnust be completed in the near future is a plan to follow up any German withdrawal. "IV. Additional Troops. 1. Shortly a+'ter l!ov('!r,ber 1, additionA.1 troops of tr e 92d Division and BEF will become available for combat. Exact dates of t1vailability are difficult to determ-lne because tl--e status of equipment on bents now unloa.dinP, and some yet to come is not lmmm. I was informed tr-is morning thAt tre 371st ROI' of 92d Division would be ava.ilnble by November 5. It will probably be near 1rover.ib,,,r 15 before BEF can complete tl"e minimum training of one RCT and haV'3 i.t reRd:,r for combat. 2. The 6th RCT of the BEF, now in action, could be withdrawn at once from its present Eirer and attFJ.ched to II Corps. 3. The area in whic1' troops of either of t} ese units are employed must he carefully selected so that any withdraw<tl would not endanger a critical sector. 0 "V. Recom.~endations. 1. That troops of' Fifth Army be withdrawn to tre FLffiENCE area for rest. 2. Thflt personnel from all divisions be withdravm for rest. The number to he based on a careful study by division conrnandors o+' the necessary strength required to hold their respective zones of action • .3. That the withdrawal of troops in t he M. GRANDE area be based on our determining the Ger111c~n's intentions in thnt sector. 4. ThA t wren possible infantry regiments, plus A.n appropriate percentai;;e of other units of tre division, be withdrawn. When it is impossible to reduce the strenrrtr of any division sector by one infantry regiment, that one or r>1ore battalions be withdrawn. 5. That, in so far as facilities r,ermit, troops withdrawn for rest M quartered in buildings. 6. That as soon as certtrl.n operat:i ons now be·i ng conducted by British troops of Fifth Army are completed, they be directed to conforn to plan for resting II Corps troops. 7. That tre 6tri RCT of tre BEF be attached to II Corps and the remainder of t hat division brougr1 in as soon as possible. t �8. That the 92d Division continue rressure along t!-,e West coast. 9. That t}-,e A:rmy Commander and tre undersigned whole },eartedly perticipate in the rest period recommended Above." * * * TRAVERSA--OCTOBER 27, 1944-~neral Cl~rk had a conference with Generals Gruenther and Brann at 0930 in the conference hut and was joined at 1000 by Gen"'ral Keyes and Colonel Porter of IT Corps. The remainder of the morning General Clark remained in his van. At 1400 in the afternoon Gereral Clark h,ld a small press conference which was Rt tended by Colonel Grogan, Fifth Army PRO; Milton Br'ncker, New York ~imes; Frank Conniff, INS; and James Roper, UP, in the conference hut. ~he remainder of the afternoon Ge~eral Clnrk spent in his van. The G...,n~ral hRd dinnt"lr in the evening with .the regular members of his mess. In the evening General Clark dfotated the following random notes for inclusion in his diary: "I have received tr e following letter from Gen~rnl Alexander: 1 1. With reference to my CGS/4~9 of 10 Oct. 44, it is now possible to go a stage further in the developm~nt of future plans. In the f:irst place it is quite clear that no additional A.llj_ed forwtions will be avaiL.,ble for operations in this t'beatre now or in 1945. On the contrary 4 Ind Div nnd the Greek Bde haYe b~en taken for duty in GRr.;:E:CE, Hnd Rre not likely to r~turn to A.A.I. In addition 1 Br Armd Div and one British inf'a.ntry div will have to be dlsbande<l to provide su·"ficient repL-=i cement personnel to maintain the remaininr- British forMRtions in a 191+5 campaign. None the less it is the C-in-C's intention to carry out A. sustained offensive in 19!~5, a.nd he has rece~ved instructions to rnRke plans f'or a campaign on the ~ener~l 1:i ll"!S indicc1ted in para 6 of rrty CGS/429 . 1 1 1 2. Plans which will now be ttiken in hand will be based on the aseumption that durin~ the next two nr three months the advance of the Russian Armies in HTH1GARY, combined vith the opera.tions of our light f'orces ?nd the Farti~ans in Y1TG0SLAVT.A, ~ill force the enemy not only to ~ive up the ports on the DalmatiA.n coast o.t least as far nortl as ZARA inclusive, hut to withdravr from the mountains in trie hinterland of' trose ports to a line between the SAVA and the coast bet :"Teen ZARA and Filn£ • 1 3. It is the intention of the SAC -in-C to occupy the rorts of SPLIT, SIB~NIK and· ZARA with COJ'lll"lA.ndos and other ljp;ht forces as they are evacu.,ted by t},e enemy, and to develop operRtions in conjunction with the> Partis1ms to gain control of the roads running inland over the mountains. If these opera.tions nre successf'ul it should be po ·sible to develop the ports t=ind the road and rail communicntions from t'.rem, under the cloak of openinr; up the country, and under the protection of our li,:;ht forces nnd the Partisens. As soon as �l 33 these prepnra.tions are sufficiently advanced our mnin ho<lies '"ill be brought in as quickly t:i.n<l secretly as rossible f'or nn advance on L.nJBLJANA and Fim.£ . This is a g1m-3ral conception , the actual rlan will of course re'1Uire a gr/lla.t deal of detailed '1tudy, i=ind its final form must rwturally der,end on the situation at that time . This oreration will be the task of ~ighth Army whose H. Q. "'ill be reljeved of opArntional resron.sibility in tir1e to :plan it, rrobably by placinit n. corrs H. Q. directly u.mer A. A. I. in command of the Eighth Army front . 4. '!'he first object of Eit;hth Army ' s operr-tiorn will be to cut the enemy ' s road and rail comM1.mjcations through LJUBLJANA AS ri step towards the destruction of KESSBIBPTG ' s Armies . Th~ capture of' the port of FIUME ·rill be esciential f'or the rn11.interumce of' the tirmy." At the si:rr'\e tirrie these operr>tions will have to he coord1nated yrith those of' It,,rsh;:il 'T'ITO 1 s forces , a.nd. rossibly with those of the Russfa.n southern Pr'f"!y e.s well . 1 5. Suffident cra.f't <'or Pll MSA.ult 1:.1-f't of one di11ision for ferrying troops to the Dal:MP.tion ports, l"nd therenfter for Pmrhibious operations in conjunction with the advance up the coast will be R.vailable for Eighth Army. 1 1 6. 'l'he task of Fifth Arrrry' will be to continue the offensive on the main front with the obJect of holdinv, the enerey- +>orce"l in I'T'ALY and driving them north eastwards . EventuAlly the two rtrmies would complete the pincer riovement by conver~inl',' on GORIZIA nnd 'T'RP'S"'E f:Teparetory to a combined r-idvance into ATT'3TRIA . Even if this conception rrowis too ambitious f'or the f'orces llVAilable it will At least serve to contain the mRx:i.mur:1 enemy forces on this front which ,\Till be a very valll.ll.ble contribution to the overall Allied strategy. 17 . 'l'hfl target date for the openini:1, of this CPJnfaign is the beginning of FebruPry. .If it cPn he launched earl ~er so much the better from the overall point of' vievr . '1'he reli:itive tinin~ of' the orerations of the two Prmies , and the final allocAtion of troops nnd other re,.,ources t'lre matters f'or discussion nearer the time • .,,here Pre ho~ever certain qmstions which must be decided in the very near f'uture . 'T'hese flre cliscussed helovr . 1 B. .,,o o-ive f'ormi=itions time for essenti~l rest, reorganization Pnd trnin:inq- before embr-trking on another protrt.Jcted offen,.,ive campair;n, it is estir.iated that it will ,e necess:iry to "'Uspend the current of'fensiv~ about 15 Nov . More over rra.ctic1> 1.ly all formations in both Prr.iies h~tve now hrd long periods of continuous fiphting , and rnPny ha .. rea.ched the stage ,,,hAre "'urther effort without rest is rm unecononical rropositj on. On the other hrnd f'ailure to se cure BOLnGnA and RAVENHA before settlin~ down on 11 winter 7 in1J , will h11ve the most serious ndverse effect on rr"pr-trPtions ,...or re.,.,1..Tlling the offensive on thP. mn.in Italian front :i.n 104'5 . With B0LOGHA and ~VF?TNA in our hpnrls rinr1 suffic ent spP.ce beyond them to n~ke it rossible to use the +>ormer fl_S " rorid nnd railhead , Pnd thP. lntter PS .<i const\vic:e port , we should be Abl13 to huild up c:uf'ficjent sup:plfos north of the A~nnines to suprort r-n 11ttack on the ADIGE position ns 1 art of a contj nuous mover1ent . Inr-> bili ty to use th".lse Preps rind the co:mriru.n:iotitions of which they f're the term·nals for "dm5nistr2tive build up durin~ the vdnter mr-ty, and rrobrhly 1•rill necessitate P nel-,y of' two or r.iore months betw~en the capture of BOif'G!~ and an attack on the ADIGE rosition . The immedirite rroblem therefor~ is to oolPnce the advantages of' sncuring BOif)GNA and RAVRT\THA a~a-inst the need of' the troop~ f'or rest . ,e �T '9. The best way of iMprovin, our chances of' CApturing BOLOG11A ·vould s seem to he to ~rsuade th~ rmemy to "'love somn of his troops -rrom ~ ts defence. The following plan to thnt en<l ha.s befm su~gestect:- a. Fiftr Army to suspend t1 ctive opP.rl'ltions; :i thctraw sry two di visions to rest in the FIDR~tTCE AREA; and simulate to the wi thdrawAl of a third div ?nd prP,parations for defence. ]2. A cover plPn to be ini tinted to tho effect that Fifth /1 rmy had been compelled to i:;o on the defensive owj.11~ to exhaustion and he1wy casualties. £• EiP.:hth Army to continue their o-rfensive w5.th all avl'ilable resources at least t5.ll 15 1Tov, to draw enemy f'orces off Fifth Army f'ront nnd to capture RAiF?r»'A. g. Fifth Army t0 pr~pro-e n pl11n f'or 1:1 f'inl'l 1 all out i:,+'fensive to capture DOT.OGNA, and th('ln to move the divisions withdrawn to rest in the I'LORF,NCE area back to the f'ront +'or th~ purrose as quickly and secretly as possible as soon as the enemy hRd moved troops away and the weather was rropitious, or P .t any rate not later than 15 tTov. ~- E; g:hth Army to concentrate on the capture of RAVEtJNA. , If this plan f'::,ilP.d it is considered th::>t the disadvHntagP.s of not holdini:; Bf\LOCP·l'A and RA~WTA must be accepted, ano th~ best •vint!'lr Une exclusive of those r-JEcM should be held. Tr0ops jn ti,e lin" shouln t}-,en be t1'i:r.ned ,cind rest, reorP,Rnization ,rnd trniniri!Y ffi'1 ould begin An<l hPve rriority. If it is not rossible to capture Bf•LOGNA and RAVE!HJA before calling a hPlt in the present offensive it will be o:"' o-reat jmportrmce to secure FORLI to open up Route 67, 11.nd r"Cl!J'l'E SMT MURE (L 873q) to cover· the northP.rn F.lxi t of the t-flllimE AOO!: ~ tunnel. 1 10. 1 11. ":'h.-, ~ajor problcl'!ls to be settlr.n At once are therefore:- (a) r-row cHn BClL()(}NA and RAVEF TA be captured before 15 ~J'ov'? (b) If thnt proves impossible whnt is the best wj nter line to hold? (c) "fu.A.t assistance or further jnformation do Armies want +'rom A.A.I. at this stage to enable them to go Ahead ':'T.ith planninp; a campaj_ on the lines indicated in this lett~r, anrl 0esif-;ned to gn be~in eA.rly in Febrmiry 191~5? •va11 you please examin!'l these questions and any others connected vrith the pla.ns outlin~d herein trat occur to you Pt tri is tage. mhe C-in-C ,;,rill holr. An Army Co..,ma!Y1er's mect:'ng rit this H.Q. at 1100 1-i.rs on 2() Oct to a~scu"s these and anv other connected questions. VT ill you please inform mP. by 27 Oct if you have any points not covered by this letter trFJt you rish to discuss e..t this meeting, also whether the rroposed time find date a.re convenient. Army Commanders r.,p_y brin1: two staff officers with them to this meeting. 1 nr have dj scu<1sed this mtter with General Alcxand er, l'md it hApp")ned thBt ��135 Genernl McNarney vras here Pt the Sl'lrr.e Mme. T told .Alexander I was not in fa• vor of abrmdoninf!, our attack on Boloenl'l but that due to the lnck of all-out effort h;v the BiP:hth Army, the German hnd been permitted to mss his defenses opposj te Fifth Army to close the ej ght-mile gar b"fore Bologna And the fourmile r;ap to Route #9 in the Fo Valley. '!'he Germtm hPs removed his best divisions at will from the F.iP,hth Arrrry +"ront, Pnd Eighth Army has done nothin~ to help us except lean aga1-nst the enemy. The -;;;ighth Army has never, in my year of nssociation with it, indulged in an all-out attack against the ~nerny, nor will they ev~r do so, in my opinion. Had they borne the5r just burden of this Fifth - Ei£;hth Arrrry pnrtnf'!rship, we would ht>Ve been in Bolor,in. Th"l enemy woul<l not have found it rossi..ble to take al 1 the d:1visions from Eighth Arrrry front Rnd plt1ced them agi:iinst us. 11 ! agree ,,rj_th the proposal to launc}-, an AY!lJ2hibiqus operation into the Balkans by ~ighth. Arrriy"w.r-Ui.r'rrth Armyrefnrorced by Poles f!nd British troops attFJcking nf'!xt sp:rin(; across the Po pist Yenice and tovrnrds the Ljubljana Gap. As a prerequjsite to this a.ttack in the sprini:;, I must htwe Bologmi this winter in order to build it up as a. base for thes,., future operl'ltions. AAI ,•u1n"t,s to withdraw Sip;hth Amy by ~ovember 15th in or<ll'lr to rrepere f'or their 11r,phibious operation wrich will be nothing but a ferrying exercise without oprosition. My troops Rre so 1':x:hn.usted now that they J'!lUst rest ~or at least t}-,ree weeks, in order to absorb new replace.ments rind rerfect sm~ 11 unit teamwork. I Pm ~oina to a reeetin~ the day after tomorrow at AAI with the following proposal: (a) That r::ii:;hth and Fifth Armies carry out an 11.ll-out desrerA.te attnck ) on or about 1\Tovember ::>oth on Bolognl'l.. Eighth Arrrry nrust put rill resources into the ettack. (b) least H '!'hnt all air suprort, includjng strategic, is mHde availn.ble for at week -in adwmce and during the attA.ck. ( c) Th,.t the l oHsh Corps be mde avFlilable to me to attack on my left ,. fl1rnk to op~n up Route #64. / 'l'hRt if bnd vreath~r slows up the attack the Britfoh Eighth Army be ~ ~~~~~:: to remRin in this area a'1 late as December 15th in order to secure ~~~ ~ (d) "I11 the meantime, I am stopring the attAck on MY front, will move 13 Corps \ \ to the north to take over Mount Grande, thereby rel-leving desp('lrately tired 8~th Division for rest. "Amrnmition will be crit~ cal for the oottle, but by r[-ltioning during this lull until '1ovember ?oth, I will ruive enough for about two weeks I all-out effort. By -r-rovembP.r :::ioth my replacem~nt situation will be suf'fici.ent to bring rne up to overstrength and to me.intain r,e in a desperate battl" for approximately two weeks. If ~i~hth Army will attack, and they n1'V~r hr>ve yet, I will attack up Rout~ !!65, and "e have ~ood chances of' cartur:ing Bologna." 11 * * �TRAVERSA--OCTOBER 28, 1944--Genertd Cl..,rk did not have his usu.el 0830 conference this mornini:; but did confer for a short whil~ w:i th Gem~r11ls Gruenther 11.nd Brann. At 1030 the Army Cornnnnr'ler, a.ccompanit"d b;v GPneral Brann, depl'l.l1ted for 13 Corps Headquarters at 'licchio, where he conferred w~th General Kirkman . Follow;n~ this conference, GenP.ral Clark drove on to Florence. At six o'clock in the evenin~ the ~neral enterteined mrious of his section chiefs +'rom the renr echelon And a few nddi tional f'riends at the J\nglo-AmeriC8n Hotel for dinner. * 17 * TRAVERSA--OCTOP.ER 29, 1944--The Amy Commander left for AAI Headquarters at Siena, accompanied by Generals Gru"nther t'lnd Brann, to confer at eleven o'clock with GenerRl Alexander. The GenerAl returned to the hotel for lunch and drove back to his commRnd po~t, arriving at About 1615. In the evening the Army CommAnder entertRined memb~rs of his st11ff '"ith a perform1mce in the hut by Miss Rlltt Logan 1md her u.s.o. Show. The performance Yrns f'ollowed by a buffet supper for approximAtely thirty guests. * * TRAVffiSA--OC'T'OBER 30, 1944--Gener,i.l Cl11.rk srent the early part of the mornin~ wor'ld.ng: in his van and at !'!lev~n o I clock oonferre<l with Generals Gruenther and Rrnnn jn his conference hut. Previous to this conference Glllnerl'll ClArl<" conferred with Lt. Col. I'fllh.off and Col. Ellison of the Inspector General I s Depirtment. At 1430 the Army CoTm"lAn<ler held a conference in the hut rit which the follovr~ni; vrere present: Generals CJ.Rrk, Gruenther, Kirkman, Keyes, CrittenberD'.er, MascFJrenhas, PritchArd, Poole, BradshPw, Lewis, Brann, Tate, Bowr1an, Fow11..rrl, Chidlaw, Bri~. Divers, Briis. Roe, Colonels McMahon, Saltzman, Zitzml'ln, Ladue, Brayner, Lt. Col. Cooper, Maj. i'lalters, 1-\:'1.j. Th".!unisson and Capt. Case. Follovring /'l.Te notes on the conferenc"! compiled by Colonl"ll Saltzman, Army Deputy Chief of Staff: llThe Army Corinmnder stated that he had convoked this conference to describe the new picture which confronts Fifth and Ejghth Armies. He h~d received ., direct:ive from Ge~ral A lexarrler purs1mnt to which th~ bulk of the Ej /:;hth Arny will und.ertA.ke another mission during the latter pl.rt of December. General Clark stressed the necessity of CRreful security in this connection. l I 11 He stated thAt another Bttempt vrould be made to take BOLOGNA and that \ such rt drive by the Fifth Army nn1st he carefully timed Vl.r~th th1' efforts of the EiP,hth Army. "C'renE"rFil Clark c;aid that the Fifth Army has advanced to rositions on a 14ne generally throui:,;h LIVBRG"TAN'O and Tir1I'. GRANDE, wh"re it has been �13'7 stopped. The four divisions of the TI Cor s could not press the att11ck further without l"lnormous c.nsualties, e.nd it is doubtful if it would bl'! possible now to ret=i.ch BOLOG1-TA on account of' the lRrge r-i.mount of Gerynpn re inf or cements which hnd bP-en throvm opposite the II Corps sector by hringinr,; units from other parts of the +'ront, particularly from the Bighth A:rmy front. "It had been R.ssurned by Qf!!nerAl Alex~urler that f!S "re threatened the principal Germ1m lPteral highway the enemy vmuld not let us cut behind him. He therefore ht:id two alterm:1.tives: to 17ithdraw or to stop our attack. He chose the latter And put l'!leven divisions in the area of the II Corps. General ClRrk had planned a new effort with II and 13 Corps but decided agri inst it when the 1st German Pt:irRchute Division was brou~ht in. "The Army Comrm.nder explPined thAt it is now necessP.ry to devise the most effective mea ns o+' resti . .ng our troops in time to mAke nnoth~r nttnck on BOLOGNA) before the rleparture o+' the bulk of the Eighth Army. It has been decided in conference At Fer.dqmtrters AAI that 11 coardin-"ted nttack to secure BOLOGNA "''ill be launchP-d A bout 1 December. We mu"'t rest the troops wh.ich will rrovide the spea.rhead of the next Pttn.ck, ,,,.,mely, the four tT. s. divisions. Means of getting them out of the line would be discussed hy G,,nerRl Clark lPter in the meeting. r~erimrhile, General r~cCreery will continue to push h::i.s "Sighth Army of'fl"lnsive. "It is difficult to judge where the Germans will try to corie to rest; there ar4' wrfous rossibllities, and the 'Rii;hth Army ,,,jll have to find out in the course 0f its A.dwmce by drivinr: the G~rJ'TFns bPck and stabjlizing the Hne. This is :fully understood hv General Mccreery. As the Germr-n rulls back to a new line he becom-.s rrogr~r,sively stronger, ann if later PI'fePrs to be su "ficfontly stron~, there is a possibil ;ty thPt the coord~nated FifthEii:;hth Army attack miP,ht not be l"lP.de. "G~nerPl 0111.rk ciaid 'thAt in order to get the TJ. s. <livisioris out of their pr-.sent positions +'or r ,u rposes o+' rest, it had been decide<'1, nft~r P consultation with Genern.ls Alexander a.nd Kirkrnrin, to r"quire the 11 Corrs to take over the terrriin in the ,,icinUy of the MI'. GR.A1IDE feature. ,r,h" Army Co:r.nn,i:inder understPnds thi:it the 13 Corps '"ill have some transportation require:rients to Rccomplish this m:ission. Pe told Ge>:rieral Kjr1~n several da'Ts arso thtit F:ifth Army is prl'!pe.rP.d to assist 13 Cor:rs to the Brnit of its Pbiljt,, in rrmriding the additiorutl transrortRtion necessnry for rnaintenr>nce durin~ this mission. 11 'T'he Army Commander believes thf't the Germflns have hrid the cqiabili ty of MA.king P stronrr, cou.ntArPttt=ick in th is Prea but does not believe he will do it. He stated thPt seven b:<ittalions ::>re required for the defense of this sector, And th~t this comnitrnent must he ~ade b:v the 11 Corrs. He stated also tht:it if lPt ,r our r>ttack shouln go toward the lest, it is rossible th~t the 13 Corps mri.:v have to trike airer more terri tor:,. 11 '1'he 88th n;vision should be rel il'!Ved as soon as possible, the t!:'rget a~te for completion heinrs a week. Geni..ral K:i.rkmrm said he hr,d !!lreadv scheduled the relief for November 2-8, rind Agreed to do it os soon as possible. 11 �✓ Genernl Clark stated t ht=it th"'! 8~th Division had unrerisone 4 , 800 battle ca sualties; thAt the 85th ,ind ,4th would stA'' ~n the line "'or the rresent, and that the 91st Division hRs .t'l Jread" two COJ'llbat tePms out of the Hne . The 1st Armored Divi'3ion vrill take over a. larger sector than rit pres"'lnt . "Gtnnera.l Clark .':JtPted thi>t the 6th South Africi>n Division h11s been fi1;hting in hifsh mountl'lins , and thPt he understnnds General foole is still plannini:; to attemnt to take SOLE . 'l'his nas confirmed by General Foole . The Armv Commnncier said tha.t it ,,.,ould be v~r· helpful if SOlE could be CAptured; otherwise fewer batt.<1.lions cnn ,:,;et out o-i:- th~ line . 11 Gener<>l Clark ~uiid it was rlanned to brinf" thei BraziHPn Division into the Un"' alonr hii,;h:<1nv 65, one conbn.t tePJ'll to rto ;nto position ri.r;ht P.wa-:r Pnd the other 11s soon As pos'3ible, probnblv· tirouna tre 10th 0r l?th . The ?3?nd Germ~m Division is opposite this rart o'"' the lin~ , Hnd the Army- Commander felt thnt rro~ess could he rm.de there . He stated l"lso that he planned to bring the IV Corps ~arther to the East . I) · "General Poole stAted that SOLE is ti very strong position, stronger than CA.SSPm; th11t it is w,ry difficult to att,-ck. The min:ir.rurn scale r,tta.ck to tak"' it And hold it T'fould htive to be n two-bnttalion attack. He does not have two available battalions at the moment . The 24th Guards Brignde is tired nnc'I must hold a certRin shoulder with one battali on. He could make an attack '7ith one battalion and :i:-ert of Another . If the situr'tion stabilizes he coulcl add nnother oottFilion to the Guards Brigade . This opern.tion would be versr costl:v; the ground is hP,ld b;v two battalions of the SS disposed AS indicated by General Foole on the map . The seizure of SOLE would not be valUAble unless exploited to th~ northeast down a difficult mountain feature with R ni:f'ficult Ma~ntenrmce problem. To be effective this rrogress should be coordinat~d with the adv;:ince o~ the division on his flnnk . GeMral foole would like to r,~'ke the attack w~th three battalions but cannot r,aintain three battalions . General Clnrk said to hold the project in abeynnce for the rresent. 11 r~neral Clark said that he desired General Poole to ~et some of his units out for rest if possible, reAlizj_ thRt this would be difficult if the diving sion sta_rs in its present position and takes over the territory to his norrwl • boundA.ry. "'T'he Arny Comander invited Gen~ral YirkrlPn I s coTTJn~nts and su~gestions from anyone present as to any improvements in the outlined plan. He stated tha.t on" of General Kirkman' s divisions may leave the 11 Corps during ~fovember, and toot some of General Kirkman 1 s units ~ill probably be pinched out as the new line devia,lops, thereby affording rm op:nortunity for restin~ such units . General Ch.rk hopes to get 18 battalions out of t}1e line . "G•meral Yir1-:rnA.n dj scuss1'd roan difficulties Hnd pointed out thAt many vehicles of British divisions are u~eless umer th~ roAd situntion confront ing the 13 Corps . H~ had nA,de a roup:h e stimate thnt :in order to ~Aintain troops in the Hf' GRANDE c;ector he would n~ed 120 a.ddi ti onal 6 x 6' s a.nd that he woul<l need an additional 100 for six dA.ys to get his units into position . General Clark said thRt we would furnish thl'lm. General J{irvrnan stated that this estil"l:=tte includes no allowrmce for bringing up res~rves , replA.cing motorcycles which cannot he u2ed , etc . If he coulo get any more je~ps they would �-be ver;r u s eful for the Frovost, dispatch riders and signal re:rairs . taking awny jeeps from other divisions for use in this '3ector . l39 Re is "G~neral Kirkmnn asked what work can be done on roads b~r the Fifth Army, and ~n~ral Bo,'frnan discussed the work which will be undertaken. General "'ate stated thPt the U. S . vehicles which will b-e turned over temporarily to 13 Corps may use Route h5 and the RADICOSA-SKSSA IF,ONE Road (65.,9) . 11 Grmeral Kirkman said a. res,,rve would be provided from the '78th Division, and that the battalions on th"" east of the 13 Cor:rs sector vlill make such progress as nay be rossible . General Clr1rk said that General Keyes ' corps wj_ll assist th"" 13 Corps es much as rossible . He also stAted thr--t this hendquarter s ,vill prescribe a main line of resistance and a regimental reserve line . "General Crittenberger stated that the Fifth Army requirenents present little difficulty for th" IY Corps; thAt General ~~scar~nhas hl'l.s one conbat tea.m ready to move Pt once ; that ~ntiaircraft units will take over their sector promptly startin~ their reconnaissa.nce on the day following the meetinp;; thRt the availabil-ity of more Brazilian units depends on equipment; that he knt,w he was exrressi.ng General Mascarenhas ' sentiments in saying that the Brazilians a.re Vf!'lry anxious to get in action . "General Vascaronh.<1.s reJ')eRted that his ability to act depends on delivery of equipment; that his units would be ready five days after such de livery. "General Clark sai d General Alexander had indicn.ted th.<it he could m1>ke some Itl'l.lian combat units RVailable , and that hA had told the C- in-C that } 1 e would he glad to take them. "~neral Chidl1m said th1.t the XXII TAC has certain training problems and problems with respMt to tre Eighth Army d1n:-ing th~ reriod betwe.en now and 10 t!ovem ber . "The Army CoP1M.ander stated t.,_,A.t thl" date for t1,e next attack mtueit not be too ri;,;idly set as tre army rmst be in a position to tak"' advimtage of any (;'ood weRthAr , but tha.t December 1 was the deadline and speed was the watcl->word . He stated that the bulk of the artillery must be left in, though soMe of' the personnel r,ay bt'! talnm out f'or rurposes of rest . " General Cll'rk this afternoon dictated the following randon notes for inclusion in his diA.r:v: "In going to General Alexander ' s conferenr,e I intended to dernnnd an all- out effort by Fifth And Eighth Armjl'! s to capture Bologna before Eighth ArMy moves out in prepA.ration for 1ts other mission . 11 Bnroute to Ale:x,:i.nder ' s conf er•mce I visited Kirknmn hecause an essential }:flrt of my plan jnvolved 11 Corps' taking over the Mount Grande fea.ture. Thi.s requires the better part of an infantry division . By so d9ine. I would rnat""ria 11v help in the re lief of U. S . troops f'or rest , r"organizA·faon ~nd \ \ ��trAining prior to the next offensive. I was sl-iocked to },enr Kirkman tell me 10~1.sticall:r tjt was not on'. He could not r,n5nt'fl.in troops on Gra.nde. The fallac;v of his stAtement lies in the fact thnt we are alrtl!ad;v maintaining over a. <B vision up there in hell:i.sh weather. His argument is that his transportation does not havf"J the SA.me mobility as ours. He is somewhat correct. \ I went on to Al~,m.nder ts meetinf; wh-.r"" I talked •Tith Mccreery ahead of the conference. I was pleased to find trat he could not t=1ttack in an A.11-out effort for Boloi:;mi. until !lovember 30th. This, I thoui;ht, was the latest date thRt F.i~hth ArM~r could rem,.,in in this HreH. I r~nd jt ca.n remain until Decemb~r 15th and possjbl;v A little longer. This will ~ive me more opportunity to rest mv troops. Alexander, Stayner, Robinson Pnd Hardini; were mn-prised at Kirkman I s A.ttitude. With their backing, I ha.ve decided to or<ler Kirkman to occupir Grande A.nd '\"1'ill tell him so at rny conference this r-ifternoon. I will bring in tre Brazilil'ln Division to relieve the P,5th. I will use the 1st Armored Division, e!'lplo;-ring all its tank crews as jn.f'ant:r", and believe I can get out practica.lly f-lll of the ~5th and 8%h and the 91st, perh,i.ps less a cornbA.t team. 34tr will have to remain in the a.rea witr A. narrow sector and as reserve. One other division, probably the 91st, will be kept in the Futti Pass area, for the German, with 11 divisions massed on the II Corps front, r11s the capability of embA.rrassin~ me by limited obJective, strong countl"lrattA.cks eit},er to regain Mount Gra.nde or the Livl'!r~ano feature. I must li~wise see that Brit.; sl1 ,lernents are rested, but not to the extent of tre American units, for t} ,e U. s. troops rave had between fotn:' and five to one casualties over tre British. 11 "Althoug} J h~we told Toole of the 6tr South African Division tliat he did not ht'lve to take Sol~ if he thought it was beyond his capabilities. I Understand hi'! intends to attempt it. If he is successful, it will }-,elp considerably. ~fr i ..e,...::t' ~ t ) 1 I;-)~~ 7 ·,._,._ ... -1. ~ - ~ ~·~- "I will tr:v to get most of my U. S. regiments lm.ck to Monteca.tini under cover. "At the AleXA.nder conference it was decided that Eighth Army iiill continue its attack, pusr•in1; nn alrea_ withdrawing enemy in [' north,~esterly d,r rlirection up the Po Valle,,. I will let 11 Corys assist tre Polish atti:i.ck by makin~ a.n tl!ffort on their right. I hope that ~ighth Army, by continued stroni; pressure and attacks, will force the enemy hack to a line r,cross tre Po Vallev generally in the CA.stel S. Pietro area. McCreery wants to make his r,,rd n effort in the attack on Bologna around November 30th astride Route 119. ThA.t precludes the possibilit"T of m•; using at least one <livision in the Po Valle·,. 11 '1'h1' c0nference also decided thflt both flrmies v1ould Attack All-out for Bol01;!1fl And thA.t Fi.round December 15th, after f'ifteen da7S of further effort, if we },ad fail"d, all rernr>ininir P-lements •rould he turned over to me, and Eighth Arm:r pulled out f'or its new venture. "Mv schene of :Ma.neu,rer for tre November 30th attack is undetermi:na ble at tre present time. rtr m,dn job now is to rest the American units And then, dep~ndin~ upon enemy reactions dur5nt; the next montr, tre westrer, I ��progress of Eighth Army, I will decide \Tr1et~er to make my at ta.ck along Route #65 and to tPe west t0ereof or to demand th8t I come into tre Po VAlley astride Route #9. I have indicated this latter possihility to Alexander. "When I do attack , it will he my last venture for Bolognn. . I will deml'lnd all the P.ir support possihle . There is a <::;rowin~ tendencv flowing ge nerall·r from Genert1.l Cannon that the:' know how to eriplo~r tre air better trian 'l'fe do. There is a reluctance to accept our targets . I feel thl'lt '"" must blitz ,1ith Stra.te~ic, Tactical and Fighter Bombers right in front of the troops astride Route .J65 ••• just spra.7 in a line on either side of the rond . I will carry that all the way to Washington in order to get it . ttr am havinf', a. neeting of corps and division commanders and my key staff officers At 2:30 this a.fternoon in order to notify them of my plans for the future and to discuss a plan for puttinP- into effect the temporarv relief of u. s. units . " TRAVERSA- -OOTOBER 31, 1944-- Genl'lral Clt:irk spent t },e entire morning in :bis van workin-; on an accumulation of pl'l.pers nnd conferring with various staff offi- cers. At 1445 in tre nfternoon General Clark, accomptmied by Colonel Saltzman and rrent"lral 'Rrann, drove to Florence, riaturning to his comm:md post at 1700 hours . · The General dined \Vith the r.-,gu].(lr Mem"1ers of his mess and in the evenin~ played hridge with General Gruenther, Lt . Col. Eberhard end f;1r-ijor Hunter. A SUJ'nmary of operations for the vreek endin~ Octoher '31, 1g44 is as fol- lows: Advances continued durim~ the enrlv part of the reriod aga inst increasin~ enem;v opposition and adverse ,::ren.ther conditions with the supply of forward elements becomin~ A. difficult pro'l,lern due to v:irtuall;r impassable, muddy ro!'lds . Du.ring the latter pa.rt of the period some withdrawAls were r.-;ade in II and 13 Corps sectors to More favorable, less exrosed defensive positions; reliefs wer"l effected to rest Porward unjts and rehabiljtate equiprn~nt; en;;ineer efforts to improve routes of supply were intensified . On the extreme right of 13 Corps, in the 6 SA Armd Div :md in IV Corps sectors our forces continued to successfully Rttack and gain local objectives. Results of operations for the month of October, 1944 are as follows: Ground forces: Stead:-, advances continued along the front of II Corps despite stubborn enemy oppos·ition and terrain very favorable to the defender . Key points were captured or by- passed and , at end of period units were firmly astride Route //65 , M BEUDNTE was secured along with the important high . ground running generally east along M FAN'O to M. GRANDE and Hill 568 to the . north of M. GRANDE . 13 Corps continued pressure and secured the important feature M. SPADURO and the high ground to the southeast . On the right 6 SA Arrnd Div seized Hill 826 and M. TERMINE while IV Corps maintained contact and secured local objectives. All ge.ins were consolidated and determined �counterattacks were successfully repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy forces. At end of month reliefs ~ere in progress and elements were enroute to rea.r rest areas. Heavy rains throughout month handicapped operations considerably and maximum effort was required to keep supply routes open. Air Suppo1:t: Weather was generally bad during month and air operations were hampered considerably. Fighter bombers flew 685 missions with 31'76 sorties and li 6ht bombers flew 6 day missions with 72 sorties. Operations on a large scale were conducted on 12 October when approximately 6(:l) heavy, 300 medium and 177 fighter bombers attacked targets near BOLOGNA. * * TRAVERSA--~OVEMBER 1, 1944--At 0900 this morning General Clark decorated Colonel Guild and Colonel Hutchinson, Chemical Warfare Officers, with the Legion of Merit. At 0915 the Army Commander met the new infantry field grade officers who reported to Fifth Army Headquarters upon their arrival in this theater from the United States. General Clark left at 1015 to go up to II Corps where he conferred with General Keyes, Corps Commander. Following this conference, the Army Commander proceeded on to the 91st Division command rost where he had lunch with General Livesay, Division Commander. Following lunch, Generals Clark and Livesay went on to the command post of the 361st Infantry Regiment where General Clark promoted Sgt. Crafton A. Palmer and Sgt. Walter Werner to the rank of 2nd Lieutenant and presented Silver Stars to 2nd Lt. la.lmer, Major Eli Black and T/5 David C. Steinman. Following this ceremony General Clark briefed Colonel Broa.dlmv, Regimental Commander, and members of his staff on future plans of the Fifth Army and the 361st In"'antry in particular, after which the Army Commander inspected a QM area and then departed for the 34th Division. Enroute to the 34th Division General Clark met General Bolte, who continued with the Army Commander to the Dbrision corirnand post where they conferred briefly prior to the neparture of General Clark. Enroute back to his command post, the General stopped in at the 8th Evacuation Hospital and talked with several of the wounded men. General Clark had dinner with the regular members of his mess and played cards in the evening before retiring. * * * TRAVERSA--'tfOVEMBER 2, 1944--General Clark remained in hi'3 van durin<=; the entire da~, working on administrative matters and conferrin~ with various staff officers. The General had Generals Brann and Lewis for dinner and for cards in the hut later in the evening. �l43 General Clark today issued the following directive to his subordinate commanders: 11 1. a. It is apparent that the enemy has regrouped his troops to place his maximum strength astride the Southern and Southeastern approaches to BOLOGNA and thereby deny to Fifth Army the accomplishment of its Phase II mission as envisioned in O.I. #34, and amended by subsequent verbal and radio instructions. b. It is also evident that Fifth Army units, particularly those of IT Corps, after more than six weeks of continuous all out attack, during which infantry casualties have been extremely heavy, are sorely in need of a period in rear areas to absorb and train replacements, rest and re-equip. 11 2. Fifth Army will therefore: a. On the mnin axis of penetration, using minimum forces, consolidate present positions, withdraw maximum number of troops to rear areas for rest, absorb replacements, and carry out tr~ining program. b. On the right flank, maintain pressure Against the enemy, withdrawing troops as pinched out by advance of Eighth Army. c. On the left flank of the penetration, improve positions to secure a sound defensive line, thereafter withdrawing to rear areas troops vrhich can be spared. d. On the coastal sector, continue to exert pressure, nrvancine as means and conditions allow. e. tTtilize the -f'ortJ,corrdng reriod of active dAfensjve to regain combat efficiency ana be prep~red to launch a major offensive in conjunction ,rlth Eighth Army on or about 1 Dec 44. II 3• a. lt Corps will: 1) Relieve troops of II Corps on the M. GRANDE hill mass to include M. CASTELLARO (L 9933) and M. CUCCOLI (L 9832). Corps Comiw.nders will arrange details of relief and of boundary and forward agreed recommendation to this Headquarters. (2) Assist the advance of Eighth Army. (3) Continue ratrol action to follow up enemy withdrawal. (4) Submit rlans for relief and resting of troops pinched out by advance of Eighth Army. (5) Maintain contact with Eighth Army and protect the right flank of Fifth Army. b. II Corps will:• (1) Using necessary minimum troops, consolidate present positions. (2) Facilitate relief of 88th Division by units of 13 Corps. (3) Maintain crmtact and follow up any enemy withdrawal. I �Plans for offensive action prior to maj_n attEJck which involves more than 1 infantry company will be submitted to this Headquarters for approval. (4) Rotate units so as to w:ithdraw as many troops as possible to rear areas for rest, re-equipring, absorption of replacements and training. PlRnnen schedule for relief and rest periods of units and other personnel will be submitted to this Headquarters (Attention G-3) with the least practicable delay. ( 5) Provide every facility for comfort r>nd welfare of troops in reserve positions in forward areas. If practicable, mess buildings and heavy tent sleeping accommodations will be utilized . c. 6 South African Armoured Division (with CC "B" attached) will: (1) Continue preparations to capture M. SOLE (L 7829); attack to be on Army order. (2) Assume responsibility for defense of division zone of action, relieving II Corps troops now in the area as soon as practicable. Contact will be maintained with minimum troops, as many as possible being withdrawn to rear areas for rest and recuperation. (3) Be prepared to follow up any enemy withdrawal. (4) Maintain contact with II Corps. d. IV Corps will: (1) Establish small command group of Corps Headquarters in position to facilitate movement, reliefs and subsequent assumption of command of new sector . Corps Comrnanilers will notify this Headquarters when he is prepared to assume command. At such time, IV Corps will assume responsibility for incompleted missions indicated for 6 South African Armoured Division under c above. (2) Concentrate 6 RCT (BEF) in area n';;w held by CC "B" (1st Armored Division). As soon as practicable, relieve CC 11 B" and attached troops . On relief, CC "B", less 2d Battalion, 370th Infantry (92d Division) reverts to parent unit control. Movement to II Corps sector will be accomplished by mutual arrangements Corps Commanders. 2d Battalion, 370th Infantry reverts to control of 92d Division and will be moved on IV Corps orders. (3) After relief of CC "B", press forward along Highway 64 to narrow zone of action of 6 South African Armoured Division. (4) If, on assumption of command, M. SOLE is in enemy hands, prepare plans for its capture and submit same to this Headquarters (Attention G-3). e. 92d Infantry Division will: (1) Operating directly under Army control, assume command of new sector and troops therein (less 6 RCT (BEF)) with least practicable delay, coordinating such action �with IV Corps. ~otify this Headquarters when connnand assumed. (2) Coordinating with PBS, make ev8ry effort to ready remaining elements of the division at the earliest possible date. (3) Hold maximum enemy force in coastal area; continue to exert pressure, occupying any areas the securing of which is deemed within capabilities. (4) Protect the left flank of Fifth Army. (NCfl'E: Attachment and detachment orders of troops now in IV Corps and 6 South African Armoured Division sectors will issue separately). "4. Security - Every effort will be made to conceal from the enemy any movement of troops away from the front. Road movements of troops will be initiated during hours of darkness. The Army Engineer is charged with the necessary coordination of camouflage and dummy instalJJ:itions. The Army Signal Officer will issue necessary instructions to insure radio deception. 11 5. Bivouac Areas: a. 13 Corps - Corps zone. Troops will not be moved South of the ARNO River without express permission of this Headquarters. b. II Corps and 6 South African Armoured Division: In general, area SESTO - PRATO - PISTOIA - MONTECATINI. Assignment of bivouacs in this area will be the responsibility of Fifth Army City Command Detachment, operating under Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, which will open Headquarters in MJNTSCATI~rr at once. Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, will coordinate selection and assignmP-ht of training areas. Training directive will issue separately. c. 11 6. IV Corps - Corps zone Boundaries: • a. II - 13 Corps: 3 ~ (1) above. b. To be submitted for approval (See paragraph II Corps - 6 South African Armoured Division: No change. c. II - IV Corps: Present II Corps - 6 South African Armoured Division boundary will become II - IT Corps boundary when IV Corps assumes command of new sector. d. IV Corps - 92d Division: 250 E~sting. Effective when Commanding General, 92d Division assumes comMand of new sector. 7. Operations Instruction #35 is cancelled. fensive will be covere<l by separate instructions." 11 Resumption of the of- �TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER J, 1944--There was a heavy fog over the entire area today, and a slight drizzle fell during the day. Just before leaving the command post, General Clark conferred with General Cerica, Corunanding General of the Delegation, Italian Army General Staff in Florence, who came to the command post to pay his respects to the Army Conmander. General Clark left the command post at eleven o'clock for Florence and went dire tly to the Anglo-American Hotel, where he had lunch at 16J0 hours. Generals Gruenther and Lewis drove in from the command post in the evening and had dinner with General Clark. * * * TRAVERSA--N'OVEMBER 4, 1944--The General arose at about 10'30 hours and walked with General Brann to the Anglo-American Hotel whe~e they had lunch, returning to the villa at 16oO hours. General Clark and Colonel Saltzman stopped in at a small reception at the 13 Corps Gazelle Club in Florence in the late afternoon where they remained for an hour before returning to General Clark's villa. Generals Gruenther, Brann and Lewis had dinner with the Army Commander this evening. * * * TRAVERSA--NOVEUBER 5, 1944--General Clark arose at 1030 this morning and spent the early part of the morning walking around the grounds of the villa before going down to the Anglo-American Hotel for lunch. He returned After lunch in mid-afternoon and took a short nap before dinner. Generals Gruenther, Tate and Bradshaw were General Clark's guests for djnner, and all played poker in the evening. General Clark today wrote the following letter to General McNarney regarding the Fifth Army situation: "Thank you for your telephone call to Gruenther yesterday in which you expressed the hope that you might be e.b le to procure for us a few 240mm howitzers. As you well know we have an urgent need for heavy artillery in the Fifth Army, and I shall be extremely grateful to you for anything you can do for us. If the 240mm howitzer is not available the 3 inch howitzer is our next choice, with the~ inch gun in third place. However, we are in the position of beggars ann not choosers, and we'll be extremely happy with any heavy caliber. "General Alexander h8ld an Army Commanders meeting at AAI on October 29 to discuss future operations. In spite of the logistical difficulties of launching an attack in the Apennine Mountains in November or December, I urged that an all-out attack be made on Bologna by both armies before Eighth Army is withdrawn for its new mission. McCreary indicated that he could not make a full-scale attack in conjunction with Fifth Army until approximately December 1st. That date suits me, for it will give me an opportunity to rest my American troops and f!bsorb replncements before another attack. • "The plan, as a~eed upon, is for Eighth Army to continue its at- 0 �l L{ '7 tack along Highway 9 to drive the enemy back to a line generally through Castel San Pietro, and extending from there to the northeast. Once the German has come to rest on whatever line he has selected to defend Bologna, both armies will square up to it and attack with every ounce of strength they have. You know, I know, and Alexander knows that Fifth Army will do this. However, based on an experience of almost 14 months association with Eighth Army, I am doubtful that McCreary will launch an all-out effort. I fear that hls attack will be made with a battalion here and a battalion· there with the inevitable danger that progress will soon stall. ) I expressed my views privately to Alexander and urged him to have Eighth Army attack vigorously now so that there will be time for Eighth Army to readjust and make a strong effort in conjunction with Fifth Army on December 1st. In my opinion the German is willing to pull back on the Eighth Army front now if pressure is applied. "I have directed 13 Corps to relieve the U. s. troops on the Mt. Grande feature and the relief by the British 1st Division is now in progress. General Kirkman has expressed doubt that the condition of the roads leading to the position will enable him to support the div~sion. However, I am determined that we can solve that problem. "I am now carrying out a plan to hold my front with about half of the present strength. U.S. troops are being sent to Monte Catini, where we have buildings and bathing facilities. In thAt way I hope to have my divisions in fairly good condition again by December 1st. "My scheme of attack for the December 1st effort has not been determined yet, but it will probably be generally along Highway 65 and to · the west thereof. I nmst be able to support my main attack along an allweather road. "I have now moved Headquarters IV Corps to Highway 64. It has under it the 6th South African Division and the Brazilian Division. The Brazilians will attack along Highway 64. Almond, operating directly under Army, has been placed in command of the coastal sector west of the 25 Ea~ting. "We sent your headquarters lViessage #6566 dated 1 November, in which • attention was called to shortages in certain critical items of equipment. I have listed these items below with a tabulation showing the allowance per infantry division so, that you will see at a glance the significance of each shortage: NUMBER mM 6omm Mortar 81mm Mortar BAR Cal. 30 YG (Lt) Compass M2 Telescopes M4 Grenade Launchers Ivr? SHORTAGE 112 85 1,134 289 207 181 3,370 ., AUTHORIZED PFll DIVISION 81 54 405 121 103 41 1,598 �I know that you realize the urgency of filling these shortages before the\ December 1st attack. I' 11 be grateful to you for any assistance you can / give us. "I am proceeding with plans for the formation of an infantry regi- \ ment by disbanding AAA units, as I discussed with you when you were here. j From our understanding of the equipment situation in the theater it appears probable that it may be necessary to delay formation of the entire regiment. If the shortage is not alleviated in the near future it seems to me that we might be able to start with the organization of one infantry battalion and complete the regiment as equipment becomes available. I shall send you a message soon nominating the AAA units-to be disbanded. "I am glad to learn that the 366th Infantry will be turned over to us soon. Your speedy action is greatly appreciated." * * * TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 6, 1944--The weather today was foggy, but there was little rain. This morning General Clark, General Brann and Colonel Saltzman walked down to the Anglo-American Hotel for lunch. General Clark returned after lunch and took a nap in the afternoon. In the late afternoon General Brann held a cocktail party in his apartment, after which General Clark returned to his villa and spent the evening playing poker with his guests. * * TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 7, 1944--The sky was overcast most of the day today, but there was no rain. General Clark spent the day at his villa with members of Ms stnff. Generals Gruenther, Brann, Tate came for dinner and after dinner the entire group played cards. Operations for the week ending Uovember 7th wer0 as follows: Forward defensive positions were maintained wjth some local improvements resulting, numerous enemy counterattacks were repulsed and a rotation system of scheduled reliefs to rest units was begun. * * * TRAVERSA--T,J'OVEMBER 8, 1944--The weRther was cloudy today with light rains in the afternoon and evening. The Army Commander remained at his villa in Florence all day today, taking care of an accumulation of papers th~t were sent down to him from his headquarters by courier. In the evening the General dined with General Brann. * * * TRAVERSA*-NOVEMBER 9, 1944--There was a steady drizzle in the air throughout the morning developing into a foggy and cloudy afternoon. General Clark left his villa this morning and tirrived at his command post for lunch. He spent the afternoon in his van working on papers and conferring wjth members of his staff. The General had General Tate and Colonel Niblo for dinner in the evening. Colonel Niblo left Fifth Army Headquarters this evening enroute to the United States for twenty-one days' leave. �TRA"\ITTR.SA--NOVCMBER 10, 1944--General Clark spent the morning in his van conferring with his various staff officers. After lunch the General drove to his villa in Florence. Generals Keyes and Pritchard came for dinner and to spend the night . General Clark entertained General Keyes and Pritchard and three Red Cross girls for dinner . General Clark dictated the following random notes for inclusion in his diary: "I spent several days at the villa which has been fixed up in Florence. It gives me an opportunity, while we s,re resting our troops and preparing for the next offensive, to get some needed rest and also a. place where :r.iy commanders and senior staff officers can meet with me for relaxation and for visits to the Florence area. "Upon my return yesterday, I checked with G-2 and G-3 on the situation, and based upon information which reveals the enemy intentions to cling to his present positions, I made the following decisions: 11 (a) To continue to rotate U. S. elements of the II Corps into the Montecatini area to rest and absorb reinforcements . The best I can give the 34th and 88th Divisions is about ten days' stay at f/fontecatini. Afterwards they must go back into the line in order to get 15th and 91st out for an attack which I hope will take place on Bologna the first week in December. 11 (b) That the earliest day I can attack is approximately December \ 5th and this, of course, is predicated upon two assumptions - first, that the Eighth Army has attacked and progressed, and secondly, that they have withdrawn by the weight of their ettack German troops now massed on my front . "(c) I have directed G-3 to prepare orders for an attack along our west coast in the direction of La Spezia in coordination with Fifth Army's attack on Bologna. I discuss < with Captain Gray, my British nflval rep1d resentative, naval gunfire support for this effort. "(d) I directed that orders be issued IV Corps to have the Brazilian Division attack to the northeast on or !'I.bout the 20th of November in order to capture successively Castelnuovo and Mount Pero - this to facilitate the attack by the 6th South African Division on Mount Sole . Both of these attacks must precede my principal effort on Bologna. "(e) I directed G-.3 to prepare plans for the Fifth Army attack, main effort by II Corps generally west of Highway #65, utilizing Routes 64, 65 and the Prata road, and that 13 Corps, depending upon the position of Eighth Army, attack generally towards Castel San Pietro from astride the San Clemente road in order to draw enemy forces in that direction and away from the main effort . 11 As I see Eighth Army's effort, I am convinced that their heart is not in their attack. I have repeatedly represented my views to General Alexander and in a letter to General McNarney copied in the diary notes for November 5th. �lSO "I am preparing a letter to General Eisenhower in answer to two from him which will let him know our eagerness to attack, how we appreciate the contribution we are making to his effort and my worries with regard to the Eighth Army. I still believe that my e~xly December attack will never take place because Eighth Army will not exert the pressure they are capable of doing. The Germans have 15 divisions on my Fifth Army front 13 massed in front of II Corps. Their infantry strength is greater than mine. My restrictions on ammunition and replacements make a prolonged ___attack out of question. I must get superiority at one spot, and this cfa.n only be accomplished by forcing the enemy to divert divisions massed there now to the Eighth Army front or elsewhere. I am convinced that / Eighth Army and Alexander are more interested in a Balkan operation than in the capture of Bologna. A Balkan operation by the Eighth Army would permit a landing behind Tito's forces without opposition. Great ballyhooing would follow for the British Empire, leaving the bulk of Kessel- \ \\ ring's Army opposing me. The withdrawal of the Eighth Army without combining in an attack with me may permit the German High Command to move divisions to meet Eisenhower or Stalin. This might be fatal to their efforts. Our mission, as unglamorous as it may be, is to keep the 28 German Divisions here and gradually chew them up. They must not be permitted to intervene in the battle of W estern Germany. "I am pleased with the prospects of getting another American division. 11 If the Eighth Army is withdrawn and does not attack, there is nothing to do except hold my present position, rotate my troops, build them up and be prepared for an early spring offensive or to follow up or attack in the event the German starts relieving divisions on my front. I still feel that Eighth Army should continue to attack with more effort and both armies square up and smack him in early December in order to capture Bologna. Then Eighth Army would be free for a Balkan venture. "I am not entirely satisfied with the air support we receive. General Eisenhower masses heavy bombers in support of his ground attacks. There is great reluctance in this theater to do so. It stems principally from General Cannon. There is reluctance on his part repeatedly to accept targets in the Bologna area for his medium bombers. I am convinced, and will so demand, that when I attack in December my assault be preceded by all air medium, heavies and fighter bombers directly in front of the main effort and that this keep up every de.y. I will accept the responsibility for bombing my ovm troops. No more important targets exist in Italy. For over a year the air people in this theater have felt it more important to go after German communications than to support directly the ground ) troops during my important attacks. It is perfectly obvious from the results that their efforts on communications hc~ve been more or less futile, for the German has moved divisions at will, maintained them in battle. and fought tenaciously. I will go to McNarney and demand all air on my call for at least ten days prior to and during my attack. I know the air won't win battles, but it will do more good in supporting me directly than by being employed on Strategic missions far remote from the battle for Bologna. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, October 1-November 10, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from October 1-November 10, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/5a7b8464869c97d27466539e4fb78253.pdf?Expires=1787184000&Signature=hjKWrYaKvSIly4snjj0PiiaaNy69%7EpsWel7yLAHaaK8e8SISGEJvzgaZ-X19snWVlSbSIw9C6LzluGZlT060Sp1xl7VHDcsVh1ratNcPrckXSad5VuClFqPgJkels6jtF5WHpWRyeStAFeQBaraK25JSCFqd-6Vo-L%7EXHq5gzx1zsXrlL9UqDKubWsh-CS-Cc2Dy7vr2wnrk%7ECtWAMSa3IP3ohHGjYthioy1gWPkHMyP82t01PxaNxzsw0PbSpzhn5SiVKxo1zP6Lu3OQH-SMJIQXWSAeGR4Ypb0R0bUEe8eZTUZW8w3IvWN6T8UQZh7dr9jjSDa0Oh0g9whcymLtQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 739923eff63ac52106369f459d3390ac PDF Text Text l :'.:) I TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER ll, 194/t·•General Clark walked this morning for about two hours in the gardens of his villa with General Keyes. At eleven o'clock the Army Commander drove back to his command post in Traversa. Upon M.s return he conferred with Generals Gruenther, Tate, MacGruder, G-4 of Ml'OUSA, and General Coffey, Ordnance Officer of Ml'OUSA. Notes of this conference are quoted at the conclusion of today' s diary. Generals Tate and MacGruder were guests of General Clark for lunch. General Clark spent the afternoon in his van. Lt. Col. Blackford of the 8th Evacuation Hospital called to see General Clark. In the evening General Clark entertained twenty-five of his staff officers at a buffet supper on the occasion of the Army-Notre Dame football game. The notes on the conference today are as follows: "General Magruder explained that the purpose of his visit to Fifth Army Headquarters was to outline the ammunition situation in view of the information contained in Message No. LX-51825, received yesterday from the War Department. The ammunition situation in the United States is so critical that it has been necessary to resort to the scheduling of current shipments direct from loading and production lines to docksides. ' The War Department expresses grave doubt of its ability to meet the demands of ETOUSA and l\ITOUSA, especially during the next three to six months. Considering 105 Howitzer M-2 ammlll1ition, the War Department estimates its supply potential in rounds per gun per day as follows: January - 15; February - 17; March - 20; April - 20. "General Tate explained that when he prepared his ammunition analysis of 31 October, he considered that the total available 105 ammunition from 30 October to 10 January would be 1,054,000 rounds. After deducting a reserve of 200,000 rounds to be held for emergencies, there remaj.ned 854,000 rounds available for expendlture during the period 30 October to 10 January. Ammunition expenditure rates have been based on this premise. As a result of information which was brought by General Magruder today, General Tate now finds that the figure of 1,054,000 is too optimistic, with the result that if present rates are continued the reserve will be reduced to approximately 6o,ooo rounds at the conclusion of the 15-day attack now planned for December. 11 General Magruder stated that if we should cut our ammunition expenditure during the quiet period to ten rounds per gun ,er day, we would be ablA to have on hand a reserve of 200,000 rounds at the conclusion of the 15-day offensive in December. "General Clark outlined his plan for the December attack to be made in conjunction with Eighth Army. He stated that he was determined that this attack would be carried out if Eighth Army is ready at that time, and if higher authority considers that it vd.11 make a contribution to the winning of the war. He issued a directive to the Chief of Sta.ff to have a study made whereby ammunition expenditure rates will be reduced immediately." �TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 12, 1944--Today was a clear cold day. The General spent the morning in his van and at ten o'clock saw staff films in his conference hut, after which he drove to the 91st Division to see General Livesay and to the 34th Division to see General Bolte. Returning to his command post, General Clark stopped enroute at the 8th Evacuation Hospital to see General Bowman who was in bed with pneumonia. The General spent the afternoon in his van and in the evening Generals Brann, Bradshaw and Tate came for dinner. After supper they played cards in the mess hut. At the same time, the General had a movie in his conference hut for the members of his staff. * * * TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 13, 1944-•Today was a clear cold day, and the General spent the early pa.rt of the morning in his van. At eleven o'clock the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee arrived, headed by Admiral Richardson and including Rear Admiral K. M. F. Schoeffel, Maj. Gen. H. L. George, Maj. Gen. w. F. Tompkins, Col. F. T. Davidson, Captain Steele, Captain Hoover, Captain Rees, Captain Cole, Colonel Theis and Lt. Col. Robinson. General Clark oriented the committee on the over-all Italian situation, after which he was interviewed by the committee. During the conference a spark from the fireplace caught fire to the camouflage net over the hut, and General Clark and his guests were forced to leave the hut while the fire was being extinguished. No serious damage was done. General Clark gave to all members of the committee an autographed copy of the "Advance on Rome 11 • After lunch the committee left the command post, and General Clark, with Generals Brann, Tate and Colonel Saltzman, left for his villa in Florence for dinner and the night. Following are the notes on the conference General Clark held with the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee: "Admiral Richardson explained that three plans were under consideration for the reorganization of national defense, namely, organization with two departments, with three departments or with a singlE3 dep8rtment. The committee would like to hear General Clark's views on these plans and ask him a few questions. "General Clark stated that he f eels that there should be a single department with one man responsible f or all the armed forces. His main interest is that such an arrangem ent provide unity of command which would flow down to the lower echelons. Although unity of command exists in principle in this theater it is exercised only by the Supreme Commander. He apparently exercises little control over the Royal Navy. There have been several instances, chiefly during the Anzio operations, when the commander on the sp9t should have coJTJmanded both the naval and ground elements in that area. "General Clark stated that air cooperation with the Fifth Army had been excellent, because the Fifth Army has its 0 1:1111 air support unit. However, General Clark believes that the effectiveness of this support �would be improved if there was unity of command rather than cooperation. At the present time, for example, it is extremely important that Fifth Army receive more air sorties daily because of the critical shortage in artillery ammunition. There is a pull between making sorties available for close ground support and using them to cut communications in the rear. "General Clark closed these remarks by expressing the belief that with a central control and unity of command, operations would be improved. He realized the difficulties this system would present, but in general that is his belief. "When asked for his recommendations regarding an j_deal air-ground setup, Gen~ral Clark stated that he was in favor of an air support com• mand with an army which is prjmarily for the direct close-in support of the army. This air group should be under the operational control of the ground commander as an attached unit, not organic in the army. Should the a:ir be needed to support other operations, elements of the air support unit could be turned over temporarily for such operations. However, the air operations staff should ordinarily remain with the ground commander. General Clark stressed that his relations with General Cannon and General Chidlaw have bAen most favorable. There is a constant exchange of a:ir officers and ground combat officers so that each group will be familiar with the air and e,:-ouno problems. "The question arose as to how much of the air would be an integral part of the ground commander's forces, .and Genera1 Clark made it clear that he meant only to have as an integral part of the army the artillery liaison cub planes. General Clark believes that the tactical reconnaissance planes which are used for reconnaissance, photo coverage, and artillery spotting should be under operational control of the army ground commander. Under the system now employed in the Fifth Army area the Tac R squadrons, in effect, function under the operational control of the Fifth Army Commander. 11 It was pointed out by members of the committee that the recommended relationship of the air support unit is contrary to the doctrine published by the War Department but is based on actual experience in this war and appears to have worked. General Clark stated that the present system will work. All concerned have cooperated effectively to insure that it works. However, he stated that he still believes that it will be a more efficient system if the principle of command is substituted for cooperation, and that it should extend down to include the 11_ rmy. "On inquiry by the committee General Clark stated th1:t he believed that in a single department of national defense the Air should be an equal component to the Army and the Navy. Upon being asked his conception of the staff of the head of the armed forces in a single department, he said that he thought it should be generally small and tht:1.t there should be larger staffs for the Army, Navy and Air respectively. He recalled that in the March 1942 reorganization of the War Department an a.ttempt was made to place the larger staffs in the Ground Forces, Air Forces and SOS respectively, reducing the War Department General Staff. �"Admiral Richardson pointed out that under the proposed plan no assistant secretary was specifically assigned to the Army, Navy or Air, bu-'-, all were to be assigned to the single department as a whole. It was hoped that this would tend to make them all pull together. The U. s. Chiefs of Staff would be composed of the senior officers of the Army, Navy and Air respectively. The plan provided that they would present the budget directly to the President, in a body. If disagreement occurred the dissenting member would be able to present his views to the President in company with the others. In answer to a question from General Gruenther as to the position of the Secretary of the Armed Forces respecting the budget, Admiral Richardson explained that the President, as Commander-in-Chief would, under the plan, deal directly with hi8 military chiefs in this regard. "Upon inquiry General Clark stated that he believed that if the single department idea should prove unrcceptable the plan witb three departments would be rreferable to the plan with two, pointing out the present size of the air forces, and stated that he assumed the other two services would retain certain essential air elements. When asked the same question General Gruenther said that he preferred two departments to three, but was enthusiastically in favor of a single department. Admiral Richardson observed that today, although General Arnold is a. member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he is a subordinate of General Marshall's so that now our air power has not coordinate power with the ground and the sea in presenting things to the President. He mentioned that an objection which can be raised to the single department plan lies in the fact that it would give more power, responsibility and influence to one cabinet officer than to any of the others and would therefore tend to throw the cabinet out of balance. General Clark pointed out that in time of peace the Air has many planning and proparatory activities involving civilian aviation and would have a vast amount of work to do. "The subject of the use of marines to make the assault a.nd develop the beaches and then turn the operation over to ground troops was discussed and General Clark stated that he had not worked with marine forces but was of the opinion that this procedure was not desirable, as it takes too long to relieve units and there is the possibility of confusion on the beaches. "When asked whether the Army is capable of conducting the training and development of amphibious and airborne troops in time of peace, General Clark gave as an illustration the situation in North Africa in 1943 when, incident to the preparations for the Salerno landings, the question arose of who should command the amphibious training involved. Finally the Navy took it over after a species of joint operation of the training just prior to Salerno. He is inclined to think that the Navy should do it. Admiral Richardson stated th~t one distinguished witness before the committee had recommended a change in the role of the fleet ihrine Corps, so that the marines would make no effort to develop assault troops of the Army passing through them. The marines would handle landing craft training, and army units would be sent to them from time to time for training. �"Along this line, the question was raised as to whether or not the marines might not take over the duty of Rangers and Commandos. General Clark was of the opinion that this plan had many merits, explaining that he had had Rangers, Commandos and the 1st Special Service Force under his command, and althougb they had performed marvelously well with him they were too hard to maintain. Finding replacements for these units is a serious problem. They require an especiRlly high caliber type of soldier and sustain heavy losses due to their aggressiveness. "A committee member inquired whether General Clark agreed with the marines 1 contention that for the period of the assault of a beach more small arms and fewer vehicles are needed than in a normal army division. General Clark replied that more machine guns were desirable but could be arranged by the provision of extra ones for a particular operation, and that excess of vehicles had not been a worry to him as they had always been limited by the available craft. At Anzio he had sent in over 500 extra machine guns. "Admiral Richardson stated that the committee felt that initially the marine setup should be left as it is and be permitted to develop later. "Upon being asked by Admiral Richardson whether supply procuremP.nt should be unified or separate, General Clark said that it was a difficult job for one man and that it might be desirable to start out with one man doing the common items. General Gruenther agreed thnt this is as far as they should go. "Generals Clark and Gruenther in reply to a question stated that they thought the several services would be more apt to drift apart in peacetime under the two or three-department system than under the plan with a single department, and said that they thought a joint secretaryship and joint chief of staff, charged with coordination by law, would facilitate cooperation. On inquiry General Clark had no additional ideas to suggest for improving the single-department organization. When asked whether it would be desirable for the chief of staff to be responsible directly to the President on military matters concerning theaters and the home forces rather than reporting through the cabinet officer, General Clark said he thought it might be better for the armed forces but wondered whether the American people would like such an arrangement. Neither General Clark nor General Gruenther had additional suggP.stions concerning the three-Hepartment or two-department organization. "The question was put to General Clark as to whether the command relationships had been satisfactory on the amphibious flagships during the various landings in wh:i.ch he had participated. General Clark replied that in his experience the cooperation had been excell8nt but recommended that in the case of an amphibious landing the naval commander be in charge of orArations until the ivound com!lk~nder reaches shore and indicates his readiness to take over the command of the land operations. The ground commander would decide when he was ready to take over. As �an example General Clark cited the SalP-rno expedition, in which he had coordinate authority with Admiral Hewitt of the Navy and Air Chief Marshal Tedder of the Air. He felt that there should have b9en one commander. The first of fie er who had single command was General I:isenhower. To illustrate the need on that occasion of unity of command, General Clark mentioned the fact that he had had a floating reserve which the local naval commander (a British officer) caused to be unloaded while General Clark was in the process of determining where it could be landed with maximum effect. "In response to the query as to whether or not there was any trouble regarding loading arrangements prior to landings due to the dual control of operations, General Clark replied that instances had occurred where the Navy would refuse to load certain items required in the operation, and the first the Army Commander heard of it was when the material was already on the docks ready to load. This further illustrated the lack of coordjnation where the command is divided. As an example he mentioned a situation which arose at Oran just prior to the Salerno landings. Air fields were vital at the beginning of the landing and the air forces needed machinery, netting, bombs, ground personnel etc. The initial air lift was always an issue in the planning. The Navy refused to load bombs at Oran. A single responsible commander would work everything out ahead of time, making his decisions and taking his calculated risks. 11 Upon being asked whether he had 0A'Jlerienced any difficulties with communications resulting from lack of unity of command, General Clark said that he had not and stated that the command ships in amphibious operations had been excellently equipped; that their facilities had been his only means of communications at the beginning of landings, and that there had been no trouble. "Admiral Richa,rdson inquired whether there had been any cases of naval commanders being loath to take ships in close to shore for fear of their running agr01md. General Clark said that there had been no holding back of any kind at Salerno, but thA.t after the capture of Naples it was decided to make one or more amphibious landings in the form of close end runs. At this time the Navy turned down some of the projects for naval reasons, notably because of the hazards due to coast defense guns and mines. The Navy at this time was under British command. "There was discussion of the joint education and trainjng of personnel of the various branches of the service and of whether, for example, officers should spend six months training with another service; also of whether West Point and Annapolis students might spend a period of study at the other academy. General Clark approved the idea of the various branches of the service working together to better understand each other's problems and cited the Fifth Army policy of having Air Corps personnel working with front line units and infantry and artillery officers working with the Air Corps." General Clark today wrote the following letter to General Alexander regarding the ammunition situation in Fifth Army: �\51 11 1. On 11 Uovember I learned that the U.S. ammunition supply situation for all theaters is critical and will remain so for several months. Allotments to be made to Fifth Army for December and subsequent months for the most important types are listed below in rounds per gun per day: Jan, Feb. Mar, ~ 21* 15 17 43* 15 14 16 15 20 15 15 20 15 16 ~ 105mm Howitzer 155mm Howitzer 155mm Gun 9 * - Bulk arrives in theater after 20 December. 11 2. When Fifth Army discontinued the attack on 28 October, expenditures of the most critical typos of artillery amnnmition were reduced to the following quantities: Rounds per gun Rer day 105mm Howitzer 155mm Howitzer 155mm Gun 27 17.5 16.5 11 3. Upon receiving word of the critical ammunition situation throughout all theaters, I reduced Fifth Army allotments on November 12th to the following: Rounds per gun per day 105mm Howitzer 155mm Howitzer 155mm Gun 15 17.5 (no change) 9 11 4. My Corps artillery is very limited and, as you know, the 105mm howitzers of U.S. Divisions are only 1/2 the strength of the 25 pounders of the British Divisions. This reduction is a drastic cut and will affect adversely the morale of my troops, but I was obliged to put it into effect in order to save for my offensive operation. All runmunition in this theater has been allotted to Fifth Army, and there is no hope of securing more. There is no treater reserve. For that reason I have set up the following amounts of the most critical types as an army reserve to be held for emergency use only: Reserve 105 mm Howitzer 155mm Howitzer 155mm Gun 11 5. 200,000 45,000 9,500 By reducing the expenditure rates during the defensive phase �t58 to those enumerated in paragraph 3 above, and deducting -the emergency reserves enumerated in paragraph 4 above, there will be sufficient ammunition for an all out offensive by Fifth Army of 13 to 15 days. This estimate is based on a daily consumption rate slightly in excess of 25,000 rounds. It conforms to Fifth Army experience for offensive operations during the past 14 months. It does not allow for ammunition expenditures to repel enemy counterattacks during the defensive phase. "6. J have ma.de a thorough c;tudy of the enemy situa. tion on the Fifth Army front, including Ms strength, dispositions and probable intentions. I have considered the recent operations of Eighth Army as they have af'fected the sitm tion of Fifth Army. It is my esti ,..,ate that it is / improbable that a combined attack by Fifth and Eighth Armies will result 1 in the capture of BOLOGWA in a 13-15 day full scale attack. Upon completion of such an offensive it will be necessary to resume for several months the low rate of fire of approximately 15 rounds per gun per day for the 1O5rmn weapons. This reduced expenditure will preclude the continuation of the offensive. 11 7. I am bringing this matter to your attention in order that you may know of Fifth Army's reduced capabilities in view of the drastic curtailments in ammunition. I shall continue to give the matter my personal attention to determine whether or not further economies can be made in our ammunition expenditures." * * TRAVERSA--~OVEMBER 14, 1944--~oday the weather was cloudy with light rains. The General spent a quiet morning walking and resting. The Army CoPnnander lunched at the villa. At one o 1 clock General Bowman arrived with Lt. Col. Blackford. General Bowman, at General Clark's invitation, came to spend a few days at the villa to recuperate from his recent illness. General Clark inspected a mobile dentistry unit and had his teeth cleaned. G~nerals Gruenther, Tate, Bowman and Colonel Saltzman were guests of General Clark for dinner, after which they played cards. A brief summary of operations for the •veek ending November 14, 1944 is as f'ollmvs: Relief of 88th Division and elements of 85th Division by 1 Br~tish Division was completed. 34th Division was reljeved by 91st Division. New sectors of responsibility became effective and scheduled reliefs to rest areas were carried out. Positions along front were maintained and some advances on the right of 13 Corps were made to conform to those made 0y elements of 2 Polish Corps. Local improvements in positions i.n left sector were made by 92d Division. Contact with enemy was maintained along entire front hy active patrolling throughout period. ��ln°I TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 15, 1944--Snou began early this morning, but the : k ~ ~ cleared later in the afternoon. General Cla.rk left his villa at 0900, arriving at his command post at 1000 hours. At 1100 hours General Sousloparov, Russian Representative to the Allied Commission, arrived, accompanied by Lt. Col. Savco and Lt. Col. Lapkin. Th8y were greeted with an honor guard, after which General Sousloparov presented General Clark with the Russian Military Order of Suvarov, First Degree, the highest Russian military decoration. General Clark briefed GAneral Sousloparov and his party on the current Fifth Army situation, after which General Clark entertained Generals Tate, Brann, Howard and Colonel McMahon and his Russian guests for lunch in the hut. The party left at 1500 hours, and the General drove to his villa in Florence. Generals Gruenther, Brann, Tate and Bowman were guests for dinner and the night. * * * TRAVERSA--NOVEl!BER 16, 1944--Tbe ""ather today was cloudy with inte~~ tent snow and rain showers. General Clark took off by L-5 from the . Florence cub strip for Montecatini where he larded on the autostrada. The General was met by Lt. Col. 'Elam, of the G-4 Section, Fifth Army, and driven to the para.de grounds where the Army Comman:'ler was greeted by Generals Bolte, Keyes, Crittenberger, Almond and Kendall. General Clark received honors of ruffles and flourishes and the General's March. The 1st Battalion of the 16~th Infantry was formed in a gm.rd of honor, as well as 135 officers and enlisted men of various Fifth Army units who were to be decorated, promoted and appointed by the Army Commander. After honors had been given the Army Commander, General Clark spoke briefly to the assembled group, commending the 1st Battalion of the 168th Infantry who were to receive the War Department Unit Citation for outstanding combat performance. The Army Command er also addressed the officers and men who were to be promoted, decorated and appointed to commissioned grades, expressing his deep appreciation of their fine service and how proud the Fifth Army was of the outstanding job these men have done. The Army Commander also explained the important part the Allied Armies in Italy were playing in the over-all picture, containing and cutting up twent:r eight of the Germans best dj_visions. After GAneral Clarkts few words, he decorated a.nd made combat appoi11.tments and promotions to the follow'i ng person 1el: From 2nd Lieutenant to 1st Lieutenant; Elizabeth J. Smith, Robert E. Bowker, Helen B. Zasedil, Jacqueline E. Samuels, Urho V. Harvinan, Al Gutterman, Edgar A. Lyon, John 'T'. Sugrue, Thomas H. Randall, Hal'ry B. Muske, George H. Moore, John F. Mihocik, Kenneth Jorjorian, Benjamin F. Graham, Roccard A. Ferrante, James A. Cochrane. 1 From 1st Lieutenant to Captain: From Captain to Major: Joseph W. Walton, Jr. Charles C. Siegling, Jose A. Andino. Appointed to 2nd Lieutenant: 1st Sgt. Alexander A. Szymanski, T/Sgt. Donald R. Sprow, T/Sgt. Dewitt H. French, 1st Sgt. Peter DeAugustine, �S/Sgt. Robert c. Osborne, 1st Sgt. Joseph F. Tucker, T/Sgt. V.verett M. Flanders, 1st Sgt. Joseph B. Bracy, T/Sgt. Wm. S. Hicks, T/Sgt. Jos. W. Fry, 1st Sgt. Gilbert Bootho, T/Sgt. Frank Whisonant, Sgt. Luther C. ,Tones, 1st Sgt. Frank J. Rodrigues, T/Sgt. Clarence E. Ripley, T/Sgt. Frank A. Drazkowski, Jr., T/Sg'",. Mnrtin L. Gnemi, T/Sgt. Haskell H. Hu~hes, s/Sgt. Stanley F. Dosey, s/sgt. Eugene A. Borg, T/Sgt. James E. Mc11anus, '1'/Sgt. Boydell Hoffman, S/Sgt. Frank E. Smith, S/Sgt. Chester Loss, '1'/Sgt. Hughes B. Bennett, Sgt. Lewis L. Millett. 'T'he Army Commander pinned the Air M8dal on Brigadier General Guy O. furtz, and the Oak Leaf Cluster to the Air Medal was pinned on 1st Lt. Ralph O. Oglesby, ?nd Lt. Walton C. Schoonover and 1st Lt. Earle I. Coleman. General Clark presented the Dist:inguished Service Cross to Fvt. Edwin Lemke, Ffc. Jack E. Green, S/Sgt. Walton C. Westfall, s/sgt. Sam McGowan, S/Sgt. Wm. H. Eastland, T/Sgt. Herman Ledford, Capt. Wm. B. Fulton, Capt. James M. Doyle, Maj. Thomas L. Cussrms and Col. Gustav J. Braun. The Legion of Herit was pinned by General Clark on Col. Henry S. Blesse, Col. Kenneth F. Ernst, Col. Lewis W. Kirlanan, Col. FrRnk Y. Lef!ver, Col. Lee R. PiArce, Col. George 'T'. 1'food, Lt. Col. Caleb J. King, Jr., ~"/Sgt. Pete G. Cl8rk, T/Sgt. Harold 1:i . Branum, T/Sgt. Whitney W. Frost, T/5 Harold C. Brmwart. Genere.l Clark also pj nned the Silver Star on Capt. Francis J. Kenyon, Capt. Ian F. Turner, 1st Lt. James R. Blount, Capt. Cleo W. Buxton, Capt. Alvin T. Colbus, 1st Lt. James E. Henderson, 1st Lt. Irving B. Fesetzky, :?nd Lt. John F. Mihocik, 1st Sgt. Thomas E. Zukauskas, T/Sgt. Robert D. Wt:1.goner, S/Sgt. Ralph D. Baker, S/Sgt. John H. Czuk, S/Sgt. Lealen R. Martin, S/Sgt. Sa1vatore G. Viselli, s/sgt. Vade G. Cash, Sgt. Chester S. Gutkowski, Sgt. raul N. Kemmler, Sgt. John W. King, Sgt. BenJamin F. Lambeth, Sist. James D. Susalia, Ffc. Er1ward Shadd, Cpl. Murcilio Juiz Finto, Sgt. James R. De~ton, Ffc. Clarence E. Dickinson, Ffc. Joe H. Hoogerheide, f Pc. Joseph Pucek, Fvt. G. Vf . Bulkin, Fvt. Robert D. Gerstenecker. 'T'he Oak Leaf Clw:;ter to the Silver Star was awarded to T/5 Louis L. Schafer and Staff Serget:mt Douglas M. Dickerson. General ClArk presented the Bronze Star to IV!aj. Arthur R. Schmidt, Maj. John M. Walker, Capt. John L. Kay, 1st Lt. Ralph H. :Major, 1st Lt. Ravmo'1d Arriza'l-ialagB. Jr., ?nd Lt. Cunningham C. Bryant, T /5 John F. Flahive, rr/5 Andrew J. Gi:rolami, Fvt. Edward Jaeger, 1st Lt. Cora i1. Foster, Capt. Brmani Airosa DaSilva, Cpl. J'1etro Re, Ffc. John S. Downer, Maj. Harris J. North. The General also pinned the streamers on the guidons of the 1st Battalion of the 168th In"'antry and presented them with the War Department Unit citation. After the ceremony Gent"lra 1 Clark gave a luncheon at Montecatini for �for approximately 100 officers and enlisted men who had been decorated, appointed and promoted. General Clark sroke briefly to the luncheon guests, telling them that he had rmde arrangements for all of them to spend three days at Montecatini before returning to their units. After lunch General Clark, with Generals Gruenther and Brann, drove to the air strip on the autostrada where they took off in L-5 1 s for Florence. General Bolte and Colonel Braun, with Colonel Wood and General Bowman, dined at the villa, and General Clark and Colonel Saltzman dined at the Hotel Anglo-American. * * TRA.VERSA--~10VEMBER 17, 1944--The General spent a quiet day at the villa. In the evening the General dined out with General Brann. * * * ~RAVERSA--ijOVEMBER 18, 1944--The weather was clear today with scattered clouds. The Army Commander left the villa at 0930, arriving at his command post at quarter of eleven. At 111~5 Genert1.ls Harding, Clark, Gruenther and Lemnitzer conferred for about an hour. Generals Harding r-md Lemnitzer had lunch with General Gruenther. Mr. H. V. Kaltenborn arrived at 1230 and was briefed by General ClHrk in the hut and remained for lunch. The General spent the ~fternoon in his van, conferr,ng w:ith Generals Keyes and Crane, Artillery Officer of AFHQ. In the evening the General dined with the regular memb~rs of his mess and after dj nner played bridge w:i th General Gruenther, Colonel Eberh.<ird and Colonel McCall. * * * TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 19, 1944--'l'he weather today remained clear with scattered clouds. 'l'he General spent the day in his van conferring with various members of his staff and working on administrative matters. In the morning General Cllll'k was interviewed by Sergeant Derry And Sergeant Scott of Yank Magazine. The General spent the remainder of the afternoon in his van and dined wi.th the regular members of his staff mess. General Clark today sent the following letter to General McNarney regard:i.ng the Fifth Army situation: "Received your letter of Novemb,~r 11th and aprrecinte the efforts you have made to secure additional heavy artillery for Fifth Army. I hope later on you can /:t ~t some 240 howitzors. We need them badly. �"I am thoroughly f-amiliar with the o.mmunition supply and appreciate that if 11ny effort is to be made later on, oonservations must be made now. To that end we have been firing approximately ten rounds per gun daily of 105mm and m.11 continue to do so until we attack . I can fire no less . If 105mm ammunition arrives as per schedule, and holding out a minimum reserve, I can attack for from thirteen to fifteen days and might, with luck, be a'hle to go on for four or f'ive days longer without touching the reserve . "I had a long conference with Harding yesterday. I have been worried, as I indicated in my letter of Novemb~r 5th, concerning :Sighth Army activity. They seem to be coming up slowly, and I do not know what shape they will be in to launch an offensive in early December. I get indications that they will not be ready quite a-t that time . However , we will see the results of their forthcoming attack and then be able to make better plans . I am most anxious to attack on Bologna in conjunction with Eighth Army. I feel their attack in the valley should precede mine, and my wallop should be turned loose at the a-r,propriate moment. I am meeting with Alexander and McCreery in a few days, at which time we can better work out the timing . The main thing is to get an agreement that both armies will attack with all their might. r am delighted that you are getting the loth Mountain Division for Fifth Army. I think the arrangements you ho.ve made are fine . We can give them the additional trainin~, and they will be better off motorized than all mule . 0 "Am also pleased with yonr efforts to obtain special critical items of equipment which we need . With what is schr~dul 1'od to come and with some minor improvisations, we will get along nicely. "Received your letter with regard to errors in reporting men "missing in action" . Am F;etting all the dope and will reply shortly. "All your asJista.nts have been most helpful . we are delighted to have them. Many have heen up, and "Will be glad to see you any time, and I will keep you posted as to the timing of the attack and my plans . I run trying to work it out so that I will have some continuity to my attack, for it will be a tough one . In the meantime, will start my attack with the Brazilians for limited ob,iectives which will help the big push later. 11 co:~ '!'RAVERSA--N~MBER 20 , 1944• -~he "eat:er today was rainy and Gene- \ ral Clark saw Colonel Johnson and Colonel Gray of the Jui:Ige~e ' s Office and 8,lso saw Major General Rooks, Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ, with whom he conferred for half an hour . After lunch Generals Clark and Brann drove to 13 Corps at Scarperia where they conferred with General Kirkman . The General then drove to his villa in Florence, stopping enroute at ��,q liovember 23rd . Jtf Following personal Mai~ !:'i~ t , from Prime :,.:inister to General Mark Clark . It gives me the greatest pleasure to te11 you that the ?resident and his military advisors regard it as a compliment that d . ,1 . Government should wish to have you command the 15th Group of armies under General ALEXf':NDBR, who becomes supreme commander owing to the appointment of Genera 1 VITI.SON to succeed Sir JOHN DILL in WASHINGTON . I am sure we could not be placing our troops, who form the large majority of your command., in better hands, and that your friendship, of which you told me, with Gen eral ALEXA1DSR will at once smooth and propel the course of operations . When I saw General EISKifHO'JER last week at his headquarters I spoke to hi;n about TRUSCOTT succeeding you in the conuand of the 5th Army . He promised to release him if in due conrse he is approached by the U.S . aut~,ori ties . I expect this will be agreeable to you and General ALEXti..NDER specially desires it. Every good 1,vish in your new command . We have the utmost confidence in you and in the goodwill which has alwa ys guided your conduct with your Bri tj_sh comrades and Allies . Time of origin 231800 receipt- 232325 Decode - 240020 �I will be deeply honored to command the 15th Army Group . I fully realize the responsibility this assignment entails and the compliment ll . ,.; . Government has paid me in 9onsenting to place your glorious Eighth Army under my command . Please rest assured that its welfare vrl.11 be carefully guarded . I ar.1 proud to continue my happy association with Generals Alexander and :cCreery . 15th Army Group 1vill be eager to resume the all-out attack at an early date in order to destroy the Cerman armies here a~d prevent tmr intervening in battles in the East and "lest . Please accept my great appreciation for the confidence you have always placed in me . �the 24th General Hospital to see Colonel McMahon, G-1 of the Fiftb Army, and Colonel Roberts, AG, MI'OUSA, who hr-i.d been injured in a motor accident this morning. General ClF1rk entertained at his villa Colonels Smith, Nygaard, W alker and General Bowman for dinner. The Army Commander r etired early in the evening. * * ,,,RAVERSA--NOVEMBER 21, 1944--The weath"'r today was fine. The General remained in bed this morning with a head cold. Major Brandt of the 15th Evacuation Hospital, ear, nose a,nd throat specialist, came to attend the Army Commander. General Sullivan and Colonel Bruce came for dinner. General Clark today received the cover plan for the attack, scheduled for the first week in December, from AAI. A summary of operations for the week ending November 21, 1944 is as follows: Some small gains were made as patrols continued active operation, defensive positions were maintained and enemy efforts to penetrate our front lines repulsed. Reliefs proceeded according to schedule and units in the rear continued a program rest reha,bilitation and further training concurrent with the absorption of new replacements. * * TRAVERSA--WOVEMBER 22, 1944--The weather today was cloudy. The General's cold was much improved today, but he was advised by Colonel Bruce and Major Brandt to stay in. General Brann came to see General Clark this morning and also General Hume, who has just returned from France. General ClRrk lunched at the villa with General Brann and his aide and rested in t he afternoon. General Gruenther arrived At 1700. General Cle.rk gave a small dinner with Generals Gruenther and Brann and three sr,uests. The Army Commander rl"ltired shortly after dinner. * * TRAVERSA--NO'\IEMBER 23, 1944--'T'he weather today wa,s rainy. Genera,ls Gruenther and Brann spent the morning conferring with General Clark. General Clark, with Gen , rals Gruenther and Brann and his aide, lunched at , the Anglo-American Hotel. Generals Clark e,nd Gruenther after lunch drove to the command post at ~raversa. This evening General Clark gav~ a Thanksgiving dinner at which the following were present: General Howard, Lt. Col. Iorter, Major Houston, Captain Crawford, Lieutenant Bajenow and Lieutenant Berenson. After �dinner the General retired early 'n the evening. * * * TRAVERSA--NOVE:tv'IBE:11. 24, 1944--The weather today was drizzling and rainy.) The General spent the day working on papers and conferring with membe~s of his staff. After lunch Gen~rlll. ClRrk jnterviewed ten field grade offfoers who had just arrived from the United States to be assigned as replaceMent battalion commanders. · Gimerals Brann and 'T'Bte came for dinner, and after dinner General Clark played carrls wjth Generals ':'ate, Brann, Gruenther and his aide. * * * TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 25, 1944--The weather today 1ms rainy. This morning Brigadier General John M. Greeley, Office of Coordinator of InterAmerican Affairs, who had just arrived from the States, called to s~e General Clark. General Kirkman and Brigadier Archibald, G-Ops of 13 Corps, camP- to confer with General Clark and stayed for lunch. General Chidlaw called to see the Army Co1'!1r:1ander this aft~rnoon. The General left for his villa in Florence at 1600 hours. Generals Gruenther, Bra.nn and 'T'ate dined with the General and after dinner play"'d cards. * * * TRAVERSA--N()VEMBER 26, 19/"4,--Today it was raining. The Army Commander spent the early part of the morning at his villa, conferring wUh Generl'l.J s Gruenth""r and Bra'1!1. In the early hours Colonel La.due, Chief of Staff of IV Corps, came to report to the Army Commar:rler concerning a repulsed attack of th~ ~nd Battalion of the 370th Infantry, 92nd Division. At 1145 hours General Clark attended a conference held by the ComTl'\ander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in Italy, General Alexander, flt the Florence CoMmand. The following officers atten0ed the conference: Gen~rals Alexander, Harding, Lemnitzer and Robertson of .l\AI; Gen~rals Clark, Gruenther, Brann and TR.te and Brigadier Divers of Fifth Army; General McCreery and Brigadier Floyd of Eighth Army; Generals Cannon and Chidlaw of the XII Air Force; A:ir Vice Marshal Dickson of the Desert Air Force. Following is the gist of Gimeral Clark' s comments at th is conference: "The Fifth Army will be r8ady to launch its attack by 7 December. Never has the Fifth Ar-rrJY been faced wi.th a more difficult ta.sk than that presented by the coming a+,tack. Enemy strength on the front o~ the Fifth Army is proportionately i;;reater than ev('l)r before. He has excellent roads which give him great flexibility and permits him mov~ng reserves to meet any threatened ar('l)a. Bis units are well up in strength, �rested and in as good condition for battle as my own. The Fifth Army has ammunition for a 15 day all out attack, and it is possible that the p~rjod may be extended about three days by the arrival of additional ammunition due approximately 20 December. I am ready and willing to launch this at.tack and will throw every man that I hav"' into the battle in the hope of capturin~ BOLOG!IA. nwhen asked whether 13 Corps should operate under Fifth Army or Eighth Army in the coming offensive, General Clark replied: 'In my opinion 13 Corps must continue to operate under Fifth Army. It is true that the operations on the right flank of 13 Corps are cl0sely allied with the operations of Eighth Army, but logistical reasons, such as the necessity for Fifth Army to furnish 13 Corps U.S. transportation and U.S. 'Enginc,ers in order that the divisions in the Mount GRANDE area be maintained, it is desirable that no change in command be made. I run / ready and will:ng that 13 Corps do ev~rything within its capabil1ties to assist the ~dvance of Elf;hth Army and will direct that Ge11eral Kirkman comnunicate direct with General T-flcCreery on the arrangement of details for operations to assist Eighth Army. I hope tha.t in a later stage of the operation I shall be 11bln to use rart of 13 Corps to assist the advance of the II Corps.' "The Gimeral was aske<l for comments concerning air support for the com1n~ offensive and stated: tit I nMd all air thtit I can possibly ~et for this coming event. By that, I mean "'ightr,r bomber attacks, Medium attacks and heavy attacks to begin possibly one day before the offensive -ls launched and to continue throu~hout the period of the attack. We h~ve prepared an air program for the initial attacks of the first two or three days and will continue to search for suitable targets for continuous air support. In this coming attack I consirler that the air is our only great Emperiority and that it must oe used to its maximum carabilities. I have notice<l that in France they are using as many as 1,200 heavy bombers to precede an assault in that theater and desire that the same t;vpe of air support be given Fifth Army in this offensive.' "Gimeral Cannon commented th~t the fi ~hter bombers and medium bombers would be mare available and that he anticipated no trouble in getting the heavies if proper targets could be produced. He further st~ted that the air was ready at ruiy time to support the o-f'fensive whenever the ground troops were prepnred to follow up the bombardment. Gen(",ral Clark stated that his troops were always reacy to follow up the bombardment and would do so in the comin~ offensive. "General McCreery Mncurred with General Clark. It wAs mandatory thi:i.t this of'fensiv~ be supported by the maximum air effort a'1d thnt, in his opinion, the air should not be too selective in the selection of targets because in many instances targets which did not appear to mAet all the requirements <lemanred by the Air on air photos were, in fact, quite sui tR.ble targets when examined on the ground. 11 �After +,he conference General Clark gave a luncheon for Generr-1 Alexander and fifteen of the off'ic"'rs who attended the meeting at the An~lo-Am~rican Fotl'!l. Just bef'or"'l lunch, Air ir-tce Marshal Dickson, before the assembled ~roup of officers, prAsP,nted the DFC to Lieutenant Jones, Co-Filot of General Clark 1 s C-47. General CltITk af'ter lunch bade goodbye to General Alexander nnd other officers anc returned to his villa. General ClPrk dined in Florence with General Brmin this evening. General Clark today wrote General McWarney as follows with regard to battle casualty reports: "I have received and given cnreful study to your letter of 13 ~-rovember regarding corrections of battle casualty reports of men initially reported as mi1sing in action. !'I fully realize the seriousness of the requirements of speed and accuracy where battle Cc'\Sual ty reports a:re concerned, ann appreciate our responsibility to next of kin. As you know, successful action has been taken in the Fifth Army in recent months to improve the general efficiency of our battle casualty reporting. I run undertaking at once to improve the situation mentioned in your letter. "In accordance with your instructions, tl1is problem has been discussed with each of my division commanders, who have been directed to discuss it peirsonally with their subordinates along indic::ited lines. Jn pc,dition, my G-1 and Adjutant Gen~ral have <liscussed the problem extensively wit}; division staff officers and regimental commanders, in an attempt to disclose the fundamental elements of the problem and to develop remedies. Small unit commanders will he impressed vri th the seriousness of corrections in this type of report nnd will impress upon their men the unfortun.Ate results which flow from their unauthorized absences. Stops will be taken to locate more promptly indivic~uals who become separated from their units during combat. In addition, ,,.,e a.re studying actively practical means of improving the general orientation of rP-placements before they actually go into combat, as it is belie.ved that straggling and AWOL is not infrequently due to new men not having had proper opportunity to become sufficiently a.cquainted with and known by their units and leaders. "Achievement of accuracy in the report-ing of men who are missing in action is, to some extent, oomplicated by a conflict of the needs for speed and accuracy. Units have been disposed to submit these reports soon after the c"isappearance of the indivinu.al, not only to insure that the casualty report is forwarded promptly, but also to be able to obtain quickly replacements of men actually lost to the enemy. The solution to the problem appears to lie not only in improving the initial dia~nosis of absence, as between actual missing-in-action cases on the one hand and m~m who are stragglers or who have gone AWOL on the other hand, but also in adopting measures which will reduce the number of ille~itimat~ absences. �nr have given instructions that battle casualty reports of men believed, but not confirmed, missing in action will not, in the future, be submitted by combat units until nine days after their disappearance, as it is believed that a considerable number of corrections will be obviated thereby." * * TRAVERSA--ijOVEMBER 27, 1944--The weather today was fair with clouds scattered over the sky in the early morning. This morning BBC prematurely announced the news of General Clark's new assignment as Commander of the 15th Army Group and of General Alexander's appointment as Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, and General Wilson's appointment as British Military R~presentative with the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington to replace Field Marshal Sir John Dill. General Clark returned to a very excited headquarters this morning. At lunch today Gen~ral Clark told Genc~ral Gruenther that his new headquarters would be a tactical rather than an adm::1ni_stra.tive set-up and that General Alexander had agreed that the biggest part of Eighth Army administration would go directly to AFHQ rather than clear through the new 15th Army Group Headquarters. The General also stated that he would probably move the headquarters from Siena to Florence. Th:ts afternoon the G~neral entertained members of his staff at a movie and also showed the Battle of San Pietro film. Misses Moen and Berney, Fifth Army Red Cross girls, came to supper. The General retired early this evening. General Clark today sent Field Marshal Alexander the following cable: RN 6897. "I express to you my most hearty congratulations on your richly deserved promotion to Field Marshal. It has been a privilege for me to serve under your command here in Italy for more than a year now, a...~d nothing could give me greater pleasure than to see this fine recognition of your outstanding ability. I wish you continued success in your nevr and more important undertakings. I am happy and proud to continue under your command in my new assignment." * * * TRAVERSA--ijOVEMBER 28, 1944--The weather is clearing today. At 1000 hours a guard of honor was held for General Bencivenga and 14 Italian officers and men who had come from Rome to be decorated by the Army Comm:mder. General Clark decorated General Bencivenga with the Legion of Merit, Degree of Commande~, with a citation from the President of the United States. General Clark also spoke br:iefly as follows: "Welcome to the Fifth Army. I am glad to have you at my headquarters today and to have this decoration ceremony where, in the name of the j �110 Pres~ dent of the United States, American decorations for ~ritorious service in direct support of Allied operations and for valorous conduct on the field of battle \"lill be conferred on Italian personnel. "The knowledge thrit this ceremony has taken place this morning will give little consolation to our hated German enemy 'l'tlo will realize the collaboration and close cooperation which exists betwn,en the Allied Armies in Italy and the Italian Armed ForcM. "General Bencivenga: You and your assocfa tes assioted rreterially th"' Allied Forces in the battle for Rome and :in our occupation of your great cj ty. Your continued increasing assistance will help to bring the complete defeat of the Gl'lrmans in Italy and bring the peace which the Allied world deserves. "I want to take this opportunity to express my apprec:iFtion to General Cortese, Commander of the ?10th Itali~n Infantry Division which has been with the Fifth Army for some time. His comma.no has assisted the Fifth Army materially jn our advance to the north. 0 we will now read the citations." General Bencivenga responded as follows: "General, gentlemen, "You will excuse me if, owing to my lim:ited knowledge of your language, I am not able to tell you in person the feelin~s of myself and of my collaborators. "My speaker will be my former executive who possesses, to the highest degree, the qualities of a ~allant patriot and of a fine diplomat, your friond Colonel Count Della Rocca. "I am an old soldier, on whom the Goddess fortune hns frequently bestowed honours and awards. But I will tell you frankly thtit never before have I known greater happin1'ss and pride. Pride, because this high award, graciously bestowed upon me by your great President, is handed to me by you, Gen~ral, the gallant and genial leader whose name is lmown throughout the world for having preserved with brilliant tactics, the City of Rome a patrimony of mankind, from the horrors of the struggle a.nd from final il.estruction. ttHappiness, because by these awards and b;,r this memorable military ceremony you have given us a testimony of your feelings toward us, the feelings of comrades - in - arms, representing a ne~ step towards a full alliance and towards the closest cooperation in the war e-f'+>ort. "To you, General, and to your valiant troops we express our greetings: We know that you will lead your "'P..mous Fifth Army a.s well as all the warriors of your new high command to new victories, and that new laurels will be added to the ma.ny battle honours you have already achi,.,ved. �11 I "Good luck to you, Sir and to your gallant soldiers in this epic struegle; good luck to all those who are engaged in this historic fight for the ideals of freedom and democracy." After the ceremony General Clro-k entertained General Bencivenga and the oth-.r officers in his conferen(!-, hut, serving them cof:ee, sandwiches and drinks. The party left 3t 1100 hours. General McUarney and his aide arriven. by car at noon. Gen•'lrals Clark ::ind McNarney conferred for an hour before lunch. After lunch the Army Commander, with General Mci{arney, drove' to the II Corps Headquarters in the vicinity of Pietramala where they met and conferred with General K~yes. They then drove to the 34th Division command post in the vicinity of Loiano where they met and talk~d to General Bolte for about a half hour. Generals Clark and McNarney returned by jeep to General Clark's command post, arriving at 1730 hours. Upon entering the command post, a JU87 flew cHrectly overhead and dropped on~ bomb in the Heac,quarters Company area, wounding several ana killing one Italian civilian. Several bombs also fell along Route 65 adjacent to the commann post. Before djnner General Clark dfacussed with Genf:'!ral McNarney the question of soldiers marrying Italian civilians. The Army Commander told General MclJarney that he felt strongly, and has dictated thE'\ policy wi.thin his Army, that American soldiers should not marry civilians. General McNarney agreed with General Clark and said tha.t he would issue a theater order on this point. The Army Commander entertained General McNarney ford.inner, and after dinner G~nerals Clark, McNarney and Gruenther an0 Major Elliman, General McNarney1 s aide, played bridge. AAI Operation Order No. 4 was issued today and reads as follows: INFORMATION 11 1. 'T'he Enemy cont1nues to contest every inch of the ground, and although he could shorten his front considerably by w-i.thdrawing his left flank to the VAIJ..I DI crr,JA.CHIO, he shows no signs of doing so except under heavy pressure, much less of carrying out any g~n~ral withdrawal voluntarily, though plans and preparations for sucli action have probably been completed. "2. It is appreciated that the enemy will continue to carry out a fighting withdrawal with his left wing until he has been farced back to the position he has selected as his main line of defence connecting his present positions south east o+> BOLOGNA and the VALLI DI CQr'!Iv'!ACHIO; that thereafter he will give battle with all his available r~sources in the hope that he will be able to wear down our offensive in those positions, and so retain his hold on BOLOGNA. "3. As regards our mm troops Eighth Army have sufficient resources to continue o+'fensive operations for another 1 - 4 weeks according to the :J.ntensity of the fighting. Fifth Army will be ready to resume the offensive after 7 Dec, but their offensive capabilities will be limited to about 15 days intensive fighting. INTE"r:t'ION 11 4. To afford the greatest possible support to the Allied winter �t7 2 offensives on the Western and Eastern fronts by bringing the enemy to battle, there~y compelling him to employ in ITALY manpower and resources which might otherwise be available for use on the other fronts. ME,,,HOD "5. Eighth Army will:(a) Continue their present operations to drive the enemy west of the SANTERNO, and SP.cure bridgeheads over that river; and th!'.!reafter (b) Develop their main thrust on the general axis IMOLA BUDRIO; with a subsidiary thrust on FERRARA by ARGENTA, if the condition of the ground on that axis is found to be favourable. The date on which operations we stwards from the SANTERNO are to begin will be left to the discretion of Commander Eighth Army. Hq. AAI and Fifth Army \"ill be given as much notice as practicable of the date selected. 11 6. Fifth Army will:(a) (b) 11 7. Develop operations on their right flank to assist Eighth Army1 s Advance to the SANTF.'R.NO and subsequent thrust on BUDRIO. °'tailed arrangements for th~se op~rations will be made by direct liaison between Eighth Army and 13 Corps, Fifth Army being kept fully informed. Plan and prt'!pa.re their main thrust on BOLOGNA by the axis of Route 65. This operation to be ready to be launched on order of C-in-C, AAI at three days notice from 7 Dec 1944. Conditions for attack. In view of the limited o~fensive capabilities of both e.rmies it is particularly important that all attacks are launched unner the most favourable conditions possible at this time of the year. Full account will there.fore be taken of the condition of the ground And the weather, and no attacks will be launched unless the ground and weather conditions are favourable. "~. Air Support. Fifth and Eighth Annies will continu~ to be supported by XXII T.A.C. and D.A.F. respectively as heretofore. In addition C.G. M.A.T.A.F. has agreed to arrange a0ditional support by medium bombers, and if necessary heavy bombers as well, when the armies nre actuAlly attacking and the targets are suitable. Annies will continue to submit their requests for air support of all natures to their respective support~ng Air Force, and will also notify Hq. AAI of any special requests. In cases of conflicting requirements· priorities will be decided 1)y crrc, AAI. A•--,,_,,·.- ,tvi\-~~- . . •. .. ' �t73 Amrri:rrs"'RA,,,IVE .ARRA ~JGEM'r.:'J'l's "9. The instructions contained in this order involve no change in existing administrative arrangements. IN'1':SRCOMrlU'!\TICA'T'!QN "10. Hq. MI will remain in its present location until the new 15 Army Group Hq. has been forrred and is in a position to undertake the day to day conduct of the battle. 11 A brief summary of operations for the week ending November 2R, 1944 is as follows: During this period the relief and novement of 85th and 91st DiviAion to rear rest nreas was completed, their sectors being taken over by the 88th, 34th and 1st Armored Divisio~s. Advances were made in the 8 Indian Division sector to conform to advances of Eighth Army units on the right flank. Limited objective attacks by TF 45 were partially successful but resistance was sti~f on the right of the sector. Active patrols maintained contact with the enemy across the entire ~rant. * * * TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 29, 1944--General McNarney left after breakfast this morning. General Clark was interviewed by Mr. William King of the Associated press and later by Mr. Dawso:1, ~ditor of -:he Johannesburg Times, and Hr. Decock. At 1130 the Army Commander held a conference of' his corps commanders, General Keyes, G:meral Crittenberger and General Kirkman. Also present were Generals Gruenther, Almond, Brann, Tate, Brigadiers Divers and Archibald, G-Ops 13 Corps, and Colonel Ladue, Chief of Staff of IV Corps. After the conference General Clark entertained these officers for lunch. Before leaving for Florence this afternoon, GonerRl Clark saw Major General Mccoach, EnginP-er Officer of AFHQ, and General Bowman, after which General Clark and Colonel Saltzman drove to the villa in Florence. Generals Gruenther and Almond dined and spent the night at the villa with General Clark. The General plaJP.)d cards in the evening and retired early. Notes on the conference held today are as follows: The Army Commander stated thPt he wished to discuss the ground plans for the forthcoming attack; that the air was not represented at this meeting because plans for the air were not yet complete but would be developed in the near future. 11 "He said that th'3 prospect of the offensive being planned was as difficult as anything yet undertaken in the Italian campaign. He has had comparisons made of previous o:P'rations, including Salerno, Anzio and others, from the standpoint of enemy strength, terrain, etc., and �that this appeared to be the toughest task yet attempted . 11 Both the Eighth Army and the Fifth Army will make all-out attacks . Commanders must think in terms of going as far as maxinrum use of available means will permit . The mission of both armies is to keep as many German Divisions as possible here in Italy end to effect the maximum destruction on these enemy forces . "D-~ is 7 December . 'l'he attac1< will not be launched unless we get a spell of fine weather. The timing problem in the operation rather resembles the one experienced at Anzio; i.e ., a decision will lave to be made as events develop as to the most favorable moment to launch successive phases of the offensive . This offensive will consist of a series of impulses from east to west with the Eighth Army assisted by the 13 Corps opening up, followed by the II Corps attack. "Corps commanders must take strong steps to conserve ammunition. Beginning with 7 December the American troops have available ?7,500 rounds per day of 105 ammunition. There will be 200,000 rounds in reserve and 116,000 rounds at the ports . The Army Commarrler believes that he will consequently have about 20 days' supply available. Brigadier Divers confirmed that the British forces in Fifth Army will have about three weeks' supply. The Army Commander mentioned that the 34th Division has had some success in salvaging ammunition. "As to the scheme of maneuver the Army Commander Eighth Army will start the attack on 30 November or 1 Canad jan Corps, the }Jew Zealanders, the 46th Division line . This is to be a vjgorous attack which is hoped Eighth Army to the Imola area . He has offered to the possible assistance from the 13 Corps along the Imola is desired . stated that the December with the ancl the Poles in to bring the Eighth Army all axis as soon as it 1 "General Kirkman described :in some < etail his contemplated operations in support of the Eighth Army, to start about 2 December. Parts of the 7'1th , 6th Armored aml 8th Jndian Divisions will be used. "General Cl~rk pointed out that Pfter the Eighth Army attack gets under way means will 11 sought for the best use of th~ 13 Corps to aid e the Bighth or Fifth Army. "The Army CoITlil1a.nder stated that it has been agreed th~t the attack will be made on three days 1 notice . ttHe stated that the II Corps attack will be preceded and accompanied by considerable air support and that the CG XII Air Force he.s told hjm that he hopes to be able to furnish 500 f:ighter-bomber sorties per day. "In the II Corps attack a C.T . of the 92d Division will be brought over to aid the II Corps; it will be unoer the 8~h Division and take over a defensive sector . "The first phase of the II Corps attack will fovolve a lim7ted �objective attack by B8th Division. General Clark pointed out that there is to be no prearranged stopping between phases but that all units are to go as fast as possible. One C.T. of the 8~th Division will be held in reserve for any use the Army Commander may wjsh. He described the first objectives of the 34th, 91st, 1st Armored and 6th South African Armored Divisions and stated that simultaneously the Brazilians will make an attack to their northeast. "General Keyes expanded the details of employment of his units. He stated that instructions have been given for conservation of ammunition and stressed the need of air support. 11 The Army Commander instructed the commanders present to take special pains to have all their subordinate commanders talce positive action to combat a feeling of futility on the part of troops who may f0el that this is a tforgotten theater'. There must be impressed on all personnel the extreme importance of our present mission of oontaining and destroying German forces which might otherwise face the Allies on other fronts. He used~ football simile, comparing our forces here to guards and tackles who enable backs to score. "General Ori ttenberger presented the present situation and the plans for TIT Corps stating that the IV Corps operations would involve three phases. The first phase, now in progress, incluiles securing of the Belvedere-Costello ridge which must be occupied in order to secure communications and to open up the operations contemplated for the South African division. He mentioned that the last battalion of the Brazilian Division comes in tomorrow and that General Mascarenhes ,vill thereafter assume responsibility for an indicated sector. The Brazilian attack which began this morning is progressing. The second phase to begin on J December involves an attack in difficult terrain for the Brazilians. In the third, the South African division will attempt to secure the Sole featurA by D-Day. ttGeneral Brann queried General Keyes about timing and was told that IT Corps estimates that it will be eight days from the jump-off until the first objective line is secured. 1tGeneral Tate staterl that rockets and 10,000 rounds of ammunition will be available for the operations. "On -inquiry as to the status of' 48 25 -pounders of Italien artillery, General Brann stated that a conference on the subject is being held today. "General Howard said that indications are that the enemy will hold tenaciously a.nd perhaps bring in additional troops, mentioning that the 71st Division may be brought down from the north wher~ it has b en resting. 11 The Army Command er mentioned that he would like if possible, in later phases of op~rations, to move the 92d Division farther to the east to make an attack of its ovm in oome sector. He said that ·'n these operations re proposes to make any adjustments of any kind which he �thinks might favorably affect the battle. "Relative to air support General Clark said that air efforts must be closely coordinated between the Fifth am Eighth Armies. Activities to locate good air targets have been in progress for oome time and certain targets will be given the XII Air Forc,, at once. Medium bombers as well as fighter bombers will be available as well as heavies if necessary. "General Kirkman asked for the services of Rover Joe before the II Corps attack and was told that they would be furnished ~nasmuch as practicable. "General Almond was told that the C.T. of the 92d Division which will aid II Corps should be ready to move as soon as possible but that it should not show up in its new area ahead of time for security reasons. "The Army Comman::1.er said that a confjrming O.I. will be issmd covering the operations. The Operations Instructions (#36) referred to above was issued today and is quoted below: 1. Since the beginning of the operations of Allied Armies in Italy, the mission has been to destroy the enemy forces in this theater.· That mission remains unchanged, but in addition, it is imperatlve at this time that operations be executed irunedia tll!ly to engage the enemy forces to prevent the withdrawal of any IE,rt of these forces to strengthen the German 0efenses against the major Allied offensives on both the Vlestern and Eastern fronts in Europe. 11 2. Eighth Army continues its attack generally NW along Route 9. If weather conditions ar~ reasonably favorable, it is estimated that it will reach the SAH'lT,RNO River about 7 December. 11 "3. On or about 7 December, exact date to be determined by the advance of Eighth Army and predicted weather conditions, Bighth Army and Fifth Army will la.unch a major offensive to capture BOLOG'iA. 11 4. Fifth Army operations will be divided into phases as follows: a. Ihase I - Objectives. PhRse line and bou:rrlary, see overlay. b. Phase II - See overlay "'or directio11 of principle efforts of Corps. Phase lines and objectives later. c. Phase DI - The objective of this phase will be the capture of IDLOONA. Details of execution will be issued later. �"5. 13 Corps will: a. Assist the advance of Eighth Army as follows: (1) As soon a.s possible launch an attack astride the CASTEL del RIO - IMOLA Road directed on IMOLA. (2) After the attack on IMOLA has been launched b" prepti.red on Army orders to launch an attack generally astrico the S. CL~MENTE CASTF.L S. PIE~RO Road directed on CASTEL S. PIETRO. b. Capture objectives sho1m on overlay. c. Maintain close contact with Eiehth Arn.y. tion between 13 Corps and Eighth Army is authorized. d. Direct communica- Protect right flank of Fifth Army. 6. II Corps will: a. Capture objectives sho.vn on overlay. b. Initially hold 35th Division in reserve. c. Hold one infantry regiment 88th Division in reserve; not to be employed until released by this Headquarters. d. 7. Haintain contact with 13 Corps. IT Corps will: a. Capture objectives shovm on overlay. b. Maintain contact with II Corps. "8. 92d Division (less one ROT) will: a. 1'19.intain pressure against enemy forces in its sector. b. Maintain contact with IT Corps." * * * 'T'RAVERSA-•N'OVE:MBER JO, 19/44--The weather today was rainy. Generals Clark and Gruenther left the Florence cub strip by L-5 at 0845 for Pistoia., arriving at 0900. The Army Commander was met by his frickard and jeep and drove to IT Corps headquarters where he was met by General Grittenberger who orient~d him and General Gruenther on the current situation. Gen~ral Clark, with General Crittenberger in his jeep, drove to inspect a battalion of the BEF about to go into the line. Here he was met by Generals Jbscarenhas and Zenobia and General GrAeley. General Clark reviewed the troops an<l shook hands with many of the o"ficers and men. Th~ Gen -,ral commented to · General r;Jasca.renhas on the light clothing 'l)eing worn by these troops. General Mascarenhas explained that they had �come from Brazil without the proper warm clothing. G~r, l'lrDl Clnrk immedf diat,.,.ly ordered combat jackets, winter underwear and shoe picks be issued to all Brazilian troops and to be delivered to th~m tomorrow. General Clark w· th G"mt'!ral Mascarenhas and party then drove to an OF, but unfortunately the terrain could not be observed due to the heavy fog. The party was met by Colonel commanding Task Force 45. The Colonel explained his situation to General Clark, pointing out on a map the location of his troops and their activities. Returning from the OP to the Brazilian headquarters, General Clark stopped to inspect tanks of the 751st T,mk Batta.lion now being used as artillery in support of the Brazilians and Task Force 45. General ClPrk shook hands and talked to many of the men, telling them of the fine support and the important part they were playing ·n the big picture. Generals Clark, Gruenth~r and Crjttenberger were th~n PntertainP-d at lunch by General Nascarenha.s at the 73EF Headquarters. After lunch General Clark, with GenerRl Mascarenhns, visited another Brazilian OP where the General had a good view of Mount Belvedere and the vicinity. General Hascarenhtis pointed out on the ground his next plan of attack on Mount Belvedere. General Clark made suggestions to him and encouraged him in his mission •• The General then drove to inspect Brazilian units, returning to IV Corps Artillery Hea,?.quart~rs where he was met by General Crane and Brigadier Haunsel, Commanding the 6?nd AA Brigade attached to IT Corps, and several artillery staff officers. The General had a warm drink, bade goodbye to General Crittenberger and members of his staff and drove with General Gruenther to Fistoia where he and General Gruenther took off by L-5 for Florence. General Clark entertained Grmerals Gru~ntht"lr, Brann, Mr. and Mrs. Charini and Mrs. Sartori for dinner. * * * ~RAVBRSA--DEqEMBER 1, 1944--The General spent a quiet day at the villa. Colonel Johnson, JAG, called on the General to discuss several outstanding court martial cases. The G~neral lunched with his aide at the Hotel Anglo-American. This evening the General spent a few minutes at a party given by G-3 at a villa in Florence. * * TRAVF.RSA--DECBMBER 2, 1944--General Clark left the villa at Aleven o 1 clock, arriving for lunch at his command post. Afte};:_ lunch the G·m eral conferred with Generals Keyes, Gruenth~r am :rrann. At 1700 hours the Army Comrnarrler drove back to his villa in Florence and this evening gave a buffet supper for forty members of his staff on the occasion of the Anny-Navy football grure. General Coulter, Commanding General of the 8 5th D1v1s1on, and G · · · eneral Livesay, Conmanding �119 General of the 91st Division, spent the night at the General's villa. * * * 'T'RAVERSA--DE0EMBER 3, 1944--This r.iorning the Army Conm,ander was to have flown from Florence to Rone in General Cannon's C-47 but due to heavy fog in the Florene~ area the General, with his P,Uests Colonels Grogan, Smith, 1rygaard and Saltzman, Captain and Mrs. '3avary, drove to Siena. At 1100 hours the General and his party took off from Malignano Airport, arriving l'!.t the Littoria airport jn Rome at 1230. Alexander Kirk, American Ambassador to Italy, and Bri'5~dier G~n"ral T. K. Brown, Cornrm.nding the Rome Area, met the Army Comrna.nder at the airfield and drove with him to the Hotel Excelsior. Major John Boettiger lunched with the Arrny Commander ,md conferred with him privately for an hour. Major Boettiger, son-in-lA.w of the President, n.elivered to General ClPrk a personal verbR.l messrge frorn the Cor.imnder-in-Chief of his appreciation and the apprecir"l.tion of the ATJ1erican J'!'!Ople for t he outstanding accomplishments of General CL-'lrk and his Fifth Army in ItR.ly. At 1700 Mr. rnyron C. Taylor, l !"!r sonal Repre srmta ti v"' of the Fre sident of the Tfnited States of A~ri~a to m.s Holiness the Pope, and Mrs. Taylor gave a tea in honor of General Clark. During the tea General Clark told the Brazilin.n Ambassador that he hRd issued to the Brazilian troops warm winter clothing. The Ambassador expressed his deep thanks but explained to General Clark that he was r.iost indignant at the shortsightecsnese of soMebody i n Braz:i 1 not having this equipment for Br~zili~n troops before they cane overseas. He told the Army Conmvmder he would make an issue of this with his goverMent at home. General c1~.rk told the Ambassador that he did not wish Mn to do this; thPt the troops were now well taken care of by the Fifth Array and to forget the issue. The AMbassador promised that he would. This evening General Clark was entertained by Arnbassador Kirk for dinner at the }alazzo Barberini. Sir Noel Charles, British Ambassador, and many distinguished lsllests were present. * * * TRAVSRSA--DF.:CEMBER 4, 1944--At 1100 hours this morning Gen~ral C:18rk was int-.rviewed by TTi,. Durrance of TIME and LIFE Magazines on his MW appoint, ment as Co"T!manding G1'n~ral, 15th Army Group. At 1200 hours Adllliral Morse flew in from Leghorn to call on Grm"'ral Clark. The G~ne·ral spent a half hour conferring privately with Admiral Morse. Admiral Morse offert'ld any assistance he could possibly render Gen~ral CL..,rk :in his new f'.ss:1gnrnent. The Generl"l said that he might call on Admiral rlorse for craft to help cross the Po when the time crune. In addition, he asked the Admiral if the Navy had any guns with ammunition which were mobile and could be used as artillery. Admiral Morse said he would look into it and advise. Ambassador and Mrs. Taylor entertained General Clark n~d Prince Hntberto f'or luncheon. �After lunch, the General was interviewed by Herbert Matthews of the NEVf YORK 'T'!r-l!P,S and ln ter by Reynolds Packard of' the UF. General Clark gave a small dinner this evening with Colonel Saltzman, Frincess Colonna, l'larchese f"arconi a.'1d her brother and child. * * * TRAVERSA--DECEMBER 5, 1944--This morning Gen11Jral Clark went shopping and bought Ann two angora sweaters and a pair of gloves and also visited the fa:mous jeweler, Bulgari, who showed General Clark through his shop and displayed for him his ~ost precious jewels. General Clark with Colonel Saltznan, Harches"'l Marconi and Princess Colonna made a short ~ight-seeing tour of the cjty. General Clark wn.s entertained at lunch at the Villa Medici by Genere.l A gui,rd of honor was held for General Clark upon his arrival. After lunch Gen-,r8.l de Couteulx de Gaumont and the French A"b!'tssador, Mr. Henri Coure de Hurville, walked through the gardens of the "iTilla. Medici, during which time the band played in honor of the Generel, de Couteulx de Cn.unont. At 1700 General Clark, Colonel Salt zmnn n.nd his aide called on General Souslopnrov at his villa. 'T'he Gll!nereJ. told Gl"'lneral So-qsloparov that in his capacity as Commander of the 15th Army Group he would do everything possible to contain the German divisions on his front, "Vhich he hoped would greatly assist the !llagnificent nussian arl:l.i-'S in their drive through the Balkans, as well as Gen~ral Eisenhmrer on the we::,tern front. The G~neral also mentioned that he was most anxious to M~et ood excha.nge ideas w:ith the Russian Commander commanding the troops in the Balkans. General Sousloparov said that it could be arranged at any tine. General Clark explained to General Sousloparov briefly his plan of operations in the m~ediate future. General Clark gave a sma.11 dinner this evening with the members of his staff who accompanied him on his trip; namely, Colonel Smith, Lt. Col. Nygaard, General HU111e, Colonel Saltzman and Colonel Grogan. A brief summRr7 of operations for the wee:< ending December 5, 1944 is as follows: Good advances continued on the right of 13 Corps sector and limited \ gains were made in the Corps sector by Brazilian troops. Heavy enemy: counterattacks on the left flnnk of 13 Corrs res11lted in tl•e loss of M. CAS':'ELLARO and forct'!ld a withdrawal from M. B"'";LVEDERE in the center of IV Corps sector. Otherwise defensive positions were maintained and aggressive patz:ollin~ continued. Resting of combat troops was completed and regrouping for future offensive operations was in progress. rr * * * TRAVT1tSA--DECEMBER 6, 1944--General Clark telephoned Mr. Taylor and Ambassador }(irk this morning to thank them. f'or their kindness to him while in �IZ( Rome . He then drove to Champiano airport where he took off by General Hune and Hr . Van Lear ·woodward of the U. s. Conmercial who is visiting the war fronts . Due to heavy fog and rains in Florence arl'!a , the Array Conmander was forced down in Siena and Florence , arriving at one o'clock . B- 25 with Council the drove to He lunched at th~ Angl o- American Hotel end after lunch went to the villa. . At six o 1 cl ock General Sir J"aitlnnd Wilson, Surreme Allied Commander , Uer'iiterranean , the Governor of Gibraltar and Brigadier Gort arrived at the Anglo-Araerican Hotel and conferred with G~..neral ClRrk for two hours . The Gen•ral din~o qui~ tly tonight ~t the villa with Col onels Saltzman and Smith and two guest~ . BBC today announced that Lt . Gen . Lucian K. Truscott would take over the coI!Ulla.nd of the Fifth Army upon the departure of Gen . Clark to take up his duties ~s Command i ng Generttl of the 15th Amy Group . * * * TRAVERSA--DECEMBER 7 , 1944- -The General left the villa this morning at 0930 , arriving at his conunand post at 1030. The Army Commander conferred this morning with General Berardi , Chief of Staff of the Italian Army. After lunch Mr . and TJ!rs . Tompkins, Regional Directors of the Red Cross , 12..nd Mr . Stevens of t~ Fifth Army Red Cross carne to see G neral Clark. Mr . Woodward came in this eveninE; to say goodbye to General Clark before his departure ~rom the Italian theater . General mruscott arrived in Florence this afternoon and called Gene ral Clark to say that he would arrive at the Fifth Army command post toJllorrow . * * * TRAVERSA--DECEMBER 8 , 1941+--'::'he weather today \ms rA.iny and misty. Gene ral Clark and General Brann droYe by jeep to the Headquarters of the 6th South African Armored Division where they were r.:et ·,y Generals Poole and Crittenberger . General Clark , with Generals Foole and Crittenberger , • drove to an OP from which they could clearly observe riount Sole , the immedfate objective of the 6th South African Division. Thl'l party then drove to the cornrnand post of th, 24th Guards Brigade where Genrral ClArk was introduced to Brigadier P . D. =:rskine and ne nbers of his staff and had a cup of -':.ea . General Clark spoke briefly to t:1e officers eX} laining to them tl,e important role that the 6th South African Armored Division was playing in the over- all pictur..,. The General \Vi th General Poole then drove to the command post of the 12th Brigade where he net i3rigac1ier R. J . Palmer and rn.1'mbers of his staff and talked to them briefly. He th•~m drove to a battalion command post for six miles over a road which was completely under enemy observation where h,, could observe Mount Sole from a.11 possible angJes of approach . �At the battalion headqilllrters General ClP.rk spoke brif'lfly to tl•e officers, encouraging them on th~ir next mission. The Army Commander was then "'ntertained at lunch at the lieadquartcrs of the 6th South African Armored Division. Before lunch General Clark promoted Lt. Col. Clark, Cot'l!!l8.nding Officer of the 1108 Enginner Combat Group to the grac~e of full colonel. General Clark also presented Generru. }oole with a carbine. After lunch the G"'neral drove, with General Poole, to the rear headquart"'rs of the 6th South African Arnored Division in Castiglione, where General Clark met Brigadier Thurstenberg, Cor,~anding the 11th Brigade, and several of his staff officers. After this General Clark departed for his headquarters by jeep and as a bridge had been washed out over the short route, the Army CoJ1Ul'l8.nder was forced to take a three-hour detour in r:eavy rain and fog, arriv·ing at his cormand post at 1830 hours. Upon his return Gen"'ral Clark met GenerM Truscott who had just arrived at his headquarters. Gen~rals Truscott and Carleton were guests of the Ar~y Commander for dinner. * * * TRAVERSA--DECEMBER 9, 1944--The weather today \"f1=1S cloudy. General Clark conferred with General "'rus cott over maps in the hut during most of the morning. Genernl Chidlaw, with Colonel Wise, his Operations Officer, carse to confer with Gen,1rals Clark 1md Truscott. At 1030 hours Gen~ral Theron, GOG Administration Union Defense Force, called on General Cla.rk and conferred for a~out half an hour. After lunch Gemra.l 7an Deusen, of the Signal Corps, called with Gen"ral rv:oran to see General 01.."l.rk. At 16oO hours the Aray Conmander drove to his villa in Florence and had Generals Gruenther, Brann, Lewis and Bradshaw. for dinner and cards. * * * TRAVERSA--DECE!,1BER 10, 1944--The weather today was fine and clear. The Giimeral ,.,ent to see Colonel McMahon at the 24th General Hospital, after which he walked with his aide for two and a half hours around Florence, sight-seeing nnd looking in shops. The G1'nertl lunched a.t the Anglo-American Hotel with Colonel Smith and his aide. He spent a. quiet afternoon and h~.d three guests for dinner. * * * TRAVERSA--DECEMBER 11, 1944--General Clark left his villa this morning at 0900 hours, arriving at his headquarters at 1000 hours. This morning General Clark prol'ioted Colonel Duff, Assis ta.nt Divisional Corarmn< er of the 10th Mountain Division, to the grade of Brigadier General. �l8 3 At 1200 hours Air Minister of Brazil, Mr. Salgado, and a pRrty consisting of Brigadier Aplmar Mascarenhas, Major Genfll>ral Wooten and five other officers arrived. A guard of honor was held for the Air Minister, after which General Clark briefed the Air Minister on the current situation a.nd entertained he and his party at a buffet lunch at which the Ch:a's of Sections of the Arny Corafflander 1 s Headquarters were present. In the h.te afternoon the General drove to his villa in Florence where he spent the night. General Clark today sent the following cable to General Mascarenhas, Comna.nder of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force: "Best wishes for success in tor.101Tow' s operations. Have every conf idence that good leadership and the fighting qualities of the Brazilian troops will carry ob.jecti ves. 11 General Clark also today sent the following cable to General Alexander regarding the food situation in Italy: 11 Since exchange of telegrams regarding civilian food si tua.tion in Fifth Army area ending with yours undated Reference #CAO 341, there has been virtually no inprovement. The ration is still 200 grams of bread per day per person supplemented by 600 grar11s per :month of flour for spaghetti or the equivalent. Besides this AMG has been distributing 250 grl-ln!s of dehydrated soup and 400 grams of dried peas per month but only in cities of 50,000 or more. However telegram froa ALCOM #6898 date<l 23 November orders that there be no distribution of these la.st items during December except occasionally in newly occupied villages. This insufficient amount of food will not support a normal individua.l. Chronic undernourishment is givlng rise to unrest. There have been recent demonstrations demanding a minimUJA of 300 grams daily per person. That amount is now being distributed -i n the south of Italy, a fact well known to the public in the Fifth Army area.. The Italian. press be. s widely quoted a Washington dispatch dated 3 November that President Roosevelt had given instructions that Italians throughout liberated Italy receive at least 300 grB.11.s of bread per persqn per day. I am infol;'nted that the continued failure to provide adequate food is likely to cause militarily serious unrest particularly as the weather grows increasingly cold. The whole sitW1.tion is much aggravated by the acute shortage of transportation. It is appreciated that SAC MED has made specific recormendations to Con.bined Chiefs of Staff to obtain necessary minimum ration. Inforlllation is requested as to the prospects of finding n,.eans of providing .300 grams of bread daily per person. 11 * TRAVERSA--DECElffiER 12, 1944--General Clark lw.d a meeting at the AngloAmerican Hotel at which the following were present: Gener~.l Harding, General Mccreery, General --::'ruscott, Brigadier Flo;yd, Genl'!ral Gruenther a.nd General Br~..nn. After the meeting the General lunched at his villa and drove back to the command post at Traversa. The Gen~ral dined with General Truscott and retired early in the evening. �A brief summary of operations for the week ending December 12, 1944 is as follows: Some gains continued to be made on the right of 13 Corps sector as forward positions in other sectors were rna7ntained, enemy counterattacks and aJ,tempts to infiltrate were frustrated, training was continued in rear areas as plan.red reliefs and resting of front l:ine troops Wl'Jre also accomplished. Local attacks comrn~nced as the ]:)'riod ended. * * * TRAVERSA--DECEMRER 13, 1944--General Clark deµi,rted from his command post by jeep early this morning to make a farewell Will' of the II Corps area before relinquishing command of the Fifth Anny. The General first stopped at the S~th Division Headquarters where he spoke briefly with Gen~ral Kenda,11, Division Commru1der, and members of his headquarters staff and presented a Distinguished Service Cross to a member of the division. From. the 88th Division the General drove to the command post of the 91st Division where he presented two Silver Sta.rs, four Legion of Merits and coamissioned an enlisted man in the grade of 2nd Lieutenant before saying goodbye to the Division Commarrler, Generru. Livesey, and 111embers of his staff. From the 91st Division the Army Comma:rrler proceeded to the command post of the 34th Division where he lunched with Gen~ral Bolte and members of his staff. Following lunch the Arny Corn.rtander presented seven decorations to members of the 34th Division before taking off for the 1st Armored Division. At the 1st Armored Division command post General ral Pritchard, Division Commander, a:rrl members of his one Distinguished Service Cross and one Silver Star. also coaaissioned two men of the 1st Armored Division 2nd Lieutenant. CJ.ark spoke with Genestaff and presented The Army Commander to the rank of Moving along to II Corps Headquarters, General C].p,rk was greeted by Maj. Gen. Keyes, Corps Comm.arrler, who he presented vr.i. th a Bronze Star. The Army Comm,:mder took this occasion to make a few remarks to Gen(")rnl Keyes and his assembled staff officers, thanking them for the fine cooperation they had given Amy Headquarters during th-3 entire period that they had been with Fifth Army, congratulating them on the succe§s they- had achieved time and again j_n taking objectives assigned them and finally expressing his regret at leaving Fifth Arny but indicating the satisfaction he would feel in still having the Fifth Army with him in his new command. The General departed from the II Corps coriuM.nd post and headed for his command post, stopping at the 8th EvacU:~tion Hospital on the way back to say goodbye to Col. Kirkman and Lt. Col. Blackford. The Army Commander had dinner with the regular members of his mess and retired early in the eve · �General Ma.scarenhas today iITote General Cl:-i.rk as follows: 11 It seems appropriate to me in the delicate situation through which we are now passing, to get in touch with my illustrious chief, in order to focalize certain special aspects of the action of the Brazilian s~peditionary Force on ItaliP.n soil. nAs a commander and above all as a soldier, I will carry out, at whatever sacrifice it may cost, all the orders emanating from rny superiors, allies and friends. "But the situation of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, as you well know, involves a political problem, of the gr("!atest inter~st to the present and future constant and friendly relntions beb 1een our countries. Under these conditions, if missions were given us, thnt were in a certain sense precipitate, which might bring about a premature expenditure of our forces, it might, p~rhaps, bring about a situation prejudical to the political aspect of our activities. \ "We wish to be employed, and we must fight for the common ideals of our countries, but with our eyes upon tomorrow, for our continent, and upon the Peace Conference. "These are the considerations which have brought me to write you these lines, ronfident in the esteem and confidence in 11,rhich I hold your decisions. "Certain that you will understand my position, I am. 11 * * * TRAiffiRSA--DECEMBER 14, 1944--General Cle.rk rlep:."-l.rted early tr is morning by jeep to make a last trip to 13 Corps before taking over command of lSth Army Group. He arrived at 13 Corps Headquarters at 0900 and was met by General Kirkman, 13 Corps Commander. After talkiiig for a short while with the Corps Com:mander, General Clrir·k departe0 with General Kirkman for the 1st British Division where they w,,re met by Maj. Gen. Lcewen, Division Conmander. General Clark spoke to Gen. Loewen and several of his sta.ff off·' cers, e:xpressing hi::1 regret at leaving Fifth A-.rmy, thanking them for their fine cooperation and congratulating them on the succ~sses th~y had achieved in the past and which he was sure they would continue to gain. Before leaving the Divisional oorm.and post, General Clark presented Gen. Loewen with the gift of a carbine. Generals Ciark and Kirkman departed for the 78th British Division and upon their arrival were rll'Jt by ri!aj. Gen. Arbuthnot, the Division Cornrn.ander. The Army Commander also spoke to the members of the division staff and presented Gen. Arbuthnot with a carbine before departing for the 6th British Armored Division. �General Clark had lunch at the 6th British Armored Division with Maj. Gen. Murray, Division Comma.mer, and after lunch talked hriefly to members of the staff and presented Gen. Murray with a cnrbine suitably inscribed. Just before departing for his own headquarters, GenAral Clark presented General Kirkman with a carbine also. General Clark then drove back to his oomman<l post at Trav'3rsa where he spent the remainder of the afternoon and early evening working on administrative matters. The Army Commander dined with the regular members of his mess and retired early in the evening. General Clark today wrote the following letter to General McNarney on the subject of the 92nd Infantry Division: n1. It appears appropriate at this time to submit a report of impressions which have been obtained to date of the battle efficiency of the 92nd Infantry Division during the period in wti ich it hP_s been in combat in Fifth Army. The approxirre.te lengths of combat service of the division1 s regiments to date are: 370th Infantry Regiment, three and onehalf months; 371st Infantry Regiment, one month; 365th Infantry Regiment, twenty days. "2. Given the fact that the various elements of the di vision have been going through their first period of actual combat, they have performed excellently in supply and administrative rra tters end in such tactical operations as do not require sustained demonstration of' initiative and aggressiveness on the parts of junior leaders and of the rank and file. In these latter aspects of combat certain sho:ctcomings have arpearfld which will bear close observation in the ::'uture oporRtions of the division. "3. '!'he ma,jority of the junior of'ficers of the di vision have -~ailed so far to show the <legree of leadership, init:iP tive, responsibility a.nd aggressiveness which is requisite if infa~try units are to achieve their objectives in offensive combat ngainst determjned opposition. SimJlarly the majority of non-commissjoned officers have appeared un~ble, due to the same nefici'mcies, to lead their men successfully under fire in the absence of forceful officer leadership. 11 4. Enlisted men of the division m ve exhibited more nervousness and less aggressive will to fight in the face of danger than do white soldiers in comparable circumstances. These cioaracteristics af'fect adversely their ability to conduct successful patrolling activities, and in particular to hold ground against counterattack after they have taken it. They appear in many instances to be lacking the mutual oonfidence a.nd team-consciousness which is essential to successful offensive com- bat. "5. The division commatrler and his senior subordinntes have found that it is necessary, in order to induce vigorous team action, for them to lead and supervise their troops much more in detail than is normally the case. Experience so far has shown that unless the men are under the immediate control and guidance of effective leaders they are apt to shrink �187 from danger and to fall away from their units as they close with the enemy. The more flagrant cases are malingerers who, in several instances, have been found to have hidden rather than go forward. In the period between 2 October and 18 November there were fifty cases in the division which requi.r8d general court martial action for offenses involving misbehavior before the enemy. In this connection it .is of interest to note the experience of one of the Division's infantry battalions in an attack on 24 November. This attack was made over moderately difficult mountainous terrain with open sloping hillsides and comparatively good roo.ds and trails. The battalion entered the attack with 411 enlisted men in three rifle companies. Twenty-four hours later there were 70 enlisted men left available for duty in the three rifle companies comblned. During this one-day period the casualties of the three rifle companies consisted of one killed, fifty-nine wounded and four exhaustion cases. By 1530 hours on the afternoon of the 25th there were left a. total of approxi mately five officers and twelve enlisted men in the three rifle oompanies. Three wounded passed through the battalion aid station on 25 Povember and three on 26 November. The total wounrl.ed for the three dnys was ®5, including 2 officers. This battalion entered this engagement well equipped and 1Jriefed and appropriately supported by artillery. A report by the Inspector Gen,::,ral of IV Corps, from which the data given above are taken, indicates that investigation disclosed a lac1c of desire on the part of this personnel to advance under artillery or small arms fire or to close with the enemy. 11 (fu. 7. This division received mitted to battle. It had a long careful indoctrination, and each relatively quiet sector. I feel no handicaps. 0 excellent preparation before being comtraining r,eriod, O)mplete equipment and unit has been init:ia ted to combat in a that the div:ision entered combat under 8. It is appreciated that the division's combat experience is s till so brief that impressions gained thus far are not conclusive, and that the division has still to demonstrate its combat value. This is necessarily in the nature of a preliminary report. The Division Commander, General Almond, is very alive to the capabilities and cha.racteristics of his personnel, and is working continuously to improve the leadership, training and performance of his unit. It is my intention to give the division increasing opportunity to assume combat responsibility and to demonstrate its ability to carry a full load in offensive operations. A further report on this subject will be submitted on the basis of future experience." 11 Major Walters, General Clark1 s personal representative with the Brazilian Expeditionary Force,today submitted the following report on the recent action of the Brazilians: "The recent attack of the 1st Brazilian Division against Mount Castello in the Reno Valley was thrmm back by the Germans, as were the two previous ones. During this attack, I observed it both from the Division command post and Vat'ious observation posts. Like the two rcr:-evious attacks, it seemed almost to have achieved success when suddenly the attacking troops fell back to the line of departure. In the latter stages of the �183 attack, I was in the divisional command post and carefully followed the messages coming in, which gave no hint of any strong Gernan reaction until the Germans put down their artillery and mortar barrage. "The Brazilian attack seems to have been r'riven off almost entirely by mortar and artillery fire. During all tho ti m I was in the obsere vation posts I heard no German machine gun fire, while ours was plainly audible. The reserve battalion vras not ey,.gaged, inasmuch as General Zenobio stated that he could only have gotten into a position to act at about two o 1 clock, which would have made it difficult to secure any definite result starting from the line of departure again before darkness. The attack originally scheduled to start an hour before dawn e ctually got under way very shortly before dmm. "The signal communications during the latter stages of the attack apparently did not function as well as might be desired, and t here were frequent long gaps with no inforl1'f!tion. 11This attack, with some variations, was almost a carbon copy, with regard to the result, of the previous attacks, with the exception that in this attack there were four battalions in the attack; two in the attacking echelon, one in local reserve and one in division reserve. ""'he failure of these attacks seems to be due to a variety of causes: 1. The junior officers do not seem to be able to hold their men together under mortar and artillery fire. 11 11 2. Orders not to withdraw are not obeyed. General Zenobio told me he had refused permission to the battalion commanders to withdraw, but that the withdrawal had been carried out any\Vay. 3. It is my impression that there exists a psychological feeling of inferiority in the Brazilian soldier with regard to the Geroo ns . 11 "4. In spite of having been in training for many months prior to embarkation, these men do not appear to have hD.d more than basic training and do not appear to know how to use Arrerican weapons to the best advantage . "5. In the previous attacks the troops arriv~d on the position at night and attacked the following morning without hav:1ng had a chence to familiarize themselves with the terrain nor even to have a hot meal prior to the jumping off. This was also the first occasion these troops have been in combat . 11 6. The difficult climatic conditions - much colder than anything known in Brazil - appears to have an adverse affect on the morale of the troops. 11 7 . The Division Cornrnarrler does not appear equipped for the position which he holds. He is very mercurial in character, passing from \ I \ ) �periods of great optimism to moods of great depression. Arter the previous failures, he, in my opin5on, had already lost faith in his troops and was beaten before he started the attack. Th5B lack of confidence on the part of the Division Commarrler is transmitted down through the junior officers, and to me the similarity of the Division command post on the eve of the attack to an undertaking µi.rlor was striking. ns. One of the basic reasons for the failure to remedy other defects is that it ap:r;ears to be an accepted custom for a junior officer or non-commissioned officer who fails to carry out a task or mission assigned to him, to present a long sDries of alibis and excuses which are listened to by his superior, and a prolonged discussion then follows. I have heard lieutenants interrupt full colonels to make excuses. After the failure of the attack of December 12th I heard the battalion commanders giving excuses to General Zenobia, Commarrler of the attacking group. I heard General Zenobia giving excuses to General MascareILhas, and the three Brazilian Gen ,rals then went to IV Corps Headquarters where they proceeded to give the Corps Commander a series of excuses. "9. Verbal rebuke seems to be almost the only accepted form of punishment for failure to comply with orders, and there is great reluctance to relieve officers of their command - especially officers of field grade. 11 10. The Brazilians, as a whole, do not auparently yet have a correct perspective on cor.ibat. lOq~ losses seem exceptionally heavy to them. "On the evening of December 12th General Mascarenhas and General Zenobia and General Cordeiro went to IV Gorps oomrmnd poot to see General Crittenberger. They explained that the failure of the attack was due to the intense mortar, artillery and machine gun f:ire of the GC;!rtmns from weapons deeply dug in on Mount Castello in positions that could not be neutralized by the artillery they had. General Crittenberger then asked General T:Tascarenhas if he could attack again on the following day, and the three Generals emphaticaJ_ly said that they oould not. General Crittenberger then asked when they could attack, and General Nascarenhas said that his division would not be any better than it had been on the eve of Mount Castello. Genera;L Mascarenh~s f1nally stated th8t he did not believe there was any offensive capacity left in his division. The Commanding General, IV Corps, then asked General Ua.scarenhas whether he would not rather consult with his staff officers and check on the condition of his troops before committing himself to this definitely. General Mascarenhas said that it was not necessary and that he could state that with his present front and means, his division was not capable of any further offensive action. The Commanding General, IV Corps, then requested the Commanding Gernral of the 1st Brazilian Division to give him his suggestion as to the employment of his division, which General Mascarenhas promised to do on the following day , after consulting with his staff. "On December 13th Gemral Mascarenhas called me into his office and stated that he was now going to trust me with the grave responsibility, as Genernl. Clark's representative, of conveying to him the situation of �l4o ~ 'V"J the Brazilian Expeditionary Force. By implication he admitted that he did not think his troops were capable of much in the way of offensive action . He said his di vision ~ nfantry was nearly a thousand men under strength and that if the division was 'annihilated' it would be a disaster not onl:, for Brazil but for the TJni ted State'3 . He said he h,=id no complaints against General Crittenberger , who as a Corps Cow.marrler had used his division properly from a strictly military point of view . However , his division was of greater political and military importance . He said to me , 1 You know we crune over here for victory and prestige, rather than to be cut to pieces'. He stated he lmew how difficult it was for the Allied Commarrler, due to the shortage of troops in Italy. He stated that the German propaganda regarding t.he Brazilian Exped~tionary Force had had such a disturbing effect that the President of Brazil had sent a special emissary to see him. He stated tl-iat if the Brazilians lost prestige or were disgraced in Italy this might provoke Argentine aggression against T3razil. Fe stated that Brazil, if it were to lose military prestige, would be a useless ally to the United States at the peace table and that a disastrous crunpaign for the Rrazi lien Exred ·'tionary Force would be so much fuel for the campaign of those anti-American elements in Brazil seeking to draw that country away from the United States . He stated that he felt sure that General Clark u.rn erstood the political importance of the 1razilian Expeditionary Force and requested me to convey his appeal to General Clark that the Brazilian Division be so used that it not have any repetition of the previous failures and, :lf possible , in a quiet sector and that if this were done for some time and he was able to rebuild the morale of his troops and get in his replacerrBnts, he felt sure that the Division would eventually be able to take its share of o~fensive action. I)" "To quote General T-1!$scarenhas: t We are in a training course here in Italy, and the course is going too fast . If the course vrnre a little slower and less arduous, I run sure rve would learn more by the end of it'. "General Mascarenhas req'llf:! sted that I speak to General Clark in the greatest confidence, as he knew that the Army Commaro.er was a friend of Brazil and would understand the serious position in which the Brazilians found themselves." * * * TRAVERSA--DECEtffiER 15, 1944--At 1000 ho1lrs GenerPl Cl~rk drove to the headquarters of the ~5th Division where he decorated And promoted several officers and men. 'f'he General made a short farewell speech to General Coulter and hj s staff on his departure to 15th Army Group. After the ceremony the General returned to hjs command post. In the afternoon the Gen9ral had pictures taken with his chiefs of sections on the occasion of his cleperture today for 15th Army Group. He then decorated and promoted approximately 100 members of Fifth Army Headquarters staff. The General spoke to the assembled officers and men of the headquarters telling how p;rntified ann rroud he was to hrive hnd the opportunity to comm,md such a wonderful team as the Fifth Army. After the ceremony the General drove to Florence and spent the night at his villa. ~ \ \ ��SIENA--DECEMBF:R 16, 1944--General Clark f'lew to Siena this morning w i t 9 General Gruenther to open his new 15th Army Group headquarters which officially opened today ?.t noon . General Clark was met by General McNarney and a guard of honor was held for the new Army Group Commander. After visjting Ms office, W"8ti ng members of the staff, the General drove to the Comm~d:ing G e n e r a ] . ! . . . s _ _ ~ from Siena, for lunch, after which he flew back to Florence, landine on the Florence rjrport. There he met and greeted the House Military Affairs Committee who arrived in C-47 1 s from Rome. General Clar1< was introduced to all members of the psrt:,r, spoke to them hr'efly tellinr, them that he would take them on a tour of the front tomorrow. The Generrl then returned to his villa in Florence and had as his dinner guests General Sullivan and Colonel Saltzman. General Clark today sent the following memorandum to Gen. Truscott: "1. As soon as J have had A.n opportunity to deterrrine the ac'lministrati ve procedure which should be followed in the 15th Army Group I shall send you a letter covering the matter in more detail. Pending receipt of this communication I desire thnt the following mP.tters be referred to Headquarters 15th Army Group: R. All recommendRtj ons for promotion to the grade of general o~ficer, to reach my headquRrters byte 10th of each Tionth. b. All transfers of general o:ficers or officers occupying position vacancies which call for genflral o"ficers, excert in emergcincies when time will not permit. In such cRses ass1.gnments will be made temporary, pending my approval. c. Recommendatj ons for the Rward of the Medal of Honor. d. Recommendations for the award of the Distinguished Service Hedal . e. Recommendations ::'or War Department unit citations. f. Requests for allocRtion of P-dditionel units, and requests for changes in priority ~or equipment o" units. g. Requests for ·nactivation, disbandment, or activation of uni+,s; or for reorganizatio'1 of units under a di~ferent T/0. h. Recommendations for changes in T/0 and E. n2. In general, supply and edministrative matters will be handled directly between Fifth Army and UJ'OUbA, with information copies .i:-urnished 15th Army Group. This is substantially the rxocedure which is already in effect. I am esp8cially desirous, however, thP.t e.11 subjects which hee.r in any way on tactical operatio"ls 1 e referred to TIY headquarters." �SIENA--DECErEBER 17 , 1944--This morning the General left his villa at eight o'clock and drove to San Fiero where he met the House Military Affairs Committee party who arr::ved in a convoy of arproximately 40 jeeps . Congressman John Costello of California, Acting Chairman of,the Committee , with Congressman J . P . Thomas of 'Jew Jersey and Congressman Overton Brooks of Louisiana, joined General Clark in his jeep, and the party drove over the Mount Altuzzo road . At the summit of Mount Altuzzo Congressman S:p3rkrnan of Alabama, Congressman Paul Kilday of ':r'exas and Congressman Cliff Davis of Tennessee Joined General Clark in his jeep , and drove to the Fifth Army command post in .,,raversa . Enroute over Altuzzo General Clerk stop:ped several tines , point1ng out key terrain features , explaining to the congressmen how the troops of the Fifth Arr,r;r overcame this heavily defended mountain barrier . Upon their arrival at the Fifth Army Feadquarters, the congressmen were greeted w:ith a guard of honor . Mr . Costello , Acting Chairman of the Committee, stood on General Clark's right side, General Truscott and other members of the Committee to his left . After the honors had been given , General Clark introduced the party to General Truscott, General Cannon , General Keyes and General Chidlaw and then took them into the conference hut where he 1~riefed them , giving them the over - all picture and explaining the tremendous problems of the Italian campaign. Among other things , General Clark mentioned the possibility of unrest in the rear area,~ due to shortage of food which might force h:im to take troops from the front lines to quell any such uprising. He stated that anything that could be done to increase the food ration for the Italians would be a great asset to the Italian campaign . After hot coffee and doughnuts , General Clark , with Congressman Sheridan of rennsylvania and Congressman Winstead of Mississippi and Congresswm Rooney of Few York in his jeep and accompanied by the rest of the party drove forward to Uonghidoro where a church service was held in an old bombed-out church . After the services, the General, with the Congressional party, had a K ration lunch . During the lunch, Generel Cb.rk talked to all members of the party. After lunch the General asked ongressman Schaeffer of Michigan, Congressman Elston of Ohio and Congresswoman Luce of Connecticut to join him in his jeep . The rarty then drove on to Loiano, which had been under heavy shellfire the day before . The General did not think it advisable to go any further forward , so the party turned around at Loia.no and drove back to Monghidoro where they stopped, and General Clark invited Congressman HPrness of Indiana, Congressman Farrington of Honolulu to ride with him. The General then escorted the party to the 8th Evacuation Hospital in the vicinity of Pietramala where he bade goodbye to the Congressmen . 'l'he General then drove to his villa. in Florence and spent the night . * * * SIEIIJ'A--DEOEMBER 18, 1944--General Clark, accompanied by General Brann, left \ �by rofld at approximately 0830. General TAcCreery, Corm1anding :3ritish Eighth Army, met General Clnrk at Castrocnro on Route #67. Genertl Clark drove with General licCreery to a ~)ui ldine in Forli where they conferred on forthcoming operations. After this, the Corps CoT'lmanders of Eighth Amy; Lieutenant GenPral Kei~htley, Commanding 5 Corps; Lieutenant General Foulkes, CoT'l!nanding 1st Canadian Corps; and Lieutenant Geni:>,ral Ander,=,, Commanding 2nd ?olish Corps, arrived. They were introduced to General Clark And talked to him for a few minutes before luncheon. General McCreery then entertained General Cl~rk at a light luncheon. Generals C1Hr1< and Brann left by road at epproxirrR tely half past two and drove back to Florence where they dined and retired early in the evening. * * * SIE'TA--DECEMBER 19, 1944--This morning the General left his villa in Florence nnd drove to Siena, arriving Bt his headquarters at 1045. General Hamblen carrte to call on General Clark this morning. General Mn.scarenhas caMe with Mnjor Walters to call on the General and stayed for lunch. At 1700 the General gave a cocktail psrty for his Chiefs of Sections of his new 15th Army Group Headqunrters. Approximately 40 guests were present. Generals Brann imd Tate stayed for dinner and after dinner the General played cards w~th his guests and retired eArly. * * * SIENA--DECEMBER 20, 191+4--This morninf, General Clark worked in his office on administrative matters and oonferring with officers of his staff. After lunch the General, with General Gruenther, Colonel McMahon, Colonel Grogan and Captain Bajenow flew in a B-25 to Rome. At 2030 hours the General gave a broadcast over CBS on the occasion of WAC Week. The General also made A BBC recording about the Allied effort ~n Italy to be used at a lA.ter date over BBC together wi_th record·;ngs by Field Jt,arshal Alexander and GenAral Mccreery. General ClPrk today sent the following letter to his two Army Commanders, General McCreery and General 'T'ruscott: The time is rapidly arproaching when I shall give the signal for The primary mission of the attack is to bring to battle A.n<l destro:r German forces in Italy and thereby prevent the withdrn.wal of Major enemy elements to other theaters. It is evident that the mission can be accomplished only by an all-out o~fensive by both armies. The specific military objective of our coming battle is the city of BOLOG''1A. You are hoth familiar with the ammunition situntion e.nd other factors that limit th9 period during which we can wage an all-out battle, and of the gren.t importance to the AlHed cause of our capturing the city of BOLOGNA 1Jefore we are forced to st0p. 11 1. a comb:'..ned all-out attack of Fifth and Eighth Armies. �2. The factors which fix the date on which my decision to launch the attack fo Illf!de Are three: favorable weather, the disposition of the enemy f'orces, and the location of the main forces of Eighth Army. Eii;hth Army, b:,r its successes of the past few days, hes drawn to H from the FFth Army front and from reserve positions in the 30100-NA area suffic: en~ enemy forces to permit Fifth Army reasonable chances of success in its attack. 11 "J. It is my desire that Eighth Army clear up the area between the LAJ\.~o~~ River and SENIO River and be prepared to launch its attack to cross the SE1JIO River at the time Fifth Army launches its attack. I consider a simultaneous attack of ·:;i--eat importance but I }1!' ve decided that favorable weather to permit an all-out attack by the heavy bombers of the 15th Air Force ::c.nd all medium and fighter bombers available to ~!JAmAF to be of greater importance. It is therefore directed that: §;• The CornrnFlnding General, Fifth ArJriy, will: (1) Be prepared to launch his attack on 48 hours notice after 22 December. (?.) Direct Fifth Army's main attack o~ BOLOGNA West of Route 65. (J) Direct that a+,ta.cks be launched without delay astride the routes Castel Del Rio - Imola ands. Clemente Castel S. Pietro to assist the advance of Eighth Army. (4) Direct 9?nd Infantry Division to execute limited objective attack in conjunction with the main effort. ,h. That the General Officer Commanding, Eighth Army, will: (1) Proceed with current operations with the object of launching an attack to force a crossing of the SENIO River in conjunction with Fifth Army's attack. (2) Drive the enemy thereafter West of the SANTERNO River, secure bridgeheads over thRt river and develop a main effort on tbe axis IMOLA - BUDRIO. (J) In conjunction with the main operation, to force the JA~IT~~NO River, make a strong secondary effort on tbe axis LUGO - ARGF.'JTA - FERRA"U . Plans for this operation will include provisions to develop this attack as the prir1ary effort if the sitwtion so dictates. ,g. That D Day for the attack will be the day on which Fifth Army launches its attack to secure M. SOLE. ,g. The inter-Army boundary will be extended by my headquarters in accordance with the development of the operations. In general, until Fifth Army can cut Route 9 wjthin its zone of action, Eighth Army will con- �tinue NW on that route with suPficient operational areas to the South of it. 11 4. Every effort hPs been made to convince the enemy that Fifth Army was so exhausted bv its recent offensive thPt it is not carable of Attack in the near future: It is directed, therefore, that information concerning Fifth Array's attack be considered TOP SECRET and not disseminated except as required for the operation. "5. I ru:ive discussed in detail with you both the great importance of the comj ng battle and the slight superiority in men and Arms available to our nrmies . We do have a great air superiority and the Air Force has plec'l.ged its full support in making this powerful weapon availHble to you. But even with the full cooperation of the air it will require the maximum effort of every officer and mnn of our combined armies to insure success." * * * SIENA--DECB?.ffiER 21, 1944--General Clnrk spent the morning in Rome and in the afternoon returned to Siena by B-25, arriving vt his headquarters at 1530 hours. The General spent the rest of the afternoon in his office conferring with members of his staff and working on an accumulation of papers that had been held pending his return. The General returned to his villa at 1800 hours and dined w1th the regulAr members of his mess . Brigadier Packard, British Deputy Chief of Staff of the new 15th Army Group was the General's guest for dinner 8nd cards. General Clark's radio sreech of yesterday is quoted in full below: "In the Fifth Army we 8re proud of our WACs. They joined us in Italy a little more than a yeAT ago--the first oontingent of WACs to serve overseas with an Army in the field--and they have marched straight up through Italy w:.ith us, through some of the worst weather nnd over some of the rou(shest terra,in that hns been encountered by any Army in this war. "To 011r VlACs, just ['S to our fighting men on the "'rant lines, this war is a deadly serious business, and they are fully aware that they are in it to see it through. Although working under the most difficult field conditions, their enthusiasm coupled with their ability has enabled them to perr.orm efficiently the varied administrative duties of a l~rge Army. 11 Fifth Army WACs do just about everything tmit a soldier does around Fi th Army Headquarters except heavy physical labor . Mainly they serve as stenographers and clerks in the various headquarters sections, in perso:1nel, intelligence, plm,nin1; and operations and suppHes. Many of them work vdth our conmunications staff, helping to orerate a telephone and teletype network that would do credit to a good-s:i zed American city. And those with whom they work will tell you, as they have often �told me, that the WACs here are very nearly indispensable. "All of us admire them for the ch9erfulness with which they go about their work. And we respect their ability to 1:1 ccept field conditions, reg~rdless of the season or the weather. "Fifth Army thinks so hi.a,hly of its HACs that it hns presented the entire detacr.mAnt the Fifth Army Plaque in recognition of their valuable contri1,ution to the campaign in Italy. And our WACs have received a high quota of awards and rromotions. "Fifth Army is deeply indebted to its WACs, for the inVPlu.able help they have ~iven us, ~or their good spirits - which have infecter us all, for their rdgh standards of discipljne - and f'or their earnest determine.tion to participate in the actua 1 winninF; of this war. I hope thHt I shall 1,e a½le to have a WAC detachment in my new 15th Army Group headquarters. We could use many more. They are worthy soldiers." * * * SIE"TA--DECEMI3ER. 22, 1944--The General spent the morning at his office and after l 1 mch flew to Florence to meet General 'T'ruscott 11.t the Anglo-A0 :e:rican Hotsl. G3:.1.eral I3ran·1 was also present at the conference. The General then went to his villa where he spent the evening quietly with Genernl Drann. * * * ~IE'JA--DECEr.iBER 23, 1944--7he General spent the entire day i:it his villa, working on papers and resting. In the evening Generals Gruenther, Tate, Brad.Jhr,w, Lewis, Colonel D1 Orsa and Lt. Col. Walker came for dinner and cards. General Clark today sent the following letter to General HcT{arney: 11 I am inclosing a report which I directed Critten:)erger to r:-ia.ke to me on the last action of the Drazilian Expeditionary Force. It :Ls quite complete, as you will see, and should give you a fair insight as to their offensbe capabilities at the present time. I am sending this to you persunally, for obviously it must be gjven only very restricted circulation. I believe it will substantiate -';:£ .'._ilf 01'r.ia tio:,. I ba ve a1r eady given you. 11 The :Jrazilian Divisio"1 now has little real 0L1..ensive combat value. It has been given every orportunity rmd nursed alone, so there are no alibis. Their troops just cannot slug it out and take the heavy punishment which is so necessary for successful offensive action. fe must, therefore, give them a defensive mission for the time being, as we have requirements f'or them in that role. There they will have an opportunity to gradually develop such of'fensive capabilities as they may have and dur~ng the forthcoming attack be prepared to follow up aggressively as our main effort succeeds. I \ �"I have had a long ~rsonal talk ni th i."ascarenhas since his last attack. He thoroughly understands the necessity for his troops to attack when the occasion demands, and although he is not a top-notch fighting soldier, there is no point in trying to replace him at the present time. Tinless you desire to send this file to General Iv'.arshall, I request you retm·n it to me. 11 11 * * * SIE'.JA--DECEMBt'STI 24, 1944--General Clark drove back to Siem this morning. The General spent four hours at the office and returned to Florence with General Gruenther for Christmas Eve. * * * SIE~- A--DECEMBER 25, 1944--The General returned to his headquf'rters in Siena J about noon. After lunch the General, with General Brann, went partridge shooting. The General and General Brann managed to shoot one partridge and one rabbit. This evening Brigadier Packfl.I'd and General Brann came for Christmas dinner. * * SIEHA--DECE!1IDER 26, 1944--The General spent the entire day in his office in Siena. The General returned to his villa at about 1800 hours and retired eadly. * * * SIENA--DECEJ,ffiER 27, 1944--The General spent the morning at the office and at noon flew to Florence. This nvening the General, with General Gruenther and Colonel Saltzman, dined at Mr. and Hrs. Arturo Grassi' s home. * * * SIENA.--DECEMBER 28, 1944--This morning the General was forced to cancel a scheduled trip to Polish Corps, due to severe stomach trouble. Colonel Bruce called to see the General and confined him to bed for the day. * * * SIE~JA--DECEMBER 29, 1944--The General's stomach was considerably improved today. However, Colonel Bruce advised him to stay in bed. General Brann came and dined with the General this evening. * * * SIE!JA--DECEMBER 30, 1944--The General was feeling well again today. �Generals Clark, Brann and Gruenther drove to the Anglo-American Hotel where they met GenAral McCreery, Brigadier Thomas, G-Ops Eighth Army, General Truscott and conferred for abou-1- an hour. After the conference the General roturned to his villa and rested in the afternoon. The General hc'l.d Generals Brann, Tate, Lewis, Colonel D1 Orsa in for dinner and poker tonight. * * * SJENA--DECEr- 1PLR 31, 1944--The General spent the entire C::ay at his villa, 1 resting and walking. For 1:ew Year's Eve the General had General Gruenther, General Brann, Mr. and L'<rs. Sartori and Mr. and Mrs. Charini a.nd five other guests for dinner a.nd to celebrate the Uew Year. Shortly after midnight the General retired. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, November 11-December 31, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from November 11-December 31, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1640