1 10 16 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/df4a00afe2c6417ca37ebc93d38f45d7.pdf?Expires=1784764800&Signature=YwVG1qbNA4OnAJ-HK1keOxb7f3M1aZh7Qn2DO%7Eq5KoahOFrQoSQg%7EzxypccyzJOiwEHNgFN%7EhE09WJYHMSn5MfkT8YMDKxhiAvb9ZdYxI5z7aUqLP8kMAP-a%7E4MDRxMNj6SNVlMHu0-SPa0jcYYjmLTTlp9e3%7EGtYsw223--EQQIpNkDPI5b%7Ezjt67ylftaET7qR-pu%7E3ukO4Fdi-gu5KUB0624ZFnIOcfPVBCsoqfh%7ENExGi2eJmUjiFVpejGT8mrevShYSV32jMbBta-lKmT7zxoD-22JYlRRmB15yt90SxgmKW5wt8pM6g1n91k5GtSyHW5HNBXLmkSX7TyLVbA__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 81a6d6bd84367e24e6a873609f8f6edb PDF Text Text �� https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/0b2a32805008914b5b0b8f9a27d597ad.jpg?Expires=1784764800&Signature=IxoI1ZoWtzoUdQToHtYAIES9x5hJ-QJqfvWM-eAMCRNOHOKWktLKW4Kq8BAlPZWBQoL395H9hZW7miiYchRiJmq5-JlS1eaQtEe0VEV7FJ%7EsUZXl8MNPMsivdd-ZXwY%7EuuUogJHK6Yw73sc9704kn1JTnoOND30UrYevIlwWuaEVTt0kjLG4kpm4KZ8GSgxFA3ViJSVGTJpsoZorIknYTpYd%7E7TATR2KeCTeGQ5xfFIdQWxAn9JCGqr2FTVGu%7EwlTQjcIp06drgNK3qk1n8CzIgRDzfTsGFFslFUpmxsnEyESst6d6TpIk222vSpSQbCjfI3hybrD8Maw84QjagsqA__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM f8660418f147eab36a6c49822e713efa Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document [Page 1] Gen. Clark The bagpipes I was in Austria and when the war ended in Italy I didn’t know when it was ended. I mean I knew it was ended I didn’t know what I was destined for my command. I then commanded an army group, two the British 8th and the American fifth and I was surprised one day to get a message from Washington telling me that I was to be the high commissioner in Austria and I was to get my commission from the state department. And I didn’t like that one bit since I didn’t want anything to do with the state department. And anyway, I wore two hats. I was a military occupation commander, and I was a high commissioner, a high commissioner’s duties being to meet with the other high commissioners, namely; the British and the Russians. [Austria] at Potsdam, the last stop before (?) they agreed on the silly arrangement with Germany, where Germany would be divided up and Berlin would be in the middle of the Russian Zone. And they made the same decision with Austria. [Austria…] Once the war started in 1938, Austria was overwhelmed by the Germans, and for all intents and purposes, became her (?). So Austria was divided up into lower proletariats, giving the French occupation. So anyhow, our headquarters were in Vienna. It took me a little while to get in there because the Russians went through (?) raising all kinds of cain. But we finally got in and I set up a headquarters. And of course each nation was competing with the other. With the troops being (?) ship shape and neat looking. And of course each occupation force had a band, and we, we formed a band, the Austrian occupation forces band. And the band was very good. And pretty soon the (?) down in the Saltzburg Zone of Austria, where the 42nd division was located. And they had gotten a few bagpipes, and some bagpipe uniforms. And it developed into a bagpipe section, which played on occasions, and made quite a hit. Of course the music… Are all you fellows in the bagpipe band? … The music is noted for ites stimulating. And it’s designed to inspire men to feel their best. And it made a [Page 2] hit with these poor, down trodden Austrian civilian people, who’d been under Russians and the Germans. And the moral [sic] was low. So I decided to take that little Austrian bagpipers and develop them into a section of the band of the United States Band that we had. And I was able to get a Pipe Major, as the British called it … you call your the Pipe Major now? … the leader - who is it now? [Interviewer] I am sir (me) [Sandy] He’s doing two jobs in one, he’s doing drum major and he’s pipe major. And he’s an officer in the company. (Sandy) Gen. Clark Who’s your, who teaches? Sandy I do that sir. Gen. Clark Who is the first man I brought in? Sandy I think his name was Creary. Gen. Clark Yea. Just as the boys finished the parade, they played Dixie and marched off, and turned to the left, he dropped dead. And I was in a quandry to get somebody. And I got Great Alexander. And I found him up in North Carolina. And I guess you are the third. Sandy Yes, sir. Gen. Clark So one day after I arrived at the Citadel, and had taken over in ‘54, I was sitting in my office thinking about various things, the bagpipes flashed across my mind, and I wondered where they were. Because when I came home from Austria, the band stayed in Austria. While the occupation was about to get over, and Austria was to become an independent state (?) and I brought the bagpipes and kilts back to the United States. And I took them out to the Presidio. I had command of the 6th Army in the city of San Francisco after World War II. I had been overseas 5 years. And so I took the band, the sections equipment out to San Francisco. And I got hold of the band leader of the 6th Army band, and I told him about the band in Austria and the hit it made, and he said he’d give it a whirl. So he found somebody who knew how to teach the [Page 3] bagpipes. And so we organized it into the 6th Army band. And it made a tremendous hit, because the regiment that occupies the army headquarters usually had the regiment, had a group there in the city, and it’s called San Francisco’s own. It’s a shoot out of the just like that in Washington. And the bagpipes made a tremendous hit in San Francisco. So when I left San Francisco in 1947, I guess it was about ‘49, I left the city of San Francisco and was given the Continental Command of the United States, the whole continent, and the Headquarters, I had two, one in Washington and one in Fort Monroe, Virginia. And so I gathered up my bagpipes, and took them to Fort Monroe, where they had one of the Field Forces there, I think it was the Army Field Force Band And they developed it, and played all throughout that part of Virginia. And, as usual, it was very successful. Then I got my orders to relieve MacArthur, and be prepared to go over to Korea, and as soon as he was relieved by Ridgeway, then, who was already over there. He had the 8th Army, and they put him in temporarily. And they sent for me to get ready to go over. And I went. And I knew I wasn’t going to need the bagpipes section over in Korea. So I said to whoever it was Chief of Staff in Washington, and I said “Look, I’ve got some bagpipes and kilts and paraphenalia that I can’t take over to Korea, and I’ve taken them several places, and I want you to keep them for me, store them,” and he said “sure, be glad to.” And he called somebody, and he said that I had a box or two or this stuff to turn over and keep until he gets back. Well after the Korean War, in the middle of the war, is when I got my message from (Huey?) if I’d be President of the Citadel. And I told him, “yes, I was interested in it.” And I told him I couldn’t leave in the middle of the war, but would he hold it for me. And they held it. And I took it. And then, one day, the office of the President there, was I think, that little office, I guess that George, is it your academic, Meenaghan, he got a little office, you, that used to be the office, that was Summerall’s office. And I remember when I took, I came, I flew back from Korea, after signing the Korean Armistice, and met Ike as President, and gave him the Korean Armistice, which I signed, and which Kim, who’s still that SOB [Page 4] that runs North Korea. And so at that time the President wanted to know I was going back to Korea. And Ike and I had been friends in battle for years. And he said, “when are you going back to Korea?” And I said, “I’m not going back, Ike.” Ike didn’t like to be called Ike was he was President. So he said, “what do you mean you’re not going back?” And I said, “The war’s over, I got 40 years in, and I want to retire.” And he said, “you can’t retire, the emergency’s still on.” And he said (?) he said “you could retire,” And he said “Do you obey your Commander-in-Chief?” And I said, “yes.” And he said “I want you to go back to Korea,” which I did for 6 more months. And he said, “I’ll order you to Washington for duty.” And I said I’d already been to Washington a half dozen times, and I’m going to retire. And he said, “What’s your (anxious), why are you so anxious to retire?” I said, “well, I got a good job, it’s in education.” And he said he’d been at Columbia, and I visited him while he was a continental commander at Columbia.” And he said, “What is it?” And I said “It was in education.” And he said, “That’s good, where are you going?” I said “It was a secret.” He said, “From the President of the United States?” I said, “Well, it’s a secret, but I guess I’ll have to tell you.” I said, “It’s the Citadel.” And Ike turned to me and he said, “Well I’ll be God damned,” he said “only yesterday I wrote to the chairman of the board of visitors recommending Willard (C?) to be President of the Citadel.” Willard C was a Major General, only about so high, a friend of mine, and I said, “Well, you’re too late Ike.” And Ike said “What do you mean, I’m too late?” So I came down and I took over the Citadel. And one day, sitting in my office, I mentioned that when I came down with Burns from Ike’s office to show me the Citadel. I’d seen it before, but they had a review of the Corps of Cadets and afterwards, of course the President was there and great crowds of people. And he took me into Bond Hall, took me into Summerall’s office. And he said, “This is the President’s office.” And I said, “this little room is the President’s office?” “Yes sir,” and he said, “Well, you can have an office [Page 5] anyplace you want.” So I said, “What will you give me?” So, that’s when I built that bigger one back in Bond Hall. It had a big desk for a big fella. And one day, sitting there, I thought about the bagpipes. And so I got on the telephone, and I called up the Chief of Staff cause I knew he’d get action. And I said, and I told him about the bagpipes in storage and I wanted them sent to the Citadel. And he said, “yes sir, we’ll get right into it.” About 4 days later, I got a telephone call from another General up there, saying that the Chief of Staff told him to get the bagpipes and kilts and equipment, that they’d run into a snag. They’d found that this equipment had been purchased by the government, that they weren’t my bagpipes, that they belonged to the government. And they said that we want you to have them, and that we know the history of them, but the technicality that they have to be sold to the Citadel. “Well,” I said, “you damn cheap skates, what are you trying to do?” So they said, “Well that’s the decision.” So I said, “well, what do you want for them?” They said to ask what you’d offer. And I said, “$25 bucks on the whole works.” And they said, “SOLD.” So they sent them down. And I had these things, and I opened them up, and I kept thinking about it. It was the summertime, and there were no cadets on campus. In those days, we didn’t have much of a summer school. And so I called in somebody, and I said, “Find out how many members of the band live in Charleston.” And they found out that the commander lived in Charleston, and a good many of them lived in Charleston. And I said, “Try and gather them up and call them in. Let me talk to to them, that they didn’t have to dress up. Tell them they weren’t in trouble, I just wanted to meet with the members of the band.” So about 15 fellas that came around in the morning. And they said the members of the band were here. And I said, “Very well,” and they came in and sat down. And I told them about the bagpipes. I said I’ve seen their band, and I think it’s a magnificent one. But I think it’d be even better with a bagpipe section in it. But I think it’d be even better with a bagpipe section in it. And so I said, “Well, does anybody have any real objections?” And nobody did. And so I said,” Well, any other questions to ask me?” And [Page 6] there wasn’t any questions. And I said, “Well, that’s it, glad to have met you.” And they went out. And pretty soon, old Suzzie Brook, she was my secretary, and she’s still hanging around. And she came to the door and said, “Sir, the band hasn’t left yet, they’re having quite a discussion, and the commander would like to speak to you.” And he came in the door, and he stood in the doorway. And I said, “What do you have on your mind?” And said, “Sit, we think this is a fine idea to have a bagpipes section, but who’s going to play the bagpipes?” And I said, “You are, that’s all, that you very much.” He was flabbergasted. And the last thing he said as he went out the door was, “Do we wear those skirts?” So I said, “Yes.” So that was a problem to begin with about the skirts. But, they solved it themselves. And as soon as they began to practice. And everybody loved it. And the Saint Andrews Society head we had bagpipes, and 2 or 3 of them would play. Gen. Clark You still attend that banquet, don’t you? Gen. Clark So that began the beginning of the bagpipes. From then on, there was no direction to go but up. The efficiency, moral [sic], admiration by Charleston, everybody. Bagpipes were in demand everywhere. I remember I was asked to be a leader of Madi Gras one year, and I had the bagpipes. Do you still go? Sandy No sir. Gen. Clark We had some hitch a few years ago. And I took them for several years. And they made a hit at the Citadel and all over the states. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Interview with General Mark W. Clark on the origins of The Citadel's Pipe Band, 1981-1982. Subject The topic of the resource Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 Bagpipes. Description An account of the resource Interview conducted by Tim French, Ken Hahn, Bill LeJeune, Mark Lester, Don Scales, and Sandy Jones with Mark W. Clark, former President of The Citadel on the origins of The Citadel's Pipe Band. The photograph was taken during the 1981-1982 school year, after The Citadel won first place in the Jacksonville, Florida Scottish Games, which was the first year The Citadel Pipe Band ever competed. In the center is Tim French. On the left is Bill LeJeune with Ken Hahn on his shoulders, and on the right is Don Scales with Mark Lester on his shoulders. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1981-1982 Decade 1980-1989 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. Contact The Citadel Archives for additional information. Language A language of the resource English Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Jones, Sandy French, Timothy Hahn, Ken LeJeune, Bill Lester, Mark Scales, Don Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/3461c2a2649c7454f1c9cf594b21e120.pdf?Expires=1784764800&Signature=tY9Z1PPIS4aDG8qLgZ-m7NDZZ3Y6kfIQOqDXxVigGOK7vSGtglNM%7EBBBAtHvaBSxp3E%7EANJN0ZvsU6%7ERhB6YSgMEhPXSHS4A8LgIP%7ET6pWqnP6%7EZQ7iX6YjhyGb9BzHtiDwUuJ9-DCY1GA2IRwS%7EV6NAF1omNyDvyoNpe%7EkRVp-HoWLT%7EGxmLPNvCE3L0wieqpOPxuje-iM10RixfGoU1WkZE9xOacdhuqt9ZbL9e6pkcppiBHGyFgO8GC5qsZ-N73joiSiZDC-iQNNTxpTCXjTTe2CNAM5RUMHVdd-1qRRP7hTiADuTxLUXtljvk%7E-IotL96xoVLZb2TG7B0P0dbA__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 8c12efdc731bd9c5c07f2bc4b2fbc226 PDF Text Text "'r_ ...,._ ,~:.ih Pr~r r"r-:-.,..tc- +t•. 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The Co::'J"?.Ylr-il1g 0-B""e:c-al of this '_'._visior is :Jlacp' in cor..r;:,rir' of thn cH:' of ?LPT"'S , o::.. erriva] 7 chargec1 \ i.._th T'AStorire OT''""'r P' thP p·~pyp11t :or; of r' ot-i r- 6 e,::d loot~ ng. 11 1 Gec2.Rra~ Cl.,, 1·+ helr a confsr,_,r,ce with r,.;.... .,raJ r,."UPDth0"", r.C'::'.onPl Braril':o arir C,::lcr:.Bl Fowarc'. 0 1 GPnero.:: P~ontgomPry c:,.T:river1 at PP.' Beach , '2 by boat at t>i5s morring to visit GAner:&.: Clrrk at thP FHth Jlr!";r CP. f'-enA-'al (']ark m"'t Genera] T-1 ortgomery at the beach arr1 escortPn 11im t0 trii:- r,:). r,P~ rc1l ~_!!or.tgor- .Pry's party incJunef the follcv:ring: rraj. P. B. :P"'nso:r, ...,;lctj ,.-.+.•.'= -• 1 .....,_, Ca·]:!-C,,-1.. _ _ N • FJ rhei~r/'.)C'C\A j -"n "' ('• Ti,,,,ut' • ..,., _ _, 1Vhic- · •r:>r 'J P.-~it,~h l\"l"W,' T'iln,_ Vt c~ -• ) - _ __.._ -~.:..,;. 1 Unit; Flight Officer r. P. PusseJl, C'o-Pilot. Y'"-(; 0 1 1, ...,_ J.~ · - _:...J_ ~ General ClPrk acc;1.1xinter1 Ge>iera7 ' 1"'cltgorrPT'~r 10 :i+l1 !'i~ plP17 to svrirc west ant ca~,turs 'Ta::_:.iles. C.A:1ere.l i"ontgo:rr.e 1·-y 1 s situ tior, is ~uc-b that direct support from the ,:,ighth _A_r!Jy ca•, not be P-.xpectpr, ::.r this opP.,,,.l'lt_:_o::i , as the T,'igl:.tl1 !.rmy is greatl:;r eYte.~r1 e~1 P. thei?' sup.,,,:::;• b1.1.:.J ·up is rot su.fficie!lt to su.r:t.:;. ·' n such employment. rorc"'c.u.c-r+ J:;·, r.c,,1:r-2 :•'or.tgon:ery plans t.o est "1 ti] .:..sh suppl:' bas PS • r th"- Pa 1'"_ P. ..,..,.~P ~ ,-.r" +-:, ffi(, 1 both his Tc1ctical ?_nc'1. r[pi,r_ :'er _ql1.ti.,...+e,,,..s to tlir t lrcality, ith c1 ,,·,,,.,rt futll...,e o;:ierst~ons b8SP.d o:r:: th s,;; .:.nst'llatio 1s. (;=r ra11fo:t~o:r_:·-,~: C."P :cot e::irpect to be abl to nov(: ;;r 1 cr to cctobe·~ 1st. T"i., ,,.,iL:-1t:. L~rrr;; · hopes that short}:, after Oct. lst they -ill be ablP tQ c2.ptur'"' tJ:ir a 1 : '.'7eather e".'.'..rports ir:. the vicir,jty of Fogg2.a. 'T'h assa11lt 1ivisions of the H'iE"hth }rr:~- s:x:pAct tc 1,;oncc:::tr1;t,· :-:_ +1:le follo inf~ &:tE.as , nc1 :: ow he.ve forwarr1 elerer,ts i:i thr-se ~ 'ePs: Tl"ce fith riv"sjon a··our,' hllPtia; the 1st Carzrliar nivis 4 on at ,,...ote"'z2-; t:1'3 Paratroop Br. 11::a ,c e+ AltrF1_1-=e; t}:ie 72th Division at Bari. Thr>Te has h"'E''1 slie;h+ eI1E:m;i' = 0 s-:_.,,ta"lc• to G>, the ""'ighth P_rrr.;,, 1 s ac~v2rce. ~ 7 •') 7 1 0 1 0 0 0 , .~ / x ,l'..,JS'' ~I r7, 1 "':r ::,:i~iYBt<::, early .:.::1 the:, CO!'.fe:·erce, r.erP-ra 1 c1~r1r toF f'-rc.~el \~.w<"'f 11 ThP F.:.fth :1.-m:: ::.s just a ;rcu!l~: ).rm;r t1:·ir\~ Lan" tc, r-t ~#F o,~<t4' along , w1ile ths "":~ehth p_,-.J"l~T is a battlP-tricriyefer?P, lo VC't;.l" ::.:· :p· c.:ate ;rou.:r teac!"~ i_ng l"!.S sc::m1:. of ;rour triclrs !' ('P:";P'l"al Pnrit[:C>BP"": 1--ePT"<" - ; ✓ C -., t lf.1 ~ iCP v,as broken, ar:~ a fr~er•"l;;, c0opPrativ"' be sis 7'c.S Astc.i,::._;_s-. r --1. _ or t:he c"iscussions. ~"tit"'" , ~ r::o::::t,;orr.Pr:': 1 ;.l,P -·Y ¥ -11- 0 1; ~.v::: "t;.,,"" ii#" Ti:e CO:!'.'.ference bet';. ee'' th'3 T'J.ft '.'.' anr' li'ighth .l'\.rri;r Cor:m:1:.rr' !"TS v,as 1:r-'" " r.; 1 cJock. T\)c:: lAavlr~g rr"ler:l Cla k's coI!'ra;:,-' ~· ~ ~· ve' .'.'..cle , the tvo Ger"'ra~ s were bes1.0gec' b;r ;Jhc+ 02:rarhcrs l:lrr' cory,<?s;.or:- rrf" C'.Snts v:l">o rec,.t:ester' stat"':merits. G"r,erel :'0::_t 6 n!:'"'ry S";"1 , uy·,., a·"e ;:"ir,<;/4.r"'e~r' , up Ita:,y side b!r sir'e. Where ''"8 shall 8:_JPYlr· Ch•niptmA~ ; T c'or 1t kro", ...,~r•.r" '4Jµ A v".r corresr orr'lert '-'·''mted to bet TI'-"" r rl::lilli::,::s thr-it the w· r , roulr-1 t~ V"V '1 f),0 "" • O• 70 r h:r Chr_'._ 'tni2s. I have ttl'~er, l:.ic:\ bet. 11 C-P:":<-"ral rlcri,- ~f V t~_pt :r~ 'I.._$ 1,,<Y' ✓ is ;ir.0:1-::. to h~;v.e the li'ightl: :'l_r:riJ- marchi::i.g si,1e by sic1c, ,, ;t1, tl-_e Fi:+ri fl<;:,~~~ l:.rrri;r fo,~1C'. th~t he 0,)10 :.:0:::,t;;0rr0ry hr.:1 r,iscUSS"'' rlnr.s :or k::.c 1r::.:c~ th:: ;t"'"'\l.f':,_Y Poe hr- out 'of' ~ta 1-,, , t.hr t. ' ,,,,, '~·1,bt..._, •·1,r ' thA r ; +'th t,-,-.-,,.,,r la"' - ~. ,, h8 " r~ (' ' r' lJ ... _ ..... .. -~ ~- > _... ......... .....,.,.., -·~ ..,__ _..,. --.... --c_, litater' the pros;ress o'!: th•~ T'ight~!- _t...rrn; v h::.l: ; o:::'- +1-ir dh, · : ar ·, +r~ c_ - w<& J S. t ~ "' r ~ / J Lt,.r :ft::if 't,'-• .tJJ,. ) 1 9 '' terr:in"tec, a:out tvelYe 7 • 01 ~ 0 1.•;_.v 0 ; _.._ 1.:. 0 1 ~ 4 A,_V\,; Q..;,t 1. " ' - !I,/; '6tM. -hJ:Ji 9, I JI. ~t atii.P..f' t t \ {If¥ )\'C, - ,.P _(;,\ r �tr- _~rr::· :.er' 9.~'"' :C' 'rl F"_:eth 1"11!;;' i• i+s tas 1 ,.,:~ l ,:~ f' • m.:.0 the SelE:TJ'10 bf' chbpar'. Gcrrral Cla,...k "r ~r+ ( C~"mpi· i· r • f''(ll '"r+';C'!!'."T'Y t:"ck to th"' bf'c1C'1 "h,1.t ,.."'Ir"'·r•o <i.t -i-r.- f"'P to C'" t·'..-l'"' hir !"'por+f<r-1 ........ OITrC'"'"' 0: tlr T'j : 0 •·u,.i s. calJ r upcr t hr (',..,!"'.- arr1 . - ,... r.0r t'f1 :i ; F. fi h } -rr:: ; .,. t"!er. Bo.,..!1, r' _':', Strc~. r: · "f!J. A~,.. Fe 0 ,c. ~,. ... 0rf 1 r:_p r-v the"'l'f'c' r,cr"'!'e~ Bor!l for t•v, :·.,"' ~i.,. s ,p_o,..-i h·,...1-i ,.,::-'-r tJ-m:• .,,.. "'F"" v..:.r::·, ar..~ f"J- r0rel Perr> ~ta+,y· ":!J1.t r"tc:.'irf tbP !"_"'.... t, !1 (·r : " :::_ I) (_' hl-•"'T'ple.n_ :T..:...-s·ons Frcav· ·2..a½l~, plus so.,.t·:-..s o.,., c<i.r. l'P'·t, Ger ,..i:i.-.:_ ric1-...1r rL.p __ l;· f ir..is~~d a '.:.:!lSS -:if r~:!)Ol"t:: r '1(. off:i.c.; r l p:c.,Pr', f ~ " thr '1 .:.m u l.' tr 2.;r "opcrtcl t'J Vi$lt lOt~ Co,...:ps "hE'..-ltlP a-r,c-:i. ["..prf' rr 1 tY':.Jrti_ce • TT OU<"P, "R-.. • '",. £ !.r!'..:.v·:ii et ::.oth Co-..-8 "-=, ·,,, ('T)' l:,P r.::or'"'ultN i;r•+r Br~t:i;P '~p- c;,-,,-.1.,-~ o~ . . t . . _t S i-tt1-atio!1. th,:r ,-~;,ar+ -. f'='~ l{"'\1 h ro~vs TPC (;P:, :..oc~+r~ :'AC r i ,.,t,..i Se.n r.:. r,c • "'r,...01.1.t-: r.er sr, l Cla-lr "'"'f' curt e,..,c • (;.i:,;:-,.,,..R, J1•cr...,. f ~ 1 "1 !• • T'J'. ~rhc i~for.•cc' ~f"'Ar:....1 C'lirlr tl:et c".1 '[1 ·cr . . fe'"':' <ic; :c_o+ Qt 'T'/(' "•-:_. [' ➔ hf' ~omi=-nt frrl ·ho, et r,,.,ri:-rt~ r~9.r'r'"' .... "'f}_UASt, "Uirr:-' ('"'"lE"'. rie-'·- +r t:.c. CP of t:1e l'fth T"\ivi.:: ic:n. r,.t _;__,.. ::. r1'1 .... } isCU""Sf r t:...f p-r-oc , Sf c::: t'10 0,-~.r-at·i:::"lS vr~tl (}prc-r,, •1lrps rr.r+r. ('E'lP"'fl 'fi:p(lr0r• c-th''"' i-rcr:iC' ru:-, bf''.;::' ..,,-oc-.-r-ri:::~; sJn l:r :r:t·1 hH:::..+ 0 1 b:· • r~moli~h,.,,, i,w·t1 ;;P ·::, +1 v·c·.,..,it:.r o::: rave!. Tl"J.P Poyal "'r~i~.01:re ~ar', at t~i ti!'!, &.oou+ co;>.rlr>t ~,,.·r,,' ec-0'"'3 tb.€' ;:;P_> tmc'rr rcc:..i_Y'c'.-1::S q,-.-t "J_::. .. 1;,r f·"-,..o, i:i.rir r0~p th,-, p.c-.-.r•1~+ ,..O<;,''1 cr:ir • cvn cP. ~cPer<i, "r · k0s,or+h ee'::'"""''l 1 t v i. f ,, itu· t 4 o.,. :0 !1arr., _ r'1 to ,..,,: cor~i,.~tJr~ . rF...,err l r,::_['r1• +:r~Y\ • rrt it:1 r, :( r· l W'V:)1"C, e.fter c.. c-l1c.-,..t Vff..:..t, hs taJ.1:P • TT 'i'hs 10th Corpe ~'J .,ct .-··o_: ... -:.s::..·.Jf •i+_}, thr Cpl ~r-~t ')-=-~ ''I ,..+r of: it Pr' .:s :b._s:,,r..:_!:f" ,;rs~ · "ff .:cult:- lo0~ ➔ iy • . .: ,:tu 2F .,..t · =-= ,..: 1: ~" _r._ HL - ·rtre:'.':'.ely p,..ec ip.: tous t e,.. !' lri ' l. (' r .t r O;'P"'' t . r ·- Co:r.t-s TTu: ·c:rw .,..te-rs 'i,9-'.: -t, 'C n".'1- IJ}.'1('(' " i c ·+o l r,;r r',:-r,, ,-.r l r~E Tr.."re hi:: ::_:::_m--,iPtt1~· ':!It to tb.:- r'_ tpp·l, V11.P.,...,. "A-:i.C!'a -~ r,•"•""' '"'(i 'HU.: no, V!H h [".pl"c ,..a~ Clar1r I f p2 t:r; or- .:..Prt IS ' VT re ,I-<" 0 t P :r '. r '.:) itu:.tio>1. 'rl•c T rorpR r_~ e· _1la•: __,.,' :,if :'+i,rt;~r tr 4·h,:-, f'-r ...,, [" 1T' r~ve~-, :r. .~ J;:.,I'-_..- t + ~(\ _rr a 'r") +:·!,: /, f':'" t :1 ~=al y•:T ; \Tis • C.1- f fl "'" !1:::-l -. ... T" .:..!l th ir r-ivi:- trirMrr C::.Pr 1' tJ·_,:n t~J:,~r iL. "' • n ~1- rort"li.. T1-i·c:; rr;:-0rt ..,re T""'"'t Y,('()1;''Y'fn'·.,.,;-. •rl :,.lf'&C, -::•. rr r" .... _;1': r-:::J'r"'' r, [ r c.i,..~c-tr-' r!-;r:s:r.-rl ~t:.CES t("\ piirh f'rll'.."" ,;-11 ~11 sr. py,l tc- -m.-~cl<'< " r ~C'~ps crt·~1c~T ::o ~st':) SJr_:~~ n•rr t 1.p':r + 10 :1rl"lk of +r fl~?" re1R~~·.,.. I,. tl--.!_l)t_! C'c.rps. r,.=-,..,0rr Tuc&s lS.!'l P-"o ,~,.."'C't" -10 'r-vr ~0ut"''1.,.. "0--roib-..£ to a~ SQ!, c:_v~r·!'lc i,11rl +0 err i<"~~· tn po . ., ~l:t:,r ":.:: r~-n, -·~a tVtoo.L..,:; r""'.0r~ t~l"'C8 ,..out eo +c a+tFc-1.c +]:r lp_:+ ~rr' ,...fr,.. of -!;_c ..-,r.r.:• . . cs·+··,:-,,,s l<J.:· pr0,'.';r'::"S[' G,r __o:,.=. 7 ·[½p r'q £' 1 t~~ r,~th Div..:.~•on. ,..,.,..tu.rrL1['. t0 t!_s F::t:1 _".,..rn:,' ('.:>;-Grrfral r2.a- 1 ~ cor.fr,...rfr ·.i.:t C'f'rir :•'.):rar a>1r' ('P"'1.PI'[~ r'r-..i_rr,tt_o,-. er' ~at,=--r; :·t ,;,,.,Y'P', C'0!'+i>1·pf'v' r'.;"1 "Of' ,..F"(' r.:..th ,-.E'"'P!"F.} r,.,......._,_.,,r,t~"'r ~ n. 9.::..so • ith rolo-:ir:!. -µ,.... r>''. T: . ~ folJor:i~:: ir.fe>r!""'"'t-io!':' yraR ~e~ri ~ .. +o,;-·~;'": l' .... 'Y'f'C 1 r:!"'~t.:-r., ('f' i_'nc Ge!'rr..:-." TTi;:h Co!l'..r- • J'l - ~., $ bN~ ,_, (' .!_ - ➔:-,.. i_h7..-:_+-,, t ,,+ i~.tc: + '1• + [ J l ~] r E,«- $ h .,_ l~lO :.f 2.'.)2r rrecr-r",.,rpr t~ ::_)l"P,-,~ .... t thrm"P V 8 .,.._.,.., ,,,,,-h·1.:..z,+ic.1 rf,.. ..,,,..,_ tar+'<'.",. Wl"ilt"-Y-.e'" +n C r-.r:..~ ,.;~1- +1--.tie1 (~,...r ,r-iJ.l b /UY"iC"":(r (,:_,. i'}-,c _,_ . 0 f" .... �J'" P": +:,~. r.·::_2 ~.t•rpt to ~r c,-,,.eC'18 C,,.O"'E 3.n 1 ...., l, 1':. n~ "+ i r 0 ... pf,..c + l~+·. T""far+,.._ ~ OW• C .... ~,,....,,., +' l () ,'1 _ _ :£' th __ vt .f'f'V ' ') Ol t Trr' · c-nt '0r .:.bott02. · t"'n+ er -':~r ~, 1 11:':; "ich l _f -nt!: ·:u~---1--,.;t + m"2."" :"I r.i.: of 0,UE tt". Ir-.f r+ r~r r~ c-" · vcri " "'ro1' r 0 :_-·0i_"'..':::'3S~ .;!!~1...~ r-f' to lan: c~~ tl! 1.,..?:_.".Tr. T Of- ,.:_ T 1 _:_~~4-.,.-,~+r>., ·p·i: ~rT nf thn ~G+h r·v1°·0.,., ~r.tL'lZ~a:ta rr~a. T o nc+ ·r.+ rmi. 0 .:.t :o be !cu ·b10 a cec.:.~ ve .'..rifl~~rc, or r r • C!f' Ger"'r - ·'er+ ~('l:::_0-r-;· c ., h. ~ .,. 2."'a::ar:-1:, "l -. S l. + _ +.n .• '.:l. 1 e,...t ar,.:, • a,,, corfic ~ =!:~: =- gr-4 · to c,U'"', T "'r ~ U'"' ,r t ,, c.."" ori ·t ~'1.a"l•,:i mo,+ ,. 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After tae services the cardinal receiYed General-Clark and members of his staff in tbe cardiD&l •s reception rooa. About 0900 this lllOl'ldng. a. tiM bah exploded· in the artille17 barracks occupied 'b7 ta Engineer Battalion ot tn.e 82nd. Airborne Division. One end ot tlae bull.ding was demolished 'b7 the explosion. Aa SOClll as the news was sent t.o his eoamand poet, Gene.ml Clark went to the seene of the accident and cllabed up into the ruins to see the progress made· in remo'Ying bodies of the dead and freeiJlg imprisoned soldiers who were still liring. At the time General Clark arri'Yed, there were 14 dead and OYer 50 wOUllded, and it was expected tbat continued, excavation of the ruins would disclose additional caslJ&l.tiell. General Georgea Beucler, Chief o£ the French Mission, arri'Yed at the Headquarters, had dinner with Genaral Clark .and conferred with tbe Chief of staff and theDepatJ' Chie:t or Stall about the. French UDi.ta to be attacked to the Fifth ArmT. Gemnl Beucler report.d tat there- were ablmdant . IIUlea obtaiJ'l&ble 1n North Africa but few pa-ck saddles. General Clark said that mules were needed in the ll01Dltain warfare DOWin pr.o gress • and directed General Beucler to take up with AIIG the problea of procuring Italian .pack saddles. ,. ... Iaportant •ssages of the dq were as follows: Personal tor Montg011917 tr.om Clark. "Delighted to have y-ou come Tuesday-, October 12. Land Capodicldno &ir£1eld on northern. outskirts Naples. Map ref'erence Nan two four five . three. Motor transportation will aeet 7011 there at 1000 hows. Will expect JOU to have lunch with••" �For Alexander tran Clark. #2251. '-In ageDda for Ooto'ber 12th conference one sub jeot is "T'ranafer 10 Corps Fifth to Eighth Army". In view our discussion this matter when ;you were last here, recOIDJllend any decisions at conference be cORSidered tentati.,.. in n&ture until after your next visit here." To Alexander from Clark ~ #2255. "Two LST 1 s will m eet minimum needs Arley" for Operation port of Na.pl.as. Reference paragraph 4 your SD 1812, reqast that· the;y be designated and nnt to Naples illmediatei,,. Additional three LST•s should be aade available on call this Headquarters on 72 hours• notice &IV' ti:ae after 15 Octo'ber. Plan to use all five LST•s in seaborne operation it such attack is ade. This supersedes our previous request for nine LST•s for Maple.a port a.nd tor seaborne operation." Fift h Prom Alexander to Eisenhower. #558Q (M) • •General Mark W. Clark reports that American LC'l' 's a.re being witlnrawn froa the Salerno Bay area at noon today'. Request consideration be given to delqing withq.rawal as long as possibl.e, because adTerae weather conditions and poor port facilities in Naples require maxi.mum number of LCT•s that can be me.de available tor landing necessar.r aintenance supplies. Request decision tor withdrawal of LCT•s be withheld until meeting here 12 October when craft situation will be discussed with ;your representa.tiTe." * * * NAPLES-OCTOBER ll, 1943-General Ridgwa7 coDferred with General Clark early this IIOrniDg in Gener&l Clark's van. General Clark then left to visit the c0111am post of the 46th Division and com"errad there with Major General Bawkesworth. Be then went to the coaand post ot the 5rd DiYision, north of Caserta, where he conferred with General Lucas, Commanding the VI Corps, General Keyes, Commanding the II Corps, am General Truscott, Comanding the 5rd Division, about .the disposition of troops in prepa.ratian tor the cOlling attack. Following this conference, General Clark, with Generals Lucas and Truscott drO'f'e north to an observation point in. an old monastery on a bill near Vaccheria., where the General discussed . with the VI Corpe and 3rd Diviaion Commanders the ena1111 positions which were visible. Juat across the Volturno in front of the observation pos. . Thereafter, General Clark . returned to the t Fifth A:nq coaam post where he conferred with General Gruenther and General Brann ab.out the results ot his visits. Important •saagea- tor toda7 are as follows& Fr<11 Flag Officer, Weatern Ital.1' to COIIIDl&nder-in-Chief, Mediterranean. "In order that the Fifth Ar,q...,. t.ake adftll'tage of opport\lDities for leap trog operations request 5 LST•s and 20 LCT,ts in addition to port require•nts •7 be sailed to Naplea -as s-oon as possible. General lark Clark agreed persoaall.1'." Fr011 Lucas to Olark. •45th Divis.ion has now reacbllld tbe southern point of its obJectin ud will reach 'blle remainder of its.objective, the high ground qing north ot Pontelamolfo, by the close of the llth of October." �NAPLES•-OCTOBER 12, 1943•-Early this morning General Clark conferred for an hour with General House, XII Air Support Command, about support for the coming attack. General Clark then drove to the command post of the 56th Division at Caserta where he met and conferred with Brigadier Lyon who was commanding the Division in place of General Graham, who was evacuated with a broken arm. General Clark asked Brigadier Lyon whether there was an OP which he could visit, but Brigadier Lyon said that the OP at Vaccheria which the General visited yesterday gave the same observation as the 56th Division OP. General ClRrk then proceeded to Headqunrters VI Corps at Maddaloni, where he discussed the situation with Colonel Galloway, Deputy Chief of Staff, in the absence of the Corps Commander. The General also stopped at a battery of the 10th Field Artillery and watched them firing upon the enemy. While there, the General talked to a sergeant in the batteiywhom he had known at Fort Lewis, Washington. j General Clark then visited the 7th Armored Division where he conferred and took tea with General Erskine at Fertilia. General Erskine described the plan of attack, commencing the night of 12/13 October. He said he planned to put patrols out across the· river to make a feint at Grazzanise and to make his main attack at another point on the river where there possibly was a ford. General Clark then proceeded to the command post of 10 Corps near Aversa where he talked with General Mccreery, the Corps Commander. General Mccreery -said that the task of the 10 Corps was a very difficult one, but that the 10 Corps would go forward all out. He said that to get tanks across the river would be extremely difficult until a bridge was constructed a.nd that he did not expect to be able to get a bridge in at Grazzanise in less than three days. His main errort would be by the 46th Division beca:t~se the hiP'h banks of the river hampe the crossing of the 56th. The 56th can not help the general course of the attack by advancing into the flat ground across the river until the tanks get across. He proposed to try bridging when the 167th Brigade should have attained its first objective, but as that is only 2,000 yards fro~ the river, the bridge will still be subject to hostile fire, and the construction may be a difficult enterprise. General Clark said that he had carefully considered the pos-1 sibility of having the VI Corps make the entire attack in order to turn the enemy's left flank but that he had decided, after full consideration, that it would be necessary to attack along the full front of the Army in order to keep the enemy from concentrating his forces on any one pa.rt of his line. General Clark asked General McCreery if there was any help which he, General Clark, could give him, and General Mccreery said he would be glad to have an attack by support bombardment at the first light on the 13th, if possible by two Mustang squadrons. General Clark then told General Mccreery that he had talked for an hour with General House this morning and that General House was bringing a P-40 group over from the Desert Air Force to operate out of a new concrete airport at Pomigliano. General Mccreery said thnt he had another request and that was that the nr Air Support Command be asked to bring up a tactical reconnaissance squadron, as the VI Corps was now calling on the TACR planes which would normally be available to the 10 Corps. General Clark said that he would look into the matter. Following the conference with General Mccreery, General Clark returned to his command post, where he ascertained that five TACR planes were avajlable to 10 Corps. He notified General McCreary of this fact. In conversation with Lt. Col. SuthPrland, A.D.C., General Clark today said that he was giving future operations in Italy. He �Be said that between the FUth and Eighth Armies there would eventually be 20 divisiops ava.Uable, bllt that t ... Gerans bad at least that aaey in opposition and tbat ne tbe 15th Arrq Group reached an area well. north ot Rome an attaot b7 tbe Geraana, with additicmal divisions brought in, would have to be considered. ·- The following illportant aeasages were received and dispatched today: Personal tor llontgOJ1917 t'roa Clark. #2286. "Sorry- )"OU could not come today. I suggest 7011 defer your visit \JD.tll 14 October in view of fact that our attack across VQlturno starts tonight. I hope you can come Friday." PersoZJal tor Clark from llontgomer,y. #U555. "!Jlportant I should see you tomorrow and discuss future plans as have no other opport\JD.ity before about 2oth October. Will arrive airfield at 1000 hours. Only want a short talk and then will go and see Naples and not bother you al\Y more." To Alexander from Clark. #2516. "Attack by both corps being executed Will aeet you 1120 Wednesda;r aorning." as planned. Personal to lontgomer, troa Clark. #2517. "Delighted ;you are coming. staff officer will meet you Capod.ichino 1000 hours." * * * NiPLF.S-OCTOBER 15, 1943-At 1000 hours General lontgomery arrived at Capodichino airport and proceeded to the commnd post. At 1120 hours there arrived at Capodichino airport: General Alexander, Air Marshal Coningham and Brigadier General Lemnitzer. They went to General Clark's cOIIIJJla?ld post where they conferred with General Clark in his van concerning the progress of the present attack on the Volturno River line. General Alexander told General Clark that be beartil.Jr approved ot General Clark's decision to attack simultaneousi, along both corps fronts to the end that the enenw should not be permitted to concentrate his forces at any one point. I J The Generals then took lunch at General Clark's mess, after which General llontgOlllery went into Naples, and Genera.ls Alexander, Clark, Air Ms.rs ml Coni.?lgbam and General Lemnitzer went to TAC lii•.t· 10 Corps, where they discussed the progress of the attack with General McCreary. The situation, as explained by General McCreer,, was that the 46th DiTision bad put several battalions across the river on its front but tbat the 56th Division bad been unable to effect a crossing and, on the contr&17_. llll&ll.- Geran forces had penetrated into the town ot Capua. These_. however, bad been eliminated by the ti.Ile Genera1 ·c1.art visited General lcCreery. General ilexamer, General Clark and the other officers then proceeded to Hq. 3rd Division, where,in the absence of the r.ommanding General, they discussed the situation with his Chief of staff. !fhe 5rd Division had effected a crossing of the Volturno with three battalions of the 7th Infantry and two battalions ot the 15th Intantry. The party then proceeded to the advance headqmrters of' VI Corps, where they examined t~e situation ap and conferred with the Corps Commander. General Clark told General Lucas that he was very anxious to have the 54th �Division press forward and oocup,y tba high ground to its present front. The 54th DiTiai-on, at this time, bas five battalions, three of ·the 168th and two ot the 155th Infantry, across the Volturno. · General Alexander, General Clark and the other officers then ret'Urlled to the comand post, where they- oolli'erred about the sitmtion. General Alexander told General Clark tat he felt that it would be wise not to bring in the let Armored Division but to use th& 7th, as it would not be possible to suppq two armored divisions. General Clark said he was very anxious to bave the lat Diviaion and that he thought he could supply both diviaions. He further said to General Alexander tba.t if the lat Armored Division were stopped now it aight, 'be ~hat he would never be able to get renewed authorization to bring it over, where&& at the present time arrangement& were all ade tor its shipment. General Alexander also discussed with General Clark the retention of the 10 Corps in the Fifth Ant¥, and he informed General Clark that 10 Corps would remain with bia, at least until Rome was taken. General Clark expressed gratification at the decision. !Jlportant messages are as follows: For Ricbardson trom Alexander. #2815. "General Clark is very anxious to get in United states 1st Armored Division and understands it is all set up to come. The whole difficult7 ia whether or not this extra divi-. sion can be maintained through Ba.plea. Fifth Army are cominced that . they can maintain it as Naples port is now putting in 5,000 tons a day and _have early prospects of increasing this. Clark's intention is to withdraw lO Corps into reserYe when tbe;y have gained their present obJeotives. 10 Corps will then be moved. aver to Eighth Army by degrees as and when Eighth Anv can accept them for maintenance-. In &DT case it is \lnliltely for administrative reasons that 10 Corps will be able to be moved for. some time. Tom.age tor Naples port for last three days 5700, 5500 and 2600. Total for Salerno and Torre Annunziata 4,000 daily. Consult Robertson and let me know." 'l'o Riobardson from Lemnitzer signed Clark. #2829. "Attack was launched last night as scheduled. Condition generalq satisfactory. In VI Corps bulk ot 5rd Division is now acroea- the river. 54th Division is having more ditficult7 but it bu tom- battalions across. On lath Corps front 56th Division attack was \mSllCcesstul and no crossings have been -.de in its sector. OnlT a small force has crossed in 7th Division sector. 46th Division crossing was successtul, and it is now south of Regia .Agne:na Canal." To Alexander froa Clark. #2867. "8itW1.tion is favorable espec.ially in VI Corps sector. 3rd Division bas fiTe battalions and one compaey tal'lks across. 54th, four bat:t.alions. 7th Armored and 56th Divisions have practicalq no troops across. 46th Division bas a shallow bridgehead with fow battalions across. 19 tanks were landed on beach north ot Volturno River by 46th Division. Five reported . lost by mines. others unable to advance inland because ot mines. Fighting on entire front bas been heavy." \ ) �came NAPLES-OCTOBER 14, 1945-At about 0850 General Alexander to General Clark's van and conferred about the general situation. General Alexander then left with General Pence on a tour of the docks, and General Clark went on by' jeep to the VI Corps, where he conferred with General Lucas. He then went to the 56th DiTision CP where he conferred with Brigadier Lyon, at the 5rd DiYision CP where he discussed the situation with General Truscott and at the 54th Division CP where he conferred with Generals Lucas and R1der. Thereupon, General Clark and General Luoas returned to the Headquarters of the 5rd DiTision, where General Clark had directed General McCreecy to report. After t'urther discussion there with his Corps Commanders, General Clark •de the following decision and directed that it be put into effect at once:. The boundary between Corps was to be shifted to the east, running southeast-northwest leaving Pontelatone to the 5rd Division and Formieola to the 56th Division. In this way a . road southeast-northwest is left in the sector of the 56th Division and also a 30-ton bridge which had been constructed across the Volturno by the 5rd Division. The 56th Division was directed to allow the · 5rd Division to complete certain crossings by this bridge, and the details of the adjustment of the corps boundary were to be settled by conference between the two adjoining division commanders, the 56th and 5rd. General llcCreeey at the final conference at the, 5rd Division CP expressed himself' as very pleased and said tbat it was a spl.enclid arrangement. General Clark said that the 5rd Division could now .advance on Dragoni, that the 56th Division, with the new boumlary and with the bridge now available to it, could apply its weight against the enem;r ·and that, as a result, the divisions of the VI Corps could execute an enveloping movement on a large scale, turning tu German easterly flank and quite possibly cutting off numbers of German troops who would find their avenue.a of retreat to the , north obstructed by the advancing Fifth .Arrq forces. General Brann, Fifth Anq G-5, who had been summoned to the 5rd Division CP for the final conference with the two Corps Commanders, was directed to put the new plan into execution at once. General Clark, discussii:ig the general situation, pointed out that the •in highw"1' :running southeast troa Dragoni to Caiazzo and the highwtq running mortheast trom Caiazzo to Ruviano formed what the General described as a "hernia". General Clark pointed out that if the 5rd Division could reach Dragoni, they would so obstruct the routes to the north t.bat, in conjunction with the advances ot the 54th and t}Je 45th Divisions, they might cut off a considerable German force 1n the "benrl.a". General Truscott commented that the '7th Infantry had found that the Germans were al.ready within.wing to the northwest. General Clark, explained that he hoped soon to press forward on_ the left of the Fifth Arnv position to take the high ground north of the mouth of the Volturno, called llonte llass.ico. On the right of the Fifth~ line, he hoped that the operations now under discussion would .pe?'Jli.t the VI Corps to move northeast up the valley of the upper Volturno which here runs from northwest to southeast. The II Corps, to which he expected to assign the 5rd Division and 36th Division, he expected before long to use to relieve the loth Corps, which bad been in action continuously since the landing. �The General commented several times on the unfortunate fact that the weather all day had been clC>lJdy' and that drizzle had altermted with heavy rains. This prevented our utiliaation of the air f' orce to the proper extent. General Clark told General Lucas that he could keep in mind that the 56th Division would be available on call if' needed. Important messages of the d8T are as follcmn Operations Instruction #7 • ._,14 Oct. 45. "l. Confirming verbal orders issued by A:nq Commandl'tr at 1550; 14 October, boundary between Corps north of VOLTURNO River changed as shown. {Mote: This refers to the change mentioned above). 2. No change in bcnmdary south of the VOLTURNO River. Movement of 10 Corps troops within VI Corps zone of action south of the VOLTURNO and over bridge near Triflisco - N 215806 by agreement between Commanding . General, 5rd Division and Commanding General, 56 Division." To Eisenhower from Alexander. #23M. •Bas &IO' reply been received to our request to keep one ROT of 82nd Airborne Division .in this theater on which to build a fresh division later on? Please send reply to 15th Ar,q Group with information copy to Fifth Army." Personal from Clark to Alexander. #2575. "In compliance with your 1n..:. structions I have had thorough st'Udy mde or LCT requireunta needed f'or Naples and adjacent port•. 43 I.CT' a will be needed. or these 20 should be operational so that they- can be used .tor seaborne attack of one combat teu when necessary. 24 are actual.q needed r or port of Naples and 11 for Salerno and Torre Anmmaiata. ~ 8 extra are requested in order to provide absolute llinimum margin tor landing operation. Remaining 12 will be taken from maintenance craft at time of operation. Will be grateful to you for your aid." For Alexander from Clark. #2382.. "Prcgress of attack continues to be favorable. 46th Division bas six battalions and two squadrons of tanks across. 7th Armored Division building bridge at Graazanise. Have shifted 56th Division boundary to right. It will cross tonight using 30 ton bridge built ~ 5rd Division. All of 3rd Division infantry across. Also two battalions artillery, one c ~ tanks, one COllp8ll7 tank destroyers. 54th Division bas two regiments across. 45th Division took Mt. Acero and is advancing to West. Present plan i& for 5rd Division to attack toward Dragoni. This advance coup.led with that of 45th Division will place mass of VI Corps in position to envelop enem;y east flank and should clear resistance in front of Mth Division and may also result 1n liquidation or pa.rt of hostile force. Determined resistance continues.• . * * * NAPLF,S-OCTOBER 15, 1945-This aorning Signor Piccardi, Minister of Labor in the Badoglio Government, called on General Clark, accompanied by Colonel Hume, AMGOT Chief ot Region #5. llinister Piccardi, on behalf of Marshal Badoglio,_ extended congratulations to the Fifth ArJq on the :tine progress the1 had made thus far. He then reported that a Captain Colquhoun, of the British Field Security, 10 Corps, bad come to a Colonel Bedoni in Naples and direor ed that he make a public proclamation, calling for the assemb~ of �Italian troops in Baples. General Clark revoked this order. The Minister then adTiaed that Jlarsbal Ba.dogllo bas ordered the 31st Italian Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General lleroelli, to Naples. General Clark directed the minister to advise Marshal Badogllo that this would cause considerable contusion in Naples, and that water supply-, resources o£ food, sewerage facilities, etc., were so limited that the 51st Corps cow.d not be brought in. In a .conference with General Gruenther, his Chief' of Staff, Clark pointed out that this was the first time. in the histor,y ot warfare that an Arm¥, never having fought before as such, bad as two operations a landing upon a hostile shore against determined tion from prepared positions and a river crossing under the same stances. The success in both was aost encouraging. General mod,rn its first opposicircua· G-2 reported this afternoon that intercepted "Y" mes.sages indicated that some German elements in front o£ the 3rd Division were requesting permission to withdraw lest they be encircled. This sustains the exact purpose of' the new dispositions directed yesterday b7 General Clark. General Beucler, Chief o£ the Fifth ArfllY French Mission, conferred with the Ar,q Cownender with regard to some or the problems inTolved• in the bringing in or French troops, the 2nd Jloroccan Division and a regiment or Spahis, who are expected to be the first French troops to come in. Major General Partiger, Anti-Aircraft Officer of AFHQ, Brig. Gen. Rutledge, Commanding General of the 45th AAA Brigade, Colonel Brucker, AFHQ Anti-Aircraft Planning Officer, and Colonel Robinson, Fifth Ar7J11 AntiAircraf't otfioer,. were guests of General Clark for dinner this evening, during which the General discussed plans for the employment of antiaircraft forces. Important messages of the day are as follows: Incoming message /16207 was reoeiTed from Allied Force Command Post yesterday and reads as follows: "Censorship guidance. Fighting in Lower Volturno and Capua area toughest, and may still become more bitter. Play down any tendency to exaggerate gains. Opposition is lighter on our right and little resistance to flank division, which went farthest. Trying to trace West Yorks." This morning General Clark sent the following dispatch concerning this Jl8ssage: "Censorship guidauce time date 141058 paints a picture which is so contrary to facts that I question its military value. There have been several inaccuracies in previous guidance messages. This suggests the probability tbat they- are issued in compliance with some policy prescribed by higher headquarters. I recommem that an officer who is familiar with this subject be sent here to enlighten ae." PersOD&l to Alexander from Clark. #2902. Will be pleased to have Italian Corps Commander and small staff set up his Headquarters in Naples area as suggested by you. I assume this is 51st Corps, collJlfinded by' �Mercelll. Arrival this Headquarters discussed with me b;r Badoglio llinister Piccardi this 110rning. I told Piceardi that with present congestion here it would be impossible to accommodate any Italian troops in Naples area in addition to those I have already- requested. I hope :you will reiterate this point with Marshal Badoglio." * * * NAPLES-OCTOBER 16, 1945--General Clark left bis command post at 0850, accompanied b;y his G-5, General Brann, and went directly to Headquarters 46th Division, where he met lla.jor .General He.wkesworth,- Division Commander. General Hawkesworth said that on his division f'ront he bad occupied all the grotmd across the Volturno, practically up to the canal line which parallels the Volturno along the 10 Corps front. He explained that he did not occup;y the actual bank o£ the oa.nal, as there was no poiut in it since it was under hea'V1' German fire. He explained that the river bad first been crossed by his intantcy, and he bad then sent nine tanks by sea to be landed by craft north or. the river :mouth, but the B,ritish Broadcasting Company bad announced that the Navy bad first made a ~ing north of the river and made it possible for the 1nfant17 to cross. He explained that there was a site for a bridge at Cancello and that the Corps Commander might put a Class 9 bridge there, and a Class 50 bridge at Capua. The Class 9 bridge will not carcy ~ tanks. General Clark told General Bawkesworth that all the 46th could do was to keep in contact with the Germans and keep pushing until the VI Corps, coming in from the east, could turn the ene• lert. General Clark told the division commander that he had alway-a hated the term "holding attack1 but that, in effect, tbat ~s what the 46th was now doing. General Clark then went to the Headquarters or the 7th Armored Division, where he aet lla.Jor General Erskine,. eOJIDIB.ming that Division. General Erskine took General Clark and General Brann in one tank and General Clark's aides in another, and the party went overland to Grazzanise, where the Division Engineers were constructing a bridge utilizing the debris of a bridge the Germans had builtand some pontoons and metal bridging members, Immediately upstream from the bridge, a ford was under preparation, and General Erskine explained that he was about to attempt to take across the river by the ford a number ot Sherman tanks which were in the immediate rear and which bad just been waterproofed. General Clark then drove to Headquarters 56th Division at Caserta, where he talked with Major General Templ.a.r who bad juat taken command of the Division. General Templar explained that there had been a certain amount of' confusion in the adjustaent or the bouniary between himself and the 5rd Division. A battalion of the 5oth was acta}4 west of a D&ttalion or the Coldstream Guards and was going along the ridge running northwest from Triflisco, although this ridge bad supposedly been allotted to the loth Corps. General Clark stated that he would take this matter up with qeneral Truscott and make sure that adequate liaison was. aintained between the divisions in question. General T9111plar said that he understood that a bridge ca.pable of carrying 50-ton loads was going in at Capua. He was having a good deal of �trouble with mines. General Clark then went to the new comI7land post of the 3rd Division at 23008620. General Truscott, with respect to the point raised by General Templar, said that he was clearing up the ridge in question but that when he got to a line running east and west through Formicola he would stop. He said that the Germans had been firing shell across the ridge in question and that to permit his advance within his sector, he had felt it necessary to clean up the ridge at once. General Clark directed that when this end was achieved, the 3rd Division should leave the 56th its allotted sector. General Truscott reported that his entire division was across the Volturno and that he had all but two battalions committed at the present time. The 175th Engineers had put in the bridge across the river at Triflisco and had lost no men in the construction, despite shell fire. The crew of a tank destroyer, however, had been drowned when it fell off the bridge. General Truscott stated th~t a bombing mission on Dragoni would be very helpful, and General Clark directed General Brann to call for such a mission at once by telephone. General Clerk then proceeded to Caiazzo and examined the terrain from a 34th Division OP. He was told by the officers in charge that a ridge to the northwest had been attacked about two hours before by the 168th Combat Team. General Clark then proceeded to a poi '1.t about four 1dlometers north of Cr.dazzo, where he examined the ground and noted that the ridge :in question had been taken. He then returned to his command post via Caserta, P ,Karcianise and Fertilia. Tomorrow he flies to the VI Corps CP. Yesterday the Army Commander dispatched the following message to Admiral Pewitt, Naval Cornmander-in-Chief: 11 Amphibjous operations require closest cooperation between naval, air and ground forces. The Allied landings in Salerno were an outstanding { example of such coordination. Air, naval or ground forces alone could not have accomplished this mission. Together, they were able to establish a • beachhead and then drive the enemy out of heavily defended positions on the beaches, in the mountains, on the plains. The Allied navies, British and American, deserve the hiehest commendation for the brilliant support of the \ Fifth Army landing. They played the important role of general support artillery. All those who took part in the landings will long remember and honor what the United States and Royal Navies did in contribut:i.ng so brilliantly to the success of the Salerno operations.rt Today Admiral Hewitt repl:i.ed to the above message as follows: "The Allied navies which participated in the Salerno operations are deeply appreciative of the warm commendations contained in your message of 15 October·. They are proud to have had a part with the Fifth Army and the Allied Air Forces in the operations for the invasion of Italy. We salute the courage and stamina of the officers and the men of the Fifth Army which enable them to continue an unrelenting offensive under particularly punishing enemy fire." �' NAPLES--OCTOBER 17, 1943--In the morning General Clark attended a high mass of thanksgiving in the Cathedral, presided over by Cardinal Asoalesi. The cathedral was packed with thousands of Allied soldiers, many sai.lors and a considerable number of neapolitan civilians. After the services, General Clark attended a memorial service at the Church of England for the dead of the 82nd Airborne Division. �then flew' to a cub field near •ddaloni, where he discussed with General Lucas the sitU&tion concerning the adjustment of the boundary between the 56th Division and the 5rd Division. Some confusion appeared to have arisen concerning the occupation of the ridge running northwesterly pa.st Formicola. The new boundary had given Formicola to the 56th Division, but the 56th Diviaion had not yet entered it. General Clark then returned to his command post and discussed the situation with his Chief of. staff, with particular reference to the report that Germans bad entered Formicola, after ncating it, because there were no troops occupying the town. General Clark directed that as early as possible in the aorning General Bram and Brigadier Richardson go to the appropriate point to determine wlat the actual facts were in order that the situation llight be corrected. ~he A.rnijr Co1111111LMer received the following letter from Admiral Morse, Flag Officer, Western Italy: "As I interpret my role in amphibious operations up the coast, I am responsible for submitting to my Commander-in-Chief' the Naval forces required to put ashore what the Military- require. "2. Apart .from a detailed examination of supporting craft, an opposed landing should be launched fro■ either {a) {b) L.C.A. L.C.V. (P) in that order if available. "5. Should these craft be unobtainable, I am informed by General 0 1Daniel that D.U.K.Ws are available and acceptable from a militan point of view. However, from a naval point of view I consider D.U.K.Ws completely unsuitable. I have discussed this point in great detail with General O•De.niel and Captain Lewis and consider it absolutely essential that assault craft be employed." The following is the complete text of a memorandum received by General Clark from General House,. Coananding General of the XII Air Support Command: J "l. General lleCreery 's statement to you that he is not getting air \ support, I believe to be unfounded by fact. ) "2. My Operations Section puts in long hours each day in trying to make our front line units safe from air attack and to lessen their casualties in going forward. There is attached herewith, a diagram of t - e air h support given this campaign by both Strategic and Tactical. Air Forces which are quite conclusive on air suppoi:-t. The targets of both the Strategic Air Force and the Media bombardment of the -Tactical Air Force are largely laid on by this Headquarters. "5 .. The Air Support Control of 7our Headquarters state that General McCreer,y is getting the missions he asks for, and I know he gets all the �,\ I I\ Tac-Rs he wants unless weather intervenes. J y _) \ Q, /1/V / Ir-~., 4i> 7.x oP: 16,3 / • .J/¥ ,/ . ,rt' ,.r;, °JO §v• • $1'?':.'lj'_ t I ~ v r' ~ ~ f~ r Y /1,,~v;,r -,,- .ro"J / "4. I understand that there was a little internal trouble in the 10th Corps between General McCreary and his South African Air Foree staff of'ficer and I am glad to state that it is 8'Y" \1Ilderstanding that this internal trom,le bas been or is being cleared up. /,-., Vo. cl o' t, ( l "5. This Headquarters has and always must reserve the right to reject targets from the Air point of' view. There are Jll&I\Y factors that are considered before a target is rejected. These rejections are not intended as a criticism of' the ground arms. Rejections in this campaign have been smaller than an;r so far and are not due in any wa.;y to a lack of eagerness on the part of my staff or my combat pilots to get at the enemy. "6. When my Headqarten, 64th Wing, Fighter Control unit were shot at by t he enell\f tor six days, not one man aimed a single criticism at "7. We a.re not above criticism and we know that there is always room for iaprOYement in &fl7 'lmit, but when General lleCreery states that he is , not getting air support, I am baffled. It is requested that Charts I and II be returned." Froa Eisenhower tor Alexander. #8513. "Reference Fifth Arm::, 2707 of 8 October. Your Tiews on proposal to empla,- French Horse Cavalry equipment a.re requested. * It you agree, what priority is required?" * * NAPLFS-OCTOBER 18, 1945--General Clark conferred with General Richardson, Chief of Staff of 15th~ Group, and General Robertson, Principal Administrative Advisor ·to General Alexander and Advance Representative to AFHQ •. Thereafter, Rear Admiral Morse, Flag Officer, Wea.tern Italy; Captain Everett, RN; and General 0 1 Daniel conferred with General Clark about proposed amphibious operations. Admiral Morse, by letter of 17 October~(47/655), had given it as his opinion that an opposed landing should be launched from either LCA 1s or LCV(P) 1s in that order if available. The Admiral's letter .tu.rt.her stated that wbil.e he understood, fro• General 0 1Daniel, that DUKW•s were available and acceptable from a military point of view, he considered them unsuitable from a naval point of view. This matter was discussed with General Clark at -the conference. General Clark stated that while he knew that DUKW•s were not the most desirable· craft for the operation, and when possible to get them he preferred LCA 1 s and LCV(P) 1 s, on the other band, the situation llight eall for an assault to be made when DUKW•s were available am other craft were not. In that case, General Clark stated, he would direct that th& assault be made • ith DUKW 1s. w Admiral llorse undertook to make an additional effort to get 7 LS'r 's equipped with davits, each carr,ing 6 LCVP'a which, if acquired, could take the place of DUKW•s in the assault phase. r I ? General McCreary or his combat \lDits. "8. " >' ~ �9l At 1100 General Clark received a call troa the Grown Prince Umberto of Piedmont. Among other things, General Clark suggested to Prince Umberto that it was desirable that the Italian people organize some system to take care of their ra.flJgees. In the afternoon, General Clark drove to Headquarters II Corps, where He explained that his purpose was to baYe the II Corps relieve 10 Corps as soon as 10 Corps should have taken the next high ground in its front beyond the canal. After the next advance, and when there is a straight road ahead to Rome, General Clark stated that he intended to put the 10 Corps back and drive ahead with all three corps abreast. be bad a discussion with General Keyes. General Clark then returned to his command post, entertained Generals Robertson and Richardson tor dinner and continued his discussion of the future course of operations in Italy. The following iaportant -messages were reoeiYed and dispatched today: Fran Eisenhower to Clark. #8867. "Have just sent to General Alexander a communication relative airborne units. I assume he will conaunicate with you, but in a~ event the status of 82nd Division should be settled within a few days. You are doing a grand job, and I am now trying to arrange my schedule so as to spend at least two days and one night with you in the near future. I •Y possiblT make it by the end of this week. Good luck." Personal to Eisenhower from Clark. #2986. "lfa?11' thanks for your message. Delighted you are coming to see us soon. Hope you will be able to re•in several days so that you can see Fifth Army in action. Glad airborne division question to be settled soon. Paschal has demonstrated his ability in this operation. strongl;r recommend his prOIIOtion." Outgoing message #3561 to AFHQ called for shipment of gasoline pipeline to elilllinate necessity of wheeled transport of gasoline as the arm;r moves forward. * * * NAPLES-OCTOBER 19, 1945--General Clark went by jeep to Capua where ha crossed the new bridge. On the way, he stopped and talked with Major Pike, General McCreery 1s aide, who said that a battalion of the Scots Guards have reached point 145895 (two kilometers northeast of Pigna.taro), where there was contact with the enemy. Gascoigne, 20lst Guards Brigade, bad reached a point north of Pontelatone. The 10 Corps TAC was three kilometers southwest of Villa Volturno. General Clark then drove north across the canal to a point where the road to Francolise branches off from the •in road running north to Rome. After observing the situation at a point approximately- 1500 to 2000 yards from the nearest German troops, he returned to Capua and drove along the north side of the river through Triflisco and went north to the 5rd Division, where he conferred with the Division Commander. General Truscott pointed out that the 15th Infantry was at Roccaromana heading northeast and northwest. The 30th Infantry was in reserve near Formicola. A captured Germn mp in the hands of the Division G-2 indicated that the Germans bad prepared a method or with- �drawal along the whole 3rd Division front. The Division Artillery was now firing on the road running through the hamlet of St. Angela 225040. General ClFirk <'Us cussed with General Truscott the future course of his operations. Referr:1.ng to the 1:250,000 map, he said that Ms next objectives were the hill masses surrounding Fietravairano, Pratella, thnt running northeast from Presenza.no, that surrounding Roccamontina and Monte Massico. He said that he had not definitely determined to pause to reorganize when these were taken, but was consider·tng advancing the 36th Division north through the 10 Corps immediately, to push on toward Rome. Returning to his CP, General Clark received Cardinal Ascalesi, Arch• bishop of Naples, who expressed himself as very gratified at the large nwnber of Allied soldiers and sailors who attended the services of thanks• giving at the Cathedral on Sunday. General Clark then received at his Heaiquarters the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Henry Morgenthau, together with his assistants, Messrs. White and Smith. The Army Commander also received Major General E. s. Hughes, and his accompanying staff offjcers, and entertained the group at dinner. The v:isitors remained for the night. * * * NAPLES--OCTOBER 20, 1943--General Clark, accompanied by the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Henry Morgenthau, Messrs. White and Smith, General Hughes, General Mcsherry, Captain Boettiger and aides, left the command post by jeep and drove north to Car•ua., where they crossed the new bridge and proceeded to the command post of the 10 Corps. Here, they discussed the situation facing this corps with General McCreery and two of his Divisional Commanders, General Erskine and General Templar. The party then went to the 3rd Division command post, about five kilometers north of Triflisco, via the road north of the Volturno. At 3rd Division, General Clark and the others conferred with General Lucas and General Trusrott. General Truscott explained that artillery and air bombardment had, on a previous day, destroyed a number of enemy vehicles on a road parallel to the 3rd Division front. General Truscott further explained that he had a number of battalions across the upper Volturno. General Lucas explained that the VI Corps was moving its command post to a point just north of Caiazzo and that elements of the 45th Division were now in Fiedmont. General Clerk explained to Secretary Morgenthau the general plan of the Battle of the Volturno. The 10 Corps front was flat wnhout cover, and the river was difficult to ford. The VI Corps front was mountainous and difficult for transport. However, by attacking all along the line, the 10 Corps had conta:1ned a large part of the enemy wh1 le the VI Corps executed an envelopjng movement in a northwesterly direction. The party then proceeded north through Liberi to Dragoni, which had been taken the day before, and then returned south through Alvignano to the 34th Division command post, three kilometers north of Caiazzo. Here, Gem=iral Clark and his guests had the 34th Division situation exylained to them by General Ryder. At this point General Clark aprroved General Ryder's recommendation of three ba+,tlefield promotions. General Ryder stated th."t he would give the officers their new insignia that afternoon, and the Secretary of the Treasury said thet he was greatly impressed by this ~nsta.nt manner of rewarding distinction in combat. �At a press conference, Secretary Morgenthau sfated thAt the thlrd week of the September War Bond campaign had been 0edicated to the Fifth Army, and that the jnspiration of this had had a great effect in putting this drive over the top. This was the first news General ClPrk had of the Fifth Army's figuring in the bond campaign. The party then returned to the command post vja Caserta . After lunch, the Secretary of the Treasury and his party left for a tour of the docks, under the guidance of General Pence, and then took off ror Bari by plane. Today Genernl CJBrk i~sued Operations Instruction #8, the substance of whjch was as follows: The Fifth Army continues its Pttack to the northwest to seizB the line Isernia exclusive Monte Tassaro (9629) GP.r iglfano River from G9011. The botmdt:iry between VI and 10 Corps runs parallel to Route //6, wh:i ch is allotted to the VI Corps. 10 Corps, making its main effort on its ri~ht, will secure the Mll masses surrounc.;ng Roccamonf'jna, anr' r"assjco Ridge, and will rush l"ght forces forward to seize the jnriicated rhase line ithi"l its zone. The VI Corps, making Hs ma:11. effort on its left, lll seize the hill nasses at, and to the east of, 'ignano and ''fill rush 11 ght forces forw, rd to seize the ;nnic~ted phase line ·qithin its zone of a ction. On completion of the seizure of the phase lj rn=~ just indicatea, the Fifth Army vlill continue to adVA.nce to the general line OPI (G8553 - exclusive) Alvito (a7q43) Arce (G6/~Jl) Fonte (G5206) • The gem~rnl plan to advance to the latter lj ne to e as follows: The main forces of 10 Corps will maintain its pressure and give indication of forcjng the Garigliano in the T!inturno area. It is not planned to force the crossing of thj_s river with large crossings . The II Corps, consisting of the J6th Division, one other division and certain supporting troops, will be put into action generally in the zone of action now held by 10 Corrs. When the hill mass lying between Formic and Pontecorvo has been cleared of the enemy by II Corps. lO Corps, less corps artillery and certain engineer and other service troops, will on Army order, pass to Army reserve. VI Corps, consisting of two divisions and supporMng troops, will continue operations as the right corps, generally north of route #6. 1 1 The follow~ng important messages were received and dispatched today: From Flag Officer, Western Italy to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. "Hay 1ST J66 be retained here as vehicle landing ship through which Ml' ships discharge . Fer work is invaluable . Another LCT as relief is equally acceptable . Any LCT allocated need not be in good engjne order since c :he is hauled ahead to unload and then back again to refjll engjnes not be needed . " 1\JRT • From Comrnander-Jn-Chief, Mediterranean to Flag Officer, Western Italy. Concur with para? of your 18 1739. (2) 7 L.ST can only be allocated with concurrence of 15th Army Group . Unless craft are (temporarily?) held immobilized awaiting the operation, 72 hours is insufficient notice to ensure the necessary 6 (davits?) 1ST being collected empty at NAPLES ready for embarkation with LCV (P) on board. 1ST might for instance be enroute laden from BIZERTA to TARANTO. 7 days notice is requjred. (J) Only (2?) I.SI are now available totFtl 16 LCA . Considered desirahle thB.t US 1ST be employed with LCV(P) thus making a mainly US force under SNOAL (W) (4) 12 US LCT have already been allotted to you for operation. Any further LCT must be found 11 �from British allocation to NAPLES port. (5) Necessary supporting force can be provided from Britiah or US resourcP-s within the notice required for 1ST . (6) Your signal should have been repeated to NW 15th Army Group. (7) FOWIT pass to CG, 15th Army." From Flag Officer, Western Italy to Commander-in-CM ef, ~fodi terranean. "Your 191340A most helpful. Request LSI be sent NAPLES as soon as possible. To reduce notice, which is essential, there seems 2 solutions. (a) LCVP pool at NAPLES and use LST 1 s whether 6 davit or 2 davit as available. (b) All or anyhow 7 of each convoy of LST 1 s to carry full compliment of LCVP and include as many 6 davit as possible. With 7, 2 davit LST plus 2 LSI there are 30 Assault craft which is sufficient." "Want 2 cruisers and escorts for bombardment to arrive here on 23rd October. Suggest U.S. cruisers and destroyers as we have both U.S. FOO parties and US Air O.P. Agreed General Clark, General House (US Air) and Captain Lewis." Personal for Clark from Eisenhower. field Naples 1145, October 21." From AFHQ to Clark. morning by air." RN 9690. RN 9901. "Arriving Pomigliano Pir- "Butcher arriving at Capodichino today or Personal for Clark from AFHQ. RN 9781. "Preliminary reconnaissance indicates possible use of the Regia Academica Aeronautica at Caserta for AFHQ. Desire you avoid use of this area pending decision here as to Forward AFHQ location and that utmost secrecy be maintained as to this possible plan." �NAPLES--OCTOBER 21, 1945--General Clark called a meeting of his Chief of Staff; General 0 1 Daniel, Chief of the Amphibious Operations Section; General Brann, his G-3; and Colonel Howard, his G-2. General Clark stated that he had given the most serious thought to the best means of hastening victory in the next phase of the Fifth Army operations, and he considered that it was of critical importance to make an amphibious landing anG a thrust northward from some appropriate point on the shore west or east of Gaeta. Accordingly, he directed the officers of his staff to make an immediate and intense stuay of the beaches, the defenses and all other pertinent information, looking toward a possible landing either in the vicinity of the coastal lake just west of Sperlonga or else in the bay between Gaeta and Formio. General 0 1 Daniel pointed out that the beach conditions between Gaeta and Formic were ideal but that it was defended by 12 coastal batteries. Colonel Howard pointed out that there were probably inundations and heavily prepared positions around the lake. General.Clark, however, stated that he had determined that despite c.ifficulties, a landing must be made in order to speed the subse4uent course of operations, and directed that the Rangers and the 509th Parachute Battalion be alerted in time to make the move in about a week. He also directed that as soon as brief additional study had been given by the assembled staff officers the Navy should be notified of the time and place to which the necessary LST•s, equipped with davits for handling small craft, should be ready. At 1250 General Eisenhower arrived by airplane at Pomigliano airfielu, where he was met by General Clark. In the afternoon, General Clark went by jeep with General Eisenhower to TAC Hq., 10 Corps, north of Capua, then to Grazzanise and thence returned to the command post via Caserta. General Clark entertained General Eisenhower at dinner. Among other things, they discussed the subject of amphibious operations and appropriate landing craft. General Eisenhower stated that if he only had craft continuous:V ' available to land a complete division on short notice, he could greatly shorten the present campaign and economize in lives. / Among the important messages of the dar are the following: To Clark from Eisenhower. "Preliminary reconnaissance indicates possible use of theRegia Academica Aeronautica at Caserta for AFHQ. Desire you avoid use of this area pending decision here as to future AFHQ location and that utmost secrecy be maintained as to this possible plan. 11 To CINC, AFHQ from Clark. "Present plans contemplate moving Fifth Army CP to Caserta area on 24 October. Forward echelon in woods north of Regia Academica Aeronautica and rear echelon in building. Essential that this move be made for operational reasons. No additional installations will be moved into this area pending your decision." * * -x- WAPLES--OCTOBER 22, 1945-At 0800 General Clark left the command post with General Eisenhower, Lt. Col. Gault of the Scots Guards, Lt. Col. Clark and Lt. Col. Sutherland. They proceeded first to the 3rd Division CP, where they met with General Lucas and General Truscott. They examined the situation map, and General Truscott explained the progress of the 3rd Division attack. The ;r 1 I ' �party then proceeded north, accompanied by General Lucas and General Truscott, visiting a number of units of the 3rd Division, passing through Dragoni and returning south to the command post of the 34th Division, where a conference was held with General Ryder. The party then continued south to the VI Corps command post, where a conference was held with General Lucas and his staff and where the party had lunch. General Clark, General Eisenhower and party then went to Naples via Caserta, where they were met by General Pence and Admiral Morse at the entrance to the docks and were shown the progress made in putting the dock installations in order. In the course of the journey, General Clark and General Eisenhower discussed proposed amphibious operations to aid the Fifth Army's advance, and General Eisenhower assured General Clark every possible support. After the visit to the docks, General Clark accompanied General Eisenhower to Pomigliano where General Eisenhower left by plane. General Clark returned to his command post, where he conferred with General Gruenther, General Brann and General 0 1 Daniel about proposed amphibious operations. As it appeared that the operationsmight be required in 11 days ' time and, as the . naval authorities had reported that it would require 7 days to assemble the necessary LST 1 s with 5 to 7 days more for subse 4uent prepara~ tions, General Clark decided to call a conference with Admiral Morse and Captain Lewis on the following morning to see what the prospect was of shortening this time, to discuss the possible reconnaissance of the beaches, and to take up the question of security concerning the whole enterprise. The following important messages were received and dispatched durinf the day: For General Clark Eyes Only Signed Hughes. RN 920. "Vacancy exists in the United States for an Infantry Division Commander, and General Eisenhower has been called upon for recommendation of a Brig. Gen. who has demonstrated his capacity in combat for that command. General Eisenhower desires a definite recommendation from you regarding Brig. Gen. Eagles. Officer is not to be informed." From Eisenhower to Clark. RN 871. "Dabney Elliott, Brig. Gen., desires to visit Headquarters Fifth Army to discuss Engineer Operational matters, including troop and battle requirements of future operations. Expected date of arrival between October 28th and 31st. You authorizect visit." From AFHQ to Clark. RN 790. "Use of Regia Academica Aeronautica, as reported in your 4027, October 21st, approved on basis that no additional installations move into the area. 11 From AFHQ to Clark. RN 777. "General Roosevelt, with Col. Cherr iere , Deputy Chief o Staff, French Expeditionary Corps, coming to your heanquarters to discuss employment of French forces. Flying via Catania ETA Pomigliano 1645 hours Sunday 24 October." * * NAPLES--OCTOBER 23, 1943--At 0900 General Clark met at his CP with Admiral �Morse arn' Captai:n1 Everett, General Gruenther, General Brann, General OI Daniel, Colonel ~rcy anc° Coloney Howard • After a few minutes, the conference was joined by Rear Admiral Davidson, who brought with him Captain Davis, his Chief of Staff, and Captain Carey, Commanding the U.S. S. Brooklyn. General Clark stated to the assembled officers that in 9 aays a major offensive wa.s to be launched by the Fifth Army to turn the enemJ' left and that as soon as the enemy's reserve should have become engaged on his left, and therefore in 10 days, General Clark desired to launch an amphibious operation with one combat team, flanked by Rangers on either siae, landing in the Formia area. General Clark pointed out the fact that the naval authorities had informed him that the necessary shipping could only be assembled in 7 days and that 5 to 7 days additional would then be required to make the additional preparations, and stated that he proposed to telegraph at once to General Alexander asking if this could not be shortened. He further stated that he wished the naval authorities to state whether, in their opinion, the operation was feasible or nqt from a naval point of view, as a final determination to stage the operation would depenc on navcJ.l possibilities. He also stated that if the operation was launchec the naV;r must be prepared to land a second RCT twenty-four hours after the first was landeu Admiral Morse stated that 7 LST's, each having six sets of c,avits, 2 LSI 1 s and 20 LCT 1 s, with 2 rocket vessels, would be necessary for the· operation. He stated that the loading could be done at Pozzuoli, that the proposed landing place was difficult of access because of a minefield which could only be swept in daylight, that reconnaissances of the beaches by folding boat operating from submarines was impracticable. He also said that an Italian Admiral had reported the beach usable, from his previous maneuvers at the beach in question, but all present doubted the reliability of his information. Rear Admiral Davidson then stated that he was prepared to furnish naval gunfire support for the operation. General Clark stated that he proposed a drop of a battalion of parachutists in the aid of the operation. He also stated that the area in question was defended by 36 guns, 88mm caliber, manned by German naval personnel. Colonel Darcy, XII Air Support Command, stated that he could give air cover, that he was prepared this afternoon to hit Gaeta with 5 medium bomber squadrons and 2 squadrons of fighter bombers. He said standing high patrols would eliminate the rocket bomb menace. General Clark finally directed that studies be made, on #1 priority, of the Formio Beach and on #2 priority, of the beach just west of Gaeta. He also stated that he would furnish the navy with targets for harrassing naval gunfire. He observed that the Fifth Army staff and the staff of Admiral Morse and Admiral Davidson should maintain the closest contact at all times. Important messages of the day are as follows: From Clark to Hughes. RN 4108. "Reference Infantry Division Commander for United States, can unqualifiedly recommend General Eagles for that position.11 Personal to Alexander from Clark. RN 4097. "I foresee the probability of a landing operation consisting- of one RCT with two Hanger battalions in f I 1 �the Gaeta area in connection with attack of 10 and VI Corps outlined in our Operation Instructions #8. Estimate that it will require 9 days before final assault on corps objectives can be initiated. If Gaeta amphibious operation is to be effective and timely complete arrangements for its execution must be ready within 10 days. I have conferred with Admirals Morse and Davidson who are working out naval phase. Morse is making every effort to provide naval facilities needed. He has indication from CINC MSD that it will require 7 days to provide 7 LST 1 s needed. This length of time, added to that required by Morse, may cause me to miss opportunity 1 seek. I urgently request your assistance in expediting arrival in N aples of 7 6davit, LST 1 s with full complement of LCVP. It ap ~ears thatother naval facilities can be made · available in time. 11 From 15th Army Group to Commanding General, Fifth Arrey. RF TRG312. "Request approval visit of Major General Karl Truesdell and Lt. Col. Sethren to Fifth Army about November 1. Purpose of visit to obtain latest information on operational methods for incorporation in course of instruction at C&GS. 11 o,S- * * ,✓ ,t. * \ ('I' J vi· ~ ( NAPLES-CASERTA-OCTOBER 24, 1943-General Clark and Colonel Martin went on t ,.., ...,.. General Clark visited ,;: 9 11.l.C.. several hundred wounded men in the various wards. v ~ a tour of hospitals in the Naples and Caserta area. ,\ ' At 1000 the command post at Capodimonte was closed and the new comrr..and post at Caserta opened. General Clark's camp here was located on the vrounds of the Bourbon Palace. At 1400 General Clark conferred with General McCreery, Commanding the 10 Corps, and General Lucas, Comn;anding the VI Corps. He inquired of the two Corps Commanders when each would be ready to engage in a large scale attack for the next objectives, and each stated that his corps \ would be ready the morning of October 31st. General Clark directed that the attack occur on that date. General Clark then stated that he had determined to shift the boundary between the two corps to the west, giving to the VI Corps the easterly pa.rt of the hill mass at Boccamonafino which had formerly all been within the 10 Corps boundary. General Clark stated that the VI Corps attack would be three divisions abreast - the 34th, 3rd and 45th, from right to left. The 45th might go a few hours ahead of the other two. General McCreery stated that he would like naval support on the coast, and General Clark said that he had already asked Admiral Davidson to furnish this. General Mccreery observed that there were no British units in A amiral Davidson's forces, and, because of common procedure, it would be easier if the 10 Corps were working with British Naval forces. General Gruenther stated that he would try to have something o this sort arranged , and General Clark observed that the furnishing of naval forces was in the control of the CINC, Mediterranean. General Clark stated that once the inland attack was under way, he ;, ished to make an amphibious attack on the seacoast. General Clark then asked his corps commanders what time they proposed to start their attacks. General Lucas said they would like to start a little before daylight, and General McCreery at daylight. General Clark stated that he was recei ving some 4.5 1 s and would give a battalion and a group headquarters to General McCreery for his support in the coming attack. He also stated that he would do what was possible to get for General McCreery a mule company for use i n l �the hills, and replacements for his shortages of personnel. The following important messages were received and dispatched during the course of the day: Personal for Clark from Montgomery. RN U/6_16 . 11 27 October most convenient date. Suggest you arrive about 1200 hours and stay lu'ch. Am sending Chevasse to see you tomorrow, and he will advise you nearest lanoing ground." For Gruenther from Lemnitzer. RN 226. "Prince of Piedmont will be in Naples Monday, 25th. He is enroute to Sardinia. This message for information only, since no action required by you." CASERTA-OCTOBER 25, 1943-General Clark went to Navy House in l'aples at 0945, where he discussed the prospect of an amphibious landing with Admiral Morse, Admiral Davidson, General House, General Brann, General 0 1 Daniel, Captain Lewis, USN, Colonel Howard, Fifth Army G-2, and others. Admiral Morse stated to General Clark that an attack on the beach east of Gaeta, which was ~1 ) defended by a minefield requiring daylight sweeping and by a number of coastal batteries, was impractical from a naval point of view but that a landing might be possible west of Gaeta. General Clark then stated that with the resources now available to him he considered an attack west of Gaeta too far { from his present base to support. He stated that under the circumstances his only remaining course was to report the facts to the CINC. General Clark further explained that, according to our intelligence reports, a whole German Divi,ion was so located as to be able to defend the area west of Gaeta anc ~ had access to the beach by roads, whereas east of Gaeta a hill mass made it difficult for the enemy to bring up substantial forces. Accordingly, General Clark stated that he proposed to hold the LST 1 s, with which he hs.d hoped to make thelanding east of Gaeta, until the attack by the 10 and VI Corps should have progressed to a point where an attack west of Gaeta had become possible. General Clark then stated that General Mccreery was anxious to have naval support and asked whether there was any possibili~' of obtaining British naval cooperation. Admiral Davidson explained that he was planning a naval supporting operation in conjunction with General House who is helping in air observation. General Clark stated that he would send General Lm is to confer with General Davidson abou+ artillery fire and that General Brann would send to Ad-_ miral Davidson an analysis of the Fifth Army needs for naval support from a military point of view. ' After the conference closed, General Clark stated to Admiral Morse tha~ he was very disappoi.nted at thenaval report that the attack east of Gaeta was impracticable, as this appeared to him to be the first opportunity the Fifth Army had had to conuuct an amphibious operation against a relatively weak enemy force. · General Clark then proceeded Rector and members of the faculty Political Science. The Rector of expressed the appreciation of the city from the Germans and for the had done in restoring water to the University of Naples, where the conferred upon him the de ~~r of Doctor of the University made an address in which he people of Naples for the liberation of the work which General Clark and his forces food to the population. 0 t'i �\00 General Clark then responded briefly as follows: "I am deeply appreciative of the honor which the Royal University of Naples has today conferred upon me. I accept the degree with profound satisfaction, recognizing that it is a tribute to the entire Fifth Army and its British and American soldiers v ,hom I am proud to commanc.. "It is o great significance that you should choose to honor me, a soldier, with an academic degree symbolizing the pursuits o peace anct scholarship. I think this most appropriate, for the purpose which brought us to Italy was, in the last analysis, to restore exactly those traditional values of peaceful civilization for which your country has long been renowned . "The peoples of Great Britain and the United States did not seek this war, nor did the Fifth Army land at Salerno Bay with any desire to take Naples from its people. We ask only enough of your Italian soil to bury our gallant dead. They gave their lives to destroy German tyranny, anct to make it impossible that he Prussian beast can ever again setout to pillage and kill. When this has been done, when the arts of peac •c succeed to those of war and your fields and villages are happy again, I am confident that Italy will see a new renascence. And our army will be happy to have helped in bringing this about. God speed the day of our victory, for that will be the day of Italy 1 s peace." General Clark then returned to his command post where he had a conference with General Brann, General 0 1 Daniel, Colonel Howard and Lt. Col. Darby of the Rangers. At this meeting, possibilities of an amphibious operation west of Gaeta were discussed. General 0 1 Daniel pointed out that because of beach conditions an initial landing could be made only with foot troops and a few jeeps, but that possibly the succeeding night some artillery and heavier vehicles could be brought ashore. Colonel Darb\ pointed out that a daylight assault on Gaeta Point, with its medieval fortifications, would be extremely hazardous without artillery. General Clark answered that if the operation was successful the ground dominating Gaeta could be occupied and the point bombarded from the sea. Important messages for the day are as follows: For Gruenther from Lemnitzer. RN lOb. 11 Am coming over tomorrow, 26th, to discuss future plans with General Clark and you. Arriving Capodichi~o 0945, returning here same day. Request transportation meet me at airfield." For Gruenther from Lemni tzer. RN 120. "li.zy- arrival Capodichino delayed until 1030 because of important conference nere prior to departure." Personal for Action General Clark signed Eisenhower. RN 02%. "CINC French troops, General Giraud, is anxious to visit your headquarters, anc he will plan to leave here early Thursday morning, 28 October, and stop to see General Alexander in mid-afternoon. He would arrive your CP either late Thursday afternoon or morning of Friday, October 29th. Please advise urgently whether visit is convenient. 11 • From EisenhoY1er to Clark. RN 2183. "This message reports that 7 LST 1 s are on the way to Fifth Army. If the plan for the seaborne attack is definitely �\OI cancelled, it is requested that the 7 LST 1 s be returned for use in build-up of vehicles into Italy • 11 From Flag Officer, Western Italy to CINC, MED. i''1RN. "Operation planned for FOPJHA area is not practical from naval point of view and alternative at Sperlonga is not practical from Army point of view. Amphibious operations therefore temporarily off. Am however anxious that 6 davit LST I s anG. LSI should be so organised that they are at short call. Bombardment programme can be met by existing forces but CTF 86 intends to have second U. S. Cruiser at short call. Agreed CTF 86. CINC MED pass to COMNAVNAW. 11 * CASERTA-- OCTOBER 26, 1945--General Clark left his command post, accompanied by General Ridgway and Lt. Col. Sutherland, at 0745 by jeep and went to Vl Corps CP at Caiazzo. General Ridgway remained at Caiazzo to confer with General Truscott who was at that CP. General Clark, accompanied by General Lucas, drove north through Dragoni across the upper Volturno at Monte Margherita and drove through San Angelo d 1 Alife to the high ~round lying northward. Leaving his jeep, General Clark, with the officers accompanying him, climbed to the top of a mountain where they met General Ryder at his observation post where he was viewing the progress of the battle on the plains to the west. Heavy artillery fire from 34th Division batteries was being laid down on Monte San Nicola, and aerial bombardment was registering on the village of Pietravairano and points beyond the ridge where that village is situated. American infantry could be seen making its way forwaru across the flat ground northwesterly in the direction of Vairano. General Clark observed to General Lucas that the flat grourrl along the river was suitable for the employment of tanks and directed General Lucas to utilize the Shermans attached to his Corps to prosecute the attack. General Clark then returned to his command post and was later informed that the Shermans would be employed the following day. In the afternoon, General Clark conferred with General Basso of the Italian Arrrry, who had been Comn;ander-in-Chief in Sardinia and who had recently come to Naples to set up a Headquarters. In the evening, General Clark pointed out to Lt. Col. Sutherland, his aide, that he had been making a map study of the high ground lying to the north and south of Capriati and the flats to the west of that point across the Volturno in the neighborhood of Venafro. General Clark saia that he was seriously considering theuse of the 82nd Airborne Division and the American infantry of VI Corps to seize the hill masses north and south of Capriati and to make possible a crossing o the Volturno at that point by tanks. He would then be in a position to utilize the 1st Armored Division and other armored elements to attack southv1est through Venafro through the pass in the hills at San Pietro Infine, force a break through into the flat ground to the west of that point, thus completely turning the left flank of the Germans opposing the Fifth Army. He stated that he had directed that air photographs be made of the place in question to deter"ine definitely whether an armored operation could be effected at that point. Captain Hall, one of General Clark's Cub pilots, and Major Webster, �fatally injured. The following important messages were received and dispatched today: To CINC, AFHQ from Clark. RN 3790. "It will be entirely cor.ivenient for me to see General Giraud 011- 28th or ~9th. Please tell him that I am looking forward to his visit. Advise ETA." Personal for Clark from Montgomery. RN A222. "Regret Thursday not suitable as I am moving my headquarters on Friday. Suggest you postpone your visit till a later date. Chevasse has • olri me a..L:'.. :-om· plarn:: a n~ e ·~ven you my plans. There is, therefore, no great urgency for- a persor,al meeting. 11 To Alexander from Clark. RN 5809. "Shall be r-lad to receiv,,, Marshal Badoglio and five accompanying officers on Friday, 29th October. Shall arrange for party to be met 1030 hours at Capodichino airport Lnc transported to my headquarters. 11 To Alexander from Clark. RN 3825. 11 Attack by tird anc: 34th Divisions today has been successful. 3rd has three battalions on Mou t Nicola. 34th, three battalions in Pratella area. 3rd Division advance facilitated by strong air and artillery support. Attack continues tomorrow. 11 To CINC, AFHQ from Clark. RN 5792. "Seaborne operation planned for Formia cancelled yesterday because Navy considered it too hazarcous. Now studying possibility landing between Gaeta ancl Sperlonfa which Navy willing to undertake. This operation has many disadvantages. Impossible,; for me to decide now whether it should be mounted. Admiral Morse suggested that 7 LST be permitted to come loaded to Naples. Decision as to their further use will be made when they arrive. I must emphasize that op~ortunities for seaborne attack are often fleeting and suitable craft must be ava i lable at. proper time. Understand thoroughly importance of LST in Italy build-up. I shall see that unnecessary interruptions are avoided. You will be actviscd decision re 7 LST. 11 For Clark signed Eisenhower. RN 2546. "Major General Gerow and staff officer desire visit your area. Request concurrence of. 11 General Clark telegraphed General Montgomery to say that as Admiral Cunningham was coming to see General Clark October 27th, he woulc like to postpone his visit to General Montgomery to October 28th. RN 5811. * * * CASERTA-OCTOBER 27, 1945--General Clark went to the Bourbon Palace in Caserta where he addressed the newly arrived Fifth Army Officers, gathere~ for an orientation course. The General stresse0 the necessity for discipline in all Ar:rey operations. General Clark then went to Naples where he was entertained at lunch by Admiral Morse and Admiral Cunningham. General Clark then went to the Headquarters of the 82nd Airborne Divi- � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President. This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, September 24 - October 26, 1943 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from September 24-October 26, 1943. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1943 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1562 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/f5a9fe15be9f659eb41e0fd28f714a6d.pdf?Expires=1784764800&Signature=JAElAOfWjaFdfK-NUHHsVH9gIEwwdtJ61OeUiHmCO%7E%7EbXWsOi2APnBYYsYbqVP9V55pwN4LbZMgWvX50j8HkrPNFXlR6ymaHJaVFHH-243Mbj02uMzn1HBILG2xSyF-zbkqCbNbRjF5NurR1npJz07hyZNH4qvyOghFOrTs-iqZBJz3slNa5DuAHaDWQf0gr9X%7EFH9iGskMyUlFc6uJrnc38MhBjheA8TVoMP3kIvMD9rJNRY5BdcDNdkEyLVQTft7ZAUoW2z2rRrUA4BIH8tk%7EOe0MjJEa79SfQVhLETW9lL2mYQVLrVYQO-N1oLuQyHGnSelXVPV8jCTALylI-Ag__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 271c110ca7a4e1a107008a55ce5f2621 PDF Text Text fatally injured. The following important messages were received and dispatched today: To CINC, AFHQ from Clark. RN 3790. "It will be entirely cor.ivenient for me to see General Giraud 011- 28th or ~9th. Please tell him that I am looking forward to his visit. Advise ETA." Personal for Clark from Montgomery. RN A222. "Regret Thursday not suitable as I am moving my headquarters on Friday. Suggest you postpone your visit till a later date. Chevasse has • olri me a..L:'.. :-om· plarn:: a n~ e ·~ven you my plans. There is, therefore, no great urgency for- a persor,al meeting. 11 To Alexander from Clark. RN 5809. "Shall be r-lad to receiv,,, Marshal Badoglio and five accompanying officers on Friday, 29th October. Shall arrange for party to be met 1030 hours at Capodichino airport Lnc transported to my headquarters. 11 To Alexander from Clark. RN 3825. 11 Attack by tird anc: 34th Divisions today has been successful. 3rd has three battalions on Mou t Nicola. 34th, three battalions in Pratella area. 3rd Division advance facilitated by strong air and artillery support. Attack continues tomorrow. 11 To CINC, AFHQ from Clark. RN 5792. "Seaborne operation planned for Formia cancelled yesterday because Navy considered it too hazarcous. Now studying possibility landing between Gaeta ancl Sperlonfa which Navy willing to undertake. This operation has many disadvantages. Impossible,; for me to decide now whether it should be mounted. Admiral Morse suggested that 7 LST be permitted to come loaded to Naples. Decision as to their further use will be made when they arrive. I must emphasize that op~ortunities for seaborne attack are often fleeting and suitable craft must be ava i lable at. proper time. Understand thoroughly importance of LST in Italy build-up. I shall see that unnecessary interruptions are avoided. You will be actviscd decision re 7 LST. 11 For Clark signed Eisenhower. RN 2546. "Major General Gerow and staff officer desire visit your area. Request concurrence of. 11 General Clark telegraphed General Montgomery to say that as Admiral Cunningham was coming to see General Clark October 27th, he woulc like to postpone his visit to General Montgomery to October 28th. RN 5811. * * * CASERTA-OCTOBER 27, 1945--General Clark went to the Bourbon Palace in Caserta where he addressed the newly arrived Fifth Army Officers, gathere~ for an orientation course. The General stresse0 the necessity for discipline in all Ar:rey operations. General Clark then went to Naples where he was entertained at lunch by Admiral Morse and Admiral Cunningham. General Clark then went to the Headquarters of the 82nd Airborne Divi- �lo3 sion and conferred with General Ridgway, the Division Commander. Among other matters they discussed the employment of 1 RCT of the 82nd Division as mountain troops on the extreme right of the Arm_v. Thereafter, he inspected the Red Cross installations in Naples . General Clark today issued Operations Instruction #9, changing the corps boundary to give Conca and Mazerta Important messages for the day are as follows: to VI Corps . For Clark signed. Eisenhower. RN 2846. "Visit of General Girauct will be on 28th. ETA 1430 hours. Accompanied by Lt . Col . Dostert, Cornma.noant Roulet and his aide, Captain V iret." To House from Spaatz. #146 . "General Somervell, accompanied by Generals Gross, Echols, Cl ay, Robinson, Stuart, Larkin ana two colonels will arrive Capodichino airport at 0900 local time , Thursday October 28. Party will leave Naples daylight 29 October. " From Eisenhower to MacFarlane. RN #2779. "Status of action in compliance with letter of this Headquarters subject; "Employment of Italian Forces," dated 9 of October 1943, requested, this action must be expedited. You will direct the Italian Government to proceed with the formation of a Division for employment in combat . This division will be organized as mountain troops insofar as possible and preferably be organized about the regiment which has been allocated already to the Fifth Army, but may, if there are compelling reasons therefor , be additional thereto . 11 * * CASERTA-- OCTOBER 28, 1945-- General Clark called a conference with his Chief of Staff, General 0 1 Daniel and Colonel Howard at 0850. He explained that he had determined on an amphibious landing immediately north of Mount Massico by a reinforced battalion of infantry with two Ranger battalions and possibly parachutists. He explained that the Germans were obtaining supplies by using a tunnel through Mount Massico, and that he wishect naval funfire to be used to obstruct the north entrance to the tunnel. He asked Gen8ral 0 1 Daniel what his estimate of shipping would be. General 0 1 Daniel said 2 LSI and 12 LST 1 s wereavailable and that plans were being made to execute tm operation 72 hours from the time of the conference. General Clark then directed that representatives of the British and American Navies be sent for to discuss the operation from the naval point of view. At 0930 Lt . Comdr. Austin, RP . , of Admiral Morse's staff, and Captain Lewis, USN, arrived and conferred further with General Clark and the Chief of Staff . Both naval officers agreed that the operation in question was feasible at the point described and undertook to make all the necessary preparations to get the ships and sweep any obstructing mines. General Clark directed that the operation take place on the night of October 31st - November 1st and that General 0 1 Daniel command the amphibious force which should consist of one battalion of reinforced infantry plus two Ranger battalions. General Clark received General Giraud and several of his and, after a discussion of the problems facing the Fifth Army vance towardRome, General Clark sent Brigadier Richardson and aide, Captain Lampson, to accompany General Giraud on a visit Corps front . staff officers in its adhis British to the 10 �General Clark then received Mr. Robert Murphy, U.S. Minister, and Mr. Harold McMillan, British Minister, with Mr. Makins, Mr. McMillan's ass.1.stant, and discussed with them the diplomatic aspects of the Italian armistice anct Marshal Bactoglio 1 s government. General Clark then received Lieut. Gen. Somervell, Major Generals Gross, Clay and Larkin, Brigadier Generals Robinson, Stuart and Pence, Colonels Case and Lastayo, with Captain Martin, General Somervell's aide, and discussed the port and supply problems affecting the Fifth Arll\Y. He then discussed with Major General Echols and General House the possibilities of future air operations in aid of the Fifth Army advance. General Clark, accompanied by Brigadier General Moran, then inspected the Fifth Army signal installati ons. Late in the afternoon, General Clark received Lt. Gen. r.;:ason MacFarlane, Governor of Gibraltar, who is representing the British Government in negotiations with Marshal Badoglio. The following important messages were received and dispatched today: General Alexander, by radio, stated that w eather prevented his arrival today, but that he would perhaps arrive October 29th. Marshal Badoglio, by radio, announced that he v,ould arrive with five of his officers at Capoctichino airport at 1030 tomorrow. From Eisenhm,er to 15th Army Group, information Fifth Army. RN ~452. "l. Prepare 82nd Airborne Division, less one regimental combat team, airborne artillery battalion v ith two batteries, 899th TD Battalion and elements of 81'.''th TD Battalion in Italy for overseas movement.in accordance with schedule to be furnished by G-4 (Movements and Transportation) AFHQ. 2. 82nc Airborne Di vision only will move fully equipped. All units will coordinate with C/S, SOS, NATOUSA. The transfer of equipment necessary to comply with the V1ar Department secret letter, 20 September 1943, Subject, "Inter-theater movement of Certain Units. 11 3. Administrative details, reference paragraphs 1 and 2 above, will be furnished in near future." Incoming cable #935 from 15th Army Group requested information whether Fifth Army could release 82nd Airborne Division, less 1 PCT, in time to embark 26th November-. General Clark directed the reply, "Yes 11 • Personal from Alexander to Clark . MA706. "Will come to your Headquarters by road tomorrow, 29 October. Expect to arrive about 15t• hours and to O stay possibly two nights. I shall bring Lemnitzer with me. Party totals three." Personal for Lemnitzer from Clark. #Z215. "In connection my request for two mule groups from Sardinia, General Stewart believes shipping can be provided without difficulty." For Clark from Ma.cFarlane. #657. "General Mason MacFarlane will arrive Capodichino airport 1550 hours 28 October in C-47. Request he be met." * * �, , .r. ~~~ I l oS (;) \-.1.(P.. i.('\l'~;\oJ" ~0 1( CASERTA-OCTOBER 29, 1943-General Clark received General Giraud early in~ ~ -)/ the morning and conferred with him at leneth upon the proposed employment ,r: of the French troops which are shortly expected to join the Fifth Army in-'_,..a ,/✓ Italy. ~ ,"Y" r ~~t":") ;> (; ~ At approximately 1000, General Clark provided cars, with Lieutenant"~ " Colonel Sutherland for a guide, and General Giraud, with his staff offi- . s / ,. cers, by that means went to VI Corps Headquarters where he examined the ~ ~ situation map. He then went on to 34th Division CP and examined the 34th Y Division situation map and then went forward to an observation post near {"I) Ailano, where General Giraud viewed the terrain over which the 3rd and .r ./' 34th Divisions v1ere attacking. '} : v':I J? . j'~ :/J ,-r" General Giraud then returned to the CP and left for a tour of the ~"<"A / Naples docks. General Alexander arrived in the afternoon and had a con- ,\ ,, / ference with General Clark about the general situation of the Eighth and 1'~.j ' & , .J Fifth Armies. (/' c.., ... c.·',.t I~ ,'}. Jr , . ' , l" y,·r. , }J..- v' OP"'"\ Important messages for the day are as folloTis: '\. S'- .r .)'G- From Eighth Army Main to Fifth Army Main. RN 1136. "Cositrep /'5 7 /"({ / 1200 hours. Five Corps. Rain anc. bad visibility have hampered opera- J -c;r" v.tions during the last 24 hours. No major change on either Division front. -r'o~11. / 13 Corps. 1 Cdn Division. Relief 2 Cdn Brigade complete and brigades now •~ ~~t concentrating in the area west and northwest of Vinchiaturo aid Campobasso. o'' 4 Cdn Reece patrolling North. 5 Division. 15 Bri~ade concentrated in , r ..If' area SAN GIULIANO H 5317 with 1 Battalion BHJANO and patrols in San Massimo C ~¥ H 04.21. Forward troops 17 BrigaCle on point l.'.)~3/H '.35[1 anc: patrolling con- o ,,,., "-" tinues West from SPIHETF. Air. Day 28/29. Spitfires searched P0P0LI - 0 G \'.,'< AQUILA area for rail movement and covered thP coast north of T:SRMOLI for ~ I~ enemy shipping but bad weather hampered operations. Two pilots have not ~ ~ yet returned. All informed. 11 _,v i 9 ,.r: •✓ r \0 1V' F Or Gruenther from Whiteley. would like to stay the night." RN 1144. 11 ->t. ..Y' I .Arriving PM 30 October and ~ r,. v C- V ..> f"' ,,. -r0 vf'- ? Cable f '3883 directs that 36th Division be assigned to II Corps. 0:i..r"" •,,/' • 1"'fl' ~/ •· •,f ,, P• Naval message to Commander-in-Chief', Mediterranean, and. N.L.O. l.Sth ~,..i ")>-~ Army Group from FOWIT. "landing ship and craft required Naples area as IJt t V (\ v.,.,soon as possible for Mondragone landing: 2 LSI V 5, 6-Davit LST with craft 20 LCT - can be found locally Supporting forces - 1 Cruiser, 2 Destroyers, Nubian, Flores, 6 PC boats. CTF 86 as Force Commander, Snow in command of landing. Request sailing im.rnediately. Preliminary investigation show landine practicable." �The casualty report as of October 29th shows: U.S. Y'ounaed, ::i, 664; Missing, 2,317; Killed, 1,087; and British Wounded, 5,063; Missing, 2,491; Killed, 1,213. * * * CASERTA-OCTOBER 30, 1943--General Alexander and General Lemnitzer, accompanied by General Clark's British aide, Captain Lampson, visited the 10 Corps front. General Clark went to VI Corps, where he cori.ferred with General Lucas. From that point, he went on to 3rd Division, where he conferred with General Truscott. He then went on to Pietrovairano and crossed the ridge at that point to an observation post, where he watched the progress of the 3rd Division attack along the upper Volturno. He was joined at that 1-'oint by General Alexander and General Lucas. After viewing the situation for a time, General Clark returned to his command post, where he rece~veo Marshal Badoglio and conferred with him about the Italian participation in the war. Thereafter, General Clark received General Whiteley anct conferred with him and the Chief of Staff, General Gruenther. General Whiteley remainea for dinner. Important messages of the day are quoted below: To Eisenhower for Murphy and MacMillan from MacFarlane signed Clark. #4252. "Badoglio reached Naples this morning after your departure and was keenly disappointed that he did not have the opportunity of discussing the terms of his reply to Bonomi with you. He still urges that he be riven some expression of Allied support which will enable him to hold the six parties in Rome and the liberal elements in line and prevent them from forming an opposition government at least until Rome is reached. We are persuacting him to delay the preparation of an answer until after his return to Brindisi in one or two days time and will endeavor to induce him not to use the arpument of foreign support. In case this fails, however, we shall require very urgent instructions as to what he may say in regard to the Allied position. In his press conference today, he publically reiterated his intention to stand by the King until the country is freea. He has also informed us in writing that any changes such as proposed by Sforza and Croce cannot fail to have a widespread and discordant echo in the country, especially in the Armed Forces and because so large a pa.rt of Italy can not now express i ts opinion. 11 For Eisenhower from MacFarlane signed Clark. #4253. 11 Badoglio failed to arrive Naples yesterday so I went back to Brindisi and brought him here today. He held Allied press conference on arrival. He had some awkward questions to answer in spite of my seeing the press here yesterday. He did not do as well as at his Brindisi conference. I will report progress as regards his political endeavors tomorrow, and I may return Brinuisi tomorrow afternoon. Caccia and Riber staying here with me. 11 The following copies of papers were received from Admiral Morse (FO\HT). Directive from Admiral Morse to Rear Admiral L.A. Davidson, United States Navy. 11 1. It has been decided to carry out a landing in the Mondragone area. �107 11 2. At any t ime from November 1 , 1943 . 11 5. For ces required : 5 - 6- Davit LST 1 s 2 - LSI(M) 6 - PC Boats A many LCG, LCF and LCT (R) as can be made available. s 20 LCT will be provided locally. 11 4 . H. M S . Nubian and H. M. S. Fl ores and submarines will be placect unaer . your command, and it is hoped you will be able to make available one cruiser and the requisite number of destroyers required for supporting fire . 11 5. You are appointed as Force Commander and will have SNOAL (W) to command the landing . 116 . In conjunction with the Fifth Army and the XII Air Support Group, you are requested to plan and execute this operation, informing me as soon as possible of : ~- Any additional forces to the above you consider necessary to go with what minesweeping operations you require . !2_. Your proposed outline plan . 11 Cable from FOWIT t o crnc, Mectiterranean "Amphibious operat ion to land one RCT in M ondragone area. First 1:'ossible D11 day , M onday , November 1st . Require following ships and landing craft in N ples area as soon as possible . a 11 2 LSI 5 6-Davit LST with er ft 20 LCT (LCT can be found locally) Supporting forces require one cruiser, two destroyers (Nubian, Flores) and 6 PC Boats "Int end CTF 86 as Force Commam' er , with SNOAL (W) in command of lanc.. ine: . Request LSI , LST, PC boats , LCG, LCT (R) s and LCT be sailer' for Naples forthwith . Preliminary investigation shows landing practicable ." Cable from FOVHT t o NOIO NAPLES "B" SQU ADRON COR SOP.A 11 12 U.S. LCT and 8 British LCT are to be prepared and ready for operational service by noon Saturday, 30th . These craft will be placer unrer orders of SNOAL (W) f rom that date . 11 Intelligence on Beach North of Mondragone 11 The beach selected lies northwest and southeast of the forke d roar:s at 878820 , where there is a conspicuous white tower, and is r1 ivirled i nto two halves of 1,000 yards each, knot'n as Red anc G .:r resp0ctiveJ.:r. Width vare r i es from 4.0 to SO ~ far's. �"2. AveragP chc.rted underwater e:radient varies between 1 : 80 anci 1 :100, and there is evidence of false beaches which are almost certa ;_nlJr irreP"ular and unstable about 125 to 250 yarcs off shore. The false beaches appear to tail off at the southeast end of Green Beach. Without actual recor:naissance, it is impossible to determine accurately the amount of water above the sandbars, but it is estimated that there should be at least~ to 5 foot at the inner bar and more at the outer. 11 5. A strong southwest wind will cause a surf and make landini:'. operations difficult. 11 4. Except for the minefields, approach is clear from southwest. The peak of Rocca di Mondragone, 1,300 feet surmounted by a ruined fortress, should be conspicuous, also thEl tov~n (and tov1er) of Monc.ragone two miles to the south . 11 5. The beach is composed of soft sand, backed by low sand• cunes. A road on a slight embankment runs along the back of the beach at a distance of from 150 yards at the southeast end to 400 yards at the northwest end. It should be possible to force exit through the dunes direct or to the roan, in addition to using about four tracks which lead from the beach. "6. CONCLUSIONS: .!!!:.• Suitable for LCA 1 s, LCM 1 s and poss~bly LCI and LCT IV. unsuitable for LST 1 s. Probably £• Probably dangerous in other than calm weather. £_. A reconnaissance is desirable to ascertain depth of water. £• Minefields, unless swept, will cause the approach course to be parallel and close to the coast. 11 Directive to Rear Admiral L.A. Davidson, United States Navy From Admiral Morse. "l. Fifth Army have rPouested that a naval bombardment be carried out as a diversion to a forthcoming attack. "2. One bombardment is required from 1530 on D-1 day, lastinr for about two hours, and another commencing at H hour on D day, lasting for about two -1 hours. It will be dark at H-1 hours. 11 3. The targets on which fire is required are: .!!!:_. h_. c. Road between 915801 and 877820 . Road between 876840 and Piedimonte Massiana (9187). Coast road north of Mondragone (9079). 4. The follovling forces are placed at your disposal for use in conjunction with the United States naval forces under your command, and you are appointed Force Commander: 11 �l09 H. * H. H. M s. NUB IAN . M s. LOOKOUT . N. M s. FLORES . E~Ti ,, British" M0'$ff,, Si~Rta 6 - - 4.7 3 - 6.0 6 · ·Max . Range inch .Max. Range - 16,000 - 20,000 inch Max . Range - 26,000 yds. 4 . 7 inch , yds . ycts . *Depending on date of operation. 5. Fifth Army have agreed that all arrangements for the operation should be made direct with the General Officer Commanding 10 Corps. 11 6 . It is requested that , in conjunction with the General Officer Commanding 10 Corps, XII Air Support Command and the Air Officer Commanding Coastal Air Force, you will plan and execute this operation and issue the necessary orders. " 11 From MacFarlane to AFHQ . RN 682. "Except for some pack elements in Sardinia, pack units Italian ArJriY are organic part of tactical units, that is battalion or battery . There are no Army or Corps pack units. Italians have been requested to furnish list of pack elements v, i th each unit. Is this correct interpretation your request? Suggest that CN Hellano mission can proviQe useful information on general questions of Italian organ~zation. " Personal for Clark from Richardson . RN 580 . "Marshal Badoglio and a party of three arrive in Naples by car about 1930 hours 30 October. Please inform Duke D1 Aosta I, General Pavona and prefects of Naple~. Latter shoula provide accomodation for party . 11 From CG, NATOUSA to Clark. RN 4348 . "A French cavalry regiment w:.11 be shipped, #2121 Q priority list 4, if shipping can be arranged. Liberty ships unsuitable for animal carriers as they can not be properly cleaned up and thereafter would have to be used for carrying only tinned products to avoid tainting. Investigation of the use of LST 1 s for carrying animals if proper animal transports can not be found from MEABSHIPPII'G(?) pool. Will keep you informed of plans." * CASERTA--OCTOBER 51, 1943-General Cle.rk left his Headquarters at 0830 ana drove to 10 Corps TAC where he conferred with General Whiteley and General M cCreery. From there he proceeded to the 56th Division CP, and on the way met General Templar who stated that the 56th had made a successful advance during the preceding 24 hours and captured 103 prisoners, of whom 4 were officers and had killed a like number at least. General Clark then went on to the 46th Division CP, conferred briefly with the Chief of Staff and then went on to the TAC Headquarters of the 7th Armorea. Division near Mondragone. From this position he went forward to the TAC CP of the 151st Brigade and discussea. with the Brigade Commanaer, Brigadier Whistler, the situation of the Brigade. General Clark then returned to his CP, had lunch and left again for the 45th Division CP. There he conferred with General Middleton, who had just moved his command post to a point a short distance west of Alife. He then proceected on �\ I0 to the Headquarters of the 34th Division, which was locatea just south of San Angelo to the north of the road running west of Alif e. Here he conferred with the Division Commander about the progress of their attack to the northwest and then returned to his command post, having been on the road about nine hours. General Clark directed that the proposed amphibious operation immediately to the northwest of Monte Massico not be mounted for the reason that the advance of the VI Corps on the north was so threatening the German right flank that they would be obliged, within a few days, to withdraw from Massico Ridge north to the Garigliano River. For that reason, he deemed the expenditure of effort and the use of craft unjust i fied and unnecessary. j A_ \ Important messages of the day are as follows: From Freedom to 15th Army Group. mi FHGCT/KCC 4514. 11 9 Infantry Division will return to U"/. as arranged in MKDP251A. ~. Firures as requested in above cable will, however, be forwardea." I From CINC to Fifth Army. NP..N. "Captain Sylvan and Lt. Gen. Hodges arrive Naples November 3rd reference our 1597, October 2::Srct. ETA and lancting field to follow." * * * CASER.TA--NOVEMBER 1, 1943--General Clark, accompanied by his aide, Captain Thrasher, left the command post about 1500. He proceeded northwest from Capua on Route #6 to its junction with the road leading northeast to Pietravairano, and thence continued on, crossing the upper Volturno at a newly erected bridge at Ponte di Raviscanina and so visiting the 34th Divisi on CP. He found the regiments of this division making excellent progress in capturing the high ground dominating the large bend of the VoJ.turno. Returning to his CP, General Clark conferred with Brigadier Genera~ babney Elliott, Chief Engineer, AFHC;, concerning the engineering problems of the Fifth Army, with particular reference to brio.ges. General .;;11iott stated that phased estimates had been maae of the requirements of bridP.' i nF as far as the Po Valley; that approximately 1,000 bridges would be required for the entire advance by the 15th Army Group to that point. ~fany of these bridges would have to come in from the United States. In the meantime, sufficient bridges were in the theater for the advance as far as Rome. General Clark asked whether the Bailey Bridges made in England were completely mterchangeable with those made in the United States. General Elliott answerea that he understood the only difference was that a separate type of wrench was required for the American Bailey bridge. On the arrival of the first American Bailey he proposed to attempt to use it in connection w1.th the British bridge, in order to see if the two could go together. Important messages for the day are as follows: From AFHQ to CG, Fifth Army. RJ\T 4961. "With reference to your 53€, dated 30 '1ctober, the 82nd Airborne Division (less one RCT anc. one airborne artillery battalion of two batteries will move on or about November 18 from �\l\ Naples for UK. 11 Memorandum from General House to General Clark: "l. There was continuous cover from 1~30 hours to 1725 hours in the area H-1609 to H-1614. At approximately 1500 hours, we engaged enemy fighter bombers in that area and claim one probable and one damaged. No other contacts were made. "2. The 1500 hpur show was relatively high, since it was picked up by our Radar and an extra unit was scrambled to meet it. Any other raids, however, were apparently of the low, sneak type. "5. The freedom of the Fifth Army from air attack during this entire campaign is almost unbelievable, in fact, it has been so good that full credit for same to this command is embarrass.mg. We feel rather that in spite of putting forth our best efforts, the small air force against us, if properly handled, could cause us much more damage and worry. 11 4. We will continue to put forth our best efforts to protect the Fifth Army from air attack. 11 CASERTA--NOVEMBER 2, 1940-General Clark conferred with his Chief of Staff and his G-~ concerning the present operations and the future employment of the II Corps. The 504th on the Army right. flank had occupied the heights surrounding San Agapito. The 34th Division v,as well up on the high e;rourid overlooking the valley which runs northwest from Capriati. The ~rd Division hact reached Presenzano. The 56th was well beyond Teano. The 1•6th was occupying Roccamonfina and advancing up the hill of Monte Di Croce, whilE the 7th Armored Division had pushed reconnaissance patrols northeast of !.'Ionte Massico to within a mile and a half of the river Garigliano, close to its mouth. General Clark stated that as soon as the next phase line was reachea, he proposed to send the II Corps, composed of the 3rci anQ 06th Divis.::.ons anu Corps troops, between the VI Corps, on the right, and the 10 Corps, on the left, debouching from the hills to the west of iHvnano and pres sine Porthwesterly in the direction of Cassino. This was to be, in substance, a holclng attack, the 36th Division to make the major effort on the II Corps rirht, the 3rd Division to be held ready to exploit the success of the 36th. The British 10 Corps was, likewise, to keep up the pressure on the south. The VI Corps was to continue its wide envelopment on the right flank of the Army, pressing forward along the ridges on the right of the Fifth Army sector and thereby ultimately forcing a withdrawal of the Germans from the low vroun6 to the southward. General Clark directed that drafts of the Operations Instructions for the operation just described be immediately sent to his Corps Commanaers for comment. In t.he afternoon, General Clark, with Lt. Col. Sutherland, left his CP and proceeded to Capua, thence north to the new CP of the ~rd Division which �.. >•,·••,.Y-11'§ . E'q'ua1s -~ Brttt$(i''.':,'.~CSlf _.{Sf2@R'&l~~·- was located immediately to the south of the hill of Patenora . After conferring with the Division Comm.ancier about the proposed operation discussed above, he drove north to the vicinity of Tavernole and then northwest to the outskirts of the villaf,e of Presenzano. It was there reported that Presenzano was occupied by advance elements of the 15th Infantry, and the 7th Infantry was occupying part of the villageof Tora. The roact beyond the point reached by General Clark had not yet been cleared of mines, and shortly before his arrival the road between Presenzano and Tora had been under enemy shell fire. Four enemy tanks were said to be dug in along Highway #6 , just north of Taverna San Felice, searching the roads for traffic. After viewing the situation and discussing it with the executive officer of the 601st TD Battalion, which was acting as a right flank euard of the 3rd Div~sion, General Clark re-entered his jeep and returned to his command post. Important messages of the day are quoted below: From General Clark to General MacFarlane . RN 4292. "Request that the advance elements of an Italian motorized brigad~ arrive at Avellino about November 8th. 11 General Clark received the following letter from General MontgOlllery today: "I hope all goes well with you. 11 My left Corps (13 Corps) is pushing on to Isernia. "My right Corps (5 Corps) attacked across the Trigno river last nip-ht with its left Division and is now well established over the river. Its right Division (78th Division) puts in a strong attack tonight across the Trigno on the coast axis directed on S. Salvo - Vasta - Cupello; if this succeeds we will have cut the northern end of the lateral Vasta - lsernia . "Chavasse will give you my further intentions. able to bring me back all your news . And I hope he will be "Good luck to you." General Clark directed the following reply to General Montgomery: "Your aide has delivered your note written today. I appreciate hearing of your situation. I am glad to know that you aremaking such good progress on your left flank and that you will soon arrive at Isernia. "My situation is as follows: In the VI Corps, the 34th Division is along the Volturno River, northwest of Capriati. The 45th Division is moving up west of theVolturno in the direction of Vena.fro. These two divisions will make a coordinated attack on the Venafro position day after tomorrow. An airborne regimental combat team is on the right flank of the 34th Division and should cut the main road leading southwest from I sernia by tomorrow. The 3rd Division is advancing on Mignano from both the south and southeast. Its leading elements are about three miles south of the town. 10 Corps, on the �\ l3 west, is occupying the high ground west of Teano. They should soon readily clear up the situation to the Garigliano River. So, you see, the situation is going fairly well here. "I am issuing new instructions for an attack on the mountain mass northwest of Cassino; that terrain to be seized by a VI Corps envelopment from the east. "Am glad things are going so well on your front. 11 * * * CASERTA--NOVEMBER 3, 1943-•Today the following officers arrived to visit General Clark and to obtain information as to operations in this theater in aid of future operations in the ETO: Lieutenant General Hodges, Commanding the Third Army; Major Generals Gerow and Gerhardt, Colonel Henion and Captain Sylvane, aide to Lieutenant General Hodges. General Clark conferred with these officers and took General Hodges to visit the Jr<l Division and the 56th Division command posts. By direction of General Clark, the following operations were launched during the night, November 3-4. The 504th Combat Team of the 82nd Airborne Division attacked northwesterly from its position near San Agnpito to seize the high ground in the vicinity of Fornelli. The 34th Division attacked across the Volturno to seize as its first objective the high ground at Santa Maria Oliveto and then to push on, as its second objective, to the high ground north of Montaquila. The 4th Ranger Battalion was assigned the mission of seizing the high ground west of Vallecupa~ The 45th Division had, as j_ts mission, to seize Mount San Croce, north of Venafro and then to proceed, as its second objective, to take the high ground at Cardito and Acqua Fondala. The 3rd Division had, as its mission, to seize the heights around San Vittore. The 10 Corps was to continue its advance to the River Garigliano within its sector and to arrive at that line by daylieht, November 5. At 2315 tonight, a patrol of the 504th Parachute Regiment entered Isernia and found it empty of civilians and troops. This occasioned a good deal of interest, as the Eighth Army had been heading for Isernia for some time. Eighth Army troops entered the town three hours and 15 minutes later. The attainment of these objectives would bring the Fifth Army to its next phase line. Lieutenant General Hodges, General Gerow, General G~rhardt, Lt. Col. Henion were guests of General Clark for dinner this evening. An j . mportant message today was as . ollows: f From Clark to 10 Corps and II Corps. RN 3341. 11 (1) II Corps will move 36th Division and Corps troops into following concentration area, beginning not before evening 4 November 1943: East of High,vay #7, north of River Volturno south of gridline 89 - west of existing boundary between VI Corps and 10 Corps. (2) 10 Corps units still in this area may remain temporarily, but should be moved out during the next two or three days. (3) 10 Corps will give II Corps any available inforlll8tion as to loc::1ted or suspected enemy mines and booby traps remaini.ng in this area. (4) 36th Division will approach area via Caivano Caserta - Triflisco bridge. arrangements will be made with traffic control. n · �114 CASERTA--NOVEMB'ER 4, 1943--Generel Clark, accompanied by Generals Hodges, Gerow and Gerhardt and Colonel Henion, left by jeep and went up to Headquarters VI Corps at Dragoni, where the Genernls went over, with General Lucas, the Corps Commander, the progress of the present attack. General Lucas reported that the attack was progre~sing favorably and that all elements were appro~ching their objectives, although the phase line assigned had not yet been reached. The 504th had sent a patrol in the region of Isernia. The 34th had crossed the Volturno in considerable strength. The 45th vms arpror_cMng Venafro, and the 3rd Division was prozyessing tovmrds jts objective. Gener:,l Clark then left, "dth General I odges, ~nd nroceeded to the 45th Dision CP where he reviewed t.he situ~tion ,,rith the Division Cormmmder [)nrl then vrent on to the 34th Division GP at Frata, where he went over the situation \Vi th the Assistant Division Commander. General Fodges remained at the 34th Division GP, and General Clark returned by jeep across the newly built pontoon bridge at Ponte di Raviscanina through Pietravairano and back to the GP by Route #6. There he was jnformed by a dispatch from the 45th Division that K Company of the 179th had entered Venafro at 12:45. vj At his CP, General ClArk had lunch with Lieutenant General Richardson, Chief of Sta.ff of the 15th Army Group. General Richardson asked General Clark to attend a conference with General Alexander at General Alexander's GP on Monday, November 8th. General Clark discussed with General Richardson the next phase of the Fifth Army's operations which he proposed to launch as soon as the present phase line prescribed by Operations Instruction #8 of 20 October should have been attained. General Clark stated that the Fifth Army would not pause for rest at that point, but would press forward at once - three corps abreast VI on the rieht, II in the middle and X on the left. The object of this operation was to continue the turning of the Germans' left flank and the occupation of the hieh ground on the right of the Fifth Army line. The directive for this operation was issued on November 4, 1943 as Operations Instruction #9. It ordered that the objective of the VI Corps, made up or the 34th and 45th Divisions, 504th Parachute Regiment and 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions, and II Corps, made up of the 3rd and 36th Divisions, be the large hill mass running from Cassino, on the southeast, up to Casalattico on the northwest and bounded on the northeast by the road running through Belmonte and, southwest, by Piedimonte, Castrocielo Roccaseoca. This objective was divided between the corps by a line running from the junction of the Secca River with the Rapido River up to the village of Terelle, and thence running westerly to a point just south of Roccasecca. This aITangement gave the northerly, And slight• ly larger, portion of the objective to the VI Corps and the southerly remainder to the II Corps. The 10 Corps was to keep up the pressure along the line of the lower Garigliano and be prepared to force a crossing of the river. The.attack was to be launched as soon as the Army should have reached the preceding phase line laid down in Operations Instruction #8. Progress toward the attainment or this phase line, which was the objective of the operations of November 3, 4 and 5, is now being made. General Richardson stated that the estimate of the 15th Army Group Intelligence was that the Germans would attempt to establish a "winter line" in the �hills to the west of the Garigliano and north and a little east of Cassino and , that a heavy attack in considerable force would be necessary to break through it. He further stated that the Army Group Commander felt that the advance to Rome would be slow and costly unless the necessary naval support for amphibious operations were forthcoming and stated that conceivably it might be necessary for the 15th A:rrny Group to hold their present positions rather than attempt to take Rome without the necessary naval support. General Clark stated unequivocally that the Fifth Army was prepared to continue its advance upon and to take ~ A Rome regardless of naval support, although he recognized the great advantage to v ✓ be derived from amphibious operations. J 'l t1 V' \" 7 ~ ,.. General Clark further stated that, in his opinion, by determined effort the war could be won in this theater. General Richardson said that he agreed and that the Balkan situation could be exploited to great advantage from the po- ) sitions gained in Italy if only sufficient naval and land forces could be made available. General Richardson further stated that 15th Army Group intended to issue orders to the Eighth Army to advance on Rome. General Clark asked whether this meant that Eighth Army was intended to take Rome. General Richardson said , that of course they were not able to· do that. General Clark repeated that the J, Fifth Army was able to do it and intended to do so. /( I On November 3rd, Fifth Army G-2 had reported considerable.motor movement behind the German lines and estimated that an additional division had come in. This estimate was confirmed today when the 34th Division captured prisoners belonging to the German 305th Division. In addition, the presence of another German Division, the 94th, opposite the Fifth Army, was verified. General Clark received the CINC, MED, Admiral Cunningham, together with Lieutenant General Sir Humphrey Gale, Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ; Lieutenant General Georges. Patton, Jr., Commanding General, Seventh Army; Major General Nicol, Chief Signal Officer, AFHQ; Rear Admiral Morse, Flag Officer, Western Italy; Major General Ridgway, Commanding the g2nd Airborne Division; Brigadier General Pence, Commanding the Peninsular Base Section. General Clark had a private discussion with Admiral Cunningham. Admiral Cunningham said that he understood that General Clark was dissatisfied with the naval situation, and particularly with the cooperation of the navy in proposed amphibious operations. General Clark said frankly that this was so; that he \ did not lay this at the feet of Admiral Morse, but felt that Admiral Davidson of the American Navy had not, in this matter, shown as much enterprise as he might have. Admiral Cunnineham said that he thought th~t amphibious operations farther up the west coast were practicable and that the crnft would be available for them. He asked General Clark what the General thought of Admiral Lowry as ~aval Commander jn such operations. General Clark said that he thought he \vould do admirably, and Admiral Cunnin~hrim said thct he intended to put Mm in charge. The Admiral asked General Clark where the rlanning should be done for such operations, and Genernl Clark replied that it should be done r:ieht here at Fifth Arny Headquarters. Important messages received anc dispatched today are as follows: The press communique for today: �"On the northern sector of Ei~hth Army front heavy fighting took place in area of San Sa.lvo. Enemy used tanks a.nd fought strongly in his endeavor to block our advance to the northwest. Elsewhere good progress was made. Further crossings over River Trigno were established. Castel Petra.so was captured. "Satisfactory advances were made by troops of the Fifth Army. In the western coastal sector the important Monte Massico feature was captured and our troops astride the main road near Sessa Aurunca. Further north more commanding heights were taken and the enemy forced westwards. In addition to taking Sessa. Aurunca, our troops hold Roccamonfina and Presenzano." Personal to Alexander from Clark. RN 4.356. "Progress VI Corps coordinated attack today most gratifying. 34th Division has eight battelions across Volturno. 45th Division captured Vena.fro • .3rd Divjsion occupies Mt. Cessima and has one battalion vicinity Campozillone. Ranger Battalion two kilometres southwest San Pietro. 10 Corps patrols making good progress northwest of Mt. ~assico and Mt. Mattone. 504th Parachute infantry patrols entered Isernia today. They reported town unoccupied." From 15th Army Group to Fifth Army PRO for Phillips. RN 4410. "General McClure arrjving Naples by courier plane 1600 hours 5 November. Request you meet him." From VI Corps to CG, Fifth Army. RN NIL. "G-2 Sitrep as of 041200A November 1943. During the afternoon .3 November enemy resistance was light except on our extreme left front where the enemy strongly contested our advance toward Mignano with MG Mortar and Arty Fire from positions N and S of Hwy 6. Our initial attack across the Volturno was met by light resistance but as the attack progressed the enemy fought stubbornly at critical points. Our patrols entered VENAFRO at 041245A and A Company was reported to have passed the town by 041345A. Our patrols which entered ISERNIA at 0.32315A reported town clear of hostile troops. Section of road between ISERNIA and FORNELL! blown bv our engineers at 040400A." * * * CASERTA--NOVEMBER 5, 1943--This morning General Clark received at his CP Maj. Gen. Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff, AFHQ, Brig. Gen. Myer, Commander Butcher and Colonel Ramsay. General Clark's sources of intell:i.gence reported to him today that two German combat teams of the Herman Goering Regiment, making up a combat group, were located in the vicinity of Mignano in the way of the advance of the 3rd Division. General Clark, therefore, determined to make a drive southwesterly from Venafro, cutting Route #6 and thereby possibly eliminating the only practicable route by which the German combat group could supply itself and over vtich it could retreat to escape the trap thus set. At the sam'3 time, a successful drive in the direction of San Pietro would open the flat ground to the west of that point to possible tank action. The Army Cormnander summoned his Chief of Staff, his G-3 and G-2 and an- �nounced to them this decision. He then telephoned to the Commanders of the VI and 10 Corps and directed them to meet him on Route #6 in order that he might, with a minimum of loss of time, outline the proposed operation. He proceeded out by jeep and met the two Corps Commanders at the intersection of the rood running into Route #6 from Riardo. He then directed that the plan described above be put into effect as follows: During the night of November 5-6, the 30th Infantry was to entruck and proceed from Presenzano, its present location, via Route #85,to a point five kilometers south of Vena.fro. Thence jt would attack at dawn through the hills to the west. At the same time, the balance of the 3rd Division would continue its advance northward on Mignano. During the evening, General Clark, in explaining the Army situation to his Senior A.D.c., stated that he was disappointed in the slowness of 10 .Corps in reachin~ the phase line prescribed in Operations Instruction #8 which followed roughly the line of the Garigliano as far as a point just west of San Ambrozio and then ran in a general northeasterly direction to Cardito. General Clark spoke of the fact that the 10 Corps was in some places several miles short of its part of this objective, which included the front between Route #6 and the sea. Later in the evening, General Clark and General Gruenther walked to the head of the cascades at Caserta to observe the progress or an air raid over Naples. Inquiry of G-4 showed that a Quartermaster Warehouse on Pier Kin Naples Harbor was set afire, resulting in a loss of about 700 tons of quartermaster class 2 and class 4 supplies, among which the most serious loss was 450 tons of woolen cargo and blankets. An Army transport service ship was damaged, and an LOT, loaded with ammunition, was destroyed. Important messages are as follows: To Wolfe from Clark. RN 5004. November approved. Advise ETA." "Your visit this Headquarters about 8 From Eisenhower personal to Clark. RN 6880. "Air Vice Marshal Foster from Joint Staff Mission is arriving Naples Sunday, 7 November, and I am most anxious that he should see you. Feeling sure that you would put him up for the night, I have told Foster to cable you tomorrow his ETA." * * * CASERTA••NOVEMBER 6, 1943--General Clark conferred with Colonel Hodges, British Military Attache to Brazil and, afterwards, with Brigadier General McClure, Chief of the Information and Censorship Section, AFHQ. General Clark then went by jeep through Capua north to the Jrd Division command post in the vicinity of the junction of Route #6 and the road running northeast through Presenzano. In the absence of the Division Commander, General Clark discussed the situation with the Division Chief of Staff, who stated that the leading battalion of the 30th Infantry had reached a point a little south of San Pietro Infine, pursuant to its orders to take the high ground immediately to the southwest of that village. Other elements of the 3rd Division were working northward into the �heights southwest of Mignano. Some 3rd Division tanks had received fire from Mignano the preceding njght. A patrol to the high ground known as Monte Ro• tondo, just southeast of San Pietro Infine, has reported this height unoccupied. No troops were in Mignano yet. General Clark then drove northward in his jeep, leaving the radio and po• lice jeeps behind, untjl he reached a point ~bout two kilometers southeast of Mignano. He was able to observe the town, and to the north the village of San Pietro. Re then returned to the Presenzano road and drove to Headquarters of the 45th Division just northeast of that village. Here he discussed the situa• tion with General Middleton, the Division Commander, with General Truscott, 3rd Division Col!ll118.nder, who was present, and also with General Gerhardt. General Middleton then joined General Clark in his jeep and the General drove north up Route 85 to a point near Roccapipirozzi, where General Clark visited the Headquarters, 30th Infantry and examined the ground over which its attack to the west was being conducted. General Clark then continued with General Middleton across the flats south of Venafro, along the road under shell fire from German batteries to the northeast and arrived At the village of Venafro which was receiving casual enemy shell fire. General Clark proceeded northeast of the village a short djstance to the command post o~ the 179th Infantry on the lower slopes of ffonte San Croce, the upper part of which was occupied by the Germans. After discussing the s ituation with Colonel Kammerer, former G-3 of the Fifth Army, now commanding that regiment, General Clark, with G-eneral Middleton, went back through the village of Venafro to the west to the CP of the 180th Infantry. This CP had just been moved to the lower slores of Monte Corvo, as shell fire a short time before had hit an ammunition truck in the former CP a few hundred yards to the east. Here, General Clark and General Middleton conferred with the Regimental Commander, Lt. Col. Delaney,and observed the enemy shelling of the road running southward across the flats. The General then returned to his jeep and drove southward across the Venafro flats, leaving General Middleton at the Fresenzano road, and stopping to visit the 94th Evacuation Hospital which had been set up the evening before and which had already received a number of wounded from shell fire and mines in the fighting around Venafro earlier in the day. Thereafter, General Clark returned to his CP. An important message dispatched today read a.s follows: From Clark personal for Alexander. RN 4386. "Information brought back today by representatives this Headquarters to AFRQ for conference re movement French troops indicates that based on priority number assigned by your headquarters French Corps cannot begin movement prior to 1 January. Urgently recom• mend as operational necessity that 2nd Moroccan Division reinforced with essen• tial services, one group of tabors and two mule pack companies be assigned priority number which will insur~ its arrival Naples beginning 17 November and closing not later than 7 December. Such movement must not affect scheduled shipment of other units Fifth Army Already assigned priority numbers. Estima.• ted strength this division reinforced is 23,000 personnel, 4,000 vehicles and 1,500 animals. Widening front of Fifth Army will soon necessitate committing all divisions available leaving no reserve for relief or reinforcement. Tactical situation demands prompt arrival of additional division. French 2nd Moroccan Division is most readily available. It can start loading immediately." From Fifth Army to 15th Army Group. RN 4428. "Consider undesirable French Forces, Fifth Army, have any direct radio circuits to Algiers. All traffic �should pass through this Headquarters for transmission over existing facilities.0 * * CASERTA--NOVEMBER 7, 1943--The operations of this day consisted in slow progress toward the phase line established in Operations Instruction #8 by the several divisions on the Fifth A:rmy front. The 141st Combat Team, part of the 36th Division, moved forvrard to the vicinity of Pietrarnalara. In the morning, General Clark conferred with his Chief of Staff and his G-3 concerning the progress of the current operations. He then recorded broadcasts for the American Red Cross and for the British Broadcasting Corporation. In the afternoon, he drove to Naples and inspected the rest camp now occupied by troops from the 3rd Infantry Division. The following important messages were received and dispatched today: From VI Corps to CG, Fifth Army. NRN. 1•Enemy has continued determ5 ned defense and has clearly indicated that he will not give up his positions without a hard fight. He has employed every means at his disposal to prevent our gaining access to the commanding terrain he ·is holding. Otherwise the enemy position has been dented in vicinity of Mignano but the enemy appears to be dug in on the favorable Mount Sa.mrnucro positions overlooking San Pietro (H-9716) and hwy. 6. An enemy counterattack launched late 6 November :in the 34th Division area was broken up during the night. Artillery fire was reported heavy and accurate. Enemy aircraft was very active. A second captured map confirms the loetJtion of enemy divisional boundaries with slight variation. 6 Co 9 PGR rpt PGB identified NW of Pozzilli. 0 From 10 Corps Main to Fifth A:rrrry. RN 0583. "Sitrep timed 2100 hours. Hard fighting for Camino feature continued throughout the day against strong enemy opposition consisting of heavy shelling numerous machine gun posts blasted out of rook which are almost impervious to shellfire. 56th Division, 201st Gds Br:igade, 6th Gren Gds on Pt 819, G95OO75 commenced mopping up the enemy in area A955O72, G955O82, considerable fighting in these areas all day. 2 Sg started move to 6th Gren Gds area at 1800 hours. Irttention to continue attack to 2nd objective G94OO76. 3 Coldm Gds called for defensive fire on 150 enemy forming up in the areas G944O62, G94OO62, G94OO56 at 1840 hours. Results not yet known. Cocuruzzo ravine from G945O49, G915O5O is prepared as strong position with many mines and wire is complete infantry obstacle. Advance 201st Gds Brigade east of this position has turned enemy flank. In view of opposition progress made most satisfactory. 168th Brigade. 1st Lond Scots have companies at G92OO36, G92OO28 in contact with enemy to north and west. Road south of Clemente G9604 to Sipiccia G95O2 not open. 18 PW taken during the day. 46th Division. Patrol to Suja M8799 failed to cross river contacted enemy M888984. 7th Armored Division shelled enemy met in Mjnturno area otherwise no change. Weather overcast thundery showers in the evening. All informed." From II Corps to CG, Fifth Army. RN 3554. "Combat elements 36th Division's new bivouac area, north of Capua, 1995A, this date. 11 From Fifth Army to 15th Army Group. RN 4460. 11 1. Fifth Army priority �\ 20 number 107A given two Italian Pack Transport Units now located Iglesias, SArdinia. Request these units be given 15 Army Group priority number that will insure movement immediately after French Spa.his Regiment. 11 2. The two groups at Iglesias consists of ~40 personnel and 600 mules." * * * CASERTA--JITOVEMBER 8, 1943-•General Clark conferred with his Chief of Staff, his G-2 and his G-3 concerning intelligence that the German 26th Division had shifted to the U.S. 34th Division front for a counterattack. He then telephoned to his two Corps Commanders and instructed them to go with the Com~anding Generals of the 34th and 3rd Divisions to meet him at the 3rd Division Command Post. The General then went by jeep, accompanied by General Brann, Brigadier Richardson and Lt. Col. Sutherland, to the 3rd Division CP at the junction of Route #6 with the Presenzano road. The 3rd Division Commander reported that his elements were attacking the high ground on the right and left of Route #6, just northeast of Mignano. General Clark pointed out to General Lucas the fact that the corps boundary ran through the middle of the high mountain mass lying to the immediate west of Mignano and asked General Lucas whether, for his purposes, he needed any change. General Lucas said the boundary was satisfactory to him as it stood. General McCreary, when informed by General Truscott that a small track led from Casale up the mountains to an old monastery at Camino, said that he would like to have the use of this route for the 10 Corps elements attacking the part of the mounlying within hjs sector. Accordingly, General Cla_rk directed that the boundary between corps be slightly shifted at that point to permit 10 Corps the desired freedom of action. General Clark asked General Middleton whether he felt that there was danger to be anticipated from a counterattack on the 45th Division front. General Middleton said he thought there was not a great deal of danger because the rough ground between him and the Germans in his sector prevented the Germans coming over in force with armored vehicles. General Clark then told General Lucas that he must establish a corps reserve, if necessary pulling units out of the line to accomplish it. He sain that he could not utilize the 36th Division or parts of it for that purpose, as he proposed to put the 36th in as a unit, as soon as the 3rd should have reached its phase line. General Clark stated, however, that Colonel Darby had an available battalion of Rangers which General ClArk would order up, with Colonel Darby in command, as an element of the VI Corps reserve and that he would alert a battalion of the 509th Parachute Regiment to add to the Corps Reserve if necessary. General ClA;rk today received a copy of the September 24th NEW YORK TIMES which contained a news item that the last week of the 3rd Division War Loan Drive was"derlicated to General Mark C1Ark 1 s gallant Fifth Army'' and that Secretary Morgenthau had sent a cable to that effect to General Eisenhower. AFHQ Post pass ment General Clark commented that he had received no notification of this from and knew nothing of it until Secretary Morgenthau arrjved at his CoJ"lllland on October 19th-?Oth. For this reason, General ClArk had been unable to this 0ncouraging word to his troops and had been unable to make any stPtewhich might have helped the bond drive in the United States. Following are important messages of the day: From 10 Corps r,ain to Fifth u. S. Army. RN SITREF . "Sitrep timed 2015 �hours. 56th Division, 201st Bds BrigAde, Gren Gds maintain position on ~t 819 and now joined by 1 company 2 SG. Indications of strong enemy reaction but no major counterattack developed as yet. Remainder of 2 SG concentrating in area of Vandria G960040. Further enemy attempts to djslodge Coldm Gds have been beaten off. Area between Campanini G 9503, Ponte M 9596 and the R Garigliano very heavily mjned and also soMe w1re. Patrols 167th Brigade suffered 17 killed, 20 wounded, this area through AP mines Novem er 7. 46th Division, 138th Brigade Company 6 Lines M 880915 engaged an enemy patrol moving along route 7 and captured 1 officer, 1 battalion, 276 PG R severely wounded. Patrol was then sent out to engage enemy patrol. 7th Armored Division 1 RB company Cellole M 8889 company :M8489, battalion headquarters and 1 cor.ipany M 868877. 1 TRT squadron Cellole M 8889 RHQ and 2 squadrons 890873. Very large explosion in Forinia M 6605 and generally in Gaeta area. Patrols dominating the river bank. Weather overcast. All informed. 11 From VI Corps to CG, Fifth Army. NR'f. "The enemy defended from strong positions throughout the period holding tenaciously to high ground. 3rd Infantry Division repulsed 2 counterattacks this morning capturing 41 PW believed to be from 3rd Bn 29 PGR. Enemy attempt to infj_ltrate through 133rd Inf during after• noon of 7th resulted in 56 Germans being killed and 21 captured all believed to be fron 2 Co 9 PGR. Arty fire continued to be heavy in close support of defending Infantry, falling along the line Fazzilli (h-0523) - Montaquila (H-0929) and reported firing from vicinity Filignano (H-0426) and San Vittore (G-9417). 1 PW reported taken at G-966107 fron 2 CO 129 PGR mornin~ of 8th." The Army CoM~ander wrote the following letter to all of his subordinate commanders today: "As ourcampaign contjnues I feel that we must give particularly careful attention to the welfare of our troops. In addition to action be:ing taken by this headquarters and yours to provide facilities for the recreation and comfort of personnel, it is incumbent upon every commanding officer of a Fifth Army unit to minister continuously to the mental and physical v,ell-being of his cornnand. If proper thought and a.ction is tRken in this regard, the present high morale of the Fifth Army can be not only maintained but improved. ttpositive action can and must be taken to keep personnel informed of the progress of our operations~ Effective dissemination of real 1nformation wlll go far toward preventing or correcting unfounded and undesirabl!3 rumors. In this connection your attention is inv'ited to the enclosed copy of a. letter from Headquarters NATOTJSA, subject: "Attitudes and Beliefs Observed in Officers and Enlisted Men", which jndicates some of the pitfalls to morale which have been discovered by sampling in one of the station hospitals in North Africa. I am confident that few of the complaints listed in this report apply to Fifth Army personnel. I also realize that the soldjer considers thrt he has an inherent right to grumble frequently merely for the sake of grumbling. Nevertheless, all such complaints must be carefully examined in order that their basis, if any, can be determjned. Where legitimate cause of complaint is fouhd it must be removed wherever possible by constructive action and good leadership. Where no such cause is found, appropriate means must be employed for correcting the misapprehensions involved. For example, sujtable sters should be ta.ken to dj ~pel any incorrect rumors regarding prospective return to the U.S. of overseas units. No �112. plan or policy in this regard has been announced by hjgher authorities. 11 As you k."low, there is being developed under the supervision of my headquarters a rest area program for the benefit of troops wjthdrawn temporarily from combat. For this purpose accommodations for officers of the Fifth Army have been provided by the requisitionine of the Vittoria Hotel in Sorrento, which is now being operated by the Peninsular Base Section. Unit quotas in the hotel have been allotted and they are already in use. Accommodations for enlisted men have been establjshed in ~aples, and the first group of 1100 arrived on Thursday to take advantage of them. Due to the extreme difficulty of finding suitable building space in the city to take care or the various agencies which have to be housed, these rest faciHties are at first necessarily limited, but they will be extended as fast as possible to provide sufficient quarters for the troops who are 1n a position to take advantage of them. "The buildings involved are operated by the Peninsular Base Section, ,h ich works in close cooperation with this headquarters on the project of pro11icing as pleasant a rest p9riod as the avajlable means will permit. The quarters include recreation rooms, in \7h:i ch Red Cross personnP.1 are assist in_,.. A recreation pror,rar, has been arrri gee wr:: c:r will ··nclude trips to I ompei, as rell as dances, movies, stage shows and sucl1 other forms of entertainment as are prov:ded y the Special Set·vices and the Red Cross. 11 For the t"oops jn tre field, unit commanders must exercise :inganuity to provide the best possi le living condj tj_o,1s and recreational '"'acil · this. 11 I desire that you that all our troops -rriay part wM ch they play in conditions wh-i.ch we are * follow up personally these var:;..ou• rrv.tters to the 0nd s hmre a clear understandiri.g of our objectives and the t em, and T'lay carry on their opero.tions under the best al:)le to provide for trem. 11 * * CASERTA--NOVE~ffiER 9, 1943--General Clnrk left his command post by jeep at 0830 with General Brann, Rrjgadier Richardson and Cartain Le.mpson, bis Britjsh aide, and vrent up to the 10 Corps area. They visited a 56th Divj sion OJ-' and viewed ire ground toward rit. Camino, over which the attack o-f' the Guards Brieade was progressing. After conferring with General r'cCreei:-y, they went to Headquarters 56th Division and discussed the siturition with the Division ComP1ander. The General then returned to the command post. In conversation with Genernl BrQ.ni."1 today, General Clark commented that the Fifth Army had been attacking continuously ever since the landing two months ago. The 3rd Division had been attacking through mountainous terrnjn for 52 days con.. tinuously. The Br1tish 56th Division, while continuously in the line since D-day, has not faced the same continuous mountains. Mr. George Biddle, an artist representing the War Department, today made a. pen and ink drawing of General Clark. In talking with the General, he spoke of the many men who had expressed to him a t"ish that they might go home. General Clark replied that in the Fifth Army there must ea spirit of determjnation to finish the job before there was any talk of going home. In the evenine, Genernl Clark conferred with General Lemnitzer and Air Vice 1i!arsha.l Foster, who took di,nne y·:t,9r11-im. Important messages fo~~~~~,are as follows: Fifth Army to 15th Army RN 3420. "Understand two American divi- �\ 23 sions will arrive North Africa in near future. Urgently request that at least one be shipped here earliest date practicable for assignment to Fifth Army. Nature of our present and contemplated operations is such that additional U.S. Division absolutely essential to provide necessary rotation. This Division needed in addition to ?nd ~oroccan Division and French Spahi Regiment already requested." From Main 10 Corps to CG, Fifth Army. NRN. 11 56 Div. 201 Gds Bde. Constant counter attacks have been launched against 6 Gren Gds yesterday and today. Bn is still in posn between Pt 727 G9506 Pt 819 G9407 but has suffered casualties from sustained shelling. 2 SG move to 6 Gren Gds Area tonight. 3 Coldms move into reserve in Ujfli G9505 tonight after relief by 1 Lon Scot. 46th Div Ntr no contact. 7 Armd Div. Inf seen throughout day at M786956 othenrise Ntr. "All Informed." General Lemnitzer brought to the Commanding General the following Operation Instruction No. 31 from the Col'TIT'.landing General, 15th Army Group: u1. It is clear that both Fifth and Ei~hth Armies have on most of tre battle front gained contact with the enerny 1 s main defensive position in southern Italy. A co-ordinated effort is now required to ½reak through to Rome. "2. Mv plan for future operations is divided into the following three phases:Phase I - Operations by Eighth Army to get astride the road communications in the area PESCARA - POFOLI - COLLARMEIE from there to threaten the enemy L of C behind Fifth Army via AVEZZANO. Phase II- An attack by Fifth Army to drive up the LIRI and SACCO Valleys to FROSINONE. Phase III-An ampMbious operation south of ROME directed on COLLI LAZIALI, together with a possible airborne landing by one R.C.T. "3. Additional LST are being retained in this theater till 15 Dec and will enable thf'l FnENCH Moroccan and 1 Br:itish Divs to be operational in Fifth and Eighth Armies by 7 and 15 Dec respectively(.) It is as yet uncertain whether suff:i cient craft will be available for PLase III but you wi 11 begin planning on the supposition that craft will be available. The ground forces for tM s operation will be provided by you. C-in-G Med has been asked to send you a naval planning staff. 11 4. During the preparatory periods, offensive probing of the enemy position along t'.1 ~ whole front will not be relaxed and he will be kept stretched to the utmost so as to give him no opportunity to rest or re-group. Eighth Army has already begun its drive forwaro on the left flank and you should give it such assistance as you ca.n. The main Eighth Army thrust will take place NOT before 20 -Pfov. This information is for your personal knowledge only. "5. You should take tl:e ee.rl:i.est opportunity to re-group your forces to �\ 14 prepare for Fhase IT . If Fhase III takes place it must be timed so that Fifth Army are wjthin supporting distance of the landing. 6. All avaj lable air support will be given to Eighth Army for I-hase I and to Fifth Army for r ases II and III . 11 The following memorandum was received today from Rear Admiral Horse with regard to Amphibious Operations - Western Italy: "Further to my memornnc1ur:i Wo . 95/~53 of 5th November, 19L.3 , n.nd with reference to Comrm.nder-in-Chie-", f1editerrr11ean, signal times 1140A of 4th ~Joven er to 15th Army Group, the "orce~ now allocated for coastvise operations nnd to be stationed in the 'iaples area are as -"ollous:(a) 2 L.S.I. ( ) 12 American 1.0.m. (c) 1 Flo-Lilla American L.C.I. (L) - 12 C1·af.'t. "2 . Jn addi .io11 ".:.be quoted above, para 5 (d) , terioration of a0runjtion made which neans that the until 24 hours after Flag ::n1PI-ort land'ng craf't. r0ferr8d ~o :tn my r'enorrndum have now ard VF)d in the Hapl•=!S area. To prev-ent cieof t~ese craft certrin arrPngements have hnd to be craft will not be operationally ready for service Officer , Western Italy, is inforrred they are required. n3 . To carry out an operation employing the ships and craft allocated above it is likely that a certain number of other naval forces rrill also be required in support such as destroyers for gunfire support , P. C.'s or similar ships , as 1;t1ides etc . To assemble these they will normPlly have to be requested from the Commander-in- CM ef, Mediterranean, and then sailed by the Authorities instructed to provide them to the 'aples area . This , together with necessary briefing required before sailing on an operation cannot , it is estimated, be achieved inside 3 days from the time Flag Officer , Western Italy, has details of what is required. tt/ +By th~s memorandum s . •1. 0.A. L.(i"J) is directed to coordinate the training and exercising of the land:.tng shir s and craft allocnted for coastwise operations . He is to arrange such training exercises as the Commanding GenAral, 5th Army, may require informing the Flag Officer , Western It~l y , of these requirements and when on such exercises command the landing ships and craft allocated to him. ,t * * * CASERTA--WOVErffif!R 10, 1943- -This morning General Clark took Air Vice Marshal Foster , of the RAF Combined Forces Mission who was here on a journey from vlashington , together with ~~r . Trammell, Fresident , and Mr . Royal , Vic0 President , of t-e ,rational Broadcasting Company to visit the front . The party w accompanied by as Captains Lampson and Thrasher, aides . General Clark first went to the 3rd Division CP , at the junction of the Fresenzano road and Route #6. Her e they dis• cussed the progress of the advance toward ragnano with the Chief of Staff , 3rd Division, in the absence of the Division Commander . The party then went up the r oad to a short distance south of r~ignano , where General ClArk led the way up a �hill and pointed out to the vi.sitors the town directly in front of them and,J beyond, the heights around Cassino . They then visited the nearby command posts of the""Jath- and 1,-Eli Tn1antrieswhich were close together . The Air Vice Marshal, accompanied by Captain Lampson, then left the rest of the party and went to 10 Corps Headquarters to talk with the Brieadier General Staff. From that point, he returned to General Clark's CF . General Glark and his guests stopped at the 94th Evacuation Hospital and talked to a number of recently wounded men. ?/fr . Trammell and Mr. Royal took the names and addresses of a nlL~ber of them and promised to call up their families as soon as they reached the United States , where they expected to be in a few days . This in no instance failed to bring a smile to the face of the wounded ma.n. The party then went south on Route #6 to the Pietravairano road and fol• lowed that northeasterly across the pontoon bridge over the Volturno and thence went north through Pratella and I'rata to Capriati, y,here General Clark met General Lucas at the 34th Division Command Fest. The party proceeded to an OP near Cupamazzo, about three miles west of Capriati, from which they had a clear view of the valley toward Vena.fro and to the north of that city. General Clark then returned with Messrs . Trammell and Royal to his command post. Messrs . Trammell and Roval were General Clark's guests at dinner . Today, General ClFrk received a report of the Red Cross Clubmobile Section for October, made by l\T . Koslowski , Clubmobile Director. Reports showed that Mr. Koslowski, together with Mrs. Stevenson, Miss Birnie , Miss Moen and �Miss Cox, had, throughout the entire months, been operating with troops as close to the front line as possible so as to distribute newly-made doughnuts and words of good cheer to soldiers just out of combat. During this period, they had worked with the 36th and 45th Divisions. The young women had lived in tents like the soldiers under conditions of considerable hardship without complaint but with the greatest cheerfulness and had distributed throughout the month 69,050 doughnuts. Mr. Koslowski coITlf'lented on the fine esprit and morale of our soldiers and spoke of their confidence in their leader and in final victory. Important messages for the day are as follows: From Main Eighth Army to CG, Fifth Army. RN 1284. "Weather conditions continue bad on whole front and snow is now falling in mountain areas. Five Corps. 78 Div. 2 patrols on 36 Bde crossed R Sangro yesterday and returned without making contact. Further patrols last night penetrated to SE of Gossacesia H3904 and H 378998 and report no enemy reaction. 8 Ind Div. 17 Ind Bde now operating West of Casalangiida H 4181 directed on Atessa. XIII Corps. 1 Cdn Div standing patrols now est Carovilla. Five Div. Adv continues with Rionero H 1245 clear and patrols beyond at H 1148. Patrols also report FT 1075 H 1646 and Roccasicura H 1943 on Forli lateral clear. Air. Day 9/10. Bad weather restricted operations. Kittyhawks bombed previously damaged MV in split harbour. Vessel received 3 direct hits and fire started among railway wagons on Jetty. Recces were flown over R Nangro and Ancona Areas without incident. All informed. 11 From 15th Army Group to AFHQ. RN SD 397. 11 In order to provide necessary rotation during present and contemplated operations Fifth Army considers ab• solutely essential an additional u. s. Divisioh. This in addition to 2nd Moroccan Division and Spa.hi Regiment. Request information on state of the 2 U. s. Divisions to arrive African theatre also future and earliest practicable date 1 Division could be sent Italy. Reply direct to Fifth Army repeated 15 Army Group. 11 * * CASERTA-•NOVEMBER 11, 1943•-General Clark left his command post at 0930 and drove to the American military cemetery at Avellino, where he attended the ceremonies in connection with Armistice Day. After a prayer by the Fifth Army Chaplain, Padre Ryan, and after the national anthem had been played, General Clark spoke briefly to the staff officers and two detachments of Fifth Army troops who were assembled. The General spoke without notes approxime.tely as follows: "Officers and men of the Fifth Army: Twenty-five years a.go today the guns stopped firing in northern France, and the surrender of the Germa.ns again brought peace to the world. And here a quarter of a century later, we find ourselves fighting again side by side with our same Allies of 1918, in order that we can destroy the same mad dogs who were loose in 1918. "It is fitting that we should assemble here in this beautiful American cemetery in order to honor nnd pay tribute to the memories of our comrades who, by their sacrifices, made it possible for the Fifth Army to land on the Salerno �beaches, to capture the great port of Naples , to cross the Volturno and now drive on to the north on the roAd to Rome . These men who lie here gave their live·s in order that r,e and our loved ones at home may lead the kind of happy lives which Americans for centuries have selected for themselves ••• ha.ppy lives , where our children can go to the schools and churches we select ••• where we can follow the line of work we like ••• a.nd where we can speak our honest convictions and be happy with our loved ones . Men, that is w we are fighting toda.y ••• to hy destroy the forces of dictatorship who would take from us our happiness and leave us beaten, broken and defeated, like these Italians whom we see all around us. ttThis is no moment for sadness but rather a. moment of inspiration to drive us on to the task which has been set for us . 1tr hear much talk a.bout going home , and I read it in the papers , and it is A unfortunate, for you know as well as I do that the Fifth Army is now a mighty \' ~ .It/p_ trained force, capable of beating the enem y. He have arrived at this state of ,:( t' v~ training the ha.rd way and after heavy casualties. Our army is now capable of f.,, -r ¥1' 1 beating and killing the onemy w is before us . W should we , then, sacriho hy -\17 ,Y fice all this tr:dning and destroy the team we have built up the hard way? ,t,{ rf. If we bring in new men and let these trained m go home, we will have the en "f' ~ same heav-<J casualties . There must be no talking of Fifth Army m going home . en }yr,I We Must not give it a thought , ut, r r, t her, pledge ourselves t h:-- t we will go $' · forward to the v:ictory which our country deserves . ,\_I, ~ r I I d\. ~ .I"' ~ /who I now lay t hese f lower s on t his f lagpole with the pledge to these men lie bef ore us that re have caught t h , torch which they have fltmg t o us , e and w will bear lt high tmtil victory is ours . 11 /" J'> '°"'f- V "\t ti ~ The sun shorn, br:i ghtly on ·the rows of w hite cros ses, and t he scene m ade a deep impression on everyone present . (' X ,( / ) ✓ A~ : c,-✓ ~ ...t"~ (" c/'\v() J ~he cer emony ended vii t h t he play:i ng of taps and a benediction by the chaplain. Thereafter , General Clark spent a short tiMe visiting individual graves in the n!"!arly kept cemetery. >-{I'( .,~ Following tMs , General Clark, accompanied by Lt . Col. Brisa.ch and Lt . Col. I ISutherland , went to the oarracks of the 1st Italian Motorized Brigade at Avel4\ )!'~.? ~~ # lino. The Gem,ral was received by Brigadier General Vincenzo Dapino and Lt. Col. Tuzi, his Chief of Staff. General Dapino presented to GenP.ral Clark a group of selected Alpini , who were qua.lif ied instructors in mountain and ski work, and then took the Gent'!ral on an inspection of the Brigade , which was in formPtion in the barrack square . The soldiers were well uniformed, alert , clean-cut men, and their officers appearen to be of a high type . Genernl Clark congratulated General Da.pino on the fine appearance of his command and stated that he was del ighted to have the Brigade in the Fifth Army. He· said that he had an important mission for them to perform very ·~hortly under an American Corps Commander and that he would shortly have staff officers come to discuss the employment of the Brjgade with General Dapino and his staff. General Dapino stated that his brigade was proud to form part of the Fifth Army, and it was ready for whatever General Clark might call on it to do. At General Clark's request , General Dapino then translated the General's remarks ~ 1 DAA- .J ~:f f->-1 ~ :--0.j;_ ie-<r ~ . -f tn,..J ,,_;... J""' oJL-J v½~~u tJ w-,-:.tt .,. r ~ ..... ,, c~ f , t.... f" t , • ~ .: .... A \ �to·the Brjgade. General Clark then returned to his jeep and went back to his command post with Lt. Col. Brisa.ch and Lt. Col. Sutherland. At h;is command post the General then conferred with General Keyes, Commanding the TT Corps, and Colonel Hill, G-3 of the VI Corps, concern:ng the future employment of the II Corps and the present situation on the front near San Pietro. General Clark was very emphatic in stating that the critical terrain in the present operations was the hill mass running north of San pjetro. He explajned that that must be taken 11s the key to succeeding advances. Today, Mr. ~ark Watson, War Correspondent, a friend of General Clark's ~ent him a copy of a dispatch which he had 8ent to the Baltimore Sun from Bari. The dispatch stated that it was unwise to expect further achievement from the Eighth Army in the near future, other than its continuation as a right flank guard for the Fifth Army. The Fifth would have to do the main fighting for Rome. There was complete confidence in Bari of success in a reasonable time and by military superiority alone - not by enemy collapse. General Clark today received a letter, dated November 6, from Mr. Robert D. Murphy, enclosing certain documents made public on November 1st following the Moscow conference. One of these documents was a statement signed by Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt and Premier Stalin concerning atrocities and stated that Germans who take part in wholesale massacre ot innocent peoples will be taken back to the scenes of their crimes and judged by the laws of their victims. This particularly interested General Clark because of the recent events at Caiazzo. Reports had reached Headquarters Fifth Army from a Mr. Stoneman, War Correspondent, that bodies of civilians were being unearthed in the recently captured town of Caiazzo. By the General's direction, the In• spector General conducted an investigation and found that 23 women and children had, on October 13th, been shot without trial, under orders of Lieutenant Lehnigk Emden, assisted by certain non-corntnissioned officers and soldiers. Lieutenant Lehnigk Emden and about 40 soldiers, some of whom are supposed to have been responsible for the atrocities in question, have been captured and are now in custody of the Fifth Army. General Clark sent the following cable in this connec• tion, and the reply is also quoted: From Clark to Alexander. RN 5146. ttThis Headquarters has received reliable evidence which would indicate that on October 13th members of the 3rd Company, 29th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, without trial or judicial proceedings, put to death some 23 Italian men, women and children in the vicinity of Caiazzo for allegedly using blinker lights in a fannhouse near forward German positions. 40 members of the 3rd Company now held in F .w. cage. Some of these have implicated 2nd Lieutenant Wolfgang Lehnigk Emden and Soldat Harald Thieke, also prisoners of war, as having taken part in killing. In view of possibility of reprisals against Allied prisoners now in German hands, and in view of declaration by Allied leaders at recent Moscow conference concerning handling of Germans guilty of atrocities, request instructions to be followed in this case; Caiazzo atrocities were featured in press stor1es on October 18 • 19. Pending receipt of guidance from you as to most effective propaganda line to be R,llowed his name has not been released, although press know that Emden has been captured." From 15th Army Group to Commanding General, Fifth Army. RN 884. "Reference your C/S 5146 of 111ovember. Make no release to press. Policy djrective follows." �CASERTA- ..TJOVEMBER 12, 1943-•During the morning hours , General Clark remained at his command post , where he conferred with the Chief of Staff, with his G- 3 and attended to a number of administrative matters . Early in the afternoon, he left the command post with General Gruenther and Captain Lampson and went to 10 Corps command post , where he conferred with General McCreary concerning the 10 Corps operations , and in particular the attempted capture of r.~ount Maggiore and Mount Camino by the 56th Di vision. General McCreary pointed out that the 56th Division had been in combat since landing and had suffered many casualties , especially among of'ficers and non- commissioned officers . At the present time , these were not replaceable; there were no replacements in Italy or in !Jorth Africa. His battalions were depleted and tired out and, despite their best efforts they had been, and he feared would be , unable to take the mountains . The only possibility of replacements in sight was to convert some armored force reJ,lacements in North Africa to infantry, a process requjring a considerable period. This conference caused General Clark a good deal or disappointment , as he had hoped that the capture of the high ground in question would contribute greatly to opening the wa-y to an advance along Route #6 tovrard Rome . However , recognizing that his plans must be amended to meet the realities of the situation, he arranged to have General Lucas and General Middleton meet him at the junction of Route #6 and the I ietravairano road. There , he had a short conference with these officers concerning the situation of the VI Corps and the 45th Division and returned with General Gruenther to his CP , where he conferred with his G-3 , General Brann, concerning the next steps to be taken. General Clark Gtated that he had considered putting the 36th Division in place of the 56th to make an assault on Mount Camino, but committing this division would mean that the last reserve of the Army had gone into combat . The General decided to announce his decision to his VI and II Corps CoMmanders in the morning. Today General Clark received at his cor.unand post Colonel Hess, whom he is assigning as Artillery Commander, 36th Division, and Messrs . Stephens and Tompkins . Mr . Tompkins is Chief of the Red Cross in Italy during the absence of Mr . Stevenson. General Clark received the following message from GINO , MED the day before yesterday: From CINC , f,'ED to CG, Fifth Army. RN 656/1 ZZFOO. 11 1 am informed that you have been instructed to initiate exploratory planning for a possible amphibious operation by about one division directed on Colli Lazzara at some fut ure date . "In event this operation crystallizes , Admiral Lowry, USN, will be the Naval Commander . "Recommend that however nebulous project may yet be , it is of utmost importance that Navy and Army Commanders elect , and their staffs , should get together now for advance examination and planning. On receipt of your agreement, Admiral Lowry will be assigned as Task Force Commander and be instructed to proceed in Biscayne to Naples for initiation of planning with Commanding General you designate . " �The Army Commander replied to the above message today as follows: From CG, Fifth Army to CINC, MED. RN 4536. "Special planning staff for operation ref~rred to in your R656/l ZZFOO has been organized in my headquarters. I am in complete accord with your desire that Admiral Lowry come here immediately. Suggest that he plan on occupying space which I will make available in Caserta Palace, where he will be ahle to work closely with air 8.nd ground planning staff$." General Clark received the following letter today from the Secretary of the Treasury. "I want to take this opportunity to thank you for the wonderful twentyfour hours you gave me while I was in your area. The day I spent with you will always be a high-water mark in my life. "I have had an opportunity to report to the President, Secretary Stimson and General 1forshall my very high regard of the way in which you are conducting the war against the enemy. "Knowing how seldom newspapers reach you, I am enclosing herewith a clipping from the New York Times which ran the story of my visit with you. Also, in the not too distant future, I hope that you will receive a box of apples from my farm. "If I can ever be of any service to you, please feel free to call on me. 11 The Commanding General replied to the Secretary as follows: "Your letter of November 6th reached me yesterday, the 11th. It certainly came in fast time. I was delighted to hear from you and to receive the clippings. I deeply appreciate the nice things you have said with regard to our conduct of the war in Italy, and I appreciate your passing them on to the President, Secretary Stimson and General Marshall. "I wrote you on N'ovember 4th, telling you of the shipment of six tanks for your war bond effort. I hope they reach you, for they should stimulate interest in the States. We knocked them out on the Salerno beaches. "The clippings from the NEW YORK TIMES are most interesting and flattering. It helps us to go on when we know the people at home are satis• fied with our efforts." The Army Commander received the following letter from the Commanding General, Eighth Army: •r was very sorry indeed we could not meet at Bari on 8 November; but I doubted if you would be able to cross the mountains in those storms of rain. 1 "Today is the first fine day that flying makes it possible for Chavasse to get to you. "He will explain all my plans to you, and bring me back your news and intentions. �\3i "I. have been watching with great admiration the way you have "seen off" I a l l the Boche counter-attacks , and have then gained more ground yourself. Good luck to you. " * * * CASERTA--TiOVEMBER 13 , 1943-•General Clark, after a short conference with the - Chief of Staff, his G-2 and G-3 , left his command post with Lt . Col. Sutherland and went to VI Corps Headquarters via Pietravairano. Here , he found the Corps Col'!lmander, General Lucas , 45th Division CoMmander, General Middleton, and these were shortly joined hy General Ryder , of the 34th Division, and General Truscott , of the 3rd Division. General Middleton said that enemy shelling had increased in intensity over night and that a number of shells had fallen in his corrnnand post near Presenzano . In vjew of this, he stated that he intended to \ move his command post to a less exposed position, possibly on the other side of I the Volturno . General Lucas stated that in his opinion the th Division was not able to take the heights north of San Pietro at the present time. It now I was taking three battalions of that division to do the normal work of one . Counterattacks were developing in an easterly direction through the mountains lying to the southwest of Venafro. •·A ,..r> I /J.Y ,- 0 1 IV General Clark said that he realized that the increasing German build-up prevented the Fifth Army from doing much offensively at the present time . on e> the Fifth Army front the Germans had six divisions opposed to four of ours. ~ \ O General li"'cCreery' s troops were unable to make further progress against Mt . ~ , Camino . However , General Clark stated to the assembled Generals in the most '('C'C' strict confidence that General Alexander had informed him that on the 20th off'" November the Eighth Army was to make an all-out attack, supported by all the air force available to the 15th Army Group and a considerable amount of artillery lent by the Fifth Army. The Eighth Army plan involved a subordinate attack on its left by the Canadian Division, the main effort on its right by the 78th and Indian Divisions, jumping off from tPe P.iver Sangro and or:ving strai~ t nort toward Piscara . After this attack was unrer vray, General Frybe:rg with his Austral1an Division and an Armored Force would dr ~vc -north to the region of Chieti, V-ence to the southwest threatening Rome. The ~ ~ighth Army, the General explained, was now opposed by two German divisions only. The German left was held by the 65th Division, containing about 601 Toles and Czechs who are supposed not to be zealous for the German cause. The right of the German line in the Bighth Army sector was held only by the parachute d:ivision. These parachutists were stout fighters , but the whole division was Hght in character. "'hus, there was a good prospect that the Eighth ArT'1y attack would.succeed and, by getting well to the rear of the present German positions in the Fifth Army sector, force a substantial number of the divisions opposing the Fifth A:rmy to move to the rear. For this reason, General Clark directed that until the 27th of November the Fifth Army hold to its present positions and that the troops get all the rest possible . At the same time, however, he directed that every possible step be taken to insure that , in the meantime , there be no German break through . He directed that the Commanders of the 34th and 45th Divisions dispose their troops in depth and added emphatically "The 45th must make damn sure that nothing can come through the hills from the west j_nto the Venafro plains 0 • He stated that the hill mass southwest of Venafro must be occupied, �/ as we could not let patrols dribble through into the Venafro plains. As soon as possible, the General announced that he had decided to relieve the 3rd Division with the 36th, and he asked the Commander of the 3rd Division whether, in his estimation, this relief could be !J8.I'ried out without too many losses. General Truscott stated that this could be done by relieving a battalion at a time. General Clark stated that when this relief was complete he proposed to have General Keyes take over the 3rd and 36th Divisions to operate under II Corps . The General further stated thnt he intended to instruct the 10 Corps Commander to make a cordon defense in order to hold firmly to the ground thus far captured as far northward as Caspoli. General Clark then stated that he had decided that around the end of November the Fifth Army should be ready to renew its attack ln an all-out effort to move northwesterly up Route #6. The general plan for this oreration was to have one division drive west from Colli but to have his main effort along the ) axis of Route #6. By this time, the General pointed out, the Special Service Force of Canadian and Amerjca.n mountaineers should be available, a French Division would have arrived, and the Italian Motorized Brigade woulct be available. The General stated that the French Division would be placed under General Lucas. The 34th Division would make the attack west from Colli, and the II Corps would make the principal effort through Mignano. The General commented on the fact that the troops would have to be ready to attack despite the fact that observations from M01mt Camino wmild, at the outset, be in German hands. In connection with this attack, the 10 Corps would be djrected to cross the Garigliano simultaneously with the attack by the VI and II Corps. General Clark then asked his assembled Generals whether they had any com• ments. Gen8ral Truscott said that it would be a hard job to hold Rotondo for a period of two weeks. He felt that the Germans would probably make a vigorous counterattack there. He stated that the 3rd Division troops needed about two weeks to rest and re-fit their equipment. Their companies were down to about 110 and their men were about 60% replacements. General Clark stated that about this period would be available for the 3rd Division, in view of the proposed relief by the 36th. General Clark then had lunch with the assembled Generals. and also General Truesdell, Commander of the General Staff and Command School at Fort Leavenwortry, who was on the Italian front _as an observer. After lunch, the General went back byPietravairano to the II Corps CP at Patragaino, where he announced to General Keyes, the II Corps Commander, and General Walker, Commanding the 36th Division, the same decision which he had announced to the VI Corps Commander . He emphasized the fact that the 3rd Division should have some time to rest and that he desired to get them out of the line as soon as possible. He djrected General Walker to talk with General Truscott immediately about the proposed relief. He emphasized the requjrement thAt the 36th be disposed in considerable depth and directed that General Walker should consider the possibility that the 36th would take over the guns of the 3rd Division in the present position. He again emphasized the fact that the Germans had the observation on the position the 36th Division was to occupy and that none of the ground now held must be lost in counterattacks. He stated that he hoped to be able later to mass the 36th, 3rd and 1st Armored Divisions for a big break through. �On the way back to the command post, General Clark commented to his aide that he was very favorably impressed with the detailed knowledge General Keyes showed of his tactical dispositions. He stated that General Keyes was outstanding in this respect among hj_s subordinate commanders in the Fifth Army and that he felt that his rresence with II Corps in the line would be a decided advantage. General Clark then returned to his CF. At dinner, discussing with his Chief of Staff, with Brigadier Richardson, Deputy Chief of Staff, and with General Brann the course of current operations, he mentioned the fact that he had directed the 1st Armored Division to move up its armor during the n5ght, in order to prevent German observation. General Gruenther explained that this was being done with great care, exactly as the General had directed. - it this conference, the Army Commander announced his decision as embodied in the following radio to General Alexander: ~ l ~/ < ~ ()'VI~ t"\• /JU "f'fi"' 7 ~ I D--cft-/7 - - "I had hoped, before now, to push through Mignano gap into more favorable terrain where armor might be emrloyed. Before doing this, the 1\Tount Maggiore and Mount Camino features had to be taken. This was the task assigned the 10 Corps, as you know. For pa.st several days 56th Division has been attempting against 1ncreasing enemy opposition to capture Mount Camino. General Mccreery informed me yesterday that further attacks against these features would probably be ineffective and thejr continuance might so deplete the d:ivision that it would be non-operational for considerable p~riod. This division was understrength at the start of the Italian campaign, and its subsequent losses, especially in officers and non-commissioned officers, have been heavy. It has been in action since September 9. Supply of reinforcements has not equalled losses. McCreary estimates that it will not be ad~,isable to use 46th Division on attack mission until November 30. The only division which I have available at present for this mission is 36th, which is only army reserve. I consider that it would be an error to use it for this purpose. 56th Division will now withdraw from slopes of Mount Camino because it cam1ot maintain itself there. I shall change mission of 10 Corps to defensive one. McCreary will direct 56th Division to defend base of Mount Camino to prevent inroads into valley to east. Fifth Army t, ill regroup in order to launch coordinated attack with main effort by II Corps northwest along Highway #6. Secondary attack by VI Corps west from Colli. 10 Corps to force crossing of Garigliano on left. 1st Armored Division in army reserve to exploit attack in Mignano valley. Estimate this attack cannot be made until latter part of this month at which time Eighth Army attack should have forced withdrawal of part of enemy on my front by that time. After 56 days of continuous attacks, 3rd D:ivision is ln need of rest and~ reorgani za.tion. I am going to relieve it by 36th Division while ma·i ntaining its/ present difficult position on Rotonda in spjte of enemy observation to jts left rear. 34th and 46th Divisions are consolidating their positions in order to hold key terrain already in our possession against repeated counterattacks." The followin~ ca le was di9patched to 15th Army Group today. RN 5225. "Desire to have 5th Canadian Armored Division, less the armored brigade, assigned to 10 Corps until December 1st. It will be used in 10 Corps reserve." �CASERTA--TTOVEMBER 14, 19l+J- -General Clark spent the morning in disposin~ of various administrative matters . At noon General Lucas , Commandin~ VI Corps , and his Chief of staff, Colonel Kaiser , arrived at General Clark I s GP , and tht'lse officers stayed to lunch with General Clark and then conferred with him and his Chief of Staff concernin~ proposed operations . In particular , they discussed the employment of the 34th Division to push west from Colli . General Clark told General Lucas that he need not delay the advance of the 34th Division but that he could start the advance as soon as the Division was in a position to begin. In the afternoon, General Clark climbed the mountt:1in beside Caserta. with Lt . Col. Sutherland , on the way inspectin~ several machine ~n posts set up to guard the Army headquarters . In the evening, General Clark received about 27 Fifth Army officers at his conference hut, where he entertained them with a buffet supper and a sound movie, "Star Spangled Rhythm" . Important messa~es for the day were as follows: From 10 Corps Main to CG, Fifth Army. RN O 636 14. "Sitrep timed 2000 hours . 56 Division. ~01 Gds Brigade . Patrol 7 OXF and Bucks believed took some Prisoners of War between Point 819 G9510'75 . Battalion now mov:in~ to re join 167 Bri~de . · 169 Brigade . Completed concentration area G971060 FRIBLLO G9806. S CLEMENTE G9604. 46 Division . 138 Brigade . One copy 2/4 KOYLI area AYULPI M9266. Patrol to M89J968 Recced track to canal tunnel M886976 reported good for tks all weather . At M887988 suspected ROO/rope brid~e M885984 Ferry. 6 Lines Carrier patrol to M887954 no contact . 1200 hours 6 enemy at bend of canal M875972. 7 Armored Division. Many explosions in the area of FORMIA M6694. 8 ME 109s bombed and straffed road VILLA LITURNO No 767 CANCELLO No 274 1130 hours . Weather showery. All informed . it * * * CASERTA- .. NOVEMBER 15, 1943-•At 0900 General Clark addressed the newly- arrived officers assembled for the second orientation course at the Opera House in the Caserta Palace . The General spoke of the importance of morale and discipline , and of the hi~h standards in this respect dema.nded by him as Commander of the Fifth Army. He urged that the men be kept informed as to the war situation in order that they mi~ht understand the reasons for their being here at the front . In this connection, he m~ged that rumors , completely unfounded, of the prospective transfer home of units , be set at rest . The GenE'!ral explained that battle- hardened troops on this front cou1d not be withdrawn and replaced by green troops without great loss to all concerned . The General then stated that discipline was a most important essential of any Army. The men must be alert in recognizing and saluting officers , alert in keeping watch for hostile airplanes, alert to maintain road discipline and proper road spacin~ and in gen~ral to maintain the standards 'of good soldiers. Fjnally, the General stated that the newly-arrived officers were most welcome and that Headquarters Fifth Army would give them every assistance(-in carrying out th,,ir missions. .r?' The General then returned to his command post and left by jeep, accompanied by Captain Thrasher , his aide , for the 3rd Division GP . After examining �the situ.at ion of that division, he went to the 45th Di vj_sion, near I resenzano and then crossed the Volturno and went up to the 34th Division CF at Caprivti. This trip was difficult . It was rainin~ extremely hard, and in many places the road was almost impassable. At one point, General Clark's jeep had to be towed throu~h a mud hole. He return1'd to his command post at about 1630 after seven hours on the road. General Clark had for dinner ~ests this evenin~ Maj. Gen. Harmon, Commmlinr; General of the 1st· Armored Division; 11aj. Gen. House, Cornnanrln~ General of the XII Air Support CoMMand; and r~aj. Gen. Rid~ay, Commandin,; Genl"rfll of the 82nd Airborne Division, who is soon to leave this theater. The 3rd Division today sent General Clark a lar~e cake decorated with frostin reproductions of airplanes, tanks, cannon, infantrymen and other warlike devices. With it came a note sayin~ thnt it was in appreciation of the Army Commanders efforts which had provided rest camps for so many 3rd Division men. * * CASERTA--NOVEMBER 16, 1943--In the morning General Clark conferred with General Gruenther, Admiral Lowry and Captain Lewis, Fifth Army Naval Liaison Officer. Admiral Lowry has been put in charge of the naval end of proposed .amphibious operations to be engaged in by the Fifth Army, and General Clerk has directed that he conduct his planning at Fifth Army Headquarters. Following this conference, General Clark commented to Lt. Col. Sutherland that he was disappointed at what appeared to him to be a lack of enterprise on the part of the naval authorities. The General pointed out that military operations were inseparable from risk and that no commander could escape the danger of defeat. He felt that the naval authorities must come to facl. the fact that any landing operation was hazardous and that it might have to be undertaken with some risk of failure. In the afternoon, General Clerk conferred with General Sir Ronald Adam, Adjutant General of the British Army. General Sir Ronald fulfills the function for the Br1.tish Army that the War Department G-1 performs in' the United States and hence is the ultimate authority on British replacements. \ General Clark discussed with him the fact that the British Divisions were depleted, both in officers and men, and the British General stated quite frankly that Britain was coming to the end of her manpower resources. At the present tim9, for replacements, he was 1)reaking up 01v1s1ons al:. the rate of one division every two months. ( ~ o c::t 'lr 0 r ., l ) .1,, \"' In the evening, General Clark jnvited several of his staff officers to go with him to a performance of a stage show in the Opera House at the Palace "For GI's By GI's". The show was very cleverly put on, and afterwards, General Clark went down backstage and personally complimented the company. The Army Commander dispatched the ~allowing cBble to General Montgomery today: "Cong.ratulations and best wishes on the occasion of your birthday. It is a great satisfaction for me to be workirg side bv side with you in a great c8use. The best of luck to you now and always." �On tMs day, General Clark issued Operations Instruction #10 embodying the directions to the Fifth Army for the conduct of operations in conjunction with the proposed action of the Eighth Army: In substance, the Fifth Army is to hold its present positions, regroup \ its forces and prepare for an attack ..2!1 the 30th of November. This attack will be conducted three corps abreast - VI Corps on the right, II Corps in the center and 10 Corps on the left. VI Corps will attack in a westerly direction along the roads COLLI - ATINA and FILIGNANO - S. ELIA. II Corps will attack straight up Highway #6, the 1st Armored Division to go forward in that direction as soon as the situation permits . 10 Corps will cross the Garigliano and establish a bridgehead in the CAST~LFORTE area and be prepared to operate to the north and/or to the west. The following situation report was received from Eighth Army today: ~ "Cosi trep number 75 1200 hours . Very bad weather on whole front has restricted j activity and movement . 5th Corps. 8th Ind. Division. Leading elements reached SAN MARCO H3586 and patrol reports enemy back in TORNTRECCIO H3481. 13th Corps . 5th Division. Patrols to area M PONTELLA H0541 and PIXXOJ\1E H0340 in last 3 days took prisoners and report former clear. AIR. Day 15th. Kittyhawks straffed few scattered nl' 1 s south of ANCONE claiming 7 destroyed and 2 damaged. Reece covering METKOVIC and r..'OSTAR areas found no movement. Spitfires carried out early patrols over forward troops but weather deteriorated and no further operations possible . All informed. 11 * * * CASERTA--NOVEr•1BER 17, 1943--In the morning General Clnrk conferred with Brigadier General Adcock, G-4, AFHQ; Brigadier General Ramsay, QM, AFHQ; and Brigadier General Sims, Finance Officer, AFHQ. General Sims had just received hjs promotfon from Colonel. General ClHrk made his position very clear on the subject of moving AFHQ to the Caserta Area. At the present time, it was pointed out, the tactical situation did not permit the Fifth Army Headquarters to move. Thus far, the Headquarters had been remarkably free from bombing, due to stringent camouflage discipline. However, if large construction crews and similar groups should start functioning in the Caserta area, the probability of disclosure to the enemy of the location of these installations would be vastly increased. r In the afternoon, General Clark, with his aide, Lt. Col. Suth9rland, walked over the mountain above Caserta. On the way ~neral Cl:=i.r k discussed the f;eneral strategical 1uestions facing the Allied Nations. He stated that, in his estimation, Germany had no further hope of victory but ~as playing ~or~ chance to make a favorable settlement with the Allies . At the present time, the Allies · were victorious on nll fronts, and Germany had no reasonable grounds for negotiating a p~ace. An invasion across the Ene;lish Channel, wM ch mj ght result in a serious defeat like Dieppe on a huge scale, would P.:ive the Germl"ns a chance to argue that the war was approaching a stalemate, and that the Allies would do well to give Germany favorable terms. According to General Clark's view, proper strategy would call for maintenance of •a threat of a cross-channel invasion which would keep Germany hanging undecjded on that front, maintenance of the ~ aerial bombardment and a strengthening of the allied forces on the Italian front to jnsure that no reverse could occur there and in order that progress could even �be made against the Qermans throu h the Balk.ans or otherwise. The Allies, by ) thus keeping up the pressure on the Germans, could put Germany in a worse.position as each day passed and bring about her surrender as soon as this fact was realized by the general run of the German populace. General Clark also discussed the fact that the capitulation of Germany, if it ,,·ere suddenly to occur, would present difficult problems to the Fifth Army. The General stated that he had instructed his G-3 to prepare plans for an immediate move into Germany, in case of a German capitulation. The General also <liscussed various problems arising out of our co-belligerency with the French. General Juin was anxious to corr.mand a Corps, but at the present time had only a prospect of bringing 5n the ?nd Moroccan Division. General Juin was hinting at the add.ition of an American Division to round out his Corps, but General Clark felt that General Juin should not be given a Corps until he had a French Corps to coMmand. Another problem arose out of a French proposal to lodge with Fifth Army Headquarters two separate French elements entitled respectively, the French Mission nnd the French Increment, Headquarters Fifth Army. General Clark stated that he proposed to take a definite stand :in favor of one French group on his staff and that he would prefer to have General Beucler, present head of the French Mission, to head that group. If the French wish to call their group something other than the French Mission, well and good. General Clark received today Prom General Montgomery the followjng response to his cable of·yesterday: "Thank you so very much for your kind message on my birthday. I have absolute confidence that the Fifth and Eighth Armies pulling together as one entity will achieve successful results. Good luck to you all. 11 * * * CASERTA--NOVEMBER 18, 1943--Gencral Clerk conferred with Mr . Watson of the Baltimore Sun and afterward with Lt. Gen. Mccreery, Commanding General, 10 Corps. Following this conference, General Clark left his command post j_ a jeep, accomn panied by Brigadier Richardson and Captain Lampson, and went to the headquarters of the 201st Guards BrigRde where he met with the officers of the Guards Brigade who had been called together at General Clark's request. The General spoke appreciatively to these officers of the ~ood work the Guards Brigade has done since the landing on Salerno Beach, and said that he knew that they would do equally well in the hard days to come. \ /1. Thereafter, General Clark went on to the command post of the 36th Division which had just been established south of' the road running from Route #6 past Fresenzano, a short distance east of the former 3rd Division command post. Here, General Clark, and the officers accompanying Mm, had lunch with the Di vision Commander, General Walker, and talked over the reHef of the 3rd Division by the 36th, which had been successfully completed durjng the precedjng night without incident of any "'Ort. After lu."lch, General Clark went by jeep across the Volturno at F-0nte Reale and went to the VI Corps Command Post at Prata, where he discussed the situation with General Lucas. General Clark then returned to his own CP via Caiazzo. �1 ~ l C ~ J. h~J< ef~o ~ r.:>.w" \32 j7_ t'. J Shortly after he arrived at his CP, General Clark received a last call from General Ridgway, Commanding the 82nd Airborne Division. The Division, less the 504th Parachute Regiment, i.s about to sail for the United Kingdom, while General Ridgway is about to leave for the United States before rejoining his Division in England. General Clark spoke appreciatively to General Ridgway of the fine work done by the 82~d Airborne Division and assured General Ridgway that he would see that the 504th Regiment rejojned the Division in due course. General Ridgway spoke of his pride at hRving been associated with the Fifth Army's invasion of Italy and of the personal satisfaction which it had given him to serve under General Clark's command. 11 The following important messages were received and dispatched today: From Fifth Army to AFHQ, 15th Army Group, 8th Army, VI Corps, II Corps, 10 Corps. RN 7047. "ISIDi1 No. 71 to include 181500 Nov. VI Corps: Enemy activity throughout the period directed toward locating our dispositions and his arty continued intermittent fire to harass and jnterdict . Fatrolling by foot elements was active during the period . Air reconnaissance active this morning. No new identifications. No change reported of units in contact and enemy front lines. "II Corps: Patrols on our f'ront were ""ired on by machine guns from vicy G-965145 and Hill 180 (G-9316) and bv mortars same vicinity. Patrol saw 20 enemy digging in near road G-990161. Machine guns fired from vicy Rd junction 69 (G-9515). No indication enemy knows presence 36 Div in line. "10 Corps: Enemy shelUngs of MIJi::Lr (G-9506) and explosions in GAETA (G-6490) continue.n From Main 10 Corns to' Fifth Army. RN 0671. 11 Sitrep timed 1930 hours. No change on Corps front . 56 Div. Enemy shelled CALABRITTO G9505 and GALLUCIO G96o5 during afternoon. 46 Div. TT R. 46 RT R now in Corps area and under Comd 23 Armd Bde. Weather . Heavy showers . All informed ." n radio order-=- Affect:::n at l.'.2ul tL.:.3 morn"n ,, t}· 3 ~rd ::)~7ision as as"'iP-·1ed to II Corrs. * * * CASERTA--NOVEMBER 19, 1943--General Clark conferred with General McCreery, Commanding 10 Corps, concerning the plans of 10 Corps to resume the advance on the Camino hill mass . He also talked ,,dth Mr . Hark Watson, correspondent for the Baltimore Sun, and recejved a call from Major General Erskine, Commanding General of the 7th Armored Division, who took his leavP- , as the 7th Armored Division is returning to the United Kingdom. The General then left his command post with Lieutenant Colonel Sut er7and and vrent to },faples, where he met Brigadier General Holmes, Chfof of the Mi.lita.ry Government Section, AFHQ; Brigadier General r•csherry, Senior American r~ilitary GovP,rnment Officer under the 15th A:rmy Group; Lt . Col. Lord Forrester of Ar 1G, Region #3; Colonel Francj s f"arkoe, Lt . Col. John '·Jygaard of AMG, Region l/3; and Capt_ain Julius Byles, now of Af'G, Region #3, and f'ormerly GenerAl Clark's aide . General Clark took lunch with these officers E'nd discussed rroblems affectinis mil-itary ~overnment of Naples and the vfoinity. Thereafter GenArnl Clark, with Colonel r~arkoe, Lt . Col. NygRard and Lt. Col. SuthArlPnd, =ent to the Fifth Army Officers I R~st Center at Sorrento, \Yhere the Genorc1l st, yed for �the nieht . He vms pleas ed w~_th the progress made in provjding a place of re creat ion -ror Fj fth Army of'ficers , rarticularly t hose of combat service , and he told lfajor Klein , the manager , thrit he would have additional rations e ggs , post exchange a.nd sales store supplies , coRl , Red Cross servi c e , a dis bursing officer and some cigarettes - made available . He rlso stated that he would send a motor boat to the rest center for use ; n fer ry:i.ng officers t o 2.nd from Capri for recrePtional purposes an~ djrected that officer s of the Army Nurse Corps be admitted to the rest center like other officer s . * * * CASERTA--N0VEMBER 20 , 1943--General Clark, nfter spending a short time at Sorrento and buyin~ Bn inlaid woorl t11ble and soMe boxes as a Christ mas present for l~r s . Clark, left for Naples by automobile ith Col. Markee , Lt . Col. Nygaard and Lt . Col. Sutherland . He returned to his command post at noon and spent the afternoon in disposing of admjnistrative matters . In the evenjnfs the Army Co111mander entertaj_ned at dinner Brigadier Gene ral Julius Holmes , CW-~ of the Pilitary Government Section, AFFQ , Rnd discussed various rroblems affecting military ~overnment . The follovd.nis important messages were received and dj_spatched today: From Fifth Army t o AFHQ , 15th Army Group , ~j r,-hth Army and the three Corps. RN 7 597. 11 En~my a ctivity on entire f'ront limit ed t o active :ratrolling, sporadic art illery on roads , bridges and installations and str~no-theninr defensive positions . Several low level air attacks vj cinity AV8RSA and CATUA . Freliminary reports claim small damage and 6 aircraft destroycd . 11 From r~ain 10 Corps to CG Fjfth Army. RN O 693 - 20 . 11 Sitrep t i med 1930 hours . L:i.ttle activity on Corps f'ront . 56 Div. f'arked decrerse ~n enemy artillery P ctj vi ty. During 19 ovember cons7 derable ~!I' movement ob2erved area G 8610 . As many as 60 vehicles yer our using the rord, this Area . Bri tfrh bridge at 891133 constantly US\.~d . 11 46 Div. i:;;nemy vrnrkj_n"' rarties observed area GCJ103 G9003 digging and repairing defenses . Little movenent observed on tre rest of the front . rn~ 109 1 s and F"if 190 1 s att ac1{ed ir,hvmys 6 11.nd 7 durin~ the day. Some dPmage and casualties . T E/A shot dovm :in the morning attack by 56 LT AA Reg!; . 4 E/A shot down by ground troops in the afternoon att ack. fo change in rosition of forward troops . T'l'eather wet in t he morninr- i Mproving later . All inforned . 11 * * * CASERTA--N0VB~BER 21 , 1943--In the morning General Clrrk attended to administrative natters and conferred with his Grief of Staff and G-3 . At 1300 the General ~nt ert~ined a number of All5ed leaders of h"s st8ff, -including Admirals i"orse and Lowry, Genl'crrils HcCreery and Rj chardson o-r the British Army, Genernls Lucas and Keyes of the American Arny, General Dody of the French Army, and other All ied officers , munberin1s P"bout 50 . After luncheon, General Cl2rk conferred V"ith General Lucas about the VI Corps situation. In the evenjng he saw the film , ttpanama Hattic 11 wjth a fe,v of his sta"'f off-i cers . The :'ollovring situation report 'ms rece:1ved from •~j i:;hth Army: �l40 11 Continued heavy rein serio1rnl7 hl"lld up movement l."'nd octivity. V Corps. 78 Division. Strong ratrol clashes rave occured north of Sangro. 8 Ind Division. •row hold l ~ ne of ro:id fron }l' 3592 to I 3089. Last nj ,:;ht river was in flood rieking crossi 1g ··mpossible . One Three Corps. 1 Cdn Division. No enemy reported east of S1.'lngro j n 3 Cc1n Drign.de Area yesterday. Bridge H 208648 and pontoon H 181616 intact. T·;vo Battalions now -in the area north r,nd south of San Msetro H 1554. Five Division. 17 Brigade rass""n<; through 13 Brigade today captured . 1252 II 0443 again,st opposition. 13 Brigade rerort point 1010 H 0441 clear . Air . Day 20. Sp~tfires on early ratrol turned bRck owing to bad weather . Due to unserviceability of LG's all f'urther operations cancelled . All inf armed . 11 1 10 Corps r~ain submitted the follo 'ling situation report today: \ "Enemy movement in areas G9506 G9/+05 G9407 G93011- G9305 engaged by Arty. Estimated strength of enemy in are8 Mi>iano Di Sopra M B697 one Pl South e.nd two pls North of river . 3 Pl posns astride ry north of river r✓1 8594. Own tps . 56 Div. 169 Bde Coy established Campo G9696 and jn wood G0 63078 report movement North of f"onastery Hill G95~082 during morning and all day on Ft 727 G 951068 . Further Coy will be established c~spoli G9708 tonight . Patrol l ocated Area G958075 still out. 168 Bde . Report f11 G fire from G 934043 . 201 Bde Hq W 076865 . Coldm Gds N 025918. SGN' 107907. 167 Bde NTR . 46 Div. 139 Bde . 5 Foresters Patrol crossed Br at M 858943 . Br not mined and passable to Inf. 128 and 138 Bdes NTR. All :tnformed. " * * * CASERTA--NOVEMBER 22, 1943--In the morning General Clark conferred with Major General Lord Rennell , Chief Civil Affairs Officer, 15th Army Group. Lord Rennell brought two messages . In the first place, he stated th~t 15th Army Group . proposed to turn over to Italian administration, under the Allied Control Commission, the southern part of Italy from Sr>lerno to Foggia, excepting essential port and airfield ~nstallations, which will remnin in Allied control. Alljed HiHtary Government, under Fifth Army, vrnuld continue to function in the combat areas . There remained a thin slice o~ territory in the rear of combat areas not yet turned over to Allied rtiilitary GoverITMent Tihich ~twas proposed to 2.dminfater under 15th Army Group under the supervision of Colonel Hurne . General Rennell stated that he proposed to send in a number of new A~G officers who would be broken in under experienced officers, to the end that when Fifth Army moved on and Colon~l Hume's staff moved with .;t, the newly imported officers might contjnue to function. General Clark stated that this plan seemed unobjectionable to him. General Rennell then stated that when Rome was taken, he proposed to f'unction under whatever Army might hav, taken it. If :it were the Fifth Army, Colonel Huri~ wuld continue to +'unction under Lord Rennell. General Clark then asked vhether G".lneral Renncll's statement ind:icRted any thour;ht that the Eighth Army, rather than the Fifth Army, vras p;oir,[" to take Rome. Lord R~:nnell stated thAt he nerely Meant whichever Army took Rome, he was prepPring to tare over under it. General Clark asked u11der ,~hori Lord Heimell proposed to f'unction, and the reply was 11 15th Army Group". General Clerk then said that as lone; as he riad tactical respons:lb:lity for administration of a city he uould ave to hav~ the Allied r.rilitary 11overnrnent jn tPBt area operatin, dj_ rectly under him. He said that he did not care , ho headen :1 t, , s long as l'e 1,new Ms busin.ess, but that it would h,~ :i.mposs~ble, nhile occupyin(J', defcndin~ and rricifying RoMe, to �have the military ':Overnme1t under a coordinete and not a suhord~nf1te Connanding 0eneral. Lord Rennell stated that he understood thjs explanation and agreed with the senti.ments 11s expressed . After the departure of Lord Rennell , Gem?ral ClRr]r discusced the AlBed MiHtary Gow,rnment situation and Lord Rennell ' s announcemunts with Colonel Htlf"le . Gener~l Clark also discussed , w~th General Keyes , the rroposed employm,nt of II Corps in future operations . . In tl1e afternoon , he 1 1ent for a walk over the mountain with Lt . Col. Sutherlanc , and he explA.ined that after considerable thou~ht , he hac:1 reluctantly cone to the conclusion that he mrnt v!ithdraw th, /~6th Division for the time bei~g from 10 Corps and place ~t lnder the II Corps . He stated that this was necessary because o+' an apparent lac 1~ of enterprise on the rart of the Commander of II Corps ·.1ho had stated, after consj derable discussion , that he would be unable to cross the Garieliano . Accordingly, General Cl11rk stated that he would be obljged to leave the 56th Division where ·twas and let the remainder of the rresent 10 Corps fro'1t be eld byte 23rd Armored Brigade . 46th Division would be moved arou.'1d for util.;zation in the adwince of II Corps northwest up Route #6; a necessory arrangement , r-s the util:ization of the single route by elements of t\10 d·1.fferent corps was a logistical jmpossibility. Hhen this operation of II Corps had yroeressed to the ro~nt that 46th Division was in 17 the lef't rear of the rresent German positions or,posjte 10 Corps , 46th Djv:ision tit . revert to 10 Corps control. General Clark stated that ·· t rras f1 cause of regret 'o t o him that General I1cCreery -..as not more agwessive and that had he been an ~~· American Corps Commander it uould have been nece sary to relieve him long before this . The diplomatic rel.<ltionships ~ nvolved , however , made thj s imposd.ble . The General stated that he proposed to transmit his dec5.sion concerning the utilj zation of 46th Division to General Alexander as --:oon r>s he arrived this afternoon. Generals Alexander and Richardson arrived in the late afternoon and had djnner with the Army Conmander . The following situation report was received from E5gbth Army: "Reece over JUS".rOSLAV Coast straffed 2 11'\7 1 s in Sibenik Hfl.rbour and 1agons in railway yards . Strikes observed hut no cln.ims made . Patrols also carried out over forward troops . Wnrhawks in search of roPd 11.nd rail movement found no suitable targets . All informed . ttRe cent rain hA.s again hamp~red all activity to such an extent that it has proved practically impossible to. move either tracked or wheeled vehicles off roads . "V Corps . 78 Div. v,st 24 hours has been spent ~n establisMng bridgeheads over River SPngro in face of strong enemy orposition. 2 Bridges are now complete with 1 fit f'or tan1·s . The building of the third · s b~ing hRmpered by enemy shelling. No pubHcit;v must be given to bridgehead act:Lvities at present . 8 Ind Div. Patrols last night sounded crossing at H 3393 but report enemy laying mines far side in this area . ttXIII Corps . 1 Cdn Div. 3 Cdn Bde . Standing Patrol Srn Angelo H 2614 attacked b-r 0nemy jn strength . este:i"day and a tF=ir 2 hours :--ction enemy forced to �withdraw but stillP.sovpr bridge H 208648 . Fatrols ocross river at Amplera H 1053 and r•"lached Castel Di Sangro r"'!Maining in trnm for 2 hours . Hany villages in t his area destroyed by enemy. 5 Div. 17 Bde continued advance in face of considerable shellfire and occupied point 1086 H 0342 and point 1192 H 0344. "AIB. Day 21. Fir:;hter Bonbers attacked eY1emy strong points at C 370015 , C:256064 and C 353009. Spitfires on offensive . " * * * CASERTA--NOVEMBER 23 , 1943--In the morning General Clark received General Alexander in his van. General Alexander stated that it would be harder now to get Monte Camino and Honte Haggiore than j_t would have been before . General Clark said he understood that thorour.;hly and that he had three times ordered 10 Corps to take the hill mass , but 10 Corps had fajled to do so . General Clark said he intended to rel!,roup his f'orces, direct Gn additional attack, and take the hill masses in question. General Alexander stated that ·'n that case, General Clark ;ould find himself "in a fight 11 , ancJ. said that he thought it would be preferable to remain ci.uiet f'or a time . General Alexander left nfter ) thi.s dj scussion, and General Clark, CO"lmemting on the conversation to Lt . Col. Sutherland, said that he would have to have an order in writing from GP,neral Alexander j f he discontinued his proposed nave fori,rard . Generol Alexander then left the comr1and y-ost wj th General R_ chards on and Captain Lompson for a :i visit to 10 Corps , Qnd General Clark had a short conference with N~ . Alan Poorehead of the Daily Express , Mr . Clifford of the Daily t"ail and r·r . Buckley of the Dailv Telegraph. The General then left by jeep for Caserta, "'here he inspected the 6th Battalion Grenadier Guards, comroanded by Major Cholmondeley. After the inspection, he passed the battalion in revierr. He was accompr-nied at this for mation b-- P~ajor General T8!'1plar, Commandinfr the 56th Division, and Lt . Col. Kingsmjll, formerly conimanding the 6th Battalion Gremdier Guards but now commanding the Guards Brigade of the 56th Division, due to the wounding of Briga<lier Gascoine . Thts battalion had been reduced ;n strenl?;th from about 500 men to about 315 in the course of recent fighting. A strikj 1g feature of' thP✓ l"Ja.ttalion was the pion~er sergeant who, follo1'!"ing an ancient custom, wore a full black beard and carried , i.n place of a rj_fle or other ueapon, a shining rixe of the shape usually associated with headsmen. 1 General Clark then i.nvited General Templar to accomp ny Mm, r>ncl , \,ith Lt. Col. Sutherland , drove north on Route k16 to the command post of the 36th Division. Here , th3y net General Keyes and General Walker . A heavy rain_ storn had borrged the command post , avid the ro?.ds around it , in sticky mud, but the Generals , in the shelter of the mess tent, exam1ned photographic studies of the terrain over which the II Corps would shortly have to attack. Generel Key"?s said that he was turn:ing the Plow Force over to the 36th Division and that their mission would be to taye the ridge south of Route #6 within the Division sector . General TE'lmplar pointed out a sharp r:' dge , part of the Camino hill mass , called the 11 Razorback", ,·,hich he considered to be the key to the attack of the 56th Division . He stated that he had had three ratrols ascend that ridge on three different routes and could not see why whole companies could not get up it. Colonel Frederick, of the Plow :force , ten arrived and likewise discussed the Camino hill problem with General Clark. Shortly therePfter General Alexander and General / �Richardson arrived, and after some discussion of the situation General Clark, General Keyes , G~neral Alexander and General Rjchardson drove north on Route //6 to examine the high terrA.in over which the attack must pa.ss . The shellfire a t this r oint was heavy, and several shells passed near the course of the party and burst a few yards from them . After this , the party returned to Gene r al Clar :!< 1 s command post , ,·,here he entertained Generals Alexander and RichPJ'dson for dinner. * * * CASERTA--'HO'TEMITCR 24, 19/-,..J--This morning General Alexander left for Bari by car . General Clnrlr had offered General Alexander his plane , but the neather proved unpropj t ious . In the morning, General Clark visited the 36t h Gener al Hosp: tal , v-here he :inspected a number of wards and tal1:ed \"Tith many patients . Amonr these was r~ajor General Piddleton who ; s in the hosp5 tal due to an injured leg and who had just been relieved of corm1and of the 45th Division be cause of his physical condition. General Clark talJ·ed with General f"iddleton a t some length and expressed his satisfaction VTith the way Generol Midoleton had commanded h·s Division and his regret that hjs injury had made ;t ne cessary for him to rel inqujsh his comnand . During the t:tft ernoon , General Clark disposed of a number of administr a - t ive nat ter s , including the approval of eight court martinl cases submitted to him by t he Judge Arivocat e , Colonel r•ickelw:-iit . He also directed that Gt"lneral Gruenther , who had had no rest from Ms duties for many weeks , take 24 hours off at the Officers ' Rest Center at Sorrent o . General Gruenther left for this purpose with Lt . Col. Tarter , Se cret a r y General Staff , and Lt . Ba,ienO''', his aide . Late in the afternoon, Colonel Howard and Genera l Brann reported to Gene r al Cltirk to discuss the tactical situation. Colonel Howard reported that a German Division had been shifted from the seacoast south of GPeta to a point opposite t he Eighth Army. Today, General Clark ~ ssn~d Operations Instruction n1 coverin~ the r.~~E:t, µ4,,i~ sumption of the offensive of Ti'ifth Army by phases . "1' ·c\1lt, j..a.c Phase #1 , to comr1ence on or about December 2nd , was to consist of the capture of the critical terrain feAtures Camino , La Difensa and !'ag~iore.. 10 Corps , 24 }.our s before Phase (/1 :· s lalmched , is to seize the Celabritto feature and the following day t o seize r•onte Camino hill !T'.ass . 10 Corps was also instructed t o ~nstjtute a de ception plan consistin~ of an att:1,ck on the lower Garigliano j n conj1.mct:'. on 7lith naval action. II Corps was directed to capture rronte La Difensa and ~ante r~ag8ior e . VI Corrs was to probe the enemy defens5ve · positions along the corps front with emr,hasis on the right . Phase 112 , to be cor1nenced on Army order , was to consist of the capture of r•onte Sar-Plucro ; n conjunction with an attack "'est :c>lon~ the Colli - Atina road . In conncct1em · ith this attack, 10 Corps will consolidate Hs y;ositions on r•onte Camino , !~ante La Difensa and Honte Mag.;iore ( on the latter two of ''Thich it rill have relieved II Corps as arranged between the Corrs Commanders) . II Corrs will capture Ponte Sammucr o , Pnd VI Corps , rrhile assisting II Corps .; n the capture of' Samrmcro , will launch a similar attack on the roR.d froM Colli to At i na in the dil'ection of the hill mass nort heast of Cassino . VI Corps will also rnak~ a secondary attack ,·,est r long; the Fil · -=;nrino - San , lia road. 1 ' �Fhase #3 1ill co11sist of a main attack :into the Lir-' V lle~T, nhich •nill be ca1·ried out on Arry order . I11 this '"ha8e , 10 Corrs ill occup~r an objective cons::_st-' Y' ; 0f 1.n area to tl'"'e irmediate west of t 1e lonte :agP-iore region and :-,rote ct the left of the II Corps . W1'e;.1 the II Corps shall 1ave arlvanced sufficjently, 10 Corps will cross the riv8r Li1·i ~nr occupy a bridgeh9ad in the viciPity of Sen Ambro,,.io . II Corns will attacl:: ·1orthw-.~t along :l'iP"h,,ay //t., to enve~op the enemy ' s de-"e'1ses 11ea.r Cas ino . VI Corp~ ,ill continue --lts attacl· outlined ~ n Phase II , c.nd, with the 11elp of II Corps , s :.:.ze t:1e M,~h f':l'Ound northwest o . . Ca~sino. Tl-J.e 2nd Moroccan D~vision, as :::oon as rea'y, is to relieve the 34th. The 1st Armored Division , rein,..orcecl , dll pr,,pare rlano for the emrloyment of its armored units with II Corps ~n the Liri Val ey ,h8n II Corps has rcael19c positions t 1rougr rrhi.ch armor·ed units ".:E' n cle bouch . It is noteworthy thrt this Operations Instruction leaves 4/Sth Division under 10 Corps an , t:1erefore , Uat tre r.,.,oposed withdrawal of thi.s Di.v:ision fron thPt \ Corps co'1trol f'or t:1e .,.,roj cted oy,eratior. was '1ot effected . Gener-8.l Clar,. mq lained ~ to Lt . Col. ,:nth,,rlrmd thet Generel ·ccr~ery rad ori~iri"l.lly considered it to be impossible f'or 4~th Division to arlvance agr. i '1st t· e 911emy to tre ,,,est o-r• the C, nine feature because of' r'~ efields and enemJ -t>::_re . Further study by GA'1eral "cCreery caused Mr>1 to ch.111e his mi11.d and co'1vi·1cod hirt tl qt th· s advance -:ms rosriible , and he stoor r0arlv to .-,- 1·e i. t . Accord· nhly, Ge nor a::. Clark det0rmi ned to leave 46th I Di vi. "l-i.011 under J, ·· s co11trol. Tn the evenin~ , Gen9ra1 ClarJr e 1t8rt'l~ ned G0ner- ls Brann rrir: Lew~ r, f'or dinner . A r,able 'liSpl'ltched .(>roT!l t.d s eadqwu·t8rs made the following corr·ectio'1 in the ov,rlay t o be nsed i.YJ. co11.nec-l;i011 witl rrert1tio'1c; :nstruction #11: "The boundary betwee'1 Fi .coth and ,.;..; gl1t}, Armies sho-17 r1 read: 'o c 1E..nge to ; "132 - tbe 11ce 7 Q3l to 1?36 to f~37 to 0339 to G0?/1-7 to 030~26 all in.elusive to l~~ c:;rth Arrw, th<>nce 110 change . u "'1e follow~ n ; ;:ii trer was received to<lry "rori 10 Corr s aic:1: L ·ttle act'i vi.ty ol" Corps froPt (L) own troo_ s . Regrou:;ii"lg in "'o~ess ~ 1t_9 Bde . 1115 1 . A1'tY ~n';I' c;ed l:? Y'1e'1 on f!o11aste,..,· ··in. J(-,3 Bde . R~1 · ef 1rs 3co4:, ei·r Ko-r> ,%r rr and L..; r ½v 1/, Dli col"y,lote . 1 Lon Jcot new . 11 E11.,..,my. 56 Di.v . of 10·1 11 Area iTessara 09303 Lill area GC'l603 . :101 Gris Rde . ~ G,~ n Bds r;;t-r·ol '• 1190 other~ ':7ise '10 chnnr;e . 167 B e . 9 RF Go11c e.::. ea TLRRA CORIC FO?Ol. /.,6 ::)iv. 13q Bde . '1TR, loc£'tions 16 DLT area '"'J ICr,JAHO '19'.502 . r.; Foresters DA·r CARLO 90300 nncl .S,2 G9'30"!.: .. -,.,/4 Leics Font1 ~,gr.;91-'J. 0 0 ncorigliano r•r:i297 . i '1 ,~qo93 e"1.1f' r.;ed ePemy . 128 and 13n B<les 'ITR . 23 Armd Bde . l n.trol /,.,6 R8cce to Br Locat-i ons . RdA ·tq r•r:i?99n . KD x F1 . 1()14°10. "'he folloui11"· ~nt,~11·· a-ence ,...1JJ'l1:r'iarv was di spatc'1erl to A.,,H1, 15tr /...J.'~Y G,,.oup , t~ e tl ree "'" ftl J\ ~'my Corr '3: ..., i. ,,. U. Army Pn:1 11 45 n~vision rP.J:ulsed ... ·11or G0rw=m rttac'~ Rt II0C?O . Art::.lle1·v so:r"e'rlll't s1Pcir'l~;t<>T1ti.0T1 "1n.:n1y on roads . , atrol to 0ridge •-~0°3 fo·mcl rrirty ell emr::.aceri. sout}, of r:-.-ri,..l~ no . 'l,.tl"8r ver•y ½ad . n "":'1ed '17lt 0 * * - THA'!K.3~IVIJ G DAY CASERTA~-'TffTE.LR:1. 25, 1n43~-Grw"•'" l Chrk le""t ii.: s ccr"'~r>'i rost ct ~bout O~lt;, ent throu .-J:- r.api..'1 YJ.orti "!l R01•+" ?9 5 , 1'1 ~ s: or-t "i-::.t:':, to t e corun~1:'1d rost 0f the '36tr Divisir-n °'1cl , roc"'ec~cr' ........ . t.'""tii'.8- ;to t· P. con,rrn i • 0s+ nf' tl ~ 7 1,.lst Inf£'11tr • m Ar8 1 e ~o-fm·T'"Jd ,,it Colo'1el Arn3r the 1.eci.rrrmt·: Co"'~ "noer . As 1 * �\ the purpose of this trip was in part tactical and in part to determine whether the units of the Fifth Army were getting turkey, the General carefully inquired at each point whether the essential element of Thanksgiving dinner had been ) provided. In the case of every tmit , he ,vas told that turkey was on hand for Thanksgiving dinner today or, due to unavoidable difficulties would not be served until tomorrow. In some instances , turkey was being brought up to forward elements on muleback after being cooked in the rear . After leavinf; the 141st (wh5ch was loci:ited on the northeast of Route #6 a few kilometers north of the l'resenzano road , the G'.3neral visited the command post of U.e 143rd, commanded by Colonel i~artin, which was in the same building as the com111and post of the 141st. He then returned rlown Route //6 and visited the conmand post of the '753rd Tank Battalion . He then ~,ent on to Venafro and visited the command post of the 509th Parachute Battalion. Colonel Yarborough was away, but General Clark had a discussion with h:.-s staff and learned that the Germans had this r1orning delivered two cou...nter-attacks against the paratroopers and the rangers on their left . The Amerj cans bid two killed, anr. bot/ counter-attacks were repulsed . Turkey ·ms on its V'Tf'Y to the men of the 509th by mule . The General them continued on throu<;h mud and driving rain to the command post of the !:-5th Di vision artillery, wh~ ch ras loc.,tod in one of the former r:11miciral buildings in Venn.fro. Pen the General arrived , G~neral PcClaj n, the Division Artillery 0-"ficer , and Ms st,c-i:"f ·rere having Than1rsgiving din.."ler in tre hall o: the building. Th~ hall was sorewh< t constricted bi1t as the upstairs h11.d b"'en damaged by a shell a few hours before it had been decided to hold the Thanksgivin.rt c1inn~r domstairs . General Cleric, Lt . Col. Suth~rland end the ,nli sted men of 1'5 s rarty had a good Tl-ian1•se;ivin~ dinn~r , including tur}:ey and ,'lll the trfo.nings , -vith the Division ertilleryrnen. After dinner, '}enere.l r7cClain accompanied General Clark, with one jeeP, to the command rost of' the 157th Infantry east of Venafro on a narrmv trail. There too, turkeys Here beinf, roA.sted or the muddy soldiers. After Goneral Clark had discussed the situation n-ith Colonel Church, Cornna.nding the 157th Infantry, he got in his jeep and went on up to a place about thr·ee miles north of Montacquila rvhere the 34th Division had .iust moved its command rost . Tre Generel :inquired as to whether the men were get tin'; their turkey anr: was assur~d that efforts were being made to get it forwar"l to tr-en j f not todry, surely tomorrow . Here , ( in a sea of mud , the Gen~ral conferred ii:.t' General Ilv1¼r and his staff off:i cers aoout the -l"nture attack .!n the westerly direction from Colli . Ye then re-entered his jeep and returned to his cor'1."k'l.-rtd post via Venafro. In the driving rain, the Genernl stopped several tines to talk to partfos of the 34th Division .~ng:ineers { who were working to repair washouts in the roRd . The men vrere in rrood heart and S"' id thev expected to ri-et ~ome l·ind of Than1rs ,:i ving dinner when they reached their b::vouac that nicht . G"'neral Clark sairl to on~ rrivste rho \ms shoveling dirt and gravel, ~taml:;ng "n rain-11hipped wE>ter, "I . ore you !ill have ;;,our Thrn ·s~lVJ.ng in a better place a :rear from nor", :ind the pr:: vate answered smartly "That I s wh1-1t we are all working for today, sir". Enroute to h~s cormand post, he stopped at the J8th Evacuntion Hospital and tal:k-ed with Colonel rood, the Commandjng 0+'ficer, llnd a number of theseriously wounded men under his care . :::::v~n here, turke.~ vms bein~ rrovided for those rat:ients able to eat . General Clark reached his comriand post at about 1700, havin1s been on the road about n~ne hours . �In thA, evening General Clark entertained for dirmer Major General Sjmonds, Commandini:; the Canadian 5th Armored Divisj on; BriEradier r"orton , his Brigadier G ,neral Staff; Lieutenant Colonel rTmThY and Lieutenant Stearn.3, his aide-de-c"mp . A report from the Arjutant Genr-ral showed the followin~ casualties and prisoners of war AS of November 23rd: American Forces Wounded r1issing Killed Axis Prisoners of Wa.r 6779 2714 1715 ?173 British Forces 6135 2661 1455 Wounded Hissing Jl~illed Axis Prisoners of la.r * 1/.,05 * * CASERTA--NOVEMBER ?.6 , 1943--General Clark received General Juin, Commanding the Frcmch -q_:xpedi tionary Corps, who had just arrived from Africa in General Clark ' s plane . He discussed 1ith General Juin the fact that the 2nd Moroccan Dj_vision, which was just arriving, would be placed under the comm::ind of ) the VI Corps. rr~meral Juin said that he tmcforstood th,: s and that he ms perfectly satisfied ~ith the arrangement . He merely requested thct the French divisions come under a French Corps Co)'Ylmander nhen another division should have arrived. Ge11eral Clark asked General Juin whether he considered ·t necessary to have two ti'rench increments, one representing General Juin and the other General Giraud . General .Juin said he did not understrnc the reason f'or two. General Clar 1: tren snid that it 1iYas his · ·j sh the.t there be one French body attached to Fifth Army and that that be headed by General Beucler. General Juin said that he was in hM.rty accord ~nd that that wr,s the way ~t vrould be . General Clark asked if he was satisfied with Generol B~ucler and Generl'l Roosevelt, and GenerRl Juin as,mred General Cl;-irk that he was perfectly content that he eard only ~ood of both. General Clark then sent ~or General Roosevelt and General B~ucler and explained to them that General Beucler was to represent General Juin at Fifth Army Headquarters and Gern'!ral Roosev,lt was to represent General Clark at General Juin 1 s Fead1uarters . Thereafter, General Cll'lrk, with the offic9rs mentioned, left his v, n, where the conference had been held , and shook hanc.ls with a mmber of staff officers there assembled . These included Generel Foydenot , f'ormerlY head of the French r•ission ns a Colonel in Oujda days, and Ge'1eral Clark -~nv~ted General foydenot to his van · here he discussed old times . G~neral Clark devoted the afternoon to the r1 isposition of a number of administrative matters . Tn the i:wening e had as h; s guests at rn Italian djnner prov:'~ded 1,y Jacomino of 'Taples: GenP-ral Gruentter, G"!nero.l Moran, Colonel Tate, �Colonel Howard , Colonel Fume , Colonel 3u1Hvan, Colonel Grant , Lt . Col. Forter , Lt . Col . ~utherland . General Clark recei.v~d the following cnble f'or General Alexander today: s eyes only from nBad •eather 4 s still delaying lijighth Army operations and has caused a cha'1ge jn rlan. I do not consider thnt their main thrust ·Till have taken effect upon the Gnrman dispositions until 12th December and therefore your ma j or operation will not be required before tat dnte . 11 * * I * CAS-2:B.TA- -'iO"IGI~TLr.:R 27, 1911-J--In t11e morninP, Generc 1 Clar1{ d:.scussed signal :::-roble~~s vrith Brigadier re'1er .1 ralder, '3-iqn<>l O~ficer of the 15th P.rmy Group e 'Je-v:t he received Captain Gil esp;e, one of is Cub pilots, ,ho was lea•ring -"or the nited States . General Ch.rk .. ished 1-iim the best of luck . Shortly thereafter, he :et his conmand rest by automobile to ray a v5sit to the Fi.ft Army Officers ' Rest Center at Sorrento . He arrived at 3orrento at 1230 and spent the afternoon resting and discussing with Major Klein the needs of the Rest Center . He arranged to send additional supplies , of which the Rest Center was short . He dined w1th Gener al Brann who was also at the Rest Center for the day, and st~yed over night . * * * CASERTA--NDVZJ'BER ?.8, 191+3--General Clark arran~ed ith the nav~l riuthorities \ f or 'vater transportation to Capri and took there General Brann, his G-3, Pajor \ Klein, Pirector of the Rest Center , and a group of o:ficers stay:1ng at the Rest Center . The General spent several hours at Capri and then returned to Sorrento and drove by automobile back to })is command post . On his roturn, he comr,ented to Lt . Col. .Sutherland that the Air Corps and naval officers were \ t oo elaborately installed at the island for their own ~ood . He stated that there would undoubtedly be critid sm of the manner :.n which all available hotels and T"any villas had been taken over for Air Cor ps and no.val officers , just as there '7ould be crit 4 cism of the British for the:ir tal~ing all available space in Sorrento . The General stated that he thought it was r,uch r1ore aprroprj_ate to do ,vhat the F.; fth Army had done and put all possi½le i nstallation7> , 'ncluding the Commanding General ' s cor 1J..,a11d post , under c2.nvas . l J 1 * * CAS"'::RTA --NovrTmR 29 , 1943--Gencral Clark spent the riorning 5n ad.."linistrative work. He le-f't Ms coril"'1anr1 post :>y jeep shortly before 1300 and , 'ent to aia Latina vhere detachments o+> the 3rd D5v .. io11 vrere assem1:Jled in an open f'ield for the r-re•:ientatior. n.f'.' the Con~r8'3Si.onal I edal of Honor and two Disting,r: shed Service Crosses . General Clark .,.1,esented the r,8dal c,f i{onor to 1st LieutenPnt David C. iavbnr of t1e 3rd ReconPfliSS['nce Troop, 3rd In+>[lntry D-i.visio1-:. and tl1e Distinr;uished 8erv::.ce Cross to Captain BenjA.n-"n A. G. li'ulJ.,=,r, II, Compt:'.nY Conranr'er of a compan r in the 601st TD Battalion, E'1d Staff ~er-geant Faro7.d J . Fowey, Comrany 1, l~th T11fantry. As rart 0f the rr~r;9ntation, tre Ge11er~l spo·e hr~, 1 to +,1~ A.s~e~bl9d of~icers and ren. ~e stat~d tr.at e took~ qt p' 1 de in ra ':;n~ the 3rd :Yvi"'io•1 as rart oi=- the if'th ArrrrJ and that re ·new of ,( G,➔ -\ r f, �no · ,y,tance ; n h5 '1tor'r v/l13re E1 Di.visio'1 },'1.d equE' lled -she length of tim0 ~·-ent i.n co11t.i'1 10U.J 9.+,tac'k- as· th· s Dj vi.:iio'1 . He st<1-l:.ed that eVP."'t ra:1 ~n tl1 e D:vision and in the Fi.f't 1 Armv '1hould resolve to continue tl e rrese'lt stru ;gle untU GP.r::"'rnv wau Pinri.11:r conqu'"re "1.d un+;::.1 thft cay should not allow himSP,lf to 1"011 on the rrospect of a ross·i.bl9 return }1ome . 1 1 1 General C1 -~r1r t½e11 co>1"'e1·red brief'ly wi. th Gcmeral J:9ye-:; , Cormanding II Corns, a"ld returned to 1i1:J CC!'1m<i.nd rost . At dinner h'"' entertained General Juin; •i '"1 Cr" 0+- of Sta.·"'f, n.Gn0ral Carre rt·· 9.,...; (}enerE' l B 1cl0r, CJ.i · P,f C'f t11e Fr•=mch ri.gsi.o!l to th'3 •i:-,+h Army; Colonel Cherrie e, Gen':lral :9eucler ' s Cl-ief of Staff; Go 1eral Roos9v,.,,-1, , l}e:,-v'!ral Clark ' s Liaison Officer with Gemral Juin; Colo'1"ll SaltzrrE'n ~'1.c'l :it . Col. J-orter . After r inner r Uscus::3ion took j."'lace etween General Cl<l.r'· r-nrl (}13r e:-al Ju:-ln A.bout the order 'in ,h~ ch tl•e French conld be brou~ht into Italy. Gemral Clark stated that e brd h11.d to choose between brin"'ing -· n ,:,,1 Amer:i cavi Di v.i sio,, -f'irst or tr.9 seco"l.d o·" tl 0 h'rench ::)i 'lision9 , ad. he had er osen to ½ri '1g i '1 the second French D~ ""' sin"l, thus perr-itt~ns Gey,ercl ;;uin to set up ris Frencr Corp2 . T-Io"1eve" , 1-,e Jt,..,ted thrt he ~nte'l'lded th'?n to ½ring .;n "ln a.ddit.;ow1l Ar"erican "1ivision, the 18th, before bri11c;i:1~ in th,,, F'.cench D·h•:i si.ol'l cor,r,a..,ded 'Tr G"'nnral BJ~ossett . This Divisio'1 ms P.11 1-ip;-ed :·n rart "':.th B-dt.:sh mA.te"iel, "'l • c:1 vr"l11ld :!'."e'1der .;ts qmrloyrv=mt . di.""'"'~c'i 7 t, and the Gene,..al did 11ot ;; ,l· to qdc to 11'.::S sur:-ly rroblel"1s . G9nr.iral Juin '>air t!1ct he 11nderstood +,his 1itTu1.tion entir9ly, thoug'1 he would. lH·e to brin~ ~n t'19 1:rosset D-'vi.Jion as soon as rosf\~·)1,-, , as .;t cont11.in"l<1 Gnullist 9lnm-,.•1ts 'lncJ. .;t ms desirable YJ:ot to ,-:,jve t},,..t faction the idea ~hat they -; ere 0ei'11"{ ,=i.: cr-1n:y,3.ted A,gai."1st i'1 or,rort:.uT1it•:es ·"or f';,,. ting. 01 Tf'lP, fol low'i'1"' J',3adquarters: ~ '1J.,e11-1 ~ence SUfil""'arv l'ff'S ; sratch"'id +,h-i s 9V9n-1 ng ,nrom th-' s 11 VI Corrs :i'ront: 34 Div . received co'1s~ dl'lr" b19 artillery ""ire Dt COLLI, .:CAFOLI and IOZZILLI. Enemy well entrE':ncl'ed and r~otected bv accur.<i.te artillery and mortar ""ire n.t F-0834. r"i'l states 81,,,mentf' of' 44 Ji~, . rel.; ew,d gth i GR ?/1 ~rov south 0: "ld GompA.11Y c:,77 Regt . .::ome on :1ill H-01527'1 . rw reports 2r1 Bn 57'1 Inf wit ldra1•m bec:'.'use ,-..:,-: 1 osses . "II Corps Front: Arty i'1ter 'icti:ng 1r' seiw~y r.> to junction !I-0306* tion of ··ricreesed activ-'ty o"l fighmy (-, in last 24 our·c: . 11 X Corps ro11t: * '-'o rr.ro1 P1d "'Ctiv·ty. T"l.dica- 1·!"·.tAd arty n::re rerortcd . 11 * * CASERTA --'f'•!C'VT<:"Tf:'1 1c, 1()43--G-Bnerrl CJarl;: remE'iY'ed <it lii;:; o"fice thro tzhout the d£y 0ngaged in the il :sro.,ition of c. great number of adl"'ini strfltive ~ at-,ters . Dnri YJ.g tl1c nl'l.Y 1e conferred ·1i. th Generr 1 Gruen~h'3r, ' ~ s C .; ef of Jtr.ff; G911e1·r 1 ~rann, his G- 3 and Co onel Ho arc, his G- 2, concernin1 th8 ;mpendin~ attrck . 1 0 At djnner GenerRl Clarl-r 9ntertained 'Rr'i gadier GenerAl ,rllliars of t 'T'ran ,port Comra~d . 1e A:r 'T'hA Ar,v Cor"mr1'1dAr Y/'I'ote a let;ter tor'la~r to • j. Gen. Joyce o tl.e A11~ ed Control Co""l:r.1ission requestinr.- I~i'."\ to convey to ''-rshal :3"doglio his assurances that tre ~-st tPlian Potorized rj i,-ade will 'l:ie aserl as soon as the rio;l t sr,ot is ·f'o me~ for ~t, rnd e.fter the :.1 rrlv situat:i.on clears u:;_} . /c "u.,-,the.,. r.isserted that e b~l-i eved lie h«d ""oun<l t},e ri; t "rot 1l.llu. "ould conummic"l.te further w· th General Joyce as soon r 'J he co 1ld cc"unit the 1,rigane. �Genercl Cl:1.rlr m·ote 01.so tod<J.y to tre ~OffiMr nder-.;n-01,_-" 0f, A'"''.1, cor>:mendi."1.g Gen')ral 'id leton, fo,,.m'3r Comrander nf t 'e 4 ~th Inf'e.ntry !)ivision, -f'or r·t. s11pcrio- ~er-ro.,,,mancc of dnty ::inn recomP1end:ln~ h.;s retur'1 tote rrn:tted States ~or assignment as CorrlTilandor of a Trainin~ Corrs due to the fact that re is suffering "'ror A. chronic art 1r·· tic left 1--n.ee "lhich ; s 0f some years 1 standi.np. The rain is rggravated bv ~ield conditions, and Gener?l C ark re~ c0mr'enrled t · s -re11s ...dP,nment PS .;t ~10uld 1.:ve him an onport1mity to make a sub1tantiAl co'1tr:Pmti0n to t,he war e fort o~ t e m .t~on ~--id nlso he a .;tting reward for '1is outstanding comb<J.t c;ervice. 1 The follm1inr, commmique v as .; r:sued by 1 Sth Army Grou:r for release 3-t 2200 hours toni~r.t by PRO, AFH~: 11 E•: '":litr. Army troors now hold Fossncesia, Vil la S,nntn. i'11"' ia, lfozzarr.ro ·na and Rome~ol:i . The vhole of ti,e ,~ r;h rido;e wM.ch 0verl00 s and dom·' rn1.tes the '3anr:;ro Vallev is no.Y ;n our hi:i.".lds . 1e t ..,o hridgAhe ds on the Adriatic side have now 'l)e-1r ioin~d u:-, to ~orn one larr-;e renetrn.tion in the enemy de fensive ....-osition . Our troops noi7 have broken deep in+,o the mn.in enemy winter line . ~,1emv counter-[l.ttacks c'luri n~ the afternoon riave <' 11 been beaten off . 11 1 l},gner?l Clar'k sent the f'ollowin~ cable to the Frir1e Pinister today, his (,9th birthday: "Tl·e Allied off~ cers a11d s010.; ers of the Fi +'th Army salute . you on the occasion of your birthday. ,ie wish you health , hRppiness nd contjnued success in your drive "'or · victory. 11 On the morni..ni:; of 1Tovember 28th a copy of the followin~ cable from Generril •,1 senhower to Gener:> 1 Alexander was received by Genere.1 Clrrk. 11 When I last talked 1.rith General Cfarlr, lie ''Toke of tl'e ~eqt desirebil:ity of havjnf; another American Division at the e'1rl:i'1st rossible roment . ; e have ex1.mined the matter carefully and vre fj nd t,wt he can move the 88th Di vision, which is reported to be a very eood division, into ITALY, much of the equipment ~oi'1.g direct . Am sure this ; s satisf'actor,~ to tl,e Commander-in- Chief , hut it must be aprrecfated th11t the T'lovemcmt will result in delay in the arrival of the 3rd Algerian Division, which is scheduled for movement in Jcnuary. Our flash estiriates indicate thet the 8~th could be put i'1to Italy during January and that all o~ 1ts equipment will arrive e::ther ahead of or with it . Unquestio ably th~ s di vision ,'fill require at least 10 days oi' training as a Di vision after it is as 3embled 'fith 'its equipment in JBS . On the otrer hand , the 3rd Alg;erian should be able to 10 ~nto the 1·i:1e Rt once , ,lith the odded advantage of completing a 2- Division Corps . The rroposal ,e rreviously made to stage the $Bth Divfaion throuf;h SJ'J... LY has been re-er.:mined c.nd +'ound jrnpracticaqle . "Gern:iral G-IB.AUD '7.i shes to noriinr-ite tho BrossP.t :;:)ivfoion 11s tl:le '3rd French Division to e;o into Italy. His rear;ons are ti.at t -is division, a former fir,ht in~ Fr9nch Division, ·i.s f':l.rt.; culP.rlv · ell trainP.d nnd co"'l.ta "1S a -~ ,h rercenta~e of Foreig.1 Legion troop,:; of f'jrst cln..ss fighting c<i.recity. There are P,lso rolHical -im:-,lj cations 1 1hich will h~ afpRrent to you as there ·rill be much crit~ cisr. if D. forr·er De Geullist Div· sion .: " ·1ot ~ ncluded "'...n t 11e Fr~ncr Contingent . mh~ d: "advPnta ,es 'l.re t:1rt tLe 'Q:rosset Divi'"'io11. is erpi.. rred in a lai-~e rc-rt w.:th ritish eq,1ir,ment . G'l'w says t at -it CflrF10t 1,e "1ai"1tajned '11ith .Rri+,ish equipment, as !'1eny o+- tl e ·terns fire ·in "10rt surrly. .reneral i'}'..MUD says ·t has a 0 �l SD co11.sidera1..,le reserve -'n its o-.m bands, t>ltrouo-h th-is is 0pe"1 to question . Our inf'o:..~matio11. j s t"1at th<: huJJc o:: ~ ts tran ,ror•+, is oJ ii ~11.r m'lst be consid8red a wasting a9set and. that thnre are ir1pcrti-int c,h0rtages in its Artillery "nd s;~nnl e1uipmont . I have T'o.;nted out to Ge'1er'l.l 'IIRAUD the dFficulties of sup:'lY i'1herent in a Corrs o""' Divisions with different equhment , but he i.s very insistent . rrm~evBr -if ne "'ake the der::and , 1'1~ will substitute the 'ii.nth Colonial 1 Division , vr1,~ ch - s "low co:-ipleti:1r; ~ ts Arieri.cFi'1 0quipmen+,, but whicr. will ·-1-esunk<tuly "1ot be ,p~fo "'O well tr, i 1ed for battle as the '1rosset D~vision. I have +,o d Ger><:)r".1 GT:::lAlID that we ·~ill rut the .:;itu.<ition u:r to General CI.A.'R.K ancl abide bv ly, s decision, hut we must sav- th.,,t our ~udgnent j s not to accept the "Aro.sset Dj vision . n ' 1 Later "'n tho nv t,h f'ollowing c .hl"' "2S receiv'3d. from G9n~ral LPmnitzer , lSt 1 Arny 3ro11p, :i'l1 rcgarcl to t11e nbove cable: 0 0 1 11 Have tr~ e to co 1+8.ct you by r"'lon,3 rrith r·=rference to AFH1 messRge A357 frorri G!l'~ tl: to ":iOC, l 'j ·,h A:J:my Grou::-,, C'lnnerni '11g ~<:th Divbio'1 c.rd '9:rosse.J:. D·· vi sion o:: Fift,h t\.~my ½ut, -;'1A i.s out of ,r er . A"'ore "Y'A-r-ly-'n, to AFrq, Gon.-~ral Alexan0c1· -ies-tr0s to 0bt1:1..:.n Gener:- l Clarl'' s v;evrs ()11 tl,ese :'.'k-'ltters . Gener"~l Alexa 10.,.,r ~ '3 -· '1 co:1.,,. 1 ete f reerent , itl· vou ..... 7')5/1 of 9 3rd ·· n •rl·~ c , vou stated t1rt 'n case con~li~t neve ors etveen 83th ~7vision and lence =r0nch Corrs , sh"pnent ~11t. Di.vision chould 'mve p·iority. Request ,rou con""'ir-r1 t'•iJ even trourrl, rla11 to .Jtro-e d-lv-· sion +,11rou-; :-_;-' cilv i:>aJ 110', br->,qn f'ouncl iYI' ract7 cM½le hy AFH~ . FtL r" 11.rcl to Brosset D;v:ision ~s lrd French Div-:sion to P'O i11to Ite.ly, we sue1 r-est You c o not ccept Rrosse-1:; Divi 3ion ·mder .. r ·3 scr+ c--1i tion o: e 1 11i: ment f1nd teke a 1'Te'1ch Divi"'iol:" rit_h F.S. er:pipwmt ~11ster , . 1f :;ol:lti.cal cons~d0ratio11s ar3 so "''lre.mo1rnt O s to re 111 • re t~ ~t Bros set D~ vi ·ic'1 t'" sent to Tt,f ly, re ro-uld be p:•3pa.roc to r3colJ11'1end to AFHQ th<i.t "'lI!ledif'te st9:"s l:,c t--'·en to e~pin tl-iis div · 'lio11 1v::.tL 1r eq·1ip'1,nt 110w in 10 ncs of ·ome other F-l'.'enc:1 Division or :'ro!" . any oth:r source A'i'H1 deems 1u5table . ";::ii:ri co-1.3:; d9r1.tion 4 s t11--t krte •<,r 'ivisiovi · s select.8d it riust 1:J:i T•. S. equi ped -:ic as to ohvinte ~ erplexi11r; "uprly rroblems 'hi.c'1 ·,oulc' ot'ier r·se arise . e1,uest vour corunen~s '"'"rl:f'\st "'Owe rmy M 0 .s. r.'H i. 11 advise G"'ner"l f}ruenti-1e'', •jft1 Armu- C ief of ..,t,:i_f", trlked ,,ith GrinerAl L~mn~tzer tod;::iv ~11r! f"[l' e 1im the ,.,ollo~·,~:ric· -·n"or•m"t-lon ~n rerlv to th'i ubj0cts !""entiori0d i. n the fl bove t rn r;,essr_g AJ: v:'3w of the co.1' emrlated delc.J · n t:1e pr-ept".ration o:: the Rqth rivisio.n or co"'bat, the Army Com:ianr1er desires to conplete the French Corrs of t·rn divisions before tLe ~"t:1 Djvision arri,res. Fe, t1,er9:'ore, recor'nends that "hip:µing rriority b9 "l.ss:_p;n9d to 11 ~tl- '"'-;vLd.on j11st 1-)9low tre two-division French Corp3 . Pow•wer , 11e is ro2t eezer to have the 0 ~th ::Jivision in ~ dlti.on to t'1e 3rd Alv,er-: a'1. Divisio'1, and he 1 1.rge<1 t 1rt "'!very e""'fort be r' de to ~et t½.is rliv; sion here as soon 'lG -03s-l le . 11 In "Tr~" renc1'.pm.rtcrs has n"t ·rev~ 01lSly be011 'ldvised t 11t t 1•1;1•e ·ill 11e nree (~jvisi011s .:y, t e 'Frener Co.... pa . 'i'he troor 1ist on 1} icl. C'Ul' crlC1 l::!.r.tinns are l)ns1d f:' O"S "I t"o-division Frencl' Corps cr-rs·sti"l~ ,....f' the ".>..-id ·o:·occqn Pivis-ion and t:10 '3:r·d Al 6e1·i.an Piv".sio 1. If +, e deci"l;_on -· s . -ide to send a tl1ird divis:.on, the Ar!"'.y Co!"'T"<t'1.c1er stro- Y""!."' rec0J'lITlA'1 s th<i.t t'1e Bross!':!t Division not )9 sent • • -:i-'-;, -it rre9A'1t 0111,pm·:m.t . I-" for 0li-!;1.c"l or r;l-lt"r, reur:011s it is ,;10el'1ed '1ecesc;c-y to s.nd th:s d.:.vision, ,t -:s e9sentinl t½Et ::~ 1 e OTL,in,erl ,,.15th U. 3. equi:-'1'1ent. I e t:biri •r9rc, division 4 s sent to t c Fift11 /lrrr.y, · t s <'Uld 1"ve a lom::.' 11 ir}'.,h~ r:dor:i_ty +. 1 "'l t',.'lt, ,~.::ip;ned to t'he P8t D-lvL,ion." 1 0 �l5 1 T'1e fo lo -~n 6 sitrnr -as received from 10 Cor:r8 r.~in tonight= "Enemy ar i.ller~- · css f1c~ 4 -,e . r' V"3nent "rea GqOlOL,S l'pproxir1ate strength "2 companies 1 rriov-·: ,mt1-1, ot er f:last. EneTlly patrol ~nto i:; Thrrps position area S Carlo GQ3OC •lspersed by SA fire. o~n troops . 56th Division. 169th Brirade ' T B. . 168th '9rissade riatrols contacted 0nemy post G951048 ~nd Pl position ~~4~049 . 167t, 0 01st Brig~~es TR. 4\th Division. 2/4 Koyli patrol area Gqll0O1 fired on l·hen att0mptin~ to cross river ratrol leader hit and believed captured . 23rd Armored BriP,"ade . K:::) GS OP a.t 877963 received direct hit from 150mm. All jnformed. tt I I Corps issued the f ollovring -; ntelligence summary tonj eht : ''Very quiet jn ,orps sector . The enemy concentrated his artillery and infantry eapons -'n repulsing the reconna-issance ~n force by the Ranger battalion. 1 prisoner of captured at G974137 , -; dentified from 11 Co 15 FG regiment states his battalion in r1ount Lungo area . friso..,,er of vrar con,..irris that 4 of 1 our · men were captured by 9 Co 15 PG Regiment . 11 ,·,ar General Clark dispatched the following cable to General 1~senhower : 11 Have b"!en advised jnformally that your Advance Command 1 ost and the Command Post of ·AAF may be establishe ·1 n Caserta by lt:; December . Do not 1'."!low ,,,hether this is definite , nor o re h1ow extent of -installations coYtte!Tlplated . Since e::;tahl·ishr-" 1t of sue~ -~n.:itallaVons br dc.te i11.d·'co.ted may serfously int9r...ere with tl•e operation ac1d security of this lfoadT:iarters , re1uest r1efiP.i te in+'ornation, -' ·-icluding agenc-'.es co·1tem;:., 1 ated a 1 1d nu.':'lb'::rs o,.. rerso11nel ~nvolved . ,.,,0-~· vrmr · nfornation, · t is o' e:catio11.ally essentfal that J?i.f'tr Arry 'Ieadq'lart"rs rerna-l n J,ero 111t1.1 line h.as aclva 1c,3d to Cassi '10 area . •t 1 1 * * CASERTA--n":GEr'Bi:.2 1, 1°43--Generel Glark co +>err d ith Ger~ral Gr-uenther, G-8neral , ~r nn, Colonel Hf")warrl, G8,.,er8l rouse a11d. Col o·rl :::k:cce, r 'it:r • articular refer1ni::e to t'1e a··!' --:u:;-rort of t,e rrorosed rttack. TIA le:.'t ' 1 is cor-r1rn-· poot at abo1:t O9OC' d th G-'311errrl T-1ran..n, J;_~igarJ.:er R·· chn.rdr.:or:. 81'1 l Captn. i 1 Lar.11 son, ris 'iri t:isl a-· de crid "ent to lC' Corr.., 'ai:1, ..,1--, re he co'u'Ffi'rP-d 1i +;h G'3ne:::·9.l r~cGreery, t e Corrs om.mnnder , a::1d Generc 1 T9T"tla.,. , Coml"'anc.>1,; t"he 50th D1vi ~ion. T•e -r,...11·1d them a:'.. A".r;e1· +,o co,.,.ni~nce tl,e att ac r r la :titto =hich wus to occm· t -' s eve11.~ n~ : rdlirn·· ;,1ary to t1 e ma:' ~ r:mse Ill attac}r tomorro= . Tl- erc1: fter, Goner-a:.. Cla.r 1c 1ent to tl>e 1/,tl D·" vi::::ion, 1 1 er9 . e co ,..er:.:·"'d with General 'Iawk8<,worth, tho 0 0 ::)-·vis-ion Command9r ., · renorf'l Clarl- 11c-ticerl at tre c~rm B···up:e cro'"'s.:.111 that there as P co·1s"'dArable accurmlat::on of traf'fic . •re tr-l'red to an • _ there !'lo sa-id. thet l'e as ')t certa,;11, but f) t1. o,1--'-it there 't'"a1 n. r·r~clol;li~,1ance of Ju 1--,.icrv.1 trafPi.c crosrt·ri,., t e ririge . 7 Il t'e co1.:·~e oP •~~ con'er0'1co ,.,_.tr 'tnne·~l 'cCref'\·y, rze1er 0 1 Clar1 - to 7 ('l I'i:'11 t 1:wt .;t .,,.; r;'1t b9 necessar·· to remove n rortion of t'1i:; 10- C0r1 G -:raffic no! ,::.M 4 n1 +r::i.t hridr;r:: to h~ · rlP,,..,s 'J7est of C:ar·,_a E>rd .s. :i:'1ortion of the correspo11.di•1r; American tra n+'ic to bridge::: east tl1ereof . 1 On bi.:i ret·Tn to n5 s com:- a-nJ rost , G'lncrnl Cl,rk ·' nctructed Generc 1 ~rann to stF:ps to see tr <it t'ie trnf,e,ic was ½e+ter ·-•e;r;u.7ded at th'.lt roir+ ~nd that noho:1" f'ro..,ser1 al:. Cr-.--.w '1-io c'id l"lot ',p,7° l-ius:l.,,,e.1s render·.,.ir; _.t n,ccssar;r. T1e 1 j_br'm s tl ere, 'te11eral C7 ar~~ Z"~d, shc-u 1 r' '"JR r " ,·ti. +,iy, --:t>m rr'lcision 11d 1 fo.} '3 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President. This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, October 27 - November 30, 1943 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from October 27-November 30, 1943. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1943 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1563 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/ea5bee2c7e93cd540945f8045858c18e.pdf?Expires=1784764800&Signature=tn4vreyW49D9QEMXhGXi08rCtHbv3tEXzX0C44q1KmIuY4foYCH0Ii7GE4NuGln4eSECqvzJrkFSOKm4XWiBYgWgyQtkezHK%7EcpKdw4PAomC5Dd%7EcmnU4P5Rwm6LiO8gYFlGxGLq5D4%7EKLvZbRF-M719kZX3MFEgrQl2-AFd4zNqCD4KHR9RrdCQr5bD4OBJ0oOkqK7xmIN-SPDYQ5vj9oLVOEfqM3H5DI7ZgQSRr%7E4Dd6iHT7Aor6naeb%7EtLGV0wqygex-AQ%7EPchAM1UlJ19Iv9FRcbr9UQ3Zv5I3zMA6vYVO2g2k8fpmAf-vgDi5k0iBJgREc%7E9M-uSMR5Zi3sNQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM a1da4ee57266ac0748c328a3e53866bb PDF Text Text l5 1 T'1e fo lo -~n 6 sitrnr -as received from 10 Cor:r8 r.~in tonight= "Enemy ar i.ller~- · css f1c~ 4 -,e . r' V"3nent "rea GqOlOL,S l'pproxir1ate strength "2 companies 1 rriov-·: ,mt1-1, ot er f:last. EneTlly patrol ~nto i:; Thrrps position area S Carlo GQ3OC •lspersed by SA fire. o~n troops . 56th Division. 169th Brirade ' T B. . 168th '9rissade riatrols contacted 0nemy post G951048 ~nd Pl position ~~4~049 . 167t, 0 01st Brig~~es TR. 4\th Division. 2/4 Koyli patrol area Gqll0O1 fired on l·hen att0mptin~ to cross river ratrol leader hit and believed captured . 23rd Armored BriP,"ade . K:::) GS OP a.t 877963 received direct hit from 150mm. All jnformed. tt I I Corps issued the f ollovring -; ntelligence summary tonj eht : ''Very quiet jn ,orps sector . The enemy concentrated his artillery and infantry eapons -'n repulsing the reconna-issance ~n force by the Ranger battalion. 1 prisoner of captured at G974137 , -; dentified from 11 Co 15 FG regiment states his battalion in r1ount Lungo area . friso..,,er of vrar con,..irris that 4 of 1 our · men were captured by 9 Co 15 PG Regiment . 11 ,·,ar General Clark dispatched the following cable to General 1~senhower : 11 Have b"!en advised jnformally that your Advance Command 1 ost and the Command Post of ·AAF may be establishe ·1 n Caserta by lt:; December . Do not 1'."!low ,,,hether this is definite , nor o re h1ow extent of -installations coYtte!Tlplated . Since e::;tahl·ishr-" 1t of sue~ -~n.:itallaVons br dc.te i11.d·'co.ted may serfously int9r...ere with tl•e operation ac1d security of this lfoadT:iarters , re1uest r1efiP.i te in+'ornation, -' ·-icluding agenc-'.es co·1tem;:., 1 ated a 1 1d nu.':'lb'::rs o,.. rerso11nel ~nvolved . ,.,,0-~· vrmr · nfornation, · t is o' e:catio11.ally essentfal that J?i.f'tr Arry 'Ieadq'lart"rs rerna-l n J,ero 111t1.1 line h.as aclva 1c,3d to Cassi '10 area . •t 1 1 * * CASERTA--n":GEr'Bi:.2 1, 1°43--Generel Glark co +>err d ith Ger~ral Gr-uenther, G-8neral , ~r nn, Colonel Hf")warrl, G8,.,er8l rouse a11d. Col o·rl :::k:cce, r 'it:r • articular refer1ni::e to t'1e a··!' --:u:;-rort of t,e rrorosed rttack. TIA le:.'t ' 1 is cor-r1rn-· poot at abo1:t O9OC' d th G-'311errrl T-1ran..n, J;_~igarJ.:er R·· chn.rdr.:or:. 81'1 l Captn. i 1 Lar.11 son, ris 'iri t:isl a-· de crid "ent to lC' Corr.., 'ai:1, ..,1--, re he co'u'Ffi'rP-d 1i +;h G'3ne:::·9.l r~cGreery, t e Corrs om.mnnder , a::1d Generc 1 T9T"tla.,. , Coml"'anc.>1,; t"he 50th D1vi ~ion. T•e -r,...11·1d them a:'.. A".r;e1· +,o co,.,.ni~nce tl,e att ac r r la :titto =hich wus to occm· t -' s eve11.~ n~ : rdlirn·· ;,1ary to t1 e ma:' ~ r:mse Ill attac}r tomorro= . Tl- erc1: fter, Goner-a:.. Cla.r 1c 1ent to tl>e 1/,tl D·" vi::::ion, 1 1 er9 . e co ,..er:.:·"'d with General 'Iawk8<,worth, tho 0 0 ::)-·vis-ion Command9r ., · renorf'l Clarl- 11c-ticerl at tre c~rm B···up:e cro'"'s.:.111 that there as P co·1s"'dArable accurmlat::on of traf'fic . •re tr-l'red to an • _ there !'lo sa-id. thet l'e as ')t certa,;11, but f) t1. o,1--'-it there 't'"a1 n. r·r~clol;li~,1ance of Ju 1--,.icrv.1 trafPi.c crosrt·ri,., t e ririge . 7 Il t'e co1.:·~e oP •~~ con'er0'1co ,.,_.tr 'tnne·~l 'cCref'\·y, rze1er 0 1 Clar1 - to 7 ('l I'i:'11 t 1:wt .;t .,,.; r;'1t b9 necessar·· to remove n rortion of t'1i:; 10- C0r1 G -:raffic no! ,::.M 4 n1 +r::i.t hridr;r:: to h~ · rlP,,..,s 'J7est of C:ar·,_a E>rd .s. :i:'1ortion of the correspo11.di•1r; American tra n+'ic to bridge::: east tl1ereof . 1 On bi.:i ret·Tn to n5 s com:- a-nJ rost , G'lncrnl Cl,rk ·' nctructed Generc 1 ~rann to stF:ps to see tr <it t'ie trnf,e,ic was ½e+ter ·-•e;r;u.7ded at th'.lt roir+ ~nd that noho:1" f'ro..,ser1 al:. Cr-.--.w '1-io c'id l"lot ',p,7° l-ius:l.,,,e.1s render·.,.ir; _.t n,ccssar;r. T1e 1 j_br'm s tl ere, 'te11eral C7 ar~~ Z"~d, shc-u 1 r' '"JR r " ,·ti. +,iy, --:t>m rr'lcision 11d 1 fo.} '3 �efficiency as the Pennsylvania Railroad. General Clark wrote to General Dapino, Commanding the 1st Italian Motorized Brigade, commenting on the maneuver of that brigade which had just been completed. General Clark 1':rote that the maneuver had shown his Brigade to be in good spirits and capable of engaging in combat but that certain deficiencies, particularly in sanitation, had appeared and that these should be corrected immediately. The Army Commander today sent the following letter to his subordinate commanders: "On November 8th I wrote you a letter concerning tho welfare of our troops. I stressed therein that steps should be taken lf.o dispel any idea about tro'ops returnine from overseas duty to their horr1es. 1 ol'"'.. . ~ . \, "Unfortunately, our Stars and Stripes has stirred up this subject. An edi- · torial in that paper has provoked letters, a number of which were ubliahed a few days ago, from enlisted men urging that veteran tl·oops be returned to theil'(y homes a:nd that new divisions from the United States be brought into overseas p theaters to replace them. It is natural for many soldiers to wish to return to their homeland and to their loved ones without realizir1g the problems involved in such a program. 11 ! want you to teJce inanediate steps to see that this st bject is thoroughly 1 explained to all elements of your command by commanders of all echelons. It is obvious that, with the far-flung combat activities of our country, shipping :is the most important factor. Its limitatiors ill not perm1t the exchange of divisions betl'!een the United States and the various theaters. Even no,r we are struggling to build thie theater up to the strength required to accomplish our mission. Vie can give no thought to troops going home at the present time. Another most important consideration is the fact that these units are battleproven and have learned the hard way. We have had mariy casualties in bringing them to their present combat efficiency. It would be an unwarranted waste of · precious manpower to lose that experience and bring in new uni ts which ,,ould have to go through the heavy casualty period before they too were proficient in battle. "I am sure that you are aware of the fact that we are now operation on a rotation policy prescribed by NATOUSA whereby approximately 1/2 of 1 per cent of the command will return to the United States each month. A small number of individuals have already returned. For your in.formation British troops are consid~red eligible for return to England after they have been overseas more than 5 years. "As you Jr.now, I am bending every effort to have additional resources moved into this combat zone. ?.hen they arrive it will be possible to rotate units out of combat more frequently. We are expanding our recreational facilities in Naples so that Fifth Army un.i.ts will be able to enjoy a well earned rest." CASERTA--DECEf.iBER 2, 1943--General Clark left his cow.mand post at 08.30 with Captain Thrasher, his ADC, and went to II Corps command post where he met and ....., I �talked with General Keyes. Leaving the II Corps Command Post, and accompanied by General Keyes, the Army Commander travelled by jeep toward the 1st Special Service Force Command Post. As this command post v,as close to the base of Mount Camino, and under direct enemy observation, the General and his party dismounted from the vehicles, left them under cover and walked the last mile and a half to the command post. General Wilbur, Assistant Division Commander of the 36th Division, was conferring with Colonel Frederick, Commanding Offi• cer of the Plow Force, when General Clark arrived. The Army Commander reviewed the final aetails of the attack plan and spoke with the principal small unit commanding officers of the attacking forces in this locality. V!hile the party was walking back to the vehicles from this command post, about a dozen shells fell in the vicinity. The a·e neral continued to the vehicles and vdth the other officers went to the command post of the 36th Division where he was met by Generals Walker, Gruenther and Commander Butcher, General Eisenhower 1 e aide. The party then ,,ent to a point 1.8 miles north of the junction of the Presenzano road with Route #6 and climbed up about 1,000 feet to an observa- ~ tion point where they observed the ground over 1'.Thich the attack on Difensa and ,e, t!'aggiore was to occur this evening. The plan of the proposed attack by the J6th Division vias that the 142nd Infantry and the 2nd Regj_ment of Special Ser1 vice Force were to attack abreast; the 142nd to capture ~ount Maggiore, and the Plow Force to take f..iount Difensa. fter viewing the terrain from the observation post, General Clark returned to the 36th Division Cub Field and got into his plane, piloted by Major Valker of the Fifth Army Artillery Section. Major ~alker flew General Clark out over tignano and gave him an opportunity to view at relatively close range the· high ground to be attacked. During this flight the General came in line of our heavy artillery fire, the shells of which were flying thickly. General Clark then returned by Cub to Caserta. During the evening, he received reports that the 46th Division had been unable to occupy Calabritto but had occupied ground within 200 yards of it, from vrhich it could support by fire the attack to be launched this evening by 56th Division. Units which had attacked Cala.britto were the 5th Forester Battalion and the 2nd Leicester Battalion. The weather had cleared at noon December let and had remained bright and clear all day December 2nd, permitting air support bombardment to be carried out. This bombardment, however, had been marred by one episode occurring December 1st, of which reports reached General Clark early today. A group of B-25 1 s had mistaken their objective and had bombed American troops on the road running northeast from Venafro. Three Americans had been killed, 42 wounded and 16 vehicles had been destroyed by this bombardment. General Clark today received an order of the day issued bs; General Juin to �t he first troops o~ the French Expe ditionary Corps t o land in Italy. This order of t. ':l day 'rlas ; ssued .just be+>ore the 2nn l'-oroccan embarked . ::-t re m~ nded the :F'rench ,,f' .,_heir _,..ormer hero1 c exploits in :taly in yiP..st centllrfos , urged t 1em to v lo:· , lonor a.nd c.isci.,..,line Fnd reminded thr;n that ~n the:r relation" '1ri.+,h th3 ... t,, .l.:ans th0y shou1r e reserv ed without arro 6 .::nce , as the eyes of ..: ra:1.ce • e r e on tl, em. G"!ner a l BAucler wcs +,oday an::o~"1t9d a Drrr,uty C}'i'3f of Staff of h'-'-f'th Arr; 0 and ,rote a 1 ett01· to G=i11er, l Clf rv.: ; n l ich he m::rressed 11is gratitude anrl :pride at tl1is apr0·L:·1tm13nt . * * * r, CAS ~A--"::C I~~ 3, 10/1 --Gene,·'l.l ClA.rk re'Tiain9d Pt .d.., comrrn:'i r,ost to ,3 follow~-n • wi.,_, 1 1 careful attAntio:-1 -l-;h8 p.·o_r.r·ess o,;- t' e attr-ic'{ ~er , as ')e~_,7,,1 last l'l~ght . A,i ..,l~ .:: · "fl+, en, ·t )0C['ffi8 a,·"ar·rnt that vl-e ·rtense art~.llery rr"''"'nl't>.t::.o-.. ,, 10. & • r 1 ')ombar 'r3n-L , ["'1 dor.--i ~ ~,,, wrk. On t:1e F::. ~t> Arrv f:.e·on+, a. total nf' · 0•1.L., QO c '1'1on ·1E",d ')een c1:nc 0 rtratecl , fl"''1 f' c-lea!', colC: ..,.; g•1t ad -f'i=;c--1.l·ta-l;ad t!ie rdv<"nce . n:r -vrc,n·r-,,. ·t:, I.,0; :'0i'ce 1 1rd rJac: id ~+,s ·sec'Jnd ob·ject-· ve anl rero:·ted that ··t YJected ·o c consol')dated trer8 by 0000 i.n the T'!orn~:r. ... . T'1e 1.!..2 1d I'1.Mlntry rad m de y--,·o ;re"', accoru·r:.; to c edul8 . G8neral Cl8.r1: 0:xrre,:sed 1 ·,1.-;e!~ A.~ AS"'ecial1y: eeseJ with th"' •wcess '1f th9 Flor, Ti'orce , ~s th·s "S t ' ,w''~ r·l· t 9.Ction . O_,.. t' ,-,:·r ~-· y l-:,11-:~t, 1-'oris, "'~ve ,ere comrr ,dod " C r'lc1 'a'l o ~f: cci1· J , l".1-:.hrur;l +l o ~ j or.:.ty of tl.e t.roops :ere of' Uni"t,3d vtri.tes all0giflnce . rlO'l Force "'"'' evi:m· ·:1g 'y l t'.lh:m SO fr.::.:o:rv:irs . GenA •·al Gr•1r>nt or i:i,,q't-'rec-1 o·"' Crci110rsl •rou"e dtu'in"' +,re ,]:1y s ~- J t! A r~l .+,ive :no nts of ~ir- :"1a11nrl. .c-01· tl e ;j13'· ·L l hrmy attack .,.,_c: Fift1' /\.rmy <1:,+,Fn 1•, t1111.'. GP.'1er8l ·ouse · rforl"!ed '1~"'1 t':.c t ~o,-· +·1e F-ifth Arny air rre;)flrat.io11 a 'lquadl'ol' mo:c0 of ½o,.,,bn.rdme.r'; f: i·"crr- "t 1f 1 beer1 nsed bp1 had evnr ber:m nsea for tl e ..::igr.t. Ar-my. '1,..,.,...,_,r.<11 Chu:·1: -l;od· y rmter+,f ·"led at lu11~r"'on Ge· ,...rel 'i.d"!leton ,J.y) ms lea.vi11.- -"'01· A1--· ,.,..s e··1J. :rec· 1 r: Jl;r f'o-,.· tle ' Tritc,r Jtr-1-;er-: , rs a rP.r-u.lt of an a,.-t,1,·•~tic lr,r,-::ie wh-·c:1 h d h90:::0"'le ag11·-v1.t,:,r hy tie }, ·re hi.,.._, of -"~,...1r1 nervice . T1'1; G0:ri,:;r nl -,1s0 .,...0~eiv0, a c1:ll -l'rom feJo,,. r,,.,.,,_,,r1:l ..,1'-:. ~1 1-'o We:: l.efv:h.3 to :oin f"ienercl /·,illwell ~n C'1~na as De~uty Commander . G8r.,ral Cln•1r R~so re ce1vAd 'l C.'.'l] +'r0m r·r . ,'ate-on of ·+:he n ltit'lore u'lh, a:•1 0ld -C'ri'"'nl of-' tre Gcs".1.eral 1s , :t0 ms leavi:r~ for t e r11~t9d. Ste.ten . 0 I. +,'1e even:no- , G8'1lr'.ll c1~r1r en-Lertri 1Dd rt, 1.i" '1.'1:..~ ri:r . ··11.ig I'i"holson o+' ReutPrs , r\.' . C1 .[ .rk Lee 0: nt..,.:rnPtiripa: T.; rs Jervice r'l'ln_ \• • Geo:r•n-9 r-: c'~-; 0 . . t•1e B1 "l" ·•0t or}:. ':'hese corre"r ()~Hient'3 f Y • () ' t tr ch-:d to T"3arl p ...A.rt~r .J Fifth Ar·f';y end '"31'8 i:resc:31-l;erl +o t ' 8 G1=>nnral b:, Lt . Co_ . K. VI . C.,EJr 1·, }u-.,..::·c Rel1'1tions Of·"'icer of ifth Army. '.:'rm" gh'· t.1 rE' ,..r:. . iv .d -l:, Ge~ !re 1 C:£..:2': 1s co.. n ... · ,.. t !"'!'.:ii•:- or vi -,iti116 '3iar oMr• C! t-3 J- o Tiere ente-.-tR ·ried ~t G.'n'1er '1.f Colonc,1 ..>nltz"la"l f'rd •;ho ver8 qu r-t~red ~ n r, n__,1· 1 Alexn lc1er ' ,.. Cc m: • Tl'e~· C01'1S.; steel or G9'1P,W 1 asil--'. o~f' 3~I". 9~ tl Jolodovn3k, Cnlonel )11dF.kon.n, ra~or .....,0"9~~i c..OV', L .!' (")"1+e11 nt 1)1~11bev .. l 0 1 G9ner['l Cl•rlr 'l""'otE> Ge11ertl J•1~r +:.oh~, ,..xpr9J"°ir, ',-· yr-·o.e n 1rl saVs"·ct.ion -~n t'1e f ct t:,,i;, ,1le•1c,:d 1111:,s of' tLe rsn'!· :x erliti0"lary Corps have ioi119d t:18 F-ift:1 Ju·my. ''i r, ~t1 c-1• ~xte"l.J;rl tl •=w E' corf· 1 ·111corrio E>nd ~'1.+'crmed +,1-,.,,m of' i·_, coif-'.1e1t eJqnctaticn "S t o t e r1;s+,·11~ · ..,hAd :rc:.rt tre.1·01.,_d la' - n t1 1 '1 •·'.Pni".l.~ ,..,+> t'e battl,,.. '~ch 1 · e [l'leP.r: . : �The Army Commander wr ote Juin today explaining that it \ Ould only be necessary that operat ional m essages pasa through t his Headquarters. GcmerA:?. 'Jbr} r .c:e'vp,' 8 le ..,ter f'::_~0m -!;he "nyor· o::' o,1jd[' tod.ay. TJ:,~s lett9r to 7 il 0f -':-h.3 r-r--at :'..e~sur9 ·t: •J:,.:..cl:. ~:" 'or k,: ~~0"1 11 E'cl rAceived Gen9l'E'l c~arl , ... lGt+...,r ~.,.. Oc ober 10th r1.d ..;nf0rP1ed G1m9r"l Clark t:,at C jda md 11~me rt s :ocre E'ftnr ,i_m 1: :-1 rad 11.E'm9d a .~~1•.,;r~ , "Boule· rd o-1" tl e Fifth Army. 11 . * * CA.J.u"l.TA --DEC";' 'ER 4, ,91e3--G-;>1.erf'l ClPrk rent th~_:3 ay rt hin command post co"lferr:in; with ',-"s '1k..£'f o~fic~r~ r11J rec9ivi11.-: r,vJ. co,...rPlPti,1:r trP re'orts ~ow" r, i; "n of' tr P ~ucc9s ... f'•1l ·1cc,"'m::-l 5 ghnl'mt o.,,.. t:1e "irst ,..:i--iE's8 0f' the e-ttack r'escr~bf-'d ·'n rrer ~::.ons .,.1nt.:~uc.i:.::.o'l 1111. : tre "lose ,..,f' -!;le 0f'y, ,t <i.s ,.,v::_ fo ,~ t' _<1t tl A ~ttac1· }1 d hPen complete 1y sncce "'f' 1l. :'' e f ollo .: 11s ,'j_sratch to l}e11.er9,l A1.exe.rdAr f'rorr ":re'1'!rQ 1 Clflr 'c nw~ ~... · ze ~ t 1e opera:l;icn A.'l'l.t its re·-r,lts : 11 3u~crA~t fo~ lo,i"'; Y'";l'"'"'10 of o~ r-ecorcl l-i!1'!lrr.-ro1•>1. ma-l:;e·•-' :::. to ( I rre<1s: A ft9r '1 p,ri•rv anc: cont· r 1 •ous -"-: ,' 1 t · 11 ~ ·i:-·v-:'1 +;1"' R ~+8rnoon of 2 Jecember , Allied troors of the t '.i+>t:t Arm:r rave crar:\. 0-d :ci_1(l ro 1-,n ·n ·o +,r•" 0.ri r y' 8 s4;ro11e defey,c-es n 1 ?•01''1, Gnm~no Ein..-1 ~curt •• r.~i.ore . 0 "' 1d r1ritL11t r i 11 ~as ~e'1 , : ose rer ', + m"Ter to '3 , COO f'eet , form o'1e mo"t i.mro· ·tant h c,t-'ons i11. 4:.h9 <119my 1 3 u·nter ,., 1--. , <'>'1cl r,;- <J.rd the left entrance +.o t' e L· r~ 11" lP.r +,h·o'1_sh r}-:ct ru:'ls the rord to Rore . 11 These 1..,1 o-1" t 1 .., 0unt C T1~ no nnd r•n•w1t t•qgr,~ ore 'v,r.-, he,'l.vi.ly fort, if.: Gd . "'he rme □y 1 S c nn~i ve ,.. osi.~,;on::; , rrnn r blr sted out c" trie , rocir.:-1,ou, wa, l □ of +,h9 h·· r,;r.est 1e· sum.-nits , 7Are -it,,.o"l~er tL9.'1 nnyt -:n; +,ln 1i"i+'tll Arrry h.acs P.nco,mtAred si11c0 the 11cnd::.,.. -:;1 ori O J'°': tenb9r o 1. +,' 9 bP.acl "s of ..;<:'..Arno y. ttr trT'1e n.+,t c'· j'lIT -,d_ c,f'.P r Ul'~ n~ q.i.,8 a-f't0~-·noon on 2 Decemb r ,.: 'v'1 C0'1\!9"'ltrcted 1 art-i, lery "~re f'roI'l r1111dreds of' ,..,r·iti ,h ind •\;rre:.~.:c~.11 r:-nnn . m A P,t'.'1.3 Yli:.ire Sf' ced only a fe1 ye_rds f: rart ~ ' +he r"p-' J ·"ir9 · c Mhes i, lu_,,,-· '1A.ted 4:.1 e l'!ountrys-ic..e "or m:lles . Po C.TG"ter rr·~.;1,cry 1 "ir9 J0IT0r r"l'3 ever he~n emrlo.red .:r. th.:s 1 treA.ter . Duri.n t ' 0 c ay our a··rcrpf't C"rried 01t auccessful "1o:"b'n; 'nd ~traf-~ro; nis~-i..011n -~n ,-,.-1,,.;n,; close surpol"t t0 r;round op-,rat-"ons . 0 0 ·... nund9r ~ovqr o-;: ,1ar 1c11ess o·.tr troors A.ss,,,,11 t9d the "irst n.n'3r.1y st:rnngrolds on t e lo7Jer rlores of r•ou.nt Cn.minn, in t 11e r> r er of Co.labritto . T 1e , hole re~ion hf',d been strewn vitli rrin9s r>nd v-~re , and the enerr1y tr~ed to stop our adVP11ce w.; -l:,h mach.:ne PU"1 , morta r ancl art: ller y -""re . Allied troops ·ept r,oing, f:gr-t~ng t,eir 1a.y ur st0er tr·ails <J.11.c1 over hcirren rock<- to '1er,,.,~>1. ros~_tio·1ri . "Ie quickl y oveITan sev'3ral citrong poj ts ' i c}-, th9 9'1emy '1ad 'J PJ:nt weeks in cons tr •ctins .;n Dn effort to delA.y ,t11e Fiftli Army ' s fldV'lnce t ovm.rd Rome . "Mount CA.m" no , • h-ich 1-" es to tre ~outh of r•ount r'ar::r;iore , co"l~ists of se vera l pe11.ks "l.''1d ridges . Tl.e +, ree· ~ost formid11.ble .Ave b9en n:i c mBmed by t 1e t roors " T "0na5tery Pi 11'1 , "Bare Botton R' dge" f'.nr TIP zorb~ c1r n-· dge 11 • Peavy -"igl t .• no; is ; n rrogress .; n t hese areas . T're assa11lt on !'ount Camino was r9.de b ritish troops "M.ch hnd distinruished t 8mselves on the 'l)eac'bes rnd · n t 1 m nt nj '1s :111 t he Srilerno rrea . 1e m 11 �'\ ~ �11 Tied 'n w-ith the attack on Mount Camino was the si.mult nGous l'ssnult on ~o,mt !".o.ggiore, wh-ich 'ms Made by Amerjcan troops, some of whom had particip11ted so successfully in the or·i r,inal lancn nr,s ~ n Italy. "The enemy • s wi nter li "'19 in t, is r-.roa is anchored in the Camino- ~ag-iore featnre . The r:reat import:ince 111':ich e attaches to jt -is shovm by the extensive .,.ortifjcations wMch he has constructed over a considerable r-eriod of time . There are co 11crete dur,outs and protected gun positions reminiscent of the first World \7ar . I nsupply presented one o:"' the major problems of the attack. Food and ammunition have to be taken up to front l:ine troops by horses and mules , or by men struggling over stony goat tre.ils .-vi th packs on their backs . "The attack was preceded by a period of detailed .o..nd painstaking preparations , whi ch jncluded aggressive day and night patrolling, regroupjng of combat forces , and the buildjng up of R.mple stocks of mnmunition and supplies . \ During practically the entire period the Army front was a sea of mud from almost daily ra·ns . On the day the attack started the weather was clear but ever since rain, from li r;ht showers to torrential downpours , hRs fallen . This gives our forces an additional heavy handicap to overcome in sroashing the enemy. in terrajn dj-1:'ficult even to climb, let alone a.ssault and capture 11.gainst a\0._~.,1/1-' strongly entrenched fo e. " ~ /¥~ "1 --(iv , I'~~ r-tJ'I'" y General Clark entertajned at dinner the Russian officers who were visitin1; the Fifth Ar my Command Post: General Vasilieff , General ~olodovnek, Colonel Sudakoff , M ajor Bobelikov and Li eutenant Golubev and also the officer s accompanyinP,' them, Lt . Col. Rea , Lt . Col. Bernier and Major Anderson. The Russian visitor s were greatl y impressed b;r their visit to the Fifth Army front , partj cularly b,r the rugged character of the terrain and by the amount of shell"'ire to which they were subjected. One British Fifth Army Staff officer , Major ' Renwick , who had been accompanying them, had been wounded by a shell fragment and had had to turn back. They also coT"Inented on the fact that able-bodied young Americans were working on the highway, while Italians were still in civilian life and expressed some curios~ty as to why the Ital:ians were not put to work on the roads . General Clark received the followinr; personal cable from General Alexander: "Following received fro111 General Eisenhower . 1 P1ease tell both Clark and ~.'ontgomery that :r contemplate their recent accomplishments with great satj sfaction and am looking forward hope-f'ully to prompt and decisive advrmce . 111 The Army Commander r1 ispatched the followj n~ cable to Ge11.eral Keyes: "Congra~ulations upon th0 success the II Corps has attrd ned in its .r-jrst o+>fensive action under Fifth A:r-my cor.inand . Your careful rlannino-, coupled with the fine artill~r-y support of corps rrnd div: sions, paved the vmy for the successful attacks by the 11Sth D:lvision and the Spec_'.al S8rv~ ce Force . The capture of t"re im:'."'ortant Defensa-J!aggiore f'el'1ture will rermit the renewal of the advance of J?ifth Army to t'1e north. Pleaae extA 11d to vour o~fic"'rs :-nd msn 5'1.volv,=.,d in this O'!eration rey ·-·arm epprec· <>tiori o"' th-,.:.r- splendid ef'forts. 11 I The ~rmy Commander wrote each of Corps Commanders explaining the current instructions with regard to interviews with the press. �(51 Mr . Mark flatson, correspondent for the Baltin1ore Sun, departed for the States tod~y, and G neral Clark handed him a letter, the full text of hich is quoted below: "It is with real regret that I see you leave the Fifth Army . Before you dep~rt, l want you to know how much we have appreciated hav1ng you with us. ~e feel as though you e.re a uember of our family . You vrere v,i th us during the formative days :tn North Africa and you were v,ith us during the Fifth Army ' s baptism to fire . "During the time you have been with us I have read many of your stories . You have served your readers and your newspaper well by your admirable presentation of the story of this Allied crunpa:1.gn. All of us are grateful for the things you have wr.tten about tho Fifth Army. "Y e are extremely eorry to have you go . 11 of us had hoped you would ste.y with us a little longer--at least until we ca.ptlll'e Rome. I look fone.rd to seeing you again soon. "{,'ith evely best ,.-ish, I um, 11 * * * CASERTA-•DECEMBER 5, 1943--General Clark today remained at his command post, having numerous conferences with various officers. At 0830 he received Major General John C.H. Lee, Commanding General, SOS, ETOUSA, together with Lt. Col. Beeler, the Chief of his Operations Section. He then conferred with Colonel John Haskell and Lt. Col. Decarlo of Marshal Badoglio's Secretariat. Colonel Decarlo brought General Clark the best wishes of Marshal Badoglio and expressed the hope of the Marshal that it might soon be possible for Italian troops to enter combat against the Germans. General Clark spoke of the good reports he had from the Italian Motorized Brigade and said that he hoped soon to employ it in an appropriate sector. At noon the General entertained at lunch Major General Lucas with Colonel Gallo•ay, his Deputy Chief of Staff, and Captain Eyston, his aide. After lunch he received a visit from General Beucler, Chief of the French Mission, and Monsieur Rene Massigli, Foreign Minister of the French Government in Algiers. M. Massigli said that he had come to call on General Clark and pay his respects because of the presence of French troops in the Fifth Army. He said that the French were proud to serve with the Fifth Army- and that the people in Algiers would follow their course with interest. General Clark said that he was happy to have the French troops under his command and that he expected great things of them . • In the evening, the General entertained at a buffet supper and showing of the movie, ."The Remarkable Mrs. Halliday": General House, General Moran, General Lewis, General Brann, Brigadier Richardson, General Beucler, Colonel Martin, Colonel Vincent, Colonel Bruce, Colonel W ilbur and a nur.iber of other officers, totalling 24. Today General Clark received the follow1.ng message from General Keyes in reply to the Army Commander's message of yesterday: 11 Deeply appreci at e your me ssage of congr atulations which has been trans- �l58 mitted throughout II Corps." * * * CASERTA--DECEMB.ER 6, 1943---General Clark left his command post at about 09.30 with General Gruenther and Lt. Col. Sutherland and went by jeep to the command post of II Corps located a short distance west of Route #6 just north of the hamlet of Santa Maria. Here he discussed the progress of the battle with Major General Keyes and expressed himself as well satisfied with the results thus far achieved by II Corps troops. He then went on up to the 36th Division command post where he talked further with General Walker. GenerE1.l Walker said, in substance, that the 36th Division had completely attained the objectives thus far assigned to it in the attack. General Clark then drove back to the village of Spara.nise to the command post of 10 Corps, where he conferred at some length with General Mccreery, Commanding 10 Corps, and then had lunch with General J,icCreery's senior staff officers. General Mccreery stated that the Monastery had been occupied by British troops the night before but that the Germans still held some high positions commanding it and had driven the 56th Division troops out of the Monastery itself by mortar and small arms fire. They intended to go back this evenins Qeneral Clark, leaving 10 Corps command post, drove to the 95th Ev&cuation Hospital on Route #6, where he met Lt. Col. Sauer who commands the hospital and visited some of the wards and the operating room. It was noteworthy that some of the seriously wounded men in the hospital belonged to the Special Service Force which had made the attack in the southern part of the 36th Division sector. The General then returned to his command post, where he received a call from Brig. Gen. Aaron Bradshaw who had commanded an anti-aircraft brigade in Sicily and who was about to be transferred to the command of an anti-aircraft brigade in the Fifth Army. General Bradshaw expressed eagerness to get this assignment which would give him a chance for more active duty than he had been having in Sicily. General Bradshaw and C~lonel Robinson were General Clark's guests for dinner. Returning from the 95th Evacuation Hospital, the Generel passed a long line of trucks and motorcycles of the Italian Motorized Brigade moving northward on Route #6 to go into position for the attack on ~ount Lungo early on December 8th. In this connection an interesting episode was r~ported to General Clark on December ?th. A Field Artillery reconnaisaance party from the Italian Motorized Brigade going up on Mount Maggiore for reconnaissance was captured by the 142nd In• fantry. However, they soon established their identity and were duly released. * * * CASEB:l'A--DECEMBER 7, 1943--General Clark left his command post at about 0900 and went to the cub field at Caserta where he and Lt. Col. Sutherland got into two cubs. They flew to an improvised cub field near Alife, landing in mud, water and among shell holes. Here the General was met by Major General Lucas, Command• ! ing VI Corps, who took him to the command post of..___the 2nd Mo~n Divisi~ _ There General Clark was received with the customary French-military onors, ana the members of the Division staff were presented to him by General Dody. General Clark spoke to them briefly, saying that he was proud to have the 2nd Moroccan Division in his command, and he expected great things of them in the coming operations in which they were about to participate. General Dody, on behalf of his officers, said that they would do all that was possible and asked only a chance to get into battle. �l09 General Clark, accompanied by General Dody and General Lucas, then visited each of the three regimental areas: The 4th Moroccan, the 5th Moroccan and) the 8th Moroccan. In each instance he was received with a guard of honor and in each he inspected the guard, met the officers and briefly glanced at the regimental area. At the area of the 8th Moroccan Regiment his party was joined by General Juin, General Beucler and General Roosevelt. During this trip, General Clark talked with General Dody and General Juin regarding the relief of the 34th Division by the 2nd Moroccan Division. General Dody said that, as directed by General Lucas, the two combat teams of the 34th now in the line would be relieved from right to left, first the 4th RTM relieving the 133rd Infantry on the evening of December 7th, and the 5th RTM relieving the 135th on the evening of December 8th; the 8th Moroccan remaining in Division reserve. At the 5th Moroccan area, General Clark shook hands with the bandleader who had been stationed with his band in Oujda and who had played at the presentation to General Clark of the Legion of Honor. The General then returned by cub to his command post. At five o'clock the General received General Vasilieff, General Solodovnek, and Colonel Sudak.off, the senior Russian officers visiting Fifth Army Headquarters. They expressed admiration for the American effort and pleasure at having had the opportunity to visit an American Army in combat. General Clark had as guests for dinner this Lt. Col. Porter, and then attended the opera, La Caserta Palace under the auspices of the Special Carlo Company. In addition to Colonels Saltzman and Thrasher and Lieutenant Bajenow. evening Colonel Saltzman and Boheme, presented at the Services Officer by the San and Porter, Captains Lampson The following important messages were received and dispatched today: Personal for Clark from Montgomery. RN 444. "Would like to fly Naples tomorrow, 8 December, and have talk with you. Will arrive in my C-47 at same airport as I used last time at 1100 hours. Could you meet me there1 We can talk in my airplane and then I will f~ back here." Personal from Clark to Montgomery. NRN. "Regret exceedingly that I will be unable to confer with you tomorrow, December 8th. Have been called to conference elsewhere by CINC. If weather does not interfere with my return, would be delighted to see you at same place and time December 9th." Personal from Clark to Montgomery. RN 1975. "Cannot manage 9 December. Very anxious get your precise battle situation. Will come Naples tomorrow and would be grateful if you could send Brigadier Richardson or possibly your Chief of Staff to meet me on airfield and give me your situation." Personal for Montgomery from Clark. RN 4957. "My Chief of Staff, General Gruenther, will meet you at Capodichino Airport 1100 hours, December 8th. Sorry I shall be unable to see you." Personal from Clark to Mccreery. RN 4937. "My hearty congratulations to the 10 Corps on its success in recent offensive action culminating in the cap• ture of the Mt. Camino feature. The capture of this formidable objective by elements of 46th and 56th Divisions, ably supported by the Corps Artillery, and �combined with the action of the 23rd Armored Brigade, is a major accomplishment in the Fifth Army's advance to the north. Please express my deep appreciation to all officers and other ranks taking part in this operation for their excellent work." * * * CASERTA--DECEMBER 8, 1943•-During the night General Clark was informed by radio that a distinguished visitor would arrive at Palermo the following day and that it would be appreciated if he attended the gethering with five officers to receive the Distinguished Service Cross. Accordingly, General Clark left his command post at 0615 by car, accompanied by Colonel Saltzman and Lt. Col. Sutherlend, and went to Capodichino where he boarded a B-25 plane which had been provided by the XII Air Support Command. The General took off at 0715 and landed at Castelvetrano airport at 0830. A considerable wait ensued, during which General ~mold and General Spaatz arrived with General Curtis, General Spaatz• Chief of Staff. At about ~ 1415 a B-17 arrived and there descended from it the President of the United States with an entourage consisting of Mr. Harry Hopkins, Admiral Leahy, General Eisenhower, General Watson and oth~r staff officials. The entire party mounted in jeeps and went before a guard of honor, where the President decorated Colonel Reuben H. Tucker, Lt. Col. Joseph B. Crawford, 1st Lt. William C. Kellogg, 2nd Lt. Thomas F. Berteau, 2nd Lt. Edwin F. Gould. At the conclusion of these decorations, the President called General Clark's naMe and to the surprise of the General, and pleasure of ev~ryone else present, pinned a Distinguished 1 Service Cross on General Clark. The President also handed General Clark a letter reading as follows: "I am very sorry to miss seeing you, but much as I wanted to come to Italy to see you at the front and to greet your fighting Array there, I was told I just could not gol "You and your Fifth Army are doing a magnificent job, under the most trying conditions imaginable. Eye witnesses have told me about the fighting, so I know how tough it is. "I have also been told of your personal courage in leading your forces, and especially of your gallantry in those first despGrate days after the landing, when by personal example and fine inspiration to your officers at the front line, there was averted a critical situation in which the enemy might have burs' through with disastrous results. "Keep on giving it all you have, and Rome will be ours and more beyondl "I am grateful to have such a staunch, fighting general. 11 The President of the United States, together with General Clark and the other distinguished officers present then reviewed the troops. The General then briefly attended a reception in honor of the President, mounted his B-25 and returned to Capodichino, arriving at rbout 1730. In addition to Colonel Saltzman and Lt. Col. Sutherland, ·General Clark took with him, on the return trip, Major John Boettiger, who had accompanied the President on his tour, and was returning to Naples. ) �\ Co I to Naples. Returning to his command post, General Clark found that the tactical situation was less favorable than he had hoped it would be. The Italian Motorized l{ Brigade has been repulsed on Mount Lungo by a counter-attack, and the 36th y Division had not yet occupied Mount Sammucro. t,s Today General Montgomery flew over to Capodichino and, in the absence of D~ f General Clark, conferred with General Gruenther about the tactical situation. (e. ► He suggested to General Gruenther a shift of one division. During the evening ..r General Clark dispatched the following telegram to General Montgomery: RN 7291. "No objection to shift of one division as discussed with my Chief of Staff today. Sorry I was unable to meet you. Reynolds in excellent health." General Clark today said that the 36th Division reported that they had counted 279 German dead in the present attack and that the total loss in dead of the Fifth Army was 168. General Clark commented on the fact that the °"\SUalties of the Fifth Army had not been light; since the original landing we had lost about 23,000 casualties all told. The American experience was that about 25% of the wounded returned to the fighting units. General Clark today also received notice that he had been awarded the K.B.E., Knight of the British Empire, by the British government and received the following congratulatory message from General Alexander: "My warmest congratulations on the award of the K.B.E. to you." The following important messages were received and dispatched today: From II Corps to CG, Fifth Army. NRN. "On Maggiore about 2000A German Combat patrol contacted and repulsed, some German casualties. Rangers advancing NW Ceppagna received some MG fire vicinity Hill 950. No contact against 143 Inf during attack on Sammucro. Until summit reached where some mortar fire was received. Some patrol activity on Lungo during night and enemy mortar fire being received that vicinity. Heavy MG and mortar fire being encountered on Mt. Lungo from the vicinity Hill 343 G 962137." Personal for Clark from Mccreery. RN 0869. "Very many thanks for your kind congratulations. All ranks 10 Corps value most highly your appreciation of our efforts and are proud to serve under you." (See General Clark's message to General McCreary, set out in the diary of 7 December). Intelligence summary from II Corps. RN R-4122-25. "Enemy resistance on Mount Lunge has been stubborn throughout the day. Italian forward elements reached hill 343 at 0800 but were forced to retire because of heavy mortar and machine gun fire. Two platoons counterattacked from the S flanks of Lungo at approximately 0900 A forced withdrawal to the original positions. The Mt. Sammucro area stubborn resistance was re~t near the summit with the defense being well supported with artillery and mortar fire. Resistance has been stubborn northeast of San Pietro. Forward elements approximately G9919, G9818, G9916, G9815, G9715, G965140, G965135, G9613, G9413, G930135, G9212, G9309 at 1200 A. Positions are essentially unchanged at 1900A. Prisoners of war taken west of hill 96o from 1 Company PGR 2 who stated his company position V 09213 and that 3 Company was in line but, location is unknown, and 2 Company had suffered heavy casualties on the 6th of December." �From II Corps to CG, Fifth Ar~. RN 4. "3 Rangers not on objective, Hill 950. Reforming on NE slopes for assault night 8/9 December. 1 Battalion 143 Infantry consolidated objective Hill 1205. 3 Battalion 143rd Infantry 985169, 2 Battalion at 985162 advancing on S PIETRO against stubborn resistance. 1 MTZ CP (IT) withdrew to original positions at 968.22 and 973128. 1st Regiment SSF relieved by elements 142 Infantry. Stubborn and well organized enemy resistance encountered on 36 Division front, particularly S PIETRO area. Enemy artillery on increased scale." The casualties in 10 Corps in the recent attack were estimated at Officers OR's Killed 19 78 Wounded 31 510 Missing -l ...1l 661 53 * * * CASERTA--DECEMBER 9, 1943-•This morning the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. John J. McCloy, together with Brigadier General Holmes and Lt. Col. Gerhardt, arrived for an inspection visit. After the Secretary and the officers had conferred with General Clark and General Gruenther, they left by jeep for the command post of II Corps, where they were met by General Keyes and taken to his situation room. The G-2, G-3 and Artillery Officer of the II Corps gave a summary of the situation, illustrated by maps. The Italians were working on Mount Lungo. The Rangers were seeking to take Hill 950 but had not yet got it. A battalion of the 143rd Infantry was on Sammucro, a second battalion was attacking San Pietro and meeting stiff resistance, including pillboxes and dug-in positions, a third battalion was echeloned to the right rear. The 142nd Infan• try was occupying Difensa and Hill 907, relieving the Special Service Force, the bulk of which was on its way back to Santa Maria. German artillery bad fired upon our troops shells up to 210mm. The II Corps, however, had 426 guns in place ready to fire in the II Corps area. Thereafter the party went from Headquarters II Corps to Headquarters 141st Infantry and the Italian Motorized Brigade which were located together at a point several miles northwest of the junction of Route 6 and the Presenzano road. Here General Clark and Secretary McCloy discussed the situation with General Dapino and with Colonel Werner, Commanding the 141st Infantry. General Dapino told General Clark that his men bad suffered badly in the Lungo effort; that at first they had advanced fairly well onto the feature, but that they had been caught in heavy cross fire and had suffered heavy casualties. He was unable to give the exact number, as yet, but thought they had lost at least JOO men from the force used in the attack. He stated that his battalions were badly shaken and thought that they should be relieved and given a chance to reorganize. General Clark told General Dapino that he was of the same opinion. The General subsequently gave directions to General Keyes to place a battalion in the rear of the Italia.n force, in order to eliminate any chance of a ·German break-through at that point. The General's determination on this subject was �rendered stronger by the fact that a patrol of 20 Germans had penetrated with impunity deep into the Italian position to a blown bridge on Rotondo and had finally been driven off without loss to themselves. After leaving General Dapino at Colonel Werner's command post, the party went by jeep to the command 'post of the 45th Division where they were met by General Lucas and his Chief of Staff and entertained at lunch by General Eagles, Commanding that Division. After lunch General Clark left the party in order to take up the problem of rectifying the condition created by the Italian reverse at Mount Lungo, while the Assistant Secretary of War, General Holmes and Colonel Gerhardt, accompanied by Lt. Col. Sutherland, were taken by General Lucas to his command post and, thereafter, to the command post of the 2nd Moroccan Division, where they were met by General Dody and where the Assistant Secretary of War was shown certain elements of the 2nd Moroccan Division which had not yet gone forward to relieve the 34th Infantry Division. Thereafter, the Assistant Secretary visited the 15th Evacuation Hospital and returned to the Fifth Army command post at 1800 hours where Mr. McCloy and his party were entertained by General Clark at dinner. _ General Clark today replied to General Alexander's radio of congratulations on his award of the K.B.E., as follows: "I am greatly honored to be the recipient of the award of the K.B.E., and deeply appreciate your message of congratulations." The following situation report was received from II Corps tonight: "During day our patrols from Mount Maggiore at G964115 came ~cross an abandoned mortar position with mortar intact and an abandoned MG position at G967113. Small groups or enemy seen and fired on in area G922155 and G922132. German counterattack on Hill 1205 repulsed at 091440A. 11 * * * CASERTA--DECEMBER 10, 1943--General Clark conferred at 0900 with General Ryder who had been in the 36th Evacuation Hospital for several days suffering from shingles but had now recovered. The subject of their conversation was a condition which had arisen in the 34th Division and which had given General Clark much concern for a number of days. The background of this situation and or General Clark's conversation with General Ryder is as follows: The morale in the 34th Division in the judgment of General Clark w~s by no means what it should be. Recently some 40 enlisted men of the division had left their units without permission and gone off to Naples for a number of days. Several had been tried and convicted of misconduct in the presence of the enemy. On November 29th Messrs. Gammack and Dixon, two correspondents representing the Des Moines Register and Tribune, and the Associated Press respectively, had written dispatches which however had not been forwarded for publication, commenting on the facts and on the sentences of dishonorable discharge and ten years• imprisonment which had been imposed. The dispatches were sob stories, one-sided in character, and tended to make heroes of the men who had quit their units. The stories stated that a Colonel, 40 of whose men had declined to enter combat, had appealed to them to buck up, but seven had persisted in their refusal. On December 4th General Clark had directed letters to the Commanding Generals of the II and VI Corps, identical in terms, as follows: �"The results of a number of recent trials by courts-martial for offenses under Article of War 75, which deals with misbehavior before the enemy, have been brought to my attention informally. Although in some instances the sentences awarded by the courts are deemed adequate in others totally inadequate sentences of five and ten years confinement were awarded. "I cannot impress upon you too strongly my views as to the serious nature of the offense of misbehaviour before the enemy. It strikes at the very foundation of battlefield discipline and each case gives aid and comfort to .our enemy. In awarding punishment the court is bound to consider the deterrent effect of the sentence awarded as well as the imposition of adequate punishment upon the individual concerned. In this connection I am inclosing copies of a letter from the Commandar-in-Chief wherein views similar to those expressed above are set forth. "Accordingly it is my desire that, prior to the initial assembling of a court martial for the trial of a case or cases under Article of War 75, the corps or division commander who appoints the court shall personally advise members of such courts concerning the serious nature of this particular offense. Members of the court may be interrogated, principles may be discussed and past errors of courts may be reviewed. Such discussions and advice should of course be general in nature and have no connection with a pending case. Thus the new court will be instructed prior to the trial of such oases in the hope that criticism of the court after trial will be unnecessary. "Will you please convey my desires in this matter to each commander of a divis~on of United States troops serving under your command." In the opinion of General Clark the morale situation in the 34th Division reflected a lack of forceful leadership in the Division Commander which had been reflected in certain of his subordinate commanders and thus had produced weaknesses in the morale of the troops themselves. The Divisional Commander had hesitated to relieve his subordinate commanders who were lacking in adequate vigor of command and when directed to make such reliefs by General Clark had recommended, as replacements, officers who turned out to be similarly inadequate. In this general connection, General Lucas wrote to General Clark the following letter on December 8th: "The documents you handed me yesterday (the newspaper stories referred to above) are enclosed herewith. I have shown them to Crane and he is familiar with the facts. Butler was not present at the investigation (referring to an investigation on the morale situation conducted under General Lucas' orders), as h9 was at the front with his regiment. I am inclined to exonerate him from blame, as I would not be surprised to find that similar things have occurred in the divi• sion before but have been condoned by officers who lack Butler's moral courage. "I think Crane can straighten things out when he gets the division back when he can reshuffle things a bit. It is unfortunate that he is not physically up to carrying on the permanent job. This division needs a very strong and experienced man. "I find that casualties in the three divisions I have commanded have been as follows: �Killed Wounded Total 34 345 1652 1997 45 552 1349 1901 3 514 1453 1967 It would seem, therefore, that the chance of survival in the 34th has been no worse than the others. Better, really. Am collecting some information on "anxiety cases" to compare the numbers in the divisions. This might show a comparison in morale. I don't know whether it will mean anything or not." At his conference with General Ryder, General Clark told him that while he was an excellent combat commander, he had demonstrated decided weakness in administration, and this had been evident for a long time. He had failed to relieve colonels whom he should have known to be weak and unwilling in their turn to insist on proper standards in their subordinates, and when General Clark had insisted on such removals he had put in others just as weak. As a result, General Clark said, there was a lack of morale and tone throu~hout the division which would have to be remedied at once in order to eliminate the weaknesses which came to the surface when so many cases of misconduct in the face of the enemy occurred. This, General Clark said, must at once be remedied by a ruthless removal of any inadequate officer and an insistance from the top down on measures to restore the morale and tone of the division. If this was not done, the General said, despite his excellent combat record General Ryder would have to be removed. At 1000 there arrived to call on General Clark, General Arnold, Lieutenant General Spaatz, Major General Cannon and Major General House. After a short visit, these officers left for an inspection of airfields. At 1330 General Clark received a call from Mr. Relrnan Morin, AP correspondent in Naples. Jlfir. Morin had been the author of a press dispatch dated November 29th in which he had reported certain Stars and Stripes stories concerning letters written to the editor in protest at an editorial which stated that the desire of Fif.t h Army men was to continue in action until the Germans surrendered. Mr. Morin had met Mr. McCloy, the Assistant Seeretary of War, in Naples yesterday, and Mr. McCloy had asked him what he thought about the morale of the troops. Mr. Morin had not indicated that the morale was excellent but had hesitated in his reply and finally had suggested that Jlf.r. McCloy inquire at Fifth Army. This apparently gave Mr. McCloy the idea that something might be wrong with morale, and Mr. McCloy had inquired of General Clark on this subject and had mentioned his conversation with Mr. Morin. Accordingly, General Clark sent for Mr. Morin and asked him what additional data he had, if any, on the morale of Fifth Army troops. Mr. Morin's reply was that he had been somewhat staggered by Jlfir. McCloy's inquiry and had not made an immediate favorable response as he should have. General Clark pointed out to Mr. Morin the dangers inherent in reporting on this subject, as it could fundamentally affect the frame of mind of many men who otherwise might continue in an excellent state of morale. Mr. Morin said he understood this and would be guided by this admonition and advice in the future. General Clark told Wir. Morin that he was convinced that the morale of the Fifth Army was excellent except for the few men in question within the 34th Division, and that situation was being taken care of. Mr. Morin also mentioned the fact that certain prominent legislators �had recently visited this theater and had subsequently made a number of pronouncements on the subject of binging men home after a certain period of ser• vice abroad. General Clark poi ted out that politics was one thing and war was another, and they were fund mentally different; and that if troops were encouraged to believe that it as their right to return home after a period of service overseas, they would b in danger of coming to a frame of mind where their usefulness as combat sol iers was seriously impaired. General Clark mentioned to Mr. Morin the story written by Messrs. Gamma.ck and Dixon about the 40 men in the 34th Division who declined to re-enter combat and the seven who finally persisted in this course in spite of their Colonel. Mr. Morin assured General Clark that .when he heard about this story he had urged Mr. Dixon not to file it, but Dixon's argument was that he wanted it on file for the record. He did not expect it to be published but said that the AP, in the case of General Patton's incident (when General Patton bit a soldier in a hospi• tal), was caught without any background material on file when the story finally broke, and this time he felt that the Associated Press should have a story ready to move should an occurrence similar to the Patton incident develop again. The General then discussed, off the record, the progress of the present operations and pointed out some of the interesting features of the Fifth Army's tactical problems, and Mr. Morin told General Clark that Mr. McCloy had spoken in warm terms of the work the Fifth Army was doing. General Clark then conferred with Colonel Frederick or the Special Service Force and personally handed him a letter to be read to his command, commending them on the good work that they had done in the successful attack on the Camino feature. General Clark entertained at lunch today Colonel Forsythe, Fifth Army historian, Lt. Col. of the War Department G-2 Historical Section and Major Salmon, in civil life professor of History at Amherst College, and discussed the problems of the Fifth Army History, and General Clark impressed on them that the reasons behind his tactical decisions were essential in any proper Army History. At 1500 General Clark and General Gruenther walked to the palace at Caserta, where they conferred with Captain Lewis, USN; Colonel Howard, Fifth Army G-2; Lt. Col. Williams, G-3 Section, Fifth Army Planning Group, and other officers concerning the planning for proposed amphibious operations. General Clark was particularly concerned that the landing forces plan to occupy a line which they could hold the required length of time; that the naval reconnaissance should in• dicate that the beach was appropriate in character to render the landing feasible, that the troops have adequate support by naval gunfire; and that the problems of re-supply were properly handled. General Clark entertained at dinner General Arnold, Lieutenant General Spaatz, arid Major Generals Cannon and House. A report on the Plough Force casualties showed 23 officers and 495 enlisted men. Of the enlisted men 65 were dead, 308 wounded, 8 missing and 114 sick, and of the men wounded 14 were serious, 197 light and 97 injured. The 10 Corps sitrep received tonight was as follows: ttLittle contact with enemy during d~y. G 9505 to Camino G 9408. 56 Div. 169 Bde. Slight shelling mule track Mielig Relief of 142 RCT by 2/6 Qu9ens on �ICo'/ Mt. Difensa G 9509 complete. Loons. 2/5 Queens Area Levaglie G 96o5. 2/7 Queens Area Campo G 9606. 201 Gds Bde. 2 S G took 3 PW from 2 Btry 33 Arty Regt at G 912096. 167 Bde moving tonight. Bde Hq to S Croce M 9986. 8 RF to Carinola M 9886. 9 RF to Casanova M 97~. 7 Oxfbucks to Nogelleto N 0184. 168 Bde Ntr. 46 Div. 128 Bde.Hq G941013. 2 Ramps Area Sippicciano G9402 with one coy G 905044 and standing patrol G 905058. 1/4 Ramps S Clemente G 9604. 5 Hamps Area G 937015. 138 Bde 139 Bde Ntr. 23 Armd Bde. 11 KR RC patroJ found buildings M 868976 occupied. All informed." II Corps reported the following tonight: "Front quiet this evening. 4 PVT taken, l from 3 Co, 1 from 4 Co and 2 from 8 Co all or 15 PGR all taken in vicinity S Pietro." * * CASERTA--DECEMBER ll, 1943-•General Clark left his command post by jeep at 0830 this morning with General H. H. Arnold, Commanding the Army Air Forces; Lt. Gen. Spaatz, Commanding the MAF; and Major General Cannon, Commanding the North African Tactical Air Force; Colonel McNally and Major Arnold, Genere.l Arnold's son. The party drove northwest on Route #6 through Capua to a point opposite Camino Ridge. Here they all climbed a small hill and watched the bursts of our artillery shells on the hills beyond Lungo. General Clark explained to the other Generals the operation which had resulted in the taking of the Camino-Maggiore hill mass, and he pointed out the depth of this mass which was not apparent from farther south. The party then got into three of the five jeeps making up the convoy and went ahead for about a mile. They then left the jeeps and walked several hundred yards farther toward the root of Mount Lunge. The nearer slopes of the hill were held by troops of the Italian Motorized Brigade while the Germans held the summit. As the party walked farther, two enemy shells whined over and burst to the right of the road. General Clark then led the party into an orchard to the west of the road where an American tank had been completely blown apart, apparently by a mine reinforced by several hundred pounds of TNT. The tank had been demo• lished, and bits of the bodies of the crew were scattered about. At this point the party was careful to go in single file to the tank and not stray about the orchard, as there were undoubtedly additional mines planted there. The party went forward along the road a little farther toward a demolished bridge. Here the engineers were seeking to complete a by-pass which would enable traffic, de• spite the shellfire, to press on down the road toward Lungo. / The party then returned to the vehicles and went back to the command post of the 36th Infantry Division, where they were met by the VI Corps Com11Rnder and the II Corps Cormnander. They had lunch as the guests of General Walker, Commanding the 36th Division. After lunch, General Clark, General Arnold, General Spaatz, General Cannon, Colonel McNally and Major Arnold got into six cub planes which had been ordered by General Clark to assemble for the purpose. General Clark returned to his command post, and the other officers went on other missions. In the afternoon, General Clark conferred at length with Major General Gruenther and also received a visit from Lt. Col. Nygaard and Colonel Frederick, Commandi.ng the Special Service Force. In the evening, General Clark entertained at dinner Mr. Laurence Packard, of the United Pres~, Mr. Matthews, of the New York Times, Mr. Whitehead, of Associated Press, and Lt. Col. Clark, Major French and Captain Beard,1ood of Fifth Army Public Relations Office. �CASERTA--DECEMBER 12, 1943-•This morning General Clark went by jeep to the Headquarters of the Special Service Force in an Italian barracks just north of Santa Maria. Here the General attended a memorial service for the men of the Special Service Force who had been killed in the Camino action between December Jrd and December 10th, numbering in all. The General spoke to the assembled officers and soldiers, saying that they had performed splendidly in their first attack under fire and that they would be called upon in the future for other equally difficult missions. He urged that they live up to the high standard set in their first attack. Returning to his command post, General Clark received Colonel Mickelwait and thereafter Brigadier Le Jeune of the British Army, Commanding the 66th Anti-Aircraft Brigade. He then received calls from General Larkin and General Pence, and he kept these two officers for lunch, together with Colonel Markee and Lt. Col. Nygaard. In the evening the General had a buffet supper and a showing of motion pictures at which he entertained Lt. Col. Wood, Commanding Officer of the 38th Evacuation Hospital, with five of his medical officers and six of his nurses, Brig. Gen. Brann, Lewis and Moran, Colonels Mi ckeiwait and Saltzman and other guests numbering 24 in all. · Today General Clark sent General Gruenther in one of his planes, piloted by Captain O'Neil, on a special mission to Algiers. Lt. Gen. Spaatz needed transportation to Bari, and General Clark sent him over in his other plane. General Clark today received the following letter from Lt. Gen. Mccreery, Commanding British 10 Corps: "I do want to congratulate you most heartily on your British honour of the K.B.E. We in 10 Corps will be particularly pleased and appreciative that you have received a British decoration, and one which you have so fully earned. I have already heard amongst my staff here, when they heard the news, many ex• pressions of spontaneous pleasure and approval. I know that we all feel that no Army staff could ever have been more helpful and cooperative. I am, therefore, very pleased also to hear of Al's C.B.E. All good wishes and the very best of luck." The General replied to the above today by the note quoted below: "Your note of December 10th has been received, and I want to tell you how much I appreciate your congratulations on my K.B.E., and the fine things you have said of my Fifth Army staff. "I am deeply touched by this award which has come to me, and also am very happy that Al has likewise received one. These awards mean to us that your country has been satisfied with the way we have conducted our relations with your Corps. "I want you to know how much I have appreciated your loyalty and the privilege it has been to have such splendid British troops under Fifth Army command." General Gruenther sent General Clark the following telegram from Algiers this evening: �"Arri~ed 16oO hours . Eisenhower returns late Monday morning. Smith and Rooks state that decision on SHINGLE nrust be made in about one week since craft must begin January 15th released." The Army Commander today dispatched a letter to all general officers in Fifth Army units exhorting them to greater efforts in instilling in the minds of the troops under their command an intense hatred for the Boche and an equally intense desire to put everything they have into the fight until the tyrannical Hun is forced into submission. Yesterday the Army Commander received the following cable from General Alexander: "I should be grateful if you would inform me of the date you will be in a position to release 10 Corps. Its early release is desirable for a variety of reasons which include the fact that some of its units are due to move to another theater and consequently various changes in organization between it and F.ighth Army will have to be made in the near future. 11 * * * CASERTA--DECEMBER 13, 1943--Generals Truscott, Harmon and 0 1Daniel conferred with General Clark this morning concerning the possibilities of Operation SHINGLE . The General then received a call from Lt. Col. Darby of the Rangers, and the General announced to him his promotion to Colonel and pinned a pair of eagles on his shoulders . General Clark then received Colonel Yarborough of the 504th Parachute Battalion and commended him for his fine work in recent operations. The General then had a visit from Commander Butcher, General Eisenhower's aide and followed this with a conference with Maj . Gen. House of the XII Air Support Command. At luncheon the Army Commander entertained Generals Harmon, Truscott and 0 1Da.niel. In the afternoon General Clark received a visit from General Beucler and discussed with him the employment of the 2nd Moroccan Division in the coming operations. He entertained at dinner Generals Brann, Lewis and Colonel Saltzman. This afternoon General Clark received the following cable from General Gruenther who is still in Algiers: "Will return early Tuesday morning. ETA later. Had lunch with General Eisenhower today. News is with minor exceptions about as you had hoped." * * * CASERTA--DECEMBER 14, 1943•-General Clark departed from his command post by cub plane, accompanied by Lt . Col. Sutherland, leaving at about 0915, and flew to the VI Corps landing field just north of Prata. Here, by previous arrangement, a jeep and motorcycle escort met the General, and he and his aide drove north to Montaquila where they conferred with General Dody, Commanding the 2nd Moroccan Division; General Poydenot, his Artillery Commander; and his Chief of Staff, Colonel DeBerchoux. General Dody explained the plan of �\ '] 0 maneuver of the 2nd Moroccan Division for the attack which was scheduled to start this evening. A maneuver force under the Divisional Infantry Commander, Colonel Cailles, was to execute a wide envelopment to the north from Scapoli, while direct pressure was to be exerted from the region of Colli down the highway which goes from Colli to Cardito. The mass of maneuver was to consist of five battalions, plus a force of Gowns, and they were to leave the region of Scapoli at dark and go by mountain trails across the Castelnuovo Ridge to a point north of Cardito and then descend on Cardito from the north. They were to be in position to make this attack at daylight. At the same time, a direct attack was to be made down the road leading from Colli to Cardito. General Clark commented that the conception of this mane~ver was striking and daring, but that the hills were high and the way was long, and there were, as reported by General Dody, two strong points occupied by Germans to reduce on the way. General Dody said that he realized the possibility of delay, but that he •ould do everything possible. General Clark then stated that he wished to go up and visit the command post of the 4th Moroccan Tirailleurs which was located at Scapoli. General Dody said that it was possible to go as far as Colli but that beyond that point the road was interdicted by enemy shellfire. General Clark stated that he would go up and take a look as far as Colli, and General Dody sent a French captain along as guide. The party crossed the river about two kilometers north of Colli and then went westward along the heights above the River Acquoso toward Soapoli. Just below the town, when_the car rounded a high shoulder, a shell whistled by and exploded beside the road. Shortly thereafter another shell exploded near the roadside. As there was direct German observation at this point, the French guide suggested that it would be well to leave the jeeps there and continue on foot. Accordingly, this was done, and the General with his party climbed up into the village of Scapoli where they found the command post of the 4th Moroccan Tirailleurs. General Clark discussed the proposed attack with Colonel Laparra, who stated that he was ready to go but that there might be some delay due to the difficult terrain. General Clark said that he was well aware of it and that he would bear the Division no grudge if the time schedule laid out could not be adhered to. The party then returned down the hill to their jeeps, following the instructions of the French military police to stick close to the sides of the buildings as there was some danger from shells. However, the cars were gained safely, and the party drove rapidly down the winding road back toward Colli. Two bursts occurred beside the road on the way down, but both cleared the General's car by some distance. On the way from Colli toward Venafro the General passed some troops of the 4th Moroccan Tabor and stopped to talk to the Major in command. The major told General Clark that the Tabor was to be attached to the 4th Moroccan Tirailleurs Regiment during the succeeding operations; that they lacked mules. As General Dody had told General Clark that mules were available, he was surprised at this news. However, the captain who had accompanied the General explained that although organic mules were still lacking, a separate muletier company was available to supply the Goumiers. General Clark drove on toward Venafro and stopped at a point just northeast of that town and conferred with the Chief of Staff of the 45th Division, Colonel Styron. The 45th had moved into a new command post at that point. Later General Eagles arrived, and General Clark discussed the proposed attack with him. Following this conference, the General proceeded on southeast to the command post of the VI Corps at Prata, where after a short conference with Colonel Galloway he re-entered his plane, with Colonel Sutherland in a second cub, and flew back to the command post, arriving at about 1600. On his return he met General Gruenther, who had come back from Algiers from an im• portant ·conference, and the General discussed at length with General Gruenther �l1l the future operations which were anticipated. * * * CASERTA--DECEMBER 15, 1943--Early this morning General Clark was disappointed to learn that the French advance through the hills from the vicinity of Scapoli had only got as far as Monte Castelnuovo, due to the difficulty of operating in the dark, the rugged terrain and the heavy snow. Hence, the attack had not been able to get off at daylight against Cardito and was deferred until tomorrow. Heavy fighting is going on in the south, particularly before the village of San Pietro, to which the Germans stubbornly cling. General Clark today received a number . of visitors, including Major 9ribble, a commentator for the London News Chronicle; Bishop Betts of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, together with Colonel Roy H. Parker, Chief Chaplain, ET0USA; Major Deveaux, a chaplain detailed from the 93rd Division to accompany Bishop Betts on his tour, and the Fifth Army Chaplain, Lt. Col. Ryan. The General also received a call from General Caffey, Assistant Division Commander, 34th Division, and Major General DeMontsabert, Commanding the 3rd Algerian Division, who came with General Beucler. General DeMontsabert has just arrived in Italy, the first officer of his Division which is to make up the second division in the French Corps. The General entertained Generals Caffey and Brann for lunch. In the afternoon, General Clark went by cub plane to the 36th Division command post where he conferred with the Division Commander concerning the progress of the attack on that front, particularly the San Pietro situation. The General entertained Colonel Sullivan for dinner this evening. General Gruenther sent General Clark a note today which read as follows: "VI Corps reports that the French attack will not be able to get off until about noon tomorrow. "8th R.T.M. will not do a wide envelopment. "Additional time is required for regrouping." AFHQ cable #13880 arrived today and stated, in substance, that a previous practice of maintaining a 15% over strength in combat units in order to take up casualties must be eliminated. General Clark told Colonel Suthrlandthat this was in accordance with the War Department policy tending to reduce the size of infantry divisions. However, General Clark stated that the maintenance of replacement units was permitted, and these could be maintained so close to combat units that the replacements would be, in effect, as available as though the over strength was actually carried on the unit rosters. * * * CASERTA••DECEMBER 16, 1943•-General Clark left his command post at about 0915, accompanied by Lt. Col. Sutherland. He drove north along Route #6 to a point just south of the village of Mignano where a newly-made military track diverged to the right. The command post of the 1/~lst Infantry was reported to be on the westerly shoulder of Hill #689, and General Clark wanted to talk with the Acting �l( I( '-' l ), �P72 Regimental Commander, Lt. Col. Wyatt, to determine the facts of the attack on San Pietro during the previous night, which had been repulsed. The General's jeeps maae their way up the muddy track with considerable difficulty and finally stopped under the shoulder of Mount Rotonda at the beginning of the pass between that and Hill #689. Here the General met 1st Lt. Mazzeo, Commander of the Mortar Platoon of M Company, 141st Infantry. He directed Lt. Mazzeo to send for Colonel Wyatt who was commanding the regiment due to Colonel Wer• ) ner•s being wounded by anti-aircraft fire, and the General then went forward towards San Pietro on foot with Lt. Col. Sutherland and Lt. Mazzeo. As the General went up the draw between Rotonda and the mountain on the right, he be• gan to see small groups of men from the 2nd Battalion of the 141st and from L Company which had been attached to it in the attacks on San Pietro during the previous night. Many of the men were in foxholes with their arms ready. Twice the General stopped while wounded men were being taken to the rear, and he talked with 1st Sgt. Childers of L Company who had been knocked blind and deaf by a mortar shell but who had recovered his sight and hearing after about half an hour and was on his way back to his company. The General next talked to Lt. Lewis, Commander of L Company, and Lt. White, Commanding G Company. These officers had the survivors of their two companies in position at the edge of the flat ground extending between the saddle and San Pietro. They were collecting stragglers and trying to organize the position. They reported that the commanding officer of the 2nd Battalion, Major Landry, and about 50 men were pinned to the ground several hundred yards ahead and were unable to get back to their position in daylight due to the heavy enemy fire. At this time the enemy was firing with machine pistols and mortars, and snipers were said to be in position to the right front. When the General approached Lieutenant White, he said, "Good morning Lieutenant. What troops are in front of' you?" Lieutenant White answered, "Sir, Germans!" Lt. Mazzeo pointed out, on the east and west road at the southern edge of San Pietro, three of the American tanks lost in the attack I of the evening before. The Lieutenant to whom he talked told him that the in• fantry attack had been launched at dusk and that the men had advanced up a small draw which runs north and then northeast acr-0ss the flats. They had, however, been received with heavy fire from San Pietro, had huddled together in the draw and waited until dayli~ht when the battalion commander had attempted to organize another attack on San Pietro. The enemy position, however, was so well prepared , that the men were very badly out up with small arms and mortar fire, and 50 \ were still out waiting for an opportunity to come back, including the battalion commander. One of the soldiers in a foxhole was Pvt. Gebhart of G Company of the 141st. He had on overshoes, and the General asked him how he liked them. Gebhart replied that they were a little heavy, but his shoes had worn out and he had been unable to get replacements as his shoes were 7D, and the Supply Sergeant didn't have any of that size in stock. General Clark said to Gebhart that if ~ there was a pair of 7D 1 s in Italy he would receive them at once, and on his return to the command post, General Clark procured a pair of shoes and the following morning sent them up to be delivered personally to Gebhart by his aide, Captain Thrasher. I f I \ Returning from these front-line positions, General Clark, with Lt. Col. Sutherland, walked back through the saddle where they met Lt. Col. Wyatt. Lt. Col. Wyatt explained the situation of the 141st Infantry, and General Clark told Colonel Wyatt, as he had told the soldiers with whom he had talked, that as we held Lungo Hill now, it was probable that the Germans would not be able to hang on in San Pietro much longer. The General then went on back to the aid station of the 141st and talked with the Regimental Surgeon, Captain Farley. Captain �113 Captain Farley said that up until that time he had cleared 100 casualties resulting from the attack launched the evening before on San Pietro. The General then had a quick lunch of K rations and drove on out to Route #6 and north several kilometers on that route to look at Lungo from its side. He then returned to the junction of the Presenzano road where he met Major General Walker, Brig. Gen. Wilbur and Lt. Col. Felgar, Commanding the 753rd Tank Battalion, whose A Company had made the attack on San Pietro the evening before with a total loss of 12 out of 16 tanks. The General encouraged Colonel Felgar by telling him not to worry about losing some tanks. The great point was that he had made the effort to take the village, and he reported that at least one German command post had be~n put to rout by a tahk before the tank itself was destroyed. The General stated that plenty of tank replacements were available and that he hoped that the Colonel would continue his aggressive efforts. The General then returned to his command post where he conferred at length with General Gruenther, ~is Chief of Staff, about future operations. In the evening there arrived General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Harold Alexander, Commanding 15th Army Group, Lt. Col. Boyle, who was accompanying General Brooke, and Captain Clark, General Alexander's aide. General Clark entertained these five officers for dinner and discussed with them the progress of operations in Italy. Today Operations Instruction #12 was issued to cover Phase III of Operations Instruction #11, with certain changes. The 10 Corps mission was ' stated in OI #12 as protection of the left flank of II Corps by occupying an objective consisting of an area about four kilometers in diameter surrounding Monte Cedro which lies about six kilometers northwest of Mignano and immediately south of the railway. When the II Corps shall have sufficiently advanced so as to permit bridging materials to be brought up, the 10 Corps is to force a crossing of the Liri and occupy a bridgehead in the vicinity of San Ambrogio. II Corps to capture Mount Porchia and Mount Trocchio, each of which are hill masses to the south of Route #6 which lie between Mount Lungo and Cassino. II Corps is to secure a bridgehead over the river Rapido and then employ the maximum amount of armor passed through the bridgehead and drive northwest through the Liri Valley to the Melfa River. For this purpose, the 1st Armored Division is attached to II Corps but will not be employed until authorized by Army order. VI Corps will continue the attack to begin on 15 December and seize the high ground northwest of Cassino. The exact time for this entire operation would be issued in a sepa• rate instruction from Army. In this connection, General Clark told Colonel Sutherland that he proposed very shortly to put the 3rd Division, which is now resting, back to occupy Lungo and to be prepared to advance to the west under II Corps. The situation reports at the close of the day showed that although the attack by the 141st Infantry on San Pietro had not succeeded, the 142nd and the Italian Motorized Brigade had taken Lungo, and the 143rd Infantry was approaching the occupation of Sammucro. In view of this, General Clark felt that San Pietro would shortly be untenable by the Germans. General Clark entertained for dinner Gen~rals Brooke and Alexander, Colonel Boyle and Captain Clark. * * * CASERTA-•DECEMBER 17, 1943•-In the morning General Clark received a call from Major General Keyes, Commanding the II Corps, and General Brann, his G-3. He �. discussed with these officers the future operations to be conducted pursuant to Operations Instruction #12, and he also pointed out to General Keyes his specific wishes on several points. He stated that the Plow Force under Colonel \ Frederick should hereafter be employed as a whole when it was turned over to I II Corps. It should not be split up and part of its components be kept in Corps or Divisional reserves. General Clark also told General Keyes that he would have to make a special effort to maintain easy relations with General Mccreery, Commanding 10 Corps. Any small differences which might arise were to' be ironed out between the Commanders concerned and adjusted in a spirit of \ mutual tolerance and not be brought to the Army Commander for settlement. General Clark also pointed out to General Keyes the condition of the 2nd Battalion of the 141st Infantry, which General Clark had visited yesterday - dis- · organized, with the battalion commander pinned down in front with 50 men and unable to exercise control over his battalion while a couple of lieutenants were seek• ing to rally stragglers and organize the ground to resist counterattacks. General Clark pointed out that the condition in the area occupied by the 141st in front of San Pietro should be improved at once and that active patrolling should be instituted in the area. In the afternoon, General Clark received a call from General Juin and Brigadier General Beucler. General Juin said that he wished to pass to General Clark the renewed request by General Giraud that General Clark withdraw his expressed opposition to the dispatch of General Brosset•s Division to Italy. General Juin explained that as the Division was partly Free French, the Free French were anxious to get it in action. General Clark stated that he had no objection at all to the Brosset Division on any grounds except that it was equipped partly with American and partly with British materiel, but his supply situation was already very complex, due to' the several nationalities with varying arms on his front, and he could not very well accept a Division of mixed equipment. General Clark further said that the 4th Moroccan Division, especially trained in mountain warfare, was obviously the next Division needed. General Juin said thAt he personally agreed with these observations and would faithfully convey them to General Giraud. He further stated that in his estimation the first thing to do was to send the 4th Moroccan Division and then to re-equip the Brosset Division, if necessary using arms from some other French Division, and then finally to send it as the next Division after the 4th. General Juin departed, and Captain Andre Maurois, with General Beucler, con• ferred with General Clark for some time. Captain Maurois, the well known French author, is visiting the American Army for a few dAys but is then shortly leaving for the United States. At the close of the afternoon the tactical situation at San Pietro had \ cleared up. It was reported to General Clark that a battalion of the 143rd In- ) fantry had progressed around to the northwest side of Samrnucro and that the Germans in San Pietro had withdrawn, they then being .caught in the jaws of Sammucro / and Lungo. Thus, San Pietro had fallen. . / General Clark entertained General Alexander, General Brooke, Lieutenant Colonel Boyle and Captain Clark, General Alexander's aide, for a drink before dinner. General Alexander concurred in the release of a dispatch of congratula• tions sent to General Dapino by General Clerk, and, accordingly, General Clark sent the following message: "I desire to congratulate the officers and men of your command on the success achieved in their attack on critical terrain features yesterday. This action demonstrates a determination on the part of Italian sol- �diers to free their count ry from German dom ination, which may well serve as an example to the oppressed peoples of Europe." The following confirmation of General Alexander's consent was received in t he m orning: "Release of congratulatory message referred to i n your 5728 approved." General Clark also discussed with General Alexander the question of release to the press of the fact that the French were now f i ghting in the line with the Fifth Army. General A lexander stated that as t he French were so close to the Eighth Army line it would be best to state th~t they w ere fighting against the Germans under the 15th Army Group. General Clark subsequently told his aide that he considered this a m stake in policy, as the 2nd M i oroccan Division had been under the Fifth Army for many months. The following day the press announced that the 2nd Moroccan had entered the li~e under the Fifth Army, although this was not done by General Clark's direction. General Eisenhower, however, approved this release. ' ·· OJ-M-: * t9-c..c.. 30 .., i( - - - - - - - - - CASERTA--DECEMBER 18, 1943---General Clark this morning left by cub plane for Pomigliano airfield where he met General Eisenhower, General Smith, Commander Butcher and Lt. Col. Lee, General Eisenhower'E aide, who arrived by plane from Algiers. General Clark drove with General Eisenhower to the villa which Gener l ·Ridgway had occupied in Naples and spent several hours conferring ~ith Genera Eisenhower about future operations. As a result of a conversation held the evening before with General Alexander, Genersl Clark sent the following cable today to General Alexander: "I reluctantly recoliiJllend cancellation of Operation SHII-lxLE in early January. The limiting date of January 15 which has been set for return of craft makes it impracticable to launch this operation due to the fact that the remainder of the Fifth Army will not be in proper position to support it. By adhering to date of January 15 for release of craft, Operation SHINGLE would if executed be based on an arbitrary date rather than on t he tactical situation. It is absolutely essential that I employ the 3rd Division, my only fresh infantry div1sion, immediately together with 36th Division in order to attempt a break through in the Mignano area. I can not afford to release it now for amphibious training and planning as would be required if SHINGLE is launched by January 10. I will continue planning SHINGLE Operation in the hope that craft can be made available at a later date when it will be possible to execute this operation properly, · coordinated and supported by the remainder of the Fifth Army. I urgently request that every effort be made to secure necessary craft to mount this operation at a later date." Message #7280 , to cr,rc , AFHQ dated December 8th , referred to above , is as follows: "Agree that 15 d1>ys ' preparation re1uired in edvance of SHIHGLE landing. In order to coordinate my attack with that of Eighth Army, 15th Army Group directed that my prihcipal attack be n:ade Pbout December 12th. It is not now possible to give estimate of date when final decision as to SHINGLE can be taken for that Operation is intimately tied in with the operations of the rest of the Fifth Army. The main body of Fifth Army must be in position to support SHINGLE , otherwise , the latter may be defeated before land Rssistance can reach it . I hope to be in the Arce-1''rosinone area before launching SHINGLE where .!'ln all out attack by main body Fift h Army will be rm.de in conjunction with the nmphibious envelopment. I am most eager to mount this operation at the earliest possible date . Rate of advance of Fifth Army dependent on factors , many of m ich this Army in no way contr ols including progress of Eighth Arm.y, weather nnd its effect on the Ca.ssino-Pontecorvo Vall ey 11nd ability of enemy to reinforce his front . I hope to be in a better position~ sti!~lte the date of SHINGLE in about a week . In the mee.ntime , planning will oo~ta;i t ~ll steam ahead . 11 �General Clark stated to his aide that he considered this to be a most important message, as the deferring of Operation SHINGLE and the employment of all available means for a break-through toward Rome up Route #6 was a tactical decision of the first order • . General Clark returned from his conference, accompanied by General Eisenhower and had a further discussion with General Bedell Smith and General Gruenther in General Clark's van. General Eisenhower then left for dinner, and General Clark sent for Colonel Howard, his G-2, and Lt. Col. Sutherland, his senior aide, to come to his van. He said that the matters previously discussed by General Gruenther with General Eisenhower in Algiers had now definitely been decided on. The radio today had announced in a broadcast that General Eisenhower was to command the European Theater of Operations and that General Alexander was to replace General Eisenhower as Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. General Clark told his two officers that he had been selected to command an Army invading France from the south. Planning for this was to start at once, but General Clark would continue in his present operations until about February 1st, making every effort to take Rome in that period. On his landing in France, General Clark was to again come under the command of General Eisenhower in the European Theater. The General poured a drink for Colonel Howard, Lt. Col. Sutherland and himself and, with his two staff officers, drank a toast to the success of the invasion of France. General Clark entertained at dinner Colonel Tate, Colonel Saltzman and Major Walker, his cub pilot. Today Gen€ral Clark signed the Distinguished Service Medal tionally meritorious service as Brigade during both the Italian an indorsement recommending the award of to Maj. Gen. John A. Crane for his excep-Commanding General of the 13th Field Artillery and Sicilian campaigns. General Clark today received a note of gratitude for his message of congratulations to General Dapino, Commander of the 1st Italian Motorized Group, upon their fine work in recent action on the Lungo feature. * CASERTA-•DECE~BER 19, 1943--General Clark left his command post at 0830 with General Eisenhower, General Eedell Smith and Lt. Col. Sutherland. The party drove to Headquarters II Corps where General Keyes was awaiting them and explained the situation jn the II Corps sector. Major Generals Truscott and Harmon were also at this point. The party left Headquarters II Corps at 1000 and drove north to the intersection of the Presenzano road where General Walker, Commanding the 36th Division, was waiting. General f.alker took the party fon,ard on Route #6 several kilometers where a stop was made at the nearest point to the Headquarters of Genere.1 Dapino, Commanding the Italian Motorized Brigade. General Dapino met the party at that point, and Generals Eisenhower and Clark congretulated him on the showing of his troops in the J second attack on lunge, and General Dapino stated that the only desire of the Italian Motorized Brigade was to carry out the mifsions entrusted to it. The party then proceeded still farther out Route #6. A little past Mignano General Clark directed that all but two jeeps be left behind, and with these he and the visiting Generals went forward around the loop on Route #6 at Rotondo. Here a good view of the San Pietro positions and of the road lead- 1 �ing through the valley towards Cassino was obtained. The party returned to 36th Division Headquarters for lunch and then drove along the road past Presenzano and through Venafro out to tte Headquarters of the 45th Division which was a few kilometers northeast of Venafro. Here General Lucas, General Eagles, General Crane, General Dody and other officers were presented to General Eisenhower. After tha.t, the party went on to the 17th Field Artillery cub field between 45th Division CP and Montaquila, from which they took off at about 1415 and returned to Caserta by cub. In the evening General Clark entertained at dinner General Eisenhower, Gener~l Smith, Commander Butcher, Lt. Col. Lee, Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, Captain Briggs, WAC, and Mrs. Surnmersby. CASERTA--DECEMBER 20, 1943--General Clark devoted the morning to a series of conferences and the disposition of many admini.strative matters. He received a call from Lt. Col. Whitaker of PWB who had been ill and had been ordered back to the United States; Colonel Markoe and Lt. Col. Nygaard of AMGOT; Colonel Mickelwait, Fifth Army Judge Advocate; Brigadier Lush .who has replaced Major General Lord Rennell as Civil Affairs Officer, 15th Army Group; and Lt. Uol. Gerry who will take Colonel Hume's place if Colonel Hu.me temporarily moves away. At 10.30 the General left by cub pls.ne for Sorrento for a brief visit to the Fifth Army Officers' Rest Center. In the afternoon General Gruenther, on General Clark's behalf, entertained the visiting Brazilian delegation at a reception in the General's hut. The following guests were present: Maj. Gen. De Morais, Brig. G~n. Dos Sartos, Lt. Col. De Queiroz, Maj. Senna Campos, Capt. Para, Lt. Col. Marques Porto, Lt. Col. Sebastiao, Maj. Moraes, Maj. Luix Gomes, Senor Barette, Naj. Gen. Ord, Capt. Walters, Col. Higgins, Maj. Potts, Brig. Gen. Lewis, Brig. Gen. Brann, Colonel Williams, Colonel Howard, Colonel Saltzman, Colonel Tate, Colonel Bertholf. General Clark hed with him at Sorrento five of his classmates from West Point with whom he had dinner. They were Colonel Sullivan, F'ifth Army Quarter~aster; Maj. Gen. Harmon, Commanding General, 1st Armored Division; Colonel Tully, Assistant to General Grey, Director of Allied Military Reilway Service; Colonel Markee and Lt. Col. Nygaard, both of AMGOT. The Army Commander today di ~patched the following cable to General Alexander: 11 Based on present situation on this front and on plans for future operations I recommend that 10 Corps remain with Fifth Army. I further recommend that this Corps be strengthened by one additional infantry division preferably 1st Infantry Division British." The following reply to the above wus received from General Alexander: "Regret it is quite in:possible for you to have 1st Division which has already concentrated and is committed to a role under Eighth Army. "As regards 10 Co1·ps it must be realized that their two divisions have been fighting continuously since the Salerno landing and must be withdrawn at an early date for rest, reorganization and training. Another serious aspect as regards 10 Corps is their weakness in replacements which is causing me serious concern." �The Army Commander dispatched the following Christmas message to his troops: "To an army in combat overseas, it is inevitable that Christmas is a very different occasion from the accustomed festival at home. We are deprived of the special happiness and inspiration l>hfoh are found each year in the reunions of beloved families and friends during the holiday season. The loss of this phase of the great annual institution is part of the price paid for war. "Nevertheless, du.ring Chri.stma.s in the field we may derive encouragement and spiritual comfort in realizing that the principles, virtues and values which Christmas symbolizes still stand unshaken s.nd that the preservation of freedom to cultivate them is the eseence of our war aim. "This Christmas of 1943 is in many ways the brightest one for us all since the beginning of the war. It marks the end of' a year in which con• sistent progress has been made on land, on sea and in the air in the process of closing in on our determined but gradually weakening foe. W are e determined that this process shall continue with such acceleration and crushing force that once victory is achieved there will be no more Christmases spent in overseas combat. "It is my sincere hope that despite the circumstances of war each member of the Fifth Army will be able to feel the presence of Christm~s and, inspired by the righteousness of our cause and the unity of this Allied team, will know that with God's help we shall make 1944 a decisively vie• torious year." * * CASERTA--DECEW3IB 21, 1943... ..Qeneral Clark spent the day at leisure in Sorrento. He found out today that people from the Fifth Army Officers' Rest Center ~ere finding some opposition from the Air Corps Officers in Capri to making visits to that island. The hir Corps appeared to take the at• titude that they were primarily in charge of the entire place and that it was largely reserved for Air Corps people. General Clark telephoned to General Gruenther about this situation, and General Gruenther arranged for a group of peopl& from the Rest Center to make a trip to the island the following day. General Clark, however, determined to correct the situation on a long term basis. AFHQ cabled 15th Army Group yesterday stating that apparently Oper~tion SHINGLE was cancelled and inquiring as to 11Jhether or not a modified amphibious operation on basis of craft avail&ble ~fter 15 January was under con• sideration. RN 6790. The reply of General Alexander, RN 318, is quoted below: "There is now no possibility of mounting Operation .SHINGLE by 15 January. It is confirmed theta modified amphibious operation after that date is still under consideration. Detailed aspect is being studied here, end proposal will be sent to you as soon as possible." �l 79 CASERTA--DECEMBIB 22, 1943--General Clark spent the day at his van in administrative work and holding conferences. At 0900 he met Admiral Lowry and Captain lewis of the Navy and discussed amphibious operations. At 0930 he received Brig. Gen. C. W. Wickersham Jr., Head of the School of Milita1'y Government at Charlottaville, Virginia. He then received General Hughes, Deputy Theater Commander. In the evening he received for dinner Maj. Gen. Mascarenhas and Brig. Gen. A.nor of the Brazilian Army, Major Gen. Ord of the United States Army, accompanying the Brazilian Mission, Colonel Higgins, Chief of the Liaison Section, AFHQ, and Captain Walters, an American officer accompanying the Brazilian officerso After dinner he received a call from Maj. Gen. Bedell Smith who conferred for some time with the Army Commander concerning future arrange~ents. In conversation with his Chief of Staff and Lt. Col. Sutherland, General Clark today remarked that he felt that the recent operations by II Corps had not been conducted with adequate energy or with the requisite completeness of planning to br:i ng about successful results. General Clark said that he had been thinking about the initiation of Phase #3, as described in Operations I nstruction #12 -and had decided to defer it until the 29th of December when the 34th Divtsion should have finished its rest period and could re-enter the line. He emphasized the fact that there was no use attempting operations until complete preparations had been made, and he considered that until the 34th was rested and ready it would not be appropriate to launch the 3rd Phase. The following message was recei.ved from Gent•ral Montgomery today: wi'\ould . like to fly over tomorrow 23 December to discuss situation and learn your plans. Will arrive Naples airfield 1000 hours in my 0-47. Could you meet me there or send your Chief of Staff. We could talk in my plane and then I will return here . Will signal you early if weather prevents flying. What is weather forecast your side?" General Clark replied to the above as follows: "I am tied up with General Eisenhower tomorrow on a visit to forward units. Hence cannot meet you. 'I.leather on this side unfavorable for tomorrow. Am anxious to talk with you. Please make it Friday, same time and place." General Montgomery's reply to the above is quoted below: "Note that you. are busy tomorrow. Will come over Friday 24 December arriving 1000 hours." -l( * CASERTA--DECEMEER 23, 1943--This m orning at 0810 General Clark received the remainder of the Brazilian Mission who had not bt en received last even:lng. General Clark gave to the Mission a set of photographs of the dinner party last evening and a Beretta pistol to be given to each of the Generals on his behalf, and he w presented in return with a Brazilian flag. Ee told them as that it was a chief desire of his to see the Generals return at the head of a Brazilian force. ��At 0830 General Clark left by automobile to go to 10 Corps, accompanied by General Eisenhower. They were guided by Captain Lampson. On their arrival at 10 Corps they Vrere greeted by General McCreary. They then went to the CP of the 56th Division near which they were able to have a good view of the Garigliano Valley. The party returned to the General's Command Post at 1245, where General Clark entertained General Eisenhower for lunch. On this journey General Clark and General Eisenho,,er had discussed General Clark's recent experiences at Sorrento where he had found it very difficult to get Air Corps cooperation in receiving Fifth Army personnel on Capri. The Air Corps seemed to have adopted the i dea that they were given the entire island for their domain. General Clark mentioned this to General Eisenhower who said that he disagreed entirely with this attitude, and General Eisenhower then dispatched a message to General Spaatz directing that this condition be rectified at once. General Clark entertained the following guests for dinner: Generals Eisenhower, 3mith, Commander Butcher, Lt. Col. Lee, Mrs. Summersby, Captain Briggs, WAC, Colonel Howard, Lt. Col. Smith. The following cable was received from General Spaatz with regard to the Air Corps situation at the Isle of Capri: "Apparently I have been misinformed as to arrangements made :i.n full conference with all concerned. I have issued instructions that Officer in charge will report to G-1 of Fifth Army immediately and straighten out this matter." * * CtSERTA-~DECEMBER 24, 1943--At 0830 General Clark received the Operations Division officers observers vho were arriving for a two months' tour of duty in the Fifth Army. General Clark spoke a few words to these officers, welcoming them to the Fifth Army, saying that they could be of great use to the units and staff sections to which they might be attached. During the morning General Lucas, General Truscott and Colonel Keiser arrived for a conference and remained for lunch. After lunch General Keyes arrived, and General Clark discussed with him, General Brann and Colonel Tate, the future operations of the II Corps. General Clark caused to be distributed to each enlisted person in his section a carton of cigarettes with a letter expressing his appreciation for the good work each had done. General Clark and General Gruenther, accompanied by Captain Lampson then went to the Municipal Theater in Ceserta, where they attended a concert and reception given by the Royal Artillery Eand, to which they had l•een invited by General Mccreery, Commanding 10 Corps. Returning to the command post, General Clark then entertained with eggnogg in his hut the chief of all his staff sections and in addition, General House and General Rutledge. The hut had been decorated with a Christmas tree, and all General Cl~rk 1 s Christmas cards had been pinned up by Pvt. Horne, WlC. When this party broke up, General Clark kept Colonel Saltzman, Lt. Col. Porter and Lieutenant Bajenow for dinner. General Clark, General Gruenther, Colonel Saltzman and Lt. Col. Sutherland then went down to the palace at Caserta, where they stopped at the NCO Club and the Red Cross for a short time. Both places ~ere crowded with men and women of the various branches of the armed service who were having a celebration of the holiday although so far from their homes. �At midnight General Clark, Gener~l Gruenther, Lt. Col. Sutherland, Lt. Colonel forter, Mr. McElligott and other staff officers attended midnight mass at the Royal Chapel in the Palace. The chapel was crowded to the le.st square inch with officers, soldiers, nurses and other members of the forces, and a choir, which had been practising for some days, sang Christmas carols while Lt. Col. Ryan, the Army Chaplain, conducted mass. At the close of the service, General Clark spoke briefly, expressing the thoughts of everya one concerning homes and families so far away and the soldier's duty to complete M.s task before returning to them. The General then said that it was his privilege to recognize the fine work the Army Chaplain had been doing by surprising him with the announcement that he had just been promoted to Colonel. General Clark pinned a new set of eagles on Chaplain Ryan's shoulders, to the pleasure of everyone present. The General's party then returned to the command post, where they were surprised a few minutes later by the choir which came and sang a few more carols before finally separating for the night. General Clark today wrote a letter to the Commander-in-Chief regarding the possibility of using airborne troops in future operations and urging the retention of the 504th Parachute Regiment from the 82nd Airborne Division in the Fifth Army. The Army Commander also today wrote a Jetter to Gen. Rooks, AFHQ G-3, with regard to training for future operations, stressing the point that he felt that the first 48 hours after a landing is so critical a period and the actual debarkat:1.on and amphi.bious plans a.re so closely correlated, that they must be worked out both by ground and navy co!J'manders. It couild not possibly be delegated entirely to Naval control. The Army commander actually has the paramount interest. However, the General indicated the.t he .would be willing in the next operation to hav'3 the Navy handle the amphibious training center while the Army runs the invasion or assault training center. * * * CASERTA--DECEMBER 25, 1943--CHRISTMAS DAY--General Clark arose a~ UoL,, had breakfast and left his command post a few minutes after 0700, proceeding t~ the parade ground adjoining the Palace at Caserta. Here a ceremony was held, at wh:i.ch ·14 officers and enlisted men were decorated ahd promoted. The General spoke briefly, stating that it was his privilege to award these decorations and p1~motions to men who had won them in the hard test of war. Following this ceremony the General went to the airfield, got into his cub, accompanied by Lt. Col. Sutherls.nd and Captain Jonas, AGC, and then flew to the 17th FA field just northeast of Venafro where the VI Corps Commander and a number of other general and other officers were assembled. At this point General Clark decorated and promoted 87 more officers and men and made a few appropriate remarks to the assembly. Following this ceremony, General Clark departed for a short visit to General Dody's Head.quarters where he extended the season's greetings to the French troops under his command. The General then toured the area of the VI Corps, visiting the CP's of the 157th, 179th and 180th regiments. At the CP of the 180th he surprised Lt. Col. Dulaney by announcing to him his promotion to Colonel and handing �him his eagles. He had lunch with the 1st Battalion of the 157th Infantry. Here, the Army Commander gave out to the men several gifts and some cigarettes which had been sent to him from people in the United States for distribution to soldiers s.t the front. General Clark then spent until 1415 touring the II Corps units in the afternoon. He then got in his Cub and flew to the II Corps field where he decorated and promoted 67 more officers and men. Following the II Corps ceremony, the General departed by jeep for the 8th Evacuation Hospital where he was met by Colonel McKean, Commanding the Hospital, and where he visited and talked to many wounded officers and men. There were in the hospital many American and Canadian soldiers from the Special Service Force, who had just been wounded in the high hills northeast of San Pietro. The Army Comniander, accompanied by Lt. Col. Sutherland and Lt. Col. Clark, who had joined the party at II Corps, then journeyed to Headquarters 10 Corps where they were entertained at tea by General Mccreery and his staff officers. After a pleasant visit at General McCreery's Headquarters, the party returned to Caserta, arriving shortly before 1800. General Clark had spent the entire day in visiting different units, and it llas interesting to see in what good heart everybody was ancl how the General's greetings were returned with genuine smiles. The General entertained at dinner the following guests: General Brann, Colonel Tate, Colonel Saltzman, Lt. Col. Porter and a few other guests numbering fifteen in all. Today General Clark received the following note from General Dapino: "General Dapino wishes to extend the best Christmas wishes from himself, officers and men of lst Italian Motorized Group to you, your officers and men while we are working together for victory. 11 General Clerk also received today a note from General Dapino transmitting to General Clark the season's greetings from the Prince of Piedmont. From Alexander to Clark. RN 1135. "High level conference just finished ' at which following decisions were made firm: A strengthened SHINGLE is to I take place during last week of January. 88 LSTS llill be made available which 1 will allow us to mount an amphibious operation of two divisions plus. If you 1 decide to put out two U.S. Divisions I will replace them by transferring two divisions from Eighth Army to your 10 Corps. I return to my Headquarters tomorrow, Sunday, and will core to you on Monday. ETA later. Start straightaway on your planning." General Clerk today cabled General Montgomery the following cancer:~ appointment to command the Fri ti sh Army Group in OVEFl,ORD: his "Congratulations to you on your well merited new appointment. wishes for a continuation in 1944 of your past succE;sses. \ . . cnj ell.#') o9-i~"~ ., - If.~ J.J '"" -\i ""~ G ... .. Best -- I C �r �l83 General Clark dispatched a letter todl".y to Gener"l Alexnnder in which he indicated his jntention to relieve the 1st Italian Potorized Group from II Corps and place it in Army reserve, not to be re-emrloycd until it is completely rehabilitP..ted and then only on very secondl"lry or tertiriry roles . * * * CASERTA --DECF.fi'BER ?6, 1943--GenerPl Clark srent the day in administrative m~tters. At 0900 Colonel Howard called on GenerPl ClFrk. At 0930 Generals Gruenth~r and Rrann had a conference wj th Gener::il Clark in his v, n to c is cuss pendjng o-rerations. At 1130 Colonel Mickelwl"it hA.d rn arrointment to c.frcuss sever1:1l cr>ses . Generfll Roosevelt ~torred in to pe.y his respects to the Army Comri1rinder around noon. At 1700 Colonel 'Robinson brought Brigadier Gcnorn.l To,mscnd, Cor.r.i.l"'nd,ng Generrl of the 34th ~AA Brigade, locr,ted in Sicily, to see General Clark. At 1715 Colonel Niblo brought Brigricier GenerAl Gordon M . Wells, Head of manufacturing c'esign for the Ordnnnce Department, Washington, D. C., and Colonel Crawford, OrdnFnce Cfficer, AFHQ, to see GenerRl Clark. At nbout 1800, the Army Cor11mPnder went to the conference hut, tl:'king ,; ith him some business rPpers, for study. Gener"l Gruenth~r joined him, Ppd they had dinner together r>nd roturnecl to the hut for furth'9r discussion. Today Gene::-cr>l Cl['rk disp.'."'tched a l~tter to Gener"l Eisenhower recor.inendj_ng the rromotion of Colonels J,•artin, Keiser, Hume, Bowman, Sullivan and Hovrord to the grPde of Brigadier General as P reword :or th9ir outstnnding servjces performed in a superior manner . The Army Comm::;nder Plso oj spntched c1nother note to GenerPl Eisenho"·er in which he reco~nended that the Fi~th Arri1y be u.~ed for OperAtion A~lVIL and thRt the Headquarters Sevnnth ~rmy come to Italy soon to rrepare to take over orerations there from Hearlquarters Fifth Army. The Car.unending G,,.,ner.81 also wrote tod~\Y'" to rraj. Gen. Gregory, Quarterm"' ster General, cornnenting to him on the fine worJ:- P ccomrli1cheo by the ')urirtermDster S0rvice in operations in Itf1ly and citing the fine work of Colonel Sullivan, Fiftr Army Quartermaster . * * * CASERTA--DECEUBER 27, 1943--At 0900 Gcnerr ls Grnenthcr am• Br11nn cr>me to Gener" 1 Clark's van to discuss future operritions in view of the iJ"'!pending arrival of General Alexander. At 1030 General r~ccreery called on Gen~ral Clf'rk to discuss the 10 Corps situntion. The Army G-4 came for luncheon and discussed v·i th Genorc1l Clark and General Gruenthcr the logistical problems involved in future operations. Gener:il Alexenr'er arrived at the CPTC's C<'1.mp shortly after noon, "nd at 111-30 he came to the recreation hut where he conferred with GenerPl Cl~rk, General Richt1rdson, Genernl Robertson and Gencr~l Gruenther. At this conference he gnve further details of the news conta.ined in his messrge of ChristwFs Day (Quoted in the diary under date of December 25, 1943) . He stated tbPt a Britfah Divisfon was to take rart in Operation SHPJGLE because of the fact tht1t i.t vm s a somewhat hazardous venture and heavy casualties mii::;ht be exy,ected. For this reason it was rlesired thPt the casualties be shared by British Pnd A"'lericPn Divisions lest undesirable reactions occur at home . 10 Corps v,ould not be withdrawn from Fifth Army as had been previously discussec rt o-ri.e t j me, but, on the contrary, the ��British 5th Division would be added to it. Oneration SFPfGLE 'rould be conducted, under tPe connand of the VI Corps Comm8nder and stnff, by the 3rd U.S. Division and the 1st British Division and the necessary corps troops. General Clark stPted thPt he vras enthusiastic for the project and would see that planning vms thoroughly and energetically carried out. At this conference nothinP' wa.s sRid by General Alexander or rrnyone else to suggest thrit the crPft mentioned in Cable RN 1135 of Christmas Day (Quoted in the diGry for December 25th) would only be PVPilable \Or a short time or tPPt no re-suprly, reinforcel"lent or other builn up would be Pvrilable. General .Ale:mnrer then left tho conference vii th Generals Richnrdson and Robertson. Gen~ral Clark called a staff meeting at hi~ hut rit 1630. This meeting ,nas attended by Colonel Bertholf, Colonel Hovrard, Generr-il Brrnn, Colonel Tate, GenerRl Le'lis, Genernl r~oran, Colonel 3ullivrm, Colonel 17illiams, Colonel Paxson, Captain LeTiis, Colonel Darcey, BrigPdier Richcirdson, Lt. Col. Br~tton, Colonel Jones. At tris gathering a number of 8dr1inistrRtive rrobJems affecting the various staff sections of the Fi~th Army ~ere discussed. GenerPl ClPrk and General Grw=mther hi:i.d dinner with General Alexrmder at the Commander-inChief' scamp. The following cable vms received today from .A.FH1: RN 19635. "Planning to leave Algiers Pbout 1?00 hours ?7 December are M. Le Troriuer and General Giraud, accompanied by five French officers r-nd Lt. Col. Dostert, AFHQ LiPison travelling in General Giraud's private plane. farty Rrriving N'aples Carodichino BTA 1700 hours.n Personal for Clark from T'ontgomery. RN 28?, referring to General Cl~·rk 1 s 1'f,Pny thanks indeed for your conI \"ish your Army fl'Mt success in the coming year. 11 //7g99 quoted in the diary of December ::>5th. gratulations and good wishes. Fallo ing rre three imrortant cables dispctched today: From Richardson to Eighth Army ACTION for Chir f of Staff nnd 15th Army Group inf'ormation and FLA.FIDO for Generel Robertson information, with a copy for Fifth Army. R·r 8047. 11 0rder Cor.i:1rmrler 1st Division together \'lith sw1-ll rlanning staff for amphibious operation to report Commanding General Fifth Army immediately. This Division will come under co:rimand Fifth Arny shortly. 11 Frepare to send 5th Division to cor1e under corn,;and Fifth Army enrlfost. It should be operationPl in Fifth Army are;, within fourteen dn.ys. Corrnander Fifth Division should report to Fifth .Army as soon es you crn sprire r. in. ?.love of this division to be arraneed between you and Fifth Army. 11 I return 15th Army Group tomorrow morning.", Five Army to 15th Army Group ACTIOIJ for DCS and FLAr1BO informrtion for General Rob"'!rtson from Richl'lrdson. RN 8048. 11 Fifth Army will rrobably require two comrnandos and all possible LOT now with Eighth Army. One British Beach Group will be needed and shonld be essernbled now . in m·ples area.• ~,.i Heachm1rters 15th .Army Grour uill move er,rliest to Naples arer> not Casertn. Send Reece rarty to report FLA.IBO irinedir-itely. Fence will be t:re ::,uthority for allottini:s accornriodation. Re uirernents ::-re similar to those now occur,ied by us 11 �and should be clenr of N8ples itself . Inform TAF of Gen~re.1 Alexander ' s decision and pet the Air f1arshal to send Reece prty rtlso . n For Eisenhower fror, Alexander, information Fifth Arny. RU 8049. "I hnve just discussed ;-iith Clark his plan for SHHYGIE on the assumption thPt the craft are bdng retrtined . I ar, giving him tro British Divisions from Eighth Army, one for SH:ITGLE and one to reinforce 10 Corps. I am most r-nxious thnt \7e retain for this operation the RCT of 8?nd Airborne Division no'7 with us and Pm continuing nll"n.'1inr; on this brisis . I '1ould be very p;rat~ful for your assistance in this matter . n * * * CASE.i~TA --DECBIIBER 28 , 1943--At 0800 Lt . Col. Bruce of the H~dical Corps called upon Gencrnl Clnrk , "rho vas troubled by a sev~re cold . At 0830 M Le Troquer , . CoMr,issaire de la Defense Netionale, Genernl Girnud, Gl"\nerrl Juin and severl"l other '!.'rench officers called upon G"neral Clark to ray their respects . At 0930 GenerRl Clrrk, on Lt . Col. Bruce I s in"istence, le-:t the l"rcr-i ~:ind went to the 36th General 1-rospjtn.l rrhere he h:od decided to st:-,y for a day or tvJO in order to clen.r up his cold . Gen~ral Grmmther beld a con:F'erence with the French officers in the conference hut in th~ absence of G~n~ral Clark. Gene ral Gruenther cntertcJned Gen,':)rl"ls LUCP"' , __::8gles, Wilbur F.nd Major Renne at luncheon. The followinr- cable v:?s ~cnt to Gr-m,,,rr>l T'ise11ho'"ler today by Gem•rql Clr-irk: RN 5906. 11 Confirming my conversation with GenerAl '3l'lith I intend to relieve Major Gen~ral John A. Crane from co!l'lm1md of 13th Fi"ld Artillery Br5gade in order to make hin PW' ile blc to serve as Military Commrmder of Rome . 11 * * * CASERTA --DECEHB<ll 29 , 1943--General Gruenthcr conferred with Generel Cl::irk r-t the '36th GenerRl Hospital several times concerning pending and future operations . In the evening Gcn0-ral Grmmther, on behalf of General Cl11rJr, entertained at dinner rJ!. Le Troquer , General GirFtud , General Juin, Genere.l B ,ucler , General CP-rpentier , Gener1'll Roosevelt , togeth"'r with staff officers of the Fifth Army, includinp- Colonel Saltzman and Lt . Col. Porter . At dinner M Le . Troquer and Gen~rnl Giraud spol<:e verv insistently regarding the bringing of the Brosset Division to Italy to ,join the Fifth Arny. Generi=i.l Gruenther re peated the previous considerntinns about the fact that the Brosset Division was armed in pa.rt Tith Americen nnd in rart with British materiel and thPt the problem of supply would be extremely difficult . GP-ncrnl GirPud Pnd H. Le Troquer repeat"d again and agai1'1 th<tt it was desirable from the point of view of French morale that the Bross~t Division come to Italy 2nd thPt b~crmse o:f its superior equipment in motor trucks and machinery repnir and mRintemimce could T'lAintain i~self despite t?e dif'ficulties wb5 ch Might oth~rwise A.rise, drawing its am~unition fron the British 10 Corps . General Clark todny dispe.tchP.d the follm· ine; BIGOT cable to GeMral Alexander: RN g132 . "Admiral Lowry arrived today from Algfors . He st11ted thnt it is Admiral Cunningham ' s understanding thr->t SHINGLE ·rill te ke place north of TIBER . Also that 56 LSTS must return to UK on Febru,.,ry ?nd. Please confj_rm. It is his understand:'i ng thot 12 six-davit LSTS VTill be sent to UK soon. Urgently rer.mest thrt they be k~pt type substituted . 14 six-dc1vit LSTS now �allotted t>re entirely inadequate for our needs . " * * * CASEP.TA-- DECETIB:r:R 30, 1943- -General ClArk conferred et his room in the 36th General Hospital with Generl"l Gruenther and Generril Brr-mn concernjng the problems arising out of simultaneous conduct of planning for O:reration JltTVIL nnd Operation SHINGI.E and the conduct of war on the Fifth Army front . re directed General Gruenth~r to go by n];me to Algiers, lePvj ng Pt dayl:i ght tomorrow·, in order to discuss the r htion of G~ner~l Clnrk to SErTGLE , ANVIL and the re-orgrmization at Allied Force Hendqw.rters . Gen~r"l '8iscnho'"'t'\r, ~ing been appointed to the ~upreme con~Bnd formerly connanding in the<]Ji_ddle Enst, with General Devers ri s bis A:merimm Deputy. General f. lexander is to be the over-all Allied Commrinder in Italy. General ClA-rk has been told informally by General Eisenhm..,er thPt he has been selected for ANVIL, but thus far Gen~rn 1 Alexander has not been in:f'orm":d of this +"act . General ClArk has heerd j ndirectly thAt r> pl1'1nninf; group from Seventh trmy is already nssembling f't Algiers, nnd this is a peculiar siturition, f'S Grmeral Clrirk does not kno1•r rhether they havens yet been jnform~d wbo is to commrnd the ANVIL Operation. As G"nerr.l Fiisenhower is J,eaving Algiers nt once for his new Pssignment , Genern.1 Clark aeemed it essential thPt General G:r;-uenther fly there inmediPtely to clear up +his situation. Becnuse of the confidential nrture of the matter8 concerned, General Clrrk a.n0 Genert> 1 Grucnther Agreed on a code which "muld rerl'li t the exchange of informP.tion without disclosure to Anyone not fPmiliar vlith the code used . General ClArk today received the following cable from Colonel Gjlner, Secretary General Staff, AFHQ . RN 21606 . 11 Gttmeral Gruenther should m"'et G~ner1:l Eisenhorer at Am~rican Operations Office at P'A.ison Blrnche 11.t noon tomorrow 'Priday. General Efaenho· ·er will be expecting him there th~n, as he will depart at 1230 hours local time . Please advise if General Gruenther is delriyed . 11 * * * CAS1~RTA--DECEMBER 1 31 , 1943--Ge:peral Gruenther left for Algiers at sunrise, and General Clr>rk, who had lPrgely recovered +'rom his aold , left , ith Lt . Colonels Sutherland and Bruce for~ couple of days ' rest Pnd r~cuperRtion Rt Sorrento . The followin~ important messafs~S "'ere received rt the co:r,_riand post during the day: Personal for Clark from Lt . Gen . Sir Oliver m. H. Leese . RN COS/200 . tr>ken over comJT1Pnd T;;ighth Army todqy froM GenerA.l Montgomery. Am delighted and honored to be serving nlongside your 11.rmy. Shall be coming to see you F'S soon as possible . tiermwhi le Rm only too r..nxious to help you j n any 'W.y possible in your codn~ ventures . " 11 Heve The two messages vihich follovr vrere received frol'l GenerHl Gruenther jn a confidentiri.1 code whicr hnd been rre-arrf'nged between he ~nd Generrl ClArk: Secret for Clark from Gruenther . RN ?1781 . Your request to keep Fifth Army disapprovcd . 11 11 Clnrk to corrrnrnd ANVIL 7Hf-lE- For Clark from Gruenther. RH ?1980 . 11 Fart of Seventh Army already under orders to arrive here soon. r':essage concerning ANVIL to be sent tonight to �l <21 Alexander and Clerk . Training Center ?..nd Operation ANVIL will be mounted from Italy. Sorry about Fifth Army. " * * � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President. This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, December 1 - 31, 1943 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from December 1-December 31, 1943. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1943 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1564 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/4405beb5486b36e1d8a6d22afcffc2ec.pdf?Expires=1784764800&Signature=eKPa4h%7ESb7k3gsk0YZ2L5YphGewHsThyPi686XLkvEzwYhfD2a9RfHhhEy9yxZRzSeCG2B4GEQPnFyqqxUI2D1u99JjyUgZZ9nxTtLWs1dpCX%7Eay3c9IChmbf-iSfUJ2QR5KOTg0vHN87Cv7aLZVTWbtbaKMvr4Vmc%7ESPkcmfoTHB3DiKjiLr06Vr0kLlZkVv4%7Eu7hC-c4KN86b5ORNXWChla5yqjWoHNvQp7JSuAGdZp1TrUZ-hc-06yxQ97hetQi5n70MRH-uL-399-kb9LV%7ESZdqjlp5F8efqSCCo2kLVTohN-Don4anLwkeCuU0yYfR%7EWdnINNYmyg%7ET5fZXkw__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM d86e20c1005ea7b0d0b109f3f49a1c20 PDF Text Text s ~ This is Volume VI of the 1/ar Dirry of Lieutenrnt General r~rk W. ClPrk. Volume I, covering p0.riod 28 Jun~, 1942 to September 24, 1942; Volum~ II, Covcrin~ reriod 25 September 194? to 5 JanuPry 1943; Volume III, covering period 6 Jimun.ry 1943 to 6 Jun"? 1943; and Volume IV, covering period 7 June 1943 to ?9 AuRUst 1943, rre h~ld in safekeeping Pt the Army 1!ar College, ·foshi"1gton, D. C. VolUJ'le V, cover- ing period Augu~t 30, 1943 to December 31, 1943 is being held in safekeeping in the Commanding Genarn1 1 s safe �OFFICERS ' REST CErT-r:;R, SORRPiIITO--JMWARY 1, 1944--NErr YEAR 1S DAY--General ClPrk r,pent the day r>t the Officers I Rest Center. In the evcninp; he dined with some of his sta.ff officers who ,,,.r~ rre3ent . During thi"' dr_y, motor messengers brought dispPctches do m fron the GenerA.1 1 s commnnd rost, and he discussed various r1atters by telerhone with his Chief of StPff. AMong the day's messages ,.,ere n.n acknowledgment by General Clrirk of Gener:, 1 Leese I s greeting, besides th~ following rnessr:tges from Gencrnl Gruenther who " rs still in Afric;:i; Persnna.l for Clark fro,,, Gruenther . RN 22103 . "My guess js thPt SHINGLE v'ill be cancelled . Rooks and '""hiteley feel thrt Alexander is bf'dly off bflse in this instance ." Personal for Clark from Gruenth~r. RN 22104. "Informe.tion from AcimirP 1 Cunningham indicates nen.rly all LSTS must be released on Febru:c>ry ?nd at latest . Concert h~re is th"t force must land with suprlies for eight dRys with no dependence on re-supply by ,wter. No craft can be furnished for subsequent build-up. General 1'~isenhower has r sked Combined Chiefs to Pllovr 504th to remain for SHINGLE . 11 Personal for Clork from Gruenthcr . RN 22354. 11 Concensus here is thnt SH:It'(\LE should be cr-ncelled unless AleXPnder and Clark can show that there Tiill be no interference with ANVIL. I assume th:ot you now hPve telegrl"'m reference Seventh Army. Suggest you hnve Ga;:r or Harkins report to you immediately to explain status of Seventh Army staff . Part of stnff will start to a.rri ve here .!orldny. 11 Personal Clark to AloY..ander . RN 6037. "fosition regnrding ll"ndine craft nov: clear . It is understood 20 LST 1 s -.rill be released for Feb 5 convoy Pnd 13 more LST ' s 10 dr:iys lriter . J lanning is proceeding on allocation of 88 1ST I s (14 - 6 davit) , 60 LCT 1 s , 90 LOI (1) 's, 6 LSI (1) 1 s, 2 LSI (M) anc' 2 AGC 1 s. Urgently request additional 12 - 6 davit LST's of ?6 destined for er-irly departure TJ . K. be allotted for OperAtion SHrJGLE . Alterm1 te rlrin being prepPred using these additfonPl 12 - 6 daYit LST I s • 11 * * * CASERTA--JJ\.NUARY 2 , 1944--Gcneral Cl.Ark left ~ ,orrento Rt 1100 a.nd arrived at his command post two hours later . Shortly there11fter Generr•l Gruenther arrived from Algiers , and Generals Gruenther and Brann immediately met -•-i th General Clark to discuss the jnformRtion w'lined by General Gruenther in Algi11rs Pnd its effect on future operPtio:r1s . A great rector in this discussion WP :" a cable, R'J' 22218, received at General Clark's commPnd rost this morning PS 11n jnformation copy of n cable from FR'?.EJ"Xlf" to 15th l\rmy Group . This crble, conpletely to General Clark ' s surprise , radically altered the nunber of crpf't :;ivrilRblc for SH:f'TGLE and so limited the time when they 1"ere avrilr-ble PS to render re supply P..nd reinforcement of the SHIJJGLE force iT'lpossible . This c~'!._')le re:.=id as follows : "At the Tunis conference on 25 December it ''IPS P greed thrt SHIJJGLE could be undertal,:~n on the follo"dng basis: !,. Thrit nothing should be allowed to interfere vrith the target d[lte of OV'i:JlLORD or ANVIL. ]2 . ThPt the build- up . into Corsica should b"l safeguPrded . Q. Thero vms no riuestion of r1r>intenrnce of tr~ force over the beaches . ]2. There wes no question of A subsequent buildup of the initial force. �"The following are full details of l"nding craft r>vailability: s_. 1ST. At the Tunis conference it was decideo thnt 88 WP.S the T1.Rximwn thrt could be mP.de awiilable. Since then: (1) Doubt hrs arisen r>s to ,~hether 8 of these will not have to proceed to UK at once to enable the r8fitting progrP.m for OTIRLORD to be completed. (2) 3 fast LST heve been ordered to return from India, and it is hoped thr>t they will arrive jn time. Thus in the best case 91 LST will be avajlable e.nd in the worst case 80. In l'my crse, ho1'Tcver, you should not plnn on more than 95% of the avPilRble LST being service8ble at the time of the operation. 15 of the 1ST allotted are of the six-drwit type, and it appears proh-'lble tht>t this will be increased to 16, which is the mnximum possible. ]. LCT. 35 T'!a.rk V and 25 rhrk II, III or IV are expected to be available and serviceable. Q. LCI(l). A total of 90 are expected to be aveilable t1nd this figure Plip;ht be increPsed slightly. ]2. LSI(l) 6 and LSI(m) 2. "It r.mst be clearly understood thrt the LST scheduled for return to UK must be releA.sed no ln.ter tran 3 Februriry reg,.,rdless of 3HINGLE D day, P lso that 16 LST must be relen.sed no bter thr-n 3 Febru~ry to be b"ck on the Corsica run by 5 February re-gr.rdless of SIIPJGIE D d11y. Certnin otr"'lr LST must be released ir.imediately after the Pssault for ov"'lrhriul, Pnd vm AstimPte thP.t tr is ,•sj 11 leave you 6 serviceable LST for ell ms intennnce rurnoses in Italy ;,ftcr D./2. It is estimated thAt 24 serviceable LCT v:ill be rvailA.ble for all mainten:rnce purposes in Italy after D/2. 11 All above (1 P,Toup corrupt) concernin~ landing craft do not tPke into account 'battle losses from present time onwards. "It is emphasized thPt there must be a return to the ngremnents of the Tunis conference :md if acceptabl~ pl::>ns c::>nnot be drarn on thPt hrisis the GOCI!JC 15th Army Group must so stPte in orcl.er th::i.t the recoP1nendrition to ce.rry out SHPTGL.Ti: can be recons5 dered. n General Gruenther informP.d Gencrrl Clark thPt a Comr.iander-in-Chief 1 s conference nas now being held in Tunis cnncerning th9 mounting of SHINGLE ::>nd ANVIL; that General Alexander WAS there and vms discuss;ng the avAi]p'l:>ility of shipping with AdT'liral Cunningham. General Clr,rk, therefore, dispatched thn fol::!..oninr; cr-ible to G"lncrril ~lexander. RN 8281. "As I stated to yo1 l rhon you rere here several days a.t;o, I am enthusiastic over outlook for Operation 3HITTGLE provided thnt nece"'sary meAns are made available. Conditions proscribed in Fr~edom message ??2rn, requiring release of ell but six 1ST by "'ebru~ry 3rd, ..rill probt->hly rflsult in situ tion which 'l"'ill :make oy,ern.tion extremel;.r hnzarcous. I urgently request thnt you m11ke every effort to hold Adequate number of crP.:i"t for SF=:'JGLE 1mtiJ such time "'S success of the opere.tion is assured. 0 "Vlith the optimum number of LSTS which :vill be avn.ilr>ble the two jnf8ntry divisions ;vill lPnd vrith grel'ltl;r reduced vehicle strenr;ths. For exnmple, the British Division will have 1?00 vehicles le~s thrn assr,ult r-c,.los. Ancricrin Division and all attached surporti11g units both divi"'ions Hil1 be correspondingly reduced. Corps troops with acequatc trnnsr,ort and eriuipment will be prricticrilly nonexistent. 1 "Another unfrvorable fa~tor is thnt smPll number of Assault cr11ft will permit lPndin1; only five 4 nfantry h'lttnlions Enrl one ranger h1tt2lion assPult ~ �loaded. Reserve battA.lions w1.ll not be Pble to lrind in assnult crnft. It was for this reRson thnt I sent you ce.ble 6037 (quoted in yesterday's diary) asking thP.t l? PdditionPl LSTS with six davits be r1ade avnilRbL. The alternative is to use LCILS for the reserve units. The NElvy co'Ylsiders this on unsl'!tisfPctory method in view of lmown beach conditions, and I concur. In spite of these difficulties I have bi,en willing to 12.nd the corps At r(~duced str ,ngth on the assurription thRt ue ·aould be able to retain P reasonRble nunbcr of LSTS for resupply purposes and to trnnsport the necessary v~hicles needed by the ass:rn.lt forces. Freedom nessage 22218 hr.s ruled out thPt assumption. Minimum nunber of LSTS 1•rhich must be ret8inod is 20. Ten are needed for Rn indefinite period for re-supply purposes a.nd. ten for a reriod of t 1To ,,,eeJrs for tr'-"nsportc'ltion of vehicles. If lJo. vy Hill not remove loading lir1itRtion of 400 tons per LST P. total of 24 LSTS will be re0uired. 1 "rt is my conccptfon of Oporrtion 3HI1IGLE th;:it vre r-mst coun.t on "'.upplying by sea for P. minimum period of 15 days rind probebly longer. The 0xr,.,cted location of the Fifth Army 11hen SHIJGLE is lP.unched is such thA.t it is highly improbeble that the two forces rill be able to gain confo ct in less than, thet time. I intend att1=1c'k in. gre<>test rossible stren<rth in L-i.ri Valley severnl days in adwmce of SHT'.JGIB ~,fitr the object of draving r1axin.um mmbcr of enemy reserves to thPt .,.~ront iind fixing then therP-. In thrt vm.;r and in thPt way only CB.n the SHFJGLB Force exercise a decisive influence in the operPtion to carture Rome. 11 If r~y idea of the opern.tion is sound it is essentiol that ··,c make rrovision to re-surPly the force ?S indicrted above. rry estimntc of ?O LSTS makes no allonance f'or craft to rrovide a build-up although it :is quitr-; conceiwible thPt the ener-iy situntion mP.y mPke thl'lt <>ction necessary. "Present estirr£tte is th~.t D Day will be Jrmwiry 25, Although T Pm making ever:r effort to adv"ncc thet sevoral days." Gener.:>l ClR.rk felt th'1t he was genu:inely e1'1~er to engrige in SHH-TGLF:, to \ the point of' committing in it units -hich he rroulrl suhsequently hnve to utiJ.:ize in K~NIL, but thrt, in effect, a. pistol was being held Pt his head becruse he was told, totally t0 hj" SW'prise, thrt if he wns to engage in '3HINGLE it must be done '"ith inadequate craft, thet the craft ,..ould be ev<>ilable for only two de.ys after the l.nndini:; rnrl thPt no re-supr,ly or rr~inforcement thereafter i7ould be awiil2.ble. In effect, therefore, he WPS Psi:0d to land two divisions et a point where a junction vith the h=iln.nce of Fifth Army was impossible for e ) long period, thereby leavinr-; tho t,ro di visions :i.n question out on a very long limb. L r2 Later in the afternoon Generr:tl IfoCreery called on General Clar}!- Pnd discussed the f'uture operations of 10 Corps. He also spoke of P conversation he recently had had vdth the General Co·1m~n.ding the 5th British Division, "hich is About to become part of the Fifth Army, and in particular rbout thrt officer's comment concerning the caswltics of thrit Division. Gener'l.1 ncCreery ) was struck by the comparativ~ly trifling c.nsualties vrhich h...,rl been suffered and by the light chPracter of the fightinp; on the Eighth Army front which this / indfoated. The follovrjn~ cnblo was srmt to VI Corps rind the Fr~mch Exy-,"Jditiom1r;7 Corrs todr-i.y. rm 6051. 11 Effective 031200 JanuPry French r.:xpca~tionary Corps riill relieve VI Corps find CG, F~C wi11 assur::1c coriT1r-ind of present VI Corre sector n.nd �..5 responsibility for current ~ission of VI Corps. "Assignmr,nts rnd 'ltt::ichmrmts ncntioned in Fifth ~rmy letter, AG file 11 Troops rrssignrnents ,nd PttPclir1<>nts1t become effective 031200 J::,nuRry 19f+/h 322 .1-Y dated 2 J,r,.nunry 19M+, "'Ubj0ct 11 VI Corps ·vill reconnoiter the flre::i uest of I\VsRSA-HAILES rord 2n south of 10 Corns reAr boundrir;r for bivoun.c are;:-~ f'or Corr-~ CI' n.nrl Corps Troops. Areris selected will be clearoa ~i th G-3 Pnd G-4 this her'dqurrtors , ·ho will arrringe contact"' rith FBS ''Ih~re necessary. "Effective 040001A January, 3d Infrntry Jivision ,.,nd rtfrch d 441st AAA A'"l Bn rnd 601st TD Bn is ntto.ch~d VI Corps." * * CASTillTA--JANUl\RY 3, 1944--Gen"'rn l Clerk tod::,y confl"lrrod j n the morning concerninf, pmnin,:,- operAtiori.s with Gcm~r"l J:9yes, Gen0r"l Gruenthrr, GPner~l Brrinn nnd G~n9r::i_l L9mnitzer. Gent'lr~l Keyes r>nd Gener~l L'jrnnitzer st~y"'d for lunch. In the pfternoon G9nOr"l LuCPfl cnr,c rind r1 jccuased J.j_s rrorosGn rll"n for the rount. nP, of SHIITGLr.;. On Jrinm1 ry 1st, by Gen"'r:' 1 Pattnn =rs relieved) fron cor1mf'nd of the 3cve'1th ArT"ly, r>nr Gcn9r~1 C1,,rv:: "'PS r,l2c..,d in comm"nd of it, in arldition to his cor,"lnnd of t}1e Fifth Army. The di:' y "f11'm h0 ,,;ould lay do 11m c6mnc'nc1 of the Fifth Army was left to 0ir> cleterrrdn.,,tion. Fart of the Seventh Army PlPnning Staff vr:'s r>lreaily on the wr,ter on its "'A.Y to Alfti-rs <>nd the Chief of StRff, Seventh Army was on his w>y to confer vi th G ,neri= 1 Clrr1r. The Grin~rrl I s int,,ntion vras to send Gemr,r il Brann ir:1I1cdirtely to Alir' ers to take charf{e o+' the I'lo.nninr, Grour anrl rt n:r eArly <lat9 he rropos9d to set ur his Army HePJ'l.quartcrs in Itn ly, ro· sibly nt Salerno, derending uron b ce of mountini; and tr" inint:; for A'nfIL. It would be di f'f'5 cult for him to retain more them ri few li::(ly reorle from his rresent sbff, - tentPtivcly his four G's and bis Sip;ml Of'fj cer, rr~ th & fc ,r junior officers "no, of course, his Chfof of Staff. The nio11nti:>1a of ANVIL vmulc'I be mr-de by four American Jjvisions and five or six -'rench Divisions. The /1.nericP..n Divisions would l110k>" the initifll 0ssault, and the rench Divisions tb..,n come in. The GenerAl is seeking to get nn airborne division in arldition 11.nd is seeking nn a.ppropriate Air Commander . 0 At noon today GenerRl Lucas rcl:i.nquished comMand of the sector in ,•·hich VI Corps had been oper~ting, and Generel Juin 1 s CEF took over the com.~and of the 2nd Norocctm Division rind the 45th Division. The 7th R.T.n. of the 3rd AlgeriPn hRd already start0d thc relief of tho 179th Inf,-,ntr;'{. GenerPl Lucas, following a ceremonial relief by Gennr.11 Juin at Prata, caml'! to t:be confero.nce with GenerPl ClRrk ri ✓ ntfoned r-bove rinc1 tr"•n '7ent on to set up his new HePdquarters at f"addaloni. The Prmy Co"1mrmder received r- cable f'rom G0nernl Alexanrler, !RN, stPting that General Alexander trill arrive Cap()dichino at 1130 to"':lorrow r>nr' plP.ns to return to B::iri th0 samn Pftr:?rnoon, 11nd 1-rill hPV3 ffcrty of' four. The fol lo"ri ni:s excerpt is f'lade of Cosi tintrop Ll78 frori 15th Arrriy Group, �RN o . 848 : "Fifth P,rmy French ~x:reditionrry r:orps (FBC) CF open".ld Prata Hl614 at 031::>00A hours . Relieved VI Corps . CG FEC ass11mnd comrr,"nd rresent VI Corps Sector a!lo resron::::ibilH;r for current m.i'>sion 0f VI Corps . 3 Al!'.;erinn Div movement to 45 Div Ar~P continues . Relief of 179 Inf :in are& Fl4,?6 by 7 .Alger Inf started todey. 2 1 'oroc Djv. r;e,,,thnr li~jt~d operf!tions . Security patroll5_np;. 4 Div Sno'" ext,r-;rie cold "'nr' rurrg,,0 t11rrrin hl=impering r>dv<>nce 180 Inf Patrols located enemy in Acquafondola H05?6. Ene!'ly still holding at G9727 9725 . II Co1'J)s . 1/i.2 Inf security ratrols only. No contact TFA strong combP.t patrols to G9L,16 - g515 met hewvy enemy resistt:>nce . 1 Armel Div less Hq One Corbot Comnand relieved nttrichl"lent II Corps 020001A hours reverted to Fifth Army Control. Povinp; vicinity Aqul'llirmo 1'Jl357. X Corrs . 56 Div. 168 Bde to M8798 found enemy. I'r.trol to bridge M 8594 niade no contact . Army 'I'f'S. 3 US Div less 15 Inf' reverteo to /irmy Con+,rol ::>921401\ Decl"):riber now closed in Area 2 rTiles T-Torth of Pozzuoli NlOL.6 . ~i.fth Army cr>sualtiAs to 1 Jan. Ameri can killed 2673 wounded 11010 r1issinP, '3366 . British killed 1682 ~rounded 7112 missing 2884 . Fr -nch 1-::illed ?28 wounded 144g missing 89 . n: by Ari.ericnns 2g95 . British 1686. French 118 . 11 * * CASERTA --JA~-lU~RY 4, 19l+L:---This morning G'"'n""rRl Gl2rk l"P.cejv~d calls from Brigcdier G"mor11l Sr•;1bridge, G- 1, A'.'Iq , rnd Brigadier Genernl Arthur Hilson , Comm""nd:ing ,13s. Tith Gener[il Srivrbridge he oiscussed the transfer of certnin rersonnel from Fi.r>th Arrny to Seventh Arr1y a:111 also the riuestions ;:,risinp; out of' certP in Legion nf T<irit 8 .,,,rds . JIG took up vr>rious ~upply problems in his ciocussion with GAnPrPl il3on . Shortly b~fore noon J::,e held 11 mr-,etinP ~t th"" hut Pt which tb~ro "'ere present Generr>l Luca" , G,~ncrr-1 GruP.nthP.r , Ac1r,irel Lo'"rry, Captain Le...,ds , Generc>l Truscott , Genf:'lral Brr>.nn and vnrious st<iff officers . Ge-neral Cl,,,rk stAtcd thr-t he '.7PS e-,rpectin?, P visit "'roT'l Gon'"ral Alexo.nder j_n A few minutes "nd th"'t the pre3c-,it mr~etine hr-d been cRlled r-s ~ preliminnry to the w:iet5.np- with GAneral Alex;:,nder . T-fe r1entioned the :mrpri~c •ri th vrhich he hPd received the message from <\FHQ (mr 2?;::>18 , quoted jn the dir->ry of Jf!nunry ?nd) r,lacinrr l:i r-d to.tions on th8 "mount of crest 11 VPilP bl': for SHINGLE and on the tir,e ,rhen the crPft ' ere awil,,ble could b"; US"'}c1 , Pnd stc t8d th['t under tho c0nditions of this messe.ee re-SUT'Pl:V r>nd rei f'orcerl\ent vras imross:ible . After 1 sone a; sc;1ssion of v::irious c et:clilP , the G~ner"l 1mr,1T'l11rizcd his nosition '"'S follows: "'"19 are supposed to go ur tbere , r1 ump t•."o di visions P shore '<ri th V.'hrt corps troops we C<'.n s~t ~ n, with r1 n indeterr1j na to nunber of craft without re suprly or reinforccT1cnt, and 1"[\i t for the rest cf the Arm:r to ;join up . n He then adned , 11 I am trying to find wPys to do it , not -rpys in which "''e con not do it . I ari convinced that -re r> re r;oing to do it, P n,1 thn t it -i s going to be a success . n The P s ser:ibled o:f'fj cers left uron the r rri vr l of G0nern 1 Alex~11.der , ,·,ho cemc with I"ajor G~nr:rR.l Rich.i:;rc'lson :::>nd Lt. Gen . HPrcl:i ng. Gen°rPl Robr:,rtson also came , a.nd these officers , ·rith Gencrl"l Grur.;nth,r E>nd G")nerrl Brnnn, discussed operntion rmI:TGLE . 1 General Cll"rk statPd to (km~rnl J\lexP.nder thl'lt th"} messae;e RN 2;)218, had corie P s r' cor,plete ourpri se n11d shoc1· to him, as no pr~vi ou'"> suggestion from General Ale7ander had rdnted at the linitrtions of riv,ilnb1e shipping ~1hich this nessage imposed . Gencr::i.l Clnr}r stnterl to General /\.lexrmder 1 s surprise / �thPt he , General Clark, had l'.11o"rn for three '"eeks th"t he hNl b0en selected to cormFind 11 1 1VIL and new~rthcles-:: , ,lesrite J,-,is nrtur2l interest jn conserving force for thrt blow , he r<1d "c'lnt.busiristjcnll:r ,nter d into C-:HI'mLF. rlP.nning and hPd nronosed to nut his 1JI Corps staff "nd .bis 3rd Infrntry Division , t",o of his fin~st rin;J T"!~st useful orgr>nizatio·'ls , ~ :nto the SVPTGI:~ Operl'ltior, ,=hicr 'WS one of c0ns::.dereble hazard in ,·:hich t.beir usefulness f'or .11.TIVIL nip;ht be considerably iripnircd . Gener;il Cl['rk furtblr ,tr>ted to Gennr"l AlexPnder thet he W"'S fully deter:riined on p-oi>-1g into jHr'GLE end puttinr, fortl1 evcr-::,r effort to rna1,:e it n. success , but it could not be done nitl1out tro cr;of't, originally Agreed on . Gen"rnl Almmnr1er then unrlertook to drn'·' r c.--ble to the Fril"le f'inister exnlE1inin1:,- tho. rer.Jnisites of srirr:inr.; for the successful confuct of r.;IUNGLE and had a difficult tin<:'! vi th the fr cts "nd figures unt:i. l G"!n<lrf' 1 Clnr], "'Ufplied him .,j th P copy of' cnble P.H 8?81 of Jl'lnw ry ?nd (quoted in thcit dey ' n diriry) ~•rhich General Ale-v:r-inder hRd hrc1 for tno dP;TS . GenerP l t lext1nrl~r , r0c0gnizing th,.,t all th0 n9cessrry datr. wa" contain,.,cl in Gen0rril Cli=irk 1 s c11ble , c'lrew a cab] e o,.. his m;ri tr, the Prime r~inister ndortinr; the subst1mce of' Gnnerfl l mm cable . lo ,l 0 1 (J G C Gr-meral ClE<r1'- tcld Generrl Alemnrler th::-t he rroposed to continue plflnning for 3HI rm,s onrl , cs 8 rossih1e c lternntiv8, 1rP.cp in riinrl r shorter ~nd run just north of Gaete Ioint to be pi<:rforned with one djvision only. However , G0nerr-il Cl..,rk further strted thrt in his estiMPtion :lt "TPS thP- ('unction of G<>n,,rrl Alexander to determine v;hother the number of Gern;:in Divisions prepPred to oppose tr1e lrirdinR; in 3HHTGLB ',ms too grer>t to per>"~-t r succcss,,.ul or'"rr tion Pnd that hr-i , G<>ner8l ClnrJ:, dic1 not rropose to rrirc-~ this question ::,ny further . He poj.nted out to GrmerRl Alexander thrt he understooc" thc-t the '.)qth P;inzer Gr0nr> dier Regj ment hPd just be(m noV!3d by the German cor,mand from the Fifth Army front to a position near Rome , •7hich n,dded rll.oth~r division to those in rosition to oprose the opr,ratfon under discussion. G"!n9rnl AlexrindP-r anc'l the throe officers riccomrnnying hin then left the cor.in;ind post by cub for Crpodi.chino airport nnd returnod by plP..ne to B2ri. / \ GencrPl Cle.rk ,,.elt thPt l't tho :nr:ietinr with the Prime I'fj nistqr in Tunis on Christnas D;:iy -·hen Gnneral Eisenhormr , Gener11l Alexander anc'l others \7ere I present , the Trime f'in:: ster had been :Lnrpircd --Ji th a desire to CPfture Rorie and bad determj ned thr>t 'HI'TGLS v;ould ta ·e plrice , Pnd GeniJra 1 Sisenho·· er "nd G0ne - 1 rel Alexand0r , ·ritrout detn:tled l:nomledge of the rro½l9l7!S involver , had r-greed / to it . n'1fortunrtely, in General Clrirk 1 s estimation, none of those rrho thus lip;ht hcartedly de c id.ed on tho SH:nTGLE Operation understood the detPils of shippj_ng end of loar'linf'" nl'"Jcessary to rut rshore the requisite .,,.orce 2nd nri"ntain it when once Pshore . The Genornl felt thrt G0n,,ral Alexnnder, even ,oft0r re ceiving GnnerPl ClPrk ' s 7JT 8?81, still did not n.rrr0.cirte the re,1uisites f'or a successful oper:=i,tion auch as SPIJ-TGL'"' , Pnd h11 had been hamper0d rt a Comm~:inder in- Chief 1 s con:'ercnce ulth Admiral Clmn:inp.;hPm on Janur>ry 0 nd by this lr>ck of informRtion. Gener8,l ClBrk felt thr-t ,•rhcn Gen(1r;:a 1 ft lexnnder hPd b0tm br,clly dis.s.prointed 1 at not gettinP' the 1•"'n.iterrPnean CoJ11Jnand , vice Grmer, 1 EisenhoT'T(')r , Pnd at not being selected to fo l low G'.mcr a l ~isenho"er to UK for a. comriand there , the Frir,e Hinistcr had ->ttcmpted to sr,othe his feelings by p,-j ving h:i.m the high s01mding ,,mt somevrhat empty title of Cor:imnnr1er- in- Chicf , Itrly, Bnd b;v ~iving him Lt. Gr:m . Harc1 ing as his Chief of :3taff , to G0neral Harding ' " oiseppoint ment cs he hrd hopcn to cor~111and his Corps jn OVT'JtLo-qn . ~lith tJ-,'3se other conc essions , the Prime r'inister kd 2lso , in Gener al Cbrk ' s estil"lr-tion, given l �General Alexn.nder P'"rmission to riount Ororntion ~HI TGLE vrithout proper consideration of the f,,ctors imrolvnd in the or'"rf1tion. The r,ritter 1c'as rendered more coJTJplex hy th~ fRct tr.Pst the crr-"t of ·7J-•:Ich the FriMe ' 1inister -r:1 s disposinr, "ere in large rrJeasure American ere ,...t And r>ot subj net to his control. _,, This evening P now phr,sc of the Fi th Army attn k "ms jnstitut'3d nhen the 3/+th Division, the Speci"ll Service Force rn~ th(') t)th ~rmorr:id Division pushed forvm.rrl. By thA close of the d<>y our troops ·;ere in S<Jn Vittore nhere street fi~hting hed occurred. Some -.,iw,nces hrd been r1c-ide on the M gh gr01md to the northeast. General Clark today rlispatchnd the follo 1'linr cr)blc to crrc, JFH'.}. RN R37?. 11 1. Decision by r,L I'130 precludes the loacing of cr.>rgo sJ-,ipr.ing at Fantaloon "or Operation SHil GI.E e:rcert for fPrt of shirrfog to :'3.ccorn.p.?ny assault convoy. This ruling nn.de because loading of ar'ditional shippi11.g would interfere rith rlrmned incorrtng tonnPr;es throui::h fort of f rnt.<:iloon. ?. Contemplate loading 4 fjtt~d Libcrtfos v7ith British Pnd Am~ricrm Ground Force Stores r,ric. 1 Cor-:ister .,..d.th Air Force supplies rt Fnntnloon because of the selective loading required anc because of non-avPilBbility of certain supplies in !forth Africa. 11 3. 'ill require 8 Fitted Liberty Ships eAch to he sprerirl loaded TTith BritisJ:, and Americn.n Ground Force supplies l'lnd ? Co9sters to be lof-1.ded with Air Force supplies in P 1forth A""ricPn Port or Forts cesignated by you. Am pr':lparecl to. Sl'!nd rGpresl'mtr,tjves ..,ith reriuisitions to 30S IJATCUSA and AFRQ (British And TQI"'s to fort or I-orts of lonning. 11 "Li-. It is required th-it four fitt"d Liberties rncl 1 CoPster loaded in North Africa a.rrive Pantaloon not later than ?3 Janwry and the brilanc" of 4 Liberties and l Coaster to arrive Pentaloon not ln.ter thnn 1 Febru,.,ry. 5. Request thA.t the Liberty 8hi:rs anr Corister be Ylomin..-ted n_nd port or rorts of loadh1g be designrited. forts selected f1ust be carabl•~ of lo::iding British rnc American supplies on the sr>me ship. Also re~uest deadline drtes for arrival in North Africa of reriuisitio11.s rnd representPtives. 11 11 6. New subject: Rerpv~st eXPrrdn1:1tion of Pdequ"'CY of stocks to be loaded on above shipping in t,rorth Africa for brilance supplying for ?O dAys of 1 Am1-,ricn.n , nd 1 Britisl Division uith supporti.n~ troops Fith particulr>r ref19rence to 0 ammunition of following calibe rs: British TyJ)es 5~ 511 G,m, 4. 5 Gun, ?; po1.L.'1der, l '7 pounder, 25 pounder, 3 11 nortar. Arnericr>n Types: 75 mm Gun 3'1 Gun 105mm Tfovri tzer, ft-2 155mm irowitzer, fi'-1 155mm G,m, M-1 57mm i\nti-t~ink Gun L~. 2 11 r 7ortn.r 11 �9 CASERTA--,TATTTTARY 5, 194L~--GeMr<>l Clnr 1{ re!7lainl')d at his cori:'lanrl post throughout th'-' day, stuc'vinrr, rlans for Opelr"tio11 s SHriGLE nnd A'TTJIL. ,7ork-i'1IT to fi.nd the nece"'sarv nunb~r of cr:i.ft for Operr>tion "HrrGIE, Gener:--1 Alexander sent a radio messaP"l'l to Gl'!nP.ral Clrrv, IHI 533 , telling h"m th"t he i"' pressing Trime T-'inister Churchill (By prl'l-errRnr;ement, the lril'1~ T~inister wes referred to :in this e.nd subse1mmt messr>ges as "Colon.el \r:=trdcn") very hPrd to get ur the necessary craft wanted for the expedition, and Us maintenrince . Gener,, 1 Alex::inder in-l"ormed Genernl r:lark thrt he hri.d suggestr-d r,oin~ by air to see the Prime l~inister Pnd asked thl'lt Genernl Clrrk be reridv to s~nd nn 8dequ.-.,te small st11ff , both i:\rmy and N11vy , armec1 with full plrin Rnd lording tabl.-,s in simple form so they can be expl11.ined to I'r. Churchill. During the nfternoon Gnnerr>l Alexander rgrin rt">dioed Generrsl C1Frk, R~r n. t'.'Jlegrrim -l"rom rrirne '1inister Churchill 1hicr indicates that .re r,r,y get thl"l crr.r-t re quired . He c sked Gener£1l Clark to nle?s~ continu~ to plan Opcrfl.tion "FJ"GLE on th·~ nss,;mption throt r full amount of craft uill b~ avn.ila½l" • He ask~d Gener'"'l Clnrk to fly his spec:ial, small SHrTGLE staff to r'Rrrrikech, rhere "Colonel V iard.en" is now staying . General Clark then issu~d instructio.,,.s to his Chief of St, ff to hPV" a smP 11 group of o-"f~_cers alerted for t,~e journe;r. A rrelin5n,"'ry discussion by the staff with Gener 1 Alexandor will be held Janu'c'ry 7th in 'arrakech, e.nd then the ma:in conference vith the Prime t'inister ,!!ill be held the following day. :'A/9~6, telling him thnt he had rccei ved 0 In A.nswer to GcnerRl C1Pr1,. 1 s cable of yest~rda.y, //8372 (quoted in yesterday ' s diPry) , l\."'FT:1 todn;r instructed FLf I"BO R ,J 23997 , to fly to Algiers immediate ly a r-"presentriti ve ,,,1.tr r8quic;i tion.s for th8 r.:ooo s of both ground 1'1.nd air, British anrl American, needed to lrn:>c1 the 8 Liberty ships rind the 2 Consters in North AfricPn ports . ',pott-in.p: P"ld loading 'ere to connence at once, Pnd officers · 1ere to be sent to arl.vise on loadj -rig methods . Anoth~r cr>bl0 receiv:~d f'rol"! Ali;iers, R'J 23999 , in reference to GenerPl ClPrk 's ;18372, Psks an urgent reply from 15th Army Group PS to vrhethAr or not the Comrnn:ider of the 8th A··phibious Force (Admiral Lorrry) h2.s Rgrecd to trike cars::;o ships in on the assault or if they nre to be in t}·e iIDI'lcdiPte follo :-up. Gcnerril r.ruenthr,r indic,,t0d on a notJ on tris messaw~ thr-t the Connrin er of the 8th Ar1phihious Force 1111d ~greed to ta. 1re the shirs in on the nsseult . 0 In the evenine n~nerRl ClPrk ha.cl rs his dj n•1er rue st r:iss Pnrge.ret Bourke White, the f'n.mous woman photogrApher . She h~ s 1),->,en t:oJ,:ine pictm·es for LIFE r~agazine along the Fifth .Arn;r front . She discussed her imrressions of fight inp; j n the Fj_fth Army sector ancl sr·id tkt sre, , rbo hPd been r-in eXDornmt of the tough life of the Air Corp'"' , h2rl learned from watch:i n1 vround troors how really tough war can be . General Levd s was nlso £J P,Uest . Other important messo.ges of the da7 ,·ere as follo.,s: For General Alexander ' s (')yes only from Clr>rk . R 1J 6203 . 11 A group of two Army Rnd one NavPl officer has been set up to accompany you to see Colonel Wardrm. I trust thnt the mettAr ,n1 be settl~d firmly within next 4g hours . 11 To crrc from Cln.r}'- reference your 23499 BIGOT . RH l:,215 . 11 Airborne divi·sions should b<3 orr;anized with three rarachute regir,~ntc1l combet terns 1rnd no glider reginent . Irt vievr of nrture of Oneration MI'TIL, I con ·ider it essential that airborne division l'.!ontain some battle-trained airborne el..,'1lent"' , 13.nd I �l() again urgentl y recomri~nd th<1.t 50/..th RCT remr in here to c onstitute nucl"'us a.round which to build new airborne combnt terns to be brought f'rom United Stnte'"' . Your directive to rne for Operntion AFVIL indic2tes two airborne RCTs will be rvailablP- in addition to four TJ . S . infantry divisions . I am count ing on four infr>ntry di visions . If I am forced to choose betvmen the fourt h infantry division and an s.irborne division , I definitely VTPnt the infnntry division . In that event :tt would be inperative thrit the 504th RCT be re t ained here "-l.nd th, t rt least one additionr.l prrachut e RCT be brought from United St ates ." 11 * * * CASERTA --JANUA.RY 6, 1944-- This morning at 0900 Genr--ral Clr>r], c111led e moet ing of officers prelirriinrry to the cl eparture of the Sm" 11 str ff wi..ich vm s to discuss 3HHTGLE with Generr,l Alexa.nc1er nnd Col onel Vhro.en . The meeting was held at the G~ner1:il 1 s conference hut , and thP,re "ere present , be'3:ides Genernl Clark, General Gruenth~r , Admirnl Lowry , Gcnerr>.l Luc3s , Genera l Brann, Cay,t ain Lewis , TTSTJ, Colonel T;,te , Col onel Hill , Col onel 11illiPms Pnd Lt . Col. O' Neill. GenerR l Glark told tJ-,e o"'ficers thrt when Gemral Alexander vms present he , (}enernl Clar1-::, had insi sted thPt he needed a l'linimum of ?.L. LSTS aft er t he Assault , 14 for n.n indefinite per; od 1rnc1 10 for rit least 15 days . These ·!ere needed for ri build- up in troors and r1nteriel. En snio that +.he o"'ficers who wer e 1soin~ to the conf'erence must stick to their figu:t' As in the conference ''Ti th the Fd.me i':inister r>1c'1 not be ca jolcd · into retrenting "rom them, as the de c ision must he ,.,rrived rt bn.sed on the a ctual meds . The GcnerPl said thrit the Fresident Pnd the Combined Chiefs of Staff ,·,ere hcsitPnt to t~ke any ster Til~foh M:i f:;ht i rip~ril A~ IL and OVER LORD , v1hile the I-rime l!inister felt t hnt it vas c1 es:i.rPble to toke Rome at almost any c ost . GenerPl Clark: rereatea thPt it wAs r'lso necessary to appraj_s" the i:memy situ.,ntion at the b.st no!'l'mt to detArmine -rhether enemy build- up was too large to be overcome . Admiral Lowry stA.t~,:i th;:it the necessary cr:1f't, for SITIITGLE must start at once :for this area - that it .,..rould be impos3:ible to \"'ait +'or Fl conference on the ,qth 7lith Col onel 'larden , a de c ision on tl e 10th rnc'l then stPrt the craft . Gcnf'!rP l Clnr'l{: str>ted thr>t th0re nust be n T::iv['l of-f'ic~r ct the conference , and Admiral Lowry stated thA.t CPptain Le"1is was needed hero for planni nr; ,·,ork. I-T owr'v'3r , it was decided that Ce.ptR fo Le'7i 'J could go to Algi P-rs , trlk over the situntio11 ,·rith Capt-in Olds , of /\.dmiral rr~,~itt 1 s stPff , and Captain Olds could then ~o on to the c0n:"'er'1nce nnri exple in th,q situr tion , while Captain Lewis return9d to Feedqunrters Fifth Army. 0 Colonel Tate reported th:=•t the rroblem of loadinr; Liberty shirs ve_s well in hand . Generel ClRrk then asked Lt . Col. O' Neill whrt his ri:nswer vrould be if he ,,,ere asked why ~4 LCT3 would not do as Fell as LSTS for re- supply. Co l onel O' Neill j mmedfo.tely saF thrit t1'e Pnmvcr "ould be that rn 1ST rnuld hold 36 trucks and an LCT ·rould hold 8 , a11d Goncrr l ClPrk r~minded him ag"in t het tr~ fnctors of weather , spel"d rn,.d turnrround of th~ different vessels were also important . Genernl Cl..,rk rcrent<;d th!'t the o"ficers v1'o go to the con:ference should mrike it vorv cler-r thrit uithout th"l 24 LSTS thP, oper2tion was not feasible; thPt Fore it frrrossibl'-' to rrocure them , 1-ic could try the landing just north of Griet::i Tith one division , if his staff found i t ro"'sible . �l\ Colonel Tate then cor;1mented on the fr,ct thrt the roRr1 net to Gaeta was hazardous , as it could be easily blocked by demolitions . As the General ' s plri_ne , piloted hy Captain 0 1 Neill , was waiting at Capo dichino to take off Ht 1100, the conference broke up shortly rifter 1000 , and Captain Lewis , Colonels Hil l and WilliPms and Lt . Col . O' Neill , who were the Fifth Army representatives , left for Capodichino and North A.fr ice. . GEmeral Clark spent the rest of the dEJY studying preliminary drafts of plans for SHINGLE and f ~TVIL . In the evening General Olrrk entertained Pt dinner Colonel Mickelwait , Co l onel l,jndner , Colonel Saltzman and Lt . Col. Porter . At about 2200 G- 3 reported thrit a II Corps message rmnounced th1=1t tho vill<>ge of Srm Vittore had been cleared of the enemy. The following j mportr•nt messages vrere received rincl dispatcht")d today: Person8l for Clark from Alexander . RN MA./973 . "I hPve received follow ing sign;::il from Chief of Combined Operations . ' try directive a.s CCO includes the study of the tactic.?l rnd technicGl prohlmris of amphibious opertions Find advice to the Chiefs of St aff . This cPnnot be done from 1:ifhi tehall Pnd re quires my stAff to keep in dir e ct touch with operat:i.ons . Therefore wbile realizing thrt spe ctators are usually a nuis11nce , I rr9quest your 8pprow:s 1 for Co l onel Langley and Commander Scott Miller of COE!'.~ to ,',itness operetion SHil'TGLE , including fina l rehearsals if possible in SNOL or HQ ships . Gener a l Yiil son has aprroved this request. If you concur request joining instructions . They wo11ld of course be avnil,.,bl e for nny duties you nm.y require . 1 I hA.ve ccmcurred Pnd ~ nstruct,~d these represente.tives to report direct to you . 11 Patton t o Clark. RN 822 . trif agreeabh t o you , desire visit your Head quarters Prrivinp; Pt Capodichino airport 1000 SRturday, Jan11c-iry 8 . 11 Per sonal to Patton from Clark. RH 8482 . "Delighted to see you S:1turday. Car will meet you a t time P.nd plac e specified . 11 Gruenther from Hill . RN 2/+899. "After talk with Rooks and Lenis , best estima.te SHP1GLE i s off as additional IBTS are not available . tr * * * CASERTA--JANUARY 7 , 1944--The situation alo_ g the front , particularly in the n area between Highway //6 and I?ilignano continu3d to go well today, with cle ments of the Special Service Force occupying t'tount Majo , one of their principal objectives . Dbvm by Highway //:6 the 135th Infantry Regiment of the 36th Division continued to move forwarc'l t,,.,yond San Vittoro, and the Fifth Army now holds the crest and tbe south and en.stern slopes of Mount PorchiP , one of the principal land blisters l ying in the Liri Velley just south of Cassino . The fighting continu"ld to be extr emely bitter , P.nd the Germ"'m:1 Aro put ting up exceptionP lly stiff resist ance . The Gerrnens countcr-Att Pcked Porchia last night , us i ng artillery and nort2.r fire , but the Attack failed . A drive hris also been started for r~o1-mt Chiaia , north of San Vittore , And it has progressed well despit e heavy machin('J gun and rifle fire from the slopes of this vita.l �hill. In generrl, curing the pst two dry::i, hePvy losses hrive been jnflicted on the enemy, P..nd nPny prisoners hPve boen t.,.,ken. Mount Chiaia shoulrl fall to us tomorrow. GPncrrl Cbrk received ,,err,_ early tr·:is 1orninp; th·· t Lt. Gen. G:-,orge latton, former Cor1mnnn.er of the 3ev"nth Army, would visit him tomorrow. Generals Clark and Patton nill discuss Sev-:inth Army IIeri.dquPrt".'lro ersonriel. G··m~ral FarI'!on, Commander of the 1st Arr,or"d 1Jivision, conferrer during tbe dn.y with Generr>l Clrirk concern::ine po,-;sible enrloyr,..,nt of armored forces in the progress of the Fifth Arny attack up Route '/6. Some arnored elements A.re already fighting in the San Vittore, '.cunt Iorchia, flaunt Ch:i.aia region and as 17e progress farthP.r up tbe Liri Valley, there "Till be r: chance to use some armor, but this j_s cerendent, to some e:rt~nt, upon th1; vreath~r. TJnlcss we h ... ve a long dry p•iriod, and sun a11d wind to dry 0 11t the muddy f'ields, the use of tanks will be restrict ,d since th~ir r,ovemcnt will be con: inecl to roads. General HBrmon told General Cb.rlr th11t he was most eager to commit as much of the 1st Armored as possible into combat. The 6th Armored Inf'antry Regiment is Already fightino-, but the tank groups have not been cbl~, As yet, to go into full STTing. The speciel VI Corps Plannin~ Group, under Gen~r"l Lu,~t>s, is ~oinr, ahead with detrils of Operation '3HITTGLE. The Fifth Army group thrt Generril Clrrk sent back to f, fric1:1 so jt could pnrticipete in discussions with Gener11l Alexander, th"n v1ith rririe Yj_nister Churchill, T•ras due in Marrakech this r:iorning. General Clerk is eagerly avaiting word from this group as to "hether or not the necessary number of lA.nding crR-ft vdl1 be availPblc. Genl"lral Cl11rk reccivl')d todav a rlirective to the Naval CoF1mander of Operation SHIFGLE. It names Admiral F. J. Lowry e.s the 'Tavril Corn1'1ander of t:bc SHINGLE Task Force. As his mHin dinner P,Ul':'!st GenerP.1 Cbrlr had Colonel SullivPn, Army nuarternaster, vrho is celebrating his 50th birthd1:1y. Alto8ethcr the Generr-il had seven guests. General Cl<irk dispatched the follm1ing Cflbl<J to Generr,l Alexander tocl8y. R°t\J 6?67. 11 As part of main land attack by Fifth Army, 10 Corps wi 11 cross Ggrigliano on 17 ,Tenuary, s~cure Uinturno area and attA.ck north toward S Giorgio nith h!O rlivisions. Important T'ert of Uis plan is smrill amrhibious operation to carturc area Ponte Scauri (rnl,.94) with three Corimrndos Pnrl to secure beachhead just north of Garigliano ·7ith infHntry force. Tan}::s And supporting erris will, if practicA.ble, be l,:,nded on this bench same night. me val bonbPrdrncnt will be required. "Frovisional estimate of craft a.fter ex11P1ir>.Ption of operation with FO'HT is tvo LSI (1:1) tvumty LOTS and thr~e LSTS with six dr-ivits. If Oreration SI"DJGLE takes place it ,·rill not be practicrble to P.llot more thnn three or four LOTS to the Scauri operfltion. However, it is desirable that detailed rlnnning be ini tinted so that plan may be executed on short notice in event SHINGLE should be cancelled. "Request you errange v:i. th c:n,JC nl'!ed for allotnent of necessary crPft 11.nd bomb<i.rding force both to be avrile,ble until end of Jrnu;:,ry in case of' bad weather. Full requircnents of croft and bnmbarding force vrill be sent by FO~'iIT �after detailed planning completed. F \iIT concurs in this message. Planning for Operation SHTHGI.E progressinp; well. operation will not interfere with SFPIGLE. 11 11 * * F lPnning for Scauri * CASERTA--JAi:TTJt\.RY 8, 19/+4--0p~ration 3HINGT.E is onl This word wris received this morning from r~arrakech. At least ?.5 LSTS will be avr ilr:lble for the follow-up, thus assuring an opporbmit:,r -"or re-supply and the bringing in of supporting corps troops. The '"10rd fron Parrakech alno in.eluded a declPration that January 20th is the target drtte thrt I rime f,'.inister Churchill desires. General Patton visitAd Gcnernl Cl,,rk this morning and cliscussed with General Clark the division of Fifth Army and Seventh Army staffs. General Patton declAred that his Seventh Army staff vm.s a fine one, and he gave G!'lnerPl Clar1':: a number of documents sho7inr; that h~ had recomnended a lArge number of his off:i.cers for proP1otion to generP 1 o-rficers. General Patton nsked GenerP.1 CJ.Ji.rk ;·1hat ho thour;ht h'"!, Gonernl Fatton, wa.s going to be arsi(?led to do in the future. Genern.l Cl11rk replied thet Genl"1rn.l Fat ton, in General Clark's estimn.tion, 1·ras going to corune.nd a fol] owup Army in OYSRLORD. Gen~ral Fatton said tb..,t thrt was a poor cornm1md for an officer of his experi.ence, but thnt if he did not p;nt sorne Army comrn.rmd he intended to resign. Genoral C:lark loaned Gemerr 1 fat ton his CP.r, and th9 former Seventh \rmy Comr1ander visited II Corps HeadquPrters anrl. the +>ront in the II Corps region durin~ the afternoon. General Cl,,rk also conferren toc1 a;)' uith G'3nerals Gruonther, Brann and Ca+'fey concerning General Caffey 1 s becoming G-3 of the Fifth Army, relieving General Brann so that he could begin work in Al1;iers on Operation ANVIL. Genern.l Caffey has already mov~d to Fifth A.rmy Headqu;-,rters r-md is world11g ...,.i th the G-3 Section. Generrrl House hiter joined thA conference rcgrrrdin~ Caffey 1 s assumption as head of' the G-3 Section. ,Just prior to the arrivr>l of General Fritton, Gen0rPl Clrr1r niscussed wjth General Lucns the new phases concern-ing Orerntion '"'.JIPTGLE. The Specirl flnY1.ning Group at Fifth f rmy near is no~, wor1.ring night ann dn7 to rcrfr"Jct rlans for the amrhibious end run just south of 11.ome. · Anoth1'3r visitor clnring th'9 day ,·as Bri@.d:ier Genernl Theodore Roosevelt who was called in by General Clnrk to r1 iscuss the innbility to obtri.in certain supplies, includinz lumber Pnd overshoes, :"'or French troops. The following T11essa~e WflS received this morning -"ro,IJ Colonel Fill. RN. SCC 602. "Shinr,le is on. At least 25 LSTS will be r:1vr:i~ lf'ble for follow-up. Prime f~jnister desires JRnlli"ry 20 P.s target d2tc.n Late in the evening G~nerrl Clnr1r drove his Buicv, v,ith Lt. Col. Suthr;rl~nd, to Sorrento "rhere he spent the night. �CAS~RTA--JANUARY 9 , 1944--General Cltirk left f.)orr~nto P.nd drovo his Buick himself back to his cor,rrv:anrl rost . He had lu'1ch dth Gen'.'lrRl Grurmthor , nd discussed with him the progress being r,ride in the prepflrfltions for SHINGLE . Immediately after lunch Gonern 1 Lucn.s , 1 d:"!iral Lowry, CArta in Leid s , General Brann and Colonel 1fo•-rard conferred 'rj th the GrcnP,rn.l about the preprrations for SHPrGr.F. . Immediately aftf'1r lunch Generril Lucas , AdmirA.l Lorry, Captr>in Lewis , Genernl Brann and Colonel Howarrl conferred d.th the Gen~rril Fbout the rreparfl tions for SHI rGLE , in order thnt all information night be 2vr->ilrble for a conference with Grmerrl Alexander ..,hose arrivPl was '"hortly expected . 11 At 1500 Genernl /\lexandP , Generrl }:r,rding, GP-nmrr,l Clrir1-c , G ,nerel Gruen✓r ther, Adr1iral Lowry, G"'lnerl'l Robertson , Gennr,"l Brann , BrigPdier Foster , Captain Fower of thl:l Royal Navy acK' a menber of .A dmirPl Cunnlngh mI s staff , and Lt . Col. Suthl"lrlrnd met in the hut +'or 11. conference . Genernl Alexander stated that thf~ meetin~ on the 7th nm~ 8th v ith the Frime fiinister had fiyed all 1uestions of craft r-ind oth"lr details ,71-tich rrd 0een settled to make ':Fr GLE possible . The fi~es ho.d now becone definite , and th~ Fifth ~rmy vms to get more craft thAn it asked for . AUVIL was affect,d by this . Of course , the Fresident of the United States ·rould have to be consulted, for PS a result of this rnP.tter , A11JVIL miisht be much smaller or might be merely a threat . The reason for all of this was that th8 entire Allied position was prejudiced by the succe1s of the GerrnPn defense south of Rone . Turkey "las thinking twice r-ibout her entrance into the war , and SpAin was harc<eninf; . 1' ccorc1jn~lv, it "r,s necessnry to make every effort to capture RoT'le . Craft on their ,,P..v from India for C'Vi~RLORD may hr-ive one av:,j 111.ble trip for us . Fifth Army needs r. follO'IT-up aftnr establishing a brir f;'"lheA.d for exploitation , P.nd the a<lditional craft mPy serve for this purpose . Gen&;ral ClHrk stn.ted tbPt for this f·,nction he hnd already alerted a combat teRM of the 1st Armored Division A,nd Pnoth"r combnt teri.m of the 45th Division. G~ner8l Al ":Xander st, ted that he hrcl. the 11 •-rew ZeAlanders 11 (The 2nd tfow Zealand Division) but thri.t he ,·muld like to keep them in his ovm hand to use if General Cl:1rv could m""kc a break through Pt C2ssino . Generr>l Alexrmder then str-ited that the tPrget date for 3I-TT 11rGIB was to be Ja.nur>ry ?2nd - not Janurry 25th - reg<>rdless of the e+'fect of this upon a rehearsnl. GonerPl Clrrk responded to this th.,t J:,e wn.s strongly orposed to a lnndinv, P~thout a. reher>rsP.l and reconMended against it . He ,-rould rather put trie lrmc.ing off until the 24th , if necessary. The miscella.11.eous craft assembled for tho rmterprise h: d never , orked to1;ether , and a r~heRrsal was necessar to coord.inste their efforts . Colonel '1',e,te sfateil. in this connection thr>t if the target drite 'WS the 22nd , a rehearsal ,1ould be impossibL~ . The lo11ding of the vessels "ould :r,rev•=mt . Gene ral Alexander rejoined thPt if the ,, e11.th"r should defer the trrget dr>.te +'or several driys after t.bA ?5th the oper"tion would ncvAr come o.,,.f ot ell , as it ,vould interfere '.'dth rVJ1.IDRD , and a.greernent hrid been reri ched bet,·rcon th=~ Prime r~inister , the President and '3t:1lin that nothi_ 11.g rit P 11 would ever i nt"lrfere with OVBRLORD . GenP.ral Alexander ,..tPterl. tkt somo other di "ficulties hnd to be faced; thPt fewer n.ir resources vro,lld be PV"iL.,bl":l frori nm' on 11nd the air would concent-rate on breeking up enemy communicf'tions . He v:arnec: against tPking too m1'1ny veriicles , st8ting th11t the L nding in the Azores lwd been planne;d ·1.th nore ve h~ cles thPn could actufllly be hPndled on the roRds . If any r1ore '!1ere needed he would see thdt they "mre made Pvailr>bll"l . He "urther said thPt up to four Liberty sl"'ips could be ben.ched for brePking "ratars "nd trePted '"'S exp ndPble . Arlrniral Lo TI';T coMment9d thrt the shallor; · ,at~r made this dj ffj cult, • s the Liberty ships would beach too far out . 0 0 General Alexander st"ted thnt rs r 0 uch e:ir supply PS pos'"'ible wo 1Jld b8 �utilized . Colonel Tate stati;d thf't it oidn 1 t Pdd up tc a grerit deri l. Gener;-,1 Cl8rk a.id thPt thorough o:z:pi=Jrinents hnd bPen crrri9d out -<>or 1:1 long tiJ:1e to exploit air suppl y to t~e grentest possible extent . GenerPl Alexander then rsked .,..rrien the frontal nttrck Pris going to be de liver c<l . Gcmerrl Clark answer ef1 that it ':7~S to occur on a. series of days . On the 12t h the r>rench would attrck in tlie vicinit•r of S . •Jlia . On the 15th the 34th Division , r>nrl on-9 RCT of the 36t Division (no"" -rut in to reliev0 the 6th Ar""'ored) "ould attn.ck to tali::0 'I'rocchiP . On the 16th 10 Corrs '"'ould at 1 tack across tl1e Gari.[C;Urmo Riv0r with the L6th , 5th end 5Sth Divisions . Cn the 20th it vm s plF111.ned to lnmch an Pttr ck hy tho II Corrs ,,or a bridg0head across the '9.apido . General Clark esthr.tccl thrt it v,ould re 7 uire four dP.ys of attack up Route 16 to clra•·r tb0 GF>rnsn force off tl 0 b<Jrichhead , pnrticulnrly the 29th PPnzer Grenadier Djvisio 11. , rn.-1 hence ho vrould su.rmcst th.-. 24th , r ather thrin the ?;Jnd , 'lhic}l is tr'3 rror:osed rnte of PttPck. Grmorrl J\.lexPnder them stated thn.t the ?6th ,w.s the e2rliest cP.te t11,.,,t trie i:'.e" zer,lan 1:lors could arrive , and Generril Clrrk corw1entn.d thrt he br->clly 11oedec'l Pnotl-'or rljvi"lion to pass throw,;h the 36th ; that +,hoy ··nuld ½e b:o.dl,r wo:r11. r'loi:m by thci" c:r·r,,,~'7 "' nf' the Rripido . 1 Gener11 l J'lexRrn~er theY\ r.aid , "I t1r1 fri~htfully k-con for a diversion rnd for a Conmr-inr:"o to crac1r into t 11~ outskirts jnto Rorie . " Generr,l Cbr]r sdd trr t 1 P.. c iversio'1. by n.,,v, 1 f;unfir e hPd ')eon rlmmed but thPt J.11ndinrr of nny T'lore t roo:rs os suggest ')c , ' "0 1 Jld <c i T'lpl y d~ ssiprte tr,e err ft ..,vr ilPble for t r- main push . l}encr111 Alex, nder P sked whether j t could be done the next nigrt , "'s he felt thr-i t it \-muld frighten Kesselring anr'l keop Rori,,., g::irrimned by trie G':':rnl"nS . G~nerrl Cl..,r1c said thn.t he vronld exnmin~ this question -very c<>refully. All tre o.,,.ficers t17 .,n left excert G"'nerr,l Clr-rk , Ge'1er.., 1 Alexanc1er '"'nd two or three senior Generr>ls . Grm~r"l Clrrk Psked GenerAl Alexnndr,r '-rhrt Gene rr>l Al ex:mner nctu::i lly tl:ou<;ht <'bout ~ 'TVIL , rinc1 Gen8rl Alexnnrler srio he triouo:ht it rnic;ht never occur . He •~r>jcl tr:rt in his estiT'1rtion it was n great nistn 1re not t o exploit the Tt'llinn success . Genern 1 Alenmder brought to Gene ral Clnr k a porsono 1 letter froPJ the Frir,e r'inist"lr . tr . Churchill congrPtulrited Goner'l l Clnr'\.c on his c~ corntion from t},e Fresident 0 '1.d on Ms "'Chi1;Vr::>l'1"Jnts in Ital y . Tl--te Prime E': nister , 'ent on to sr-y he sinc':lrel v hared th0 SHIPGLE rmeration could be riounted by ?2 ,fanu"ry, ewen if some of tho forces hrd t o be dir1inishod , ris jt wonld be disnstrous to J-,r, ve c. c"elr,y rec::ult in t:re crncellation of the operPtion. General Chrk thon,r;ht to h::ms!")lf th"t po"sibly G~nerrl "Sisenhower 1 s move to '"':uro:re nnd the re-exaMin.,tfon of the '"hole P~ 7IL proje ct might result in a rer,lizi,=ttion of t}1e •·rea1m~~s of the forces involved rnd <' reconsiderP.tion of the whole r:'fair . T-J:A did not wish to be withdrann fror, his Fifth .'\.rrny comnrnd Pnd be Ieft in s0T11e rlanning cornJ:1Anrl "bm th<:! •rnr rmded ~r:r tli~reby niss e c}lr>nce to mare}-, into GerT'lan;v at trie h~ad of his Arr11y. Gen~ral .Alex::md r 1'111d G~nerr-1 R"rc'1inr; le-ft a,"ter the conf'0rnnc~ n.nr re turnPCl at 1845 for n drinl.: with Gen~rol Clrr1< anc1 GAnerrl Gruenth"lr . Gen0ral Al exander os 1 red Gm1er..,l Cl.nd: •;hetri'3r t11e Ge::nerPl ··,ould consider tf'l-cino; him a l ong in his JT boflt in Crerrition ·1rrJHGIE , nlthouf;h Qr::merEl Alex?nder did not · ish to ~ ntrude . Gnr er'll Clrrl· said t:ba t , on the contrary, ric "ro,, ld be de lighted . 0 ~ �Aft13r,1ar0s, repec tedly had ther fluster. j •hen Generr,l l\..lcxr1nclcr h"r1 ~nne, Gencr··l Cl..,r1-:: S""id, RS he n the J'P st, tbrt Gon'"rr 1 Alexand0.r ~19 s a pc11nut and a +-ea1 Tho fo11o,:li-rirr cable, 'R.N 25773, ,vas receivAd +'rom the CPTC today: ,r'ncob L. Devers, Lieutenant G0n9r,.,l, o.r the Unit8d StPtes /\.rny, assumed corimand t orth ffrican Theater of Or<orrtions, United 5trit,3s }rmy, 1?00 hours 8 Janur>ry :r0r.r present. 11 11 "- Crble RJ'J 0 .1878 also was receivC'd f'rom 15th Army Grour ann is quoted below: "Target date for opening HQ now adwmced 48 hours to 1~ Janwry." The follovdng message , RH 6381, was dispatched tod, y to 15th Arrn.y Group, pass to AFFQ for Gir::md: 11 2 DHt sector quiet, normal e:<rchenf;e ~.nfordictor;r 11nc: hnrressing fire, one of our 1:,r,trols found enemy rt LA fl\.I'Ji•'P..f''S 992347, 3 DIA took command e,t 090900 of 45 Div sector. 3 RTA relieved troors of' II Corps on nr '•lc'\.,JO night e/9. nne Bn L, RTT ri.rrivryd staging r>reD lPst n:lp-rt ,·;ill reinforce 3 RSA toni~ht on TT/I.JO . Frc11ch losses for S JRnw,r;v, lzilled 1-S , 7ounded 73, missing 3 . TANK STAT,; - No changA . 11 The :lnrlicetion by,Gcn"c'rPl .Alc:xand~r thrit A' 1'VIL YToulrJ proh..,bly never ·trike place caused Gc:merPl Clrir to r~flect tririt h..,d it not been for the AUVIL plrn, he vro11lr1 unrlo11bt~dly norr hPvc hrd the !T~iTrTTSA commarn' which ,Gencr~l Devers hPs in his pln.ce. Fo~vever, offered the choice, Genernl Cl.nr 1,;: would certAinly h1cnre chosen his Army cor:inand r11th0r thnn go to rm ;,dninistrritivc rost . Furthcrmorc, he rronld '"'Ot ·ish to rclinqu,sh co,.,mnnd of Fifth Army Bnrt tal<A up h t , rluties "ritr a small pLrinning str+"f rnr pr.rh, ps hPve the ,-mr CC'IT'.C to ::sn end wh:i le he 1·r11s so "}nG" ~er!, lePvinC'l' so11.,,bocly "1se to lead tlie Fifth Arny north into G"!rri;, ny. r * * * Ct\SF.RTA--JA..lITJA'9.Y 10, 191+4--GAnerPls Alex.?nder and ratton both r'ernrted from the Fifth 4.rny CO'"lmr>nd post errly this riorning. At 0900 G~ner;::,l Cl,:,r met ·dth G""ncrl ror:=m to dj scu,s the sigffl features of SHITTGLE . ThcrcPftcr he hrd.., short conference v:jth Colonel Ryrn, Fifth Army Chaplr>:.n, anc r1onsignor Carroll v.rho h11.d recently co!'1e from Rorie and who tolrl the Ar'fl1.y Comrnanrler of conditions thf"re. Follo1crj ng tri is conference, Gener-=il Clark h2d a cell f'rom M"l.,jor Gnnert"l Corell, ~PH1 Surgeon, -;ho cane 'vith Colonel ·"artin, Pnd hriefly cliscussed thJ Fi:'th i'lrmy r,edicel problems. At 1000 Generpls T,~ogles and m,rmon c2me :in e.nd 0iscussed tb!') employri~nt of' the 45th fl.nd 1st J'rnored Divisions in the com~nr, op"lrn.tions of the Fifth Army on the present ":'ro-rit flnd in 3HJ'TGL'8 . Follo"jnrr this, BrigrHU'"r G,~nerPl Donovrin cnllcd 2nd cliscussed prosrcct5.ve oper- tions from the OSS anelc . At 1130 Lieutcncnt GenE'lrtd I'cCreery arriwid rmc'l discussecl '.1ith Generol Clr"rk the nmrloyricnt of 10 Corps in the comi"'lg , ttPck . �At 1200 the Gen~r"'l held 11 conference in his hut mith GFmer,,ls rcCreery, Juin, Y ,yes, Lucas, l}ru~nth~r ri;'ld Fouse, AdmirPl Lo,,TY, G~nerrls Roosevelt, Carpentier, Cri ~..,f~y, Bronn, Bri <;ndi. rs Cool·'.)~ e nrl "..iChP rr1 so>1, Colonel Keiser ancl L:i9utem.nt Colonel P.obnrt Forter, Derutv Chief of Stnff ('ractic- 1) of II ~or:rs, And Lieuten.-·mt Colonel Suth0rlnnd. The Gtm,ral outlined Oper."tion qprrr;.r.,E for the assenblecl offic')r~, roinV_ng out th"t the Rssnult '78S to be rnRde bv the British 1st Division, t'l7o bRtt?lions abreast, Pnd the American 3rd Divir:ion, thr-;e battelions "'hrer>st, ,·rHh three bettr>lions of Rr-ngers "nd one battalion of the 509th going in Pt ~nzio, and th1~ 50L~th Inr~ chute Regiment r12kinfs a drop inland to th<1 north of Anzio to :rr;"lvent GArrrn forces coming do•m on the beR cJ:-, bef'ore ri ".leachheed w1s established. Alterru tc reinforcer1ents by the 45th Div:i.sion or b;r a cnmb~t team of the 1st t\rmored Division "rnre r>rranged, cencnd:ing ur,on t:r,, situ..,tion. Admiral Lowry wr>s to be the over-1-111 n!"VDl conrrian<"er a11c'1 under him fldrnirnl Troubridge of the British ~b,,y is to cor~me.nc'l the n;:,w,1 force effect: nrr tre British landing. Due to the I rime fl} nister I s i-ritcrvention, ')P, LSTS were to be ma' e aw i L0 ble. A feint vas ci.rranged by n;:,w,1 gunf'ire <>t Cjvitr>vecchio. Cme Cor1rrndo WPS to land on tre night of D day just soutli of the Tiber 1'1.nd strike north to•7ard Rone. In the nrea of' the landing of the 21th J l'.'nzer GrenRdier R!'.lgim~"lt is no'.'' asser bled. lart o+' the Gerr19n 3rd Division vrill be there and t,~o brttnlion- of a Fleger Corps. It is est·mPt0c'1 thPt ~t the tjr1e of our l~noing Germr>n forces numbering 17,000 1"ill be in the are.,., , and at the e11d of 7? hours, 34,000. 0 1 0 In the meantime, a direct attack on the present f'ront is to be mBde in order to contain Els large a G9rnPn force as possible. On the 12th the French Corfs is to A..ttr>c 1, a.11 out towe.rd S. 'SliEl. Three dc-vs l::iter II Corps goes on to attacl: Trocehin, using the 34th Division, an J.CT of the 16th Division and P lso s 0"1P- P rnor. 10 Corps on the 17th or 16th will l'1 t tn ck Rcro s s the Gr, rigliP no wHh the 4{,th, 56th and 5th Divisions. Generql Fnrmon and the ArnorArl Di vi ~io"' Penoqu.,'<rt~rs, with one Co!'lbPt Corimanrl, pL1s the Qlst Reconnaissance ,qu"'dron Rrc to be rer>d;v to be used on SFrrGLE. Gen<1ral Alexander st.-.ted 111st night thrit t'berc might be still more troops Pvailr>ble. There nust be ~ood werther for SFIITGIE. If it is b.-:id, the Fifth Army vdll hPve to sit it out, but tht'l targ0t datl"! T'lust be the ?2nd, so th"'t a wait for good re2.ther nill 1"lot no.ke the attack too ll'lto. r~ jor G0nernl Crf1ne hns been set up to plan for the occupation of Rone. Fellington bombers ·'i 11 be set up for h38V'J n:l ~ht ?tto.cks in support of the ln.nding rnd also of the direct -cttAck. The G9ri.errl :!')Ointed out thnt he hr-id been requested by cable to sr-'re . 11 apr.l propnrtirrn, 1,nt, +,}'pt, there vrere n. o-re.nt n, ny brfr'p;es "cross tJ-19 Tib8r .; n the j_-•1.ediPte vi cin.;t;r of' r1r,ny :rripf1l rror,ertiRS ·7hi_~h would hA the onl:v c:br-nnAlc: h;T 11 r1.cl' Gernnn r9;n~... orceny-i:ritc; could c0rx~ rip;r:i!1St Y'j_"') on YrT"GLE:. The Generrl, nccord.;nr.;lv, sent a cnble ns 1dnr; pArn; ssion j f' necessi::iry to r-ittnc 1- thn Germnns "ll'Arewff +,re,r ·,ere, r9~"rc'lless of c0nse1uenc9s to fl"pnl rronBrties. Follo"'i"1/'.; tliis conf'9renc0, tlie G9>1er::i.l (mtertnined GP,n0r"ls f,icCr9er;,r, Juin, Keyes, JT01lse nnr Lucas, witr t-. a,1iral Lo"TY, f'or 1uncl'. f. t lnnch t r, Genern 1 sro l(e of the Oj f+'·· culty o: corrs -"'l::i,., 1r O'U" rd s' n.s efl ell CO'Y'nS 1--ir>.d di f'f 9rPnt nnt:i onri 1 i -':.ies on its f'lpn1i.:s. In fr>.ct, +,he G n9r0 l Sllf{fY,8Sted inster>d of hr,v; ni:s liPison ,.,,... ,"'icers +'rn'rfJ corrs to corrs, it ''loulri b8 "'referable t0 hr>ve nmb::>ssf'c1 ors. 0 �Gener11 l Prl:'mn 9ntP.rtrd:n.0 J..,l,0 re3+, r"" t1'8 o·'"'ficrrs · rho rrn attroYld9' the c0nferr:mce n:t th9 GeYl"3rrl Of'ficers ' Pe, . In -':..9 1<<'t8rnooY1 Ge"lerPl Cl:lr:V re ceivecl c,cills fron tno 'r)riti:"'}1 .l11r Gorr9"'rondents '"r . F'l.lls , o"' the Ti7r::s, r,nd •·r . Gordon of the C'unda;v Sxpress . In tbe lPte af'ternoon Gen'°'rrl Clrrk received n er 11 +>ron Colonels J".-,rl,oe , Tully and Hyr::-ard, clnssnr.t':3s of }'is at ·rest Fo-Tnt, and t),ese o:f'ficers stn.7ed :.:or dinner . As soon ns thr8e d;visioYJ.s shil] hrvA been lPndec' , Gener"l Clnr1r rroroses to now~ 11 S"'11'111 [ldv:,nce headqunrters to the be::ichhead, ~"lcludin~ hi:riself , his G- 2 , his G- '3 , an aide :~nrl rossjbly one or two others . GenerP 1 Cl::ir}r dispBtcr9d th':3 follovri ng er bl9 to Gen9rRl j lson , CTNC , tod::iy : R'·T gg5g _ nFor Orerntion sr:-w}L"; urgently r,questnd th~t vr•ter trr,ns fortc1tion be r:iri.de r-i.milribl0 for sreci· 1 orer['tio'1 .; 11v0lving -i"l.fj ltration of egents vicinity Rf'l'19 . :1oon rhrse requires use of' suhnnrine "·Mel· should be at B1rnti11 Corsicri b:r noon of Janu::--ry Vi.th for in:it:i.Pl operrtio11s nnd sho 1ld continue R.vailri'1le dnr-inr; cnntjnu::::.nce of ::lHUJC',L~ O:;errtio11s . If no suhr1"rine crn be rrJPre ~rilrible ther t,,·ro }T borits s'hould he subdituted but they ~7ill not be r0cpJJ.r9d until ,fonu..,ry l t,th since moon rhas9 'ill not -rermit use of.' f'i' bo:-it rr-ior to thPt drte . I+' rrr borts !']re srmt they should be continu'"d r>vriilnble until orr>r:otio11s corrirleted . 1~rinhPsize agr,in hr1rortance o:f' subnrrine f'or this operntion and ur~e you do utmost to fr1rl3ment my rAquest . 1 11 Cartrin FrcRtte , this F.er>f'l_u::irter" , now in Bc1stia to mPhi detriled rr rn.np;ements and ··ill be '•rrdti n~ :,t 'rival J-l'eBr1qurrters there for ::iuthorization. " Gener~l Clnrk today -issued ('rerntions Im+.ruction /JlJ +'or tre continwi.nce of' the n.ttRc 1r 1mr'ler th"l gener.,l ril"'n for OrerPtions Tnstruct ·i.on tll. This Oper.?tjons Jnstruction CC'Wlrs Vie nttacJ,. );r the '?rencb EYfc,djtiom1ry Corps , II Corrs n.ncl 10 CorT's, /'J.S 8A.'1'.'lni11ed by Grmerrl Cl.,rk nt the conf'Arence tor1Py. * * CAT~RTA --.JAr'TJAP.Y 11, 1 <)/;,4-- G0ner, 1 Cl qr Jr. tor:py irect<Jd Gener81 'lrr'nn to nA.ke prerPr::i.tions f'or tre l:mding of An Prld:itional cor,brit tePr1 nortr. of the Tib8r to strjke tm·•8rd Rora9 f'ron tre sr>me position v·her9 th0 Comr1nnc1os "re to lrnrl r,s pPrt of tbe rP.i"1 rl1rn of wrrGIJ~ . I nrt o<' tre rePson fer lnndinr: this c0,,.,b~t teAn at the ros.i tioYJ. :1 n ,1unstion. i o thP. rossibilHy tl ,..t tl•e G"'rrirms riry 0efend aloni:; the lj nP of' the ':'j '10r, ; ncJ.i.1dJ'"lg P nefense of tre city of Row=? its elf . Thi:1 ',vnu1.d ma're necessary eitlnr fl nire~t rittac'r 0'1 th~ cit;v , "itr c0nsequent outcrsr on all sides thnt srcren srrinris ",er9 being violr>te,1 , or else GOP19 sort o:f' rrneuver to force the GerTT>-"'11S to eV['CUPte . J\ccorclin1;l:,, the lnnf'ng o+' a coribn.t team 17ell north of thr~ Tiber is to be :rrer:.rect rs A ossibility. The Co:rrr-1rndos, "rho 1-,re to coJ'1e ~.n nre to hr've e goon '3Ufply of jeers ::i.s vell rs arr1ored ieeps . Genernl C11'1rk toilP:r co·,yf'erred vri-':,h 'Rr:1gRrlier C11urchill '''ro commrinr'l.s the t""ro Co"'!mannos in riui")stion P!lrl unr1ertoo'k to rr-; ve },j ;n a lr>rge nuT"her of jeeps, i '1c1u,1i. nr "'rrior~d j "GPf' tr>1rnn f'rom another lmi t . Witr tr esA Vie Cor1rrir,nc1os , nnrnberin.o; about .~oo, '"lll n['}rG P nu-=:h tO'"ard Rom9 on tP9 ":Venin.c:; of D dP.y , creatinP," as much ntir pnrl disturb,,nc~ as r.ossibl e . ·n,P.n thr>Y crin /?'et no furtJ--- r,r, th 0 ~r nrorosA to tr- 'P, tC' tJ--,9 )7j lls no:rth·7est of Ro"'le "Yl(1 rrerrire to defend trenselves until r0liP-V9~ . GenerPl Cl~rk hns Pl~o rlirected rrepGrrt;ons to be mride -:'or nr1 w"1.ces to th8 hiP'h PT01i:nd to t}~9 e"st a11d southerst of Ro"le with 0 �the irlea o~ se1z1ng the pro~inent terrAin ~eritures jn th~ re?.r of trose forces v1hich will be onr,os:i n1; the CEF, the II A"lericrin Corps rnrl the 10 British Corps i:i s they rusl~ forwqrr1 to·7arcl Ron0 fro,.,, th" ir prese>1t nosi tions . Gf:meral Clrri• spent thP da7 T"or1 dn~ on rlans for C,TTPJGLB . ThR Genercl has rlet8rrd ned tr visit tte 'WI',Tl}L'~ fron.t 0'1 1) da;r, c-oin1; up 1-:Jy TT borit . He has also directPd Grmerril Br.<1nn to rrepArG -for rn errlv nove of' r c:1releton heRdau,_9rters to the c;r J'TGLC front . In the <-fternoo"l r~ajor CrenerPl. Kenyon A Joyce , HSI\, ,...,ho is hein~ replrced as hei:id of' the {l.llied MjJ_itrrY Control. Conri"sion by G0n~ral Pr,son I1<ic"rrlf'ne of tre 'Ariti~h Army, caJ"'le in to have r tr, ll:. In th,.., evenj_n?, G"lnernl c1~r1,. enterta4 n-~d rt rlinner 'r . :::'nlls of the LovtrJon "'~Mes , ··r . Gorrso 11 of' the Lon.don Sundriy F>::nress , l'Rjor n;p;el Do11gc\9le , J~ of 10 Corrs and Lt . Col. CJ..--rk , Fi f'tb ArMy PRn. GenerRl Cl2rk rlisp."tcl rid the fo:. lo'v1.nc- cr>1-ile to G~nerri 1 Ke;res +,o<fay: 11 Congrotn1Ation-, on t,},9 successes you haYe Dtt~d.nec. in ~rou.r recent offensive . T nT'l esrn:icir'lly rleRsec ·Ti.th t 9 rron:re"'s :mR(e by t:re 14th Db.rision ~en s11ch rl i ffj e11 l t tt:irrn.in R.nd r "'.:t1.i.nst -SU';r' deterrni ned res ~stn.nce , rrrticulrrly in view o+> th9 short t·ime tr0 Divi."ion ·· rs ::1.:-ile to bo, 011t of the 1 :ine to recnrerPte Pnd re-fit . IJea"e esrtend ry co"1P'r..-,tulf'+ions to Generril Ryder . J rar1 1i.1cewis8 f;J'f'ti,,.i"ld " ith tre cont-inw=id ::-ucce">s o+> the SpeciAl S8rvice Force 1mrer Colonel Frederick. Plen.se tell h;m conf'~ dentiA lly t:brt I have recor "1e.1rled hin f'or r,ro,.,,otion to tr,e arr,cle of' Bri';nrl~ er GP-v,r£> 1. Also extend to Gern=,ral l'i.1len my conisratubtions on the ucce"''3 l1is f'orce has ntt;:iined jn its ;_nitiA1 rJebnt in the Ttfllirn c'l.rnrrii~n . Unner vou.r s:rfondid J.ePdership ::i.nd c'ir8ct io1-1 Yo11 hn.110 mo11ln.ed these thro.e orf'.;f'.ni7,ntions into "'n o~fensive +'orce ;r}lj ell the enern7 "'ill haw, r;rer>t cH f'f:l cult:r in '-"toprinr:r. Good luck for your future oper11. tio11 s . 11 R1T 64?1. 1 1 0 0 The i'rny CoT"\mPncler crbled CG , ',t>'f'nUSA ns follorrs: RF 64?5 . "In view of impendinr; orernV011.s, T cnnsi.r'er trnt 01:ir infrn~r;r rerlacement s}1ortar;e i"' cri tically serj ons . I-s is not rocssih1 e to rrov:tr.le nece"-'sary numher of -i_n:.-.rntry rerlacenients by cnnversion ".S ,.,,1thoriz9d jn ,ro 1 1r 0 ~1StSl , drited Jr,nuriry 10 . 1 e estirnrte th.-.t 9n r-i.dd:itional !, , C'OO 1 nr,mtr:r rer111cen,mts "rill be r9111.irei!., rrtbar thr>n '3 , 000 e:1tiP1rited hv ;vou in last PDTPf;rPph vour messPg9 . I 1rr_r:;8ntly recomrnend -1-hPt ?500 1n+>Pntr;r renlricerrienta be obtP:ined from ~5th Pnd 89itr Divisions anr1 shipped to Fifth Arn-r:r 11.t FlnrUest ross:i..hl d11te . They will not be used to fil1 re,p1isi tio>1s unl11ss Pbs,-,lutel1r 11ecessriry. rur orer.--ti on.s to dr>te have fr8'l'1.entlv bee'1. J~qn_rlicripred bv inFC'e1u11te c•urrlv of inf'nntry rerl?ce1cents ' ;,ind I +'13el thRt :tt ..muld be [l fQ.'"lVG 8rror j f ,e +'nj_lrd to reve on f1P>1d tre 0 500 re1uested . !\nrroxinPte rercentri r,-es of' spec:i fi_c,,t:i.on nur'11 "lers requirecl a-re "'s follows: 721, Sp,c JBR 7!~5 , 71, CnP,C 'JFR 746 , 5 1 Srec ·rnn 60'3, 5~ ST'eC ";JR ,S05 , 1 ~ Srec 'JBR 60!,.,, 6"~ 3pec 60'7 , 4; Sp9C ifBP. S04 . 0 Gener::il tad.Py wrote " lett9r to 1 ~<ij. Gen . L . 'I . P.ooks, G- 3 , A,.,IY2, in nhich 1,e rnade three in1portrint no~ nts: !1 • He ,-·;,, s 1mr ')19 to s<>"1.rl SPner::> 1 BrP nn to A"'PJ to coorl~ n2te Al"l.,.L r-ltmn4 nr; r>t t)-ijc tirie, bu.J. hrd sent Pirj r:;..-:idier Gener"'l Ca+>fey 5nste:ad . !?• Fe rw1uw,ted thnt tl'9 l;,,test ~n"o:rm~tion on ~FVIL be T}lP �forwarded him, as he hi=1-d received the impression from Genr':lr"'l 1\lexander th2t t},is operation was son01r~hr-1t of P "dying dog" and "'ir;r,t be relegPted into the re.<1.lm o:P a feint in that areP, rmd cert;:dnly not r,ore than e very smPll lPndinp; . c . He re7uested that Genern.l Rooks fpc:ilitr:d:,e :bis tP 1-iinr; severPl of bis 'ke~r st~ff officers 11ith him to the 3eventh l\rrriy; nPmely, Gener."ls Gruenther , Brann , Vornn , Lewis and Colorn~ls Tate Pnd Fowarfl , along with a fe,c; other junior officers . Genern.l Clark today receivAd the. following letter fror1 frime Pinister nhurchill: 11 I was very ;:;orr;:r not to see ;rou at the conf0,rence yesterday , but I feel vou ,,,r3re so closel7 e11g2p;ed vrith the eneny thet jt "'2'3 irnpossible for both .Alexander ,ci"l.rl you to be away- Pt the '3/'J'Tl"J t:ir1e . Your of'ficers idll tell JOU about the bro ""earci,.,in'{ discussions we hAve h,..,d , nnd I 1--torie "'ill reassure you cor1pletel:v about the aauatic suprort our gre.?t oner,.-,tion 1rrill receive . It may even ")e roc::sible to throv in ths eci.nivr'leYJt o+' Ft third div:1sion, "lhich ought to clinch nntteri:, . I Am deeply con:ocious of the : mrortr-nce of this brittle , withont "Jl'ich the cPrnp;:dgn in Ital::r ·viU be regnrrled PS h1wing petered out inglorjously. "nne thing I ½eg yon , n,..,mel;;r , to do evei~~rthing in -ronr pov,er to stnrt off on the ??nd if the 11eather is good . ~ver;r day ge :tned incre 0 .sed the use you will have o+' these invPlueble lrinc'li·'1o;-craft . If you R.re eble to begin AS ePrl:r as thPt, not 011ly r"laintenance but P lsrp;e build - up would be in sii-;ht . It 1 -,,-,uJ_fl even be hettsr to start vith three- 1uPrters on the 2?nd than ·ith full nur1bers on the 'Jfsth or later . Tt is inti-mden thPt ci 11 the lronding craft shall noJ.nq severn 1 vo:rages be+'ore they rlepart . The eorlier the7 strrt, the more they c:1.11 nt?Jce . Yo11r rerresen.tative , Colonel Hill , Viill tell ~rou the grea.t 5nportn.nr,e ,·re attnch t,,-, t'ris . I 1rnow you ''Jill 00 everythb.g h1 hur:1an power . 1 11 ! hnve been merming to write to offer you my sincere cr:mgrf\t,·lrotions on t11e signal hononr raid ;rou by the Fres-i.c1 ent jn c'lecorP+,jng you for vour :rerso11Pl bravery in the p-re t battle of Salerno . I have heard f'rom British c'-01..1.rces of the wpy in nhich you e~,,..,,.,osed :1rourself jn the "orw,.,rrl rositions to sustain Dnd P ninPte ;rour troops, And it is vnry l:i.l.r:ely th0t vour v:ir-;onF l intervention 1'"as decisive in ,.., bl=ittle of' which jt night rrell ½e snic'', as the Dulce of ''ellin,c;ton i.n efter J.ife S8id of the Bettle of '"Dterloo, tt:rt y,r,:,s .~ O-''Yined c l ose-run trdng 1 J 0 ThG Army CoT"!m2:nder r8plied to }rir:1e r"in~ st2r Criurchill as follous: rryour letter of ,January 8th was (1 elivered to me by Generrl Alexander . He and my represe:1.tr-itives wl-}o ottendec 701Jr conference P-;PVe r4e full deteils es to the decisions wf'ich vou arrived nt . U::r: PY~ deligr>ted vrith tre orrortnn~t;rr of 12.unching '3HPTGLE OrerBtion. I hPve f'elt .,.,or P long ti"le thr.t j_t WPS the decjsive ,m7 to Pprrorch Ror1e . This is the f'irst tir e the reans , incJ.udinr.; extra clivisions "nd cr9ft, hnve bee11 assenhled Jn sufficient qmmtitfos to do the job . I 2r, fully conscious of t're necessity for lPunchi· 0; the Pttf"cl: rt the e;,irUest ro'rnible drte rnc1 ½ave set J muc1ry ??nd PS the target dete . ''TeA.th'er permjtting, ~·e sl·01·lcl mnke ~t et thPt tir:e . There "'re many dif'fic,:lties coY1frontinr; us, but ,·e "re tirAl•e3sly 'm0 1 0 �deavorinr; to overccr .e tbem . 0 nr,ry rlans jnclu.de a third division rs <'.'1'1 j7nedirte folJm1-up . It r1ry be L'll-i11f'nntr7 div5sion, c)r ;:- c01 11)ir:ied ..,rnor-i·flP"'ntr · ta.s 1: fr:irce . Bot}, COJ;lb:l .,,-tioYJ.s vill be reoc':· to sciil, Pnd I ,'Til l make the decision as a result of my observation of the lnnc1:inr; , +>or I :i nt9'nr; to 1 r,r 1 )e ::n<;n.t At t'v, 7..r·nrl_ino; o-r the '.l'.)nd, nrtc1_ "rt0.r vis:.ti,,o; t'."0 ,_""_" co,,,r rio.0r':l rsl orA, ..d_ll trr,nsrdt the orrl.0rs ·"or the P 1Tror,:ri:---te ·"·orcc; to +'ollo·, ur . en 1 0 0 I wns d:1 stressec1 to h92'r cf srmn' illness 15 r;hted 2.t tho fi YJ.C, rrogress· ;rou P::c·e r"'k~_ng . 11 "ThPnl· y01..1 ·"'or vour cr'1rz.rr·ti1l..,tio 11s on the :Jictin.'7,11:i sred Service Cross presr-mted r,8 b:r tr,e } resident . "I C:'1,n n0ver e:,.::pTes:=; ~n Yrorcs my rleer 1=;rrtrtude nt the orport11,,j_t;,r 1,1}-ich I hriv0 h'7d to crnrrm=rnd Br·itish trcops. I 11i:,ve ,-1.evc;:i.:- sr;en f:i.ner "'en of f'll rnnks . The:-r f'r9 0 1 1tstr,.ndinp-ly c01ITPf'Gous , 2'.nd their "'lorrfo js high . The orTcrtunity for _An,3ric2.n D"1d Britisr_ scldiers +o S9rV8 iYJ. cnr1b"t nloy,~side of e0_ch other hris dev"'loped betvreen thr;m an 1mderst2nding of ea~h othPr "hich h'".S engendered notl--i~ng but T'iutual adniration . 1 t1 I hnve ev,er7 cm·S-i rl.ence U1r1t ve vri.11 procuce the rr~s11lts in this ne:zt o:rernt::1-on rhich ~rou so r:mch desire . Thr.nk you for "",P Jdni:; the ne2n s ri vailable to l"!e . I hope ~rou ' 1Till visit tre Fifth Army in Ro,.,,e bc:ifore returninR; to the 1 TT• 'fC • !t CA3~RTA --.T!~'T1F.RY J.? , 191/~--General Cbrk spent todP,y rt the co11mPnd rost and �1:1.t the office of' th0 nlanninp; ~our j_n tro rr-irir echelon ,orking on ~:rnnmu; . In the afternoon ro receivea :-i csll -('rom Lt . Col. 1,Jyr;nard 11ho hrs just been rlrced j_,1 clr1ri:re o{' Fift}, ~rTTJ.y v,rir )on.d s.:iles, n.ry1 0iscussed this s 1J.bject ,-,jth the Colonel. Gi:mernl Clnrk .£'>eels thr1t sPti 1fP ctory rroeress is bA-trr: Ic['de in the plenninr; for GFJ"TGLB ~nd th,.,t one by ono the necessr-ry rletPj lP rire bej n~ huttoned up . Tn the evening ('.:mer"'l ClRrk Pttended n cinner gj_ven by the Fifth Army chaplein for B out 20 ~rmy chaphi.ns . Todn.y the Army Cot'1"1Pnder r1isprtched n cnble to the crrc, AFH1, RI 8676, reouestinrr th,,t Brig . Gen . Holmes he assigned ns Chief Civil Ar-fPirs Cf'fi cer for Operntion A~TTTIL ancl th.t jf he mre not r>VP.' lable th11.t Lt . Col. Gerry h=i mac1 e Actjng Cl ief ..,ith tr,e 09finite unr1 erstn.nding thr,t an officer in chrrge , preferably Colonel T-fuT'le , be r'nsir;nn.ted e.t a l"ter dPte . 0 Genernl CL r 1< yesterdry received "ror<'l , PN '3125 , th 0 t Grm.er"l ·F'reyburg of the ')nrl 'T9yr Zealand Di.vision woulrl lil-:e to vi:3lt li'ifth Arrriy Pe--:d1uPrters 0·1 t're ll+th 1mr'i to<lP.;T cPblPd A re ,ly, PlJ 86B'3, ridvisi::-i~ h~.T'l. to ln.rid Pt Capodi.chino and to ::,c'lvis':1 ETA . 'J'he folJ.0·1-'"'lfl' c?b1e w11s receivoo from 15th Arriy Group tocJav, :N CGS 11 Gen':lral Frc:vbur.:; will probnbly ask for (1) ::i.n rirmorr;c1 cr,r unit and (2) a mP-dium arty regt to be rln.cerl unrler his cnmr1r1 nrl j f' rind :hen he is loosed on Pn exploitPtion tDsl'.: in frvmi.rRble cfrc'J_nstnnces I think (1) woulrl fP'T a rlividi::mt Pnr· (?) \·rould be necess11.rv for al"'lost 'lny tasks he might he piv<m hut these two 1mits could only be found hy drP\7inr; on 10 Corns . Hill cl-' scuss this -Purther with you •vhen next we rieet . 11 192 . * * * CASE'1TJ\- -JA'.TTJA.RY 13 , 1941.--Genernl Clnrk tbls morn-'n-s left his c0P1rn.Pnd rost hy cub plane :md fle 1 ·1 to Irat"l , ':rere he vislted the ffeA.rkpt"'rters of the Frenc}1 ~xp=;dj tionr-i.ry Corrs . A. t frn. ta. he t0 J.1u:1d t o Genera 1 J11in "nr'1 noted \Ti th satisfActj_on thl'J prop;ress the :Frencr Corrs ,·as r,r,lr-ing :in tre ,,ttricl,- v·hich had been lmmched on the previous day. He then flew to the II Corps lrrnr1 j nr; field in Iresenzano, "IrerA be ''let ·vi th GenAral Kqyn,s r nc1 -,ent ov8r ·•ith him the arrnng8ments +>or the r~ Corns attacv v}'ich w:=is to be lrnnched on the evening of the 14/15 . At lunch G9nerr,.l Clr rl.r entP-rtained GenerR 1 Penney , the Commnndj nO' Gener:11 of' the 1st ".ritisr ;)iv-ision and c1T'liral 'T'rouhridr;e oP t½e H.m1<,l TJrvy. ·,ith this or>ficer , h8 r'iscussgd r'etrii], of th9 nrorosed operPtion 3PT7f"rlvc; , as Acl mire.l 'l'rou'l)ridge is ~o comI"!Rnr'l thRt r,ortion of the n.av::il force ·1hich will support the British operation in SJII 11 TGL""; . In tbe r-:>ver,inq; Genorr>l Clr>rk rec0jved for dinner Grmeral TloX1rel1 T'lylor of the 8?rod Airhorne Division , "rho has re centl:r bee 1 on r'letR ched s0rviM ""i tr tte Allied Mili tn.r;r Control CoT'lriission. 1 Grmerq 1 ':!lr,rk torh,r r ispritched the following two cPhles vith rPg,rn to re cent successes of Frencl-i troops on the Fi Pth .rny front: �bers o:f the C-STi' on vonr Sf'l9nd 4 d successes in ~~1rie oper"tio-'1S no•rr in rrogress . In spite of stu½r,o~n onen;tr resj strince n.nd counter"tt" c 1's you br;ve <7ined Pll of YO'lr ~nitiPl objnctives n_r,_(1 f're coY1ti11uing to r1r1 1m eyc0Jl9nt rro~ess to the north . The courP~e , det8rrn4nrtion rinc1 s 1·ill derionstratecl by All members of your cmmrind Pre f1ildirii:; ::1.nothnr gloriom· chPrter j n th'3 long r-inil noble historv of -,-,ren~h nrr1s . France mav ''T8 ll l)e eternr>ll;sr ~rn.t')ful for th8 rnrt you are non -nlnyin<; i1 secnrj_nr; her l i b~ffrtion -f'r,-,,,,, t e GArT1rn foe . 11 "fi'iV8 A:rny to AFHQ Pass to G8nerf11 Giraml FersonPl fron C1Pr 1< o.nd Info Cor,r to t;BF I er on<> l +"or Juin frol'1 Clar le. "I desire to congrrtulrite you on the successes of the c·":F in its rresent operrtio"'s . Fightjng in PdV9rse 1•reather Pnd over the nost di ~ficult terrra in , th9 Corrs hns succGeded in cr-1.p tL,ri.nv all of its ::i_nitir-1 obj"'!ctives R;:t,riinst r1et0rnined GerT!lPn resistance nnd :is continuin'; to nrike eYcell ent rr0e;ress to tJ,q rorth . GenerPl Juin ,.,_nd his co,n:r1!:'.n0 p_re daily e.dcti:1g to the finest trp.r,itio of' Fr/'.mcr fifshtini:; men , and I am rrou0 to heve t,1--_qn n.s members of Fifth Arny. 11 0 * * 1, * CASER.TA- - JAJUAEY 14, 191~4- -This ';Jorni ''1/'.; GrmP,ral Clnrk conferred with his Chief of Staff, his G- '3 and G- ? concerning the rrogress of flP.nning +'er 01 eration SH:'" rr.LE . The prospect continues to b<=i fFvorPblo, Pnd there is evo,ry indica tion th<1t suhstn.ntjBl Gorrmn forces 'lhi ch r,ight heve been pulled a\'Jr>y toward the v-i cini tv of Rone wer8 beinP- conto ined on th3 J resi:mt +'ront by tl,e vip-0rous froYJ.tril thrust now in r,rogr9ss . Genernl C1Pr1• then recejved Colonel nurf'e , 1 with ';'Thom he c iscussed the mi lHPry ~overnf'lfmt rroblP-'"'1S in .... respect for Operr tion A''":TIL. Gengral Clrrk desires to hPve Colone) Fune r- ssir;ned to hean up this section, j f it cen be a.rranfl'ed , as it Ppperrs thrt General Tfolmes is una vail<" ble • G,:,neral Clr-rk c1lso discussed wHr· Lt . Col. Clr,rk pr,nc in~ pubHc rel,tioYls proble 1q anc wit], Colonel '3nltzrnrn quest-i.ori"' concernin<:; unit citatioY\s 11nd the award of' the new service unit plaque . At 101,5 thri Gencir~ 1 left his conmEnd post and ,·,ent to tre cuh f'ielcl , wbere }19 tooJ~ off ·dth 'k•jor 11'\lker for the beach just sonth of' the T"louth of the Volturno . FiAre he trn.nsferred to R cub on floats 1111.d flew to t} e b0ncJ.-, just south of th9 Tusc:ir>no, storrin<; on the 1 re vms J11et rit tr>e beach bv n, j . V!P.y at the >?.est Cent3r fl.t '1orrento for lunch . Ge-1 . Tenn9'T 0nr insp9cted tl')e trr<in:ing o-1' the 3dtish 1st Division. The G9neral t 1en r9turn0d to his coro.nnnd -r,ost by cub rlrne . 0 Tre /,rmy Gortr'1fl nder ent9rtrdnn.d for dj 11."'er th:i.s 9VGrii n~ G9ncrp 1 Freyburg of the ?nd '•'(,,'l Zealrind Jivbio11 ~ncl Rrip; . Gen . IB,is , Fi.,.th ,,rmy Artilbry Of+'. "icer. G")nn.r[' 1 Glr-rk discucised -;ith GonnrP1 Pre;•1,urr; tro rrosr9ctivA 8r1rloyment o-1' thn 'Jnd 'Tnvr '',o"11flnd Djv:i.sion cor1mfinded by Ge11.Arnl '.F'reyburo- riDd rrro:nged -rith Ge,1ernl Le'·ri s to P!Ake E'V,,.,i bble for Ge1-1er;1]_ Freyhurg n cub pl"" ne to r-ssist his reconnaissl'1nce of rosi tio11s ['''1,-1 J-,j s ,risit t0 units on this front . -x- * * CA9,_,,;,,.,~ --JA'JUi'P.'·' 15, 19/J~--GenR:r::i.1 Clr-:rk left his co·1r1r-nc1 fO"lt by cub rl1me at C'8SO nnrl <'l"'W to the 10 Corrs f'ie1d ner.r ()pF1rnnise, hero hri wrs ff,t 1::>y e �stRf'f' of'ficm' anr1 -l:,pv9n to 10 Sorps He11drJ_1trrt8rs. Fere General Cl::irk tAlked to the rrinci P' l o·nficer"' of' 10 Corrs ,. ho hr;r1 eo11 :, c:sernbl9d by Genernl ~c';reAr;r. G'"'ner1.l Clrrk, spea}:inr- f'rom P r1°r ,~hjch he hnc" hr>c1 prer-rec l,y 0-3 nn0 hro11 '"'ent uy-, bv GnptAin Vn!lrson, 011tlim1d the rror,osed --;pr T(}L Orerati.on a11d t,}-,1; nro"'ltal or0rations jn cnorc1iri8tion " 7 th it ['nd emrh,,sjzed the irrportPnce o+> the lC' Corns role. Fe nlso .,,..end to t,},e 1>ssembled o+'fic1~rs some letter, ""ro1"1 A'7ericnn solrFers rr,rorted in a p:->pi:ir "1hich he hr>d, 'Jrich inr':ic...,ted an e~·cellent +'eelin()' 011 the r"'rt of' t:re Aniericf'lns +>or their British brothers in ~rms. GenerAl Clrr}· lef't 10 Corr,s co!",.,,Pnd ro"t "hortly l,ef'ore 1or,o 1>11d returned to the 10 Cnrps cuh Airf'iel.11 where h:! •;c,q J"'1et by T,t. Col. ·utherl --ir7 wJ--o had bee11 ou+, b,r cub to locnte n lan11;n"' ,..,..,,.ounr'l close to U 0 lrr: Division cor'lrn['nd post. ,,.,he G,1-v1riT'n.l f'lcivr to +,J~j s f'j A 1.cl, th,t of' the '10th Arr ored Arti llciry near fozznoli, "rhere he wrs ririt by rr,m0r.,ls I,ucPs Pnrl Truscott. T--Ie \7RS 1>ccomrPnied b;r +,h':'lS9 o-"+>ic8rs to n nerr 1)y l"'i9lc1 wher'J, ~n t},e rr9srinc0 of the entire ass9rnhled lrd Divirion, he mR~e ~ short arldress nnrl decor1>ted ?l officers. FolloTing tris cer9,·1onv the Ge,p-ri:il returner! to 1-:ls C0"'1Jl1Rnd :rost y rl:>'t'le. 01 0 At lrS1O Genern.1 r:lnr'k receivnd Lt . Grm. "lerPro:i, Chief of' '3faf'f of' the Tt.,linn Ar"~', '"ith Colo11el ] nll.Pvj cjno f'"l_ti rne of i,~ s <-t,"'l+>f' of'f':i cers who srokA ....,n!":;lish. The l"]-ci11erf'l r1 isc 1 1~sed ··,ith Colonel T-Pllmricino the errirloynent o+> Itn-1.i<>n unHs on th9 Fif'th ArmY front. He told G0n0rril P,0rrr0i thrit the It? l i_nn ~otorized nr:tr::>rle hd not clone we 11 or Inn.c;o, its f'ir.st orerr1tion, n.nrl t½Pt th9 rnn.-n,-yir ~ n ,.,,,i ch +,}-,9 t-roors l-11:,0 riled out unrer r.,,..cssure from the TTermPn rroeril"J.P,' TJivisio:ri. ri"CT ref'lectA- no c.,,..e0i+, on th;::,vn, thoncrr, to he sure, rrtPny Ttril:i.r>n solr1j 0 rs in tht Action }, 0 <1 r'ier o:rill'""·.,_t1,r. Gen"lr"l r:1Pr1c further S.?ir' thr,t he hr>d P'iW~n thA Br~<;"'c1e f'IY10th0r cl rnc8 r,nn t,1-yt it r'?O 0one fnirly- \"'ell, ..-,1t1,o,1gh not rerll:r wel enou,a,}, to T""9t'it tb=i co~r~enrlrition v;hich he h:->r ,·TH,te11 tC1 GAn'"rPl 0rid.no in orc1er th1 t h9 rniP'rt ~iv8 encou.,,..11,a,erient to the Itriljan troors. Shortly the:r9a+>ter Gener.,l Cl,Mr 1r J--nc1 r"irected Gen0rrl I'nri..'1.o to tr> 1'e ov r t"1 rpli9t r1 ef'ensive sector ""'rAre n. Ger'"'lnn Ptt1ck on I? hill WPS ro"'s::ible ut 1'1ot likely, and Genc.;rf'l Darino I,r, 11 rerlied by letter, st11ting thrt his rrro1rr c011ld not rlo th:i job, t},qt he was },,wing heri,,y- des 0 rti0'1s 1:1n.d thr-t 19 shonld h 0 ~ent to the T'APr to reorr;r>n · ze. Generf"'l -Pe.,,-.Mrcl;_ s, id tht:>t Generel Darino ~,..,,,., he tho 1li'"½.t, A. def'eati..st in outlook rinr1 thrt he intended to relieve hi.TYJ. 1 0 Ger9r<1l ~1P-r 1r -1-1 r,n ,,..eceiw~d P c::tll ,~rom 1.nbbi 11ric 1'Tler of' tre ,Te,:risb Jelf<1rA '9orrrl anrl Chrln.-in t'l ior Lev o" thA C+"fice c" t•19 Chief of ChPrla~ns, u:ro was al'.!co,1rn11.yinc- noctor Br~ c 1'1v~r on ,"' t011:r ,.,<> the P-':,tl0f'ielr's. These officers cMrne to visit 0"'"1Gr£'1 Ckrlr w;tl-i GnJ.on,l Rvrn. fl"'t8r r1~n11n,·•, 11'-mrerrl Glc-,rlr ,,rent r'o"n to t 1 e o+>PiCA'3 of' t:re Iln1.ning Grour Pt the FM1...,ce ·~th G9rPr.?l GruAnt 110r, 1:1here Ge'19rPl Clark n/0ress9ri tJ,,e officers o-'"' ' 7I Gorps stfl "'f nho w0r, [I c;q9·,"hlPrl tlvY"'e c0·ncerni n.g th=i im 'ort,,nt r;"Jrt to 1,0 plri:,r<=Jd b•r 1TI Corp', in Or,9,..."tion srr GL--;. 'l'her0.""'t9r, th8 G-ori0rnl, f99li 11a- trr-at tris 'N/lS +,he last orrortn:rdty he ~LV9 f'or ., lor,_P- t•i179 to P-et "'1;' r 1st rv,ay Prori tre cc,n_-1-,inuous rressure of' 1,'tsiness rt Ji.is CO"'l""P.,,.,r1 rns+, -inv-ite,i Colon9l '"inltzr,rn .<i.nd Lt. Col. '>uth,--,r7_-,,nrl to orive ,,dth M.m ~n hi.s B11i.c"k- to ti--0 .,..,ifth Arriy C'""f'i.cers 1 Rest Center to ,·rnul.d �f',,,., ',n,1.r'"l . T:be rr'rt•r 10ft, Ge 1v,r"l r~l.<>Y' 1,c c'r·· v.,,,.,cr, r.nr'l I""ce very P'OOcl t,-':r,n 1111.til r>hout '18V8'1 rdl93 frorr ~orr9nto, wh0n th Blic1~ 1111..,ccountribly r9Pnsnrl +,o ro [tY\17 "'2rtrnr . Lt . Col. cut],,--,rlrnc1 \T"''"' r-',~r..,tcl-9cl to '"iorrAnto f'or helr on fl rr-i ,,c;i11.r1 Itrlinn truck , but ,.,hi.19 thr-i Gonerr>l riw,.,it0r! his return 9 i0Ar Pror~ +,h9 I ,=m:i'1<JU1flr Bn.s9 Se::r':.io11. Re"lollnt 0 9rvj ce , rri ve,1 , driv0,11 by S9rf:;er>rt n. . "estor~ 'H\ .., YJ.d t ct int:; SerP-A"YJ.t P.. . } lo1 rnher . 'T'hese t·im non- comriis,,,ionod o""f-i cers c;to1"r9d nn 'W'ffY ef'f'ici.e11.t •r nttP ched f' chr i11 to tr0 Generr>l I S CPr rind +,o••refl hi,.., to tre ( ff~ cors I P.est S011.ter . The G"'"'C'\T, 1 "P s c;;-ref.ltl y .; M:r,ressed by the ch0e~01l eff.;c1encv nP thes0 t~o non - con~i.s,..ionnd of'ficers nna a.;rgct~f th"t ,, l_9t,+,or ho -rrritten "'or 1-ii" si ,.,.n.,ture, cnr...,0nr1i.nr:r th9rri f'or their rtnod ror 1c. stf-l7 f'o,~ P 0 T e n.911.~r.,1 sr,9nt th9 11i ,-,.ht, ,,~,1 f'ollo"inC; dE'y resti mi: rit ,orr0nto nnd retnr11Ad to -1-,:r,9 com1...,n 1 rost on tt A ev9nin"" of the lhth . * * CI\SF,"R.T.f\ -- J4.'J1Tf, .. Y 17, 194L~--Grm9rPl r:l"r 1• to,'"'Y .,...ec9iV"'d <i crll f'rom G0,ri 0 r11l K9V8'1 nho ' 01 SCUSSP,( "itl-i hiri th9 rroc'res-:; of' +:,r, II Gorrs Of9rntio'1.~ rr,_c :its 9mrlo:m•,'1t . Hri t -,p rec9jvecl A. C9ll ·"ran G,"3r""rPl Luc"s ·rho ,rs joined (}911';rrl TJrnnn , <>nrl th(Yl9 o,,.Pi.cer-:i ,H r;c 1.ssen t,>19 .,,-rop;r9ss in mP 1dn--; thA f'in~J l_;=ms f'or Orer<Jtion ·:rrrGL.~ . Q9:rr..rrl CrPne, v~o is -rlanY\inp; f'or th8 nd mini strr-tivn rr0hle"l in tr9 ~it,r o-" no"9, tJ-,en ..,ic1 ,, 'hri0f' c..,11 on G<;nerr,l C7 rr1-::, r,110 , "'ol 7 o-••-iYJ.F; t 7•-is , Colonel '1ic 1 .relwrjt cn 1 led to rli--;cuss rend~nf.; co11rt <>rti." 1 C," SAS . -",1tiir9 bv 1 V9gt,9-rr "Y "10rn-i ,,_~ t 8 f'ollo"'jrir; cn 1,19 vms sert to 15th l\rmy l',rouy, f'ron-i t,h9 ~ilitnrr n.ssi.on •rith th8 Tt,nl-l1m AY'-r1y ,,1th P"l. -':nfor'Tintion cor;r to .,..,if'th Army: P,.'·T ClRO . "'irirr . rrt,; 1 i TTmh 0 rto tn'ms rver coMrn...,nrl of' 1 ·,otori Z"'r! Bde 15 .J"n yice T'lri . • Tl..,ni.no ·r~ncenzo . " 3b 1 YJ.l'.l'le Ty,+,911i,...9nce su, tio11 or er,e""Y t::r-oonq, " 1lil. it, Djv-isioY\ rnd tre ')Gth rnn7,er f,..ont:-1.l i:1,sr-i 1l+, of' th::i 7i->'tl-i t ion to ->.:r-.,_r~r---: . 1 0 ..,...,F mnr~r 'Q "'A.S is::;11.9r' torn,r c;11!""1°r17,1no- the 1iqrosj,,...,s ""9}+, tl-i.rt ,. ., n'T'8"t nnr+, of' the F9rrrirn Goeri11.g r,rerv,01er n·vis-ion rniv1-,t b<::i contr>jned in the Arn 7, tbus en.~i1·v:1 tbe pr9~qur9 o-F> eneny orrosi- r,., 501.th Cor1hrit "'9PM ,.,i9ld r rder ,tq v1r, s issw::id tocl::i7 nescrihing in detri il tre r';,'lrt ,., ,; ci,, the 5C:/.1-th Cof'lbnt Ten"! ,rill ::-1.r'y 1n nyer11t:ion C-:.HPiGIB . 11 T hr>ve been +><>vorribl7 im:8,T,J ;073 _ PArso'1<1.l "'or rrcGre8r;r f'rori ClPrk . ress<;r1 ');T tl-'e tl1orour:h119ss of' vo 1r lnnn~n1 for f'orthcorojna op9rat:ion. I .'l"' con-"ir19nt 70 1.1 'ill b9 -;uccessf'ul. Gond lu~ 1, to you . 11 0 * * r:~s:SRTA-- -JA1' JAR'( 1~ , lqLi-4- -In t,he ...,,orn;n:; tJ-,e G'~ner11 l r13crdved n er 11 f'ror r:o,.,,\'1A nrl i:ri P" t 19 !+5th D:5 vj -; j_o11.. mhe Gener/l 1 ,'i ~cu,s9cl -'-,he ross-:1-,79 enrlovrnAnt, n:' r" . . . t, of' th9 Li/5th Division to r0inforc9 ~ t 1·oors l'"'rrlirp; i:r +.h9 "irst rhrse of' n:,°"rn:tion JI'I'Jr;.LS . Th8 C"¼e'7.err, 1 next rec9 i V8rl n. "r 11 (1011 <::Jrn 1 T;r, rrJ.e s, v, �fror1 GenArr-1 Le"lnitzer ho discu~10rl i-iri0fly th~ iJ11!"l;n°nt FrrivPl of G0n°rtil Alexri.nrler 9nrl -+:,J:-0 0stohl ishrri0nt o 1-iis •lead 1ur:>rters nt CA.sertl'l. ~nstern of Bnri . mber9P Pter G~ner"ll V1r r; n ri.nd Gen°.,...'1 J. i= PYJ.C 0 en '1A to c, 11 on G,meral 0,lprk ?11(1 d1'1CUS9 tJ.-e 1uestio'1"l o+' suprly +'ro'1 tre ro-lnt 0{' ,,.:<JV[ o-f' the 1 Jorth Africrri establisrment"' cic; w9ll rs tJ,0 r,.,ninsulRr Rase '":ection. At 1 ')45 '}eneral Slr-rk- 1-i?d nn o-"+'-th0.-,,.ecorcl "Te3s cn.,,+'9rr.mce in +,re ½ut , 9.t ,..,11i.c"i he .:11r1 • cri.ted to 17 1vrr corr0sronr113>its , rh0+,or~P;hers R!'ld rnhl:i c relrt~ ons o"fjcers +J,.,,t c1 ne•,, bl_o"T '71"1'1 to he struck rit the Germr·ns . These corresronr1en.ts r8 1ervi nn- toniorrow to jc-.: n c-utfits rrrtj cip[ltini; in 01 erfltion ,PI'VH..E . ""'he G0'1eral rlid !1ot ;_,,1:Ucnte '7h9re OT' when th8 orer.,tion r,,oulrl take plPce h1t exrl, ·in")r to t O COT'r0.r;rondey,ts t'1,:,+, tre ...,if+,h AT''1Y w;.s rrepnring to 1tri"k:':l th<1 h rr'e3t ½low it }--,.ns y0t .?tr1u::: --;~nee the 1.rindinf; .,t Sr>lerno . Tr'.) 0en':i'"l out1in'"'rl +re ~j ➔,n'ltion 8.'3 it no'"' C''ists, e·"TlriinAr.l that tre ,..,rench l'Jorrs "'nrl str11cl• 11lon"' the r·i"'l1t f'l,.,nk ~n fl.n ef'fort to dr-o "l Merri GPr>,rn troors . +,o t ,,t E1roe, t'1Pt tbe T-lritish Corrs lrnnched 1.r o"'f'cmsivo ,,cros<J the Grri -~, i Dno ln.st nir; 11t i'1 ,,n e+'+"ort to Purther »re11.'\rnn the Gerritins I Cr ssino rosi t-i on rn rl 4:,hPt n 1 tb-~11. fl. c;hoT't t~·,0 the tr Corrs "1011lrJ P,''9rt more rr 0 '1sure in t,he c911ter c--f' the lir,<> . mhes": trree r1oves , 1-,0 sPi..r, 7err, P ~n~lude to rinother or-orntion th,t ho WPE' ;:orry he could not 9,crln 1 n ~n c'letPi.1. The,e thr•w corr,s o-reT'<itions "''3re designed to bririr; Yoore Gr::rl"'r n ::;+,renn;th dum to the 'l<'ifth !\rmy f'rc.11t cinc'l to tl1in out, if' ross~1--,7..e, l}err,rn -rorces th;t T".• P,ht orrose tre sreci.ri l operDtion . Fe s<i.id rc".d "1.j'J't' hor0s of the t'encli'1P' orer[ltion, '"'nr ,,hen 1 ::i.s 1(ecl if' this or0rrition 'ms not c esif{l1ed to J.ir, sten the f'r 11 of Ro , the ii'ifth PrMy Corrir~ppr]er renli8d thrt ever7 orer.?.tion th0 ,..,j_ftr J.rmy unrlertco 1• WRS de'<if;ned to sr,eed thP rlPY " en Allied troors ·011J.d erter Rorrl9 . Fe outHned to thA Co"'rec;nondents "O'M', n-" t,hn c°-l "r'i("''ll~ rn·i l-lt,:-r7 "' 11c'I '10n Pl: litn.ry rroblems thrt vro 1 1ld qr~<Je ,,~tJ, tre +,[-l 1ri'Ylf"" nf the ItRli Pn ~r~·-itrl. 0 0 0 "'e 0 , Ge.,,8rP 1 81 "'r,, no" ril"rs to 1-i'"'ve one> o+> 011.r corr.e,..ronde'1ts ri.ccornr"'ny him on the rm hcnt hen he dw,hes ur to the 8'111 rPn QSS"nlt Prea on :;' fr V . Tr is c0rrPsro11dent rrobr->"117 "rill be '"yron Snlzberr,er of the 'iew York T:im<=>s . ,_~ Th"' G0YJ.eral, Pfter cn 1 1tjouc:;l'r ;_-,,c'i.cnt-ina; thnt rin i.rriportrint str.<-te~ic "10Vel""mt WRS i1"1m:inl'-mt , tJ-re1•1 the cc-n-:errmce oren to qw=igtions . The corres ronclo.,,ts , -"ror,, t 11"':i r ci_ue-.:it ~ ons , "ere YCJost : -,,tere"lted in 'Then Rone won 1d be tri 1~en "'nr "'hRn the l}ener.n 1 exrected ,, juncture bet ·:een th<o tJ-,ree corrs now in cnP1bPt r,nd tre srec" n.l force (<1TIT TGJ:E). Th3 G,mera1 "n.id he ropec1 thrit this juncture •m111.cs 1,e "'1,,de '7itr.:n t,rn ·7ee 1rs ?+'+,er +,J-n [nsnult . Tre corresrondents r>lso ·•0'1(~8red i.,.. this srecii=il ii'i.f'th Arr pr oy,er.,,tion vrr,s i~ n.n:v 'il";l ticid in ··fith onerPti.o~s c,lsev.,here . The (}Pn9rr 1 tol-1 them thrt f'or <1c11e time hc, hnd been wn.ntinr>; to 8Xecutr:, '>11cJ-· r-i.11 orer,,tjon but thn.t until now suf'f"ici<mt crnf't hRc! not bnen rvn.ilrible . Th9 cr-"r"nr811ce ;::inded ,.,-J,cin G3n8rr-tl Clrrk hr>d to hurrv to "'noth9r :"'9eti11f m~th Gen0:rnls nouse 211,, Gr>11non . P;::i""or9 1.eriving, ho1ever, G8nerr>l C1."r 1,. F>lso to1,1 tl:-e corres-ron/lents th"t onc, of tre ..,ost ~l"!Jx·,rtrint +',9ctors th~t '!onld P-overn the Rssrult "•oitlrl he tre werther rnd th-,,t p;ood 11er>tber would hpve to nr9vPil +'or th, r:rerc1tion . He '"laid thrt , <>s yet, hCJ had received no lorin; rc1nP,'e rr11r'iction on h"t the weather ·1011.ld be on the 11lr.nned day. 1 1 1 rT'}i9 s11bjAct of his con.,..errmce ·ith Gcmernl Uouse a'1r1 Gener, 1 Cn.nnon VIf>S ti,9 rro:--oscid drop o+> the 50l+th . nrad ute Jn+'..,ntry 11egim0nt . Generr 1 Cl,,rlc WR s �worrieil by t"Jo c0nsir1errtio,...s "Tfectinr; this o erntio"l . In the f'jr--;t :lace , thA r.res"'nr:<J of r, force "ell +>cT''l,":rd of tr 0 1 rndi'1gc3 tc cut off the f'"'rrooch to the rieach by rr0rT11r>n +'orces is 'hifl'hlv desirri>:>lc "nrl , if' eff'r>ctiv"' , 1-:ould greatlv f'Pci litr>te the whole S:irTGL'":: Ororn.tion . On tr•, otl 0r 11;-,nc", ti-,9 two g,:i r r-onerc ls ro-i '1ted out tJ,~t no r -heAr,[il "0r the orer,-,tj o'1 hc=>d been T'O"' sible , trrit tl-io :iirborne troo:rs hrrl 11ot _rect.; cec r lr''1r1int; "'or a '1umh=,r of r1onths Fnd t,hn.t ti- n1°019 !l f'frd r, +>ror. t'he -roi'1t o+' v.; e· r o"' the r> ir , hnc'1 the n'1.ture o"' P'1 "mrrovi:v1.tio11 . -t F9.S ro~sP1le th.:t t. n prr cJ,utists r.iip,ht be '7idely sc,.,ttrired upon ln.ncHn"', b9 j,,,,P,ff9ctive as n delr>yinrr force 11.nd be rendered ther0nf+,er useless i'S ri forr:e for A-ny rurpose . Th9y nlso roi11ted out th,-,t th0re ~"011l_d ")e no T'\oon nt U'is ti:me . 0 The General , r,fter be2ri.ng tre r•ros ~1;_d ccns 0ecid0cl to ,:,-ive tl1 8 rn?tter 14ttl9 -"F"'t '?r c1'ns-irl0rrtjon . ~vrmt,1rll:'r be decider' to eljr~innte th9 dror 11d lonr1 th9 50/1,th from the sea . At 1330 G9r0rnl Alev:D 1d9r ,,,.,,.rived "lith Q,m9rnJ. ford4nr; rn0 Gonerrl J,e"1nitzer . G")""lernl lil9x:Rnder t"rowi his o',n jeep ur tl 9 rath to a po 4 nt in f'ront o,-, tre n j r1es I t,mt nnrl cnne to r da;;;hi ng halt . In th~ co-.-,f0rence ·Tith GA:>111rn1 Cl~r4 1 the Genernl di -::cussed the ::trtus of Or11rqtion r;rrr 1GLP. and the 10 Corrs o ~f'P.ris" V8 no,·, in rrogress which ap1 yier>rs to be mn l::~ n,, o;ooc. ·,rogres s c esr; te count8r rt tr c r:::; ner r th 9 T"louth of ,thFJ G~rir.:7 j nno jn tho vi.cinit7 o-" the villPge of' ''inturno and 4rgento . The Rr-itish "re berdnninp- to f8rr;r trin1rs :'Cross, :rnc Ui9 0 1 1tlook -':or ri rerosonr-l)ly s11ec13ssful op9r Ptio:r -ts 1,right . p 1 0 G,~"10rn.l Clr,rlz saic1 to GenerP1 Ale·-:and"'r, fl"'lonr; oth9r trh1gs , th:-t the t:iT118 would con.1~ ·+0n he hnd to ,fo so~rithjr,Q' Rbout th'3 number of visitors nho "ere descFJnrli·'1i:r uron him , 11sin1; hi,s C,'"rs , J- 4 s 1'llc'l:..~t9rs r>'1rl tn 1·::ln~ up the time of h:i""self' anc: bis stp+'f of'f'-icers hen they ,·;ere eng:-,p;ed in orer,-,tions . HA sn5d th,,t this rlid "lot Ap ly to Generrl J\lex11nr'er ·1ho , Pfter rll , 'ms ris direct co"111ar.r1 er, bnt he t ·ougl·t GsmerP 1 ~ l 3xr-nder should tr> ke tre onus of r,rotecti11.r him f'roJY> othr:ir ~,-wursions . Gennrril c1~rk r-dder ti,,.,t, PS G3ner2l \lexancler knew , re hnr'l thus f13r been extr emely r8certi ve t0 visitor~ , 1 mt tbe r1ooc1 hfld -"e.'.'lch'Jd tJ:.r" poi11t '7},8re c;ow,th 4 nfJ' J.-i,:,d to he do11'3 riho11t ·'t . Gener~l Alex8.11der sa ir1 ths.t he wo 11ld do 0ver:yth:; nP, he co 1lr1 t0 keep Gen9r"' 1 C}Prk frorn br,ino- ov,rburrl9ned . 0 1 A+'ter nn , ho11r I s cnnfercmce, Gener"' 1 Ale'm.nder left 1i.tr r r'1J.ide :rrovided by General Clark , to 170 to 10 Corrs TAC Fendqur'rters nerr Sessr ~runca to d5.scuss ,d_t}:1 General ,,cCreery the rroi;;ress o-f' t,119 10 Corrs nttl'J.clr . At 153C Achir11l Cunn'nP-h['m, P. 1, s- 1·c, ~~:r , nrr:tv~d ..,nrl <liGCll8S8d. v1ith GAn'Jral / :·editerrPnean , nn''i Captnin I o"er , Glrr 1~ the sea 1sr,ects 0~ the r}l-IItTGL:~ Oreration . Today ~t noon the 'Prenc'r Bxredj tionary Corp, rrovr>d j ts col"1r1r>11rl_ rost from 1 ratf1. to enpf'ro , thus r,utting it -in r J11ore fn:ror0ole rosition to control t},e r~ovris of th0 ?nri l'oroc c'ln Pnd 1rd Plr,eri:,n Divisions . At 171C Gener~l Clr-r 1r '.7ent r'1o"m to -'-,he r~l,,,ce ;-,nd h:-d P blk vrith Lt . G8n . Devers , Americ..,n Cor~l"'J"'.'1der-in-Chief ~n t½e treater , rep;-,rf;_nr" pro!"lotions ,..,_nd necoratio11s , urF;inF; upon G8nernl Y'evprc the fflct t rt o'1ce " quote of decorntions wns ceterT'J~ ned re , Q,:merPl Clerk, sho11ld h::"Je the decidinq voice �1 as to who sroul d b0 c ecorrted vri t hin Fifth Army. Gener.? 1 Dev-1rs was ~ost corrli['l one sta.tecl th 0 t he intended t0 rocomF1end G8nerril Clrr 1,,. .('or the commr>nd of' Op9r11tion A TTTIL . Ge,,,0rri l GlnT' sriic~ th,-,t ho FP s grrtef'11l for G1=me ral Devers I c0nsii4eration b,,t tl "t be br-td bee11 notified severnl ··reeks be fore thE1t he h:-:id been selected ·"0r th"t conm.ond . Gener11 l Cl11rk recrd VArl tr8 fol 1 o..:in'; rP.nio from GenerP 1 O::isenho ver yesterday : 1 1tr 7078 . w tre11. I '.31"' irl p•oor'l.by0 to you in ifrirlos : still held the hore th11t I rii ,.,.ht ~et to s0e :rou once More b9fore I left th:i tre.oter . r:;j nee thj s hn.s rroved impo"'sihle I an senilinr: this tPl0~ram just to c,n.y ag.oin ho •r f'leeplv grat8"'ul I r>m to you "'or tl-ie nPgnificent servi C8S you h1we per f'ormed trrou,.,.l~out the year r>nd n hr- lf th-ot hn.s 0l1>rs0rl. sirce you rnd I lef't lashing-ton . 1\11 A11iPd -"-ip:1tirio- '"1en nrA rrond of vou nnd ::i.re looking form.rd to a rerform~nce iri. your next grec't tris}r thnt will equal your rPst accompl i shm,,11ts . t'\r 1-i8st to yo11 , to Grue:o.thAr r>nf'l to :1y otht=Jr friends 011 Your c;ta"'f ancl in your Army. Goorl luck on CjJ:-TIFGLE . n 0 !!Yo'U' rn.c1jo re'lch0d ~ 0 vesterd"y, nnd I "ms del ip:htec1 to herr from you , 1 alt 011R;h c :isanroi nted that I m:ii:,ht not baV8 r-n orrortunity to s?e and tRlk vdth you f'or f' fei-r minutes . I h1'1rl hop3d to "'et -::O·1e 11'1te ·:ord on an:,r chRnl!es in f 1lt1U'e ev'3nt s, +>or thA -:nrlicrtio"'s I r: t hero , trrou~h Alex,.,11cier, arP. thfl.t mv tas 1• is on 'l ,rre:,tly reduced sc8l9 . 4o"mver, ··e ,ill do it, whntev"'r it is . J h, ve h2r1 no timA to r,-j_ve r:ucl· thouqht to thPt, for I h:.ve "l;T Pye on :1noth0r little ti'"'f::ii.r rc,re, wit•1 1 r1-ich ;rou are verv fF>mil-:Pr, r.nd bv tre til'lA tliis letter reaches yo1 1 '·e wi 11 -non th'" resnl ts . I rm goin~ alonp; on trn.t OT'8ration in order to obtl'lin +'irst-hrnd -:nformntj_o,,,_ as to its injtinl success, jn order tr<it ~ r~r7 t.<>l·e rc1vt1:nto[>'e o" orrortunitfes to re in.i>orce tb2t "ront in exrloitRtio11 of Pny orrortm1ities '1-iicl-J. might co:r1e to 11s . ( "I 11:no-·r yo11 must 1:)e husv. I hope tJ-,,-,t this otrcr ri. "fr, ir /?OAS t},rour:;h as you h"'d nnt:i cip~ted nnd ti,:cit I rnay have t},e orrortunity be"ore lo1tg to fl f5A in cnr,e unr1er ;irour conT'l.and. rrry r0qFrds to B9d91l r,nrl. the rest of my l'rlends . 11 A l1"1nni.,1ri; 0x,~rcise o+' tbc, 1rc1 Dlvision r.,ris scher1 11l80 for tl1 0 n:t 0 lt, b11t durinr, the late cwr=q1:i ni re; orts bep;" in to re:::• er Gener/' 1 Clnr}~ th,,t fl n' 1 rnb9r of losses o-: c,u101s nnrl. 105mm field guns hr'd occurred . The Gr:m<:Jrel rr-- s grertly concerned . * x- CAS P.TA-- .Jt'ITJARY 19, 191..4-- This nornjno; l}-9mr l Cl:cirk dictate6. the following to be :inserted in t11e dif'ry of today : 0 "LA.st nip-ht at 'T'ruscott . l' bout ten o I clock I r0cei ver1 the .ottr> chec'l from Grmernl \ 3hortly there"' fter , rlurh11s the n:l 1;ht , ne n trickled in -d.th re- �garcls the losses in equipment and JT111teriel ..rhich t e 3rd Divjsion Pd suf-l'ered j n ;ts r0hCJ<1rsal. The" nni.ounterl. ron ;hly to 1.3 dulcNs , 19 105 1 s includi n!'.{ f'ire control e1uir"'1ent , '7 57rim rmti- tronk f;'l.ms 11nd ? 37 1 s . Fre sumn.h1y s0rici co""munic"tion equirnent '8.s lost, but r1et.nils h11ve not yet been +'urni"hed me . l)11r5.ng tre nir,1-it :r directer'l that Goner" 1 Luer> s, General Tru~cott , '1."'vrl representn.tives , GenP-rr-1 ·olfe "ncl otrers be '1SS9mbled h0re in order th,,t ,te night discuss, roint by roint, di+'ficulties encountered and b.1,8 the necessr>ry ster"' to see tri"t the;r ,·,oulG. not recur in the oreration. "It has 9.lunys been my t} our-'1t in roherirsing +"or these oper~tio11s th.,t tl 0 dr;,r r'm srould be b,qd , rnri thrt r1i -:;tr :es occurring b8 correctecl before the final O:'er 0 tio'1 . Th9 overFhelming r,-i "'T'1!1nPgeri(mt by the "Jrwy in this cn.se arra71~d ne . I.,~ convjnced t½rt Dost o+' the ni"'ficulties encountered nere due to ln.clc o"' rroper plrnn~ng, ½uttoninr; 11r ~nc' b·rinin--; on the vrt o+' Vie r"'-vy. 0 'Thi, rnorninr I hPve c'iscnssed tris r"-"tter ":th Gener~1 Lucr>s, Gener...-1 Truscott l'nr-1 otl·9rs ['11( qrrrnr,r;n "or t':1°ri to con"ront the ildrir, 1'3 ~Ylrl th0:5.r a~rnistants (Lo··ry) ;n order to ov"rc01;'} tlvv:·e di"ficulti",s . ::: hPve just tr>.lkod on the telepr one ~Ii th Ar,riirr-1 Lo-··r;,r nnd ~r.formed him tr,~.,t I am ri sto ni S ed ri.t sud· ,.,,-; ~M..,1'1.aP,P,r1r,nt • '.!:'i·u. ,Cott ~ 0 I UC" S "'T0 on t 8 :,,,,- "o,-. confer9nce ,vjth hiri . 1 r 11 '.!:'he ,...A-;--1...-coment o"' f'l,1,li.fT'lA..,t nf trA "rc'l Div; sj on h ~ er1bP 1·r~q:.Jer' m8 17e...-tly. It "n~ n"'ce::>s"r7 "'or ~,e to t,rl,9 t"rese ri1.1~·rs .;-ro7 thA lC Gorrs , 'll'o n0er10r~ them bfldl:r in the G'rigliano River crossing . It rer:nr· thrt I cr>n not "11rn~sh the '3")th Dj_vision ··;ith tre ,_,, duhrn ·<-r•:ic11 they need so brdly in tho-ir cross~ne: o+" t}1e R:cipido. I h~ve hnd to t1> 1<:" m11toriel from the 45th Div~sion '-rr·i_cl, ":ill 11e hf-1rd to r9plcce . I N1 r9cord-l11r: t' -is hrief outl:ino of nction tr ken ~ n orr1er t 1rt it roy be in r7 p9r:io11al record . •Uso 11otified Ge11eral Alexanc1 er . 11 11 Q,:,neral Truscott sent in r,n offici.,l rerort on the rehe8rse.l ;:,nd also sent a brief note to General Gruenther . Botl-i of these 2re quotec' belo tr: 1 The note to Gennrr,l Gruenther: 11 1 ,"'T'1 ta\ing the liherty o:' ;:,endin;:; this to you so th;:,t you "ill lrnol' how .;-rincy this ev·ercise re0llv W"S . ::'urtt9r, 1 tine is so short thPt senr:li'-iF tl-ii~1 to you c irect rrir>~f pive you 1>ncl tr9 Boss 1e time to CC'nsjder i.t before you roceive tl- o<'f'jcfrl copr thrt I'r -forwarding tbrough proper chr.nnels . "I believe thrit you 1mow r1e v,e 11 enour;h to -mov1.' th, t I ,muld not r.[l ke such a point unlecis I n ctur1 lly f'i:~ lt stronrrlv 1:1 bout it . J+" this is to be 8 "forlorn hope 11 or a 11 suicir1 e s.oshnyu tl-•=m o.11 I rrr-nt to 1mo i1 t},f't f11ct I./'.' so , I ' m ro~itive t¼rt t'1ero ::.s no outfit in t 1-10 rrorld thR.t ci:m do it better thri".l ne - even tl"ou~h I reserve :!"ir;J.t (personally) to believe we :-:iight deserve a better fate . u 1 1.• GenerR.l Truscott I fl official report follons: 11 1. To m-i1:ttarv f'orce con hop8 to f'ssault r. ' of011ded bench rrith prospects 1 1 �of succes s 1mless it cnn be l 0 nc1 ed on sl:>ore in tacticr-1 order rind rroper co·'ldition to onga~e j n coT'lb"t . •,- ercise ,just conclud9d t ; '" dnte disclosed so "'lnn~r rlefJ ciencies in thes'J 1"9'1rects t l."'t t11e neec1 for ::ic'di ti.on"'l fr1v£1l train-' 11g and ;,~proved orgr,··izrt,ion i'1 r9rfectl:,r ohvio1w . This exercise hnc been plArmed for the JalP.rno beacres in +,he vicinity of' Faest1 1r1 and this area h1:1c'l been Hccepted by th0 ·Tnv7. Les 0, th:m 16 hours prior to the exerci 1e the areP 1·r s ch...,nged to British bePches nortl-i of the Sele River for Uaval reasons , in spite of' tl1 e -f:Pct th:->t t½.e Pre11 inlirnd wi:1s entirely unsuitable +'or rel1enrsing the militnry orerrition involved in the 3d Division's part in the 11 3f.I'TGLE 11 operfltion . 0 11 2 . nut of 37 LCTs assir,ned f'or t e opern.tion, only 11 ,rent on the exercise; q srec:iPic LCTs sreci1:1lly rerp1ested, cPrrying tanl•s , cornmunication.s equipr1ent, anr1 Di.vision hnadquR-rtors , "mre not 1:1vrilr1 ble; 1 LJT car rying one <J.snai1lt coTT1rany ·ras not Pv;:;.ilnble . Son8 of th9 rnore sed ons poh1ts noted in the execution of the e--::ercise ~re: (a) 'Jo si.m;lo hattr>lion Jrndod on time or in formPtion . 1 aer1ents of the bePch P,sanlt hrttn.Hon o.c> tl,e 15th Infrntry ·rere lrndod rs "'allows: 0/i.L,5, L Compl."'ny "''1d hnlf' of HeQdriu;:irtors Company; 0500 , K ComrPny and hPlf of 1· Company; 0800 , hrl-r:' be...,ch nssPult l,d,tP}ion , ·ps lPnded first , between the hours of 0405 Pnd 0/,50 . Tbe 1st BPttPliM , ··11 ic°!" srio11ld have been the lr st bPttnlion to lr>nr , wos l~ndec'l b8t•-reen 0/,?5 Pnd 0610 . Corironies were l11nr'l.ed 11+, Pll points on Green Beacr , "S ell PS to the north r>nd south thereof . (b) Tr"ne::norts 1;,ere so ,~t<r o f sl- ore thrt rssrult crrift re-mired fron 3 to 4- 1/2 hours to reach the beach . (c) DHK"lS required 4 to 5 J:>ours to 1J.3rch anc1 , further, s-t le11st 1 /, TFKFS carTYi'Y1.g ? 17nm P'1d 2 57"'lm AT runs, were sw11mred . rres"mt indications Pre tr.rt Pt least 5 others, cnrryin,r; 105mm Ho7 1 s 1·ere 1."'lso lost . (rl.) ?o single 9le•i1cmt 1 'Ir>s lr>nded in hPnd and on its correct be11ch . BeAchcs '''ere n:issen b:r as much as l,OC'O yards . (e) Iracticallv no b:"irntry trcticnl vehicles ·vere lcnded . (f) Ho :inf<>ntry anti-t~nk mnrons , rirtiller·r, or tr:mv-destroyer .a,,.:ms rere l'shore by daylio;ht Pnd in position to mP.et enem:r iwtion. (g) Assnult crri.ft hench8d nt ,,J.ow sp~ed c1nrl stonr<ed ·crl,en g-.ronnded, forcinq, troops to diserbrirv in deep water unnAce--;sriril;r. (h) v-:rs . 'In tan1rs ·, ere ln.nded . (i) Crp_ft f'::, j lnd to report to tc.ke rn~iT"1rmtril commm,r ers from Ci) Prnct-i ca 1 .ly no use '7f' s nJ?de of LCWs or LCA.s to ferr:r troops ashore "rom LGis , nlthouo;h t1,-~_s rrocofur9 is includ0cl ~n the plan 'ln,, will \ �3\ undoubtedly be essenti/"l 1 in the oper.otion. (k) Ship-to- shore conmunic."V ans were ••efed,i ve , if not tota.lly (1) Th9 r9h9rirsRl rrovidnc no test +'or CCH'1l1Unicnticns , r11rticmlr1rly with reference to 1'nvn.l P,11.n+'ire . (T'1) Troop o<'ficr,rs 111_...,rt 01·s not "r iJr ble to Army personnel. Army of'f:icers in so.,1e en.sec PS 1'8d to use e 11list0d mens ' l"trine n.YJcl vrore barrec .,,.r()Jn r.... rrlroon . "3 . Tl e ·r.,,vnl sjoe of the 0.~srult orerrtion ras controlled .,..ror.1 the Risca me by the 'T[' v'11 Cori11n.nrler . The Di vision Co:1r.:n.nder, ···ho P ctu.-, lly conrrncls the ::-sseult troops , is A.ssig"l d a nritis)1 L<,I as He2d111.rrters ship . TJ-,e so-cPlloc Derut-r to t,}-,9 ·rrv~1 Coruri..,n'ier (vrho J,<>s never been so desirn~ted in · ritin1Y) hfls Y10ither stP,...,... , n.or cilitiT'~ , nor co·~r-n.micn. tions "or control o"' t,1-,,. c;lyi_~-ninr: involver:'l . ~o -rr,r r,s 1::>~Htv to ~Ylfluence the nssr>ult oreration, the •):ivi'1ion Co,.,,r nnder, is , :in effect , rierely ~ F'3senP'er . 1 0 0 00 1 0 0 11 1, . To lrncl trds Divi.sion on "SVI'Tl}:r,Ett 0eaches 8S it ·ras lnY1neo during this rel-iearsnl !O'lld be to i'1vite rl:i_s~ ster i.(' tre i:mom:r sl 011lrl counterr-ttack at dr-iylight wHh /,0 or 5C' tnnk, . There is no doubt thrt the -=:uccess of the operation "rould b"'l jeopnrclized nor t.hr>t t},e loss o+> l.i+'e "nd mnteriel 'lOuld be excessjve . 0 11 5. (a) In my or1nion, ti,ere is i:;rPVe ne~d +>or 11cdition"l trr>i"d.no- to insurr, tJ, 0t AS'"'ault troop, ··ill be lPnded in cc,nc1 4 tion to "'Ccor1pli::ih their . m:isslons . I ,..ecOT'1.I'l8nd a r8herirsal. 1 (b) 'Pre corriwmd orgrni,rn.tion ~ s obvio1rnl;,r c efecti ve . The comnanrler of' the as"lm"lt T'ivioion hns the respons~bility f'c,r the assn.ult; he has nr-i:.it .or cow1unicr1tions, -1' 0 cil~ +,ies, nor :iccess to ,TP.vr l cor~mr>11d "'or j_nfluencinr the onoratj on rrior to landinfs. 11 1.r-'ni:; the nir;ht Gener"l ";lr,rl,: decider1 thrt hn "mnld not put on the pro rosed drop of the 50l;th Inrn.chute !n"rn+,ry Reg~rnent "n thA ·e0rlv 'iorni.m; of D day anc1 thPt insteocl h,., ·muld drop it ,·,jth:1.n our o•;n l:ines on th8 riight of D da.y. The rlecision to "'/"1 1·e the 0:ror i:rith:in our o·:n 1i113s v'lP.S sub,i ct to reconc;iderPtion i-1. crise the G-=mer;:-1 kter considerecl it un..,ise . 0 /1. t 0~30 GerierR 1 Luc::i s arri vx1 , in res:ronse to Gr.mArR 1 Cln.rk I s surrimons . GenerP 1 Dev"?rs , Gen0ral G.9rrJTI0ll and Generr 1 Roo}"1 nl,:;o E>-rri V8cl . nd hPd a brief tall: "Iith Gener"l Clrir1c. Ge11errl . Dev9rs tivm lef't -~ith Colon0l Hrrrj son rind Lt . C:ol. C"mphell o+' 11is r.ePC1qu~rtqrs to visit T.'rench Corrs , nnd Grmer<>l GR"'1"1Cll vrent with Cantain L"mpson of General Clrir:V 1 s stl:!f'f to visit 10 Corns . /1.t 1030 G0119rri1 Glar 1c c ecorr>t-,c1 '"'2 rien ,rith tGC I s, L<~gio·"s of "erit rnc1. Silver 3tRrs . Th8 cerewon-r trok r lac9 in the I'1endo1·1 in f'ront of the Chief of Str f'f I s V'ln ,,;j th a 1ruPr~ of honor , i;onsi sting of R co"1p1rny of th::i 101st MP Br>ttn.lion and the Fj_fth ArT'ly Band . ':'h9 o"'+'icers "'1d n"m to b"'l r1 9corrted included Colonel "lutler, 'Jnn in commnnc;. of th9 1/.i-th Di-rision , Lt . Col. Denholm, Bri~ . Gen . :ilb11r p7.rl Color,el Krimmerer . 1 I},en tJ--9 off·i ccrs [" ·'lrl 119n to b8 rricor..,ted v10re 1 �assembled General Clrr'lz, icrho vms About to go to his rositfon in front of the men, saio to Captain Be/'.1.rcvrood in P cor,m::cncl tone, fl Get dovm there E>nd strmd up with tl-•ose men to be decoroted. 11 Ca.ptt ~n BeRrdwood rlid not \,n.0 ·r thPt the eve11j ni:; before papers hP.c b9en comrleted to 1T''Jard him r,nd Cpl. Tn-,,nenbaum Silvnr 3trirs t:'or rr.olle.ntry At the Selerno lenr1 ing for bringing ashore vitally needed signAl eauipment . · He sair to GrmerPl Clr-rk, "'1JhPt did you say, sir?" 'i hereupon Genriral Glarl,c said, flDo as you r>re told" . C::i.ptain 13e~rdwood went do·m and stood with the men to be decorPted Pnd received his Silver Stnr at the h~nas of the Army Commander. 1 1 In the eveninFt, Grmeral C:l11rk hr,d t,·rel ve dinner guests. They included most of the hi~her militPry leac'ers o.f tre r1e0Uerr,.,nean the.?ter. Before going to d.:i nner the !'.:;nests met at the hut. Tresent ,-,t th0 dinner, in 11.ddition to Generals ClRr\: 811d Gruenth8r, were: From IY'J, AC 1 lF, Generals AlexPnder, Harding and Lemnitzer; from the Perliterranean Fenfquarters, Gener2!s Wilson, 1'evers, Gammell and Hooks; froq the Air :F'orce, Ge11er~1s Eaker, Crnnon o.nd House . The dinner, 1 rhich was s0rvr;d in Gen,ernl Clnrk 1 s unpr9tr-mtious mess shnc}i::, l8st8d over P'1. hour and si..,ortly therePfter, · Pfter returnin~ to the hut, the guests ,1 eparted. * * CA.)~RTA--JAHUARY 20, 1941.- -GenerPl Clark depPrtecl from ris ac~w,nce corn.mrind post at 09.30 this morn 1 ng and flew to II Corrs Heac1 ri_uflrters, where he conferred crith GenerPl }(r,yes, the Corps CommRnder. Returning by cub, General Clnrk arriv':!d bac1.r at hi:., Heaclqunrters at 1130. Instend of us:ng the sm11ll Caserte artillery a.irffold, Q9nernl ClPrk utilized n n11rrow roR.d in the comFrand post area as his t2l:e-off end landine; strip. TJpon his return, he conferred with Colone 1 rhillips, Public RelF1tions 0fficer of Allied T.'orce Feadqw,rters, rind Lt. Col. Clark, thE:i Fifth Arm~r FR(. ~rot Jrno,virlP; the stPtus of tbsi co:rnn.and o.c> Oreration A"TVIL, Col. Phillip:: had ,-.rr.:itten asking th~t Colonel Clork's services be turned over to him for a special operP_tion . GenerRl Cl11rl:, lmowinc; thrt Colonel Fhillips "!PS referring to A~flIL, the vory operetion thnt he is set up to comrr1rnr1, t."lked over public rel8tions plans ,·•ith the t.-,o public relPtions officer"' Pnd agreed to detach Colonel /J1Pr 1" for sp8cial plr-rnninr: for Op:"r"tion A',TVIL r,bout Fehrl1?r;r 15th. The Fifth t rmy Gomrnr>.nner i:i lso dj scusserl i: ith Colon8ls rhillips Pnd ClR_rk the release of informetion concernin<; the irrmirn:mt Operation ::mr'TGLE . He stressed th"'.t it must be brought forcibly to thP- rnblic I s attention thPt this is a Fifth Arny oreration, an integrnl mil.itr-1.r7 pnrt of the rusb Plong the, present front. Colonel Fhillh,s P greed to :3tre::s this f,:, ct in "'n on-the-recorc b,, ckground press conf'en=mce thAt ,fill be h0ld tomorrow. Generri 1 Clr,rlc noYr ['lens on takin:; two correspondents vrith him r.boPrc' the FT bo."t on D dny, one P.merican c1nd one British . 1 Generr:il Glrr 1 hr;d Colonel,:, ihill"ps Pnd ClArl, , flC'.' ,1is luncheon r-;,J.ests . Pollo,,inr llmch, G/'.mernl Clark went -into A. co>1f'8rence ,·,ith Q~ia~rrls Gruenther end BrRnn, and lPter they "rere joined by GfmerRl Luces. G'en8rP1 Luc8s had COJ'l1e f'or a lnst TT1jnute '-:ord from Grmer-:;1 Clr>rk before r;oi11g jnto "TA.plGs to board the vessel th11t ri1l tAke him on C'rerrtion 3IIrfGLE . 1 �"As " rr:sult o-f' tho J.rmy--~f:'VY ccnf8r'"3nC'3 ye'1t8rr!ry tc i1'1V:c,t:i.g:c.te misr,rin~P""Tf1Gl1t ci,..,f'l loss o+> 8auirra9'1t nn.rinO' r9herrsr>l of "r' i)iv~"'ion, rrPcticrlly f:11.1 ro:i.nt'1 ;n il_1.J.8Stio'1 ~mr9 r1 ~"'CUSS(➔(1 0 n/ srtic-f.-,ctor;r ,olntion'"' Prrived c>t •rrereby these S8.'."19 errors . ouJrl 1-ie r1in-'mized 0 ,1r-'11p; tr9 orer:>tion. I lir->ve t:'llked with G""nrir·l T,ucPc; tJ.i-'s rintr>, r:dor to 1 js r1 er'1rt1J.re +>or the "3hip, "nd l e is rtis.-.i0d tJ,-,f't evnryt1-1 ~nr; h"s been rlnn9 b-r the •·pvy to fr,c~.litrite the l::i.n,li nP' . GenPrP 1 Truscott has bee"' ~0ver to t 9 Biscr->yrY3 --~th f' sn°ll nurnber of ris :::tn"f . I hn.-re ~n:f'crwid Gennrr,l Luc"''"' tlrt I "'ill <1.rrive rt r1 out oqoo 0'1 D clay at tho iscn.'1'19 ·"or cr-ri.+>ere'1ce yd or to go~ ng ns'10re if tho tr> cticnl situr>tion p9,,.nits . 1 0 1 tt'l'h:i fr ilure o+> tl-i.0 .,ttP c1 0-0 t 1,e /"iStJ~ "'i.v-' don to reacb its obj octive r acrO"S t e Lir~ Riv'"'r t0Hr.rr"' tli8 Sr-ri .Ar11,,,.o,...,.io ,ms ri.11itr:i [1 ½lo"!. J '."'A.'1 +>e8r+'ul th'lt Gr:me:r~1 ·'rT1'8S"\"!Orth hric a "'9ntr1 .,,..93n>•vntio>1 ~s tc t)l() or;sjb-ilities o+> ciuccess o+> bi.f> or9rr-tion. Tt "08'llc to 1e r.n inh"r9rt nrr>ctj ce ,•j th liim to ttPc"k ·lith r1;nirn1m •·orc9s, ··itb the -,...esrlt ti~,t 9 ~3 re 11lserl ··ith 7o,ses, 0111 11 to "1£1 1,,.e :'.t '1.ecessPr~r to se<1d ;n r·erviPr "orcgs 1Rt"1r to do tl-iA c-,9r1e ,ioh. It is thfl 1uestion n+' "si::nrlino-.., ½ov tn r1o £1 "'l""n's ,job". Ie id tie <:!p"lp t},-·'1.,.. i11 +,he ratt,,c'· on ..mmt Gedro, ••·l--,-,re 0n9 or t· o cornp nies Fere se"lt, re:rulserl, anrl a l<>rger "orce sent in to c'o the job. ~ flP.n to TI Cori's, +'0elinF th,.,t ' t vrPs necessPr;r to d;sc1 .J.S" "!~th G'"n,.,...,,.,l i' 0 ye:s -1::,},P. results o+' this +'pilure, for " 7 +,1101 1 :~h t A 1,Sth Affort •-rc11lc Pot e11.+,ir9l· 1 "VA ·n rotect9c• ris lef't f'l['nlc, itci f"i1ure •·oul•' l_9r•ve :it Antirel·r uncovP.rerl r1ur:i. o- his crossi,,g o.o tl·e R"pj do Pi vnr . As e. res11lt o+' ny con+'ereYJ.ce 1 1~ tb K•Jyes, J h;:iv9 r;ent thP- -"ollo d·1p- clirectiV9 to Generrl r·ccr0er;r. 1 "I s0nt !}-"n.er"'l Gr119ntrP.r lw rlPne to see ''cCrnery, ho feels th"t the <>ttn.c 1 ' o-1' +ho Y)th .,.,ivi::don } ~ci little chm1ce of rucce"s on. ncconnt o+' tl--e '19nv r ,,ef',msj ve riosi tion of ti·1e A1:l.8"':r ..-•est o+' trr:i Re...-i_do. t rr iDt" in ti,,,.,t ~ t ·s 0SSA'1tiqJ_ t}v,t, T T•r 1 th..,t rtt'1C +'11lly A:;mect~_nr: }19QV" losses in order to 11.0 lr1 ,, 11 -':,] e trooyis on n:r ~rn'1t Pnr7 c rr.,. roor0 tn .· t, thPre i...,; cle~r-' nn- t},,, •·1ey f0r pr;GLB. The Pttn.c'r -~ S ori . 11 ri, _r "l. ::n orclAr to .c,rici.1~t<"lte th:i nttrclr o+' tre ''\J: ,0 P,iv9r ,, jch 'ill be eP11n b•r 1) 'J II Gorrs rt ')oro 1 cnrs +,l'is rnte H i"' di.rc➔ cterl i:,l,..,t the !"1S Divi cio11 bo ~ ssued ., n--;trur:t:1.0'1S '3 Pollo S: r !!• rro ½rvr:i t,.,o PC\ P.ri.p;Pd8 f'ni,.,:, .., cross~,,.1 0-!' the G'?IrrLIJ'PO Riv,9r to11icrJ,t 0 0/0 1 ;rn-ri1rr:r, in tb'l 1rrne Pren"" t,J-,nir rrs~ul_t o·" tlii:1 r:vor ·-r0 C'''11111.ct9rl ri rht 10/')o ,Tqnurry. ..--,V9-.CY effnrt . ; 11 be, 1"1'"08 to ; ,,, iC' +,c, thPt th;s ·•ill 11e q lrirse-scn1e oro ·sing . ]2. Fold onP brtt;lio<1 0f t'1<=i l . N Bri~"de rPndy on c"ll f'rom the Co 17 nin.n. inn; Gener"l, II Gorrs, to ''K'VP, i.11to tl-e ::>re" ''et •e9n ''a-'vcrr LIRI ~nd •i ver G".,,..igHano ( c,:_,nter of r>reR. GO.>S71?7) tC' -rr0t9ct ti,,,, left of II Corrs. '],is 7,n-':,tnlio·1 1 ✓ill not 1-ie usAr'l to r::-:;s.nult tl 's locriljt•r, but •·•i.11 br:i mow1d thGre tr relj e~_r9 r battalion of the II Gorrs vrhich will heve prcw5 ously occupied the area. �£• Be pr epr r ea to surport by .(>ire the II Corps f' t tPc:lr . netr,ils of this supportine; f'ire to be arrrnw~rl betv"A"1 the Cor1ririnc1 -i11p- GPr10r~1c;, '<')th J)jvision (rJ. 3 . ) rnd /~6 Divi:::io11 ( 13r) . "2 . II Cor:rs hrs hnen ,-:i11.t,l orized to ''moke 01:Jser v'l-<-ion south of the T{iver LTRI in zonn o+> 10 Gorrs . 11 FolJ.o•ri11r' tln ri-ieti:np; ··it:-- G"'nGrrl Lucr>s , Gr-,'1 errl Cl.,rk n,ceivnc1 his Jude;e l\rJvocr>t9 , Colonr:il ' 1ickr:1Yr::-iit . A dert' "'Ant0nce 1"'or t 1"0 Tt...,li"n::: -Pound r,1:lty o.,.. 9SfiO"f'C'9 hrs b,9e11 decrP.ed hy G"'ner'l Al0·,cfl 1Y1 nr, "'1d G·3rter 0 l Clrrk is crPrP,'Gd ·ith r.in. 1dn't -nl.!'.!'1:0 .f'or t:1e e:recutior . Th0 t•'T() :rt~l~pn, nre to go be+>ore a f':i_rinO" sound !"t 1000 tomorrow . T11ero 'ill be no rictu:re-:; ::--nd no WEIT corre.sronc011t~ pre::;9·'1t, b11+, r y11hlic relr -J:,j ons o"""icer vri 11 brief the corresr,ondents concerning tb11 e'recu+ ion . Lnte 111 t,J-,e ...,.r-t0rnoon Gen0rPl IJL..,r 1..- ::>lso co:nferred ,.,.•th Ge,..,nrr1 ''or,qn C0'1.Cern:in17 s~ rtnF 1 rr0hl 0"']', on. Crer,n+.ion <"'FI'.GLE . * * * GA::r"'-qTA-- .JArWAR.Y ?l, 19/J~- - Aln1ost bAfor0 be '7'1S out o+> b8d tris "lorri~ng, Genern l (a.,.r1 rece5 vecl P JFte · ,.,te 7.lj "9nc..., ;~ei ort 'from Colo11el HonPr'' . The ,;: ·ertl er todr.y is C;Oorl , •ritb orily 8 "'ll:ir,ht t,!:lzo nt nbout 10 , 00C' feet, ~no the i•y1 ic· t~cns Pr<'.J t'y,+, the •19pt,]-,nr <ill bP ,~it]:-, tl A Fifth Prrrr:/ nhrm OrerA t70'l. "",JPJGTZ'a i..s lannched ePrlytomorro" nor.,..,~11P". Colonel 1io•rird 1 s rr,Tort 1 sho'l''S th..,t tLe G0r'1[1ns nra d,il1 r0,i11.forc:lnr: c c:n ~n the Cr ssino-Rer-ido (}r,r:i.p-l.in.no "'eeion, nnr'l t js ~s f'l1. -;.,,.c]jc"ti.011. th£'t tl-e GPr"lPns ,<-·.-.e -f'rlE:nr; +>o:r tl is ""ove to dra:v troors "rorr. tl10 ·ireR. ~hPr8 the 'T J"'11,... ~ .-orce ·d 7.1 inv"d8 . 0 '::;hec1{in[l' ovnr 1'.' t rn~ nute rlr'ir ' Gencr<' l s1~r1✓- cori-f'errPC' "nr ~ O"'" trnn >1onr cluT.; '1c- the morn-; 11. c- ·-ith Gnnnr"t. ls (}ruenther f111.cl Brr nn. GrmAr~ 1 :'r nn y•ill he PCCOT"P<'D;T7 n (1-c,nr>rrl GlPr 1 r tn tl1 e ·in•TGL~ hP"crread -~0P1orro , "nd G"'1er"l Gru,.,rither 1ill b<3 rnr."in·nr rt "'·ftl1 Army J'e-vlqu..,,rtnrs . "l,.., I G0nerrrl Cl..,r~ receiverl GenPr''l Gu 7 llnn!'lA, Co,.,"'",..,ri'1P' C1n'1ertil of th'3 '1-ouris . GenerPl Gu"lltur1, ?rriv"!rl. in Jtrly v03tercry , "nrl 1,11 ·ill be ioinin~ G nerPl ,Juin 11 stRff . G0ner,l c1~r'r rl~CCTY'ed ··iti /}011errl Guillruri9 , vrho FPS r· r>cor'lpr>n-i.9(' to +,\-i9 Grmerql 1 9 '/"1n hy Gc:ine-r"l 1lc:il1Cl9r nnd Colonel Sr ltzr1Pn , tl-e emplo~1T1ent o-f' Go1mc; R.lonp- the I'i fth Arrviy fro11t . 0 Follo•·i11'1 the G11jllR' 1 "'1P c,~n.-"r"'·1ce , G"-'ner..,l Cl"rlc r0cejvocl his Iub1ic P."ll[lt1011s f .(>f'icer , Lt . Co • Cl..,,...,,, to obt, in , r9J ort on tr•e nr9s"" cor,.-9rence thrt G';'18rPl ~1il-,on held tl ~s =orn~11:-: ~n th,=i Crsertn. J.-,Jpce . Colonel Cl::irk rero-rt9r t},nt r'ren.er; 1 11 :i lson €;[''!'< t 1'19 corresronr1 P.nts 8. I101'8 or le" '3 detr- ilAd • .t:> • • "T,., b rl.P.Llng on n perP +ion ,,•T '"•-'·' ,qnc, + l' T,[C))'J tbn+, trjs "'lPS a h'ifth ~rPly,., OVl vn ( , fl. (iff\T9lor,,,'3rt o-"' th9 rres'3nt r'l"'t' UT' trn Liri Vr 7 l8y tow1rrl Ro-,,,9 P.'1d th.ot the f'j c.rhtj ng cnmmanrler 0 .. tri ':: S-r:9ci,"l or0r"tion "OUld be C'w1er;, 1 c1,~rk. G9rerr 1 CJ "r 1r '1 l"lo 8rrrovod [' srec~.., 1 C01"JT"U'1"; QU') OY\ CDP.rev on sµ::• GL~ th['.t Hill be re19,'lSecl tor.1orrow at "hPtev9r t 1 ''IA ~.s r1 0cic1 e0 ur,011 '1y G"'neral C1Pr1c. Anothr,r Morn.; 11,,. caller 11:-i.s GoJ . f'-i c 1re 1· r it , •·rJ:-o 00'1-r'i=~rrerl , rj th (},3r.0rP 1 Clur r c~ncer~~ nr: r-:mr:l D'' con-rt ,.,.,,.,rti --1 er ses . Th8 t •ro It" liPn -=-pies mentio11ed yesterdn.·r '7ere e'recut'3d rt 1100 l'01lJ'S th:i~ "1(Tni'1.P,. As Ms lunchPOYJ. ';Uest �General Glor· had r:S j. Gen. La-~ell ! • Rook", G-3 o+> ITeorlqurrt8rs CentrPl 1'.edit9rrR.n3.'1"' Forces (h0re:1,yf't,'3r T'P,ferrerl to r.s rn J\CMF, Gsmorrl r11s011 1 s 1 He'l( qu.,rters 9nd t]:,9 --;ncces::-or to A'i'Fn) • Ge>Y>r-:il Clnrl, c i sc11.'1s9d Yith f}nnor91 11.ooks the or"['niz~tio'1...,l l·iero.rcby E'S jt <'rrlies to TtPly. Gener9l G-rwmther ioi.n8d n-~11._.,r,.,ls 'Jkrk [Pl.rl Roc 1'"s ~-'1 r r i.scussion of orgnnizntionnl ~-,,.o')l8"1S "t th8 l1J_ncheon table. Durj"'f" the d'1.V Lt. Col. Sutho.,...1,-.nd .,,,erle J.rr::t r,innte rlrn2 for the depf'rt·1re nt 05(1C'A to~,orrff' of' the Fifth ~ rm:r C0"1ffi:'1nr1 er rn0 l1j ~ str>ff -f'or th9 re,a,jon of np0rPt·on t·TT,GLE. (}0ner...,l C;l,..r1· 'rill r;o b7 c~r to t}on to'm o+' CPstel ,Tolturno, borird a stor~ i--iort tr"re rnc' 0'() a~rroyj,11,ntely 1,000 V'f'rr's ·r,-,st the TTJOUt}, of' t}ie 'lolt11r'1.o 1-iere re "ill bo,rd the TJ • .-. • ·r!""IV'r rT llo"'t 1?01 ,nnd thAn speed nortli unler" --irec-i,-,1 t'1"r cover to the 'iT-ITJ\Tf'rL"L~ corriP-rv'l. s1,·r, the T"3isca:me. In th""J ln.te ,;1J't ,rnoon th8 G,..,nr,rri 1 receiv8d . ., cnll .('ror" Joe r;. Bro :m, Lefty Gor9z, '""rer1 Corcor;,n, Jrcv Shrr '--9Y ::ind 1, jor "ovotn;v. TrP Pirst four rnu1ed r,..0 t011ri'1!! tJ19 t,rcPter 9n_t9rtr-irdn-; <1oldi9rs. ThA Gr,ner8.l "8.S photogrFnhecl ·jt,h ti is grour w} osP vi--iit ""'PE' rP.nder9cl so~,-31;,hr-t r1 rf'mrt--:c hy t!-·'"e fPct t1'rit 'r. Bro..m's son h,ic-1 bf=Jen k:il --id i11. "ction jn th8 South T rc:fjc, wrirl "r. 'lrovm hrs cont~nuou::,ly devoted !-'in ti""e s_.11ce thrt v0nt +,oh-is rerform::,,·wes "s 9. ,~or~cl:i.nn for m0Vih"'rs of the nrriec' forces. 1, 0 :-:r the enrly eV8'1.iPr -1)18 A.rny Co"'lr-i,.,nder for :'1.S9rt::1on ~n his d"Pry: 11 fj ctr>ted the follow~ng r1 rt.,.,ri<>l :•atters "cc11.pyin,r. my Ptte'1.tion ,ri,...,rr:llv tor<>y ···ere [IS follorlS: t1As ·ws P 1t-iciyiR.t8d, henv•r resistrmce ..,.rs 11co·mtn.-rec1 to th8 '.3'1tr Divisio11 cro·1si11u cf' tl e Rrrido R:'...vor. ~cc1;1.rqto rme!'ly Prtjller'r .t>-'r0 destroyed brirlp;9s PS thwr ·nr9 9r9ctAr'. It 19c,.,r,., nece3sPr;v, 71:ter in the c'ry, tc ··it},r1ra,·r t,i1 e l/,3rd, but tl, 0 lL,lst, north of '3Pn ~1,~010, I"['--:nt,.,iY1.e0 its -rcsitio1;., nn.,1 r,·"'fOJ~ts to r0i11"'orce i+, 1••pr8 t~ tr ,.G r 1 rce t ~s rf't"'rnoon. ThA lL~Jrd v•As to an across ::-c;r"n r-it 1600. T hr>VA tr-i.l1'9d -,it,J-, I eyns prr.1 :rot o'1ly ~resterdr>y but tode:r d:irecteo h':n to be11d e1nry e·"f'ort +.0 ~et tn:•., 1·s ",-,a knl: cle~tro;trers across rromrtly. 0 11 Sorie "('VnJ1~03 118re nrr1o north [''1<'1 south. I look t0 t,i-.,..,t rittr'C 1 " to hold U 1 8 1rd J ;:,nzer G-renN1 i8r J!j_v:ision on thrt +>ront. :'." t'l sn looJr to co1 tinuf'ti.on of.' tl-ie attf'c'· b•r 10 Cor:rs to l107 cl the !-0rm11n Go9ri'1g, 'J9th f''1d 'l/"th Div=.sio'1.s :in pl"C9. It is o1,viou;:: to re rio7 tb,t t e he0,ry 0-.ie111y r0i:"l"orcer1ent o-f' the 1 Gnetn area ,fls c ue to ~~ s :rnp~essio,1 tl:['t t 0 f!ros::,inr; o-"' the Gcir:i ,.,.liFno Rjvnr io1 1ld bo cnrnb 4 riad ·ritl·, 9'1 Pmfhi.1)io11s lrnd:nr:- i"1 stren~h in GPeto Bty. 111 Te hrve no ind:.c" tio,-,,~, !1.S yet, +,r t t 1y, 0 Pernr l,f'V8 cl i ,3cover<;r1 tbem. In ·"?ct, there n~p no 4 nc'icntioriG o"' "1"1'T 1rind thrt rn 1·no·"J~ of our ~v~'TGLE lrndj_l'}P'. T 9Xf8Ct dur;1,s:i; -1~1 8 n.;(;rt 1 '18 will i:u,t SOJTI': ·rord of A. sl·ift in riG c'lis0 1 �rosition tc mnet this attP c1r -Jj th r1ore stren~h . TPl1'ed ,. :ith G- 4 rritr r81s~r<1s is ..,b~ ljty to urrlv the lrn_ ~ effort of the 1i'-ifth A.rViv shnulrl r-i rr,-,ic7 one'"'ly 'lith rP"Tf'l tnke rlri.ce . 0 "I hrve Put}1 orized hi:n to ~:i..-,n to trike truc 1:s +>ror, all units not directly enr-;"' ged :in t11e fo llo"-UT' . TrJlced 'Iith Brann ,,jtJ1 rem'1rc1 s the r>ror.Tess of hj_s,. 1;lnns for :i raricl followup of ·"''1 enemv ,rithr1rR.vrnl Pnr· t},e rossible utilizntion of 7 revburft 1 s 'Tew Ze:=>1'1nd Divisio·1 Fhen we rercb .tho Soprrino ~'rea . 11 Routo /!7 anroers to be out of the qur>st:ion, r>s the "'lnin rur~uit route . Innunr1 ['tiorts jn the rirl"shos anr' tl,e m['ny c11Jvert3 Pnc l:lridr;es in th['t Rre.o, ,·rill ,,.enr:ler it unusn.ble . Ho'·•ever, •··e 1,71.ll use it if possible . I hRve directed the Chief of Stnff , in m;v nbsence on SHINGL"S , to direct corrs to fo110'"l up V1.e P.l1.8T'1;T relent1essl ,r -i_n the 8V9nt of [' nithdrnyml. Discussed vrith r•tt the :'irct comf'!uninue . it clearod by 15th Army Group ,s -"ollovrs: 11 Har• I 1lritisli r11.rl ~rnericrn troops of {}e-ner'"'l Clnrk 1 s ?if'th Army lPnded eRrly t,his r,1orning on tb0 vrest COP st of ItP ly d9ep in -the rear of rresent eneriy "'ront l 4 ne ros:i.tions . ·raw 1 l"lnd -:i;_r -'-'orces c1re :mpnorting the ground troops. 1 1 7 1 The l· nc1ini was coordinf"'ted vrith strong rttricks ½y other n..11its of the ifth Army, :incl,1ding Briti"'h , •--rcmch and ,.,,,,3rfoan , in the LIEI Van,,iy. 'The nm-r.hibious r.ttncJ,. began before da·:m vrith Allied troops o+> the Fift],, Army ~o5_ng ashore fror.1 landi'W crroft nlong a beach front extending severPl mil9s fro '1 north to south . Br 4 ti"'h Corimrmr1os and AViericrn R;:ingars , re pPrtj_cjpntj 1r in tris assault . 1 1 ' The operations in It8.l~r are under the clirection of GAner::>l Alexancer , Cor'lmander o:" tl~e Allied Ce-ritrril 1".editerrrnerin Force (fornerly 15th ,~rriy Grour) . HI will try to rr>0io bf1c1" Ford to relerose H by 1000, rrovidi'1P' s::.tmition is sr>t:i.sfactory in :-WIIJGLE . If no v:ord. j s receiver1 from me , Pnd othr;r indj cations rece;_ved by the Grief of 3taff indicnte th..,t the lrmc1 jng is successful, he will release i_t pt, 1000 . Discussed ·1itr G- 3 tre build-up f'or SHJTGI/~ . rrvr Corns hrrn sent in th,:dr priorities for tu_rn riround of LSTs . Their pl?n Ppnears to be too hePvy ·i_n servi0e troo~ s . Ho,·mver , 7,,,. tre sj_tm tion p,rr its, I "rill adhere to their re1uest, u+, '"'nould conditions aeem criticrl , I ''ill substitutt"! the 179th Comb,.,t Tew~ of the 45th Division for certoin ser vice 1mits . 11 0 * 1 �f .J.. > . ;:.,.. . l:l., \ >' .... ~~ C, ,, " ..... . , u �311 ~ f'<'-°'Ji.s,.{.; ~ Ci SERTA -- JJl'TF~RY ?:1 , 194/+--In the snnll ho 11rs of J"lo rn _, "' land~nP' bep;nn to come in by rar'io . A courl8 of' rAr-rP.s'3ntritive on quoted: t:: ,,,_ At ()1C'5 t}ie ·' "'ollo"1in~ :r,essrige C"J11e in from GeY\eral Luca~ , Con,rrr-,nding VI r:orrs . As ['_ c iriosity , tl e orip;h1[' 1 of th" cr--,wmtional code bet"'een the GenArrils is quoted: 1 1 \ \ I \ I 11 "7eE'.tb,r clei•r , sea calm , little '"'inrl , our presence not discovered . inr.:s in prop-ress . no reports fro.,..., lA."'Jl i ngs yet . 11 11,nd- At 0'310 the -f'ollo T1.'1P' arHJ.tio 1Pl w~ssnge crrme in: 1 1 11 La.11dino-s '1fper,r to he rroc8cd 4 rir-; on schP-duJ.e . First troops hnvr., hit beach . 'To reports fron lf'nrPn("s yet . TrooT'S lrve 5tnrted to lr:.nd o~ yello·v 1,en.ch , red beach rind green beach . n At apnroxi"TJfltel:,r 0S00 the Generr>l left Ii.is co1°mr>nr1 T'OSt ::>nc1 joined G8ner1:l Alex8nder nnd. other stnff of'ficers nt the ralPce a11n w:mt to Castel Volturno -rhere the rest of tre pE>rty hacl n lrP-:>ny embarl-ceo. f'or the ITs . The rr-irty consisted of Gen8rPl GlRrl-c, G'meral A.lexa;1der , n-e,19r} :fouse, GenerPl Lemnitze,,. , Gener::il Brann, GFm"rril Do11ovnn , Lt . Cr;l. Lazqr , T"t . Col. 1nt~9rlnnd , Lt . Col. ells, ~'n ior .Tack-son, GA.rt~in Portunr•to nnr1 Lt . "9erl, USllT. T}1e rPrt-r ,.,,,mt to +,he fT T-loPts JJ')0l , ')16 P'1d ;::>1~, w•1d tb9 +'lotiJ la stnrted north -f'or Anzio nt 0630 just as thAr0 1 ·'AS liP-h_t enoucrh to 899 th9 ·,1ay. r-. ~-rit-"ir9 escort of -f'our flf'nP-s had b0An rrovided by the YII Air Surrort Cor m11nr1 , P11d thP- flotilh ,rps not molested by enemy nir attr,1cks o>-i tr9 w<iy. Of'f Gercio Joint tho e>1g:ine on 0Y\9 0·"" the es cortinp; SpiV'ires ...niler'l, r>nd th.8 T'ilot ntternpt0d to lr,nd on t½e sen . rrn.,c,ortu11r1tely h:i c11J1;e in rt n.11 [P-letle thr>t was sliri:rtl:,r too stee:i:, dove intc tl-e water :md 1-iis rlnn8 irnrri.0di.'.'telv sank . On9 of' the 1T 'RoRt'i 11'1n the otrer three Sritfires soArched tre rir9[', l111t no sii:;n of' the rilot or r.l.'.'''le w:=i.s seen e•,:cept for A. pool of oil . As the Arrw Cori,.,,nnder »roceer1 erl toward ,'\nzio, he received a number of' bullet:!.ns f'rom G9n9rP.l Gruenther, relryinp; to Generr> 1 Cl;:ir1r nessoees sent by General Lucas . i\t 0735 G9ner"l Gruentrer rPdioed to Generril GlPrk, 11 r0 AT Gr.:LS Y,:,~T, G'l'J'J' <;J/1 JnE'I''l'~ , 11 "1h:i.ch , being tr9.nsl11.t0d mes.nt , 11 1-'o tn.n1-cs :,et ::,cro<Js the Rarido but th9 '3ril Div'si_on q,,d 1st Jivision att,,,c1<s 11,...e oini:; ~ ell." At Of-550 Gerr,rp 1 Gruent]-;"'r rr,c1 ioed thqt tre 15th r>11r1 7tr 111.,rintry Ref;i"1ents we:re r lmost on their ol-:l_jectives 11nd trrit tl1 ere wa:, no enemy orrosHion. 0 I I I l Th8 flotilla continuer1 to tre nc-,...tlmest Pnd ,,;t]o11t inc:ic1 e'1.t re~ched the Biscry,-ie 11.t 0900 . There , (}nn9rnl Glark "rent r s,.,ort t.;~e in the nrerotfon_s Room ['nd, ;vas n1er-ised to hear thflt tl·e Jrrl ;"livision 'JPS cor1pletelY ashore, n.nd one Brigrde of' the Br:;ti.sh 1st Divisio11 "fl.S .o.shore on its "-Vm heRches . Tbe RPni:;ers h-"'d successfully lrinded rind U8re occupvino- A'1zio 'fl; ch vms receivinq '"p0r9r ic ~hellfire . Ge11erri 1 Cl/'.lrK tl" ~n left the 'RfacAyn~ on h-i s l T r.nd ~rent ri s f'nr j nshore fl s the derth of m.tor ,··011ld nermit . Lt . } atterson , skirr,9r of' the t?0l , hniled 8n LCI(l) ,•rhicl1 continued OY\ toward ::ihore untj 1 it ri;ro'mded on r b['r . Grm9rr,l c1~r1r then \ hR5 led .ri r;:i.s:=d.11.rr d11"l(!v, tre rrrty trAnsferr8d to t 1 ;_s vehicle and so cr,rne ashore drvshod at trie junction of R9d 2.nd Gr8en Beciches v,here tre 3rd Division hf'd �1Pnr1ed . 'I'he br,rbor Tif'-l.S "ill9d 11 -ith -hirdnf)" o"' <ill 1dnc1 s , wit Li':I ' .3 c'i'='ChRrgina- "'+,111:1dv ·":iles ()n solr'l.ierc •nho ",er e VT'"'r1jn'; "Sl·or3 , t}·.-,i 1~ r-i-"l11s b-=ild "hOV8 tJ19 ,mter . Du};:,·1s pnrl oU ""lr vehicles ·1-re ''"'9in-o- 1 ml o:<>, 1 ed, qrir 9 on r"rnr s rind "'O'll•" directly into tre F ter, !->er"! t ey !'"n f'C'l-o-,,,e, ·t),,.,n1rs to t}.")ir Yl"t9rrroof inn; . ''\1e rie"ch YIPS nnt C' 11f.,.,st<>rl . -~i.r8 netti.na rPd lv"en 1R-ir7 dovrn on P :coqd le'"ld:i.nr :across ·!)1n c;n>y1 rhnss -l_:.o· '":Y' l t,h':l 1rd .,. ivisio'1 CO"'lM"n.d ro---;t . The (}r:ner87 C0T"M-nr1Peren. r j8PT', r:1r', it11 (1':)'1f't''ll T"nn, ,"'"ent '"'bo11.t n riilA ,--'1d 'l fl lf ::inlnnrJ. to •ris-it the 1rr1 r··visio'1. C0"1IO'"tnd ror;t ,~ere]•'") ccnf'9,-r~r 'ith l}r-nerPl Tr•rcott . Genor"7 t!ou"'A, r;.,,nArri.l Do"O'/"'TJ. . r r1 ot)1<>r -trf'-f' o-"fic r.s nrited fer tre GAn.9rri.l on tl"e ·he<>ch . Tiro 1-io.,..1:i-i11"' rn-:c s occurred, onA .iu"t before <>Y)d one dnr-;_ncr tre Gen0rrl ' s vici.t F,hore - 0'1.9 rAruJ.tjnr, ~_n bo,.,,h r1PT'lf'!"l'P tor f'lor,tjng r"l""fl r.nd anoth0r estroyinr P.n LC: . The G,.._,,y,rrl ' s i 0 ep r:-s bit hy a lPrge r,ntj a ;_r~r" ·"t 91-11:i 71 f',,..q rr,ent , ""'o-,,,ti111."tol:r ~,~ +,hout dr mR ;., to 9'1'T0"1e in the Ge11er"' 1 1 s pnrty. At a>Jou-l::. 1130 tre f10ner"l rr:turncd to tl e conu-rnrl shir, Riscr-yne, 'here he rnet GA"!.errl Lucas anri Ad1'"1irrl Lo'TI'Y l'l~r' conf""lrrcd ·7it1,, tiv~m for "or,,,, tiT"le . G<=m9rr,l D0nov<>n le-f't ..,ith 1 T .11?18 011 "'1 1.ndependent :r1.i."'sion, "'1d nt ll.OO G0ner"l Cl11rk arirl GenerPl Ale;:21n0er, ... ~tr tbPir -resr·ecti,re rnrt-ie", left on 1· 0 01 rnd ·216 . 0 0 At lL.07 Gene:;rPl r:1_.,,,.1.-, -f'rom h~s I':' BoRt, r1 isprtch,d tr:e f'ollo"i'Ylg '7essPr;e .,,ic'~ ~ms received ½y G0neral Gr1_1~11trer ['t 1515: 11 3rd Divis:ior r-,11 '1shore on initial obioctivc . OnP hrir,;"de l"'t British .:'ivision wi.th ci.rtillery "nn tPn}:s rsl'ore . Losses ljght . 504th JE>rac' utA In-r~11trv lr-11.r:B11g Pt trR -rort of nzio . Port of' Anzio co'1dition unkn.o"m. ChP'1.nel "Iill be sFept bv 1600 . 'Qeecr O'Ood for LCT onl;,:r. Irior·ities for fol10 1 v-ur: 1 to 11; then, ??; then , ?I+; followed by/_/~ to 54 inclusive . " At 1700 rours the pPrtv renc','3d tr11 r"outh o-r the iTolturno , here they were picked u h:,r tre storm bort3 r-11.r1 t,-,ken ashor0, ,-rr 0 n0e they return9d to the comm,cp1r'1 '""nst y ~11tomobile . Rm orts co---.ti '1U9d to rer cl' G0 11Pral Cl11rv c .. tJ-,e continu0d ~,icc'3ss of' ': 1 P'GL r.:, ½ut the G~mer"l -relt t½at ria::dmum pre?sure '!lust 1 1e e"ertnd ')y t:be Frenc11 Corr..,, II Corns r1 nd hy 10 Corrs ~11 orrler to ~ontnin, insof.nr r>s Y'Ossjble, th0 f'orces -ric'"J onprs-in!'.; tne Fif't"h Armv """- ~ts lo·,,9r "ront .,11,' rer'""jt t½e T"r-rirmm P~'nloitrtion of tre succ0'1s of :'-'I'rGL'E . If +.l1 e r:rw311ire si-ould ~JA relaxed on the CH~sino front 1 A.11d the GPrmP 1s sronld be..--r')J· 1itted to dis9,-,g['ge substr>11tio 1 forces, their orro\ sitio11. to c)p.,..nar.,~ '''onld t'l9CO""e rnucri heavior, ci r-1 the di"fi cult;t o-" cuttini;,; off , / 1rillin("J' or cn.rturi11.n; r-, lR.rge part of the GerM:on ... orces orrosi>1r, tie Fifth Army would he f'T"lP tl7 ~ "lcre." sen . 1 General Clnrk , upon l i c; ret,1.rn, co lled in (}enArR 1 G-ruentl,,er to exnl2 in to him ·-,1,,,t o h"n '""'.le,,, oTJ. th9 '11"01p·ir 1 r>nc1 to ,..et tr.e l.:"test ~,,.,-"orrrtio11 thr>t GP'1.e ral G-rucntl:ler rqrl received . 0 The Army Comr1Rmlcr r1urjn!"J' tl'e evening received ._., copy o+' the follovrinP- cr>ble to Ge110r" ls TH son and Alexander f'rorn t1-\e Co'"'lh,; ned Chiefs of StPff . RH 7779 . e are wr,tcl in~ yo11r hrirrl. b:1.ttles in :r:'ALY nith 1.mc1e-rc;tr'nc1 i'1J:; interest p,d 'li"h you 1 ev0.,,.v success in the c ririnr:; operr>tion (" r-rrrG1-i:~ 11 ) ,,iiicl you ."re undert,,.,Jrjnq; . 11 (},:mernl r.lerk '"'lso r9co-ivAd a cory of TT 71'5? "'ro,,.., Ge11~rnl ·-::isenho· er to Ge 11T'"l Ale~rr>nder '1 ich ren.o ns f'ollo:vs: ttl}oor1 luc 1( to you ,n0 (;VRY. I ~'ill )e wn.tchinrr tho r9y;or-ts "or tJ--,o r,:rePt ~,F:c8"S you dese,rve RY\cl ,rill obtl"in. 11 1 �CAS~RTA--JA~TTJAPY ?3 , 1944--Follo-:ini:; ri11. early rnorni-ri.g conference ·vHh GenCJrPls Gr11rmth0.,... .<J.nd Br2nn , Generr 1 Clar1<: le+'t his cor:mR'10 post to confer rersomlly \ ,Hh his Cor·p:=; Co'1nn.nders nlon1; th0 FFth J·rny front to str0ss to them th.<it I they riust continue strong -rressure "'f;C.i11.st tho 0nemy at nll costs, tr·us engagj_np: n r1rtxirmm number of' ,-ernrin troops nlon~ the rer;ulPr -l"'roYJ.t "'nd rrevent r->ny reinforce'Dent by the Gormrins f'rom the south ag" ir1st the SPI 1 TGLE beachhead . The Gc11.er21 1 s own notes on t}-iese conf'ercnces are rerorted n.t ti-.e end of today ' s cinry. I He ceF1rterl :roJ'1 hj s rnn1·e - ;.;i-:" +'t cub ruffcr['_y - th.0 ro['d in fro::1.t of his comrnr,nd -,~ost :_ r>t 0915 rmd +'low ..,~t1, 1 'Pjor 7.-,,prer to the II Corps comnr>nd rost near } res,:mzano . her0 ho co'1-/'.'errr,d -"ith !'1l.,jor Gen"r~ 1 Keyes cu-,_cern:ing the situr>tion on the II Corps fro 1t . RAtnrnir<:T to tl-1e II Corrs cub field Generfll Clrirk too 1<:: off f"'or VenP+>ro, anc' tl· we conferred with GeYJ.er, 1 Juin . He then flew hr> ck to tho II Corps +'ield 811.d left b·r car -rcr the 1":>th Division co!11l'1rtnd post northeast of 'i.r..;n:=mo . TTe rrirrle the trir "rith Ge'19r"l J<'eyes who jojn9c. hjrn qt the :d.rf'i9ld . Arr-tvi11P- nt tlie l?itr :Jivisfo,, com!'J.:-,nd post Gr>11.ernl Ch'r: ·;ent into crnf'er,,mc8 vith Ge110r.,ls fnl1':er , r; lbur and Keves ccncerning the sitUc..,tion alonn- the 11':,ti,, Di•rision nroYJ.t . Qc-,"lAr"'l Clnrk- had the rlensure of i11.""ormh1r:t ColoriP.1 Hess , ''rtill9r7 O"fj_cer o-f' the '26th Divjsion, th"t his YJ.f1"1e h::,_d been sent to +1-,9 "An,,,te f'o-y, con f'irr,irtion ?S P. '9rignc1ier Gener" 1 . G"}ner-il Clark- then h<rl lune½ Pt the 11Sth Divi..sion mess ~nd c;er,art,-,a Pt l:"'15 f'or the 14th Division CO:rJT'Jf:lnc'l post . Just rs +,he G9n.Arnl 1 s jeer, con:-riining Grm"'rol Key0s Pnd CPpfain Bearrh10od, VP"l nprroAchin,o; the ,j11nction of Firi;hm:i_y #6 and the road cuttin~ o"'f to S8n Pietro on the r· i;ht , t -ro lPrge forwtions of nl<>nes vmre see'1 flfrror>ch inr:; "'roc1 the souther-ist . T.111') cr w of ::>n A.nti-eircrnft P,1m •r::is looking the r-l~ne over l'l'j ➔~h b~noculrrs, "ncl Gen9rr>l C1Pr 1• wi1:1r>r1<:ed thr->t the AA crew didn ' t n':3ed to "orr7 ::i.bout b0nb:' nr; becm1'1e the G9rmr•ns rrobably were concentratinr- their effort'J on +,re 'HJ •n1E beachhead . Just B+>ter turning on thtJ rond to s,-,n I fotro, se,mrA.l 1-,or1b3 lit on a ridge just northwest of tbe tom . The boT1bs 'mre rlrorred by AJ"'ie:ricrm B- 0 t) 1 s, ~11.d Gc'1.ernl Cl::ir1,. -:vas hi ,,.hly in ignant . The bcm1bs lnnded rbout f'. mile from Gr=mer1"'1 Clrr1r 1 c:; jeep , but they sent ur such splFl.tterings of roc'k and cebris trr>t •\ jor Prout , GA'19r<>l Ryder ' s aide, ~,ho "A..s ·1aiting .,,t a cro-srorr'l apr:ro::rim:itely n hr.lf-mile awa:,, ''lf'S rit j_n th"."l J-,11."'ld b;r rock f'rag:cnnts . 0 1 I 1 0 Arrivi11.c; nt the 31.th D5•dsion conir1n.nd po::;t , G·"nerPl Clrork rer1'rked, 11 ·hr-it ' s ) the mn+,ter , Doc , I 1 TYJ entitfod to a 17-gun sr-ilute, "'Pd tho,e bl-.., steri bcmhers only gavs 1"'0 Pbont 8? 0 Gener"l Ryder rerorten tl-i::it th9t r>s th8 sec0nd time tor'lpy thnt Americrn ')ombers hr>d crorped t½ejr lo::in ½e 11~_nc the /1rir;ric"n li.rn:is . The slopes of •~ount Limi:;o hPd been lrmbed enrlier in the norn1np; . Ge'ternl Cl,-,r1<. sici.irl thr>t he vrould take tl1 e mritter ur upon his return to the Fifth Army col"!mnnd post . 1 Genernl Cl'"'rl< t·hen 'vent into conferenc9 nith GenerB 1 Ryr'iP,r nnd Gener" 1 Keyes . Colonel Butler , AssistRnd Divisional Gofll'1,"'11.der , ...as cnlled over , Pnd Ge118rnl ClPr'k i.n+'orTYJ'Jd birri t11at his ni:ime hnrl b0en ~9rit to the Senrte for confj_rriation r> s a 'Rri e::idier Gener::i 1 . G-:i11erril Clnr 1z then c'lrove 'v, cl· to thP- II Corrs ri irfj_r~ld '7:ith GenerF 1 K9yes and tool,,;: off Rt 11+05 ':'or a 1Pnc1 inP, st"l"'ip at Sessr Jlurunca nerir the 10 Corps TAC Hee.rl.·:pwrtArs . GenerRl Clerv.: then rlrove to the ~1ritish Co.,,.ps Ferirlqu"rters Pnrl con"'erred with GenerFl r?cGr9ery. Follo"l . . nf' this con+"erence '"Jith Genornl r'cCreery, GererPl Cl~rv.: orice np;r>in rrot into hi.s cub pl"ne Pnd +'le": br>ck to Fiftr Arny ::end- �qw=trt ers Rt Caserta, errivi_ng at 1505 }·ours . Fpon returning , Go"leral Cl"rk- irnmediFltely took ur wjth Gen'"lrfll House the matter of' the B- ".>,,) 1 s bonbi.np; beMnd our ovm 1~110s ::ind issued instructio!ls to assure that tr.9re rou1d not be f:' r9c1i.rnmce of such P 1:>rientrble incident . i The siturition -<: n the T<'i+'tr. Arr~:r ' s ne- 1 br:'.dgeheod nrea remr ins '3trictly in our fRvor . General Cl.<>rk's troops ,..,.,ve f"'nned out tc '"'~den the beachhead and , r.s yet , the enemy has mride no counter "tt;:ic1, . Air activity is on the incre"se . _The 1,0_ Corps briop;AheacJ F1cross t"be Gnrir:tliano Tliver i,:, secure ., Pltbou~r there fo despernte "'.p'G,},tjng juc;t north of r inturno . The II Corr,s front }s r1ost ACtiV.£_ ··,itl· t1ie 11-errnrns thro-rinr_: ver~rthing theY h...,V8 in nn ef-i'ort to y,revent Pny sizeable cro~s:i.n"' o th9 n_,,,:-ido River . TherP :is ::>lso 0xtenc;jve ?ictJvity ,.,Ion~ th9 French Cfo171sfront . 0 G8110r., 1 Cln,.lr confe,.red in t½e late 11 ft8rnoon vri th Generril Gruenther to in-'.'orm him of' t½e nrranr~eme11.ts thrt h:-ive been !'1Prle for ti--e flttl"'ck nort}, of C:->ssino by the lrd Alr;erinn ::,nd JI.th Aw~rj cnn f'ivido11s . The G8rn,ns along the Cassino line hflve not :ret sro"rn irny indicr->tion thr>t trey intend to ,·,ithdraw sizeoble numbers of' troops because of our 1-ie~chhePrl closer to Rone . Undoubteol~r the cmemy is wa~ting to cou- ter :-ittrcJ,. tJ-,e bddg,=ihe8d ·1hen he h:-as b11:i.lt ur sni'fjcie"lt str<':mrt h to attrcl: with po"'er . I ) As lriis dinner ruPst GenerCJ.l Cln· 1-c h9d Colo11el Trte , his G-4 . It WRS sonevrhat of a celebration , since Colonel Tnte hris ½0en recomr11ended for a Brir,Rdier GenernlcY. The Germrm co"1Yl11mique at 1600 today s~;y's ·1 n rr,rt: 11 In the evening rours of yesterda~r An::i;lo - Ar:iericnn troons lRnded on ½oth sides of t•j nturno on the Tyrrh8nfan coast . ~ountAr missions Pre in rrofI'ess . ThA Luf'tvmffe successfully rcided the c.,,emy lr nr1.j ng f'l ~et ••• 11 The Anc;lo J\.JJericr11. cori'7unique strtes tor"ny, n In ~~he lrr~e scA.l':l aniph5 bious operrtion in '7r'ich British ?nd" Arr.ericrin forces of t½e ,.,ift h Arm? were lnnded south of Romri , a ,mbst::>11.ti::il beochhead WAS seized. This ber>crhePi1 11P'"' ber-m •-;id-:med rind deepened . The thrust S9riously threatens the enemy l ines of communicRtion lecr'j no; south <JTIC e"'st to t e mfJ i.n bPttlo line • •• Arrnricnn troor s l,nve enlrirged their R<irido Riv"'r hridp-,:,}•epr'J. . 1 l 1 GeYJ.ernl Glnr 1 todav c ispr1 tchec' th~ f'ollo 1·1 inrr cri½le to Gener'l.l rr.ccreery. , R'T 751+ . "In view o-" success of' Orer:.,,tio;" "FT""GU::: E' 1-:wlut l-r essentir'l 10 Cor,..,s co"l.tinue attac 1-c tc secure objActjyes p~,w:tcusly r'esi';n, ted . '1:i.11 try to see you this aftnrnoon . Tine later. 11 0 General '::lar1c I s Hre the f'ollowinp: . Nm ·1.ot8s 011. torlny' 3 nctivi+,iPS, n.ncl th8 conferonces. he h;:,d , ~1trough dictoted thA ?/~th . ':'hey refer ririinly to the ;1Jrd : nyg:-;T"11.DfY 1 0 TR.TI - 'te"'tewl"'y, 011 the ?3rd, <>fter h"'vi;i.rr rAtu.,...n0d tl"e night rief'ore "ron Jhzio , ·,· fl9w· b·r cub to t11.e throe corr-s cor:1rnr1 ers E'nrl to the 34th r>nd 36th Divisions -"or conf~rerces . I iPJ:T3ssed ~ro·:1 tb<1 corr~ commP.riders pers011r'·1.l•r tho vitnl 11ec3,sity for their rJrivinP" •r>or11Arcl co11tinuosly in the , ttri.ck · north to ,.,.iVP the enemy no rest :..n 1:.~_s ro'"'sihle ·•r-i·';hr raw",.l rnd -in order thrt the two 8lenonts of t},9 Ti'ifth /\rr:1.y ...,,ir,-ht jo-i.n h9rids rit tbe sarlir-,st rossi'ble mor{)nt. 1 �L\ l from a north,··e,terly r'irection to the ..,sst f'roP" t1 G i,_..; r:;h r;round nortr o"' Srn F,li11 to crr,turFJ tho '3eb,,.,der3 ol:ii8ctive '"Jec;t of tJ->e :ilnpido River . Jui 1 , ril'73-;T> coorer,,t:..ve <''1cl "'-~:X1.0ll8 to do all e crl'l to furtr er the Fif'th Arr v ricture , renlied thr>t he could T1Ph~ r cliv j sioY1.<1l coordint=>ted ,ntt1°cv thG Picrning of tre ?5tl--1, or a h,c1J.:f'-nssed onP c0"'s i '"'tinr; of O'.18 r0gj,.,,ent on t'1e f"!orninP' of tle ':/i,th . Altho11gl-i. speec1. ~s essent-i"l , J .. ,_,..-:; ~''climid to p;:l ve 1-dm the delrl.y, A.nd .,,hrm T r1 erarted told him I would ,..,P_,,.~ rw decj 3ion r>ft er t11.l1-d.ng with the II Corrs CoT"rn'111c'ler pn_rl 11yder of the '3L~th, f'o:c I r1 esir"ld t'y,t the 1r-itt8r divisio11. r.tt~c'< to tbe "est on the bi½b F{round north of Cr- s,ino in conj:mctfon •'Jith t 11e Frencl' 3rd f lo;r,ri.'7.n l'i7i3io 1, attrck on Belvedere . 1 0 "cn•Tf',.-:R...,'rr,B . IJ'.2H G•~:...,..,.., '\L,... yr:•~~;, ' 1ALPR ~ ~m ~'CJSR - I hrd rreviously flo 1-rn to !<'eyes I Hen.c1riu,:,r~-::; t.N 'T!ornino; r'Y1 (li ... cussed this "'ith hirn . I then +>:.ew br c 1 to Xey9s R"l th0'1 ~ ent to c-;ee R:rrhr , vrho could h,c,ve ottr>.c 1crid ' last nj~J.it, but "n orlditio11ril ?!; hours r-111 p·_}v8 him r> better oprortunity to coordinate 11~::i Pttrick •·Jit:1 thA ~rench . ::: thrm rne(e the decision thrt the 34th Divisio11. ronld rttacl, the hir, 1 r:rou11d north of C1<ssino ton' r t , r.ionda._r the ?/1-th , anrl the Fre11ch tivision on its 11.orth to attoc1· t:re ne:':t norning t 0500 . I o.ir9ct0d the t,·:o cor.,..>s commc1 richrs !lnr' 'i i vis ionr 1 co!"lmano.ers co11cerned to ·7or1.r out 211 of' the necessrrr c'etails bot ·een t'rernelves . A.t t 1'is f'O'lI' , 1000 , tM_s has been done . Also directed GeYJ.i=,r9.l Keyes , i':t9r the conference vr:ith Gener, 1 Tel}cer a.t hio 36th Division co11na11d. rost , th.-t :Y,th Division r'1.'> 1.,.e c1'.e r10··1str1:1tions and ·"ei YJ.t crossino;s o·~ th0 "R.ar ido , both ln.st nir;ht and toniD'rt , and support bv fire the r.ttac,. of t're JL~th . ·hilr-, at 'lP1 1:er 1 s T{end1_urrters, h·1-d the co,.,,me,Y'0ers co,,c,:_irn9c p;jve !1"' brio:f' Accounts of thdr unsucce.ssfnl efforts to esta½lish nrl rn11-i ·1tr_i'1 br~c1 isehen.ns OV'Jr t.h9 ~.,pido. In decid:i_np; upon thAt nttack SOY'le tir-e A";o , I '·nR'7 it ·-roulrl be coitlv 1:iut ,ras -:.nipelled to go ahead •,,i. th the E>ttncl• in 0rnAr tri"t :r co11ld draw to tH s front all ro "sible Germw1 rev~rves -iri order to clFiar t1 e -.;n~r for PI rm::: . Thie:: WE'S 8CCorn:;:lisred i.n , rn."8'J'1ificent T"rnner . Somr; b1ooc1 h"c1 to be S!)illed 0"1 °·th9r tho lnnd or tlD "TI".'JGL-C::: -"ront, ;.nd I grortl-r ~referred t 1 1"t ;t he on thn Ra ir:o, ..,here -7e "rere sec rre , rrt!~er thrn <>t ~nzio ..,.:t,h t110 seri ..,t our bncl: . I r,lso directed Ke-res to rom•p-criiv~ tl-ie 3?'.ith Divfrion P.ml nt "n n.n.."opri ,..te t 4 "18 to be rre ~-rireo. to f1ttnc1c across the F.nrido north of 81:m ~--1pel0 ·,hen th9 '3/+th hnd 11ccor1pl:i hed their ""i.ssion o-:' seizi11r; tre Cassino l-i.jgh ""round . ·,e nust ~0t A bricl.n-0hefld. over the R[mirlo i:1 ortier to r"'r--i t ti-,e debouch9ment of our tnnk f'orc'3s i-ri.to t!:-ie Liri V"lley. 1 0 0 0 ~F'r'',\L C0f'r."TT'f:C•'rn,n• :r:'R0;1 'FT 1 GL~ A"?.EA - I <Jm a little r'isturbed ,.,t the lPck of r1 etn5lec1 norcl f'ro'7 Lnces . Co11rnunicrtj_o11s +>ror the '1isc"";me J:-,nv9 been overlo. dRd ,,nd hnd . ~To•• thAt Lucns i~ estr'½li,c:hr-,d. fishc a , ,..e hPVe good coT'1T1unicr-i.ti_ons, and I h<ive sent 1-ii"l th,:; follovrLnp; "'lessp·ro: mr 427. 11 Ioor communic"tion hRs result0d in my 1rno";in[f li+tle of :ronr ::::.iturtion. FleRse ans"mr th9 fo, lo·•rinr, riuesti 0'1S at once . Hor• fElr hflVP. your n,"trols "mrh'3d? fh<it <:ire vour ~ntentio'tS "or imr1odiPte operRtions? 'lhrt is 70'1r est~r,hte of ener1y siti..wtion? }Y'CJs0nt ,,rid rr9dicted unlondi'1r; cn.racity o+> Fort of Anzi.o? Cn.n r;-;"'S unloa0 dryshod et Anzio? Is won.th<)r effectjng nnlord~ng? 11 Luc[\_s r1urt be c1g""ressive . He r11nt ta 9 ...,m,o chrnces . lie nust 1.ic·e the 3rd Division to rush out . 11 1,oon. 0 "E'-Ff'l'{ IT1'1'f.'":"IO' 3 - I still hrivA no rositive -inc"icr,tions of enemy -intentio"ls . Heather is brirl . J hrve no Pir reconnaisnr'1ce. Hence, I do not know the clegree of' his retr0r;rrde movements lr~t ni~ht . I have r:Urect0d PttPcl·s �1 flnd r9cn:rnn.issn1t~e in force in order thr>t 1 0 may 11ot get rwoy 11:itrout o;i.r 1rno"119dp;e . I feel t,-,rt h9 is; ,rreakeninv, the line 4 n +'ront of us i..n order to na.ss troops to nr~et SFJ',TGL.B rmd destroy ~t i.f r:o ~sible . Anoth9r 0 4 hours , r9rhl'rs , rill give me a better ricture of is incications . "!ITH G ~TRt.L ·i;ccR~'EJ.Y, GOG, BRITISH 10 'J0RTS - After cons11ltation with II Corps ;rest0rdn.,, I "'lew "'or n. ccn"'9rence ·1ith Gew,r<'ll ncCreery. Fe was in the r-ror;ress o-" r,R1"inr; rm ,-,_ttack . I vms stprtled ··hen he told me thPt the Sth Division needed a 1"eek 1 s rest . It hlls bee-n borne out V,.,e nnc1 ti,.,,c., f'f::c in tJ,flt the British Co!"lrinnders require more :rest f'or treir troops th1 n are --:;iv9n the P erican units . Ther9 'ig no ti"le -ro:::- restin{s nt this crit:1cfll r9T'iorl in this all - out bnttle . Fe rn1rnd !"le +,0 cbrn~e tre bnundrirr b~~tween II Cor"'s and 1() Corps in r."trolling the Liri and the G,"'rigli£ino arer, . I denied 1--iis request but did autror:i.ze him to mov9 the bulk of the 4iSth Division to thP. soutr, but ;t must be resro'1s-ibl9 +'or the rrotectio'1 of its entire Pren . 11 CrT~~r:;·•rGi<; \ r;.-;;;· 'ltl\1.9 ""'R ~ ':IHT A''ffl "OTlJ\ N, cnr.o'T'":L I3C "T'!I\_ ·r pr--;, LT. COJ;;. crrifer--mcP., th~-,; r1>1.te, ' rith Brrnn, r~orPn, 'imitr, i:Ir-1_ . CoMr1f1'1da11t, ai1d Bo'·ma11 , "":nf'{i.neer, , j th rep;rirds to nirvinr, m·r forir•;:ird corwnanr1 rost to 1 resenzn.no . I hri.ve so much "',ressu.rA fror1 h-1 P'hP.r 1--ienrqun.rters to the re::ir and p= aetting so frir ~rom the b:ittlefield tr.nt I feel it essent:rl to move up . I hrive rli.rected th:,t th9 co!'ll11anr1 ro~t Of'9D in the '.'1.0"r loc.,,tion by l?CO noon on Thursdn.y, t}-,e ')7th . I hrvP- decided to reinforce S]P'11LB to t 8 mRxj'n1L'11 consistent ..,; th its surr ly. I vrill move the e11tire /,.5th Di v2-sion nround tog0ther ·· ith HP.rmon I s Divisio11 , less one cninbat com~Dnd . I 1111.Ve d::i_rected th.-,t the Speci:il Service Force be alerted for imM8dinte "'1ovement . I have rr':lrrred my O"Tn TA'J Headqurrters , consisti11P' of m:rsel"', G-3 , G- ? and a Pev sii=;nn.ls, to be rreprired to "lOVe on ')/,, l101 irs I notice to tbe Anzj O Area . Thnt is Vll0 8re the bnttl9 1·Till be , 11,11d thPt is ·,rhAre I -int,=md to be locPted when our huild- ur in thPt Are;::1 is su..+-fici9nt to take tre on+'ensjw~ . I may ro~s~bly h1::mdle 1fc1rmon as an exploi ti:ri:: +"orce wit}-, ex:trfl :lnfn.ntry, tPr1·s ond trnk destroy9rs under rlirect ,:,ifth l\rri~r corunand , 1·rhile VI Corps '70V9S on its objective to•·mrds Rome . t1 Gr?'F''rl_~NSB Sf'TTf! - }Tqve hrd I"'l. P 0 11 0,.,FTGTAL ' 7TSIIT'CR.S PJ FC'fW~T:lT) !\Rt,~A.S - Bvery rlrice I r,o, I f:ind rw subord'nate cornJnrinders, r,ostlv corp:i , ::ire 1)9-111.,,. both,::rerl ½7 11 brriss h.,ts" fro'7 ArF~ , Air , Fq . AC'F (15t:b l\.rrw Grour) , ·r'1v etc . Trere h"'i.ng no otlv~r bPttle in the i'~di terrane'ln are::i, , r>ll hePr()uPrters , including General 'Tilson I s, Adl"liral C:::unninghArri 1 s , General ·,.,,l,.er 1 s, Gr:m.er.,l flev~rs 1 , Genrir8l AleYa'1cer 1 s 011d rr:Rny le~ser 1 i rhts h-'lve noved into Crs9rta on top of "'IJT henrlrp1::irters . 1 evPr ;)rifore, in th0 istor:r of' ,,,.nrfare, ~ e ::::o !_evL bP-:£!1 comprr11ded b~{ ,o "'L:'ln;y:. It does "'l.e no p-ood •-rhen : stic" to my g,ms A."ld rJ.9I"Pncl th"l.t ""Y 1ear1111rrters be the 'huffer between '7Y cinborr.:: nflte uni ts 7itr resp9ct to tr9s9 v~ 1 · t:i nr-; d i.gni tr-:d.ec; . I hr>ve requ,v~ted that in no case s 0 11lrl they be i,errriittecl to v; sit forwq_rd units in fl desperate battle without "l~v .,uthority. r, 1 11 ROTA'l':rn~r FnR. "": 1·!LISTT~D ''::::'T - I Prn imrr<JssGd ·1it'1 th9 nece"sity of soT'!e r,lan h8inr; ',orl::od 011t l-i:r tre ·rRr r-ep"rt;1~mt h5 c, will -rrovide " rotntio11 f'or more rmli"ted men af't8r r1n.:rrr "'trll1t,hs of comh t bn ck to t}-,9 United Str-ites . I do not 1mow ·vlirt the 'lOlution is , but I dll studv ~ t cnr9-f11lly to sRe j f some plnn ca'1. not be wor 1~od o,1t . 11 11 0 * * \ I �( CM?m.TA--,JAinJA'><.Y '?!., , 19411---Exr;a1.1sion of' the bric1 i:;9head south of Rome continued to 1;0 17ell , but thf"'lre fire inrlicrtfo,,~ thr>t tl-io Germrin is coilin[". hir,s9lf to strike RQ'.ainst General Clark ' s troops 'lho mPde tJ,-,.e 11mrhibious lr>ndinp; . ( · Reports received from VI Corps indicate that t},e Ariericnn and Brjt i sh trooris ~re no7r well inlnnr! and thPt trey Gre co'l.solidPtinp; themselves while the ~up'" lies A.re 1 ng 'orcur:1ht in . The weather torh.y is bi:i.d , with rn in squri 11s )8~ anrl heavy swells thr,t -rreve'l.t unloadinP" orernt;ons excert from li=mdjnp; craft . The seo. j s too rou,sh for tl e rlnkTs to cnrry o'1 treir ~huttk: service, ½etween s'.ore nnc-1 corF;o shins . There is conr-:-jderr- 1,10 r,ir r-ctivity toduy in tho An zio a,..ea . Dtrrin...,. tbe rl~y t·~o iles+.roy0rs ·Terc M.t by r=memy boT'!b9rs , fl.nd rit night a rerort cn.r,o in th8t tr0rc hPs h"len a he:wv aerif'l n.ttacJr .?go.inst shipring rnd thrit t,·,o hos ital srirs hrve 1Jeen Ii.it . Gen8ral t;ru"3ntb1r 'lnd sever,,, eotnf-P of'f'ic'3rs Ptterpted to r;o to tr,e bridgehen.<1 areP 'W } "' bor t this morn:i ng , ~ut they 1'lere +< arced to ·1urn around "nd go ~ bnclr to ·rarles 1-x;crmse of th9 !)9/lv·r S88S . There is rePv,r .co;_p,J,t:hr: n 1_1 "lo11n- the Fifth Army ' s c;r.utlrrn front . The bPttl'3 j s rPrt; culPrly vii:;orous riround San Croce on the Ti'rench CorT'2 sector, rtnrl Generf' 1 ,J lin re-r:orts he::>vy losses "hen the '7tl-:i. .f lger:'c.nn .,.n"':=mtry R0r;iri':nt was rriven o.,..f r~o,mt CnrAlla. .Jlrtillf;r'r ·"i.r0 • r>s '.riole11t in this Prep troughout the dny. Th9 II Corps re ortAd tr"lt 34th ::Ji.vision 1v1 trols ~ronsin,i; the Rr) p-i rlo River received stro11e A1 1torintic 7er>pon rnrl. sn1r ll nrms f'ire . 36th Division pPt:rols also cro 0 sed tre river but •rr=;re piat ·~i th J,en.vy mrc}1 ~ ne ITT.Fl 11.nrl n9be ]_vrerfer +'ire . II Corrs b"'] j m,e +,h,.,t the eneriw is :bolrinP", the P.rnido Riv0r 1~ ne j_n ,, strr-mP"th . , ;J 1,7 er \ r;. ~ ~ 10 Corns reported tJ~r,t enerw rctivity was conf.;nei1. to she 7 linp- of +'orwnrd positio•1s ~n +, 11'3 3~th Division 8Y'e" . 5tSth :Jjvision rntrols "'ent to Cflstel :i'orte and found it strC'nR;l, r held by G0rrrians . 0n the VI Corrs ~ront tJ,e 1st Br~tish n~rntry rivision rnoved to the high. r:;ro11110 so J_tJ:, of the r:010tta 'tivcr , rnd elerirmts of tbe 5C4th :'\.meric"'1 I:--r~chute Tnfantr:, ffl"'ned out as ·"'3r rs LittoriB ,., 1,l re:rorted no confrct . The 179th Infantry ~ep;ime:v1t o.<> the l+5tl1 TJ . , . '1ivision -i_s now , shore at tre b9f1Cl'hend P11d is !"s,e:nbli11n- to ::,o 111to action . F.ner, r ~,..,+,:r0lc; , co·1.si3t;nf; of" ric to '?5 rien in }'p]_f tr..,cks , ['Ccor1p.<tni_ed b•r ;:> or 3 c::el+'- prorelled mms or tr>n'n:; vrere rero,,.ted active 'lrour1r1 th"3 nP.rjy,v~ter of' tre cn'1Pl north of t e Anzio S'3Ctor . The enemy j_s rlso rer.orted to he h"stily dj_gp;in~ 0rnrlPceT19nts . Th0re 1 "ri-=; "cne rrtillery .,.,5 re rnc1 shells dror:red spor<i.dic" lly into Anz.; o . l? ener,y pln.nes "'9re reported drorpinp.: +.roops or sup11 l" PS •iy 1,,...,ro.c1,ut9 to r'.):i_r?orce G,9rmRn e lnnents ; n the bridi:;0reail Pren . fr9nerril Clnrk , "+>tor "rendiYJ.t:1 tJ:,e niorn-l np; lookinp: O''Gr tre situ:-itiovi , hn..d Grn0rnl Pc.oaks PS h.;s l mcheo>1 rn1est . Ve d:tseu:,sed wjth G-=,'18I'fl Rooks once apniri ~1,e ora-..,n_jzation.. of i\",1'1 in Itnl:,r. Gencrnl Cl..,rlr 1:lso r-3ceived a vi.sit +>ror, (Jp::,tain Le,·Jis o+> the n . 1. ~r..,v·•, and he exnressed to him t e deep tl1 an1rs of tbe Fift!, Arriy for tiv~ fi.11e ,y,rn.l surrort g·1 ven to t e forces lrncl;ni:r Pt ti..,e br-i.dgehend . Gf'rtain Lewis is r l)o1 t to rqturn to -!:;l1e rrnHed "t~tes . 1 1 Ge:rern l ClRr1• th n received n visit f'rorn Colonel3 E•vprt Pnd Dnvirl . Both 'Y!en rre S::,ec..: al S,.,rvices O"ficers . Colo 1el ~"A.rt :is P ssc-cirtc,d vdth frrnerri.l nsl)or''le ~n tho d:i.vjsion of troop r1orPle rnd c,ri mtntion. Genernl Clrr1<: di"'cw·sed ,···i.tli Colo11el Ew['.rt t 1'P 1 l9,+, n0tl-1orls o+' 1·9erh1g Aniericrn sr,J_rli9rs ..:nform3d of' the 0 �c::-lobrl situ...,tion ,<1ry'l ''OW th<:v CPn 9 ··,y,-':,i1l,..,d ·dtl~ r1efinite ir'e'"'s crw1cern~np; t1'ose tb"'1f.S +>or ,~iricr th-3 r Pre ,....;glt·h.r; . G0nt:Jrrl C7 ·r'~ 'n9-r Coloriel T>ert from f'orr:t:Jr ;--C"'soci_..,tions ,r11en t. e Fif'tl' Arrriy f;o'7r"'1r<er ' '1 S ~tn.tj_on8d rt t'1e ',r>r Crll9~9 in ·"s:h:in.crton . 1 G8n9t'nl 01f'r1rl s 119xt ~n_ller '7"S ('.-,.'1.-,rE 1 Utili who -i '3 '"'11CC99d.;nr:r G"n"r"l :Car~ no rs the C.o··,..,-,,1r3.Ar of' t'-le lf't --1:,,,_1-' '1.".l • oto 10 ized Group . Th-' s Itr li"n ) f'orc9 -', no..r r"'or;;:"·1.i..zing in ::i reP'~ ''r9ci., rnvjn,; '1-ic-.en +,r- 1 a~n out 0f' tl--i.e line t:'ollm-ring t'1e-Lr rH sastrou"' "-tt,,c1: E gr-:•·1st TTount Lungo 'JOl'F) VPJe "'l;O . GnnerPl Utili •·m.s r.0compan-i0d. b• 1~is c·,:2e"" of 8tr>:' . . . , Colonel Lo,.,.,1rr~j . 'i'l,o '70eting betvreen t½e F-L"th Arny Go~,,rrcJ9r an~ ·"1 c, -n'3vl ItR.lirn G-,•,errl ,·ras l·rgel~r one 1 G"'"'Gr"l Clrr}- tole Generel ctili t½et roynd the It"'lirms 0 -r - ,--,troduction . W01'ld ½e EJ½lc to ta 1re ., "!Ore ective J1f1rt in bringing r-bout the oe"Art of Ger r,r-11;,r. G9ner" 1 'Sue 1cnP 11 , Conriander of" the British 5t11 .:)i vis ion cnlled on GenfJral GlArk to say fare•·rell. He is bei'1g S'lt::Ce8dec1 bv G<:n"rrl G:rerson-Ellis . Gt:Jne~rtl Bncknall is uncle.,..tP l'irt , rinothPr co:rirr.ri11.d . 0 "'e A lr:i.te r'fter11oon cnrfer8rice wris ½alc1 111 t'np Generr1 1 s vs.11. bet,"een Gffrterr--1s Glrrlr, RobPrtson , Gr1nnth,.,r E>nc1 =:renn . T11 e oi'rnussion c ent8red ::,ro11.nd the ~uprbdn~ of troors, r"rticulrrly :in the ne,-rly-"on hridp;ehead rrea. The extent to ,7' icl' th8 ne17 posj+,io11.s c,n be explo~ted r"erends on "lll 7 nten~ncP Hrich must be atte11rled to vrith every d~liR"erice . * CASffiTft - -,JAJTTARY 25 , 191~4--Today Gen°rril Gl11r'' +>J.ew to t},e 1-ie 0 chheP,1 1)y cub , :r~loted by •~::i.jor ';a1 1rer . Tbe Grmer~l •s ovrr Bcco1nt of his rlqy 1 s "ctiv~ties f'ol1ov1s: 11 I TA i AGKC'l nv G-,., Ju L PL~"rrr -;,,. '.:'L .~ ccc" TA1w TT}T 0" A DD :;ri::oY~R TC' VI ,IT THR VI CO;:,.} S - 't!e PFfE'.,..E"ntl,r f'eels PS +,ho1 rrl ro is r11nn~!if:!: thrt "how. ?Jot much : CPn rlo "b0ut it . T)ur; t-- the f'orecast of bnd ... ,e?t}v~r , T _esitn.torl. to go vith him bec,,,use :: W8.S ree.rful t .n.t T coule' not go asl;ore on acco,mt o~ the 0 ea . I, theref'ore, c'1ecid.ed to fly 1-,,r cub, ,·,rich I cJid . It -is 1.11it':l r ;trip, "'hout Pn ho1 ir :1110 fl. h;-,l_f' ' 011t ever t}1e PerliterrPnen.n ur -;:,} '; cor st . Altbougr I hac'l requested air cover , t'"ro11o;r "iO'T~ ,..,i-v:-up in Air CorT s Nlministr0tion, none ..;rs furnished . I lrmcecl about 1C'10 <\.nr1 irnm0di,,,telY corrnr>rrl.ecred ndin/:; tl e 1st Brit-i sh Division . '"et Luers trere . Ant"'r fl.SCertn.ininrr sitwtion , nent to tl 8 rort , 'here I intervie"!ed Ca:rtr.in Turner , 7 ritish 'Ji:iv;-,1 ('f'f'icer in chRrge. Tre rort j"' c snlenc'1;ii asset, .?n,.:i -it, muct bA rrotected J~· more anti- Pircr0+>t . T will e.rr'lnge ti• t . By bulldozi11.s anc' 3CrP.f 1.:; son9 0f tle .jetti.s , ~ LJTS C"n :)e unlo<iclecl sirmltr:>1eo1.wly ::>t t'1e rnte of ~ L ;'T'S every 3 hnurs . T'h-i s requ~re;s r,erf0ct coorr1i nation, n.rd -in a ')4- h)"r reriod 1·1oulr1 give you 64 L::Ts . Surrose •-re cut thr•t in hal:"' -r>or s,.-r8ty 1 s sr 1'e, v-;e still could mPintf'in through th0 port t 11e force of' I+ r"ivisions, whi..ch I conteJ11plri.te '·;uildin~ up to . 1 1 0 1 1 R0turned to VI Corn8 Herrrlriuarters in ·'ettunf' r11.r1 t>-1en ,-ent to tb9 corn~and rost of the 3rd D~vis-ion . ,'3itu"tio1'1 is s.-,,V sf,,ctor7. '3rd D;visioYJ. is odw·l'lc~ ng on C1 "'ternP , ··rhile one Flri,c;::>tle Grour wi ti- t'·1e 1st Pr:. tish ;Ji visior is advrncing 11orth to the junction o+> t:re Anzio ro.c1c1 "Hl~ t},e m9in r··i lroPr1 at q?339 . The 179th Pr.T ·.g_s rsho::.·e ond esseribled . TJron "'lY rstur11, T c'irocted thr-t tbe hnl<>nce \ I �,,-,J of the 1st Armored Division, 1'nown a.s CombAt Comnn.nd A, and "lh1ch js novr with the II Corps, be alerted for a movement j_nto '"JFT'tGLE. I hPve Plso alerted the 180th RCT for sh:,ilar moVGT"ient, r1lso the Specie l Service Force . Th:is, within a '7eek, should give me three infPntr:r r'l:ivisions, one Rrmored division, the Rangers, Jpecial Service Force, 5O1.th I'arnc·hute 11.esiment rnd 509th fprachute ) Bf'lttAlion. I '"Jill thfm strike out and cut the German lines of communicPtions, forc:i.-r1g hiR withr.'ravml out of the CPssino area. ~'hen, I "'ill turn my Pttention to Rome. I propose to move in my advn.nce comrnFJ.nd rost, very srv:1 11, ''lith Brann, Howard and Signals Pnd set ur in a fevr dr;ys . I cen tlnn fly back r;nd forth, or go by lT boat, and direct the rsrincipal operPtions of the Fifth trmy. I probably will hold Harmon I s Division with S0"1e pt,tached :inf'1mtry as e.n exrloiting force directly under army control while VI Corrs goes after its objective . Due to the rapidly deteriorating weP.ther indicrtio'1S in thPt areP, I hristily took off et B?O, rmd in ,m hour ancl tl,irty minutes lPnded on the r,alnce pond. ncr 'JF'7 'lR'';D · fJTH G'~~n::RAL BR!drN - Upon my return cnnferred with BrPnn and called II Corps 5n order to ascertein progress o"" their Crssino attack. 'lhere as tl1e 14th Division has one br>ttPlion acroc:;s tl--e RP-rido, the 3rd AlgeriPn Division (French) to the north has just rhoned in thPt they brve t£>ken Belvedere, w},ich is a great success . "Te T'lny turn the G,"!rrrnn out of his Cr>ssino rosition froT'l the north . * -x- CASERTA--,JANU!>tY 26, 19M~--Gen<Jral Clrrk spent tocl.a:r in A series of conferences and in e.dministrrtive 1 rnrk Pt riis con1m2.nd post. His notes on the dPy 1 s P.ctivities t1re the following: "I attended a neeting this morning '"Tith GenerrJ. ~'ilson , GenerrJ. 1\le"-Crincler, Adriiral CunninghaM, Gener8l EHker ·1nd "lhout ?O to ?5 other officers, r1ostly Bri1 tish. Th8;' have two meetings a cay. :svery subject ciscu.ssed pertBine0 to the Fifth Army, whereas I arn the first Fifth Army officer who hrs ever r,ttended one of these meetjrJJ;S . AppArently nonA of these hearlarn=irters hPve ny other mission in life th::m to :i nterAst theJ11selves in n+'f1:1irs pertaining to Fiftr, Army - ''!hetrer a mrt should be taken in for the Pirfield? 'dhAt its priorities should be? Hh2t should be the build up? '.That sho11l0 be the tacticPl plan? All of ttese r"etn; ls were discussed. r,iy opinions wAre 1=1sked on none of these subjects. I T'lerely record this to sJ-iow how several heH~qurrters h"Ve ,..,,oved in on top of Fifth Army Pnd, having nothj_np; else to do, Pro grP'lU'llly tekin.c; over mrny of :its f'unctj ons . Again I n~peA.t, nevP.r "rere so f'ew corrimi:mderl by so rmny. 0 Aft8r the meetin~ I stPyed +-or PD.othc.r c0nducted by Genernl 'Nilson on tho subject of /1 HlfIL. AppA.rently Generri 1 ':isenrorrer has cl e~idecl thPt P·TTJIL is on in full swing . ::'.: 1.vas shocked to see how All of the British Com.menders '-rere sabotag- I ino: this :r 11:m. None of them are for it, n nd a 11 still feel thr' t it wi 11 not be executed. Hence, p11J.ling of units out of th.ts th.enter is r;o; ng to be ext'.f'em~ly difficult And will nlr•ce me in 1>.n emb1=1rrassing position ''!rile I a.m both conmAndin('j'\ the Fifth Army and pla,nn:inr for Pnother orera.tion. Admiral Cunninrhmn suggested thPt if tvro divisions v1ere used in the PP.SR.ult v:e could solve our trou1iles by hPv:ini- a French And U. '~ . Division from 'forth 0' �Africn used, neither of ··•}'j ch vrou]/l ever have b8e-ri in combat. :;: strongly rrotested , r'le,.,,<1ndinr- t}i:,t the 3rd nnd /+5th nt ler<st be t 1··0 of these to bA used . I foresee p;reri.t r1i"fj c'1ltv in ex~·,,.icati11.~ in t:i ne -"rm'! t1 ::..s tr enter the units •vl ic P.re to he set up . T recom·,enc'len. thnt t'1<=> 85tr Division , ne"' fr0r1 the TJnited Strtes, be trained in 'Torth tfricr. ri.t A:rzew "'nil t11~t the 3rd erd the 45+,h he withr'ra,m , co::'ne11.cj nn; [' xmt the ,..irst rvee',: ~-n ·•,..rch, to the Salerno area here I ··:ill set ur the 1nw1sion TrriininfJ' Ce,,t-,r r,.,,/ conduct nrererrtory traiYlinq; . It is '3SS9Ptirl tJ.i,-,t the 'iav r ..1orlr ~nto this .,.,lP"', r.lthoucrh Admiral Cunn:' n--:harr stro'1p;ly objected to novino; the •r~v1.l AT'1phi1Jious Tr ininC; Center to thPt area . "The II Gorrs P-tti'lc , f'ttn.ck.:in~ tre eRstern fAce of c,-,ssino hPs been held up . T cr>ll.ed KeyRs ;:,nr1 n.s 1 n"'!o. Mm if he con1n. AXPloit t,0 "uccess oc> tre 3rd Al~erj~n I"ivision by "lOVin.G' H. > Tr'"'ODS in behind the1"1 ['nrl att""c 1dnr:; to the • sc-uthwest. Fe is doino; thr't, co.,,.,rn~ncinr; to11~P-rt, "ut t}1e Ptt.c-cr cA.n not ~o 1 e ,.,ust bror, 1 t}·;rouR;r into the C;:,s oPf until tl1e d v o;:'tr:.,.. t0"1orro·r 111orni11P' . r s i.no :1 .ren . 0 ';leath0.r is lrmprffi,w; our unloenin~ in trfl 'r,ttuno bridgehen.d Prea, altl:ough I feel 1Prfectly sR.f'e in tl~? brid.~"he::od ,,i.th tre number of troops in there Pt t 11e nreseY\t -1:,; me . Hflrmon I s +'orce sh011ld be unloprli;,r soon, "nd ti-19 rest o~ the 45t11 Divi :ion, less th·, l8OtJ1 Comb"t '.::' ,Pn, rril'ly <""et ;_n th,re tonorro1 1 niD'rt . r7ith them in tb:irP. , riur hridr,;eh9,1.d ~hould be secure, "r'"1 j_+' the Germrm 1-mild up is not t/")o stro:rio- '"le "'il1 s11cceed in punr~no; out . 11 11 Gener:il ClA.r,. toc":.v 9rt':lrfoined r"'s c1"ssr,,r>te Brip;. Gen . ..0ce rit l1mch . In tr,e p·"'t9r110on r,e receivPd,., c"ll f'ro~11 Ge:rierr-1 Gir,.,ucl, 'me. Cr-t:roux (w o is }1Gre 0·1.., tour of Fre11.cl-i hosritnls) .,,,,.r1 Gener...,l DP.V'nck, G8nerrl Gir,,un 1 n CriP..,.. of StP"f. rrjtr Ge11Arsl GirP.ud, tl,e f',J-r1.-r Comnrnrler discussed r:iuestio11.s o.c:> the French forces i'1 :!°tR.ly rnr' the brhr;ing ~n of oth"r"' . GeY1erPl Girnud srid he vro·1ld "'end tre /,th ('•ountain) Divisfon nt once iP 09n0rnl Cl"'r1 i:isJ.:ed for it but th,.,t the r mules -Por ct1rrvh1p- its e,U~f"'1Ant 170'Jld be [1P1"( to fi"'ld chir:rinP, for - it rould require mo11.ths ..,5 ti, 4~re rresent ::i 'l" il" hl0 cr::i.ft . Grmerri 1 Cl:, rk sd_r1 ho I d be gl<>cl to rave t e Di. v:i.sion r-,~.d v ould st,1r'ly the .,,.,ul8 questj on . I erh"rs the 4th cculd r9ljev3 Rnoth8r c1ivision 11wl use its trqnc;port . G8nernl :,ucas se11.t in the follm•in~ cr>.ble "rit}' rr>gr' rrl to th 0. sj tur tio'1 j n the fort of' 11.nz~o . R'T 39. ff] revriilirif{ •me1tlii=;r , r,en.v;v r« ·n, sleAt, li,:,;rtning ri'"d stro--i.p; .,.; d.s . "TnJ.013.rli"lf, c f' Liberties Pn<l over benches ;~possible . Fo eir rc.iids durino- ni.rht but Anz:i.o J:iprbour «>nlled ½v ho-;t·;19 70'1~ rnnr;c rirtil11;ry. CnrturAd rloc11me11.+, incl icrites ,meny d13fr,nsi V".3 t" tti tune 0'1 +>rent of 1 '3t Di vi:1ion . J:o i=;vir1ence PS vet o" l}err1an couY1ter,:ittacv r>g"inst e['st +'lnnk. Flan to continue n 7P'ressi. ve !'econnn. i ssr>Y1ce "l'lr' loc" 1 attacks to i=;n ln.rge beF cl1hew' . Fire o:ri 1.'T 4,:,2 ·"T"'('r'3ntly r0sulte0 in sin1 "'lC ,:r-j oY• to 1mlo"c f 11c:. T" 1ill rP.:rort e"r ct f 0m,, re ·i lriter . tt 1 General Cl.Pr'\.:: tod;:,y cnbbd Adriiral Lowry, Co~'unn.nder of the Eiphth Amphibious Force, and General House, of the XII Air Support Comriand, expressing },is appre ciation for the fine '>Ufport tb 0 j_r respective forces hP.d given the Fifth Army in thoi.r recent l.ondinf;S at A"'1zio . * * * CA~~?.TA --JANU(IRY ?7 , 19li4--The Army Conimander ' s notes on todey ' s f'ctivities fol - �low: "Flew to 1:'rench ~xrer itionr>ry Corps this morni'1P' in order to encourri ge further atto.c 1rs b;r tl1e 1rd Al1seriAn Divj sion B 1d to chec1r on the coordinetion of thi:it 11ttrick ·1 itr t 1 e 14?nd Coribrit ':'ear'l. 'Jext "ent by air to Presenzano 17hore I went b•r jeep to the '31+ th ri vision 0f '"!h0re I observed the 168th Infantry in its attack acro:·s tre Rnpido River . It seemed to he going vrell. I imrressed upon botb tbe Fr1:mch Pnd the II Corps Co ,rnanc'ers the obsolute necessjty for rill out ePfort, th=•.t I hn.d s}:iot my wod nnr'l this 'ras my last chance to bre:i 1r throuph into the Cassino posit; on anc th'1 t I 1'new the Germans / were equally deter..,::.11.ec'l to 1teep us out. Upon rriy r0turn to my cornm:,nd rost at A.bout 1700 , I tele'Jh0'1ed both ar;A·n to inpress upon trmri the all-out nn.ture of this Ptt- c1< . I thfm nent from trie 34th Dj_vision or to the command rost of tbe B5th Jn-n~n:1try f"cing Cn.ssino . 1 Upon rw return , Gr-meral Alexander asv;:ed to see r10 . He is worried. Pbout \ the slo1 mess of the Pttac1,;: in t 11e north b~r the VI Corps . I "'m too, and 1,ave been ... or flt least 43 hours . Al tliour;li I did 11.ot tell J,irri, I 1movr thnt he has received a rerson, 1 telegre.m from the Iri~,e ri~.nister 'rho , from his rlesk "'t #10 Do.ming Str8et , is going to direct the bettle here in ItPly. The Frime wants an attr-ick , Rol"e f>nd fl vj~tory, not'"rithstanding- tncticf'l or logistical \ reasons to tlio cn'1.trary. !hen I told AleYr11,,er that I ·, s going ur personr'lly torno 7ow and woulc:1 stay up f'or severn 1 0a;rs, he H"-=; coripletely srtisfied for I told him it 1.'TP.s my ideA. to lay on an all-ou+, coor(lj n, tea corffl .'.'lttack support9d by tan1·s . 1 Gen9r'l.1 "'i lson A.sb::id 11n to comri to s9e him. After exrlainjn,;; the situation on both fronts , h~ told rie the rurpose of my vi'"'it "as to c'liscuss rith him ATTTTIL . Tnasnuch rs I am to co•i"'l<inrl tl1 •1t op"'rr>tj on, he -r~nts to deR 1 directlv wit11 rre and tc; P,et m:1 vie''TS . It was a r.ost s11tisf.-,ctory m9eting . I;e asked f'irst when 1 thought I riu,_.t leaV8 this battle in order to devote my full attention to A"lVIL . I rerlied sor~o tine Aro1md ; 1ar ch 15th or perhrrs later . He told me he was anxious for T"\O to remr in '1S lonr; [' s ro:--s; 0le, rJ.iich fits in exactly ,Tith my ic'leas . T tole him J ',anted to speA 1{ frankl7 , tririt the Fifth Army had lPnded rit 'ialerno , ta 1cen 'fanles rt11d h.,ttled its way to tre north tl ro'1r;h re 7 lish terrain ann with hlood,r los, e,; n..11d th..,t it was eY1titled 1mder s my conr1, nd to tA.ko Rome - th,.,t if on Vie 15tJ1 of 1 '~rch J ,,,as battlino; Pt the gn.tes of ~{0""e, under no c; rcm,st'lnces shoul 1 I be r,ulled. out . H~ nssured rne t hat under no cond ·tions would he do no . I f'\lno told hi m t h,.,t if 1mder certB.in conceptions that A'liJIL should become a "fart 1.n the dark" of one division spavmin the ~~erl.iterrn.n0rn ..,ith no intention of lying /:my place, I wanted no part of it . Be nssured "'le U-..,t it ·:vas hj s desire thrt I stay .<J.l''J[ly,; vJit], the Fi.fth Ar-my and never even look Pt A. JIL . ·-;e discussed t},e tr:>ining of the divisions, thPt I ••rould get the 3rd anrl the 45th, th-rit I ·rould get the French battle - trEl ined d.i visions th, t I ·ranted . m=i told me trie only difficulty 'ms thPt Robertson said two divisiorLS co 1ld not be mounted out of T;,ples . I told hiP1 thrt I hesit11tecl to challenge sucli 8 loo;istical ex:rBrt r>s Gener;:il Robertson, but thPt I Wf'S dan.n sure t:1at two could ,,,ithout interferjnu; with the Italian cPnipaii:~n. He expressed a desire to help me get such embers of my staf-1" as T .,,anted , t "t he · oulcl fly here rigcin soo'1 to discuss A'TVIL nith ne and. 11 s sured r1e of 1-ijs complete cooperation in , s sist~ :ng me in my effort. 0 0 1 GenerAl ClArk too.a:, '."ll'ote to Genorn.l Juin , of the French E'Terlitionary Corps ; Gen':!r[:ll Keyes, of the II Corrs; and Genernl PcCreery, 10 Corps, thrin1-::- \ �ing them for the spl8ndid J11anner in wh·:ch thPir c_or s carried out tl'eir role_ in facilitati11g t}19 success-1:ul lD.nclings of' our forces in Ue vicinity of \nzio. The Arm;! Com1"1Rnder has bee'1. disturbed by the too infrequent sitwtion rer,orts coming from 7I Corps rnd for this reason C"'bled Genern.l Luers, RN 53?, askinr; tl:1'."t brief reports be submitted f'reqnentl v, 0 n estirn:ite as to when Cister11r> would be ta1 :on, short stnte·"'lent bis ;rrrregsions nnd '~lans and the rr0o-ress of unloadin1;. Ferso"1al Luc"'.S "ror, Clark. RP 555. "If po.~s1 ble I desire thAt your rl"n involve coordinated r>.ttac"k '·itr use of f'rmor 0'1 Jrnu<>ry ?9th. Hill discuss details to'llorrow. 11 * * * FR~ >i.~rzA 10--JAl'Ul\1:.Y ?q, lq/i/4--Gemr:s.1 !Jlrirlc 1-rs felt +>or some tjTie thnt the force at Anzio is not 1Jr:>i11i:s pushec'l for,"r,1 -rith suffic-i_ent r <;rre"'Si veness and thrit orr-ort, n.;ties to "!a1rr-i JX'Orr'9'3, 11.orthF11rr! ''1j le the (;.9r]'1'1r n troors 'were as y9t disoro;"njzo.d rt t e ti'!"le are beino; lost. ./\ccorr'inn-lr, 1.e rietermi.ned to P'O at 011ce to tl e An.z~ o -"'ront Pnrl urge Generrl Lucas to 1njtiate rggressive action at once . ~~ He arose at 0345 this morning , breakfasted "Tith General Brnnn, Sflville B"l'' h:i s aides rnr1 lAft hJ ca:r- for tl e :rnoutl1 of the Volturno .,here he harl. arr1mp;ed to meet TT Borts /,hOl and , 1')lt;. His cwh r1:rtion by storm boat VTP.s very <ljf"ficult, as tl-te 1•,9.ves 1ere l"-ir;r, Pn' V1e orer.,tcr of hi.s boflt, unf8.mil"i.r,r ,,ith t},e chPnnel at the !"lout of' th9 riv""r, 1 it R bnr anrl shirred a greqt deal of ',2ter, 11etti'1,.,. t e Gonerfll '"'nr1 evr;r ro,9 ,.,-i+, him. -":ventu...,lly, mmver, the ho, t, wm·e r,ic 1red un, P.nd the r<irty -;ot 1mrler 'l!'iV c1t 06::>0, 35 "lirn1te•3 lriter th,nY' t:1ey li.c1.d beer ~chedulc:,cl to 1 enve. Gr-mer/'11 Clerk rncl General T3.,,..2nn, Colonel T-l'01;ar"', Colonel Bo•rrnpn, l;e:rit'1.in Pef rd ··ood qnd i 1r . Gerw'si,) of' Collier's, vrere 011 I"' oc1t (?01, 9nd on}"' 'R011t f?16 were Ge'1er11l '-i'"'Ville, ,,,.. /'JoJ.onel Fhr 1·er, Colo>1n,l Jjblo, CPpt~in Le' ;s, r. Fo rle of CBS, ri1d CPrt"lin L~rpson. The tri , rmt "noothly nntil Pbo 1 1t ,even "1:i lPs c,.outh of An.z:· o, "'hrm the :vr ''"C)l nas cha lJ engect b:r a nij nesweRrer, the A:1 l?C, then r bout ;::, , oc,r yPrcls to t,i-9 north. :St. Irtterson, ,..n17l"k"r.di'1,.,. the '1')('7 , 4 r,nedintel,r Cf"Used r:;reen '"'nr' ello•; -Plrires 2nc1 11 ,i11 on the blin1'er to be f'ircd PS 'mrn:inr: to the mi '1.es nerer trrt tre rrr ror> cM np- 1,o.,ts ·-,r-re Alli8d , hiit tre minesueer,or, supposing tl-ie t· o r'T' Bont-, to be Ggr,,,Pn.,.., boPts, orened f' 4 r0. fl. nu,..,,,ber o.,.. l+O·'l:'1 srAll w10 '5--inch shell -,8r8 firer., Pnd on8 ~hell struc1' thn deckhouse and GYrloded Phont 5 feet f'ror, Grmert:'l Clrrl'. 0 1 I I I All three r,,,,...,l o.,...,..icers on th9 sr.ip vmre hit, al3o tHo n"V'l rrn "s. one n.t the, ,--heel of' thP V8"''3el. T'113~Lr.r:n Rr-mson, 11ho hrd been hit I in the legs, nl"'-;110 1 1,,.1,, no orie 1->ut Ben'3on 1me" j t Pt t½n, tirne, ~ot to h'is feet P,11,n tool.• tl"C) 11-ir:iel o+' the bort . The rm 11 ?01 swuni:r 1.er ,:;tern tow11rr' t},e firin.g vessel n.nd, ~ "ter ;,one el<>y, sped a·vay _,.,rom tl-i8 shir. The IT t?l6, , hich was bring Frrroxim;::it11ly 1 SO :mrrls t'lstern ::tno to the stPrhoPrd of tl--ie '1 201 nlso turned and hegqn to 'T!a1 '8 P.. run for it. .All o.,.. the fire fron tbe vessel that wes shellini:; t. e F':' Bo-'lts ""S directed at the FT 1201. Poth-inq hit the lT ?16, ,vhich n.J.so brd br:ien blinkinP' tlie corrAct recogni- �49 \ rPr,onn"'l F1.bor-1rri t'be J T ''?Ol imn180i~tely p;ot out a fj.,.,;'t r, :i.rl 'rit Pnd rut sul:l:anilimide i:1to th9 munds o" th0 five n' vr 1 "t0n ::1nd triPd to tr 1•C<3 ct.re of t1'18rri. H'our o-f' th0 r11:m "T8rA on dPc ", and they ''mre 1:Jl8ed i_ng T rofusel v. t. lmost h<il+' of the deC1 " WA..3 COV8red 'ith r)lood. or tr'P -"j_VP, r.10'1 'ho 'TP,r8 hit, four were ~Jj_ thi:a 6 f0et o+' '}enernl Clark. ThA -"j_fth mrin "1rs belo v i;.1 tre tiny mess hri 11. he t r10 rT BoRts srcirl to-·mrd r; ve T"ines-·,eerers thrt hFd been se,gn to the soutt· r h"H' an hour be-f'orP Genl'lrPl Clrrk's t" 10 sh-:.r-s i:tot ,·,it},i"1 r~m;"l of the :-,ines\'leeper 1 s PUn. A-"ter "o e Pnxious ro,..,Gnts, dur::i'1f; ·-rrich the IT '90:1.ts 7ere .,l,le to iilent·:"'r tben"elves sat~_sfri.ctori_l•r to tre ninesweep3rs, the J·T 1?01 nulled 11lo110'side the Dritish r,-inesweer9r IT''S Acute. The vessel fortunntel.7 hRd A.. rloctor q1Jor-rd, A."'lrl, ,-,-"ter srrv1p j "f~ culty, t)-,e ·"ive ~101mded -;ere tr"'nsferred in l:ltters f'rom the l ':' "01 to the Acute. It '7rs discovered Pt th:i s t~rne thPt ~nsign Bfmson hi,d hrndled V1e : T Bo"'t desritc 10rious ·shell fra"'r,ent t'ounr1s in his leF;s. ':'he doctor, Pf'ter look::.np; quickly rt -,Jl tho mf'm on the shir, decided tb.t the .,ir'Jt '"lf'n to be ,..,e"'loved "'hould be F.nsign ~ori~lr'l, si.,....ce O11.e o+' 1-ii_"' leg ~rterios h'ld heen "'0V9red. Lt. Jr-l.tter2on, Com1?01, hnd su"f1;red seriou:-> shcill 10unrls in both le~s .?nd "11")!" ncer of the i T so hnd n -"r" r.tm~ed l 80'. '::'he rian do"-rn in th, nie:.;s room hAd been hit in the sto"1ACh rind Also had a fr"ctur"3d n<:Jlvis bone. The oth9r enlisted man h d b,d his lmce cri.p blo·m ,·r:-:i·r rind •".Tns in ITent rain. The skipper of the H. M. S. Acute is Cmdr . Andrew Edward Doran. hile the T1e11 ,-9,.-,e ½ein~ tr, 1ren off the Vi' hOl Pnd moved to the hosr 0 t,l Abo~ra t,h9 H1 B AcutA, Gener:-il Br:-,nn and 0,ri.. -tsin Ber>rcrood tri9r1 to ·erS1wr1e Gonernl C1Pr1" thrit re should "lot :::i.ttempt to 1:'f;f'in go :into Pnzio. Generrl \ Clr>r 1 decl.,,red thnt he hr>d to get in and thr>t )19 "'P s ~oing to tl,1,:e the chPnce, r ev<1n tl--i.011gb the l"-i.nesweeper Plir'ht ~ P'P in shell the two } T Bont"'. After instructinr: +,he Acute 1 s sk:ipper, CornPnder Doran, +:.o get tre men to '3. }osritP1, Gener"'l CJark ordered the t,·10 PT's to head once ag11in for fnz~o . Upon reqcrjn~ th9 aren "here they hfld heen shel1.ed before, th1; fT ; 1?01 agnin sent ur the proper recognition flr>res f'nd ½linked the sri'lle correct letter on its blin1rnr liP"0t . After soroe time tbe ship reco~nized the t -;o Aneric~11 boats and P,rPnted the 1"' /f?Ol nArrnission to cor1e alono;side. 1 \ 1 "hen tbe J T 11?01 '7aS vrithin haili11,,. distance, th~ skipper of the torpedo bo"'t, who hr>d trpnc;ferred roT'l the IT l/:'?16 to the FT 11 ?01 ?s she ''83 lylng alonr;sid e th !'\.cute, :i nforriPd the CaptP i 11 o+> the Ar" l "0 th~ t he hacl fired upon an Arierican 2hip ann thrit he hPd eUb1r 1 rill<.3d or '"ounded five Hn.vy nen. T½.e skipper, shouting t½roug} a negr>phone fro;ri the bririge o-" his s ip, decl"'red thRt 11e bad believed the two vessels 1·1ere Germa11 r: bor-ts, th"'t becPuse of' the slantjn_q rays of the errly Morn:inr; sun, do m which the two IT boPts vere trA.velinrt, he ~;:id bAen unoble to 0-i stinruish any- rAcognit1on sign, ls. •Iencc he had f'ired upo:1 tr ship . Tie r1ec}f'rl'Yl Unt b~ trcmght he · RS doi'1f; his cluty. J\130, be sRiri thet at the ti:18 he h d -r-:.r0d upon t 10 0 sl--i:-c's r r1011vy enemy f'ir rf'id on Anzio ·1as in rro ress, a;-1d he ind:ic~ted tbflt h'3 t 1"ought :rerhnps the bonbing had beAn ti:1"3d to coincide ''lith an attri ck upon hipr•ing h~,r enemy E bor=>ts • 0 0 0 0 .Af'ter snne rrgmnent bPc 1,;: A-nd forth, the IT //'201 to :,ard. A'1zio. Rnd heflded tt4 1 t:( ,, .Tu:-:t RS the Fm ½orts ~ot ~_nto th0 l1rrbor, the third enem:r nir rnid of the l"lorri:l ng strrted, "l."'ld t,l10 TT '1?01 Pncl / 1'21-S cru:i.sed ~rou>1d the }·qrbor 1rhile the enemy unsuccessfullv bonbed shipping. 11.t PlO the FT f'201 ~nil rT /!?16 drff'l up Plone;side shippine; tied "t i'11zio dock, '1.nd Q-9nerr-l ClnrJr nnri. his r"rty debrrked. rrr;:msnortntion ,"'3 rustled ur, flnd Ge'1err 1 Clrirk ···ent im..1119dirtely to the corrnnd ~ �50 post of Generi=tl Lucas . General Clri:'.'k conferr9d with the VI Corps ConnP.nder Pnd ~rged upon him the necessity of .sn ir,1mediate attP ck which he fixed for Sux1dny morning. He pointed out to Gc:merrl Lucas the fPct thPt full ridv2ntage of the landing could only be tAken by bold Pnrl aggres"1ive action,ay,rl thPt delAy now •rould only perr'lit the enemy to build up forces orrosite the Fifth Army amphibious force . 0 Following this conference GenerPl Clr,r1c re-ernbPrkAd rnrl returned to the Volturno mout h, transferrinsi; to storn boat and crir successively Hnd reaching h·is comnHnct post ~,et from sprry anc1 waves v1hich he.d been shipped in the storm boats . Today the N 1 v;cmce party for Gen0rn 1 012 rk I s personal section at the TP c tical GP a.t the new beachhead was embarked . This consisted of Sgt . Don, CpL Shusteric and Cpl. Yermolovich, with the General I s jeep, on MP ;jeep, a second living van and the radio jeep with two operators . S MP 1 s were also taken along as a personal guard for the Gener81. This p8rty accompanied a group of officers and men selected frol'1 each section in the 1-TeadquJJrters necessary to the operPtion of a small Tecticn,l Conmnnd Fost . GenerPl Clrrk plA.ns to divide his time between the regular command po,;t end the be2 chhead comwnd post. At General Clark ' s direction ris conmancJ rost ras moved todriy from the palace gro1Jnds at Caserta to n hillside Just south of Presenzano-., The r,1oving W,9S done in the absence of GenerPl Cl'="rl~ on his trip to Anz:i.o , a,1;d was largely completed by the time he returnecl . I 'T'he following important messRges were received anr1 dispatched today: For Lucas fron Gruenther . RN 2005 . "CIFC, T'!F'.D believes coordination be tween Arm.~r and 1\dmiral 10,n·y not close enough . :sspeciall;f as regerds 2bility to receive shiDping . See Lowry and 8dVise . u From Lucas to Clark. RN 72 . 11 Recent inform<>tion incHc~tes 45th Division enroute . In accordance with my messe,ge 60 , will start corps attack tomorrow . 11 From Lucas to Gruenther . rJRN . "Armored counterettack force from 1st Arrnorecl Division now available . Consists of 2 br.ttali.ons tanks , one bPtt a l ion of 0rtlllery, one battnlion of infrintry. 11 Gener2l Clrrk today received a short note from General VJilson , Comrr;:,nrier-inChief, Allied Force Heec3']unrters , thanking him for his many courtesies during the latter's visit to Fifth Army Headqurrters rnd extending his best wishes for the present campaign. * * * FRBSE 1,TZANO--JA11JUARY 29, l 9M.1---Today General ClArk re!"la ined Pt his command post except for a short trip by jeep to hnve a discussion with GenerPl Welker, Cof'ln°nd.ing the 36th Division , concerning the pror;ress of that oj vision in its rittack. l\.t 1130 General Devers rrrived, conferred 11dth Gener11l Clark Abont t}'ie org1rnization of the ~rnerican forces in the theater Pnd about the rro1sress beiri.c; nr->.de in planning for /\. 'f\iIL rmd OVV:RLOR.D . Throughout the day the General received f'reqmmt r1 essar;es concernin~ the � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President. This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, January 1 - 28, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from January 1-January 28, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1565 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/6b8209d3e75dd83037250ca7ccd8c173.pdf?Expires=1784764800&Signature=i3gBX%7EOMzQXWrZRnRzM1cBi3hbVnl%7EhzelMxwaVLfTF8gmWUGl72BP3lWlEs41F2f4LDrKwnOZnMUS7wRhphExQW23zN0SGvyGuMdueheQRfjpg5lOmamBTNDhBEBiuHGubDUQ-4KMCOKbF8AUyev6StZ61DLCCUxtwSgCJIRZ5tGBKbacBOcAG24btJDH5l4kYRYXXvqwoGBl8YipPs-9E5MBpryFZbm%7ER1O6HJAOcvHS1iLtUWprMQ7ijOPvjIlEClUjhsM4K--GWHgIfTKs1JPW6GiS5y1Q7WnorH3pFPskGOcqEg%7EGYInpWt8PBEf8gpGW9NsXufTwZjD60mjw__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM e471d6d541fdedebba7141f82204a9ce PDF Text Text 50 post of Generi=tl Lucas . General Clri:'.'k conferr9d with the VI Corps ConnP.nder Pnd ~rged upon him the necessity of .sn ir,1mediate attP ck which he fixed for Sux1dny morning. He pointed out to Gc:merrl Lucas the fPct thPt full ridv2ntage of the landing could only be tAken by bold Pnrl aggres"1ive action,ay,rl thPt delAy now •rould only perr'lit the enemy to build up forces orrosite the Fifth Army amphibious force . 0 Following this conference GenerPl Clr,r1c re-ernbPrkAd rnrl returned to the Volturno mout h, transferrinsi; to storn boat and crir successively Hnd reaching h·is comnHnct post ~,et from sprry anc1 waves v1hich he.d been shipped in the storm boats . Today the N 1 v;cmce party for Gen0rn 1 012 rk I s personal section at the TP c tical GP a.t the new beachhead was embarked . This consisted of Sgt . Don, CpL Shusteric and Cpl. Yermolovich, with the General I s jeep, on MP ;jeep, a second living van and the radio jeep with two operators . S MP 1 s were also taken along as a personal guard for the Gener81. This p8rty accompanied a group of officers and men selected frol'1 each section in the 1-TeadquJJrters necessary to the operPtion of a small Tecticn,l Conmnnd Fost . GenerPl Clrrk plA.ns to divide his time between the regular command po,;t end the be2 chhead comwnd post. At General Clark ' s direction ris conmancJ rost ras moved todriy from the palace gro1Jnds at Caserta to n hillside Just south of Presenzano-., The r,1oving W,9S done in the absence of GenerPl Cl'="rl~ on his trip to Anz:i.o , a,1;d was largely completed by the time he returnecl . I 'T'he following important messRges were received anr1 dispatched today: For Lucas fron Gruenther . RN 2005 . "CIFC, T'!F'.D believes coordination be tween Arm.~r and 1\dmiral 10,n·y not close enough . :sspeciall;f as regerds 2bility to receive shiDping . See Lowry and 8dVise . u From Lucas to Clark. RN 72 . 11 Recent inform<>tion incHc~tes 45th Division enroute . In accordance with my messe,ge 60 , will start corps attack tomorrow . 11 From Lucas to Gruenther . rJRN . "Armored counterettack force from 1st Arrnorecl Division now available . Consists of 2 br.ttali.ons tanks , one bPtt a l ion of 0rtlllery, one battnlion of infrintry. 11 Gener2l Clrrk today received a short note from General VJilson , Comrr;:,nrier-inChief, Allied Force Heec3']unrters , thanking him for his many courtesies during the latter's visit to Fifth Army Headqurrters rnd extending his best wishes for the present campaign. * * * FRBSE 1,TZANO--JA11JUARY 29, l 9M.1---Today General ClArk re!"la ined Pt his command post except for a short trip by jeep to hnve a discussion with GenerPl Welker, Cof'ln°nd.ing the 36th Division , concerning the pror;ress of that oj vision in its rittack. l\.t 1130 General Devers rrrived, conferred 11dth Gener11l Clark Abont t}'ie org1rnization of the ~rnerican forces in the theater Pnd about the rro1sress beiri.c; nr->.de in planning for /\. 'f\iIL rmd OVV:RLOR.D . Throughout the day the General received f'reqmmt r1 essar;es concernin~ the �.:) \ situation on the VI Corps -"'ront . In the pf'ternoon Gen0ral Clrr1 r r!et<Jrnineo th~t h':l "0" 1 ld go in the 1'1orninp; b7 plane or y lT bof"t to the Anzi.o front i_n order to 1'1A.ke sure thnt P grePt effort to push +>or,vard "es b0inr: r.arl.e by the VI Corrs . As the lrnding strip a.t Anzio wris reporterl unf1V, j_lrble , tre Gener~l deter,.,.,irv':lc to ~o by fT bort Pnd al9rted the ti"o era t sta•1dj n~ 'ri:r at Ic-;ch:i n. to be rePr'y for a trip the fol l o !'1; nr: day . DurinCl' the n;r-r-t , a st;:,ff o+>:::'icAr froT"l tb, II Corrs brought :in P mcssag8 to Gen8rnl Clnrk thn.t the 1rc" Alrreri i:in Di vision 1° 0. ,,..8., ched P roint cc 1 s~_der P bly in ar1 wince of' tln 14th D"vision on ·:its 18ft And thnt the Algeri"'n Division hrid this uncovP-red its le.,..t flnnk . It '7ould ½e nn.,bl to hold thPt position unless th0 3/_th ::-i:tvision vras rble to "dv•1 nce to r correspoYJ.ding eYte 11t. Thj_s SR."1':l 'n.f'ormr-ition had ril-ren.ry, hour0ver , hAen rn.ssed on to tb.e Arny G-3. 1 0 0 To remove th-i R thrent to t, e left fl1:nk of' tlie 3rd Alrseri, n flivision , the 1/}?nd Roginentn 1 Corr bn t 'l'ean is orrlered to r~ove "'ronnrl the b- ck of the 34th Division , pass ow~r the RP"Y"Jjrlo Bt the French br-id'"ere:=id rmr'I tPke ur 8 rosition to nrotect tl·e left flar 1~ o.,. ➔;he 17rench Pnc" fill ~n the rossjblv d.8n15erous W'P bet ,,.,een the 3rd P lp;8rir>n ;,.-,,c" t}'c, 34th 1 ivisions . BecPuse o:.' the concentration of' t r oops in f ront of Cnsaino , the l4?nd cl'ln be spi.red to alli=ivir,te tl--iis thrert and also give g-.ceater rmnchi.n1r ro,nr 011 tr8 drive towPrd Cairo 1:nd Vaunt Corna . Th9 follovrin½ if"rortant r1 essaP-es vere receivod P11d r'isp1 tched today: I'ersonPl to Clar1-c +>ron Lucas . R.J R5 . 11 All r.vnilrble L..;T 1 s unloPded by lf:~00 . Exrcict othFJr 9rrivP1s .r.-roT'l ·rarles br 0 ?00 . )T'lendid. resiilts i.n nnlo:or'ing are c'ne to nArfect c0orc'H m"tion bet·veen Army :1110 !Ta·ry. I p3rsonn lly con "'erred "'it,h Lowry v0sterdr, , and ·re £'re :!n troro 1g' nccord on R.11 c- 1,ir:;-ing detrils . F~v·1l str--"'+> .<>11d my rerrese11tati.ves nre in .,nti,.,,8.te rJaily contrct n."lcl 10r7, in close hr>rrnony 1111d close coor0ration nt '111 tir1es . 11 Pers0·111.l to L11c1>.s f'ror1 Clnrk . R'' 59ES . 11 lhve t·,m jPers f'nrl nn offjc9r mlic'1 e rnet lt-A'1Arn 1 Dev8rs r, nd Ge11ern 1 F.;,:,ker R nc" t ·ro ot:b =:r offic9rs r> t LCT A.lonps ide ½ertr in port of Anzio m~oo hours Sundriy, 30 J9nu~ry • 11 1 }ersorn~l to ~1""rk -f'rorq Lucas . nr>y . 11 ,;P,rithP.r clenr . Sef"> cr,lm. Lerdjng elements !+5th Divis'i_o~ (le3s 1'7qth Tn-"rintr,) st9rtin°, to debnr1· . Good proi:;ress in unlondh1G buU· carP·o -rrom Lib8rties duri11(1' ni~ht . ::neJ11y 9ir ti-ds !'"lor11iYlg fail8d to dam., n-e Dort . 11 Perso11Al. to Clflrk fron Lucas . R r 05 . 11 In furtr0r0nce of Corns coordinrted attn ck, 30 ,Janunr:r , O"'e aivision nttPc cs tonif~:bt to secure line of Ro"1e - Ci sternr, r11ilroad so ::i.s to n'ain roan fo:r f\9ssnr;e of Armor . ,ituntion bein~ developed on the 11est flPn 1<:: . TTarmon in:ttfotes pctjv., r~cmmnissance tHs rfternooYl north,,est of Gorrocr-ita 8601'30 . /ill rro all m t toF>o,,..rov or nt nnce j f co 1di·~io·'ls warr<Jnt . 11 1 1 fer.sonr,l to ,1cA.s "ro~ Clnrk . 'JR' . 11 Ho,e yo,1 "l0re ::-ble to jni.tirite n.r,gressive r>ct~on by 1st 11nd 1rd Divic:ions rursur-i'"t to my ·'"""'+;ructions esterr'!ny. Reports from ~rou i. 1dicrite li.ttl8 nr no rrlv!lnce . Adv'i,"'0 . "il1 see you tnmorrmr . ~T lr-iter . 11 1 �5J Jer'1onp l f'rori Lucas to Cl rk. -i:p qa . r lease 1~ef Pr my 0 5. 11 HAp;~0sc;iV9 Pction Plre11d initinted . Re f,=n •9nce yo'J.r 577 , ferso'1al f'ron Luc'l.S to ClPrlr . R'T 101. 11 2L, L~T ' s 1J.11loP.'1ed this dnte . I1Tr,v-_r re-rorts these :,re the onl y "hi_ns of' th.is t .mo in the An z i.o aren . Im-r9r2tive tl,rt the remrind.er Li.Sth Div'si~11 2nd oth9r rPrrin~ni'lP' Co"'b t troors be '"or»rrded ,Jithout r1 el.?y . Request th t ou -rush sbjf""' 0 nts -"ro,., 1 Tarln.s RTA" ,·hile ..,e, th'3r ,nd sea cnncl ~t io11.s renPin f'rivorr½le . 11 0 Ge>1rm'< l Four-e , CoT"mrndi.ria the I.II Air Support Co"""'Pnd , clisratched th3 f'ollm" :inr. cPl) 1_e to th.e Cor:..,,,, ndinn; r--"ficer , '7Qth '}roun , P'1d '1ent 0 cor,y to Grm0rPl ClArlr . 11 }leRRe co11.vey to Co~..,11.11.d ~nP" r·"f'_•cer , 9Crth Sf.lnrdron , 1--iis ilots 11"" mechrirics tr e /ln z io ~re., . Srlondid . K0ep ~ac1-i en9n, r rlrn~ sbot rin'-:-n '1f88 's the reirrf'orcerP>1t rnd ridvn.nce o" the mv conc;:r11tu1°ti_ons -f'or r,-,sul ts obtr i.ni:ic1 OV/"3l" shoot~n~ . Fifth Prry. 11 Tod.ay, i'1 rec1ronse to Fl CF1 1,l8 f'ro 111 Lt . Gen . Frrr1 :::ry•, Chief of Jtnff of tre All ied Cent ral ~edit8rrD110A.n ""'orces , G,..,'1'=Jr."1 Clr-rlr c,ent ' 1 long lettAr to Generr,l !\.le:,rnnc'ler in whi.ch 1'8 descri'bec! tlie -nifth ~r,,,,~r C'iturtion 011 n.11 f'roritri , the Pnemy situr>ti.o::i , Fi+'t h ! r ny nlnns "':or tl e f'11ture , rrobrble 3nemy int".mtio'"'3 Pnd his .,..ecomrn9ndnti.ons . * * * r 1P.'31~ T'3ll. ·JO- - TA. TTT!\.P_Y JO , 1 "4l. --~" rly in t}-,e ,..,ornirw , rs soon "S flyi11.r; WPS ,~ossil-le , Ge-nerP 1 Clr>rk sent Lt. Co l. Suth,~rlrnd by cub rl."ne ~o fhd. out tr e st:-te of the sr-,2 flt t',e r 0·1th of the Volt11rno , in or der to decide 'Jhetb3r wa'b:>r1r,,tion T:-os ros S"hle i.'1 stor;;, boPts . Tr•is report beinr; "avorRble , th8 G"'terMl rnr1ioed his t"ro T,,., 1s to '":,..,et hi.m o-F'f tJ,e T"outr o:' th," ri V9r Mt l? o I cloc 1 noon . At 0900 th0r0. :,r { ri ved V!> ior G "1.,:irfll Slo0n , Co"''nnnc'Jar o+> tJ-,9 B8th Division no"T in 'forth Afrjcp , "nd P.ric;,,.,ciier Ger.9r;:,l Kurtz (}-,j_.-, rrtillery cor-~rnr1er) . The Q,9nerql riscu-=-sed t ese o<'fic,-,rs V"'r i o' JS 1 1 nstj 0'13 co'1c8r11~ n.c; t e .>3,'th Dj vision ond jts co"'cH tion "\'T i t rGsr8 ct to e'7lr7oV'"'J.e'1t . At noo tr0 G-fm8rF1 le£'t J-ijs cnrw1."'11d rost '),r cub p l P.11.e ::i11.c" +>J.,= to r. s t Al Volt urno , ,-,}i9re he 1~nd8il. 011 . ., roFd tnct ·ms riGt by ri C"'r n find trilrrm to tl-ie r~V'3r '~i.il.e . ' TerP , r,.9~0rMl Rr"nr , r t. ~ol . Sutr9rl..,nd , r:r . ,er>cb , Sp;t s . 'I'½o'"'9" , Cb...,ney and Tfolden hr>cl "lI'9'lrl.' Mrrivor-1 •inc" ·r0re JT9rr·red to e"bqrl: . ':'he :rnrtv "e-i.t cfo=n to the :ci.ver mouth -in stor·, ho!>ts rncl T~et the I'l' 1 s Rt l "05 . 1 '"'jt},) 0 0 GenAra1 Cl:or1i: "'rriYPd ;-,t ,hzi_o Pt 1515 n.nrl Pt once weYJ.t to th,-, new }'j+'tr l1r,-.,_y 4.dvnnce Co111~ .,y'J rost , '-jc1 h:-id beGn 1ricl out th9 rrececti..n,:,; n-"t9rnoo-i. flnd in the \ 8"'rl~· -rqrt of tod1.·r i.n A. p-i:r9 ,..,,.ove. 7'1 t e rrrc1i.rd, of' t,l--o r...,1PC'3 of Jrince Bo_rP'hese ' ju ,t nortr. of Tett, 1 no . .;-Pn°r 1 r:1r-,-,l• rt 0nce '9''t to vj -;j_t Vt Corrs ·1.nd ti,en the 1st frmorer'l T:ivi.sion . •·e f'onrd t},o orro"'~tio,.., +o tr0 VI Corrs st,~oni:-rer -tl-1 an , '1d hren ~nrJic·ted ,,v ti.,,A re'"'ort~ se11t +,o . :::-osenznnc , ncd r0. f'lso fo'u1_,_ th['t tJ,13 z""•~l'1"'1 1)u-i lrl-up liad not Ci rii. 11i 3},9rl t118 .,..orC8S OTTO' ., r '": the Fi {'tr ArrriY OP the Cn.ssino {'rant ['S 1 .,~ been hope , rs thP ~e~M..., n -"orcos orr0~i"a tl-ie he:ocrhe,.,d rere lrr~el~.r -"rr~ ,..,·~or~ elsff·l--i rn . 0 0 Generrl CJ.n,~', rirnCTt"'C1 C,,hle '!°Cl0 to +,;1 e F'ift JrMV r,~ ,.:tirecVrvr 4:,h.-,t f' ""8(~1. cr 1 of'f'j C P,' ~ nitb '11.l.i'l'.';rJ"'nt nnc1 h0lr be ,e11t +,o ti10 AdV..,'1C'3 ':I 1~y .,..irst "Vr il" le tr'"'.11srort rtion . 0 �53 Cable J1006 +>roT"' Fiftt Ar-m..y CJ to CG, VI Corl s not·i f'i<>c< rll c0,.,c9r110. t'1rt the 16Sth Br'1e Gro,1.r ·ri lJ i:1ov9 to ST"C'rI.I', "''1'1 corie under co,.,,rrv:ind r/' VI C0rrs rrovisjo'1ally 011 the rii17ht 1/2 .,.,Phru~r:r. A s;-1,,,ll "nrnce :r"-rty, ~ncl1 J.di11g the Bri gacle Cor1N1'1d0r, "l.rri ves S":::Hr,.L]~ 1 r~ 31 Jan1 1Pr7. G9nArA l C:!.rirk 1 s o f' Pl. notes -"'nr toda;v "'ollow: go: ' All i_,1+>or:"'~tion ~ncic<>t0c t'-,~t tb, c,ne,..,,., is hivjnf-: ci•rr~c,11ty -ln P'"1senbli.ng forces 0'1 "'ront of' 71 Corrs. r,:;-,·c con'>~ rl0rs it o.o v~ tr 1 ·i m:•ort· nee to t'l 1~e eve,..,, Pdv-=:intr ":9 o"" tl-~ s f~ct by pres1i11r, 011r 11rlw·nce •·dth th9 utmost enerr;;7 so r,s to estroy tl e rmeri;v forcc_;s in c'letPil "'S t"l'\'l rrrive in t e 1).qttlA r-irea nnd to r.reve11.t :r---~n1 "'ro1'"1J. hold:inC' ur our r-tt11C 1'S vrith cor:irer~t:ively ,renk f'orces behinr1 Hl icb he c~n co11ceritrrt9 +>or E' r!'ljor cou'1t9r "'ttack. 1 Tith thn, rosp')ct o"' th8 b::iJ.ance of /1,5 Div . Rrrivi.nP' in the bridg9heaii sbortly, r,:;:nc C()l'nicJ.9rs sorie .,,.isks c::,n 1 trik9'7 [ r-d re s11f"F;ests thrt r.Jll ef'forts srould now be ur.::-ently Je c011centrnted on +'ull seal:: cror--:i1111-l:.ed Pttrc 1rs to cPrture C1..,Tffi'IA a"YJ.d CA~TOL ~Ql-r<; -rollo-red hy A. rpr-id nc'v"nce o'1 V"'LLSTRI. CI'TC nuld liYe G9nerrl Clrirk 1 s PpfrAciA.tion on rres8nt situ~tio11. c,·rc is c~ncArned Pt l"'.C1' o.t> up-to-c'lt:1te in+'or~~tion fron th9 hPttl9 nren esrec~::illy in r9g~r0 to tre stren1th and nrture of tre o-r:rosi.tion "nrt th9 5q,ressio11.s ,,,nr:i rlPns of Cof'1m9nder VI Cor's 'Vithout wrich ~t js dif .. ic 1lt to dfrn,ct and rlr11 o:;erPtions c'1 the r~st of the f'ro11t or to ensm~o the T'1ost ef'fective use of th.e sir f'r,rces PV'.li.lflble to surrort tre oper1.t10:1"' . 1 0 1 11 T 1 1. repliAd ['S +>oJ.10•7s: .,.,,"· f''Y '1'.I'R'.."TG';'H Al'ZIO rECT'I' . En9r•y f'orces ~n the ANZ 7 0 D.reA. Are e1 11-iw·lent to 3-rlus riivi~ior<' ,·,i..th c>bout 175 knvs . Tt is esti'11Atec1 tr"t the enemy c"n incr2~se tris "'crce by r,p:rroxinrtely thr'":e :>ck!itio'1,"'1 cliv·1 sio1.s ry 5 rebruPry. 1st Tn+'r,.:ritr,r :8iv:ision (Dr) 1rd Jn+>R.ntr~r :Division 1 Rc.nr8r 7311.s rlus SC' 0 th J'rcht Bn. 5C'/¥th Ircht ReO'irvmt 1st Armored Division (less CoTT1½nt Co1'11['ncl 170th RCT 11 B") _"b . n.y 1800 bours, 30 ,Tam1r>ry it is expected thrt ½r lnnce of 4 5th Division ,,,~11 1-iflve l0nded . VI Corr<' nill have 1t thnt tiriP the 0quiwi.lent of alr:'O ;t 11- <liv 4 sions, •·rith Pl•rroxiro'ltely ?L1-r, tnnks (150 tCJ.n 1rs ''ith 1st .'\rmored ;)ivision) . Six divisions. ('£' these all but 0118, i:,he 71st Division , CFr.. be ex- �pected to hPVP .§. . o 1"10r9 thn11 t\· o-t i_rrl c; "'tre-1.clh • TI Corns : 3/4-th Division. (short l/-1,00 in°">ntry) ,~th Division (short 3~00 inf',ntry;? regts . 141st bPdly C 1.t ur) Comb:o t Co,..,rriand "B" R11d 143rd 3rd DIA (short lC1CO in-f'pntr:r) ?.rid nn~ (short ?000 ..: nf'r -ritry) 5 Division (short 1700 i11f'nntr7) 1()()0 in-f'"ntry) 56 l1i vision (short 11.00 in:"i'ntry) "3rd Ar 1o'~ed Bri o;ade /1-f) Division (short f. "nd \Je ' Zealrmd Di visio-ri (ACFF Reserve) . ~ • .hile th9re rre flrrroxiy,,ntely ~-1/2 All -i 8d division.s orro;:}ing six e119ni;,r nivisions on +1-,..: s .,.ront , t},e AJ.li9c'I Ji ,,i_sio"ls }irve lo'"'t c011-:;:i.derPble of t 1 r:ir effectivoness beCP.llS8 o+' s'l.ort..., r,es in erso"lne 1 <1 nd b9c1,1 re of th8 long ; 0riocl of c~nti.nuous henv:~ -f'i,-.htj n~ . All inrlicPtio11s ojn.t to tre enerw 1 s .lrn to bold RC- rit "11 costs . The orip;innl est..; •·ate th,.,t h9 ·1culd weah:,11 tr,9 GAR!GLI.A 1-ro-rtAl WO front to meet the a"'lphibious lrnd..; YJP' , to ~-n 9xtent ,·,hic1-, "1r01·ld n0r,..,it t 11e n.c1vnnce o +,re t"i +'th ArrY to t 8 FR(" r•0nP A.re~ , lr 3 not y9t m"'tP''in liz9d . :rrn:rber>d , the -:me1 1w '~as dee~ c P-C1 to li.olrl t1'e G~F ,-GJ ,- no-R '\} Iff .,..ront ( s; v dj vi ,:dons) end rt the sam9 V ··e h.9 l'P- 3 rei nforc9d th9 r JZIO 1:1ren b7 ..,.- thdrn V"' ls ""ron the GAP.IGLIAIJOR } T'" a 11d U:irrhth P.rriy f'ron.ts, nnd 1:Jy r""inforc0-rmts "'rom th9 north . There h"'s bee11 nn 1in1.v0idPble delf-l~T in "'ttrc1d1'1"; the COLLI-L~ZI!\LI +'Aature C"11Sed bunf'p.vorahle we..,th'"'r rrich res,1lted in a dele;r in thA I Corrq build-up . 1 ) , ( VI Gor-ris Pttac1·s 30 ,fanunrv to c,spture 7 1~LL~rn11:-~LBfl ro-"'R/1,,;CATI. The '3rd Tnf"'ntr • Divisi.on ·,iJ.1. centure CI T~RJII/1 anr then r:idvrnce on V 'LL•;TRI. 1'1t Ir1+>r1ntry Div' sion (Br) · ill cnrture birrh ri;ronnc' 301,tJ:-,,rest o-f' GT~·rzA O nncl then ndv..,nce to ALB~~H() . 1st r.,.ored Div:i s..;_on (less Cor1br-t Comro..,nd nBtt) will ,..,.,_ss thrornrn t1'9 1st n.,.r-i_ntry Division a"ter it hrs cnrt,1r9d CAI'EOLT~O-IB r,nd vill c·,:ecute r, fl,,,nking '70V9n9nt to t1,e left of 1st Division r+,tnckino; FR!\.JC''T'J .,.ro11 the ·rest . Reqm'lsts h;:ive b?en ·mbrnitted +'or n.11 "'Vf':: Ir.bl'.) air rA"'ources 1 , �to support this att:,,ck . The "'rench Bxpedi tionrr;r Corps, 168th RCT and 142nrl RCT Pt tacked early tod8y (?9 Januflry) to cnpture tJ1e high ground north of CASSINO . fresent inclicritions 2.re thr,t the att1rnk is encountering strong resistAnce . 10 Cor:rs attac1r is in progress to extF>nd its bridgehead over tl~e lower GIIRIGLIAT'JO River and to advance north in the direction t,TJS0 1nA - .S. GIORGIA . Combat CoVir and 11 B11 is in II Corps reserve 8VAilr1 hle to cross the R/IIIDO River RS soon as the enemy position at CASSIT1TO is outf'lanked . 0 17 . C01'JCLTTSI01JS. ,2.. Although a fully coordinPted Att8ck, employimr all PVail2ble armor, and all other means, will be lrnrnched on Janur-1.ry 30th b~T the VI Corps, the strength of the enerw force in the COLLI-LAZIALI B.re11 n,-,y be such thet rrogress will 'be slow . AnticipPting the Prrival of a British 13rirsRde Group in Italy, · it is planned to re:l.nforce the 1st InfAntry Di vision (Br) ni th one British Brigade Group from the 10 Corps . If practicrible logisticP lly , one RCT (US) will also be taken -"'rom the II Corps for use as VI Corps reserve . The nrrival of these groups in the 1-:iridgehe;:id will bring the VI Corps to the maximum strength th2t can be maintained . ]2 . If the enemy is able to bring j n suffj_cient reinforcenents to rre verit the VI Corps from securing its objective, it 7il1 p:rob,::;bly be necessary to assum8 the r'efensive in the Ai,TZIO area until fl hrei:fr-trrough c:cin be effected on the GAR.:"CrLil\.FO-F~/\J IDO front . A rl.efensive line of r>ction would be indicated unless means are found to T'laintain r> lRrger force in the A~;zro area . 1 £ · The attack tc secure tbe J1igh ground north of Cl\<'.:'.'3INO njll rrobPbly req1 lire all availab19 -"'orces in the II Corrs and French Corps, with the exception of Corih"lt Connand "Bn Pnd weak elenents of the 36th Division . There •-rill be no sni table unit remrdning for furt:ber sustP ined ef'fort "Jest o.c, the RAI IDO River unless the ~nd new Zealand Division is usec1 for this :rur:rose . £1. If the ?nd 'Tew Zealand Division is used PS indicated e,boV8 H is estinnted tlint r•r1ditional troops 11:ill be needed for e:x:rloitation in the LIRI Valley and to gain contPct with the VI Corrs . ~ - The 88th In-0 antry Division "rill not be ready for conbr,t rrior to Marer, 1 , lGLi,L; • .§1 • It is r,:,conmended that the followinp; pdditional troors be rnPde able to the Commnnding General, Fif'th Arrriy , iMr,ediBtel;r: 0 vriil- (1) One British Division ·"rorn Jighth Army. 0 " rrenc h t · · · . ne ' ;1v1s1on (3) One British Brigade Group to rerlace the group to be taken fron the 10 Corps . 1 ,-., \ ?... ) ]2 . It is recomnended thPt the Bighth Army lPunch as strong an :ottAck PS �roris~ bJ.8 nt t ,3 '3r>rliest rossible clP.te in ord8r to hold trie mrizi,~um on that +'ront . 1 en8 □Y +>orce "I l8+'t +'or the Rome fro,1t wjthnut, contecti11r; Gs110r~l t.levp,1d8r i,ut J-,r,ve juc::t rFJceived word f'rom Gruenth0r to t11e effect t11...,t Alexander is tr,ri11i:i; bis best to conirl:v "it}, all o+' rw r "''1uests . 1 "I c,:ir,9 1-)•r FT bor-it to Anzio tocln7. '-1°F.d horecl to f'l;r in my C- L~7 , but due to short rrnT'TaV 011 nevr Pirfield , G8 1errils ··01re :.:inrl CP11non pc'vised "P'Pin"'t it . Tio·'"'e to bring the phne ln Tucsdr>y in order to fly br>ck. The trip here to<"ay ,ras uneventful , in P,TePt contr:ist to our hectic trip t"m 0 r.ys nl"f'o . Incide11ta1 ly, two o+> th0 five 1 1}'0 'ere \101mcled. on th· t trir <'lied of wounns . I 2!"1 cor1m1.1nic~ti nr; '1/ll'ith~ tl1A A.....,9ricr111 •·.rr;-.V"r , P-j~1i11P, ttlen the fncts in the cn..se ~.s I SPTIT theri, and StRtinR' +'ror /l lr-i:vr~r-in 1 ~ point o.C• V"erJ thrt it .ris rs '"'lagr:=>nt PD error of iu,lgrnent on th8 pirt o"' n commPncler P s I have evr-ir seen. 1 "I left th8 s0u-L}v,r:r1 frrmt i'1 " eotnte of ~ ndec' sion . It i '3 lilr0 t"o ',oxers in thA r:inr-, ½0th qbot1t to collRrse . I hrivo c01mnit,ted my lrst res9rve, r.11d I Pm s1rre tre Bocl~e hPs don-3 the srrae . I P7 o-rentlv rl 1.s1:1rroint od in Gr,nernJ Keyes ' ef'fort to coord:i.nato the ntt nck of t he 142nd C01 h.,t Ter-T11 vrith thr,t of the 3rd P.l,,.~r~"n Dhrjc;ion . For four c'ry"' no1'T, V·is rttnck ½Rs been neleved . The :'."rench ,.,re criticrl o-" the -initiritive o+' tl-ie l4?nd Co"1b'"'t TeP'1 and of the 34th Divi3ion on its sc,uth . So am I hPd intonclP.c to r9in:force success , rl"'ther th1m fn.ilure <J.nd rir, r-1 4 sarroi11ted thrit r, •1ore coord:inl."'ted Fr;:,nco-1',.r1ericr,n e "fort could not "'.fl'Te tn. 1rnn rl0ce . I vm.s rpd.te h11rsh '7 7 tb Keyes todriy P11d hope th8t H 1rill rrod11ee th8 res•ilts tl-i.Pt the Pttricl,;: "'8S rusb0d ho''le v,itb vigor toc!P..y. nr have b8en cl 4 sri-rpojnter! for several days b7 the lrc 1,;: of Pggressiveness on the rert o+' the VI Carr's, 2.lthouP"h it wo11l' h"vo >y,en VIT0"1? , 4 n .,...y opinion, .to attack to cP..r.ture 0 1 fi.nal objective oJ'l this +'ront . :::l8CO"l'1"' 1 "c'r-nce in force J.r ..,j-1:,}, tanh; slould 1-irve bee11 r:ore rio;gressivA to crrture GI ·rri,;R :Jl , nr G'\'}(LFO'~. ~l.epe::-itedly I hn.vo told Jue.rs to rush v~i:;;orously to g9t those locrl objectives . Ye hns 11ot i.11"'-lsted uron thic; rrith the Divisi.o·ri Corr-iqnflers . TTi,0 11 my arrival here -l:,oc'l"'Y, I --1As oisrp} ointed to "'~11rl th<>t nbnnt J:-,ql f o-"' our :1vribble errior o+' the lot !trJ"lored D·ivis 4 on 1 '.ld b0en cori!"·tter1 to the rrotection of the 1st Briti3h Di vj sion I s left flrn 1' . I 'I-Jone to e'·tric0te these coEnj tments in order to launch ::i. "'ull-out rrmor8rl. "'ttnck to th8 northuest f'rom CPrnpoleone to"1orrow. I v!n.s likewise distrec;sod to +'ind tb,t th8 '3rd T'ivision h':d led with tr e R"n:::;er force in jts ::ittrc1' on CI ;rn-:;n•rA . Thi, -v :=is a c"efinite error in ,jur·P'JY"ent , f0r t'he '!:?t:ngers do not hrve tre surrort '"'8"]"0"18 tr ov~rcn'"'lr; tJ--e resiGtPnC8 .;nnicrtec'!. Tlie fq_J_J_ncy of' t11i..3 co:--w•itrn,'3nt ),,:is been horne out by -1:,be 1Pc 1c of results toc1oy. I hP.Ve been ht>rsh vdth Lucns torla;", rruch to ny rei:;ret, 1---,1t in ?'1 e+'f'ort to energize him to grenter effort . 1 11 I r,_ri wr,tchinv the 1 or-;.;_<"Jtic"' l huild-ur, clo ely, 1ith thA bore tr."t r;ood •:e,-,tb,r na:r -n,,r:,~_t U'> to l"l.7 in rm oxtro stor0 o" surrlies . If I cn.n gr;t "her>d ·11t}, t•18 H"'l;ted sMprino- 11vaibble to rr.e, ·1 hor8 to bring 4 n rm f-lr"ditionPl 2t,..H:i'"P' Poree +'or .,..,eriod of ton d::1v•,, in ord0r to obtr in rlecisive results. At t}e er1r1 o+' thrit V"'lc, I cou1-d rryove it b,c,,. to +,'-Jo, otrAr front. It <>11 dep1=mds on 0 1 rr r-i."bility to ciuc;troin it v-},~le 1, 0 re . It rouc-;t be unr'erstood thrt tho port cr11acit7 h3r8 1-i_.os a def;nite cejlinP;, end ·e crn ""rintn.in 0'11,r 'lT'rrovir,,,tely "'our divis".ons . P-nv cxtn1 I im"ort for a sn{3ci~1 :,ission rmst bA wdntPinr"Jd out of surrlus store;d up dur~nr; p="riods 0 ➔1 good wer:tl:v"r. 11 a �FREs,-;,•r7,AIJO-- J:'I eITJ~'llY 31 , 1 g4L,---r:-,rly this morn-i ni:r Gc"1err J. Clrrl· .. e'lt to the 3rd Divi ion er, n):-,fo}1 is locrt8d "t Bor~o 1 "ontello on tre ror.d f'rom ·rettuno to ';isternr>. . Her8 he t8l1 red ,·fith GPn9r':l mru"'cott , Genernl fawns , Gr,n~r-il T~:--P'les :CJ,"').(1 Colo-1. 1 Dnrb ~. }fe :'.:Ol'"J.(1., to his ('lj stre'-'r,, thr>t t 10 b11ttA lions of DrrJ.:i;· 1 8 Rrngers ·:rl·ich hrrl. n+,tf'l.cl.;:ed Ci -,tern:-- vesterd:,,.y mor'1.i np; lirid been cut off an~. rnu"lt be crmsidered 8S entirely lost . Tb.e 1rd Division rerort'3cl throt it 1·ms rl()eting heav r res·:str>nce, not merely 3cntt0r~nl1' or:nosi_t~o11 . Gr·1.0r"l Clr-r1, then went to the Feadriuarters 1st .A,,.P'-0•'ed Di ric:ion 71--t-,re kl net Ge'1"'rr 1'1 Jinrrion rnd I enney. Gen'"r:il J 1cns "llso C".me to tJ, is rnreting . G0·1."r,"l I',--rron wrs rl,out to lrunch PD attPck ton11rd Str7.ione di Cai-oroleorn~ . f.f'tpr Ge'1.9rnls H"r~on ann J enn9y hf'd 11'1-ree0 betw e""1_ theriselves 0"1 certPin 1.uestio·,1S rl.eelinr:; with Generr>l µ,.,rf'on 1 s re.ssn.P"e thrru':h the l'.lri tis!l l st ,·Yvis ion, t]~':l col1.f'ert=mc"' enr1ec'l and Gen9rc- 1 Cl;:,r 1 rGt1rrn°d to >1is Corrmnnr'l Foc-t . • 0 1 0 I 1 1 1 0 Lnter in Vie r,+'ternoon G0n9rPl Clrir 1:: le'1rnnrl thrt Gen~rrl Prr~·on ½Ad ""et heavy oproc;ition ,:,11cl m['.ffT "'1nns . I'is effort wr> s U'1.S 1cc9ssful, Rncl i,., Pd withdra:rm. 1 I I "T½e situ... tion \-ii;rn ~"' -U+'fjcult . Th9 9'1.emy l'1 rolrP·'1_q bis rrP.S8'1.t f'ro:it i.n co::::rtnct n~t 11 our troo s ·":ith tre /,th Pirborne Divisi.o,... , the 1r~1 .:)ivi::;ion re~nforced r,-ir] ,. "th tre rer""rn f;.oerin:" D:ivi '4on . ':'r'1.1rs nrA A1cmint9red on all front"' . heprcl. , +'or t;e f'irst ti..,e tr~c; ,-orniyr, thrt 3rd J:iV'J..sion hr>rl em:ilo;ired -'::.wo Ranger bn.J..,talions --: n t1~0"r 2ttr,cl' r.i_.-1--,t before 7.nst on Ci-.ter'1.c . Roth o:-~ tl ese bn.ttalio:11s 'T8re "nn-:.hilated . I thin1' thP.ir pL.<>nninr; wrs frulty, altho11r,J-, Luc;cis , tru::;cott and f1r,r1Jy e.11 e~Tressf')d their op~nions t o ne thAt the plans ',.'er0 •1ell thou½ht out. To enploy li.<;ht forces in such an rttPck , in r,y orinfon , was 1msound . 3rd DiviGion attacked Ciatrirnn tJ,is ..,+'ternoon ' ithout Rir ::mp,..ort , rl.11e to brd v1en.thr:ir (Ps a1Jeged by tr·e Air Cor s) . !eather vms ,ntirely -~-vorahlo h9r9, r>nd :'.n e ,.,.,ess"W' .,..rom Gru9ntr.9r to ·e , he rerortecl m11ther cle .... r ri.t ot1·1;Jr end . f..t 190( toni,..,.it Tru,cott rnrorti'ld to ,.,.,e tl. . Pt the si.brt:i.o'1. '7f'S '"tfo':y ancl progr0ss ,...o,..t cUf'ficult PP;.' i 11,..t heavy r0sist<'nce . He told r,r:; ti,-' G morn~ '1."' t-:,...,.,,t th., +'::_O'ht-i nr: tl'e 3r :;-li vi"lion h"c1 n, 1countered ·,,,,s the -r:iost dj: .,..ic·1lt it 't d e:x:1."'91~ienced d1 1rins the rr9s,=mt wer . For tre 1rd Division to maJ·e th-is p('lr~-i ssi on ~ s i11.r'~ crtive o+> tlie rlet9rl'1in, :.ion o" the enem-r to hold . 0 1 0 Due to +.he lf't9n.8S'3 of tl10 dPte of' rttnc 1 ri]l el8rrtAl'ltS 0~ t: e 1st A.rr ored -, [' 1rl the f'n ct t',r t ·\l1ey G"1Cl"Ul1.f:.Arcc i.ne 3 in th0 I",rir o+' t ·. . ri 1st Br·• tic· h f"'v·ision, their efforts tn burst fr ::--th Pnd hrrfass the n,11.eny cid ·-iot reP.ch "'irst 0 Dj vi '3 ~ O"'.. 1::>a 3 9 • I a.ttcnrl,,rl a co11fer9rce "bcut noon i>.t 1st Ar,.,,ored D:lvision, ··,here :,ucas discuc;sed th9 situ."'tio"1 •ritl--i Ten:n--:Jy and ;·ar" en. I w.,,s 'orri"c' ever t o. enerv hu~ ld-up 011 0 1 1.r "8St "'l:i.n1• :inr1 tre odge od½9 s~tu"ti.ori in the VI Cor-::.'s on tl 5 s front . 3;;t}i ~n()'incors , rf[1r, on 1 s ~n.c>p,,rtr:~ rYJ.r1 so~·e Brit-i.sh ·rr>r3 J::olcl-i11; tre line a;<>:::"s·t, "'ti ~f resistance . T-:le'Yf'"mt--: o.t:> trc '~>5th "nrl ·n 5t½ G9rr•on '"livisi on hflve )Oen iclent:i -ri8d on t 11 :i.s ·"'ro11.t . These, with -l:,1---A Li.th f 0 rn.chute Divis::_o'1., int1.ct 0"1 t},r,t f'ro'1.t i'Y1 ic-"'te to J11e tre -r:oss:i.b~lity of a GAr,- n trrust f'':;"i.n~t tris '19Ctor. --r sucl• shoU 7 '1 occur, •;9 hrv-, li.ttlo to orrose it . Lucns jg re-ori;n~1.iz~hP' 8nd lias ,.., ,_.., cod the 157th Coribrt Te;,_m ~ n th' t , rec' . The 170th is beini:: "Ii trdr[~•m :'rorn the east f'l11nk ."nCi r,.,, 1,~c,~r'l by the 1Gth ~11C'~r1°ers. TH'3 rrill -ut the !,,5th Divjsion, l9ss 0 1e co~l-)pt ten,, i'1 Corrs reserve . 1 �11 It is ny est i , te, Pnrl I hrve "nriic· ter, to Lucn.s tJ,-,,,t ,·,hen Cistornr is reR.Ch'3d and tl'e l:1t 1riti c.ih Di vision J.:t..-,v · YJ.P: reR.cred CE1r-:ro leon8, ~nrt]r,r offensive eff'oc:t by the 'TI Corp"' is out o:f' the nivrntion -Por t'1e t2..rr0 bi=dn ,;. There r-i.~e t, 10 e-rieri.y· rlj vi .-;ions on e ·.tr "'r c;j rie cf' the road 7 ,,r c -; n~ north "'r m,, nzio . If tlLse struc 1r sir:ultn.neously t 1 1e situ, t,; on 1 10uld hCJ rlFficult . It is rw be lief th..,t ·e r,ust tpl,:e a rosition in rerd; ness, ""i.nirnizing the dcneer 0·1 the east f'1Fm 1· , enphPsizin"' it on th"o "Ost -"l..,11 1• ·rit'.1 tb, '3rd Jjvision in dertr in tJ1e Ci~tA1~r..p rrCJr ~,r r,,•"nr1 tn cou-'lter,,ttrcl.c to the 'ec;t, ·•:ttJ-· f;J,e 1st Britisl-1 11iviflion in r~e,·t11 in tl'e Cr- ,olAnne ['T'(Jf' nrepr:~e,1 tc COU'1t r'-'tt"c1· in either r1 ire ction with t},e /i,5th Divi,:;ion bss ::i. cor1rt te/lo in cor:rc.i resr,rve nell 11.orth of Anzio enr1 ·1ith rarnon just ~n th9 rear n""' the 1st British Div~sion pr"T"red <'or a li,.,,itecl o"fe'.1s;vc t !'1-1',t to r"~,orr--orjze tJ-,n oro'7y l"'nrl :in a co1 mtGrettacJr role to Aith9r fl.~nk . llSt<>r t e '1ffct Jritisr. br-'g.,.-,,'e r,;roup comes in , I rrorose to brin~ in on9 ~,or3 British br-i 2:, de ';!'our rnd :m Ji;r1 e:l"icPn. co"'!bnt tean . This ..ril1 rPke the hri ip;"hn.rc1 more secitre, altl-ioup;h ov rt1-1z its sur,nly crir,bility flnd 0;ive us a cl-:trnce for offensive Pction. 0 0 0 "The ~e;r~"Pl 'h<'S ~rrro•ri,,,ntel, "~ve d-'vi:-iors cnnf'ront-inc; us no", with c,·1other j'YJ. q-: r-11t, P";<-in~t our four . le hrv9 1.0 C'l"nce , in 1-riy op~nion., to re2ch Colli L2zi,'-'1i rire'1 Rf:;Hi'1e;t the orrositi.on "'a::sec1 jn th-t vidn"'ty. Should U~e enemy r8.:'1.ize 011r ~nr 1ili.ty to re2cr this ob,jective , Pnd ·:ith ris i:-rr,nrent c> 1)il~t:v to "10ve c1ivisio"1S f'ro11'l tJ.ie ....,ort]~ .. h never r quired , b~ r ay c'lecide tl~"t t 110 onort'mitv :is present to ri;ive tlie Alli9s R. r"lvArse. Should . e r,ovn., rnc' I an s1-tre he hns the CP"''l.b:iljt:r, t 1'!0 or t},ree r1ore divisions i'7to this ~ren , ,'e \ ·vwild h;:,ve d:t-'"ficulty r,<>j·1tri::nic1~ mi.r;;CJlves . : hr've r· sol11tio>1 ',hich I nf:ill .,..res9nt to GenAr" 1 7 ex2nc'er toriorro" t}, t 9n-,:: S[' ~es ., celn.y in fa'TVJL bec,.,use it i'"' rerfectl; 2pr"r9nt t'ht thA VI Co:r''"S TreRc1 ·1u11rt9rs My' th9 3rd P'1ri /,5tl" Divisions C"'11 not b9 evtr1crted i11 +,i.me. It brinn;s 1 1S f''lce to ""2ce FHh tre rerilization thrt '70 n"'ve n. co"!r itnent en om· hrnds ··r1Jic'1 ""ust ½e "'urrlied rnd •_p'YJ.trined throu,:,}, l 81:111S o-"' crrft :f'or sone t~"l8 mtil tr0 Cr:::-sino +'roYJ.t is built ur sufficiently to bren k t~1rourh . A better pl" n , in -,v or~ nio;1 , ~ould be to l"!ass I" 11 me"ns jn thn l'ed.itc~rn..n1;ri.11 - 11, D11 il;~ou1, n"V"'l anri Pir - "nC lr,uncl" rnother Cor:;-s rmnhibious [lttaclr of' t 10 cl-ivision.s , 1ref2rr½l, t,J~e /~t}, Tnrlif'n, or~ Britis}, div:isio11, n..nd tre 155th 11ot 1<>ter tl"Yl Ti'e1,rurr· 15th in 11n rttPck on C:.vitr-ivecch:La . It 'l01J. 7 rl 1-:ie "'racticr71y- unoprosec . I should r" 1<9 fl lrmc1 in1s on the b81lches at ei.th0r side . One clivision could hold tl e rort, wr:118 anothor noved rr~idly on Rorie to 1,J.oc1; the vri.thr1 rPwal of troor, orvosin/"1' tre VI Corns . In 1'1:V orinion it hn.s sreRt rossibilHiAs rind shou 7.d be dnne . ThA 'Javy '"Jill sr>y, 11 imro~si'Jle 11 , but :it caY\ ')e rlcn-. "n( 10 1li ';iife us F clrnce to tr['r t' 9 Q9r,nrns on t1--e Cr ssino f'::-cmt. I '1Pve iust tro'1--;ht o·r +-,ri:1 } lan and "lill ~ive it norCJ st1 1d r torri~ht , r11d if I r:nr11101'.nsurmo·ntn.ble obstPcles wil1 prese11.t it to AlexRnrler to orrow . FRir • eather ;''Ve us 0 noth9r orport11'1~t - to U'110P.C1 [' J.pr~e l'I'l0·1nt of "urrlios . e r,re i'1 .ctoorl. shRne, e-rcept f'or pr~mun5tion. 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 Perso11::>l Cl"rk to r:ruenth9r . fl.~T OQl{. 111 101"1 crn Spadgor Corr>s o+> ? Divisio·1s Cl".lrT'V' 0-1 tl--ie jmp9tU3 of /~~ roes ~l8X,"11('9r unrlPrstn.nr1 thP. no.,,ible nece sit;,r of ,ls:lvi:-: ro;,,e of trj_s force if' :;,resent 1:tt11 c1c1 "re ui1succe3sful? 11 i'erson11l Gr 1ent)1er to Cl. rk . R1J 657 . tt1Ar,,.nitzer i·1dicr1tes thf't 'l.lexa11der •1ill rrobn.bly be rl:llucta"'lt to coT 14 t rr->rt of Spac--;rir Force rs surrr;ested in ~'our �59 r~7 i·'p'essio"l is t 1r t \leYDnder visu:--lizes fl sit1rtio·, ,..,,1ereb;r Jrad½"'r Corrs rjF-;ht 1,e forcec to trih? over sector no'r occupfod by 3rd J1I>'\. and 1/,.t:t I"ivj sion . ''ill niscuss r0ints r::,isefl in :ro'n~ rries::1pa9 -1l'en Lerrinitzer cones J-,ere U is Rfternoon . Your GOJJ.. ccr10 sl5 r;},tl:r garbled but : believe 1 nnderstr>nc_ your c1e-:,ire. See rw next ""8SS"C:8 reference TndiPn Jivjr;ion f'or non p9rsonr>l flddress . 1 Frorri Fi"t:1 "..rni;,r to FFth rr-iy Pdv Cl - R'T 65? _tt}'0urth Ind1n.n Division has been ordered f'rom T~j_r,hth Army to Sradger Force . rove,.,,ent \"ill be1dn t(might . tt rersonnl Glnrlr -fron Qrmmt},er - R' 701 - 11 Ler'l Y,88 'ln"bln to throw •ouch 1:-l l"ht 011. Ale".'1nder rlrin e"'CP-,t to co..,f';,,..r ,,..eluct,.,nce to use pr rt of :;rndi:;er Corrs . In f8rsorv11· riesseg8 to I eese, l\lexP.nd r st,-,ted , 11 1 r1J:in to er-rlov Jew ?:ealancl D.;vision north of C:Rssino r1~rect8rl on /lrcGtt . LeM sq-r--:; tbere h::-s 1)een 1 no rlisc1rsion o-"' S''.Cf' a rJr>n . He bel iPves th"t Ale' rinrler his no c efiY1ite plrn but is w 1..,::ti11g d8VeloF1P.nts rn 'Till triH· to you rnc' f'l'rlger . Srrdger v-isit8d ..-,rench Corn" n.nr1 II Go,,.rs tod::i y . 'IP. sa"' Juin but 1ot Keyes . ft presfmt he ar T'9"T'"l to be coy,rluetinr- recc:--•1n1:1~<1scnce only f'nd hris o-ivon no i11,"iCPtion of' hjs in..,entions . Alexandc,r 1 s decj sio11 to gc- to /lnzio to,,i rht ''f1S n SU(1den oYJ.e , but he [l ssur"'ld 1811 ~ t /1.S notr; nr to clc vr~ t}, s lowne'1s of VI Corrs a,1 v:-,nce . }Te S" id h0 ,just wn.nted to tPl 1,,. to G nerPl ~lriri• . He l'F'Y re.-,"in rit Anzio Tuesday nig t . He js •,rina-i-no; h"'"' 1,it J unc'erstr1r1d . }le v:isited T'cCreerr this e~"ternoon. I w1s 1 11jte pess:iristic ov1c1r s;tuqtion here lrst nip½t ,,.Pter I returrn~d fro1"1 Juin Keyes conference . T feel Jetter r-bn' t ~t tonight . -,nem7 )'"S everyth"np; cornr-dtted , Pnd : bcilieve "le will tri.1'.:e CAssino . Vo '9VP..,.., no blitz is 1ndicrted . Keyes "Ji 11 p;iwi no 9S-Si~Ate . "'ine j s Febru,.,ry 6tJ- - I J-,ope . 11 0 0 * 1 RSS~F'l,A'TO-- F~B~TT~RY l , 19/)j.--G ,n~rnl J\l ,:Pnd,.r .nrriv d b;r destro.r0r pt, the con•rorinc' ro"t 11.t Anzio at about 0730 ancl cr "l Pt once to Gener,.,l Clar'k: 1 s co· r-nn'' post . '7ith hin uer"l ~e'lt"!ral }'nrding rrir1 his 1--.i1it8TY Pnd nRV/'.11 rides . Cr .n~r"l Cl,,,rk at once hr>d t:1 S"lrious cnri.versetiori. "-"Tith ,...,..,nerPl Al-:ixBndl')r rbout th"' J.-,tt ... r 1 i:- sup- rosition thrt '31-T 'G-LE hnrl not 1,,"'n e:,._'T'loit"ld n.s rnrinl'r "S icir: t h~·ve b"'!en the .f C"se . G"rJ.~rt:'l Clr-rl' noint~d ont ti--,..,t s""ri0us orrosition hAd b en m,t b·,. thn VI Con1s , r>n-1 +,hrt there '"8.S no vrlid. r;ro1ryi -"'or rli_ssqtj_;;':'Pction ,,-·th th, rrocrress \ ""ade . 'I'h"l G,..n")rr l nent on to outlin~ +'or C'r ,n,,r" 1 A1,,., ~AnJ0r tbe rro•,osed o:--erc ti.on At Civi.tn.vecc ~iP descri', ,cl in ycst"lrcl.<'Y ' s diRry. G"lnerr, l /1 lev-::md""r nnd G~neral P..,rd"-nq; ap.,..,,a,,..,d to l,e tri1·cn nooc1· by tre sur;p;"'!stio'Yl ,-ind cc,uld only state thA.t it :nres"nted 7 or-i--:;ti.c,:,-il dF'ficnlti~s . ·.ro this G~·v"r:> 1 Cl<>r 1r.: sa ~a , "C v .rco!"e tJ-, ... ! 11 P'"l fl" id trnt ,., 11 tr"t , 0,1lc' ~ n111cess"r r ,.,.011ld be for Gen,,rr 1 Alexenc'"lr to P'1"t fn,...iral Cunnjn'"'·r.,"' nnd ttrub his nose ·h11 tr,e rroposAl nntil the l'r11-1irr-il coll,:,ct'1d th, n,cessrir" crnft tc lrnd ,:it th~ ro-5.rits ~n r:pJ.estion . Th'1 results, G':)rt"'!rol Slsr'· said , wnnl.rl. ITT'~Rtl:r ,ri.hnnc"' Gn 1."';rP l ·"..l~'':Elnd ,r Is r~ru+ntion n s ". il~tary co .....,..,n.nrll')r . G"YJ.ernl Clr,...1 "'u.rt'h r srirl -t-;J-,rat r,, hed no ennc""rn ris to ·vho (' cor--,...and,d th~ or,r'-'tion or vho <;ot the cr,oit +>or it; wh~t h~ · :~bed to s"e WP.. S th, r ."''llts . "o ,,,.v,r , Qn11,-..r~l C1Pr 1". snjcl ... ;..,,...,t i.f G,..-1.r'lr,.,l ~lJ-~pnr er ·ish"d hi to t'lk"l th-is n~1 r,r0i ,ct i1e 011ld do it "rrl 1cu1 r1 sncc~ed in it . In "'nY 9V"'YJ.t , frl"n"'rRl c1...,,~,, s.'."'id 1 df'y sro·1lil. b" Febru"rv JSth "n.d ,wt lrter , "'S til'le i_3 rrecious , and t. 11'~ op,..rntio11 ~ruln b" ~ onrit"'ld b. th"t t~r r'; ~ {' s•1f'f'i_c~ "'nt ,n ,rr:y 'l re, •~isrl "V~d . l G~n rPl !le"Ca ,dP.r P'1(1 Gl')n~r"l ;r.. rdiri,-r ½otr sric'l th"l. th"'l r ,<itter v0rr '1"')rio1rnl~·. 1 7r 1 1ld hf'V to ccris5cPr �Fol,_o"".;1'10" t11-t.s tr11( , G~nf:}rr>l Cl,r1r , G"lner'1.l P.l~'rancer rind G·,nl"lrRl rrrding vi"'it~d the CF o"' VI Cor,..,•c,, '3rd D.;vi<,ion ,,,...,,~ the 1st Ar11ored Divic:ion. Th ,,'f th "ll return"ld to lllYlCt"' [: t t½, CO"''•qn,i rost . \ +'ter lw1ch G~n4'rE' 1 Cl nrlr, ; ho bnd S1lJ11"'oned .; s G-/,,7 to t 1'1" '11"J' ly-coT rl~t~a lPnr'-'1,,.,. 9+,,...ir rt r . . ttuno , -int .r"'fl. 1°:i s rl~'1e Pnd set oPf f'or 1 '""rc·ir'ni~r; , JSCorted hy f0ur Sr"tfirf'.'!s ,v'~ich ,..,,d been on t ., lrm.ding strip ""nd lrd b"'l1"'1 hci tily ordered to t,"'ke off . Thfa '111.provised escort ·ras Dl"Jcecgrir rs t " ,"'Cort -:-r"lvinusly, 1•rpnr,ed ·ritl: th"' •rI= J\ir ~urp0rt C0"1""Pnrl h-1d. f'n.:lE'!d to nrriv~ , (lll~ tot!-:~ "'urrositio'1 ('"'1 tt,.;r r~rt thPt the weath"lr 1.ade .(>lyinr; .:rrrPcticaol,~ . G.n ,rel Cl""r1r "'i"lC. r~s escort lrnd"lrl S"::r-ily £'t Parc;"'n1se ,..i~ld , ri11.c G.,n"lr,l Cl<>r1 G"mer;-,} :,~'7 7 8 '1.nd Lt . Col. 'intJ:-11•rlrnd ::, r,t,n·n"<l. to tlie co """Pnr rost jn cnh~ . I ... ,d-'..,t,ly uy;on ri8 r"lturn t1"3 G n r"'J. c1-ir;cu<1s d ,,.;th '}~r.rPl ,rU"''1+r.,r +,i-, •·ln.n ·rH-;h f'"' hrcl proroq,c_ to G,n,rP.l Al~~-ann".lr '"no. obt . . ~1,d .-,ro·• G "nrt=il Gru,ntl~ r the J~test r~rorts on tre C,ss:i.no oper"+,-tons . 0 r -rsn"1nl to l\lexanc'l"r "ro"' Clrirl:. :?.'I 1117. "}reSPF1t '"'(1 -icrot~cns .,..," -'.:.rot CasJi'10 h i··h+,s -,;_ll ,~ -;~;:-'t1T:' v~r;r soo,, . :;:+, "u,c ;1,si--;t 'l'" T"<>terfrlly ir, -ror-ul"'ti."'<"' ,T'f "'nt11••p ;- 7 "'"'8 i+' .ro11_ C0'1 1.ci ~,,,,q-i_cr-t, no r -1) ,.,,~ss'o·1 'ric1 you cont •11 1 ,t'.'.l for tJ-,"l >m1 r;- .r "'ore, . I d,-,~r, to rit:ov V1ic; "'ore~ to --1v""nce nortr·:rest i·1. +,},~ Llri V- ll~y 'l;'~'W tlie II Car:-''' to Jl'"'tect t'1~ r~ c"}-t -r:::_nnlr of tr, 0DPC1 ger Fore~ . II Corrs ·,ill rirlvsYJCC -: n th" r'~.rectior T"re 7 l4'-Ro°C'1. )~CCP <>·1d "t . C<>st ,llo "'J - I~'°'d~~0·1t ,-Rocca ;l"C'CA. . ·r 'ncl• Co:,,r, J.:;o Pdvrnce 011 ttirn Pnd t r--·1c~ on ..;o:-P . JJec-·<:.-:o- nn ':•r,d'=-~r Fore~ 3}'0'1ld ,..,, rcr·ched Ft 1d rut i.11to "f'f~ct fr'"J'A'J.i,:,t~ly 1.11 order t:1rt l'T}'rit "'Y"f' ,t'J.s t 11~r"' 78 l,..ft to Fi::'th Arc;/ s011tli')rn e.ttrlc'r sJ,-,011ld not b" lost ." 1 1 -x- * * Pr~s /'1ZA'J(~--1<"8BF.Uil.RY 2 , J_0/,4--'ft ,r t8 1-:::::i_ 1 ,.p; err' o·r 8 hervy p CCUT"UlF tio'1 o+' Fr .r •s10r'r r·-yl b:l.c"cl-i"1.0' ...,.ooc'by, to 1 "j . G~n . ro11,:; ,, is r-,turni11rt to the 'n:te<1 Str-tes rp,cl to Drii:;('l.diF-r Geri, ral ''ax ro ~" ,ro p-oin,: to join tlie 8:-'11.d 1\.ir1,orn, Division iJ'l ,n'1'1Pnc1., f}nn"'ral CJ,.,r'" l~+'t 'is ·!"'a-1 ,..,u,•~'t,rs ~.t lJ.C'() iours to ,,~nit t·,o o"' 1·.::'s Corrs Co~J1rincfors . At the II Corn:: CI, G"l"'erf'l Cl.<>rk con±:'"lrrec vritli 'rij . G...,n . Kcy~s C0'1C i·nin<:; tl • si-SUA.tion Pl0'1P' t½"' II Corr::. -"'ront, A.nr' rlrinr for tJ e i'"-~ediPte +'uture . The situFti.on is -reirly gr,od, fllthougl· tre Ger,.,,nns rre still resi-tinrr stuhhornly, r2rtic 1lPrlv 'l.rO'P1r th-· lr~y c1P-f ... nse roint of Cassino . (}rm ,rn l Clrr 1 told G"!·-1 ral Y~:ns thr>t r'~ nrofos~d to r-ov : th"" TStri Di vj si.on f9rthe:~ to th~ nort'') so tJ.i.rt 5t could strik, west alonn; t 1 e r ~ g0 p:round nc.rth of C:::;_ssino . GenJrPl ~"r<"}•rb11rg 1 s 'Jew ZeA.lr-ncl Div-: sion ,.,.ould tl "''1. h us~r' to c<ttack alono- th~ Liri River 1o rl.<>nrs . The _3/{,th Division ·roulc'l join th, 16th jn this vest"'rn thrust north of Grssino . G"ln""r·1l C1Pr1c l1incr."'c1 with G.. n~r"l 1:~_.,..s .,nd sc"'- of ~-"' stn.-rf o"'fic"'rs r>nd th""n left -"'or the Fr~nch ":Xf"lditionrr.r Cor::--,s corr, r..,n'i :~o-:it iust rl-iove V""r"-rro . l\.r·,,.iv~nr; ~t t1-l"! '"rrincr Cor-rs , G~n.. rPl ClFrk '7Ps rn ,,t h G~n"rnls Juin , 11d il.oosev 1 t, nnd '1"'! ,.. ,nt · r , ~ai~t~ly : nto tJ, , corps ap room to i1~ SC'lSS plflns rith G"!'1 .rel Juin . Th., t"7o :-'re11c1- djvisio-1S ·~ill no i turn t'h jr R.ttack northvmrd striking e lo:rig the :riorth- soutr ronf ler.di'1': to ·prd J\t:: nD . G.... n rr>.l Jujn -:mirl th1t ;~e hf\d rec.,,.iVeQ l , 000 '1ntive replPc ,~ent::; ,~rort TTorth A"ricP r.ind t11r>t r_,, wns r')ady tc-, jur-r off 0n tle 9+,tac1, at i=my Vye . G,n~rnl Clrir-: sa~.d tl1""t th. otr r divis:lo:ris jo-inil'lP- .;11 .l,:,h, ntb.cl: conld not bt'l Y'c<JPCY 1uite so quickl:,. In fnct it rrobrhly '1011lrl be :cm·· or f·'.ve cfavs bP-+'or~ the ne' offrmsivc co 12ld ,~ lf'·mch~d . Tn1n~::--inq 11bout •-.rencl-i r ,fl"ce "nts , G"'n"'r~1 'P<i rl_or , 1 J �Clerk learn ,d thn.t 0t!1r-r nntives nrn rca(v to sriil +'ror "orth 11:fric<"' but thrt the rrincinal -r,,r"'net' rl'lrlr..c~r ~nt nrobl~n ''P'S in Fr ,nch o•~f'ic"rs r,y' non-corwission~d o.c>fic~rs . T11"•ir" nr~ -rew r~rlrocem.nts for t 11es~ '""l")n , nio"'t of \-'orn hnve J.rd to sca·0, fro fr;~nce . G~n~rc1 l ,Tuin rromj sed t rt his Gonr11s v;culd take r1011nt c.- :ro nnd that tre"T 11ro11ld rln11t the '1trrs n.:r-cl ~tripes n.nd the French Tricolor on the crest o:' the 'll01A7.ta;n . G~n..ral c1~rt: SP.id tbrt if' 7,he Gourns took t..,e !"ountain he want~d the ricolor t0 fly f;,bove tre Jters anc. 3trip,s . G"neral ,Tuin c greed vigorously nith G~n"!rn.l Clprlr tbnt 11 He .,..,rt 1reep the ½riyonet f'°!rr~tur lly in tl·e r·un ' s behind" , if 1e r1r~ going to s ove 1--d r:- bn ck raridl Y . Gen .ral Clnrk also lenrn .d thr>t "' Gnn rnl of th~ /~th I"ldinn Divisio:-1 WP. s in thf'! French a::..·en torlay lookinc- oveir the t~.,..rn.in to see if Tndi"'n trr,ops could Pight in th':l countr;v Fh~re the French di.visions nre now rushing +'orw[lrd . G,.,n~rril Cl;,rk l"\;{fTessed ris objec tion to tres" o-"'fi_c ,rs goi11r; ~ nto th., section whrm "t ms not his :;1:-n to employ eith"lr th~ /!,tr- ·~"ldfan Divi3iori or t11c ~ evr ZP,[llPnd Divi ~ion in this f'IOuntPinous country. G~n~ral Clar 1• 1.-,ft th-, Fre11cr Corra reric.quarters n'1.rl :,--etnrn-n.d to his 0'7n advPnc~ co r "'nd post Pt Fr~se'1zr-no . Upon returnin-,, he ~nform0d GencrPl 1ru,nth ,r of' ris d"scu-::sio'1s with G ner<>ls K"'Jy ,s R"'.(' Tuin a11r• t.11 ,n cnri.ferred br:i~f'ly 'Vith Colon~l Sul7_:ir11, th"? Arry ';ut=1 rterr,,ns~ ~r , · ho 11r d cone up "'ror~ th : r~nr Jche lon, ri bout nro hl~ s of t rr;•y sur l·r. * }-ff-; )r; T7A'Tf' --Y ~3FFFIRY 3, 1944--G"'"l rnl ClPrk too1<- off +>ro~, tl"e ;:;'ifth 11 r,,,.,y- co' rand rost strip 1-:Jy cul) t>t OR/!,5 t is r orn1ng. B:19 arr-:v~d nt th, JO CorJ s striT' 11t £> bout 0900 l 1ours wher" ' ~ , JI? s r•"'lt ½y G.rin~r" 1 cC:r er;r th , Corr s Cor '"lntl.-,r rnd proc .,dee! tn T{ePri.'JU"'rt ,rs 0 01 Gu:-.rds BrirrR.de 1h .re 11, ,1_,,t F2j . Gen . Gr")gson-Ellis , Co.,.rrnd-:na th., Sth British Divjsio"l , Ms Brirr::idJ Co"'!"a11r1,,rs ,-.-rir1 oth r o+'fic~rs . P.-"ter ::i )ri"l-r c0·1,:_rnltE'tion ,jt11 thes~ o""''ic,rs, the A.rrv Cor anner rroc~ccled to Tufo wher~ h~ sp ,nt snT'l, ti,•e in two OP 1 s o½s,.rvi'1P' th, terr['in rind discussi'1n' tr e 10 Corps Ptt;:, c'r ..,:i tr +,he Corrs Com•!J.nc,er . G~11~rr 1 ClPrlc took of'f fro'! th~ sb· ip , r~turn-inF to >1,s co.,.,,,.,,Pnd post Rt 1175 . 1 1 G .nern.l Alexrind"'r hr>c1 exrresscd n _,rish to r -i<::cuss '7it11 G".!n rrl Cl"r 1,.,. t11e \ VA.rio11s "'rohl ,l:13 fpcirir.; tl1 "'\ ~.rrriy Co :r2nder on tre nz-i.o and Cr>ssino :ronts. Accorc'l-i•1r;l:0, ..,t RP_ roxill'atelr l//)0 G .n r l Cl"'r-!{ fl"li•r by cub rlr->nl'l to CE>sertP , "'h ,re le lPnded b~• tl-i"' Hat .. rfr 11 ::rnrl "ent b~f CQr to Genl"Jrf11 Alex3.nr1er I s hMd q11art..,rr1, •1rh,r"l h, co11f~rrt"lil -"or aqrox" "t,ly i=i.11 hour ·ith Gen~rals Ple'Cf'1,ler and ,-,re; v.rp· b ,-"ore l'')tnrnj nrr to ris CO"'r•pnn post by Cllb . 0 The frr,.y Cor'"Pnoer re-c•')ived t h , f'oll◊'·;'1ro- T"CS ra') "'rori }1js Chief of -·taff tl-Jis r>ft rr:oon ''Tho W"S up Pt the new brir'geheRd rre8 checki.,,,g 0;1 the ituation . Rr . 18°. 11 Fnve seen Lnc:Y, . H~ feels .,,£'irlY cw·fortnblr, r>bout ,~resent situr> t"on. ~Jo 1 nd:cr>tio11s y~t o-r- rajor attnc\: . Does not nlen to ·-,~thdraw 1st Div., but ''il] be n"'cessn:c,r to ,dthdrAvr '.lrd Div . JiouP'hnuts r>ml linuor h"'V"'\ hnd v'oncerful ~"".l:>ect . 11 0 TTpon l'l"!C"lip+. of .._,r~ 8 bove C' bl~' th~ ~r1117 Co•'1~,nnc1~r disr:>tc1~~r1 the .,..ollm inr- cicr)l., to Gn,n~rr.l Lueras . PJ 14/,/!, . "Gru~nth~r r~rortq sitw tion ·rell in h<Pnd . .,,"{r.: .ct to fly up cAturc'.~y riornjnr- nnd loo1·' the ciiturition ov~r . Arn 17,lPd 3rd Division is b~i'1'; orrr,rin-1zed nn_ T'l"ced in ri P1orJ coi"p"ct situr+.ion 'h<1r~ it can ~ith"lr rep ,1 collnt.,rattack or later, at Pn ar ropriat~ ti , , ,.,1{e Pn ::ill out e.ssr-mlt O"l Cister'1.a . 'ir- 11'\a}~in~ r,lnns .ror "JJ out w·srult h~re. ill "'ivc you 1 1 �the details 0.,1 Sr-turda'r. lt .~r-rds . 11 G~n rl'l Clf'r1" .,..,iceiv d r- C"rile +>ror, Adnirnl Lo'TY th 1 Con•.an<ler of 'I'i:,sk Force ;¥81 in , hich r"' ~}.Tr~ssed rd.s ple,,sur~ f't norldnP, ,.,jth tl,e Fifth Army P.nd :bis hop'"! for R aui ck junction :l n Ror ,e . G~n~r!':'l Tl'te , Fi+'th ArPly G- k , todPV subf'!itt1'd a rl"'rort to Corr~anrl'!)r r,-,p;nrfli.na trc '~ur,pl "';_turition Rt Anzio . The rerort th-, suppl • 9itw,tion in g ,n"'rl' 1 -is Sl'l.t:i.sfr- ctory for the troops excert for E>rtiller:, RP"'mnition . Ad justT'lcnts in the surrly of nition ar, ~i11~ ca.de driily 'by tht"! 1c;rr - trucv n<1tror . the Fifth l\rr y .<>sscrted th0t no ::r in th.._, ar1'P nrtill .r.r Br rm- The ~ nfnntry r"'rl::> c"..,,~nt sj tuntion -in Fifth Army is b"'cor,inrr r11or, :, cute ev .ry rla.y. A+.'ter co-1siderf'ble ,tuc1 y o+' the nrobl ,ni, G('mernl Cli:irk c..,1-iled G,Jr~ral Dev~rs as f'ollff1s: 'R,'T l/~09 . 11 Inr~r>ntr rePl'"'Cr)T ent s-itu0 tion in Fifth rr,y is ~xtr(Y el-r s~rio11s . Fresfl:l'1t srortar s i 11 6 i. vi sio'1s nm· ,Yceed <S , 00C' . Nunh•·r rr"s~ntly f'W,~ lPbll"J in r'"°'rot is 800 , whicri ~ncludes '3CC ..l ich hrve been co werted to i nfPnt:r-y from. oth"'r bro.nch ,s . CP sun lti,,,,s j n tl-ie 3rd Di vi 1ion c1.lone totnl ?L,00 of 7},-i ch only 900 c1re non- bri+,tl'1 . Total United Stftt~s er sunlti~s in VT Corps nre rro . In-~rntr:r "'hortn½e :n '3L.th liv:5sion is 1'300 . In '36tr Division '3000 . J r~sent o-r~r tions involve sirnultn.n~ous U"e of' all di.visions "nd re q,1-i.re tbrit T /o str na;ths b"l • a.:ht.., in":!d . 1 1 0 ttr urgentl:r r1'corari~nd BS n ,..,,,.,tt"'r of Of"!rPtj onn 1 n~Ce"'sity thrt 1000 infrn tr~r rP-plncl':l'llents ')~ t.ri}cn f'ror, 85th T)ivision r>nd "'r~rm .d h"lr~ b:r f;:,stest nvnilnble r A1ns. I 1-iPvc fllr'"lndv r'lir~c+,cc1 that infantr:r r,.,.rlrcer ~nts b, t£1k"'n ~rm~ 88th Divis-ton "n~n :t nr-rjves , ½ut I desire to liriit thPt nu.,...ber to minirnu,'ll Pbs0lutcly n~cesser·r. Th,re rr~ rlso shorter;es in artill~rv, P"!d;_ccil l'nd enr;in"!ers, but t "'Y P.r"' not y"\t r.rjtj cal. 0 "I ;-, lso 1 1rt-:~ thr,t cverythhi.r• rossihl~ b"' dnn~ to ~1ove u-r th~ F~bru"ry r>nd ~•o;_rch li f'ts o+> r~r'lncer-~nts fr01., th~ Un:i tcd Jtc1tes rim' +,o e'r.-,edite shipPent to Itn ly of RTUS fro, ·rorth l\fricr . } leP s~ E>dvj se ~ct-ion t tris conf""r"'1C~ ,~<>s thr. rro- \ ro:;,d r"'nrrl'nr,~:--.-int oft},,. forc~s on th~ Cr>ssino front, in vi~·~ o+' -:.he Rrdw·l r+> th~ 'L' '.fonln.nd Gorns, Cor n_,yl..,d b· G~n~r,,l Fr~•hurr, . Bri~f'lv ,t.-.t"'rl, G.. 11,rnl Clrr1" 1 '3 tl-io110'ht, n,3 ror0s~d to G,n,rPl .Tuin, ''PS ti-nt 1-ir-i 3J.-,oulrl Ce'"'S') to ,....0ve 1-ii s Corps on At.-i.n;:, 8 nrl r .-ori_Pnt T-ii s e+>+>ort to-erd Ter~lle - 11.occa .,.eccr . GPvi~r;, l Glar 1( propos"?d to reJi ,v~ th, -:i;t11 DivisioP fro,.. ~t:J rr .s..,11t ro"itionP ['3 soon r>s ;os~ibl"' 11 '1rl disrhc~ :it. north of th, '3/i-t • JT_ th"!n T'ropo'l"'f to rut the ·rew ~eelrnG D-ivision in jnst s011th on trc Crssi.no +'')<1t11r~ FITJ.d b8Vt" ~t strjk~ north,·est,..,~,-.i1 up ti-ii'\ I ir-i iT:,11.-n. Gen~ral Juin ir .,.,~dilltel:v '7'!'8Sn"'r t'fi~ fnct t1-i_nt this rlrn i.nvolv"?d P r1 esir11.})l_~ CC'"lC ,ntr['ti.0'1 of' norc rl'1t'h"'!r· trJ:1'1 1licr~rsi.011 of jt. H"' st;:ited, ho ·•w ,r, thrit h, .,.nst 1-irv~ r-rot, ct-i.on on tr~ nort'fi 0f l,i s rr~s~nt position ·h":\r~ ~_+, :=i.r•join .d the ";-iP-}'th t\rllly. G~n~ral Glrr1' rrordser1 to lnok into tlie 1Jucstion of' Its. 1 "irn. n.'1.c: ro'"'s-ibly so e .l1 m"ricr'1 troors to h lr the si'1~le co,.,,bat t,.11 , 11.i er f'}~,ii-r<- 1 Juin ·,rps ri hl , to l""f v . 011 tl c n0rtr. �G 3 nu ,st-ioYJ.s -j,-wolv"'d :i11 th"! ~r,,rlo~:fl'.'lt'mt o.,.. th, l,T"'w 7,en 1 r'nd Corps. G~n"'lrr:l Fr,.,yburg ) stater thrt 'r:i:, r~conneissorice 'R.S in proP-r~ss ,110 thrt i11 two cir '3 he could get th'3 'Ie·'T 7,e" lanc'lers -in rosi tfon r;outri of Cassj rio to 11:oVl'; north'"'"'st ur the Liri Vr,l 1 J.T . At luncl1 GenP-rnl Cler1c r-ece:i.vcd nn.ior G"ln rr>l r·cI"n.hon Rn,'l. ;h,ior G•nerc>l Rob"lrtson , Co....,'""Pn<'F"'P: the ~th and "nd TT . S . Jnfnntrv Divisions r1'spectiv.,.ly. Thl"lse o+'f'icers, ·•hose 11.11i.-':.s r>,re 'lo.., in th!'! lritish IslP,s, hn.v"-' co""e wjtr '1°rue of their 0°"fiCC"Y'8 to Itrily to studv actual or~rp-'",~ ons . G... ri~rn 1 01::T"lr "'urnishcd t},eTII w'th ,je"lt'S ['''.\d recor'1[-)7"'Si1.'1Ce CATS Awl <J.rrflnrr.~d for tri~ 1 1 to visit II Corrs where tr"l~r would o-,,.t experience ~ n actual ,mrfare 11s c0nd11ct~r "'.:,oca.r. In the r-> "'t,.,r-r1oon GenPrnl Juin r ,turn~d yrj_t}, G1'YJ.l"!r,l CPrpl'!ntier f1ncl Colon~l Cherriere . G~ner a l Cl Arl,. to l d G~n"lrnl ,Tuin thnt "' hprl fcund r flllw rundred Itqlirn troops to reinforce G~ner'11 .Tuin 1 s north~rn flPnk . G .n~rr,l J,1in erir:erly strotecl thrt YJ.f"! 'WS renrlv to ta," ur the n,w r>ttnck Terclle - Roccasecca . G.n~r~l Clr:- 1r, rr"'n"!r::il Gru.-mtr~r and Gen ,rr> 1 TPte P 11 v~ o;orousl7 a::rner-tcn , howeve r, t hr-i t thl"?rc , •ust b" econoni.~r exerci s~d by G"'n rn 1 ,Juin in tl-i~ cc11c;u~ption of artill~ry 11.n11,unition , as r, hrd h~en b 1 1r'1in½ nor"'l thFr ::>n;r oth ,r nn:'t . Genr.,r"'l Juin s11.id thf't i-,.., 1rn ':V it , ')ut' ,~1-i"'l'1 his soldiers su":erec1 hePVY cr"'!urltj~s r·1r'i 9till hnd to hold on , the onl-r rr-y 1 1, 1 ,m~',r to ricco·-:rlish it ·'Tpc; to use artillery on t:re G~rr-Pns . 0 At din'1cr G"'n~rr l Clnrl~ ""'1t"'!rtr-i in"'d Gonerri 1 P~uclAr, Golo'1el S? ltzri>n and Lieutenant Colonel }orter . I>1.rl7 in the ev~n:inp.: Generl?l Clrirk clictoted th~ f'ollm1iY1g +'or in ½is dia:r: llVj sited 10 Cor·· s yest':lrrln:r 1w cub, ,~ns """lt by G ,n~rrl , ccr--er7 :1nc tqJ·en to the Hint11rno Pr•r1, -rhr>rc I visited thll! Sth Divinio'1 ::ind ...,,"lt its ne·.,. co~"'nYJ.cl"r, T½.j . Gen . Gr,o;,0'1-ElliP. Pe ?nd his prLncip~l s bord 0 nrt~s i~nr s~"')d ~~ A.s being, h-i P,'hly er-ficient 1:i->1.d likeable ch'"lfS . I 11is:i.ted tre Tu:"'o Prer> -::bere, fr/")'l\ an OI I hnd P onoc'l. loo c flt thl"!ir '1~xt ob,ject5v"' • TTrg ,rl l'cGr•cr~r tr lnimc" an rttrc1~ 2t the earliest possibl, drte . He fP-els hl':l r,ny not be r>ble to do it b~forl'" th.e ?th. ,rq~turned 1 cub to my co~, ,1nl Fr~:~ourg r>t Cf1sertR. G-,n~rr1l :!:"revhurg had been d~rected by Alexr,nder to rrep::1rP reco.,.,,Pl"lndi;tions fer h-i s e.,,.;-lo; ent -: n tJ-1~ Fi f'th I Ar:-.,.v frr.nt . Frevburp; hPd do'1."l tr is ·ajtl'out re-1:er~nce to Jll-,. Ji le~rrinrler hd like·11is"' :mnr'1c nlr>ns, n.11 of v;},ich emit~ un"'Jtric;.-,11-r, f'or .,-,f't~r r>ll it is T"Y job to pr~rrre the tPcticP>l '"'lnns PYJ.c conduct the or.•~rr>tions of tre li"ifth Jrrn:y. It ·,7i;,3 EJr.rar'!'1t at th~ ½eqi11n; n,~ o ~ tbe ,.,. eti '10: thrt 15th l\:r:rr.y Group P':.d """revburg 1~re p;oil"J.P' to tell m~ ,just Po', ni-r n xt [lttrrc 1.,. 1 ould b~ r 11de . ; ob.j ,cted rs dirlo:niF' t~callv PS no_:si~lP- . D-iffe,...~rl ~ntir.~l • 1it. h rre:rburr, 1 s end ~1.,,rmncle.~ 1 ~ v:ie1 s on ti"'~ er•rlo, e-110 01 the YITevt lealand Corns Rnd told ther, th"t, in my orin10'1 , the Few '3-,13. la."lriers and TndiA.ns ,-rould not get to f'irst bn.so 1wrH no; in tre Cr ss5 nof"o1n,:t Cniro "ou~1tr>inr;, t½r-t the II Corr,s 11.nd Frrmch sho1 1ld r,imin in th')re Pnd the 'ew z~olanders car~ i.tt!'d. to thri Liri VRlle:r ,,hen tl,,,y could .,.~t "Cro"s the Pqrido without too ""UC½ .:'ir:;htj ng . I nrg"'d thst Freyburo Rnc1 hj s co, "0 n.d be f'.lc>Sed to 1':V control ir,,difltel,r . Thr,v fina11;,r Po/~er- to y rl<'ns, n.nd Fre.rburg VPS pl,,ced unc1 ,r rrrr C'Y"", ,;i_11d . I �i, had in handling the t.revr Zealander Bx-plaining thPt they -rere territorial troops, responsible only to their 1?overnnent a.nd v;e ht:'d to get Along rri th them. I assured r.im our relations wouln. be happ:r and th::it "'e =ould T'i8.ke a go 0 1 ' "In view o:"' certain intelligence·I had r11ceived th'.'l nir:ht before on enemy intentions in tl10 FFth Arny l\.nzio bridgehcHd, I sent the following rad:i.oo;rRfl'I to GencrPl Lucas: issued to you to :=i.dwmco ;,rour left and to cr1pture Cisterna 11re hereby rescinded . You sh011ld novr consolid2.te ,·rour bePchhead and mrke suitable disrosjtions to neet Rn attrw 1-:: . You PP~T withdraw 1st Division far th~r to south if vou consider thRt Action nclvisable . Ar<vance on ow objectives will be r~suri'"ld later . "\::if'th~r v~rf'li tting Gru"'11th0r rill r ee ch your HePdqm1 r ters nt 1130 tor1orrow to give furth?r d"tails . Ackno··rledge . 1 1 I nstructions 11 T also sent Genornl Gruenther th~ following cl,'-'y to give hirn T'Or(~ detPils •. I hav"" felt .Por sor•? ta no thHt it '78.s foolish for us to co11tinue to 1.raste our stren~th on an Ptt"" ck 011 Cisternr. G8nl'JrP 1 l\.l~xanr:"r has co•1trar;7' views. I told G'merPl Al".)xandt"lr yesterdPy -ift0rnoon th:-,t I }v .d storped th~ att~ck on Cisterna, <>.nd h~ uas gre2tlv clisturbed . Ifo urg,:;d w, to bf>, rrep"T':ld to attack with that division in an all- out effort to F•~t •:isternP on 48 hours 1 notice and tolcl '"'l.e a,c,;ain that the Gtirr 1 2.ns '70uld not P.ttack in force . I differed agr in and told hirn thnt I would not i"'astc tbe 3rc1 Division, which hPs P.lreBci.;,r hr-,d ?L~OO losses (500 losses for the entire VI Corrs) , but th"'t I would dispose the entire corps to Peet P co1 mter1;ttack in stren~;, nnc thrm bA rrcpered to advance . 0 "Last niirht additional corroborating enemy intelligence indic~ted strong General Alexander received the sm,r~ infor:r",'."tion ,ond lvd hia Chief of .;t,e:,ff t,·lephovie at 1"'idnight, to "rnrn ne of ·7t. I tnl1"ed '"•ith Alexander this T"orn:ing , Fmd he vras delighted th:-,t I hHd ta\:en the defensive rttitudo t~nporaril;,r, and hrid chrnged his •vhole opinion . 1i "l.(r:,lj hood of a.n ~ner,1y attack j_n force FE< inst r,.y bridgehe8d rosition. ur j,1fornf3d Pl~xand~r th2t J had heri "'revburg Pnc liis stef'f in confer~nce 1 this r·orn~_ng 1 1ith Juin , K,;y,es and my stpff rn.C: bad c irected Freyburi:; to rr"1m a r~lief in the 16th Division sector to"1orro nio;ht A.nd thnt toraorrovr, Pt a tir~e to b0 mutun.lly n r,;rccd upon bet,,,.,en II Corps and Fr3yburg I s Corrs the cor'T'!and \ vmuld pass to the latter . Ti'r~yburg is sort of e 1 b•111 jn a chirn closet 1 • He feels h~ is ~oing to win th::i 1·:nr , r>nd ''lith his 15 , 000 V'?hiclcs is going to clutter up the rmtir~ Liri Vf'lley c1rea . Fe inr"diately clash""d crith K'3yes ,-hrm ho 1 ndic2ted wh·c;re he ·-res '""OVinr,; artill~ry , his rrew je.<>lcnr~rs, his In6irms Pnd other ir11p,dimenta . I turn,~d it ov,;r to r,y st2.ff, tellin'{ ?rl'lyburg that he could noYe :into no areas until he had coordjnatcd ,-,it)~ Pll Fifth Arriy activiti ;S . I WPS disappointed in K iyes I Attitude tov.ercl P-re:rburg r'nd sent hil" th~ follor,ing ~ J_e ~~ ! 1, ver 1: ' 1 ' I tried to 1r,ic1.te to you tris "'lorning the i"~oortence o+> +'ri·mdly Pnd coopcrntive reJ.r,t:: ons 'Tith Gencr~l Vrcyburg . 1I j 1 arn constrain~cl to tell ~rou thr:t I ..-as 2 littb r'lisaproj·,"ted in your \ �scTJJ.,'"'hPt br-ll-1g~..,,,,rt .?i:.titude to-.arr:1 h~•• t 1,j"' nrn:l'l'lr; . T '1.0.i. .d "'t , n.nd G '11"rP1 Fr, rburg s:;ok, to of it , "'1.d lrit ,r r;ro 1c to G,,.n,.r~l Gru-,ntb r conc,..rnin<" it . T arrr .ci t, 4:-11 "rl,n( id job r011, >1riv~ b"!e'1 rloj'"'t , th ... 10·7...,. 'hc•l'r" u,pt OU "re 7 "' -fo'Y" Cr>.ssino , rirc'I thrt tl , rov .... _,n~~ of tl·is Sft<:Cial out rutt··n3 i11. yo ·r , att ""it on to of you rr~~~11.ts rm co~~ l ,'ci'1.g r.,..-o½l"'PlS . A 1 tl e ott ,r 1--Ja.nd , .c,: ~'le '7:··~ rlo -j nion .i..1~oops ',}- 0 a:,:·'") V ry j Aq_lous o~... th~ir pr·,rogativcs . The Br itish hav~ -fo 1 md th~m di:"!.'ic11lt to . [>nc'le . The~r h11v, al 'a.rs b,,'c'l "'.-''7"''1 ::::rec,;i.al -::0•,L;:lcie:~.-, ·tjon ..i:ic"' e r1· 7 c' 'lot r--'v, t0 cur ovn troops . rl~?Se ) nr '·,',-' S :'.'..'1. -' "1_(1. I -',-.t,,.,.,,, ":,r .,,.,,. ,fl")"'r r ,lat-' ('•T1", ritli the 1 l';C'Y'"'.,..'ll e1·~cl -niftl, Arr,o . "r· 'lrl harry, P'1d -ol' "'U"t h~lr r11~ ell ,·ou ccn . I, ther fore , loo 1r: to ·on -t.o ~o ,,11 01 1 t o,.. .·orr "lf' iri orc'"'r tc r•,c,1r" y jo "')<isier. }1.erise see tre1t .ro1n• =-te1+'f (1 0~S 1,:1{,ris~ . 1 On r, "' ' You cen ,,,,,crt ssnr"'ld t½."t · rrill 1,r•s Pr:'! r-ive'l "ull ,,.ei,,ht 1 ,re . 0 -"'ir~ ~rd ju t :'1. '11o,...i· g t'.',t yonr rrob- 1-:, 0 0 UPnt to [' ,"in tell yn:.i ' 1 0'"" c'e~, ly I arrr"'C~qt, ",re srl",'1did ;·cr1 : :·ou, ~•ell'~ ~ta·"'" anc ·our ~orJ s ' 1riv, 'on, on t' ~ Cassino ..,ront 11 11c1 ~r l"xtrP.r-el,:r t ~y:::1g corrl~ t io11:J . 1 1: 0 11 Todn~, :: n stec' Jl'in to c , t~ s~"l "f l ., cc-ulrl c i.rect h:.'...s Fr nch Corr s 1 i11 the c'ir ,c";ion f"f T"'"-"' 1 "!-'tl,occ1,,secc11, inster-r' of' .;n th, direction o"' :J.tt"IC ?" B l·onte-Ati"''l . I }1"V~ ius t m"'t 'H'1 Mr• r,o-qjn , ·nc1 re },qv~ P.rrn1.g"'C' tris . Py t--"'fort :is to conv~rc; tl·.,. F-r nc Gorrs , t 11~ II Cor,..," , Fr ,ybure; 1 s Corrs and the 10 Corrs into tl~e Liri VaJ.ley f'or P :'inal rune, • (See OD0r tions Instruction '11, nl1 ic will be publisher1 to""torrow) . 0 "I no'-r ly•ve •'ive corrs under ,..,y cor"'k'l:1d , 0·1lv two of v:li.ich r>re Arn9d cr·n, all othnrs o+> diff'0r8nt rtioneliti '"s • I t}1inv ''f1po1Pon wn.s rie;ht ·rJ,en he C'"'1e to t 1e conclusion thP.t it was better to ::'if,1-it Allies thl'in to h=~ 011.e of them . " * * * FR"';,S'RHZf\. ~ro--F ~BB.TT-\R-l 5, 19/i/4-- In t e rnorni"lg Gen9rPl C:l"'r'-: ·rent by ;jeAT' to vi sit tli.e Co'1I'1anrl post of' tl-ie 34th Division r-it Serv2ro anc1 gPi'1'3d a +'irst hn.nd .:def' of the rro/7:r'ess o-r tli.8 brittle "or Crc:sino . Troop'> of' tre P3rd Infontry bve reo.c>1Ad the outs\:irts of tt ci to· m but ri.ro m0etinq: bitter P nd det0r,.,,; ned resi s tPnce from the Gerrrns rr o r-re dug in in th0 tovm . On tl e road U:e Ganer-1 net anrl t al1 :ed for a ·vhiln FHh Ge 11erel Yeyes 'Tho h0 hrs directec1 to re- group his forces as decided in 'Teste ·driy 1 s co 11:f'erence , puttinrr the 30th Division in north of Cassino to tri. 1re tre ,-1ountrin Vir-iss trer,3 . 1 ::;:n the rtfternoon the '1'1n"-r 0 l rer1dned <>t t½e ccr.n~r· d ro""t, c isr-,osj11.p; of r-id rrinist~at:lve 1"1a·\,t9rs . The Qqnerl rietermined to flv to /\.:"lzio i11 tre M.orn:inr- rind tissure M.nself' thrt th-i•10's fl.re ,:i;oi"l.g rrorPrly ti,0rc . I1:1 the n"'t9rnoon re went by jAer to the 3Rth 1.~v~cur-tion Por;pH::i 1 , · h<1re he visited m;:iny pPtirmts wounded on the Cn.ssino f'ront i'1 recent or9ratio-1s . At rlinYJ. ,r J-,0 0ntertnJned Lt . Col. Wood , r.:o,,:,Pnd 4 y; (V'ficer o-r the ''103ritrl , Pn<' ~hree of h:ls of'ficers , togethPr "lith t•r . & Trs . tltev0nso·1 of the ''7eric"'n Fed Cross . ()r,erntior,s Tnst::1uction 1tl/1- wc1s i '3sued toc'IPy ::i.nr' is 7Hoted b~lo.r: �1. Upon t 11e c11ptuse o;-~ GA,)cTfO J-,nj_ghts Pnd the occupr>tion of n bridgehead j n LJJU V::- Uey sonth of Ci' S 1rro, Ti'i +>tr ArY'ly on the G.A.RJG-LIAJJO-~./1 I IDO front continues tb~ -ittn.ck to the north '-''1.d .,,.,orth,vest . 11 9.. F,.,ench "':'T;ed:i tj_onPrv Corns , cons· r:tinr; 3d Alp;erj"'n Divisions , :.~einforced, will: 0"" the .,nd :!orocc::m and (1) Attack to the ·rest, within i..ts zo 11e o-" Pction , riwJd np; its r1n.in e,:,"'ort aloni:; the m-,'P.-SIJ,1';-n()CG ~ crr,;ccl\ tY'a il , seize RO"iGA. '3ECCA A.riri the high gro1mr east o.(> the '"Alfa River . n tt1e~ d~_rectfo·1 of ATrrA. (2) Cont~nue pr9~s1,1.r0 (3) Vin.int<> in cont"' ct ..;j th F:ishth Arri:r. 2• II Oorrs , co11si st.; rig o.c-- tfle -~/4,tr nnO 16th Divisions nnr1 Combc't Cori1"1P'1d n'9" , 1st frrnoreCi I'iv, .... 9~7.+'orced, 1ill: (?) Assi,.,t t 1e "ey 7.ef"l'\11Ci Co1~·r:,s jn its cros2111f" of tbe B..t} IDO and debonc11•--,ent "nto the LITIT V"lley. (3) r";ubseriurmtl~r att13clr to t}-•9 r1orth"est vri trin its zo'1e of' l'ction. c. ,Jrr:r Ze,-ilrmd CorDs , consistina; of' 2d 'Tew Ze'"land anr L,tb I"1dfon DjvisionB, r'3~n"nrced , '·rill: (1) A<,<,enblG -in the "T TP.C'(!CTTIO fl.re:> er'>t of tre R!J IDO . (?) Be '"'repnrec, on Army ord0r, to debouch into the I.I11I Vr:i lley, t}1 ro 1 1_r,h oleri1ents of IT (!orps, 8.'•.ri rn0k'y ~ts rrin e+>fort n.lo,1g -.;f"-;[1','l['Y 6 attac 1c to t},e 11orthwest ,-,ithin its zone of act·o11 . J)R"lS ,d. 10 Corns , consistir,c,; of' the 5, 1/i, ".11r 56 Divisi.o"'l.s (less 168 Pr:i..g) vrill: (2) CC'r stP 1 ljr-ht forcAs , r:1n..;nt1=dn cont..,ct vdt rand .; n tJ...e direction o+> 1-,vw IA. 1 J2i'1P" (3) rrpo"1 cnrtw·e of' 7 GTO"P.GIO bo prep['rerl. to the nest 1:1nc1 '1o.,...tr"est . (netr ils 1 rter) . 011 th,=,, 9neriy on the Arr1y orrer to e:;.,..,,.lo:t �U+) 11 !~ . l rotect le:':t f}.[1n}r of ::'jf't'- Army. +,"l"'l Iristructio''.'3 f'or coorr1in"tioYJ. c,f ['rtillerY f':ires 11ill be isr:ued sep- nrately. " * * fR.,,'"'F.'•IZAJJ0 --""'-;:9".U~'R.Y (, , lr:J!i/4,-- Gem:rA.l Glnr 1 " 19ft f'or tJ-i9 be.,chherid h:r C-/+7 from l"arc;;,nir;e Pirroy,t, to ,-,l icr h9 flew 1)y ~ub . Fe "'PS accor-r~·ni0d ')y Crrtriin LRmrso11., 'r· . Peach, c;ergennts rolr1en An' ~;uitte:1-nen anc1 triA frdtbful ,J~rg1;ant Chr,ney. Jn thr:, rlane '7ith the r.,rty there also 1ent G,~nerr,l Brpc,shaw rn/ his 1:1.ide, Lieutenent Re'1le'r, a.:nn ·~a.jor Ross, of the G-1~ Section. 1 Soon Rf't0:r- arrivii:1i:; Pt tre .,,j +'th Armv A1'w1 nce Crrrir>Rncl fost r>t AYlzio, G9vie1 ral ClPrk c enPrtnrl to visit VI Corrr--, 3rd Divisio'1 , 7-st :9rittsb D:vision, 1st rmorPr Divi:--:i_on a'1a the Speci~l '~nrvice ..,orce, T'r:,turnj•1.o; to hi-c:; comfl['nd rost jn m~d-.,+'ternoon <>-"ter rriv:i 1'"' dj,c,Fsed t)113 sjtiction vrith the vrrious COl'll"!Pnr18rs o+> t 1 ,e'V3 1m~ ts r>ncl "1emb9rs of' tJ-,e5r st8 ffs . At 171. 5 G(m--ir" 1 Clic-rk clrove by jee to thA VI Corrs co,~~"nd r 03t "rl---erA he hE>d d:l nner ;7ith GP:riciral'1 Lucas and Feiser, rP.tllrn1'1r to } is corrr.f1nc1 r,ost pt, riooo rours . 0 T'ris AVG"l-ing GeYlPral Clarr receiv d th9 -"ollorjn,:,· s:itu,-,tion rero·~t on the \ Gn.ssino ,.--.ro11t +>rori G0neral Grwmtrer . E~; 1533 . "H9RVY f-i .c:;hting c011tirn19s in the Ccissino nr8n . 115 P,e.aimeYJ.-1; ~s ner:.r "':C''11 stnry·. :1_;7c"er i-,~s hopes of surrounding it thfr aft9rnrovi . XeyRs esti.,, tes ti.~t 1/, Tlivi'1ion ,-rill not be strorP, eno11p;h to t,R1:e Cnssj_no nn-1:,il trr-o-r;:; ;n Tere 1 .l8 RT"lr Cf'n be relieveil rm' tJ:,ereby ( be f'r9e to 13c;sist i·1 Gassinc, "rer nttack. 3(, Div~ sion "'trrts relief' i·'1 Terelle areri toni P,ht . Frenc'.1 sector ,7uiAt . A-',r reports r Jtrn:1 rby. Res11lts rill be 1movm l nter . ()" e:i 11 wi 11 ry~et you oq30 :'on,l2v r,orniric- . ll 0 1 0 1 ThP /\r ;' Corirr1nnc er to,1 rY recejv 0 n P P1r>mor nc1nn from 1,~, G-/, rointi11r out tre crjti~Pl slortP~8 i·,1 prruTm~tioYJ., r.<'t1o"S qn,1 "'1:ir·oline . 0-" ec:r--:;cinl note is the -"pct t:>-ir-it evr enrn tuT0S of cr'1T7Ul1ition "l!''-3 now res+,ricted to ?5 T'OU'1c1S p dRy poncHnp- tJ-,e Prrivc1l_ of ,'l ,,rec;;:iJ_ sh-"r,nent Prom the tT . S. ,r:rich is :1ched ilecl to 2rrive i~nrc'1 1rd . Ge'19rrl G1Ar 1• t',~s riftr-rnoon rl;spqtcher; ti,e :'ollo·I:ivi~ cl"ble tc G-e'1or~1 Gru<>nthor . R r '"J5.S2 . n:-rnrn i:1,::; 8Cter1 entirA "ro'1t, iric7.udj:nr '"', 50L"th, 1rd, /~5th , 1st \rr,or9d rrrl 7.c:t Brit~sh Divis 4 o-'1s. •ro Pct'on torlr-iy. · :i+urtion i:ipr9rr, to be ----rirlr,ell in rPnC -,i.th th;n srotc; bet•Aen ~:cm·cott A.DC' }enne~r. '-ipd not rtrlizec'l Y1ur1½Pr of' Prtj-tp11-1 • P,l:'.1S lo"'t ½y Jenne" • ThBSR rrnnt bf1 mr de up i•1rner'-i_rtel' 7 • A"! cr w·1 -1cerl_ -'-,i-,~t, ·re T1u~t c-et in rnotber Br~_tisl:, briri-,,r'e p:rour or TTn:i_tecl :t~tes c"nk·t te.?m, rr9f9r 11ly t' e -"or 1 er. TH s ''l; 11 ;1'1r;0 i t 8 more 7 ·,ui)sf:.a:rit:i.nl c e,~en-:e l'lP"P inst a stroYJ.P' a ttr c '~ P -ric• ~; ve us •7or0 n "·"'9'1 si ve ro·--er lpter. e ""U"t hrve :>rotl r l.'55 PUn b<>-':,t~lion. r;:'ruscott "'11ort ?/.,,00 nen. 111 rossibl·'"> .-,+,"-'r2 ru.,,t b9 tr 1:en t0 9Xp9d~te th3ir rrriV''l h'1r 0 , j'1cludi'1f YO'tr investi,,.etion 0f seri":inp; th8n -in b" d_r +,rnns:-iort, r-erhn-rs ?O f 7 "'nes ~ dey each ri-i1•i"',[l' t ro 1~r:i:-s rt ~.,,tArV ls. re~~i.-nr"' thi" j s not } r,:,ctic~l_ . r-rrv0 <"1 ~c-nsed "ifi1.l,tenn:rce ,·it 1-i D 1C'rsa l"n o-1:,h"'r"', ~ri/ ·e rre crnvincec1 \78 C, n •nint:-i.in these 1 1 0 1 �a0rlitio11Al unit'>. r,:;_~11 "'t, Y•ust be T11:-1.r1e "VE'il"'h1"" for th"'>Vi "rid for th,,dr "c'ded 'orley '1Ri 1.ten"'nce. rJill r9turn 1-:iy C-/"7' 1,_y"J~no; r0r0 ,,t 1000 hours tor-10,,,ro 7. ~Oll C ec \r -for ""'-i P:hter COVP,r • n has heen inf'orm00. 1 1 * :rn ;c-rFZ..A."'0--..,.e:BR Tr.RY 7, lq/v"--This nc.,,.n:'ng Gen0r11l Cl"r 1 lnft his Anzio cor~rnP.11.rl rost by j er, in thn c"Jmr"'ny of' Colonel Fu0 nleston, VI Cor.,.,., --;urr-eon, Pnd visitr.:id the sSth, 03rd Pnrl. 95tri BV"ClJntion Hosr;tn:..~, t"l1 r:i11.1?' to m'ny Vjftr Prmy solriiers rho :b d b':3en 'ounded i11. r>ction dur-i 11.p the 9,were f':: ghtino; in the i:rr;Giz~ c re~. r 0 "4:9 hrd S1JT1T'J011.8d Gen9rel rnr11<"'cott to '"')';0t J.-,jr, rit the ::.irrort, nn iu"'t before leaving t11.e f'-ieP ,~i'1.nod on <1011c,r'l Tr1 rcott 1 s jricket tre f\ist'ni:;t.11shnd <:erv-ice Cro"'s. '1en0r"'l. Clrr', '1ric'l 1':no ·11. of t"is ,"'·nrd +-or"' 11.u:nber of' c1riys but S"'Ved tl-ie act1rl_ r--,,.esfmtrition ·mtil hn -f'el +, +,} <>t i~ ''oulrl de, tre n·ost r-oorl. Gennr[' 1 'T'rtl"'Cott hP'i bAeri. snm0, 7h"t n9r,rAsser, '·w +,} 9 l_0'1S o+' +,"A two Pr:inp-or Batt9 lfors r>ncl, ."""'to-r ,,.:vi11rt J-,jr1 the Cross, Gr;n9r::>l Cl...,r1· tc·ld l-i'm 11.e thought J,i~h1" o·" ½i"' n-~on ,·rorl• r11r1 11ro-An l'il'l t,n P-o b,,c•- "'1.C' n-iv9 t,11_9 G,rrr"'11.s ri be..-tinr,. The Ge-11Pr:--l f'le"l bric 1: in ri~ nl'l.YlP, to ~··rci""l~S"J "h9Y'9 he "'PS n10.t b~r flrjor [..,_l1rer 8.nc'l rP.+,,rrn9r{ to } i.'1 coM~,r,nd rost lr cub, "rriv:::1,,. ,.,t Pb"ut 11 O. E9 ')11.tertri ined •r11 -io:r G9rnrf' 1. ' c '.j"1.l1on j'.l.t lnnch. Yn tli.9 :ifternnon tr9 G""n"'r,;l r cA,v '4 ,, cnll :'ror" G9W-'l'.'C,_ V,syes rnd oyr,lnined t0 1 1~..,, C"ref'ulJ..,r ,r},..,t hn ev-~"ct,•"d o+' r:- Corr.,. TTe to]rl th0 Gpn_crrl trrit re 1mew tl e troors 0~ ·•,h~ lL,t' ~11(' l\t11. D5vi-,ions VJ9-~ Prnrl o.f' Touc', -;:-· r,1,t~n,.,., bnt he S"id tl- e '3/<J'lP, '"Jfl s t.,..U9 o+' rll ::'ifth t l'T'JV troc,Y•<"'. F9 tolr' Gr>nrY "nl Ynyns r,ot to ~,orrv .bout tr 1ri•r Fiednont9 1,ut to cr'1.C9"'t"['te O"' trki11."' t11e ri-;11. g1"onncl inmedi"t"l:r north r,f C<F·sino. T;if,J.-, th~~s crcint,1r9d, t},9 cro"s of t e Ro··ido bv the '>:ri=i.cr-;er 1·'orce i--itc tli.e Vri Vrllev b9lo'7 Cr-;;:;i·10 "01 1lr'l be !'.Te"'tl:v- fec-i".;tPteri, anc' tbe IJ Co;•--f' "10·11 -J. !lP7e :=i.cri0verl i+, i· T'!P.di::ite l'li sion. Geriel"'l Gln~l nt,,rta-inAd Ge'1.r>rPl ·nr:=i.11., thA Ar'1.y 3·iannl ('-l"'ficer ""er dinrer. 0 0 0 1 0 t1 i S 01 0 1 Th:_s -ft8rnnon General Clark c ictA.ted the follovri"lg natAr~al fer ;'1.elusio,~ 111 nir.ry: "'JisitAd Anzio brid~0ree..r1 , est0rc1 n • "'nd SfP.rit tr,, d· y visiting all forward units nnrl c'iscu•:ni'1.n- tl-v'.3 s1tu.,tion ·•:'tb COT'1"1Pc'1dAr • Conc'.~_cerrr ') "111rroV<,"'ent hqs tPk8n nlpce 'n the r,e.,''-,,yy,jve ciet-u. • 'r ,l'Ae }-!r,n P1'9 '"i"l" JT8f"'r9d - the pre,e11.t f'ro"l.t 1 in°, t,}•9 . '1.tc::r"18di te 8.11.'1 t,ly, C"n£ 1, tl P, l8ttar 1y,~inr: ,-,,i nerl f'""ld prnp<1r":lc'l -,;th bn1~hed ---ire. "':-c, '3rd J~.Vi'"'it'n ""> n;et,e,"Ylf" '°'trfiahten:,;d out, ,.,,lthourth it ,s thin on its ''lest ..c,1ri'1.1 . r · "It ··s rinly after -':,"11-~YJ.P ·ith GA:1,PrA.l 1enYJev thrt T b0.,c;r11. ,~r: 1~r; u, ,0'" 0f t e lo<1ses li8 lnd usta-1~130 i_r try-i11.,,. to frctr"c.cite his 11 te,1t frc-"" t,br, --1riYJ.';er 11 • I J:y·cl '"'U·..,~este")i'.' tr TuCMl to ··ithdr~i,•r th"t sA.liPnt. Jeri-ney "'FIS rAluctrnt to do so becflu"e nf I l9YPn• er', jnf'J 1ence, trn l,.,tter hrvi,1"' "'e7.t th~t the "'1871l could 11.ot attn~'-. :'n.wt"'-r lo<;t rhcut 700 or 8rn '"191", 7 " tr,--. 1 - , 'P1.rl 11 '3iY-rou'1.C1 8r r'1.titQn1< l'.;ll'1S. :re S"er1,:,d 1uite cor,rlacent f 11.cl +'9lt tbrt '18 ..,,.,3 111:ite l_11e'cr not to '1rve 1o9t 'l •}olG b:rjrride. D:~cu.Jserl siturtio11. --ri.th r.;..-.~~es "'n'l 'Trrr'Jn11., rinc1 -it ~s a sou,...ce of srtisf- ction to 1-no r tlcrt tl,ose t•m .nhl0 co-m,.,,pnr1ers f'T'O -in re·n·,-.ve cJ1.'1 r-pJl~na t0rrotle3r. �HLucris nes not r:ro ~nt-:; detriil., . I 111'P-8d h;m to rl1:n"1n"te HFlrrnon rs his 'h.n .. llesty,o-rer rinc, 'T'qnl· O.f.'fi ':!<Jr .1..,0 c orcl7 '1Pt9 th9 11019 d0f911se . Fe rrr"'rently r''l'3 no '"'!Oh;le trn'· c'est,r1 -r9r un;t tc r 1 1"h ""ror-i '"'lace to Pl"Ce t:"3 thr' sit11rition rerpire" ; t . :r t,07.11 Lucris +,o use ~r"r1 shf1., 4n -t,},,-_,t co ··1n°ctic'1, +'oy, 'lnti- r>ircr~ft mms c::iri hr: used ; n an rintl - tfl'1l:: role . Al 7_ the o;non I .c;ot +'rom thAt su,.,.P-0,tion V-8.S p crihl" -<>ro,.,, 111.l;I to qf,mrl 1,;., an.oth~r 'lnti-8.;_rcr.-,f't P-1.m bc+,t,lion. I know it, r,r-n not be ~1p4nt. ;n90 4 n t 1y,t rire"' . It rou:r1 1Jc e~si!"Jr to send hil'l a ':'D Dr>ttPlion , and I P!"'l s,r-i:1cHng h 4 'f'1 t 1·m C0"1"r'rni<;"' '1'1'1 r>10tJ,nr hatklion of 155 ~uns for co mt0r-battery "rJor • A.r-i '1.lso r:etti>1p; r 4 T"' hi3 rerl,,c0rirmts ~mm0dirt9lv 8.nd setti"rJP ur +,'·0 ·"i,-,.,.t co,..,,brit +.erim o-" the R~th rnvi"'ior>· tr r,c 4 ntr -'.:,},9 bridP"0h0ari . 1" 1 1 1 11 Dur~--i~ mo"t o"' :resterdP.v- ,,..-..t".lrnoon tbor0 vnc; lo11r, r-:inrr9 r:hn 7 ljnr-• of the Anzio- 'Jettu.no flr9ri. , i·-icl,ir1 ; r>~ om· CO'"""'J, ·10 poc::t . ~ev9r[l l r;l ,-, , 1, 7 ...,11cled 4 n the comr~8:1.rl nost . A4 r r:!tion ..ms spor-:.c'lic , 4 r!clurl""l.;J' loF-level bo"'l,J7YJ.g flttr-c 1' in N9ttuno t1-i;s "10rn.;.,,,g , destrov;r1 r;ev'3r!11 P"'lrnun"tion truc 1·s r>'7.d C"'ls:ina C"SUPlties . Visit0rl '3St•1 anc'I q5th r•vec11.r-tion i{os-ritrls , "9lec;s0 rinQ •.,uer r sr0ct~w~ly, end t8l 1rer1 ,·th tl e ,.,r,m,fod . 0 0 rriP.et ~,e p+, 4;h~ 8.ir+"'" 8ld nt o0 LS in orc'ler -:.o c'H 'C 1 1ss lflst- minute rn~~o+,t rnd a fr; 17 c-+' his ,,t,:,f'f officers rres0:r-rt ~ncl finned the Dj_qti·1 ,; hed ...,PrV" 0e Cross on ,..,ru'"'co+.t . 117 Tpr1 T uca, detai ::' s . T-fr1d t:rnhe nlaht wes ;_~et.J1n:·~ r0c+,; c, +'or ·re h...,d r0~9jy9c7 , fron rT'es11~,...,bl7 T'Ol i"hl9 so1rces , i'1c'ic-.:"ti0ns o~ "'n all-out a+,+,..,cl• ti,; ..... o,:-ni..,_,..,. _ -t r'irl rot r'evP-lo;, '111.t t,"o 'lrn"~ 7 er 11tt11c1-~ r1 ev loy,ed rhrri.nrr tl-ir; 11~ r, t on tl 0 "'ro11.t o tl e l S7th I'1.-f'r-.ntry <inrl 0-1 thn +'r 0 nt nf th~ 1st 1'.1r.;t:i,1-i Div"-;ion . :30+,1 •,nrq .,...0.,.111,ed . 0 ~ 'l'Y\f'3n.Y'ls . ' 1 1 ...,I" r1 4 S'l.fro··11.+,0d ;n tl-iP. flir ef'fc~t . I foel t.het rlerrnds c;ho1 1ld be nirde for t½.e ::i+,r.<>te ic h~mh0rs to h0 us0d -:n clo e b::1ttlefi,,,ld ,urrort; it ...,ny do snmo, gooc1 ti,9re, n.1tho'1P'h strPter,ic bn:'lb..,rr1m81t m' b0 c1 c~·1 so;~e r;cod h1 c ttjn17; :_•q-': l CC'J"'1rimicPtio,..,s, "or si X 'T\O"'l.ths 0'1 mY r,ro11t 1. t l1n S :not nr0vented the r>nerny f'rctm mov~ 1~ in addit 7on.n l trOO;'S p ni sur-cl:1 8S fl. t , d 11. l "Di -rect 0 rl. rrr ri.clir-:in0e co...,, 1 a11.d * ost ')O "lC''•c,d t0rlay. n * * PK,c..r,:~nA 1 TO-- 1.:9RF'RY q, 191+/j,- -Genernl Clnrlr sp=mt the dry rt the CO'""TTJRncl rost in conferen.ces ":i th v<>.rious ~•:me1~.., l o.,..""'icers 11nc st1-1 ff offi.cers . Fe j s suffer_i.np- fr0'"1 a. verv ½nc. cold r,rr1;rrv:-:ited by hi~ eino; ur ell njisht O'1 his lP-st visit to the 11enchhead. 1 rhen tre shellin~ 1-:as co-n_tinuons n11d heRvy . He '7r>s visited to dn.-r by Colone l DRly of the 16th r:v11 cuation Hospital ,.. ho '{"Ve him thA necess,- ry treatJ"11811t . 1 Gr 1eral 3.'.'. v::Ule , Co":·~prd. · ''11 the XII /\ ir Sur-rm~t , cn..ne in ancl r'li8cussed the . lnns -"or !15_:;:- su:rrort on tJ:,e main ""'ro11t and tre bel'chhead front . 1 Gener,,l Tate v:i sited l}e'1.8rnl Cl11r -c and discusser1 t:he amrmnit ion situ,,tion) It had alread;,r ' ee>1 necessar;r to curtA.il tris rA.te of fire of' 155'11ITl ;rowitzers , l"lncl now 105mm 11rnmunition 8.frenred to be setti11.7 s1-0" t,- n S3rio1 7 situntio1 , R) �this aTI'7unition is used by the direct infn.ntry sunnorti'1.g battrlions . At JJ.30 General flexanrler , G9n~.:::--rl Fardj'1,..,, ris Ch;ef of _,fa.ff , ~nd Gener['l G<J.,..,r1ell , Gnnernl r;1son 1 s Gh;_ef of 3t<J.f.r-, ce~ri to c8ll on GenerMl ClPrk. T1'ey djsc,1ssed the rlr>n'3 for th0 rrospect·'.ve em loyment of' tre vrriou'> corps y-,pking up the Fifth Arrriy, ,ri th r8rticulnr refer'3nce to · t)y~ F-w1 Ze" l<>YJ.d Corrs under G9n9rc1l F'reybu.rg ,.,hich is ri1701 1t to go into Pction. After o,J.<-cu~sin'?; the stubborn defense the Qgrmnns w~re putting up in rnrl ['ro ind C2 ssino rmd the wer>r:i.ness r>nc'l derletion t 11£1t ''rere ::f'fecti:1g the 34t}-> Div"sio11., it "ff' clec~ded thPt t]:-,e di·~posi tio"ls of' the :e•;r Zealand Corpe, would he cr:inr·e0 so 8 s to 'ut .f'resh troors jnto ) the Cassi110 ?ttaclc. The 1/,.th Division is to '"J8' relieved in jtg :rresent nosition b tl,e 4th IndiPrt Divisfo· ''Thier "rill continue tl'e rresent attr>ck of the 34th . The 34th i ill h0 displaced "lo ~t1· 1arrl to the rj -;l-1t of the 4th Indi".n . The fow Zealnnd Wvfoion Pill continue in its r,ositio'1 at the '.1ead of t11.e Lfri Vrlley rerdy to push ',estward thro 11gh thPt corridor . 1 0 0 :'ollo"d11o; t! is co11.fer<:mce, G2nerP 1 Keyes r>nn Ma ..,e ··ut;'T Cr-i ef of Jtpf'f , Lt . Col. forter, stopped to see G81'1"'.,..l11 CJ"r r .,-1d briefly r'-iscussed t},9 -·ror:res"' o: 10 Cory-,s 1n its Pttac 1,. on C,., ssino nc'l tJ.,9 hi f"l- r;ro mcl controllinc; :20 1t9 '1?; beyo"ld 1 1 0 1 1 :tt . rnoday Genr;r<1l r:i.-,r 1o:: '.'lr"'l , ~ePtl;y cc11cernr>d to "..ef'rn th:ct t e GPr'72.11s b&c' h,ribed thP r:istr. ;vric'1rtion rosp-itn 7. w~st9r, ":r inst pfter he ly,d left the be::chhePd end A½out three ho1 rs rfter 9 h d loft tre 10s1-'tal. Colcnel '"uer ,,..,d been wo1r-1c1ed, 0 3 pff•·· so'1S "rir1 1,9e-n '•:i lled, · ·,0luc'l ir~ r 11 of:"-: Cl';~, three '1Ul'se s, , Red Croc;s fJ'--'_rl, ')Oy ., corr-s r1en Rn.cl r"t:rmts, /1'1C 'S 0 .-.c1 been ··01.,n.dod . Th=i hm b b'.d 1 fa 7- 8"' on t 11 9 JTos1 5tri.l r0criTl"rters' 'l 1 1 ' 'v,s--' r ec ·H,0 , 03"1 O'n f'3l'S0'-'1f'9l, m10h of the l osritnl "'1uirT'1e11t, -':11cJ1e'·,,,r; "{-ra.y i.'1~t&'1Pticr"', ra( b0e-r 'estroyed . 1 1 11 1 0 1 1 Toc1 n.y +/10 t rmv Comriander rece:i ved tr e -"ollo-rri_r g 1 e;t ter -"ror'l tre GOC, 'Jew Zenlrnd r.:orrs, Lt . Ge·1. F'reybi1.rg: :~"bl5sJ--,:h.p yoiir letter ::n fl ... recir>l rrr r,r tc •\11 rr,-,lrr (\.c> t e 'J9rr ZeRl/:nid no:r.,· s . I 1 .1 'Your wn-,,,, riessq gP o: · ·e 7 cc · e n.'1rl ,...ood --fishes dl:'.. 1--ie "'10 re. d uitJ--,_ a sen,·e of ;r"r1.e n.11r' E:fTreci~ tio'1 l)Y ev,:iryone . 11 1 'l"l 1 11 nsince "Te r·ave bee'1 }19re no l1'=ive seen your brttlefields ,..,., s0~G f'f t1.e "if'"ic'tlt-Le--: :rm, h·we ha.d to f'pce . VTe re1"life VThr.t the 'UV, f.rr y h9s r-crjeved, pnr'l tre C "fic rs fTr' 10 en of tl1e Leth Indio.11. Divis:i 011 rnrl the 'Jnd ·re~J ~8/llrnd Iiv;s1.011 ·1ill bP r,roud to f'ii:(1t elonr~side the Arericrn, :::>ritisb r'1d .,.rench troops under your co,.,,;1a'1.d . I '70l'l<' also 1~1(8 yo1 to 'enc ro---r much we r"v0 ap1 rreciated t. e "riencly cooperrition and helr ·e iia.vP hr.d from your sk f'f Rnd ;11 t"'9 :."'ormntio'1S 17itr vrrd ch ·,re hP.Ve been i.n touch . 1 0 1 w 'e hore thrt , ·e -rill be f'l:JlP, to plri~r -, 11seful part i·'1 tre di""'icult bFttle lies ~1!T·~c 8h8t:\C~ . f! The folloir-1_ng cr>ble, .'J ;,011, vr s received tod?y .(>rorri E'2 P.Cl'F: ."r- r;r.rc has c.ecicJed tr,.,t -if' ::=i. recisio11 on l'i.,,th y ni1 in front c, nnot be ~btri11ed. 5.~ ·1 ny <::_th9r ,.,.,r-r 'ie ''lill .,...:ui('r'1,r 71 Divisio'1· ,"'ror, l::ighth Army n.nr use :it to r9in'.orce '.ew Zen.l1mcl Corrs. As already arranfs"d by ~i~l,th .Army, 7g I)jvj 11 �1/ sion -rill t!1ere;fore be kert ot '21~ hours notice to !'1ove to Fi·"th Army ,-1r0° Pnd. nll"ns will be coF leted flt O'1ce to e'1f'bl8 such l:'. move to t~ke rlr,ce R.'> '"l 1 1ic 1 ·ly as -cossiblo j f orrler9c1 . To rmsure 70: Div:sion is fully in touci1 •ith •r.z. Corps pln.,..,_s Cor1d 7g Divisio"1 rind :recce ::-,,rties will report .z . , Division C{eedr:n1rrters <>t G qc~o1 '30 errliest rossibl8 IJ'll.(1 ·i:!..l th9r9r.c,tcr "'K'l.int in closest touch ith situ tion on '\Z. r:orrs front ,o th t the '1-ivic,ion crn be emplo;ved if.:' required .,~th lenst rossi 1 lle c1eleY. '~ighth Arriy will sif718 l -~TA N. Z. Divisio11 r;:eadaur.rters of Co,.,,rl rnd recce pcrties 78 ::Ji.vision . crm h::,c: also r1ecided that .:my 1.tlditionrl stE1P-f or sianr1 l rerrniren:mts of T Z. Corrs ,-ill be . Y"\et es 2 t0T1pc-,rar;,r meesure fro'TI -.ifth Cor'"'S r1 rind sipnrils. :?F'th Army w-I.11 noti y rll sucb re1 lfrerents to thi~ i:.r'1. who mill ..,rrPn[:r:i for ~revision c'irect with Fifth Corrs 1-::eepi11"' -:1 O'hth rmy f illy i 11-t>or·w~c . tr T 0 0 0 1 * }R SE'TZA.' 0--F~BP..lTAF.Y 9 , 194!;.--Gener~l Cl:ark spent t},e d'\'T Pt hjs conm nd ~ost in a series of ccn+'erenc,1s . GcmerA.l r,:,y 11r,,. ·i th a number of str ff o ficers , errived ot 1030 r ric1, ·rith GP.118rc-ls CJ.rr 1r rricl Gruen·~}-ir.r, rl:Lscussr:id nt lenr:th tJ-1e qission o.., t'1e 'Ten ze..., lri · 1d Corr s fl'1'1 t.re arr,.,nr:rments -"or er:rrloyine; it aro,md Cassino . Gener;-,1 Fn:-iy',urg , rmon~ other th~rn;s, e::s, ,ressed sc'ne arpre hensio:ri thPt the TTJO'1-" st8r;T bvj lrlin,~s ·ould , e used by tre G-9rmrns "'ncl "'t"ted t):,nt in ris opi'l.~on , i ~ J19Cessr.Y''y, the r s½ould b': ')lo'm do '1 hy artill'3r.r +'ire or hoT'!k.rdnent . Gen0rFl Cl,.,rlr decidecl to P'~Ve him ri written directive to tr..e effect thnt if in his judgment milit"r" necessity rlictated it, he wes erected to fire on tl e p10 11.rtster1r 1,uildinf. 0 1 ) After Gener"'l Fre~rht.1.J'.'f, h<>d t2lv:Ad for ~on, t-:r,e ,,,tri GPn9r"l Clr-rv- jn his vDn , G9nerf'l Vrevburg "ent to t;l·ie conf'erence hut nhere n long coriversr-ition W"S hAd bet !Veen General Fre r1mrg ::ind his stnf:· orf'icers ;-,nrl treir corresrondh1.g Fifth Ar-y ster'f o-l>fic8rs . I·1 -:.J,o T")eant~nie, G9ner"l Clrr 1' in his V"11 rec•~ivarl the nembers of a 'J9tt1P.rbnc1 s Armv mi c:sion vi:=dting the bA.ttle+'rorit - r '1.,j . Gen . Phnff, Colonel Vnn Der F- l ssche end c---..tr in Dr-dtenstein - to(J'eth'3r ,. ith e. TJnited >tPtes acco-mpAnyi.,..,_F: oc>ficer , f'njor Rr>nc1 olnh . AL'tor trese c::in-..,er9'1CeS , Generr J. (;lrrk c' pn in Ciscu.::sed the 1)ric1 p;ehorid sit,rtion with Gen9r"l l}r-1enther . Tri-=3 G rnrins Pre nttrickinc; 0Y1. th0 rirlr;r,hePd in SC'~1") norce, £'nc1 '}rrn0r"l Clnl", is nrrt~c,ilrrl:r desirous of r;ett··nr, <'ll the air support rossible , not onlv +'or -'ts r3sults on tr.e Q9rr1Pns but becriuse of the ' oral_ supr,ort ~;1 ,j_cl -it '"ill. f;~'lO to c-ur troOJ'1. ':'o h lr ::-ttr>in tJ--is (1'1.d, be invited /}e'19r~1 ;. v:il_le to ta1 :e lun~J-i ·-ri+, ri·1 rnd Gevinrr,l Gru9nther, nr,d at l_unch YFJS verv emrl1ritic rith G0·1er:0 ] ,2ville o'1 tJ,e necessity of' i"'lmedi~tely suTPrnoni·F; the '>trri.tegic Air Force tc, riic' i_·1 tr9 brttle r>t the br~ dgr:ihend . Generc l C1Rr1? srdd t}-r,t re lrn8W V""rY 17el.l tirt concen.t,rrtiors d' G-;rrn.an troors "nd r1Pteriel "ere not trn,'iti.cri:=il targP.ts f0r t 1-e _;tr"te-;ic Air Force but thrt 11t tre rresent ti,.,1 0 bnmb<'.'rdnent of ball- be£>rin(J' fRctories or r<'.'il junctions in the nortl:i of Ttaly hAd no 9ffect at 1111 on tre bridf,ehead battle . The nermRn troo s \ were 8.l'~CJRd'r jn tJ,9 'er>cl,heP0 11re" , l'.nd t'~•"'li.r e1uiprn9rit vr, thr,r8, rn/1 -·t WPS tre Ge11nrc 1 1 s r es~re to cnncentrat0 every "V<1il"11le .?jr bor1brrdr1ent resource, h9t}v"r str"te<;ic or otb0r ri-;e, OYJ tPrget"' within th9 ~11z-:_o --ren . Ge118r ls G:ruenthnr ;:i11d S"ville sr,~d thnt they ···Are hendinfl' tbeir effort-: i-ri tl'.nt dj_roction . Ganer,l Cl:ork r<;re,-,ted t rt -1-,1,e ;-r,ntter 17"S e:xtremol:17 si.,.,,nle in his ;11ind; re siriply ventod f'l] qvril,,hle 9.ir -..o·rel" C"PCentrrtec'l 011 the Gcry,,r,ns i.n the Anz-i o b,ttle ;;,rea . 0 0 0 0 �A little l.nter in tl~e [':i"t8r100·'1 tbe Generr,l Sup:rort Co,,m.,Y1c tbnt t½i 9rK1 t'Pc'l berm P chieved . 1 VT"S ;nforn9d by the XII Air C" G0ner..,l Clrrk r't tl e clo~e o·~ the ,-:,fternoon ct~ctnterl the '..'ollo-:ing rend1u0 for hi"' r i ..,ry: 1 t 0 eno- HJ hE>ve b8en some'vhr>t .,-,0rtur x~d torfr,~r bv tre ne 'TS -"'rom the Anzio beP ch:heed . Gene::::-::il LucBs "ent I'lR the -"'ollmri"lP' message: 1Fressu:re 11,crei'tlst Prit-"c-;J. 1st 'livisio·1 cnntL'1u~n~ . Enr:my rP.Tortec1 at CR 873'3 . Sitiwtio•1 not cl'3nT and e:xect loc.'ltion of lin':l undeternin0d . ~ppenrs necessPr r to er:irloy e.rditional ~orce2 to T"Jrint::iin front . li11 keer you advisec1 . ~eriuest 811 avnilrul0 n~r in1d nr:v..,J suprort on nort rind north"Test fronts of sector . Request iT"L'"'!ed·i_pte r-l2ns 1)e niride for tr0 shipment o-1" P'1 <1dditionr,l jnf'11ntTy division Pt the eA.rliost rossihle ·noncnt . 1 1 11 1 rePlied as ~allows: 1101.1.r ?'18 received . Keep T1e -ro,:;ted O"l the sjt,urtion . I f'eel yon C"'n stop T'1ost "nyt1-,··nr '7ith the 35n t11n1·s you hwe . hen you r'?,uest ~ir , try to gi'-18 loc1.t~o11 and n"'ture of ts:;rr;Pt-, . 'e1cthP.r -n9rnitt~1,r , entire '-'-tr effort of' XII Air Suy.;rort TPct5 C" 1 and Str..,ter;;ic ,ill be concentr,.,ted on your front Thursdry. 'le h;::ive a.lerted 1 rr-ivy. } res1me ~rou ri.P'~e your rer:i. 1ests "or nRw 1 su1 :rort tr.rouc:;h Lo..1.·;r. You T"lUSt reri]:i ze tl e 1•• -r,r.,cticPbilitv of' 38ndin~ ;v-011 Pn pr'ditionPl inf211try di vision ..,t 0'1ce . Shipping, TT\f' i -1:.enr>nce ririd "V":.i 1r>bi litv o cliv~ sions .,re fn.ctors to be considered . I :1:-ive 01·dered this rl~te Another British briP,Pde group to irour front . Everv e-l"'f'ort vill be ,.,,,,de to e:x edite its R.rrivnl in your area . ~ wo 1lrl 3A.Y vou crin eJ'""lect it in P'lou~~ Le or 5 days . :::t · il1 b8 167 Bri<;Pde fro"1 the '56th D-lv:lsion . Tbj 1 vdll r;jve -rou t,,o ri<?'F19s of tl1js divi,ion, and ,.,t .-1n e::irly dPtc I conld ""OVe in t'1e 56th D:ivision T-J:en.rlriuPrters . Keep ne posted on your R. )il-i.t7 to SUTP1' ac'ditioml troops. I PT'l "'till ';'11:inninP' on "'ending E'notl:or crrnhPt te,.,T1, 9itl1'?r '1riti h or Amer:l.crn , ::i ter the 167th. Ani "s1dn~ G r,era2- "c'"nhon to rw1r.~r 7ith yo 1 tenporf"rily to act :cs vo 1r ~)eruty. "'0el 1-ie will be of gre,.-,t ""'s-~stance to you . Fleese '"lo r",snrec1 of' mv comrl.c>te of'.,..ort to suTJrort :rou jn ever r no'1s;bl9 r.:r.v. I 11n19 ~ull cc.,.,r.;r'ence : 1 succec,C)f'ul outcoc-1e . 1 0 1 1 1 0 7 1 1 "He shoulr 1 rnon etter trPn to derrnd <inothor :'11.fflntrv divi~ion, realizing f',111 7e11 tl,nt co not 1F1Ve t½9 div:i sion, e~·cert t' ose t½Pt Ar8 tired "nrl comnitted to b~ttle; nor do I kwe tl'e sM.rri·1a, nor co11lrl it be .1r·i_ntd.ned loi;,;ic:tiCP' ly in t'~e 'JeP chh .ad . n In coming to t'1e cr'nclus;_on tly,t , Bri ti '"'h by,ir;ade p;roup sbould be <>ent, I vre~ p-hed crrefully th, Y'ARuJ.t<> on tJ·,e 10 Corrs A.tt,..c1: . Thrit corr" hr•s ..,,pr'e J.ittl8 pro'!ress, so t:c'l<inf; "'nothr=ir rio-,qc1,e fror1 it '"'roulr' m::iJre littlA c.iff9rence. It ~o 0·1t of the li Y1e , ~ nd, "'ccm~d1110- to the Chief' of Staff I s rerort (1'3ri.g?r3.ier Cooh~) H 5s in pretty cor' si,"T''1 . Ro.,,lizin" thP. implic.,tio11 o~ t.-,1dnp; this '!Jrjf;;:-de and its r9percussions 1 dt 1 lexA."lrler , I phon~d hh11 t0 +971 him of my decirion, rnr1 , l'l.lt½o 1~h it tno\:: him bv S1l.Y'T'rise, h8 ren(ily "gre':!o . I r"'l kkj11; tro ]_()7th Brigr,ce, "'or tri:i lfAth or the c,r-17e '56t1, ni.visio,, is ..,lr0"c'y :in t11e be,,crbe . . ThP.re.,d fore , I cr,n se 11c1 the 169th up bter , hi~', ,Jill 1 rt t 0 •·· ol9 rF vj "'j 011. ::n. 1 "Gwv,rn.l J\Je'"'ln( er rho11'"Jc'! TJI';) /1 +'0,,, m~nutes rwo , 1"r0SU."'1rblv influ0'1ccc' by Harc1 ino- '1.YJr ,fteT tel~:'..11g •·ritr "cCreer7, to t87l "'1e tlr>t he horied ':Y sendin"' the I �1-S?th in ;rs to renlnce i}1e :nost tir8d rme of t 11e bt British Division F"lC tbr>t, trerefore, only the rersonnel neec1 17,0 U;", tn 1ce ovnr t e 1st British l'ivision e:mirl"l9nt And thrt rerso'u"'lel come out, o':' tre berchhe?.d. I infornecl him thr-t this was ent:i:!. el'v contrrrv to my i'1r:ia'1 -"n•l thr>t I clirl not r-roro"'e to do jt thr>t vmy, th"t ~ ,-,as se11di'1g anotror bri.:-ade "'.rou:r up because I f'elt thnt I needed thf't extra i'1surance :in thflt aren. r,nrl thrt lrter, Hhen tre s-·turtion "lPS nell in l,;:ind th,:,re, I 1oul(l ',e P'lR.d to rota,te f8rsonn.Pl out o tho ½riclgehead. He insisted, rmd ::: strermously olJjecterl r>nd tol(1 thPt -· f rny of the 1st B:dtish rivisio11 wns to c0:"!A out of tlrie 1::Jr-ir:gAhe,:i,,d nor' : t ",ts ov9r I'lY trongest obji::>ction rnd thet he v1011l•' bnve to g-iv0 me rin order in ,•rr.iti-'1IT. ·re told ~ e tJ:,e British 1st Div~ sion W,"3 tired. I tolrl h:i'1 so the '<rd Division but tJ,,,t if the situPtlon f;Ot crit:i crl thRt all V:'nulc1 hr.v':l to +'i ;ht nri9th'or theY r:ot tir9d or not. I tnl0 l1im none o+' tl7 e troors '!ere OS tirec'l 93 tl1e French or t're :::r Corn, . :re also told me thrt h9 hPd cPlled 'cCreery, o- 'e of I'l7 cubordinntc co~··r·~-:ers, ,..,nrl ok 1d -my orrlors. I told H~·' thn~ I obiAct9d to thi", f'or I hrve tli.e Putbority, ns an Army Cor:, 1r11c'er, to i,sue the order th"'t I hrd c,j•ren . Fe r"h:)d for '19 to 1119et h-tm at ;1oon ~t r·ccr9ery 1 s VeridquPrters toTTJorro' • I 1 1il1 strenuousl1 ob_iect to b:ringi,1p- qny troo~s 0 1 1t o" tr'A l1r:ic.c;ehePrl untjl t1 P s 4 tu,..,tion :s ,.,,nre cl,..,ri+'ied there . I '1'"'\ [;orrv this (:iif'f'ere-0co of orinion l-i;:is l"r~se11, f'or it onl~r [lclds rcdition::il IO;~ric,s tn t'rie rwnv I pJ..:~e-"'1 Y lyv':l, ½11.t I 11il: rec:ist, "ith .?11 t\-ie energy I hrvo, 1-is co,.,,---;rnc i:r£; r.iy Ar'"!.y.n 0 1-,~, 0 0 0 F~-" 1 1 1 At q•)o11t lTlO GAn9r>1} ClrY•k 4 nform,:v' J:,is rideq ,~1,,:,t /1 trir to GenPr<1l 1 'cCrAery 1 : Feridro'JP-rtr>rc; ½y r,ub ·~as to ,e Elrrrnc·er.1 tre follo ,~--y, r1 "7r ~t 11c0n :n orc'er to r~rr,jt hh,1 to flttc.md A con"'erence l7~ -':.L Gener~ ls Ale:x-Hnder rinc' ·•ccreerr. Sbortly tl-ier1y1 "'ter, G8·•1 ')r'll -.- 0.m11-i tzer C'l 7 l'"~cl Q9n0r~ l Gr 1 1enth"'r ,J10 sr if tr•<>t 1 e Ut1('9rstoorl +,hrt +,be er '1f'erenc9 to..,orro'"' '"n s to 1,8 r r:, ln to ;,ett le +,},P, question ns to •h_et11,3r tr'e l'S?th Br~_p;rrle , ,0,,1 d rnr J_r1ce troors of' tl'e 1st Brit-L"'h Division or ',011lr' ')1: rin <>dn~tion to tPP"". G,.,ner"l Clr>-·11 • cr• 7 1":ld Gen0.r"l T--1'rrc1in~ to reF<::sert thrt 1 e hrrl m·i •e ap l: s m:'.nd th"t t 1-r:_s Pou1c1 b9 "'1 'rlrJjtion "'nc: -,,_ot r re1 lnce"'!0YJt . G:rriP.ral ".rr11r, "Tho -is no .1 rt the Fi i:-t,h ,\rr'ly !\dv<>nce ConnPnc F ost, sent tr8 f'ollowi:1P- cq_bl9 to G<:"erril Gruenther tor'":>r rer;"rc1~11p- t,h3 s~t,.1ntion on the fnzio f'r0nt: 1 m·. 051. 11 ""'119J11Y cont:inU•')S reM :r ,79r3•.1.,~e cr""~'1-t 1st D-ivisio'1. Th5s ,njt h"'S s1r''fer9d i1e~ V'"J losses, r nrl Corr"nder rer orts 1-Je c' n not holrl ~rese11t front. 180th Inf'rntrv i beinn; put i'1to lino 1J1:lt'YeAn 1st Div~ sion ri:rv:i lrd Divi -iio,,,, trkinr; over :r 0 rt of rresent 1st Division +>ront. ·-rrrrr:on will e""lrloy t"m COT'lfPnies 0i:- l:5_rrrt Pnd one ;)Pttqlion of "0rliu:1s this' r-"'ternoon to rssist on reestrblishing front in 1-st Div·sio11 sector. ~:verv effort ~1101 170 be 1'1'\M'e to 0-:r'3dite RGT o-;: 8Pth r-i,r:i,sion . T,on~ r"'DP'9 r,.,.t:111,..,r;r ' 1it ~nothcir "',1nu11;tion rlm1r Pt 1100 bonrs. 1' 0 G3n9r2l (;Jnr1r cnb]Pd 6r1P'lirrl ~>1nn;11r-J.vr1 ti j _ , ~ft9r'1oon, F'J 1143, thr") ·in,; \ jyn -"er t,l;,9 rrnT1rt st9--,,.. t~ l,911 to ,,-rc-v:i_de 'Y' Vr' 1 ,~m-~irA snrr ort f'or pj ft}, f rrn:r oper.?tions. * * �noon ~· itl'l Gennr;:,ls ~lexrn-v'er ['Ylr'l r~cCreerv ,-,t 10 Cor:;s re'lc1 r;u"rters at Sessri, ceciaec to flv ,-'O'T. to Car-;ert'l by cub •n1cl ccnf8r ,-,.;th C'r9n9r"'l A.lexrnder th8re. rre cen1Jrtcd +'ro"'l ·\hp '";"'" 71 C"'t\ -"i9:d 11ertr t "e '"'i ~~tl ArT"i.y Cor,.,,E>n l ! ost at Pbo-ct 0900.· . :t8 l"'nded :in the old 4'erriil.;nr ror'l .;n f'r0nt c,.c- t½,9 forJ'!ler Fifth Ar'"'ly for rarc1 Coram.., n,1 F Ost ,-, 11(' rirove Oo··rn t0 tr 8 c-=i c:t le ,-,]-,ere he i rnmer j ..- tely 'ient irrto c0nfer"mce ,,.;th Gen,..,rnl Ale:z::-'1cler. Genernl ra,-,r 1r1 s 0 1 ·rn notes t½is con"erenc8 follow: 0>1 = ' 1Th-ic; rnorn.;n--:..,. nhonec1 G,mer,.,1 Al8':"n'er, telljng 1~jM th,,t VIPS reluctrnt to ·-rai t ,mtil p O I cloc, to '17 'JCUS'1 ...,;th !'1"' U·e build-ur :i.n ths briclw hP,tVl. T d.;d tl~is h,c.n1we l ~,e.s relnctnnt to r2V8 t'~.," w,+,t9r di scussec with J"'P, before .. cCr8er7 vrl:iA'1 -'-,:,0, lA.tter h"d no+,'hi.,,_c- to rlo yr-ith .;t. J fle-' to Alexrnc1e:r- 1 s 1 Heerl'l_11<1rtr.;:rs on,' +,0ld rini, l,ef'o-,-.9 ·:rir"inr [')1'1 L8"'nitZ8T', 1 0 l unaltPrnbly I 'c!PS OF"OS.(' +,o ru+ti·1,.,. '1r.;t~.:::'1 51'.'>th Division 1"1"its .;nto t 1 e hrirl.ctnherrl ri:vl '"TithcrP'Ii"lr "''1 ,s111.r'l m::i.nber o-1: 1st Britisli Di,1isio·1 u,1-lts. 1'.:r~.,.,..9ntly 1'9 h d '"leen tl,e i sdoT" d1iri11~ t~·e 11-i __, +,, -"'or T 1"rd •10 dif-"-l r,ult•r -in putti'1~ ovqr =y 1 lrn. 'To dou',t L 0 "'1nitz8r 'ircl contr 4_',uter' to 1.'·r-rr1 -it. h '1n-:J:•eed to ·-ut ~n t e e-·1tire S'Stb Divisior :=pvi_ : 9PV'3 t"e 1st 1iT'; t~ sl: "'1ivision; tl-irt wo11lJ c::::ve r~e t-m P.ritish .,..,ivisio11s 4 11 th-=, hrid.gnlerd ,nr two /\meriCPn In.c,'ntry I,ivisions, r,1'1S :rarmon1s "ore<> !J.VJ." m~sc9llL.YJeous units . I sent the follovring rar :iocram to Luco.s: 0 1 0 1 RN 1816. ",fill senrl -~e.,,,r ·i. nr' er o+> S S Brit isl' ::Ji vis :.'.o"l M f'r st :1.3 sh:Lpring 7 is rvc1il:>bl i . TJ-,is :)-'.vis.;on :,.;1_1 then cor,sist of 167, 163 [inr: lSq Brir: c es. 1 1 c-ut o': 1 ere 'by tor1orro" 17.0r"irr; l'J7 1!'i1ar e "roup sho'11d be cor-rlntel,r lordec a...,,l .;r "Our ::incls by tomorroF 11.; <t}•t. 169 lr.; r-rcJe rrc~ :iv.; sion r..rerdrp1r:cters ,·::1.1:::. folJo-' it 7..'7:'19di,-,tely es en ft r,3-t,,ffns. •re "'ill '1..-,n 011 t'ro Briti3h In"A.:1.t'"'•r err +,,;o r~~':,sd ·t~t s Jryf'pnt::-,, Divi;:;·'.or, ~'1. 1)riclgeh8ac1 plus ·: rr.10'1 1S "o:---ce :nc1 in Pdclit~o'l to ,.,,.;sce11,meoue 'lni+,. I"' l_o?i;tics · -lJ: rqr-,'t, ~ ,rjll add i11""l.C 'l' 11,,· t,r ,~rJT"t1i·1d ,~ 0" the ::..st fr·1or1xl '. 4 -ri.r:i.on ~r;tVP'"" :~r.;:w",- " T n-f:e11.sivP. r>ctio--i. ~r '"'1lt rjr "),..,..ort on 70lJ:' ~r,,nt todPI • • r8C1U'"" Tl)U 11PV9 nrw1.l f"1mf':i--,-.e su-:-1.·or+, •ro 1 1 ri9S~r8. Co1 1l" ',('tn9 +;p,,,_:,,~ be ro·c>-itr-t')J.y e""ploy9rl, rlu~ .;i1 -in sur,-,c:rt cf .,.,rort roc-iVLOn..J? A."i snro /i,5 l].'Tis·io11 ·-yill star 0np:1r R.C'l,'n.ce." 0 0 0 0 7 "AftA::.~ hnd "'"'1'1.0"9T'J911t ·1 ·,½n "'18t 11od for ld Y1 to 1·1 ~V9, "c•r '1!rri 'IG v--.; '1 r'c_<'c•i_ssi.on :;: f'T0 '•'3 , Jith '}911erc 1 AJ.ex,"n~rn• T "'I'3011P llJ rind told to ½e f'rr11l- 9.-i_d th·t l rrt,,.,<;r ',ac} .~,,,lt sr:nrY: ~t rr:n+,"l"'j Ct";d jn rriy· o+' t}e l<'i·"'tl, Arrri:r 1-iscriuse nf hPv~_ ":O ·~A.ny \11 iAI'.' Cor-0-i. T told. 1,.,5,.,, 1w 07, 1,-; ,:;1 1 '; <1c;sirrn°f tl--9 1•9,., Ze,"lrnderJ t,h9 7g WO, :V'119i"h~t •muc:url te 1..: Tn9 ";~:ri ctly ro , to 8''1 -ilo;r tri0m. : rut cvcir rw } o·· r,t "':~11, I beh=i 1m 1 erstoocl. n 1 G8nerril Clrr 1 '" retur'"l=ed to 1-i, l-ier1d,iurirtcrs <=>t 10/;5 rw1 , ~-"tor ~.,forF:i'1p; Genorf' l fi-rll<"nt118r ('+' 11,ad h<>d oc~ui••n~d ,,t t I} r:ieet: 11[' ,- ~ t' /"}0°1.'"'r[' 1 II l ';'cE' nder' 'i1J"911t to n13 VP'} ;1.r1 ·-ror 1"00. OP fE'""'9l"'S un"t,il ]110, 'Jh"ln Colonel'1 T'";.r'!zo9 ;,n_n '~y7nrc, ·1ho hail. 0 1~ 0 -✓ ~'1 up "T"C"' 'rA.r l"'s, 1/1['( 8 [' :re;r'~On"l_ C, 71 011. ri.n, st?yi"lg "or l1 1nch. 1 Ge>1ff'r>"l (:1_,:,r•)r i'1 -=:;u""'e,-.-i 1g ",-.o, rf'th0:2 01'"' C'1lr'' '1.11(' ],8 "')<;n-1; thA rP.st of the E1.,.,t9rn00'1 ,,r,r1:-irip on pt'pi:,rc; cnrl lrri vrr~ous section c½iPfs in. r, �The hecV1/ ni_:~ rroCT'>J" ~cl--_9(:>-1led irest0rr1p7 t0 b:---e,, 1• 11r Gerr'l,nn tl-ire,,+,eni11r:- the Anzio beBc1 1hen.d '7as ,lmost totGllV ~trillnc:1 ,,.,y -'-,r" rP l Sl,,rk raa n crv, "9rrmce let9 ·in t, 1,9 R +'ternoo'1 --i tr G8'19r"' 1 '"'nv to ri~TTJ thf1t hePV7 C0'1C9ntrr't~.on of' n-ir rnu~t stri(e p 7 ni:r1:·t ~- lzio ' 4 t is c7irri'lti-::ri117 nossible . I ccnceritr<>tioY\S ,·e2th0r . Ge'1e- \ llo ~n ",tressed U"t [!S roon PS 1}0ner1.l 0,l<ir1, toda:r ''eceivnd 9 criblA -"ran ArlmirPl Lo ::;:-y, R.n '355/10, stating tl,nt, the PT ?(ll l''lS b09n sent to Pi_?;9rte -"nr r13rairs Bnrl tJ,~t " rerl-,cei7<'mt ,•rp,3 bPi"'P' Se'1t to • P'""llAs ;.,,111.,di..,+~1:r ['8 p rer 1~c0,..,e'1t . 1 Ger8r.2l T,ucas cahl90 toc1Pv, '"'.F '3/,1, thr-1:, furth9r siell:i'1C;' 0f lio~rit"l 11re"S 1-wd occui~rc;d ~n tl19 1\'1z-io brjcrrerer.icl ,,reP. As ri. r8s11lt 0.., tl-i~s , 11.e rps decided to riove +,}·, • cs-.. ~+,P.1s to +,be ef'st f'l~ ,1• C'.., +,J,., sector tn"10-r•ro1·' • R • '3?? . "Yon,,. r1 ec~ sion cc"'c8rn-inrr l'S7 Bri;rrde fAr3011fll Lncr,s to 0,lPr 1- . Group c0nc11rr9d ;_ri . Th~ "l 'lriP'rrlo r:roun "hon1r1 ccvn3 i.,, -Jquipped r"1·l J'9r>cly ·"'or COI""bat . T'fo hrin-n.de '-'l'.'om1 to 7 eave 1-ieri,c her,d . 11 Per Pn"l C]prv to Lucri-:i . P'J unr,. !IT'fill se11c't -r'AT'1.."iYJ.cler of' 50 Brit, sr f'~vjrir; fR,t '0 s1'-i_r:j11F· is rv·,-ilrhl9 . T11ic; 1ivision "I-ill thc".l C"'1sist o-"' 7(,7, V,8 <>nd 1(;g Brio-rdes . 1S7 Rr-irrtde Grom"' sionJrl 1:)9 cnr1rl,.,tr,ly 7.orred out c+> her0 ')y t,,'10rrcn mnr.,,.,,,~~ 7"'1, Y01U' 10 ,nrls lyr tomorrrwr Y\~r·l·t . 1/)q Prig'lcl9 [1'10 .)-ivi'3ion Fe c'l1uart"'rs ·-rill follo~1 iJ~ in;1edir1 ,..el· PS cr<>ft retur'1s . •:e "'ill plPn on -L,vm Rr'tis}1 In PY1tr7 l'W~ t ro 'Tniter1 ft.cites :n+>rintr•r T)-ivisioY\S jn l,rj('lr,:~horir1_ nl•1s '!rir'"0'1 1 S +'01~cA P'1d in Pr!c-itio·1 to n·1cA11"'19ous units . P' lo.,.istics vlill nr:,:rr1it, I ~-,ill r-ild rrri<ln,.,Jl~r th"l ,,,erin.5nclor of t,ho 1st rr,,or8d ··1vi~-ion .o;ottinr; reP<'1V for o-:'fensive net-ion . All 011t 1.ir eff'ort on .7O1 rr f'ront torlr•r. 1res1•ne vou i,,., ,13 nr-v::il mu,f-ire ,,,,lrpo-,,,t von des-tr0 . Conlri 80m8 tnnJrf'l be rrof'• t hly emrl oyecl , dug i11 -ln surrort 0f +>rant roc;itjons? Am sure 1~5 Div 4 sion 'ill stop 3llA'TIY flrV" YJr;e . " 0 sion ,..,_a 1 The llrny CoP1mR 11der todnv dict8tocl tl-9 +'ollo,·r,rf'" ,.,,87"or.?ndrn'l for hi'.3 Chief of 3tri+>f ~ ith ret;"rcl to f ltu.r9 off,=msi ve oper~tions: 1 "l. 'jt}, the remov'"'l of tr0 S/)t), Divi -;in'"l P,,,o,,.., t,½9 ]_() Sorns f'ront n11c0 trio exchf''1<";8 o,,. t,l•e !/,t11 Br~·':/ sh Divi3ion by the !,th Divis:i.on , we rnu--:t mor1ify our rJrrns . } l0Pse hrvr::. G-3 ,-,.:.9r::-r 0 r nr,w set of' i11s+,.,..uctio>1s .,t j ch · 1ill rrovide +>or tro fol 7 0 17~ 11rr: ~ §; • ,-,,he t<> 1-~n'; o-"' C'l.Ssi·10 f-lnd tJ~e hi r,', f"""('OU 11r nortk10st t'1.,..r<>ff.- b•r t e 9vr ZeRland ".Jo·•TS in the PVCJnt t 1 P.ttriclr toJ11orro= bv the V+t1' Ji vision fail.-. . 1e 2• 'T'he co-ritjnuPtion 0-" the <i.ttMck 'w t,hp French 011 tre e-:ds T0relle ~oc0Aseccr , Pssist0c'l l;y th9 II Corrs jn 'l nrirro•r zo11,e routh thereof Att1:1c1ring in colurm of' rivisicw1 s . Th:i.s will n-ive the II Corrp ~n o'~porbmity to ··•Hhc'lrPw one c:li.visior frorl\ tl-i"'i~ li'19 +'or r9st P.'1C r9f'ittin~ . c . Tl-ie rittnc1r 1y tl·e 'Tow ZeP1'l'10 Corn:?, ross~bly re-li-i+'orced by ,..jvision- (British) i'1 tl'9 Lfr 4 V1:l10y. f. t}-P, 7qth A holc1 :ij7f; ottcic'r i-nintA.ininf" stron~ rrer-mre by +,h8 10 COTf'3 i'1 thP r•;rtiir110 1:1re:1 '"Ii.th on0 d~v:iRion, th"l otrA"' r1~vi3ion b0i11q ,-,~tr.0rr ..,11 f'or rest c'nd �for ult,rriPte emrloyr10nt ir th0 Liri V8ll3y. ~• VP. lley . ':'o hold tre B'~tb Division i"l rrr1y re-:;nrve f•or GXI loitctio11 in th0 Liri f . To holrl · t½e J 8t,b "RY'iti sh Br~ r;Mde Grour out o+> the li:ri.9 for ro~sj ble eT11ployment for rel_ief n.t thr1 brirlp2hearl or lrter ev-r-loitation nros1 ects . "Let I s try to o;et :., pla11 v: . : cl1 -,~rovic1es ,~or P".l P 11-out .,.,i f'th A.ryiy effort i'1 one vi tn.1 a re 8,, ·-,hile ,old~ •1p in others. l le11se e-vTedi te this. 11 Perso"lrl Lucf's to Clrir1•• R" 3rig . 11 1119 to r.rese: t Rl ortrge of infn'l'ltry to ::::ur:;ortinrt arrs in B:d.t:i..s T'i7isior. reco-,-~,,,1c th:;t 167 :n~rntr:r Bri;:;~l'e '7ove to t, is sector at lj_p-rt scr> le onl~r c'1d not Bd_f~de Group . '"a"~_mun r mr mjtion should be brou1;i1t . Otber c111its o""' Drii:,;<'<le Group crn ',e c<'lled forurird later. 11 0 1 1 * * * IR.Er;~,~;TZA1'0--P~B7.TTJ\RY F, 19/_)~--Because 0 f' his cold, Gci,,,,,erfll ClPrk did not Jer->ve the w=-vi tb-,.,our,b011t th9 entire rriorn:: ~e1 . ne r0mf'jned 8t '1:is des', "10r1dnr- on vn.rio11~ 1JJ~v,ertt r.intt9rs , :i ncl..11.ci11p; str ,,_ctl1eninr of' the A:r>zio be?.chherd ·;ith P British Br~g~de Group . 0 0 At 1110 he receivec1 n,, jor GenP-rrl F cH['ro11, CorJnrncler of' tbe ~tr A..,,ericrin J11.""~F1try D~ vision , ,·,ro is in It" lv on rn in3rection tour . Th0 Division "'t rresent is in ~nr,land . Later, Gnnerr ls Gbr"lr rnd Mcf''-1.hon ·•rorc joined bv I'r,jor Genern.1 Robertson, CoT'1mander o-':' tre ?nd An2ricrin Inf'rintr;r D-i vision, "rhich is P lso in F,nglnvid . Gew:ir1:1 l •~ci.'lP.hon returned yest9rd'l~T froT"'l the Anzio bridr;ehe'-"'d, rincl he f;PVe (},=mrmcil Clarl,c a f:irst kmd re1 ort on hi3 :i11rressio"ls of the situntion up there . Gennr,9.l Br1:inn n lso returned from the hr-i d1;1>he:id yesterdr.y. The si tu"'tion up t:iere hrs j_mproved a great deel d'1.ring the p 0 st ?/.J. hours , Pnc1 the German thren.ts hrve been beateri bn.clr . Lnter in tl· ~ cfay Ge 11erri 1 1wille n.nd Air Vice Fa:rshrl Dl' lbiac conferred witb tl1 e Ge;1erPl. Genernl Clrrk clictr>ted the followini:i; with regf:lrd to air support oi' the l<'i.fth Arrriy: vrns only as P -result of my P 11-out ef'fort to conce!ltrr>te n 11 tre P ir in \ this therter on my -'"'ront th::it tho CP'C rutl·oriz9d tbis the dny before yesterclr:>y. I 1"\a·1 ntained that for six T'JOnth;:; the Str:=i.tegi c Air hri s been j nterrupting eneT"y lines of corirrunicPtion bnt not su+'fi c:i.cmtly to r•revent h~ s oringj n; down wrirtever di visions hn neeclec'l , suppl~ : nr; them and -'::l gr tine; with thoP1 . Never yet has air preventecl 11ove11ents or sup,lies beinr- riwiiln.blG in ordAr to rerri:it suffic~,mt -f'ip;htin£; on the pirt of the e!1e17y to stop us . 11 It I As r rGsul t of trie cecision to use r> 11 tre 9.~ r, my stP ff, , ror"kinf, wHri XII Air Support , lri:i.d on £' fine rrogrrm for Stl~ategic , TPc 0 nc1 YII Air ..::u: r,ort in clirect sup:;ort of' the Anzio brittl0f::ela. _,..or JTester(;"'Y. TTn..,ortun,,tely, weather closed in ['t 11 o I cloc 1 , ;:i_nd 011],, rt out 1/1.~ o+' the 1 roP-r'lm n.s pit ; nto effect. : TTord fro1TJ +,he bridrreheecl s 11ow9d bov1 it b osted thP.jr riorale enc how ent;.usfactic the troors ~;ere to see i11cicc1tion8 of close •·ir nur,,·ort. ';8 r,:,·;ri"l l"id on yrrntGrdGy-1 s incomrleted pro~rn.n ""or ~~od'ly , l,1.1t v!et1thlr J-,as not fAr1,,itted its execution . 11 0 HTod.s.v, J.ir Chief n'lrSh£'1 D 1Albi1.c , TrP i>,h,~r ' s Depu+,y /\ir Co•~r,,r>nr1'1r, 8ncl :::MvillC:l ,iu,t called on ''IP., nnf in 2 cr>s1J1"1l_ co:'1.v0r2ntjon, told rie th t the r,eci- ~ sion b1<'1 1"'9en r1tirie t'·d s ~,orni11o; b~r t}-,9 .?ir , ·7ithout r~ference to m<-), th"t the )\ 0 �Str::1tegic, I told t1'e nrese1ct my reriuest to or h0aviP-s , would. ~o br-clc on their old co:-imu11icn.tion job to,..,.orrow . \ ldr ··arsbn l tb.Pt I v1r>s l0C' ~ opposer.. tc this rila11. ,ind hoped he would \ vir=ns to E8 1rer 1111d <"\lessor , trirt I mnde t1-rour;r rin 2.n official lay on one d"'y ' s <ill-out air pron:r:,m -i_n snrrort of' riy bric!1.;-'3heed . nr nr r0cordi11r-- t}-1: s to 1ndicnte thA +>8ct thPt teie 'pj_r oftent~_nes run their Om -mr, ,-rbic: is not ,"'l"JP'fC conrletely coor!i:l.nrted dth tre ITT'.'ound . I L"e.i,1triin thPt O11e 0ny 1 s 811- ont ~Jr effort in close surrort o+> the bridgehe"d on 1·11011m enemy concentrE1tio11s , nrtillerv- rirori s , c'u,1rps 01 nc'l cor,~unic'-ltion centers will cert,,,inly slow nr Pr.ri r<j~courrp;e his +'urth9r P1.ll-out nttr,c'c nhich re is bound to make . At len st we s:~oulrl r:-j_ ve ::1 t a try. I doubt if the.· wi 11 comply vlith rrn request . u 1 7 At 1530 G"mer"l Fre:rburg rinrl menbers of h"s taf'-f' nrriver:'l, c>YJ.d G,mern.l Cl11.rl;: V'ent ~YJ.to co:r.feronce rit 1'1 tr.en jn t},-3 con+>errnce hut . Tbe t:;rour · hj ch al,30 i11cluded G,.,11eral Gru,-=mtJ~0r f'nd ~3mi,0rs o.C: w-rious F-i Pth Army ::;ectio11s , discuc;sed tJ,9 co"lin~ srirloynent of +.re ,.,nd ~i8'1 Ze[llr11rl DivisioYJ. Elnri the Li-th Indian Division, wh.:ch conrrise Gener<>l ..,reyhur~ ' s 'Jew 7,ealf'nr1 Corrs . Followin,s the co 1<>erence , Q9rerrl Clnr1r returned to ris vn.11 to n.g,,jn nork on lo ,isticrl rrobl"'l:11s v·1 ii le GFm8rri 1 Gruonth"r refl" ~ 'lr>d i.n tl~e l ut to act P s host to Goner 0 1 :::"reyburg nt tre t:raditio'19l British late cfternoo11 te8. . 0 1 GenerqJ Clr-r1c fllso receiv0rl in tre late pfternoon P.n intollifence report from Colonel Howard. . Colonel Ho'-ra.rc1 sqid thPt tre siturtion i11 the bridgehead area V't=>S rruch i-proved . For dinr,er Ge·'le}~Pl Clri.r r had Lt . Col. :Port0r, SecretFry, Ganer"'l 3t2ff , as his guest . General Lucr>s rAnorted 011 1'is situ"'tio'1 2s f'ollo'rs this morninP": 1m 353. En°my comrrirntively -i n,,ctiv0 r'•.1.rinP' r.ig'~t . B.elief of Gur,rds Bri p;1=1de by BBttri lion 179th aCCOT'lpHshed ::.--TI10othl;y. EP.rly r9rort on ."'tt,,c'r of 45 Diviecion Pfperr sot::isf-"ctorv, rilthoug]-, heavv f'j_r,hti---i-,_; is in rroF,res-, . At 08'30 h.ours lenling cor:p:,nv- 179tl1 Inf:rntrr hPd reoch9d fPctory . '7 tc:.,-,~·, '"J9r8 puPhed through olc. rrilronrl. 1mderrrss, ? knocked out ut 5 co:-1tinue ~n cJose surrort . Con"icerrble German act::vit;r, co•1position rnd strcn::rtJ-i un'ri~o"m re:rort9d north"•est of f"ctory . Porrion 1 s trin'rs c1~sroserl to surport f'DY act5on "S rirti..ller,r -f'rol"' rr0.rri.rerl ro'"'ition or to f'Ssenble C1'1icJrly to r1eet r t,=m1,• threrit . 11 11 A lriter report frorr G9rerA.l LUC!" c, r' i"' closer' thA f'ol lm~inG -in "'orr1" tio11: 1N 3rSl. 11 Frogress o-f' !1-5 "1ivision c1ttac 1 cn,1ti"1ues -f, vorF.1bl0. . F..,ctory Pf]Y'rentJ.y set 1'1fir9 by our :=i.rtillery n. 1d tr111rs, eltho'F';h erri,,1.::i..1 :imount of r""'CI'ine ~m rind rifle fjre still comjn['. from thnt Pre? . Cur ten','1 on 1'111 sides o:' -"':::i.ctory rositioYJ. , b 11t m.<>in bod;r o:' ene"1Y Prpears to bP to tl1e YJ.orU . ''fo furthr:r h1-f'crr1r->tion co·1cern~nn; :;nef'17 force rrevio'1s1-.- rerorterl to t 1· e no:..•th ·est . !}5 :8i.vision 1:i ll c011tinuP to rusr to trie "lortl' . Rough r-·1r1 he11vv- scris r,rev9nt Pll iinlorriin~ ~-1cl'1J.inr; L ~TS in 'lzio h<'rbor . rr r 1 * * Il'ES '."V P0- - '2~RRT'Al.7.Y l? , 194/,;,--G'3nerP 7 f;lrrk left hi o. COTY\m nr· ro"t !"t 0,..,50 houl's 'Pld le,_-.+, the cu', "ield :i.t ()()00 , "lvin,,. to Pqrc~rni,.,e ··~th Lt. Col. utherlf'·'ld. T:r-iere lv~ met i' "'j. Gen . Crnnon .nnil le"t by Hs C- L.7 , riloted 1,~- 'r io.,... lorle ~, f_'or the n.~rro:rt ['t "8ttuno . Tre v,l,.,'1A ~rr::iVA0 th,:,re e"'ter "n 1 mevent:f'ul journe;r Pt 1035 . I �General Clrr1r hnl"'edi::i.+,ely ni:mt t0 the rePcl.ou; rt0rs VI CoP'IS 'VP c:re ho hPd ) lorig talk ''Tith GP110rrl L11cn.s. VI Corps l.e"'il'1_urrter3 is 110w loc"ter' jn the cellrtr c,f q 1uild-'ng in Nettuno. Foll◊"'"n,,. tM.s, tho Gi:mer:ol 'rent, ;:-uided ,,,_,y r"a.i. Jr cl:,on, to tre c0r,"'1r'1d r,of',t o.,,. tbe lc-Sth ...1jvj sion, 1 crricl is locnt0d in r f· rr:thonse ju t to t,i,e 11ortJ, o ~ tho ro' d ..r} icl' P.083 f'ro"l ~Tr,ttuno to ll'rGc<>ncelli. On the "Pl.Y GPn,srrl C:!.nr 1, T'fl.SS<;d !l err crrt..,in:in,.,. Gonerrl 'T'rurco~t e11rl -to:rred +'o-~ R sl-iort t1.ll•. fiurinP- ths r"rive t-,c p-rrn-n::: o"' '8-17' 1 s ~ere ohc:-erved bombing) tarp9ts +,o tl-i.e nec;t of tbe b"l~cl-t"l9"ti• The G-er""Yl .!>7r 1 v•ris iiecvy, rnd "t lorst r one B-17 wns '388"1 s11ot dovm.. \t the /.,S "-'~vis·ion Cl Q9rv,r"l Clnrlr }cd n t::1lk vd th G"'nern 1 r.:r 1les ,:n,o_ G.::,nerP 7 .,.._.., SC"' 1. The 179th Tn.t'.>rintry }1r,d successfully tA.hm thro tob..,cco -'-'::i.ctor'T r t Cnrrocetc· t½e PVeni"1 7 bPf'ore, but t 0()0(' t~js morni'1r_; tre Gerrrnrs "P,£1iTl re-too 1~ ··t. Colonel }'Prrerer -rrorosed t0 p;o ½Pc'r 1.11cl try O ,.,.q in. 0 R 0 0 Follo·,in<:; t}1i =- cn'l.,..GrA11".le G8·'1erf'l Clc-rl· •qent on -1:.o tJ-A '9:en(111 rrters of tl19 1st /\r"'lor8c Div-l sio11, locnte,-.icers r ccornrn nyi nr, th8ri, h8cl lunc11 'rith G9"19l1"1 irf'rrno11. rmi c1.:scussed hi.c- s.:turt-1..on. Tl,e G0n0r.<>l hf'd 11Pd '30"!9 cnqupl_+, 4 1"''3 tJ.--8 r-i~'-t ""3·"'cY"8 k r rip'1 ·111rs-l:.~YJ.g '1bell2 ne2ar r5s CI but ··[;'', in P'OOd ''ifj.,..-lts "l'1d CO"\p~c e 1 t. ~f'tr')""" l0,vi.·1p- (}''1~r:ol J,rr!'Jon 1 S CO"'lmRnd rost, Go,1er"l t;l[lr1:, · 14 th Gr>nnr"l "" 1v1on "'nrs t, e cth-,r o.,.,f'icers, ,~ent to t e Ci o+" tho :SrH:1.sJ~ 1st I'5.visio,., "1lier9 Ger...,rnl Clrr 1c tnlh,d w:ith G-8nor"l Tenn0y. ThA 1st Jivis~on su"fer8C1 hervr }oc- es J'8S'llV'1", nt l8n'3t in rrirt, fro' i'lfiltrPtion of '.}0rm"11S h9t'ree11. Prit·;_sr 1 mits so t11,-+, t},9 British ·r,r9 +,r"lr"'YJ. jn t:1e -"1P'1 'S prd •9nr ""lrl '·:..Jled or cn.rturec". G011.9rnl Gl·r1· r'ecided to pull this clivir;io"l out :"lc1 i·•1rlrc9 it b:r a-iothr;r r':;V)',1.('r'' rcrr}•<irs thr, 5r,th, "S soon fS por-;s:..ble. 'r2ne,,..A.l Cl"r': t 1 19n lrove to t'1e ,,.,-j·"th A_rmv ~ hr 1~e C}, ·10 loc1-1.t9d 1 jn .i.,,,e h::sorr;:nt o'., the "Borr,.hcse I'P)-nce 9.t 'Tett,_mo . TbAre he c iSClLBsed su;11~ ~ro',-1 er,s r1ith Colon8l D 1rrsa. At : hout 1530 110 lPft tl~Cl cor>"l/'T,d post p:•-irl ·rnnt to tl·e P.~r.,,.hld ,T1 s9re be tal 1 r,d ,,ith Genernl Lucas Yho hed met him there, and also with GenerPl Templar , Co1'mn.nd:Lng the Brit:i.sh 56th Division, who h'.c1 just arriv9d b:,- pl,ne ·7ith :::;cno of · ~::; str "f o"fic9rs to lool: ov0r t,J~e ,70 ,,,,c' -.,i...-': ch t11e 5/)tr vas to occur;t. ?ol10"":1n, ti is th9 G(3'1.8r'l::.. :.~ turmd to h~ .... SI- h;/ S-4"' an.r c1 11, , ~rrivt11~ ~t p'l-.,01,t 1700. }TPre 118 w,t G'"''1Pr''l'3 "lexrn.der rnrl :•rr,1 ~11c; ncl ,-c=J r h:-~9:' tPl''". '.:'here,f'ter, -:e9li.n~; -i,.,r'lsnos8c1, Qr,·-ier'"'l ClPi~ 1 , r9·~:I.red 1 1 1 t,J 11'q V8D 1 -r'o-r t11e 0 9V9n~'1C; . 1 RE i-r:TTZ\ 'TO--r \ ~,r~r~ [ 13, 1:4/,--i'C'<hy GnYJ.er" l r,1, r 1 - , 1or-"'':1l-<-t in, :;.sposed, rer,c.: nPd in 11is V"r, qll ''lPY. He recoiV'3d H nu,~'Y,:t 0~ crll J~s, ho·;·9ver, 1v10. r+,t3 1cled :,o A.d..,icr:str.'.:'tive ,,,,rtte-r-. 3ennrnl Cn"'11on, Co~·•cinr1-i--p; t½e 1°tt fir Force, v5 ,i:.9c1 tho t\.T'",r Con... ::i.nrler T ( -"'·'.~-.,13S'30. .. ~-'.:.r i-,..;"l t,h, ,ro·,1,-,ms ('~ , i.:r suprort o.(' t}'e "'iftl Arri. activ··t 1 es. It. :::ol. Dal:r, Co•1n:.:rr'~nc; +,11_9 l':>t', -r:v~cu· tion nos;itel, G;one:ri::il ''nrti:ri rnd Lt. Col. "lrnce e.lso cPllecl 011 Gn 1110r, 1 Clrrk . :}9nrir,,ls "cl rhon A.:rid "oh9rtso11 ~+.o:;red in 01•-i_9.r>l;, -l-,o s:p- <;oou.11 re to GenPr' 1 Cl<ir 1z, a,; tl 3y ·nre 01c 4:.1 si.r ·v::.,_r ·-.,ec1· to the Unitec1 K..;,,, ...,-r om P ~t'"r the~_r visit- tr the Ft .,..tl Arr1y :ro>1t. 0 0 (1"1"9r' 1 'Jl' r 1: ~ s ;-;rentl~,r concerrn}C. ow~r t,; e ~robl8IJ 0f' 1,r;~bir"" the Ably') r "'.t \ Cess..;no. Q,9r1D,_~q~ ,-,re;rb,,~g ..;'3 co•m-'·0cer1 tl·"t t}•9 (}'1r""rnc, "rP •1,:;·'1y,· tl-18 ~bb9'r for nr::_lit,,..,.,r p 1 1.r-"'oses. G8rerrl ,,ru<mthPr, ,t G-"YJ.Pr.,, Cl,,rk 1s c'irAct-·on, ,:1ct,qt,9d the .,..olJ.017 ·n[l' ""'P,f1C)"'P11,1l1J'l 0'1 -:,Jiis c;ub·'.ect: �;:,½011t lQOO :~ours on nt1u•rl:;, -, i"'0br·•nrv 1.?th , Qr,nAr"l Fr9•>-i11r,..,. t9leJ:,on9d -n-. '1'1cl sti terl, ' T resi:re J.J «t ::: he ';ive,,., 0 :•~ "'Hf"Ort to,.,,orro\·1 ln orr1 er to 'lC:ft~r t'19 c.r19....,,r Y'OGit50vi .!.1th~ CA'3'>: . ,.,~ ::--ren. : "rrit t1.1~t~e 'l:ljc s~o'Y'ls of l? rJ..r n'=>'l e2c] tl,e l;:,n91 to he ::.;_+,tv For1')9:c·, C"'rr-r:i.,,'s 1000 rou.nr1 b0mbs 1• 1 I tnlr r'ronc,ral .,.,,reyburg tb·-t t,}-,9 nr•1r C0''1'11'"'1r13r hf'n rl::lr9ct9d tr:, M 0 in <>ir eff'o··t .Pnr to,.,,orro''i be CC1'1CP Ttrrted on th·-i ··rzro hf'+,tlc,"'ro11t, ~,,_r' tb')t J ' [ l f '10t ;urA ·l <>th0r or r(Yt, •-re ·1011lc he ·1 1'ln, tc pi.•re .,.;,~ t},,,t r u-:11 «ir on the 13th. I told ":n trat tl1 P Arr1y Cor '"nr'er ·,0ulc1 rn.q·•r, P.V •r" '3+'+'ort to coricentr-=i.te ?:lr in surrort of t',e T11r1:La·1 J'ivisioP ..,,:;trc: 011 tre ll;.tr . Gr-i-r1A'l""l --,reybnrg 8m:;--h.,sized t ..,t .e vo11l 1 l iJr0 to }1 :c1ve 811 ·!:;hP ~ 'r ,,,., co11-1, ';9t O'"' +,h.-, 13th in order to "'ofte•1 th=; 01Ymy, Ancl thPt b8 boJJ.everl th9 th:res ni S"'ions r<:? i.u •sted ·18rA the T')-i_n .._:rmrn l {~('111i.re.,,,sntci . I r9r l~Ad t 11~t T . ,.,,, 7 " '1'0 ~nto thJ mrtt0:c rt OPCfl . ttnt 1 ; 1 1 1 1 0 1 "I then crec1·ed ,,::tt} Go'1cr;-,l P.r['17Yl n,~..:i Lt . Col. ·r,nsbc-r011~1i to detsr"1i·1e t e '1,ntu.t'e 0f thP trrn;At : s1nerits 'ltlich t]:-.9 t'S" :39,lA.'1d Cor "3 1--::cl 911bnitted t'1ro11v½ n.lr snrrort C}''1'1J1C 7 s. I ,.ounrl. t,h t j t m1 17.rl be rossiblr-i to f11' 1:'3 one ;".; r:}'t.9r- ½0"'1hnr S Jll,'lr'lron ['V" ., l·- ':ll9 ":o cur"0rt t t'E') tT9vr '3e~. "nrl Cor· S • I Cf' lled Ge11.9r,l 4 'rsvb1n•n; snc t0lc 1 ~"'1 that i.t ;1ould ")9 rossihJ.,, to P-iv0 rj.,,, C''1e s11 w.dro.., 0.,, A- 1-S ril" nP s carr ·i. ir 5or. ro1111d hor'lbS for Cl19 o<' -1:,l·v:i rn~ -sioYJ."1 7J.1~cl' he hMl subri~tted . I "sved h-i11 to rlesir;r1"te •rrich trrr;et !'e de irec' ,.,tt,,cksd. Pe rA....,lied 'T W'l."l+; the Corvont Pttr c 1n:id I• I tolc rim thr't .,. '"'rssunec1 },9 ' [ ' ~ re-"9rr-in; to +.hn f'o11.Pstsr bl,t ti1i=t th;c, -,.,~" not O""t '1-is list of tnrr,9ts . He rerli.ed , ' I r->rr1 r:mite sure it ,w-; 011. :r 1 ~st o+' tn~gnts, b1't in nn~~ r:rise I 7r>'1t ~Lt b0:ribed . rn1-,.9 otr r tarrt9tc; f'~e l'n~rrrnort;:,nt, hut tl-,'3 0'10 ~s vit['L ~h8 diviz:i_o11 conm"nrier ·-rl-o "S ""~ 1cinn- t1'8 nt,t11c f"e 7 .S th"t i.t i'"' f'n e ,-;ent; ... 1 tr get ~ind I Voro•1cthlv "qr'Ge r·rjt}' 'ini '. ::: tolrl Grn,:,rnl ~r.-,ybu.:r~ t A.t 1 )0C"USe of restr~ ctions in co'1n9ction ·7ith t},iG t['rcret I rroulrl h,VP to "',fl'rn a fw:·th'".)r ~heck to d0tern-:'18 the ~rny Co'~¥v,,nr"er 1 s "AsirP . 1 1 1 7 1 1 0 1 1 · , 10 r 0 ClP:r 1• ,;ri:is 11.ot «v?ilPble . .,. called Gen0rrl ~'frc'i'1rt B'"'C tn)f hiri 1 Ge'1errl 'reYbnrc; • qc; p-:;knd +,i,.,t the fbbe r o+> su1x,t-int.;~1Jy tl e f'ollo,;~ng: F~onte CH$Sino be bol'1 b9d toY'lorro-7 . GPn9r" 1 C}r .,.,,. ,.,~ 11 not be r Vf' :· L" ble for , ';out an 1~o·n·, so h') does not 1-no-r. 0~ t]~is rec1uent . Gr-in . 8J.Fr'- hR3 r.ir0Jr9n to Gr:n . Fre7h1 rro; on -it le:1.st t 'O or:~R'liO''S co'1r:Prn;ni:; th9 1<rl,Jj sal;i l·"ty c+' boMbino- the t"omist 0 ry. J:e to l cl G9n . k'revburg thPt r"ter co'1s1 11t~'1g Gen . Y:>.ye", tl::0 Cor'"'s Co~r1 nnc'ler, ?nd Gen . Ryder, the Sor.,,,rnder n,.. +,i--.9 11,th ~iv . , },p ccn::-ider.c>c1 tJ-,E't no militriry necess:itr existed "'or its clestruct~.on . '1en . c"reyhuro- e·0-re· sed tc Ger. c1.~r 1' 1 :i ,~ cr·ns~ r'91~9d 0 ·in.: 011 thrt th8 C.9TGru~Von o~~ tJ19 "on-- '1tr-,rv ~s r ,.,.il it,_,•,..y ;y!ces-;-ity, nnr' t11.rt .:t, ''!1.S unfrii.r to ass~~'1 to f1'1.'T M~L1it.-ir~r cor1r1rnr"0r the ~ic;si.on of trl'i'la ti1e hill , P'1rl pt, t.},., s~me t-ime not PTP'1t rPr'""'jp;s"on to bc,;nb tle rionR.story. ro·mver , in vjrn o" tre nrtur9 cf t' 8 t'"rr;et, r-11.r' i~}i'} i11~~"'r'1R.tiom1l Pnd r, 7 '/:;ious inrrlicPt:i.0 11s '>rrrlv8c1 , T c,h01,:.r l-"Y-'1 to f"nt 0 n e;q,rcssioYJ. o+' or·"nio11. -"ro.,,, Ar,r}' a.s to t',e •1rli1isabjlit•~ o" ... ,1t' or::lz·inp; t 11e ½cr1binq: 1 • G<m . 'I•rr··n,,. stRt90. h. ➔ m1 il l t[' 1 :0 tbe ,._,rtt9r ur ·ri.tl G9'1 . A.l8XP'1c1Gr, 1'1'1(' ·ro•11J' l 0 t "18 1rnm !}rm . Ale,~"'1rler 1 s vjG'·', shortlv-. ' 1Gc,ner2l 1 0 0 n"e"llTYhile I got i'1 touc" with Gen ~ Cl- r -, --,h0 tolrl n tl-1rit he consi.c1ered t 11e dest~ 1 1'"!ti.0'1. o+' tho ro1ri"t9"'r "RS not n ,,,,~litrar•r necessity, 'l'Yl tlYt I s:rnuld P!Pl,e tr'l.t r9rrr:;"'e-'1tE1tion to G0r . T'r -,..d,no- n 1 0n he c'>lled lrtor to g:Jve Grm . Alo· :varder 1s vi9 1 • Gen . Cl,,r'r ::>}so :=;tf'ted +;r"t t',~s Y'"3 a p,rttsr, l icb caus9d h:1"'1 so"19 P.m')f'rr<:13'"'· ,'3nt 3.n vi.9'V o-P the extremel7 str01.,0; vieT3 of G<:m . 1<'rr,vhurr; t 1~t t,1113 r estructio11 nf t>o "nnast9rv is R "'!ili trr•r necessit,r . G~ne:~'1.l c1,,r 1, +>e 1t th<lt 'illl-32S C'ren . Frtwburg recGder fror1 tris ror~tioYJ. ~t "0Uld rlPce Gen . Clrr1r 1-'1 2 very dj ~r~ cult ro-iti.or in tb2 ':;Vent tl1 r t tJ.,.~ rtt.., C1' ~11 0'11 cl "~j_J.. 10 1 0 1 �ttr crilled Gen . K0sreq rit Rbout 0 11-5, ·rho tolcl me t],l='t, he cjd not co11s:lder the rles-!:.ruct1on o+' tl'e ffonasterv to be r mi.li+,Ary D")CessitJ. Fe -f'1.JTtrr::;_n stnted thrt t},e bomb:ir1re o-"' t} e ]'0'1R,3terv "'Olll' rrol-i·0 ½1~, "'Phnnce its v~11 1.e ns R militar- obstacle, hecnu:-;e tre (}0rm:::-11s ronld t½e'1 f'e0l free to 11,e it '"'S " b?rricade . Gen . Yey0s !=Jtr>ted thc:it Gem . lty,~er , G0YJ. . Butler f''1d Col. Bortnnr were nn,c,YJ.·imons in treir opi nioYJ. tret the destru"!t:ton of' th-; building ·p11s not necess<iry. BT r,,a !}9n . K-Jves s"dtcl ""'1 to lis 0-'"', T.,t. Col. iElter, -1:-,o f'jnd 011t ;vbrit in.tell~r"'1Ce re-roy,ts h0 ½rid nn -1::,}•e b11-i.ldj11.,..,. . Co10110l ·;c•ltc,r ➔;old r9 tl,,.,t -Prom two civn.~r-m so~.i.rcec; re hNl rea;'O'1 to ½el 1 '"'Vo th['t t1-;_ere T3re r'>+'11P-nes in th0, t,1,1jld1-Yl<=;, 0ne re·,-,ort st.,ti"1.,. +,J.-int trere ·rere proly,bly a.3 ""any as ?Oro. Colonel 'Ir lter st ter' thrt f'rtill ..,ry CI I s h"l.d suh- 1 tted sev9rP: r0rorts concerninr, the u·::e o ~ the ..onr st8·~v as ,.,.'1 C'I , ½11:. thrit '1e }1r>d no r0, orts of rn;r P ct 1° 1 fire com-irr: from t,,13 build~ng . He stPtod thc:it the rwidence pointed to tho f,-,ct thrt there w'°'re :memy strongro:: nt2 vr=,r-r close to th':! ,"D lls of' the 1-:ll1" ldin'$ . 1 "At ?130 I telhod to /}e"1 . FPrc.~r>f" ·r~c ,trted su0stP'1t-i.<>1l;v rs follO'"S: li}e11'3r[' 1 l\lrn:ander r,f' s decided th~t tr e r'o>1r-> sterY sr 0'1 lr'J. lie 'JC""nbed if GP'18N 1 Freyburg consirfors 1 t as P militr>r~r necessity. He rer;rets thnt tl-e building sho11l rl h,, c' estro•red, but th t he hP s f'r, Hh :.n Gen . Fr0yrmrg I s .iun[;T'lent . If th9re is PYJ.V Y'eD.'3011.able "•robqbil itv thr>t t,lie ,,,,1il,H11_-; is bei11n- usec'l for · rilite.r • nnrro"'8S G""n8rP1.flexam'"lr believes tl'f,t its clestruction ::s 1Vf1rrant9d 1 • I tho'1 tnld Ge:-1 . r·,rcl~nP- th~t I }y,d leen ahl0 to tnlc to G8nerP1 Clf"rl, siYJ.ce my first telerhonr:, C"nv0rsrition. wi.th Gen . Fardinr- P'1c thr,t Gen . Clr>rk ' s view 1 Gen. Clr>r , does not thin"" thrt tr e '1,uilding was substri11.tif' lly P s .Pollo"IS: .sho11ld be 1,(1..,berl, 8 d trPt ;r- tJ,-,9 cor "'lrnrler of tl~e 1.:JPW Zet1lrnd Gorps 'Vere an Ani0ri":1.n cor;1n.:<inder ho •7ould c;ive sr-eci+'ic orriers thPt it vrould not ')e bombed . Ho"P.Ver, in vie,v of Gen . l?r9-r;)nrp; 1 s posjtio'1 in tbA British .,.,ynrire forces , the sjtu"'tion "'1S n. r'elic...,te one, P11c: Gem . Cl."rlr hAsit,-,ted tr f;ive hin snch qn order '7~thout first re+'errinr; the r:1-,"'",ter to Gen. AlezA.nrr,r . Gen. Clrrk is still o-"' tl 0 o. infon tr'lt no r1.il-'tprr YJ.ecessity e~'~ sts >'or th" ceRtr11::::tion of the f!'onr,PtArv. H':! ½eli9V'")':: it nill '3'1dR.n[;er +,J,-,r:, liYes of' rnr,nv c-'vi.linn refuisees in th8 1:iuildi.YJ.o;; '1'1.d tr· t P bo;1binfs r-ill not r'estroy its v~lue r>9 a forti -"icPtion +'or t 1 1e A11em;ir. In fact Gen . Clr-r1 •"eels tl nt tl 1: bo ,b~ ng "rill rro " br-1blv 8nh1.11ce j_t,s \}'c:i:!_,_rn . I Gl")'1 . FPrn5nr; st,.,tnr', ' Gen . fleYnnder h"'S mrdP, h:s position ri_uite clePr en t11is point . He rer;-.cets very T'J.Uch thrt the lonaster:· s' ould be destrove,:-1 , hut re !'l88S no other choice . If Gen. Cl"r:V r'esires to tP11-:: J=Ar sonr>ll•r to Gen. Ale~<rinu,r Pbo11t t,t,e --:u'lJject , J <">rrl ::11JTP. thr>t Gen . Ale~~ander "'ill be pleR'3"')d to dif'cu"s it T:tl- hin . 1 0 0 0 1 J rerorted [' S11mffi.'lr:; of' mY cnnvers"tion with Gen . I'"rdi.11; to G 11 . Cl,r1 r '7ho told T"e tr tell Gen . r'reyb11rp; thrt ,,11il"' h8 still c1-;d not co11.:;irler trrt it Y'9.S ri rnilitflr.' necessity to boT'lb tl e r'o•1rstery, he , Ps vr.i ll 1ng to defer to Gen • ..,re·rbur~ 1 s iud,vient i +' Grm . Fr8:rburg han evidence thct -' nr1:i c~ted tb1'1t the ''onn s ter.r shoulc! be bonbed . II 0 0 I CPlled Gen. Frevhurr; R.t ::>prrox"'r~tel•r 2?00 :ond prlvised ~"'1 as -"ollo"'s: Gen . Clar1" does not be 7 ieve thr1.t ri raili t'l.rir nece,si t. ~ e:vi st~ +'oy, tl-:te destruction o"' the 'On.,...,ster;,r. He :ls reluctf''1.t to ruthoi~ize its bomb-ing unless you nre cert1:1in th~t -'ts lestruc.tio 1 -;s 11ece"'Scl.''Y•' GenP.rf'l Proybure st,,tec' th"t re hPd ri:onn, ~nto tl1e natter t'hoY"01 1 Yh]y n-'t,r t,J,,9 cljvision coromp'1r'Or OJ"' the; /,th Indirn Dtvisio·1 8'1d tl "t t;1G '~vision coT'1T"rnder "'as riuite co•Wi'1ced thrt tl'e borribjnr:: of 11 1 1 �the r~omistery is necessPry . Gem . P1·0ybur~ furth9r st ter1 +,b,,t h9 d-id not be1 ieve th.nt it ~r0111c1 be SO1Flr1 to v:ve "11 ord9r to cn:rtu.,..e '011rsterr T':ill pnrl f't t},e SP"'l9 t; me den7 tl10 CO' rr,rny'pr ti 9 ri ;it tC' r8nove PD -i "'!Tortnnt ob·,t::i.'.:!le to tbe success o-" tris mission . Fe stPterl thrt ri'1:r hip-her cor:1nnnc1 er who re+>,1sed tc ::i.uthorize the l;o"'Jb-i nv, would hnv9 to be fT9p"rec' to take tre resr,onsib:'..1-i tv ""or P. r>ailure of th0 rttr>c}· . I told Gen . Frr,yburg tlvt the Arny Co,,.,>Jnander '''P q repnroc: to A11t'1or-i z9 tt e h----mbinr; o" tl-e tPrget i +> it WPS Gen. Frevburp.; 1s conc-;:lr1ered 0;1in-io·-1 trnt it WPS A nilitar r neces,jty. Gen . Fre·irurf! "ns·vered thPt i.t "l:'lS hj s co11sHer'.Jd opjnion thnt H is e rd lHr->ry neces1:it7 . I t11-=ir> told rren . Fre7b11r--:- t]'.1',t the fljr .;;ssion VIPS f1Uthorized, end th"t he sr.011 1.c'l A.rran1;e vrith Gen . Ke-res for the rernov'll o-"' II Corrs troo.,...,... ~i-io would be e11dri11vered Y t,hj s boJ11bing , ond th~t Grm . ~reYbur~ \Joulrl iet9,~1,ri.11e "'1 l1 om· "lhFJn t:re area v1ould be safe f'or th bombing . 0 0 11 I t1 en CP lled Gen • Brann [' nd to l rJ. !' ~ m to P rr<> nge 'Ti th tr O "ir +>o:r- t>1e bo'"'Jbin;r of' tre rI011r-istery c'1 thci r1or11i11e- of 13 Febru, rr; the exact ti"1e to bA riven later, b11t i:ri. no cnse should Ve born1,inr· be executed ,rior to 1000 hours on 13 FebruPry. 0 "At Grm . ra.crv ' '"' rer11J_p<;+, I (![' lled Ger, . Fn.r<"~ no; <>t ?l/,O 1-rnc: told 1ir1 substPn1 G-en . Clrr1 w·11 trH· to Gen . \leX'l'1.dP.r ~n tre n-:crn~ng contj ,::ill, r as f'olloirs: cernin's +,rFJ c,"'11,i'1's o-~ t} 9 ~011;-,st')r,r. T{e still +>,,,els th~t :Jt ~ s n11 '3rror to br;-nb it . He does 'Wt think th"'t there i"" suff':i.cient evir' nee to PrrPnt the> stntemP'1t th"t ~t -is n '"'lilitrir;r nece9s~ty to bo"1½ thFJ ~'.onastcrv , nnn -l:h~t -in vi"''"l o" tre ~9l 4 .c-io1 1s nnd int9.,,.n~tio11rl :imrlic,tio~s 0P -i+, e fni=lls th·0 t le shoulr1 discuss it wjth Gen. AleYander i'1. tl e r,r,rni."v: . ~-A"'1"hil8 ti, e 1x,7Y'1'~ mi<:>c,jon h"S been l'lid on . It will not be sch=irh1led before l0Gn rn' ~t can he cr,ncel1ed. ThP Ge·-1ernl f'Ae1s t.nt s-ince (}en • ..,r9T1 "U'f; +>:i0l ~ sc strc,,,r1·} - nbout it rnd -in vir:iw of G9·1er<>l .,..,re~rhc1rr 1 s 1-ositio he 1ouln li 1r'3 to t"llr. to G8n0rr-l Ale7°nr'er ·"')out it . Jf' it v1ere [lr,, i~er~ cPr corin"'n ler his c'eci.c::ion V'o 1ln be r-n easv oYJ.e n.11r1 r would not bother G9'1nrrl Plexrinder Pbci1t it, but he :ill tn.l{ to him in tre "'lorni11r.tt 0 1 0 rrcun le"'le11V,,"' Ge'1Gral G·eu9'1t 3r 1 , r,'eco::-cl o+' eonver::mtio"1., ('n ::"re ·blP'P: 1 s re111est to hnmb tre J'o·rirstPrir, Gener8l Ale"rinrer r11onP0 T'l8 tii--; '"10rriinc; abcl't 0015 . Fe told ">8 i1e 11nrl0r:?tond I did not .,.8el the r:,O11ri sterv ,..~1ould b8 bo"'lbGd. :::: co11+>ir"'1ed J,;_c:; belief on t e ,vo1mds th~t 4TTJ.ericPn Co,,,m9nders <'or soTfje ··,eeks now •rrl not -"'ound it "lAce~sarv. " h,:,r1 rio .;rlic"tion +,h-t tle rnonr->stery ·•1rs bei11,.,. user r-iy t1'e G0rn'1ns; t1,,~t our m::i.ny ""'rev~ o-;,, e "-fort~ to bnnl; f' bui lrl~ ng or locpljt,,,. to rrnvent its use hY t},e GFJr~wns hu' Al'7Pys "~iled, 2nd "f' ;t -;rs bombed it Wf'S a better def'e,1sive ~r>strl l <>tior, tl'an befo"e . I +.old ,-i"'l thrt if the GArriiins WAre 11ot in P'1C' :1e t,l·mu;lt tJ:-ev '7ere ~n, ti,eJ certf'inly "'cnlc1 go ~-n it ,.,f'ter our bo.,,bin"· . Trese r,,.re th9 m~l:itrry r9rir;or2 . 0 11 or rel:tr•j_o,1s P'1r' sP,rit,-iro9·1t87 re!l<;cw1c:;, H, is tno ½nrl unnecessrrily to des+,ro~- o.,,e o" the Prt +:.rA"S1IT99 of'+, e world. Bedrles, ·e h<>ve indjc~tioYls tr"t JT''l".lJ c-i,vili:in "/'Omen P'1<1 ch~ ldr9'1 ['T'e t" 1r:;.rip; .,: elt~r ther i11 . Tre eyhrit of our '"ir 9f'fort ,.,'~ici, we cr111 rut on it ri 1 7 ;-,ot rlestro"T th9 builc i r, r ',,1t ,~ ll rrierely ""iVe t},e G0 rr,r'l, 11'1 8'CCUS9 -1:.o USP, it . 0 Al8X1"rr]9r '7P.S 1111it0 i.n'l~strmt th,-t -it ½e boni'ben if "'rp-burr; WP:r>tec. it Pnoth9r evi. ➔ enr,'3 o,. ris undul·r ~ntc:;rf'8ri11 w't½ Fif'tl-i Ar~.· Activit-ies _qn' rlo~n,.,. 11 �business direct '.Vi th my subordinn.tes . It s:rows th::=it he is most reluctr->nt , even / over my objection, in doi11.1s A.nything in disspr,rov:i.nr; Pn Hction of' Freybur,q; for (' political reasons . I told AJ.exA.nder t1Y t j f ~t ,,,as en A·~ericB11. Conmwr'J.der, PS j t had been in the ;)A.St , I would re:'u se to give the PutJ-.ority, but du2- to the noliticnl daintiness ,,,jth vir•ich "re h.rd to bmdle the 't>Jew ZePlanders and ?reyburg, I was reluctR.nt to cause a. najor issue Pt t½e present tir e . 11 0 0 Last even-in[' •srorc. cc=nne thDt G·enerel 'r;'re:,hurg h['.d re lli''JSted t 1 Y"'t the bcw']_>)r-rdrnent he de+'errecl tenporar-i l:;, r<ue to the f2ct thr>t r, oiscu.:;sion bet1 rnen him and General Ye;/AS hAd developed th rrobP.bility thrt II Corra troops "mule'. be injurec' i:" the bc~11);::.rdnocn1t - rprr; cr> ried out ~t t 11 is t~ me . Hm1ever , the rrospect of bor'l1:>"rdme~:1t is still il'.'.lFtinent . 0 11 Today a nessage frori tl~e beachhead announced thPt f-'. jett:isoned Germrn bornb harl_ s~L1 1'..c1r in t)· e other r:r -.;ound: '1F; ~9r,1e,~ nt Do'7' the rPdio orerator 8.'10 r1 r:' ver o'"' tr,e rr-Ldio j,)er r:.--y' +1·,ree o,... tl1r-, eic-;]1 t T'.F 1 s ;1.0 J-,r,,1 been taken up to the br~ dceher,_d last 1veek P s ri. p;uard for General Clt1rk I s imnedlnte C} . T1.--o of the Gcmerr,1 1 s jeeps h9d been dameged by i'ra~r,rmts, anc1 his van, r>.lt'-i01rnh rlaced in a tnnnel near +,he r0Jazzo Por 0 :hese hrd been dnmager1 1,-;; blR.st . I 1 \ Gener.s 1 Clark +,oda r rGcei vr:,cl tre follow5 nc:; cA blr-; fro"! G--i1P.rP 1 J\le-'rn.nu.er . T'A 1007. 11 I have rt'eceived the +:'ollo 0 "in,q; r;1essag fror:·1 General -~isenl 0 1 19r . 1 All rorr last ;,rear I s terT'l'T!etes now 7 n the United 1~i n.-=;dori. Pre follo"ring :lour operAtions 1.'ii th 1 :een r9ri J.ization of the innurnere hle o bstP. clec. you Rre encountc~rj ng rnd with comrJ.ete +>p:ith :i11 ~¥"c:..:: ahilHy to remove them . The unbre8h1ble solidPrit:r of the '"eciiterrono,c,n "'.rounr1 , navnl, P5-r cornr'lflnd ·,ill win through to total victory just as it emerged triur'1phant :f'ror,1 tre discour::i-:;ing cJjfficulties of Jast winter I s Tunisian car,'paign. We dPsire especially to conve;r to :rou Pnd to GenerPl Cl.,.,r 1" our lasth1e; con+'5_clence ln your leac:er•Jhip a 1d our :rride j n your FJap;n:ificent troops . Cunnin1=;h2m , Teclder, Srdtr Gnc1 P.11 the oth0rs here share m;r regTet that we can novr be with you only jn spirit 1,ut r,11 of us send 2.. rroud salute to :rou 8110 to all the Allied o·~f:i cers 8nd men that mak:e up your great f'ir;ht:i ng co:ri:riaml. 1 n n.r-r 0 1 1 111:~ ..:•-r:; 1·JZA u0--F1 :rrnJ.A :,:y 14, 1944--Genern 1 Clnr}:: toctwr, still :;:·,c;cow,rin~ "'rori his cold, remained at his comrr1.'.,."lr1 rost vc:-n nnd Pttsrrideo to Pdr1 4 n.:istr,,tive ,~Ptters and held a number of' conferences . At lCCO in t 1"e norni'1.p; r,9 tPlked ui tJ--, Colonel Hj ckel1r1ait and reviewer] '7ith him n number of r8cords on court mn.rtir..l cases . At 1100 L~ entenant G8nernl Pnders o-f' the -Jnd Folish Corps and BrigPdier :c'rith, British Liaison ( Pficer , togeth<;r ,,uh Lt . Co1. Szym<"nski, c"lled on General Clark. The GarpPthian Division o-f' the Fol:ish Corns adjoins the Fiftt, Army on the rj ,·ht, ½einG the left :lan], 0lement of the 1-;;iR:hth FTFJ.:f. <\ f'ter lunch the C,AnerP 1 received P call ,:>rorn GenerR 1 ?rev1,urg v ho cl-i scussed at sorre len-rth thA rrobl0m of bomGing the Abbey l"t Cassino . GenerP.l Frevhurg sa:ic1 thrt if he was to tRl:e the r~onr ster:,r Fill the \bbey- •'To11ld hn.ve to be f'lAt tened; h8 conld not be responsible :or the cnrture or fRilure to C"pture ·if tl e .A½bey 1vere left as Rn obstPcle . As 1 ';:ener,:il Freyhm·g was le,.,,ving, Gnnerc1l Jnin arriV8d , Pho the t"rO had a short tal1(. Gener2l ,Juin expressed t};e ide2 thRt fla+,ten5no; the Abbe;r wns unnecess,g_r,, n.s troors co111d by-rass :it nno tlvm smoke 0 1 0 I I �it ,·he'1 tJ1e +>·-.,11.1 rlcc-':s 4ve 7 n,,.,tt9r ·rqs rll c ec 4 dec1 . ""UC\ rn_q r-ut GP.nerrl ,;,.,,,,, ·bur,.,. 0"' . "'['j_(' tJ'1rt tbe Generel Juin 7, Pll ·ent u-~ 81Y1 1-~d fl t.nl1" ·:itl-i r',<;n9rrl c1~rk . Qr>'1 ,rrl •vr,•, jYJ. f'rvor of ST'eer1·• rit,tp0i- . F9 3w·c1 "''1Ce l O"'Rstery Fill wrs rer1 ced a', ~.l'1"1CJdi,-,te rush +>or•Aro ,.,.' 4 1,, ... , 9 r9T""<l'1'1 ·ere -till ',roren "1 4 P-1,,-1- rrocuce sr10 '1cl4n re""ult::; . T·e sP~c1 , h0 ever, ' e nul'i 09:'.:'lor0 " lcY'"' r:-=,riod of orw 11.~ i.nt4 011. ·"ollow" nr: t} "l ottr"c1· 0'1 t e h 4 ll before tl"e ~ :ri~ral atk c 1c 11ent ""OT'"/U'O.. G9;1e:Ml Cln.r1r S"'id to G0;,"9rnl Ju-'..n tl-iPt h-"' ','T"S t"c 0'18 bri~ht srot jn R tou,c:;'1 ('!'1 a"1(1 tr<>t he, C're>1crPl vlRr'r , '""S iu~t "'S rn..xious to att8Ck %"It tre e,rlies+, 1o~s::.'1le mo nnt f!S Qr,119r~,1 Ju:;.n '"'A.'J . .Tuin I I G"'nerrl CJ.'•rlr t 1~11 ''rent clc m • _.t G0n0r"l Juin t0 tl 8 but "''1.rl wve hi.n t•m '~ottles o.c> c' "'"T ~'lfl, "lld nll hpnrls hrid a 1 rin1• o+> "'herry to thn s,wcess o" the f'rrt co·ina rttRck. Gon.9r<>l crville tb9n cr>mc tc s9e (}nnArR 7 Cl-or1r, P'1C t ey hPd a t~lk ::-bout F1jr surror~ f'cr +he -i'ortrco"!~ri • op"r:1Vo11s of t e -nifth trn:r. * * * PRESENZANO-•P:EmUARY 15, 1944-Today the Anr:, Commander remained at his command post attending to administrative matters. The air program JrOT.ided tor bombing Cassino monastery with tour groups of "Fortresses" beginning at 0930, and the large tormtions passed directly- over the comnand post. As the planes were eoming over, 16 bomba were released by mistan. One or these hit near the com• •nd post, sending a number or fragments through the Commanding General's area. Fortunately- no one was hurt. The ••sages f'rom the beachhead during the day- indicated that the night 14/15 was fairly quiet bat that air activity- b7 the Germans built up towards the close of the da7 and finally- caused considerable damage in the port. At 0230, RN 5860, VI Corps radioed that the night quiet and that there we.a nothing to report. •s RN 5886, from VI Corps, reported patrol actions at various points bat a quiet night in general. By VI Corps message RN 443, an air attack south of Garroceto was reported by 12 ME•s and n•s with only slight damage. A message f'rom General Lucas at 1750, RN 452, reported three bombing end strafing attacks on front line troops with one rE 109 shot down. At 2055 the following dispatch was received: RN 461. "Air raidl!I port tonight destroyed one LCT with gasoline. One Liberty, Yale, had ,,.o ne hold damaged by fire, other re,rts of Liberty may be damaged but are under control. Air activity of enemy noticeable during the day. Several ME'a shot down. Frederick reports enemy front lines closer in and more strongly held on his front. Power reports our artillery and mortars have caused man:, enemy casualties in factory area." * * * �PRESENZANO-•FEBRUARY 16, 1944•-General Clark's notes of today's activities follow: 1 "This morning I attended a conference with General Alexander. The first subject to be discussed was his disa~int~nt in the way Lucas was handling the Corps Commander's job in the Anzionr:ldgehead. I knew this was mming, for he had discussed it with me previously and, to be perfectly frank, I am not 100% satisfied with the hold Lucas has taken on that situation. When Alexander told me he was dissatisfied, I asked him to tell me why, and from what sources he ob• tained his information. He told me that Lucas was older than hie age, he was old physically and mentall,-, was tired, had no flash and was not at all familiar with the deta.ils of' the situation. I had found Lucas, on my many- trips there, unfamiliar with many details, and I had urged him to send out members of his staff' and to go out himself' and satisfy himself with conditions as they were. Alexander had to admit to me that moat ot his inf'orma.tion came from General Penny, Commanding General or the let British Division. I told Alexander that as long as we were discussing personalities and being perfectly !rank, that my trip up there a few days ag0 had revealed from Lucas, Truscott, Harmon and Eagles that none or them had any confidence in Penny. This shocked Alexander, and he repl1.9d that he had confidence in him, to which I replied, "Nature.117, tor you appointed him". I told him I was making no request for Penny's relief' but that I did believe that a change in Lucas would be advisable but under no oircumstanees would I hurt Lucas, for he had performed well as CoJllllanding General of the VI Corpe from Salerno north and in the initial landing at Anzio. He had la.eked some aggressiveness after the landing, al.though allegations that he could have gone to his objective or to Rome were ridiculous, for had he done so with any force he would have been cut orf from his bridgehead. •r told Alexander t~t I would put Truscott in aa Deput7, 0 1Daniel to commam the 3rd Division, Sherman to be second in eomnand of 3rd Division a!!rl Darby to command Shermn•a Regiment, the 7th Infantry. Alexander asked what staff' l would provide Truscott with, and when he appeared to dictate this, I told hi11 that that ns a matter that I would handle. "I haw sent the following radiogram to Lucas: RN 1741. 'Orders issued this date as follows: Major General Truscott re- lieved from command of 3rd Division and assigned as Deputy Commander, VI Corps. Brigadier General O'Daniel to command 3rd Division. Colonel Darby transferred trom Ranger Force to 3rd Dinsion. All assignments to take etf'ect 17th February. I desire that Colonel Sherman be designated as Acting Assistant Division Comtllfimer and that De.rby be placed in command of Sherman's Regiment. Acknowledge.' "I told Alexander that l would not relieve Lucas in the middle of the battle ) which is currently taking pl.ace for, while a change seemed necessary, it might make matters worae to do it at the present moment while the Germns are attacking. "I urged Alexander to release the 169th Brigade of the 56th DiVision to me immediatel,-, and told him again how I disapproved of hia ~equirement that it have 7 da711' recreation before moving to the bridgehead. He t.1.nall7 gave in. •r told Ale:xamer that 1n the current situation 1n the bridgehead I was taking all Ill Air SUpport off of Frey-burg's Cassino af'f'air and diverting it to the \ \ �bridgehead in aeoordance with Lucas• request. He was displeased, but I told him that it was 1IY' f'irm desire and that as Army Commander I would indicate m7 priorities to the air. I also asked that tomorrow, the 17th, an all-out air ef'fort be made in the bridgehead, including Strat•a, Tactical and llI Air Force, aa well as the Desert Air Force. I told him I was desirous of maintaining the impetus of the attack in Cassino and 110uld attempt to put some Desert Air Force on the Cassino front this af'ternoon, which I did to Freyburg'a satisfaction. I also have arranged for Freyburg's missions to be continued tomorrow in the Cassino area by some of the Desert Air Force, the balance being added to the all• out air attack in the Anzio area. "I told Deirers, who happened to be here, of my prnpoeed changes in personnel He agreed that it waa a good idea. 1 in the Anzio area. I.. -1 •I want to record m:r definite feelings that Admiral Cunningham has been as uncooperative as possible in this SHINGLE Operation. Yesterday- Lucas asked for cruiser gmf' re support am did not get it. Today he asked again. Admiral Cun- 1 ninghu will give it onl,7 if' it comes from Lucas through his liaison of'fioer, not honoring 'lfl1' request.• In the af'ternoon General Cl.ark received a call from Brigadier General Sewez the French Arnr:, who commands the 4th r.oroccan Mcuntain Division. The first of the division personnel is coming in, but its mules, which are an essentiel part of' its equipment, will be very slow in arriving. However, General Juin proposes to put the first combat teem, with General Sewez in command, under General DeMontaa.bert as soon as it gets in. · or General Clark today received a copy of' the fb llowing cable from Admiral Morse to the British Naval Liaison Officer of' VI Corps: "Following received from Nava.l Officer in charge Anzio begina: 'Shelling or town and port has increased. More than one gun ta.king i:art and firing more accurately-.' Request you will bring this to personal notice of G.o.c., VI Corps. Should shelling of port continue the maintenance of Army will decrease, am that the only remedy ia action by our own forces to silence these guns and thus prevent your vital line of' snppl.,- being jeopardized." General Clark cabled General Lucas as follows: RN 1740. "If you will eub111it target requests thru your Naval Commander 1ilich justify second cruiser, Ad• 1tiral Cunningham states it will be sent. Advise action taken." Personal to Lucas from Clark. RN 1738. •weather permitting an extremel.,heavy all-out air program will be executed on Anzio front tomorrow. Let me lmow earliest possible time the natur8 of request you made for naval gunfire support for today. CINC MED of'f'ice here sa)'S that no request tor cruiser was received from Naftl Task Force Col!Dll&.nder in Anzi.o area. Possible that Commander estimated that he could provide necessary support using destroyers only. I shall follow up this failure as soon aa further information is received from you. One cruiser surely will be aftilable tomorrow. Am endeavoring to arrange for second one." * * l * PRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 17, 1944•-This morning at 0930 General Devers arrived by cub plane which General Clark had sent to Mareianise for him. Gemral Devers conferred �all morning with General Cl.ark and sta,ed to lunch, together with Generals Keyes and Crane. General Clark's notes on the conference with General Devera follow: "Had a long talk with General Devers this morning. Items were as f'ollowsz UJ..IEF OF LUCAS "He feels as Alexander does - that General Lucas should be relieved. His estimte of Luca.a ia that he is extremely tired, mentally and physic&lly, and should be taken out. I told him that I bad already initiated steps in that direction. I will assign Lucas as lff1' Deputy, but Devers will attempt to have him returned to the United States without in any wa-r hurting him. l INTERFERENCE FROM ACMF "Told Devers of the increasing interference I was receiving from ACMF in operational and logistical mtters pertaining to Firth Army affairs but that I could handle it. m.§CU§SIQN OF A ~ "H• indicated that, whereas no decision had been arrived at on ANVIL, it looked aa though it would not amount to much a.?Xl feels that I should remain with the Firth Arrq, whioh, of aourse, suits me. I told him that was a matter tor det9l"lllination by the 1t'f: Department. I had no other desire than to command the Firth Army in bsttle and to the successful 00ncl.usion of this war. "I explained to hint the difficulties in this allied command or having Bri• tish subordimte commanders do exactly what I desire. I told him in man)" cases it was almost impossible to handle them like Ameriaan oomma?Xlers where orders were giV9tl and compliance demanded. ACW TAKING OVER MANAGEMENT OF ANZIO BRIDGEHEAD "He indicated to me that there was a feeling that ACMF might take over the management of the beachhead. He did not feel that it should be done and asked for my opinion. I told him that was a matter for higher headquarters to determine, but later, after I had thought over the matter, I told him that from the administrative point of view it would be most difficult for Alexander to handle the American units in that area. I think it is the desire of Alexander to disassociate Fifth Army from those troops in the Rome area. It might be a good solution to do it that way, for I feel that Alexander is not using all the means available - namely the Eighth ArJey'. Either a solution of Eighth Army taking over this front and Fifth Army the bridgehead, or ACMF taking over the bridgehead might be a ePod solution. I can state that it certainly is a tremen• dous burden which I am carrying with five corps, one of which is isolated by sea some 100 miles away. I :feel that we can do it, end hope to keep it up, but if' a ' change is ma.de I have no objection. "De,rers assured me of his desire to assist in all ways he could. He seems to understand the difficult position which we rl?Xl om-selves in with the entire Mediterranean now in British bands. I explained to him my difficulties with the New Zealand Corps. I also told him that, although the replacement situation was �getting better, it was still far t.rom satisfactory• that I have the 34th Division with approximately 4,000 replacements required which S1ould go to them today, and I won 1t be able to get any to them for probably a week, resulting in a week's delay in the return or that unit to oombat. "I urged Devers to get the Fifth Army 111 th all American units in it, with none other except perhaps French, and that when the French can bring in enough to form an Arra:,, there should be three armies - The British Eighth with all British Units, a French Army and the Fifth All American and that with those three armies, forgetting ANVIL, with the 85th and 91st Divisions added, we could drive up to northern Italy. He agrees with me heartily', but let• a see what ean be done." In the afternoon General Cl.ark received a call from Colonel Eddy who is the officer in charge of development at Aberdeen Proving Ground. Colonel Eddy is making a tour of the battlefront to exhibit to American officers new items of equipment which have been developed. He put on a demonstration of various weapons this morning and a motion picture for selected officers this afternoon, showing the technique of emplo,ment of the new developments. During the tomorrow. L•5 cub planes, making the trip head evening General Clark determined to make a trip to the beach• For this trip he set up his PT Boa.ts, his C•47 and his two new in order that he might select the most appropriate means for in the morning. * * * PRESENZANO-•FEBRUARY 18, 1944-•By 0530 General Clark was examining the latest dispatches from the beachhead. He determined to make the trip by cub and left the cub strip piloted by Major Walker, with a stand-by plane following him, at 0830. He arrived at the beachhead approximately an hour later, landing on the Nettuno airfield. The airfield was un:ler shellfire, but no shells hit on the strip as the General was coming in, and he landed safely. General Cl.ark's notes on the trip follow: "The situation was tense in the bridgehead, so I flew by cub to that area. I was escorted by two Spitfires up and four be.ck. It was about the only way to get in there fast, for the airfield was under heavy shellfire, and I had to go in some plane in which I could come down on a road if the field was being shelled or damaged at any time. The trip was uneventful. Went immediately to ~ Lucas, where I soon met Harmon, Eagles, Truscott, Eveleigh, Baehr, Keiser and Lewis. The situation was confused. Lucas is tired - very tired - but I did not take him out because it was in the middle or a be.ttle and although Truscott had reported the night before he was not sufficiently into the western sector picture to take over. It would have been a great mistake, in my opinion, to have me.de the change in the middle or this p1,rticular fight. "The situation was confused. The 179th Infantry had not performed well - \ Eagles admitted it. I suggested that he relieve Kammerer and that I would put Colonel Darby in oomnand. This was done. In the western sector a heavy German attack had carried the line to the final bridgehead position, where the British were apparently in good shape, but the 179th was disorg8nized. The 180th Infantry stuck out like a sore thumb to the east. The leading battalion of the 157th �on the west was out of contact with the rest or the regiment and was short or food and ammunition. Efforts of the 3rd Battalion, 157th, to join it had been f'utile. I was afraid that it had been cut off. One battalion or the 6th Armored Infantry had been committed at the underpass to ease the situation. l "At the conterenoe, Lucas and Truscott wanted to mke a counterattack and decided that Harmon shot1ld counterattack that afternoon. I felt that a proper counterattack could not be coordinated in that short time. It was then about 1030. I suggested that they hold the shoulders on either side or the penetration readjusting in the 180th sector; that all commanders go forward to their front line units and take hold of the situation and make it plain that they hold to the last man on the final bridgehead position; that Harmon's 6th In• rantry, less one battalion already committed ( that made only two weak batta• lions or his - 550 men in each) reinforced bya battalion or the .30th Infantry in reserve and supported by tanks, attack from the general area 9128 to the northwest with the tanks along the road and the infantry veering more to the west, and that plans be mde for the .3rd British Brigade and 169th Brigade to make similar counterattacks from the underpass area to the northeast, should this become necessary. This plan was adopted. Lucas issued the instructions., and the commanders lef't. "I discussed with Lucas the possibility of a parachute drop in his rear area and that careful planning should be made to break up any nuisance raid like this without alarming any of the bridgehead personnel. "I checked carefully on the organization of their final bridgehead position and am of the opinion that it was not thoroughly followed up by Lucas or his staff. I may be wrong on this point. "I discussed with Keiser the necessity of organizing other units, anti• aircraft and what not, for possible reserves in an emergency - this they had thought or. "I went with Truscott to the 45th Division commnd post where I saw Paul Pascal, second in command of the division. He con.firmed the situation on the front of the 45th Division and had already taken steps to readjust the front of the 180th Infantry to conform to the withdrawal or the 179th. "I then went to Harmon's command post, where he was calling a conference of his commanders to prepare the plans for a counterattack in the morning. Harmon told me that two companies of his tanks had operated on the road running northwest from 9128 earlier in the day and if it had not been for his tanks there might have been a minor crisis in that area, for a battalion of the 179th had withdrawn precipitously to the rear when confronted by superior German forces. He told me his tankers had killed about 125 Boche. All during the af• / ternoon, f'rom latest reports, his tanks operated successfully in that area. I then returned to Lucas command post. "I did not go to see Templar because Lucas and Eveleigh and at such a tense period I felt it unwise to inject myself post at the same time. I again discussed the situation with and told Truscott or m:, plan to put him in command of the VI Lucas into my Army as Deputy until something else developed. were visiting him, into his command Lucas and Truscott Corps and to bring I told Truscott �that I would take out Keiser and Hill at the same time, and he could take Carleton as his Chief of Staff and his 3rd Division Deputy as his G-3. He asked for Campbell as his Artillery Officer, and I denied him that reqmst temporarily. I returned by plane to T'ltY command post in the afternoon. That's quittl a lone• some trip in a cub, but it is a quick way of getting up and be.ck. "At night I discussed plans with General Freyburg. He oould not continue ~ his Indian Division attack on the monastery until the night of the 20th. I urged him to speedier action, knowing it would be to no avail. You can •t hurry these Britishers." The General returned to his command post at 1515 and innnediately summoned General Gruenther, and after discussing the tactieal situation at the bridgehead and on the Cassino front, he called in General Saville and General Brann and went over the situation with them. The attack of the Germans against the beachhead is in considerable force and is potentially very dangerous. General Clark today dispatched the following cable to Admiral Morse. RN 3590. "Fully appreciate present difficulties of port of Anzio 110rking under enemy shelling. We are doing all we can now by counter battery and air attack to deal with enemy batteries and intend to resume offensive and enlarge bridgehead at earliest practicable moment. I am deeply grateful to the British and American personnel who are performing difficult tasks efficiently and cheerfully. I am especially appreciative of the work of the port parties under the leadership of Captain Turner." Later in the day the following reply was received from Admiral Morse. RN' 1175. "Message is tremendously appreciated, most grateful. It is being passed to all concerned. Good luck."' * * * PRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 19, 1944--General Clark remained at the command post throughout the day where he held a number of conferences. General Clark's notes concerning the activities and conferences of to dny are as f ollolvs: "I received the following letter from ACJF: IDST SECRET STJBJEC'l': Regi:ouping. TO Fifth Army. : H.g. -1, A. ••C. M,F. 1. Now that N.Z. Corps has been comrni t ted 1.t is essentiitl to carry out further regrouping to provide a fresh reserve with which to continue the battle. 2. The main factors in the solution of this problem appear to be:- �96 (a) 88 U.S. Div. is the only formation not yet committed. It has, it is understood, one R.C.T. fully equipped now and the rest of the Division should be complete between now and the end of February. It has had no previous battle experience and should therefore be put into a reasonably quiet part of the front to start with. (b) 34 and 36 U.S. Divs. have had a period of very heavy fighting and require first a period to reorganise and then a per1.od in a quiet pa.rt of the front. (c) 46 British Div, will very shortly be i.n the process of being relieved by 4 British Division, which must also be given a period in a reasonabl.7 quiet sector before being committed to offensive operations. (d) 10 Corps Fro~~ will for physical reasons remain the most quiet sector for some time to come, and offensive operations there can be confined to brigade attacks with limited objectives without detriment to the general plan. (e) No more troops can be withdrawn from Eighth Army front. (f) 5 Br, Div, hes not had a very arduous time since the fighting around rAINTURNO died down, and, after a short period out of the line, should be fit for offensive operations. 3. After full consideration of the factors set out in para 2 above, the C in C suggests the following as perhaps the most satisfactory way of creating a new reserve:(a) General Intention, (1) 88 u,s, Div. to begin to relieve 5 British Div at once. Reli.ef to continue as fast as the components of 88 Div can be equipped. (ii) 5 Br. Div. to come into A.C.M.F. reserve on relief. (iii)34 U.S. Div. to relieve 46 British Div as soon as the former can be got fit to take its place again in the line. (iv) H.Q. 2 U.S. Corns to relieve H.Q. 10 Corps, command to pass with relief of 46 British Div by 34 U.S. Div. (v) 36 u,s, Div, to be withdrawn into Fifth Army reserve as soon as its extraction from the line can be effected as a result of the converging advance of N.Z. and French Corps. 4. The C in C wishes to discuss the above proposals with Commander Fifth Ar1If1 as soon as General CLARK returns from the bridgehead and has had time to study the problem. Please report by telephone when General CLARK is in a posi• tion to discuss the matter. Meantime the C in C suggests that plans be prepared to put regrouping proposals into effect in the shortest possible space of time once a definite decision has been reached. It is vital to the maintenance of the momentum of the battle that any relief to be effected should be completed �91 without loss of time so that the troops required for further offensive operations get the maximum time for reorganization out of the_ line. /s/ A. F. HARDING Lt. Gen., C.G.S. PWM/gb ~9 Januy, 1944 (Changed by yhone call from 18 February, 1944 ACMF /s/ Wood) INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: M.A. P.A. P.A. Gen. to C-in-c to C.G.S. to D.C.G.s. ROBERTSON B.G.s. (G(Ops) "It really shocked me. There is nothing in it that I agree with. It is indicative or ACMF's willingness to delay this operation indefinitely. In compliance with its le.st pers.graph, I called General Lemnitzer and told him I was ready to discuss it at any time - the sooner the better - and requested that General Alexander, who was visiting Freyburg this morning, to drop by this afternoon. I later received word that he would come to see me tomorrow morning. "I am convinced that we must do something now. I have been so hamstrung and jockeyed by higher headquarters that the Firth Arrrr:, has lost a great deal of ) its power to control its own tactical operations, but I will insist, as long as / I am Comnander, on presenting my views and demanding their execution as far as possible. "I intend to recommend that the French attack toward Atina, the II Corps, leading with the 88th Division, making a holding attack in the direction TerelleRoccaaecca, with the Indians attacking from the Monastery towards Piedmonte, with the New Zealand Division and the 78th Division attacking abreast across the Rapido up the Liri Valley and with 10 Corps attacking from the Minturno area after re• grouping in the direction of S. Giorgia. This will meet opposition by Alexander, but I am convinced if we are to get going it must be done this way. It is abso• lutely impossible to mass for an attack doffll the Liri Valley without first se• curing the commanding elevation on one fiank or the other, particularly in view of the heavily defended defenses prepared after months of German occupation in that area. "I called Keyes and Sloan, Commanding General of the 88th Division, for a conference, and they agreed, as do my G-J and Chief of Staff. "I conferred with Air Marshal Slessor and Major General Joe Cannon, of the TAF today, urging all-out air support of the battlefield in the bridgehead. I &eked these air experts if they could make it possible, through air power in direct support or my Army, to go down the Liri Valley without securing the elevation on at least one side. They agreed that they could not. "Gener&l Wilson called on me this morning, and I had a very frank conversation with him. He is always considerate, and I feel wants to be helpful. I �explained the situation in detail in the bridgehead and told him that he, the Navy, the Air and the Ground had a. commitment there which they must appreciate ) and support. I told him the Navy had not given me support and had acted in many high-handed ways, particularly in trying to cut my tonnage when I must have a certain tonnage there to support the necessary troops to hold the bridgehead and to build up some small reserve. As an example of interference, an I.ST loaded with equipment for the 169 Brigade, which I had rushed into the bridge• head, was in the port of Ando last night when a mine scare was raised by the Navy. The naval officer promptly closed the port and sent this I.ST with its valuable cargo· out to sea. I told General Wilson that I needed the 85th Divi• sion. He said he would send it early in March. I told him that this theater was being criticized for not massing our means. I asked him where my means were with which to mass. I explained my entire plan of maneuver in this area - the Liri Valley attack versus the Mount Cairo attack, coupled with a Liri Valley effort. He agrees that it is necessary to secure the high ground before sticking one's head into the Liri Valley trap. I told him of General Alexander's propo• sal as contained in the re-grouping letter referred to above. I rather felt, although he did not say so, that he did not agree with those proposals. "General Wilson asked me what I thought of General Penney's handling of the British 1st Division in the bridgehead. I told him that I was not too satisfied with it, nor were the other American Division Commanders with whom he worked. General Wilson indicated that he did not think Penney had handled his job well. I told Wilson that I had so reported to General Alexander. "Word from the bridgehead today has been increasingly cheerful. The counterattack arranged for yesterday by the Armored Division apparently has produced results. The "lost battalion" of the 157th is in contact with the rest of its regiment. Appt.rently the 179th has been relieved and is holding fast on its final bridgehead position. Harmon reports his tanks killed about 400 Germans. This is probably emggerated, but it must have been good shooting. "I told General Wilson that as long as the German kept six or seven divisions in the bridgehead area it would be futile for us to attempt to attack to gain our final objective at Colli Le.ziali, for we can not build up sufficient force in the bridgehead to overcome that much resistance; that I would lay in some extra supplies and import extra troops to regain more elbow room in the bridgehead and then dig in, relieving troop unit personnel to take over equip• ment of units going out and to build up in the Cassino area to join up with the bridgehead force. · "I have sent Colonel Bowman, my Engineer, up there to start advising on putting amnrunition dumps underground and on securing a bridgehead which can be held by defensive works by the minimum of troops." The following important messages were received and dispatched today: The Army Commander received the following cable yesterday, RN MI.479, from General Eisenhower; "Dear Wayne: In all the years I have known you I have never been prouder of you than during the past strenuous weeks. Despite every diffi• culty you are obviously doing a grand job of leadership with your chin up. I read the fine message ;rou recently" sent to your troops. Together with men like Al and Truscott you are writing history that Americans will always read with pride. Signed Ikett. l �General Clark today replied to General Eisenhower as follows, RN 3257: ttNothing in the world could have given me more encouragement than your message received during the last hectic night. I had just conferred with all comman• ders and visited units in bridgehead. British and American troops are fighting as usual with their chins up. I believe the Boche has shot his wad today, ) although I may be wrong. We are holding today and inflicting heavy casualties upon him. Air and Navy supporting us admirably. Thanks a million for your thoughtfulness. Al sends regards." Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 538. "Last night have closed port Anzio because of mines. I immediately contacted Captain Turner and notified him equipment of 169 Brigade on 3 ISTS's was vital tor today's operation. LST's mean• while had put to sea, and Turner reports despite all attempts to this hour he has been unable to reach LST's to bring them into port. If certain equipment does not reach 169 by 0900 hours this brigade may be unable to counterattack today." From AFHQ to CG, Fifth Arm:y. R1f R/35-3919. ttpart 1: Following under• water explosion l LST sank off Ponxa Island on 16 February. Part 2: Cruiser ,,,...Penelope sunk in same area morning- 18 February probably by U-boat. Hunt in progress. Penelope was returning from giving fire support with Dilo in Ageio area morning 17 February. Part 3: Destroyers pa.trolled in Vis channel off Menders Point and off the Albanian coast during night 16/17 February, but nothing was sighted. Part 4: PT boats intercepted the enemy destroyers or · minelayers off Capraia during night 17/18 February and delivered torpedo attack results unobserved. Part 5: m&S/M on patrol off' French Riviera attacked escorted M/V on 8 February 1 escort vessel believed sunk. 60 ton schooner also sunk by gunfire on 15 February." Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 539. "In your 3629, anti-personnel mines have been installed on final beachhead position and also on positions forward thereof held by our forces. Final beachhead position organized by continuous line of coordinated strong points with dug in positions protected by weapons, mines and wire except on right flank where Canale Mussolini is defended as continuous obstacle covered by weapons and by mines and wire at likely avenues or approach. Work continuing on this line and reserve line shown on overlay Field Order 22 this headquarters, 17 February. See mine data on overlay "Location of minefields 162400 Februs.rY" file Engineer, Fifth Army. Right flank canal mine installations not recorded at time above overlay published." Personal Clark from Lucas. RN 542. "Absolutely essential all-out air effort today. Have identified elements of at least five German divisions in salient. All roads into salient must be constantly bombed to prevent further reinforcement. In addition, enemy artillery must be constantly attacked. I believe heavy bombers must assist mediums and fighter bombers. Have made request for this support thru air officer." Personal Lucas to Clark. R?f 543. "Request you have sipply agencies give priority on shipping to 155mm gun and 81mm mortar (light) ammunition. If you can find some extra ammunition for 155 Howitzer M•l would certainly appreciate it." Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 544. "Situation as to progress or oounter• attack still indefinite. However it appears to have lessened pressure on beach- �head line. Will advise you when aco~ate information available." Personal Clark to Lucas. RN .3246. "7,000 rounds 81 mortar and 10,000 rounds 155 gun anmunition being shipped today. Have asked Newton to explain to 0 1:Yeill ammunition status which is improving. At any time that you feel your operations are being hampered by ammunition siortages be sure to let me know." Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 548. "Harmon's f'oroe making progress slowly having advanced about 2t kilometers on arc from point 90328.3. Several hundred prisoners taken. Our artillery, air and weapons fire has reduced enemy fight• ing strength considerably according to PW reports. Situation on 56 Division front remains generally satisfactory but some enemy infiltration has made con• tact with some companies obscure. Would like inf'ormation on Cassino front operations if' available." Personal Clark to Lucas. RN 3254. "Am pleased that counterattack has eased your situation. Apparently 45th position has stabilized. What is status and position of 169 and 3rd Brigades? Hope air eff'ort has helped. Feel you have done exceedingly well in today's fighting. Still struggling at Cassino where severe fighting oontinues." Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 551. "Essential that 54,580 rounds 105mm Howitzer &mmUnition originally scheduled f'or coaster but deducted from Liberty David Terry cargo arrive without delay and preferably by truck so that unload• ing may be assured regardless or weather. It is likewise essential that allocation and shipment this type ammunition be materially increased for period February 22 to March 3 due to heavy expenditures of past 48 hours and expectation that similar expenditures will be necessary in the near future because or tactical situation with which you are familiar." Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 452. "Counterattack by Harmon force highly successful. Pressure on beachhead line relieved. Estimated large number enemy casualties and at least 250 PW 1 s taken. Majority expressed f'ear our artillery fire and bombing. Will outpost line 887282 - 898295 • 903300 - 902.312 tonight and withdraw bilk of H force vicinity 915280 prepared to counterattack tomorrow to northwest or north as sitmtion warrants. 169 Brigade being moved vicinity 8430 prepared to counterattack to northeast tomorrow. Situation at present more favorable but all out air effort will be essential to check and break enemy renewed attacks expected." Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 553. "Due to S1ortage or infantry in beachhead and looking to accomplishment your fut~e offensive plans, I strongly recommend despite arrival of 18 Brigade, 24 Guards Brigade remain in this sector. The Guards, although depleted, are still a splendid fighting unit of great value in emergency. Suggest replacements forwarded here where brigade could be refitted and utilized in an offensive." Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 561. "Situation at present generally quiet and stabilized along front. Small air raid on port, no damage reported. Enemy artillery on both forward and rear troop areas increased during late afternoon. Advance of one ,oompany of Harmon's tanks north of underpass on Albano road caused approximately 150 prisoners. Small company attacks with some tanks one �95 let't flank of 3 Division, all repulsed. Air effort today accomplished superb \ results that cannot be simply expressed. Please inform all air personnel of the troops appreciation. 3rd Brigade remains corps reserve. 169 Brigade baa all troops and equipment ashore. Prepares to relieve two battalions 157 and second battalion 6th Infantry west of Albano-Anzio road tomorrow night, prepared to counterattack to northeast. Appreciate your news from Cassino front. Express our regards to troops there." Personal Clark to Lucas. RN 3276. "Thoroughly agree with your 553. Will do all in my power to comply with your wishes. Am expediting arrival of lB Brigade all possible." Personal Clark to Lucas. RN 3278. "Reference your 452, congratulate Harmon on his success today. Again I want to tell you that your accomplishments today have been outstanding. Keep it up. I think your proposed dis• positions of Harmon and 169 Brigade for possible counterattack roles tomorrow are exactly correct. We have laid on an all-out air program for tomorrow, the success of which is dependent on good weather. We are praying for that." Personal Lucas from Clark. RN 3279. 11 105 ammunition referred to in your 551 will be shipped by truck beginning 22 Febru.a:ry. Ship with 95,000 rounds due Naples tomo1Tow and will be moved to Anzio immediately. Will do everything possible to insure that you do not run short of ammunition." * * * PRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 20 1 1944--General Clark's notes of today's activities are as follows: "Called a conference at 0900 with General Juin, GenerAl Roosevelt and General Carpentier this morning in order to discuss the French Expeditionary Corps capabilities in the Fifth Army attack from the Cassino front. They are most anxious to go to Atina. I had always known this but knew that it was a divergent attack which may or may not contribute to the main effort. I also knew that General Alexander was opposed to their attacking in that direction. Juin indicated that he did not have the capability in his weakened condition to attack to the west from Terelle on Roccasecca. I find so many details had not been worked out by my staff I broke up the meeting, deciding I would see Juin later in the day. Met with General Alexander at 1030 with Harding and with Gruenther. Took up his proposal for regrouping and told him I was opposed to it. Whereas I had anticipated a stormy session, it worked out alright. I pointed out why the Americans should not take over from 10 Corps, mainly for logistical reasons. General Alexander had not thought out his plan very well. When I asked who would take over the Campoleone area, he did not know. He astounded me by being worried about an attack on the Eighth Army front by the Germans, positively beyond their capability. He further astounded me by indicating that if the bridgehead should be lost, Kesselring would bring all his divisions down here, and we could not hold them. There is no question in my mind that we could hold them under those conditions after a little regrouping. However, the bridgehead probably will not be lost. · It was finally decided that the French will hold in their present posi- �tion and take over Castellone; that the New Zealand Corps with the New Zea• land Division, 4th Indian and 78th will take out the Abbey Cassino obstacle and cross the Rapido into the Liri Valley; 10 Corps to regroup for pressure from Y~nturno on San Giorgio and an attack as San Giorgio is threatened by the 78th Division; II Corps will be withdrawn into Army reserve, consisting of the 34th, 36th and 88th Divisions. I will direct an intensive training and rehabilitating program for the two tired divisions." General Clark invited a number of staff officers and guests to come up to his hut in the evening, have something to eat and see a movie. The party numbered 2.3 in all, including General Bronn, General Tate, Colonel Saltzman, Lt. Col. Porter and others. The following important messages were received and dispatched today: Personal Clark to Lucas. RN .3654. "When the impetus of enemy's attack has slowed down, you should promptly retake some of the terrain lost on the 45th Division front. The extent to which you are able to do this is for your determination but can more easily be accomplished the minute his attack bas spent itself. Please advise me of your intentions. Another attack scheduled for tonight in direction of Cassino Monastery." Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 567. "Enemy relatively inactive during night except for aggressive pitrolling on front of 56 Division and light harrassing artillery fire in other sectors. At 0500 hours today enemy force not exceeding two companies supported by artillery fire attacked 1st Division. Attack repulsed. Greatly appreciate your understanding attitude toward our problems." Personal Sawbridge to Clark. RN 54011. for duty with a division in UK which has not matter bas not yet been presented to General you concur in release of Roosevelt. We have replace him." "Bradley wants General Roosevelt had battle experience. This Devers but in case he agrees will a Colonel Landis available to Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 569. "Situation quiet. Enemy artillery ac• tive on front of 1st and 45th Divisions, heaviest being on 2nd Battalion, 157th Infantry (85.30). Work our Air Corps continues splendid but in several instances p:i.lots apparently carelessly briefed have bombed our ground troops. Instances reported through air liaison. Damage not yet evaluated. Prisoners of war taken yesterday total 500." Personal Clark to Lucas. RN .3672. "All possible steps must be taken to further strengthen and coordinate the defenses on your final beachhead position, reinforcing with mines and wire. Has your sitmtion permitted your pushing out on the front or the 45th Division as suggested in my .3654? Believe one important factor contributing to the success of your stopping his penetration was that you held the shoulders. These must be strengthened against another attack. Regret exceedingly bombing of our own troops. You can rest assured I Mve made strong representations to air." Personal Lucas to Clerk. RN 584. "Every possible step has and is being taken to strengthen beachhead position. Reference your 3654 and 3672, situ.a- �tion today prevented our oughly agree this should be made to do so. Enemy in 1st and 45th Division pushing out in front lat and 45th Divisions. Thorbe done as soon as possible and every effort will artillery is now aetive age.inst front line elements sectors." Personal Clark to Sawbridge. RN 3687. "General Devers has been advised that Roosevelt is available. Landis is not desired as replacement. Shall submit name of recommended replacement for Roosevelt shortly." * * PRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 21, 1944•-General Clark spent the day at his command post engaged in administrative work and conferences. In the morning he received a call from three British military commentators: Lt. Gen. Martin, Ret., of the Daily Telegram; Mr. Brandon, of the Sunday Times; and Mr. Woodham, of the Kemsley Press which publishes the Daily Sketch. In the afternoon the Chief of Staff held a staff conference in the hut to explain the latest developments to representatives of ea.ch staff section. At the close of this meeting General Clark came in and made a short talk. The General said that he had not had as much chance to meet some of the staff offi• cers in the rear echelon as he would have liked during recent weeks, due to the pressure of operations which kept him at the front most or the time, but that he was conscious of and grateful for the fine work that they were conti• nuously doing. Today orders were received for General Roosevelt to leave Headquarters Fifth Army and report to Headquarters U.S. Forces in United Kingdom where his services had been requested by General Bradley. General Roosevelt had shortly before been cited for the Legion of Merit, and on his la.st visit to the Headquarters General Clark pinned the ribbon on General Roosevelt's tunic. General Clark's notes of today's activities are as follows: "Visited General Sp=idger I s Headquarters this morni.ng and discussed with , him and his Chief of Staff plans for future operations to take Cassino. He has weakened from day to day in his ability to take the monastery. We now propose to bomb the City of Cassino heavily a.nd then to attack it with fresh New Zealand troops. If successful, this will be followed by a push directly across the Rapido River in the direction of the railroad station. I urged that he expedite in every way possible this attack. He hopes to get it off on the 24th, but of course it may be delayed. 1 "I discussed with Freyburg, and directed my G-3 to prepare, the necessary alternate plans in the event this attack on Cassino failed. "Visited II Corps Headquarters and told General Keyes to plan for a withdranl of his Corps into Army reserve prepared to follow up the New Zealand Corps attack when it gets started in the Liri Valley." In the evening General Clark had as his guests ror dinner, Brigadier General Gar Davidson and Colonel Maddox of Force 163. General Clark today received the following letter from General Juin with �98 regard to :future missions of the CEF: "I have received notice of the new purely defensive mission assj_gned to the French Corps. "You wjll not overlook that this mission, undoubtedly imposed by serious necessity, is going to have the effect of prolonging the immobilization of my divisions - principally the 3rd DIA in very exposed positions, the occupation of which, to tep. you the truth, can be justified only by offensive intentions. "I do hope then that it is only a question of a momentary holdup to faci• litate the regrouping and putting in position of new forces, and that the offensive conception of the army maneuver will be taken up again as soon as possible. "Yesterday I had the pleasure of subnitting to you my point-of-view concerning the action of the C.E.F. in this maneuver. I feel that I have to consider again that it seems to me more and more impossible, with the new extension of my front, to continue alone in the direction of TERELLE-ROCCASECCA; "I should be required, in effect, to push out from a very pronounced salient at the extremity of my front and in prolongation thereof because they are dominated on all sides by the new position of the "Adolf Hitler" line, today well organized and strongly held by the enemy. "My" action cannot be started mtlesa it would be possible to oover it from the north by simultaneous operations, and the multiplicity of tasks which take up the means left at my disposal leave little to devote to the action of breaking through in the direction of ROCCASECCA. The intervention of the C.E.F. on this flank will be without force and without effect and the army maneuver might be impaired. "Not enough importance is attached, in my humble opinion, to the role played in the ATINA region by the defensive maneuver of the enemy. "This region is a vast hollow from the rear of which roads lead to ROME which are not at all menaced by the attacks of the Fifth Army. "From ATINA, the focal point, lead out communications which permit easy supply to all the enemy front from META to ROCCASECCA. The concentration of artillery which the enemy has emplaced in this region fires just as well on ROCCASECCA as in the plain of CASSINO - S. ELIA and on the COLLI road. "Thus the region of ATINA will provide a constant menace to the flank of the army. In neglecting it one definitely limits the success of the army maneuver and would always have to cover this flank under adverse conditions. "Therefore it is necessary to take ATINA and the C.E.F. alone is in the position to do it. 11 I also feel that there is some misconception on this immediate sction of the C.E.F. towards ATINA. There is some feeling that it is a movement which is divergent rather than convergent with respect to the principal effort that has been chosen. �"This action in itself can, in effect, appear to be divergent but the net result of the effort is what counts. My precise intentions thereby in directing my effort toward ATINA would be to shorten my front by anchoring it facing west (the north flank anchored to the high ground of META and consequently more easily defended) for a subsequent action truly converging in the direction of ARCE-FR0SINONE region. "This region being the true objective envisioned by the army maneuver, it is my belief that this is the converging point of all the army efforts and not R0CCASECCA, which is only a secondary converging point. "I restate my recommendations of yesterday, that is: 1. That it would be advisable first, while waiting, to permit me to execute the ATINA maneuver which will necessarily bring about, as you will have seen, a relief of pressure on my western defensive front. 2. If this is impossible at present, to give to another division when offensive action is retaken, the mission to advance in the direction of TERELLE-R0CCASECCA, my role being limited to covering this action from the north by simultaneous attack. It must be understood that I cannot, in spite of the best intentions on my part, assume all tasks on a front abnormally extended (almost half of the entire army front). "I am sending you my purely personal thoughts which may be of some value in subsequent decisions." General Clark received the following cable from General Lucas: RN 586. "Enemy artillery active during night on fronts of 3rd, 45th and 56th Divisions, particularly in the sector 179th Infantry. Up to this hour no attacks by German infantry. Considerable activity oonsisting of gunfire and flares at sea off peter beaches about 0120 hours. Navy reports small engagement with several E boats driving them off." Personal to Lucas from Cla.rk. RN 3299. "Do not return 24 Guards Brigade until specific orders are received from me. I am doing everything possible to arrange to have Brigade remain in bridgehead. I am reasonably certain it will remain at least temporarily. Replacement problem for this brigade still unsolved." * * * PRESENZAN0••FEBRUARY 22, 1944•uGeneral Clark left his command post at 0815 and, in company with General Saville of the XII Air Support Command, rode in his L-5 to Capodichino airport at Naples. The General's two pla.nes landed at 0850, making the flight from Presenzano in 20 minutes. Generals Clark and Saville got into General Clark's Packard and drove to Pier Bin Naples harbor where the two PT Boats, the #216 and #217, were waiting to leave for Anzio. The Anzio group was composed of 22 officers and men, including Generals Clark, Saville, Hawkins, Hays, Craigie, Martin and Moran. The trip up to Anzio was almost without incident. General Clark's boat swung shoreward in the Gulf of Gaeta so that a suspicious looking craft could be investigated. It was found to contain four Italians. While the F1' 1 s machine guns were trained on the Italian �lOO boat, the men were forced to pull back the tarpaulin covering _their cargo, which turned out to be nothing but sacks of lima beans. Just as .the two PT Boats were about to enter Anzio, "Moaning Mamie", believed to be a 170mm railroad gun, began to pitch shells into the harbor of Anzio. The PT Boats waited until the firing had ceased and then sped into the docks where the party and its equipment were loaded into vehicles. General Clark, accompanied by Generals Hays and Saville, went imme• diately to VI Corps Headquarters where General Clark conferred with Generals Lucas and Truscott. The remainder of the party went to the Fifth Army Advance Command Post, now located in a castle overlooking Anzio harbor, finding that the situation in the Anzio bridgehead was relatively good and that a German concentrntion, apparently aimed at a new offensive, had been broken up yesterday evening by artillery fire. The General then went to the 3rd Division command post where he talked with Brigadier General John W. 0 1Daniel, newly designated commander of the 3rd Division. From there General Clark went to the 45th Division, where he conferred with General Eagles. Following this conference the Army Commander departed for the command post of the 1st Armored Division where he discussed the situation with General Harmon. He then decided to go to the command post of the 179th. When General Clark neared the command post, a German tank some distance away laid four shells along the road down which General Clark and his party was driving. One of the shells was within 50 yards of the jeep. After talking to officers at the regimental command post and finding they felt quite confident of their ability to halt any further German attacks, General Clark / then drove to the Headquarters of the 56th British Division, where he conferred with General Templar. He found that the 2/6 Queens had replaced the 179th Infantry Regiment in the "hot corner" south of the 11 factory" and that within 24 hours the 2/7 Queens would go in to assist and ultimately relieve the 2/6 Queens. General Clark then went to the Fifth Army Advance Command Post, arriving there at 1620. After looking over cables that had come in, including a cable from General Gruenther saying that it was relatively quiet on the Cassino front, General Clark conferred a..t some length with General Truscott. Next he had conferences with various officers at the Advance Command Fost, concerning the particular problems they faced. Last night the Germans staged one of their heaviest air raids against Anzio. One bomb struck an armnunition dump and destroyed a considerable a.mount of 105 ammunition. General Clark instructed G-4 to get all ammunition pits below the surface of the ground as soon as possible. General Clark ate at the regular officers' mess, having as his dinner guests Generals Seville, Hays, Craigie and Hawkins. Following dinner, he had a conference with General Lucas, discussing with him the general plan for General Lucas' new assignment as Deputy Commander of the Fifth Army. General Aaron Bradshaw, Commanding the 34th AAA Brigade, which is charged with anti-aircraft protection for the beachhead, was the next visitor. He told General Clark that he was particularly in need of some special radar equipment to counteract the dropping by Germans of "window" which throws the �lO l normal radar machines out of adjustment and brings a number of anti-aircraft protection difficulties. General Clark immediately sent a cable to General Gruenther telling M_m to get this equipment on the next boat to Ando. The Army Commander then conferred with Lt. Col. Wells, G-2 at the Ad• vance Command Post, and later General Moran, before going to bed. General Clark dispatched the following cables to General Gruenther who had remained back at Fifth Army Main Headquarters: RN 9796. "Situation relatively quiet with sporadic artillery fire, mainly in forward areas. Second battalion, 157th, being relieved tonight by British. When completed will give 157th Infantry, less one battalion, as additional reserve. One battalion, 30th Infantry, being committed to strengthen position in vicinity of 9431. Will leave Anzio harbor exactly 1100 hours tomorrow. Saville requests you arrange air cover. Have two cubs at Capodichino 1500 hours. Have Packard and other transportation at dock at 1430 hours. Clear return PT trip with Navy. Don't let Spadger browbeat you. Acknowledge." RN 9798. "Eagles hopes there may be a vacancy in OPDWD for Churchill. Can we take him off his hands? Acknowledge.'' RN 9799. "Bringing Johnny back with me in the morning with two aides. Issue orders by direction of the President in Truscott•s case. They should confirm my verbal orders I have issued tonight. Send on my PT Boats on 24th Brig. Gen. Fred Butler, to be Truscott•s Deputy. Also send Colonel Shepard at same time if he is not sick. Request NATOUSA to send Brig. Gen. Ramey to me immediately by air. I intend to make him VI Corps Anti-Tank Officer. Have extra car at dock for Lucas. May send him direct to Sorrento for rest. Issue orders announcing Lucas as Deputy Commander, Fifth Army. Acknowledge.n RN 9800. "Bradshaw has urgent need for three SCR 1 s 584. Robinson familiar with this requirement. They must be shipped by LST tomorrow." General Gruenther dispatched the following cable to General Clark re the situation at the Cassino front: RN 3712. "Bombing attack on Cassino scheduled to end noon 24th. Ground attack follows immediately thereafter. Weather prediction starting afternoon 24th is unfavorable and continues unfavorable for thr~e days. XII Air Support estimate thAt 7 heavy groups and 7 medium groups will be required and have submitted request for thnt number. Spadger says that this force is not enough. He feels that the maximum effort must be placed on the target and that no whittling down can be permitted. He has expressed his opinion rather vigorously and there may be a minor crisis developing. I believe I can handle the situation." Total Fifth Army battle casualties as of today are 72,982. * * * PRESENZANO-•FEBRUARY 23, 1944-•General Clark left the command post and went to VI Corps Headquarters where he again conferred with VI Corps staff officers. At 0800 he left for the 56th Evacuation Hospital. He was accompanied by two American war correspondents, Reynolds Packard of United Press and Edward Ken- � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President. This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, January 29 - February 22, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from January 29-February 22, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1568 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/ba37d37c5906be82c27dc3d5dd969641.pdf?Expires=1784764800&Signature=jG5e54a6PEr0QH-9oYZWCtzVjEKE0osalFyWB19E9LOl6buuS4TgFX4LV0keP6bVQHfuHl-CT293gvvVLIAbI4N5tNpHNgB5xYZ8WMnMpbI0iubfbBuPSWKLXPCkuL4lFaaDa7uM4BDUDJNO26zVE3qV6y6N0xnbXvybheoHo1Y1a07in7K2EGoVzTRzDes4LjNglqAlJNKAFk45jFsTLd7dbcIvqmjeoc3ISa%7EDFahx%7En9KIz6wW%7EA4zY9d1wR%7E6m98PhEbBNsobtVA%7EUKytAX4Rk2pvK%7EDkb95OntQZnrTCEx1h%7E6ZuYv9BdLj1KAHz6Onqt-5sbeLFaZ0PkBvXQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 742e0bfcde68850ae59ad10b129f2d72 PDF Text Text lO l normal radar machines out of adjustment and brings a number of anti-aircraft protection difficulties. General Clark immediately sent a cable to General Gruenther telling M_m to get this equipment on the next boat to Ando. The Army Commander then conferred with Lt. Col. Wells, G-2 at the Ad• vance Command Post, and later General Moran, before going to bed. General Clark dispatched the following cables to General Gruenther who had remained back at Fifth Army Main Headquarters: RN 9796. "Situation relatively quiet with sporadic artillery fire, mainly in forward areas. Second battalion, 157th, being relieved tonight by British. When completed will give 157th Infantry, less one battalion, as additional reserve. One battalion, 30th Infantry, being committed to strengthen position in vicinity of 9431. Will leave Anzio harbor exactly 1100 hours tomorrow. Saville requests you arrange air cover. Have two cubs at Capodichino 1500 hours. Have Packard and other transportation at dock at 1430 hours. Clear return PT trip with Navy. Don't let Spadger browbeat you. Acknowledge." RN 9798. "Eagles hopes there may be a vacancy in OPDWD for Churchill. Can we take him off his hands? Acknowledge.'' RN 9799. "Bringing Johnny back with me in the morning with two aides. Issue orders by direction of the President in Truscott•s case. They should confirm my verbal orders I have issued tonight. Send on my PT Boats on 24th Brig. Gen. Fred Butler, to be Truscott•s Deputy. Also send Colonel Shepard at same time if he is not sick. Request NATOUSA to send Brig. Gen. Ramey to me immediately by air. I intend to make him VI Corps Anti-Tank Officer. Have extra car at dock for Lucas. May send him direct to Sorrento for rest. Issue orders announcing Lucas as Deputy Commander, Fifth Army. Acknowledge.n RN 9800. "Bradshaw has urgent need for three SCR 1 s 584. Robinson familiar with this requirement. They must be shipped by LST tomorrow." General Gruenther dispatched the following cable to General Clark re the situation at the Cassino front: RN 3712. "Bombing attack on Cassino scheduled to end noon 24th. Ground attack follows immediately thereafter. Weather prediction starting afternoon 24th is unfavorable and continues unfavorable for thr~e days. XII Air Support estimate thAt 7 heavy groups and 7 medium groups will be required and have submitted request for thnt number. Spadger says that this force is not enough. He feels that the maximum effort must be placed on the target and that no whittling down can be permitted. He has expressed his opinion rather vigorously and there may be a minor crisis developing. I believe I can handle the situation." Total Fifth Army battle casualties as of today are 72,982. * * * PRESENZANO-•FEBRUARY 23, 1944-•General Clark left the command post and went to VI Corps Headquarters where he again conferred with VI Corps staff officers. At 0800 he left for the 56th Evacuation Hospital. He was accompanied by two American war correspondents, Reynolds Packard of United Press and Edward Ken- �nedy of Associated Press, and a pool photographer, Sammy Goldstein of Acme. At the 56th Evacuation Hospital, General Clark decorated 1st Lieutenant Donald E. Knowlton with the Distinguished Service Cross. General Clark had acted particularly fast in decorating this man, since Knowlton had performed his deed of valor only two days previously. General Clark was accompanied by General McLain, Artillery Officer of the 45th Division. Following his visit to the hospital, General Clark went to the 1st British Division where he conferred with General Penney. Returning to the Advance Command Post in a heavy rainstorm, General Clark looked over last minute messages and found that chances of the FT Boats returning to Naples were remote because of a heavy wind. General Clark drove to the dock and after some discussion with the PT Boat Comnanders decided he would put four members of his party on each of the boots and try to make the trip. General Clark, acconpanied by Lt. Col. Brit~on, Captain Beardwood, Sergeant Holden and Sergeant Chaney got on the PT and headed out into the harbor. It was soon apparent that the FTs could not make the trip. Within a few seconds everyone on board was soaking wet, and the PT #216 was alternately standing on its bow and then on its stern. The FTs turned around and went back into the harbor. After a conference with the Port Commander, General Clark arranged for part of his party to return to Naples on the U.s.s. Davis, a destroyer escort. General Clark went out to the Davis aboard a sub-chaser. The Davis departed for Naples at 1230 P.M., and General Clark arrived at the Navy House landing stage about 1900. He was accompanied by Generals Saville, Hawkins and Sergeant Chaney. Because of heavy swells, high winds and rain squalls, the return trip was extremely rough. The remainder of General Clark's party departed from Anzio at 1600 aboard two LSTS, the #63 and #64. Upon arriving in Naples, General Clark was met at the dock by his Packard, and he returned innnediately to his command post at Presenzano. Important messages received and dispatched today are as follows: RN 3745. Gruenther to Clark. this afternoon.~ "Three radio sets for Bradshaw were shipped Clark to CTNC, AFHQ. RN 3749. "Desire that Brigadier General Ramey report this Headquarters earliest date possible. Advise when he will arrive." Gruenther to Clark. RN 3748. "Have asked for Ramey. Orders will be issued as directed in your 9799. Extra car will be at pier for Lucas. Will advise about Butler and Ramey later." Gruenther to Clark. RN 3752. "Have sent message to NATOUSA offering Churchill for OPD assignment as directed in your 9798. 11 * * * FRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 24, 1944--General Clark remained at his command post holding a series of conferences. General Keyes of II Corps called. He discussed the relief of II Corps and the withdrawal of organizations, their reorga.nization, re-equipping and training as provided in Operations Instruction #16 is- �lo3 sued this day. Thereafter General Walker paid a short call on the Army Com• mander, who spoke of the fine work the 36th Division had done and of his confidence that the Division, by rest, reorganization and training, would soon be restored to full combat efficiency. The next caller was General Freyburg, who came to see General Clark with the Chief of Staff. The Army Commander feels that General Freyburg has been rather spoiled by the British Arrrr:,, due to the somewhat unique position occupied by the New Zealand Corps. Because it is not desired to offend New Zealand politically, the Corps and Corps Commander have been treated with a certain deference which has caused -Spadger to cavil at orders unless they are to his liking. Latterly, the question of the taking of Cassino by the New Zealand Corps has been an important project of the Fifth Army, but Spadger has been stating that he will or will not attack, depending upon the extent of the air support being to his liking. An attack by Spadger to definitely take the town was planned fo:r today but was postponed, as the weather was unsuitable for air operations. In the meantime, General Clark has arranged for 900 tons, in place of 600 tons, of bombs to be dropped on the tovm in support of the attack. During the conversation with Sradger today, G~neral Clark told him of this favorable development but was quite blunt in express- \ ing the idea that as long as Spadger was serving with the Fifth Army he would have to comply with Fifth Army orders and not argue about them. At lunch Colonels Sullivan and Elllott, both of the Class of 1917 at West Poir..t, were General Clark's guests. Today Operations Instruction #16 was issued from Headquarters Fifth Army. This Operations Instruction modifies Operations Instructions #14 and #15 in certain respects. It provides that II Corps will be vrithdrawn to the Alife area for rest and re-organization. 'T'he front will be taken over from right to left by the CEF, New Zealand Corps and 10 Corps. The CEF' will be allotted that part of the front down to a point immediately north of Cassino. The New Zealand Corps will take over that part of the line running south from Cassino to a point just north of the junction of the Garigliano and the Liri Rivers. 10 Corps will take o,rer the interval from the New Zealand Corrs to the sea. Reliefs b~r the CEF and New Zealand Corps of those portions of the II Corps front to be relieved by them respectively will be arranged by Corps Commanders between themselves, and the relieving commanders will notify the Army Commander when the relief is completed. In the meantime, VI Corps, consisting of the 1st, 56th, 3rd and 45th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Armored Division, less Combat Command B, will restore its forward positions and prepare then for defense. General Clark's notes for the 22nd and 23rd are as follows: "Visited the beachhead on the 22nd and 23rd, going up by PT boat and returning by destroyer after PT 1 s found weather was too rough to negotiate. "Took Generals Saville, Hays, Hawkins and Craigie in order to see firsthand air conditions and to discuss with VI Corps their problems. Also took up Colonel Ma.ck, who will stay with VI Corps and advise them more fully on air ��matters. ''Visited all units and talked with all commanders. Personally went to Darby's Headquarters of the 179th Infantry. I continued to be disappointed with the follow-up by VI Corps of work on their final beachhead position. Apparently Lucas thought it had been done, but neither himself nor his subordinates had checked. Am likewise dj_ssatisfied with the coordination of anti-tank means within the corps. I am sending Brigadier General Rufus Ramey, Cavalry, to the VI Corps for that purpose. "Was disappointed with the infiltration which continued to take place through the British units. I am convinced that they have lost a good many men by being cut off, yet they feel quite happy about it and take no steps to strengthen their lines. I brought that to Truscott•s attention, and he had a meeting with Templar to straighten it out. "Upon my arrival, found that Lucas was about to pull the 179th Infantry out and commit the 6th Infantry. I felt that was a mistake and so indicated, but did not direct it. The 6th Infantry, due to a success, has its chin up, is motorized and works with armor handily. It should be kept during these tense times to be used as their counterattack agency. The 179th, in its de• pleted condition and in absorbing some 900 replacements, would not be ready for a counterattack role for ten days to two weeks, whereas, I verified personally with Darby, it can hold its present position with one battalion up and two back. "I discussed with Truscott his taking over from Lucas, for I had told him on my last trip that I would do it when things stabilized a little bit. Truscott thought it best that I leave Lucas there, for it would hurt Lucas' feelings. After hearing Truscott 1 s story and realizing that one motive which might be guiding him was that in the event of a reversal Truscott would prefer to be second in command rather than in command, I then sent for Lucas, having come to the conclusion that I would have to take h:i.m out. I laid a.11 the cards on the table. Told him that Alexander had demanded his release, that General Devers, without talking to me, had visited the VI Corps and had come to me and recommended that Lucas be changed. Both thought that he was tired, mentally and physically, had had too much time in combat and needed a rest. I told Lucas he had done a grand job but that, inasmuch as he was not in mental or physical condition to carry on as well as someone else, my course was clear. It was my duty to take him out; that I would make him my Deputy Army Commander. nr,therefore, directed that the orders be issued appointing Truscott, relieving Lucas and making him my Deputy. Brought Luca.a back with me out of the beachhead the following day. I directed that General Butler be sent as Truscott1s American Deputy - Butler being Truscott 1 s choice. I also sent Colonel Shepard into the beachhead to be second in command of the 3rd Division under 0 1 Daniel. "Visited Templar's Headquarters and discussed the situation with him, also Harmon, Eagles (twice), Penney and 0'Daniel. Pinned the DSC on a Lieutenant Knowlton for heroism in battle - this at the 56th E.,,a.cua.tion Hospital. �105 "After talking with General McLain, I continued to be disturbed on the losses of tanks and anti-tank guns. I am afraid that some of our personnel abandon their equipment unnecessarily, and that, in some cases, it falls, undamaged, into the hands of the enemy. I have sent a radiogram to Truscott to correct this situation. Also, have directed that ammunition dumps be dug in and piles be farther spaced. 11 Following are the Army CoMill8.nder•s notes on today's activities: "General Freyburg visited me this noon and still complains a.bout the a~ount of air which he is to get. We have bent all our energies in arranging for air bombardment of Cassino. I told him I would take no further steps because I have satisfied myself, as had General Alexander, that this is an air matter - they were the experts and were putting enough on it to do the job, in their opinion. General Freyburg is writing me a letter to get it in the record. I have reported this to General Alexander, through General Harding. The more I see of Freyburg the more disgusted I am with his actions. He may be an extremely courageous individual, but he has no brains, has been spoiled, demands everything in sight, and altogeth~r is most difficult to handle." General Clark today dispatched the following cables to General Truscott: RN 3781. "Give me your intentions for strengthening British position just west of Anzio-Albano highway. When do you plan to advance British so as to secure terrain dominating that highway? Keep me advised of situation and your intentions by frequent personal messages." RN 3783. "Your 9291 indicates accumulative loss of 68 tanks. Was told during my last visit that a considerable number of TD 1 s have likewise been lost. Consider these losses hieh in proportion to number of similar enemy co~bat vehicles we have destroyed. Under no conditions should our materiel be abandoned to the enemy without destruction. Please follow up on this matter. General Ramey is expected here wjthin next few days. He will be sent to you as soon as he arrives." '* * * PRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 25, 1944--This morning General Clark went by jeep to the command post of the 4th Indian Division where he called on Brigadier H.K. Dimoline who was in tempora_ command of the di vision during the illness of ry General Tuker. On the road from Route #6 to the 4th Indian Division the General stopped and made a careful examination, through his glasses, of Cassino Monastery Hill and the heights surrounding it which could clearly be seen across the intervening flat ground. The General also stopped at the New Zealand Corps Headquarters and had a talk with Spadger about the attack of his corps on Cassino which is still held up because the weather has prevented the all-out bombing of the town which Spadger considers essential. A further dif• ficulty arises out of the fact that if the bombing of Cassino occurs it may be necessary to withdraw from the town the American troops which have occupied a third of it after a bitter and protracted battle. Once the bombardment ceases it will not be certain that the Germans will not at least attempt to reoccupy �part of this ground which would thus be vacated. This problem is being studied by the Fifth Army staff and the XII Air Support CO!'IIllAnd staff in an effort to arrange the bombardment so that it will not be necessary to vacate the area. (Note:- The solution of this problem, ultimately decided on, was that as two things can not be in the same place at the same time, the Fifth A:rmy troops would have to be withdrawn from the town before the bombs could be dropped there. To reduce to a minimum the chances of German re-occupation, this withdrawal is to be carried out at the la.st possible moment before the bombardment. This in turn requires some expert weather forecasting, as the actual recurrence of the ombardmcnt must be assured long enough in advance to pr:rmH the distrihution of orders.) At lunch General Clark entertained Generals Spaatz, Cannon, Saville and Lucas. General Cannon, during the meal, made some interesting statements about the air cover over the beachhead. He said that it had diminished from a start of 28 planes continuously in the air du.ring daylight to 8 continuously in the air, and that even this was difficult to maintain, due to the impossibility of using the strip at Nettuno as a base for planes at the present time because of the enemy's artillery fire. General Cannon further said that if at any time Germany was 'nilling to make the sacrifice of planes involved he thought they could accumulate the necessary number and conduct a damaging attack on the port. At the present tj_rne he said that the 8 planes on standing patrol were so much more aggressive than the Germans that they were successfully defending the port against recurring attacks by 20 or 30 planes which they drove off and forced to jettison their bombs . General Eagles, Commanding General of the 45th Division, was hospitalized today as a result of an attack of faintness, and arrang~ments were made to have an electro- cardiograph shipped up to the beachhead to determine whether or not he hns a cardiac condition. In the meantime, General McLain, Artillery Officer of the Division, has been put in temporary command. Important messages of the day are as follows: Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 675 . 11 1 am making strong effort with artillery on front of 56 Division. Have requested cruiser gunfire support. Some delay owing to mines . Please do what you can to expedite ava.ilability of cruiser for this purpose." Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 678. "Principal enemy activity yesterday against 2/6 Queens , London Scots , in front of 56 Division. 2/6 Queens beat off strong attack late yesterday. 1 Advanced Company London Scots at 845507 driven out by surprise attack. Ternplar has ordered brigade commander to reestablish situation today. Enemy patrols active on remainder 56 Division front . Need for British replacements immediate action, relief of Irish Guards by 1st Division accomplished, DVIR reached 858298, Penney has laid on aggressive patrols in that area . Remainder of front relatively quiet except for 1ntermittent heavy shelling of front line areas , especially on British front and in �vicinity of Carano. Enemy air active during night 2300 to 0100, dropping AP bombs on forward troop areas 1st British Division and 1st Armored Division. Casualties reported slight. Am attaching RCN Bn, 1st Armored Division to Frederick on Harmon's recomnendation. Will withdraw remnant 2nd Bn., 157th to rear area for 2 or 3 days to absorb replacements. 11 Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 174. 11 Reference your 3789, Keiser desires to accompany Lucas. He does not desire to remain with me on same status as Butler. States that he would prefer to start elsewhere. Suggest you relieve him from assignment to VI Corps at once. Colonel D. H. Galloway also desires to accompany Lucas. I would be glad to have him as Deputy Chtef of Staff, but there is some embarrassment since he is the oldest staff officer with VI Corps in point of service. I believe Galloway has deteriorated physically and recommend his return to the United States as soon as possible. Suggest that he remains here for another week." Personal Clark to Truscott. RN 3412. "Instructions issued by ACMF direct me to have 24 Guards Brigade return to Naples area by March 2nd unless another full scale enemy attack is launched on the bridgehead before the Brigade leaves, in which case they may be retained in reserve until the attack has been repulsed but not longer. Let me have your comments as to effect of this withdrawal. Also those of the appropriate British Commanders. Do not move the Guards Brigade until specific instructions are issued by me." Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 680. "Eagles yesterday had an attack of faintness and a physical examination at 56 Evacuation Hospital indic8ted low blood pressure. Surgeon recommends thPt he go to Naples for electrocardiograph to determine if condition due to cardiac condition. Can you send a plane here for him? 11 General Clark replied to the above cable, advising that he would send a medical officer and an electro-cardiograph up to Anzio to examine General Eagles. Clark to Truscott. RN 3420. "In view of enemy's present defensive attitude you should plan limited objective attack to retake all or part of salient north of 29 grid and between Anzio-Albano highway and 92 grid. This should be done before enemy has adcUtional time to prepare defenses. What are your intentions and capabilities along this line?" Clark to Truscott. RN 3421. "Orders issued this date relj eving Brigadier General Laurence B. Keiser from assignment to Headquarters VI Corps and assigning him to Headquarters Fifth Army. Instruct him to proceed without delay. 11 Personal to Truscott from Clark. RN 3422. "Orders nre being issued today assigning Keiser to this Headquarters. I desire that you retain Galloway since I do not have an appropriate assignment for him now." Clark to Truscott. RN 3423. "One American cruiser will be on hand morning ?6th to furnish gunfire support. Time when it ecm start firing will depend on clearing of mines. Your naval liaison officer will be able to give you the hour. Navy here has suggested that you may be able to utilize ( �lo8 Navy radar in locating hostile batteries firing on harbor . discuss w1-th naval liaison officer." Suggest you HQ ACMF to Fifth Arrrry and Eighth Army . RN 914. "Reference 48/G(OFS) dated 22 February. In confirnation of t1'1ephone conversation, CINC's meeting will take place at this HQ. at 1100 hours on 28 February. Lunch will be provided as it may be necessary to continue the meeting in the afternoon. Please notify number of staff officers accompanying Army Commanders . " Personal Clark to Devers . RN 3397. "Because of lack of replacements rl'!organization and return to combat of 34th and 36th Divisions will be delayed . At present there are no effective infantry replacements on hand, all available in l ersonnel Center i/6 having been sbipped to beachhead ~ncluding approximately 1400 infantry arriv"d 20 Februe.ry. Approximately 1600 new replacements are expected any day but will probably all be needed for beach~ head divisions whose total infantry deficiency was 660 as of 22 February. Expected to arrive Naples from 2 J\:'arch are shipments totalling 3877 U. S. general assignment replacements and 4518 specific assignment personnel. It is improbable that these replacements will be enough to fill up infantry deficiencies of 2581 in 34th Division and 3722 in J6th Division as of February 21. Furthermore very important for these divisions to receive their replacements at once in order to give theM maxinnnn training with units . To expedite arrival and increase number of infantry replacements in immediate future shall appreciate any assistance you can give . " Personal Alexander to Clark. RN 918 . 11 My staff have issued orders that 24 Gds Bde is to be withdrawn from the bridgehead so as to reach the Nocera area at about the same time as 201 Gds Bde . I am told that your staff rave expressed doubts about the practicability of releasing 24 Gds Bde at present . It was however arranged that 18 Infantry Brigade should rel.ieve 24 Gds Bde and it is essential to reorganize 24 and 201 Gds Bde into 1 brigade with adequate reinforcements without any further delay. I must therefore insist that all arrangements are made for 24 Gds Bde to join 201 Gds Bde in the Nocera e.rea by 2 A-arch at the latest unless another full scale enemy attack is launched on the bridgehead before 24 Gds Bde leaves in which case they may be retained in reserve in the bridgehead unMl the attack has been repulsed but not longer . I should be glad to know that these arrangements have been made . " * * * PRESENZANO- -FEBRU.ARY 26, 1944- -General Clark remained at his command post today engaged in administrative work. He received a call from Major Blom, of the Fifth Army CIC , who brought a report about the use of the Abbey at Monte Cassino . The substance of the report was that the Abbey was not used in a military way by the Germans . This justifies the position taken by General Clark with respect to the bombardment , as contrasted to that of the British. Today the command post of the II Corps was moved to a point just west of Raviscanina. The 34th and 36th Division command rosts will be in the immediate vicinity, and the II Corps will thus have An opportunity to rest and ref:i.t. General Lucas and his aides , Major Renne and Captain Eyston arrjved at �C �the Fifth Army command post today, where General Lucas is taking over the duties of Deputy Army Commander. General Lucas has been established in a caravan with tents for his aic•es and staff near the Chief of Sta.ff area. Late in the afternoon General Clark left by car for Caserta where he picked up Colonel Sullivan and then departed for Naples where he dined with Brigadier General Edgar Erskine Hume, recently promoted from the rank of Colonel. General Hume today presented General Clark with the personal flag of Mussolini, flovm only when the Duce was present. This particular fanion was picked up in Sardinia and given to General HUMe, who made a present of jt to the Army Commander. General Clark's notes for toda.y 1 s activities follow: "Evidence continues to accumulate that Admiral Cunningham and his Navy ; are in no way cooperating with me. He does not come direct to me but insinuates to everyone he sees that he has been hoaxed into the position which makes it necessary for him to maint8in my forces in the Anzio bridgehead. He not only does not cooperate in the supply set-up but with his naval gunfire. He imposes so many restrictions and makes it so difficult, that it is easier, in most cases, to do without his naval gunfire support than to accept the restrictions he imposes. He continually screams about gunfire in the harbor, knowing full well that there is nothing that can be done on this situation that is not already being done. With reference to supplies, he has set an arbitrary limit of 2500 tons per day, which not only is not suffjcient to maintain my forces but thereby precludes the essential build-up for any counter-offensive. e~ I'-'( ~ ~ ~c.t... ff" ' \ c~ .J..-h- ~ ...er. M", ) "I have received the following letter from Alexander which Robertson, who is in complete cahoots with Cunningham, has prepared: 1. The situation at ANZIO has developed in a manner very different from that originally conceived when the operation was planned. Instead of maintaining there a force of 2 - 3 divisions for a limited time until junction with our main forces could be made, we are now committed to the maintenance of a force equivalent to 5 divisions for an indefinite period. 1 2. This throws a heavy strain on our naval resources. C-in-C Mediterranean has, however, said that the Navies can, though not easily, sustain the force in the bridgehead for some time longer at an average rate of 2,500 tons per day, unless sor1e major disaster in the harbour or great increase in casualties among craft occurs. 1 '3. I feel it necessary to emphasize, firstly, that we must do everything possible to lighten the Navies ' task, secondly, that we must economize our resources in order to conserve them for the essential task of driving the enemy back. 4. With these objects in view I ask you to take all possible steps in the following directions:1 (a) The strict control of ammunition expenditure to enable us to build up ample reserves for the renewal of th~ offensive. If the enemy attacks us, �l ID heavy artill ery fir e must of cours e be brought down to stop him , but at other \ time s every r o1md expended should pay a dividend in proportion to the investment which it represents . (b) Grent care in the lay- out of dUr1ps of all kinds to minimize damage from bombing and shellfire . (c) Cl ose supervision of forward dumps to prevent loss of ammrmition or stores by hostile raiding parties or local successes . (d) An austere standard of living among the troops in order to d:l.spense with many accessories , such as laundries , canteens etc ., which we normally consider proper and necessary to provide . (e) Rigid check on pilfering and all forms of waste. (f) Full use of all means made available by the Navies for getting additional stores into the bridgehead, including the use of LCI's for the trans port of stores . ' 5. I am confident that the troops will accept these measures cheerfully if the reasons for them are explained to them.' 11 I hB:ve replied as follows : 1. Reference is made to your letter dated 23 February 1944, subject , "Maintenance ' SHINGLE ' " • As directed in paragraph 4, thereof , steps have been taken to eliminate non- essentials from maintenance tonnages , to keep ammunition expenditures to the minimum consistent with tactical needs, to :insure maximwn dispersion and supervision of dumps in order to minimize losses due to enemy action , and to dispense with accessories normally considered proper and necess ary for the col"tfort and well- being of troops . 1 2. The need for limiting maintenance to essential supplies has been recognized by r1e froM the beginning of Operation "SHINGLE" , and wherever it has been found that reductions or elim~nations could be made in quantiti~s and types of supplies I have ordered this done . I shall continue to give this matter my personal attent ion. 1 1 3. After making such reductions and el iminations in maintenance asappear to be desiral1 at this time , I found that the daily maintenance requirele ments of the beachhead force (British and American) amount to 2700 long tons and that over 50% of this tonnage is amr.nmition. Thjs is based upon operations to date . Since it is planned to launch offensive operations from this area as soon as possible it is necessary to build up a reserve of supplies \ for this purpose . I feel that this reserve should be not less th,-,n 20 days . The building up of such a r~serve is nov1 underway, and for the next six weeks it will be necessary to put into the beachhead area 3750 long t ons of supplies da ily to maintain the force there and to provide the reserve I consider essen- \ tial for planned offensive operations . \ 4. The attached analysis of the ATfZIO beachhead supply requirements v,as prepared at my direction and was discussed hy General Tate , Fifth Army G- 4, 1 �Il I with General Robertson and navy represent atives on 18 February. (See anal ys is in General Clark ' s SHIN'GLE file) . TM.s analysis shons that if we are to ma.inta in the force now in the beachhead and be pre pa.red to launch an off en\ sive , the tonnage discharged da i ly m ust be increased considerably beyond t he 2500 tons r efer red t o in paragraph 2 of your letter . ' 5. Commander- in- Chief , r~editerranean recently suggested the use of LCI's as a means of increasing the daily tonnage into ANZIO. Thi s type of craft is now being used in shuttle service between NAPLES a.nil the beachhead, and we are using 10 to supplement the LCT 1 s in unloading cargo ships at Anzio . We are prepared to employ 10 LCI I s daily in the NAPLES -ANZIO supply shuttle service if the 'N'avy can make this number available . This will increase our tonnage input by 400 tons daily during periods of good weather . •6. In order that I may continue to supply the forces at ANZIO and also provide the buildup of supplies required to support planned offenoive action, I feel that the means must be provided to place the requisite tonnages ashore . I ask your support and assistance in accomplisMne this end. Should operations in the near future consume less supplies , requirements for maintenance will be revised dovmward. 1 nr have exercised great restraint in not taking a swing in writing officially at the Adniral, but hate to cause any more friction which would hinder the war effort . "Cunningham acts as a completely independent agency. He knows no laws from any higher a.uthority. Apparently the GING , General Vrilson, vrill not go against his will under any conditions . This situPtion emphasizes the need for unity of command , which is impossible under the British system of complete independence of the Air Corps , Navy and Army. "The replacement system for British troops in the bridgehead is bad. have sent the following radiogram: I 'Personal to Alexander from Clark. RN 3409. 11 Fresent reinforcement deficiencies for British units in beachhead excl uding guards are 26oO. Only 450 reinforcements are on hand, and it is my understanding that only 700 vvill be available each week for all British units in Fifth Army. If present wastage rates continue the strengths of the British 1 )eachhead units will continue to decrease even considering receipt of 700 replacements weekly. "General Truscott reports that the depleted strengths of British battalions has reduced materi~lly the defensive strengths of the two British divisions and greatly reduces the offensive value of these divisions . My own observations confirm his estimate . The v,eakness of these units is causing me considerable concern. I urgently request that you do everything possible to bring the Anzio units to full strength without delay" "There is a delay in the American replacements , and I have sent the follow ing radiogram to Devers . Personal Clark to Devers . RH 3397. 'Because of lack of replacements reorganization and return to combat of 34th and 36th Divisions will be delayed. �I lJ.. At present there are no effective infantry replacements on hend , all available in rersonnel Center No . 6 having been shipped to beachhead including approx:i.mately 1400 infantry arrived 20 February. Approximately 1600 new replacements are expected any day but will probably all be needed for beachhead divisions whose total infantry defici~ncy was 66o as of 22 February. Expected to _arrive Naples from 2 March are shipments totalling 3877 U.S. general assign~ent replacements and 4518 specific assignment personnel. It is improbable that these replacements will be enough to fill up infantry deficiencies of 2581 in 34th Division and 3722 in 36th Division as of February 21. Furthermore very important for these divisions to receive their replacement s at once in order to give them maximum training with units . To expedite arrival and increase number of infantry replacements in immediate future shall appreciate any assistance you can give.' 7 I "I am to attend a rn"'eting on the 28th with Alexander to discuss reorganization. It brings the Eighth Army into this area north of the Liri Valley and puts the Fifth Army into the bridgehead area; the Fifth Army to be composed of all Americans and French. I am willing to accept any tactical role for the Fifth Army if I can get all Americans and French consolidated jnto my Army, allowing British, New Zealanders , Indians, etc ., to go to the Eighth Army where they can be better handled . " General Clark dictated the following memorandum to his Chief of Staff today with regard to the proposed reorganization: "Returned herewith are th~ pap1'rs on the reorganization. Please screen the requests from the various staff sections for additional troops and give me your recommendations . Also , have G- 3 prepare a letter to GOC , ACTuF stating that I have studied his plan, am in favor of it , list items upon which I need decisions , list the additional troops which I need from NATOUSA , both French and U. S., and finally state my requirem~nts for 12 LSTS for a given period. "Also, in my opening concurrence paragraph you might state that I can see my w cl ear to relieve only one British Division jn the bridgehead by ay U. S., giving as a reason inadequate number of U. S. Divisions, together with the casualty rate in the bridgehead and our difficulty with replacements similar to theirs . " Personal to Alexander from Clark. RN 3838. "In my 3409 to you I stated reinforcement deficiencies for first and 56th Divisions as 2600. That figure was in error and should have read 36oO. Deficiency is now increased to 4100 with shortage of 3100 in 56 Division and 1000 in 1st Division. DP-ficiency of Guards Brigade has not been included in above figures . " Personal to Truscott from Clark. RN 3839. "Information here indicates deficiency 3100 men in 56 Division and 1000 in 1st Division. What is your estimate of present combat effici~ncy of 56 Division? I share your concern over British replacement situation , and I am doj_ng everything possible to solve it . 1000 American replacements arrived here today. Infantry portion will be shipped to you on 28th . " Truscott to Clark. RN 704. "I believe enemy's present defensive attitude �\l 3 covers regrouping for final blow against bridgehead. I do not have capabi- ·) lities for immediate attack to reduce salient on account of weak strength of infantry battalions. 56 Division are inadequate to hold present front and cannot stop determined infiltration. Regrouping in progress in 1st Division. Will make 2nd Brigade available by 29 February unless something unforeseen interferes. Depleted battalions of 157 and 179 should be in be+ter condition by that time. Have directed 1st Division to advance Links tonight to vicinity of M-28 on Anzio road to permit moving anti-tank guns forward to control the road. Will launch limited objective attack as outlined in my messages yesterday as soon as the situation permits. Meanwhile I run making every effort to improve defensive organization. 11 Truscott to Clark. RN 703. "Reference your 3412. Everly, Penney and Templar believe 24 Guards Brigade should be relieved because further operations will result in loss of key personnel who cannot be replaced. In my opinion this brigade is so weak as to have little value for any oth~r than stop gap purposes. Brigade Commn.nder hns received orders direct concerning his relief. British units, particularly 56 Division, are so reduced in strength that the loss of this brigade will of course be felt. I believe we can expect entire 56 Division to be in similar state very soon unless drastic measures are taken with regard to replacement. There is an urgent need for a full brigade group or American infantry regiment immediately." * * PRESEUZANO--FEBRUARY 27, 1944--Early today General Clark received a cvll from Brigadier Stayner who had come to replace Colonel Jones in performing the G-/+- work in the British Increment. Thereafter, General Seville called to discuss with General Clark the question of air support of rending operations. General Clark then received a call from Brigadier General Clarkson, Inspector General of NATOUSA, who had been directed to investigate an alleged order made by Brigadier General Wilbur of the 36th Division that the troops of that division crossing the Rapido should go over with weapons unloaded and with only 25 rounds carried on their persons . General Clark is having the matter looked into. General Clark next received visits from Brigadier Generals Bronn and Ramey who had been newly assigned to Fifth Army. General Ramey is being sent to the bridgehead as anti-tank officer, VI Corps. Genl'lral Brovrr is to be assigned to the 88th Division. At 1645 General Giraud arrived at the command post for a call on General Clark. The General went into the hut with General Giraud and, using Lt. Col. Sutherland as his interpreter, discussed operations on the whole front with partjcular reference to employment of the French. General Clark said to General Giraud that he would speak frankly with him but requested him to receive whatever General Clark said in complete confidence. General Clark said that he felt that the attack of the French Corps should be directed on Atina. General Giraud said that that was clearly the proper course. General Clark said that he had so recommendl'!d but that the British High Cornnand, which had the last word in such matters, had insisted on an attack for objectives farther south; namely, Terelle and Roccasecca. General Clark said he disagreed with this employment but had been ordered by General Alexander to follow it. �\ l L\ / General Giraud said that he too felt that this was a bad mistake . General Giraud spoke of the urgency of an attack on the Germans in France this year . The French have been holding up their spirit during the occupation , but they are weakening. General Clark said he quite understood their predicament . He asked General Giraud if he knew of ANVIL and who had been slated to command it . General Giraud grinned and said "Yes" . "Then" , said General Clark, "You will realize not only my understanding of the need for such a move , but also of its difficulty and of the considerations which might prevent it . " Shortly after 1700 General Clark called together his principal staff officers , including Generals Gruenther , Lucas , Brann, Tate and Colonel Howard , Brigadier Richardson and Brigadier Stayner . A conference was held by all concerned about the subject matter of the meeting at General Alexander ' s Headquarters at Caserta tomorrow·. The proposal in question involves a shortening of the Fifth Army front to that now occupied by the 10 Corps and a side-slip to the left of the Eiehth Army to take over the intervening area . This also involves the relief of British units from the Fifth Army so that the Fifth Army will ultimately be conposed of Americans and French only. After dinner this evening, General Clark invited a few of his staff section chiefs to the recreation hut to see a movie shovm by tht'! Special Service Section. Colonel Howard today dispatched the following cable to Lt. Col. Wells, G-2 at the Fifth Army Advance Command Post at Anzio : "Following message from Colonel DeMa.rco : Very ureent fron B. L. Z. 27 Feb . L~4, 0940- M 77 fror1 A. On night of 27th or thereafter , an attack attempt on C. P. of ALEXAlIDER ~nd CLARK, as well as nearby workshop . The agents will land from sea near C. P. Agent with cut hand is our confidence man. At the time the blow is effected and the mjnes, which shall have been laid are exploded , a very violent German attack may be unleashed . In case of failure , Germans may withdraw to defend COLLE LAZIALE . 11 The following nre the important messages of the day: Personal Clark to Alexander. RN 3460 . "General Truscott reported to me last night that the strength of 56 Division is inadequa.te to hold present front and to prevent determined infiltration. He is attempting to compensate for this weakness by regrouping within 1st Division in order to make 2nd Brigade available . Truscott believes that 56 Division r ill be almost completely ineffective if reinforcements are not received in the immediate future . I realize fully that you are doing everything possible to procure reinforcements for this division but again I must invite your attention to the fact that I consider the situation so serious that drastic action must be taken without delay." Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 723 . "I do not believe tha.t exchange of 5 Division would be able to do little more than relieve the 56th Division. I need infantry djvision strong enough to relieve 56th Division and 36th Engineers and consolidate that front . When this has been accoriplished , 56th Division must be withdrawn and refitted here or in Naples . Your suggestion to return them by LCI seems workable 56 Division for 5 Division would solve rroblel"l here . �l 15 if other troops not available. Hov1ever, consider American Division with its higher infantry strl'lngth preferable." Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 722. "Reference your radio 3839 deficiencies infantry and artillery British divisions as of 26 February: 1st Division (less 13 Brigade) 2486; 56 Division 2520. Great bulk these deficiencies in fighting i"lfantry soldier. In the case of 56 Division each battalion consists of not more than two very weak companies, mostly replacements. Few have any experienced junior officers and NC0 1 s remaining estimate present infantry combat efficiency 56 Division at approximately 25%." Clark to Truscott. RN 3863. "In view of another possible strong attack developing from north, can eastern part of 3rd Division sector and 504 Para Regiment and SSF sectors be lightened so as to make ndditional resources available to you to meet such an attack?" Yesterday the Arm:l Command.er received the following cable from Adriiral Horse, Flag Officer of Western Italy: Nrt:J. "Am so very sorry that the weather has broken to add to your worries. However, the book says 'Whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth 111 • Today the Army Commander replied to Admiral Morse as follows: RN 3461. "Thanks for your kind thoughts. Chastening already ample. Surely tir~e has come to spare the rod. 11 From CG, NATOUSA to CG FIFTH ARLfI. RN 57059. "Your situation fully understood. An effort is being made to forward replacements as fnst as received. Reurad 3397 Feb. 25 earliest arrival dates DUKO of infantry replacements in nunbers needed is 1\TS'F 17 on 14 March with anticipated 120 officers, 5221 enlisted and UGS-34 on 18 March with 150 officers, 3500 enlisted. Further information our 56572 Feb 24 refer. 11 * * FRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 28, 1944--Barly in the morning General Clark recorded a message to the Red Cross to be used in connection with the current drive. The 'lffiC made an exception to their usual rule and broadcast this recording over its full network February 29th. Shortly thereafter the General, with Generals Gruenther, Brann, Tate, Saville and Brigadiers Richardson and Stayner, left for Caserta by car where they conferred for sev~ral hours with General Alexander and his staff officers concerning the re-erouping of the Allied forces in Italy. General Clark's coMm~nts regarding this conference are as follows: "General Alexander called a conference today of General Leese and myself, members of our staff, his staff, General Cannon and some of his staff. The purpose was to discuss the reorganization of the two armies. Briefly, to get the Fifth Army with American and French troops and the Eighth Army with all the British. I have welcomed such a move for a long time a.nd have advocated it. It puts the Fifth Army on the south, or coastal flank, including the beachhead. It is going to take sore time to execute because of lack of decision from AFHQ on additional troops. In other vJOrds, it may result in more command of fewer troops. However, anything that will divest me of the terri- �l If> fie responsibilities v1hich I have had in trying to command McCreery' s Corps and Freyburg ' s Gorps will be welcor'le to me . ''Following is quoted a memorandum which I took to the conference and which I delivered verbally to the assembled group: 'l. Troops in the bridgehead are depleted Pnd need to be built up to The depletion occurs almost entirely in British elements . effective strength to maintain their present position . 1 2. General Truscot t reports that the 56th Division is unable to hold its present position at its present strength, to say nothing of having any offensive power . 5th Division , at full strength, must be moved to the bridgehead to 1st brigade must start by 1tJ!arch 3rd or 4th at the latest . 1 3. relieve the 56th Division immediately. come . '4. 24th Guards Brigade must remain in the bridgehead for some time to It should be built up to effective strength there . ' 5. Infantry reinforcements must be taken from the 56th Division to fill up the 1st Division before the 56th Division returns to the Naples area . 1 6. I have been directed repeatedly by General Alexander to retake Carroceto and Cisterna . In his agenda for today ' s meeting one of the immediate steps is to take these two points. This will require a major offensive operation by the VI Corps which it is totally incapable of doing with its present strength or even if present units in the bridgehead were brought up to T/O strength. Troops are tired and fresh units must be moved in and an additional division provided for the offensive action. The 34th Division is the only division in sight to be moved up . I will direct that it coI'1l"lence moving by combat team with the target date of the 1st CT , March 15th. It is badly in need of replacements which do not arrive in this area for several days . 1 7. ACfr~ and the Navy must accept this additional responsibility and whole-heartedly support present troops in the bridgehead at full strength, plus an additional U. s. Infantry Division. Craft to maintain this increased force and to move the additional division commencing t~rch 15th must be assembled at once . Some additional LSTS , probably 2 per day, will be required to build up in advance some maintenance supplies to take care of the 34th Division. 1 8. With respect to reorganization on this front , I am ready to proceed with General Alexander ' s plan immediately, relieving the 5th Division at once by the 8Sth. I will continue my efforts on Cassino and to get a bridgehead across the Rapido . The start of the relief of the French should commence without deThy. II Corps Headquarters is available to take over from 10 Corps Headquarters at such time as that may seem desirable . In the meantime, 88 Division to come under the orders of 10 Corps . If any continuity is to be provided U. s. troops on its new Minturno front and to provide a division to relieve tired units in the bridgehead, the 85th U. S. Division must be dispatched here imnedfately. 1 �"I made it extremely plain that I must have more whole-hearted support from the Navy and ACMF in maintaining the present f orce, in laying in reserve supplies and in building up for another division. I told Alexander that his thought of offensive action was entirely out of the auestion until tired troops had been reinforced, brought up to strength and one new division put in. "I would like to put in the 88th now but ar,1 tmable to do so because of lack of craft to make the move. tty only solution, therefore, is to put in the 5th British Division at full strength without equipment to relieve the depleted personnel of the 56th Division. As soon as craft is assembled, and I have made the demand for it, I will send more troops in. 11 1 am rather disturbed at the whining attitude of Truscott' s radios. He knows full well that I fully appreciate the situation. I believe he is trying to put it all on the record. When I see him, in a day or two, I will jnform him that he need not do that, for I accept full responsibility. 7 ,, 1 11 The question of air support of the two armjes came up at the meeting, in which I djsagrMd with Cannon's solution. Leese concurred witb me. \le will have further discussions. "General Giraud called on me a couple of days ago a.nd is quite perturbed over the situation. He feels that if we are not successful in the bridgehead it means no attack in southern France. I quite agree. He feels there must be an attnck in southern France soon or else all hope of rescue by the French 1 people will have been lost. He decried my calling off · the attack of the French ( Corps on Atina. I likewise regret it, and it was only done on the direct orders of General Alexander over my protest. I have always felt that an attack in the J direction of Atina would outflank the Cassino position." Following that gathering, General Clark returned to his command post where he met Major General John E. Hull of the Operations Division, War Department. General Clark conferred with General Hull 1n his van for some time. General Hull spent the night. General Clark today received the following cable fron General Truscott: RN 750. "Situation on front of 56 Division critical because weak strength of units render them unable to stop enemy infiltration and loss of ground little by little. The condition is a natter of grave concern to Generals Evelegh and Templer as well as myself. While I consider the situation critical, I cannot alleviate it without grave risk entailed by comr.1 itting the two battalions of the 18 Brigade which is P1y only British reserve. Committing these battalions now would be only a stop gap and would seriously impair my capabilities for counter attack against a major German effort. "Substitution of the 5 Division for the 56 Division v1ill not correct· the condition because the 700 British replacements allocated weekly will not cover the attrition from casualties, and I shall be faced with a similar problem for both divisions within two or three weeks. Therefore, I recol'1!1end that you send one brigade of the 5 Division ~ithout vehicles et once to reinforce the 56 Division in the present critical situation. Instead of sending the remainder of the 5 Division, I recomnend sendj_ng the 88 or other full strength American Division at the earliest possible time, for the following reasons: (1) American �\ 18 units are larger and capable of longer sustained effort without replace~ents; (2) Our replacement situation, while bad itself, is still better than the British; (3) On that section of the front the crying need is more men; (4) Unless such a solution is adopted, I see little hope for collecting troops for counter attack when the Boche is stopped. Evelegh concurs in these recommendations. This situation is so critical that urgent and immediate action is essontial." 11 In this connection, General Clark replied to General Truscott as follows: RU 5050. "Reference your 750, critical situation in 56 Division is appreciated here. I have represented the situation personally to General Alexander this date, and it r,as been decided that 5th Division at full strength will be sent to you without equipment, 15th Brigade Group leaving here Uarch 4th. 56th Division, as relieved, will be returned without equipment to :lfaples area. You must realize in making your demands for immediate shipment of additional British and American units that availability of craft is the limiting factor. Every effort is being made to increase suprly of craft. 88th Division is not available for you but relieves 5th. Plan to send 34th Division by combat team to you, commending betvreen March 15th and 20th. Delay caused by lack of replacements and necessity for assembling craft for move. Am also recommending that such personnel as is required for replacements be taken from 56th Division to fill up 1st Division. It is essential that you impress General Templer vd th the absolute necessity of holding his ground in the event of an attack in his sector. Am planning, if weath~r rermits, all out air effort in your sector j;~arcli 1st. Please assist us by submitting suitable targets. Guards Brigade remains with you until after 1st Brigade Group of 56th Division has been relieved. Details later." The Army Cornnander sent the following memorandum to General Alexander regarding this situation: "Attached hereto is a copy of a radiogram I have just received from General ':'ruscott and my reply thereto. I failed to take up with you this morning the question of reinforcl'!ments for British increments .in the bridgehead. Prospects for arrival of British reinforcem~nts in this area will not meet the requirements of the VI Corps. I recommend that such personnel as may be urgently required to fill up the 1st British Division be taken from the 56th Division prior to its return to the Naples area. I am assuming that the 5th Division will go to the bridgehead at full strength. Otherwise, additional personnel from the 56th Division should be taken to fill it up also. I realize this is an extraordinary measure, but if British reinforcements are not available from other sources, the drastic steps reconm ended above should, in my opinion, be taken. Gen. Truscott fMls, and I concur, that British units in the bridgehead must be maintained at full strength. "I hope my position with respect to added craft for maintenance requirements and for the movement of 34th Division to the bridgehead beginning on or about Harch 15th have been cleared with the Navy." General Clark today received a copy of a cable from General Alexander to General Hilson, the complete text of which is quoted below: RU DCAO 202. 11 I have had full discussion on tactical and maintenance position at Anzio with �Clark and his staff this morning. Daily maintenance requirements of troops at present in Anzio beachhead are 2700 TFD. I am satisfied that this figure is approximately correct. CINC MED is unable to assure me a higher average discharge than 2500 TFD although actual discharges to date have averaged slightly { more than 3000 TPD. Reserves at Anzio now are not adequate for defence security if present arrangements are not substantially improved there is no chance of increasing these reserves to the point vrhere we can rass to the offensive and gain the extra ground the importance of which you have so correctly emphasized. To avoid collapse of present front must relieve immediately one tired division by a fresh one. To conduct an offensive successfully General Clark considers that he must put one extra division into the beachhead. I consider therefore that we must face the fact that our average daily discharge must be raised as quickly as possible to 3200 TfD for maintenance plus 800 TfD to build up reserves total 4000 TPD plus additional draft lifts for troop movements mentioned above. To put in the extra division alone will require 39 LST lifts during last two wMks of Parch. Discharge at the higher rate of 4000 TfD must start ten clear days before the extra division goes into effect necessary improvenent in present weak reserve position. Hovr these things are to be done is not for me to say, but I am sure that they are necessary. Nothing I suggest could be worse for OVERLORD than a catastrophe at Anzio." * * FRESENZANO--FER:1.UARY 29, 1944--This morning there arrived Gener111 H. D. Cri ttenberger, Colonel Ladue, J'.'ajor Lodge, r.73.jor Collins and Lieutenant Case, newly assigned to Fifth Army. After a conference with General Crittenberger in his van, General Clark met the other officers at the hut, and General Cr5ttenberger returned to Caserta with the plan of going to II Corps tomorrov,. General Clark remained at his command rost during the balance of the day, receiving his staff officers and going over dispatches. At dinner tirrte news arrjved that the enemy had opened an attack on the positions held by the 509th Parachute Battalion. General Clark personally went over tto air targets for the succeeding day with Lt. Col. Hare of his Air Suprort Control Section and kept General Hull, General Brann and Colonel Hare with him for dinner. In the evening the General sent for Lieutenant Devol, Hho commands his two PT boats, and discussed with him the arrangen"'nts for a proposed trip to Anzio tomorrow. General Clark 1 s notos on the day's activities follow: "The Boche attacked today on the 3rd Division front. Although sorie small penetrations have been mad~, from the information I have received to date the situation is in hand. "Word has been received that heavy and continuous shelling of tLe port area has continued all day, with the result that two ISTS receiv~d direct hits, killing my Captain Haverty of the Medical Corps \'Tho was handling th~ evacuation there. As a result of this shelling the Navy has again issued high-handed orders w:i.thout reference to the Army. These include: ~- No trucks to be loaded on top decks of LSTS, which will seriously curtail our maintenance of supplies. E• Discontinuing the evacuation of wounded by LST. I am asking the Surgeon what this will amount �to . I mention this to Admiral Cunningham and their shipping vrHhout upon the grom1d battle illustrate again the high-handed methods pursued by his subordinPtes . They take drastic action to protect giv5ng the least thought to the results of such action in the bridgehead . "Another example of lack of Navy cooperation arose when I had notice given to the Navy that I would be flying by cub on a prescribed route to the bridgehead tomorrow , requesting that shipping be notified ecause yesterday one of our destroyers , without provocation, fired on our courier cub . Although three officers in the Navy Department were told that I was flying in the plane , they have all replied that planes must keep their distance or be fired upon . 11 Due to my pre-occupation with the Italian cnmpaign , I have received word that I am relieved of all further responsibility for the operation or ) planning of ANVIL. This is a great relief to me , for I have no tine to give any thought to any other subject except the battle of the l'idgehead . Quoted below are the jnstructions on this subJect : 1 1. The Italian campaign has assumt'!d such importance that tl'e Commandern-Ghief is loathe to risk a change in Cor1manders of Fifth Army either now or in the near future . j 1 2. Fir directives from the Col"lbj ned Chiefs Your responsibilities on the added resronsibility perv.i.sed from now on . concerning Operation ANVIL have now been received of Staff which require immediate implemi"lntation. the Italian mainland are too grave to burden you with for continued ANVIL planning which must be closely su- 1 3. For these reasons decision has been reached by Genera]. Wilson and concurred in by General Devers , that you shall remain in command of Fifth Army and be reliev~d of responsibility for the Seventh Army and ANVIL planning effective this date . Hence the instructions forwarded you y cable and letter 1 January on this subject are revoked . 1 11 c/s , General Clark today received the following letter from General Harding, ACMF : "In reply to your memorandum dated 28 February 1944 addressed to the C-in- C personally, I am directed by the C-in- C to inform you that after the nost careful consideration of all the factors involved , he cannot in any circumstances agree to the transfer of personnel from 56 Division to replace deficiencies in 5 Division or 1 Division. · "Every effort will be made to · make and keep 1 and 5 Divisions up to a strength of 26 officers and 700 0.Rs per infantry battalion, but the transfer of personnel from one division to anoth~r , especially in the circumstances which exist in this case , is rightly or wrongly contrary to all the principles on which the British Army is trained and j nspirea·, and would certainly lead to the most serious loss of morale , if not to disastrous results . "The C-in-C considers that the remedy lies in the rapid replacement of 56 Division by 5 Division , and the rearrangement ,. if necessary, of the 6 Corps �front so that the tasks of the two Dritish divisions are as nearly as practicable related to the s·'-.rength at which they can be maintnined with the flow of reinforcements available . "In this connection will you please forward for the information o~ the C- in-C your programme for the r1ove of 5 Division to the bridgehead, and for the return of 56 Division and 24 Guards Brigade. "As regnrds additional craft , the C- in-C has taktm the question up as a matter of the utmost urgency with the Supreme Allied Cornnander and the C- in-C Mediterranean. Authority has been obtained for the I.STs due to leave NAFI.ES today to b~ held for the moment , and the question of their further retention has been taken up by the Supreme Allied Corniander with C- in- C Mediterranean today, and you will be kept informed of the situation. In the meantime the C- in-C directs me to emphasise the vital importance of ensuring that not one man , or vehicle , or pound of stores is put into the bridgehead that does not make a direct contribution to its security. I am to ask you to continue to give this a spect of the matter your closest personal attention. 11 Following are the important messages of the day: Personal Clark to Truscott: RN 7509 . "Medical reports show alarming inEvery effort must be mnde to stop this waste of manpower . Assure yourself thPt existing instructions for prevention of trench foot are being complied with . " crease in trench foot in 3rd and 45th Divisions . Personal Clark to Truscott: RN 753() . "To support you this afternoon, started 3 sn_uadrons of fighter bombers at about 1300 hours to support you in your defense against the attack on tht'l front of the 509th. Leading brigade 5th Division scheduled to leave here Harch 4th. Fastest it can be done. What is status of 24 Guards Brigade? Of course it is available to you for combat and will not be withdrawn until my further orders . What is status of 157 and 179 Regiments? I feel confident of your ability to stop this attack with heavy losses to the enemy. Vlill see you soon . ETA later. All out air attack your front being planned for tomorrow if weather permits . " Personal Clark to Bowman. RN 7539 . "I expect to arrive with 2 cubs Nett.::::-J airfield tomorrow morn:i..ng at rbout 0930 . You be at field with jeep from 0915 on. / Fire pyrotechnic signal from middle of field as cubs aprroach if fielri is not operational and I can not land there , in v,hich case will land on a road . Will \ return same afternoon . Weather nay rrevent trip , in which case will notify you. Inform Truscott . Have AA warned of my arrival . Vlill come in low. Acknowledge .__, " Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 775 . "Strong t,nemy atb=icks all along front between 93 and OJ eastings . 3rd Division heavily engaged by entire 362 and Herman Goering Divisions . Elements 715 Division and 1028 R~giment also identified. Intense fighting in progress . TAC/R reports 50 tanks in Cisterna and 20 addi tional tanks entering tmvn . It is most essential thnt heavy air bombardment be placed on this target tonight . " Personal Truscott to Clark. W1 777. 11 I anticipate heavy- enemy air attA.cks tonight ag;:dnst our artillery positions , and the port area . Recommend steps be taken to provide maximum night fighter cover . " �l 22 Personal Clark to Trus cott . RH 7545 . "Reference your 775 a.na 777, maximum night fiF,hter cover will be provided tonight . Two dive oomb bomber squadrons ti.ttacked tanks at Ci sterna this afternoon . Results not yet known . Air advise s against Attack of Cisterna tonight , due to the necessity of using heavy bombs in close proximity to friendl y troops . Roans leading into Cisterna wil l be covered tonight by night bomber s , and all targets in this area covered in t omorrow ' s progran. Am sending you two British Commandos , total strength approximatel y 600 . Hope to get them to you in the next two or three days. They should help . 11 * * * PRESENZANO--MARCH 1, 1941~--Today General Clark remained at · his comriand rost all day. He had jntended to go to the b~achheHd today and made arrangements for transportation by cub . However , the weath ,r deteriorated throughout the morning and by noon it was aprarent that the trip would not be possibl e . Accordingly, General Cl ark directed that the sam"' arrangements for the succeeding day, March 2nd, be made . In the small hours of the morning today there arrived two cables which greatly annoyed General Clark. One numbered 02158 was from Headquarters ACMF t o Fifth Army with a eomplete distribution through the milit8ry ~stablishments in the Mediterranean basin. The other , #605 , came from FRO , ACMF and was directed to the Commanding General , Fifth Army. The first cP.ble , RN 02158, is quoted in full as f ollows : "The formation of Allied Troops now fighting in the A'!IJZIO Bridgehead will he known as the "Allied Brlngeh&nd Force" on order of the Prime Minister WEFQ 0001 hours 2 March, This term will be used in sitreps communiques and tre press . Ho change will take r l ace in normal signE>l address . 11 That rortion of #605 , which is here in question , reads as follows : "As from 0001 hours 2 Maren, formation of Allied troops now fighting in beachhead will be known as "The Allied Beachhead Forces" for all purposes less normal Army s:.gnal aarlress . 11 G~neral Clark discussed these documents at length with General Gru.enther , his Chief of :: ta ".'f , and with General Hull of the Orerations Division of the ,Jar Department , who took lunch with the General . 'T'he General then drafted the fol low.'ng radio to General Alexander covering this su')j,.ct : R J 5117. 11 T-teP""rl'!nce is Made your 02158 and my conver sation with you today. In view of the progr"ss by the Fifth Ar1:1y over a P"riod of six months in developing Allied relations , and of the F'ifth Arny "sprlt vrhich has been built upon a dirficnlt a+.tlefield , I r"quest that the order ot the lr5Me f.i:inister b<!'l riodified to r"'ad "The Fifth Arny Allied Br:'Ldgehead Force" . It is my considerec' opinion that the use of the modified title , espl')cially at this critical thne , will contr:.bute materially to the maint'°'nance of the hj g}, state of r..oral~i of' tbe Jrj tish and Anerican troops of the Fifth Army now in the Anxio bridg..,head . 11 The General feels that this is rart of a steady effort by the British to in-\ crease th~ir rrestiee :in the r·~~di terranl'lan area and to exalt j n the ru.blic nind the part that the British, as contrasted to the Americans , are , rlayjng there . ) �123 At the conference with the CITJC , AC!'F on the 28th, one of the questions arising was the system of air support which would bl"' used when the Eighth Army should side-slip to the left and should j_ ncorporate w~thin itself the British elements jncluded vTithin the Fifth Arny. Gen~ral Clark has had close perso11al and staff relationships with General Eouse and with his successor , General Saville . He has 1mmm the latter since boyhood. Accordingly, Gen6ral Clark feels that it would be desirable to 1-:t"ep the XII Air Support Cornmand with Fifth Army rather than to have it occupy a position in wrich its attention would be divided 1:Jetween the Fifth and :2ighth Armies . A cable from General Leese , Commanding the Eighth Army, to General Harding, of which an information copy was furnjshed General Clark, makes it evident that General Leese heartily agr""es with General Clark 1 s feeling in this matter: RN COS 49. "SASO has re • ported to me the proposals promulgated after the air force meeting which followed the GP.TC I s conferf'!nce . Understand XII ASC would have orerotional control of DAF Squadrons less 239 and 7 wings and that our needs will be met by XII ASC through the medium of a small operatiom1l headquarters DAF attached to our Hq . Regret cannot accept this situation. Must insist that Eighth Army orerations must be supported by DAF under direct command AVM Broadhurst in the same way as Gen. Clark insisted that his operntions must be supported by XII ASC under General SRville . For speclfjc operations of course either air force would give whole- hearted support to the other accordjng to w0ich Army wAs the predominant partner in that phase . Cannot believe tht>t agreement on these lines cannot be reached . Request thnt f~nal decision be postponed until return AVM Broadhurst arproximately March 10th. " General Clark has been greatly concerned with the necessity for frequent reports from the beachhead concerning unloading. Because of his not receiving such reports with satisfactory sp~ed, General Clark dispatched the following radio to Colonel Bowman : RN 5087. "I am not kept rrop~rly foformed on the status of unloading jn the beachhead. General Tnte has sent several messnges calling for reports from Colonel Newton , yet they fail to come . " Colonel Bowman replied as follows : RN 9926 . "Cable 5087 received . Initial request by General Tate for reports by his cable 3878, dr,ted 272238A , called for full report four tfoes daily progress of unloacUng and tYres of cargo being unloaded . It is impracticable to furnish this detailed information at such frl"lquent intervals without materially jncreasing the port and naval staffs and communication facilities . TM s was cxr lained by radio 9375 , drited 290003 , and memorandum Newton to Tate , dated 28 Feb. Cable 7531, dated 291440, modified request by General Tate to require 3 rerorts of a more general nature . Since receipt of cable 3878 the following reports have been made ; Cable 9981 , dated 291530 - Cable 9887, dated 291725 - Cable 9905 , dated 010025, CRble at 0800 , 1200 and 1600 as to whether unloading is or not - Memo Newton to Tate dated ?9 February sent by courier , Cable 9909, date<l. 011025 . In addition 4 cables daily will be sent giving detailed reports of rrogress of unload"ng and unloading operations of interest . " General Clark today wrote a long personal letter to General Devers, giving information on the latest developr1ents here . This letter , which was sent to General Devers b:r his pilot , is quoted as follows : 11 I am sending you this information in order that you may know the latest developnents here . You probably have tht'! news from the bridgeh!'!ad . The trird �attack is developing but bejng held in good shape . Some minor renetrations have been made , but the situation appea.rs to be well in hand . We are killing a good many Boche , and our casual ties to date have not been unduly heavy. "I am perturbed about the British sector . The 5()th Division, in parti cular , is not doing well . It has lost a lot of men in the "mi ssing" st atus and has been more in the nature of infiltration by the enemy. They have given ground which is vital to our left flank, and some of their small units have been cut off . ACMF is unabl e to rrovide me with British rt'}pl11cements as requ:ired , which has led to the necessity of taking th~ 5th British Division, which is in comparatively good shape , out of the line here and send:ing its personnel up only to take over the equipment of the 56th Division . I am insisting that the 5th go completely filled up , although I am not sur-e the British can do that . Its leading brigade will leave here on the 4th of March . Am also sending two British Comr~andos , strength about 600, who leave here this afternoon . The pl'!rsonnel of the 56th Division is scheduled to leave for Uaple s j_mmediately upon being relieved by the 5th. Inasmuc}1 as the British can not fill up the 1st Division in the bridgehead, I requested that some men of the 56th, rather than being pulled out of the bridgehead, be turned over to the 1st, particularl y those new replacements whlch the 56th has just received . General Alexander turnl"\d we dovrn on thi s request , stating that it was " contrary to all the principles on which the Briti sh Army is trainr-id and inspired, and would certainly lead to the most serious loss of morale , jf not to disastrous resultsn. General Al exander SU[~gests , as an alternative , to contract the British front and have more front and mor e responsibility given to the U. s. troops . That is impracticable , for we do not have enough U. S. troors for thAt purpose . I am makine repeated requests for British replacements , and they must do everything they can to assist . "I have been ordered to relieve the 24 Guards Brigade from the bridgehead, and , although it has a fighting strength of 1400, it must come back in a very few days . I have resist ed its return so far and rray be able to continue to do so . Until the situation settles dovm definitely trere , I am reluctant to bring out any troops who can still fieht . I am sure I can handle this situation. "I attended General Alexander ' s conference where Leese , Ct>nnon and I , and some of our staffs , were present . It was to discuss the reorgan:1-zation with which you are :"amiliar . I concurred, f'or I ari willing to do most anything in order to get all U. S. and French troops in the Fi-rth Army . I certainly hore that you can expedite r,ettin8 the 35th Division over here , followed by the 91st . When I 7 et trose two and anoth~r French Division, with the brideehead stabilized, I assure you we \vill join up . "~eneral Alexander has instructed me repeatedly to take the o"fensive in the brJdgehead and cap~ure Cisterna and Carroceto . You can arpreciate that with the enemy str('!ni;th against us and with our weakened condition there at present , I am unabl~ ~o. do ~his nov,. ~fter the Boche has spent his attack, I plan to rut the 34th Division J.nto the bridgehead . I am grMtly worried by tbe Navy's attitude on limiting the amonnt of suprlics v/rich they will send into t},e bridgehead . I must say that Admiral Cunningham ' s attitude has not bren ~trill helpful :in this respect . I h~ve presented this .in writing to Alexand~r , and he , in turn, has sent our requirements on to Gt"!neral .Jilson. I am satisfied that General Alexander is going to bat and will force the Havy to meet my minimum requirements now �1.:25 and provide some reserve for a future offensive and a hec1ge against bad r1eather. I figure the leading ccmbat team of the 34th Di vision can go in bet\'Teen the 15th and ?0th of this wmth ; that i', , rroviding I can get snrne rerlacements to it in the next day or two . "T . Y.. Brovm is here , and I have attach~d Ur,1 as an extra brigadier to the 88th Division which , jncidentally, is going in to relieve the 5th British Division and whicl , will e t're beginning of the reorganization plan . Crittenberger is here also. I will facilitate his seeing and doing whrt he nost desires with coribat units . I am keeping reople out of the bridgehead right at present but will give them all an opportunity to go up later. 11 I am rather surpr:i sed toclay to receive the following radiogram fror1 ACMF: The formation of Allied troops now fighting in the Anzio bridgehead will be 'lrnovm as the 11 Allied Bridgehead Force" on orders of the Prime Minister. This term will be used in sitreps , communiques and the press 1 • Th:i s rather disturbs me , for it is all a part of the Fifth Army up there. The men have b~en with it a long time and are proud of their Army organization . I do not know what I can do about it, but it seems to me tha.t if they want to emphasize Allied unity, and that must be the only reason underlyine this change , they could include Fifth Army in the title ; such as, 'Fifth Army Allied Bridgehead Force 1 • I am taking this mat t~r up with ACJ.:lF . 1 "I want to thank you for your surrort . I will kMp you posted from time to tine wj_th these personal lett"rs. I know that I can handle all these natters in a diplomatic way without in any way jMpardizi'1.g our Allied unity but f ,el it will help if you are informed as to my rroblems anrl how· I am attemrting to solve them in order that you may be ln a better position to assist." Today 1 s operations on the beachhead w~re r:1arked by th-; progress of the third of the German riajor attacks . This was opened by two battalions abreast Pgrinst the 509th Farachute Battalion position, and tbe assault wave was followed by a force in considerable c'epth . In all , the Germrms w~re tliought to have used three Divisions for the attack. In the course of the oa.y the enemy penetrated the VI Corps position to the extent of 1500 yards, but later in the day General Truscott counterattacked and durinp.; the ni,3ht regajned all i,} e p;round v;J,L::h the Germans had temporarily won. A large factor in stopping the Httack was a heavy concentration of our artill~ry. Air support was not effective because of weathr--r . General Clark entertain,.d for d~nner this evening General Beucler , Colonel Saltzman and Lieutenant Colonel I orter . * * * FRESENZANO--MARCH 2, 1944--Today General Clark rleterrninP,d to v:isit tb!'! bridge- \ head, desrite the v,eath""lr wh1ch was somewhat threatening . Accord:",ngly, he made t e followine; plans : A cub on floats was sent to take up a rosition between Hondragone and Zannone . The two FT boats were sent up to take their position at regular intervals between ronziane Islands anil Nettuno . General Clrrk arranged to leave w:i.th General Hull in two L- 5 1 s and fly over the course thus m10rked out , spendine a few hours on the'! beachhead , retm·ning n.t 1400 or 1500 hours , derending on the weather . �... Accordingly, the General vrent to the cub field at 0830 and was in a cub ready to take off with Gen~ral Hull in th~ following ,cub , but rio air cover appeared. A series of calls to G("meral Saville got the information that the original air cov~r had been ordered by General SAvill , but that due to a failure of staff work h1 the XII Air Support Command had never been actually ordered to leave the field . General Saville promptly ordered up an escort of four planes while Gt'meral Clark wait ,d . These four rlanes lost themselves in the fog and haze , and after General Clar"k- had waited 3/4 of an bour and made a few calls to General Saville., Gl'lneral Saville then ordered up four more planes . These too lost thenselves . In trie meantine the day was wasting away, and General Clark's important mission at the bridgehead was unfulfilled. From tjme to time the lost planes would cone into sight flying to and fro at a distance and then would be lost in the fog again . Eventually, they were guided to the Genere.l I s cub strip by General Saville who telephoned continued ~nstructions to i'iarcianise , from which point the message was relayed to the planes by voice radio . The Gene ral left at 1030 , instead of 08.30 , but no s0oner had the trip started than the e.scort needed to refuel, and General Clark ,•·as obliged to descend at an air strip j ust south of f'iondraeone while the escort took on gasoline . Finally, after this exasperating delc.y, the journey startec·, and the General reached Nettuno air strip without incident at about 12.30 . On this trip to the bridgehead, General Clark had a close shave from enemy shellfire . He was going up a road near the .3rd Division CP and following him was a jeep in which was riding Mr . Reynolds }ackard of the United }ress . The jeeps had just cleared a crossroads when a salvo of four enemy shells landed exactly at the intersection . Had the vehicles rassed n second or two earlier , some or all of the party would undoubtedly have been killed. I The General left Ncttuno air strip at 1400, protected by air cov~r which had been arranged by XII Air Support Conunand for 1400 or 1500, d~pending on the hour of the General I s departure . 'l'he return trip was with out j ncid ent , and the General arrived at his cornnand post at flbout 1600. He was well content with the situation at the bridgehead and on the Cassino front and had his cub fly him to rriarcianise , v,hence he went by automobile to the Officers 1 Rest Center at Sorrento in order to get a good night ' s sleep. \ General Clark last night dispatcl1ed the following c~ble to General Truscott , with a copy to Colonel Bowman: Wi 5118 . "The 1nstructio'1s issued by you in a letter dated 27 Februo.ry, subject "Improvement of Dump Conditions " , has just bee} brought to my attention. You will refrain from issuing directives of this kind to Advance Headquarters Fifth Army. Fersonnel at my Advance Command Post are there to assist you. We realize our responsibility with r(')gards the improvement of these dumps . I have personally issued instructions on tris subject on severa visits to the bridgehead . If you have recoTI1T1endations to make , you will submit them to my senior representative in the form of a recoMmendation , at the same time advising my headquarters of your desires . Instructions issued as of February 27 will be revoked . AcLnowledge this message . I hope to see you tomorrow if weather will permit rne to fly in. 11 • General Clark today sent the following cable to General Truscott . RN .3917. I congratulate you , members of your staff and the Brjtish and American troops of VI Corps on the magnificent manner in wriich the strong German attack of th., rast 11 �( �few days was repelled . Fighting wit h great tenacity and skill your troops have rnade the enemy pay dearl y for his temporary offensive role , and have furt her / diminished any waning hope for victory the German sol dier may still imprudently cheri sh . I am confident that in the heavy fighting yet to come the Fifth Army will further demonstrate in a most effective manner the superiority of Allied arms . " · General Clark today received a copy of the following cable from General Alexander to General Truscott : RN MA.1128. "My heart iest congratulations to you persohal l y on·the abl e way you have handled this most successful battle and please convey to a ll the troors under your comi:1and my admiration and thanks for the magnificent display of courage and soldierl y qualities which they have shown during these last few days of bitt er fighting . They have held firm everywhere and repulsed the enemy vlith bloody losses . Well done boys . 11 General Cl ark today received the fo l lowing reply to his letter of yesterday to General Devers : It w s very helpful for P1e to lrnov: what you are doing and thinking and I a greatly appr eciate the letter wrich you sent to r1e today. I talked to Gi-!neral Wilson at length about the situation on the Fifth Army front concerrdng command and , incidentally, have had inquiries from General Marshall along the same lines . I am gl ad that you have now agreed to the new line- up in order to get the U. S. and French troops together in the Fifth Army. I am sure this i s better for everybody. 11 . "With reference to the 3/,1,th Division , we have sent a consi<lerE:ble number of repl acements to you, r1any of them belongi-,.,g to the 34t h Division . I am hoping that there are not only enough replacements for this Division, but also for tbe 36th. In any case , we are trying hard to get replacements to you in sufficient numbers to take care of your needs in this matter . In this connection, Stayer has arrived and he has already started the work on the doctors to cut dovm on the number of sick and non- operational casualties , and also to return men from the hospitals sooner . 1 am sorry about the name for the All ied bridgehead force . I , of course , do not like this any more than you do , but after all it is a name and cannot have · much to do with winning the war . It was one of those things which I class as destructive , unnecessary and unessential . I elieve we have Allied unity more than ever , and I an sure this hnd nothing to do w:ith this theater , ut had more to do with tre politicians in England . 11 "Patch has arrived and has been assignll!d to the Seventh Army. He js going right to work to build a staff . I do not 1':now just what the .r'uture of A.r1VIL is at tre riontimt but 1 1e hope to have H firmed up :in the next few days . "He are hr' nging pressure on tbc 'favy to give th, oriel gehead all the supplies necessary, ut ue are havjng a great deal of,trou1)1 .. with landing craft. I think it .:.s v ry inportant thnt H('} do not put too "~ ucL r1aintenance on the br:irlgehead . There is not room tl.er-: to attack it and :n my opinion invites loss . If we coulc, push the brirlgehead out far enougb so that we are reaso1.a,)ly sure that the port canno~~ he :'ired on by artill ... ry fire , I elieve v1e could get along with seven days 10.:1-ntenance. 11 �11 G"'lneral ';;ilson is making every effort to get replacements for the British uni ts . We :have hid to give a limi tine date with r~fer~nce to the RCT of the Airborn~ Division, in order that we r~ay carry out our orders and get it back to its division by a certain date . I am hoping that this will not affect you too much . We are also J11aking efforts to get th~ battalion of the 34th Division to it as soon as possible . "I hope to be up there in the next week or so , when I will E;\'.'lt closer to your problerris . Lots of luck, " * * * PRF.SENZANO--MARCH 3, 1944- -Today General Clark spent the entire day at the Fi fth Army Officers I Rest Center , the first day of recreation which he has had for a long time . The qu:i_et situation at ~he beachhead 1md the relo.tive inactivity of affairs on the Cassino front gave him this opportunity for repose . Throughout the day a series 'of cables were received from Anzio concerning the progress of unloading there . Unloadtng has proceeded all night and continu!'!d until 1300 today when it ceased because of rough weather . General Clark had planned a little celebration this evening in honor of General Gruenther 1 s birthday and , in order to return from Sorrento, had his L- 5 plane go down to a landing strip near Pompei. General Clark left the Rest Centt"ir at about 1600 to find the landing strip , but the roads leading to it over and across thl'! partly destroyed autostrade were very confusing, a,nd eventually General Clark turned ba ck to the Rest Center . In the meantime , at the CF 40 officers , representing the various staff sections of the Fifth Army, gat hered in the General's Recreation Hut and had a buffet supper , watched the remarkable performance of a sleight- of-hand artist and listened to two Special Service nusicians play the piano and accordion~ General Gruenther was presented with a huge birthday cake , everybody sang songs , and the evening w s a great success . a The replacement s ituation still being critical, General Gruenther wrote the follovring letter to General Sawbridge , AFHQ G- 1: "I am reluct ant to continue to bring to your attention the subject of replacem s . However, I feel that yc,u should know of a misunderstanding on our ent part which has developed as a. result of the exchange of the following messages : Yciur 52933 , 57079 , 57996; and our 3397 and 4 7/.,6 . Based on thes e messages , we obtained the distinct impression that on or about March 2 we would receive approximately 3800 general a ss ignment replacements and 4500 RTU ' s . For several months now we have been stressing the necessity of infantry replacements - s o much ao in fact that , rightly or wrongly, we have come to consider the term 11 replacements" as meaning 11 infantry replacements" . our · shortage of infantry replacernents has been so critical during this period that we have , for all i'l"ltemts a.nd purposes , practj cally disregarded the question of other types of replacements . For that reason we made the assumption that of the 8300 " replacements and RTU I s expected on March 2 , the proportion of infantry replacement::; would be low. It is true that in your 57079 you warned us that "infantry replacements in th~ number we required would not be available until March 1411 • 11 �Howev~r, in no way v,ere we prepared for the shock that fBS gave us yesterday wh"'n ...,hey told us that on r~ arch 4th we shall receive 3063 enlisted replacements with 753 infantry and 526 RTU's with ?63 infantry. I feel tha.t your //57079, answering mu· 3397, might have given us the bad news then. 11 As you know we have a serious personnel problem in connection with the beachhead . The casualties there have been .;airly heavy and have thus far absorbed all the infantry rerlacements which we have received during the past two weeks, and there is still a shortage . The 34th and 36th Divisions are now out of the line and are eagerly awaiting their infantry replacements. In order to resune the offensive in the beachhead it will be necessary to ship another division there . General Clark decided on February 28th th11t he would se:?.1.d the 34th, shipping one RCT about 1'.1'arch 20 . I gave rim every assurance that out of 8300 reflacements and RTlPs expected on or about March 2, we would surely l;e able to f:i nd enough infantry rerL:-:i.cements to make good the losses at the beachhead and also to fill one infantry regiMent of the 34th Division. On that assumption we rmde a strong apreal to tbe Navy for the shipping to start the movement of the division about March 20. Moreover a tactical plan has b"'en forrmlated involving the use of the 34th Division in the beachhead early in April which may now be of doubtful value . Had we realized that of the 8300 RTTJ 1 s and r~place rients, there vrould i..,e only 1000 infantry our picture would have been very much different . "It was , of course , an error on my part to indicate to General Clark that any proportion of the Farch 4th shipment would be infantry, although he ha s not placed that blame on me . In order to rrevent :'uture errors of tris character, I should like to urge that you, Ben Sawbridge , send us messages for the next two weeks advising us of the infantry (I repeat infantry) shipments which can be expected and their dates of arrival here . This message will be in addition to the routine message sent to FBS for each shipment . After two weeks we'll probably be out of the woods and we won't bother you any more . "Please realize that we understand thoroughly that your headquarters is doing everything in the world to get us the replacements that we need . My only request is that we be kept in the picture concerning the jnfantry end of the game. · It is often necessary for us to deal in individuals; we are usually that short . "Our troops have junt had a fine victory in repulsing the third strong attack by enemy forces . We killed a great many Germans, and I feel quite confident that the situation there is r.iore than under control." * * FRI":SE',JZANO--MARCH 4, 1944--General Clark returned to his command post by cub today, arriving at about 1210 . He immediately began disposing of those matters which had accumulated during his absence and cleared his desk by early afternoon . In the afternoon General Kenneth N. Anderson , formerly coP1ma.nding the British First Army in Tunisia and now in charge of the Eastern C01mnand in England (having been removed from his Army comnand by Gent'!ral fontgol"lt'!ry as soon as the latter took over in Enr,land) paid a visit to General Clark. General Clark was very courteous in his treatr.ient of General Anderson who appeared somewhat mollified by his recent experiences . �Following General Anderson's visit , General Clark received a call from Generals Cannon and Saville and J3rieadier Mainwaring, who discussed problems of air support control . General DeGaulle arrived today at Capodichino for a visit to the Fifth Army area and went to Venafro to the command post of General Juin. By prearrangement with General Clark , he arrived at 1800 at the Fifth Army command post and went at once to General Clark ' s van where the two commanders had an interesting conversation, ·rith Lt . Col. Sutherland act:ing as interpreter . General DeGaulle started the conversrtion speaking soMewhat laborious English but later lapsed into French. General DeGaulle had two points to nake . One was that France should be invaded during the current year or she would be so drained of strength and resources of every kind that effective resistance by the French would be impossible . The second was that if because of a lack of shipping the Allies were unable to invade southern France and jnstead had to adopt as an alternative the placing of all French resources in Italy, the French authorities , in order to preserve the psychologict=il well being of the French people, should be tnken into the complete cnnfidence of the Allied leadership and should assist in the plannjng of whatever operations were in store . It was evident , when General DeGauJ.le sroke this way, that he thought he had been coldshouldered by the Allies , and this further appeared when the General remarked that he was somewhat surprised that no French divisions had been allotted the task of joining in the cross- channel invasion. General Clark was quite frank with General DeGaulle , stating that he , General Cle.rk, knew that~ southern France operation, termed ANVIL, had been in contemplation but that the shipping which had been short enough to cause great concern in the Italian operations , had been still further shortened in order to support the forthcoming ovri:nLORD Operation. An jnvasion of southern France had become a practical impossibiUty. There was no use trying to invade southern France with one division or two . "Why not , " said General Clark, "put whatever resources the Allies have available in the Mediterrant1ian basin into the Italian campaign where a great victory might be won?" "Very well, " said General DeGaulle, "I will agree wjth you upon a certain hypothesis . Let's suppose that the Allied High Command intends during the current year to launch a major offensive ncrof's the channel into F'rance or into Holland or somewhere else in Western Europe and , assume further that there is not enough shipping for an invasion of southern France; then I will agree with you that it would be desirable to take all the French Divisions now disponible in the Mediterranean and put them into the Italian c8mpaign to the end that a major diversion might there be made and the Germans be contained there." Hovrever , General DeGaulle asb,d if General Clark had available the necessary shipping to maintain the French and American Divisions now in North Africa . General Clark said he had . A quantity of shipping here novr is being utilized to support the air preparations and the other steps being taken to lay the foundations for ANVIL in Corsica and Sardinia. If ANVIL were abandoned then that shipping could be available to support the Italian campaign. General CJBrk added that if the French and Anerican Divisions in Africa were brought in echelons to Bizerte , the shipping could be used to ferry them to Messina, and. they could then come north over the road by automobile , saving shipping time to a large degree . The conference was as amicable as it could be in view of General DeGaulle's extremely phlegmatic personality. General Clark took occasion to rraise the · �dash and esprit which characterized General Juin and to exrress his great satisfaction at havJng General Juin in the Fifth Army. General DeGaulle expressed gratifjcation at this mutufll confidence and said that he was glad to be at the front among soldiers, but that he would like still more to be in Paris among the French people. At 1900 General Clark and General DeGaulle went to the hut where a U shaped table had been set up and aperitifs rrepered for 17 guests. After a short time General Clark seated his guests and entertained them at dinner. DeGaulle was a curious dinner guest, courteous, at all times making the polite responses, but with a peculiar, flat, uninspired manner which contrasted strangely with the affable, pleasant manner of General Juin, who sat on the left of General Clark, while General DeGaulle sat on his right. However, the dinner was a great success. In addition to Generals Clark, Gruenther, DeGaulle and Juin there were present Generals Sevez, deHontsabert, Keyes, Dody, Chaillet, CPrpentier and Beucler, Brigadier Richardson and Colonels Kammerer, Saltzman, Billotte and Lt. Col. Sutherland. General Clark today djspatched the following letter to General Leese: "With the coning Movement of Eighth Army to the west of the Appenines, I believe there will be need of closer liaison between Eighth and Fifth Armies than has been necessary while our comJ'!lB.nds were separated by the mountains. "I propose, therefore, sending two of my staff officers to your headquarters for this purpose and would appreciate a similar arrangement on your part. I believe one of these offjcers should be particularly qualified in Operations (G-3) and the other in Supply (G-4). nrt would be particularly desirable if you vrouln approve my retention of Lieutenant Colonel George Britten as your liaison officer for operations. Colonel Britten is an outstanding officer, known and well-liked by all with whom he has cori.e in contact. He has been a most dependable member of Fifth Army's BrHish Incr~ment and J would like to retain him on my stAff as your representative. "General Alexander has told me that Brigadier Charles Richardson, who has been with me during all of the Italian camraign, is to be given another assignment. "I have no suggestions for a mination. 11 11 Q officer and would appreciate your no- "As for thia. American offic~rs to cone to ·your headquarters, if you lmow of any by name which you would like to have, please let me knov1. If tht"!y can be made available, I will eladly detail them. "i"lith fullest expectations for our joint march on Rnn; and to the north, I am.'' General Clark today sent the following message to crrc, ACMF. RN 5194. "Paraphrase oi' message 9941 (Five Army to AC'l.F from Clark) dated 040040A from �Fifth Army Advance CP follows : ' Fort and .naval personnel held confer~nce with Fifth Army r~presentatives this date rel~tive to unloading of Lih~rty ships . Considered opinion of all ' that small craft situation must be improved with least practicable delay. Have operational following craft : 4 American and S British LCTS , 2 additional American LCTS in poor shape are being utilized on hospital carrj~r run, and sev~n LCIS . LCIS are a help but are limited in capacity and ease of unloading . 12 LCTS are definitely insufficient to efficiently unload five Liberties . Navy personnel cooperative to fullest extent and doing everything possible to keep craft operational. New subject: 2 hospital ca'rr:iers arrived at 0945 this date rmd insisted on leaving at 1430. No information received that they were to arrive . In view of late carrier arrivals and distance anchored from shore due to shelling, only 2 LCT loads were able to reach ship side in time . Furthermore , although LCT loaded with patients was alongside st . Andrew, the Captain refused to take on the second load . The LGT was then sent to the St . Julien, and the Captain was prevailed upon to accept this load which he did . Request that action be taken to preelude refusal of hospital carrier to accept ratients who are alongside ship in an LCT after having been transported approximately 2 miles to get to ship siae . Request ETA of all hospital carriers sent Anzio . In order to assure maximum loading recorirnencl that this he not later ogoo if possible and sailing time be not earlier than 1500 hour-s . 1 I shall be grateful to you H you will assist us to solve these probleris . " !? j \ General Clark cabled General Truscott as follows today: R!J 5190. "Your request to retain two field companies of 56 Division is approved . I have asked General Alexander to secure Admiral Cunningham I s cooperation in raising naval morale . Keep me t~dvised if unfavorable attitude continues . " * * * FRF.SEHZANO-•MARCR 5, 1944--In the morning General Clark flevr by cub to Caserta where he conferred with General Alexander . The General returned to his command post shortly before 1300 hours . He spent the afternoon in administrative work at his van. At 1730 the General, with his Chief of Staff, his Public Relations Officer and Captain B~ardwood, met in the hut with five American newspaper correspondents: Lynn Heinzerling of Associated Fress , James Roper of United rress , Graham Hovey of International :Jews Service , Lee McCardell of the Baltimore Sun and William Shadel of the Infantry Journal. General Clflrk told the correspondents that he was having them in merely for a drink and a chat . However , before long the General was discussing, off the record , the re-grouping of troops in the Italian campaign. He revealed to the correspondents that the Fifth Army would becone a Fr['ncoA111erican Army and that British troops eventually would no longer be part of his command . He told the correspondents thot the Fifth Army would control the west coast sector of the main Italian front (that sector now ht'lld by the 10 British Corps) and the Anzio bridgehead . He said that the Eighth Ar"f'iy would shift westward and eventually would ½e the force driving up the Liri ·valley. Hovey asked the General how he felt about the new make-up of the Fifth Army, and the Army Commander said that h(') felt the move would be beneficial in that it would give him troops equipped exclusively with American mat~riel and that �133 this would facilitate administrative and supply -rroblems . He said that his relations with the 'r;ritish were most anica,"le 1)u-t, explained that some times it was particularly difficult to order a British Corps Commander to execute certain operations . Such action with British officers entailed longer discussion and a certain amount of debate . The correspo'1d~nts also brought up the matter of replacements , and General Clark said that the replacewmt probleri, , while bad enough for Anerican troops , was extremely difficult for hoth the '3ritish and the French. He said that he hoped to get two more American divisions in th" Italian caMpaign the 85th, now in Af'rica, rind one other division. G1meral Clark also revealed to the correspondents that !:,he leading ele ments of a brigade of the 5th British Info.ntry Division had almost net with a disaster while moving by LCIL.S from Haples to Anzio . Through faulty navigation the vessels started to put in at Circeo and had been fired upon by German gt.ms . They pulled out without suffering any casualties and moved up to Anzto . 11 If you think I have been confused by this action" , said General Clark, "Think what the confusfon of the German High Corimand must be . \le are wondering if the German comm1mique tonight will say that they rerulsed an attenpted Fifth Army landing at Circeo'! Hovey also 1 rought up the qu~stion as to why higher headquarters had issued the directive that a dateline referring to th~ bridgehead forces must read "Allied Bridgehead Forcesu . Hovey said this action had left the correspondents somewhat cnnfused . He asked General Clark what was the reason for it , and General Clark said that he too was confused but that he had made strong reprosentations to General Alexander and. the Har Department . Hovey said that riost of t},~ correspondents vrere continuing to write of it as the Fifth Army Bridgehead but that he noted that tr e censors were inserting the vrord "Allied 11 in the Fifth Arrny dateline . General Clark said that the Fifth Army had fos tered an Allied feeling and that he felt tl-at the troper dateline was "Fifth Army Allied Bridg~head Forces" • rffcCardell brought up the subject as to who was the father of the rlan for the amphibious operation at Anzio . General Clark anrl General Gruenther explained that there had been several rlans for amphibious operations , that the first one was in tr e i:;lanning phas~ three days after our initial landing at Salerno . General Clark said that three othl"r anph1bious plans had b~en laid down before proper craft was available and the Anzio operation executed . Roper then brought up the question as to why the Fifth Army bridgehead had not been e:xploi ted , and General Clark pointed out that by dusk on D day all that the Fifth Army had ashore on the bridgehead was tbe 3rd Division and one brigade of the Bri tish 1st Division . Both of these organizations had about 1/5 of their vehicles . The Germnns , however, had lnnd supply lines and had 16 battalions ranged around the briclg~head perimeter bytthe night of D day. The General said that } ifth Army forces probflbly could have driv~n onto the Mgh ground doninating the Anzio bridgehead but that such a move would have greatly endangered the rear areas at Anzio and Nettuno and thnt the troops right have easily been cut off from all supplies hnd they moved too far forward and left thl'!lir flanks and rear thinly held . 1 �13Y Sitting informally around the stove in the hut, General Clark chatted with the correspondents for over an hour. In the evening General Clark invited a number of his staff officers from the headquarters to a movie in the hut. General Clark today sent the following cable to General Devers with regard to the replacement situation: RN 7696. "In your March 2nd letter you indicate that you are under impression that replacement situation is satisfactory for 34th Div. and probably so for 36th Div. Sawbridge message to Gruenther lists replacements scheduled and I realize you are doing everything possible. However, I desire to bring following facts to your attention. 34th Div. short 1500 infantry enlisted exclusive of lOoth Battalion. 36th Div. short 2400. Both Divisions now under new T/O. Total shortage of 3rd and 45th Divisions approximately 1500. Shipment of 3391 enlisted replacements which arrived March 3 included only 469 infantry and this is total infantry now available. Since movement of 34th Div. to bridgehead nnist start about March 20th, I am forced to convert to infantry approximately 1500 replacements from other branches as authorized in your W/9832/26661 dated 10 January. I consider the conversion an unsatisfactory expedient but in view of the urgency of getti.~g 34th Div. to ANZIO in immediate future, that solution is forcod on me." \ Today the Inspector Gen~ral's report was received on the investigation con- / ducted relative to the allegations regarding the insufficjency of ammunition and the carrying of unloaded weapons by units of the 36th Division in the Ra/ pido River crossing. The conclusions reached are (a) that all personnel started on the operation carrying at least one extra oondolier of ammunition, and no general shortage of ammunition existed, (b) that although orders were issued that assault companies in the 141st Infantry would make the crossing of the Rapido River with weapons unloaded, no disastrous results occurred from this procedure; that all personnel of the 143rd Infantry crossed the river with loaded weapons; the 142nd Infantry was in Division Reserve and was not engaged, (c) that orders of the 141st Infantry directing that assault companies would carry weapons unloaded a.re not ascribed to General Wilbur, (d) that any disastrous results which may have occurred during this operation, were not due to insufficiency of ammunition or the procedure followed by some companies of the 141st Infantry in crossing the river with unloaded weapons. It was recommended that no further action be taken in the case. General Clark received the following cable from General Truscott today: RN 907. "Front quiet today except for small attack a.gainst third battalion, 7th Infantry last night which was repulsed. I am continuing aggressive reconnaissance. Begin tonight regrouping to make first division and 2 regiments 45th Division available for attack which I am planning to reduce Carroceto salient. Should complete regrouping by 8th and be ready by 11th or 12th enemy action and weather permitting. Will coordinate date with operations on southern front and will give you complete details of plan later." * * * PRESENZANO--MARCH 6, 1944--Today was the birthday of Sergeant Dow one of General Clark's Headquarters Detachnent, who has bAen an efficient an! devoted soldier in General Clark's imnediate entourage for many months. Sergeant Dow had �been wounded by an enemy bomb at the beachhead but has recovered a.nd is back on duty. This morning General Clark pinned a purple heart medal on Sergeant Dow, to the sergeant's great delight and pride. At about 1030 General Clark flew by cub to a field near Headquarters 10 Corps where he conferred with General Mccreery concerning the proposed ch,=inges in his corps nispositions involved in the re-grouping of forces on this front and the transfer of the British 5th Division now under General Mccreery to the beachhead. Thereafter, General Clark went on to visit General Sloan, Col"l1llandjng the 88th Division at his comr.,and post which js located where the present 5th Division CP also is, at a place called Carano about three miles southwest of Cessa Aurunca. Following this talk General Clark returned by cub plane to his command post. While at the 88th Division, General Clark noticed that the division lacked sufficient shower bath equipment, and, as General Moran happened to be there, General Clark asked General Moran to see that an additional mobile shower unit was sent to this division. General Moran had the Quartermaster take the necessary steps in the afternoon. The following important messages were received and dispatched today: Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 907. "Front quiet today except for small attack against 3 Bn., 7th In:'antry la.st night wM.ch was repulsed. I am con• tinuing aggressive reconnaissance. Begin tonight regrouping to make 1st Division and two regiments 45 Division Rvailab1e for attack which I am planning to reduce Carroceto salient. Should complete regrouping by 8th and be ready by 11th or 12th enemy action and weather permitting. Will coordinate date with operations on southern front and will give you complete details of plan later." Personal Clark to Truscott. RN 5220. "Reference your 907, am delighted with your plans to retake Carroceto salient. Keep me posted as to timing of attack. Hope to launch Cassino attack just before yours if weather permits. Heavy rains here have inundated large areas on the Rapido involved in this attack. With 3 or 4 days good weather , will launch it. Will see you in me~ntime. 11 Personal Clark to Alexender. RN 5229. 11 Will be gratoful to you if you will inform me whether or not craft will be available for shipment of 34th Division to Anzio on March 20th as requested by me at your February 28th conference. If shipment is to start on 2oth craft for shipment of supplies should be availRble by March 10th. New subject. I am still concerned over shortage of LOTS for unloading of Liberty ships at Anzio. I hope that you will be able to arrange for additional craft for this purpose." Personal Alexander to Clark. RN MA 1134. "I have received following message from the CIGS. 'Please convey to Clark my admiration for wonderful defensive fjght put up by his troops. Very best luck to you all.'" Personal From ClArk to Brooke. and is deeply appreciated." * RN' 5250. * "Your message has been received * PRESENZANO--MARCH 7, 1944--General Clark left his command post at 0915 by jeep �for Spa.dger Headquarters where he conferred with General Freyburg about the proposed attack of his corps on Cassino. He then went to the Headquarters of Combat Command B, where he ma.de a short visit and then returned to his command post. The two naval officers who had been on General Clark's PT boat the day it was fired upon are still in the 118th Station Hospital but have recovered sufficiently to engage in a decoration ceremony. Accordingly, following lunch General Clark flew to Capodichino where he was met by his Packard and by Lt. Col. ~ygaard. The General went to the 118th Station Hospital where a brief ceremony was held and where Lieut. (j.g.) Patterson and Ensign Benson received the Silver Star at the hands of General Clark. Benson was able to stand, but Lieutenant Patterson received the decoration in a wheeloh~ir, as one of his legs was still in a cast. Following this ceremony General Clark had dinner with friends in Naples and returned to his command post by car. The following are the important messages of the day: Personal Clark to Alexander. RN 7721. rtGeneral Mccreery has recommended that 88th Division be provided with one additional U.S. infantry regiment in order to furnish reliefs considered absolutely necessary if difieion is to be capable of offensive action in April. It is necessary to employ all 3 CT's in line at present. I have checked to djspositions of 88th Division, and I concur in General McCreery's recommendation. Since I have no U. s. regiment immediately available for this purpose, I request that 1 regiment of infantry of 85th Division less organization equipment be shlpped here from North Africa by fastest means possible. Hope that air transportation can be at least partially employed but if that is not practicable request that this regiment be ~iven priority to insure its arrival i"ithin the next 10 days. Shipment of U.S. and French replacements now scheduled for 14, 18, 24 and 29 March should not be changed. However, these replacements total only 16443 against lift of 29349 allotted for March on your priority list 4. Equipment of regiment should fol• low with least practicable delay. Desire balance of 85th Division arrive prior to April 1st. Request this division be given priority above remainder 6th Armored Division. In the event additional replacements are not available for shipment in March personnel lift for division should be ample. Lift allotted of est1mated 1300 vehicles for 6th Armored Division can be credited to 85th Division." * * * PRESENZA.NO--MARCH 8, 1944--At 1000 General Clark received the new arriving group of War Department Operations Division officers, 19 in number, at his hut. General Clark talked briefly with these officers concerning the present situation and the course of operations which have led up to it in this theater. He said that on the Cassino front the Fifth Army was faced · by enemy superi.or in numbers to the Fifth Army forces opposing them and enjoying the advantage of commanding ground. As a result, the Fifth Army, after advancing up to its present positions, had found itself unable to advance even with heavy losses. Accordingly, intelligence estimates of higher authorities had been furnished to the Fifth Arrrr:, to the effect that if a landing were made in the Anzio region it would oblige the enemy to withdraw a substantial force from the Cassino front, �as he was unable to rejnforce himself by bringing troops from the north. Upon the basis of this estimate the Fifth Army had been directed to make a landing at Anzio and Nettuno, and this it had done efficiently and successfully. Unfortunately, neither estimate proved to be correct. The enemy had not withdrawn any considerable forces from the Cassino front, and, on the contrary, had reinforced himself up to a strength of 10 divisions on the Anzio front by bringing troops down from France, the Balkans and northern Italy. So equipped, the Germans had made a series of strong attacks upon the bridgehead, all of which had been thrown back by the Fifth A:rmy forces which now amount to about 5 divisions. Various armchair strategists in the United States and elsewhere are now criticizing the Fifth Army for failure tn seize the Colle Laziale or to take Rome immediately after the landing. General Clark said that any one of the visiting officers was at liberty to quote him anywhere as saying that such a course would have been reckless at the extreme and that undoubtedly would have resulted in the cutM.ng off and capture or destruction by the increasing enemy of the troops attempting such a long advance without a secure base. The General gave the incoming officers a hearty welcome and said that they would be assigned to duties with the Fifth Army of a nature which would give them the most useful experience and instruction. Follow:i.ng this General Clark returned to his van and spent the balance of the day in disposing of administrative matters and working at his desk. General Clark dictated the following notes for inclusion in his diary: "On my last trip to the beachhead by cub I particularly wanted to discuss with General Truscott some of the radiograms he had been sending to me. I have known Truscott for a long time, and he is a difficult subordinate to handle. He makes many demands, knowing full well that many of them can not be granted. I had the impression that many of them were being recorded for the record. He had issued peremptory orders to my G-4 at the Advance Fifth Army Headquarters with reference to Fifth Army dumps. I told him to discontinue such instructions and that if he had any idea of writing for the record to discontinue it, for I would back him up to the limit and would accept all responsibility for difficulties at the beachhead. "He has since written direct to General Devers on the question of lack of effectiveness of tactical air reconnaissance. I will tell him on my next visit there to discontinue writing official letters to higher headquarters but rather to send all such matters to Fifth Army. He also took up direct w1.th General Devers the question of assignment of personnel. This must be stopped. "Visited General Freyburg yesterda.y and met his subordinate commanders. Checked his plan for the attack on CRssino. Urged that he not wait for ideal weather, for that would take a week or two, but that if weather permits aerial bombardment on the 10th, after four days of drying weather, for tanks to go ahead. His tank experts recommended four to six days. The 10th would give us four days of drying weather. I fully realize that we are not going to completely break through, and the tanks will play only a small part in this attack. nAs I reflect upon the situaM.on today, I am convinced that ·Alexander is �floundering in his effort to solve the tactical situation here. He has built a fine picture on paper which ostensibly masses the Fifth and Eighth Armies on a narrow front, whereas actually the only Eighth Army troops which are coming this side of the mountains are the Headquarters Eighth Army. We will still have a maximum of 11 Divisions attacking on this side of the mountains, opposed to 8 German, and a maximum of 6 Allied Divisions in the bridgehead, opposed to 10. In this difficult terrain, with weather usually bad for long periods of air activity and with the time that the German has had to prepare his defensive positions with wire, · mj_nes and other defensive works, I do not feel that we will have the continuity of effort to drive through if he decides to stand. / The best hope we have is the jnfluence of the Russian situation or that the German feels that he must withdraw troops from here to block a channel threat I or unless long periods of fair weather permit our ajr to effectively work on I his communications. ( The following important messages were received and dispatched today: PRO, ACMF to PRC', AFHQ (Copy to Fifth Army) RN 842. "As long as weather remains unfavorable towards full Air Support, no major actions by our troops due on any front. This off record background. In view some apparent doubt that exists over expression "Allied Beachhead Force", wish stress this only title to emphasize Allied effort and that VI Corps troops - both British and American - are still integral part Fifth Army. No new command jn beachhead has been formed. There is no objection to stating on record that beachhead force still integral part of and still operating under command of Fifth Army. tt Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 963. 11 Gen. Ramey j nforms me there is 1 TD Bn (tov1ed) now in Naples area available for use here if desired. Could this be with personnel guns and absolute minimum of transportation be infiltra.ted to beachhead. I will attach to uni.ts in defense position to relieve M-10 units that have been dug in front line positions for some time and in need of maintenance." Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 965. 11 14 11/:arch earliest cfate 1st Di.vision will be ready for offensive operations. 5 Division should be complete in area at that time. Propose to attack 14 March or as soon thereafter As approved by you with 1st Division and 5 Division to clear enemy from rough country west of Anzio road and reestablish western shoulder of salient in vicinity RJ at $64314. When firmly established and regrouped there, to attack with 45 Division and 1st Armored Div:l..sion from east shoulder of salient to seize the area Macchia del Casale - Carroceto. Maximum air effort for day preceding attack and continuing while attack actually in progress. Cover plan objective Littoria. Detailed \ plan in preparation. Owing to advantage that would accrue to enemy with annihilation of Anzio bet:!,chhead, I do not believe that he will forego another effort if he can find sufficient force. Having failed twice with present forces, it is doubtful that he will undertake another major effort wjthout 3 or 4 additional divisions. "My capability for reduc:ing the Cerroceto salient with forces now available is contingent upon no material increase in enemy strength oprosite the beachhead. However, I believe that I can reestablish western shoulder in any case. We should be able to hold present position against attacks materially stronger than previous ones. However, such attacks launched in great depth and continued at maximum pressure regardless of loss will wear :infantry holding l �13°1 elements and result in great attrition. With shortage of infantry reserves, such an attack is the greatest danger to the beachhead; if events indicate material increase in concentration, additional infantry here will be an urgent need." * * * PRESENZANO•-MARCH 9, 1944--This morning General Clark left his comr1B.nd post at 0815 and went to the cub field where he took off with M9.jor Walker for the Nettuno airfield. At Lago strip he was picked up by an escort of four planes, and he arrived promptly at the beachhead. He made visits to the Corps and 3rd Division CP 1 s and gained a first-hand idea of the situation. The enemy shelling of the port, while annoying, has had no really damaging effect. The General left the Nettuno strip for his return flight at 1500 hours and arrived at his own field at Presenzano at 16oO hours. On this trip the General's escort consisted of two Australian and two South African pilots - testimony to the Allied character of the war. Today Lieutenant General Crerar, who is relinquishing command of the Canadian Corps in the Eighth Army to take command of a Canadian Army in England, arrived at the com.~and post to be a guest of General Clark overnight. General Gruenther entertained him at lunch, together with General Sawbridge, Colonel Duncan and Colonel Bertholf. In the afternoon General Crerar went to visit Spadger for tea, with a guide furnished by General Clark. In the evening General Clark entertained at dinner in the hut Generals Crerar, M cCreary, Hawkesworth (who was leaving the Fifth Army with his 46th Division) Kirkman, Conmanding the 13th British Corps, together with Brigadier Lambert, his B.G.s., and Brigadier Roe, his "Q" Brigadier, Brigadiers Richardson, Stayner and Cooke, together with the regular members of his mess, Generals Gruenther, Lucas, K eiser and Lt. Col. Sutherland. General Gruenther sent the following two messages to General Clark up at the beachheact today: RN 7772. "All set for Spadger on zero day. 11 RN 7774. t•In order to supplement air for zero afternoon and one day, Saville proposes to reduce fighter cover over bridgehead by withdrawing fighter bombers. This would result in reduction from 18 to 8 fighters over area at one time. Suggest you discuss with Truscott." Word had been received a few days ago that the Boche was plotting to blow I up General Alexander and General Clark's CP at Anzio. La.st night the operation I actually took place and three Italians w ere caught on the beach with explosive ~ These Italians caused no damage as their attempt failed, and they are being held at the beachhead. * * * PRESENZANO--MARCH 10, 1944--II Corps is now entirely moved back to its rest area. The headquarters is at St. Agata. The J6th Division is just northwest of Maddaloni, and the 34th Division is ,just northeast of Benevento. �The beachhead is quiet. General Clark feels more content about the situa.tion there than he has at any time since the landing. Spadger's attack on Oas-' sino has been waiting from day to day for sufficient good weather to permit the air. to operate and to permit the ground on Cassino fL~ts to dry sufficiently to conduct ground operations. The weather varies a good deal locally. Some times there have been a few clear hours here, while at Foggia or other bases rain has prevented all bombers taking off. This morning General Saville called on General Clark and discussed the air support of the Spadger attack at some length. At noon General Clark entertained at lunch Gene:rals Eaker, Cannon and Crerar. General Eaker spoke of the recent successful bombardment of Germany by the air force. He said that yesterday there were 1800 Allied planes over Germany, 1,000 of them fighters and the rest bombers. He said that after a little Berlin will cease to be an asset but will be a liability to the Germans, and we ' can stop bombing it. He spoke of the recent successful bombing of the ballbearing factories, stating that OSS reported that after the last raids 80 German buyers of ball-bearings had turried up in Sweden, trying to buy up odd lots of ball-bearings in little shops. With the coming of good weather, General Eaker said that he was confident that aerial bombardment would go far to cut off the supply of the troops now facing Fifth Arrny. After lunch General Crerar said goodbye to General Clark and left. He had visited the G-2, G-3 and G-4 staff sections and investigated their workings, and Major Walker had taken him on a cub flight over Cassino. General Clark spent the afternoon in his van disposing of administrative matters. At dinner be entertained General Bouscat, Commanding all French Air Forces, together with Lt. Col. Harteman, one of his staff officers, and also General Srwille and Col. Darcy of the XII Air Support Command. General Bouscat said that he had been dismissed from the Army by the Vichy regime and, as a civilian, had taken to journalism in Africa, and at the time of General Clark's landing of October, 1942, he had been one of those who had been in touch with the pro-American French officers. He had, he said, djsmissed all the French Aviation Generals when he came in. Gt\neral Bouscat spoke interestingly of General N'ogues; saying that early j_n the vrar he had been a great friend of his, but General Nogues' trimming ~tttitude had disgusted General Bouscat, so that he ceased to have any friendly feeling for Nogues. By Operational Instruction #1, Mediterranean Allied Tactfoal Air Force, the responsibilities for air support were re-stated and it was asserted that the XII Air Support Command would be responsible for all air support for the Fifth and Eighth Armies. When requirements for air support for the Fifth and Eighth Armies exceeded the resources at the disposal of XII Air Support Command, the Comnanding General thereof was to refer these requ:i.rements to MATAF. Liaison representatives were to be exchanged between the various air elements and 11 if XII Air Support Command become separated from Fifth Army they will detach a small operational liaison section to work with Fifth Army". Today General Leese sent the following cable to General Clark and to General Cannon, Commanding the TAF. 11RP-f erence MA'rAF Operational Instruction f/1, dated 7 March, I take great exception to issue of this in view of agreement to �lL!l defer final decision on air force set-up until return .Air Vice Marshal Broadhurst. Latter was recalled and is due Algiers today, see COS 251+ to ACMF only of 5 March.n The agreement to await the return of Air Vice Marshal Broadhurst is described in cable COS 49 from General Leese to General Harding, dated March l and quoted in the diary for that day. It is apparent, therefore, from General Leese radio, that he still feels strongly that the Fifth and the Eighth Armies should have their separate air support commands and should not have to comrete for the intentions of a single air support conmand. Following are the jmportant messages of the day: Fifth Army to CG, l\TATOTJSA, RN' 5347. "Ranger Force now consists of 50 officers and q59 enlisted men present for duty or in hospitals, all assigned to 4th Ranger Battalion. Reference your 59018. Of this total 19 officers and 137 enHsted men joined in Ireland in June, 1942 and ps.rticipated in all campaigns. They are classed as veterans and should be returned to United States on emergency rotation. 30 officers and 419 enlisted men are cl8ssified as experi.enced and 11 officers and 282 enlisted men as comparatively inexperienced. In general, value of special trained forces is not considered worth the efforts expended in special organization and training. Most unsatisfactory obstacle. to overcoMe with special forces in Fifth Army has been procurement of suitable replacements. Fifth Army desires to continue · Spedal Service Force as outlined in February 17th letter, subject: "The Rangers.n Personal Truscott to Clark. Rl'T 1002. 11 7791 your Headquarters asks availability Colonel Donald H. G alloway for assignment Deputy Chief of Staff, Seventh Army. If General Lucas to command Seventh Army, Galloway desires to accept, and I will make him available. If not, Galloway desires to remain with me, and I would like to retain him. Will you advise me on this matter. 11 Personal Clark to Truscott. RN 5380. "Lucas not to cornmr,nd Seventh Army. Reference your 1002. Galloway remains with you." Today General Clark received a reply to his letter of M arch 4th to General Leese as follows: · "Thank you very much for your letter, which I was delighted to get. I quite ageee with you about the need for very close liaison, and General George Walsh, my Chief of Staff, wi.11 get in toucri with your Staff about this question directly we come over. "Most certainly keep Lt. Colon"l George Britten with you; I feel sure trds will be a good arrnngement. I hope very rnuch also that all Branches e.nd Services of our two Armies will be abl~ to keep a very close liaison together. In this way we should maintain permanently a very close and friendly co-operation which will, I am sure, lead to very high effjciency in battle. 11 May we offer you our "1ost sincere congratulations on your srlendj d defence o±: the ANZIO bridgehead during the last week. Everyone here is full of admiration for your splendid fighting. We all look forward very much to our joint �march on RNn:E and to the Horth with you. "Thank you ver~r much for your telegra,ri about the Italian Brigade. They will help me a lot as my Polish Divisions have only got two Brigades each. They are, therefore, short of men on the ground. "Best of luck.It * * * FRESENZANO--MA.RCH 11, 1944--At 0900 General Clark mmt down to a clear space just beyond the Chief of Staff's van where there had been drawn up a guard of honor of MP's and a band ready for a decoration ceremony wherein officers and men to receive a DSC, four Legion of Merits, nine Silver Stars, two Soldiers Medals and two Air Meda.ls were to be decorated. Gen~rBl Bowman was present to receive his new Silver Stars as Brigadier General, at the hands of the Army ComMander. At this formation, Lt. Col. Alphonse Van Hecko of the French Army received the Letion of Uerit for his outstandfog work in Ali<:iers 1 cooperation with the Allied .n landings in Operation TORCH. General Lewis and Ms.jor John T. Walker receivP-d the Silver Star for their flight to Anzio on D day. The ceremony was also noteworthy because the band played a newly-composed Fifth Army march for part of the ceremony. After the formation GenAral Devers and GenerBl Rooks arrived, and General Devers talked with Gener8l Clark in his van for about half a.n hour. Afterwards General Devers left for a visit to Spadger. General Rooks stayed for lunch with General Clark. There was a general discussion of the rrogress of the war. General Rooks expressed the opinion that the Russian progress was bona fide and most encouraging. Discussing the recent order of the Frime Minister concerning the change in the dateline from the beachhead to read, "Allied Beachhead Forces", General Rooks told of receivin~ a message fron TROOPERS recently saying that hereafter all dispatches sent personally to the Prime Minister should spell "theater" - "t-h-e-a- \ t-r-e" and should not spell "through" "t-h-r-u11 • _ ,,,,. At 1325 General Clark left his com~and post by jeep for the cub field and flew in a cub to an improvised landing strip near Maddaloni where there had been drawn up representative battalions from the 36th Division. The Gener~l landed here with a tail wind and had little space to come to rest by the assembled troops. He was annoyed with the arrangements for his landing which he felt savored of a stunt rather than a proper landi.ng. The ceremony went smootl:ly, and he conferred a Medal of Honor on Technical Sergeant Kelly, 2 DSC I s, 135 Silver Stars and a War Department unit citation on the 3rd Battalion, 141st Infantry for its gallant work at Salerno. During this ceremony, General Clark, at one point, made a brief talk to the assembled troops. He emphasized the fine part played by the 36th Division in the Salerno Operation r.nd since then and stated that the persons being decorated were the natural battlefield leaders who had shown their capH city by their courage against the enemy. Following the ceremony, the General took off and return"'d to his command post. In the evening he drove to Caserta with Generals Lucas and Gruenther and had dinner as the guest of General Eaker. One of the annoying developments of the day was the necessUy of still furth~r �\43 postponement of the Spadger attack on Cassino. Repeated prophecies of bad weather have made it necessary to put this operation off from day to day. It was confidently expected to stage the operation 12 March but can not now be held until 13 March, if then. One reason for these dehi.ys is the local variation in weather in the theater. It js sometimes clear in Presenzano, foggy in the Naples Plain, raining in Foggia whence many planes take off, and still different in Corsica, Sardinia and .North Africa. An interesting situation has arisen from time to time at various points \ on the front concerning truces held for burial of the dead, etc. The GE'lrmans 1 / frequently send emmisaries over under flags of truce, and in a couple of recent instances General Hawkesworth has detained the emmisaries rather than al\ low them to return because of the military situation which rendered this necessary. Memorandum of 1 March 1944 from O:eneral Mccreery indicntes that during recent fighting on 10 Corps front in a number of instances the enemy requested local truces to collect wounded and dead. In several such instances the Germans were thought to have been using the Red Cross flag in order to withdraw snipers or othervvise obtain military advantages. On 20 February a Division Commander, 46 Division, directed that no further truces could be considered and stated tha.t any further deputations coming over under white flags of truce would be considered prisoners of war, although the collection of wounded by 11 Red Cross personneln would always be respected if not abused. On 21 February a German officer, Oberlt Herman Schmidt of the 129th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, came over to the French lines with the white flag, accompanied by an jnterpreter, requesting to be allov,ed to remove dead and wounded. This officer was treated as a prisoner of war, but General Mccreery in his letter of 1 March to Fifth Army, recommended that after an appropriate advance had been made the officer be returned with his interpreter to the·German lines. Accordingly, 'on 10 March a letter was sent from Headquarters Fifth Army to the G.o.c., ACMF referring to the enclosed correspondence stating that instructions had been issued to all F5.fth Army units that no truces would be allowed without prior approval from Army Headquarters, requesting authorization to return Oberlt Schmidt and his interpreter to the German lines as soon as security conditions permit on the ground that in the opinion of the 46th Division Commander they were not familiar with the message ending all truces. This letter also recommended that a Lieutenant Roland Weiser, 10th Parachute Regiment, who entered 56th lines in the bridgehead requesting a truce to remove wounded, but held as a prisoner of war in North Africa. It was decided today by General Clark that no truces for the purpose of removing dead for burial would be requested by any Fifth Army unit, and so a telegram to this effect, reference #7841, was sent to all Corps of the Army, reading as follows: "No truce for the purpose of removing dead or wounded will be requested or granted by any Fifth Army .u nit. Detailed instructions will follow." General Clark today issued a letter to all subordj_nate commanders on duty on the Cassino front, explaining in detail the ACMF Reorganization Pl~n as a guide for future planning. �Important messages of the day are as follows: Personal from Clark to Port Commandant and NOIC, Anzio. RN 7836. "During the past few days I have watched carefully port operations at Anzio. The excellent work done by you and your men has resulted in a record unequalled to date. The discharge of over 5 ,ooo tons daily for the pa.st 3 days indicates a ) . high degree of organization and willingness of your men to rerform under most trying conditions. For this outstanding performance I congratulate you and your men. 11 From Fifth Army Adv OP to CG, Fifth Army (G-4). RN' 632. "Request you send another ship to arrive 130600 in addition to Fletcher and 1 additional ship requested for 120600. Cresop will finish tonight and Grey sometime tomorrow. LCM 1 s foun~ to be impracticable cannot he utj_lized at Xray beach and tie up berth space in harbor. Both port and navy personnel recommend against furtrer use of LCM's and return of same to DUKO. Concur in recommendations. Read General CLARK'S personal nessage to assembled port and naval personnel at port meeting and gave copies to Port Commandant and NOIC, Anzio personally on behalf of General CLA...llK. h1rsonnel expressed pleasure in no uncertain · terms, thanks." * * * PRESENZAN0--MARCH 12, 1944--General Clark today remained at his cornmand post engaged in administrative work. The attack on Cassino was still deferred because of weather, although it was hoped to get it off on Tuesday. At 1030 thj_s morning Colonel Sullivan arrived at the comJ11.and post, at General Clark's jnvitation, and General Clark pinned his new Brigadier General stars on his classmate's shoulders. Shortly thereafter, General Templer, Commandjng the 56th Division, arrived and had a brief talk with General Gruenther and later with General Clark. In the evening General Clark showed a r.10vie film at the hut called "The Miracle at Morgan's Creek". The fj_lrn was preceded by a buffet supper at which the General entertained. a number of staff officers and also Lt. Col. Daly of the 16th Evacuation Hospital with some of his staff. General Clark sent the following cable to General Truscott today. RN 5454. "Shall be glad to see Butler tomorrow. Weather forecast and expected ground conditions for March 14th unfavorable. I am willing to have you attack on March 15th, and I desire that you prepare plans on that basis. Weather permitting all out air effort will be given your front on March 14th. However, it should be understood by you that Cassino attack has top :r:riority and must take place as soon as weather permits. This means that ff weather prediction at 1800 hours any day indicates favorable weather for Cassino attack on following day entire air effort will support Cassino attack even though your attack is still in progress. Moreover, bulk of air will probably be needed for Cassino attack for two days after Cassino D day. If Cassino attack starts while your attack is in progress I will do everything possible to give you some air effort, but it will probably be light. Your comments and recommendation desired. New subject 168 CT scheduled to leave Naples March 20th. If you desire I will delay until March 22 in order to give more time to absorb replacements scheduled to arrive Naples March 14th. 11 �PRESENZANO--MARCH 13, 1944--The bad weather again deferring the Cassino attack, General Clark this morning remained at bis co:rm:1.and post disposing of administrative matters. Just before lunch he pinned the Silver Star on lVfaj. Gen. Lucas who is about to leave Fifth Army for the United States. Following lunch the General flew by cub to the 34th Division cub field north of Benevento where h('l presented 3 DSC I s, 54 Silver Stars and 4 Soldier's Medals. He returned from this flight at 1600. \ This evening Generals Clark and Gruenther and Lt. Col. Sutherland vmre entertained at dinner ·by General Juin. The weather forecast for tomorrow is again bad, and the Cassino attack has again been deferred, to the great annoyance of General Clark. The weather here j_s perfect today with sunshine, a diminishing wind and unrestricted visibilityo However, the XII Air Support Conmand reports that conditfons at Foggia yesterday were such that bombardment planes could not get off the ground at all. The cons:ideratfons which defer the Cassino operation must obviously be those applicable to tl1e area. as a whole and not to a small part of it which can be seen from any one position. The planes for the attsck come from as far away as Foggia on one side and Sardinia on the other, and good weather in one Italian valley is not indicative of good weather in all areas concerned. Today, by letter, "Relief of Remaining British Troops in 10 Corps Sector~" the details of the relief of certain units of 10 Gorps by French Expeditionary Corps between 19 and 29 March were set forth. Today the following cable was received from AFHQ relative to the departure of General Lucas, Deputy A:rmy Commander, from Fifth Army: RN 63886. 11 Upon General Lucas arrival in Algiers orders will be issued for permanent change of station to the United States vdth travel vi.a United Kingdom. If aide or aides are to accompany General Lucas request names and serial numbers so that they may be placed on the same order. You are further authorized to issue appropriate orders transferring an enlisted man with General Lucas baggage to the United States via water transportation." General Truscott cabled General Clark as follows today: RN 1055. "My attack not practicable under conditfons stated jn your 5454. I consider all out air effort D-1 continuing through attack to be essential owing to relative combat strength, enemy organization, and difficult terrain. Yiith adequate support I hope to complete operation on D-2; thus I feel that a:ir effort should be allocated to this force for approximately 4 days to begin operation. I do understand that Cassino attack has top priority; however, every day's delay here increases enemy ground organization and makes the attack more difficult. If weather forecast indicates unfavorable conditions for Cassino for 3 or 4 days I recommend you allocate air effort to me and let me proceed v;rith attack. Butler is enroute by cub. He has air plan and can amplify my views. Recommend no delay in shipping RCT 168. 11 �fRESENZANO--MARCF 14, 1941~- -This norning General Lucas , together vri th his two aides , Major Renne and Captain Eyster, left the Fifth Army con.'7and rost enroute 1 to Algiers , UK and the lrnited States, pursuant to the orders of cable ~ 63886 , quoted in yesterday ' s diary. The General receivo.d a brief call fror.i Colonel Tully, who cane in w-ith a quantity of in+'orl'l1ation about the errployP1ent of some Italian railroad artillery pressed into service of the Fift]:, Army and was now being fir'3d against the Gerr:ians . General Clark spent the day jn his comancl rost engaged in aclrnj_ nistrative Matters . In the aftr:irnoon Lieutenant General Leese, who had just arrivod , storped to pay a short visit of courtesy. He was acconpanied by Lieutenant General Kirknan , Cor'nanding the British 13 Corps . Late j_n the afternoon word was received from General Cannon that the wea ther reports for the followinf! day were favorabl/3 anc'l thRt tho Cassino attack was definitely scheduled . Generals Clark and Gruenthl'lr trereupon planned to go up to Headquarters New Zealand Corps , frol"" whicr they would be taken to an OP to observe the attack . The following are the jmportant nessages of the day : Fron HQ AAI to Fifth Army. RN O 2275 . 11 4 Div on vrithdra.wel fro,· 10 Corrs will pass to Corid 5 Corps v,here it will relieve 1 CDN Div vrhlch in tu:rn will pa.s s to Cond CDN Corps . Withdrawal of 4 Div from the line Yrill be as follm"S . 10 BDE GF 22 Iinr . 12 BDE GP 25 MBrch. HQ 4 Div Div Sigs Iert Div TFS 25 Mar . Balance Div TFS ?6 Mf'r . 28 BDE GI, rpprox 30 TJ'iarch to be confirmed by Fiftr Army later. :,3 Arrnd BDE GP less 46 RTR will be i:rithdrawn c'l1trin 6 this p:!riod and will pass to cOJ11d 5 Corps e.nd will relieve 1 CDH Arny Tank BDE whicr will revert corid CDN Corps . Fifth Army will Brrancre c1ircct v;ith 5 Corrs for the required Reece parMes to rove in advance to ensure no deley jn take over on arrivnl. A meeting will be held at this Hq Ht 1030 hou:rs 18 !1arch to decide all detBils o.f' the reliefs and l"loveP1ents in the above regrouping. This Hq 1aill arrr->.ngc nccn for rep or reps 5 Corps night 15/16 t-~circh . Reps Fifth Arny Eigtth /\.rrny 5 Corps F'lrmbo nill cit tend . 11 Personal Truscott to ClPrk. R\T 1075 . 11 I expect to rnlease Gen<>rel Evelegh about 0 0 r~arch. I h'3lieve hi.s r~placerent should be here by 18 flPrcJ,, to be with hin for a day or so prior to his departure and he here during rroposed attack . Cl'm ~rou nake Richardson available by that date? 11 Fersonal Clar}- to Truscott . RH 5493 . "Brigadier RichPrd Goodbody llAs been selected to replace Evelegh . He 1rill arrive here tomorrow and will be sent to you within next few days . " Clark to Truscott . RN 5490 . 11 There is a cr:i ticP 1 shortage of l05mn 2mriunition ju this tr>eatcr c1 espite riy nost urgent arpcals which have been sent directly t0 the War Departnent . Recent shirmnts of tJ:,is type of anr.iunition have been reduced helow al"'ounts prevjously aut:borized ana expected . Future a.llotr1ents n1av be reduced hecause of higher priorities for otPAr theaters . Exrenditures on the ri1ain army f'ront ha.vc been reduced to the Pbsolute riinimu.rn to rrovide cdditional anounts for the bridp:ehead . i �"Fron this dete until April 6 inclusi vo thA followinp; l"nmunition will be avn ilr1b1_e in thr- bri..dgchead: On hand rt A:nzj_o Arny ASP I s 111800 tre sun of 137927 r01mds; on hand at Anzio '<Im rositions cv~185 rounds; rlue to be shiprcd by 12 narch but not shipped as of 101800 hours q4074 rounds; to be shiprcd d11rj n~ :1r>rioo 12 Harer to h April ;:,q5000 rounds; total on hand or due in to 6 Aprj_l 6211~6 rounds. 11 Bffective irmcdiately fill previous allocations 105nm howitzer aJ'l1l'1unition to VI Corps ere cancelled. In order to provide for enem" counterattac'rn, losses b'r shipping, unfavorable lm,.ding poriods an<l sorie reserve for a T'!ajor attack after the 14th Division t1rrives in the beachhead, you trill fi_y your rates of ~xp:ind-ltures, includinP," yonr ettack cxrcnditures, so thAt on April 6 there i::ill be 2goooo rounc'1s in the bcacl~heed. It is estinatcd t:rat this will leave · approximately 130000 rounds at gun posHions and 150000 rou_m'1s in Army dllJ"lps. "There cen he no further allocations -ror the period. It ~s regretted that tLis restriction is necessary but only after careful ccnsideration and study this decision has been riade. Ac1~nowledge receipt of tbis ressage. n Hews carrie through toray thrit G('nerA 1 Gira,10 1 s dauglitcr rad died in a Ger!"lan concentration camp. General Clark dispatched the follo-\'Jing C[lble to the French Col"t!"'ander-in-Chief. RN 5517. "You rave ny sincer" r>nd ceep syripathy for your sad loss." * * * fP.ES"~l,TZANO--MARCH 15, 1944--The Jonrs-av10ited but oft-postponed P..ttack on Cassino too}: rl11ce tor'Py. At 0700 Gcnerril Clerk, r>cconran~cd by Generr,l Gru"nther, left Ms commancl rost rind rlrove to the Feadqurrters o+" the \Tew Zealand Corrs near :3an pjetro. There he vms net by Generril Freyburg, Genor2l Alexen<l0r, General °SPker, GenerE'l Dcv"'rs a.ncl a Dost ..,ore hj_gh ranlring officers. Guided by a Now Zea.lend Corps o-"ficer, General ClA.rk drove to Cnrvaro whr>re a special observation post had been set asil'e for him. It was located in an old battered stone house on tre nortl' side o:f' Ccrvaro, and +'rom thl"1 second floor Crssino is little less than three niles eway and plainly vjsible. Othsr o"'ficers who used G-.nernl Clark's OP nere General Devers, General Gr11anth0r, Gr:merP 1 Chr11~ncey, General Devers 1 Chief of Staff, and Colon0l Harrison of Gcncrri.l Dcv0rs I Staff.,..,_ --::;- l .._,._,._.J ~ I •.t. ~ ~ 4-- ,,.._..,.:t P"' ~ t ~ - ~ + t. .,.k.... ~ ......... General Clark ::-eached the OP at 08?0 -:>nd rroriptly at OPi~O tre first wave of bot!bers carri0 fl y:i.ng diroctl ,r over Cerwro Pnil thP✓n 0'mred their load on Cassino. Gener<>l Glrr 1r tood o:n th~ brlcony of Ms OT Pnd wrtched tb~ bor1bing I thronr.:h field r,:lasses. The first bombers were B-26•s, and they la.id 80% of { their bombs in the heart of the town. A few bombs were short, landing just on our s5de of the Rapido River. VIhen the bor1bs hit, they sent quicl , stRbbine flashP,s of nran1;e fln.11~, ri"'d t}~is W8S fol]_..or.rcd b~r n joint ernption o-r srio'k:~ and debris. By the t:inc tre first mwe of ho:1bers had rassed ('Ver Cassino, tLc to'm rms alnost oblitcrt1ted 1) . ' sroke ancl dust. At 08/~5 the sec0nd vmve of bor,bers, Flying Fortresses, droy:p:-.d t'v~jr load, and General Clark's OT- :.,hoo-k v~ obntl7 ,'ncer th~ i.,.,pact of t11e bfo.st. Tr~ bor:ibing continu~d on an almost uninterrupted schednle 1mtil noon. There were two untoward incirlents . One wave of bonbcrs dropped a stic1, near San f.!jchele, which is well within our \ 0 �lines. This stick landed arprox-iriotely two riiles north~ast of' the Gl')nArA.1 1 s On9 b0nber i-., anoth,..,r wave unloaded its bo,-,bs aprrovinatcly one mile vrest of' the Gen~ral I s OP and killed severa 1 rc9n in a NeVT Zealand artill ~ry battery. General Clark was extrer,,elv d~ sturberl by t11ese two occurrences, and General Cannon, who also had co,..,e to General Clark's or, got on tre rhone to the XII Air Suprort Com~and, in an attenpt to nak~ sure that no bonbs 1imulo ½e dropp~d unless the crews v1ere sure that they were over the target . Th~ first tno waves ret absolutel:,r no enemy fighters !1.or ener:iy flak. V1ter in the '"'Orninrs bo,..,bers trat turned vrest after },itting Cassino ran :nto re.ther } light flak soril') ten niles west of' Cassino . 1Jot cne rlane was stJen to crash. nr. Between tre v:aves of bonbers, fifth Army artillP-ry lobb~d occasional shells into Cassino . A total of 1320 tons of hor:bs were c'1rorped on_ th") tovm of Cassino during the day. 'i'l'~ attackincr ships :l ncluc'ed 134 Heavies, 255 Fighter Bo,.,bers, or light boribers , and t}-,9 renainder Medium Borib"!rs. Durj n[; tY,e day the Air Corrs flew 820 sorties over Cassino and dispritched a total of 1150 rlanes. The Hediur,., Bor:b0rs Wt"lre by far tre rost accurnte, and Gen~ral Clark was extremely pl'3ascd \Ti tri their vrork . \ rronptly at noon, whem t1-,e last borbers had du..nped their bo;1bs on Cassino, Fifth Arny artillery openF-d ur w~tr. a trc11endous barrage thn.t literally shook the grouni:1, Bnd Fifth Arr,y 5nfantry and ~ng; necrs, \"1'0 },ad been wa-i ting in th~ flatlands behind the Bapico River, began r;oving forvm.rcl j nto Cassino. Th~ r:;tms k~pt up their barrage until 1420, thrm j ng tons of 1~ igh exr losi ves into Cassino and into tre rtont1stery as well. Durini:; the bo'ibing and thn artiller;r barrage Gen"'ral Clark r10.de trips to various oth0r buildinr,s in Cervaro nrh~re oth~r OP 1 s were situated. He also vm.lked approx5nritely 1/? mile farth")r clmm tbeJ road toward Crissino so he could better see t},e effect of t1~is trenendous assault . On his return he stopp"ld in at the observation rost wh,,re t},e war correspondents vere watching th~ hattle, aY1.d 1"e chatted with them for several ninutes . Gen0ral Clnr1r R lso ··,ent down to the :'J0v1 Zealand Corrs Adve.nce CI, about 200 ynrc.;s f'rom G~n~ral Cl8rk 1 s or, rind got reports on trrJ f'ip;hting. By l"1id-afternoon th"l troops 1·er~ well into Cassino. and they had taken Hill #1q3, a rise that overlooks the entire town. Through his fil"lld glasses Gen"lral Clar1,, cm1ld see our tanks rioving into town, but rcrorts cane back that the tanks ,,ere having difficulty because of the tret1cndous craters J"'lade ~ n +.he roads by tr e boT"bers . General Cler1r riade four trips Pcross the field to tte Jfow Zealand or. Dud ng the afternoon the Germans threw a few shells into the -:·enaral area , th1 closest landing about 400 yr'lrds frorn the ClA.rk OP. During Most of the e.fternoon Gen~ral Clark sat on the ed~e of the ) balcony, his legs hanging over the edge , 1,eeping his ffold v,lasses on tr"l torm of Cassino and chatt-inr; '"ith the GcnE'!rnls w·ho were with rim. 1 By 1600 it was appRrcnt th~t the ettock ,ms 17,oing fairly '7ell but tl1at the bo,,..bing and qrtill")ry !:ad not driven the Gernans frorn Cassino and that they rrere putting up rath~r stiff oprosition. The Indian Gurl..ras uere to have at.. tacvnd late tonif;ht up t1"P. slopes .,,.roM t:re town of Cassino to the Abbey. Aft'1r a final chec 1: at G~ncrnl Freyburg' s OF and a brief talk ,-,~th General Gallov ay, Cor1rio:r1.0er of the l+t} Indfon Di vision ,-ho rad cone be ck to the nevr Zealand Corps or, Gnneral Clark, still acconpanied by Gen9ral Gruonther, drove . I �lY9 back to his coMP1and post Pt Presenzano, arriving th0re at 1650 .. G8neral Clark this evening cabled General Truscott as follows: RN 7961. "Attack on Cassino took pl2ce today vrit}, all out air effort from 0830 to noon and heavy fighter bonher effort this afternoon. Bonb:i ng appeared to be effective aJ.though tanks hwe not been abl"o to rass through tmm yet because of debris. Attack to take Monastery Hill will he mode tonight. Progress generally satisfactor7 although slower than ant:icipated. TAC R spotted heavy rioter novenents from Frosinone area tovmrd Cassino late this afternoon. 19th is earliest date for your attack. fiill k8ep you advised. 11 The Air Support Control Sectfon reported today on the bombing of our troops by our own planes. Their report may be sUTir:1arized as follows: On the 15th the first bonbs dropped on Allied troops on the Cassino front fell on 0930 hours, and this "friendly11 bombPrdl"'lent continued until 1130 hours. The bonba.rdr1.ent was quite indiscriminate, as the Folisl1 Corps, the New Zealand Corps, tho French EYfPditionary Corrs at Vl'.lnafro anrl. Eighth Army Headquarters in Venafro were all, turn and turn about, the objects of this bombardment. In all, the Polish Corps lost 3 r1en wounded, the Bighth Army Headquarters lost 7 men wounded, the French Expeditionary Corps lost 1 officer and 5 men killed and 52 wounded, the New Zealand Corps lost 11 nen killed, 2 offj cers killed and ?.4 mi:in wounded. l I \ \ l General Juin turned in a separate report for Ue French vfr•ich can not be entirely reconciled wj th tho Air Support Control report. According to General Juin, on the 15th the first bar.bing of the :F'rencb occurred at 1000 when one or two Fortresses dropped B bombs on Macchia d 1 Isornia, causini; no casualties, and tvrelve hombs were dropped on Vemtfro and vicinity, two of wt1ich fell on the 1-1 ills overlooking the cor:1nand post and ten on the town itself. The Venafro bor,,bing caused two sold51;r and q1Jite r-,. few civilian casualties. At 1020 one or tno Fortresses drorred about thirty bombs in the J'ozzillj_ area, killing 4 French, including a battalion cormander, and woundJ ng 34, includj ng two officers. At 1125 about 15 Fortresses bonbed the Volturno valley from Macchia d I Isernia to a point just south of Ven~fro, re,sul ting j n one French soldier killed and eight wounded. The total casualties come to~ killed, including one officer, and 52 wounded, including two officers. GonerF,1 Juin also reported that at Eighth Army Advance CF 10 British 1vere killed and the losses among the civilians at Vena.fro are esttnated at 40 killed and 100 wounded. (The General adds a footnote to his report that on the 16th of March six New Zealand fighter honbers bombed and strafed tl1e Frencl1 at Belvedere and dropped leaflets inviting the Germans to surrender.) * * * FRESENZANO--MARCH 16, 19/i/4--Today the rrincipal subject of interest Y1as the rrog-ress of the attack on Cassino. General Clark received frequent bulletins throughout the day, and in the afternoon nont by j~ep to Sradger 1 s OP where he checked for h·iMsolf tho gains being nade. Irisonr,rs of war indicated that tbe bonbardri.o:nt had caused considerable casualties c.nong the Gernans. One difficulty arose througl, the trouble the attackers had in rJ'etting tanks across borb cratc~rs and throup;h the ruhblo filled streets of the town. One crater had to be bridged by engineers before it could be crossed. Dt:irjng tho course of the � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President. This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, February 23 - March 15, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from February 23-March 15, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1569 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/04d0c79ec217dd53a07a86ca40e41a26.pdf?Expires=1784764800&Signature=ODK1R5AeSgbZSHyDY6734viMrODVbqhMySwSD%7EMPchHpAiGFJt%7ErIdtIy9k8tH2FJCzGLtXeYYcGTRa5i3ksFph8ugjSIpZGvI0aeEAagdCfktP8gexS6LFtmVU1XCSls5cMLtukBixzSZduKUxrzKnA3ujouHVbHSQ0IZYNfy%7EnYjnHHUYU4jN3Nl6stUi-y88p7ygFuZgAzP298LdTqmFf09d2%7ENyvMmnByP6zFQS1k7ZHnlm8psw0OmLQr2XnALuLUBHHHExgNDtuTx8PF5czHB8TyfYLmiUsqfTaSZJMUXIgDGWxSDVZ9KoDlumld5TiecDApRx6BGNSlye7IQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 03adcc634f09a4535f76ec6eb5c4ffee PDF Text Text lY9 back to his coMP1and post Pt Presenzano, arriving th0re at 1650 .. G8neral Clark this evening cabled General Truscott as follows: RN 7961. "Attack on Cassino took pl2ce today vrit}, all out air effort from 0830 to noon and heavy fighter bonher effort this afternoon. Bonb:i ng appeared to be effective aJ.though tanks hwe not been abl"o to rass through tmm yet because of debris. Attack to take Monastery Hill will he mode tonight. Progress generally satisfactor7 although slower than ant:icipated. TAC R spotted heavy rioter novenents from Frosinone area tovmrd Cassino late this afternoon. 19th is earliest date for your attack. fiill k8ep you advised. 11 The Air Support Control Sectfon reported today on the bombing of our troops by our own planes. Their report may be sUTir:1arized as follows: On the 15th the first bonbs dropped on Allied troops on the Cassino front fell on 0930 hours, and this "friendly11 bombPrdl"'lent continued until 1130 hours. The bonba.rdr1.ent was quite indiscriminate, as the Folisl1 Corps, the New Zealand Corps, tho French EYfPditionary Corrs at Vl'.lnafro anrl. Eighth Army Headquarters in Venafro were all, turn and turn about, the objects of this bombardment. In all, the Polish Corps lost 3 r1en wounded, the Bighth Army Headquarters lost 7 men wounded, the French Expeditionary Corps lost 1 officer and 5 men killed and 52 wounded, the New Zealand Corps lost 11 nen killed, 2 offj cers killed and ?.4 mi:in wounded. l I \ \ l General Juin turned in a separate report for Ue French vfr•ich can not be entirely reconciled wj th tho Air Support Control report. According to General Juin, on the 15th the first bar.bing of the :F'rencb occurred at 1000 when one or two Fortresses dropped B bombs on Macchia d 1 Isornia, causini; no casualties, and tvrelve hombs were dropped on Vemtfro and vicinity, two of wt1ich fell on the 1-1 ills overlooking the cor:1nand post and ten on the town itself. The Venafro bor,,bing caused two sold51;r and q1Jite r-,. few civilian casualties. At 1020 one or tno Fortresses drorred about thirty bombs in the J'ozzillj_ area, killing 4 French, including a battalion cormander, and woundJ ng 34, includj ng two officers. At 1125 about 15 Fortresses bonbed the Volturno valley from Macchia d I Isernia to a point just south of Ven~fro, re,sul ting j n one French soldier killed and eight wounded. The total casualties come to~ killed, including one officer, and 52 wounded, including two officers. GonerF,1 Juin also reported that at Eighth Army Advance CF 10 British 1vere killed and the losses among the civilians at Vena.fro are esttnated at 40 killed and 100 wounded. (The General adds a footnote to his report that on the 16th of March six New Zealand fighter honbers bombed and strafed tl1e Frencl1 at Belvedere and dropped leaflets inviting the Germans to surrender.) * * * FRESENZANO--MARCH 16, 19/i/4--Today the rrincipal subject of interest Y1as the rrog-ress of the attack on Cassino. General Clark received frequent bulletins throughout the day, and in the afternoon nont by j~ep to Sradger 1 s OP where he checked for h·iMsolf tho gains being nade. Irisonr,rs of war indicated that tbe bonbardri.o:nt had caused considerable casualties c.nong the Gernans. One difficulty arose througl, the trouble the attackers had in rJ'etting tanks across borb cratc~rs and throup;h the ruhblo filled streets of the town. One crater had to be bridged by engineers before it could be crossed. Dt:irjng tho course of the �~~~~;~~~.~~6 .:~~~ f=\.ct- ~d°q- ~~·r. ~~·- day, Hill 193 continued in our possession and a relatively sr-a.11 pocket of enemy resistance remained at the southwest corner of Cassino . The unfortunate bor,Mng nistakes continued today. Air Support Control re ports that at lL,15 and 1445 hours on the Belvedere and Belr10nte rol'.ds Allied fighter bonb,.,rs killed 2 and wounded 12 French soldiers . At 1505 hours , be tween San EliP and Cervaro, the Frcncr' sustained another attack by P-40 1 s, but no report of casualties has be?en received. At 1515 rolll~s 6 B-25 ' s borbed thei French Expeditionary Corps and the Nev, Zealand Corps in the region of I ortella and San Micbele, resulting tn th" death of 1 of"'fi_cer l"nd the wounding of 18 enlisted nen o-r the New Zealand Corps. The aircraft engaged in these r,istaken bonbings yesterday and today i:rere of :>any rliff erent types . Yesterday they were reported to be B-17 1 s arid B-24 1 s . Today fighter bombers, P-40 1 s and B-25 1 s were reported to hove caused the damrge. Today a messHge fron Gen3rr.l Truscott j_ndic: tcd that three companies of the Y1ng 1 s own Yorkshire Light Infantry had been captured by the Gerl"'ans, rnd Gonerr.l Clar1r, concerned lest this have sorsc effect on Gener11l Truscott I s attack, sent him the following cable : RN 5534 . "Advise immodietely ,.-rhether or not you plan to Pttack on 19th11 • 0 The follow5ng cablo was received fron General Alexander: RN CGS 289 . 11 CINC considers it ~10st important to take advantage of' the cneny 1 s preoccupation with the attack of new Zealand Corps to lrrnnch the attack from Anzio bridgehead to recover the ground lost in the Carroceto area , plans for which CINC unclerstands have now been fully prepared . Attack hy VI Corrs will therefore be launched at earliest possible date . flease report :'.:'or inforrnPtion of CJHC the general rlan of attack and tl1e date on which jt is rroposed to launch it ." Gerno;ral Clark replied to the above as follows : RN 6538 . "Detailed rlans for attack toward Carroceto were O);.-plaJned to Brigmlier Mani'ering this afternoon . This attack scheduled for Marer 19th and will require extra heavy atr effort on r1arch 18th and JQth. I may n,~cd your assista.nce in getting sor .e strategic 17issions on t}10se days. 11 0 Gen0ral Freyburg directed a r~essage to Gencrel Snvillc congratulatjng him on the aj_r effort on Ce.ssino, but General Clark d~rected Gener;:,l Gruenther to hold this and not allow the original to get out . Other tmportant nessagcs of the day are as follo·.rs : F'Arsonal Truscott to Chirk. RN 1116. 11 Air attack 0700A - 16 plPn~s . Our AA report four probables, minor da1,age . Unfort1mately fjgl1ters hecld back hy ground hRze did not arrj_ve until just aft0r attack. I would apprecfote being 'kept :infornod on Cassino action . First word received here your personal OU 7961 at 213gA . AT" altering r;y plan slightly to r.i~et changing situetion. Will be reacbr to go when you say the ·vord . rr Fror, FLJIJ'lBO to Fiftl- Army. RN CAO 23371. 11 Following pcrsoY1al and secret fror Frj_ne Min~ ster to Gennral Alexa.nder. Fray congratulate all at work et brjdgchead on record fif;Ure cl:i.scharge at Anz5.o 10 Harch. 11 �I ':) l From VI Corps to Fifth Arny. Rr,J 1128 . nMap reference Italy 1 : 25 ,ooo. Attack by 1st Div. night 1/+ March to se izc FOSSO DI C,~RANTE and FOSSO DI FUl\lTOHI (8S6298) as lim"! of rleparture failed with loss of J compenies . Owing to incroaserl Gernan ground organi zation and strength , partjcult'rly along ANZIO road , I do not believe original mhrnion contcr:1plated for 1st Div . is within its capabilities . I have therefore r".odified 'r'\Y rlan for attack as follows: D- Day, an attac:V by /+5th Div . and 1st Div . to seize the line 914320 , 904320 , 891318 , jnclusive to 45th Div., 890298 M 854300 to the ':Test the 5t h , Divis i on will sc:izo the streal"' line to its ,junction at 815311; D plus 1 , 45t h Div. t o extemd the line to the line 9?0333 , 915334 , 908330 , 904320 . 11 0n this line I ,'ill rog-.coup to ma1'::J~ 1 conbat team avaifable to attack wJ t h Harnon to capture l'!J'tCCFIA DEL CASALS (895345) and tr> n C/l.JUWCETO area. , assist ('!d by 45th Div . and perhaps 1 brigade e:roup , 5th Div. I will forward de tai l ed plans later . I anticipate that regrouping "fill require 2 days , but I do not see how sufficient strength can be T'1nde avail able ot}1erwise . I will be prepared to use Harmon eRrlier in tho nvent of unexpe cted success . Part this plan nec essit ates slight nodification in air plan. I will notify Brann of req1J.irer•mts ,Jj thout delay. nr hope your CASSINO attack is making progress . except your radio last night . 11 I lw:110 heard nothing Personal Clark to Truscott . RN 6536 . "Dat e for your att a ck is March 19th. Extr a heavy air effort will bo r,rovidcd on March 18th as well as 19th. Confirm that your attac k will be riade on 19th . 11 "---✓ Personal Clark t o Tr us cott. RN 6537 . "Progr ess in Cassino area today has been s l ow . Tanks are havi n g great diff i cu l ty gettjng througl, c:ity • . Hi l l 435 capt ured . At tack on Monastery Hill will be rosur:i.ed t onight . 11 'rhe A riy Co:"nr,.nder rec~_ ved the f'ollovdne; letter fron Lt . Gen. HPrdjng , r d General Alexander ' s Chief of Staff , on the subject of "Air Bol"bard:r;ent of Land 0b,iectives rreparatory to Assault. 11 "1. Without vraitjng for detaJ.l~d reports , it '!ms c lear frof'l ,;,h/'1t could be seen nf the op"rations in the CASSPrn Brer-i on 15 r,~arch thnt bor:;barc'lnent by heavy and nediur1 bonbers of land ob,i!"lctivcs rreparr,tory to n ssault by land forces offers conslrl ,~rable scop,n, for the f'uture . 11 2 . J t is also cle2r tho t son"' aircraft had difficulty -in recognis:i ng the target as n nUJ"'ber of' bonbs vrere rlrorred :inside th~ bo,.,,bline , Pno son~ 2t 2 consider1:1 ble r•istance fror~ t},,., farget . F'ror1 thl"l roint of view of' th~ lanc1 f'orces, it :is realised th11t sor1c r:istakes are bounc1 to occur and thnt rjslz js accepted . At tre sar,e tir,e it js obviously riost :irirortant fror1 f'"Very point of view to ensure that rwerv l"Jffort ano device is l"1ade use of' to obviate suer l"1istBkes in fut1rre . The C• in- C considers thr1t land forces can be of' c1efinite assistnnc(;) to the t>ir rorces in assistinP" thl'ln to f'ind thl')ir targets . Arti ficial L<rnd r<orks and 1 i ~ht sigrw ls hPve heen snccessfully 11s""d for this purrose on occc1 sions in th"' p=:st , ond. tr!"! use of a. row of colour~d searchlip;hts set out in som~ rrearrrnged r~lntionshi:r to thl") target has bMn suggested for an or~ration o:f' th~ tyre carried out on 1 S Mrirch. L .,____ l! 3• 'T'h~ C-in-C would be G:lrd to 1"now i:1hrt Armfos a11d ~'!ATAF think on t}, is J �question, f'nd on rny other roints connected with coor~ration between ti,_,, tvrn servj ces in s1ich orerations , that nrise out of the attac1{ on CA.3SPJ0. Will you rl~ase for,:roro your vjl'lws as soon rs ro:-;sible. .After r~cc 1 rt of all rerli~s it is rroposed to hold a "1eeting to c'H scuss all roints rut forward. 11 * * * fR.ESE"JZANO- - rTARCF 17, 1944--Th~ rrogr~ss of' th'> rittack on Cassino contj nued ton1:1y ns t}1e ne1:1 Zealand Corrs rushed on through th~ to·rm. ,/\ft~r an ~arly rornjng conf")r,~nc~ ",it:b his CMef rf' Stoff , G-3 and G-2, General Clark re ccj Ve'!<:' f1aj or n-rny, Acting Arny Judge Advoca tc , nho rcviewod ,.,.j th G"'n""ral Clark 25 court 1"1artj_al cases. Jhortly hefor~ noon G"'n~rals Cannon W"rl I l'lT"'nitzcr arrived for a conferem ce zrjtr Generf11 Clark rbout the ai:r situation, and a f"w T'linutes late?r Cren"'ral Mason-MacFBrlane and Colonel '}elson !l!rntfort , his Arericen personal staff of'ficer, nrr~ved . G":n~ral Cl2r1 '.'lnt,,rtairnd ell tr,-, v~sitjr:g officers for 1uncheon. Gen"lrEl ftason-Mac1"arlane spoke cf sonc of tr,e er-barrassY:ents ar5 sjng cut of t'is r""-culiar position. Honinally, th~ nrrd.stice vritl--i Italy was ..,nde by Russia , Engltmrt and the Unitl']d States together, and , accord1ngly, as I res-i de11t of' th" Allied Control Corriission , Gen~ral Mason-Mac:F'arlane acted for nll thr~e countr-i!"!s . Hcw,ever, he had just been scooped by the Russians v1ho had ""ade Rrrang"'·rients to exchange diplor,•atic representA.tion with tJ~e [;overnment of Yinr '\Tittorio El"'Mtmu~le wjt}1out letting General MasonMacFPrlane in on the transaction at all until it h~_d becor:e a fait accor,rlL r Genl"!ral Clarl<: d:i ctated the following naterial for -1nclusion in his diary: The r.,attl~ of Cassino is progressing slowl)r. plans are not l:~:eping up to hj_s tiJ11e sc},ed11le . Freyburg ' s enthusiastic 11 nr witnflssed t11e bor'bardr ent of' Cnssino in coripany vdth Gl"!nerals Eek~r , Devers, Cannon and oth,~r Aj_r Corrs orf-icials. I vrould say t}1at apyroxJn8tely hp,lf of th,-, boT"bs rlid not fj nd the target area. Ferheps 60<:s were in t}1 A prescrjbed area . The oth~r 40°~ fell in tb") f'lats w:i tr1 no damage , in T"IY opinion, to th, eneny. Many bor"bs, on different occasions 8nr'l :in d:ifferent rl;:,ces, vrere dropped on our troops . Rorbardm~nt of cur own troops fron Isernia throui:;h 1J~nafro e.nd-~all c1round Cervaro took :rlace with casualti"s 11.prroxirr:atfo_-:,; 75 1~:illed rmn around 250 r,mmded . This is appalling rnd can be attributed only to roor trainjng end j nwleqmttt"'! briefini:; of crl"!ws. It was a beautiful day, bo!"'b:ing taking rlace fron low altitudes wHh Mount Cairo And Cassino well defim•d . J can not rossi bly un,:'1~rstrnd J-1ovr th~se errors occurred . It hR.s brought forth v:igorous rrotests frorct th" French and oth"lr Headquarters and created a lack of' confj_dence jn our air ar1ong mLr i'ro,1t line troors . 0 nr hev'-" rt'!pe2-tedly told Ti'reyburg frorr: his :incertion of this rlan that .\ a~rial ho~bardn,,.,nt e lone n"ver hR.s and never v·ill drive a deterr.1j ned · enerw fror1 his rosition. Cessino has agein rroven this tJ-,eory, for, altrough no doubt h11.!8VY casuslties 1"Iere inflfoted upon the ene1"1y in Cassino , sufficient I have rl'?rndn~d to hold ur our advance and cause severe fighting in ~e town for th!'! past two days . CJ ~ .~1~(-~ • t.,,f'Vl\,,o() (\»",,, . ~ ' ~ (: o.,a...-1.,v1A.i) / ~ QJ-"\ " ,t.. ~,~...L"{~ ~ A.HrY"'-ir'"":.~ ¾ ~f u~~~ A,,' (fl �l53 \ "Freyburg ' s rrindl·i ri.r; o-r t1'c ~ris 1ing attacl• rps hr--eri. cbl"'re cterized by indecision nnd lacl· of r,ggress::lven"'ss. Fis rlnri t o have t he Indians attack fror. TTill 503 ·dth te.n1rs has !"'ot ,...,r>t,..rialized , due, I 1--i~ljev~, to objections on tbt"! rR.rt of G,..n~ral G:<1.llovray, the Indian Division Co,...,.,.,anrler. In ry conv,..rsat1o11s ,-,; th the l:=itter , I ,-stfr1ptl'} bir, to bl'l a r"'fel1tist . Every ti"'le he sees ri~ he er.1rr;asizes th~ seriousness o+' tb.. +"ighting . I f'f"el, and told r:>reyburg last ni~ht and ngain this riorninr;, that it is essential t1'at he attack thl'l riomistery sir,ultaneously from Hill 5q3 and Hill 435 vrith the Indians . Fe js not ~nclin~d to do it . 1 "The British cr,..,rP ct,..ristic of } oldj "11" ob,i,..ctives gaj n~d Vl!'Jry lightly ras again coT"'e to tre +'ront . I11. th"' case of ~Till 165 just west of Cassino , this was countl'lrattacked by the Gr-,rJ"'ans last nigh~ and wr('!sted frol"'l British con trol. ()rders J,,av, been issul'ld to re-tPk'°' it , b11t tris slovrs ur the yro:;ress . 1 Yesterdnv, not bei'l'lg ::irile to r-et any accurllte inf'orp,rtion as to th~ state of affn.::.rs at th!'! hridr,c over tr~ Rarido on Fi 1s}111u1y //6 , I f"'::rsonaJ.ly 'Vent to thnt ro:i.nt and f'ound tr,-,t only o'l'le tank rad gotten across , ,-;rer'"las rereated reports inr1 4 cated thr~"!, a11d Frevburg ad told Me two squPdrons . Th" brid~e wa 9 unr1"'r hel:'V:V ,.,ortn.r f'ire . I th"ln rmnt to see Freyburg P gain nnd rece-i v~rl tre sitw,tion fron him. I snv,r,estec1 to hir, t're use of Hi.r,hway //6 to riove th"' 78th Divisirrn across by co,..,bnt ten1;1 to r:et riore in-rantry ~ nto the soutr . Fe did 'l'lot lik,.. tris idea . T exrressed to hin r,y dj:,arroint,..,"lnt jn J-d.s not n.ttackinr with tc-nks enc1 infantry fron y,3 in coorrlinf'tion with th~ Incl.fans I attn ck fror, Hcmgman I s Fill. He t0lc1 ne he intenr1ed to rip lre tbe tanlr nttac1(', and I ,mr1erstoocl infrmtrv, +'roT'I 5q3 . Last nir,},t, in trlking with G~neral Gru""nth~r , he contradicted himself . : rrd Grul"'nth.,r rhon~ him back and tel l hin of r,,y disaprointr~nt in not attr-icking .. rom both directio11s . 11 11 Todn:v I bv~ tal1~ed "~th G"'n~rn l F,,.l"Jyburg on ri~my occasions . Arrrrent1:,r G!"lneral Gallo- •f1y, the I'1dian Division Cor""ander , docs not v•nnt to Attack v:i.th J,,is +'ive batt2Uons froM 503 .n.nd th righ c;:round northeast of tlie r1onas tery. T told Freyburg th~ tanks to be errloyed were t t"~rican , and h~ could los~ th"'"' $.l l and I noulrl replace ther1 within ?L,.. hours . I sent BrRnn to see rim . It is now lf->15, Pnd I hf"ve talked vdth hilll nany tjr-,")s sine~ , and he sti11 js opyosed to an attack fron th~ north . He },ores to reinforce tre Indjnns on Eangrnan 1 s Hill tonigrt Pnd nttack towarc1 s th~ Monast"3ry. Durjng the day ,.,e MOVed t1=m1':s And -tn..,antry into the railroad station soutr of Cassino . \ If we can clear tl-•~ srorad:ic resistance out of t ,~ town tr"! situ1"ltion will 4 r.irrove raridl 'T . 1 r "Due to G--neral Ale'-Trnier 1 s cHrl'l c t rleaHn,.,. "Tith Freyhurg and tre fact thnt tM s is an all- British show, J an rf'luctant to e;ive a direct order to Freyhur£s to put the- 78th I'i vision over Route /16 and to attack fror, t}1a north fror 5q3, b")cau se he h::is rr,pMtedly ~ndicn t ec1 thrt h, is orrosed to these rlans . If ht'! were an Arierican Cor ps Cor~mander with Arierican troops I would have no hesitancy in P"iv~ng such an orrler . I have just now t~ler-hon•d to Gt•n1eral Al exander , 11hom T noulr1 nl"!Ver ;:ro to on snch r ovc if it ,•rere not for th~ deHcate ~nt,,.rnntional relations involv"'!d here . I exrlnined the co,.,,rlete s:itm1tion Pncl ,..,,y v 4 "':WS anc1 told r jr, ::: would not issue a dj_rcct order contrar;~ to t.re vie rn of' th~ British Corps a'l'ld Division Co,...,!""Pnders . 1-+e quit e agreeci and did not in any way seen excited Aho11t the siturtion . O 0 l �l5Y "As previously rerortecl in tbl diary, Al\'lxander directed ne again to attack in the br i dg~head to tc1.ke ndvPntage of the conf'nsion in the bridgehead Prea . This had al;eady heen arrang"d for, but toda:r ! ,~et new word fron Truscott that he must alter his rlPns (as indfoat c,d in cable ;/1128 , quoted in yesterday ' s diary) . I have passed th:is word on to G~neral Alexandl":r, cs it ne.y nlter the date of the attack . 11 I hPve hrid quit"! a conference with Generals Cannon and L,~mnitzer toda,y. Cannon nnd. I are in conplete accord with the use of afr to support ground troops . rrruscott has ask"\d f'or a r:lrl:iculous ar1ount of support , totP lling sone 80 groups if Pll targets are cov"lred . :r have decided , in accordance vrith the air CToup , that no strategic should be nscd in sup:rort of ':l'ruscott 1 s lir,itcd objective attack; that it can b"! used r"ucri better on strategic nissions but thrit 1•re will use all the XII Air Su:rrort , reinforc"d by the Dest'lrt Air Force and s 1 1.ch J110d:l.um hol"1b~rs as we have suitable targets for . This will probably Fllt -,r rrruscott I s recoT'lri.endation for an attack, although Alexander agrees with ne completely, Pnd I Rr1 s1.ire v,ill require that we put it on . J 11 The Air Corps are quite upset vrith the rl')sults of their boribing our own troops . f'uring the rast 48 hours l:mndreds of bonbs on at least seven different 1 oc casions have been crorped i.n our own areas with rat1'c-r heavy losses . General ~ Ealrer is takinr; drastic action to fiY th~ resronsibility. , . tt::"., ·~- ~~ nsone decision must soon be nade b:r th~ Co,,,,b~ ned C!-1,:i ef s or. Staff as to ~ A.~,JVIL for it will soon begin to take air sup:rort fror, this critical si tuntion . The lack of coorcljnation and hesitancy on the rart of the hir;h cor"land running t},j s war is dis graceful in ro;r opinion. o1 pivv-~ "The capability of 0lernents of VI Corps to attack beinr; doubtful, Gl;lneral Glarlc cabled General Truscott tnrice to(fay , RN 5534 r-md RH 5537, in an effort to deternine wh,ther or not rlans wer~ r;o:ing ph•1r-,d for the r ttack on tbe 19th as h~rctofore schednled . n 0 :rmportant nessages of t he day are ;:,s f'ollows : Persorn,l Clrrk to Truscott . you plan to attack on 19th . " R"~ 5534 . flAdv!sc :i.r1M,~diately yrhether or not P~rsonal Clnrl- to Truscott . RN 553'7 . "In vi,,.w of vour 11?8 it is not clear ,,}1,..thA:r or not you "TilJ be nhlr, to attac)r March 19th . Arvise 5rnedi ntely." r~rsonal Clar1r to Truscott . Rl'T 5570 . 11 Detailed yl1=ms Pre being rr~rared +>or er1rlor,.ent of f:i~rt~r bor·bers , lir;ht bonbers Pnd ~1l"diur1s in surrort of your D- 1 9ffort starting on March ].'1th . TITo strategic P ir '"'ill be a.wdlable for support of your Pttack . Hor vrill 5t be possible :in future to secure E:3trat Air Force for close support ~xcer,t in <'.;ri'lP.t !'!ner~"!ncy. 11 Personal Truscott to Clark . R~.r 1134. "Ref•~renc,:,, '::SD 536 . I ,·,ill nttack 19 H0rch . Since r-dr sur,..r:5-orHv is the s.;n::;l"' factor thA.t justjfies my attack, I ,·rill require th~ P ir r-; f'fort on 18 r11arch , continuing during attack . 'Sxtr a l,eavv air e:f'fort requfr~d Mar ch 18 , 19 and 20. After regrouping, a p~riod of probably 2 days, extra. heavy A.ir ef for t will proba bl y be required for a n additional 2 days . There is no change in air plan for D l"linus 1 day. Corr ections �I ::>5 for a5r plan D and D plus 1 by radjo tooay. "Am sorry n.hout slO''l rrop:ress of CASSI'TO attack. Hop"! yon are not expecti n[; r,y attnc1: to r Pfect s.; t1..wtion tl "re. I do not believ~ 1t can J-in.ve P."'lY ef'fect on tJ-,P.t ;;i tuction. 11 Detail!"Jd rhirs to you b;,r couri~r today. 11 F.<?rsonnl "'ruscott to Clark. RTJ 1136. "In rerl;r to your 5537, I will be able to attack 19 J'Prch. My 11?8 described chang~ jn plPn whicli A rfMts Briti.sh objectives only. feath1'1r report r~r"' indicates detcriorati..nG weather tomorrovr. Air sureriorit;r single factor tret justi.fies riy attac1r . I will attack if weath~r r,ri•its a:i.r on D-1 and!) days. 11 * * * FlESF: 1 TZANO--MARCH lP:, 104/~--Th~ tvm cntstanding fePtures of t},e day · "'re tr,. conti.nuance or the rittl".c 1e:: on Cassi.no r:nd tre oecision by th'-'l Arr:;y Cor ~;flnrcr to def ,r ,mtjl furtr r :rot:i ce th(~ rro.i cterl attnck by VI Corrs in tre br5clgeh"Jad . 0 Th" P..ttack on Cassino continu~c1 slo" l y, rs rocY.l"\t"' cf' G0rrn,ins in and ri.round th"J to,m rut up desyernte redsta-1ce. Hil11ri3, to tl-,e northvre:-;t of tl ~ to' ;-n a few G_,,rnans cont1 nu~d to holrl c ff cur troops. G"'n,:,rfl 1 Clr>r 10 in tr,.. r-orn-:nrt ,~l"mt hy j<')er to tre 'Tevr Zenhnd Corrs Heaclqmrtcr::: and th<'lnce to U•e 'Tew Zl'\Pland Corps ohsnrvation rost, wh"'r~ rl"! ''TP.s abl~ to vi~w the Cassino hPttle. Th .. r.ionnst ,r:.r i'l still h""ld by the Ger,,,rns. Thfo nfternoon an n.ttenr+: rms r-:ar 1e to r~-surrly sone o-r th(' Indj ans on tl-,.. slop~s A.bove Cassino b;r air, RS y,Pc1:inr RM'7Unition, food n.nd -r:rt"'r ur tr,,.. l1illsjcL unrler fire was rroving inross1ble. The drop \''as only rrrtil'll;r 3uccessful, r-s tre green snok. signa 7 s 11Mcr the Ind~l'nrl should hew, d:i SJ lt1.yed to mprJr tr" srot for the clrop "rere lat":'. Th~ 1'lind ' cnrrie-d !"'rn:r of' the loeds av;py fro1"1 the trcors for whon th("Jy •mre int"'1nred, nnrl, jn son~ --'nstnnces, l~t th~m fall aT'long tre G"rnnns . ' 1 f \ \ In tJ,~ l Ate Pfternoon, General ClPr'k flew by cub rlPne t0 the rond at Caserta Pnd "ent by cA.r to tl1c 3Atb General Fos:r: t11 l vbere h~ took to Lt. Col. T'offitt, Executive Q+'fjcer of th,! Crdnance 0ection, wro was ill 'vith fn"!U1"10nia, TI"''-'1 S thnt 1,,, },,,,c1 been rror-oted to tl--i~ rpn1r of Colonel. Gen~rc1l Clar,,. bnd y,rystin,rdriy ca.bled to ~i.AT0FSA n~ws o 0 the Colonel I s desrerate conditi.on and reCO!"'r>Cnded V1at l-1 ~ be rror-ioted as it r-i.r;rt ')nCOUt'rJfsC rim. 'fovrn of th(" rronotion arriv~d tris r·orning. Gen~ral Clarlr Pound Colonel 1 1of'f'itt with a H gr teN:rereture and E:t t-im"1s c1elirious, but the siclr man vms able to greet th" Army Cnr"'!ander and was delighted -rith the n•,vrs. Unharrily, dnring the evening '"lord ··ms rece-ived thPt Colo>1el r1offitt hacl died . 1 1 G"'n"lrnl c1nr1.r, on :bis return .c>ron t!:is trir, "'1"!t A grour of riiHfory Pttac}-,es to tre Frencrl Ccr,ni ttee of 'rational Li bnrrtion Gov~rnri.•mt mho ,·,ere tourino- the front, accoT1panied by two Frencb of'ficers . Thes'"! ,·,ere: Colo 1el Bula.ndr, Gzecho•3lovakia; Colon0l Colocoetronis, Greece; Lt. Col. F,,,,sen, Jorvra;v; Lt . Col. Forrret, C2nada; :::.,t. Col. Deslo~es, Canada; 1 '.r j. 'lziP.sPno ski, Joland; ~hj. ~onjoie, n,~lr;ium, 1 'eJ. CPyo, rcru; 1 ~nj. A1lcrinnr1 and Ca.rtf,in d"'Croix, Fr~nch accor-ip:inyin1; of'f-i cers. 1 1 \ \ l �l Sfo General Alexnnc1cr arrived at Gen"lral Clark's cor'1nand rost in the late afternoon, rmd GenArol Ch,rk read to h5r, r~rsonally UH': following cable v'hich he ha.d just drafted for t..:i isp=itch to the CPJC: "Truscott , }1as radioed "'~ durj ng the past 48 hours tbat air sup,":riority vras the single factor that justified his attack, thPt he 1·ms forcod to change l1is attaclc plen because the rission assj ~ned the 1st British Division vras not ·ritrin its carability, anc1 that he did not f'eel that an attB ck in the bridrshcad vroulc'l contribute tow2rds the attac1c in +,he GP ssino area . After receiving this inforl7P.tion, togeth,,.,,r vd th anoth0r report :'ro"'l m7 senior Fifth .A.rr,y representative in the bridgehead that scir e cor,1r,am1ers and staff o.c>fic'."rs of VI Corps ,,_,ere not rappy about the attack, I sent Gen'3ri:tl Brann, ny G-3, this r,orning to cJjscuss the attack with Truscott. Truscott rocor -r1ends cancellation of th~ rrorosed li1:1it".'!d objective c1ttack based on the follo1rring 1r.nown f11cts: (a) The attacl' will noct aprro~"irately equal eneny str~ngtr in well rrcrared ros:i tions, a'igmented by mines and vrire (b) Thrat ~neny artillPr:r is appro"'.:i1;1atcly equal to th:cit of the VI Corps with I superj or observation ( c) That tho anount of air availahle fror the XII Air 1 Support Cor1r.Pnd , a 1 1gnented only by certain nediun bo,.,1bcrs is not sufficient I to create thei overwheln1ing air support he bcJJ,w0s necessary for the success \ of this attack (d) '7ithout such an ov"1r :rhelning air Attack the odds Pre against a successful acconplishr1ent of the planned attack (o) That trc attack TTould be extremely costly in personnel and r,ight r-:Jsult in a suitDble opportunity for an enemy count~r offensiv~ . In this connection losses in British troops can not bn 1:1ad~ ,g;ood (f) After thf') rroposed l:imit""'d objective bas been reached, ener1y :3ffecVve fire can still be yleced throughout the entire brid.-i;ebead. 1 ~ 0 0 1 11 I concur in Truscott 1 s co>1clu.-,ions. ::r Fould }1ave cance 7~ led the attack irnediat':lly had it not been for th~ :instructions contained in your radio CGS 2~9. I, tJ,3refor"l, recoro"~!"lnd th?t the attB ck scheduled f'or to:norrovr b"" Jostroned until aft<:;r t0e 2rriw1l of th~ 34th Division Pnd a re-study of the enemy situation at thPt timJ. n General Clrrv dictrct"'.!d the follo-rrinr; not?.s for inclusion -in }7iS diary: "'Sl'l,rly =orning r"lrorts f'ror 1 Freyburg indicated that little or no rrogress was hein"' n,de . In fact, slt,lwtion 0f Indian battalion on Fangr1an I s Fill ' secried rr'3CRrious clue to lack of supply. I ,·1,:mt forwBrd to see Freyhurg and again 11rFscd 1--iin to "lrrploy !"'ore troops in GPssino. re w;:is cor1i:ng to the decision at that ti"1A to rut the 5th Brigade ovr,r Route !/6 into t},'" town. I urged haste but have little assurance that speed will be usep_. I Pgein pointed out the d~sirability of pushing a brjgade of the 78th Division over the railroad bridge past th2 r,ilroad stAtion ov~r the Gari River to get a briilg"'head to perr;it tanks to follow . I tl~ink I r-!ade sop~ progress along t:-;ese lin'3s . Tliscus.sed w:i.th General Gallo Nay, Con:"!Bnding Q,~neral of the Indian Division, tho use of t11nks fron CPiro 2593. He hopes to do th0t first thing in the rmrning . Arranp;9d, at Ga.110,-:ay' s insistance and Freyburg 1 s request, tc, dror suprlics by planes on Hangnan 1 s Hill Uis afternoon. Frcyburg is not P.ggressive; is ponderous a:rd slow . I net Alexanc'lcr on "'Y ',ray bac 1{, revievred tbe situetion with hirr, told bim of riy diffj culty in ordering a Hew Zealand Connander to er;rploy British troops in a nanner he did not like and urged Alexander, when reapproved of' r,y sugg0stions, to rrod Fre7burg a little into sone ACM on. He said he would do so and was quite disP.ppointed at th: slowness of his a.ction. Alexander feels as :::: do thPt tJ-,c ,many is waiting to see ..,}-,pt, rre do before counterattackinr; or rulling back . Vii th r~gc1rd to thP- Ptt8 ck torriorrow in the 1 I \ �bri,1(-;ehead for a lir-dted ob,i~cti ve, I rointed out to Alexander, who is riost pnxious thet tbis attacl· take rlPce, that it had certain drawbe.cks as follows: (a) It nould not talre any fire of'f of tho rear ereas or the rort (b) It was ae;a in:~t a strongly defended rosi tfon ·;ri th 11.t least equal Gcrnan tr0ors orrosinG; us (c) The G'}rr an had sll the observation, 1111.d we attacked over cren terrain (d) The casualties we r'if;ht suffer would be quite a sctbacl< to us in vfow of the difficulty of securing British rcinforcem~nts, and we can ill afford to take heavy casualtfos a.t this tir1c . Of course the advantages nrrJ rolitical, and Alexancer "'."~eels th2t it night offset another Ger:rian attack . Anoth0r edvantage is thPt v,e do secure a little nor,., fRvorabL~ tGrrain ay,d give ourselves a littl<; ,..,,ore roan, if svccessful , in the bridgehead. In viPW of '17ruscott 1 s radio ton~ yesterde;r th2t the 1st British Division , due to recent losses, (including thTee conranfos cartured) was incarable of offensive action and that the only reason he was justified in naking the attack rms duo to our great air f'lffort . I sent General Brann to see rj_'TI today to get his real thoughts on th~ subject . As soon as he returns I will decide ,,rh~tl1~r I will rake the attack or recorr1end to Genoral Alexsnder thPt it hf"J rostroned until the 34th Division ,;ets in. Due to the inability of the 1st British Division to attnck, it mePns tlwt the Rttack will he r'1adfl by Anerican troops, wr,jch arrarently the British are rerfectly willing to do . I must see tb:it "'C r;et targible returns for the nen I en Hable to expend in this limited effort . Alexander indicRted to nn that he was :rositive tJ,,at it rmst be done. 11 1 7996. Genl"lrri.l Glarl,. this afternoon cabled General Truscott as follows: "Yoll.r attack for 19th cancellr-id. Will see you soon. 11 RN 'T'hc following cablA was received froP NJ\TC\USA today: RN 66275. 11 Nar Dr.•n,artr1 ent ('ecision is to retain Ranger battalions. Sep2rE1te action this l eadquarters will transfer first, third and fourth Ranger Battalions to the United States with veteran pArsonnnl only (137 enlisted nen and 19 officers listed your 534 7, r'arcr 10, 1041,) . Transfer non-veteran p~rsonnel of these battalions to 1st Spccj_al Service Force . n 1 * * * FRESENZANO--P1A,.1i.CH 19, 1Q44--This r1orning General Clark left by cub at 0900 for' the beachhead . .Acco.,.1panying hin j_n the second cub was Lt . Col. Draper of the Artill'"ry Section . The General reacr1Rd t1-1c beac}1 h0ad at ar,rrmdnPtcly 1015A and irm-iediatcly went to GonAral Truscott I s headqur~rters vrhere hr~ conferred with rin about the beacl1hcad situation. He read to Generals Truscott and F.ve,legh r~rsonally the draft cable to GennrA 1 Alexander, riuoted in yesterday ' s diary, and they botr heartily concurred . Tr,~ Jtrny Corn"'andcr nade only a short stay at the beachhead , however, and left on 'ii s return trip a few rij_rmtes rifter l?OO, flrriving Rt the Fifth Arr:y cor.nnnd post at 1315 . The G·~neral thsn went into conference ,,,~th Gern;rAl Gruenthnr on the ste. tus of the CRssi110 attack . The G~rnons had twice counter-attacked on Hill 1q3 , their attacks hejng cst:iT1a.ted to have been by as rany as 300 ~en . The Gerrian pocket :In t}1e southwcstGrn corner of the tmm sti.11 contjnues to give trouble . Two Gernan tanks haVt9 taken up positions j_n "rhrt was the lobby of the Hotel Continental. By the close of the day a Brj tish tank had 1rnockcd out one of the Gl"rnan tenlrn, but t'rie otl~0r one continued to fire fron the �l'.JT"battled lobby. At 1500 General Frcyberg arriv,)d to discuss the difficulties }se was exrerhmcing in his Cassino attack. To add to his m,berrass•,"lnts , an apmmition durap on Route #6, ,:hicr had accidentally taken fire, began to blow up just as he rassed it on his WAY to tr,e cor·1r1and rost, and the rest of the afternoon v1as punctuated by the sound of n:xrlodinr, shells . At 1515 Generals AlexA.nr'1er, Hardj_ng nnd Lormitzer arri vod and joined G;~nerals Clark, Grucnth,-,r and Freyberg in tho hut in a discussion of the Cassino situntion 1:p1d "•'hPt shoulc'l ½e done to ridvance the attack tb,,re . The British officers left with G,rn~ral Lermitzer at about 1700 , end General Cli:irk left by auto,,,obile for Sorrento wl1ere he dinAd with friends at the Cfficers 1 Rest Center and returned after dinner to his cor1nand rost . General Gruentrnr sent the following two he 17as f'..'t the beacrihead : RN 6562. hill 165. 11 CP bles to G!-'3neral Clrrk nM.le "Attack fron HanP,nan I s Hill has not started yl'lt. Ener'y holds R~J 6563. HGr'lncral r'reyburg has ash~d to cone and see you tris efternoon to discuss present attack." * * * FRBSENZAl'JO--rnJIRCH :?O, 1944--This :morninr.; the funornl of Colonel Moffitt, Bxecutive Officer of the Ordrn=nce Section, wAs held in th~ Aneric:m military cenet~r~r in Naples. As General Clark had conferences scheduled whic0 could not be :rostpon8d, lie directed Lt. Col. SutherJPnd to r~present him at the funerPl. This was done, :=ind a lari;;e wre!"th wr:>s plAced on the p;rPve from GemerPl Clark. At llOO Generel Clark received a call from General Saville, Comrnnding At this conference it wfls a gr Md thi-i t the XII Air Support Col"w1and couJ.d rlevotA itself to destroyinR ene"l;T comr1unicAtions, srive for 11n occasiona 1 mmber of sorties ( supposed to be 96) reserved for support of ground troops • XII Air Surrort Col"lFm no. .Pt 1130 General Mccreery called on Gen('}rr-1 ClRrk to dj scuss the rroblens involved in the regrouping of the Fifth Arny and the withdrnwal from their present sector of 10 Corps. Cartnin H:i_lbert, u. S. Navy, CB.me to lunch. He had recently COTae from the United StAtes , where he hnd seen r.itrs. ClRrk. At 1600 Colonel Brfan, Inspector Genl'lral of II Corps, arrtved 11.nd discussed with Genc'JrAl Cbr:k the op-'~rrtions of 16 Decer~ber before San Pietro which he WPS investigatin~ for II Corps. General Clark hfld been rresent on thot day And observed the T".lovement of :forirr...,rd rlatoons of the bptfolion vrhich hBd just been emgav,ed in tpe AttRck on San Pif>tro. At 1630 hours Lt. Gen. Burro,rn, British Arny, called to see Gimeral Clark. Fe is on hiA v-rny to Ru~sia to heAd the Br:itisP Mission there And discussed the 'Russian sjtul'l.tion very inter,.,stingly. He eAi,ressed the op:inion thr-t the f'i~htini:; on the Russian :front WPS nlr-ost non-existe1mt Pnd thrt the Gernr-,ns were ,yj t'.bdrawinP- voluntnrily. '!'oclF.y Genc,ral Cli-irk 8pproved a recor,,r,~nc'lf,tion of Colonel Rob:inson, Fifth �ftrriy .A.ntirdrcrnft Officer, for thr; followinr:; chnnges in antiBircreft officers: Colonel Rob:5.nson to replricl"l General Tovmsend with the French ExredJtj_onr->ry Corps, Gen~rnl Townsend to rer ln c ~ Gen•"'l'.l"P l BrRdsrr-,w v;j tr the '35th AI\A Brj r;rde And GenA.rl'1.1 BradshR.''l to rey,lrice Colonel RoMnson A.s Fift}, ArPly Antiri ircrPft 0fficer . Important messPges of the day ore as follo YS: 1 r ersonal ClPrk to Truscott. RN 56//1 . "Sjtu..,tion in C11ssino continues to he ,Hfficnlt . Enery a:rpeers to have been rejnforced. Heavy enemy shelling on tovm todny. · Our troops still occupy reilror,d stf>tion, Hill 435 and Hill 1Q3 . Rnen:v occupies hill 165 1md strong roints on southwest side of tm"n. Surplies dropped successfully by 11ir todny for troops on hill 435. nur t:cmk attack from hill 5q3 yesterrl.a;r was unsuccessful. n Personn1 Clar1-: to Saville . RN 5651. "New 7,ealrmd Corrs reports thPt supply drop for troops in area of hill 435 today constitut~d a model of perf~ction . T'lease nccer,t r,y sincere thanks for tM_s outstr-inding achievenent. n Pe:rsonnl Clark to 'T'ruscott . RlJ 5617. 11 MP1rirjp control officers 1,rho hr>ve visited ~nz5 o repo:rt thr,t it shouln not be necessr-ry to strirt 11tr-ibrinA br:iforc April 15th . Arr,y Surw,eon ,,,ill visit you on MPrch ?1st or 22nd. If rfter your conference vdtr him you ,3till deslre to stort atabr-'ine on t'lPrch ?5th you are p11thorize0 to start on that date . J h1'1.ve ::irr::,nr;ed tlwt r:osqnito net,s, he~:i_d nets and insect repellf:lnt 1'!ill be r,M_pped to bridf;eherid within next fevr dPys. ff From AAI to Fifth P.nd Eighth Arr:,y Conmr>nders - R1,T CGS300. 11 The slow proPTess rnrir!e so fpr jn clearint; the to1·rn of Crissino wjtJ1 t}1e consequent delriy in buncM_nP" the rittnck on the monPster1 r cor1bin0.d wj_th the necessity for prernr5 ng the PV'Xi:rur, forces for ri fnll scri le of'fensj-ve in the second ki lf of' Aprj 1 □Rkes j_t essential to decide in the course or the next '?4 or J6 hours wheth,,.,r (a) to continue wi tr the CP ssino operr,tfon in the hope of cPrturfog \/ the r'!onristerv durjnp; the nf')xt three or f'ou.t' dr,vs or (b) to CPll th") Of?:rr-,tion l off f1nd to consolidrite "1UCh g2ins of p,round as Pre import1:1nt for the renewrl of the of'fensive later . It is rilso necesm:ir;v to decide when Ei~}lth ~rr;v is to tA.ke over resr,onsiM.li ty for or,er8tions on the Cr-i ssino front nnd when Hq. NZ Corp<; is tn be dissolvl"ld r-ind replaced by Hq. 13 Corps. In the C-in-C 's view Eighth l\rrw Pnd 13 Corps should Pssume responsibUity for the CPssino front as soon ns th0 monnster;tr has been captur~<l r-mo consolidPted or P ltArnf'tively ininediately it is decided t o cPll off the present offensjve but h"3 wishes to dis cuss this point with Arn,;,r ComnAnders before rea.ching A fi nal dec ision. Consequently C- in- C hl'l.S dec1_ded to hold A neeting of Army ConMPnders at Hq. Fif'th Arny At 1530 hours 21 March . He wishes GenerRl Ti're;rberg to be rrMcnt to give a det1=dled rrJport on the situf'tion on th<o Cassino front. As decisions regarcUnP, the r;rounrl to be consolidated w:Ul dfrectly affect tb~ future opP-raMons of' E:5-ghth Arr1 y, C-in-C vd sh~s Co,..,nrmder ~j_ghth .~rny to be prerrred to give his views on tbr-t point in the hro possible crses rYmtfoned under (a) and (b) l'lbove. In that connection Coml""nnder E:i.ghth Arny r,,ny, jf be ,,rish"'ls, bring Conn<>nr1 er 13 Corps to th~ r10etine:. Ac1rnovrledge. 11 �FRgSEHZArsrn--MARCH 21, 1944--General Clrirk left his CO"'l.r1Pnd rost this r1orning at 0910 by ieep, tl'lkinr; with hh:1 Lt. Col. Drrrper whor1 h~ hns selccted to be his senior e ide upon th1' deprirture of Lt. Col. Sutherbnd. Tho General went directl:v to the New 'Zealnnd Corps observation post wrere ho met General Freyberig an<l his division conT'!Pnders, Gencrlr.i rrirkinson, Kei1shtfoy nnd GRllmvc1y. Gen".'lral CJ.rirk asked the Corps and Division ComrnPnde:rs to i;ive their impressions of the present state o-1" the battle at CA.ssino. GenerPl Freyberg sio.id th,,.t in his opinion, based on his battle ~x.rerience to datt'l, especially in Tunisia, where !'l'lountA.inous terrnin was hr:ild by the Boche, one hBd to fight ) for one's ob .j ect:i.ve, And it WA.s us~m~l:v slow going. He was not -~ssimistic about the eventui:i.l outcome and def1n1t!"!ly stated th:,,t he ;,ms not J_n fnvor of call:irni; of'f the Attn.ck. A short discussion of the existence of a tunnel used bv the (}erT'lans indicAted thnt GenerP,l Fre7berP, -mrA.s not too faMiliar w:l th its existence. However, Division Corir1Pnder8 hrid hePrd of the wherenbouts of r:1 tunnel, which vms eln.borated upon bv Brir;A.dicr (Juer~,e, who stated thPt from prison~r rerorts h~ felt thi:>t its existence was mRinly legt!'lndary and thPt the Boch.-, did hnve, undoubtedlv, n"ltworks of s:r1.r,ller tunnels but nothing BS gr~at in len~i;,h as the one M" rk;d on General Glrirk' s photo. G~neral Clarlr P sk<"ld General Gn,llov'nY to pr,j_ve him an estirl',te of how 1"'lany bri.~l'ldes would be n~cessary to rush forward froT"! Hanf;!1P n I s Hill on th"- Monastery to seize that ob,iective. Gen~ral Cl11-rk Pt the time stated that he did not have the r<"linf'orcenents to do it, but he was curious to have Gener['!l Grillm11a71 s est4,.,r,te of how rir,ny [1oditionA.l troops would be n'."~Cessar:1.r to rush forvmrd. Ge'Yl,,,rrrl G.9JJ_01.7r,_y estiry,ted thrM brj fV1des. Th~ group of r;~nerals f:1 nally S".lpr'rf-'t~d into a few sr1Pller groups and ciscuss"':!d w 4 th eri.ch oth"lr their -riarticulRr front. GenerR.l ClPrk r,ov(')d fror:1 on~ C'roup to another li st"'nin1;, and on sone occR.sions P skin0' nertin~nt t1Ue8tions as to conditions und~r thl'lir personal co.,,.,,..,~_ nd. G~n~rPl Clrir'l!: m:mpA.rod the New ZeolP.nders and the Boche to two heA~rr,reight fir~hters in the ring, both ~o-;g;r, with edth"!r one in a position to lmoclc out the oth,-,,r. · Genern.l Freyh~rg irnriediPt"!ly reacted to this ancl sr-i.id thRt he nj dn 1t consider th~,t his troops -rrere f:'"I'ogiz:r y~t flnd thPt in his opinion the attack should continue; that the present sitmition di(l not seen hop1>3less to him in the least. Gent':ral Cln.rk left the !\Tew ~e11.land OP and, P c~oripanied by Lt. Col. Drarer, proceeded to tre vicinity of' the bridge at Cassino to l';"'t a close viewv of cond:itions in the to''m. The Ger"1,-ins were sh"lling thl'l brid1;e 1uite heavily and its A'1Virons. lifter about 15 "1inutes G,m~rnl Cbr'k n.nd Colonel DrRrer returned to the Fifth Ar'ly CP. A conf"'lr~nce hr-id b~en CE'.ll•'!d today b;r Gen,~ral A.lexr,rn'1er, P s e.nnounced in Cable CGS 300, to be h'\ld at the Fifth llrrw C0"'11"\And post, to deterr1in"l v•hether the attack on Cassino .••.nr the ;1onasterv should be continued or ebrmdon':'ld because of' the strong Gcrl"lnn oprosition 17.ct vdth. At l1mch today General ClPrk entertain~d Gc:n'"rP 1 Juin, Gen';ral Carncnti l'lr and Colonel Kar~ncr~r :in order to hRve A. chance before th!':! confer~nce to obtain th.,, v:i ':'lWS of Genor2.l Juin ::,bout thP- Cassino opcrrttion And its effect on the r"l~ li"lf of' the 3rd DIA. In a short tl1lk before 11mch, GeneirPl Cl;:,rl· nskAd General .Tuin to state frnnkl~r his :i neas on this snb_j,.,ct. Generri 1 Juin said thP.t in his _judr;1c1Ant the attack on Cassino WP. s rrovint; too costly and should be dropped �\ Gl I and in its stead a mP.neuver to the south of Crissino cihnuld be c~1 rr1n-d out PS soon as the Fifth Arn:r had occunied its n~w sector. In this we.y, GenAral Juin s~dil, the r(mt"'s bv whkh CA.s8ino is supplfod c ould be cut off rind the to,m c0uld be starved out . Generril Glr.r1r then said t½"t in his estimntion it wr-i,s quite likely thrit if tJ1 ,~ attack on Cnssino shoulcl be rlropped the Bri= tish would ask thrit the 3rd DU. r"')riHin in th~ l:i.ne instear1 of beinr; relieved 11.nd cor1e 1mder co-r"!rnand of' the '8i~hth Arny instl'JPd of the Fifth. Generri.l Juin <>t once th"t h"'! should rl'lfuse to serve under those circur1stri.nces ~nn th1:1t in his estiMPtion it ·•m.s i_nperPtive thn.t tl-i.e '3rc1 DIA be relieved 11t the ea.rliest possibl e mom~nt. GenP.rri.1 Juin arlcl"ld thrt nriturP.lly if it wns a case of h~lpinr; out with the services of I'!. T1ivision for A short tim~, J,-, 1"oul0 be thorom;hly coop"'lrri.tive, n°--id h~ reriliz~d thnt :i.f the Cassino atfa,clr ·1ere PbPndonc d the reli"'f of tl1"' 3rd DJA must be rlefcrr<'ld for A. rcncionr>ble time; but he had served under Gen~ral Anrlerson in the F"rst Arny in Tunisin nnd did not vrPnt tc hnve his Cory,s cut up and pnt o"' :.tt s~rve under the British F,j_ghth Ar,..iy in this therrter. General ClPrk snir thrt h~ was 1:;ratifi"ld to het1r this on inion of GenerRl Juin ' s; thPt h'?. had invited Gen~rRl Juin in order to obtain his ir'leas on th~ s11b,iect and th,-,t they were exrctly the se.:1e n.s his o"m Dnd thPt hi<, proposed to insist ''dth Gen~rnl Alexri.nder that the 3rd DIA be relieved, and thet it remin part of the ?ifth Arr-1y. I I Follo1Jvin»: lunch, the Fr"!nc}, officers Pnd Colonel Ka·1rierer left for their co,.,rirmd post, and the officers C811Ad for the conference gradunllY Psser,bled. GenerPl i\.leXA"lrler Prriverl r>t 1550 . There ,·,ere r-1rcsent b(':lsides Gen0r'11 Alex.,nder, General Clark, GenerPl T,~ese, Cornr-mndjn,<; the Eighth Arr,y, Gent'lrPl Herding, General ti'reyber1;, General Gruenthl"lr, GenerPl Lemnitzer, Gen~rrl i"alsh (Chj_ef of Staff of GenerP 1 Leese), GenerA.l Kir 1<:man, General Tate nnd General Bra nn . At Genert1.l Uexrmrler 1 s request, Generr>l Prcyberg stated his r,rASl'.'lnt situ11tion . He said that he had six bA.ttri.lJ.ons of the New Zeri l<Jnd D:ivision in Cassino tovm . The rpj_lror>d station vms actually held by the 78th Divi 9 ion. Resistance, hO''.Tever, WPS continuini:; at the westerly edge of the town, and Pt the cliff free be~rond it. The;r hnve trdrnn fror, 200 to 300 rr:isomrs out of the town, and Gen0rP.l Freyber1; thinks thrit they "lust be gainine-r, access to their positions by tunnels . The comnanding officer of the bntt2lion now attecking the Conti n"'lntal Hotel says th2t ho can not R,'Ul"_ rrintee th"t he will hnve th".l hotel toni!t!'ht or tnriorrow niF,ht, but fAels ver~r hop~ful of taking it. The New ZealP.nd Corps ha s thus far h,,d 1400 casuAlti~s. Yesterd0.y th,n,:,r had 120 casueltfos j_n six brittelions, 1. hich Genern.l Freyberg did not constcler large . General 1 Alexander re"'lnrk!!ld thrit jf' we CAn k~ep pic'ldng at the eneny for 24 or 48 hours he T"W -v co llapsA, "rhr,reupon Gener;, 1 Freyberi; stated tlv1-t the Boche was becoming short of food and "'"' s in a v~rv diff'ic11lt -position. Generri.1 Clr,rk then st11ted tho.t h8 hn0 felt discourne;cd this rnornini:; ~mtil hn talked to General Freyberg' s officers on his visit in the Cri.ssino aree. . l\fow he hns becoMe encouraged and said thnt h'3 -reels thi-i.t no 0ecision should be mane today to -rull out. GAnerAl Leese stated thnt he wrs or thA sry•e wriv of' thinking. Gen"lral AleXRrider then said thnt he felt thrt jt, ~ws unw·i se to call the attack off toc18y. He felt that thP, situr,tion should be reviewed PJVery '24 hours in order to permit a decision on thAt snbj'l)ct to be made. Gen~rP..l Freyberg then said that he "rould 1rno'7 by 1000 tomorro•rr whPt his siturition "'-'ns, flnd GenerAl ClPrk sPid thP.t after he hPd ta.11<ed wi.th Gen~rRl 4'reyberg in the r1orn1nr: h"l would tf'llephone GcnnrPl Alexonder . GenerA.l J\lP.XRnder then rois~rl tbA 1_11".lstion of' t 11e relief of the 3rd DIA which Gl:"lnerAl Clri.rk h;id discussed r,t lunch witJ-; GenGrt1.l Juin, r>nd, ri.s he.d I I �been pr~clict~d, r1~ntioncd the difficulties of' 0~ett 4 n1; thcr, out. Gen9rPl Clar1c innedfotely stressed the length of ti "'1 e thPt the French hr>d been in the line r 1.d the ir,n,Cr"ltive necessity thPt they be relieved nt tbc ePrlie st po,rnjble nor-ient. G~nernl 1\loxanrler was "'lvirl~ntlv imrressed with this view, r,no st;:,ted thr>t h0 would fr1,.,edint"!!ly tPke up tho question of f:indin1; sone Division which would be used to relieve the Fremch. Gcnerr,l Leese undertook to studv the qu"'!stion nt once. 11 There was then sorie discnssio11. of air supnort as the Cri ssino oper..,tion pro.gressed Pnd of the continued dropping of suppEes. GenerP l ClPrk sent for Genernl SPvill~ rind, followin~ th0 0 cr"rture of Genr)rn1 AlexPnder, G")n~rals Snville, Cl..,r1,::, Gru8ntr'1r P 1d Brann di scusscd nt so"lc length the n0cessarr A-ir support for the continu0nce of the Cn.ssino or8ration. 1 General S,ciyille then left i'nd GenerA.1 Clnrk at once notified General .Juin thnt the nttnck on C,?ssino wri.s to continw, subject to ra r"lvi-:m tomorrrn"T. Barl; r;r in t},e afternoon, durinl his !Y'nversntion ?jth Q;-morol .Juin, Gr:meral Clrirk ni':'lntj oned to him th~ fr.ct thr, t he wr, s r:i v; ng serious conversP tion to us:i.ng two of the thrAe c0nhPt tew1 s of th~ 3L;th Division to join in the ".lttaclr on Monaster7 Hill fron Hill 591 because tht'.l troop:~ of the IndiRn Divj_sion n.ppoared to him to be lackin~ in dash and jnj_tfative. 1 The fo11owim; cs.ble WP.s received toda;r frors Gr:m8ral D~vers: RrJ 67311. l11'ThRt j s vonr estimnte of Brig. Gen. Raynond S. McL9.in, 45 Division, rts nble prospective Division Co'7m1nder for OVF:RLnH.D? On"l VTP;T or nnoth<"Jr '7ashin2;ton has received very fA.vorablc r3ports r<"JgArdins hj,.,, but not5 ced he was not given the Ii-5th Division on }.'iic'kl1Aton 1 s withdrawnl. 11 General Clark today received the fo1lo"7ino; llT'preci;:-,tion of the enemy situntion in Co.ssino fro~,, Brigadier A:irey, G"!lncrel Alexander's B.G.S. (I): "l. The cnermv hRs so far left the defr:mce of thl"l CASSPTO nreP to 1 }lara Div. 3 Para Rer,t is responsjbl:'l for th"'l defence of' tho town and MonPsterv reinforced hy the Pi,ra M.G. Bn, th"3 Fern A/Tk Bn, I Bn l Prora Regt and II/:U5 G.R., i.e. a totPl of seven bns (but the M.G. ,,nd ~/T1( Bns were probably rath0r under strength at th~ tiMo tre battle began). 4 Para Regt ls hold511.~ f'urther West hut S"1e:1s to hnve sent its II Bn to tho assistance of 3 Regt. It should be noted that th0re hns been onl;r one SJ"rill inf re~nforcerient (i.e. II Bn 115 a r~hAsh of II Bn 129) and that this wr1s not sent from re servo, but 111,,rely sidestop:red frol"1 South of the LIRI where no at ts ck was ta1dng r,lace. 11 2. 'l'he SUC'~ests that base his reRl latter vlith a fEtct thnt the i")neny hRs not sent r 11y furthm~ re:inforcen~nts he int•~nded only to rlela~r as long 2 s possible in CASSINO and oefence on the AIOLF PITL1i;R Line. He has probably r~£Jnn~d the fornPtion brought up from the 14 Arry area. 3. Th8 prrncbuti~1ts hr.vti defrmded and count:1r-attackec'l w~ry stubbornly but ti,ere i::i s<r~ evidence thEtt tr>ey are i'.;'TO"ring wc11k,r. Alread~r by 10 March cnsualties in CASSrTn WAre reported as 11 very hir;h 11 • On ?O March one Gov was reduced to one officer r>nd thirty !"len and another to ten ncn with on~ LMG A.nd three tom.my-!;1._ms withont 8.l"iT"!tmj_tion li,s:kimr, for snake-cover and 11 �perrd.ssion to withdraw. Th11 G~rrrPns were b,~ginninr; on 20 I1JPrch to tiilce 11, pessiT11~_stic viewr of the situ-"tion as the tanks were reducing thedr strong points on~ by one. (They stil1 think, hovrnver, thet they hold Pt •• 193). ). tt 4. The course of events seer:1s to be thFLt when tl1e attack stPrted the ene"'1;7 were prepared to give up CASSIN() after a '.'ltubborn resist.<mce and 11dthdraw to the ADOL't'i" HTTLSR line; when tlv=iy S8"1 their defence was being '!'lore successful thnn they :first expectecl they decided to hang on and trv to restore the situntion by local counter-attAck, and thrct no,rr they Pre h1mging on in th,:; hope throt we '7ill ~i,,e up first. In spite of its fierce resjstnnce and outstandini~ tou!Shness, 1 Para Div is certrdnl:r now ,,cry ,reduced in strength and must be r;ettin1; tired. Th~y cannot be exp0cted to continue indefinitely· if we go on dev"'lloping the strength of our thr~e availabb divisions against then in thoir pres,"lnt state. "It is true thRt they are now receiving r1ore arty and ..,,ortar surrort than before, but this c~m only be Vl"lry s'"1all co17pared with our large resources both in runs and armrunition. 5. In cimclusion, tri(iref'ore, I feel thrt nssm'ling 1rrc continue to ntta.ck with the suynrior resources 1,,liich n.re awdlBblt':J to us, the Gerr0 n.n 1 Para Div is fe,cing the a1tcrmtive of n.~struction or ,_,r:ithdrai:<ml. 'Ve hP ve alre'ldV sho'm that (up to last ni~ht at lenst) there vras no indication of it beinr: reinforced and the enemy can hnrdl:,r brJ expected to allow his best di,rjsion to be~ dAstroyed and at tho SD''le tj ,.,c los,~ the position. On the other hand it must nlso be re!"'e""lbered thE't the enen;r rill be quick to take advnntai;e of n.ny s111;11 of "maknAss on 01ll' part in order to regrdn the initiAtive." 0 * * PR8,SF.'TZA]'.m--MlL'lC:R 22, 1941~--/\.t ocno tl1is norninr;, 11.fter ta1dng CA.re of urgent ad,..,inir:itrntive "'!2tters, General Clark, 1:1.ccomprnicd by Lt. Col. Draper, ,;rent for,wrd to the ?1st Tl!ew Zeeland Battalion Rear CP nbout 1,000 yards south of Cassino bridr,e. Visibility vms poor, due to nist <>nd Rr1oke. The f.Prty th<m proc1'eded to the co1'1r1ri,nd rost of' the 5th ~Jei,r Zealand Brigade, nnd GenerA.1 Clark discussed the Cassino situetion with BrigRd:ter Burrows. A. Gerrian t Hnk, intAct w7th crew, W,9,S found in the rubbl"-l of Cassino, r,uch to the forward ell"lr,cnts 1 Rrtrprisc,. It 'l'T!"S tnken 1mcler fire n.nd destroyed. The s:itu;-,tion in tho town was not definitely h-no•m, so the Gen0rel nnd his y,nrty :r1ov'9d to the 2nd 1'Jew Zealana. Division OP north of' Ccriraro '"Ihere the situPtion was discussed with General Parkinson, Co"'ln.and:ing the ::>nd New ZePland Division. G~neral Fnrkinson thought it best to continue the attn ck 2s planned for Rround noon tbat day. The JX:1 rtY then proceeded to G"'lneral Fre;1rburg 1 s Cori1"'1.ond fast , 11 Pre General Clark 1.unchAd H:1d discussed continuance of th~ ntti:rnlc. At 1?45 our artiller:,r opened up ,y-ith a violent bri1:;f µ.rt':rmration. .C3hortly thr.;rePfter ene111y l'jr A,Fr,eared over our rear areas. Our l"ntHnrcraft rencted i"J.Modfa_tel~r end sent up hcnrr f:ire. One Ger""'an r~lPnc r,rn.s seen p;oinr; d0 m. LPter, it wP·S reported thPt seven or ("!i ri;ht enemy rlanes were destroved. 1 General Clrrk And Lt. Col. Draper then return~a to tJ,e Fifth Amy Coml"'ln.nd Post wher~ G,".ln0ral Clnrk went i1"'l9Gd:iPt~ly into conJ'Arence icrj th GeY1.orril Gru~nt}1er. Dur:ing th/;) nftr-,rnoon G~norrll Cl:>rk work~d on Pdninistrntive nRtters and had ns his f;l..l8Sts for dinner t}1is evening Genersil Moran and Colorn=il Kio'"ell of �the 8igna1 Section. HDecisions r1pde at yoster(fr1yt s cnnferenc~ with Gen~ral Alexander required thAt I p;ivc hin n reco"'!J"l!">.ndPtion torlB;T as to thA oonHnuation of the Cr,ssino battla by the New Zealrmd Corps. In order to obfain first hnnd infornPtion, I nroceeded tn ili scuss th~ sjtuntion with Brig~clier Burro1"s, ConT1andj_ng tho }Tew zer,land 5th Br-i_1;arle; Hajor Gcnr;rnl nnrkinson, Corir:Rnrler of the ;)nd Nl"lw Zel:llnnd Db,1.si.on; r1~1.jor Gemrr,.l KeiC;btlev, Cor1r1,rinder of the 78th Division, and LieutenFnt Gen')ral 'G'reyberg. 1''hcreRs no clef'inite rrogress ru> s been nr1.de since yesterda:r, r 11 wr3re in f'~wor of crntinning the Pt tri.c k. Cn snnl ties were light in the Cnssino nrea 7~st('l)rday, m1mr)ering 73, a.s rerorted hy General Pnrkinson. An attack to clenr the slopes of Hill 1g3 wes ::icheduled for. 1100 1c!"ith heavy artillery surport. Farldnson felt this h,c,d good chences of '.=;uccess r'nd, when successful, '7ould cnntribute M.Ht~rially to the:ir position in Crissino. Freyberg reported tl:v t the troops on H11ns~mR.n I s Hill were stj_ 11 jn r;oorl heart and, althoug-h :r hnve no defj_nj_te feeling th0t greA.t i r,prove"'ent ,-r:i. 1]_ trko pbce liy our action, J concur in the r"co!'lnendPtion of these cor.."'11'1.ncl ers to oontinue t:r e attack for rnoth 0 r tmenty-four hours, for so ~'luch is rt st10ke. I ,;rive thjs :infor"~ation to Ge:mcral Alex::inder who herrtil;r concurr0:d :in F'c;T r,"co-c,r~end~ition. I then nassecl this "rnrrl. on to H'r"'ybn~g. He sRys he ,·-ill give it evE'!rything he hns e;ot. '7e hnve J~jd on a heavv ~ir RttacJr, but rue to tr..,"! disi:1ster to the plnnes on Pol'l.pei field b:v the eruption of Mount Vesuvius our air effort will be ~entl"T cnt do1.Mm. Th•:q r"!lport that ov~r 80 B-25 1 s hrive been dar~ar,ed or destroyed. It seems inconccivriblc, wHh this eruption tA]dnR' plnce in th"'l lrst week, tr'lt theY woulo 1 eave th,., nlnni;s in such nrox:i."1ity to Vesuvius. 1 11 ! hf'Ye indj_c:::it~a. above thrt I no not fee1 trnt tr is or~rl'1tj on 1·,ill be suc- cessful b:1r 01ir efforts r,J.on"' if th-~ ene 11y continues to r'"sist, nnd reLnforces , as be is doin:-;. P°o' 1cver, jntelligcmce inoic8tes tri,.,t he is not too h2rrY, thr,t he is h~1.vi'1.IY, her-v 7 losses, thnt h<"l hrs heavj l;r roinforc".d the Hitler Lin") so that the sj_t11ntion mny b~ 7_i1ce bro h~rnr;rr~j p;hts jn th... ring, both ."bout to topple ov~r. It ~n.y be tlint if we continul"l to nttnc1· a.t not too great expense for nbout th~ next 48 hours, we my succeed. n Th0 frriy Gor11Pnclf'lr today d-isprtchod t},c followim,· l.ritter to Lt. Gl"ln. Devors, Deput:r Suprc:1e 1Ulil"ld Cor:,,P.nd er: rtYour J_ritt"lr of lB MA.rch },p s been received. "I Pr pr<"lpnred to lo01F'l the VI Cor:rs 1•rith tri!'l 3rd and !~5th Divisions Rfter the Main Fif'th Ar"'ly fore,, hns ioincd up w:i th trio brjrlr,;ehead force. I undeirstr,nd thnt General Alex~mrler he.., s pr~pProd A tentat:i.v,, t,j ri~ table for tris rnnAuver and that 7011_ have a copy. I hA.vc not received a copy yc!t. My o··rn esti nnte is that we shall not be Rble to launch n coord:innted nttack bv the:: t"'O arnies until 11bout '1e.v lst. T believe j t ,7ill require at len_ '3t three, reeks befor~ w~ cnn reA ch the bridgehead force. Jf you them ad.d tl~ <3 t5 ""'" to f.;l"lt the VI Cor:rs out, A.nd a r ,rj od of rest nnd r~or1;13nizntion you vdll be vr,~11 into the su-,,,ricr, n"1d it r,ay bo too late to cnntribut"'- ""UCh to r,v1 ;;F.LnRD. Ho •revcr thn t is a natter beyond '1;f scope. 1 "I h~licvc yon nre mistri1zen in yo1rr •"!stin•1tA of B~rtholf. I con'·ider thRt he is rloin1; a eood iob. T'fhen ~rour l~tter arri vcd ~sterd;-1y GrnentJ1 ,1r h:1 d the �Chi~f nf Str>:f'f of' tb'l TI Corrs ch~c1< rrivPtelv nit½ th.e G-l's of II Corrs, 1/+th And 11Sth Divj sfons to nsccrtrdn ,,,.,i,_,..thnr nr not thE' ~rr,y G-1 s~ction nns i;ivinr; sati sfr:1~tory erv:i c~. ""ht"! rerort of 1111 trr"e G-1' s '7r s th,.,t th~ :,r"~r G-1 Section h::,s ,., s~.'J'\prithetic ,md~rstrnr1 in~ o+' the r"'rsonnel rrobl""-l"'S ,--;thin trc cl;visjon ,.,nrl is ril··,,,•rs "'ager to assist in th'"!~r s::ilution. Colon~l '3."ltzr,rin, ny PerutY Chi~f of Striff, ::ind en 0utst11ndi np; officl'!r, is consbntly on tr~ job su:r~rvisj nr; G-1 r,r>ttl'!rs f'or th~ Chief of St?ff. Fo-•<"ver, since vou h11ve .,.,"mti oned the '"latt"'r, T shn 11 b..., on t1-- c al~rt to ascertr'.in ,,./r'ether or not ne hnve a Feakness in the G-1 Section of 1 ich T pri not ermre. "I do not l-no'"' tr1' b",d.s of' :--ro11r belief thrt Bertbolf dons· not senri to be to ~lve •1011 correlct fi ';)ITes. I bel; ":!Ve th Pt your hen.dqu11rters is faMilinr ...,;th the !l.,ture r>nd sources of our reri odic rerorts, ri s rerresent1>tives of both yo11r G-1 nnd c:tntisticrl of'fices hr•ve hr,d occr, sion to ~o ov~r the,, with :r.w G-1. In A. l~tt"'r on l F"'brnnry 104/., Se1bridge ~P,ntion~d to Gru~nth~r sor~ nrparent incons~ st"'nci"!s in fj_n•nr~s ,,rhj ch w~ hnd .,.,irnishr!d, but these ''!~re exrlriincd in detail in (}ruenth"'r's repl~r of 7 Fcbrunr7 -inc ns fnr "'SI 1mo11 thcv ,·,ere rccept'!l<l ,, s correct. I do not lD7-oW o+' A.n7 oth~r instanc"s in ·JY1 icr our figur~s hAV1' b~cn sPid to b~ inl'ccurrite, l"nr1 J uncl~rc:;trnd th . . t S•wrbrid.'1'e oic not indicr>te di.ssritisf11ction "Tith the'~ jn his r!'!Ce'1t visit to this headqurirtf":rs. c1 ble 1 "You Mention th"' rl'riclity ·lith wJ, icr I rut r~rlr>cl'.'.!rimts into divisions i:1nd then ;,.,_to co,..,bat. 'l'hPt, of cours~, hns b"len neccssr·ry ~n th"' brid~P-rte"d and in the 14th Div1.sion vrrich r--ust f';O to J\nzio nt once. Had ·,~e benn "bl"! to secure rerlri cer,ents wh~r r:re ost n~~ded tr>e"", thcv would hrivc been n ble to sr~nd a rea"'onable yicr;od of ori1mt,,tj_on before s~einP ..,ction. The r~rlr-ccr"ent situ"'tion no", 7 ooks t-;oor, but it h::, s b~en fpr fror S" tis fr, ctory in th"' rr st. "You ...,ention b"i'1."' shodc.,d ':7ith t}11" sl.onnl'>SS of the r,ttn c}r • I r,r too' but probabl:r not to the "'xtl:!nt thrt you nre, f'or I h:·we se~n for tr., :re <1t '"!icrht 11onths, r>ncl hric'! il"'lpr ,sscd 1rron .,.,.,, thri re.,.,sons f'o:r tb"l slowness of om~ rrogress in JtPJ.y. The:r Pre: 'T'errrdn, YTePth~r, cr,.r,:;fnlly :rrAff'rcr c4ef~nsjv, 1-oc::itions in the r10 1 mtrdns, rcterdn,;d anr, '"cll-train,.1d rmer,y troops, ;;rossly in"derp1rte ...,e."'ns nt our oisr,osr,l wr51') on th") offensiv"!, witr arnrox:i,..,rtely (>.qual forc0s \ to th~ dl')fender. I hPVe scf'!n, fror, actufll exy,criencc on l"!any occ10sions, th~ 1 air feil ropel'l.te<lly to rlrive c ,.,t-:;:r-r1:in"'d in_f,.,,ntrv out of n~frmdl'lr locPlit5 "!s. You J:,r,ve 'Jerm it dA"'1onstr..,ted at Cassino. Plrnt;r of Gernan in:";-,ntry re"'l<iinnd in the to"m, " ith tt=1nl'r.;, .,,f't~r t 10 c borib'i.n~. I :F1 not sAtisf'ind ,,,ith tho ''PY ll'r ... yberg hes h,.,ndlec, th':! si tuPtion, but you nuc:t undcrstP.'1C1 the deli er c:,r 17ith vrhi_ch ::r Must ne<il. 1 rith hi.,.,, r'h1c to -instructions T hrive received rersom1lly on this M 0 ttcr fron General ~lexr,nder. l;'reybcrP, hPs 1,-,cked ng~ess:iv~n~s~, and I hnv"' so -inoicPt')d to !\.lcxr-nr er. Fe hPs br-,.n rc1uctl'lrit to errloy th'°) troops !1V•15 lable to M.T'I, ,-,11 of t'Thich ',"?r~ Br:i tish. T h~ve dPil;r oontacfod hi" And 11rgcd tb" use of "'ore rrerr ~AP 11:ind troops in the to,·'11. , l'l.n Attr c1r b:r the Indians fror.1 the north surport"'ld bY tri.n 1 ·s "'nd the cnri,.,.; t,.,ont of tl e 73th Di vlsion to . ush rronnd th~ brise o.i:> the h:ill. 'J'onn of th~se "ere 11tte"1T'ted, cxc~rt rfter t,-ro days' dP-l11y noditionRl Nl"lW' 7:enl::,nd troops "mre used in tho village. 1 0 0 "You Mention ti,"' t t 'hP, G"'rririns ~°-""" to bP, P ble to tr k.-, it ; n r bi,.,. n:,..y. 'T'her._• hf-Ive done so to -ri.y 1,:no=l -1d~"- f' or rr> n•.r '"'Onths r nc rr , c ortrd.nl~r c oin~ 1.t :ln Cassino and h"ve nl.P c~d therf'? the 'Jr-st rind tr"' riost I'1.l/"f,"d troops nt trci r d; srosril. In riv opinion, tho 2ttc'lck by the Nevr Zl'l~lRnd Corr::i "rith ti.e r0stric- �tion of trc use o-<' t'1c 7gth f'ivision rs jT1J'oMc1 b,r t\J.l"Jxnncer , ,-,e rr, not ~ing to siicceecl in cRptur;np; t h':'! Mo:nrstl"Jrv but wjl]_ prob:=ibly hoJ.rl thP, tovrn , the raiJ.ror,d 8tAtion t0 the soutr rind h,.-, ve r- snrll briclt;"he:=id ov".lr the Rapido 'R.i ver to fr,d11 t et-, future operntions b~r the Rin;htr ,hrriy. This of' course is not s;e,tjsfri ctorv to Me . to "Ar:i p;J.nd Grittenbl'lr,:;~r is b11:i -n"" f'ittcd out i:-rith n strff . et hi as s0on ...,s vou cnn nrike hiri aw•ilRblc . T ,~ill be glrid 1':rith r ef8renc" tr, rw conversntio1'1 1:ith Bull rbout fl new !)iv:ision Cor'"'1::inder . Hull ~ 1'1d-i catcd thrit Gemern 1 •i,,_rshall hno s0~e Division Co,.,,,.,Rncl ers irho, he 'l''A s f'·0xious to tret into conhnt rind ~ sk"<l if :r coulcl us~ on!".l in ~m unoerstudy cPraci tv. T s11id "v~s" . It :is of no nor,~nt to me . "I fL"r :into tho ber-ichhel'l<l yester01:i;y tc, c eek on tre ~iturition there . The li""itl'.'ld ob j octiv" ntt ...,c1' schedufod +'or th~ 10th ,ws crnccll ,cl on r,y ord3rs upon tn'1 re co,..,.,l")nd<>ti.on n-P "'rnscott , d-10 hod to altAr his r,lnns for tr~ rittri.ck h·· scd upon Ms conclusion thr,t the 1st British f'iv:i s:i.on Jpck~d th:~ cnpbi 1 it;v of its offensive iob . t-tc fnlt, n.nd I "~Md, th"t he nrs nttric1dn~ ,-,;th rirrroxi,..,r>tely even nnr,bers , throu"'11 tl,e on'1n, Pnd thrt he ·,roulrl. hnve h ,rivY CRsnrltfos •~:bi.ch 1"oulrl he :i.nsi 'T'11.ificr>nt . Tt •ould not trlr.., nn:,, 11rtill'"'r:.r +'ire of'f of nny pRrt of trc be."c'hAP.d . "L~ rir~ r,ovin-, tlie 14th Divisio"Yl in , bce;inn:i.n,... toc1Py . It ':i 11 Bll be in in t::m d11ys . Then,-,~ c<>n rotate son~ troops th11t rirl"! t1red . Unl oad:i_nr is ,:oi11"' well. I ra~ O"'ntinuin:' ··ii.th r-:r rilan to r-int PnothAr Div:ision in at a lnt~r t iriA if the r>nC"'Y situ..,tion ,iustifi~s . Tfoirever, 11.lexrYP ~r told r1e yesterday thn.t he T"'P '3 T'UttinP' out instructio11s f'or t:r~ det.., il"d r.tt'l c1rc bv both cle "'!cnts nf t:rc F5-f'th and ,:;_;ir;hth .J\.rr ies . 0 "101,mlJ. R.oo'\cs told Al th:'t you 0btain~cl t1-i., i rprcssion fro:-- G~nern 1 T:'r,.,,yb""ri; thnt ',e hri<l " ti"Me schedule to join un 'TI. th t I'! briogehcPcl forM by Mnrch ?Jrd . nf'litb'"'r .,.,., stnf'f nor J ..,t llny t;...,'" "!ntertninr,d such optiriistic hop0s . It is 1truc thrit G~neral Fre:,rberq; rad r;rert strnt8~ic p]pns for ru::;J--inp- througr to ) Roi,8 in a hurrv but P.Ven h~ rerlized t}-•r,t hn wr s induli;ine :in 11:i r;hf'u1. tr inkin~ . t1 rther i Mrortant "lssnges of the dry follow: Hf), At.I t o FI,A 1 1B<), rcrent<'lcl Fi"th Ar'fl:r. RH SD 601. nrt is ess,,,ntinl thrit th., RC,,., o:" L. D!'M in Corsicn. n.rrive in .lr-ples hv 1st April. Since rres,~nt 1;-<'t i"' n.ot S'.tPfici~nt to "Ssur~ tr·s, FiY~ ~r.,.,y r.Ps ,...,~l"'"d thPt h"'cs.11se of n:l cessit~r, th ,:T [l"t'e r"'~T'"rl"!d t o r~lr-rn.se i.-r::iricd:irtel_ ~7 r;ht L'"'.Ts :f'ror> tr~ ~nzio run f'or ,r one t 1 1rn 'lTritmd erich . Tlc:is" rrrrinr•~ ,~ctrils. This =u'1t not :i.nt"!rf..,:r-e ,~it}, rove of 1/;, T)iv i c;fon nor return of 50/;, FrcJ-,t RCT . t1 F'r o,., Devcr<1 t o Cl "r1, . ~M '17311. 111•rhf-,t ; s 7O,1r "'Jt;~r,te o:"' Brir"c :i.l"!r Gr:-ner:c>l R.rwr,onil S . r1cL,.,:i.n , L.5th "livi.sio"l, r,s rbl" ros:rectiv"'l f:i.visio-n Co--r-1ri11der for n 111i-;R,Tr"'1.D? rn"' H'"'T n"t' rn0th"1r, •-r..,sr:inp-ton hrs rr?c~iv,.,,d vJr- -"MTOr"hl~ r~rorts re~crn.-i.n~ hh• h11.t notice h, -.,-, not --;iven th"1 !.. 5th 1Jivi"ion on Mi,'r!leton 1 s ,-;1 thdra'"ml . " G"'n~ral Cl"r1, 1 s r"'rly t0 th~ ,, bov"' is ,, s follo···s: ~n ,S,SJ.4 . 11 I tl-·:i.n!r 'R"t' ;,.,...,di.11r Gl"'n·~"t'tl Hc L..,in, 45 n; y;_.--:i on , ,·rill Mr1rn :: -:0od f'ivision Cor-ri,,nc er in c o"'!brit. T rlic'l n0t "'jv~ hi:, th ':J Division -c• en Mir r'l"lton l~:f't bec~,Fe i;;r ~l"ls ,...,[' s '"'Or~ r:~s"'lrv:inr "'111 iM iedi:•t~l•r ~v-dlnbl"l . 1Tr,11r,v~r , s•rh')n T<;· "'l~c; b~C~"'1~ siclr a 1 �short tir'l~ :"F.;0 in th~ brir"'l'3he..,r P"1r j t 1ook~cl P'3 tr 011';'!' he ni.n:rt b"' inc.'.'raci-\ t?t~a for f'urth"r dutv, T hnd COT""' tr the ccncJ usion that McL..,:in <::hould ,o;et the Di.vision. "P'heri,ris I ,-,ould hrte to 1_ose McLnin, I riro 1villin~ to l~t him go for this nese!rV~d pro,..,otion. 11 Cable from HQ AAI to Fifth Ar y . R".f RE/166. "'R.oA d fo,.-,,_p,,lii - S0 ll"lrno cinder covered. Scafati tJocera 6 inch to 1? inc},. "'Tocer·:i CP~TP 4 incr to 6 inch. C,9VA Sril'"lrno ? inch to 3 inch. Rord fASs?ble only for jo~ps. Diversion po,..,s:ibl~ SAlerno t\.vcllino - NPrlr-s. 11 General GlPrk tociA.y "IT'ot~ to CG, 1-JATOlTSA, rccor-i ,ending the pronotion of Bri<;. Gen. John li. 0 'Daniel to Maj. Gen., nnd the follo 1.' inr nnn~d Colon~ls to th~ r['n1< of' T'lr 4 r. Gen: Cnl. u,,rr-r B. Sh,,rt'lr-in, Col. C<1.rl C. Brn'k-, Col. Urb..,n 'J:iblo rnil Gol. R~uben l-T. rruc1r~r. * * * rB.r:S1~•rzA.'TO--fifl''R.CTT ?J, 104/+--Gcn"lr<>l Clrrk rcs~rv--d th ""orninc: +'or ,r1r-,i.nistrrtive ""nttcrs and f'f;'Oin.+,n,..nts. ft 0015 Pri!lcc Hr:,berto F-id Ms rcsr>"Cts rnd rm·rincn +'or rbont on~ ho11.r in tr, Gen.err>l 1 s ven. At 1115 Grnerril Coult r, Co..,T'r'1d·'nr-: th"'l ~5tl1 f\1.v:i.sion, ,.,1--,icr is "'OOn tc b"lc0-)"' rrrt of t"'"J .,.,jftl--i ~ !'"Y, I'"-: d J-,-i s rr"Jsr,P-cts P'1r' con+>-,rr~d for 1/i ,.,j_nutes ,,,.i_tr n~nl'\rr 1 Clrrk conC1'r'1in ~ 11se o-r t e d 4Vi"jon, r,rrt of' Flier hr~ p1r-0::ir1:v 0rr1v~d in Ttrily. tt tl-\-:i ~11.,1 o-<' Ms confnr-,ncf" "5tr G"l'1~rcl Cl11r1r, r~ rl";r-dnryc1 +'or l1~ncr rnc'l l,ft 11.t Pbout 1130. Snff--r f'ell (1nr-1nr.; Most of' t,._,,_ ""'orn:in";, but it r,,-,.lt"'!d soon ,-,ft.-.r hi.ttinr t n ::-round. 1 H~"'S f'ro,., t},,ry Grssino -r'ront ,....,s ;n('lr;f'-:,,it~, :-ind G~c1.rirril Clrrk refrnincd +'ro!"! goi.n,.,. +'0r "ard, 1mo,·r-in,.,. thr+, Grmnrr,l Alcxrintler rTa.s ,,:tsitinr; G~n~ral Ti'reyb~r~ "nd rmnld retnrn ~ ith a cccision conc"'Jrninl"' ,··!1 cth0r or not to continue th~ attrck. 1 /1.t 1'345 G~n"'lral Ho1s1-rorthy, n'.",r Co..,,.,rrider o+> t e 4th Jndi8n I'ivis:ior, c;:il.l,'ld on G""n~r,,1 Clr-r'k. G•w~r..,1 TTnlsvrorthy is r11rlPc:i11..,. Genr"Jr..,l Gr-llo'''r;r, .,.,,10 ·•rs r1!t i"l t"',.,-rorrril~r ,·+".ln the old Division Co,.,~1!'.'ndor hrd his foot blo'·m of'f bir f' box min~. Gc11err-1 G1Pr 1: crnt~nu'"'c1 tr -i.ft"lrnoon ..,nc~ took P short '""O 11-c. .,,j_t]-, prl•in;"'trr>tive r-ntt~rs c'!11rjng At l '70() f'o11:r Brr zilfr '1 o-''fic~rs "rro hn.r b"len servi n- 1rit}i th(") Ferilriu~rtP.rs pj_+'th /\rrw CfH11") to F''r thl"Jir rt";lf"lCts t,, G~n ~rrl Cl.rr1r rr~ or to 1-,1:ivjni=; for Al-::t~rs, 'Ji-. ,r~ the7r ,dll pr".lrrre to rMf-"live ri B:rt-zilirin Corrs tlirt ,-ill rirriv~ in ~forth ~ fr:i CP rrithjn trie n ,xt f 'r ...,,mtrs. 1 At 1R1O r.~n~rrl A. 7 ""xnnr1 er, l'lCCCH'1T[ln:i,~d hv G"'....,A,r~l L,.,,-nj_tz")r, cr""'e to th'! Co,,,,.,,. ..,,.,,.,,d;n~ r.,..nr>r~1 1 s h t r:1.rl vmt -lnto ir"'0d:l:--t~ ccri:"cr1mce -":1th r.e 1,rrls Clrirk and Grnenth--r re7rdinr tJ:,n n ct ion ,-,t C0 ssino. Shortl7 riftcr G<1ner~ 1 Alexnnclcr I s ar:rivl'll, (}en-;r:-:,1 LA.esc, CoM- :-,ndinr; 0-"lner..,1 o-<' "":i ,.,ht!~ Arr''", rnd on~ of his staff off; cr"Jrs rir~jv,.,d to r,rrt:i cir-=it" in tr,~ ,1; ,cussion. At 1010 th·, crn-"'~r~nc~ '"n 'ed, P'10 C11'!nerrl Clr•rlr !">'7.(~ hi~ Ch;"lf of Stpff', ,r;t:r Pi.res, rl")rrin"ld jn t,hc con:f'ercnce roori p110 discussed ~vents ,.,} ich hrd tr.,,nsr,irt"ld durinr- tre 7-Pst hour. 1 0 cuss ,Aft"'r '"'1.lf'f ir ('.,..,,~r."l Glrr 1r dociderJ. to t~lrC' rt brief "Trll• r-nc' tc f'1irtr9r r1is'"1 7 tr Gen~rPl f1r, 1 "lntli"'r th') d~vclorr"1nts of the day. �"It b~CP!"'~ rrrnr~11t tori~v, in r,y conversFtionn ,fith General "F'r'"'ybl"lrg, thnt t)1c rre,.,. 61"lB1Pnd Div-l <Jio"Y'I h,d ,hot itP bolt, PS ""!11 . s the Inrin 11 Division, and thnt the British Hir-;h Co,..ri!'_ncl '7PS r~luctE1nt to t 11ro= the '7Sth Dj_v:5.sion into tr~ C" ssino r>ren . -Pr-~yb~rg nnnur-1.ifiedl~v reco-:yv:mchd thrt t -i attac1· cense • nd ' th1:1t the Ind; "'DS on Hnnf!mnn ' s Hill bl'>, '"7 thrrnv'TI. T [1 r-reec' b11t 1rno1•rj_n..,. th 0 t Alex..,.,11rler ,rras ~nrout" to tl is hencrpJ.rirt~rs, T told li'rnyb,.,rg thr>t I ''Ould conflrn T"'Y orcl ~r to hi to withrr~r t}11"l Hanr>;nA.n I s Tiill fore"' . llAll"lXFlnrler r1 -id not cor,."' to tH_s hePr-1qu,..,rt~rs hut •-r,mt clirect to ?r<~yhl"lrg and S"lent th~ dnv. n"" r'°'turnnd hP-re c1t 1810 Pnn cr,lled r> ,, t'!tin~ r" t:r Leese 11.nd .,..,ys"llf. He hr-tl')c1 to coll o-ff tho rittr,ck but f0lt th,,.,t tl•e Mew Zer,lr>n°ers had l--1'1Pde no rror;rcs<J rn(1 hnc no furt:rl"lr off~nsive riction . Fe 1meTT tris to hr, the cr>S/'>, vrith th"'l 4tr Tnd:i.en nivision. J n•1 convinced trat t}1 e rJew Zealnn( ers hr>Vl"l n0t br,en -fi..,htj_nr_; tonri cj onsly j_n t 0 ci.ty, but I ,,rpnted tr"' r~co,...,.,,,~ndr,tion to ( cr-i lJ. ot'f the f1ttack to cor,P'J fro,,, the British, 11s [111 troops involv d ,., re Bri tish . "It ·ras rlecidl',ld by A1c,a.,nrl~r rt tonipht 1 s :"~"ting thrt the Hrn,.,,-irn 1 s I-fj_ll eroup would b"l =ithdre,m but if rossibl~ to r,aj ntnin n S'7P.11 rost in thr>t Prt"'P; thrit Hill 1113, the rP "lror>d strition ""nd t},"" -rr3s"mt line in Cr>ssino he ,.,.,intriined; th::-t t_ l"l t 1.rnov~r fro!"' Fifth to T<~j_~hth Arr1fos ,ould tr1r~ rlnce irr .dfrtAly PS arrPno;n.d b~t ,Mn I.eese rinrl "1YS"'1f . ,.le heve rlecidcd thr>t tJ, is rrill tP1-c~ rl<>ce "t noon Sunrlny, Parch 26. Leese "'ill rut tho 78th Division in to reljeve the 4th Indian 1mcl th" /+th Brj_tish Division to r~li~VI" th~ '3rd DH. (Frt'.'lnch) . 1 1 "I l'T' ,-,or 11.nd ~ore convinccrl, rnd so is /\.lexander rind Lees~, tbrit the coriinr; bi? attrick of th!<) t .'"'o r-r,...,jes cPn not he riricle h~for'3 Mrq 1st ['nd tl·at ,.,h~n it does t111.-,,., rlricA, insterid of the T'ifth t-r~y exccutinfl' r subsi0i8ry role, it '"ill h1we to cBrry tr~ br>ll throu~r t} '3 nountnins r- s ·~w,1, for I ny, of the rlefinite opinion th,.,t the --r;;irhth Arrw vrill not ridvance throur;h the Liri Vri lJ.ev P-XCept as asqist~r~ b:,T the Fifth Arny attack. 1 1 "I hritc t o see the Cr-ssino c;ro ·r -flop . It has been ,, !"'ost difficult sHul"tion thr>t T h"'V'-' been in , due to the f,.,ct thnt r>ll troors jnvolv~d 1r·ere British , itJ.-, a British chrnn~l of corriand · ,xt ,nding -f'rom Uex->n<ler, in 'tany inst1:1nces, dire c t to "F'r~·rberg . The Ner-r ZePl.,.,nc'ers a.n<l TncHr•ns hnv"l not f0ught vrell . FreyberP-, T'l'ht1r~ri.s h~ is ti courp r,;cous nnr coor~rntive corrn;:i,nder, j c1 11oefully <foficient j_n j_nt~lli.<;enc~ . 'R"i.s nritisr suboroi11<"'tes do not --irlriirc his leadership, And it hPs b~en nn nnhapr,Y situ,..,tion since Alexrinrler crent~a 1-i'reyhJrg ' s rrovisionRl corps. '!;'re,rberP" is not 'l_llfllif'i--ir! to oorinanr it, nor fo~s he hPve the staff to i""rl"!M(•mt his in- tructions. r1y on~ ,·,orry is tho.t n,vers J-,,-,fl fr-il-id to portr"Y tl~~ trur, rictu:r~ to thf"-? r~orl<1 in the '.'lnr Deprrt~,cnt . In fret, I nn convinced 0f thnt . 1 0 "I p~, riost --inxious to "'tart th" r~ or~P11:ization , for J AM .ri cr,ns ann Frencl- toi:;et}l')r we vrill PdVPnce . " 1 pr, sure th<>t r-Titl1 the r �Two important messages of the day are as follows: Personal from Devers to CJark. RN l:?814. "Is Eagles still in cor1rn.and of the 45th Division? Is there any danger of his being removed bPcause of sickness? If there is a chance of McLain I s ComlTll'lnding the Division, Ms.rshall desires th::it he be consulted as to his rersonel rreference as to remrdning with the 45th or going to another Division in UK with view of commanding it." Personal from Clark to Truscott . RN 5719. "Inquiry has been received from War Department as to availability of McLc'dn to commtmd Division in UK. Before replying, tell me of EP.P-les 1 health. Is there nny ch1mce that Eagles can not continue on account of health? If so, McLain should be held for possible cor:imand 45 Division. If Eagles in good health, will recommend McLain for ill( assignment with view of la.ter comrianding a Division there." * * * PRESENZANO--MARCH 24, 1944--At last nj ght 1 8 mnet1 ne GenerAl ClArk invited General Alexander, ris aide, Ceptain Grjmsley, General Lemnitzer r>nd General Clark's British aid0, CPptain Lnmpson, to breokf[lst, and the conversation at the t,able centered around GenerAls Alexancer, ClPrk and Gruenther, who discussed mainly the rresent st~tus of the Italian ct:unpnign. At the completion of the breakfast Generfll Alexander, }-,is n:ide 11nd General Lemnitzer proceeded forward to the comJll..and post of General Leese and from there to General Freyberg 1 s Headqwrters. Before leavinp: the Fifth Army command post at 0950 from the landing strip, General Clark c:rent the early part of the mornj ng disposing of Bdmjnistrntive TTR tters in hifl vRn. The Army Comnander visited the 88th Division at its front ljne rositions on the left flank of the Fifth Army front today, making his first formal call on this Division since its arrival in Italy. Arriving Rt the 88th airfield, General Clark was met by l'Tajor General Sloan, Division Commander, and after visiting the command rost he went to the command posts of all three regiments and conferrPd with the Regjmental CommA.nders. Although the R8th Division hr-is been in tJ-ie line for approximately two weeJrs, jt has seen little nction, gj nee it is in a sector thr>t h1rn been extremely quiet. The Division hns had an.excellent oprortunity to become indoctrinnted into battle action because of the ros~ tion j n wM ch it VTP s plnced. • · Flyinr b"ck to his commPnd post by cub Generrl Clark reached Iresenzrrno at 1?30 and immediP.tely 1"ent to luncb an0 discussed l'is trip vri th General Grnenther during the rreal. The nfternoon vas spent in conference ·i:i th ,mrj ous HeF>drpmrters Section Chiefs and in disposing of vital paper 1·rork. At 1620 General Clrrk flew· over Nnples and around tr e slopes of Mount Vesuvjus so hP- could view f'rol'l the air the damage caused by the volcano's eruption. After this aerial reconnnissance of the volc1mo rrea, General Clnrk landed Pt Car,odicMno airport, }Japles, �where he WPS net b;v his cn.r r'1.d tflken to "'faples . He had dinner vrith three of his Hest I oint classmPtcs - Colonels Tully, M2.rkoe and Nygaard, returning lrter in the evening to his cor,mand post . Following are the importnnt messages of the day: ersona.l Truscott to Clark. R:T 1259 . "Mess~t=;e from FRO, AAI, #783 to PR g, received 2350 yesterdry, states CPssino battle has been called off but withdrawPl will not be completed for 4~ hours and thAt the w~thdrawal of units from 435 and 202 "'ill be difficult 11nd will be made !'lore so if any intention reaches enemy before completion, also states this to be off record background . I have received no word f'roM you relAtive to calling off Cassino ba.ttle and aJ11 surprised thr>t stAff ch:mnel should receive such informHtion before I do . · Request you inform me whether or not TRO message states facts . Termination of battle under circumst:rnces indicated hRs serious implications here . " Persorn:1.l Clark to Truscott . R'l 6701. "I am ristounded thrit AAI FRO is communicating direct with your fRO and have rrode ~trong representations thPt in the future all such communic11tions will be sent by my Headqw=irters . Reference your 1259. I issued instructions that j nformation concernj ng Cassino battle be sent you last night but through staff error you were not advised. Only change in battle of Cassi no i"' withdrawal of troops from hill · 435 , which we hope to accomplish tonir,ht. Their strength has bP.en reduced so as to make an attnck on the monastery impracticable. Hill 193, the rf'ilroad station Rnrl the bulk of Cassino will be retained with the troops as now disposed . Effort to eject Boche from his remaining few locnlities in Cassino will continue. Impetus of the attack Las died down due to exhaustion of troops ·nvolved. Do not understand the serious implications which this has on your situation. Wish you would be tbink.:.ng of an eRrly attack on Cfaterna in order that '.',e ray d-iscuss it when -I come up in the next day or two . Th::nning out on your front would appear to make such an attack practicable." * * * FRESE1'JZAN6--r,iRCH 25, 1944--After cispatch:ing important adm:i.nj strative rn:i:ers, General Clr-irk rnade a study of a ffemorcnduPJ submitted by General Brann, Arr":Y G- 3, concern:·ng Fift}1 Ar1:ry operations . At 1130 Captain Lindsay V Jrtson, a French officer who Met General Ckrk Pt the beach at Cherchel when he landed by submarine , came to pay his respects to the Gerieral . General Beucler and Lt . Col . Draper accompanied Captain \latson to the Genernl 1 s van. General Clark and Cartain ' Ptson reminisced on this hazardous adventure, and General Clark signed his narne on a thousand-franc note which already bore the signature of Bob Murrhy and other persona.ges at this historic meeting. Shortly after Captain WAtson left, General Keyes reported to General Clark and lunched with him . After lunch both of them went to Genera.l Clark 1 s van where they discussed the regrouping of the Fifth Army and its future plans . After General Keyes left General ClE.1.rk bunied himself with admjnistrative rretters, took a short nap and then, accompanied by Lt . Col. Dra:rer , walked to the village of Fresenzano . The climb up to the village was noteworthy in thRt it was made in a brisk wind and blinding snow flurry . Upon his return, General ClRrk signP.d so!'le decorations and cor.iP1endations and Pt 1g15 received Ernie Iyle, ) ) �Vt t 1 Scripps-Hovmrd press correspondent, Ed Kermedy of the Associated J ress, Sherman Montrose, Chief of the Fhotowaphic Pool and Lt. Col. Clark, PRO Chief. This was an informal gathering, 11nd aftervmrds the entire party had supper with the GenerEil. Du:d ng dinner General Clark exr lained that the Fifth Army was now taking up a new +'rant on tre left flank and disclosed, off the record, to the corresronr' ents thnt the Fifth Army was receiving the 85th Division and it would also receive Headqwrters of the 4th Corps and there was a po'.:'sibility that another American Division would join the Fifth Army within the next few months. The correspondents asked a number of questions, including a . general evalu::1tion of the situation at the Cassino and Anzio regions, and he answered trem frankly but not for publication. A very friendly atmosphere rreva~led throughout the evening. The correspondents left at ?030, and General Clark retired to his vrn n1:i th GEmeral Keiser for further discussion of the day. General Clark dictated the following materjal for foclusion in his diary: 11 My belief that the New Zealand and Indian Di visioYJ.s did not fight well during the Cassino battle hes been further strengthened as a result of the withdrawal of Indian troops from Hangman's Hill in suf'ficient strength to warrF1.nt an assault on the monl'lstery itself. Rereated efforts of the New ZeAlanders to reach Hangman 1 s Hill or to make nny progress in the town failed. Reports from Freyberg and tee New Zealand Commanders were thrt the troops could not advrnce. However , all the troops on Eangman 1 s Hill car.1e off the hill last night without any di1'ficulty f'rom enemy action. Arparently the urge to attPck up t]:-,e hill WP.S lacking. I a!'1 conv:i need that the New ZeA.land troops in the tovm were roorly lead 11nd shm•1ed absolutely no offensive sp:irj t. From apprmci mately Uie ffrst day of the Cassino sho,, the Indinn Division had totally lost its offensive rower. I attribute this, in greBt part, to the defeatist attitude ::,nd lack of initfr,tive of its commander, General GaJ lo,ray." The Army Commander today dispatched a letter to the Corrmrndfog General, NAT0TTSA recorrirending the promotion of Lt. Col. R. J. 17ood , executive officer :ind rrincip=tl assistant to the Army G-3, to the rank of Colonel. * * * SAN MARCO--lVfARCF 26, 1944--After taking co.re of the accumulation of lPst night I s important r,11rers, General Clark left his oommand rost for Harles , y.rhere he dined with sever.!1.l of his West r oj_nt classmates - Colonels T-Tr,rkoe, Tully . and Nygaard - and then left to join General Gruenther at the Officers' Rest Center for dinner and the evening. Imnediately following the General's departure, hi::i Pides and tre enlisted rnen of his section broke camr i:md set ur his new rommand post in the vicinity of $an M&rco. * * SAN T,Llu:"1CO--nARCH 27, 1944--General Clark remA.ined at the Officers ' Rest Center at Sorrento today in coMpany with General Gruenther. Viork continued �today on setting up trie now cornand rost and by sundown the CoMManding Gene ral ' s Section was comrletely orgnniz0d n.nd ready for operation. Word was received today that General Giraud , Comnander- in-CMef of the French Expeditionary Forces , would CPrie forward tonorrow afternoon to inspect French units of the Fifth Army, nnd arrnngements were mule for h..;m to see the Army CoPLrnander at the Fifth Army conmand post at 1630 . The following import ant mess,ges were received today : rersonal Devers to Clark. RN F 23198 . "I am submitting to GHQ , War De partment proT11otion recoT'lmendations for the rromotiom; of O'Daniel, Bank, Sherman nnd JJiblo for vacancies existi::ig in this theater • .l\.lso I am subnittinP" tre n.-.,me of Tucker for rroT11otion providing a vacancy esists :in the United JUngdom or elsewhere with the statement that Tucker is a ccomranying the 504 J'arachute Infantry Regiment to 'ill( . I hn.ve told General iiarshall that I realize that we have T. Brown and Rufus Ramey to yet absorb and that it is my intention to absorb thAm as soon [1S they have rad a little battle experience by attachment to divisions of Fifth Army, but that I do not feel tho.t their presence in the treater should deny Sherman his pronotion. 11 •<. AFI'Q to All Concerned . R'J F23714. "Herewith jnfornation requested in your SD 608 dat ed 26 f:arch . This HeadquPrters hes asked AG1ilAR to ship maximum possible number of J,ersonnel of 91 Div direct to Italy. Equipment is planned for shipP1ent direct to Italy on UGS 39 . rresent jndfoations are that 10 , 000 personnel will r.iove direct to Italian or Sicilinn ports with remainder to 7forth Africa ports . The latter will be transshipped to Italy. Estimate that Division l'dll clone Italy approximately 15 May and will require 1 month I s shakedown before it can be orerational. 11 * * * SMT Ml\RCO--MARCF 28 , 1944- -General Cl['lrk returned from Sorrento at 1230 today where he riad rassed Sunday and n;onday with General G:ruenthP-r . The brief sojourn that the General had at the Rest Camp stowed that it hnd done him much good . Shortly after lunch the Generr->.l vrnrked on iT'lport~nt rilitary dj spatches tm.til 1630. At tlwt time General Giraud. , accomranied by GenerP.l Juin and Colonel ICammerer , came to confer with General Clark . General Gruenther and Lt . Co.ls . Draper and SuthcrlFnd were also rresent . The conference resulied in a discussion between General Giraud and Gener1:1l Clerk for the next great offensive oper ation of the Fifth Army. General Giraud presented to General Clrrk a 1rorosed plen for coord{nated / offensive operl'.tions between the French and Ar.mricans j n conjunction vrith that of the British Eighth A:r:my to t ,e right of the Fifth Army. The rlan vras based on the worst possible situntion; namely, thnt the British Eighth Arrr1y would not crack the Cassino line . r orces ava:l lnble to the Fifth ArMy were four French divisions, one mountain , two infantry and one motorized division not yet arrived in Italy, two groupes of Tabors and three AmericP.n infantry divisions , exclusive of bridgehead forces . General Giraud proposed that one French mountain division , in a reriod of four days , would negotiate the mountainous crests via Luga , Spigno , retralla , Ruaz zo to Ii:.fi. He emphasized thet this mountain division must reach its objective within four days, due to the fact �that all of its supplies , wa t er , materiel , amnmnition , food , would have to be carried by mules . In conjun ction with t}, is operation , another French mountain force would proceed from Ausonia toward Esperia , followed by the t wo r emaining French divisions . Simultaneously, the three American divisions would attack :tn column along the co2stal road from Minturno toward Gaeta . The pr ogress of the American divisions would be facilite.ted by the fact that t he French mountain division, nith Itri as its objective , would so surprise the Germans that they would be forced to withdraw rapid l y , thereby not having t ime to thorough l y mine the coastal approach . This coordinat ed offensive of the Fifth Army vmuld have as its object ive the north- south communication r oute from Itri t o Ceprano a..'1.d Arce . G,:meral Giraud believed that four days after the mount ain division arrived nt Itri it would. take an additional fif teen days for the Fifth Ari:1y objective to be reached , due to the fact that once the surprise of the movntai n divi sion had worn off the Germans would more determinedly resist the seizure of the Ceprano- Arce objective . He bel ieved tha.t one month after this objective had been reached the Fifth Army w01ild be in Rome . He believed that there was the possibility thrt once this objective was reached the !"rermans would disengage some of t}1eir forces at the bridgehead to meet the Fifth Army ' s threat toward Fros:i.none . At th5.s par ticular point a determim"d offensive action by the bridgebead forces would force a general Gernan withdrawal toward Rone . General Giraud wished to emphasize that this vrhole plan was based on the success of this mountain division seiz:i.n g Itri, seizing it within four days and by surprise. He felt that this mountainous country would not be strongly defended by t he Germans , nor would they anticipate that any of our forces could negotiate them in any type of offensive ac~~ion . He realized that the terrain was very difficult but that such an offensive was possible and could be carried 01,t . At the same ti:ne he stated that the Eighth Ar1:1y must launch an attack at Crssino . If the attad: of the Eighth Army was s uccessful so muct' the better , but as suming that the Eighth Arr,~y could not advance f'l'l st th8 Cassino line, he still felt that a successful Fift:h Army offensive reaching the rain objective would force the Germans to withdraw from the Cossino sector to the northvrest . The quest i on of the da.te of attaclc aro13e , and General Giraud felt that snch an offensive➔ not be launched before the 1st or 5th of ti<Jy for two reasons ; that the French division being brought in would not arr5ve before April 15th and vrould require a week to organize itself , and that such an attack in the mountains would require a good moon which woul d not appear until t ht) 1st of May. He , therefore , s et a date for this offensive to be between the 1st and 5th of May. General Giraud a l so felt th;, t by seizing tliis objective the port of Gaeta would prove of immeasurable assistance in s upplying a further push toward Rome ; that after the port facilitie s had been cleared for vess els to debark supplies it i:rould considerably lessen the time of jnland suppl y routes to maintain offensive orerations . ~11'~ General Giraud made a further staternent that this offensive action , if successful , might conceivably end the war in two ways . First , it would be a great tactical setback for the GArmrns , and , seoondly, the seizure of Rome would be a great political victory. At the sartLe time , a successful Russian offensive from the east and a successful cros::dng of the channel by Allied forces would require that the Gerr'l8.ns use reserves either to resist the Allied offensive a cross the chrmnel or a successful Russia n offensive . Confronting �all three of these situ:·tio11.s, he believed th::>t it would result in a military defeat to the German Army. Sud· a plan, as discussed by GenerPl Giraud and General ClPrk , would require vigorous a11.cl courageous offensive Pction and quick cleaning up and folJ.owing through of those divisions in the re2r . The p~an as rresented by General Giraud is submitted here in its general scope only and not in detail. Only gener11.l riirections nf tre attack rre mentioned and in a broad sense o-f' tre maneuver . General Clark ,v:i_shed to point out to Gener~ 1 Grr aud that he real 1 zed thnt t P- G0rman s •rP.re a smart enemy, and they had so d:i sposed their troops so that f'rom onr rresent 1~ nes they would 11.ot cl.isAngage any forces from tl-ie bridge}· en.d to meet nn AHied attack. Eowever , he did agr0e thet if the Itri - Arce objective was reached tLe Ger1 I'l.< ns ~id1t coYJ.ceivably withdraw sc,me of its bridgehead forces to n eet this threat. General Clark then tLanked General Glraud for his tacticel e'<y·osition and stated thn.t his staff r·1d thnt of the French would co'1.sider this plan in more detailed nnd joint confere ces . After Generals Giraud and Juin lF.ift , General TJicCreery, Corinancler of Britisb lC Corrs, ceme to ray his resrects to General Clnrk. General Cl8ri: yrosented to G9nernl r'c'Jrflery a personal lettPr , tt•anking l''iP' and corunendinB h2.m :'or his out stand~ ng v:ork under Genernl Clark I s cor-r1aric . Ge ,1ernl Clark stBted that there WE"s a rossibi1ity that Gener£' 1 '1cCreery m.- ght be givon A cor1mand at t1,e beachhead; tlmt he recommended that le take a B1-it:i sh Corr s once the beac head force initiated. a lnrge scale offensive action . Ge erEl licCreery appeared to be g,:muinely sor:ry to leave General ClarJ.:- 1 s comnand and eave the aprearance of being none too srtisfied with '1is new assignnent uncler the ;.ightJ1 Army. He extended to G,::_merals Clrr}· and qruenther an j nvitcktion to din..ner after Ms return from a tvro or trree days I rest at Sorrento . Generals Clar ancl Gruenther accerted when General HcCreery v ould nn.me the date . 1 After Gennral ricCreery 1 s co"t+'err-mce , Generr ls Clr r'l-:, Keiser, Drn.nn Rnd GrnenthPr asrienl)led in tJ- e con""'erence rut for, a before-din'1er drink and dis cussed U•':l talk with Gen0ral Giraud . General Clr.r'l.- rrdteratecl a statement thr,t he mr>de to General G:iraud I s question of what forces would be evailnble to tre 'Rrj tish Eighth Army. General Glarl: 1 s re~~ly ,,.rs that trey ,,rould have sorie Folish troops, S0''1e Canad:.an troors , 'Jew Zealand troors, Indian troops and rerhars sorie r:ngB sh , and furt er that tl e I olj sh and Canadians would probably bear the brunt of the Rttack. The fcmr eenerals nnd Colonels Sutherlt:>nrJ and Draper bad dinner together . Gf:meral CL"'rk broke out three bottles of ".'rhite wine which tie decided , after drinking, vras del'cious . The ul,ite _wjne was fror'l Verona . A:"ter supper General Clar\-- vent bacJ.< to } · s van to v•ork on more adrrr'cn:t strr tive rat tors . 0 General Cl8.r·: today recei vr.~d He folJ.owing c2ble frori General Devers: 11 I have just rnceived tl-e fol1owbis eyes only cable which I am paraphrasing to you: '1'J :"?3?86 . "Late Secretary of the War Department General Staff, Colonel William T. Sexton, is enroute to your theater. He has taken course at Fort Sill and been assigned to a Division during recent Louisiana maneuvers. As able member of division on duty with artillery, I now want him attached to a United St8tes Division in the line in Italy, not as a liaison officer or observer. He can be made subordinate to a junior in rank as his assignment is to be made without regard to his rank. �l15 "To offset his long service to me here in the office, I want to give him the experience in field as a final step. Thereafter he is on his own. We will assigr,. him to a division training in United States or you can keep him." "On Sexton's arrival I will assign him to Fifth Army." * * * SAN MARCO-•MARCH 29, 1944--General Clark left for Anzio at 0900, accompanied by General Saville, Commanding the XII Air Support Command, to confer with General Truscott. He visited front line units and just prior to his taking off from the airfield at 1625, about 20 German bombers swooped down on the beachhead, bombed it and returned. They were met by heavy flak, three of the bombers being downed. One British Spitfire fell very close to the airport, killing a pilot. Shortly after this raid, Generals Clark and Saville flew back in their two L-5' s to the command post. They arr1ved at about 1710. After General Clark returned, he invited Misses Berney and Moen in for a drink and supper. * * * SA~T rM.RC0•-11.ARCH 30, 1944-General Clark V10rked on administrative papers, until 0930 when the Army G-3, General Brann, visited his van. After discussing future operations in the van Generals Clark and Brann went down to the G-3 Section where General Clark studied with his G-3 a relief model of the mountainous country which the Fifth Anny will confront in its next offensive action. General Clark was particularly interested in pointing out to General Brann the boundaries between the French and the American forces in the Fifth Anny zone of action. General Clark returned to his van and worked on more administrative matters until he received General Sibert, G-2 of the 1st Army Group in the United Kingdom. General Sibert stayed for lunch and was asked several pointed questions by Generals Clark and Gruenther. General Clark wanted to know how many German di visions it l'lOUld take before OVERLCRD would be called off - that OVERLCRD was so intermingled with political factors that it would have to go on._ General Clark wanted to point out that air power was not enough, as learned by the lesson at Cassino. A discussion of how well the coastal regions were defended was also brought up, and General Sibert believed that they knew practically all of the installations but that it was impossible to be sure of each one as a certainty. General Clark wanted to know the rate of di visions landed per day, and General Sibert answered approximately two. General Clark believed that, as a result of his previous landing operation experience, it was important that troops be landed quickly and in sufficient strength to force a beachhead. Another qw stion asked was on how wide a front were the landings to take place, and General Sibert responded about 4fJ miles. General Sibert believed that they could expect a. counter attack by' one infantry division about 48 hours after the landing and a large scale collllter attack within �four or forces. stating and the t five days which would have to be net with determination and superior General Clark closed the conversation in rather a light vein by that he would gladly gi.. ve as opposition the Herman Goering Division 1st Parachute Division which he has faced during the Italian campaign. After lunch General Clark, accompanied by Lt. Col. Draper, went by jeep to the II Corps command post at Piedmonte where he conferred with General Keyes at his van. Just prfor to leaving the II Corps comnand post General Clark and General Keyes climbed up in the rear of the II Corps command post where an excellent view of the future battlefield was revealed before them. The route taken back to the Fifth Army command post was around the coastal road through Mondragone. On the return trip General Clark stopped off at the 38th Evacuation Hospital to see how their installe.tions were getting along. They had been installed there for about ten days and were in excellent shape. They had only seven patients in the hospital. Upon his return to the command post General Clark went to his van and worked on more papers until General Sullivan and Chaplain Ryen came for supper. Generals Clark, Gruenther, Keiser, Sullivan and Chaplain Ryen had a before-dinner drink in the conference hut. The principal topic of conversation was American cemeteries; the fact that in order to conserve wood the white crosses ·had been done away with by the w~r Department, being substituted by a straight stick or wood flanged out at the top. The discussion also led to present regulations which have forbade cemeteries or graves being photographed end the inexcusable manner in which relatives of soldiers who have died in be.ttle have been delayed in receiving details or their death and where they are buried. General Sullivan said that he would get a letter off to Washington stating the problem and ma.king necessary recommenda• tions to be certain that relatives were notified of circumstances surrounding a soldier's death and where he was buried. The group had supper and later returned to the conference hut. General Clark went to his van at about 2100, worked on important dis~tches and retired. * i * * SAN MARCO--MARCH 31, 1944•-General Clark arose early in order to be at the French Expeditionary Corps command post at Sessa by 0830. He checked a few important dispatches prior to leaving and left the command post at 0800, accompanied by Lt. Col. Draper. At the French 1!,'xped:i.tionary Corps he was met by Generals Juin and Sevez. Led by General Sevez the party left in three jeeps for the command post of the 4th DIM at Cescheto. From Cescheto the party proceeded along a. rough and dusty road across the Garigliano to the vicinity or Tiboldi where they dismounted and transferred to horses. Prior to leaving Tiboldi, the PRO photographers and Sargeant Thomas, General Clark's personal photographer, took a number of pictures of the General starting off on horseback. l The party proceeded along a tortuous and rocky mountain trail to the vi.- I cinity of Suio where they dismounted and went by foot about 500 yards to an / artillery observation post in this small village overlooking the town of Castelforte. This observation post was only a few hundred yards from the front lines and afforded an excellent view of the ten-ain held by the enemy to the �immediate tront. While in this observation post, General Clark, General Juin and General Sevez discussed in detail the French d1.spositions, paying particular attention to the bridgehead held by the French across the Garigliano. The activity along the front in the French sector has been confined mostly to local patrol action by night. In front of the town of Suio the French extend their lines a.bout 400 or 500 yards from the town by night. They w:1.thdraw back into the town by daylight, during mich time there is little activity except for mortar, small arms and artillery fire. The 2nd Moroccan Regiment, with three battalions in the line, hold the left sector. The 6th Moroccan, with two battalions in the line, hold the central sector. A regiment of dismounted cavalry with American mechanized equipment hold the right sector. The party proceeded be.ck to their horses and again followed rocky, tortuous mountain trails to the 6th Moroccan eommand post. Colonel Buot de l 'Epeine, Commanding the 2nd Moroccan Regiment, accompanied the pe.rty to the 6th Moroccan sector. There, Colonel Cherriere, Commanding the 2nd Moroccan Regiment, met General Clark and discussed briefly with him the troops in his part of the line. Colonel Cherriere had just received a minor wound to his right wrist and was be.ck for full duty • • From this point the party left their horses, got into their jeeps and returned to the Garigliano River over a mule trail which had just been improved into a jeep trail. In the mort time that the French hs.d been here, they had transformed this British mule trail into a satisfactory jeep trail by dint of hard and fast \llOrk. The party proceeded back to Sessa and arrived there at about 1130. At the French Expeditionary Corps command post General Clark immediately participated in a ceremony wherein he decorated seven French officers and two enlisted men. The ceremony took place in the courtyard of Prince Umberto's Palace. It was a very colorful ceremony and lasted for aQOut 30 minutes. Among those decorated were: General Beucler, General Poydenot, General Guillaume and Colonel Pia.tte, all of whom received the Legion of Merit. One DSC and six Silver Stars were given to the other officers and men for bravery in combat. There were several absentees among those to be decorated who were unable to attend inasmuch as they were hospitalized. After the decoration ceremony General Juin had a very delightful lunch at which the following guests were present: General Clark, General Ke:ye s, General Poydenot, General Carpentier, General Beucler, General Guillaume, Colonel Piatte, Col. KamJ merer, Lt. Col. Draper and Countess Duluart who is the mother of General Gruenther's aide, Lt. Bajenow. She is a very charming French woman who heads a mobile surgical unit which is doing excellent work for the seriously wounded soldiers. Her hospital unit treats both American and French sold:i.ers - the bulk being French. General Cl.ark had known the Countess in Oujda. The guests at this luncheon left the table at about 1400, and General Clark and Colonel Draper proceeded back to the Fifth Army command post where Gene. ral Clark worked on important military di spa.tches. At 1530 he received Colonel Sexton, former Secretary to General Marshall. Colonel Sexton is over here to gain combat experience prior to an assignment. After Colonel Sexton's call, General Cl.ark looked at five combinations of uniforms for Fifth Army MP's and decided which one would be standard. �Just prior to dj_ nner this evening General Clark had General Deford, General Brann end General Moran into the conference hut for a before-dinner drink. The entire group then stayed for dinner. General Clark discussed with General Deford at great length the possibilities of air power in support of ground action. General Deford gave some interesting facts and figures on air tombing against Germany, the relative strengths of the German Luftwaffe end his ex• periences in the Pacific where he oommanded bomber units which operated against Attu, Kiska and Parima.shiro. After dinner General Clark returned to his van where he conferred with General Gruenther, worked on more administrative matters and retired. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President. This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, March 16 - 31, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from March 16-31, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1570 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/a4742a438efa0471ae6df48addf7f29f.pdf?Expires=1784764800&Signature=WW%7EJRnZ7tcNsimL0x2PMM5QXGoeb9X4kSPhOxVOJMq6CvUAO9hOaF6XBQwgysHd0zmEIwICPv0iRAF1OgCvbwoFBzSaXP0SJCSGsKgevFIipvEUv6gQlGA34Pg61nAe9fsqUQkVrPZSXncatC1XnNN03umTLkB1UrxwhmLYf28pvzdoGdISxOl8uLNIuGGzAV60NUiNbpwLXP7fp2aW3VXR3UVdgxqw4Y7IFY%7EMMA3dhVzsbtF7LR6XLQLQJpEDWMOpU8Y4Ma4AKmJRXHyd2fqZMin7SgdxKVpshE6U6UJmGPREUM8Hud-eqJu8CwAFI4ag8w9GguKMV4UsI0QGyBQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM af5ed591272f3f0d48eeaed333b33581 PDF Text Text . ~ This is Volume VII of the War Diary of Lieutenant General Mark w. Clark. Volume I, covering period 28 June, 1942 to Sep- tember 24, 1942; Volume II, covering period 25 September 1942 to 5 January 1943; Volume III, covering period 6 January 1943 to 6 June 1943; and Volume IV, covering period 7 June 1943 to 29 August 1943, are held in safekeeping at the Army War College, Washington, D. c. Volume V, covering period August JO, 1943 to December 31, 1943; and Volume VI, covering period January 1, 1944 to March 31, 1944 are being held in safekeeping in the Commanding General's safe. �3 SAN MARCO-•APRIL 1, 1944--An early morning promotion ceremony was held at the Forward Echelon, Fifth Army. It began e.t 0900. General Clark addressed the 45 officers,who were to be promoted1for a few minutes and then passed down the line and pinned on their bars, leaves or eagles. The ceremony lasted about half an hour. All of those promoted were Headquarters Fifth Army per• sonnel. Immediately after the ceremony Eric Severeid, CBS broadcaster, visited General Clark. General Clark was astounded at his lack of understanding of the situation and problems on the Italian front. He talked to him for about 45 minutes. After a few Headquarters visits, General Evetts, Assistant Chief of the Imperial General Staff, conferred with General Clark. Shortly after General Evetts departed, General Clark went into conference with Generals Brann, Gruenther, Tate and Keiser reference offensive operations of the Fifth Army and the coordination necessary with the Eighth Army. Shortly after the conference General Brann went to the Eighth Army command post, submitting proposals for coordination between the Eighth and Fifth Armies. He returned with the•. fu.11 concurrence and approval of the Eighth Arey of this plan, which pleased and surprised General Clark inunensely. During the afternoon, General Clark worked on administrative nntters and conferred with General Gruenther on several occasions. Major Metcalfe, PRO Section, was invited for supper. Generals Clark and Gruenther discussed at some length with Major Metcalfe the correspondents' viewpoint of the Cassino situation and criticized Correspondent Sultzberger's over-estimation of the tonnage dropped on Cassino by the Strategic Air Force. General Clark was very desirous that Sultzberger be straightened out on this matter in case he might make any further statements on the .bombing of Cassino. * * * SAN MARCO-•APRIL 2, 1944-•The first Sunday in April turned out to be a very spring-like day. General Clark worked on administrative mtters and held a conference with Generals Gruenther, Brann, Keiser and Tate prior to attending a meeting at AAI Headqua.r ters in Caserta. At 0930 General Clark left for the Caserta conference preµired to spend the following three or four days in Sorrento. The conference in Sorrento is covered full7 at the end of this day's diary. After the meeting, Generals Clark and Brann proceeded to Naples where they had lunch with General Wilson, new Commanding General of the Penin~1lar Base Section. After lunch the General oontinued on to Sorrento where he was going to take a much-needed rest after the gruelling and trying days during and following the Cassino attack. The following notes pertaining to future operations of the Allied Armies in Italy, covered at the meeting in Caserta, were compiled by Generals Gruenther and Keiser: "1. General Alexander opened meeting by calling upon BGSI Airey for estimate of the enemy situation. This was given as we knew the situation existed. �The BGSI's conclusions were: a. That the German 90th and 29th Divs would be utilized to defend their switchline. )2. That the enemy will defend strongly routh of Rot!le. ,2. That the ma.in .front (Cassino) will probably not be reinforced. "2. The C in C then went into a general discussion am reading of the directive •Future Operations' 48/G (ops) 25 NE.rch 1944. ' "He covered the tasks for each Army a?Xl V Corps as in Par. 1, and the breakdown of tasks as in Par. 2; stating that these tasks 1110uld not neces• sarily follow in the order as arranged in the directive. "In summation and deducing a time for the operation he stated that due t-o troop movements, regrouping of the armies particularly the Eighth :Army and V Corps that it was evident that it could not occur prior to the first week in May. He asked the Army Commanders a.bout this timing to which General Clark answered that the Fifth Army could do it any time ~fter 25 April; Gene• ral Leese said Eighth Army oould not do it prior to 10 May. "3. The C in C then discussed the phases of the moon which eventually wound up in referring to an air drop (sabotage operations in mind) and the ) availability of air transport. General Eaker replied to this that the air transport oomma.nd had steadily been required to transfer its ships to other theatres and that the chances of having more than one squadron (30 ships) were remote. Those are all the transport ships available here. "4. Next subject mentioned by C in C was the 'Timing of the Attacks' by the Main Front and the beachhead forces. Would they be simultaneous or one precede the other? The C in C stated he believed the main front attack should be first. Reasons that this would draw troops from beachhead where the enemy is strong and then when enemy has drawn troops from beachhead area the breakout from the beachhead could follow when the opportunity was evident. "Both Army Comnanders agreed to this, GenerAl Clark stating that the lead off should be on the main front with both the Fifth and Eighth Armies attacking simultaneously. General Leese also a.greed to that view. "5. General Alexander next mentioned the date for the attack as probably 10 May and upon being questioned General Clark stated that the Fifth Army is ready at any time; that is after 25 April, whereas General Leese, Eighth Army, replied that he needed time for rehearsals and that the 10th of May was still the earliest he oould be ready. "6. The C in C then stated that he believed the main battle would no doubt last a.bout a week before the position lossens up and that if the ma.in front opens up on the loth that Anzio should be ready to push out four days later. General Clark said that the beachhead forces could be set to go with 24 hours' notice and that he had not yet decided on extra divisions to go in· there. · / 1 �s "7. General Alexander then decided that D-day therefore was to be set tentatively for 10 May; that the main front attack was to be delivered first and that Anzio was to be prepared to push out on 24 hours notice any time after 14 May and that the decision on extra divisions into the beachhead would be given later. tt8. General Eaker then said that in regard to the air he considered both these fronts together as one battle and that the air could support both fronts. He stated that it must be known that their attack was now going on against the communications and that one month from now their effectiveness and value at the time of our attack would be im. terially reduced. This would be due to •war weariness' of personnel as well as probable future losses to OVERLORD and other theatres. "9. General Clark next stated th~t he had been to Anzio two days ago and that he had discussed the timing of the attacks with all commanders there and that they (the oomrnarrlers) were all agreed that the timing plan (main front attack to be first) was correct. He further stated that he wanted to place CCB in the beachhead at an early date. That he had not yet decided on whether to put in the 88th or 36th Div there and that he would reserve decision on that matter until around 15 April. He further stated that if the beachhead attack goes well it would be practicable to reinforce it at once with an RCT from the main front with little trouble and thAt he would draw plans to do so. "10. Admiral Morse next discussed the shipping situation and the Elba mission. He stated that 26 new LCT 1 s were arriving soon with JO additional ones now at Anzio (these need repair soon). There are also 50 LCI(L)'s in the area end plenty of LCA 1 s. They have lifted for. 6000 personnel end 100 vehicles. The difficulty with Elba 190uld be a:fr cover which the Navy badly needs for the operation. "General Eaker replied air could not give the support. That air cover now over the beachhead was a drain on them and even though reduced from 28 to 8 missions that they would not take on another air cover job such as Elba even from groups in Sardinia or Corsica. "11. Gen. Gammell said Elba planning was still going on et AFHQ. not be undertaken unless the a:fr objection was overcome. It would "12. General Clark then stated that the 509th Para. Bn. was now coming out of the beachhead and that plans were to be drawn as to its probable drop to help Fifth Army operations. He indicated that they would need a little training if possible and General Eaker remarked that only the one group would be availRble and then only if it was not being used on other transport missions or training missions now going on in Sicily. General Alexander said go ahead and pJ.t.in to use them. "13. General Leese stressed the importance of making the Allied troops in Italy feel that they were a rart of the OVERLCRD force. General Alexander said he would issue an Order of the Day covering this point. "14. General Alexander next took up the 2d phases of the attack as stated ·~ �in the directive. He talked about 'Speed and Punch'. "15. General Cannon next asked if ANVIL was on or off. To this General Alexander replied that he had no knowledge of it, but General Gammell, on being questioned, inferred that from his impressions it appeared to be off. "General Cannon remarked that if ANVIL is on then from D-47 the AAI loses 2/3 of_its air support. "Also, that if the armies are south of Rome we will lose our air the next month and 60% of it within 6 weeks. 30% of \ } "The present air plan to include 10 Mly is to: "Cut lines of communication. The air is all out on this now. The light and fighter bombers only to be used south of Rome. There is no need for mediums oouth of Rome. They must go beyond. Air forces will be weaker on D day than now. "He believes the lirt for the 509th Par. Bn. can be handled. He brought up the Elba situation again. The air can support the initial landing l;>ut can't continue defense. May be coastal command can do it. Beyond Rome-control reverts to original plan, i.e. XII ASC to Fifth Army. "16. Admiral Morse then remarked about the difficulties in defending Anzio port because of: ~• Increase in Limpits ]2. Human torpedoes ,g. Mines "They do not want to man too many ports bece.use it is costly in ships and personnel overhead and they haven't the defending craft necessary. "17. General Robertson then discussed Q matters. He spoke of congestion in the areas and to have armies agree to keep troops back until they actually move in to attack. "Also to get all unnecessary paraphernalia out of forward zones such as laundries, bath units, etc. "He stated that casualties are necessarily heavy in first few days of attack and that for pla:rming purposes the A:rrrry Surgeons should be advised of this and to have them plan accordingly. Camouflage of dumps etc. to be done to hide direction or area of attack. Also have troops get rid of the junk they have been collecting. He stressed the necessity of a drastic reduction in equipment to be carried wheh the pursuit actually begins. "Support of air forces a major problem." * * * �SAN MA.RCO--APRIL 3, 1944--General Clark enjoyed a very restful day at Sorrento. During his absence, General Gruenther hB.d as dinner guests Maj. Gen. David Barr, Chief of Staff to General Devers; General Tate, Fifth Army G-4; Col. Barron, War Department Assistant G-4, OPD. General Barr and General Gruenther entered into a general discussion concerning the Cassino operation. General Barr stated thPt he knew the u. s. wa.s disappointed in the failure of the Cassino attack and that he did not think the attack was followed up aggressively enough; that the casualty report did not indicate this. General Gruenther cited the total casualties a"i about 2100, which surprised General Barr, who did not think that they were tha.t great. The discussion brought out the difficulty facing General Clark in that all the troops involved were either British, New Zealand or Indian, with a few American troops part1cipating, such as Engineers and Tanks. It was also brought up that General Clark could not have relieved General Freyberg, due to his reputation and the political complications involved. General Barr asked if the Divisional Commanders went forward to actively direct operations, and General Gruenther stated that to his knowledge he didn't think that General Parkinson, Commanding the New Zealand Division did. As to the others, he was not sure, but in any case the re~ sults of the operation would not indicate that they did. General Barr then discussed how in the last war when an important objective had to be taken it necessarily was costly in men and that in the Cassino attack in order to capture the monastery heavy casualties should have been expected. General Gruenther then pointed out the difficulty in replacements for British divisions and other empire troops and said that that particular subject would, and always has, come up when these troops a.r e employed. * * SAN 111.ARCO•-AI'R.IL 4, 1944--General Clark remained at Sorrento and visited and spent the night at the Isle of Capri. During his absence General Gruenther had as his dinner guests General li:tartin, Anrty Surgeon; General Bowman, Army Engineer; Colonel Avery, ~.rmy Inspector General; and Colonel Weaver of the PWB Section. General ATartin had just returned from Anzio and told how they were really digging in the hospitals on the beachhead. The question of malaria control was also discussed, and General Bmman brought out the fact that they would get four of the seven pumps going in the Mondragone area to drain out the marshy area. General Martin also explained that he would powder spray with airplane this swampy area and then oil spray the ditches and other areas where the plane spray would not be effective. He said that atebrine would be taken by all personnel as of April 15th. Colonel Weaver brought some samples of German propaganda with him and pointed out that some of them were very well prei:itred and with a keen insight into American psychology. Others, however, were completely ineffective. He stated that our policy was educating the German with facts, with no t . ndency e to emggeration or bold statements. This policy is being pursued so that when we oontinue our efforts, in increasing intensity, our propaganda will be able to greatly affect German morale. He pointed out that the Russian type of propaganda was so fantastic that German prisoners indicated that they placed no concern nor belief in it. Colonel Weaver pointed out that we wouldn't want our propaganda to be so oonsidered by the German • .. ,/' �SAN MARCO--Al'RIL 5, 1944-•General Clark was still enjoying his rest a.t Sorrento and Capri. The following is a compilation of the casualties incurred by the New Zealand Corps from 0600 hom:-s 15 March 1944 to 060o hours 26 March 1944: 26 officers and 261 enlisted men killed, 108 officers and 1474 enlisted men 'l'IOunded, 6 officers and 231 enlisted men missing. The following letter 1VI'itten by General Clark to General Eaker is quoted in full: ttI understand that there has been some comment in the press that the unsuccessful outcome of the recent Cassino battle was due to the failure of the Air forces to perform properly their tasks in the combined operation. I do not share that view. I feel that the results obtained by the air bombardment of Cassino were those predicted by General Saville, and I can assure you that if there is any tendency to blame the Air Forces for the result of the operation, it has not been inspired by my headquarters. "As I have told :vt,u before, it is my conviction that no aerial oombard• ment can be expected to clear any fortified area of determined infantrymen who are occupying well covered emplacements. In the last analysis our infantry must close with the enemy in order to achieve final victory. "I desire to take this opportunity to express deep appreciation for the excellent cooperation which the Fifth 'Army has always received from the Air Forces under your command. They have already made a notable contribution to our successes, and I am confident that we shall continue to receive effective support in the battles to oome." * * * SAN MARCO-•APRIL 6, 1944--General Cle.rk flew back by cub float plane from Sorrento to Caserta lake where he transferred to a cub land plane and arrived at the forward echelon at 1235. His total f'.l.y:l.ng time was about 42 minutes. The General appeared completely rested, and it clearly showed that his three days' sojourn at Sorrento did him worlds of good. General Clark had as his guest for dinner General Forde who is being transferred to the United States for work on ordnance matters. General Clark's day was spent primarily on reading the accumulation of dispatches, personal mail end other important administrative matters which would bring him up to date after his short visit to Sorrento. Colonel Robinson made a brief call on the General. He was formerly the AA officer of Fifth Army and has been transferred to the 34th AAA Bri.gade in the II Corps sector. After Colonel Robinson le:f't, General Bradshaw who had returned from the beachhead called and paid his respects to General Clark. He was invited to supper after a short conference with General Clark in his van. After supper General Clark continued work on administrative matters and retired early. General Clark this afternoon received the following cable from General Truscott: ) �RN 044. "The average strength of British infantry battalions is a.s follows: 1st Division, 31 officers, 582 other ranks; 5th Division, 26 officers, 6o2 other ranks. The War establishment for Br:J.tish ba.tta.lfons is 36 officers, 809 other ranks. General Alexander stated, a.:rter the 56th Division was relieved, that battalions would be ma.intained at 30 officers, 700 other ranks. In my opinion, the battalions are already dangerously low. Within a few days hard fighting they will become so reduced in strength as to be ineffective, just a.s happened to both the 1st and 56th Divisions dur:l.ng previous fighting. Recommend that you take this latter up with the C-in-C a.nd advise me a.s to the possibility of bringing these units up to strength." * * * SAN MARCO--APRIL 7, 19M.-- General Clark worked upon important military dispatches during the early morning, clearing the way for a da.y of appointments. Spring-like weather prevailed today. General Clark received Genernl Dody at 1045. General Dody is taking over temporary connnand of the French Expeditionary Corps and ca.me to pa.y his respects to General Clark. They discussed briefly General Juin 1 s absence from the Corps and the date of his expected return. General Clark asked General Dody how his 2nd Moroccan Division was getting a.long, particularly as to replacements, training and French junior officer and non-commissioned officer personnel. General Dody stated he was up to strength; that he had units undergoing srecialized training in mine warfare, special operations for river crossings and a.tta.cking in mountainous country. General Dody complimented General Clark on the progress that he was making in speaking French. r At 1300 General Leese and four of his staff officers, Ma.j. Gen. Walsh, Brigadier Stratton, Lt. Col. Kent and Maj. Verney, came to a luncheon 'Which was arranged in the Eighth Army Commander's honor. General Leese and General Clark sat in the sun near General Clark's van so they could discuss together future operations. The remaining officers and guests from the Fifth Army Headquarters, General Gruenther, General Tate, Brigadier Stayner, Colonel Britten, General Keiser, General Lemnitzer, Colonel Wood and Lt. Col. Draper, went into the conference hut where they studied a SJSCial ma.p prepared by G-3, showing genernl directions of attack, l:xnu:rlaries a.nd schemes of mneuver. After this short discussion luncheon was served and was oompleted at about 1430. A:rter luncheon Generals Clark and Leese came outside the hut where pictures were taken of the two together. At this point Colonel Darby, Commanding Officer of the Ranger Force and formerly of the 179th Infantry Regiment of the 45th Division, carrie to pay his respects to General Clark prior to leaving for the United States with his Ranger veterans. It happened that Colonel Darby's British decoration, the D.s.o., had arrived, and General Leese presented this high British award to him. After the luncheon guests had departed for a visit to the Fifth Army front, General Clark began immediate preparations on his speech for the Jewish service of the Passover mich he was attending at Caserta at 2000 hours this evening. During Genernl Leese's tour, Colonel Wood, Fifth Army G-3 Executive Officer was wounded by a shell fragment. �General Clark dined early and, accompanied by General Gruenther, left for Caserta where he attended the Jewish Seder Service and made a very inspiring speech. Upon leaving the service General Clark noticed about 100 enlisted men who were unable to get inside. One or them asked if the General would address them, as they had not been able to hear his regular speech. The General agreed and led the group to a vacant lot, spoke a few words to them and then shook hands with all the men. The soldiers were impressed by this thoughtfulness on the General's part, and some were heard to say, "Gosh, I shook hands with General Clark, I won't wash my hands for a week." General Clark returned and retired early to his van. \A. S _ ~ '1 :;z.,, C< , e,,--c. t ... Q........:.- Important messages of the day are as follows: Clark to Alemmer. RN 8247. "Reports from VI Corps show average .,,. strength British infantry battalions as follows: 1st Division, 31 Officers, 582 other ranks; 5th Division, 26 Officers, 6o2 other ranks. In my opinion the battalions are now dangerously low, and within a few days' severe fighting would become so reduced in strength as to be ineffective. Urgently recom\ mend serious efforts be made to maintain battalions war establishment strength." Harding to Clark. RN CGS 3.30. "Your 8247 of 7 April. General Alexander recently reviewed the whole question of allocation of British infantry rein• forcements and decided that even with resources becoming available this month it would not be possible to do more than make infantry battalions of land 5 Divisions up to 26 officers and 700 other ranks. Regret that at present this cannot be done but draft is expected from UK shortly vm.ich should enable battalions of 1 and 5 Divisions to be mde up to above strength by about 20 April." Truscott to Clark. RN T-005. "I need information a.s to oontemplated operations as basis for planning here. Do you expect to come here by 9th? If not, I would like to fly down and discuss this matter with you. Situation continues relatively quiet, limited to patrol activity and artillery harassing fires. I am making strenuous effort to reduce enemy artillery fire on beach a.nd port areas. So far we are making some ~gress and damage has not been excessive." * * * SAN MARCO-APRIL 8, 1944-Up until 0945 General Clark worked on administrative matters. At 0950, accompanied by Lt. Col. Draper, he took off by an L-5 plane to Bagnoli where he bade farewell to tte 504th Parachute Regiment which was leaving for England with an attached artillery battalion and composite service group battalion. He decorated two chaplains of the regiment with bronze stars and presented War Derartment battle streamers to the Jrd Battalion of the 504th for outstanding performances in the beachhead. He gave a farewell speech to the regiment and conunended them arrl their Cornmarrl er, Colonel Tucker, for their outstanding work with the Fifth Army. He also announced that Colonel Tucker had been E\wa.rded the D.s.o. by His Majesty the King of England. Before taking off at 1055, the General looked over the Bagnoli replacement center with the Commanding Officer, Colonel Tenney. General Clark returned to �l1 the forward command post and arrived at ll20. At 1155 General Devers, accom• panied by his British aide, Colonel Campbell, arrived at the Headquarters. Generals Clark and Devers conferred far about one hour before going to lunch. The following points were discussed at lunch. (1) The complicP-tions of the French political situation, with General Giraud being replaced by Generf',J. DeGaulle as Head of the French Army and what General Giraud's status will be in the future. No definite statements were ma.de. (2) The fact that General Devers was beginning to clear up some of his base section hospitals in North Afr5.ca and that all hospital patients would be returned directly to the United States. The long range plan was for General Devers eventually to move his Headquarters from Alders to Italy to relieve trans-shipping difficulties. (3) The question of whether ANVIL was on or off. Specific answers were not given, but the general trend was that ANVIL was not off but was dependent upon the date set for OVERLORD, shipping that muld be available such as LST's LCI's, etc., and the successes made by the Allied Armies in Italy in their next offensive operation. The general opinion was that there would be a 45day delay after D day of OVERLCRD before a sufficient amount of shipping could be sent down the Mediterranean for ANVIL or for further needs of the Fifth Army for future operations. After lunch General Devers left to visit the 85th Division oommand post. Shortly after General Devers left, General Clark made immediate pl.ans to take off for the United States for a ten-day visit. He had received a letter from General Marshall, requesting that when the time presented itself he would like to have General Clark oome to Washington for a brief stay. General Clark plans to leave at 0900, 9 April, in General Eaker 1 s plane. He plans to take with him Colonel Saltzman, Lt. Col. Smith and Sergeant Chaney. At 1500 Lt. Col. Gray came up to review pending general oourt martial cases. General Clark oompleted his ~rk with Colonel Gray and at 1700 General Juin flew up from Capodichino on his return from Algiers to confer with General Clark. General Clark had in his van at the same time Generals Gruenther, Brann and Colonel Saltzman. Generals Gruenther and Brann left, and Colonel Saltzman remained with General Juin and General Clark. A general discussion of the plans for future operations took place, and General Juin was told that the Fifth Army staff and his staff would start w ork immediately on the details of the coming attack. General Juin then discussed what had taken place in Africa. General Giraud's responsibilities will be nnterially reduced. General DeGaulle has ta.ken over the duties as Army Commander with General Bethouard as his Chief of Staff. General Giraud will be given some title which will oorrespond to om- Inspector General. He will be oonsulted on all planning for the employment of the French troops. General Giraud does not like his new title but it was perfectly clear that he w ould be reduced to a minor role. Howeve;, General DeGaulle did make it clear that he did not want to lose General Giraud completely but would use him in some sort of an advisor capacity. Gmeral Juin stated that he had General DeGaulle 1 s oomplete oonfidence and would re- ) main in command of the French Expeditionary Corps. After General Juin left �ET General Saville of the XI I Air Support Command conferred briefly with General Clark. Shortly after this conference, General Truscott, who had just arrived from the beachhead, had a conference with Gmeral Clark. General Clark told General Truscott that he was !J)ing to Washington and discussed with the VI Corps Commander the sitttation at the beachhead. General Truscott wanted to know when it was expected that his beachhead forces would attack; that much of his planning was based on this decision. General Clark said that he couldn't give him a definite date but that he thought it would be around May 10th, but certainly not before May 3rd. The date May 10th was given because thAt was the earliest day that General Leese of the British Eighth Army would be ready for any coordinated { attack. General Clark then told General Truscott that whatever the date of the attack was, he was assured by all Commanders, British and French, that it would / be an all-out effort and that it would be successful. General Clark emphasized that the Eighth Army, under the oonnnand of General Leese, would throw in everything they had. General Clark then stated that it muld be possible that the beachhead forces would not attack before the 2oth of May. He asked General Truscott what his plans were. Gereral Truscott then stated that his planning group was considering a limited objective attack to capture Cisterna, which he thought that he could accomplish within three days. This attack would be SJ:earheaded by the 1st Armored Division under Gereral Hannon. He also mentioned an attack to take Carroceto. The point was brought out that such an attack should wait until after the main Fifth and Eighth Anny front had pushed forward in an all-out effort. General Clark asked General Truscott specifically if he thought any limited attack in the beachhead would be profitable prior to this all-out offensive on the ma.in front. General Truscott said that he had considered such attacks, but he agreed with General Clark that the beachhead should hold now and conserve its forces. Then when the opportune moment came to attack it should be done also with an all-out effort. General Truscott said that he would like to put the 3rd Division back in the lines about 10 April and withdraw it so it would be in reserve when he did attack. By direct questions to General Truscott, General Clark managed to draw out from him all possible plans of attack available to the beachhead forces. General Clark stated that when he went back to Washington he would emphasize the fact that the morale on the beachhead was high, and he asked General Truscott if he concurred in the statement. General Truscott replied that he did 100%. General Truscott said, however, that he was ! very disappointed in the decision to withdraw the 56th Evacmtion Hospital and that he thought that it had a very poor effect on the morale of the beachhead forces. He added that he didn't think the hospital itself wanted to leave. After conferring in the hut, General Clark and General Truscott went to supper. After supper, General Clark began packing his personal things in preparation for his brief trip back to the United States. General Clark today cabled General Truscott as follows: RN 6011. "Personal representation has been made to the CINC, AAI, regarding your 044, and he has replied as follows: 'The entire problem of disposition of British infantry replacements has recently been studied by the CINC, and it is his decision that even with the availability of replacements this month, it would be impossible to do better than to make infantry battalions of 1 and 5 divisions up to 26 offi~ers and 700 other E ��ranks. Am sorry that we can't do this now, but draft should arrive soon from UK which, it is believed, will make possible battalions of 1 and 5 Divisions increasing to above strength by appr~ximately April 2oth. 1 I understand fully that their reply is not satisfactory and will keep on doing all I possibly can to s:, lve the problem." General Clark also cabled General Truscott as follows: RN 6o24. "Recommend that you fly down as soon as oonvenient, as I do not plan on visiting you by 9th. Let me know when you plan to arrive." * * * SAN MARCO--APRIL 9, 1944--General Clark and his party, which is leaving for )\ the United States in General Eaker's B-17, piloted by Captain Smith, took off \\ from Marcianise airport at 0850. General Clark took Colonel Saltzman, Lt. Col. Smith and Sergeant Chaney with him. General Clark flew by cub to Marcianise, delaying his departure time in order that he might confer with General Gruenther. General Truscott was invited by General Gruenther for lunch: TMs being Easter Sunday, a special service was held in the daisy field adjacent to the command post. General Clark being unable to read the Easter story, General Gruenther substituted for him. This service was broadcast to the United States. General Gruenther invited for dinner General Moran and General Coulter. General Coulter is head of the Maintenance, Researcr and Development Section of the Signal Corps. The topic of the conversation centered ma.inly around equipment and personnel problems. The question of the security of the Sigaba code was brought up, and when General Coulter was asked if when a set was captured ' by the enemy it would compromise the code, he said that he thought not. However, he asserted that we should make every effort to make sure that a set does not get into enemy hands. This code system has enebled us to maintain complete secrecy of messages from Washington to the various theaters and within the theaters themselves. After supper the dinner guests attended a movie set up for Section Chiefs of thA Forward Echelon in the conference hut. * * * SAN MARCO--APRIL 10, 1944--The command post missed the personality of General Clark today, this being his first day's absence during his trip to the United States. General Brann held a G-3 conference at which attended General Tate, G-4; Colonel Howard, G-2; General Bowma.n, Army Engineer; General Moran, Army Signal Officer, and General Saville of the XII Air Support Command. General Brann discussed in detail the attack by the Fifth Army. He completely outlined the objectives and directions of attack contemplated by the French and II Corps. The 2nd DIM would attack in the direction of Majo, which it planned on taking by the first night, to proceed down into Ausonia up to the high ground south �of Esperia. This attack would be closely timed with the 3rd DIA, proceeding on and taking the high ground in the vicinity of Mount D1 0ro. The 4th DMM, especially trained in mountain warfare, would follow through with a small part of its force proceeding toward Itri. General Brann does not favor this. He would rather have II Corps take Itri. The remainder of the 4th DMM would consolidate in the Mount D1 0ro region and push on to Pico. This plan would place in our hands the high ground dominating the Liri Valley, which would forcefully enhance the attack of the Eighth Army up that valley. The II Corps, at the same time, would attack with two divisions abreast, the 88th on the right and the 85th on the left. The 88th would have as its initial objective the commanding terrain in the vicinity of Castellonorato, and the 85th the commanding terrain on Mount Scauri. Simultaneously II Corps would rroceed along the coastal road, wresting the commanding terrain overlooking this route from the enemy toward the direction of Formia, Gaeta and Itri. This would be accomplished by small turning movements as the advance progressed. General Brann then stated that the 36th Division would be held in reserve; that its employment depended on whether the Army Commander wanted to use it on this front or on the beachhead. If used on the Garigliano front the 36th would follow through and exploit successes of the 85th and 88th. If used on the beachhead, it would be used to exploit any successes on that front. He also stated tha.t the 91st Division, which had not yet arrived in this theater, would be available to the Fifth Army around June 1st. It should arrive here around the 1st of April and would be ready for battle in 4 or 6 weeks. General Saville was then consulted as to how the Air Corps would closely support this attack. Their particular objectives would point toward isolating the battlefield in the Ausente Valley, paying particular attention to the rear slopes of Mount Scauri, which at the same time would be rounded with a terrific artillery bombardment of at least 400 guns and also the road junctions terminating bot}-, entrances to the Ausente River Valley. General Saville posed the question of conserving his air might to facilitate the second phase of the attack which would concentrate on the high ground and to the west of Spigno. However, General Brann thought that it would be important to go all out during the initial stages of the attack so that it would facilitate the isolation of the battlefield on both corps fronts; that is denying the enemy any withdrawal routes on the road from Ausnnia down to the coast. If this bottleneck was offered to the enemy, only infantry soldiers would be able to withdraw and force any effective resistance later on, makin~ it impossible for transport or artillery to escape. General Gruenther represented General Clark this afternoon at the Polish Corps dinner. * * * SAN MA.RCO--AFRIL 11, 1944--The appointment that General Cl~.rk made with the Duke of Aosta was not cancelled. The Duke arrived at the command post an hour earlier than 10 o'clock, the appointment hour, and was taken immediately over to General Gruenther, who discussed with him Italian units, their loos.lity and the type of work they are doing. General Livesay, Com1mnding General of the ; .: it '·. ' . :-~·~J_,): :..-:{ �15 91st Division, and his Chief of Staff, Colonel Donovan, also reported in to the Commanding General, Fifth Army, and was received by the Chief of Staff, General Gruenther. These two officers were invited to lunch. General Livesay discussed some of the POM difficulties thet the Division had in the States; such as, wh8t was the meaning of the term "combat serviceable" as pertaining to their ordnance weapons? Staff officers from III Corps indicated that they should be very strict, so all weapons were turned in that were shiny, regardless of small defects. Later on, ASF representatives said that this interpretation was too strict and th8t they should turn all those weapons in for bluing only, to eliminate the shine. It eventually turned out thnt they got back the weapons that they had turned in, blued and with minor repairs accom• plished. . The 91st Division did not lrnow where they were going until they reported in to the staging area at Fort Patrick Henry. They lrnew they were coming to the European Theater, but the exact destination was not known. About two months prior to getting alert orders the Division received a considerable number of replacements of German, Italian and Austrian parentage. This led them to believe that they would probably go west and to the Pacific. General Livesay ha.d extreme confidence in the Division's ability and commented on its past performances. General Gerhardt who now commands the 29th Division "brought up" this Division from its activation date in #43. The Mondragone Villa project has started on 1ts way and should be completed in about 15 days. Lt. Col. Sutherland, former aide to General Clark, and Colonel Porter were invited to dinner by General Gruenther. Colonel Sutherland is leaving for Algiers to determine whether or not he is going back to Washington or will remain on duty with OSS in this theater. At 2130 a cable came in relieving the 91st Division from assignment to the Fifth Army, stating that it would not be unloaded in Italy but would be staged in Arzew and would be under the command of AFHQ. When General Gruenther saw this he said that he didn't like it, but there was nothing he could do about it so he was going to bed. * / * * SAN MARCO--APRIL 12, 1944--General Keyes, Deputy Army Commander, flew up to the beachhead and decorated Brigadier Generals Ramey (Legion of Merit), Fredericks (Silver Star) and Baehr (Bronze Star) and Colonel Bauchspies, (Legion of Merit}. The purpose of General Keyes' visit was to make a personal reconnaissance of the beachhead while assuming this temporary title. Mr. Bob Murphy, U. s. Ambassador-at-Large in North Africa, came to call on General Gruenther and have supper with him. He was accompanied by Mr. Reinhart and Mr. Offay. Mr. Murphy and General Gruenther had a grand time reminiscing about past events in North Africa. Mr. Murphy answered a number of questions regarding U. s. reactions to the Italian campaign, and, in substance, stated that he didn't think that there was any criticism in the States \ of the Fifth Army or any of the operating troops, but that he believed that ) there was serious doubt as to the grand strategy of the campaign - what we ... I �were trying to accoMplish here and the reason for not giving the ~herewithal to accomplish this mission. He brought out also that the State Department was well a.ware of the Russian situation and possible menace - that a.t the present moment our policy was to be extremely friendly toward the Russians that their efforts on the eastern front were necessary to our success and that future problems would have to be dealt wlth as they a.rose. He also mentioned the fact that the Russians wanted an airfield in Italy but that, as far as he was concerned, he wasn't going to give it to them. General Gruenther then outlined on the map in the hut the Fifth Army dispositions as of today. Mr. Murphy was extremely interested in what General Gruenther pointed out, and the discussion developed into practically a map study of the entire Italian campaign, bringi.ng up action in the Volturno crossing, the Camino, Lunge and Cassino battles. General Gruenther thoroughly acquainted Mr. Murphy with the true facts of Cassino, emphasizing the fact that this battle was conducted with an American Army Commander and heterogeneous British troops; that the attack was not vigorously pushed. However, General Gruenther did bring out that as long es we are fighting with British divisions, the replacement problem will hamper operatfons inasmuch as the British fear sui'fering too many casualties and are unwilling to attack in force. He also pointed out that many Br1tish troops have been fighting for four or five years and are in soJ'le cases pretty tired. Mr. Murphy said tlwt he would stay with General Wilson's Headqm:irters and that when they moved here he would move with them. After supper Mr. Murphy, accompanied by Lt. Col. Draper, went up to the French Expeditionary Corps CP to pay his respects to General Juin. Mr. Murphy got quite a kick out of passing the "light line" and knowing thRt he was within five or six kiloMeters of the enemy. He had a delightful talk with General Juin, at l'kiich time they discussed General Giraud's position with the Liberation Committee. Neither one seemed to know more than what the radio had) announced. ~ Mr. Murphy returned back to the Fifth Army Forward CP am. left for Naples f at about 11 o'clock. • n 1 •• -t. /J /1"" , ',( t--, ti"' ~ C * . ..,..--.. -;t;_ , ,,.. "· 4.,1;f ~ ·,~A( Qt T _/? ----------' ,_,~ ... * - ., ... ,{ -c. ~ ., I. ~ .,.. - * , SAN MARCO--APRIL 13, 1944--General Gruenther flew to the beachhead in General &lville's C-78 and spent the day conferring with General Truscott and visiting units. The 3rd Division had relieved the 45th Division in the line, and things were generally quiet except for daily shelling. General Gruenther discussed at some length the whereabouts of the 28th Centimeter Gun the.t hl'ld been regularly adjusting in the vicinity of the Fifth Army Command Post at Anzfo. He brought out the strong possibility that this gun was located near the Pope's Palace at Castel Gandolfo. As yet no definite location had been arrived at, and the Air Corps was trying to knock it out. Colonel Ladue, Chief of Staff of General Crjttenberger's IT Corps, had lunch with General Keiser. d- beachhead at about 1600. \ " .,.. () yvv-l.Y.. ., ' .<, ,,.,. ~ t;-<-\ J_;JL,, ~ r '1 cl~-- o -tr'-"' - P 1- - �11 SAN Mf\RCO--APRIL 14, 1944--Administrative natters were carried out by General Gruenther. He had General Keyes and Colonel Nygaard for lunch. At 16oo General Juin, accompanied by his Chief of Staff, General Carpentier, came to d1 scuss future planning with General Gruenther. General Juin left at 1715 for his Headquarters at Sessa. General Keiser is !Ping to present the Fifth Army plaque to the Allied Railway Military Service at a ceremony given in General Gray's honor at Naples tonight. It harpens to be General Gray's birthday. General Gruenther this evening attended a G-3 i::arty in Naples, leaving the comma.nd post at 1900. * * * SAN M\RCO--APRIL 15, 1944--Activity for the last ten days at the front has been confined mainly to ·patrol action and artillery duels. However, in some cases the German artillery has increased in intensity, and his patrol probing action indicates that he is getting very curious about activities on our side. General Gruenther received General Tate, Army G-4, for about 20 minutes. There were a number of v:isiting ~iremen in the Fifth Army command post: General Brittenham, Artillery Officer of Seventh Army; Generals Warrock and Vanderveer, Assistant Division Commander and Artillery Commander respectively of 5th Division; Colonel Franson and Lt. Col. Dickens, Chief of Staff and G-3 of the 5th Division. Colonel Black, Tank Destroyer Officer, also called. Generals ~artin and Blesse, Fifth Army and AFHQ Surgeons respectively, con• ferred with General Gruenther, as well as Colonel Ryan, Fifth Army Chaplain, and Captain Moore, new Catholic chaplain for the for ward echelon. General Gruenther and Lt. Col. Draper went to Mondragone at 1700 to make a personal inspection of the villa project now under way there. The villa project has possibilities of getting involved in a Fifth Army recreation and rest center. The beach there, known as Alido, is one of the best beaches along the coast, and G-1 has already recommended that parts of the beach in the vicinity be used for officers and nurses for mixed bathing facilities, as well as a beach for enlisted Fifth Army personnel. This would require zoning off areas along the beach, and as yet no definite decision has been made. General Gruenther has as his supper guests General Brann, General Bowman and Colonel Howard. Colonel Howard conferred for about twenty minutes with General Gruenther before dinner, br:inging him up to date on the latest G-2 inform~tion available. * * * SAN :WARCO--APRIL 16, 1944--A week ago · today General Clark took off for Washington. This past week routine activity at the forward echelon was carried on. General Keyes, the Deputy Commander, has remained at II Corps Headquarters, and General Gruenther, Army Chief of Staff, has carried on for the Army Commander. General Gruenther oonferred with the following people: Colonel Berry, War �.. Department G-1; General Wilson, Commanding General of PBS; General Patch, Seventh Army Commander. With General Patch were Colonel White, his Chief of Staff, and Colonel Daly. Colonel Daly is a classmDte of Genera.l Clark. After supper General Patch and several of the Fifth Army Section Chiefs witnessed the movie "Meet The People", starring Dick Powell and Lucille Ball. Follow~ng are extracts from the Fifth Army Camouflage Plan issued yesterday: The object of this plan is to ensure complete surprise for the main Fifth Army attack. If complete surprise is Achieved, the German units on the Garigliano front on D day will almost certainly be overwhelmed by the weight and surprise of our assault. If surprise is lost the 17 German Bns at present on the main Fifth Anny front between the Liri River and the sea will be considerably reinforced between now and D day and our attack may consequently lose its momentum and eventually bog do,m without achieving decisive results. Surprise will undoubtedly be the most powerful weapon in the hands of the assaulting units of Fifth Army. Centralised planning and control are necessary. Responsibility for the execution of this plan will rest with II Corps Pnd the FEC, and, in the case of Army troops not attached to Corps, with the heads of sections concerned at Hq. Fifth Army. If one unit fails and thereby alerts the enemy of the impending blow, the harm done cannot be localized. Corps and Divisions will organize from this date forward to D day small "camouflage patrols", which should contain one or more trained camouflage officers. Eng:i neer Officer, Fifth Army, is taking action to provide the nece ssary camouflage personnel for this purpose. Normal activity between now and D day must be evident on our front. Nothing must be seen or heard which might lead the enemy to believe that we have anything other than defensive intentions. An impression of "normal f!.ctivity11 will not be given if: ~• There is a sudden increase in the mlume of artillery fire. ]2. Infantry patrols become more (or less) active than they have been up to now. £• There is an increasing volume of radio activity. g. The number of supply, engineer etc, dumps obviously increases in the forward area. ~• Gun positions, dumps, infantry positions, etc., already obvious to the enemy, Are suddenly camouflaged: i.e. do .Nm: try to cover up or improve camouflage of existing installations. Normal relief of units in the front lines will oontinue. No offensive activity on the Fifth Army front, other than normal patrolling and shootjng, will take place. This precludes any preliminary attacks being made without the prior approval of the A rmy Commander. As many units as possible will remain �in their present training areas until the last possible moment. Normal radio activity must be maintained while these units are in their present training areas until they displace forward, at vhich time strict radio silence must be maintained. Corps will submit their plans for forward concentration of units at present training in rear areas to Hq. Fifth Army. These plans should show proposed dates and areas of forward moves. plan. The above extracts are hi~J.ights on this very detailed camouflage Details are omitted. * * * SA1'l' MA.RCO--APRIL 17, 1944--The coming and going of visiting offj_cers at the command post oontinued. After oonsulting with General Tate, General Gruenther, accompanied by General Brann, went to the Eighth Army command post in the vicinity of Venafro for a conference. General Keiser took General Devers to the G-4 Section before lunch and after lunch ,vent to Artillery, G-2, G-3 and the Engineer Sections. General Devers spent the entire day in these various sections to e.cquaint himself with their daily duties. At 1815 General Gruenther had as his supper guests Generals Devers, Patch, Crittenberger, Keyes, Lewis, Brann, Saville, Keiser and Colonel White , Chief of Staff to General Patch. They had before-dinner cocktails in the conference hut. Small groups of officers chatted together before they went up to supper. They retUl".ll'Jled to the hut after supper and had liquers, oontinuing in piecemeal talks the conversations of the evening. They left the hut at 2100. Generals Patch and Devers are staying in the C-in-C camp area near the PRO Section. * * * SAN r1YI.RCO--APRIL 18, 1944--General Devers continued his visits to sections in the forward echelon. He stayed with Colonel Niblo, the Ordnance Officer, for about 30 minutes. He discussed mainly vehicular maintenance and ammunition stocks and studied recent rr.raphs of ammunition levels just oompleted by the Ordnance Section. When he finished with the Ordnance Section, he went over to see General Moran, Signal Officer, and spent about an hour looking over the entire Signal Section, including its forward echelon radio monitoring section, radio station, encoding and <lecoding sections, transmitter locations and switchboard. General Devers then returned to General Gruenther's office and after a thirty-minute conference left for the rear echelon where he talked with Generals Martin and Sullivan. He then proceeded to II Corps where he had luncheon with General Keyes. In the afternoon General Gruenther saw General V/olfe of the Invasion Training Center and Lt. Col. Hare of the Air Support Control. Colonel Hare is leaving for a new assignment as yet undetermined. �General Gruenther had as dinn8r guests Brigadier Stayner and Lt. Col. Hare, two British officers very well liked and thought of by1his Headquarters. * * * SAN MARCO--APRIL 19, 1944--Word has been received that General Clark will proceed back from the States on or about Friday, April 21st. The routine and daily business has been quickened a bit by the Tentative Field Order for the next offensive operation. All sections have been busily occupied in working out the details and also preparing annexes to the Field Order. General Vanderveer, Artillery Officer of the 5th Division, is dovm from F.ngland and called on General Gruenther. General Keyes of II Corps al so came to the command post where he discussed with General Gruenther forthcoming operations and in particular the fact that he didn't want to lose the 77th Artillery Group to the beachhead. General Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff of AAI, came up to talk with General Grnenther. He arrived in time to see the Chief of Staff taking his exercise on the volleyball court. General Lemnitzer took General Gruenther 1 s place and continued the stellar playing of the general officers. General Chevillon of the 3rd DIA, who has just been promoted to a general officer's rank, called on General Gruenther and vras invited to supper. General Sullivan also had supper with the Chief of Staff, in addition to the regular members of the Army Commander's mess. * * * SAN t~RCO--APRIL 20, 1944--General Gruenther received in his office this morning the following officers: Brigadier Stayner, who is soon to les.ve Headquarters Fifth Army; General Tlartin, Fifth Army Surgeon; General Brann, P.:rmy G-3; and General Tate, Army G-4. 1 In the afternoon the Chief of Staff went to II Corps to confer with General Keyes. Later in the afternoon he received General Beucler of the French Mission. During the afternoon General Clark's new trailer arrived and, with the assistance of the Ordnance, Engineers and the Utilities Plrrtoon the trailer was installed and made ready for occupancy. General Gruenther had as his dinner guests this evening Generals Elliott, AFHQ Engineer, and General Bowman, Fifth Army Engineer. After supper he went immediately to Santa Maria for the premiere showing to Fifth Army personnel of Irving Berlin's nThis Is The Army". Mr. Berlin, the well-lmown composer and singer who heads the show, came up to General Gruenther's box before the show and greeted the Army Chief of Staff. News photographers took several pictures before the curtain went up. The show was warmly received by the audience, which was composed mostly of combat troops which had just been relieved from front line duty, a great many being 36th Division troops now in the rest area. After the show General �Gruenther went backstage, cut a piece of the welcome cake and expressed appreciation for the fine performance. He explained that General Clark's absence from Army Headqwtrters prevented his presence at the opening of the show but added that he was certain the Army Commander would attend a subsequent performance upon his return. * * * SAN MARCO-QAPRIL 21, 1944--Generals Gruenther, Brann and Carpentier, Chief of Staff to General Juin, conferred for about an hour this morning concerning the French plan for the next big attack. The French were submittjng important changes to their preliminary tentative plan. General Gruenther had Colonel Scobi, Special Services Officer from AFHQ, for lunch. The main subject of discussion was the availability of a radio station for the beachhead. Colonel Scobi said that he would arrange to have one sent up and thAt it probably could be there j_n about ten days. The question of the power of the station came up,. and General Gruenther was to check to see that a station of 250 to 500 kilo,mtts could function under the existing power system up there. General Gruenther saw General Cannon, CommPnding General of the Tactical Air Force, as well as Colonel Harding of AFHQ and Colonel Pulliam, OPD War Department. GAneral Gruenther had as his dinner guest General Bradshaw, Antiaircraft Officer of Fifth Army. General Bradsh11w djd an excellent job as Antiaircraft Officer of VI Corps at the beachhead. He told of his organization at the beachhead and of the difficulties antiaircraft encountered there. The German considerably outnumbered our forces in the air when he came over in force and so it fell to the antiaircraft to make it as costly as possible to the Luftwaffe. They tried all sorts of tricks, such ti.s using one plane as a decoy with special type of transmitters to lead us to believe that a flight with as many as 15 planes were approaching on one direction, and the actual attacking force would come in from another direction. The German was not successful at pulling this ruse at any time 100%. At the beginning they did confuse the plotting room temporarily, but they soon caught on to the German tactics. The antiaircraft at the beachhead has downed over 120 planes. It is rather difficult to give a particular battery credit for a plane because so many claim the same knockdown. General Bradshaw had a system whereby he djstributed them equitably among his batteries. He also explained how he thought the radar might be used in locating the 28 Centimeter Gun. He proposed having Beaufighters in the air at night. As soon as the big gun flashed, these planes would fly straight for the area, the radar would pick up the line plots of this flash, should intersect and with additional intelligence this gun should definitely be located and taken care of. * * * SAN MA.RCO--APRIL 22, 19Li4--General Clark's van was completed nnd ready for occupancy by him upon his return from the StRtes tomorrow. General Gruenther conferred with General Saville, of the XII Air Support CoMmand, in the morning prior to leaving for Fompei where he attended a ceremony sponsored by the 3rd Algerian Division, at which ceremony several units of the division were decorated for their excellent work on the Fifth Army front during February and �March. The ceremony was very colorful and was attended by Generals Gruenther and Brann who represented the Fifth Army at the ceremony. This evening General Gruenther attended a dinner given by General Devers at the Palace in Caserta. General officers of the Eighth Army and Fifth Army were present as also was General Alexander, CINC, AAI. * * * SAN MARCO--AFRIL 23, 1944--General Clark arrived at Fornigliano field at 1845. The total elapsed time since he left Washington was 43 hours and 25 mjnutes. Accompanying General Clark were Brigadier General Foster Tate, who will replace General Mclain as Artillery Officer of the 45th Division, Colonel Saltzman, Lt. Col. Smith, General Tate's aide and Sergeant Chaney. General Clark rode back to the command post with General Gruenther and did not utilize his cub plane which was waiting to take him back. He and General Gruenther took this opportunity to talk of the many things which General Clark had to say. General Clark christened his new van by opening a bottle of Scotch and Bourbon and invited several of his staff officers in for a drink. Genere.l Clark unpacked, read some letters, important dispatches and retired early in the evening. * * * SAN MARCO--APRIL 24, 1944--General Clark spent the entire day in his new van going over dispatches, conferring with his various general p,nd special staff officers and receiving visiting officers. Col. Howard, the Army G-2, started the morning off by spending an hour with the General in his van. He was followed by General Moran, Army Signal Officer. General Brann and General Gruenther then spent the remainder of the morning vri th General Clark. At noon Admiral Rogers, USN, and Captain Simpson, USN, came to pay the1r respects to the Army Commander. The latter had just returned from the IndiaBurma theater. They had recently been in contact with Lord Louis Mountbatten's staff. In the afternoon General Bissell of the W Department G-2 paid his rear spects to General Clark. He was follovrnd by General Saville, XII J, ir Support Cor1mander. In the latter re,rt of the afternoon Lt. Brown came to see General Clark. General Clark ~ished to deliver to him a few rersonal messages from his mother, rrs. George C. Marshall. Col. Nygaard and Colonel Bruce conferred with the General during the latter part of the afternoon. At 1800 ~T. Bob Jl(urphy, an old anrl intimate friend of General Chrk from his 'North African days, came for supper. Mr·. Murphy was accompanied by Mr. ()ffay l'lnd spent the night at the command post under field conditions. * SAN MARCO--APRIL 25, 1944--After lest night's diary had been written Kraut planes appeared over the Naples area, Capodichino and Aversa. The night fire- �- ' works were brilliant and evoked amazement and r'dmiration from Mr. Murphy. The German effort was apparently not effective. On their return home some German planes passed over the Army command post and were met with intermittent ackack in our vicinity. This morning Mr. rmrphy awakened eRrly, had breal<-i'ast and left. General Clark worked on dispatches until General Juin came to see him prior to General W ilson's visit. General Clark discussed with General Juin primarily details concerning the proposed French Corps Headquarters'coming to this theater with General DeLarminat in col"1l11and. General Clark wanted to know first what General Juin 1 s reaction was to a spare French Headquarters. General Juin stated that General DeGaulle was very anxious for it to come and, as far as he, General Juin, was concerned, under the conditions stated, he recomr1ended th11t it be accepted. The Corps Headquarters was to be under his command and to be used for tactical purposes only. His proposed use of this Corps Headquarters was to coordinate action of two divisions on his right. He emphasized that General DeLarminat was to be under his command and not to be used as an additional separate corps. General Clark told General Juin thnt he wanted to speak to General W ilson first and see General DeLa.rminat before he expressed his desire to have it included in the Fifth Army. The second point of discussion ~as the over-all French plan for the forthcoming big sea.le operation. General Juin pointed out on his map briefly his proposed plan of action. This discussion brought out two points (1) That General ClPrk did not want General Juin to enter into any agreements or understandings with the British that they would delay agrsressive offensive action until French Corps had seized dominating terrain adjacent to the Eighth Army's left. General Clark enphasized that under no conditions did he want the British to feel that Fifth Army had to achieve certain objectives prior to their advance; that he had had previous experience with this particular type of understanding. (2) That the 88th Division attack to seize Damiano must be coorcljnated simultaneously with the French attack on its ri.ght. General Clark stated that this would be definj_ tely settled by staff conferences immediately. Shortly af'ter General Juin left, General Clark went down to the conference hut where he discussed the Fifth Army's plan for attack with Generals Brann and Gruenther. General Wilson, Cor.unanding General of AFHQ, arrived, accompanied by Generals Devers and Rooks, the latter having just turned over his duties as G-3 of NATC1USA to General Noce. General Clerk then personally outlined to General Wilson the Fifth Army's plan for its next offensive action. The conference hut was well decorated with maps to facilitate this explanation. Gern=~rals Clark, Gruenther, Brann, Wilson, Devers and Rooks then had lunch together. After lunch General Devers returned to Casert~:i and GenerRls W ilson and Rooks proceeded to visit French Corps and II Corps. At 1645 General Clark took off in a cub plane to fly to Caserta. where he went into conference with General Alexander. He returned at 1g15 and invited General Gruenther and Colonel Saltzman to his VHn. Colonel Saltzman will replace Genern.l Keiser in the General's Mess. After dinner General Cl.Ark visited General Brann 1 s van and took a short walk before retiring. �' ~ SAN MARCO--APRIL 26, 1944--A heavy spring rain which began at 0400 ma.de a quagmire of the Fifth Army front. General Clark worked with military dis- ( patches, conferred with Generals Brann and Gruenther and was visited by Colonel Howard, his G-2. At 1030 he went by jeep to Mondragone where he inspected a project already begun for an officers' beach and rest area. He inspected a villa which has been very modestly set up for him in the vicinity of the beach. From there he proceeded to the II Corps beach at Bagni Minerale which is used for enlisted personnel only of the II Corps. From there he went to the II Corps command post at Piedmonte where he went into immediate conference with General Keyes, II Corps Commander; General Sloan, 88th Division Commander; General Coulter, 85th Division Cornnander, and General Walker, 36th Division Commander. After the conference General Keyes had a luncheon for General Clark and his Divisional Commanders. After luncheon General Clark went to General Coulter I s command post vrhere he inspected installations and met General Coulter 1 s staff. He returned back to the Fifth Army command post and worked on administrHtive matters. During the day's journey through the Fifth Arrrry area, he was greatly impressed by the improvements accomplished on road maintenance, signs and general discipline nnd appearance of troops and bivouac areas. General Clark had supper and conferred with General Gruenther and Colonel Saltzman. * * * SAN r~RCO--APRIL 27, 1944--Despite overcase and threatening \'leather the ceremony for the presentation of theater ribbons with battle stars to selected WACS and the Fifth Army Plaque and Clasp to the WAC platoon serving with Headquarters Fifth Army was accomplished. The ceremony went extremely ,,ell and was very colorful. General Clark gave an excellent speech which is quoted below: "Lieutenants Foster and Butler, Members of the Fifth Army Women I s Army Corps: "I am delighted to have the opportunity this morning to greet you again to tell you and the world how rroud we are of the splendid work you have performed during these last eight months under campaign conditions; how delighted I am to be able to award the campaign service ribbon with star to certain of your members and to be able to give to your platoon as a whole the Fifth Army Plaque and Clasp for outstanding meritorious service. "I well recall, and most of you do too, our last meeting nine months ago in North Africa when you had just arrived from the United StRtes. At that time I forecast brilliant service on your part. I well remember, during the hectic days before our Salerno landing, how excited some of you were because you knew that important preparations were in progress but did not know whether you were to participate or not. Many of you worried that the Fifth Army was running off and leaving you, but you now 1mow how impossible that was, for we needed you too badly•. So when the Fifth Army captured Naples, sent for you to resume the splendid work you had started. we "I am pleased now, after these nine months, to be :=tble to tell you how you have lived up to our hopes, expectations and standards. You have fulfilled �J. �,~~♦ "'~""· d , ~,t-:;',Jt.1; ~ .t•"' ~· .:: • 1,- "y ~ ~(.,~ ~"11 , . y ' ~ ~ ~ ·H1--~ ,,- j~ fP ~ vc~p 1 /l"P,'%:1. .1,Q.. .,,' ,,,. ~ -,..1, ~5 ly every obligation we have placed upon you. ✓~/ "Now for a glimpse of your record to date. You have released an equal number of men for more arduous duty. You have brought a bit of American womanhood into our midst which has helped us tremendously. You know that the protection and sanctification of our American women is one of the things which ,,e of the Fifth Army are fighting so hrird to preserve. Your presence made us spruce up. We were more careful of our appearance and of our language, and for my part, when I pick up the telephone now and hear one of your courteous voices I am much less impatient than before. Two officers and fiftyseven of your group came to us nine months ago. The same two offict1rs and fifty-five of that original group are still with us. W have not had a single e disciplinary case. Your appearance and conduct have been exemplary, and your contacts have always been courteous and considerate. "Your families and friends at home have every ri p:ht to be proud of your accomplishments overseas. I hope many more young American women will follow your fine pioneering example and join your organization and come to the Fifth Army, for we can use two or three hundred more throughout our Army organization. W have appropriate jobs for them, and they will relieve a corresponde ing number of able-bodied men for other combat duties and at the same time materially assist in our manpower problems back home. "Again, I want to tell you how pleasP-d I am to be with you this morning to note your fine appearance, to make this award to you and to congratulate you on the splendid work you have done and will do in the future. I am sure you will keep up your splendid record." Among the witnesses to the ceremony were selected F:nglish women of the ATS and French WACS. About 200 people witnessed the ceremony, and it was drawn up with the idea in mind of helping out with W recruiting in the United AC States. During his visit to Washington, General Clark found that the manpower problem was becoming critical, and he felt that this ceremony here would help in attracting women volunteers to this meritorfous organization. General Truscott, who was down from the beachhead, accompanied General Clark w hen he inspected the W platoon. After the ceremony Generals Clark, Truscott, GruenAC ther and Brann went into immediate conference in the hut. General Clark discussed with General Truscott the enemy situation at the beachhead and General Truscott 1 s plan for his attack during the next operation. General Truscott stayed for lunch and left for Naples w here he will rest for five days. At 1430 Generals Clark, Brann and Gruenther rode up to French Corps in General Clark's jeep. At French Corps he was received by a guard of honor which he inspected and went immediately to Gener,iJ. Juin's office. At this conference were Generals Juin, his Chief of Staf'f General Carpentier, General Keyes, II Corps Commander, his Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel Porter, Generals Clark, Gruenther and Brann. During the conference General Clark coordinated the II Corps attack and seizure of Damiano with French action on its right. Dtlmiano TTill be taken on the first day. The boundary between French Corps and I+ Corps was definitely settled. As the conference drew to an end, General ••~ ~.),ti;".>:,"';.,_ ,•~~_,'" ,J �Clark made the statement that it was one of the most pleasant and shortest) conferences that he had ever attended in that nobody argued with anybody else and everybody seemed to be in complete ~greement with everything discussed. General DeLarminat was introduced to General Clark. He commands the 1st French Infantry Division - a crack outfit that will see action on the Fifth Army front. It jncludes a brigade of the Foreign Legion. After the conference the entire group proceeded to General Juin's OP on top of the castle where an excellent view of tbe entire Garigliano front can be seen. From French Corps General Clark went to the 88th Division where he conferred with General Sloan and ma.de a detailed inspection of his staff sections at his new command post. General Clark was very much il"lJ)ressed with the neatness, protection and camouflage discipline at the command post. He congratulated General Sloan for this very fine command rost installation. From the 88th Division General Clark went to the rear echelon where he met General Sullivan, the Army f'),unrtermaster. He went through the QM, Surgeon, G-1, Officers' Bar, Officers' riless, Colonels' Mess and Chaplain's Sections. From there he returned to the forward echelon and had as dinner guests Generals Bo1·'!llan, Sullivan and Colonel Howard. After supper he worked on dispatches and signed some decorations that will be presented tomorrow when he visits the 36th Division. * * * SAN r~RCO--APRIL 28, 1944--General Clark took off by cub plane, ~ccompanied by Lt. Col. Draper, for the 36th Division. They landed at Fomigliano field and were met by General Walker, Division Commander. They proceeded by car to the Division area in the vicinity of Ferina. The first stop was at a ceremonial field where the Army Commander gave decorations to members of the J6th Division. He pinned on four DSC I s and nine Air Medals. The ceremony, while simple, was very impressive. General Cla.rk gavA a very stirring speech to those who had accomplished deeds of bravery on the battlefield. After the decoration ceremony he visited the 141st Infantry Regiment, cormnanded by Colonel Fannony. All three battalions of t:re 141st Infantry were out on either plRtoon, company or battalion exercises. General Clrirk v1ent through the area a.nd visited several kitchens. He then went to the 143rd Infantry where he inspected the area and found all battalions engaged in a showdown inspection. As General Clark walked through the e.rea, he questioned many of the enlisted men as to how long they had been in the Division and what combat experience they had. He was keenly interested in finding out how the replacements were being fitted in and comparing their statements with those of veterans. After the 143rd Infantry, he went to the medical battalion of the Division. He then went to a luncheon which was attended by Division staff officers. After luncheon he went to the 142nd Infantry and visited the various battalions which were also having a showdown inspection of clothing and equipment. He stopped by briefly at the reconnaissance troop. }~ om the reconnaissance troop he proceeded to the Division Artillery. He and Colonel Draper then took off by Division Artillery cub plane and landed at Fomigliano, where he transferred to his own cubs and went directly to the Eighth Army TAC CP. He conferred vTith General Leese, Eighth Army Commander, for about an hour and returned b;1r cub to the Fifth Anny Advap.ce GP • ~ 1 . ~ �~ i' "'" .; ~ ••. ,, , '. ,.::•:t,. He had as dinner guests General Tate, his G-4, and one of our many American Cross voltmteers. After supper General Clark walked down through his command post to confer with Generals Brann and Lewis and returned to the Chief of Staff's office before retirjng for the night. Red The following letter was received today from AFHQ regarding security of information: "1. Inf'orma tion of a secret or confidential nature will only be given to \ the French if it is necessary for them to have it in order to carry out planning ) and operations. It is the responsibility of the originating headquarters to determine whether or not information or documents are to be transmitted to the French, considering each case on its own merits. If there is any doubt as to whether the information should be transmitted or not, this headquarters should be consulted. 11 2. In all cases where documents are given to the French, the orieinating headquarters transmitting such documents will be responsible for the careful scrutiny of the material contained in them, a.nd for assuring that no more infor• mation of a secret or confidential nature than is necessary is transmitted. The greatest possible care will be taken in the case of Top Secret material. 11 3. No particulars whatsoever , having l'!ny bearinr; on projected operations from the United Kingdom, will be conveyed to the French. 11 4. All documents given to the French will carry the following WP.rning clearly printed or stamped on them: 'No information contained in this document is to be divulged to any person except in the oourse of duty. No reproduction, either whole or in part, will be made without permission from the chief of t h e * - - - - - Section, ~ - - - - - - - -•' 11 5. The foregoing ~nstructions hRVe equal a.pplication to informRtion given or transmitted to personnel or hea.dquerters of other nations. 11 *Insert designation of originating section. ~Designation of headquarters." General Clark today received the following letter from General Juin regarding the use of the 194th Artillery Group: "During our conversation of 27 April you were kind enough to assure me that thP fire of the 194th Artillery GroupMent would be placed exclusively at the disposition of the CEF for the beginning of the next operation. "On the morning of the 28th, General CHAILLET, Cormanding the C.E.F. Artillery, broached this subject to General I.EWIS. The methods of employment of the 194th Artillery Groupment could not be settled during this conference since General LEWIS had not as yet received from you the necessary directives. For the action planned, it is indispensable for me to have a.vailable a powerful reinforcement of heavy artillery fire. In fact, the terrain will make the forward displacement of Division .Artillery very difficult, and it is essential �to the success of the first phase of the operation that the CEF benefit from the support of powerful and long range Artillery fires. "Since the developnent of the plan for Artillery employment should be behonor to request that you be so kind as to give all necess~ry instructions concerning the 194th Groupment to the proper authorities." gun immediately, I have the * * * SAN MARCO--APRIL 29, 1941~--This day from the outset had promise of being a very busy one. General Clark worked on military dispatches and plans for future operations. At 1000 he received General Juin and also met GenerRl Brosset who comma.nds the 1st French Division now training in rear areas in Italy. At 1030 he went down to an open field where a very picturesque decoration ceremony took place. General Alexander, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in Italy, arrived for the ceremony to decorate Generals Clark, Gruenther, Truscott, Harmon, Hartin and four other officers of krmy Headquarters. General Clark met General Alexander at the entrance to the field. As they approached the decorees and honor guard troops, "To the General" and "Ruffles" smmded. Facing Generals Alexander and Clark were one company of French ~foroccan troops, one company of MP 1 s, color guards with the three Allied flags (French, British and American) and the decorees. Generr-ils Alexander and Clark reviewed the troops, and General Alexander then rroceeded to p±n on General Clark's chest the ribbon designating him a Knight of the British Empire. After thr-it he decorated Generals Gruenther, Truscott and Harmon as Companions of the BBth, and four other officers, General T•-!artin, Colonel Saltzman, Col. Smith Rnd Major Connor, received the Order of the British Empire . Following this presentation, General Clark then decorated five French officers and soldiers, one of whom received the Distinguished Service Cross and the remaining Silver Stars, one British officer with a Soldier's Medal, four Legion of Merits, of which one was General Bradshaw, Fifth Army Antiaircraft Officer, one Silver Star and three Air Medals. After the ceremoriy General Clark went irnmediately to his van where he conferred with Generals 'l'ruscott and Harmon concern:i.ng future operations at the beachhead. After that he received General Beucler of the French Mission and General 0 1Daniel, Commander of the 3rd Division. Genernl 0 1 DPniel stayed for lunch. After lunch General Clerk went out to inspect ordnance units, accomp1mied by Colonel Niblo, Fifth Army Ordnance Officer, and Colonel Artamanoff. The itinerary included a visit to the followin>1, units: 109th Ordnance CornpPny, ?630th Ordnance Group, 188-th Ordnance Battalion, 94th Ordnance Company, 3485th Ordnance Compa,ny, 86th Ordnance Company, 93rd Ordrumce Company, 477th Ordrnmce Company, 29th Ordnance Company, 42nd Ordnance Battalion and 3488th Ordnance Company. All of these ordnance compr-inies except the ?9th Ordnance Company support Corps and Army troops. The ?9th supports the 88th Division. As they visited these various ordnance units, most of them were busily engaged in rna.intenance and repairs. Two of these outfits, the 901st and 94th, were celebrating overseas anniversaries. The others could be seen working on various types of field artillery rnajntem:mce such Hs, packing of equiliberators for our big guns. 'T'he Ordnance has quite e problem in thllt they need repacking every two weeks and just recently they have been bringing the equiliberators �back to the ordnance repair areas rather the.n doing j t ,=it the gun position, believing that this will be more satisfactory. When a tube requires ch~nging the whole gun is brought back nnd a re:rleceT'lent is sent up so thr-it at no time is a battery minus one of its guns or howitzers. At the 3485th Company mechanics were busily engaged in repairing motors and tanks. At this company the General witnessed an experiment in the mounting of one of the infantry 105 howitzers in a dukw. This improvisation is being done to rrovide some means for giving effective fire support in assr-iulting beeches. GenerPl Clark was very interested in this project and said that he always thought that it we.s feasible and that he thought it WPS a tremendous advantage for troops assaulting a beach. At the 93rd Ordnance Company, wM ch supports Army antiaircraft troops, the General went through the small arms section where 50 caliber mA.chine guns were being worked on. The GenerPl asked whPt seemed to be the greatest dH..,i culty and was told that extractors caused the Most trouble. He then went over to where the men were preparing dj~ectors for qo mm guns, and he stopped for some period of time to look over the multiple 50 caliber machine gun mount, the M51. The M51 has a ,lower silhouette than the former one anr appears to be a good weapon. It packs four 50 calibers. At the 477th Ordnance Company he saw sorne of the big t~nk retriever trucks. This is a truck tractor rrime mover wjth a huge silhouette. The carriage mounts 1/2 inch armor plate. The tank retrievers can go up in forward a.ref's and bring out damaged tanks. At the ?9th Ordnance Company, which suprorts the 88th Division, General Clark remarked on hoi:r little activity seemed to be taking place there. He was told thAt the ordnance company of the 88th Divfaion is a very good company and, in addition, they had practically finished up with third echelon maintenance for that division. '--- I The entire trip entailed much walking. Colonel Cabelle, Orommce Officer of T'lBS accompanied General Clark, until he WPS too tired to carry on. After I the ordnance inspection General Clark returned home, worked on d7srt1tches and prepared to attend the Army show, "This Is The Arny" which was gjven in the Allied Military Theater at Santa MCJ.ria. There he met Hr. Berlin, who came up to his box just rrior to the start of the s},ow. General Clark enjoyed the show very much and t1fterwards went backstage to congratulate the cast. He returned __I home at 10 o'clock and retired. v>l"v-~c ~ .rN"' JrvJ._ ~ - t::l~c, r . Y"'"v~ * ~~ * \ff!.~"' ~~ * (i SAN MARCO--AFRIL 30, 1944--General Clark had H meeting in the hut at 0930 to discuss preparations for the Army Commanders I meeting at AAI Headquarters on tomorrow, Nay 1. Present vrere Generals Gruenther, Brann, Lt. Col. Hansborough, ✓ Colonel Howard, Colonel Saltzman, Colon~l Paxson and Lt. Col. Draper. At this conference the first discussion centered on the air plan for the attack. General Clark wanted to make certain that on D day large headquarters of the Boche such as Arny and Corps would receive cnreful attention by the Air Coryis. Also , General Clark emphasized that he succeeded on having the air effort on a 50-50 basis and not 70-30 in favor of the highth Army, as previously planned. This caused considerable controversy and bickering. General Clark jnsisted that the air effort be divided between the two arrdes. ' : ,Pf, • ". t ;£ ·,,,... • ,. I~\ • '>i ~ J �30 Colonel Hansborough pointed out that the air pll}.n was divided :i.nto four phases . In the f'irst phase the first priority would be tsolation of the battlefield by sustained attacks at the road center at Itri-Pontecorvo-~spcria road and to deny the use of the San Giovanni - Pico road . The second priority is counter battery targets as requested by corps , priority being given to FEC . The third prjority is close support targets as. requested 11y corps with the priority going to FEC . The second phase gives first priorjty to the continuation of isolation of the bAttlefield . Second rriority will be close support targets in the vicinity of La Civita , Spigno and Ausonia , witb the rriority going to FEC . The second phase gives first priority to tre continuation of isolation of the battl~field . Second y,r:i ori ty will be close support tArgets in the vicinity of La Civit a , Spigno and Ausonja , with the rriority going to II Corps . The third priority goes to counter battery targets . In the third phase the first priority will be a continuation of isolAtion of the bA.ttlefield . Second nr:i ority will be counter battery targets, :md third rriority will be close support targets . A parachute drop night be undertPken during tris phase. This would take prfority over all other tasks . In the fourth phase the first priority will be continuation of isolation of the battlefield . Second priority will be counter battr:iry targets , Pnd the third rrfority will be close support targets . General ClPrk brought out thPt we will not nsk the air to do what the artillery can do . Targets within our rPnge will not be Pttacked by the air except rossibly soMe counter battery missions . Col. Hans- / borough briefly discussed the counter battery missions thnt the Air Corps would accomplish , cb1efly concentrating on larger caliber guns out of our artillery range . I The artillAry plan was discussed next. General Lewis stated th1=1t until he received the divisions ' fire plan and the boundary limits were settled he could not rresent his complete Prtillery plan . He showed General ClPrk fire possibilities for various cal i bers of the artillery with the Army. This f1re possibility chart was genernl in scope , showing the sectors of fire of 155 guns , 8" howitzers, 240mm howitzers , 155 and 105 hovrit zers . The artillery officer stated there would be no rreparation prior to H hour and that our fire plrm cai bs for Artillery fire to start as soon as our infantry cross their line of r'eparture at H hour . General I ewis then brought up the contrbversy concerning the 194th Artillery Group which occupies rositions in the Ejghth Army's zone of action . This group has two 155 gun battalions, the 633rd and 985th , one 21..0 battalion, the 698th less one battery, and one 8 11 howitzer battalion , the 995th . General Lewis brought out that the only support at H hour given in Eighth Army zone of action cornrrised counter battery, whic}, is, in rMlity, support for the Fifth Army, becAuse these hostile rieces can and do fire in the Fifth ArMy zone of action . This counter battery is desjred by the French also , who agree that jt is necessary for their ovm support . All F.ighth Arrny' s calls for fire for the 194th Group are to be clMred through the ti'rench after the injtial pre- arranged fires agreed on at H hour are fired. The ?.40mm howitzers of this group have an Army string tied on them in that Army has priority on their use for special missions such as bridge busting. General Lewis bronfsht out the fact thr-t the only battalion of this grou:r th11t the British can expect is the gu battA.lion, the 985th, which has its center 15ne so fixed that it can rMcl 1 out and tAke targets under fire on the reverse slore of Monastery Hill nnd that vj cini ty. He empha.sized thl't all calls for fire from Ej gbth Army will be cleared through the French. General Chaillet , Artillery Officer for FEC , wanted one 155mm gun battalion to change its center line so - �31 that it could reach Ausonia and answer calls for fire :in that vicinity. This has been done. As it stands now, the 194th Group is prepRred to furnish complete support to Fifth Army requirements, specifically the French. General Lewis stated that the Eighth Army Artillery Officer was agreeable a.nd easy to do business with, but the artillery officer of 13 Corps was not. Much of the difficulty arose between tre artillery of'ficer of 13 Corps not being able to ( coorerate and coordinPte wjth the French. This was due mostly to the fact \ thrit the French did not completely understPnd our neaning of the word attachment, mean:ing th~t the 194th Group being attached to them is at their disposal and also they entertain some distrust of the British. The British,· in turn, were trying to get all the support that they could expect from the 194th Group and even riore. Much of the difficulty lies in misunderstanding of the term attachment. In any case, where artillery can fire beyond the limits of \ its boundarfos, it is normal that they fire such contingent f'lissions in order to strengthen this possible weak point, and if it were not for the fact that discussions involved British, French and our troops, there ·,ould undoubtedly J be no difficulty. It would consist merely of cooreration bl'ltween adj?cent divisions, corps and armies, a.nd artillery carable of firing outside of those boundaries would natural.ly give support outside of the boundary when asked for if it did not interfere with primary missions in its own zone of action. One advantage of th~ 194th Grour's present position, as brought out by General Levris, was thPt l'lS the advl'lnce continues and cHsplacement becomes necessary, there are many excellent positions up the Liri Valley for the 194th Group from which it can better support the continued action of the French up the mountainous terrain. General Lewis stated h!'l felt conficent thr,t after the meeting toriorrow between General Chaillet, Artillery C'fficer of the FEC, and the 13 Corps Artillery Officer all difficulties would be solved and flny bickering as to where the 194th Group was to fire during the attack would be eliminated. I General Clark then discussed w:i th General Brann and General Gruenther specific questions and decisions to be answered and decided upon at the meeting at AAI Headquarters tomorrow; such questions as D day, H hour, further plans as the attack progresses which would involve oommitment of reserves or water-borne troop movements for attacks inland. General Clark studied air photographs of numerous beaches. These were assembled and explained by Colonel Paxson, Rngineer Executive. General Clark stated that any new beachhead established would be within supporting distance or oommitted with the certainty of its being quickly merged in with the attacking front. He wanted no P3rt of any repetition of an Anzio beachhead. Likely defensive lines that the Ger:rrens could or might establish were discussed as well as general lines of action open to the Fifth Army as the attack progressed. General Clark brought out that at the meeting tomorrow he didn't want to be pinned down as to what his intentions would be or how he would ciispose his farces at any specific time or when any specific line was reached. He emphasized that any such questions 'directed to him along those lines he would answer that they all would depend on the enemy situation and where his forces were disposed at tre time. Anything that required getting out the crystal ball to answer specific questions of this sort would be dealt wj th in thl't manner. Colonel Paxson was asked about opening up Highway #7 to Rome. He said it would be merely a matter of putting up Bailey bridges w!:f re thJ permans knocked out any along the road. He emphasized that the~ wt\i/"iand along �both sides of the road precluded any troop movements or operations except on the road. General Clark then examined the maps that were to be taken down to AAI Headquarters and pointed out changes that he desired to be made. The conference closed with Generals Clark, Brann and Gruenther conferring alone. When General Clark returned to his van, he received Generl'11 Kingman, Chief of the French Rearmament Committee, who was accomponied by Colonel L'Huillier. After General Kingman left, General Cl1'1rk received seven officers sent down from UK to observe on this front. ~ At 11+00 General Clark had two war correspondents, Graham Hovey of International News Service, and Jim Roper, of United rress, plus Colonel Clark and Captain Reardwood into the hut to discuss a censorship matter that arose yesterday in connection with the decoration ceremony. Hovey, Roper and George Tucker of the Af' all ,1rote terse stories on tr, e decoration ceremony because of the fact that the names of three of the people receiving awards were not releasable: Generals Harmon, Truscott and Bradshaw. All of them attached notes to their copy, letting their offices know thAt the brevity was caused because of their objection to censorship restrictions. General Clark felt that he should 1mow when such matters were disturbing the correspondents, so he had Hovey and Roper in for a discussion of the matter. Hovey said the.t he felt there was no reason why the names of Truscott, Harmon and Bradshaw could not be released. He saio that he felt that the censors had been picayunish concerning many matters, and General ClPrk told the two correspondents that he would do everything he could to help them if they would only bring their problems to him. He pointed out, however, that censorship matters were under AAI and AFHQ, but he was willing to swing his weight when tbe cause was just. Hovey and Roper said that they had no quarrel to pick with Fifth Army or the PRr set-up; that they felt they had been very well treated in that respect, but that there were man:r censorship natters that caused cnnsiderable concern. After discussing censorship with the two oorrespondents, General Clnrk told them that a large scale attack by Fifth Army was imminent and · that he planned on having all the correspondents up f'or P buffet supper, probably Thursday night, at wrich time he would give them a 1lriefing on the proposed plan. After concluding his talk with Roper and Hovey, General Clark went to his van with Colonel Clark and Captain Beardwood and said that it was imperative that they keep their fingers on the press pulse so that he ·would know if anything was disturbing the correspondents. He pointed out that in the case of the closing of' the Anzio radio he car-ie in for a lot of criticism when he had had nothing to do with it, and he felt that the actions of Hovey, Roper and Tucker might also result in criticism of his handling of censorship - a matter which is out of the Fifth ArMy bailiwick. Later in the afternoon General Clerk saw General Bradshaw and left at 1845 for General Eaker•s Headquarters at Caserta where he had sup~r. General Spaatz, Commander of the Air Forces in the Mediterranean Theater, was also present. General Clark returned back to tre conmwnd post and visi tcd General Brann, a.s well as General Gruenther, prior to retir:ing at 2245. * * SAN MARCO--MA.Y 1, 1944--General Clark was awakened today, his 48th birthday, by the Fifth Army Band pla.ying a medley of songs depicting his life in music. �33 Just as soon as the General had buzzed Chaney, the band, fbnked by most of the officers in the forward command post, blared out with the songs. By the time the band was playing "Over There 11 to denote the General's service overseas, the Fifth Army Commander came out of his van. Over his trousers and underwear he was wearing a raincoat a.nd had on his· slippers. He made an extemporaneous speech to his officers and men, telling them how much he appreciated their loyalty and the fact that they would so thoughtfully remember him on his birthday. He added that there was still much to be done in this war, and he felt that some day before the war ended a great many of the Fifth Army would see action in the South Pacific. He said that he knew there were many of us who desire this. As the General came out of the van the band played "Ruffles, Flourishes and To The General", e.nd as re storted to re-enter, they opened up with "The Old Gray r.Tare, She Ain't What She Used To Be". General Clark grinned, knowing that this was an idea of General Gruenther's, since the same piece was played at General Clark's 47th birthday party in Oujda last year. Following breakfast, General Clark conferred w:ith Maj. Gen. Hawkesworth who is taking command of the 1st British Division. General Hawkesworth already knows General Clark, as he had h.ad command of a division under General HcCreery in 10 Corps. Gener2l Clark then conferred vrith General Gruenther to straighten out last-minute detajls prior to his neparture for Caserta to attend General Alexander's staff conference. At 1020 Generals Clark and Gruenther left in General Clark's car for Caserta. Generals Brann and Tate had left a ljttle earlier. Following a thorough discussion of the coming concerted drive by the Fifth and Eighth Armies, General Clark and his staff members attended a luncheon given by General Alexander. The Fifth ~my Commander then went to the road landing strip just north of the castle at Caserta and took off in his L-5 for his command post. J After going through his papers, he flew to Mnndragone v·here he h2s a seaside villa. General Clark spent the latter part of the afternoon dovm there enjoy-lng rela:xation on his birthday. Guests at the villa were Generals Sullivan, Brann and Lewis, Colonels Saltzman and Draper and Misses Moen and Berney of the American Red Cross. The more hardy people, including General Clark, nent swimming in the Tyrhenian Sea, despite the fact that it was rather cold. General Clark returned to the command post at 1800 and went to his van where he got ready for the birthday party being given in his honor by the headquarters officers. At 1850 he went to the hut where all the guests were assembled and a huge buffet supper had been spread. The guests -included the heads of all the sections in Fifth Army, plus other more or less close friends of the General. Following cocktails, the General and his guests had a cold buffet and vrere entertained by members of a USO troupe who had also been guests at the buffet. General Clark retired to his van at about 2230. General C:!.;o.rk received the following letter from his staff o+-'fj_cers: "On the occasion of your birthday today, we the heads of your staff sections not only wish you the many happy returns of the day vrhich we all desire, but seize avidly- this opportunit:,. to express to you, as a group and as indivi- �3Y duals , some th~_ngs which we all feel very strongly. " It gives us great pleasure to have such e chance to tell you v1hat an honor j_t is to serve under you on your staff and how proud we are of you , of the Fifth Army and of its Headquarter·s. It is a rare l onor and rrivilege to work under your foresighted and vigorous leadership in a headquarters which, under your euidance , has a rerutation throughout the Arny for extraordinary harmony and efficiency. Our pride is equally great in being members of a field force which has sho,.,m itself to be so effective in battle . "This occasion provides us also ·6 th a v'elcome opportunity to express to you our deep appreciation of the consideration and loyalty which you unfailingly show to your staff officers as individuals . One of the harpiest aspects of serving on your staff is the knowledge each of us has that our Army Cornnander is our personal friend who , in tbe midst of his heavy responsibilities and eY..acting and time-consuming duties , is never too busy to be thoughtfully concerned with the welfare of the individuals composing his staff . The 1mowledge that this is so cements our personal loyalty to you and inspires us with the desire to give to .you and to the Fifth Army the best of v,hich we are capable in the busy da:rs that remP.in between now end complete victory. 1 "We erlend to you our heartiest birthday congratulations and express to you our conf:i dent wishes that your future undertakings may continue to be outstandingly successful and that you and your family will enjoy a full measure of health and happiness . " General Cl a:t"k tode.y received an jnformation copy of the following cable from General Alexander to General Wilson : mr 0 , 2632 . As you know it is an essential feature of my plan for DIA DEM that Fifth Arny should hold 36th u. S. Division in reserve ready to operate on the main front or in the bridgehead According to the Vff'Y in which the battle develops . It is impossible to fix precisely when the decision whether to commit 36th U. S. Division can be tr-ken. It cannot in any case be before DIADEM D plus 2 but it may be any day after that . If decision is to employ 36th U. S. Division in the bridgehead it is most important from surprise and security aspects that it should be moved there at fastest possible rate . The necessary craft to lift 36th U. S. Division should therefore be standing by at Naples from DIADEM D plus 2 until decisj_on where to commit 36th U. S. Division has been taken . I understand that this may def er date at which brassard can be launched , but I consider that must be accepted. It has always been a cardinal condition of BRASSARD that it should not in any way interfere with resources required for main battle . I therefore request that arrangements be made for 15 1ST and 18 LCI(L) to be standing by in Naples from DIADEM D plus 2 until decision where to commit 36th U. S. Division has been taken . DIADEM requires maximum support by naval bombardment . It is understood from FOVJIT that this may not be forthcoming unless 3rd Divi sion mine sweeping M/LS are retained and not sailed for BRASS/\RD on 15 May. I shall be glad of earliest confirmation tha.t the lift for 36th U. s. Division will be available as indicated above and that the minesweeping M/IS will not be wi_ thdravm. DIADEM D and H hour follow by special lett er by hand of Liaison Officer. " 11 �~ ~ s"''~·.·t""u-~ ~;;.,._-,. • tro ,&-' '·~ 1 ~ r- ~ '.'.a -~ ✓~~~~ .~ / ~~ ,-J y· ~ c,/''f' \V° ..,_, •✓1- 1 yr- ..- ~UV.I' ,,--/ _ .r . ..J. r ·,-., ~ , ~ 35 r W-c:~ 0V" ~~-_g_;_~ <<.;.,..~('-v" I • ~ tJ-- V ;:_yi :,,,,- I v 1:.- ~~ y ) SAN MARCO--MA.Y 2, 1941,--General Clark left the command post early to make an inspection visit to the 85th Division. He proceeded to the junction of Highway /fl and Rout e #?14 where he was met by General Coulter, the Division -Commander . The party consisted of two jeeps . They proceeded forward across the Garjgliano at increased distances and visited the 328th Field Artillery Battalion command post , comnanded by Lt . Colonel rerkins . This battalion is in direct support of the 337th Infantry. General Clark visited the command post proper and the fire c1 irectio:n center . He met there Tiaster Sergeant Reed who had served with General Bolles . General Cll"rk immediately recognized Sergeant Reed as he reported to the Army Commander outside of the command post . After leaving the command post Genere.1 Clc1rk went to C Battery posi tion area and inspected all gun pits and questioned the cannoneers . From C Battery he went to the comnand post of the 337th Infantry commanded by Colonel Ollie Hughes . General Clnrk immediately asked for a map showing the regimental dispositions which were explained to him by Colonel Hughes . He also asked to be shown briefly the regimental plan for the next attack. ~•· . ) - ~ ~ I t . , .✓ J-" From the comrnmd post of the 337th, General Clark proceeded to the command post of the 3rd Battalion colTll'l.anded by Colonel Smith , where he reviewed again battalion dispositions and future plans for offensive action. From the battalion coMmand post he went to K Company corunand post where he discussed company dispositions and counter attack plans . From K Company he walked cross country to Tufo . On the way he passed by a machine gun platoon of Company M and talked with the platoon commander , Lt . Hughes . In Tufo he visited the OP of the 2nd Bn., of the 337th and also the OP of the 913th Field Artillery Battalion, a direct support battalion of the 88th D:ivision which was furnishing general support to the 85th Di vision at this particular time . General Clerk then proceeded to the command post of the 138th Infantry where he talked to Colonel Safay, Regimental Commander . They d1scussed regimental dispositions , future offensive action of the regiment and also , General Clark particularly asked to what extent the regiment could make use of tanks . He stated that he wanted tanks to be used wherever feasible , regardless of losses , because he has plenty of tanks and has 100 replacement tanks . From the 338th Infantry General Clark and party left for the Division command post where they had lunch. After llmch General Clark proceeded to the rear area of the 85th Division and was met enroute by Colonel Brady, Commander of the 339th Infantry which was in a rest area west of Mondragone . The regiment was assembled in an open field . As soon as General Clark arrived he mounted a speaker ' s platform and gave a very inspiring talk to the 339th Infantry in which he welcor.1.ed then and the Division to the Fifth Army, stating that he was very proud to have them; that they were very fortunate to have undergone the excellent training thct they had had in the United States and that this additional combat phase in a quiet sector could also be considered as excellent additional training. He felt certain that the Division was ready for combat and asserted thet he had no fears whatsoever in committing them for hard, offensive and aggressive action. After the short talk General Clark proceeded to a demonstration where he witnessed a platoon in the attack against bunkers and a i'ortified house . After the demonstration General Cla.rl•· was guided by General Sullivan to the 98th Railhead Company. This railhead company was operating a truckhead for ration breakdovm. The truckhead company is assisted by the 3062nd Labor CoJilpany, whose company area was also inspected by �the General. He was very pleased to find the Fifth Army Plaque for excellence displayed . From there General Clark proceeded to the 815th Sterilization and Bath Company vrhere he sav, the complete cycle of where a man comes in dirty, takes off his clothes , gets a good hot shower , co!'1es out , dries M mself off and gets a complete new outfit of clean clothes . A tired and dirty soldier comes out a clean and presentable looking soldier . This unit can handle 1600 men a day, but on Easter Eve it handled 2100 . From there the General visited the 110th QM Bakery- Company cormanded by Captain ~nest . He inspected installations and commended Captain Ernest for his initiative . He also se.w the Fifth Army plaque for excellence which was displayed with three clasps for January, February and March . From the Bakery Company he vrent to the 230th Sl'l.lva.ge Collectine Company commanded by Captain North . This salvage collecting company has done excellent work. General Clark -inspected every phase of its £Jctivity and commended Captain North very highly for his initiative and judgment in handling this most important function of salvage collection Rnd rerair of all ty-pes of clothing and equipment which , in some cases , had the appearance of being hopelessly unusable forever. During the past months this conpany has salvaged and repaired over $13 , 000, 000 worth of equipment and materiel. General Clark then proceeded to the 86th Depot Compe.ny commanded by Major Lazarus where Class II and IV supplies are stored and issued . The last quartermaster installation, the 3839th QM Gas Supply Company, comnanded by Captain Hiller , was then visited by the General. This is where gt'soline and oil are placed in conta.iners from pipe lines and are ready for distribution forward . General Clark returned to his command post where he worked on dispatches and had as his dinner guest General Adcock, G-4, NATOUSA, and General Tate , his G- 4 . After supper he worked some more on important papArs and retired . The Army Commander today received the follovring cable of congratulations on his birthday from the Prime rflinister: "Many Happy Returns of the Day. 11 * * * SAN MARCO--MAY 3, 1944--General Clark left the command post at 0830 to fly by cub to the II Corps cub field . J-ie made the flight in a total elapsed time of five minuteft . At the cub field he was met by General Keyes , II Corps Commander , and General Sloan, 88th Division Commander . He inspected a cub plane which had been improvised to drop supplies to maintain troops in isolated spots and a cub ambulance arrangement. The plane had a separate attachment for dropping supplies . The general principle is that the pilot pulls a release and m8.kes a slight brink to the right , causing the :rackage to slip off rollers out the cub door to the ground. There is a baffle plate on the left side preventing the package from Mtting the wing struts . To use a cub as an ambulance this device is removed and the patient pl~ced on a flat pa'.nel board with his feet toward the tail. In order to pick the patient up , a special canvas ty-pe litter is improvised . It is only an experiment, and further tests will be made . From the II Corps cub field General Clark and GenerPl Sloan, accompanied by Colonel Draper , left for the 88th Division front line units . Two jeeps I \ �lllfllllr were in the par ty, and t hey crossed the ferry over the Garigliano at about 0915 , the time generally reserved by the Boche for shelling. The crossing was made . wit hout incident except t hat the motor failed to start on the ferry at the beginning. Cnce a cross the G;:irigliano , the jeeps were taken ?S far for ward as allowable . The road is under obser vation from the Boche frol'l severHl directions . The jeeps were parked in an old stone house , and the party continued on foot to the 350th Infantry command post , a walk of about two miles . General Clark dis cussed wit h Col onel Lynch, regimental commander , his regiment al dispositions and plans for the next attack. General Clark emphe.sized again the fact that he wanted tanks used and discussed with Colonel Lvnch his tentative plans for their employment . Col onel Lynch called in Colonel Frey who is attached to the regiment and was formerly w:th the Prmored force . Colonel Frey briefly Axplained to Gener.<il Clark how he would recomriend the t,-,nks be used . In general , they would att ack in platoon strengt}1 find, where terrain permitted, in company strength . They would assault a M 11 , gain the p:round , and the infantry would quickly follow up and hold . The tanks , in the meantime , could be used to assist other infantry units attacking up precipitous terrain to the flanks , b~ infil aded fire . After leaving the 350th Infe.ntry command post General Clark proceeded dovm to a detachment of the 351st Infantry which is attached to Colonel Lynch. This consists of L, Hand K Companies under the command of T:a.,ior T':a:vrokas . Re has K Company rrotecth1g a l ikely avenue of approach by the Boche with three platoons in line . P Company h2.s its machine guns sighted for close sun,ort . L Conpany was in the reRr in reserve . In f'..ddition , this cetabhment has three tanks spaced at about 200 yard intervals along the road ready to oppose any counter-attack. General Cl?rk vrent up to the nost forward elements rmd viewed Castelforte and the interven:ing terrain vrM ch is "No rran I s Land1t at the prese'1.t tine . He discussed with Hajor f'!avrokas pe.trol activities and f 01.md that lj ttle information has been deter mined with regard to enemy activi ties in the vicinity of Castelforte . He met Colonel Coleman, Commander of the 3rd Battalion, which is held in reserve of the 350th Infantry. He discussed with him his role as a reserve bRtt e.lion . Gener 2l Clark continued his discussions w:tth Col. Lynch, and when he found that the 350th was planning to attack Damiano in column of companies he desired thPt this plan be reconsidered . Pe wanted an attack rnflde on 2 broader front and with more strength. At 1130 the party proceeded bacl< to the 38th Division command rest wl ere luncheon was served for General Clark, General Keyes e.nd members of the 88th Di vision staff. Aft"?r hmch GenorP-1 Clark left for a decoretion ceremony and also to address t '!0 regir1ents of the 88th Division in reer areas . On the way he inspe cted an improvised dental laboratory devised from a salvaged 2- 1/? ton truck. 1 As General Clark approached the assembly area of the two regiments , the 349th and 351st with other divisi on att achments , the troops were assembled in front of a reviewing platrorm. The troops were in command of Generfll Kendall, Assistant Division Commander , who called them to attention, anc , as General Clark stood on the reviewinr platforn "Ruffles and To The Generali' were rlayed by the band. He was introduced to the troors by General Sloan . In his introduction , General Sloan presented the Army Cor:unander to his men and , in turn, his men to the Army Commander . He mentioned thet General Clark nas one of his students at Fort Leavenworth, and that fa.ct gave him added pride in presenting t o his men General Clark. General Clark, in acknowlerging General Sloan ' s introduction , also mentioned the fact that be:ing his instructor, if he did nake ' ' ··" ' ,,,, ~ ~- ) t~ ,'. :~~ "',t • u �any tactical mistakes he had en out because of this fact. After bis talk Gen8ral Clark presented the DSC to Lt . La.mb - the first DSC to be given to a \ member of the 88th Division. Lt . Lamb's citation indicated his bravery and courage while leading a sri.all patrol into eneJ11y territory . The assembled mer.1 of the 38th Division were a very enthusiastic audience and cheered after General Clark ' s very stirring talk to them . As General Clark left , the troops were called to attention, and he left imnediately for Mondragone vrhere he had about an hour I s relc'lxation on the beach r>nd then worked on some hundred odd decoration cases . While f1t Hondragone , General Crittenberger arrived to confer with General Clark for about half an hour . General Clark left by cub plane for the Fifth Army command post at 1800 v,here he conferred with General Gruenther and Colonel Saltzman. After supper he vTOrked again on administrative matters and retired at about 2200 . General Clark today replied to the Prime Minister ' s cable of birthday congratulations as follows: RH 8723 . "Your kind birthday message deeply appreciated . " . ;--t. ·• * * :Jr~~ c-.~ r'J'-~y;:_~.Yu~1:.'I: .~ ..(,,,>;:" r-WP ~ ~ ,J--- .o ..l-' j'-"- , er'" ru,..,....._ v--- . , • .J r---:"" ~ SAN MARCO- -MAY 4 , 1944- -General ClErk left the command rost at 0830 for a full day ' s visit to the French Expeditionary Corps . He arrived at Sessa at 0855 and was presented with a guard of honor which he inspected with General ,Juin and immediately started for the 4th iiountain Moroccan Division command post at Cescheto . Colonels Draper and Kammerer accompanied Generals Clrrk and Juin. At the 4th Moroccan Division they were met by General Sevez who presented General Clark to his staff . General Clark renewed his acquaintance with Colonel Bauffre , Chief of Staff to General Sevez, whom he ha.d knovm in Africa . Colonel Bauffre speaks English quite well and had been to the United States where he had called upon General Clark's son at West Point . General Sevez then conducted the party to his observation post on some commanding terrain near his command post. The visibility was poor, but an effort was m11de to point out the terrain over v1hich the next attack will be conducted . Such features as Mount .Cairo , San Ambrogio , Hount r~ajo , Pount Rotundo and Damiano were pointed out . The party then returned to the command post where General Clark went over the troop dispositions under General Sevez' command. He pointed out th11t he had under his command at present elements from the 1st rloroccan Division which were in their place in the ljne on the right . This Division r•rill be under the command of General Brosset . In the center were el~ments of the 2nd Moroccan Division under the command of General Dody. On the left were elements of the 4th Mountain Moroccan Division under tr e OOillPln.nd of General Sevez . Elements of these three divisions were actually occupying the line so that on the day of the attac1<: these troops would be familiar w:i th the terrain in their zones of action from the line of departure. General Clark then vrent into detail as to tb e direction of attack and the maneuvers J'l"cessary to capture initial objectives Pnd follow up action s. This was done so that General Clark could rersonP lly familiarize himself with all details of the French Expec1itionary Corps efforts in the attack. Colonel Bauffre acted as 4 nterprt"!ter for General Clark. Geri eral Cl9.r1<: wanted to point out that �39 the entire front, both Eighth and Fifth Army, were going to attack simultaneously and aggressively. Jt was rointed out that once the French had attained Mount j•ajo, speed and surprise was necessary to capture objectives in the vicinity of Ausonia and further developments from that point northwest to ri(ount D'Oro. General Clark also dj scussed the coordi netion required with actions of the French Corps as concerned the .Attack on Deniano by the 88th Division and thP-ir further actions in seizing the terrain in the Yicj nity of Spigno . He w:i shed to point out that the II Corps was not attacking according to any schedule but thnt they were going to pusl~ aggressively forward so tl at all troops would not be waiting for others to grdn certain objectives. He also dj scussed with General Sevez the employment of tanks in tl·e ettack and indicated thflt he desir~d tanks to be used aggressively and wherever terrain permitted, regardless of losses, because he would have replacements . He also discussed artillery dispositions and verified the fact th8t any British requests for fire in the Eighth Army zone of action from artillery with the Frencr.1 Corps would be first cleared through French Corps. These discussions finished, the party then left for the front, crossing the Garigliano at wrat is knoin as the Pont Jaguar. ,I In approaching this bridge, the party traveled over~ ro?d mAde by French eng:ineer trnops. It was an excellent engineering job and was very well camouflaged. After crossing the Garigliano, the rarty nroceeded to the right flank of the French bridgehead ::-cross the Garigliano where Generals Clark, Juin, Sevez and Colonel Draper visitP-d a company occupying the front line. This company belonged to the 4th Regiment of General Dody's 2nd rbroccan Division. It had attached to it some American tanks which were well camouflaged and sheltered along a side mountain road very close to the front line. This company e.nd the tanks were so disposed as to react immediately to any oounter-attack down this road of approach by the Boche . The visibility was not very good, and very little terrain could be viewed. The party went as far forward as was pos~ible without breaking too much defilade. German posts were only nbout 300 yArds from their position. General Clrirk paused a few minutes ·to talk to members of an American tank crew and renarkl'ld that the terrain was good for t::inks ·and wished them good luck, sayinP' thrt re knew th,'lt they would do well. The party thlcln proceeded over a raid, which hA.d recently been opened for trucks to the ?nd Regim"'nt of the 4th Mountain Moroccan Division. This road was a rmle trail when the sector was occup:ied by the British and was improved by the French to a ,jeep trail and then to a rDl:'d passable for trucks. This also represented excellent engineerjng work. At the :?nd R~giment there was a small guard . o~ ronor which was presented to Gener~l Clark, and he talked w:ith Colonel Buot de L'Epine. He was also introduced to Colonel Tolle, ComMander of the 8th RTM of the 2nd Moroccan Division. Colonel Molle is considered R fj ne col11rlander and has been given a difficult sector to attack over. At tMs point Generel ClRrk inspected an ) advance surgical unit which was rrepared to hPndle seriously wounded rnen who needed il'llJ'lediate at tent ion before being taken back to the rear. The French had planned an evacuation by cub plane from t} is point. From there tr e rart~r vrent forward to one of the battalions of the 2nd Regiment and inspected dispositions and routes used in the mountai_ns. The party proceeded back to the Go.rigliano by a different road wr ich had recently ½een improved for trucks ½y the French. It made P comylete circuit of the Frenc1 bridgehead over the Garigliano. On reac} ~ng the Garigliano Gen"lrRl Clark was conducted thro 1gh tl--ie ~h ~•edical Batta lion I s insta] lation. He viewed the 1 �operat:i.ng rooms and wards ,,,here wmmded were kept prior to being sent back to the evacuation hospital . This bnttnl:ion was the org~.nj c nedical battalion of the L~th }fountain Moroccan Division. Fror, here the party proceeded to Sessa where they had lunch in General Juin ' s P1ess . The lunch was quite ~laborate, as is customary witr the French , cons:i sting of f:i_ ve courses . Those present were Generals Clark, Juin and Carpentier, Colonels Kammerer and Drap~r and Lieutenant.s de Noblee, Vrois:3art and ratrico . After luncl1 the party we:nt to visit the Gouras . They were met by General Guillaume , Commander of tl'e Goums, who had lim,d up as guard of honor mounted elements of the Goums . Bugles r:ind drums rendered the necessary honors as General Clark inspected the tr,~ops . Genere.l GuillauJne then introduced to Gene ral Clark three of his Group Commarders, Colonel LeBlanc of t},e 1st Group of Gourns, Colonel Soulard of the 2nd and Colonel ~~assiet Dubies of the 3rd Group . Thi'! 4th Group Conmander was not m·esent, Colonel DeLatour. G"3neral Clrrrk explained bri"'fly to these Group Commanders tre situation as it now exi_sted on the Garigliano front and at the beachhMd. He told them that rie had recently visited the ';~r and 85th Divisions and fennel that they were eager and anxious for the 0>1~0..,.,-ing attack, and l'.e assured everyone trat it was going to be an allout effort, nnd he was confident thn.t the Gou.TJ1s vrould carry out their rart well . He also ri-ma.rked that while he was in the United States he had talked with President Roosevelt ancl thet the latter was very :interested to know how the French were doing and that he , General Clark, told the President tha.t they were mngni:!:icent ; thnt they were excel l~nt ffrrhters .nnd had done well and, in addition , he told Fres:i.d ent Roosevelt that General Juin was do.:ng a sr lendid job; and that in his opinion there was and could not be a better choice as a col"lmander of the French troops than Gener/31 Juin . After inspecting the Goums the party then proceeded to the 6th Regiment of the 4th 1,101mtain Poroccan Division, Colonel Cherriere commanding. Genl')ral Clark knew Colonel Cherr:l ere and was very pleased with t,,e arrangemt"nts rn.de for his visit . Colonel Cherriere had a Moroccan drum and bugle corps and a band and a battalion lined up in parade ground fashion . As G1imeral Clark approached, the drum and bugle corps rilayed 11 Sur Les ChaJr1ps 11 and thl'ln th" hand played the "Star Spangl~d Flanner" wh:: ch was followed by the 11 rtarseillaise 11 • Generri Clr.irk tben inspected the battalion of the 6th 1r:oroccan Regiment ruid congratufated Colonel. Cherriere on the excell~nt anpe2.rRnce of his troors and explD ined to hin that he was sure thct this reginent would play a big role in the ettack to come and that he was confident that they were ready. H~ remarked on itieir alertness and enthusiasm and was very rleased with the recertion accorded him. The party then left for Sessa v1here Gen~ral Clark left Genernl Juin and Colonel Karrnnerer and nroceeded to the Fifth Army command rost ~ith Colonel Lraper. On his return to the corunand post Gener.<>l Clrirk i rnmediately worked on administrative n£1tters and later received General Martin, Fifth Army Surgeon, and Colonel Barker, I<'ifth Army Chemical Warfare Officer, who is to leave shortly for the United Sfo.tes to tall:e over conmand of the CheMicel ~rrarfere School at Edgewood Arsenal. He had these two o"ficers as dinner p;i1ests . Gen~ral Cfark excused himself and said thPt he hnd quite a b:it o+' work to do j n preparation for the conference witb his Corps and Division Commanders tomorrow Morning which will take ,. ! .,"' ... ~ ~ ' ' " ~' I \..t < . ~,i:;14,. ~ ,.>, �' ~•' ' • . . ,. • • '· place at 10 o I clock. During this Army plan of nttack and make sure part that they are to play in the planning, timing and coordj m-i.tion after a very busy day . * ., ;;IJ \1 • tat conference J:,e will go over jn detAil the Fifth that all comlllEl.nders understand thoroughly the over-A.11 plan and settle any questions as to of the attack. He retir ed at n.bout 10 o I clock * * SMT MARC0--MAY 5, 1944--General Clark, preparing for the launching of the tremendous offensive on the Fifth Army front vd thin the next week, called a conference of all his nain Fifth Army front corps and division cornmanders today, and the entire plan of attack was gone into during a 2- 1/2 hour conference that was followed by a buffet llmcheon at which Genernl Clark vms the host . Upon arising, General Clark disposed of administrative work and then conferred with General Brann to button up last - minute details on the conference . 'l'he various commanders , P.11 of wron were accompanied by tl·eir Chiefs of Staff and G- J ' s , began to arrive at 0945 , and motion pictures were taken for use in short subjects and newsreels in the United States . Those present included: · GeneraJs Juin, Harding, Crittenberger , Dody, Brosset, deMontsabert, Sy_vez , Carpentier , Y,'al',;:er, Sloan, Coulter , dalsh, Saville , Guillaume, Chnillie:r, Johnson, Hume , Lewis, Poran, Bradsh~w, Brann, Sullivan, r.1artin, Tate , Beucler and , of course Generals Clark and Gruenther . The lf1.st man to arrive was General Juin, Cor.imander of the French Expeditionary Corps . General Clark met him and accompanied him into the hut , and t!-i.e conference got undervmy. Because of the fact thnt all remarks had to be translated either from English to French or French to English , the conference proceeded ratl-ir--r slowly. Following is a gist of the conference taken from stenographic notes: GENERAL CLARK : 11 We are going to have various officers t:Iiscuss their plans this morning and will have interpreters for the French . "Gentlemen, I called this me.eting in order that subordinPte oommanders might meet each other here and discuss their plans briefly so that everyone will know what the other fellow is going to do . The Army Plan will be outlined in its br oad form , and corps and division comm~ders will likewise give us a brief orientation of their plans. If there are any loose ends or discrepancies this is the last chance to clear them up . ttin addition we have a fine plan - it has been developed by General \ Alexander ' s headque,rters whereby both the Fifth and Eighth Armies attack at the same time without on~ holding back and waiting for the other to do some thing toward the attack. We are attacking over ~ vridc front in grePt strength. There are eight divisions attacking simu1taneously on D- Day. These troops are fresh . We have reserved , both infantry an'd. artillery. It is the f;irst time that the total resou.rc.- s of both armies. have been thrown into the attack at the same time . These remarks I have ma.de rpply to the majn Cassino - Garigliano front . At the same time we }1.a.ve the bridgehead force of the Fifth Army which is prepared to attack at the opportune time either with or w:ithout reinforcements . "Now I want to sa;v a word as to over- optimism. I have every confidence in the success of this a ttack but I must emphasize that we must not let ourselves �~~ ~ .~ t?" _,,~4 ,;.,,:~ ~ i look into the crystal ball and by wishful t~inking realize that we are going to join up or capture Rome within a few days . We should join up - we will join up - and we will march on to the north in reasonable time . I mention this because during the last Cassino attack there were some who thought that we would join up in a matter of a few days , and the.t over- opHmistic estimate a ctually got back to the United States . I was confronted with that when I returned on my recent visit to the United States , and it took me some time to explain and straighten it out . If the enemy delays us , as he did for many months before we attacked Cassino , by demolitions and delaying action, he can delay us materially. He cPn delay our advance so thet we will be fort unate to make two miles per day in my opinion. So let us realize thP-t we bave a battle ahead and that we are not going to wj_n it the easy way or by his pulling out . There a.re no indications of that . We have f,I'and air support in this attack . It is the first time that we hnve joined up, with good weather to operate in , the many groups thPt will support us directly in this battle . 11 low I vrant to emphasi ze that for my subordinate co:mnanders there are no } time schedules. No one plans ahead of time that they will wait to do something after someone on his flanks acts in order to accor1plish some objective . \ In the Fifth Arny we are basing the success of our att..,ck largely on surprise ~! We must not lose the impetus of this attack if we do secure surprise. We must push on or out with everything we have without delay. ·" "Another point wM.ch I want to emphasize is the use of tanks :in this battle . I want no holding back on the use of tanks . We have tank superiority; l we have some terrain where \"Te can use t hem, so use them in mass and throw all \ of them at thr? enemy after you get the oprortunity. 'l"e have arranged for 100 reserve tanks right b"'hind the Fifth Army on this front and 100 reserve tanks up on the beachhead . Now the great problem whi.· ch confronts me is how I would like to use my Army Reserve , the 36th Division - whether to put therr on the main front or in the bridgehead . In that connection a decision must be mnde as to when the attack from the bridgehead will be launched and in what direction . The bridgehead is a dangerous threat to the enemy and he recognizes it as such a threat - a threat whicb will do , in the early stages of our attack here, as much as an actual attack. I am most gnxious to launch an attack out of the bridgehead with all the force I can put into it , but it must not be premature and it nrust be done with adequate forces to break throue-Ji once'we start . I am going to be subjected to pressure both from above and below to use that I _ 36th Division ahead of time . Now I know that the II Corps is planning, and V should hnve planne~, use of the ,6th Division , and I don ' t want tc get premature urging from that source as to the early corunitment of that division because I will not do it . As I see it, if the attack goes as we have a r:i ght to exrect, it would be premeture to move the 36th Division either to the bridgehead or to this front tmtil at least n week after tre ettack has started , and once it has been decided to put it in the bridgehead I hope to be able to put in additional troops for either the 88th or 85th Division. Our position ,. ill be difficult until we find out what will be the enemy ' s reaction - · how he reacts to this attack , and we will have to maJntain flexibility and be prepared in either direction once we find out hovr he is reacting to tliis attack. I "I wanted to explain this ribout the 36th Division so it would be thoroughly understood by subordinate commanders . We have a great opportunity here if we play our car:d_s and do not permit it to become premature. ) �~ ' .' !+ ·, . ., ~ ,' ' 43 ' COLONEL HOV'rARD: 11 The enemy sitw~tion in general js indicated on the situation rr.ap. On the oouthern or main front of Fifth Army the enemy has· two P.nd onehalf divisions facing us on the GUSTAV LINE defending th<>t line. In the rear he has the AIOLF HITLER LINE, a well prepared position. He has e.bout one-half of the 15th Greru:idier Division in the general 8.rea of ITRI in reserve . On the Eighth Army front, north of the LIRI River he has Pbout two and one-half divisions as indicAted def ending the forward lines. In the rear he has about onehalf of the 15th Division wbich is in position there to defend the ADOLF HITLER Line in case it is desired to do so . Certain st::itistics are indicated on the chart concerning enemy strength and disposition. North of the Eighth Army_position the 5th British Corps is opposed by a force whose strength is indicated on the chart. "In the bridgehea'.d the enemy has five divisions defend:i11.g the rer-'imeter of the beach wit}, one division in irnmediF t~ reserve. In ardition he he,s a di vision in the general areA south of RCTJ!E with re,rt of it south of the mouth of the TIBER River and re.rt of it ooutheast of ROVIE, and two divisions in this general area of CIVITAVECCHIA. He has also been v-.rorking diligently on a new defense line defending south of ROHE. In northern ITALY he has five divisions in addition to the ones I have mentioned , three of which ere defending the coastline in th is general area as indicated. As to the enemy's capability, he is capable of defending the GUSTAV tine or fighting delaying action on thRt line and on successive positions in the rear thereof. He may defend the AID LF HITLER Line /'IS soon as that line is reached, and is carable of fighting delay-ing e ction on thet line and delaying action on successive positions in rear thereof until the line south of ROrE is reached. Of oourse, he cen mass his reserves from up north and launch a counteroffensive but this is not considered feasible because he would not have much of a chance of success. It is possible that he could bring down about five divisions, but the number he could brin2' dovm wculd be fofiuenced by the sea.le and t:im:i ng of the attack j n the beachhead. 11 The lfoe of riction the enemy is nost likely to adopt is indicated by what he did in the CASSINO battle - th:1t is, to defend the GTTSTAV Line with the force he has on that line without reinforcing it, but he is likely to reinforce the ATY'LF RI'T'LER Line when we reach it. If we push him out of the GUSTAV Line he is likely then to delay by successive rosjtions and contesting each 7mportRnt tactical locality tmt:i 1 the AIDLF HITLER Line is reached. If pushed out of t:bat line, then I believe he will defend along the prer,i1red line south of ROME. GP-JGRAL BRANN! "General ClDrl< and gentlenen. The nission of the Allied Armies in Italy on tl-e next oT"erntion :is to join forces with the briqgehead and drive the enemy north of ROT~. There is a cover rl~n now being conducted for this operation. Th:is plan was desi~ed to make the Germans believe thrt there will be a landing in force at CIVITAVECCFIA. (Informr>tion that there is a concentration of three divisions in the NAPIES-SAIBR.NO area training in ITC designed to make the Germans think we are going to load in thrt area.) "On the east of the AJ'PENTN'ES the 5th Corns, operating under AAI, has \ the mission of containing as J11any Gorr.inn troops as rossible in the erel'l, and at the slightest withdrawal to follow them up raridly. On our right th'e Eighth \ Army ha.s the rdssion of breaking into the LIBI Valley and acvancing r;-,.pidly } vrest via Highway 6. The Eighth Army consists of' three corps, the 10 Corps on �• • , ~I ' r, I ~ •~I ' :, : . .... .. ' the right , the Polish Corps in the center r.nd the 13 Corrs on the Eighth Arny \ left . Th~ 10 Corps , which consists of the New Zealand Division and certain 1 other separate troops, will cover a ,dde rent. This corrs has a deception \ plan designed to make the Germans think there will be an attack in force in the\ direction of ATIHA . The PoHsh Corrs consists of two divisio11s, ea.ch division with two brigades. The;r have the mission of first, frol"l a position in the CASTELLONE area, drivjng soutb tonard the critical area around Hill 593 and cutting the highwa:, west of the •!(l';.,\STERY. ':'he second phase of the Polish Corps is to turn to the east and take the :~'JASTBRY. Having accomplished that they turn northwest toward F:Fnnrn:rrE, protecting the rigl-·t of the 13 Corps and getting as much high ground toward RC'CCASECCA as possible . The 13 Corps consists of four divisions, three :infantry divj_sions and one armored division. The plan is to force a crossing of the RArIDO River end Bdvance rap5 dly northwest through the LIRI Valley. The Eighth Army has the 1st Canadian Corps jn reserve , consisting of o:rie j nfantry $.n<l one armored division . That corps will be used either to pass througl tr e 13 Corps After they have come to the HITLER Line and start up Highway 6, or second, if the 13 Corps bogs down on the HITLER Lin~ , to assist in the break-through of the HITL :::R. Linf1 . They may rn ve to move in and assist in driving forward to the HITLER Line . The riission of the Fifth Army is to secure the ATTS(PifIA Defile, advence via BSFERIA to the south o~ the LIRI and SACCO Rivers . "The Army Plan for the French Corps Vfit' four divisions on thP. right \ ano tl-ie II Corps with tvro d- ivisions on tre left , is separated into phases : First , capturing the hir,h ground in the V" cinity of 11A.JO and cut the FORMIA ATJSC""ITA Road nortr of AFSOtITA . The f:ir st phP.se of II Co1ys is to take DA''IANO and the S Ridge , move down the S Ridge tavarA.s CCIJ.E MARTINO, thereby cutting the road in this area (vie. CDLLE f':ARTrm) "The second phase for the FrP-nch is to advance with additional troops and close tre AUSENTE Valley •• • • Here in the south the II Corps t~kes critical features :in th~ foothills of the PBTREIJ..A Hill Mass . "The third rl'ase or principal action will be for tl'e French Corps to. move general on r~ fi 1 C'iRO area assisted by ti,~ troops th t }1a.ve P1oved into the hills by a flanking attack, this being the critice.l feature for the third phase. 11 The third J,hase -f'or tre II Corps is to r,ove for ·mrd througb the hill ·riasses vTith the mission of gettfog jnto the ITRI area with or without the assistance of the 36th Division, to be decided at a lPter tjme, the F'rencl: having established a firri base in this gtmeral area, operat:i ng in the direction of FICO and cutting the road directly west o:' the M REVOLE Hill I'hss in conJunction wi tr the attack on FICO . The artillery opens nt 2300 for forth (40) minutes and fires genern.lly on known positio11s and counterbattery. In general, there will he a large force of Hrtill0ry w;th the principal mission of maintPining the blocks already established across the LIRI River and the area west of those blocks on the critical roads in the ITRI and fICO areas . 240' s and Long Toms will be used on this Mission and consioerahle force will have to be used in that wav. Plans are being prepared for an airborne drop generally in the vicinHy of M R.T.;VOLP. . Decision to make this drop will be r-F<le nfter the second phPse. The 509th Parachute Battalion will be dropped in tI-ii:i.t .<irea to secure a firm position and operatini:; toward the French in this direction (:~) or toward the �<-(5 II Corps in that direction · (SE ). In the coming operations rriority in the employment of e.ir for Fifth Army will be given to isolating the battlefield . "There are few roP-ds lee.ding to the combat area. W hope by establishe ing and Faintaining blocks in the S 0LIVA and JTRI areas to isolate the bBttlefield using our artillery to J'llaintain t} ose blocks already established. Ad. ditional blocks will be estahljsh,-,d along l ::nes at critical points es indicated b:,r those three red dots (S OLIVA, S GIOVA 11H-lT, PASTENA). These blocks are established not only to prevent rdnforceMent of the battle area but to prevent bringing in troops to man the HITLER Line. The Navy will assist by establishing a block in the ef1rly phase in the T"':R.RJI.CINA area and along the flank of the II Corps . "The P.rmy Commander told you of his concern over the timing of the beachhead attack. We not only have the tim~n~ but have the direction to con- · sider and thP, -forces that will be required to su,:;cessfully attA.ck from the \~ beachhead. At present there hove been three plPns prep11red. , Each w:i 11 be \ t used depending upon things we don't know at this time. One attack is toward CARROCETO and west of COLLE LAZIALE. The second attack is in the direction of CORI P.nd after the canture of CORI and advancing north cutting Highway 6. -.;J,... A~ The Army Commander thinl:s it necessary that rt least one di vision go in to fl~ \\: ar,sist either of these attacks f'nd probably more vlill be n°edecl. Time does s/' not rermit goir EY, over the conditions under ,m,·, ich each ,":i 11 be le..1 ·nched. t , r. ' ;yr\..P/ " \L.J,\.l"),. J' tt o-...>;r.,.. t J<. Yo A r- r?'- - "'"' J "The third attn.ck :is probably the easiest attack to accoMplisp. success- ft fully. The attack is ; n the direction of ~EZZE, gPining this high ground. Assu~ ini:; that we have arr:ived At t:be initial Army 0bjective, tlv·t the Eight}, Army has had hn.rd fighting and may need some t:i me for regrouping in the ARCE-CEFRANO area, one plan mie;ht be, hav:ing gained tre Hill Hass (SISERNO) with the French Corps, drjv-ing in this direction dovm the natural corr:idor toward SEZZE in conjunction with th") hridgehead attack on the same objective . Such 8n i>ttHck 1 would turn thj s ent:i. re nrea P .nd permit drnvr.i ng of the re1'!1a:i ning troops of the II Corps off this line and giving more flexibility to tlie ie>.ttacJr- clesired in the br:idgehead . 11 GENERAL JUIN: General Juin explained ·the action and maneuvers of the French Corps in French. Lieutemmt Patrice, aide to Generril Carpentier, ..;nterpreted in English. The interpretation was very broken and not easily understood . General Juin brought out that the 2nd DIM would attack, triking '5ount Majo And proceeding over to Ausonia . The 1st DIM would attack j n a northerly direction and proceed to the Laguardia hill, rbunt Croce and the San Ambrogio region. Elements of the 3rd Algerian, Division would push into Castelforte as soon es the 88th Division had taken Damfano and the 2nd Froroccan Division ha.d pushed into Cescheto , along with elements of the 4th Mountain Moroccan Division. It would then push up through to Ausonia and pass on taking the high ground Mount D1 oro - Pico. In the meantime, the 4th DMM would rush across the mmmtnins and continue over the mountainous mass of Petrella - Revole, cleaning out any German elements holding out in the mountains . General Juin's Map had numerous arrows point~ng out rPgimental objectives, and it would be confusing to include them in this accourtt. General Juin was followed by General Dody, Commander of the ~nd Moroccru1 Division, who explained tMs Division's action in its pusr to take Mount Majo and ·;;~··~. ~;• ~ I ••-,. • • t,: I �its subsequent fannini:; out to the north and west. He brought out the point that supply wns going to be difficult in tr,e mountains for his division and that he would like to consider the rossibility of air drops for his troops, especially the 8th RTM, col"lJ!landed by Colonel Molle. Lt. Fatrj co interpreted for General Dody. Gem=iral Sevez, Commander of the /+th r~ountain Division, was the next speaker and used as his interpreter Colonel Bauffe who s:renks some English. H~ explainerl the actions of the 4th Mountain Division, their push toward Mount Faito and south to Ceschito and, in conjunction with II Corps, action to take ~Tolmt Rotundo, thus isolating the C?stelforte area. Again coordinating with II Corps, to proceed in a westerly direction and quickly negotiating the hj_ll masses toward Mount Fetrella - ReYole and to the r ico - Itri road. General Brosset, of the 1st Voroccan Division, spoke in English which was quite understandable. He brought out how his Jivision vrould push north in a flanking diversion from a French bridgehead across the G~rigliano. This diversion would seize and holrl the high ground west of the Gr,1rjgliHno and just south of the Liri so as to facilitate the advance of tl-i e Eighth Army up the Liri Valley. The next speaker was General deMontsabert who used Colonel Bauffe. as his interpreter. He expl::dned t:re,t the 3rd Algerian Divj_sion would ent~r Castelforte as s"'on as the 88th Division and the French had seized their objectives, Damiano, Siola 1Reali and Mount Rotundo and as soon as the artillery bonbardment in Castelforte itself had ended. In other vrords, his division would entP-r th~ town when ordered to do so by higher hea<lquart.ers after these previous actions had taken place. This p1-1rticulc-tr statenent caused some controversy because it appeared as ·if there were too many factors der,ending on other circumstances a.s to when th~ 3rd AlP,erian 7!ould push into Castelforte. However this entire question was settled. after the close of the conference. General deMontsabert then continued the action of the 3rd Algerian Division from Ausonia northeast to secure and hold the high ground south of the Liri Valley from ~".cunt D1 0ro up to Pico. The French discussions were a little drawn out, due to the interpretation necessary, and it was impossible to get stenographic notes from the interpreters becAuse none of them spoke well enough for the stenographer to take dovm full sentences. GENiffi.4.L KEYES: "General Clark and gentlemen. The mission given to the II Corps is to cut the AUSO'JIA road toward tJ-,e lower AUSENTE Valley, gr-iining a foothold in the mountains in order to push troops tr,rough to cut the ITRI-PICO road in the vicinity of ITRI, and eventually to open up the FORMIA corridor. We have for our means two divisions plus one in reserve. We haw, l '3 bAttalions of corps artillery including two pack battalions. We. heve one group of tanks. Our front is 16,000 yards long--will be increased to 20,000 and leter reduced to 11,000. The enemy on our front consists of elenents of the '71st and 94th Divisions with an estim..,ted seven battalions in the front lines. We understl'lnd he hP s reserves in the vicinity of ITRI. He· has a selected ancl stronf!.,ly prepf:.red position. He will be expected to put up strong resistance. Our maneuver must necessarily be broken dovm into phases because of the extent of our front by the divergence of the directions in which the Corps must attack, and by the necessity of regrouping and concentrating our means behind each other. Broken - ', ' �r down 'into three phases: In the first pbP.se we shP.11 cut the AUSONIA road, capture DAMIANO and initiPte the second rhase. The capture of DAMIANO will assist capture of these hills north of our sector by the French; assist the attack of the CEF on M. MAJr. The second phase ,rill consist of cleaning up the lower AUSENTE. Valley by the capture of BRACCHI and CF.F.RI. With only the delay thrt is imposed by the necessity of displacing artillery and regrouping the forces of the 88th, which rre to lead the attack, the third phase will be led off by a strong tank and infnntry attack supported by air and the naximum artillery. Once this phase will be culminated by the capture of CASTELWORATO this will definjtely block for the moment the FC1RMIA corridor. Once the heights to CASTELNORATO are secured it is planned to pass the %th through to gain rapidly a base in this vicinity fror, which to pass on and cut the TI'RI - PICO road, and at the same time by action from the south to assist the 85th Division which is constantly pushing through the lower valley. There is no deloy contemplF.ted betv,een phases other than that imposed by the necessity of displ11cing artillery and regrouping troops. We may expect the enemy to react strongly, especially on our left and to either reform or regain his rosition, to disrupt our attack or impose a delay. We may expect him to resist in this position since thrit is the covering position wJ,ich has been built up in a.nd Around Colle San na:r-tino. Every effort will be made to effect speed in the execution and cut dovm the overall time between steps as I have outlined them. Few if any can be omitted nor can the sequence be readily changed. For air support we are confining that to the :rreventjng of enemy reinforcements from being rushed in and reaching the battlefield, and for coverage for opera.tioro through the mountains. During the attack on SCAURI we hor,e to get close support to reinforce artillery fire; getting 'faval gun support to reinforce Corps artillery targets beyond Corps artillery range, primcrily in the ITRI area.. We have in r~serve initially the 36th Division. Its oontemplated employment is in the mountains, for wM.ch H js specially trajned. If it is not used in this manner obviously the results to be obtained from the II Corps will be limited. GBNERAL CLARK: 11 I want to add one point. ':'he 16th will be put in Army reserve right away. I want those jnstructions issued. It probnbly will be moved into the heachhead ""irst--that is :i.ts most likely employment, so that you must plan for that movement into the ITRI area by either the 38th or 85th or parts of them. I know there will be limitations, hut if they have punch left, they will keep on moving with elements other than the '36th. GE~IBRAL GOFLTER: "General Clr,rk and gentlemen. In describ:ing the operation of the g5th Di vision T shall discuss trie three pm, ses a.s covered by my Corps Cornnander. In the -f'irst ph;i se the mission of the division is to seize that part of the San r!art:i.no ridge within its zone of action, holding ::t and the highway in its sector and being prepared for strong counterattack and prepared for advance to t e west in its zone of action. Formtion--rP-giments a.breast. The J ine of 0ep13rture--the prese'.'1t -"ront lines ;inci the boundary be- _ tween regh1ents as yon see here. The right regiment with two battalions in the assa.ult will nave at 2300, seize and hold S Ridge rnd a part of SANTA f'ARIA with the division assault, to cut the highway in its zone and be prerered for counterPttack and for advance. The left reg:incnt vdtr one bPttalion of the trird reg:iMent nttac:bed l"'lp 1ring its nair oqffort on its right to seize irnd hold C. HARTrJO, the high r;rou.nd 1700 yards uest of s. i:J\.RIA, and to obtain the " f~ , i.~ ~f~ ·.: ~ 1~:.\ .,, -, c �town of S. LIARIA; to .c ut the highway in its front and be prepPred against strong counterattacks nnd for furtrier adwmce. Tho remaining regiment less the battalion will be in division reserve prepared to counterattack to the southwest or to the northeast. 1'The di vision artiller:r, reinforced by the 602nd Field Artillery Battalion, Pack, the 776th TD B,attalion and the '36th Division Artill,ry to support the Rttack. TL.e 756th Tank Battalion to be employed as follows: One company, less ono platoon, directly supports tre right regiment. One conpany plus one platoon directly supports the left regiment and [>SSists it in the capture of S. PARIA. The battalion less the two companies to be prepared to support either regiment or o destroy counterattacks. In the second phase t:te dj_vision to aid the 88th :Jivision on its rjght b:,.r fire and to patrol f(l'.'eparatory to the capture of CASTELLO K'RATO and Ir:OlTTiiT SCA URI. The third phase to advance and link with the attack of t:be 83th Division on Eount CIVITA; to capture CA~T:SLLONORATO a.nd Pount SCAllRI, continue the pressure to the west and in all three phases to protect the left flank of the Corps and Army. GENERAL SLOAN: "General Clrirk and felloTT officers. In orc'ler to accomplish the task assiened the 38th Division b;,r the Corps Cornnander it will be desirable to initiate it in three separate rhases. The fo~·ti..al objf!ctive vlill be S Ridge, which is actually in my zone of action, Cericoli and Damiano. Attack on those objectives will be launched At 2300 and we e).-r,ect ·to take all three by daylight. This will ~nvolve a concentrated effort of the 350th end 349th including flemethrowers. The second ph2se will be established by an attack of tr.nks in the zone of action w:.th support by tank fire fror the front of tre 350th Infantry. For this purpose the division lms one group of tanks less one b~ ttalion. Immediately follow::tnis the tank attack the 351st attecks in tl' is direction assisted by the 349th Jnfantry attack. The ultimn.te objective of this phase will be taken in coordimition with the 4th French D:i.vision. B.qfore rroceeding to the third rlwse, due to the fact thnt we must make a change of direction of 90 degrees it v~ 11 be 1 necessary to regroup. :nitiatinry that phase will be a mass tan} action in the zone of action of the 34Qth and trv~ 351st Infa.ntry to close out Spigno and exploit the slopes opposite. The ~nfantry '1:1ttack follows the ta'1k rt tack, the riain attack on the north fl::mk by the 349th Infantr;:r tnking CIVITA by fl1mking action from the ·:orth. The 341st nill assist thrt attack by taking the south bank of RIO CAPO d 'AC 1TTA by flanking action f'rom the soutl1 and '7 assisting the 85th Division to take CAST~LI.£'NORATO. Immedietely that this area is opened up the 351st less one battalion will rass t},rough 2.nd rroceed toward the fi.nal obj~ctive. '.:.'hroug'1out this operation the division is rrotecting the right flank. 'l'he third phase will involve the movement of the CEF into the mountains. G0'i'.SRAL S.1WILLF.: "The opening rhases of this b11.ttle started for the air arm after the battle of CASSPJO. Since thnt tine the entire Jlediterrnnean Allied Air Forces have been devoting their attention to direct support of the coming ground offensive. The 1~nes of communication--r,specfall;v rnil lines between IT.OF-:.:WCE and the ba.ttlefield--hiive been and are cut. This map shows the main bridge blocks th1Jt are out and the rail cuts that are relE'tively quickly repaired. For t:be :rast two weeks no trains have moved eYcept over very short d5stances on sliuttle trips between this point and the battlefield. In tre coming campaign of the ground forces this air effort will continue. At the srnall rate of expenditure that has been made by both farces in the past month tr is interdiction crnnot be e:,,.,'J)ected to be coMplete. The notor transport of the Germans is now �-..r stretched to the rm.ximtm . Viewing tbP- coning bnttle es a preBminPry to a campaign to capture ROHE , it is apparent thc,.,t thifl cont-i.nurtion will be of material overall assistance to both armies . This will be the principal effort of the Air Forces in general or ~irect sunport of both the Bighth nnd the Fifth Arrnies . Close support will not , however, be neglected . Our problem on the Eighth Army front is creatod as A res•1lt of the ground feature of CASSINO and the RAFII:O RIV'"ffi. Frol'"' an ajr stan0pojnt that makes the Eighth Army problem largely one of artillery because it is the enemy's artillery that can hurt the Eip-,hth Arrw ,more th~n anytbing else . On the Fifth Army front , however , the situation is somewhPt different . The problem there is , as previously stated , the isolation of the b?ttlefielrl, the r,erformance of the rrovement of reserves thereto and the breaking up of counterattacks formin~ therein . In preparation for close support operation~ jn the comjnp, battle , fiP:hter controls ?re beinp; set up on the Eighth Army front , on the main Fifth Army front and in the bridgehead. With these instaJ_lr>tions Pnd with the force available we feel confident that we can give effective close support to all of the forces engaged . We feel that it is necessary for everyone to appreciate the fact that the Air Forces are looking upon the coming ground battle as a part of a, campaign to capture RC f!!E . GE {!<~AL HJ\RDING : "I am quite sm~e thet t:re plan thot i.s being unfolded this mornin~ is in line with General Alexander ' s intentions . I am , lso sure that General Alexander is in full agreement with the Corm1anding Gern~ral of the Fifth Army in his remarks about the 36th Division , in tb, t it is most essential not .to com.l"lit it rrenaturely to the battle . And I lmow that I am speaking for General Alexander when I say that he also agrees trat the same applies to the attack from the bridgehead. I think I am right in saying th::it GenAre 1 Alexander regards the attack from the bridgehead as a nost important weapon of opportunity to be launclPd when the situation is fluio , ?_ncJ which nay well be decisive in cutting o""'f the supply n.nd preventjng the withclravuil of the enemy force then opposing the advance of the main armi~s on the main front . In conclusion I am sure that he would wish me to add his emphasis to your reml"'rks about the need for all forces pushinP, on ancl not waiting on each otb~r . l GENERA!, CLARK : "Gentlemen, it has been a great privjlege in planning this battle to have General Leese , the Cornrrander of the Eiehth Army, by our side. There hns been absolute understanding and cooperPtion given by General Leese and his staff . , General Ualsh , his Chief of Staff , is here and I will ask General Walsh if he has any remarks to P1ake . G'";' RAT, ...,ALSH: I think the -point that General ClPr_k has brought out; thAt we have had si1ch close cooperation between the two armies , is well fa.ken . Fe have worked side by side , and we have received, over and above all in this question of zero hour, the greatest consideration and help , and I know I will express General Leese ' s gratitude for that . 11 GF,NT.RAL CLARK :· "Notes have been made by General Gruenther :ond other staff o.,..ficers of all these little controversir> 1 points that lmve been brought out in this conference, and they will pursue these points 1mt:i 1 they are satisfactorilyworked out . There is just one point I want to emphasize and thPt is air supply in the mountains . · It is very difficult , as ne know fron our experiC)nce at CAS8P!O . Try to plan on your supply by means other than air . It takes a great �50 • number of our A-36 Fighter-BombArs to take CB.re of even a battalion. As I remember we had 40 or 50 to take care of that one battalion that was up on Hangman's Hill. To take care of a combt->t team or di vision would exhaust the entire supply of Fighter-Bombers. However, •ve have planned it and should there be an emerg~ncy which would dernnd it, we can supply to the best of our ab:ility. Now during t:be last few days I have visited all of the divisions jn tM.s area-French and Americans. I have seen their sector which they Bre holdj ng rt the present time and from wiich they will Httack. I am delighted to lmow the thoroughness of planning and the enthusiasm of everybody concerned for this attack. And I Hm completely satisfied that with the team-play and the determination of everybody vTill have a great victory. I wish corps and divirum commanders would assemble their princ~pal subordinates 1md impress upon them the essential elements of this attack. It calls for sreed end all out . with everything we have. Th::ink you, gentlemen. 11 we After the conference had enderl cr>terers immediPtely rushed in and set up a cold luncheon. General Clr>rk also served beer - an unusual bevera~e in Italy to his guests. Genern 1 Clark and his subordin~tes Hlso cong-regated outside around a map for close-up shots for the newsreels. The guests departed at 1345, and General ClPrk went up to his van to take care of papers that had accrued during the conference. Later in the afternoon General Clark received a visit from Cartain Lowden of the Medical Corps, an officer who had been General C1Pxk 1 s rr:othin,r I s prysician for twelve years. Captain Lowden told General Clark that he had· been on hospital sM.ps for the past 18 months, ret:µrning to the States with the vmnnded, spending a few months back there and then r~turning with the ship "or More wounded . At present he is stationed aboard the hospital ship Seminole. Captain Lo~den vm.s rlso accompanied by Ca.ptain Kojas, nlso of the Se!'linole. Both officers said they would like to have continuous service overseas and. thr.t they would apprecfr1te being trrnsferred off' the Seminole to some Fifth Army hosrital. Genl'lral Clrrk saw this as a goon. opportunity to give Fifth Army medical o..,fic~rs 8 chRnce to return to · the States without going through the rotation process, and he intends to investigate the witter further. General Clark also received a call from Captain Cliff Brown, an of'ficer \ with Allied Force Headquarters who is the son of r'frs. George c. Marshall. General Clark told Captain Drovm of his r~cent visit to the United States and gave him various messages that 1frs . f.1rirshtll had asked him to deliver . J Following dinner, Gen~~al ClPrk retired quite early, since he will leave tomorrow for the beachhead with Colonel Draper. He will r~main there overnight, returning to h1s headquarters Sunday. General Clark this evening dictated the following Material f'or inclusion in his diary: "General Alexander visit"d the beecl,head today. I received the following radiogram from General Truscott: RN T037. 1 Gen,.,ral Alexander nrri ved tr· is morn 4 ng. Yfhen I informed him of the f'our plrms on which I an vrorking, he stated that I was pnyinr: too ruch A.ttention to alternate rlans. He said that the only attack he envisages from the beachhead is the Cisterna-Cori-Arrqij (?) attack rv~tS\~ �:)) ,. 1,A. and thnt he does not consider that any other attacks will attain 1orthwhile results. He advised ne to concentrate on rlans for that atfock and said that if and when he ordered the attRck, he would give me ever;r support that I considered n"cessary. He also said trP,t he was most anxious to give me the '36th Division. I stated to General Alexander thAt my greatest concern was the timing of the attack ·"rom the bridgehead and the object to be accomplished; that is, vliether the object was to be accomplished with T'l"tms now existing in the bridgehead or wit}, the additional division. He informed me he had re/ _.,, served to him'1elf the decision as to tbe time of ln. 1 mching the attack from ~ the bririgehead. Since I believe there is P rossib~lity thrt the Sezze operation may be desirable, I nm continuing all out preparation for that operation. In view of' General Alexander's statement, I a,,, concentrating as first priority preparation for the Cisterna-Cori attack. }lease advic,e me if this meets your arproval. I rissune that you l'.re fully cognizant of General Alexander's ideas on this su"l:>ject but I want you to know whr-t '1.e has told me today. If you desire a.ny action on !'W part oth"r than ~ ndic<ited here, please ndvise me bl'lcause you lmow -thn.t I am with you all the way. 1 I I wnited until Alexander 1 s return and then had Gruenth~r call Lemnitzer. Lemnitzer stated that Alexander was calling Me t't nine o'clock. He did not phone so :r phoned Lennitzer 1md told 1 irn how cieepl;r I resented Alexander's issuing instructions to my subordinate com.~anrjers, particularly those which are in conflict with mine. Lemnitzer told me trat there was some justification in the radio which mruscott sent me. I then asked thAt he bring Alexander to tre phone. When Alexander came on tle phone I told him I ri.a.d received a radio from Truscott which thoroughly astounded me because Truscott repor-, ted thn t he had issu"d instructions to h:i m which were contrary to I'line, and Tru~cott, being confused, asked me for cJJ;i.rification. I told fllexander th:=it if 7ruscott 1 s report was correct I resented deeply his issuing any instructions to r,y ;:iubordinat'1s; that if h1'3 did not lik~ the manner in which I was carrying on the functio11s of the VI Co111s Ln should issue ariy orders to the contrary through me and thPt uncler no circ11r1stances would I tolerate his direct dealings· with suhord.:innt~s . It was rerfectly appn.rent that Alexander had a guilty conscience, and he assured m, thRt he had no intention of resc:indjng "lY order; thPt he thought we were in oonplete agreement and th,,t if, efter I talked rith ':'ruscott tomorrow, I ./"elt that there hrid been any underhanded dealings, I ms to tell him frankly o: my oonclusions - wlicl I ~ill do. This is a small matter, for it hn.ppens that my rlans for the l'ltta.ck from the heachhead and my views 1'1S to the v1ny thrt battle shoul<t be run coincide exactly with those of Alexanrler, but it is vell that I 1 t him know nm, as I have in the past, that h"! will deal directly witli me and never with a subordim:1 te, wl~ ~ c:r he is· so prone to do. I lmow factually thAt there are -:nterests brew:ing for the Eighth Army to take Ro"le, and I might as well let Alexa.nil.er know now thrt if he nttempts any thing o~ that kind he will have anothl'!r 1111-out battle on his hands; m1melt, with me. * * * SAN 1~RCO--T1AY 6, 1944--At 0900 General Clark had a small decoration ceremony \ I I I � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President. This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, April 1-May 5, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from April 1-May 5, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1632 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/91daa1dc6425ec62f434935157c325f5.pdf?Expires=1784764800&Signature=EiByeLFd%7Ej9UoX3FBfUzsuqZvOKqmr-ZXntTADB7ZUOqn4PsDguckjL2K2sw5nEfRQ59Miz-yMCRXfUsHPHtmOJQ7KpAAZGEb1L%7EM9abuCsx%7ExrkjCqzrj2DvL4EJ3APgsuak9j02hOstVflzSdUYB8DPLAWbTWScFkYy1uLBQWpOhphkKxPiXz9PqLwD1xO0is%7EdznP8f3qGiQjAK-cr3JAuY9jGkfKz9R6PqH73Mp0RaTnOJNyvrNwuRJVoSQgbCixGwMXYHInjZZeHbHkmQ5ZQFKWvpeW8jADaEnh3j4h93os995nAooG2Byinpxu5v-tqoxxl1LO74lO1NPjHg__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 88feed208ede6fb0e32344327f77fcfe PDF Text Text :)) ,. 1,A. and thnt he does not consider that any other attacks will attain 1orthwhile results. He advised ne to concentrate on rlans for that atfock and said that if and when he ordered the attRck, he would give me ever;r support that I considered n"cessary. He also said trP,t he was most anxious to give me the '36th Division. I stated to General Alexander thAt my greatest concern was the timing of the attack ·"rom the bridgehead and the object to be accomplished; that is, vliether the object was to be accomplished with T'l"tms now existing in the bridgehead or wit}, the additional division. He informed me he had re/ _.,, served to him'1elf the decision as to tbe time of ln. 1 mching the attack from ~ the bririgehead. Since I believe there is P rossib~lity thrt the Sezze operation may be desirable, I nm continuing all out preparation for that operation. In view of' General Alexander's statement, I a,,, concentrating as first priority preparation for the Cisterna-Cori attack. }lease advic,e me if this meets your arproval. I rissune that you l'.re fully cognizant of General Alexander's ideas on this su"l:>ject but I want you to know whr-t '1.e has told me today. If you desire a.ny action on !'W part oth"r than ~ ndic<ited here, please ndvise me bl'lcause you lmow -thn.t I am with you all the way. 1 I I wnited until Alexander 1 s return and then had Gruenth~r call Lemnitzer. Lemnitzer stated that Alexander was calling Me t't nine o'clock. He did not phone so :r phoned Lennitzer 1md told 1 irn how cieepl;r I resented Alexander's issuing instructions to my subordinate com.~anrjers, particularly those which are in conflict with mine. Lemnitzer told me trat there was some justification in the radio which mruscott sent me. I then asked thAt he bring Alexander to tre phone. When Alexander came on tle phone I told him I ri.a.d received a radio from Truscott which thoroughly astounded me because Truscott repor-, ted thn t he had issu"d instructions to h:i m which were contrary to I'line, and Tru~cott, being confused, asked me for cJJ;i.rification. I told fllexander th:=it if 7ruscott 1 s report was correct I resented deeply his issuing any instructions to r,y ;:iubordinat'1s; that if h1'3 did not lik~ the manner in which I was carrying on the functio11s of the VI Co111s Ln should issue ariy orders to the contrary through me and thPt uncler no circ11r1stances would I tolerate his direct dealings· with suhord.:innt~s . It was rerfectly appn.rent that Alexander had a guilty conscience, and he assured m, thRt he had no intention of resc:indjng "lY order; thPt he thought we were in oonplete agreement and th,,t if, efter I talked rith ':'ruscott tomorrow, I ./"elt that there hrid been any underhanded dealings, I ms to tell him frankly o: my oonclusions - wlicl I ~ill do. This is a small matter, for it hn.ppens that my rlans for the l'ltta.ck from the heachhead and my views 1'1S to the v1ny thrt battle shoul<t be run coincide exactly with those of Alexanrler, but it is vell that I 1 t him know nm, as I have in the past, that h"! will deal directly witli me and never with a subordim:1 te, wl~ ~ c:r he is· so prone to do. I lmow factually thAt there are -:nterests brew:ing for the Eighth Army to take Ro"le, and I might as well let Alexa.nil.er know now thrt if he nttempts any thing o~ that kind he will have anothl'!r 1111-out battle on his hands; m1melt, with me. * * * SAN 1~RCO--T1AY 6, 1944--At 0900 General Clark had a small decoration ceremony \ I I I �'{ .,,,f,,::-·~ "'. .-'} ,• for two mer.,bers of his staff. He pinned th~ D::istinguished Service Eedal on General Brwn, his G-3 . This e.warcl was ver;t deserving 1,ecause General Brann carried a terrific load in planning the operations for the landing at Salerno and th1' subsequent crossing of the Volt1-irno. The next officer to be decorated was Colonel arker, Army Ghef"ical Warfare Officer who received the Legion of 1erit Hedal . Colonel Barker is to leave srortly for the United States to take over co:mmnd of the 1':dgewood Arsenal in New Jersey. After the ceremony General Clerk returned to his van and confer ·ed with Gene~al Gru~nth~r. He left tl:e command post Pt 1010 for Lago field. This was done in an L-5 cub and from Lago field e took off in a C-78 for the beachhead. He :irrived at ~rettuno field at 1145. Fe was rccomprnif"d hy Lt . Col. Drarer, his aide. Imr1~diately upon landing l't the .airport, General Clar}:: •rent to the VI Corps command post wh"'!re he oonferred and had luncr with General Truscott. A~ter lunch, accompanied by Colonel Hine and Colonel Draper, he visited the 1st British Di vision, oommPnded by Gener~l m~wkesworth •. _ He went over the division I s dispositions and pl ans for the next big attack. After . leaving tre 1st British Division , he proceeded to the 5th British Division where he had a similar conference with General Gregson-Ellis, Division Corunander . After leaving the command post of the 5th British Division, General ClArk, aceoripanied by General Gregson-Ellis, Colonel Hine and Colonel Draper, went up to the front lines and visited the co"'1Tl\and post o~ the 2nd Carneronians under the corunand of Colonel Graham. General Clark was very happy to Pleet Colonel GrahaM, for his father, General Graham, had served under General Clark during the Salerno landings. General Graham corunanded the 56th British Division during th:it or,eration . 1 After visiting the 2nd Cameronians, the party proceeded to the 2nd Inniskillings . Here he met Lt. Colonel Slene, Cor'7anding, Pnd discussed the situation immediatel;v confronting th is battalion. Vis1bility was poor, and there were very little inco!'ling shells during the visit . A.fter droT•ping off General Gregson-Ellis at the 5th British Division command post, General Clark, Colonels Hine and Draper, proceeded directly to the VI Corps oornmand post where they pick~d up General Truscott and proceeded to a demonstration area in tl:ie vicinity of the 1st Armored Division where they saw tank retrievers pull out tanlcs , that had b~en stalled and broken down in minefields. The tank retriever consists of a tank with a front cram" 1.'lb ich drops and hooks onto a cable in the rear of the stalled tank. ~he whole process takes very little time and quickly moves th~ tanks back rearward frori the minefield. The next part of the cemonstration was what is knovm as the "snake" . A tank pushes forward whn.t looks like a huge boa constrictor . It is really a long segmented piec~ of metal tubing bolted in the center with each side capable of rr-icking 'l.'IJT. A guide runner is out in front of this linked metal tubinr, so tht>t it follows the terrain quite readily as the .trnk rushes it forward . The snake is 100 feet long. One the tank has plrced it in the minefield, it detonf!tes tte snake by firing one of its machine guns into a target detonator in the rear end of the snake. The last 20 feet of the snake :is lor-iiled with sand so thAt no harm is done to tre tank. As soon as the snake is detonl'lted H destroys all mjn"s .<as deep as 5 feet e.nd clears a pat}, wide enough f'or a tflnk to go tlirougr. Follow up tanks witJ:, additional srwkes pusr. through lllltil eventU81ly a gar has been made through the entire minefield . ... After witrn ssin~ tr is demonstration, Generals CJ.e.rk and Truscott left to �53 visit the evacuation hospitals. They visited the 11th, 94th, 15th and 38th. All commanding officers of these hospitals 1mow General Cl1cr1<- and received him enthusiastically. General Clark went through tr,e battle casualty wards and talked with each man that was physically able to talk. They all seemed cheerful, and it was appArent that they got a big kick out of talking to the Army Commander. The G"neral a(ldressed all of these men in a very f'riendly and infernal marmer, wiflhing them all good luck and saying thl"t our hospitals were rivinv them the best ana thPt they would soon be well. After visiting the hospitals, GenerPl Clerk returned to the Fifth Army Advance Command Post between Anzio and Nettuno, }:md a before-supper drink with the members of his staff there, l1ad supper and retired erirly. General Gruenther dispatched the following cable to General Clm-k today: RN ~804. "Operation order received this afternoon from AAI gives Fifth Army mission for main Pront PS previously known. For bridgehead it prescribed attack on general axis Cori-VPlrnontone to cut hj ghway #6 in Valnontone area.• No alternative direction is innicated. Attack from bridgehePd ~~11 be ready to be launched on ?4 hours' notice flt Pny time from D plus 4 day inclusive. 36th Division to be comriited only o.f'ter reference to AAI. 11 * * * SAN MARCO--M.(1.Y 7, 1944--General Clark nrose early flt 0615. The night was At 0700, accompanied by Colonel Draper, General Clark went to have hreakfast with Colonel Marvin, Comma.nding Officer of the 540th Combn.t ~ngineer Regimcmt which maintains and runs the port for 1mloading the Liberty ships. After breakfast General Clark •inspected the port installritions. The rort personnel }-,ave done an excellent job in unloading supplies by dukws and laniling craft frow the Liberty ships in the harbor, and they have done this type of work uncer most adverse conditions, including weather, hostile shellings n.nd bombings. After inspecting the rort, General Clerk then met General Truscott at the VI Corps command post nnd proceeded directly to the 3rd Division. This division is now in a rest area, and General Clark made a general ::nspection of a battalion ) bivouac aree. Her: he saw several m~del tents for enlisted rie~ ~rhich <:'m'listed of a pup tent dug in to the grouno with only the top part sh owing. This gtwe the men protection from hostile shelling vn1ile they slept. After going through the battalion bivouac area., General Clark discussed with General 0 1 Daniel his plans for the next attack. He discussed the BUFFALO and GRASSHOPP'i.ll plans. The BUFFALO plan is the one vmich AAI hi=1s directed to be worked on in oonjunction wit!-· the attt>.ck on the mm n battl~front. Thi.s calls for an all-out drive toward the direction of CISTFRNA. ':'he GRASSPOPfffi plr->ne is an alter·nate plc'ln which attacks in a direction to the left of the B lFFALO plan. V rather quiet +>or the bea.cbhead with very f~w incomjng shells. General Clark then left with Generals Truscott and 0 1 Daniel to go to a demonstration area where he sav tl'e brttle sleds that' the 3rd Division will use during the next attack. The br1.ttle sled consists of what looks like ordfoary hot water boilers cut in half, linked one behind the other and placed in d0uble rows. There- P.r~ l? sleds, 6 on each side, which are hooked on to the back of a tank. The r..an lies prone on the sled with a small amount o+> armor protection in front, P .nd as the tank now•s forward it pulls a oomplete infPntry squ11.d behind �SY it . When viewed from the distance, the s1eds 11re scarcely noticeable , e spe cially as they go through any grass , at all. By tr is means , men cfln quickly follow up and hold terrain features which have been t11ken ½y tnnks . The next part of the c" emonstration sh owed what was known 2 s a "mangle buggy" . This was what looked like en old farr, bayrack ay,.le vtith a jeep motor on it and a trail gurrd in bac:k-. This arrangement towed in rear of it a long strip of primer cord, and as the clriverleu~ contraption went over bnrbed wire it towed the primer cord tail. The ~.§:.i~ cord is detonated, thereby leaving a space for infantrymen to go through . It would ro.ve some e~fect on anti-personnel mines , in addition to clea,ring a rassage through barbed wire . j After tbis demonstr[ition , Generals Cl£ rk and Truscott and Colonels Hine and Draper left for the command rost of th~ Special Service Force . There they met General Fredericks, his staff and regim~mtal cornrrmnders . General Clark talked to them informally for about 10 minutes :md left immediately for the 34t h Division . Gen~ral Ryder was in Sorrento for a rest, so General CJ.ark discussed dispositions anr rlans for the next attack with Colonel Sherman, the Assistant Divis i onal Commander . While there he also met General Tate , the new Division:11 Artillery O""ficer , who flew back from the Stl.'l.tes vrith him. He also met Colonel Boatner and Colonel Childers , regimental commanders . From the 34th Division the party proceeded to the 45th Division. Here General ~ruscott left , and Gener~l Clark tal~ed for quite a period of time with General Eagles , the Division Commander . The tt>lk concerned principally the replacem~nt a s Division Artillery Commander , ,romotions, Legion of Merit cases and pl ans for the next offensive action. Toward the end of the visit , General raschal , Assistant Division Cornnander, brought in the three regimental commanders ; Colonels Dul:mey, ·iy~rs and Church . Af'ter talking informally with the regimental commanders , General Cl8rk left for the 1st Armored Division where he had lunch with General Harmon . He tnlked briefly with General Harmon concernjng the next attack. Genern.l Clark witnessed demonstrations of three types of treadway brir1 ges to be r l eced e cross sl'l'all streams or dry creek beds . The first one was improvised by tlie division engineers and consisted of a tank with a crane on tl e front holding the bridge and rlacing it where desired . The next was the reeular issued type of treadway bridge with a trnck and crr-ne . The difference between these tv 10 "IRS trPt tl1 e one w:itr t}-,1') truck left the operating personnel much more exposed , not having the rrmor r,rotection of tre tank. rrihe third was th\"! :'loat tYJ'.'e on rubber rontoons . The nl'lxt ff! rt of the demonstretion consisted of a 60mm mortar firing a h~rroon into a minefield . This harpoon carr~ed in jts flight through the air 3 rrimer cord rope which , when it fell to the grolmd aril was ignited, quickly cleP~ed bot}, tne grass and vegetation and , in addition, any anti- personnel minl'ls . lhe rath thus creeted was strv.ight anc1 went for a a: stence of Pbout 5r, feet . In tl'is way, by firi.ng successive harpoon prirn"'r cord snakes , a treil for single columns of' nen to go tl rough r,inefil'!lds A.nd high vegetation v1as quickly mPde . Next t},e General saw tanks fitted wit11 growsers whicl gave the tank 1J1ore :"lotation and grip over difficult tl'lrrain . From t l'lre he -nroceeded to a tBnk rrrich mounted an 81mm r ortar and fired out a lanced harpoon, taking w:t', it tbrougr tl,e air .a cA~le wMch W8S quickl:r relt'l8sed from sprockets on t;he front rart of tre tenJr . 1 he idea of t}1-ts was th.,,t the cable would lodge itself in bn.rbed wire ; and by the tank movinr, to the rear it could easily dreg wi+,h it the bnrbed wire a11d clear a place for cttac1r· rg troops to pass through. In acdition to tris ,,,ortar 0 1 0 �harpoon method of pullinr: out b2r~ed wire, ther~ was Anotr:r t~nk rigg~d v.rit~ a three-prong~d anchor tyyc hook. 1 he tan1· n~gotrntes the vnre 1.tself, arops l,he look over tre barbed wire and tren turns around a"'ld comes forwarc , pulling along wit it the barbed wire remaining on the ground . I General Clerk ie~t the demon;tration and proceed~d immediately to VI Corps to a decoration ceremony. He r resented four Dj stingi1:l shed Service Crosses to three of'ficers and one e,,:!..:sted man : Captain \'Tilson of the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment , 1st Lt . Hodgdon of the 15th Infantry R~girient, Capt . Kimball of the 135th ~n~antry Regiment am Sgt . Broriley of the 133rd Infantry Regiment . He prese!ltod letters whicl. he had brought bacl< from the Stetes personally to Major Austin of the 645th TD Battalion, Lt . Kile of the 69th Field Artillery Battalion and Captain Ballantine of the 33rd Field rospital . He talked briefly with these offfoers saying th t he was glad to have had the opportunity to bring t} em letters from their families . 0 A:.'ter the e1ecoration cereno:"lJl, the '!,and t'lryed t½e Jrd Dj vision song ,;rhj ch has a very catchy tune. General Clark, accomranied by Gener~l mruscott rnd Colonel Draper left immediately for t11.e 'Jettuno airfield wher~ General Clark and Colonel Draper took off in a C-78 . At the airport also wer"'! Generr>1s Br11.dshPw , Sullivan and Bowman, who also flev1 back to Lago fi~lcl. An additional C-78 was sent· to the 'fottuno airfield. for this purpose . After landing et Lago field , General Clark v,ent directly to his villa at Hondragone and relaxed on the beach after a very diffic,1lt two days at the beachhead . He invited some of his staff to supper, and a::ter supper they returned to th~ command post wbere General Clark \·:orked on some adJ"'inistrative papt'rs end retired . General Clark today received the following letter fro~ General Truscott: 11 1. I am prepared to do the BUFFALO Operation under conc'i.tions now existing on the ·1eacl head on 7 days notice . 0 ,g . r1.ans have been drawn and preparntioris are noV' under Y!ay. Upon comrletion o" these prep~rritory steps everytring virill be set ur and reac'y to go except for tbose things that can be accompl5 shed only j_r, the l1:1st L,8 hours pri.or to D day. 11 2 . When present work has been finished I will be prf"pared to lPunch not only BFFFALO but P,ither GRASSHOFPER or Tlffi'rLE within 48 rours . However , if definite preparatory cornmittment js made to either G.B.ASSHOPF:::R or BUFFALO and I am required to launch TUR,.,,LE I will need 72 hours in which to Make the necessary shift and launch the attack. 11 3 . I do not consider trat any operation :now envisaged will product worthwhile results with the troops now under my cormand agE> inst t1 e enemy ros; tion as I know it and in which I expect no chringe prior to D day. 4. I feel thr,t I must have at least one additional InfPntry Di vision and that that Division or Divjsions must beein rnoverient to tl--is erea "TitMn the next two days . 11 11 5. In undertaking the preliminary work outlined aoove Pnd tabulA.ted in ~ , �the attached, it is to be pointed out th2t secrecy is sacrificed! or. at least jeopardized. In addition, artillery coverage of t~e.Beachhead_l~ne is gravely jeopardized if artillery is noved from p~esen~ position to pos1t1.0~s for t~e attack and then remains therein necessarily silent, for a long period of time awaiting announcenent of D day. 11 * SAN MA.RCO--N!AY e, J...- * * 1944--General ClRrk worked on administrative matters and conferred with GenerAls Gruenthe,r and Brann prjor to leaving by cub for Caserta for a co'1.ference with General Alexander,. CDJC, AAI. Details of the conference are covered in General Cui.rk I s notes for the day. He returned frori. AAI at 1045 and went back to his van where he received Gemer21 Larkin, Supply Officer for SOS at Oran, and General Stewart in charge of shipping in the Mediterranean area. He lunched nt 1230 and depa.rted by cub for F.ighth Army TAC field for inspection of Fifth Army artillery units. He was accompanied by General Lewis, A.rtillery Officer, and Colonel Draper. General Clark's jeep met him at Eighth Army TAC field, and the party proceeded to the 194th Group command post at San Vittore wbere they were met by Colonel Banks, 13th Field Artillery Brigade Commander, and Colonel Cook, 194th Group Commander. He inspected the command post and talked with Colonel BPnks with reference to a replacement as Division Artillery Commander of the 45th Division. He explained to Colonel Banks that he had several officers in mind, two of whom were Colonel Cook and Colonel Meyer. He wished to see Colonel Meyer at the 17th Field Artillery Group oommand post later on. He also told Colonel Banks that he had submitted his name to NATOUSA for promotion to Brigadier General and that NATOUSA had approved it. In d.i.scussine with Colonel Banks the 194th Field Artillery Group's participation in trie next attack the latter confirmed that after the pre-arranged fires for the Eighth Army, mostly counter battery, .had been completed at H hour, the group wouid honor only those requests for fire that had been cleared through the French Corps with one exception. One battalion of 155 g1ms would answer calls for fire direct from Eighth Army providing they were not firing for the French at that time. The Eighth Army has more artillery than it had a week ago and is even in ,a better position to fire. contingent missions for the Fifth Army. From the 194th Group command post, Colonels Banks and Cook accompAnied the pa.rty to the 698th Field .A rtillery Battalion oommand post. This is a 240 howitzer battalion and is commanded by Lt. Col. Clifton. lf'hile at the command post the battalion fired a counter battery mission requested by Eighth Anny. General Cfark found this very interesting and had the map location of the target pointed out to him.· Upon leaving the 698th command post, he met three AMG officers who were in San Vittore arranging civil affairs natters and looking into the possibility ·of opening the schools. This to~m is still subjected to enemy artillery fire . The General inspected a 240 howitzer gun position on his way to the 633rd Field Artillery Bc'l.ttalion oommandeo by Lt. Col. Halliday. Upon arrival he inspected the command . post and chatted with enlisted personnel present and shook hands with them all. ..._,I From tbis comma...11d post he went to a 155. gun position which was just about �to fire a mission. GenerPl Clark stnyed while the mission was fired. He talked to the gun crew and told them that they would chanee positions soon because the attack was going forward. From this gun position the pl'lrty proceeded over a long, dusty, tortuous road to the 17th Field Artillery Group oommand post. He was r.et by Colonel Meyer who had a small honor guard w},ich was presented to General Clnrk. He went up to Colonel Meyer's oomr,and· post and discussed with him his dispositions in preparation for the attack. He also told him that he had selected him to becone Artillery Officer for the L;.5th Division; thet hP could make plans to go there soon and trike with him one additionEil j1mior o-f'ficer who could become his ajde vihen he received his star. From the 17th Field Artillery Group the ra.rty rroc eeded to the 17tr Field Artillery Battalion, stopping enroute to see a 155 howitzer brttery of the 933rd Field Artillery Brttalion. At the 17th Field Artillery Battalion, Gene- · ral Clerk walked to a battery position, passing through the battalion area which, at the time, was busy vdth cannoneers getting their supper. Having inspected the battery position, the party then rroceeded to the 13th Field Artillery Brigade command post at Sipiciano. There General ClPrk was presented to the staff and enlisted men of tr,e Br:igHde cor1 man0 r,ost. He insrected the fire direction center and counter battery section and the command post proper. The coruna.nd post is in a building which has an excellent view of the major terrPin features on the brttlefront. From there he left Colonel Banks and, accompflnied by Genercl Vmis and Colonel Draper, proceeded back to the Fifth Arrn;:r command. rost, Prri ving there at 1800. General Cl::i.rk dusted himself of'f nnd received William Randolph Hearst, Jr., a war correspondent now in Italy. Mr. Hearst was accomp1mied by Colonel Clark, Fublic Relations Officer. Generril Clark dis cussed with him Ms recent visits to all Fifth Arny troops and of his beach installation rit Morrlraf;one whic'r is available to Headquarters officers of the Fifth Army. He also tnlked about the l"lnlisted men's beach at Bagni ninerali. Fe told Mr. Hearst that he could come to his :rress conference whicr he was holding the next day at 1600 for war correspondents attached to the Fifth Army. He stated that t},is was an (ff\ off-the-record talk and that he was going to explain to them the forthooming ~ attack. 'l.r. Hearst and Colonel Clark were jnvited to supper where conversRtions cnntjnu~d concernjng Fifth Army activities. '-l. ~ ;; l ' ~ 0 \JJ'\ After supper Generfll Clm' 1r conferred brj efly with General Gruenther and worked_ on administrative J"'1attt'lrs 1mtil he r~tired at ?200 hours. "',J>I c,._V ~ V,.P I' \I"~ \\! ' fr,( eneral Clark dictated the following notes for inclusion in his diery, "As a result of riy vi sit to the /\nzio benchhead for two days I learned rom General r•ruscott that General Alexander had conveyed to the fact t~at he was to run directly the VI Corps attack; thrt J~e would reinforce it with anyth:ing Truscott wanted and would set tre tjr,e and cH r ction of Pttack And the troops involved. He also conveyed to Truscott the fr'ct that the instructions I had issued for alt errn:i. te 2 ttacks were not in accordance w.; th his h~r/ 0 �53 . ' '),t '~1,, ~ ;.,(t·t"~ • ,;' ,,,.!!"':·~·1"Jli'.'-~ . . . desires and that there v,as only one .<1.ttack envisaged tma.rd Cori-Valrwntone; that to preprtre other alternate plans tovmrd Sezze and to the north along the l\.lbano-Anzio road was sheer waste of time. In other v'ords, General Alexander, before a civilian mP-mb<;r of rarliament, and to General Truscott, with General Lernnitzer present, embarrassed m~ by in~icating thRt he was not in accord with the instructions I hBd issued. "Upon my return I asked to see Alexander and had a conference with him this morning. I told him he h,id embarrassed me. He replied that h0 h8.d no intention to do so :md was surrrised that Truscott +'elt thP-t he hP.d countermanded my instructions. ''I told Alexander that, pursuant to his latest instructions to attack on 24 hours' notice, we could not do so - 1,,g hours vms the rnnirmm. I also told him thPt if we complied w5t'r his D plus 4 att8ck orders from the beacl1 heAd, tl e '36th Di vision would rn vc to move tomorrov,. 11 Alexander immed:i.Btely jumped to tre conclusion thPt I ,vrs 11ot all out for the attack; t},nt I did not e,rprove of his plans. I assured him tru1t the Fi~th Army attack would )('!) as aggressive as any rlan or ~ttrck he had ever been in or read of. "I told Alexa11der that I wanted to Rttack out of the beachheRd with every- \ thing I ha0; thPt if conditions v1 ere rigl t I wanted to attack towards Cori but , I that what I was guarding agriinst vras pre-conceived ideas as to wh..,t exnctly was to be donP. and thPt ri1e felt tht1t he Rnd Hl:i.rdine hrd such pre-conceived ideas. I told him that I thought there was ri crnnce for a great victory if l i we played our cnrc1 s right and did not attack rrem!"turely. He kept pulling on me the idea that "Ve were to annihilate the entire G8rmrm Army and did it so many times thflt I told hi.m that I did not bel:ieve tlrn.t we hnd too many clwnces f '" f to do that; thA.t the Boche WA s too snart. He HgP j n seized the orport, ni ty to .~. J accuse the Americans of lack of aggressiveness. T vras c'i sgusted vnd disap\J pointed with my conference. He has a pre-conceived idea to do something to v" avoid criticism at borne. This was brought out in the conference. I told Mm thr>t inasrnucr as the attac}· was to be Pll-Americnn I would strongly recoml:"end /\ thPt we sit t:i eht, maintain our +"lexibility and under no conditions should we § permit the main attack to be stalled and tr.en try to save our face by a rremature attack out of t}le beachhead. I told },im that I had d:irected Truscott to give first rrfori.ty to tre Corj attack but th, t he would contj nue plans for the attac · t0 tre west of Colli Laziali. I wanted to have rbns rr8pared to meet any eve11tuFility, keeping ny m·nd free of Finy d0finite cc•mnitment before tl~e battle started. JI I I fI "I em thoroughly d~sgusted with him and w:itr h.; s Pttitude but hnve tre satisfaction of knowing th11t I told him exactly the fFi cts as I see then. 11 * * * SAN HMCO--MAY 9, 1944--General Clark started the day by working on administrative matters. Due to pressing duties at t!-ie col"IIJland rest he decided not to visit troops under bis commnnd tocl ay. He received a classlTfl te of his, Colonel Wooley, Signal Officer of Sewmth Army who dropped in to say hello. Shortly �after Colonel Wooley left, Gen rals Gruenther and Brann conferred with General Clark brfofly concerning ma.tters wrich were discussed between General Gruenther and General Harding, Chief of Staff to GenerRl Alexander, the CINC, AAI. General Harding came to see General Gruenthcr with reference to GenerRls Clark and Alexander's talks the day bef'ore ruid to button up staff rrocedures concerned with decisions of their talk. Shortly after this conference, GenerPl Clc.,rk stepped ont of his van and -rinned ?nd Lieutennnt bA.rs on t •,o Air OP sergeant pilots, Sergeants Holle and Bergf'lan. General Lewis Rnd his r,rtillery section were rresent, and all congratulated the two new 2nd Lieutenants after this ~nformal ceremony. Shortly after this General Clark conferred with Colonel Gray, his Fifth Army Judge t dvocate, who rresented 26 court ma.rt:ial ca.ses to General Clark. This ~cessive backlog of cases has built up due to General Clerk's visits to his troops prior to the attack. He just didn't have time to fit in everything. After Colonel Gray left, General Clark ~orked on decoration cases which also have accumulated in the aides' office. After lunch General Clark received General Saville, XII Air Support Command Gomnander, and conferred with him brjefly concerning close support air miss:ions to be given durinq; the attack. General Clark desired to assure himself that General Saville hrid :ironed out any rnisunderstr>nding and had coordinated his air efforts. He then vrorked on adrlinistrnti ve matters and, in addition, his talk to war correspondents which would take place at 1600. Details of this conference follow: General Clark entered the hut at 1555 and the conference strirted. 31 correspondents had already arrived and were seated. General Clark opened the meeting by stating that in the forthcoming operaHons the beachhead forces would not be irn,ediately involved. He stated that he wished the rress to be familiar with all plans and to have a complete understanding of the objectives of the operation. He emphasized that no quotations would be permitted, r,nd the information to he disclosed was secret. The General pointed out that the Eighth Anny is now concentrated in the Cassino area. The Fifth Army is concentrrted along the GariP,liano. Courses of action open to the Allied planners are: (1) to attack from the bet1.chhead (2) to attack :'rom the ~io:hth Army area first and follow up by an attack from the Fifth Arf",y area later. Both Army Commanders, however, agreed that this should be an all-out simultr>neous P.ttack of both armies along the entire front. General Clnrk emphasized tha.t the situation on the beachhead vras excellent. The morale o+> the troops is hif'ti, and all Pre eagerly awaiting coming operations. He furthP-r stated thl'lt the supply situ1>tion in t1 is sector is in very good shape. The General outlined the enemy order of battle, stating thPt there were 23 German divisions available in Italy and furthP-r rointed out "'here these divisions are now located. The General asserted that his discussions wj th General Leese and the Eighth �1"''-'' 1' • Army staff were most cordial. on details of the operation. ~~~(fl~:-,,~ ... ~-" , , < " ' '1'"" The two Army Commanders are in complete accord In the French Corps 4 French Divisions · are available. In II Corps 2 divisions are available, the 85th and 88th. The 36th Division is in reserve, but the General pointed out that this division is r.. ctm1.~ly in MI reserve and May not be comri.itted without the autl ority of GenerPl Alexander after consultation with him. 1 4 Divisions are available to Eighth Army :in 13 Corps plus 2 divisions in Polish Corps and 2 Canadian Divisions in reserve. The immediate objective of / French -Sxy,editionary Corps is the capture of Mount Majo feature; the first objective of II Corps is Haunt DaJ11iano. The General st11ted that while each corps has sub-divided the operation into tl-.ree phflses, the units are instruct- ( ed that immediately upon aqcomplishing the first phc~se of the mission they 11re to immediately rroceed with tri~ second ~.nd third pl ases of their mission regardless of vh~ther or not flanking units have reached th~ir objecti'les. The 1 Fifth Army, it ~ s planned, will rove un the Ausonia Valley to D1 0ro, Pico and Itri. On the beachhead we have six divisions, including one armored. Here there are three possible axes of attack: (1) North +,oward Rome (2) soutrieast (3) northeast in the direction of Cori-V~lmontone to cut Route #6. Of these courses General Clark prefers the third. He emphasized that the bridgehead attack must depend on operations on tre main rant. Soon after operotions comnence the coITll'.'land echelon of the Fifth Army will be transferred to the beachhead '1h",r it lrunches its attack about 15 Hay. General Gruenther will rennin here Ls GenerRl Clark's Deputy. G~neral CJFrk ras prepRred a letter to all troqs in the F:ifth Arny to be released immedietely be~ore operations get under way. General Clark stflted. · hat we are in eYcellent shape with respect to Army artillery witr 240mm ho vitzers and 155mm rifles [lnd 8 11 howitzers. He also emphasized that we are in an excellent position Yrith rl'lspect to our reserves; i.e., we will be in a position to employ them amphibiously if this course proves to be best at any point along the main front. The Army Cornriander disclos~d to the press his recent visit to the United States and stated that he had an excelle"lt opportunity to discuss with the Fresident, with GenerDl ·!arshall and vTitr various members of Congress, all phases of the Italian operation. After General Clark had concluded tis expos:ition of the plan, severnl questions were asked by the correspondents. The conference ended at 1700. After the war correspondents had departed, Gerteral Clark worked on more administrative matters and correspondence and received na,ior Duncan Sandys, Under Secretary of Surply for British Ground Forces, and Colonel Post, one of his T-lr:i tish Army representatives. He had invited -~hese two Britishers for supper. Friar to supper, Genernl Gruenther, Colonel Galtz!l18n, Colonel ✓ Draper and Captain Lampson were present with General Clnrk and his 'Jrit ish �Col guests for a before-dinner drink. Generals Clerk and Gruenther talked ¥'ith Major Sandys concern:ing the big and over-all picture of British supply. In addition, other small, -informal talks centered around vrrious other subjects from the 3rjtish viewpoint; such as, women workers in war factories, women ATS and the British lik.'"l.npower problem. After supper had finished and his dinner guests depPrted for CE'serta, Gener~l Clr,.rk visited wrious staff sections in his command post, returned to his van and retired. * * * SAN MARCo--r:AY 10, 1944--General CL<>rk worked on important dispntches from the time le a.rose until he hf!d Generals Gruenther and Brann in his van for a short conference. The C-in-C, Gener~l Alexanr1er, was to arrive at the command post at 1030, and there were last-minute details thrt Generf'l Clrrk wanted to discuss with •his staff concerning the attack before he talked to Genernl Alexander. General Alexander arrived at 1045 a,nd talked briefly with General Clark before leav1'1g to inspect Fifth Army units. Gener8 l Clark accoMpanj_ed General l le:xander in his cpr to the French Corps. They arrived there at A ,hout 11 o I clock and were net by General Juin tmd the usual p-uard of honor. mhey went up to Genern 1 Juin I s office where they djscussed briefly Frencr Corps' partjcipation in the Attack tomorrow. General ,Tuin gave ti brief surnmnry of his rart in the operation. A small point arose which caused some discussion. General Juin had heard that General Ke;res '"las moving :in sore tanks from the &m Lorenzo nrea tonight. This would, of course, obviously be against security and tre cover plan. After consulting with General Keyes, Generrl Clnrk found th,:it they were movipg in some tank destroyers, wrich were rract1CAlly t\-ie same AS tanks, and he requested General Keyes to call it off. From l<'rencl> Expeditionr>ry Corrs the two GenerPls went imTiediately to II C9rps. General Kt"yeS rresented General Alexander to all members of his staff. This took r.;bout 20 minutes, as Gl'mcral Alexander shook hPncts with eacr of them and questioned them briefly concernjng their function :in the comman<l rost. Immediately from II Corrs Gen~rals Clt1rk and Alexander left for the e5th Division and after thrit for the 88th. At both divisions General Alexan<ler met merely the ~enernl staff officers 1:1nd discussed briefly witl1 each di vision commander his operAtiom11 plan for the attRck tomorrow • . Generals Clrrk and Alexander arrived rit the Fifth Army command post At about 1330 where they had lunch and cont:inued discussing briefly and inforr.ially activities of tre troops on the Rttacking front. After General Alexnnder left, Generl'll Clrirk work~d 011 snr1e importn,nt dispatches and also on some decoration cases. He left nt 1500 by L-5, acCol'lpanied by Colonel Draper, for IV Corps. He vrns met Ht IV Corps cub field by General Crittenberger vrho took h:im il'lmedfately to the comJMnd rost r>t Pozzuoli. After conferring briefly with General Crittenberger, General Clark met the entire staff of IV Corps. He tRlked to them briefly but quite significRntly. He reminisced thrt a year ar;o tJ, is Mrne his Fifth Army str>ff hnd �not entered combat. They had worked on many plans and were impPtient to g t into battle. Finally the chance came on the Saforno landing, and they became indoctrinated fast. He assured IV Corps that it would not be far off before they would f1mction as a staff in combat and not to lose heart because they were in a rear area and just working on plans. After his tnllc, Genernl Clarv i.nsrected the command post proper, going through all of the G sections, AG, Engineer and company Preas. Fe returned to General Crittenberger 1 s tent wht'!re he wrs served a refreshlng drink. Present were: G"neral Crittenberger; Colont"'l Harrison, G-.3; Colonel Sims, G-1; Colonel Gillette, Engineer Officer; Colonel Nance and Colonel Draper. This little gathering brought forth manY interesting points, and GeneralCL"lrk corimented thPt it was now practically the twilight before the battle and that naturally he was anxious for it to start; thr-t he was sure it was to go, but he wasn't too optimistic ~hout the Boche not standin~ up to fight. He felt certain that they would do so; thot Here wasn't any indication of any withdrt1wal at ·rresent. He stated thrit it was his prime desire to vindicPte the beachhead, Pnd if it vms the last thing he did, he would do it. After this informel conference, Generr->l Clark left imriedi, tely for MondraP.'one where he, Colonel Draper and the tviJO r,ilots went in for rin evening dip. The water vms col<l but refresM_ng and rTde everyone feel very alive. The Genernl returned to the com~and post rit 1845 ~nd met his dinner guests whom he took into his win. They were: Generals ~•oran, Tate and Brann. A-"'ter supr,er they tnlklll<l informally ;Jut side, walkinP' l~isurel;r riround t,he command post. General Clt1rk ret:ired early t1fter a rather strenuous day. General Clark rec11ii ved the followinP, cable from General Freyberg, Commandin~ the 2nd }Tew Zealand Division: RK C/1?66. 11 0n eve such important bA.ttle we of 2nd New Zealand Division send our best wishes to your Army in which we were privileged to serve." * * * 1 YlRC0--~1AY 11, 1Q44--Genernl Chirk worked on rilitnry disratches until 0900 when he l("Jft +-or the 16th Division cub field accom:rrinied by c~ptain Lampson. He arrtv"'d there in 2bout tw"!nt:v n-lnutes 11.nrl W:"lS tr1cen over to tr e ceremonial <"i.eld wrere ab0ut 1,000 r1~n of tl'e 16th Division were in :r-iass formation facing General Clark. In front of the mass -l'orl""f1tion were the decorees. General Clark rresented thf'? 1isti:ripnished Service rnedal to Genernl .. alker, three Dist"inguished Service Crosses and twenty one Silv"'r Sbi.rs. He ar'ldressed the troops and decorees br:i,-fly and prnised Ge111'\ra1 Walker 1 s efforts as Division Co:rimander for t,},e pnst two yenrs. A.ftl'!r the decorations h;d been awarded the decorees rlaced tl~emselves to the right "lank of Gen.-ra.l Clar}·:, and the troops passed in review. Af'ter the last p:roup rad p1ssed in review, General ClPrk left imrn"!diately to tr.e cub fi.-ld where e took off' for CPpo--lichino airport and arrfved there at about 1015. He was guided to the 509th I 2rachute Battalion 1 s ce:ceT'!onial fielrl where +,h~ entire battalion was :ined up in r'iass formation in front of hiM. The decor.,.es :vere rlaced in f'ro"l-1:. of tt,e battalion, rind prj or to the a rarding of the decora.tio-1s, Gl'lneral '.Jh1rl<: sroke warmf.y of the battalion 1 s ,fforts in battle and rraised tr""n for their exrloHs. He then awarded tre decor2tions, af'ter wl ich the decorMs p1£ced tremselves on the le ..t o-"' Gent"'ral ClP.rk, Pnd tr e bt-,ttalion nt1ss.e d in review. He awarded five SAN �Dist3nguished 3ervice Crosses, five Bronze Stars. O'Yl_. Legion of Perit, twelve 3ilvl"r Stars and Il'!lmediatl'lly after tl e ceremony G"'"'l'''ral Cl"1rk and Captain Lampson returned to Capodichino, from vr.icb point -1;,hev flew bRck to the Army command post., arriving fit 111+5. Gl'lner, 1 Clark went to his van ['ncl confl'lrred with Genl'?ral Gruenther. At 1'345 Gen~ral Jevers nrrived ot the cor-!'J.a:•1.d · post, nccompanied by hls pilot-aide, Lt. Col. ;rormel . Gen~rals Clnrk and Devers conf1"'rred in the confl"rence hut f'or ~bout half an flour rmd then had l1mch together. At lunch G~neral Devers iscussed th~ r1P..npower shortr ge in the United Stntes nncl stated that as :.'ar as his administrative functions were concernl'ld, in the Mediterranean Theater he was going to adhere strictly to Vlar Depirtment requirements and inactivate provisional units. If the nl'led required, they would be reactivated not as provisional 1.mits but as T/O orgF1nizations, and other units would have to be de-activnted to tak~ care of th,.. new act::vation. General Devers also stated th:_-,t re h8d tal 1i::ed to G y, Jral V7ilson, who had just returned from England, and he said that Ge11:eral ~: se>1hower was very optfristic concerning OVF:P.LORD; that he thought it would definitely go and th.Pt we would have a complete victory. Genernl Dev,..rs -1-1- en discussed the rossibilHies of Operation ANVIL taking place and went ~nto some of the rari~icctions of ~he French political and military oorunand in !fortP Africa. Initially they would not ~llo 1 a French Army during the initial stas:;es of the operation, but eventually, for the rayoff, a M'rench Army Co!"mander would 11e in romM~nd of fa o French Corps. The .\rny Co,'!mnnder might be Gen,..ral DeL..,tte. In all probability Gen~ral Juin culd not be chosen because he was not in very ~ood :avor with General DeGnulle, due to his :l nitial stanrJ on the landint: operations in :rorth Africa in 194?. The conversation then centerJd Around the n.ttack tris evenjng. After luncr Gemeral Devers lf".!ft "'or II Corrs, and GenerA.l ClPrY returned to his vim whl'lre he worked on r,ore rilitr>ry fjsrrtches. The rest of tre afternoon General Clark ,rorked ir. Lis va.11. ar d confer:ced with }l"'neral Gruenth"'lr. For dinn r gu..,sts the General entertflin'°'d Major Knjp-ht ~..,a Lt. Col. iorter. Aft..,r dinner GenerPl CL<irk wor}-..,d on ad,.,,~nistrn.tive nf1tters Pnd left 11t 1000 for French Corps where :he vif',wed fror. the observation tower in the castle at the French Corps comman"l. post t're beginnings of tre great offMsive to he launched against German positions along the Pront . Ee return..,d at nbout idnight nnd retired. General Clark cabled ~"-'""ral Leese today as follows: RTI 7523. "Best·wishes fror. FFtl, Arr'ly ror complete success in the COT'linr, operation. I an. deerly grat"'ful to you f'or wholehearted ccoperatio:'.1. in planning rhase. 11 General Leese resronded as follows: R:J 794. 11 Greatly aJ precit>te your kind message. It ras been a great plea.sure to work w:i .L}1 you throughout, ~nd we very mucr. apprecfate the concessions you al"d General Juin made to concert tirdng. We all in Eighth Army send your Fi.f'tr Arri.y 0 1Jr cordir•l eood wishes and look confidently forwal"d to advw cing shoulder to sl1 oulder together . 11 ', ��\/1;-POfi"-. fa;:;. Ii f~a.__ ~ / ' ~ l °"'.;;.-. sA1~r1A.Y l? , 1944--Tre British Eigrth and the AIT'"lrican Fifth Armies , ) lamched treir hi~ offensive at 1100 hours last evening . General Cln.rk arose early this morninr, to receive rerorts concerninr· rrogress rnerle . The French Corps inade some rcr-o~ress durinrr thl'l nigbt rind increased its rositions towa.,,..r1 tbe west somewi1at . i~ount Fa-:to was tRl,.en ancl h!"!ld after bitter +"ighting . By l40C tl,.is afternoon r~ount Frd.to ·ms firn, end the ?nd 1~oroccan Division was rontinuinp; its r-ttack on otrer objectives . Tre 1st Poroccan Division on the rii:;ht at the hridgehM.d WPS ri?kin.t:s no progress . It rad a couple of trnk companies nortJ, of its r,res"nt lin"'s tut f'j ghting was bitter tind enemy oprositi.on to(\ great to ronsidl."r any progress as havin~ been Made . To the soutr in t}:e Frencl sector the 4th r:ountain Division was having mnch dif:'iculty in mn iri~ rroP,ress toward Mt. Ceschito . On the left of tlie Frencr Gorps, II Corps h~d taken rractic,...lly all of its initial o½jectives. Th~ 150th Jnfa~try of th~ 8~h Division had taken and held Da!'iin.no fir"'l . They were in V"ntosa and ready to go on as soon as the Francl,. had nroceedea south toward C"'scr·to to Rotundo . I Company of the 350th ht'!ld Cer:icola . ':'he 151st Inf'antry hRd 1110ved f'orwRrd about 1 , 000 yards find was stopred toward t! e entrance of' Jantn "r,1·i.r, Infante . They had -ianaged to ~et a few tarks .-:D.to the tovm anrl sorie infl'ntry +, .... oops . A coordinated attack to teJ" the town is ·r. rrep1,ration, 1-,ut th~ to 1m PS yl"'t has not fallen . F,lements o.f' the 139th Infantry ?dva:>1ced -f'orward as far P.s Gan !'artino and the two hill masses /t66 anr #69 , known as the Clle. San •;artino . There was ri~ tter f'-': ghting tr ere duri. 11f" the riorn-i ng. .Arou.11d noon ·:~ 11 #?.;q was tri.ken and an attack planned to ,vrest Hill #66 from the Gl'!rm..,ns. B-itt(')r counterattacks were lmmched by the f}"rrans t.l.l'oughout th~ dav on th"'se positions . Further south a'1c'1 to the coast other eleT"ents of the 85th Di vision had rroceeded for ward about 1,000 yards and were lam1.ching aggressive combat ratrols to feel r out ene'1y res~ ,;-::;&nee . In ;~enerrl t},e tempo o:: the attack shortly r,fte:r daybreak slowed down considerably, 8S the 1oche was putting ur bitter resistance . He 1 ad accepted battle as had · "'!e11. anticipated , t:1us rreventing tl," seizure of all objectives as anticipat~ : . Up on t,e -r::~_ghth Arny ~rant the Folisr , Corrs proceeded southwest from rositions nortl of the ncnastery and rrad" soTl'le -rrogress , hri.vi11.g !'laced el..,r'lents on FrantoT'l B.idge whicl~ underwert var:..ous 1 cr-·D.terattad~s all c ay lorg. In so. r:2ses nP-~ther Ue 7oche nor the foles actually possessed rarts of ~f''"' rid ;A. . To tbe S0'1tJ-,, across th,. ~-EJ: ldo, the Eii:;hth Arrny had pushed 8bout eir;r.t 1 )at~r>lions e cross this river eith r by n,eans of' class 30 ferries, r,qfts er bridges . South of ::;an J\.ngelo two 1,r:idges ht:1d been constructed across the lZaJ ido n.nd triree sq1.1adrons of tanks, in addition to infantry troops , had been rushed in+.,o the vr-tll"'Y• Tr.e:ir advance .-:n c'epth was lim:tted to ariout 1 , 000 yf'rds . Reportg continued to cor,e in durinP, the day, some confirmed and some not confirmed, indicating t:b1.t this ev~ning ard tmorrow would clarj fy 1'1any sit1.W 4~ions w:hich rlevelop!"ld durin~ th~ ...irst dey o; tre attack . ! Ge'1.,.ral 8lrrrk co11.ferr~cl w:i th Ge'1.ern.l Gr·1enther, his Chief of Strff, arrl General Brann, ½is G-3, on nun~rous occasio11s . :~ajor Gen"ral "Tate Twin:irc, Cor:rrnanrii11rt, Gen rel o-f' the ~trater;ic Air Force, v;as -tnvi.ted to l1mch. qe discussed 1:r-il'lfly the Strate1:;ic Air Force I s role in hi ttin~ targets in central Gen~ny a~d int~~ ree~ arees o.P It~ly rnd in ~oumania and Bulgaria . He nlso dj scussed sr:ri1' of t1 e h,ly that h,. ,res gjvi~g to the XI! Air 3U:i:,J.ort Com_,and, under General S::i.vHJ.-,, w{th l'il.rts of the Strategic Air Force. 1 G"lneral Clark co:1ti'1ued to o llow th~ battles closely throuJrout t:1e ef- ~ ~ •" • !llt/l-ft< - - �ternoon and evening. The lack of rrogress ~n the French sector might require the 3rd Algerian Division to vr,ry its rol~ in trie rrorosed rlan rnd pass through eler,ents of the 4th to accomplish obj"' cti ves north and nortl:.cast of Castelforte to seize end hold Ceschito, Reali, Rotundo and Siola. Orders of th"! day irsued by Genl'!rals Clark and Alexander are quoted below: General Alexander ' s messrge is cs follows: "Soldiers of the Allied Arnies in Italy. "Throur-hout the pest wjnter you 1rive fouapt hf'rd r,nd vnlfrntly end killP,d many Ger~ans . 1~rrinrs you Pre disarpointed that re h~ve not been abl~ to advance faster Pnd .('arther, but I rmd tl:'ose wl-'o knou, realize full well how !Il8gnif'icently you h~Ye fow~ht amonr;st these Plmost insur ,oPntable obstccles of . rocky, trac1·less ~ounta.:L-'l.s, deep i.n snow, and in valleys blocked by river::; ri.nd rud, against a stubborn foe . "The results of tr•ese prist months may not ny:penr srectaculPr, but you have c1rawr into Ttnly Pnd mauled rmny of t:b~ enemy's best divjsions "1Mch he badly '1eeded to stem th"? ad.vnnce of tre Rmsfan Arr,i"s in the East . Hitler l as Bd.mitted thE't Ms defeats in the East were lrirgely due to tre bitterness of t:i-,~ fiP-hting and is losses in Italy. This, in itsel""', is a gr"'ct 8 cl ievement and y0u ma~,r well be ri s proud of ;vout scl ves Rs I e rn of you . You have gafoed the rdmiration of +.he v10rlr'l Pnd th(> i:,;ratitude of our Russir,n Allies. 0 0 ''Today trie bad tmes are behind us and to"llorrow we crin see victory ahead . TTnder the ever increr>si11cr blo"'ls of the 1c1ir -f'orces of tre United Nations, which are mount~ ng every day in intensity, the Gerr,an war r.a·cliine is beginni"l:lg to crumble . The Alli"'d Prmed forces 8re nm1 ~.ssembling ·"or tre fjnal b0ttles on sea , on lrmd, P'1d in the air to crush the enemy once and for all. Fror the East and the West, -f'rol:' the Nortri and tl· e South, blows are Bbout to fa.11 which will result in th~ final rlestruction of thfl" •·razis and brirg freedou once n.gain to f>:irone , 1md hnsten reace for 1m all. To us jn Italy, las heen given the honom· to strike tre first blow . "We nre going to destroy tr~ German Armies in :;:tnJ.y. The fiishtjng will be lwrd, hitter , a.vid p~rhaps long, hut yon 1.1re warriors and soldiers of the highest order , who for more t1 r,n n. yeay, ~ ve kn01·11 only victory . You have courage, <1eterrni11.Ption enn skill. You ,-ii 11 he sur-rorted by overwhelming air forces , and in ,C!1.ms and tn.rks ue far outnumber t:re Gl'?rrrans . No Armies rave ever entered battle before with a more just t'1nd rig! teous cause . 11 80 vrith God 1 s ri~lr and ½lessjng, we tnlr~ the field - confident of: vic- tory • 11 The text of G"'n~ral ClFirk ' s 11 TO: ~ ssage is as follows: The Officers and Men of thl'! Fifth Army. "During the ei.r,ht months th..,t have pt>ssed sj nee your inv11sion of the -·-,. .l:J. �Italian mainland you have accomplished results of majqr strategic e.nd tactical importance to the United Nt>tions . The entire world , including the Axis , lmovrn the success and significance of your Salerno landing against bitter opposition , and of your subsequ\"nt capture of Naples :in the fact of the enemy' s deterrnination to deny to us the port ,t, ich was indispensable to sup~ . port our further operations in Italy. After tbe fall of Naples you pressed your attack relentlessly and without delay, forcing the GerrEns to continue their retreat until they had reached crrefully prepared lines, where the exceedingly difficult mo1mtainous terrain provided extreme advantages to the defender . Notwithstanding the obstacles of nountnins, lack of rce ds , bitter weather '111d concrete defensive fortifications, you have in your various wellexecuted nttacks forced the enemy to reinforce heavily his 1:1dvnntageous position at the expense of other comrlitments and have hs rassed him continuously. "At the san,e tiMe you ha,re established firmly a strong beachhe2cd in the Anzio - Nettuno area, where you hav"! provided a·serious threat on his lines of communication which he is attemrting to neet by the diversion of a large force from other operations . 11 It may appear to you, s:i nee the Fifth Army ' s progress in terms of territory gained during the past few months has been slow·, that our campaign is no longer a major one or that it is not having significant success in the war es a whole . rfothing o:rnld bl'! furth~r from the truth. You bave :c:/'."de n conspicuously successful invasion of the continental fortress which the Germans · boasted was impregnable . You have required the G.e;rBPns to devote more than twenty divisions to the costly and losing task of reta.rdjng the Allied progress to tJ,e north . You have inflicted heavy losses upon their troops and have taken more than 13, 000 prj_soners . You 1:mve plPced the enemy in his present distressing' positj_on of trying hopelessly to hold back the Allied forces, which he knows will eventually overrun him from two directions . nr have direct personal knowledge the.t the accomplishments of the Fifth Army are understood and Appreciated by tr e governments 8nrl. peoples of the United Nations • . They apprec:iE te not only th.at you have accomplished n.s much as was possible witr. the strt'!ngth of your force, but also that you hPve co,1tained in this campa.ign many thousands of German soldiers whom the Nazis have needed desperately in their attempts to stem the Russian advance and to prepare themselves age.inst inva.sion in other µirts of Europe . 11 For some weeks there has been a period of comyiarative cr-ilm, during which therA has been opportunity for replenishment of men and equipment . We shall soon fl gain resume the offen si ve and lPunch the 2ttacks which our appre hensive enemy expects and dreads . You have what you need to strike smashing blows and to follow them through to conpletion: thorough training, superfor equipment , heroic courage and the knowledge that we can and will destroy the German armies . ttI have full ,confidence that, as in th" rast, the men of the Fifth Army will meet the tests to come Ps true soL:iiers anr thct with God 1 s guidance and help you will press on to great and decisive v.i.ctories . 11 \ \ �SAN r,.V\.RCO-- MA.Y 13 , 19/44- -Reports concernin;;, the prodess of the battle came in during the en.rly hours of the morning 11,nd continued to come in throughout the day. - General Clark studied his map and progress rede during the past night . He had General Brann up in his v~m and conferred with him concerning th~ Attack. He talked to Gener9.l Saville on the telephone and later saw him personally concerning the air effort . He vlishod to have the air abandon part of the effort on battlefield isolAtion and attack targets that he considered more important . Some difficulties were involved with AAI and TAF on calling of'f battlefield isolation objectives allotted to the medium bombers. ) Shortly after lunch G-eneral Clerk, accompanied by Colonel Drarer , left for the forward areas . · They first visited the 85th Di vision advance command post at Minturno where General CJErk discussed with Genernl Coulter , the Division Conmander, the progress made by the division . He reviewed briefly the seizure of hills #66 and #69, known as Clle San Martino; the fact that the Division had two companies in Cave d 1Argilla, and the dj sposition of the Division in front of Santa Marfa Infante . The minor change in the Division boundary, as ordered by General Keyes, was alsci discussed . GenerPl Clerk asked about the casu.H.lties in the Division and was told thPt.. about 956 passed. throur-h clearing stations, but General Coulter trought that probably there were a little over a thousand . However, th~se figures could not be considered accurate, and JEter developments will cfarify them . From the 85th Division command post General Clark then vrent to visit Gene- · ral Sloan I s oommand post, the 88th Divis ion. There he reviewed the 88th Division I s efforts from the beginning, which included the capture of Damiano and Caracoli and the Division I s efforts north toward Santa Marfa . General ') Sloan WA.S disappointed vnth the lack of aggressiveness HS shown by the tank commander who was hesitant to take his tRnks off the road and really push theI!! forward, helping the infantry. General Sloan assured M.Jn that he was going to require the tanl'::s to work closely with the 351st InfHntry, corrJ11anded by Colonel Champeny, in the preparation of their next attack. He discussed briefly the atta.ck nol::'th from Damiano with the ultirn.te objectives of Bracchi and Cerri . · · After leaving the 85th Division oornrnand post, General CL'lrk proceeded immedi ately to the French Expeditionary Corps where he conferred with Generals Juin a.rid Carpentier . While there he learned thP_t the French had taken Majo and Rinchinso and had rroceeded south and held Ceschito and Rotundo . At all command posts General Clark expressed satisfaction to comm-anders for_ the excel-) lent work that they had accomplished so far and was very pleased with the Aggressive action of the French in reaching their objectives . Upon his return , to his command post he learned later on that the 1st DMI had rroceeded northward and had rre,de a, junction with other elements of the di vision where the Liri and the Garigliano met . · The French esMmeted thRt thev would have about 1 , 000 German prj_soners b:r night . As soon as Genernl Clc.,,rk i:-eturned to the command post he issued orders to Gener.al Keyes , II Corps ·Commander, to speed up attacks tonight , regardless of previous schedules or plans . He desired the R$th to attack tonight , regardless of previous schedules or plans . He desired the 88th to attack ;hunt Bracchi tonir,ht .from three directions P.nd to rush fa.st for the town of Spigno in order to take advantage of the Gerrrans being off balance from Fifth Army successes tocl ay. �After supper he conferred with Generals Gruenther a.nd Brann concerning new developments of the offensive which he.d apµ,ared• after tod_ry's sucpesses . After this conference he retired early. * * * SA~,T HARCO--HAY 14, 1944--Last night enemy bombers bit Naples and strafed Highway #7 . A few bonbs were dropped in the hosnital areas in the vicinity of Carinola. General ClHrk r>rose early, acquainted himself wit'b early morning dj spatches and progress made on the Fifth Prmy front. He conferred with General Brann concerning future actions of th('.l Fiftr, Arny, specifically II Corps . They dis cussed in brief the 351st Infantry assisting the 349th in takin~ Mount Bracchi and then continuing vrestward to take and hold Spigno . The 34gth wos to take Mount Bracchi and thr~n go westward to seize and hold Mount Civita . II Corps was to speed vigorougly west nnd cut the AusoniaScauri road nnr'l prevent mP-my withdrawals from the area or reinforcements being pushed in . - During th is conference General Gruenther brought in Colonel Zeller, Deputy Chief of Staff of French Expeditionary Corps . General Clark rendered a decision to allow the French to use the road Minturno - S. rJarfa. Infante - Ausonia, part of which is in the 88th livision sector . This 'could allow the i:;trench to :iove in their supplies to Ausonia by this road . He discussed br:iefly the 1st DrIT sweep westward , seizing and holding dominating terrain and assisting the 3rd DIA in taking Mount D1 0ro . · The 3rd DIA is pushing up toward Esperfa. to attack and' seize Hount D1 0ro. The Gou:r1s will be pushed westward, by-passing Spigno and filtering in to the mountainous Petrella mass ~ ~ General Seville came to confer with Gener<Jl Clark immedie tely A.fter this conference, and they discussed air support. General Cl11rk ,.ranted the Esperia area bombed to complete isolPtion of tj e battlefield and to dislocate enem:r concentratim-1s fi lterjng back m1d forth tr rough the to '\'n. He also discussed f'uture reguirernents f'rom the [;,ir f'or ground_ support . After General Saville had left, General 01:9.rk went to lunch . General Cannon carie to see him 5n the early part of the afternoon and discussed briefly with him the effectiveness of' the air support being gi1.ren by the Tactical fdr F'orce . After l}eneral Cannon had left, General Clark worked on adnd nistrPti ve matters unbl General Alexander, cnrc, AAI, came to see him. Generrils /\lexander, ClRrk, Gruenther and Brann went to tr e conference hut, wr ere General Clark oriented General Alexander on Fifth .Arr-iy results to date . General Ale~ander was very rleased with the results and so ~xpressed himself. He also said he believed the Boche were esta½lisbing a (efemsive 1" ne from Cassino - Pignataro . He hoped t:bey did, as rositio11.s gained by tbe French would out-flank this position. The subject of novine; the %th Division to the beachhead was brought up by· General Alexander ~or an all-out 'lttacl, from there to the cne"'V 1 ~ flank . General Clark d:i ssuaded Ge11eral Alexander from reaching a decision at this time as to exact dates to nave the, ?,Sth Di vision to the beachhead. P-e said he would like to rlefer a ,lecision as to tre e•ract time for tJce nover,ent rending later developr1ents . After General Alexander l~ft, G-;yieral Clark went to bis van and worked on �more administrative matters and continued to receive dispatches from his forward elements . After dinner , the movie nnoly Hatrimony" was shown in the conference hut to sonc rierbcrs of the Fifth Arrr1y staff. Gtmeral Clark dictated the following notes for inclusion in his diary : HThe Fifth Army ettack has bPen characterized by great aggressiveness and dash on the rart of 4:,Le "?rench ~xp~dltionar:r Corps . Our plans were well conceived nnd have been executed as previously planned . French units push on, passing by isol11ted Gerrien troops leaving rear Frencl' elements to nop them up. By so dojnri_:, the:r have not lost the inpetus 0 1~ their surp;~~~ ... \. :-t-. ~ r-cvJ tack. \ ;t,lP -~~ , 'The situation on the II Corps front hns been somewhPt <'1ifferent, for our attacv was not initially :in tle J:J.ountains, but as vie adv~nced we approached the mountains . The French att·ack str-trted in the P1ountn.i11s, their ::irst objec1 tives being the highest pea}s . I arn c :: sappointed in the rigidity of II Corrs plans . They hs.ve not shovm n flexibility of m'nd and an aggressive r,ttitude. In !'1Y· opinion, with the strenr:th we had 1".vailable a~~ Santa til'lria Infante that resistance should have been elininated by-mid-day yesterday. As it was, tanks ( and the 351st Infantry, again in.my opinion poorly commanded by Colonel Champ8ny, permitted thenselw•s to he held up e'1d pernittcd G8rnans to withdr·aw from the Bracchi pocket during the n:i-ght . If it had not been for my intervention last evening to speed up th"'.l r-ittack on Rotlmdo imd to mntinue it on to Bracchi and tc- speed up the attack by the 3/,qth on Bracchi, we probably would still be sitting further back thj_s morning. I r,nve oomrnnnicated with General Keyes and sMn both Division Co1'1me.nders yesterday at their forvmrd command posts and urged sr:eed of action . I hPve directed Keyes to use the 349th to attack immediately this mornjng fron Scmta i'1aria in the direction of Civita, t:be higr; r:round north of Spigno . During the disruption of the enemy we must break into his ljnes and g~t -thet high ground . v "Again, I am greatly dj sappointed by t're lack of aggressiv.,,ness of II Corps . I am also disappoint1'd :in the apparent timidity of the tank commanders to shoot their tanks in an all-out attack. Fractics.lly p.one have been 1':l'l.ocked out by enem;r action but 1'y indecisive piddling around in rear areas, throwing tracks and, in one or two cases, hitting mines . nsent the following messr,ge of <X'nr-;ratulAtions to General Juin last night acconpanied by two bottles of, whiskey: 111 My sincere congratulations on your important accomplisriments in the present offensive . The capture of essential and dominotfog terrain hy the F'rench troops is of naj or VP lue in tl is ore ration vti ich the Fifth Army is carrying out so ··igorously. I know that you will continue to rress on witl-ollt pause in this phase of our c2.r1paign for the destruction of our enemy and tre ultimate liberation of France. You are proving to an anxiously awaiting F'rance toot the French Army has retained sacred its finest fj ehting traditions . It is e.n honor to have your troops in the Fifth .Army. 1 0 11 1ile should have Spigno b;v tonight . 11 - ' -.,: ; '"\.}-'~' .J • • ~' ' ~,i: ' ) / �General Juin today issu ,d the follow· 1 ng order of the day: ''After two days 0 1: -f'ip.-hting against positions tllet the enemy thought were impregnable end in spite of "ierce r~sistance he is retiring, disorganized and beQte~ . ''A large orea J:,ns bMn conquered. A position of vital inportence the rt. ~lAJ0 is jn our hnnds . Hore tr an 1000 rrisonP-rs hrve been taken including 18 offic~rs . Our edvance continues. "I call upon all for a r~doubled effort [lnc' renewed vigour . YesterdA.y1 s r-D,,-iificent success is t} e rl"!dee of assurance for tnr,o~row' s victory. "Forward." * * * SMT HA.RC0--HAY 15, 194/+--General ClPrk :-rose Mrly and r;tunied disrrtch~s from th"' "'ront l:ine units. .Action durinf; tJ:,e night and rrcceed-inr, throughout the day by the 88th Division res•1lted in Srir,;no, the high hill I".a.ss of nount La Civita a.rr1 southwarcl +'ailing jnto our hPnds. A II Corps B.ttack in th~ r,+'t~rnoon, el"\rloyino; tlie ~5th Divir:ion, southward cau.,.ed Cestellonoroto to fall in our hands . Trt"- ?~d and ,ra. Battalions of the ,17th Inf'antry hrv~ establ:'°L'''h""'d them"'elv"'s ...- 4 ,,.m ~n t}-,e to·m P'1d on t},e higr ground to tl">e south of the tovm. T:1e 'llst Rt"!connaismmce 3quedron, r1ttaclred to tbe 85th Di vision, will pass throur,1· -1:.1,e 1st Battalion of tre 1'3Qth anc. gp, in contact ~ith enemy eler-ents in Scauri a11.d, ½y ~ggressive actior, push the~ out. This wil] be ci 4 multa'1e0us 1"':.th Pn attac'I{ "by tb•· ':\J~th southwest to the rorid junction at San Croce. It is felt thnt not many Gern..,ns remain in th~ town of Sca,ll'i . By tomorrow tlie Scauri area should Hlso be in o•u- hands • . General Clin.. k c0nferred wi tr Gent""rr ls Grul"::rr+;h"'r r nd ~re"'.n trrour,hout tlie '7ornin,;. Later 011. they Tient c1 o' m to th"' G-3 Section to discuss .:-uture operations by Fifth Ar...,y on the rnu<l relief P.!ap which dericts the no..mteinous t"lrrain in minit=ture as it is. Af'ter this conf~re11ce Gtmeral Clark had lune •• Dur 4 nr, luncr Gereral Keves came ar.1 conferred ½r" +'ly with General CL~rk. ~ot"Js concerning this conference are discussed belo. Dur:!.ng ....,he ['fternoon General CL"rk ..,t,udied closf'lly the progress of the battle. Incor-ing dispatchAs continued to come -ln shovring our successful efforts to take ancl c,eize Castellonoroto . The Fre~1eh Corrs continu,..d to follo11 up wi~h r>.ggressive f'ctions throughout tr~ day. mhe Gou"ls hac'l pP..ssed westwar•l and were into t}-,e mo'mtains in and north of Spigno . Ele,.,ents of the 3rcl Algerian Division were pushing p11.st Ausonia on the road to Esperia. Elements of the 1st DMI were rroceeding southward from San Giorgio on the road to Esperia . Details concerning f')Xac·1:, location of these Frencr elements are not ::i.vailable du~ to difficulty of maintaining coruiunict'tions through this ountainous terrain. ��11 1......4 After supper General Clark visited -.rarious staff sections in the com!'l.and· post and retired early. General Clark dictated the following J111:>.t"rial for inclusion in his diary: "My fears that the enemy might react to our lack of Pggressive attitude toward Spigno did not develop . We hove occupi..,d Spigno and the key terrain to the south known as La Civita . Our good fortune does not minimize the fa.ilure on the part of someone in the g8th Division to carry out orders with energy. General Keyes is investigating this delinquency and when I get the whol ~ story I n.ust take r>.pproprfo.te action . I have congratulated General Keyes and his tT"O new Di vision Commanders as follows: 111 ·congratulations on the success which the forces under :rour command have acr-foved dur:rng past three da~rs of intense fighting . I especially desire to co"!linend the 85th and ~8th Divisions which are engaged in of"'ensive combat f'or first time and which bave conducted ther,sebres in a glorious manner, true to the traditions of the United States Army. J leasy congratulAte Sloan and Coulter not only for their current successes but also for tle mann~r in which th~y have trained their divisions in prepnration for these eventful days . Great victories are in store for the Fifth Army when it is composed of troops of the caliber of the II Corps . ' ~ "I am also sending a message to Genf'-ral McNair, telling M.rn hm1 prouc, I am to be the first comrm.nder to employ his new civisions ill combat . It has proved' the method by which thl')y W('H'e originally fornl'.'d and later trained . I, o,.. course, am delighted with the great punch, initintive P_nd l'bnergy displayed by the French. They are really carrying- the weight of tbis battle . I am ~ disappointed in the effort of' the Eighth Ar1-..y. The Fifth having taken the \ Apollinare - San Giorgio area should permit tt~rr. to advance without opposition at least as far as Pignetaro . I am tole' tney rre commiting parts of the Canadians and of the 78th Division , which should help ., "I am delighted with our efforts to get into the mountains. The Fifth Army 'mows how to operate in the :iountains and is trnined for it . The Germans dislike the mountains , and I prefer to work jn tl em to the valleys where the German has prep2red defens1's , mines and other delaying obstecles . 1 11 I hffve directed Keyes to push with all the en~rgy ;md speed he mm muster from Spieno directly across the mountnins to Itri, en.ploying the 88th Division for this purpose; at the same time to attack with the 85th to capture Castellonoroto which , in turn, should bring ribout' the collapse of the Scauri area . I have authorized Keyes to use the 85th in advance of these areas as far as Nount Campese but no further . I have told him the.t I anticiprite the 36th Division will move to the bridgehead , cor,nencing in about 72 hours, that it will take another five days to complet~ tl1e move . At the end of this eight- day period I desire to start the mov..-ment of tbe ~5th Division at full strengtr to the bridgehead, together with sufficient command and conmn~~ication ell!"Ments of Keyes' II Corrs ~ Hence, the 85th Division must be ·employed in limited objectives from now on, with the 88th carrying on towards Itri. "I will put Crittenberger 1 s IV Corps in when I take Keyes out . Gritten- ) berger is already with Ke~ecoi'ning familiar wjth the situation ra- �7J pidly. It vrill give Cri ttenberger an entry into combPt under favorable conditions . 11 By moving the II Corps with me into the bridgehead, V:hen I do attack I can attack first with the VI Corps , followed immediAtely by the II Corps with the British, 85th Division and 1st ArP1ored Division, after I -pull it out of the VI Corps attack. This should have decisive results . " * * * SAN 1 ':ARCO--MAY 16, 1941+--General C~ark arose and studied :military dispatches . Operations during the night were a little disappointing in that elements of the 85th Division had not been nble to gain the hill mass of Scauri and trap the few remaining Germans left there . At .0900 the GenerBl left the command post to visit the ew:1 cu.ation hospitals and see the wounf1ed from the 35th and 88th Divisions . He first visited the 56th Evacuation Hospital where he awarded 21 Bronze Stars to hospital personnel, including nurses, for bravery during ah eir raid at the beachhead . 11.fter this ceremony he went througl1 the various 1i< ards am• talked to the wounded . Leaving the 56th, he went to the 95th Evacuation Hospital where he decorat ed four medical personnel with the Bronze Star for bravery during the initial landings at Salerno. After the ceremony he went through the casualty wards . Following this visit , he went to the 93rd Evacuation Hospital and awarded one TJistinguished Service Cross to Captain Stone for his courageous actions while accompanying a front line unit Ht the be2chhead . He also awarded two Bronze Stars to medical personnel for bravery at the beachhead . In all of the evacuation hospitals that he visited, he found the wounded cheerful and with their chins up. 1 After leaving the 9Jrd Evacuation Hosp1 tal, he went to the 175th Engineer area where he awarded five Bronze Stars . Upon returning from thj_s tour of the evacuation hospitals rrnd engineer unit , he v;ent into immedia.te conference with Genera.ls Gruenther r,nd Brann. After lunch General Clark, Pccompanfod by Colonel Draper, left for the front . He went directly up Highway #7 through the town of Scauri. Thj_s was bej_ng occupied by the 339th Infantry. Vlhile the General was there , one sniper prisoner was being passed through the town to the prj_soner of i'lar cage to the rear . From the town of Scauri the General proceeded further along the highway to the vicinity of the crossroads at San Croce . While there , a plAtoon of light tanks of the 91st ReconnHissance Squadron passed along the road but were forced back by antj_-tank gunfire $ General Cli:irk stopped the platoon leader and inquired why he was withrlrav1dng his platoon, and he stated that one tank was put out of action by four well-sip;hted anti- tank guns l'lnd Also thPt scattered Germans were throwing anti- tank mines on the road '1S they passed by. He stated that he was brin--:jng his tanks back to snfety prior to pushini:; forward so that he could call for artillery fire on the anti - tank guns . While in th~ vicinity, thl'lre was considerable small a.rms fire up ahead and both hostile and friendly Artillery fire in the vicinity of Mount CRmpese . After seeing everything thrit had te1<~n place in the vicinjty of this �crossroad, General ClBrk proceeded back to the ~8th Division command post southeast of Minturno. 1Vhile there he conferred with General Sloan and discussed positions of the elements of his Divis:ion proceedjng forward over the Petrella hill mass. After leaving the 88th Division, the General went to the 85th Division to see General Coulter where he verified disposition of el~nents of t}1 is Di vision in their push westward to Hount Campese and cleaning up operations in the Scauri hill area. From the 85th Division, General ClRrk went to the II Corps co~ma.nd post , ,hich had r,oved the night before from theJr location east of Minturno to a new location northeast of Minturno. The coMmand post was Moved to a quieter place and to get away from the congested traffic in and around Minturno. While at II Corps he discussed with Gensral Kl'lyes and General Crittenberger of IV Corps the rrovisions of Onerations Instruction #18 which had just been issued. This Operations Instruction confirmed the verbal instructions issu~d the day before by GenerBl Clark to General Keyes. rrovisions 0f this Operations Instruction were discussed in the Army Comrnander 1 s notes of yesterday. In brief, II Corps was ordered to attack and capture Castellonorato without delay and push the t1dvance westward to Itri. The 88th Division was to be employed rapidly tl:1rough the Petrella mass, pushing the German forces from Campese and moving on to Itri. The 85th Division vras riot to be employed in operations west of Campese without approval of this headquarters. -Sffective at 1200 hours 16 May the Commanding General, II Corps, was to he prepared on 72 hours' notice to begin withnrawal of the 85th Division from its present zone of action preparatory to a water movement to Anzio. Tentative plans for the withdrawal and movement of this Division wcire to be made so that the coMplete Division could be closed in Naples stagjng area?'? hours after the vdthdrawal began. The Commanding General, II Corps, was directed to prepare the following plan: (a) To turn over to the Commanding Gen~ral, IV Corps, the present zone of r>ction of II Corrs. (br PlPnS for the movement of the following units from the present zone of action to the Anzio beacJ-1 h~ad on 2L~ hours 1 notice on or after May ')2nd: Hq. and Hq. Co., II Corps; Hq. and Hq. Btry., II Gorps a.rtilhiry; Military P r,lice platoon, II Corps; 53rd Signal Bn.; 54tr. JITedical Bn. 1 After supper the GenerPl workeid on adninistrative w.atters and military dispatches a.nd retired. General Clark today received the following reply from General Keyes to his congratnlatory ceble of yesterday: "II Corps is appreciative of your fine congratulatory message which will inspire all to contribute their full share to the victories destined for Fifth Army. 11 * * * SAN MARCO--MAY 17, 1944--Aftcr havinf; dispensed with early morning dispatches from the front, General Clark conferred with General Brann, his G-3, artd his �Chief of Staff, General Gruenther, concerning future F:ctions of the battle . Following this conference, General ClArk r~ceived Colonel Gray, Fifth Army Judge Advoc~te,and reviewed nine general court martial cases. After Colonel Gray had left his van, GenerPl Clark walked down to the G- 3 Section to see General Brann. v) o.1r, At three o'clock General Alexander, his Chief of Staff,,GenerrlrHarding, and his Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, Genernl Robertson, came to see Genera.l Clark. General Clark brought, ther1 into the conference hut, where his G-3, GenerA,l Brann, his G-2, Colonel Howard, and his Chief of Staff, General Gruenther conferred concerning progress o~ the battle . The actions of the Eighth Army to date were discussed, as well as the movement of the ,6th Division to the bridgehead and the attack from the bridgehead. General Clark also brought up the point th-:it he vmuld like to have the ,French Corps attack from fjco toward Ceprano to cut off 2s much of the German Army ) facing the British Army as possible. In order to do this, he brought out that it was necessary to change the present boundary as t:re Fifth Army would necessarily have to go beyond its limits. Details of this conference are covered l)elow in +..he Army Comll18,nder 1 s notes. In the l.<>tter pRrt of the afternoon GenerAl DeGaulle, Head of the French \ State, accompanied by his Chief of Staff, Genern.l Bethouard, General DeLattre \ de rriassigny, Corunander of the ?nd French Arrriy; Mr. Dietholrn, Commissioner of' War; and General Juin, Cornnanoer of the French Sxpeditionary Corps, came to pay their respects to General Clark. General Clnrk and Generrtl DeGAulle, accompanied by r1ajor Ridgway Knight, interpreter, went up to General Clark's van, where they discussed the 2ctions of the French Corps and the situation on the Fifth Army front toget:ber. Genera.l DeGaulle was very enthusiastic and pleased with the progress of tre battle. The remainine;GenerPls . were in the conference hut ,1rhere General Gruenther, Colonel Snltzman, Colonel Porter, Colonel Draper and Lieutenant Bajenow talked with the visiting French Generals while Generals ClPrk and DeGaulle conferred alone. Hews photogrPphers took pictures of Generals Clark, DeGaulle and Juin together and, after a very brief stay, the visJ ting French Gr-merP ls left for the French Exr,ecH tionary Corps commanc1 rost at Sessa. Battle reports today found the French Corps pusl ing northwestward Y'ith advance tank elements reported in Honticelli. The G01,m1s, with other elflnents of the French Corps, wer0 pusMng westward and passed the Revole hill mass, leading elements reported Ps hrvfog cut tl-ie roAd Itri-Fico. In the south, II Corps reported RS unconfirMP,d that leading eleT'lents of the 85th Division were in Formia where they r,et sligrit resistance. Hostile f'rtillP,ry which,hacl been firing from the vicinity of Gaeta had lifted, indicqting prcp2rations for enemy w2thdrawals this evening. The 88th Division had reported eleJ11ents past Mount Ruazza anc pusbi11g down toward the direction o~ Itri. Where::i s all of these reports were nnconfirned, it inc'lj cntes, hovrever, th.<>t the Fifth Arny is on the move and th"'t they have forcl!'ld the Poche into a gen"lrPl vd thdrawal. General Clerk's notes on trie day's acti,rities are as follows: "Generals Alexander, Harding and Robertson ceme o call on me at three o'clock as pre-arranged. Su'½ject of conf.,,rence was current battle and roove- �ment of '36t,.,, Division to bridgehead . I ·explained thnt we v;ere in the outsldrts of Fornia; thet J hoped to have Itri by tomorrow ; that we had captured Ti:speria and leading t2nk el0ments of the 3rd DIA were reported at Uonticelli , to all o:' which Ge:vieral Alexander srowed great elution - as he should. I told hin that we Lad 3, 000 prisoners in the Fifth Army. 1'TTe theYl asked ahout the 36th Divisio,.,. I told him I had vdthr}rawn its artillery from the battl e , was moving it to the rest of the Division and it would be prepared to load on his order . He gave no order to load but indicated that 1-;,e ,•rould na1rn the decision , probably tomorrow or the next day. He indicated that hn felt the time was rapidly approaching 1'Then we should get ready for the attack out of the bridgehead . He thought when Cassino foll he would order the 36th to start its movement up . He seemed to think that the Gernans would not stand on the Hitler Lino . I Pgree , but the only reason it will not is because of the flanking action cf th~ifth Arl"ly_on_!11e south. 11 I ------ - then brought up the subject of direction of attack out of the bridgehead on Cor:. and VP lnontone . He remains ada.rant that that is the corrl"!ct and only direction of attack, regardless of the enemy sitUFtion. I drew a circle on the map , projecte-d my VI Corps into the high ground southwest of Valmontone and ask,"'d him where I would go fror1 there; to which he replied that fast , r1obile patrols '.'muld operate to cut the routes to the east. I rP-plied that in getting to iTplmontone I had gone over the mounta.ins, ha.d ab,.,,olutely no roads and i'!culd only have foot troops and pack equipment . He brushed this Aside . I poj nted this out ''ecause I want him to evalw:1te the situation v,hen th~ time to attacl~ approaches, in order that we can attack in the right direction , and the Cori-Valmontone t1.P:1' be the wrong direction . · tr:::- then pointed out to h:m the rles:Lr£1bilHy cf Fi+'th Army attacVing from Pico on Ceprano in order to cut -in 1Jehind the Eighth ttrrny at the narrowest point in the Liri Valley. He was cleli;;hted and told me he would issue instructions accordingly. "I hn.ve issu".!d instructions to my Chief of Staff and G-3 to hold the 85th Division in its present position in the Fornia area , to push the 88th first on the high ground northwest of Itri anr:1. then to the northwest on Lenola . It will then be prepared to push either to the west or to the north, if the latter - to protect the left flank of the Frenct Corps in its advance from Pico to Ceprano . I certainly would like to join my II Corps up overland '!lf~_tb the bridp:ehead . I may i:;et the opport1mity. I talk~d with General Alexander about ANVIL. He thinks it is not "hot 11 • I am told otherwise by Colonel Jenkins , AFHQ planner." 11 General Clark today received the following cable from General Alexa.no.er: "If, as seems likely, Bighth Arr,y have not been r_ble to draw level with Fifth Army by t:ime lntter reach Fico P-rea, CP\fC directs Fifth krmy to strike northwards by San Giovanni on Ceprano to cut off v,_;thclrawal by Highway #6 of enemy forces still opposing Eighth Army irrespective of existing jnter-Army boundary. In thet event , boundary will be adjusted by this Headqwrters in consultation with Armies to suit result:lng situation. 11 �. ~ r \,~•"i . t,, \~; . Gen~ral Clar.k disratch"d tl e "oll0w~ ni:i; lett":lr to General Tu''-'rshall today, reportin, upon the initiA.l action of the 85th and 88th Divisions: 11 K"lowing your r;reft interest in tl 13 new. dj visions t hie}, wer!'l created in tre TTnited StRtes , I an writhg you brfoPly to tell you of th .ir debut in offensive conhrt wi. th the Fift"' Arny. 7 "The ~5th a"ld 8Af-~ Inft:i.ntry .Jivisions ~nt"'recl con.brt un·ler ideA.l conditions . Upon thrdr assi~nmPnt to Fiftl• Arrny, "I pli>ced th~:ri in the new Fifth Arr1y s1'ctor alonr, the GarigJ iano Riv r . The sitwtion was c;tetic "n0 the 1 fro'Ylt rclrtiv ly qui~t . Botl1 c jvisions hnd ari opr'ortunity to heco:"e rccustom~d to trP.~ r battla, sectors grri.dually. -)'urinr; t: 1 is r!'lrioc' they executed extensive ORY l'nd ni~ht rA.trolling . 'T'he, r soon becare P11mili "'r vri th the tl'lrrain over wl-iicl' they are now A.ttacld.no;. On the night of ~!B.Y 11th, at 2300 hours , they jumped off . They "lave dnne rell arid hnve r->ttained all thedr objectiyes . FiP-htjng !1rs been severe in r:aces . Casurlties in these two divisions for the fj.rst four days of -f'j r;hting arn ti.s f ollous: W01mded Killed 107 87 1316 658 194 85th Division 88th Division 1974 ':'reir Morale is rigl-' . In one ::instance , an inff!ntry regiMent of the 85th Division was driven of" its objective three times . "'::2.ch time it counterF1ttacked find. finally re- took the hill with teavy losses to the enemy. The tenacious , deterr~::ined sort or fightinr· wrich trese a;visions hqve shovm speaks well of thejr tr8ining 11t hone. I lmew you anil Grmeral ircnair would be interested , as I am, to see the result of' the War DepPrtment I s e-r-fort to build nev, divisions ·"c.:r battle . They hDve met their f'nal test in corbat with complete success . Unfortunately, it was necessary for the division cor,manders to reco"'1mend the relief of four o<' the regir,ental corunanders - -for a corbination of Ag~ and rhysical reasons . They were replaced by yotmger M'9n prior to tee stArt of the current b?ttle . "The brj dgehend is poised for an nttnck 't't'P1 tirrdnf" SM"S appropriflte . I shall first reinforce it . Prior to th?t attack I v ill move my r>dwmce headquarters into tie _-i,ridgehead where I feel our efforts r1?y be dedsive . There will 1-le considerable tanlc nction , An<i , in order that infantry nay follow pro!'lrtly behind +,1,e ti:-nks , v1e hi:i.ve devised whrt we. call an "infantry bl,ttle sled 11 • "':nclosed are photograplrn to illustrate its emplo;ment. Fifth Arny ornnance naintenance coupanies hrve bujlt enour;J:-, to tow 30 <:-1U."'r1 s bP-h~na Bttacking -1:.imks . He have experimented vdth then and feel thf't the fjrst time they nre used, with tre elenent of surprise , they should be extrAnely helpful . I will rurnish you more Jnformation on them r>ft~r we h(lve trind the:-1 in conbrit . 1 "I saw Captain Clifton Brown tre otr-er dny. He is fine , in good spirits and ~nt' usinstic over his wor'k here . He sends his vmr!"" regr•rds to you am' Hrs. Marshall. I hc>ve already v.ritten !'h's. rbrshnll about Lt . Allan Brm,m • .... . ' �"I want to thank you -f'or ,1nkinr.; ~t poss5bl~ f'or me to r~turn for ny short v~ sit . It gave me a werit 1~ ft to see my fPmily rg:,in . I know it m~ant os ~u~r to them. 11 I am deli.r;hte-c with tl e five - day results of our Fiftr Army attack. We hr,ve brok!:!n the Guc;tnv Line jn several pl8ces by attecking over the mountains . "re have ren tr<ited to n distl"nce of fourtr-,en rniles on both the II Corps and French Corps fronts . Fifth Army has capt'Ul'~d appro:irim~tely 1 , 000 pr:i soners to of'te . The Fren_ch are ,..j_g},t;ng splendidly 11i th our U. S. equipnent . We will continue to m(-lke progress . 11 * * SA"f\T r~JIJWO-- MAY 18, 1944--After dispP-nsing with earlJr morning disprtches , Gener1"1 l Cl0rk had Genert1 l Brann, his G-3, t:ind General Gruenth"'r, his Chief of Sb.ff, in his van to discuss present developments of the bPttl~ -rrfor to the arr:lvl'll of GenerPl 7,Jilson, CTWC, AFHQ .and GenArPl ::Jevers, :JCI:JC, AT<'H'), . Gen~rels Hilson a.:ri<l. Devers nrriv0d at 0910 and were accompanied by General Alexander , CI 11C, AA.I , end General Lernnitzer , DCS, AAI. Genernls ·c1ark, Wilson, Al~xander, Devers, Gru~nther, Brarm and Lemnitzer went into the conference hut where Gerieral Clnrk outlined the progress riade by the Fifth Army since D day. He coMpletely orient~d G~nPr~l Wilson on the Fifth Arny front . The discussion also 1.nvolvP-d 8ctions on thB Eighth Arr.y front and present GcrM"n re~ctions to the nll-out attack. One o~ the highli~hts of the meet;ng wap Gen""rE>ls GlR.rk end /llexander 1 s request thrt they did not wont the Ah 'orce Tran'3port Group to be ta1ren awry at this ti!'1r-, for they vere needed for supply5 ng troops "nd also a contemplated pl'l.rachute drop . General /jlson immediotely put ~n a telephone cell to ~ake certain that the Transport Group was not triken a.vmv for operr>tions r-ilsewhere . After the conference the v~ sj_ting Ge11erels broke off into small groups and Gereral Clr-irk received General R"rrnon , Co~"nding General of the 1st Armored Division at the l:>eac1'head, in his van where they a~scussed the .Armored Division ' s conte'"'lplated cf+'orts in tre t>ttf'ck f'rom the beachhePcl . Later on in the morning, Genr>rsils ClP.rk, Gruenth"r and Brann revj ewed t:re Plan BUFFALO . General Cbrk desires to see General ,,,rucicott at };is comnand post tonorrov, and sent him the radio v1hich is quoted at the conclusion of' today ' s diary. This cnble sumrnarizes the results of the conferonce on the rlan BUFFALO , which is the attrck from t1'e be8chhead jn tre direction Cori-Valr1ontone . General Clark had as his guest for lunch Generrl Sr>wbricge, G- 1 of NATOUSA . During l1mch General S:=>wbridge spoke of his recent visit to th0 United States and talks thPt he had with General 'larsh~ll concerning G- 1 matt~rs . Shortly after lunch Generel Clnrk left by cub pl1:me for the II Corps 1-=drfield southeast of' Minturno "There he conferred ni th G,eneral !f eyes concern:i ng future offensive R.ction on tJ-,e main Fifth Army front , the att.nck from the bridgehead and movement of the '36th Division and elements of II Gorps to the bridgt9head prior to the attack. Jn the latter part o+' the t1fternoon, General Clrir}- rec.,,.ived GenPral Loevren wl.-io is to replace General J-fawkesworth , Comnanding the 1st British Division at ' �the bridgehead. Genc-:ral Clark had as supper guests Genernl Brann, his G-3, and General Lewis, . his Artillery Officer. A brief sUJ11mary of the day's events on the rrogress of the battle w11.ged }>Y both armies is as fallows: 0 The Polish Corps took the monastery in the latter part of the morning, and elements of the 1st Guards Brigade were mopping up in Cassino town where all organized resistance had ceased. The Eighth Army front surged ahead somewhl'lt throughout the day when German resistance slackened considerably along the whole front. The French Corps had taken Mount D'Oro around noon and occupied·Monticelli and were pushing elements to the north and east beyond the tovm. The GoUJns had raided the Itri-f ico road dur:ing the night and withdrew during the day into the mountajnB astride the road. Elements of the 8E!th Division had maintained contact.and pushed to about 800 yards east of the Itri-Pico road. Their advance over this difficult mountain terrain had caused them, according to unconfirmed reports, to be short of amnunitjon, food and radio batteries. Lqter on in the day they received necessary supplies, 2.nd the 350th and 351st Infantry Regiments ,7ere prepared to launch an attack acro8S the ro2d with th!'! objective of sej_zing Haunt GrHnde to the northwest of Itri. Elements of the 85th Division had reached Formia and by afternoon the 338th Conbat Team had completely occupied the tovrn. Hostile enemy artillery fire frorn Gaeta continued to harrass columns along the ScauriFormia road. By late afternoon counter-batter:r Pnd navr:i.l gunfire had silenced most of the artillery nre comini:; from Gaeta. The 337th and '338th Regiments of the 85th Division had maintained contact and were on a north-south line about a mile west of Marinola. The following important messages were received and dispatched today: . AAI to CG; Fifth Army. RN 247. 11 CINC considers the time has come to \ move 36th Division into the bridgehead. He therefore directs that the move J should begin forthwith." . Clark to Truscott. RN 5791. "Movement 36th Division to bridgehead starts immediate:j.y. Shipment will be made in four lifts. Expect to move six LST 1 s tonight. Further details later. It now appears probable that Operation BUFFALO will be launched in nbout six or seven days. Time is only an estimate. I will keep you advised of developments. Progress continues to be satisfactory on main front. We have Mt. D10ro and Monticelli. Cassino anc1 monastery have been taken. 11 Clark to Truscott. RN 5792. 11 I desire that you be at r1.y headquarters by 0930 Fridny morning for conference concerninl." future operations from briqgehead •. C-78 plrne will be on Anzio field at 0800 Friday morning to bring you and ty,o stnff officers, returning after conference. Be prepared to discuss feasibility of continuing 3rd Division in Operation BUFFALO to take objectives #1 and 1/2 instead of passing the 36th Division through." Eighth Army to Fifth Army. RN U 312. "II Polish Corrs to cor:iplete clearance of area of monastery hill and west of it and to push towards Villa S Lucjp.. �13 Corps and I Canadian Corps to •,pke contact uith Hitler Line end break trrougl1 if possible without '"'elay or if strongly held to tap in along front to discover 11eak poim,s . All inform1?d . 11 Clark to Truscott . RN 5822 . 11 Wl1 "t tirm vlill you ~rrive on Friday? At conference please be prepared to discuss feas~bility of following operation as an alternative rlan. BU'''FALO att~ck to he launched es now planned to "nclude capture o~ objectives }l q~d ¥2. Special SArvice Force would continue toward Artena and Velmontone. Ac-~ter cnpture of ob,iectives '1 1 ~rnrl '.'2 regroupin½ woulc take place and new attack :::..r,mched north~1est -f'roI'l. Cisterna area . " * * * SA ..J fVJlCO--Jffi.Y 19 , 1944--Genere.l Clark :rose enrly nncl studied militery dispatch s cc11cerning irogress ri,..,de by Fift}, Army 1.mits during the nj ght . At oq10 General Truscott, VI Corrs co~,.nanrler, P.nd Coloni;l CPrlson, his Crief of Staff, and nn Assistant G- 3 arrived Bt Fifth Arr,y forvmrd co"'rriand post by C- 78 from the bridge'beA.d to confer vi tr Generf'l ClPrk on Flan Btr'FALO, t7l-iicl-i -is the attack at tl e bridgeheaa in the direction of Cori-Vn.lmontone . In addition to Gcn--ral Clr->,.:r'c nt t 1n conf ,rence \crere GenerPls '"'rann, Tate rind Colonel Howard . :'rior to di.scu.-,sirig Pl1m '"llITTALO, Genernl Cl1>.rk outlfo" ~ tr Gen,~ral '.I'ruscott thP, rrogress to d<itc r ade by the Fift}-, Army 1:md the implications trat c: t would hn.vc conce:;_~ning the ettc.ck fron t'r e briclgehoad. After orienting Genoral T1~c1scott, Gemrfll ClRrk stAted thPt Gcnere.l Alexander .ad, -rror,, the beginning, a rre-conceived rlan of the e.ttPck from the 1-)ridgehead to <;mt Route //6, harrass the enemy r~s.r with ligr.t colurms avid ev·wtually annihilo.te the Gernan -rorces. Generr>l Clark emphvsi zed thFJ.t he, in his planning , wanted to naintain flexibility; that the Plan BUFFALO would be carri~d out as plan"lod but the.t he wanted General Truscott to be flexible in 1'is plans and e prepared to change the direction of the attack north frori Cori- Valr.ontonE' to ar attack to tl---~ riorthwest toward Rome. Huch dep ,nded upon tl 1 e Gern1an reaction to the attack on the main Allied front . If the Hitler Linc 1•rere pierced and th0 rmemy with(lrevr to the -:Jnction Line just soutr of :tome , then there would be -¾:.he possibility thrt the 8ttack to the northwest ,vculd "l)e successful. He said that he :r·:'lself was gojni; to the )Cachhead wi tl, a snaller , conposi te staff group, begirn~ ng to move probably tomorrow ?nC completbr; it Sunclay. from there Fiftr Army v,oulc1 ta}-e under tl eir corm:anc.· tr e two Br5.tish dj_vj sions anci leave VI Corrs the -ri::rnion o" carry:1 n1 out the l'lan TJFFALO . In the very near -r.'ut1ire },e rad pln.nnec1 to nove up II Corps He8dquarters and 8Ccor,panying troops as ordered in Operations Instruction '18. I: Corps, once established jn the briclgehend would then Lave undi:,r its comriand the two Br~ t ish di visions and the 85t Di lision, if moved up to th~ bridgeheaC. All plans :'or, tiie necessary lifts of' trese dj visiors · ·m,e completed, a:r1d bP- directed his G-3, Ge 1er1'1 l Brann to -"'ix up a dP ily schedule sl o :1:i ng J'10Y11ments of all units until they had coi,.pleted trcir ~ovcments to tr.e ')ridgel el?'d . , This would enable Ger. iral Cl-~1·· to rlan tr is diversionrry etta.ck by. II Corrs and thFJ troops under it . G0PPr[ll Clark, in t8l'-dr~ to Ge'10ral 'I.'rua,cott, also 1 ' �srPd hj_n to ,,,..,}:-ri rlri11s for a 1,,,racrutc <irop by the 509th Sep"'rr'te Frrachute ,,, Battalion south 1est o:: Littoria . Imr edinte plPns to hr.ve tris rrrachute ✓ drop a r-:a1·ty wouln hri.ve to be clelr.yed due to c~ "+'iculties !'THh the Air Corps in obtaining tre necessary tr1:insport plan s . In discussing the time for th,~ attack , Gcr,,ral Clr>rk risked Gcn,.,,ral Tru,,cott v1hen ·,•rould -..,e the earliest re coulrl attac 1r if be were told to e.-ttack t0nj P-rt . G~neral Truscott sa-i rl thn.t the ea.•liest he could n.ttacJ, ,1ould be Moncln;v norning and. tb'1t H lour woulc1 be ah0·1t 0630 . General Clar·~ told G<>ncrPl Trw·cott thr>t at the beginninf th ,{)th Division woulr' have a strine tied on 5t by Arrn.y; thRt he vmnld k~ep it in Arny reserve rt <-'5rst . GenerrJ. '"ruscott stPted thnt GcnerPl 1 Frec'ler: cks of Special Jervice Poree would like to c ror by p>racrute sorne "'ield artill.-,ry observers on the r:igh gro1.mc east of S('rnoneta :ln order that trey could observe artillery <-'ire for trA rttack. G·~'1.er11.l Clark st..,tcd that if tl·.e necessary transport planes co11ln. not 11e mere available by the Air Corps , re would release his tv,o C- 47 1 s ~or t fa purpose . Genercl ':'ruscott . le-f't ",..,riv~d~atel-.r after t,'1e conference for tlie br;d,o:e>head to call a comrnandersj mP,eV 11.:t anc to complete Pll nrrangrirul')nts for ar erirly attPck fron the brj dgehead . .._____ w~ 0 In th1 11-"ternoon General Clark left for the French :'xpeditionary Corr,s co"lriand post at Sessa . Fro::" tr.ere , re , .<iccomranied by Genere.l Juin , went by jeep via Castel"'orte, Corene , Ausonia to "s11erifi.. At Esper:ir:: tbe rarty mP.t General De,1o'1.tsabert , Garrand i ng the .3rd A lgori.an Division, who was dj rectinr, advance el rments of r is division from ifonticelli to Mount Delrmndrone . The latter f eature had bee;1 occupied y eleM~nts of thP, '3rd DIA after severe fightin~ . rresent with General De;'Io11tsabert nas Gemiral DeLarmjnat who was acti..>1g as a deputy for General Juin . General DeLP.rminat has only two staff officers in Italy at tte present moment . General Clnr 1r d-i s'cussed ~,-:th G~n~rri.ls Juin and De:irontsabert the A.ctions in progress toward F ice . :"ro!" :srorfa. Gen~ral Cl8rk went to San Giorgio , where he flew 1:>ac'k- b~r cub to the Fifth Arr'ly coMmn.nd post . Dur:'. ng the ri. "ter noon it h1cl ra~.ned quite J:ieavily, and Gener1=a.l CJ.Hrk I s / 1 return to the adV'ance cor'l..™and post was c'1011.n with poor v:: sibility e.nd during a dull drizzle . Whnn GenPral Cbrk returned to the commnd post, all arrangements hRd been nr>rte to move his co!'lposite st,ff eroup to the hridgehead on SPturday a'1r1 completing the r1ove on Sunclay. A<'ter supper General Cll".rk went to Naples to see Colonel Tully, his classn9te , anrl severPl oth0rs of his class 8t West Point who were f.1sser,bled in Colonel Tully' s apartMen~ . Hir,hlights of tor'r.y 1 s -rrogress showf'd th"' 3rd DIA and 1st D:.lI rushing past Mou.rt Delmandrone to 1T1rd Fico . G~ner['l Guillaune I s Group of Goums hP.d taken the town o-" C:-impodjmele nnd had cut the Itri- Fico road . Other elements of Lis Gouns were pusMng northwar d froM · ~iount Croce and r'ount Fotttan~no . "'hP- Groupement Lonchet had taken ·rount V le west of the J.trj -1 ico road . The 350t h 8nd 351st U. S . Infantry Regi"'lonts of tre 88th :!)ivision .had taken ;,Jonte Grande . The 34%h In+>~mtry of the S38th was cleaning up the torm of Itri. The 33'1th InPantry of the 85th Division had bken ;.1ount Cefrla west of the Itri- Formia road . "'he 138th InfPntry had· taken F,Tount DragonP- FJouth of r1ount �Zl Cefala, f't1d some of its elements were nlready in the town of Gaeta. In the Eig:bth Army sector it h:>d advr,nced to a genP.rPl line I iedmonte-Aquirn,Pontecorvo which j s in direct contact with the Adolf Hitler Line. Operations Instruction # 19 is quoted below, as vrell as fl personal telegram frorn Gcn(>rf'l Leese. Operations Instruction #19 follows: 11 1. Upon t:be compl0tion of the mission given in Field Order f}6~ Fifth Army on the main +'ront rer;roups its forces and prepPres for further offensive action to destroy the enemy forces oprosing it. 11 2. a. II Corps vtl~~: (1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5) b. FEC will: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) c. Consolidn.te 38th Division positions in the Ml' GR.A IDE - Ml' LARIGNO HiU Hs.ss. Regroup its +'orces nnc'l be rrepnred, on Army Order, to: (a) Continue the adwmce on the J"'P:'.: (!1 6098)-FC 'IDI (G 5106)-'1'.,'1:RACI'~ (P 3698) Axis towards the AUSONI Hill Mass, or (b) Advn11ce tc the 'M on the ITRI - FONDI - 1·~:NC!,A ( G 5411) CAS'l'RC D~L VCLSCI (G 5023) Axis. Complete plans for dthclrawal of tre 85th Division and accompanying troors a.s directed in OperRtions Instruction No. 18. The 85th Division, less one RCT, will not be employed ,1est of vnmrrA (V 6795) wHhout permission from tM.. s Headquarters. One RCT, 85th Division, may be used for Mopping up the ITRI - GAT'JJ'A (M 6390) SF'FRL(' {GA (r.1 5?95) Area. Protect the left flank of Fifth Army. iSaintain contact with FEC. 1 Continue the P-+,tack to the 11w to secure the righ ground in tre vicinity of PICO (G 6116). ConsoHdrte its positions ~n the PICO area. f'Jaintain contact witl· ,;i8rth Army. Protect the rigut flank of Fifth Army. Regroup its forces and be prepAred, on Army order, to: (a) Advance to the '1W to cut l'ighrmy 6 in the vicinity of CEFRA!ro (G 5926), or (b) Advl'nce to the west to secm·e the GISERHO Hill mass. VI Corps will: ConMnue the mission assigned in Field Order No. 6. d. The 509th Paracrute In"Pntr:,r Battolion ·rill rreprre plans to drop, on J.rmy Or er, in the AU3flNI Hill Hass anr' facilitrte the l'!dVPnce of the II Corps via the I'1'RI - F0'11DI - TERRA.CI!~ Axis. "3. 36th Division, in Army resArve, will be pro}Tred for moverient to the AHZIO Beachhead on e~ght hours' notice. �11 4. Boundaries: See ovGrlay. 11 Leese to Clark. RN 70. "Thank you for you.r kind congratulPtions which I appreciate very much. He all realise how much our success a.t Ca,ssino is due to the hPrd fighting n.nd the rapif advances richieved by the II U.S. Gorps and the French under your command. The previous hard fighting of your troops in that area paved the way for t},e final capture of Cassino and thus its fall is a symbol of our joint Anglo-American effort. The progress of our two Armies side by side as a result of' the close cooperation there ha.s always been between us ,7ill, I feel certain, lead to even greater successes in the future. We look forward to great results wl,en your decisive push from the bridgehead comes in. I send to you and the Fifth Army the grateful thanks and good w:i,shes of the Bighth Army." Keyes to Clark. RN NR8A. "Enemy resistance overcome and our troops took M. Grande. Enemy resistance · sli~bt to our capture of Itri. The ridge M. Dragone (611932) - M. Cefalo (6o9956) taken without resistance. Unconfirmed reports indicate that S!Tk'lll groups of enemy were captured on Gaeta. 'Snemy road block 1500 yards south of Itr:t }v-,.ld up our advance. Pw 1 s from 7th Co. 620 ·o st Bn., and 1 Bn., 194th Artill 1ry Regiwmt were captured west of M. Mola." - Yesterday General Clark sent the following cable to Admiral Hewitt: RH 5786. 11 Understanr1 that you would like to visit the French ;J.1rine Cannoneers now serving with the CF.Ji,. Hould be most happy to mal-ce necessary arrangements if you will notify me when you desire to come. 11 Admiral Hewitt replied today as follows: T\JRN. 11 .1\ppreciPte your message. 1:'lould much like to visit you as 1vell ~ s CPnnoniers sor1etine later when I can arrange return Haples. ~lhilc it would have been highly ~nteresting to me, I did not feel thPt last week was a · proper time for you to be bothered with outsiders. Congratulations on your successes." * * SAN MA.i"lCO--"~AY 20, 1%4--Gt"lneral Clr'r'ir rer,p.in'°'d ~ n tr!'! co1,mand post during the entire day. 'L conferred :':n t'he morning at greet length wit!1 GenerPls Gruenther and Brann. The J"love to th"' hr' dgehead of adv[lnced el~r,ents o.: General Clark's staff continu-,d e::-cept that selected war corresrondents, Section Chiefs and GenerPl Clark will not Move up, as plannl"!d, tomorrow, Sunday. Jetails of General Clark's decision to delay the attack at the bridgehead and to have II Corrs continue its ~fforts on up through I'ondi are covered :i,n General Clark's notes of the day. Tl-ie Army Commander conferred YT.:i th Gen ·,ral K,-,r.. s at noon PJ1d j mri ted him to l1mch. After Genernl K~yes depart~d, he worked on administrPtive Matters and studied II Corps progress up to Fondj and French Corps advances toward Pico .. At six o I clock Gl"lneral Alexander, acco ",pani~d by his Chief of Staf+', General HP..rding, cam~ to conf' 7' with G""n'°'ral Clar:!<. D~tt=dl2 of this cc nf rence are cover"d in General Clark's notes of today's conferences. ~ �Highlights of today's battle reports fou;nd the French on the outskirts of Pontecorvo and abcut 1,000 yt'lrds northwest of Fico, which had fallen . All of the high ground dominating tbe Liri Valley un to Tice is now in Fifth Arny hands . On u,e II Corrs +>ront eler,l'lnts of -the 349th Infantry ht=1d taken Fondi and elements of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron v-:ere edvPnc::i ng dovm mghway //7. Exact locations of tht""se ""1.e1'ents Pre not kno1•m at this time. C Troop of tr.e g1st TI.econ vm s reported ,just nortl, of Lrk" L, 1ngo, rue south of Fondi. GeMral Clark r'iictated the following notes for inclusion in his diary: u t S , ~ . Q u,... ~+J, ,,;x-.,>-f1 . 11 Yesterday General Le:mitzer/\delivered the folJ.owinf.; !"lessage: 1. The C-in-C directs tJ,,.-,t the P.tt11ck from the ANZIO bridg-,herid on CORI and VAUif'\TC NE is to b~ lmmched on thi"! night of 21/22 Mt=!y or on tr,e mornlnf'" of 22 May according to wheth~r you hPve decided on a night or day attack. 11 t ✓ 2 . Will you rl ,ase rerort for the ~nforr1ation of the C-in-C the hour and date on w} icr.. the attack vrill be li,u.nched, and r,t the same time inform Co:mnander Eighth Army by letter . This H.1. will inform C.G. M.J\.'T'.A.F. 1 1 3. rlease acl::no Nledge receipt of this order'. 1 1 11 T was shockl":d wren: received it to think tht a riecision of this i~portance would have bl"'en rnac1e witl10·t't reference to l"'e. I sent trPt word b~ck to Ge11.ernl Ale:1."llnder, who r.,pde the weak excuse thnt he felt thAt we h~d discussed it f'or the past thrM days. "General Lermitzer said that the decision was !'IP de Pt the ten o I clock rn.eeting in th,_,. mornjng when a rerort hPd cone in thrit the British had broken 1 the Eitll'lr Line at Aquino . I am sure thnt this vas erroneous, and General AJexander now knows it . Also, so~e air officer at the meeting had indicated conf'lSion in rear of the G"rnan f'orces sirdlar to that wtich pr"'vnHed at_ T1mis. These over ortjr:'listic reports resulted in this nomentous decision. I replied that the 22nd was the earliest d8te that I could ~ttack out of the bridgehead . I \ ( "I had been in conference with General mruscott, whom I had sent for, and issued jnstructions accordingly to hi111.. "Today the wel'lther "orecast is bad for air operations on the ??nd. I feel that en all-out air effort must r,ccompany the ground Attack. I also COM.rmnicated with General Lenmitzer, sayin~ thrt th"' d/11\cision handed r,e in writing yesterday should be carefully reviewed each day in view of' the fact that the BrHish were not attacking Rnd had failed to r.en~trate. the Hitler Line. In fact they had oeen push1'!d:-ttrck at 11:q~uina and Piedmonte . I also indjcat~d that the air outlook was bad for t,he ,22nd. As a result, Genl"rnl Alexander is coming to see re tJ,,is afternoon when .I will tell him thet in my opinion the decision to attack fror1 the bridgehead is prem0 ture, based on erroneous information And wishful thinking; thrt the soonest we should attack is ;>rhen both Fif''th and Eighth Arrnies are in desperate grips with the 1 �Hitler Line, at whic:b time the German troops on this front would be so heavily engaged that they could not withdraw to influence tr.e bridg1'heatl battle. The mere fact that the 26th Division has noved do m is no justification for tJ,,is premeture attack. It should be given a ch~nce to get heavily committed on this front. I will also tell him that I must have air support, which the weather forecast seems to preclude at the present tirne. 1 nuave just conferred witr General Keyes. I am torn between two desires: To let his Corps with all its present nea.ns push on to try to penetrate t h e \ ~ Hitler Line in thf'l vicinity of Fondi; or to rush up to the Hitler Line at Fondi without an attack withdrawing tl:ie 85th now and other corps troops with possible movement to the brj_dgehead. I have decided to do the forrner - to pnsh on, and ha~re so directed hin1 wj_ th all the effort he can muster. If I cen crack the :Hitler Line in the Fondi area with airborne trooris north of Terracina and perhaps a small amphibious landing in Terracina coupled with a · small task rorce pushing out from the briclgehead, I may join ur. 11 FollowinFY, General Alexande:r:'s visit, General Clark dictated the following material: .~t "ti ,_,.,..; 'ff'" 0\// r / l /"' r ,,-.1 n.rl. \Ud 11 rf".11) (I'.~ ~efr- ~ ! ( .," .f' ~ IF~-· c . if}., ~~ , - . , • I ttGeneral Alexander just came to see Me with Harding. Fe told ne that G ,neral Leese would not be able to attack until probably the nj ght o.,. the 23/~th and then with one divjsion - the Carno.dians. He asked me hesitatingly if I could l'.lttack and outflank tre Germans, "'laking it unnecessary for the Eighth ArT"iy to attack. He said he desired tc conser·;re losses. I told him to con, serve losses in one r,lace we would have them in another; n.f!mely, the Fifth Army sector nnd that I strongly recomMended that Leese speed ur his attack and that both a.rmies attack all-out at the same tj_r,e, but if the attack was at night as Leese wanted it, lt would conform to the Fifth Army riain front and thnt the bridg"!head attack should r;o the follm'Ting rnorninr;. agreed, although convinced that Eigrth Arrny will hold their attack and let the French carry the ball for them es they have done so far in this battle. He l I a,, ttAlso told Alexander thnt I had come to the conclusion to delay the bridgehead attack ?4 and possibly 48 hours, for the weather outlook arpears bad for their effort in support o"' the bridgehead attack. I told him that I must accompany my attack from the brj_dgl'lhead with strong air effort. I also told him.that each aft~rnoon at five o'clock I must lmow for the ~econd mornj_ng follovnng for the bridgl"'head attack. He agrieed. I also told hJrn. of the progress t ~ 1 north of Fondi. Twas going all-out and w1'1S goinr, to join ur. He has always ¥ J> /. been opposed to MY southern effort, and he apologj_zed today, l'!tl'lting thR.t he /V J ' ~ never drearned that we could make tre progress that we have through the moun- . tains. He congrntulated T'ie on tr,e progress of the Fifth Army. I e.lso told (JV~ l him of r,y possible plans for use of the airborne 50Qth Farachute BPttalion on ,ti,. r· the Mgh ground north of Terracina. .l#~ lJ . . ,,r["1 pl". "I believe j_f the Eighth Army will attack the Hitll'lr Line in the Fontecorvo .fo region in the next two days; we hit it north from fico all-01.1.t with all our forces and the br:i.dgehead tre next mornjng, we will fold up the German Army in S-,1 / ·1 Y ~ 1A-'·r "' ,,.i.Y p-° Italy."~ d'--. ~C\.,.,!~ ~~•if~ _,.~,.,,.,-~ .-~ ~ I~ wv• - - ~ - ~ 6V\. v-,>.r ~ p ~ ;_7- ~-_,1 Oil :lo &oJ_+~7J - u fq- ~,At"' it\. ~ ~ h . . ~ . -~ - . ; ; { A , .. I.A.~--t. ,.,. ~~ t ~ ·~ r ~ ~-,,~. c> . . M-t> - ~~ ~~t ~ ~ . - �Followini:; :Ls a cable recei-ved by Gener.sl Clark from General Truscott: RN. T052. "All scheduled movements last night coripleted without incident li f·reparations continue according to plan and on schedule . Ever::r indication that cover plan working successfully. "Reference your 7701, will have task force organized and prepPred for operation on east +'lank after H hour . Did not understand your '1lessage concerning Yarborough . Will he be availDble to drop any ti.r•~ af.t"r daylight or s1'1ould plans disr~gard r,ossibility or hi~ ernploymen+; ~ntirely? ur hope- progress on south front, particulPrly Eighth Arny continues satistactory. Do not heli~ve NY attack should be launched until withdrawal definitely ½~gins . Any delay after preparations of' tonie;ht will 1,e hazardous." General Clark cabled General Truscott today as follows: RN 3073. 11 Attack from bridgehead is postponed 24 hours. There is a strong probability that it .-,ay ½e postroned an additional 24 rours . I shall advise you .'.'urther on this r,ojnt rrior to 1700 hours on :'1st. Acknowledge. 11 General r1cGreer:r, 10 British Corps Co,.11mander, wrote G~neral Ch1rk today as follows1 "My most sincere congrat J.lations on the P,J.·ea-: victory ;;mu have Pcri1"Ved with F:Lt"th Army. 10 Corps, t:':t"'t"'Jr our long , r,ncl harp:r association w:lth your Arny, are really delighted Rt tris great success. As you can imt.:igin~ the ex:rloits o.-:'. II Corrs and FEC these last eight dr17s hrve rind an exceptional ::iY1t1'rest for ~1e, know:in'; the lower Gl'riclieno sector so we 11. 11 11 TJ~ tlirnino: of tJ,,e Hitler pos-ition will :~ed to big results, imd your rapid progress soutr of R. Lfri has undoubtedl:-, helred Eighth Arny to a very large extent. "We in 10 Corps ",,..el now tht"t th('I bridgehead position e cross th"' GPrigliano which we put in JanUr'J_ry anc' early Febru,qry has nov• priH a handsol"'-i divid"lnd, which ii,ore thPn makes up for th~ disaproint""lent felt nt the time that we were not a½l" to exploit further. "I know rm•, thrilled both TeY'lpler am' Hawkeswortr , rill be at tris Fifth All best "'ishes for your future operations, and ny kindest regards to Al anc1 oth~r old f'riends on your sta-Pf .n · ArMy victory. np1ease do not dream of answering ti'is . 11 The Array CoME>ander replied to General ~TcCreery as follows: ttYour letter hr> s .iust h,,..en deli vercd to me by :rorr liaison officer, and . I read it to Al and Don Brann, who hRpf1•med to be w,ith me in conference. We �can 1 t tell you l.ow muc:b 'Ve A.;_1rrecirit"" yom~ ttougrt~l11ess in vrriting, and prirticu1<>rly the C'in1' trings you SAY ...r the Fifth Arry. .,. "ant you to mow that RS T "'lew ov,..r t½rt area ;v:esterc'ey on y r"'turn Prom a vi.sit to the Frend- mmr Fsperia, I could not re lp but gi Ye a rrF f"'r of thanks Por the fine pfonMr work w1~ic. 10 Corps did for Fifth Army ~n obtaining the rir~eriead fro "lh~ cL we de ouched . As I Ple I alon'; the Gf!rigliano River , y tho11ghts went back to t':le hr"'d "i.ght:in,:; wh~ er your 3ritish troops perforl"l."'d under your cor:~1and in crossinp; thnt rjv"'r and ,stabl:i hing tr..,mselves on the heights beyo 1d, in th" face of s·1cr ,ne:r1y r~si~tr-nce. You gaY1' us t:re c;pringbo:ird fro11 r1hicl. we were Abl,.. to launch our successf'ul attack. 1 "This Y'lorning II Cor}"s troors ar(" about four m:iles northwest of Itri , o inp; on Fo:rdi . French trooJs pre eeting incrensed .,..es::stance nortrwest of San Oli va . We will keep on r,oinr.;, however, and, of cours", the riridgehead is no source of cc11fort tc the Boch..,, for it i.s strong imcl rearly when needed . nl:: you n.r;aih Per your good w:i.shes . Al and Don and : send onr war re~rrds to you a'1d 111f'lb~rs of' your staff . TTe hor~ anoth~r opportunity comes for us to be associllt"d together in battle . J-leas, ~ive our esrecial regards to Cooki.e . " 11 T} * * SAN r~ARC --~flAY 21 , 19'11+--Gen~ral Clnr'c sp..,nt a 1;ood rortion o:f tre day v:i sitinp; forwarc1 ele ents of the Fif't'.r Ar y. At 0900 re left f'or ·the --:ir,hth Army ~AC by'ris L-5 light ~ll'lne . At Bighth Ar~y ~AC re conferr~d with General L~ese, Co 't:>.nrler of th, Eighth Army. Fror, ~i..grth Ar.,.,y TAC he flew to a cub field due west cf S . Giorgio where he was, i,t by General Juin . He ~cipferred with Generel .Juin rt teie r~ l'lld and tren made A short side trip befond Bsreria . ,ihile tr ere he saw 0oncrete e icence of the eff~cts of our Prtillery fjr~. Elenents o~ the 90th Panzer Grentidier Regiment were cPu~ht on the road nortrwest of '3speria by our P.rtillery fire . mhere were trucks , tanks, guns and perso11nel carriers whic1" wer• conr:-letely cte1"l0lished. Tliey },nd evidently b"!en r,oinp, dovm the road at closed intervnls whim cau17,ht in successive artillery concentrations frorn our guns . In order to clear tre ro8d, the Frenc}, had to bulldoze ehicles 8nd Gerrmn dead, sweep5ng theJ11 over to the side in order to let French ,.lements pass by. A Fr.encl' cartain, who },rd been R Gem,an prisciner <'or two days, told o how the Ge:rrans were very s:~ort on aMrrun~ tion; ti ~t sol"\e divisions were only a11.ow-t'1.g 10 rounds per indivjdual ~r day, anc ot},1'rs only 5 . From French Corps General Clark flew to tr~ II Corps cub field in th~ vicini t;r o~ Argenta. Fro. t 1ere he took ri s j~ep, storped riefly At n Corps comf'!and post nort½ of Arg"!nta anc thl"!n proc,eded do rrn '..r~ 11rway ;i/:7 to Forl"'ia where he conrerred with General Coulter, 85th Division Co. manrler . Frnm Fori,fa he continu-,d down Fi rrhway #7 up toward Itri . 011 tris rm:1.d Rhove For ,ia a oobv trnp exploded at a'l,out t},e sru ~ t~ Me that the General I s j~!"lp passed . Troo:rs were cleaninr out part of t½e road where an anti-tank gun 1 as . Anparently on~ of tre soldi"'rs worki11g Freund t e p;un had srrunr: a booby trap causinr, a violent. ~xplosion just ~s th~ General's ieep went hy. One soldier was killed and two ,.,ounded. The ~nerril f s jeep escriped unharrn~d. General Clrr~ storped bri"'~ly at the gpth Division cornnand post just north of Itri , but General Sloan, the Division Co~~ander , was not in so Gen~ral Cl~rk �/" proceeded on towards Fondi to find him. While in Fondi he talked to Colonel Jacobson, Division Artillery Executive for the 88th Division, who pointed out the direct support artillery positions in the vicinity of Fondi. General Clark then proceeded up the road from Fondi toward San Biagio - a small village at the foot o:f.' Monte S. Biagio. There he met Colonl"ll Hughes, Commanding the , 137th Inf'antry, ·vhich was in the process of attacking this higJ:-, ground. - He discussed the situation with Colonel Hurhes, who said thrit his troops were receiving sone opposition which he estimated to be P..bout 100 Germans who vrere dug in in the hills. Colonel Hughes was coni~iclent thflt he would have the high ground in a few hours and was Pt this tinte fY,Oing beck to see his Division Co:m:Mander to push on f'urt1->er up the hill mass to the northwest. General ClPrk, after conferrine; with Colonel Hughes, retraced his steps and rroceeded bt>ck down Jfip;hway #7 to Gaeta. Enroute h!"! l"let General Coulter of the 85th Di vision going up to his forward el~"'ents and discussed with him briefly his conversation with Colonel Hue;hes. General Clark thoui:1,rt that Colonel Hughes 1 desire to pusri on forwa.rd was excell,,.,nt nnd told General Coulter that he could discuss the matter when he saw Colonel Hughes up the road. In Gaeta General Clark went dciv.11 to the point where he met Colonel Safay, Corn:Mandine- the 338th Infantry of the 88th Di vision. Colonel Sa.fay's regiment was about to begin a movement by water in dukws to Sperlonga. Genern.l Clark went down to the beach from wh,,.,re they would depart and saw Rn engineer company svreeping the beach for M~ nes in order to make a safe lane for the dukvvs to p;o down to thi'? water. Quite a f'.ew rnines were found in this pr-irticular beach. General Clark said he was glad to see the 1-,each because he had planned at one ti1"11.e to send in a Ranger Battalion at this particular point in the beach to scal"l tre r.eip;hts and take GAeta. From there General Clark went back d 1 ri"Jctly to the cub fjeld where he took off in his L-5 to return to his command post. During his trip ur P:i<shway #7 the militRry traffic was very congested, ,vith .,,,any 1"1.otor vehicl""s and Italian pack units noving up toward the front. Gaeta and Itri had suffered quite heavily· froll\ our artillery fire and bombing. At five o'clock ~Tiss Curie, daui?:hter of ~1aclame Curie who discovered radium, ca!"le to call on General Clark. Sr e is now a French WAC o.i:'ficer and j s over here in Italy on an inspection trip. At six thirty Genera.1 Clark had as dinner r:me sts Mr. Irving Berl in, of the show, 11 This Is The Armyn, Major Holmgren, his business r.anager, 1md Wri.rrant Officer Wasser, his Fublic RelAtions Officer. After supper ~'!r. '3..,rlin came down to the conference hut where he played J11any of th , tunes thnt he had written for Gener~l Chrk. He also rla.yed the Fiftr Arny song thet he had written, a new infantry song and other ,,,ar ballPds which were very good. Hip;hlj t;hts of the day's battle news were increasing rrogress by the French northv•est of Pico and Pontecorvo. On the II Corrs front Monte S. Biagio l"a.d fallen, whicl\_}'Vas abont three miles west o':' t1,e tovm of Fondi. Also, elements of the 91st R connaissance Squndron had reached the outskirts of Terracina. Notes concernini; General Clnrk 1 s visit to General Leese nnd General Jv.in will be quoted in the diary for tor-1orrow. · �In the lRtter part of tl"e afternoon Geri~rol ClPxk, accompanied by Brigad:i.er Goodbo<ly, went to tre 1st Bri.tish Division to confer with Generril Hawkes-· wortr, Division CoMmander, and GenerPl Gregson-Ellis, ConMander of the 5th JiTision. Also present was Brigadi~r Loewen, who will tnke over c~n~and from Gen"'ral Hawkeswort , who is leav~ ng to take CC"ffland of the 4t>th British Divi, sion w}'ich is in Egypt at the present rnonent. General Clrirk made arrangements for General Hawke sworth to leave tonorrow and turn over the conm111.nd to Brigadier Loewen. He also d-iscussed wi.th these British Commanders f'n attack plan for the two British di,isions i.n conjunction wi..tr attack by our 45th Division and 1st Armort"ld Division. The ~--neral scope of the plan is to h(.lve t:he British 5th Division, w:it1, the TJ. S. 517th Farachute RCT, the 551st F11rPchute Bn., and the 55oth Glider Bn., take over tre entire British -f'ront, Makinr: fl holding t1ttack, whil"' Ue "qritish 1st Division, with the U. S. 45th Di ision on jts rigrt, attackin~ in a northwesterly direction toward Rom,. In Co"1junction with tris attack-, t},e 1st A:i."mored Division will make an t'lrr,ored thrust to the right bf the 1T. S. Li.5th Di vision. J l;:,..11s for tJ-,is Rtt[\ck Hre being made in detailed form, b11t the exact time is not definite. ',!fuch will r1erend upon tre progress of the rrese"1t be~clhead attack in tre rirectioP Cori - VPlJ,,ontone. If this attack bor,s dmm in tP.e Cori area, or i-(' the Bo ere falls back to defend its Unction Lin<'"!, t!1en U·is combined Brjtisr and AMerican attack riigl.t take place. This attack is in conjunction with G~neral Clark's desire to be flexible and meet any contingency that tlo Boche might offer. Tht"l Arer:ican p~rac},ute and r,Hder troops contemplated to be used on the present British front will rrobt1.bly 11.rrive flt t:1e beachhead by 3 June. Later in the eTening General Clark called all Hs djTision coM::mners on his field rhone to discuss witr th"'Tl\ the situntion j n their zones of ri ct ion. He retir-,d Ft ~130. The -f'ollowing are tbe i:rrportant messages recei"'fed and cl:ispatched during the course of the day: Gruenther to AdTance CI • 'q_M 152. "French rl'ly,ort their attack jumped off on schedule. No locrtions y ,t. Heavy fiehtfog in Lenola area during nir,ht." Gruenther to Aovance CF. Rt{ 153. 11 Eigrth Army jillllped off o630 rreceded by forty r·1 nute artilJ ery prerr-r['tion. Attack prog.ressjng accordinr, to :rlan. They rraintajred co':'ltact vr~.th eneMy throughout nigl t and state that enef'l.y shows intt'!nt:i.on o-f' holding. 11 Clark to Gruenther. RN l4lQ. "Situ::-tion looks good. Co bat COI"I" nd A just srort o"' railroad. B pro -T .:.; -~ni;; ,.,ell tl-r011gl minefield l?OC yarcss in rerr. 45th Division Pbout on i.ts limited objective. Otherc; rrog:ressing slowly. Reference Eighth Arny's proposed new boundr>ry, 111Pke no cori:mitI'lents. Do not lik~ it. It ,ives us absolutely no ro,d. I ould like to do a little purs11ing too. Detailed answer to you this 1d'ternoon. t1 1 Ch.rk to Gr11enther. RN 1424. 11 Bo·mdr->ry proposed by 'jighth Arny is unacceptable. It is Pbsolutely necessf!.ry for the French Corps to hr>ve a rorid north of tlie Lepini r·ountains. Frorosed boundri 1~.~ 0·1ld force ,..,e to pincl out Frencr Corps and hr,ve them ::'allow :::I Corps throu ,h AT"'k<i.seno Vrilley to route 7. �I do not bt"'Ueve 'Sighth Army could o<lV."lnce throug1~ Liri Vnlley unless French cover the nounta-ins on the Eighth f..rmy le-"t. IIighwt=>y 6 nrid tre !!'.any routes north thereof should meet Ei~hth Arny need. Make strong representation that present boundnry be changed as follows, all points exclusive to Fifth ArMy: · From present boundary at strerim j,mction (369182) - hill 215 (265461) - hill ?69 (09850~) - hill 773 (Q50556) - point (~90610) rnd then continue on present bou.ndPr~v- as set forth in op ,rrtions order number 1, AAI, 5 -rtay 1944." Clark to Gruenther. RN 1443. ttHave just visited ravrkesworth, GregsonBllis, Loewen and w~s ~cco pani~d by Goodbody. The l~mited objective attacks by these two d~visions have bee~ completed 8nd no~ is t~e time to let Hawkeswortr return. I will send him bqck in one of MY C-78 1 s tomorrow unless General Alexander desires otherwise. Acvi 8e. t-rove me e it rlnin to trese conrnanders t!'lrt the Bri tisJ~ Divisions will re1·ticjrate in the next Pttack. They are i.n accord n11d we f'.rl'l . nlcin11 pl1rns accordinr,ly and will outline t1'em to you at a lt1ter t-ime. ttUp u11til 1600 11.ours to,1ay 7-qq bP-ttl,.. crsualti~s hrve bl'!eTI admitted to eTacuation hosT':tals. This "'ncludes 98 Brit~ sh casualti~s. 11 Gruenther to Arlvance GP. RN 165. "II Corps news good. Our ta'1.ks and troops now fighti.nt; in T .rracina. 350th bes tvo bE1tt,,lions r,ener< lly in Mount Curio area. Eir,hth Arny now stnte tl-'"lt sirns 0f enemy withdrawal have not b~en confir ~d. Canadian ar~or will 11ot be nassed trrour,r toni~rt ~s prev:5 0'1sly pl.a n..1ed. 11 Ger~ral CL.,rk this afternoon dictated th11 f ollowj ng men:orandurn. to Gerierol Grul'!nther: 11 Hansborou ,1 is here and rill return this to yo·1. Th~ nr,s seem to be going well here. T r.:ot up at 4 A.f~., vnd went to a forFard or under cover of darkness and. :atched tre rr ,rt>rPti.on anc1 tJi- ~niti,,l t,., 11k n.ttt>ck. Th" rreprPtion was srlendic. ~fo reply from t:re ene y. I h-1.ve t~lked with J-r.r-r,:,on, ,n1,ose Con-bat Col" r-md B, 'on tre r.1 ght, has htid ,u ffic·1lty w:;t~ r~nl"'s. He hf's lost ten tanks on min~s. His Combat Conmand A, on the left, lwd :nore success r>n<' Pt ~bout ~: 30 had covered half tre distnnce to tre rn·· lrord ,., anrnent. :::t 1-iad ,,sed snelces success+'ul1y. n7 Combat Co~Rncl B did not use then i."1-itinlly ::: do not know, but ~t .i.s Mo· inr; t:1el? up now ~n t'l'1 effor-1:. to clePr tre nines. Tre 45th Division arp:ir~y,tly has reac1'"'d -.;ts :~rniterl object-ivt"'. '3rd D-i ision and ~,ecial Service Force rave eacl' advenced 1,000 to 1, '500 yrrds. I'a-1:.urally, reports Rre mear;er rt th, present ti.e, hnt I wo,1ld s~-.~ it -is '?"lror:r,ssing ~n good shape. "':'here ~s R nrinll tas,· +>crce o+' a reconnf'lissance unit, sonto: TD 1 <J ,nd ~Y'r;ineers, prep?-rec' to ,ovi, 0'1t on +J,e south flan¥, but : ,rant to hold thPt until it can ,e coord:natec'l vitr an e"fort o-" tre II Corrs anc'l perh:::ips P 11 rop b7 '\'.'nrborouv}•, if •e decide to do t at. ::: am reluctant to C0""111it Y,;.rboro"1r,h now, althour,h the rlan B wMch Don h~s v:ror'\reil on looks +'E'irly proris~ng. .7e have told Yarborougl' to be vr-erart"'d -"or thr-t Thursday rorn~nr,. I won 1t rull -it unfoss conditio'1.'3 are r-i.1;ht. "A . delir,½ted w: .J.;l +lie rrc- ress of tl "'l 9 8tr ""ivisio'1 orito Mow"lt Alto. Looks as tr•ou;;-r tr"'r"' is a ros,:;i b::: lity of bPgging so""e Ge-1--mens tc t,._(I\' soutl, tfereof. - '' Y??Z . ·~ . �9D Your radios are cor11ing in well. of that II CorJs . Be sure and keep Ml'! rested on the progress Havl'l not had a r"ply from you on t'bis censorship b,1siness . You go allout in set"\inP- trflt ti-,~re is no restri~tion rlacf'.'ld on v.y whereabouts . I have always trav~lled rit .,.Till in rry Fifth Army sector , and, when appropriate , it has be~n arno'mcr".d, and ::: do not i11tlimd to 1, ave any restriction p1Pced on that now. Y01.:. tear anybody to pieces who r,ttl':npts to c½.ange tb,; s . The censor here , due to soMe damn fool idea , tl1in1,rs th<"t r-iy presence in t},e bridg~head can not be rn_~ntioned ,. Yo11 riust ? ct on t} j_s pro""'T't ly.. I am wond l"rinr; v·hy I ½ave not receiVl"'d a reply. 1r"'dt},nr 'have we received the co:rmunique . ;Je sure trat trat is properl7 word ,d and tl"9_t it ~ s a Fif'tr ,\rrrr shovr . I do not want t'b"" first a"lnouncement r,f this to come out to the e-'"'f11;:ct thPt Alexander's troops hav"" attaclred fron +he bridgo}'ead. This all should have been straightened out 1:iefore I car1e up here . j ki1o"i you can handl,. tl-is ~iploratically. 11 11 General Gruenther sent General Clark a neno:..·andun wit]:, regard to the witLdrawal of certain troops from FiftL Arny. The Arr1y Commander plans on taking up this r1atter ·after he has accomplished whfat re set out_ to do ~ Clark to Gruenther . R;J 1429. "I agrE'e that l:":ly~s 3 s r11 1shing ris ettack to th~ utmost . Fn.:i""!r no c:'rci_nnstances do I d""sire to div~rt his Httac'\c in trie direction of Ceccano . On tl-ie contrary, it must be pushed along the h1.gl· grotmd in the direction o.~ t:lv b:;.•idgl".!Lead with all spl"ed possible . 11 v General Clark sent Gen1'ral Grurnther th"' following note with regard to tr e coordin,'1.tio11 o-"' the :'r1'nch Corps and II Corrs attack: "Sending this by courier . Just rt'!ad thl" r:..a.ns c-1"' tl e FT::C with 4th Mountain Di11ision going +'rom Lenola ,.,,fa the m.01mt;,,ins to C1'1stro di Volsc, vritr the II Corps moving in the direction oi fip~rno . You ce.n see th?t .the two corps F<re diverging from each other, leaving a W'T 'Lt"reen . I an, worried for fear the right flan"l.:: o-1"' II 0orrs Y"'ay beco,..e or~m . It seem to me that 88tr Division sho11lc co11,s0Hdate its position in the Tlount Alto region , pushin[" on to the no-rtbwest so tei.at it controls the rig}, ground just south of' the F . Amaseno 1~iver , wi.th its tail echelo11ed in, the direction of the F"'C . Tl•,,t woald rerr it 85th Divi;,:;ion on t}-,e soutl, to continue on to tl1~ Li,;h 1yound ,,est of r iperno and rerhaps on to Sezze . If you draw this out on th~ mar you will see th.Pt the II Corps t1: en is f"i 11 ~ ng th"! ;ar between the Frencl, and VI Cor-rs and any advance by Special Service Poree to its area #3 south of Cori will put us in fine position to join up . "I~ow ;vou are watcl:ing this . this . n 1 lease let ;;e -:now vhat you are doing Pbout General Gruenther rep lied to the 13 boi-re as :'allows: 11 T have spei1t 13 ccmsiderable amount of tlne toclay in order to !"Void the creation of' thriJ gap wl icr you referr~d to in -your riote thet car,,e tonic;r>t . I do not claim that we lave 11rrived at tLe rerfect solution , but I ari quite certF<in that botl: the EC and the II Corps are aware of th•• :r-roblem, and thRt botr of them Dre doin[; evervtr j_ng possible to [',void our beine :rlaced in a position where t:r"' gap ~Jill embarrass us . · 0 �9/ "The Frencl. plan of advnnce is as follows: 4 nm~ wil1 advance on the axis LENDLA-VALLF.Cr,RSA-:''OP.1T SISER'JA, ?nd DIM on axis FASTEHA-CASTRO DEI VOISCI, 3rd DIA on axis FICO-SAN GIOVA\fTTI, 1st DMI protecting the rir;ht flank of F-r;C 1mtil the Ei~hth Arr1y arrives, 11-ft ,r wrich it will rr-sv!'"-rt to corps ,reser'V'e. "The II Corps plan is as follows: The f'"P:th Division to capture tre mtmr CTJRIA-FO'JTA DE Gf.J~I area; then advance to the northwest cutting the AMASENO Valley road. The ~5th Division to capture the high gr01md v,est of PIPERHO (I RJVERHC on so~e naps) ; th..,n nd.,rance to the northwest on S~ZZE and 'IORiffi.. "'l'hr, Frencri operations are proceeding accordin.i-; to plan and no gar has developed yet, but t'ris ·is chiefly bec~use th relief o:f' th~ 351st Infantry on HC'U rri CHIAVI'JO has not bMn completed y,t. 'l'he Frfl'lncr (General Carpentier·) insist that it has taken -place and th~y ar~ c}eckinp; vigorously tonight to prove trqt a battalion of the 4th DMH occupies that hill, but Porter hftS convinced m('l that tre:ir lnformation is viot t>b"'olutely- correct. It is tr,1"'! thrt th, French this aft!")rnoon had troops on T'fTNT VO'JA and M01Nl' r:zzUTO, but the enemy sent in sore troops between :num VC '{A and r:'.OTJl''T CHIAVINO ur ich prevented the relief, and the troops - l::>oth Am~rican and :::-'rench - are attempting to clear up that sitmition tonight. Rega:;.-r1less of the stnte of confusion - end it is only minor - which exists in that part5 cular area, tr e fact remP ins that no ga.p has developed and the II Corrs is rrotectinp; ~ ts ovm flt>nk es well as assisting the French. The reason one can say th1:1t the II Corrs is rrotecting its fhmk is because it 1w s the 35oth Inf entry genl"rally in the MOUilT CURIO area; the 349th Infantry gen~rally in the f'f0tnl1T ROTFNDC area. (Exact location llllkno,,m. Crawford has ;nstructiohs to nove an fffl'J:'A I''::: CAHFI, but he has b~en delayed in arriving there). 11 m1at the II Corps want to <lo now, and they have pushed r,e vigorously all day on this point, is to free their 351st RegiM.ent in order to be P.ble to rlace it in corps reserve. 339th will attack northwest regardless of 351st; Ps will the 337th and 338th as soon as they take TFJffi.ACINA. In thPt event they would then continue the attack of the '339th fro'lt f.ONNINC' toward the northwest toward PIP"":RNO. The 337th and ,3gth, still fighting in the TF.RRACINA-r-'DUW LEANA area, would proceed toward FifF.RNO while the 151st would be held under corps control in a central position to be used as the situl'ltion demands. I believe thr,t the entire problem will be solv~d as soon P s the siturition in the CHIAVINO-VALLE CORSA area clears. The French are not at all worried thn.t there is any danger in the so-called gap area and I 1u1 inclined to ~gree with them. Howev-er, I can a.ssure you that we area, not being conplacent about the matter, and thBt I am · followinr, it up relentlessly. rood is thoroughl7.r cognizant of the problem, and he is givin1; it hi3 very careful 8ttention. "It seems to me that we should now cons:ider extending th .. boundary between the FF,r, and the II Corps. I have not had a chance to discuss it vrlth either headquarters yet, but I suggest that the present boundaries be erlended to the northwest so that the road FIP'"RNO-Tf'YI'"SIANICO be given to II Corps. I realize, of course, thnt the boundary derends on the use you intend to make of the II Corrs when :it reaches the brjdgehead, but J believe that this boundary will at least orient both corrs in the correct direction. I will talk to G~nernls Keyes and Gr,rpentier tomorrow on this subject in order to ascertain their views. 11 �SAU MARCO-A •;crc--r:A.Y 2?, lq/44--General ClFrk this rnorn:ng dictated the following notes regardin~ his trip yesterday for inclusion in tr.c diBry: "Yesterday I flew to see Ge'1"ral Leese in [ln effort to coordin.'1te our ntAlthougP he professes tlwt Ms Pttack will be all-out, it is eing r.l"de by one di ision. I .cor.m:ented as well as I could on the weakness of the attack, but +,hroui:i;h qnick talk he indicated a great massing behind. All t:beir ections are always dictated b:, their rlesire to SP.Ve mnnpower and let someone else do i.t. I pointed out the a Jsolute necessity of eTl"lryone attacking all-out at tre sane time. He agrMs in pr--:nciple but will not do it in fact . I then flew to Juin. He is r'!ost eap;er to Rttack on tre ?3rd "ut will not let up his attacks in the nM.ntine. He exy-ressed surprise nt th..,. weakne9s of' the British attack. ne told Me ti-mt Fontecor-ro was rmoccupied and tht1t he was in th'-" outskirts, yet tre Canadfrns would not go in. He hPs born~ th~ brunt of tJ:,e Liri Valley battl'-"'. I am issuing orders co11.firl"l.-'ni,; M.Y 'Conversation with him in order that his r>ttack toMor:cow, in conjunction witr the Eighth ArMy, will a,,.,.. i.tsel" felt over pnd above trose t1tta~ks of the past few dl'lys. tacks <'or t ,e ?3rd . - "I visited a battle~ield west o~ Esp~ria witr Juin. It was ~s concentrPted n destruction of G1'rman rerso1mel a'1d T"l'l.teriel as I hA.ve ever seen. It ,,as nat;ni~5cent. Froba~ly 100 vericles, r,ostly vrmored, were destroyed. J tren flew to Scauri Rnd vi.sited in turn Ferr ia, Itri, Fondi and several riiles west of Fon:ii wrer" tl e 11attle , as taki.nr, place east of 'fonte San Bfap;io. II Corps is rnak'tr,rr vood rror;ress. I tl-i,-n w~nt to Gaeta an,, observed a lx=\ttalion of the 138th a)out to take off Por Sperlon,a in dukws. I urged II Cor~s to be allout in their forward move. e'1t. He . ust r-et the M. ;r ~ound '1orth of T~rrr>cina rrer~ratory to join;nv, up. "Upon "IV return by air I phoned Ge:reral A7evanil"'r, told hi1'1 of my trip and of rny plans to rush the II Corps to t!- e hi.gh rrro1md nortr of Terracina." General Clark c0nf~rr~d with G"'neral Gr,1entr~r Pnd GenerPl i'.lrl'lnn duri.nr, tre rnor.~n~ rr~or to his Move to ~re ½eachhe~<l. At 1100 re, G~ner~l Brann Pnn Colonel Drapl'!r f'lew to tl e beachrMd. Tpo'1 hfr Arri wi.1, Ge'1erel Cl.,,rk Fen+, ,im- . redirtely t0 hi.s Arvrnce Co:r,T"rntl Jost, had lunch flrr1 l~"'t with G~n~rl'll Bra"U'l. ror VI Corps wr"re hJ '.!onf'err'-"'<l 'fl'~th Ger"rE-1 '1' 1-uscott. Fro the VI Corps COl"'Mand post he :sited General Harl"l'Jon ()"" t1", 1st llrnored r-;vi.s5on, General 0 1 I1a'1i.el 0$' tl e '3rd Di.vic:;ion, rr~nerel Ryder of tl"' 14th Division and Gl!'n"'rrl 'tilker o" tre 1/,tJ:- Civision. All co and"rs wer~ .;n 1'1'0od ½eart ~'1d were ,., ,er Pn<l fl..nxious to jUMl'.' off .;n t1-_ 0rn~n-; nt 063C' lmmc:'Yi"1f! tle Dt°'PChhead attack. r-Po'1 h--1 s ,,..e+.urn to his co;-, and rest, (},•:nl"'rP 1 Clnrk, f'renerr>l Bra:r.:1 e"ld Colc..,e:' Yoward disc'rnsed br•-',..f'ly th• en ..my si.twtion. Tl·e fact +rrt t}-1"' G-errrrm 2i::,t:r Di vi.sion · '1 the Cori ?rea bid ee:>1 brcurrl t so1 t1· and tr~ q('t}, aTJ.d 29tli Divisions nortl of" Rn to the 'li' :rtl~ Arrw fl~fl front FJ.m so el mf'lnt trri Tl1.v1 ... siono on t e Adrir-tic s~c'le op 1 ositfl! the Fritis}:, 5tr Div!.sion v"ere discussed. ~1--at U e Gei-.an reac+j on would he, to t", contimlP.tio:r. of nn all-out attf,c:k from tr~ ~a·n :ront 8nd from t~e beachhead could not be defin~~elv v,lwted rt tlis t-· e. :Jo '-"' i:'."ldicP.tions were th.<i:1., th" Gernan was wi+,hilraw~r.,.,.: Oth,..rs indicPted th-it h"" in+~11c1 d to a~~ ,pt bF.tt1e P'1d d"'ren.rl v•-.-y ~lose tr- h-' s present J os: tions a3 of tc:-r1ay. �93 hnurs. At this confer"'r.ce he gave a.n off-the-record talk on "'V~nts thFt were to take plac/1! to""1orrow. In brief he exrlainl'"d row the attack on the Fifth Arm:t main t'ront was to b~ cortinued tomorrow 2nr1 rt 0630 the beacrhead forces ~ould lr 1 nch its attacv jn the djrectjon Cori - Valnontone . He emphesized that th is attack was planned to cut n r:hwa;v /16 r rid to 1 1.sh ro lu""ns nor-':.h a11rl Pouth wit} the ultirir>te obj1-ctives of r1 estroy~ng es l"'l"DY Gio-r:":Pl1.S as possible . General Clark stated that he. was not rrepl"red to say exactly wfo:,t the G6rr"E.n reaction would be and that he had a flexible mind, e11c , dere':.C::.ii.~ upon what tl:>e German did , was prepared to r,eet sev~ral "!Vent .mlities ••••• on~, a chanie in the direction of attack f'rorn due nortt to northwest. :L "ncicat~d thnt the beacr'head attack did not have as its p~ll'pose to capture Rorre . He explained }-ow the 45th Division ,·rould launch a li, ited obj~ctive attack on the lef't wit}. the 1st Ar:r,ored on jts right, leadin:r ler-ients being its tanl:s and its infantry f'ollowin,; up . On ti1e 1st Ar:"ored Di vision's right, would be the 3rd Division , trhicli w011lf Pttaek +re CisternP Pren which would -rrobably be heavily def'ended . "'he 36th Division ,ms to be prepnred to pass through the 3rd Di v5 sion if it was necessa1.7 to re-gi~oup and clean out the Cisterna area with the 3rd Division. He emphe.sized that the 36th Division, however, would not pass thrN1.~h unless the situation warranted it . There would be a thirtyminute a.rtillery preparation y.rio:r· to the attact:-, concentrated on the front of the 1st Arnori"'d and 3rd Divfoion in addition to count"'rbattery. The air also would play a heavy role, '1otr light, ,.,.,.diun end hea11:r borAb,.rs of the Strateq;ic Air :"ore~ . 'rhe weather forecast appeared ':'avora~l-,, and General Clark was corfident tLat rlans had been well prepareri and thPt the attack should go . He e:q,lai'Yl~d tret tl-e t rm Britisli Divjsfons on the hft were 1 mder Fifth Ar111 y control ar.c1 would hold t! eir positio!'ls with linjt Jd attacks only. The question arose as trJ vfrether or not tl-ie Ari y's left flank ms vulnera1:Jle to a l}"'rr:an attar::k +"rom t: e S'JUtl, since he had a1railable sev~ral divisions thPt could be b:>'01 1r,;J-it down with:in 24 hours . G~ner2 l Clark saic. trat this was always a possibility but that he tJ-iought thet if such an attsc},;: did take place we could hold it because we had done so before . He answered several questions fro;"' correspondents ,,ho wer('a, very entJ:,usiastic and pleased tC' be ½rieferl on -':.he attack taking place tomorrow. After U,e conferf"!nce General Clark saw Ge1'1Lral Horan, Signal Cf'ficer, and Gen"ral Bradshaw, AA Officer , after wh:5~h he r~tired early. 1 1 An estimated total o: prisoners of war as of 0625 this morning was 4,748. The following irportant mess~ges were received and dispatched today: Gruenther to Clarko TI.N' 142. "Eighth Army Stratton reports that Canadian progress in Fortecorvo Prea procl'leding satisfactorily. Believes that Canadians may be 8ble to 0 1t"'lank fixed defenses Pontecorvo area todr,,y. They consider it likely that enemy may start withdrawal front Hitler Line toniglit . So entr,usiastfo are they that they are discussing pursuit plnns and have s116 gest"'d boundary J'llodification a·"ter -':.he;-r net b'°'yond Cerrano . We have Jl'l.8.de no comr,itments . Will keep you advised . " 1 Gruenther to Clark. R'·J 14/ ,i-. 11 rren ::h re:rort thHt German withdrawal frol'I. Fico and Fontecorvo areas continues tc :increase. Brosset Division observer states that G~rnans appear to be in .confusion. Saville is sending out heavy armed recces . t•reather deteriorating . French occupfod :.enola. Now :rushing towards rastena and Snn Giovarni . 11 �CL"-1.rk to Gruenther . RN 8033 . 11 Your weathP,r message received . We will attack as s,heduled . Mnke every effort to carry out fighter bomber and light bomber missions at tjmes agreed upon. Weather ,iay look bad there but be good here . ~1issions cancelled should be mede available w en weather perr,its . " FiftJ; , Ar□y to Fifth Arm:.r Afhrance er. · RN 148. "Eight:b Army has requested AAI to adjust boundary forward o"" Cecca.no as follows . 'All incl Eighth Arrny Patricia 3833 - Supino 3535 - r1orola 3337 - Scurgolfi 2941 - rd junc ?242 thence Sei::;ni and your orir,inal bo1.U1dary. Both Fifth Army and ~ighth Army will probably be interested in routes through Ceccano 1 • AAI has been requested to rnake no cl ange for the present . ti 1 * ANZIO--M.AY 23 , 19/44--General Clark arose at 0430 , had a quick bree..kfast and went to a forward observation post to be on hand at the front rrior to the artillery preparation . He was .o:nided to the OP by General Butler , Deputy Com- · mander to General. Truscott . The trip out was quiet Rnd continued to be so until 0545 when more than 5CO guns opened up on the half hour's preparation preceding the attack. Soon after th"' cannons started firi:n.<:;, visibility -became very poor , due to smoke and morn:ing hn.ze . Little could be seen, but through the din and roar of the g1mfi1~e, tanks could be heard ~oving up into position ready to attack. At 0615 the dull rul'llble of our aircraft proceeding to drop their bornb loads on schedule could also be heard . At the forward OP , in addi- tion to General Clark, were General 'i'ruscott, VI Corps Commander; General BPehr , Corps Artillery Officer; and General Lewis , Arny Artillery Officer . General Clark remained at the forward OF 1.mtil 0730 when-he started bnck t'o his adYance command post. The return trip was mA.de in a dull drizzle which lasted for about fifteen ainutes . Upon his return· to the advance comme.nd post , General Cl.8.rk remained in :bis office the entire mornj_ng, receiving reports of the progress of the battle , both on the beachhead front and the Min Fifth Army front . He conferred fre quently with General Brann, his G- 3, concerning future plans . Copies of messages sont to General Gruenther , Chief of Staff, report hlghlights of today ' s events and future actions . 1n brief, reports of rrogress made came in rather slowly during the day. The 45th had rractically taken its limited objective . The 1st ArMored Division had ·passed the railroad north of 0111' front line , and the 3rd Division had advanced its position about 2 , 000 yards , and the Special Servjce Force had pushed elenents across Highway //7 but ,,ere driven back lPte in the day and evening. From the main front , II Corrs had still not taken Terracina, but the 337th Infantry had takeP Mount Croce to the nort1' of the town and was planning an enveloping maneuver from the north to take it . Other elements of the 85th and ~8th Di.visions were Naking rarid rrogress through the mountains to the northwest . F..arly this afternoon elements of the 88th Di vision reported that they could see motor Movements on the east-west road north of Ir.iverno . These elements were probably on Pount Curio . The French Corrs was having sm-1e tough fighting , and the report that they had captured Mount Cerreta was not correct . They were still fighting for tM.s high ground . The attack by the Canadians on the Bighth Army front had no aprearance of being all- out and WHS rather disappointing. Gonf~rPll'ld reports of any progress they had n2de have not been received . �As of r,idnight tonight casuPlties in th!" Anzio area ran up to JJ1-90 . * * * A' 1ZIO--t'!AY 24, 1944--General Clark arose early to study communiques concern:1 ng progress of tl-i."'l battle on botl:i fronts . Inforrn,.-,tion concerning the beachheail. was r1eager in the early r-orning hours. G"'ner81 rarrnon I s 1st Armored Division had passed some ele,..ents e cross th"' railroad who held their positions 0'1ring the night . The only point wherir: enemy counterattacks · push1'd our e 1e:'le'1ts back were in th~ Specfa l Service Force eree in which 'mi ts were forced back of Hi~hway #7. Durin,o; tJ,,e d2y, however, the 1st ArJ11.ored niv1sibn had 0dvrmced past Fi ~hway }7 and h"l.d rrflct1cally reached its fir st phase -1ine, the TI line, by nightfall, nort.h of Fig,.'1way ,¥7 . The 3rd Tli_vision, ,vhile not D ctuD lly occupying Cistern2., 1-iad :~us1..,1-d elel""1'nts on botr Jtc1 -'s of jt •ell nor-tr- of righway /17. On +,}- e naJn Fiftl- ArBy front Terracina liar'l fallen, ard m.otoriMd reconnaissar:ce elements were fay,:ning out fro., Terrac':na or I'ighway ¥7 and on lateral roacs toward the bridgehead . Frogress j s slov: 1,ecause of !:'any der:.olitio:ris encmmtered. Ac'~mnces were -Ede along th'!! entire II Corps front., 6 iving us practicall:t all of tbe h~_gJ., rrouna east of th!": ljne fjperno 'T' r:::-acin11 . Frer1 ch Corps ~1ad , so, e :r.,...or;ress on th"' rigl•t Jlnnk, · :nota'l-,ly 1 aving- cr'1W_11.r::ed as far as Vall~corsa . On th,..ir r::gl"t pr0gess was slo".r be cause of bitter res:Lstence . aeports indicrted that t:1e Eighth Army had rushed "'iooil,... 1:"lements as far as the Mel.fa River. At 0840 General Clerk left for the Srecial Service Go~rnand Post where he decorated Genl'!ra1 Frederic 1-:: vlith the T.listinguished Service Cross . Prior to t':11'! awarding of the decoration, General ClPrk d:lscussed with General Frederick diff>iculties thPt L" had encountered the preceding afternoon and evenin ,. ;::)eterrnined counterrtti:icks by 9.r:nor fo:-ced General ""rederick to w~ thdraw his forces sontr of Hi,.:;hway #7 . I.i'ror, th" Special ~lervice Force, General Clark went to the 1st .Arn1ored Dbrision where be co"lferred with General Harmon . He first learned here that tank elenents had crossed Hic:,;hway #7 . Upon leaviw; the 1st Armored Di vision comr'land post, he Met General 0 1Daniel, Cormanding General of the 3rd Divj_sion , and acconpanied him to the 3rd ::Jivision corm.and post, where te discussed with him condjtions on the 3rd Dh'ision frcnt. Their progress was slower , due to heavy defenses in and around Cisterna. After leav5-ng Genl')ral O'Daniel , General Clark went to the Y~tL ·:va.cuation Hospital where he visited his Fifth ArM.y soldiers that had been wounded withi:'1 the last two days . He cr,a t ted .. with many in tLe casualty wards i:rnd elso visited one of the operating rooms . From the J"J;th I'vacue.tion Hospital he went directly bacl: to the Fifth .Arny advance com:"land post ,il::ere he went into c011ference with Genl"r-al Brnnn. Faramount in his discussions Fith his G-J was the possibility of joinjng the bridgehead forces from the west with II Corrs +:'orces aprroac1'ing fron the east. He took the 16th T'.::i-igineer Reg:i rent frorn unde:r VI Corps control and took them under his co1 mand, allo~ving General ':'ruscott to ·1-:eep his eye straight ahe1id toward 1-lis ob.i~ctives in the vicinity of Cori . The 36th l~ng~neers had attached. to it the Brett Force , combination of a British recce unit e.nd sore American tank destroyers . mhe 36th Engineers vdth its attaclun"lnts under corn:r1a.nd of Colonel �Stanl-,y will jur::p off early to:-ior-row "'orn~n with elements of II Corps . Important erstwerd, e:;.'T-,ctinr; to join ·,1p essages of the day are as follows: Gru~nther to Clar'• . R'' 167. "Tio,rracina is ours" . General Gruenther this morning sent General ClFrk the followinr, rl, e orl."n- : "I h'l e just 'lert you a ,..lr:tsh thflt T~HRACPIA is now in our rossession . We hav~ rad th., wh~els reased sine, last nir,ht that as soon as it ea.r1e into o•ir i:ossession word would bJ piven to e i ediately. The ressR.ge was on its way to you within five minutes of the -ti.me tht-1t II CorJ s learned of the carture . "':be exact position of t'1e 1313th on Monte Leano i.s not !c"lO\m but it is helieTl'!r" to be ot1 tor of th!" M.11 oving west to cut t, e ro::irl and bottle 1 1r any Ger :'l.ns still i.n +,re a.rel:'. , · •v~e~s entered town w-:tr the i.nf'·rntry &d are ull-dozing a path throu11;h . GenerPl Keyes w:i.11 ress so I'." artille:r-y tlu-ough first hecause he hA.S snre positions just vest 0f the tow:r w'r ~ er he is T"'ry t"ag~r to occupy. 3;.,,.111ta"11.eously !'!ler •r.ts o:' th"' 91st R~cn . Sqmidron will ;ass throng}, in an l'!J"Ce[lvor to dash on to th.- 1-)ridr,ehead area. Get11'!rt': l'"'yes has thorour,hly j hued J,,js troops wit tr" ~rlea o-f "rescu~nr; trl" ½r-td,ahead" anrl ~twill not surprise me to refl.r thfl·t c0!ltact o+' A. sort is ar'e wi th:in tl-il"\ next 24-36 hours . T'/an'11.a bet? 11 T'n "The 330 :n..,antry has <Jent a :force t0 cPrb.1re the western end of the r~onte ORSr tunnel . J+' the -tmml"l can be used it will g.reatlv facilitate tre mov"' eP-t 0f troors and supplies to t,e FIP~RNC' area . "Gen ,ral Ori tt"'nberger :has askfl!d for autrority to .ov" his command post to t},l" area :.'orm~r:i.y occupii,d by II Corrs . I hav~ a-nprovfl')d his r"'qu-,st and the ~ove fill be ade within a few days . Gfl!neral Critte11r- ,r ,er told e thrt h., has just rec1'iVl"d newspar-,r clip r-in ,s 4"rom t:1e States f'ron Hay ll anc l? n.,wsrap~rs ard thiot the universal attitude is one of extr~ne corf:ldence in th~ rbiE.ty of the Fifth Arny to accomplish its ~ission . 11 G-,!'11!ral Alexander is most enthusias+,ic- over the rrogress of tre Fifth tr e brid,,ebead yester,fay. He has as'.<ed e to extio,'1d h5.s best wi.shes to you . GenerPl Alexnnder will dehi.y his decoration of General K.,yes and General Juin until you can be present.11 11 Army and esrecially th"' advc.nce mane 1n A r,risoner o-f' war report as of 1 :30 t1,is afternoon showed the li'ifth Ar ,y as takinn; a total of 7 , 304 nri soners anc' tre ::a ,hth Army taking ,., , '3 50, aking a to+,al of 0, 654. ~his .Piriru:re rerresents the total prisoners taken since the egjnninp, of the all-out offensive on the night of r!ay 11- 12 . This l'.f'ternoon General Clark sent the .c>ollowing rnernorandum to General Gruenther: �ii/(' ~ ~ .3 "The joininr, ur of II Corrs and Fifth Army bridg"hMd forces may take rlace at any time, Ps you know. Witri the thr"'at of the II Corrs in the rear of 17tr Division, ·1:,11,., Boche will be reluct;:int to kMr iraport~mt <Xl~""itments south of Littoria and south of Route #7. "As you know, tre joininr, up of ny two Fifth Army forces will be one of tlie 1'-' ,..,lir;hts of' tJ:,e Fifth ArMy 1 s career . rt is rrimnrily a Fifth Arr.y M.tter, nnd I want you tot 11 Generfll Alexander thr-t I want autl::ority given me i .ediPtel;v to -issue n sil"\ple oomri~m:ique +>ref'! rere as soon as II Corrs t~oops have moved overl11ncl into the bridgehe['.d . "'he rebuttal they may ii;ive you that a teTipornry joinin~ up noes not ~ean a permanent one - is unimportant, for tl'e story, arrl the big arrunent, is ·1hen Fifth Arny main front troops Move ov""rla.nd into the hrideehead. The bri<l~ehead is entitl~d to this story, and if we have tc wnit .,,.or a commmique .~ro. A.AI, Alr;iers, Naples and all the r~st get the story before tre ~en do rer,. All I ,culd g;ve would be a simple st~te~ent in a coJ!l?llunique that troops o~ t 1 main Fifth Army hr:i.ve broken into the bridgehead ovt""r1Fn<l . As soon as thr-t stnte nt is r;iven, I would radio to you in order tl:-r>t AAI could rut out ?. siT'lilar co. unique . J lease hA.nclle this +>or me and ins~ st, i+' you cnn, upon riy request being ~anted . "I hn.ve visited advance cp ' s of '3rd I)ivision, Special Service Force ['nd 1st Ar,nored Division this morning , and, in addition, talked to Truscott . The "ight ing is se-ver"' on l--oth sides of Cistena. Special Service Force had a tough time last evening. Tanks Pttac1cl'lri it and "nf'l.icted rathl'lr seY"'re casualties . The 133rd Inf'antry took over 1ts f'r-0nt w~ich hrd been r-ushed back south of Route #7. S~cial Service Force wrs bl'ling rMrg1:111.ized and by this t.;_,,,e should have juriped off in thP- attr:i.ck again, for tre 3rd Djvision has rusred ur across Route //7 on its left . I wa<J et '":rnie r~rmo:'1 1 s CP tris norning ·,hen news cane in th,... t two of hts 1st Armored tnnk comprmies were astride Route #7. Tr.l:'t was ITOod news. I exrect ~ore to follow . The 5th Division's Sl'l!flll effort yesterday on tl.e left "'lnnk rnet wit}, a counter attack last nir;rit which pushed it beck across the river. Tt is bi:>ck wh"'r~ it str,rted. ITren I r,et additional parachute troors, u.s., I will lwve 5tr. Rritish Division take ovl'!r the entire sector of the two British :::)ivisions rlus fPrachute troops and perhnps the %th En ,.;neer, if we close in with VI and II Corps. Then I am prepering y,J.ans to use the 1st British Di.vision with the 45th for an att ck northwest astrice th"' railroad track. This is j,1st r plan, but if eTentue.lities require :tt, ~.t is well to ha e it in hen1 . :: e0uld support it with tanks . "I would say tl ere are about ? , OOO battle cti.sualti""s to date. I visited one evflcuation hospital tr:! s nornin1;, and fro, reports I would sny th:::i,t is about tre score . It May run as high as 2,500, including.dean and wounded . 0 "I arn wonder-:11~ where HG Division will go. If he is s"'.art, he r.ill put it in the Vflll'lontone area, or he a;r brlng it in southwest of' Velletri for a co•mterattack. • 11 Vlith re-rerenl:"e to t e comnmnique referred to jn tJ-,"' sec0nn p:::iragrarh, if, f'or any reason and : cnn t 1 1Jnk of none whi..cr is justifiable, A.AI will not r;rant :re thPt [l 1tl·orjty, you r:a,<"' fflrnn sur,. thf't their commmi<J_ue is prorerly worded, making it cl, Fifth A-.cn.y s>-iow, for thrt is exactly whPt it is. 1 "Have Stanl"'Y of tr~ 3bth .,Tt,r'reers ;n lier~ now, so as to talk over ways �and means thf1t he might move out of the bridgehead if required to meet II Corps .. I would pref\")r that II Corps ca:r,e in. HReceived your notes' on detachments from Fifth Army at a later time,. will think about that e fter we hmre accomplished whet we · set out to do. "Delighted the way Keyes is pusring his II Corps. which you give him. 11 I I know the impetus Gruenther to Clark. RN 171. "Keyes has just returned from cub reconnaissance west of Terracina. Denolitions are extensive. Improbable th8t reconnaissances squadron ca.n start north today. Western "'.'nd of Monte Orsa tlmnel blocked.. 349th in contact south of Mo1L'lt Rotundo." Clark to Gruenther. RT-I H-19.. "Reference your NR 171, reconnaissance squadron should not wait to Move north. They should go as fnst as the~r can go, stopping only as demolitions ere encountered. Your message indic8tes that they will vrait unt-' 1 tomorrow or s0J11e other t:i me to start. Get them going and let the demolitions dictate tl-eir rate of speed. Our cub reconnaissance ov~r Route through Bergo Grappa does not indkate heavy derwlitions. 11 At 1650 tl is afternoon General Clark sent tte fallowing e:-1orandum to General Gruenther: ';I have taken Jt8.nley 1 s 36th Fngin1'ers snd its sector defense over to Army control in order to further relieve Truscott from lookiYJ.g over his shoulder. I want his eye on tr e ball ont in .,.ro11t - Cori - Valmontone WJY. I have put the so-called 11 Brett 11 force under Jtanl~~~. Stenley will still have his sector defense responsibility, whic~ ~ill gradually dissolve as the Boche pull out of the Littoria area. As Keyes• advance elenents advauce Littoria way, I will shoot Stanley out. Stanley thinks it will be a pushover. The Boche has fired a lot of ammunition on that sector today - I think, getting rid of it. As soon as the 85th Di vision has secured the high 6rol.md in the Sezze area, I will bring II Corps Headquerters and corps troops complete into the bridgehead. The faster Key..,s cen gnllop his hors,, the ',etter I will like it. By that time the Frencr should have pushed up, pl'rr:.itting 88th to push up, relieving th~ 35th. 85th will then come into the bridgehead. I will ass'ign the 45th Division, the $5th, the two British Division, 16th Engineers and tanks, perhaps some from ITarmon but not if' his going is good the other vray (Herman Goering w!.11 help c1 "'cide tJ:,is), and II Corps will prepare "plans for an all-out ol.:ensive to the northwest astricle the newly gained railroad ernbenl:ment which is outside o.,. thdr principal !'lined area. rJ Coll)S will take over the Sezze - Fiperno sector. Just want"d to let you know what I s in my mind., "If things M.ove as raridly as I tr.ink they will with regRrd to the joining up, I see no excuse for moving the rear elef'lents of our F5+'th Ari y CI into the Itri area. I ha"'te just talked with Uoran, who 11.grees. We might go to Littoria. I 1'>.1\1. a::'raid that 1 s pretty well smashed. and probflbly a heavily nined area which would not facilitate our spreading over the countryside. Dick is working on it and will let you ::now. nr hope we will eet Cisterna tris ev-ening. ~ ~ ' - Ernie I s Cor"lbat Gol"inand A is on �the Ti line and B is approa cl ing it . As I told you, his reconnaissance eler,ents e.re work:i.nf!, slo·,vly northward. He is pushing some light t.<mks to the east. I mn optid.stic. I estii"'l8.te 1500 p'.r'isoners haV'c been taken up here since the beginning of the attack. It may run over that. 11 Enc1osed is a note for Lem, as you suggested. u The Army Chie~ of Staff sent the following Memorandum to th~ Army Commander: "I hHve your letter written at 1/410 hours this date. 11 I have just been cble to reac:b Lem '7i thin the -rast few :r::inutes and I • discussed the special coro:m.mique request vr~ th him. He is i:;oing to get the feel of it w:ithin the next two hours Pnc< call ne back to give rne the reaction. :rt is h~s belief thnt there will he oppositfon to the issuing of a special comnnmique direct fro,., tre Bridgehead. He do~s, however, feel con!'iclent tlk"lt we can probably write our· own communique in r1dvance so that it can be released simultaneously here ano at the Bridgehead. t shall hold out for the issue of a simple comrimiq11e .,..rom tre Bridgehead couched in such lengu_.qp~e as will +'it t_ e siturtion wrich occurs. rowever, I suggest that :rou l,ave Ken Clark draft a suggested cor,,rnunique and senc1 it alo11g by th1&, 8 o I clock poucr tornorrow norn5 ng. It arpears n011, I regret to say, thrit the Reen Squadron ni 11 :not pet to LITT0RIA as soon as vre bP.d roped this morninr,. Gene:;.~el Yeyes reports thrt tb•, (' enolitio:n wori< has tl1'en very th0roui:;hly dont:. He has sent more eng'ri~ers up to pusr the wor'k: energetically and he will g,.,,t tl1rou:;! Ps fast as he possibly can. Fov'ever, P.t this writin · l e can not gun.rantee thEt the Reen U..."1~ts wil1 be stf1rted by r.iorning; in fact, h~ is alnost certain thPt they w:n: not. I Br following this matt"'r u:r ccnst?ntly and I s½all k~er v-0 11 advis"'ld of the rrogress of the rerair work, b~ca.use I know how r-uch this join-up Means to the Brjdeehead forces and to t½e entire Fift ArMy. 0 0 EXTRA SFBCIAL FL.ASE~ "G"neral Carrentjer just telerronl"ld (1705) to sta.t~ tr.at V1>llecorsa is ours. I aJ,, hapry about tr~ s in nore ways thari one, because now Generril K"'y~s should be satisfi"'d thflt the Chi.avino-P1zzuto a:cea is secure. He will now be a'l-:Jle to rove ris 351st aro·md to tre west•rn flank to give extra ~!'Ip ,tus to }ris rus1' th~re. I sent you a r,essage 15 m~.rn1tes 1:>go tl 2t the St, ArI'l';y has reported whPt 0 mounts to a break-ti:--rourh of tan1,s to the Vi'LFA River. Tl-iey clai,;i t},at there is e ~ai:.-·l~f 1£.rr-e ~nl"!!'1Y .('orce ., n the A'),FHTO-r:rn-r•~o'IT:C area a~1c Hey now h--,ve hopes of a r,ooc~-size G•r,,on bag. : jl"""ediately got in · touch with Gen"ral Car·entier to give him tl·e news. Ht" checl'ed ,,:th the 3rd DIA and th""?y r~ported that there has ')e"'n no decrease in 1'ne1::- r4'sistance in the SA'-J GIQ1Tfi>JNI area. However, wit}' t!1e news o-P the ''l'ri'LFA River- brer.k-thro'_1gh, tLe French are now go:.n: to pus} nort 11 W"th r"r,l')wed v:l p;or. Unfortun/0 tely, of course, they are 11ot at all certain +.l1nt t]1e ?th Arry r-•port is correct. C':i.·d~11arily, :r wouldn't bet a nickl, 01 that ""~tl·er, but in t!1is case I believe tLe report is e"ccurate. -..le shall see! 0 doubts that ,,e will be able to get the parachute battalion and the glider battalion ir1 addition to the parachute 11.CT. '.'"! tr irL',,:, ,.:,hat AfH,i will 11 Lem 'td) ;· /~ ,"'., .,,½:_ "',,. ,'," \ '~ /i ~;y,, >~· �100 insi.st ~n si-nding on~ or +,:1e ct,h\"'r of th1'8 1111.its -C') tr e Airborn~ "'rchl.ing Cert\"'r ·,.., ediately. 'fowevl"r, I told '1 4 t:r11.t JOU rac!. t-- hEve bc,+h of tre. now and that AAI should not cons.::d"r a co J..,.c r.:s\"' wr-ile th" b1:ttle is in its pres1•nt critical stage . He says they wil:.. rusr the atter for all their worth . "He are all 1: ,hly alrted v,.: t·1 t>~ st'r'Cl"SS o~ th~ R:"'idg"':bead etti=wk • t~.a-:. , e ca 1 gi e yo,:;. t' e necessary ass.:s+ance from this end • .- .,. on";.v 'op\"' '"!11:'.rk to Gr·w-.ther- . RT· 8j_C7 . 11 R~fer~>1~e sped al co ,,,,mique , I R~ w-"Ui•1~ ·r ·)e;r -'ns··s~ to a si u:.to.~.-.ous iss...1e . I s-..1t~gest "';he fo:lo1ing com-·mique: ' Jlimaxing F srectact l8r d •tmce 0f 6o iles in pnly blf:·nk days , Fi"th Ar y ~roops f"':co -'-;l e ain fron.t j a.: r\"'d ur tc 'r- y vri. th F:'...ft. Ar y All;"'d fcrces w1--,~~· r" · 1:'l~oken out o"" th, l)ef>chhead . 1 1Tr~ -!;roo1 s -"ro tl e ::::-•1t' , ov rcom-i 1r, ro "'rful erl"ny rl'lsistance , . ave +'ou~ht th~ir way sin~e t11e ·1i l + c. f ::a- :2 J'iay over so e of tb"' most <liffic-ul-:. 0·1'1-:.ain ter1·ain of the wrole Palinn . carirpai -n . ' Tle c'r. ati.c .~urcture of the t~o :'-:l.-l"tl Ar ~,-,..r0rts riccurrl"d a '"',,.w ,iles soutl east c" t'1.- 11eachhead on -+;l,t"' '"!O, str 1 ·h: gl war ru.nr::..n ~-:.wei,r. T\"'rracira ~nd A~zio . ,,.,.. e jun.c4:.ur~ o., the two f'orces i:;iv1's riftL Ar y •m.:.nterrupt\"'d lard co _ _ , :>1:;..caticns "or the "· rst t · , si 111"' th"I '1c£' chreac O;' ,rp+,io11s 1i,gan on 22 .Ta'luA.ry. ""'•ir·n" +,'1e • rt"'r-;--:.. '3.11 t,~oors; equip ~11t e"lr' surrlies hr-d to e tra""sr 01·ted ov..,_,__• : czardcu3 sec. r0•1t-,s . 1 1 11 You will note thrt I lav,,. left blan" ~1 A number o~ days i.t took to ~oin up . Each readqwrter<i cc"tld '"'i --nire th:i-:, s+,artj n, "rom -!;r.., nigrt 11-1? ~n<1 co mti.., tl I" 12t"h es +ne fir·st day enr'l t1·-, c F.' ~ nf ~oi.'1.~r -1p t 1 ,e l.<tst day. Re sure thf1t ·nstr,1~tioris Eir~ i<1sued :i edia... •ly to censors here to pass stori,.s "lasec1 on t: is speci · 1 corir·unic:'1• whfllln I ci.v" tl" authority to re:..e1'.lse them . After joinin.~ · r I would f 1 P sh r !'I ssage to yo'J. and giv" yo·.1.the ti e t '1pt we wofrd r~lerse here, p·obably an hour's not.!ce. I a stRrti.'l y '°'rec' al task fore.., •md"'r 3tanLy o·lt 0f tre br ~ c1 ,1"'1-iePd at di:' li 1~t tc. o.,,. ,cw rnornir . -~ K~yes r,ets on ris horse, junction Rt lePst 'y ~oot l"'le~ents srould take J lace befo-~e roon tomorrow . C:orfi rm thPt +,I-- ese "rran ,enents ar'!! sE'tis factory. '' Lat"' t1,~ s e ',n_:nc General Grul'lnt'ber sent GenerPl Cl;:ir'k- tr~ following e~o.ranclu!'l: h.'"'Yfllls call1'd tonight to flC.Vl"'e us of th"' -!; ·,....ing !'or the next phase or ri.-:; O}. eration . He rill attacl-': on ?6 nay - prob~ )ly l'!arly orning on thPt da. · - to capture th, ~'T . 3AIA'JO hill ass (;:H~-18) . Tris mir;sion will l)e ~.: "'e'"1 to the '1t:;tr Di~·ision. The "339th In-"Pntry -: ,-:; in t11e [.0~"'·:-·m area YJ.ow and. will lean tPe attack. T' e 13ntr. Inf~ntry will be ov~d tonorrow so it crn i"'l'rV c ~rat~ , P7.trour(1 G~rP.ral Yeyes is not certr:i:in thrt -it will be t} ere in t · m~ -l"o:r th-, jl.ll'lp-off . The ".<37th wi.11 1e used .:r "l.ecessary. Yo·1 l'rf~rsta11rl , o:: course , that th• ,37-t.!1 t=:nd tl1' -:i3'1-1-,h A.re still 'r the T•?ffi}CIFA.-f'T. :..C,A..TC area . Tl-i~:-r will be oved nortr +,ornorro • Aft .r rrr . ,AIA 'IO 1.r.s b ~~n se~ured the ~5ti D7 Vi.sion wil: car~ure t~e r~~ r,rotn~ in the 1~ZZ~ area. Tr~ ~8th 11 G"'n•ral �lDI Divisioy, will assist the 85th on 26 '1ay - in a oo.nner which Generril Keyes has ·'lot indicat~d yet - find will be rre:rrired to attnck on corps order in the direction ~'IT'. CT1RIA-R0CGAC'i0RGA . Gen~ral Keyes does not n.nticiprite tlm.t the. SSth Divisio11 will arivance across the A1·1ASI:NO Valley on 26 May unless the French are abreast of hi!!! at thrt ti, e - a:r1 faprobabl~ situ:otion . Gen~ral K~yes is sorry thFt he cannot launch this attack until the ?6th, but a consiclernble anount of regrouping has bt"!en necessary as fl result of t'1e f"ighting in the TERRACINA area . HoreOirer, he has h11d to displace his artillery in order to support the attack . A considerflble pRrt of it wilJ. bl") placed just west of T1?.RRACI 1~ . As I expla:.ned to you in the n~ssage ton:i ght the 91st R-,connaissnnce Squadron started this mornjng ~n the direction of LITTORIA . Hm1ever, the' demolitions have hpeded progress to such r-i.n extent th?t in my earlier !"!essage today J f'elt it rdse to indicate that the advance to t:re north had not yet started. Actually, of course, it has be~1m, and your 4 nstructions thr..t th~ rate o:' advance should be determined by the denolitions are being followed implicitly. The 117th Tteconna'i.ssance Squadron is also available for this assir,nr!IP!nt i"" :!t is n"leded . As it sfrrds novr no inffantry has been assigned for the reco"lna:i ssanc~ , a..'1d 11one will be unless it becomes necessary, since General Keyes f'eels th,.,t h~ t,ill probably need all of his infantry in the attack toward SEZZE . General Keyes does not admit th-it his divisions are tired , but some of our staff officers who hPve seen the 137th and 318th indicate thPt thev are quite tired. 11 I told you in my 23 May letter the 4th Dr 1M is attacking :in the direction VALLECOB.SA-IR.OST~EDI . General Juin visitl"d the 4th DMM today, and rt,P.Ve then hell because the:v hav~ b~en :l!oving so slowly. Gen rel Carpi-.ntier predicts that we shall see a fast1'r rete of advance tomorrow., 11 As "I told you that j would let you know further f bout the rrorosed e:x-tension of the II Corps- FEC bour1dary. This is our suP-gestion: Brlend the rresent bo,m<lnry- to Ml'. s. '',\HTPJO (32-?6), thence west to rrr . GASTc;11or.JE (26- 27), thence northwest to HI' LUPONE (16- 38) . This boundary is agreeable to General Keyes . It also has the concu:t'rence of General Carpentier, but he has not had a chance to discuss it with Gen~ral Juin yet. He will let me have General Juin ' s comments in th,.. morning . I ~xplained to both General K~yes and General Carpentier that trie boundary had not b!"!en referred to you ttnd thr-,_t it m1 -:;lit not fi. t in with your r lans . "Speaking of boundar:i ,s , General Juin sent in Colonel I<arnr~erer to se"' me this Hfternoon to suggest to you that you con sider tl rl ndv-isability of proposing a change in tre AAI maneuver . He belj eves thAt the sector assir;ned to the Fifth Ar:riy is too restrjcted for the mmber of di visioris in the Pr~y. He believes thl'lt the boundary should b"l 111odif:ied t0 give t o t1'e F ift h Army the road: GEFRANO-F'1.03IN'ONE-STTPIACO-RC'VIA~TO-TIVOLI . Uith such a zone of a,ction the French Corps could swing wide to the rir;ht anrl execute an ~nveloping attack in the direction RrVLti.rro-rr,IVOLI. Under this yianeuver the Fifth Army would avoid a frontal attack and should. secure d~cisivl'l results . Oh yes, I forgot about the ~ighth A:rmy. It will sv1ing very wide in the direction ARC~AYEZZA'm-RIETI- TBRNI. (I rather suspect thAt there is some r0 ~thod in his Madness in send ~_ng the Eigbth Arny on this ,vide end run . The CanadJans fj red a 0 �lOJ. few ~hells i~to th~ Frencr today, killinr, severr! m,nbers of tre Brosset Division). I told Colonel Kam..,,erl'lr to advise Ge"lerPl Juin thrt I would present an out1 i.ne of the plan to you. I und~rstand tht 1 ~fapoleon I Br~mn and his planners are in a lull at the mommt, ·and I f'm s·rre t Pt they will be more than ear.er to play with thj_s latest scr ,rne. 11 Genl"'ral Juin still has C'EIRANO as his object~ve. re hRs no evidence of any wei:ik1•mjng or t11.e eneI'ly resist~!lce in th~t sector. If, howe er, it should col1flpse anrl the 'Sir;hth Arey rroMed up t'1e Vr>lll'!y before the French crossed j>1to tre r.ig'1tr Army zrne, Generr:.l Juin will stop tre 1rd DIA and plRce it in corps reserv"'• Be is ,oin~ to place thl"' Bros3fllt !Jivision in corrs reserve tomorro ,, any.how. '!'he Ti're!'lcli would trif"n rave two divisions e"vr-ncing to the northiest, the Dody Division in t1e direction IAS':'t:NA-CAJTRO DEI 'CLCESI, and the /¥th flMM in the 1rection VALL~ CX'RSA-PRO'lSEI'I. "I feel th"lt evt•n·;vtJ..ijnP" is rrop;ressi'r1g sati.sfa.ctorily on this Pront. I re~ret that the Ke-yes attack could n0t e made fll!~rl~er, but I believe trat his l~-hour lmlt was necessnry i'1 view o+' the scr-tt.,.red co11.dj tion of '1-ij s two di visio11.s. f P,rsonally .,. ha e ;"ly dnubt'1 whethflllr fl' will 11e ahle t0 attack fro!'l so•;HJNO on t norni::1.r, of trie 26th as 11e now rlr-ms. If. he esti, n.tes thi:--t tl e attack requires two RCT I s attecldr..~ si.TT1ltanl'!ously, I am almost certain that he cA.nnot do i.t e,t thPt tjme . He will submit his rlr-n tomorrow, and as soon P.S it arriv.as I shRll fo E!rd it to you. 1" 11 ! just talked to W lsh, Ei,hth Arffly, to brin~ to his attention th~ erratic artiller.r fi.re of tl·e Canadians. He l'a"' rro isf"d tn takt".! proMft C<'"'l'rective action, and has request'°!d t 1nt I convflly sincere r ,r;rets to the Frenc' • It 'is true ~hat tre Canadian armor res reached the !~LFA RIVER. However, i Boche st~11 holds on to A rrrm, and Ge"l.<"lral Leese ;s i.ncl"ned to b~l~evfll! thnt tl·e ene-rny will delay at t.1t·r•ro as 1onr, ['S rossible-, l'lnd ill tr,..n ease out via t e CAS?RO CT~LO-RC'CCAS":'iCA ROA") to tbl'l north test . 'lf,lsh is not at all certein thc,,t the Ei,,.rth Army can rrfllvent tbis o,re. 1Ie says tJ-rnt trie tanks are havi"lg hard going -tn tr!'! r .LFA VAIJ,F.Y, nnd t},rt . 8!1Y of the ?re bogged do m. 11 The total m: ber of rr · soners t 'ken dm·ini-; this oreration as of eleven o I clock tr is even: ng is 10,715, or w},icr 2, "3 50 }',9.ve been tak"'n by Eighth Army ancl the reminder by Fift Army. * * * A11lZIC--MAY 25, 191.4--Generi=il Clerk lert · h::s cc nil rost at 08'10 to r,o to VI Corps here he conferren brie ly with GenerFl "'ruccott concerninr, tre progress of the VI Corps attack E1nd possibility of div"'rting the 45th, 34th ~nd 36th Diisio"'ls to a+tack in a nort}, restf';rl v direction. towErd Vfll1-letri and to its south, while at th,.. sam~ time the 3rd DivisioB, Sp,..cial Service Force c0ntinue north to Valmo11.tone, t' e 1st Arrored Division to support both attacks witr its bulk goi"l.g to the attack tom.rd V,.. l.1etri. He returned to the F-;.fth Army Advance col"'Pnd post where he co:i1."'errl"'r'i. brieflv ·rri tJ- Ge:1err.l Brann anrl left irmediEtfllly -/"or the Y-i.cin-14:;y of' Borgo Gran"'a h~r"' he was to se,.. the overland juncture of II Car-rs a11n bridgehead forces. He was Pcco panie-d by 8bout 25 correspondevits and photof"'l'.'Ftphers . "'he juncture of' th-, br~cg~head fo:-cces vith tre . a.in Fifth Army front w:ci.s a ITOMento,1s occr-,sion. It occ,ll'red fourt"'en days ::i:."ter tre l""'ain F" fth Arny .i:-rcnt wr-i s unmched on tre 11th of I ay. 1 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President. This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, May 6-24, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from May 6-24, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1633