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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Museum Ring Collection, 1895-2000
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Citadel Archives & Museum
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
Subject
The topic of the resource
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Description
An account of the resource
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">The oldest known Citadel Class Ring dates to 1895, and features a dark stone with the year '95 inscribed in the center. Early rings changed design from year to year until the design was standardized in 1940. A special war ring was made for those who had been called to active duty directly from The Citadel at the close of the 1942-1943 academic year. This war ring was unique in that it did not have class numerals.</span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">Citadel Class Rings for the Corps of Cadets feature an oval crest with a Palmetto tree and the South Carolina State Seal with the graduating class numerals. The words “The Military College of S.C. 1842” wrap around the oval. The right side of the ring depicts the United States and South Carolina flags, cannon balls, and a star representing the Star of the West steamship that cadets fired upon in January of 1861. The left side depicts a crossed sword and rifle with oak leaves and laurel wreath.</span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">For more information, visit <a href="http://www.citadelalumni.org/s/1674/alumni/index.aspx?sid=1674&gid=1001&pgid=391" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">The Citadel Alumni Association's Cadet Ring History & Symbolism</a> website.</span></p>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Museum Ring Collection
Relation
A related resource
Museum Ring Collection
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
image/jpeg
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Physical Object
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/23
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Charleston (S.C.)
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Citadel Class Ring, 1944. Emmett H. Venning
Subject
The topic of the resource
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Citadel Archives & Museum
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/701
Description
An account of the resource
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">The oldest known Citadel Class Ring dates to 1895, and features a dark stone with the year '95 inscribed in the center. Early rings changed design from year to year until the design was standardized in 1940. A special war ring was made for those who had been called to active duty directly from The Citadel at the close of the 1942-1943 academic year. This war ring was unique in that it did not have class numerals.</span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">Citadel Class Rings for the Corps of Cadets feature an oval crest with a Palmetto tree and the South Carolina State Seal with the graduating class numerals. The words “The Military College of S.C. 1842” wrap around the oval. The right side of the ring depicts the United States and South Carolina flags, cannon balls, and a star representing the Star of the West steamship that cadets fired upon in January of 1861. The left side depicts a crossed sword and rifle with oak leaves and laurel wreath.</span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">For more information, visit <a href="http://www.citadelalumni.org/s/1674/alumni/index.aspx?sid=1674&gid=1001&pgid=391" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">The Citadel Alumni Association's Cadet Ring History & Symbolism</a> website.</span></p>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
A1967.066
Relation
A related resource
Museum Ring Collection
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
image/jpeg
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Physical Object
Date Valid
Date (often a range) of validity of a resource.
1940-1949
Audience
A class of entity for whom the resource is intended or useful.
Citadel Class of 1944
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Museum Ring Collection, 1895-2000
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Citadel Archives & Museum
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
Subject
The topic of the resource
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Description
An account of the resource
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">The oldest known Citadel Class Ring dates to 1895, and features a dark stone with the year '95 inscribed in the center. Early rings changed design from year to year until the design was standardized in 1940. A special war ring was made for those who had been called to active duty directly from The Citadel at the close of the 1942-1943 academic year. This war ring was unique in that it did not have class numerals.</span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">Citadel Class Rings for the Corps of Cadets feature an oval crest with a Palmetto tree and the South Carolina State Seal with the graduating class numerals. The words “The Military College of S.C. 1842” wrap around the oval. The right side of the ring depicts the United States and South Carolina flags, cannon balls, and a star representing the Star of the West steamship that cadets fired upon in January of 1861. The left side depicts a crossed sword and rifle with oak leaves and laurel wreath.</span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">For more information, visit <a href="http://www.citadelalumni.org/s/1674/alumni/index.aspx?sid=1674&gid=1001&pgid=391" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">The Citadel Alumni Association's Cadet Ring History & Symbolism</a> website.</span></p>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Museum Ring Collection
Relation
A related resource
Museum Ring Collection
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
image/jpeg
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Physical Object
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/23
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Charleston (S.C.)
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Citadel Class Ring, 1944. Everett R. Lashley
Subject
The topic of the resource
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Citadel Archives & Museum
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
image/jpeg
Description
An account of the resource
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">The oldest known Citadel Class Ring dates to 1895, and features a dark stone with the year '95 inscribed in the center. Early rings changed design from year to year until the design was standardized in 1940. A special war ring was made for those who had been called to active duty directly from The Citadel at the close of the 1942-1943 academic year. This war ring was unique in that it did not have class numerals.</span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">Citadel Class Rings for the Corps of Cadets feature an oval crest with a Palmetto tree and the South Carolina State Seal with the graduating class numerals. The words “The Military College of S.C. 1842” wrap around the oval. The right side of the ring depicts the United States and South Carolina flags, cannon balls, and a star representing the Star of the West steamship that cadets fired upon in January of 1861. The left side depicts a crossed sword and rifle with oak leaves and laurel wreath.</span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">For more information, visit <a href="http://www.citadelalumni.org/s/1674/alumni/index.aspx?sid=1674&gid=1001&pgid=391" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">The Citadel Alumni Association's Cadet Ring History & Symbolism</a> website.</span></p>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Museum Ring Collection
Relation
A related resource
Museum Ring Collection
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Physical Object
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/702
Date Valid
Date (often a range) of validity of a resource.
1940-1949
Audience
A class of entity for whom the resource is intended or useful.
Citadel Class of 1944
-
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d86e20c1005ea7b0d0b109f3f49a1c20
PDF Text
Text
s
~
This is Volume VI of the 1/ar Dirry of Lieutenrnt General r~rk
W. ClPrk.
Volume I, covering p0.riod 28 Jun~, 1942 to September 24,
1942; Volum~ II, Covcrin~ reriod 25 September 194? to 5 JanuPry 1943;
Volume III, covering period 6 Jimun.ry 1943 to 6 Jun"? 1943; and Volume
IV, covering period 7 June 1943 to ?9 AuRUst 1943, rre h~ld in safekeeping Pt the Army 1!ar College, ·foshi"1gton, D. C.
VolUJ'le V, cover-
ing period Augu~t 30, 1943 to December 31, 1943 is being held in
safekeeping in the Commanding Genarn1 1 s safe
�OFFICERS ' REST CErT-r:;R, SORRPiIITO--JMWARY 1, 1944--NErr YEAR 1S DAY--General
ClPrk r,pent the day r>t the Officers I Rest Center. In the evcninp; he dined
with some of his sta.ff officers who ,,,.r~ rre3ent . During thi"' dr_y, motor messengers brought dispPctches do m fron the GenerA.1 1 s commnnd rost, and he discussed various r1atters by telerhone with his Chief of StPff. AMong the day's
messages ,.,ere n.n acknowledgment by General Clrirk of Gener:, 1 Leese I s greeting,
besides th~ following rnessr:tges from Gencrnl Gruenther who " rs still in Afric;:i;
Persnna.l for Clark fro,,, Gruenther . RN 22103 . "My guess js thPt SHINGLE
v'ill be cancelled . Rooks and '""hiteley feel thrt Alexander is bf'dly off bflse
in this instance ."
Personal for Clark from Gruenth~r. RN 22104. "Informe.tion from AcimirP 1
Cunningham indicates nen.rly all LSTS must be released on Febru:c>ry ?nd at latest . Concert h~re is th"t force must land with suprlies for eight dRys with
no dependence on re-supply by ,wter. No craft can be furnished for subsequent build-up. General 1'~isenhower has r sked Combined Chiefs to Pllovr 504th
to remain for SHINGLE . 11
Personal for Clork from Gruenthcr .
RN 22354.
11
Concensus here is thnt
SH:It'(\LE should be cr-ncelled unless AleXPnder and Clark can show that there
Tiill be no interference with ANVIL. I assume th:ot you now hPve telegrl"'m reference Seventh Army. Suggest you hnve Ga;:r or Harkins report to you immediately to explain status of Seventh Army staff . Part of stnff will start to a.rri ve here .!orldny. 11
Personal Clark to AloY..ander . RN 6037. "fosition regnrding ll"ndine craft
nov: clear . It is understood 20 LST 1 s -.rill be released for Feb 5 convoy Pnd 13
more LST ' s 10 dr:iys lriter . J lanning is proceeding on allocation of 88 1ST I s
(14 - 6 davit) , 60 LCT 1 s , 90 LOI (1) 's, 6 LSI (1) 1 s, 2 LSI (M) anc' 2 AGC 1 s.
Urgently request additional 12 - 6 davit LST's of ?6 destined for er-irly departure TJ . K. be allotted for OperAtion SHrJGLE . Alterm1 te rlrin being prepPred
using these additfonPl 12 - 6 daYit LST I s • 11
*
*
*
CASERTA--JJ\.NUARY 2 , 1944--Gcneral Cl.Ark left ~
,orrento Rt 1100 a.nd arrived at
his command post two hours later . Shortly there11fter Generr•l Gruenther arrived
from Algiers , and Generals Gruenther and Brann immediately met -•-i th General
Clark to discuss the jnformRtion w'lined by General Gruenther in Algi11rs Pnd its
effect on future operPtio:r1s . A great rector in this discussion WP :" a cable,
R'J' 22218, received at General Clark's commPnd rost this morning PS 11n jnformation copy of n cable from FR'?.EJ"Xlf" to 15th l\rmy Group . This crble, conpletely
to General Clark ' s surprise , radically altered the nunber of crpf't :;ivrilRblc
for SH:f'TGLE and so limited the time when they 1"ere avrilr-ble PS to render re supply P..nd reinforcement of the SHIJJGLE force iT'lpossible . This c~'!._')le re:.=id as
follows :
"At the Tunis conference on 25 December it ''IPS P greed thrt SHIJJGLE could
be undertal,:~n on the follo"dng basis: !,. Thrit nothing should be allowed to
interfere vrith the target d[lte of OV'i:JlLORD or ANVIL. ]2 . ThPt the build- up .
into Corsica should b"l safeguPrded . Q. Thero vms no riuestion of r1r>intenrnce
of tr~ force over the beaches . ]2. There wes no question of A subsequent buildup of the initial force.
�"The following are full details of l"nding craft r>vailability: s_. 1ST.
At the Tunis conference it was decideo thnt 88 WP.S the T1.Rximwn thrt could be
mP.de awiilable. Since then: (1) Doubt hrs arisen r>s to ,~hether 8 of these
will not have to proceed to UK at once to enable the r8fitting progrP.m for
OTIRLORD to be completed. (2) 3 fast LST heve been ordered to return from
India, and it is hoped thr>t they will arrive jn time. Thus in the best case
91 LST will be avajlable e.nd in the worst case 80. In l'my crse, ho1'Tcver, you
should not plnn on more than 95% of the avPilRble LST being service8ble at
the time of the operation. 15 of the 1ST allotted are of the six-drwit type,
and it appears proh-'lble tht>t this will be increased to 16, which is the mnximum possible. ]. LCT. 35 T'!a.rk V and 25 rhrk II, III or IV are expected to
be available and serviceable. Q. LCI(l). A total of 90 are expected to be
aveilable t1nd this figure Plip;ht be increPsed slightly. ]2. LSI(l) 6 and LSI(m)
2.
"It r.mst be clearly understood thrt the LST scheduled for return to UK
must be releA.sed no ln.ter tran 3 Februriry reg,.,rdless of 3HINGLE D day, P lso
that 16 LST must be relen.sed no bter thr-n 3 Febru~ry to be b"ck on the Corsica run by 5 February re-gr.rdless of SIIPJGIE D d11y. Certnin otr"'lr LST must be
released ir.imediately after the Pssault for ov"'lrhriul, Pnd vm AstimPte thP.t tr is ,•sj 11
leave you 6 serviceable LST for ell ms intennnce rurnoses in Italy ;,ftcr D./2. It
is estimated thAt 24 serviceable LCT v:ill be rvailA.ble for all mainten:rnce purposes in Italy after D/2.
11 All above (1 P,Toup corrupt) concernin~ landing craft do not tPke into
account 'battle losses from present time onwards.
"It is emphasized thPt there must be a return to the ngremnents of the
Tunis conference :md if acceptabl~ pl::>ns c::>nnot be drarn on thPt hrisis the
GOCI!JC 15th Army Group must so stPte in orcl.er th::i.t the recoP1nendrition to ce.rry
out SHPTGL.Ti: can be recons5 dered. n
General Gruenther informP.d Gencrrl Clark thPt a Comr.iander-in-Chief 1 s conference nas now being held in Tunis cnncerning th9 mounting of SHINGLE ::>nd ANVIL;
that General Alexander WAS there and vms discuss;ng the avAi]p'l:>ility of shipping
with AdT'liral Cunningham.
General Clr,rk, therefore, dispatched thn fol::!..oninr; cr-ible to G"lncrril ~lexander. RN 8281. "As I stated to yo1 l rhon you rere here several days a.t;o, I am
enthusiastic over outlook for Operation 3HITTGLE provided thnt nece"'sary meAns
are made available. Conditions proscribed in Fr~edom message ??2rn, requiring
release of ell but six 1ST by "'ebru~ry 3rd, ..rill probt->hly rflsult in situ tion
which 'l"'ill :make oy,ern.tion extremel;.r hnzarcous. I urgently request thnt you m11ke
every effort to hold Adequate number of crP.:i"t for SF=:'JGLE 1mtiJ such time "'S
success of the opere.tion is assured.
0
"Vlith the optimum number of LSTS which :vill be avn.ilr>ble the two jnf8ntry
divisions ;vill lPnd vrith grel'ltl;r reduced vehicle strenr;ths. For exnmple, the
British Division will have 1?00 vehicles le~s thrn assr,ult r-c,.los. Ancricrin
Division and all attached surporti11g units both divi"'ions Hil1 be correspondingly
reduced. Corps troops with acequatc trnnsr,ort and eriuipment will be prricticrilly
nonexistent.
1
"Another unfrvorable fa~tor is thnt smPll number of Assault cr11ft will permit lPndin1; only five 4 nfantry h'lttnlions Enrl one ranger h1tt2lion assPult
~
�loaded. Reserve battA.lions w1.ll not be Pble to lrind in assnult crnft. It was
for this reRson thnt I sent you ce.ble 6037 (quoted in yesterday's diary) asking
thP.t l? PdditionPl LSTS with six davits be r1ade avnilRbL. The alternative is
to use LCILS for the reserve units. The NElvy co'Ylsiders this on unsl'!tisfPctory
method in view of lmown beach conditions, and I concur. In spite of these difficulties I have bi,en willing to 12.nd the corps At r(~duced str ,ngth on the assurription thRt ue ·aould be able to retain P reasonRble nunbcr of LSTS for resupply purposes and to trnnsport the necessary v~hicles needed by the ass:rn.lt
forces. Freedom nessage 22218 hr.s ruled out thPt assumption. Minimum nunber
of LSTS 1•rhich must be ret8inod is 20. Ten are needed for Rn indefinite period
for re-supply purposes a.nd. ten for a reriod of t 1To ,,,eeJrs for tr'-"nsportc'ltion of
vehicles. If lJo. vy Hill not remove loading lir1itRtion of 400 tons per LST P.
total of 24 LSTS will be re0uired.
1
"rt is my conccptfon of Oporrtion 3HI1IGLE th;:it vre r-mst coun.t on "'.upplying
by sea for P. minimum period of 15 days rind probebly longer. The 0xr,.,cted location of the Fifth Army 11hen SHIJGLE is lP.unched is such thA.t it is highly improbeble that the two forces rill be able to gain confo ct in less than, thet time.
I intend att1=1c'k in. gre<>test rossible stren<rth in L-i.ri Valley severnl days in
adwmce of SHT'.JGIB ~,fitr the object of draving r1axin.um mmbcr of enemy reserves
to thPt .,.~ront iind fixing then therP-. In thrt vm.;r and in thPt way only CB.n the
SHFJGLB Force exercise a decisive influence in the operPtion to carture Rome.
11 If r~y idea of the opern.tion is sound it is essentiol that ··,c make rrovision to re-surPly the force ?S indicrted above. rry estimntc of ?O LSTS makes
no allonance f'or craft to rrovide a build-up although it :is quitr-; conceiwible
thPt the ener-iy situntion mP.y mPke thl'lt <>ction necessary.
"Present estirr£tte is th~.t D Day will be Jrmwiry 25, Although T Pm making
ever:r effort to adv"ncc thet sevoral days."
Gener.:>l ClR.rk felt th'1t he was genu:inely e1'1~er to engrige in SHH-TGLF:, to
\
the point of' committing in it units -hich he rroulrl suhsequently hnve to utiJ.:ize
in K~NIL, but thrt, in effect, a. pistol was being held Pt his head becruse he
was told, totally t0 hj" SW'prise, thrt if he wns to engage in '3HINGLE it must
be done '"ith inadequate craft, thet the craft ,..ould be ev<>ilable for only two
de.ys after the l.nndini:; rnrl thPt no re-supr,ly or rr~inforcement thereafter i7ould
be awiil2.ble. In effect, therefore, he WPS Psi:0d to land two divisions et a
point where a junction vith the h=iln.nce of Fifth Army was impossible for e
)
long period, thereby leavinr-; tho t,ro di visions :i.n question out on a very long
limb.
L
r2
Later in the afternoon Generr:tl IfoCreery called on General Clar}!- Pnd discussed the f'uture operations of 10 Corps. He also spoke of P conversation he
recently had had vdth the General Co·1m~n.ding the 5th British Division, "hich
is About to become part of the Fifth Army, and in particular rbout thrt officer's comment concerning the caswltics of thrit Division. Gener'l.1 ncCreery )
was struck by the comparativ~ly trifling c.nsualties vrhich h...,rl been suffered
and by the light chPracter of the fightinp; on the Eighth Army front which this /
indfoated.
The follovrjn~ cnblo was srmt to VI Corps rind the Fr~mch Exy-,"Jditiom1r;7 Corrs
todr-i.y. rm 6051. 11 Effective 031200 JanuPry French r.:xpca~tionary Corps riill relieve VI Corps find CG, F~C wi11 assur::1c coriT1r-ind of present VI Corre sector n.nd
�..5
responsibility for current ~ission of VI Corps.
"Assignmr,nts rnd 'ltt::ichmrmts ncntioned in Fifth ~rmy letter, AG file
11 Troops rrssignrnents ,nd PttPclir1<>nts1t
become effective 031200 J::,nuRry 19f+/h
322 .1-Y dated 2 J,r,.nunry 19M+, "'Ubj0ct
11 VI
Corps ·vill reconnoiter the flre::i uest of I\VsRSA-HAILES rord 2n south of
10 Corns reAr boundrir;r for bivoun.c are;:-~ f'or Corr-~ CI' n.nrl Corps Troops. Areris
selected will be clearoa ~i th G-3 Pnd G-4 this her'dqurrtors , ·ho will arrringe
contact"' rith FBS ''Ih~re necessary.
"Effective 040001A January, 3d Infrntry Jivision ,.,nd rtfrch d 441st AAA
A'"l Bn rnd 601st TD Bn is ntto.ch~d VI Corps."
*
*
CASTillTA--JANUl\RY 3, 1944--Gen"'rn l Clerk tod::,y confl"lrrod j n the morning concerninf, pmnin,:,- operAtiori.s with Gcm~r"l J:9yes, Gen0r"l Gruenthrr, GPner~l Brrinn
nnd G~n9r::i_l L9mnitzer. Gent'lr~l Keyes r>nd Gener~l L'jrnnitzer st~y"'d for lunch.
In the pfternoon G9nOr"l LuCPfl cnr,c rind r1 jccuased J.j_s rrorosGn rll"n for the
rount. nP, of SHIITGLr.;.
On Jrinm1 ry 1st, by
Gen"'r:' 1 Pattnn =rs relieved)
fron cor1mf'nd of the 3cve'1th ArT"ly, r>nr Gcn9r~1 C1,,rv:: "'PS r,l2c..,d in comm"nd of
it, in arldition to his cor,"lnnd of t}1e Fifth Army. The di:' y "f11'm h0 ,,;ould lay
do 11m c6mnc'nc1 of the Fifth Army was left to 0ir> cleterrrdn.,,tion. Fart of the
Seventh Army PlPnning Staff vr:'s r>lreaily on the wr,ter on its "'A.Y to Alfti-rs <>nd
the Chief of StRff, Seventh Army was on his w>y to confer vi th G ,neri= 1 Clrr1r.
The Grin~rrl I s int,,ntion vras to send Gemr,r il Brann ir:1I1cdirtely to Alir' ers to
take charf{e o+' the I'lo.nninr, Grour anrl rt n:r eArly <lat9 he rropos9d to set ur
his Army HePJ'l.quartcrs in Itn ly, ro· sibly nt Salerno, derending uron b ce of
mountini; and tr" inint:; for A'nfIL. It would be di f'f'5 cult for him to retain
more them ri few li::(ly reorle from his rresent sbff, - tentPtivcly his four G's
and bis Sip;ml Of'fj cer, rr~ th & fc ,r junior officers "no, of course, his Chfof
of Staff. The nio11nti:>1a of ANVIL vmulc'I be mr-de by four American Jjvisions
and five or six -'rench Divisions. The /1.nericP..n Divisions would l110k>" the initifll 0ssault, and the rench Divisions tb..,n come in. The GenerAl is seeking
to get nn airborne division in arldition 11.nd is seeking nn a.ppropriate Air Commander .
0
At noon today GenerRl Lucas rcl:i.nquished comMand of the sector in ,•·hich
VI Corps had been oper~ting, and Generel Juin 1 s CEF took over the com.~and of
the 2nd Norocctm Division rind the 45th Division. The 7th R.T.n. of the 3rd
AlgeriPn hRd already start0d thc relief of tho 179th Inf,-,ntr;'{. GenerPl Lucas,
following a ceremonial relief by Gennr.11 Juin at Prata, caml'! to t:be confero.nce
with GenerPl ClRrk ri ✓ ntfoned r-bove rinc1 tr"•n '7ent on to set up his new HePdquarters at f"addaloni.
The Prmy Co"1mrmder received r- cable f'rom G0nernl Alexanrler, !RN, stPting
that General Alexander trill arrive Cap()dichino at 1130 to"':lorrow r>nr' plP.ns to
return to B::iri th0 samn Pftr:?rnoon, 11nd 1-rill hPV3 ffcrty of' four.
The fol lo"ri ni:s excerpt is f'lade of Cosi tintrop Ll78 frori 15th Arrriy Group,
�RN o . 848 :
"Fifth P,rmy French ~x:reditionrry r:orps (FBC) CF open".ld Prata Hl614 at
031::>00A hours . Relieved VI Corps . CG FEC ass11mnd comrr,"nd rresent VI Corps
Sector a!lo resron::::ibilH;r for current m.i'>sion 0f VI Corps . 3 Al!'.;erinn Div
movement to 45 Div Ar~P continues . Relief of 179 Inf :in are& Fl4,?6 by 7
.Alger Inf started todey. 2 1 'oroc Djv. r;e,,,thnr li~jt~d operf!tions . Security
patroll5_np;. 4 Div Sno'" ext,r-;rie cold "'nr' rurrg,,0 t11rrrin hl=impering r>dv<>nce 180
Inf Patrols located enemy in Acquafondola H05?6. Ene!'ly still holding at
G9727 9725 . II Co1'J)s . 1/i.2 Inf security ratrols only. No contact TFA strong
combP.t patrols to G9L,16 - g515 met hewvy enemy resistt:>nce . 1 Armel Div less
Hq One Corbot Comnand relieved nttrichl"lent II Corps 020001A hours reverted to
Fifth Army Control. Povinp; vicinity Aqul'llirmo 1'Jl357. X Corrs . 56 Div. 168
Bde to M8798 found enemy. I'r.trol to bridge M 8594 niade no contact . Army 'I'f'S.
3 US Div less 15 Inf' reverteo to /irmy Con+,rol ::>921401\ Decl"):riber now closed in
Area 2 rTiles T-Torth of Pozzuoli NlOL.6 . ~i.fth Army cr>sualtiAs to 1 Jan. Ameri can killed 2673 wounded 11010 r1issinP, '3366 . British killed 1682 ~rounded 7112
missing 2884 . Fr -nch 1-::illed ?28 wounded 144g missing 89 . n: by Ari.ericnns
2g95 . British 1686. French 118 . 11
*
*
CASERTA --JA~-lU~RY 4, 19l+L:---This morning G'"'n""rRl Gl2rk l"P.cejv~d calls from Brigcdier G"mor11l Sr•;1bridge, G- 1, A'.'Iq , rnd Brigadier Genernl Arthur Hilson , Comm""nd:ing ,13s.
Tith Gener[il Srivrbridge he oiscussed the transfer of certnin rersonnel
from Fi.r>th Arrny to Seventh Arr1y a:111 also the riuestions ;:,risinp; out of' certP in
Legion nf T<irit 8 .,,,rds . JIG took up vr>rious ~upply problems in his ciocussion
with GAnPrPl il3on . Shortly b~fore noon J::,e held 11 mr-,etinP ~t th"" hut Pt
which tb~ro "'ere present Generr>l Luca" , G,~ncrr-1 GruP.nthP.r , Ac1r,irel Lo'"rry, Captain Le...,ds , Generc>l Truscott , Genf:'lral Brr>.nn and vnrious st<iff officers . Ge-neral Cl,,,rk stAtcd thr-t he '.7PS e-,rpectin?, P visit "'roT'l Gon'"ral Alexo.nder j_n A few
minutes "nd th"'t the pre3c-,it mr~etine hr-d been cRlled r-s ~ preliminnry to the
w:iet5.np- with GAneral Alex;:,nder . T-fe r1entioned the :mrpri~c •ri th vrhich he hPd
received the message from <\FHQ (mr 2?;::>18 , quoted jn the dir->ry of Jf!nunry ?nd)
r,lacinrr l:i r-d to.tions on th8 "mount of crest 11 VPilP bl': for SHINGLE and on the
tir,e ,rhen the crPft ' ere awil,,ble could b"; US"'}c1 , Pnd stc t8d th['t under tho
c0nditions of this messe.ee re-SUT'Pl:V r>nd rei f'orcerl\ent vras imross:ible . After
1
sone a; sc;1ssion of v::irious c et:clilP , the G~ner"l 1mr,1T'l11rizcd his nosition '"'S follows: "'"19 are supposed to go ur tbere , r1 ump t•."o di visions P shore '<ri th V.'hrt
corps troops we C<'.n s~t ~ n, with r1 n indeterr1j na to nunber of craft without re suprly or reinforccT1cnt, and 1"[\i t for the rest cf the Arm:r to ;join up . n He
then adned , 11 I am trying to find wPys to do it , not -rpys in which "''e con not
do it . I ari convinced that -re r> re r;oing to do it, P n,1 thn t it -i s going to be
a success . n
The P s ser:ibled o:f'fj cers left uron the r rri vr l of G0nern 1 Alex~11.der , ,·,ho
cemc with I"ajor G~nr:rR.l Rich.i:;rc'lson :::>nd Lt. Gen . HPrcl:i ng. Gen°rPl Robr:,rtson
also came , a.nd these officers , ·rith Gencrl"l Grur.;nth,r E>nd G")nerrl Brnnn, discussed operntion rmI:TGLE .
1
General Cll"rk statPd to (km~rnl J\lexP.nder thl'lt th"} messae;e RN 2;)218, had
corie P s r' cor,plete ourpri se n11d shoc1· to him, as no pr~vi ou'"> suggestion from
General Ale7ander had rdnted at the linitrtions of riv,ilnb1e shipping ~1hich
this nessage imposed . Gencr::i.l Clnr}r stnterl to General /\.lexrmder 1 s surprise
/
�thPt he , General Clark, had l'.11o"rn for three '"eeks th"t he hNl b0en selected to
cormFind 11 1 1VIL and new~rthcles-:: , ,lesrite J,-,is nrtur2l interest jn conserving
force for thrt blow , he r<1d "c'lnt.busiristjcnll:r ,nter d into C-:HI'mLF. rlP.nning and
hPd nronosed to nut his 1JI Corps staff "nd .bis 3rd Infrntry Division , t",o of
his fin~st rin;J T"!~st useful orgr>nizatio·'ls , ~ :nto the SVPTGI:~ Operl'ltior, ,=hicr 'WS
one of c0ns::.dereble hazard in ,·:hich t.beir usefulness f'or .11.TIVIL nip;ht be considerably iripnircd . Gener;il Cl['rk furtblr ,tr>ted to Gennr"l AlexPnder thet he
W"'S fully deter:riined on p-oi>-1g into jHr'GLE end puttinr, fortl1 evcr-::,r effort to
rna1,:e it n. success , but it could not be done nitl1out tro cr;of't, originally Agreed
on . Gen"rnl Almmnr1er then unrlertook to drn'·' r c.--ble to the Fril"le f'inister
exnlE1inin1:,- tho. rer.Jnisites of srirr:inr.; for the successful confuct of r.;IUNGLE and
had a difficult tin<:'! vi th the fr cts "nd figures unt:i. l G"!n<lrf' 1 Clnr], "'Ufplied
him .,j th P copy of' cnble P.H 8?81 of Jl'lnw ry ?nd (quoted in thcit dey ' n diriry)
~•rhich General Ale-v:r-inder hRd hrc1 for tno dP;TS . GenerP l t lext1nrl~r , r0c0gnizing
th,.,t all th0 n9cessrry datr. wa" contain,.,cl in Gen0rril Cli=irk 1 s c11ble , c'lrew a
cab] e o,.. his m;ri tr, the Prime r~inister ndortinr; the subst1mce of' Gnnerfl l
mm cable .
lo
,l
0
1
(J
G
C
Gr-meral ClE<r1'- tcld Generrl Alemnrler th::-t he rroposed to continue plflnning
for 3HI rm,s onrl , cs 8 rossih1e c lternntiv8, 1rP.cp in riinrl r shorter ~nd run just
north of Gaete Ioint to be pi<:rforned with one djvision only. However , G0nerr-il
Cl..,rk further strted thrt in his estiMPtion :lt "TPS thP- ('unction of G<>n,,rrl
Alexander to determine v;hother the number of Gern;:in Divisions prepPred to oppose tr1e lrirdinR; in 3HHTGLB ',ms too grer>t to per>"~-t r succcss,,.ul or'"rr tion Pnd
that hr-i , G<>ner8l ClnrJ:, dic1 not rropose to rrirc-~ this question ::,ny further . He
poj.nted out to GrmerRl Alexander thrt he understooc" thc-t the '.)qth P;inzer Gr0nr> dier Regj ment hPd just be(m noV!3d by the German cor,mand from the Fifth Army
front to a position near Rome , •7hich n,dded rll.oth~r division to those in rosition to oprose the opr,ratfon under discussion. G"!n9rnl AlexrindP-r anc'l the throe
officers riccomrnnying hin then left the cor.in;ind post by cub for Crpodi.chino
airport nnd returnod by plP..ne to B2ri.
/
\
GencrPl Cle.rk ,,.elt thPt l't tho :nr:ietinr with the Prime I'fj nistqr in Tunis
on Christnas D;:iy -·hen Gnneral Eisenhormr , Gener11l Alexander anc'l others \7ere
I
present , the Trime f'in:: ster had been :Lnrpircd --Ji th a desire to CPfture Rorie and
bad determj ned thr>t 'HI'TGLS v;ould ta ·e plrice , Pnd GeniJra 1 Sisenho·· er "nd G0ne - 1
rel Alexand0r , ·ritrout detn:tled l:nomledge of the rro½l9l7!S involver , had r-greed /
to it . n'1fortunrtely, in General Clrirk 1 s estimation, none of those rrho thus
lip;ht hcartedly de c id.ed on tho SH:nTGLE Operation understood the detPils of shippj_ng end of loar'linf'" nl'"Jcessary to rut rshore the requisite .,,.orce 2nd nri"ntain
it when once Pshore . The Genornl felt thrt G0n,,ral Alexnnder, even ,oft0r re ceiving GnnerPl ClPrk ' s 7JT 8?81, still did not n.rrr0.cirte the re,1uisites f'or a
successful oper:=i,tion auch as SPIJ-TGL'"' , Pnd h11 had been hamper0d rt a Comm~:inder in- Chief 1 s con:'ercnce ulth Admiral Clmn:inp.;hPm on Janur>ry 0 nd by this lr>ck of
informRtion.
Gener8,l ClBrk felt thr-t ,•rhcn Gen(1r;:a 1 ft lexnnder hPd b0tm br,clly dis.s.prointed
1
at not gettinP' the 1•"'n.iterrPnean CoJ11Jnand , vice Grmer, 1 EisenhoT'T(')r , Pnd at not
being selected to fo l low G'.mcr a l ~isenho"er to UK for a. comriand there , the
Frir,e Hinistcr had ->ttcmpted to sr,othe his feelings by p,-j ving h:i.m the high
s01mding ,,mt somevrhat empty title of Cor:imnnr1er- in- Chicf , Itrly, Bnd b;v ~iving
him Lt. Gr:m . Harc1 ing as his Chief of :3taff , to G0neral Harding ' " oiseppoint ment cs he hrd hopcn to cor~111and his Corps jn OVT'JtLo-qn . ~lith tJ-,'3se other conc essions , the Prime r'inister kd 2lso , in Gener al Cbrk ' s estil"lr-tion, given
l
�General Alexn.nder P'"rmission to riount Ororntion ~HI TGLE vrithout proper consideration of the f,,ctors imrolvnd in the or'"rf1tion. The r,ritter 1c'as rendered
more coJTJplex hy th~ fRct tr.Pst the crr-"t of ·7J-•:Ich the FriMe ' 1inister -r:1 s disposinr, "ere in large rrJeasure American ere ,...t And r>ot subj net to his control. _,,
This evening P now phr,sc of the Fi th Army attn k "ms jnstitut'3d nhen
the 3/+th Division, the Speci"ll Service Force rn~ th(') t)th ~rmorr:id Division
pushed forvm.rrl. By thA close of the d<>y our troops ·;ere in S<Jn Vittore nhere
street fi~hting hed occurred. Some -.,iw,nces hrd been r1c-ide on the M gh gr01md
to the northeast.
General Clark today rlispatchnd the follo 1'linr cr)blc to crrc, JFH'.}. RN
R37?. 11 1. Decision by r,L I'130 precludes the loacing of cr.>rgo sJ-,ipr.ing at
Fantaloon "or Operation SHil GI.E e:rcert for fPrt of shirrfog to :'3.ccorn.p.?ny assault convoy. This ruling nn.de because loading of ar'ditional shippi11.g would
interfere rith rlrmned incorrtng tonnPr;es throui::h fort of f rnt.<:iloon.
?. Contemplate loading 4 fjtt~d Libcrtfos v7ith British Pnd Am~ricrm
Ground Force Stores r,ric. 1 Cor-:ister .,..d.th Air Force supplies rt Fnntnloon because of the selective loading required anc because of non-avPilBbility of
certain supplies in !forth Africa.
11
3.
'ill require 8 Fitted Liberty Ships eAch to he sprerirl loaded TTith
BritisJ:, and Americn.n Ground Force supplies l'lnd ? Co9sters to be lof-1.ded with
Air Force supplies in P 1forth A""ricPn Port or Forts cesignated by you. Am
pr':lparecl to. Sl'!nd rGpresl'mtr,tjves ..,ith reriuisitions to 30S IJATCUSA and AFRQ
(British And TQI"'s to fort or I-orts of lonning.
11
"Li-. It is required th-it four fitt"d Liberties rncl 1 CoPster loaded in
North Africa a.rrive Pantaloon not later than ?3 Janwry and the brilanc" of 4
Liberties and l Coaster to arrive Pentaloon not ln.ter thnn 1 Febru,.,ry.
5. Request thA.t the Liberty 8hi:rs anr Corister be Ylomin..-ted n_nd port
or rorts of loadh1g be designrited. forts selected f1ust be carabl•~ of lo::iding
British rnc American supplies on the sr>me ship. Also re~uest deadline drtes
for arrival in North Africa of reriuisitio11.s rnd representPtives.
11
11
6.
New subject:
Rerpv~st eXPrrdn1:1tion of Pdequ"'CY of stocks to be loaded
on above shipping in t,rorth Africa for brilance supplying for ?O dAys of 1 Am1-,ricn.n , nd 1 Britisl Division uith supporti.n~ troops Fith particulr>r ref19rence to
0
ammunition of following calibe rs:
British TyJ)es 5~ 511 G,m,
4. 5 Gun, ?; po1.L.'1der, l '7 pounder, 25 pounder,
3 11 nortar.
Arnericr>n Types:
75 mm Gun
3'1 Gun
105mm Tfovri tzer, ft-2
155mm irowitzer, fi'-1
155mm G,m, M-1
57mm i\nti-t~ink Gun
L~. 2 11 r 7ortn.r 11
�9
CASERTA--,TATTTTARY 5, 194L~--GeMr<>l Clnr 1{ re!7lainl')d at his cori:'lanrl post throughout th'-' day, stuc'vinrr, rlans for Opelr"tio11 s SHriGLE nnd A'TTJIL. ,7ork-i'1IT to fi.nd
the nece"'sarv nunb~r of cr:i.ft for Operr>tion "HrrGIE, Gener:--1 Alexander sent a
radio messaP"l'l to Gl'!nP.ral Clrrv, IHI 533 , telling h"m th"t he i"' pressing Trime
T-'inister Churchill (By prl'l-errRnr;ement, the lril'1~ T~inister wes referred to :in
this e.nd subse1mmt messr>ges as "Colon.el \r:=trdcn") very hPrd to get ur the necessary craft wanted for the expedition, and Us maintenrince . Gener,, 1 Alex::inder in-l"ormed Genernl r:lark thrt he hri.d suggestr-d r,oin~ by air to see the
Prime l~inister Pnd asked thl'lt Genernl Clrrk be reridv to s~nd nn 8dequ.-.,te small
st11ff , both i:\rmy and N11vy , armec1 with full plrin Rnd lording tabl.-,s in simple
form so they can be expl11.ined to I'r. Churchill.
During the nfternoon Gnnerr>l Alexander rgrin rt">dioed Generrsl C1Frk, R~r
n. t'.'Jlegrrim -l"rom rrirne '1inister Churchill 1hicr indicates that .re r,r,y get thl"l crr.r-t re quired . He c sked Gener£1l Clark
to nle?s~ continu~ to plan Opcrfl.tion "FJ"GLE on th·~ nss,;mption throt r full
amount of craft uill b~ avn.ila½l" • He ask~d Gener'"'l Clnrk to fly his spec:ial,
small SHrTGLE staff to r'Rrrrikech, rhere "Colonel V
iard.en" is now staying . General Clark then issu~d instructio.,,.s to his Chief of St, ff to hPV" a smP 11 group
of o-"f~_cers alerted for t,~e journe;r. A rrelin5n,"'ry discussion by the staff
with Gener 1 Alexandor will be held Janu'c'ry 7th in 'arrakech, e.nd then the ma:in
conference vith the Prime t'inister ,!!ill be held the following day.
:'A/9~6, telling him thnt he had rccei ved
0
In A.nswer to GcnerRl C1Pr1,. 1 s cable of yest~rda.y, //8372 (quoted in yesterday ' s diPry) , l\."'FT:1 todn;r instructed FLf I"BO R ,J 23997 , to fly to Algiers immediate ly a r-"presentriti ve ,,,1.tr r8quic;i tion.s for th8 r.:ooo s of both ground 1'1.nd air,
British anrl American, needed to lrn:>c1 the 8 Liberty ships rind the 2 Consters in
North AfricPn ports . ',pott-in.p: P"ld loading 'ere to connence at once, Pnd officers · 1ere to be sent to arl.vise on loadj -rig methods .
Anoth~r cr>bl0 receiv:~d f'rol"! Ali;iers, R'J 23999 , in reference to GenerPl
ClPrk 's ;18372, Psks an urgent reply from 15th Army Group PS to vrhethAr or not
the Comrnn:ider of the 8th A··phibious Force (Admiral Lorrry) h2.s Rgrecd to trike
cars::;o ships in on the assault or if they nre to be in t}·e iIDI'lcdiPte follo :-up.
Gcnerril r.ruenthr,r indic,,t0d on a notJ on tris messaw~ thr-t the Connrin er of the
8th Ar1phihious Force 1111d ~greed to ta. 1re the shirs in on the nsseult .
0
In the evenine n~nerRl ClPrk ha.cl rs his dj n•1er rue st r:iss Pnrge.ret Bourke
White, the f'n.mous woman photogrApher . She h~ s 1),->,en t:oJ,:ine pictm·es for LIFE
r~agazine along the Fifth .Arn;r front . She discussed her imrressions of fight inp; j n the Fj_fth Army sector ancl sr·id tkt sre, , rbo hPd been r-in eXDornmt of the
tough life of the Air Corp'"' , h2rl learned from watch:i n1 vround troors how really
tough war can be . General Levd s was nlso £J P,Uest .
Other important messo.ges of the da7 ,·ere as follo.,s:
For General Alexander ' s (')yes only from Clr>rk . R 1J 6203 . 11 A group of two
Army Rnd one NavPl officer has been set up to accompany you to see Colonel
Wardrm. I trust thnt the mettAr ,n1 be settl~d firmly within next 4g hours . 11
To crrc from Cln.r}'- reference your 23499 BIGOT . RH l:,215 . 11 Airborne divi·sions should b<3 orr;anized with three rarachute regir,~ntc1l combet terns 1rnd no
glider reginent . Irt vievr of nrture of Oneration MI'TIL, I con ·ider it essential
that airborne division l'.!ontain some battle-trained airborne el..,'1lent"' , 13.nd I
�l()
again urgentl y recomri~nd th<1.t 50/..th RCT remr in here to c onstitute nucl"'us
a.round which to build new airborne combnt terns to be brought f'rom United
Stnte'"' .
Your directive to rne for Operntion AFVIL indic2tes two airborne RCTs
will be rvailablP- in addition to four TJ . S . infantry divisions . I am count ing on four infr>ntry di visions . If I am forced to choose betvmen the fourt h
infantry division and an s.irborne division , I definitely VTPnt the infnntry
division . In that event :tt would be inperative thrit the 504th RCT be re t ained here "-l.nd th, t rt least one additionr.l prrachut e RCT be brought from
United St ates ."
11
*
*
*
CASERTA --JANUA.RY 6, 1944-- This morning at 0900 Genr--ral Clr>r], c111led e moet ing of officers prelirriinrry to the cl eparture of the Sm" 11 str ff wi..ich vm s
to discuss 3HHTGLE with Generr,l Alexa.nc1er nnd Col onel Vhro.en . The meeting
was held at the G~ner1:il 1 s conference hut , and thP,re "ere present , be'3:ides
Genernl Clark, General Gruenth~r , Admirnl Lowry , Gcnerr>.l Luc3s , Genera l
Brann, Cay,t ain Lewis , TTSTJ, Colonel T;,te , Col onel Hill , Col onel 11illiPms Pnd
Lt . Col. O' Neill. GenerR l Glark told tJ-,e o"'ficers thrt when Gemral Alexander vms present he , (}enernl Clar1-::, had insi sted thPt he needed a l'linimum
of ?.L. LSTS aft er t he Assault , 14 for n.n indefinite per; od 1rnc1 10 for rit
least 15 days . These ·!ere needed for ri build- up in troors and r1nteriel.
En snio that +.he o"'ficers who wer e 1soin~ to the conf'erence must stick to
their figu:t' As in the conference ''Ti th the Fd.me i':inister r>1c'1 not be ca jolcd ·
into retrenting "rom them, as the de c ision must he ,.,rrived rt bn.sed on the
a ctual meds . The GcnerPl said thrit the Fresident Pnd the Combined Chiefs
of Staff ,·,ere hcsitPnt to t~ke any ster Til~foh M:i f:;ht i rip~ril A~ IL and OVER LORD , v1hile the I-rime l!inister felt t hnt it vas c1 es:i.rPble to toke Rome at
almost any c ost . GenerPl Clark: rereatea thPt it wAs r'lso necessary to appraj_s" the i:memy situ.,ntion at the b.st no!'l'mt to detArmine -rhether enemy
build- up was too large to be overcome .
Admiral Lowry stA.t~,:i th;:it the necessary cr:1f't, for SITIITGLE must start
at once :for this area - that it .,..rould be impos3:ible to \"'ait +'or Fl conference
on the ,qth 7lith Col onel 'larden , a de c ision on tl e 10th rnc'l then stPrt the
craft . Gcnf'!rP l Clnr'l{: str>ted thr>t th0re nust be n T::iv['l of-f'ic~r ct the conference , and Admiral Lowry stated thA.t CPptain Le"1is was needed hero for
planni nr; ,·,ork. I-T owr'v'3r , it was decided that Ce.ptR fo Le'7i 'J could go to Algi P-rs ,
trlk over the situntio11 ,·rith Capt-in Olds , of /\.dmiral rr~,~itt 1 s stPff , and
Captain Olds could then ~o on to the c0n:"'er'1nce nnri exple in th,q situr tion ,
while Captain Lewis return9d to Feedqunrters Fifth Army.
0
Colonel Tate reported th:=•t the rroblem of loadinr; Liberty shirs ve_s well
in hand . Generel ClRrk then asked Lt . Col. O' Neill whrt his ri:nswer vrould be
if he ,,,ere asked why ~4 LCT3 would not do as Fell as LSTS for re- supply.
Co l onel O' Neill j mmedfo.tely saF thrit t1'e Pnmvcr "ould be that rn 1ST rnuld
hold 36 trucks and an LCT ·rould hold 8 , a11d Goncrr l ClPrk r~minded him ag"in
t het tr~ fnctors of weather , spel"d rn,.d turnrround of th~ different vessels
were also important . Genernl Cl..,rk rcrent<;d th!'t the o"ficers v1'o go to the
con:ference should mrike it vorv cler-r thrit uithout th"l 24 LSTS thP, oper2tion
was not feasible; thPt Fore it frrrossibl'-' to rrocure them , 1-ic could try the
landing just north of Griet::i Tith one division , if his staff found i t ro"'sible .
�l\
Colonel Tate then cor;1mented on the fr,ct thrt the roRr1 net to Gaeta was
hazardous , as it could be easily blocked by demolitions .
As the General ' s plri_ne , piloted hy Captain 0 1 Neill , was waiting at Capo dichino to take off Ht 1100, the conference broke up shortly rifter 1000 , and
Captain Lewis , Colonels Hil l and WilliPms and Lt . Col . O' Neill , who were the
Fifth Army representatives , left for Capodichino and North A.fr ice. .
GEmeral Clark spent the rest of the dEJY studying preliminary drafts of
plans for SHINGLE and f ~TVIL .
In the evening General Olrrk entertained Pt dinner Colonel Mickelwait ,
Co l onel l,jndner , Colonel Saltzman and Lt . Col. Porter . At about 2200 G- 3
reported thrit a II Corps message rmnounced th1=1t tho vill<>ge of Srm Vittore
had been cleared of the enemy.
The following
j
mportr•nt messages vrere received rincl dispatcht")d today:
Person8l for Clark from Alexander . RN MA./973 . "I hPve received follow ing sign;::il from Chief of Combined Operations . ' try directive a.s CCO includes
the study of the tactic.?l rnd technicGl prohlmris of amphibious opertions Find
advice to the Chiefs of St aff . This cPnnot be done from 1:ifhi tehall Pnd re quires my stAff to keep in dir e ct touch with operat:i.ons . Therefore wbile
realizing thrt spe ctators are usually a nuis11nce , I rr9quest your 8pprow:s 1
for Co l onel Langley and Commander Scott Miller of COE!'.~ to ,',itness operetion
SHil'TGLE , including fina l rehearsals if possible in SNOL or HQ ships . Gener a l Yiil son has aprroved this request. If you concur request joining instructions . They wo11ld of course be avnil,.,bl e for nny duties you nm.y require . 1 I
hA.ve ccmcurred Pnd ~ nstruct,~d these represente.tives to report direct to you . 11
Patton t o Clark. RN 822 . trif agreeabh t o you , desire visit your Head quarters Prrivinp; Pt Capodichino airport 1000 SRturday, Jan11c-iry 8 . 11
Per sonal to Patton from Clark. RH 8482 . "Delighted to see you S:1turday.
Car will meet you a t time P.nd plac e specified . 11
Gruenther from Hill . RN 2/+899. "After talk with Rooks and Lenis , best
estima.te SHP1GLE i s off as additional IBTS are not available . tr
*
*
*
CASERTA--JANUARY 7 , 1944--The situation alo_ g the front , particularly in the
n
area between Highway //6 and I?ilignano continu3d to go well today, with cle ments of the Special Service Force occupying t'tount Majo , one of their principal objectives . Dbvm by Highway //:6 the 135th Infantry Regiment of the 36th
Division continued to move forwarc'l t,,.,yond San Vittoro, and the Fifth Army now
holds the crest and tbe south and en.stern slopes of Mount PorchiP , one of
the principal land blisters l ying in the Liri Velley just south of Cassino .
The fighting continu"ld to be extr emely bitter , P.nd the Germ"'m:1 Aro put ting up
exceptionP lly stiff resist ance . The Gerrnens countcr-Att Pcked Porchia last
night , us i ng artillery and nort2.r fire , but the Attack failed . A drive hris
also been started for r~o1-mt Chiaia , north of San Vittore , And it has progressed
well despit e heavy machin('J gun and rifle fire from the slopes of this vita.l
�hill. In generrl, curing the pst two dry::i, hePvy losses hrive been jnflicted
on the enemy, P..nd nPny prisoners hPve boen t.,.,ken. Mount Chiaia shoulrl fall
to us tomorrow.
GPncrrl Cbrk received ,,err,_ early tr·:is 1orninp; th·· t Lt. Gen. G:-,orge latton,
former Cor1mnnn.er of the 3ev"nth Army, would visit him tomorrow. Generals Clark
and Patton nill discuss Sev-:inth Army IIeri.dquPrt".'lro ersonriel.
G··m~ral FarI'!on, Commander of the 1st Arr,or"d 1Jivision, conferrer during
tbe dn.y with Generr>l Clrirk concern::ine po,-;sible enrloyr,..,nt of armored forces in
the progress of the Fifth Arny attack up Route '/6. Some arnored elements A.re
already fighting in the San Vittore, '.cunt Iorchia, flaunt Ch:i.aia region and as
17e progress farthP.r up tbe Liri Valley, there "Till be r: chance to use some armor, but this j_s cerendent, to some e:rt~nt, upon th1; vreath~r. TJnlcss we h ... ve
a long dry p•iriod, and sun a11d wind to dry 0 11t the muddy f'ields, the use of
tanks will be restrict ,d since th~ir r,ovemcnt will be con: inecl to roads. General HBrmon told General Cb.rlr th11t he was most eager to commit as much of the
1st Armored as possible into combat. The 6th Armored Inf'antry Regiment is Already fightino-, but the tank groups have not been cbl~, As yet, to go into full
STTing.
The speciel VI Corps Plannin~ Group, under Gen~r"l Lu,~t>s, is ~oinr, ahead
with detrils of Operation '3HITTGLE. The Fifth Army group thrt Generril Clrrk
sent back to f, fric1:1 so jt could pnrticipete in discussions with Gener11l Alexander, th"n v1ith rririe Yj_nister Churchill, T•ras due in Marrakech this r:iorning.
General Clerk is eagerly avaiting word from this group as to "hether or not the
necessary number of lA.nding crR-ft vdl1 be availPblc. Genl"lral Cl11rk reccivl')d
todav a rlirective to the Naval CoF1mander of Operation SHIFGLE. It names Admiral
F. J. Lowry e.s the 'Tavril Corn1'1ander of t:bc SHINGLE Task Force.
As his mHin dinner P,Ul':'!st GenerP.1 Cbrlr had Colonel SullivPn, Army nuarternaster, vrho is celebrating his 50th birthd1:1y. Alto8ethcr the Generr-il had
seven guests.
General Cl<irk dispatched the follm1ing Cflbl<J to Generr,l Alexander tocl8y.
R°t\J 6?67. 11 As part of main land attack by Fifth Army, 10 Corps wi 11 cross
Ggrigliano on 17 ,Tenuary, s~cure Uinturno area and attA.ck north toward S Giorgio
nith h!O rlivisions. Important T'ert of Uis plan is smrill amrhibious operation
to carturc area Ponte Scauri (rnl,.94) with three Corimrndos Pnrl to secure beachhead just north of Garigliano ·7ith infHntry force. Tan}::s And supporting erris
will, if practicA.ble, be l,:,nded on this bench same night. me val bonbPrdrncnt
will be required.
"Frovisional estimate of craft a.fter ex11P1ir>.Ption of operation with FO'HT
is tvo LSI (1:1) tvumty LOTS and thr~e LSTS with six dr-ivits. If Oreration SI"DJGLE
takes place it ,·rill not be practicrble to P.llot more thnn three or four LOTS
to the Scauri operfltion. However, it is desirable that detailed rlnnning be
ini tinted so that plan may be executed on short notice in event SHINGLE should
be cancelled.
"Request you errange v:i. th c:n,JC nl'!ed for allotnent of necessary crPft 11.nd
bomb<i.rding force both to be avrile,ble until end of Jrnu;:,ry in case of' bad weather. Full requircnents of croft and bnmbarding force vrill be sent by FO~'iIT
�after detailed planning completed.
F \iIT concurs in this message.
Planning for Operation SHTHGI.E progressinp; well.
operation will not interfere with SFPIGLE. 11
11
*
*
F lPnning for Scauri
*
CASERTA--JAi:TTJt\.RY 8, 19/+4--0p~ration 3HINGT.E is onl This word wris received
this morning from r~arrakech. At least ?.5 LSTS will be avr ilr:lble for the follow-up, thus assuring an opporbmit:,r -"or re-supply and the bringing in of
supporting corps troops. The '"10rd fron Parrakech alno in.eluded a declPration that January 20th is the target drtte thrt I rime f,'.inister Churchill desires.
General Patton visitAd Gcnernl Cl,,rk this morning and cliscussed with
General Clark the division of Fifth Army and Seventh Army staffs. General
Patton declAred that his Seventh Army staff vm.s a fine one, and he gave G!'lnerPl Clar1':: a number of documents sho7inr; that h~ had recomnended a lArge number of his off:i.cers for proP1otion to generP 1 o-rficers.
General Patton nsked GenerP.1 CJ.Ji.rk ;·1hat ho thour;ht h'"!, Gonernl Fatton,
wa.s going to be arsi(?led to do in the future. Genern.l Cl11rk replied thet
Genl"1rn.l Fat ton, in General Clark's estimn.tion, 1·ras going to corune.nd a fol] owup Army in OYSRLORD. Gen~ral Fatton said tb..,t thrt was a poor cornm1md for
an officer of his experi.ence, but thnt if he did not p;nt sorne Army comrn.rmd he
intended to resign.
Genoral C:lark loaned Gemerr 1 fat ton his CP.r, and th9 former Seventh \rmy
Comr1ander visited II Corps HeadquPrters anrl. the +>ront in the II Corps region
durin~ the afternoon.
General Cl,,rk also conferren toc1 a;)' uith G'3nerals Gruonther, Brann and
Ca+'fey concerning General Caffey 1 s becoming G-3 of the Fifth Army, relieving
General Brann so that he could begin work in Al1;iers on Operation ANVIL.
Genern.l Caffey has already mov~d to Fifth A.rmy Headqu;-,rters r-md is world11g ...,.i th
the G-3 Section. Generrrl House hiter joined thA conference rcgrrrdin~ Caffey 1 s
assumption as head of' the G-3 Section.
,Just prior to the arrivr>l of General Fritton, Gen0rPl Clrr1r niscussed wjth
General Lucns the new phases concern-ing Orerntion '"'.JIPTGLE. The Specirl flnY1.ning
Group at Fifth f rmy near is no~, wor1.ring night ann dn7 to rcrfr"Jct rlans for the
amrhibious end run just south of 11.ome. ·
Anoth1'3r visitor clnring th'9 day ,·as Bri@.d:ier Genernl Theodore Roosevelt who was
called in by General Clnrk to r1 iscuss the innbility to obtri.in certain supplies,
includinz lumber Pnd overshoes, :"'or French troops.
The following T11essa~e WflS received this morning -"ro,IJ Colonel Fill. RN.
SCC 602. "Shinr,le is on. At least 25 LSTS will be r:1vr:i~ lf'ble for follow-up.
Prime f~jnister desires JRnlli"ry 20 P.s target d2tc.n
Late in the evening G~nerrl Clnr1r drove his Buicv, v,ith Lt. Col. Suthr;rl~nd,
to Sorrento "rhere he spent the night.
�CAS~RTA--JANUARY 9 , 1944--General Cltirk left f.)orr~nto P.nd drovo his Buick himself back to his cor,rrv:anrl rost . He had lu'1ch dth Gen'.'lrRl Grurmthor , nd discussed with him the progress being r,ride in the prepflrfltions for SHINGLE . Immediately after lunch Gonern 1 Lucn.s , 1 d:"!iral Lowry, CArta in Leid s , General
Brann and Colonel 1fo•-rard conferred 'rj th the GrcnP,rn.l about the preprrations for
SHPrGr.F. . Immediately aftf'1r lunch Generril Lucas , AdmirA.l Lorry, Captr>in Lewis ,
Genernl Brann and Colonel Howarrl conferred d.th the Gen~rril Fbout the rreparfl tions for SHI rGLE , in order thnt all information night be 2vr->ilrble for a conference with Grmerrl Alexander ..,hose arrivPl was '"hortly expected .
11
At 1500 Genernl /\lexandP , Generrl }:r,rding, GP-nmrr,l Clrir1-c , G ,nerel Gruen✓r
ther, Adr1iral Lowry, G"'lnerl'l Robertson , Gennr,"l Brann , BrigPdier Foster , Captain Fower of thl:l Royal Navy acK' a menber of .A dmirPl Cunnlngh mI s staff , and
Lt . Col. Suthl"lrlrnd met in the hut +'or 11. conference . Genernl Alexander stated
that thf~ meetin~ on the 7th nm~ 8th v ith the Frime fiinister had fiyed all 1uestions
of craft r-ind oth"lr details ,71-tich rrd 0een settled to make ':Fr GLE possible .
The fi~es ho.d now becone definite , and th~ Fifth ~rmy vms to get more craft
thAn it asked for . AUVIL was affect,d by this . Of course , the Fresident of
the United States ·rould have to be consulted, for PS a result of this rnP.tter ,
A11JVIL miisht be much smaller or might be merely a threat . The reason for all
of this was that th8 entire Allied position was prejudiced by the succe1s of
the GerrnPn defense south of Rone . Turkey "las thinking twice r-ibout her entrance
into the war , and SpAin was harc<eninf; . 1' ccorc1jn~lv, it "r,s necessnry to make
every effort to capture RoT'le . Craft on their ,,P..v from India for C'Vi~RLORD may
hr-ive one av:,j 111.ble trip for us . Fifth Army needs r. follO'IT-up aftnr establishing
a brir f;'"lheA.d for exploitation , P.nd the a<lditional craft mPy serve for this purpose . Gen&;ral ClHrk stn.ted tbPt for this f·,nction he hnd already alerted a combat teRM of the 1st Armored Division A,nd Pnoth"r combnt teri.m of the 45th Division. G~ner8l Al ":Xander st, ted that he hrcl. the 11 •-rew ZeAlanders 11 (The 2nd tfow
Zealand Division) but thri.t he ,·muld like to keep them in his ovm hand to use if
General Cl:1rv could m""kc a break through Pt C2ssino . Generr>l Alexrmder then
str-ited that the tPrget date for 3I-TT 11rGIB was to be Ja.nur>ry ?2nd - not Janurry
25th - reg<>rdless of the e+'fect of this upon a rehearsnl. GonerPl Clrrk responded to this th.,t J:,e wn.s strongly orposed to a lnndinv, P~thout a. reher>rsP.l and
reconMended against it . He ,-rould rather put trie lrmc.ing off until the 24th , if
necessary. The miscella.11.eous craft assembled for tho rmterprise h: d never
, orked to1;ether , and a r~heRrsal was necessar to coord.inste their efforts .
Colonel '1',e,te sfateil. in this connection thr>t if the target drite 'WS the 22nd , a
rehearsal ,1ould be impossibL~ . The lo11ding of the vessels "ould :r,rev•=mt . Gene ral Alexander rejoined thPt if the ,, e11.th"r should defer the trrget dr>.te +'or
several driys after t.bA ?5th the oper"tion would ncvAr come o.,,.f ot ell , as it
,vould interfere '.'dth rVJ1.IDRD , and a.greernent hrid been reri ched bet,·rcon th=~ Prime
r~inister , the President and '3t:1lin that nothi_ 11.g rit P 11 would ever i nt"lrfere with
OVBRLORD . GenP.ral Alexander ,..tPterl. tkt somo other di "ficulties hnd to be faced;
thPt fewer n.ir resources vro,lld be PV"iL.,bl":l frori nm' on 11nd the air would concent-rate on breeking up enemy communicf'tions . He v:arnec: against tPking too m1'1ny
veriicles , st8ting th11t the L nding in the Azores lwd been planne;d ·1.th nore ve h~ cles thPn could actufllly be hPndled on the roRds . If any r1ore '!1ere needed he
would see thdt they "mre made Pvailr>bll"l . He "urther said thPt up to four Liberty
sl"'ips could be ben.ched for brePking "ratars "nd trePted '"'S exp ndPble . Arlrniral
Lo TI';T coMment9d thrt the shallor; · ,at~r made this dj ffj cult, • s the Liberty ships
would beach too far out .
0
0
General Alexander st"ted thnt rs
r 0 uch
e:ir supply
PS
pos'"'ible wo 1Jld b8
�utilized . Colonel Tate stati;d thf't it oidn 1 t Pdd up tc a grerit deri l. Gener;-,1
Cl8rk a.id thPt thorough o:z:pi=Jrinents hnd bPen crrri9d out -<>or 1:1 long tiJ:1e to
exploit air suppl y to t~e grentest possible extent .
GenerPl Alexander then rsked .,..rrien the frontal nttrck Pris going to be de liver c<l . Gcmerrl Clark answer ef1 that it ':7~S to occur on a. series of days . On
the 12t h the r>rench would attrck in tlie vicinit•r of S . •Jlia . On the 15th the
34th Division , r>nrl on-9 RCT of the 36t Division (no"" -rut in to reliev0 the
6th Ar""'ored) "ould attn.ck to tali::0 'I'rocchiP . On the 16th 10 Corrs '"'ould at 1
tack across tl1e Gari.[C;Urmo Riv0r with the L6th , 5th end 5Sth Divisions . Cn
the 20th it vm s plF111.ned to lnmch an Pttr ck hy tho II Corrs ,,or a bridg0head
across the '9.apido . General Clark esthr.tccl thrt it v,ould re 7 uire four dP.ys
of attack up Route 16 to clra•·r tb0 GF>rnsn force off tl 0 b<Jrichhead , pnrticulnrly
the 29th PPnzer Grenadier Djvisio 11. , rn.-1 hence ho vrould su.rmcst th.-. 24th ,
r ather thrin the ?;Jnd , 'lhic}l is tr'3 rror:osed rnte of PttPck. Grmorrl J\.lexPnder
them stated thn.t the ?6th ,w.s the e2rliest cP.te t11,.,,t trie i:'.e" zer,lan 1:lors could
arrive , and Generril Clrrk corw1entn.d thrt he br->clly 11oedec'l Pnotl-'or rljvi"lion to
pass throw,;h the 36th ; that +,hoy ··nuld ½e b:o.dl,r wo:r11. r'loi:m by thci" c:r·r,,,~'7 "' nf'
the Rripido .
1
Gener11 l J'lexRrn~er theY\ r.aid , "I t1r1 fri~htfully k-con for a diversion rnd
for a Conmr-inr:"o to crac1r into t 11~ outskirts jnto Rorie . " Generr,l Cbr]r sdd trr t
1
P.. c iversio'1. by n.,,v, 1 f;unfir e hPd ')eon rlmmed but thPt J.11ndinrr of nny T'lore
t roo:rs os suggest ')c , ' "0 1 Jld <c i T'lpl y d~ ssiprte tr,e err ft ..,vr ilPble for t r- main
push . l}encr111 Alex, nder P sked whether j t could be done the next nigrt , "'s he
felt thr-i t it \-muld frighten Kesselring anr'l keop Rori,,., g::irrimned by trie G':':rnl"nS .
G~nerrl Cl..,r1c said thn.t he vronld exnmin~ this question -very c<>refully.
All tre o.,,.ficers t17 .,n left excert G"'nerr,l Clr-rk , Ge'1er.., 1 Alexanc1er '"'nd
two or three senior Generr>ls . Grm~r"l Clrrk Psked GenerAl Alexnndr,r '-rhrt Gene rr>l Al ex:mner nctu::i lly tl:ou<;ht <'bout ~ 'TVIL , rinc1 Gen8rl Alexnnrler srio he
triouo:ht it rnic;ht never occur . He •~r>jcl tr:rt in his estiT'1rtion it was n great
nistn 1re not t o exploit the Tt'llinn success . Genern 1 Alenmder brought to Gene ral Clnr k a porsono 1 letter froPJ the Frir,e r'inist"lr . tr . Churchill congrPtulrited Goner'l l Clnr'\.c on his c~ corntion from t},e Fresident 0 '1.d on Ms "'Chi1;Vr::>l'1"Jnts
in Ital y . Tl--te Prime E': nister , 'ent on to sr-y he sinc':lrel v hared th0 SHIPGLE
rmeration could be riounted by ?2 ,fanu"ry, ewen if some of tho forces hrd t o be
dir1inishod , ris jt wonld be disnstrous to J-,r, ve c. c"elr,y rec::ult in t:re crncellation of the operPtion.
General Chrk thon,r;ht to h::ms!")lf th"t po"sibly G~nerrl "Sisenhower 1 s move
to '"':uro:re nnd the re-exaMin.,tfon of the '"hole P~ 7IL proje ct might result in a
rer,lizi,=ttion of t}1e •·rea1m~~s of the forces involved rnd <' reconsiderP.tion of the
whole r:'fair . T-J:A did not wish to be withdrann fror, his Fifth .'\.rrny comnrnd Pnd
be Ieft in s0T11e rlanning cornJ:1Anrl "bm th<:! •rnr rmded ~r:r tli~reby niss e c}lr>nce
to mare}-, into GerT'lan;v at trie h~ad of his Arr11y.
Gen~ral .Alex::md r 1'111d G~nerr-1 R"rc'1inr; le-ft a,"ter the conf'0rnnc~ n.nr re turnPCl at 1845 for n drinl.: with Gen~rol Clrr1< anc1 GAnerrl Gruenth"lr . Gen0ral
Al exander os 1
red Gm1er..,l Cl.nd: •;hetri'3r t11e Ge::nerPl ··,ould consider tf'l-cino; him
a l ong in his JT boflt in Crerrition ·1rrJHGIE , nlthouf;h Qr::merEl Alex?nder did not
· ish to ~ ntrude . Gnr er'll Clrrl· said t:ba t , on the contrary, ric "ro,, ld be de lighted .
0
~
�Aft13r,1ar0s,
repec tedly had
ther fluster.
j
•hen Generr,l l\..lcxr1nclcr h"r1 ~nne, Gencr··l Cl..,r1-:: S""id, RS he
n the J'P st, tbrt Gon'"rr 1 Alexand0.r ~19 s a pc11nut and a +-ea1
Tho fo11o,:li-rirr cable, 'R.N 25773, ,vas receivAd +'rom the CPTC today:
,r'ncob L. Devers, Lieutenant G0n9r,.,l, o.r the Unit8d StPtes /\.rny, assumed
corimand t orth ffrican Theater of Or<orrtions, United 5trit,3s }rmy, 1?00 hours
8 Janur>ry :r0r.r present. 11
11
"-
Crble RJ'J 0 .1878 also was receivC'd f'rom 15th Army Grour ann is quoted
below:
"Target date for opening HQ now adwmced 48 hours to 1~ Janwry."
The follovdng message , RH 6381, was dispatched tod, y to 15th Arrn.y Group,
pass to AFFQ for Gir::md:
11 2 DHt sector quiet, normal e:<rchenf;e ~.nfordictor;r 11nc: hnrressing fire,
one of our 1:,r,trols found enemy rt LA fl\.I'Ji•'P..f''S 992347, 3 DIA took command e,t
090900 of 45 Div sector. 3 RTA relieved troors of' II Corps on nr '•lc'\.,JO night
e/9. nne Bn L, RTT ri.rrivryd staging r>reD lPst n:lp-rt ,·;ill reinforce 3 RSA toni~ht on TT/I.JO . Frc11ch losses for S JRnw,r;v, lzilled 1-S , 7ounded 73, missing
3 . TANK STAT,; - No changA . 11
The :lnrlicetion by,Gcn"c'rPl .Alc:xand~r thrit A' 1'VIL YToulrJ proh..,bly never ·trike
place caused Gc:merPl Clrir to r~flect tririt h..,d it not been for the AUVIL plrn,
he vro11lr1 unrlo11bt~dly norr hPvc hrd the !T~iTrTTSA commarn' which ,Gencr~l Devers
hPs in his pln.ce. Fo~vever, offered the choice, Genernl Cl.nr 1,;: would certAinly
h1cnre chosen his Army cor:inand r11th0r thnn go to rm ;,dninistrritivc rost . Furthcrmorc, he rronld '"'Ot ·ish to rclinqu,sh co,.,mnnd of Fifth Army Bnrt tal<A up
h t , rluties "ritr a small pLrinning str+"f rnr pr.rh, ps hPve the ,-mr CC'IT'.C to ::sn end
wh:i le he 1·r11s so "}nG" ~er!, lePvinC'l' so11.,,bocly "1se to lead tlie Fifth Arny north
into G"!rri;, ny.
r
*
*
*
Ct\SF.RTA--JA..lITJA'9.Y 10, 191+4--GAnerPls Alex.?nder and ratton both r'ernrted from
the Fifth 4.rny CO'"lmr>nd post errly this riorning.
At 0900 G~ner;::,l Cl,:,r met ·dth G""ncrl ror:=m to dj scu,s the sigffl features of SHITTGLE . ThcrcPftcr he hrd.., short conference v:jth Colonel Ryrn,
Fifth Army Chaplr>:.n, anc r1onsignor Carroll v.rho h11.d recently co!'1e from Rorie
and who tolrl the Ar'fl1.y Comrnanrler of conditions thf"re. Follo1crj ng tri is conference, Gener-=il Clark h2d a cell f'rom M"l.,jor Gnnert"l Corell, ~PH1 Surgeon,
-;ho cane 'vith Colonel ·"artin, Pnd hriefly cliscussed thJ Fi:'th i'lrmy r,edicel
problems.
At 1000 Generpls T,~ogles and m,rmon c2me :in e.nd 0iscussed tb!') employri~nt
of' the 45th fl.nd 1st J'rnored Divisions in the com~nr, op"lrn.tions of the Fifth
Army on the present ":'ro-rit flnd in 3HJ'TGL'8 . Follo"jnrr this, BrigrHU'"r G,~nerPl
Donovrin cnllcd 2nd cliscussed prosrcct5.ve oper- tions from the OSS anelc . At
1130 Lieutcncnt GenE'lrtd I'cCreery arriwid rmc'l discussecl '.1ith Generol Clr"rk
the nmrloyricnt of 10 Corps in the comi"'lg , ttPck .
�At 1200 the Gen~r"'l held 11 conference in his hut mith GFmer,,ls rcCreery,
Juin, Y ,yes, Lucas, l}ru~nth~r ri;'ld Fouse, AdmirPl Lo,,TY, G~nerrls Roosevelt,
Carpentier, Cri ~..,f~y, Bronn, Bri <;ndi. rs Cool·'.)~ e nrl "..iChP rr1 so>1, Colonel Keiser
ancl L:i9utem.nt Colonel P.obnrt Forter, Derutv Chief of Stnff ('ractic- 1) of II
~or:rs, And Lieuten.-·mt Colonel Suth0rlnnd. The Gtm,ral outlined Oper."tion
qprrr;.r.,E for the assenblecl offic')r~, roinV_ng out th"t the Rssnult '78S to be
rnRde bv the British 1st Division, t'l7o bRtt?lions abreast, Pnd the American
3rd Divir:ion, thr-;e battelions "'hrer>st, ,·rHh three bettr>lions of Rr-ngers "nd
one battalion of the 509th going in Pt ~nzio, and th1~ 50L~th Inr~ chute Regiment r12kinfs a drop inland to th<1 north of Anzio to :rr;"lvent GArrrn forces
coming do•m on the beR cJ:-, bef'ore ri ".leachheed w1s established. Alterru tc reinforcer1ents by the 45th Div:i.sion or b;r a cnmb~t team of the 1st t\rmored Division "rnre r>rranged, cencnd:ing ur,on t:r,, situ..,tion. Admiral Lowry wr>s to be
the over-1-111 n!"VDl conrrian<"er a11c'1 under him fldrnirnl Troubridge of the British
~b,,y is to cor~me.nc'l the n;:,w,1 force effect: nrr tre British landing. Due to
the I rime fl} nister I s i-ritcrvention, ')P, LSTS were to be ma' e aw i L0 ble. A
feint vas ci.rranged by n;:,w,1 gunf'ire <>t Cjvitr>vecchio. Cme Cor1rrndo WPS to
land on tre night of D day just soutli of the Tiber 1'1.nd strike north to•7ard
Rone. In the nrea of' the landing of the 21th J l'.'nzer GrenRdier R!'.lgim~"lt is no'.''
asser bled. lart o+' the Gerr19n 3rd Division vrill be there and t,~o brttnlion- of
a Fleger Corps. It is est·mPt0c'1 thPt ~t the tjr1e of our l~noing Germr>n forces
numbering 17,000 1"ill be in the are.,., , and at the e11d of 7? hours, 34,000.
0
1
0
In the meantime, a direct attack on the present f'ront is to be mBde in
order to contain Els large a G9rnPn force as possible. On the 12th the French
Corfs is to A..ttr>c 1, a.11 out towe.rd S. 'SliEl. Three dc-vs l::iter II Corps goes on
to attacl: Trocehin, using the 34th Division, an J.CT of the 16th Division and
P lso s 0"1P- P rnor.
10 Corps on the 17th or 16th will l'1 t tn ck Rcro s s the Gr, rigliP no
wHh the 4{,th, 56th and 5th Divisions.
Generql Fnrmon and the ArnorArl Di vi ~io"' Penoqu.,'<rt~rs, with one Co!'lbPt
Corimanrl, pL1s the Qlst Reconnaissance ,qu"'dron Rrc to be rer>d;v to be used on
SFrrGLE. Gen<1ral Alexander st.-.ted 111st night thrit t'berc might be still more
troops Pvailr>ble.
There nust be ~ood werther for SFIITGIE. If it is b.-:id, the Fifth Army vdll
hPve to sit it out, but tht'l targ0t datl"! T'lust be the ?2nd, so th"'t a wait for
good re2.ther nill 1"lot no.ke the attack too ll'lto. r~ jor G0nernl Crf1ne hns been
set up to plan for the occupation of Rone. Fellington bombers ·'i 11 be set up
for h38V'J n:l ~ht ?tto.cks in support of the ln.nding rnd also of the direct -cttAck.
The G9ri.errl :!')Ointed out thnt he hr-id been requested by cable to sr-'re . 11 apr.l
propnrtirrn, 1,nt, +,}'pt, there vrere n. o-re.nt n, ny brfr'p;es "cross tJ-19 Tib8r .; n the
j_-•1.ediPte vi cin.;t;r of' r1r,ny :rripf1l rror,ertiRS ·7hi_~h would hA the onl:v c:br-nnAlc:
h;T 11 r1.cl' Gernnn r9;n~... orceny-i:ritc; could c0rx~ rip;r:i!1St Y'j_"') on YrT"GLE:. The Generrl,
nccord.;nr.;lv, sent a cnble ns 1dnr; pArn; ssion j f' necessi::iry to r-ittnc 1- thn Germnns
"ll'Arewff +,re,r ·,ere, r9~"rc'lless of c0nse1uenc9s to fl"pnl rronBrties.
Follo"'i"1/'.; tliis conf'9renc0, tlie G9>1er::i.l (mtertnined GP,n0r"ls f,icCr9er;,r, Juin,
Keyes, JT01lse nnr Lucas, witr t-. a,1iral Lo"TY, f'or 1uncl'. f. t lnnch t r, Genern 1
sro l(e of the Oj f+'·· culty o: corrs -"'l::i,., 1r O'U" rd s' n.s efl ell CO'Y'nS 1--ir>.d di f'f 9rPnt
nnt:i onri 1 i -':.ies on its f'lpn1i.:s. In fr>.ct, +,he G n9r0 l Sllf{fY,8Sted inster>d of hr,v; ni:s
liPison ,.,,... ,"'icers +'rn'rfJ corrs to corrs, it ''loulri b8 "'referable t0 hr>ve nmb::>ssf'c1 ors.
0
�Gener11 l Prl:'mn 9ntP.rtrd:n.0 J..,l,0 re3+, r"" t1'8 o·'"'ficrrs · rho rrn attroYld9' the
c0nferr:mce n:t th9 GeYl"3rrl Of'ficers ' Pe, . In -':..9 1<<'t8rnooY1 Ge"lerPl Cl:lr:V re ceivecl c,cills fron tno 'r)riti:"'}1 .l11r Gorr9"'rondents '"r . F'l.lls , o"' the Ti7r::s, r,nd
•·r . Gordon of the C'unda;v Sxpress . In tbe lPte af'ternoon Gen'°'rrl Clrrk received n er 11 +>ron Colonels J".-,rl,oe , Tully and Hyr::-ard, clnssnr.t':3s of }'is at
·rest Fo-Tnt, and t),ese o:f'ficers stn.7ed :.:or dinner .
As soon ns thr8e d;visioYJ.s shil] hrvA been lPndec' , Gener"l Clnr1r rroroses
to now~ 11 S"'11'111 [ldv:,nce headqunrters to the be::ichhead, ~"lcludin~ hi:riself , his
G- 2 , his G- '3 , an aide :~nrl rossjbly one or two others .
GenerP 1 Cl::ir}r dispBtcr9d th':3 follovri ng er bl9 to Gen9rRl j lson , CTNC ,
tod::iy : R'·T gg5g _ nFor Orerntion sr:-w}L"; urgently r,questnd th~t vr•ter trr,ns fortc1tion be r:iri.de r-i.milribl0 for sreci· 1 orer['tio'1 .; 11v0lving -i"l.fj ltration of
egents vicinity Rf'l'19 . :1oon rhrse requires use of' suhnnrine "·Mel· should be at
B1rnti11 Corsicri b:r noon of Janu::--ry Vi.th for in:it:i.Pl operrtio11s nnd sho 1ld continue R.vailri'1le dnr-inr; cnntjnu::::.nce of ::lHUJC',L~ O:;errtio11s . If no suhr1"rine crn
be rrJPre ~rilrible ther t,,·ro }T borits s'hould he subdituted but they ~7ill not
be r0cpJJ.r9d until ,fonu..,ry l t,th since moon rhas9 'ill not -rermit use of.' f'i' bo:-it
rr-ior to thPt drte . I+' rrr borts !']re srmt they should be continu'"d r>vriilnble
until orr>r:otio11s corrirleted . 1~rinhPsize agr,in hr1rortance o:f' subnrrine f'or this
operntion and ur~e you do utmost to fr1rl3ment my rAquest .
1
11 Cartrin FrcRtte , this F.er>f'l_u::irter" , now in Bc1stia to mPhi detriled rr rn.np;ements and ··ill be '•rrdti n~ :,t 'rival J-l'eBr1qurrters there for ::iuthorization. "
Gener~l Clnrk today -issued ('rerntions Im+.ruction /JlJ +'or tre continwi.nce
of' the n.ttRc 1r 1mr'ler th"l gener.,l ril"'n for OrerPtions Tnstruct ·i.on tll. This
Oper.?tjons Jnstruction CC'Wlrs Vie nttacJ,. );r the '?rencb EYfc,djtiom1ry Corps , II
Corrs n.ncl 10 CorT's, /'J.S 8A.'1'.'lni11ed by Grmerrl Cl.,rk nt the conf'Arence tor1Py.
*
*
CAT~RTA --.JAr'TJAP.Y 11, 1 <)/;,4-- G0ner, 1 Cl qr Jr. tor:py irect<Jd Gener81 'lrr'nn to nA.ke
prerPr::i.tions f'or tre l:mding of An Prld:itional cor,brit tePr1 nortr. of the Tib8r to
strjke tm·•8rd Rora9 f'ron tre sr>me position v·her9 th0 Comr1nnc1os "re to lrnrl r,s
pPrt of tbe rP.i"1 rl1rn of wrrGIJ~ . I nrt o<' tre rePson fer lnndinr: this c0,,.,b~t
teAn at the ros.i tioYJ. :1 n ,1unstion. i o thP. rossibilHy tl ,..t tl•e G"'rrirms riry 0efend
aloni:; the lj nP of' the ':'j '10r, ; ncJ.i.1dJ'"lg P nefense of tre city of Row=? its elf .
Thi:1 ',vnu1.d ma're necessary eitlnr fl nire~t rittac'r 0'1 th~ cit;v , "itr c0nsequent
outcrsr on all sides thnt srcren srrinris ",er9 being violr>te,1 , or else GOP19 sort
o:f' rrneuver to force the GerTT>-"'11S to eV['CUPte . J\ccorclin1;l:,, the lnnf'ng o+' a
coribn.t team 17ell north of thr~ Tiber is to be :rrer:.rect rs A ossibility. The
Co:rrr-1rndos, "rho 1-,re to coJ'1e ~.n nre to hr've e goon '3Ufply of jeers ::i.s vell rs
arr1ored ieeps . Genernl C11'1rk toilP:r co·,yf'erred vri-':,h 'Rr:1gRrlier C11urchill '''ro commrinr'l.s the t""ro Co"'!mannos in riui")stion P!lrl unr1ertoo'k to rr-; ve },j ;n a lr>rge nuT"her of
jeeps, i '1c1u,1i. nr "'rrior~d j "GPf' tr>1rnn f'rom another lmi t . Witr tr esA Vie Cor1rrir,nc1os , nnrnberin.o; about .~oo, '"lll n['}rG P nu-=:h tO'"ard Rom9 on tP9 ":Venin.c:; of D
dP.y , creatinP," as much ntir pnrl disturb,,nc~ as r.ossibl e . ·n,P.n thr>Y crin /?'et no
furtJ--- r,r, th 0 ~r nrorosA to tr- 'P, tC' tJ--,9 )7j lls no:rth·7est of Ro"'le "Yl(1 rrerrire to defend trenselves until r0liP-V9~ . GenerPl Cl~rk hns Pl~o rlirected rrepGrrt;ons to
be mride -:'or nr1 w"1.ces to th8 hiP'h PT01i:nd to t}~9 e"st a11d southerst of Ro"le with
0
�the irlea o~ se1z1ng the pro~inent terrAin ~eritures jn th~ re?.r of trose forces
v1hich will be onr,os:i n1; the CEF, the II A"lericrin Corps rnrl the 10 British Corps
i:i s they rusl~ forwqrr1 to·7arcl Ron0 fro,.,, th" ir prese>1t nosi tions .
Gf:meral Clrri• spent thP da7 T"or1
dn~ on rlans for C,TTPJGLB . ThR Genercl
has rlet8rrd ned tr visit tte 'WI',Tl}L'~ fron.t 0'1 1) da;r, c-oin1; up 1-:Jy TT borit . He
has also directPd Grmerril Br.<1nn to rrepArG -for rn errlv nove of' r c:1releton
heRdau,_9rters to the c;r J'TGLC front .
In the <-fternoo"l r~ajor CrenerPl. Kenyon A Joyce , HSI\, ,...,ho is hein~ replrced
as hei:id of' the {l.llied MjJ_itrrY Control. Conri"sion by G0n~ral Pr,son I1<ic"rrlf'ne
of tre 'Ariti~h Army, caJ"'le in to have r tr, ll:. In th,.., evenj_n?, G"lnernl c1~r1,. enterta4 n-~d rt rlinner 'r . :::'nlls of the LovtrJon "'~Mes , ··r . Gorrso 11 of' the Lon.don
Sundriy F>::nress , l'Rjor n;p;el Do11gc\9le , J~ of 10 Corrs and Lt . Col. CJ..--rk ,
Fi f'tb ArMy PRn.
GenerRl Cl2rk rlisp."tcl rid the fo:. lo'v1.nc- cr>1-ile to G~nerri 1 Ke;res +,o<fay:
11 Congrotn1Ation-, on t,},9 successes you haYe Dtt~d.nec. in ~rou.r recent
offensive . T nT'l esrn:icir'lly rleRsec ·Ti.th t 9 rron:re"'s :mR(e by t:re 14th Db.rision ~en s11ch rl i ffj e11 l t tt:irrn.in R.nd r "'.:t1.i.nst -SU';r' deterrni ned res ~stn.nce , rrrticulrrly in view o+> th9 short t·ime tr0 Divi."ion ·· rs ::1.:-ile to bo, 011t of the 1 :ine
to recnrerPte Pnd re-fit . IJea"e esrtend ry co"1P'r..-,tulf'+ions to Generril Ryder .
J rar1 1i.1cewis8 f;J'f'ti,,.i"ld " ith tre cont-inw=id ::-ucce">s o+> the SpeciAl S8rvice
Force 1mrer Colonel Frederick. Plen.se tell h;m conf'~ dentiA lly t:brt I have
recor "1e.1rled hin f'or r,ro,.,,otion to tr,e arr,cle of' Bri';nrl~ er GP-v,r£> 1. Also extend
to Gern=,ral l'i.1len my conisratubtions on the ucce"''3 l1is f'orce has ntt;:iined jn
its ;_nitiA1 rJebnt in the Ttfllirn c'l.rnrrii~n . Unner vou.r s:rfondid J.ePdership
::i.nd c'ir8ct io1-1 Yo11 hn.110 mo11ln.ed these thro.e orf'.;f'.ni7,ntions into "'n o~fensive
+'orce ;r}lj ell the enern7 "'ill haw, r;rer>t cH f'f:l cult:r in '-"toprinr:r. Good luck for
your future oper11. tio11 s . 11
R1T 64?1.
1
1
0
0
The i'rny CoT"\mPncler crbled CG , ',t>'f'nUSA ns follorrs: RF 64?5 . "In view of
impendinr; orernV011.s, T cnnsi.r'er trnt 01:ir infrn~r;r rerlacement s}1ortar;e i"' cri tically serj ons . I-s is not rocssih1 e to rrov:tr.le nece"-'sary numher of -i_n:.-.rntry
rerlacenients by cnnversion ".S ,.,,1thoriz9d jn ,ro 1 1r 0 ~1StSl , drited Jr,nuriry 10 . 1 e
estirnrte th.-.t 9n r-i.dd:itional !, , C'OO 1 nr,mtr:r rer111cen,mts "rill be r9111.irei!., rrtbar
thr>n '3 , 000 e:1tiP1rited hv ;vou in last PDTPf;rPph vour messPg9 . I 1rr_r:;8ntly recomrnend -1-hPt ?500 1n+>Pntr;r renlricerrienta be obtP:ined from ~5th Pnd 89itr Divisions
anr1 shipped to Fifth Arn-r:r 11.t FlnrUest ross:i..hl d11te . They will not be used to
fil1 re,p1isi tio>1s unl11ss Pbs,-,lutel1r 11ecessriry. rur orer.--ti on.s to dr>te have
fr8'l'1.entlv bee'1. J~qn_rlicripred bv inFC'e1u11te c•urrlv of inf'nntry rerl?ce1cents ' ;,ind
I +'13el thRt :tt ..muld be [l fQ.'"lVG 8rror j f ,e +'nj_lrd to reve on f1P>1d tre 0 500
re1uested . !\nrroxinPte rercentri r,-es of' spec:i fi_c,,t:i.on nur'11
"lers requirecl a-re "'s
follows: 721, Sp,c JBR 7!~5 , 71, CnP,C 'JFR 746 , 5 1 Srec ·rnn 60'3, 5~ ST'eC ";JR ,S05 ,
1 ~ Srec 'JBR 60!,.,, 6"~ 3pec 60'7 , 4; Sp9C ifBP. S04 .
0
Gener::il tad.Py wrote " lett9r to 1 ~<ij. Gen . L . 'I . P.ooks, G- 3 , A,.,IY2, in
nhich 1,e rnade three in1portrint no~ nts: !1 • He ,-·;,, s 1mr ')19 to s<>"1.rl SPner::> 1 BrP nn
to A"'PJ to coorl~ n2te Al"l.,.L r-ltmn4 nr; r>t t)-ijc tirie, bu.J. hrd sent Pirj r:;..-:idier Gener"'l Ca+>fey 5nste:ad . !?• Fe rw1uw,ted thnt tl'9 l;,,test ~n"o:rm~tion on ~FVIL be
T}lP
�forwarded him, as he hi=1-d received the impression from Genr':lr"'l 1\lexander th2t
t},is operation was son01r~hr-1t of P "dying dog" and "'ir;r,t be relegPted into the
re.<1.lm o:P a feint in that areP, rmd cert;:dnly not r,ore than e very smPll lPndinp; . c . He re7uested that Genern.l Rooks fpc:ilitr:d:,e :bis tP 1-iinr; severPl of bis
'ke~r st~ff officers 11ith him to the 3eventh l\rrriy; nPmely, Gener."ls Gruenther ,
Brann , Vornn , Lewis and Colorn~ls Tate Pnd Fowarfl , along with a fe,c; other
junior officers .
Genern.l Clark today receivAd the. following letter fror1 frime Pinister
nhurchill:
11 I was very ;:;orr;:r not to see ;rou at the conf0,rence yesterday , but I feel
vou ,,,r3re so closel7 e11g2p;ed vrith the eneny thet jt "'2'3 irnpossible for both
.Alexander ,ci"l.rl you to be away- Pt the '3/'J'Tl"J t:ir1e . Your of'ficers idll tell JOU
about the bro ""earci,.,in'{ discussions we hAve h,..,d , nnd I 1--torie "'ill reassure you
cor1pletel:v about the aauatic suprort our gre.?t oner,.-,tion 1rrill receive . It
may even ")e roc::sible to throv in ths eci.nivr'leYJt o+' Ft third div:1sion, "lhich
ought to clinch nntteri:, . I Am deeply con:ocious of the : mrortr-nce of this
brittle , withont "Jl'ich the cPrnp;:dgn in Ital::r ·viU be regnrrled PS h1wing petered
out inglorjously.
"nne thing I ½eg yon , n,..,mel;;r , to do evei~~rthing in -ronr pov,er to stnrt off
on the ??nd if the 11eather is good . ~ver;r day ge :tned incre 0 .sed the use you
will have o+' these invPlueble lrinc'li·'1o;-craft . If you R.re eble to begin AS
ePrl:r as thPt, not 011ly r"laintenance but P lsrp;e build - up would be in sii-;ht .
It 1
-,,-,uJ_fl even be hettsr to start vith three- 1uPrters on the 2?nd than ·ith
full nur1bers on the 'Jfsth or later . Tt is inti-mden thPt ci 11 the lronding craft
shall noJ.nq severn 1 vo:rages be+'ore they rlepart . The eorlier the7 strrt, the
more they c:1.11 nt?Jce . Yo11r rerresen.tative , Colonel Hill , Viill tell ~rou the
grea.t 5nportn.nr,e ,·re attnch t,,-, t'ris . I 1rnow you ''Jill 00 everythb.g h1 hur:1an
power .
1
11 ! hnve been merming to write to offer you my sincere cr:mgrf\t,·lrotions on
t11e signal hononr raid ;rou by the Fres-i.c1 ent jn c'lecorP+,jng you for vour :rerso11Pl
bravery in the p-re t battle of Salerno . I have heard f'rom British c'-01..1.rces of
the wpy in nhich you e~,,..,,.,osed :1rourself jn the "orw,.,rrl rositions to sustain Dnd
P ninPte ;rour troops, And it is vnry l:i.l.r:ely th0t vour v:ir-;onF l intervention 1'"as
decisive in ,.., bl=ittle of' which jt night rrell ½e snic'', as the Dulce of ''ellin,c;ton
i.n efter J.ife S8id of the Bettle of '"Dterloo, tt:rt y,r,:,s .~ O-''Yined c l ose-run trdng 1
J
0
ThG Army CoT"!m2:nder r8plied to }rir:1e r"in~ st2r Criurchill as follous:
rryour letter of ,January 8th was (1 elivered to me by Generrl Alexander . He
and my represe:1.tr-itives wl-}o ottendec 701Jr conference P-;PVe r4e full deteils es to
the decisions wf'ich vou arrived nt .
U::r: PY~ deligr>ted vrith tre orrortnn~t;rr of 12.unching '3HPTGLE OrerBtion. I
hPve f'elt .,.,or P long ti"le thr.t j_t WPS the decjsive ,m7 to Pprrorch Ror1e . This
is the f'irst tir e the reans , incJ.udinr.; extra clivisions "nd cr9ft, hnve bee11 assenhled Jn sufficient qmmtitfos to do the job . I 2r, fully conscious of t're
necessity for lPunchi· 0; the Pttf"cl: rt the e;,irUest ro'rnible drte rnc1 ½ave set
J muc1ry ??nd PS the target dete . ''TeA.th'er permjtting, ~·e sl·01·lcl mnke ~t et thPt
tir:e . There "'re many dif'fic,:lties coY1frontinr; us, but ,·e "re tirAl•e3sly 'm0
1
0
�deavorinr; to overccr .e tbem .
0
nr,ry rlans jnclu.de a third division rs <'.'1'1 j7nedirte folJm1-up . It r1ry be
L'll-i11f'nntr7 div5sion, c)r ;:- c01 11)ir:ied ..,rnor-i·flP"'ntr · ta.s 1: fr:irce . Bot}, COJ;lb:l .,,-tioYJ.s vill be reoc':· to sciil, Pnd I ,'Til l make the decision as a result of my
observation of the lnnc1:inr; , +>or I :i nt9'nr; to 1 r,r 1
)e
::n<;n.t At t'v, 7..r·nrl_ino; o-r the
'.l'.)nd, nrtc1_ "rt0.r vis:.ti,,o; t'."0 ,_""_" co,,,r rio.0r':l rsl orA, ..d_ll trr,nsrdt the orrl.0rs
·"or the P 1Tror,:ri:---te ·"·orcc; to +'ollo·, ur .
en
1
0
0
I wns d:1 stressec1 to h92'r cf srmn' illness
15 r;hted 2.t tho fi YJ.C, rrogress· ;rou P::c·e r"'k~_ng .
11
"ThPnl· y01..1 ·"'or vour cr'1rz.rr·ti1l..,tio 11s on the :Jictin.'7,11:i sred Service Cross
presr-mted r,8 b:r tr,e } resident .
"I C:'1,n n0ver e:,.::pTes:=; ~n Yrorcs my rleer 1=;rrtrtude nt the orport11,,j_t;,r 1,1}-ich
I hriv0 h'7d to crnrrm=rnd Br·itish trcops. I 11i:,ve ,-1.evc;:i.:- sr;en f:i.ner "'en of f'll rnnks .
The:-r f'r9 0 1 1tstr,.ndinp-ly c01ITPf'Gous , 2'.nd their "'lorrfo js high . The orTcrtunity
for _An,3ric2.n D"1d Britisr_ scldiers +o S9rV8 iYJ. cnr1b"t nloy,~side of e0_ch other
hris dev"'loped betvreen thr;m an 1mderst2nding of ea~h othPr "hich h'".S engendered
notl--i~ng but T'iutual adniration .
1
t1 I hnve ev,er7 cm·S-i rl.ence U1r1t ve vri.11 procuce the rr~s11lts in this ne:zt
o:rernt::1-on rhich ~rou so r:mch desire . Thr.nk you for "",P Jdni:; the ne2n s ri vailable
to l"!e . I hope ~rou ' 1Till visit tre Fifth Army in Ro,.,,e bc:ifore returninR; to the
1
TT• 'fC • !t
CA3~RTA --.T!~'T1F.RY J.? , 191/~--General Cbrk spent todP,y rt the co11mPnd rost and
�1:1.t the office of' th0 nlanninp; ~our j_n tro rr-irir echelon ,orking on ~:rnnmu; .
In the afternoon ro receivea :-i csll -('rom Lt . Col. 1,Jyr;nard 11ho hrs just been
rlrced j_,1 clr1ri:re o{' Fift}, ~rTTJ.y v,rir )on.d s.:iles, n.ry1 0iscussed this s 1J.bject
,-,jth the Colonel.
Gi:mernl Clnrk .£'>eels thr1t sPti 1fP ctory rroeress is bA-trr: Ic['de in the
plenninr; for GFJ"TGLB ~nd th,.,t one by ono the necessr-ry rletPj lP rire bej n~
huttoned up . Tn the evening ('.:mer"'l ClRrk Pttended n cinner gj_ven by the
Fifth Army chaplein for B out 20 ~rmy chaphi.ns .
Todn.y the Army Cot'1"1Pnder r1isprtched n cnble to the crrc, AFH1, RI 8676,
reouestinrr th,,t Brig . Gen . Holmes he assigned ns Chief Civil Ar-fPirs Cf'fi cer for Operntion A~TTTIL ancl th.t jf he mre not r>VP.' lable th11.t Lt . Col.
Gerry h=i mac1 e Actjng Cl ief ..,ith tr,e 09finite unr1 erstn.nding thr,t an officer
in chrrge , preferably Colonel T-fuT'le , be r'nsir;nn.ted e.t a l"ter dPte .
0
Genernl CL r 1< yesterdry received "ror<'l , PN '3125 , th 0 t Grm.er"l ·F'reyburg
of the ')nrl 'T9yr Zealand Di.vision woulrl lil-:e to vi:3lt li'ifth Arrriy Pe--:d1uPrters
0·1 t're ll+th 1mr'i to<lP.;T cPblPd A re ,ly, PlJ 86B'3, ridvisi::-i~ h~.T'l. to ln.rid Pt Capodi.chino and to ::,c'lvis':1 ETA .
'J'he folJ.0·1-'"'lfl' c?b1e w11s receivoo from 15th Arriy Group tocJav, :N CGS
11 Gen':lral Frc:vbur.:; will probnbly ask for (1) ::i.n rirmorr;c1 cr,r unit and
(2) a mP-dium arty regt to be rln.cerl unrler his cnmr1r1 nrl j f' rind :hen he is
loosed on Pn exploitPtion tDsl'.: in frvmi.rRble cfrc'J_nstnnces I think (1)
woulrl fP'T a rlividi::mt Pnr· (?) \·rould be necess11.rv for al"'lost 'lny tasks he might
he piv<m hut these two 1mits could only be found hy drP\7inr; on 10 Corns .
Hill cl-' scuss this -Purther with you •vhen next we rieet . 11
192 .
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CASE'1TJ\- -JA'.TTJA.RY 13 , 1941.--Genernl Clnrk tbls morn-'n-s left his c0P1rn.Pnd rost
hy cub plane :md fle 1 ·1 to Irat"l , ':rere he vislted the ffeA.rkpt"'rters of the
Frenc}1 ~xp=;dj tionr-i.ry Corrs . A. t frn. ta. he t0 J.1u:1d t o Genera 1 J11in "nr'1 noted \Ti th
satisfActj_on thl'J prop;ress the :Frencr Corrs ,·as r,r,lr-ing :in tre ,,ttricl,- v·hich had
been lmmched on the previous day. He then flew to the II Corps lrrnr1 j nr; field
in Iresenzano, "IrerA be ''let ·vi th GenAral Kqyn,s r nc1 -,ent ov8r ·•ith him the arrnng8ments +>or the r~ Corns attacv v}'ich w:=is to be lrnnched on the evening of
the 14/15 .
At lunch G9nerr,.l Clr rl.r entP-rtained GenerR 1 Penney , the Commnndj nO' Gener:11
of' the 1st ".ritisr ;)iv-ision and c1T'liral 'T'rouhridr;e oP t½e H.m1<,l TJrvy. ·,ith
this or>ficer , h8 r'iscussgd r'etrii], of th9 nrorosed operPtion 3PT7f"rlvc; , as Acl mire.l 'l'rou'l)ridge is ~o comI"!Rnr'l thRt r,ortion of the n.av::il force ·1hich will support the British operation in SJII 11 TGL""; . In tbe r-:>ver,inq; Genorr>l Clr>rk rec0jved
for dinner Grmeral TloX1rel1 T'lylor of the 8?rod Airhorne Division , "rho has re centl:r bee 1 on r'letR ched s0rviM ""i tr tte Allied Mili tn.r;r Control CoT'lriission.
1
Grmerq 1 ':!lr,rk torh,r r ispritched the following two cPhles vith rPg,rn to re cent successes of Frencl-i troops on the Fi Pth .rny front:
�bers o:f the C-STi' on vonr Sf'l9nd 4 d successes in ~~1rie oper"tio-'1S no•rr in rrogress .
In spite of stu½r,o~n onen;tr resj strince n.nd counter"tt" c 1's you br;ve <7ined Pll
of YO'lr ~nitiPl objnctives n_r,_(1 f're coY1ti11uing to r1r1 1m eyc0Jl9nt rro~ess to
the north . The courP~e , det8rrn4nrtion rinc1 s 1·ill derionstratecl by All members
of your cmmrind Pre f1ildirii:; ::1.nothnr gloriom· chPrter j n th'3 long r-inil noble
historv of -,-,ren~h nrr1s . France mav ''T8 ll l)e eternr>ll;sr ~rn.t')ful for th8 rnrt
you are non -nlnyin<; i1 secnrj_nr; her l i b~ffrtion -f'r,-,,,,, t e GArT1rn foe . 11
"fi'iV8 A:rny to AFHQ Pass to G8nerf11 Giraml FersonPl fron C1Pr 1< o.nd Info
Cor,r to t;BF I er on<> l +"or Juin frol'1 Clar le. "I desire to congrrtulrite you on
the successes of the c·":F in its rresent operrtio"'s . Fightjng in PdV9rse
1•reather Pnd over the nost di ~ficult terrra in , th9 Corrs hns succGeded in cr-1.p tL,ri.nv all of its ::i_nitir-1 obj"'!ctives R;:t,riinst r1et0rnined GerT!lPn resistance
nnd :is continuin'; to nrike eYcell ent rr0e;ress to tJ,q rorth . GenerPl Juin ,.,_nd
his co,n:r1!:'.n0 p_re daily e.dcti:1g to the finest trp.r,itio
of' Fr/'.mcr fifshtini:; men ,
and I am rrou0 to heve t,1--_qn n.s members of Fifth Arny. 11
0
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CASER.TA- - JAJUAEY 14, 191~4- -This ';Jorni ''1/'.; GrmP,ral Clnrk conferred with his Chief
of Staff, his G- '3 and G- ? concerning the rrogress of flP.nning +'er 01 eration
SH:'" rr.LE . The prospect continues to b<=i fFvorPblo, Pnd there is evo,ry indica tion th<1t suhstn.ntjBl Gorrmn forces 'lhi ch r,ight heve been pulled a\'Jr>y toward
the v-i cini tv of Rone wer8 beinP- conto ined on th3 J resi:mt +'ront by tl,e vip-0rous
froYJ.tril thrust now in r,rogr9ss . Genernl C1Pr1• then recejved Colonel nurf'e ,
1
with ';'Thom he c iscussed the mi lHPry ~overnf'lfmt rroblP-'"'1S in .... respect for Operr tion A''":TIL. Gengral Clrrk desires to hPve Colone) Fune r- ssir;ned to hean up
this section, j f it cen be a.rranfl'ed , as it Ppperrs thrt General Tfolmes is una vail<" ble •
G,:,neral Clr-rk c1lso discussed wHr· Lt . Col. Clr,rk pr,nc in~ pubHc rel,tioYls
proble 1q anc wit], Colonel '3nltzrnrn quest-i.ori"' concernin<:; unit citatioY\s 11nd the
award of' the new service unit plaque . At 101,5 thri Gencir~ 1 left his conmEnd
post and ,·,ent to tre cuh f'ielcl , wbere }19 tooJ~ off ·dth 'k•jor 11'\lker for the
beach just sonth of' the T"louth of the Volturno . FiAre he trn.nsferred to R cub
on floats 1111.d flew to t} e b0ncJ.-, just south of th9 Tusc:ir>no, storrin<; on the
1 re vms J11et rit tr>e beach bv n, j .
V!P.y at the >?.est Cent3r fl.t '1orrento for lunch .
Ge-1 . Tenn9'T 0nr insp9cted tl')e trr<in:ing o-1' the 3dtish 1st Division. The G9neral t 1en r9turn0d to his coro.nnnd -r,ost by cub rlrne .
0
Tre /,rmy Gortr'1fl nder ent9rtrdnn.d for dj 11."'er th:i.s 9VGrii n~ G9ncrp 1 Freyburg
of the ?nd '•'(,,'l Zealrind Jivbio11 ~ncl Rrip; . Gen . IB,is , Fi.,.th ,,rmy Artilbry Of+'.
"icer.
G")nn.r[' 1 Glr-rk discucised -;ith GonnrP1 Pre;•1,urr; tro rrosr9ctivA 8r1rloyment
o-1' thn 'Jnd 'Tnvr '',o"11flnd Djv:i.sion cor1mfinded by Ge11.Arnl '.F'reyburo- riDd rrro:nged -rith
Ge,1ernl Le'·ri s to P!Ake E'V,,.,i bble for Ge1-1er;1]_ Freyhurg n cub pl"" ne to r-ssist his
reconnaissl'1nce of rosi tio11s ['''1,-1 J-,j s ,risit t0 units on this front .
-x-
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*
CA9,_,,;,,.,~ --JA'JUi'P.'·' 15, 19/J~--GenR:r::i.1 Clr-:rk left his co·1r1r-nc1 fO"lt by cub rl1me at
C'8SO nnrl <'l"'W to the 10 Corrs f'ie1d ner.r ()pF1rnnise, hero hri wrs ff,t 1::>y e
�stRf'f' of'ficm' anr1 -l:,pv9n to 10 Sorps He11drJ_1trrt8rs. Fere General Cl::irk tAlked
to the rrinci P' l o·nficer"' of' 10 Corrs ,. ho hr;r1 eo11 :, c:sernbl9d by Genernl
~c';reAr;r. G'"'ner1.l Clrrk, spea}:inr- f'rom P r1°r ,~hjch he hnc" hr>c1 prer-rec l,y
0-3 nn0 hro11 '"'ent uy-, bv GnptAin Vn!lrson, 011tlim1d the rror,osed --;pr T(}L Orerati.on a11d t,}-,1; nro"'ltal or0rations jn cnorc1iri8tion " 7 th it ['nd emrh,,sjzed the
irrportPnce o+> the lC' Corns role. Fe nlso .,,..end to t,},e 1>ssembled o+'fic1~rs
some letter, ""ro1"1 A'7ericnn solrFers rr,rorted in a p:->pi:ir "1hich he hr>d, 'Jrich
inr':ic...,ted an e~·cellent +'eelin()' 011 the r"'rt of' t:re Aniericf'lns +>or their British brothers in ~rms.
GenerAl Clrr}· lef't 10 Corr,s co!",.,,Pnd ro"t "hortly l,ef'ore 1or,o 1>11d returned
to the 10 Cnrps cuh Airf'iel.11 where h:! •;c,q J"'1et by T,t. Col. ·utherl --ir7 wJ--o had
bee11 ou+, b,r cub to locnte n lan11;n"' ,..,..,,.ounr'l close to U 0 lrr: Division cor'lrn['nd
post. ,,.,he G,1-v1riT'n.l f'lcivr to +,J~j s f'j A 1.cl, th,t of' the '10th Arr ored Arti llciry near
fozznoli, "rhere he wrs ririt by rr,m0r.,ls I,ucPs Pnrl Truscott. T--Ie \7RS 1>ccomrPnied b;r +,h':'lS9 o-"+>ic8rs to n nerr 1)y l"'i9lc1 wher'J, ~n t},e rr9srinc0 of the entire
ass9rnhled lrd Divirion, he mR~e ~ short arldress nnrl decor1>ted ?l officers.
FolloTing tris cer9,·1onv the Ge,p-ri:il returner! to 1-:ls C0"'1Jl1Rnd :rost y rl:>'t'le.
01
0
At lrS1O Genern.1 r:lnr'k receivnd Lt . Grm. "lerPro:i, Chief of' '3faf'f of' the
Tt.,linn Ar"~', '"ith Colo11el ] nll.Pvj cjno f'"l_ti rne of i,~ s <-t,"'l+>f' of'f':i cers who
srokA ....,n!":;lish. The l"]-ci11erf'l r1 isc 1 1~sed ··,ith Colonel T-Pllmricino the errirloynent
o+> Itn-1.i<>n unHs on th9 Fif'th ArmY front. He told G0n0rril P,0rrr0i thrit the
It? l i_nn ~otorized nr:tr::>rle hd not clone we 11 or Inn.c;o, its f'ir.st orerr1tion,
n.nrl t½Pt th9 rnn.-n,-yir ~ n ,.,,,i ch +,}-,9 t-roors l-11:,0 riled out unrer r.,,..cssure from the
TTermPn rroeril"J.P,' TJivisio:ri. ri"CT ref'lectA- no c.,,..e0i+, on th;::,vn, thoncrr, to he sure,
rrtPny Ttril:i.r>n solr1j 0 rs in tht Action }, 0 <1 r'ier o:rill'""·.,_t1,r. Gen"lr"l r:1Pr1c further S.?ir' thr,t he hr>d P'iW~n thA Br~<;"'c1e f'IY10th0r cl rnc8 r,nn t,1-yt it r'?O 0one
fnirly- \"'ell, ..-,1t1,o,1gh not rerll:r wel enou,a,}, to T""9t'it tb=i co~r~enrlrition v;hich
he h:->r ,·TH,te11 tC1 GAn'"rPl 0rid.no in orc1er th1 t h9 rniP'rt ~iv8 encou.,,..11,a,erient
to the Itriljan troors. Shortly the:r9a+>ter Gener.,l Cl,Mr 1r J--nc1 r"irected Gen0rrl
I'nri..'1.o to tr> 1'e ov r t"1 rpli9t r1 ef'ensive sector ""'rAre n. Ger'"'lnn Ptt1ck on I? hill
WPS ro"'s::ible ut 1'1ot likely, and Genc.;rf'l Darino I,r, 11 rerlied by letter, st11ting
thrt his rrro1rr c011ld not rlo th:i job, t},qt he was },,wing heri,,y- des 0 rti0'1s 1:1n.d
thr-t 19 shonld h 0 ~ent to the T'APr to reorr;r>n · ze. Generf"'l -Pe.,,-.Mrcl;_ s, id tht:>t
Generel Darino ~,..,,,., he tho 1li'"½.t, A. def'eati..st in outlook rinr1 thrt he intended to
relieve hi.TYJ.
1
0
Ger9r<1l ~1P-r 1r -1-1 r,n ,,..eceiw~d P c::tll ,~rom 1.nbbi 11ric 1'Tler of' tre ,Te,:risb Jelf<1rA '9orrrl anrl Chrln.-in t'l ior Lev o" thA C+"fice c" t•19 Chief of ChPrla~ns, u:ro
was al'.!co,1rn11.yinc- noctor Br~ c 1'1v~r on ,"' t011:r ,.,<> the P-':,tl0f'ielr's. These officers cMrne to visit 0"'"1Gr£'1 Ckrlr w;tl-i GnJ.on,l Rvrn.
fl"'t8r r1~n11n,·•, 11'-mrerrl Glc-,rlr ,,rent r'o"n to t 1 e o+>PiCA'3 of' t:re Iln1.ning Grour
Pt the FM1...,ce ·~th G9rPr.?l GruAnt 110r, 1:1here Ge'19rPl Clark n/0ress9ri tJ,,e officers o-'"' ' 7I Gorps stfl "'f nho w0r, [I c;q9·,"hlPrl tlvY"'e c0·ncerni n.g th=i im 'ort,,nt r;"Jrt
to 1,0 plri:,r<=Jd b•r 1TI Corp', in Or,9,..."tion srr GL--;.
'l'her0.""'t9r, th8 G-ori0rnl, f99li 11a- trr-at tris 'N/lS +,he last orrortn:rdty he
~LV9 f'or ., lor,_P- t•i179 to P-et "'1;' r 1st rv,ay Prori tre cc,n_-1-,inuous rressure
of' 1,'tsiness rt Ji.is CO"'l""P.,,.,r1 rns+, -inv-ite,i Colon9l '"inltzr,rn .<i.nd Lt. Col. '>uth,--,r7_-,,nrl to orive ,,dth M.m ~n hi.s B11i.c"k- to ti--0 .,..,ifth Arriy C'""f'i.cers 1 Rest Center to
,·rnul.d
�f',,,., ',n,1.r'"l . T:be rr'rt•r 10ft, Ge 1v,r"l r~l.<>Y' 1,c c'r·· v.,,,.,cr, r.nr'l I""ce very
P'OOcl t,-':r,n 1111.til r>hout '18V8'1 rdl93 frorr ~orr9nto, wh0n th
Blic1~ 1111..,ccountribly
r9Pnsnrl +,o ro [tY\17 "'2rtrnr . Lt . Col. cut],,--,rlrnc1 \T"''"' r-',~r..,tcl-9cl to '"iorrAnto f'or
helr on fl rr-i ,,c;i11.r1 Itrlinn truck , but ,.,hi.19 thr-i Gonerr>l riw,.,it0r! his return 9
i0Ar Pror~ +,h9 I ,=m:i'1<JU1flr Bn.s9 Se::r':.io11. Re"lollnt 0 9rvj ce , rri ve,1 , driv0,11 by S9rf:;er>rt n. . "estor~ 'H\ .., YJ.d t ct int:; SerP-A"YJ.t P.. . } lo1 rnher . 'T'hese t·im non- comriis,,,ionod
o""f-i cers c;to1"r9d nn 'W'ffY ef'f'ici.e11.t •r nttP ched f' chr i11 to tr0 Generr>l I S CPr rind
+,o••refl hi,.., to tre ( ff~ cors I P.est S011.ter . The G"'"'C'\T, 1 "P s c;;-ref.ltl y .; M:r,ressed by
the ch0e~01l eff.;c1encv nP thes0 t~o non - con~i.s,..ionnd of'ficers nna a.;rgct~f
th"t ,, l_9t,+,or ho -rrritten "'or 1-ii" si ,.,.n.,ture, cnr...,0nr1i.nr:r th9rri f'or their rtnod ror 1c.
stf-l7 f'o,~
P
0
T e n.911.~r.,1 sr,9nt th9 11i ,-,.ht, ,,~,1 f'ollo"inC; dE'y resti mi: rit ,orr0nto nnd retnr11Ad to -1-,:r,9 com1...,n 1 rost on tt A ev9nin"" of the lhth .
*
*
CI\SF,"R.T.f\ -- J4.'J1Tf, .. Y 17, 194L~--Grm9rPl r:l"r 1• to,'"'Y .,...ec9iV"'d <i crll f'rom G0,ri 0 r11l
K9V8'1 nho ' 01 SCUSSP,( "itl-i hiri th9 rroc'res-:; of' +:,r, II Gorrs Of9rntio'1.~ rr,_c :its
9mrlo:m•,'1t . Hri t -,p rec9jvecl A. C9ll ·"ran G,"3r""rPl Luc"s ·rho ,rs joined
(}911';rrl TJrnnn , <>nrl th(Yl9 o,,.Pi.cer-:i ,H r;c 1.ssen t,>19 .,,-rop;r9ss in mP 1dn--; thA f'in~J l_;=ms f'or Orer<Jtion ·:rrrGL.~ . Q9:rr..rrl CrPne, v~o is -rlanY\inp; f'or th8 nd mini strr-tivn rr0hle"l in tr9 ~it,r o-" no"9, tJ-,en ..,ic1 ,, 'hri0f' c..,11 on G<;nerr,l
C7 rr1-::, r,110 , "'ol 7 o-••-iYJ.F; t 7•-is , Colonel '1ic 1
.relwrjt cn 1 led to rli--;cuss rend~nf.; co11rt
<>rti." 1 C," SAS .
-",1tiir9
bv
1
V9gt,9-rr "Y "10rn-i ,,_~ t 8 f'ollo"'jrir; cn 1,19 vms sert to 15th l\rmy l',rouy, f'ron-i
t,h9 ~ilitnrr n.ssi.on •rith th8 Tt,nl-l1m AY'-r1y ,,1th P"l. -':nfor'Tintion cor;r to .,..,if'th
Army:
P,.'·T ClRO . "'irirr . rrt,; 1 i TTmh 0 rto tn'ms rver coMrn...,nrl of' 1 ·,otori Z"'r! Bde
15 .J"n yice T'lri . • Tl..,ni.no ·r~ncenzo . "
3b 1 YJ.l'.l'le Ty,+,911i,...9nce su,
tio11 or er,e""Y t::r-oonq, " 1lil. it,
Djv-isioY\ rnd tre ')Gth rnn7,er
f,..ont:-1.l i:1,sr-i 1l+, of' th::i 7i->'tl-i
t ion to ->.:r-.,_r~r---: .
1
0
..,...,F
mnr~r 'Q "'A.S is::;11.9r' torn,r c;11!""1°r17,1no- the 1iqrosj,,...,s ""9}+, tl-i.rt ,. ., n'T'8"t nnr+, of' the F9rrrirn Goeri11.g
r,rerv,01er n·vis-ion rniv1-,t b<::i contr>jned in the
Arn 7, tbus en.~i1·v:1 tbe pr9~qur9 o-F> eneny orrosi-
r,., 501.th Cor1hrit "'9PM ,.,i9ld r rder ,tq v1r, s issw::id tocl::i7 nescrihing in detri il
tre r';,'lrt ,., ,; ci,, the 5C:/.1-th Cof'lbnt Ten"! ,rill ::-1.r'y 1n nyer11t:ion C-:.HPiGIB .
11 T hr>ve been +><>vorribl7 im:8,T,J ;073 _ PArso'1<1.l "'or rrcGre8r;r f'rori ClPrk .
ress<;r1 ');T tl-'e tl1orour:h119ss of' vo 1r lnnn~n1 for f'orthcorojna op9rat:ion. I .'l"'
con-"ir19nt 70 1.1 'ill b9 -;uccessf'ul. Gond lu~ 1, to you . 11
0
*
*
r:~s:SRTA-- -JA1' JAR'( 1~ , lqLi-4- -In t,he ...,,orn;n:; tJ-,e G'~ner11 l r13crdved n er 11 f'ror
r:o,.,,\'1A nrl i:ri P" t 19 !+5th D:5 vj -; j_o11.. mhe Gener/l 1 ,'i ~cu,s9cl -'-,he ross-:1-,79 enrlovrnAnt, n:' r" . . . t, of' th9 Li/5th Division to r0inforc9
~ t 1·oors l'"'rrlirp;
i:r +.h9 "irst rhrse of' n:,°"rn:tion JI'I'Jr;.LS . Th8 C"¼e'7.err, 1 next rec9 i V8rl n. "r 11
(1011 <::Jrn 1 T;r, rrJ.e s,
v,
�fror1 GenArr-1 Le"lnitzer ho discu~10rl i-iri0fly th~ iJ11!"l;n°nt FrrivPl of G0n°rtil
Alexri.nrler 9nrl -+:,J:-0 0stohl ishrri0nt o 1-iis •lead 1ur:>rters nt CA.sertl'l. ~nstern of
Bnri . mber9P Pter G~ner"ll V1r r; n ri.nd Gen°.,...'1 J. i= PYJ.C 0 en '1A to c, 11 on G,meral
0,lprk ?11(1 d1'1CUS9 tJ.-e 1uestio'1"l o+' suprly +'ro'1 tre ro-lnt 0{' ,,.:<JV[ o-f' the 1 Jorth
Africrri establisrment"' cic; w9ll rs tJ,0 r,.,ninsulRr Rase '":ection.
At 1 ')45 '}eneral Slr-rk- 1-i?d nn o-"+'-th0.-,,.ecorcl "Te3s cn.,,+'9rr.mce in +,re ½ut ,
9.t ,..,11i.c"i he .:11r1 • cri.ted to 17 1vrr corr0sronr113>its , rh0+,or~P;hers R!'ld rnhl:i c relrt~ ons o"fjcers +J,.,,t c1 ne•,, bl_o"T '71"1'1 to he struck rit the Germr·ns . These corresronr1en.ts r8 1ervi nn- toniorrow to jc-.: n c-utfits rrrtj cip[ltini; in 01 erfltion
,PI'VH..E . ""'he G0'1eral rlid !1ot ;_,,1:Ucnte '7h9re OT' when th8 orer.,tion r,,oulrl take
plPce h1t exrl, ·in")r to t O COT'r0.r;rondey,ts t'1,:,+, tre ...,if+,h AT''1Y w;.s rrepnring
to 1tri"k:':l th<1 h rr'e3t ½low it }--,.ns y0t .?tr1u::: --;~nee the 1.rindinf; .,t Sr>lerno .
Tr'.) 0en':i'"l out1in'"'rl +re ~j ➔,n'ltion 8.'3 it no'"' C''ists, e·"TlriinAr.l that tre ,..,rench
l'Jorrs "'nrl str11cl• 11lon"' the r·i"'l1t f'l,.,nk ~n fl.n ef'fort to dr-o "l Merri GPr>,rn troors
. +,o t ,,t E1roe, t'1Pt tbe T-lritish Corrs lrnnched 1.r o"'f'cmsivo ,,cros<J the Grri -~, i Dno ln.st nir; 11t i'1 ,,n e+'+"ort to Purther »re11.'\rnn the Gerritins I Cr ssino rosi t-i on rn rl 4:,hPt n 1 tb-~11. fl. c;hoT't t~·,0 the tr Corrs "1011lrJ P,''9rt more rr 0 '1sure in
t,he c911ter c--f' the lir,<> . mhes": trree r1oves , 1-,0 sPi..r, 7err, P ~n~lude to rinother
or-orntion th,t ho WPE' ;:orry he could not 9,crln 1 n ~n c'letPi.1. The,e thr•w corr,s
o-reT'<itions "''3re designed to bririr; Yoore Gr::rl"'r n ::;+,renn;th dum to the 'l<'ifth !\rmy
f'rc.11t cinc'l to tl1in out, if' ross~1--,7..e, l}err,rn -rorces th;t T".• P,ht orrose tre sreci.ri l operDtion . Fe s<i.id
rc".d "1.j'J't' hor0s of the t'encli'1P' orer[ltion, '"'nr ,,hen
1
::i.s 1(ecl if' this or0rrition 'ms not c esif{l1ed to J.ir, sten the f'r 11 of Ro ,
the ii'ifth
PrMy Corrir~ppr]er renli8d thrt ever7 orer.?.tion th0 ,..,j_ftr J.rmy unrlertco 1• WRS de'<if;ned to sr,eed thP rlPY " en Allied troors ·011J.d erter Rorrl9 . Fe outHned to
thA Co"'rec;nondents "O'M', n-" t,hn c°-l "r'i("''ll~ rn·i l-lt,:-r7 "' 11c'I '10n Pl: litn.ry rroblems
thrt vro 1 1ld qr~<Je ,,~tJ, tre +,[-l 1ri'Ylf"" nf the ItRli Pn ~r~·-itrl.
0
0
0
"'e
0
,
Ge.,,8rP 1 81 "'r,, no" ril"rs to 1-i'"'ve one> o+> 011.r corr.e,..ronde'1ts ri.ccornr"'ny him
on the rm hcnt hen he dw,hes ur to the 8'111 rPn QSS"nlt Prea on :;' fr V . Tr is
c0rrPsro11dent rrobr->"117 "rill be '"yron Snlzberr,er of the 'iew York T:im<=>s .
,_~
Th"' G0YJ.eral, Pfter cn 1 1tjouc:;l'r ;_-,,c'i.cnt-ina; thnt rin i.rriportrint str.<-te~ic
"10Vel""mt WRS i1"1m:inl'-mt , tJ-re1•1 the cc-n-:errmce oren to qw=igtions . The corres ronclo.,,ts , -"ror,, t 11"':i r ci_ue-.:it ~ ons , "ere YCJost : -,,tere"lted in 'Then Rone won 1d be
tri 1~en "'nr "'hRn the l}ener.n 1 exrected ,, juncture bet ·:een th<o tJ-,ree corrs now in
cnP1bPt r,nd tre srec" n.l force (<1TIT TGJ:E). Th3 G,mera1 "n.id he ropec1 thrit this
juncture •m111.cs 1,e "'1,,de '7itr.:n t,rn ·7ee 1rs ?+'+,er +,J-n [nsnult . Tre corresrondents
r>lso ·•0'1(~8red i.,.. this srecii=il ii'i.f'th Arr pr oy,er.,,tion vrr,s i~ n.n:v 'il";l ticid in ··fith
onerPti.o~s c,lsev.,here . The (}Pn9rr 1 tol-1 them thrt f'or <1c11e time hc, hnd been
wn.ntinr>; to 8Xecutr:, '>11cJ-· r-i.11 orer,,tjon but thn.t until now suf'f"ici<mt crnf't hRc!
not bnen rvn.ilrible . Th9 cr-"r"nr811ce ;::inded ,.,-J,cin G3n8rr-tl Clrrk hr>d to hurrv to
"'noth9r :"'9eti11f m~th Gen0:rnls nouse 211,, Gr>11non . P;::i""or9 1.eriving, ho1ever,
G8nerr>l C1."r 1,. F>lso to1,1 tl:-e corres-ron/lents th"t onc, of tre ..,ost ~l"!Jx·,rtrint +',9ctors th~t '!onld P-overn the Rssrult "•oitlrl he tre werther rnd th-,,t p;ood 11er>tber
would hpve to nr9vPil +'or th, r:rerc1tion . He '"laid thrt , <>s yet, hCJ had received no lorin; rc1nP,'e rr11r'iction on h"t the weather ·1011.ld be on the 11lr.nned
day.
1
1
1
rT'}i9 s11bjAct of his con.,..errmce ·ith Gcmernl Uouse a'1r1 Gener, 1 Cn.nnon VIf>S
ti,9 rro:--oscid drop o+> the 50l+th . nrad ute Jn+'..,ntry 11egim0nt . Generr 1 Cl,,rlc WR s
�worrieil by t"Jo c0nsir1errtio,...s "Tfectinr; this o erntio"l . In the f'jr--;t :lace ,
thA r.res"'nr:<J of r, force "ell +>cT''l,":rd of tr 0 1 rndi'1gc3 tc cut off the f'"'rrooch
to the rieach by rr0rT11r>n +'orces is 'hifl'hlv desirri>:>lc "nrl , if' eff'r>ctiv"' , 1-:ould
greatlv f'Pci litr>te the whole S:irTGL'":: Ororn.tion . On tr•, otl 0r 11;-,nc", ti-,9 two
g,:i r r-onerc ls ro-i '1ted out tJ,~t no r -heAr,[il "0r the orer,-,tj o'1 hc=>d been T'O"' sible ,
trrit tl-io :iirborne troo:rs hrrl 11ot _rect.; cec r lr''1r1int; "'or a '1umh=,r of r1onths
Fnd t,hn.t ti- n1°019 !l f'frd r, +>ror. t'he -roi'1t o+' v.; e· r o"' the r> ir , hnc'1 the n'1.ture
o"' P'1 "mrrovi:v1.tio11 . -t F9.S ro~sP1le th.:t t. n prr cJ,utists r.iip,ht be '7idely
sc,.,ttrired upon ln.ncHn"', b9 j,,,,P,ff9ctive as n delr>yinrr force 11.nd be rendered
ther0nf+,er useless i'S ri forr:e for A-ny rurpose . Th9y nlso roi11ted out th,-,t
th0re ~"011l_d ")e no T'\oon nt U'is ti:me .
0
The General , r,fter be2ri.ng tre r•ros ~1;_d ccns 0ecid0cl to ,:,-ive tl1 8 rn?tter
14ttl9 -"F"'t '?r c1'ns-irl0rrtjon .
~vrmt,1rll:'r be decider' to eljr~innte th9 dror
11d lonr1 th9 50/1,th from the sea . At 1330 G9r0rnl Alev:D 1d9r ,,,.,,.rived "lith
Q,m9rnJ. ford4nr; rn0 Gonerrl J,e"1nitzer . G")""lernl lil9x:Rnder t"rowi his o',n jeep
ur tl 9 rath to a po 4 nt in f'ront o,-, tre n j r1es I t,mt nnrl cnne to r da;;;hi ng
halt . In th~ co-.-,f0rence ·Tith GA:>111rn1 Cl~r4 1 the Genernl di -::cussed the ::trtus
of Or11rqtion r;rrr 1GLP. and the 10 Corrs o ~f'P.ris" V8 no,·, in rrogress which ap1
yier>rs to be mn l::~ n,, o;ooc. ·,rogres s c esr; te count8r rt tr c r:::; ner r th 9 T"louth of
,thFJ G~rir.:7 j nno jn tho vi.cinit7 o-" the villPge of' ''inturno and 4rgento . The
Rr-itish "re berdnninp- to f8rr;r trin1rs :'Cross, :rnc Ui9 0 1 1tlook -':or ri rerosonr-l)ly
s11ec13ssful op9r Ptio:r -ts 1,right .
p
1
0
G,~"10rn.l Clr,rlz saic1 to GenerP1 Ale·-:and"'r, fl"'lonr; oth9r trh1gs , th:-t the
t:iT118 would con.1~ ·+0n he hnd to ,fo so~rithjr,Q' Rbout th'3 number of visitors nho
"ere descFJnrli·'1i:r uron him , 11sin1; hi,s C,'"rs , J- 4 s 1'llc'l:..~t9rs r>'1rl tn 1·::ln~ up the
time of h:i""self' anc: bis stp+'f of'f'-icers hen they ,·;ere eng:-,p;ed in orer,-,tions .
HA sn5d th,,t this rlid "lot Ap ly to Generrl J\lex11nr'er ·1ho , Pfter rll , 'ms ris
direct co"111ar.r1 er, bnt he t ·ougl·t GsmerP 1 ~ l 3xr-nder should tr> ke tre onus of
r,rotecti11.r him f'roJY> othr:ir ~,-wursions . Gennrril c1~rk r-dder ti,,.,t, PS G3ner2l
\lexancler knew , re hnr'l thus f13r been extr emely r8certi ve t0 visitor~ , 1 mt tbe
r1ooc1 hfld -"e.'.'lch'Jd tJ:.r" poi11t '7},8re c;ow,th 4 nfJ' J.-i,:,d to he do11'3 riho11t ·'t . Gener~l
Alex8.11der sa ir1 ths.t he wo 11ld do 0ver:yth:; nP, he co 1lr1 t0 keep Gen9r"' 1 C}Prk
frorn br,ino- ov,rburrl9ned .
0
1
A+'ter nn , ho11r I s cnnfercmce, Gener"' 1 Ale'm.nder left 1i.tr r r'1J.ide :rrovided
by General Clark , to 170 to 10 Corrs TAC Fendqur'rters nerr Sessr ~runca to d5.scuss ,d_t}:1 General ,,cCreery the rroi;;ress o-f' t,119 10 Corrs nttl'J.clr .
At 153C Achir11l Cunn'nP-h['m, P. 1,
s- 1·c,
~~:r , nrr:tv~d ..,nrl <liGCll8S8d. v1ith GAn'Jral
/
:·editerrPnean , nn''i Captnin I o"er ,
Glrr 1~ the sea 1sr,ects 0~ the r}l-IItTGL:~
Oreration .
Today ~t noon the 'Prenc'r Bxredj tionary Corp, rrovr>d j ts col"1r1r>11rl_ rost from
1 ratf1. to enpf'ro , thus r,utting it -in r J11ore fn:ror0ole rosition to control t},e
r~ovris of th0 ?nri l'oroc c'ln Pnd 1rd Plr,eri:,n Divisions .
At 171C Gener~l Clr-r 1r '.7ent r'1o"m to -'-,he r~l,,,ce ;-,nd h:-d P blk vrith Lt .
G8n . Devers , Americ..,n Cor~l"'J"'.'1der-in-Chief ~n t½e treater , rep;-,rf;_nr" pro!"lotions
,..,_nd necoratio11s , urF;inF; upon G8nernl Y'evprc the fflct t rt o'1ce " quote of
decorntions wns ceterT'J~ ned re , Q,:merPl Clerk, sho11ld h::"Je the decidinq voice
�1
as to who sroul d b0 c ecorrted vri t hin Fifth Army. Gener.? 1 Dev-1rs was ~ost
corrli['l one sta.tecl th 0 t he intended t0 rocomF1end G8nerril Clrr 1,,. .('or the commr>nd of' Op9r11tion A TTTIL . Ge,,,0rri l GlnT' sriic~ th,-,t ho FP s grrtef'11l for G1=me ral Devers I c0nsii4eration b,,t tl "t be br-td bee11 notified severnl ··reeks be fore thE1t he h:-:id been selected ·"0r th"t conm.ond .
Gener11 l Cl11rk recrd VArl tr8 fol 1 o..:in'; rP.nio from GenerP 1 O::isenho ver
yesterday :
1
1tr 7078 . w tre11. I '.31"' irl p•oor'l.by0 to you in ifrirlos : still held the hore
th11t I rii ,.,.ht ~et to s0e :rou once More b9fore I left th:i tre.oter . r:;j nee
thj s hn.s rroved impo"'sihle I an senilinr: this tPl0~ram just to c,n.y ag.oin
ho •r f'leeplv grat8"'ul I r>m to you "'or tl-ie nPgnificent servi C8S you h1we per f'ormed trrou,.,.l~out the year r>nd n hr- lf th-ot hn.s 0l1>rs0rl. sirce you rnd I
lef't lashing-ton . 1\11 A11iPd -"-ip:1tirio- '"1en nrA rrond of vou nnd ::i.re looking
form.rd to a rerform~nce iri. your next grec't tris}r thnt will equal your rPst
accompl i shm,,11ts . t'\r 1-i8st to yo11 , to Grue:o.thAr r>nf'l to :1y otht=Jr friends 011
Your c;ta"'f ancl in your Army. Goorl luck on CjJ:-TIFGLE . n
0
!!Yo'U' rn.c1jo re'lch0d ~ 0 vesterd"y, nnd I "ms del ip:htec1 to herr from you ,
1
alt 011R;h c :isanroi nted that I m:ii:,ht not baV8 r-n orrortunity to s?e and tRlk
vdth you f'or f' fei-r minutes . I h1'1rl hop3d to "'et -::O·1e 11'1te ·:ord on an:,r
chRnl!es in f 1lt1U'e ev'3nt s, +>or thA -:nrlicrtio"'s I r: t hero , trrou~h Alex,.,11cier,
arP. thfl.t mv tas 1• is on 'l ,rre:,tly reduced sc8l9 . 4o"mver, ··e ,ill do it,
whntev"'r it is . J h, ve h2r1 no timA to r,-j_ve r:ucl· thouqht to thPt, for I h:.ve
"l;T Pye on :1noth0r little ti'"'f::ii.r rc,re, wit•1 1
r1-ich ;rou are verv fF>mil-:Pr, r.nd
bv tre til'lA tliis letter reaches yo1 1 '·e wi 11 -non th'" resnl ts . I rm goin~
alonp; on trn.t OT'8ration in order to obtl'lin +'irst-hrnd -:nformntj_o,,,_ as to its
injtinl success, jn order tr<it ~ r~r7 t.<>l·e rc1vt1:nto[>'e o" orrortunitfes to re in.i>orce tb2t "ront in exrloitRtio11 of Pny orrortm1ities '1-iicl-J. might co:r1e to
11s .
(
"I 11:no-·r yo11 must 1:)e husv. I hope tJ-,,-,t this otrcr ri. "fr, ir /?OAS t},rour:;h
as you h"'d nnt:i cip~ted nnd ti,:cit I rnay have t},e orrortunity be"ore lo1tg to
fl f5A
in cnr,e unr1er ;irour conT'l.and.
rrry r0qFrds to B9d91l r,nrl. the rest of my l'rlends . 11
A l1"1nni.,1ri; 0x,~rcise o+' tbc, 1rc1 Dlvision r.,ris scher1 11l80 for tl1 0 n:t 0 lt, b11t
durinr, the late cwr=q1:i ni re; orts bep;" in to re:::• er Gener/' 1 Clnr}~ th,,t fl n' 1 rnb9r
of losses o-: c,u101s nnrl. 105mm field guns hr'd occurred . The Gr:m<:Jrel rr-- s grertly
concerned .
*
x-
CAS P.TA-- .Jt'ITJARY 19, 191..4-- This nornjno; l}-9mr l Cl:cirk dictate6. the following
to be :inserted in t11e dif'ry of today :
0
"LA.st nip-ht at
'T'ruscott .
l' bout ten o I clock I r0cei ver1 the .ottr> chec'l from Grmernl
\
3hortly there"' fter , rlurh11s the n:l 1;ht , ne n trickled in -d.th re-
�garcls the losses in equipment and JT111teriel ..rhich t e 3rd Divjsion Pd suf-l'ered j n ;ts r0hCJ<1rsal. The" nni.ounterl. ron ;hly to 1.3 dulcNs , 19 105 1 s includi n!'.{ f'ire control e1uir"'1ent , '7 57rim rmti- tronk f;'l.ms 11nd ? 37 1 s . Fre sumn.h1y s0rici co""munic"tion equirnent '8.s lost, but r1et.nils h11ve not yet
been +'urni"hed me . l)11r5.ng tre nir,1-it :r directer'l that Goner" 1 Luer> s, General Tru~cott , '1."'vrl representn.tives , GenP-rr-1 ·olfe "ncl otrers be '1SS9mbled
h0re in order th,,t ,te night discuss, roint by roint, di+'ficulties encountered and b.1,8 the necessr>ry ster"' to see tri"t the;r ,·,oulG. not recur in the
oreration.
"It has 9.lunys been my t} our-'1t in roherirsing +"or these oper~tio11s th.,t
tl 0 dr;,r r'm srould be b,qd , rnri thrt r1i -:;tr :es occurring b8 correctecl before
the final O:'er 0 tio'1 . Th9 overFhelming r,-i "'T'1!1nPgeri(mt by the "Jrwy in this
cn.se arra71~d ne . I.,~ convjnced t½rt Dost o+' the ni"'ficulties encountered
nere due to ln.clc o"' rroper plrnn~ng, ½uttoninr; 11r ~nc' b·rinin--; on the vrt
o+' Vie r"'-vy.
0
'Thi, rnorninr I hPve c'iscnssed tris r"-"tter ":th Gener~1 Lucr>s, Gener...-1
Truscott l'nr-1 otl·9rs ['11( qrrrnr,r;n "or t':1°ri to con"ront the ildrir, 1'3 ~Ylrl th0:5.r
a~rnistants (Lo··ry) ;n order to ov"rc01;'} tlvv:·e di"ficulti",s . ::: hPve just
tr>.lkod on the telepr one ~Ii th Ar,riirr-1 Lo-··r;,r nnd ~r.formed him tr,~.,t I am ri sto ni S ed ri.t sud· ,.,,-; ~M..,1'1.aP,P,r1r,nt • '.!:'i·u. ,Cott ~ 0 I UC" S "'T0 on t 8 :,,,,- "o,-.
confer9nce ,vjth hiri .
1
r
11 '.!:'he ,...A-;--1...-coment o"' f'l,1,li.fT'lA..,t nf trA "rc'l Div; sj on h ~ er1bP 1·r~q:.Jer' m8
17e...-tly. It "n~ n"'ce::>s"r7 "'or ~,e to t,rl,9 t"rese ri1.1~·rs .;-ro7 thA lC Gorrs ,
'll'o n0er10r~ them bfldl:r in the G'rigliano River crossing . It rer:nr· thrt I cr>n
not "11rn~sh the '3")th Dj_vision ··;ith tre ,_,, duhrn ·<-r•:ic11 they need so brdly in
tho-ir cross~ne: o+" t}1e R:cipido. I h~ve hnd to t1> 1<:" m11toriel from the 45th Div~sion '-rr·i_cl, ":ill 11e hf-1rd to r9plcce .
I N1 r9cord-l11r: t' -is hrief outl:ino of nction tr ken ~ n orr1er t 1rt it roy
be in r7 p9r:io11al record . •Uso 11otified Ge11eral Alexanc1 er . 11
11
Q,:,neral Truscott sent in r,n offici.,l rerort on the rehe8rse.l ;:,nd also
sent a brief note to General Gruenther . Botl-i of these 2re quotec' belo tr:
1
The note to Gennrr,l Gruenther: 11 1 ,"'T'1 ta\ing the liherty o:' ;:,endin;:; this
to you so th;:,t you "ill lrnol' how .;-rincy this ev·ercise re0llv W"S . ::'urtt9r,
1
tine is so short thPt senr:li'-iF tl-ii~1 to you c irect rrir>~f pive you 1>ncl tr9 Boss
1e
time to CC'nsjder i.t before you roceive tl- o<'f'jcfrl copr thrt I'r -forwarding
tbrough proper chr.nnels .
"I believe thrit you 1mow r1e v,e 11 enour;h to -mov1.' th, t I ,muld not r.[l ke
such a point unlecis I n ctur1 lly f'i:~ lt stronrrlv 1:1 bout it . J+" this is to be 8
"forlorn hope 11 or a 11 suicir1 e s.oshnyu tl-•=m o.11 I rrr-nt to 1mo i1 t},f't f11ct I./'.' so , I ' m ro~itive t¼rt t'1ero ::.s no outfit in t 1-10 rrorld thR.t ci:m do it better thri".l ne - even tl"ou~h I reserve :!"ir;J.t (personally) to believe we :-:iight
deserve a better fate . u
1
1.•
GenerR.l Truscott I fl official report follons:
11 1.
To m-i1:ttarv f'orce con hop8 to f'ssault r. ' of011ded bench rrith prospects
1
1
�of succes s 1mless it cnn be l 0 nc1 ed on sl:>ore in tacticr-1 order rind rroper
co·'ldition to onga~e j n coT'lb"t .
•,- ercise ,just conclud9d t ; '" dnte disclosed
so "'lnn~r rlefJ ciencies in thes'J 1"9'1rects t l."'t t11e neec1 for ::ic'di ti.on"'l fr1v£1l
train-' 11g and ;,~proved orgr,··izrt,ion i'1 r9rfectl:,r ohvio1w . This exercise hnc
been plArmed for the JalP.rno beacres in +,he vicinity of' Faest1 1r1 and this
area h1:1c'l been Hccepted by th0 ·Tnv7. Les 0, th:m 16 hours prior to the exerci 1e the areP 1·r s ch...,nged to British bePches nortl-i of the Sele River for
Uaval reasons , in spite of' tl1 e -f:Pct th:->t t½.e Pre11 inlirnd wi:1s entirely unsuitable +'or rel1enrsing the militnry orerrition involved in the 3d Division's
part in the 11 3f.I'TGLE 11 operfltion .
0
11 2 .
nut of 37 LCTs assir,ned f'or t e opern.tion, only 11 ,rent on the
exercise; q srec:iPic LCTs sreci1:1lly rerp1ested, cPrrying tanl•s , cornmunication.s equipr1ent, anr1 Di.vision hnadquR-rtors , "mre not 1:1vrilr1 ble; 1 LJT car rying one <J.snai1lt coTT1rany ·ras not Pv;:;.ilnble .
Son8 of th9 rnore sed ons poh1ts noted in the execution of the
e--::ercise ~re:
(a) 'Jo si.m;lo hattr>lion Jrndod on time or in formPtion . 1 aer1ents
of the bePch P,sanlt hrttn.Hon o.c> tl,e 15th Infrntry ·rere lrndod rs "'allows:
0/i.L,5, L Compl."'ny "''1d hnlf' of HeQdriu;:irtors Company; 0500 , K ComrPny and hPlf
of 1· Company; 0800 , hrl-r:' be...,ch nssPult l,d,tP}ion , ·ps lPnded first , between
the hours of 0405 Pnd 0/,50 . Tbe 1st BPttPliM , ··11 ic°!" srio11ld have been the
lr st bPttnlion to lr>nr , wos l~ndec'l b8t•-reen 0/,?5 Pnd 0610 . Corironies were
l11nr'l.ed 11+, Pll points on Green Beacr , "S ell PS to the north r>nd south
thereof .
(b) Tr"ne::norts 1;,ere so ,~t<r o f sl- ore thrt rssrult crrift re-mired
fron 3 to 4- 1/2 hours to reach the beach .
(c) DHK"lS required 4 to 5 J:>ours to 1J.3rch anc1 , further, s-t le11st
1
/, TFKFS carTYi'Y1.g ? 17nm P'1d 2 57"'lm AT runs, were sw11mred . rres"mt indications Pre tr.rt Pt least 5 others, cnrryin,r; 105mm Ho7 1 s 1·ere 1."'lso lost .
(rl.) ?o single 9le•i1cmt 1 'Ir>s lr>nded in hPnd and on its correct be11ch .
BeAchcs '''ere n:issen b:r as much as l,OC'O yards .
(e)
Iracticallv no b:"irntry trcticnl vehicles ·vere lcnded .
(f) Ho :inf<>ntry anti-t~nk mnrons , rirtiller·r, or tr:mv-destroyer
.a,,.:ms rere l'shore by daylio;ht Pnd in position to mP.et enem:r iwtion.
(g) Assnult crri.ft hench8d nt ,,J.ow sp~ed c1nrl stonr<ed ·crl,en g-.ronnded,
forcinq, troops to diserbrirv in deep water unnAce--;sriril;r.
(h)
v-:rs .
'In tan1rs ·, ere ln.nded .
(i)
Crp_ft f'::, j lnd to report to tc.ke rn~iT"1rmtril commm,r ers from
Ci)
Prnct-i ca 1 .ly no use '7f' s nJ?de of LCWs or LCA.s to ferr:r troops
ashore "rom LGis , nlthouo;h t1,-~_s rrocofur9 is includ0cl ~n the plan 'ln,, will
\
�3\
undoubtedly be essenti/"l 1 in the oper.otion.
(k)
Ship-to- shore conmunic."V ans were ••efed,i ve , if not tota.lly
(1) Th9 r9h9rirsRl rrovidnc no test +'or CCH'1l1Unicnticns , r11rticmlr1rly with reference to 1'nvn.l P,11.n+'ire .
(T'1) Troop o<'ficr,rs 111_...,rt 01·s not "r iJr ble to Army personnel.
Army of'f:icers in so.,1e en.sec PS 1'8d to use e 11list0d mens ' l"trine n.YJcl vrore
barrec .,,.r()Jn r.... rrlroon .
"3 . Tl e ·r.,,vnl sjoe of the 0.~srult orerrtion ras controlled .,..ror.1 the
Risca me by the 'T[' v'11 Cori11n.nrler . The Di vision Co:1r.:n.nder, ···ho P ctu.-, lly
conrrncls the ::-sseult troops , is A.ssig"l d a nritis)1 L<,I as He2d111.rrters
ship . TJ-,e so-cPlloc Derut-r to t,}-,9 ·rrv~1 Coruri..,n'ier (vrho J,<>s never been so
desirn~ted in · ritin1Y) hfls Y10ither stP,...,... , n.or
cilitiT'~ , nor co·~r-n.micn. tions "or control o"' t,1-,,. c;lyi_~-ninr: involver:'l . ~o -rr,r r,s 1::>~Htv to ~Ylfluence
the nssr>ult oreration, the •):ivi'1ion Co,.,,r nnder, is , :in effect , rierely ~ F'3senP'er .
1
0
0
00
1
0
0
11 1, .
To lrncl trds Divi.sion on "SVI'Tl}:r,Ett 0eaches 8S it ·ras lnY1neo during
this rel-iearsnl !O'lld be to i'1vite rl:i_s~ ster i.(' tre i:mom:r sl 011lrl counterr-ttack
at dr-iylight wHh /,0 or 5C' tnnk, . There is no doubt thrt the -=:uccess of the
operation "rould b"'l jeopnrclized nor t.hr>t t},e loss o+> l.i+'e "nd mnteriel 'lOuld
be excessjve .
0
11 5.
(a)
In my or1nion, ti,ere is i:;rPVe ne~d +>or 11cdition"l trr>i"d.no- to
insurr, tJ, 0t AS'"'ault troop, ··ill be lPnded in cc,nc1 4 tion to "'Ccor1pli::ih their .
m:isslons . I ,..ecOT'1.I'l8nd a r8herirsal.
1
(b) 'Pre corriwmd orgrni,rn.tion ~ s obvio1rnl;,r c efecti ve . The comnanrler of' the as"lm"lt T'ivioion hns the respons~bility f'c,r the assn.ult; he has
nr-i:.it .or cow1unicr1tions, -1' 0 cil~ +,ies, nor :iccess to ,TP.vr l cor~mr>11d "'or j_nfluencinr the onoratj on rrior to landinfs. 11
1.r-'ni:; the nir;ht Gener"l ";lr,rl,: decider1 thrt hn "mnld not put on the pro rosed drop of the 50l;th Inrn.chute !n"rn+,ry Reg~rnent "n thA ·e0rlv 'iorni.m; of
D day anc1 thPt insteocl h,., ·muld drop it ,·,jth:1.n our o•;n l:ines on th8 riight of
D da.y. The rlecision to "'/"1 1·e the 0:ror i:rith:in our o·:n 1i113s v'lP.S sub,i ct to reconc;iderPtion i-1. crise the G-=mer;:-1 kter considerecl it un..,ise .
0
/1. t 0~30 GerierR 1 Luc::i s arri vx1 , in res:ronse to Gr.mArR 1 Cln.rk I s surrimons .
GenerP 1 Dev"?rs , Gen0ral G.9rrJTI0ll and Generr 1 Roo}"1 nl,:;o E>-rri V8cl . nd hPd a brief
tall: "Iith Gener"l Clrir1c. Ge11errl . Dev9rs tivm lef't -~ith Colon0l Hrrrj son rind
Lt . C:ol. C"mphell o+' 11is r.ePC1qu~rtqrs to visit T.'rench Corrs , nnd Grmer<>l
GR"'1"1Cll vrent with Cantain L"mpson of General Clrir:V 1 s stl:!f'f to visit 10 Corns .
/1.t 1030 G0119rri1 Glar 1c c ecorr>t-,c1 '"'2 rien ,rith tGC I s, L<~gio·"s of "erit rnc1. Silver
3tRrs . Th8 cerewon-r trok r lac9 in the I'1endo1·1 in f'ront of the Chief of Str f'f I s
V'ln ,,;j th a 1ruPr~ of honor , i;onsi sting of R co"1p1rny of th::i 101st MP Br>ttn.lion
and the Fj_fth ArT'ly Band . ':'h9 o"'+'icers "'1d n"m to b"'l r1 9corrted included Colonel
"lutler, 'Jnn in commnnc;. of th9 1/.i-th Di-rision , Lt . Col. Denholm, Bri~ . Gen . :ilb11r p7.rl Color,el Krimmerer . 1 I},en tJ--9 off·i ccrs [" ·'lrl 119n to b8 rricor..,ted v10re
1
�assembled General Clrr'lz, icrho vms About to go to his rositfon in front of the
men, saio to Captain Be/'.1.rcvrood in P cor,m::cncl tone, fl Get dovm there E>nd strmd
up with tl-•ose men to be decoroted. 11 Ca.ptt ~n BeRrdwood rlid not \,n.0 ·r thPt the
eve11j ni:; before papers hP.c b9en comrleted to 1T''Jard him r,nd Cpl. Tn-,,nenbaum
Silvnr 3trirs t:'or rr.olle.ntry At the Selerno lenr1 ing for bringing ashore vitally
needed signAl eauipment . · He sair to GrmerPl Clr-rk, "'1JhPt did you say, sir?"
'i hereupon Genriral Glarl,c said, flDo as you r>re told" .
C::i.ptain 13e~rdwood went
do·m and stood with the men to be decorPted Pnd received his Silver Stnr at
the h~nas of the Army Commander.
1
1
In the eveninFt, Grmeral C:l11rk hr,d t,·rel ve dinner guests. They included
most of the hi~her militPry leac'ers o.f tre r1e0Uerr,.,nean the.?ter. Before
going to d.:i nner the !'.:;nests met at the hut. Tresent ,-,t th0 dinner, in 11.ddition to Generals ClRr\: 811d Gruenth8r, were: From IY'J, AC 1 lF, Generals AlexPnder,
Harding and Lemnitzer; from the Perliterranean Fenfquarters, Gener2!s Wilson,
1'evers, Gammell and Hooks; froq the Air :F'orce, Ge11er~1s Eaker, Crnnon o.nd
House . The dinner, 1 rhich was s0rvr;d in Gen,ernl Clnrk 1 s unpr9tr-mtious mess
shnc}i::, l8st8d over P'1. hour and si..,ortly therePfter, · Pfter returnin~ to the hut,
the guests ,1 eparted.
*
*
CA.)~RTA--JAHUARY 20, 1941.- -GenerPl Clark depPrtecl from ris ac~w,nce corn.mrind
post at 09.30 this morn 1 ng and flew to II Corrs Heac1 ri_uflrters, where he conferred crith GenerPl }(r,yes, the Corps CommRnder. Returning by cub, General
Clnrk arriv':!d bac1.r at hi:., Heaclqunrters at 1130. Instend of us:ng the sm11ll
Caserte artillery a.irffold, Q9nernl ClPrk utilized n n11rrow roR.d in the comFrand post area as his t2l:e-off end landine; strip.
TJpon his return, he conferred with Colone 1 rhillips, Public RelF1tions
0fficer of Allied T.'orce Feadqw,rters, rind Lt. Col. Clark, thE:i Fifth Arm~r FR(.
~rot Jrno,virlP; the stPtus of tbsi co:rnn.and o.c> Oreration A"TVIL, Col. Phillip:: had
,-.rr.:itten asking th~t Colonel Clork's services be turned over to him for a special operP_tion . GenerRl Cl11rl:, lmowinc; thrt Colonel Fhillips "!PS referring
to A~flIL, the vory operetion thnt he is set up to comrr1rnr1, t."lked over public
rel8tions plans ,·•ith the t.-,o public relPtions officer"' Pnd agreed to detach
Colonel /J1Pr 1" for sp8cial plr-rnninr: for Op:"r"tion A',TVIL r,bout Fehrl1?r;r 15th.
The Fifth t rmy Gomrnr>.nner i:i lso dj scusserl i: ith Colon8ls rhillips Pnd ClR_rk the
release of informetion concernin<; the irrmirn:mt Operation ::mr'TGLE . He stressed
th"'.t it must be brought forcibly to thP- rnblic I s attention thPt this is a
Fifth Arny oreration, an integrnl mil.itr-1.r7 pnrt of the rusb Plong the, present
front. Colonel Fhillh,s P greed to :3tre::s this f,:, ct in "'n on-the-recorc b,, ckground press conf'en=mce thAt ,fill be h0ld tomorrow. Generri 1 Clr,rlc noYr ['lens
on takin:; two correspondents vrith him r.boPrc' the FT bo."t on D dny, one P.merican c1nd one British .
1
Generr:il Glrr 1 hr;d Colonel,:, ihill"ps Pnd ClArl,
,
flC'.'
,1is luncheon r-;,J.ests .
Pollo,,inr llmch, G/'.mernl Clark went -into A. co>1f'8rence ,·,ith Q~ia~rrls
Gruenther end BrRnn, and lPter they "rere joined by GfmerRl Luces. G'en8rP1
Luc8s had COJ'l1e f'or a lnst TT1jnute '-:ord from Grmer-:;1 Clr>rk before r;oi11g jnto
"TA.plGs to board the vessel th11t ri1l tAke him on C'rerrtion 3IIrfGLE .
1
�"As " rr:sult o-f' tho J.rmy--~f:'VY ccnf8r'"3nC'3 ye'1t8rr!ry tc i1'1V:c,t:i.g:c.te misr,rin~P""Tf1Gl1t ci,..,f'l loss o+> 8auirra9'1t nn.rinO' r9herrsr>l of "r' i)iv~"'ion, rrPcticrlly f:11.1 ro:i.nt'1 ;n il_1.J.8Stio'1 ~mr9 r1 ~"'CUSS(➔(1 0 n/ srtic-f.-,ctor;r ,olntion'"' Prrived
c>t •rrereby these S8.'."19 errors . ouJrl 1-ie r1in-'mized 0 ,1r-'11p; tr9 orer:>tion. I lir->ve
t:'llked with G""nrir·l T,ucPc; tJ.i-'s rintr>, r:dor to 1 js r1 er'1rt1J.re +>or the "3hip, "nd
l e is rtis.-.i0d tJ,-,f't evnryt1-1 ~nr; h"s been rlnn9 b-r the •·pvy to fr,c~.litrite the
l::i.n,li nP' . GenPrP 1 Truscott has bee"' ~0ver to t 9 Biscr->yrY3 --~th f' sn°ll nurnber
of ris :::tn"f . I hn.-re ~n:f'crwid Gennrr,l Luc"''"' tlrt I "'ill <1.rrive rt r1 out oqoo
0'1 D clay at tho
iscn.'1'19 ·"or cr-ri.+>ere'1ce yd or to go~ ng ns'10re if tho tr> cticnl
situr>tion p9,,.nits .
1
0
1
tt'l'h:i fr ilure o+> tl-i.0 .,ttP c1 0-0 t 1,e /"iStJ~ "'i.v-' don to reacb its obj octive
r
acrO"S t e Lir~ Riv'"'r t0Hr.rr"' tli8 Sr-ri .Ar11,,,.o,...,.io ,ms ri.11itr:i [1 ½lo"!. J '."'A.'1 +>e8r+'ul th'lt Gr:me:r~1 ·'rT1'8S"\"!Orth hric a "'9ntr1 .,,..93n>•vntio>1 ~s tc t)l() or;sjb-ilities
o+> ciuccess o+> bi.f> or9rr-tion. Tt "08'llc to 1e r.n inh"r9rt nrr>ctj ce ,•j th liim to
ttPc"k ·lith r1;nirn1m •·orc9s, ··itb the -,...esrlt ti~,t 9 ~3 re 11lserl ··ith 7o,ses,
0111 11 to "1£1 1,,.e :'.t '1.ecessPr~r to se<1d ;n r·erviPr "orcgs 1Rt"1r to do tl-iA c-,9r1e ,ioh.
It is thfl 1uestion n+' "si::nrlino-.., ½ov tn r1o £1 "'l""n's ,job". Ie id tie <:!p"lp
t},-·'1.,.. i11 +,he ratt,,c'· on ..mmt Gedro, ••·l--,-,re 0n9 or t· o cornp nies Fere se"lt, re:rulserl, anrl a l<>rger "orce sent in to c'o the job. ~ flP.n to TI Cori's, +'0elinF th,.,t ' t vrPs necessPr;r to d;sc1
.J.S" "!~th G'"n,.,...,,.,l i' 0 ye:s -1::,},P. results o+' this
+'pilure, for " 7 +,1101 1 :~h t A 1,Sth Affort •-rc11lc Pot e11.+,ir9l· 1 "VA ·n rotect9c• ris
lef't f'l['nlc, itci f"i1ure •·oul•' l_9r•ve :it Antirel·r uncovP.rerl r1ur:i. o- his crossi,,g
o.o tl·e R"pj do Pi vnr . As e. res11lt o+' ny con+'ereYJ.ce 1 1~ tb K•Jyes, J h;:iv9 r;ent
thP- -"ollo d·1p- clirectiV9 to Generrl r·ccr0er;r.
1
"I s0nt !}-"n.er"'l Gr119ntrP.r lw rlPne to see ''cCrnery, ho feels th"t the
<>ttn.c 1 ' o-1' +ho Y)th .,.,ivi::don } ~ci little chm1ce of rucce"s on. ncconnt o+' tl--e
'19nv r ,,ef',msj ve riosi tion of ti·1e A1:l.8"':r ..-•est o+' trr:i Re...-i_do. t rr iDt" in ti,,,.,t ~ t
·s 0SSA'1tiqJ_ t}v,t, T T•r 1 th..,t rtt'1C +'11lly A:;mect~_nr: }19QV" losses in order to
11.0 lr1 ,, 11 -':,] e trooyis on n:r ~rn'1t Pnr7 c rr.,. roor0 tn .· t, thPre i...,; cle~r-' nn- t},,, •·1ey
f0r
pr;GLB. The Pttn.c'r -~ S ori . 11
ri,
_r
"l. ::n orclAr to .c,rici.1~t<"lte th:i nttrclr o+' tre ''\J: ,0 P,iv9r ,, jch 'ill be
eP11n b•r 1) 'J II Gorrs rt ')oro 1 cnrs +,l'is rnte H i"' di.rc➔ cterl i:,l,..,t the !"1S Divi cio11 bo ~ ssued ., n--;trur:t:1.0'1S '3 Pollo S:
r
!!• rro ½rvr:i t,.,o PC\ P.ri.p;Pd8 f'ni,.,:, .., cross~,,.1 0-!' the G'?IrrLIJ'PO Riv,9r
to11icrJ,t 0 0/0 1 ;rn-ri1rr:r, in tb'l 1rrne Pren"" t,J-,nir rrs~ul_t o·" tlii:1 r:vor ·-r0
C'''11111.ct9rl ri rht 10/')o ,Tqnurry.
..--,V9-.CY effnrt . ; 11 be, 1"1'"08 to ; ,,, iC' +,c, thPt
th;s ·•ill 11e q lrirse-scn1e oro ·sing .
]2. Fold onP brtt;lio<1 0f t'1<=i l . N Bri~"de rPndy on c"ll f'rom the
Co 17 nin.n. inn; Gener"l, II Gorrs, to ''K'VP, i.11to tl-e ::>re" ''et •e9n ''a-'vcrr LIRI ~nd
•i ver G".,,..igHano ( c,:_,nter of r>reR. GO.>S71?7) tC' -rr0t9ct ti,,,, left of II Corrs.
'],is 7,n-':,tnlio·1 1 ✓ill not 1-ie usAr'l to r::-:;s.nult tl 's locriljt•r, but •·•i.11 br:i mow1d
thGre tr relj e~_r9 r battalion of the II Gorrs vrhich will heve prcw5 ously occupied the area.
�£• Be pr epr r ea to surport by .(>ire the II Corps f' t tPc:lr . netr,ils of
this supportine; f'ire to be arrrnw~rl betv"A"1 the Cor1ririnc1 -i11p- GPr10r~1c;, '<')th
J)jvision (rJ. 3 . ) rnd /~6 Divi:::io11 ( 13r) .
"2 . II Cor:rs hrs hnen ,-:i11.t,l orized to ''moke 01:Jser v'l-<-ion south of the
T{iver LTRI in zonn o+> 10 Gorrs . 11
FolJ.o•ri11r' tln ri-ieti:np; ··it:-- G"'nGrrl Lucr>s , Gr-,'1 errl Cl.,rk n,ceivnc1 his
Jude;e l\rJvocr>t9 , Colonr:il ' 1ickr:1Yr::-iit . A dert' "'Ant0nce 1"'or t 1"0 Tt...,li"n::: -Pound
r,1:lty o.,.. 9SfiO"f'C'9 hrs b,9e11 decrP.ed hy G"'ner'l Al0·,cfl 1Y1 nr, "'1d G·3rter 0 l Clrrk
is crPrP,'Gd ·ith r.in. 1dn't -nl.!'.!'1:0 .f'or t:1e e:recutior . Th0 t•'T() :rt~l~pn, nre to go
be+>ore a f':i_rinO" sound !"t 1000 tomorrow . T11ero 'ill be no rictu:re-:; ::--nd no
WEIT corre.sronc011t~ pre::;9·'1t, b11+, r y11hlic relr -J:,j ons o"""icer vri 11 brief the
corresr,ondents concerning tb11 e'recu+ ion .
Lnte 111 t,J-,e ...,.r-t0rnoon Gen0rPl IJL..,r 1..- ::>lso co:nferred ,.,.•th Ge,..,nrr1 ''or,qn
C0'1.Cern:in17 s~ rtnF 1 rr0hl 0"']', on. Crer,n+.ion <"'FI'.GLE .
*
*
*
GA::r"'-qTA-- .JArWAR.Y ?l, 19/J~- - Aln1ost bAfor0 be '7'1S out o+> b8d tris "lorri~ng,
Genern l (a.,.r1 rece5 vecl P JFte · ,.,te 7.lj "9nc..., ;~ei ort 'from Colo11el HonPr'' . The
,;:
·ertl er todr.y is C;Oorl , •ritb orily 8 "'ll:ir,ht t,!:lzo nt nbout 10 , 00C' feet, ~no
the i•y1 ic· t~cns Pr<'.J t'y,+, the •19pt,]-,nr <ill bP ,~it]:-, tl A Fifth Prrrr:/ nhrm OrerA t70'l. "",JPJGTZ'a i..s lannched ePrlytomorro" nor.,..,~11P". Colonel 1io•rird 1 s rr,Tort
1
sho'l''S th..,t tLe G0r'1[1ns nra d,il1 r0,i11.forc:lnr: c c:n ~n the Cr ssino-Rer-ido (}r,r:i.p-l.in.no "'eeion, nnr'l t js ~s f'l1. -;.,,.c]jc"ti.011. th£'t tl-e GPr"lPns ,<-·.-.e -f'rlE:nr;
+>o:r tl is ""ove to dra:v troors "rorr. tl10 ·ireR. ~hPr8 the 'T J"'11,... ~ .-orce ·d 7.1 inv"d8 .
0
'::;hec1{in[l' ovnr 1'.' t rn~ nute rlr'ir ' Gencr<' l s1~r1✓- cori-f'errPC' "nr ~ O"'" trnn
>1onr cluT.; '1c- the morn-; 11. c- ·-ith Gnnnr"t. ls (}ruenther f111.cl Brr nn. GrmAr~ 1 :'r nn
y•ill he PCCOT"P<'D;T7 n (1-c,nr>rrl GlPr 1 r tn tl1 e ·in•TGL~ hP"crread -~0P1orro , "nd
G"'1er"l Gru,.,rither 1ill b<3 rnr."in·nr rt "'·ftl1 Army J'e-vlqu..,,rtnrs .
"l,..,
I
G0nerrrl Cl..,r~ receiverl GenPr''l Gu 7 llnn!'lA, Co,.,"'",..,ri'1P' C1n'1ertil of th'3
'1-ouris . GenerPl Gu"lltur1, ?rriv"!rl. in Jtrly v03tercry , "nrl 1,11 ·ill be ioinin~
G nerPl ,Juin 11 stRff . G0ner,l c1~r'r rl~CCTY'ed ··iti /}011errl Guillruri9 , vrho
FPS r· r>cor'lpr>n-i.9(' to +,\-i9 Grmerql 1 9 '/"1n hy Gc:ine-r"l 1lc:il1Cl9r nnd Colonel Sr ltzr1Pn ,
tl-e emplo~1T1ent o-f' Go1mc; R.lonp- the I'i fth Arrviy fro11t .
0
Follo•·i11'1 the G11jllR' 1 "'1P c,~n.-"r"'·1ce , G"-'ner..,l Cl"rlc r0cejvocl his Iub1ic
P."ll[lt1011s f .(>f'icer , Lt . Co • Cl..,,...,,, to obt, in , r9J ort on tr•e nr9s"" cor,.-9rence
thrt G';'18rPl ~1il-,on held tl ~s =orn~11:-: ~n th,=i Crsertn. J.-,Jpce . Colonel Cl::irk
rero-rt9r t},nt r'ren.er; 1 11 :i lson €;[''!'< t 1'19 corresronr1 P.nts 8. I101'8 or le" '3 detr- ilAd
• .t:> •
•
"T,.,
b rl.P.Llng on n perP +ion ,,•T '"•-'·' ,qnc, + l' T,[C))'J tbn+, trjs "'lPS a h'ifth ~rPly,., OVl vn ( ,
fl. (iff\T9lor,,,'3rt o-"' th9 rres'3nt r'l"'t' UT' trn Liri Vr 7 l8y tow1rrl Ro-,,,9 P.'1d th.ot the
f'j c.rhtj ng cnmmanrler 0 .. tri ':: S-r:9ci,"l or0r"tion "OUld be C'w1er;, 1 c1,~rk. G9rerr 1
CJ "r 1r '1 l"lo 8rrrovod [' srec~.., 1 C01"JT"U'1"; QU') OY\ CDP.rev on sµ::• GL~ th['.t Hill be re19,'lSecl tor.1orrow at "hPtev9r t 1 ''IA ~.s r1 0cic1 e0 ur,011 '1y G"'neral C1Pr1c.
Anothr,r Morn.; 11,,. caller 11:-i.s GoJ . f'-i c 1re 1· r it , •·rJ:-o 00'1-r'i=~rrerl , rj th (},3r.0rP 1
Clur r c~ncer~~ nr: r-:mr:l D'' con-rt ,.,.,,.,rti --1 er ses . Th8 t •ro It" liPn -=-pies mentio11ed
yesterdn.·r '7ere e'recut'3d rt 1100 l'01lJ'S th:i~ "1(Tni'1.P,. As Ms lunchPOYJ. ';Uest
�General Glor· had r:S j. Gen. La-~ell ! • Rook", G-3 o+> ITeorlqurrt8rs CentrPl
1'.edit9rrR.n3.'1"' Forces (h0re:1,yf't,'3r T'P,ferrerl to r.s rn J\CMF, Gsmorrl r11s011 1 s
1
He'l( qu.,rters 9nd t]:,9 --;ncces::-or to A'i'Fn) • Ge>Y>r-:il Clnrl, c i sc11.'1s9d Yith
f}nnor91 11.ooks the or"['niz~tio'1...,l l·iero.rcby E'S jt <'rrlies to TtPly. Gener9l G-rwmther ioi.n8d n-~11._.,r,.,ls 'Jkrk [Pl.rl Roc 1'"s ~-'1 r r i.scussion of orgnnizntionnl ~-,,.o')l8"1S "t th8 l1J_ncheon table.
Durj"'f" the d'1.V Lt. Col. Sutho.,...1,-.nd .,,,erle J.rr::t r,innte rlrn2 for the depf'rt·1re nt 05(1C'A to~,orrff' of' the Fifth ~ rm:r C0"1ffi:'1nr1 er rn0 l1j ~ str>ff -f'or
th9 re,a,jon of np0rPt·on t·TT,GLE. (}0ner...,l C;l,..r1· 'rill r;o b7 c~r to t}on to'm
o+' CPstel ,Tolturno, borird a stor~ i--iort tr"re rnc' 0'() a~rroyj,11,ntely 1,000
V'f'rr's ·r,-,st the TTJOUt}, of' t}ie 'lolt11r'1.o 1-iere re "ill bo,rd the TJ • .-. • ·r!""IV'r rT
llo"'t 1?01 ,nnd thAn speed nortli unler" --irec-i,-,1 t'1"r cover to the 'iT-ITJ\Tf'rL"L~
corriP-rv'l. s1,·r, the T"3isca:me.
In th""J ln.te ,;1J't ,rnoon th8 G,..,nr,rri 1 receiv8d . ., cnll .('ror" Joe r;. Bro :m,
Lefty Gor9z, '""rer1 Corcor;,n, Jrcv Shrr '--9Y ::ind 1, jor "ovotn;v. TrP Pirst four
rnu1ed r,..0 t011ri'1!! tJ19 t,rcPter 9n_t9rtr-irdn-; <1oldi9rs. ThA Gr,ner8.l "8.S photogrFnhecl ·jt,h ti is grour w} osP vi--iit ""'PE' rP.nder9cl so~,-31;,hr-t r1 rf'mrt--:c hy t!-·'"e
fPct t1'rit 'r. Bro..m's son h,ic-1 bf=Jen k:il --id i11. "ction jn th8 South T rc:fjc,
wrirl "r. 'lrovm hrs cont~nuou::,ly devoted !-'in ti""e s_.11ce thrt v0nt +,oh-is rerform::,,·wes "s 9. ,~or~cl:i.nn for m0Vih"'rs of the nrriec' forces.
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0
:-:r the enrly eV8'1.iPr -1)18 A.rny Co"'lr-i,.,nder
for :'1.S9rt::1on ~n his d"Pry:
11
fj
ctr>ted the follow~ng r1 rt.,.,ri<>l
:•atters "cc11.pyin,r. my Ptte'1.tion ,ri,...,rr:llv tor<>y ···ere
[IS
follorlS:
t1As ·ws P 1t-iciyiR.t8d, henv•r resistrmce ..,.rs 11co·mtn.-rec1 to th8 '.3'1tr Divisio11 cro·1si11u cf' tl e Rrrido R:'...vor. ~cc1;1.rqto rme!'ly Prtjller'r .t>-'r0 destroyed
brirlp;9s PS thwr ·nr9 9r9ctAr'. It 19c,.,r,., nece3sPr;v, 71:ter in the c'ry, tc ··it},r1ra,·r t,i1 e l/,3rd, but tl, 0 lL,lst, north of '3Pn ~1,~010, I"['--:nt,.,iY1.e0 its -rcsitio1;.,
nn.,1 r,·"'fOJ~ts to r0i11"'orce i+, 1••pr8 t~ tr ,.G r 1 rce t ~s rf't"'rnoon. ThA lL~Jrd v•As
to an across ::-c;r"n r-it 1600. T hr>VA tr-i.l1'9d -,it,J-, I eyns prr.1 :rot o'1ly ~resterdr>y
but tode:r d:irecteo h':n to be11d e1nry e·"f'ort +.0 ~et tn:•., 1·s ",-,a knl: cle~tro;trers
across rromrtly.
0
11 Sorie "('VnJ1~03 118re nrr1o north [''1<'1 south.
I look t0 t,i-.,..,t rittr'C 1 " to hold
U 1 8 1rd J ;:,nzer G-renN1 i8r J!j_v:ision on thrt +>ront. :'." t'l sn looJr to co1 tinuf'ti.on
of.' tl-ie attf'c'· b•r 10 Cor:rs to l107 cl the !-0rm11n Go9ri'1g, 'J9th f''1d 'l/"th Div=.sio'1.s
:in pl"C9. It is o1,viou;:: to re rio7 tb,t t e he0,ry 0-.ie111y r0i:"l"orcer1ent o-f' the
1
Gnetn area ,fls c ue to ~~ s :rnp~essio,1 tl:['t t 0 f!ros::,inr; o-"' the Gcir:i ,.,.liFno Rjvnr
io1 1ld bo cnrnb 4 riad ·ritl·, 9'1 Pmfhi.1)io11s lrnd:nr:- i"1 stren~h in GPeto Bty.
111 Te hrve no ind:.c" tio,-,,~, !1.S yet,
+,r t t 1y, 0 Pernr l,f'V8 cl i ,3cover<;r1 tbem. In
·"?ct, there n~p no 4 nc'icntioriG o"' "1"1'T 1rind thrt rn 1·no·"J~ of our ~v~'TGLE lrndj_l'}P'.
T 9Xf8Ct dur;1,s:i; -1~1 8 n.;(;rt 1 '18 will i:u,t SOJTI': ·rord of A. sl·ift in riG c'lis0
1
�rosition tc mnet this attP c1r
-Jj
th r1ore stren~h .
TPl1'ed ,. :ith G- 4 rritr r81s~r<1s is ..,b~ ljty to urrlv the lrn_ ~ effort of the
1i'-ifth A.rViv shnulrl r-i rr,-,ic7 one'"'ly 'lith rP"Tf'l tnke rlri.ce .
0
"I hrve Put}1 orized hi:n to ~:i..-,n to trike truc 1:s +>ror, all units not directly enr-;"' ged :in t11e fo llo"-UT' .
TrJlced 'Iith Brann ,,jtJ1 rem'1rc1 s the r>ror.Tess of hj_s,. 1;lnns for :i raricl followup of ·"''1 enemv ,rithr1rR.vrnl Pnr· t},e rossible utilizntion of 7 revburft 1 s 'Tew
Ze:=>1'1nd Divisio·1 Fhen we rercb .tho Soprrino ~'rea .
11 Routo /!7 anroers to be out of the qur>st:ion, r>s the "'lnin rur~uit route .
Innunr1 ['tiorts jn the rirl"shos anr' tl,e m['ny c11Jvert3 Pnc l:lridr;es in th['t Rre.o,
,·rill ,,.enr:ler it unusn.ble . Ho'·•ever, •··e 1,71.ll use it if possible .
I hRve directed the Chief of Stnff , in m;v nbsence on SHINGL"S , to direct
corrs to fo110'"l up V1.e P.l1.8T'1;T relent1essl ,r -i_n the 8V9nt of [' nithdrnyml.
Discussed vrith r•tt the :'irct comf'!uninue .
it clearod by 15th Army Group ,s -"ollovrs:
11 Har•
I
1lritisli r11.rl ~rnericrn troops of {}e-ner'"'l Clnrk 1 s ?if'th Army lPnded eRrly
t,his r,1orning on tb0 vrest COP st of ItP ly d9ep in -the rear of rresent eneriy
"'ront l 4 ne ros:i.tions . ·raw 1 l"lnd -:i;_r -'-'orces c1re :mpnorting the ground troops.
1
1
7
1 The l· nc1ini was coordinf"'ted vrith strong rttricks ½y other n..11its of the
ifth Army, :incl,1ding Briti"'h , •--rcmch and ,.,,,,3rfoan , in the LIEI Van,,iy.
'The nm-r.hibious r.ttncJ,. began before da·:m vrith Allied troops o+> the Fift],,
Army ~o5_ng ashore fror.1 landi'W crroft nlong a beach front extending severPl
mil9s fro '1 north to south . Br 4 ti"'h Corimrmr1os and AViericrn R;:ingars , re pPrtj_cjpntj 1r in tris assault .
1
1
' The operations in It8.l~r are under the clirection of GAner::>l Alexancer ,
Cor'lmander o:" tl~e Allied Ce-ritrril 1".editerrrnerin Force (fornerly 15th ,~rriy Grour) .
HI will try to rr>0io bf1c1" Ford to relerose H by 1000, rrovidi'1P' s::.tmition
is sr>t:i.sfactory in :-WIIJGLE . If no v:ord. j s receiver1 from me , Pnd othr;r indj cations rece;_ved by the Grief of 3taff indicnte th..,t the lrmc1 jng is successful,
he will release i_t pt, 1000 .
Discussed ·1itr G- 3 tre build-up f'or SHJTGI/~ .
rrvr Corns hrrn sent in th,:dr priorities for tu_rn riround of LSTs . Their
pl?n Ppnears to be too hePvy ·i_n servi0e troo~ s . Ho,·mver , 7,,,. tre sj_tm tion
p,rr its, I "rill adhere to their re1uest, u+, '"'nould conditions aeem criticrl ,
I ''ill substitutt"! the 179th Comb,.,t Tew~ of the 45th Division for certoin ser vice 1mits . 11
0
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�f
.J..
>
.
;:.,.. . l:l.,
\ >'
....
~~
C,
,,
" .....
.
,
u
�311
~
f'<'-°'Ji.s,.{.;
~
Ci SERTA -- JJl'TF~RY ?:1 , 194/+--In the snnll ho 11rs of
J"lo rn _,
"'
land~nP' bep;nn to come in by rar'io . A courl8 of' rAr-rP.s'3ntritive on
quoted:
t:: ,,,_
At ()1C'5 t}ie ·' "'ollo"1in~ :r,essrige C"J11e in from GeY\eral Luca~ , Con,rrr-,nding VI
r:orrs . As ['_ c iriosity , tl e orip;h1[' 1 of th" cr--,wmtional code bet"'een the
GenArrils is quoted:
1
1
\
\
I
\
I
11 "7eE'.tb,r clei•r , sea calm , little '"'inrl , our presence not discovered .
inr.:s in prop-ress . no reports fro.,..., lA."'Jl i ngs yet . 11
11,nd-
At 0'310 the -f'ollo T1.'1P' arHJ.tio 1Pl w~ssnge crrme in:
1
1
11 La.11dino-s '1fper,r to he rroc8cd 4 rir-; on schP-duJ.e .
First troops hnvr., hit beach .
'To reports fron lf'nrPn("s yet . TrooT'S lrve 5tnrted to lr:.nd o~ yello·v 1,en.ch , red
beach rind green beach . n
At apnroxi"TJfltel:,r 0S00 the Generr>l left Ii.is co1°mr>nr1 T'OSt ::>nc1 joined G8ner1:l
Alex8nder nnd. other stnff of'ficers nt the ralPce a11n w:mt to Castel Volturno
-rhere the rest of tre pE>rty hacl n lrP-:>ny embarl-ceo. f'or the ITs . The rr-irty consisted of Gen8rPl GlRrl-c, G'meral A.lexa;1der , n-e,19r} :fouse, GenerPl Lemnitze,,. , Gener::il Brann, GFm"rril Do11ovnn , Lt . Cr;l. Lazqr , T"t . Col. 1nt~9rlnnd , Lt . Col. ells,
~'n ior .Tack-son, GA.rt~in Portunr•to nnr1 Lt . "9erl, USllT. T}1e rPrt-r ,.,,,mt to +,he fT
T-loPts JJ')0l , ')16 P'1d ;::>1~, w•1d tb9 +'lotiJ la stnrted north -f'or Anzio nt 0630 just
as thAr0 1 ·'AS liP-h_t enoucrh to 899 th9 ·,1ay. r-. ~-rit-"ir9 escort of -f'our flf'nP-s had
b0An rrovided by the YII Air Surrort Cor m11nr1 , P11d thP- flotilh ,rps not molested
by enemy nir attr,1cks o>-i tr9 w<iy. Of'f Gercio Joint tho e>1g:ine on 0Y\9 0·"" the es cortinp; SpiV'ires ...niler'l, r>nd th.8 T'ilot ntternpt0d to lr,nd on t½e sen . rrn.,c,ortu11r1tely h:i c11J1;e in rt n.11 [P-letle thr>t was sliri:rtl:,r too stee:i:, dove intc tl-e water
:md 1-iis rlnn8 irnrri.0di.'.'telv sank . On9 of' the 1T 'RoRt'i 11'1n the otrer three Sritfires soArched tre rir9[', l111t no sii:;n of' the rilot or r.l.'.'''le w:=i.s seen e•,:cept for
A. pool of oil .
As the Arrw Cori,.,,nnder »roceer1 erl toward ,'\nzio, he received a number of' bullet:!.ns f'rom G9n9rP.l Gruenther, relryinp; to Generr> 1 Cl;:ir1r nessoees sent
by General Lucas . i\t 0735 G9ner"l Gruentrer rPdioed to Generril GlPrk, 11 r0 AT Gr.:LS
Y,:,~T, G'l'J'J' <;J/1 JnE'I''l'~ , 11 "1h:i.ch , being tr9.nsl11.t0d mes.nt , 11 1-'o tn.n1-cs :,et ::,cro<Js the
Rarido but th9 '3ril Div'si_on q,,d 1st Jivision att,,,c1<s 11,...e oini:; ~ ell." At Of-550
Gerr,rp 1 Gruent]-;"'r rr,c1 ioed thqt tre 15th r>11r1 7tr 111.,rintry Ref;i"1ents we:re r lmost on
their ol-:l_jectives 11nd trrit tl1 ere wa:, no enemy orrosHion.
0
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Th8 flotilla continuer1 to tre nc-,...tlmest Pnd ,,;t]o11t inc:ic1 e'1.t re~ched the Biscry,-ie 11.t 0900 . There , (}nn9rnl Glark "rent r s,.,ort t.;~e in the nrerotfon_s Room ['nd,
;vas n1er-ised to hear thflt tl·e Jrrl ;"livision 'JPS cor1pletelY ashore, n.nd one Brigrde
of' the Br:;ti.sh 1st Divisio11 "fl.S .o.shore on its "-Vm heRches . Tbe RPni:;ers h-"'d successfully lrinded rind U8re occupvino- A'1zio 'fl; ch vms receivinq '"p0r9r ic ~hellfire .
Ge11erri 1 Cl/'.lrK tl" ~n left the 'RfacAyn~ on h-i s l T r.nd ~rent ri s f'nr j nshore fl s the
derth of m.tor ,··011ld nermit . Lt . } atterson , skirr,9r of' the t?0l , hniled 8n LCI(l)
,•rhicl1 continued OY\ toward ::ihore untj 1 it ri;ro'mded on r b['r . Grm9rr,l c1~r1r then
\
hR5 led .ri r;:i.s:=d.11.rr d11"l(!v, tre rrrty trAnsferr8d to t 1 ;_s vehicle and so cr,rne ashore
drvshod at trie junction of R9d 2.nd Gr8en Beciches v,here tre 3rd Division hf'd
�1Pnr1ed . 'I'he br,rbor Tif'-l.S "ill9d 11 -ith -hirdnf)" o"' <ill 1dnc1 s , wit Li':I ' .3 c'i'='ChRrgina- "'+,111:1dv ·":iles ()n solr'l.ierc •nho ",er e VT'"'r1jn'; "Sl·or3 , t}·.-,i 1~ r-i-"l11s b-=ild "hOV8
tJ19 ,mter .
Du};:,·1s pnrl oU ""lr vehicles ·1-re ''"'9in-o- 1 ml o:<>, 1 ed, qrir 9 on r"rnr s rind
"'O'll•" directly into tre F ter, !->er"! t ey !'"n f'C'l-o-,,,e, ·t),,.,n1rs to t}.")ir Yl"t9rrroof inn; . ''\1e rie"ch YIPS nnt C' 11f.,.,st<>rl . -~i.r8 netti.na rPd lv"en 1R-ir7 dovrn on P :coqd
le'"ld:i.nr :across ·!)1n c;n>y1 rhnss -l_:.o· '":Y' l t,h':l 1rd .,. ivisio'1 CO"'lM"n.d ro---;t . The (}r:ner87 C0T"M-nr1Peren. r j8PT', r:1r', it11 (1':)'1f't''ll T"nn, ,"'"ent '"'bo11.t n riilA ,--'1d 'l fl lf
::inlnnrJ. to •ris-it the 1rr1 r··visio'1. C0"1IO'"tnd ror;t ,~ere]•'") ccnf'9,-r~r 'ith l}r-nerPl
Tr•rcott . Genor"7 t!ou"'A, r;.,,nArri.l Do"O'/"'TJ. . r r1 ot)1<>r -trf'-f' o-"fic r.s nrited fer
tre GAn.9rri.l on tl"e ·he<>ch . Tiro 1-io.,..1:i-i11"' rn-:c s occurred, onA .iu"t before <>Y)d one
dnr-;_ncr tre Gen0rrl ' s vici.t F,hore - 0'1.9 rAruJ.tjnr, ~_n bo,.,,h r1PT'lf'!"l'P tor f'lor,tjng
r"l""fl r.nd anoth0r estroyinr P.n LC: . The G,.._,,y,rrl ' s i 0 ep r:-s bit hy a lPrge r,ntj a ;_r~r" ·"t 91-11:i 71 f',,..q rr,ent , ""'o-,,,ti111."tol:r ~,~ +,hout dr mR ;., to 9'1'T0"1e in the Ge11er"' 1 1 s
pnrty. At a>Jou-l::. 1130 tre f10ner"l rr:turncd to tl e conu-rnrl shir, Riscr-yne, 'here
he rnet GA"!.errl Lucas anri Ad1'"1irrl Lo'TI'Y l'l~r' conf""lrrcd ·7it1,, tiv~m for "or,,,, tiT"le .
G<=m9rr,l D0nov<>n le-f't ..,ith 1 T .11?18 011 "'1 1.ndependent :r1.i."'sion, "'1d nt ll.OO G0ner"l
Cl11rk arirl GenerPl Ale;:21n0er, ... ~tr tbPir -resr·ecti,re rnrt-ie", left on 1· 0 01 rnd
·216 .
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At lL.07 Gene:;rPl r:1_.,,,.1.-, -f'rom h~s I':' BoRt, r1 isprtch,d tr:e f'ollo"i'Ylg '7essPr;e
.,,ic'~ ~ms received ½y G0neral Gr1_1~11trer ['t 1515: 11 3rd Divis:ior r-,11 '1shore on
initial obioctivc . OnP hrir,;"de l"'t British .:'ivision wi.th ci.rtillery "nn tPn}:s
rsl'ore . Losses ljght . 504th JE>rac' utA In-r~11trv lr-11.r:B11g Pt trR -rort of nzio .
Port of' Anzio co'1dition unkn.o"m. ChP'1.nel "Iill be sFept bv 1600 . 'Qeecr O'Ood
for LCT onl;,:r. Irior·ities for fol10 1 v-ur: 1 to 11; then, ??; then , ?I+; followed
by/_/~ to 54 inclusive . "
At 1700 rours the pPrtv renc','3d tr11 r"outh o-r the iTolturno , here they were
picked u h:,r tre storm bort3 r-11.r1 t,-,ken ashor0, ,-rr 0 n0e they return9d to the comm,cp1r'1 '""nst
y ~11tomobile .
Rm orts co---.ti '1U9d to rer cl' G0 11Pral Cl11rv c .. tJ-,e continu0d ~,icc'3ss of' ': 1 P'GL
r.:,
½ut the G~mer"l -relt t½at ria::dmum pre?sure '!lust 1 1e e"ertnd ')y t:be Frenc11 Corr..,,
II Corns r1 nd hy 10 Corrs ~11 orrler to ~ontnin, insof.nr r>s Y'Ossjble, th0 f'orces -ric'"J
onprs-in!'.; tne Fif't"h Armv """- ~ts lo·,,9r "ront .,11,' rer'""jt t½e T"r-rirmm P~'nloitrtion of
tre succ0'1s of :'-'I'rGL'E . If +.l1 e r:rw311ire si-ould ~JA relaxed on the CH~sino front 1
A.11d the GPrmP 1s sronld be..--r')J· 1itted to dis9,-,g['ge substr>11tio 1 forces, their orro\
sitio11. to c)p.,..nar.,~ '''onld t'l9CO""e rnucri heavior, ci r-1 the di"fi cult;t o-" cuttini;,; off ,
/
1rillin("J' or cn.rturi11.n; r-, lR.rge part of the GerM:on ... orces orrosi>1r, tie Fifth Army
would he f'T"lP tl7 ~ "lcre." sen .
1
General Clnrk , upon l i c; ret,1.rn, co lled in (}enArR 1 G-ruentl,,er to exnl2 in to
him ·-,1,,,t o h"n '""'.le,,, oTJ. th9 '11"01p·ir 1 r>nc1 to ,..et tr.e l.:"test ~,,.,-"orrrtio11 thr>t GP'1.e ral G-rucntl:ler rqrl received .
0
The Army Comr1Rmlcr r1urjn!"J' tl'e evening received ._., copy o+' the follovrinP- cr>ble
to Ge110r" ls TH son and Alexander f'rorn t1-\e Co'"'lh,; ned Chiefs of StPff . RH 7779 .
e
are wr,tcl in~ yo11r hrirrl. b:1.ttles in :r:'ALY nith 1.mc1e-rc;tr'nc1 i'1J:; interest p,d 'li"h you
1
ev0.,,.v success in the c ririnr:; operr>tion (" r-rrrG1-i:~ 11 ) ,,iiicl you ."re undert,,.,Jrjnq; . 11
(},:mernl r.lerk '"'lso r9co-ivAd a cory of TT 71'5? "'ro,,.., Ge11~rnl ·-::isenho· er to
Ge 11T'"l Ale~rr>nder '1 ich ren.o ns f'ollo:vs: ttl}oor1 luc 1( to you ,n0 (;VRY. I ~'ill
)e wn.tchinrr tho r9y;or-ts "or tJ--,o r,:rePt ~,F:c8"S you dese,rve RY\cl ,rill obtl"in. 11
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�CAS~RTA--JA~TTJAPY ?3 , 1944--Follo-:ini:; ri11. early rnorni-ri.g conference ·vHh GenCJrPls
Gr11rmth0.,... .<J.nd Br2nn , Generr 1 Clar1<: le+'t his cor:mR'10 post to confer rersomlly
\
,Hh his Cor·p:=; Co'1nn.nders nlon1; th0 FFth J·rny front to str0ss to them th.<it
I
they riust continue strong -rressure "'f;C.i11.st tho 0nemy at nll costs, tr·us engagj_np: n r1rtxirmm number of' ,-ernrin troops nlon~ the rer;ulPr -l"'roYJ.t "'nd rrevent r->ny
reinforce'Dent by the Gormrins f'rom the south ag" ir1st the SPI 1 TGLE beachhead .
The Gc11.er21 1 s own notes on t}-iese conf'ercnces are rerorted n.t ti-.e end of today ' s
cinry.
I
He ceF1rterl :roJ'1 hj s rnn1·e - ;.;i-:" +'t cub ruffcr['_y - th.0 ro['d in fro::1.t of his comrnr,nd -,~ost :_ r>t 0915 rmd +'low ..,~t1, 1 'Pjor 7.-,,prer to the II Corps comnr>nd rost
near } res,:mzano .
her0 ho co'1-/'.'errr,d -"ith !'1l.,jor Gen"r~ 1 Keyes cu-,_cern:ing the
situr>tion on the II Corps fro 1t . RAtnrnir<:T to tl-1e II Corrs cub field Generfll
Clrirk too 1<:: off f"'or VenP+>ro, anc' tl· we conferred with GeYJ.er, 1 Juin . He then
flew hr> ck to tho II Corps +'ield 811.d left b·r car -rcr the 1":>th Division co!11l'1rtnd
post northeast of 'i.r..;n:=mo . TTe rrirrle the trir "rith Ge'19r"l J<'eyes who jojn9c. hjrn
qt the :d.rf'i9ld . Arr-tvi11P- nt tlie l?itr :Jivisfo,, com!'J.:-,nd post Gr>11.ernl Ch'r: ·;ent
into crnf'er,,mc8 vith Ge110r.,ls fnl1':er , r; lbur and Keves ccncerning the sitUc..,tion
alonn- the 11':,ti,, Di•rision nroYJ.t . Qc-,"lAr"'l Clnrk- had the rlensure of i11.""ormh1r:t
ColoriP.1 Hess , ''rtill9r7 O"fj_cer o-f' the '26th Divjsion, th"t his YJ.f1"1e h::,_d been
sent to +1-,9 "An,,,te f'o-y, con f'irr,irtion ?S P. '9rignc1ier Gener" 1 . G"}ner-il Clark- then
h<rl lune½ Pt the 11Sth Divi..sion mess ~nd c;er,art,-,a Pt l:"'15 f'or the 14th Division
CO:rJT'Jf:lnc'l post . Just rs +,he G9n.Arnl 1 s jeer, con:-riining Grm"'rol Key0s Pnd CPpfain
Bearrh10od, VP"l nprroAchin,o; the ,j11nction of Firi;hm:i_y #6 and the road cuttin~ o"'f
to S8n Pietro on the r· i;ht , t -ro lPrge forwtions of nl<>nes vmre see'1 flfrror>ch inr:; "'roc1 the souther-ist . T.111') cr w of ::>n A.nti-eircrnft P,1m •r::is looking the r-l~ne
over l'l'j ➔~h b~noculrrs, "ncl Gen9rr>l C1Pr 1• wi1:1r>r1<:ed thr->t the AA crew didn ' t n':3ed
to "orr7 ::i.bout b0nb:' nr; becm1'1e the G9rmr•ns rrobably were concentratinr- their
effort'J on +,re 'HJ •n1E beachhead . Just B+>ter turning on thtJ rond to s,-,n I fotro,
se,mrA.l 1-,or1b3 lit on a ridge just northwest of tbe tom . The boT1bs 'mre rlrorred
by AJ"'ie:ricrm B- 0 t) 1 s, ~11.d Gc'1.ernl Cl::ir1,. -:vas hi ,,.hly in ignant . The bcm1bs lnnded
rbout f'. mile from Gr=mer1"'1 Clrr1r 1 c:; jeep , but they sent ur such splFl.tterings of
roc'k and cebris trr>t •\ jor Prout , GA'19r<>l Ryder ' s aide, ~,ho "A..s ·1aiting .,,t a
cro-srorr'l apr:ro::rim:itely n hr.lf-mile awa:,, ''lf'S rit j_n th"."l J-,11."'ld b;r rock f'rag:cnnts .
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Arrivi11.c; nt the 31.th D5•dsion conir1n.nd po::;t , G·"nerPl Clrork rer1'rked, 11 ·hr-it ' s )
the mn+,ter , Doc , I 1 TYJ entitfod to a 17-gun sr-ilute, "'Pd tho,e bl-.., steri bcmhers only
gavs 1"'0 Pbont 8? 0 Gener"l Ryder rerorten tl-i::it th9t r>s th8 sec0nd time tor'lpy
thnt Americrn ')ombers hr>d crorped t½ejr lo::in ½e 11~_nc the /1rir;ric"n li.rn:is . The
slopes of •~ount Limi:;o hPd been lrmbed enrlier in the norn1np; . Ge'ternl Cl,-,r1<.
sici.irl thr>t he vrould take tl1 e mritter ur upon his return to the Fifth Army col"!mnnd
post .
1
Genernl Cl'"'rl< t·hen 'vent into conferenc9 nith GenerB 1 Ryr'iP,r nnd Gener" 1
Keyes . Colonel Butler , AssistRnd Divisional Gofll'1,"'11.der , ...as cnlled over , Pnd
Ge118rnl ClPr'k i.n+'orTYJ'Jd birri t11at his ni:ime hnrl b0en ~9rit to the Senrte for confj_rriation r> s a 'Rri e::idier Gener::i 1 .
G-:i11erril Clnr 1z then c'lrove 'v, cl· to thP- II Corrs ri irfj_r~ld '7:ith GenerF 1 K9yes
and tool,,;: off Rt 11+05 ':'or a 1Pnc1 inP, st"l"'ip at Sessr Jlurunca nerir the 10 Corps TAC
Hee.rl.·:pwrtArs . GenerRl Clerv.: then rlrove to the ~1ritish Co.,,.ps Ferirlqu"rters Pnrl
con"'erred with GenerFl r?cGr9ery. Follo"l . . nf' this con+"erence '"Jith Genornl r'cCreery,
GererPl Cl~rv.: orice np;r>in rrot into hi.s cub pl"ne Pnd +'le": br>ck to Fiftr Arny ::end-
�qw=trt ers Rt Caserta, errivi_ng at 1505 }·ours .
Fpon returning , Go"leral Cl"rk- irnmediFltely took ur wjth Gen'"lrfll House the
matter of' the B- ".>,,) 1 s bonbi.np; beMnd our ovm 1~110s ::ind issued instructio!ls to
assure that tr.9re rou1d not be f:' r9c1i.rnmce of such P 1:>rientrble incident .
i
The siturition -<: n the T<'i+'tr. Arr~:r ' s ne- 1 br:'.dgeheod nrea remr ins '3trictly
in our fRvor . General Cl.<>rk's troops ,..,.,ve f"'nned out tc '"'~den the beachhead
and , r.s yet , the enemy has mride no counter "tt;:ic1, . Air activity is on the incre"se . _The 1,0_ Corps briop;AheacJ F1cross t"be Gnrir:tliano Tliver i,:, secure ., Pltbou~r there fo despernte "'.p'G,},tjng juc;t north of r inturno . The II Corr,s front
}s r1ost ACtiV.£_ ··,itl· t1ie 11-errnrns thro-rinr_: ver~rthing theY h...,V8 in nn ef-i'ort to
y,revent Pny sizeable cro~s:i.n"' o th9 n_,,,:-ido River . TherP :is ::>lso 0xtenc;jve
?ictJvity ,.,Ion~ th9 French Cfo171sfront .
0
G8110r., 1 Cln,.lr confe,.red in t½e late 11 ft8rnoon vri th Generril Gruenther to
in-'.'orm him of' t½e nrranr~eme11.ts thrt h:-ive been !'1Prle for ti--e flttl"'ck nort}, of
C:->ssino by the lrd Alr;erinn ::,nd JI.th Aw~rj cnn f'ivido11s . The G8rn,ns along
the Cassino line hflve not :ret sro"rn irny indicr->tion thr>t trey intend to ,·,ithdraw sizeoble numbers of' troops because of our 1-ie~chhePrl closer to Rone . Undoubteol~r the cmemy is wa~ting to cou- ter :-ittrcJ,. tJ-,e bddg,=ihe8d ·1hen he h:-as
b11:i.lt ur sni'fjcie"lt str<':mrt h to attrcl: with po"'er .
I
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As lriis dinner ruPst GenerCJ.l Cln· 1-c h9d Colo11el Trte , his G-4 .
It WRS sonevrhat of a celebration , since Colonel Tnte hris ½0en recomr11ended for a Brir,Rdier
GenernlcY.
The Germrm co"1Yl11mique at 1600 today s~;y's ·1 n rr,rt: 11 In the evening rours
of yesterda~r An::i;lo - Ar:iericnn troons lRnded on ½oth sides of t•j nturno on the Tyrrh8nfan coast . ~ountAr missions Pre in rrofI'ess . ThA Luf'tvmffe successfully
rcided the c.,,emy lr nr1.j ng f'l ~et ••• 11 The Anc;lo J\.JJericr11. cori'7unique strtes tor"ny,
n In ~~he lrr~e scA.l':l aniph5 bious operrtion in '7r'ich British ?nd" Arr.ericrin forces
of t½e ,.,ift h Arm? were lnnded south of Romri , a ,mbst::>11.ti::il beochhead WAS seized.
This ber>crhePi1 11P'"' ber-m •-;id-:med rind deepened . The thrust S9riously threatens
the enemy l ines of communicRtion lecr'j no; south <JTIC e"'st to t e mfJ i.n bPttlo line • ••
Arrnricnn troor s l,nve enlrirged their R<irido Riv"'r hridp-,:,}•epr'J. .
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GeYJ.ernl Glnr 1 todav c ispr1 tchec' th~ f'ollo 1·1 inrr cri½le to Gener'l.l rr.ccreery.
,
R'T 751+ . "In view o-" success of' Orer:.,,tio;" "FT""GU::: E' 1-:wlut l-r essentir'l 10 Cor,..,s
co"l.tinue attac 1-c tc secure objActjyes p~,w:tcusly r'esi';n, ted .
'1:i.11 try to see
you this aftnrnoon . Tine later. 11
0
General '::lar1c I s
Hre the f'ollowinp: .
Nm ·1.ot8s 011. torlny' 3 nctivi+,iPS, n.ncl th8 conferonces. he h;:,d ,
~1trough dictoted thA ?/~th . ':'hey refer ririinly to the ;1Jrd :
nyg:-;T"11.DfY 1 0 TR.TI - 'te"'tewl"'y, 011 the ?3rd, <>fter h"'vi;i.rr rAtu.,...n0d tl"e night
rief'ore "ron Jhzio , ·,· fl9w· b·r cub to t11.e throe corr-s cor:1rnr1 ers E'nrl to the 34th
r>nd 36th Divisions -"or conf~rerces . I iPJ:T3ssed ~ro·:1 tb<1 corr~ commP.riders pers011r'·1.l•r tho vitnl 11ec3,sity for their rJrivinP" •r>or11Arcl co11tinuosly in the , ttri.ck ·
north to ,.,.iVP the enemy no rest :..n 1:.~_s ro'"'sihle ·•r-i·';hr raw",.l rnd -in order thrt the
two 8lenonts of t},9 Ti'ifth /\rr:1.y ...,,ir,-ht jo-i.n h9rids rit tbe sarlir-,st rossi'ble mor{)nt.
1
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from a north,··e,terly r'irection to the ..,sst f'roP" t1 G i,_..; r:;h r;round nortr o"' Srn
F,li11 to crr,turFJ tho '3eb,,.,der3 ol:ii8ctive '"Jec;t of tJ->e :ilnpido River . Jui 1 , ril'73-;T> coorer,,t:..ve <''1cl "'-~:X1.0ll8 to do all
e crl'l to furtr er the Fif'th Arr v ricture , renlied thr>t he could T1Ph~ r cliv j sioY1.<1l coordint=>ted ,ntt1°cv thG Picrning
of tre ?5tl--1, or a h,c1J.:f'-nssed onP c0"'s i '"'tinr; of O'.18 r0gj,.,,ent on t'1e f"!orninP' of
tle ':/i,th . Altho11gl-i. speec1. ~s essent-i"l , J .. ,_,..-:; ~''climid to p;:l ve 1-dm the delrl.y,
A.nd .,,hrm T r1 erarted told him I would ,..,P_,,.~ rw decj 3ion r>ft er t11.l1-d.ng with the
II Corrs CoT"rn'111c'ler pn_rl 11yder of the '3L~th, f'o:c I r1 esir"ld t'y,t the 1r-itt8r divisio11. r.tt~c'< to tbe "est on the bi½b F{round north of Cr- s,ino in conj:mctfon
•'Jith t 11e Frencl' 3rd f lo;r,ri.'7.n l'i7i3io 1, attrck on Belvedere .
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"cn•Tf',.-:R...,'rr,B . IJ'.2H G•~:...,..,.., '\L,... yr:•~~;, ' 1ALPR ~ ~m ~'CJSR - I hrd rreviously
flo 1-rn to !<'eyes I Hen.c1riu,:,r~-::; t.N 'T!ornino; r'Y1 (li ... cussed this "'ith hirn . I
then +>:.ew br c 1 to Xey9s R"l th0'1 ~ ent to c-;ee R:rrhr , vrho could h,c,ve ottr>.c 1crid
'
last nj~J.it, but "n orlditio11ril ?!; hours r-111 p·_}v8 him r> better oprortunity to
coordinate 11~::i Pttrick •·Jit:1 thA ~rench . ::: thrm rne(e the decision thrt the 34th
Divisio11. ronld rttacl, the hir, 1 r:rou11d north of C1<ssino ton' r t , r.ionda._r the
?/1-th , anrl the Fre11ch tivision on its 11.orth to attoc1· t:re ne:':t norning t 0500 .
I o.ir9ct0d the t,·:o cor.,..>s commc1 richrs !lnr' 'i i vis ionr 1 co!"lmano.ers co11cerned to
·7or1.r out 211 of' the necessrrr c'etails bot ·een t'rernelves . A.t t 1'is f'O'lI' , 1000 ,
tM_s has been done . Also directed GeYJ.i=,r9.l Keyes , i':t9r the conference vr:ith
Gener, 1 Tel}cer a.t hio 36th Division co11na11d. rost , th.-t :Y,th Division r'1.'> 1.,.e c1'.e r10··1str1:1tions and ·"ei YJ.t crossino;s o·~ th0 "R.ar ido , both ln.st nir;ht and toniD'rt ,
and support bv fire the r.ttac,. of t're JL~th . ·hilr-, at 'lP1 1:er 1 s T{end1_urrters,
h·1-d the co,.,,me,Y'0ers co,,c,:_irn9c p;jve !1"' brio:f' Accounts of thdr unsucce.ssfnl efforts to esta½lish nrl rn11-i ·1tr_i'1 br~c1 isehen.ns OV'Jr t.h9 ~.,pido. In decid:i_np; upon
thAt nttack SOY'le tir-e A";o , I '·nR'7 it ·-roulrl be coitlv 1:iut ,ras -:.nipelled to go
ahead •,,i. th the E>ttncl• in 0rnAr tri"t :r co11ld draw to tH s front all ro "sible
Germw1 rev~rves -iri order to clFiar t1 e -.;n~r for PI rm::: . Thie:: WE'S 8CCorn:;:lisred
i.n , rn."8'J'1ificent T"rnner . Somr; b1ooc1 h"c1 to be S!)illed 0"1 °·th9r tho lnnd or
tlD "TI".'JGL-C::: -"ront, ;.nd I grortl-r ~referred t 1
1"t ;t he on thn Ra ir:o, ..,here -7e
"rere sec rre , rrt!~er thrn <>t ~nzio ..,.:t,h t110 seri ..,t our bncl: . I r,lso directed
Ke-res to rom•p-criiv~ tl-ie 3?'.ith Divfrion P.ml nt "n n.n.."opri ,..te t 4 "18 to be rre ~-rireo. to f1ttnc1c across the F.nrido north of 81:m ~--1pel0 ·,hen th9 '3/+th hnd 11ccor1pl:i hed their ""i.ssion o-:' seizi11r; tre Cassino l-i.jgh ""round . ·,e nust ~0t A
bricl.n-0hefld. over the R[mirlo i:1 ortier to r"'r--i t ti-,e debouch9ment of our tnnk
f'orc'3s i-ri.to t!:-ie Liri V"lley.
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~F'r'',\L C0f'r."TT'f:C•'rn,n• :r:'R0;1 'FT 1 GL~ A"?.EA - I <Jm a little r'isturbed ,.,t the
lPck of r1 etn5lec1 norcl f'ro'7 Lnces . Co11rnunicrtj_o11s +>ror the '1isc"";me J:-,nv9 been
overlo. dRd ,,nd hnd . ~To•• thAt Lucns i~ estr'½li,c:hr-,d. fishc a , ,..e hPVe good coT'1T1unicr-i.ti_ons, and I h<ive sent 1-ii"l th,:; follovrLnp; "'lessp·ro: mr 427. 11 Ioor communic"tion hRs result0d in my 1rno";in[f li+tle of :ronr ::::.iturtion. FleRse ans"mr
th9 fo, lo·•rinr, riuesti 0'1S at once . Hor• fElr hflVP. your n,"trols "mrh'3d? fh<it <:ire
vour ~ntentio'tS "or imr1odiPte operRtions? 'lhrt is 70'1r est~r,hte of ener1y
siti..wtion? }Y'CJs0nt ,,rid rr9dicted unlondi'1r; cn.racity o+> Fort of Anzi.o? Cn.n
r;-;"'S unloa0 dryshod et Anzio? Is won.th<)r effectjng nnlord~ng? 11 Luc[\_s r1urt be
c1g""ressive . He r11nt ta 9 ...,m,o chrnces . lie nust 1.ic·e the 3rd Division to rush
out .
11 1,oon.
0
"E'-Ff'l'{ IT1'1'f.'":"IO' 3 - I still hrivA no rositive -inc"icr,tions of enemy -intentio"ls . Heather is brirl . J hrve no Pir reconnaisnr'1ce. Hence, I do not know
the clegree of' his retr0r;rrde movements lr~t ni~ht . I have r:Urect0d PttPcl·s
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flnd r9cn:rnn.issn1t~e in force in order thr>t 1 0 may 11ot get rwoy 11:itrout o;i.r 1rno"119dp;e . I feel t,-,rt h9 is; ,rreakeninv, the line 4 n +'ront of us i..n order to na.ss
troops to nr~et SFJ',TGL.B rmd destroy ~t i.f r:o ~sible . Anoth9r 0 4 hours , r9rhl'rs ,
rill give me a better ricture of is incications .
"!ITH G ~TRt.L ·i;ccR~'EJ.Y, GOG, BRITISH 10 'J0RTS - After cons11ltation with II Corps ;rest0rdn.,, I "'lew "'or n. ccn"'9rence ·1ith Gew,r<'ll ncCreery.
Fe was in the r-ror;ress o-" r,R1"inr; rm ,-,_ttack .
I vms stprtled ··hen he told me
thPt the Sth Division needed a 1"eek 1 s rest . It hlls bee-n borne out V,.,e nnc1
ti,.,,c., f'f::c in tJ,flt the British Co!"lrinnders require more :rest f'or treir troops th1 n
are --:;iv9n the P erican units . Ther9 'ig no ti"le -ro:::- restin{s nt this crit:1cfll
r9T'iorl in this all - out bnttle . Fe rn1rnd !"le +,0 cbrn~e tre bnundrirr b~~tween II
Cor"'s and 1() Corps in r."trolling the Liri and the G,"'rigli£ino arer, . I denied
1--iis request but did autror:i.ze him to mov9 the bulk of the 4iSth Division to thP.
soutr, but ;t must be resro'1s-ibl9 +'or the rrotectio'1 of its entire Pren .
11 CrT~~r:;·•rGi<;
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r;.-;;;· 'ltl\1.9 ""'R ~ ':IHT A''ffl "OTlJ\ N, cnr.o'T'":L I3C "T'!I\_ ·r pr--;, LT. COJ;;.
crrifer--mcP., th~-,; r1>1.te, ' rith Brrnn, r~orPn, 'imitr, i:Ir-1_ . CoMr1f1'1da11t, ai1d Bo'·ma11 , "":nf'{i.neer, , j th rep;rirds to nirvinr, m·r forir•;:ird corwnanr1 rost
to 1 resenzn.no . I hri.ve so much "',ressu.rA fror1 h-1 P'hP.r 1--ienrqun.rters to the re::ir
and p= aetting so frir ~rom the b:ittlefield tr.nt I feel it essent:rl to move up .
I hrive rli.rected th:,t th9 co!'ll11anr1 ro~t Of'9D in the '.'1.0"r loc.,,tion by l?CO noon on
Thursdn.y, t}-,e ')7th . I hrvP- decided to reinforce S]P'11LB to t 8 mRxj'n1L'11 consistent ..,; th its surr ly. I vrill move the e11tire /,.5th Di v2-sion nround tog0ther
·· ith HP.rmon I s Divisio11 , less one cninbat com~Dnd . I 1111.Ve d::i_rected th.-,t the
Speci:il Service Force be alerted for imM8dinte "'1ovement . I have rr':lrrred my
O"Tn TA'J Headqurrters , consisti11P' of m:rsel"', G-3 , G- ? and a Pev sii=;nn.ls, to be
rreprired to "lOVe on ')/,, l101 irs I notice to tbe Anzj O Area . Thnt is Vll0 8re the
bnttl9 1·Till be , 11,11d thPt is ·,rhAre I -int,=md to be locPted when our huild- ur in
thPt Are;::1 is su..+-fici9nt to take tre on+'ensjw~ . I may ro~s~bly h1::mdle 1fc1rmon
as an exploi ti:ri:: +"orce wit}-, ex:trfl :lnfn.ntry, tPr1·s ond trnk destroy9rs under
rlirect ,:,ifth l\rri~r corunand , 1·rhile VI Corps '70V9S on its objective to•·mrds Rome .
t1 Gr?'F''rl_~NSB
Sf'TTf! - }Tqve hrd
I"'l.
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11 0,.,FTGTAL ' 7TSIIT'CR.S PJ FC'fW~T:lT) !\Rt,~A.S - Bvery rlrice I r,o, I f:ind rw subord'nate cornJnrinders, r,ostlv corp:i , ::ire 1)9-111.,,. both,::rerl ½7 11 brriss h.,ts" fro'7 ArF~ ,
Air , Fq . AC'F (15t:b l\.rrw Grour) , ·r'1v
etc . Trere h"'i.ng no otlv~r bPttle in
the i'~di terrane'ln are::i, , r>ll hePr()uPrters , including General 'Tilson I s, Adl"liral
C:::unninghArri 1 s , General ·,.,,l,.er 1 s, Gr:m.er.,l flev~rs 1 , Genrir8l AleYa'1cer 1 s 011d rr:Rny
le~ser 1 i rhts h-'lve noved into Crs9rta on top of "'IJT henrlrp1::irters . 1 evPr ;)rifore,
in th0 istor:r of' ,,,.nrfare, ~ e ::::o !_evL bP-:£!1 comprr11ded b~{ ,o "'L:'ln;y:. It does "'l.e
no p-ood •-rhen : stic" to my g,ms A."ld rJ.9I"Pncl th"l.t ""Y 1ear1111rrters be the 'huffer
between '7Y cinborr.:: nflte uni ts 7itr resp9ct to tr9s9 v~ 1 · t:i nr-; d i.gni tr-:d.ec; . I
hr>ve requ,v~ted that in no case s 0 11lrl they be i,errriittecl to v; sit forwq_rd units
in fl desperate battle without "l~v .,uthority.
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11 ROTA'l':rn~r FnR. "": 1·!LISTT~D ''::::'T - I Prn imrr<JssGd ·1it'1 th9 nece"sity of soT'!e
r,lan h8inr; ',orl::od 011t l-i:r tre ·rRr r-ep"rt;1~mt h5 c, will -rrovide " rotntio11 f'or
more rmli"ted men af't8r r1n.:rrr "'trll1t,hs of comh t bn ck to t}-,9 United Str-ites . I do
not 1mow ·vlirt the 'lOlution is , but I dll studv ~ t cnr9-f11lly to sRe j f some plnn
ca'1. not be wor 1~od o,1t . 11
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CM?m.TA--,JAinJA'><.Y '?!., , 19411---Exr;a1.1sion of' the bric1 i:;9head south of Rome continued
to 1;0 17ell , but thf"'lre fire inrlicrtfo,,~ thr>t tl-io Germrin is coilin[". hir,s9lf to
strike RQ'.ainst General Clark ' s troops 'lho mPde tJ,-,.e 11mrhibious lr>ndinp; .
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Reports received from VI Corps indicate that t},e Ariericnn and Brjt i sh
trooris ~re no7r well inlnnr! and thPt trey Gre co'l.solidPtinp; themselves while
the ~up'" lies A.re 1 ng 'orcur:1ht in . The weather torh.y is bi:i.d , with rn in squri 11s
)8~
anrl heavy swells thr,t -rreve'l.t unloadinP" orernt;ons excert from li=mdjnp; craft .
The seo. j s too rou,sh for tl e rlnkTs to cnrry o'1 treir ~huttk: service, ½etween
s'.ore nnc-1 corF;o shins . There is conr-:-jderr- 1,10 r,ir r-ctivity toduy in tho An zio
a,..ea . Dtrrin...,. tbe rl~y t·~o iles+.roy0rs ·Terc M.t by r=memy boT'!b9rs , fl.nd rit night a
rerort cn.r,o in th8t tr0rc hPs h"len a he:wv aerif'l n.ttacJr .?go.inst shipring rnd
thrit t,·,o hos ital srirs hrve 1Jeen Ii.it .
Gen8ral t;ru"3ntb1r 'lnd sever,,, eotnf-P of'f'ic'3rs Ptterpted to r;o to tr,e bridgehen.<1 areP 'W } "' bor t this morn:i ng , ~ut they 1'lere +< arced to ·1urn around "nd go
~
bnclr to ·rarles 1-x;crmse of th9 !)9/lv·r S88S .
There is rePv,r .co;_p,J,t:hr: n 1_1 "lo11n- the Fifth Army ' s c;r.utlrrn front . The
bPttl'3 j s rPrt; culPrly vii:;orous riround San Croce on the Ti'rench CorT'2 sector,
rtnrl Generf' 1 ,J lin re-r:orts he::>vy losses "hen the '7tl-:i. .f lger:'c.nn .,.n"':=mtry R0r;iri':nt
was rriven o.,..f r~o,mt CnrAlla. .Jlrtillf;r'r ·"i.r0 • r>s '.riole11t in this Prep troughout the dny. Th9 II Corps re ortAd tr"lt 34th ::Ji.vision 1v1 trols ~ronsin,i; the Rr)
p-i rlo River received stro11e A1 1torintic 7er>pon rnrl. sn1r ll nrms f'ire . 36th Division
pPt:rols also cro 0 sed tre river but •rr=;re piat ·~i th J,en.vy mrc}1 ~ ne ITT.Fl 11.nrl n9be ]_vrerfer
+'ire . II Corrs b"'] j m,e +,h,.,t the eneriw is :bolrinP", the P.rnido Riv0r 1~ ne j_n
,,
strr-mP"th .
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1,7 er \ r;. ~
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10 Corns reported tJ~r,t enerw rctivity was conf.;nei1. to she 7 linp- of +'orwnrd
positio•1s ~n +, 11'3 3~th Division 8Y'e" . 5tSth :Jjvision rntrols "'ent to Cflstel :i'orte
and found it strC'nR;l, r held by G0rrrians .
0n the VI Corrs ~ront tJ,e 1st Br~tish n~rntry rivision rnoved to the high.
r:;ro11110 so J_tJ:, of the r:010tta 'tivcr , rnd elerirmts of tbe 5C4th :'\.meric"'1 I:--r~chute
Tnfantr:, ffl"'ned out as ·"'3r rs LittoriB ,., 1,l re:rorted no confrct . The 179th Infantry ~ep;ime:v1t o.<> the l+5tl1 TJ . , . '1ivision -i_s now , shore at tre b9f1Cl'hend P11d
is !"s,e:nbli11n- to ::,o 111to action . F.ner, r ~,..,+,:r0lc; , co·1.si3t;nf; of" ric to '?5 rien in
}'p]_f tr..,cks , ['Ccor1p.<tni_ed b•r ;:> or 3 c::el+'- prorelled mms or tr>n'n:; vrere rero,,.ted
active 'lrour1r1 th"3 nP.rjy,v~ter of' tre cn'1Pl north of t e Anzio S'3Ctor . The enemy
j_s rlso rer.orted to he h"stily dj_gp;in~ 0rnrlPceT19nts . Th0re 1 "ri-=; "cne rrtillery
.,.,5 re rnc1 shells dror:red spor<i.dic" lly into Anz.; o . l? ener,y pln.nes "'9re reported
drorpinp.: +.roops or sup11 l" PS •iy 1,,...,ro.c1,ut9 to r'.):i_r?orce G,9rmRn e lnnents ; n the
bridi:;0reail Pren . fr9nerril Clnrk , "+>tor "rendiYJ.t:1 tJ:,e niorn-l np; lookinp: O''Gr tre
situ:-itiovi , hn..d Grn0rnl Pc.oaks PS h.;s l mcheo>1 rn1est . Ve d:tseu:,sed wjth G-=,'18I'fl
Rooks once apniri ~1,e ora-..,n_jzation.. of i\",1'1 in Itnl:,r. Gencrnl Cl..,rlr 1:lso r-3ceived
a vi.sit +>ror, (Jp::,tain Le,·Jis o+> the n . 1. ~r..,v·•, and he exnressed to him t e deep
tl1 an1rs of tbe Fift!, Arriy for tiv~ fi.11e ,y,rn.l surrort g·1 ven to t e forces lrncl;ni:r
Pt ti..,e br-i.dgehend .
Gf'rtain Lewis is r l)o1 t to rqturn to -!:;l1e rrnHed "t~tes .
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Ge:rern l ClRr1• th n received n visit f'rorn Colonel3 E•vprt Pnd Dnvirl . Both
'Y!en rre S::,ec..: al S,.,rvices O"ficers . Colo 1el ~"A.rt :is P ssc-cirtc,d vdth frrnerri.l
nsl)or''le ~n tho d:i.vjsion of troop r1orPle rnd c,ri mtntion. Genernl Clrr1<: di"'cw·sed
,···i.tli Colo11el Ew['.rt t 1'P 1 l9,+, n0tl-1orls o+' 1·9erh1g Aniericrn sr,J_rli9rs ..:nform3d of' the
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�c::-lobrl situ...,tion ,<1ry'l ''OW th<:v CPn 9 ··,y,-':,i1l,..,d ·dtl~ r1efinite ir'e'"'s crw1cern~np;
t1'ose tb"'1f.S +>or ,~iricr th-3 r Pre ,....;glt·h.r; . G0nt:Jrrl C7 ·r'~ 'n9-r Coloriel T>ert
from f'orr:t:Jr ;--C"'soci_..,tions ,r11en t. e Fif'tl' Arrriy f;o'7r"'1r<er ' '1 S ~tn.tj_on8d rt t'1e
',r>r Crll9~9 in ·"s:h:in.crton .
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G8n9t'nl 01f'r1rl s 119xt ~n_ller '7"S ('.-,.'1.-,rE 1 Utili who -i '3 '"'11CC99d.;nr:r G"n"r"l
:Car~ no rs the C.o··,..,-,,1r3.Ar of' t'-le lf't --1:,,,_1-' '1.".l • oto 10 ized Group . Th-' s Itr li"n
)
f'orc9 -', no..r r"'or;;:"·1.i..zing in ::i reP'~ ''r9ci., rnvjn,; '1-ic-.en +,r- 1
a~n out 0f' tl--i.e line
t:'ollm-ring t'1e-Lr rH sastrou"' "-tt,,c1: E gr-:•·1st TTount Lungo 'JOl'F) VPJe "'l;O . GnnerPl
Utili •·m.s r.0compan-i0d. b• 1~is c·,:2e"" of 8tr>:' . . . , Colonel Lo,.,.,1rr~j . 'i'l,o '70eting
betvreen t½e F-L"th Arny Go~,,rrcJ9r an~ ·"1 c, -n'3vl ItR.lirn G-,•,errl ,·ras l·rgel~r one
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G"'"'Gr"l Clrr}- tole Generel ctili t½et
roynd the It"'lirms
0 -r - ,--,troduction .
W01'ld ½e EJ½lc to ta 1re ., "!Ore ective J1f1rt in bringing r-bout the oe"Art of Ger r,r-11;,r. G9ner" 1 'Sue 1cnP 11 , Conriander of" the British 5t11 .:)i vis ion cnlled on
GenfJral GlArk to say fare•·rell. He is bei'1g S'lt::Ce8dec1 bv G<:n"rrl G:rerson-Ellis .
Gt:Jne~rtl Bncknall is uncle.,..tP l'irt , rinothPr co:rirr.ri11.d .
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A lr:i.te r'fter11oon cnrfer8rice wris ½alc1 111 t'np Generr1 1 s vs.11. bet,"een Gffrterr--1s
Glrrlr, RobPrtson , Gr1nnth,.,r E>nc1 =:renn . T11 e oi'rnussion c ent8red ::,ro11.nd the ~uprbdn~ of troors, r"rticulrrly :in the ne,-rly-"on hridp;ehead rrea. The extent to
,7' icl' th8 ne17 posj+,io11.s c,n be explo~ted r"erends on "lll 7 nten~ncP Hrich must be
atte11rled to vrith every d~liR"erice .
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CASffiTft - -,JAJTTARY 25 , 191~4--Today Gen°rril Gl11r'' +>J.ew to t},e 1-ie 0 chheP,1 1)y cub ,
:r~loted by •~::i.jor ';a1 1rer . Tbe Grmer~l •s ovrr Bcco1nt of his rlqy 1 s "ctiv~ties
f'ol1ov1s:
11 I TA i AGKC'l nv G-,., Ju L PL~"rrr -;,,. '.:'L .~ ccc" TA1w TT}T 0" A DD :;ri::oY~R TC' VI ,IT
THR VI CO;:,.} S - 't!e PFfE'.,..E"ntl,r f'eels PS +,ho1 rrl ro is r11nn~!if:!: thrt "how. ?Jot much
: CPn rlo "b0ut it . T)ur; t-- the f'orecast of bnd ... ,e?t}v~r , T _esitn.torl. to go vith
him bec,,,use :: W8.S ree.rful t .n.t T coule' not go asl;ore on acco,mt o~ the 0 ea . I,
theref'ore, c'1ecid.ed to fly 1-,,r cub, ,·,rich I cJid . It -is 1.11it':l r ;trip, "'hout Pn
ho1 ir :1110 fl. h;-,l_f' ' 011t ever t}1e PerliterrPnen.n ur -;:,} '; cor st . Altbougr I hac'l requested air cover , t'"ro11o;r "iO'T~ ,..,i-v:-up in Air CorT s Nlministr0tion, none ..;rs
furnished . I lrmcecl about 1C'10 <\.nr1 irnm0di,,,telY corrnr>rrl.ecred <i jeer L'rom the
Jhore "Sngin 'ers rnd 1ent to the VI Corrs, ascertf"ined tl,e situRtion th~re nnd
then 'rent to tbe conil'1rnr1 rost of Q911eral Pe-1,,,ey, Conimr>ndin/:; tl e 1st Brit-i sh Division . '"et Luers trere . Ant"'r fl.SCertn.ininrr sitwtion , nent to tl 8 rort , 'here
I intervie"!ed Ca:rtr.in Turner , 7 ritish 'Ji:iv;-,1 ('f'f'icer in chRrge. Tre rort j"' c
snlenc'1;ii asset, .?n,.:i -it, muct bA rrotected J~· more anti- Pircr0+>t . T will e.rr'lnge
ti• t . By bulldozi11.s anc' 3CrP.f 1.:; son9 0f tle .jetti.s , ~ LJTS C"n :)e unlo<iclecl
sirmltr:>1eo1.wly ::>t t'1e rnte of ~ L ;'T'S every 3 hnurs . T'h-i s requ~re;s r,erf0ct coorr1i nation, n.rd -in a ')4- h)"r reriod 1·1oulr1 give you 64 L::Ts . Surrose •-re cut
thr•t in hal:"' -r>or s,.-r8ty 1 s sr 1'e, v-;e still could mPintf'in through th0 port t 11e
force of' I+ r"ivisions, whi..ch I conteJ11plri.te '·;uildin~ up to .
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R0turned to VI Corn8 Herrrlriuarters in ·'ettunf' r11.r1 t>-1en ,-ent to tb9 corn~and
rost of the 3rd D~vis-ion . ,'3itu"tio1'1 is s.-,,V sf,,ctor7. '3rd D;visioYJ. is odw·l'lc~ ng
on C1 "'ternP , ··rhile one Flri,c;::>tle Grour wi ti- t'·1e 1st Pr:. tish ;Ji visior is advrncing
11orth to the junction o+> t:re Anzio ro.c1c1 "Hl~ t},e m9in r··i lroPr1 at q?339 . The
179th Pr.T ·.g_s rsho::.·e ond esseribled . TJron "'lY rstur11, T c'irocted thr-t tbe hnl<>nce
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of the 1st Armored Division, 1'nown a.s CombAt Comnn.nd A, and "lh1ch js novr with
the II Corps, be alerted for a movement j_nto '"JFT'tGLE. I hPve Plso alerted the
180th RCT for sh:,ilar moVGT"ient, r1lso the Specie l Service Force . Th:is, within
a '7eek, should give me three infPntr:r r'l:ivisions, one Rrmored division, the
Rangers, Jpecial Service Force, 5O1.th I'arnc·hute 11.esiment rnd 509th fprachute
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Bf'lttAlion. I '"Jill thfm strike out and cut the German lines of communicPtions,
forc:i.-r1g hiR withr.'ravml out of the CPssino area. ~'hen, I "'ill turn my Pttention to Rome. I propose to move in my advn.nce comrnFJ.nd rost, very srv:1 11, ''lith
Brann, Howard and Signals Pnd set ur in a fevr dr;ys . I cen tlnn fly back r;nd
forth, or go by lT boat, and direct the rsrincipal operPtions of the Fifth trmy.
I probably will hold Harmon I s Division with S0"1e pt,tached :inf'1mtry as e.n exrloiting force directly under army control while VI Corrs goes after its objective .
Due to the rapidly deteriorating weP.ther indicrtio'1S in thPt areP, I hristily took off et B?O, rmd in ,m hour ancl tl,irty minutes lPnded on the r,alnce
pond.
ncr 'JF'7 'lR'';D · fJTH G'~~n::RAL BR!drN - Upon my return cnnferred with BrPnn and
called II Corps 5n order to ascertein progress o"" their Crssino attack. 'lhere as tl1e 14th Division has one br>ttPlion acroc:;s tl--e RP-rido, the 3rd AlgeriPn Division (French) to the north has just rhoned in thPt they brve t£>ken Belvedere,
w},ich is a great success . "Te T'lny turn the G,"!rrrnn out of his Cr>ssino rosition
froT'l the north .
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CASERTA--,JANU!>tY 26, 19M~--Gen<Jral Clrrk spent tocl.a:r in A series of conferences
and in e.dministrrtive 1 rnrk Pt riis con1m2.nd post. His notes on the dPy 1 s P.ctivities t1re the following:
"I attended a neeting this morning '"Tith GenerrJ. ~'ilson , GenerrJ. 1\le"-Crincler,
Adriiral CunninghaM, Gener8l EHker ·1nd "lhout ?O to ?5 other officers, r1ostly Bri1
tish. Th8;' have two meetings a cay. :svery subject ciscu.ssed pertBine0 to the
Fifth Army, whereas I arn the first Fifth Army officer who hrs ever r,ttended one
of these meetjrJJ;S . AppArently nonA of these hearlarn=irters hPve ny other mission
in life th::m to :i nterAst theJ11selves in n+'f1:1irs pertaining to Fiftr, Army - ''!hetrer
a mrt should be taken in for the Pirfield? 'dhAt its priorities should be? Hh2t
should be the build up? '.That sho11l0 be the tacticPl plan? All of ttese r"etn; ls
were discussed. r,iy opinions wAre 1=1sked on none of these subjects. I T'lerely record this to sJ-iow how several heH~qurrters h"Ve ,..,,oved in on top of Fifth Army Pnd,
having nothj_np; else to do, Pro grP'lU'llly tekin.c; over mrny of :its f'unctj ons .
Again I n~peA.t, nevP.r "rere so f'ew corrimi:mderl by so rmny.
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Aft8r the meetin~ I stPyed +-or PD.othc.r c0nducted by Genernl 'Nilson on tho
subject of /1 HlfIL. AppA.rently Generri 1 ':isenrorrer has cl e~idecl thPt P·TTJIL is on in
full swing . ::'.: 1.vas shocked to see how All of the British Com.menders '-rere sabotag- I
ino: this :r 11:m. None of them are for it, n nd a 11 still feel thr' t it wi 11 not be
executed. Hence, p11J.ling of units out of th.ts th.enter is r;o; ng to be ext'.f'em~ly
difficult And will nlr•ce me in 1>.n emb1=1rrassing position ''!rile I a.m both conmAndin('j'\
the Fifth Army and pla,nn:inr for Pnother orera.tion.
Admiral Cunninrhmn suggested thPt if tvro divisions v1ere used in the PP.SR.ult
v:e could solve our trou1iles by hPv:ini- a French And U. '~ . Division from 'forth
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�Africn used, neither of ··•}'j ch vrou]/l ever have b8e-ri in combat. :;: strongly rrotested , r'le,.,,<1ndinr- t}i:,t the 3rd nnd /+5th nt ler<st be t 1··0 of these to bA used .
I foresee p;reri.t r1i"fj c'1ltv in ex~·,,.icati11.~ in t:i ne -"rm'! t1 ::..s tr enter the units
•vl ic P.re to he set up . T recom·,enc'len. thnt t'1<=> 85tr Division , ne"' fr0r1 the
TJnited Strtes, be trained in 'Torth tfricr. ri.t A:rzew "'nil t11~t the 3rd erd the
45+,h he withr'ra,m , co::'ne11.cj nn; [' xmt the ,..irst rvee',: ~-n ·•,..rch, to the Salerno
area here I ··:ill set ur the 1nw1sion TrriininfJ' Ce,,t-,r r,.,,/ conduct nrererrtory
traiYlinq; . It is '3SS9Ptirl tJ.i,-,t the 'iav r ..1orlr ~nto this .,.,lP"', r.lthoucrh Admiral
Cunn:' n--:harr stro'1p;ly objected to novino; the •r~v1.l AT'1phi1Jious Tr ininC; Center to
thPt area .
"The II Gorrs P-tti'lc , f'ttn.ck.:in~ tre eRstern fAce of c,-,ssino hPs been held
up . T cr>ll.ed KeyRs ;:,nr1 n.s 1
n"'!o. Mm if he con1n. AXPloit t,0 "uccess oc> tre 3rd
Al~erj~n I"ivision by "lOVin.G' H. > Tr'"'ODS in behind the1"1 ['nrl att""c 1dnr:; to the
•
sc-uthwest. Fe is doino; thr't, co.,,.,rn~ncinr; to11~P-rt, "ut t}1e Ptt.c-cr cA.n not ~o
1 e ,.,ust bror, 1 t}·;rouR;r into the C;:,s oPf until tl1e d v o;:'tr:.,.. t0"1orro·r 111orni11P' .
r
s i.no :1 .ren .
0
';leath0.r is lrmprffi,w; our unloenin~ in trfl 'r,ttuno bridgehen.d Prea, altl:ough
I feel 1Prfectly sR.f'e in tl~? brid.~"he::od ,,i.th tre number of troops in there Pt
t 11e nreseY\t -1:,; me . Hflrmon I s +'orce sh011ld be unloprli;,r soon, "nd ti-19 rest o~ the
45t11 Divi :ion, less th·, l8OtJ1 Comb"t '.::' ,Pn, rril'ly <""et ;_n th,re tonorro1 1 niD'rt .
r7ith them in tb:irP. , riur hridr,;eh9,1.d ~hould be secure, "r'"1 j_+' the Germrm 1-mild up
is not t/")o stro:rio- '"le "'il1 s11cceed in punr~no; out . 11
11
Gener:il ClA.r,. toc":.v 9rt':lrfoined r"'s c1"ssr,,r>te Brip;. Gen . ..0ce rit l1mch . In
tr,e p·"'t9r110on r,e receivPd,., c"ll f'ro~11 Ge:rierr-1 Gir,.,ucl, 'me. Cr-t:roux (w o is }1Gre
0·1.., tour of Fre11.cl-i hosritnls) .,,,,.r1 Gener...,l DP.V'nck, G8nerrl Gir,,un 1 n CriP..,.. of
StP"f. rrjtr Ge11Arsl GirP.ud, tl,e f',J-r1.-r Comnrnrler discussed r:iuestio11.s o.c:> the French
forces i'1 :!°tR.ly rnr' the brhr;ing ~n of oth"r"' . GeY1erPl Girnud srid he vro·1ld "'end
tre /,th ('•ountain) Divisfon nt once iP 09n0rnl Cl"'r1 i:isJ.:ed for it but th,.,t the
r
mules -Por ct1rrvh1p- its e,U~f"'1Ant 170'Jld be [1P1"( to fi"'ld chir:rinP, for - it rould
require mo11.ths ..,5 ti, 4~re rresent ::i 'l" il" hl0 cr::i.ft . Grmerri 1 Cl:, rk sd_r1 ho I d be
gl<>cl to rave t e Di. v:i.sion r-,~.d v ould st,1r'ly the .,,.,ul8 questj on . I erh"rs the 4th
cculd r9ljev3 Rnoth8r c1ivision 11wl use its trqnc;port .
G8nernl :,ucas se11.t in the follm•in~ cr>.ble "rit}' rr>gr' rrl to th 0. sj tur tio'1 j n
the fort of' 11.nz~o . R'T 39. ff] revriilirif{ •me1tlii=;r , r,en.v;v r« ·n, sleAt, li,:,;rtning
ri'"d stro--i.p; .,.; d.s . "TnJ.013.rli"lf, c f' Liberties Pn<l over benches ;~possible . Fo eir
rc.iids durino- ni.rht but Anz:i.o J:iprbour «>nlled ½v ho-;t·;19 70'1~ rnnr;c rirtil11;ry.
CnrturAd rloc11me11.+, incl icrites ,meny d13fr,nsi V".3 t" tti tune 0'1 +>rent of 1 '3t Di vi:1ion .
J:o i=;vir1ence PS vet o" l}err1an couY1ter,:ittacv r>g"inst e['st +'lnnk. Flan to continue
n 7P'ressi. ve !'econnn. i ssr>Y1ce "l'lr' loc" 1 attacks to i=;n ln.rge beF cl1hew' . Fire o:ri 1.'T
4,:,2 ·"T"'('r'3ntly r0sulte0 in sin1 "'lC ,:r-j oY• to 1mlo"c f 11c:. T" 1ill rP.:rort e"r ct f 0m,, re
·i
lriter . tt
1
General Cl.Pr'\.:: tod;:,y cnbbd Adriiral Lowry, Co~'unn.nder of the Eiphth Amphibious
Force, and General House, of the XII Air Support Comriand, expressing },is appre ciation for the fine '>Ufport tb 0 j_r respective forces hP.d given the Fifth Army in
thoi.r recent l.ondinf;S at A"'1zio .
*
*
*
CA~~?.TA --JANU(IRY ?7 , 19li4--The Army Conimander ' s notes on todey ' s f'ctivities fol -
�low:
"Flew to 1:'rench ~xrer itionr>ry Corps this morni'1P' in order to encourri ge
further atto.c 1rs b;r tl1e 1rd Al1seriAn Divj sion B 1d to chec1r on the coordinetion
of thi:it 11ttrick ·1 itr t 1 e 14?nd Coribrit ':'ear'l. 'Jext "ent by air to Presenzano
17hore I went b•r jeep to the '31+ th ri vision 0f '"!h0re I observed the 168th Infantry in its attack acro:·s tre Rnpido River . It seemed to he going vrell.
I imrressed upon botb tbe Fr1:mch Pnd the II Corps Co ,rnanc'ers the obsolute
necessjty for rill out ePfort, th=•.t I hn.d s}:iot my wod nnr'l this 'ras my last
chance to bre:i 1r throuph into the Cassino posit; on anc th'1 t I 1'new the Germans /
were equally deter..,::.11.ec'l to 1teep us out. Upon rriy r0turn to my cornm:,nd rost at
A.bout 1700 , I tele'Jh0'1ed both ar;A·n to inpress upon trmri the all-out nn.ture
of this Ptt- c1< . I thfm nent from trie 34th Dj_vision or to the command rost of
tbe B5th Jn-n~n:1try f"cing Cn.ssino .
1
Upon rw return , Gr-meral Alexander asv;:ed to see r10 . He is worried. Pbout \
the slo1 mess of the Pttac1,;: in t 11e north b~r the VI Corps . I "'m too, and 1,ave
been ... or flt least 43 hours . Al tliour;li I did 11.ot tell J,irri, I 1movr thnt he has
received a rerson, 1 telegre.m from the Iri~,e ri~.nister 'rho , from his rlesk "'t
#10 Do.ming Str8et , is going to direct the bettle here in ItPly. The Frime
wants an attr-ick , Rol"e f>nd fl vj~tory, not'"rithstanding- tncticf'l or logistical
\
reasons to tlio cn'1.trary.
!hen I told AleYr11,,er that I ·, s going ur personr'lly
torno 7ow and woulc:1 stay up f'or severn 1 0a;rs, he H"-=; coripletely srtisfied for
I told him it 1.'TP.s my ideA. to lay on an all-ou+, coor(lj n, tea corffl .'.'lttack support9d by tan1·s .
1
Gen9r'l.1 "'i lson A.sb::id 11n to comri to s9e him. After exrlainjn,;; the situation on both fronts , h~ told rie the rurpose of my vi'"'it "as to c'liscuss rith
him ATTTTIL . Tnasnuch rs I am to co•i"'l<inrl tl1 •1t op"'rr>tj on, he -r~nts to deR 1 directlv wit11 rre and tc; P,et m:1 vie''TS . It was a r.ost s11tisf.-,ctory m9eting . I;e
asked f'irst when 1 thought I riu,_.t leaV8 this battle in order to devote my full
attention to A"lVIL . I rerlied sor~o tine Aro1md ; 1ar ch 15th or perhrrs later .
He told me he was anxious for T"\O to remr in '1S lonr; [' s ro:--s; 0le, rJ.iich fits in
exactly ,Tith my ic'leas . T tole him J ',anted to speA 1{ frankl7 , tririt the Fifth
Army had lPnded rit 'ialerno , ta 1cen 'fanles rt11d h.,ttled its way to tre north
tl ro'1r;h re 7 lish terrain ann with hlood,r los, e,; n..11d th..,t it was eY1titled 1mder
s
my conr1, nd to tA.ko Rome - th,.,t if on Vie 15tJ1 of 1 '~rch J ,,,as battlino; Pt the
gn.tes of ~{0""e, under no c; rcm,st'lnces shoul 1 I be r,ulled. out . H~ nssured rne
t hat under no cond ·tions would he do no . I f'\lno told hi m t h,.,t if 1mder certB.in conceptions that A'liJIL should become a "fart 1.n the dark" of one division
spavmin the ~~erl.iterrn.n0rn ..,ith no intention of lying /:my place, I wanted no
part of it . Be nssured "'le U-..,t it ·:vas hj s desire thrt I stay .<J.l''J[ly,; vJit], the
Fi.fth Ar-my and never even look Pt A. JIL . ·-;e discussed t},e tr:>ining of the divisions, thPt I ••rould get the 3rd anrl the 45th, th-rit I ·rould get the French
battle - trEl ined d.i visions th, t I ·ranted . m=i told me trie only difficulty 'ms
thPt Robertson said two divisiorLS co 1ld not be mounted out of T;,ples . I told
hiP1 thrt I hesit11tecl to challenge sucli 8 loo;istical ex:rBrt r>s Gener;:il Robertson, but thPt I Wf'S dan.n sure t:1at two could ,,,ithout interferjnu; with the
Italian cPnipaii:~n. He expressed a desire to help me get such embers of my
staf-1" as T .,,anted , t "t he · oulcl fly here rigcin soo'1 to discuss A'TVIL nith ne
and. 11 s sured r1e of 1-ijs complete cooperation in , s sist~ :ng me in my effort.
0
0
1
GenerAl ClArk too.a:, '."ll'ote to Genorn.l Juin , of the French E'Terlitionary
Corps ; Gen':!r[:ll Keyes, of the II Corrs; and Genernl PcCreery, 10 Corps, thrin1-::-
\
�ing them for the spl8ndid J11anner in wh·:ch thPir c_or s carried out tl'eir role_
in facilitati11g t}19 success-1:ul lD.nclings of' our forces in Ue vicinity of
\nzio.
The Arm;! Com1"1Rnder has bee'1. disturbed by the too infrequent sitwtion
rer,orts coming from 7I Corps rnd for this reason C"'bled Genern.l Luers, RN
53?, askinr; tl:1'."t brief reports be submitted f'reqnentl v, 0 n estirn:ite as to
when Cister11r> would be ta1 :on, short stnte·"'lent bis ;rrrregsions nnd '~lans and
the rr0o-ress of unloadin1;.
Ferso"1al Luc"'.S "ror, Clark. RP 555. "If po.~s1 ble I desire thAt your rl"n
involve coordinated r>.ttac"k '·itr use of f'rmor 0'1 Jrnu<>ry ?9th. Hill discuss
details to'llorrow. 11
*
*
*
FR~ >i.~rzA 10--JAl'Ul\1:.Y ?q, lq/i/4--Gemr:s.1 !Jlrirlc 1-rs felt +>or some tjTie thnt the
force at Anzio is not 1Jr:>i11i:s pushec'l for,"r,1 -rith suffic-i_ent r <;rre"'Si veness and
thrit orr-ort, n.;ties to "!a1rr-i JX'Orr'9'3, 11.orthF11rr! ''1j le the (;.9r]'1'1r n troors 'were as
y9t disoro;"njzo.d rt t e ti'!"le are beino; lost. ./\ccorr'inn-lr, 1.e rietermi.ned to
P'O at 011ce to tl e An.z~ o -"'ront Pnrl urge Generrl Lucas to 1njtiate rggressive
action at once .
~~
He arose at 0345 this morning , breakfasted "Tith General Brnnn,
Sflville B"l'' h:i s aides rnr1 lAft hJ ca:r- for tl e :rnoutl1 of the Volturno .,here he
harl. arr1mp;ed to meet TT Borts /,hOl and , 1')lt;. His cwh r1:rtion by storm boat
VTP.s very <ljf"ficult, as tl-te 1•,9.ves 1ere l"-ir;r, Pn' V1e orer.,tcr of hi.s boflt,
unf8.mil"i.r,r ,,ith t},e chPnnel at the !"lout of' th9 riv""r, 1 it R bnr anrl shirred
a greqt deal of ',2ter, 11etti'1,.,. t e Gonerfll '"'nr1 evr;r ro,9 ,.,-i+, him. -":ventu...,lly,
mmver, the ho, t, wm·e r,ic 1red un, P.nd the r<irty -;ot 1mrler 'l!'iV c1t 06::>0, 35
"lirn1te•3 lriter th,nY' t:1ey li.c1.d beer ~chedulc:,cl to 1 enve. Gr-mer/'11 Clerk rncl General T3.,,..2nn, Colonel T-l'01;ar"', Colonel Bo•rrnpn, l;e:rit'1.in Pef rd ··ood qnd i 1r . Gerw'si,)
of' Collier's, vrere 011 I"' oc1t (?01, 9nd on}"' 'R011t f?16 were Ge'1er11l '-i'"'Ville,
,,,.. /'JoJ.onel Fhr 1·er, Colo>1n,l Jjblo, CPpt~in Le' ;s, r. Fo rle of CBS, ri1d CPrt"lin
L~rpson. The tri , rmt "noothly nntil Pbo 1 1t ,even "1:i lPs c,.outh of An.z:· o, "'hrm
the :vr ''"C)l nas cha lJ engect b:r a nij nesweRrer, the A:1 l?C, then r bout ;::, , oc,r
yPrcls to t,i-9 north. :St. Irtterson, ,..n17l"k"r.di'1,.,. the '1')('7 , 4 r,nedintel,r Cf"Used
r:;reen '"'nr' ello•; -Plrires 2nc1 11 ,i11 on the blin1'er to be f'ircd PS 'mrn:inr: to the
mi '1.es nerer trrt tre rrr ror> cM np- 1,o.,ts ·-,r-re Alli8d , hiit tre minesueer,or,
supposing tl-ie t· o r'T' Bont-, to be Ggr,,,Pn.,.., boPts, orened f' 4 r0. fl. nu,..,,,ber o.,..
l+O·'l:'1 srAll w10 '5--inch shell -,8r8 firer., Pnd on8 ~hell struc1' thn deckhouse
and GYrloded Phont 5 feet f'ror, Grmert:'l Clrrl'.
0
1
I
I
I
All three r,,,,...,l o.,...,..icers on th9 sr.ip vmre hit, al3o tHo n"V'l rrn "s.
one n.t the, ,--heel of' thP V8"''3el. T'113~Lr.r:n Rr-mson, 11ho hrd been hit
I
in the legs, nl"'-;110 1 1,,.1,, no orie 1->ut Ben'3on 1me" j t Pt t½n, tirne, ~ot to h'is feet
P,11,n tool.• tl"C) 11-ir:iel o+' the bort .
The rm 11 ?01 swuni:r 1.er ,:;tern tow11rr' t},e firin.g
vessel n.nd, ~ "ter ;,one el<>y, sped a·vay _,.,rom tl-i8 shir. The IT t?l6, , hich was
bring Frrroxim;::it11ly 1 SO :mrrls t'lstern ::tno to the stPrhoPrd of tl--ie '1 201 nlso
turned and hegqn to 'T!a1 '8 P.. run for it. .All o.,.. the fire fron tbe vessel that
wes shellini:; t. e F':' Bo-'lts ""S directed at the FT 1201. Poth-inq hit the lT ?16,
,vhich n.J.so brd br:ien
blinkinP' tlie corrAct recogni-
�49
\
rPr,onn"'l F1.bor-1rri t'be J T ''?Ol imn180i~tely p;ot out a fj.,.,;'t r, :i.rl 'rit Pnd rut
sul:l:anilimide i:1to th9 munds o" th0 five n' vr 1 "t0n ::1nd triPd to tr 1•C<3 ct.re of
t1'18rri. H'our o-f' th0 r11:m "T8rA on dPc ", and they ''mre 1:Jl8ed i_ng T rofusel v.
t. lmost
h<il+' of the deC1 " WA..3 COV8red 'ith r)lood. or tr'P -"j_VP, r.10'1 'ho 'TP,r8 hit, four
were ~Jj_ thi:a 6 f0et o+' '}enernl Clark. ThA -"j_fth mrin "1rs belo v i;.1 tre tiny mess
hri 11.
he t r10 rT BoRts srcirl to-·mrd r; ve T"ines-·,eerers thrt hFd been se,gn to
the soutt· r h"H' an hour be-f'orP Genl'lrPl Clrrk's t" 10 sh-:.r-s i:tot ,·,it},i"1 r~m;"l of
the :-,ines\'leeper 1 s PUn. A-"ter "o e Pnxious ro,..,Gnts, dur::i'1f; ·-rrich the IT '90:1.ts
7ere .,l,le to iilent·:"'r tben"elves sat~_sfri.ctori_l•r to tre ninesweep3rs, the J·T
1?01 nulled 11lo110'side the Dritish r,-inesweer9r IT''S Acute. The vessel fortunntel.7 hRd A.. rloctor q1Jor-rd, A."'lrl, ,-,-"ter srrv1p j "f~ culty, t)-,e ·"ive ~101mded -;ere
tr"'nsferred in l:ltters f'rom the l ':' "01 to the Acute. It '7rs discovered Pt
th:i s t~rne thPt ~nsign Bfmson hi,d hrndled V1e : T Bo"'t desritc 10rious ·shell
fra"'r,ent t'ounr1s in his leF;s. ':'he doctor, Pf'ter look::.np; quickly rt -,Jl tho
mf'm on the shir, decided tb.t the .,ir'Jt '"lf'n to be ,..,e"'loved "'hould be F.nsign
~ori~lr'l, si.,....ce O11.e o+' 1-ii_"' leg ~rterios h'ld heen "'0V9red. Lt. Jr-l.tter2on, Com1?01, hnd su"f1;red seriou:-> shcill 10unrls in both le~s .?nd "11")!" ncer of the i T
so hnd n -"r" r.tm~ed l 80'. '::'he rian do"-rn in th, nie:.;s room hAd been hit in the
sto"1ACh rind Also had a fr"ctur"3d n<:Jlvis bone. The oth9r enlisted man h d b,d
his lmce cri.p blo·m ,·r:-:i·r rind •".Tns in ITent rain. The skipper of the H. M. S. Acute
is Cmdr . Andrew Edward Doran.
hile the T1e11 ,-9,.-,e ½ein~ tr, 1ren off the Vi' hOl Pnd moved to the hosr 0 t,l
Abo~ra t,h9 H1 B AcutA, Gener:-il Br:-,nn and 0,ri.. -tsin Ber>rcrood tri9r1 to ·erS1wr1e
Gonernl C1Pr1" thrit re should "lot :::i.ttempt to 1:'f;f'in go :into Pnzio. Generrl
\
Clr>r 1 decl.,,red thnt he hr>d to get in and thr>t )19 "'P s ~oing to tl,1,:e the chPnce,
r
ev<1n tl--i.011gb the l"-i.nesweeper Plir'ht ~ P'P in shell the two } T Bont"'. After instructinr: +,he Acute 1 s sk:ipper, CornPnder Doran, +:.o get tre men to '3. }osritP1, Gener"'l CJark ordered the t,·10 PT's to head once ag11in for fnz~o . Upon reqcrjn~
th9 aren "here they hfld heen shel1.ed before, th1; fT ; 1?01 agnin sent ur the
proper recognition flr>res f'nd ½linked the sri'lle correct letter on its blin1rnr
liP"0t . After soroe time tbe ship reco~nized the t -;o Aneric~11 boats and P,rPnted
the 1"' /f?Ol nArrnission to cor1e alono;side.
1
\
1
"hen tbe J T 11?01 '7aS vrithin haili11,,. distance, th~ skipper of the torpedo
bo"'t, who hr>d trpnc;ferred roT'l the IT l/:'?16 to the FT 11 ?01 ?s she ''83 lylng
alonr;sid e th !'\.cute, :i nforriPd the CaptP i 11 o+> the Ar" l "0 th~ t he hacl fired
upon an Arierican 2hip ann thrit he hPd eUb1r 1 rill<.3d or '"ounded five Hn.vy nen.
T½.e skipper, shouting t½roug} a negr>phone fro;ri the bririge o-" his s ip, decl"'red
thRt 11e bad believed the two vessels 1·1ere Germa11 r: bor-ts, th"'t becPuse of' the
slantjn_q rays of the errly Morn:inr; sun, do m which the two IT boPts vere trA.velinrt, he ~;:id bAen unoble to 0-i stinruish any- rAcognit1on sign, ls. •Iencc he had
f'ired upo:1 tr ship . Tie r1ec}f'rl'Yl Unt b~ trcmght he · RS doi'1f; his cluty. J\130,
be sRiri thet at the ti:18 he h d -r-:.r0d upon t 10 0 sl--i:-c's r r1011vy enemy f'ir rf'id on
Anzio ·1as in rro ress, a;-1d he ind:ic~ted tbflt h'3 t 1"ought :rerhnps the bonbing
had beAn ti:1"3d to coincide ''lith an attri ck upon hipr•ing h~,r enemy E bor=>ts •
0
0
0
0
.Af'ter snne rrgmnent bPc 1,;: A-nd forth, the IT //'201
to :,ard. A'1zio.
Rnd heflded
tt4
1
t:(
,,
.Tu:-:t RS the Fm ½orts ~ot ~_nto th0 l1rrbor, the third enem:r nir rnid of the
l"lorri:l ng strrted, "l."'ld t,l10 TT '1?01 Pncl / 1'21-S cru:i.sed ~rou>1d the }·qrbor 1rhile the
enemy unsuccessfullv bonbed shipping. 11.t PlO the FT f'201 ~nil rT /!?16 drff'l up
Plone;side shippine; tied "t i'11zio dock, '1.nd Q-9nerr-l ClnrJr nnri. his r"rty debrrked.
rrr;:msnortntion ,"'3 rustled ur, flnd Ge'1err 1 Clrirk ···ent im..1119dirtely to the corrnnd
~
�50
post of Generi=tl Lucas . General Clri:'.'k conferr9d with the VI Corps ConnP.nder Pnd
~rged upon him the necessity of .sn ir,1mediate attP ck which he fixed for Sux1dny
morning. He pointed out to Gc:merrl Lucas the fPct thPt full ridv2ntage of the
landing could only be tAken by bold Pnrl aggres"1ive action,ay,rl thPt delAy now
•rould only perr'lit the enemy to build up forces orrosite the Fifth Army amphibious force .
0
Following this conference GenerPl Clr,r1c re-ernbPrkAd rnrl returned to the
Volturno mout h, transferrinsi; to storn boat and crir successively Hnd reaching
h·is comnHnct post ~,et from sprry anc1 waves v1hich he.d been shipped in the storm
boats .
Today the N 1 v;cmce party for Gen0rn 1 012 rk I s personal section at the TP c tical GP a.t the new beachhead was embarked . This consisted of Sgt . Don, CpL
Shusteric and Cpl. Yermolovich, with the General I s jeep, on MP ;jeep, a second
living van and the radio jeep with two operators . S MP 1 s were also taken
along as a personal guard for the Gener81. This p8rty accompanied a group of
officers and men selected frol'1 each section in the 1-TeadquJJrters necessary to
the operPtion of a small Tecticn,l Conmnnd Fost . GenerPl Clrrk plA.ns to divide
his time between the regular command po,;t end the be2 chhead comwnd post.
At General Clark ' s direction ris conmancJ rost ras moved todriy from the
palace gro1Jnds at Caserta to n hillside Just south of Presenzano-., The r,1oving
W,9S done in the absence of GenerPl Cl'="rl~ on his trip to Anz:i.o , a,1;d was largely
completed by the time he returnecl .
I
'T'he following important messRges were received anr1 dispatched today:
For Lucas fron Gruenther . RN 2005 . "CIFC, T'!F'.D believes coordination be tween Arm.~r and 1\dmiral 10,n·y not close enough . :sspeciall;f as regerds 2bility
to receive shiDping . See Lowry and 8dVise . u
From Lucas to Clark. RN 72 . 11 Recent inform<>tion incHc~tes 45th Division
enroute . In accordance with my messe,ge 60 , will start corps attack tomorrow . 11
From Lucas to Gruenther . rJRN . "Armored counterettack force from 1st Arrnorecl
Division now available . Consists of 2 br.ttali.ons tanks , one bPtt a l ion of 0rtlllery, one battnlion of infrintry. 11
Gener2l Clrrk today received a short note from General VJilson , Comrr;:,nrier-inChief, Allied Force Heec3']unrters , thanking him for his many courtesies during the
latter's visit to Fifth Army Headqurrters rnd extending his best wishes for the
present campaign.
*
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*
FRBSE 1,TZANO--JA11JUARY 29, l 9M.1---Today General ClArk re!"la ined Pt his command post
except for a short trip by jeep to hnve a discussion with GenerPl Welker, Cof'ln°nd.ing the 36th Division , concerning the pror;ress of that oj vision in its rittack. l\.t
1130 General Devers rrrived, conferred 11dth Gener11l Clark Abont t}'ie org1rnization
of the ~rnerican forces in the theater Pnd about the rro1sress beiri.c; nr->.de in planning
for /\. 'f\iIL rmd OVV:RLOR.D .
Throughout the day the General received f'reqmmt r1 essar;es concernin~ the
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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Clark, Mark W. Diaries
Subject
The topic of the resource
Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984.
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns.
United States—History, Military—20th century.
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950.
Publisher
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The Citadel Archives & Museum
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Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
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CP Clark
Relation
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Mark W. Clark Collection
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application/pdf
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English
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Text
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mark W. Clark Diary, January 1 - 28, 1944
Subject
The topic of the resource
Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns
United States—History, Military—20th century
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from January 1-January 28, 1944.
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
CP Clark
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Citadel Archives and Museum
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
Format
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application/pdf
Language
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English
Type
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Text
Identifier
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1565
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Text
50
post of Generi=tl Lucas . General Clri:'.'k conferr9d with the VI Corps ConnP.nder Pnd
~rged upon him the necessity of .sn ir,1mediate attP ck which he fixed for Sux1dny
morning. He pointed out to Gc:merrl Lucas the fPct thPt full ridv2ntage of the
landing could only be tAken by bold Pnrl aggres"1ive action,ay,rl thPt delAy now
•rould only perr'lit the enemy to build up forces orrosite the Fifth Army amphibious force .
0
Following this conference GenerPl Clr,r1c re-ernbPrkAd rnrl returned to the
Volturno mout h, transferrinsi; to storn boat and crir successively Hnd reaching
h·is comnHnct post ~,et from sprry anc1 waves v1hich he.d been shipped in the storm
boats .
Today the N 1 v;cmce party for Gen0rn 1 012 rk I s personal section at the TP c tical GP a.t the new beachhead was embarked . This consisted of Sgt . Don, CpL
Shusteric and Cpl. Yermolovich, with the General I s jeep, on MP ;jeep, a second
living van and the radio jeep with two operators . S MP 1 s were also taken
along as a personal guard for the Gener81. This p8rty accompanied a group of
officers and men selected frol'1 each section in the 1-TeadquJJrters necessary to
the operPtion of a small Tecticn,l Conmnnd Fost . GenerPl Clrrk plA.ns to divide
his time between the regular command po,;t end the be2 chhead comwnd post.
At General Clark ' s direction ris conmancJ rost ras moved todriy from the
palace gro1Jnds at Caserta to n hillside Just south of Presenzano-., The r,1oving
W,9S done in the absence of GenerPl Cl'="rl~ on his trip to Anz:i.o , a,1;d was largely
completed by the time he returnecl .
I
'T'he following important messRges were received anr1 dispatched today:
For Lucas fron Gruenther . RN 2005 . "CIFC, T'!F'.D believes coordination be tween Arm.~r and 1\dmiral 10,n·y not close enough . :sspeciall;f as regerds 2bility
to receive shiDping . See Lowry and 8dVise . u
From Lucas to Clark. RN 72 . 11 Recent inform<>tion incHc~tes 45th Division
enroute . In accordance with my messe,ge 60 , will start corps attack tomorrow . 11
From Lucas to Gruenther . rJRN . "Armored counterettack force from 1st Arrnorecl
Division now available . Consists of 2 br.ttali.ons tanks , one bPtt a l ion of 0rtlllery, one battnlion of infrintry. 11
Gener2l Clrrk today received a short note from General VJilson , Comrr;:,nrier-inChief, Allied Force Heec3']unrters , thanking him for his many courtesies during the
latter's visit to Fifth Army Headqurrters rnd extending his best wishes for the
present campaign.
*
*
*
FRBSE 1,TZANO--JA11JUARY 29, l 9M.1---Today General ClArk re!"la ined Pt his command post
except for a short trip by jeep to hnve a discussion with GenerPl Welker, Cof'ln°nd.ing the 36th Division , concerning the pror;ress of that oj vision in its rittack. l\.t
1130 General Devers rrrived, conferred 11dth Gener11l Clark Abont t}'ie org1rnization
of the ~rnerican forces in the theater Pnd about the rro1sress beiri.c; nr->.de in planning
for /\. 'f\iIL rmd OVV:RLOR.D .
Throughout the day the General received f'reqmmt r1 essar;es concernin~ the
�.:)
\
situation on the VI Corps -"'ront .
In the pf'ternoon Gen0ral Clrr1 r r!et<Jrnineo th~t h':l "0" 1 ld go in the 1'1orninp;
b7 plane or y lT bof"t to the Anzi.o front i_n order to 1'1A.ke sure thnt P grePt
effort to push +>or,vard "es b0inr: r.arl.e by the VI Corrs . As the lrnding strip
a.t Anzio wris reporterl unf1V, j_lrble , tre Gener~l deter,.,.,irv':lc to ~o by fT bort Pnd
al9rted the ti"o era t sta•1dj n~ 'ri:r at Ic-;ch:i n. to be rePr'y for a trip the fol l o !'1; nr: day .
DurinCl' the n;r-r-t , a st;:,ff o+>:::'icAr froT"l tb, II Corrs brought :in P mcssag8
to Gen8rnl Clnrk thn.t the 1rc" Alrreri i:in Di vision 1° 0. ,,..8., ched P roint cc 1 s~_der P bly in ar1 wince of' tln 14th D"vision on ·:its 18ft And thnt the Algeri"'n Division hrid this uncovP-red its le.,..t flnnk . It '7ould ½e nn.,bl to hold thPt position unless th0 3/_th ::-i:tvision vras rble to "dv•1 nce to r correspoYJ.ding eYte 11t.
Thj_s SR."1':l 'n.f'ormr-ition had ril-ren.ry, hour0ver , hAen rn.ssed on to tb.e Arny G-3.
1
0
0
To remove th-i R thrent to t, e left fl1:nk of' tlie 3rd Alrseri, n flivision , the
1/}?nd Roginentn 1 Corr bn t 'l'ean is orrlered to r~ove "'ronnrl the b- ck of the 34th
Division , pass ow~r the RP"Y"Jjrlo Bt the French br-id'"ere:=id rmr'I tPke ur 8 rosition
to nrotect tl·e left flar 1~ o.,. ➔;he 17rench Pnc" fill ~n the rossjblv d.8n15erous W'P
bet ,,.,een the 3rd P lp;8rir>n ;,.-,,c" t}'c, 34th 1 ivisions . BecPuse o:.' the concentration
of' t r oops in f ront of Cnsaino , the l4?nd cl'ln be spi.red to alli=ivir,te tl--iis
thrert and also give g-.ceater rmnchi.n1r ro,nr 011 tr8 drive towPrd Cairo 1:nd
Vaunt Corna .
Th9 follovrin½ if"rortant r1 essaP-es vere receivod
P11d
r'isp1 tched today:
I'ersonPl to Clar1-c +>ron Lucas . R.J R5 . 11 All r.vnilrble L..;T 1 s unloPded by
lf:~00 . Exrcict othFJr 9rrivP1s .r.-roT'l ·rarles br 0 ?00 . )T'lendid. resiilts i.n nnlo:or'ing
are c'ne to nArfect c0orc'H m"tion bet·veen Army :1110 !Ta·ry. I p3rsonn lly con "'erred
"'it,h Lowry v0sterdr, , and ·re £'re :!n troro 1g' nccord on R.11 c- 1,ir:;-ing detrils .
F~v·1l str--"'+> .<>11d my rerrese11tati.ves nre in .,nti,.,,8.te rJaily contrct n."lcl 10r7, in
close hr>rrnony 1111d close coor0ration nt '111 tir1es . 11
Pers0·111.l to L11c1>.s f'ror1 Clnrk . R'' 59ES . 11 lhve t·,m jPers f'nrl nn offjc9r
mlic'1 e rnet lt-A'1Arn 1 Dev8rs r, nd Ge11ern 1 F.;,:,ker R nc" t ·ro ot:b =:r offic9rs r> t LCT A.lonps ide ½ertr in port of Anzio m~oo hours Sundriy, 30 J9nu~ry • 11
1
}ersorn~l to ~1""rk -f'rorq Lucas . nr>y . 11 ,;P,rithP.r clenr . Sef"> cr,lm. Lerdjng
elements !+5th Divis'i_o~ (le3s 1'7qth Tn-"rintr,) st9rtin°, to debnr1· . Good proi:;ress
in unlondh1G buU· carP·o -rrom Lib8rties duri11(1' ni~ht . ::neJ11y 9ir ti-ds !'"lor11iYlg
fail8d to dam., n-e Dort . 11
Perso11Al. to Clflrk fron Lucas . R r 05 . 11 In furtr0r0nce of Corns coordinrted
attn ck, 30 ,Janunr:r , O"'e aivision nttPc cs tonif~:bt to secure line of Ro"1e - Ci sternr,
r11ilroad so ::i.s to n'ain roan fo:r f\9ssnr;e of Armor .
,ituntion bein~ developed on
the 11est flPn 1<:: . TTarmon in:ttfotes pctjv., r~cmmnissance tHs rfternooYl north,,est
of Gorrocr-ita 8601'30 .
/ill rro all m t toF>o,,..rov or nt nnce j f co 1di·~io·'ls warr<Jnt . 11
1
1
fer.sonr,l to ,1cA.s "ro~ Clnrk . 'JR' . 11 Ho,e yo,1 "l0re ::-ble to jni.tirite n.r,gressive r>ct~on by 1st 11nd 1rd Divic:ions rursur-i'"t to my ·'"""'+;ructions esterr'!ny. Reports from ~rou i. 1dicrite li.ttl8 nr no rrlv!lnce . Adv'i,"'0 . "il1 see you tnmorrmr .
~T lr-iter . 11
1
�5J
Jer'1onp l f'rori Lucas to Cl rk. -i:p qa .
r lease 1~ef Pr my 0 5. 11
HAp;~0sc;iV9 Pction Plre11d
initinted .
Re f,=n •9nce yo'J.r 577 ,
ferso'1al f'ron Luc'l.S to ClPrlr . R'T 101. 11 2L, L~T ' s 1J.11loP.'1ed this dnte . I1Tr,v-_r
re-rorts these :,re the onl y "hi_ns of' th.is t .mo in the An z i.o aren . Im-r9r2tive tl,rt
the remrind.er Li.Sth Div'si~11 2nd oth9r rPrrin~ni'lP' Co"'b t troors be '"or»rrded ,Jithout r1 el.?y . Request th t ou -rush sbjf""' 0 nts -"ro,., 1 Tarln.s RTA" ,·hile ..,e, th'3r ,nd
sea cnncl ~t io11.s renPin f'rivorr½le . 11
0
Ge>1rm'< l Four-e , CoT"mrndi.ria the I.II Air Support Co"""'Pnd , clisratched th3 f'ollm" :inr. cPl) 1_e to th.e Cor:..,,,, ndinn; r--"ficer , '7Qth '}roun , P'1d '1ent 0 cor,y to Grm0rPl ClArlr .
11 }leRRe
co11.vey to Co~..,11.11.d ~nP" r·"f'_•cer , 9Crth Sf.lnrdron , 1--iis ilots 11"" mechrirics
tr e /ln z io ~re., . Srlondid . K0ep
~ac1-i en9n, r rlrn~ sbot rin'-:-n '1f88 's the reirrf'orcerP>1t rnd ridvn.nce o" the
mv conc;:r11tu1°ti_ons -f'or r,-,sul ts obtr i.ni:ic1 OV/"3l"
shoot~n~ .
Fifth Prry. 11
Tod.ay, i'1 rec1ronse to Fl CF1 1,l8 f'ro 111 Lt . Gen . Frrr1 :::ry•, Chief of Jtnff of tre
All ied Cent ral ~edit8rrD110A.n ""'orces , G,..,'1'=Jr."1 Clr-rlr c,ent ' 1 long lettAr to Generr,l
!\.le:,rnnc'ler in whi.ch 1'8 descri'bec! tlie -nifth ~r,,,,~r C'iturtion 011 n.11 f'roritri , the Pnemy
situr>ti.o::i , Fi+'t h ! r ny nlnns "':or tl e f'11ture , rrobrble 3nemy int".mtio'"'3 Pnd his
.,..ecomrn9ndnti.ons .
*
*
*
r 1P.'31~ T'3ll. ·JO- - TA. TTT!\.P_Y
JO , 1 "4l. --~" rly in t}-,e ,..,ornirw , rs soon "S flyi11.r; WPS ,~ossil-le ,
Ge-nerP 1 Clr>rk sent Lt. Co l. Suth,~rlrnd by cub rl."ne ~o fhd. out tr e st:-te of the
sr-,2 flt t',e r 0·1th of the Volt11rno , in or der to decide 'Jhetb3r wa'b:>r1r,,tion T:-os ros S"hle i.'1 stor;;, boPts . Tr•is report beinr; "avorRble , th8 G"'terMl rnr1ioed his t"ro
T,,., 1s to '":,..,et hi.m o-F'f tJ,e T"outr o:' th," ri V9r Mt l? o I cloc 1 noon . At 0900 th0r0. :,r {
ri ved V!> ior G "1.,:irfll Slo0n , Co"''nnnc'Jar o+> tJ-,9 B8th Division no"T in 'forth Afrjcp ,
"nd P.ric;,,.,ciier Ger.9r;:,l Kurtz (}-,j_.-, rrtillery cor-~rnr1er) . The Q,9nerql riscu-=-sed
t ese o<'fic,-,rs V"'r i o' JS 1 1 nstj 0'13 co'1c8r11~ n.c; t e .>3,'th Dj vision ond jts co"'cH tion
"\'T i t rGsr8 ct to e'7lr7oV'"'J.e'1t . At noo tr0 G-fm8rF1 le£'t J-ijs cnrw1."'11d rost '),r cub
p l P.11.e ::i11.c" +>J.,= to r. s t Al Volt urno , ,-,}i9re he 1~nd8il. 011 . ., roFd tnct ·ms riGt by ri C"'r
n
find trilrrm to tl-ie r~V'3r '~i.il.e . ' TerP , r,.9~0rMl Rr"nr , r t. ~ol . Sutr9rl..,nd , r:r . ,er>cb ,
Sp;t s . 'I'½o'"'9" , Cb...,ney and Tfolden hr>cl "lI'9'lrl.' Mrrivor-1 •inc" ·r0re JT9rr·red to e"bqrl: .
':'he :rnrtv "e-i.t cfo=n to the :ci.ver mouth -in stor·, ho!>ts rncl T~et the I'l' 1 s Rt l "05 .
1
'"'jt},)
0
0
GenAra1 Cl:or1i: "'rriYPd ;-,t ,hzi_o Pt 1515 n.nrl Pt once weYJ.t to th,-, new }'j+'tr l1r,-.,_y
4.dvnnce Co111~ .,y'J rost , '-jc1 h:-id beGn 1ricl out th9 rrececti..n,:,; n-"t9rnoo-i. flnd in the
\
8"'rl~· -rqrt of tod1.·r i.n A. p-i:r9 ,..,,.ove. 7'1 t e rrrc1i.rd, of' t,l--o r...,1PC'3 of Jrince Bo_rP'hese ' ju ,t nortr. of Tett, 1 no . .;-Pn°r 1 r:1r-,-,l• rt 0nce '9''t to vj -;j_t Vt Corrs ·1.nd
ti,en the 1st frmorer'l T:ivi.sion . •·e f'onrd t},o orro"'~tio,.., +o tr0 VI Corrs st,~oni:-rer
-tl-1 an , '1d hren ~nrJic·ted ,,v ti.,,A re'"'ort~ se11t +,o . :::-osenznnc , ncd r0. f'lso fo'u1_,_ th['t
tJ,13 z""•~l'1"'1 1)u-i lrl-up liad not Ci rii. 11i 3},9rl t118 .,..orC8S OTTO' ., r '": the Fi {'tr ArrriY OP the
Cn.ssino {'rant ['S 1 .,~ been hope , rs thP ~e~M..., n -"orcos orr0~i"a tl-ie he:ocrhe,.,d rere
lrr~el~.r -"rr~ ,..,·~or~ elsff·l--i rn .
0
0
Generrl CJ.n,~', rirnCTt"'C1 C,,hle '!°Cl0 to +,;1 e F'ift JrMV r,~ ,.:tirecVrvr 4:,h.-,t f' ""8(~1. cr 1 of'f'j C P,' ~ nitb '11.l.i'l'.';rJ"'nt nnc1 h0lr be ,e11t +,o ti10 AdV..,'1C'3 ':I 1~y .,..irst "Vr il" le
tr'"'.11srort rtion .
0
�53
Cable J1006 +>roT"' Fiftt Ar-m..y CJ to CG, VI Corl s not·i f'i<>c< rll c0,.,c9r110. t'1rt
the 16Sth Br'1e Gro,1.r ·ri lJ i:1ov9 to ST"C'rI.I', "''1'1 corie under co,.,,rrv:ind r/' VI C0rrs
rrovisjo'1ally 011 the rii17ht 1/2 .,.,Phru~r:r. A s;-1,,,ll "nrnce :r"-rty, ~ncl1 J.di11g the
Bri gacle Cor1N1'1d0r, "l.rri ves S":::Hr,.L]~ 1 r~ 31 Jan1 1Pr7.
G9nArA l C:!.rirk 1 s o
f'
Pl.
notes -"'nr toda;v "'ollow:
go:
' All i_,1+>or:"'~tion ~ncic<>t0c t'-,~t tb, c,ne,..,,., is hivjnf-: ci•rr~c,11ty -ln P'"1senbli.ng forces 0'1 "'ront of' 71 Corrs. r,:;-,·c con'>~ rl0rs it o.o v~ tr 1 ·i m:•ort· nee to t'l 1~e
eve,..,, Pdv-=:intr ":9 o"" tl-~ s f~ct by pres1i11r, 011r 11rlw·nce •·dth th9 utmost enerr;;7 so
r,s to estroy tl e rmeri;v forcc_;s in c'letPil "'S t"l'\'l rrrive in t e 1).qttlA r-irea nnd
to r.reve11.t :r---~n1 "'ro1'"1J. hold:inC' ur our r-tt11C 1'S vrith cor:irer~t:ively ,renk f'orces behinr1 Hl icb he c~n co11ceritrrt9 +>or E' r!'ljor cou'1t9r "'ttack. 1 Tith thn, rosp')ct
o"' th8 b::iJ.ance of /1,5 Div . Rrrivi.nP' in the bridg9heaii sbortly, r,:;:nc C()l'nicJ.9rs
sorie .,,.isks c::,n 1 trik9'7 [ r-d re s11f"F;ests thrt r.Jll ef'forts srould now be ur.::-ently
Je
c011centrnted on +'ull seal:: cror--:i1111-l:.ed Pttrc 1rs to cPrture C1..,Tffi'IA a"YJ.d CA~TOL ~Ql-r<; -rollo-red hy A. rpr-id nc'v"nce o'1 V"'LLSTRI. CI'TC nuld liYe G9nerrl Clrirk 1 s
PpfrAciA.tion on rres8nt situ~tio11. c,·rc is c~ncArned Pt l"'.C1' o.t> up-to-c'lt:1te in+'or~~tion fron th9 hPttl9 nren esrec~::illy in r9g~r0 to tre stren1th and nrture
of tre o-r:rosi.tion "nrt th9 5q,ressio11.s ,,,nr:i rlPns of Cof'1m9nder VI Cor's 'Vithout
wrich ~t js dif .. ic 1lt to dfrn,ct and rlr11 o:;erPtions c'1 the r~st of the f'ro11t or
to ensm~o the T'1ost ef'fective use of th.e sir f'r,rces PV'.li.lflble to surrort tre
oper1.t10:1"' . 1
0
1
11 T
1
1.
repliAd
['S
+>oJ.10•7s:
.,.,,"· f''Y '1'.I'R'.."TG';'H Al'ZIO rECT'I' .
En9r•y f'orces ~n the ANZ 7 0 D.reA. Are e1 11-iw·lent to 3-rlus riivi~ior<' ,·,i..th
c>bout 175 knvs . Tt is esti'11Atec1 tr"t the enemy c"n incr2~se tris "'crce by r,p:rroxinrtely thr'":e :>ck!itio'1,"'1 cliv·1 sio1.s ry 5 rebruPry.
1st Tn+'r,.:ritr,r :8iv:ision (Dr)
1rd Jn+>R.ntr~r :Division
1 Rc.nr8r 7311.s rlus SC' 0 th J'rcht Bn.
5C'/¥th Ircht ReO'irvmt
1st Armored Division (less CoTT1½nt Co1'11['ncl
170th RCT
11
B")
_"b . n.y 1800 bours, 30 ,Tam1r>ry it is expected thrt ½r lnnce of 4 5th Division ,,,~11 1-iflve l0nded . VI Corr<' nill have 1t thnt tiriP the 0quiwi.lent of alr:'O ;t 11- <liv 4 sions, •·rith Pl•rroxiro'ltely ?L1-r, tnnks (150 tCJ.n 1rs ''ith 1st .'\rmored ;)ivision) .
Six divisions.
('£'
these all but
0118,
i:,he 71st Division ,
CFr..
be ex-
�pected to hPVP
.§. .
o 1"10r9 thn11 t\· o-t i_rrl c; "'tre-1.clh •
TI Corns :
3/4-th Division. (short l/-1,00 in°">ntry)
,~th Division (short 3~00 inf',ntry;? regts . 141st
bPdly C 1.t ur)
Comb:o t Co,..,rriand "B"
R11d
143rd
3rd DIA (short lC1CO in-f'pntr:r)
?.rid nn~ (short ?000 ..: nf'r -ritry)
5 Division (short 1700 i11f'nntr7)
1()()0 in-f'"ntry)
56 l1i vision (short 11.00 in:"i'ntry)
"3rd Ar 1o'~ed Bri o;ade
/1-f) Division (short
f.
"nd \Je ' Zealrmd Di visio-ri (ACFF Reserve) .
~ • .hile th9re rre flrrroxiy,,ntely ~-1/2 All -i 8d division.s orro;:}ing six
e119ni;,r nivisions on +1-,..: s .,.ront , t},e AJ.li9c'I Ji ,,i_sio"ls }irve lo'"'t c011-:;:i.derPble of
t 1 r:ir effectivoness beCP.llS8 o+' s'l.ort..., r,es in erso"lne 1 <1 nd b9c1,1 re of th8 long
; 0riocl of c~nti.nuous henv:~ -f'i,-.htj n~ .
All inrlicPtio11s ojn.t to tre enerw 1 s .lrn to bold RC- rit "11 costs .
The orip;innl est..; •·ate th,.,t h9 ·1culd weah:,11 tr,9 GAR!GLI.A 1-ro-rtAl WO front to meet
the a"'lphibious lrnd..; YJP' , to ~-n 9xtent ,·,hic1-, "1r01·ld n0r,..,it t 11e n.c1vnnce o +,re
t"i +'th ArrY to t 8 FR(" r•0nP A.re~ , lr 3 not y9t m"'tP''in liz9d . :rrn:rber>d , the -:me1
1w '~as dee~ c P-C1 to li.olrl t1'e G~F ,-GJ ,- no-R '\} Iff .,..ront ( s; v dj vi ,:dons) end rt the
sam9 V ··e h.9 l'P- 3 rei nforc9d th9 r JZIO 1:1ren b7 ..,.- thdrn V"' ls ""ron the GAP.IGLIAIJOR } T'"
a 11d U:irrhth P.rriy f'ron.ts, nnd 1:Jy r""inforc0-rmts "'rom th9 north . There
h"'s bee11 nn 1in1.v0idPble delf-l~T in "'ttrc1d1'1"; the COLLI-L~ZI!\LI +'Aature C"11Sed bunf'p.vorahle we..,th'"'r rrich res,1lted in a dele;r in thA I Corrq build-up .
1 ) ,
(
VI Gor-ris Pttac1·s 30 ,fanunrv to c,spture 7 1~LL~rn11:-~LBfl ro-"'R/1,,;CATI.
The '3rd Tnf"'ntr • Divisi.on ·,iJ.1. centure CI T~RJII/1 anr then r:idvrnce on V 'LL•;TRI.
1'1t Ir1+>r1ntry Div' sion (Br) · ill cnrture birrh ri;ronnc' 301,tJ:-,,rest o-f' GT~·rzA O nncl
then ndv..,nce to ALB~~H() . 1st r.,.ored Div:i s..;_on (less Cor1br-t Comro..,nd nBtt) will
,..,.,_ss thrornrn t1'9 1st n.,.r-i_ntry Division a"ter it hrs cnrt,1r9d CAI'EOLT~O-IB r,nd
vill c·,:ecute r, fl,,,nking '70V9n9nt to t1,e left of 1st Division r+,tnckino; FR!\.JC''T'J
.,.ro11 the ·rest . Reqm'lsts h;:ive b?en ·mbrnitted +'or n.11 "'Vf':: Ir.bl'.) air rA"'ources
1
,
�to support this att:,,ck .
The "'rench Bxpedi tionrr;r Corps, 168th RCT and 142nrl RCT Pt tacked
early tod8y (?9 Januflry) to cnpture tJ1e high ground north of CASSINO . fresent
inclicritions 2.re thr,t the att1rnk is encountering strong resistAnce . 10 Cor:rs
attac1r is in progress to extF>nd its bridgehead over tl~e lower GIIRIGLIAT'JO River
and to advance north in the direction t,TJS0 1nA - .S. GIORGIA . Combat CoVir and 11 B11
is in II Corps reserve 8VAilr1 hle to cross the R/IIIDO River RS soon as the
enemy position at CASSIT1TO is outf'lanked .
0
17 .
C01'JCLTTSI01JS.
,2.. Although a fully coordinPted Att8ck, employimr all PVail2ble armor,
and all other means, will be lrnrnched on Janur-1.ry 30th b~T the VI Corps, the
strength of the enerw force in the COLLI-LAZIALI B.re11 n,-,y be such thet rrogress
will 'be slow . AnticipPting the Prrival of a British 13rirsRde Group in Italy, · it
is planned to re:l.nforce the 1st InfAntry Di vision (Br) ni th one British Brigade
Group from the 10 Corps . If practicrible logisticP lly , one RCT (US) will also
be taken -"'rom the II Corps for use as VI Corps reserve . The nrrival of these
groups in the 1-:iridgehe;:id will bring the VI Corps to the maximum strength th2t
can be maintained .
]2 . If the enemy is able to bring j n suffj_cient reinforcenents to rre verit the VI Corps from securing its objective, it 7il1 p:rob,::;bly be necessary
to assum8 the r'efensive in the Ai,TZIO area until fl hrei:fr-trrough c:cin be effected
on the GAR.:"CrLil\.FO-F~/\J IDO front . A rl.efensive line of r>ction would be indicated
unless means are found to T'laintain r> lRrger force in the A~;zro area .
1
£ · The attack tc secure tbe J1igh ground north of Cl\<'.:'.'3INO njll rrobPbly
req1 lire all availab19 -"'orces in the II Corrs and French Corps, with the exception of Corih"lt Connand "Bn Pnd weak elenents of the 36th Division . There •-rill
be no sni table unit remrdning for furt:ber sustP ined ef'fort "Jest o.c, the RAI IDO
River unless the ~nd new Zealand Division is usec1 for this :rur:rose .
£1. If the ?nd 'Tew Zealand Division is used PS indicated e,boV8 H is
estinnted tlint r•r1ditional troops 11:ill be needed for e:x:rloitation in the LIRI
Valley and to gain contPct with the VI Corrs .
~ - The 88th In-0 antry Division "rill not be ready for conbr,t rrior to
Marer, 1 , lGLi,L; •
.§1 • It is r,:,conmended that the followinp; pdditional troors be rnPde
able to the Commnnding General, Fif'th Arrriy , iMr,ediBtel;r:
0
vriil-
(1)
One British Division ·"rorn Jighth Army.
0 " rrenc h t · · · .
ne '
;1v1s1on
(3) One British Brigade Group to rerlace the group to be taken
fron the 10 Corps .
1 ,-.,
\ ?... )
]2 .
It is recomnended thPt the Bighth Army lPunch as strong an :ottAck
PS
�roris~ bJ.8 nt t ,3 '3r>rliest rossible clP.te in ord8r to hold trie mrizi,~um
on that +'ront . 1
en8 □Y
+>orce
"I l8+'t +'or the Rome fro,1t wjthnut, contecti11r; Gs110r~l t.levp,1d8r i,ut J-,r,ve
juc::t rFJceived word f'rom Gruenth0r to t11e effect t11...,t Alexander is tr,ri11i:i; bis
best to conirl:v "it}, all o+' rw r "''1uests .
1
"I c,:ir,9 1-)•r FT bor-it to Anzio tocln7. '-1°F.d horecl to f'l;r in my C- L~7 , but due
to short rrnT'TaV 011 nevr Pirfield , G8 1errils ··01re :.:inrl CP11non pc'vised "P'Pin"'t it .
Tio·'"'e to bring the phne ln Tucsdr>y in order to fly br>ck. The trip here to<"ay
,ras uneventful , in P,TePt contr:ist to our hectic trip t"m 0 r.ys nl"f'o . Incide11ta1 ly, two o+> th0 five 1 1}'0
'ere \101mcled. on th· t trir <'lied of wounns . I 2!"1 cor1m1.1nic~ti nr; '1/ll'ith~ tl1A A.....,9ricr111 •·.rr;-.V"r , P-j~1i11P, ttlen the fncts in the cn..se ~.s I SPTIT
theri, and StRtinR' +'ror /l lr-i:vr~r-in 1 ~ point o.C• V"erJ thrt it .ris rs '"'lagr:=>nt PD error
of iu,lgrnent on th8 pirt o"' n commPncler P s I have evr-ir seen.
1
"I left th8 s0u-L}v,r:r1 frrmt i'1 " eotnte of ~ ndec' sion . It i '3 lilr0 t"o ',oxers
in thA r:inr-, ½0th qbot1t to collRrse . I hrivo c01mnit,ted my lrst res9rve, r.11d I Pm
s1rre tre Bocl~e hPs don-3 the srrae . I P7 o-rentlv rl 1.s1:1rroint od in Gr,nernJ Keyes '
ef'fort to coord:i.nato the ntt nck of t he 142nd C01 h.,t Ter-T11 vrith thr,t of the 3rd
P.l,,.~r~"n Dhrjc;ion . For four c'ry"' no1'T, V·is rttnck ½Rs been neleved . The :'."rench
,.,re criticrl o-" the -initiritive o+' tl-ie l4?nd Co"1b'"'t TeP'1 and of the 34th Divi3ion
on its sc,uth . So am
I hPd intonclP.c to r9in:force success , rl"'ther th1m fn.ilure <J.nd rir, r-1 4 sarroi11ted thrit r, •1ore coord:inl."'ted Fr;:,nco-1',.r1ericr,n e "fort could
not "'.fl'Te tn. 1rnn rl0ce . I vm.s rpd.te h11rsh '7 7 tb Keyes todriy P11d hope th8t H 1rill
rrod11ee th8 res•ilts tl-i.Pt the Pttricl,;: "'8S rusb0d ho''le v,itb vigor toc!P..y.
nr have b8en cl 4 sri-rpojnter! for several days b7 the lrc 1,;: of Pggressiveness on
the rert o+' the VI Carr's, 2.lthouP"h it wo11l' h"vo >y,en VIT0"1? , 4 n .,...y opinion, .to
attack to cP..r.ture 0 1 fi.nal objective oJ'l this +'ront . :::l8CO"l'1"' 1 "c'r-nce in force
J.r
..,j-1:,}, tanh; slould 1-irve bee11 r:ore rio;gressivA to crrture GI ·rri,;R :Jl , nr G'\'}(LFO'~.
~l.epe::-itedly I hn.vo told Jue.rs to rush v~i:;;orously to g9t those locrl objectives .
Ye hns 11ot i.11"'-lsted uron thic; rrith the Divisi.o·ri Corr-iqnflers . TTi,0 11 my arrival
here -l:,oc'l"'Y, I --1As oisrp} ointed to "'~11rl th<>t nbnnt J:-,ql f o-"' our :1vribble errior
o+' the lot !trJ"lored D·ivis 4 on 1 '.ld b0en cori!"·tter1 to the rrotection of the 1st Briti3h Di vj sion I s left flrn 1' . I 'I-Jone to e'·tric0te these coEnj tments in order to
launch ::i. "'ull-out rrmor8rl. "'ttnck to th8 northuest f'rom CPrnpoleone to"1orrow. I
v!n.s likewise distrec;sod to +'ind tb,t th8 '3rd T'ivision h':d led with tr e R"n:::;er
force in jts ::ittrc1' on CI ;rn-:;n•rA . Thi, -v :=is a c"efinite error in ,jur·P'JY"ent , f0r t'he
'!:?t:ngers do not hrve tre surrort '"'8"]"0"18 tr ov~rcn'"'lr; tJ--e resiGtPnC8 .;nnicrtec'!.
Tlie fq_J_J_ncy of' t11i..3 co:--w•itrn,'3nt ),,:is been horne out by -1:,be 1Pc 1c of results toc1oy.
I hP.Ve been ht>rsh vdth Lucns torla;", rruch to ny rei:;ret, 1---,1t in ?'1 e+'f'ort to energize him to grenter effort .
1
11 I r,_ri wr,tchinv the 1 or-;.;_<"Jtic"' l huild-ur, clo ely, 1ith thA bore tr."t r;ood
•:e,-,tb,r na:r -n,,r:,~_t U'> to l"l.7 in rm oxtro stor0 o" surrlies . If I cn.n gr;t "her>d
·11t}, t•18 H"'l;ted sMprino- 11vaibble to rr.e, ·1 hor8 to bring 4 n rm f-lr"ditionPl
2t,..H:i'"P' Poree +'or
.,..,eriod of ton d::1v•,, in ord0r to obtr in rlecisive results.
At t}e er1r1 o+' thrit V"'lc, I cou1-d rryove it b,c,,. to +,'-Jo, otrAr front. It <>11 dep1=mds on 0 1 rr r-i."bility to ciuc;troin it v-},~le 1, 0 re . It rouc-;t be unr'erstood thrt tho
port cr11acit7 h3r8 1-i_.os a def;nite cejlinP;, end ·e crn ""rintn.in 0'11,r 'lT'rrovir,,,tely
"'our divis".ons . P-nv cxtn1 I im"ort for a sn{3ci~1 :,ission rmst bA wdntPinr"Jd out
of surrlus store;d up dur~nr; p="riods 0 ➔1 good wer:tl:v"r. 11
a
�FREs,-;,•r7,AIJO-- J:'I eITJ~'llY 31 , 1 g4L,---r:-,rly this morn-i ni:r Gc"1err J. Clrrl· .. e'lt to the 3rd
Divi ion er, n):-,fo}1 is locrt8d "t Bor~o 1 "ontello on tre ror.d f'rom ·rettuno to
';isternr>. . Her8 he t8l1
red ,·fith GPn9r':l mru"'cott , Genernl fawns , Gr,n~r-il T~:--P'les
:CJ,"').(1 Colo-1. 1 Dnrb ~.
}fe :'.:Ol'"J.(1., to his ('lj stre'-'r,, thr>t t 10 b11ttA lions of DrrJ.:i;· 1 8
Rrngers ·:rl·ich hrrl. n+,tf'l.cl.;:ed Ci -,tern:-- vesterd:,,.y mor'1.i np; lirid been cut off an~. rnu"lt
be crmsidered 8S entirely lost . Tb.e 1rd Division rerort'3cl throt it 1·ms rl()eting
heav r res·:str>nce, not merely 3cntt0r~nl1' or:nosi_t~o11 . Gr·1.0r"l Clr-r1, then went to
the Feadriuarters 1st .A,,.P'-0•'ed Di ric:ion 71--t-,re kl net Ge'1"'rr 1'1 Jinrrion rnd I enney.
Gen'"r:il J 1cns "llso C".me to tJ, is rnreting . G0·1."r,"l I',--rron wrs rl,out to lrunch PD
attPck ton11rd Str7.ione di Cai-oroleorn~ . f.f'tpr Ge'1.9rnls H"r~on ann J enn9y hf'd
11'1-ree0 betw e""1_ theriselves 0"1 certPin 1.uestio·,1S rl.eelinr:; with Generr>l µ,.,rf'on 1 s
re.ssn.P"e thrru':h the l'.lri tis!l l st ,·Yvis ion, t]~':l col1.f'ert=mc"' enr1ec'l and Gen9rc- 1
Cl;:,r 1 rGt1rrn°d to >1is Corrmnnr'l Foc-t .
•
0
1
0
I
1
1
1
0
Lnter in Vie r,+'ternoon G0n9rPl Clrir 1:: le'1rnnrl thrt Gen~rrl Prr~·on ½Ad ""et
heavy oproc;ition ,:,11cl m['.ffT "'1nns . I'is effort wr> s U'1.S 1cc9ssful, Rncl i,., Pd withdra:rm.
1
I
I
"T½e situ... tion \-ii;rn ~"' -U+'fjcult . Th9 9'1.emy l'1 rolrP·'1_q bis rrP.S8'1.t f'ro:it
i.n co::::rtnct n~t 11 our troo s ·":ith tre /,th Pirborne Divisi.o,... , the 1r~1 .:)ivi::;ion re~nforced r,-ir] ,. "th tre rer""rn f;.oerin:" D:ivi '4on . ':'r'1.1rs nrA A1cmint9red on all
front"' .
heprcl. , +'or t;e f'irst ti..,e tr~c; ,-orniyr, thrt 3rd J:iV'J..sion hr>rl em:ilo;ired -'::.wo Ranger bn.J..,talions --: n t1~0"r 2ttr,cl' r.i_.-1--,t before 7.nst on Ci-.ter'1.c .
Roth o:-~ tl ese bn.ttalio:11s 'T8re "nn-:.hilated . I thin1' thP.ir pL.<>nninr; wrs frulty,
altho11r,J-, Luc;cis , tru::;cott and f1r,r1Jy e.11 e~Tressf')d their op~nions t o ne thAt the
plans ',.'er0 •1ell thou½ht out. To enploy li.<;ht forces in such an rttPck , in r,y
orinfon , was 1msound . 3rd DiviGion attacked Ciatrirnn tJ,is ..,+'ternoon ' ithout
Rir ::mp,..ort , rl.11e to brd v1en.thr:ir (Ps a1Jeged by tr·e Air Cor s) .
!eather vms
,ntirely -~-vorahlo h9r9, r>nd :'.n e ,.,.,ess"W' .,..rom Gru9ntr.9r to ·e , he rerortecl
m11ther cle .... r ri.t ot1·1;Jr end . f..t 190( toni,..,.it Tru,cott rnrorti'ld to ,.,.,e tl. . Pt the
si.brt:i.o'1. '7f'S '"tfo':y ancl progr0ss ,...o,..t cUf'ficult PP;.' i 11,..t heavy r0sist<'nce . He
told r,r:; ti,-' G morn~ '1."' t-:,...,.,,t th., +'::_O'ht-i nr: tl'e 3r :;-li vi"lion h"c1 n, 1countered ·,,,,s the
-r:iost dj: .,..ic·1lt it 't d e:x:1."'91~ienced d1
1rins the rr9s,=mt wer . For tre 1rd Division
to maJ·e th-is p('lr~-i ssi on ~ s i11.r'~ crtive o+> tlie rlet9rl'1in, :.ion o" the enem-r to hold .
0
1
0
Due to +.he lf't9n.8S'3 of tl10 dPte of' rttnc 1 ri]l el8rrtAl'ltS 0~ t: e 1st A.rr ored
-,
[' 1rl the f'n ct t',r t ·\l1ey G"1Cl"Ul1.f:.Arcc
i.ne 3 in th0 I",rir o+' t ·. . ri 1st Br·• tic· h
f"'v·ision, their efforts tn burst fr ::--th Pnd hrrfass the n,11.eny cid ·-iot reP.ch "'irst
0
Dj vi '3 ~ O"'..
1::>a 3 9 •
I a.ttcnrl,,rl a co11fer9rce "bcut noon i>.t 1st Ar,.,,ored D:lvision, ··,here :,ucas
discuc;sed th9 situ."'tio"1 •ritl--i Ten:n--:Jy and ;·ar" en. I w.,,s 'orri"c' ever t o. enerv
hu~ ld-up 011 0 1 1.r "8St "'l:i.n1• :inr1 tre odge od½9 s~tu"ti.ori in the VI Cor-::.'s on tl 5 s
front . 3;;t}i ~n()'incors , rf[1r, on 1 s ~n.c>p,,rtr:~ rYJ.r1 so~·e Brit-i.sh ·rr>r3 J::olcl-i11; tre line
a;<>:::"s·t, "'ti ~f resistance . T-:le'Yf'"mt--: o.t:> trc '~>5th "nrl ·n 5t½ G9rr•on '"livisi on hflve
)Oen iclent:i -ri8d on t 11 :i.s ·"'ro11.t . These, with -l:,1---A Li.th f 0 rn.chute Divis::_o'1., int1.ct
0"1 t},r,t f'ro'1.t i'Y1 ic-"'te to J11e tre -r:oss:i.b~lity of a GAr,- n trrust f'':;"i.n~t tris
'19Ctor. --r sucl• shoU 7 '1 occur, •;9 hrv-, li.ttlo to orrose it . Lucns jg re-ori;n~1.iz~hP'
8nd lias ,.., ,_.., cod the 157th Coribrt Te;,_m ~ n th' t , rec' . The 170th is beini:: "Ii trdr[~•m
:'rorn the east f'l11nk ."nCi r,.,, 1,~c,~r'l by the 1Gth ~11C'~r1°ers. TH'3 rrill -ut the !,,5th
Divjsion, l9ss 0 1e co~l-)pt ten,, i'1 Corrs reserve .
1
�11 It is ny est i , te, Pnrl I hrve "nriic· ter, to Lucn.s tJ,-,,,t ,·,hen Cistornr is
reR.Ch'3d and tl'e l:1t 1riti c.ih Di vision J.:t..-,v · YJ.P: reR.cred CE1r-:ro leon8, ~nrt]r,r offensive eff'oc:t by the 'TI Corp"' is out o:f' the nivrntion -Por t'1e t2..rr0 bi=dn ,;. There
r-i.~e t, 10 e-rieri.y· rlj vi .-;ions on e ·.tr "'r c;j rie cf' the road 7 ,,r c -; n~ north "'r m,, nzio .
If tlLse struc 1r sir:ultn.neously t 1 1e situ, t,; on 1 10uld hCJ rlFficult . It is rw be lief th..,t ·e r,ust tpl,:e a rosition in rerd; ness, ""i.nirnizing the dcneer 0·1 the
east f'1Fm 1· , enphPsizin"' it on th"o "Ost -"l..,11 1• ·rit'.1 tb, '3rd Jjvision in dertr in
tJ1e Ci~tA1~r..p rrCJr ~,r r,,•"nr1 tn cou-'lter,,ttrcl.c to the 'ec;t, ·•:ttJ-· f;J,e 1st Britisl-1
11iviflion in r~e,·t11 in tl'e Cr- ,olAnne ['T'(Jf' nrepr:~e,1 tc COU'1t r'-'tt"c1· in either
r1 ire ction with t},e /i,5th Divi,:;ion bss ::i. cor1rt te/lo in cor:rc.i resr,rve nell 11.orth
of Anzio enr1 ·1ith rarnon just ~n th9 rear n""' the 1st British Div~sion pr"T"red
<'or a li,.,,itecl o"fe'.1s;vc t !'1-1',t to r"~,orr--orjze tJ-,n oro'7y l"'nrl :in a co1 mtGrettacJr
role to Aith9r fl.~nk . llSt<>r t e '1ffct Jritisr. br-'g.,.-,,'e r,;roup comes in , I rrorose
to brin~ in on9 ~,or3 British br-i 2:, de ';!'our rnd :m Ji;r1 e:l"icPn. co"'!bnt tean . This
..ril1 rPke the hri ip;"hn.rc1 more secitre, altl-ioup;h ov rt1-1z its sur,nly crir,bility
flnd 0;ive us a cl-:trnce for offensive Pction.
0
0
0
"The ~e;r~"Pl 'h<'S ~rrro•ri,,,ntel, "~ve d-'vi:-iors cnnf'ront-inc; us no", with
c,·1other j'YJ. q-: r-11t, P";<-in~t our four .
le hrv9 1.0 C'l"nce , in 1-riy op~nion., to re2ch
Colli L2zi,'-'1i rire'1 Rf:;Hi'1e;t the orrositi.on "'a::sec1 jn th-t vidn"'ty. Should U~e
enemy r8.:'1.ize 011r ~nr 1ili.ty to re2cr this ob,jective , Pnd ·:ith ris i:-rr,nrent
c> 1)il~t:v to "10ve c1ivisio"1S f'ro11'l tJ.ie ....,ort]~ .. h never r quired , b~ r ay c'lecide tl~"t
t 110 onort'mitv :is present to ri;ive tlie Alli9s R. r"lvArse. Should . e r,ovn., rnc' I
an s1-tre he hns the CP"''l.b:iljt:r, t 1'!0 or t},ree r1ore divisions i'7to this ~ren , ,'e
\
·vwild h;:,ve d:t-'"ficulty r,<>j·1tri::nic1~ mi.r;;CJlves . : hr've r· sol11tio>1 ',hich I nf:ill
.,..res9nt to GenAr" 1 7 ex2nc'er toriorro" t}, t 9n-,:: S[' ~es ., celn.y in fa'TVJL bec,.,use
it i'"' rerfectl; 2pr"r9nt t'ht thA VI Co:r''"S TreRc1 ·1u11rt9rs My' th9 3rd P'1ri /,5tl" Divisions C"'11 not b9 evtr1crted i11 +,i.me. It brinn;s 1 1S f''lce to ""2ce FHh tre rerilization thrt '70 n"'ve n. co"!r itnent en om· hrnds ··r1Jic'1 ""ust ½e "'urrlied rnd •_p'YJ.trined
throu,:,}, l 81:111S o-"' crrft :f'or sone t~"l8 mtil tr0 Cr:::-sino +'roYJ.t is built ur sufficiently to bren k t~1rourh . A better pl" n , in -,v or~ nio;1 , ~ould be to l"!ass I" 11
me"ns jn thn l'ed.itc~rn..n1;ri.11 - 11, D11 il;~ou1, n"V"'l anri Pir - "nC lr,uncl" rnother Cor:;-s
rmnhibious [lttaclr of' t 10 cl-ivision.s , 1ref2rr½l, t,J~e /~t}, Tnrlif'n, or~ Britis}, div:isio11, n..nd tre 155th 11ot 1<>ter tl"Yl Ti'e1,rurr· 15th in 11n rttPck on C:.vitr-ivecch:La .
It 'l01J. 7 rl 1-:ie "'racticr71y- unoprosec . I should r" 1<9 fl lrmc1 in1s on the b81lches at
ei.th0r side . One clivision could hold tl e rort, wr:118 anothor noved rr~idly on
Rorie to 1,J.oc1; the vri.thr1 rPwal of troor, orvosin/"1' tre VI Corns . In 1'1:V orinion it
hn.s sreRt rossibilHiAs rind shou 7.d be dnne . ThA 'Javy '"Jill sr>y, 11 imro~si'Jle 11 , but
:it caY\ ')e rlcn-. "n( 10 1li ';iife us F clrnce to tr['r t' 9 Q9r,nrns on t1--e Cr ssino f'::-cmt.
I '1Pve iust tro'1--;ht o·r +-,ri:1 } lan and "lill ~ive it norCJ st1 1d r torri~ht , r11d if I
r:nr11101'.nsurmo·ntn.ble obstPcles wil1 prese11.t it to AlexRnrler to orrow . FRir
• eather ;''Ve us 0 noth9r orport11'1~t - to U'110P.C1 [' J.pr~e l'I'l0·1nt of "urrlios .
e r,re
i'1 .ctoorl. shRne, e-rcept f'or pr~mun5tion.
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Perso11::>l Cl"rk to r:ruenth9r . fl.~T OQl{. 111 101"1 crn Spadgor Corr>s o+> ? Divisio·1s
Cl".lrT'V' 0-1 tl--ie jmp9tU3 of /~~ roes ~l8X,"11('9r unrlPrstn.nr1 thP. no.,,ible nece sit;,r of
,ls:lvi:-: ro;,,e of trj_s force if' :;,resent 1:tt11 c1c1 "re ui1succe3sful? 11
i'erson11l Gr 1ent)1er to Cl. rk . R1J 657 . tt1Ar,,.nitzer i·1dicr1tes thf't 'l.lexa11der
•1ill rrobn.bly be rl:llucta"'lt to coT 14 t rr->rt of Spac--;rir Force rs surrr;ested in ~'our
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i·'p'essio"l is t 1r t \leYDnder visu:--lizes fl sit1rtio·, ,..,,1ereb;r Jrad½"'r Corrs
rjF-;ht 1,e forcec to trih? over sector no'r occupfod by 3rd J1I>'\. and 1/,.t:t I"ivj sion .
''ill niscuss r0ints r::,isefl in :ro'n~ rries::1pa9 -1l'en Lerrinitzer cones J-,ere U is Rfternoon . Your GOJJ.. ccr10 sl5 r;},tl:r garbled but : believe 1 nnderstr>nc_ your c1e-:,ire.
See rw next ""8SS"C:8 reference TndiPn Jivjr;ion f'or non p9rsonr>l flddress .
1
Frorri Fi"t:1 "..rni;,r to FFth rr-iy Pdv Cl - R'T 65? _tt}'0urth Ind1n.n Division has
been ordered f'rom T~j_r,hth Army to Sradger Force . rove,.,,ent \"ill be1dn t(might . tt
rersonnl Glnrlr -fron Qrmmt},er - R' 701 - 11 Ler'l Y,88 'ln"bln to throw •ouch
1:-l l"ht 011. Ale".'1nder rlrin e"'CP-,t to co..,f';,,..r ,,..eluct,.,nce to use pr rt of :;rndi:;er
Corrs . In f8rsorv11· riesseg8 to I eese, l\lexP.nd r st,-,ted , 11 1 r1J:in to er-rlov Jew
?:ealancl D.;vision north of C:Rssino r1~rect8rl on /lrcGtt . LeM sq-r--:; tbere h::-s 1)een
1
no rlisc1rsion o-"' S''.Cf' a rJr>n . He bel iPves th"t Ale' rinrler his no c efiY1ite plrn
but is w 1..,::ti11g d8VeloF1P.nts rn 'Till triH· to you rnc' f'l'rlger . Srrdger v-isit8d
..-,rench Corn" n.nr1 II Go,,.rs tod::i y . 'IP. sa"' Juin but 1ot Keyes . ft presfmt he ar T'9"T'"l to be coy,rluetinr- recc:--•1n1:1~<1scnce only f'nd hris o-ivon no i11,"iCPtion of' hjs
in..,entions . Alexandc,r 1 s decj sio11 to gc- to /lnzio to,,i rht ''f1S n SU(1den oYJ.e , but
he [l ssur"'ld 1811 ~ t /1.S notr; nr to clc vr~ t}, s lowne'1s of VI Corrs a,1 v:-,nce . }Te S" id
h0 ,just wn.nted to tPl 1,,. to G nerPl ~lriri• .
He l'F'Y re.-,"in rit Anzio Tuesday nig t .
He js •,rina-i-no; h"'"' 1,it J unc'erstr1r1d . }le v:isited T'cCreerr this e~"ternoon. I
w1s 1 11jte pess:iristic ov1c1r s;tuqtion here lrst nip½t ,,.Pter I returrn~d fro1"1 Juin
Keyes conference . T feel Jetter r-bn' t ~t tonight . -,nem7 )'"S everyth"np; cornr-dtted , Pnd : bcilieve "le will tri.1'.:e CAssino . Vo '9VP..,.., no blitz is 1ndicrted .
Keyes "Ji 11 p;iwi no 9S-Si~Ate . "'ine j s Febru,.,ry 6tJ- - I J-,ope . 11
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1 RSS~F'l,A'TO-- F~B~TT~RY l , 19/)j.--G ,n~rnl J\l ,:Pnd,.r .nrriv d b;r destro.r0r pt, the con•rorinc' ro"t 11.t Anzio at about 0730 ancl cr "l Pt once to Gener,.,l Clar'k: 1 s co· r-nn'' post .
'7ith hin uer"l ~e'lt"!ral }'nrding rrir1 his 1--.i1it8TY Pnd nRV/'.11 rides . Cr .n~r"l Cl,,,rk
at once hr>d t:1 S"lrious cnri.versetiori. "-"Tith ,...,..,nerPl Al-:ixBndl')r rbout th"' J.-,tt ... r 1 i:- sup-
rosition thrt '31-T 'G-LE hnrl not 1,,"'n e:,._'T'loit"ld n.s rnrinl'r "S icir: t h~·ve b"'!en the .f
C"se . G"rJ.~rt:'l Clr-rl' noint~d ont ti--,..,t s""ri0us orrosition hAd b en m,t b·,. thn VI
Con1s , r>n-1 +,hrt there '"8.S no vrlid. r;ro1ryi -"'or rli_ssqtj_;;':'Pction ,,-·th th, rrocrress \
""ade . 'I'h"l G,..n")rr l nent on to outlin~ +'or C'r ,n,,r" 1 A1,,., ~AnJ0r tbe rro•,osed o:--erc ti.on At Civi.tn.vecc ~iP descri', ,cl in ycst"lrcl.<'Y ' s diRry. G"lnerr, l /1 lev-::md""r nnd
G~neral P..,rd"-nq; ap.,..,,a,,..,d to l,e tri1·cn nooc1· by tre sur;p;"'!stio'Yl ,-ind cc,uld only state
thA.t it :nres"nted 7 or-i--:;ti.c,:,-il dF'ficnlti~s . ·.ro this G~·v"r:> 1 Cl<>r 1r.: sa ~a , "C v .rco!"e
tJ-, ... ! 11 P'"l fl" id trnt ,., 11 tr"t , 0,1lc' ~ n111cess"r r ,.,.011ld be for Gen,,rr 1 Alexenc'"lr
to P'1"t fn,...iral Cunnjn'"'·r.,"' nnd ttrub his nose ·h11 tr,e rroposAl nntil the l'r11-1irr-il
coll,:,ct'1d th, n,cessrir" crnft tc lrnd ,:it th~ ro-5.rits ~n r:pJ.estion . Th'1 results,
G':)rt"'!rol Slsr'· said , wnnl.rl. ITT'~Rtl:r ,ri.hnnc"' Gn 1."';rP l ·"..l~'':Elnd ,r Is r~ru+ntion n s ".
il~tary co .....,..,n.nrll')r . G"YJ.ernl Clr,...1 "'u.rt'h r srirl -t-;J-,rat r,, hed no ennc""rn ris to ·vho
('
cor--,...and,d th~ or,r'-'tion or vho <;ot the cr,oit +>or it; wh~t h~ · :~bed to s"e WP.. S
th, r ."''llts . "o ,,,.v,r , Qn11,-..r~l C1Pr 1". snjcl ... ;..,,...,t i.f G,..-1.r'lr,.,l ~lJ-~pnr er ·ish"d hi to
t'lk"l th-is n~1 r,r0i ,ct i1e 011ld do it "rrl 1cu1 r1 sncc~ed in it . In "'nY 9V"'YJ.t ,
frl"n"'rRl c1...,,~,, s.'."'id 1 df'y sro·1lil. b" Febru"rv JSth "n.d ,wt lrter , "'S til'le i_3 rrecious ,
and t. 11'~ op,..rntio11 ~ruln b" ~ onrit"'ld b. th"t t~r r'; ~ {' s•1f'f'i_c~ "'nt ,n ,rr:y 'l re, •~isrl "V~d .
l
G~n rPl !le"Ca ,dP.r P'1(1 Gl')n~r"l ;r.. rdiri,-r ½otr sric'l th"l.
th"'l r ,<itter v0rr '1"')rio1rnl~·.
1
7r 1 1ld
hf'V
to ccris5cPr
�Fol,_o"".;1'10" t11-t.s tr11( , G~nf:}rr>l Cl,r1r , G"lner'1.l P.l~'rancer rind G·,nl"lrRl rrrding
vi"'it~d the CF o"' VI Cor,..,•c,, '3rd D.;vi<,ion ,,,...,,~ the 1st Ar11ored Divic:ion. Th ,,'f
th "ll return"ld to lllYlCt"' [: t t½, CO"''•qn,i rost . \ +'ter lw1ch G~n4'rE' 1 Cl nrlr, ; ho bnd
S1lJ11"'oned .; s G-/,,7 to t 1'1" '11"J' ly-coT rl~t~a lPnr'-'1,,.,. 9+,,...ir rt r . . ttuno , -int .r"'fl. 1°:i s
rl~'1e Pnd set oPf f'or 1 '""rc·ir'ni~r; , JSCorted hy f0ur Sr"tfirf'.'!s ,v'~ich ,..,,d been on
t ., lrm.ding strip ""nd lrd b"'l1"'1 hci tily ordered to t,"'ke off . Thfa '111.provised
escort ·ras Dl"Jcecgrir rs t " ,"'Cort -:-r"lvinusly, 1•rpnr,ed ·ritl: th"' •rI= J\ir ~urp0rt
C0"1""Pnrl h-1d. f'n.:lE'!d to nrriv~ , (lll~ tot!-:~ "'urrositio'1 ('"'1 tt,.;r r~rt thPt the
weath"lr 1.ade .(>lyinr; .:rrrPcticaol,~ . G.n ,rel Cl""r1r "'i"lC. r~s escort lrnd"lrl S"::r-ily
£'t Parc;"'n1se ,..i~ld , ri11.c G.,n"lr,l Cl<>r1 G"mer;-,} :,~'7 7 8 '1.nd Lt . Col. 'intJ:-11•rlrnd
::,
r,t,n·n"<l. to tlie co """Pnr rost jn cnh~ . I ... ,d-'..,t,ly uy;on ri8 r"lturn t1"3 G n r"'J.
c1-ir;cu<1s d ,,.;th '}~r.rPl ,rU"''1+r.,r +,i-, •·ln.n ·rH-;h f'"' hrcl proroq,c_ to G,n,rP.l
Al~~-ann".lr '"no. obt . . ~1,d .-,ro·• G "nrt=il Gru,ntl~ r the J~test r~rorts on tre C,ss:i.no
oper"+,-tons .
0
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-rsn"1nl to l\lexanc'l"r "ro"' Clrirl:. :?.'I 1117. "}reSPF1t '"'(1 -icrot~cns .,..," -'.:.rot
CasJi'10 h i··h+,s -,;_ll ,~ -;~;:-'t1T:' v~r;r soo,, . :;:+, "u,c ;1,si--;t 'l'" T"<>terfrlly ir,
-ror-ul"'ti."'<"' ,T'f "'nt11••p ;- 7 "'"'8 i+' .ro11_ C0'1 1.ci ~,,,,q-i_cr-t, no r -1) ,.,,~ss'o·1 'ric1 you cont •11 1 ,t'.'.l for tJ-,"l >m1 r;- .r "'ore, . I d,-,~r, to rit:ov V1ic; "'ore~ to --1v""nce nortr·:rest i·1. +,},~ Llri V- ll~y 'l;'~'W tlie II Car:-''' to Jl'"'tect t'1~ r~ c"}-t -r:::_nnlr of tr,
0DPC1 ger Fore~ .
II Corrs ·,ill rirlvsYJCC -: n th" r'~.rectior T"re 7 l4'-Ro°C'1. )~CCP <>·1d
"t . C<>st ,llo "'J - I~'°'d~~0·1t ,-Rocca ;l"C'CA. .
·r 'ncl• Co:,,r, J.:;o Pdvrnce 011 ttirn Pnd
t r--·1c~ on ..;o:-P . JJec-·<:.-:o- nn ':•r,d'=-~r Fore~ 3}'0'1ld ,..,, rcr·ched Ft 1d rut i.11to "f'f~ct
fr'"J'A'J.i,:,t~ly 1.11 order t:1rt l'T}'rit "'Y"f' ,t'J.s t 11~r"' 78 l,..ft to Fi::'th Arc;/ s011tli')rn e.ttrlc'r sJ,-,011ld not b" lost ."
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Pr~s /'1ZA'J(~--1<"8BF.Uil.RY 2 , J_0/,4--'ft ,r t8 1-:::::i_ 1 ,.p; err' o·r 8 hervy p CCUT"UlF tio'1 o+' Fr .r
•s10r'r r·-yl b:l.c"cl-i"1.0' ...,.ooc'by, to 1 "j . G~n . ro11,:; ,,
is r-,turni11rt to the 'n:te<1 Str-tes
rp,cl to Drii:;('l.diF-r Geri, ral ''ax
ro ~"
,ro
p-oin,: to join tlie 8:-'11.d 1\.ir1,orn, Division iJ'l ,n'1'1Pnc1., f}nn"'ral CJ,.,r'" l~+'t 'is ·!"'a-1 ,..,u,•~'t,rs ~.t lJ.C'() iours to ,,~nit t·,o
o"' 1·.::'s Corrs Co~J1rincfors . At the II Corn:: CI, G"l"'erf'l Cl.<>rk con±:'"lrrec vritli 'rij .
G...,n . Kcy~s C0'1C i·nin<:; tl • si-SUA.tion Pl0'1P' t½"' II Corr::. -"'ront, A.nr' rlrinr for tJ e
i'"-~ediPte +'uture . The situFti.on is -reirly gr,od, fllthougl· tre Ger,.,,nns rre still
resi-tinrr stuhhornly, r2rtic 1lPrlv 'l.rO'P1r th-· lr~y c1P-f ... nse roint of Cassino .
(}rm ,rn l Clrr 1 told G"!·-1 ral Y~:ns thr>t r'~ nrofos~d to r-ov
:
th"" TStri Di vj si.on f9rthe:~ to th~ nort'') so tJ.i.rt 5t could strik, west alonn; t 1 e r ~ g0 p:round nc.rth of
C:::;_ssino . GenJrPl ~"r<"}•rb11rg 1 s 'Jew ZeA.lr-ncl Div-: sion ,.,.ould tl "''1. h us~r' to c<ttack
alono- th~ Liri River 1o rl.<>nrs . The _3/{,th Division ·roulc'l join th, 16th jn this
vest"'rn thrust north of Grssino . G"ln""r·1l C1Pr1c l1incr."'c1 with G.. n~r"l 1:~_.,..s .,nd
sc"'- of ~-"' stn.-rf o"'fic"'rs r>nd th""n left -"'or the Fr~nch ":Xf"lditionrr.r Cor::--,s corr, r..,n'i :~o-:it iust rl-iove V""r"-rro . l\.r·,,.iv~nr; ~t t1-l"! '"rrincr Cor-rs , G~n.. rPl ClFrk '7Ps
rn ,,t h G~n"rnls Juin , 11d il.oosev 1 t, nnd '1"'! ,.. ,nt · r , ~ai~t~ly : nto tJ, , corps ap
room to i1~ SC'lSS plflns rith G"!'1 .rel Juin . Th., t"7o :-'re11c1- djvisio-1S ·~ill no i turn
t'h jr R.ttack northvmrd striking e lo:rig the :riorth- soutr ronf ler.di'1': to ·prd J\t:: nD .
G.... n rr>.l Jujn -:mirl th1t ;~e hf\d rec.,,.iVeQ l , 000 '1ntive replPc ,~ent::; ,~rort TTorth
A"ricP r.ind t11r>t r_,, wns r')ady tc-, jur-r off 0n tle 9+,tac1, at i=my Vye . G,n~rnl
Clrir-: sa~.d tl1""t th. otr r divis:lo:ris jo-inil'lP- .;11 .l,:,h, ntb.cl: conld not bt'l Y'c<JPCY
1uite so quickl:,. In fnct it rrobrhly '1011lrl be :cm·· or f·'.ve cfavs bP-+'or~ the
ne' offrmsivc co 12ld ,~ lf'·mch~d . Tn1n~::--inq 11bout •-.rencl-i r ,fl"ce "nts , G"'n"'r~1
'P<i rl_or ,
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�Clerk learn ,d thn.t 0t!1r-r nntives nrn rca(v to sriil +'ror "orth 11:fric<"' but thrt
the rrincinal -r,,r"'net' rl'lrlr..c~r ~nt nrobl~n ''P'S in Fr ,nch o•~f'ic"rs r,y' non-corwission~d
o.c>fic~rs . T11"•ir" nr~ -rew r~rlrocem.nts for t 11es~ '""l")n , nio"'t of \-'orn hnve J.rd to
sca·0, fro fr;~nce . G~n~rc1 l ,Tuin rromj sed t rt his Gonr11s v;culd take r1011nt c.- :ro
nnd that tre"T 11ro11ld rln11t the '1trrs n.:r-cl ~tripes n.nd the French Tricolor on the
crest o:' the 'll01A7.ta;n . G~n..ral c1~rt: SP.id tbrt if' 7,he Gourns took t..,e !"ountain
he want~d the ricolor t0 fly f;,bove tre Jters anc. 3trip,s . G"neral ,Tuin c greed
vigorously nith G~n"!rn.l Clprlr tbnt 11 He .,..,rt 1reep the ½riyonet f'°!rr~tur lly in tl·e
r·un ' s behind" , if 1e r1r~ going to s ove 1--d r:- bn ck raridl Y . Gen .ral Clnrk also
lenrn .d thr>t "' Gnn rnl of th~ /~th I"ldinn Divisio:-1 WP. s in thf'! French a::..·en torlay
lookinc- oveir the t~.,..rn.in to see if Tndi"'n trr,ops could Pight in th':l countr;v Fh~re
the French di.visions nre now rushing +'orw[lrd . G,.,n~rril Cl;,rk l"\;{fTessed ris objec tion to tres" o-"'fi_c ,rs goi11r; ~ nto th., section whrm "t ms not his :;1:-n to employ
eith"lr th~ /!,tr- ·~"ldfan Divi3iori or t11c ~ evr ZP,[llPnd Divi ~ion in this f'IOuntPinous
country. G~n~ral Clar 1• 1.-,ft th-, Fre11cr Corra reric.quarters n'1.rl :,--etnrn-n.d to his
0'7n advPnc~ co r "'nd post Pt Fr~se'1zr-no .
Upon returnin-,, he ~nform0d GencrPl 1ru,nth ,r of' ris d"scu-::sio'1s with G ner<>ls K"'Jy ,s R"'.(' Tuin a11r• t.11 ,n cnri.ferred br:i~f'ly 'Vith Colon~l Sul7_:ir11, th"? Arry
';ut=1 rterr,,ns~ ~r , · ho 11r d cone up "'ror~ th : r~nr Jche lon, ri bout nro hl~ s of t rr;•y
sur l·r.
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}-ff-; )r; T7A'Tf' --Y ~3FFFIRY 3, 1944--G"'"l rnl ClPrk too1<- off +>ro~, tl"e ;:;'ifth 11 r,,,.,y- co' rand
rost strip 1-:Jy cul) t>t OR/!,5 t is r orn1ng. B:19 arr-:v~d nt th, JO CorJ s striT' 11t
£> bout 0900 l 1ours wher" ' ~ , JI? s r•"'lt ½y G.rin~r" 1
cC:r er;r th , Corr s Cor '"lntl.-,r rnd
proc .,dee! tn T{ePri.'JU"'rt ,rs 0 01 Gu:-.rds BrirrR.de 1h .re 11, ,1_,,t F2j . Gen . Gr")gson-Ellis ,
Co.,.rrnd-:na th., Sth British Divjsio"l , Ms Brirr::idJ Co"'!"a11r1,,rs ,-.-rir1 oth r o+'fic~rs .
P.-"ter ::i )ri"l-r c0·1,:_rnltE'tion ,jt11 thes~ o""''ic,rs, the A.rrv Cor anner rroc~ccled to
Tufo wher~ h~ sp ,nt snT'l, ti,•e in two OP 1 s o½s,.rvi'1P' th, terr['in rind discussi'1n'
tr e 10 Corps Ptt;:, c'r ..,:i tr +,he Corrs Com•!J.nc,er . G~11~rr 1 ClPrlc took of'f fro'! th~
sb· ip , r~turn-inF to >1,s co.,.,,,.,,Pnd post Rt 1175 .
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G .nern.l Alexrind"'r hr>c1 exrresscd n _,rish to r -i<::cuss '7it11 G".!n rrl Cl"r 1,.,. t11e \
VA.rio11s "'rohl ,l:13 fpcirir.; tl1 "'\ ~.rrriy Co :r2nder on tre nz-i.o and Cr>ssino :ronts. Accorc'l-i•1r;l:0, ..,t RP_ roxill'atelr l//)0 G .n r l Cl"'r-!{ fl"li•r by cub rlr->nl'l to CE>sertP ,
"'h ,re le lPnded b~• tl-i"' Hat .. rfr 11 ::rnrl "ent b~f CQr to Genl"Jrf11 Alex3.nr1er I s hMd q11art..,rr1, •1rh,r"l h, co11f~rrt"lil -"or aqrox" "t,ly i=i.11 hour ·ith Gen~rals Ple'Cf'1,ler
and ,-,re; v.rp· b ,-"ore l'')tnrnj nrr to ris CO"'r•pnn post by Cllb .
0
The frr,.y Cor'"Pnoer re-c•')ived t h , f'oll◊'·;'1ro- T"CS ra') "'rori }1js Chief of -·taff
tl-Jis r>ft rr:oon ''Tho W"S up Pt the new brir'geheRd rre8 checki.,,,g 0;1 the ituation .
Rr . 18°. 11 Fnve seen Lnc:Y, . H~ feels .,,£'irlY cw·fortnblr, r>bout ,~resent situr> t"on. ~Jo 1 nd:cr>tio11s y~t o-r- rajor attnc\: . Does not nlen to ·-,~thdraw 1st Div.,
but ''il] be n"'cessn:c,r to ,dthdrAvr '.lrd Div . JiouP'hnuts r>ml linuor h"'V"'\ hnd v'oncerful ~"".l:>ect . 11
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TTpon l'l"!C"lip+. of .._,r~ 8 bove C' bl~' th~ ~r1117 Co•'1~,nnc1~r disr:>tc1~~r1 the .,..ollm inr- cicr)l., to Gn,n~rr.l Lueras .
PJ 14/,/!, . "Gru~nth~r r~rortq sitw tion ·rell in
h<Pnd . .,,"{r.: .ct to fly up cAturc'.~y riornjnr- nnd loo1·' the ciiturition ov~r . Arn 17,lPd
3rd Division is b~i'1'; orrr,rin-1zed nn_ T'l"ced in ri P1orJ coi"p"ct situr+.ion 'h<1r~ it
can ~ith"lr rep ,1 collnt.,rattack or later, at Pn ar ropriat~ ti , , ,.,1{e Pn ::ill out
e.ssr-mlt O"l Cister'1.a .
'ir- 11'\a}~in~ r,lnns .ror "JJ out w·srult h~re.
ill "'ivc you
1
1
�the details
0.,1
Sr-turda'r.
lt .~r-rds . 11
G~n rl'l Clf'r1" .,..,iceiv d r- C"rile +>ror, Adnirnl Lo'TY th 1 Con•.an<ler of 'I'i:,sk
Force ;¥81 in , hich r"' ~}.Tr~ssed rd.s ple,,sur~ f't norldnP, ,.,jth tl,e Fifth Army
P.nd :bis hop'"! for R aui ck junction :l n Ror ,e .
G~n~r!':'l Tl'te , Fi+'th ArPly G- k , todPV subf'!itt1'd a rl"'rort to
Corr~anrl'!)r r,-,p;nrfli.na trc '~ur,pl "';_turition Rt Anzio . The rerort
th-, suppl • 9itw,tion in g ,n"'rl' 1 -is Sl'l.t:i.sfr- ctory for the troops
excert for E>rtiller:, RP"'mnition . Ad justT'lcnts in the surrly of
nition ar, ~i11~ ca.de driily 'by tht"! 1c;rr - trucv n<1tror .
the Fifth l\rr y
.<>sscrted th0t
no ::r in th.._, ar1'P
nrtill .r.r Br rm-
The ~ nfnntry r"'rl::> c"..,,~nt sj tuntion -in Fifth Army is b"'cor,inrr r11or, :, cute
ev .ry rla.y. A+.'ter co-1siderf'ble ,tuc1 y o+' the nrobl ,ni, G('mernl Cli:irk c..,1-iled
G,Jr~ral Dev~rs as f'ollff1s: 'R,'T l/~09 . 11 Inr~r>ntr rePl'"'Cr)T ent s-itu0 tion in Fifth
rr,y is ~xtr(Y el-r s~rio11s . Fresfl:l'1t srortar s i 11 6 i. vi sio'1s nm· ,Yceed <S , 00C' .
Nunh•·r rr"s~ntly f'W,~ lPbll"J in r'"°'rot is 800 , whicri ~ncludes '3CC ..l ich hrve been
co werted to i nfPnt:r-y from. oth"'r bro.nch ,s . CP sun lti,,,,s j n tl-ie 3rd Di vi 1ion c1.lone
totnl ?L,00 of 7},-i ch only 900 c1re non- bri+,tl'1 . Total United Stftt~s er sunlti~s in
VT Corps nre rro . In-~rntr:r "'hortn½e :n '3L.th liv:5sion is 1'300 . In '36tr Division '3000 . J r~sent o-r~r tions involve sirnultn.n~ous U"e of' all di.visions "nd re q,1-i.re tbrit T /o str na;ths b"l • a.:ht.., in":!d .
1
1
0
ttr urgentl:r r1'corari~nd BS n ,..,,,.,tt"'r of Of"!rPtj onn 1 n~Ce"'sity thrt 1000 infrn tr~r rP-plncl':l'llents ')~ t.ri}cn f'ror, 85th T)ivision r>nd "'r~rm .d h"lr~ b:r f;:,stest nvnilnble r A1ns. I 1-iPvc fllr'"lndv r'lir~c+,cc1 that infantr:r r,.,.rlrcer ~nts b, t£1k"'n ~rm~
88th Divis-ton "n~n :t nr-rjves , ½ut I desire to liriit thPt nu.,...ber to minirnu,'ll Pbs0lutcly n~cesser·r. Th,re rr~ rlso shorter;es in artill~rv, P"!d;_ccil l'nd enr;in"!ers,
but t "'Y P.r"' not y"\t r.rjtj cal.
0
"I ;-, lso 1 1rt-:~ thr,t cverythhi.r• rossihl~ b"' dnn~ to ~1ove u-r th~ F~bru"ry r>nd
~•o;_rch li f'ts o+> r~r'lncer-~nts fr01., th~ Un:i tcd Jtc1tes rim' +,o e'r.-,edite shipPent to
Itn ly of RTUS fro, ·rorth l\fricr . } leP s~ E>dvj se ~ct-ion t<i 1,.""n• 11
*
*
L,,
1'1'"'cE,gA' 0 - -Ti'.,..,B,'tF~qy
1944- -At 0G00 tMs ,...or11hw G,')l•"lrrl Cl;-,r 1,. r~ceiv1'd G•n~r, 1 I
Ke•r~s, .Tu jn f''1d R")11Clt"lr i.n J.-,~s hut . Th") '":ll[)j~ct ().(> tris conf""r"'1C~ ,~<>s thr. rro- \
ro:;,d r"'nrrl'nr,~:--.-int oft},,. forc~s on th~ Cr>ssino front, in vi~·~ o+' -:.he Rrdw·l r+>
th~ 'L' '.fonln.nd Gorns, Cor n_,yl..,d b· G~n~r,,l Fr~•hurr, . Bri~f'lv ,t.-.t"'rl, G.. 11,rnl
Clrr1" 1 '3 tl-io110'ht, n,3 ror0s~d to G,n,rPl .Tuin, ''PS ti-nt 1-ir-i 3J.-,oulrl Ce'"'S') to ,....0ve
1-ii s Corps on At.-i.n;:, 8 nrl r .-ori_Pnt T-ii s e+>+>ort to-erd Ter~lle - 11.occa .,.eccr . GPvi~r;, l
Glar 1( propos"?d to reJi ,v~ th, -:i;t11 DivisioP fro,.. ~t:J rr .s..,11t ro"itionP ['3 soon r>s
;os~ibl"' 11 '1rl disrhc~ :it. north of th, '3/i-t • JT_ th"!n T'ropo'l"'f to rut the ·rew ~eelrnG D-ivision in jnst s011th on trc Crssi.no +'')<1t11r~ FITJ.d b8Vt" ~t strjk~ north,·est,..,~,-.i1 up ti-ii'\ I ir-i iT:,11.-n. Gen~ral Juin ir .,.,~dilltel:v '7'!'8Sn"'r t'fi~ fnct t1-i_nt this
rlrn i.nvolv"?d P r1 esir11.})l_~ CC'"lC ,ntr['ti.0'1 of' norc rl'1t'h"'!r· trJ:1'1 1licr~rsi.011 of jt.
H"' st;:ited, ho ·•w ,r, thrit h, .,.nst 1-irv~ r-rot, ct-i.on on tr~ nort'fi 0f l,i s rr~s~nt
position ·h":\r~ ~_+, :=i.r•join .d the ";-iP-}'th t\rllly. G~n~ral Glrr1' rrordser1 to lnok into
tlie 1Jucstion of' Its. 1 "irn. n.'1.c: ro'"'s-ibly so e .l1 m"ricr'1 troors to h lr the si'1~le co,.,,bat t,.11 , 11.i er f'}~,ii-r<- 1 Juin ·,rps ri hl , to l""f v . 011 tl c n0rtr.
�G
3
nu ,st-ioYJ.s -j,-wolv"'d :i11 th"! ~r,,rlo~:fl'.'lt'mt o.,.. th, l,T"'w 7,en 1 r'nd Corps. G~n"'lrr:l Fr,.,yburg )
stater thrt 'r:i:, r~conneissorice 'R.S in proP-r~ss ,110 thrt i11 two cir '3 he could get
th'3 'Ie·'T 7,e" lanc'lers -in rosi tfon r;outri of Cassj rio to 11:oVl'; north'"'"'st ur the Liri
Vr,l 1 J.T .
At luncl1 GenP-rnl Cler1c r-ece:i.vcd nn.ior G"ln rr>l r·cI"n.hon Rn,'l. ;h,ior G•nerc>l Rob"lrtson , Co....,'""Pn<'F"'P: the ~th and "nd TT . S . Jnfnntrv Divisions r1'spectiv.,.ly.
Thl"lse o+'f'icers, ·•hose 11.11i.-':.s r>,re 'lo.., in th!'! lritish IslP,s, hn.v"-' co""e wjtr '1°rue of
their 0°"fiCC"Y'8 to Itrily to studv actual or~rp-'",~ ons . G... ri~rn 1 01::T"lr "'urnishcd
t},eTII w'th ,je"lt'S ['''.\d recor'1[-)7"'Si1.'1Ce CATS Awl <J.rrflnrr.~d for tri~ 1 1 to visit II Corrs
where tr"l~r would o-,,.t experience ~ n actual ,mrfare 11s c0nd11ct~r "'.:,oca.r.
In the r-> "'t,.,r-r1oon GenPrnl Juin r ,turn~d yrj_t}, G1'YJ.l"!r,l CPrpl'!ntier f1ncl Colon~l
Cherriere . G~ner a l Cl Arl,. to l d G~n"lrnl ,Tuin thnt "' hprl fcund r flllw rundred
Itqlirn troops to reinforce G~ner'11 .Tuin 1 s north~rn flPnk . G .n~rr,l J,1in erir:erly
strotecl thrt YJ.f"! 'WS renrlv to ta," ur the n,w r>ttnck Terclle - Roccasecca . G.n~r~l
Clr:- 1r, rr"'n"!r::il Gru.-mtr~r and Gen ,rr> 1 TPte P 11 v~ o;orousl7 a::rner-tcn , howeve r, t hr-i t
thl"?rc , •ust b" econoni.~r exerci s~d by G"'n rn 1 ,Juin in tl-i~ cc11c;u~ption of artill~ry
11.n11,unition , as r, hrd h~en b 1 1r'1in½ nor"'l thFr ::>n;r oth ,r nn:'t . Genr.,r"'l Juin s11.id
thf't i-,.., 1rn ':V it , ')ut' ,~1-i"'l'1 his soldiers su":erec1 hePVY cr"'!urltj~s r·1r'i 9till hnd
to hold on , the onl-r rr-y 1 1, 1
,m~',r to ricco·-:rlish it ·'Tpc; to use artillery on t:re
G~rr-Pns .
0
At din'1cr G"'n~rr l Clnrl~ ""'1t"'!rtr-i in"'d Gonerri 1 P~uclAr, Golo'1el S? ltzri>n and
Lieutenant Colonel }orter .
I>1.rl7 in the ev~n:inp.: Generl?l Clrirk clictoted th~ f'ollm1iY1g +'or
in ½is dia:r:
llVj sited 10 Cor·· s yest':lrrln:r 1w cub, ,~ns """lt by G ,n~rrl , ccr--er7 :1nc tqJ·en
to the Hint11rno Pr•r1, -rhr>rc I visited thll! Sth Divinio'1 ::ind ...,,"lt its ne·.,. co~"'nYJ.cl"r,
T½.j . Gen . Gr,o;,0'1-ElliP. Pe ?nd his prLncip~l s bord 0 nrt~s i~nr s~"')d ~~ A.s being,
h-i P,'hly er-ficient 1:i->1.d likeable ch'"lfS . I 11is:i.ted tre Tu:"'o Prer> -::bere, fr/")'l\ an OI
I hnd P onoc'l. loo c flt thl"!ir '1~xt ob,ject5v"' • TTrg ,rl l'cGr•cr~r tr lnimc" an rttrc1~ 2t
the earliest possibl, drte . He fP-els hl':l r,ny not be r>ble to do it b~forl'" th.e ?th.
,rq~turned 1 cub to my co~, ,1n<i rost . Flew 1"'t 14 30 to R confr!rance v,j th
;y
G~n~1~91 l\.l,xRnd~r rl.l1d G~n1'rr>l Fr~:~ourg r>t Cf1sertR. G-,n~rr1l :!:"revhurg had been d~rected by Alexr,nder to rrep::1rP reco.,.,,Pl"lndi;tions fer h-i s e.,,.;-lo; ent -: n tJ-1~ Fi f'th
I
Ar:-.,.v frr.nt . Frevburp; hPd do'1."l tr is ·ajtl'out re-1:er~nce to Jll-,. Ji le~rrinrler hd like·11is"' :mnr'1c nlr>ns, n.11 of v;},ich emit~ un"'Jtric;.-,11-r, f'or .,-,f't~r r>ll it is T"Y job to
pr~rrre the tPcticP>l '"'lnns PYJ.c conduct the or.•~rr>tions of tre li"ifth Jrrn:y. It ·,7i;,3
EJr.rar'!'1t at th~ ½eqi11n; n,~ o ~ tbe ,.,. eti '10: thrt 15th l\:r:rr.y Group P':.d """revburg 1~re
p;oil"J.P' to tell m~ ,just Po', ni-r n xt [lttrrc 1.,. 1 ould b~ r 11de . ; ob.j ,cted rs dirlo:niF' t~callv PS no_:si~lP- . D-iffe,...~rl ~ntir.~l • 1it. h rre:rburr, 1 s end ~1.,,rmncle.~ 1 ~ v:ie1 s on
ti"'~ er•rlo, e-110 01 the YITevt lealand Corns Rnd told ther, th"t, in my orin10'1 , the
Few '3-,13. la."lriers and TndiA.ns ,-rould not get to f'irst bn.so 1wrH no; in tre Cr ss5 nof"o1n,:t Cniro "ou~1tr>inr;, t½r-t the II Corr,s 11.nd Frrmch sho1 1ld r,imin in th')re Pnd
the 'ew z~olanders car~ i.tt!'d. to thri Liri VRlle:r ,,hen tl,,,y could .,.~t "Cro"s the
Pqrido without too ""UC½ .:'ir:;htj ng . I nrg"'d thst Freyburo Rnc1 hj s co, "0 n.d be f'.lc>Sed
to 1':V control ir,,difltel,r . Thr,v fina11;,r Po/~er- to y rl<'ns, n.nd Fre.rburg VPS
pl,,ced unc1 ,r rrrr C'Y"", ,;i_11d .
I
�i,
had in handling the t.revr Zealander
Bx-plaining thPt they -rere territorial
troops, responsible only to their 1?overnnent a.nd v;e ht:'d to get Along rri th
them. I assured r.im our relations wouln. be happ:r and th::it "'e =ould T'i8.ke a
go
0
1
'
"In view o:"' certain intelligence·I had r11ceived th'.'l nir:ht before on enemy
intentions in tl10 FFth Arny l\.nzio bridgehcHd, I sent the following rad:i.oo;rRfl'I
to GencrPl Lucas:
issued to you to :=i.dwmco ;,rour left and to cr1pture Cisterna
11re hereby rescinded . You sh011ld novr consolid2.te ,·rour bePchhead and mrke
suitable disrosjtions to neet Rn attrw 1-:: . You PP~T withdraw 1st Division far th~r to south if vou consider thRt Action nclvisable . Ar<vance on ow objectives
will be r~suri'"ld later . "\::if'th~r v~rf'li tting Gru"'11th0r rill r ee ch your HePdqm1 r ters nt 1130 tor1orrow to give furth?r d"tails . Ackno··rledge . 1
1 I nstructions
11 T also sent Genornl Gruenther th~ following cl,'-'y to give hirn T'Or(~ detPils •.
I hav"" felt .Por sor•? ta no thHt it '78.s foolish for us to co11tinue to 1.raste our
stren~th on an Ptt"" ck 011 Cisternr. G8nl'JrP 1 l\.l~xanr:"r has co•1trar;7' views. I
told G'merPl Al".)xandt"lr yesterdPy -ift0rnoon th:-,t I }v .d storped th~ att~ck on
Cisterna, <>.nd h~ uas gre2tlv clisturbed . Ifo urg,:;d w, to bf>, rrep"T':ld to attack
with that division in an all- out effort to F•~t •:isternP on 48 hours 1 notice
and tolcl '"'l.e a,c,;ain that the Gtirr 1 2.ns '70uld not P.ttack in force . I differed agr in
and told hirn thnt I would not i"'astc tbe 3rc1 Division, which hPs P.lreBci.;,r hr-,d
?L~OO losses (500 losses for the entire VI Corrs) , but th"'t I would dispose the
entire corps to Peet P co1 mter1;ttack in stren~;, nnc thrm bA rrcpered to advance .
0
"Last niirht additional corroborating enemy intelligence indic~ted strong
General
Alexander received the sm,r~ infor:r",'."tion ,ond lvd hia Chief of .;t,e:,ff t,·lephovie at
1"'idnight, to "rnrn ne of ·7t. I tnl1"ed '"•ith Alexander this T"orn:ing , Fmd he vras
delighted th:-,t I hHd ta\:en the defensive rttitudo t~nporaril;,r, and hrid chrnged
his •vhole opinion .
1i "l.(r:,lj hood of a.n ~ner,1y attack j_n force FE< inst r,.y bridgehe8d rosition.
ur j,1fornf3d Pl~xand~r th2t J had heri "'revburg Pnc liis stef'f in confer~nce
1
this r·orn~_ng 1 1ith Juin , K,;y,es and my stpff rn.C: bad c irected Freyburi:; to rr"1m a
r~lief in the 16th Division sector to"1orro nio;ht A.nd thnt toraorrovr, Pt a tir~e
to b0 mutun.lly n r,;rccd upon bet,,,.,en II Corps and Fr3yburg I s Corrs the cor'T'!and
\
vmuld pass to the latter . Ti'r~yburg is sort of e 1 b•111 jn a chirn closet 1 • He
feels h~ is ~oing to win th::i 1·:nr , r>nd ''lith his 15 , 000 V'?hiclcs is going to
clutter up the rmtir~ Liri Vf'lley c1rea . Fe inr"diately clash""d crith K'3yes ,-hrm
ho 1 ndic2ted wh·c;re he ·-res '""OVinr,; artill~ry , his rrew je.<>lcnr~rs, his In6irms Pnd
other ir11p,dimenta . I turn,~d it ov,;r to r,y st2.ff, tellin'{ ?rl'lyburg that he
could noYe :into no areas until he had coordjnatcd ,-,it)~ Pll Fifth Arriy activiti ;S .
I WPS disappointed in K iyes I Attitude tov.ercl P-re:rburg r'nd sent hil" th~ follor,ing
~
J_e ~~ !
1, ver
1: '
1
' I tried to
1r,ic1.te to you tris "'lorning the i"~oortence o+> +'ri·mdly Pnd coopcrntive reJ.r,t:: ons 'Tith Gencr~l Vrcyburg .
1I
j
1
arn constrain~cl to tell ~rou thr:t I ..-as
2
littb r'lisaproj·,"ted in your
\
�scTJJ.,'"'hPt br-ll-1g~..,,,,rt .?i:.titude to-.arr:1 h~•• t 1,j"' nrn:l'l'lr; . T '1.0.i. .d "'t , n.nd G '11"rP1
Fr, rburg s:;ok, to
of it , "'1.d lrit ,r r;ro 1c to G,,.n,.r~l Gru-,ntb r conc,..rnin<" it .
T arrr .ci t, 4:-11 "rl,n( id job r011, >1riv~ b"!e'1 rloj'"'t , th ... 10·7...,. 'hc•l'r" u,pt
OU "re
7 "' -fo'Y" Cr>.ssino , rirc'I thrt tl , rov .... _,n~~ of tl·is Sft<:Cial out rutt··n3 i11. yo ·r , att
""it on to of you rr~~~11.ts rm co~~ l ,'ci'1.g r.,..-o½l"'PlS .
A
1
tl e ott ,r 1--Ja.nd , .c,: ~'le '7:··~ rlo -j nion .i..1~oops ',}- 0 a:,:·'") V ry j Aq_lous o~...
th~ir pr·,rogativcs . The Br itish hav~ -fo 1 md th~m di:"!.'ic11lt to . [>nc'le . The~r
h11v, al 'a.rs b,,'c'l "'.-''7"''1 ::::rec,;i.al -::0•,L;:lcie:~.-, ·tjon ..i:ic"' e r1· 7 c' 'lot r--'v, t0 cur ovn
troops . rl~?Se ) nr '·,',-' S :'.'..'1. -' "1_(1. I -',-.t,,.,.,,, ":,r .,,.,,. ,fl")"'r r ,lat-' ('•T1", ritli the
1 l';C'Y'"'.,..'ll e1·~cl
-niftl, Arr,o . "r· 'lrl
harry, P'1d -ol' "'U"t h~lr r11~ ell ,·ou ccn . I,
ther fore , loo 1r: to ·on -t.o ~o ,,11 01 1 t o,.. .·orr "lf' iri orc'"'r tc r•,c,1r" y jo "')<isier.
}1.erise see tre1t .ro1n• =-te1+'f (1 0~S 1,:1{,ris~ .
1 On
r, "'
' You cen ,,,,,crt ssnr"'ld t½."t · rrill
1,r•s Pr:'! r-ive'l "ull ,,.ei,,ht 1 ,re .
0
-"'ir~ ~rd ju t :'1. '11o,...i· g t'.',t yonr rrob-
1-:,
0
0
UPnt to [' ,"in tell yn:.i ' 1 0'"" c'e~, ly I arrr"'C~qt, ",re srl",'1did ;·cr1 : :·ou,
~•ell'~ ~ta·"'" anc ·our ~orJ s ' 1riv, 'on, on t' ~ Cassino ..,ront 11 11c1 ~r l"xtrP.r-el,:r t ~y:::1g
corrl~ t io11:J . 1
1:
0
11 Todn~, ::
n stec' Jl'in to c
, t~ s~"l "f l ., cc-ulrl c i.rect h:.'...s Fr nch Corr s
1 i11 the c'ir ,c";ion f"f T"'"-"' 1 "!-'tl,occ1,,secc11, inster-r' of' .;n th, direction o"'
:J.tt"IC ?"
B l·onte-Ati"''l . I }1"V~ ius t m"'t 'H'1 Mr• r,o-qjn , ·nc1 re },qv~ P.rrn1.g"'C' tris . Py
t--"'fort :is to conv~rc; tl·.,. F-r nc Gorrs , t 11~ II Cor,..," , Fr ,ybure; 1 s Corrs and the
10 Corrs into tl~e Liri VaJ.ley f'or P :'inal rune, • (See OD0r tions Instruction
'11, nl1 ic will be publisher1 to""torrow) .
0
"I no'-r ly•ve •'ive corrs under ,..,y cor"'k'l:1d , 0·1lv two of v:li.ich r>re Arn9d cr·n,
all othnrs o+> diff'0r8nt rtioneliti '"s • I t}1inv ''f1po1Pon wn.s rie;ht ·rJ,en he C'"'1e
to t 1e conclusion thP.t it was better to ::'if,1-it Allies thl'in to h=~ 011.e of them . "
*
*
*
FR"';,S'RHZf\. ~ro--F ~BB.TT-\R-l
5, 19/i/4-- In t e rnorni"lg Gen9rPl C:l"'r'-: ·rent by ;jeAT' to vi sit
tli.e Co'1I'1anrl post of' tl-ie 34th Division r-it Serv2ro anc1 gPi'1'3d a +'irst hn.nd .:def' of
the rro/7:r'ess o-r tli.8 brittle "or Crc:sino . Troop'> of' tre P3rd Infontry bve
reo.c>1Ad the outs\:irts of tt ci to· m but ri.ro m0etinq: bitter P nd det0r,.,,; ned resi s tPnce from the Gerrrns rr o r-re dug in in th0 tovm . On tl e road U:e Ganer-1 net
anrl t al1 :ed for a ·vhiln FHh Ge 11erel Yeyes 'Tho h0 hrs directec1 to re- group his
forces as decided in 'Teste ·driy 1 s co 11:f'erence , puttinrr the 30th Division in north
of Cassino to tri. 1re tre ,-1ountrin Vir-iss trer,3 .
1
::;:n the rtfternoon the '1'1n"-r 0 l rer1dned <>t t½e ccr.n~r· d ro""t, c isr-,osj11.p; of r-id rrinist~at:lve 1"1a·\,t9rs . The Qqnerl rietermined to flv to /\.:"lzio i11 tre M.orn:inr- rind
tissure M.nself' thrt th-i•10's fl.re ,:i;oi"l.g rrorPrly ti,0rc . I1:1 the n"'t9rnoon re went
by jAer to the 3Rth 1.~v~cur-tion Por;pH::i 1 , · h<1re he visited m;:iny pPtirmts wounded
on the Cn.ssino f'ront i'1 recent or9ratio-1s . At rlinYJ. ,r J-,0 0ntertnJned Lt . Col.
Wood , r.:o,,:,Pnd 4 y; (V'ficer o-r the ''103ritrl , Pn<' ~hree of h:ls of'ficers , togethPr
"lith t•r . & Trs . tltev0nso·1 of the ''7eric"'n Fed Cross .
()r,erntior,s Tnst::1uction 1tl/1- wc1s i '3sued toc'IPy ::i.nr' is 7Hoted b~lo.r:
�1. Upon t 11e c11ptuse o;-~ GA,)cTfO J-,nj_ghts Pnd the occupr>tion of n bridgehead j n LJJU V::- Uey sonth of Ci' S 1rro, Ti'i +>tr ArY'ly on the G.A.RJG-LIAJJO-~./1 I IDO front
continues tb~ -ittn.ck to the north '-''1.d .,,.,orth,vest .
11
9.. F,.,ench "':'T;ed:i tj_onPrv Corns , cons· r:tinr;
3d Alp;erj"'n Divisions , :.~einforced, will:
0""
the .,nd :!orocc::m and
(1) Attack to the ·rest, within i..ts zo 11e o-" Pction , riwJd np; its
r1n.in e,:,"'ort aloni:; the m-,'P.-SIJ,1';-n()CG ~ crr,;ccl\ tY'a il , seize RO"iGA. '3ECCA A.riri the high
gro1mr east o.(> the '"Alfa River .
n tt1e~ d~_rectfo·1 of ATrrA.
(2)
Cont~nue pr9~s1,1.r0
(3)
Vin.int<> in cont"' ct ..;j th F:ishth Arri:r.
2• II Oorrs , co11si st.; rig o.c-- tfle -~/4,tr nnO 16th Divisions nnr1 Combc't
Cori1"1P'1d n'9" , 1st frrnoreCi I'iv, .... 9~7.+'orced, 1ill:
(?) Assi,.,t t 1e "ey 7.ef"l'\11Ci Co1~·r:,s jn its cros2111f" of tbe B..t} IDO
and debonc11•--,ent "nto the LITIT V"lley.
(3)
r";ubseriurmtl~r att13clr to
t}-•9
r1orth"est vri trin its zo'1e of' l'ction.
c. ,Jrr:r Ze,-ilrmd CorDs , consistina; of' 2d 'Tew Ze'"land anr L,tb I"1dfon
DjvisionB, r'3~n"nrced , '·rill:
(1)
A<,<,enblG -in the "T TP.C'(!CTTIO fl.re:> er'>t of tre R!J IDO .
(?) Be '"'repnrec, on Army ord0r, to debouch into the I.I11I Vr:i lley,
t}1 ro 1 1_r,h oleri1ents of IT (!orps, 8.'•.ri rn0k'y ~ts rrin e+>fort n.lo,1g -.;f"-;[1','l['Y 6
attac 1c to t},e 11orthwest ,-,ithin its zone of act·o11 .
J)R"lS
,d.
10 Corns , consistir,c,; of' the 5, 1/i, ".11r
56
Divisi.o"'l.s (less 168
Pr:i..g) vrill:
(2)
CC'r stP 1
ljr-ht forcAs , r:1n..;nt1=dn cont..,ct vdt
rand .; n tJ...e direction o+> 1-,vw IA.
1 J2i'1P"
(3) rrpo"1 cnrtw·e of' 7 GTO"P.GIO bo prep['rerl.
to the nest 1:1nc1 '1o.,...tr"est . (netr ils 1 rter) .
011
th,=,, 9neriy on the
Arr1y orrer to e:;.,..,,.lo:t
�U+)
11 !~ .
l rotect
le:':t f}.[1n}r of ::'jf't'- Army.
+,"l"'l
Iristructio''.'3 f'or coorr1in"tioYJ. c,f ['rtillerY f':ires 11ill be isr:ued sep-
nrately. "
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*
fR.,,'"'F.'•IZAJJ0 --""'-;:9".U~'R.Y (, , lr:J!i/4,-- Gem:rA.l Glnr 1 " 19ft f'or tJ-i9 be.,chherid h:r C-/+7 from
l"arc;;,nir;e Pirroy,t, to ,-,l icr h9 flew 1)y ~ub . Fe "'PS accor-r~·ni0d ')y Crrtriin
LRmrso11., 'r· . Peach, c;ergennts rolr1en An' ~;uitte:1-nen anc1 triA frdtbful ,J~rg1;ant
Chr,ney. Jn thr:, rlane '7ith the r.,rty there also 1ent G,~nerr,l Brpc,shaw rn/ his
1:1.ide, Lieutenent Re'1le'r, a.:nn ·~a.jor Ross, of the G-1~ Section.
1
Soon Rf't0:r- arrivii:1i:; Pt tre .,,j +'th Armv A1'w1 nce Crrrir>Rncl fost r>t AYlzio, G9vie1
ral ClPrk c enPrtnrl to visit VI Corrr--, 3rd Divisio'1 , 7-st :9rittsb D:vision, 1st
rmorPr Divi:--:i_on a'1a the Speci~l '~nrvice ..,orce, T'r:,turnj•1.o; to hi-c:; comfl['nd rost
jn m~d-.,+'ternoon <>-"ter rriv:i 1'"' dj,c,Fsed t)113 sjtiction vrith the vrrious COl'll"!Pnr18rs o+> t 1 ,e'V3 1m~ ts r>ncl "1emb9rs of' tJ-,e5r st8 ffs .
At 171. 5 G(m--ir" 1 Clic-rk clrove by jee to thA VI Corrs co,~~"nd r 03t "rl---erA he
hE>d d:l nner ;7ith GP:riciral'1 Lucas and Feiser, rP.tllrn1'1r to } is corrr.f1nc1 r,ost pt,
riooo rours .
0
T'ris AVG"l-ing GeYlPral Clarr receiv d th9 -"ollorjn,:,· s:itu,-,tion rero·~t on the
\
Gn.ssino ,.--.ro11t +>rori G0neral Grwmtrer . E~; 1533 . "H9RVY f-i .c:;hting c011tirn19s in
the Ccissino nr8n . 115 P,e.aimeYJ.-1; ~s ner:.r "':C''11 stnry·. :1_;7c"er i-,~s hopes of surrounding it thfr aft9rnrovi . XeyRs esti.,, tes ti.~t 1/, Tlivi'1ion ,-rill not be strorP,
eno11p;h to t,R1:e Cnssj_no nn-1:,il trr-o-r;:; ;n Tere 1 .l8 RT"lr Cf'n be relieveil rm' tJ:,ereby (
be f'r9e to 13c;sist i·1 Gassinc, "rer nttack. 3(, Div~ sion "'trrts relief' i·'1 Terelle
areri toni P,ht . Frenc'.1 sector ,7uiAt . A-',r reports r Jtrn:1 rby. Res11lts rill be
1movm l nter . ()" e:i 11 wi 11 ry~et you oq30 :'on,l2v r,orniric- . ll
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ThP /\r ;' Corirr1nnc er to,1 rY recejv 0 n P P1r>mor nc1nn from 1,~, G-/, rointi11r out
tre crjti~Pl slortP~8 i·,1 prruTm~tioYJ., r.<'t1o"S qn,1 "'1:ir·oline . 0-" ec:r--:;cinl note is
the -"pct t:>-ir-it evr enrn tuT0S of cr'1T7Ul1ition "l!''-3 now res+,ricted to ?5 T'OU'1c1S p dRy
poncHnp- tJ-,e Prrivc1l_ of ,'l ,,rec;;:iJ_ sh-"r,nent Prom the tT . S. ,r:rich is :1ched ilecl to
2rrive i~nrc'1 1rd .
Ge'19rrl G1Ar 1• t',~s riftr-rnoon rl;spqtcher; ti,e :'ollo·I:ivi~ cl"ble tc G-e'1or~1
Gru<>nthor . R r '"J5.S2 . n:-rnrn i:1,::; 8Cter1 entirA "ro'1t, iric7.udj:nr '"', 50L"th, 1rd,
/~5th , 1st \rr,or9d rrrl 7.c:t Brit~sh Divis 4 o-'1s. •ro Pct'on torlr-iy. · :i+urtion i:ipr9rr, to be ----rirlr,ell in rPnC -,i.th th;n srotc; bet•Aen ~:cm·cott A.DC' }enne~r.
'-ipd not rtrlizec'l Y1ur1½Pr of' Prtj-tp11-1 • P,l:'.1S lo"'t ½y Jenne" • ThBSR rrnnt bf1 mr de
up i•1rner'-i_rtel' 7 • A"! cr w·1 -1cerl_ -'-,i-,~t, ·re T1u~t c-et in rnotber Br~_tisl:, briri-,,r'e p:rour
or TTn:i_tecl :t~tes c"nk·t te.?m, rr9f9r 11ly t' e -"or 1 er. TH s ''l; 11 ;1'1r;0 i t 8 more
7
·,ui)sf:.a:rit:i.nl c e,~en-:e l'lP"P inst a stroYJ.P' a ttr c '~ P -ric• ~; ve us •7or0 n "·"'9'1 si ve ro·--er
lpter.
e ""U"t hrve :>rotl r l.'55 PUn b<>-':,t~lion. r;:'ruscott "'11ort ?/.,,00 nen. 111
rossibl·'"> .-,+,"-'r2 ru.,,t b9 tr 1:en t0 9Xp9d~te th3ir rrriV''l h'1r 0 , j'1cludi'1f YO'tr investi,,.etion 0f seri":inp; th8n -in b" d_r +,rnns:-iort, r-erhn-rs ?O f 7 "'nes ~ dey each
ri-i1•i"',[l' t ro 1~r:i:-s rt ~.,,tArV ls. re~~i.-nr"' thi" j s not } r,:,ctic~l_ . r-rrv0 <"1 ~c-nsed
"ifi1.l,tenn:rce ,·it 1-i D 1C'rsa l"n o-1:,h"'r"', ~ri/ ·e rre crnvincec1 \78 C, n •nint:-i.in these
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�a0rlitio11Al unit'>. r,:;_~11 "'t, Y•ust be T11:-1.r1e "VE'il"'h1"" for th"'>Vi "rid for th,,dr "c'ded
'orley
'1Ri 1.ten"'nce. rJill r9turn 1-:iy C-/"7' 1,_y"J~no; r0r0 ,,t 1000 hours tor-10,,,ro 7.
~Oll C ec \r -for ""'-i P:hter COVP,r • n
has heen inf'orm00.
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:rn
;c-rFZ..A."'0--..,.e:BR Tr.RY 7, lq/v"--This nc.,,.n:'ng Gen0r11l Cl"r 1 lnft his Anzio cor~rnP.11.rl
rost by j er, in thn c"Jmr"'ny of' Colonel Fu0 nleston, VI Cor.,.,., --;urr-eon, Pnd visitr.:id the sSth, 03rd Pnrl. 95tri BV"ClJntion Hosr;tn:..~, t"l1 r:i11.1?' to m'ny Vjftr Prmy
solriiers rho :b d b':3en 'ounded i11. r>ction dur-i 11.p the 9,were f':: ghtino; in the i:rr;Giz~
c re~.
r
0
"4:9 hrd S1JT1T'J011.8d Gen9rel rnr11<"'cott to '"')';0t J.-,jr, rit the ::.irrort, nn iu"'t before leaving t11.e f'-ieP ,~i'1.nod on <1011c,r'l Tr1 rcott 1 s jricket tre f\ist'ni:;t.11shnd
<:erv-ice Cro"'s. '1en0r"'l. Clrr', '1ric'l 1':no ·11. of t"is ,"'·nrd +-or"' 11.u:nber of' c1riys but
S"'Ved tl-ie act1rl_ r--,,.esfmtrition ·mtil hn -f'el +, +,} <>t i~ ''oulrl de, tre n·ost r-oorl.
Gennr[' 1 'T'rtl"'Cott hP'i bAeri. snm0, 7h"t n9r,rAsser, '·w +,} 9 l_0'1S o+' +,"A two Pr:inp-or Batt9 lfors r>ncl, ."""'to-r ,,.:vi11rt J-,jr1 the Cross, Gr;n9r::>l Cl...,r1· tc·ld l-i'm 11.e thought J,i~h1" o·" ½i"' n-~on ,·rorl• r11r1 11ro-An l'il'l t,n P-o b,,c•- "'1.C' n-iv9 t,11_9 G,rrr"'11.s ri be..-tinr,.
The Ge-11Pr:--l f'le"l bric 1: in ri~ nl'l.YlP, to ~··rci""l~S"J "h9Y'9 he "'PS n10.t b~r flrjor [..,_l1rer 8.nc'l rP.+,,rrn9r{ to } i.'1 coM~,r,nd rost lr cub, "rriv:::1,,. ,.,t Pb"ut 11 O. E9 ')11.tertri ined •r11 -io:r G9rnrf' 1. ' c '.j"1.l1on j'.l.t lnnch.
Yn tli.9 :ifternnon tr9 G""n"'r,;l r cA,v '4 ,, cnll :'ror" G9W-'l'.'C,_ V,syes rnd oyr,lnined
t0 1
1~..,, C"ref'ulJ..,r ,r},..,t hn ev-~"ct,•"d o+' r:- Corr.,. TTe to]rl th0 Gpn_crrl trrit re 1mew
tl e troors 0~ ·•,h~ lL,t' ~11(' l\t11. D5vi-,ions VJ9-~ Prnrl o.f' Touc', -;:-· r,1,t~n,.,., bnt he
S"id tl- e '3/<J'lP, '"Jfl s t.,..U9 o+' rll ::'ifth t l'T'JV troc,Y•<"'. F9 tolr' Gr>nrY "nl Ynyns r,ot to
~,orrv .bout tr 1ri•r Fiednont9 1,ut to cr'1.C9"'t"['te O"' trki11."' t11e ri-;11. g1"onncl inmedi"t"l:r north r,f C<F·sino. T;if,J.-, th~~s crcint,1r9d, t},9 cro"s of t e Ro··ido bv the
'>:ri=i.cr-;er 1·'orce i--itc tli.e Vri Vrllev b9lo'7 Cr-;;:;i·10 "01 1lr'l be !'.Te"'tl:v- fec-i".;tPteri,
anc' tbe IJ Co;•--f' "10·11 -J. !lP7e :=i.cri0verl i+, i· T'!P.di::ite l'li sion. Geriel"'l Gln~l
nt,,rta-inAd Ge'1.r>rPl ·nr:=i.11., thA Ar'1.y 3·iannl ('-l"'ficer ""er dinrer.
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01
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Th:_s -ft8rnnon General Clark c ictA.ted the follovri"lg natAr~al fer ;'1.elusio,~ 111
nir.ry:
"'JisitAd Anzio brid~0ree..r1 , est0rc1 n • "'nd SfP.rit tr,, d· y visiting all forward
units nnrl c'iscu•:ni'1.n- tl-v'.3 s1tu.,tion ·•:'tb COT'1"1Pc'1dAr • Conc'.~_cerrr ') "111rroV<,"'ent
hqs tPk8n nlpce 'n the r,e.,''-,,yy,jve ciet-u. • 'r ,l'Ae }-!r,n P1'9 '"i"l" JT8f"'r9d - the
pre,e11.t f'ro"l.t 1 in°, t,}•9 . '1.tc::r"18di te 8.11.'1 t,ly, C"n£ 1, tl P, l8ttar 1y,~inr: ,-,,i nerl f'""ld
prnp<1r":lc'l -,;th bn1~hed ---ire. "':-c, '3rd J~.Vi'"'it'n ""> n;et,e,"Ylf" '°'trfiahten:,;d out, ,.,,lthourth
it ,s thin on its ''lest ..c,1ri'1.1 .
r
· "It ··s rinly after -':,"11-~YJ.P ·ith GA:1,PrA.l 1enYJev thrt T b0.,c;r11. ,~r: 1~r; u, ,0'" 0f
t e lo<1ses li8 lnd usta-1~130 i_r try-i11.,,. to frctr"c.cite his 11 te,1t frc-"" t,br, --1riYJ.';er 11 •
I J:y·cl '"'U·..,~este")i'.' tr TuCMl to ··ithdr~i,•r th"t sA.liPnt. Jeri-ney "'FIS rAluctrnt to do
so becflu"e nf I l9YPn• er', jnf'J 1ence, trn l,.,tter hrvi,1"' "'e7.t th~t the "'1871l could
11.ot attn~'-. :'n.wt"'-r lo<;t rhcut 700 or 8rn '"191", 7 " tr,--. 1 - , 'P1.rl 11 '3iY-rou'1.C1 8r r'1.titQn1< l'.;ll'1S. :re S"er1,:,d 1uite cor,rlacent f 11.cl +'9lt tbrt '18 ..,,.,3 111:ite l_11e'cr not to
'1rve 1o9t 'l •}olG b:rjrride.
D:~cu.Jserl siturtio11. --ri.th r.;..-.~~es "'n'l 'Trrr'Jn11., rinc1 -it ~s
a sou,...ce of srtisf- ction to 1-no r tlcrt tl,ose t•m .nhl0 co-m,.,,pnr1ers f'T'O -in re·n·,-.ve
cJ1.'1 r-pJl~na t0rrotle3r.
�HLucris nes not r:ro ~nt-:; detriil., . I 111'P-8d h;m to rl1:n"1n"te HFlrrnon rs his
'h.n .. llesty,o-rer rinc, 'T'qnl· O.f.'fi ':!<Jr .1..,0 c orcl7 '1Pt9 th9 11019 d0f911se . Fe rrr"'rently
r''l'3 no '"'!Oh;le trn'· c'est,r1 -r9r un;t tc r 1 1"h ""ror-i '"'lace to Pl"Ce t:"3 thr' sit11rition
rerpire" ; t . :r t,07.11 Lucris +,o use ~r"r1 shf1., 4n -t,},,-_,t co ··1n°ctic'1, +'oy, 'lnti- r>ircr~ft
mms c::iri hr: used ; n an rintl - tfl'1l:: role . Al 7_ the o;non I .c;ot +'rom thAt su,.,.P-0,tion
V-8.S p crihl" -<>ro,.,, 111.l;I to qf,mrl 1,;., an.oth~r 'lnti-8.;_rcr.-,f't P-1.m bc+,t,lion. I know
it, r,r-n not be ~1p4nt. ;n90 4 n t 1y,t rire"' .
It rou:r1 1Jc e~si!"Jr to send hil'l a ':'D
Dr>ttPlion , and I P!"'l s,r-i:1cHng h 4 'f'1 t 1·m C0"1"r'rni<;"' '1'1'1 r>10tJ,nr hatklion of 155 ~uns
for co mt0r-battery "rJor • A.r-i '1.lso r:etti>1p; r 4 T"' hi3 rerl,,c0rirmts ~mm0dirt9lv 8.nd
setti"rJP ur +,'·0 ·"i,-,.,.t co,..,,brit +.erim o-" the R~th rnvi"'ior>· tr r,c 4 ntr -'.:,},9 bridP"0h0ari .
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11 Dur~--i~ mo"t o"' :resterdP.v- ,,..-..t".lrnoon tbor0 vnc; lo11r, r-:inrr9 r:hn 7 ljnr-• of the
Anzio- 'Jettu.no flr9ri. , i·-icl,ir1 ; r>~ om· CO'"""'J, ·10 poc::t . ~ev9r[l l r;l ,-, , 1, 7 ...,11cled 4 n the
comr~8:1.rl nost . A4 r
r:!tion ..ms spor-:.c'lic , 4 r!clurl""l.;J' loF-level bo"'l,J7YJ.g flttr-c 1' in
N9ttuno t1-i;s "10rn.;.,,,g , destrov;r1 r;ev'3r!11 P"'lrnun"tion truc 1·s r>'7.d C"'ls:ina C"SUPlties .
Visit0rl '3St•1 anc'I q5th r•vec11.r-tion i{os-ritrls , "9lec;s0 rinQ •.,uer r sr0ct~w~ly, end
t8l 1rer1 ,·th tl e ,.,r,m,fod .
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rriP.et ~,e p+, 4;h~ 8.ir+"'" 8ld nt o0 LS in orc'ler -:.o c'H 'C 1 1ss lflst- minute
rn~~o+,t rnd a fr; 17 c-+' his ,,t,:,f'f officers rres0:r-rt ~ncl finned the
Dj_qti·1 ,; hed ...,PrV" 0e Cross on ,..,ru'"'co+.t .
117 Tpr1 T uca,
detai ::' s .
T-fr1d
t:rnhe nlaht wes ;_~et.J1n:·~ r0c+,; c, +'or ·re h...,d r0~9jy9c7 , fron rT'es11~,...,bl7 T'Ol i"hl9
so1rces , i'1c'ic-.:"ti0ns o~ "'n all-out a+,+,..,cl• ti,; ..... o,:-ni..,_,..,. _ -t r'irl rot r'evP-lo;, '111.t
t,"o 'lrn"~ 7 er 11tt11c1-~ r1 ev loy,ed rhrri.nrr tl-ir; 11~ r, t on tl 0 "'ro11.t o tl e l S7th I'1.-f'r-.ntry
<inrl 0-1 thn +'r 0 nt nf th~ 1st 1'.1r.;t:i,1-i Div"-;ion . :30+,1 •,nrq .,...0.,.111,ed .
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~
'l'Y\f'3n.Y'ls .
' 1 1 ...,I" r1 4 S'l.fro··11.+,0d ;n tl-iP. flir ef'fc~t .
I foel t.het rlerrnds c;ho1 1ld be nirde
for t½.e ::i+,r.<>te ic h~mh0rs to h0 us0d -:n clo e b::1ttlefi,,,ld ,urrort; it ...,ny do
snmo, gooc1 ti,9re, n.1tho'1P'h strPter,ic bn:'lb..,rr1m81t m'
b0 c1 c~·1 so;~e r;cod h1 c ttjn17;
:_•q-': l CC'J"'1rimicPtio,..,s, "or si X 'T\O"'l.ths 0'1 mY r,ro11t 1. t l1n S :not nr0vented the r>nerny f'rctm
mov~ 1~ in addit 7on.n l trOO;'S p ni sur-cl:1 8S fl. t , d 11.
l
"Di -rect 0 rl. rrr ri.clir-:in0e co...,, 1 a11.d
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ost ')O "lC''•c,d t0rlay. n
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PK,c..r,:~nA 1 TO-- 1.:9RF'RY q, 191+/j,- -Genernl Clnrlr sp=mt the dry rt the CO'""TTJRncl rost
in conferen.ces ":i th v<>.rious ~•:me1~.., l o.,..""'icers 11nc st1-1 ff offi.cers . Fe j s suffer_i.np- fr0'"1 a. verv ½nc. cold r,rr1;rrv:-:ited by hi~ eino; ur ell njisht O'1 his lP-st visit
to the 11enchhead. 1 rhen tre shellin~ 1-:as co-n_tinuons n11d heRvy . He '7r>s visited to dn.-r by Colone l DRly of the 16th r:v11 cuation Hospital ,.. ho '{"Ve him thA necess,- ry
treatJ"11811t .
1
Gr 1eral 3.'.'. v::Ule , Co":·~prd. · ''11 the XII /\ ir Sur-rm~t , cn..ne in ancl r'li8cussed the
. lnns -"or !15_:;:- su:rrort on tJ:,e main ""'ro11t and tre bel'chhead front .
1
Gener,,l Tate v:i sited l}e'1.8rnl Cl11r -c and discusser1 t:he amrmnit ion situ,,tion)
It had alread;,r ' ee>1 necessar;r to curtA.il tris rA.te of fire of' 155'11ITl ;rowitzers ,
l"lncl now 105mm 11rnmunition 8.frenred to be setti11.7 s1-0" t,- n S3rio1 7 situntio1 ,
R)
�this aTI'7unition is used by the direct infn.ntry sunnorti'1.g battrlions .
At JJ.30 General flexanrler , G9n~.:::--rl Fardj'1,..,, ris Ch;ef of _,fa.ff , ~nd Gener['l
G<J.,..,r1ell , Gnnernl r;1son 1 s Gh;_ef of 3t<J.f.r-, ce~ri to c8ll on GenerMl ClPrk. T1'ey
djsc,1ssed the rlr>n'3 for th0 rrospect·'.ve em loyment of' tre vrriou'> corps y-,pking
up the Fifth Arrriy, ,ri th r8rticulnr refer'3nce to · t)y~ F-w1 Ze" l<>YJ.d Corrs under
G9n9rc1l F'reybu.rg ,.,hich is ri1701 1t to go into Pction. After o,J.<-cu~sin'?; the stubborn
defense the Qgrmnns w~re putting up in rnrl ['ro ind C2 ssino rmd the wer>r:i.ness r>nc'l
derletion t 11£1t ''rere ::f'fecti:1g the 34t}-> Div"sio11., it "ff' clec~ded thPt t]:-,e di·~posi tio"ls of' the :e•;r Zealand Corpe, would he cr:inr·e0 so 8 s to 'ut .f'resh troors jnto )
the Cassi110 ?ttaclc. The 1/,.th Division is to '"J8' relieved in jtg :rresent nosition
b tl,e 4th IndiPrt Divisfo· ''Thier "rill continue tl'e rresent attr>ck of the 34th .
The 34th i ill h0 displaced "lo ~t1· 1arrl to the rj -;l-1t of the 4th Indi".n . The fow
Zealnnd Wvfoion Pill continue in its r,ositio'1 at the '.1ead of t11.e Lfri Vrlley
rerdy to push ',estward thro 11gh thPt corridor .
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:'ollo"d11o; t! is co11.fer<:mce, G2nerP 1 Keyes r>nn Ma ..,e ··ut;'T Cr-i ef of Jtpf'f , Lt .
Col. forter, stopped to see G81'1"'.,..l11 CJ"r r .,-1d briefly r'-iscussed t},9 -·ror:res"' o:
10 Cory-,s 1n its Pttac 1,. on C,., ssino nc'l tJ.,9 hi f"l- r;ro mcl controllinc; :20 1t9 '1?; beyo"ld
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rnoday Genr;r<1l r:i.-,r 1o:: '.'lr"'l , ~ePtl;y cc11cernr>d to "..ef'rn th:ct t e GPr'72.11s b&c'
h,ribed thP r:istr. ;vric'1rtion rosp-itn 7. w~st9r, ":r inst pfter he ly,d left the be::chhePd
end A½out three ho1 rs rfter 9 h d loft tre 10s1-'tal. Colcnel '"uer ,,..,d been
wo1r-1c1ed, 0 3 pff•·· so'1S "rir1 1,9e-n '•:i lled, · ·,0luc'l ir~ r 11 of:"-: Cl';~, three '1Ul'se s, , Red
Croc;s fJ'--'_rl, ')Oy ., corr-s r1en Rn.cl r"t:rmts, /1'1C 'S 0 .-.c1 been ··01.,n.dod . Th=i hm b b'.d
1
fa 7- 8"' on t 11 9 JTos1 5tri.l r0criTl"rters' 'l 1 1 ' 'v,s--' r ec ·H,0 , 03"1 O'n f'3l'S0'-'1f'9l, m10h of
the l osritnl "'1uirT'1e11t, -':11cJ1e'·,,,r; "{-ra.y i.'1~t&'1Pticr"', ra( b0e-r 'estroyed .
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Toc1 n.y +/10 t rmv Comriander rece:i ved tr e -"ollo-rri_r g 1 e;t ter -"ror'l tre GOC, 'Jew
Zenlrnd r.:orrs, Lt . Ge·1. F'reybi1.rg:
:~"bl5sJ--,:h.p yoiir letter ::n fl ... recir>l rrr r,r tc •\11 rr,-,lrr (\.c> t e 'J9rr
ZeRl/:nid no:r.,· s . I 1 .1 'Your wn-,,,, riessq gP o: · ·e 7 cc · e n.'1rl ,...ood --fishes dl:'.. 1--ie
"'10
re. d uitJ--,_ a sen,·e of ;r"r1.e n.11r' E:fTreci~ tio'1 l)Y ev,:iryone .
11 1
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nsince "Te r·ave bee'1 }19re no l1'=ive seen your brttlefields ,..,., s0~G f'f t1.e
"if'"ic'tlt-Le--: :rm, h·we ha.d to f'pce . VTe re1"life VThr.t the 'UV, f.rr y h9s r-crjeved,
pnr'l tre C "fic rs fTr' 10 en of tl1e Leth Indio.11. Divis:i 011 rnrl the 'Jnd ·re~J ~8/llrnd
Iiv;s1.011 ·1ill bP r,roud to f'ii:(1t elonr~side the Arericrn, :::>ritisb r'1d .,.rench
troops under your co,.,,;1a'1.d . I '70l'l<' also 1~1(8 yo1 to 'enc ro---r much we r"v0 ap1
rreciated t. e "riencly cooperrition and helr ·e iia.vP hr.d from your sk f'f Rnd ;11
t"'9 :."'ormntio'1S 17itr vrrd ch ·,re hP.Ve been i.n touch .
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w 'e hore thrt , ·e -rill be f'l:JlP, to plri~r -, 11seful part i·'1 tre di""'icult bFttle
lies
~1!T·~c
8h8t:\C~ . f!
The folloir-1_ng cr>ble,
.'J ;,011, vr s received tod?y .(>rorri E'2 P.Cl'F:
."r-
r;r.rc has c.ecicJed tr,.,t -if' ::=i. recisio11 on l'i.,,th
y ni1 in front c, nnot be
~btri11ed. 5.~ ·1 ny <::_th9r ,.,.,r-r 'ie ''lill .,...:ui('r'1,r 71 Divisio'1· ,"'ror, l::ighth Army n.nr use
:it to r9in'.orce '.ew Zen.l1mcl Corrs. As already arranfs"d by ~i~l,th .Army, 7g I)jvj 11
�1/
sion -rill t!1ere;fore be kert ot '21~ hours notice to !'1ove to Fi·"th Army ,-1r0° Pnd.
nll"ns will be coF leted flt O'1ce to e'1f'bl8 such l:'. move to t~ke rlr,ce R.'> '"l 1 1ic 1 ·ly
as -cossiblo j f orrler9c1 . To rmsure 70: Div:sion is fully in touci1 •ith •r.z.
Corps pln.,..,_s Cor1d 7g Divisio"1 rind :recce ::-,,rties will report .z . , Division
C{eedr:n1rrters <>t G qc~o1 '30 errliest rossibl8 IJ'll.(1 ·i:!..l th9r9r.c,tcr "'K'l.int in closest
touch ith situ tion on '\Z. r:orrs front ,o th t the '1-ivic,ion crn be emplo;ved
if.:' required .,~th lenst rossi 1 lle c1eleY. '~ighth Arriy will sif718 l -~TA N. Z.
Divisio11 r;:eadaur.rters of Co,.,,rl rnd recce pcrties 78 ::Ji.vision . crm h::,c: also
r1ecided that .:my 1.tlditionrl stE1P-f or sianr1 l rerrniren:mts of T Z. Corrs ,-ill be
.
Y"\et es 2 t0T1pc-,rar;,r meesure fro'TI -.ifth Cor'"'S r1 rind sipnrils. :?F'th Army w-I.11
noti y rll sucb re1 lfrerents to thi~ i:.r'1. who mill ..,rrPn[:r:i for ~revision c'irect
with Fifth Corrs 1-::eepi11"' -:1 O'hth rmy f illy i 11-t>or·w~c . tr
T
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*
}R SE'TZA.' 0--F~BP..lTAF.Y 9 , 194!;.--Gener~l Cl:ark spent t},e d'\'T Pt hjs conm nd ~ost
in a series of ccn+'erenc,1s . GcmerA.l r,:,y 11r,,. ·i th a number of str ff o ficers ,
errived ot 1030 r ric1, ·rith GP.118rc-ls CJ.rr 1r rricl Gruen·~}-ir.r, rl:Lscussr:id nt lenr:th
tJ-1e qission o.., t'1e 'Ten ze..., lri · 1d Corr s fl'1'1 t.re arr,.,nr:rments -"or er:rrloyine; it
aro,md Cassino . Gener;-,1 Fn:-iy',urg , rmon~ other th~rn;s, e::s, ,ressed sc'ne arpre hensio:ri thPt the TTJO'1-" st8r;T bvj lrlin,~s ·ould , e used by tre G-9rmrns "'ncl "'t"ted
t):,nt in ris opi'l.~on , i ~ J19Cessr.Y''y, the r s½ould b': ')lo'm do '1 hy artill'3r.r +'ire
or hoT'!k.rdnent . Gen0rFl Cl,.,rlr decidecl to P'~Ve him ri written directive to tr..e
effect thnt if in his judgment milit"r" necessity rlictated it, he wes erected
to fire on tl e p10 11.rtster1r 1,uildinf.
0
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After Gener"'l Fre~rht.1.J'.'f, h<>d t2lv:Ad for ~on, t-:r,e ,,,tri GPn9r"l Clr-rv- jn his
vDn , G9nerf'l Vrevburg "ent to t;l·ie conf'erence hut nhere n long coriversr-ition W"S
hAd bet !Veen General Fre r1mrg ::ind his stnf:· orf'icers ;-,nrl treir corresrondh1.g
Fifth Ar-y ster'f o-l>fic8rs . I·1 -:.J,o T")eant~nie, G9ner"l Clrr 1' in his V"11 rec•~ivarl
the nembers of a 'J9tt1P.rbnc1 s Armv mi c:sion vi:=dting the bA.ttle+'rorit - r '1.,j . Gen .
Phnff, Colonel Vnn Der F- l ssche end c---..tr in Dr-dtenstein - to(J'eth'3r ,. ith e.
TJnited >tPtes acco-mpAnyi.,..,_F: oc>ficer , f'njor Rr>nc1 olnh .
AL'tor trese c::in-..,er9'1CeS , Generr J. (;lrrk c' pn in Ciscu.::sed the 1)ric1 p;ehorid
sit,rtion with Gen9r"l l}r-1enther . Tri-=3 G rnrins Pre nttrickinc; 0Y1. th0 rirlr;r,hePd
in SC'~1") norce, £'nc1 '}rrn0r"l Clnl", is nrrt~c,ilrrl:r desirous of r;ett··nr, <'ll the
air support rossible , not onlv +'or -'ts r3sults on tr.e Q9rr1Pns but becriuse of
the ' oral_ supr,ort ~;1
,j_cl -it '"ill. f;~'lO to c-ur troOJ'1. ':'o h lr ::-ttr>in tJ--is (1'1.d,
be invited /}e'19r~1 ;. v:il_le to ta1 :e lun~J-i ·-ri+, ri·1 rnd Gevinrr,l Gru9nther, nr,d
at l_unch YFJS verv emrl1ritic rith G0·1er:0 ] ,2ville o'1 tJ,e necessity of' i"'lmedi~tely
suTPrnoni·F; the '>trri.tegic Air Force tc, riic' i_·1 tr9 brttle r>t the br~ dgr:ihend . Generc l C1Rr1? srdd t}-r,t re lrn8W V""rY 17el.l tirt concen.t,rrtiors d' G-;rrn.an troors "nd
r1Pteriel "ere not trn,'iti.cri:=il targP.ts f0r t 1-e _;tr"te-;ic Air Force but thrt 11t
tre rresent ti,.,1 0 bnmb<'.'rdnent of ball- be£>rin(J' fRctories or r<'.'il junctions in the
nortl:i of Ttaly hAd no 9ffect at 1111 on tre bridf,ehead battle . The nermRn troo s \
were 8.l'~CJRd'r jn tJ,9 'er>cl,heP0 11re" , l'.nd t'~•"'li.r e1uiprn9rit vr, thr,r8, rn/1 -·t WPS
tre Ge11nrc 1 1 s r es~re to cnncentrat0 every "V<1il"11le .?jr bor1brrdr1ent resource,
h9t}v"r str"te<;ic or otb0r ri-;e, OYJ tPrget"' within th9 ~11z-:_o --ren . Ge118r ls
G:ruenthnr ;:i11d S"ville sr,~d thnt they ···Are hendinfl' tbeir effort-: i-ri tl'.nt dj_roction . Ganer,l Cl:ork r<;re,-,ted t rt -1-,1,e ;-r,ntter 17"S e:xtremol:17 si.,.,,nle in his ;11ind;
re siriply ventod f'l] qvril,,hle 9.ir -..o·rel" C"PCentrrtec'l 011 the Gcry,,r,ns i.n the
Anz-i o b,ttle ;;,rea .
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�A little l.nter in tl~e [':i"t8r100·'1 tbe Generr,l
Sup:rort Co,,m.,Y1c tbnt t½i 9rK1 t'Pc'l berm P chieved .
1
VT"S
;nforn9d by the XII Air
C"
G0ner..,l Clrrk r't tl e clo~e o·~ the ,-:,fternoon ct~ctnterl the '..'ollo-:ing
rend1u0 for hi"' r i ..,ry:
1
t 0 eno-
HJ hE>ve b8en some'vhr>t .,-,0rtur x~d torfr,~r bv tre ne 'TS -"'rom the Anzio beP ch:heed .
Gene::::-::il LucBs "ent I'lR the -"'ollmri"lP' message:
1Fressu:re 11,crei'tlst Prit-"c-;J. 1st 'livisio·1 cnntL'1u~n~ .
Enr:my rP.Tortec1 at CR
873'3 . Sitiwtio•1 not cl'3nT and e:xect loc.'ltion of lin':l undeternin0d . ~ppenrs
necessPr r to er:irloy e.rditional ~orce2 to T"Jrint::iin front .
li11 keer you advisec1 . ~eriuest 811 avnilrul0 n~r in1d nr:v..,J suprort on nort rind north"Test
fronts of sector . Request iT"L'"'!ed·i_pte r-l2ns 1)e niride for tr0 shipment o-1" P'1 <1dditionr,l jnf'11ntTy division Pt the eA.rliost rossihle ·noncnt . 1
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11
1 rePlied as ~allows:
1101.1.r ?'18 received .
Keep T1e -ro,:;ted O"l the sjt,urtion . I f'eel yon C"'n stop
T'1ost "nyt1-,··nr '7ith the 35n t11n1·s you hwe .
hen you r'?,uest ~ir , try to gi'-18
loc1.t~o11 and n"'ture of ts:;rr;Pt-, .
'e1cthP.r -n9rnitt~1,r , entire '-'-tr effort of' XII
Air Suy.;rort TPct5 C" 1 and Str..,ter;;ic ,ill be concentr,.,ted on your front Thursdry.
'le h;::ive a.lerted 1 rr-ivy. } res1me ~rou ri.P'~e your rer:i. 1ests "or nRw 1 su1
:rort tr.rouc:;h
Lo..1.·;r. You T"lUSt reri]:i ze tl e 1•• -r,r.,cticPbilitv of' 38ndin~ ;v-011 Pn pr'ditionPl inf211try di vision ..,t 0'1ce . Shipping, TT\f' i -1:.enr>nce ririd "V":.i 1r>bi litv o cliv~ sions
.,re fn.ctors to be considered . I :1:-ive 01·dered this rl~te Another British briP,Pde
group to irour front . Everv e-l"'f'ort vill be ,.,,,,de to e:x edite its R.rrivnl in your
area . ~ wo 1lrl 3A.Y vou crin eJ'""lect it in P'lou~~ Le or 5 days . :::t · il1 b8 167 Bri<;Pde fro"1 the '56th D-lv:lsion . Tbj 1 vdll r;jve -rou t,,o ri<?'F19s of tl1js divi,ion,
and ,.,t .-1n e::irly dPtc I conld ""OVe in t'1e 56th D:ivision T-J:en.rlriuPrters . Keep ne
posted on your R. )il-i.t7 to SUTP1' ac'ditioml troops. I PT'l "'till ';'11:inninP' on "'ending E'notl:or crrnhPt te,.,T1, 9itl1'?r '1riti h or Amer:l.crn , ::i ter the 167th. Ani "s1dn~
G r,era2- "c'"nhon to rw1r.~r 7ith yo 1 tenporf"rily to act :cs vo 1r ~)eruty. "'0el 1-ie
will be of gre,.-,t ""'s-~stance to you . Fleese '"lo r",snrec1 of' mv comrl.c>te of'.,..ort to
suTJrort :rou jn ever r no'1s;bl9 r.:r.v. I 11n19 ~ull cc.,.,r.;r'ence : 1 succec,C)f'ul outcoc-1e . 1
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"He shoulr 1
rnon etter trPn to derrnd <inothor :'11.fflntrv divi~ion, realizing
f',111 7e11 tl,nt
co not 1F1Ve t½9 div:i sion, e~·cert t' ose t½Pt Ar8 tired "nrl comnitted to b~ttle; nor do I kwe tl'e sM.rri·1a, nor co11lrl it be .1r·i_ntd.ned loi;,;ic:tiCP' ly in t'~e 'JeP chh .ad .
n In coming to t'1e cr'nclus;_on tly,t , Bri ti '"'h by,ir;ade p;roup sbould be <>ent, I
vre~ p-hed crrefully th, Y'ARuJ.t<> on tJ·,e 10 Corrs A.tt,..c1: . Thrit corr" hr•s ..,,pr'e J.ittl8
pro'!ress, so t:c'l<inf; "'nothr=ir rio-,qc1,e fror1 it '"'roulr' m::iJre littlA c.iff9rence. It ~o
0·1t of the li Y1e , ~ nd, "'ccm~d1110- to the Chief' of Staff I s rerort (1'3ri.g?r3.ier Cooh~)
H 5s in pretty cor' si,"T''1 . Ro.,,lizin" thP. implic.,tio11 o~ t.-,1dnp; this '!Jrjf;;:-de and
its r9percussions 1 dt 1 lexA."lrler , I phon~d hh11 t0 +971 him of my decirion, rnr1 ,
l'l.lt½o 1~h it tno\:: him bv S1l.Y'T'rise, h8 ren(ily "gre':!o . I r"'l kkj11; tro ]_()7th Brigr,ce, "'or tri:i lfAth or the c,r-17e '56t1, ni.visio,, is ..,lr0"c'y :in t11e be,,crbe . . ThP.re.,d
fore , I cr,n se 11c1 the 169th up bter , hi~', ,Jill 1 rt t 0 •·· ol9 rF vj "'j 011. ::n.
1
"Gwv,rn.l J\Je'"'ln( er rho11'"Jc'! TJI';) /1 +'0,,, m~nutes rwo , 1"r0SU."'1rblv influ0'1ccc' by
Harc1 ino- '1.YJr ,fteT tel~:'..11g •·ritr "cCreer7, to t87l "'1e tlr>t he horied ':Y sendin"' the
I
�1-S?th in ;rs to renlnce i}1e :nost tir8d rme of t 11e bt British Division F"lC tbr>t,
trerefore, only the rersonnel neec1 17,0 U;", tn 1ce ovnr t e 1st British l'ivision
e:mirl"l9nt And thrt rerso'u"'lel come out, o':' tre berchhe?.d. I infornecl him thr-t
this was ent:i:!. el'v contrrrv to my i'1r:ia'1 -"n•l thr>t I clirl not r-roro"'e to do jt thr>t
vmy, th"t ~ ,-,as se11di'1g anotror bri.:-ade "'.rou:r up because I f'elt thnt I needed
thf't extra i'1surance :in thflt aren. r,nrl thrt lrter, Hhen tre s-·turtion "lPS nell
in l,;:ind th,:,re, I 1oul(l ',e P'lR.d to rota,te f8rsonn.Pl out o tho ½riclgehead. He
insisted, rmd ::: strermously olJjecterl r>nd tol(1
thPt -· f rny of the 1st B:dtish
rivisio11 wns to c0:"!A out of tlrie 1::Jr-ir:gAhe,:i,,d nor' : t ",ts ov9r I'lY trongest obji::>ction
rnd thet he v1011l•' bnve to g-iv0 me rin order in ,•rr.iti-'1IT. ·re told ~ e tJ:,e British
1st Div~ sion W,"3 tired. I tolrl h:i'1 so
the '<rd Division but tJ,,,t if the situPtlon f;Ot crit:i crl thRt all V:'nulc1 hr.v':l to +'i ;ht nri9th'or theY r:ot tir9d or not. I
tnl0 l1im none o+' tl7 e troors '!ere OS tirec'l 93 tl1e French or t're :::r Corn, . :re also
told me thrt h9 hPd cPlled 'cCreery, o- 'e of I'l7 cubordinntc co~··r·~-:ers, ,..,nrl ok 1d
-my orrlors. I told H~·' thn~ I obiAct9d to thi", f'or I hrve tli.e Putbority, ns an
Army Cor:, 1r11c'er, to i,sue the order th"'t I hrd c,j•ren . Fe r"h:)d for '19 to 1119et
h-tm at ;1oon ~t r·ccr9ery 1 s VeridquPrters toTTJorro' • I 1 1il1 strenuousl1 ob_iect to
b:ringi,1p- qny troo~s 0 1 1t o" tr'A l1r:ic.c;ehePrl untjl t1 P s 4 tu,..,tion :s ,.,,nre cl,..,ri+'ied
there . I '1'"'\ [;orrv this (:iif'f'ere-0co of orinion l-i;:is l"r~se11, f'or it onl~r [lclds rcdition::il IO;~ric,s tn t'rie rwnv I pJ..:~e-"'1 Y lyv':l, ½11.t I 11il: rec:ist, "ith .?11 t\-ie energy
I hrvo, 1-is co,.,,---;rnc i:r£; r.iy Ar'"!.y.n
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At q•)o11t lTlO GAn9r>1} ClrY•k 4 nform,:v' J:,is rideq ,~1,,:,t /1 trir to GenPr<1l 1 'cCrAery 1 :
Feridro'JP-rtr>rc; ½y r,ub ·~as to ,e Elrrrnc·er.1 tre follo ,~--y, r1 "7r ~t 11c0n :n orc'er to r~rr,jt
hh,1 to flttc.md A con"'erence l7~ -':.L Gener~ ls Ale:x-Hnder rinc' ·•ccreerr.
Sbortly tl-ier1y1 "'ter, G8·•1 ')r'll -.- 0.m11-i tzer C'l 7 l'"~cl Q9n0r~ l Gr 1 1enth"'r ,J10 sr if tr•<>t
1 e Ut1('9rstoorl +,hrt +,be er '1f'erenc9 to..,orro'"' '"n s to 1,8 r r:, ln to ;,ett le +,},P, question
ns to •h_et11,3r tr'e l'S?th Br~_p;rrle , ,0,,1 d rnr J_r1ce troors of' tl'e 1st Brit-L"'h Division
or ',011lr' ')1: rin <>dn~tion to tPP"". G,.,ner"l Clr>-·11 • cr• 7 1":ld Gen0.r"l T--1'rrc1in~ to reF<::sert
thrt 1 e hrrl m·i •e ap l: s m:'.nd th"t t 1-r:_s Pou1c1 b9 "'1 'rlrJjtion "'nc: -,,_ot r re1 lnce"'!0YJt .
G:rriP.ral ".rr11r, "Tho -is no .1 rt the Fi i:-t,h ,\rr'ly !\dv<>nce ConnPnc F ost, sent tr8
f'ollowi:1P- cq_bl9 to G<:"erril Gruenther tor'":>r rer;"rc1~11p- t,h3 s~t,.1ntion on the fnzio
f'r0nt:
1
m·. 051. 11 ""'119J11Y cont:inU•')S reM :r ,79r3•.1.,~e cr""~'1-t 1st D-ivisio'1. Th5s ,njt
h"'S s1r''fer9d i1e~ V'"J losses, r nrl Corr"nder rer orts 1-Je c' n not holrl ~rese11t front.
180th Inf'rntrv i beinn; put i'1to lino 1J1:lt'YeAn 1st Div~ sion ri:rv:i lrd Divi -iio,,,,
trkinr; over :r 0 rt of rresent 1st Division +>ront. ·-rrrrr:on will e""lrloy t"m COT'lfPnies
0i:- l:5_rrrt Pnd one ;)Pttqlion of "0rliu:1s this' r-"'ternoon to rssist on reestrblishing
front in 1-st Div·sio11 sector. ~:verv effort ~1101 170 be 1'1'\M'e to 0-:r'3dite RGT o-;: 8Pth
r-i,r:i,sion . T,on~ r"'DP'9 r,.,.t:111,..,r;r ' 1it ~nothcir "',1nu11;tion rlm1r Pt 1100 bonrs. 1'
0
G3n9r2l (;Jnr1r cnb]Pd 6r1P'lirrl ~>1nn;11r-J.vr1 ti j _ , ~ft9r'1oon, F'J 1143, thr") ·in,;
\ jyn -"er t,l;,9 rrnT1rt st9--,,.. t~ l,911 to ,,-rc-v:i_de 'Y' Vr' 1 ,~m-~irA snrr ort f'or pj ft}, f rrn:r
oper.?tions.
*
*
�noon ~· itl'l Gennr;:,ls ~lexrn-v'er ['Ylr'l r~cCreerv ,-,t 10 Cor:;s re'lc1 r;u"rters at Sessri,
ceciaec to flv ,-'O'T. to Car-;ert'l by cub •n1cl ccnf8r ,-,.;th C'r9n9r"'l A.lexrnder th8re.
rre cen1Jrtcd +'ro"'l ·\hp '";"'" 71 C"'t\ -"i9:d 11ertr t "e '"'i ~~tl ArT"i.y Cor,.,,E>n l ! ost at Pbo-ct
0900.· . :t8 l"'nded :in the old 4'erriil.;nr ror'l .;n f'r0nt c,.c- t½,9 forJ'!ler Fifth Ar'"'ly
for rarc1 Coram.., n,1 F Ost ,-, 11(' rirove Oo··rn t0 tr 8 c-=i c:t le ,-,]-,ere he i rnmer j ..- tely 'ient
irrto c0nfer"mce ,,.;th Gen,..,rnl Ale:z::-'1cler.
Genernl ra,-,r 1r1 s
0 1 ·rn
notes
t½is con"erenc8 follow:
0>1
=
' 1Th-ic; rnorn.;n--:..,. nhonec1 G,mer,.,1 Al8':"n'er, telljng 1~jM th,,t
VIPS reluctrnt
to ·-rai t ,mtil p O I cloc, to '17 'JCUS'1 ...,;th !'1"' U·e build-ur :i.n ths briclw hP,tVl. T
d.;d tl~is h,c.n1we l ~,e.s relnctnnt to r2V8 t'~.," w,+,t9r di scussec with J"'P, before
.. cCr8er7 vrl:iA'1 -'-,:,0, lA.tter h"d no+,'hi.,,_c- to rlo yr-ith .;t. J fle-' to Alexrnc1e:r- 1 s
1
Heerl'l_11<1rtr.;:rs on,' +,0ld rini, l,ef'o-,-.9 ·:rir"inr [')1'1 L8"'nitZ8T', 1 0 l unaltPrnbly I 'c!PS
OF"OS.(' +,o ru+ti·1,.,. '1r.;t~.:::'1 51'.'>th Division 1"1"its .;nto t 1 e hrirl.ctnherrl ri:vl '"TithcrP'Ii"lr "''1 ,s111.r'l m::i.nber o-1: 1st Britisli Di,1isio·1 u,1-lts. 1'.:r~.,.,..9ntly 1'9 h d '"leen
tl,e i sdoT" d1iri11~ t~·e 11-i __, +,, -"'or T 1"rd •10 dif-"-l r,ult•r -in putti'1~ ovqr =y 1 lrn.
'To dou',t L 0 "'1nitz8r 'ircl contr 4_',uter' to 1.'·r-rr1 -it.
h '1n-:J:•eed to ·-ut ~n t e e-·1tire
S'Stb Divisior :=pvi_ : 9PV'3 t"e 1st 1iT'; t~ sl: "'1ivision; tl-irt wo11lJ c::::ve r~e t-m P.ritish .,..,ivisio11s 4 11 th-=, hrid.gnlerd ,nr two /\meriCPn In.c,'ntry I,ivisions, r,1'1S :rarmon1s "ore<> !J.VJ." m~sc9llL.YJeous units . I sent the follovring rar :iocram to Luco.s:
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1
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RN 1816. ",fill senrl -~e.,,,r ·i. nr' er o+> S S Brit isl' ::Ji vis :.'.o"l M f'r st :1.3 sh:Lpring
7
is rvc1il:>bl i . TJ-,is :)-'.vis.;on :,.;1_1 then cor,sist of 167, 163 [inr: lSq Brir: c es.
1
1 c-ut o': 1 ere 'by tor1orro" 17.0r"irr;
l'J7 1!'i1ar e "roup sho'11d be cor-rlntel,r lordec
a...,,l .;r "Our ::incls by tomorroF 11.; <t}•t. 169 lr.; r-rcJe rrc~ :iv.; sion r..rerdrp1r:cters
,·::1.1:::. folJo-' it 7..'7:'19di,-,tely es en ft r,3-t,,ffns. •re "'ill '1..-,n 011 t'ro Briti3h In"A.:1.t'"'•r err +,,;o r~~':,sd ·t~t s Jryf'pnt::-,, Divi;:;·'.or, ~'1. 1)riclgeh8ac1 plus ·: rr.10'1 1S
"o:---ce :nc1 in Pdclit~o'l to ,.,,.;sce11,meoue 'lni+,. I"' l_o?i;tics · -lJ: rqr-,'t, ~ ,rjll
add i11""l.C 'l' 11,,· t,r ,~rJT"t1i·1d ,~ 0" the ::..st fr·1or1xl '. 4 -ri.r:i.on ~r;tVP'"" :~r.;:w",- " T n-f:e11.sivP. r>ctio--i. ~r '"'1lt rjr "),..,..ort on 70lJ:' ~r,,nt todPI • • r8C1U'"" Tl)U 11PV9 nrw1.l
f"1mf':i--,-.e su-:-1.·or+, •ro 1 1 ri9S~r8.
Co1 1l" ',('tn9 +;p,,,_:,,~ be ro·c>-itr-t')J.y e""ploy9rl, rlu~ .;i1 -in
sur,-,c:rt cf .,.,rort roc-iVLOn..J? A."i snro /i,5 l].'Tis·io11 ·-yill star 0np:1r R.C'l,'n.ce."
0
0
0
0
7
"AftA::.~
hnd
"'"'1'1.0"9T'J911t
·1
·,½n "'18t 11od
for ld Y1 to
1·1 ~V9, "c•r
'1!rri
'IG
v--.; '1
r'c_<'c•i_ssi.on :;: f'T0 '•'3 , Jith '}911erc 1 AJ.ex,"n~rn• T "'I'3011P llJ rind told
to ½e f'rr11l- 9.-i_d th·t l rrt,,.,<;r ',ac} .~,,,lt sr:nrY: ~t rr:n+,"l"'j Ct";d jn rriy·
o+' t}e l<'i·"'tl, Arrri:r 1-iscriuse nf hPv~_ ":O ·~A.ny \11 iAI'.' Cor-0-i. T told. 1,.,5,.,,
1w
07, 1,-; ,:;1 1 '; <1c;sirrn°f tl--9 1•9,., Ze,"lrnderJ t,h9 7g WO, :V'119i"h~t •muc:url te 1..: Tn9 ";~:ri ctly ro , to 8''1 -ilo;r tri0m. : rut cvcir rw } o·· r,t "':~11, I beh=i 1m 1 erstoocl. n
1
G8nerril Clrr 1 '" retur'"l=ed to 1-i, l-ier1d,iurirtcrs <=>t 10/;5 rw1 , ~-"tor ~.,forF:i'1p;
Genorf' l fi-rll<"nt118r ('+' 11,ad h<>d oc~ui••n~d ,,t t I} r:ieet: 11[' ,- ~ t' /"}0°1.'"'r[' 1 II l ';'cE' nder'
'i1J"911t to n13 VP'} ;1.r1 ·-ror 1"00. OP fE'""'9l"'S un"t,il ]110, 'Jh"ln Colonel'1 T'";.r'!zo9 ;,n_n '~y7nrc,
·1ho hail. 0 1~ 0 -✓ ~'1 up "T"C"' 'rA.r l"'s, 1/1['( 8 [' :re;r'~On"l_ C, 71 011. ri.n, st?yi"lg "or l1 1nch.
1
Ge>1ff'r>"l (:1_,:,r•)r i'1 -=:;u""'e,-.-i 1g ",-.o,
rf'th0:2 01'"' C'1lr'' '1.11(' ],8 "')<;n-1; thA rP.st of
the E1.,.,t9rn00'1 ,,r,r1:-irip on pt'pi:,rc; cnrl lrri vrr~ous section c½iPfs in.
r,
�The hecV1/ ni_:~ rroCT'>J" ~cl--_9(:>-1led irest0rr1p7 t0 b:---e,, 1• 11r Gerr'l,nn
tl-ire,,+,eni11r:- the Anzio beBc1
1hen.d '7as ,lmost totGllV ~trillnc:1 ,,.,y -'-,r"
rP l Sl,,rk raa n crv, "9rrmce let9 ·in t, 1,9 R +'ternoo'1 --i tr G8'19r"' 1 '"'nv
to ri~TTJ thf1t hePV7 C0'1C9ntrr't~.on of' n-ir rnu~t stri(e p 7 ni:r1:·t ~- lzio
'
4 t is c7irri'lti-::ri117 nossible .
I
ccnceritr<>tioY\S
,·e2th0r . Ge'1e- \
llo ~n ",tressed
U"t [!S roon PS
1}0ner1.l 0,l<ir1, toda:r ''eceivnd 9 criblA -"ran ArlmirPl Lo ::;:-y, R.n '355/10, stating
tl,nt, the PT ?(ll l''lS b09n sent to Pi_?;9rte -"nr r13rairs Bnrl tJ,~t " rerl-,cei7<'mt ,•rp,3
bPi"'P' Se'1t to • P'""llAs ;.,,111.,di..,+~1:r ['8 p rer 1~c0,..,e'1t .
1
Ger8r.2l T,ucas cahl90 toc1Pv, '"'.F '3/,1, thr-1:, furth9r siell:i'1C;' 0f lio~rit"l 11re"S
1-wd occui~rc;d ~n tl19 1\'1z-io brjcrrerer.icl ,,reP. As ri. r8s11lt 0.., tl-i~s , 11.e rps decided
to riove +,}·, • cs-.. ~+,P.1s to +,be ef'st f'l~ ,1• C'.., +,J,., sector tn"10-r•ro1·' •
R • '3?? . "Yon,,. r1 ec~ sion cc"'c8rn-inrr l'S7 Bri;rrde
fAr3011fll Lncr,s to 0,lPr 1- .
Group c0nc11rr9d ;_ri . Th~ "l 'lriP'rrlo r:roun "hon1r1 ccvn3 i.,, -Jquipped r"1·l J'9r>cly ·"'or
COI""bat . T'fo hrin-n.de '-'l'.'om1 to 7 eave 1-ieri,c her,d . 11
Per Pn"l C]prv to Lucri-:i . P'J unr,. !IT'fill se11c't -r'AT'1.."iYJ.cler of' 50 Brit, sr f'~vjrir; fR,t '0 s1'-i_r:j11F· is rv·,-ilrhl9 .
T11ic; 1ivision "I-ill thc".l C"'1sist o-"' 7(,7,
V,8 <>nd 1(;g Brio-rdes . 1S7 Rr-irrtde Grom"' sionJrl 1:)9 cnr1rl,.,tr,ly 7.orred out c+> her0
')y t,,'10rrcn mnr.,,.,,,~~
7"'1, Y01U' 10 ,nrls lyr tomorrrwr Y\~r·l·t . 1/)q Prig'lcl9 [1'10 .)-ivi'3ion Fe c'l1uart"'rs ·-rill follo~1 iJ~ in;1edir1 ,..el· PS cr<>ft retur'1s . •:e "'ill plPn on
-L,vm Rr'tis}1 In PY1tr7 l'W~ t ro 'Tniter1 ft.cites :n+>rintr•r T)-ivisioY\S jn l,rj('lr,:~horir1_ nl•1s
'!rir'"0'1 1 S +'01~cA P'1d in Pr!c-itio·1 to n·1cA11"'19ous units . P' lo.,.istics vlill nr:,:rr1it,
I ~-,ill r-ild rrri<ln,.,Jl~r th"l ,,,erin.5nclor of t,ho 1st rr,,or8d ··1vi~-ion .o;ottinr; reP<'1V for
o-:'fensive net-ion . All 011t 1.ir eff'ort on .7O1 rr f'ront torlr•r. 1res1•ne vou i,,., ,13
nr-v::il mu,f-ire ,,,,lrpo-,,,t von des-tr0 . Conlri 80m8 tnnJrf'l be rrof'• t hly emrl oyecl , dug
i11 -ln surrort 0f +>rant roc;itjons?
Am sure 1~5 Div 4 sion 'ill stop 3llA'TIY flrV" YJr;e . "
0
sion
,..,_a
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The llrny CoP1mR 11der todnv dict8tocl tl-9 +'ollo,·r,rf'" ,.,,87"or.?ndrn'l for hi'.3 Chief of
3tri+>f ~ ith ret;"rcl to f ltu.r9 off,=msi ve oper~tions:
1
"l.
'jt}, the remov'"'l of tr0 S/)t), Divi -;in'"l P,,,o,,.., t,½9 ]_() Sorns f'ront n11c0 trio
exchf''1<";8 o,,. t,l•e !/,t11 Br~·':/ sh Divi3ion by the !,th Divis:i.on , we rnu--:t mor1ify our
rJrrns . } l0Pse hrvr::. G-3 ,-,.:.9r::-r 0 r nr,w set of' i11s+,.,..uctio>1s .,t j ch · 1ill rrovide +>or
tro fol 7 0 17~ 11rr:
~
§; •
,-,,he t<> 1-~n'; o-"' C'l.Ssi·10 f-lnd tJ~e hi r,', f"""('OU 11r nortk10st t'1.,..r<>ff.- b•r t e
9vr ZeRland ".Jo·•TS in the PVCJnt t 1 P.ttriclr toJ11orro= bv the V+t1' Ji vision fail.-. .
1e
2•
'T'he co-ritjnuPtion 0-" the <i.ttMck 'w t,hp French 011 tre e-:ds T0relle ~oc0Aseccr , Pssist0c'l l;y th9 II Corrs jn 'l nrirro•r zo11,e routh thereof Att1:1c1ring in
colurm of' rivisicw1 s . Th:i.s will n-ive the II Corrp ~n o'~porbmity to ··•Hhc'lrPw
one c:li.visior frorl\ tl-i"'i~ li'19 +'or r9st P.'1C r9f'ittin~ .
c . Tl-ie rittnc1r 1y tl·e 'Tow ZeP1'l'10 Corn:?, ross~bly re-li-i+'orced by
,..jvision- (British) i'1 tl'9 Lfr 4 V1:l10y.
f.
t}-P,
7qth
A holc1 :ij7f; ottcic'r i-nintA.ininf" stron~ rrer-mre by +,h8 10 COTf'3 i'1 thP
r•;rtiir110 1:1re:1 '"Ii.th on0 d~v:iRion, th"l otrA"' r1~vi3ion b0i11q ,-,~tr.0rr ..,11 f'or rest c'nd
�for ult,rriPte emrloyr10nt ir th0 Liri V8ll3y.
~•
VP. lley .
':'o hold tre B'~tb Division i"l rrr1y re-:;nrve f•or
GXI
loitctio11 in th0 Liri
f . To holrl · t½e J 8t,b "RY'iti sh Br~ r;Mde Grour out o+> the li:ri.9 for ro~sj ble
eT11ployment for rel_ief n.t thr1 brirlp2hearl or lrter ev-r-loitation nros1 ects .
"Let I s try to o;et :., pla11 v: . : cl1 -,~rovic1es ,~or P".l P 11-out .,.,i f'th A.ryiy effort
i'1 one vi tn.1 a re 8,, ·-,hile ,old~ •1p in others. l le11se e-vTedi te this. 11
Perso"lrl Lucf's to Clrir1•• R" 3rig . 11 1119 to r.rese: t Rl ortrge of infn'l'ltry to
::::ur:;ortinrt arrs in B:d.t:i..s T'i7isior. reco-,-~,,,1c th:;t 167 :n~rntr:r Bri;:;~l'e '7ove to
t, is sector at lj_p-rt scr> le onl~r c'1d not Bd_f~de Group . '"a"~_mun r mr mjtion should
be brou1;i1t . Otber c111its o""' Drii:,;<'<le Group crn ',e c<'lled forurird later. 11
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IR.Er;~,~;TZA1'0--P~B7.TTJ\RY F, 19/_)~--Because 0 f' his cold, Gci,,,,,erfll ClPrk did not Jer->ve
the w=-vi tb-,.,our,b011t th9 entire rriorn:: ~e1 . ne r0mf'jned 8t '1:is des', "10r1dnr- on vn.rio11~ 1JJ~v,ertt r.intt9rs , :i ncl..11.ci11p; str ,,_ctl1eninr of' the A:r>zio be?.chherd ·;ith P
British Br~g~de Group .
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0
At 1110 he receivec1 n,, jor GenP-rrl F cH['ro11, CorJnrncler of' tbe ~tr A..,,ericrin
J11.""~F1try D~ vision , ,·,ro is in It" lv on rn in3rection tour . Th0 Division "'t rresent is in ~nr,land . Later, Gnnerr ls Gbr"lr rnd Mcf''-1.hon ·•rorc joined bv I'r,jor Genern.1 Robertson, CoT'1mander o-':' tre ?nd An2ricrin Inf'rintr;r D-i vision, "rhich is P lso
in F,nglnvid . Gew:ir1:1 l •~ci.'lP.hon returned yest9rd'l~T froT"'l the Anzio bridr;ehe'-"'d, rincl
he f;PVe (},=mrmcil Clarl,c a f:irst kmd re1 ort on hi3 :i11rressio"ls of the situntion up
there . Gennr,9.l Br1:inn n lso returned from the hr-i d1;1>he:id yesterdr.y. The si tu"'tion
up t:iere hrs j_mproved a great deel d'1.ring the p 0 st ?/.J. hours , Pnc1 the German
thren.ts hrve been beateri bn.clr . Lnter in tl· ~ cfay Ge 11erri 1 1wille n.nd Air Vice
Fa:rshrl Dl' lbiac conferred witb tl1 e Ge;1erPl. Genernl Clrrk clictr>ted the followini:i; with regf:lrd to air support oi' the l<'i.fth Arrriy:
vrns only as P -result of my P 11-out ef'fort to conce!ltrr>te n 11 tre P ir in \
this therter on my -'"'ront th::it tho CP'C rutl·oriz9d tbis the dny before yesterclr:>y.
I 1"\a·1 ntained that for six T'JOnth;:; the Str:=i.tegi c Air hri s been j nterrupting eneT"y
lines of corirrunicPtion bnt not su+'fi c:i.cmtly to r•revent h~ s oringj n; down wrirtever
di visions hn neeclec'l , suppl~ : nr; them and -'::l gr tine; with thoP1 . Never yet has air
preventecl 11ove11ents or sup,lies beinr- riwiiln.blG in ordAr to rerri:it suffic~,mt
-f'ip;htin£; on the pirt of the e!1e17y to stop us .
11 It
I
As r rGsul t of trie cecision to use r> 11 tre 9.~ r, my stP ff, , ror"kinf, wHri XII
Air Support , lri:i.d on £' fine rrogrrm for Stl~ategic , TPc 0 nc1 YII Air ..::u: r,ort in
clirect sup:;ort of' the Anzio brittl0f::ela. _,..or JTester(;"'Y. TTn..,ortun,,tely, weather
closed in ['t 11 o I cloc 1 , ;:i_nd 011],, rt out 1/1.~ o+' the 1 roP-r'lm n.s pit ; nto effect.
:
TTord fro1TJ +,he bridrreheecl s 11ow9d bov1 it b osted thP.jr riorale enc how ent;.usfactic
the troors ~;ere to see i11cicc1tion8 of close •·ir nur,,·ort. ';8 r,:,·;ri"l l"id on yrrntGrdGy-1 s incomrleted pro~rn.n ""or ~~od'ly , l,1.1t v!et1thlr J-,as not fAr1,,itted its execution .
11
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HTod.s.v, J.ir Chief n'lrSh£'1 D 1Albi1.c , TrP i>,h,~r ' s Depu+,y /\ir Co•~r,,r>nr1'1r, 8ncl
:::MvillC:l ,iu,t called on ''IP., nnf in 2 cr>s1J1"1l_ co:'1.v0r2ntjon, told rie th t the r,eci- ~
sion b1<'1 1"'9en r1tirie t'·d s ~,orni11o; b~r t}-,9 .?ir , ·7ithout r~ference to m<-), th"t the
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0
�Str::1tegic,
I told t1'e
nrese1ct my
reriuest to
or h0aviP-s , would. ~o br-clc on their old co:-imu11icn.tion job to,..,.orrow . \
ldr ··arsbn l tb.Pt I v1r>s l0C' ~ opposer.. tc this rila11. ,ind hoped he would \
vir=ns to E8 1rer 1111d <"\lessor , trirt I mnde t1-rour;r rin 2.n official
lay on one d"'y ' s <ill-out air pron:r:,m -i_n snrrort of' riy bric!1.;-'3heed .
nr nr r0cordi11r-- t}-1: s to 1ndicnte thA +>8ct thPt teie 'pj_r oftent~_nes run
their Om -mr, ,-rbic: is not ,"'l"JP'fC conrletely coor!i:l.nrted dth tre ITT'.'ound . I
L"e.i,1triin thPt O11e 0ny 1 s 811- ont ~Jr effort in close surrort o+> the bridgehe"d
on 1·11011m enemy concentrE1tio11s , nrtillerv- rirori s , c'u,1rps 01 nc'l cor,~unic'-ltion centers will cert,,,inly slow nr Pr.ri r<j~courrp;e his +'urth9r P1.ll-out nttr,c'c nhich re
is bound to make . At len st we s:~oulrl r:-j_ ve ::1 t a try. I doubt if the.· wi 11 comply vlith rrn request . u
1
7
At 1530 G"mer"l Fre:rburg rinrl menbers of h"s taf'-f' nrriver:'l, c>YJ.d G,mern.l
Cl11.rl;: V'ent ~YJ.to co:r.feronce rit 1'1 tr.en jn t},-3 con+>errnce hut . Tbe t:;rour · hj ch
al,30 i11cluded G,.,11eral Gru,-=mtJ~0r f'nd ~3mi,0rs o.C: w-rious F-i Pth Army ::;ectio11s , discuc;sed tJ,9 co"lin~ srirloynent of +.re ,.,nd ~i8'1 Ze[llr11rl DivisioYJ. Elnri the Li-th Indian
Division, wh.:ch conrrise Gener<>l ..,reyhur~ ' s 'Jew 7,ealf'nr1 Corrs . Followin,s the
co 1<>erence , Q9rerrl Clnr1r returned to ris vn.11 to n.g,,jn nork on lo ,isticrl rrobl"'l:11s v·1 ii le GFm8rri 1 Gruonth"r refl" ~ 'lr>d i.n tl~e l ut to act P s host to Goner 0 1 :::"reyburg nt tre t:raditio'19l British late cfternoo11 te8. .
0
1
GenerqJ Clr-r1c fllso receiv0rl in tre late pfternoon P.n intollifence report
from Colonel Howard. . Colonel Ho'-ra.rc1 sqid thPt tre siturtion i11 the bridgehead
area V't=>S rruch i-proved . For dinr,er Ge·'le}~Pl Clri.r r had Lt . Col. :Port0r, SecretFry,
Ganer"'l 3t2ff , as his guest .
General Lucr>s rAnorted 011 1'is situ"'tio'1 2s f'ollo'rs this morninP": 1m 353.
En°my comrrirntively -i n,,ctiv0 r'•.1.rinP' r.ig'~t . B.elief of Gur,rds Bri p;1=1de by BBttri lion
179th aCCOT'lpHshed ::.--TI10othl;y. EP.rly r9rort on ."'tt,,c'r of 45 Diviecion Pfperr sot::isf-"ctorv, rilthoug]-, heavv f'j_r,hti---i-,_; is in rroF,res-, . At 08'30 h.ours lenling cor:p:,nv- 179tl1 Inf:rntrr hPd reoch9d fPctory . '7 tc:.,-,~·, '"J9r8 puPhed through olc. rrilronrl. 1mderrrss, ? knocked out ut 5 co:-1tinue ~n cJose surrort . Con"icerrble German act::vit;r, co•1position rnd strcn::rtJ-i un'ri~o"m re:rort9d north"•est of f"ctory .
Porrion 1 s trin'rs c1~sroserl to surport f'DY act5on "S rirti..ller,r -f'rol"' rr0.rri.rerl ro'"'ition
or to f'Ssenble C1'1icJrly to r1eet r t,=m1,• threrit . 11
11
A lriter report frorr G9rerA.l LUC!" c, r' i"' closer' thA f'ol lm~inG -in "'orr1" tio11: 1N
3rSl. 11 Frogress o-f' !1-5 "1ivision c1ttac 1 cn,1ti"1ues -f, vorF.1bl0. . F..,ctory Pf]Y'rentJ.y
set 1'1fir9 by our :=i.rtillery n. 1d tr111rs, eltho'F';h erri,,1.::i..1 :imount of r""'CI'ine ~m rind
rifle fjre still comjn['. from thnt Pre? . Cur ten','1 on 1'111 sides o:' -"':::i.ctory rositioYJ. , b 11t m.<>in bod;r o:' ene"1Y Prpears to bP to tl1e YJ.orU . ''fo furthr:r h1-f'crr1r->tion
co·1cern~nn; :;nef'17 force rrevio'1s1-.- rerorterl to t 1· e no:..•th ·est . !}5 :8i.vision 1:i ll
c011tinuP to rusr to trie "lortl' . Rough r-·1r1 he11vv- scris r,rev9nt Pll iinlorriin~ ~-1cl'1J.inr; L ~TS in 'lzio h<'rbor . rr
r
1
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*
Il'ES '."V P0- - '2~RRT'Al.7.Y l? , 194/,;,--G'3nerP 7 f;lrrk left hi o. COTY\m nr· ro"t !"t 0,..,50 houl's
'Pld le,_-.+, the cu', "ield :i.t ()()00 , "lvin,,. to Pqrc~rni,.,e ··~th Lt. Col. utherlf'·'ld.
T:r-iere lv~ met i' "'j. Gen . Crnnon .nnil le"t by Hs C- L.7 , riloted 1,~- 'r io.,... lorle ~, f_'or
the n.~rro:rt ['t "8ttuno . Tre v,l,.,'1A ~rr::iVA0 th,:,re e"'ter "n 1 mevent:f'ul journe;r Pt
1035 .
I
�General Clrr1r hnl"'edi::i.+,ely ni:mt t0 the rePcl.ou; rt0rs VI CoP'IS 'VP c:re ho hPd )
lorig talk ''Tith GP110rrl L11cn.s. VI Corps l.e"'il'1_urrter3 is 110w loc"ter' jn the
cellrtr c,f q 1uild-'ng in Nettuno. Foll◊"'"n,,. tM.s, tho Gi:mer:ol 'rent, ;:-uided ,,,_,y
r"a.i. Jr cl:,on, to tre c0r,"'1r'1d r,of',t o.,,. tbe lc-Sth ...1jvj sion, 1
crricl is locnt0d in r
f· rr:thonse ju t to t,i,e 11ortJ, o ~ tho ro' d ..r} icl' P.083 f'ro"l ~Tr,ttuno to ll'rGc<>ncelli.
On the "Pl.Y GPn,srrl C:!.nr 1, T'fl.SS<;d !l err crrt..,in:in,.,. Gonerrl 'T'rurco~t e11rl -to:rred
+'o-~ R sl-iort t1.ll•. fiurinP- ths r"rive t-,c p-rrn-n::: o"' '8-17' 1 s ~ere ohc:-erved bombing)
tarp9ts +,o tl-i.e nec;t of tbe b"l~cl-t"l9"ti• The G-er""Yl .!>7r 1 v•ris iiecvy, rnd "t lorst
r
one B-17 wns '388"1 s11ot dovm.. \t the /.,S "-'~vis·ion Cl Q9rv,r"l Clnrlr }cd n t::1lk
vd th G"'nern 1 r.:r 1les ,:n,o_ G.::,nerP 7 .,.._.., SC"' 1. The 179th Tn.t'.>rintry }1r,d successfully
tA.hm thro tob..,cco -'-'::i.ctor'T r t Cnrrocetc· t½e PVeni"1 7 bPf'ore, but t 0()0(' t~js
morni'1r_; tre Gerrrnrs "P,£1iTl re-too 1~ ··t. Colonel }'Prrerer -rrorosed t0 p;o ½Pc'r
1.11cl try O ,.,.q in.
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Follo·,in<:; t}1i =- cn'l.,..GrA11".le G8·'1erf'l Clc-rl· •qent on -1:.o tJ-A '9:en(111 rrters of
tl19 1st /\r"'lor8c Div-l sio11, locnte<i :,,bout .:-.:ve ..-,i les nort):, o-"' 'Tettuno -in a ine
woorl s. Hr--re G8ri9r'17 8 Cl" }~1.;: arid C'1 <1no11, r nc1 ~1'8 nc>,-.icers r ccornrn nyi nr, th8ri,
h8cl lunc11 'rith G9"19l1"1 irf'rrno11. rmi c1.:scussed hi.c- s.:turt-1..on. Tl,e G0n0r.<>l hf'd
11Pd '30"!9 cnqupl_+, 4 1"''3 tJ.--8 r-i~'-t ""3·"'cY"8 k r rip'1 ·111rs-l:.~YJ.g '1bell2 ne2ar r5s CI but
··[;'', in P'OOd ''ifj.,..-lts "l'1d CO"\p~c e 1 t. ~f'tr')""" l0,vi.·1p- (}''1~r:ol J,rr!'Jon 1 S CO"'lmRnd
rost, Go,1er"l t;l[lr1:, · 14 th Gr>nnr"l "" 1v1on "'nrs t, e cth-,r o.,.,f'icers, ,~ent to t e
Ci o+" tho :SrH:1.sJ~ 1st I'5.visio,., "1lier9 Ger...,rnl Clrr 1c tnlh,d w:ith G-8nor"l Tenn0y.
ThA 1st Jivis~on su"fer8C1 hervr }oc- es J'8S'llV'1", nt l8n'3t in rrirt, fro' i'lfiltrPtion of '.}0rm"11S h9t'ree11. Prit·;_sr 1 mits so t11,-+, t},9 British ·r,r9 +,r"lr"'YJ. jn t:1e
-"1P'1 'S prd •9nr ""lrl '·:..Jled or cn.rturec". G011.9rnl Gl·r1· r'ecided to pull this clivir;io"l out :"lc1 i·•1rlrc9 it b:r a-iothr;r r':;V)',1.('r'' rcrr}•<irs thr, 5r,th, "S soon fS
por-;s:..ble. 'r2ne,,..A.l Cl"r': t 1
19n lrove to t'1e ,,.,-j·"th A_rmv ~ hr 1~e C}, ·10 loc1-1.t9d
1
jn .i.,,,e h::sorr;:nt o'., the "Borr,.hcse I'P)-nce 9.t 'Tett,_mo . TbAre he c iSClLBsed su;11~
~ro',-1 er,s r1ith Colon8l D 1rrsa. At : hout 1530 110 lPft tl~Cl cor>"l/'T,d post p:•-irl ·rnnt
to tl·e P.~r.,,.hld ,T1 s9re be tal 1 r,d ,,ith Genernl Lucas Yho hed met him there, and
also with GenerPl Templar , Co1'mn.nd:Lng the Brit:i.sh 56th Division, who h'.c1 just
arriv9d b:,- pl,ne ·7ith :::;cno of · ~::; str "f o"fic9rs to lool: ov0r t,J~e ,70 ,,,,c' -.,i...-': ch
t11e 5/)tr vas to occur;t. ?ol10"":1n, ti is th9 G(3'1.8r'l::.. :.~ turmd to h~ .... SI- h;/ S-4"'
an.r c1 11, , ~rrivt11~ ~t p'l-.,01,t 1700. }TPre 118 w,t G'"''1Pr''l'3 "lexrn.der rnrl :•rr,1 ~11c;
ncl ,-c=J r h:-~9:' tPl''". '.:'here,f'ter, -:e9li.n~; -i,.,r'lsnos8c1, Qr,·-ier'"'l ClPi~ 1 , r9·~:I.red
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1 RE i-r:TTZ\ 'TO--r \ ~,r~r~ [ 13, 1:4/,--i'C'<hy GnYJ.er" l r,1, r 1 - , 1or-"'':1l-<-t in, :;.sposed, rer,c.: nPd
in 11is V"r, qll ''lPY. He recoiV'3d H nu,~'Y,:t 0~ crll J~s, ho·;·9ver, 1v10. r+,t3 1cled :,o A.d..,icr:str.'.:'tive ,,,,rtte-r-. 3ennrnl Cn"'11on, Co~·•cinr1-i--p; t½e 1°tt fir Force, v5 ,i:.9c1 tho
t\.T'",r Con...
::i.nrler T ( -"'·'.~-.,13S'30. .. ~-'.:.r i-,..;"l t,h, ,ro·,1,-,ms ('~ , i.:r suprort o.(' t}'e "'iftl
Arri. activ··t 1 es. It. :::ol. Dal:r, Co•1n:.:rr'~nc; +,11_9 l':>t', -r:v~cu· tion nos;itel, G;one:ri::il
''nrti:ri rnd Lt. Col. "lrnce e.lso cPllecl 011 Gn 1110r, 1 Clrrk . :}9nrir,,ls "cl rhon A.:rid
"oh9rtso11 ~+.o:;red in 01•-i_9.r>l;, -l-,o s:p- <;oou.11 re to GenPr' 1 Cl<ir 1z, a,; tl 3y ·nre 01c
4:.1 si.r ·v::.,_r ·-.,ec1· to the Unitec1 K..;,,, ...,-r om P ~t'"r the~_r visit- tr the Ft .,..tl Arr1y :ro>1t.
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(1"1"9r' 1 'Jl' r 1: ~ s ;-;rentl~,r concerrn}C. ow~r t,; e ~robl8IJ 0f' 1,r;~bir"" the Ably') r "'.t \
Cess..;no. Q,9r1D,_~q~ ,-,re;rb,,~g ..;'3 co•m-'·0cer1 tl·"t t}•9 (}'1r""rnc, "rP •1,:;·'1y,· tl-18 ~bb9'r for
nr::_lit,,..,.,r p 1 1.r-"'oses. G8rerrl ,,ru<mthPr, ,t G-"YJ.Pr.,, Cl,,rk 1s c'irAct-·on, ,:1ct,qt,9d the
.,..olJ.017 ·n[l' ""'P,f1C)"'P11,1l1J'l 0'1 -:,Jiis c;ub·'.ect:
�;:,½011t lQOO :~ours on nt1u•rl:;, -, i"'0br·•nrv 1.?th , Qr,nAr"l Fr9•>-i11r,..,. t9leJ:,on9d -n-. '1'1cl sti terl, ' T resi:re J.J «t ::: he ';ive,,., 0 :•~ "'Hf"Ort to,.,,orro\·1 ln orr1 er
to 'lC:ft~r t'19 c.r19....,,r Y'OGit50vi .!.1th~ CA'3'>: . ,.,~ ::--ren.
: "rrit t1.1~t~e 'l:ljc s~o'Y'ls of
l? rJ..r n'=>'l e2c]
tl,e l;:,n91 to he ::.;_+,tv For1')9:c·, C"'rr-r:i.,,'s 1000 rou.nr1 b0mbs 1•
1
I tnlr r'ronc,ral .,.,,reyburg tb·-t t,}-,9 nr•1r C0''1'11'"'1r13r hf'n rl::lr9ct9d tr:, M 0 in <>ir eff'o··t .Pnr to,.,,orro''i be CC1'1CP Ttrrted on th·-i ··rzro hf'+,tlc,"'ro11t, ~,,_r' tb')t J ' [ l f '10t
;urA ·l <>th0r or r(Yt, •-re ·1011lc he ·1 1'ln, tc pi.•re .,.;,~ t},,,t r u-:11 «ir on the 13th. I
told ":n trat tl1 P Arr1y Cor '"nr'er ·,0ulc1 rn.q·•r, P.V •r" '3+'+'ort to coricentr-=i.te ?:lr in
surrort of t',e T11r1:La·1 J'ivisioP ..,,:;trc: 011 tre ll;.tr . Gr-i-r1A'l""l --,reybnrg 8m:;--h.,sized
t ..,t .e vo11l 1 l iJr0 to }1 :c1ve 811 ·!:;hP ~ 'r ,,,., co11-1, ';9t O'"' +,h.-, 13th in order to
"'ofte•1 th=; 01Ymy, Ancl thPt b8 boJJ.everl th9 th:res ni S"'ions r<:? i.u •sted ·18rA the
T')-i_n .._:rmrn l {~('111i.re.,,,sntci .
I r9r l~Ad t 11~t T . ,.,,, 7 " '1'0 ~nto thJ mrtt0:c rt OPCfl .
ttnt
1 ;
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"I then crec1·ed ,,::tt} Go'1cr;-,l P.r['17Yl n,~..:i Lt . Col. ·r,nsbc-r011~1i to detsr"1i·1e
t e '1,ntu.t'e 0f thP trrn;At : s1nerits 'ltlich t]:-.9 t'S" :39,lA.'1d Cor "3 1--::cl 911bnitted
t'1ro11v½ n.lr snrrort C}''1'1J1C 7 s. I ,.ounrl. t,h t j t m1 17.rl be rossiblr-i to f11' 1:'3 one
;".; r:}'t.9r- ½0"'1hnr S Jll,'lr'lron ['V" ., l·- ':ll9 ":o cur"0rt t t'E') tT9vr '3e~. "nrl Cor· S •
I Cf' lled
Ge11.9r,l 4 'rsvb1n•n; snc t0lc 1 ~"'1 that i.t ;1ould ")9 rossihJ.,, to P-iv0 rj.,,, C''1e s11 w.dro.., 0.,, A- 1-S ril" nP s carr ·i. ir 5or. ro1111d hor'lbS for Cl19 o<' -1:,l·v:i rn~ -sioYJ."1 7J.1~cl' he
hMl subri~tted .
I "sved h-i11 to rlesir;r1"te •rrich trrr;et !'e de irec' ,.,tt,,cksd. Pe
rA....,lied 'T W'l."l+; the Corvont Pttr c 1n:id I• I tolc rim thr't .,. '"'rssunec1 },9 ' [ ' ~ re-"9rr-in; to +.hn f'o11.Pstsr
bl,t ti1i=t th;c, -,.,~" not O""t '1-is list of tnrr,9ts . He
rerli.ed , ' I r->rr1 r:mite sure it ,w-; 011. :r 1 ~st o+' tn~gnts, b1't in nn~~ r:rise I 7r>'1t
~Lt b0:ribed . rn1-,.9 otr r tarrt9tc; f'~e l'n~rrrnort;:,nt, hut tl-,'3 0'10 ~s vit['L ~h8 diviz:i_o11 conm"nrier ·-rl-o "S ""~ 1cinn- t1'8 nt,t11c f"e 7 .S th"t i.t i'"' f'n e ,-;ent; ... 1 tr get
~ind I Voro•1cthlv "qr'Ge r·rjt}' 'ini '. ::: tolrl Grn,:,rnl ~r.-,ybu.:r~ t A.t 1 )0C"USe of restr~ ctions in co'1n9ction ·7ith t},iG t['rcret I rroulrl h,VP to "',fl'rn a fw:·th'".)r ~heck
to d0tern-:'18 the ~rny Co'~¥v,,nr"er 1 s "AsirP .
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7
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ClP:r 1• ,;ri:is 11.ot «v?ilPble . .,. called Gen0rrl ~'frc'i'1rt B'"'C tn)f hiri
1 Ge'1errl 'reYbnrc; • qc; p-:;knd +,i,.,t the fbbe r o+>
su1x,t-int.;~1Jy tl e f'ollo,;~ng:
F~onte CH$Sino be bol'1 b9d toY'lorro-7 . GPn9r" 1 C}r .,.,,. ,.,~ 11 not be r Vf' :· L" ble for , ';out
an 1~o·n·, so h') does not 1-no-r. 0~ t]~is rec1uent . Gr-in . 8J.Fr'- hR3 r.ir0Jr9n to Gr:n .
Fre7h1 rro; on -it le:1.st t 'O or:~R'liO''S co'1r:Prn;ni:; th9 1<rl,Jj sal;i l·"ty c+' boMbino- the
t"omist 0 ry. J:e to l cl G9n . k'revburg thPt r"ter co'1s1 11t~'1g Gen . Y:>.ye", tl::0 Cor'"'s
Co~r1 nnc'ler, ?nd Gen . Ryder, the Sor.,,,rnder n,.. +,i--.9 11,th ~iv . , },p ccn::-ider.c>c1 tJ-,E't no
militriry necess:itr existed "'or its clestruct~.on . '1en . c"reyhuro- e·0-re· sed tc Ger.
c1.~r 1' 1 :i ,~ cr·ns~ r'91~9d 0 ·in.: 011 thrt th8 C.9TGru~Von o~~ tJ19 "on-- '1tr-,rv ~s r ,.,.il it,_,•,..y
;y!ces-;-ity, nnr' t11.rt .:t, ''!1.S unfrii.r to ass~~'1 to f1'1.'T M~L1it.-ir~r cor1r1rnr"0r the ~ic;si.on
of trl'i'la ti1e hill , P'1rl pt, t.},., s~me t-ime not PTP'1t rPr'""'jp;s"on to bc,;nb tle rionR.story. ro·mver , in vjrn o" tre nrtur9 cf t' 8 t'"rr;et, r-11.r' i~}i'} i11~~"'r'1R.tiom1l Pnd
r, 7 '/:;ious inrrlicPt:i.0 11s '>rrrlv8c1 , T c,h01,:.r l-"Y-'1 to f"nt 0 n e;q,rcssioYJ. o+' or·"nio11.
-"ro.,,, Ar,r}' a.s to t',e •1rli1isabjlit•~ o" ... ,1t' or::lz·inp; t 11e ½cr1binq: 1 • G<m . 'I•rr··n,,.
stRt90. h. ➔ m1 il l t[' 1 :0 tbe ,._,rtt9r ur ·ri.tl G9'1 . A.l8XP'1c1Gr, 1'1'1(' ·ro•11J' l 0 t "18 1rnm
!}rm . Ale,~"'1rler 1 s vjG'·', shortlv-.
' 1Gc,ner2l
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0
0
n"e"llTYhile I got i'1 touc" with Gen ~ Cl- r -, --,h0 tolrl n tl-1rit he consi.c1ered
t 11e dest~ 1 1'"!ti.0'1. o+' tho ro1ri"t9"'r "RS not n ,,,,~litrar•r necessity, 'l'Yl tlYt I s:rnuld
P!Pl,e tr'l.t r9rrr:;"'e-'1tE1tion to G0r . T'r -,..d,no- n 1 0n he c'>lled lrtor to g:Jve Grm . Alo·
:varder 1s vi9 1 • Gen . Cl,,r'r ::>}so :=;tf'ted +;r"t t',~s Y'"3 a p,rttsr, l icb caus9d h:1"'1
so"19 P.m')f'rr<:13'"'· ,'3nt 3.n vi.9'V o-P the extremel7 str01.,0; vieT3 of G<:m . 1<'rr,vhurr; t 1~t
t,1113 r estructio11 nf t>o "nnast9rv is R "'!ili trr•r necessit,r .
G~ne:~'1.l c1,,r 1, +>e 1t
th<lt 'illl-32S C'ren . Frtwburg recGder fror1 tris ror~tioYJ. ~t "0Uld rlPce Gen . Clrr1r
1-'1 2 very dj ~r~ cult ro-iti.or in tb2 ':;Vent tl1 r t tJ.,.~ rtt.., C1' ~11 0'11 cl "~j_J..
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�ttr crilled Gen . K0sreq rit Rbout 0 11-5, ·rho tolcl me t],l='t, he cjd not co11s:lder
the rles-!:.ruct1on o+' tl'e ffonasterv to be r mi.li+,Ary D")CessitJ. Fe -f'1.JTtrr::;_n stnted
thrt t},e bomb:ir1re o-"' t} e ]'0'1R,3terv "'Olll' rrol-i·0 ½1~, "'Phnnce its v~11 1.e ns R militar- obstacle, hecnu:-;e tre (}0rm:::-11s ronld t½e'1 f'e0l free to 11,e it '"'S " b?rricade . Gen . Yey0s !=Jtr>ted thc:it Gem . lty,~er , G0YJ. . Butler f''1d Col. Bortnnr were
nn,c,YJ.·imons in treir opi nioYJ. tret the destru"!t:ton of' th-; building ·p11s not necess<iry.
BT r,,a !}9n . K-Jves s"dtcl
""'1 to lis 0-'"', T.,t. Col.
iElter, -1:-,o f'jnd 011t ;vbrit
in.tell~r"'1Ce re-roy,ts h0 ½rid nn -1::,}•e b11-i.ldj11.,..,. . Co10110l ·;c•ltc,r ➔;old r9 tl,,.,t -Prom
two civn.~r-m so~.i.rcec; re hNl rea;'O'1 to ½el 1 '"'Vo th['t t1-;_ere T3re r'>+'11P-nes in th0,
t,1,1jld1-Yl<=;, 0ne re·,-,ort st.,ti"1.,. +,J.-int trere ·rere proly,bly a.3 ""any as ?Oro. Colonel
'Ir lter st ter' thrt f'rtill ..,ry CI I s h"l.d suh- 1 tted sev9rP: r0rorts concerninr, the
u·::e o ~ the ..onr st8·~v as ,.,.'1 C'I , ½11:. thrit '1e }1r>d no r0, orts of rn;r P ct 1° 1 fire
com-irr: from t,,13 build~ng . He stPtod thc:it the rwidence pointed to tho f,-,ct thrt
there w'°'re :memy strongro:: nt2 vr=,r-r close to th':! ,"D lls of' the 1-:ll1" ldin'$ .
1
"At ?130 I telhod to /}e"1 . FPrc.~r>f" ·r~c ,trted su0stP'1t-i.<>1l;v rs follO'"S:
li}e11'3r[' 1 l\lrn:ander r,f' s decided th~t tr e r'o>1r-> sterY sr 0'1 lr'J. lie 'JC""nbed if GP'18N 1
Freyburg consirfors 1 t as P militr>r~r necessity. He rer;rets thnt tl-e building
sho11l rl h,, c' estro•red, but th t he hP s f'r, Hh :.n Gen . Fr0yrmrg I s .iun[;T'lent . If
th9re is PYJ.V Y'eD.'3011.able "•robqbil itv thr>t t,lie ,,,,1il,H11_-; is bei11n- usec'l for · rilite.r • nnrro"'8S G""n8rP1.flexam'"lr believes tl'f,t its clestruction ::s 1Vf1rrant9d 1 •
I tho'1 tnld Ge:-1 . r·,rcl~nP- th~t I }y,d leen ahl0 to tnlc to G8nerP1 Clf"rl, siYJ.ce
my first telerhonr:, C"nv0rsrition. wi.th Gen . Fardinr- P'1c thr,t Gen . Clr>rk ' s view
1 Gen. Clr>r , does not thin"" thrt tr e '1,uilding
was substri11.tif' lly P s .Pollo"IS:
.sho11ld be 1,(1..,berl, 8 d trPt ;r- tJ,-,9 cor "'lrnrler of tl~e 1.:JPW Zet1lrnd Gorps 'Vere an
Ani0ri":1.n cor;1n.:<inder ho •7ould c;ive sr-eci+'ic orriers thPt it vrould not ')e bombed .
Ho"P.Ver, in vie,v of Gen . l?r9-r;)nrp; 1 s posjtio'1 in tbA British .,.,ynrire forces , the
sjtu"'tion "'1S n. r'elic...,te one, P11c: Gem . Cl."rlr hAsit,-,ted tr f;ive hin snch qn
order '7~thout first re+'errinr; the r:1-,"'",ter to Gen. AlezA.nrr,r . Gen. Clrrk is
still o-"' tl 0 o. infon tr'lt no r1.il-'tprr YJ.ecessity e~'~ sts >'or th" ceRtr11::::tion of
the f!'onr,PtArv. H':! ½eli9V'")':: it nill '3'1dR.n[;er +,J,-,r:, liYes of' rnr,nv c-'vi.linn refuisees in th8 1:iuildi.YJ.o;; '1'1.d tr· t P bo;1binfs r-ill not r'estroy its v~lue r>9 a forti -"icPtion +'or t 1 1e A11em;ir. In fact Gen . Clr-r1 •"eels tl nt tl 1: bo ,b~ ng "rill rro "
br-1blv 8nh1.11ce j_t,s \}'c:i:!_,_rn . I Gl")'1 . FPrn5nr; st,.,tnr', ' Gen . fleYnnder h"'S mrdP, h:s
position ri_uite clePr en t11is point . He rer;-.cets very T'J.Uch thrt the lonaster:· s' ould
be destrove,:-1 , hut re !'l88S no other choice . If Gen. Cl"r:V r'esires to tP11-:: J=Ar sonr>ll•r to Gen. Ale~<rinu,r Pbo11t t,t,e --:u'lJject , J <">rrl ::11JTP. thr>t Gen . Ale~~ander "'ill
be pleR'3"')d to dif'cu"s it T:tl- hin . 1
0
0
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1
J rerorted [' S11mffi.'lr:; of' mY cnnvers"tion with Gen . I'"rdi.11; to G 11 . Cl,r1
r
'7ho told T"e tr tell Gen . r'reyb11rp; thrt ,,11il"' h8 still c1-;d not co11.:;irler trrt it
Y'9.S ri rnilitflr.' necessity to boT'lb tl e r'o•1rstery, he , Ps vr.i ll 1ng to defer to Gen •
..,re·rbur~ 1 s iud,vient i +' Grm . Fr8:rburg han evidence thct -' nr1:i c~ted tb1'1t the ''onn s ter.r shoulc! be bonbed .
II
0
0
I CPlled Gen. Frevhurr; R.t ::>prrox"'r~tel•r 2?00 :ond prlvised ~"'1 as -"ollo"'s:
Gen . Clar1" does not be 7 ieve thr1.t ri raili t'l.rir nece,si t. ~ e:vi st~ +'oy, tl-:te destruction o"' the 'On.,...,ster;,r. He :ls reluctf''1.t to ruthoi~ize its bomb-ing unless you nre
cert1:1in th~t -'ts lestruc.tio 1 -;s 11ece"'Scl.''Y•' GenP.rf'l Proybure st,,tec' th"t re hPd
ri:onn, ~nto tl1e natter t'hoY"01 1 Yh]y n-'t,r t,J,,9 cljvision coromp'1r'Or OJ"' the; /,th Indirn
Dtvisio·1 8'1d tl "t t;1G '~vision coT'1T"rnder "'as riuite co•Wi'1ced thrt tl'e borribjnr:: of
11
1
1
�the r~omistery is necessPry . Gem . P1·0ybur~ furth9r st ter1 +,b,,t h9 d-id not be1 ieve th.nt it ~r0111c1 be SO1Flr1 to v:ve "11 ord9r to cn:rtu.,..e '011rsterr T':ill pnrl
f't t},e SP"'l9 t; me den7 tl10 CO' rr,rny'pr ti 9 ri ;it tC' r8nove PD -i "'!Tortnnt ob·,t::i.'.:!le
to tbe success o-" tris mission . Fe stPterl thrt ri'1:r hip-her cor:1nnnc1 er who re+>,1sed tc ::i.uthorize the l;o"'Jb-i nv, would hnv9 to be fT9p"rec' to take tre resr,onsib:'..1-i tv ""or P. r>ailure of th0 rttr>c}· . I told Gen . Frr,yburg tlvt the Arny Co,,.,>Jnander '''P q repnroc: to A11t'1or-i z9 tt e h----mbinr; o" tl-e tPrget i +> it WPS Gen. Frevburp.; 1s
conc-;:lr1ered 0;1in-io·-1 trnt it WPS A nilitar r neces,jty. Gen . Fre·irurf! "ns·vered
thPt i.t "l:'lS hj s co11sHer'.Jd opjnion thnt H is e rd lHr->ry neces1:it7 . I t11-=ir> told
rren . Fre7b11r--:- t]'.1',t the fljr .;;ssion VIPS f1Uthorized, end th"t he sr.011 1.c'l A.rran1;e
vrith Gen . Ke-res for the rernov'll o-"' II Corrs troo.,...,... ~i-io would be e11dri11vered Y
t,hj s boJ11bing , ond th~t Grm . ~reYbur~ \Joulrl iet9,~1,ri.11e "'1 l1 om· "lhFJn t:re area v1ould
be safe f'or th bombing .
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11 I t1 en CP lled Gen • Brann [' nd to l rJ. !' ~ m to P rr<> nge 'Ti th tr O "ir +>o:r- t>1e bo'"'Jbin;r of' tre rI011r-istery c'1 thci r1or11i11e- of 13 Febru, rr; the exact ti"1e to bA riven
later, b11t i:ri. no cnse should Ve born1,inr· be executed ,rior to 1000 hours on 13
FebruPry.
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"At Grm . ra.crv ' '"' rer11J_p<;+, I (![' lled Ger, . Fn.r<"~ no; <>t ?l/,O 1-rnc: told 1ir1 substPn1 G-en . Clrr1 w·11 trH· to Gen . \leX'l'1.dP.r ~n tre n-:crn~ng contj ,::ill, r as f'olloirs:
cernin's +,rFJ c,"'11,i'1's o-~ t} 9 ~011;-,st')r,r. T{e still +>,,,els th~t :Jt ~ s n11 '3rror to br;-nb
it . He does 'Wt think th"'t there i"" suff':i.cient evir' nee to PrrPnt the> stntemP'1t
th"t ~t -is n '"'lilitrir;r nece9s~ty to bo"1½ thFJ ~'.onastcrv , nnn -l:h~t -in vi"''"l o" tre
~9l 4 .c-io1 1s nnd int9.,,.n~tio11rl :imrlic,tio~s 0P -i+, e fni=lls th·0 t le shoulr1 discuss
it wjth Gen. AleYander i'1. tl e r,r,rni."v: . ~-A"'1"hil8 ti, e 1x,7Y'1'~ mi<:>c,jon h"S been
l'lid on . It will not be sch=irh1led before l0Gn rn' ~t can he cr,ncel1ed. ThP
Ge·-1ernl f'Ae1s t.nt s-ince (}en • ..,r9T1 "U'f; +>:i0l ~ sc strc,,,r1·} - nbout it rnd -in vir:iw of
G9·1er<>l .,..,re~rhc1rr 1 s 1-ositio he 1ouln li 1r'3 to t"llr. to G8n0rr-l Ale7°nr'er ·"')out it .
Jf' it v1ere [lr,, i~er~ cPr corin"'n ler his c'eci.c::ion V'o 1ln be r-n easv oYJ.e n.11r1 r would
not bother G9'1nrrl Plexrinder Pbci1t it, but he :ill tn.l{ to him in tre "'lorni11r.tt
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rrcun le"'le11V,,"' Ge'1Gral G·eu9'1t 3r 1 , r,'eco::-cl o+' eonver::mtio"1., ('n ::"re ·blP'P: 1 s
re111est to hnmb tre J'o·rirstPrir, Gener8l Ale"rinrer r11onP0 T'l8 tii--; '"10rriinc; abcl't
0015 . Fe told ">8 i1e 11nrl0r:?tond I did not .,.8el the r:,O11ri sterv ,..~1ould b8 bo"'lbGd.
:::: co11+>ir"'1ed J,;_c:; belief on t e ,vo1mds th~t 4TTJ.ericPn Co,,,m9nders <'or soTfje ··,eeks
now •rrl not -"'ound it "lAce~sarv. " h,:,r1 rio .;rlic"tion +,h-t tle rnonr->stery ·•1rs
bei11,.,. user r-iy t1'e G0rn'1ns; t1,,~t our m::i.ny ""'rev~ o-;,, e "-fort~ to bnnl; f' bui lrl~ ng or
locpljt,,,. to rrnvent its use hY t},e GFJr~wns hu' Al'7Pys "~iled, 2nd "f' ;t -;rs
bombed it Wf'S a better def'e,1sive ~r>strl l <>tior, tl'an befo"e . I +.old ,-i"'l thrt if
the GArriiins WAre 11ot in P'1C' :1e t,l·mu;lt tJ:-ev '7ere ~n, ti,eJ certf'inly "'cnlc1 go ~-n
it ,.,f'ter our bo.,,bin"· . Trese r,,.re th9 m~l:itrry r9rir;or2 .
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11 or rel:tr•j_o,1s P'1r' sP,rit,-iro9·1t87 re!l<;cw1c:;, H, is tno ½nrl unnecessrrily to des+,ro~- o.,,e o" the Prt +:.rA"S1IT99 of'+, e world. Bedrles, ·e h<>ve indjc~tioYls tr"t
JT''l".lJ c-i,vili:in "/'Omen P'1<1 ch~ ldr9'1 ['T'e t" 1r:;.rip; .,: elt~r ther i11 .
Tre eyhrit of our
'"ir 9f'fort ,.,'~ici, we cr111 rut on it ri 1 7 ;-,ot rlestro"T th9 builc i r, r ',,1t ,~ ll rrierely
""iVe t},e G0 rr,r'l, 11'1 8'CCUS9 -1:.o USP, it .
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Al8X1"rr]9r '7P.S 1111it0 i.n'l~strmt th,-t -it ½e boni'ben if "'rp-burr; WP:r>tec. it Pnoth9r evi. ➔ enr,'3 o,. ris undul·r ~ntc:;rf'8ri11 w't½ Fif'tl-i Ar~.· Activit-ies _qn' rlo~n,.,.
11
�business direct '.Vi th my subordinn.tes . It s:rows th::=it he is most reluctr->nt , even /
over my objection, in doi11.1s A.nything in disspr,rov:i.nr; Pn Hction of' Freybur,q; for
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political reasons . I told AJ.exA.nder t1Y t j f ~t ,,,as en A·~ericB11. Conmwr'J.der, PS
j t had been in the ;)A.St , I would re:'u se to give the PutJ-.ority, but du2- to the
noliticnl daintiness ,,,jth vir•ich "re h.rd to bmdle the 't>Jew ZePlanders and ?reyburg, I was reluctR.nt to cause a. najor issue Pt t½e present tir e . 11
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Last even-in[' •srorc. cc=nne thDt G·enerel 'r;'re:,hurg h['.d re lli''JSted t 1
Y"'t the bcw']_>)r-rdrnent he de+'errecl tenporar-i l:;, r<ue to the f2ct thr>t r, oiscu.:;sion bet1 rnen him and
General Ye;/AS hAd developed th rrobP.bility thrt II Corra troops "mule'. be injurec' i:" the bc~11);::.rdnocn1t - rprr; cr> ried out ~t t 11 is t~ me . Hm1ever , the rrospect
of bor'l1:>"rdme~:1t is still il'.'.lFtinent .
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Today a nessage frori tl~e beachhead announced thPt f-'. jett:isoned Germrn bornb
harl_ s~L1 1'..c1r in t)· e other r:r -.;ound: '1F; ~9r,1e,~ nt Do'7' the rPdio orerator 8.'10 r1 r:' ver
o'"' tr,e rr-Ldio j,)er r:.--y' +1·,ree o,... tl1r-, eic-;]1 t T'.F 1 s ;1.0 J-,r,,1 been taken up to the
br~ dceher,_d last 1veek P s ri. p;uard for General Clt1rk I s imnedlnte C} . T1.--o of the
Gcmerr,1 1 s jeeps h9d been dameged by i'ra~r,rmts, anc1 his van, r>.lt'-i01rnh rlaced in
a tnnnel near +,he r0Jazzo Por 0 :hese hrd been dnmager1 1,-;; blR.st .
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Gener.s 1 Clark +,oda r rGcei vr:,cl tre follow5 nc:; cA blr-; fro"! G--i1P.rP 1 J\le-'rn.nu.er .
T'A 1007. 11 I have rt'eceived the +:'ollo 0 "in,q; r;1essag fror:·1 General -~isenl 0 1 19r .
1 All
rorr last ;,rear I s terT'l'T!etes now 7 n the United 1~i n.-=;dori. Pre follo"ring :lour
operAtions 1.'ii th 1 :een r9ri J.ization of the innurnere hle o bstP. clec. you Rre encountc~rj ng rnd with comrJ.ete +>p:ith :i11 ~¥"c:..:: ahilHy to remove them .
The unbre8h1ble
solidPrit:r of the '"eciiterrono,c,n "'.rounr1 , navnl, P5-r cornr'lflnd ·,ill win through to
total victory just as it emerged triur'1phant :f'ror,1 tre discour::i-:;ing cJjfficulties
of Jast winter I s Tunisian car,'paign. We dPsire especially to conve;r to :rou Pnd
to GenerPl Cl.,.,r 1" our lasth1e; con+'5_clence ln your leac:er•Jhip a 1d our :rride j n
your FJap;n:ificent troops . Cunnin1=;h2m , Teclder, Srdtr Gnc1 P.11 the oth0rs here
share m;r regTet that we can novr be with you only jn spirit 1,ut r,11 of us send
2.. rroud salute to :rou 8110 to all the Allied o·~f:i cers 8nd men that mak:e up your
great f'ir;ht:i ng co:ri:riaml. 1 n
n.r-r
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111:~ ..:•-r:; 1·JZA u0--F1 :rrnJ.A :,:y 14, 1944--Genern 1 Clnr}:: toctwr, still :;:·,c;cow,rin~ "'rori his
cold, remained at his comrr1.'.,."lr1 rost vc:-n nnd Pttsrrideo to Pdr1 4 n.:istr,,tive ,~Ptters
and held a number of' conferences . At lCCO in t 1"e norni'1.p; r,9 tPlked ui tJ--, Colonel
Hj ckel1r1ait and reviewer] '7ith him n number of r8cords on court mn.rtir..l cases .
At 1100 L~ entenant G8nernl Pnders o-f' the -Jnd Folish Corps and BrigPdier
:c'rith, British Liaison ( Pficer , togeth<;r ,,uh Lt . Co1. Szym<"nski, c"lled on General Clark. The GarpPthian Division o-f' the Fol:ish Corns adjoins the Fiftt, Army on
the rj ,·ht, ½einG the left :lan], 0lement of the 1-;;iR:hth FTFJ.:f.
<\ f'ter lunch the C,AnerP 1 received P call ,:>rorn GenerR 1 ?rev1,urg v ho cl-i scussed
at sorre len-rth thA rrobl0m of bomGing the Abbey l"t Cassino . GenerP.l Frevhurg
sa:ic1 thrt if he was to tRl:e the r~onr ster:,r Fill the \bbey- •'To11ld hn.ve to be f'lAt tened; h8 conld not be responsible :or the cnrture or fRilure to C"pture ·if tl e
.A½bey 1vere left as Rn obstPcle . As 1
';:ener,:il Freyhm·g was le,.,,ving, Gnnerc1l Jnin
arriV8d , Pho the t"rO had a short tal1(. Gener2l ,Juin expressed t};e ide2 thRt
fla+,ten5no; the Abbe;r wns unnecess,g_r,, n.s troors co111d by-rass :it nno tlvm smoke
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�it ,·he'1 tJ1e +>·-.,11.1 rlcc-':s 4ve
7
n,,.,tt9r ·rqs rll c ec 4 dec1 .
""UC\
rn_q
r-ut
GP.nerrl ,;,.,,,,, ·bur,.,.
0"' .
"'['j_('
tJ'1rt tbe
Generel Juin 7, Pll ·ent u-~ 81Y1 1-~d fl t.nl1" ·:itl-i r',<;n9rrl c1~rk . Qr>'1 ,rrl
•vr,•, jYJ. f'rvor of ST'eer1·• rit,tp0i- . F9 3w·c1 "''1Ce l O"'Rstery Fill wrs rer1 ced
a', ~.l'1"1CJdi,-,te rush +>or•Aro ,.,.' 4 1,, ... , 9 r9T""<l'1'1 ·ere -till ',roren "1 4 P-1,,-1- rrocuce
sr10 '1cl4n re""ult::; . T·e sP~c1 , h0 ever, ' e nul'i 09:'.:'lor0 " lcY'"' r:-=,riod of orw 11.~ i.nt4 011. ·"ollow" nr: t} "l ottr"c1· 0'1 t e h 4 ll before tl"e ~ :ri~ral atk c 1c 11ent
""OT'"/U'O..
G9;1e:Ml Cln.r1r S"'id to G0;,"9rnl Ju-'..n tl-iPt h-"' ','T"S t"c 0'18 bri~ht srot
jn R tou,c:;'1 ('!'1 a"1(1 tr<>t he, C're>1crPl vlRr'r , '""S iu~t "'S rn..xious to att8Ck %"It
tre e,rlies+, 1o~s::.'1le mo nnt f!S Qr,119r~,1 Ju:;.n '"'A.'J .
.Tuin
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G"'nerrl CJ.'•rlr t 1~11 ''rent clc m • _.t G0n0r"l Juin t0 tl 8 but "''1.rl wve hi.n
t•m '~ottles o.c> c' "'"T ~'lfl, "lld nll hpnrls hrid a 1 rin1• o+> "'herry to thn s,wcess
o" the f'rrt co·ina rttRck.
Gon.9r<>l crville tb9n cr>mc tc s9e (}nnArR 7 Cl-or1r, P'1C t ey hPd a t~lk ::-bout
F1jr surror~ f'cr +he -i'ortrco"!~ri • op"r:1Vo11s of t e -nifth trn:r.
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PRESENZANO-•P:EmUARY 15, 1944-Today the Anr:, Commander remained at his command
post attending to administrative matters. The air program JrOT.ided tor bombing
Cassino monastery with tour groups of "Fortresses" beginning at 0930, and the
large tormtions passed directly- over the comnand post. As the planes were
eoming over, 16 bomba were released by mistan. One or these hit near the com•
•nd post, sending a number or fragments through the Commanding General's area.
Fortunately- no one was hurt.
The ••sages f'rom the beachhead during the day- indicated that the night
14/15 was fairly quiet bat that air activity- b7 the Germans built up towards
the close of the da7 and finally- caused considerable damage in the port. At
0230, RN 5860, VI Corps radioed that the night
quiet and that there we.a
nothing to report.
•s
RN 5886, from VI Corps, reported patrol actions at various points bat a
quiet night in general.
By VI Corps message RN 443, an air attack south of Garroceto was reported
by 12 ME•s and n•s with only slight damage.
A message f'rom General Lucas at 1750, RN 452, reported three bombing end
strafing attacks on front line troops with one rE 109 shot down.
At 2055 the following dispatch was received: RN 461. "Air raidl!I port
tonight destroyed one LCT with gasoline. One Liberty, Yale, had ,,.o ne hold damaged
by fire, other re,rts of Liberty may be damaged but are under control. Air activity of enemy noticeable during the day. Several ME'a shot down. Frederick reports enemy front lines closer in and more strongly held on his front. Power reports our artillery and mortars have caused man:, enemy casualties in factory
area."
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�PRESENZANO-•FEBRUARY 16, 1944•-General Clark's notes of today's activities follow:
1
"This morning I attended a conference with General Alexander. The first
subject to be discussed was his disa~int~nt in the way Lucas was handling the
Corps Commander's job in the Anzionr:ldgehead. I knew this was mming, for he
had discussed it with me previously and, to be perfectly frank, I am not 100%
satisfied with the hold Lucas has taken on that situation. When Alexander told
me he was dissatisfied, I asked him to tell me why, and from what sources he ob•
tained his information. He told me that Lucas was older than hie age, he was
old physically and mentall,-, was tired, had no flash and was not at all familiar
with the deta.ils of' the situation. I had found Lucas, on my many- trips there,
unfamiliar with many details, and I had urged him to send out members of his
staff' and to go out himself' and satisfy himself with conditions as they were.
Alexander had to admit to me that moat ot his inf'orma.tion came from General Penny,
Commanding General or the let British Division. I told Alexander that as long as
we were discussing personalities and being perfectly !rank, that my trip up there
a few days ag0 had revealed from Lucas, Truscott, Harmon and Eagles that none or
them had any confidence in Penny. This shocked Alexander, and he repl1.9d that he
had confidence in him, to which I replied, "Nature.117, tor you appointed him".
I told him I was making no request for Penny's relief' but that I did believe that
a change in Lucas would be advisable but under no oircumstanees would I hurt Lucas, for he had performed well as CoJllllanding General of the VI Corpe from Salerno
north and in the initial landing at Anzio. He had la.eked some aggressiveness
after the landing, al.though allegations that he could have gone to his objective
or to Rome were ridiculous, for had he done so with any force he would have been
cut orf from his bridgehead.
•r told Alexander t~t I would put Truscott in aa Deput7, 0 1Daniel to commam
the 3rd Division, Sherman to be second in eomnand of 3rd Division a!!rl Darby to
command Shermn•a Regiment, the 7th Infantry. Alexander asked what staff' l would
provide Truscott with, and when he appeared to dictate this, I told hi11 that that
ns a matter that I would handle.
"I haw sent the following radiogram to Lucas:
RN 1741.
'Orders issued this date as follows:
Major General Truscott re-
lieved from command of 3rd Division and assigned as Deputy Commander, VI Corps.
Brigadier General O'Daniel to command 3rd Division. Colonel Darby transferred
trom Ranger Force to 3rd Dinsion. All assignments to take etf'ect 17th February.
I desire that Colonel Sherman be designated as Acting Assistant Division Comtllfimer
and that De.rby be placed in command of Sherman's Regiment.
Acknowledge.'
"I told Alexander that l would not relieve Lucas in the middle of the battle )
which is currently taking pl.ace for, while a change seemed necessary, it might
make matters worae to do it at the present moment while the Germns are attacking.
"I urged Alexander to release the 169th Brigade of the 56th DiVision to me
immediatel,-, and told him again how I disapproved of hia ~equirement that it have
7 da711' recreation before moving to the bridgehead. He t.1.nall7 gave in.
•r
told Ale:xamer that 1n the current situation 1n the bridgehead I was taking all Ill Air SUpport off of Frey-burg's Cassino af'f'air and diverting it to the
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�bridgehead in aeoordance with Lucas• request. He was displeased, but I told
him that it was 1IY' f'irm desire and that as Army Commander I would indicate m7
priorities to the air. I also asked that tomorrow, the 17th, an all-out air
ef'fort be made in the bridgehead, including Strat•a, Tactical and llI Air Force,
aa well as the Desert Air Force. I told him I was desirous of maintaining the
impetus of the attack in Cassino and 110uld attempt to put some Desert Air Force
on the Cassino front this af'ternoon, which I did to Freyburg'a satisfaction. I
also have arranged for Freyburg's missions to be continued tomorrow in the Cassino area by some of the Desert Air Force, the balance being added to the all•
out air attack in the Anzio area.
"I told Deirers, who happened to be here, of my prnpoeed changes in personnel
He agreed that it waa a good idea.
1
in the Anzio area.
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•I want to record m:r definite feelings that Admiral Cunningham has been as
uncooperative as possible in this SHINGLE Operation. Yesterday- Lucas asked for
cruiser gmf' re support am did not get it. Today he asked again. Admiral Cun- 1
ninghu will give it onl,7 if' it comes from Lucas through his liaison of'fioer, not
honoring 'lfl1' request.•
In the af'ternoon General Cl.ark received a call from Brigadier General Sewez
the French Arnr:, who commands the 4th r.oroccan Mcuntain Division. The first of
the division personnel is coming in, but its mules, which are an essentiel part
of' its equipment, will be very slow in arriving. However, General Juin proposes
to put the first combat teem, with General Sewez in command, under General DeMontaa.bert as soon as it gets in.
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General Clark today received a copy of' the fb llowing cable from Admiral Morse
to the British Naval Liaison Officer of' VI Corps: "Following received from Nava.l
Officer in charge Anzio begina: 'Shelling or town and port has increased. More
than one gun ta.king i:art and firing more accurately-.' Request you will bring
this to personal notice of G.o.c., VI Corps. Should shelling of port continue the
maintenance of Army will decrease, am that the only remedy ia action by our own
forces to silence these guns and thus prevent your vital line of' snppl.,- being
jeopardized."
General Clark cabled General Lucas as follows: RN 1740. "If you will eub111it target requests thru your Naval Commander 1ilich justify second cruiser, Ad•
1tiral Cunningham states it will be sent. Advise action taken."
Personal to Lucas from Clark. RN 1738. •weather permitting an extremel.,heavy all-out air program will be executed on Anzio front tomorrow. Let me lmow
earliest possible time the natur8 of request you made for naval gunfire support
for today. CINC MED of'f'ice here sa)'S that no request tor cruiser was received
from Naftl Task Force Col!Dll&.nder in Anzi.o area. Possible that Commander estimated
that he could provide necessary support using destroyers only. I shall follow up
this failure as soon aa further information is received from you. One cruiser
surely will be aftilable tomorrow. Am endeavoring to arrange for second one."
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PRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 17, 1944•-This morning at 0930 General Devers arrived by cub
plane which General Clark had sent to Mareianise for him. Gemral Devers conferred
�all morning with General Cl.ark and sta,ed to lunch, together with Generals Keyes
and Crane. General Clark's notes on the conference with General Devera follow:
"Had a long talk with General Devers this morning.
Items were as f'ollowsz
UJ..IEF OF LUCAS
"He feels as Alexander does - that General Lucas should be relieved. His
estimte of Luca.a ia that he is extremely tired, mentally and physic&lly, and
should be taken out. I told him that I bad already initiated steps in that direction. I will assign Lucas as lff1' Deputy, but Devers will attempt to have him
returned to the United States without in any wa-r hurting him.
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INTERFERENCE FROM ACMF
"Told Devers of the increasing interference I was receiving from ACMF in
operational and logistical mtters pertaining to Firth Army affairs but that I
could handle it.
m.§CU§SIQN OF A ~
"H• indicated that, whereas no decision had been arrived at on ANVIL, it
looked aa though it would not amount to much a.?Xl feels that I should remain
with the Firth Arrq, whioh, of aourse, suits me. I told him that was a matter
tor det9l"lllination by the 1t'f: Department. I had no other desire than to command
the Firth Army in bsttle and to the successful 00ncl.usion of this war.
"I explained to hint the difficulties in this allied command or having Bri•
tish subordimte commanders do exactly what I desire. I told him in man)" cases
it was almost impossible to handle them like Ameriaan oomma?Xlers where orders
were giV9tl and compliance demanded.
ACW TAKING OVER MANAGEMENT OF ANZIO BRIDGEHEAD
"He indicated to me that there was a feeling that ACMF might take over the
management of the beachhead. He did not feel that it should be done and asked
for my opinion. I told him that was a matter for higher headquarters to determine, but later, after I had thought over the matter, I told him that from the
administrative point of view it would be most difficult for Alexander to handle
the American units in that area. I think it is the desire of Alexander to disassociate Fifth Army from those troops in the Rome area. It might be a good
solution to do it that way, for I feel that Alexander is not using all the
means available - namely the Eighth ArJey'. Either a solution of Eighth Army
taking over this front and Fifth Army the bridgehead, or ACMF taking over the
bridgehead might be a ePod solution. I can state that it certainly is a tremen•
dous burden which I am carrying with five corps, one of which is isolated by sea
some 100 miles away. I :feel that we can do it, end hope to keep it up, but if' a '
change is ma.de I have no objection.
"De,rers assured me of his desire to assist in all ways he could. He seems
to understand the difficult position which we rl?Xl om-selves in with the entire
Mediterranean now in British bands. I explained to him my difficulties with the
New Zealand Corps. I also told him that, although the replacement situation was
�getting better, it was still far t.rom satisfactory• that I have the 34th Division with approximately 4,000 replacements required which S1ould go to them
today, and I won 1t be able to get any to them for probably a week, resulting in
a week's delay in the return or that unit to oombat.
"I urged Devers to get the Fifth Army 111 th all American units in it, with
none other except perhaps French, and that when the French can bring in enough
to form an Arra:,, there should be three armies - The British Eighth with all
British Units, a French Army and the Fifth All American and that with those
three armies, forgetting ANVIL, with the 85th and 91st Divisions added, we
could drive up to northern Italy. He agrees with me heartily', but let• a see
what ean be done."
In the afternoon General Cl.ark received a call from Colonel Eddy who is
the officer in charge of development at Aberdeen Proving Ground. Colonel Eddy
is making a tour of the battlefront to exhibit to American officers new items
of equipment which have been developed. He put on a demonstration of various
weapons this morning and a motion picture for selected officers this afternoon,
showing the technique of emplo,ment of the new developments.
During the
tomorrow.
L•5 cub planes,
making the trip
head
evening General Clark determined to make a trip to the beach•
For this trip he set up his PT Boa.ts, his C•47 and his two new
in order that he might select the most appropriate means for
in the morning.
*
*
*
PRESENZANO-•FEBRUARY 18, 1944-•By 0530 General Clark was examining the latest
dispatches from the beachhead. He determined to make the trip by cub and left
the cub strip piloted by Major Walker, with a stand-by plane following him, at
0830. He arrived at the beachhead approximately an hour later, landing on the
Nettuno airfield. The airfield was un:ler shellfire, but no shells hit on the
strip as the General was coming in, and he landed safely.
General Cl.ark's notes on the trip follow:
"The situation was tense in the bridgehead, so I flew by cub to that area.
I was escorted by two Spitfires up and four be.ck. It was about the only way
to get in there fast, for the airfield was under heavy shellfire, and I had to
go in some plane in which I could come down on a road if the field was being
shelled or damaged at any time. The trip was uneventful. Went immediately to ~
Lucas, where I soon met Harmon, Eagles, Truscott, Eveleigh, Baehr, Keiser and
Lewis. The situation was confused. Lucas is tired - very tired - but I did
not take him out because it was in the middle or a be.ttle and although Truscott had reported the night before he was not sufficiently into the western sector picture to take over. It would have been a great mistake, in my opinion, to
have me.de the change in the middle or this p1,rticular fight.
"The situation was confused. The 179th Infantry had not performed well - \
Eagles admitted it. I suggested that he relieve Kammerer and that I would put
Colonel Darby in oomnand. This was done. In the western sector a heavy German
attack had carried the line to the final bridgehead position, where the British
were apparently in good shape, but the 179th was disorg8nized. The 180th Infantry stuck out like a sore thumb to the east. The leading battalion of the 157th
�on the west was out of contact with the rest or the regiment and was short or
food and ammunition. Efforts of the 3rd Battalion, 157th, to join it had been
f'utile. I was afraid that it had been cut off. One battalion or the 6th
Armored Infantry had been committed at the underpass to ease the situation.
l
"At the conterenoe, Lucas and Truscott wanted to mke a counterattack and
decided that Harmon shot1ld counterattack that afternoon. I felt that a proper
counterattack could not be coordinated in that short time. It was then about
1030. I suggested that they hold the shoulders on either side or the penetration readjusting in the 180th sector; that all commanders go forward to their
front line units and take hold of the situation and make it plain that they
hold to the last man on the final bridgehead position; that Harmon's 6th In•
rantry, less one battalion already committed ( that made only two weak batta•
lions or his - 550 men in each) reinforced bya battalion or the .30th Infantry in reserve and supported by tanks, attack from the general area 9128 to
the northwest with the tanks along the road and the infantry veering more to
the west, and that plans be mde for the .3rd British Brigade and 169th Brigade
to make similar counterattacks from the underpass area to the northeast,
should this become necessary. This plan was adopted. Lucas issued the instructions., and the commanders lef't.
"I discussed with Lucas the possibility of a parachute drop in his rear
area and that careful planning should be made to break up any nuisance raid
like this without alarming any of the bridgehead personnel.
"I checked carefully on the organization of their final bridgehead position
and am of the opinion that it was not thoroughly followed up by Lucas or his
staff. I may be wrong on this point.
"I discussed with Keiser the necessity of organizing other units, anti•
aircraft and what not, for possible reserves in an emergency - this they had
thought or.
"I went with Truscott to the 45th Division commnd post where I saw Paul
Pascal, second in command of the division. He con.firmed the situation on the
front of the 45th Division and had already taken steps to readjust the front of
the 180th Infantry to conform to the withdrawal or the 179th.
"I then went to Harmon's command post, where he was calling a conference
of his commanders to prepare the plans for a counterattack in the morning.
Harmon told me that two companies of his tanks had operated on the road running northwest from 9128 earlier in the day and if it had not been for his tanks
there might have been a minor crisis in that area, for a battalion of the 179th
had withdrawn precipitously to the rear when confronted by superior German
forces. He told me his tankers had killed about 125 Boche. All during the af• /
ternoon, f'rom latest reports, his tanks operated successfully in that area. I
then returned to Lucas command post.
"I did not go to see Templar because Lucas and Eveleigh
and at such a tense period I felt it unwise to inject myself
post at the same time. I again discussed the situation with
and told Truscott or m:, plan to put him in command of the VI
Lucas into my Army as Deputy until something else developed.
were visiting him,
into his command
Lucas and Truscott
Corps and to bring
I told Truscott
�that I would take out Keiser and Hill at the same time, and he could take Carleton as his Chief of Staff and his 3rd Division Deputy as his G-3. He asked for
Campbell as his Artillery Officer, and I denied him that reqmst temporarily.
I returned by plane to T'ltY command post in the afternoon. That's quittl a lone•
some trip in a cub, but it is a quick way of getting up and be.ck.
"At night I discussed plans with General Freyburg. He oould not continue ~
his Indian Division attack on the monastery until the night of the 20th. I
urged him to speedier action, knowing it would be to no avail. You can •t hurry
these Britishers."
The General returned to his command post at 1515 and innnediately summoned
General Gruenther, and after discussing the tactieal situation at the bridgehead and on the Cassino front, he called in General Saville and General Brann
and went over the situation with them. The attack of the Germans against the
beachhead is in considerable force and is potentially very dangerous.
General Clark today dispatched the following cable to Admiral Morse. RN
3590. "Fully appreciate present difficulties of port of Anzio 110rking under
enemy shelling. We are doing all we can now by counter battery and air attack
to deal with enemy batteries and intend to resume offensive and enlarge bridgehead at earliest practicable moment. I am deeply grateful to the British and
American personnel who are performing difficult tasks efficiently and cheerfully.
I am especially appreciative of the work of the port parties under the leadership of Captain Turner."
Later in the day the following reply was received from Admiral Morse. RN'
1175. "Message is tremendously appreciated, most grateful. It is being passed
to all concerned. Good luck."'
*
*
*
PRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 19, 1944--General Clark remained at the command post throughout the day where he held a number of conferences.
General Clark's notes concerning the activities and conferences of to dny are
as f ollolvs:
"I received the following letter from ACJF:
IDST SECRET
STJBJEC'l':
Regi:ouping.
TO
Fifth Army.
:
H.g. -1,
A. ••C. M,F.
1.
Now that N.Z. Corps has been comrni t ted 1.t is essentiitl to carry out
further regrouping to provide a fresh reserve with which to continue the battle.
2.
The main factors in the solution of this problem appear to be:-
�96
(a) 88 U.S. Div. is the only formation not yet committed. It has, it is
understood, one R.C.T. fully equipped now and the rest of the Division
should be complete between now and the end of February. It has had no previous battle experience and should therefore be put into a reasonably quiet
part of the front to start with.
(b) 34 and 36 U.S. Divs. have had a period of very heavy fighting and require first a period to reorganise and then a per1.od in a quiet pa.rt of the
front.
(c)
46 British Div, will very shortly
be i.n the process of being relieved
by 4 British Division, which must also be given a period in a reasonabl.7
quiet sector before being committed to offensive operations.
(d) 10 Corps Fro~~ will for physical reasons remain the most quiet sector
for some time to come, and offensive operations there can be confined to
brigade attacks with limited objectives without detriment to the general
plan.
(e)
No more troops can be withdrawn from Eighth Army front.
(f)
5 Br,
Div, hes not had a very arduous time since the fighting around
rAINTURNO died down, and, after a short period out of the line, should be
fit for offensive operations.
3.
After full consideration of the factors set out in para 2 above, the
C in C suggests the following as perhaps the most satisfactory way of creating
a new reserve:(a)
General Intention,
(1) 88 u,s, Div. to begin to relieve 5 British Div at once. Reli.ef
to continue as fast as the components of 88 Div can be equipped.
(ii)
5 Br. Div. to come into A.C.M.F. reserve on relief.
(iii)34 U.S. Div. to relieve 46 British Div as soon as the former
can be got fit to take its place again in the line.
(iv) H.Q. 2 U.S. Corns to relieve H.Q. 10 Corps, command to pass with
relief of 46 British Div by 34 U.S. Div.
(v) 36 u,s, Div, to be withdrawn into Fifth Army reserve as soon as
its extraction from the line can be effected as a result of the converging advance of N.Z. and French Corps.
4.
The C in C wishes to discuss the above proposals with Commander Fifth
Ar1If1 as soon as General CLARK returns from the bridgehead and has had time to
study the problem. Please report by telephone when General CLARK is in a posi•
tion to discuss the matter. Meantime the C in C suggests that plans be prepared
to put regrouping proposals into effect in the shortest possible space of time
once a definite decision has been reached. It is vital to the maintenance of
the momentum of the battle that any relief to be effected should be completed
�91
without loss of time so that the troops required for further offensive operations
get the maximum time for reorganization out of the_ line.
/s/ A.
F. HARDING
Lt. Gen.,
C.G.S.
PWM/gb
~9 Januy, 1944 (Changed by yhone call from
18 February, 1944
ACMF /s/ Wood)
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
M.A.
P.A.
P.A.
Gen.
to C-in-c
to C.G.S.
to D.C.G.s.
ROBERTSON
B.G.s.
(G(Ops)
"It really shocked me. There is nothing in it that I agree with. It is
indicative or ACMF's willingness to delay this operation indefinitely. In compliance with its le.st pers.graph, I called General Lemnitzer and told him I was
ready to discuss it at any time - the sooner the better - and requested that
General Alexander, who was visiting Freyburg this morning, to drop by this
afternoon. I later received word that he would come to see me tomorrow morning.
"I am convinced that we must do something now. I have been so hamstrung
and jockeyed by higher headquarters that the Firth Arrrr:, has lost a great deal of )
its power to control its own tactical operations, but I will insist, as long as /
I am Comnander, on presenting my views and demanding their execution as far as
possible.
"I intend to recommend that the French attack toward Atina, the II Corps,
leading with the 88th Division, making a holding attack in the direction TerelleRoccaaecca, with the Indians attacking from the Monastery towards Piedmonte, with
the New Zealand Division and the 78th Division attacking abreast across the Rapido
up the Liri Valley and with 10 Corps attacking from the Minturno area after re•
grouping in the direction of S. Giorgia. This will meet opposition by Alexander,
but I am convinced if we are to get going it must be done this way. It is abso•
lutely impossible to mass for an attack doffll the Liri Valley without first se•
curing the commanding elevation on one fiank or the other, particularly in view
of the heavily defended defenses prepared after months of German occupation in that
area.
"I called Keyes and Sloan, Commanding General of the 88th Division, for a conference, and they agreed, as do my G-J and Chief of Staff.
"I conferred with Air Marshal Slessor and Major General Joe Cannon, of the
TAF today, urging all-out air support of the battlefield in the bridgehead. I
&eked these air experts if they could make it possible, through air power in direct support or my Army, to go down the Liri Valley without securing the elevation
on at least one side. They agreed that they could not.
"Gener&l Wilson called on me this morning, and I had a very frank conversation with him. He is always considerate, and I feel wants to be helpful. I
�explained the situation in detail in the bridgehead and told him that he, the
Navy, the Air and the Ground had a. commitment there which they must appreciate )
and support. I told him the Navy had not given me support and had acted in
many high-handed ways, particularly in trying to cut my tonnage when I must
have a certain tonnage there to support the necessary troops to hold the bridgehead and to build up some small reserve. As an example of interference, an I.ST
loaded with equipment for the 169 Brigade, which I had rushed into the bridge•
head, was in the port of Ando last night when a mine scare was raised by the
Navy. The naval officer promptly closed the port and sent this I.ST with its
valuable cargo· out to sea. I told General Wilson that I needed the 85th Divi•
sion. He said he would send it early in March. I told him that this theater
was being criticized for not massing our means. I asked him where my means were
with which to mass. I explained my entire plan of maneuver in this area - the
Liri Valley attack versus the Mount Cairo attack, coupled with a Liri Valley effort. He agrees that it is necessary to secure the high ground before sticking
one's head into the Liri Valley trap. I told him of General Alexander's propo•
sal as contained in the re-grouping letter referred to above. I rather felt,
although he did not say so, that he did not agree with those proposals.
"General Wilson asked me what I thought of General Penney's handling of
the British 1st Division in the bridgehead. I told him that I was not too satisfied with it, nor were the other American Division Commanders with whom he
worked. General Wilson indicated that he did not think Penney had handled his
job well. I told Wilson that I had so reported to General Alexander.
"Word from the bridgehead today has been increasingly cheerful. The counterattack arranged for yesterday by the Armored Division apparently has produced
results. The "lost battalion" of the 157th is in contact with the rest of its
regiment. Appt.rently the 179th has been relieved and is holding fast on its
final bridgehead position. Harmon reports his tanks killed about 400 Germans.
This is probably emggerated, but it must have been good shooting.
"I told General Wilson that as long as the German kept six or seven divisions in the bridgehead area it would be futile for us to attempt to attack to
gain our final objective at Colli Le.ziali, for we can not build up sufficient
force in the bridgehead to overcome that much resistance; that I would lay in
some extra supplies and import extra troops to regain more elbow room in the
bridgehead and then dig in, relieving troop unit personnel to take over equip•
ment of units going out and to build up in the Cassino area to join up with the
bridgehead force.
·
"I have sent Colonel Bowman, my Engineer, up there to start advising on
putting amnrunition dumps underground and on securing a bridgehead which can be
held by defensive works by the minimum of troops."
The following important messages were received and dispatched today:
The Army Commander received the following cable yesterday, RN MI.479, from
General Eisenhower; "Dear Wayne: In all the years I have known you I have never
been prouder of you than during the past strenuous weeks. Despite every diffi•
culty you are obviously doing a grand job of leadership with your chin up. I
read the fine message ;rou recently" sent to your troops. Together with men like
Al and Truscott you are writing history that Americans will always read with
pride. Signed Ikett.
l
�General Clark today replied to General Eisenhower as follows, RN 3257:
ttNothing in the world could have given me more encouragement than your message
received during the last hectic night. I had just conferred with all comman•
ders and visited units in bridgehead. British and American troops are fighting as usual with their chins up. I believe the Boche has shot his wad today, )
although I may be wrong. We are holding today and inflicting heavy casualties
upon him. Air and Navy supporting us admirably. Thanks a million for your
thoughtfulness. Al sends regards."
Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 538. "Last night have closed port Anzio because of mines. I immediately contacted Captain Turner and notified him equipment of 169 Brigade on 3 ISTS's was vital tor today's operation. LST's mean•
while had put to sea, and Turner reports despite all attempts to this hour he
has been unable to reach LST's to bring them into port. If certain equipment
does not reach 169 by 0900 hours this brigade may be unable to counterattack
today."
From AFHQ to CG, Fifth Arm:y. R1f R/35-3919. ttpart 1: Following under•
water explosion l LST sank off Ponxa Island on 16 February. Part 2: Cruiser ,,,...Penelope sunk in same area morning- 18 February probably by U-boat. Hunt in
progress. Penelope was returning from giving fire support with Dilo in Ageio
area morning 17 February. Part 3: Destroyers pa.trolled in Vis channel off
Menders Point and off the Albanian coast during night 16/17 February, but
nothing was sighted. Part 4: PT boats intercepted the enemy destroyers or ·
minelayers off Capraia during night 17/18 February and delivered torpedo attack results unobserved. Part 5: m&S/M on patrol off' French Riviera attacked
escorted M/V on 8 February 1 escort vessel believed sunk. 60 ton schooner
also sunk by gunfire on 15 February."
Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 539. "In your 3629, anti-personnel mines
have been installed on final beachhead position and also on positions forward
thereof held by our forces. Final beachhead position organized by continuous
line of coordinated strong points with dug in positions protected by weapons,
mines and wire except on right flank where Canale Mussolini is defended as
continuous obstacle covered by weapons and by mines and wire at likely avenues
or approach. Work continuing on this line and reserve line shown on overlay
Field Order 22 this headquarters, 17 February. See mine data on overlay "Location of minefields 162400 Februs.rY" file Engineer, Fifth Army. Right flank
canal mine installations not recorded at time above overlay published."
Personal Clark from Lucas. RN 542. "Absolutely essential all-out air effort today. Have identified elements of at least five German divisions in
salient. All roads into salient must be constantly bombed to prevent further
reinforcement. In addition, enemy artillery must be constantly attacked. I
believe heavy bombers must assist mediums and fighter bombers. Have made request for this support thru air officer."
Personal Lucas to Clark. R?f 543. "Request you have sipply agencies give
priority on shipping to 155mm gun and 81mm mortar (light) ammunition. If you
can find some extra ammunition for 155 Howitzer M•l would certainly appreciate
it."
Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 544. "Situation as to progress or oounter•
attack still indefinite. However it appears to have lessened pressure on beach-
�head line. Will advise you when aco~ate information available."
Personal Clark to Lucas. RN .3246. "7,000 rounds 81 mortar and 10,000
rounds 155 gun anmunition being shipped today. Have asked Newton to explain
to 0 1:Yeill ammunition status which is improving. At any time that you feel
your operations are being hampered by ammunition siortages be sure to let me
know."
Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 548. "Harmon's f'oroe making progress slowly
having advanced about 2t kilometers on arc from point 90328.3. Several hundred
prisoners taken. Our artillery, air and weapons fire has reduced enemy fight•
ing strength considerably according to PW reports. Situation on 56 Division
front remains generally satisfactory but some enemy infiltration has made con•
tact with some companies obscure. Would like inf'ormation on Cassino front
operations if' available."
Personal Clark to Lucas. RN 3254. "Am pleased that counterattack has
eased your situation. Apparently 45th position has stabilized. What is status and position of 169 and 3rd Brigades? Hope air eff'ort has helped. Feel
you have done exceedingly well in today's fighting. Still struggling at Cassino where severe fighting oontinues."
Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 551. "Essential that 54,580 rounds 105mm
Howitzer &mmUnition originally scheduled f'or coaster but deducted from Liberty
David Terry cargo arrive without delay and preferably by truck so that unload•
ing may be assured regardless or weather. It is likewise essential that allocation and shipment this type ammunition be materially increased for period February 22 to March 3 due to heavy expenditures of past 48 hours and expectation
that similar expenditures will be necessary in the near future because or tactical situation with which you are familiar."
Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 452. "Counterattack by Harmon force highly
successful. Pressure on beachhead line relieved. Estimated large number
enemy casualties and at least 250 PW 1 s taken. Majority expressed f'ear our
artillery fire and bombing. Will outpost line 887282 - 898295 • 903300 - 902.312
tonight and withdraw bilk of H force vicinity 915280 prepared to counterattack
tomorrow to northwest or north as sitmtion warrants. 169 Brigade being moved
vicinity 8430 prepared to counterattack to northeast tomorrow. Situation at
present more favorable but all out air effort will be essential to check and
break enemy renewed attacks expected."
Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 553. "Due to S1ortage or infantry in beachhead and looking to accomplishment your fut~e offensive plans, I strongly recommend despite arrival of 18 Brigade, 24 Guards Brigade remain in this sector.
The Guards, although depleted, are still a splendid fighting unit of great
value in emergency. Suggest replacements forwarded here where brigade could be
refitted and utilized in an offensive."
Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 561. "Situation at present generally quiet
and stabilized along front. Small air raid on port, no damage reported. Enemy
artillery on both forward and rear troop areas increased during late afternoon.
Advance of one ,oompany of Harmon's tanks north of underpass on Albano road
caused approximately 150 prisoners. Small company attacks with some tanks one
�95
let't flank of 3 Division, all repulsed. Air effort today accomplished superb \
results that cannot be simply expressed. Please inform all air personnel of
the troops appreciation. 3rd Brigade remains corps reserve. 169 Brigade baa
all troops and equipment ashore. Prepares to relieve two battalions 157 and
second battalion 6th Infantry west of Albano-Anzio road tomorrow night, prepared to counterattack to northeast. Appreciate your news from Cassino front.
Express our regards to troops there."
Personal Clark to Lucas. RN 3276. "Thoroughly agree with your 553.
Will do all in my power to comply with your wishes. Am expediting arrival of
lB Brigade all possible."
Personal Clark to Lucas. RN 3278. "Reference your 452, congratulate
Harmon on his success today. Again I want to tell you that your accomplishments today have been outstanding. Keep it up. I think your proposed dis•
positions of Harmon and 169 Brigade for possible counterattack roles tomorrow
are exactly correct. We have laid on an all-out air program for tomorrow,
the success of which is dependent on good weather. We are praying for that."
Personal Lucas from Clark. RN 3279. 11 105 ammunition referred to in
your 551 will be shipped by truck beginning 22 Febru.a:ry. Ship with 95,000
rounds due Naples tomo1Tow and will be moved to Anzio immediately. Will do
everything possible to insure that you do not run short of ammunition."
*
*
*
PRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 20 1 1944--General Clark's notes of today's activities are
as follows:
"Called a conference at 0900 with General Juin, GenerAl Roosevelt and
General Carpentier this morning in order to discuss the French Expeditionary
Corps capabilities in the Fifth Army attack from the Cassino front. They are
most anxious to go to Atina. I had always known this but knew that it was a
divergent attack which may or may not contribute to the main effort. I also
knew that General Alexander was opposed to their attacking in that direction.
Juin indicated that he did not have the capability in his weakened condition
to attack to the west from Terelle on Roccasecca. I find so many details had
not been worked out by my staff I broke up the meeting, deciding I would see
Juin later in the day.
Met with General Alexander at 1030 with Harding and with Gruenther. Took
up his proposal for regrouping and told him I was opposed to it. Whereas I
had anticipated a stormy session, it worked out alright. I pointed out why
the Americans should not take over from 10 Corps, mainly for logistical reasons. General Alexander had not thought out his plan very well. When I asked
who would take over the Campoleone area, he did not know. He astounded me
by being worried about an attack on the Eighth Army front by the Germans, positively beyond their capability. He further astounded me by indicating that
if the bridgehead should be lost, Kesselring would bring all his divisions
down here, and we could not hold them. There is no question in my mind that
we could hold them under those conditions after a little regrouping. However,
the bridgehead probably will not be lost.
·
It was finally decided that the French will hold in their present posi-
�tion and take over Castellone; that the New Zealand Corps with the New Zea•
land Division, 4th Indian and 78th will take out the Abbey Cassino obstacle
and cross the Rapido into the Liri Valley; 10 Corps to regroup for pressure
from Y~nturno on San Giorgio and an attack as San Giorgio is threatened by
the 78th Division; II Corps will be withdrawn into Army reserve, consisting
of the 34th, 36th and 88th Divisions. I will direct an intensive training
and rehabilitating program for the two tired divisions."
General Clark invited a number of staff officers and guests to come up
to his hut in the evening, have something to eat and see a movie. The
party numbered 2.3 in all, including General Bronn, General Tate, Colonel
Saltzman, Lt. Col. Porter and others.
The following important messages were received and dispatched today:
Personal Clark to Lucas. RN .3654. "When the impetus of enemy's attack
has slowed down, you should promptly retake some of the terrain lost on the
45th Division front. The extent to which you are able to do this is for
your determination but can more easily be accomplished the minute his attack
bas spent itself. Please advise me of your intentions. Another attack
scheduled for tonight in direction of Cassino Monastery."
Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 567. "Enemy relatively inactive during
night except for aggressive pitrolling on front of 56 Division and light
harrassing artillery fire in other sectors. At 0500 hours today enemy force
not exceeding two companies supported by artillery fire attacked 1st Division.
Attack repulsed. Greatly appreciate your understanding attitude toward our
problems."
Personal Sawbridge to Clark. RN 54011.
for duty with a division in UK which has not
matter bas not yet been presented to General
you concur in release of Roosevelt. We have
replace him."
"Bradley wants General Roosevelt
had battle experience. This
Devers but in case he agrees will
a Colonel Landis available to
Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 569. "Situation quiet. Enemy artillery ac•
tive on front of 1st and 45th Divisions, heaviest being on 2nd Battalion, 157th
Infantry (85.30). Work our Air Corps continues splendid but in several instances p:i.lots apparently carelessly briefed have bombed our ground troops. Instances reported through air liaison. Damage not yet evaluated. Prisoners of
war taken yesterday total 500."
Personal Clark to Lucas. RN .3672. "All possible steps must be taken to
further strengthen and coordinate the defenses on your final beachhead position,
reinforcing with mines and wire. Has your sitmtion permitted your pushing out
on the front or the 45th Division as suggested in my .3654? Believe one important factor contributing to the success of your stopping his penetration was
that you held the shoulders. These must be strengthened against another attack.
Regret exceedingly bombing of our own troops. You can rest assured I Mve made
strong representations to air."
Personal Lucas to Clerk. RN 584. "Every possible step has and is being
taken to strengthen beachhead position. Reference your 3654 and 3672, situ.a-
�tion today prevented our
oughly agree this should
be made to do so. Enemy
in 1st and 45th Division
pushing out in front lat and 45th Divisions. Thorbe done as soon as possible and every effort will
artillery is now aetive age.inst front line elements
sectors."
Personal Clark to Sawbridge. RN 3687. "General Devers has been advised
that Roosevelt is available. Landis is not desired as replacement. Shall
submit name of recommended replacement for Roosevelt shortly."
*
*
PRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 21, 1944•-General Clark spent the day at his command post
engaged in administrative work and conferences. In the morning he received a
call from three British military commentators: Lt. Gen. Martin, Ret., of the
Daily Telegram; Mr. Brandon, of the Sunday Times; and Mr. Woodham, of the Kemsley Press which publishes the Daily Sketch.
In the afternoon the Chief of Staff held a staff conference in the hut to
explain the latest developments to representatives of ea.ch staff section. At
the close of this meeting General Clark came in and made a short talk. The
General said that he had not had as much chance to meet some of the staff offi•
cers in the rear echelon as he would have liked during recent weeks, due to
the pressure of operations which kept him at the front most or the time, but
that he was conscious of and grateful for the fine work that they were conti•
nuously doing.
Today orders were received for General Roosevelt to leave Headquarters
Fifth Army and report to Headquarters U.S. Forces in United Kingdom where his
services had been requested by General Bradley. General Roosevelt had shortly
before been cited for the Legion of Merit, and on his la.st visit to the Headquarters General Clark pinned the ribbon on General Roosevelt's tunic.
General Clark's notes of today's activities are as follows:
"Visited General Sp=idger I s Headquarters this morni.ng and discussed with ,
him and his Chief of Staff plans for future operations to take Cassino. He
has weakened from day to day in his ability to take the monastery. We now
propose to bomb the City of Cassino heavily a.nd then to attack it with fresh
New Zealand troops. If successful, this will be followed by a push directly
across the Rapido River in the direction of the railroad station. I urged
that he expedite in every way possible this attack. He hopes to get it off
on the 24th, but of course it may be delayed.
1
"I discussed with Freyburg, and directed my G-3 to prepare, the necessary
alternate plans in the event this attack on Cassino failed.
"Visited II Corps Headquarters and told General Keyes to plan for a withdranl of his Corps into Army reserve prepared to follow up the New Zealand
Corps attack when it gets started in the Liri Valley."
In the evening General Clark had as his guests ror dinner, Brigadier
General Gar Davidson and Colonel Maddox of Force 163.
General Clark today received the following letter from General Juin with
�98
regard to :future missions of the CEF:
"I have received notice of the new purely defensive mission assj_gned to
the French Corps.
"You wjll not overlook that this mission, undoubtedly imposed by serious
necessity, is going to have the effect of prolonging the immobilization of my
divisions - principally the 3rd DIA in very exposed positions, the occupation
of which, to tep. you the truth, can be justified only by offensive intentions.
"I do hope then that it is only a question of a momentary holdup to faci•
litate the regrouping and putting in position of new forces, and that the offensive conception of the army maneuver will be taken up again as soon as
possible.
"Yesterday I had the pleasure of subnitting to you my point-of-view concerning the action of the C.E.F. in this maneuver. I feel that I have to consider again that it seems to me more and more impossible, with the new extension of my front, to continue alone in the direction of TERELLE-ROCCASECCA;
"I should be required, in effect, to push out from a very pronounced salient at the extremity of my front and in prolongation thereof because they
are dominated on all sides by the new position of the "Adolf Hitler" line,
today well organized and strongly held by the enemy.
"My" action cannot be started mtlesa it would be possible to oover it
from the north by simultaneous operations, and the multiplicity of tasks
which take up the means left at my disposal leave little to devote to the action of breaking through in the direction of ROCCASECCA. The intervention of
the C.E.F. on this flank will be without force and without effect and the army
maneuver might be impaired.
"Not enough importance is attached, in my humble opinion, to the role
played in the ATINA region by the defensive maneuver of the enemy.
"This region is a vast hollow from the rear of which roads lead to ROME
which are not at all menaced by the attacks of the Fifth Army.
"From ATINA, the focal point, lead out communications which permit easy
supply to all the enemy front from META to ROCCASECCA. The concentration of
artillery which the enemy has emplaced in this region fires just as well on
ROCCASECCA as in the plain of CASSINO - S. ELIA and on the COLLI road.
"Thus the region of ATINA will provide a constant menace to the flank of
the army. In neglecting it one definitely limits the success of the army
maneuver and would always have to cover this flank under adverse conditions.
"Therefore it is necessary to take ATINA and the C.E.F. alone is in the
position to do it.
11 I also feel that there is some misconception on this immediate sction of
the C.E.F. towards ATINA. There is some feeling that it is a movement which
is divergent rather than convergent with respect to the principal effort that
has been chosen.
�"This action in itself can, in effect, appear to be divergent but the net
result of the effort is what counts. My precise intentions thereby in directing my effort toward ATINA would be to shorten my front by anchoring it facing
west (the north flank anchored to the high ground of META and consequently more
easily defended) for a subsequent action truly converging in the direction of
ARCE-FR0SINONE region.
"This region being the true objective envisioned by the army maneuver, it
is my belief that this is the converging point of all the army efforts and not
R0CCASECCA, which is only a secondary converging point.
"I restate my recommendations of yesterday, that is:
1. That it would be advisable first, while waiting, to permit me to
execute the ATINA maneuver which will necessarily bring about, as you
will have seen, a relief of pressure on my western defensive front.
2. If this is impossible at present, to give to another division
when offensive action is retaken, the mission to advance in the direction of TERELLE-R0CCASECCA, my role being limited to covering this action
from the north by simultaneous attack. It must be understood that I cannot, in spite of the best intentions on my part, assume all tasks on a
front abnormally extended (almost half of the entire army front).
"I am sending you my purely personal thoughts which may be of some value
in subsequent decisions."
General Clark received the following cable from General Lucas: RN 586.
"Enemy artillery active during night on fronts of 3rd, 45th and 56th Divisions, particularly in the sector 179th Infantry. Up to this hour no attacks
by German infantry. Considerable activity oonsisting of gunfire and flares
at sea off peter beaches about 0120 hours. Navy reports small engagement with
several E boats driving them off."
Personal to Lucas from Cla.rk. RN 3299. "Do not return 24 Guards Brigade
until specific orders are received from me. I am doing everything possible to
arrange to have Brigade remain in bridgehead. I am reasonably certain it will
remain at least temporarily. Replacement problem for this brigade still unsolved."
*
*
*
PRESENZAN0••FEBRUARY 22, 1944•uGeneral Clark left his command post at 0815 and,
in company with General Saville of the XII Air Support Command, rode in his L-5
to Capodichino airport at Naples. The General's two pla.nes landed at 0850,
making the flight from Presenzano in 20 minutes. Generals Clark and Saville
got into General Clark's Packard and drove to Pier Bin Naples harbor where the
two PT Boats, the #216 and #217, were waiting to leave for Anzio. The Anzio
group was composed of 22 officers and men, including Generals Clark, Saville,
Hawkins, Hays, Craigie, Martin and Moran. The trip up to Anzio was almost
without incident. General Clark's boat swung shoreward in the Gulf of Gaeta
so that a suspicious looking craft could be investigated. It was found to contain four Italians. While the F1' 1 s machine guns were trained on the Italian
�lOO
boat, the men were forced to pull back the tarpaulin covering _their cargo,
which turned out to be nothing but sacks of lima beans. Just as .the two
PT Boats were about to enter Anzio, "Moaning Mamie", believed to be a
170mm railroad gun, began to pitch shells into the harbor of Anzio. The
PT Boats waited until the firing had ceased and then sped into the docks
where the party and its equipment were loaded into vehicles.
General Clark, accompanied by Generals Hays and Saville, went imme•
diately to VI Corps Headquarters where General Clark conferred with Generals Lucas and Truscott. The remainder of the party went to the Fifth
Army Advance Command Post, now located in a castle overlooking Anzio harbor, finding that the situation in the Anzio bridgehead was relatively
good and that a German concentrntion, apparently aimed at a new offensive,
had been broken up yesterday evening by artillery fire. The General then
went to the 3rd Division command post where he talked with Brigadier General John W. 0 1Daniel, newly designated commander of the 3rd Division.
From there General Clark went to the 45th Division, where he conferred with
General Eagles.
Following this conference the Army Commander departed for the command
post of the 1st Armored Division where he discussed the situation with General Harmon. He then decided to go to the command post of the 179th. When
General Clark neared the command post, a German tank some distance away
laid four shells along the road down which General Clark and his party was
driving. One of the shells was within 50 yards of the jeep. After talking
to officers at the regimental command post and finding they felt quite confident of their ability to halt any further German attacks, General Clark
/
then drove to the Headquarters of the 56th British Division, where he conferred with General Templar. He found that the 2/6 Queens had replaced the
179th Infantry Regiment in the "hot corner" south of the 11 factory" and that
within 24 hours the 2/7 Queens would go in to assist and ultimately relieve
the 2/6 Queens.
General Clark then went to the Fifth Army Advance Command Post, arriving there at 1620. After looking over cables that had come in, including a
cable from General Gruenther saying that it was relatively quiet on the Cassino front, General Clark conferred a..t some length with General Truscott.
Next he had conferences with various officers at the Advance Command Fost,
concerning the particular problems they faced. Last night the Germans staged
one of their heaviest air raids against Anzio. One bomb struck an armnunition
dump and destroyed a considerable a.mount of 105 ammunition. General Clark
instructed G-4 to get all ammunition pits below the surface of the ground as
soon as possible.
General Clark ate at the regular officers' mess, having as his dinner
guests Generals Seville, Hays, Craigie and Hawkins. Following dinner, he had
a conference with General Lucas, discussing with him the general plan for
General Lucas' new assignment as Deputy Commander of the Fifth Army.
General Aaron Bradshaw, Commanding the 34th AAA Brigade, which is charged
with anti-aircraft protection for the beachhead, was the next visitor. He
told General Clark that he was particularly in need of some special radar
equipment to counteract the dropping by Germans of "window" which throws the
�lO l
normal radar machines out of adjustment and brings a number of anti-aircraft
protection difficulties. General Clark immediately sent a cable to General
Gruenther telling M_m to get this equipment on the next boat to Ando.
The Army Commander then conferred with Lt. Col. Wells, G-2 at the Ad•
vance Command Post, and later General Moran, before going to bed.
General Clark dispatched the following cables to General Gruenther who
had remained back at Fifth Army Main Headquarters:
RN 9796. "Situation relatively quiet with sporadic artillery fire, mainly in forward areas. Second battalion, 157th, being relieved tonight by British. When completed will give 157th Infantry, less one battalion, as additional reserve. One battalion, 30th Infantry, being committed to strengthen
position in vicinity of 9431. Will leave Anzio harbor exactly 1100 hours tomorrow. Saville requests you arrange air cover. Have two cubs at Capodichino
1500 hours. Have Packard and other transportation at dock at 1430 hours.
Clear return PT trip with Navy. Don't let Spadger browbeat you. Acknowledge."
RN 9798. "Eagles hopes there may be a vacancy in OPDWD for Churchill.
Can we take him off his hands? Acknowledge.''
RN 9799. "Bringing Johnny back with me in the morning with two aides.
Issue orders by direction of the President in Truscott•s case. They should
confirm my verbal orders I have issued tonight. Send on my PT Boats on 24th
Brig. Gen. Fred Butler, to be Truscott•s Deputy. Also send Colonel Shepard
at same time if he is not sick. Request NATOUSA to send Brig. Gen. Ramey to
me immediately by air. I intend to make him VI Corps Anti-Tank Officer. Have
extra car at dock for Lucas. May send him direct to Sorrento for rest. Issue
orders announcing Lucas as Deputy Commander, Fifth Army. Acknowledge.n
RN 9800. "Bradshaw has urgent need for three SCR 1 s 584. Robinson familiar with this requirement. They must be shipped by LST tomorrow."
General Gruenther dispatched the following cable to General Clark re the
situation at the Cassino front: RN 3712. "Bombing attack on Cassino scheduled
to end noon 24th. Ground attack follows immediately thereafter. Weather prediction starting afternoon 24th is unfavorable and continues unfavorable for
thr~e days. XII Air Support estimate thAt 7 heavy groups and 7 medium groups
will be required and have submitted request for thnt number. Spadger says that
this force is not enough. He feels that the maximum effort must be placed on
the target and that no whittling down can be permitted. He has expressed his
opinion rather vigorously and there may be a minor crisis developing. I believe I can handle the situation."
Total Fifth Army battle casualties as of today are 72,982.
*
*
*
PRESENZANO-•FEBRUARY 23, 1944-•General Clark left the command post and went to
VI Corps Headquarters where he again conferred with VI Corps staff officers.
At 0800 he left for the 56th Evacuation Hospital. He was accompanied by two
American war correspondents, Reynolds Packard of United Press and Edward Ken-
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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Clark, Mark W. Diaries
Subject
The topic of the resource
Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984.
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns.
United States—History, Military—20th century.
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950.
Publisher
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The Citadel Archives & Museum
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Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
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CP Clark
Relation
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Mark W. Clark Collection
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application/pdf
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English
Type
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Text
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Mark W. Clark Diary, January 29 - February 22, 1944
Subject
The topic of the resource
Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns
United States—History, Military—20th century
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from January 29-February 22, 1944.
Source
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CP Clark
Publisher
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The Citadel Archives and Museum
Date
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1944
Rights
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Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
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application/pdf
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English
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Text
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1568
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lO l
normal radar machines out of adjustment and brings a number of anti-aircraft
protection difficulties. General Clark immediately sent a cable to General
Gruenther telling M_m to get this equipment on the next boat to Ando.
The Army Commander then conferred with Lt. Col. Wells, G-2 at the Ad•
vance Command Post, and later General Moran, before going to bed.
General Clark dispatched the following cables to General Gruenther who
had remained back at Fifth Army Main Headquarters:
RN 9796. "Situation relatively quiet with sporadic artillery fire, mainly in forward areas. Second battalion, 157th, being relieved tonight by British. When completed will give 157th Infantry, less one battalion, as additional reserve. One battalion, 30th Infantry, being committed to strengthen
position in vicinity of 9431. Will leave Anzio harbor exactly 1100 hours tomorrow. Saville requests you arrange air cover. Have two cubs at Capodichino
1500 hours. Have Packard and other transportation at dock at 1430 hours.
Clear return PT trip with Navy. Don't let Spadger browbeat you. Acknowledge."
RN 9798. "Eagles hopes there may be a vacancy in OPDWD for Churchill.
Can we take him off his hands? Acknowledge.''
RN 9799. "Bringing Johnny back with me in the morning with two aides.
Issue orders by direction of the President in Truscott•s case. They should
confirm my verbal orders I have issued tonight. Send on my PT Boats on 24th
Brig. Gen. Fred Butler, to be Truscott•s Deputy. Also send Colonel Shepard
at same time if he is not sick. Request NATOUSA to send Brig. Gen. Ramey to
me immediately by air. I intend to make him VI Corps Anti-Tank Officer. Have
extra car at dock for Lucas. May send him direct to Sorrento for rest. Issue
orders announcing Lucas as Deputy Commander, Fifth Army. Acknowledge.n
RN 9800. "Bradshaw has urgent need for three SCR 1 s 584. Robinson familiar with this requirement. They must be shipped by LST tomorrow."
General Gruenther dispatched the following cable to General Clark re the
situation at the Cassino front: RN 3712. "Bombing attack on Cassino scheduled
to end noon 24th. Ground attack follows immediately thereafter. Weather prediction starting afternoon 24th is unfavorable and continues unfavorable for
thr~e days. XII Air Support estimate thAt 7 heavy groups and 7 medium groups
will be required and have submitted request for thnt number. Spadger says that
this force is not enough. He feels that the maximum effort must be placed on
the target and that no whittling down can be permitted. He has expressed his
opinion rather vigorously and there may be a minor crisis developing. I believe I can handle the situation."
Total Fifth Army battle casualties as of today are 72,982.
*
*
*
PRESENZANO-•FEBRUARY 23, 1944-•General Clark left the command post and went to
VI Corps Headquarters where he again conferred with VI Corps staff officers.
At 0800 he left for the 56th Evacuation Hospital. He was accompanied by two
American war correspondents, Reynolds Packard of United Press and Edward Ken-
�nedy of Associated Press, and a pool photographer, Sammy Goldstein of Acme.
At the 56th Evacuation Hospital, General Clark decorated 1st Lieutenant
Donald E. Knowlton with the Distinguished Service Cross. General Clark had
acted particularly fast in decorating this man, since Knowlton had performed
his deed of valor only two days previously. General Clark was accompanied
by General McLain, Artillery Officer of the 45th Division.
Following his visit to the hospital, General Clark went to the 1st British Division where he conferred with General Penney.
Returning to the Advance Command Post in a heavy rainstorm, General
Clark looked over last minute messages and found that chances of the FT Boats
returning to Naples were remote because of a heavy wind. General Clark drove
to the dock and after some discussion with the PT Boat Comnanders decided he
would put four members of his party on each of the boots and try to make the
trip. General Clark, acconpanied by Lt. Col. Brit~on, Captain Beardwood,
Sergeant Holden and Sergeant Chaney got on the PT and headed out into the
harbor. It was soon apparent that the FTs could not make the trip. Within
a few seconds everyone on board was soaking wet, and the PT #216 was alternately standing on its bow and then on its stern. The FTs turned around and went
back into the harbor. After a conference with the Port Commander, General
Clark arranged for part of his party to return to Naples on the U.s.s. Davis,
a destroyer escort. General Clark went out to the Davis aboard a sub-chaser.
The Davis departed for Naples at 1230 P.M., and General Clark arrived at the
Navy House landing stage about 1900. He was accompanied by Generals Saville,
Hawkins and Sergeant Chaney. Because of heavy swells, high winds and rain
squalls, the return trip was extremely rough. The remainder of General Clark's
party departed from Anzio at 1600 aboard two LSTS, the #63 and #64.
Upon arriving in Naples, General Clark was met at the dock by his Packard,
and he returned innnediately to his command post at Presenzano.
Important messages received and dispatched today are as follows:
RN 3745. Gruenther to Clark.
this afternoon.~
"Three radio sets for Bradshaw were shipped
Clark to CTNC, AFHQ. RN 3749. "Desire that Brigadier General Ramey report
this Headquarters earliest date possible. Advise when he will arrive."
Gruenther to Clark. RN 3748. "Have asked for Ramey. Orders will be issued as directed in your 9799. Extra car will be at pier for Lucas. Will advise about Butler and Ramey later."
Gruenther to Clark. RN 3752. "Have sent message to NATOUSA offering
Churchill for OPD assignment as directed in your 9798. 11
*
*
*
FRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 24, 1944--General Clark remained at his command post holding a series of conferences. General Keyes of II Corps called. He discussed
the relief of II Corps and the withdrawal of organizations, their reorga.nization, re-equipping and training as provided in Operations Instruction #16 is-
�lo3
sued this day. Thereafter General Walker paid a short call on the Army Com•
mander, who spoke of the fine work the 36th Division had done and of his confidence that the Division, by rest, reorganization and training, would soon
be restored to full combat efficiency.
The next caller was General Freyburg, who came to see General Clark with
the Chief of Staff. The Army Commander feels that General Freyburg has been
rather spoiled by the British Arrrr:,, due to the somewhat unique position occupied by the New Zealand Corps. Because it is not desired to offend New
Zealand politically, the Corps and Corps Commander have been treated with a
certain deference which has caused -Spadger to cavil at orders unless they
are to his liking. Latterly, the question of the taking of Cassino by the
New Zealand Corps has been an important project of the Fifth Army, but Spadger has been stating that he will or will not attack, depending upon the extent of the air support being to his liking. An attack by Spadger to definitely take the town was planned fo:r today but was postponed, as the weather
was unsuitable for air operations. In the meantime, General Clark has arranged for 900 tons, in place of 600 tons, of bombs to be dropped on the tovm
in support of the attack. During the conversation with Sradger today, G~neral
Clark told him of this favorable development but was quite blunt in express- \
ing the idea that as long as Spadger was serving with the Fifth Army he would
have to comply with Fifth Army orders and not argue about them.
At lunch Colonels Sullivan and Elllott, both of the Class of 1917 at
West Poir..t, were General Clark's guests.
Today Operations Instruction #16 was issued from Headquarters Fifth Army.
This Operations Instruction modifies Operations Instructions #14 and #15 in
certain respects. It provides that II Corps will be vrithdrawn to the Alife
area for rest and re-organization. 'T'he front will be taken over from right to
left by the CEF, New Zealand Corps and 10 Corps. The CEF' will be allotted
that part of the front down to a point immediately north of Cassino. The New
Zealand Corps will take over that part of the line running south from Cassino
to a point just north of the junction of the Garigliano and the Liri Rivers.
10 Corps will take o,rer the interval from the New Zealand Corrs to the sea.
Reliefs b~r the CEF and New Zealand Corps of those portions of the II Corps
front to be relieved by them respectively will be arranged by Corps Commanders
between themselves, and the relieving commanders will notify the Army Commander
when the relief is completed.
In the meantime, VI Corps, consisting of the 1st, 56th, 3rd and 45th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Armored Division, less Combat Command B, will restore its forward positions and prepare then for defense.
General Clark's notes for the 22nd and 23rd are as follows:
"Visited the beachhead on the 22nd and 23rd, going up by PT boat and returning by destroyer after PT 1 s found weather was too rough to negotiate.
"Took Generals Saville, Hays, Hawkins and Craigie in order to see firsthand air conditions and to discuss with VI Corps their problems. Also took
up Colonel Ma.ck, who will stay with VI Corps and advise them more fully on air
��matters.
''Visited all units and talked with all commanders. Personally went to
Darby's Headquarters of the 179th Infantry. I continued to be disappointed
with the follow-up by VI Corps of work on their final beachhead position.
Apparently Lucas thought it had been done, but neither himself nor his subordinates had checked. Am likewise dj_ssatisfied with the coordination of
anti-tank means within the corps. I am sending Brigadier General Rufus
Ramey, Cavalry, to the VI Corps for that purpose.
"Was disappointed with the infiltration which continued to take place
through the British units. I am convinced that they have lost a good many
men by being cut off, yet they feel quite happy about it and take no steps to
strengthen their lines. I brought that to Truscott•s attention, and he had
a meeting with Templar to straighten it out.
"Upon my arrival, found that Lucas was about to pull the 179th Infantry
out and commit the 6th Infantry. I felt that was a mistake and so indicated,
but did not direct it. The 6th Infantry, due to a success, has its chin up,
is motorized and works with armor handily. It should be kept during these
tense times to be used as their counterattack agency. The 179th, in its de•
pleted condition and in absorbing some 900 replacements, would not be ready
for a counterattack role for ten days to two weeks, whereas, I verified personally with Darby, it can hold its present position with one battalion up
and two back.
"I discussed with Truscott his taking over from Lucas, for I had told
him on my last trip that I would do it when things stabilized a little bit.
Truscott thought it best that I leave Lucas there, for it would hurt Lucas'
feelings. After hearing Truscott 1 s story and realizing that one motive which
might be guiding him was that in the event of a reversal Truscott would prefer to be second in command rather than in command, I then sent for Lucas,
having come to the conclusion that I would have to take h:i.m out. I laid a.11
the cards on the table. Told him that Alexander had demanded his release,
that General Devers, without talking to me, had visited the VI Corps and had
come to me and recommended that Lucas be changed. Both thought that he was
tired, mentally and physically, had had too much time in combat and needed a
rest. I told Lucas he had done a grand job but that, inasmuch as he was not
in mental or physical condition to carry on as well as someone else, my
course was clear. It was my duty to take him out; that I would make him my
Deputy Army Commander.
nr,therefore, directed that the orders be issued appointing Truscott, relieving Lucas and making him my Deputy. Brought Luca.a back with me out of the
beachhead the following day. I directed that General Butler be sent as Truscott1s American Deputy - Butler being Truscott 1 s choice. I also sent Colonel
Shepard into the beachhead to be second in command of the 3rd Division under
0 1 Daniel.
"Visited Templar's Headquarters and discussed the situation with him,
also Harmon, Eagles (twice), Penney and 0'Daniel. Pinned the DSC on a Lieutenant Knowlton for heroism in battle - this at the 56th E.,,a.cua.tion Hospital.
�105
"After talking with General McLain, I continued to be disturbed on the
losses of tanks and anti-tank guns. I am afraid that some of our personnel
abandon their equipment unnecessarily, and that, in some cases, it falls,
undamaged, into the hands of the enemy. I have sent a radiogram to Truscott to correct this situation. Also, have directed that ammunition dumps
be dug in and piles be farther spaced. 11
Following are the Army CoMill8.nder•s notes on today's activities:
"General Freyburg visited me this noon and still complains a.bout the
a~ount of air which he is to get. We have bent all our energies in arranging for air bombardment of Cassino. I told him I would take no further steps
because I have satisfied myself, as had General Alexander, that this is an
air matter - they were the experts and were putting enough on it to do the
job, in their opinion. General Freyburg is writing me a letter to get it in
the record. I have reported this to General Alexander, through General Harding. The more I see of Freyburg the more disgusted I am with his actions.
He may be an extremely courageous individual, but he has no brains, has been
spoiled, demands everything in sight, and altogeth~r is most difficult to
handle."
General Clark today dispatched the following cables to General Truscott:
RN 3781. "Give me your intentions for strengthening British position
just west of Anzio-Albano highway. When do you plan to advance British so as
to secure terrain dominating that highway? Keep me advised of situation and
your intentions by frequent personal messages."
RN 3783. "Your 9291 indicates accumulative loss of 68 tanks. Was told
during my last visit that a considerable number of TD 1 s have likewise been
lost. Consider these losses hieh in proportion to number of similar enemy
co~bat vehicles we have destroyed. Under no conditions should our materiel be
abandoned to the enemy without destruction. Please follow up on this matter.
General Ramey is expected here wjthin next few days. He will be sent to you
as soon as he arrives."
'*
*
*
PRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 25, 1944--This morning General Clark went by jeep to the
command post of the 4th Indian Division where he called on Brigadier H.K.
Dimoline who was in tempora_ command of the di vision during the illness of
ry
General Tuker. On the road from Route #6 to the 4th Indian Division the General stopped and made a careful examination, through his glasses, of Cassino
Monastery Hill and the heights surrounding it which could clearly be seen
across the intervening flat ground. The General also stopped at the New Zealand Corps Headquarters and had a talk with Spadger about the attack of his
corps on Cassino which is still held up because the weather has prevented the
all-out bombing of the town which Spadger considers essential. A further dif•
ficulty arises out of the fact that if the bombing of Cassino occurs it may be
necessary to withdraw from the town the American troops which have occupied a
third of it after a bitter and protracted battle. Once the bombardment ceases
it will not be certain that the Germans will not at least attempt to reoccupy
�part of this ground which would thus be vacated. This problem is being
studied by the Fifth Army staff and the XII Air Support CO!'IIllAnd staff in
an effort to arrange the bombardment so that it will not be necessary to
vacate the area.
(Note:- The solution of this problem, ultimately decided on, was
that as two things can not be in the same place at the same time, the
Fifth A:rmy troops would have to be withdrawn from the town before the
bombs could be dropped there. To reduce to a minimum the chances of German re-occupation, this withdrawal is to be carried out at the la.st possible moment before the bombardment. This in turn requires some expert
weather forecasting, as the actual recurrence of the ombardmcnt must be
assured long enough in advance to pr:rmH the distrihution of orders.)
At lunch General Clark entertained Generals Spaatz, Cannon, Saville
and Lucas. General Cannon, during the meal, made some interesting statements about the air cover over the beachhead. He said that it had diminished from a start of 28 planes continuously in the air du.ring daylight
to 8 continuously in the air, and that even this was difficult to maintain, due to the impossibility of using the strip at Nettuno as a base
for planes at the present time because of the enemy's artillery fire.
General Cannon further said that if at any time Germany was 'nilling to
make the sacrifice of planes involved he thought they could accumulate
the necessary number and conduct a damaging attack on the port. At the
present tj_rne he said that the 8 planes on standing patrol were so much
more aggressive than the Germans that they were successfully defending
the port against recurring attacks by 20 or 30 planes which they drove
off and forced to jettison their bombs .
General Eagles, Commanding General of the 45th Division, was hospitalized
today as a result of an attack of faintness, and arrang~ments were made to
have an electro- cardiograph shipped up to the beachhead to determine whether
or not he hns a cardiac condition. In the meantime, General McLain, Artillery Officer of the Division, has been put in temporary command.
Important messages of the day are as follows:
Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 675 . 11 1 am making strong effort with
artillery on front of 56 Division. Have requested cruiser gunfire support.
Some delay owing to mines . Please do what you can to expedite ava.ilability
of cruiser for this purpose."
Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 678. "Principal enemy activity yesterday against 2/6 Queens , London Scots , in front of 56 Division. 2/6 Queens
beat off strong attack late yesterday. 1 Advanced Company London Scots at
845507 driven out by surprise attack. Ternplar has ordered brigade commander
to reestablish situation today. Enemy patrols active on remainder 56 Division
front . Need for British replacements immediate action, relief of Irish Guards
by 1st Division accomplished, DVIR reached 858298, Penney has laid on aggressive
patrols in that area . Remainder of front relatively quiet except for 1ntermittent heavy shelling of front line areas , especially on British front and in
�vicinity of Carano. Enemy air active during night 2300 to 0100, dropping AP
bombs on forward troop areas 1st British Division and 1st Armored Division.
Casualties reported slight. Am attaching RCN Bn, 1st Armored Division to
Frederick on Harmon's recomnendation. Will withdraw remnant 2nd Bn., 157th
to rear area for 2 or 3 days to absorb replacements. 11
Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 174. 11 Reference your 3789, Keiser desires to accompany Lucas. He does not desire to remain with me on same status as Butler. States that he would prefer to start elsewhere. Suggest you
relieve him from assignment to VI Corps at once. Colonel D. H. Galloway
also desires to accompany Lucas. I would be glad to have him as Deputy
Chtef of Staff, but there is some embarrassment since he is the oldest staff
officer with VI Corps in point of service. I believe Galloway has deteriorated physically and recommend his return to the United States as soon as
possible. Suggest that he remains here for another week."
Personal Clark to Truscott. RN 3412. "Instructions issued by ACMF direct me to have 24 Guards Brigade return to Naples area by March 2nd unless
another full scale enemy attack is launched on the bridgehead before the
Brigade leaves, in which case they may be retained in reserve until the attack has been repulsed but not longer. Let me have your comments as to effect of this withdrawal. Also those of the appropriate British Commanders.
Do not move the Guards Brigade until specific instructions are issued by me."
Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 680. "Eagles yesterday had an attack
of faintness and a physical examination at 56 Evacuation Hospital indic8ted
low blood pressure. Surgeon recommends thPt he go to Naples for electrocardiograph to determine if condition due to cardiac condition. Can you
send a plane here for him? 11
General Clark replied to the above cable, advising that he would send
a medical officer and an electro-cardiograph up to Anzio to examine General
Eagles.
Clark to Truscott. RN 3420. "In view of enemy's present defensive attitude you should plan limited objective attack to retake all or part of
salient north of 29 grid and between Anzio-Albano highway and 92 grid. This
should be done before enemy has adcUtional time to prepare defenses. What
are your intentions and capabilities along this line?"
Clark to Truscott. RN 3421. "Orders issued this date relj eving Brigadier General Laurence B. Keiser from assignment to Headquarters VI Corps and
assigning him to Headquarters Fifth Army. Instruct him to proceed without
delay. 11
Personal to Truscott from Clark. RN 3422. "Orders nre being issued
today assigning Keiser to this Headquarters. I desire that you retain Galloway since I do not have an appropriate assignment for him now."
Clark to Truscott. RN 3423. "One American cruiser will be on hand
morning ?6th to furnish gunfire support. Time when it ecm start firing will
depend on clearing of mines. Your naval liaison officer will be able to
give you the hour. Navy here has suggested that you may be able to utilize
(
�lo8
Navy radar in locating hostile batteries firing on harbor .
discuss w1-th naval liaison officer."
Suggest you
HQ ACMF to Fifth Arrrry and Eighth Army . RN 914. "Reference 48/G(OFS)
dated 22 February. In confirnation of t1'1ephone conversation, CINC's meeting will take place at this HQ. at 1100 hours on 28 February. Lunch will
be provided as it may be necessary to continue the meeting in the afternoon. Please notify number of staff officers accompanying Army Commanders . "
Personal Clark to Devers . RN 3397. "Because of lack of replacements
rl'!organization and return to combat of 34th and 36th Divisions will be delayed . At present there are no effective infantry replacements on hand, all
available in l ersonnel Center i/6 having been sbipped to beachhead ~ncluding
approximately 1400 infantry arriv"d 20 Februe.ry. Approximately 1600 new
replacements are expected any day but will probably all be needed for beach~
head divisions whose total infantry deficiency was 660 as of 22 February.
Expected to arrive Naples from 2 J\:'arch are shipments totalling 3877 U. S.
general assignment replacements and 4518 specific assignment personnel. It
is improbable that these replacements will be enough to fill up infantry
deficiencies of 2581 in 34th Division and 3722 in J6th Division as of February 21. Furthermore very important for these divisions to receive their
replacements at once in order to give theM maxinnnn training with units . To
expedite arrival and increase number of infantry replacements in immediate
future shall appreciate any assistance you can give . "
Personal Alexander to Clark. RN 918 . 11 My staff have issued orders
that 24 Gds Bde is to be withdrawn from the bridgehead so as to reach the
Nocera area at about the same time as 201 Gds Bde . I am told that your staff
rave expressed doubts about the practicability of releasing 24 Gds Bde at
present . It was however arranged that 18 Infantry Brigade should rel.ieve
24 Gds Bde and it is essential to reorganize 24 and 201 Gds Bde into 1 brigade with adequate reinforcements without any further delay. I must therefore
insist that all arrangements are made for 24 Gds Bde to join 201 Gds Bde in
the Nocera e.rea by 2 A-arch at the latest unless another full scale enemy attack is launched on the bridgehead before 24 Gds Bde leaves in which case they
may be retained in reserve in the bridgehead unMl the attack has been repulsed but not longer . I should be glad to know that these arrangements have
been made . "
*
*
*
PRESENZANO- -FEBRU.ARY 26, 1944- -General Clark remained at his command post
today engaged in administrative work. He received a call from Major Blom, of
the Fifth Army CIC , who brought a report about the use of the Abbey at Monte
Cassino . The substance of the report was that the Abbey was not used in a
military way by the Germans . This justifies the position taken by General
Clark with respect to the bombardment , as contrasted to that of the British.
Today the command post of the II Corps was moved to a point just west of
Raviscanina. The 34th and 36th Division command rosts will be in the immediate
vicinity, and the II Corps will thus have An opportunity to rest and ref:i.t.
General Lucas and his aides , Major Renne and Captain Eyston arrjved at
�C
�the Fifth Army command post today, where General Lucas is taking over the
duties of Deputy Army Commander. General Lucas has been established in a
caravan with tents for his aic•es and staff near the Chief of Sta.ff area.
Late in the afternoon General Clark left by car for Caserta where he
picked up Colonel Sullivan and then departed for Naples where he dined
with Brigadier General Edgar Erskine Hume, recently promoted from the rank
of Colonel. General Hume today presented General Clark with the personal
flag of Mussolini, flovm only when the Duce was present. This particular
fanion was picked up in Sardinia and given to General HUMe, who made a
present of jt to the Army Commander.
General Clark's notes for toda.y 1 s activities follow:
"Evidence continues to accumulate that Admiral Cunningham and his Navy ;
are in no way cooperating with me. He does not come direct to me but insinuates to everyone he sees that he has been hoaxed into the position which
makes it necessary for him to maint8in my forces in the Anzio bridgehead.
He not only does not cooperate in the supply set-up but with his naval gunfire. He imposes so many restrictions and makes it so difficult, that it is
easier, in most cases, to do without his naval gunfire support than to accept the restrictions he imposes. He continually screams about gunfire in
the harbor, knowing full well that there is nothing that can be done on this
situation that is not already being done. With reference to supplies, he
has set an arbitrary limit of 2500 tons per day, which not only is not suffjcient to maintain my forces but thereby precludes the essential build-up
for any counter-offensive.
e~ I'-'(
~ ~ ~c.t... ff" ' \
c~
.J..-h-
~
...er.
M", )
"I have received the following letter from Alexander which Robertson,
who is in complete cahoots with Cunningham, has prepared:
1. The situation at ANZIO has developed in a manner very different
from that originally conceived when the operation was planned. Instead of
maintaining there a force of 2 - 3 divisions for a limited time until junction with our main forces could be made, we are now committed to the maintenance of a force equivalent to 5 divisions for an indefinite period.
1
2. This throws a heavy strain on our naval resources. C-in-C Mediterranean has, however, said that the Navies can, though not easily, sustain the
force in the bridgehead for some time longer at an average rate of 2,500 tons
per day, unless sor1e major disaster in the harbour or great increase in casualties among craft occurs.
1
'3. I feel it necessary to emphasize, firstly, that we must do everything possible to lighten the Navies ' task, secondly, that we must economize
our resources in order to conserve them for the essential task of driving
the enemy back.
4. With these objects in view I ask you to take all possible steps in
the following directions:1
(a) The strict control of ammunition expenditure to enable us to build
up ample reserves for the renewal of th~ offensive. If the enemy attacks us,
�l ID
heavy artill ery fir e must of cours e be brought down to stop him , but at other \
time s every r o1md expended should pay a dividend in proportion to the investment which it represents .
(b) Grent care in the lay- out of dUr1ps of all kinds to minimize damage
from bombing and shellfire .
(c) Cl ose supervision of forward dumps to prevent loss of ammrmition
or stores by hostile raiding parties or local successes .
(d) An austere standard of living among the troops in order to d:l.spense
with many accessories , such as laundries , canteens etc ., which we normally consider proper and necessary to provide .
(e)
Rigid check on pilfering and all forms of waste.
(f) Full use of all means made available by the Navies for getting additional stores into the bridgehead, including the use of LCI's for the trans port of stores .
' 5. I am confident that the troops will accept these measures cheerfully
if the reasons for them are explained to them.'
11
I hB:ve replied as follows :
1. Reference is made to your letter dated 23 February 1944, subject ,
"Maintenance ' SHINGLE ' " • As directed in paragraph 4, thereof , steps have been
taken to eliminate non- essentials from maintenance tonnages , to keep ammunition expenditures to the minimum consistent with tactical needs, to :insure
maximwn dispersion and supervision of dumps in order to minimize losses due to
enemy action , and to dispense with accessories normally considered proper and
necess ary for the col"tfort and well- being of troops .
1
2. The need for limiting maintenance to essential supplies has been
recognized by r1e froM the beginning of Operation "SHINGLE" , and wherever it
has been found that reductions or elim~nations could be made in quantiti~s and
types of supplies I have ordered this done . I shall continue to give this
matter my personal attent ion.
1
1 3.
After making such reductions and el iminations in maintenance asappear to be desiral1 at this time , I found that the daily maintenance requirele
ments of the beachhead force (British and American) amount to 2700 long tons
and that over 50% of this tonnage is amr.nmition. Thjs is based upon operations to date . Since it is planned to launch offensive operations from this
area as soon as possible it is necessary to build up a reserve of supplies
\
for this purpose . I feel that this reserve should be not less th,-,n 20 days .
The building up of such a r~serve is nov1 underway, and for the next six weeks
it will be necessary to put into the beachhead area 3750 long t ons of supplies
da ily to maintain the force there and to provide the reserve I consider essen- \
tial for planned offensive operations .
\
4. The attached analysis of the ATfZIO beachhead supply requirements v,as
prepared at my direction and was discussed hy General Tate , Fifth Army G- 4,
1
�Il I
with General Robertson and navy represent atives on 18 February. (See anal ys is in General Clark ' s SHIN'GLE file) . TM.s analysis shons that if we are to
ma.inta in the force now in the beachhead and be pre pa.red to launch an off en\
sive , the tonnage discharged da i ly m
ust be increased considerably beyond t he
2500 tons r efer red t o in paragraph 2 of your letter .
' 5. Commander- in- Chief , r~editerranean recently suggested the use of
LCI's as a means of increasing the daily tonnage into ANZIO. Thi s type of
craft is now being used in shuttle service between NAPLES a.nil the beachhead,
and we are using 10 to supplement the LCT 1 s in unloading cargo ships at Anzio .
We are prepared to employ 10 LCI I s daily in the NAPLES -ANZIO supply shuttle
service if the 'N'avy can make this number available . This will increase our
tonnage input by 400 tons daily during periods of good weather .
•6. In order that I may continue to supply the forces at ANZIO and
also provide the buildup of supplies required to support planned offenoive
action, I feel that the means must be provided to place the requisite tonnages
ashore . I ask your support and assistance in accomplisMne this end. Should
operations in the near future consume less supplies , requirements for maintenance will be revised dovmward. 1
nr have exercised great restraint in not taking a swing in writing officially at the Adniral, but hate to cause any more friction which would hinder the war effort .
"Cunningham acts as a completely independent agency. He knows no laws
from any higher a.uthority. Apparently the GING , General Vrilson, vrill not go
against his will under any conditions . This situPtion emphasizes the need
for unity of command , which is impossible under the British system of complete
independence of the Air Corps , Navy and Army.
"The replacement system for British troops in the bridgehead is bad.
have sent the following radiogram:
I
'Personal to Alexander from Clark. RN 3409. 11 Fresent reinforcement deficiencies for British units in beachhead excl uding guards are 26oO. Only
450 reinforcements are on hand, and it is my understanding that only 700 vvill
be available each week for all British units in Fifth Army. If present wastage rates continue the strengths of the British 1
)eachhead units will continue
to decrease even considering receipt of 700 replacements weekly.
"General Truscott reports that the depleted strengths of British battalions has reduced materi~lly the defensive strengths of the two British divisions and greatly reduces the offensive value of these divisions . My own observations confirm his estimate . The v,eakness of these units is causing me
considerable concern. I urgently request that you do everything possible to
bring the Anzio units to full strength without delay"
"There is a delay in the American replacements , and I have sent the follow ing radiogram to Devers .
Personal Clark to Devers . RH 3397. 'Because of lack of replacements reorganization and return to combat of 34th and 36th Divisions will be delayed.
�I lJ..
At present there are no effective infantry replacements on hend , all available in rersonnel Center No . 6 having been shipped to beachhead including
approx:i.mately 1400 infantry arrived 20 February. Approximately 1600 new
replacements are expected any day but will probably all be needed for beachhead divisions whose total infantry defici~ncy was 66o as of 22 February.
Expected to _arrive Naples from 2 March are shipments totalling 3877 U.S.
general assign~ent replacements and 4518 specific assignment personnel. It
is improbable that these replacements will be enough to fill up infantry
deficiencies of 2581 in 34th Division and 3722 in 36th Division as of February 21. Furthermore very important for these divisions to receive their
replacement s at once in order to give them maximum training with units . To
expedite arrival and increase number of infantry replacements in immediate
future shall appreciate any assistance you can give.'
7
I
"I am to attend a rn"'eting on the 28th with Alexander to discuss reorganization. It brings the Eighth Army into this area north of the Liri Valley
and puts the Fifth Army into the bridgehead area; the Fifth Army to be composed of all Americans and French. I am willing to accept any tactical role
for the Fifth Army if I can get all Americans and French consolidated jnto my
Army, allowing British, New Zealanders , Indians, etc ., to go to the Eighth
Army where they can be better handled . "
General Clark dictated the following memorandum to his Chief of Staff
today with regard to the proposed reorganization:
"Returned herewith are th~ pap1'rs on the reorganization. Please screen
the requests from the various staff sections for additional troops and give
me your recommendations . Also , have G- 3 prepare a letter to GOC , ACTuF stating that I have studied his plan, am in favor of it , list items upon which I
need decisions , list the additional troops which I need from NATOUSA , both
French and U. S., and finally state my requirem~nts for 12 LSTS for a given
period.
"Also, in my opening concurrence paragraph you might state that I can
see my w cl ear to relieve only one British Division jn the bridgehead by
ay
U. S., giving as a reason inadequate number of U. S. Divisions, together with
the casualty rate in the bridgehead and our difficulty with replacements
similar to theirs . "
Personal to Alexander from Clark. RN 3838. "In my 3409 to you I stated
reinforcement deficiencies for first and 56th Divisions as 2600. That figure
was in error and should have read 36oO. Deficiency is now increased to 4100
with shortage of 3100 in 56 Division and 1000 in 1st Division. DP-ficiency of
Guards Brigade has not been included in above figures . "
Personal to Truscott from Clark. RN 3839. "Information here indicates
deficiency 3100 men in 56 Division and 1000 in 1st Division. What is your
estimate of present combat effici~ncy of 56 Division? I share your concern
over British replacement situation , and I am doj_ng everything possible to
solve it . 1000 American replacements arrived here today. Infantry portion
will be shipped to you on 28th . "
Truscott to Clark.
RN 704.
"I believe enemy's present defensive attitude
�\l 3
covers regrouping for final blow against bridgehead. I do not have capabi- ·)
lities for immediate attack to reduce salient on account of weak strength
of infantry battalions. 56 Division are inadequate to hold present front
and cannot stop determined infiltration. Regrouping in progress in 1st
Division. Will make 2nd Brigade available by 29 February unless something
unforeseen interferes. Depleted battalions of 157 and 179 should be in
be+ter condition by that time. Have directed 1st Division to advance Links
tonight to vicinity of M-28 on Anzio road to permit moving anti-tank guns
forward to control the road. Will launch limited objective attack as outlined in my messages yesterday as soon as the situation permits. Meanwhile
I run making every effort to improve defensive organization. 11
Truscott to Clark. RN 703. "Reference your 3412. Everly, Penney and
Templar believe 24 Guards Brigade should be relieved because further operations will result in loss of key personnel who cannot be replaced. In my
opinion this brigade is so weak as to have little value for any oth~r than
stop gap purposes. Brigade Commn.nder hns received orders direct concerning
his relief. British units, particularly 56 Division, are so reduced in
strength that the loss of this brigade will of course be felt. I believe
we can expect entire 56 Division to be in similar state very soon unless
drastic measures are taken with regard to replacement. There is an urgent
need for a full brigade group or American infantry regiment immediately."
*
*
PRESEUZANO--FEBRUARY 27, 1944--Early today General Clark received a cvll
from Brigadier Stayner who had come to replace Colonel Jones in performing
the G-/+- work in the British Increment. Thereafter, General Seville called
to discuss with General Clark the question of air support of rending operations. General Clark then received a call from Brigadier General Clarkson,
Inspector General of NATOUSA, who had been directed to investigate an alleged
order made by Brigadier General Wilbur of the 36th Division that the troops
of that division crossing the Rapido should go over with weapons unloaded
and with only 25 rounds carried on their persons . General Clark is having
the matter looked into.
General Clark next received visits from Brigadier Generals Bronn and
Ramey who had been newly assigned to Fifth Army. General Ramey is being
sent to the bridgehead as anti-tank officer, VI Corps. Genl'lral Brovrr is to
be assigned to the 88th Division.
At 1645 General Giraud arrived at the command post for a call on General
Clark. The General went into the hut with General Giraud and, using Lt. Col.
Sutherland as his interpreter, discussed operations on the whole front with
partjcular reference to employment of the French. General Clark said to
General Giraud that he would speak frankly with him but requested him to receive whatever General Clark said in complete confidence. General Clark said
that he felt that the attack of the French Corps should be directed on Atina.
General Giraud said that that was clearly the proper course. General Clark
said that he had so recommendl'!d but that the British High Cornnand, which had
the last word in such matters, had insisted on an attack for objectives farther south; namely, Terelle and Roccasecca. General Clark said he disagreed
with this employment but had been ordered by General Alexander to follow it.
�\ l L\
/
General Giraud said that he too felt that this was a bad mistake . General
Giraud spoke of the urgency of an attack on the Germans in France this year .
The French have been holding up their spirit during the occupation , but they
are weakening. General Clark said he quite understood their predicament .
He asked General Giraud if he knew of ANVIL and who had been slated to command it . General Giraud grinned and said "Yes" . "Then" , said General Clark,
"You will realize not only my understanding of the need for such a move , but
also of its difficulty and of the considerations which might prevent it . "
Shortly after 1700 General Clark called together his principal staff officers , including Generals Gruenther , Lucas , Brann, Tate and Colonel Howard ,
Brigadier Richardson and Brigadier Stayner . A conference was held by all concerned about the subject matter of the meeting at General Alexander ' s Headquarters at Caserta tomorrow·. The proposal in question involves a shortening
of the Fifth Army front to that now occupied by the 10 Corps and a side-slip
to the left of the Eiehth Army to take over the intervening area . This also
involves the relief of British units from the Fifth Army so that the Fifth
Army will ultimately be conposed of Americans and French only.
After dinner this evening, General Clark invited a few of his staff section chiefs to the recreation hut to see a movie shovm by tht'! Special Service
Section.
Colonel Howard today dispatched the following cable to Lt. Col. Wells,
G-2 at the Fifth Army Advance Command Post at Anzio : "Following message from
Colonel DeMa.rco : Very ureent fron B. L. Z. 27 Feb . L~4, 0940- M 77 fror1 A. On
night of 27th or thereafter , an attack attempt on C. P. of ALEXAlIDER ~nd CLARK,
as well as nearby workshop . The agents will land from sea near C. P. Agent
with cut hand is our confidence man. At the time the blow is effected and
the mjnes, which shall have been laid are exploded , a very violent German
attack may be unleashed . In case of failure , Germans may withdraw to defend
COLLE LAZIALE . 11
The following nre the important messages of the day:
Personal Clark to Alexander. RN 3460 . "General Truscott reported to me
last night that the strength of 56 Division is inadequa.te to hold present front
and to prevent determined infiltration. He is attempting to compensate for
this weakness by regrouping within 1st Division in order to make 2nd Brigade
available . Truscott believes that 56 Division r ill be almost completely ineffective if reinforcements are not received in the immediate future . I realize fully that you are doing everything possible to procure reinforcements
for this division but again I must invite your attention to the fact that I
consider the situation so serious that drastic action must be taken without
delay."
Personal Truscott to Clark.
RN 723 .
"I do not believe tha.t exchange of
5 Division would be able
to do little more than relieve the 56th Division. I need infantry djvision
strong enough to relieve 56th Division and 36th Engineers and consolidate that
front . When this has been accoriplished , 56th Division must be withdrawn and
refitted here or in Naples . Your suggestion to return them by LCI seems workable
56 Division for 5 Division would solve rroblel"l here .
�l 15
if other troops not available. Hov1ever, consider American Division with its
higher infantry strl'lngth preferable."
Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 722. "Reference your radio 3839 deficiencies infantry and artillery British divisions as of 26 February: 1st Division
(less 13 Brigade) 2486; 56 Division 2520. Great bulk these deficiencies in
fighting i"lfantry soldier. In the case of 56 Division each battalion consists
of not more than two very weak companies, mostly replacements. Few have any
experienced junior officers and NC0 1 s remaining estimate present infantry
combat efficiency 56 Division at approximately 25%."
Clark to Truscott. RN 3863. "In view of another possible strong attack
developing from north, can eastern part of 3rd Division sector and 504 Para
Regiment and SSF sectors be lightened so as to make ndditional resources available to you to meet such an attack?"
Yesterday the Arm:l Command.er received the following cable from Adriiral
Horse, Flag Officer of Western Italy: Nrt:J. "Am so very sorry that the weather
has broken to add to your worries. However, the book says 'Whom the Lord
loveth he chasteneth 111 •
Today the Army Commander replied to Admiral Morse as follows: RN 3461.
"Thanks for your kind thoughts. Chastening already ample. Surely tir~e has
come to spare the rod. 11
From CG, NATOUSA to CG FIFTH ARLfI. RN 57059. "Your situation fully understood. An effort is being made to forward replacements as fnst as received.
Reurad 3397 Feb. 25 earliest arrival dates DUKO of infantry replacements in
nunbers needed is 1\TS'F 17 on 14 March with anticipated 120 officers, 5221 enlisted and UGS-34 on 18 March with 150 officers, 3500 enlisted. Further information our 56572 Feb 24 refer. 11
*
*
FRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 28, 1944--Barly in the morning General Clark recorded a
message to the Red Cross to be used in connection with the current drive. The
'lffiC made an exception to their usual rule and broadcast this recording over
its full network February 29th. Shortly thereafter the General, with Generals Gruenther, Brann, Tate, Saville and Brigadiers Richardson and Stayner,
left for Caserta by car where they conferred for sev~ral hours with General
Alexander and his staff officers concerning the re-erouping of the Allied
forces in Italy. General Clark's coMm~nts regarding this conference are as
follows:
"General Alexander called a conference today of General Leese and myself,
members of our staff, his staff, General Cannon and some of his staff. The
purpose was to discuss the reorganization of the two armies. Briefly, to get
the Fifth Army with American and French troops and the Eighth Army with all
the British. I have welcomed such a move for a long time a.nd have advocated
it. It puts the Fifth Army on the south, or coastal flank, including the
beachhead. It is going to take sore time to execute because of lack of decision from AFHQ on additional troops. In other vJOrds, it may result in more
command of fewer troops. However, anything that will divest me of the terri-
�l If>
fie responsibilities v1hich I have had in trying to command McCreery' s Corps
and Freyburg ' s Gorps will be welcor'le to me .
''Following is quoted a memorandum which I took to the conference and
which I delivered verbally to the assembled group:
'l.
Troops in the bridgehead are depleted Pnd need to be built up to
The depletion occurs
almost entirely in British elements .
effective strength to maintain their present position .
1 2.
General Truscot t reports that the 56th Division is unable to hold
its present position at its present strength, to say nothing of having any
offensive power .
5th Division , at full strength, must be moved to the bridgehead to
1st brigade must start by 1tJ!arch 3rd
or 4th at the latest .
1
3.
relieve the 56th Division immediately.
come .
'4. 24th Guards Brigade must remain in the bridgehead for some time to
It should be built up to effective strength there .
' 5. Infantry reinforcements must be taken from the 56th Division to
fill up the 1st Division before the 56th Division returns to the Naples area .
1 6.
I have been directed repeatedly by General Alexander to retake Carroceto and Cisterna . In his agenda for today ' s meeting one of the immediate
steps is to take these two points. This will require a major offensive operation by the VI Corps which it is totally incapable of doing with its present
strength or even if present units in the bridgehead were brought up to T/O
strength. Troops are tired and fresh units must be moved in and an additional division provided for the offensive action. The 34th Division is the only
division in sight to be moved up . I will direct that it coI'1l"lence moving by
combat team with the target date of the 1st CT , March 15th. It is badly in
need of replacements which do not arrive in this area for several days .
1 7.
ACfr~ and the Navy must accept this additional responsibility and
whole-heartedly support present troops in the bridgehead at full strength,
plus an additional U. s. Infantry Division. Craft to maintain this increased
force and to move the additional division commencing t~rch 15th must be assembled at once . Some additional LSTS , probably 2 per day, will be required
to build up in advance some maintenance supplies to take care of the 34th Division.
1 8.
With respect to reorganization on this front , I am ready to proceed
with General Alexander ' s plan immediately, relieving the 5th Division at once
by the 8Sth. I will continue my efforts on Cassino and to get a bridgehead
across the Rapido . The start of the relief of the French should commence
without deThy. II Corps Headquarters is available to take over from 10 Corps
Headquarters at such time as that may seem desirable . In the meantime, 88
Division to come under the orders of 10 Corps . If any continuity is to be
provided U. s. troops on its new Minturno front and to provide a division to
relieve tired units in the bridgehead, the 85th U. S. Division must be dispatched here imnedfately. 1
�"I made it extremely plain that I must have more whole-hearted support from the
Navy and ACMF in maintaining the present f orce, in laying in reserve supplies
and in building up for another division. I told Alexander that his thought of
offensive action was entirely out of the auestion until tired troops had been
reinforced, brought up to strength and one new division put in.
"I would like to put in the 88th now but ar,1 tmable to do so because of
lack of craft to make the move. tty only solution, therefore, is to put in the
5th British Division at full strength without equipment to relieve the depleted
personnel of the 56th Division. As soon as craft is assembled, and I have made
the demand for it, I will send more troops in.
11 1 am rather disturbed at the whining attitude of Truscott' s radios.
He
knows full well that I fully appreciate the situation. I believe he is trying
to put it all on the record. When I see him, in a day or two, I will jnform
him that he need not do that, for I accept full responsibility.
7
,,
1
11 The question of air support of the two armjes came up at the meeting, in
which I djsagrMd with Cannon's solution. Leese concurred witb me. \le will
have further discussions.
"General Giraud called on me a couple of days ago a.nd is quite perturbed
over the situation. He feels that if we are not successful in the bridgehead
it means no attack in southern France. I quite agree. He feels there must be
an attnck in southern France soon or else all hope of rescue by the French
1
people will have been lost. He decried my calling off · the attack of the French (
Corps on Atina. I likewise regret it, and it was only done on the direct orders
of General Alexander over my protest. I have always felt that an attack in the J
direction of Atina would outflank the Cassino position."
Following that gathering, General Clark returned to his command post where
he met Major General John E. Hull of the Operations Division, War Department.
General Clark conferred with General Hull 1n his van for some time. General
Hull spent the night.
General Clark today received the following cable fron General Truscott:
RN 750. "Situation on front of 56 Division critical because weak strength of
units render them unable to stop enemy infiltration and loss of ground little
by little. The condition is a natter of grave concern to Generals Evelegh and
Templer as well as myself. While I consider the situation critical, I cannot
alleviate it without grave risk entailed by comr.1
itting the two battalions of
the 18 Brigade which is P1y only British reserve. Committing these battalions
now would be only a stop gap and would seriously impair my capabilities for
counter attack against a major German effort.
"Substitution of the 5 Division for the 56 Division v1ill not correct· the
condition because the 700 British replacements allocated weekly will not cover
the attrition from casualties, and I shall be faced with a similar problem for
both divisions within two or three weeks. Therefore, I recol'1!1end that you send
one brigade of the 5 Division ~ithout vehicles et once to reinforce the 56 Division in the present critical situation. Instead of sending the remainder of
the 5 Division, I recomnend sendj_ng the 88 or other full strength American Division at the earliest possible time, for the following reasons: (1) American
�\ 18
units are larger and capable of longer sustained effort without replace~ents;
(2) Our replacement situation, while bad itself, is still better than the
British; (3) On that section of the front the crying need is more men; (4)
Unless such a solution is adopted, I see little hope for collecting troops
for counter attack when the Boche is stopped.
Evelegh concurs in these recommendations. This situation is so critical that urgent and immediate action is essontial."
11
In this connection, General Clark replied to General Truscott as follows:
RU 5050. "Reference your 750, critical situation in 56 Division is appreciated here. I have represented the situation personally to General Alexander
this date, and it r,as been decided that 5th Division at full strength will be
sent to you without equipment, 15th Brigade Group leaving here Uarch 4th.
56th Division, as relieved, will be returned without equipment to :lfaples area.
You must realize in making your demands for immediate shipment of additional
British and American units that availability of craft is the limiting factor.
Every effort is being made to increase suprly of craft. 88th Division is not
available for you but relieves 5th. Plan to send 34th Division by combat
team to you, commending betvreen March 15th and 20th. Delay caused by lack of
replacements and necessity for assembling craft for move. Am also recommending that such personnel as is required for replacements be taken from 56th Division to fill up 1st Division. It is essential that you impress General Templer vd th the absolute necessity of holding his ground in the event of an attack in his sector. Am planning, if weath~r rermits, all out air effort in
your sector j;~arcli 1st. Please assist us by submitting suitable targets. Guards
Brigade remains with you until after 1st Brigade Group of 56th Division has been
relieved. Details later."
The Army Cornnander sent the following memorandum to General Alexander regarding this situation:
"Attached hereto is a copy of a radiogram I have just received from General ':'ruscott and my reply thereto. I failed to take up with you this morning
the question of reinforcl'!ments for British increments .in the bridgehead. Prospects for arrival of British reinforcem~nts in this area will not meet the requirements of the VI Corps. I recommend that such personnel as may be urgently
required to fill up the 1st British Division be taken from the 56th Division
prior to its return to the Naples area. I am assuming that the 5th Division
will go to the bridgehead at full strength. Otherwise, additional personnel
from the 56th Division should be taken to fill it up also. I realize this is
an extraordinary measure, but if British reinforcements are not available from
other sources, the drastic steps reconm
ended above should, in my opinion, be
taken. Gen. Truscott fMls, and I concur, that British units in the bridgehead
must be maintained at full strength.
"I hope my position with respect to added craft for maintenance requirements
and for the movement of 34th Division to the bridgehead beginning on or about
Harch 15th have been cleared with the Navy."
General Clark today received a copy of a cable from General Alexander to
General Hilson, the complete text of which is quoted below: RU DCAO 202. 11 I
have had full discussion on tactical and maintenance position at Anzio with
�Clark and his staff this morning. Daily maintenance requirements of troops at
present in Anzio beachhead are 2700 TFD. I am satisfied that this figure is
approximately correct. CINC MED is unable to assure me a higher average discharge than 2500 TFD although actual discharges to date have averaged slightly {
more than 3000 TPD. Reserves at Anzio now are not adequate for defence security if present arrangements are not substantially improved there is no chance
of increasing these reserves to the point vrhere we can rass to the offensive
and gain the extra ground the importance of which you have so correctly emphasized. To avoid collapse of present front must relieve immediately one tired
division by a fresh one. To conduct an offensive successfully General Clark
considers that he must put one extra division into the beachhead. I consider
therefore that we must face the fact that our average daily discharge must be
raised as quickly as possible to 3200 TfD for maintenance plus 800 TfD to
build up reserves total 4000 TPD plus additional draft lifts for troop movements mentioned above. To put in the extra division alone will require 39 LST
lifts during last two wMks of Parch. Discharge at the higher rate of 4000
TfD must start ten clear days before the extra division goes into effect necessary improvenent in present weak reserve position. Hovr these things are to be
done is not for me to say, but I am sure that they are necessary. Nothing I
suggest could be worse for OVERLORD than a catastrophe at Anzio."
*
*
FRESENZANO--FER:1.UARY 29, 1944--This morning there arrived Gener111 H. D. Cri ttenberger, Colonel Ladue, J'.'ajor Lodge, r.73.jor Collins and Lieutenant Case, newly
assigned to Fifth Army. After a conference with General Crittenberger in his
van, General Clark met the other officers at the hut, and General Cr5ttenberger returned to Caserta with the plan of going to II Corps tomorrov,.
General Clark remained at his command rost during the balance of the day,
receiving his staff officers and going over dispatches. At dinner tirrte news
arrjved that the enemy had opened an attack on the positions held by the 509th
Parachute Battalion. General Clark personally went over tto air targets for the
succeeding day with Lt. Col. Hare of his Air Suprort Control Section and kept
General Hull, General Brann and Colonel Hare with him for dinner.
In the evening the General sent for Lieutenant Devol, Hho commands his two
PT boats, and discussed with him the arrangen"'nts for a proposed trip to Anzio
tomorrow.
General Clark 1 s notos on the day's activities follow:
"The Boche attacked today on the 3rd Division front. Although sorie small
penetrations have been mad~, from the information I have received to date the
situation is in hand.
"Word has been received that heavy and continuous shelling of tLe port area
has continued all day, with the result that two ISTS receiv~d direct hits, killing my Captain Haverty of the Medical Corps \'Tho was handling th~ evacuation there.
As a result of this shelling the Navy has again issued high-handed orders w:i.thout
reference to the Army. These include: ~- No trucks to be loaded on top decks of
LSTS, which will seriously curtail our maintenance of supplies. E• Discontinuing
the evacuation of wounded by LST. I am asking the Surgeon what this will amount
�to . I mention this to
Admiral Cunningham and
their shipping vrHhout
upon the grom1d battle
illustrate again the high-handed methods pursued by
his subordinPtes . They take drastic action to protect
giv5ng the least thought to the results of such action
in the bridgehead .
"Another example of lack of Navy cooperation arose when I had notice
given to the Navy that I would be flying by cub on a prescribed route to the
bridgehead tomorrow , requesting that shipping be notified ecause yesterday
one of our destroyers , without provocation, fired on our courier cub . Although three officers in the Navy Department were told that I was flying in
the plane , they have all replied that planes must keep their distance or be
fired upon .
11 Due to my pre-occupation with the Italian cnmpaign , I have received
word that I am relieved of all further responsibility for the operation or
)
planning of ANVIL. This is a great relief to me , for I have no tine to give
any thought to any other subject except the battle of the l'idgehead . Quoted
below are the jnstructions on this subJect :
1 1.
The Italian campaign has assumt'!d such importance that tl'e Commandern-Ghief is loathe to risk a change in Cor1manders of Fifth Army either now or
in the near future .
j
1 2.
Fir directives
from the Col"lbj ned Chiefs
Your responsibilities on
the added resronsibility
perv.i.sed from now on .
concerning Operation ANVIL have now been received
of Staff which require immediate implemi"lntation.
the Italian mainland are too grave to burden you with
for continued ANVIL planning which must be closely su-
1 3.
For these reasons decision has been reached by Genera]. Wilson and
concurred in by General Devers , that you shall remain in command of Fifth Army
and be reliev~d of responsibility for the Seventh Army and ANVIL planning effective this date . Hence the instructions forwarded you y cable and letter
1 January on this subject are revoked . 1 11
c/s ,
General Clark today received the following letter from General Harding,
ACMF :
"In reply to your memorandum dated 28 February 1944 addressed to the C-in- C
personally, I am directed by the C-in- C to inform you that after the nost careful consideration of all the factors involved , he cannot in any circumstances
agree to the transfer of personnel from 56 Division to replace deficiencies in
5 Division or 1 Division.
·
"Every effort will be made to · make and keep 1 and 5 Divisions up to a
strength of 26 officers and 700 0.Rs per infantry battalion, but the transfer
of personnel from one division to anoth~r , especially in the circumstances which
exist in this case , is rightly or wrongly contrary to all the principles on which
the British Army is trained and j nspirea·, and would certainly lead to the most
serious loss of morale , if not to disastrous results .
"The C-in-C considers that the remedy lies in the rapid replacement of 56
Division by 5 Division , and the rearrangement ,. if necessary, of the 6 Corps
�front so that the tasks of the two Dritish divisions are as nearly as practicable
related to the s·'-.rength at which they can be maintnined with the flow of reinforcements available .
"In this connection will you please forward for the information o~ the C- in-C
your programme for the r1ove of 5 Division to the bridgehead, and for the return
of 56 Division and 24 Guards Brigade.
"As regnrds additional craft , the C- in-C has taktm the question up as a
matter of the utmost urgency with the Supreme Allied Cornnander and the C- in-C
Mediterranean. Authority has been obtained for the I.STs due to leave NAFI.ES
today to b~ held for the moment , and the question of their further retention has
been taken up by the Supreme Allied Corniander with C- in- C Mediterranean today,
and you will be kept informed of the situation. In the meantime the C- in-C directs me to emphasise the vital importance of ensuring that not one man , or vehicle , or pound of stores is put into the bridgehead that does not make a direct
contribution to its security. I am to ask you to continue to give this a spect
of the matter your closest personal attention. 11
Following are the important messages of the day:
Personal Clark to Truscott:
RN 7509 .
"Medical reports show alarming inEvery effort must be mnde to
stop this waste of manpower . Assure yourself thPt existing instructions for
prevention of trench foot are being complied with . "
crease in trench foot in 3rd and 45th Divisions .
Personal Clark to Truscott: RN 753() . "To support you this afternoon,
started 3 sn_uadrons of fighter bombers at about 1300 hours to support you in
your defense against the attack on tht'l front of the 509th. Leading brigade 5th
Division scheduled to leave here Harch 4th. Fastest it can be done. What is
status of 24 Guards Brigade? Of course it is available to you for combat and
will not be withdrawn until my further orders . What is status of 157 and 179
Regiments? I feel confident of your ability to stop this attack with heavy
losses to the enemy. Vlill see you soon . ETA later. All out air attack your
front being planned for tomorrow if weather permits . "
Personal Clark to Bowman. RN 7539 . "I expect to arrive with 2 cubs Nett.::::-J
airfield tomorrow morn:i..ng at rbout 0930 . You be at field with jeep from 0915 on. /
Fire pyrotechnic signal from middle of field as cubs aprroach if fielri is not
operational and I can not land there , in v,hich case will land on a road . Will
\
return same afternoon . Weather nay rrevent trip , in which case will notify you.
Inform Truscott . Have AA warned of my arrival . Vlill come in low. Acknowledge .__,
"
Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 775 . "Strong t,nemy atb=icks all along front
between 93 and OJ eastings . 3rd Division heavily engaged by entire 362 and Herman Goering Divisions . Elements 715 Division and 1028 R~giment also identified.
Intense fighting in progress . TAC/R reports 50 tanks in Cisterna and 20 addi tional tanks entering tmvn . It is most essential thnt heavy air bombardment be
placed on this target tonight . "
Personal Truscott to Clark. W1 777. 11 I anticipate heavy- enemy air attA.cks
tonight ag;:dnst our artillery positions , and the port area . Recommend steps be
taken to provide maximum night fighter cover . "
�l 22
Personal Clark to Trus cott . RH 7545 . "Reference your 775 a.na 777, maximum night fiF,hter cover will be provided tonight . Two dive oomb bomber squadrons ti.ttacked tanks at Ci sterna this afternoon . Results not yet known . Air
advise s against Attack of Cisterna tonight , due to the necessity of using heavy
bombs in close proximity to friendl y troops . Roans leading into Cisterna wil l
be covered tonight by night bomber s , and all targets in this area covered in
t omorrow ' s progran. Am sending you two British Commandos , total strength approximatel y 600 . Hope to get them to you in the next two or three days. They
should help . 11
*
*
*
PRESENZANO--MARCH 1, 1941~--Today General Clark remained at · his comriand rost all
day. He had jntended to go to the b~achheHd today and made arrangements for
transportation by cub . However , the weath ,r deteriorated throughout the morning and by noon it was aprarent that the trip would not be possibl e . Accordingly, General Cl ark directed that the sam"' arrangements for the succeeding day,
March 2nd, be made .
In the small hours of the morning today there arrived two cables which
greatly annoyed General Clark. One numbered 02158 was from Headquarters ACMF
t o Fifth Army with a eomplete distribution through the milit8ry ~stablishments
in the Mediterranean basin. The other , #605 , came from FRO , ACMF and was directed to the Commanding General , Fifth Army. The first cP.ble , RN 02158, is
quoted in full as f ollows : "The formation of Allied Troops now fighting in the
A'!IJZIO Bridgehead will he known as the "Allied Brlngeh&nd Force" on order of the
Prime Minister WEFQ 0001 hours 2 March, This term will be used in sitreps communiques and tre press . Ho change will take r l ace in normal signE>l address . 11
That rortion of #605 , which is here in question , reads as follows : "As
from 0001 hours 2 Maren, formation of Allied troops now fighting in beachhead
will be known as "The Allied Beachhead Forces" for all purposes less normal
Army s:.gnal aarlress . 11
G~neral Clark discussed these documents at length with General Gru.enther ,
his Chief of :: ta ".'f , and with General Hull of the Orerations Division of the ,Jar
Department , who took lunch with the General . 'T'he General then drafted the fol low.'ng radio to General Alexander covering this su')j,.ct :
R J 5117. 11 T-teP""rl'!nce is Made your 02158 and my conver sation with you today.
In view of the progr"ss by the Fifth Ar1:1y over a P"riod of six months in developing Allied relations , and of the F'ifth Arny "sprlt vrhich has been built upon a
dirficnlt a+.tlefield , I r"quest that the order ot the lr5Me f.i:inister b<!'l riodified
to r"'ad "The Fifth Arny Allied Br:'Ldgehead Force" . It is my considerec' opinion
that the use of the modified title , espl')cially at this critical thne , will contr:.bute materially to the maint'°'nance of the hj g}, state of r..oral~i of' tbe Jrj tish
and Anerican troops of the Fifth Army now in the Anxio bridg..,head . 11
The General feels that this is rart of a steady effort by the British to in-\
crease th~ir rrestiee :in the r·~~di terranl'lan area and to exalt j n the ru.blic nind
the part that the British, as contrasted to the Americans , are , rlayjng there .
)
�123
At the conference with the CITJC , AC!'F on the 28th, one of the questions
arising was the system of air support which would bl"' used when the Eighth
Army should side-slip to the left and should j_
ncorporate w~thin itself the
British elements jncluded vTithin the Fifth Arny. Gen~ral Clark has had close
perso11al and staff relationships with General Eouse and with his successor ,
General Saville . He has 1mmm the latter since boyhood. Accordingly, Gen6ral
Clark feels that it would be desirable to 1-:t"ep the XII Air Support Cornmand with
Fifth Army rather than to have it occupy a position in wrich its attention
would be divided 1:Jetween the Fifth and :2ighth Armies . A cable from General
Leese , Commanding the Eighth Army, to General Harding, of which an information
copy was furnjshed General Clark, makes it evident that General Leese heartily
agr""es with General Clark 1 s feeling in this matter: RN COS 49. "SASO has re •
ported to me the proposals promulgated after the air force meeting which followed the GP.TC I s conferf'!nce . Understand XII ASC would have orerotional control
of DAF Squadrons less 239 and 7 wings and that our needs will be met by XII ASC
through the medium of a small operatiom1l headquarters DAF attached to our Hq .
Regret cannot accept this situation. Must insist that Eighth Army orerations
must be supported by DAF under direct command AVM Broadhurst in the same way
as Gen. Clark insisted that his operntions must be supported by XII ASC under
General SRville . For speclfjc operations of course either air force would give
whole- hearted support to the other accordjng to w0ich Army wAs the predominant
partner in that phase . Cannot believe tht>t agreement on these lines cannot be
reached . Request thnt f~nal decision be postponed until return AVM Broadhurst
arproximately March 10th. "
General Clark has been greatly concerned with the necessity for frequent
reports from the beachhead concerning unloading. Because of his not receiving
such reports with satisfactory sp~ed, General Clark dispatched the following
radio to Colonel Bowman : RN 5087. "I am not kept rrop~rly foformed on the
status of unloading jn the beachhead. General Tnte has sent several messnges
calling for reports from Colonel Newton , yet they fail to come . "
Colonel Bowman replied as follows : RN 9926 . "Cable 5087 received . Initial request by General Tate for reports by his cable 3878, dr,ted 272238A ,
called for full report four tfoes daily progress of unloacUng and tYres of cargo being unloaded . It is impracticable to furnish this detailed information
at such frl"lquent intervals without materially jncreasing the port and naval
staffs and communication facilities . TM s was cxr lained by radio 9375 , drited
290003 , and memorandum Newton to Tate , dated 28 Feb. Cable 7531, dated 291440,
modified request by General Tate to require 3 rerorts of a more general nature .
Since receipt of cable 3878 the following reports have been made ; Cable 9981 ,
dated 291530 - Cable 9887, dated 291725 - Cable 9905 , dated 010025, CRble at
0800 , 1200 and 1600 as to whether unloading is or not - Memo Newton to Tate
dated ?9 February sent by courier , Cable 9909, date<l. 011025 . In addition 4
cables daily will be sent giving detailed reports of rrogress of unload"ng and
unloading operations of interest . "
General Clark today wrote a long personal letter to General Devers, giving
information on the latest developr1ents here . This letter , which was sent to
General Devers b:r his pilot , is quoted as follows :
11 I am sending you this information in order that you may know the latest
developnents here . You probably have tht'! news from the bridgeh!'!ad . The trird
�attack is developing but bejng held in good shape . Some minor renetrations
have been made , but the situation appea.rs to be well in hand . We are killing
a good many Boche , and our casual ties to date have not been unduly heavy.
"I am perturbed about the British sector . The 5()th Division, in parti cular , is not doing well . It has lost a lot of men in the "mi ssing" st atus
and has been more in the nature of infiltration by the enemy. They have
given ground which is vital to our left flank, and some of their small units
have been cut off . ACMF is unabl e to rrovide me with British rt'}pl11cements
as requ:ired , which has led to the necessity of taking th~ 5th British Division,
which is in comparatively good shape , out of the line here and send:ing its
personnel up only to take over the equipment of the 56th Division . I am insisting that the 5th go completely filled up , although I am not sur-e the British can do that . Its leading brigade will leave here on the 4th of March .
Am also sending two British Comr~andos , strength about 600, who leave here this
afternoon . The pl'!rsonnel of the 56th Division is scheduled to leave for Uaple s
j_mmediately upon being relieved by the 5th. Inasmuc}1 as the British can not
fill up the 1st Division in the bridgehead, I requested that some men of the
56th, rather than being pulled out of the bridgehead, be turned over to the 1st,
particularl y those new replacements whlch the 56th has just received . General
Alexander turnl"\d we dovrn on thi s request , stating that it was " contrary to all
the principles on which the Briti sh Army is trainr-id and inspired, and would certainly lead to the most serious loss of morale , jf not to disastrous resultsn.
General Al exander SU[~gests , as an alternative , to contract the British front
and have more front and mor e responsibility given to the U. s. troops . That is
impracticable , for we do not have enough U. S. troors for thAt purpose . I am
makine repeated requests for British replacements , and they must do everything
they can to assist .
"I have been ordered to relieve the 24 Guards Brigade from the bridgehead,
and , although it has a fighting strength of 1400, it must come back in a very
few days . I have resist ed its return so far and rray be able to continue to do
so . Until the situation settles dovm definitely trere , I am reluctant to bring
out any troops who can still fieht . I am sure I can handle this situation.
"I attended General Alexander ' s conference where Leese , Ct>nnon and I , and
some of our staffs , were present . It was to discuss the reorgan:1-zation with
which you are :"amiliar . I concurred, f'or I ari willing to do most anything in
order to get all U. S. and French troops in the Fi-rth Army . I certainly hore
that you can expedite r,ettin8 the 35th Division over here , followed by the 91st .
When I 7 et trose two and anoth~r French Division, with the brideehead stabilized,
I assure you we \vill join up .
"~eneral Alexander has instructed me repeatedly to take the o"fensive in
the brJdgehead and cap~ure Cisterna and Carroceto . You can arpreciate that with
the enemy str('!ni;th against us and with our weakened condition there at present ,
I am unabl~ ~o. do ~his nov,. ~fter the Boche has spent his attack, I plan to rut
the 34th Division J.nto the bridgehead . I am grMtly worried by tbe Navy's attitude on limiting the amonnt of suprlics v/rich they will send into t},e bridgehead .
I must say that Admiral Cunningham ' s attitude has not bren ~trill helpful :in this
respect . I h~ve presented this .in writing to Alexand~r , and he , in turn, has
sent our requirements on to Gt"!neral .Jilson. I am satisfied that General Alexander is going to bat and will force the Havy to meet my minimum requirements now
�1.:25
and provide some reserve for a future offensive and a hec1ge against bad r1eather.
I figure the leading ccmbat team of the 34th Di vision can go in bet\'Teen the 15th
and ?0th of this wmth ; that i', , rroviding I can get snrne rerlacements to it in
the next day or two .
"T . Y.. Brovm is here , and I have attach~d Ur,1 as an extra brigadier to the
88th Division which , jncidentally, is going in to relieve the 5th British Division and whicl , will e t're beginning of the reorganization plan . Crittenberger
is here also. I will facilitate his seeing and doing whrt he nost desires with
coribat units . I am keeping reople out of the bridgehead right at present but
will give them all an opportunity to go up later.
11 I am rather surpr:i sed toclay to receive the following radiogram fror1 ACMF:
The formation of Allied troops now fighting in the Anzio bridgehead will be
'lrnovm as the 11 Allied Bridgehead Force" on orders of the Prime Minister. This
term will be used in sitreps , communiques and the press 1 • Th:i s rather disturbs
me , for it is all a part of the Fifth Army up there. The men have b~en with it
a long time and are proud of their Army organization . I do not know what I can
do about it, but it seems to me tha.t if they want to emphasize Allied unity, and
that must be the only reason underlyine this change , they could include Fifth
Army in the title ; such as, 'Fifth Army Allied Bridgehead Force 1 • I am taking
this mat t~r up with ACJ.:lF .
1
"I want to thank you for your surrort . I will kMp you posted from time to
tine wj_th these personal lett"rs. I know that I can handle all these natters in
a diplomatic way without in any way jMpardizi'1.g our Allied unity but f ,el it
will help if you are informed as to my rroblems anrl how· I am attemrting to solve
them in order that you may be ln a better position to assist."
Today 1 s operations on the beachhead w~re r:1arked by th-; progress of the third
of the German riajor attacks . This was opened by two battalions abreast Pgrinst
the 509th Farachute Battalion position, and tbe assault wave was followed by a
force in considerable c'epth . In all , the Germrms w~re tliought to have used three
Divisions for the attack. In the course of the oa.y the enemy penetrated the VI
Corps position to the extent of 1500 yards, but later in the day General Truscott
counterattacked and durinp.; the ni,3ht regajned all i,} e p;round v;J,L::h the Germans
had temporarily won. A large factor in stopping the Httack was a heavy concentration of our artill~ry. Air support was not effective because of weathr--r .
General Clark entertain,.d for d~nner this evening General Beucler , Colonel
Saltzman and Lieutenant Colonel I orter .
*
*
*
FRESENZANO--MARCH 2, 1944--Today General Clark rleterrninP,d to v:isit tb!'! bridge- \
head, desrite the v,eath""lr wh1ch was somewhat threatening . Accord:",ngly, he made
t e followine; plans : A cub on floats was sent to take up a rosition between Hondragone and Zannone . The two FT boats were sent up to take their position at
regular intervals between ronziane Islands anil Nettuno . General Clrrk arranged
to leave w:i.th General Hull in two L- 5 1 s and fly over the course thus m10rked out ,
spendine a few hours on the'! beachhead , retm·ning n.t 1400 or 1500 hours , derending
on the weather .
�...
Accordingly, the General vrent to the cub field at 0830 and was in a cub
ready to take off with Gen~ral Hull in th~ following ,cub , but rio air cover appeared. A series of calls to G("meral Saville got the information that the original air cov~r had been ordered by General SAvill , but that due to a failure
of staff work h1 the XII Air Support Command had never been actually ordered to
leave the field . General Saville promptly ordered up an escort of four planes
while Gt'meral Clark wait ,d . These four rlanes lost themselves in the fog and
haze , and after General Clar"k- had waited 3/4 of an bour and made a few calls to
General Saville., Gl'lneral Saville then ordered up four more planes . These too
lost thenselves . In trie meantine the day was wasting away, and General Clark's
important mission at the bridgehead was unfulfilled. From tjme to time the
lost planes would cone into sight flying to and fro at a distance and then would
be lost in the fog again . Eventually, they were guided to the Genere.l I s cub
strip by General Saville who telephoned continued ~nstructions to i'iarcianise ,
from which point the message was relayed to the planes by voice radio . The Gene ral left at 1030 , instead of 08.30 , but no s0oner had the trip started than the
e.scort needed to refuel, and General Clark ,•·as obliged to descend at an air
strip j ust south of f'iondraeone while the escort took on gasoline . Finally, after
this exasperating delc.y, the journey startec·, and the General reached Nettuno
air strip without incident at about 12.30 .
On this trip to the bridgehead, General Clark had a close shave from enemy
shellfire . He was going up a road near the .3rd Division CP and following him
was a jeep in which was riding Mr . Reynolds }ackard of the United }ress . The
jeeps had just cleared a crossroads when a salvo of four enemy shells landed
exactly at the intersection . Had the vehicles rassed n second or two earlier ,
some or all of the party would undoubtedly have been killed.
I
The General left Ncttuno air strip at 1400, protected by air cov~r which
had been arranged by XII Air Support Conunand for 1400 or 1500, d~pending on the
hour of the General I s departure . 'l'he return trip was with out j ncid ent , and the
General arrived at his cornnand post at flbout 1600. He was well content with the
situation at the bridgehead and on the Cassino front and had his cub fly him to
rriarcianise , v,hence he went by automobile to the Officers 1 Rest Center at Sorrento
in order to get a good night ' s sleep.
\
General Clark last night dispatcl1ed the following c~ble to General Truscott ,
with a copy to Colonel Bowman: Wi 5118 . "The 1nstructio'1s issued by you in a
letter dated 27 Februo.ry, subject "Improvement of Dump Conditions " , has just bee}
brought to my attention. You will refrain from issuing directives of this kind
to Advance Headquarters Fifth Army. Fersonnel at my Advance Command Post are
there to assist you. We realize our responsibility with r(')gards the improvement
of these dumps . I have personally issued instructions on tris subject on severa
visits to the bridgehead . If you have recoTI1T1endations to make , you will submit
them to my senior representative in the form of a recoMmendation , at the same
time advising my headquarters of your desires . Instructions issued as of February 27 will be revoked . AcLnowledge this message . I hope to see you tomorrow if
weather will permit rne to fly in. 11
•
General Clark today sent the following cable to General Truscott . RN .3917.
I congratulate you , members of your staff and the Brjtish and American troops of
VI Corps on the magnificent manner in wriich the strong German attack of th., rast
11
�(
�few days was repelled . Fighting wit h great tenacity and skill your troops have
rnade the enemy pay dearl y for his temporary offensive role , and have furt her
/
diminished any waning hope for victory the German sol dier may still imprudently
cheri sh . I am confident that in the heavy fighting yet to come the Fifth Army
will further demonstrate in a most effective manner the superiority of Allied
arms . "
·
General Clark today received a copy of the following cable from General
Alexander to General Truscott : RN MA.1128. "My heart iest congratulations to you
persohal l y on·the abl e way you have handled this most successful battle and
please convey to a ll the troors under your comi:1and my admiration and thanks for
the magnificent display of courage and soldierl y qualities which they have shown
during these last few days of bitt er fighting . They have held firm everywhere
and repulsed the enemy vlith bloody losses . Well done boys . 11
General Cl ark today received the fo l lowing reply to his letter of yesterday
to General Devers :
It w s very helpful for P1e to lrnov: what you are doing and thinking and I
a
greatly appr eciate the letter wrich you sent to r1e today. I talked to Gi-!neral
Wilson at length about the situation on the Fifth Army front concerrdng command
and , incidentally, have had inquiries from General Marshall along the same lines .
I am gl ad that you have now agreed to the new line- up in order to get the U. S.
and French troops together in the Fifth Army. I am sure this i s better for everybody.
11
.
"With reference to the 3/,1,th Division , we have sent a consi<lerE:ble number of
repl acements to you, r1any of them belongi-,.,g to the 34t h Division . I am hoping
that there are not only enough replacements for this Division, but also for tbe
36th. In any case , we are trying hard to get replacements to you in sufficient
numbers to take care of your needs in this matter . In this connection, Stayer
has arrived and he has already started the work on the doctors to cut dovm on
the number of sick and non- operational casualties , and also to return men from
the hospitals sooner .
1 am sorry about the name for the All ied bridgehead force . I , of course ,
do not like this any more than you do , but after all it is a name and cannot have ·
much to do with winning the war . It was one of those things which I class as destructive , unnecessary and unessential . I elieve we have Allied unity more than
ever , and I an sure this hnd nothing to do w:ith this theater , ut had more to do
with tre politicians in England .
11
"Patch has arrived and has been assignll!d to the Seventh Army. He js going
right to work to build a staff . I do not 1':now just what the .r'uture of A.r1VIL is
at tre riontimt but 1 1e hope to have H firmed up :in the next few days .
"He are hr' nging pressure on tbc 'favy to give th, oriel gehead all the supplies necessary, ut ue are havjng a great deal of,trou1)1 .. with landing craft.
I think it .:.s v ry inportant thnt H('} do not put too "~
ucL r1aintenance on the
br:irlgehead . There is not room tl.er-: to attack it and :n my opinion invites loss .
If we coulc, push the brirlgehead out far enougb so that we are reaso1.a,)ly sure
that the port canno~~ he :'ired on by artill ... ry fire , I elieve v1e could get along
with seven days 10.:1-ntenance.
11
�11 G"'lneral ';;ilson is making every effort to get replacements for the British uni ts . We :have hid to give a limi tine date with r~fer~nce to the RCT
of the Airborn~ Division, in order that we r~ay carry out our orders and get
it back to its division by a certain date . I am hoping that this will not
affect you too much . We are also J11aking efforts to get th~ battalion of the
34th Division to it as soon as possible .
"I hope to be up there in the next week or so , when I will E;\'.'lt closer
to your problerris . Lots of luck, "
*
*
*
PRF.SENZANO--MARCH 3, 1944- -Today General Clark spent the entire day at the
Fi fth Army Officers I Rest Center , the first day of recreation which he has
had for a long time . The qu:i_et situation at ~he beachhead 1md the relo.tive
inactivity of affairs on the Cassino front gave him this opportunity for repose . Throughout the day a series 'of cables were received from Anzio concerning the progress of unloading there . Unloadtng has proceeded all night and
continu!'!d until 1300 today when it ceased because of rough weather .
General Clark had planned a little celebration this evening in honor of
General Gruenther 1 s birthday and , in order to return from Sorrento, had his
L- 5 plane go down to a landing strip near Pompei. General Clark left the Rest
Centt"ir at about 1600 to find the landing strip , but the roads leading to it
over and across thl'! partly destroyed autostrade were very confusing, a,nd eventually General Clark turned ba ck to the Rest Center .
In the meantime , at the CF 40 officers , representing the various staff
sections of the Fifth Army, gat hered in the General's Recreation Hut and had a
buffet supper , watched the remarkable performance of a sleight- of-hand artist
and listened to two Special Service nusicians play the piano and accordion~
General Gruenther was presented with a huge birthday cake , everybody sang songs ,
and the evening w s a great success .
a
The replacement s ituation still being critical, General Gruenther wrote the
follovring letter to General Sawbridge , AFHQ G- 1:
"I am reluct ant to continue to bring to your attention the subject of replacem s . However, I feel that yc,u should know of a misunderstanding on our
ent
part which has developed as a. result of the exchange of the following messages :
Yciur 52933 , 57079 , 57996; and our 3397 and 4 7/.,6 .
Based on thes e messages , we obtained the distinct impression that on or
about March 2 we would receive approximately 3800 general a ss ignment replacements
and 4500 RTU ' s . For several months now we have been stressing the necessity of
infantry replacements - s o much ao in fact that , rightly or wrongly, we have come
to consider the term 11 replacements" as meaning 11 infantry replacements" . our ·
shortage of infantry replacernents has been so critical during this period that we
have , for all i'l"ltemts a.nd purposes , practj cally disregarded the question of other
types of replacements . For that reason we made the assumption that of the 8300
" replacements and RTU I s expected on March 2 , the proportion of infantry replacement::; would be low. It is true that in your 57079 you warned us that "infantry
replacements in th~ number we required would not be available until March 1411 •
11
�Howev~r, in no way v,ere we prepared for the shock that fBS gave us yesterday
wh"'n ...,hey told us that on r~
arch 4th we shall receive 3063 enlisted replacements with 753 infantry and 526 RTU's with ?63 infantry. I feel tha.t your
//57079, answering mu· 3397, might have given us the bad news then.
11 As you know we have a serious personnel problem in connection with the
beachhead . The casualties there have been .;airly heavy and have thus far
absorbed all the infantry rerlacements which we have received during the past
two weeks, and there is still a shortage . The 34th and 36th Divisions are
now out of the line and are eagerly awaiting their infantry replacements. In
order to resune the offensive in the beachhead it will be necessary to ship
another division there . General Clark decided on February 28th th11t he would
se:?.1.d the 34th, shipping one RCT about 1'.1'arch 20 . I gave rim every assurance
that out of 8300 reflacements and RTlPs expected on or about March 2, we would
surely l;e able to f:i nd enough infantry rerL:-:i.cements to make good the losses at
the beachhead and also to fill one infantry regiMent of the 34th Division. On
that assumption we rmde a strong apreal to tbe Navy for the shipping to start
the movement of the division about March 20. Moreover a tactical plan has
b"'en forrmlated involving the use of the 34th Division in the beachhead early
in April which may now be of doubtful value . Had we realized that of the 8300
RTTJ 1 s and r~place rients, there vrould i..,e only 1000 infantry our picture would
have been very much different .
"It was , of course , an error on my part to indicate to General Clark that
any proportion of the Farch 4th shipment would be infantry, although he ha s
not placed that blame on me . In order to rrevent :'uture errors of tris character, I should like to urge that you, Ben Sawbridge , send us messages for the
next two weeks advising us of the infantry (I repeat infantry) shipments which
can be expected and their dates of arrival here . This message will be in addition to the routine message sent to FBS for each shipment . After two weeks
we'll probably be out of the woods and we won't bother you any more .
"Please realize that we understand thoroughly that your headquarters is
doing everything in the world to get us the replacements that we need . My only
request is that we be kept in the picture concerning the jnfantry end of the
game. · It is often necessary for us to deal in individuals; we are usually that
short .
"Our troops have junt had a fine victory in repulsing the third strong attack by enemy forces . We killed a great many Germans, and I feel quite confident that the situation there is r.iore than under control."
*
*
FRI":SE',JZANO--MARCH 4, 1944--General Clark returned to his command post by cub
today, arriving at about 1210 . He immediately began disposing of those matters which had accumulated during his absence and cleared his desk by early afternoon . In the afternoon General Kenneth N. Anderson , formerly coP1ma.nding the
British First Army in Tunisia and now in charge of the Eastern C01mnand in England
(having been removed from his Army comnand by Gent'!ral fontgol"lt'!ry as soon as the
latter took over in Enr,land) paid a visit to General Clark. General Clark was
very courteous in his treatr.ient of General Anderson who appeared somewhat mollified by his recent experiences .
�Following General Anderson's visit , General Clark received a call from
Generals Cannon and Saville and J3rieadier Mainwaring, who discussed problems
of air support control .
General DeGaulle arrived today at Capodichino for a visit to the Fifth
Army area and went to Venafro to the command post of General Juin. By prearrangement with General Clark , he arrived at 1800 at the Fifth Army command
post and went at once to General Clark ' s van where the two commanders had an
interesting conversation, ·rith Lt . Col. Sutherland act:ing as interpreter .
General DeGaulle started the conversrtion speaking soMewhat laborious English
but later lapsed into French.
General DeGaulle had two points to nake . One was that France should be
invaded during the current year or she would be so drained of strength and
resources of every kind that effective resistance by the French would be impossible . The second was that if because of a lack of shipping the Allies
were unable to invade southern France and jnstead had to adopt as an alternative the placing of all French resources in Italy, the French authorities ,
in order to preserve the psychologict=il well being of the French people, should
be tnken into the complete cnnfidence of the Allied leadership and should assist in the plannjng of whatever operations were in store . It was evident ,
when General DeGauJ.le sroke this way, that he thought he had been coldshouldered by the Allies , and this further appeared when the General remarked
that he was somewhat surprised that no French divisions had been allotted the
task of joining in the cross- channel invasion. General Clark was quite frank
with General DeGaulle , stating that he , General Cle.rk, knew that~ southern
France operation, termed ANVIL, had been in contemplation but that the shipping
which had been short enough to cause great concern in the Italian operations ,
had been still further shortened in order to support the forthcoming ovri:nLORD
Operation. An jnvasion of southern France had become a practical impossibiUty.
There was no use trying to invade southern France with one division or two .
"Why not , " said General Clark, "put whatever resources the Allies have available in the Mediterrant1ian basin into the Italian campaign where a great victory
might be won?" "Very well, " said General DeGaulle, "I will agree wjth you upon
a certain hypothesis . Let's suppose that the Allied High Command intends during
the current year to launch a major offensive ncrof's the channel into F'rance or
into Holland or somewhere else in Western Europe and , assume further that there
is not enough shipping for an invasion of southern France; then I will agree
with you that it would be desirable to take all the French Divisions now disponible in the Mediterranean and put them into the Italian c8mpaign to the end
that a major diversion might there be made and the Germans be contained there."
Hovrever , General DeGaulle asb,d if General Clark had available the necessary
shipping to maintain the French and American Divisions now in North Africa .
General Clark said he had . A quantity of shipping here novr is being utilized
to support the air preparations and the other steps being taken to lay the foundations for ANVIL in Corsica and Sardinia. If ANVIL were abandoned then that shipping could be available to support the Italian campaign. General CJBrk added
that if the French and Anerican Divisions in Africa were brought in echelons to
Bizerte , the shipping could be used to ferry them to Messina, and. they could then
come north over the road by automobile , saving shipping time to a large degree .
The conference was as amicable as it could be in view of General DeGaulle's
extremely phlegmatic personality. General Clark took occasion to rraise the ·
�dash and esprit which characterized General Juin and to exrress his great
satisfaction at havJng General Juin in the Fifth Army. General DeGaulle
expressed gratifjcation at this mutufll confidence and said that he was
glad to be at the front among soldiers, but that he would like still more
to be in Paris among the French people.
At 1900 General Clark and General DeGaulle went to the hut where a U
shaped table had been set up and aperitifs rrepered for 17 guests. After
a short time General Clark seated his guests and entertained them at dinner.
DeGaulle was a curious dinner guest, courteous, at all times making the polite responses, but with a peculiar, flat, uninspired manner which contrasted strangely with the affable, pleasant manner of General Juin, who
sat on the left of General Clark, while General DeGaulle sat on his right.
However, the dinner was a great success. In addition to Generals Clark,
Gruenther, DeGaulle and Juin there were present Generals Sevez, deHontsabert,
Keyes, Dody, Chaillet, CPrpentier and Beucler, Brigadier Richardson and
Colonels Kammerer, Saltzman, Billotte and Lt. Col. Sutherland.
General Clark today djspatched the following letter to General Leese:
"With the coning Movement of Eighth Army to the west of the Appenines,
I believe there will be need of closer liaison between Eighth and Fifth
Armies than has been necessary while our comJ'!lB.nds were separated by the
mountains.
"I propose, therefore, sending two of my staff officers to your headquarters for this purpose and would appreciate a similar arrangement on
your part. I believe one of these offjcers should be particularly qualified
in Operations (G-3) and the other in Supply (G-4).
nrt would be particularly desirable if you vrouln approve my retention
of Lieutenant Colonel George Britten as your liaison officer for operations.
Colonel Britten is an outstanding officer, known and well-liked by all with
whom he has cori.e in contact. He has been a most dependable member of Fifth
Army's BrHish Incr~ment and J would like to retain him on my stAff as your
representative.
"General Alexander has told me that Brigadier Charles Richardson, who
has been with me during all of the Italian camraign, is to be given another
assignment.
"I have no suggestions for a
mination.
11
11
Q officer and would appreciate your no-
"As for thia. American offic~rs to cone to ·your headquarters, if you lmow
of any by name which you would like to have, please let me knov1. If tht"!y
can be made available, I will eladly detail them.
"i"lith fullest expectations for our joint march on Rnn; and to the north,
I am.''
General Clark today sent the following message to crrc, ACMF. RN 5194.
"Paraphrase oi' message 9941 (Five Army to AC'l.F from Clark) dated 040040A from
�Fifth Army Advance CP follows : ' Fort and .naval personnel held confer~nce
with Fifth Army r~presentatives this date rel~tive to unloading of Lih~rty
ships . Considered opinion of all ' that small craft situation must be improved
with least practicable delay. Have operational following craft : 4 American
and S British LCTS , 2 additional American LCTS in poor shape are being utilized on hospital carrj~r run, and sev~n LCIS . LCIS are a help but are limited in capacity and ease of unloading . 12 LCTS are definitely insufficient
to efficiently unload five Liberties . Navy personnel cooperative to fullest
extent and doing everything possible to keep craft operational. New subject:
2 hospital ca'rr:iers arrived at 0945 this date rmd insisted on leaving at 1430.
No information received that they were to arrive . In view of late carrier
arrivals and distance anchored from shore due to shelling, only 2 LCT loads
were able to reach ship side in time . Furthermore , although LCT loaded with
patients was alongside st . Andrew, the Captain refused to take on the second
load . The LGT was then sent to the St . Julien, and the Captain was prevailed
upon to accept this load which he did . Request that action be taken to preelude refusal of hospital carrier to accept ratients who are alongside ship
in an LCT after having been transported approximately 2 miles to get to ship
siae . Request ETA of all hospital carriers sent Anzio . In order to assure
maximum loading recorirnencl that this he not later ogoo if possible and sailing
time be not earlier than 1500 hour-s . 1 I shall be grateful to you H you will
assist us to solve these probleris . "
!?
j
\
General Clark cabled General Truscott as follows today: R!J 5190. "Your
request to retain two field companies of 56 Division is approved . I have
asked General Alexander to secure Admiral Cunningham I s cooperation in raising
naval morale . Keep me t~dvised if unfavorable attitude continues . "
*
*
*
FRF.SEHZANO-•MARCR 5, 1944--In the morning General Clark flevr by cub to Caserta
where he conferred with General Alexander . The General returned to his command
post shortly before 1300 hours .
He spent the afternoon in administrative work at his van. At 1730 the
General, with his Chief of Staff, his Public Relations Officer and Captain
B~ardwood, met in the hut with five American newspaper correspondents: Lynn
Heinzerling of Associated Fress , James Roper of United rress , Graham Hovey of
International :Jews Service , Lee McCardell of the Baltimore Sun and William
Shadel of the Infantry Journal. General Clflrk told the correspondents that he
was having them in merely for a drink and a chat . However , before long the
General was discussing, off the record , the re-grouping of troops in the Italian
campaign.
He revealed to the correspondents that the Fifth Army would becone a Fr['ncoA111erican Army and that British troops eventually would no longer be part of his
command . He told the correspondents thot the Fifth Army would control the west
coast sector of the main Italian front (that sector now ht'lld by the 10 British
Corps) and the Anzio bridgehead . He said that the Eighth Ar"f'iy would shift westward and eventually would ½e the force driving up the Liri ·valley.
Hovey asked the General how he felt about the new make-up of the Fifth Army,
and the Army Commander said that h(') felt the move would be beneficial in that
it would give him troops equipped exclusively with American mat~riel and that
�133
this would facilitate administrative and supply -rroblems . He said that his
relations with the 'r;ritish were most anica,"le 1)u-t, explained that some times
it was particularly difficult to order a British Corps Commander to execute
certain operations . Such action with British officers entailed longer discussion and a certain amount of debate .
The correspo'1d~nts also brought up the matter of replacements , and General Clark said that the replacewmt probleri, , while bad enough for Anerican
troops , was extremely difficult for hoth the '3ritish and the French. He said
that he hoped to get two more American divisions in th" Italian caMpaign the 85th, now in Af'rica, rind one other division.
G1meral Clark also revealed to the correspondents that !:,he leading ele ments of a brigade of the 5th British Info.ntry Division had almost net with
a disaster while moving by LCIL.S from Haples to Anzio . Through faulty navigation the vessels started to put in at Circeo and had been fired upon by
German gt.ms . They pulled out without suffering any casualties and moved up
to Anzto . 11 If you think I have been confused by this action" , said General
Clark, "Think what the confusfon of the German High Corimand must be . \le are
wondering if the German comm1mique tonight will say that they rerulsed an
attenpted Fifth Army landing at Circeo'!
Hovey also 1 rought up the qu~stion as to why higher headquarters had issued the directive that a dateline referring to th~ bridgehead forces must
read "Allied Bridgehead Forcesu . Hovey said this action had left the correspondents somewhat cnnfused . He asked General Clark what was the reason for it ,
and General Clark said that he too was confused but that he had made strong
reprosentations to General Alexander and. the Har Department . Hovey said that
riost of t},~ correspondents vrere continuing to write of it as the Fifth Army
Bridgehead but that he noted that tr e censors were inserting the vrord "Allied 11
in the Fifth Arrny dateline . General Clark said that the Fifth Army had fos tered an Allied feeling and that he felt tl-at the troper dateline was "Fifth
Army Allied Bridg~head Forces" •
rffcCardell brought up the subject as to who was the father of the rlan for
the amphibious operation at Anzio . General Clark anrl General Gruenther explained that there had been several rlans for amphibious operations , that the
first one was in tr e i:;lanning phas~ three days after our initial landing at
Salerno . General Clark said that three othl"r anph1bious plans had b~en laid
down before proper craft was available and the Anzio operation executed .
Roper then brought up the question as to why the Fifth Army bridgehead
had not been e:xploi ted , and General Clark pointed out that by dusk on D day
all that the Fifth Army had ashore on the bridgehead was tbe 3rd Division and
one brigade of the Bri tish 1st Division . Both of these organizations had about
1/5 of their vehicles . The Germnns , however, had lnnd supply lines and had 16
battalions ranged around the briclg~head perimeter bytthe night of D day. The
General said that } ifth Army forces probflbly could have driv~n onto the Mgh
ground doninating the Anzio bridgehead but that such a move would have greatly
endangered the rear areas at Anzio and Nettuno and thnt the troops right have
easily been cut off from all supplies hnd they moved too far forward and left
thl'!lir flanks and rear thinly held .
1
�13Y
Sitting informally around the stove in the hut, General Clark chatted with
the correspondents for over an hour.
In the evening General Clark invited a number of his staff officers from
the headquarters to a movie in the hut.
General Clark today sent the following cable to General Devers with regard to the replacement situation: RN 7696. "In your March 2nd letter you indicate that you are under impression that replacement situation is satisfactory for 34th Div. and probably so for 36th Div. Sawbridge message to Gruenther
lists replacements scheduled and I realize you are doing everything possible.
However, I desire to bring following facts to your attention. 34th Div. short
1500 infantry enlisted exclusive of lOoth Battalion. 36th Div. short 2400.
Both Divisions now under new T/O. Total shortage of 3rd and 45th Divisions
approximately 1500. Shipment of 3391 enlisted replacements which arrived March
3 included only 469 infantry and this is total infantry now available. Since
movement of 34th Div. to bridgehead nnist start about March 20th, I am forced to
convert to infantry approximately 1500 replacements from other branches as authorized in your W/9832/26661 dated 10 January. I consider the conversion an
unsatisfactory expedient but in view of the urgency of getti.~g 34th Div. to
ANZIO in immediate future, that solution is forcod on me."
\
Today the Inspector Gen~ral's report was received on the investigation con- /
ducted relative to the allegations regarding the insufficjency of ammunition
and the carrying of unloaded weapons by units of the 36th Division in the Ra/
pido River crossing. The conclusions reached are (a) that all personnel started on the operation carrying at least one extra oondolier of ammunition, and no
general shortage of ammunition existed, (b) that although orders were issued
that assault companies in the 141st Infantry would make the crossing of the Rapido River with weapons unloaded, no disastrous results occurred from this procedure; that all personnel of the 143rd Infantry crossed the river with loaded
weapons; the 142nd Infantry was in Division Reserve and was not engaged, (c)
that orders of the 141st Infantry directing that assault companies would carry
weapons unloaded a.re not ascribed to General Wilbur, (d) that any disastrous
results which may have occurred during this operation, were not due to insufficiency of ammunition or the procedure followed by some companies of the 141st
Infantry in crossing the river with unloaded weapons. It was recommended that
no further action be taken in the case.
General Clark received the following cable from General Truscott today:
RN 907. "Front quiet today except for small attack a.gainst third battalion,
7th Infantry last night which was repulsed. I am continuing aggressive reconnaissance. Begin tonight regrouping to make first division and 2 regiments 45th
Division available for attack which I am planning to reduce Carroceto salient.
Should complete regrouping by 8th and be ready by 11th or 12th enemy action and
weather permitting. Will coordinate date with operations on southern front and
will give you complete details of plan later."
*
*
*
PRESENZANO--MARCH 6, 1944--Today was the birthday of Sergeant Dow one of General Clark's Headquarters Detachnent, who has bAen an efficient an! devoted soldier in General Clark's imnediate entourage for many months. Sergeant Dow had
�been wounded by an enemy bomb at the beachhead but has recovered a.nd is back
on duty. This morning General Clark pinned a purple heart medal on Sergeant
Dow, to the sergeant's great delight and pride.
At about 1030 General Clark flew by cub to a field near Headquarters 10
Corps where he conferred with General Mccreery concerning the proposed ch,=inges
in his corps nispositions involved in the re-grouping of forces on this front
and the transfer of the British 5th Division now under General Mccreery to the
beachhead.
Thereafter, General Clark went on to visit General Sloan, Col"l1llandjng the
88th Division at his comr.,and post which js located where the present 5th Division CP also is, at a place called Carano about three miles southwest of Cessa
Aurunca. Following this talk General Clark returned by cub plane to his command post. While at the 88th Division, General Clark noticed that the division lacked sufficient shower bath equipment, and, as General Moran happened
to be there, General Clark asked General Moran to see that an additional mobile shower unit was sent to this division. General Moran had the Quartermaster take the necessary steps in the afternoon.
The following important messages were received and dispatched today:
Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 907. "Front quiet today except for small
attack against 3 Bn., 7th In:'antry la.st night wM.ch was repulsed. I am con•
tinuing aggressive reconnaissance. Begin tonight regrouping to make 1st Division and two regiments 45 Division Rvailab1e for attack which I am planning to
reduce Carroceto salient. Should complete regrouping by 8th and be ready by
11th or 12th enemy action and weather permitting. Will coordinate date with
operations on southern front and will give you complete details of plan later."
Personal Clark to Truscott. RN 5220. "Reference your 907, am delighted
with your plans to retake Carroceto salient. Keep me posted as to timing of
attack. Hope to launch Cassino attack just before yours if weather permits.
Heavy rains here have inundated large areas on the Rapido involved in this attack. With 3 or 4 days good weather , will launch it. Will see you in me~ntime. 11
Personal Clark to Alexender. RN 5229. 11 Will be gratoful to you if you
will inform me whether or not craft will be available for shipment of 34th Division to Anzio on March 20th as requested by me at your February 28th conference. If shipment is to start on 2oth craft for shipment of supplies should
be availRble by March 10th. New subject. I am still concerned over shortage
of LOTS for unloading of Liberty ships at Anzio. I hope that you will be able
to arrange for additional craft for this purpose."
Personal Alexander to Clark. RN MA 1134. "I have received following message from the CIGS. 'Please convey to Clark my admiration for wonderful defensive fjght put up by his troops. Very best luck to you all.'"
Personal From ClArk to Brooke.
and is deeply appreciated."
*
RN' 5250.
*
"Your message has been received
*
PRESENZANO--MARCH 7, 1944--General Clark left his command post at 0915 by jeep
�for Spa.dger Headquarters where he conferred with General Freyburg about the
proposed attack of his corps on Cassino. He then went to the Headquarters
of Combat Command B, where he ma.de a short visit and then returned to his
command post.
The two naval officers who had been on General Clark's PT boat the day
it was fired upon are still in the 118th Station Hospital but have recovered
sufficiently to engage in a decoration ceremony. Accordingly, following
lunch General Clark flew to Capodichino where he was met by his Packard and
by Lt. Col. ~ygaard. The General went to the 118th Station Hospital where a
brief ceremony was held and where Lieut. (j.g.) Patterson and Ensign Benson
received the Silver Star at the hands of General Clark. Benson was able to
stand, but Lieutenant Patterson received the decoration in a wheeloh~ir, as
one of his legs was still in a cast.
Following this ceremony General Clark had dinner with friends in Naples
and returned to his command post by car.
The following are the important messages of the day:
Personal Clark to Alexander. RN 7721. rtGeneral Mccreery has recommended
that 88th Division be provided with one additional U.S. infantry regiment in
order to furnish reliefs considered absolutely necessary if difieion is to be
capable of offensive action in April. It is necessary to employ all 3 CT's in
line at present. I have checked to djspositions of 88th Division, and I concur in General McCreery's recommendation. Since I have no U. s. regiment immediately available for this purpose, I request that 1 regiment of infantry of
85th Division less organization equipment be shlpped here from North Africa by
fastest means possible. Hope that air transportation can be at least partially
employed but if that is not practicable request that this regiment be ~iven
priority to insure its arrival i"ithin the next 10 days. Shipment of U.S. and
French replacements now scheduled for 14, 18, 24 and 29 March should not be
changed. However, these replacements total only 16443 against lift of 29349
allotted for March on your priority list 4. Equipment of regiment should fol•
low with least practicable delay. Desire balance of 85th Division arrive prior
to April 1st. Request this division be given priority above remainder 6th
Armored Division. In the event additional replacements are not available for
shipment in March personnel lift for division should be ample. Lift allotted
of est1mated 1300 vehicles for 6th Armored Division can be credited to 85th
Division."
*
*
*
PRESENZA.NO--MARCH 8, 1944--At 1000 General Clark received the new arriving
group of War Department Operations Division officers, 19 in number, at his hut.
General Clark talked briefly with these officers concerning the present situation and the course of operations which have led up to it in this theater. He
said that on the Cassino front the Fifth Army was faced · by enemy superi.or in
numbers to the Fifth Army forces opposing them and enjoying the advantage of
commanding ground. As a result, the Fifth Army, after advancing up to its
present positions, had found itself unable to advance even with heavy losses.
Accordingly, intelligence estimates of higher authorities had been furnished
to the Fifth Arrrr:, to the effect that if a landing were made in the Anzio region
it would oblige the enemy to withdraw a substantial force from the Cassino front,
�as he was unable to rejnforce himself by bringing troops from the north. Upon
the basis of this estimate the Fifth Army had been directed to make a landing
at Anzio and Nettuno, and this it had done efficiently and successfully. Unfortunately, neither estimate proved to be correct. The enemy had not withdrawn any considerable forces from the Cassino front, and, on the contrary,
had reinforced himself up to a strength of 10 divisions on the Anzio front by
bringing troops down from France, the Balkans and northern Italy. So equipped,
the Germans had made a series of strong attacks upon the bridgehead, all of
which had been thrown back by the Fifth A:rmy forces which now amount to about
5 divisions. Various armchair strategists in the United States and elsewhere
are now criticizing the Fifth Army for failure tn seize the Colle Laziale or
to take Rome immediately after the landing. General Clark said that any one
of the visiting officers was at liberty to quote him anywhere as saying that
such a course would have been reckless at the extreme and that undoubtedly
would have resulted in the cutM.ng off and capture or destruction by the increasing enemy of the troops attempting such a long advance without a secure
base.
The General gave the incoming officers a hearty welcome and said that they
would be assigned to duties with the Fifth Army of a nature which would give
them the most useful experience and instruction.
Follow:i.ng this General Clark returned to his van and spent the balance of
the day in disposing of administrative matters and working at his desk.
General Clark dictated the following notes for inclusion in his diary:
"On my last trip to the beachhead by cub I particularly wanted to discuss
with General Truscott some of the radiograms he had been sending to me. I have
known Truscott for a long time, and he is a difficult subordinate to handle.
He makes many demands, knowing full well that many of them can not be granted.
I had the impression that many of them were being recorded for the record. He
had issued peremptory orders to my G-4 at the Advance Fifth Army Headquarters
with reference to Fifth Army dumps. I told him to discontinue such instructions and that if he had any idea of writing for the record to discontinue it,
for I would back him up to the limit and would accept all responsibility for
difficulties at the beachhead.
"He has since written direct to General Devers on the question of lack of
effectiveness of tactical air reconnaissance. I will tell him on my next visit
there to discontinue writing official letters to higher headquarters but rather
to send all such matters to Fifth Army. He also took up direct w1.th General Devers the question of assignment of personnel. This must be stopped.
"Visited General Freyburg yesterda.y and met his subordinate commanders.
Checked his plan for the attack on CRssino. Urged that he not wait for ideal
weather, for that would take a week or two, but that if weather permits aerial
bombardment on the 10th, after four days of drying weather, for tanks to go
ahead. His tank experts recommended four to six days. The 10th would give us
four days of drying weather. I fully realize that we are not going to completely break through, and the tanks will play only a small part in this attack.
nAs I reflect upon the situaM.on today, I am convinced that ·Alexander is
�floundering in his effort to solve the tactical situation here. He has built
a fine picture on paper which ostensibly masses the Fifth and Eighth Armies on
a narrow front, whereas actually the only Eighth Army troops which are coming
this side of the mountains are the Headquarters Eighth Army. We will still
have a maximum of 11 Divisions attacking on this side of the mountains, opposed
to 8 German, and a maximum of 6 Allied Divisions in the bridgehead, opposed to
10. In this difficult terrain, with weather usually bad for long periods of
air activity and with the time that the German has had to prepare his defensive positions with wire, · mj_nes and other defensive works, I do not feel that
we will have the continuity of effort to drive through if he decides to stand. /
The best hope we have is the jnfluence of the Russian situation or that the
German feels that he must withdraw troops from here to block a channel threat I
or unless long periods of fair weather permit our ajr to effectively work on
I
his communications.
(
The following important messages were received and dispatched today:
PRO, ACMF to PRC', AFHQ (Copy to Fifth Army) RN 842. "As long as weather
remains unfavorable towards full Air Support, no major actions by our troops
due on any front. This off record background. In view some apparent doubt
that exists over expression "Allied Beachhead Force", wish stress this only
title to emphasize Allied effort and that VI Corps troops - both British and
American - are still integral part Fifth Army. No new command jn beachhead
has been formed. There is no objection to stating on record that beachhead
force still integral part of and still operating under command of Fifth Army. tt
Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 963. 11 Gen. Ramey j nforms me there is 1
TD Bn (tov1ed) now in Naples area available for use here if desired. Could
this be with personnel guns and absolute minimum of transportation be infiltra.ted to beachhead. I will attach to uni.ts in defense position to relieve
M-10 units that have been dug in front line positions for some time and in
need of maintenance."
Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 965. 11 14 11/:arch earliest cfate 1st Di.vision
will be ready for offensive operations. 5 Division should be complete in area
at that time. Propose to attack 14 March or as soon thereafter As approved by
you with 1st Division and 5 Division to clear enemy from rough country west of
Anzio road and reestablish western shoulder of salient in vicinity RJ at $64314.
When firmly established and regrouped there, to attack with 45 Division and 1st
Armored Div:l..sion from east shoulder of salient to seize the area Macchia del
Casale - Carroceto. Maximum air effort for day preceding attack and continuing
while attack actually in progress. Cover plan objective Littoria. Detailed
\
plan in preparation. Owing to advantage that would accrue to enemy with annihilation of Anzio bet:!,chhead, I do not believe that he will forego another effort if he can find sufficient force. Having failed twice with present forces,
it is doubtful that he will undertake another major effort wjthout 3 or 4 additional divisions.
"My capability for reduc:ing the Cerroceto salient with forces now available is contingent upon no material increase in enemy strength oprosite the
beachhead. However, I believe that I can reestablish western shoulder in any
case. We should be able to hold present position against attacks materially
stronger than previous ones. However, such attacks launched in great depth
and continued at maximum pressure regardless of loss will wear :infantry holding
l
�13°1
elements and result in great attrition. With shortage of infantry reserves,
such an attack is the greatest danger to the beachhead; if events indicate
material increase in concentration, additional infantry here will be an urgent
need."
*
*
*
PRESENZANO•-MARCH 9, 1944--This morning General Clark left his comr1B.nd post
at 0815 and went to the cub field where he took off with M9.jor Walker for the
Nettuno airfield. At Lago strip he was picked up by an escort of four planes,
and he arrived promptly at the beachhead. He made visits to the Corps and
3rd Division CP 1 s and gained a first-hand idea of the situation. The enemy
shelling of the port, while annoying, has had no really damaging effect. The
General left the Nettuno strip for his return flight at 1500 hours and arrived
at his own field at Presenzano at 16oO hours. On this trip the General's escort consisted of two Australian and two South African pilots - testimony to
the Allied character of the war.
Today Lieutenant General Crerar, who is relinquishing command of the Canadian Corps in the Eighth Army to take command of a Canadian Army in England,
arrived at the com.~and post to be a guest of General Clark overnight. General
Gruenther entertained him at lunch, together with General Sawbridge, Colonel
Duncan and Colonel Bertholf. In the afternoon General Crerar went to visit
Spadger for tea, with a guide furnished by General Clark.
In the evening General Clark entertained at dinner in the hut Generals
Crerar, M
cCreary, Hawkesworth (who was leaving the Fifth Army with his 46th
Division) Kirkman, Conmanding the 13th British Corps, together with Brigadier
Lambert, his B.G.s., and Brigadier Roe, his "Q" Brigadier, Brigadiers Richardson, Stayner and Cooke, together with the regular members of his mess, Generals
Gruenther, Lucas, K
eiser and Lt. Col. Sutherland.
General Gruenther sent the following two messages to General Clark up at
the beachheact today:
RN 7772.
"All set for Spadger on zero day. 11
RN 7774. t•In order to supplement air for zero afternoon and one day,
Saville proposes to reduce fighter cover over bridgehead by withdrawing fighter
bombers. This would result in reduction from 18 to 8 fighters over area at one
time. Suggest you discuss with Truscott."
Word had been received a few days ago that the Boche was plotting to blow I
up General Alexander and General Clark's CP at Anzio. La.st night the operation I
actually took place and three Italians w
ere caught on the beach with explosive ~
These Italians caused no damage as their attempt failed, and they are being held
at the beachhead.
*
*
*
PRESENZANO--MARCH 10, 1944--II Corps is now entirely moved back to its rest
area. The headquarters is at St. Agata. The J6th Division is just northwest
of Maddaloni, and the 34th Division is ,just northeast of Benevento.
�The beachhead is quiet. General Clark feels more content about the situa.tion there than he has at any time since the landing. Spadger's attack on Oas-'
sino has been waiting from day to day for sufficient good weather to permit the
air. to operate and to permit the ground on Cassino fL~ts to dry sufficiently to
conduct ground operations. The weather varies a good deal locally. Some times
there have been a few clear hours here, while at Foggia or other bases rain has
prevented all bombers taking off.
This morning General Saville called on General Clark and discussed the air
support of the Spadger attack at some length.
At noon General Clark entertained at lunch Gene:rals Eaker, Cannon and Crerar. General Eaker spoke of the recent successful bombardment of Germany by
the air force. He said that yesterday there were 1800 Allied planes over Germany, 1,000 of them fighters and the rest bombers. He said that after a little
Berlin will cease to be an asset but will be a liability to the Germans, and we '
can stop bombing it. He spoke of the recent successful bombing of the ballbearing factories, stating that OSS reported that after the last raids 80 German buyers of ball-bearings had turried up in Sweden, trying to buy up odd lots
of ball-bearings in little shops. With the coming of good weather, General
Eaker said that he was confident that aerial bombardment would go far to cut
off the supply of the troops now facing Fifth Arrny.
After lunch General Crerar said goodbye to General Clark and left. He had
visited the G-2, G-3 and G-4 staff sections and investigated their workings,
and Major Walker had taken him on a cub flight over Cassino.
General Clark spent the afternoon in his van disposing of administrative
matters. At dinner be entertained General Bouscat, Commanding all French Air
Forces, together with Lt. Col. Harteman, one of his staff officers, and also
General Srwille and Col. Darcy of the XII Air Support Command. General Bouscat
said that he had been dismissed from the Army by the Vichy regime and, as a civilian, had taken to journalism in Africa, and at the time of General Clark's
landing of October, 1942, he had been one of those who had been in touch with
the pro-American French officers. He had, he said, djsmissed all the French
Aviation Generals when he came in. Gt\neral Bouscat spoke interestingly of
General N'ogues; saying that early j_n the vrar he had been a great friend of his,
but General Nogues' trimming ~tttitude had disgusted General Bouscat, so that he
ceased to have any friendly feeling for Nogues.
By Operational Instruction #1, Mediterranean Allied Tactfoal Air Force,
the responsibilities for air support were re-stated and it was asserted that
the XII Air Support Command would be responsible for all air support for the
Fifth and Eighth Armies. When requirements for air support for the Fifth and
Eighth Armies exceeded the resources at the disposal of XII Air Support Command,
the Comnanding General thereof was to refer these requ:i.rements to MATAF. Liaison
representatives were to be exchanged between the various air elements and 11 if
XII Air Support Command become separated from Fifth Army they will detach a small
operational liaison section to work with Fifth Army".
Today General Leese sent the following cable to General Clark and to General Cannon, Commanding the TAF. 11RP-f erence MA'rAF Operational Instruction f/1,
dated 7 March, I take great exception to issue of this in view of agreement to
�lL!l
defer final decision on air force set-up until return .Air Vice Marshal Broadhurst. Latter was recalled and is due Algiers today, see COS 251+ to ACMF only
of 5 March.n
The agreement to await the return of Air Vice Marshal Broadhurst is described in cable COS 49 from General Leese to General Harding, dated March l
and quoted in the diary for that day.
It is apparent, therefore, from General Leese radio, that he still feels
strongly that the Fifth and the Eighth Armies should have their separate air
support commands and should not have to comrete for the intentions of a single
air support conmand.
Following are the jmportant messages of the day:
Fifth Army to CG, l\TATOTJSA, RN' 5347. "Ranger Force now consists of 50 officers and q59 enlisted men present for duty or in hospitals, all assigned to
4th Ranger Battalion. Reference your 59018. Of this total 19 officers and
137 enHsted men joined in Ireland in June, 1942 and ps.rticipated in all campaigns. They are classed as veterans and should be returned to United States
on emergency rotation. 30 officers and 419 enlisted men are cl8ssified as experi.enced and 11 officers and 282 enlisted men as comparatively inexperienced.
In general, value of special trained forces is not considered worth the efforts
expended in special organization and training. Most unsatisfactory obstacle.
to overcoMe with special forces in Fifth Army has been procurement of suitable
replacements. Fifth Army desires to continue · Spedal Service Force as outlined in February 17th letter, subject: "The Rangers.n
Personal Truscott to Clark. Rl'T 1002. 11 7791 your Headquarters asks availability Colonel Donald H. G
alloway for assignment Deputy Chief of Staff, Seventh
Army. If General Lucas to command Seventh Army, Galloway desires to accept, and
I will make him available. If not, Galloway desires to remain with me, and I
would like to retain him. Will you advise me on this matter. 11
Personal Clark to Truscott. RN 5380. "Lucas not to cornmr,nd Seventh Army.
Reference your 1002. Galloway remains with you."
Today General Clark received a reply to his letter of M
arch 4th to General
Leese as follows:
· "Thank you very much for your letter, which I was delighted to get. I
quite ageee with you about the need for very close liaison, and General George
Walsh, my Chief of Staff, wi.11 get in toucri with your Staff about this question
directly we come over.
"Most certainly keep Lt. Colon"l George Britten with you; I feel sure trds
will be a good arrnngement. I hope very rnuch also that all Branches e.nd Services of our two Armies will be abl~ to keep a very close liaison together. In
this way we should maintain permanently a very close and friendly co-operation
which will, I am sure, lead to very high effjciency in battle.
11 May we offer you our "1ost sincere congratulations on your srlendj d defence
o±: the ANZIO bridgehead during the last week. Everyone here is full of admiration for your splendid fighting. We all look forward very much to our joint
�march on RNn:E and to the Horth with you.
"Thank you ver~r much for your telegra,ri about the Italian Brigade. They will
help me a lot as my Polish Divisions have only got two Brigades each. They are,
therefore, short of men on the ground.
"Best of luck.It
*
*
*
FRESENZANO--MA.RCH 11, 1944--At 0900 General Clark mmt down to a clear space just
beyond the Chief of Staff's van where there had been drawn up a guard of honor of
MP's and a band ready for a decoration ceremony wherein officers and men to receive a DSC, four Legion of Merits, nine Silver Stars, two Soldiers Medals and
two Air Meda.ls were to be decorated. Gen~rBl Bowman was present to receive his
new Silver Stars as Brigadier General, at the hands of the Army ComMander. At
this formation, Lt. Col. Alphonse Van Hecko of the French Army received the Letion of Uerit for his outstandfog work in Ali<:iers 1 cooperation with the Allied
.n
landings in Operation TORCH. General Lewis and Ms.jor John T. Walker receivP-d the
Silver Star for their flight to Anzio on D day. The ceremony was also noteworthy
because the band played a newly-composed Fifth Army march for part of the ceremony. After the formation GenAral Devers and GenerBl Rooks arrived, and General
Devers talked with Gener8l Clark in his van for about half a.n hour. Afterwards
General Devers left for a visit to Spadger. General Rooks stayed for lunch with
General Clark. There was a general discussion of the rrogress of the war. General Rooks expressed the opinion that the Russian progress was bona fide and most
encouraging.
Discussing the recent order of the Frime Minister concerning the change in
the dateline from the beachhead to read, "Allied Beachhead Forces", General Rooks
told of receivin~ a message fron TROOPERS recently saying that hereafter all dispatches sent personally to the Prime Minister should spell "theater" - "t-h-e-a- \
t-r-e" and should not spell "through" "t-h-r-u11 •
_ ,,,,.
At 1325 General Clark left his com~and post by jeep for the cub field and
flew in a cub to an improvised landing strip near Maddaloni where there had been
drawn up representative battalions from the 36th Division. The Gener~l landed
here with a tail wind and had little space to come to rest by the assembled troops.
He was annoyed with the arrangements for his landing which he felt savored of a
stunt rather than a proper landi.ng. The ceremony went smootl:ly, and he conferred a Medal of Honor on Technical Sergeant Kelly, 2 DSC I s, 135 Silver Stars
and a War Department unit citation on the 3rd Battalion, 141st Infantry for its
gallant work at Salerno. During this ceremony, General Clark, at one point,
made a brief talk to the assembled troops. He emphasized the fine part played
by the 36th Division in the Salerno Operation r.nd since then and stated that the
persons being decorated were the natural battlefield leaders who had shown their
capH city by their courage against the enemy.
Following the ceremony, the General took off and return"'d to his command
post. In the evening he drove to Caserta with Generals Lucas and Gruenther and
had dinner as the guest of General Eaker.
One of the annoying developments of the day was the necessUy of still furth~r
�\43
postponement of the Spadger attack on Cassino. Repeated prophecies of bad
weather have made it necessary to put this operation off from day to day. It
was confidently expected to stage the operation 12 March but can not now be
held until 13 March, if then. One reason for these dehi.ys is the local variation in weather in the theater. It js sometimes clear in Presenzano, foggy in
the Naples Plain, raining in Foggia whence many planes take off, and still different in Corsica, Sardinia and .North Africa.
An interesting situation has arisen from time to time at various points \
on the front concerning truces held for burial of the dead, etc. The GE'lrmans 1 /
frequently send emmisaries over under flags of truce, and in a couple of recent instances General Hawkesworth has detained the emmisaries rather than al\
low them to return because of the military situation which rendered this necessary.
Memorandum of 1 March 1944 from O:eneral Mccreery indicntes that during recent fighting on 10 Corps front in a number of instances the enemy requested
local truces to collect wounded and dead. In several such instances the Germans were thought to have been using the Red Cross flag in order to withdraw
snipers or othervvise obtain military advantages. On 20 February a Division
Commander, 46 Division, directed that no further truces could be considered
and stated tha.t any further deputations coming over under white flags of truce
would be considered prisoners of war, although the collection of wounded by
11 Red Cross personneln would always be respected if not abused.
On 21 February
a German officer, Oberlt Herman Schmidt of the 129th Panzer Grenadier Regiment,
came over to the French lines with the white flag, accompanied by an jnterpreter, requesting to be allov,ed to remove dead and wounded. This officer was
treated as a prisoner of war, but General Mccreery in his letter of 1 March to
Fifth Army, recommended that after an appropriate advance had been made the officer be returned with his interpreter to the·German lines. Accordingly, 'on
10 March a letter was sent from Headquarters Fifth Army to the G.o.c., ACMF referring to the enclosed correspondence stating that instructions had been issued to all F5.fth Army units that no truces would be allowed without prior approval from Army Headquarters, requesting authorization to return Oberlt Schmidt
and his interpreter to the German lines as soon as security conditions permit on
the ground that in the opinion of the 46th Division Commander they were not familiar with the message ending all truces. This letter also recommended that a
Lieutenant Roland Weiser, 10th Parachute Regiment, who entered 56th lines in
the bridgehead requesting a truce to remove wounded, but held as a prisoner of
war in North Africa.
It was decided today by General Clark that no truces for the purpose of removing dead for burial would be requested by any Fifth Army unit, and so a telegram to this effect, reference #7841, was sent to all Corps of the Army, reading
as follows:
"No truce for the purpose of removing dead or wounded will be requested or
granted by any Fifth Army .u nit. Detailed instructions will follow."
General Clark today issued a letter to all subordj_nate commanders on duty
on the Cassino front, explaining in detail the ACMF Reorganization Pl~n as a
guide for future planning.
�Important messages of the day are as follows:
Personal from Clark to Port Commandant and NOIC, Anzio. RN 7836. "During
the past few days I have watched carefully port operations at Anzio. The excellent work done by you and your men has resulted in a record unequalled to
date. The discharge of over 5 ,ooo tons daily for the pa.st 3 days indicates a )
.
high degree of organization and willingness of your men to rerform under most
trying conditions. For this outstanding performance I congratulate you and
your men. 11
From Fifth Army Adv OP to CG, Fifth Army (G-4). RN' 632. "Request you
send another ship to arrive 130600 in addition to Fletcher and 1 additional
ship requested for 120600. Cresop will finish tonight and Grey sometime tomorrow. LCM 1 s foun~ to be impracticable cannot he utj_lized at Xray beach and
tie up berth space in harbor. Both port and navy personnel recommend against
furtrer use of LCM's and return of same to DUKO. Concur in recommendations.
Read General CLARK'S personal nessage to assembled port and naval personnel
at port meeting and gave copies to Port Commandant and NOIC, Anzio personally
on behalf of General CLA...llK. h1rsonnel expressed pleasure in no uncertain ·
terms, thanks."
*
*
*
PRESENZAN0--MARCH 12, 1944--General Clark today remained at his cornmand post
engaged in administrative work. The attack on Cassino was still deferred because of weather, although it was hoped to get it off on Tuesday.
At 1030 thj_s morning Colonel Sullivan arrived at the comJ11.and post, at
General Clark's jnvitation, and General Clark pinned his new Brigadier General stars on his classmate's shoulders.
Shortly thereafter, General Templer, Commandjng the 56th Division, arrived and had a brief talk with General Gruenther and later with General Clark.
In the evening General Clark showed a r.10vie film at the hut called "The Miracle
at Morgan's Creek". The fj_lrn was preceded by a buffet supper at which the
General entertained. a number of staff officers and also Lt. Col. Daly of the
16th Evacuation Hospital with some of his staff.
General Clark sent the following cable to General Truscott today. RN 5454.
"Shall be glad to see Butler tomorrow. Weather forecast and expected ground
conditions for March 14th unfavorable. I am willing to have you attack on March
15th, and I desire that you prepare plans on that basis. Weather permitting all
out air effort will be given your front on March 14th. However, it should be
understood by you that Cassino attack has top :r:riority and must take place as
soon as weather permits. This means that ff weather prediction at 1800 hours
any day indicates favorable weather for Cassino attack on following day entire
air effort will support Cassino attack even though your attack is still in progress. Moreover, bulk of air will probably be needed for Cassino attack for two
days after Cassino D day. If Cassino attack starts while your attack is in
progress I will do everything possible to give you some air effort, but it will
probably be light. Your comments and recommendation desired. New subject 168
CT scheduled to leave Naples March 20th. If you desire I will delay until March
22 in order to give more time to absorb replacements scheduled to arrive Naples
March 14th. 11
�PRESENZANO--MARCH 13, 1944--The bad weather again deferring the Cassino attack,
General Clark this morning remained at bis co:rm:1.and post disposing of administrative matters. Just before lunch he pinned the Silver Star on lVfaj. Gen.
Lucas who is about to leave Fifth Army for the United States. Following lunch
the General flew by cub to the 34th Division cub field north of Benevento
where h('l presented 3 DSC I s, 54 Silver Stars and 4 Soldier's Medals. He returned from this flight at 1600.
\
This evening Generals Clark and Gruenther and Lt. Col. Sutherland vmre
entertained at dinner ·by General Juin.
The weather forecast for tomorrow is again bad, and the Cassino attack has
again been deferred, to the great annoyance of General Clark. The weather here
j_s perfect today with sunshine, a diminishing wind and unrestricted visibilityo
However, the XII Air Support Conmand reports that conditfons at Foggia yesterday were such that bombardment planes could not get off the ground at all. The
cons:ideratfons which defer the Cassino operation must obviously be those applicable to tl1e area. as a whole and not to a small part of it which can be seen
from any one position. The planes for the attsck come from as far away as Foggia on one side and Sardinia on the other, and good weather in one Italian valley is not indicative of good weather in all areas concerned.
Today, by letter, "Relief of Remaining British Troops in 10 Corps Sector~"
the details of the relief of certain units of 10 Gorps by French Expeditionary
Corps between 19 and 29 March were set forth.
Today the following cable was received from AFHQ relative to the departure
of General Lucas, Deputy A:rmy Commander, from Fifth Army:
RN 63886. 11 Upon General Lucas arrival in Algiers orders will be issued
for permanent change of station to the United States vdth travel vi.a United
Kingdom. If aide or aides are to accompany General Lucas request names and serial numbers so that they may be placed on the same order. You are further authorized to issue appropriate orders transferring an enlisted man with General
Lucas baggage to the United States via water transportation."
General Truscott cabled General Clark as follows today: RN 1055. "My attack not practicable under conditfons stated jn your 5454. I consider all out
air effort D-1 continuing through attack to be essential owing to relative combat strength, enemy organization, and difficult terrain. Yiith adequate support
I hope to complete operation on D-2; thus I feel that a:ir effort should be allocated to this force for approximately 4 days to begin operation. I do understand that Cassino attack has top priority; however, every day's delay here increases enemy ground organization and makes the attack more difficult. If weather forecast indicates unfavorable conditions for Cassino for 3 or 4 days I
recommend you allocate air effort to me and let me proceed v;rith attack. Butler
is enroute by cub. He has air plan and can amplify my views. Recommend no delay in shipping RCT 168. 11
�fRESENZANO--MARCF 14, 1941~- -This norning General Lucas , together vri th his two
aides , Major Renne and Captain Eyster, left the Fifth Army con.'7and rost enroute
1
to Algiers , UK and the lrnited States, pursuant to the orders of cable ~ 63886 ,
quoted in yesterday ' s diary.
The General receivo.d a brief call fror.i Colonel Tully, who cane in w-ith a
quantity of in+'orl'l1ation about the errployP1ent of some Italian railroad artillery pressed into service of the Fift]:, Army and was now being fir'3d against the
Gerr:ians .
General Clark spent the day jn his comancl rost engaged in aclrnj_
nistrative
Matters . In the aftr:irnoon Lieutenant General Leese, who had just arrivod ,
storped to pay a short visit of courtesy. He was acconpanied by Lieutenant
General Kirknan , Cor'nanding the British 13 Corps .
Late j_n the afternoon word was received from General Cannon that the wea ther reports for the followinf! day were favorabl/3 anc'l thRt tho Cassino attack
was definitely scheduled . Generals Clark and Gruenthl'lr trereupon planned to
go up to Headquarters New Zealand Corps , frol"" whicr they would be taken to an
OP to observe the attack .
The following are the jmportant nessages of the day :
Fron HQ AAI to Fifth Army. RN O 2275 . 11 4 Div on vrithdra.wel fro,· 10 Corrs
will pass to Corid 5 Corps v,here it will relieve 1 CDN Div vrhlch in tu:rn will
pa.s s to Cond CDN Corps . Withdrawal of 4 Div from the line Yrill be as follm"S .
10 BDE GF 22 Iinr . 12 BDE GP 25 MBrch. HQ 4 Div Div Sigs Iert Div TFS 25 Mar .
Balance Div TFS ?6 Mf'r . 28 BDE GI, rpprox 30 TJ'iarch to be confirmed by Fiftr Army
later. :,3 Arrnd BDE GP less 46 RTR will be i:rithdrawn c'l1trin 6 this p:!riod and will
pass to cOJ11d 5 Corps e.nd will relieve 1 CDH Arny Tank BDE whicr will revert corid
CDN Corps . Fifth Army will Brrancre c1ircct v;ith 5 Corrs for the required Reece
parMes to rove in advance to ensure no deley jn take over on arrivnl. A meeting will be held at this Hq Ht 1030 hou:rs 18 !1arch to decide all detBils o.f' the
reliefs and l"loveP1ents in the above regrouping. This Hq 1aill arrr->.ngc nccn for
rep or reps 5 Corps night 15/16 t-~circh . Reps Fifth Arny Eigtth /\.rrny 5 Corps
F'lrmbo nill cit tend . 11
Personal Truscott to ClPrk. R\T 1075 . 11 I expect to rnlease Gen<>rel Evelegh
about 0 0 r~arch. I h'3lieve hi.s r~placerent should be here by 18 flPrcJ,, to be with
hin for a day or so prior to his departure and he here during rroposed attack .
Cl'm ~rou nake Richardson available by that date? 11
Fersonal Clar}- to Truscott . RH 5493 . "Brigadier RichPrd Goodbody llAs been
selected to replace Evelegh . He 1rill arrive here tomorrow and will be sent to
you within next few days . "
Clark to Truscott . RN 5490 . 11 There is a cr:i ticP 1 shortage of l05mn 2mriunition ju this tr>eatcr c1 espite riy nost urgent arpcals which have been sent directly t0 the War Departnent . Recent shirmnts of tJ:,is type of anr.iunition have
been reduced helow al"'ounts prevjously aut:borized ana expected . Future a.llotr1ents
n1av be reduced hecause of higher priorities for otPAr theaters . Exrenditures on
the ri1ain army f'ront ha.vc been reduced to the Pbsolute riinimu.rn to rrovide cdditional anounts for the bridp:ehead .
i
�"Fron this dete until April 6 inclusi vo thA followinp; l"nmunition will be
avn ilr1b1_e in thr- bri..dgchead: On hand rt A:nzj_o Arny ASP I s 111800 tre sun of
137927 r01mds; on hand at Anzio '<Im rositions cv~185 rounds; rlue to be shiprcd
by 12 narch but not shipped as of 101800 hours q4074 rounds; to be shiprcd
d11rj n~ :1r>rioo 12 Harer to h April ;:,q5000 rounds; total on hand or due in to
6 Aprj_l 6211~6 rounds.
11 Bffective irmcdiately fill previous allocations 105nm howitzer aJ'l1l'1unition to VI Corps ere cancelled. In order to provide for enem" counterattac'rn,
losses b'r shipping, unfavorable lm,.ding poriods an<l sorie reserve for a T'!ajor
attack after the 14th Division t1rrives in the beachhead, you trill fi_y your
rates of ~xp:ind-ltures, includinP," yonr ettack cxrcnditures, so thAt on April 6
there i::ill be 2goooo rounc'1s in the bcacl~heed. It is estinatcd t:rat this will
leave · approximately 130000 rounds at gun posHions and 150000 rou_m'1s in Army
dllJ"lps.
"There cen he no further allocations -ror the period. It ~s regretted
that tLis restriction is necessary but only after careful ccnsideration and
study this decision has been riade. Ac1~nowledge receipt of tbis ressage. n
Hews carrie through toray thrit G('nerA 1 Gira,10 1 s dauglitcr rad died in a Ger!"lan concentration camp. General Clark dispatched the follo-\'Jing C[lble to the
French Col"t!"'ander-in-Chief. RN 5517. "You rave ny sincer" r>nd ceep syripathy
for your sad loss."
*
*
*
fP.ES"~l,TZANO--MARCH 15, 1944--The Jonrs-av10ited but oft-postponed P..ttack on Cassino too}: rl11ce tor'Py. At 0700 Gcnerril Clerk, r>cconran~cd by Generr,l Gru"nther,
left Ms commancl rost rind rlrove to the Feadqurrters o+" the \Tew Zealand Corrs
near :3an pjetro. There he vms net by Generril Freyburg, Genor2l Alexen<l0r, General °SPker, GenerE'l Dcv"'rs a.ncl a Dost ..,ore hj_gh ranlring officers. Guided by a
Now Zea.lend Corps o-"ficer, General ClA.rk drove to Cnrvaro whr>re a special observation post had been set asil'e for him. It was located in an old battered
stone house on tre nortl' side o:f' Ccrvaro, and +'rom thl"1 second floor Crssino is
little less than three niles eway and plainly vjsible. Othsr o"'ficers who used
G-.nernl Clark's OP nere General Devers, General Gr11anth0r, Gr:merP 1 Chr11~ncey,
General Devers 1 Chief of Staff, and Colon0l Harrison of Gcncrri.l Dcv0rs I Staff.,..,_
--::;- l .._,._,._.J ~ I
•.t. ~ ~ 4-- ,,.._..,.:t P"' ~ t ~ - ~ + t. .,.k.... ~ .........
General Clark ::-eached the OP at 08?0 -:>nd rroriptly at OPi~O tre first wave
of bot!bers carri0 fl y:i.ng diroctl ,r over Cerwro Pnil thP✓n 0'mred their load on Cassino. Gener<>l Glrr 1r tood o:n th~ brlcony of Ms OT Pnd wrtched tb~ bor1bing
I
thronr.:h field r,:lasses. The first bombers were B-26•s, and they la.id 80% of
{
their bombs in the heart of the town. A few bombs were short, landing just on
our s5de of the Rapido River. VIhen the bor1bs hit, they sent quicl , stRbbine
flashP,s of nran1;e fln.11~, ri"'d t}~is W8S fol]_..or.rcd b~r n joint ernption o-r srio'k:~
and debris. By the t:inc tre first mwe of ho:1bers had rassed ('Ver Cassino,
tLc to'm rms alnost oblitcrt1ted 1) . ' sroke ancl dust. At 08/~5 the sec0nd vmve of
bor,bers, Flying Fortresses, droy:p:-.d t'v~jr load, and General Clark's OT- :.,hoo-k
v~ obntl7 ,'ncer th~ i.,.,pact of t11e bfo.st. Tr~ bor:ibing continu~d on an almost
uninterrupted schednle 1mtil noon. There were two untoward incirlents . One
wave of bonbcrs dropped a stic1, near San f.!jchele, which is well within our
\
0
�lines. This stick landed arprox-iriotely two riiles north~ast of' the Gl')nArA.1 1 s
On9 b0nber i-., anoth,..,r wave unloaded its bo,-,bs aprrovinatcly one mile
vrest of' the Gen~ral I s OP and killed severa 1 rc9n in a NeVT Zealand artill ~ry
battery. General Clark was extrer,,elv d~ sturberl by t11ese two occurrences,
and General Cannon, who also had co,..,e to General Clark's or, got on tre rhone
to the XII Air Suprort Com~and, in an attenpt to nak~ sure that no bonbs
1imulo ½e dropp~d unless the crews v1ere sure that they were over the target .
Th~ first tno waves ret absolutel:,r no enemy fighters !1.or ener:iy flak. V1ter
in the '"'Orninrs bo,..,bers trat turned vrest after },itting Cassino ran :nto re.ther }
light flak soril') ten niles west of' Cassino . 1Jot cne rlane was stJen to crash.
nr.
Between tre v:aves of bonbers, fifth Army artillP-ry lobb~d occasional
shells into Cassino .
A total of 1320 tons of hor:bs were c'1rorped on_ th") tovm of Cassino during
the day. 'i'l'~ attackincr ships :l ncluc'ed 134 Heavies, 255 Fighter Bo,.,bers, or
light boribers , and t}-,9 renainder Medium Borib"!rs. Durj n[; tY,e day the Air Corrs
flew 820 sorties over Cassino and dispritched a total of 1150 rlanes. The Hediur,., Bor:b0rs Wt"lre by far tre rost accurnte, and Gen~ral Clark was extremely
pl'3ascd \Ti tri their vrork .
\
rronptly at noon, whem t1-,e last borbers had du..nped their bo;1bs on Cassino, Fifth Arny artillery openF-d ur w~tr. a trc11endous barrage thn.t literally
shook the grouni:1, Bnd Fifth Arr,y 5nfantry and ~ng; necrs, \"1'0 },ad been wa-i ting
in th~ flatlands behind the Bapico River, began r;oving forvm.rcl j nto Cassino.
Th~ r:;tms k~pt up their barrage until 1420, thrm j ng tons of 1~ igh exr losi ves
into Cassino and into tre rtont1stery as well. Durini:; the bo'ibing and thn artiller;r barrage Gen"'ral Clark r10.de trips to various oth0r buildinr,s in Cervaro nrh~re oth~r OP 1 s were situated. He also vm.lked approx5nritely 1/? mile
farth")r clmm tbeJ road toward Crissino so he could better see t},e effect of
t1~is trenendous assault . On his return he stopp"ld in at the observation rost
wh,,re t},e war correspondents vere watching th~ hattle, aY1.d 1"e chatted with
them for several ninutes . Gen0ral Clnr1r R lso ··,ent down to the :'J0v1 Zealand
Corrs Adve.nce CI, about 200 ynrc.;s f'rom G~n~ral Cl8rk 1 s or, rind got reports on
trrJ f'ip;hting. By l"1id-afternoon th"l troops 1·er~ well into Cassino. and they
had taken Hill #1q3, a rise that overlooks the entire town. Through his
fil"lld glasses Gen"lral Clar1,, cm1ld see our tanks rioving into town, but rcrorts
cane back that the tanks ,,ere having difficulty because of the tret1cndous
craters J"'lade ~ n +.he roads by tr e boT"bers . General Cler1r riade four trips Pcross
the field to tte Jfow Zealand or. Dud ng the afternoon the Germans threw a few
shells into the -:·enaral area , th1 closest landing about 400 yr'lrds frorn the
ClA.rk OP. During Most of the e.fternoon Gen~ral Clark sat on the ed~e of the )
balcony, his legs hanging over the edge , 1,eeping his ffold v,lasses on tr"l torm
of Cassino and chatt-inr; '"ith the GcnE'!rnls w·ho were with rim.
1
By 1600 it was appRrcnt th~t the ettock ,ms 17,oing fairly '7ell but tl1at the
bo,,..bing and qrtill")ry !:ad not driven the Gernans frorn Cassino and that they
rrere putting up rath~r stiff oprosition. The Indian Gurl..ras uere to have at..
tacvnd late tonif;ht up t1"P. slopes .,,.roM t:re town of Cassino to the Abbey. Aft'1r a final chec 1: at G~ncrnl Freyburg' s OF and a brief talk ,-,~th General Gallov ay, Cor1rio:r1.0er of the l+t} Indfon Di vision ,-ho rad cone be ck to the nevr Zealand Corps or, Gnneral Clark, still acconpanied by Gen9ral Gruonther, drove
.
I
�lY9
back to his coMP1and post Pt Presenzano, arriving th0re at 1650 ..
G8neral Clark this evening cabled General Truscott as follows: RN 7961.
"Attack on Cassino took pl2ce today vrit}, all out air effort from 0830 to noon
and heavy fighter bonher effort this afternoon. Bonb:i ng appeared to be effective aJ.though tanks hwe not been abl"o to rass through tmm yet because of
debris. Attack to take Monastery Hill will he mode tonight. Progress generally satisfactor7 although slower than ant:icipated. TAC R spotted heavy
rioter novenents from Frosinone area tovmrd Cassino late this afternoon. 19th
is earliest date for your attack. fiill k8ep you advised. 11
The Air Support Control Sectfon reported today on the bombing of our
troops by our own planes. Their report may be sUTir:1arized as follows:
On the 15th the first bonbs dropped on Allied troops on the Cassino
front fell on 0930 hours, and this "friendly11 bombPrdl"'lent continued until
1130 hours. The bonba.rdr1.ent was quite indiscriminate, as the Folisl1 Corps,
the New Zealand Corps, tho French EYfPditionary Corrs at Vl'.lnafro anrl. Eighth
Army Headquarters in Venafro were all, turn and turn about, the objects of
this bombardment. In all, the Polish Corps lost 3 r1en wounded, the Bighth
Army Headquarters lost 7 men wounded, the French Expeditionary Corps lost 1
officer and 5 men killed and 52 wounded, the New Zealand Corps lost 11 nen
killed, 2 offj cers killed and ?.4 mi:in wounded.
l
I
\
\
l
General Juin turned in a separate report for Ue French vfr•ich can not be
entirely reconciled wj th tho Air Support Control report. According to General Juin, on the 15th the first bar.bing of the :F'rencb occurred at 1000 when
one or two Fortresses dropped B bombs on Macchia d 1 Isornia, causini; no casualties, and tvrelve hombs were dropped on Vemtfro and vicinity, two of wt1ich fell
on the 1-1 ills overlooking the cor:1nand post and ten on the town itself. The
Venafro bor,,bing caused two sold51;r and q1Jite r-,. few civilian casualties. At
1020 one or tno Fortresses drorred about thirty bombs in the J'ozzillj_ area,
killing 4 French, including a battalion cormander, and woundJ ng 34, includj ng
two officers. At 1125 about 15 Fortresses bonbed the Volturno valley from
Macchia d I Isernia to a point just south of Ven~fro, re,sul ting j n one French
soldier killed and eight wounded. The total casualties come to~ killed, including one officer, and 52 wounded, including two officers. GonerF,1 Juin also
reported that at Eighth Army Advance CF 10 British 1vere killed and the losses
among the civilians at Vena.fro are esttnated at 40 killed and 100 wounded.
(The General adds a footnote to his report that on the 16th of March six New
Zealand fighter honbers bombed and strafed tl1e Frencl1 at Belvedere and dropped
leaflets inviting the Germans to surrender.)
*
*
*
FRESENZANO--MARCH 16, 19/i/4--Today the rrincipal subject of interest Y1as the
rrog-ress of the attack on Cassino. General Clark received frequent bulletins
throughout the day, and in the afternoon nont by j~ep to Sradger 1 s OP where he
checked for h·iMsolf tho gains being nade. Irisonr,rs of war indicated that tbe
bonbardri.o:nt had caused considerable casualties c.nong the Gernans. One difficulty arose througl, the trouble the attackers had in rJ'etting tanks across borb
cratc~rs and throup;h the ruhblo filled streets of the town. One crater had to
be bridged by engineers before it could be crossed. Dt:irjng tho course of the
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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Clark, Mark W. Diaries
Subject
The topic of the resource
Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984.
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns.
United States—History, Military—20th century.
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950.
Publisher
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The Citadel Archives & Museum
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Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
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CP Clark
Relation
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Mark W. Clark Collection
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application/pdf
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English
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Text
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Mark W. Clark Diary, February 23 - March 15, 1944
Subject
The topic of the resource
Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns
United States—History, Military—20th century
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from February 23-March 15, 1944.
Source
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CP Clark
Publisher
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The Citadel Archives and Museum
Date
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1944
Rights
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Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
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English
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1569
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Text
lY9
back to his coMP1and post Pt Presenzano, arriving th0re at 1650 ..
G8neral Clark this evening cabled General Truscott as follows: RN 7961.
"Attack on Cassino took pl2ce today vrit}, all out air effort from 0830 to noon
and heavy fighter bonher effort this afternoon. Bonb:i ng appeared to be effective aJ.though tanks hwe not been abl"o to rass through tmm yet because of
debris. Attack to take Monastery Hill will he mode tonight. Progress generally satisfactor7 although slower than ant:icipated. TAC R spotted heavy
rioter novenents from Frosinone area tovmrd Cassino late this afternoon. 19th
is earliest date for your attack. fiill k8ep you advised. 11
The Air Support Control Sectfon reported today on the bombing of our
troops by our own planes. Their report may be sUTir:1arized as follows:
On the 15th the first bonbs dropped on Allied troops on the Cassino
front fell on 0930 hours, and this "friendly11 bombPrdl"'lent continued until
1130 hours. The bonba.rdr1.ent was quite indiscriminate, as the Folisl1 Corps,
the New Zealand Corps, tho French EYfPditionary Corrs at Vl'.lnafro anrl. Eighth
Army Headquarters in Venafro were all, turn and turn about, the objects of
this bombardment. In all, the Polish Corps lost 3 r1en wounded, the Bighth
Army Headquarters lost 7 men wounded, the French Expeditionary Corps lost 1
officer and 5 men killed and 52 wounded, the New Zealand Corps lost 11 nen
killed, 2 offj cers killed and ?.4 mi:in wounded.
l
I
\
\
l
General Juin turned in a separate report for Ue French vfr•ich can not be
entirely reconciled wj th tho Air Support Control report. According to General Juin, on the 15th the first bar.bing of the :F'rencb occurred at 1000 when
one or two Fortresses dropped B bombs on Macchia d 1 Isornia, causini; no casualties, and tvrelve hombs were dropped on Vemtfro and vicinity, two of wt1ich fell
on the 1-1 ills overlooking the cor:1nand post and ten on the town itself. The
Venafro bor,,bing caused two sold51;r and q1Jite r-,. few civilian casualties. At
1020 one or tno Fortresses drorred about thirty bombs in the J'ozzillj_ area,
killing 4 French, including a battalion cormander, and woundJ ng 34, includj ng
two officers. At 1125 about 15 Fortresses bonbed the Volturno valley from
Macchia d I Isernia to a point just south of Ven~fro, re,sul ting j n one French
soldier killed and eight wounded. The total casualties come to~ killed, including one officer, and 52 wounded, including two officers. GonerF,1 Juin also
reported that at Eighth Army Advance CF 10 British 1vere killed and the losses
among the civilians at Vena.fro are esttnated at 40 killed and 100 wounded.
(The General adds a footnote to his report that on the 16th of March six New
Zealand fighter honbers bombed and strafed tl1e Frencl1 at Belvedere and dropped
leaflets inviting the Germans to surrender.)
*
*
*
FRESENZANO--MARCH 16, 19/i/4--Today the rrincipal subject of interest Y1as the
rrog-ress of the attack on Cassino. General Clark received frequent bulletins
throughout the day, and in the afternoon nont by j~ep to Sradger 1 s OP where he
checked for h·iMsolf tho gains being nade. Irisonr,rs of war indicated that tbe
bonbardri.o:nt had caused considerable casualties c.nong the Gernans. One difficulty arose througl, the trouble the attackers had in rJ'etting tanks across borb
cratc~rs and throup;h the ruhblo filled streets of the town. One crater had to
be bridged by engineers before it could be crossed. Dt:irjng tho course of the
�~~~~;~~~.~~6
.:~~~ f=\.ct- ~d°q-
~~·r.
~~·-
day, Hill 193 continued in our possession and a relatively sr-a.11 pocket of enemy
resistance remained at the southwest corner of Cassino .
The unfortunate bor,Mng nistakes continued today. Air Support Control re ports that at lL,15 and 1445 hours on the Belvedere and Belr10nte rol'.ds Allied
fighter bonb,.,rs killed 2 and wounded 12 French soldiers . At 1505 hours , be tween San EliP and Cervaro, the Frcncr' sustained another attack by P-40 1 s, but
no report of casualties has be?en received. At 1515 rolll~s 6 B-25 ' s borbed thei
French Expeditionary Corps and the Nev, Zealand Corps in the region of I ortella
and San Micbele, resulting tn th" death of 1 of"'fi_cer l"nd the wounding of 18 enlisted nen o-r the New Zealand Corps.
The aircraft engaged in these r,istaken bonbings yesterday and today i:rere
of :>any rliff erent types . Yesterday they were reported to be B-17 1 s arid B-24 1 s .
Today fighter bombers, P-40 1 s and B-25 1 s were reported to hove caused the damrge.
Today a messHge fron Gen3rr.l Truscott j_ndic: tcd that three companies of
the Y1ng 1 s own Yorkshire Light Infantry had been captured by the Gerl"'ans, rnd
Gonerr.l Clar1r, concerned lest this have sorsc effect on Gener11l Truscott I s attack,
sent him the following cable : RN 5534 . "Advise immodietely ,.-rhether or not you
plan to Pttack on 19th11 •
0
The follow5ng cablo was received fron General Alexander: RN CGS 289 . 11 CINC
considers it ~10st important to take advantage of' the cneny 1 s preoccupation with
the attack of new Zealand Corps to lrrnnch the attack from Anzio bridgehead to recover the ground lost in the Carroceto area , plans for which CINC unclerstands
have now been fully prepared . Attack hy VI Corrs will therefore be launched at
earliest possible date . flease report :'.:'or inforrnPtion of CJHC the general rlan
of attack and tl1e date on which jt is rroposed to launch it ."
Gerno;ral Clark replied to the above as follows : RN 6538 . "Detailed rlans
for attack toward Carroceto were O);.-plaJned to Brigmlier Mani'ering this afternoon . This attack scheduled for Marer 19th and will require extra heavy atr
effort on r1arch 18th and JQth. I may n,~cd your assista.nce in getting sor .e strategic 17issions on t}10se days. 11
0
Gen0ral Freyburg directed a r~essage to Gencrel Snvillc congratulatjng him
on the aj_r effort on Ce.ssino, but General Clark d~rected Gener;:,l Gruenther to
hold this and not allow the original to get out .
Other tmportant nessagcs of the day are as follo·.rs :
F'Arsonal Truscott to Chirk. RN 1116. 11 Air attack 0700A - 16 plPn~s . Our
AA report four probables, minor da1,age . Unfort1mately fjgl1ters hecld back hy
ground hRze did not arrj_ve until just aft0r attack. I would apprecfote being
'kept :infornod on Cassino action . First word received here your personal OU
7961 at 213gA . AT" altering r;y plan slightly to r.i~et changing situetion. Will
be reacbr to go when you say the ·vord . rr
Fror, FLJIJ'lBO to Fiftl- Army. RN CAO 23371. 11 Following pcrsoY1al and secret
fror Frj_ne Min~ ster to Gennral Alexa.nder. Fray congratulate all at work et
brjdgchead on record fif;Ure cl:i.scharge at Anz5.o 10 Harch. 11
�I ':) l
From VI Corps to Fifth Arny. Rr,J 1128 . nMap reference Italy 1 : 25 ,ooo.
Attack by 1st Div. night 1/+ March to se izc FOSSO DI C,~RANTE and FOSSO DI
FUl\lTOHI (8S6298) as lim"! of rleparture failed with loss of J compenies . Owing
to incroaserl Gernan ground organi zation and strength , partjcult'rly along
ANZIO road , I do not believe original mhrnion contcr:1plated for 1st Div . is
within its capabilities . I have therefore r".odified 'r'\Y rlan for attack as
follows: D- Day, an attac:V by /+5th Div . and 1st Div . to seize the line 914320 ,
904320 , 891318 , jnclusive to 45th Div., 890298 M 854300 to the ':Test the 5t h
,
Divis i on will sc:izo the streal"' line to its ,junction at 815311; D plus 1 , 45t h
Div. t o extemd the line to the line 9?0333 , 915334 , 908330 , 904320 .
11 0n this line I ,'ill rog-.coup to ma1'::J~ 1 conbat team avaifable to attack
wJ t h Harnon to capture l'!J'tCCFIA DEL CASALS (895345) and tr> n C/l.JUWCETO area. , assist ('!d by 45th Div . and perhaps 1 brigade e:roup , 5th Div. I will forward de tai l ed plans later . I anticipate that regrouping "fill require 2 days , but I
do not see how sufficient strength can be T'1nde avail able ot}1erwise . I will
be prepared to use Harmon eRrlier in tho nvent of unexpe cted success . Part
this plan nec essit ates slight nodification in air plan. I will notify Brann
of req1J.irer•mts ,Jj thout delay.
nr hope your CASSINO attack is making progress .
except your radio last night . 11
I lw:110 heard nothing
Personal Clark to Truscott . RN 6536 . "Dat e for your att a ck is March 19th.
Extr a heavy air effort will bo r,rovidcd on March 18th as well as 19th. Confirm that your attac k will be riade on 19th . 11
"---✓
Personal Clark t o Tr us cott. RN 6537 . "Progr ess in Cassino area today has
been s l ow . Tanks are havi n g great diff i cu l ty gettjng througl, c:ity • . Hi l l 435
capt ured . At tack on Monastery Hill will be rosur:i.ed t onight . 11
'rhe A riy Co:"nr,.nder rec~_ ved the f'ollovdne; letter fron Lt . Gen. HPrdjng ,
r
d
General Alexander ' s Chief of Staff , on the subject of "Air Bol"bard:r;ent of Land
0b,iectives rreparatory to Assault. 11
"1. Without vraitjng for detaJ.l~d reports , it '!ms c lear frof'l ,;,h/'1t could be
seen nf the op"rations in the CASSPrn Brer-i on 15 r,~arch thnt bor:;barc'lnent by heavy
and nediur1 bonbers of land ob,i!"lctivcs rreparr,tory to n ssault by land forces offers conslrl ,~rable scop,n, for the f'uture .
11 2 .
J t is also cle2r tho t son"' aircraft had difficulty -in recognis:i ng the
target as n nUJ"'ber of' bonbs vrere rlrorred :inside th~ bo,.,,bline , Pno son~ 2t 2 consider1:1 ble r•istance fror~ t},,., farget . F'ror1 thl"l roint of view of' th~ lanc1 f'orces,
it :is realised th11t sor1c r:istakes are bounc1 to occur and thnt rjslz js accepted .
At tre sar,e tir,e it js obviously riost :irirortant fror1 f'"Very point of view to ensure that rwerv l"Jffort ano device is l"1ade use of' to obviate suer l"1istBkes in
fut1rre . The C• in- C considers thr1t land forces can be of' c1efinite assistnnc(;) to
the t>ir rorces in assistinP" thl'ln to f'ind thl')ir targets . Arti ficial L<rnd r<orks
and 1 i ~ht sigrw ls hPve heen snccessfully 11s""d for this purrose on occc1 sions in
th"' p=:st , ond. tr!"! use of a. row of colour~d searchlip;hts set out in som~ rrearrrnged
r~lntionshi:r to thl") target has bMn suggested for an or~ration o:f' th~ tyre carried
out on 1 S Mrirch.
L .,____
l!
3•
'T'h~ C-in-C would be G:lrd to 1"now i:1hrt Armfos a11d ~'!ATAF think on t}, is
J
�question, f'nd on rny other roints connected with coor~ration between ti,_,, tvrn
servj ces in s1ich orerations , that nrise out of the attac1{ on CA.3SPJ0. Will
you rl~ase for,:roro your vjl'lws as soon rs ro:-;sible. .After r~cc 1 rt of all rerli~s it is rroposed to hold a "1eeting to c'H scuss all roints rut forward. 11
*
*
*
fR.ESE"JZANO- - rTARCF 17, 1944--Th~ rrogr~ss of' th'> rittack on Cassino contj nued
ton1:1y ns t}1e ne1:1 Zealand Corrs rushed on through th~ to·rm. ,/\ft~r an ~arly
rornjng conf")r,~nc~ ",it:b his CMef rf' Stoff , G-3 and G-2, General Clark re ccj Ve'!<:' f1aj or n-rny, Acting Arny Judge Advoca tc , nho rcviewod ,.,.j th G"'n""ral
Clark 25 court 1"1artj_al cases.
Jhortly hefor~ noon G"'n~rals Cannon W"rl I l'lT"'nitzcr arrived for a conferem ce zrjtr Generf11 Clark rbout the ai:r situation, and a f"w T'linutes late?r
Cren"'ral Mason-MacFBrlane and Colonel '}elson !l!rntfort , his Arericen personal
staff of'ficer, nrr~ved . G":n~ral Cl2r1 '.'lnt,,rtairnd ell tr,-, v~sitjr:g officers
for 1uncheon. Gen"lrEl ftason-Mac1"arlane spoke cf sonc of tr,e er-barrassY:ents
ar5 sjng cut of t'is r""-culiar position. Honinally, th~ nrrd.stice vritl--i Italy
was ..,nde by Russia , Engltmrt and the Unitl']d States together, and , accord1ngly,
as I res-i de11t of' th" Allied Control Corriission , Gen~ral Mason-Mac:F'arlane
acted for nll thr~e countr-i!"!s . Hcw,ever, he had just been scooped by the
Russians v1ho had ""ade Rrrang"'·rients to exchange diplor,•atic representA.tion with
tJ~e [;overnment of Yinr '\Tittorio El"'Mtmu~le wjt}1out letting General MasonMacFPrlane in on the transaction at all until it h~_d becor:e a fait accor,rlL
r
Genl"!ral Clarl<: d:i ctated the following naterial for -1nclusion in his diary:
The r.,attl~ of Cassino is progressing slowl)r.
plans are not l:~:eping up to hj_s tiJ11e sc},ed11le .
Freyburg ' s enthusiastic
11
nr witnflssed t11e bor'bardr ent of' Cnssino in coripany vdth Gl"!nerals Eek~r ,
Devers, Cannon and oth,~r Aj_r Corrs orf-icials. I vrould say t}1at apyroxJn8tely
hp,lf of th,-, boT"bs rlid not fj nd the target area. Ferheps 60<:s were in t}1 A prescrjbed area . The oth~r 40°~ fell in tb") f'lats w:i tr1 no damage , in T"IY opinion,
to th, eneny. Many bor"bs, on different occasions 8nr'l :in d:ifferent rl;:,ces,
vrere dropped on our troops . Rorbardm~nt of cur own troops fron Isernia
throui:;h 1J~nafro e.nd-~all c1round Cervaro took :rlace with casualti"s 11.prroxirr:atfo_-:,; 75 1~:illed rmn around 250 r,mmded . This is appalling rnd can be attributed only to roor trainjng end j nwleqmttt"'! briefini:; of crl"!ws. It was a beautiful day, bo!"'b:ing taking rlace fron low altitudes wHh Mount Cairo And Cassino well defim•d . J can not rossi bly un,:'1~rstrnd J-1ovr th~se errors occurred .
It hR.s brought forth v:igorous rrotests frorct th" French and oth"lr Headquarters
and created a lack of' confj_dence jn our air ar1ong mLr i'ro,1t line troors .
0
nr hev'-" rt'!pe2-tedly told Ti'reyburg frorr: his :incertion of this rlan that .\
a~rial ho~bardn,,.,nt e lone n"ver hR.s and never v·ill drive a deterr.1j ned · enerw
fror1 his rosition. Cessino has agein rroven this tJ-,eory, for, altrough no
doubt h11.!8VY casuslties 1"Iere inflfoted upon the ene1"1y in Cassino , sufficient I
have rl'?rndn~d to hold ur our advance and cause severe fighting in ~e town
for th!'! past two days .
CJ
~ .~1~(-~
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'
~ (: o.,a...-1.,v1A.i) / ~ QJ-"\ " ,t.. ~,~...L"{~ ~ A.HrY"'-ir'"":.~
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�l53
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"Freyburg ' s rrindl·i ri.r; o-r t1'c ~ris 1ing attacl• rps hr--eri. cbl"'re cterized by indecision nnd lacl· of r,ggress::lven"'ss. Fis rlnri t o have t he Indians attack
fror. TTill 503 ·dth te.n1rs has !"'ot ,...,r>t,..rialized , due, I 1--i~ljev~, to objections
on tbt"! rR.rt of G,..n~ral G:<1.llovray, the Indian Division Co,...,.,.,anrler. In ry conv,..rsat1o11s ,-,; th the l:=itter , I ,-stfr1ptl'} bir, to bl'l a r"'fel1tist . Every ti"'le he
sees ri~ he er.1rr;asizes th~ seriousness o+' tb.. +"ighting . I f'f"el, and told
r:>reyburg last ni~ht and ngain this riorninr;, that it is essential t1'at he attack thl'l riomistery sir,ultaneously from Hill 5q3 and Hill 435 vrith the Indians .
Fe js not ~nclin~d to do it .
1
"The British cr,..,rP ct,..ristic of } oldj "11" ob,i,..ctives gaj n~d Vl!'Jry lightly ras
again coT"'e to tre +'ront . I11. th"' case of ~Till 165 just west of Cassino , this
was countl'lrattacked by the Gr-,rJ"'ans last nigh~ and wr('!sted frol"'l British con trol. ()rders J,,av, been issul'ld to re-tPk'°' it , b11t tris slovrs ur the yro:;ress .
1
Yesterdnv, not bei'l'lg ::irile to r-et any accurllte inf'orp,rtion as to th~
state of affn.::.rs at th!'! hridr,c over tr~ Rarido on Fi 1s}111u1y //6 , I f"'::rsonaJ.ly
'Vent to thnt ro:i.nt and f'ound tr,-,t only o'l'le tank rad gotten across , ,-;rer'"las
rereated reports inr1 4 cated thr~"!, a11d Frevburg ad told Me two squPdrons .
Th" brid~e wa 9 unr1"'r hel:'V:V ,.,ortn.r f'ire . I th"ln rmnt to see Freyburg P gain
nnd rece-i v~rl tre sitw,tion fron him. I snv,r,estec1 to hir, t're use of Hi.r,hway
//6 to riove th"' 78th Divisirrn across by co,..,bnt ten1;1 to r:et riore in-rantry ~ nto
the soutr . Fe did 'l'lot lik,.. tris idea . T exrressed to hin r,y dj:,arroint,..,"lnt
jn J-d.s not n.ttackinr with tc-nks enc1 infantry fron y,3 in coorrlinf'tion with
th~ Incl.fans I attn ck fror, Hcmgman I s Fill. He t0lc1 ne he intenr1ed to rip lre tbe
tanlr nttac1(', and I ,mr1erstoocl infrmtrv, +'roT'I 5q3 . Last nir,},t, in trlking
with G~neral Gru""nth~r , he contradicted himself . : rrd Grul"'nth.,r rhon~ him
back and tel l hin of r,,y disaprointr~nt in not attr-icking .. rom both directio11s .
11
11 Todn:v
I bv~ tal1~ed "~th G"'n~rn l F,,.l"Jyburg on ri~my occasions . Arrrrent1:,r G!"lneral Gallo- •f1y, the I'1dian Division Cor""ander , docs not v•nnt to Attack
v:i.th J,,is +'ive batt2Uons froM 503 .n.nd th righ c;:round northeast of tlie r1onas tery. T told Freyburg th~ tanks to be errloyed were t t"~rican , and h~ could
los~ th"'"' $.l l and I noulrl replace ther1 within ?L,.. hours . I sent BrRnn to see
rim . It is now lf->15, Pnd I hf"ve talked vdth hilll nany tjr-,")s sine~ , and he
sti11 js opyosed to an attack fron th~ north . He },ores to reinforce tre Indjnns on Eangrnan 1 s Hill tonigrt Pnd nttack towarc1 s th~ Monast"3ry. Durjng the
day ,.,e MOVed t1=m1':s And -tn..,antry into the railroad station soutr of Cassino .
\
If we can clear tl-•~ srorad:ic resistance out of t ,~ town tr"! situ1"ltion will
4 r.irrove raridl 'T .
1
r
"Due to G--neral Ale'-Trnier 1 s cHrl'l c t rleaHn,.,. "Tith Freyhurg and tre fact
thnt tM s is an all- British show, J an rf'luctant to e;ive a direct order to
Freyhur£s to put the- 78th I'i vision over Route /16 and to attack fror, t}1a north
fror 5q3, b")cau se he h::is rr,pMtedly ~ndicn t ec1 thrt h, is orrosed to these
rlans . If ht'! were an Arierican Cor ps Cor~mander with Arierican troops I would
have no hesitancy in P"iv~ng such an orrler . I have just now t~ler-hon•d to
Gt•n1eral Al exander , 11hom T noulr1 nl"!Ver ;:ro to on snch
r ovc if it ,•rere not
for th~ deHcate ~nt,,.rnntional relations involv"'!d here . I exrlnined the
co,.,,rlete s:itm1tion Pncl ,..,,y v 4 "':WS anc1 told r jr, ::: would not issue a dj_rcct order contrar;~ to t.re vie rn of' th~ British Corps a'l'ld Division Co,...,!""Pnders . 1-+e
quit e agreeci and did not in any way seen excited Aho11t the siturtion .
O
0
l
�l5Y
"As previously rerortecl in tbl diary, Al\'lxander directed ne again to attack
in the br i dg~head to tc1.ke ndvPntage of the conf'nsion in the bridgehead Prea .
This had al;eady heen arrang"d for, but toda:r ! ,~et new word fron Truscott that
he must alter his rlPns (as indfoat c,d in cable ;/1128 , quoted in yesterday ' s
diary) . I have passed th:is word on to G~neral Alexandl":r, cs it ne.y nlter the
date of the attack .
11 I hPve hrid quit"! a conference with Generals Cannon and L,~mnitzer toda,y.
Cannon nnd. I are in conplete accord with the use of afr to support ground
troops . rrruscott has ask"\d f'or a r:lrl:iculous ar1ount of support , totP lling sone
80 groups if Pll targets are cov"lred . :r have decided , in accordance vrith the
air CToup , that no strategic should be nscd in sup:rort of ':l'ruscott 1 s lir,itcd
objective attack; that it can b"! used r"ucri better on strategic nissions but
thrit 1•re will use all the XII Air Su:rrort , reinforc"d by the Dest'lrt Air Force
and s 1 1.ch J110d:l.um hol"1b~rs as we have suitable targets for . This will probably
Fllt -,r rrruscott I s recoT'lri.endation for an attack, although Alexander agrees with
ne completely, Pnd I Rr1 s1.ire v,ill require that we put it on .
J
11 The Air Corps are quite upset vrith the rl')sults of their boribing our own
troops . f'uring the rast 48 hours l:mndreds of bonbs on at least seven different 1
oc casions have been crorped i.n our own areas with rat1'c-r heavy losses . General ~
Ealrer is takinr; drastic action to fiY th~ resronsibility. , . tt::".,
·~- ~~
nsone decision must soon be nade b:r th~ Co,,,,b~ ned C!-1,:i ef s or. Staff as to ~
A.~,JVIL for it will soon begin to take air sup:rort fror, this critical si tuntion .
The lack of coorcljnation and hesitancy on the rart of the hir;h cor"land running
t},j s war is dis graceful in ro;r opinion.
o1 pivv-~
"The capability of 0lernents of VI Corps to attack beinr; doubtful, Gl;lneral
Glarlc cabled General Truscott tnrice to(fay , RN 5534 r-md RH 5537, in an effort
to deternine wh,ther or not rlans wer~ r;o:ing ph•1r-,d for the r ttack on tbe 19th as
h~rctofore schednled . n
0
:rmportant nessages of t he day are ;:,s f'ollows :
Persorn,l Clrrk to Truscott .
you plan to attack on 19th . "
R"~ 5534 .
flAdv!sc :i.r1M,~diately yrhether or not
P~rsonal Clnrl- to Truscott . RN 553'7 . "In vi,,.w of vour 11?8 it is not
clear ,,}1,..thA:r or not you "TilJ be nhlr, to attac)r March 19th . Arvise 5rnedi ntely."
r~rsonal Clar1r to Truscott . Rl'T 5570 . 11 Detailed yl1=ms Pre being rr~rared
+>or er1rlor,.ent of f:i~rt~r bor·bers , lir;ht bonbers Pnd ~1l"diur1s in surrort of your
D- 1 9ffort starting on March ].'1th . TITo strategic P ir '"'ill be a.wdlable for support of your Pttack . Hor vrill 5t be possible :in future to secure E:3trat Air
Force for close support ~xcer,t in <'.;ri'lP.t !'!ner~"!ncy. 11
Personal Truscott to Clark . R~.r 1134. "Ref•~renc,:,, '::SD 536 . I ,·,ill nttack
19 H0rch . Since r-dr sur,..r:5-orHv is the s.;n::;l"' factor thA.t justjfies my attack,
I ,·rill require th~ P ir r-; f'fort on 18 r11arch , continuing during attack . 'Sxtr a
l,eavv air e:f'fort requfr~d Mar ch 18 , 19 and 20. After regrouping, a p~riod of
probably 2 days, extra. heavy A.ir ef for t will proba bl y be required for a n additional 2 days . There is no change in air plan for D l"linus 1 day. Corr ections
�I ::>5
for a5r plan D and D plus 1 by radjo tooay.
"Am sorry n.hout slO''l rrop:ress of CASSI'TO attack. Hop"! yon are not expecti n[; r,y attnc1: to r Pfect s.; t1..wtion tl "re. I do not believ~ 1t can J-in.ve
P."'lY ef'fect on tJ-,P.t ;;i tuction.
11
Detail!"Jd rhirs to you b;,r couri~r today. 11
F.<?rsonnl "'ruscott to Clark. RTJ 1136. "In rerl;r to your 5537, I will be
able to attack 19 J'Prch. My 11?8 described chang~ jn plPn whicli A rfMts Briti.sh objectives only.
feath1'1r report r~r"' indicates detcriorati..nG weather
tomorrovr. Air sureriorit;r single factor tret justi.fies riy attac1r . I will
attack if weath~r r,ri•its a:i.r on D-1 and!) days. 11
*
*
*
FlESF: 1 TZANO--MARCH lP:, 104/~--Th~ tvm cntstanding fePtures of t},e day · "'re tr,.
conti.nuance or the rittl".c 1e:: on Cassi.no r:nd tre oecision by th'-'l Arr:;y Cor ~;flnrcr
to def ,r ,mtjl furtr r :rot:i ce th(~ rro.i cterl attnck by VI Corrs in tre br5clgeh"Jad .
0
Th" P..ttack on Cassino continu~c1 slo" l y, rs rocY.l"\t"' cf' G0rrn,ins in and
ri.round th"J to,m rut up desyernte redsta-1ce. Hil11ri3, to tl-,e northvre:-;t of
tl ~ to' ;-n a few G_,,rnans cont1 nu~d to holrl c ff cur troops. G"'n,:,rfl 1 Clr>r 10 in
tr,.. r-orn-:nrt ,~l"mt hy j<')er to tre 'Tevr Zenhnd Corrs Heaclqmrtcr::: and th<'lnce to
U•e 'Tew Zl'\Pland Corps ohsnrvation rost, wh"'r~ rl"! ''TP.s abl~ to vi~w the Cassino hPttle. Th .. r.ionnst ,r:.r i'l still h""ld by the Ger,,,rns. Thfo nfternoon an
n.ttenr+: rms r-:ar 1e to r~-surrly sone o-r th(' Indj ans on tl-,.. slop~s A.bove Cassino b;r air, RS y,Pc1:inr RM'7Unition, food n.nd -r:rt"'r ur tr,,.. l1illsjcL unrler fire
was rroving inross1ble. The drop \''as only rrrtil'll;r 3uccessful, r-s tre
green snok. signa 7 s 11Mcr the Ind~l'nrl should hew, d:i SJ lt1.yed to mprJr tr" srot
for the clrop "rere lat":'. Th~ 1'lind ' cnrrie-d !"'rn:r of' the loeds av;py fro1"1 the
trcors for whon th("Jy •mre int"'1nred, nnrl, jn son~ --'nstnnces, l~t th~m fall
aT'long tre G"rnnns .
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In tJ,~ l Ate Pfternoon, General ClPr'k flew by cub rlPne t0 the rond at
Caserta Pnd "ent by cA.r to tl1c 3Atb General Fos:r: t11 l vbere h~ took to Lt.
Col. T'offitt, Executive Q+'fjcer of th,! Crdnance 0ection, wro was ill 'vith
fn"!U1"10nia, TI"''-'1 S thnt 1,,, },,,,c1 been rror-oted to tl--i~ rpn1r of Colonel. Gen~rc1l
Clar,,. bnd y,rystin,rdriy ca.bled to ~i.AT0FSA n~ws o 0 the Colonel I s desrerate conditi.on and reCO!"'r>Cnded V1at l-1 ~ be rror-ioted as it r-i.r;rt ')nCOUt'rJfsC rim. 'fovrn of
th(" rronotion arriv~d tris r·orning. Gen~ral Clarlr Pound Colonel 1 1of'f'itt with
a H gr teN:rereture and E:t t-im"1s c1elirious, but the siclr man vms able to greet
th" Army Cnr"'!ander and was delighted -rith the n•,vrs. Unharrily, dnring the
evening '"lord ··ms rece-ived thPt Colo>1el r1offitt hacl died .
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G"'n"lrnl c1nr1.r, on :bis return .c>ron t!:is trir, "'1"!t A grour of riiHfory Pttac}-,es to tre Frencrl Ccr,ni ttee of 'rational Li bnrrtion Gov~rnri.•mt mho ,·,ere
tourino- the front, accoT1panied by two Frencb of'ficers . Thes'"! ,·,ere: Colo 1el
Bula.ndr, Gzecho•3lovakia; Colon0l Colocoetronis, Greece; Lt. Col. F,,,,sen,
Jorvra;v; Lt . Col. Forrret, C2nada; :::.,t. Col. Deslo~es, Canada; 1 '.r j. 'lziP.sPno ski,
Joland; ~hj. ~onjoie, n,~lr;ium, 1 'eJ. CPyo, rcru; 1 ~nj. A1lcrinnr1 and Ca.rtf,in d"'Croix, Fr~nch accor-ip:inyin1; of'f-i cers.
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�l Sfo
General Alexnnc1cr arrived at Gen"lral Clark's cor'1nand rost in the late afternoon, rmd GenArol Ch,rk read to h5r, r~rsonally UH': following cable v'hich he
ha.d just drafted for t..:i isp=itch to the CPJC: "Truscott , }1as radioed "'~ durj ng
the past 48 hours tbat air sup,":riority vras the single factor that justified
his attack, thPt he 1·ms forcod to change l1is attaclc plen because the rission
assj ~ned the 1st British Division vras not ·ritrin its carability, anc1 that he
did not f'eel that an attB ck in the bridrshcad vroulc'l contribute tow2rds the
attac1c in +,he GP ssino area . After receiving this inforl7P.tion, togeth,,.,,r vd th
anoth0r report :'ro"'l m7 senior Fifth .A.rr,y representative in the bridgehead that
scir e cor,1r,am1ers and staff o.c>fic'."rs of VI Corps ,,_,ere not rappy about the attack,
I sent Gen'3ri:tl Brann, ny G-3, this r,orning to cJjscuss the attack with Truscott.
Truscott rocor -r1ends cancellation of th~ rrorosed li1:1it".'!d objective c1ttack
based on the follo1rring 1r.nown f11cts: (a) The attacl' will noct aprro~"irately
equal eneny str~ngtr in well rrcrared ros:i tions, a'igmented by mines and vrire
(b) Thrat ~neny artillPr:r is appro"'.:i1;1atcly equal to th:cit of the VI Corps with
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superj or observation ( c) That tho anount of air availahle fror the XII Air
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Support Cor1r.Pnd , a 1 1gnented only by certain nediun bo,.,1bcrs is not sufficient
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to create thei overwheln1ing air support he bcJJ,w0s necessary for the success
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of this attack (d) '7ithout such an ov"1r :rhelning air Attack the odds Pre against
a successful acconplishr1ent of the planned attack (o) That trc attack TTould
be extremely costly in personnel and r,ight r-:Jsult in a suitDble opportunity for
an enemy count~r offensiv~ . In this connection losses in British troops can
not bn 1:1ad~ ,g;ood (f) After thf') rroposed l:imit""'d objective bas been reached,
ener1y :3ffecVve fire can still be yleced throughout the entire brid.-i;ebead.
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11 I concur in Truscott 1 s co>1clu.-,ions.
::r Fould }1ave cance 7~
led the attack
irnediat':lly had it not been for th~ :instructions contained in your radio CGS
2~9. I, tJ,3refor"l, recoro"~!"lnd th?t the attB ck scheduled f'or to:norrovr b"" Jostroned until aft<:;r t0e 2rriw1l of th~ 34th Division Pnd a re-study of the enemy
situation at thPt timJ. n
General Clrrv dictrct"'.!d the follo-rrinr; not?.s for inclusion -in }7iS diary:
"'Sl'l,rly =orning r"lrorts f'ror 1 Freyburg indicated that little or no rrogress
was hein"' n,de . In fact, slt,lwtion 0f Indian battalion on Fangr1an I s Fill
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secried rr'3CRrious clue to lack of supply. I ,·1,:mt forwBrd to see Freyhurg and
again 11rFscd 1--iin to "lrrploy !"'ore troops in GPssino. re w;:is cor1i:ng to the decision at that ti"1A to rut the 5th Brigade ovr,r Route !/6 into t},'" town. I urged
haste but have little assurance that speed will be usep_. I Pgein pointed out
the d~sirability of pushing a brjgade of the 78th Division over the railroad
bridge past th2 r,ilroad stAtion ov~r the Gari River to get a briilg"'head to
perr;it tanks to follow . I tl~ink I r-!ade sop~ progress along t:-;ese lin'3s . Tliscus.sed w:i.th General Gallo Nay, Con:"!Bnding Q,~neral of the Indian Division, tho
use of t11nks fron CPiro 2593. He hopes to do th0t first thing in the rmrning .
Arranp;9d, at Ga.110,-:ay' s insistance and Freyburg 1 s request, tc, dror suprlics by
planes on Hangnan 1 s Hill Uis afternoon. Frcyburg is not P.ggressive; is ponderous a:rd slow . I net Alexanc'lcr on "'Y ',ray bac 1{, revievred tbe situetion with
hirr, told bim of riy diffj culty in ordering a Hew Zealand Connander to er;rploy
British troops in a nanner he did not like and urged Alexander, when reapproved of' r,y sugg0stions, to rrod Fre7burg a little into sone ACM on. He said
he would do so and was quite disP.ppointed at th: slowness of his a.ction.
Alexander feels as :::: do thPt tJ-,c ,many is waiting to see ..,}-,pt, rre do before
counterattackinr; or rulling back . Vii th r~gc1rd to thP- Ptt8 ck torriorrow in the
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�bri,1(-;ehead for a lir-dted ob,i~cti ve, I rointed out to Alexander, who is riost
pnxious thet tbis attacl· take rlPce, that it had certain drawbe.cks as follows: (a) It nould not talre any fire of'f of tho rear ereas or the rort
(b) It was ae;a in:~t a strongly defended rosi tfon ·;ri th 11.t least equal Gcrnan
tr0ors orrosinG; us (c) The G'}rr an had sll the observation, 1111.d we attacked
over cren terrain (d) The casualties we r'if;ht suffer would be quite a sctbacl< to us in vfow of the difficulty of securing British rcinforcem~nts,
and we can ill afford to take heavy casualtfos a.t this tir1c . Of course the
advantages nrrJ rolitical, and Alexancer "'."~eels th2t it night offset another
Ger:rian attack . Anoth0r edvantage is thPt v,e do secure a little nor,., fRvorabL~ tGrrain ay,d give ourselves a littl<; ,..,,ore roan, if svccessful , in the
bridgehead. In viPW of '17ruscott 1 s radio ton~ yesterde;r th2t the 1st British Division , due to recent losses, (including thTee conranfos cartured)
was incarable of offensive action and that the only reason he was justified
in naking the attack rms duo to our great air f'lffort . I sent General Brann
to see rj_'TI today to get his real thoughts on th~ subject . As soon as he returns I will decide ,,rh~tl1~r I will rake the attack or recorr1end to Genoral
Alexsnder thPt it hf"J rostroned until the 34th Division ,;ets in. Due to the
inability of the 1st British Division to attnck, it mePns tlwt the Rttack
will he r'1adfl by Anerican troops, wr,jch arrarently the British are rerfectly
willing to do . I must see tb:it "'C r;et targible returns for the nen I en
Hable to expend in this limited effort . Alexander indicRted to nn that he
was :rositive tJ,,at it rmst be done. 11
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Genl"lrri.l Glarl,. this afternoon cabled General Truscott as follows:
"Yoll.r attack for 19th cancellr-id. Will see you soon. 11
RN
'T'hc following cablA was received froP NJ\TC\USA today: RN 66275. 11 Nar
Dr.•n,artr1 ent ('ecision is to retain Ranger battalions. Sep2rE1te action this
l eadquarters will transfer first, third and fourth Ranger Battalions to the
United States with veteran pArsonnnl only (137 enlisted nen and 19 officers
listed your 534 7, r'arcr 10, 1041,) . Transfer non-veteran p~rsonnel of these
battalions to 1st Spccj_al Service Force . n
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FRESENZANO--P1A,.1i.CH 19, 1Q44--This r1orning General Clark left by cub at 0900
for' the beachhead . .Acco.,.1panying hin j_n the second cub was Lt . Col. Draper
of the Artill'"ry Section . The General reacr1Rd t1-1c beac}1 h0ad at ar,rrmdnPtcly
1015A and irm-iediatcly went to GonAral Truscott I s headqur~rters vrhere hr~ conferred with rin about the beacl1hcad situation. He read to Generals Truscott
and F.ve,legh r~rsonally the draft cable to GennrA 1 Alexander, riuoted in yesterday ' s diary, and they botr heartily concurred . Tr,~ Jtrny Corn"'andcr nade
only a short stay at the beachhead , however, and left on 'ii s return trip a
few rij_rmtes rifter l?OO, flrriving Rt the Fifth Arr:y cor.nnnd post at 1315 .
The G·~neral thsn went into conference ,,,~th Gern;rAl Gruenthnr on the ste. tus of the CRssi110 attack . The G~rnons had twice counter-attacked on Hill
1q3 , their attacks hejng cst:iT1a.ted to have been by as rany as 300 ~en . The
Gerrian pocket :In t}1e southwcstGrn corner of the tmm sti.11 contjnues to give
trouble . Two Gernan tanks haVt9 taken up positions j_n "rhrt was the lobby of
the Hotel Continental. By the close of the day a Brj tish tank had 1rnockcd
out one of the Gl"rnan tenlrn, but t'rie otl~0r one continued to fire fron the
�l'.JT"battled lobby. At 1500 General Frcyberg arriv,)d to discuss the difficulties }se was exrerhmcing in his Cassino attack. To add to his m,berrass•,"lnts , an apmmition durap on Route #6, ,:hicr had accidentally taken fire,
began to blow up just as he rassed it on his WAY to tr,e cor·1r1and rost, and
the rest of the afternoon v1as punctuated by the sound of n:xrlodinr, shells .
At 1515 Generals AlexA.nr'1er, Hardj_ng nnd Lormitzer arri vod and joined
G;~nerals Clark, Grucnth,-,r and Freyberg in tho hut in a discussion of the
Cassino situntion 1:p1d "•'hPt shoulc'l ½e done to ridvance the attack tb,,re . The
British officers left with G,rn~ral Lermitzer at about 1700 , end General Cli:irk
left by auto,,,obile for Sorrento wl1ere he dinAd with friends at the Cfficers 1
Rest Center and returned after dinner to his cor1nand rost .
General Gruentrnr sent the following two
he 17as f'..'t the beacrihead :
RN 6562.
hill 165. 11
CP bles
to G!-'3neral Clrrk nM.le
"Attack fron HanP,nan I s Hill has not started yl'lt.
Ener'y holds
R~J 6563. HGr'lncral r'reyburg has ash~d to cone and see you tris efternoon
to discuss present attack."
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FRBSENZAl'JO--rnJIRCH :?O, 1944--This :morninr.; the funornl of Colonel Moffitt, Bxecutive Officer of the Ordrn=nce Section, wAs held in th~ Aneric:m military cenet~r~r in Naples. As General Clark had conferences scheduled whic0 could not
be :rostpon8d, lie directed Lt. Col. SutherJPnd to r~present him at the funerPl.
This was done, :=ind a lari;;e wre!"th wr:>s plAced on the p;rPve from GemerPl Clark.
At llOO Generel Clark received a call from General Saville, Comrnnding
At this conference it wfls a gr Md thi-i t the XII Air
Support Col"w1and couJ.d rlevotA itself to destroyinR ene"l;T comr1unicAtions, srive
for 11n occasiona 1 mmber of sorties ( supposed to be 96) reserved for support
of ground troops •
XII Air Surrort Col"lFm no.
.Pt 1130 General Mccreery called on Gen('}rr-1 ClRrk to dj scuss the rroblens
involved in the regrouping of the Fifth Arny and the withdrnwal from their
present sector of 10 Corps. Cartnin H:i_lbert, u. S. Navy, CB.me to lunch. He
had recently COTae from the United StAtes , where he hnd seen r.itrs. ClRrk.
At 1600 Colonel Brfan, Inspector Genl'lral of II Corps, arrtved 11.nd discussed with Genc'JrAl Cbr:k the op-'~rrtions of 16 Decer~ber before San Pietro
which he WPS investigatin~ for II Corps. General Clark hfld been rresent on
thot day And observed the T".lovement of :forirr...,rd rlatoons of the bptfolion vrhich
hBd just been emgav,ed in tpe AttRck on San Pif>tro.
At 1630 hours Lt. Gen. Burro,rn, British Arny, called to see Gimeral Clark.
Fe is on hiA v-rny to Ru~sia to heAd the Br:itisP Mission there And discussed the
'Russian sjtul'l.tion very inter,.,stingly. He eAi,ressed the op:inion thr-t the f'i~htini:; on the Russian :front WPS nlr-ost non-existe1mt Pnd thrt the Gernr-,ns were
,yj t'.bdrawinP- voluntnrily.
'!'oclF.y Genc,ral Cli-irk 8pproved a recor,,r,~nc'lf,tion of Colonel Rob:inson, Fifth
�ftrriy .A.ntirdrcrnft Officer, for thr; followinr:; chnnges in antiBircreft officers:
Colonel Rob:5.nson to replricl"l General Tovmsend with the French ExredJtj_onr->ry
Corps, Gen~rnl Townsend to rer ln c ~ Gen•"'l'.l"P l BrRdsrr-,w v;j tr the '35th AI\A Brj r;rde
And GenA.rl'1.1 BradshR.''l to rey,lrice Colonel RoMnson A.s Fift}, ArPly Antiri ircrPft
0fficer .
Important messPges of the day ore as follo YS:
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r ersonal
ClPrk to Truscott. RN 56//1 . "Sjtu..,tion in C11ssino continues to
he ,Hfficnlt . Enery a:rpeers to have been rejnforced. Heavy enemy shelling
on tovm todny. · Our troops still occupy reilror,d stf>tion, Hill 435 and Hill
1Q3 . Rnen:v occupies hill 165 1md strong roints on southwest side of tm"n.
Surplies dropped successfully by 11ir todny for troops on hill 435. nur t:cmk
attack from hill 5q3 yesterrl.a;r was unsuccessful. n
Personn1 Clar1-: to Saville . RN 5651. "New 7,ealrmd Corrs reports thPt supply drop for troops in area of hill 435 today constitut~d a model of perf~ction . T'lease nccer,t r,y sincere thanks for tM_s outstr-inding achievenent. n
Pe:rsonnl Clark to 'T'ruscott . RlJ 5617. 11 MP1rirjp control officers 1,rho hr>ve
visited ~nz5 o repo:rt thr,t it shouln not be necessr-ry to strirt 11tr-ibrinA br:iforc
April 15th . Arr,y Surw,eon ,,,ill visit you on MPrch ?1st or 22nd. If rfter your
conference vdtr him you ,3till deslre to stort atabr-'ine on t'lPrch ?5th you are
p11thorize0 to start on that date . J h1'1.ve ::irr::,nr;ed tlwt r:osqnito net,s, he~:i_d
nets and insect repellf:lnt 1'!ill be r,M_pped to bridf;eherid within next fevr dPys. ff
From AAI to Fifth P.nd Eighth Arr:,y Conmr>nders - R1,T CGS300. 11 The slow
proPTess rnrir!e so fpr jn clearint; the to1·rn of Crissino wjtJ1 t}1e consequent delriy
in buncM_nP" the rittnck on the monPster1 r cor1bin0.d wj_th the necessity for prernr5 ng the PV'Xi:rur, forces for ri fnll scri le of'fensj-ve in the second ki lf of'
Aprj 1 □Rkes j_t essential to decide in the course or the next '?4 or J6 hours
wheth,,.,r (a) to continue wi tr the CP ssino operr,tfon in the hope of cPrturfog
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the r'!onristerv durjnp; the nf')xt three or f'ou.t' dr,vs or (b) to CPll th") Of?:rr-,tion l
off f1nd to consolidrite "1UCh g2ins of p,round as Pre import1:1nt for the renewrl
of the of'fensive later . It is rilso necesm:ir;v to decide when Ei~}lth ~rr;v is to
tA.ke over resr,onsiM.li ty for or,er8tions on the Cr-i ssino front nnd when Hq. NZ
Corp<; is tn be dissolvl"ld r-ind replaced by Hq. 13 Corps. In the C-in-C 's view
Eighth l\rrw Pnd 13 Corps should Pssume responsibUity for the CPssino front
as soon ns th0 monnster;tr has been captur~<l r-mo consolidPted or P ltArnf'tively
ininediately it is decided t o cPll off the present offensjve but h"3 wishes to
dis cuss this point with Arn,;,r ComnAnders before rea.ching A fi nal dec ision.
Consequently C- in- C hl'l.S dec1_ded to hold A neeting of Army ConMPnders at Hq.
Fif'th Arny At 1530 hours 21 March . He wishes GenerRl Ti're;rberg to be rrMcnt
to give a det1=dled rrJport on the situf'tion on th<o Cassino front. As decisions
regarcUnP, the r;rounrl to be consolidated w:Ul dfrectly affect tb~ future opP-raMons of' E:5-ghth Arr1 y, C-in-C vd sh~s Co,..,nrmder ~j_ghth .~rny to be prerrred to
give his views on tbr-t point in the hro possible crses rYmtfoned under (a) and
(b) l'lbove. In that connection Coml""nnder E:i.ghth Arny r,,ny, jf be ,,rish"'ls, bring
Conn<>nr1 er 13 Corps to th~ r10etine:. Ac1rnovrledge. 11
�FRgSEHZArsrn--MARCH 21, 1944--General Clrirk left his CO"'l.r1Pnd rost this r1orning
at 0910 by ieep, tl'lkinr; with hh:1 Lt. Col. Drrrper whor1 h~ hns selccted to be
his senior e ide upon th1' deprirture of Lt. Col. Sutherbnd. Tho General went
directl:v to the New 'Zealnnd Corps observation post wrere ho met General Freyberig an<l his division conT'!Pnders, Gencrlr.i rrirkinson, Kei1shtfoy nnd GRllmvc1y.
Gen".'lral CJ.rirk asked the Corps and Division ComrnPnde:rs to i;ive their impressions of the present state o-1" the battle at CA.ssino. GenerPl Freyberg sio.id
th,,.t in his opinion, based on his battle ~x.rerience to datt'l, especially in
Tunisia, where !'l'lountA.inous terrnin was hr:ild by the Boche, one hBd to fight
)
for one's ob .j ect:i.ve, And it WA.s us~m~l:v slow going. He was not -~ssimistic
about the eventui:i.l outcome and def1n1t!"!ly stated th:,,t he ;,ms not J_n fnvor of
call:irni; of'f the Attn.ck. A short discussion of the existence of a tunnel used
bv the (}erT'lans indicAted thnt GenerP,l Fre7berP, -mrA.s not too faMiliar w:l th its
existence. However, Division Corir1Pnder8 hrid hePrd of the wherenbouts of r:1
tunnel, which vms eln.borated upon bv Brir;A.dicr (Juer~,e, who stated thPt from
prison~r rerorts h~ felt thi:>t its existence was mRinly legt!'lndary and thPt the
Boch.-, did hnve, undoubtedlv, n"ltworks of s:r1.r,ller tunnels but nothing BS gr~at
in len~i;,h as the one M" rk;d on General Glrirk' s photo.
G~neral Clarlr P sk<"ld General Gn,llov'nY to pr,j_ve him an estirl',te of how 1"'lany
bri.~l'ldes would be n~cessary to rush forward froT"! Hanf;!1P n I s Hill on th"- Monastery to seize that ob,iective. Gen~ral Cl11-rk Pt the time stated that he did
not have the r<"linf'orcenents to do it, but he was curious to have Gener['!l Grillm11a71 s est4,.,r,te of how rir,ny [1oditionA.l troops would be n'."~Cessar:1.r to rush
forvmrd. Ge'Yl,,,rrrl G.9JJ_01.7r,_y estiry,ted thrM brj fV1des.
Th~ group of r;~nerals f:1 nally S".lpr'rf-'t~d into a few sr1Pller groups and
ciscuss"':!d w 4 th eri.ch oth"lr their -riarticulRr front. GenerR.l ClPrk r,ov(')d fror:1
on~ C'roup to another li st"'nin1;, and on sone occR.sions P skin0' nertin~nt t1Ue8tions as to conditions und~r thl'lir personal co.,,.,,..,~_
nd. G~n~rPl Clrir'l!: m:mpA.rod
the New ZeolP.nders and the Boche to two heA~rr,reight fir~hters in the ring,
both ~o-;g;r, with edth"!r one in a position to lmoclc out the oth,-,,r. · Genern.l
Freyh~rg irnriediPt"!ly reacted to this ancl sr-i.id thRt he nj dn 1t consider th~,t
his troops -rrere f:'"I'ogiz:r y~t flnd thPt in his opinion the attack should continue;
that the present sitmition di(l not seen hop1>3less to him in the least.
Gent':ral Cln.rk left the !\Tew ~e11.land OP and, P c~oripanied by Lt. Col. Drarer,
proceeded to tre vicinity of' the bridge at Cassino to l';"'t a close viewv of cond:itions in the to''m. The Ger"1,-ins were sh"lling thl'l brid1;e 1uite heavily and
its A'1Virons. lifter about 15 "1inutes G,m~rnl Cbr'k n.nd Colonel DrRrer returned
to the Fifth Ar'ly CP.
A conf"'lr~nce hr-id b~en CE'.ll•'!d today b;r Gen,~ral A.lexr,rn'1er, P s e.nnounced in
Cable CGS 300, to be h'\ld at the Fifth llrrw C0"'11"\And post, to deterr1in"l v•hether
the attack on Cassino .••.nr the ;1onasterv should be continued or ebrmdon':'ld because of' the strong Gcrl"lnn oprosition 17.ct vdth.
At l1mch today General ClPrk entertain~d Gc:n'"rP 1 Juin, Gen';ral Carncnti l'lr
and Colonel Kar~ncr~r :in order to hRve A. chance before th!':! confer~nce to obtain
th.,, v:i ':'lWS of Genor2.l Juin ::,bout thP- Cassino opcrrttion And its effect on the r"l~
li"lf of' the 3rd DIA. In a short tl1lk before 11mch, GeneirPl Cl;:,rl· nskAd General .Tuin to state frnnkl~r his :i neas on this snb_j,.,ct. Generri 1 Juin said thP.t in
his _judr;1c1Ant the attack on Cassino WP. s rrovint; too costly and should be dropped
�\ Gl
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and in its stead a mP.neuver to the south of Crissino cihnuld be c~1 rr1n-d out PS
soon as the Fifth Arn:r had occunied its n~w sector. In this we.y, GenAral
Juin s~dil, the r(mt"'s bv whkh CA.s8ino is supplfod c ould be cut off rind the
to,m c0uld be starved out . Generril Glr.r1r then said t½"t in his estimntion
it wr-i,s quite likely thrit if tJ1 ,~ attack on Cnssino shoulcl be rlropped the Bri=
tish would ask thrit the 3rd DU. r"')riHin in th~ l:i.ne instear1 of beinr; relieved
11.nd cor1e 1mder co-r"!rnand of' the '8i~hth Arny instl'JPd of the Fifth. Generri.l Juin
<>t once th"t h"'! should rl'lfuse to serve under those circur1stri.nces ~nn th1:1t in
his estiMPtion it ·•m.s i_nperPtive thn.t tl-i.e '3rc1 DIA be relieved 11t the ea.rliest
possibl e mom~nt. GenP.rri.1 Juin arlcl"ld thrt nriturP.lly if it wns a case of h~lpinr; out with the services of I'!. T1ivision for A short tim~, J,-, 1"oul0 be thorom;hly coop"'lrri.tive, n°--id h~ reriliz~d thnt :i.f the Cassino atfa,clr ·1ere PbPndonc d
the reli"'f of tl1"' 3rd DJA must be rlefcrr<'ld for A. rcncionr>ble time; but he had
served under Gen~ral Anrlerson in the F"rst Arny in Tunisin nnd did not vrPnt tc
hnve his Cory,s cut up and pnt o"' :.tt s~rve under the British F,j_ghth Ar,..iy in
this therrter. General ClPrk snir thrt h~ was 1:;ratifi"ld to het1r this on inion
of GenerRl Juin ' s; thPt h'?. had invited Gen~rRl Juin in order to obtain his
ir'leas on th~ s11b,iect and th,-,t they were exrctly the se.:1e n.s his o"m Dnd thPt
hi<, proposed to insist ''dth Gen~rnl Alexri.nder that the 3rd DIA be relieved,
and thet it remin part of the ?ifth Arr-1y.
I
I
Follo1Jvin»: lunch, the Fr"!nc}, officers Pnd Colonel Ka·1rierer left for their
co,.,rirmd post, and the officers C811Ad for the conference gradunllY Psser,bled.
GenerPl i\.leXA"lrler Prriverl r>t 1550 . There ,·,ere r-1rcsent b(':lsides Gen0r'11 Alex.,nder, General Clark, GenerPl T,~ese, Cornr-mndjn,<; the Eighth Arr,y, Gent'lrPl Herding,
General ti'reyber1;, General Gruenthl"lr, GenerPl Lemnitzer, Gen~rrl i"alsh (Chj_ef
of Staff of GenerP 1 Leese), GenerA.l Kir 1<:man, General Tate nnd General Bra nn .
At Genert1.l Uexrmrler 1 s request, Generr>l Prcyberg stated his r,rASl'.'lnt situ11tion . He said that he had six bA.ttri.lJ.ons of the New Zeri l<Jnd D:ivision in Cassino tovm . The rpj_lror>d station vms actually held by the 78th Divi 9 ion. Resistance, hO''.Tever, WPS continuini:; at the westerly edge of the town, and Pt the
cliff free be~rond it. The;r hnve trdrnn fror, 200 to 300 rr:isomrs out of the
town, and Gen0rP.l Freyber1; thinks thrit they "lust be gainine-r, access to their
positions by tunnels . The comnanding officer of the bntt2lion now attecking
the Conti n"'lntal Hotel says th2t ho can not R,'Ul"_
rrintee th"t he will hnve th".l hotel
toni!t!'ht or tnriorrow niF,ht, but fAels ver~r hop~ful of taking it. The New ZealP.nd Corps ha s thus far h,,d 1400 casuAlti~s. Yesterd0.y th,n,:,r had 120 casueltfos
j_n six brittelions, 1. hich Genern.l Freyberg did not constcler large . General
1
Alexander re"'lnrk!!ld thrit jf' we CAn k~ep pic'ldng at the eneny for 24 or 48 hours
he T"W -v co llapsA, "rhr,reupon Gener;, 1 Freyberi; stated tlv1-t the Boche was becoming
short of food and "'"' s in a v~rv diff'ic11lt -position. Generri.1 Clr,rk then st11ted
tho.t h8 hn0 felt discourne;cd this rnornini:; ~mtil hn talked to General Freyberg' s
officers on his visit in the Cri.ssino aree. . l\fow he hns becoMe encouraged and
said thnt h'3 -reels thi-i.t no 0ecision should be mane today to -rull out. GAnerAl
Leese stated thnt he wrs or thA sry•e wriv of' thinking. Gen"lral AleXRrider then
said thnt he felt thrt jt, ~ws unw·i se to call the attack off toc18y. He felt
that thP, situr,tion should be reviewed PJVery '24 hours in order to permit a decision on thAt snbj'l)ct to be made. Gen~rP..l Freyberg then said that he "rould
1rno'7 by 1000 tomorro•rr whPt his siturition "'-'ns, flnd GenerAl ClPrk sPid thP.t after
he hPd ta.11<ed wi.th Gen~rRl 4'reyberg in the r1orn1nr: h"l would tf'llephone GcnnrPl
Alexonder . GenerA.l J\lP.XRnder then rois~rl tbA 1_11".lstion of' t 11e relief of the 3rd
DIA which Gl:"lnerAl Clri.rk h;id discussed r,t lunch witJ-; GenGrt1.l Juin, r>nd, ri.s he.d
I
I
�been pr~clict~d, r1~ntioncd the difficulties of' 0~ett 4 n1; thcr, out. Gen9rPl
Clar1c innedfotely stressed the length of ti "'1 e thPt the French hr>d been in
the line r 1.d the ir,n,Cr"ltive necessity thPt they be relieved nt tbc ePrlie st
po,rnjble nor-ient. G~nernl 1\loxanrler was "'lvirl~ntlv imrressed with this view,
r,no st;:,ted thr>t h0 would fr1,.,edint"!!ly tPke up tho question of f:indin1; sone
Division which would be used to relieve the Fremch. Gcnerr,l Leese undertook
to studv the qu"'!stion nt once.
11
There was then sorie discnssio11. of air supnort as the Cri ssino oper..,tion
pro.gressed Pnd of the continued dropping of suppEes. GenerP l ClPrk sent
for Genernl SPvill~ rind, followin~ th0 0 cr"rture of Genr)rn1 AlexPnder, G")n~rals Snville, Cl..,r1,::, Gru8ntr'1r P 1d Brann di scusscd nt so"lc length the n0cessarr A-ir support for the continu0nce of the Cn.ssino or8ration.
1
General S,ciyille then left i'nd GenerA.1 Clnrk at once notified General
.Juin thnt the nttnck on C,?ssino wri.s to continw, subject to ra r"lvi-:m tomorrrn"T.
Barl; r;r in t},e afternoon, durinl his !Y'nversntion ?jth Q;-morol .Juin,
Gr:meral Clrirk ni':'lntj oned to him th~ fr.ct thr, t he wr, s r:i v; ng serious conversP tion to us:i.ng two of the thrAe c0nhPt tew1 s of th~ 3L;th Division to join in
the ".lttaclr on Monaster7 Hill fron Hill 591 because tht'.l troop:~ of the IndiRn
Divj_sion n.ppoared to him to be lackin~ in dash and jnj_tfative.
1
The fo11owim; cs.ble WP.s received toda;r frors Gr:m8ral D~vers: RrJ 67311.
l11'ThRt j s vonr estimnte of Brig. Gen. Raynond S. McL9.in, 45 Division, rts nble
prospective Division Co'7m1nder for OVF:RLnH.D? On"l VTP;T or nnoth<"Jr '7ashin2;ton
has received very fA.vorablc r3ports r<"JgArdins hj,.,, but not5 ced he was not
given the Ii-5th Division on }.'iic'kl1Aton 1 s withdrawnl. 11
General Clark today received the fo1lo"7ino; llT'preci;:-,tion of the enemy
situntion in Co.ssino fro~,, Brigadier A:irey, G"!lncrel Alexander's B.G.S. (I):
"l. The cnermv hRs so far left the defr:mce of thl"l CASSPTO nreP to 1
}lara Div. 3 Para Rer,t is responsjbl:'l for th"'l defence of' tho town and MonPsterv reinforced hy the Pi,ra M.G. Bn, th"3 Fern A/Tk Bn, I Bn l Prora Regt and
II/:U5 G.R., i.e. a totPl of seven bns (but the M.G. ,,nd ~/T1( Bns were probably rath0r under strength at th~ tiMo tre battle began). 4 Para Regt ls
hold511.~ f'urther West hut S"1e:1s to hnve sent its II Bn to tho assistance of 3
Regt. It should be noted that th0re hns been onl;r one SJ"rill inf re~nforcerient (i.e. II Bn 115 a r~hAsh of II Bn 129) and that this wr1s not sent from
re servo, but 111,,rely sidestop:red frol"1 South of the LIRI where no at ts ck was
ta1dng r,lace.
11 2.
'l'he
SUC'~ests that
base his reRl
latter vlith a
fEtct thnt the i")neny hRs not sent r 11y furthm~ re:inforcen~nts
he int•~nded only to rlela~r as long 2 s possible in CASSINO and
oefence on the AIOLF PITL1i;R Line. He has probably r~£Jnn~d the
fornPtion brought up from the 14 Arry area.
3. Th8 prrncbuti~1ts hr.vti defrmded and count:1r-attackec'l w~ry stubbornly
but ti,ere i::i s<r~ evidence thEtt tr>ey are i'.;'TO"ring wc11k,r. Alread~r by 10
March cnsualties in CASSrTn WAre reported as 11 very hir;h 11 • On ?O March one
Gov was reduced to one officer r>nd thirty !"len and another to ten ncn with
on~ LMG A.nd three tom.my-!;1._ms withont 8.l"iT"!tmj_tion li,s:kimr, for snake-cover and
11
�perrd.ssion to withdraw. Th11 G~rrrPns were b,~ginninr; on 20 I1JPrch to tiilce 11,
pessiT11~_stic viewr of the situ-"tion as the tanks were reducing thedr strong
points on~ by one. (They stil1 think, hovrnver, thet they hold Pt •• 193).
).
tt 4.
The course of events seer:1s to be thFLt when tl1e attack stPrted
the ene"'1;7 were prepared to give up CASSIN() after a '.'ltubborn resist.<mce and
11dthdraw to the ADOL't'i" HTTLSR line; when tlv=iy S8"1 their defence was being
'!'lore successful thnn they :first expectecl they decided to hang on and trv to
restore the situntion by local counter-attAck, and thrct no,rr they Pre h1mging
on in th,:; hope throt we '7ill ~i,,e up first. In spite of its fierce resjstnnce
and outstandini~ tou!Shness, 1 Para Div is certrdnl:r now ,,cry ,reduced in
strength and must be r;ettin1; tired. Th~y cannot be exp0cted to continue indefinitely· if we go on dev"'lloping the strength of our thr~e availabb divisions against then in thoir pres,"lnt state.
"It is true thRt they are now receiving r1ore arty and ..,,ortar surrort
than before, but this c~m only be Vl"lry s'"1all co17pared with our large resources both in runs and armrunition.
5. In cimclusion, tri(iref'ore, I feel thrt nssm'ling 1rrc continue to ntta.ck with the suynrior resources 1,,liich n.re awdlBblt':J to us, the Gerr0 n.n 1
Para Div is fe,cing the a1tcrmtive of n.~struction or ,_,r:ithdrai:<ml. 'Ve hP ve
alre'ldV sho'm that (up to last ni~ht at lenst) there vras no indication of it
beinr: reinforced and the enemy can hnrdl:,r brJ expected to allow his best di,rjsion to be~ dAstroyed and at tho SD''le tj ,.,c los,~ the position. On the other
hand it must nlso be re!"'e""lbered thE't the enen;r rill be quick to take advnntai;e of n.ny s111;11 of "maknAss on 01ll' part in order to regrdn the initiAtive."
0
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*
PR8,SF.'TZA]'.m--MlL'lC:R 22, 1941~--/\.t ocno tl1is norninr;, 11.fter ta1dng CA.re of urgent
ad,..,inir:itrntive "'!2tters, General Clark, 1:1.ccomprnicd by Lt. Col. Draper, ,;rent
for,wrd to the ?1st Tl!ew Zeeland Battalion Rear CP nbout 1,000 yards south of
Cassino bridr,e. Visibility vms poor, due to nist <>nd Rr1oke. The f.Prty th<m
proc1'eded to the co1'1r1ri,nd rost of' the 5th ~Jei,r Zealand Brigade, nnd GenerA.1
Clark discussed the Cassino situetion with BrigRd:ter Burrows. A. Gerrian t Hnk,
intAct w7th crew, W,9,S found in the rubbl"-l of Cassino, r,uch to the forward
ell"lr,cnts 1 Rrtrprisc,. It 'l'T!"S tnken 1mcler fire n.nd destroyed. The s:itu;-,tion in
tho town was not definitely h-no•m, so the Gen0rel nnd his y,nrty :r1ov'9d to the
2nd 1'Jew Zealana. Division OP north of' Ccriraro '"Ihere the situPtion was discussed
with General Parkinson, Co"'ln.and:ing the ::>nd New ZePland Division. G~neral Fnrkinson thought it best to continue the attn ck 2s planned for Rround noon tbat
day. The JX:1 rtY then proceeded to G"'lneral Fre;1rburg 1 s Cori1"'1.ond fast , 11 Pre General Clark 1.unchAd H:1d discussed continuance of th~ ntti:rnlc. At 1?45 our artiller:,r opened up ,y-ith a violent bri1:;f µ.rt':rmration. .C3hortly thr.;rePfter ene111y l'jr A,Fr,eared over our rear areas. Our l"ntHnrcraft rencted i"J.Modfa_tel~r end sent up
hcnrr f:ire. One Ger""'an r~lPnc r,rn.s seen p;oinr; d0 m. LPter, it wP·S reported thPt
seven or ("!i ri;ht enemy rlanes were destroved.
1
General Clrrk And Lt. Col. Draper then return~a to tJ,e Fifth Amy Coml"'ln.nd
Post wher~ G,".ln0ral Clnrk went i1"'l9Gd:iPt~ly into conJ'Arence icrj th GeY1.orril Gru~nt}1er.
Dur:ing th/;) nftr-,rnoon G~norrll Cl:>rk work~d on Pdninistrntive nRtters and
had ns his f;l..l8Sts for dinner t}1is evening Genersil Moran and Colorn=il Kio'"ell of
�the 8igna1 Section.
HDecisions r1pde at yoster(fr1yt s cnnferenc~ with Gen~ral Alexander required
thAt I p;ivc hin n reco"'!J"l!">.ndPtion torlB;T as to thA oonHnuation of the Cr,ssino
battla by the New Zealrmd Corps. In order to obfain first hnnd infornPtion, I
nroceeded tn ili scuss th~ sjtuntion with Brig~clier Burro1"s, ConT1andj_ng tho }Tew
zer,land 5th Br-i_1;arle; Hajor Gcnr;rnl nnrkinson, Corir:Rnrler of the ;)nd Nl"lw Zel:llnnd
Db,1.si.on; r1~1.jor Gemrr,.l KeiC;btlev, Cor1r1,rinder of the 78th Division, and LieutenFnt Gen')ral 'G'reyberg. 1''hcreRs no clef'inite rrogress ru> s been nr1.de since yesterda:r, r 11 wr3re in f'~wor of crntinning the Pt tri.c k. Cn snnl ties were light in the
Cnssino nrea 7~st('l)rday, m1mr)ering 73, a.s rerorted hy General Pnrkinson. An attack to clenr the slopes of Hill 1g3 wes ::icheduled for. 1100 1c!"ith heavy artillery surport. Farldnson felt this h,c,d good chences of '.=;uccess r'nd, when successful, '7ould cnntribute M.Ht~rially to the:ir position in Crissino. Freyberg
reported tl:v t the troops on H11ns~mR.n I s Hill were stj_ 11 jn r;oorl heart and, althoug-h :r hnve no defj_nj_te feeling th0t greA.t i r,prove"'ent ,-r:i. 1]_ trko pbce liy our
action, J concur in the r"co!'lnendPtion of these cor.."'11'1.ncl ers to oontinue t:r e attack for rnoth 0 r tmenty-four hours, for so ~'luch is rt st10ke. I ,;rive thjs :infor"~ation to Ge:mcral Alex::inder who herrtil;r concurr0:d :in F'c;T r,"co-c,r~end~ition. I
then nassecl this "rnrrl. on to H'r"'ybn~g. He sRys he ,·-ill give it evE'!rything he
hns e;ot. '7e hnve J~jd on a heavv ~ir RttacJr, but rue to tr..,"! disi:1ster to the
plnnes on Pol'l.pei field b:v the eruption of Mount Vesuvius our air effort will be
~entl"T cnt do1.Mm. Th•:q r"!lport that ov~r 80 B-25 1 s hrive been dar~ar,ed or destroyed. It seems inconccivriblc, wHh this eruption tA]dnR' plnce in th"'l lrst
week, tr'lt theY woulo 1 eave th,., nlnni;s in such nrox:i."1ity to Vesuvius.
1
11
! hf'Ye indj_c:::it~a. above thrt I no not fee1 trnt tr is or~rl'1tj on 1·,ill be suc-
cessful b:1r 01ir efforts r,J.on"' if th-~ ene 11y continues to r'"sist, nnd reLnforces
,
as be is doin:-;. P°o' 1cver, jntelligcmce inoic8tes tri,.,t he is not too h2rrY, thr,t
he is h~1.vi'1.IY, her-v 7 losses, thnt h<"l hrs heavj l;r roinforc".d the Hitler Lin") so
that the sj_t11ntion mny b~ 7_i1ce bro h~rnr;rr~j p;hts jn th... ring, both ."bout to
topple ov~r. It ~n.y be tlint if we continul"l to nttnc1· a.t not too great expense
for nbout th~ next 48 hours, we my succeed. n
Th0 frriy Gor11Pnclf'lr today d-isprtchod t},c followim,· l.ritter to Lt. Gl"ln. Devors,
Deput:r Suprc:1e 1Ulil"ld Cor:,,P.nd er:
rtYour J_ritt"lr of lB MA.rch
},p s
been received.
"I Pr pr<"lpnred to lo01F'l the VI Cor:rs 1•rith tri!'l 3rd and !~5th Divisions Rfter
the Main Fif'th Ar"'ly fore,, hns ioincd up w:i th trio brjrlr,;ehead force. I undeirstr,nd
thnt General Alex~mrler he.., s pr~pProd A tentat:i.v,, t,j ri~ table for tris rnnAuver and
that 7011_ have a copy. I hA.vc not received a copy yc!t. My o··rn esti nnte is that
we shall not be Rble to launch n coord:innted nttack bv the:: t"'O arnies until 11bout
'1e.v lst. T believe j t ,7ill require at len_ '3t three, reeks befor~ w~ cnn reA ch the
bridgehead force. Jf you them ad.d tl~ <3 t5 ""'" to f.;l"lt the VI Cor:rs out, A.nd a r ,rj od
of rest nnd r~or1;13nizntion you vdll be vr,~11 into the su-,,,ricr, n"1d it r,ay bo too
late to cnntribut"'- ""UCh to r,v1 ;;F.LnRD. Ho •revcr thn t is a natter beyond '1;f scope.
1
"I h~licvc yon nre mistri1zen in yo1rr •"!stin•1tA of B~rtholf. I con'·ider thRt
he is rloin1; a eood iob. T'fhen ~rour l~tter arri vcd ~sterd;-1y GrnentJ1 ,1r h:1 d the
�Chi~f nf Str>:f'f of' tb'l TI Corrs ch~c1< rrivPtelv nit½ th.e G-l's of II Corrs, 1/+th
And 11Sth Divj sfons to nsccrtrdn ,,,.,i,_,..thnr nr not thE' ~rr,y G-1 s~ction nns i;ivinr;
sati sfr:1~tory erv:i c~. ""ht"! rerort of 1111 trr"e G-1' s '7r s th,.,t th~ :,r"~r G-1 Section h::,s ,., s~.'J'\prithetic ,md~rstrnr1 in~ o+' the r"'rsonnel rrobl""-l"'S ,--;thin trc cl;visjon ,.,nrl is ril··,,,•rs "'ager to assist in th'"!~r s::ilution. Colon~l '3."ltzr,rin, ny
PerutY Chi~f of Striff, ::ind en 0utst11ndi np; officl'!r, is consbntly on tr~ job su:r~rvisj nr; G-1 r,r>ttl'!rs f'or th~ Chief of St?ff. Fo-•<"ver, since vou h11ve .,.,"mti oned
the '"latt"'r, T shn 11 b..., on t1-- c al~rt to ascertr'.in ,,./r'ether or not ne hnve a Feakness in the G-1 Section of 1 ich T pri not ermre.
"I do not l-no'"' tr1' b",d.s of' :--ro11r belief thrt Bertbolf dons· not senri to be
to ~lve •1011 correlct fi ';)ITes. I bel; ":!Ve th Pt your hen.dqu11rters is faMilinr
...,;th the !l.,ture r>nd sources of our reri odic rerorts, ri s rerresent1>tives of both
yo11r G-1 nnd c:tntisticrl of'fices hr•ve hr,d occr, sion to ~o ov~r the,, with :r.w G-1.
In A. l~tt"'r on l F"'brnnry 104/., Se1bridge ~P,ntion~d to Gru~nth~r sor~ nrparent
incons~ st"'nci"!s in fj_n•nr~s ,,rhj ch w~ hnd .,.,irnishr!d, but these ''!~re exrlriincd in
detail in (}ruenth"'r's repl~r of 7 Fcbrunr7 -inc ns fnr "'SI 1mo11 thcv ,·,ere rccept'!l<l ,, s correct. I do not lD7-oW o+' A.n7 oth~r instanc"s in ·JY1 icr our figur~s
hAV1' b~cn sPid to b~ inl'ccurrite, l"nr1 J uncl~rc:;trnd th . . t S•wrbrid.'1'e oic not indicr>te di.ssritisf11ction "Tith the'~ jn his r!'!Ce'1t visit to this headqurirtf":rs.
c1 ble
1
"You Mention th"' rl'riclity ·lith wJ, icr I rut r~rlr>cl'.'.!rimts into divisions i:1nd
then ;,.,_to co,..,bat. 'l'hPt, of cours~, hns b"len neccssr·ry ~n th"' brid~P-rte"d and in
the 14th Div1.sion vrrich r--ust f';O to J\nzio nt once. Had ·,~e benn "bl"! to secure
rerlri cer,ents wh~r r:re ost n~~ded tr>e"", thcv would hrivc been n ble to sr~nd a rea"'onable yicr;od of ori1mt,,tj_on before s~einP ..,ction. The r~rlr-ccr"ent situ"'tion
no", 7 ooks t-;oor, but it h::, s b~en fpr fror S" tis fr, ctory in th"' rr st.
"You ...,ention b"i'1."' shodc.,d ':7ith t}11" sl.onnl'>SS of the r,ttn c}r • I r,r too' but
probabl:r not to the "'xtl:!nt thrt you nre, f'or I h:·we se~n for tr., :re <1t '"!icrht
11onths, r>ncl hric'! il"'lpr ,sscd 1rron .,.,.,, thri re.,.,sons f'o:r tb"l slowness of om~ rrogress
in JtPJ.y. The:r Pre: 'T'errrdn, YTePth~r, cr,.r,:;fnlly :rrAff'rcr c4ef~nsjv, 1-oc::itions
in the r10 1 mtrdns, rcterdn,;d anr, '"cll-train,.1d rmer,y troops, ;;rossly in"derp1rte
...,e."'ns nt our oisr,osr,l wr51') on th") offensiv"!, witr arnrox:i,..,rtely (>.qual forc0s
\
to th~ dl')fender. I hPVe scf'!n, fror, actufll exy,criencc on l"!any occ10sions, th~
1
air feil ropel'l.te<lly to rlrive c ,.,t-:;:r-r1:in"'d in_f,.,,ntrv out of n~frmdl'lr locPlit5 "!s.
You J:,r,ve 'Jerm it dA"'1onstr..,ted at Cassino. Plrnt;r of Gernan in:";-,ntry re"'l<iinnd
in the to"m, " ith tt=1nl'r.;, .,,f't~r t 10 c borib'i.n~. I :F1 not sAtisf'ind ,,,ith tho ''PY
ll'r ... yberg hes h,.,ndlec, th':! si tuPtion, but you nuc:t undcrstP.'1C1 the deli er c:,r 17ith
vrhi_ch ::r Must ne<il. 1 rith hi.,.,, r'h1c to -instructions T hrive received rersom1lly on
this M 0 ttcr fron General ~lexr,nder. l;'reybcrP, hPs 1,-,cked ng~ess:iv~n~s~, and I
hnv"' so -inoicPt')d to !\.lcxr-nr er. Fe hPs br-,.n rc1uctl'lrit to errloy th'°) troops
!1V•15 lable to M.T'I, ,-,11 of t'Thich ',"?r~ Br:i tish.
T h~ve dPil;r oontacfod hi" And
11rgcd tb" use of "'ore rrerr ~AP 11:ind troops in the to,·'11. , l'l.n Attr c1r b:r the Indians
fror.1 the north surport"'ld bY tri.n 1 ·s "'nd the cnri,.,.; t,.,ont of tl e 73th Di vlsion to
. ush rronnd th~ brise o.i:> the h:ill. 'J'onn of th~se "ere 11tte"1T'ted, cxc~rt rfter
t,-ro days' dP-l11y noditionRl Nl"lW' 7:enl::,nd troops "mre used in tho village.
1
0
0
"You Mention ti,"' t t 'hP, G"'rririns ~°-""" to bP, P ble to tr k.-, it ; n r bi,.,. n:,..y.
'T'her._• hf-Ive done so to -ri.y 1,:no=l -1d~"- f' or rr> n•.r '"'Onths r nc rr , c ortrd.nl~r c oin~ 1.t
:ln Cassino and h"ve nl.P c~d therf'? the 'Jr-st rind tr"' riost I'1.l/"f,"d troops nt trci r
d; srosril. In riv opinion, tho 2ttc'lck by the Nevr Zl'l~lRnd Corr::i "rith ti.e r0stric-
�tion of trc use o-<' t'1c 7gth f'ivision rs jT1J'oMc1 b,r t\J.l"Jxnncer , ,-,e rr, not ~ing
to siicceecl in cRptur;np; t h':'! Mo:nrstl"Jrv but wjl]_ prob:=ibly hoJ.rl thP, tovrn , the
raiJ.ror,d 8tAtion t0 the soutr rind h,.-, ve r- snrll briclt;"he:=id ov".lr the Rapido 'R.i ver to fr,d11 t et-, future operntions b~r the Rin;htr ,hrriy. This of' course is not
s;e,tjsfri ctorv to Me .
to
"Ar:i p;J.nd Grittenbl'lr,:;~r is b11:i -n"" f'ittcd out i:-rith n strff .
et hi as s0on ...,s vou cnn nrike hiri aw•ilRblc .
T
,~ill be glrid
1':rith r ef8renc" tr, rw conversntio1'1 1:ith Bull rbout fl new !)iv:ision Cor'"'1::inder .
Hull ~ 1'1d-i catcd thrit Gemern 1 •i,,_rshall hno s0~e Division Co,.,,,.,Rncl ers irho, he 'l''A s
f'·0xious to tret into conhnt rind ~ sk"<l if :r coulcl us~ on!".l in ~m unoerstudy cPraci tv. T s11id "v~s" . It :is of no nor,~nt to me .
"I fL"r :into tho ber-ichhel'l<l yester01:i;y tc, c eek on tre ~iturition there . The
li""itl'.'ld ob j octiv" ntt ...,c1' schedufod +'or th~ 10th ,ws crnccll ,cl on r,y ord3rs upon
tn'1 re co,..,.,l")nd<>ti.on n-P "'rnscott , d-10 hod to altAr his r,lnns for tr~ rittri.ck h·· scd
upon Ms conclusion thr,t the 1st British f'iv:i s:i.on Jpck~d th:~ cnpbi 1 it;v of its
offensive iob . t-tc fnlt, n.nd I "~Md, th"t he nrs nttric1dn~ ,-,;th rirrroxi,..,r>tely
even nnr,bers , throu"'11 tl,e on'1n, Pnd thrt he ·,roulrl. hnve h ,rivY CRsnrltfos •~:bi.ch
1"oulrl he :i.nsi 'T'11.ificr>nt . Tt •ould not trlr.., nn:,, 11rtill'"'r:.r +'ire of'f of nny pRrt
of trc be."c'hAP.d . "L~ rir~ r,ovin-, tlie 14th Divisio"Yl in , bce;inn:i.n,... toc1Py . It ':i 11
Bll be in in t::m d11ys . Then,-,~ c<>n rotate son~ troops th11t rirl"! t1red . Unl oad:i_nr is ,:oi11"' well. I ra~ O"'ntinuin:' ··ii.th r-:r rilan to r-int PnothAr Div:ision in at a
lnt~r t iriA if the r>nC"'Y situ..,tion ,iustifi~s . Tfoirever, 11.lexrYP ~r told r1e yesterday thn.t he T"'P '3 T'UttinP' out instructio11s f'or t:r~ det.., il"d r.tt'l c1rc bv both cle "'!cnts nf t:rc F5-f'th and ,:;_;ir;hth .J\.rr ies .
0
"101,mlJ. R.oo'\cs told Al th:'t you 0btain~cl t1-i., i rprcssion fro:-- G~nern 1 T:'r,.,,yb""ri; thnt ',e hri<l " ti"Me schedule to join un 'TI. th t I'! briogehcPcl forM by Mnrch
?Jrd . nf'litb'"'r .,.,., stnf'f nor J ..,t llny t;...,'" "!ntertninr,d such optiriistic hop0s . It
is 1truc thrit G~neral Fre:,rberq; rad r;rert strnt8~ic p]pns for ru::;J--inp- througr to
)
Roi,8 in a hurrv but P.Ven h~ rerlized t}-•r,t hn wr s induli;ine :in 11:i r;hf'u1. tr inkin~ . t1
rther i Mrortant
"lssnges of the dry follow:
Hf), At.I t o FI,A 1 1B<), rcrent<'lcl Fi"th Ar'fl:r. RH SD 601. nrt is ess,,,ntinl thrit
th., RC,,., o:" L. D!'M in Corsicn. n.rrive in .lr-ples hv 1st April. Since rres,~nt 1;-<'t
i"' n.ot S'.tPfici~nt to "Ssur~ tr·s, FiY~ ~r.,.,y r.Ps ,...,~l"'"d thPt h"'cs.11se of n:l cessit~r, th ,:T [l"t'e r"'~T'"rl"!d t o r~lr-rn.se i.-r::iricd:irtel_ ~7 r;ht L'"'.Ts :f'ror> tr~ ~nzio run f'or
,r
one t 1 1rn 'lTritmd erich . Tlc:is" rrrrinr•~ ,~ctrils. This =u'1t not :i.nt"!rf..,:r-e ,~it},
rove of 1/;, T)iv i c;fon nor return of 50/;, FrcJ-,t RCT . t1
F'r o,., Devcr<1 t o Cl "r1, . ~M '17311. 111•rhf-,t ; s 7O,1r "'Jt;~r,te o:"' Brir"c :i.l"!r Gr:-ner:c>l R.rwr,onil S . r1cL,.,:i.n , L.5th "livi.sio"l, r,s rbl" ros:rectiv"'l f:i.visio-n Co--r-1ri11der for
n 111i-;R,Tr"'1.D? rn"' H'"'T n"t' rn0th"1r, •-r..,sr:inp-ton hrs rr?c~iv,.,,d vJr- -"MTOr"hl~ r~rorts
re~crn.-i.n~ hh• h11.t notice h, -.,-, not --;iven th"1 !.. 5th 1Jivi"ion on Mi,'r!leton 1 s
,-;1 thdra'"ml . "
G"'n~ral Cl"r1, 1 s r"'rly t0 th~ ,, bov"' is ,, s follo···s: ~n ,S,SJ.4 . 11 I tl-·:i.n!r
'R"t' ;,.,...,di.11r Gl"'n·~"t'tl Hc L..,in, 45 n; y;_.--:i on , ,·rill Mr1rn :: -:0od f'ivision Cor-ri,,nc er in
c o"'!brit. T rlic'l n0t "'jv~ hi:, th ':J Division -c• en Mir r'l"lton l~:f't bec~,Fe i;;r ~l"ls ,...,[' s
'"'Or~ r:~s"'lrv:inr "'111 iM iedi:•t~l•r ~v-dlnbl"l . 1Tr,11r,v~r , s•rh')n T<;· "'l~c; b~C~"'1~ siclr a
1
�short tir'l~ :"F.;0 in th~ brir"'l'3he..,r P"1r j t 1ook~cl P'3 tr 011';'!' he ni.n:rt b"' inc.'.'raci-\
t?t~a for f'urth"r dutv, T hnd COT""' tr the ccncJ usion that McL..,:in <::hould ,o;et
the Di.vision. "P'heri,ris I ,-,ould hrte to 1_ose McLnin, I riro 1villin~ to l~t him go
for this nese!rV~d pro,..,otion. 11
Cable from HQ AAI to Fifth Ar y . R".f RE/166. "'R.oA d fo,.-,,_p,,lii - S0 ll"lrno
cinder covered. Scafati tJocera 6 inch to 1? inc},. "'Tocer·:i CP~TP 4 incr to 6
inch. C,9VA Sril'"lrno ? inch to 3 inch. Rord fASs?ble only for jo~ps. Diversion po,..,s:ibl~ SAlerno t\.vcllino - NPrlr-s. 11
General GlPrk tociA.y "IT'ot~ to CG, 1-JATOlTSA, rccor-i ,ending the pronotion of
Bri<;. Gen. John li. 0 'Daniel to Maj. Gen., nnd the follo 1.' inr nnn~d Colon~ls to
th~ r['n1< of' T'lr 4 r. Gen: Cnl. u,,rr-r B. Sh,,rt'lr-in, Col. C<1.rl C. Brn'k-, Col. Urb..,n
'J:iblo rnil Gol. R~uben l-T. rruc1r~r.
*
*
*
rB.r:S1~•rzA.'TO--fifl''R.CTT ?J,
104/+--Gcn"lr<>l Clrrk rcs~rv--d th ""orninc: +'or ,r1r-,i.nistrrtive ""nttcrs and f'f;'Oin.+,n,..nts. ft 0015 Pri!lcc Hr:,berto F-id Ms rcsr>"Cts rnd
rm·rincn +'or rbont on~ ho11.r in tr, Gen.err>l 1 s ven. At 1115 Grnerril Coult r,
Co..,T'r'1d·'nr-: th"'l ~5tl1 f\1.v:i.sion, ,.,1--,icr is "'OOn tc b"lc0-)"' rrrt of t"'"J .,.,jftl--i
~ !'"Y, I'"-: d J-,-i s rr"Jsr,P-cts P'1r' con+>-,rr~d for 1/i ,.,j_nutes ,,,.i_tr n~nl'\rr 1 Clrrk conC1'r'1in ~ 11se o-r t e d 4Vi"jon, r,rrt of' Flier hr~ p1r-0::ir1:v 0rr1v~d in Ttrily. tt
tl-\-:i ~11.,1 o-<' Ms confnr-,ncf" "5tr G"l'1~rcl Cl11r1r, r~ rl";r-dnryc1 +'or l1~ncr rnc'l l,ft
11.t Pbout 1130. Snff--r f'ell (1nr-1nr.; Most of' t,._,,_ ""'orn:in";, but it r,,-,.lt"'!d soon ,-,ft.-.r
hi.ttinr t n ::-round.
1
H~"'S f'ro,., t},,ry Grssino -r'ront ,....,s ;n('lr;f'-:,,it~, :-ind G~c1.rirril Clrrk refrnincd
+'ro!"! goi.n,.,. +'0r "ard, 1mo,·r-in,.,. thr+, Grmnrr,l Alcxrintler rTa.s ,,:tsitinr; G~n~ral Ti'reyb~r~ "nd rmnld retnrn ~ ith a cccision conc"'Jrninl"' ,··!1 cth0r or not to continue
th~ attrck.
1
/1.t 1'345 G~n"'lral Ho1s1-rorthy, n'.",r Co..,,.,rrider o+> t e 4th Jndi8n I'ivis:ior,
c;:il.l,'ld on G""n~r,,1 Clr-r'k. G•w~r..,1 TTnlsvrorthy is r11rlPc:i11..,. Genr"Jr..,l Gr-llo'''r;r,
.,.,,10 ·•rs r1!t i"l t"',.,-rorrril~r ,·+".ln the old Division Co,.,~1!'.'ndor hrd his foot blo'·m
of'f bir f' box min~. Gc11err-1 G1Pr 1: crnt~nu'"'c1
tr -i.ft"lrnoon ..,nc~ took P short '""O 11-c.
.,,j_t]-,
prl•in;"'trr>tive r-ntt~rs c'!11rjng
At l '70() f'o11:r Brr zilfr '1 o-''fic~rs "rro hn.r b"len servi n- 1rit}i th(") Ferilriu~rtP.rs
pj_+'th /\rrw CfH11") to F''r thl"Jir rt";lf"lCts t,, G~n ~rrl Cl.rr1r rr~ or to 1-,1:ivjni=; for Al-::t~rs, 'Ji-. ,r~ the7r ,dll pr".lrrre to rMf-"live ri B:rt-zilirin Corrs tlirt ,-ill rirriv~ in
~forth ~ fr:i CP rrithjn trie n ,xt f 'r ...,,mtrs.
1
At 1R1O r.~n~rrl A. 7 ""xnnr1 er, l'lCCCH'1T[ln:i,~d hv G"'....,A,r~l L,.,,-nj_tz")r, cr""'e to th'!
Co,,,,.,,.
..,,.,,.,,d;n~ r.,..nr>r~1 1 s h t r:1.rl vmt -lnto ir"'0d:l:--t~ ccri:"cr1mce -":1th r.e 1,rrls Clrirk
and Grnenth--r re7rdinr tJ:,n n ct ion ,-,t C0 ssino. Shortl7 riftcr G<1ner~ 1 Alexnnclcr I s
ar:rivl'll, (}en-;r:-:,1 LA.esc, CoM- :-,ndinr; 0-"lner..,1 o-<' "":i ,.,ht!~ Arr''", rnd on~ of his staff
off; cr"Jrs rir~jv,.,d to r,rrt:i cir-=it" in tr,~ ,1; ,cussion. At 1010 th·, crn-"'~r~nc~ '"n 'ed,
P'10 C11'!nerrl Clr•rlr !">'7.(~ hi~ Ch;"lf of Stpff', ,r;t:r Pi.res, rl")rrin"ld jn t,hc con:f'ercnce
roori p110 discussed ~vents ,.,} ich hrd tr.,,nsr,irt"ld durinr- tre 7-Pst hour.
1
0
cuss
,Aft"'r '"'1.lf'f ir ('.,..,,~r."l Glrr 1r dociderJ. to t~lrC' rt brief "Trll• r-nc' tc f'1irtr9r r1is'"1 7 tr Gen~rPl f1r, 1 "lntli"'r th') d~vclorr"1nts of the day.
�"It b~CP!"'~ rrrnr~11t tori~v, in r,y conversFtionn ,fith General "F'r'"'ybl"lrg,
thnt t)1c rre,.,. 61"lB1Pnd Div-l <Jio"Y'I h,d ,hot itP bolt, PS ""!11 . s the Inrin 11 Division,
and thnt the British Hir-;h Co,..ri!'_ncl '7PS r~luctE1nt to t 11ro= the '7Sth Dj_v:5.sion into
tr~ C" ssino r>ren . -Pr-~yb~rg nnnur-1.ifiedl~v reco-:yv:mchd thrt t -i attac1· cense • nd
'
th1:1t the Ind; "'DS on Hnnf!mnn ' s Hill bl'>, '"7 thrrnv'TI. T [1 r-reec' b11t 1rno1•rj_n..,. th 0 t
Alex..,.,11rler ,rras ~nrout" to tl is hencrpJ.rirt~rs, T told li'rnyb,.,rg thr>t I ''Ould conflrn
T"'Y orcl ~r to hi to withrr~r t}11"l Hanr>;nA.n I s Tiill fore"' .
llAll"lXFlnrler r1 -id not cor,."' to tH_s hePr-1qu,..,rt~rs hut •-r,mt clirect to ?r<~yhl"lrg
and S"lent th~ dnv. n"" r'°'turnnd hP-re c1t 1810 Pnn cr,lled r> ,, t'!tin~ r" t:r Leese 11.nd
.,..,ys"llf. He hr-tl')c1 to coll o-ff tho rittr,ck but f0lt th,,.,t tl•e Mew Zer,lr>n°ers had
l--1'1Pde no rror;rcs<J rn(1 hnc no furt:rl"lr off~nsive riction . Fe 1meTT tris to hr, the
cr>S/'>, vrith th"'l 4tr Tnd:i.en nivision. J n•1 convinced trat t}1 e rJew Zealnn( ers hr>Vl"l
n0t br,en -fi..,htj_nr_; tonri cj onsly j_n t 0 ci.ty, but I ,,rpnted tr"' r~co,...,.,,,~ndr,tion to
(
cr-i lJ. ot'f the f1ttack to cor,P'J fro,,, the British, 11s [111 troops involv d ,., re Bri tish .
"It ·ras rlecidl',ld by A1c,a.,nrl~r rt tonipht 1 s :"~"ting thrt the Hrn,.,,-irn 1 s I-fj_ll
eroup would b"l =ithdre,m but if rossibl~ to r,aj ntnin n S'7P.11 rost in thr>t Prt"'P;
thrit Hill 1113, the rP "lror>d strition ""nd t},"" -rr3s"mt line in Cr>ssino he ,.,.,intriined;
th::-t t_ l"l t 1.rnov~r fro!"' Fifth to T<~j_~hth Arr1fos ,ould tr1r~ rlnce irr .dfrtAly PS arrPno;n.d b~t ,Mn I.eese rinrl "1YS"'1f . ,.le heve rlecidcd thr>t tJ, is rrill tP1-c~ rl<>ce "t
noon Sunrlny, Parch 26. Leese "'ill rut tho 78th Division in to reljeve the 4th Indian 1mcl th" /+th Brj_tish Division to r~li~VI" th~ '3rd DH. (Frt'.'lnch) .
1
1
"I l'T' ,-,or 11.nd ~ore convinccrl, rnd so is /\.lexander rind Lees~, tbrit the coriinr;
bi? attrick of th!<) t .'"'o r-r,...,jes cPn not he riricle h~for'3 Mrq 1st ['nd tl·at ,.,h~n it
does t111.-,,., rlricA, insterid of the T'ifth t-r~y exccutinfl' r subsi0i8ry role, it '"ill
h1we to cBrry tr~ br>ll throu~r t} '3 nountnins r- s ·~w,1, for I ny, of the rlefinite
opinion th,.,t the --r;;irhth Arrw vrill not ridvance throur;h the Liri Vri lJ.ev P-XCept as
asqist~r~ b:,T the Fifth Arny attack.
1
1
"I hritc t o see the Cr-ssino c;ro ·r -flop . It has been ,, !"'ost difficult sHul"tion thr>t T h"'V'-' been in , due to the f,.,ct thnt r>ll troors jnvolv~d 1r·ere British
, itJ.-, a British chrnn~l of corriand · ,xt ,nding -f'rom Uex->n<ler, in 'tany inst1:1nces,
dire c t to "F'r~·rberg . The Ner-r ZePl.,.,nc'ers a.n<l TncHr•ns hnv"l not f0ught vrell . FreyberP-, T'l'ht1r~ri.s h~ is ti courp r,;cous nnr coor~rntive corrn;:i,nder, j c1 11oefully <foficient j_n j_nt~lli.<;enc~ . 'R"i.s nritisr suboroi11<"'tes do not --irlriirc his leadership,
And it hPs b~en nn nnhapr,Y situ,..,tion since Alexrinrler crent~a 1-i'reyhJrg ' s rrovisionRl corps. '!;'re,rberP" is not 'l_llfllif'i--ir! to oorinanr it, nor fo~s he hPve the
staff to i""rl"!M(•mt his in- tructions. r1y on~ ,·,orry is tho.t n,vers J-,,-,fl fr-il-id to
portr"Y tl~~ trur, rictu:r~ to thf"-? r~orl<1 in the '.'lnr Deprrt~,cnt . In fret, I nn
convinced 0f thnt .
1
0
"I p~, riost --inxious to "'tart th" r~ or~P11:ization , for J
AM .ri cr,ns ann Frencl- toi:;et}l')r we vrill PdVPnce . "
1
pr,
sure th<>t r-Titl1 the
r
�Two important messages of the day are as follows:
Personal from Devers to CJark. RN l:?814. "Is Eagles still in cor1rn.and of
the 45th Division? Is there any danger of his being removed bPcause of sickness? If there is a chance of McLain I s ComlTll'lnding the Division, Ms.rshall desires th::it he be consulted as to his rersonel rreference as to remrdning with
the 45th or going to another Division in UK with view of commanding it."
Personal from Clark to Truscott . RN 5719. "Inquiry has been received
from War Department as to availability of McLc'dn to commtmd Division in UK.
Before replying, tell me of EP.P-les 1 health. Is there nny ch1mce that Eagles
can not continue on account of health? If so, McLain should be held for
possible cor:imand 45 Division. If Eagles in good health, will recommend McLain
for ill( assignment with view of la.ter comrianding a Division there."
*
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*
PRESENZANO--MARCH 24, 1944--At last nj ght 1 8 mnet1 ne GenerAl ClArk invited
General Alexander, ris aide, Ceptain Grjmsley, General Lemnitzer r>nd General
Clark's British aid0, CPptain Lnmpson, to breokf[lst, and the conversation
at the t,able centered around GenerAls Alexancer, ClPrk and Gruenther, who
discussed mainly the rresent st~tus of the Italian ct:unpnign. At the completion of the breakfast Generfll Alexander, }-,is n:ide 11nd General Lemnitzer proceeded forward to the comJll..and post of General Leese and from there to General Freyberg 1 s Headqwrters.
Before leavinp: the Fifth Army command post at 0950 from the landing
strip, General Clark c:rent the early part of the mornj ng disposing of Bdmjnistrntive TTR tters in hifl vRn.
The Army Comnander visited the 88th Division at its front ljne rositions
on the left flank of the Fifth Army front today, making his first formal call
on this Division since its arrival in Italy.
Arriving Rt the 88th airfield, General Clark was met by l'Tajor General
Sloan, Division Commander, and after visiting the command rost he went to the
command posts of all three regiments and conferrPd with the Regjmental CommA.nders. Although the R8th Division hr-is been in tJ-ie line for approximately
two weeJrs, jt has seen little nction, gj nee it is in a sector thr>t h1rn been
extremely quiet. The Division hns had an.excellent oprortunity to become
indoctrinnted into battle action because of the ros~ tion j n wM ch it VTP s
plnced.
•
·
Flyinr b"ck to his commPnd post by cub Generrl Clark reached Iresenzrrno
at 1?30 and immediP.tely 1"ent to luncb an0 discussed l'is trip vri th General
Grnenther during the rreal.
The nfternoon vas spent in conference ·i:i th ,mrj ous HeF>drpmrters Section
Chiefs and in disposing of vital paper 1·rork. At 1620 General Clrrk flew·
over Nnples and around tr e slopes of Mount Vesuvjus so hP- could view f'rol'l the
air the damage caused by the volcano's eruption. After this aerial reconnnissance of the volc1mo rrea, General Clnrk landed Pt Car,odicMno airport, }Japles,
�where he WPS net b;v his cn.r r'1.d tflken to "'faples . He had dinner vrith three of
his Hest I oint classmPtcs - Colonels Tully, M2.rkoe and Nygaard, returning
lrter in the evening to his cor,mand post .
Following are the importnnt messages of the day:
ersona.l Truscott to Clark. R:T 1259 . "Mess~t=;e from FRO, AAI, #783 to
PR g, received 2350 yesterdry, states CPssino battle has been called off but
withdrawPl will not be completed for 4~ hours and thAt the w~thdrawal of
units from 435 and 202 "'ill be difficult 11nd will be made !'lore so if any intention reaches enemy before completion, also states this to be off record
background . I have received no word f'roM you relAtive to calling off Cassino
ba.ttle and aJ11 surprised thr>t stAff ch:mnel should receive such informHtion
before I do . · Request you inform me whether or not TRO message states facts .
Termination of battle under circumst:rnces indicated hRs serious implications
here . "
Persorn:1.l Clark to Truscott . R'l 6701. "I am ristounded thrit AAI FRO is
communicating direct with your fRO and have rrode ~trong representations thPt
in the future all such communic11tions will be sent by my Headqw=irters . Reference your 1259. I issued instructions that j nformation concernj ng Cassino battle be sent you last night but through staff error you were not advised. Only change in battle of Cassi no i"' withdrawal of troops from hill ·
435 , which we hope to accomplish tonir,ht. Their strength has bP.en reduced
so as to make an attnck on the monastery impracticable. Hill 193, the rf'ilroad station Rnrl the bulk of Cassino will be retained with the troops as now
disposed . Effort to eject Boche from his remaining few locnlities in Cassino will continue. Impetus of the attack Las died down due to exhaustion of
troops ·nvolved. Do not understand the serious implications which this has
on your situation. Wish you would be tbink.:.ng of an eRrly attack on Cfaterna
in order that '.',e ray d-iscuss it when -I come up in the next day or two . Th::nning out on your front would appear to make such an attack practicable."
*
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FRESE1'JZAN6--r,iRCH 25, 1944--After cispatch:ing important adm:i.nj strative rn:i:ers,
General Clr-irk rnade a study of a ffemorcnduPJ submitted by General Brann, Arr":Y
G- 3, concern:·ng Fift}1 Ar1:ry operations . At 1130 Captain Lindsay V
Jrtson, a
French officer who Met General Ckrk Pt the beach at Cherchel when he landed
by submarine , came to pay his respects to the Gerieral . General Beucler and
Lt . Col . Draper accompanied Captain \latson to the Genernl 1 s van. General
Clark and Cartain ' Ptson reminisced on this hazardous adventure, and General
Clark signed his narne on a thousand-franc note which already bore the signature of Bob Murrhy and other persona.ges at this historic meeting. Shortly after Captain WAtson left, General Keyes reported to General Clark and lunched
with him . After lunch both of them went to Genera.l Clark 1 s van where they
discussed the regrouping of the Fifth Army and its future plans . After General Keyes left General ClE.1.rk bunied himself with admjnistrative rretters, took
a short nap and then, accompanied by Lt . Col. Dra:rer , walked to the village
of Fresenzano . The climb up to the village was noteworthy in thRt it was made
in a brisk wind and blinding snow flurry . Upon his return, General ClRrk
signP.d so!'le decorations and cor.iP1endations and Pt 1g15 received Ernie Iyle,
)
)
�Vt t
1
Scripps-Hovmrd press correspondent, Ed Kermedy of the Associated J ress,
Sherman Montrose, Chief of the Fhotowaphic Pool and Lt. Col. Clark, PRO
Chief. This was an informal gathering, 11nd aftervmrds the entire party
had supper with the GenerEil. Du:d ng dinner General Clark exr lained that
the Fifth Army was now taking up a new +'rant on tre left flank and disclosed, off the record, to the corresronr' ents thnt the Fifth Army was receiving the 85th Division and it would also receive Headqwrters of the 4th
Corps and there was a po'.:'sibility that another American Division would join
the Fifth Army within the next few months. The correspondents asked a number of questions, including a . general evalu::1tion of the situation at the Cassino and Anzio regions, and he answered trem frankly but not for publication.
A very friendly atmosphere rreva~led throughout the evening. The correspondents left at ?030, and General Clark retired to his vrn n1:i th GEmeral
Keiser for further discussion of the day.
General Clark dictated the following materjal for foclusion in his
diary:
11 My
belief that the New Zealand and Indian Di visioYJ.s did not fight
well during the Cassino battle hes been further strengthened as a result of
the withdrawal of Indian troops from Hangman's Hill in suf'ficient strength
to warrF1.nt an assault on the monl'lstery itself. Rereated efforts of the New
ZeAlanders to reach Hangman 1 s Hill or to make nny progress in the town failed.
Reports from Freyberg and tee New Zealand Commanders were thrt the troops
could not advrnce. However , all the troops on Eangman 1 s Hill car.1e off the
hill last night without any di1'ficulty f'rom enemy action. Arparently the urge
to attPck up t]:-,e hill WP.S lacking. I a!'1 conv:i need that the New ZeA.land
troops in the tovm were roorly lead 11nd shm•1ed absolutely no offensive
sp:irj t. From apprmci mately Uie ffrst day of the Cassino sho,, the Indinn Division had totally lost its offensive rower. I attribute this, in greBt
part, to the defeatist attitude ::,nd lack of initfr,tive of its commander,
General GaJ lo,ray."
The Army Commander today dispatched a letter to the Corrmrndfog General,
NAT0TTSA recorrirending the promotion of Lt. Col. R. J. 17ood , executive officer
:ind rrincip=tl assistant to the Army G-3, to the rank of Colonel.
*
*
*
SAN MARCO--lVfARCF 26, 1944--After taking co.re of the accumulation of lPst night I s
important r,11rers, General Clark left his oommand rost for Harles , y.rhere he
dined with sever.!1.l of his West r oj_nt classmates - Colonels T-Tr,rkoe, Tully .
and Nygaard - and then left to join General Gruenther at the Officers' Rest
Center for dinner and the evening.
Imnediately following the General's departure, hi::i Pides and tre enlisted
rnen of his section broke camr i:md set ur his new rommand post in the vicinity
of $an M&rco.
*
*
SAN T,Llu:"1CO--nARCH 27, 1944--General Clark remA.ined at the Officers ' Rest Center at Sorrento today in coMpany with General Gruenther. Viork continued
�today on setting up trie now cornand rost and by sundown the CoMManding Gene ral ' s Section was comrletely orgnniz0d n.nd ready for operation.
Word was received today that General Giraud , Comnander- in-CMef of the
French Expeditionary Forces , would CPrie forward tonorrow afternoon to inspect
French units of the Fifth Army, nnd arrnngements were mule for h..;m to see the
Army CoPLrnander at the Fifth Army conmand post at 1630 .
The following import ant mess,ges were received today :
rersonal Devers to Clark. RN F 23198 . "I am submitting to GHQ , War De partment proT11otion recoT'lmendations for the rromotiom; of O'Daniel, Bank,
Sherman nnd JJiblo for vacancies existi::ig in this theater • .l\.lso I am subnittinP" tre n.-.,me of Tucker for rroT11otion providing a vacancy esists :in the United
JUngdom or elsewhere with the statement that Tucker is a ccomranying the 504
J'arachute Infantry Regiment to 'ill( . I hn.ve told General iiarshall that I realize
that we have T.
Brown and Rufus Ramey to yet absorb and that it is my intention to absorb thAm as soon [1S they have rad a little battle experience by attachment to divisions of Fifth Army, but that I do not feel tho.t their presence
in the treater should deny Sherman his pronotion. 11
•<.
AFI'Q to All Concerned . R'J F23714. "Herewith jnfornation requested in
your SD 608 dat ed 26 f:arch . This HeadquPrters hes asked AG1ilAR to ship maximum
possible number of J,ersonnel of 91 Div direct to Italy. Equipment is planned
for shipP1ent direct to Italy on UGS 39 . rresent jndfoations are that 10 , 000
personnel will r.iove direct to Italian or Sicilinn ports with remainder to 7forth
Africa ports . The latter will be transshipped to Italy. Estimate that Division l'dll clone Italy approximately 15 May and will require 1 month I s shakedown
before it can be orerational. 11
*
*
*
SMT Ml\RCO--MARCF 28 , 1944- -General Cl['lrk returned from Sorrento at 1230 today
where he riad rassed Sunday and n;onday with General G:ruenthP-r . The brief sojourn that the General had at the Rest Camp stowed that it hnd done him much
good . Shortly after lunch the Generr->.l vrnrked on iT'lport~nt rilitary dj spatches
tm.til 1630. At tlwt time General Giraud. , accomranied by GenerP.l Juin and
Colonel ICammerer , came to confer with General Clark . General Gruenther and
Lt . Co.ls . Draper and SuthcrlFnd were also rresent . The conference resulied in
a discussion between General Giraud and Gener1:1l Clerk for the next great offensive oper ation of the Fifth Army.
General Giraud presented to General Clrrk a 1rorosed plen for coord{nated /
offensive operl'.tions between the French and Ar.mricans j n conjunction vrith that
of the British Eighth A:r:my to t ,e right of the Fifth Army. The rlan vras based
on the worst possible situntion; namely, thnt the British Eighth Arrr1y would
not crack the Cassino line . r orces ava:l lnble to the Fifth ArMy were four
French divisions, one mountain , two infantry and one motorized division not
yet arrived in Italy, two groupes of Tabors and three AmericP.n infantry divisions , exclusive of bridgehead forces . General Giraud proposed that one French
mountain division , in a reriod of four days , would negotiate the mountainous
crests via Luga , Spigno , retralla , Ruaz zo to Ii:.fi. He emphasized thet this
mountain division must reach its objective within four days, due to the fact
�that all of its supplies , wa t er , materiel , amnmnition , food , would have to be
carried by mules . In conjun ction with t}, is operation , another French mountain force would proceed from Ausonia toward Esperia , followed by the t wo
r emaining French divisions . Simultaneously, the three American divisions
would attack :tn column along the co2stal road from Minturno toward Gaeta .
The pr ogress of the American divisions would be facilite.ted by the fact that
t he French mountain division, nith Itri as its objective , would so surprise
the Germans that they would be forced to withdraw rapid l y , thereby not having
t ime to thorough l y mine the coastal approach . This coordinat ed offensive of
the Fifth Army vmuld have as its object ive the north- south communication
r oute from Itri t o Ceprano a..'1.d Arce . G,:meral Giraud believed that four days
after the mount ain division arrived nt Itri it would. take an additional fif teen days for the Fifth Ari:1y objective to be reached , due to the fact that
once the surprise of the movntai n divi sion had worn off the Germans would
more determinedly resist the seizure of the Ceprano- Arce objective . He bel ieved tha.t one month after this objective had been reached the Fifth Army
w01ild be in Rome . He believed that there was the possibility thrt once this
objective was reached the !"rermans would disengage some of t}1eir forces at
the bridgehead to meet the Fifth Army ' s threat toward Fros:i.none . At th5.s par ticular point a determim"d offensive action by the bridgebead forces would
force a general Gernan withdrawal toward Rone . General Giraud wished to emphasize that this vrhole plan was based on the success of this mountain division seiz:i.n g Itri, seizing it within four days and by surprise. He felt
that this mountainous country would not be strongly defended by t he Germans ,
nor would they anticipate that any of our forces could negotiate them in any
type of offensive ac~~ion . He realized that the terrain was very difficult
but that such an offensive was possible and could be carried 01,t . At the
same ti:ne he stated that the Eighth Ar1:1y must launch an attack at Crssino .
If the attad: of the Eighth Army was s uccessful so muct' the better , but as suming that the Eighth Arr,~y could not advance f'l'l st th8 Cassino line, he
still felt that a successful Fift:h Army offensive reaching the rain objective would force the Germans to withdraw from the Cossino sector to the northvrest .
The quest i on of the da.te of attaclc aro13e , and General Giraud felt that
snch an offensive➔
not be launched before the 1st or 5th of ti<Jy for two
reasons ; that the
French division being brought in would not arr5ve
before April 15th and vrould require a week to organize itself , and that such
an attack in the mountains would require a good moon which woul d not appear
until t ht) 1st of May. He , therefore , s et a date for this offensive to be
between the 1st and 5th of May. General Giraud a l so felt th;, t by seizing
tliis objective the port of Gaeta would prove of immeasurable assistance in
s upplying a further push toward Rome ; that after the port facilitie s had been
cleared for vess els to debark supplies it i:rould considerably lessen the time
of jnland suppl y routes to maintain offensive orerations .
~11'~
General Giraud made a further staternent that this offensive action , if
successful , might conceivably end the war in two ways . First , it would be a
great tactical setback for the GArmrns , and , seoondly, the seizure of Rome
would be a great political victory. At the sartLe time , a successful Russian
offensive from the east and a successful cros::dng of the channel by Allied
forces would require that the Gerr'l8.ns use reserves either to resist the Allied
offensive a cross the chrmnel or a successful Russia n offensive . Confronting
�all three of these situ:·tio11.s, he believed th::>t it would result in a military defeat to the German Army. Sud· a plan, as discussed by GenerPl Giraud
and General ClPrk , would require vigorous a11.cl courageous offensive Pction
and quick cleaning up and folJ.owing through of those divisions in the re2r .
The p~an as rresented by General Giraud is submitted here in its general
scope only and not in detail. Only gener11.l riirections nf tre attack rre mentioned and in a broad sense o-f' tre maneuver . General Clark ,v:i_shed to point
out to Gener~ 1 Grr aud that he real 1 zed thnt t P- G0rman s •rP.re a smart enemy,
and they had so d:i sposed their troops so that f'rom onr rresent 1~ nes they
would 11.ot cl.isAngage any forces from tl-ie bridge}· en.d to meet nn AHied attack.
Eowever , he did agr0e thet if the Itri - Arce objective was reached tLe Ger1
I'l.< ns ~id1t coYJ.ceivably withdraw sc,me of its bridgehead forces to n eet this
threat. General Clark then tLanked General Glraud for his tacticel e'<y·osition and stated thn.t his staff r·1d thnt of the French would co'1.sider this
plan in more detailed nnd joint confere ces .
After Generals Giraud and Juin lF.ift , General TJicCreery, Corinancler of Britisb lC Corrs, ceme to ray his resrects to General Clnrk. General Cl8ri: yrosented to G9nernl r'c'Jrflery a personal lettPr , tt•anking l''iP' and corunendinB h2.m
:'or his out stand~ ng v:ork under Genernl Clark I s cor-r1aric . Ge ,1ernl Clark stBted
that there WE"s a rossibi1ity that Gener£' 1 '1cCreery m.- ght be givon A cor1mand
at t1,e beachhead; tlmt he recommended that le take a B1-it:i sh Corr s once the
beac head force initiated. a lnrge scale offensive action . Ge erEl licCreery
appeared to be g,:muinely sor:ry to leave General ClarJ.:- 1 s comnand and eave the
aprearance of being none too srtisfied with '1is new assignnent uncler the
;.ightJ1 Army. He extended to G,::_merals Clrr}· and qruenther an j nvitcktion to
din..ner after Ms return from a tvro or trree days I rest at Sorrento . Generals
Clar ancl Gruenther accerted when General HcCreery v ould nn.me the date .
1
After Gennral ricCreery 1 s co"t+'err-mce , Generr ls Clr r'l-:, Keiser, Drn.nn Rnd
GrnenthPr asrienl)led in tJ- e con""'erence rut for, a before-din'1er drink and dis cussed U•':l talk with Gen0ral Giraud . General Clr.r'l.- rrdteratecl a statement
thr,t he mr>de to General G:iraud I s question of what forces would be evailnble
to tre 'Rrj tish Eighth Army. General Glarl: 1 s re~~ly ,,.rs that trey ,,rould have
sorie Folish troops, S0''1e Canad:.an troors , 'Jew Zealand troors, Indian troops
and rerhars sorie r:ngB sh , and furt er that tl e I olj sh and Canadians would
probably bear the brunt of the Rttack. The fcmr eenerals nnd Colonels Sutherlt:>nrJ and Draper bad dinner together . Gf:meral CL"'rk broke out three bottles of
".'rhite wine which tie decided , after drinking, vras del'cious . The ul,ite _wjne
was fror'l Verona . A:"ter supper General Clar\-- vent bacJ.< to } · s van to v•ork on
more adrrr'cn:t strr tive rat tors .
0
General Cl8.r·: today recei vr.~d He folJ.owing c2ble frori General Devers:
11 I have just rnceived tl-e fol1owbis eyes only cable which I am
paraphrasing to you:
'1'J :"?3?86 .
"Late Secretary of the War Department General Staff, Colonel William T.
Sexton, is enroute to your theater. He has taken course at Fort Sill and been
assigned to a Division during recent Louisiana maneuvers. As able member of
division on duty with artillery, I now want him attached to a United St8tes
Division in the line in Italy, not as a liaison officer or observer. He can
be made subordinate to a junior in rank as his assignment is to be made without
regard to his rank.
�l15
"To offset his long service to me here in the office, I want to give
him the experience in field as a final step. Thereafter he is on his own.
We will assigr,. him to a division training in United States or you can keep
him."
"On Sexton's arrival I will assign him to Fifth Army."
*
*
*
SAN MARCO-•MARCH 29, 1944--General Clark left for Anzio at 0900, accompanied
by General Saville, Commanding the XII Air Support Command, to confer with
General Truscott. He visited front line units and just prior to his taking
off from the airfield at 1625, about 20 German bombers swooped down on the
beachhead, bombed it and returned. They were met by heavy flak, three of
the bombers being downed. One British Spitfire fell very close to the airport, killing a pilot. Shortly after this raid, Generals Clark and Saville
flew back in their two L-5' s to the command post. They arr1ved at about
1710.
After General Clark returned, he invited Misses Berney and Moen in for
a drink and supper.
*
*
*
SA~T rM.RC0•-11.ARCH 30, 1944-General Clark V10rked on administrative papers,
until 0930 when the Army G-3, General Brann, visited his van. After discussing future operations in the van Generals Clark and Brann went down to
the G-3 Section where General Clark studied with his G-3 a relief model of
the mountainous country which the Fifth Anny will confront in its next offensive action. General Clark was particularly interested in pointing out
to General Brann the boundaries between the French and the American forces
in the Fifth Anny zone of action. General Clark returned to his van and
worked on more administrative matters until he received General Sibert, G-2
of the 1st Army Group in the United Kingdom. General Sibert stayed for
lunch and was asked several pointed questions by Generals Clark and Gruenther. General Clark wanted to know how many German di visions it l'lOUld take
before OVERLCRD would be called off - that OVERLCRD was so intermingled
with political factors that it would have to go on._ General Clark wanted
to point out that air power was not enough, as learned by the lesson at Cassino. A discussion of how well the coastal regions were defended was also
brought up, and General Sibert believed that they knew practically all of
the installations but that it was impossible to be sure of each one as a
certainty.
General Clark wanted to know the rate of di visions landed per day, and
General Sibert answered approximately two. General Clark believed that, as
a result of his previous landing operation experience, it was important
that troops be landed quickly and in sufficient strength to force a beachhead. Another qw stion asked was on how wide a front were the landings to
take place, and General Sibert responded about 4fJ miles. General Sibert
believed that they could expect a. counter attack by' one infantry division
about 48 hours after the landing and a large scale collllter attack within
�four or
forces.
stating
and the
t
five days which would have to be net with determination and superior
General Clark closed the conversation in rather a light vein by
that he would gladly gi.. ve as opposition the Herman Goering Division
1st Parachute Division which he has faced during the Italian campaign.
After lunch General Clark, accompanied by Lt. Col. Draper, went by jeep
to the II Corps command post at Piedmonte where he conferred with General
Keyes at his van. Just prfor to leaving the II Corps comnand post General
Clark and General Keyes climbed up in the rear of the II Corps command post
where an excellent view of the future battlefield was revealed before them.
The route taken back to the Fifth Army command post was around the coastal
road through Mondragone. On the return trip General Clark stopped off at
the 38th Evacuation Hospital to see how their installe.tions were getting
along. They had been installed there for about ten days and were in excellent shape. They had only seven patients in the hospital.
Upon his return to the command post General Clark went to his van and
worked on more papers until General Sullivan and Chaplain Ryen came for supper. Generals Clark, Gruenther, Keiser, Sullivan and Chaplain Ryen had a
before-dinner drink in the conference hut. The principal topic of conversation was American cemeteries; the fact that in order to conserve wood the
white crosses ·had been done away with by the w~r Department, being substituted by a straight stick or wood flanged out at the top. The discussion
also led to present regulations which have forbade cemeteries or graves
being photographed end the inexcusable manner in which relatives of soldiers
who have died in be.ttle have been delayed in receiving details or their
death and where they are buried. General Sullivan said that he would get a
letter off to Washington stating the problem and ma.king necessary recommenda•
tions to be certain that relatives were notified of circumstances surrounding
a soldier's death and where he was buried. The group had supper and later
returned to the conference hut. General Clark went to his van at about 2100,
worked on important dis~tches and retired.
*
i
*
*
SAN MARCO--MARCH 31, 1944•-General Clark arose early in order to be at the
French Expeditionary Corps command post at Sessa by 0830. He checked a few
important dispatches prior to leaving and left the command post at 0800, accompanied by Lt. Col. Draper. At the French 1!,'xped:i.tionary Corps he was met
by Generals Juin and Sevez. Led by General Sevez the party left in three
jeeps for the command post of the 4th DIM at Cescheto. From Cescheto the
party proceeded along a. rough and dusty road across the Garigliano to the
vicinity or Tiboldi where they dismounted and transferred to horses. Prior
to leaving Tiboldi, the PRO photographers and Sargeant Thomas, General Clark's
personal photographer, took a number of pictures of the General starting off
on horseback.
l
The party proceeded along a tortuous and rocky mountain trail to the vi.- I
cinity of Suio where they dismounted and went by foot about 500 yards to an
/
artillery observation post in this small village overlooking the town of Castelforte. This observation post was only a few hundred yards from the front
lines and afforded an excellent view of the ten-ain held by the enemy to the
�immediate tront. While in this observation post, General Clark, General Juin
and General Sevez discussed in detail the French d1.spositions, paying particular attention to the bridgehead held by the French across the Garigliano.
The activity along the front in the French sector has been confined mostly to
local patrol action by night. In front of the town of Suio the French extend
their lines a.bout 400 or 500 yards from the town by night. They w:1.thdraw
back into the town by daylight, during mich time there is little activity
except for mortar, small arms and artillery fire. The 2nd Moroccan Regiment,
with three battalions in the line, hold the left sector. The 6th Moroccan,
with two battalions in the line, hold the central sector. A regiment of dismounted cavalry with American mechanized equipment hold the right sector.
The party proceeded be.ck to their horses and again followed rocky, tortuous mountain trails to the 6th Moroccan eommand post. Colonel Buot de
l 'Epeine, Commanding the 2nd Moroccan Regiment, accompanied the pe.rty to the
6th Moroccan sector. There, Colonel Cherriere, Commanding the 2nd Moroccan
Regiment, met General Clark and discussed briefly with him the troops in his
part of the line. Colonel Cherriere had just received a minor wound to his
right wrist and was be.ck for full duty •
•
From this point the party left their horses, got into their jeeps and
returned to the Garigliano River over a mule trail which had just been improved into a jeep trail. In the mort time that the French hs.d been here,
they had transformed this British mule trail into a satisfactory jeep trail
by dint of hard and fast \llOrk. The party proceeded back to Sessa and arrived there at about 1130.
At the French Expeditionary Corps command post General Clark immediately
participated in a ceremony wherein he decorated seven French officers and two
enlisted men. The ceremony took place in the courtyard of Prince Umberto's
Palace. It was a very colorful ceremony and lasted for aQOut 30 minutes.
Among those decorated were: General Beucler, General Poydenot, General Guillaume and Colonel Pia.tte, all of whom received the Legion of Merit. One DSC
and six Silver Stars were given to the other officers and men for bravery in
combat. There were several absentees among those to be decorated who were
unable to attend inasmuch as they were hospitalized. After the decoration
ceremony General Juin had a very delightful lunch at which the following
guests were present: General Clark, General Ke:ye s, General Poydenot, General Carpentier, General Beucler, General Guillaume, Colonel Piatte, Col. KamJ merer, Lt. Col. Draper and Countess Duluart who is the mother of General
Gruenther's aide, Lt. Bajenow. She is a very charming French woman who heads
a mobile surgical unit which is doing excellent work for the seriously
wounded soldiers. Her hospital unit treats both American and French sold:i.ers
- the bulk being French. General Cl.ark had known the Countess in Oujda.
The guests at this luncheon left the table at about 1400, and General Clark
and Colonel Draper proceeded back to the Fifth Army command post where Gene. ral Clark worked on important military di spa.tches.
At 1530 he received Colonel Sexton, former Secretary to General Marshall.
Colonel Sexton is over here to gain combat experience prior to an assignment.
After Colonel Sexton's call, General Cl.ark looked at five combinations of uniforms for Fifth Army MP's and decided which one would be standard.
�Just prior to dj_
nner this evening General Clark had General Deford, General Brann end General Moran into the conference hut for a before-dinner drink.
The entire group then stayed for dinner. General Clark discussed with General Deford at great length the possibilities of air power in support of ground
action. General Deford gave some interesting facts and figures on air tombing
against Germany, the relative strengths of the German Luftwaffe end his ex•
periences in the Pacific where he oommanded bomber units which operated against
Attu, Kiska and Parima.shiro.
After dinner General Clark returned to his van where he conferred with
General Gruenther, worked on more administrative matters and retired.
�
Dublin Core
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Clark, Mark W. Diaries
Subject
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Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984.
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns.
United States—History, Military—20th century.
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950.
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The Citadel Archives & Museum
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Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
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CP Clark
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Mark W. Clark Collection
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English
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20
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Title
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Mark W. Clark Diary, March 16 - 31, 1944
Subject
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Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns
United States—History, Military—20th century
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from March 16-31, 1944.
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CP Clark
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The Citadel Archives and Museum
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1944
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Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1570
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Text
.
~
This is Volume VII of the War Diary of Lieutenant General
Mark
w.
Clark.
Volume I, covering period 28 June, 1942 to Sep-
tember 24, 1942; Volume II, covering period 25 September 1942
to 5 January 1943; Volume III, covering period 6 January 1943
to 6 June 1943; and Volume IV, covering period 7 June 1943 to
29 August 1943, are held in safekeeping at the Army War College,
Washington, D.
c.
Volume V, covering period August JO, 1943 to
December 31, 1943; and Volume VI, covering period January 1,
1944 to March 31, 1944 are being held in safekeeping in the Commanding General's safe.
�3
SAN MARCO-•APRIL 1, 1944--An early morning promotion ceremony was held at the
Forward Echelon, Fifth Army. It began e.t 0900. General Clark addressed the
45 officers,who were to be promoted1for a few minutes and then passed down
the line and pinned on their bars, leaves or eagles. The ceremony lasted
about half an hour. All of those promoted were Headquarters Fifth Army per•
sonnel. Immediately after the ceremony Eric Severeid, CBS broadcaster, visited General Clark. General Clark was astounded at his lack of understanding of the situation and problems on the Italian front. He talked to him for
about 45 minutes.
After a few Headquarters visits, General Evetts, Assistant Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, conferred with General Clark. Shortly after General
Evetts departed, General Clark went into conference with Generals Brann,
Gruenther, Tate and Keiser reference offensive operations of the Fifth Army
and the coordination necessary with the Eighth Army. Shortly after the conference General Brann went to the Eighth Army command post, submitting proposals for coordination between the Eighth and Fifth Armies. He returned
with the•. fu.11 concurrence and approval of the Eighth Arey of this plan, which
pleased and surprised General Clark inunensely. During the afternoon, General
Clark worked on administrative nntters and conferred with General Gruenther
on several occasions.
Major Metcalfe, PRO Section, was invited for supper. Generals Clark and
Gruenther discussed at some length with Major Metcalfe the correspondents'
viewpoint of the Cassino situation and criticized Correspondent Sultzberger's
over-estimation of the tonnage dropped on Cassino by the Strategic Air Force.
General Clark was very desirous that Sultzberger be straightened out on this
matter in case he might make any further statements on the .bombing of Cassino.
*
*
*
SAN MARCO-•APRIL 2, 1944-•The first Sunday in April turned out to be a very
spring-like day. General Clark worked on administrative mtters and held a
conference with Generals Gruenther, Brann, Keiser and Tate prior to attending
a meeting at AAI Headqua.r ters in Caserta.
At 0930 General Clark left for the Caserta conference preµired to spend
the following three or four days in Sorrento. The conference in Sorrento is
covered full7 at the end of this day's diary.
After the meeting, Generals Clark and Brann proceeded to Naples where
they had lunch with General Wilson, new Commanding General of the Penin~1lar
Base Section. After lunch the General oontinued on to Sorrento where he was
going to take a much-needed rest after the gruelling and trying days during
and following the Cassino attack.
The following notes pertaining to future operations of the Allied Armies
in Italy, covered at the meeting in Caserta, were compiled by Generals
Gruenther and Keiser:
"1. General Alexander opened meeting by calling upon BGSI Airey for estimate of the enemy situation. This was given as we knew the situation existed.
�The BGSI's conclusions were:
a. That the German 90th and 29th Divs would be utilized to defend
their switchline.
)2.
That the enemy will defend strongly routh of Rot!le.
,2.
That the ma.in .front (Cassino) will probably not be reinforced.
"2. The C in C then went into a general discussion am reading of the
directive •Future Operations' 48/G (ops) 25 NE.rch 1944.
'
"He covered the tasks for each Army a?Xl V Corps as in Par. 1, and
the breakdown of tasks as in Par. 2; stating that these tasks 1110uld not neces•
sarily follow in the order as arranged in the directive.
"In summation and deducing a time for the operation he stated that
due t-o troop movements, regrouping of the armies particularly the Eighth :Army
and V Corps that it was evident that it could not occur prior to the first
week in May. He asked the Army Commanders a.bout this timing to which General
Clark answered that the Fifth Army could do it any time ~fter 25 April; Gene•
ral Leese said Eighth Army oould not do it prior to 10 May.
"3. The C in C then discussed the phases of the moon which eventually
wound up in referring to an air drop (sabotage operations in mind) and the
)
availability of air transport. General Eaker replied to this that the air
transport oomma.nd had steadily been required to transfer its ships to other
theatres and that the chances of having more than one squadron (30 ships) were
remote. Those are all the transport ships available here.
"4. Next subject mentioned by C in C was the 'Timing of the Attacks' by
the Main Front and the beachhead forces. Would they be simultaneous or one
precede the other? The C in C stated he believed the main front attack should
be first. Reasons that this would draw troops from beachhead where the enemy
is strong and then when enemy has drawn troops from beachhead area the breakout from the beachhead could follow when the opportunity was evident.
"Both Army Comnanders agreed to this, GenerAl Clark stating that the
lead off should be on the main front with both the Fifth and Eighth Armies attacking simultaneously. General Leese also a.greed to that view.
"5. General Alexander next mentioned the date for the attack as probably
10 May and upon being questioned General Clark stated that the Fifth Army is
ready at any time; that is after 25 April, whereas General Leese, Eighth Army,
replied that he needed time for rehearsals and that the 10th of May was still
the earliest he oould be ready.
"6. The C in C then stated that he believed the main battle would no
doubt last a.bout a week before the position lossens up and that if the ma.in
front opens up on the loth that Anzio should be ready to push out four days
later. General Clark said that the beachhead forces could be set to go with
24 hours' notice and that he had not yet decided on extra divisions to go in·
there.
·
/
1
�s
"7. General Alexander then decided that D-day therefore was to be set
tentatively for 10 May; that the main front attack was to be delivered first
and that Anzio was to be prepared to push out on 24 hours notice any time
after 14 May and that the decision on extra divisions into the beachhead would
be given later.
tt8. General Eaker then said that in regard to the air he considered
both these fronts together as one battle and that the air could support both
fronts. He stated that it must be known that their attack was now going on
against the communications and that one month from now their effectiveness and
value at the time of our attack would be im. terially reduced. This would be
due to •war weariness' of personnel as well as probable future losses to OVERLORD and other theatres.
"9. General Clark next stated th~t he had been to Anzio two days ago and
that he had discussed the timing of the attacks with all commanders there and
that they (the oomrnarrlers) were all agreed that the timing plan (main front
attack to be first) was correct. He further stated that he wanted to place
CCB in the beachhead at an early date. That he had not yet decided on whether
to put in the 88th or 36th Div there and that he would reserve decision on that
matter until around 15 April. He further stated that if the beachhead attack
goes well it would be practicable to reinforce it at once with an RCT from the
main front with little trouble and thAt he would draw plans to do so.
"10. Admiral Morse next discussed the shipping situation and the Elba
mission. He stated that 26 new LCT 1 s were arriving soon with JO additional
ones now at Anzio (these need repair soon). There are also 50 LCI(L)'s in
the area end plenty of LCA 1 s. They have lifted for. 6000 personnel end 100
vehicles. The difficulty with Elba 190uld be a:fr cover which the Navy badly
needs for the operation.
"General Eaker replied air could not give the support. That air cover
now over the beachhead was a drain on them and even though reduced from 28 to
8 missions that they would not take on another air cover job such as Elba
even from groups in Sardinia or Corsica.
"11. Gen. Gammell said Elba planning was still going on et AFHQ.
not be undertaken unless the a:fr objection was overcome.
It would
"12. General Clark then stated that the 509th Para. Bn. was now coming
out of the beachhead and that plans were to be drawn as to its probable drop
to help Fifth Army operations. He indicated that they would need a little
training if possible and General Eaker remarked that only the one group would
be availRble and then only if it was not being used on other transport missions
or training missions now going on in Sicily.
General Alexander said go ahead and pJ.t.in to use them.
"13. General Leese stressed the importance of making the Allied troops in
Italy feel that they were a rart of the OVERLCRD force. General Alexander said
he would issue an Order of the Day covering this point.
"14. General Alexander next took up the 2d phases of the attack as stated
·~
�in the directive.
He talked about 'Speed and Punch'.
"15. General Cannon next asked if ANVIL was on or off. To this General
Alexander replied that he had no knowledge of it, but General Gammell, on
being questioned, inferred that from his impressions it appeared to be off.
"General Cannon remarked that if ANVIL is on then from D-47 the
AAI loses 2/3 of_its air support.
"Also, that if the armies are south of Rome we will lose
our air the next month and 60% of it within 6 weeks.
30%
of
\
}
"The present air plan to include 10 Mly is to:
"Cut lines of communication. The air is all out on this now. The
light and fighter bombers only to be used south of Rome. There is no need for
mediums oouth of Rome. They must go beyond. Air forces will be weaker on D
day than now.
"He believes the lirt for the 509th Par. Bn. can be handled. He
brought up the Elba situation again. The air can support the initial landing
l;>ut can't continue defense. May be coastal command can do it. Beyond Rome-control reverts to original plan, i.e. XII ASC to Fifth Army.
"16. Admiral Morse then remarked about the difficulties in defending
Anzio port because of:
~•
Increase in Limpits
]2.
Human torpedoes
,g.
Mines
"They do not want to man too many ports bece.use it is costly in
ships and personnel overhead and they haven't the defending craft necessary.
"17. General Robertson then discussed Q matters. He spoke of congestion
in the areas and to have armies agree to keep troops back until they actually
move in to attack.
"Also to get all unnecessary paraphernalia out of forward zones
such as laundries, bath units, etc.
"He stated that casualties are necessarily heavy in first few days
of attack and that for pla:rming purposes the A:rrrry Surgeons should be advised
of this and to have them plan accordingly. Camouflage of dumps etc. to be
done to hide direction or area of attack. Also have troops get rid of the
junk they have been collecting. He stressed the necessity of a drastic reduction in equipment to be carried wheh the pursuit actually begins.
"Support of air forces a major problem."
*
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�SAN MA.RCO--APRIL 3, 1944--General Clark enjoyed a very restful day at Sorrento.
During his absence, General Gruenther hB.d as dinner guests Maj. Gen. David
Barr, Chief of Staff to General Devers; General Tate, Fifth Army G-4; Col.
Barron, War Department Assistant G-4, OPD. General Barr and General Gruenther entered into a general discussion concerning the Cassino operation. General Barr stated thPt he knew the u. s. wa.s disappointed in the failure of the
Cassino attack and that he did not think the attack was followed up aggressively enough; that the casualty report did not indicate this. General Gruenther
cited the total casualties a"i about 2100, which surprised General Barr, who
did not think that they were tha.t great. The discussion brought out the difficulty facing General Clark in that all the troops involved were either British, New Zealand or Indian, with a few American troops part1cipating, such
as Engineers and Tanks. It was also brought up that General Clark could not
have relieved General Freyberg, due to his reputation and the political complications involved. General Barr asked if the Divisional Commanders went
forward to actively direct operations, and General Gruenther stated that to
his knowledge he didn't think that General Parkinson, Commanding the New Zealand Division did. As to the others, he was not sure, but in any case the re~
sults of the operation would not indicate that they did.
General Barr then discussed how in the last war when an important objective had to be taken it necessarily was costly in men and that in the Cassino
attack in order to capture the monastery heavy casualties should have been
expected. General Gruenther then pointed out the difficulty in replacements
for British divisions and other empire troops and said that that particular
subject would, and always has, come up when these troops a.r e employed.
*
*
SAN 111.ARCO•-AI'R.IL 4, 1944--General Clark remained at Sorrento and visited and
spent the night at the Isle of Capri. During his absence General Gruenther
had as his dinner guests General li:tartin, Anrty Surgeon; General Bowman, Army
Engineer; Colonel Avery, ~.rmy Inspector General; and Colonel Weaver of the PWB
Section.
General ATartin had just returned from Anzio and told how they were really
digging in the hospitals on the beachhead. The question of malaria control
was also discussed, and General Bmman brought out the fact that they would
get four of the seven pumps going in the Mondragone area to drain out the
marshy area. General Martin also explained that he would powder spray with
airplane this swampy area and then oil spray the ditches and other areas where
the plane spray would not be effective. He said that atebrine would be taken
by all personnel as of April 15th.
Colonel Weaver brought some samples of German propaganda with him and
pointed out that some of them were very well prei:itred and with a keen insight
into American psychology. Others, however, were completely ineffective. He
stated that our policy was educating the German with facts, with no t . ndency
e
to emggeration or bold statements. This policy is being pursued so that
when we oontinue our efforts, in increasing intensity, our propaganda will be
able to greatly affect German morale. He pointed out that the Russian type
of propaganda was so fantastic that German prisoners indicated that they
placed no concern nor belief in it. Colonel Weaver pointed out that we
wouldn't want our propaganda to be so oonsidered by the German •
..
,/'
�SAN MARCO--Al'RIL 5, 1944-•General Clark was still enjoying his rest a.t Sorrento and Capri. The following is a compilation of the casualties incurred
by the New Zealand Corps from 0600 hom:-s 15 March 1944 to 060o hours 26
March 1944: 26 officers and 261 enlisted men killed, 108 officers and 1474
enlisted men 'l'IOunded, 6 officers and 231 enlisted men missing.
The following letter 1VI'itten by General Clark to General Eaker is quoted
in full:
ttI understand that there has been some comment in the press that the unsuccessful outcome of the recent Cassino battle was due to the failure of the
Air forces to perform properly their tasks in the combined operation. I do
not share that view. I feel that the results obtained by the air bombardment
of Cassino were those predicted by General Saville, and I can assure you that
if there is any tendency to blame the Air Forces for the result of the operation, it has not been inspired by my headquarters.
"As I have told :vt,u before, it is my conviction that no aerial oombard•
ment can be expected to clear any fortified area of determined infantrymen
who are occupying well covered emplacements. In the last analysis our infantry must close with the enemy in order to achieve final victory.
"I desire to take this opportunity to express deep appreciation for the
excellent cooperation which the Fifth 'Army has always received from the Air
Forces under your command. They have already made a notable contribution to
our successes, and I am confident that we shall continue to receive effective
support in the battles to oome."
*
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*
SAN MARCO-•APRIL 6, 1944--General Cle.rk flew back by cub float plane from
Sorrento to Caserta lake where he transferred to a cub land plane and arrived
at the forward echelon at 1235. His total f'.l.y:l.ng time was about 42 minutes.
The General appeared completely rested, and it clearly showed that his three
days' sojourn at Sorrento did him worlds of good.
General Clark had as his guest for dinner General Forde who is being
transferred to the United States for work on ordnance matters.
General Clark's day was spent primarily on reading the accumulation of
dispatches, personal mail end other important administrative matters which
would bring him up to date after his short visit to Sorrento.
Colonel Robinson made a brief call on the General. He was formerly the
AA officer of Fifth Army and has been transferred to the 34th AAA Bri.gade in
the II Corps sector. After Colonel Robinson le:f't, General Bradshaw who had
returned from the beachhead called and paid his respects to General Clark.
He was invited to supper after a short conference with General Clark in his
van. After supper General Clark continued work on administrative matters and
retired early.
General Clark this afternoon received the following cable from General
Truscott:
)
�RN 044. "The average strength of British infantry battalions is a.s follows: 1st Division, 31 officers, 582 other ranks; 5th Division, 26 officers,
6o2 other ranks. The War establishment for Br:J.tish ba.tta.lfons is 36 officers,
809 other ranks. General Alexander stated, a.:rter the 56th Division was relieved, that battalions would be ma.intained at 30 officers, 700 other ranks.
In my opinion, the battalions are already dangerously low. Within a few days
hard fighting they will become so reduced in strength as to be ineffective,
just a.s happened to both the 1st and 56th Divisions dur:l.ng previous fighting.
Recommend that you take this latter up with the C-in-C a.nd advise me a.s to
the possibility of bringing these units up to strength."
*
*
*
SAN MARCO--APRIL 7, 19M.-- General Clark worked upon important military dispatches during the early morning, clearing the way for a da.y of appointments.
Spring-like weather prevailed today. General Clark received Genernl Dody at
1045. General Dody is taking over temporary connnand of the French Expeditionary Corps and ca.me to pa.y his respects to General Clark. They discussed
briefly General Juin 1 s absence from the Corps and the date of his expected
return. General Clark asked General Dody how his 2nd Moroccan Division was
getting a.long, particularly as to replacements, training and French junior
officer and non-commissioned officer personnel. General Dody stated he was
up to strength; that he had units undergoing srecialized training in mine warfare, special operations for river crossings and a.tta.cking in mountainous
country. General Dody complimented General Clark on the progress that he was
making in speaking French.
r
At 1300 General Leese and four of his staff officers, Ma.j. Gen. Walsh,
Brigadier Stratton, Lt. Col. Kent and Maj. Verney, came to a luncheon 'Which
was arranged in the Eighth Army Commander's honor. General Leese and General
Clark sat in the sun near General Clark's van so they could discuss together
future operations. The remaining officers and guests from the Fifth Army
Headquarters, General Gruenther, General Tate, Brigadier Stayner, Colonel
Britten, General Keiser, General Lemnitzer, Colonel Wood and Lt. Col. Draper,
went into the conference hut where they studied a SJSCial ma.p prepared by G-3,
showing genernl directions of attack, l:xnu:rlaries a.nd schemes of mneuver.
After this short discussion luncheon was served and was oompleted at about
1430.
A:rter luncheon Generals Clark and Leese came outside the hut where pictures were taken of the two together. At this point Colonel Darby, Commanding Officer of the Ranger Force and formerly of the 179th Infantry Regiment
of the 45th Division, carrie to pay his respects to General Clark prior to leaving for the United States with his Ranger veterans. It happened that Colonel
Darby's British decoration, the D.s.o., had arrived, and General Leese presented this high British award to him.
After the luncheon guests had departed for a visit to the Fifth Army
front, General Clark began immediate preparations on his speech for the Jewish
service of the Passover mich he was attending at Caserta at 2000 hours this
evening. During Genernl Leese's tour, Colonel Wood, Fifth Army G-3 Executive
Officer was wounded by a shell fragment.
�General Clark dined early and, accompanied by General Gruenther, left
for Caserta where he attended the Jewish Seder Service and made a very inspiring speech. Upon leaving the service General Clark noticed about 100
enlisted men who were unable to get inside. One or them asked if the General would address them, as they had not been able to hear his regular speech.
The General agreed and led the group to a vacant lot, spoke a few words to
them and then shook hands with all the men. The soldiers were impressed by
this thoughtfulness on the General's part, and some were heard to say, "Gosh,
I shook hands with General Clark, I won't wash my hands for a week."
General Clark returned and retired early to his van.
\A. S
_ ~ '1
:;z.,,
C<
,
e,,--c. t ... Q........:.-
Important messages of the day are as follows:
Clark to Alemmer. RN 8247. "Reports from VI Corps show average
.,,.
strength British infantry battalions as follows: 1st Division, 31 Officers,
582 other ranks; 5th Division, 26 Officers, 6o2 other ranks. In my opinion
the battalions are now dangerously low, and within a few days' severe fighting would become so reduced in strength as to be ineffective. Urgently recom\
mend serious efforts be made to maintain battalions war establishment strength."
Harding to Clark. RN CGS 3.30. "Your 8247 of 7 April. General Alexander
recently reviewed the whole question of allocation of British infantry rein•
forcements and decided that even with resources becoming available this month
it would not be possible to do more than make infantry battalions of land 5
Divisions up to 26 officers and 700 other ranks. Regret that at present this
cannot be done but draft is expected from UK shortly vm.ich should enable battalions of 1 and 5 Divisions to be mde up to above strength by about 20 April."
Truscott to Clark. RN T-005. "I need information a.s to oontemplated
operations as basis for planning here. Do you expect to come here by 9th?
If not, I would like to fly down and discuss this matter with you. Situation
continues relatively quiet, limited to patrol activity and artillery harassing fires. I am making strenuous effort to reduce enemy artillery fire on
beach a.nd port areas. So far we are making some ~gress and damage has not
been excessive."
*
*
*
SAN MARCO-APRIL 8, 1944-Up until 0945 General Clark worked on administrative
matters. At 0950, accompanied by Lt. Col. Draper, he took off by an L-5 plane
to Bagnoli where he bade farewell to tte 504th Parachute Regiment which was
leaving for England with an attached artillery battalion and composite service
group battalion. He decorated two chaplains of the regiment with bronze stars
and presented War Derartment battle streamers to the Jrd Battalion of the
504th for outstanding performances in the beachhead. He gave a farewell speech
to the regiment and conunended them arrl their Cornmarrl er, Colonel Tucker, for
their outstanding work with the Fifth Army. He also announced that Colonel
Tucker had been E\wa.rded the D.s.o. by His Majesty the King of England.
Before taking off at 1055, the General looked over the Bagnoli replacement
center with the Commanding Officer, Colonel Tenney. General Clark returned to
�l1
the forward command post and arrived at ll20. At 1155 General Devers, accom•
panied by his British aide, Colonel Campbell, arrived at the Headquarters.
Generals Clark and Devers conferred far about one hour before going to lunch.
The following points were discussed at lunch.
(1) The complicP-tions of the French political situation, with General
Giraud being replaced by Generf',J. DeGaulle as Head of the French Army and what
General Giraud's status will be in the future. No definite statements were
ma.de.
(2) The fact that General Devers was beginning to clear up some of his
base section hospitals in North Afr5.ca and that all hospital patients would
be returned directly to the United States. The long range plan was for
General Devers eventually to move his Headquarters from Alders to Italy to
relieve trans-shipping difficulties.
(3) The question of whether ANVIL was on or off. Specific answers were
not given, but the general trend was that ANVIL was not off but was dependent
upon the date set for OVERLORD, shipping that muld be available such as LST's
LCI's, etc., and the successes made by the Allied Armies in Italy in their
next offensive operation. The general opinion was that there would be a 45day delay after D day of OVERLCRD before a sufficient amount of shipping could
be sent down the Mediterranean for ANVIL or for further needs of the Fifth
Army for future operations.
After lunch General Devers left to visit the 85th Division oommand post.
Shortly after General Devers left, General Clark made immediate pl.ans to
take off for the United States for a ten-day visit. He had received a letter
from General Marshall, requesting that when the time presented itself he would
like to have General Clark oome to Washington for a brief stay. General Clark
plans to leave at 0900, 9 April, in General Eaker 1 s plane. He plans to take
with him Colonel Saltzman, Lt. Col. Smith and Sergeant Chaney.
At 1500 Lt. Col. Gray came up to review pending general oourt martial
cases. General Clark oompleted his ~rk with Colonel Gray and at 1700 General
Juin flew up from Capodichino on his return from Algiers to confer with General Clark. General Clark had in his van at the same time Generals Gruenther,
Brann and Colonel Saltzman. Generals Gruenther and Brann left, and Colonel
Saltzman remained with General Juin and General Clark. A general discussion
of the plans for future operations took place, and General Juin was told that
the Fifth Army staff and his staff would start w
ork immediately on the details
of the coming attack. General Juin then discussed what had taken place in
Africa. General Giraud's responsibilities will be nnterially reduced. General
DeGaulle has ta.ken over the duties as Army Commander with General Bethouard as
his Chief of Staff. General Giraud will be given some title which will oorrespond to om- Inspector General. He will be oonsulted on all planning for the
employment of the French troops. General Giraud does not like his new title
but it was perfectly clear that he w
ould be reduced to a minor role. Howeve;,
General DeGaulle did make it clear that he did not want to lose General Giraud
completely but would use him in some sort of an advisor capacity. Gmeral
Juin stated that he had General DeGaulle 1 s oomplete oonfidence and would re- )
main in command of the French Expeditionary Corps. After General Juin left
�ET
General Saville of the XI I Air Support Command conferred briefly with General
Clark.
Shortly after this conference, General Truscott, who had just arrived from
the beachhead, had a conference with Gmeral Clark. General Clark told General
Truscott that he was !J)ing to Washington and discussed with the VI Corps Commander the sitttation at the beachhead. General Truscott wanted to know when it
was expected that his beachhead forces would attack; that much of his planning
was based on this decision. General Clark said that he couldn't give him a definite date but that he thought it would be around May 10th, but certainly not
before May 3rd. The date May 10th was given because thAt was the earliest day
that General Leese of the British Eighth Army would be ready for any coordinated {
attack. General Clark then told General Truscott that whatever the date of the
attack was, he was assured by all Commanders, British and French, that it would /
be an all-out effort and that it would be successful. General Clark emphasized
that the Eighth Army, under the oonnnand of General Leese, would throw in everything they had. General Clark then stated that it muld be possible that the
beachhead forces would not attack before the 2oth of May. He asked General
Truscott what his plans were. Gereral Truscott then stated that his planning
group was considering a limited objective attack to capture Cisterna, which he
thought that he could accomplish within three days. This attack would be SJ:earheaded by the 1st Armored Division under Gereral Hannon. He also mentioned an
attack to take Carroceto. The point was brought out that such an attack should
wait until after the main Fifth and Eighth Anny front had pushed forward in an
all-out effort. General Clark asked General Truscott specifically if he thought
any limited attack in the beachhead would be profitable prior to this all-out
offensive on the ma.in front. General Truscott said that he had considered such
attacks, but he agreed with General Clark that the beachhead should hold now and
conserve its forces. Then when the opportune moment came to attack it should be
done also with an all-out effort. General Truscott said that he would like to
put the 3rd Division back in the lines about 10 April and withdraw it so it
would be in reserve when he did attack. By direct questions to General Truscott,
General Clark managed to draw out from him all possible plans of attack available to the beachhead forces. General Clark stated that when he went back to
Washington he would emphasize the fact that the morale on the beachhead was
high, and he asked General Truscott if he concurred in the statement. General
Truscott replied that he did 100%. General Truscott said, however, that he was !
very disappointed in the decision to withdraw the 56th Evacmtion Hospital and
that he thought that it had a very poor effect on the morale of the beachhead
forces. He added that he didn't think the hospital itself wanted to leave.
After conferring in the hut, General Clark and General Truscott went to
supper. After supper, General Clark began packing his personal things in preparation for his brief trip back to the United States.
General Clark today cabled General Truscott as follows: RN 6011. "Personal representation has been made to the CINC, AAI, regarding your 044, and he
has replied as follows:
'The entire problem of disposition of British infantry replacements has recently been studied by the CINC, and it is his decision that even with the availability of replacements this month, it would be impossible to do better than to
make infantry battalions of 1 and 5 divisions up to 26 offi~ers and 700 other
E
��ranks. Am sorry that we can't do this now, but draft should arrive soon from
UK which, it is believed, will make possible battalions of 1 and 5 Divisions
increasing to above strength by appr~ximately April 2oth. 1
I understand fully that their reply is not satisfactory and will keep on
doing all I possibly can to s:, lve the problem."
General Clark also cabled General Truscott as follows: RN 6o24. "Recommend that you fly down as soon as oonvenient, as I do not plan on visiting you
by 9th. Let me know when you plan to arrive."
*
*
*
SAN MARCO--APRIL 9, 1944--General Clark and his party, which is leaving for
)\
the United States in General Eaker's B-17, piloted by Captain Smith, took off
\\
from Marcianise airport at 0850. General Clark took Colonel Saltzman, Lt. Col.
Smith and Sergeant Chaney with him. General Clark flew by cub to Marcianise,
delaying his departure time in order that he might confer with General Gruenther.
General Truscott was invited by General Gruenther for lunch:
TMs being Easter Sunday, a special service was held in the daisy field
adjacent to the command post. General Clark being unable to read the Easter
story, General Gruenther substituted for him. This service was broadcast to
the United States.
General Gruenther invited for dinner General Moran and General Coulter.
General Coulter is head of the Maintenance, Researcr and Development Section of
the Signal Corps. The topic of the conversation centered ma.inly around equipment and personnel problems. The question of the security of the Sigaba code
was brought up, and when General Coulter was asked if when a set was captured '
by the enemy it would compromise the code, he said that he thought not. However, he asserted that we should make every effort to make sure that a set does
not get into enemy hands. This code system has enebled us to maintain complete
secrecy of messages from Washington to the various theaters and within the
theaters themselves.
After supper the dinner guests attended a movie set up for Section Chiefs
of thA Forward Echelon in the conference hut.
*
*
*
SAN MARCO--APRIL 10, 1944--The command post missed the personality of General
Clark today, this being his first day's absence during his trip to the United
States.
General Brann held a G-3 conference at which attended General Tate, G-4;
Colonel Howard, G-2; General Bowma.n, Army Engineer; General Moran, Army Signal
Officer, and General Saville of the XII Air Support Command. General Brann
discussed in detail the attack by the Fifth Army. He completely outlined the
objectives and directions of attack contemplated by the French and II Corps.
The 2nd DIM would attack in the direction of Majo, which it planned on taking
by the first night, to proceed down into Ausonia up to the high ground south
�of Esperia. This attack would be closely timed with the 3rd DIA, proceeding
on and taking the high ground in the vicinity of Mount D1 0ro. The 4th DMM,
especially trained in mountain warfare, would follow through with a small
part of its force proceeding toward Itri. General Brann does not favor this.
He would rather have II Corps take Itri. The remainder of the 4th DMM would
consolidate in the Mount D1 0ro region and push on to Pico. This plan would
place in our hands the high ground dominating the Liri Valley, which would
forcefully enhance the attack of the Eighth Army up that valley.
The II Corps, at the same time, would attack with two divisions abreast,
the 88th on the right and the 85th on the left. The 88th would have as its
initial objective the commanding terrain in the vicinity of Castellonorato,
and the 85th the commanding terrain on Mount Scauri. Simultaneously II Corps
would rroceed along the coastal road, wresting the commanding terrain overlooking this route from the enemy toward the direction of Formia, Gaeta and
Itri. This would be accomplished by small turning movements as the advance
progressed.
General Brann then stated that the 36th Division would be held in reserve;
that its employment depended on whether the Army Commander wanted to use it on
this front or on the beachhead. If used on the Garigliano front the 36th
would follow through and exploit successes of the 85th and 88th. If used on
the beachhead, it would be used to exploit any successes on that front. He
also stated tha.t the 91st Division, which had not yet arrived in this theater,
would be available to the Fifth Army around June 1st. It should arrive here
around the 1st of April and would be ready for battle in 4 or 6 weeks.
General Saville was then consulted as to how the Air Corps would closely
support this attack. Their particular objectives would point toward isolating
the battlefield in the Ausente Valley, paying particular attention to the rear
slopes of Mount Scauri, which at the same time would be rounded with a terrific artillery bombardment of at least 400 guns and also the road junctions terminating bot}-, entrances to the Ausente River Valley. General Saville posed the
question of conserving his air might to facilitate the second phase of the attack which would concentrate on the high ground and to the west of Spigno.
However, General Brann thought that it would be important to go all out during
the initial stages of the attack so that it would facilitate the isolation of
the battlefield on both corps fronts; that is denying the enemy any withdrawal
routes on the road from Ausnnia down to the coast. If this bottleneck was offered to the enemy, only infantry soldiers would be able to withdraw and force
any effective resistance later on, makin~ it impossible for transport or artillery to escape.
General Gruenther represented General Clark this afternoon at the Polish
Corps dinner.
*
*
*
SAN MA.RCO--AFRIL 11, 1944--The appointment that General Cl~.rk made with the
Duke of Aosta was not cancelled. The Duke arrived at the command post an hour
earlier than 10 o'clock, the appointment hour, and was taken immediately over
to General Gruenther, who discussed with him Italian units, their loos.lity and
the type of work they are doing. General Livesay, Com1mnding General of the
; .: it '·.
'
.
:-~·~J_,): :..-:{
�15
91st Division, and his Chief of Staff, Colonel Donovan, also reported in to
the Commanding General, Fifth Army, and was received by the Chief of Staff,
General Gruenther. These two officers were invited to lunch. General Livesay
discussed some of the POM difficulties thet the Division had in the States;
such as, wh8t was the meaning of the term "combat serviceable" as pertaining
to their ordnance weapons? Staff officers from III Corps indicated that they
should be very strict, so all weapons were turned in that were shiny, regardless of small defects. Later on, ASF representatives said that this interpretation was too strict and th8t they should turn all those weapons in for
bluing only, to eliminate the shine. It eventually turned out thnt they got
back the weapons that they had turned in, blued and with minor repairs accom•
plished.
.
The 91st Division did not lrnow where they were going until they reported
in to the staging area at Fort Patrick Henry. They lrnew they were coming to
the European Theater, but the exact destination was not known. About two
months prior to getting alert orders the Division received a considerable number of replacements of German, Italian and Austrian parentage. This led them
to believe that they would probably go west and to the Pacific. General
Livesay ha.d extreme confidence in the Division's ability and commented on its
past performances. General Gerhardt who now commands the 29th Division
"brought up" this Division from its activation date in #43.
The Mondragone Villa project has started on 1ts way and should be completed in about 15 days.
Lt. Col. Sutherland, former aide to General Clark, and Colonel Porter
were invited to dinner by General Gruenther. Colonel Sutherland is leaving
for Algiers to determine whether or not he is going back to Washington or
will remain on duty with OSS in this theater.
At 2130 a cable came in relieving the 91st Division from assignment to
the Fifth Army, stating that it would not be unloaded in Italy but would be
staged in Arzew and would be under the command of AFHQ. When General Gruenther saw this he said that he didn't like it, but there was nothing he could
do about it so he was going to bed.
*
/
*
*
SAN MARCO--APRIL 12, 1944--General Keyes, Deputy Army Commander, flew up to
the beachhead and decorated Brigadier Generals Ramey (Legion of Merit),
Fredericks (Silver Star) and Baehr (Bronze Star) and Colonel Bauchspies,
(Legion of Merit}. The purpose of General Keyes' visit was to make a personal reconnaissance of the beachhead while assuming this temporary title.
Mr. Bob Murphy, U. s. Ambassador-at-Large in North Africa, came to call
on General Gruenther and have supper with him. He was accompanied by Mr.
Reinhart and Mr. Offay. Mr. Murphy and General Gruenther had a grand time
reminiscing about past events in North Africa. Mr. Murphy answered a number
of questions regarding U. s. reactions to the Italian campaign, and, in substance, stated that he didn't think that there was any criticism in the States \
of the Fifth Army or any of the operating troops, but that he believed that
)
there was serious doubt as to the grand strategy of the campaign - what we
...
I
�were trying to accoMplish here and the reason for not giving the ~herewithal
to accomplish this mission. He brought out also that the State Department
was well a.ware of the Russian situation and possible menace - that a.t the
present moment our policy was to be extremely friendly toward the Russians that their efforts on the eastern front were necessary to our success and
that future problems would have to be dealt wlth as they a.rose. He also
mentioned the fact that the Russians wanted an airfield in Italy but that,
as far as he was concerned, he wasn't going to give it to them.
General Gruenther then outlined on the map in the hut the Fifth Army
dispositions as of today. Mr. Murphy was extremely interested in what General Gruenther pointed out, and the discussion developed into practically a
map study of the entire Italian campaign, bringi.ng up action in the Volturno
crossing, the Camino, Lunge and Cassino battles. General Gruenther thoroughly acquainted Mr. Murphy with the true facts of Cassino, emphasizing the fact
that this battle was conducted with an American Army Commander and heterogeneous British troops; that the attack was not vigorously pushed. However,
General Gruenther did bring out that as long es we are fighting with British
divisions, the replacement problem will hamper operatfons inasmuch as the
British fear sui'fering too many casualties and are unwilling to attack in
force. He also pointed out that many Br1tish troops have been fighting for
four or five years and are in soJ'le cases pretty tired.
Mr. Murphy said tlwt he would stay with General Wilson's Headqm:irters
and that when they moved here he would move with them.
After supper Mr. Murphy, accompanied by Lt. Col. Draper, went up to the
French Expeditionary Corps CP to pay his respects to General Juin. Mr. Murphy
got quite a kick out of passing the "light line" and knowing thRt he was
within five or six kiloMeters of the enemy. He had a delightful talk with
General Juin, at l'kiich time they discussed General Giraud's position with the
Liberation Committee. Neither one seemed to know more than what the radio had)
announced.
~
Mr. Murphy returned back to the Fifth Army Forward CP am. left for Naples
f
at about 11 o'clock.
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SAN MARCO--APRIL 13, 1944--General Gruenther flew to the beachhead in General
&lville's C-78 and spent the day conferring with General Truscott and visiting
units. The 3rd Division had relieved the 45th Division in the line, and things
were generally quiet except for daily shelling. General Gruenther discussed at
some length the whereabouts of the 28th Centimeter Gun the.t hl'ld been regularly
adjusting in the vicinity of the Fifth Army Command Post at Anzfo. He brought
out the strong possibility that this gun was located near the Pope's Palace at
Castel Gandolfo. As yet no definite location had been arrived at, and the Air
Corps was trying to knock it out.
Colonel Ladue, Chief of Staff of General Crjttenberger's IT Corps, had
lunch with General Keiser.
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beachhead at about 1600.
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SAN Mf\RCO--APRIL 14, 1944--Administrative natters were carried out by General Gruenther. He had General Keyes and Colonel Nygaard for lunch.
At 16oo General Juin, accompanied by his Chief of Staff, General Carpentier, came to d1 scuss future planning with General Gruenther. General
Juin left at 1715 for his Headquarters at Sessa.
General Keiser is !Ping to present the Fifth Army plaque to the Allied
Railway Military Service at a ceremony given in General Gray's honor at
Naples tonight. It harpens to be General Gray's birthday.
General Gruenther this evening attended a G-3 i::arty in Naples, leaving
the comma.nd post at 1900.
*
*
*
SAN M\RCO--APRIL 15, 1944--Activity for the last ten days at the front has
been confined mainly to ·patrol action and artillery duels. However, in
some cases the German artillery has increased in intensity, and his patrol
probing action indicates that he is getting very curious about activities
on our side.
General Gruenther received General Tate, Army G-4, for about 20 minutes.
There were a number of v:isiting ~iremen in the Fifth Army command post:
General Brittenham, Artillery Officer of Seventh Army; Generals Warrock and
Vanderveer, Assistant Division Commander and Artillery Commander respectively
of 5th Division; Colonel Franson and Lt. Col. Dickens, Chief of Staff and G-3
of the 5th Division. Colonel Black, Tank Destroyer Officer, also called.
Generals ~artin and Blesse, Fifth Army and AFHQ Surgeons respectively, con•
ferred with General Gruenther, as well as Colonel Ryan, Fifth Army Chaplain,
and Captain Moore, new Catholic chaplain for the for ward echelon.
General Gruenther and Lt. Col. Draper went to Mondragone at 1700 to make
a personal inspection of the villa project now under way there. The villa
project has possibilities of getting involved in a Fifth Army recreation and
rest center. The beach there, known as Alido, is one of the best beaches
along the coast, and G-1 has already recommended that parts of the beach in the
vicinity be used for officers and nurses for mixed bathing facilities, as well
as a beach for enlisted Fifth Army personnel. This would require zoning off
areas along the beach, and as yet no definite decision has been made. General
Gruenther has as his supper guests General Brann, General Bowman and Colonel
Howard. Colonel Howard conferred for about twenty minutes with General Gruenther before dinner, br:inging him up to date on the latest G-2 inform~tion
available.
*
*
*
SAN :WARCO--APRIL 16, 1944--A week ago · today General Clark took off for Washington. This past week routine activity at the forward echelon was carried on.
General Keyes, the Deputy Commander, has remained at II Corps Headquarters, and
General Gruenther, Army Chief of Staff, has carried on for the Army Commander.
General Gruenther oonferred with the following people:
Colonel Berry, War
�..
Department G-1; General Wilson, Commanding General of PBS; General Patch,
Seventh Army Commander. With General Patch were Colonel White, his Chief
of Staff, and Colonel Daly. Colonel Daly is a classmDte of Genera.l Clark.
After supper General Patch and several of the Fifth Army Section Chiefs
witnessed the movie "Meet The People", starring Dick Powell and Lucille Ball.
Follow~ng are extracts from the Fifth Army Camouflage Plan issued yesterday:
The object of this plan is to ensure complete surprise for the main
Fifth Army attack. If complete surprise is Achieved, the German units on the
Garigliano front on D day will almost certainly be overwhelmed by the weight
and surprise of our assault. If surprise is lost the 17 German Bns at present on the main Fifth Anny front between the Liri River and the sea will be
considerably reinforced between now and D day and our attack may consequently
lose its momentum and eventually bog do,m without achieving decisive results.
Surprise will undoubtedly be the most powerful weapon in the hands of the assaulting units of Fifth Army.
Centralised planning and control are necessary. Responsibility for the
execution of this plan will rest with II Corps Pnd the FEC, and, in the case
of Army troops not attached to Corps, with the heads of sections concerned at
Hq. Fifth Army. If one unit fails and thereby alerts the enemy of the impending blow, the harm done cannot be localized. Corps and Divisions will organize
from this date forward to D day small "camouflage patrols", which should contain one or more trained camouflage officers. Eng:i neer Officer, Fifth Army,
is taking action to provide the nece ssary camouflage personnel for this purpose.
Normal activity between now and D day must be evident on our front.
Nothing must be seen or heard which might lead the enemy to believe that we
have anything other than defensive intentions. An impression of "normal f!.ctivity11 will not be given if:
~•
There is a sudden increase in the mlume of artillery fire.
]2.
Infantry patrols become more (or less) active than they have been up
to now.
£•
There is an increasing volume of radio activity.
g. The number of supply, engineer etc, dumps obviously increases in the
forward area.
~• Gun positions, dumps, infantry positions, etc., already obvious to
the enemy, Are suddenly camouflaged: i.e. do .Nm: try to cover up or improve
camouflage of existing installations.
Normal relief of units in the front lines will oontinue. No offensive activity on the Fifth Army front, other than normal patrolling and shootjng, will
take place. This precludes any preliminary attacks being made without the
prior approval of the A
rmy Commander. As many units as possible will remain
�in their present training areas until the last possible moment. Normal
radio activity must be maintained while these units are in their present
training areas until they displace forward, at vhich time strict radio
silence must be maintained.
Corps will submit their plans for forward concentration of units at
present training in rear areas to Hq. Fifth Army. These plans should show
proposed dates and areas of forward moves.
plan.
The above extracts are hi~J.ights on this very detailed camouflage
Details are omitted.
*
*
*
SA1'l' MA.RCO--APRIL 17, 1944--The coming and going of visiting offj_cers at the
command post oontinued. After oonsulting with General Tate, General Gruenther, accompanied by General Brann, went to the Eighth Army command post in
the vicinity of Venafro for a conference.
General Keiser took General Devers to the G-4 Section before lunch and
after lunch ,vent to Artillery, G-2, G-3 and the Engineer Sections. General
Devers spent the entire day in these various sections to e.cquaint himself
with their daily duties.
At 1815 General Gruenther had as his supper guests Generals Devers,
Patch, Crittenberger, Keyes, Lewis, Brann, Saville, Keiser and Colonel White ,
Chief of Staff to General Patch. They had before-dinner cocktails in the conference hut. Small groups of officers chatted together before they went up
to supper. They retUl".ll'Jled to the hut after supper and had liquers, oontinuing
in piecemeal talks the conversations of the evening. They left the hut at
2100. Generals Patch and Devers are staying in the C-in-C camp area near the
PRO Section.
*
*
*
SAN r1YI.RCO--APRIL 18, 1944--General Devers continued his visits to sections in
the forward echelon. He stayed with Colonel Niblo, the Ordnance Officer, for
about 30 minutes. He discussed mainly vehicular maintenance and ammunition
stocks and studied recent rr.raphs of ammunition levels just oompleted by the
Ordnance Section. When he finished with the Ordnance Section, he went over to
see General Moran, Signal Officer, and spent about an hour looking over the
entire Signal Section, including its forward echelon radio monitoring section,
radio station, encoding and <lecoding sections, transmitter locations and switchboard. General Devers then returned to General Gruenther's office and after a
thirty-minute conference left for the rear echelon where he talked with Generals
Martin and Sullivan. He then proceeded to II Corps where he had luncheon with
General Keyes.
In the afternoon General Gruenther saw General V/olfe of the Invasion Training Center and Lt. Col. Hare of the Air Support Control. Colonel Hare is leaving for a new assignment as yet undetermined.
�General Gruenther had as dinn8r guests Brigadier Stayner and Lt. Col.
Hare, two British officers very well liked and thought of by1his Headquarters.
*
*
*
SAN MARCO--APRIL 19, 1944--Word has been received that General Clark will
proceed back from the States on or about Friday, April 21st. The routine
and daily business has been quickened a bit by the Tentative Field Order
for the next offensive operation. All sections have been busily occupied
in working out the details and also preparing annexes to the Field Order.
General Vanderveer, Artillery Officer of the 5th Division, is dovm
from F.ngland and called on General Gruenther. General Keyes of II Corps al so
came to the command post where he discussed with General Gruenther forthcoming operations and in particular the fact that he didn't want to lose the
77th Artillery Group to the beachhead. General Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of
Staff of AAI, came up to talk with General Grnenther. He arrived in time to
see the Chief of Staff taking his exercise on the volleyball court.
General Lemnitzer took General Gruenther 1 s place and continued the stellar
playing of the general officers.
General Chevillon of the 3rd DIA, who has just been promoted to a general officer's rank, called on General Gruenther and vras invited to supper.
General Sullivan also had supper with the Chief of Staff, in addition to the
regular members of the Army Commander's mess.
*
*
*
SAN t~RCO--APRIL 20, 1944--General Gruenther received in his office this
morning the following officers: Brigadier Stayner, who is soon to les.ve Headquarters Fifth Army; General Tlartin, Fifth Army Surgeon; General Brann, P.:rmy
G-3; and General Tate, Army G-4.
1
In the afternoon the Chief of Staff went to II Corps to confer with General Keyes. Later in the afternoon he received General Beucler of the French
Mission.
During the afternoon General Clark's new trailer arrived and, with the
assistance of the Ordnance, Engineers and the Utilities Plrrtoon the trailer
was installed and made ready for occupancy.
General Gruenther had as his dinner guests this evening Generals Elliott,
AFHQ Engineer, and General Bowman, Fifth Army Engineer. After supper he went
immediately to Santa Maria for the premiere showing to Fifth Army personnel of
Irving Berlin's nThis Is The Army". Mr. Berlin, the well-lmown composer and
singer who heads the show, came up to General Gruenther's box before the show
and greeted the Army Chief of Staff. News photographers took several pictures
before the curtain went up.
The show was warmly received by the audience, which was composed mostly
of combat troops which had just been relieved from front line duty, a great
many being 36th Division troops now in the rest area. After the show General
�Gruenther went backstage, cut a piece of the welcome cake and expressed appreciation for the fine performance. He explained that General Clark's absence
from Army Headqwtrters prevented his presence at the opening of the show but
added that he was certain the Army Commander would attend a subsequent performance upon his return.
*
*
*
SAN MARCO-QAPRIL 21, 1944--Generals Gruenther, Brann and Carpentier, Chief of
Staff to General Juin, conferred for about an hour this morning concerning the
French plan for the next big attack. The French were submittjng important
changes to their preliminary tentative plan. General Gruenther had Colonel
Scobi, Special Services Officer from AFHQ, for lunch. The main subject of
discussion was the availability of a radio station for the beachhead. Colonel
Scobi said that he would arrange to have one sent up and thAt it probably
could be there j_n about ten days. The question of the power of the station
came up,. and General Gruenther was to check to see that a station of 250 to
500 kilo,mtts could function under the existing power system up there.
General Gruenther saw General Cannon, CommPnding General of the Tactical
Air Force, as well as Colonel Harding of AFHQ and Colonel Pulliam, OPD War
Department.
GAneral Gruenther had as his dinner guest General Bradshaw, Antiaircraft
Officer of Fifth Army. General Bradsh11w djd an excellent job as Antiaircraft
Officer of VI Corps at the beachhead. He told of his organization at the
beachhead and of the difficulties antiaircraft encountered there. The German
considerably outnumbered our forces in the air when he came over in force and
so it fell to the antiaircraft to make it as costly as possible to the Luftwaffe. They tried all sorts of tricks, such ti.s using one plane as a decoy
with special type of transmitters to lead us to believe that a flight with as
many as 15 planes were approaching on one direction, and the actual attacking
force would come in from another direction. The German was not successful at
pulling this ruse at any time 100%. At the beginning they did confuse the
plotting room temporarily, but they soon caught on to the German tactics.
The antiaircraft at the beachhead has downed over 120 planes. It is rather
difficult to give a particular battery credit for a plane because so many
claim the same knockdown. General Bradshaw had a system whereby he djstributed them equitably among his batteries. He also explained how he thought
the radar might be used in locating the 28 Centimeter Gun. He proposed having
Beaufighters in the air at night. As soon as the big gun flashed, these
planes would fly straight for the area, the radar would pick up the line plots
of this flash, should intersect and with additional intelligence this gun
should definitely be located and taken care of.
*
*
*
SAN MA.RCO--APRIL 22, 19Li4--General Clark's van was completed nnd ready for occupancy by him upon his return from the StRtes tomorrow. General Gruenther
conferred with General Saville, of the XII Air Support CoMmand, in the morning
prior to leaving for Fompei where he attended a ceremony sponsored by the 3rd
Algerian Division, at which ceremony several units of the division were decorated for their excellent work on the Fifth Army front during February and
�March. The ceremony was very colorful and was attended by Generals Gruenther and Brann who represented the Fifth Army at the ceremony.
This evening General Gruenther attended a dinner given by General Devers
at the Palace in Caserta. General officers of the Eighth Army and Fifth Army
were present as also was General Alexander, CINC, AAI.
*
*
*
SAN MARCO--AFRIL 23, 1944--General Clark arrived at Fornigliano field at 1845.
The total elapsed time since he left Washington was 43 hours and 25 mjnutes.
Accompanying General Clark were Brigadier General Foster Tate, who will replace General Mclain as Artillery Officer of the 45th Division, Colonel Saltzman, Lt. Col. Smith, General Tate's aide and Sergeant Chaney.
General Clark rode back to the command post with General Gruenther and
did not utilize his cub plane which was waiting to take him back. He and
General Gruenther took this opportunity to talk of the many things which
General Clark had to say. General Clark christened his new van by opening a
bottle of Scotch and Bourbon and invited several of his staff officers in for
a drink. Genere.l Clark unpacked, read some letters, important dispatches and
retired early in the evening.
*
*
*
SAN MARCO--APRIL 24, 1944--General Clark spent the entire day in his new van
going over dispatches, conferring with his various general p,nd special staff
officers and receiving visiting officers. Col. Howard, the Army G-2, started
the morning off by spending an hour with the General in his van. He was followed by General Moran, Army Signal Officer. General Brann and General
Gruenther then spent the remainder of the morning vri th General Clark.
At noon Admiral Rogers, USN, and Captain Simpson, USN, came to pay the1r
respects to the Army Commander. The latter had just returned from the IndiaBurma theater. They had recently been in contact with Lord Louis Mountbatten's
staff.
In the afternoon General Bissell of the W Department G-2 paid his rear
spects to General Clark. He was follovrnd by General Saville, XII J, ir Support
Cor1mander. In the latter re,rt of the afternoon Lt. Brown came to see General
Clark. General Clark ~ished to deliver to him a few rersonal messages from
his mother, rrs. George C. Marshall. Col. Nygaard and Colonel Bruce conferred
with the General during the latter part of the afternoon.
At 1800 ~T. Bob Jl(urphy, an old anrl intimate friend of General Chrk from
his 'North African days, came for supper. Mr·. Murphy was accompanied by Mr.
()ffay l'lnd spent the night at the command post under field conditions.
*
SAN MARCO--APRIL 25, 1944--After lest night's diary had been written Kraut
planes appeared over the Naples area, Capodichino and Aversa. The night fire-
�-
'
works were brilliant and evoked amazement and r'dmiration from Mr. Murphy.
The German effort was apparently not effective. On their return home some
German planes passed over the Army command post and were met with intermittent ackack in our vicinity.
This morning Mr. rmrphy awakened eRrly, had breal<-i'ast and left. General
Clark worked on dispatches until General Juin came to see him prior to General W
ilson's visit.
General Clark discussed with General Juin primarily details concerning
the proposed French Corps Headquarters'coming to this theater with General
DeLarminat in col"1l11and. General Clark wanted to know first what General Juin 1 s
reaction was to a spare French Headquarters. General Juin stated that General DeGaulle was very anxious for it to come and, as far as he, General Juin,
was concerned, under the conditions stated, he recomr1ended th11t it be accepted.
The Corps Headquarters was to be under his command and to be used for tactical
purposes only. His proposed use of this Corps Headquarters was to coordinate
action of two divisions on his right. He emphasized that General DeLarminat
was to be under his command and not to be used as an additional separate corps.
General Clark told General Juin thnt he wanted to speak to General W
ilson
first and see General DeLa.rminat before he expressed his desire to have it
included in the Fifth Army.
The second point of discussion ~as the over-all French plan for the forthcoming big sea.le operation. General Juin pointed out on his map briefly his
proposed plan of action. This discussion brought out two points (1) That
General ClPrk did not want General Juin to enter into any agreements or understandings with the British that they would delay agrsressive offensive action
until French Corps had seized dominating terrain adjacent to the Eighth Army's
left. General Clark enphasized that under no conditions did he want the British to feel that Fifth Army had to achieve certain objectives prior to their
advance; that he had had previous experience with this particular type of
understanding. (2) That the 88th Division attack to seize Damiano must be
coorcljnated simultaneously with the French attack on its ri.ght. General Clark
stated that this would be definj_
tely settled by staff conferences immediately.
Shortly af'ter General Juin left, General Clark went down to the conference
hut where he discussed the Fifth Army's plan for attack with Generals Brann and
Gruenther. General Wilson, Cor.unanding General of AFHQ, arrived, accompanied by
Generals Devers and Rooks, the latter having just turned over his duties as G-3
of NATC1USA to General Noce. General Clerk then personally outlined to General
Wilson the Fifth Army's plan for its next offensive action. The conference hut
was well decorated with maps to facilitate this explanation. Gern=~rals Clark,
Gruenther, Brann, Wilson, Devers and Rooks then had lunch together. After
lunch General Devers returned to Casert~:i and GenerRls W
ilson and Rooks proceeded to visit French Corps and II Corps.
At 1645 General Clark took off in a cub plane to fly to Caserta. where he
went into conference with General Alexander. He returned at 1g15 and invited
General Gruenther and Colonel Saltzman to his VHn. Colonel Saltzman will replace Genern.l Keiser in the General's Mess.
After dinner General Cl.Ark visited General Brann 1 s van and took a short
walk before retiring.
�'
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SAN MARCO--APRIL 26, 1944--A heavy spring rain which began at 0400 ma.de a
quagmire of the Fifth Army front. General Clark worked with military dis- (
patches, conferred with Generals Brann and Gruenther and was visited by
Colonel Howard, his G-2. At 1030 he went by jeep to Mondragone where he inspected a project already begun for an officers' beach and rest area. He
inspected a villa which has been very modestly set up for him in the vicinity of the beach. From there he proceeded to the II Corps beach at Bagni
Minerale which is used for enlisted personnel only of the II Corps. From
there he went to the II Corps command post at Piedmonte where he went into
immediate conference with General Keyes, II Corps Commander; General Sloan,
88th Division Commander; General Coulter, 85th Division Cornnander, and General Walker, 36th Division Commander. After the conference General Keyes had
a luncheon for General Clark and his Divisional Commanders. After luncheon
General Clark went to General Coulter I s command post vrhere he inspected installations and met General Coulter 1 s staff. He returned back to the Fifth
Army command post and worked on administrHtive matters.
During the day's journey through the Fifth Arrrry area, he was greatly
impressed by the improvements accomplished on road maintenance, signs and
general discipline nnd appearance of troops and bivouac areas. General
Clark had supper and conferred with General Gruenther and Colonel Saltzman.
*
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SAN r~RCO--APRIL 27, 1944--Despite overcase and threatening \'leather the
ceremony for the presentation of theater ribbons with battle stars to selected WACS and the Fifth Army Plaque and Clasp to the WAC platoon serving with
Headquarters Fifth Army was accomplished. The ceremony went extremely ,,ell
and was very colorful. General Clark gave an excellent speech which is
quoted below:
"Lieutenants Foster and Butler, Members of the Fifth Army Women I s Army
Corps:
"I am delighted to have the opportunity this morning to greet you again
to tell you and the world how rroud we are of the splendid work you have performed during these last eight months under campaign conditions; how delighted I am to be able to award the campaign service ribbon with star to
certain of your members and to be able to give to your platoon as a whole the
Fifth Army Plaque and Clasp for outstanding meritorious service.
"I well recall, and most of you do too, our last meeting nine months
ago in North Africa when you had just arrived from the United StRtes. At
that time I forecast brilliant service on your part. I well remember, during
the hectic days before our Salerno landing, how excited some of you were because you knew that important preparations were in progress but did not know
whether you were to participate or not. Many of you worried that the Fifth
Army was running off and leaving you, but you now 1mow how impossible that
was, for we needed you too badly•. So when the Fifth Army captured Naples,
sent for you to resume the splendid work you had started.
we
"I am pleased now, after these nine months, to be :=tble to tell you how
you have lived up to our hopes, expectations and standards. You have fulfilled
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"Now for a glimpse of your record to date. You have released an equal
number of men for more arduous duty. You have brought a bit of American
womanhood into our midst which has helped us tremendously. You know that
the protection and sanctification of our American women is one of the things
which ,,e of the Fifth Army are fighting so hrird to preserve. Your presence
made us spruce up. We were more careful of our appearance and of our language, and for my part, when I pick up the telephone now and hear one of your
courteous voices I am much less impatient than before. Two officers and fiftyseven of your group came to us nine months ago. The same two offict1rs and
fifty-five of that original group are still with us. W have not had a single
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disciplinary case. Your appearance and conduct have been exemplary, and your
contacts have always been courteous and considerate.
"Your families and friends at home have every ri p:ht to be proud of your
accomplishments overseas. I hope many more young American women will follow
your fine pioneering example and join your organization and come to the Fifth
Army, for we can use two or three hundred more throughout our Army organization. W have appropriate jobs for them, and they will relieve a corresponde
ing number of able-bodied men for other combat duties and at the same time
materially assist in our manpower problems back home.
"Again, I want to tell you how pleasP-d I am to be with you this morning
to note your fine appearance, to make this award to you and to congratulate
you on the splendid work you have done and will do in the future. I am sure
you will keep up your splendid record."
Among the witnesses to the ceremony were selected F:nglish women of the
ATS and French WACS. About 200 people witnessed the ceremony, and it was drawn
up with the idea in mind of helping out with W recruiting in the United
AC
States. During his visit to Washington, General Clark found that the manpower
problem was becoming critical, and he felt that this ceremony here would help
in attracting women volunteers to this meritorfous organization. General Truscott, who was down from the beachhead, accompanied General Clark w
hen he inspected the W platoon. After the ceremony Generals Clark, Truscott, GruenAC
ther and Brann went into immediate conference in the hut.
General Clark discussed with General Truscott the enemy situation at the
beachhead and General Truscott 1 s plan for his attack during the next operation.
General Truscott stayed for lunch and left for Naples w
here he will rest for
five days.
At 1430 Generals Clark, Brann and Gruenther rode up to French Corps in
General Clark's jeep. At French Corps he was received by a guard of honor
which he inspected and went immediately to Gener,iJ. Juin's office. At this conference were Generals Juin, his Chief of Staf'f General Carpentier, General
Keyes, II Corps Commander, his Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel Porter, Generals
Clark, Gruenther and Brann. During the conference General Clark coordinated
the II Corps attack and seizure of Damiano with French action on its right.
Dtlmiano TTill be taken on the first day. The boundary between French Corps and
I+ Corps was definitely settled. As the conference drew to an end, General
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�Clark made the statement that it was one of the most pleasant and shortest)
conferences that he had ever attended in that nobody argued with anybody
else and everybody seemed to be in complete ~greement with everything discussed. General DeLarminat was introduced to General Clark. He commands
the 1st French Infantry Division - a crack outfit that will see action on
the Fifth Army front. It jncludes a brigade of the Foreign Legion. After
the conference the entire group proceeded to General Juin's OP on top of
the castle where an excellent view of tbe entire Garigliano front can be
seen.
From French Corps General Clark went to the 88th Division where he conferred with General Sloan and ma.de a detailed inspection of his staff sections at his new command post. General Clark was very much il"lJ)ressed with
the neatness, protection and camouflage discipline at the command post. He
congratulated General Sloan for this very fine command rost installation.
From the 88th Division General Clark went to the rear echelon where he
met General Sullivan, the Army f'),unrtermaster. He went through the QM, Surgeon, G-1, Officers' Bar, Officers' riless, Colonels' Mess and Chaplain's
Sections. From there he returned to the forward echelon and had as dinner
guests Generals Bo1·'!llan, Sullivan and Colonel Howard. After supper he worked
on dispatches and signed some decorations that will be presented tomorrow
when he visits the 36th Division.
*
*
*
SAN r~RCO--APRIL 28, 1944--General Clark took off by cub plane, ~ccompanied
by Lt. Col. Draper, for the 36th Division. They landed at Fomigliano field
and were met by General Walker, Division Commander. They proceeded by car to
the Division area in the vicinity of Ferina. The first stop was at a ceremonial field where the Army Commander gave decorations to members of the J6th
Division. He pinned on four DSC I s and nine Air Medals. The ceremony, while
simple, was very impressive. General Cla.rk gavA a very stirring speech to
those who had accomplished deeds of bravery on the battlefield.
After the decoration ceremony he visited the 141st Infantry Regiment,
cormnanded by Colonel Fannony. All three battalions of t:re 141st Infantry were
out on either plRtoon, company or battalion exercises. General Clrirk v1ent
through the area a.nd visited several kitchens. He then went to the 143rd Infantry where he inspected the area and found all battalions engaged in a showdown inspection. As General Clark walked through the e.rea, he questioned many
of the enlisted men as to how long they had been in the Division and what combat experience they had. He was keenly interested in finding out how the replacements were being fitted in and comparing their statements with those of
veterans. After the 143rd Infantry, he went to the medical battalion of the
Division. He then went to a luncheon which was attended by Division staff officers. After luncheon he went to the 142nd Infantry and visited the various
battalions which were also having a showdown inspection of clothing and equipment. He stopped by briefly at the reconnaissance troop. }~ om the reconnaissance troop he proceeded to the Division Artillery. He and Colonel Draper
then took off by Division Artillery cub plane and landed at Fomigliano, where
he transferred to his own cubs and went directly to the Eighth Army TAC CP.
He conferred vTith General Leese, Eighth Army Commander, for about an hour and
returned b;1r cub to the Fifth Anny Advap.ce GP •
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He had as dinner guests General Tate, his G-4, and one of our many American
Cross voltmteers. After supper General Clark walked down through his command
post to confer with Generals Brann and Lewis and returned to the Chief of Staff's
office before retirjng for the night.
Red
The following letter was received today from AFHQ regarding security of information:
"1. Inf'orma tion of a secret or confidential nature will only be given to
\
the French if it is necessary for them to have it in order to carry out planning )
and operations. It is the responsibility of the originating headquarters to determine whether or not information or documents are to be transmitted to the
French, considering each case on its own merits. If there is any doubt as to
whether the information should be transmitted or not, this headquarters should
be consulted.
11 2.
In all cases where documents are given to the French, the orieinating
headquarters transmitting such documents will be responsible for the careful
scrutiny of the material contained in them, a.nd for assuring that no more infor•
mation of a secret or confidential nature than is necessary is transmitted. The
greatest possible care will be taken in the case of Top Secret material.
11 3.
No particulars whatsoever , having l'!ny bearinr; on projected operations
from the United Kingdom, will be conveyed to the French.
11 4.
All documents given to the French will carry the following WP.rning
clearly printed or stamped on them:
'No information contained in this document is to be divulged to any
person except in the oourse of duty. No reproduction, either whole or in
part, will be made without permission from the chief of t h e * - - - - - Section, ~ - - - - - - - -•'
11 5.
The foregoing ~nstructions hRVe equal a.pplication to informRtion given
or transmitted to personnel or hea.dquerters of other nations. 11
*Insert designation of originating section.
~Designation of headquarters."
General Clark today received the following letter from General Juin regarding the use of the 194th Artillery Group:
"During our conversation of 27 April you were kind enough to assure me that
thP fire of the 194th Artillery GroupMent would be placed exclusively at the disposition of the CEF for the beginning of the next operation.
"On the morning of the 28th, General CHAILLET, Cormanding the C.E.F. Artillery, broached this subject to General I.EWIS. The methods of employment of the
194th Artillery Groupment could not be settled during this conference since
General LEWIS had not as yet received from you the necessary directives.
For the action planned, it is indispensable for me to have a.vailable a powerful reinforcement of heavy artillery fire. In fact, the terrain will make the
forward displacement of Division .Artillery very difficult, and it is essential
�to the success of the first phase of the operation that the CEF benefit from
the support of powerful and long range Artillery fires.
"Since the developnent of the plan for Artillery employment should be behonor to request that you be so kind as to give
all necess~ry instructions concerning the 194th Groupment to the proper authorities."
gun immediately, I have the
*
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*
SAN MARCO--APRIL 29, 1941~--This day from the outset had promise of being a
very busy one. General Clark worked on military dispatches and plans for future operations. At 1000 he received General Juin and also met GenerRl Brosset who comma.nds the 1st French Division now training in rear areas in Italy.
At 1030 he went down to an open field where a very picturesque decoration
ceremony took place. General Alexander, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in
Italy, arrived for the ceremony to decorate Generals Clark, Gruenther, Truscott, Harmon, Hartin and four other officers of krmy Headquarters. General
Clark met General Alexander at the entrance to the field. As they approached
the decorees and honor guard troops, "To the General" and "Ruffles" smmded.
Facing Generals Alexander and Clark were one company of French ~foroccan troops,
one company of MP 1 s, color guards with the three Allied flags (French, British
and American) and the decorees. Generr-ils Alexander and Clark reviewed the
troops, and General Alexander then rroceeded to p±n on General Clark's chest
the ribbon designating him a Knight of the British Empire. After thr-it he decorated Generals Gruenther, Truscott and Harmon as Companions of the BBth, and
four other officers, General T•-!artin, Colonel Saltzman, Col. Smith Rnd Major
Connor, received the Order of the British Empire . Following this presentation,
General Clark then decorated five French officers and soldiers, one of whom
received the Distinguished Service Cross and the remaining Silver Stars, one
British officer with a Soldier's Medal, four Legion of Merits, of which one was
General Bradshaw, Fifth Army Antiaircraft Officer, one Silver Star and three
Air Medals.
After the ceremoriy General Clark went irnmediately to his van where he conferred with Generals 'l'ruscott and Harmon concern:i.ng future operations at the
beachhead. After that he received General Beucler of the French Mission and
General 0 1Daniel, Commander of the 3rd Division. Genernl 0 1 DPniel stayed for
lunch. After lunch General Clerk went out to inspect ordnance units, accomp1mied
by Colonel Niblo, Fifth Army Ordnance Officer, and Colonel Artamanoff. The
itinerary included a visit to the followin>1, units: 109th Ordnance CornpPny, ?630th
Ordnance Group, 188-th Ordnance Battalion, 94th Ordnance Company, 3485th Ordnance
Compa,ny, 86th Ordnance Company, 93rd Ordrumce Company, 477th Ordrnmce Company,
29th Ordnance Company, 42nd Ordnance Battalion and 3488th Ordnance Company. All
of these ordnance compr-inies except the ?9th Ordnance Company support Corps and
Army troops. The ?9th supports the 88th Division.
As they visited these various ordnance units, most of them were busily engaged in rna.intenance and repairs. Two of these outfits, the 901st and 94th,
were celebrating overseas anniversaries. The others could be seen working on
various types of field artillery rnajntem:mce such Hs, packing of equiliberators
for our big guns. 'T'he Ordnance has quite e problem in thllt they need repacking
every two weeks and just recently they have been bringing the equiliberators
�back to the ordnance repair areas rather the.n doing j t ,=it the gun position,
believing that this will be more satisfactory. When a tube requires ch~nging the whole gun is brought back nnd a re:rleceT'lent is sent up so thr-it at
no time is a battery minus one of its guns or howitzers. At the 3485th
Company mechanics were busily engaged in repairing motors and tanks. At this
company the General witnessed an experiment in the mounting of one of the infantry 105 howitzers in a dukw. This improvisation is being done to rrovide
some means for giving effective fire support in assr-iulting beeches. GenerPl
Clark was very interested in this project and said that he always thought
that it we.s feasible and that he thought it WPS a tremendous advantage for
troops assaulting a beach.
At the 93rd Ordnance Company, wM ch supports Army antiaircraft troops, the
General went through the small arms section where 50 caliber mA.chine guns were
being worked on. The GenerPl asked whPt seemed to be the greatest dH..,i culty
and was told that extractors caused the Most trouble. He then went over to
where the men were preparing dj~ectors for qo mm guns, and he stopped for some
period of time to look over the multiple 50 caliber machine gun mount, the M51.
The M51 has a ,lower silhouette than the former one anr appears to be a good
weapon. It packs four 50 calibers.
At the 477th Ordnance Company he saw sorne of the big t~nk retriever trucks.
This is a truck tractor rrime mover wjth a huge silhouette. The carriage mounts
1/2 inch armor plate. The tank retrievers can go up in forward a.ref's and bring
out damaged tanks. At the ?9th Ordnance Company, which suprorts the 88th Division, General Clark remarked on hoi:r little activity seemed to be taking place
there. He was told thAt the ordnance company of the 88th Divfaion is a very
good company and, in addition, they had practically finished up with third
echelon maintenance for that division.
'---
I
The entire trip entailed much walking. Colonel Cabelle, Orommce Officer
of T'lBS accompanied General Clark, until he WPS too tired to carry on. After
I
the ordnance inspection General Clark returned home, worked on d7srt1tches and
prepared to attend the Army show, "This Is The Arny" which was gjven in the
Allied Military Theater at Santa MCJ.ria. There he met Hr. Berlin, who came up
to his box just rrior to the start of the s},ow. General Clark enjoyed the show
very much and t1fterwards went backstage to congratulate the cast. He returned __I
home at 10 o'clock and retired.
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SAN MARCO--AFRIL 30, 1944--General Clark had H meeting in the hut at 0930 to discuss preparations for the Army Commanders I meeting at AAI Headquarters on tomorrow, Nay 1. Present vrere Generals Gruenther, Brann, Lt. Col. Hansborough,
✓ Colonel Howard, Colonel Saltzman, Colon~l Paxson and Lt. Col. Draper. At this
conference the first discussion centered on the air plan for the attack. General Clark wanted to make certain that on D day large headquarters of the Boche
such as Arny and Corps would receive cnreful attention by the Air Coryis. Also ,
General Clark emphasized that he succeeded on having the air effort on a 50-50
basis and not 70-30 in favor of the highth Army, as previously planned. This
caused considerable controversy and bickering. General Clark jnsisted that the
air effort be divided between the two arrdes.
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Colonel Hansborough pointed out that the air pll}.n was divided :i.nto four
phases . In the f'irst phase the first priority would be tsolation of the battlefield by sustained attacks at the road center at Itri-Pontecorvo-~spcria
road and to deny the use of the San Giovanni - Pico road . The second priority
is counter battery targets as requested by corps , priority being given to FEC .
The third prjority is close support targets as. requested 11y corps with the
priority going to FEC . The second phase gives first priorjty to the continuation of isolation of the bAttlefield . Second rriority will be close support
targets in the vicinity of La Civita , Spigno and Ausonia , witb the rriority
going to FEC . The second phase gives first priority to tre continuation of
isolation of the battl~field . Second y,r:i ori ty will be close support tArgets
in the vicinity of La Civit a , Spigno and Ausonja , with the rriority going to
II Corps . The third priority goes to counter battery targets . In the third
phase the first priority will be a continuation of isolAtion of the bA.ttlefield . Second nr:i ority will be counter battery targets, :md third rriority
will be close support targets . A parachute drop night be undertPken during
tris phase. This would take prfority over all other tasks . In the fourth
phase the first priority will be continuation of isolation of the battlefield .
Second priority will be counter battr:iry targets , Pnd the third rrfority will
be close support targets . General ClPrk brought out thPt we will not nsk the
air to do what the artillery can do . Targets within our rPnge will not be Pttacked by the air except rossibly soMe counter battery missions . Col. Hans- /
borough briefly discussed the counter battery missions thnt the Air Corps
would accomplish , cb1efly concentrating on larger caliber guns out of our artillery range .
I
The artillAry plan was discussed next. General Lewis stated th1=1t until
he received the divisions ' fire plan and the boundary limits were settled he
could not rresent his complete Prtillery plan . He showed General ClPrk fire
possibilities for various cal i bers of the artillery with the Army. This f1re
possibility chart was genernl in scope , showing the sectors of fire of 155
guns , 8" howitzers, 240mm howitzers , 155 and 105 hovrit zers . The artillery officer stated there would be no rreparation prior to H hour and that our fire
plrm cai bs for Artillery fire to start as soon as our infantry cross their
line of r'eparture at H hour . General I ewis then brought up the contrbversy
concerning the 194th Artillery Group which occupies rositions in the Ejghth
Army's zone of action . This group has two 155 gun battalions, the 633rd and
985th , one 21..0 battalion, the 698th less one battery, and one 8 11 howitzer battalion , the 995th . General Lewis brought out that the only support at H hour
given in Eighth Army zone of action cornrrised counter battery, whic}, is, in
rMlity, support for the Fifth Army, becAuse these hostile rieces can and do
fire in the Fifth ArMy zone of action . This counter battery is desjred by the
French also , who agree that jt is necessary for their ovm support . All F.ighth
Arrny' s calls for fire for the 194th Group are to be clMred through the ti'rench
after the injtial pre- arranged fires agreed on at H hour are fired. The ?.40mm
howitzers of this group have an Army string tied on them in that Army has
priority on their use for special missions such as bridge busting. General
Lewis bronfsht out the fact thr-t the only battalion of this grou:r th11t the British can expect is the gu battA.lion, the 985th, which has its center 15ne so
fixed that it can rMcl 1 out and tAke targets under fire on the reverse slore of
Monastery Hill nnd that vj cini ty. He empha.sized thl't all calls for fire from
Ej gbth Army will be cleared through the French. General Chaillet , Artillery
Officer for FEC , wanted one 155mm gun battalion to change its center line so
-
�31
that it could reach Ausonia and answer calls for fire :in that vicinity. This
has been done. As it stands now, the 194th Group is prepRred to furnish complete support to Fifth Army requirements, specifically the French. General
Lewis stated that the Eighth Army Artillery Officer was agreeable a.nd easy to
do business with, but the artillery officer of 13 Corps was not. Much of the
difficulty arose between tre artillery of'ficer of 13 Corps not being able to
(
coorerate and coordinPte wjth the French. This was due mostly to the fact
\
thrit the French did not completely understPnd our neaning of the word attachment, mean:ing th~t the 194th Group being attached to them is at their disposal and also they entertain some distrust of the British. The British,· in
turn, were trying to get all the support that they could expect from the 194th
Group and even riore. Much of the difficulty lies in misunderstanding of the
term attachment. In any case, where artillery can fire beyond the limits of
\
its boundarfos, it is normal that they fire such contingent f'lissions in order
to strengthen this possible weak point, and if it were not for the fact that
discussions involved British, French and our troops, there ·,ould undoubtedly
J
be no difficulty. It would consist merely of cooreration bl'ltween adj?cent divisions, corps and armies, a.nd artillery carable of firing outside of those
boundaries would natural.ly give support outside of the boundary when asked for
if it did not interfere with primary missions in its own zone of action. One
advantage of th~ 194th Grour's present position, as brought out by General Levris, was thPt l'lS the advl'lnce continues and cHsplacement becomes necessary,
there are many excellent positions up the Liri Valley for the 194th Group from
which it can better support the continued action of the French up the mountainous terrain. General Lewis stated h!'l felt conficent thr,t after the meeting
toriorrow between General Chaillet, Artillery C'fficer of the FEC, and the 13
Corps Artillery Officer all difficulties would be solved and flny bickering as
to where the 194th Group was to fire during the attack would be eliminated.
I
General Clark then discussed w:i th General Brann and General Gruenther
specific questions and decisions to be answered and decided upon at the meeting at AAI Headquarters tomorrow; such questions as D day, H hour, further
plans as the attack progresses which would involve oommitment of reserves or
water-borne troop movements for attacks inland. General Clark studied air
photographs of numerous beaches. These were assembled and explained by Colonel
Paxson, Rngineer Executive. General Clark stated that any new beachhead established would be within supporting distance or oommitted with the certainty of
its being quickly merged in with the attacking front. He wanted no P3rt of any
repetition of an Anzio beachhead. Likely defensive lines that the Ger:rrens
could or might establish were discussed as well as general lines of action
open to the Fifth Army as the attack progressed. General Clark brought out
that at the meeting tomorrow he didn't want to be pinned down as to what his
intentions would be or how he would ciispose his farces at any specific time
or when any specific line was reached. He emphasized that any such questions
'directed to him along those lines he would answer that they all would depend
on the enemy situation and where his forces were disposed at tre time. Anything that required getting out the crystal ball to answer specific questions
of this sort would be dealt wj th in thl't manner.
Colonel Paxson was asked about opening up Highway #7 to Rome. He said
it would be merely a matter of putting up Bailey bridges w!:f re thJ permans
knocked out any along the road. He emphasized that the~ wt\i/"iand along
�both sides of the road precluded any troop movements or operations except on
the road. General Clark then examined the maps that were to be taken down
to AAI Headquarters and pointed out changes that he desired to be made. The
conference closed with Generals Clark, Brann and Gruenther conferring alone.
When General Clark returned to his van, he received Generl'11 Kingman, Chief
of the French Rearmament Committee, who was accomponied by Colonel L'Huillier.
After General Kingman left, General Cl1'1rk received seven officers sent down
from UK to observe on this front.
~
At 11+00 General Clark had two war correspondents, Graham Hovey of International News Service, and Jim Roper, of United rress, plus Colonel Clark and
Captain Reardwood into the hut to discuss a censorship matter that arose yesterday in connection with the decoration ceremony. Hovey, Roper and George
Tucker of the Af' all ,1rote terse stories on tr, e decoration ceremony because of
the fact that the names of three of the people receiving awards were not releasable: Generals Harmon, Truscott and Bradshaw. All of them attached notes
to their copy, letting their offices know thAt the brevity was caused because
of their objection to censorship restrictions. General Clark felt that he
should 1mow when such matters were disturbing the correspondents, so he had
Hovey and Roper in for a discussion of the matter. Hovey said the.t he felt
there was no reason why the names of Truscott, Harmon and Bradshaw could not
be released. He saio that he felt that the censors had been picayunish concerning many matters, and General ClPrk told the two correspondents that he
would do everything he could to help them if they would only bring their problems to him. He pointed out, however, that censorship matters were under AAI
and AFHQ, but he was willing to swing his weight when tbe cause was just.
Hovey and Roper said that they had no quarrel to pick with Fifth Army or the
PRr set-up; that they felt they had been very well treated in that respect,
but that there were man:r censorship natters that caused cnnsiderable concern.
After discussing censorship with the two oorrespondents, General Clnrk told
them that a large scale attack by Fifth Army was imminent and · that he planned
on having all the correspondents up f'or P buffet supper, probably Thursday
night, at wrich time he would give them a 1lriefing on the proposed plan.
After concluding his talk with Roper and Hovey, General Clark went to his van
with Colonel Clark and Captain Beardwood and said that it was imperative that
they keep their fingers on the press pulse so that he ·would know if anything
was disturbing the correspondents. He pointed out that in the case of the
closing of' the Anzio radio he car-ie in for a lot of criticism when he had had
nothing to do with it, and he felt that the actions of Hovey, Roper and
Tucker might also result in criticism of his handling of censorship - a matter
which is out of the Fifth ArMy bailiwick.
Later in the afternoon General Clerk saw General Bradshaw and left at
1845 for General Eaker•s Headquarters at Caserta where he had sup~r. General
Spaatz, Commander of the Air Forces in the Mediterranean Theater, was also
present. General Clark returned back to tre conmwnd post and visi tcd General
Brann, a.s well as General Gruenther, prior to retir:ing at 2245.
*
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SAN MARCO--MA.Y 1, 1944--General Clark was awakened today, his 48th birthday,
by the Fifth Army Band pla.ying a medley of songs depicting his life in music.
�33
Just as soon as the General had buzzed Chaney, the band, fbnked by most of
the officers in the forward command post, blared out with the songs. By the
time the band was playing "Over There 11 to denote the General's service overseas, the Fifth Army Commander came out of his van. Over his trousers and
underwear he was wearing a raincoat a.nd had on his· slippers. He made an extemporaneous speech to his officers and men, telling them how much he appreciated their loyalty and the fact that they would so thoughtfully remember
him on his birthday. He added that there was still much to be done in this
war, and he felt that some day before the war ended a great many of the Fifth
Army would see action in the South Pacific. He said that he knew there were
many of us who desire this. As the General came out of the van the band
played "Ruffles, Flourishes and To The General", e.nd as re storted to re-enter,
they opened up with "The Old Gray r.Tare, She Ain't What She Used To Be". General Clark grinned, knowing that this was an idea of General Gruenther's, since
the same piece was played at General Clark's 47th birthday party in Oujda last
year.
Following breakfast, General Clark conferred w:ith Maj. Gen. Hawkesworth
who is taking command of the 1st British Division. General Hawkesworth already
knows General Clark, as he had h.ad command of a division under General HcCreery
in 10 Corps. Gener2l Clark then conferred vrith General Gruenther to straighten
out last-minute detajls prior to his neparture for Caserta to attend General
Alexander's staff conference.
At 1020 Generals Clark and Gruenther left in General Clark's car for Caserta. Generals Brann and Tate had left a ljttle earlier. Following a thorough
discussion of the coming concerted drive by the Fifth and Eighth Armies, General
Clark and his staff members attended a luncheon given by General Alexander. The
Fifth ~my Commander then went to the road landing strip just north of the castle
at Caserta and took off in his L-5 for his command post.
J
After going through his papers, he flew to Mnndragone v·here he h2s a seaside villa. General Clark spent the latter part of the afternoon dovm there enjoy-lng rela:xation on his birthday. Guests at the villa were Generals Sullivan,
Brann and Lewis, Colonels Saltzman and Draper and Misses Moen and Berney of the
American Red Cross. The more hardy people, including General Clark, nent swimming in the Tyrhenian Sea, despite the fact that it was rather cold.
General Clark returned to the command post at 1800 and went to his van
where he got ready for the birthday party being given in his honor by the headquarters officers. At 1850 he went to the hut where all the guests were assembled and a huge buffet supper had been spread. The guests -included the heads
of all the sections in Fifth Army, plus other more or less close friends of the
General. Following cocktails, the General and his guests had a cold buffet and
vrere entertained by members of a USO troupe who had also been guests at the buffet. General Clark retired to his van at about 2230.
General C:!.;o.rk received the following letter from his staff o+-'fj_cers:
"On the occasion of your birthday today, we the heads of your staff sections not only wish you the many happy returns of the day vrhich we all desire,
but seize avidly- this opportunit:,. to express to you, as a group and as indivi-
�3Y
duals , some th~_ngs which we all feel very strongly.
" It gives us great pleasure to have such e chance to tell you v1hat an
honor j_t is to serve under you on your staff and how proud we are of you ,
of the Fifth Army and of its Headquarter·s. It is a rare l onor and rrivilege to work under your foresighted and vigorous leadership in a headquarters
which, under your euidance , has a rerutation throughout the Arny for extraordinary harmony and efficiency. Our pride is equally great in being members of a field force which has sho,.,m itself to be so effective in battle .
"This occasion provides us also ·6 th a v'elcome opportunity to express
to you our deep appreciation of the consideration and loyalty which you unfailingly show to your staff officers as individuals . One of the harpiest
aspects of serving on your staff is the knowledge each of us has that our
Army Cornnander is our personal friend who , in tbe midst of his heavy responsibilities and eY..acting and time-consuming duties , is never too busy to
be thoughtfully concerned with the welfare of the individuals composing his
staff . The 1mowledge that this is so cements our personal loyalty to you
and inspires us with the desire to give to .you and to the Fifth Army the
best of v,hich we are capable in the busy da:rs that remP.in between now end
complete victory.
1
"We erlend to you our heartiest birthday congratulations and express
to you our conf:i dent wishes that your future undertakings may continue to be
outstandingly successful and that you and your family will enjoy a full measure of health and happiness . "
General Cl a:t"k tode.y received an jnformation copy of the following cable
from General Alexander to General Wilson :
mr 0 , 2632 .
As you know it is an essential feature of my plan for DIA DEM that Fifth Arny should hold 36th u. S. Division in reserve ready to operate
on the main front or in the bridgehead According to the Vff'Y in which the battle
develops . It is impossible to fix precisely when the decision whether to commit 36th U. S. Division can be tr-ken. It cannot in any case be before DIADEM
D plus 2 but it may be any day after that . If decision is to employ 36th U. S.
Division in the bridgehead it is most important from surprise and security aspects that it should be moved there at fastest possible rate . The necessary
craft to lift 36th U. S. Division should therefore be standing by at Naples
from DIADEM D plus 2 until decisj_on where to commit 36th U. S. Division has
been taken . I understand that this may def er date at which brassard can be
launched , but I consider that must be accepted. It has always been a cardinal
condition of BRASSARD that it should not in any way interfere with resources
required for main battle . I therefore request that arrangements be made for 15
1ST and 18 LCI(L) to be standing by in Naples from DIADEM D plus 2 until decision where to commit 36th U. S. Division has been taken . DIADEM requires maximum support by naval bombardment . It is understood from FOVJIT that this may not
be forthcoming unless 3rd Divi sion mine sweeping M/LS are retained and not sailed
for BRASS/\RD on 15 May. I shall be glad of earliest confirmation tha.t the lift
for 36th U. s. Division will be available as indicated above and that the minesweeping M/IS will not be wi_
thdravm. DIADEM D and H hour follow by special lett er by hand of Liaison Officer. "
11
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SAN MARCO--MA.Y 2, 1941,--General Clark left the command post early to make an
inspection visit to the 85th Division. He proceeded to the junction of Highway /fl and Rout e #?14 where he was met by General Coulter, the Division -Commander . The party consisted of two jeeps . They proceeded forward across the
Garjgliano at increased distances and visited the 328th Field Artillery Battalion command post , comnanded by Lt . Colonel rerkins . This battalion is in
direct support of the 337th Infantry. General Clark visited the command post
proper and the fire c1 irectio:n center . He met there Tiaster Sergeant Reed who
had served with General Bolles . General Cll"rk immediately recognized Sergeant
Reed as he reported to the Army Commander outside of the command post . After
leaving the command post Genere.1 Clc1rk went to C Battery posi tion area and
inspected all gun pits and questioned the cannoneers . From C Battery he went
to the comnand post of the 337th Infantry commanded by Colonel Ollie Hughes .
General Clnrk immediately asked for a map showing the regimental dispositions
which were explained to him by Colonel Hughes . He also asked to be shown
briefly the regimental plan for the next attack.
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From the comrnmd post of the 337th, General Clark proceeded to the command post of the 3rd Battalion colTll'l.anded by Colonel Smith , where he reviewed
again battalion dispositions and future plans for offensive action. From the
battalion coMmand post he went to K Company corunand post where he discussed
company dispositions and counter attack plans . From K Company he walked cross
country to Tufo . On the way he passed by a machine gun platoon of Company M
and talked with the platoon commander , Lt . Hughes . In Tufo he visited the OP
of the 2nd Bn., of the 337th and also the OP of the 913th Field Artillery Battalion, a direct support battalion of the 88th D:ivision which was furnishing
general support to the 85th Di vision at this particular time . General Clerk
then proceeded to the command post of the 138th Infantry where he talked to
Colonel Safay, Regimental Commander . They d1scussed regimental dispositions ,
future offensive action of the regiment and also , General Clark particularly
asked to what extent the regiment could make use of tanks . He stated that
he wanted tanks to be used wherever feasible , regardless of losses , because he
has plenty of tanks and has 100 replacement tanks .
From the 338th Infantry General Clark and party left for the Division command post where they had lunch. After llmch General Clark proceeded to the
rear area of the 85th Division and was met enroute by Colonel Brady, Commander
of the 339th Infantry which was in a rest area west of Mondragone . The regiment was assembled in an open field . As soon as General Clark arrived he
mounted a speaker ' s platform and gave a very inspiring talk to the 339th Infantry in which he welcor.1.ed then and the Division to the Fifth Army, stating
that he was very proud to have them; that they were very fortunate to have
undergone the excellent training thct they had had in the United States and
that this additional combat phase in a quiet sector could also be considered
as excellent additional training. He felt certain that the Division was ready
for combat and asserted thet he had no fears whatsoever in committing them for
hard, offensive and aggressive action. After the short talk General Clark proceeded to a demonstration where he witnessed a platoon in the attack against
bunkers and a i'ortified house . After the demonstration General Cla.rl•· was
guided by General Sullivan to the 98th Railhead Company. This railhead company
was operating a truckhead for ration breakdovm. The truckhead company is assisted by the 3062nd Labor CoJilpany, whose company area was also inspected by
�the General. He was very pleased to find the Fifth Army Plaque for excellence
displayed . From there General Clark proceeded to the 815th Sterilization and
Bath Company vrhere he sav, the complete cycle of where a man comes in dirty,
takes off his clothes , gets a good hot shower , co!'1es out , dries M mself off
and gets a complete new outfit of clean clothes . A tired and dirty soldier
comes out a clean and presentable looking soldier . This unit can handle 1600
men a day, but on Easter Eve it handled 2100 . From there the General visited
the 110th QM Bakery- Company cormanded by Captain ~nest . He inspected installations and commended Captain Ernest for his initiative . He also se.w the Fifth
Army plaque for excellence which was displayed with three clasps for January,
February and March .
From the Bakery Company he vrent to the 230th Sl'l.lva.ge Collectine Company
commanded by Captain North . This salvage collecting company has done excellent
work. General Clark -inspected every phase of its £Jctivity and commended Captain North very highly for his initiative and judgment in handling this most
important function of salvage collection Rnd rerair of all ty-pes of clothing
and equipment which , in some cases , had the appearance of being hopelessly unusable forever. During the past months this conpany has salvaged and repaired
over $13 , 000, 000 worth of equipment and materiel.
General Clark then proceeded to the 86th Depot Compe.ny commanded by Major
Lazarus where Class II and IV supplies are stored and issued . The last quartermaster installation, the 3839th QM Gas Supply Company, comnanded by Captain
Hiller , was then visited by the General. This is where gt'soline and oil are
placed in conta.iners from pipe lines and are ready for distribution forward .
General Clark returned to his command post where he worked on dispatches and
had as his dinner guest General Adcock, G-4, NATOUSA, and General Tate , his
G- 4 . After supper he worked some more on important papArs and retired .
The Army Commander today received the follovring cable of congratulations
on his birthday from the Prime rflinister: "Many Happy Returns of the Day. 11
*
*
*
SAN MARCO--MAY 3, 1944--General Clark left the command post at 0830 to fly by
cub to the II Corps cub field . J-ie made the flight in a total elapsed time of
five minuteft . At the cub field he was met by General Keyes , II Corps Commander , and General Sloan, 88th Division Commander . He inspected a cub plane
which had been improvised to drop supplies to maintain troops in isolated
spots and a cub ambulance arrangement. The plane had a separate attachment
for dropping supplies . The general principle is that the pilot pulls a release and m8.kes a slight brink to the right , causing the :rackage to slip off
rollers out the cub door to the ground. There is a baffle plate on the left
side preventing the package from Mtting the wing struts . To use a cub as an
ambulance this device is removed and the patient pl~ced on a flat pa'.nel board
with his feet toward the tail. In order to pick the patient up , a special
canvas ty-pe litter is improvised . It is only an experiment, and further
tests will be made .
From the II Corps cub field General Clark and GenerPl Sloan, accompanied
by Colonel Draper , left for the 88th Division front line units . Two jeeps
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were in the par ty, and t hey crossed the ferry over the Garigliano at about 0915 ,
the time generally reserved by the Boche for shelling. The crossing was made .
wit hout incident except t hat the motor failed to start on the ferry at the beginning. Cnce a cross the G;:irigliano , the jeeps were taken ?S far for ward as
allowable . The road is under obser vation from the Boche frol'l severHl directions . The jeeps were parked in an old stone house , and the party continued
on foot to the 350th Infantry command post , a walk of about two miles . General
Clark dis cussed wit h Col onel Lynch, regimental commander , his regiment al dispositions and plans for the next attack. General Clark emphe.sized again the
fact that he wanted tanks used and discussed with Colonel Lvnch his tentative
plans for their employment . Col onel Lynch called in Colonel Frey who is attached to the regiment and was formerly w:th the Prmored force . Colonel Frey
briefly Axplained to Gener.<il Clark how he would recomriend the t,-,nks be used .
In general , they would att ack in platoon strengt}1 find, where terrain permitted,
in company strength . They would assault a M 11 , gain the p:round , and the infantry would quickly follow up and hold . The tanks , in the meantime , could be
used to assist other infantry units attacking up precipitous terrain to the
flanks , b~ infil aded fire . After leaving the 350th Infe.ntry command post
General Clark proceeded dovm to a detachment of the 351st Infantry which is
attached to Colonel Lynch. This consists of L, Hand K Companies under the command of T:a.,ior T':a:vrokas . Re has K Company rrotecth1g a l ikely avenue of approach
by the Boche with three platoons in line . P Company h2.s its machine guns
sighted for close sun,ort . L Conpany was in the reRr in reserve . In f'..ddition ,
this cetabhment has three tanks spaced at about 200 yard intervals along the
road ready to oppose any counter-attack. General Cl?rk vrent up to the nost
forward elements rmd viewed Castelforte and the interven:ing terrain vrM ch is
"No rran I s Land1t at the prese'1.t tine . He discussed with Hajor f'!avrokas pe.trol
activities and f 01.md that lj ttle information has been deter mined with regard
to enemy activi ties in the vicinity of Castelforte . He met Colonel Coleman,
Commander of the 3rd Battalion, which is held in reserve of the 350th Infantry.
He discussed with him his role as a reserve bRtt e.lion . Gener 2l Clark continued
his discussions w:tth Col. Lynch, and when he found that the 350th was planning
to attack Damiano in column of companies he desired thPt this plan be reconsidered . Pe wanted an attack rnflde on 2 broader front and with more strength.
At 1130 the party proceeded bacl< to the 38th Division command rest wl ere
luncheon was served for General Clark, General Keyes e.nd members of the 88th
Di vision staff. Aft"?r hmch GenorP-1 Clark left for a decoretion ceremony and
also to address t '!0 regir1ents of the 88th Division in reer areas . On the way
he inspe cted an improvised dental laboratory devised from a salvaged 2- 1/? ton
truck.
1
As General Clark approached the assembly area of the two regiments , the
349th and 351st with other divisi on att achments , the troops were assembled in
front of a reviewing platrorm. The troops were in command of Generfll Kendall,
Assistant Division Commander , who called them to attention, anc , as General
Clark stood on the reviewinr platforn "Ruffles and To The Generali' were rlayed
by the band. He was introduced to the troors by General Sloan . In his introduction , General Sloan presented the Army Cor:unander to his men and , in turn,
his men to the Army Commander . He mentioned thet General Clark nas one of his
students at Fort Leavenworth, and that fa.ct gave him added pride in presenting
t o his men General Clark. General Clark, in acknowlerging General Sloan ' s introduction , also mentioned the fact that be:ing his instructor, if he did nake
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�any tactical mistakes he had en out because of this fact. After bis talk
Gen8ral Clark presented the DSC to Lt . La.mb - the first DSC to be given to a
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member of the 88th Division. Lt . Lamb's citation indicated his bravery and
courage while leading a sri.all patrol into eneJ11y territory . The assembled
mer.1 of the 38th Division were a very enthusiastic audience and cheered after
General Clark ' s very stirring talk to them . As General Clark left , the troops
were called to attention, and he left imnediately for Mondragone vrhere he had
about an hour I s relc'lxation on the beach r>nd then worked on some hundred odd
decoration cases .
While f1t Hondragone , General Crittenberger arrived to confer with General Clark for about half an hour . General Clark left by cub plane for the
Fifth Army command post at 1800 v,here he conferred with General Gruenther and
Colonel Saltzman. After supper he vTOrked again on administrative matters and
retired at about 2200 .
General Clark today replied to the Prime Minister ' s cable of birthday
congratulations as follows: RH 8723 . "Your kind birthday message deeply appreciated . "
.
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SAN MARCO- -MAY 4 , 1944- -General ClErk left the command rost at 0830 for a full
day ' s visit to the French Expeditionary Corps . He arrived at Sessa at 0855
and was presented with a guard of honor which he inspected with General ,Juin
and immediately started for the 4th iiountain Moroccan Division command post at
Cescheto . Colonels Draper and Kammerer accompanied Generals Clrrk and Juin.
At the 4th Moroccan Division they were met by General Sevez who presented General Clark to his staff . General Clark renewed his acquaintance with Colonel
Bauffre , Chief of Staff to General Sevez, whom he ha.d knovm in Africa . Colonel
Bauffre speaks English quite well and had been to the United States where he
had called upon General Clark's son at West Point . General Sevez then conducted the party to his observation post on some commanding terrain near his command post. The visibility was poor, but an effort was m11de to point out the
terrain over v1hich the next attack will be conducted . Such features as Mount
.Cairo , San Ambrogio , Hount r~ajo , Pount Rotundo and Damiano were pointed out .
The party then returned to the command post where General Clark went over
the troop dispositions under General Sevez' command. He pointed out th11t he
had under his command at present elements from the 1st rloroccan Division which
were in their place in the ljne on the right . This Division r•rill be under the
command of General Brosset . In the center were el~ments of the 2nd Moroccan
Division under the command of General Dody. On the left were elements of the
4th Mountain Moroccan Division under tr e OOillPln.nd of General Sevez . Elements of
these three divisions were actually occupying the line so that on the day of
the attac1<: these troops would be familiar w:i th the terrain in their zones of
action from the line of departure.
General Clark then vrent into detail as to tb e direction of attack and the
maneuvers J'l"cessary to capture initial objectives Pnd follow up action s. This
was done so that General Clark could rersonP lly familiarize himself with all
details of the French Expec1itionary Corps efforts in the attack. Colonel Bauffre
acted as 4 nterprt"!ter for General Clark. Geri eral Cl9.r1<: wanted to point out that
�39
the entire front, both Eighth and Fifth Army, were going to attack simultaneously
and aggressively. Jt was rointed out that once the French had attained Mount
j•ajo, speed and surprise was necessary to capture objectives in the vicinity of
Ausonia and further developments from that point northwest to ri(ount D'Oro. General Clark also dj scussed the coordi netion required with actions of the French
Corps as concerned the .Attack on Deniano by the 88th Division and thP-ir further
actions in seizing the terrain in the Yicj nity of Spigno . He w:i shed to point
out that the II Corps was not attacking according to any schedule but thnt they
were going to pusl~ aggressively forward so tl at all troops would not be waiting
for others to grdn certain objectives. He also dj scussed with General Sevez the
employment of tanks in tl·e ettack and indicated thflt he desir~d tanks to be used
aggressively and wherever terrain permitted, regardless of losses, because he
would have replacements . He also discussed artillery dispositions and verified
the fact th8t any British requests for fire in the Eighth Army zone of action
from artillery with the Frencr.1 Corps would be first cleared through French Corps.
These discussions finished, the party then left for the front, crossing the Garigliano at wrat is knoin as the Pont Jaguar.
,I
In approaching this bridge, the party traveled over~ ro?d mAde by French
eng:ineer trnops. It was an excellent engineering job and was very well camouflaged. After crossing the Garigliano, the rarty nroceeded to the right flank
of the French bridgehead ::-cross the Garigliano where Generals Clark, Juin, Sevez
and Colonel Draper visitP-d a company occupying the front line. This company
belonged to the 4th Regiment of General Dody's 2nd rbroccan Division. It had
attached to it some American tanks which were well camouflaged and sheltered along
a side mountain road very close to the front line. This company e.nd the tanks
were so disposed as to react immediately to any oounter-attack down this road of
approach by the Boche . The visibility was not very good, and very little terrain
could be viewed. The party went as far forward as was pos~ible without breaking
too much defilade. German posts were only nbout 300 yArds from their position.
General Clrirk paused a few minutes ·to talk to members of an American tank crew
and renarkl'ld that the terrain was good for t::inks ·and wished them good luck, sayinP' thrt re knew th,'lt they would do well.
The party thlcln proceeded over a raid, which hA.d recently been opened for
trucks to the ?nd Regim"'nt of the 4th Mountain Moroccan Division. This road was
a rmle trail when the sector was occup:ied by the British and was improved by the
French to a ,jeep trail and then to a rDl:'d passable for trucks. This also represented excellent engineerjng work. At the :?nd R~giment there was a small guard .
o~ ronor which was presented to Gener~l Clark, and he talked w:ith Colonel Buot de
L'Epine. He was also introduced to Colonel Tolle, ComMander of the 8th RTM of the
2nd Moroccan Division. Colonel Molle is considered R fj ne col11rlander and has been
given a difficult sector to attack over. At tMs point Generel ClRrk inspected an )
advance surgical unit which was rrepared to hPndle seriously wounded rnen who needed il'llJ'lediate at tent ion before being taken back to the rear. The French had planned
an evacuation by cub plane from t} is point. From there tr e rart~r vrent forward to
one of the battalions of the 2nd Regiment and inspected dispositions and routes
used in the mountai_ns.
The party proceeded back to the Go.rigliano by a different road wr ich had recently ½een improved for trucks ½y the French. It made P comylete circuit of the
Frenc1 bridgehead over the Garigliano. On reac} ~ng the Garigliano Gen"lrRl Clark
was conducted thro 1gh tl--ie ~h ~•edical Batta lion I s insta] lation. He viewed the
1
�operat:i.ng rooms and wards ,,,here wmmded were kept prior to being sent back to
the evacuation hospital . This bnttnl:ion was the org~.nj c nedical battalion of
the L~th }fountain Moroccan Division.
Fror, here the party proceeded to Sessa where they had lunch in General
Juin ' s P1ess . The lunch was quite ~laborate, as is customary witr the French ,
cons:i sting of f:i_ ve courses . Those present were Generals Clark, Juin and Carpentier, Colonels Kammerer and Drap~r and Lieutenant.s de Noblee, Vrois:3art
and ratrico .
After luncl1 the party we:nt to visit the Gouras . They were met by General
Guillaume , Commander of tl'e Goums, who had lim,d up as guard of honor mounted
elements of the Goums . Bugles r:ind drums rendered the necessary honors as
General Clark inspected the tr,~ops . Genere.l GuillauJne then introduced to Gene ral Clark three of his Group Commarders, Colonel LeBlanc of t},e 1st Group of
Gourns, Colonel Soulard of the 2nd and Colonel ~~assiet Dubies of the 3rd Group .
Thi'! 4th Group Conmander was not m·esent, Colonel DeLatour. G"3neral Clrrrk explained bri"'fly to these Group Commanders tre situation as it now exi_sted on
the Garigliano front and at the beachhMd. He told them that rie had recently
visited the ';~r and 85th Divisions and fennel that they were eager and anxious
for the 0>1~0..,.,-ing attack, and l'.e assured everyone trat it was going to be an allout effort, nnd he was confident thn.t the Gou.TJ1s vrould carry out their rart
well . He also ri-ma.rked that while he was in the United States he had talked
with President Roosevelt ancl thet the latter was very :interested to know how
the French were doing and that he , General Clark, told the President tha.t they
were mngni:!:icent ; thnt they were excel l~nt ffrrhters .nnd had done well and, in
addition , he told Fres:i.d ent Roosevelt that General Juin was do.:ng a sr lendid
job; and that in his opinion there was and could not be a better choice as a
col"lmander of the French troops than Gener/31 Juin .
After inspecting the Goums the party then proceeded to the 6th Regiment of
the 4th 1,101mtain Poroccan Division, Colonel Cherriere commanding. Genl')ral Clark
knew Colonel Cherr:l ere and was very pleased with t,,e arrangemt"nts rn.de for his
visit . Colonel Cherriere had a Moroccan drum and bugle corps and a band and a
battalion lined up in parade ground fashion . As G1imeral Clark approached, the
drum and bugle corps rilayed 11 Sur Les ChaJr1ps 11 and thl'ln th" hand played the "Star
Spangl~d Flanner" wh:: ch was followed by the 11 rtarseillaise 11 • Generri Clr.irk tben
inspected the battalion of the 6th 1r:oroccan Regiment ruid congratufated Colonel.
Cherriere on the excell~nt anpe2.rRnce of his troors and explD ined to hin that he
was sure thct this reginent would play a big role in the ettack to come and that
he was confident that they were ready. H~ remarked on itieir alertness and enthusiasm and was very rleased with the recertion accorded him.
The party then left for Sessa v1here Gen~ral Clark left Genernl Juin and
Colonel Karrnnerer and nroceeded to the Fifth Army command rost ~ith Colonel Lraper.
On his return to the corunand post Gener.<>l Clrirk i rnmediately worked on administrative n£1tters and later received General Martin, Fifth Army Surgeon, and Colonel
Barker, I<'ifth Army Chemical Warfare Officer, who is to leave shortly for the
United Sfo.tes to tall:e over conmand of the CheMicel ~rrarfere School at Edgewood Arsenal. He had these two o"ficers as dinner p;i1ests . Gen~ral Cfark excused himself and said thPt he hnd quite a b:it o+' work to do j n preparation for the conference witb his Corps and Division Commanders tomorrow Morning which will take
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place at 10 o I clock. During this
Army plan of nttack and make sure
part that they are to play in the
planning, timing and coordj m-i.tion
after a very busy day .
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conference J:,e will go over jn detAil the Fifth
that all comlllEl.nders understand thoroughly the
over-A.11 plan and settle any questions as to
of the attack. He retir ed at n.bout 10 o I clock
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SMT MARC0--MAY 5, 1944--General Clark, preparing for the launching of the tremendous offensive on the Fifth Army front vd thin the next week, called a conference of all his nain Fifth Army front corps and division cornmanders today,
and the entire plan of attack was gone into during a 2- 1/2 hour conference that
was followed by a buffet llmcheon at which Genernl Clark vms the host .
Upon arising, General Clark disposed of administrative work and then conferred with General Brann to button up last - minute details on the conference .
'l'he various commanders , P.11 of wron were accompanied by tl·eir Chiefs of Staff
and G- J ' s , began to arrive at 0945 , and motion pictures were taken for use in
short subjects and newsreels in the United States . Those present included:
· GeneraJs Juin, Harding, Crittenberger , Dody, Brosset, deMontsabert, Sy_vez , Carpentier , Y,'al',;:er, Sloan, Coulter , dalsh, Saville , Guillaume, Chnillie:r, Johnson,
Hume , Lewis, Poran, Bradsh~w, Brann, Sullivan, r.1artin, Tate , Beucler and , of
course Generals Clark and Gruenther . The lf1.st man to arrive was General Juin,
Cor.imander of the French Expeditionary Corps . General Clark met him and accompanied him into the hut , and t!-i.e conference got undervmy. Because of the fact
thnt all remarks had to be translated either from English to French or French
to English , the conference proceeded ratl-ir--r slowly. Following is a gist of the
conference taken from stenographic notes:
GENERAL CLARK : 11 We are going to have various officers t:Iiscuss their plans
this morning and will have interpreters for the French .
"Gentlemen, I called this me.eting in order that subordinPte oommanders
might meet each other here and discuss their plans briefly so that everyone
will know what the other fellow is going to do . The Army Plan will be outlined
in its br oad form , and corps and division comm~ders will likewise give us a
brief orientation of their plans. If there are any loose ends or discrepancies this is the last chance to clear them up .
ttin addition we have a fine plan - it has been developed by General
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Alexander ' s headque,rters whereby both the Fifth and Eighth Armies attack at
the same time without on~ holding back and waiting for the other to do some thing toward the attack. We are attacking over ~ vridc front in grePt strength.
There are eight divisions attacking simu1taneously on D- Day. These troops are
fresh . We have reserved , both infantry an'd. artillery. It is the f;irst time
that the total resou.rc.- s of both armies. have been thrown into the attack at the
same time . These remarks I have ma.de rpply to the majn Cassino - Garigliano
front . At the same time we }1.a.ve the bridgehead force of the Fifth Army which
is prepared to attack at the opportune time either with or w:ithout reinforcements .
"Now I want to sa;v a word as to over- optimism. I have every confidence in
the success of this a ttack but I must emphasize that we must not let ourselves
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look into the crystal ball and by wishful t~inking realize that we are going
to join up or capture Rome within a few days . We should join up - we will
join up - and we will march on to the north in reasonable time . I mention
this because during the last Cassino attack there were some who thought that
we would join up in a matter of a few days , and the.t over- opHmistic estimate
a ctually got back to the United States . I was confronted with that when I
returned on my recent visit to the United States , and it took me some time to
explain and straighten it out . If the enemy delays us , as he did for many
months before we attacked Cassino , by demolitions and delaying action, he can
delay us materially. He cPn delay our advance so thet we will be fort unate
to make two miles per day in my opinion. So let us realize thP-t we bave a
battle ahead and that we are not going to wj_n it the easy way or by his pulling out . There a.re no indications of that . We have f,I'and air support in
this attack . It is the first time that we hnve joined up, with good weather
to operate in , the many groups thPt will support us directly in this battle .
11 low I vrant to emphasi ze that for my subordinate co:mnanders there are no }
time schedules. No one plans ahead of time that they will wait to do something after someone on his flanks acts in order to accor1plish some objective . \
In the Fifth Arny we are basing the success of our att..,ck largely on surprise ~!
We must not lose the impetus of this attack if we do secure surprise. We must
push on or out with everything we have without delay.
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"Another point wM.ch I want to emphasize is the use of tanks :in this
battle . I want no holding back on the use of tanks . We have tank superiority; l
we have some terrain where \"Te can use t hem, so use them in mass and throw all \
of them at thr? enemy after you get the oprortunity. 'l"e have arranged for 100
reserve tanks right b"'hind the Fifth Army on this front and 100 reserve tanks
up on the beachhead . Now the great problem whi.· ch confronts me is how I would
like to use my Army Reserve , the 36th Division - whether to put therr on the
main front or in the bridgehead . In that connection a decision must be mnde
as to when the attack from the bridgehead will be launched and in what direction . The bridgehead is a dangerous threat to the enemy and he recognizes it
as such a threat - a threat whicb will do , in the early stages of our attack
here, as much as an actual attack. I am most gnxious to launch an attack out
of the bridgehead with all the force I can put into it , but it must not be premature and it nrust be done with adequate forces to break throue-Ji once'we start .
I am going to be subjected to pressure both from above and below to use that I _
36th Division ahead of time . Now I know that the II Corps is planning, and
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should hnve planne~, use of the ,6th Division , and I don ' t want tc get premature
urging from that source as to the early corunitment of that division because I
will not do it . As I see it, if the attack goes as we have a r:i ght to exrect,
it would be premeture to move the 36th Division either to the bridgehead or to
this front tmtil at least n week after tre ettack has started , and once it has
been decided to put it in the bridgehead I hope to be able to put in additional troops for either the 88th or 85th Division. Our position ,. ill be difficult
until we find out what will be the enemy ' s reaction - · how he reacts to this attack , and we will have to maJntain flexibility and be prepared in either direction once we find out hovr he is reacting to tliis attack.
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"I wanted to explain this ribout the 36th Division so it would be thoroughly
understood by subordinate commanders . We have a great opportunity here if we
play our car:d_s and do not permit it to become premature.
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COLONEL HOV'rARD: 11 The enemy sitw~tion in general js indicated on the situation rr.ap. On the oouthern or main front of Fifth Army the enemy has· two P.nd onehalf divisions facing us on the GUSTAV LINE defending th<>t line. In the rear he
has the AIOLF HITLER LINE, a well prepared position. He has e.bout one-half of
the 15th Greru:idier Division in the general 8.rea of ITRI in reserve . On the
Eighth Army front, north of the LIRI River he has Pbout two and one-half divisions as indicAted def ending the forward lines. In the rear he has about onehalf of the 15th Division wbich is in position there to defend the ADOLF HITLER
Line in case it is desired to do so . Certain st::itistics are indicated on the
chart concerning enemy strength and disposition. North of the Eighth Army_position the 5th British Corps is opposed by a force whose strength is indicated on
the chart.
"In the bridgehea'.d the enemy has five divisions defend:i11.g the rer-'imeter of
the beach wit}, one division in irnmediF t~ reserve. In ardition he he,s a di vision in the general areA south of RCTJ!E with re,rt of it south of the mouth of the
TIBER River and re.rt of it ooutheast of ROVIE, and two divisions in this general
area of CIVITAVECCHIA. He has also been v-.rorking diligently on a new defense line
defending south of ROHE. In northern ITALY he has five divisions in addition to
the ones I have mentioned , three of which ere defending the coastline in th is
general area as indicated. As to the enemy's capability, he is capable of defending the GUSTAV tine or fighting delaying action on thRt line and on successive
positions in the rear thereof. He may defend the AID LF HITLER Line /'IS soon as
that line is reached, and is carable of fighting delay-ing e ction on thet line and
delaying action on successive positions in rear thereof until the line south of
ROrE is reached. Of oourse, he cen mass his reserves from up north and launch a
counteroffensive but this is not considered feasible because he would not have
much of a chance of success. It is possible that he could bring down about five
divisions, but the number he could brin2' dovm wculd be fofiuenced by the sea.le
and t:im:i ng of the attack j n the beachhead.
11 The lfoe of riction the enemy is nost likely to adopt is indicated by
what he did in the CASSINO battle - th:1t is, to defend the GTTSTAV Line with the
force he has on that line without reinforcing it, but he is likely to reinforce
the ATY'LF RI'T'LER Line when we reach it. If we push him out of the GUSTAV Line
he is likely then to delay by successive rosjtions and contesting each 7mportRnt
tactical locality tmt:i 1 the AIDLF HITLER Line is reached. If pushed out of t:bat
line, then I believe he will defend along the prer,i1red line south of ROME.
GP-JGRAL BRANN! "General ClDrl< and gentlenen. The nission of the Allied
Armies in Italy on tl-e next oT"erntion :is to join forces with the briqgehead and
drive the enemy north of ROT~. There is a cover rl~n now being conducted for
this operation. Th:is plan was desi~ed to make the Germans believe thrt there
will be a landing in force at CIVITAVECCFIA. (Informr>tion that there is a concentration of three divisions in the NAPIES-SAIBR.NO area training in ITC designed to make the Germans think we are going to load in thrt area.)
"On the east of the AJ'PENTN'ES the 5th Corns, operating under AAI, has
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the mission of containing as J11any Gorr.inn troops as rossible in the erel'l, and
at the slightest withdrawal to follow them up raridly. On our right th'e Eighth \
Army ha.s the rdssion of breaking into the LIBI Valley and acvancing r;-,.pidly
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vrest via Highway 6. The Eighth Army consists of' three corps, the 10 Corps on
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the right , the Polish Corps in the center r.nd the 13 Corrs on the Eighth Arny \
left . Th~ 10 Corps , which consists of the New Zealand Division and certain
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other separate troops, will cover a ,dde rent. This corrs has a deception
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plan designed to make the Germans think there will be an attack in force in the\
direction of ATIHA . The PoHsh Corrs consists of two divisio11s, ea.ch division
with two brigades. The;r have the mission of first, frol"l a position in the CASTELLONE area, drivjng soutb tonard the critical area around Hill 593 and cutting
the highwa:, west of the •!(l';.,\STERY. ':'he second phase of the Polish Corps is to
turn to the east and take the :~'JASTBRY. Having accomplished that they turn
northwest toward F:Fnnrn:rrE, protecting the rigl-·t of the 13 Corps and getting
as much high ground toward RC'CCASECCA as possible . The 13 Corps consists of
four divisions, three :infantry divj_sions and one armored division. The plan
is to force a crossing of the RArIDO River end Bdvance rap5 dly northwest through
the LIRI Valley. The Eighth Army has the 1st Canadian Corps jn reserve , consisting of o:rie j nfantry $.n<l one armored division . That corps will be used
either to pass througl tr e 13 Corps After they have come to the HITLER Line
and start up Highway 6, or second, if the 13 Corps bogs down on the HITLER
Lin~ , to assist in the break-through of the HITL :::R. Linf1 . They may rn ve to
move in and assist in driving forward to the HITLER Line . The riission of the
Fifth Army is to secure the ATTS(PifIA Defile, advence via BSFERIA to the south
o~ the LIRI and SACCO Rivers .
"The Army Plan for the French Corps Vfit' four divisions on thP. right
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ano tl-ie II Corps with tvro d- ivisions on tre left , is separated into phases :
First , capturing the hir,h ground in the V" cinity of 11A.JO and cut the FORMIA ATJSC""ITA Road nortr of AFSOtITA . The f:ir st phP.se of II Co1ys is to take DA''IANO
and the S Ridge , move down the S Ridge tavarA.s CCIJ.E MARTINO, thereby cutting
the road in this area (vie. CDLLE f':ARTrm)
"The second phase for the FrP-nch is to advance with additional troops
and close tre AUSENTE Valley •• • • Here in the south the II Corps t~kes critical
features :in th~ foothills of the PBTREIJ..A Hill Mass .
"The third rl'ase or principal action will be for tl'e French Corps to.
move general on r~ fi 1 C'iRO area assisted by ti,~ troops th t }1a.ve P1oved into the
hills by a flanking attack, this being the critice.l feature for the third phase.
11 The third J,hase -f'or tre II Corps is to r,ove for ·mrd througb the hill
·riasses vTith the mission of gettfog jnto the ITRI area with or without the assistance of the 36th Division, to be decided at a lPter tjme, the F'rencl: having
established a firri base in this gtmeral area, operat:i ng in the direction of
FICO and cutting the road directly west o:' the M REVOLE Hill I'hss in conJunction wi tr the attack on FICO . The artillery opens nt 2300 for forth (40) minutes
and fires genern.lly on known positio11s and counterbattery. In general, there
will he a large force of Hrtill0ry w;th the principal mission of maintPining
the blocks already established across the LIRI River and the area west of those
blocks on the critical roads in the ITRI and fICO areas . 240' s and Long Toms
will be used on this Mission and consioerahle force will have to be used in
that wav. Plans are being prepared for an airborne drop generally in the vicinHy
of M R.T.;VOLP. . Decision to make this drop will be r-F<le nfter the second phPse.
The 509th Parachute Battalion will be dropped in tI-ii:i.t .<irea to secure a firm
position and operatini:; toward the French in this direction (:~) or toward the
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II Corps in that direction · (SE ). In the coming operations rriority in the
employment of e.ir for Fifth Army will be given to isolating the battlefield .
"There are few roP-ds lee.ding to the combat area. W hope by establishe
ing and Faintaining blocks in the S 0LIVA and JTRI areas to isolate the bBttlefield using our artillery to J'llaintain t} ose blocks already established. Ad. ditional blocks will be estahljsh,-,d along l ::nes at critical points es indicated b:,r those three red dots (S OLIVA, S GIOVA 11H-lT, PASTENA). These blocks
are established not only to prevent rdnforceMent of the battle area but to
prevent bringing in troops to man the HITLER Line. The Navy will assist by
establishing a block in the ef1rly phase in the T"':R.RJI.CINA area and along the
flank of the II Corps .
"The P.rmy Commander told you of his concern over the timing of the beachhead attack. We not only have the tim~n~ but have the direction to con- ·
sider and thP, -forces that will be required to su,:;cessfully attA.ck from the
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beachhead. At present there hove been three plPns prep11red. , Each w:i 11 be
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t used depending upon things we don't know at this time. One attack is toward
CARROCETO and west of COLLE LAZIALE. The second attack is in the direction
of CORI P.nd after the canture of CORI and advancing north cutting Highway 6.
-.;J,... A~ The Army Commander thinl:s it necessary that rt least one di vision go in to
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ar,sist either of these attacks f'nd probably more vlill be n°edecl. Time does
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not rermit goir EY, over the conditions under ,m,·, ich each ,":i 11 be le..1 ·nched. t , r. '
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"The third attn.ck :is probably the easiest attack to accoMplisp. success- ft
fully. The attack is ; n the direction of ~EZZE, gPining this high ground. Assu~
ini:; that we have arr:ived At t:be initial Army 0bjective, tlv·t the Eight}, Army
has had hn.rd fighting and may need some t:i me for regrouping in the ARCE-CEFRANO
area, one plan mie;ht be, hav:ing gained tre Hill Hass (SISERNO) with the French
Corps, drjv-ing in this direction dovm the natural corr:idor toward SEZZE in
conjunction with th") hridgehead attack on the same objective . Such 8n i>ttHck 1
would turn thj s ent:i. re nrea P
.nd permit drnvr.i ng of the re1'!1a:i ning troops of the
II Corps off this line and giving more flexibility to tlie ie>.ttacJr- clesired in
the br:idgehead . 11
GENERAL JUIN: General Juin explained ·the action and maneuvers of the French
Corps in French. Lieutemmt Patrice, aide to Generril Carpentier, ..;nterpreted in
English. The interpretation was very broken and not easily understood . General
Juin brought out that the 2nd DIM would attack, triking '5ount Majo And proceeding
over to Ausonia . The 1st DIM would attack j n a northerly direction and proceed
to the Laguardia hill, rbunt Croce and the San Ambrogio region. Elements of the
3rd Algerian, Division would push into Castelforte as soon es the 88th Division
had taken Damfano and the 2nd Froroccan Division ha.d pushed into Cescheto , along
with elements of the 4th Mountain Moroccan Division. It would then push up through
to Ausonia and pass on taking the high ground Mount D1 oro - Pico. In the meantime,
the 4th DMM would rush across the mmmtnins and continue over the mountainous mass
of Petrella - Revole, cleaning out any German elements holding out in the mountains . General Juin's Map had numerous arrows point~ng out rPgimental objectives,
and it would be confusing to include them in this accourtt.
General Juin was followed by General Dody, Commander of the ~nd Moroccru1 Division, who explained tMs Division's action in its pusr to take Mount Majo and
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�its subsequent fannini:; out to the north and west. He brought out the point
that supply wns going to be difficult in tr,e mountains for his division and
that he would like to consider the rossibility of air drops for his troops,
especially the 8th RTM, col"lJ!landed by Colonel Molle. Lt. Fatrj co interpreted
for General Dody.
Gem=iral Sevez, Commander of the /+th r~ountain Division, was the next
speaker and used as his interpreter Colonel Bauffe who s:renks some English.
H~ explainerl the actions of the 4th Mountain Division, their push toward
Mount Faito and south to Ceschito and, in conjunction with II Corps, action
to take ~Tolmt Rotundo, thus isolating the C?stelforte area. Again coordinating with II Corps, to proceed in a westerly direction and quickly negotiating
the hj_ll masses toward Mount Fetrella - ReYole and to the r ico - Itri road.
General Brosset, of the 1st Voroccan Division, spoke in English which
was quite understandable. He brought out how his Jivision vrould push north
in a flanking diversion from a French bridgehead across the G~rigliano. This
diversion would seize and holrl the high ground west of the Gr,1rjgliHno and
just south of the Liri so as to facilitate the advance of tl-i e Eighth Army up
the Liri Valley.
The next speaker was General deMontsabert who used Colonel Bauffe. as his
interpreter. He expl::dned t:re,t the 3rd Algerian Divj_sion would ent~r Castelforte as s"'on as the 88th Division and the French had seized their objectives,
Damiano, Siola 1Reali and Mount Rotundo and as soon as the artillery bonbardment in Castelforte itself had ended. In other vrords, his division would
entP-r th~ town when ordered to do so by higher hea<lquart.ers after these previous actions had taken place. This p1-1rticulc-tr statenent caused some controversy because it appeared as ·if there were too many factors der,ending on other
circumstances a.s to when th~ 3rd AlP,erian 7!ould push into Castelforte. However this entire question was settled. after the close of the conference.
General deMontsabert then continued the action of the 3rd Algerian Division
from Ausonia northeast to secure and hold the high ground south of the Liri
Valley from ~".cunt D1 0ro up to Pico. The French discussions were a little
drawn out, due to the interpretation necessary, and it was impossible to get
stenographic notes from the interpreters becAuse none of them spoke well enough
for the stenographer to take dovm full sentences.
GENiffi.4.L KEYES: "General Clark and gentlemen. The mission given to the II
Corps is to cut the AUSO'JIA road toward tJ-,e lower AUSENTE Valley, gr-iining a
foothold in the mountains in order to push troops tr,rough to cut the ITRI-PICO
road in the vicinity of ITRI, and eventually to open up the FORMIA corridor.
We have for our means two divisions plus one in reserve. We haw, l '3 bAttalions
of corps artillery including two pack battalions. We. heve one group of tanks.
Our front is 16,000 yards long--will be increased to 20,000 and leter reduced to
11,000. The enemy on our front consists of elenents of the '71st and 94th Divisions with an estim..,ted seven battalions in the front lines. We understl'lnd he
hP s reserves in the vicinity of ITRI. He· has a selected ancl stronf!.,ly prepf:.red
position. He will be expected to put up strong resistance. Our maneuver must
necessarily be broken dovm into phases because of the extent of our front by
the divergence of the directions in which the Corps must attack, and by the necessity of regrouping and concentrating our means behind each other. Broken
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down 'into three phases: In the first pbP.se we shP.11 cut the AUSONIA road,
capture DAMIANO and initiPte the second rhase. The capture of DAMIANO will
assist capture of these hills north of our sector by the French; assist the
attack of the CEF on M. MAJr. The second phase ,rill consist of cleaning up
the lower AUSENTE. Valley by the capture of BRACCHI and CF.F.RI. With only
the delay thrt is imposed by the necessity of displacing artillery and regrouping the forces of the 88th, which rre to lead the attack, the third
phase will be led off by a strong tank and infnntry attack supported by air
and the naximum artillery. Once this phase will be culminated by the capture of CASTELWORATO this will definjtely block for the moment the FC1RMIA
corridor. Once the heights to CASTELNORATO are secured it is planned to
pass the %th through to gain rapidly a base in this vicinity fror, which to
pass on and cut the TI'RI - PICO road, and at the same time by action from
the south to assist the 85th Division which is constantly pushing through
the lower valley. There is no deloy contemplF.ted betv,een phases other than
that imposed by the necessity of displ11cing artillery and regrouping troops.
We may expect the enemy to react strongly, especially on our left and to
either reform or regain his rosition, to disrupt our attack or impose a delay. We may expect him to resist in this position since thrit is the covering position wJ,ich has been built up in a.nd Around Colle San na:r-tino.
Every effort will be made to effect speed in the execution and cut dovm the
overall time between steps as I have outlined them. Few if any can be
omitted nor can the sequence be readily changed. For air support we are
confining that to the :rreventjng of enemy reinforcements from being rushed
in and reaching the battlefield, and for coverage for opera.tioro through the
mountains. During the attack on SCAURI we hor,e to get close support to reinforce artillery fire; getting 'faval gun support to reinforce Corps artillery targets beyond Corps artillery range, primcrily in the ITRI area.. We
have in r~serve initially the 36th Division. Its oontemplated employment
is in the mountains, for wM.ch H js specially trajned. If it is not used
in this manner obviously the results to be obtained from the II Corps will
be limited.
GBNERAL CLARK: 11 I want to add one point. ':'he 16th will be put in Army
reserve right away. I want those jnstructions issued. It probnbly will be
moved into the heachhead ""irst--that is :i.ts most likely employment, so that
you must plan for that movement into the ITRI area by either the 38th or 85th
or parts of them. I know there will be limitations, hut if they have punch
left, they will keep on moving with elements other than the '36th.
GE~IBRAL GOFLTER: "General Clr,rk and gentlemen. In describ:ing the operation of the g5th Di vision T shall discuss trie three pm, ses a.s covered by my
Corps Cornnander. In the -f'irst ph;i se the mission of the division is to seize
that part of the San r!art:i.no ridge within its zone of action, holding ::t and
the highway in its sector and being prepared for strong counterattack and
prepared for advance to t e west in its zone of action. Formtion--rP-giments
a.breast. The J ine of 0ep13rture--the prese'.'1t -"ront lines ;inci the boundary be- _
tween regh1ents as yon see here. The right regiment with two battalions in
the assa.ult will nave at 2300, seize and hold S Ridge rnd a part of SANTA f'ARIA
with the division assault, to cut the highway in its zone and be prerered for
counterPttack and for advance. The left reg:incnt vdtr one bPttalion of the
trird reg:iMent nttac:bed l"'lp 1ring its nair oqffort on its right to seize irnd hold
C. HARTrJO, the high r;rou.nd 1700 yards uest of s. i:J\.RIA, and to obtain the
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�town of S. LIARIA; to .c ut the highway in its front and be prepPred against strong
counterattacks nnd for furtrier adwmce. Tho remaining regiment less the battalion will be in division reserve prepared to counterattack to the southwest or
to the northeast.
1'The di vision artiller:r, reinforced by the 602nd Field Artillery Battalion,
Pack, the 776th TD B,attalion and the '36th Division Artill,ry to support the Rttack. TL.e 756th Tank Battalion to be employed as follows: One company, less
ono platoon, directly supports tre right regiment. One conpany plus one platoon directly supports the left regiment and [>SSists it in the capture of S.
PARIA. The battalion less the two companies to be prepared to support either
regiment or o destroy counterattacks. In the second phase t:te dj_vision to aid
the 88th :Jivision on its rjght b:,.r fire and to patrol f(l'.'eparatory to the capture
of CASTELLO K'RATO and Ir:OlTTiiT SCA URI. The third phase to advance and link with
the attack of t:be 83th Division on Eount CIVITA; to capture CA~T:SLLONORATO a.nd
Pount SCAllRI, continue the pressure to the west and in all three phases to protect the left flank of the Corps and Army.
GENERAL SLOAN: "General Clrirk and felloTT officers. In orc'ler to accomplish
the task assiened the 38th Division b;,r the Corps Cornnander it will be desirable
to initiate it in three separate rhases. The fo~·ti..al objf!ctive vlill be S Ridge,
which is actually in my zone of action, Cericoli and Damiano. Attack on those
objectives will be launched At 2300 and we e).-r,ect ·to take all three by daylight.
This will ~nvolve a concentrated effort of the 350th end 349th including flemethrowers. The second ph2se will be established by an attack of tr.nks in the zone
of action w:.th support by tank fire fror the front of tre 350th Infantry. For
this purpose the division lms one group of tanks less one b~ ttalion. Immediately
follow::tnis the tank attack the 351st attecks in tl' is direction assisted by the
349th Jnfantry attack. The ultimn.te objective of this phase will be taken in
coordimition with the 4th French D:i.vision. B.qfore rroceeding to the third rlwse,
due to the fact thnt we must make a change of direction of 90 degrees it v~ 11 be
1
necessary to regroup. :nitiatinry that phase will be a mass tan} action in the
zone of action of the 34Qth and trv~ 351st Infa.ntry to close out Spigno and exploit the slopes opposite. The ~nfantry '1:1ttack follows the ta'1k rt tack, the
riain attack on the north fl::mk by the 349th Infantr;:r tnking CIVITA by fl1mking
action from the ·:orth. The 341st nill assist thrt attack by taking the south
bank of RIO CAPO d 'AC 1TTA by flanking action f'rom the soutl1 and '7 assisting the
85th Division to take CAST~LI.£'NORATO. Immedietely that this area is opened up
the 351st less one battalion will rass t},rough 2.nd rroceed toward the fi.nal obj~ctive. '.:.'hroug'1out this operation the division is rrotecting the right flank.
'l'he third phase will involve the movement of the CEF into the mountains.
G0'i'.SRAL S.1WILLF.: "The opening rhases of this b11.ttle started for the air
arm after the battle of CASSPJO. Since thnt tine the entire Jlediterrnnean Allied
Air Forces have been devoting their attention to direct support of the coming
ground offensive. The 1~nes of communication--r,specfall;v rnil lines between
IT.OF-:.:WCE and the ba.ttlefield--hiive been and are cut. This map shows the main
bridge blocks th1Jt are out and the rail cuts that are relE'tively quickly repaired.
For t:be :rast two weeks no trains have moved eYcept over very short d5stances on
sliuttle trips between this point and the battlefield. In tre coming campaign
of the ground forces this air effort will continue. At the srnall rate of expenditure that has been made by both farces in the past month tr is interdiction crnnot be e:,,.,'J)ected to be coMplete. The notor transport of the Germans is now
�-..r
stretched to the rm.ximtm . Viewing tbP- coning bnttle es a preBminPry to a
campaign to capture ROHE , it is apparent thc,.,t thifl cont-i.nurtion will be of
material overall assistance to both armies . This will be the principal effort of the Air Forces in general or ~irect sunport of both the Bighth nnd
the Fifth Arrnies . Close support will not , however, be neglected . Our problem on the Eighth Army front is creatod as A res•1lt of the ground feature of
CASSINO and the RAFII:O RIV'"ffi. Frol'"' an ajr stan0pojnt that makes the Eighth
Army problem largely one of artillery because it is the enemy's artillery
that can hurt the Eip-,hth Arrw ,more th~n anytbing else . On the Fifth Army
front , however , the situation is somewhPt different . The problem there is ,
as previously stated , the isolation of the b?ttlefielrl, the r,erformance of
the rrovement of reserves thereto and the breaking up of counterattacks formin~ therein . In preparation for close support operation~ jn the comjnp, battle ,
fiP:hter controls ?re beinp; set up on the Eighth Army front , on the main Fifth
Army front and in the bridgehead. With these instaJ_lr>tions Pnd with the force
available we feel confident that we can give effective close support to all of
the forces engaged . We feel that it is necessary for everyone to appreciate
the fact that the Air Forces are looking upon the coming ground battle as a
part of a, campaign to capture RC f!!E .
GE {!<~AL HJ\RDING : "I am quite sm~e thet t:re plan thot i.s being unfolded
this mornin~ is in line with General Alexander ' s intentions . I am , lso sure
that General Alexander is in full agreement with the Corm1anding Gern~ral of the
Fifth Army in his remarks about the 36th Division , in tb, t it is most essential
not .to com.l"lit it rrenaturely to the battle . And I lmow that I am speaking for
General Alexander when I say that he also agrees trat the same applies to the
attack from the bridgehead. I think I am right in saying th::it GenAre 1 Alexander regards the attack from the bridgehead as a nost important weapon of opportunity to be launclPd when the situation is fluio , ?_ncJ which nay well be decisive in cutting o""'f the supply n.nd preventjng the withclravuil of the enemy force
then opposing the advance of the main armi~s on the main front . In conclusion
I am sure that he would wish me to add his emphasis to your reml"'rks about the
need for all forces pushinP, on ancl not waiting on each otb~r .
l
GENERA!, CLARK : "Gentlemen, it has been a great privjlege in planning this
battle to have General Leese , the Cornrrander of the Eiehth Army, by our side.
There hns been absolute understanding and cooperPtion given by General Leese
and his staff . , General Ualsh , his Chief of Staff , is here and I will ask General Walsh if he has any remarks to P1ake .
G'";' RAT, ...,ALSH:
I think the -point that General ClPr_k has brought out; thAt
we have had si1ch close cooperation between the two armies , is well fa.ken . Fe
have worked side by side , and we have received, over and above all in this
question of zero hour, the greatest consideration and help , and I know I will
express General Leese ' s gratitude for that .
11
GF,NT.RAL CLARK :· "Notes have been made by General Gruenther :ond other staff
o.,..ficers of all these little controversir> 1 points that lmve been brought out in
this conference, and they will pursue these points 1mt:i 1 they are satisfactorilyworked out . There is just one point I want to emphasize and thPt is air supply
in the mountains . · It is very difficult , as ne know fron our experiC)nce at CAS8P!O . Try to plan on your supply by means other than air . It takes a great
�50
• number of our A-36 Fighter-BombArs to take CB.re of even a battalion. As I remember we had 40 or 50 to take care of that one battalion that was up on Hangman's Hill. To take care of a combt->t team or di vision would exhaust the entire
supply of Fighter-Bombers. However, •ve have planned it and should there be an
emerg~ncy which would dernnd it, we can supply to the best of our ab:ility. Now
during t:be last few days I have visited all of the divisions jn tM.s area-French and Americans. I have seen their sector which they Bre holdj ng rt the
present time and from wiich they will Httack. I am delighted to lmow the
thoroughness of planning and the enthusiasm of everybody concerned for this attack. And I Hm completely satisfied that with the team-play and the determination of everybody
vTill have a great victory. I wish corps and divirum commanders would assemble their princ~pal subordinates 1md impress upon them the
essential elements of this attack. It calls for sreed end all out . with everything we have. Th::ink you, gentlemen. 11
we
After the conference had enderl cr>terers immediPtely rushed in and set up
a cold luncheon. General Clr>rk also served beer - an unusual bevera~e in Italy to his guests. Genern 1 Clark and his subordin~tes Hlso cong-regated outside
around a map for close-up shots for the newsreels.
The guests departed at 1345, and General ClPrk went up to his van to take
care of papers that had accrued during the conference. Later in the afternoon
General Clark received a visit from Cartain Lowden of the Medical Corps, an officer who had been General C1Pxk 1 s rr:othin,r I s prysician for twelve years. Captain Lowden told General Clark that he had· been on hospital sM.ps for the past
18 months, ret:µrning to the States with the vmnnded, spending a few months back
there and then r~turning with the ship "or More wounded . At present he is stationed aboard the hospital ship Seminole. Captain Lo~den vm.s rlso accompanied
by Ca.ptain Kojas, nlso of the Se!'linole. Both officers said they would like to
have continuous service overseas and. thr.t they would apprecfr1te being trrnsferred off' the Seminole to some Fifth Army hosrital. Genl'lral Clrrk saw this as
a goon. opportunity to give Fifth Army medical o..,fic~rs 8 chRnce to return to ·
the States without going through the rotation process, and he intends to investigate the witter further.
General Clark also received a call from Captain Cliff Brown, an of'ficer
\
with Allied Force Headquarters who is the son of r'frs. George c. Marshall. General Clark told Captain Drovm of his r~cent visit to the United States and gave
him various messages that 1frs . f.1rirshtll had asked him to deliver .
J
Following dinner, Gen~~al ClPrk retired quite early, since he will leave
tomorrow for the beachhead with Colonel Draper. He will r~main there overnight,
returning to h1s headquarters Sunday.
General Clark this evening dictated the following Material f'or inclusion
in his diary:
"General Alexander visit"d the beecl,head today. I received the following
radiogram from General Truscott: RN T037. 1 Gen,.,ral Alexander nrri ved tr· is
morn 4 ng. Yfhen I informed him of the f'our plrms on which I an vrorking, he stated
that I was pnyinr: too ruch A.ttention to alternate rlans. He said that the only
attack he envisages from the beachhead is the Cisterna-Cori-Arrqij (?) attack
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and thnt he does not consider that any other attacks will attain 1orthwhile
results. He advised ne to concentrate on rlans for that atfock and said that
if and when he ordered the attRck, he would give me ever;r support that I considered n"cessary. He also said trP,t he was most anxious to give me the '36th
Division. I stated to General Alexander thAt my greatest concern was the
timing of the attack ·"rom the bridgehead and the object to be accomplished;
that is, vliether the object was to be accomplished with T'l"tms now existing in
the bridgehead or wit}, the additional division. He informed me he had re/ _.,,
served to him'1elf the decision as to tbe time of ln. 1 mching the attack from ~
the bririgehead. Since I believe there is P rossib~lity thrt the Sezze operation may be desirable, I nm continuing all out preparation for that operation.
In view of' General Alexander's statement, I a,,, concentrating as first priority preparation for the Cisterna-Cori attack. }lease advic,e me if this meets
your arproval. I rissune that you l'.re fully cognizant of General Alexander's
ideas on this su"l:>ject but I want you to know whr-t '1.e has told me today. If
you desire a.ny action on !'W part oth"r than ~ ndic<ited here, please ndvise me
bl'lcause you lmow -thn.t I am with you all the way. 1
I
I wnited until Alexander 1 s return and then had Gruenth~r call Lemnitzer.
Lemnitzer stated that Alexander was calling Me t't nine o'clock. He did not
phone so :r phoned Lennitzer 1md told 1 irn how cieepl;r I resented Alexander's
issuing instructions to my subordinate com.~anrjers, particularly those which
are in conflict with mine. Lemnitzer told me trat there was some justification in the radio which mruscott sent me. I then asked thAt he bring Alexander to tre phone. When Alexander came on tle phone I told him I ri.a.d received
a radio from Truscott which thoroughly astounded me because Truscott repor-,
ted thn t he had issu"d instructions to h:i m which were contrary to I'line, and
Tru~cott, being confused, asked me for cJJ;i.rification. I told fllexander th:=it
if 7ruscott 1 s report was correct I resented deeply his issuing any instructions to r,y ;:iubordinat'1s; that if h1'3 did not lik~ the manner in which I was
carrying on the functio11s of the VI Co111s Ln should issue ariy orders to the
contrary through me and thPt uncler no circ11r1stances would I tolerate his direct dealings· with suhord.:innt~s . It was rerfectly appn.rent that Alexander had
a guilty conscience, and he assured m, thRt he had no intention of resc:indjng
"lY order; thPt he thought we were in oonplete agreement and th,,t if, efter I
talked rith ':'ruscott tomorrow, I ./"elt that there hrid been any underhanded
dealings, I ms to tell him frankly o: my oonclusions - wlicl I ~ill do.
This is a small matter, for it hn.ppens that my rlans for the l'ltta.ck from
the heachhead and my views 1'1S to the v1ny thrt battle shoul<t be run coincide
exactly with those of Alexanrler, but it is vell that I 1 t him know nm, as I
have in the past, that h"! will deal directly witli me and never with a subordim:1 te, wl~ ~ c:r he is· so prone to do.
I lmow factually thAt there are -:nterests brew:ing for the Eighth Army to
take Ro"le, and I might as well let Alexa.nil.er know now thrt if he nttempts any
thing o~ that kind he will have anothl'!r 1111-out battle on his hands; m1melt,
with me.
*
*
*
SAN 1~RCO--T1AY 6, 1944--At 0900 General Clark had a small decoration ceremony
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Clark, Mark W. Diaries
Subject
The topic of the resource
Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984.
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns.
United States—History, Military—20th century.
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950.
Publisher
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The Citadel Archives & Museum
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Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
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CP Clark
Relation
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Mark W. Clark Collection
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application/pdf
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English
Type
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Text
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Mark W. Clark Diary, April 1-May 5, 1944
Subject
The topic of the resource
Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns
United States—History, Military—20th century
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from April 1-May 5, 1944.
Source
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CP Clark
Publisher
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The Citadel Archives and Museum
Date
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1944
Rights
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Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
Format
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application/pdf
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English
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Text
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1632
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and thnt he does not consider that any other attacks will attain 1orthwhile
results. He advised ne to concentrate on rlans for that atfock and said that
if and when he ordered the attRck, he would give me ever;r support that I considered n"cessary. He also said trP,t he was most anxious to give me the '36th
Division. I stated to General Alexander thAt my greatest concern was the
timing of the attack ·"rom the bridgehead and the object to be accomplished;
that is, vliether the object was to be accomplished with T'l"tms now existing in
the bridgehead or wit}, the additional division. He informed me he had re/ _.,,
served to him'1elf the decision as to tbe time of ln. 1 mching the attack from ~
the bririgehead. Since I believe there is P rossib~lity thrt the Sezze operation may be desirable, I nm continuing all out preparation for that operation.
In view of' General Alexander's statement, I a,,, concentrating as first priority preparation for the Cisterna-Cori attack. }lease advic,e me if this meets
your arproval. I rissune that you l'.re fully cognizant of General Alexander's
ideas on this su"l:>ject but I want you to know whr-t '1.e has told me today. If
you desire a.ny action on !'W part oth"r than ~ ndic<ited here, please ndvise me
bl'lcause you lmow -thn.t I am with you all the way. 1
I
I wnited until Alexander 1 s return and then had Gruenth~r call Lemnitzer.
Lemnitzer stated that Alexander was calling Me t't nine o'clock. He did not
phone so :r phoned Lennitzer 1md told 1 irn how cieepl;r I resented Alexander's
issuing instructions to my subordinate com.~anrjers, particularly those which
are in conflict with mine. Lemnitzer told me trat there was some justification in the radio which mruscott sent me. I then asked thAt he bring Alexander to tre phone. When Alexander came on tle phone I told him I ri.a.d received
a radio from Truscott which thoroughly astounded me because Truscott repor-,
ted thn t he had issu"d instructions to h:i m which were contrary to I'line, and
Tru~cott, being confused, asked me for cJJ;i.rification. I told fllexander th:=it
if 7ruscott 1 s report was correct I resented deeply his issuing any instructions to r,y ;:iubordinat'1s; that if h1'3 did not lik~ the manner in which I was
carrying on the functio11s of the VI Co111s Ln should issue ariy orders to the
contrary through me and thPt uncler no circ11r1stances would I tolerate his direct dealings· with suhord.:innt~s . It was rerfectly appn.rent that Alexander had
a guilty conscience, and he assured m, thRt he had no intention of resc:indjng
"lY order; thPt he thought we were in oonplete agreement and th,,t if, efter I
talked rith ':'ruscott tomorrow, I ./"elt that there hrid been any underhanded
dealings, I ms to tell him frankly o: my oonclusions - wlicl I ~ill do.
This is a small matter, for it hn.ppens that my rlans for the l'ltta.ck from
the heachhead and my views 1'1S to the v1ny thrt battle shoul<t be run coincide
exactly with those of Alexanrler, but it is vell that I 1 t him know nm, as I
have in the past, that h"! will deal directly witli me and never with a subordim:1 te, wl~ ~ c:r he is· so prone to do.
I lmow factually thAt there are -:nterests brew:ing for the Eighth Army to
take Ro"le, and I might as well let Alexa.nil.er know now thrt if he nttempts any
thing o~ that kind he will have anothl'!r 1111-out battle on his hands; m1melt,
with me.
*
*
*
SAN 1~RCO--T1AY 6, 1944--At 0900 General Clark had a small decoration ceremony
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for two mer.,bers of his staff. He pinned th~ D::istinguished Service Eedal on
General Brwn, his G-3 . This e.warcl was ver;t deserving 1,ecause General Brann
carried a terrific load in planning the operations for the landing at Salerno
and th1' subsequent crossing of the Volt1-irno. The next officer to be decorated
was Colonel arker, Army Ghef"ical Warfare Officer who received the Legion of
1erit Hedal . Colonel Barker is to leave srortly for the United States to take
over co:mmnd of the 1':dgewood Arsenal in New Jersey.
After the ceremony General Clerk returned to his van and confer ·ed with
Gene~al Gru~nth~r. He left tl:e command post Pt 1010 for Lago field. This was
done in an L-5 cub and from Lago field e took off in a C-78 for the beachhead.
He :irrived at ~rettuno field at 1145. Fe was rccomprnif"d hy Lt . Col. Drarer,
his aide. Imr1~diately upon landing l't the .airport, General Clar}:: •rent to the
VI Corps command post wh"'!re he oonferred and had luncr with General Truscott.
A~ter lunch, accompanied by Colonel Hine and Colonel Draper, he visited the 1st
British Di vision, oommPnded by Gener~l m~wkesworth •. _ He went over the division I s
dispositions and pl ans for the next big attack. After . leaving tre 1st British
Division , he proceeded to the 5th British Division where he had a similar conference with General Gregson-Ellis, Division Corunander . After leaving the command post of the 5th British Division, General ClArk, aceoripanied by General
Gregson-Ellis, Colonel Hine and Colonel Draper, went up to the front lines and
visited the co"'1Tl\and post o~ the 2nd Carneronians under the corunand of Colonel
Graham. General Clark was very happy to Pleet Colonel GrahaM, for his father,
General Graham, had served under General Clark during the Salerno landings.
General Graham corunanded the 56th British Division during th:it or,eration .
1
After visiting the 2nd Cameronians, the party proceeded to the 2nd Inniskillings . Here he met Lt. Colonel Slene, Cor'7anding, Pnd discussed the situation immediatel;v confronting th is battalion. Vis1bility was poor, and there
were very little inco!'ling shells during the visit . A.fter droT•ping off General
Gregson-Ellis at the 5th British Division command post, General Clark, Colonels
Hine and Draper, proceeded directly to the VI Corps oornmand post where they
pick~d up General Truscott and proceeded to a demonstration area in tl:ie vicinity of the 1st Armored Division where they saw tank retrievers pull out tanlcs ,
that had b~en stalled and broken down in minefields. The tank retriever consists of a tank with a front cram" 1.'lb ich drops and hooks onto a cable in the
rear of the stalled tank. ~he whole process takes very little time and quickly
moves th~ tanks back rearward frori the minefield. The next part of the cemonstration was what is knovm as the "snake" . A tank pushes forward whn.t looks
like a huge boa constrictor . It is really a long segmented piec~ of metal
tubing bolted in the center with each side capable of rr-icking 'l.'IJT. A guide
runner is out in front of this linked metal tubinr, so tht>t it follows the terrain quite readily as the .trnk rushes it forward . The snake is 100 feet long.
One the tank has plrced it in the minefield, it detonf!tes tte snake by firing
one of its machine guns into a target detonator in the rear end of the snake.
The last 20 feet of the snake :is lor-iiled with sand so thAt no harm is done to
tre tank. As soon as the snake is detonl'lted H destroys all mjn"s .<as deep as
5 feet e.nd clears a pat}, wide enough f'or a tflnk to go tlirougr. Follow up tanks
witJ:, additional srwkes pusr. through lllltil eventU81ly a gar has been made through
the entire minefield .
...
After witrn ssin~ tr is demonstration, Generals CJ.e.rk and Truscott left to
�53
visit the evacuation hospitals. They visited the 11th, 94th, 15th and 38th.
All commanding officers of these hospitals 1mow General Cl1cr1<- and received
him enthusiastically. General Clark went through tr,e battle casualty wards
and talked with each man that was physically able to talk. They all seemed
cheerful, and it was appArent that they got a big kick out of talking to the
Army Commander. The G"neral a(ldressed all of these men in a very f'riendly
and infernal marmer, wiflhing them all good luck and saying thl"t our hospitals
were rivinv them the best ana thPt they would soon be well.
After visiting the hospitals, GenerPl Clerk returned to the Fifth Army
Advance Command Post between Anzio and Nettuno, }:md a before-supper drink with
the members of his staff there, l1ad supper and retired erirly.
General Gruenther dispatched the following cable to General Clm-k today:
RN ~804. "Operation order received this afternoon from AAI gives Fifth Army
mission for main Pront PS previously known. For bridgehead it prescribed attack on general axis Cori-VPlrnontone to cut hj ghway #6 in Valnontone area.•
No alternative direction is innicated. Attack from bridgehePd ~~11 be ready
to be launched on ?4 hours' notice flt Pny time from D plus 4 day inclusive.
36th Division to be comriited only o.f'ter reference to AAI. 11
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SAN MARCO--M.(1.Y 7, 1944--General Clark nrose early flt 0615.
The night was
At 0700, accompanied by Colonel Draper, General Clark went to have hreakfast with Colonel
Marvin, Comma.nding Officer of the 540th Combn.t ~ngineer Regimcmt which maintains and runs the port for 1mloading the Liberty ships. After breakfast
General Clark •inspected the port installritions. The rort personnel }-,ave done
an excellent job in unloading supplies by dukws and laniling craft frow the
Liberty ships in the harbor, and they have done this type of work uncer most
adverse conditions, including weather, hostile shellings n.nd bombings. After
inspecting the rort, General Clerk then met General Truscott at the VI Corps
command post nnd proceeded directly to the 3rd Division. This division is
now in a rest area, and General Clark made a general ::nspection of a battalion )
bivouac aree. Her: he saw several m~del tents for enlisted rie~ ~rhich <:'m'listed
of a pup tent dug in to the grouno with only the top part sh owing. This gtwe
the men protection from hostile shelling vn1ile they slept. After going through
the battalion bivouac area., General Clark discussed with General 0 1 Daniel his
plans for the next attack. He discussed the BUFFALO and GRASSHOPP'i.ll plans.
The BUFFALO plan is the one vmich AAI hi=1s directed to be worked on in oonjunction wit!-· the attt>.ck on the mm n battl~front. Thi.s calls for an all-out drive
toward the direction of CISTFRNA. ':'he GRASSPOPfffi plr->ne is an alter·nate plc'ln
which attacks in a direction to the left of the B lFFALO plan.
V rather quiet +>or the bea.cbhead with very f~w incomjng shells.
General Clark then left with Generals Truscott and 0 1 Daniel to go to a
demonstration area where he sav tl'e brttle sleds that' the 3rd Division will use
during the next attack. The br1.ttle sled consists of what looks like ordfoary
hot water boilers cut in half, linked one behind the other and placed in d0uble
rows. There- P.r~ l? sleds, 6 on each side, which are hooked on to the back of a
tank. The r..an lies prone on the sled with a small amount o+> armor protection in
front, P
.nd as the tank now•s forward it pulls a oomplete infPntry squ11.d behind
�SY
it . When viewed from the distance, the s1eds 11re scarcely noticeable , e spe cially as they go through any grass , at all. By tr is means , men cfln quickly
follow up and hold terrain features which have been t11ken ½y tnnks . The next
part of the c" emonstration sh owed what was known 2 s a "mangle buggy" . This
was what looked like en old farr, bayrack ay,.le vtith a jeep motor on it and a
trail gurrd in bac:k-. This arrangement towed in rear of it a long strip of
primer cord, and as the clriverleu~ contraption went over bnrbed wire it towed
the primer cord tail. The ~.§:.i~ cord is detonated, thereby leaving a space
for infantrymen to go through . It would ro.ve some e~fect on anti-personnel
mines , in addition to clea,ring a rassage through barbed wire .
j
After tbis demonstr[ition , Generals Cl£ rk and Truscott and Colonels Hine
and Draper left for the command rost of th~ Special Service Force . There
they met General Fredericks, his staff and regim~mtal cornrrmnders . General
Clark talked to them informally for about 10 minutes :md left immediately for
the 34t h Division . Gen~ral Ryder was in Sorrento for a rest, so General CJ.ark
discussed dispositions anr rlans for the next attack with Colonel Sherman, the
Assistant Divis i onal Commander . While there he also met General Tate , the new
Division:11 Artillery O""ficer , who flew back from the Stl.'l.tes vrith him. He also
met Colonel Boatner and Colonel Childers , regimental commanders .
From the 34th Division the party proceeded to the 45th Division. Here
General ~ruscott left , and Gener~l Clark tal~ed for quite a period of time
with General Eagles , the Division Commander . The tt>lk concerned principally
the replacem~nt a s Division Artillery Commander , ,romotions, Legion of Merit
cases and pl ans for the next offensive action. Toward the end of the visit ,
General raschal , Assistant Division Cornnander, brought in the three regimental
commanders ; Colonels Dul:mey, ·iy~rs and Church . Af'ter talking informally with
the regimental commanders , General Cl8rk left for the 1st Armored Division
where he had lunch with General Harmon . He tnlked briefly with General Harmon
concernjng the next attack. Genern.l Clark witnessed demonstrations of three
types of treadway brir1 ges to be r l eced e cross sl'l'all streams or dry creek beds .
The first one was improvised by tlie division engineers and consisted of a tank
with a crane on tl e front holding the bridge and rlacing it where desired .
The next was the reeular issued type of treadway bridge with a trnck and crr-ne .
The difference between these tv 10 "IRS trPt tl1 e one w:itr t}-,1') truck left the
operating personnel much more exposed , not having the rrmor r,rotection of
tre tank. rrihe third was th\"! :'loat tYJ'.'e on rubber rontoons . The nl'lxt ff! rt of
the demonstretion consisted of a 60mm mortar firing a h~rroon into a minefield .
This harpoon carr~ed in jts flight through the air 3 rrimer cord rope which ,
when it fell to the grolmd aril was ignited, quickly cleP~ed bot}, tne grass and
vegetation and , in addition, any anti- personnel minl'ls . lhe rath thus creeted
was strv.ight anc1 went for a a: stence of Pbout 5r, feet . In tl'is way, by firi.ng
successive harpoon prirn"'r cord snakes , a treil for single columns of' nen to go
tl rough r,inefil'!lds A.nd high vegetation v1as quickly mPde . Next t},e General saw
tanks fitted wit11 growsers whicl gave the tank 1J1ore :"lotation and grip over
difficult tl'lrrain . From t l'lre he -nroceeded to a tBnk rrrich mounted an 81mm
r ortar and fired out a lanced harpoon, taking w:t', it tbrougr tl,e air .a cA~le
wMch W8S quickl:r relt'l8sed from sprockets on t;he front rart of tre tenJr . 1 he
idea of t}1-ts was th.,,t the cable would lodge itself in bn.rbed wire ; and by the
tank movinr, to the rear it could easily dreg wi+,h it the bnrbed wire a11d clear
a place for cttac1r· rg troops to pass through. In acdition to tris ,,,ortar
0
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�harpoon method of pullinr: out b2r~ed wire, ther~ was Anotr:r t~nk rigg~d v.rit~ a
three-prong~d anchor tyyc hook. 1 he tan1· n~gotrntes the vnre 1.tself, arops l,he
look over tre barbed wire and tren turns around a"'ld comes forwarc , pulling along
wit it the barbed wire remaining on the ground .
I
General Clerk ie~t the demon;tration and proceed~d immediately to VI Corps
to a decoration ceremony. He r resented four Dj stingi1:l shed Service Crosses to
three of'ficers and one e,,:!..:sted man : Captain \'Tilson of the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment , 1st Lt . Hodgdon of the 15th Infantry R~girient, Capt . Kimball of
the 135th ~n~antry Regiment am Sgt . Broriley of the 133rd Infantry Regiment . He
prese!ltod letters whicl. he had brought bacl< from the Stetes personally to Major
Austin of the 645th TD Battalion, Lt . Kile of the 69th Field Artillery Battalion
and Captain Ballantine of the 33rd Field rospital . He talked briefly with these
offfoers saying th t he was glad to have had the opportunity to bring t} em letters from their families .
0
A:.'ter the e1ecoration cereno:"lJl, the '!,and t'lryed t½e Jrd Dj vision song ,;rhj ch
has a very catchy tune. General Clark, accomranied by Gener~l mruscott rnd
Colonel Draper left immediately for t11.e 'Jettuno airfield wher~ General Clark and
Colonel Draper took off in a C-78 . At the airport also wer"'! Generr>1s Br11.dshPw ,
Sullivan and Bowman, who also flev1 back to Lago fi~lcl. An additional C-78 was
sent· to the 'fottuno airfield. for this purpose .
After landing et Lago field , General Clark v,ent directly to his villa at
Hondragone and relaxed on the beach after a very diffic,1lt two days at the beachhead . He invited some of his staff to supper, and a::ter supper they returned to
th~ command post wbere General Clark \·:orked on some adJ"'inistrative papt'rs end
retired .
General Clark today received the following letter fro~ General Truscott:
11 1.
I am prepared to do the BUFFALO Operation under conc'i.tions now existing on the ·1eacl head on 7 days notice .
0
,g . r1.ans have been drawn and preparntioris are noV' under Y!ay. Upon comrletion o" these prep~rritory steps everytring virill be set ur and reac'y to go
except for tbose things that can be accompl5 shed only j_r, the l1:1st L,8 hours
pri.or to D day.
11 2 .
When present work has been finished I will be prf"pared to lPunch not
only BFFFALO but P,ither GRASSHOFPER or Tlffi'rLE within 48 rours . However , if definite preparatory cornmittment js made to either G.B.ASSHOPF:::R or BUFFALO and I am
required to launch TUR,.,,LE I will need 72 hours in which to Make the necessary
shift and launch the attack.
11 3 .
I do not consider trat any operation :now envisaged will product worthwhile results with the troops now under my cormand agE> inst t1 e enemy ros; tion as
I know it and in which I expect no chringe prior to D day.
4. I feel thr,t I must have at least one additional InfPntry Di vision and
that that Division or Divjsions must beein rnoverient to tl--is erea "TitMn the next
two days .
11
11
5.
In undertaking the preliminary work outlined aoove Pnd tabulA.ted in
~
,
�the attached, it is to be pointed out th2t secrecy is sacrificed! or. at least
jeopardized. In addition, artillery coverage of t~e.Beachhead_l~ne is gravely
jeopardized if artillery is noved from p~esen~ position to pos1t1.0~s for t~e
attack and then remains therein necessarily silent, for a long period of time
awaiting announcenent of D day. 11
*
SAN MA.RCO--N!AY e,
J...-
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1944--General ClRrk worked on administrative matters and conferred with GenerAls Gruenthe,r and Brann prjor to leaving by cub for Caserta
for a co'1.ference with General Alexander,. CDJC, AAI. Details of the conference
are covered in General Cui.rk I s notes for the day. He returned frori. AAI at 1045
and went back to his van where he received Gemer21 Larkin, Supply Officer for
SOS at Oran, and General Stewart in charge of shipping in the Mediterranean
area. He lunched nt 1230 and depa.rted by cub for F.ighth Army TAC field for inspection of Fifth Army artillery units. He was accompanied by General Lewis,
A.rtillery Officer, and Colonel Draper.
General Clark's jeep met him at Eighth Army TAC field, and the party proceeded to the 194th Group command post at San Vittore wbere they were met by
Colonel Banks, 13th Field Artillery Brigade Commander, and Colonel Cook, 194th
Group Commander. He inspected the command post and talked with Colonel BPnks
with reference to a replacement as Division Artillery Commander of the 45th Division. He explained to Colonel Banks that he had several officers in mind,
two of whom were Colonel Cook and Colonel Meyer. He wished to see Colonel
Meyer at the 17th Field Artillery Group oommand post later on. He also told
Colonel Banks that he had submitted his name to NATOUSA for promotion to Brigadier General and that NATOUSA had approved it. In d.i.scussine with Colonel Banks
the 194th Field Artillery Group's participation in trie next attack the latter
confirmed that after the pre-arranged fires for the Eighth Army, mostly counter
battery, .had been completed at H hour, the group wouid honor only those requests
for fire that had been cleared through the French Corps with one exception. One
battalion of 155 g1ms would answer calls for fire direct from Eighth Army providing they were not firing for the French at that time. The Eighth Army has
more artillery than it had a week ago and is even in ,a better position to fire.
contingent missions for the Fifth Army.
From the 194th Group command post, Colonels Banks and Cook accompAnied the
pa.rty to the 698th Field .A rtillery Battalion oommand post. This is a 240 howitzer battalion and is commanded by Lt. Col. Clifton. lf'hile at the command post
the battalion fired a counter battery mission requested by Eighth Anny. General
Cfark found this very interesting and had the map location of the target pointed
out to him.· Upon leaving the 698th command post, he met three AMG officers who
were in San Vittore arranging civil affairs natters and looking into the possibility ·of opening the schools. This to~m is still subjected to enemy artillery
fire .
The General inspected a 240 howitzer gun position on his way to the 633rd
Field Artillery Bc'l.ttalion oommandeo by Lt. Col. Halliday. Upon arrival he inspected the command . post and chatted with enlisted personnel present and shook
hands with them all.
..._,I
From tbis comma...11d post he went to a 155. gun position which was just about
�to fire a mission. GenerPl Clark stnyed while the mission was fired. He
talked to the gun crew and told them that they would chanee positions soon
because the attack was going forward.
From this gun position the pl'lrty proceeded over a long, dusty, tortuous
road to the 17th Field Artillery Group oommand post. He was r.et by Colonel
Meyer who had a small honor guard w},ich was presented to General Clnrk. He
went up to Colonel Meyer's oomr,and· post and discussed with him his dispositions in preparation for the attack. He also told him that he had selected
him to becone Artillery Officer for the L;.5th Division; thet hP could make
plans to go there soon and trike with him one additionEil j1mior o-f'ficer who
could become his ajde vihen he received his star.
From the 17th Field Artillery Group the ra.rty rroc eeded to the 17tr Field
Artillery Battalion, stopping enroute to see a 155 howitzer brttery of the
933rd Field Artillery Brttalion. At the 17th Field Artillery Battalion, Gene- ·
ral Clerk walked to a battery position, passing through the battalion area
which, at the time, was busy vdth cannoneers getting their supper. Having inspected the battery position, the party then rroceeded to the 13th Field Artillery Brigade command post at Sipiciano. There General ClPrk was presented
to the staff and enlisted men of tr,e Br:igHde cor1 man0 r,ost. He insrected the
fire direction center and counter battery section and the command post proper.
The coruna.nd post is in a building which has an excellent view of the major
terrPin features on the brttlefront.
From there he left Colonel Banks and, accompflnied by Genercl Vmis and
Colonel Draper, proceeded back to the Fifth Arrn;:r command. rost, Prri ving there
at 1800.
General Cl::i.rk dusted himself of'f nnd received William Randolph Hearst,
Jr., a war correspondent now in Italy. Mr. Hearst was accomp1mied by Colonel
Clark, Fublic Relations Officer. Generril Clark dis cussed with him Ms recent
visits to all Fifth Arny troops and of his beach installation rit Morrlraf;one
whic'r is available to Headquarters officers of the Fifth Army. He also tnlked
about the l"lnlisted men's beach at Bagni ninerali. Fe told Mr. Hearst that he
could come to his :rress conference whicr he was holding the next day at 1600
for war correspondents attached to the Fifth Army. He stated that t},is was an
(ff\ off-the-record talk and that he was going to explain to them the forthooming
~ attack.
'l.r. Hearst and Colonel Clark were jnvited to supper where conversRtions cnntjnu~d concernjng Fifth Army activities.
'-l.
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After supper Generfll Clm' 1r conferred brj efly with General Gruenther and
worked_ on administrative J"'1attt'lrs 1mtil he r~tired at ?200 hours.
"',J>I
c,._V ~
V,.P
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eneral Clark dictated the following notes for inclusion in his diery,
"As a result of riy vi sit to the /\nzio benchhead for two days I learned
rom General r•ruscott that General Alexander had conveyed to
the fact
t~at he was to run directly the VI Corps attack; thrt J~e would reinforce it
with anyth:ing Truscott wanted and would set tre tjr,e and cH r ction of Pttack
And the troops involved. He also conveyed to Truscott the fr'ct that the instructions I had issued for alt errn:i. te 2 ttacks were not in accordance w.; th his
h~r/
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'),t
'~1,, ~
;.,(t·t"~
• ,;' ,,,.!!"':·~·1"Jli'.'-~
.
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desires and that there v,as only one .<1.ttack envisaged tma.rd Cori-Valrwntone;
that to preprtre other alternate plans tovmrd Sezze and to the north along the
l\.lbano-Anzio road was sheer waste of time. In other v'ords, General Alexander,
before a civilian mP-mb<;r of rarliament, and to General Truscott, with General
Lernnitzer present, embarrassed m~ by in~icating thRt he was not in accord with
the instructions I hBd issued.
"Upon my return I asked to see Alexander and had a conference with him
this morning. I told him he h,id embarrassed me. He replied that h0 h8.d no
intention to do so :md was surrrised that Truscott +'elt thP-t he hP.d countermanded my instructions.
''I told Alexander that, pursuant to his latest instructions to attack on
24 hours' notice, we could not do so - 1,,g hours vms the rnnirmm. I also told
him thPt if we complied w5t'r his D plus 4 att8ck orders from the beacl1 heAd,
tl e '36th Di vision would rn vc to move tomorrov,.
11 Alexander immed:i.Btely jumped to tre conclusion thPt I ,vrs 11ot all out
for the attack; t},nt I did not e,rprove of his plans. I assured him tru1t the
Fi~th Army attack would )('!) as aggressive as any rlan or ~ttrck he had ever
been in or read of.
"I told Alexa11der that I wanted to Rttack out of the beachheRd with every- \
thing I ha0; thPt if conditions v1 ere rigl t I wanted to attack towards Cori but , I
that what I was guarding agriinst vras pre-conceived ideas as to wh..,t exnctly
was to be donP. and thPt ri1e felt tht1t he Rnd Hl:i.rdine hrd such pre-conceived
ideas. I told him that I thought there was ri crnnce for a great victory if
l i we played our cnrc1 s right and did not attack rrem!"turely. He kept pulling on
me the idea that "Ve were to annihilate the entire G8rmrm Army and did it so
many times thflt I told hi.m that I did not bel:ieve tlrn.t we hnd too many clwnces f
'" f
to do that; thA.t the Boche WA s too snart. He HgP j n seized the orport, ni ty to
.~. J accuse the Americans of lack of aggressiveness. T vras c'i sgusted vnd disap\J
pointed with my conference. He has a pre-conceived idea to do something to
v"
avoid criticism at borne. This was brought out in the conference. I told Mm
thr>t inasrnucr as the attac}· was to be Pll-Americnn I would strongly recoml:"end
/\ thPt we sit t:i eht, maintain our +"lexibility and under no conditions should we
§ permit the main attack to be stalled and tr.en try to save our face by a rremature attack out of t}le beachhead. I told },im that I had d:irected Truscott
to give first rrfori.ty to tre Corj attack but th, t he would contj nue plans for
the attac · t0 tre west of Colli Laziali. I wanted to have rbns rr8pared to
meet any eve11tuFility, keeping ny m·nd free of Finy d0finite cc•mnitment before
tl~e battle started.
JI
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fI
"I em thoroughly d~sgusted with him and w:itr h.; s Pttitude but hnve tre satisfaction of knowing th11t I told him exactly the fFi cts as I see then. 11
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SAN HMCO--MAY 9, 1944--General Clark started the day by working on administrative matters. Due to pressing duties at t!-ie col"IIJland rest he decided not to
visit troops under bis commnnd tocl ay. He received a classlTfl te of his, Colonel
Wooley, Signal Officer of Sewmth Army who dropped in to say hello. Shortly
�after Colonel Wooley left, Gen rals Gruenther and Brann conferred with General
Clark brfofly concerning ma.tters wrich were discussed between General Gruenther
and General Harding, Chief of Staff to GenerRl Alexander, the CINC, AAI. General Harding came to see General Gruenthcr with reference to GenerRls Clark and
Alexander's talks the day bef'ore ruid to button up staff rrocedures concerned
with decisions of their talk. Shortly after this conference, GenerPl Clc.,rk
stepped ont of his van and -rinned ?nd Lieutennnt bA.rs on t •,o Air OP sergeant
pilots, Sergeants Holle and Bergf'lan. General Lewis Rnd his r,rtillery section
were rresent, and all congratulated the two new 2nd Lieutenants after this ~nformal ceremony.
Shortly after this General Clark conferred with Colonel Gray, his Fifth
Army Judge t dvocate, who rresented 26 court ma.rt:ial ca.ses to General Clark.
This ~cessive backlog of cases has built up due to General Clerk's visits
to his troops prior to the attack. He just didn't have time to fit in everything. After Colonel Gray left, General Clark ~orked on decoration cases which
also have accumulated in the aides' office.
After lunch General Clark received General Saville, XII Air Support Command Gomnander, and conferred with him brjefly concerning close support air
miss:ions to be given durinq; the attack. General Clark desired to assure himself that General Saville hrid :ironed out any rnisunderstr>nding and had coordinated his air efforts. He then vrorked on adrlinistrnti ve matters and, in addition, his talk to war correspondents which would take place at 1600. Details
of this conference follow:
General Clark entered the hut at 1555 and the conference strirted. 31
correspondents had already arrived and were seated. General Clark opened the
meeting by stating that in the forthcoming operaHons the beachhead forces
would not be irn,ediately involved. He stated that he wished the rress to be
familiar with all plans and to have a complete understanding of the objectives
of the operation. He emphasized that no quotations would be permitted, r,nd
the information to he disclosed was secret.
The General pointed out that the Eighth Anny is now concentrated in the
Cassino area. The Fifth Army is concentrrted along the GariP,liano. Courses
of action open to the Allied planners are: (1) to attack from the bet1.chhead
(2) to attack :'rom the ~io:hth Army area first and follow up by an attack from
the Fifth Arf",y area later. Both Army Commanders, however, agreed that this
should be an all-out simultr>neous P.ttack of both armies along the entire front.
General Clnrk emphasized tha.t the situation on the beachhead vras excellent.
The morale o+> the troops is hif'ti, and all Pre eagerly awaiting coming operations.
He furthP-r stated thl'lt the supply situ1>tion in t1 is sector is in very good
shape.
The General outlined the enemy order of battle, stating thPt there were
23 German divisions available in Italy and furthP-r rointed out "'here these
divisions are now located.
The General asserted that his discussions
wj
th General Leese and the Eighth
�1"''-''
1' •
Army staff were most cordial.
on details of the operation.
~~~(fl~:-,,~ ... ~-"
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The two Army Commanders are in complete accord
In the French Corps 4 French Divisions · are available. In II Corps 2 divisions are available, the 85th and 88th. The 36th Division is in reserve,
but the General pointed out that this division is r.. ctm1.~ly in MI reserve
and May not be comri.itted without the autl ority of GenerPl Alexander after consultation with him.
1
4 Divisions are available to Eighth Army :in 13 Corps plus 2 divisions in
Polish Corps and 2 Canadian Divisions in reserve. The immediate objective of /
French -Sxy,editionary Corps is the capture of Mount Majo feature; the first objective of II Corps is Haunt DaJ11iano. The General st11ted that while each
corps has sub-divided the operation into tl-.ree phflses, the units are instruct- (
ed that immediately upon aqcomplishing the first phc~se of the mission they 11re
to immediately rroceed with tri~ second ~.nd third pl ases of their mission regardless of vh~ther or not flanking units have reached th~ir objecti'les. The 1
Fifth Army, it ~ s planned, will rove un the Ausonia Valley to D1 0ro, Pico and
Itri.
On the beachhead we have six divisions, including one armored. Here there
are three possible axes of attack: (1) North +,oward Rome (2) soutrieast (3)
northeast in the direction of Cori-V~lmontone to cut Route #6. Of these
courses General Clark prefers the third. He emphasized that the bridgehead attack must depend on operations on tre main rant.
Soon after operotions comnence the coITll'.'land echelon of the Fifth Army will
be transferred to the beachhead '1h",r it lrunches its attack about 15 Hay.
General Gruenther will rennin here Ls GenerRl Clark's Deputy. G~neral CJFrk
ras prepRred a letter to all troqs in the F:ifth Arny to be released immedietely
be~ore operations get under way.
General Clark stflted. · hat we are in eYcellent shape with respect to Army
artillery witr 240mm ho vitzers and 155mm rifles [lnd 8 11 howitzers. He also emphasized that we are in an excellent position Yrith rl'lspect to our reserves;
i.e., we will be in a position to employ them amphibiously if this course
proves to be best at any point along the main front.
The Army Cornriander disclos~d to the press his recent visit to the United
States and stated that he had an excelle"lt opportunity to discuss with the
Fresident, with GenerDl ·!arshall and vTitr various members of Congress, all
phases of the Italian operation.
After General Clark had concluded tis expos:ition of the plan, severnl
questions were asked by the correspondents. The conference ended at 1700.
After the war correspondents had departed, Gerteral Clark worked on more
administrative matters and correspondence and received na,ior Duncan Sandys,
Under Secretary of Surply for British Ground Forces, and Colonel Post, one
of his T-lr:i tish Army representatives. He had invited -~hese two Britishers
for supper. Friar to supper, Genernl Gruenther, Colonel Galtz!l18n, Colonel
✓ Draper and Captain Lampson were present with General Clnrk and his 'Jrit ish
�Col
guests for a before-dinner drink. Generals Clerk and Gruenther talked ¥'ith
Major Sandys concern:ing the big and over-all picture of British supply. In
addition, other small, -informal talks centered around vrrious other subjects
from the 3rjtish viewpoint; such as, women workers in war factories, women
ATS and the British lik.'"l.npower problem.
After supper had finished and his dinner guests depPrted for CE'serta,
Gener~l Clr,.rk visited wrious staff sections in his command post, returned
to his van and retired.
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SAN MARCo--r:AY 10, 1944--General CL<>rk worked on important dispntches from
the time le a.rose until he hf!d Generals Gruenther and Brann in his van for
a short conference. The C-in-C, Gener~l Alexanr1er, was to arrive at the command post at 1030, and there were last-minute details thrt Generf'l Clrrk
wanted to discuss with •his staff concerning the attack before he talked to
Genernl Alexander. General Alexander arrived at 1045 a,nd talked briefly
with General Clark before leav1'1g to inspect Fifth Army units.
Gener8 l Clark accoMpanj_ed General l le:xander in his cpr to the French
Corps. They arrived there at A
,hout 11 o I clock and were net by General Juin
tmd the usual p-uard of honor. mhey went up to Genern 1 Juin I s office where
they djscussed briefly Frencr Corps' partjcipation in the Attack tomorrow.
General ,Tuin gave ti brief surnmnry of his rart in the operation. A small
point arose which caused some discussion. General Juin had heard that General Ke;res '"las moving :in sore tanks from the &m Lorenzo nrea tonight. This
would, of course, obviously be against security and tre cover plan. After
consulting with General Keyes, Generrl Clnrk found th,:it they were movipg in
some tank destroyers, wrich were rract1CAlly t\-ie same AS tanks, and he requested General Keyes to call it off.
From l<'rencl> Expeditionr>ry Corrs the two GenerPls went imTiediately to
II C9rps. General Kt"yeS rresented General Alexander to all members of his
staff. This took r.;bout 20 minutes, as Gl'mcral Alexander shook hPncts with
eacr of them and questioned them briefly concernjng their function :in the
comman<l rost. Immediately from II Corrs Gen~rals Clt1rk and Alexander left
for the e5th Division and after thrit for the 88th. At both divisions General Alexan<ler met merely the ~enernl staff officers 1:1nd discussed briefly
witl1 each di vision commander his operAtiom11 plan for the attRck tomorrow •
.
Generals Clrrk and Alexander arrived rit the Fifth Army command post At
about 1330 where they had lunch and cont:inued discussing briefly and inforr.ially activities of tre troops on the Rttacking front.
After General Alexnnder left, Generl'll Clrirk work~d 011 snr1e importn,nt
dispatches and also on some decoration cases. He left nt 1500 by L-5, acCol'lpanied by Colonel Draper, for IV Corps. He vrns met Ht IV Corps cub field
by General Crittenberger vrho took h:im il'lmedfately to the comJMnd rost r>t
Pozzuoli. After conferring briefly with General Crittenberger, General Clark
met the entire staff of IV Corps. He tRlked to them briefly but quite significRntly. He reminisced thrt a year ar;o tJ, is Mrne his Fifth Army str>ff hnd
�not entered combat. They had worked on many plans and were impPtient to g t
into battle. Finally the chance came on the Saforno landing, and they became
indoctrinated fast. He assured IV Corps that it would not be far off before
they would f1mction as a staff in combat and not to lose heart because they
were in a rear area and just working on plans.
After his tnllc, Genernl Clarv i.nsrected the command post proper, going
through all of the G sections, AG, Engineer and company Preas. Fe returned
to General Crittenberger 1 s tent wht'!re he wrs served a refreshlng drink.
Present were: G"neral Crittenberger; Colont"'l Harrison, G-.3; Colonel Sims,
G-1; Colonel Gillette, Engineer Officer; Colonel Nance and Colonel Draper.
This little gathering brought forth manY interesting points, and GeneralCL"lrk corimented thPt it was now practically the twilight before the battle
and that naturally he was anxious for it to start; thr-t he was sure it was to
go, but he wasn't too optimistic ~hout the Boche not standin~ up to fight.
He felt certain that they would do so; thot Here wasn't any indication of
any withdrt1wal at ·rresent. He stated thrit it was his prime desire to vindicPte the beachhead, Pnd if it vms the last thing he did, he would do it.
After this informel conference, Generr->l Clark left imriedi, tely for MondraP.'one where he, Colonel Draper and the tviJO r,ilots went in for rin evening
dip. The water vms col<l but refresM_ng and rTde everyone feel very alive.
The Genernl returned to the com~and post rit 1845 ~nd met his dinner
guests whom he took into his win. They were: Generals ~•oran, Tate and Brann.
A-"'ter supr,er they tnlklll<l informally ;Jut side, walkinP' l~isurel;r riround t,he command post. General Clt1rk ret:ired early t1fter a rather strenuous day.
General Clark rec11ii ved the followinP, cable from General Freyberg, Commandin~ the 2nd }Tew Zealand Division: RK C/1?66. 11 0n eve such important bA.ttle
we of 2nd New Zealand Division send our best wishes to your Army in which we
were privileged to serve."
*
*
*
1 YlRC0--~1AY 11, 1Q44--Genernl Chirk worked on rilitnry disratches until
0900 when he l("Jft +-or the 16th Division cub field accom:rrinied by c~ptain Lampson. He arrtv"'d there in 2bout tw"!nt:v n-lnutes 11.nrl W:"lS tr1cen over to tr e ceremonial <"i.eld wrere ab0ut 1,000 r1~n of tl'e 16th Division were in :r-iass formation
facing General Clark. In front of the mass -l'orl""f1tion were the decorees. General Clark rresented thf'? 1isti:ripnished Service rnedal to Genernl .. alker, three
Dist"inguished Service Crosses and twenty one Silv"'r Sbi.rs. He ar'ldressed the
troops and decorees br:i,-fly and prnised Ge111'\ra1 Walker 1 s efforts as Division
Co:rimander for t,},e pnst two yenrs. A.ftl'!r the decorations h;d been awarded the
decorees rlaced tl~emselves to the right "lank of Gen.-ra.l Clar}·:, and the troops
passed in review. Af'ter the last p:roup rad p1ssed in review, General ClPrk
left imrn"!diately to tr.e cub fi.-ld where e took off' for CPpo--lichino airport
and arrfved there at about 1015. He was guided to the 509th I 2rachute Battalion 1 s ce:ceT'!onial fielrl where +,h~ entire battalion was :ined up in r'iass formation in front of hiM. The decor.,.es :vere rlaced in f'ro"l-1:. of tt,e battalion, rind
prj or to the a rarding of the decora.tio-1s, Gl'lneral '.Jh1rl<: sroke warmf.y of the
battalion 1 s ,fforts in battle and rraised tr""n for their exrloHs. He then
awarded tre decor2tions, af'ter wl ich the decorMs p1£ced tremselves on the
le ..t o-"' Gent"'ral ClP.rk, Pnd tr e bt-,ttalion nt1ss.e d in review. He awarded five
SAN
�Dist3nguished 3ervice Crosses,
five Bronze Stars.
O'Yl_.
Legion of Perit, twelve 3ilvl"r Stars and
Il'!lmediatl'lly after tl e ceremony G"'"'l'''ral Cl"1rk and Captain Lampson returned
to Capodichino, from vr.icb point -1;,hev flew bRck to the Army command post., arriving fit 111+5. Gl'lner, 1 Clark went to his van ['ncl confl'lrred with Genl'?ral
Gruenther.
At 1'345 Gen~ral Jevers nrrived ot the cor-!'J.a:•1.d · post, nccompanied by hls
pilot-aide, Lt. Col. ;rormel . Gen~rals Clnrk and Devers conf1"'rred in the confl"rence hut f'or ~bout half an flour rmd then had l1mch together. At lunch
G~neral Devers iscussed th~ r1P..npower shortr ge in the United Stntes nncl stated
that as :.'ar as his administrative functions were concernl'ld, in the Mediterranean Theater he was going to adhere strictly to Vlar Depirtment requirements
and inactivate provisional units. If the nl'led required, they would be reactivated not as provisional 1.mits but as T/O orgF1nizations, and other units
would have to be de-activnted to tak~ care of th,.. new act::vation. General
Devers also stated th:_-,t re h8d tal 1i::ed to G y, Jral V7ilson, who had just returned
from England, and he said that Ge11:eral ~: se>1hower was very optfristic concerning OVF:P.LORD; that he thought it would definitely go and th.Pt we would have a
complete victory. Genernl Dev,..rs -1-1- en discussed the rossibilHies of Operation
ANVIL taking place and went ~nto some of the rari~icctions of ~he French political and military oorunand in !fortP Africa. Initially they would not ~llo 1 a
French Army during the initial stas:;es of the operation, but eventually, for the
rayoff, a M'rench Army Co!"mander would 11e in romM~nd of fa o French Corps. The
.\rny Co,'!mnnder might be Gen,..ral DeL..,tte. In all probability Gen~ral Juin culd
not be chosen because he was not in very ~ood :avor with General DeGnulle, due
to his :l nitial stanrJ on the landint: operations in :rorth Africa in 194?. The
conversation then centerJd Around the n.ttack tris evenjng.
After luncr Gemeral Devers lf".!ft "'or II Corrs, and GenerA.l ClPrY returned
to his vim whl'lre he worked on r,ore rilitr>ry fjsrrtches. The rest of tre afternoon General Clark ,rorked ir. Lis va.11. ar d confer:ced with }l"'neral Gruenth"'lr.
For dinn r gu..,sts the General entertflin'°'d Major Knjp-ht ~..,a Lt. Col. iorter.
Aft..,r dinner GenerPl CL<irk wor}-..,d on ad,.,,~nistrn.tive nf1tters Pnd left 11t 1000
for French Corps where :he vif',wed fror. the observation tower in the castle at
the French Corps comman"l. post t're beginnings of tre great offMsive to he launched
against German positions along the Pront . Ee return..,d at nbout idnight nnd retired.
General Clark cabled ~"-'""ral Leese today as follows: RTI 7523. "Best·wishes
fror. FFtl, Arr'ly ror complete success in the COT'linr, operation. I an. deerly grat"'ful to you f'or wholehearted ccoperatio:'.1. in planning rhase. 11
General Leese resronded as follows: R:J 794. 11 Greatly aJ precit>te your kind
message. It ras been a great plea.sure to work w:i .L}1 you throughout, ~nd we very
mucr. apprecfate the concessions you al"d General Juin made to concert tirdng. We
all in Eighth Army send your Fi.f'tr Arri.y 0 1Jr cordir•l eood wishes and look confidently forwal"d to advw cing shoulder to sl1 oulder together . 11
',
��\/1;-POfi"-.
fa;:;.
Ii
f~a.__
~
/ ' ~ l °"'.;;.-. sA1~r1A.Y l? , 1944--Tre British Eigrth and the AIT'"lrican Fifth Armies , )
lamched treir hi~ offensive at 1100 hours last evening . General Cln.rk
arose early this morninr, to receive rerorts concerninr· rrogress rnerle . The
French Corps inade some rcr-o~ress durinrr thl'l nigbt rind increased its rositions towa.,,..r1 tbe west somewi1at . i~ount Fa-:to was tRl,.en ancl h!"!ld after bitter +"ighting . By l40C tl,.is afternoon r~ount Frd.to ·ms firn, end the ?nd
1~oroccan Division was rontinuinp; its r-ttack on otrer objectives . Tre 1st
Poroccan Division on the rii:;ht at the hridgehM.d WPS ri?kin.t:s no progress .
It rad a couple of trnk companies nortJ, of its r,res"nt lin"'s tut f'j ghting
was bitter tind enemy oprositi.on to(\ great to ronsidl."r any progress as
havin~ been Made . To the soutr in t}:e Frencl sector the 4th r:ountain Division was having mnch dif:'iculty in mn iri~ rroP,ress toward Mt. Ceschito .
On the left of tlie Frencr Gorps, II Corps h~d taken rractic,...lly all of its
initial o½jectives. Th~ 150th Jnfa~try of th~ 8~h Division had taken and
held Da!'iin.no fir"'l . They were in V"ntosa and ready to go on as soon as the
Francl,. had nroceedea south toward C"'scr·to to Rotundo . I Company of the
350th ht'!ld Cer:icola . ':'he 151st Inf'antry hRd 1110ved f'orwRrd about 1 , 000 yards
find was stopred toward t! e entrance of' Jantn "r,1·i.r, Infante . They had -ianaged
to ~et a few tarks .-:D.to the tovm anrl sorie infl'ntry +, .... oops . A coordinated attack to teJ" the town is ·r. rrep1,ration, 1-,ut th~ to 1m PS yl"'t has not fallen .
F,lements o.f' the 139th Infantry ?dva:>1ced -f'orward as far P.s Gan !'artino and the
two hill masses /t66 anr #69 , known as the Clle. San •;artino . There was ri~ tter f'-': ghting tr ere duri. 11f" the riorn-i ng. .Arou.11d noon ·:~ 11 #?.;q was tri.ken and
an attack planned to ,vrest Hill #66 from the Gl'!rm..,ns. B-itt(')r counterattacks
were lmmched by the f}"rrans t.l.l'oughout th~ dav on th"'se positions . Further
south a'1c'1 to the coast other eleT"ents of the 85th Di vision had rroceeded for ward about 1,000 yards and were lam1.ching aggressive combat ratrols to feel
r
out ene'1y res~ ,;-::;&nee . In ;~enerrl t},e tempo o:: the attack shortly r,fte:r daybreak slowed down considerably, 8S the 1oche was putting ur bitter resistance .
He 1 ad accepted battle as had · "'!e11. anticipated , t:1us rreventing tl," seizure
of all objectives as anticipat~ : . Up on t,e -r::~_ghth Arny ~rant the Folisr
,
Corrs proceeded southwest from rositions nortl of the ncnastery and rrad" soTl'le
-rrogress , hri.vi11.g !'laced el..,r'lents on FrantoT'l B.idge whicl~ underwert var:..ous
1
cr-·D.terattad~s all c ay lorg. In so. r:2ses nP-~ther Ue 7oche nor the foles
actually possessed rarts of ~f''"' rid ;A. . To tbe S0'1tJ-,, across th,. ~-EJ: ldo, the
Eii:;hth Arrny had pushed 8bout eir;r.t 1 )at~r>lions e cross this river eith r by n,eans
of' class 30 ferries, r,qfts er bridges . South of ::;an J\.ngelo two 1,r:idges ht:1d
been constructed across the lZaJ ido n.nd triree sq1.1adrons of tanks, in addition
to infantry troops , had been rushed in+.,o the vr-tll"'Y• Tr.e:ir advance .-:n c'epth
was lim:tted to ariout 1 , 000 yf'rds . Reportg continued to cor,e in durinP, the day,
some confirmed and some not confirmed, indicating t:b1.t this ev~ning ard tmorrow would clarj fy 1'1any sit1.W 4~ions w:hich rlevelop!"ld durin~ th~ ...irst dey o; tre
attack .
!
Ge'1.,.ral 8lrrrk co11.ferr~cl w:i th Ge'1.ern.l Gr·1enther, his Chief of Strff, arrl
General Brann, ½is G-3, on nun~rous occasio11s . :~ajor Gen"ral "Tate Twin:irc,
Cor:rrnanrii11rt, Gen rel o-f' the ~trater;ic Air Force, v;as -tnvi.ted to l1mch. qe discussed 1:r-il'lfly the Strate1:;ic Air Force I s role in hi ttin~ targets in central
Gen~ny a~d int~~ ree~ arees o.P It~ly rnd in ~oumania and Bulgaria . He nlso
dj scussed sr:ri1' of t1 e h,ly that h,. ,res gjvi~g to the XI! Air 3U:i:,J.ort Com_,and,
under General S::i.vHJ.-,, w{th l'il.rts of the Strategic Air Force.
1
G"lneral Clark co:1ti'1ued to
o llow th~ battles closely throuJrout t:1e ef-
~ ~ •"
•
!llt/l-ft<
-
-
�ternoon and evening. The lack of rrogress ~n the French sector might require
the 3rd Algerian Division to vr,ry its rol~ in trie rrorosed rlan rnd pass
through eler,ents of the 4th to accomplish obj"' cti ves north and nortl:.cast of
Castelforte to seize end hold Ceschito, Reali, Rotundo and Siola.
Orders of th"! day irsued by Genl'!rals Clark and Alexander are quoted
below:
General Alexander ' s messrge is cs follows:
"Soldiers of the Allied Arnies in Italy.
"Throur-hout the pest wjnter you 1rive fouapt hf'rd r,nd vnlfrntly end killP,d
many Ger~ans . 1~rrinrs you Pre disarpointed that re h~ve not been abl~ to advance faster Pnd .('arther, but I rmd tl:'ose wl-'o knou, realize full well how !Il8gnif'icently you h~Ye fow~ht amonr;st these Plmost insur ,oPntable obstccles of .
rocky, trac1·less ~ounta.:L-'l.s, deep i.n snow, and in valleys blocked by river::; ri.nd
rud, against a stubborn foe .
"The results of tr•ese prist months may not ny:penr srectaculPr, but you
have c1rawr into Ttnly Pnd mauled rmny of t:b~ enemy's best divjsions "1Mch he
badly '1eeded to stem th"? ad.vnnce of tre Rmsfan Arr,i"s in the East . Hitler
l as Bd.mitted thE't Ms defeats in the East were lrirgely due to tre bitterness
of t:i-,~ fiP-hting and is losses in Italy. This, in itsel""', is a gr"'ct 8 cl ievement and y0u ma~,r well be ri s proud of ;vout scl ves Rs I e rn of you . You have
gafoed the rdmiration of +.he v10rlr'l Pnd th(> i:,;ratitude of our Russir,n Allies.
0
0
''Today trie bad tmes are behind us and to"llorrow we crin see victory ahead .
TTnder the ever increr>si11cr blo"'ls of the 1c1ir -f'orces of tre United Nations, which
are mount~ ng every day in intensity, the Gerr,an war r.a·cliine is beginni"l:lg to
crumble . The Alli"'d Prmed forces 8re nm1 ~.ssembling ·"or tre fjnal b0ttles on
sea , on lrmd, P'1d in the air to crush the enemy once and for all. Fror the
East and the West, -f'rol:' the Nortri and tl· e South, blows are Bbout to fa.11 which
will result in th~ final rlestruction of thfl" •·razis and brirg freedou once n.gain
to f>:irone , 1md hnsten reace for 1m all. To us jn Italy, las heen given the
honom· to strike tre first blow .
"We nre going to destroy tr~ German Armies in :;:tnJ.y. The fiishtjng will
be lwrd, hitter , a.vid p~rhaps long, hut yon 1.1re warriors and soldiers of the
highest order , who for more t1 r,n n. yeay, ~ ve kn01·11 only victory . You have
courage, <1eterrni11.Ption enn skill. You ,-ii 11 he sur-rorted by overwhelming air
forces , and in ,C!1.ms and tn.rks ue far outnumber t:re Gl'?rrrans . No Armies rave
ever entered battle before with a more just t'1nd rig! teous cause .
11 80
vrith God 1 s ri~lr and ½lessjng, we tnlr~ the field - confident of: vic-
tory • 11
The text of G"'n~ral ClFirk ' s
11 TO:
~
ssage is as follows:
The Officers and Men of thl'! Fifth Army.
"During the ei.r,ht months th..,t have pt>ssed sj nee your inv11sion of the
-·-,.
.l:J.
�Italian mainland you have accomplished results of majqr strategic e.nd tactical importance to the United Nt>tions . The entire world , including the Axis ,
lmovrn the success and significance of your Salerno landing against bitter
opposition , and of your subsequ\"nt capture of Naples :in the fact of the
enemy' s deterrnination to deny to us the port ,t, ich was indispensable to sup~ .
port our further operations in Italy. After tbe fall of Naples you pressed
your attack relentlessly and without delay, forcing the GerrEns to continue
their retreat until they had reached crrefully prepared lines, where the exceedingly difficult mo1mtainous terrain provided extreme advantages to the
defender . Notwithstanding the obstacles of nountnins, lack of rce ds , bitter
weather '111d concrete defensive fortifications, you have in your various wellexecuted nttacks forced the enemy to reinforce heavily his 1:1dvnntageous position at the expense of other comrlitments and have hs rassed him continuously.
"At the san,e tiMe you ha,re established firmly a strong beachhe2cd in the
Anzio - Nettuno area, where you hav"! provided a·serious threat on his lines
of communication which he is attemrting to neet by the diversion of a large
force from other operations .
11 It may appear to you, s:i nee the Fifth Army ' s progress in terms of territory gained during the past few months has been slow·, that our campaign is
no longer a major one or that it is not having significant success in the
war es a whole . rfothing o:rnld bl'! furth~r from the truth. You bave :c:/'."de n
conspicuously successful invasion of the continental fortress which the Germans · boasted was impregnable . You have required the G.e;rBPns to devote more
than twenty divisions to the costly and losing task of reta.rdjng the Allied
progress to tJ,e north . You have inflicted heavy losses upon their troops
and have taken more than 13, 000 prj_soners . You 1:mve plPced the enemy in his
present distressing' positj_on of trying hopelessly to hold back the Allied
forces, which he knows will eventually overrun him from two directions .
nr
have direct personal knowledge the.t the accomplishments of the Fifth
Army are understood and Appreciated by tr e governments 8nrl. peoples of the
United Nations • . They apprec:iE te not only th.at you have accomplished n.s much
as was possible witr. the strt'!ngth of your force, but also that you hPve co,1tained in this campa.ign many thousands of German soldiers whom the Nazis have
needed desperately in their attempts to stem the Russian advance and to prepare themselves age.inst inva.sion in other µirts of Europe .
11 For
some weeks there has been a period of comyiarative cr-ilm, during
which therA has been opportunity for replenishment of men and equipment . We
shall soon fl gain resume the offen si ve and lPunch the 2ttacks which our appre hensive enemy expects and dreads . You have what you need to strike smashing
blows and to follow them through to conpletion: thorough training, superfor
equipment , heroic courage and the knowledge that we can and will destroy the
German armies .
ttI have full ,confidence that, as in th" rast, the men of the Fifth
Army will meet the tests to come Ps true soL:iiers anr thct with God 1 s guidance
and help you will press on to great and decisive v.i.ctories . 11
\
\
�SAN r,.V\.RCO-- MA.Y 13 , 19/44- -Reports concernin;;, the prodess of the battle came
in during the en.rly hours of the morning 11,nd continued to come in throughout
the day. - General Clark studied his map and progress rede during the past
night . He had General Brann up in his v~m and conferred with him concerning
th~ Attack. He talked to Gener9.l Saville on the telephone and later saw him
personally concerning the air effort . He vlishod to have the air abandon
part of the effort on battlefield isolAtion and attack targets that he considered more important . Some difficulties were involved with AAI and TAF on
calling of'f battlefield isolation objectives allotted to the medium bombers.
)
Shortly after lunch G-eneral Clerk, accompanied by Colonel Drarer , left
for the forward areas . · They first visited the 85th Di vision advance command
post at Minturno where General CJErk discussed with Genernl Coulter , the Division Conmander, the progress made by the division . He reviewed briefly
the seizure of hills #66 and #69, known as Clle San Martino; the fact that
the Division had two companies in Cave d 1Argilla, and the dj sposition of the
Division in front of Santa Marfa Infante . The minor change in the Division
boundary, as ordered by General Keyes, was alsci discussed . GenerPl Clerk
asked about the casu.H.lties in the Division and was told thPt.. about 956 passed.
throur-h clearing stations, but General Coulter trought that probably there
were a little over a thousand . However, th~se figures could not be considered
accurate, and JEter developments will cfarify them .
From the 85th Division command post General Clark then vrent to visit Gene- ·
ral Sloan I s oommand post, the 88th Divis ion. There he reviewed the 88th Division I s efforts from the beginning, which included the capture of Damiano
and Caracoli and the Division I s efforts north toward Santa Marfa . General ')
Sloan WA.S disappointed vnth the lack of aggressiveness HS shown by the tank
commander who was hesitant to take his tRnks off the road and really push
theI!! forward, helping the infantry. General Sloan assured M.Jn that he was
going to require the tanl'::s to work closely with the 351st InfHntry, corrJ11anded
by Colonel Champeny, in the preparation of their next attack. He discussed
briefly the atta.ck nol::'th from Damiano with the ultirn.te objectives of Bracchi
and Cerri .
·
·
After leaving the 85th Division oornrnand post, General CL'lrk proceeded immedi ately to the French Expeditionary Corps where he conferred with Generals
Juin a.rid Carpentier . While there he learned thP_t the French had taken Majo
and Rinchinso and had rroceeded south and held Ceschito and Rotundo . At all
command posts General Clark expressed satisfaction to comm-anders for_ the excel-)
lent work that they had accomplished so far and was very pleased with the Aggressive action of the French in reaching their objectives . Upon his return
,
to his command post he learned later on that the 1st DMI had rroceeded northward and had rre,de a, junction with other elements of the di vision where the
Liri and the Garigliano met . · The French esMmeted thRt thev would have about
1 , 000 German prj_soners b:r night . As soon as Genernl Clc.,,rk i:-eturned to the command post he issued orders to Gener.al Keyes , II Corps ·Commander, to speed up
attacks tonight , regardless of previous schedules or plans . He desired the
R$th to attack tonight , regardless of previous schedules or plans . He desired
the 88th to attack ;hunt Bracchi tonir,ht .from three directions P.nd to rush fa.st
for the town of Spigno in order to take advantage of the Gerrrans being off
balance from Fifth Army successes tocl ay.
�After supper he conferred with Generals Gruenther a.nd Brann concerning
new developments of the offensive which he.d apµ,ared• after tod_ry's sucpesses .
After this conference he retired early.
*
*
*
SA~,T HARCO--HAY 14, 1944--Last night enemy bombers bit Naples and strafed
Highway #7 . A few bonbs were dropped in the hosnital areas in the vicinity
of Carinola. General ClHrk r>rose early, acquainted himself wit'b early morning dj spatches and progress made on the Fifth Prmy front. He conferred with
General Brann concerning future actions of th('.l Fiftr, Arny, specifically II
Corps . They dis cussed in brief the 351st Infantry assisting the 349th in
takin~ Mount Bracchi and then continuing vrestward to take and hold Spigno .
The 34gth wos to take Mount Bracchi and thr~n go westward to seize and hold
Mount Civita . II Corps was to speed vigorougly west nnd cut the AusoniaScauri road nnr'l prevent mP-my withdrawals from the area or reinforcements
being pushed in . - During th is conference General Gruenther brought in Colonel
Zeller, Deputy Chief of Staff of French Expeditionary Corps . General Clark
rendered a decision to allow the French to use the road Minturno - S. rJarfa.
Infante - Ausonia, part of which is in the 88th livision sector . This 'could
allow the i:;trench to :iove in their supplies to Ausonia by this road . He discussed br:iefly the 1st DrIT sweep westward , seizing and holding dominating
terrain and assisting the 3rd DIA in taking Mount D1 0ro . · The 3rd DIA is
pushing up toward Esperfa. to attack and' seize Hount D1 0ro. The Gou:r1s will
be pushed westward, by-passing Spigno and filtering in to the mountainous
Petrella mass ~
~
General Seville came to confer with Gener<Jl Clark immedie tely A.fter
this conference, and they discussed air support. General Cl11rk ,.ranted the
Esperia area bombed to complete isolPtion of tj e battlefield and to dislocate enem:r concentratim-1s fi lterjng back m1d forth tr rough the to '\'n. He also
discussed f'uture reguirernents f'rom the [;,ir f'or ground_ support .
After General Saville had left, General 01:9.rk went to lunch . General
Cannon carie to see him 5n the early part of the afternoon and discussed
briefly with him the effectiveness of' the air support being gi1.ren by the
Tactical fdr F'orce .
After l}eneral Cannon had left, General Clark worked on adnd nistrPti ve
matters unbl General Alexander, cnrc, AAI, came to see him. Generrils /\lexander, ClRrk, Gruenther and Brann went to tr e conference hut, wr ere General
Clark oriented General Alexander on Fifth .Arr-iy results to date . General
Ale~ander was very rleased with the results and so ~xpressed himself. He
also said he believed the Boche were esta½lisbing a (efemsive 1" ne from Cassino - Pignataro . He hoped t:bey did, as rositio11.s gained by tbe French would
out-flank this position. The subject of novine; the %th Division to the
beachhead was brought up by· General Alexander ~or an all-out 'lttacl, from there
to the cne"'V 1 ~ flank . General Clark d:i ssuaded Ge11eral Alexander from reaching
a decision at this time as to exact dates to nave the, ?,Sth Di vision to the
beachhead. P-e said he would like to rlefer a ,lecision as to tre e•ract time for
tJce nover,ent rending later developr1ents .
After General Alexander l~ft, G-;yieral Clark went to bis van and worked on
�more administrative matters and continued to receive dispatches from his forward elements .
After dinner , the movie nnoly Hatrimony" was shown in the conference hut
to sonc rierbcrs of the Fifth Arrr1y staff.
Gtmeral Clark dictated the following notes for inclusion in his diary :
HThe Fifth Army ettack has bPen characterized by great aggressiveness
and dash on the rart of 4:,Le "?rench ~xp~dltionar:r Corps . Our plans were well
conceived nnd have been executed as previously planned . French units push
on, passing by isol11ted Gerrien troops leaving rear Frencl' elements to nop
them up. By so dojnri_:, the:r have not lost the inpetus 0 1~ their surp;~~~ ...
\.
:-t-.
~ r-cvJ
tack.
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;t,lP -~~ ,
'The situation on the II Corps front hns been somewhPt <'1ifferent, for our
attacv was not initially :in tle J:J.ountains, but as vie adv~nced we approached
the mountains . The French att·ack str-trted in the P1ountn.i11s, their ::irst objec1
tives being the highest pea}s . I arn c :: sappointed in the rigidity of II Corrs
plans . They hs.ve not shovm n flexibility of m'nd and an aggressive r,ttitude.
In !'1Y· opinion, with the strenr:th we had 1".vailable a~~ Santa til'lria Infante that
resistance should have been elininated by-mid-day yesterday. As it was, tanks (
and the 351st Infantry, again in.my opinion poorly commanded by Colonel Champ8ny, permitted thenselw•s to he held up e'1d pernittcd G8rnans to withdr·aw
from the Bracchi pocket during the n:i-ght . If it had not been for my intervention last evening to speed up th"'.l r-ittack on Rotlmdo imd to mntinue it on
to Bracchi and tc- speed up the attack by the 3/,qth on Bracchi, we probably
would still be sitting further back thj_s morning. I r,nve oomrnnnicated with
General Keyes and sMn both Division Co1'1me.nders yesterday at their forvmrd
command posts and urged sr:eed of action . I hPve directed Keyes to use the
349th to attack immediately this mornjng fron Scmta i'1aria in the direction of
Civita, t:be higr; r:round north of Spigno . During the disruption of the enemy
we must break into his ljnes and g~t -thet high ground .
v
"Again, I am greatly dj sappointed by t're lack of aggressiv.,,ness of II
Corps . I am also disappoint1'd :in the apparent timidity of the tank commanders
to shoot their tanks in an all-out attack. Fractics.lly p.one have been 1':l'l.ocked
out by enem;r action but 1'y indecisive piddling around in rear areas, throwing
tracks and, in one or two cases, hitting mines .
nsent the following messr,ge of <X'nr-;ratulAtions to General Juin last night
acconpanied by two bottles of, whiskey:
111 My sincere congratulations on your important accomplisriments in the present offensive . The capture of essential and dominotfog terrain hy the F'rench
troops is of naj or VP lue in tl is ore ration vti ich the Fifth Army is carrying out
so ··igorously. I know that you will continue to rress on witl-ollt pause in this
phase of our c2.r1paign for the destruction of our enemy and tre ultimate liberation of France. You are proving to an anxiously awaiting F'rance toot the French
Army has retained sacred its finest fj ehting traditions . It is e.n honor to have
your troops in the Fifth .Army. 1
0
11
1ile should have Spigno b;v tonight . 11
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�General Juin today issu ,d the follow· 1 ng order of the day:
''After two days 0 1: -f'ip.-hting against positions tllet the enemy thought
were impregnable end in spite of "ierce r~sistance he is retiring, disorganized and beQte~ .
''A large orea J:,ns bMn conquered. A position of vital inportence the rt. ~lAJ0 is jn our hnnds . Hore tr an 1000 rrisonP-rs hrve been taken
including 18 offic~rs . Our edvance continues.
"I call upon all for a r~doubled effort [lnc' renewed vigour . YesterdA.y1 s r-D,,-iificent success is t} e rl"!dee of assurance for tnr,o~row' s victory.
"Forward."
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SMT HA.RC0--HAY 15, 194/+--General ClPrk :-rose Mrly and r;tunied disrrtch~s
from th"' "'ront l:ine units. .Action durinf; tJ:,e night and rrcceed-inr, throughout the day by the 88th Division res•1lted in Srir,;no, the high hill I".a.ss of
nount La Civita a.rr1 southwarcl +'ailing jnto our hPnds. A II Corps B.ttack in
th~ r,+'t~rnoon, el"\rloyino; tlie ~5th Divir:ion, southward cau.,.ed Cestellonoroto
to fall in our hands . Trt"- ?~d and ,ra. Battalions of the ,17th Inf'antry
hrv~ establ:'°L'''h""'d them"'elv"'s ...- 4 ,,.m ~n t}-,e to·m P'1d on t},e higr ground to tl">e
south of the tovm. T:1e 'llst Rt"!connaismmce 3quedron, r1ttaclred to tbe 85th
Di vision, will pass throur,1· -1:.1,e 1st Battalion of tre 1'3Qth anc. gp, in contact
~ith enemy eler-ents in Scauri a11.d, ½y ~ggressive actior, push the~ out.
This wil] be ci 4 multa'1e0us 1"':.th Pn attac'I{ "by tb•· ':\J~th southwest to the rorid
junction at San Croce. It is felt thnt not many Gern..,ns remain in th~ town
of Sca,ll'i . By tomorrow tlie Scauri area should Hlso be in o•u- hands •
.
General Clin.. k c0nferred wi tr Gent""rr ls Grul"::rr+;h"'r r nd ~re"'.n trrour,hout
tlie '7ornin,;. Later 011. they Tient c1 o' m to th"' G-3 Section to discuss .:-uture
operations by Fifth Ar...,y on the rnu<l relief P.!ap which dericts the no..mteinous
t"lrrain in minit=ture as it is. Af'ter this conf~re11ce Gtmeral Clark had
lune ••
Dur 4 nr, luncr Gereral Keves came ar.1 conferred ½r" +'ly with General CL~rk.
~ot"Js concerning this conference are discussed belo.
Dur:!.ng ....,he ['fternoon General CL"rk ..,t,udied closf'lly the progress of the
battle. Incor-ing dispatchAs continued to come -ln shovring our successful efforts to take ancl c,eize Castellonoroto .
The Fre~1eh Corrs continu,..d to follo11 up wi~h r>.ggressive f'ctions throughout tr~ day. mhe Gou"ls hac'l pP..ssed westwar•l and were into t}-,e mo'mtains in
and north of Spigno . Ele,.,ents of the 3rcl Algerian Division were pushing p11.st
Ausonia on the road to Esperia. Elements of the 1st DMI were rroceeding
southward from San Giorgio on the road to Esperia . Details concerning f')Xac·1:,
location of these Frencr elements are not ::i.vailable du~ to difficulty of
maintaining coruiunict'tions through this ountainous terrain.
��11
1......4
After supper General Clark visited -.rarious staff sections in the com!'l.and·
post and retired early.
General Clark dictated the following J111:>.t"rial for inclusion in his diary:
"My fears that the enemy might react to our lack of Pggressive attitude
toward Spigno did not develop . We hove occupi..,d Spigno and the key terrain
to the south known as La Civita . Our good fortune does not minimize the fa.ilure on the part of someone in the g8th Division to carry out orders with
energy. General Keyes is investigating this delinquency and when I get the
whol ~ story I n.ust take r>.pproprfo.te action . I have congratulated General
Keyes and his tT"O new Di vision Commanders as follows:
111 ·congratulations on the success which the forces under :rour command
have acr-foved dur:rng past three da~rs of intense fighting . I especially desire to co"!linend the 85th and ~8th Divisions which are engaged in of"'ensive
combat f'or first time and which bave conducted ther,sebres in a glorious manner, true to the traditions of the United States Army. J leasy congratulAte
Sloan and Coulter not only for their current successes but also for tle mann~r in which th~y have trained their divisions in prepnration for these eventful days . Great victories are in store for the Fifth Army when it is composed of troops of the caliber of the II Corps . '
~
"I am also sending a message to Genf'-ral McNair, telling M.rn hm1 prouc, I
am to be the first comrm.nder to employ his new civisions ill combat . It has
proved' the method by which thl')y W('H'e originally fornl'.'d and later trained . I,
o,.. course, am delighted with the great punch, initintive P_nd l'bnergy displayed
by the French. They are really carrying- the weight of tbis battle . I am
~
disappointed in the effort of' the Eighth Ar1-..y. The Fifth having taken the
\
Apollinare - San Giorgio area should permit tt~rr. to advance without opposition at least as far as Pignetaro . I am tole' tney rre commiting parts of the
Canadians and of the 78th Division , which should help .,
"I am delighted with our efforts to get into the mountains. The Fifth
Army 'mows how to operate in the :iountains and is trnined for it . The Germans dislike the mountains , and I prefer to work jn tl em to the valleys where
the German has prep2red defens1's , mines and other delaying obstecles .
1
11 I hffve directed Keyes to push with all the en~rgy ;md speed he mm muster from Spieno directly across the mountnins to Itri, en.ploying the 88th Division for this purpose; at the same time to attack with the 85th to capture
Castellonoroto which , in turn, should bring ribout' the collapse of the Scauri
area . I have authorized Keyes to use the 85th in advance of these areas as
far as Nount Campese but no further . I have told him the.t I anticiprite the
36th Division will move to the bridgehead , cor,nencing in about 72 hours, that
it will take another five days to complet~ tl1e move . At the end of this
eight- day period I desire to start the mov..-ment of tbe ~5th Division at full
strengtr to the bridgehead, together with sufficient command and conmn~~ication ell!"Ments of Keyes' II Corrs ~ Hence, the 85th Division must be ·employed
in limited objectives from now on, with the 88th carrying on towards Itri.
"I will put Crittenberger 1 s IV Corps in when I take Keyes out . Gritten- )
berger is already with Ke~ecoi'ning familiar wjth the situation ra-
�7J
pidly. It vrill give Cri ttenberger an entry into combPt under favorable conditions .
11 By moving the II Corps with me into the bridgehead, V:hen I do attack I
can attack first with the VI Corps , followed immediAtely by the II Corps
with the British, 85th Division and 1st ArP1ored Division, after I -pull it
out of the VI Corps attack. This should have decisive results . "
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SAN 1 ':ARCO--MAY 16, 1941+--General C~ark arose and studied :military dispatches .
Operations during the night were a little disappointing in that elements of
the 85th Division had not been nble to gain the hill mass of Scauri and trap
the few remaining Germans left there .
At .0900 the GenerBl left the command post to visit the ew:1 cu.ation hospitals and see the wounf1ed from the 35th and 88th Divisions . He first visited
the 56th Evacuation Hospital where he awarded 21 Bronze Stars to hospital
personnel, including nurses, for bravery during ah eir raid at the beachhead .
11.fter this ceremony he went througl1 the various 1i< ards am• talked to the
wounded . Leaving the 56th, he went to the 95th Evacuation Hospital where he
decorat ed four medical personnel with the Bronze Star for bravery during the
initial landings at Salerno. After the ceremony he went through the casualty
wards . Following this visit , he went to the 93rd Evacuation Hospital and
awarded one TJistinguished Service Cross to Captain Stone for his courageous
actions while accompanying a front line unit Ht the be2chhead . He also
awarded two Bronze Stars to medical personnel for bravery at the beachhead .
In all of the evacuation hospitals that he visited, he found the wounded
cheerful and with their chins up.
1
After leaving the 9Jrd Evacuation Hosp1 tal, he went to the 175th Engineer area where he awarded five Bronze Stars .
Upon returning from thj_s tour of the evacuation hospitals rrnd engineer
unit , he v;ent into immedia.te conference with Genera.ls Gruenther r,nd Brann.
After lunch General Clark, Pccompanfod by Colonel Draper, left for the front .
He went directly up Highway #7 through the town of Scauri. Thj_s was bej_ng
occupied by the 339th Infantry. Vlhile the General was there , one sniper prisoner was being passed through the town to the prj_soner of i'lar cage to the
rear . From the town of Scauri the General proceeded further along the highway to the vicinity of the crossroads at San Croce . While there , a plAtoon
of light tanks of the 91st ReconnHissance Squadron passed along the road but
were forced back by antj_-tank gunfire $ General Cli:irk stopped the platoon
leader and inquired why he was withrlrav1dng his platoon, and he stated that
one tank was put out of action by four well-sip;hted anti- tank guns l'lnd Also
thPt scattered Germans were throwing anti- tank mines on the road '1S they
passed by. He stated that he was brin--:jng his tanks back to snfety prior
to pushini:; forward so that he could call for artillery fire on the anti - tank
guns . While in th~ vicinity, thl'lre was considerable small a.rms fire up ahead
and both hostile and friendly Artillery fire in the vicinity of Mount CRmpese .
After seeing everything thrit had te1<~n place in the vicinjty of this
�crossroad, General ClBrk proceeded back to the ~8th Division command post
southeast of Minturno. 1Vhile there he conferred with General Sloan and
discussed positions of the elements of his Divis:ion proceedjng forward
over the Petrella hill mass.
After leaving the 88th Division, the General went to the 85th Division to see General Coulter where he verified disposition of el~nents of
t}1 is Di vision in their push westward to Hount Campese and cleaning up
operations in the Scauri hill area.
From the 85th Division, General ClRrk went to the II Corps co~ma.nd
post , ,hich had r,oved the night before from theJr location east of Minturno
to a new location northeast of Minturno. The coMmand post was Moved to a
quieter place and to get away from the congested traffic in and around
Minturno. While at II Corps he discussed with Gensral Kl'lyes and General
Crittenberger of IV Corps the rrovisions of Onerations Instruction #18
which had just been issued. This Operations Instruction confirmed the
verbal instructions issu~d the day before by GenerBl Clark to General
Keyes. rrovisions 0f this Operations Instruction were discussed in the
Army Comrnander 1 s notes of yesterday. In brief, II Corps was ordered to
attack and capture Castellonorato without delay and push the t1dvance westward to Itri. The 88th Division was to be employed rapidly tl:1rough the
Petrella mass, pushing the German forces from Campese and moving on to
Itri. The 85th Division vras riot to be employed in operations west of Campese without approval of this headquarters. -Sffective at 1200 hours 16
May the Commanding General, II Corps, was to he prepared on 72 hours' notice to begin withnrawal of the 85th Division from its present zone of action preparatory to a water movement to Anzio. Tentative plans for the
withdrawal and movement of this Division wcire to be made so that the coMplete Division could be closed in Naples stagjng area?'? hours after the
vdthdrawal began. The Commanding General, II Corps, was directed to prepare the following plan: (a) To turn over to the Commanding Gen~ral, IV
Corps, the present zone of r>ction of II Corrs. (br PlPnS for the movement of the following units from the present zone of action to the Anzio
beacJ-1 h~ad on 2L~ hours 1 notice on or after May ')2nd: Hq. and Hq. Co., II
Corps; Hq. and Hq. Btry., II Gorps a.rtilhiry; Military P r,lice platoon, II
Corps; 53rd Signal Bn.; 54tr. JITedical Bn.
1
After supper the GenerPl workeid on adninistrative w.atters and military
dispatches a.nd retired.
General Clark today received the following reply from General Keyes to
his congratnlatory ceble of yesterday:
"II Corps is appreciative of your fine congratulatory message which
will inspire all to contribute their full share to the victories destined
for Fifth Army. 11
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SAN MARCO--MAY 17, 1944--Aftcr havinf; dispensed with early morning dispatches
from the front, General Clark conferred with General Brann, his G-3, artd his
�Chief of Staff, General Gruenther, concerning future F:ctions of the battle .
Following this conference, General ClArk r~ceived Colonel Gray, Fifth Army
Judge Advoc~te,and reviewed nine general court martial cases.
After Colonel Gray had left his van, GenerPl Clark walked down to the
G- 3 Section to see General Brann.
v)
o.1r,
At three o'clock General Alexander, his Chief of Staff,,GenerrlrHarding, and his Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, Genernl Robertson, came
to see Genera.l Clark. General Clark brought, ther1 into the conference hut,
where his G-3, GenerA,l Brann, his G-2, Colonel Howard, and his Chief of
Staff, General Gruenther conferred concerning progress o~ the battle . The
actions of the Eighth Army to date were discussed, as well as the movement
of the ,6th Division to the bridgehead and the attack from the bridgehead.
General Clark also brought up the point th-:it he vmuld like to have the ,French
Corps attack from fjco toward Ceprano to cut off 2s much of the German Army )
facing the British Army as possible. In order to do this, he brought out
that it was necessary to change the present boundary as t:re Fifth Army would
necessarily have to go beyond its limits. Details of this conference are
covered l)elow in +..he Army Comll18,nder 1 s notes.
In the l.<>tter pRrt of the afternoon GenerAl DeGaulle, Head of the French \
State, accompanied by his Chief of Staff, Genern.l Bethouard, General DeLattre \
de rriassigny, Corunander of the ?nd French Arrriy; Mr. Dietholrn, Commissioner of'
War; and General Juin, Cornnanoer of the French Sxpeditionary Corps, came to
pay their respects to General Clark. General Clnrk and Generrtl DeGAulle, accompanied by r1ajor Ridgway Knight, interpreter, went up to General Clark's
van, where they discussed the 2ctions of the French Corps and the situation
on the Fifth Army front toget:ber. Genera.l DeGaulle was very enthusiastic
and pleased with the progress of tre battle. The remainine;GenerPls . were in
the conference hut ,1rhere General Gruenther, Colonel Snltzman, Colonel Porter,
Colonel Draper and Lieutenant Bajenow talked with the visiting French Generals while Generals ClPrk and DeGaulle conferred alone. Hews photogrPphers
took pictures of Generals Clark, DeGaulle and Juin together and, after a very
brief stay, the visJ ting French Gr-merP ls left for the French Exr,ecH tionary
Corps commanc1 rost at Sessa.
Battle reports today found the French Corps pusl ing northwestward Y'ith
advance tank elements reported in Honticelli. The G01,m1s, with other elflnents
of the French Corps, wer0 pusMng westward and passed the Revole hill mass,
leading elements reported Ps hrvfog cut tl-ie roAd Itri-Fico. In the south, II
Corps reported RS unconfirMP,d that leading eleT'lents of the 85th Division were
in Formia where they r,et sligrit resistance. Hostile f'rtillP,ry which,hacl been
firing from the vicinity of Gaeta had lifted, indicqting prcp2rations for
enemy w2thdrawals this evening. The 88th Division had reported eleJ11ents past
Mount Ruazza anc pusbi11g down toward the direction o~ Itri. Where::i s all of
these reports were nnconfirned, it inc'lj cntes, hovrever, th.<>t the Fifth Arny is
on the move and th"'t they have forcl!'ld the Poche into a gen"lrPl vd thdrawal.
General Clerk's notes on trie day's acti,rities are as follows:
"Generals Alexander, Harding and Robertson ceme o call on me at three
o'clock as pre-arranged. Su'½ject of conf.,,rence was current battle and roove-
�ment of '36t,.,, Division to bridgehead . I ·explained thnt we v;ere in the outsldrts of Fornia; thet J hoped to have Itri by tomorrow ; that we had captured Ti:speria and leading t2nk el0ments of the 3rd DIA were reported at Uonticelli , to all o:' which Ge:vieral Alexander srowed great elution - as he should.
I told hin that we Lad 3, 000 prisoners in the Fifth Army.
1'TTe theYl asked ahout the 36th Divisio,.,.
I told him I had vdthr}rawn its
artillery from the battl e , was moving it to the rest of the Division and it
would be prepared to load on his order . He gave no order to load but indicated that 1-;,e ,•rould na1rn the decision , probably tomorrow or the next day. He
indicated that hn felt the time was rapidly approaching 1'Then we should get
ready for the attack out of the bridgehead . He thought when Cassino foll he
would order the 36th to start its movement up . He seemed to think that the
Gernans would not stand on the Hitler Lino . I Pgree , but the only reason it
will not is because of the flanking action cf th~ifth Arl"ly_on_!11e south.
11 I
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then brought up the subject of direction of attack out of the bridgehead on Cor:. and VP lnontone . He remains ada.rant that that is the corrl"!ct and
only direction of attack, regardless of the enemy sitUFtion. I drew a circle
on the map , projecte-d my VI Corps into the high ground southwest of Valmontone and ask,"'d him where I would go fror1 there; to which he replied that fast ,
r1obile patrols '.'muld operate to cut the routes to the east. I rP-plied that in
getting to iTplmontone I had gone over the mounta.ins, ha.d ab,.,,olutely no roads
and i'!culd only have foot troops and pack equipment . He brushed this Aside .
I poj nted this out ''ecause I want him to evalw:1te the situation v,hen th~ time
to attacl~ approaches, in order that we can attack in the right direction , and
the Cori-Valmontone t1.P:1' be the wrong direction .
·
tr:::- then pointed out to h:m the rles:Lr£1bilHy cf Fi+'th Army attacVing from
Pico on Ceprano in order to cut -in 1Jehind the Eighth ttrrny at the narrowest
point in the Liri Valley. He was cleli;;hted and told me he would issue instructions accordingly.
"I hn.ve issu".!d instructions to my Chief of Staff and G-3 to hold the 85th
Division in its present position in the Fornia area , to push the 88th first on
the high ground northwest of Itri anr:1. then to the northwest on Lenola . It
will then be prepared to push either to the west or to the north, if the latter
- to protect the left flank of the Frenct Corps in its advance from Pico to
Ceprano . I certainly would like to join my II Corps up overland '!lf~_tb the
bridp:ehead . I may i:;et the opport1mity.
I talk~d with General Alexander about ANVIL. He thinks it is not "hot 11 •
I am told otherwise by Colonel Jenkins , AFHQ planner."
11
General Clark today received the following cable from General Alexa.no.er:
"If, as seems likely, Bighth Arr,y have not been r_ble to draw level with
Fifth Army by t:ime lntter reach Fico P-rea, CP\fC directs Fifth krmy to strike
northwards by San Giovanni on Ceprano to cut off v,_;thclrawal by Highway #6 of
enemy forces still opposing Eighth Army irrespective of existing jnter-Army
boundary. In thet event , boundary will be adjusted by this Headqwrters in
consultation with Armies to suit result:lng situation. 11
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Gen~ral Clar.k disratch"d tl e "oll0w~ ni:i; lett":lr to General Tu''-'rshall today,
reportin, upon the initiA.l action of the 85th and 88th Divisions:
11 K"lowing your r;reft interest in tl 13 new. dj visions t hie}, wer!'l created in
tre TTnited StRtes , I an writhg you brfoPly to tell you of th .ir debut in offensive conhrt wi. th the Fift"' Arny.
7
"The ~5th a"ld 8Af-~ Inft:i.ntry .Jivisions ~nt"'recl con.brt un·ler ideA.l conditions . Upon thrdr assi~nmPnt to Fiftl• Arrny, "I pli>ced th~:ri in the new Fifth
Arr1y s1'ctor alonr, the GarigJ iano Riv r . The sitwtion was c;tetic "n0 the
1
fro'Ylt rclrtiv ly qui~t . Botl1 c jvisions hnd ari opr'ortunity to heco:"e rccustom~d to trP.~ r battla, sectors grri.dually. -)'urinr; t: 1 is r!'lrioc' they executed extensive ORY l'nd ni~ht rA.trolling . 'T'he, r soon becare P11mili "'r vri th the tl'lrrain
over wl-iicl' they are now A.ttacld.no;. On the night of ~!B.Y 11th, at 2300 hours ,
they jumped off . They "lave dnne rell arid hnve r->ttained all thedr objectiyes .
FiP-htjng !1rs been severe in r:aces . Casurlties in these two divisions for the
fj.rst four days of -f'j r;hting arn ti.s f ollous:
W01mded
Killed
107
87
1316
658
194
85th Division
88th Division
1974
':'reir Morale is rigl-' . In one ::instance , an inff!ntry regiMent of the 85th Division was driven of" its objective three times . "'::2.ch time it counterF1ttacked
find. finally re- took the hill with teavy losses to the enemy. The tenacious ,
deterr~::ined sort or fightinr· wrich trese a;visions hqve shovm speaks well of
thejr tr8ining 11t hone. I lmew you anil Grmeral ircnair would be interested ,
as I am, to see the result of' the War DepPrtment I s e-r-fort to build nev, divisions ·"c.:r battle . They hDve met their f'nal test in corbat with complete success . Unfortunately, it was necessary for the division cor,manders to reco"'1mend
the relief of four o<' the regir,ental corunanders - -for a corbination of Ag~ and
rhysical reasons . They were replaced by yotmger M'9n prior to tee stArt of the
current b?ttle .
"The brj dgehend is poised for an nttnck 't't'P1 tirrdnf" SM"S appropriflte .
I shall first reinforce it . Prior to th?t attack I v ill move my r>dwmce headquarters into tie _-i,ridgehead where I feel our efforts r1?y be dedsive . There
will 1-le considerable tanlc nction , An<i , in order that infantry nay follow pro!'lrtly behind +,1,e ti:-nks , v1e hi:i.ve devised whrt we. call an "infantry bl,ttle sled 11 •
"':nclosed are photograplrn to illustrate its emplo;ment. Fifth Arny ornnance
naintenance coupanies hrve bujlt enour;J:-, to tow 30 <:-1U."'r1 s bP-h~na Bttacking -1:.imks .
He have experimented vdth then and feel thf't the fjrst time they nre used, with
tre elenent of surprise , they should be extrAnely helpful . I will rurnish you
more Jnformation on them r>ft~r we h(lve trind the:-1 in conbrit .
1
"I saw Captain Clifton Brown tre otr-er dny. He is fine , in good spirits
and ~nt' usinstic over his wor'k here . He sends his vmr!"" regr•rds to you am' Hrs.
Marshall. I hc>ve already v.ritten !'h's. rbrshnll about Lt . Allan Brm,m •
....
.
'
�"I want to thank you -f'or ,1nkinr.; ~t poss5bl~ f'or me to r~turn for ny
short v~ sit . It gave me a werit 1~ ft to see my fPmily rg:,in . I know it
m~ant os ~u~r to them.
11 I am deli.r;hte-c with tl e five - day results of our Fiftr Army attack.
We hr,ve brok!:!n the Guc;tnv Line jn several pl8ces by attecking over the
mountains . "re have ren tr<ited to n distl"nce of fourtr-,en rniles on both
the II Corps and French Corps fronts . Fifth Army has capt'Ul'~d appro:irim~tely 1 , 000 pr:i soners to of'te . The Fren_ch are ,..j_g},t;ng splendidly 11i th
our U. S. equipnent . We will continue to m(-lke progress . 11
*
*
SA"f\T r~JIJWO-- MAY 18, 1944--After dispP-nsing with earlJr morning disprtches ,
Gener1"1 l Cl0rk had Genert1 l Brann, his G-3, t:ind General Gruenth"'r, his Chief
of Sb.ff, in his van to discuss present developments of the bPttl~ -rrfor
to the arr:lvl'll of GenerPl 7,Jilson, CTWC, AFHQ .and GenArPl ::Jevers, :JCI:JC,
AT<'H'), . Gen~rels Hilson a.:ri<l. Devers nrriv0d at 0910 and were accompanied by
General Alexander , CI 11C, AA.I , end General Lernnitzer , DCS, AAI. Genernls
·c1ark, Wilson, Al~xander, Devers, Gru~nther, Brarm and Lemnitzer went into
the conference hut where Gerieral Clnrk outlined the progress riade by the
Fifth Army since D day. He coMpletely orient~d G~nPr~l Wilson on the Fifth
Arny front . The discussion also 1.nvolvP-d 8ctions on thB Eighth Arr.y front
and present GcrM"n re~ctions to the nll-out attack. One o~ the highli~hts
of the meet;ng wap Gen""rE>ls GlR.rk end /llexander 1 s request thrt they did
not wont the Ah 'orce Tran'3port Group to be ta1ren awry at this ti!'1r-, for
they vere needed for supply5 ng troops "nd also a contemplated pl'l.rachute
drop . General /jlson immediotely put ~n a telephone cell to ~ake certain
that the Transport Group was not triken a.vmv for operr>tions r-ilsewhere .
After the conference the v~ sj_ting Ge11erels broke off into small groups
and Gereral Clr-irk received General R"rrnon , Co~"nding General of the 1st
Armored Division at the l:>eac1'head, in his van where they a~scussed the .Armored Division ' s conte'"'lplated cf+'orts in tre t>ttf'ck f'rom the beachhePcl .
Later on in the morning, Genr>rsils ClP.rk, Gruenth"r and Brann revj ewed
t:re Plan BUFFALO . General Cbrk desires to see General ,,,rucicott at };is
comnand post tonorrov, and sent him the radio v1hich is quoted at the conclusion of' today ' s diary. This cnble sumrnarizes the results of the conferonce
on the rlan BUFFALO , which is the attrck from t1'e be8chhead jn tre direction
Cori-Valr1ontone .
General Clark had as his guest for lunch Generrl Sr>wbricge, G- 1 of NATOUSA .
During l1mch General S:=>wbridge spoke of his recent visit to th0 United States
and talks thPt he had with General 'larsh~ll concerning G- 1 matt~rs . Shortly
after lunch Generel Clnrk left by cub pl1:me for the II Corps 1-=drfield southeast of' Minturno "There he conferred ni th G,eneral !f eyes concern:i ng future offensive R.ction on tJ-,e main Fifth Army front , the att.nck from the bridgehead
and movement of the '36th Division and elements of II Gorps to the bridgt9head
prior to the attack.
Jn the latter part o+' the t1fternoon, General Clrir}- rec.,,.ived GenPral Loevren
wl.-io is to replace General J-fawkesworth , Comnanding the 1st British Division at
'
�the bridgehead.
Genc-:ral Clark had as supper guests Genernl Brann, his G-3, and General
Lewis, . his Artillery Officer.
A brief sUJ11mary of the day's events on the rrogress of the battle w11.ged
}>Y both armies is as fallows:
0
The Polish Corps took the monastery in the latter part of the morning,
and elements of the 1st Guards Brigade were mopping up in Cassino town where
all organized resistance had ceased. The Eighth Army front surged ahead
somewhl'lt throughout the day when German resistance slackened considerably
along the whole front. The French Corps had taken Mount D'Oro around noon
and occupied·Monticelli and were pushing elements to the north and east beyond the tovm. The GoUJns had raided the Itri-f ico road dur:ing the night and
withdrew during the day into the mountajnB astride the road. Elements of
the 8E!th Division had maintained contact.and pushed to about 800 yards east
of the Itri-Pico road. Their advance over this difficult mountain terrain
had caused them, according to unconfirmed reports, to be short of amnunitjon,
food and radio batteries. Lqter on in the day they received necessary supplies, 2.nd the 350th and 351st Infantry Regiments ,7ere prepared to launch an
attack acro8S the ro2d with th!'! objective of sej_zing Haunt GrHnde to the
northwest of Itri. Elements of the 85th Division had reached Formia and by
afternoon the 338th Conbat Team had completely occupied the tovrn. Hostile
enemy artillery fire frorn Gaeta continued to harrass columns along the ScauriFormia road. By late afternoon counter-batter:r Pnd navr:i.l gunfire had silenced
most of the artillery nre comini:; from Gaeta. The 337th and '338th Regiments
of the 85th Division had maintained contact and were on a north-south line
about a mile west of Marinola.
The following important messages were received and dispatched today:
. AAI to CG; Fifth Army. RN 247. 11 CINC considers the time has come to \
move 36th Division into the bridgehead. He therefore directs that the move J
should begin forthwith."
.
Clark to Truscott. RN 5791. "Movement 36th Division to bridgehead starts
immediate:j.y. Shipment will be made in four lifts. Expect to move six LST 1 s
tonight. Further details later. It now appears probable that Operation BUFFALO will be launched in nbout six or seven days. Time is only an estimate.
I will keep you advised of developments. Progress continues to be satisfactory on main front. We have Mt. D10ro and Monticelli. Cassino anc1 monastery
have been taken. 11
Clark to Truscott. RN 5792. 11 I desire that you be at r1.y headquarters by
0930 Fridny morning for conference concerninl." future operations from briqgehead •. C-78 plrne will be on Anzio field at 0800 Friday morning to bring you
and ty,o stnff officers, returning after conference. Be prepared to discuss
feasibility of continuing 3rd Division in Operation BUFFALO to take objectives
#1 and 1/2 instead of passing the 36th Division through."
Eighth Army to Fifth Army. RN U 312. "II Polish Corrs to cor:iplete clearance of area of monastery hill and west of it and to push towards Villa S Lucjp..
�13 Corps and I Canadian Corps to •,pke contact uith Hitler Line end break
trrougl1 if possible without '"'elay or if strongly held to tap in along
front to discover 11eak poim,s . All inform1?d . 11
Clark to Truscott . RN 5822 . 11 Wl1 "t tirm vlill you ~rrive on Friday?
At conference please be prepared to discuss feas~bility of following
operation as an alternative rlan. BU'''FALO att~ck to he launched es now
planned to "nclude capture o~ objectives }l q~d ¥2. Special SArvice Force
would continue toward Artena and Velmontone. Ac-~ter cnpture of ob,iectives
'1 1 ~rnrl '.'2 regroupin½ woulc take place and new attack :::..r,mched north~1est
-f'roI'l. Cisterna area . "
*
*
*
SA ..J fVJlCO--Jffi.Y 19 , 1944--Genere.l Clark :rose enrly nncl studied militery
dispatch s cc11cerning irogress ri,..,de by Fift}, Army 1.mits during the nj ght .
At oq10 General Truscott, VI Corrs co~,.nanrler, P.nd Coloni;l CPrlson, his Crief
of Staff, and nn Assistant G- 3 arrived Bt Fifth Arr,y forvmrd co"'rriand post
by C- 78 from the bridge'beA.d to confer vi tr Generf'l ClPrk on Flan Btr'FALO,
t7l-iicl-i -is the attack at tl e bridgeheaa in the direction of Cori-Vn.lmontone .
In addition to Gcn--ral Clr->,.:r'c nt t 1n conf ,rence \crere GenerPls '"'rann, Tate rind
Colonel Howard . :'rior to di.scu.-,sirig Pl1m '"llITTALO, Genernl Cl1>.rk outlfo" ~ tr
Gen,~ral '.I'ruscott thP, rrogress to d<itc r ade by the Fift}-, Army 1:md the implications trat c: t would hn.vc conce:;_~ning the ettc.ck fron t'r e briclgehoad.
After orienting Genoral T1~c1scott, Gemrfll ClRrk stAted thPt Gcnere.l
Alexander .ad, -rror,, the beginning, a rre-conceived rlan of the e.ttPck from
the 1-)ridgehead to <;mt Route //6, harrass the enemy r~s.r with ligr.t colurms
avid ev·wtually annihilo.te the Gernan -rorces. Generr>l Clark emphvsi zed thFJ.t
he, in his planning , wanted to naintain flexibility; that the Plan BUFFALO
would be carri~d out as plan"lod but the.t he wanted General Truscott to be
flexible in 1'is plans and e prepared to change the direction of the attack
north frori Cori- Valr.ontonE' to ar attack to tl---~ riorthwest toward Rome. Huch
dep ,nded upon tl 1 e Gern1an reaction to the attack on the main Allied front .
If the Hitler Linc 1•rere pierced and th0 rmemy with(lrevr to the -:Jnction Line
just soutr of :tome , then there would be -¾:.he possibility thrt the 8ttack to
the northwest ,vculd "l)e successful. He said that he :r·:'lself was gojni; to
the )Cachhead wi tl, a snaller , conposi te staff group, begirn~ ng to move
probably tomorrow ?nC completbr; it Sunclay. from there Fiftr Army v,oulc1 ta}-e
under tl eir corm:anc.· tr e two Br5.tish dj_vj sions anci leave VI Corrs the -ri::rnion
o" carry:1 n1 out the l'lan TJFFALO .
In the very near -r.'ut1ire },e rad pln.nnec1 to nove up II Corps He8dquarters
and 8Ccor,panying troops as ordered in Operations Instruction '18. I: Corps,
once established jn the briclgehend would then Lave undi:,r its comriand the two
Br~ t ish di visions and the 85t Di lision, if moved up to th~ bridgeheaC. All
plans :'or, tiie necessary lifts of' trese dj visiors · ·m,e completed, a:r1d bP- directed his G-3, Ge 1er1'1 l Brann to -"'ix up a dP ily schedule sl o :1:i ng J'10Y11ments of
all units until they had coi,.pleted trcir ~ovcments to tr.e ')ridgel el?'d . , This
would enable Ger. iral Cl-~1·· to rlan tr is diversionrry etta.ck by. II Corrs and
thFJ troops under it . G0PPr[ll Clark, in t8l'-dr~ to Ge'10ral 'I.'rua,cott, also
1
'
�srPd hj_n to ,,,..,}:-ri rlri11s for a 1,,,racrutc <irop by the 509th Sep"'rr'te Frrachute ,,,
Battalion south 1est o:: Littoria . Imr edinte plPns to hr.ve tris rrrachute
✓
drop a r-:a1·ty wouln hri.ve to be clelr.yed due to c~ "+'iculties !'THh the Air
Corps in obtaining tre necessary tr1:insport plan s . In discussing the time
for th,~ attack , Gcr,,ral Clr>rk risked Gcn,.,,ral Tru,,cott v1hen ·,•rould -..,e the earliest re coulrl attac 1r if be were told to e.-ttack t0nj P-rt . G~neral Truscott
sa-i rl thn.t the ea.•liest he could n.ttacJ, ,1ould be Moncln;v norning and. tb'1t H
lour woulc1 be ah0·1t 0630 . General Clar·~ told G<>ncrPl Trw·cott thr>t at the
beginninf th ,{)th Division woulr' have a strine tied on 5t by Arrn.y; thRt he
vmnld k~ep it in Arny reserve rt <-'5rst . GenerrJ. '"ruscott stPted thnt GcnerPl
1
Frec'ler: cks of Special Jervice Poree would like to c ror by p>racrute sorne
"'ield artill.-,ry observers on the r:igh gro1.mc east of S('rnoneta :ln order that
trey could observe artillery <-'ire for trA rttack. G·~'1.er11.l Clark st..,tcd that
if tl·.e necessary transport planes co11ln. not 11e mere available by the Air
Corps , re would release his tv,o C- 47 1 s ~or t fa purpose . Genercl ':'ruscott .
le-f't ",..,riv~d~atel-.r after t,'1e conference for tlie br;d,o:e>head to call a comrnandersj
mP,eV 11.:t anc to complete Pll nrrangrirul')nts for ar erirly attPck fron the brj dgehead .
.._____
w~
0
In th1 11-"ternoon General Clark left for the French :'xpeditionary Corr,s
co"lriand post at Sessa . Fro::" tr.ere , re , .<iccomranied by Genere.l Juin , went by
jeep via Castel"'orte, Corene , Ausonia to "s11erifi.. At Esper:ir:: tbe rarty mP.t
General De,1o'1.tsabert , Garrand i ng the .3rd A lgori.an Division, who was dj rectinr, advance el rments of r is division from ifonticelli to Mount Delrmndrone .
The latter f eature had bee;1 occupied y eleM~nts of thP, '3rd DIA after severe
fightin~ . rresent with General De;'Io11tsabert nas Gemiral DeLarmjnat who was
acti..>1g as a deputy for General Juin . General DeLP.rminat has only two staff
officers in Italy at tte present moment .
General Clnr 1r d-i s'cussed ~,-:th G~n~rri.ls Juin and De:irontsabert the A.ctions
in progress toward F ice . :"ro!" :srorfa. Gen~ral Cl8rk went to San Giorgio ,
where he flew 1:>ac'k- b~r cub to the Fifth Arr'ly coMmn.nd post .
Dur:'. ng the ri. "ter noon it h1cl ra~.ned quite J:ieavily, and Gener1=a.l CJ.Hrk I s / 1
return to the adV'ance cor'l..™and post was c'1011.n with poor v:: sibility e.nd during
a dull drizzle . Whnn GenPral Cbrk returned to the commnd post, all arrangements hRd been nr>rte to move his co!'lposite st,ff eroup to the hridgehead on
SPturday a'1r1 completing the r1ove on Sunclay.
A<'ter supper General Cll".rk went to Naples to see Colonel Tully, his
classn9te , anrl severPl oth0rs of his class 8t West Point who were f.1sser,bled
in Colonel Tully' s apartMen~ .
Hir,hlights of tor'r.y 1 s -rrogress showf'd th"' 3rd DIA and 1st D:.lI rushing
past Mou.rt Delmandrone to 1T1rd Fico . G~ner['l Guillaune I s Group of Goums hP.d
taken the town o-" C:-impodjmele nnd had cut the Itri- Fico road . Other elements
of Lis Gouns were pusMng northwar d froM · ~iount Croce and r'ount Fotttan~no .
"'hP- Groupement Lonchet had taken ·rount V le west of the J.trj -1 ico road . The
350t h 8nd 351st U. S . Infantry Regi"'lonts of tre 88th :!)ivision .had taken ;,Jonte
Grande . The 34%h In+>~mtry of the S38th was cleaning up the torm of Itri.
The 33'1th InPantry of the 85th Division had bken ;.1ount Cefrla west of the
Itri- Formia road . "'he 138th InfPntry had· taken F,Tount DragonP- FJouth of r1ount
�Zl
Cefala, f't1d some of its elements were nlready in the town of Gaeta. In the
Eig:bth Army sector it h:>d advr,nced to a genP.rPl line I iedmonte-Aquirn,Pontecorvo which j s in direct contact with the Adolf Hitler Line. Operations
Instruction # 19 is quoted below, as vrell as fl personal telegram frorn Gcn(>rf'l
Leese.
Operations Instruction #19 follows:
11 1.
Upon t:be compl0tion of the mission given in Field Order f}6~ Fifth
Army on the main +'ront rer;roups its forces and prepPres for further offensive
action to destroy the enemy forces oprosing it.
11
2.
a.
II Corps vtl~~:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
( 5)
b.
FEC will:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
c.
Consolidn.te 38th Division positions in the Ml' GR.A IDE - Ml'
LARIGNO HiU Hs.ss.
Regroup its +'orces nnc'l be rrepnred, on Army Order, to:
(a) Continue the adwmce on the J"'P:'.: (!1 6098)-FC 'IDI
(G 5106)-'1'.,'1:RACI'~ (P 3698) Axis towards the AUSONI
Hill Mass, or
(b) Advn11ce tc the 'M on the ITRI - FONDI - 1·~:NC!,A ( G 5411)
CAS'l'RC D~L VCLSCI (G 5023) Axis.
Complete plans for dthclrawal of tre 85th Division and accompanying troors a.s directed in OperRtions Instruction No.
18. The 85th Division, less one RCT, will not be employed
,1est of vnmrrA (V 6795) wHhout permission from tM.. s Headquarters. One RCT, 85th Division, may be used for Mopping
up the ITRI - GAT'JJ'A (M 6390) SF'FRL(' {GA (r.1 5?95) Area.
Protect the left flank of Fifth Army.
iSaintain contact with FEC.
1
Continue the P-+,tack to the 11w to secure the righ ground in
tre vicinity of PICO (G 6116).
ConsoHdrte its positions ~n the PICO area.
f'Jaintain contact witl· ,;i8rth Army.
Protect the rigut flank of Fifth Army.
Regroup its forces and be prepAred, on Army order, to:
(a) Advance to the '1W to cut l'ighrmy 6 in the vicinity of
CEFRA!ro (G 5926), or
(b) Advl'nce to the west to secm·e the GISERHO Hill mass.
VI Corps will:
ConMnue the mission assigned in Field Order No. 6.
d. The 509th Paracrute In"Pntr:,r Battolion ·rill rreprre plans to
drop, on J.rmy Or er, in the AU3flNI Hill Hass anr' facilitrte the l'!dVPnce of the
II Corps via the I'1'RI - F0'11DI - TERRA.CI!~ Axis.
"3. 36th Division, in Army resArve, will be pro}Tred for moverient to the
AHZIO Beachhead on e~ght hours' notice.
�11
4.
Boundaries:
See ovGrlay. 11
Leese to Clark. RN 70. "Thank you for you.r kind congratulPtions which
I appreciate very much. He all realise how much our success a.t Ca,ssino is
due to the hPrd fighting n.nd the rapif advances richieved by the II U.S.
Gorps and the French under your command. The previous hard fighting of your
troops in that area paved the way for t},e final capture of Cassino and thus
its fall is a symbol of our joint Anglo-American effort. The progress of
our two Armies side by side as a result of' the close cooperation there ha.s
always been between us ,7ill, I feel certain, lead to even greater successes
in the future. We look forward to great results wl,en your decisive push
from the bridgehead comes in. I send to you and the Fifth Army the grateful
thanks and good w:i,shes of the Bighth Army."
Keyes to Clark. RN NR8A. "Enemy resistance overcome and our troops
took M. Grande. Enemy resistance · sli~bt to our capture of Itri. The ridge
M. Dragone (611932) - M. Cefalo (6o9956) taken without resistance. Unconfirmed reports indicate that S!Tk'lll groups of enemy were captured on Gaeta.
'Snemy road block 1500 yards south of Itr:t }v-,.ld up our advance. Pw 1 s from
7th Co. 620 ·o st Bn., and 1 Bn., 194th Artill 1ry Regiwmt were captured west
of M. Mola."
- Yesterday General Clark sent the following cable to Admiral Hewitt:
RH 5786. 11 Understanr1 that you would like to visit the French ;J.1rine Cannoneers now serving with the CF.Ji,. Hould be most happy to mal-ce necessary arrangements if you will notify me when you desire to come. 11
Admiral Hewitt replied today as follows: T\JRN. 11 .1\ppreciPte your message.
1:'lould much like to visit you as 1vell ~ s CPnnoniers sor1etine later when I can
arrange return Haples. ~lhilc it would have been highly ~nteresting to me, I
did not feel thPt last week was a · proper time for you to be bothered with
outsiders. Congratulations on your successes."
*
*
SAN MA.i"lCO--"~AY 20, 1%4--Gt"lneral Clr'r'ir rer,p.in'°'d ~ n tr!'! co1,mand post during
the entire day. 'L conferred :':n t'he morning at greet length wit!1 GenerPls
Gruenther and Brann. The J"love to th"' hr' dgehead of adv[lnced el~r,ents o.: General Clark's staff continu-,d e::-cept that selected war corresrondents, Section
Chiefs and GenerPl Clark will not Move up, as plannl"!d, tomorrow, Sunday. Jetails of General Clark's decision to delay the attack at the bridgehead and
to have II Corrs continue its ~fforts on up through I'ondi are covered :i,n General Clark's notes of the day.
Tl-ie Army Commander conferred YT.:i th Gen ·,ral K,-,r.. s at noon PJ1d j mri ted him
to l1mch. After Genernl K~yes depart~d, he worked on administrPtive Matters
and studied II Corps progress up to Fondj and French Corps advances toward
Pico ..
At six o I clock Gl"lneral Alexander, acco ",pani~d by his Chief of Staf+',
General HP..rding, cam~ to conf' 7' with G""n'°'ral Clar:!<. D~tt=dl2 of this cc nf rence
are cover"d in General Clark's notes of today's conferences.
~
�Highlights of today's battle reports fou;nd the French on the outskirts
of Pontecorvo and abcut 1,000 yt'lrds northwest of Fico, which had fallen . All
of the high ground dominating tbe Liri Valley un to Tice is now in Fifth Arny
hands . On u,e II Corrs +>ront eler,l'lnts of -the 349th Infantry ht=1d taken Fondi
and elements of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron v-:ere edvPnc::i ng dovm mghway
//7. Exact locations of tht""se ""1.e1'ents Pre not kno1•m at this time. C Troop of
tr.e g1st TI.econ vm s reported ,just nortl, of Lrk" L, 1ngo, rue south of Fondi.
GeMral Clark r'iictated the following notes for inclusion in his diary:
u t S , ~ . Q u,... ~+J, ,,;x-.,>-f1
.
11 Yesterday General Le:mitzer/\delivered the folJ.owinf.; !"lessage:
1. The C-in-C directs tJ,,.-,t the P.tt11ck from the ANZIO bridg-,herid on
CORI and VAUif'\TC NE is to b~ lmmched on thi"! night of 21/22 Mt=!y or on tr,e
mornlnf'" of 22 May according to wheth~r you hPve decided on a night or day
attack.
11 t
✓
2 . Will you rl ,ase rerort for the ~nforr1ation of the C-in-C the hour
and date on w} icr.. the attack vrill be li,u.nched, and r,t the same time inform
Co:mnander Eighth Army by letter . This H.1. will inform C.G. M.J\.'T'.A.F.
1
1 3.
rlease acl::no Nledge receipt of this order'.
1
1
11 T was shockl":d wren: received it to think tht a riecision of this i~portance would have bl"'en rnac1e witl10·t't reference to l"'e. I sent trPt word b~ck
to Ge11.ernl Ale:1."llnder, who r.,pde the weak excuse thnt he felt thAt we h~d discussed it f'or the past thrM days.
"General Lermitzer said that the decision was !'IP de Pt the ten o I clock
rn.eeting in th,_,. mornjng when a rerort hPd cone in thrit the British had broken
1
the Eitll'lr Line at Aquino . I am sure thnt this vas erroneous, and General
AJexander now knows it . Also, so~e air officer at the meeting had indicated
conf'lSion in rear of the G"rnan f'orces sirdlar to that wtich pr"'vnHed at_
T1mis. These over ortjr:'listic reports resulted in this nomentous decision.
I replied that the 22nd was the earliest d8te that I could ~ttack out of the
bridgehead .
I
\
(
"I had been in conference with General mruscott, whom I had sent for,
and issued jnstructions accordingly to hi111..
"Today the wel'lther "orecast is bad for air operations on the ??nd. I
feel that en all-out air effort must r,ccompany the ground Attack. I also
COM.rmnicated with General Lenmitzer, sayin~ thrt th"' d/11\cision handed r,e in
writing yesterday should be carefully reviewed each day in view of' the fact
that the BrHish were not attacking Rnd had failed to r.en~trate. the Hitler
Line. In fact they had oeen push1'!d:-ttrck at 11:q~uina and Piedmonte . I also
indjcat~d that the air outlook was bad for t,he ,22nd. As a result, Genl"rnl
Alexander is coming to see re tJ,,is afternoon when .I will tell him thet in my
opinion the decision to attack fror1 the bridgehead is prem0 ture, based on
erroneous information And wishful thinking; thrt the soonest we should attack is ;>rhen both Fif''th and Eighth Arrnies are in desperate grips with the
1
�Hitler Line, at whic:b time the German troops on this front would be so heavily
engaged that they could not withdraw to influence tr.e bridg1'heatl battle. The
mere fact that the 26th Division has noved do m is no justification for tJ,,is
premeture attack. It should be given a ch~nce to get heavily committed on
this front. I will also tell him that I must have air support, which the
weather forecast seems to preclude at the present tirne.
1
nuave just conferred witr General Keyes.
I am torn between two desires:
To let his Corps with all its present nea.ns push on to try to penetrate t h e \ ~
Hitler Line in thf'l vicinity of Fondi; or to rush up to the Hitler Line at
Fondi without an attack withdrawing tl:ie 85th now and other corps troops with
possible movement to the brj_dgehead. I have decided to do the forrner - to
pnsh on, and ha~re so directed hin1 wj_ th all the effort he can muster. If I
cen crack the :Hitler Line in the Fondi area with airborne trooris north of Terracina and perhaps a small amphibious landing in Terracina coupled with a ·
small task rorce pushing out from the briclgehead, I may join ur. 11
FollowinFY, General Alexande:r:'s visit, General Clark dictated the following material:
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ttGeneral Alexander just came to see Me with Harding. Fe told ne that
G ,neral Leese would not be able to attack until probably the nj ght o.,. the 23/~th and then with one divjsion - the Carno.dians. He asked me hesitatingly if
I could l'.lttack and outflank tre Germans, "'laking it unnecessary for the Eighth
ArT"iy to attack. He said he desired tc conser·;re losses. I told him to con,
serve losses in one r,lace we would have them in another; n.f!mely, the Fifth Army
sector nnd that I strongly recomMended that Leese speed ur his attack and that
both a.rmies attack all-out at the same tj_r,e, but if the attack was at night as
Leese wanted it, lt would conform to the Fifth Army riain front and thnt the
bridg"!head attack should r;o the follm'Ting rnorninr;.
agreed, although
convinced that Eigrth Arrny will hold their attack and let the French carry
the ball for them es they have done so far in this battle.
He
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ttAlso told Alexander thnt I had come to the conclusion to delay the bridgehead attack ?4 and possibly 48 hours, for the weather outlook arpears bad for
their effort in support o"' the bridgehead attack. I told him that I must accompany my attack from the brj_dgl'lhead with strong air effort. I also told
him.that each aft~rnoon at five o'clock I must lmow for the ~econd mornj_ng follovnng for the bridgl"'head attack. He agrieed. I also told hJrn. of the progress
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~
1
north of Fondi. Twas going all-out and w1'1S goinr, to join ur. He has always
¥
J> /. been opposed to MY southern effort, and he apologj_zed today, l'!tl'lting thR.t he
/V J ' ~ never drearned that we could make tre progress that we have through the moun- .
tains. He congrntulated T'ie on tr,e progress of the Fifth Army. I e.lso told
(JV~ l him of r,y possible plans for use of the airborne 50Qth Farachute BPttalion on
,ti,. r· the Mgh ground north of Terracina.
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.
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"I believe j_f the Eighth Army will attack the Hitll'lr Line in the Fontecorvo
.fo region in the next two days; we hit it north from fico all-01.1.t with all our
forces and the br:i.dgehead tre next mornjng, we will fold up the German Army in
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�Followini:; :Ls a cable recei-ved by Gener.sl Clark from General Truscott:
RN. T052. "All scheduled movements last night coripleted without incident li f·reparations continue according to plan and on schedule . Ever::r indication that cover plan working successfully.
"Reference your 7701, will have task force organized and prepPred for
operation on east +'lank after H hour . Did not understand your '1lessage concerning Yarborough . Will he be availDble to drop any ti.r•~ af.t"r daylight
or s1'1ould plans disr~gard r,ossibility or hi~ ernploymen+; ~ntirely?
ur hope- progress on south front, particulPrly Eighth Arny continues
satistactory. Do not heli~ve NY attack should be launched until withdrawal
definitely ½~gins . Any delay after preparations of' tonie;ht will 1,e hazardous."
General Clark cabled General Truscott today as follows:
RN 3073. 11 Attack from bridgehead is postponed 24 hours. There is a
strong probability that it .-,ay ½e postroned an additional 24 rours . I
shall advise you .'.'urther on this r,ojnt rrior to 1700 hours on :'1st. Acknowledge. 11
General r1cGreer:r, 10 British Corps Co,.11mander, wrote G~neral Ch1rk today
as follows1
"My most sincere congrat J.lations on the P,J.·ea-: victory ;;mu have Pcri1"Ved
with F:Lt"th Army. 10 Corps, t:':t"'t"'Jr our long , r,ncl harp:r association w:lth your
Arny, are really delighted Rt tris great success.
As you can imt.:igin~ the ex:rloits o.-:'. II Corrs and FEC these last eight
dr17s hrve rind an exceptional ::iY1t1'rest for ~1e, know:in'; the lower Gl'riclieno
sector so we 11.
11
11 TJ~ tlirnino: of tJ,,e Hitler pos-ition will :~ed to big results, imd your
rapid progress soutr of R. Lfri has undoubtedl:-, helred Eighth Arny to a very
large extent.
"We in 10 Corps ",,..el now tht"t th('I bridgehead position e cross th"' GPrigliano which we put in JanUr'J_ry anc' early Febru,qry has nov• priH a handsol"'-i
divid"lnd, which ii,ore thPn makes up for th~ disaproint""lent felt nt the time
that we were not a½l" to exploit further.
"I know rm•, thrilled both TeY'lpler am' Hawkeswortr , rill be at tris Fifth
All best "'ishes for your future operations, and ny kindest
regards to Al anc1 oth~r old f'riends on your sta-Pf .n
·
ArMy victory.
np1ease do not dream of answering ti'is . 11
The Array CoME>ander replied to General ~TcCreery as follows:
ttYour letter hr> s .iust h,,..en deli vercd to me by :rorr liaison officer, and .
I read it to Al and Don Brann, who hRpf1•med to be w,ith me in conference. We
�can 1 t tell you l.ow muc:b 'Ve A.;_1rrecirit"" yom~ ttougrt~l11ess in vrriting, and
prirticu1<>rly the C'in1' trings you SAY ...r the Fifth Arry. .,. "ant you to mow
that RS T "'lew ov,..r t½rt area ;v:esterc'ey on y r"'turn Prom a vi.sit to the
Frend- mmr Fsperia, I could not re lp but gi Ye a rrF f"'r of thanks Por the
fine pfonMr work w1~ic. 10 Corps did for Fifth Army ~n obtaining the rir~eriead fro "lh~ cL we de ouched . As I Ple I alon'; the Gf!rigliano River , y
tho11ghts went back to t':le hr"'d "i.ght:in,:; wh~ er your 3ritish troops perforl"l."'d
under your cor:~1and in crossinp; thnt rjv"'r and ,stabl:i hing tr..,mselves on the
heights beyo 1d, in th" face of s·1cr ,ne:r1y r~si~tr-nce. You gaY1' us t:re c;pringbo:ird fro11 r1hicl. we were Abl,.. to launch our successf'ul attack.
1
"This Y'lorning II Cor}"s troors ar(" about four m:iles northwest of Itri ,
o inp; on Fo:rdi . French trooJs pre eeting incrensed .,..es::stance nortrwest of
San Oli va . We will keep on r,oinr.;, however, and, of cours", the riridgehead is
no source of cc11fort tc the Boch..,, for it i.s strong imcl rearly when needed .
nl:: you n.r;aih Per your good w:i.shes . Al and Don and : send onr war
re~rrds to you a'1d 111f'lb~rs of' your staff . TTe hor~ anoth~r opportunity comes
for us to be associllt"d together in battle . J-leas, ~ive our esrecial regards
to Cooki.e . "
11 T}
*
*
SAN r~ARC --~flAY 21 , 19'11+--Gen~ral Clnr'c sp..,nt a 1;ood rortion o:f tre day v:i sitinp; forwarc1 ele ents of the Fif't'.r Ar y. At 0900 re left f'or ·the --:ir,hth Army
~AC by'ris L-5 light ~ll'lne . At Bighth Ar~y ~AC re conferr~d with General L~ese,
Co 't:>.nrler of th, Eighth Army. Fror, ~i..grth Ar.,.,y TAC he flew to a cub field due
west cf S . Giorgio where he was, i,t by General Juin . He ~cipferred with Generel
.Juin rt teie r~ l'lld and tren made A short side trip befond Bsreria . ,ihile tr ere
he saw 0oncrete e icence of the eff~cts of our Prtillery fjr~. Elenents o~ the
90th Panzer Grentidier Regiment were cPu~ht on the road nortrwest of '3speria by
our P.rtillery fire . mhere were trucks , tanks, guns and perso11nel carriers
whic1" wer• conr:-letely cte1"l0lished. Tliey },nd evidently b"!en r,oinp, dovm the road
at closed intervnls whim cau17,ht in successive artillery concentrations frorn our
guns . In order to clear tre ro8d, the Frenc}, had to bulldoze ehicles 8nd
Gerrmn dead, sweep5ng theJ11 over to the side in order to let French ,.lements
pass by. A Fr.encl' cartain, who },rd been R Gem,an prisciner <'or two days, told
o how the Ge:rrans were very s:~ort on aMrrun~ tion; ti ~t sol"\e divisions were only
a11.ow-t'1.g 10 rounds per indivjdual ~r day, anc ot},1'rs only 5 .
From French Corps General Clark flew to tr~ II Corps cub field in th~ vicini t;r o~ Argenta. Fro. t 1ere he took ri s j~ep, storped riefly At n Corps
comf'!and post nort½ of Arg"!nta anc thl"!n proc,eded do rrn '..r~ 11rway ;i/:7 to Forl"'ia where
he conrerred with General Coulter, 85th Division Co. manrler . Frnm Fori,fa he continu-,d down Fi rrhway #7 up toward Itri . 011 tris rm:1.d Rhove For ,ia a oobv trnp
exploded at a'l,out t},e sru ~ t~ Me that the General I s j~!"lp passed . Troo:rs were
cleaninr out part of t½e road where an anti-tank gun 1 as . Anparently on~ of
tre soldi"'rs worki11g Freund t e p;un had srrunr: a booby trap causinr, a violent.
~xplosion just ~s th~ General's ieep went hy. One soldier was killed and two
,.,ounded. The ~nerril f s jeep escriped unharrn~d.
General Clrr~ storped bri"'~ly at the gpth Division cornnand post just north
of Itri , but General Sloan, the Division Co~~ander , was not in so Gen~ral Cl~rk
�/"
proceeded on towards Fondi to find him. While in Fondi he talked to Colonel
Jacobson, Division Artillery Executive for the 88th Division, who pointed out
the direct support artillery positions in the vicinity of Fondi. General
Clark then proceeded up the road from Fondi toward San Biagio - a small village at the foot o:f.' Monte S. Biagio. There he met Colonl"ll Hughes, Commanding
the , 137th Inf'antry, ·vhich was in the process of attacking this higJ:-, ground.
- He discussed the situation with Colonel Hurhes, who said thrit his troops were
receiving sone opposition which he estimated to be P..bout 100 Germans who vrere
dug in in the hills. Colonel Hughes was coni~iclent thflt he would have the high
ground in a few hours and was Pt this tinte fY,Oing beck to see his Division Co:m:Mander to push on f'urt1->er up the hill mass to the northwest. General ClPrk,
after conferrine; with Colonel Hughes, retraced his steps and rroceeded bt>ck
down Jfip;hway #7 to Gaeta. Enroute h!"! l"let General Coulter of the 85th Di vision going up to his forward el~"'ents and discussed with him briefly his conversation with Colonel Hue;hes. General Clark thoui:1,rt that Colonel Hughes 1
desire to pusri on forwa.rd was excell,,.,nt nnd told General Coulter that he
could discuss the matter when he saw Colonel Hughes up the road.
In Gaeta General Clark went dciv.11 to the point where he met Colonel Safay,
Corn:Mandine- the 338th Infantry of the 88th Di vision. Colonel Sa.fay's regiment
was about to begin a movement by water in dukws to Sperlonga. Genern.l Clark
went down to the beach from wh,,.,re they would depart and saw Rn engineer company svreeping the beach for M~ nes in order to make a safe lane for the dukvvs
to p;o down to thi'? water. Quite a f'.ew rnines were found in this pr-irticular
beach. General Clark said he was glad to see the 1-,each because he had planned
at one ti1"11.e to send in a Ranger Battalion at this particular point in the
beach to scal"l tre r.eip;hts and take GAeta.
From there General Clark went back d 1 ri"Jctly to the cub fjeld where he took
off in his L-5 to return to his command post. During his trip ur P:i<shway #7
the militRry traffic was very congested, ,vith .,,,any 1"1.otor vehicl""s and Italian
pack units noving up toward the front. Gaeta and Itri had suffered quite
heavily· froll\ our artillery fire and bombing.
At five o'clock ~Tiss Curie, daui?:hter of ~1aclame Curie who discovered radium,
ca!"le to call on General Clark. Sr e is now a French WAC o.i:'ficer and j s over here
in Italy on an inspection trip.
At six thirty Genera.1 Clark had as dinner r:me sts Mr. Irving Berl in, of the
show, 11 This Is The Armyn, Major Holmgren, his business r.anager, 1md Wri.rrant
Officer Wasser, his Fublic RelAtions Officer. After supper ~'!r. '3..,rlin came
down to the conference hut where he played J11any of th , tunes thnt he had written
for Gener~l Chrk. He also rla.yed the Fiftr Arny song thet he had written, a
new infantry song and other ,,,ar ballPds which were very good.
Hip;hlj t;hts of the day's battle news were increasing rrogress by the French
northv•est of Pico and Pontecorvo. On the II Corrs front Monte S. Biagio l"a.d
fallen, whicl\_}'Vas abont three miles west o':' t1,e tovm of Fondi. Also, elements
of the 91st R connaissance Squndron had reached the outskirts of Terracina.
Notes concernini; General Clnrk 1 s visit to General Leese nnd General Jv.in will
be quoted in the diary for tor-1orrow.
·
�In the lRtter part of tl"e afternoon Geri~rol ClPxk, accompanied by Brigad:i.er Goodbo<ly, went to tre 1st Bri.tish Division to confer with Generril Hawkes-·
wortr, Division CoMmander, and GenerPl Gregson-Ellis, ConMander of the 5th JiTision. Also present was Brigadi~r Loewen, who will tnke over c~n~and from
Gen"'ral Hawkeswort , who is leav~ ng to take CC"ffland of the 4t>th British Divi, sion w}'ich is in Egypt at the present rnonent. General Clrirk made arrangements
for General Hawke sworth to leave tonorrow and turn over the conm111.nd to Brigadier Loewen. He also d-iscussed wi.th these British Commanders f'n attack plan
for the two British di,isions i.n conjunction wi..tr attack by our 45th Division
and 1st Armort"ld Division. The ~--neral scope of the plan is to h(.lve t:he British
5th Division, w:it1, the TJ. S. 517th Farachute RCT, the 551st F11rPchute Bn., and
the 55oth Glider Bn., take over tre entire British -f'ront, Makinr: fl holding t1ttack, whil"' Ue "qritish 1st Division, with the U. S. 45th Di ision on jts rigrt,
attackin~ in a northwesterly direction toward Rom,. In Co"1junction with tris
attack-, t},e 1st A:i."mored Division will make an t'lrr,ored thrust to the right bf
the 1T. S. Li.5th Di vision. J l;:,..11s for tJ-,is Rtt[\ck Hre being made in detailed form,
b11t the exact time is not definite. ',!fuch will r1erend upon tre progress of the
rrese"1t be~clhead attack in tre rirectioP Cori - VPlJ,,ontone. If this attack
bor,s dmm in tP.e Cori area, or i-(' the Bo ere falls back to defend its Unction
Lin<'"!, t!1en U·is combined Brjtisr and AMerican attack riigl.t take place. This
attack is in conjunction with G~neral Clark's desire to be flexible and meet
any contingency that tlo Boche might offer.
Tht"l Arer:ican p~rac},ute and r,Hder troops contemplated to be used on the
present British front will rrobt1.bly 11.rrive flt t:1e beachhead by 3 June.
Later in the eTening General Clark called all Hs djTision coM::mners on
his field rhone to discuss witr th"'Tl\ the situntion j n their zones of ri ct ion.
He retir-,d Ft ~130.
The -f'ollowing are tbe i:rrportant messages recei"'fed and cl:ispatched during
the course of the day:
Gruenther to AdTance CI • 'q_M 152. "French rl'ly,ort their attack jumped off
on schedule. No locrtions y ,t. Heavy fiehtfog in Lenola area during nir,ht."
Gruenther to Aovance CF. Rt{ 153. 11 Eigrth Army jillllped off o630 rreceded
by forty r·1 nute artilJ ery prerr-r['tion. Attack prog.ressjng accordinr, to :rlan.
They rraintajred co':'ltact vr~.th eneMy throughout nigl t and state that enef'l.y shows
intt'!nt:i.on o-f' holding. 11
Clark to Gruenther. RN l4lQ. "Situ::-tion looks good. Co bat COI"I" nd A
just srort o"' railroad. B pro -T .:.; -~ni;; ,.,ell tl-r011gl minefield l?OC yarcss in
rerr. 45th Division Pbout on i.ts limited objective. Otherc; rrog:ressing
slowly. Reference Eighth Arny's proposed new boundr>ry, 111Pke no cori:mitI'lents.
Do not lik~ it. It ,ives us absolutely no ro,d. I ould like to do a little
purs11ing too. Detailed answer to you this 1d'ternoon. t1
1
Ch.rk to Gr11enther. RN 1424. 11 Bo·mdr->ry proposed by 'jighth Arny is unacceptable. It is Pbsolutely necessf!.ry for the French Corps to hr>ve a rorid
north of tlie Lepini r·ountains. Frorosed boundri 1~.~ 0·1ld force ,..,e to pincl out
Frencr Corps and hr,ve them ::'allow :::I Corps throu ,h AT"'k<i.seno Vrilley to route 7.
�I do not bt"'Ueve 'Sighth Army could o<lV."lnce throug1~ Liri Vnlley unless French
cover the nounta-ins on the Eighth f..rmy le-"t. IIighwt=>y 6 nrid tre !!'.any routes
north thereof should meet Ei~hth Arny need. Make strong representation that
present boundnry be changed as follows, all points exclusive to Fifth ArMy: ·
From present boundary at strerim j,mction (369182) - hill 215 (265461) - hill
?69 (09850~) - hill 773 (Q50556) - point (~90610) rnd then continue on present bou.ndPr~v- as set forth in op ,rrtions order number 1, AAI, 5 -rtay 1944."
Clark to Gruenther. RN 1443. ttHave just visited ravrkesworth, GregsonBllis, Loewen and w~s ~cco pani~d by Goodbody. The l~mited objective attacks
by these two d~visions have bee~ completed 8nd no~ is t~e time to let Hawkeswortr return. I will send him bqck in one of MY C-78 1 s tomorrow unless General Alexander desires otherwise. Acvi 8e. t-rove me e it rlnin to trese conrnanders t!'lrt the Bri tisJ~ Divisions will re1·ticjrate in the next Pttack. They
are i.n accord n11d we f'.rl'l . nlcin11 pl1rns accordinr,ly and will outline t1'em to you
at a lt1ter t-ime.
ttUp u11til 1600 11.ours to,1ay 7-qq bP-ttl,.. crsualti~s hrve bl'!eTI admitted to
eTacuation hosT':tals. This "'ncludes 98 Brit~ sh casualti~s. 11
Gruenther to Arlvance GP. RN 165. "II Corps news good. Our ta'1.ks and
troops now fighti.nt; in T .rracina. 350th bes tvo bE1tt,,lions r,ener< lly in Mount
Curio area. Eir,hth Arny now stnte tl-'"lt sirns 0f enemy withdrawal have not
b~en confir ~d. Canadian ar~or will 11ot be nassed trrour,r toni~rt ~s prev:5 0'1sly pl.a n..1ed. 11
Ger~ral CL.,rk this afternoon dictated th11 f ollowj ng men:orandurn. to Gerierol
Grul'!nther:
11 Hansborou ,1 is here and rill return this to yo·1.
Th~ nr,s seem to be going
well here. T r.:ot up at 4 A.f~., vnd went to a forFard or under cover of darkness and. :atched tre rr ,rt>rPti.on anc1 tJi- ~niti,,l t,., 11k n.ttt>ck. Th" rreprPtion
was srlendic. ~fo reply from t:re ene y.
I h-1.ve t~lked with J-r.r-r,:,on, ,n1,ose Con-bat Col" r-md B, 'on tre r.1 ght, has htid ,u ffic·1lty w:;t~ r~nl"'s. He hf's lost ten
tanks on min~s. His Combat Conmand A, on the left, lwd :nore success r>n<' Pt ~bout
~: 30 had covered half tre distnnce to tre rn·· lrord ,., anrnent. :::t 1-iad ,,sed
snelces success+'ul1y.
n7 Combat Co~Rncl B did not use then i."1-itinlly ::: do not
know, but ~t .i.s Mo· inr; t:1el? up now ~n t'l'1 effor-1:. to clePr tre nines. Tre 45th
Division arp:ir~y,tly has reac1'"'d -.;ts :~rniterl object-ivt"'. '3rd D-i ision and ~,ecial
Service Force rave eacl' advenced 1,000 to 1, '500 yrrds. I'a-1:.urally, reports Rre
mear;er rt th, present ti.e, hnt I wo,1ld s~-.~ it -is '?"lror:r,ssing ~n good shape.
"':'here ~s R nrinll tas,· +>crce o+' a reconnf'lissance unit, sonto: TD 1 <J ,nd ~Y'r;ineers, prep?-rec' to ,ovi, 0'1t on +J,e south flan¥, but : ,rant to hold thPt until it
can ,e coord:natec'l vitr an e"fort o-" tre II Corrs anc'l perh:::ips P 11 rop b7 '\'.'nrborouv}•, if •e decide to do t at. ::: am reluctant to C0""111it Y,;.rboro"1r,h now, althour,h the rlan B wMch Don h~s v:ror'\reil on looks +'E'irly proris~ng. .7e have told
Yarborougl' to be vr-erart"'d -"or thr-t Thursday rorn~nr,. I won 1t rull -it unfoss conditio'1.'3 are r-i.1;ht.
"A . delir,½ted w: .J.;l +lie rrc- ress of tl "'l 9 8tr ""ivisio'1 orito Mow"lt Alto. Looks
as tr•ou;;-r tr"'r"' is a ros,:;i b::: lity of bPgging so""e Ge-1--mens tc t,._(I\' soutl, tfereof.
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Your radios are cor11ing in well.
of that II CorJs .
Be sure and keep Ml'! rested on the progress
Havl'l not had a r"ply from you on t'bis censorship b,1siness . You go allout in set"\inP- trflt ti-,~re is no restri~tion rlacf'.'ld on v.y whereabouts . I have
always trav~lled rit .,.Till in rry Fifth Army sector , and, when appropriate , it
has be~n arno'mcr".d, and ::: do not i11tlimd to 1, ave any restriction p1Pced on that
now. Y01.:. tear anybody to pieces who r,ttl':npts to c½.ange tb,; s . The censor here ,
due to soMe damn fool idea , tl1in1,rs th<"t r-iy presence in t},e bridg~head can not
be rn_~ntioned ,. Yo11 riust ? ct on t} j_s pro""'T't ly.. I am wond l"rinr; v·hy I ½ave not
receiVl"'d a reply. 1r"'dt},nr 'have we received the co:rmunique . ;Je sure trat trat
is properl7 word ,d and tl"9_t it ~ s a Fif'tr ,\rrrr shovr . I do not want t'b"" first
a"lnouncement r,f this to come out to the e-'"'f11;:ct thPt Alexander's troops hav""
attaclred fron +he bridgo}'ead. This all should have been straightened out 1:iefore I car1e up here . j ki1o"i you can handl,. tl-is ~iploratically. 11
11
General Gruenther sent General Clark a neno:..·andun wit]:, regard to the witLdrawal of certain troops from FiftL Arny. The Arr1y Commander plans on taking
up this r1atter ·after he has accomplished whfat re set out_ to do ~
Clark to Gruenther . R;J 1429. "I agrE'e that l:":ly~s 3 s r11 1shing ris ettack
to th~ utmost . Fn.:i""!r no c:'rci_nnstances do I d""sire to div~rt his Httac'\c in trie
direction of Ceccano . On tl-ie contrary, it must be pushed along the h1.gl· grotmd
in the direction o.~ t:lv b:;.•idgl".!Lead with all spl"ed possible . 11
v
General Clark sent Gen1'ral Grurnther th"' following note with regard to tr e
coordin,'1.tio11 o-"' the :'r1'nch Corps and II Corrs attack:
"Sending this by courier . Just rt'!ad thl" r:..a.ns c-1"' tl e FT::C with 4th Mountain
Di11ision going +'rom Lenola ,.,,fa the m.01mt;,,ins to C1'1stro di Volsc, vritr the II
Corps moving in the direction oi fip~rno . You ce.n see th?t .the two corps F<re
diverging from each other, leaving a W'T 'Lt"reen . I an, worried for fear the
right flan"l.:: o-1"' II 0orrs Y"'ay beco,..e or~m . It seem to me that 88tr Division
sho11lc co11,s0Hdate its position in the Tlount Alto region , pushin[" on to the
no-rtbwest so tei.at it controls the rig}, ground just south of' the F . Amaseno 1~iver ,
wi.th its tail echelo11ed in, the direction of the F"'C . Tl•,,t woald rerr it 85th Divi;,:;ion on t}-,e soutl, to continue on to tl1~ Li,;h 1yound ,,est of r iperno and rerhaps on to Sezze . If you draw this out on th~ mar you will see th.Pt the II
Corps t1: en is f"i 11 ~ ng th"! ;ar between the Frencl, and VI Cor-rs and any advance by
Special Service Poree to its area #3 south of Cori will put us in fine position
to join up .
"I~ow ;vou are watcl:ing this .
this . n
1 lease let ;;e -:now vhat you are doing Pbout
General Gruenther rep lied to the
13 boi-re
as :'allows:
11 T have spei1t 13 ccmsiderable amount of tlne toclay in order to !"Void the
creation of' thriJ gap wl icr you referr~d to in -your riote thet car,,e tonic;r>t . I do
not claim that we lave 11rrived at tLe rerfect solution , but I ari quite certF<in
that botl: the EC and the II Corps are aware of th•• :r-roblem, and thRt botr of
them Dre doin[; evervtr j_ng possible to [',void our beine :rlaced in a position where
t:r"' gap ~Jill embarrass us . ·
0
�9/
"The Frencl. plan of advnnce is as follows: 4 nm~ wil1 advance on the
axis LENDLA-VALLF.Cr,RSA-:''OP.1T SISER'JA, ?nd DIM on axis FASTEHA-CASTRO DEI
VOISCI, 3rd DIA on axis FICO-SAN GIOVA\fTTI, 1st DMI protecting the rir;ht flank
of F-r;C 1mtil the Ei~hth Arr1y arrives, 11-ft ,r wrich it will rr-sv!'"-rt to corps
,reser'V'e.
"The II Corps plan is as follows: The f'"P:th Division to capture tre mtmr
CTJRIA-FO'JTA DE Gf.J~I area; then advance to the northwest cutting the AMASENO
Valley road. The ~5th Division to capture the high gr01md v,est of PIPERHO
(I RJVERHC on so~e naps) ; th..,n nd.,rance to the northwest on S~ZZE and 'IORiffi..
"'l'hr, Frencri operations are proceeding accordin.i-; to plan and no gar has
developed yet, but t'ris ·is chiefly bec~use th relief o:f' th~ 351st Infantry
on HC'U rri CHIAVI'JO has not bMn completed y,t. 'l'he Frfl'lncr (General Carpentier·)
insist that it has taken -place and th~y ar~ c}eckinp; vigorously tonight to
prove trqt a battalion of the 4th DMH occupies that hill, but Porter hftS convinced m('l that tre:ir lnformation is viot t>b"'olutely- correct. It is tr,1"'! thrt
th, French this aft!")rnoon had troops on T'fTNT VO'JA and M01Nl' r:zzUTO, but the
enemy sent in sore troops between :num VC '{A and r:'.OTJl''T CHIAVINO ur ich prevented
the relief, and the troops - l::>oth Am~rican and :::-'rench - are attempting to clear
up that sitmition tonight. Rega:;.-r1less of the stnte of confusion - end it is
only minor - which exists in that part5 cular area, tr e fact remP ins that no ga.p
has developed and the II Corrs is rrotectinp; ~ ts ovm flt>nk es well as assisting
the French. The reason one can say th1:1t the II Corrs is rrotecting its fhmk
is because it 1w s the 35oth Inf entry genl"rally in the MOUilT CURIO area; the
349th Infantry gen~rally in the f'f0tnl1T ROTFNDC area. (Exact location llllkno,,m.
Crawford has ;nstructiohs to nove an fffl'J:'A I''::: CAHFI, but he has b~en delayed
in arriving there).
11 m1at the II Corps want to <lo now, and they have pushed r,e vigorously all
day on this point, is to free their 351st RegiM.ent in order to be P.ble to rlace
it in corps reserve. 339th will attack northwest regardless of 351st; Ps will
the 337th and 338th as soon as they take TFJffi.ACINA. In thPt event they would
then continue the attack of the '339th fro'lt f.ONNINC' toward the northwest toward
PIP"":RNO. The 337th and ,3gth, still fighting in the TF.RRACINA-r-'DUW LEANA area,
would proceed toward FifF.RNO while the 151st would be held under corps control
in a central position to be used as the situl'ltion demands. I believe thr,t the
entire problem will be solv~d as soon P s the siturition in the CHIAVINO-VALLE
CORSA area clears. The French are not at all worried thn.t there is any danger
in the so-called gap area and I 1u1 inclined to ~gree with them. Howev-er, I
can a.ssure you that we area, not being conplacent about the matter, and thBt I am ·
followinr, it up relentlessly. rood is thoroughl7.r cognizant of the problem, and
he is givin1; it hi3 very careful 8ttention.
"It seems to me that we should now cons:ider extending th .. boundary between
the FF,r, and the II Corps. I have not had a chance to discuss it vrlth either
headquarters yet, but I suggest that the present boundaries be erlended to the
northwest so that the road FIP'"RNO-Tf'YI'"SIANICO be given to II Corps. I realize,
of course, thnt the boundary derends on the use you intend to make of the II
Corrs when :it reaches the brjdgehead, but J believe that this boundary will at
least orient both corrs in the correct direction. I will talk to G~nernls
Keyes and Gr,rpentier tomorrow on this subject in order to ascertain their views. 11
�SAU MARCO-A •;crc--r:A.Y 2?, lq/44--General ClFrk this rnorn:ng dictated the following notes regardin~ his trip yesterday for inclusion in tr.c diBry:
"Yesterday I flew to see Ge'1"ral Leese in [ln effort to coordin.'1te our ntAlthougP he professes tlwt Ms Pttack will be all-out, it
is eing r.l"de by one di ision. I .cor.m:ented as well as I could on the weakness
of the attack, but +,hroui:i;h qnick talk he indicated a great massing behind.
All t:beir ections are always dictated b:, their rlesire to SP.Ve mnnpower and let
someone else do i.t. I pointed out the a Jsolute necessity of eTl"lryone attacking
all-out at tre sane time. He agrMs in pr--:nciple but will not do it in fact .
I then flew to Juin. He is r'!ost eap;er to Rttack on tre ?3rd "ut will not let
up his attacks in the nM.ntine. He exy-ressed surprise nt th..,. weakne9s of' the
British attack. ne told Me ti-mt Fontecor-ro was rmoccupied and tht1t he was in
th'-" outskirts, yet tre Canadfrns would not go in. He hPs born~ th~ brunt of
tJ:,e Liri Valley battl'-"'. I am issuing orders co11.firl"l.-'ni,; M.Y 'Conversation with
him in order that his r>ttack toMor:cow, in conjunction witr the Eighth ArMy,
will a,,.,.. i.tsel" felt over pnd above trose t1tta~ks of the past few dl'lys.
tacks <'or t ,e ?3rd .
- "I visited a battle~ield west o~ Esp~ria witr Juin. It was ~s concentrPted
n destruction of G1'rman rerso1mel a'1d T"l'l.teriel as I hA.ve ever seen. It ,,as
nat;ni~5cent. Froba~ly 100 vericles, r,ostly vrmored, were destroyed. J tren
flew to Scauri Rnd vi.sited in turn Ferr ia, Itri, Fondi and several riiles west
of Fon:ii wrer" tl e 11attle , as taki.nr, place east of 'fonte San Bfap;io. II Corps
is rnak'tr,rr vood rror;ress. I tl-i,-n w~nt to Gaeta an,, observed a lx=\ttalion of the
138th a)out to take off Por Sperlon,a in dukws. I urged II Cor~s to be allout in their forward move. e'1t. He . ust r-et the M. ;r ~ound '1orth of T~rrr>cina
rrer~ratory to join;nv, up.
"Upon "IV return by air I phoned Ge:reral A7evanil"'r, told hi1'1 of my trip and
of rny plans to rush the II Corps to t!- e hi.gh rrro1md nortr of Terracina."
General Clark c0nf~rr~d with G"'neral Gr,1entr~r Pnd GenerPl i'.lrl'lnn duri.nr,
tre rnor.~n~ rr~or to his Move to ~re ½eachhe~<l. At 1100 re, G~ner~l Brann Pnn
Colonel Drapl'!r f'lew to tl e beachrMd.
Tpo'1 hfr Arri wi.1, Ge'1erel Cl.,,rk Fen+, ,im- .
redirtely t0 hi.s Arvrnce Co:r,T"rntl Jost, had lunch flrr1 l~"'t with G~n~rl'll Bra"U'l.
ror VI Corps wr"re hJ '.!onf'err'-"'<l 'fl'~th Ger"rE-1 '1' 1-uscott. Fro the VI Corps COl"'Mand post he :sited General Harl"l'Jon ()"" t1", 1st llrnored r-;vi.s5on, General 0 1 I1a'1i.el
0$' tl e '3rd Di.vic:;ion, rr~nerel Ryder of tl"' 14th Division and Gl!'n"'rrl 'tilker o" tre
1/,tJ:- Civision. All co and"rs wer~ .;n 1'1'0od ½eart ~'1d were ,., ,er Pn<l fl..nxious to
jUMl'.' off .;n t1-_ 0rn~n-; nt 063C' lmmc:'Yi"1f! tle Dt°'PChhead attack.
r-Po'1 h--1 s ,,..e+.urn to his co;-, and rest, (},•:nl"'rP 1 Clnrk, f'renerr>l Bra:r.:1 e"ld
Colc..,e:' Yoward disc'rnsed br•-',..f'ly th• en ..my si.twtion. Tl·e fact +rrt t}-1"' G-errrrm
2i::,t:r Di vi.sion · '1 the Cori ?rea bid ee:>1 brcurrl t so1 t1· and tr~ q('t}, aTJ.d 29tli Divisions nortl of" Rn
to the 'li' :rtl~ Arrw fl~fl front FJ.m so
el mf'lnt trri Tl1.v1 ...
siono on t e Adrir-tic s~c'le op 1 ositfl! the Fritis}:, 5tr Div!.sion v"ere discussed.
~1--at U e Gei-.an reac+j on would he, to t", contimlP.tio:r. of nn all-out attf,c:k from
tr~ ~a·n :ront 8nd from t~e beachhead could not be defin~~elv v,lwted rt tlis
t-· e. :Jo '-"' i:'."ldicP.tions were th.<i:1., th" Gernan was wi+,hilraw~r.,.,.: Oth,..rs indicPted
th-it h"" in+~11c1 d to a~~ ,pt bF.tt1e P'1d d"'ren.rl v•-.-y ~lose tr- h-' s present J os: tions
a3 of tc:-r1ay.
�93
hnurs. At this confer"'r.ce he gave a.n off-the-record talk on "'V~nts thFt were
to take plac/1! to""1orrow. In brief he exrlainl'"d row the attack on the Fifth
Arm:t main t'ront was to b~ cortinued tomorrow 2nr1 rt 0630 the beacrhead forces
~ould lr 1 nch its attacv jn the djrectjon Cori - Valnontone . He emphesized that
th is attack was planned to cut n r:hwa;v /16 r rid to 1 1.sh ro lu""ns nor-':.h a11rl Pouth
wit} the ultirir>te obj1-ctives of r1 estroy~ng es l"'l"DY Gio-r:":Pl1.S as possible .
General Clark stated that he. was not rrepl"red to say exactly wfo:,t the G6rr"E.n
reaction would be and that he had a flexible mind, e11c , dere':.C::.ii.~ upon what
tl:>e German did , was prepared to r,eet sev~ral "!Vent .mlities ••••• on~, a chanie
in the direction of attack f'rorn due nortt to northwest. :L "ncicat~d thnt
the beacr'head attack did not have as its p~ll'pose to capture Rorre . He explained }-ow the 45th Division ,·rould launch a li, ited obj~ctive attack on the
lef't wit}. the 1st Ar:r,ored on jts right, leadin:r ler-ients being its tanl:s and
its infantry f'ollowin,; up . On ti1e 1st Ar:"ored Di vision's right, would be the
3rd Division , trhicli w011lf Pttaek +re CisternP Pren which would -rrobably be
heavily def'ended . "'he 36th Division ,ms to be prepnred to pass through the
3rd Di v5 sion if it was necessa1.7 to re-gi~oup and clean out the Cisterna area
with the 3rd Division. He emphe.sized that the 36th Division, however, would
not pass thrN1.~h unless the situation warranted it . There would be a thirtyminute a.rtillery preparation y.rio:r· to the attact:-, concentrated on the front
of the 1st Arnori"'d and 3rd Divfoion in addition to count"'rbattery. The air
also would play a heavy role, '1otr light, ,.,.,.diun end hea11:r borAb,.rs of the
Strateq;ic Air :"ore~ . 'rhe weather forecast appeared ':'avora~l-,, and General
Clark was corfident tLat rlans had been well prepareri and thPt the attack
should go . He e:q,lai'Yl~d tret tl-e t rm Britisli Divjsfons on the hft were
1 mder Fifth Ar111 y control ar.c1 would hold t! eir positio!'ls with
linjt Jd attacks
only. The question arose as trJ vfrether or not tl-ie Ari y's left flank ms vulnera1:Jle to a l}"'rr:an attar::k +"rom t: e S'JUtl, since he had a1railable sev~ral divisions thPt could be b:>'01 1r,;J-it down with:in 24 hours . G~ner2 l Clark saic. trat
this was always a possibility but that he tJ-iought thet if such an attsc},;: did
take place we could hold it because we had done so before . He answered
several questions fro;"' correspondents ,,ho wer('a, very entJ:,usiastic and pleased
tC' be ½rieferl on -':.he attack taking place tomorrow. After U,e conferf"!nce General Clark saw Ge1'1Lral Horan, Signal Cf'ficer, and Gen"ral Bradshaw, AA Officer ,
after wh:5~h he r~tired early.
1
1
An estimated total
o:
prisoners of war as of 0625 this morning was 4,748.
The following irportant mess~ges were received and dispatched today:
Gruenther to Clarko TI.N' 142. "Eighth Army Stratton reports that Canadian
progress in Fortecorvo Prea procl'leding satisfactorily. Believes that Canadians may be 8ble to 0 1t"'lank fixed defenses Pontecorvo area todr,,y. They consider it likely that enemy may start withdrawal front Hitler Line toniglit . So
entr,usiastfo are they that they are discussing pursuit plnns and have s116 gest"'d boundary J'llodification a·"ter -':.he;-r net b'°'yond Cerrano . We have Jl'l.8.de no
comr,itments . Will keep you advised . "
1
Gruenther to Clark. R'·J 14/
,i-. 11 rren ::h re:rort thHt German withdrawal frol'I.
Fico and Fontecorvo areas continues tc :increase. Brosset Division observer
states that G~rnans appear to be in .confusion. Saville is sending out heavy
armed recces . t•reather deteriorating . French occupfod :.enola. Now :rushing
towards rastena and Snn Giovarni . 11
�CL"-1.rk to Gruenther . RN 8033 . 11 Your weathP,r message received . We will
attack as s,heduled . Mnke every effort to carry out fighter bomber and light
bomber missions at tjmes agreed upon. Weather ,iay look bad there but be good
here . ~1issions cancelled should be mede available w en weather perr,its . "
FiftJ; , Ar□y to Fifth Arm:.r Afhrance er. · RN 148. "Eight:b Army has requested
AAI to adjust boundary forward o"" Cecca.no as follows . 'All incl Eighth Arrny
Patricia 3833 - Supino 3535 - r1orola 3337 - Scurgolfi 2941 - rd junc ?242 thence Sei::;ni and your orir,inal bo1.U1dary. Both Fifth Army and ~ighth Army will
probably be interested in routes through Ceccano 1 • AAI has been requested to
rnake no cl ange for the present . ti
1
*
ANZIO--M.AY 23 , 19/44--General Clark arose at 0430 , had a quick bree..kfast and
went to a forward observation post to be on hand at the front rrior to the artillery preparation . He was .o:nided to the OP by General Butler , Deputy Com- ·
mander to General. Truscott . The trip out was quiet Rnd continued to be so until 0545 when more than 5CO guns opened up on the half hour's preparation preceding the attack. Soon after th"' cannons started firi:n.<:;, visibility -became
very poor , due to smoke and morn:ing hn.ze . Little could be seen, but through
the din and roar of the g1mfi1~e, tanks could be heard ~oving up into position
ready to attack. At 0615 the dull rul'llble of our aircraft proceeding to drop
their bornb loads on schedule could also be heard . At the forward OP , in addi-
tion to General Clark, were General 'i'ruscott, VI Corps Commander; General BPehr ,
Corps Artillery Officer; and General Lewis , Arny Artillery Officer . General
Clark remained at the forward OF 1.mtil 0730 when-he started bnck t'o his adYance
command post. The return trip was mA.de in a dull drizzle which lasted for
about fifteen ainutes .
Upon his return· to the advance comme.nd post , General Cl.8.rk remained in :bis
office the entire mornj_ng, receiving reports of the progress of the battle ,
both on the beachhead front and the Min Fifth Army front . He conferred fre quently with General Brann, his G- 3, concerning future plans . Copies of messages sont to General Gruenther , Chief of Staff, report hlghlights of today ' s
events and future actions . 1n brief, reports of rrogress made came in rather
slowly during the day.
The 45th had rractically taken its limited objective . The 1st ArMored
Division had ·passed the railroad north of 0111' front line , and the 3rd Division
had advanced its position about 2 , 000 yards , and the Special Servjce Force had
pushed elenents across Highway //7 but ,,ere driven back lPte in the day and
evening. From the main front , II Corrs had still not taken Terracina, but the
337th Infantry had takeP Mount Croce to the nort1' of the town and was planning
an enveloping maneuver from the north to take it . Other elements of the 85th
and ~8th Di.visions were Naking rarid rrogress through the mountains to the
northwest . F..arly this afternoon elements of the 88th Di vision reported that
they could see motor Movements on the east-west road north of Ir.iverno . These
elements were probably on Pount Curio . The French Corrs was having sm-1e tough
fighting , and the report that they had captured Mount Cerreta was not correct .
They were still fighting for tM.s high ground . The attack by the Canadians on
the Bighth Army front had no aprearance of being all- out and WHS rather disappointing. Gonf~rPll'ld reports of any progress they had n2de have not been received .
�As of r,idnight tonight casuPlties in th!" Anzio area ran up to JJ1-90 .
*
*
*
A' 1ZIO--t'!AY 24, 1944--General Clark arose early to study communiques concern:1 ng progress of tl-i."'l battle on botl:i fronts . Inforrn,.-,tion concerning the
beachheail. was r1eager in the early r-orning hours. G"'ner81 rarrnon I s 1st Armored Division had passed some ele,..ents e cross th"' railroad who held their
positions 0'1ring the night . The only point wherir: enemy counterattacks ·
push1'd our e 1e:'le'1ts back were in th~ Specfa l Service Force eree in which
'mi ts were forced back of Hi~hway #7. Durin,o; tJ,,e d2y, however, the 1st
ArJ11.ored niv1sibn had 0dvrmced past Fi ~hway }7 and h"l.d rrflct1cally reached
its fir st phase -1ine, the TI line, by nightfall, nort.h of Fig,.'1way ,¥7 . The
3rd Tli_vision, ,vhile not D ctuD lly occupying Cistern2., 1-iad :~us1..,1-d elel""1'nts on
botr Jtc1 -'s of jt •ell nor-tr- of righway /17.
On +,}- e naJn Fiftl- ArBy front Terracina liar'l fallen, ard m.otoriMd reconnaissar:ce elements were fay,:ning out fro., Terrac':na or I'ighway ¥7 and on lateral roacs toward the bridgehead . Frogress j s slov: 1,ecause of !:'any der:.olitio:ris encmmtered. Ac'~mnces were -Ede along th'!! entire II Corps front.,
6 iving us practicall:t all of tbe h~_gJ., rrouna east of th!": ljne fjperno 'T' r:::-acin11 .
Frer1 ch Corps ~1ad , so, e :r.,...or;ress on th"' rigl•t Jlnnk, · :nota'l-,ly
1 aving- cr'1W_11.r::ed as far as Vall~corsa . On th,..ir r::gl"t pr0gess was slo".r be cause of bitter res:Lstence . aeports indicrted that t:1e Eighth Army had
rushed "'iooil,... 1:"lements as far as the Mel.fa River.
At 0840 General Clerk left for the Srecial Service Go~rnand Post where
he decorated Genl'!ra1 Frederic 1-:: vlith the T.listinguished Service Cross . Prior
to t':11'! awarding of the decoration, General ClPrk d:lscussed with General
Frederick diff>iculties thPt L" had encountered the preceding afternoon and
evenin ,. ;::)eterrnined counterrtti:icks by 9.r:nor fo:-ced General ""rederick to
w~ thdraw his forces sontr of Hi,.:;hway #7 .
I.i'ror, th" Special ~lervice Force, General Clark went to the 1st .Arn1ored
Dbrision where be co"lferred with General Harmon . He first learned here that
tank elenents had crossed Hic:,;hway #7 . Upon leaviw; the 1st Armored Di vision
comr'land post, he Met General 0 1Daniel, Cormanding General of the 3rd Divj_sion ,
and acconpanied him to the 3rd ::Jivision corm.and post, where te discussed with
him condjtions on the 3rd Dh'ision frcnt. Their progress was slower , due to
heavy defenses in and around Cisterna. After leav5-ng Genl')ral O'Daniel , General Clark went to the Y~tL ·:va.cuation Hospital where he visited his Fifth
ArM.y soldiers that had been wounded withi:'1 the last two days . He cr,a t ted
..
with many in tLe casualty wards i:rnd elso visited one of the operating rooms .
From the J"J;th I'vacue.tion Hospital he went directly bacl: to the Fifth .Arny
advance com:"land post ,il::ere he went into c011ference with Genl"r-al Brnnn. Faramount in his discussions Fith his G-J was the possibility of joinjng the bridgehead forces from the west with II Corrs +:'orces aprroac1'ing fron the east. He
took the 16th T'.::i-igineer Reg:i rent frorn unde:r VI Corps control and took them under
his co1 mand, allo~ving General ':'ruscott to ·1-:eep his eye straight ahe1id toward
1-lis ob.i~ctives in the vicinity of Cori . The 36th l~ng~neers had attached. to it
the Brett Force , combination of a British recce unit e.nd sore American tank
destroyers . mhe 36th Engineers vdth its attaclun"lnts under corn:r1a.nd of Colonel
�Stanl-,y will jur::p off early to:-ior-row "'orn~n
with elements of II Corps .
Important
erstwerd, e:;.'T-,ctinr; to join ·,1p
essages of the day are as follows:
Gru~nther to Clar'• .
R'' 167.
"Tio,rracina is ours" .
General Gruenther this morning sent General ClFrk the followinr,
rl,
e orl."n-
:
"I h'l e just 'lert you a ,..lr:tsh thflt T~HRACPIA is now in our rossession .
We hav~ rad th., wh~els reased sine, last nir,ht that as soon as it ea.r1e into
o•ir i:ossession word would bJ piven to e i ediately. The ressR.ge was on
its way to you within five minutes of the -ti.me tht-1t II CorJ s learned of the
carture . "':be exact position of t'1e 1313th on Monte Leano i.s not !c"lO\m but it
is helieTl'!r" to be ot1 tor of th!" M.11 oving west to cut t, e ro::irl and bottle
1 1r any Ger :'l.ns still i.n +,re a.rel:'.
, · •v~e~s entered town w-:tr the i.nf'·rntry &d are ull-dozing a path
throu11;h . GenerPl Keyes w:i.11 ress so I'." artille:r-y tlu-ough first hecause he
hA.S snre positions just vest 0f the tow:r w'r ~ er he is T"'ry t"ag~r to occupy.
3;.,,.111ta"11.eously !'!ler •r.ts o:' th"' 91st R~cn . Sqmidron will ;ass throng}, in an
l'!J"Ce[lvor to dash on to th.- 1-)ridr,ehead area. Get11'!rt': l'"'yes has thorour,hly
j hued J,,js troops wit
tr" ~rlea o-f "rescu~nr; trl" ½r-td,ahead" anrl ~twill not
surprise me to refl.r thfl·t c0!ltact o+' A. sort is ar'e wi th:in tl-il"\ next 24-36
hours . T'/an'11.a bet?
11 T'n
"The 330 :n..,antry has <Jent a :force t0 cPrb.1re the western end of the
r~onte ORSr tunnel . J+' the -tmml"l can be used it will g.reatlv facilitate tre
mov"' eP-t 0f troors and supplies to t,e FIP~RNC' area .
"Gen ,ral Ori tt"'nberger :has askfl!d for autrority to .ov" his command post
to t},l" area :.'orm~r:i.y occupii,d by II Corrs . I hav~ a-nprovfl')d his r"'qu-,st and
the ~ove fill be ade within a few days .
Gfl!neral Critte11r- ,r ,er told e thrt h., has just rec1'iVl"d newspar-,r clip r-in ,s 4"rom t:1e States f'ron Hay ll anc l? n.,wsrap~rs ard thiot the universal
attitude is one of extr~ne corf:ldence in th~ rbiE.ty of the Fifth Arny to accomplish its ~ission .
11
G-,!'11!ral Alexander is most enthusias+,ic- over the rrogress of tre Fifth
tr e brid,,ebead yester,fay. He has
as'.<ed e to extio,'1d h5.s best wi.shes to you . GenerPl Alexnnder will dehi.y his
decoration of General K.,yes and General Juin until you can be present.11
11
Army and esrecially th"' advc.nce mane 1n
A r,risoner o-f' war report as of 1 :30 t1,is afternoon showed the li'ifth Ar ,y
as takinn; a total of 7 , 304 nri soners anc' tre ::a ,hth Army taking ,., , '3 50, aking
a to+,al of 0, 654. ~his .Piriru:re rerresents the total prisoners taken since the
egjnninp, of the all-out offensive on the night of r!ay 11- 12 .
This l'.f'ternoon General Clark sent the .c>ollowing rnernorandum to General
Gruenther:
�ii/('
~
~
.3
"The joininr, ur of II Corrs and Fifth Army bridg"hMd forces may take
rlace at any time, Ps you know. Witri the thr"'at of the II Corrs in the rear
of 17tr Division, ·1:,11,., Boche will be reluct;:int to kMr iraport~mt <Xl~""itments
south of Littoria and south of Route #7.
"As you know, tre joininr, up of ny two Fifth Army forces will be one of
tlie 1'-' ,..,lir;hts of' tJ:,e Fifth ArMy 1 s career . rt is rrimnrily a Fifth Arr.y M.tter, nnd I want you tot 11 Generfll Alexander thr-t I want autl::ority given me
i .ediPtel;v to -issue n sil"\ple oomri~m:ique +>ref'! rere as soon as II Corrs t~oops
have moved overl11ncl into the bridgehe['.d . "'he rebuttal they may ii;ive you that a teTipornry joinin~ up noes not ~ean a permanent one - is unimportant,
for tl'e story, arrl the big arrunent, is ·1hen Fifth Arny main front troops
Move ov""rla.nd into the hrideehead. The bri<l~ehead is entitl~d to this story,
and if we have tc wnit .,,.or a commmique .~ro. A.AI, Alr;iers, Naples and all the
r~st get the story before tre ~en do rer,. All I ,culd g;ve would be a simple
st~te~ent in a coJ!l?llunique that troops o~ t 1 main Fifth Army hr:i.ve broken into
the bridgehead ovt""r1Fn<l . As soon as thr-t stnte nt is r;iven, I would radio to
you in order tl:-r>t AAI could rut out ?. siT'lilar co. unique . J lease hA.nclle this
+>or me and ins~ st, i+' you cnn, upon riy request being ~anted .
"I hn.ve visited advance cp ' s of '3rd I)ivision, Special Service Force ['nd
1st Ar,nored Division this morning , and, in addition, talked to Truscott . The
"ight ing is se-ver"' on l--oth sides of Cistena. Special Service Force had a
tough time last evening. Tanks Pttac1cl'lri it and "nf'l.icted rathl'lr seY"'re
casualties . The 133rd Inf'antry took over 1ts f'r-0nt w~ich hrd been r-ushed back
south of Route #7. S~cial Service Force wrs bl'ling rMrg1:111.ized and by this
t.;_,,,e should have juriped off in thP- attr:i.ck again, for tre 3rd Djvision has
rusred ur across Route //7 on its left . I wa<J et '":rnie r~rmo:'1 1 s CP tris norning ·,hen news cane in th,... t two of hts 1st Armored tnnk comprmies were astride
Route #7. Tr.l:'t was ITOod news. I exrect ~ore to follow . The 5th Division's
Sl'l!flll effort yesterday on tl.e left "'lnnk rnet wit}, a counter attack last nir;rit
which pushed it beck across the river. Tt is bi:>ck wh"'r~ it str,rted. ITren I
r,et additional parachute troors, u.s., I will lwve 5tr. Rritish Division take
ovl'!r the entire sector of the two British :::)ivisions rlus fPrachute troops and
perhnps the %th En ,.;neer, if we close in with VI and II Corps. Then I am prepering y,J.ans to use the 1st British Di.vision with the 45th for an att ck northwest astrice th"' railroad track. This is j,1st r plan, but if eTentue.lities require :tt, ~.t is well to ha e it in hen1 . :: e0uld support it with tanks .
"I would say tl ere are about ? , OOO battle cti.sualti""s to date. I visited
one evflcuation hospital tr:! s nornin1;, and fro, reports I would sny th:::i,t is
about tre score . It May run as high as 2,500, including.dean and wounded .
0
"I arn wonder-:11~ where HG Division will go. If he is s"'.art, he r.ill put
it in the Vflll'lontone area, or he a;r brlng it in southwest of' Velletri for a
co•mterattack.
• 11 Vlith re-rerenl:"e to t e comnmnique referred to jn tJ-,"' sec0nn p:::iragrarh,
if, f'or any reason and : cnn t 1
1Jnk of none whi..cr is justifiable, A.AI will not
r;rant :re thPt [l 1tl·orjty, you r:a,<"' fflrnn sur,. thf't their commmi<J_ue is prorerly
worded, making it cl, Fifth A-.cn.y s>-iow, for thrt is exactly whPt it is.
1
"Have Stanl"'Y of
tr~
3bth .,Tt,r'reers ;n lier~ now, so as to talk over ways
�and means thf1t he might move out of the bridgehead if required to meet II
Corps .. I would pref\")r that II Corps ca:r,e in.
HReceived your notes' on detachments from Fifth Army at a later time,.
will think about that e fter we hmre accomplished whet we · set out to do.
"Delighted the way Keyes is pusring his II Corps.
which you give him. 11
I
I know the impetus
Gruenther to Clark. RN 171. "Keyes has just returned from cub reconnaissance west of Terracina. Denolitions are extensive. Improbable th8t reconnaissances squadron ca.n start north today. Western "'.'nd of Monte Orsa tlmnel blocked.. 349th in contact south of Mo1L'lt Rotundo."
Clark to Gruenther. RT-I H-19.. "Reference your NR 171, reconnaissance
squadron should not wait to Move north. They should go as fnst as the~r can
go, stopping only as demolitions ere encountered. Your message indic8tes
that they will vrait unt-' 1 tomorrow or s0J11e other t:i me to start. Get them
going and let the demolitions dictate tl-eir rate of speed. Our cub reconnaissance ov~r Route through Bergo Grappa does not indkate heavy derwlitions. 11
At 1650 tl is afternoon General Clark sent tte fallowing
e:-1orandum to
General Gruenther:
';I have taken Jt8.nley 1 s 36th Fngin1'ers snd its sector defense over to
Army control in order to further relieve Truscott from lookiYJ.g over his
shoulder. I want his eye on tr e ball ont in .,.ro11t - Cori - Valmontone WJY.
I have put the so-called 11 Brett 11 force under Jtanl~~~. Stenley will still have
his sector defense responsibility, whic~ ~ill gradually dissolve as the Boche
pull out of the Littoria area. As Keyes• advance elenents advauce Littoria
way, I will shoot Stanley out. Stanley thinks it will be a pushover. The
Boche has fired a lot of ammunition on that sector today - I think, getting
rid of it. As soon as the 85th Di vision has secured the high 6rol.md in the
Sezze area, I will bring II Corps Headquerters and corps troops complete into
the bridgehead. The faster Key..,s cen gnllop his hors,, the ',etter I will like
it. By that time the Frencr should have pushed up, pl'rr:.itting 88th to push up,
relieving th~ 35th. 85th will then come into the bridgehead. I will ass'ign
the 45th Division, the $5th, the two British Division, 16th Engineers and tanks,
perhaps some from ITarmon but not if' his going is good the other vray (Herman
Goering w!.11 help c1 "'cide tJ:,is), and II Corps will prepare "plans for an all-out
ol.:ensive to the northwest astricle the newly gained railroad ernbenl:ment which
is outside o.,. thdr principal !'lined area. rJ Coll)S will take over the Sezze
- Fiperno sector. Just want"d to let you know what I s in my mind.,
"If things M.ove as raridly as I tr.ink they will with regRrd to the joining
up, I see no excuse for moving the rear elef'lents of our F5+'th Ari y CI into the
Itri area. I ha"'te just talked with Uoran, who 11.grees. We might go to Littoria. I 1'>.1\1. a::'raid that 1 s pretty well smashed. and probflbly a heavily nined area
which would not facilitate our spreading over the countryside. Dick is working
on it and will let you ::now.
nr
hope we will eet Cisterna tris ev-ening.
~
~
'
-
Ernie I s Cor"lbat Gol"inand A is on
�the Ti line and B is approa cl ing it . As I told you, his reconnaissance eler,ents e.re work:i.nf!, slo·,vly northward. He is pushing some light t.<mks to the
east. I mn optid.stic. I estii"'l8.te 1500 p'.r'isoners haV'c been taken up here
since the beginning of the attack. It may run over that.
11
Enc1osed is a note for Lem, as you suggested. u
The Army Chie~ of Staff sent the following Memorandum to th~ Army Commander:
"I hHve your letter written at 1/410 hours this date.
11 I have just been cble to reac:b Lem '7i thin the -rast few :r::inutes and I
• discussed the special coro:m.mique request vr~ th him. He is i:;oing to get the
feel of it w:ithin the next two hours Pnc< call ne back to give rne the reaction. :rt is h~s belief thnt there will he oppositfon to the issuing of a
special comnnmique direct fro,., tre Bridgehead. He do~s, however, feel
con!'iclent tlk"lt we can probably write our· own communique in r1dvance so that
it can be released simultaneously here ano at the Bridgehead. t shall hold
out for the issue of a simple comrimiq11e .,..rom tre Bridgehead couched in
such lengu_.qp~e as will +'it t_ e siturtion wrich occurs. rowever, I suggest
that :rou l,ave Ken Clark draft a suggested cor,,rnunique and senc1 it alo11g by
th1&, 8 o I clock poucr tornorrow norn5 ng. It arpears n011, I regret to say, thrit
the Reen Squadron ni 11 :not pet to LITT0RIA as soon as vre bP.d roped this
morninr,. Gene:;.~el Yeyes reports thrt tb•, (' enolitio:n wori< has tl1'en very
th0roui:;hly dont:. He has sent more eng'ri~ers up to pusr the wor'k: energetically and he will g,.,,t tl1rou:;! Ps fast as he possibly can. Fov'ever, P.t this
writin · l e can not gun.rantee thEt the Reen U..."1~ts wil1 be stf1rted by r.iorning;
in fact, h~ is alnost certain thPt they w:n: not. I Br following this matt"'r u:r ccnst?ntly and I s½all k~er v-0 11 advis"'ld of the rrogress of the rerair
work, b~ca.use I know how r-uch this join-up Means to the Brjdeehead forces
and to t½e entire Fift ArMy.
0
0
EXTRA SFBCIAL FL.ASE~
"G"neral Carrentjer just telerronl"ld (1705) to sta.t~ tr.at V1>llecorsa is
ours. I aJ,, hapry about tr~ s in nore ways thari one, because now Generril K"'y~s
should be satisfi"'d thflt the Chi.avino-P1zzuto a:cea is secure. He will now be
a'l-:Jle to rove ris 351st aro·md to tre west•rn flank to give extra ~!'Ip ,tus to
}ris rus1' th~re. I sent you a r,essage 15 m~.rn1tes 1:>go tl 2t the St, ArI'l';y has
reported whPt 0 mounts to a break-ti:--rourh of tan1,s to the Vi'LFA River. Tl-iey
clai,;i t},at there is e ~ai:.-·l~f 1£.rr-e ~nl"!!'1Y .('orce ., n the A'),FHTO-r:rn-r•~o'IT:C area
a~1c Hey now h--,ve hopes of a r,ooc~-size G•r,,on bag. : jl"""ediately got in
·
touch with Gen"ral Car·entier to give him tl·e news. Ht" checl'ed ,,:th the 3rd
DIA and th""?y r~ported that there has ')e"'n no decrease in 1'ne1::- r4'sistance in
the SA'-J GIQ1Tfi>JNI area. However, wit}' t!1e news o-P the ''l'ri'LFA River- brer.k-thro'_1gh,
tLe French are now go:.n: to pus} nort 11 W"th r"r,l')wed v:l p;or. Unfortun/0 tely, of
course, they are 11ot at all certain +.l1nt t]1e ?th Arry r-•port is correct. C':i.·d~11arily, :r wouldn't bet a nickl, 01 that ""~tl·er, but in t!1is case I believe
tLe report is e"ccurate. -..le shall see!
0
doubts that ,,e will be able to get the parachute battalion and the
glider battalion ir1 addition to the parachute 11.CT. '.'"! tr irL',,:, ,.:,hat AfH,i will
11 Lem
'td)
;· /~
,"'., .,,½:_ "',,. ,'," \
'~ /i
~;y,, >~·
�100
insi.st ~n si-nding on~ or +,:1e ct,h\"'r of th1'8 1111.its -C') tr e Airborn~ "'rchl.ing
Cert\"'r ·,.., ediately. 'fowevl"r, I told '1 4 t:r11.t JOU rac!. t-- hEve bc,+h of tre.
now and that AAI should not cons.::d"r a co J..,.c r.:s\"' wr-ile th" b1:ttle is in
its pres1•nt critical stage . He says they wil:.. rusr the atter for all their
worth .
"He are all 1: ,hly alrted v,.: t·1 t>~ st'r'Cl"SS o~ th~ R:"'idg"':bead etti=wk •
t~.a-:. , e ca 1 gi e yo,:;. t' e necessary ass.:s+ance from this end • .-
.,. on";.v 'op\"'
'"!11:'.rk to Gr·w-.ther- .
RT· 8j_C7 . 11 R~fer~>1~e sped al co ,,,,mique , I R~
w-"Ui•1~ ·r ·)e;r -'ns··s~ to a si u:.to.~.-.ous iss...1e .
I s-..1t~gest "';he fo:lo1ing
com-·mique: ' Jlimaxing F srectact l8r d •tmce 0f 6o iles in pnly blf:·nk
days , Fi"th Ar y ~roops f"':co -'-;l e ain fron.t j a.: r\"'d ur tc 'r- y vri. th F:'...ft. Ar y
All;"'d fcrces w1--,~~· r" · 1:'l~oken out o"" th, l)ef>chhead .
1
1Tr~ -!;roo1 s -"ro
tl e ::::-•1t' , ov rcom-i 1r, ro "'rful erl"ny rl'lsistance , . ave
+'ou~ht th~ir way sin~e t11e ·1i l + c. f ::a- :2 J'iay over so e of tb"' most <liffic-ul-:. 0·1'1-:.ain ter1·ain of the wrole Palinn . carirpai -n .
' Tle c'r. ati.c .~urcture of the t~o :'-:l.-l"tl Ar ~,-,..r0rts riccurrl"d a '"',,.w ,iles
soutl east c" t'1.- 11eachhead on -+;l,t"' '"!O, str 1 ·h: gl war ru.nr::..n
~-:.wei,r. T\"'rracira
~nd A~zio .
,,.,.. e jun.c4:.ur~ o., the two f'orces i:;iv1's riftL Ar y •m.:.nterrupt\"'d lard co _
_
, :>1:;..caticns "or the "· rst t · , si 111"' th"I '1c£' chreac O;' ,rp+,io11s 1i,gan on 22
.Ta'luA.ry. ""'•ir·n" +,'1e • rt"'r-;--:.. '3.11 t,~oors; equip ~11t e"lr' surrlies hr-d to e
tra""sr 01·ted ov..,_,__• : czardcu3 sec. r0•1t-,s . 1
1
11 You will note thrt I lav,,. left blan" ~1 A number o~ days i.t took to ~oin
up . Each readqwrter<i cc"tld '"'i --nire th:i-:, s+,artj n, "rom -!;r.., nigrt 11-1? ~n<1
co mti.., tl I" 12t"h es +ne fir·st day enr'l t1·-, c F.' ~ nf ~oi.'1.~r -1p t 1 ,e l.<tst day.
Re sure thf1t ·nstr,1~tioris Eir~ i<1sued :i edia... •ly to censors here to pass
stori,.s "lasec1 on t: is speci · 1 corir·unic:'1• whfllln I ci.v" tl" authority to re:..e1'.lse
them . After joinin.~ · r I would f 1 P sh r !'I ssage to yo'J. and giv" yo·.1.the ti e
t '1pt we wofrd r~lerse here, p·obably an hour's not.!ce. I a stRrti.'l
y '°'rec' al task fore.., •md"'r 3tanLy o·lt 0f tre br ~ c1 ,1"'1-iePd at di:' li 1~t tc. o.,,. ,cw rnornir . -~ K~yes r,ets on ris horse, junction Rt lePst 'y ~oot l"'le~ents srould
take J lace befo-~e roon tomorrow . C:orfi rm thPt +,I-- ese "rran ,enents ar'!! sE'tis factory. ''
Lat"' t1,~ s e ',n_:nc General Grul'lnt'ber sent GenerPl Cl;:ir'k-
tr~
following
e~o.ranclu!'l:
h.'"'Yfllls call1'd tonight to flC.Vl"'e us of th"' -!; ·,....ing !'or the next
phase or ri.-:; O}. eration . He rill attacl-': on ?6 nay - prob~ )ly l'!arly orning on
thPt da. · - to capture th, ~'T . 3AIA'JO hill ass (;:H~-18) . Tris mir;sion will l)e
~.: "'e'"1 to the '1t:;tr Di~·ision. The "339th In-"Pntry -: ,-:; in t11e [.0~"'·:-·m area YJ.ow and.
will lean tPe attack. T' e 13ntr. Inf~ntry will be ov~d tonorrow so it crn
i"'l'rV c ~rat~ , P7.trour(1 G~rP.ral Yeyes is not certr:i:in thrt -it will be t} ere in
t · m~ -l"o:r th-, jl.ll'lp-off . The ".<37th wi.11 1e used .:r "l.ecessary. Yo·1 l'rf~rsta11rl ,
o:: course , that th• ,37-t.!1 t=:nd tl1' -:i3'1-1-,h A.re still 'r the T•?ffi}CIFA.-f'T. :..C,A..TC
area . Tl-i~:-r will be oved nortr +,ornorro • Aft .r rrr . ,AIA 'IO 1.r.s b ~~n se~ured
the ~5ti D7 Vi.sion wil: car~ure t~e r~~ r,rotn~ in the 1~ZZ~ area. Tr~ ~8th
11 G"'n•ral
�lDI
Divisioy, will assist the 85th on 26 '1ay - in a oo.nner which Generril Keyes has
·'lot indicat~d yet - find will be rre:rrired to attnck on corps order in the direction ~'IT'. CT1RIA-R0CGAC'i0RGA . Gen~ral Keyes does not n.nticiprite tlm.t the. SSth
Divisio11 will arivance across the A1·1ASI:NO Valley on 26 May unless the French
are abreast of hi!!! at thrt ti, e - a:r1 faprobabl~ situ:otion . Gen~ral K~yes is
sorry thFt he cannot launch this attack until the ?6th, but a consiclernble
anount of regrouping has bt"!en necessary as fl result of t'1e f"ighting in the
TERRACINA area . HoreOirer, he has h11d to displace his artillery in order to
support the attack . A considerflble pRrt of it wilJ. bl") placed just west of
T1?.RRACI 1~ .
As I expla:.ned to you in the n~ssage ton:i ght the 91st R-,connaissnnce
Squadron started this mornjng ~n the direction of LITTORIA . Hm1ever, the' demolitions have hpeded progress to such r-i.n extent th?t in my earlier !"!essage
today J f'elt it rdse to indicate that the advance to t:re north had not yet
started. Actually, of course, it has be~1m, and your 4 nstructions thr..t th~
rate o:' advance should be determined by the denolitions are being followed implicitly. The 117th Tteconna'i.ssance Squadron is also available for this assir,nr!IP!nt i"" :!t is n"leded . As it sfrrds novr no inffantry has been assigned for
the reco"lna:i ssanc~ , a..'1d 11one will be unless it becomes necessary, since General Keyes f'eels th,.,t h~ t,ill probably need all of his infantry in the attack
toward SEZZE . General Keyes does not admit th-it his divisions are tired , but
some of our staff officers who hPve seen the 137th and 318th indicate thPt
thev are quite tired.
11
I told you in my 23 May letter the 4th Dr 1M is attacking :in the direction VALLECOB.SA-IR.OST~EDI . General Juin visitl"d the 4th DMM today, and rt,P.Ve
then hell because the:v hav~ b~en :l!oving so slowly. Gen rel Carpi-.ntier predicts that we shall see a fast1'r rete of advance tomorrow.,
11 As
"I told you that j would let you know further f bout the rrorosed e:x-tension of the II Corps- FEC bour1dary. This is our suP-gestion: Brlend the rresent bo,m<lnry- to Ml'. s. '',\HTPJO (32-?6), thence west to rrr . GASTc;11or.JE (26- 27),
thence northwest to HI' LUPONE (16- 38) . This boundary is agreeable to General
Keyes . It also has the concu:t'rence of General Carpentier, but he has not had
a chance to discuss it with Gen~ral Juin yet. He will let me have General
Juin ' s comments in th,.. morning . I ~xplained to both General K~yes and General Carpentier that trie boundary had not b!"!en referred to you ttnd thr-,_t it
m1 -:;lit not fi. t in with your r lans .
"Speaking of boundar:i ,s , General Juin sent in Colonel I<arnr~erer to se"' me
this Hfternoon to suggest to you that you con sider tl rl ndv-isability of proposing a change in tre AAI maneuver . He belj eves thAt the sector assir;ned to
the Fifth Ar:riy is too restrjcted for the mmber of di visioris in the Pr~y. He
believes thl'lt the boundary should b"l 111odif:ied t0 give t o t1'e F ift h Army the
road: GEFRANO-F'1.03IN'ONE-STTPIACO-RC'VIA~TO-TIVOLI . Uith such a zone of a,ction
the French Corps could swing wide to the rir;ht anrl execute an ~nveloping attack in the direction RrVLti.rro-rr,IVOLI. Under this yianeuver the Fifth Army
would avoid a frontal attack and should. secure d~cisivl'l results . Oh yes, I
forgot about the ~ighth A:rmy. It will sv1ing very wide in the direction ARC~AYEZZA'm-RIETI- TBRNI. (I rather suspect thAt there is some r0 ~thod in his Madness in send ~_ng the Eigbth Arny on this ,vide end run . The CanadJans fj red a
0
�lOJ.
few ~hells i~to th~ Frencr today, killinr, severr! m,nbers of tre Brosset Division). I told Colonel Kam..,,erl'lr to advise Ge"lerPl Juin thrt I would present an
out1 i.ne of the plan to you. I und~rstand tht 1 ~fapoleon I Br~mn and his planners are in a lull at the mommt, ·and I f'm s·rre t Pt they will be more than
ear.er to play with thj_s latest scr ,rne.
11 Genl"'ral Juin still has C'EIRANO as his object~ve.
re hRs no evidence of
any wei:ik1•mjng or t11.e eneI'ly resist~!lce in th~t sector. If, howe er, it should
col1flpse anrl the 'Sir;hth Arey rroMed up t'1e Vr>lll'!y before the French crossed
j>1to tre r.ig'1tr Army zrne, Generr:.l Juin will stop tre 1rd DIA and plRce it in
corps reserv"'• Be is ,oin~ to place thl"' Bros3fllt !Jivision in corrs reserve tomorro ,, any.how. '!'he Ti're!'lcli would trif"n rave two divisions e"vr-ncing to the northiest, the Dody Division in t1e direction IAS':'t:NA-CAJTRO DEI 'CLCESI, and the
/¥th flMM in the 1rection VALL~ CX'RSA-PRO'lSEI'I.
"I feel th"lt evt•n·;vtJ..ijnP" is rrop;ressi'r1g sati.sfa.ctorily on this Pront. I
re~ret that the Ke-yes attack could n0t e made fll!~rl~er, but I believe trat his
l~-hour lmlt was necessnry i'1 view o+' the scr-tt.,.red co11.dj tion of '1-ij s two di visio11.s. f P,rsonally .,. ha e ;"ly dnubt'1 whethflllr fl' will 11e ahle t0 attack fro!'l so•;HJNO on t
norni::1.r, of trie 26th as 11e now rlr-ms. If. he esti, n.tes thi:--t tl e attack requires two RCT I s attecldr..~ si.TT1ltanl'!ously, I am almost certain that he
cA.nnot do i.t e,t thPt tjme . He will submit his rlr-n tomorrow, and as soon P.S it
arriv.as I shRll fo E!rd it to you.
1"
11 ! just talked to W lsh, Ei,hth Arffly, to brin~ to his attention th~ erratic artiller.r fi.re of tl·e Canadians. He l'a"' rro isf"d tn takt".! proMft C<'"'l'rective
action, and has request'°!d t 1nt I convflly sincere r ,r;rets to the Frenc' • It 'is
true ~hat tre Canadian armor res reached the !~LFA RIVER. However, i Boche
st~11 holds on to A rrrm, and Ge"l.<"lral Leese ;s i.ncl"ned to b~l~evfll! thnt tl·e ene-rny
will delay at t.1t·r•ro as 1onr, ['S rossible-, l'lnd ill tr,..n ease out via t e CAS?RO
CT~LO-RC'CCAS":'iCA ROA") to tbl'l north test . 'lf,lsh is not at all certein thc,,t the
Ei,,.rth Army can rrfllvent tbis o,re. 1Ie says tJ-rnt trie tanks are havi"lg hard
going -tn tr!'! r .LFA VAIJ,F.Y, nnd t},rt . 8!1Y of the ?re bogged do m. 11
The total m: ber of rr · soners t 'ken dm·ini-; this oreration as of eleven
o I clock tr is even: ng is 10,715, or w},icr 2, "3 50 }',9.ve been tak"'n by Eighth Army
ancl the reminder by Fift Army.
*
*
*
A11lZIC--MAY 25, 191.4--Generi=il Clerk lert · h::s cc
nil rost at 08'10 to r,o to VI
Corps here he conferren brie ly with GenerFl "'ruccott concerninr, tre progress
of the VI Corps attack E1nd possibility of div"'rting the 45th, 34th ~nd 36th Diisio"'ls to a+tack in a nort}, restf';rl v direction. towErd Vfll1-letri and to its south,
while at th,.. sam~ time the 3rd DivisioB, Sp,..cial Service Force c0ntinue north
to Valmo11.tone, t' e 1st Arrored Division to support both attacks witr its bulk
goi"l.g to the attack tom.rd V,.. l.1etri. He returned to the F-;.fth Army Advance col"'Pnd post where he co:i1."'errl"'r'i. brieflv ·rri tJ- Ge:1err.l Brann anrl left irmediEtfllly -/"or
the Y-i.cin-14:;y of' Borgo Gran"'a h~r"' he was to se,.. the overland juncture of II
Car-rs a11n bridgehead forces. He was Pcco panie-d by 8bout 25 correspondevits and
photof"'l'.'Ftphers . "'he juncture of' th-, br~cg~head fo:-cces vith tre . a.in Fifth Army
front w:ci.s a ITOMento,1s occr-,sion. It occ,ll'red fourt"'en days ::i:."ter tre l""'ain F" fth
Arny .i:-rcnt wr-i s unmched on tre 11th of I ay.
1
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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Clark, Mark W. Diaries
Subject
The topic of the resource
Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984.
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns.
United States—History, Military—20th century.
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950.
Publisher
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The Citadel Archives & Museum
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Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
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CP Clark
Relation
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Mark W. Clark Collection
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application/pdf
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English
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Text
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Mark W. Clark Diary, May 6-24, 1944
Subject
The topic of the resource
Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns
United States—History, Military—20th century
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from May 6-24, 1944.
Source
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CP Clark
Publisher
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The Citadel Archives and Museum
Date
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1944
Rights
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Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
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English
Type
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Text
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1633
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Text
lOJ
few shells irito th" French today, killing severril ""leJ"lbers of the Brosset Division). I told Colonel Kanu".'1er1'r to advise General Juin thr--t I would present an
outline of the plan to you. I 1.mderstnnd that 'Napoleon I Brnnn and his planners are in a lull at the monent, and I am sure thtt they will be r,ore than
ea~er to play with this latest scheme. .
"General Juin still has Cf.FRANO as his obj,•,ctivee He .h1:1s no evidence of
any weakening of' the enemy resistance in that sector. If, however, it should
collapse and the ~ighth Arny proceed up th('! valley b"'lfore the French crossed
into the ~ighth Army zone, General Juin will stop the lrd DIA and place it in
corps reserve. He is going to place the Brosset Division in cor:rs reserve tomorrow anyho-v,. The Vrench would then have two divisions advr.ncing to the northwest, the Dody Division in tbe direction FASTENA-GASTRO DEI VC'LCESI, and the
4th Dt,J in the direction VALLE CX'RSA-PROSSEDI.
*'I feel tfo,.t ev~rything is progressi"lg satisfactorily on this front. I
regret that the K~yes attack could not be r,ade e11rlier, but I believe t,,,,at his
4q-hour balt was necessary in view· of the scattered condition of his two divisions. fersonall:r I have r,y doubts whether ½.e will be able to attack from SONirrNO on the riorning of the 26th as he nov plans. If. he estimates thAt the attack requires two RC'.::''s attacking simultaneously, I am almost certain that he
cannot do j_t at thr-d:, tjme. He ~vill submit his rlan tomorrow, and as soon as it
arriVAS I she.11 forward it to you.
11 ! just talked to Walsh, Eighth .Ari~y, to bring to his attention the erratic artillery fire of the Cenadians. H, has pronisl'ld to take y,roMpt corrective
action, and ha.s requested that I convey sincere regrets to the French. It is
true that the Canadfan armor has re11ehed the 1i'F.LFA RIVER. However, tht'l Boche
still holds on to A'WINO., and Ge11eral Leese is incEned to believe that the enemy
will delay at AJU:~•TO as long as possible, 1:1nd will th,..n ease out via the CASTRO
CnLO-RC'CCASSCCA ROAD to the north,1est. Walsh is not at all certain thc-,t the
Eightr, Army can prevent t'ds I"\ove. He says th1Jt the tanks are having hard
going in the MELFA VALLEY, arid tht>t ""a:1y of then are bogged dovm. 11
The total number of prisoners taken dm·ing this operation as of ele...ren
o'clock this evening is 10,715, of' which 2,350 have been taken by Eighth Army
a nt"i the rerrainder by Fifth Army.
*
*
*
Al\TZIO--HAY 25, 1944-=GenerR 1 ClPrk left · his co:mJ'lland post at 08"30 to go to VI
Corps where he conferrerl briefly with General Truscott conc~rning the progress
of the VI Corps attack end possibility of div~rting th~ 45th, 34th and 36th Divisions to attack in a northv1esterly d1rection towerd V·~lletri and to its south,
while at the same t"me the 3rd Divisioa, Spec:L-~l Service Force continue north
to Valmontone, ti1e 1st Arriored Division to support both athtcks with its bulk
going to the attack toward Vl'llletri. He ret'Ened to the Fifth Arny Advrmce comrn.11.nd post where he conferred briefly with Generl'l.1 Brann and left iMMediately for
the v:i cinity of J3orgo Grappa where he was to see the overland juncture of II
Corrs and bridgehead forces. H<'! was Pccortpanied by about 25 correspondents and
photogrA.phers. '!'he ,juncture of the bridgehead forces witt tre main Fifth Army
front was a momentous occasion. It. occurred fourteen days r->fter the main Fifth
Army front was lal.lllch"d on the 11th of May.
�[03
?
t.
Gtmeral Clark return~d to the Fifth Army comriand post where he conferred
with General Brann concerning the continued VI Corps .<tttack tomorrow. General Keyes a:r-rived at the Fifth Army advance command post fror, the bridgehead
overland, hav:inp; come in his .jeep frort his con..111and post northeast of Terracina.
The purpose of General Kl'lyes visit was to djscuss the irrm1.immt r>1ove of the II
Corps to the bridgehead. General Clark also discussed with General Keyes the
progress ~,a.de by the 85th and 88th Divisions.
Immediately after General Key~s left, Gen_ ral CJ:9rk flew back to the Fifth
e
Army forward comnand post in t 11e vicinity of San r,1arco to confer with General
G:ruenther. This was his first visit b~ck to confer witP his Chief of Staff
since·his movement up here on May 22nd.
At ?030 Gen~ral Truscott and his Chief of Staff, Colonel c~rleton, came
to confer with General Clar Jr, Gen~rnl Brann and Colont-'l Howarcl concerning the
VI Corps attack tor-iorrovr morning. Details of this Ptta.ck are covered in the
cable sent to General Gruenther.
A"'ter Genernl Truscott 1eft,Generril Clark worked on f!dministrative matters,
conferred bri~fly with General Brann and retired.
Anotrl"!r exanple. of ho"' slow th,. British react to the offensive spirit occurred whim Brigadier Good body, Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for British troops,
said that the two British Divisions woulcl be unable ·co srift positions and participate in tre attack tomorrov1 'l)ecause tl-iey required 72 hours to move one brigade. General Clarl< orderl'!d, nevertl-ieless, that they take over from the 45th
a SM.all pPrt of their front and be rrepared to f'ollow up VI Corps Pdvances to
the northwest.
The Frisoner of War report showed 9,018 Fi,..tr Arif prisoners as hi:iving been,)
taken since the beginning of tl--ie presert al1-011t offensive.
Qeneral Gru~nth.er this morning sent the following memorand1m to General
Clark:
11 I have been push:i.nt; the communique subject since early tl:is rnornjng.
It
went to General Alexancle:r for decision ff 1c I received a CPll back a few :minutes
ago that Generi'l1 Alexander desired that the co:r.,r.,uniqu"'! be issued simultan~ously
at 1400 hou:n today. Trarcling states t1'nt ris rePso,n for thr>t tim..- was to prevent Ue 1cillinP, of last night 1 s co""" unique 'l i ch was releasnble on tre radio
"or th~ f'5rst t:l"'!e at a:rproxhmtely 10:30 tris morning. An earli"'r rl"leA.se
would prtictic8lly eliminate trose stories..
\
1
0
11 I a,,.. l"!nclosinr; copies of th~ Co"1munique as chPnged.
Grme:;_~21 Alexanfer
\
felt tl~t th, comr-1.miriue as word,a,d by you gnve the jl"lpression t1'at lFrr;e forces
)
ht:1d jo:nef-, wh~reas }1e desired thPt tli~ inl.tj:11 rel"ase should indic~te th1' joj.nup of patrols only.
\.,.__,/
11 ';:'h"' last sentence referrins to th1' 1 Hazarrfomi sea rout1's 11 was del"t'"'d beCPuse of en Pgreement w:i th ':.he "'fovy. Harding says thnt the '!Pvy desire8 to issue --tts own cor1nmiques. I arg,1ed ar;rdnst· that on the fsroun 1 thPt this comnm-nique wo_ ld get the big rlay and that you ~anted to sM the "!avy ;et credit. He
u
said he would take up the r1atter with Aclmiral Cunningram but he was quit" certain
�that the Navy would not agree.
If there is a change in this I shall let you
know.
"The report which we h::ive from II Gorps is that the jluicture was made
by elements of the 91st Recon Squ.adror. nr.c1 a B:ritish Squadron in the LITTORIA
area. J-i:' that is true I sugg""st that you authorize r---~ to give that inforraa-
tion to AAI so that the British correspondents here can give a little pl11y to
tr.e British side."
'l'he special press CO"'"'illlique 1'mnouncing the juncture of the two elements
of Fifth Army is quoted below:
"Patrols fro 7i~th Army I'8in front rnade contact with patrols from Fifth
Arriy alHed bridgehead force in the early morning of 25 May. This brings to
a cl:t:r.iax tht"' spectacular advance of Fifth Arm,v· of rqore than sixty miles in
only fourteen cays. Th"'l dranatic juncture of these patrols occ 1_xrred a few
niles southeas+, o i:- the bridgehead on the cof' stal highvtay- running between
TT'.JL1ACrTA and A~'ZIO. Thus ~i,ftl Arny have t""Stablisht"il. lane corsrmication
-riith the bricg1~'het'ld for the first tj I:'~ sirce tt"' li-mdi-'lg ~1hich was made on
22 Januery~
1
0
"The. troops -"'ron th, ;".a" n +'ront, c-v~rcorrint:: rowerf1.:.: ene ..y r1'sistance, ,
hmre "cm,-,-}--,t their wa, r forwarc1 rell"ntlessly s~ nee tl e nip-ht of 11-12 May over
sc:"!e of' the r·ost d:1 fficult t('>rrain of the wrole Italial'"l campaign.
L
11 The troors of th~ br-tdr;eh"tvi ha~re broken tl,ro"J.gh :he porerful defenses
bu:_l:. by the <'lnemy +,o rrevent tr~ br:trlgei1ea.d force · rarticipating in our Pdvance f"roM the main front. 11
The followinr; importa11t
course of the day:
essages v,ere received an<~ disp::•tch~d dur·inr:; the
Clark to Gruenth,er. RN 14°2. 11 'fon that we have joinl'ld up, ,s2re restrictions on 'S'l.iscelfa.neons individ1.1als visiting this area apply. The one 1~oute we
now ha- e te'!"porarily repaired will riot stand other than. essential traf?ic.. Do
not rermit ""'iscellan~ous activiti_,..s to pile in here in rrl"r[lratio"'l for oar advance to Rol1ile. Fe n11st control trat verv car·e!'uJ.lv. 'To i ndi vj d 1als to co·,e
in l,y car, air or sea without prior ari:roval from ne. 11
0
Clar}-- to Keyes. R;'J 1494. 11 I desire to cc""'m.end in 1 irr,h~st t"')-r,s tre -=,,->gnifjcent op('Jrn.tions of yo1•r co :"1and since thl"J beginnin,.; of tre rresent offensi·.re on r~ay lltl by vi' ich it cs effected Ue ,;unction 0f Fi-"'th Arm~" "lain +>o:c'ces aPl'l the Fifth Ar,y b"'achhead trocps. You hve ~:r~cuted tl,ie nission w1 th
sur"'rlative ar;i;re.,,siv1'ness ~~rr•r-tn~; the fi1ht w5trout rause to a clo-:;gec' r,nd
deterndn~d erL''lY, re1 elling prornrtly his re1 eu.t~d count~rattacks a"ld r~fusing
to 1.e r::iela.," ,c' ('r ob;;;trL --ted. by his strong defe:rsive pot'tions, by the fatigue
of your troops, by his mines and demolitions or by the difficult terrain over,
which your continuous advance has been conc.uct"'cl· ::;:n driving rim back fron
:;:.osH:ion to rosition you have '"'lade hi111 ray a heavy price in casualties and
pr~_soners . This brilliant aC.'/an~e wLich rms ~en exec,rted co:r-:-:iruousl~~ and
persiste'1tly :'or 14 days r~ 1 :;__~es~nts a :;reat victory for the rifth Ar"'-Y a-1d e;an
not fail to have a najor effect r.ot onl._-r upon the Allied ca~raign in Italy but
upon the whole we.r against Ger·1nn7. :I'le:oasA. conv~y ,..y conrretulations to all
�l OJ
the rersonnel of' vour co '111.d as e, 1 as t' "" e;q. r~ sio"1
your sp1""'1d~cl rm~ts ~n trt" Y,jfth Arr,.y. "
o: . . . J
rride in ra i~g
Clark to J 1in. R'I :1-1-~·.'.5 . 11 : rave j•1st c'ispc,,tched to Ge11.~n-al r"yA; a rr.es sage of con7·at·1lat..:.o,,.,s on t. e r:rilliant op~rftions by hie ~r:.,..re has been
~ffe'1te:i a junction witl J.,} e F~.fth Ar .•Y beac'.1head Porces . I wis :.c, congro.tulate you and the Fr~rch T,",:;q: edj tiom ry Corrs rm t1 f'l • r if~ cert n-rnner in
wl ich si'l,;e +:.} e e ,jrn;l..1, , of 01.u- present dr~ve on '"ay 11th you vave car:~ied
out yow.· offersive w1 i.c • .as arle :ross~ble +'1is union o" Ue Fifti- ArB:y·forces . In your raJ hl a.,cl cc 11.t~ r. 1ous advar.ce 011 'ha e attacked continuously,
stea~ily dr~ ..-::..r , ac' · the e.1e.• "lot •ithstAnai• 1; his s't~'on o.ef""~sive rosit,j ons
s:i:,d ~n sn:.te o: t ,e c · ff:i-::mlt cmntA.i11.o• . .s no• n+.-r-.r t: rol_ ,'r- wl.ic' you 'ia,r h£.d
to acvarce . You l:.ave rei.•mJ.,l~esly forced h~m to pay a !1eavv toll of his for n"s in t '10•1st"n'1s o"' c&sualti.!"s an<l p~:: so" ,rs . FLase trar:=.rr i+, ·::,o all the
ti-•1')01 s o your 00 • a iri ry co11. ,rEtnlPtions on t' ir . Hlorous echieve, P!r.ts •hich
heve cortr·· bu.ted ir snci- g-::- .at ensure to tl , FL'tl A,. r I s vi n":.or: t1nd to our
rrcgr--ss -1-owar +: e libers.+io11. of Frr-.nce . T f'.
err rrou~ trat tre r:·1•n:.ch
r::xrier1 • tiona.ry Co,,.::-'E' j s part of l1e Fift Arr:iy. 11
J
r:::e.rk to Gruenther . R'r h 2?. 11 Ju.'lction took rlace tli::s or-ciin 6 nt 1('10
lours on Anzio-rn,..rraci.11c road ~b, 'l+. 1 or
iles n"rth ent c,.. norgo GrepJx't
by r ::- Corr s f'm,•c-, ~0nsistJ•1g 0f "'lenents of tte 4"t .....,ng.;neer Regiml"11-':. and
o" the 01st Recon:-1a.;ssance SquPdron a11c! :;;, tEisk fo:;,·ce L·orn t: e '1eachhead under
co '1rd of' Co avid·r Officer nf 36tr. "::m(neer •..- · "'11t :'l.rc ,nc: ld-lnr, :r. : :. .
ta"l1 r c""'stroyer e ....t"r:i11mts anc' e1e ents of tr,- recc,rp-1a.issru1ce wit of t:,e 1st
Br-:.tish ·Division. Arr1.. n ,e t'::"lts seti..sfactory. 11
1-;-
7
Clark to· Gr11~:dher . R'T 1513 . 11 H8v.-. di.rect"'d I Cor-ps to a4:.tac}· PS f'ol~ovrs
rrior to "loon to crro • 31"' Ji · s~ or. e11f' JpeciE>l Sf'lrv.; c~ Force rush ~ igorously fro Cori Arl"!a on a lY-10>1.t,.Yr~ j a Arte-ra, ..,}er ents l , 1 st ftr:""lored ·Di vj sion
i:r1 s·1rport . 14th ard /;5th I,~ isionsa,+,tack north:vest, folk• ed by 36th Ji vision echelc11.""c'1 tor.; ,1-it reer . Obj.active r::<lr,e rn'1nin, fro CrupolJon"' ...>tt"tjon
to La:riuvio . 1")t'I- o,... 34·::.h, t?S s·tu<>tion warrants , to be nrert1.rl"!t' to tur11 i,,., tc
a":.ta~l- i, i ,h :rou'ld 11orth of .-11e+,r-t <'rom e::;t, bur~ of lf't Armored Divi sio:-1 in
sur;ort o"' tris Attack to nort}wl"!st. B• "tisr rf'llievj11.g 45th fivis:cn sout,r of
road r1:ir .... -·...,,.,; ti-roun;:r Carano. B:rHisr Ilivis::.ons to ½e rr~pc'lr""d to f'ollov.r ur as
I Cor· s advancfl\s to rort,i,,w~st . Have tolc1 '9rnrn to ;,,, ,... st,i ,Fte rossib' lity of
drorr.;~, 'iO<'.tth i~ Co:.li Ll'iziali nr~a ""<'rn:·n, 27th. A.;r 17.ill ]:'re,bab,y object,
nu to r1~•-c cn:rid·tions . C'tl ""1-~s.., will br~r S09th in ovf'lrl['"O. or bv boet.
Aho1 1t SOO p. so11 ,r"' .J:.~J. .!' in C1 ste1·nr . 0 1 DaniP:!.. t,,11:3 " tris ~ven·rg tl: at
Ppp·ox.;r.nt""l 100 more tal fl\U 11 ,t Tl'?er. Cist~rri•1 e11r1 Cori. 3rd n~vis'cn rrEct~callr on i.b; o"1iectives ore r"ld t •o . S;reciA.l Sl"!r·.rice F·orce on three. 1st Ar ored1
PA.d toup-,r r,-oinr; jn the dirl'\ction of ""lletr:i . I r launching t'1"1 s new !l.tfa,ck
w1tl 1111 sreed J'ORsi1'le in <'rd~r o ta},;~ t>dYDnuige of ~ r•tns ot our "rlvance an 1
in 0rder to ov~rwhe:1n tl1e enemy i.n v.l:-Pt I11'lY bt'l r ·erion·lized conditio"l at ti1e
.
tresel"t til'i e . Vcu can assure G .. "ral Alexen<ler t:rrt tr::s ~ s a'1 all- out attrck . I
e Fre shoot ·11~ tl e works . "
,
__
1
1
•
I
r
Gru~nt er to Ac'I anM CJ . ::rn 1~5. ''Troop Carri.""r Cor ar.:'I r•rorts tr..nt
ht"!a .r fla'• r,,13.l·~s 1"Prb0rour;r >1rop i.mrractic<ibl"' f'o:r ?Sth . G--in"'r[ll Cannon will
a' e t"1orou~i- study o" flak situF.tio11 to arrow ~n cr"ler to settle confl·· ctinC;s . ' 1
Gru,..ntl-ier to Advance GP . R'J 7~12 . "Assu e trat no decisi.on has been
roached ooncerninCT ~srac"ute ~
ou. I" • ,~ ,rronr, ae ine ur,rently.'
-------.;.
�~
As of this e •P-in~ ther" have been 1,357 casu.nlties Fon~ Fifth Ar~y for ces on tr."! 1)eecrihead s-i hce ti1e 1ep;inning of tre all-out offensi e '!ay ?J, 1944.
Durini:: t t same reriod o" time 2, 633 prisoners of war have been tak"n in this
sa"' sector .
*
*
*
ANZIO--!¾.Y 26 , 1q44--0rer1,,tiol"s Instruction #?4 1.e.s issu."d today. This dire cts
I Gorps to attack to_ thi-. north!!est, c:;e~ z-= n , the rrl'lni-.:.."Rl line Lanmrio - Ca. poleo e station and fro thri.t r: r'•rPl line rress on vigorously toward Rome. The
attack, as outlini-.d in this Or-.r~tions Instruction, div~rts part of the VI Corps
force i'.'1. a new trr 1st northwest tol"mrd Rone . Th~ att'lck toward Valmontone still
continu•s a.s in t¾e ori inal rlan Btfi'I~ALO .
1
At r915 General Clr>rk left with BrigP"li..er Goodbodv and his British aide,
C1mtnin Lnnrson for tl e 1st 3:ritisr ~1ivision where he conferred with r-t ,adie.r
Loewen ~nd General Gregson-Ellis, Connander of the 5tr British Division. mhe ·
toric o~ discussion was t:be f8rt that the 31:itiqr Div~si s w~ll play i..n tl.e
attack . T!1ey are to .r>.ssif:t tl-e attn.ck 11 rusl in,:,; ~orward stro.,,_,~ co. oct petrols
a11d increased fir"'s 8lo:'1~ the entire rront. Bott ~jvisions will conform to tre
advance of "tre Divisions on treir ri ht .
Gtmeral Clark return~d to tr e co1"111n:nd i:ost nt 1030 and hed a press conferenc~ at wricl-- ,~ or-ien-l;ed t:1e rress on the new Attack to kke :rlace later
this orn~n ,. He exrlA.~n~d to thel'! that !;r is attR.clc ,as a direct threat towartl Rol'!e a:>1d tru 1 t it would e push"'d vigorously - that it WPS an all-out 2ttack
and th<it h"' was shootirr, the wo1~'rs. Gt'!nl'lrt,.l ClPrlr brou rht out thf!t the German
was in a bad rosition f>.nd thPt tr 1 s n""w attaC'k was launched so tbnt we do not
lose nny impetus to t!-1" ,, ins already rnc>de by tr'e brid ,!'!head ~orces. ':'his attack pusr ing YJ.o.,,.th rest c~n r,ain for u11 tre hi.11h r;round 110~·th and soutl1 of Velle tri wl-iich would force the G~r:--ia:1s to withdraw fro. tr e entire area to the northwest and v :rus}1.inr1 vigor usly northward towRrd Rol"le ,e rd.r,ht craclc a svdtcb rosi tion which we knov1 to bl"! prep:'1red bet een Lake Albano Md tl-e Tiber. The
press as'ked se eral questions whic:1 Gen,.,ral CJ.Fr', ansvr'"'r""d frnnkly and to the
point .
At 1115 Gen-,ral Devers t=irri V1'd by cub t>nd CE' ., i 1'di:>tely
COJ1U'l4nd post .
General Clnrk orjented General Dev~rs on
and what he contenplr-ited to do as t11e ::>tt1:1 c1,(" todny rrowessed .
le+'t tod4y Pt noo:>1 and ~ent direct tot~ VI CorTs co~-and post
Clark 1 s
to G""n!'!r~l
events to date
Gen~ral Dev ,:l's
at Conca.
General Clc--rk cmf""rrer1 with G~neral Brnnn Pnd stud.:.ed rrogress of the
b~ttle in the •arly f8~t of tre a.:'ternoon and at three o'clock left for the
co.Mand rost of the 45th and 1st Armored Di i~ions . !Ie discussed with tPese
Division CoriManders -l;le siturtion at t eir i ..; ::ate fronts ~c" ::..eRrned first
hand how the attack as pror,ressi".l.g . He r~turn•d to the co 1a11d post at 1745.
Highli :hts of t:., Fifth Ar .y 1 s pror;ress toc-iy were thrt reco-rnpissance
eleJ"lents had r~acPed Art.,na. Th"' 14t~, 45th and 1st J'rmored Divisions read made
r,;ains or abo1 1t ,., ,ooc yarc s to tl1~ 11orthwest. T "' '3rd ;)i 1.sion anc1 Special Cervi.ce Force w~re also :--•.1shing northw,,rd. r:1-, ents o~ the '3J~d :Ci-vision were just
sout.1 of. Artena . On the TI Corrs ~"ront the hir:h P,"round to the i'lest of J irerno
was t....
<i.ken bv th!'! 139th In+>antry. We had r/1\connf'i•~s nee ra.trols in Sezze. In
�lt
1,_ l.P
the French sector some advances were Made , ,sr"lcially on the right where ele ments had passed through San Giovanni to the north . On the 1!:igrith Arf'l'y sector two bridgeheads have been established ncross the Melfa River , and tank
units were rushing out to the northwest .
The following important messages of the da;::r are quoted below:
Clark to Gruenther . ·RU 8124. "Represent strongly to S-"ville the fact
that ten cases occ11rred yesterday where.our ai:- ~ttricked our own troops in the
bridgehead area . Brann ;1as offered a solution. Flease see that imr1ediate
steps are takl'!n to correct th is d:lffi culty. Last night at about 7: 00 P . r.,. ,
eigl1t f' - 40 • s attacked 3rd Division colullln 1)e'0ween Cisterna and Cori, killing
three and wounding twelve . Those ,.,,is sions 'nhich do not check in with our forward control nust keep clear, ~,ust give this place a wide herth. 11
Leese to Clark. WT 2609. "This is a great day for the Fifth Army so
finely er.r-ned . On behalf oft):-,~ "":ighth Army I most heartily congratulate you
and your troops . 11
Clark to Leese . RN 8170 .
tions . Hany thanks . n
11
Deepl;r appreciate your raessage of congratula-
General Gruenther sent General Clark t1'e following memorandum at noon today:
"General Alexander arrived here at 11:15 this morning and reriained cbout
twenty minutes . He was acconpanied by Lerm1,itzer . He ask~d if he could drive
toward ':'-:-:RRACI'JA , and I told him 'certainly, Sir' $ Iie is i'Tell pleased with
A.. f'l
C.
the entire situ.c'ltion, and was w:,ost compliFentary in his references to the Fift,hl.
Army and to you.
T explained the plan of today ' s atta.ck in the bridgehead as outlined in
your radio, and as :1"urtrier amplified by yon while you were here yesterday.
General Alexander agreed that the plan is a 1sood one. He stated, 1 I am for
any line of' action which tre Arr·J Conw,nnder believes will offe:r a chance to
continue his present success 1 • Ahout five l'.'.'linutes later he said, 'I am sure
that the Army Co:mr1ander will continue to push toward Valmontone, won't he'? I
\:now th.t he npprecfrtes tre r'portance of.' e:iining the 1-igh ~01.U1d just south
of Artena . As soon as he captures that he ~ill be absolutely safe. 1 I assured him that you had that situation thoroughly in "'lind, and that he could de .. l');r.
pend upon you to execute a viigorous plan with all the :!"ush in th~ world. I
am certain that he left w:Jt}-i no r:1.ental reservations as to the wisdom of your attack. He stated that if you are able to capture the hieh .c;round north of Velletri it, would put the enemy at a serio11s disadvantage, and would practically insure the success of tl1e bridgehead attack . He j_s looking forward to his visit
to the bridi;ehead tori,_orrow .
11
.i/-.
"Joe Cannon called to find out the status of' the parachute drop . I advised
him that Plan 1 B' was definitely off, and that you hnd SlL"IW!oned Yarborough for
a cor"'"'rl'mce to c'eterrnine tte f'easibilit;r of a dr<?r in the Coli Lazzoli area .
---Joe is .,...ost eager for a dror . He sup;z~sts, A.s did St-'lville yesterday , a drop
north of Rome . I told him that you had given tru:t Fiatter careful consider~tion,
but at tMs noment such a mission see, s inadvisabb . Joe said that he was
"1
�going to keep thinking of other possible missfons, And thl"t he vrould probably
be offering lousy su~gestions :rorn time to time. I told hi~ to go ahead because you were always glad to recei-ve new ideas. 11
General Clark later in the afternoon replied to the abov-e memorandun as
follows:
11 Your 1?20B memorandw. of the ?6th has just been handed to rne.
I hope
you have been able to tell General Alexander by t:tis V'Tie thPt we have Artena
and are no doubt pusriing well on towards Vnl;,,ontone. I did not deter from
sending a strong -;:...orce in that direction in compliance with his instructions.
The other advance is going well. I am a. little confused as to vihether the
enemy is going to ""ake a stfl.nd on the prep..,red f'OSition running east and west
through Velletri. Ee must, or lose considerable of his force.
"I visited the British Corinnanders this morning and urged thern to in=
creased effort. I b"lieve there is only a shell in front of tbern.
"Devers spoke to me th:i.s rnornjng about the parachute drop. ·I told him I
was not going to be stampeded into a 1 two-bit I effort under Plan B in the vicinity of r1ount Malaina. It would contr:ibute nothing, in my opinfon, and just
satisfy sor,,e of these birds who wnnt to see somebody drop~ Besides, the nir
screamed 1 flnk 1 at that point. I would like them dropred on the Colli Laziali,
but I can ir.',a.gine how far I will get witl~ the flak holler. Yarborough has
been here, an<l I have told hiM of _my desires. They are studying it.
ttrn
would b'°'
I can do
zation.
head and
my opinion, to drop the handful of ~rachutists, 500, nortr of Rorie
perfectly futile. I will dror thent when the situn.tion dictBtes and
some good by the e:xrenditure of at least a part of that 4'-ine organiIf son"tring does not show ur soon, I will bring them "nto the bridgeuse thel"' as ground troops. T told Ile'V';l!)!'S all of this.tt
Clark to Gruenther. RV 8165. 11 VI Corps just re:rorts bornb:Jnis of our tank
units in the Artena area wi tM.n t:he 111st two hours. This is seriously affecting morale of our troops. They report oth~r instances have occurred today. I
insist that air units wro CA.n not :identify our troops k"'lep out of this area.
Please take drastic 2ction to see that this is done. 11
/
At 5:30 this evening General Gruenther dispatched the following menorandum
to Gent"!ral Clark:
11 I am very much disturbed to learn that the air is bombing our own troops
\
again. I got in toucr with Ge"leral Sr>ville imrnedfr,tely, end he is taking every
possible :ri.eans to see that such jncidents do not recur. He has forbidden all
air to enter the line included between t:be following linits: Bomb line Valmontone - Fighway 6 to Rome; thence down LMa Ror1a; along the coast to the bomb ·
line. According to the 4 nstructions he has issued no planes will or,erate in
that area except the control bv AGORif, "J"'icD is the forwrrd control in the
bridgehead area..
11 G"lnera.1 Sairille is very eager to get further details of' the Artern1 bonibing. He is thorou~1ly cooperetive in atteT1J.rt:ing to avoid it, but I get the
impression that he <loesn 1t 1mo"' 'V:at to do in addition to th"l instructions he
has already laid down.
�t09
11 General Keyes has just left here.
Fis attack in the Sezze area is
going very well, and there is at least e reasonl'!ble chance that he will be
on the Sezze heights by e11rly riorning. We are "'10W rla"Ylning to have General
Crittenberger take over coy1rnand at 280001. · e shall know by noon tomorrow
whether or not the transfer at that time is practicable, but as far as I
can tell nmv it is quite feasible. Generel Keyes, will have a small advance
party at your headquarters by ~ o I clock in tl,e morning in order to be
oriented on the operation wMch YOU des1.re to hrw"' him 1Lndertake.
11 Your 1530 memorandum just arrived.
We are rill very rleased over the
pro.:;ress ,wM ch the bridgehead attack is n:'lking.
"Genl'Jral S2ville f .. els thPt there is a reasom:ible chance th~t the bombing of Artena was done by an ACCR 11T mtssion. 11
Gruenther to ClPrk. R:lf 18'7. n-•aville has cancelled all Pi.neapple mission south of' Hir;hvnly 1 and Hi~hway 5, and issued orders to close down Acorn~
This is from 5: 30 memo. 11
The total casualties in the beachhead from th·e opening of the present
attack to mid!J-ight tonight 1'.mount to 3,579 American a11d 199 British.
Gen1'ral Juin today issued the following Order of the Day to his troops:
11 With thl"\ end of the first phase of the offensive T.Jr"rked by the total
defeat of' the cnemiy who opposed us and by the Junction of all Fifth Arri.y Forces, I salute piouslv our r:;lorious ·dead, ,,.,110se n.<=tnes today, ,join in the Legnnd,
tJ,ose many H~roes of our rnce wr o fell on Italian soil during the centuries
of hj_story.
"I express my sn.tisf'action encl grrititude to t"be troops stpffs and services who carried -'rnto battle so '1Uch courrge, faitr, intelligence and abnegation.
"Rivaling with audacity, tJ.,e units o+> the Fr<"'nch E:x11editionary Forces sue ..
cessfully cracl,:ed two strongly organized ene:rny positions and fought continuously
and without rest side by side witr our gel lant Allies.
"A deep advance wMch has already attained /,,,5 kilor,eters several ene-rny
Divisions annihilated, "lore than 4,000 rrison~rs (of wrich there were 110 officers), and nuch "10re jri:rortant enemy mnteriel CR.ftlJI·ed, sue}" is th~ result,
to date, of the ~J'ictory gained by the F.F..C. The echo of this vi;:tory, charged
with hope so'mr'ed in the her,.rt of all r'renchme:'1 and elevrted the B.dmiration of
the Allied Co"lllanders.
"Another phase, ,rr:tch will tn.ke us fnr is now openinp;; the F .E.C. will continue to 1
1old hi.P,h tre> proud colors w1,ose Appearence on Mou'1t 1Majo I terrified
the Gnrman and signaled his i'etreat.
"For1vard always forward.
11 T1'"";
HC'HR.
()V
LIB~'l'I0>;,T IS '-IEAR. 11
�l1
0
A'"ZIO- -·•\V:- '27, ·19/+4-..farly -':.:bis rorn1ng 'ontill'.3 :;-lA.nes flew ov6:..' th,, port
ar8a a.nd 0.rorr0.cl sol"le bo~bs . C""fice1·s ann "'18n. rtayi nf! thP c~ stle urstairs
were -f'0rce{ do"ll into t 1 1e tunnel. The a;)..ert last11c:'l f'or a..,0ut Pn 1 our .
Ge11eral Clar', arc-se early ancl stt'c "ed rro resc- made "'Y t:10 1,eachhe c1 +>crces durinr; tre Tl~ ,~t . There were i"lany v·sitors to trP col"''T!a'1r' post today.
First to arriw, wps .Go-'1°rr,J. 'foce, G-3, .AFHQ. Be conferred vr'th Gene:N,l
C Prk ,r' efly, w110 oriPnted him rr. t: e situation, and then left to visit
frort li~e di.visions.
A'"te:,.~ GenerPl •roce left, G~r8rf'l Sn,•·tlle caJ"B in to c'H sc'lSf' with General Clr:ci tre ~rci.<lerts wl'" d1 c-ccurred ir -rrl- ic'1 C'U~ tr.oors r.!ld beer. bC'mbed
by our ovm aircra..:t. A bor. 1 ~110 wil: )e Astabl isrnd short of wr :::.c. forward .cm1t:col ca'1not Ni:rn~ t n11y bcnibing sorties. After GenArr 1 J,,,ville left
Gen8ra:.s Jo11·1pon £rd Fur,A cr;1Je t, co'1..f'er witr. Genert>l Clark refcr,mce t e
O'!';U}."'l'tion rf' Ro"'!? b. tl e F:i.ftl1 A1•y,y. GenPr~l Clnr'l- ~~ntE'd t0 or-tent tl1 eP1
1uic'.klv ""1r1 ra,re tl1em rre1 ared to accoFpany him -into Rc:ne s0 tl Rt re cou~_d
··Y'!mediate1_v re-''er 2."l ,Ptters 0-r ti,.,, city f'dniin-1 strfl.tior. tot er.
AftP-r Gonr~~ls Johnson ['nd qumq 1e~t, General Gammell, Chi~f of Staff
t0 Genern.l 'Hlson, CI {C "'editerr~n'3an Tl:9<1.ter, arrived to vi. it t. e two
British Div::.s::'..011s in Fifth A.rry Pr>d tc corfer briE'fly with GP,nPrl"l Clark.
~e Wf!S acco~pan-led by rigRniPr mronpson.
At 101(' General fl.lexander prrived Pccr'"'~nind by Gorerrl GP non aYJ.d
Bri.gad i.er 1 •cirreri.n~. General ClA.rk or:· entBd GBnerr- 1 Alexann.er a11.cl Ge'."leral
Ca"l't'lon 1Jriefly on events to dP.te at tl:-E' 1,eccl ead front, and the party left
, imnedj ately' b•r jeep for tre VI Corr<'! c0"':mand no'1t rere tl.ey con''erred with
GenP.ral 'T'ruscott . From tr e VI Corps cor>1mRnrl ,-~st the rarty ;ent to Cisternn .
Tre to,m vas comrJ etely 'l~eclred and in s am'-ilo. • Abandoned arc destroyed
GerTan 0quirnent were strem on the roarlsi'.ies, , ·' ,.,T".mu..."li.tion wt>s abPndonen .
Tre scrme WBS t;,,'J;'~cal of' many areas f'rom 1,1c:b thP Gflrman hfl9 bee11 driven
by t '1e Fift1 Army.
From c:ster'iR t' e rart went to tre 45th Division comT".and post to rliscuss tl e sitwtion on tre:r front. Fror- the 4Sth I..ivision cor"'lft.no rost tre
YJ.ext stop was the 1st Armored D~vi.sior vrrere Generc-1s Ckr'I" and. Alexander
discussed w.;t1, GenAral PPr,.,,on thA 1st f\I'Jrlored e"forts rdnce tl e beac head Pt tack e ,an. The 1st J'lrmored was in thP rrocess of regroupinr, foinr, back into
rear areas in rrerPrA.tion "'or an all-out attac1:: next 'kmdey to:ward Rome.
Fror the 1st Armored com.mand post the rarty went to tre: 5th British Division
and frori there to the 1st British Divjsion .
~eneral 'lexander an➔ h~s rerty left iT'1111ediPtely upon treir r8turn to
tre Fi.ft Army adw nee com11and rost +>or AAI Headquarters in c~serta. GenP,rr,l
1
Cl1'1.r1r c P,cide>d to. i'ly bPc' k t ,8 iftr Arrv corlr'end post in t fl vicinity of
San •rarco in order to d::: scuss with his Chief of Staff , Gen8ra~ Grui=mther , 1.m:rorta:"lt mritters concerning the II uorr,s a11.d Frm,c}, Corps "rents. He wished
to discU~8 in pnrti cu1t"r w~ tr GP-neral Juin tr e rossil)ilities of send~n~ up a
Fren-JJ.1 Division to tl e beE!ci he11d to assist ·i.n rushin~ on into Rome. Re also
wi=mted to P.xpeditP. f' move111en-f; of r::: Cor-rs to tre beac1'.hevd f'roT'1t "in cr der to
utilize II Corps Headqu.:"'rters in a drive towi.rd Rone . He intends to fly
back tonorrow T11orn-1.nr, P"'ter these d.! <Jcussions take pltice .
~
~
�ll l
Hir:hlights of todAy 1 s battle progress were HS f ollons: Limited P dvances
were rrede by the 45th and 34th vivisions Pgainst determined GermPn resistance .
The 36th Division had relieved the 1st Arnored :-Jivision, and the 3rd Division
had rushed "1ore of lts units up into tre _~.rten.a area. A new task force was
formed, called Shepherd T2.sk Force, wliicb coi-i.s:i.sted of the 15th Infantry less
one battalion and with one b;:ittalion of med.i.um hmks . Its mission is to attack vigorously tovrard. Valmontone and seize and hold that locH.li ty.
On the II Corns f'ront Sezze had been occup7ed and rdvrinces were made to
the hi.gh r,round. further to the northeast. In the French sector, although
prof:;ress was slow, some advances were made . On the Bighth Army front the 5th
Canadian Brigflde hr d tA.ken Geprano and was pushinc• forward on a new objective
to tre northeast called Pofi. The seizure of Ceprano by the Canadians will
relieve to some extent pressure on the French r:l1ht flAnk rlong the Sacco
River o
General Clark's notes on today's Pctivities are as follows:
"As I have often indicf'ted, the direction of etteck assigned me for the
Anzio effort vm.s in the direction of Cori - Valmontone . This w2s due to a
long-standin~ , pre-conceived idea by Alexander , instigated by his Chief of
Staff, Hardin~. It was based on the false -premise that if Route //6 were cut
at ValmontonP a German Army would be annihilated . Tris is ridiculous, for
many roads lead to tl-,e north +'ram Arce, '7rosinone and in between. I was
forced into this attack, but it had a 6ood feature in thrt it took Cisterna
and gr:ive us the o½servation in Ue area of Cori. If the going became tough
on Valmontone I could shif't the weir•ht of my attack to the northwest . ::xactly
this has happened . All German troops "ithdrawing from tl--e Cisterna area have
taken a position between Velletrj and Va lmontone . This area has been reinforced
from tl e Britisl" ,"est flanl· ~rea and b;· t½.e Her:mi->n Goerin~ Dj_vision. Once we
advanced to Valmontone it would be difficult to turn west ~n road via Route #6.
Cornri,.mications alone would r1ai:e this impracticable . I therefore directed VI
Corps, as indicated in Operations In"ltruction.#24, which is quoted below. The
attack is pro':;I"essin~ slowlyo We will hreak the Fnction Line to wrich he is
withdraw:i· . .,., and 1rre will ca.pture Rome. It i.s just a question of time now .
0
, . t1The j1mction of the two forces day before yesterday was a grand event
for the Fifth Army. It completed a si.xty- mile drive through the mountains by
II Corps with two newt:' . S . Divisions . I had to be on hand for tre official
Junction . It meant more to me thrin anything since our success P.t SPlerno . I
have now ordered II Corps into the beachhead with ' t} e view of putting t,"O
corps into the attack with an all-out drive to capture the Colli Laziali area
w}ich mean:c:: the early fall of Ro,,,e . It will be desperate figJ,ting , but I must
maintain the impetus of 011:r attack and take advantage of the remornlized,
shatterecl condition of the enemy. Fifth Army alone has captured over 10,000
prisoners in two weeks , kill0d ano wounded as many and destroyed great qu;e,ntities of enemy equipment. The enemy will have diffic11lty mriking a deterMined
sta11d wHh l1is hodge- podge mixture of units against the trrust of the Fifth
l\.rmy.
0
11 1st Armored Division ' s efforts were not success.ful yesterday, due to
great resistance Mouth of V9lletri and poor tank terrein. Truscott has put
36th Division in ~ts place , regroupinr, Harmon in order to c1rive in the 45th
�l l 2.
Division sector wrere the terrain is better.
ThPt shoul1 t~ke plRce tomo~row
P.nd lT\PY break th0 c~mel' s back.
nr _ave continually telked with my British Co...,,,.,.an.ders in an e-f'fort to
en~r~ize trP.~ ~~to Pn Attack. There i9 Po P~tac left in them. Tre 5th Division· is poorly led by Ge~ern.l GrP, ,9on-"";ll is. :re h~s no oNensive 1yd.rit .
Brit;Pd-· er ;,oewen, wlio has iust 1nen put in co:r.rnpn<l o-" t 11e J:st Division is better, alt 1oup:h new <>nc: yo,mg. I f'TT\ sure l-ie dll rus:-1 fo:t""Tard witr :iore vigor. 11
1
Import~nt nessa ,es of the day Freas follovs:
General Gruenther this r,iorninr; dispr>tched the following nemorandum to
General Cl~rk:
"Four dPys p ,o I took up A.t;Pin with AAI the question 0:f speed:lng up the
arr:vBl of tre J.<'1l8nce of tle Qlst Pivision. I vas advised that they are still
scheduled to Pr~ive rere ~hout June 15, ann that this date can not be adv~nced.
Yesterday: spoke to GenerPl AlRXP~der E'~out it, and hP, sai<l r.e certPinly
agreed that we needP,d it row on' th<>t he woulr do everytl-dn he could to get
it. Last rie1 t re sent a !'lessage to Al.,.,HQ !"""'kb, "!:.re request. :::: Gfoke to G~inel aho11t it 1est nir,ht anc' he saii t! Pt --1;1 e instructions fron the Combined
C' ;efs of Ste.-i--"" conc0,rninc- tre cover r ln~ 1 ere so de"i11ite t}'f't le r1oes not
soe how it ~n ossibly 1:-e r ade evailr-hle to us Ft t' ·is t5m 0 • All o-" t rt, I
believe, is 1baloney 1 • I su,;eqt tl-iet you tak~ the ~atter up wit~ GAner~l ,
Alexander todny and A.lso dt: 'foce anrl Gn1mel. Inc.; rlentr,lly, L"'nmitzer st::-tes
that it is his uncerstandirrr thFt the balance of tl e 91st vill not leave forth
Africe 11..11--l;il June 15; :!n fnct he is 1ui.te cnrt~in of thE!t. Hovever our -inforrztion :is t½at it will arri. ve here Junn 15.
11 G8ner? 1 De·:ers ca 11 ed 1 ti st n.; rt to 8tate th, t ' e shall get -:. e 517th
Parachute RCT as or:: t(~E.lly plenned, but t-i-Ft o'IT ~eq'1est fo.,.. tl:o 5"i0th Glirler
Bn eni the '551st Ferachute ~"l will ½e d.; rPpproved. I tMnk th=it these units
are to be tr~in"'d for 7tl Ar~y use. I suggest t Ft you Plso <li~cuss this nQtter wi. tb ./1 le:xander, Gm,mel t:ind i'oce. P. s you ~; 11 reme"'lber t:ra 517th "'s e :ng
,ive:'1 ,o us to 0btain P :rnri..o 1 of h:1.ttl e-qier :nnce. "t seems to Me tb1t the
sarre ar"1.L'ilent ~roulrl 1.1n-r.l for t1-- ~ S5Ctr f'n -J. t' o '.>5lst.
11 GenAi."a1 Ale:ia>nc'er
,~ 1"' derf'rt c::h0rt:.y <ifte,.. ! ~ s c,"lf'eri=:rce. Le.I"" estiT"'atec:: tl--iPt tl1e der 01 rtl're t,•,.,,, will be 10 o 1 cloc·'"• Cannon will be v:,·t1 1 i!'1
bu-s it haa not -yet be3!' c'eci.rlerl -i-:r f>t P,r or '10 4; ~1[,rr"'rir-<; vrill be ··1 -tlin Jcirty.
"I ta""',.P,d to 'i~rhorou
a'1t Idr~s 1':'"""oor Ct>.,..rie:r Cor"lf11d) .,-este""'ri<i.7 f'f,errioon Pbout tJ:-e, Coll:i kzzol· dror. '!'le' ~re cP.rt1.11.n:y "lot ent1,·1c;'=<:i.sti.c
o er t e ros ... ect 0"' dror~i.r , ·ln t 1Pt area.
"I ha e just veri ,.iP.d t' ~t de}x'r
Africa f' ho·1-t -Ju"'e 15th. 11
1
-ir~
ff'te.
L8rr. i.s ri '1t.
ThRY sail
.p,,.o:-, •rort
A report rrom G-? today nulTl~er~d the rrisoners as 0-P ?100 ~6 r~
'1,850 taken by Fifth Arn;~ R•y' 3,?lt tn -,n y =·i ,hth Arny.
As o.p '100n today 1,B43 Amr,r~.car bat+, 1 e cas·ta lt~ '"'S
been ad,itted to osr~tf'-~ ~n t e rz·o are&.
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F'1C
rs
"l~ B:--itish
ave
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l3
Gei19ral Clari.. this afternoon sent the followinc T'."enorandum to General
Gruenther:
ttGertainly hav-e bee·'1 bomb rdec=t with hrass h.0o.ts today. Believe ::e have
st:::a~ r;hte'1erl out tl'e nir contro,1 9rsy with S8ville . He will tell you, of
course . tiave he'ln all aro'r.'lrl tbe fro:1t »r:ltl1 Alex, and l e see'!"ed neetly
f
please.:: er"1 ,,e·('y flatteri''lf; i r H s rci:rn::ir 1:s of Fift1,, Army., I a skec1 },im to }
prod t!-1.e two BrH:l sh Div~ sio:rs, ahic) 1~"'! did.
le ere making prc,-;ress with
34t:1 a 1d 45tr. . '1:'re.r nig1·t cc '1Cei'7'!lt'llur 00 on tr8ir Carnroleone JtPtion Laninrio objef!tive toni 11t hit l1P~re ._;us+, seen Faul Faschal ur forwarc' , and
he t½.inJ.s not . T' ,1~e :l s st:::-ong opposi tior, ,: n tre wad dies ..,rom machine gux1s ,
self- propcllec Y'lOU'1ts . Trcse are p9r: ar s d9la;v:nr- dc,t,wh"'lents ,+ile the
mai'1 h')cly r;oes back tc tle T'nction Lin,~. The rressure 1,y 34th and 45th
st..o"J.l:l out-;riaY19 1 1vc,r tie G9r,"12ns -'11 :'ron+. 0:' t' e :st and 5th '"'1~-ttis 1 :8ivisio·'13 . 1st ~r~ t · .J, is pus:.::.11..-r on in confcrmit.l ith Birdie I s ndvance .
1
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11 Just received your not-3 rc,com.11end:5n~ ··nlease of II and VI Corps .
What ·i 1s1-,irrscl :fuJl" recor-mendation·1 I :,a7e had it in :mind and intenJ to do
it, 1-m-i-, I ju::t wonderc,d : f bJ any cLrnce JeVf'lrs Lad discussed it. Tte :Jecretary of Har all·eady announced the II Gorps, so Keyes is al1 eady ir. t~1e
clear . .,,ruscott I s nane 'ms l-ieen released as co:r:n1andin~ a forr-1ation, and
as soon as h~ Las r:m1pleted a phase of his attack .,.. intend to corT1E:md him
and the 'ifI COl],S and ther announce it, but I do no;:, t0el that his o::.s.rpl.oits
1 12.ve 1 188!" sufficiently outstandh:,
yet to warrart +hat coT'lmondation. Yo·u.
know 1 ha7e always waited 1.n1til soret} ::ng l:'as reall,t happened before : conne'·1d . Incicle11tally, I discussed with Alexander the releasing of ..:..loan and
Coult:r vcitl t' 8 :numbers r/: their divisions . Follow up . It wo,1ld be a
great 11oost for training norP.le in the 0tates .
1
1
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HAn1 letting Don cori.e do,vr1 fo1~ h.is Sat111~c1a~r n::.r+~t .
Ile will be bac]{ i.n
tl'e 111orn~ ng. I may conceivably "'ly down lrater l',u.t rrobably v·ill not . There
'is notl ~ng oim; on l er") of a sensational nature .
11 C' Drniel 1s Affort to cut ac1·oss to Valnontone h8s been held up , due
to some clean5n~ up of 'Jocl,e in tL., Arte11a area . ]e l"opes tc send the 15th
In<''antry, less one ,1.s.tt&li·'J,1., and witl1 a 1:xitt.alion o-P tan-;cs, td 1 s and eri6 i \ 1ers, to c11t tre roed to Valmo"ltone to11ie;ht . It will
a lmzardous task .
½e
t1: have ',een 't'ery leni~nt in perr-,~ t ting r eople to cone ur here . I
spol~e +:.o Alex "'bou4:. it and said 1e must TT'a; nte ir. tl e rr-lnciple th.ot no one
ca'1. -:;ome witl:cut n1y 11.utLo:city.
,!hen th· bi,; 2.ttac'lr is on here for Rone, I
will +;ry to s1 ut dcwn except for Alex if he ins:: sts on coning .
HHeve ordered Johnson and Hu.me to bring their gan,:, up . As the time
shortens 1,ef'ore our ent:r-ance to Romo, I rmst h2ve 8ccess to those people ns
questiors cone up . Tliey will nove t 1 0i:;:· 7,00C stront:, outfi.t ir. to an area
des: ::,1ated by Brann, yresu.rnably e.round Li ttoria .
"fith Don away tl is evening, I will stay here and may fly down tomor~
row and get a swim. H
G·ffriern.1 Juin today issuec tr·e follovd·11; ;11emorand1:u;; to bis cownanders:
fl
�l l4
111. The G2rerRl Corr.'01rncFng I"re 11ch Expect-· +.ionary Corps 'ms been shocked
by the compla;11ts made by 1• • ".G . relAtive to tl""' attitude of certain elements
o+' ..-:irPncL Troops toward the Italian popui:-.,+,ion in the course of our recent
advFnce .
Acts of br5 p,ndar,n have bee11 cc"'lmitted . Armed roo Jery and rape
hl've rous-sc~ the people vko 7 i ve in forward areas and Wl7 o are cot1plaining
l-i+,terly to tre Lill fod autror:1..,_ iAs .
Tl'-ere is cause of course to make allovrances f'or exaggeration, but
sue) fncts rim the risk of d-'Lscr9dit~ --:r:; an army Fhicl: is composed pr:iJ"'larily
of Colonial troors . ·
11 2 ..
How8V'er strong 0 11r :eelinr;s 17ay he ar,ainst a nation F 1 ich treache rously betrayed France, we must m8:n~Pin an attitude c~ di~nity.
T 18 :-'rend~ army hes gain9d the respect of e~:eryore on the Ital:._an
battlefield . It should be easy to cement t>is rerutatfon by adopting a correct E'_ttitude in ,1 con.::pered country toward n. people who are experiencing at
tris ~10111e 01t t1'8 t'1ost terrP)] e horrors of Y!ar .<>nd •rhose lot is pitiable in
the e:,res o:: our ollies w} o are charged w:it':1 the edmin5_stretive resronsibility.
11 3 .
Divisional Oor.-illm.nclers nnd the Commandinr, Ge 1eral of tre Gouns will
take forthwith all tJ--.e necessary sters wrich are required to rut an erirl to
all acts w}i.ic11 are detrimr-mtal to tr e morr le ri.nd :,l,e di ';lli ty of the v:tctor . 11
1
Operations Instruction #24, issued yesterday, is quoted below:
11 1.
The enemy forces orrosirg the beachhend offensive in the CI3TER 1•TA CrYJ.I Area hl've been decisively defeated . The ber,clthead and main :!:'ifth Army
forces :bave _joinerl . Tr.e. overwhelming success of the current bc..,ttle mr 1:es it
possilJle to continue Operation BUFFALO with powerful forces and to launeh a
new attack alonrt, t:1e most direct route to RNiE.
1!2 . 'Jot later than 261200:S J'Iay, VI Corps will attack to seize initi.nlly
the 1;eneral line LAUF\TIO - C:' Il'CLEff\JE Station an¢1 from that general line press
on vigorously on RC' •E . PlaPs +'or this operation ,d.ll include an attack (on
Army Crder) generally +'rom the area of LA\TfJVIO to s9ize tl'e COLLI LAZIALI
mmmtain mass .
Boundar:1 es :
Boundary between VI Corrs and 1 Inf'antry Division
(Br) F g193OO ,_ r 010310 - F 892334.
ether oundPries no change .
11 3.
1 Infentry Division (1'.3r) will by first Eght 26 May relieve the 179th
Infantry Regiment . Acturi.l time at ,,,, ich 1·espons~bility :t'or thi:3 sector will
pass to 1 Infantry Di vision (Br) by agreerrent betwP.en Di vision Comr-1anders concer11ed .
lhen VI Corps attack is launched, 1 Infantry Division (Br) will as =
slst the P.ttP.ck by push:ini; forward strong combat patrols and by j_ncrePsed fires
alonrs the e 11tire front . As VI Corps attack advrmces , 1 Infantry Division (Br)
will co'1form with the a<~vance .
11
4. 5
Infantry Division (Br) in its present zone of action will assist
�\l5
the attack by pushing forward strong combat pntrols and increased fires along
the e~tire front. 5 Infantry Division (Br) will conform to the advance of l
Infantry Division (Br) • 11
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A1TZIC ... -MAY 28, 1944--After conferrinr; with Genera.l GruentJ,-,er during the morning at his forward command post at Stm T1arco, General ClPrk flow brwk to hi~_
advance comr1and post in the vicinity of Anzio and arrived there at 1430. , He
went into an immediate conference with General Brann concerning the continuation of the attack from the old bridgehead ::ront. II Corps comm1:md post has
already been movec1 and is now located about tr.ree and a half mjles northeast
of Cisterna. II Corps will take over the 3rd Division Reinforced, Special
Service ,;,orce and the 85th Division, 1.1'.J'hich will be moved up immediately with
other attachments. The attacr,wmt order is quoted below. II Corps will be
charged with the responsibility of attacking northward through Valmontone and
attaining the hish ground in that vicinit:r, thereby cutting Highway ,¥6 and
preventinrs its use by the Gerrr.ans. It will then cha.n~e its direction of attack to the northwest toward Rone, seizing tind holdin1; the high ground 1mown
as the Colli Laziali and then continuing northwest toward Rome. The VI Corps
, will attack in the morning, employing the 1st Armored Division and pushing its
attack to the northwest and south of the La~o Albano ~rea towarc Rome. At
th5 s moment what the German reaction will be is not definite. Genr'lral Clark's
intentions are to push these attacks vigorously so that their thrusts go to
the north and south of Rone respectively, thereby isolating and bypassing the
city itself. 'fuether or not the German intends to fjght in the streets of
Rome is not lrnovm . It is improbable, however, thPt he will do this. General
Keyes came to his advance corimand post to confer with General Clark concerning
the new operations that II Corps will rmdertake.
After supper General Clnrk flew back by cub to hfa forward comrriPnd post
to confer with General Gruenther. He will hPve Generr, 1 Juin at his comr1and
post there tomorrow at nine o'clock to discuss the movement of a French Division to the ,1ew II Corps front to assist in the attack toward Rome. General
Clark also will discuss with General Cannon while there his contemrlated use of
the 509th Parachute Battalion. He was very upset by a suggested plan of General Cannon to use the 509th Faracrute Br.tt2lion in a crop to assist the ad ..
vance of the Br~tish Eighth Army. General Clark wishes to ta.lk with General
Cannon concernin~ this and frustrate any notions wldch have been o:r might be
taken to use the 509th Parachute Battalion in a fruitless and westeful mf,nner.
General Brann has been working on plans for a ,"1rop of this battalion north of
Rome but tl-e tine has not arrived yet where such a drop is feasible.,
The rJ' Corps ha.s taken over the old II Corps front and for the time being•
after the 85th is attached to the II Corps, will have only th~ SB-th Division.
The 91st Division, :Vhen it arrives in Italy, will be moved up under IV Corrs
control.
Highlights of' today's battle pro~ess were as follows: The 34th and 45th
Divisiohs had moved forvrard about tr;o miles. This forward movement enabled
the British to tnke C8rroceto on their north flank . Pl?.rts of the Unction Line
have already been pierced by this attack. Velletri is not yet in our hands.
�On tl-e north of the VI Corps f'rcnt the '3rd )iv~"lion 1md Spec':il Service Force
ha e pushP-d Pbou+
r1ile ::iorth o+' Artenc. On t1ie IV Corps .-f'ront tl.e 88th Division conti..nued :lts attack northwest thro 1gl' tre nounteinous terrrin. The
French were rushin~ steadil northwest and r.ad kkAn Villa S. Stefano and
Y,iount '1iserno. The,- hrd also occupied Crstro Dei Volsci and 1bunt :Jero south
of tre ('1>1'lcc0 River. '.:.'he EiGhtr Arny rr:ade some a:i:vrnces ',vest of Ceprrno.
1
Important messa;es of the d~y are as follows:
General Juin tod, y sent tre followin
nemora.nclum to Generrll Clark:
11 T1·e U::ip;l tr /i.rmy
..,s crossed t' e Lir:i 11iirer Pnd -ts c1.eboucrin towar•1s
Frosino11e. Liaison 'BS been estAhlisl1Ad w-i_tr t e Anzfo Br-idgehead Forces.
T1 e ~irst ~r~se of tPe battle 0f ItPly is nor ondin~.
nrn a very ahort whilf', should we cc,ntinue on the same several axes, a
l:=irge number of' d"'visions will f'ind tlemselves l'1P'3sed in front of Rome, or,
in ot <"r words, on an extrenel nPrrow f':ro11t, poor in col"l!l'unicr-tions.
11 TrP.re+'orc,
it is irnrort~ nt t'l-i t f'rom no·, on everyone I s mission be clei:1rlT cletcrr-ined i.tl 111 t' e "r?menori.;: of the Army i=ind the Army gr-ours o;err-11
P1aneuver; other ise, ti--0.re would 1--ie "the risk- of a te .... ft-le congestio11. o::
~t~norari0s which 1 ould cri·ise f:' coTiplete 1"'-c1· o_,., po•1er nf"r'inMt l'n eneny ,·hose
onl ~ 8illl is to ~r in ti.'!TJe.
ri A
0
clecision rust t eref ere be nit1de soon.
11 Concern:n.-, the (j_.,.,., 'it -l"ollom-s t' e sc•ut½ern ba11k of t1 e -iricco from S,,-vi
l'-i_o,ranni to r~ount 3iserno. Tomorrow t:1e CEF will bP in front of Ceccano and
therP- buttressin, itself towards the west nf"E'inst the AYJ.zio fm:•ces anC: the
Fourth T• . J. Arrv '":orps ' ill only be able to ·ait for the Eir,;btl-- Army axed
on roari 16.
"Orders hn e been ,brer for tr e 2~tl i'i'hic srould 1 ea.d tre CEF west of
the .,,,r·or:iinon":! ljne of corrr"1mication between rrossedi and Tor-acella.
11 It lws not bAen -noss':.blo to moJre rlAns for t' e ?9+,b and PS tLi11 ,s now
stnnd onlv P. secondPry oreration ~-s eing thou-r}1t of w ich would hve ns its
goal t. e freei"lg o+' t '.e road Jri ·erno-r1ontelanj co.
11 IYJ. riy opinion jt would be desirable tl1 '1t from Frosinone on tl e left, of
tlie '"::i~ th Army +,ake t!-.e rrerPrBl direction Sub8:1co-Rieti.-Terni ard t:bFt the
left of the CJ,;? orient itsel:' on t' e axis frossedi-G1'lvignano-Tivoli Pnd "'rom
there FPJ-:e tts way to Ve 3abine J--il:!..s .
11 :
tl
1
A
see the followin~ ad~rintr ,es i.n t is a~rection:
"l. Should there e a lest battlA f'or Rome in t'l-ie gap of Velmontone
c:;;:r,' couB t'ien be used -l"cr a n.rmkin, Pction erist of Vnlmontone.
Ti'or tre fo :J owi11, O},era-1;~ ons rnd the y-ro ,ressior tmwrds the north,
j1e G'•'?' uouJ<i t'bus nnd itnelf agnin in its ·10·,,n,'ll nos.;+,ion in tle nourtains
11
2.
a,;,, .
.
�to tl·e east of the Tiber. 11
As of midnight toniePt the total battle casualtiAs since the opening of
tre offensive fron tbe Anzio area amount to 4,458 AMorican ~nd 357 Britisl:i.
Frisoners of war since tre beginnin; of the all-out offensive on the
night of 11-12 Hay- total 11,030 ta1rnn by Fii'tl:: ,Army and 3,2Q5 tA.ken by Eighth
Army.
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A!JZIC-~MAY 29, 191.4--General Clrrk flew bl'lck from Ms forward cof"mand post at
Ban ·t<i.rco to his ad.v<1nce co!""rr.ard post :'it Anzio r-t eleven o 1 clock. .t11s mornin, was s:rent co11:t'erri.nr; ,,1.::th Ge'1.Crr> 1 C'rrne"'1th<ir, ]1~ s Chief of Staff, General
Juin, Fwmch Corps Cor,mander-, 1:1nd '1en.ernl Alexnno.er. Upon J:iis return to the
ad,r nee crrnmand rost, '1e received 3ent<>r::i.l 1 ilson, CorinPnd:i.n; Ge-1er~l of IRS,
concernin~ move:n1ent of the bAse section Dfter Ro1'1e is taken. · /\fter Gener.<il
Wilso 1, he rec~i ed Colonel Gray, his JAG, a1d reviewerl ten ~en8rHl court
martial cases. After lunch Generfl Cl?rk receiv0d v~ce Air •~rrshl"l D'Albie.c,
Deputv to Ge"\1,,,,...,,1 Cannon of TAF. ::n mid-rfternoon Generrl Cln.rlr left by jeep
for the advance command r,ost of' thP, lst Arrored :JiYision where he cijscussed
prorress o-f' tPe tanv battle. Forward elenents of tPe tPnxs had arrived at a
line just beyond Valle .Ariccia and Cnmroleone. Tenk losses have been rat.er
heavy. mhe proir.ress of' the tn."1i-s h1d been steP.dy a:rd f8ster t} an the infant,.,.y l"nd l1r-rl nrorrresserl A. considerable rlistrnce tieyon--1 the ~nf.,,ntry. General
Clar1r was very ?r.cdous t•.rt tlie _.nfn.ntry elemerits 0+: tl e 45th and '34tr 7i dsio1s 1-:,e pus' ed .('orwar·d, o~cupy imc'! hold tl'e H ) TOU110 alrerdy tPken by the
tan'rn. J'e d-1 scusc:;ed rri. th G0,11errl rl"rmon ruture ~ctions nnr t?nl:- tLrusts to
the rorth,·rest. On his way bl:'c',. fror: t 1e 1st Armored Division cormf'.nii rost
General Clnrk otorped General T.JutJ.:,r, ,..erutv Corp~ Commander, VI Corps, Pnd
discussed t11e pushin of i'lf2.ntry elements up to the Osco..r Line. Fe also
sto·c,ped General Fasc 11al, Assista:'lt Division Commn.nder of the 45th ::Ji-.rj sion,
who was r;o-;n~ forward to see Gern~r,l Har!"lon, and talked wi..tl-i ri-rn n.1:>out this
same '~atter.
General Clnr::<: returned to Ms comri.anrl post at fi, e o I clock a.mi found his
Chief of Staff, Ge'1eral Gruentrer, ~,ho 1rn.d flovm up -"rom the i'orwArd commri.n<l
post at San ~rco. GeDer::i.l ClFrk :.ren tent into imnodir:te conference with
Gn.:rf!rDls Mruscott, Keyes, Gruenther 8Pd Br"'-nn. Tris conference wF:s called to
coordinate a cortinm,tio:".1 o+" the attacl< by II and V'I Corr s. This attack involves additional , ttacJ,mEmts to tbe II Corps t::iken "1~om tre IV Corps +"ront.
The order issued to cover these attacrr.ents is quoted below:
11 1.
Eff'ective on i.ssurrption of' comrand ~n new II Corrs zone of Pction,
the follovrinr, units r.re re1iev-ed from f'ttrc ment to VI Corrs and nre attached
to II Corps:
3rd Tnfi·ntry Ji.vision
4L~lst A..4.A AW Bn (ST)
6olst Tank :Jestrover Battalion
Howze Task •orce
13t~ Arnored Reg~ment (- lst nnd 2d Bns and Ren Go)
�118
Det 16th Armored =n~:neer Battalion
Det 47th Armored Medical Battalion
751st Tank Battalion (-Companies A and D)
Company A, 805th Tank Destroyer Batta.lion
84th Chemical BAttalion (Htz)(- Companies Band C)
1st Special Service Force
463rd Pr>.rachute FA Battalion (- BHtt8ries C and D)
24 Army Field Regiment, R.A.
36th FA Battalion (155mm Gun)
Det (one 8 11 gun), 698th FA Batt1:1.lion
?. E+'fective 2900018 May, the following units ?re relie'1ed from attachment to IV Corps anc1 are attach2d to II Corps:
11
760th Tank Battalion
776th Tank Destroyer BA.ttalion
105th A.u.A AW Battalion (SP)
2d Chm'1ical Battalion (r-rtz)
Headquarters and Headqunrters Battery, 6th FA Group
59th Armored FA Battalion ( 105mm SP)
93rd Armored FA Battalion (105mm SP)
11 3.
Effective on arrival ft TfZ'O, the following units ere att['ched to
II Corps.
361st ROT
361st Infantry Regiment
q16th FA BattaHon
Company A, 316th Medical Battalion
Company A, 316tr Engin9er Battalion
517th RCT
517th 1 arachute Infantry Regiment
460th Parachute FA Battalion
596th Airborne Engineer Company
11 4.,
Effectbre on assumption of command in new zone of action, the
following units are attached to II Corps:
91st Reconnaissance Squadron (- one Troop)
Headqm1 rters and Headquarters Battery, 36th FA Group
932d FA Battalion (8 11 :riow)
937th FA Battalion (155mm How)".
Important messages of the day are as follows:
General Gruenther sent tle follouing memorandun to General Clr1rk in tbe
early afternoon:
itGeneral Hn.rding just called up ~rom Eirsl1t1' Army 'N1C and str1ted that the
Commnnder-in-Chief has no 1 considered carefull:r your proposal for the French to
ndvance on "'erentiro, anC: thence '1.orthwest nlonr FicJ--.vff'Y 6 to..mrd Valrriontone.,
He weJ comes vOill' proposal to advarice on :'.i'erentino, but }1e c'esires to rqake it
0
�clePr t½f't the F'iftr Armv -u"'t Jree:r t1 e Ferentino - Vvl~ontone Ro<><l clec.r for t' e use of th~ ~:.(!bth "-rrv. I tole' Yard~ nr; ~ '°t "'s "EJr P s - could "'ee , t .is
hd t' e e"fect o-r co"1pletely nullif. in w' ,,t GenerP.l A:exawler "d tolr" you
this '"'10rni11 ,. i-Ie rer-li-ed, 1 -o, tl-r>t i'3 not true . He ,•_11 be 7er,y r,lPd to
1 9Ye tl-e Fre11cl1 l'lnvrnce on F'ere~tino. He conc:;ide-•·s t,h.-.t ~uc [l :,o--e wou~d 1 p• e
the e ,...f'ect o, '_elrh1 ~i 'it ! rm alo11F . But ' e noes in ... ist tht thR ro"'d from
,.,erent~no to 'J'l"lmonto'1.P. muc:. remfl;n c,e"r for t' e "3j ,:htr Prny. Ctl er 1ise it
rri. t ',e irro"sible to ,..,r·11, t' e .,.,i ht' Army ~o "'enr ~n t 0 bPttle :'or J.ome. 1
1 e srent ten m·11utes ar 1..·~rin; t
P. r,a+ter bee)-' pffl fortl, l:>ut F~rding, in tre
nf'.me or Gn•1err 1 ! le""ffindP..,.., stood f; rm. Fe d.: d, 0 eve.,.., Rdd t :! s statement:
1 If the Fi·"tl /rTY\Y -ts
ble to cr.,.,,turP. VrJ.n1011tone, GerP.r"l /llexmr"er ,...,1t'orizes
t e ~.: ftl- /lrmv to '1se r::.rr} · ay 6 i.11 the c0rti.mmt.;on of its attack on RoT'ie . IIe
will +, e"l d.;vert t' e ~ir;l•t tirmy <>-!:; Vri.lr.·1'"'tor0 tor1nrc' !Flestri::1.P f'nd Tbroli. 1
1
0
"As soon as General Ht:.rc.; ,,g 'm1rr u:r T ce llAd C· rpmtier v:r' •c, of course,
does not likfi tl e i.del'l of '10t ">e.;11 <>blA t,.., me T-iir-1 w::v (,. >-Ie in turn ,rro,osen
.
trat t 1 e T<'renc ½e allo•vecl to rroceed towE'rds ...,0.renti.no .?nn n',ter c· yturfn 1<1erenti110 tle'1 cl'O'>S }.; h 'a.r 6 ..,~rl flrlvPnce to•rprds 1-'llestri.na ,,,.:t'-out usinr,; l'.fi ;hv"l.r 6.
PA "(\Y3 t nt G,~"l"'rrl Juin rJll ;"l'OlsiP"'l
,lDl'PY\tee t ,.,t 'e CPU J.<9er aheod
of t18 Rrit.;st-. I:" Grmerpl Ale"":ander rP ,,,i.,.11 "ir ;n ·.::_:: dec'qi.o-'l t:b-,t vre !"Ust
keep t'1e Fm-.qrtino- rpl"'o"l-:.one ror,d '!lear ~ c oubt erv ,..,uc t Pt • 9 nill allov
tbe ""renc "to move no1·t <Y·.r0r "'i.l"'' WA,' 6. m•,e "'r·e11.c' r,,; 11 '1.0t j "Sue tl-e order
""'or t 1 ie Ferqntino adw 1co until to11· · t, so no ac~u~1 hnrm .<1s been d0'1e y0t.
T t' jn'· t'v•t you s' oulrl direct r'1e '-,,... mn1 8 P •.,., 1orous -re"uest to be ril .,_ovrect to cont~ nu8 witl-i the plan " i c' tras Putho.,...ized b. Grmer.?l ~1P-xa.-ric1 er thj"' I"'orninP,. I
sral1 a";~ i. t f'U'-S' er vord from you.
0
nlrn tc execute t e Ferent ·no acvf'nce 011 t' e norni'1 of '31 ~r-.y.
GerArel FPrdin" c:tr>tes t _Ft ~t Arrnv est-im~te th,.,t tier rill capture ""rosinone
tor: · t. T '; FrP>1C "lay t <1t t i.s i:_:, r11. nnt 1s::~stic nrd urn1<1rrrnted esti!"'l.te. ·1
nT 1 e Freno·
1
Gruent er t0 kod .
i. ~· -;r-i ~tel"·. 11
h
1654.
11 Pove 0·1e
tank 1-i::itt.,:,l'on -":;. or-1 1i're:rc
0
Gr1.'ent'8r to llood. . n~T liS55 . 11 Tirir,.,..o'1 n<"ecs ~o
Frobebl·; v-'11 'n-.,.e tc tf' 1 'e L'rom 752nc' Bi:-tt~lion. 11
tDr'r
to Anzio
crews -i'Jl.TlJE)d·titely.
GruAnth9r to 7lood . R"1 2q . 11 :s~ ue orde1·s f' ssignin om RCT ~8th Di v:i sion to
'.::'I Cor"'s . Tt1'1t r,ove ,-;t1-,out c'l0lrpr. ,.,ell IV Corps t rt b~l,:nce of' di•rision :ess
on7 RCT wi.11 fo11o-· soon . 11
Gruent er to -ood . •t:"i 1656. 11 "otif Frenc
CPlled . ...,urt' "r rl.etni.ls w' en I retur"l toni ,;' t . 11
t' nt Ferent-ino attnc1---- is cr.n-
Gruentl er to Clrrr 1r . R'J ')16. 11 149t RCT rer-cl • tr move .
li ll issue order on
belnnce o-r 'iv' sio-1 less one RCT tomorrov, . ?0 tan1 er •'vs vill. be t' ~re by noon
,.
""'uesdri Y' or else . m~n1,. battn lion :7ill bA •·ent ··it'.0·1t riel,, • 11
Gruenther to ClA.rk. Rr 7g5q .
be sent to Anz · o ;:i_r,;in Pt t is t"rie .
c-~errnnent . n~no r o 110'10 . 11
11
Gen.8ral Juin
1 esi..res
He c~n riot iust·Lf'y
tl f't ~rd Di~r·is~on not
t1--.,, -l:;r"11ci,..er to his
�\JD
Genert:'l Qruent'
,1ir,11t ton-: ri:tt.
"?l'
sent t' e follori.'1rr Fer.-or'3ndum to Ge'1Ar;:il Cl11rk Pt r-:id-
11 1 te1ep' on8cl Gf'n ~r~::. Juin tonir -: <1.11.d tolcl J,-,-":m of
our extrene di.sflproint""ent w' e'1 you le9rn8d tl: 'lt G·=mer"l A. lexm1der lrd r·econc,i.dered '1is e".rlier decisio'1 to pernr't t e f'dw1 nee of thP F'rencl Corrs_ in tl e dirnctior.. of :'8rentino,
and t 3nce nort',,ve"'t 10,..•tii o ~ ~-: · · "'Y t6. I exr lni"led t0
t· nt your rl2n nov,
is for tiie rime 'Jorrs to arl. •~nee to tre nort vrest v1itl in its rreset1t z0re, A'l'J.d
ti-·~t PS 1con ns jt 9rr::ves 1n ~• e :-irec sout1 P-r>rit of' VPlmonton,c!, you ,·ill, i.n rill
rrc )A hi. l i_+, ", PrrPn e 1,y rok or 11 crook to ' PVe it cross T-I~ "; "Ia,~ 11:6 o.n<l to cssi9t the Pttric'· of ti e 1: : Cory" nort est frc·::11 VPlT1ontone - boundf-r r or no boundflr;v. Go.,,nrel ,Juin "lbbd t',et r8 ,·ps T"Oc,t un rp to leArn t "t t' e su estion
for t'1a F re1ti110 A.dvttnce }<>( ~9er rE''ecterl, '1,t +,:r,.-.t P. rould rusr 811 out in
tb'> direction i.ndicated b. you, an~ t 'lt yo1 1 cou1c. .cest · rsured t' Pt you ill
rec9.: e lOC''"j rerforr""'lt;e nror11 +;"" ...,renc' Corps.
u
'h~,
1
0
ed t0 '·. Uvt jt' ~'e "re' '1lnr ia no"! jn pror,ress fr tle fnzio
area, rou ne"'t it -'Mnernti.ve to 'a·•e •n1ot""r Civision ti-ere :. ""''3di ... tel:v -'.n af.di.tio'1 to + o qi:,tl r,nrJ. the 8%h, botl of w1 _. c' noulrl re co!:lrni tt"d "'it in the next
roew dnys. I tolrJ ·n t}" t you v,ere reluct.,nt tc '1rinf up nr,<' in t] e question cf
t' e s 1f't o.(> the 1rd nrA, ,ut +,' rt you "'e~t +,' n necessit r for it so .c;rert t 9t
;rou must no·, roriRVJ' t' e request to h<>ve lt ~e.,+ tC' t 1 e 11r_. ,1ce 1 eP'l v1i th all po~s~ ble
<"need. "'"told l·'r- t' nt vou ?Ylt~cir"ted, ·it' -:,•9 one P:",jor rttRck nmrr in yro~ress
a'1d tl e ot 1 er nbont to he 1 "1 nr:',erl, ~• Pt -rou 'cu1r1 100n "Ve t' e :r-iost ur o-rt need
frr a11oth0r divisi.on. I rlso t0l' 1 1-'m t .,t you 7ere brinGing -''1 all srrre prrt
1
eleI'l8;1ts t --t :vo·J. coulrl po sib:;_v r··'1r', · nclud~n~ t' e J 11r~c' ute RCT t'nd the RCT of
t>J.e 01st r-.:•rision, -tn order t0 -ive tro necessvr ~ ,,e-' ,-'. t to t' e ..,ttrick. I f'urt'I· er
strtecl +, nt .,. rns mn·e t Rt the ':..eCe"'~~t r for ar:. <-dditional Ji.vision to hP. 'P.ld 1 <I ,;S
in rrmy resP.rve W'S ev-ident to irn.
f"' 5 tr11 I
P.'CTlil
0
,t
' ~
is br'
~
"Grmerr-1 J·1in repl'.ed t 1 ,,t re \ rnted you tn know tl nt hi'> lo ~1t,~ to . ou
U111_uer::tioY1et1., .,nd t 1 Rt 1 P m·1ld pers0r 7 ly ~ i1.;:8 very nu"!. to do , ou r f', vor.
(" ~
;;o 1ever, e loes not fee1 ti t hE' co11lcl ro"'si.1,1 v- justify t· e trans:er cf a divi~tis~_on to l is n-o:crrmrr t, nf' i=>ci~lly "n •• ~ w ('.., t o r• f'u1f'l r,.f' Ge.,crnl Alr.>X1"•1r,er to
nccert rour S'l; ·,sted Ptnenver for t o AI!Jflovn10 11 c,r:, th1 ""rJ c' Corrs. ·re f'ur-'
t' ~r Pddeci tl t the O er:=itio:'1 1l~ich r'8 ~cl ciu ,est0c1 -:'or t' '3 'rend Corr 3 ~·ns R
mo""t P znrdous op9r<iti.on, "'n' t} "t t1 ° Car ,s stoo11 ri ·oo,' c· f'!l.Ce of su"'fering
heaY'"' c11suriltil)S in tl ~t orierTt·i o'1. I11 sr:ite of it3 cl~ ~ficulty, ho•mv'1r, t e
..,r9nc' FerP. ri.-, in- +.o "18 ':E' +,} js Sf'Cri:':'. ce 'n ord"'r to f1n•t' r J.; E' ;\lli0.c cnuse.
•fo "'.<i:;.d, 'I ,i-ut rlo not ro0el tl t ~ coul~ ever exrlfi'1 t'e t~•q,,,.."or r,f' t':~ c'ivision to e11otr.:ir "ro:--it ~ n vir>1/IJ' of' the r8jection of: t' ~s n"'turf!l , r lo ;ical ren uv ,r. I ccnro"' crnc·.n- ·n ·'tn ~ra.,.,s"'er 'mlo2s an nxt·e. e emer e11cy e-·~ets, ard I
do 'lot bnlieve 4:.' nt t' ,r8 ~ s ::;1 c' a s.;tun+,i.on <>t tbis t.:.m1=;. 1
0
0
1
0
""'" n e t:r-' .' t" et 'o 7 d of' KPmnerer to secU1·e f'u:;:·t 1 ".' c:'etri.7.., ~, '1C'r·n:n
rfll. Juir 1 n rn,ctio'1, ½t·t t•,.,,...e is P hri 1 , •p:-'lc .;r.. rro~··"sJ -nr':.. rr,·p ·~ot
8"''1 "ble "-,c telk to 4 ~-1t. lo ev'3r, ~".!r ~.P-1~.'1 IDA tlrt c-r t' n r'de t o t e cub
fie lri +,~1. '3 F"r-,~; !l ~f'tnr . S r.'"'"'t-i '1 r' ;;' you, :},r:-,:,1
l .Jui:n qvrre "S JC, '<,l bt tl nt
Ge,_,_..,rrl ~. 7 r-"{""rider roul.rl [CCe'"t o·rr ,..::'OJ .... : . ·re
9 ,rir.r ~:ncicn"-,-ion ··11
,
c> n rnrsn.t·· or t• rt ' e '(') i · • ',e mor-;+, Prnoy~r·, i.f 'e r1ce·1 pr' ,- t· ···n- :om, · E"CPUSe
'e ')el:· vec' +,'<it t, e i. ~U"l YA.9 mucl ·~r-rtr-r +, "'1 f' ro7·"ti.c<il 0'18. ·e ..,r· !:,'nt
'o +' 1· 't, rolitic~::. mn.t-':;"'rs 9 Ol' 7 r' ',1, l"c· ottPl"l rt t :is "!r"t·'cnl ~··s'3 oft e
(}A,
--~n
r
�battle .
11 Althou,;'· '1-e'ler21 Juin t'lesi:~es v ,r • n1.e; 1 to ''"'0:1 d d et;, c' in; R di vision to
be se'1t to t e Anzio f're2, : :1."3 ? "nii~8.tion evirl r-esrect for :rou 'Te so ~TGf't trr-t
1 e
v6 ll ,.,e8 1
,en :1 f' _ :rou r8.i se tl1e "'."Oint .., ·a in. I "'.m '7illing to 1·,n ~;er r r-;ood s-Lzed sum thPt if yol'. s' ould say, 1G,-,,, 'l'Pl Ju::..:1., T l rve •i-·en .rou R.n opportuni_.}
t·· to 0:;q~-r:;2s -·our v"ew "n t 1 is rrtter, rnd T respect your judgr1Pnt very rruch;
:-•o,e,er;ue situ,,tion :ls so critical thet: arn no"r COF;Jelled to or·er you to
tlj
sm1d tbe rl.bdsion 1, S-on"ff•al J·1ir: would stn.te, PTery , ell , I a.Pt P goori solr'.ier;
. z_
I s"1all cooperate 1 • "r sur;,.,;estj 0:1. iR thPt you J_et the natter 2ir1r1er ::'or another \\uti
da~-r. Tl,e roads to II Gon)s '"::..11 1:.18 ··rstt;r vrell cmvested f'or t>e next tJnree
days 0n r} o•, ujt 1 tt~e r1ov-e;:nent of the ~5tl· and tr e :C:Str T'i j sions, tre tm,.1': 1
1
')rtta1 f1~0F1 tl e rJ Corps .
lion , end t' e 2rtill,...r:--· ,attDlions v'.:: c}· ore beino; tr1r1sferrer
I'.:' torn.o-rrow ni '-.t you still feel trnt ;rou must ha Ye the :7renc' di ,r-i sion, I em
coDfident tl at you -vill be able to get, it .
1
1
1
"I t[l_lkGd to rr~rd:in.,. tonif,},t 2.nc~ ex-plained to hhn tl.flt you felt it would be
very di "f~ cu 7-t, to GtErt t)· e :::'renci,., Corrs to1"ard Fe1~ent ino , r nrl then stor it ri s
soor, PS it p' o•-r"ld any te 1.c1 enc. • to cross V:i r;h1vey 46. Be safr1 "'.e 1mc1 erstood t1'at v
difficnl ty. He f 1 1Tt: .--.r "teted tht n 1~r2rentl;sr General '\loxanc'er >1."d not unr'er - 1 i~
stood ,'four proposal wl:-en JOU -':,al~:ed i'd t: , ~~m tM.s :r:r1ornjnr:;. I told hin thPt was ~,,Jv&-'
1."erv 3trPnr;e to me , ~)<:>cause I was present ·ihen you tr JJcr:ir'l. to Gener2 l .!',lexrinder ,
P-nd .,. ·ot the cecired im:rres~io 1., ,..rm1 l i. -:;tenin · to your ccnv,3rsation, that there
was a 1efini te meet.:: ·1.p- of t 1,e :1ind,s . 11
,,,p
•f
1
1
As of midn:ir;l't toni:;rt A111ericPn forces in tLe Anzio are2 r.P."!e quffered 5,116
battle casur-lti9S rnd hnve coptured 4, 97'6 prisoners since t' e open:1ng of tr.e of fensive on the 111orn:i np; of the ?3rd of May.
*
*
*
A'{ZIO--T".1-\Y 30 , 194/4,--Genr-ir<i.l Clar:V A.rose erirl,r, stuc1 :ied the dispatd 1 es on bd,tle
pror:re~s and conferred Tl tL ,.,is G-3 , GenerP 1 Bre.nn. 1-fo P lso work0d on H 1-Temorif.l
Day speech which was given rit tl,e ·retbmo cernetery. !~t eleven o 1 clock GenerP.l
Ch.rk -,ont to tJ~e Nettuno ceneter:r w>ere a very- i:wpressive Tvler10rie,l Day ceremony
vms hold .
'ince there are :'iritisl. en,' Canadirn nead in t"'e cei, ,:;terJ·, 1:)ot:1 tLe
A:r-ierican end 0ritish f1R.gs ~rere carried , and botb n::itional a:1tlv~ms nere played .
One enlisted m2-.n per company and one officer per reg:' ·aent of A,-,ericrin troops
were assen1
)led rt the ceneter~· . T>is :: ncluded trcors frof' all tl~e divisions , as
well as ot}-,r,r ~ttacherl m1its; sud as , medical , orc1 n.'1nc0 , 7_11.Brterf'!rister and engin' ers . Altore:etl1er tl·ere Fere 1,etvrnen 400 and 500 rerso ..,s re;:;resent•inrr all uni ts
in thA Fift' Arrrv TxirticipPting on t'·,is front . T1~e Britisl' IncrPme•1t Pnd a snPll
body of men fmd offj cers , ,,,,1,0 vere headed by i,h;jor Gener"l Gregson- Bllis, Cor'nAnder of the 5th Britisl . T)ivision , vmre fll9o present. Taps was blovm Pnd a f:i ring
souE.d dired three ·1olle;rs over t} e ,raves .
fter tl-ie cl'r>rlai.11 1 s blessin;; , Gene 1 "Tas :htroduced b~r Gen0ral Truscott , Commnnder of' t} e VI Corps, a.nrl gtive
ra l Cl2.r {
a ver ~ inspiri:·1e; speech wJ-iicl is quoted 'oelovr:
11 This is ~lgmorial f,ay , wtich , as ;rou 2.11 1:110 1 , is dedicated to tJ- e riernory
of our -"irthtinr.; rersonnel who have given their lives to their beloved country.
At all our otLer cemeteries here in Italy ,ve .-:ire likewise payini; tribute to our
nen vrho h8Ye given t 1,eir all in order thit t11 e :?iftli Arm? night continue to advance .
1
...
�'IT' js i~ fl da;u· ch cee:rly tou~h~s tl e he,,rts o::: r>ll of us r>s •e stand
before t 1
,ese V<J.lia11t men restin : erA . I want you to fcel , as I do , ti-flt t' is
is r10t a noMent of sad 11ess no,,. sorrow but rather a t·"le o-f in,p:Lr 0 tior.. to 8pur
us on to the t2.sk '11 ich ! ns been S"'t :'or us .
le s 11ould use their r-spirPtions
[l'1d fi,.,1t·inf sni.r-tt to drive u::; ""orv:arcl PS J'\m~.ricr1 np PVe ehays done in tl e re.st
8.:1.d 2cs r1;n o::' t e :-'iftri Ar: y 1 <'-,e c_one in Tb 1. for ti- e T ast nine months at Sal9rno , Rt 'fripl9s , across t: e iJcltm.'no , a.lonP- t c Gflrio;liano ::i.nd in t he Anzio
ber,chhead • .lit 1 Gorl ' s 1 elp vm &all c3.I':ry on t' A tasJr w' jc' the:, began .
11 A li \tl9 r:iore t an fo·rr- r-iontl s ago A1liAd troors care Bcroc s the beriches
11ot f'pr rom tri s sa,cred
011.rid .
-.-:;- Rr si11~e tb,t t ·nr, t 1·A ""'i:'tr Arny troops in
tl-e '\.nzio beochl•e11d 'mve been n C( nstent l'nd f'"r:iovc t:breP.t to t'•e e:1erv 1 s l.:.1rns
of comrnmicotion. '1' 1 e · r"' ·e ""'l!l, red 'l.:n imrortrint role i.n tl e strnteey of the succe9s-':'nl crimpPi';Tl we are no· r cnnr'uct~ '1 ,. Tl1.o:=ie pl o lo'"lt treir lives ~n t} e 1)each1eed s~nce tbt 1,-:ind;no; 1.1.:ca rest"'n · · FJre, r>nrl it .is to -1-; er" ttiflt "e Df\Y tribute
t -i S d!'l:- . Others 'nve l Ucil-ed C'll "';drst t' l f"10T"Y , anc' d 11r"'n- -:-1-e interve.l the
beac'1her>c hrs ~ssed into 1··istory vi..tl t e join~n-; of tre two :':Lft' Arm:1 fronts
on "p;r 0 '5tb...
le • · e '1uilt ur o-.ir streno-t' , rin<'l we r•J.'e no'· r--nr.i;" t;ed in P ,-;refit
o"fe 11si 1e th1t is pvn:i s' i~n- rinc cle9troyin1" tre eneP1y 1 s hest troops . I'-: ft! Army
soldiers fror. tl c main 'ront 1 PVe nlready joined i..n t 1 e qttr>d: on Rone .
"Our Fi-l'tl Army h-is b"'en e Tiio'1 er "'or ot! ~r .Allied victories t.·<>t Eire to
cone . Curs hl's bo8-1 ~;rul.- 311 Alli8tl Prn7 . Men w. o 1-;--·-ve c 1 erished ::1ibr;rty and
"reedor-, n.s 1-i fe itself , h::-ve cnf'!e fron. many rarts of t'. , orlc... to form t 1 ~ s
r~,-,1 t~n; te.,-,,..,_ 1:lore jn ·-t l;v. 0vr '"lritish and c~"l.edian Fiftl· Army comrPn-ions
rest heJ~E' "'J or.-;side of tl P:: r Americ.<>n -:.em rne tes . L · i·ewise t 1 rl.e.<>.q of our eP 1 1e
1.P nt 'l.'rench forces lie ::. n otl er cerietqrif's · n :tr> ly.
0
0
11 '1'!1is success:'ul o"frmsbre las rer,resent--:i,' "u 11 cooperri.tion of .Allied -f'igl t n forcAs on t 1e 7_:ird. nr rl ser-- 2"1.rl in tl e n ir . (;i1r Nrvy nr,t4 J...ir Forces hnve ~up portPd us T"1<J.'1"1:f'5 ceritly d.ur:ng ou:c curre,1t 01 ~r, tfons .
"You men o.c, the Fift> nrmy '.ri.ve overcr,nr soMe c: the rost diff:..cult obstacl"'ls ih. n~litary on8rFtions . You ccrne 11.cro<1s m~les of sen to la.no rt Jr lerno
against,, s-1:rongl.- e11trenc-'ec1 Pnem:,-. You l"'ve crossecl rj_1p,r•s ::,nr' fcur-'t .rour
w2.~r over mou'1t"inous terrr--i,1 .
Yo·1 "Ve ,.•ti-stood t1~ ri o::.~3 0f s1ow, r:-i.::..n r>nd
r~·1d . You k':.Ye ,.,,,,r shed n"tur:o 1 cA""'Anse ros it' 0•1s , · t. fe r-l'r[' :1 ls :in t' E" 1 istor o? v•ar<'are . You i ave c'L''1e t· ese t' i:!'1..,.s ,.,·trout t· oufht of y,~rsonrl aa cri -fi ce beca1 1se ·,n
:,ve 11.ovm t rt it is onl.r ori.r v·ctorious "r'"'re"! t Pt ~11 restC're P worlrl. 11here hu.m8n 1-Jein ,s crn 1.'ve ·n riece.c , :_-,eace rnd l:.arpiness ~•"'t
ti eir "'ellow men .
1 ·,
1
7e strnd non on-:.' e t 1 res: '-old o:: Ro e . Before mri:::i.r C1""S lE1ve pi:issed 1e
shB 11 ',r;e "reod t' ~ s :!'-·rst o" t} 1 Euro'r)er 1 crp:' tals .:'ror hzi. dom-i_n"tion .
111
"I ¥ill '10w '"'lr,ce t} is vrreatl on ·•~: {n
lloued "'Tounr'l ·~',tl t' e r;,.ed ;e to
t',ese me-1 w1 ,o ~_je be::ore us thr>t tl e .,ifth Arry sl•ri.11 co'1t-°nue t· e fi •'1t ·,: i:-:re
the• 7_eft off , w'th tre;1· srjr·itc-; rs our ,lide, till v'r>tor;v- 1s rnll'', . "
After t e Amori"l Service, Gener...,l Clark returned to '; s cor"l,rc' ro"'t r,!ld
work'id in · · s o:"f ice ·mtil [' bo'1t 1_ 430 . 1 Ie co11.f erred br·' c-fl
•-it' Ge11err 1 Jrann
2'1c' 1 e~t by c-,1b fol' II Co"''t:'3 field to c, '1fer i7:itl Gen°r..,l K~JP,s .
'·hile v1itGeneral he ~es ,, ~ rent un fol"rrrd to t' n 1rrl. J:i, isirm 2,n<l Speci..c 1 Jervice 'orce
�a . illr
i
, area ,. As soon 8S tl e 85th Division is moved in, tre II Corrs wil l continue the
attack toward Vr>lmontone to the north and north,mst . The 85th Division ,:ill
close tonight, a,nd the 8-ttack T•ill tn.l.,;:e rlace the followin,; morning . Hhile up
forward GenerP.1 Clark was told by General Frederick, Special Service Force Commander , t hat last night the:' hnd received the hea·J'iest l7 ostile sl'elling of t 1
1e
entire carnpr.ign. General Clark returned to bis comme.nrl post e.t 1610 where he
vm.s met by Gener<' 1 Gruenther , l is Chief of Str ff, who flew up from the forward
command post .
Gen2rals Clark, Gruenther 2nd Brann went i.nto immediate conference concernin"' tre aJl- out effort to be mr->de d1..u~inr; tl e ne:x-t three da;rn . These dri~rs 'Till
be critical end will require bitter :Pi ,}"ting. As soon as our forces advance A.nd
tBke tl,e bir,:J, --rounr 1.aiovm as the Colli Laziali , the GermPn rlill be for c ed to
withdraw north of Rome , becamJe we will comm1=1nd all of tbe high 1;round overlookinp; tJ-ie city and tJ.ie routes tlv~reto . ·c-:very indice.tion turns to tre fact
t hat the Germai1 vrill bitterly resist 01.ir ;c1ttrcks to gf1in tl-iis commnnding terrain .
1
1
\fter the con:'.:erence Crenernl Cln.rk hnd supper Pnd retired to 1-ds room 1Yhere
he worked until 110 retired to his nuarters .
Fighlii:;hts of today ' s battle proGress yrere sl:Lgbt advHnces by· our rirmor
wi tt t:,e infantry following up r:md hol riing the ,:;round taken by the ;:,rmor since
yesterdav 1Yhcm the attac1, wes renewed . The gains n;:ac1e by VI Corps r,re,.,tl;f fa ciUt ated the British 1st Dic_rJsion I s move up on tl-1 eir left flank . The British
1st Di"ision was ,..,racticnlly in Hne witL the VI Corps rc':lv:nnce elenents . The
5t} Bri tisr Divis ion , Low ever , was still meldn/~ slmr rro,Tf'ess and hr d not conformed r:rith VI Corps ;r,0_vnnces . There ~,rere no outptnnding grins on the II Carris
or IV Corr,s fronts . On tl'e IV Corps ,~·ront one battnlion of tl·•e 151st hrd e.dYenced f'.8 .,..nr es :·font8 SempervisB. , ren.c'. jnt; further to tbe nortl::rest on tl'e high
ground. north of Sezze . The Frend· rid'il'Pnced up slightly past Ceccano . :'.::;lenents
o:'.:' tre lritish 13ir;htb. Army hPd rished rhout D mile p:1 st }offi. The 88th Jbrision , less a combat team , rill be moved up to II Corpn front tonir·;>t end tomorrow . Tts wei;;ht 1crill be th.ro'''n in on whatev er corns front is i:; needed most.
At tbis tirt1e no decision ns to where it will be employed has been nrde .
The Ar my Commander dictat ed t1--,e follo,'finc notes todc.y "or :nclusion
diary:
v1orri9s ta"'✓e r1ot!1i!1o; to do ~t} t~ e j_rTI_''J--diElte battle . Tl~.,:\f . -,_re
riatu.re. 1 ~7il1 nPr:1e ,l1er1 i:ri ()l'd81~ of t:-19 t1~ou'-;le tl ey ceuse ~10 .
ur_ort o:-: F!
1· olit~ cal
i11
1
in
1·
1
_
!!T'irst , ti1e T;r··tis1 1 ..,.,.,.,., tl r.i.r F,le 0"1 ;:.cr 18, rict1-ritl-•st0nc;,i-·t1; Ale~::e.nfer' s
co}1st2.11t [~~~: 311.ra~1ce to 1:1e tI'Pt l1or19 :~ s 5.n t:.o sectur of t 11e Fl/tl Arrr"". ~! ~v·
'10.~·e 11ra1r1 t e Arm:, bound"r. · sout 1 o: :lo1-1te ;/-6 ju.st to tl 0 out:=,·'drts· of J.om~ and
tl-iel1 V'•~erod it to t e --- 0I·t! " r:11 e "M:i_r;]·t}, f\r~vi..:r "'.i:1.S ...:une littl0 ~ ~_[_:L.tinb .
...
:t ::as
lPcked e.r; T0s,sivrm.ess 2.n" railed in it,3 ;:,cert in t 1 is conb511ed Allied effort.
'"et , m.·· e-Pfort to ,1:litcr t' eir boundnr:-· east "",et v,:t-~J- "· rr-r~-:· ·ntl:::.c< t:' n; tl d~ tl e
1 tl
,....~~
ArLT/ rnust ~,e.rt-~ cir)nte : ; 11 -l:-}1e l>P.~ttle Zor Rorie .
1
1
1
1
0
nSe er rrl , T" I'renc' Corp 3 -is ½ein:; i inc; ec: out . A :rore ga.11:mt fi ,, ,ti-n_~ orr;a'"' iz2.tio·, nev:ir 9-Xis+:.ed , .;et n,.r o~f:r fc,r -t to attE.c1r :;:'t;::c2.nt1no , :,-ro··idi:1i it
• could use T{oute ,16 to the y:est , was 1roroptl;i tm ·1ec. dovm. GeYJera1. /.le"':c:,c' er in r1-tcate-:~. t}"Pt,-; vJ01.1lc~ l\e --_eli;lted ~01~ Y'1e tr:· tn,1:e :,1e;r,qn_t:i110 to -:P.C~Llitp,_te t~ e
1
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u ,t r: t' RO.vc 11-::~ <:,,.. t't o "":::_ ;' ~1 lr :, ,,t t" ,.,t qf~ ➔r .; ~: .. .;_ · t,
to~rt !"".1 trc,o_
·_11 u : t'1 o.n ti ; ~~ct t~~~,
1 r•a,, tr
t, - 10 r':.i Of 1~ t 1 ~ r-on,~ 3 i • r_·/ l r{ cor fJ .,.. t
r0 . ,..• Cor1s, P,.,te.,· ta1:-1.
):---r:+,--·ro, wild 1)e t'l-~rt, LT "or~· ="l,:cs in dT r:::..11, -'-,o ' :, J•1-:r.
TT-,
-;,_,
c
~o of tc :_rnc' •.
r,l_f'" '"lts () ~ t 1 ('
i. •' t
l\:..-r1 •
)·"'
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:,:. t.i. e r1;1 s "c:- ""' to yiol~t0
bet 1"'
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,
•
,l0v,.,,',r 1 • ·r,tru'"·t·'
s,
,0
0 . "
')A."':.tl , or to 1,r~ , , , r
of · '",.:v~sio·1 ~nto ", '; A>1z-io E'~'8f'l. :'m· IO ..,::rlc P,''"
~ .,oitt,,tio:"l 1",e ·r 0•1
o~ r
~nor· ccir. -::orps. •I, to ~_rl. r '3 l i · ovl':rill'l0"l"v , ulJ e
"st --~E::i..uc-tant t > et 1se:nt ·':,ct' '1 1.-,ttr,r ...,c"':,'.:;ion. - CFllecl o~::: ':.. "'er"nJc•no
rtti:ic 1r an:. <>n directi1•' ·.m, ,j-!:;' i'1 ,~,, :c 'Jt:·~c-tecl mo•u,-tnin zo:-1·, o:v1 }jo-1-)inrro
-1,,,re th0 Tl"om+ain roPS: r-AMcres Ro·1te ,'/:6. - t', 1, br ::.·i ' t C)~., inert c1o"'l9in,
,::i_ 71 I slon () T"r I ~ r.to -r.:_ 1 t 1 :-,,-.-,, "l'"l"l., USl11'p Route 'f6 .q_nr' rut rirr: 'n rr u nort 1
rer-d9d. ... er· Ro ·e.
T "eel t"' ,re : . . , so ~ _...,c: inr-i.tion on +: e 1 ".rt c,f Alexan 'cl" tn conrnPnce flli~or , -~s •~: ·1 tl 1 n1,... : rth~ ~::,,e ij,1c1· cr"'j-ions t,l-;:,t , ~ .: -; r ... r,.; J F1'1 ""'t..
t,p C 1d"l ' to c ~·ds :to· :) ·h it encl O" -C' P , ::; 1- ,,.rot....1Ct ~ 1::. t' e Colli .J.' Z. f1 l i f 1'')!1 •
1'8
is iron~. T B~r:r· c·ft8 t' 0 ~ni,.or-':,<1r,~e c.," t· ~, i , tqrrf1in "nl1 r.[l-.:-e ,.:.rectn,d
[l .. l of ~ r f1Ubor li.-::-tes to tr·-~ ~-!:;.
'1 "'""~nr1er ·i ' nr-ri•.:c' tr rt I ' ,., "e Sf' ½otl" rreC:
· .i.s l1°rccti e -1-0 'lt.t..<i.~·,. Valrie ,to,r.
e.. ... net C.:0.,..,e so.
I ,, rn tre ?rd ~i-•isio>1 pc' ,;;ec·c11 '"'er"::lce rorc~ yr~~,·rel to ett1=1c 1< int' Pt directio:'1 es soon PS
: c2·n. ·r,t t',e ~5t' Dj ,.,.~ sion ... 1 -its lcrt t-:, sup 'o_·t it. ':'l'e
Di,.; sion does
:v1ot c0rTlete itc; r-0ve rntil toni.,l·t.
, ·~;1: F1tt1;1c1 +,,p "ollo~·i1· ·orrin. V::-1<:
r-crto.,.,8 ::·1: t' P. l -· ' -round to -'-,' P ~a~t , nnc' to +; 1 ;rest .:s so "'tro , 1-r r, ld r u:1
·r -1-,., e1ery 1s •'lir c'~f8>1--:e or•J_:/on tb t i,o ,rncl er' c'"v:.s1o"l +r ";'r, orJ..;: -1010
•ou lr: r n"t w:i. ·tl c' j ::m.s-1- o:.".
11
'h :5r.
0
-~_,t'
"T jwt f 0.1)0. to "'ruc-ocott, FPl•ro,1, ,rl"'l"''l, ::nrl ~c <"•ier tote,, t e- I ET
rlisr.rp0i_:rt d ~·-·t 1 t~oir 0+:'·"or~s toc1f'. - ti-rt OE' er tnc T"Ore 'n-s of Rll-out
r-tteci, C!Ourl~cl .;t1 t' P rttr->c'• to·y~ ' t C"' t' 8 ,l'>tl "'~-·isio:'1 MYJ.r 1 ,~+, t}p '1ttPck
SC c-d·1l_.-..,' t' "3 foJ.10 rjr : "'Or,1:r; r:· tl l IT -::errs T1[ - ~.,..., c" tJ:-:;_c, ' 0, ~ GermF '1 :t-Os·_-1:,io 1 in tJ--.~ Col.lj -,n.zi::i.l:i "'re11.. I ' · -·e lU'.,.Pil t; er to Tflrter e-"'fo..,.ts tonorrow
ri. 'l 1 t' ---:i next dn,r.
.,. <l'\t': , ttr c Pel tl e 1st -.:r--: tisl )i :iir,ion to t' e • I C0r1 s n,-,•·
t'1Ft ~,,.. r Pr, out o"' t· .-u· c'efenni e 1·ole. To attnc 1 t'" 5tr ·;ri-1-,,;:;1', :i· ::i"i.or to
t' e •r: Corrs ~oul - bf> 7 ik-e ·:.·r-ir , r- poor ,"'l:!1 "' d;rt sr:lrt. Tre r r e r o of~oni ve . nc:.. ·.nrtio 'l.S. - bR lie·re t'
l "'t ..,.,..~ +,is' Di• is~ 0:r. . 'ill 1 "lr'
or j t S001Jl"' to
1 "Ve ~ts tri.l up.
1
<C
eV':"vt} :n, T 11f'-·o into t,' ::'s 0A.ttl~, • oy-·:'1 to cr<ic 1r t 1 -:_ro l· .y
it nece"sr\.I' for Ye'1·:nlr•··-., to srit: drr hotl o-f: ris i:irri ·es to t e north of ·1or-ir •
"'l e Gerr·..,-1 i. r <i 1 .:~.o;
r eterri.a()d ef'fort to SP v0 F.0 .e.
M',ere rre irid:"cn~io1s tl~t l1e ~., :rour:Jrr, i.n re:iJYorcer'Ants fro"'! t'e north.
If I
do rot Cl"c· t· ·s position in tlrP.e or f'our fr-s I ~,p.- l-;-,·e tc- re-orgnyize, ?<i.it
fr,r tl-iE' >' ·} t' Army ::mc1 ,o ['t it 17it', n coorr'-"r/'tecl ~ttncl,- •
)ot' Mrr.iies, but I
fear -the c~.me rPs11 1.ts -rror ~"1. );-ti \rmy. ..,.t rill rot p11t in its full e~fo1--t, for
i-1:. never ras. 11
11 .,.
<11"
~:row:in
}>O<iit.:.0'1. '\'J1 icr- l'dlJ :"'k'l1 'C
T
r
1
AAI tc Hl 8o"lcerne'i - "I 0-2''20. •r 1 i.le (;T'JC •relco 'W ~o IT " .... opoq.-,} th.t
'I:C s'·or-:.cl r'le--:elor on 'rr-tion° ro:-t' o-'" ~.iv,r ).ACCO c"ir cted on Ferent:i.110 n.nc'
rot<'l"l ~t 1~_11 be TO'>Si 1)1~ to yut it ·,..-:,o 3f::'ect he CP"lrot ..,,,.ree to rllot ti,e :~oad
Fercnt:iro-'J~l~onto·,,, to Fi~t, Arrrvu'11A,s or until ;t beco ""S clA:=-<r t.';:,t r,;i 't>-t
0
�Army "!ill not be required to cooperr>te in Your Pttack on the VAlmontone line .
In this case he will be prepar9d to reconsider matter . Road Valr ontone-Rome
is ro"rever allotted to Fi.c,th Army. 11
0
Gruenther to Clark. R'T ?1~. "General Devers called.
Corps corrimancl post "md then proceed by- jeep to Tforma area.
,,,',ether or not he will f,8t to your command post. 11
qe will fly to IV
They do not lmow
Gern•ral Gl<>rk sent General Gruenthsr the f'ollowinr; m9morendum at noon
--':,odn;v:
11 The action taken by AA I rtoes not surprise me.
I r,,nticip,:,ted it. Do not
raise the question of the boundar.v between Ei%;}1th and Fifth Armies beyond Valmontone ~mt watch it ver·· cRrefully when t} e question does come up, so t:r-ot it
is not dravm absolu+,el;r alonp; the north edge of Route //6. I would say thAt it
should ~o from Valmontone to Palestr~nP 11nd Palestrina to the Ti:i.c;hth i\rmy.
Valmontone will haVP to be used jointly. From fR.lr-istrj_na it shou1d go the
most direct route to Tivoli, ":i ,.,in~ me an opportunity to mPneuver to the north
of Route 11 6 as we appro1:ich Rome . I must have the road that ~oes trrough Casal
Santambro~io at q166. :rn other .-,orr1s, t} ere is no eycuse for their runnin-;
the 1,oundarv too close to '!tome .
11 With regard to the Frencr, I w~ 11 defer any .r.iction on tnkin~ a French Dision. Fo'vever, ha'te directed ti-.is morn-i np; thrt t½.e '7rench tnJce ower, with
one corrJbat team or whatever they feel is necessary, 88th Division positions
north of Se'3ze so I can brinE: the 88th Di vision :in for tl e final attack.
VJ
11 H:<J.Ve just JM.de a talk out Pt the ceremony.
affa.ir .
It Wf'l.s 1uite rm imnressive
"I do not blnme you .c>or ettinP.; a little provoked in talking to 1fording
with reference to t},.e ½oundary. AppA.rently- the tacticn.l si t1.wtion is not dictatinr; the decisions . "
L
As of ei~ht o t clock t'.llis wrenino; ~llied forces in the Anzio area had suffered 6147 battle casualties and captured 4615 prisoners clurini:; tl-ie recent offens:
,e.
*
*
*
A~JZI0-- Hli.Y 31, 1944-- At 0930 General Clarl, held a rress conference . T'1is is
ti1e third press con:'erence t~1Pt Genernl ClA.r:V has hAld since the day before
t' e offensive stA.rted on the 11th o+' May. It was an off-t1~e-record talk for
1'1. back~-r01md for tl .e correspondents for the next pht=ise of tbe fi<)"hting .
General ClArk e:;..,'J)lained ho··r h8 hnd Pttached ti..,e 1st British Division °to the VI
Corps, ,c,;i-<rinr; it the 1st l\rmored, 1+5tl, 34t:r, J6tl and 1st Brjtisb Divisions .
VI Corps will Pttack northwest toward RoT'le, its rj l\°ht te..kinf the hi<;h €{round
1movm As the Colli lazial:i and its left proceed:i n~ directl:v northwest toward
RoY'le . On the rip;ht of VI Gorps, II Corps V'ith t},e 85th, '3rd Di-.risions and
Special "';ervice Force . The 85th Division is to attack tomorrow morning northwest wHh the high ~ou.nr' ih the vic~nity of 1occa Priora as its initial objective . ':'he 3rd Division and :;pecial 3ervice Force will spearhead_ ".lorth to the
ri~l-i r,;rolmd nP st VRlmonto"le nnd cut 'ioute ,%. General Cl8rk emphasized that
0
�t 1 is Ptt"'':),,. doPs not hrve Rone pc; ~ ::.s rrili'"ry objective b·1t to kill :?nd anni' ill:1.te as "'J,ny o-" the Qqrmc1.ns as po,::;sible on our -F'ront. He SPid t}nt re did
not, owever ,' lose si · t of t 1e fp ct -1- pt, :.}•e c; tv of Rone Mifl t be /' ined ,, s
fl rAs•1lt of t' :l c:; Pttn.ck-.
•·any -iuesti ons 'r,re r>sked by tl e corresroY" 'e>1ts
wi ; ch Ge 1r=irPl r:lF,r', P"1Sv"ered <ts ·"r::i11.kl,r P s e CC'"' 1 ,:;. So-me '7ere di.rect'":ld concerni 11.. the occ11rnt-l0n of Rope [Pd y w1 nt trOOT'<::!. G<>11ernl c1,,-rk SB 'd thPt
le could not sa.,,- l '"'t troor:i mule" ente.,,. ~;rst, t ,t -Lt r'e-,endod r,n wrich ones
drove t} e ::<rdest. As to T;:i 1-t' l:\.rmy troops, t} rt would he P r ecision r,~rie y
A.AI. Ger-?ral '::lnr 1 nar·e it un ·erstooc: th"t ns "Etr l'lc; t'h0 City of Rcme itse:..f
w1:1 c; concArvv~d, re was not interA sted e""c8-rit to secure t' 1 e c · ty, am' A.S soon fl s
ti rt •vie b,qer r'J.o:>1P, he ryrmld +>pn ' is .('orr;es out to tie nortl east .<ind , est for
fu"t er -~J.sres.
A-Pter -1-,''"' l'ress con ... -:ire"l.ce, Ge11errtls Ca11.non find ~avi 1-ln CRr-e ur tr- cc•1.f'er
wi.t' G9r-erf'1 "!li-cir1' Cl"'rcer>1'n,.. t 9 ['ir suprort ,,~ en to t1 e rP''18"'7ed Ptt;:,c"l( •
bo'1t noon Ge-1e1">l Cl"rk tele,' o'1ed /}9'1.er;:,l rr,,.,1"cctt "no. c: ·.3cussed vdtl 'dm
-:,' A situntio'"l. /18 ~t '10V' "'X:1 stPr' •
Fe c'irecteC:. Gem,ral nr'lSCott to ·i e hi'1 ci-v·hi_or11l ccr.r'lc""l'lers 4n n.c1d.'tio11"l s} ot in t!"le Prr~. :'-om no, on for t1 e neY.t
"''3w r1q ; ,,13 need to mus+.er I'll our efforts "ln' ~nush tre r>tbick -v1..,.or0-,slT. He
also r'Hr0cted t A.t t 11e I1 Cory-::, attA.ck by t''"' ri-5t1 D.:. 1.sion hR 'f90ded up. 'I'he
attE'~k W"l.
"re ...,d at '1,,cut 11+00 '01rrs +, is n".l.9rv:.0or, q">' ~ts 10c1yrncf' '--is
·,1ro ,.C9'1 '9G. ·r. co -~o.,. ·tr it1 +,' c-se t:'de ..,y -1:l"' 16th Ji ·i3 4 on on. its le~"t.
Pt 1330 'orl W8S r9c-'3ived ':-,,,A+,+' A Britis 'Pc' occu1iec 'i'ros·nor,0. No res··~trn0e ""'1 P11.r:o-mtsred, 1--,1t ,ill -:.r-ci "hrid·es 0re ''lo'", ,,,,,1 t'e +oin ·.q,s 'eriv·1· ..,,·'1nd. At 1430 ';.e11°-~q1 K,y0s err., to r:o:rf,r 't' (}eYl,rfl r;:rr}-.
t +,J is
+, imA 'e <'ccic' 'c.' t' ...,t t' '3 1"t' n~ Yi<"'iO"', lw,s rre co· bnt +,eRm, w::is to be attAc 1 cd
to I: ~orrs ,, c' wo 1lrl JU fl -its r-ttec>' 0'1 t' '3 (1,5t' 1 s ,,-: t .(':flnk nC'rt 11 lP:rd.
1
G-=1r0rr>l ClqJ~i,-, aft r co1n9r-r''1
-'t' GPYlPra~ B""'<1'1n l'r;n, +, ': hster r~rt
r "~9rno0r
... ~;:"u d q '1'3W (hprr.ti0">1'1 ::-n"'tr·1ctio'1 '?5
. c' i<J ,..,10t"i h"'lo, •
ftc,r ,u !"Jr It. Col. IJln.r', bro 1:t ·11 ~::r. :i·orman c" t e c·~cfl o "r~burc..
o·""'
t e
1
•• 1~Nhts o"' t' A
h s '-attle rrr)"T0S9 W8.S "-_,' A 8izure 0f T<"lrt o""' t'.e,-: b
\.ro·
rs -f;he Cnll-'_ Lrz·,.::.-: 1""J, t,;.:s ~")t D"'~jsion. So. 0 ;-i'1s ,,.,re 1"'1",·e in
t· '3 Fr';r-c s.:ictor it' 3"_0~ ', 1t .,tgac: • r,YTe ,:; to ~, e ·1.o.,..t 1 rnt. r;,• 0 ..,:;.~en~'
we:;.~0 ·r::pPri en""' j 1 ' i 1. SOJl" ~ ~ ' b:i i1C8S' y +, ter re 1. stR nee' 9 S" (,cir 11 ":t'Oi"'i ti eir
r :_ t J'."'lRnlr r0---t, of t 1 e r ~co ~i "f'er.
•T.'
r011r
Ga'1er.q_j_ Clark 1 a notes or.
+, 9
1
'1., 1 s
r>
cti • :.ties '""'o llow:
1 I Co~J3 attPc:k is no~
uri,
')oi~ · ell today, I1Aet:.n
"ri~y st:.rr resis-':,fnce.
1st Ar"'o.,..nd has '7::-de very little '1eadway. '.:" "l. Ar tired, '1eed mH-:'1t9'-Y"'Cf-, ard
e,:c'3 '3 in ' A.r/assed by Sr- 1 s fro". t e ' ~ ·' Tci11.r i souj' o ·: Lake Albano. Truscott
is r1lli~ ... , '3 1:C"1or ack tor-' 'i:, ., eav" 1 , .i.; , -· 1fa'1t" .:n a'1d i ·i 1; ~"' ,18S , is
full Di · .1 > , t 1 - ush ,..orwm-d..
0
~
0
0
"Doc .,rder an ~.q_de no 1 rr,~ess tc, 'ay. T'
t' e 3"J"':.
i ·s::.011 shou:rl assL·t i""1 tor>ll'row.
3
-''lank:'.n, . 0 ~!'lent, '., \lr 11':er o-!:
n.l\:,r 'a.3 , cn0 ,1ell.
"'}0,1.~rA.l ,loan ~l'l~,9 ~:'1 i=m riJ.l ',ye rll ·'s ~8t' J;v-i.s'_on ,sse"'lb:ed 1 ) dPyli '-: to::-'o~row. It i, tirec1, , l t : 1•.:.11 ':.L.row :t into ,)ri.:;tJe ·n .1., e II Go'fs
sect01~, f'eE'l~1 t· 2t : 'Ill' ·t 1 l"'3 evfr ounc--. ; . , r e"~r · • r Cn.nmU'3u')' r._, .,vl--i, "'.;'me.
.,_
,. _
r
"''
�.
+. ·
+
' •
",--,5
,
It ,uill attack to +.he north. I ,.,J1,e issue d Op:ira..,ions I ns0ruc-c,1on Jr. t octay,
tell -in.,. rrr su1,-)ordi·::ate com,vrnders tLr-it t'.Y~::.~ fi::·st "1issio,.., Pfter takin~ the
1~::: p 11- ~ou..;d in t'·\e Colli LaziRli areP
is to r'l_estroy t: e enem;r on our frO',t
vrl ile 'at the :oame tine setting- up 3. task force under General Frederick to
move east on Fi ;hvmy !J6 to disrupt and destroy the en ,my movin[; out from in
front o" the 'SightJ- Arm~' Hnd the Frenc'" -;-;,g~prljtiorw.r;,;r Corrs.
llJl.pparentl." the -.::: --ft' J\rr:1, -, hei11.,; rror ded fron tl e Frime Hinist r down,
is srordn,r; a little :-'lore 0neri:~Y• It 'ms f:1nally taken 7 rosinone. The, enem;,t
hacl evccunted ..
1
1:r,
0
11 1"1here is rmc'i p.~essure uron r1e, alt} oug,., it is not bein
to 'ave -::: r;'1tl: ,\rny -:_n on tl e bntt1e +'or Rol'7e.
0
Pf plied
direct-
HJ am worri("'d about t 119 future of the 'Frenc'~ "Sxpeditionary Corps.
~Jitb
the restrictio".!.s t}rt Alexancbr ;•2s r,l1°ced upon rne, their zone of action is
narro 11:_n'~ llOVm to noth~ nr;. I :,opA to squeeze t'1.em nort1• of IIi r;h,•r9.7 /6 in t e
attac;, on Rome. It pro'xi.bl::r 111ill 1Je violr:mtl:r o"posed by AAI.
11 I am ettackinn- across ia ;hway ."6 tomorrow to tal,e Vn.lmontone Hnd some of
the hi} rmmd to t'~e north. :: must take t' is hi,r,t -o;round j_f I Pm to naintain myself F>.t Vr-ilm...,ntone. I rather 1,elieve thnt tbe decision will come in
the II Gor:;:,s fro,,.,t and t/ r•t I qa;r 1.Jreal, t} :rough triere. T·1e next two d-:iys !!'Till
tell t½e tale. 11
GenerPl C1?.rk today issued tne follo 1~in~ operF>tions order to 5t1 British
Division:
11
1.
5 Infantry Division (Br) will attaclr wH'·out , elay to Cf'lfture t: e
1
line Hill 104 (756434.) - RJ 751427 - Hill 103 (751419) - fRATICA J1I •:rtHE (73L,1).
F' en nbove line las been secured, mqloitf1tion f0rwrrd will be nPde wit} all
possible speed to secure t'. e folloninr: objectb1 es:
a.
Are8 et bend in ro1:d 71.5504.
b.
Road ;n
8J'."ea_
:;755.
'
c•
Road between 615531+ and 585515 .
.Sreed in e:xyloitinrr forwc'rd to sec1JTe t} e lrtter t1::ree objectives j_s
esse:ntjnl in order to:
a.
'f'TPFP. before
Destroy nn;r enemy remn.ininrr between tl e 1+2 Nortl~ing and 7.iver
ey can cro"'s t' e river.
t:
b . Freve:vit t1 e enem:,. on 5 Infa,,tr;ir '>i-,j_ sion (Br) front from ,·it; dra,ring to tl e norU1 ef:I st to rnm the s,, itc' line runninp rpproYinntely norti,_
west - sou-f:;keast 1Jet,vee:1 88/,.4 - 7158 .
"3. Effecti~re et once, t' e '10undrry betwee·1 5 Infa•,tr;;·· Division (Br)
and VI Corps ( 1 Inf'E1ntr:r Division (Br) will be:
.,.nclusive to VI Corps road A''TZ:'.:O - AIBP.I'JO to RJ 865326 - t: Ance
�railwr--~r bed to track jlJnction '3?3154 - Sci.ddle 806367 - Hill 55 (80?374)
CR 786391
:1..nclusi~re m 11 62 (7973~1)
exclusi ~·e ;:,pm~ 801377
RJ 771/+47 - llJ 737536 - RJ 738564 - RJ 7051=i89 .
"i" .
5 Infar-tr, Divisior- (Dr) 17ill be respc-~s' hle f'or rrotection of t 1 e
left +'1211}: c,,.. , and r:1P.intP~ 1inD" crntPct Fit ' , 1 ::r:r.f'antr;r Division (Br) on
t eir rirl t .
1
11
5.
Fo~nts o·"' junction bet·,een l a,,,d 5 Infantr:· Divisions (Br) 2re:
a.
Cros.sroads 78739?.
c.
Crossroads 7711+!+7 .
e.
RJ ri37s32 .
C\ erfltio·~s :rnstruction
=1ssuec1 tode./· e.1s0, reacls
PS
follovJs:
Fi"tl i'.rri:r +:'orces re ''.lO~' ·'n ro"'~tio·1 to :!_p il"C' ,,, rt cs ~,,,t,e~cid,d
to 1-ie t• '3 -"'~nal ,. · r• se of' our or0rat::.o•· s Bo.st cf RO'~ . 1 June VI Corrs will
str=.Je 0"1+, ~1it'• Pll +-; eir "'orces in cortixrmtior of t' sir successes of t 1 e
rr'st O cl2c_~s . II CorJ s -.~111 lPPnc' a ren offens::1'e "ron :lta rresent rosi tio~1s . 11 tt:1sio~1 o:~ t 1 'JSe !~1ttt?c: s ls +,o cr·us' t, ~ :?01irtee~t} Gorr~e...'\'" !11.... F:r
foci "1,.: o'J.r A'TZ.,.O ?nrces rc,.:i t,o P:T lo:i t 1,~' al1 ro ,s: 1.10 neans o'f'""l7 orr,or·tunit . trs r'estro - corirlet,31~· t; p ""1.P'7.:f 1 '1 .forces B.1",' ~Pt"'r~ el. '!'o accor0 1 lis 1
t js , -t_t is d_r'3cted t~et :
u1.
0
1
II Corps 'V~ll :
A:'."t,-,r · f'';:·np secv.red t' 1e :-i--;;1, R;r01.md nort:, of Vl\LJ;r,·r'C'NE ,
blocked all traff~c tlrour:;' 7.ol1 te j ti'irl "ecurer' -:, 1 f't ~"Tt c" COLL!: L..ZIALI
t '3:t lies nit1in ~ts zon9 J '~o :,rt;}a.red on Armf Crder to yt1rsne and rnnili lr.te G-err'a'1 :'orces w!tl dra .~n[r nort' west a•y" ''Jill se"ld 1 t,rd · itt-ing mobile
r-Ol"CGS 11.D 'er ••.• roro11s le2.der _;: J1 --~ p Route 6 on r-:rCI:'J'P10 to C/'lJ tur-=i o:c
ciesti--ot.~ a11- c;_1e:mlt -~c:.-·:le~; \ ~t'-.d~a'tI5_rz ·~ror~ 1:: o :rcr1ts '-~~ ~=-r,t A.J'r·:- an0
a.
1
1
1;'1 rer1c~
1
,-:Jcpeditionar:~ CoI"I s.
:,;.
VI Gory s wj 11 :
::-"'ectu e -1::.' 11.t y.art o:' COLL= I,,.t. ZIAL~ b Hs zone 0:' act5_o•· and
dri··e -'"'orrmrr ,,;'t' tl P; utnost ·,reed t0 Cllt t 1 e routes o: ,-it1-,"TeW£,l of -~ner·,u·
forc'l'.)s -':,1 rou,:,·' 1:C lli: anc' t· en -'-rn°n stron"; f0rces c;ou-'-,' ,·est to pv,n_i'. 5 late t'. e
e'1ern; ap;a:11'.lst t' e ,..,TB1°R :'.::i ·rer . Lo-1/ :.. n.n-:e rrt:p_lery ilJ. te used to interdict an:-" cro0si"l"' sites b'T vi' ic} +, 1 0 ene~.- ''a,' rittemrt to VIitrdr-m c:,r t 1 e
rn-nER Rj_ rer to +j-- e "Test •
0
1
0
�Fress +>orwarc1 s,-j r;orousl,.' 'rit">in t'•eir zo110 of action to secure
t'e 'ig c-ro1.md in t'e ·,ricinit;r of 3Errrr (G 1ri44), protect t:e r::1.-;'t flank
of .,..I '.Jorps arid ;,' '.c nt' ArT1,,- ard fpcilitate t· 6 B.l1.-ance of ,.:~_i:-' t' Army.
1
d.
5 :::nfantr:, Di· ision (nr) will:
0
rress :::'orwarc: rn.1:i.cJl; towards t' 8 TIE' :r. Riv"ff tc c11t off e.11c.
destroy sner-;' forces t' et · E!Ve b1=,en turr;ed sout1 ~:" t\e ,rr Gol'I s . ArtilJ.~ry
- -·
, .
,
t
ule
will he ,,:er t ·,rc-:)LL f.crwara in oroer t o . n·ercJ.Cv cror3s1,.,g sir,es over +'
J.
...
•
•
'
11 ?. .
Defr ils on sec+,ors ol resror s:; bil~ t~- for seizing t e
anc:. ac.-vPnce to t' e rort' later. 11
Cb.rl- to G-r1 1.ent1 er . JJr 1714. HJJ,2 Pnc? 143 prog:ressinc satic:fcctoril;r
on ~:onte ArtPmiso on t' ejJ_' first oi.-.jective in +,'··e -vidn::_ty of 9646. 85t'
f~,·i8ion junped o·nf et l I.:'., occupied. Lar:lBno 0J48. Tell Juin: understand ' is situn:l::.ion. Will jur1p off tonorrovr r;ornine; rriti 3rd Di vision and
::ipec:.1.11 .;,erv--: ce :'orce tl~ occupy ~ ir 1 ground j· ,rnediatel, · nort 1• of Vnlmont,one .
Sloan is '-er,=i . Fis di··: sion wil.1 be 0 s,;enbled ')~r d.n;rl:ir:; t tomorrow morn:~ng .
Re sure ;1·011 ~,ate' qu,=ist:i.on of bou.,.'1.dPr:,. fro"' Vr lr10rtone northwest . 11
0
Gener-al Clark toc1r.· sent t 1 e followin~ menorandul'l t0 GenerP.l Grmwt er:
11 I 1 ave c1ecid9cl to comr:.t t: e 88t'
Di~1 ision in t' e II Corps w'·ere one
cor~bat +e1;r,, Rlreo.r::r is . 'T'here is 1_uite /:'. ger bet reen t' e 3rd 8I'C1 t' e '";8th
:Ci-visions . 88th will attack tomorro'i ~Ln t1·rt [;Pp gener.,lly· nort: • ::: 1 c-ve
directed Keyes tc set up a tas'lc +>orce 1mder :::'rederir!k; a fast 1·itting , mobile llnit '7:.t' ris ..:>pecfo.l Service Force, TD I s am' tt=:inks to rroceed east
along t?.oute /!6 as soon ns we cnn t;et on to it . Its nif'sion is to ('estroy,
discm.u~age , disrupt, disorganize, Pno P.n:r ot\er d's you t' ink of, r-ny enemy
forces in t' Pt area opposino- Eig:.t: Army or F-SC .
....
I kn.o"' of no "ro.,· to emrloy tLe ,:\8t 1 Division better. If I rut lv in
the VI Go11,s t' ere "muld 'PVe :-iee11. P 1assage of ti~e 1 i_nc')s, nd it vould e
time - consur1ing . ''it. t} e success of t' e ::St' Division '?.nc t, e vvr:,y 85t' is
goinp-, I p,yn c0.,,"ir,c0cl t' Pt is t' e t' in; to do .
0
•0
11 I i,,,...,.e iflsued an OI w~ ~ c:
instructs Ke;Tes to set up ti is Frm'ierick Task
Force rnc1 c1irects tie tvm c0rrs P.nd 5t Di-ision, P.fter Colli LP zj_ri.li is cPp turec1, to r'estroy t' e l4t: Arn;r in our :'.:'ront . In otl•,Tc worc1 s, t} --it is our
1
P :i.ssior, r"t'er t 1 .<in '-:Justinp; into Rone . You rrill get a cop:· rronrtl;r.
11 :
cert?inl:r will feel 1
,etter ,,,1-e11 tie F'':C pus1 e,s up r•8st Po 1te LPn.ico,
for 1'1 en 1• 1e rittacl: wit' t' e 3rd Div:i s5.on a1:1.d >pecial ,..,,ervice Force our wl1 ole
rir-' t flank is open excert for t! e 91st R,conneissance . 11
1
GenerP l Gri.entr er disr,ntc1 ed t'.
8
follo"rin_u neI'lor 0 nchm to Gr-nerrl C1Pr1 r:
11 1.
! i'PYe bnen r1.prlyin2; a '.l;e'"1+;le sqt1eeze on ?'SC , stressing t' e vittc1l
contribution t' ev- cPn ffl::e i_n connection Fit' t 1 VAJPC7>frr ,]E Gtt? ck if t'"e:r
·e
ct>r> W'.nn-o.;e some' O''! to r-rnt t1 ere in time .
�11 ? . Gennr<J.1 Juin is becor-,ing fea:t'f'u.2. t.,rt you mPJ be e:xrecting too
mud from 'im, so , e '. ,-,cl Colonel Zellar teleplone tl is Dorn:..r·n; to say:
1Generc\l Juj_n believes t} 0t ,·m Pre nxrectinP, Frenc: Gorrs
to buttress Genera.I Keyes I riglrt . Genera.I Juin is exceedingly
Anxious tl:,t,t '"8 not count on '. is sup:;ort w'•9n, in fact, 1·e will
be unable to be in lin,3 wit'. Gener,1 Ye:ms by tl1 e mornjng of 1
June .
1
At present t'e Frenci li11e r1ms as ::ollows:
'T'he 1 eft is secured on CARPI'1JETO and tbe right is from
three to fom· kilometers nortl-- of C:CCCA "JO .
1
1 The
terrain is difficult and the Frenc:1 Corps is still
neeti:nr; u:it,- 2.prred.a11le resistance .
.)\oulil t 1·i·'1.F"S continue R.S ,eJJ. as t' e:r "'re going now they
would need about U•ree na·rs to '')e in a position to cehoucJ,, in tl•e
GAv:rrmANO area . In ot 1 er words, FEC can prob2bly be t 1 ere eit, er
in tie eveninp; of ~ June or :mornini:; of 3 June . Should resistance
sti "fen the date 'muld ',e correspon<lirn,:ly JB.ter. 1
1
0
Colonel Zeller P r;n in :i.nsisted on Generrl ,Tuin I s desire to
make sure ti1a.t Gex"~rr.l Clark does not court on :bim in connection
'"it t, 1 e Keyes o-oerRtion in an p.rea yr,. ere ' e cr-.n not possibly be
0t t' e time of t~e sc:1eduled orerati.on (1 June) .
"3 . ':::'h~ news of t} e ,mccess of' tle ?nd Battalion, 111,?nd In-fan try h:1s
caused all o:f' us to turn landsprings . 11
Clnrk to Gruentl 8r . rn 1706. 11 'l'wo regiments of 16t' novr on Honte Artemiso . 1:.iav-e 01.rectec' 85tla Djvision to atbc 1r along;side of '36t} . Attack
s1 ould be launc: eel by ? r. •~. It will r;o for t',e ; ig' r:round in tre -r;icini ty of 99. 5 49 . 5 Pnd to t. e nort up to r.Tount Ceraso . IIPve triPd to speed
up <' 1 Da.niel 1 s a.ttP.ck to t' e 'ig'. P,r01md north of VRlmontone, :)ut it rrobr>bly
can not get off earlier t 11an duJ'.'ing tk.e n::ig' t . T½.e lfovrze Force reinforced
will fill t'. e &;ap hetween U e !:5"5tl and '3rd Divisions. Still sticky in tl .e
h'1.mnri.o area ~ 88t'1 less one CT will he in Army reserve until I see w'•ere
t}rn ~oinP, is F!ood . It may be in tl e II Corps. T:Jhere r-ire t' e Frenc~? }us}
t' em up w:1 t: all possible speed . ''
General Clark tlis evening sent t'e following memorandum to General
GruenthPr:
AttPc1 ed is rm HdditionPl cormmmigue vrl ici., cr.J'Je out t1-is evening and
w':i.c evoked some co::-:i.nent from t' e rress, rerticulnrl•r t 10 e vrriters for t1 e
morn:i nP' n:npers in t'·e States. The,- claim t' Pt t;-"ere is Hn excellent story
for ti e BritisJ,-. papers but not one vrorc;. '1B vin,c- been said about the lend
battle on t},e Fiftr .~rmy front. They ]'.ad not' :nf" to ·,rite r:.bout. C'f course,
I realize t 111>t ,;:i..,en t} ey put t' e special cor r,nu,irrne out on tl e joininr, up of
t} e '"r:ldp;eheod ·f'orces ti·e lritisl mi';ht
rve rid t 1-e same comrlP:int : ad '"'e
1 ad lritisb
not
troons in tl e ;joir,-up .
11
1
10
1
�11 Ti is ½rinv,s T"\e to a suggestion •v' 1
ic• you 111iP-,ht discuss informally first
'Nit'· Lem, nnd thnt is th9t d11.dng tl1ese tense tj mes w' An t}·e siturtion is
moving rapic1 ly, ever-" afternoon b:,r t 1 rr-ee o I cloclc tbere r-J .o-',t crnne out an addition to ti,,e on-tr,e-record br>clrgrounc in 1,il icl:i they could mention such items
as our c1mtu1·e of t' e ' ia;b P;round bnck of Velletri. Tkm.t is a tremendously
important" 10nnouncement, n,nd b= getting ere in mid-rifternoon it gives the
morni np; newspaper corresrondents Pn opportunit:r to get t'·eir copv b::-.ck in
time for first-pafse U. ' • publicA.tion.
11 Flease do not start a controversY ,ret, but first !ave Lem look into it
and see wl·,:,t cr>n be done. It soui1ds reasonable to me.
inp:s seem to be r:oin,:,; well t"j s evenin,:,;. Brnie I s tanks ore coming
rrtey are 1:111 in and need a rest. His inf Pntry wi 11 stn;--r in, and ~P ~les
1rno Doc 11.yder "'rill pus1 on to:morrov'. T1-eir attack, ':rit' trose of t} e II Corps
And 36t1 Di vision, ma;w begin to .a:et decisive results. I prPY it does. 11
11 T'
out.
The addjtionnl CO""lr,uni(l_ue mentioned in the above memorandum is quoted
belovr:
11 Tbe enemy continues to f2,ll beck undP.r pressure of our nd-vandng Bigbth
Arm;sr forces "ft icr are astride ½ip-1w1a~ 6 on P broad front ;:ind h<1ve reac1-oed t~e
outskirts of :r;'rosinone.
11
troors
Tt may no1;1 be stPted ti·t?t P b£1tt2 lion of tl e Black Ha tel was e.monr, the
wi ic•· made tl,e originP 1 hridge 1 ead [icrorn the Rapj_do. 11
11 Fip·1 +,9rs and lir,1 t 1
XJmbers founc:. onem: flPk exceptio:nall7 li,o:ht tooRy as
thev bonbed rmd stro feel troops, bivouac arAas, gnn posit ions and enem7 l eld
tovms in t' e bittle nre~s. No r10venent of enel"'' traffic was seen in the bPttle
and Rome areas.
nvP.rhavrks, T}nmder 11olts, Inwders nnd Bostons drorped 1-nmdreds of toI1.s of
bo111bs on troors, isnns and bj YOUc".c areas near Albano, W' ic1' we.s rractics lly
covered in smoke by bombinl!,.
11 Soutl west of Velletri T ·•underholts bombed nnd set fires in the town of
Lanuvio. In tie Rome narsl·•p,llinf ~mr·c1s tJ:oe · strafed a locomotive nnd left it
,
•
ournJng. II
As of midnj gt t tonight the da:r 1 s battle casualties amounted to 633 men in
the Anzio area, with a total of 1811- rrisorers taken.
*
*
*
ANZI0--,TTPIS 1, lq/-1-4--At 0800 General Clark \"e1t dovm to tl'e port nrea to vmlcorne tbe '361st RCT wl-:i c1 was lP.nding in LCI I s from t' e Naples oreri. Re met
Colonel Bro['dlow, t'1e Regimental Cornms:r1.der, and wptc} ed so111.e of t} e troops debark. At 0900 3rlgadier Gooclbod:' came in to sr, • ,o;•-iodb;we to GenerPl Cl0rk. He
is leav-inn· to join 'is Prmored brip;['ide. He hrs been wit' VI Corrs for tr.e pst
ten weeks , and just recently Cf!me to t1 e AdvPnce Fift'. Arr1y Corrr110nd Jost AS Britisr M 1visor to t: e Army Comm:mder.
Genernl Glrrk co11.ferred ,':'reouentl:v with Generr-1 Brnnn, : is G-3, for tl e re-
�rnainrler of tt e morning, we.tel inf closely t1,,e bRttle ~rogTess rnAcle b:· II and
VI Corps. He called General 'T'ruscott, GenerPl ~,ogles ~md General 'f,-,lker on
occasions to P"et first hPnn_ in:"ormation on ti-,eir progress.
I
At noon Gener,.,l Gruentl er flew up from t 1 ·e forwr-rd con'nl:'lnd rost to confer wit' General ClBr}r. He, GenerPl Clark and Generr-1 Brann remained in con.eoerFmce for about 1 nlf an 1 our. 11_fter tl is conference General Clr.rk received
lTajor Green- rilkinson of t} e ~ip;}'.th Army. Ee was sent up by General Leese to
explain t' at j_f trie ?iftl· /1.rrry W"S ;:,ble to teke Ror1e witl- out assistance from
tl e -r;ii:::;' tr Army·, t1 e ~-; ~l U A.rmy woulc continue its attacks further to t' e
nort' of Rone in t' e d~irection of Tivoli.
J\t 1400 General Bl'rr, G;;l.ief of Steff for General Devers, came to visit
General CL•1rk •
•After General Barr tr d left, Geri eral Clr, r l" 'vvent up to see Genernl Truscott at 1 is VI Corrs corJ11P:1d post. Later on in t e ;:,fternoon ; e received
Generals Brads'·-aw and 1.amey. Fe discussed wit 1 Ge 11eral Brn.csbi.v1 anti-aircr~ft
1
matters. l\.fter supper Ge:ner<il ClPrk conferred 1·1:i.t"' 1 is G-.3, Gener81 Brann.
f urinc-' t' i.s conference ..,e made rl~one cells to General :-_::pgles, Generril Ryder,
Ge11eral };eyes ancl General 'f'ruscott. Ee vrr.nted to empbPsize wit'. Pll of l'!is
subordinate commanders t11e necessit.r for an R 11-out offend v-e tomorrow - that
tomorrow was critical - t 1 rt t' e;' '"'t:id to r,us 1 to t"'e l:init rmc '.'re nj ght crnck
t)·e Boe' e defensive line.
1
:Ug1 liP..:hts of today's rrogress were t' P entrance -; nto Tfelletri of %t1'
Di vision troor,s in tle lrtter ~9rt of t1 e ,.,.;:,ternoon. 7- e 34t: And 45t:- nade
little ri,...or:ress. ':' 1 e 85th D5,dsion h,.,d reac1 ed rronte Crstel Laccio. T' is
hs put t,,.,em just si,,ort of their injtial objectiYe, Pou:nt Ceraso. Tl e 88th
Division in its attHck to t' 'e northvest ad-.rnced about a r1ile 0nd n. '-a1f.
T 1a.e 3rd Division 'he.d cut Hip-lw:ay /!6 just en.st of VA lmonto11e and 3peciR.l Ser-vice Ti'orce troops were pus 1 ing eastw~.rd clown Route ?6. T• e 'Frenc' · ave mPde
some PdYr>nces to t1 e no·ct'. 1"est. T}•e 3rd DJA will pass t'."rougl t 1 e /,.tL ;)~,TM at
J'ionte LPnico. On t1°e r;;i1:;' t1 P.rrr,7 ,..ront :Sritisl reco1·mnissrn1ce units were
just s'•ort of "'erentino. Tl'eir Ac1 --;r,nr::e :,es not bc:;en ver:r rPT~ r" t' rou,:l out the
camrx:iip;n and has not ke1t rince vit1 Fif't~ _'\.rE1y r,clvances t'rouo·'out t~e bettle.
:mportant messB.ges o:f' the day are quoted as follow.s:
Devers to Cli:,rk. R"T F53358. "Included in a messnge .c>rom Gemeral · e:r·s1 all to Generr,l DeY0rs r-0.s t' 9 follonin,· nesSPf:;9
icl we } '-'Ye been asked to
1 trs. ' 1
pRss to you. m, is was oontained in messPfe "-4407'2 of 31 May.
Pr 1 all
and I greatl,. arprec 0 rite your Pction onc1 messages refr-irding Alle-1 'lro·m. You
,,_,.,_ve been '"10st t' oufrtfnl W'cl cons1rlerrte, dosrite our tri:,PJ.endous resporsibil:ities at t: e r1oment I• I!
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AG'il\Jt to Clark • .1:J ,;,53437. ":·'.Rrk • Cl,rk, Lt. Gen., f"'rn,e•1.ent HpJoint"1.ent Brigt1c'l-'.er Gener::il, Rog,1lar -irn\,., renk from 1 ,:3epte'11.her 41 P1nounced Tera
1, 7iDS'"' ''110, dP..tAc1 31 ''Tay ad...-ises AG"\JAR. 11
Gener .l Slar1 t· is efterrioon c,ent tl 9 follo•"'"n: rnessa,:;e to G0,1errl
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.ave .iust rotl1.rned +'rom t8.lk~_ng ··r"t1 mrusc.ott.
I wo"L..lc~ "'Ot let "'in
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e•1-l:,ir~ ..,,,)tl n-:_y-:si011. to Fttt=10' a, soon rs 7P1l~tr" f,Ps fror r·o 1te ~rte iE:io
t'u9 11r •t'P;st, r0~ii.wnt, dreRst, or -qc,rca r.:. ;n.f<J..
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c~.d 70 w;ll ,lo ·+,. L tc, 7(: 1 ·L :-- ,;nr, rli:3Fno~_rtPd in 1 " .. i<;' ....,j"lg r.c> t' {' 4'.>t '
34+; a.11rl ls-:-.. Ar· or0C:. :.st ,'i~;. c,r~d · s nE' 10 to -o in toror.,..ow - r·1st wait
'l--ioi) ,r 0 4 'o''rs. It 'rd t· ·rt - P:_ '""rs Josterfr:· 9~ccrc.ing -'-,c, "'ruscott.
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of Valr.iontone. Spec::!rl 0erl":ce :'01·c1; :s ta ;E"mt to ~t flY0 JUJ.,tirr; sr:rl::.. L'Lo
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nnu:i.r' s: Pct '-• , a -~e'1,;,"'f;e ~fJ i.r ' + ~ +'err al reque1t, '-J ,,0·1~11 r,,,'-'o +,' 1 1Fir
~ ,par+, ,n l t a,y' r,Jc,ue..:;t ['} 1 re •rl, C:itPtion t''i ,9P-n.
'lo not ·i.rtenc" tr .L".JCO ~~ lG. Jui~1 ancl IJe~•ont'1"' 1 )F':l't f'f,a · 1. , nti l l'"t01° :-(oI"e · .'13 +'r lion, sc } l8n.Jn
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in -~iew of estirn<1tec1 strnn:-it' of '3nemu- in '!ri lP1ontone nre~. l r>rd:; ng stronf in
·,elief it is uns01mc to ,·j_·-a Fif't' Arn - red ror,1 but 1 believe , -om case is so
loE;ic.ol t' rt -ou ce.n ,"orce ;_t tl rou.•,.., Generr1 Ale~carider . i'"rdim~ st;:,tes t'.. at
1:-' }2J c!str~na l_irt'_ ri:round s' onld b0 s-'::.unbl:·,o- bloc'"" s~tu['.tion can be reYie1·1erl
Again vrit 1 nury,ose of 1:llo1T-':•c '"i'i+>t 1 i\rF ·- to exterr' to Y10rt' into t: rt 2rea .
r1ore . 11
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Gr11ent: er to Sl~n•k . J:l,r 7904 . 11 Generril Juin still feels it irn.perBtive
·"or Fi.,-.t 1 Arr~ r to
V-'3 Jlrcl: lin0 b01mdrr:r.
Fe 9H;'7"S ,UeXPJ1 er prorosal is
little bettPr i;,1 an gr,~er. 1-immrlp•·· r «.nd 'rs r;rept c:i S/1.c'-Vanta ge of rreventj ng
Frenc' mq7.euver so esse;1ti<il. to success . It v•ill force Frenc' troors to r:arade in front of lalestrina Tieivl ts w ile Britis' are still ten rrUes to reer .
}Ie unrlerstrnds tl.ot you ''lill -nrob8bl.r aut' orize 1 i:m to t2ke Palestrina Hei,,;kts
reg:?rdless of bourihry ½ut of 1ecessit:,- fOU will be f'orced to iss1 .e t' Pt order
too late to ena Jlo ..,r,''l1C1 to swing wide . 'Tore . "
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Gruent' er to Clark. }FT 7905 . n-~a-ve ju it tal 1 ed to T:21°dini=; P g:,in. He
believet, t 1 at 1\le:r~:i.ncAr n;:v ~l.'" to see , ·0 11 Friday 2.:c-ternoon or '-i8tU1·d.a;r morning . I vfill advise ''OU la.i-,nr tcrc".. ;::d t . In view o"' tl At visit , I r ,co1:1nend
··ou accept Alexander bo1mdfirr t0nJgl.t wit1 out nrotest. .::.:iturtion existLw
w11 en 'e arrives mav give o,·c:itioral vein·' t to your nri::tment .
F.orr1ing states
t 11r.t if -present Fi~t· A.rT1y attncl· s' onld bo g dovm Alexander will re:vert to orifl'~nal bouncRr;r to Higl w1:1:, 6 to Ti;:' ::;:'-t1 Army acv.once af'ter rerrouring_ lnunc}comb5ned :?i Pt' Arm_; !"JJ1d '}i p;1 t} attack. n
Gruent' er to Clar}- . RN ~42 . "Your. appo:Intment r- s rpi•manent gTade Brige d:er GenerAl tc date from 1 Septem1 er 43 :,,mounced -"n ·t,,-,r DepPrtment srecial
orders . Congratulntions . 11
Clar}: to Gri1ent1 er 4 R1'J /,,_6 . 11 ,'\:;,preciate your d-t.+"ficult job on tLe boundaI will 8Ccert Alexnnder 1 s proyiosBl alt· our";' it dor,s not i:o;ive me t 1 e necesst:i.r,r room to !"Fneu··er Juin.
:=11clicrate t' ,et to 1 im but t' ri t I ,·rill acco17pJ.ish my
mission wit in Lis restr · cted area . mell J 11in t:_e decision 1 as bPen l11:<Jde .
Rave l im re:,ort to ne 8t rr;r er ~ P.re at 1000 om's tomorrow riornin~ if convenient.
1.Rdio ~'11A, and ' 8 '•ill be net . 85t now on Cc1stel LPccio at 00.5 52 . 5 continuin1; on to north-rest . Tell rarding we 9re ~lread;v- 2cross route 6 and ; ore to
sta;r , Lenee revArsi.on to orirrinal boundar.r we ore will not be nece•~sar:". I ray
,ard tonio-} t . 11
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ATTZIO-- Jtnf~ ;? , 1'144~-General Cla.rk tallr:ed over t 1 e pi one to Generals Truscott
and 'fplJcer earlv t' is r1or:nin['" to GMpl asize t' et sr0ed is important; thpt tre
attPc 1, toclr>.J must be rus ed to its limit . At 0'110 le rent b ,iAep to tnlk to
the '31Slst RCT, vrelcoming tl em to Fift Army and e:x:plr infog to t em the importantpart t1 e 17 vroul 1. rlr:,- in t' is PTeat Fifth Army drive . T' .e RGT is compossd of t' e
116th FA Battalion, Coi"lprn:r A, 31f-it• Pnf(neArs and GompPny A, '316tr :red~ cal Battalion . At 1030 General ,Juin Prriv8d 1w cub irom ·is HePdq_uPrters for a conference wit 1 Gen0rcl GL"1r1c . .At l?J0 GenPrPls Alexenc"er ;one. H,,,rc!ing arrived. At
16!}5 General Glrirk ~lsiw to II Corps conmrnd post for P conf'erence 211.d also flew
o-ver Ve battfofi9ld in is cub . After supr:er GenerP.l ClRrv.: rnd GenerPl Brann,
i,,is G- 3, discussed tJ..e new 1-lOtmdPrv 1Jetween :'<'EC nnd II Corps . Br1ttle pro£,;ress
i:i.nd toclay 1 s e· ents 0 e included in t: e Armv Co,.,,,mPl'lrler t s notes and tl e important
messoges ~toted ~elow :
0,
11
�Ge:r.ern. l Clerk ti,,is mornin~ dictated the following notes for inclusion
in his di.nry:
\
"Am greatly c'!ist:'ppointed in Truscott I s attPck. His :rroposnl lPst night
to rne to move 45tr Di;,::i sior. out o" the line rnd swing it Pround to Velletri
was fantastic. I nut} orized ore conbat team to il.o tM. s job, and it is not
vet in the P. ttpck. 'T'he "l.ttPck o+> the 36th Division f'rom r;onte Artemisio
and Rocca di rPpa we. s delayed until 0030 .nnd then werilrened by tbP conf'usion
of units in Velletri. I am greatly disappointed. I hrve directed Truscott
to have the 1st Armored D-'vlsion rerdy on one hour's notice to ·l:ie thrown in
when the seI'!bleDce of n break occurs. This is a rr>ce f',-;_;ninst time, v ith my
subordinates failing to np1°reciate hm" close t};e decision will be. Two Germen Division9 !>re on the WH;7 dovm, wrich mill, o:= cour~e, swny tlie tide if
they cone in before we tA..'ke the Colli Laziali.
1
"T hr,ve had Juin flown here tod1P to speed hiil' up ta, debouch on Route 6
1''ith his 3rd DIA and tl,en turn toward 1 alestrina and Cav~ • . GenerPl Alexander
will -,1ot ·"'ive rrie thrit Mi:i;h terrr-in so essential to protect his ·"lank.
"II Corps is mrikin/J' prop;ress. I l-r1 vc directed Fredericl<:: 1 s exrloitrtion
"'orce noving east on Route 6 to fricil:itate the debouchment of the French
Corps, "or I need thefr "reip;ht bedly on my right.
1
"General 1\leXA.nder and Ge:1eral Hr>rding co!"le to see me rt one o I clock. I
will tell therri plP.inly ,'hat .,. think of the restrictions they rre rJ,,cing upon
me in order to rti ve ,,: ighth Prmy the posit ion in t:be battle for Rone. 11
Follo,,dng Genern.l Alexancler's visit., General Clar1{ dictated t:be following:
"Generals • lexRnder nnd 1{1"rding lave come to see me. They were '}Uite r,eek.
I expected more of' rm Prgument f'_fter hrivinq; receiv?d certain word from General
Gruenther toaay to t},e effect thnt re regerded l{ardin!; 1 s qotives with suspicion.
'ihen Alexander st"'rted tc tell TD9 thPt -if' riy Ptt"'ck didn 1t r.;o h8re not to ''Jorry;
thtt ·h"" rm li• bring the
ole ..,...'iiehth /,_rrny in, I told tim thrt my rttack w,"'S
going, thr,t I w?.s putting t 1e French north o·"' Route rl6, that I rrobobly would
be f'orced to t;:ike the 1'igh P;rotmc in tre· vicinit,r of Ialestrino becnuse I could 6-j.,.,..
not rely upon the ';ig;hth Army to be there wl- en I nseded them. I told him thnt ~\ 'l
· the bPttle wo11ld 11ecessitate doing it. He said to go r:.ght ahead. I snid I ~ "1 t"
would clear out o? thPt Ei..ghtl-. Army area vrl-,en tbe Britisb ca.ire along to tAke
over t}ei. r respo,,silJiHty. I "ltK1e it ver· rlain to him th"'t 1-ie was sandwicring
"'!Y French Corps in nortl., o-: Route ~6 nnd tr ere rrnuld :1e no room f'or the 7:ighth
'rr1:v in Ve Vrilrnontone <>rep. I ·-ent to the T'l<'P so thr.t there could be no misunderstRnr1~ng nnd pointed out ex"'ctly my underst011c"ing of' the red J ~ne b01.mdt,ry
· rl'i ch f¼ru0nth9r hrs bRe:n d~ scussing rdt]:, Hardin,:,-.
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HAlAxaYJ..c:er ;:iro;--..cAed conpletely in my sche'Tie c"' menemrer for tre II Corps.'
r-1a1;dinc,, WP s m,=,ek rs <=i nouse.
...,_
"',"ith reference to the publicity on Ro'1e, thev left "'J'iti~ ne P copy of the
followin'1'. letter (quote letter). I ,,,r.ceed to "t 911d r11>de it plain tl1 at when
troops entered How'! :r "muld radio 1Fi f'th Arrriy troops :bPve entered Ron e 1 , ancl
Ale,cancler 8PTeed that he v1onlc1 release it qjr11l-'-~ 11Rou<Jly ..,11 over tl0 e rorl:1 on
mv say so. T lPter nould determine exActlv ,,,1 rt 'mit ,,.eacl,ed tJ,-,9re "'irst c 1cl
-,r~uld so a 1mo1mce thnt. 11
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�'T'he dir9c+,ivA from A.AI regn.rdirg rress reler,ses uron t1-ie capt-ure of
Rome, 1"1,c,nti0'1ed aboV8, ~:..s quoted below:
nrn orcle:c;\ + u •':!D~.n_u..,e tl1.8,t the ::,9v1s o·r"I th.e c2. .rtl1.J..~9 of Ro ...1e is L.i0-vic~ led
c ue re~ri_rd to s~m.ultP'Y'IJ~ous 1~elease tLe f·o1 -
in a sat~ s:fPc.cf~o=~~?" v-r12~riner '\Vit 1 1
1
lovri11g proceuvre ~,il 7- 'he -i.o.orte.-1.
C<o 1sor stops rill be in:' tiated .f'o:, tl -. ::..t:. anc will 1Je o~errt::_ ve
1mtil covo:c ed b~, - releas9 h3r on reco::--cl •:r cLgrounds .
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This ITrJ will 1-:ie guided 1,y you t:1.roughout the :xi.ttle rs to the
.L:1~ release..:~ o: t; '3 f\.~')0 110 1~J:r 0'1 1,..1?-corC bt1 cl~r::ro1.Jn~se
·,ro i11Pntion vrill 1 'e 81loned of t;1s rrr\,-, rr:':,j_orialit.i, f'ormrtion, division er 1.mit wl -'Lcl1 ertsrs ]( :"~ first 1 mtil relensed b:- on record ,x,c:-g-I'otmd .
'u'",3quently e.11 co1 ~- H:i.11 1,e cu~ referr:.'rc; to any other unit other tl e..n the
onP rel eased . Co·"n.·ln-1 "r, • Ge:-ernl Fift> A.rr-,;i" will inforn trjs TrQ as soon f's
possible which fornation , un:'it etc., shoulc: ')e rnle~1 sed in co::.--,n0ctiov1 \ it:
H?,.
first e11tr:r ~.nto ~r,1'·rr~ .
n 3., A speciP.l cor. 71.mi me vrill be issued sir·ultPnAousl.1 :ln London,
t shj,~pto::--, ;"1_rlc'le r;Pst, AI"T!), PY'.C:c 1-ocrlly in :tt::,.ly r~no-,c_ndnt; th:cit ncrs is riori in
0
A11:ec h,'1:rir1 s . ':11.-~s cor1r 11r1~-011P wil1 1·v3 issl1ed Els 0On :·s tl..e Connanr.~nf; Cfe11e1
re.l ?iftr Ar~y c ecii:'es t1,2t T--7 -is su,..f-'~c·i 0ritly in our :-~nrl s P 1_0 ccnld not
1.L.11.der· Any circ1 1I·1.str,11.ces )8 retFw:ll'>'Jd }tl e tJn.er1:r. (1n re core~ l1r·.C 1 "" "rOl ri' anC_
1 7-ec
1 :n tl e l'10r1·1rtl \/ia:r .
t~ 0 3~f -~c~ !:._l CO":rr l?]l~ r~u8 ;iil1 be f1rrc
1I bey ; ill 9r1tviPte
::.'ror L 2 AA: and wil:c 1•e r0lee s0c' throur;l l ublic n,e1rtio·13 c::2· 1nels to r 11 co1.1cernsd sts:t'":; t},e tiI"c: tt / "d tle :;.~.-:;lePse ~s ,aY1ctio11ed .
1
0
1
-r-
1
''4. t~l--':.k,u/ t'. o 'rorrlinP, of t';e 1-it=J.c1·gro'Pc. or t:.o sp9cie1 corrn1n~_q1..'e i'r!f:'Y
be , {;l~e"Jd ·0v 7iftic Army arc' t' is I' 1 it ";•ill not 1,e pe.ssed by FiftL .Prny to t'1e
tress cl·'. rect . u
I:mpor-c2.r.t vessages of the day a.re
2
s ·'.:'ol1ows:
G0 nere.1 '.}ruonthAr se t t},e .r-ollorri:1g rrci,,1or2nc1un to G9nArrl Clr>.rJ, tris
norninr::
"Your mess[• ge (iic: not r,•et to :1e tmtil 1: 30 tr:Ls morn:· "'lg so I did not call
'}•:lrETPl ;f'l1~d--tn..,. or GerPr/<J_ ,Tuin 11t t},,·,t hour ., :-: hr.d alerte,' Gm1errl Cr rr entier to ti.~ rrobnhility th;:,t yon vmu:lc 1•1P.nt Gererr.l Juin ,·t Anzio at lG:OO l\ . ;·.
this '"101"~inp;. T h2ve om~ y,eople try 4
_ng to get I' r.:"11er9r to co.,,':'irn nou.
�Tlny r.,..e ~:oinr: to rut 01.,.t P SJ 0c-ir-l 1on tl-,-: record 1 :-01.er e "t "b01:t lSOO
tocay. '""'1°·· 'l w:l 11 ,o'•e t' e ")n"i'' r_p- 2rnrs fer 1 J·n,, but ::: t' .;n}• t'1"·:; it
i'1r:-11msatisf'r-ctory p·:-rqnge ,t~rt. A"": '1as P ru:;__e thPt tr.e cC'nrun .. 1w ::,_nc;':
C'1. tr 9 record mn~_;erif' 1 will close "'t noon, i.e . , evnrts ur unt:i 1 ncion •
• OW0V";r, they rf'rely r:itjcr to ,I.' rt t'rin li: it, 1
1:1t t}li.s t.;'"'J.P, ~h1rer~'1.;
·1sod -tt 9.S PYJ. exc·-1rie, .:.t .'.'oms . I hn.d Lel"" .,__,ry t(: cr.rri~e ~'1ru1n,r~r v, b,1t
witr 10 luck . - cljd no~~ c'l:.~~ f· rclln; bec~use - co'1r;~c'ered it irrrpro,,rir>te
to T""tf',r~ [)Jl ir, 1ll8 0~ t,1ic-- C~Se.
0
~'e c<qJrs +;. 1 1"t G,.,,er:il Ale'>~9.n, Pr h"s ir:1 ·os"cl tle
tFel VP, O I clock ti,-,,9 "'...:i.n't ',P,(''lUS'"' 0-. ROT' 'l et·J:;9 T;"'t'1 '1 • ~i ;' tr ~r ;" to ! rve
lr·l:.0 c ph•Y-os ·~1c> ·n: 'eri tr9,' '1,,,ve ,,,ot r-.lw,,~rs bee11. tco "'ecure . ·.,:e
,-1.,rJ.t''l t1~~ tl8 •r.-,r,,tri r91.8E'Sa
~ulc: }-'>W~ 1"'1 to 1.<>Vf' 8-GY'9rP::.. Alp"'rr/er ' "
"rrrovr 1 .
llLem :u<J'!- c..,1_::._,c1.
0
tc,lc1 L~·rn tc t91.?'0, ro n111·tl .-r --icti.o:'1 .
.~tl tr is PX('8l i1=mc~ he},ind r,1e
-- be 1.; ev0 I 1 11 1:-e "'ble +,o r nc... :.e t1, 1 1en er se F3E'~~. sf'" ctc,r~ ly ,. .Hl do it
,7~t' out '::P'lS~r~ A "·1ss .
At PPY rqtn 1 1 r
·ive :i-1-; ~;,p r•rocl olc' col}9r,e t-r•y.
It.,.
1
0
0
11 ::-
nn do~-~
11
~Ad
O"lG'l" YOU.I'
-nro7vtion.
You 0ertPinly r'lrned it. 11
ti~I to Al7 Co•1cerned . R" "'t 1115 . 11 Ger11·('l fl')XP'l'er r'"''1 r8Ci)j7"cl thP
1 1 l "'V8 rece·'. v0c. t'ie "ollo' iri[' ~esf'ollo ·ir.,. "'"'S"l"t'{P "ror, Gen'1rl'l f:i_}i:-011:
1
1 rer .
sar,;e ·ro7 GEnerP.l isT1ro
.,,eP-i~s. Battle h,~YJ.ninP' in TtP.ly or. :•::-;r l:'
l1~s rJ.rePdy ,·rC't:;r~rnsed f,9,r 0 >1ou·1 to
cl,..sJed E'S c mr:-j0r A.llied vi.ctory.
r"'fi.c"rs rn' ot:1fir r""l' s o·" ~11 ,._} re~ s~·-vicee cn l of• all }lE'rticiratiris=: n..,tio:vial .;t-'."''1 11:=>ve r0acon tr f'eel ;":i. "Ud of t;w f'"J''Vice they r"ve rf',rder8d tr-e
co~10:1 C'1U'1e .
C0.,..t11inly t11jr ur.ol9 co.·,ari is roud of tr.en . Ile:=i.se ,o;ive
ny rersorial "'elici.ta-l:;for~ to t'1'} Cor':r11JrU~rs o": all three C:"!rvices. bnc.s . I
!'<'IV<") repl-;Ad ~r ~b:> nollou:lnr: t~'Y•r.is. 1ei:;:rs.
er, 1 Ah.-,p' of e:_::. rc'1'reo QC> the
tl:c·Ae S"''·v~ces -:ie-"Vi"l~ ·YJ.-;;L~ ~:,.,,lit~rr"n <tr t.r'£'Rtr0 I -::-'1!'1''1-~ you or your "'elic'btions .<>nd Prrr,:,c~;:,t,ior. o ... -:r"'ir e~fort in tr e F"'sent b<>ttle.
~ve17one ~l'J. f;fertt i-ieart nYJ.d deter!"linn.d f'·'.nic;h onf thn CPIDfl"i[;n , Tl~e f-':rst pl'"Se
of nl., ch.\ PS 'JC' snccesci ' ..1:1_ tmd~r VCPu· ccrJn"nc· l"'st :rer:r.
'nc,c;!''
0
,A
1
Genor('l rrrucmtr.-r S"nt tl0 .::'ollo·•ir,;todt=>y:
enorrrc:.1u1 to rP.,.erE"l :1'1 riid-mornini:i;
''1 .
I t11ll(0c1 to Ger,Prr>l 'fr-rrli:'1F' "'!""[11,n r few TlrJ onts (''";O . Ge110r"l flcxnric '"-'r hes 'ec'J.ed to 2'l'1fOrir t 1,e tnn0·mceront o+' .Lr,.,, "18U bounlnry until r,...ter
:ii q cov,_ ... _re:'1"e ,, · tr you. Hn['r1'·hilo T ,,, ve '10t ifieo U e Fre11.cl~ of Ge11.""'rti.l
~lexander 1s tentr-tive oec~sion so t~Pt +,reir O'f'errt::or.s cnn 'ie concltcted in
tre lirht o' +r,·t in~c,r1~<1t.,_on. ~ou, of course, ,,,ill "':Ve c'etc,iled iYJ.f'tructiors t0 G"'lri"TPJ Juir. vl•en you see l in tl is mc,rn:rg .
Jn my c''<1cuss~ors witl' irprd~rig +,}e J01nt •rp not f'ettl0c' to ,.•ve us
]:l, -t l " :,o lcl me reP 1 ly amou,,tec!
t},e ..-r-=e•1 boundr rv l>ey0ncl. tbe 'T' i vc li rrer .
tot'"s: "'h,t Fll d' t, 3 r>r<>p to -1,l e :--rt r f th, roe' 1 ·De rtr.,,,-t-.;_np ,ri_t½ the
Ii ,:l •rpy 6 roFd jul"'c-l;io:-1 ·-oPlC' he cv~i. 7 ,,11le +o us . In :: 1 "tPr di ,cuss::.on 1 e
jrcl-icBti=>cl tkt ~;igl,tJ,1 Army w0ul<l :'1PCd s re ror>d'l -'-;o tre 1e':'t 0~ the r;reen line
�_,vl e 019:""Elt·
..
7
·
_,_
1.OTlA._ 1·0n1.c:::,.r9renvS O ~ .._, e -r.i•r-1-,. JAr,.,..·r lt- ,., d been"' t·,..-"~ed • I took
,,
~
1.,r
I'.'.
ofl J ,:,.L-'
-that -i-,c- ner..n thl"t, he "rris prer-u·.:.1g " 'PG~e c;o ·!:,J-.-:-t t:1e Eighth frny bourdrry
cculd ,1fl sriStnd clo'1'1l' townrd t:19 ori[":im:il on' Pt suer time PS r:ip-1 t be exr-=erH i:-rt "'er '.iP"l~t· Arey. I djn rot ,'iYl rflr0j11 g c1o::'1 on tH_s roint bec,.,use
t't tl'·e time 'he brouP-l·t it ur- ::: ·mew t: --t Ge'1ert1l Ale:xrnr'er n>..s going to see
you +,oday, Pnd :r f'elt thRt it VTas n ratter t11r>t you coul'l 30,ttle quite
ersil y wit:~ him as yo 1r co'1 'e:rerc1-; developed . : rry he e'1+;:·rely wrong in
estir.rtino- r9rclir>" 1s ;ntention in tl-:i f' rnrtter but I r>m incl.;neC:: to regf'rd
hi"l motive w-i_tl; •·usric·ion . 'fril·e my o"'inion for v1hrt 1t rP.y be rort''l .
.L'
1
n3 . vn1e1 I tol(l TT~-;_•"i11P- ti-js morn.;nr tb=it the AleXcnrler bounr'<iry does not
r-.;ve vo11 the n-,cessai·y room to TW'1E"1Ver tre T-'re11cl1 he +,cld rn th!'t GenerPl
AleJmnder ray ru ·ge"t [lt t1--1P. con{'erenc8 tod<:i.:, tl-wt ~le T're'1ch Gorrs t!'J<:e ()Ver
some o:' tl'e nreP. ~.on occup.:.Ad by II Corrf' .;'1 thP vicin~tv of v~Ln J::.'( -C .
'T'l is s}ift ·muld P,T'"lble t'1e II Corpri to co"lcentrri.tP P. h:,!J.v:lPr ef~ort in tl,e
::-tte.ck on '::olli LE'z:.flli . re furtl,er strted tr--it -1-; i_,, rrrri11-;e"1t'nt r-~ ,c;ht
enr'ble vou to const.:.tute an Arry reserve ,,hicr •rou.Ld ~er!"lit you to hPve cont'nuity o-n ntt11c'c. I [''lSUl'ed l'i.I'!l t1 ,.,t you T ere nt..11.r aw::i.re o:" t 11e imrortPYJ.Ce
of' C1-1f't11rjw tle Colli lFziPli ;"'ea·;:.ur8 nrd Urt you 11ere :;ush:n: th;:,t Pttack
rd th alJ. o,.. ti,e vi ~oi- vou t assess . "IA ,~urther sbted th, t G•;nernl A::.eXBncler
consj derHd t,' 1at , f' 1 tl-iough our trooT.>s l r"/8 '1."de a J "'netrntion of tl e er.eriy de fsr"'e ;-,osi.tio11 , ·t } rs not y9t bee"! (eer ,,...,_OUP"1 to ~1'..sure tl1.c-t 4:.l:-'3 enemy ,1ill
not be Pbl.e to sel'l ·t o·n"' • : ~nterrrP-t d t',js ...,i1 ... se 0 • ~l·e diocus-:;ion PS an
rttA"1pted .,..,e:r talk on t1e necessit·..r ~f e.xrloit.;ng c11rrent S'lccesses in t17.e
Cori Laz-'al i erea . 7 mn cr,11"'-idert t'1rit ;,rou ·.rill be :>ble to 'l1r'ke en ader,uate
pref' 1=mtRt:i.on on +,l is ;i1b5"lct 1 /!'e"l Gerierr 1 J\le,canc' er arrives .
0
0
11 4.
I told you lnst nir'l t trlf't G2:-1.err-i 1 Al8XFnder w.ill rrobMbly A.rri V':l
"'bout 12 : 30 n . ri . too.:ciy. : <>rc'U.nr; now st,.,tes th~t Generrl U9XFr er is hr>ving
SO""A Polish di.f'+'1.c·1.lt11-;s Pr.d th'1t l'is arri.v<>l 'rill rrobr,hly be clelnyAd . :re
bas -:~ve:1 an -;TA s:10rtly r>:t9r 1:00 r .m T shell k"e:r in cny,stant touch ,fith
.
ldm, bec,.,use I rep li.ze how this lmcertnin arrivrl ti::''e "Till t 4_e yoG to your
o 'f~ ce . -r ,·ill send you a nl.? sl. -~· ~ inute - c:m g:i ve you .?-. 111ore ·i ntelli r;ent
esti. w-2te . 11
0
Ge:rierrl Clrrk sent tl-,e +'ol 1.ovr~ng ne111or1>n<lW1 to Gener, 1 r..rt..enthsr this qfter11.oon :
"Received yo·rr r',rr:or11r. :u-1 of ::.015 h'JUJ'S encl 1·rr-<1 ,.,.7_,Mr1 : rr>cl. :5t ')P.fore
Alex and Fn•rlinf" Prri ved . A'1 sn0r es ":.l e,f CF:'1P. 1 l!PVe Al PX tl e situRtiot1 ,
,r} icl rle1?s8c< M.n gree.tly, ard he indicrted conrlete "Ccod 1?nr1 P.Y1thusiN1m
1it'1 ri:v emrloyme11t of II Corr3 , r,ar+.ic·J.1.rr·l y , A.nd o:" +,: e effort of the "'"1th Pivision ·in the VI Gor:is . r.:re rrtrer ~'1<l: ctitec'1 V1"'-+:, i" I did riot ;,,rih:i 11 ro of
tri s ~1ot to •r0rry, thrt t,},e ~;iphtr frri.v "'oul1 <>gc~in C()re tn r·r rescu"l . I let
t~1 P"1 lrve :lt pl,ntv rt -!:,l1Pt-ti"18 . I tol~ then t} rt J} l'IG_ 'hr r Ju:in lerR , WPS
rutt"'ne; }1im in e11.1:,t o+' V:1 lnontone <ind nort' of R011te ·16, t;irt le •· oul<l trlre
the h-' wJ-, -~L•011.rc" in the Palestrina ernP 1:-ecriw·e +}-,e Jritish 1 :oulrl n"t be tr ere .
Tie ::;a-:d 1 ri_u~te rill r~ght 1 jus~ so-:" got out o+' th3 wFy :i.n thRt Rrea wlien trey
did come un . He su-;r·ested I us9 the I'rench nflrt w2 r soutr of R011te t6 . I
to 1.d h-i m "I ,oul.d rt8 0. mv mm corps bounrl-"l.r-i "~ "c; tri.P sit urtion r"eve:.oJfi<:'l '-,,lt
thr-~, qssuredly the Fri:mch rro""bly could rele 0 9e -':.re ?rd D:ivision to me for
oth0~· use .
1
1
�139
11 '.::'hP~r as:V.-ed "'IY r-rrrovF>J. on a IRC relee.se on the rews of Rome.
I quite
arrr0ed Tiiti1 lt pnc,_ nrir,e tre 111.tin tl:'At 0'1. "'IV \'lord to t} em they would relerise
1hnt :. '1'11red f'or.
1
11 Ju::..n v•as t·11e n.nd tr.oroughly tmd0.rstoof.. my rosition.
I told Mm ~·e
uould conf:irn my instructions to hiT'l in an CI and th t as re found it necessary to go nortl: into tre Br-i_tisl' sFictor l,e ould do so in accordance with
t 11e si tun.tion.
"fart of tl' e 7t:1 In..fantry is goin~ t0 ?ttr:-c1r PPlest:d.no t'ris ;,fternoon.
AnotbAr lx>ttelion is go:ng to .:-ttac1 Cnve. "'hey rire cl_ose to t ose two roi:1ts Pow. Howze ras been directed
on t:re road junction on ~.oute J1,S at 01.,.. 5 5 5. 7. ~en I t h10w d en h"' ni 11 get
there, hut s ,e no rearw11 uby he sboulc' not be t1'ere by :1ovr. ~in.lker I s two
re,:,·mo11ts iu.n.,..ed o,..f frir Racer; J.; I flrr t½.is norn" ng f't rbo 1 1t 0()30, and they
l:rd '""'de slovr rrop-ress accord::r.,; to t'·e ::.Pst rerort, du"' to difficult terrain. Heve i'u:t +,H~ed rith r-r,ruscott who .Jays ·;alker -· s con~ident he rill
rePc1 ½_js obj~ctive • .,. ½ore '1e i'1 rir,l,t. Still stjcky witr tre '34th and
!/>th. 1-re1TM prepElred tr go bflck in wl1 qn the 4'5th hr:is nc.Vfmcec:1 ri little
bit fnrt:""'r•
"'1 ere 1 s too much +'fr:inr corfre; fror ~t.
11 T ?ddresserl tl-e '361st Conbat r"enm t} is r10rr. ·nr·.
H2ve about decided
to £!~.ve -;:,} en tc Luci,m to be ·n a ce-f'enr;j ve role ·11ortr of Velletri while
tre r:bole 36ti1 poes 011 its vray. "'hrt leaves =8 ~p;r :in Fi.tr. Jon, Chr-ncy F.nd
Fal as riy l\_rrrv reserve.
, .,
11 Sure will be p.:lrd w}f'l"' we p.;et tof$etbr.ir.
It ,d 11 ei.ve r1e an orrort1 mitv tc, n!'ly you the '10 w~li cb yo'l 'lPY I owe you flnd w' ich I, as a cif~Di .:ied
rer,,1a11ent Ge~er2l, could not 11:ford to c<eny. IJm1 l P s consnnted to ½e riy
aide P fter tr e vmr ,: en 1-" ,.,.oes b.<1 ct to heinf a rer~~rent I~jor. Keep up
th
;cor ucrk!
0
11 F. S.
I LPve jmrl, reBd ·•nrc1.:-~· 1 s directive to ··,e - tuhject, -ress
RP leP ses - Cart ure of Ro"'1e - Ar. send · np; you a cor. - of it. You cnn l r:, ve ['
corv Il1f'c'e "or ;vourse 1 :::· nno retur 1 this vre tc me. You T,rj 11 riote in f'BTt>P_;-.caph ld i e P"'nounces that 1fl.o~·,e is ro r ~J,. Alliec.. Lnnds 1 • } 9rpgi'1.phs b and
c rAad I Cur P.dvancec< eleren+ s I etc. I 2 s1':ed LnrdinF anrl ;\ 7 c:irender i.:' ~.;hey
meant thflt tl1e '11'1"'1e o:f the /Jrrv ·vras not to be rAle.0 s,t', anc they "aid 1 0h,
no I fine told rr thet ·, woulri. send in a stt.te"10nt to th~ effect t'l-i.nt adw rce
elerte11ts of the ';>j ftr Arr-y nre nou j n Romo, A.l1l' lA.ter, Ror '1 is 11r1vr in F · fth
Arr1y r111nfs. The r ni.--rPed t},1t Fi t1-, !'lrriy vroulc-1 be used. roTrever, in this
rar,r yoll no+,e they cn.re+',1Jly flVo:~c tlP use o!' 1:::-'ift: Arrry 1 n.ml ,r,v 1Allies 1 •
You en 11_ r. rclinr . ; rL"": •d.iP+,Bly, tell him :- r' on I t "'r-rree to -!-;his rcrer .. . ; tb regflrd to rrir8g:rqrl 1, nnl9"'S +,hey nre, -'.1::.~n/'; to ·nclur'e in +J:9ir stn~omrnt
t 11rt t' e advrnce 0ler"';nts 1,elonr, to Fi :'tr· Arr1y. Yo·, ':row I don 1t l nve m1...ch
cc:rfj/ence jn :iim re1d wulr r.ot ')e surr:ri.sed ·1 f tl-ey oPJitted tl-e .:-i"'tli Arny.
""'Kl -!;}is ~)oi_v;'- clear +,o •1;.,,; tl[t TTrnr. Fi"th Army nfvcnce elA"19i'ts e-rpror-c-r,
er.tP.r a'1d SF'C'll'~ R0,..,,
e '"1e giv011 t'1e full credit :'..n t',e ~irst stRtenrrnt rr,d
no orriittinr, Fi "tL Arr)".
0
1
0
·
11 ~ou •il::. P.l"'o ..,cte
n ~9.rr ;rql? it i='f'Yf 1 rc "1"':rit5or w:ill 'e elloved
oft'~ A:::•rl'T, r'l.tior lity ••.•.•.•• until r ler ed b_r r,~ t' E rec01nrl ½ c 1 ;ronrd'.
·•,,,· n ~1U'e thPt 1h')11 ::- •o-,d t:ier1 t"'E" +'~.Y' "t ·r ~orr-Ptior r 3 ' o·• -1-1 n ., ncor- ·
0
0
0
1
�bac,:ground anc1 sb.te t'e:;ri. J,-:ly th.rt Arosr:'. C' 1 ,,::;,_e,,,e:1ts · e:~" t: e :ir-,-+;, t:1"y
be -twm +,1 e crPd;t. 11
:t.
Cl.81+ to Gru0 nthor. T "
tlf>r~c~al · , :cv~LCe Force' 0. t to Colle Ferro.
Too'• 200 pri.,0•1f-r.; w " bAve jc ~ v • 'rencl_ t' ·r ,. T9" l Juin to us} ~ e·•or+,spbnrt 'it'1 r Jl ~r00 l ·11i R.0•1' 0 () tcvrrrrl. VPl.1110,1tone. •Te tcrw lr ,,.., le:.r E "ert
: ned~Ptely.
,., '"'V"l .1..<i.'·0r ••o mt CPr9.so ..,'1, F~or0 1-::,t· oen 0'; rr' 00 erst_· bs
rrC::. 0354 rc.,..tri::1 s.
~5t>1 i'Tl 1es or ~ro'i1 +; "".'9 on Lr ..o tP''Ylcla 0.456 "':-o::-·i ·rt.
:1nn8n':.s 351 Pnc' 1,,99 astrirJo :lout,:;'> bPtW""'n ()') EYi.c' C,~ 8a-,t·rgs. TPn 1 'S be1- j11.' -i-; -:n.
:f-;qve d-t..rectod Troyes -i-,0 rus', · "'st v~ c-nrourl:~ ,i.lc"~ "'cute 6 tc'7orro • r•rve citor<'.3: '3rcl :5":·'"'~o'.'1 1 _.. ~usr on CPve A. r" r~:ns ...,ri·· . . . ill :et '3rd
cort··nuc 4:.'1'lt.
1
0
Clfr1 • 4io l"'r1...~ntlor.
l' 55. •r•r.,ve ':Ve1 ,,,>l CIT' to "\TT Cor1 s to hld "irn
he se "rtr- -~t("'"'i ·1 01 ld.le Y'>th "d*!7C8S. ~St 1 [T ro--~r-"tely 1., ~-f'way Ero ...
tl~re to Roccn I•: }A.pi.• ''o"'e ~o --;"'"':. '".l•no:1 ·n PP.;ri..11. tono-r•:..·ovr if 4')t: r'1W'nces.
,t:icky the:ce to 'ay. J <:ive ~01,1 r
C"Pr": 11.0', to -<11-e any 11'(.:r-c rB pests
1
withort rrr R,1t' or~ty.
,:1rn I r 1 ' -"o= the.i r:iref':ter, yo1... tel: ·:.,: 3m T want
trcr a:r prove(. ·tr r•ques4:.s 11ill ~e fe r nrc: far )Gt\ "E'n . J"' e .cr1y not reir norcod i'' ~-,,v·t 16 ro·u·s ·i:J. 1°or'"' tc crt"'!'- '1~n h,re. If 1," :.s "e~11?0rced
,1 ii::. err c:. \-' :"l arrywe.y. 11
0 ~
'J:u1 r·al Gru.entLer ..,c :. t1·e folloni_ng r omorandnr to Ge~1or11l ClPrk late
t):iis evening:
11 ·1any thanks for yo'IT 1520 r:,er;-:o tM s c'ate.
of your corference -:r.i. th Alo:>."Ul'lc1er nm Hr :n1
'ne.
It ga"'c'1 '
r ,_::(; :rL ·t.
T :tc-' ·.:.. -
"Len brought rie a cop:r of tre ' rress role:,se--copture of Ror,e I rarer
tl·is Pfternoon. :rt is quite n coincidence t1 2t I raised the sane c::uPstion:
1· There is riftr ArP1y r:.~ntioned? ' Le~1 has s:5.J"Ce ndvised re th:ot the Fifth
Array refere'1ce w~ 11 1')e T"'ndA. 1beyonc1_ t, n sh~dc' · of E doubt 1 • Ye says tht
Paimvarin-,; 1·/I'ote tre raper, e·1d was a bit dizzy--not m<'llicious --at the time.
L9r ~ s qui tc certr, in thrt tr.e lett0r hri s G1 renlv gon0 out, but he i3 ch0c1<inr,.
I can 1t get F2rd:i n(l' no1 T, bi1t ~ sl1nll talk to him later toni~ht or first thin[
in tri=, rnorn:'nr: concerning tr is rmtter .
11 Fard1ni:;
cellPd r~e sh,rtly a.(>t0r t'e returnnd fror H.r Anz:1 o vis~t rnd
str>tef th.nt GenPr1:,l Alexander hrc1 notrj nq but the } : vhest rrEJ~ se :'or the v;r~y
in ,,.,HcJ~ t 11e Anz··o or"'rntjons are 1,ciritt co"'ducted. Ve 3t:-'ted it \··t1 suer a
s~ncere tonn thrt I :>m certein hP r-eprt w}rt Lo "kid . l'o" could ::i.t 1Je c,trer'Yi.se? To'1~ght :- a'r~ reell7 most opt·ir'!:istic . ~ t}in}--tkt tr9 success ,•,.ich
ne h9ve )wd vesterday r>rid torlay has "11 rkcd tre t1rrninr: rofo.t ~:n tl~in bf'ttle.
For ri:• p.-,,rt I ['m th~011~ 1~"' r~y }-['tin tre 'l:i.1~ r,nr' vellin- 17 Tip Mp roorey '.
··110th9r T an unrhf'L:r optin~ st:i c or not, tle nAxt feu do -,,, ~·~ 11 tell. JTorr0ver ,
I rust tell ;ro11 t'. 2t I '"'"'Ve r,b,ol1 tte Cr'11f'i,1 ,:mce tl·,,t you b,ve d~rectec1 the
bPttle ·n n r1astorful fashion . I 1;:no·.. th· t G"rr-rn rA;i.1~f'orcomm1ts ar0 on tl e
vm-r nrd j t :ls 'Y'O..,r>bly a tcuch-rnd-go •;•tt:r ,, tl r tlA' ":..lJ. rrriv9 in tine
or not . Fo•1ever , n7 r:onn~r is on ~.?r1· · 9Jrne Gon"'lrPl Clt:,r'= first, 111st trd
alnavs, and I rm only one of tlousarcls who ere ;:,inp~ng yo1Jr yrr>:'se.
:: note vd th pl,-,asure thPt the 1st Arr.ored Di vii=;ion is r bout reM':r tc, go
bac1( 'n tJ~o 0 ray. "?ro:-1 t'lis detrch,d t'lP.d inaderiu:=i.te observri.tion rost I nm
�J:,op·· ng tb=1t th0 cc nclitions "rill be suer as to "'[Irr rt y0l1r :---uttinr Harmon
in on tl c richt fl;:,nk . I feel thr>t -· s ,1}1 er0 ,rnin c11n 11 'mch the kr.ockout blou .
111 e-;.7'."ect to f'ly to our n ,,~ c0r'""Fnd }'O,t tnno~·row ev9ni.n · nbout 8:00
rrovj r1.ed co' rn.m-i crit-' ans are F<'•r'dn~ et that tine .
e sb:i l l h_.-,ve everytr:'vict -'n rearl:'ness for ',ou by noon on Su,vic'n7. Yonr v, n nill :'_e[lve SPtnr dfl" P1orninr;, Pnd sllonld be instrlled ·n.ot later thnn 7 : 00 tor1orro 7 evenjng.
\'9 s1- all Rll be mrn:it haprr to be to1ether o::;;ein. It has been a rather he ctic t"TTie but our 11gony hRs been noth-'nry conp;:-rec1 to yours .
1
11 T note th t you :u•e hu~lding ur a defense :'n connection w:th the py-:""·:mt o+' th1:1t '10 bet . I 1-:no'T tkt it ust be c,wbarr[iss;ng tc- ;;ou to contenp1tte t',e nonotonous refJ'ularH,y ·-rr,icl marks tl~e success of rlnost fill of
•w P,Amblin': venturDs . In ~ 1 is ccse I r-u.~t ric1nit that I r:=>c' P v:i!'tuti.l c:.nch .
Hitl• the F1ith Prrn:r C['I1f"'i.gn r,oing so 'ell ~t was .;n<wit""bJ.0 tl,,,t you s}•ould
1·,e conf~ rned prior to Ju"lc? 15th , so :rrc con scit=mce really botlvTs ne . I 1 11
..
te 1 l ~rou ·-rhPt we'll do . Orie of Colonel ru.nt~nf,-ton 1 s friends brought a
J'l'lCh:-p.;e ;ve-=itcrdr-r sa~dnrt, ' I ' ve brourht soT 1 0 linuor for Generl:'1 Cl::irk and
you '. ''h0.p I orn:med the fPC 1 :cge I fourd t}.-,c-t tl-~re ,... ere three bottles of
bourbon . 1 ror1 1101 1 in +l'f~ ~wrld can ,,e divide up t}u·ee bottles anoru5 t•"'o
people? ~,fter cons:.derable coi;itation I hnre "rr·· ved rt U 1e solution tb1t
one ½ottle ~-rill go tr you , one bottle njll cto to ne (a:_;:,:=-;, :tt h~s n.lrord;t
bee-,1 c( nsur.1ed ! ) rind tre t 1 ird bottle vdll he 11s0d "'or c cel9brat7 on- -let I s
say on f'-onr:a~r n:l ,.,.ht , then "e ' 11 cancel all bo~s . Ho'' about it?"
*
*
*
A'TZTO--,JTPP. 3, 19/.;,L,.-- Aft er sturl~·inG bP.t,tle rerorts [Ind crrfcrring w:th Gene ral Brann , Gerern.l CJ.ar 1' left to visit e.11 di. v:sion coI1!'le.ri(1ers of the VI
Corvs . At 0010 he 3tor,J eel at the lot Arl'lored :Jivision conFmd rost r:rd
tall:ad v :lt}1 General :I8r111on . Gen0ral Hr>;rmon he.d "SSer1 bled his unj t cori1Yn' ers
arcl '"Jas prep"r8d on ver-r short notice to coI11nit },j_c; di vj sion on the left of
t}1e /,5th Divj_sion sector . Generr 1 Clrrl· disc11ssecl his r 1r ns c nc1 emrhrisized
with Ge 11cr2l r:'rron He necessity -ror ri;,,-rensiveness , tl 1 "t t,nr1 ry ·,p~ th"' clry
th;-t ·~o mu'1t TTP 1"9 nn all- out ef'fort lv:if orP tl 8 Bocl e co ult' br' n 'I UJ l,~::; re i1:."orcemcnts . Aft0r .b8 7 e+'t t is cor rnncl rost h:., "ent to tJ10 !~5th D~ vision
COFman.rl. rost p·'>( t:11)-0<'1 •;Ur Grneral Br ;r;les .
} e [ [;l' in er rhr si?:ec1 the n0ces1=:d ty of ~-us1,,ini:.~ all - out , bri.nging out, th~ fact t1crt jt, was ;mperFtivR thrct
t}·e :1.dvn.nce CC'ntinue to +1 9 1orthrrest. Fro.,, the ., :;th i1ivision commr,,-y:i rost
~10 ,-,e.-1t to tlw Cf o.c> the 'ii.th Di vision -here J-e conferred ni th Ge'1er£' 1 Ryder
:=i.nd ::ipr·in enpk1s, zod tb:~ nece--;sitv ..,or nn all -out attrck toce_y. The rords
wern v;;,rv c',,sty, f"1C t,} r,r<; ,.,:,s rnuch !trtillcir;,r ·f'~rirg throughout tb0 division
arert·s .
7
:'ron t},e 111-th I'ivision GP he rroc8er]ed irr.""ediritely to trc 16th Div:i.sion
rost norti·, of VelletrL T'nrout~ to tr P, -;:6th Di vision ttere 1,ms "'Virlence of nucl· clestrnction of Boche rr.et0r" '".ll. Bocl"A Pnrmnition mis left ,'long
t}'e ron(1s-' de , rnd tr ere "'ere ,tj 11 so-·1e G-ernnn deivl tr",t rP<.:i not been dis posed o"". At th" Y)th Division corr•''"'Pnc post h'=l trilked · jt,11 Ger,er"l 'r,l1 ~er
concern-inc• th~ 8Xcell8nt •Tof'!'CSP t 1 1rt Ve ·~6th Division hN1 rrde . "}1ey hed
secm·ed pr act icri lly tre entire sout11err, ::--ortj on of the Co111 Laz~ r li and r ere
pus 1·ing ahee.d to t.11e north~;est . He enphr,sized ;:'.th GenF!rPl FPlkt?r the
comror;·nd
1
�necessity of rushing ahead vir,orously and at the sano ti.."le ·wiping out all
Boche pockets of resistance between Lave Albano and L ke de 'fomi.
Gencm=il Clnrk then rroceeded from the 36th Division co!'lm~nd y:ost back
to his cvm cor1ma.vid rost at Fett1m.o. Be arrived thArc nt obout 1330 and
conferred brjefly Tith Generr,l Barr, Chief' of Staff to General Devers. At
1430 GenerP-1 Sevill9 caF!e in to see him and talk about tbe air effort that
was being "lade. Tac R had reported heavy GPrrnan '"1thdrmw1s to t1,e northwest toward Rome. Our artillery fouJ'ld rany lucrative trrgets on '-{j ghvmy
#6 and plnced nurderous co:"lcentrat-ions on c0pn;Aste;d Gorr<-r, traffic on th"t
Mr-,h my. The ~ gl-'ter hornhers rnre also ",rking on thi"' tr1:.'''fic. After
GenerPl Savil19 left, Ge'leral Clrir;r cor+>crred i.1i+, his G-1, G::rv,or;:11 BrPnn,
for the balP.nce of tl e afternoon.
1
Colo'1el Clr>1' 1 , Fift!, Ar-my l RO, CR.me in on sever::i 1 occ8:1io.,.1s to corf er
with Ge:r8ral CJrr 1• reference on-tJ1 9-record hncb:::round cOTrr u..n.i me:=- to bo
role1: s9d ~nr n 1 so to ...,~ 'ce arrcnP-e:-r-9nts for r 11otot',--raph3rs [ind c, rresponde'lts to acconpan;r qeJ'1f"'>i'r> 1 C1Pr1· -into 1.or.ir> 1,;hen the Fiftr Arr1y enters the
city. After surror Go''i?ral Cl['r' · con+>erred son8 r,oro w~u, his G-3, General
'9rann, and Ms G-?, Color el Hana.rd. Ge,1ernl Cl_prk was a little Pnrehensi ve "'bout th0 right nortl ern flr>n 1,. of' II Corrs, and he taU·od \"~th Generel
Y.oyes on several occasions concernin?- t},is r;-atter. He wanted General Keyos
to be co,~tinuall y m'l11re o ... tbis threat. BA al.Jo tr 11':ed vrj t, G "'Oral Gruenth,.,,r and ··anted tl c Frenc}- Corrs to s1oed up t}1 e 1rd DIA to add Pdditionrl
,rei1.:(1t to t'ri s t}-!re;:-t to tr e nort), f1Pnk.
0
1
1
I-Tigr]j d1ts of torlay 1 s bEittl9 rros=rress indicr-te thPt tl e p-ercrrl brerikthrough t0nard :,.ome vfit}, all of t}'e Colli L."l.zia1i in our lwnds a"ld the
Bocbe in a prec['rious rosition. He still offered cons~ derc>ble resistrnce
:in the /+5th and ~4th rnvision sectors sout}, of L.-=1ke AJ.bc no. 'f'here wa,; tre
y-rob_
.,_1,il~t" thrit t>1 0 encny 1 s commu11ica.tion syst0-m had fDiled co:rny1etely and
thrt these isol2.ted i:r,i~oups in the south vmre U..""l[1rmre o-f' t• is brePk-through
to t' o north o•" LaJro AJ.b0no. Tndicctions are that tl is resistance on the
noutl wil1 witrdra':i- tonid·t r-nd trvt our o,dvnnce to Rol'""e .rill be fast.
Important messages 0f tho day Pre as ro11o,,,s:
AAI to All Concerned. W-J O.?851. 11 To enable Fiftl· Army t(' dovelor its
operatio'1S in trA Prea. west o:' Vn J.Jnor:.tone the inter-arr(, bcund['ry , i 11 be
r,oved '1ortrwerds to t''A fo1.loniri:; i:ren0ral line inclusive Fiftr Arrny ro;,d
junction 2634q2 exclus 4 ve Fift), Arr-:r rc::id jru1ction 2':,?L.82 exclusive Fifth
Army ro::1-d Fnliano - Csve - F· e:.::trfori - GPll ~ ceno - Ro::i/l junction cnorn2.
Fi.-:.'tr /-rr:yv,ill howr;ver hnve tnrninf" rji:;}·t 011 rc,rrl C·vo - In1-1strina GP 11; cr-,no till "":ighth Army troors ree ch tb~ c~vc 1.rct1 \7t An th1t roPd ui11
poss to complete c0c1trol of "'ir;rth ftrny.
If CG, F 4 +'t}, P,.rm'r f-in,'s : imself
unPble to drive thA ener.w off th0 Colle I!"lziali fe;:,tu.,..e c1l,r.;11g the next few
da;,rs h~ ·-•ill rer,ort tl'iS fc>ct b-· most imr~0d' "t'-1 s:: p,nal to ti is reN qm,rters
reronti.,.r; to Eig},th Ar'"!Jy. In th.'."t P.VeY,t ~i~},th Army Fill trlrP. over the
front dmn to the originrl tn+,0.r-Arl'ly boimdrn~,,,. fl'1.C1 " coribfr,~d r-tt1" cl' by
botr Arr'l"' es ,1ill be ctP "'ed. I:1 1:1ny ovon.t wheri the '"''19ry hr· s 1)e<>n north of
tro roPd 1lome - Tivoli t} e origi.,.11A.l ~nter frny bound ry "ill be ro·n.,.tituted
to "mal,le r~ r.;rth Arny to r1['~ ntriin its form,,,tions in th,,,ir 110v"11ce northvmrr's."
1
�Gruenthor to Clark. R'I 361g. "Your instructions delivered to DeMontsabert by Juin. Jrd DIA has eler1P.nts 011 re ilror d bet, ·een 15 and "0 castings.
Repu 1 s~d strong counter fl ttack f'rori east on M Ii sso but lost 5 ligl,t tr- nks . AdVl1nce rrill be res·tnod 1:1t first 1 :i F;rt to ,r>rd Valno:rtone to nnk0 co'1t;:-,ct with
0 1:raniAl. 11
Gcnr,ral Gruontrer tr-is mornjng sent the followinf r.1nr1or;:,ndum to General
CLnrl-s:
11
AAI received the follo"ing telegr, rn from AFHQ tris nornin.c!':
1ItequAst li.£ s been r.r de bv r oli sr' Co:t1tG;-:ir,der-in-Chief in London
ancl indorsed by GIGS that a d~trchTient of the II Polish Corps p1rticiprte in tl~e Emtr;,.r into Rome. Please conf:irn th,t rtecessary
action "fill be tn.ken 1 •
I told u~rding that you werA not planning on any formal entry into Rorie; thrit
you were r,..~marily conc'3rned w-:th the r,,il1.ta.r7 situn.tion, and thrt suer entrance o:£' troops into RomG ns ··rill talre rlrce ·'fill 1,e dictated b:r the tactical situPtion. I also told him thrt 7hen it cPrie to tre ri.uest:_on of r,uerding
Ror1e thnt you will rut part of An An:erj can dj_vision tbere so that tl e necessflr:,r transrortf'tion and other facilities which HAT0USA cannot rrovic'le will be
avail~ble to tre Area ConnPnder of Ro~e; trat it is your pl~n to also rttach
to t},is force a battalion of "'rencr troors and a oottalion of British trriors.
AAT rrefers thn.t tl is battalion be t1;1um f'ro!'l 1st f'ivision if rracticable.
tJprding is not insistent . Advise Don if you concur '30 tJ:-pt on"' can be tent~tively earmarked .
0
npardj ng strted thrt your J'll'-1'1 is exr.ctly in Pccordance with General Alexanr'er Is desires . Hovrever, J-io ½elieven thrt Ger,eral Alexander has in mind a
formal parade o:f' allied tr0op3 at sone later dnte. Fe conteripli-tes a ceremony similnr to the one vrrich vms held in Tunis. The r~rade there was held
about a wee 1r a.f'tor Tunis was captured. I told Farding tri['t I would p;:iss tris
informntion on to you.
11 Hy recoy,T"',:indDtion is thrt you jnstruct r:ie to tell A.A.:. that you definitely do not desire to l1 ave any r1isce llPneous detr> chments ( the Ind inns enr1
the ~revr Ze11lcinc1ers ,;jll f'lso put their bids in, T an sure) entBr·YJ.g Rome
during +re early days; that if General Alexander c,esires a formal rarade some
days after Ro"!e is cartured th.,t you will subrdt a pl;:,n vrl'ich rill rrovide for
the inclusion of allied troops.n
General Cln.r:V rerl; cd to General Gruenthor I s memorrndum as follons:
"Sure enjoyed your note of 1030 I.·-. ve..,terda~r pre dion 1 t enjoy so ruch
your one of' this Forninr r£~:f'erenco the T'or1;. See if ;,rou crin -:et me a courle
of thou.sand Swedes to rnn tl,rcugb t}0. ,~coos :h1 Rome, then I'll be :,11 set.
You roli tely tell t},er 1 th,t T 11r not "'reminr; the tri.cti CP 1 entrn.nce of troops
jnto Rome. God and the 13oche ::re dictPting tl;::,t. : wouldn't lcnou wrere the
hell to plt anybody to ~et t 11ere first, the chPnces :ire so even 11etween VI rnd
II Co..,y;s :vitr m:r mon-,y iust ::i. shade on II Corps. Tell Alexa:rrler I co11e11r in
his idea to bwe e big pri=ide about i=i weal· ll"ter, but 1 et I s p;et through ar..d exr lo1 t our success to t1-ie nortr r>nd Civiteveccl ia before re thinv- of rarndes.
�Also , tell Pt1rding and Alex if necJssary and Lem to please shut off jmportnnt
f j remen who want to run up here as soon es the capture of Rome is irrnninen.t .
I insist ths.t I be f' sked fir st . I don't want to cause l'my more trouble nnd
kno'.'r you CR.n do it diplornntically.
11 Got it SP.Wed up a million :rer cent g11Prn 11tAed tb::it the first comrmnique which :indicates troops ~ n t'be outskirts of Rone :includes tbe stPtement
that the;,r are Fifth Arr~;r troops. Also , the first stA.tement tb2t they have occupied Ron"'l must include Fiftl Army. I ',vill ste.ke everyt:bing I have got in
cor>1batting any ne.rrov-minded individual who will not :=igree to tlis .
0
1'Tfow , in order that vou can yell 1 uhoopee 1 , the news is great .
I hPve
just come f'rol:l visiting ever:v division in the VI Corps up on the high ground
north 0f Vclletri with Walker and all. over . 7/elker hP.s the high ground at
Rocca Di Fe.pa firm. Ee is continuing the attack in the cUrection of Rone
from Hnrino . One of Ms battalioris should now be firn betueen t:be two lakes
on H. Gent iles . Howze tas1{ force is on Route 1/6 under Ti'rederick nith two batfo.lions of infantry and 100 tanks nbout ;phere the 97 easting crosses Highway
1/6. 85tb Division is abreast of J6th Division. A French battalion is in
Falostrino and a French battalion in Cave . The 1.rill is here, and I have just
i•:;sued instructions to all of my subordinate cor,nnnders to rursue relentlessly
and destroy the enemy and not think of Rome . 'T'here is still tough figliting ,
parM cularly on the front of the !,5th Division. Harmon is in the act of being
corrritted no'7. Flease do not com1m1nicAte tM.s over-optiJ11i'3tic news to AAI
under :my circ1 mstl'lnces; on the other licnd, indicate we rire rnaJdng ourselves
firm on the high ground on bot}, sides of Rocca Di l'l"rn and thPt the Fov,ze
Force is pusring out on Route -/i6 against oprosition. Let them know I consider
the goini:; satisfP ctory, but you knovr hov, rerred ur they get, l'!rd I mriy be a
little overl;r OJit:i.mj stic myself .
11 By all Jlleans come to the new command rost knight if it is hwnanly possible . I will fly over and meet you there . If communications 2re in it will
be f::'i ne to hflve you there . If ,.re sho ld enter tre out skirts of Rome tomorrow,
remeriber you Pre to go vd tr> r1e .
11
11 Remenber the young bu 11 vrho j tunned the fence?
Re 11, I t 11 g: ve you tr1e
:tlO and drink both bottles of booze if tM..s i1orks out like I think it will . "
t}, is
General Gruenther sent Gem,rnl Clnrk the following memor,?ndu,'TI at 1615 rours
D fternoon:
"The Command rest hr.i s gone to ,hell . 'fo one is doing 2.ny wor1r here tr is
eSternoon . .4.11 semblr>nce of ,~focipline has broken dmm. Although the G-3 Vfor
Roor1. r,urposely shovm only a noder;:itely conservative 1,icture , every pilot-ever,rone in fact--vrho has cc.rte from A'TZIO since 10:00 o 1 cloc1r tris norning has
brought back a prd.r of' pants full of snts with the result th;:it this unsuppressiblc wave of optimism l'nd exrect.Dncy hP s swept t1~roug} the headqurrters . I
try to wear a loni:; +>8ce riyself but I Pm hevirw H devil of a time dojng so. 'w
picture to FPrding hPs been: •The condition is favorable . Generrl Clrrk is
quite happy mth the situr-tion but he vdll make no rredictions . His big Prnbition is to kill Germrns and then more Gcrmrms . 1 General Alexander made several
complimentary stPtements in his r.1orn~ng conference ebout the way you Pre conducting t:re bettle .
�"Yonr 11.15 lettP.r just rirrived. It cont1c1ir1s suer verv fine ne rs th"t I
':lP.lfi 1hly goinr, to ceep it to T'i;fSAli". I quite q,;ree l:"~th you tl1"'t H j s
"i nadvisabl9 to rns3 on r>ny of that inform::ition to AAI yet.
DI'1
11 'l'he directive on rress release wl ich :rou discussed nith Geri 0 rr>l l-fr•rd:tn~
yesterd~v ,..Rs r~ceiwid here officiall;r this nornjn1:;. Lem hrid told me lPst
evening th"t he "m.s quite sure it had Plre:::>dy beer> i ssu0,d in the f'orn sho·•:n
to vou. T hrv'3 p tl oro,ir;hJ.y cler:r undcrstr:nding ·•it:li Gen0rril Pr:rd-'ng thAt
any cor~rr.1-mique wM er i e; j c;suP.d rnnouncj nr- the entry of Fift:l'' A:r'f'ly troops :l nto
n0 1 ~ or into the outsldrts of Jl.O'E will g:i ve cr'3dit to Fifth Army. Hrrd:ing
stntes thfl.t he l'"S r-iwm :instructions to tl is ef'""'ect to '1n.ini-rr-ri.ng. :r hrive
co'1f'i:rm d. thrcu ;J. Lem thflt " c}~ instructioris have bPen i su c'1, l'H"'C1 th,,t there
i, r.o evidence o<' D'1:v t~ndcmcy to g::p the Fifth Ar1n:r in Hs our o"' triumph.
The com:nmique writers, ;nclui4inr: Goneral '"upper, Arnric"'n t'RO at •TAT0USA,
aro tr;v-inP" their hr>nd at r> few dri.ft cor·,.,unjques this 8fternoon. They will
be suhmitted to us -Por our co,..,mff•1.to. At tJ,is v:ri ting three J-i,we heen suggested:
1
1
0
1,
(2)
R.rT"' ?.i\LLS "'O FITTP ARl'Y
"Len teJ.ls r,e thFt there rire Plso soverr-1 lon~er v9rsions -in tl e rnill.
'!'he ehove e:xpmplPs v~ s 1pl :i zo rin unexp~ctedly r.opid entry. Lem thinJrs u,,.,t i_t
j s ~r1rrob,.,ble thr>t sucb a sho,...t flas!1 ,ffill he issu0d. T ri:ove sent you P l"lessat:;8 sw•p;estinP" t},"t Ven O]Frk rrepare P drrift.
Len sa:vs thrit such a drnft
will 1,e "BlCO""'?d by AA1. You riny rest "'""·~u:recl trat it wil) be tioorougl·ly
vmr 1~8d over, by everyone in the HeAdqu...,rters ns rell rs by the AFR~ cro rd, but
it won't do any },arm to rut in our idePs and it rir>y do some good.
1
Pfrrdinr- st,,tes tl~"t ;,rou rm.r count on Ge,..,errl Alexr>rtder 1s PulJ cooperation
in 1:eepirg visiting husv-hod7 brass hats +>rom tl e R( f"E areP.. I PT'l ~onvinceo
Uwt he Hill do evor:rtMng he can to cnntrol this l"love:"ent. Yesterd:-,y, for
examr:J.'3, ;v-our ver,r close .c,r-irmd., on-re f''t~D, sent p stn.+'f officer to AAJ mith lll'gent request th,1t the staf"./" off.; c0r bB allovrerl -1:.o enter RC ~!F. shortly fl "'t~ its
capture in order to select sdtf-lble 0,..f'jc9 "nd livinr- 9cc01-:r'"od11tjo1'1s +>or the
crrc r=n staff• The 0ffic0r CHJ'18 pr9p'."•red tc l"lOVe to RC''E ir "'1edit>tely. rr~rd:ng
sent him 1:-Eclr to tT'J T.J~S •r'tr a 1 no sottp 1 Ri'\Svrer flnd r1e hrsn 1 t been herrd ~rorn
sin8e. Of co'.irse t 1 ere 11re go~n<; to be lervs, hocruse the rressure of VPrious
ind~vidua1s tr;r~ng to enter vd.11 be terri.,,.;c. vo,;ever, I belfove thrt tle sitll.3,tion is gen°re.lly rretty "ell unrler control. As a ,r\f'tter of ~ntr:,re.st, th"" Greek
Arm;l has npr l:i ed for rermission to c• c:nn n Greek detr er nent for the ~ ni ti.- 1 occupr1tion o:' P 'IE. As I told you ~ n my letter tJ, is r orn~ ng th~re is "OV' a thorough
meeting of tl e mi.nc1 s at AAI that no detr>crir'lents of Greeks, I oles, IndiPns, New
Zef:l.lrmr'ers, 0r what-nots will enter Rome until tLe f'orrml t,:irade is rield. Gen°rrl
Alexi:mc1 er will consult •rou concern-' n<; the -"'orMnl l f-lrnde. A
ft-3r I sent you ny
morn;nc- letter he mPcle tbe remPrk: rrn1,e formal n-...,r11d.e May not ta 1,o r)pce untjl
as lrte as t"'O '1 ePkS rifter the Cc'Tture of"<('"'";. I am convinc~d tt"t the dr>te
must rlepe'1d eritirclv on tr·c tPctic~l ~jtu tion. 1 I v.nora- t}Pt t1,,is er-resses
,r01ir roin+. o" view exe ctly, A.nil .,. do rct believe th~t ·r8 shRll li...,ve :-,ny trr-uble
on th8t score.
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expect to
7
ePve here 1:w c11b at about 7 :00 o I clock tonj P'ht.
I 1 11 tele-
��phone you as so0n r-s I arrive trier'). Jt is quite ro""s.;ble, of cnurse, thr.it .'.'lt
the last rrdnute I rn'Y r1ecide not to CC>'""8 if I feel th,<>t I PPl n0eded ],ere. 11
Clar, to Gruenther:
iJ 57 . "In .'.'ln OI today l'lm setting ur 3rd Di v5 sion
less one coTrJ.1-iat terom ,,,.,.jth the ,..,rench battRlion you }'PVC designrt9rl rlus one
British brttalion from th<=J 1st British Division 11s tr1e troops to garr~ son Rome.
Both seprate hottRlions 'Till b<=J ottnched to the 3rd Division and all under
the command of Johnson . He has been notified . J lease inform Brnnn o+"' tre bat talion selected ½y French to <=JntAr Rone. 11
General CL~rk sent the +"'ollowinp; menorwdmn to Genc--rrl Gruenther ,iu'3t 1)efore <ljnner this even"ng:
"A Lt . Col. Olson, rr. S . , from AAI h,.,s rrrived r-t ny J-endqwrtors with
five Yugoslavian officers vritl' ~:1structio:1s fror'l Brigndier P'!Pnn0ring thrt they
rre to tour th'3 front. ''hy A.TI I not cons1 ·ltecl, an" -rhy "rP. peor1e thrust upon
ir1e ·•t such 1'1"'1 im1 prropriatA tine?
They brouf"ht, food And bl."nvets w1.tr them
and ""'rP- told to sta:r as long PS they 'Fished . Due to the hectic sto.te of traffic Pnd tl'e munber r·"' M.en. involved, I am unR.½le at tM s time to p::irnit these
officers to wP.,,Hfor rt '-rill tl rou;rh my ·'\--,r,rrd r-rea. This throws t ·e burden o<'
findjnr sleepj"'11". flccorioclet 1 ons .. or tris mo½ t>'> well E's r~~edinr, thPr.1.
11 ':ou roust m;:,}re it clear to Jhnnr➔rjn<; thrt h9 has no hl...sjrwss tc, do tliis
rrithont 1ett~np; l'le 1rno"', a.. 111:icl he s 1:ec mo, ~ '""Oulr; r;ro~ntly hnve t 1.rn"d it
'1.d
do '\TD as tl A nost inr>ppropriate tfrn trrt :f l'tlo l o.(' to bn.ve tl 0111 CC'I:Je here. Tre
r;rst +,ri'nr; you 1"110''' +,1,e claiM ·ill be tht tl'e Yu17oslr-:virins ''er0 trie first to
ont9r Rr•me .
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TTJ ar, 1;oing to tell Lt. Col. C'1son trr>t r1e can look f-'rounc1 the old 1-JriC.ge-
herc t'rea t 'is evenin.r, <i. ' ,.,13 v•ill tr" to [ ccomod;:ite trer r-orr1"'r lrce, hut I
11 'tot P'1thorize then to r-c forvmrc . nf my Any "'ref' r-t tl ; s tiI'le. 11
'7~
Cl:=irk to Gruenth-,r. 11"T 53. 11 Referenc,:i MI ·o. ')851 on ass; r;ri:1 ng nff" bouncl11T'ies, rlArse not:ify AAT thc1t I rn hrtpf'"T to str-te that Fi+'tJ, rmy occurios
the lnl"k: of Colli Laz5 ali t Lus rif'kinc:- it unnecessr1ry for AAI to re~:nstnte the
old ho1mdPrv as indj ctcited . n
Gruenther to ClRr"k.
RT 3643.
"Rardinp- w<1nts to vnow whetber time hns ~rAlso to i"'1struct these
resistrmce groups by radio broRdcast tonight • 11
rived to drop 1eRflets to resistance groups in Rome .
Gem'lral GlPrk gave the "go ahead 11 sigmil to tris request imrnedL tel~r.
Gruen+,her to ClArk. R~-r 3644. 11 AleX13.nder desires to relea3e srecial comrnuniq11e no1"1 th"'t Ji_fth Arny tr"ops hPve broken tl·rough enony d9fenses l"lnd flre
appro:::i chinp; outskirts of Rorne. Do you concur? Rerly. n
Gencrr-1 Clark denied tbis request
;:,11d
sent tre follo•,,ing rrorosal:
"Fifth
,rmy troops hrwe hro rnn through the G<=Jwan deferses southeast of Ror1e in sever11.l plrces . Fi "th Army troops 11.o~' occupy t. e bulk of' Colli LA.ziali wriich doni.nrites tre <1t'T'rnPCh8S to Ro"le. 11
Total battle C8surlties since the openin~r of the Anzio o"'fensive rrmou..YJ.t':ld
to C'J,1q5 A"ler~cr>n 11.nc: 1,001 British.
��sri::m1n'JSTA--JTJNE I+ , l '1L~4- -Goneral Cla.rk left s.t 0830, a ccor,1prmied by Generf' 1 Brann,
l"is G- 3 , and tvro Rides , Lt . Col. Draper and Cartain kmpson, for Rone . Colonel
/Jlar}- and renresentatives of tho nress and GJC personnel nlso accompanied him.
'T'he rest of the convoy, wM.ch rnov~d from Nettnno vir-i Cisterna, Velletri , Artena ,
Valmontone and nort}1 1·;est on EiD",lnrn.y ;!J6, consisted of two rr>11ored C-"rs and six
jeeps .
About five mjles :f'rori Rome General Clerk Met GenerPl }<,:eyes on the roeo, and
the co"'!voy continued to the outskirts of Rome. Just nrior to arriving qt, the outskirts of th9 city, General Jlrrk ,'1et General Ii'redorick of' the Sreci:-i.l Service
Vorce ,-rho alread:r hPd elerne11ts jn the Pester'") 'Jdge of tl e c.;ty. The Gsrmflns }wd
a11.ti-tank q;,1:J.s 0~d r>bout ?00 infantry w110 were opposing our entrance :"nto the city.
The resi..stance o"'fered WPS stron.P' 01101J;=;h to delflv additionPJ elonents from going
into the city. There wa,:; shP.rp fighting in spots, and it wes Avir1 ent tlKt the
entrance into Rome tociay would not be rossible.
7
VI Corps, on tl· e left, had made "'9me PdVP11ces past LR go Albano, but the II
Corps had pushed wel 1 to the north ·rest e 1c1 ''ere on the outskirts of Rone. Elements of the 3rd Divisio11 and 88th Division ,· er9 waiting outside and were clerloying to pusl out tJ,e enennr pcc 1"ets of' resistlince '71 ich "rere orgr-rnized in the outskirts . GenPral i";lrrl' p0rsonally ··nsrected t:be frc'1t-line elements thPt ,rere
rus1~ing into tl)e cit:v. Snall arrs f':ire was plainly hen.rd, and tlere rere ,;till
snipers in t:re vicin-i ty. F0ws pl,otographers Rnd wr-r correspondents took pictures of GenPrril Glark, General Frederick r,nd Ge11er11l Ye;res discussing the opposition conf'ronting our troops Antering the city.
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The French hP.d made satisfactory advr-i.nces to the :north of II Gorps and were
in a posi..tion to protect the Army's right flr:mk . The exact locatfo1ts of units
is not exPctl:v lmovm . The advance command post r1oved f'rom Anzio and joim,d th8
forward con:'land post, ct Sermoneta . CoJ1nunications with front l 7ne divisions is
lackinp;, due to their raphl advances. }Iovrever, it is lJelieved thet b;-:r morn~ ng
vre 1'7ill undoubtedl~v have rost of our advanc8 elements in t:re c:i ty.
General Clerk
flew hwk :f'rol'1 the outskil~ts of Rome bY cub a1,,d landed et his cub rdrfield at the
new conrnana post . He immedj 2 tely went into conference with Ge11eral Gruenther ,n >:d
nade his plan for his entrance into Rome tomorrow. rracticr:. lly tr1 e same arrangel'lents thn.t 'Tere ',et up for today will be CflPried out tomorrow .
u •
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SERMliP,TA --JUN1~ 5, 1944--General Clark left his cov1mand post at SermonGta at 0730
fly bv cub to Rome . At Rone he met the following convoy •,rhich loft the comma:nd post at 0530 this morning: Gen0rals Johnson and Hume in one ,jc~ep, General
Beucler and Colonel Britten in anotJ,Ar, three pl,ot,ographers and Colonel Clark,
r1n, two counter-intelligence officers 8nd an officer of the G- 2 Section, two
armored cars and four of the Gen"'rnl I s personel guards.
' l' to
~' 1 '·
As soon 11s General Gle.rk lnnded tJ,e cc,nvoy started out and entered the City
of Rome . Th,.w entered on Route #6 and proceeded rast tbe Coliseum to the Campidoi;lio and up to Capitoline Fill . From there the convoy rode through w,rious
str:ets in Rome and were accla.irv=id by the :i.nhsbitants who lim,d the streets ,
wav1.ng f'J.Bgs, cheering and entrusiasticelJ.y rrel_comir,r; GererF'l ClRrk, tl~e Army
Gori:rnanoer , t0 the ci t;-:r. The scene '"as rem:iniscent of Arri st ice Day in 1918.
mhe crowd seemed carried e.way 1r 1 t:r <1motjon cnr" was hysterj cally hn.pry.
��~
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P
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At 1010 GenorRl Cl0r 1, r'9t his Cor'f' Co"lrl8'11'1 Prs r-t Cnritoljvie Hill in the . ~
OS f.l'eadquRrters ,.,, icl-' "7ere in thP To"m ·1 p11. At t!-'"s reet:inp; "ere Gennrrls ~~
1
'rro'1c ott , Yn~r.es a'1d (}r>n rP l J.uin . P,ach one ri~cussed } is situetion prr1 roint~ed~
out the artvances nnde b'T t1'0ir +,roops . All bridges across the "'iber had been ~
secured n11.c1 adv, •1ces rr>d bnen rricle r .,,.ff' miles .,cro"'s tre ri,mr . ThA Fron.ch
Corps l'"<l been rkcef1 jn a r1 , "fic1
1lt ..--.ositj on in th"t triey rir>cl bi~en +'creed off
ut(l'J:i•m.y 1/:t; +>or ro·rar,,mts of tl oir tronps . TMs s.; tnrtion ·as A llev;a ted by
req11iri;1<; II Corrs to clef1.r th~ir ror>d·., b;-r to!"orro"l' .('or use of th0. Ti'rerich
Corf':.:- . "'he ol<l ½onndriries botve<Jn 'ighth and Fift1 Army "ent into ,f.c>ect ,
•},j ch f'"VG F 4 rth q,w
S to t} P, -r;; rl tr Ar"IYJV r "'ter Fift1 Arny troops hfl, f'"' ssed
tlie·~r trf'op-. thrm O'h +1 P city nnd on •~he c-tr"'r sjde of tl 1 0 Ttber . r<1ny r:boto graph0.rs nrid vmr corre:=ipo"a•=mts 1·mr,9 rr0s,..nt talc'nr rictures on tl':is ri~toric
mPeti'1a; o.,.. <1"''1"'r9l Clrr1' r>11 • his Corps CorTr.irinrers in HoTfle.
0
AftPr tl'e conf'err=mce on Cr-ritol.:ne Fill Ge,:,r.rrl Clrrk ::i:rd rd s Coe.TS Comrvnrl:rs 1e11+, tc t:bc, -r::"c3l cior rotel ·'~c,re f19y,,,ral Glor\:. v;-ill set up ri terpora ~
r•r C("·nand post 1mt~ 1 t}->9 ar'lv.s:r1ce COT1."'f'l1rl 1'0:"t is set ur "Il the v~ 1111 Srvoia .
}- 1/ "'he fol 1.ouj ~g wgre th=J l1incheon '""'1?sts of' t110 Co.,.,,rrnrl.; ng Grneral : Geri0rFls
~}°'
,.,, Keyes , .Tuin, Johnson , Hure , Beucl9r , Rrnnn , Cr1rpe'1ti0.r , Gruenther, Bro·m end
/' Colonels Brj ..,ten , Kn.m~"'rPr <1nr ::)r3p~r. Aft0r l11ncl1 GonPr01 CfarJ· rl" scusned
~j1 edrl.:n· s-1-r,.,ti..vc nritters ~d_th Genrirp,J.s Hm 1 e ~md Jol~nson . Ge"1ArPl Jobnson ill
)I
be mil"tr>rv c"rnrPi-ic'or of th9 dty, ;:1nd Genr,ral Hurne is I'ifth Army Ar·G o"fjcnr .
/)'/
'f'l,e :;-ror1lens r-f' trkj n g OVPr -':,hn ['( J:'l~_n~strPt:1on of thP cit;r "Till t)") r:,any; feed ~
in; tre civili•n1~ , get ti:ni:; uti.litiP.s in order, recrr>rition,il +'pciljt"cs +'or
tr 0 o:;-'1 rnd o+'ficP-r s . All of -1:,~ese ·roble;rnq 1 ·Are 0•:c;cn-:;sed.
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At five O I clock G9J:'(~rP 1 Clrr'· .c,7 el b,, C1' tr r.i9 CO"'"':' c' ro'"t 8t S rmonet~
A,nd di"'cti.rised ; 4J1 1 is Chief of ctr,"~ thi "'OVcmw1t 0f' h:: s c0-rrn11. :;-ost from
q,~rmrnetP to Ro..,e . It rill talre rlrce ~n -1-re ·•0r nerir +'1,t.lU'e, -rob·1hly t}>e
dr> v 11 -<'ter tcriorrC'V' .
0
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r.rigl•l i~hts of th., hatt1e rroF;ress centered r>ro,,nc1 e] enientc; hr v~vig "P c;sed
c5t:r ::incl Vie estri 1li.M' -,,11t c,f' l' 1 )rir'i-;el'e:0 d c,, +J~e 0th r ""de .
L~-'-tle n.1=>tr~L, 0 ' 4ib"l -+;roop ""0v0~ 0rnts were 1 TO'm 0r PXPCt rositiore; . • 0 1 ever ,
it 1nis r>scertn.in'"-'d thr1t th,~y rrd "dva11ced aho11t trro r~ J.es I rist 4;110 city. Thi::
dav in i tseJ f rri s 8 ,,orinnto11s m 0 pnc' ,.. 0'"Te '"'rted "11 e>1orrou'1 v~ ctory +'or the
•if>t), A.rrv-y •·11 ich h,d hrvm so Fbly led 1,y Geryirnl r:a~r1r . Tres;cient Roosevelt
crnveyen } :.s rers,mril C"ngrnt11l"Vo...,·'"' to G1=moral Cl:,,rk jn P verv sincere rianner ,
str-i.t: nr- thn.t t}·e AnAr5 ca n reople -,ere V9r7 PJ.•nt9+'uJ. for t'· is rnornr-r tnus "'Ve>1t in
t,]:v, Cf ftUre o':° :1.omr; .
~;:--.::·011,c:l the
0
G- 1 todn,r r"3rorted t:re
fc
llo,,,rinr; crisu<1lty f'ipures for the orerc1tion:
Yilled in nctjon
founded
1 "i '1Sing
'T'otfl 1
1.. , L.68
?l , 045
? , J~?2
V
?7, 035
GrnAral H"rding s9nt tJ:,e :'ollow-inp- r:emorflndmn to Grmern 1 (:lr:irk
to af'f[lirs •;.:-+:,], the V,tican:
j_th rogrird
'1
"'h8 C-:ln-'.:!, AAI hns r0ceived tr9 'ol.loyr~n,... ,.,ror. Ami • It js rass0d to
yo,, .,..or such ['ction as van r1n7 C"Yk,ider rlesirri.bl9 or 110cess,,,ry.
�•VaticB.n Aut,},orities hrv8 Axrressed r,nxi9ty over ir1tervrl thrt will
elarse hetween Gerrir>n PV'1CU<"tion n.nr1 'lli8d occup1 tio"' of Rf '"E.
Thwr stress rece-::it;r for efft•li.0::t rossible ,1 9Spfltch of smf'll All::ed
force to s"r 0·1 Hself r>t central roi11.t of town. They believe such
action -,,ou1d rlel"'onstr?t,e irrirenclinr; Allied control rnd '1dministrr-tion,
and serve to rvert d:1 sorderG.
'H. "• J\nbr s::irdor sur-~0sts errl;r r:esture of resrect to Vrticrin ···ould
~e "'ir,l 1.7 n-•'yrecjnterl, for ~rstrnce i.., British Pnd J\T"'9ric::>n officers
could bri trihC?n ~iv l im rinc his Arri.eric"n c0lle;:.r;i1e P s soon n.s JO"'Sible
to see Cr"rd~rn1l Secr,")to.r;r r.f' Strto, ~n ,,rcer tr cr,nvey l""essr-i_ge from
All.;ed Cor1nrmrlers to tr.A rope, and to info~·m Vrticr>n Autloriti,,,s of
contemrl[lted A1 lied rier>res (r1oves?) i.n c011.11~ction ·;rith J.( J'E . 111
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n,-1i~--Jl;'IE 6, l 0/i-L~--Gerier~l Clr,rlr r9tnrn°d to Ro=8 ':r cub r fter confcrrint; the
r:reatPr rrxt of t•,e T'lorn~riP- ,7ith liic; Chief of 3t..,""f, G.-::nerel Grw=mt'her. re
"ms arconrf'nied by r'iS G-3, Gen ,r[,11 "lr::,nn' arirl Colon8l )? ltzrrfln anc'l C!'lne directly tC' trP ~~'"celsior '"hAre; corys 1irison o"ficers l'rd rerorted 'vith 7, test
in"'ormntio-r.. on tlie rror;ress of th--ir ~ort s Pcro,s t ,p, :riv9r. P.dv, ce r-lPP"ents
had :rPPCh"'d P Doin+ "bout trelw~ 1'1il8s_rpst 4-,110, citY, Fr_intri:ring contr>ct r.ind
in sor<: c11ses h"v;n(1' cr•nsidernble resiC"t~YJ.ce tc tl,e~r f'dv::mces. GA"1PrPl Clerk
cr-·1.f'err')CT r•,t,h h1s G-1, Gen9rP1 Brann, Genercol Johnson, Co •1'JAnr1er of -'-,) 0 city
o+> Rone, C:P'l.d f}p· er,.,1 r11m0 , hi.~ Fift!:' Army A'~G officer. Colonel Tully of the
'"ili trry RP il, ay S0,rv; ce r0:r,,ort0d to 'renerPl ClPrl< ancl qtntec' t},f>t reconriaisfTncA 1artiPS bd nlrerrl;v flrrivl"ld ~n t1 1 e city P"ld 11 AY'n str,rting tor1orrow to
rut ··nto onAr:ition tl e r::,, 7 .rwds. Colonel Tu1ly r8C0r'"' nded tl rt hi9", Triority
hr> J""ade PS "'r'on ~s possible to orfmin': the r~ilror-ds from !Wzio to Rol'Y'e. In
abo11t 11 nol"t}1 ro · lro110 7_: nAs continn~d from the G~rj r;liano to t 9 Ro,.,.c rrea
couln '1-)e comr leted. ·
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G<"'rerfll 1<,.,:res, II Co~ps So"=Pndcr, c[lr,1"' to ~P,e G<=>n~rfll Clnrk e:r1d di.-;cussed
'"'Tith 1'"!'1 +,h'3 c;itn.,,tio11 o"l. his corJ,3 ...rort. Ge·-iaral 0 1 J'lniFl1, Co=lllE'nrler of the
1rcl Div~ sion, Plso cnl"e !;o er i-"er "it}, Gem,ral Clrr1·. Bis riv:i 1io11 hr.s l'ttnn.red
f' Frencl t'nd Brjtisr brtt~lion "'or r:r--.rr' r,onin-; .+J1e dJ,y.
Th8 site +'or the new
ro::.-t in t],e Vjlla q;cvoi'< hrrl l,eeri ric'lreri, rinr1
~tPrtin'; iPJJ\'18d:.r-tel;:r ~,itr rreprrPtio-1s -for tl,.e
Y"!ovcment of trie ric'lvr,nce 9ln• ents of the conrrnc1 r ost tor·orro· •
COT"Jl'J.PJ"'0
tre lfeMlri,un.rtl"lrs CoririPnr1,9.'1t
·1qs
G8nAral Cl,,r'· bad as dhiner ruests Gem~rrls Johnson
11lly.
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:'Dr~ F11.r11r;
11.nc' Colonel
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ROTE--JU' ; 7, lqM~--Gcn"'rPl ';lr,rk -x n-"0rr"d 1 rith Genrrril Brllnn, his G-1, .-,tn 'yin.a; pro,c,-ress T"'Pcle 'h,r c-u~ trooi s 1orth o ... Ror-0. llr1 v,nces Yl9re r?J ic1 • Civitavecc~,i_<, on '"'le cot<st l·2e1 +>allen to our trnor s, and they ·Are r1rnhi~~ rri.st t},is
jnpo:"'+,Pnt rort nrea. /It 1010 Gen0rrl C1Pr 1, /'111(1 h.;s G-3, Gow,r,il Brc nn, lef't by
,ieep to vjsit IT Co,..ps rnrl. VI Corr'> wr8re t,}·e•r cc'l."'r-rrec'l ·jt,1-, erch Gorrs Com'1"nder and r0vie '<3rl +r" '1itu"ti0n on ~bc.ir .('rent. I rior to re+,urnini; to t: 9
.,,xcelsior, +J-1 ey c:topred rt the non c0T'lnrnd rost rt Yillri c•,voir wl icli ·'lp~• being
�set up tcdny. After Gen"r.nl Clnr returrP.d to tf'p
i'YJ. to conf',.~r i"iti-, hiM. II Corrs ancl VI Corps "PTj 11
ccme in wi.tl1 :'ranch Corrs oY\ its ri grt. II and VI
for a lonr- ti..rie, VI Corrs l·n.v.;np; b9en "n since thn
; 0tol, G0n0,r['l Truscott cr"'le
ru7 l ou.t, :-ind IV Co-1"} s ,1ill
Cor~,s hf'Ve been in brttle
1.nndinr- ;:it, Salerno.
G0,n0r.'lJ. Gr119nthr>r Prrivcd from t,1-ie for,r9rc1
copr>f:lncl post rit Serrnonetn and
hn.d lunch v,ith Ge'1er;ql ci..,rl,;. Gener8l m.nte, the G-4, Plso +'lew up on sur,ply
,..,,,n-tters. "'h0 rar:id 11rhr"'nces of tho Arny 1'.?Ve extenr<ed our '>urply lin"'s, rrk..,king
the suppl r rrohlem di 'ficult but not w1t} out .n solution. 3urrlj0s ··•ill be
brcu<?"ht into Anz~ o n11d trucked ur to tr9 front, nnd in th, nenr f 1 1tm~e sor:,e
nrill be tRkm from lfriples to r.::1vit;:iveccL.ir- and brou~ht forw rel ovr-rlr1 nc +'ror:1
therA. Tre des tr, "tion of the rri ilrou1~ b~r tr e GeTI"rns will rrr-1m it :'. nr,oss i blc
to extend Ue railroad 1-inns i7'I"'Pdirtelv up to the PttFcri~o; -<"ront from the
renr nrec1.
~•n. io,,. G9.,.,·,..r-l Greri;so 1-,.,llj "l of' tl A Stri Rrit,j s\ rivisio', Cf'rn0 :i.n t0 sn,y
f'Ood1:>;re to Ge110 r:ol Clrr~:. r•;s Djvi<:ion ... ill be detrcr'ed -<>ror,,, Fj4"tr l.rrw and
r,:.1..Pcecl under cnrJ~r0l cf 4.. I.
1
Ge110.rc1ls ,To 10 1son A.rc1 F1me cri:r.e in ·ust r,rior to luncr m.r1 r-i "'cussed .,.,,iF!tt~rs riertoininr; "'::.o t}v:- ci-sv o::' Ro"1c w~ th Generrl Cl."rk. GenPrPl Furi.e hrs arranp-ed for R visit to t},f~ Vaticm1 torriorroT witl, Pore J ius XII. mhe /1udj once
"'ill tck-e plri.ce at n-i..ne o I c1ocl• in the • ort'i.nr:.
1
At noon DAW i. 11.:_;tructio11s rP.ceivod -"'rori AAI HeE1dqur-rters required tre Arry
tr rusr <'~,rwircl rA.r-ic:'ll~r rmd c::eize r, li'1<; r1ur:''1,: AP.st-west trrou£,11 ris2...
Th:is
d1rective is quoted below.
r,
Ge11erals Clar
Gru~mtlrr a11.rl Rrf'.nn n·1 "'c1i-:1sed the I!'"rr.P.r j r. wt· i.c" tli:Ls direceive ,;;oul.o be ca-ri8d out. It req,lires f'nri->'t nnd nggressive rirrs·1it to trke
dvantage of' t1 e • ·eav,med G~rni:in ,1ho fr rithrrawing rP-ricly to tre rortr.
0
Arol'nd f<,ur o 1 c1ocl: Gc;neral Crittcsnberger ri 1rl. GenorRl Cr, . . P. err" to confer
"i.th Ge'leral Clr>rk rA+'erence th, rr Corrs takirf" over bot}~ the II rncl 'II Corrs
fr('"\nts. GenAraJ. Cb:rk rlmmc,d tn tPJr0 tre l.5th ';ivision out c.,.. t:re line a>1d
place it in Army res~rve. All Divisio~s ,.,ill ·,e given ~' ch'U'ce t0 tn 1c'" nlv;:,nt1:1f"e 0:f t',13 new rAst center ·r' : cl1 yrill be set ur ~11 Rol"le • It .-rill he ablA to
ta1·e CPre o-1" <'Ver lC,OOO soldi0rs Pt a tirv~.
~rou,1d -"ive o 1 cloc1: G rerril "pc.,.,<>rlBne o-" ACC came in ~~o co•1.,.er .,;_+,}-, +,J...e Arrw Corr:.ander. Ju ,t rri.or to d~ rner
GenPrf'l Cl r 1• 'Y'P,C"iV"-'d pn A er..\c,-,ri '1()1"'9D •rho h,'lG. rrrriod r.n It91-l__;:,n, r,drrse
·u,..c} esa de Bon-Is. '1ro ...,rintGd to "~et Gen"'rl'l J. CJ.0r}· r>11.c1 c<'>1':7'Ptul[lte 1-:lim on
'his "hilit;r as v great nilitar:r leader.
0
0
ri.,
For dinner Ge11.orl'll CL<lr1· ]:-,pd Generi:>ls Sulliwn, his T~ o-"'ficnr 8....,d ':'cte,
G-1+, ris p-,1ests in ac'ldition to hjs r0~ 1 lPr r1ess.
A.AI to A11 Co>1c0r'1ed. "?_H O?OOCJ. 11 ':'he ener,iy hn s h~en r;rer,tly v.ren 1'ened. by
tre _,..if"ht:i nn; since 11 I!ay c:nrl ::.;J non tl orc,ur;•1l;r ,1 4 sor'".'.'l'lized. I'e is certr inly
in no position rt rres0nt t, l111 nci1 /1 s~ri.oun cmmter ettrick. re ..,~ 11 ccrtinue
to su,..f"')r n9r~ ously d11r-inr his r"trert fror rttackr, b,, 0ur 8 :Lr -l'orces £inc' adv, ncir,r• c0lurnns.
1
�l :> I
THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY
*****
From tra Gennan viewpoint it is incomprehensible why the 34th
Division on the evening or 7 Jtme and the F.irst Armored Division on
the evening of 9 June were withdrawn from the front. Whatever were
the reasons, it is sure they all accrued to the benefit of the Gennan
high cormnand.
*****
The middle am the east wing of the A:rm:, was forced back further
during the period 12-14 June due to the superiority or the enemy. As
a result of the commitment of the 26th .Armored Division and parts of
the 3rd Arraored Group or the 4th Parachute Division, in the area of the
356th Division, it was possible to hold the Orvieto Bridge open long
enough far all units of the XIV ~ored Corps and its attachments to
reach the western shore o£ the Tiber. Qrvieto itself was lost on the
14th of J~• The French Expeditionary Corps, newly committed, and
at present on both sides of the Bolsener Lake, which at the beginning
of the Allied May offensive had so distinguished itself and so greatly
contributed to the first successes, was now not so overpowering. This
can probably be attributed to the fact that the Corps lmew that in the
not. far distant future they would be withdrawn for the invasion of
Southern France and that they wanted to con"Berve their power for use in
combat in their homeland. This is psychologically self evident, but it
is questionable if it was necessary or suitable to relieve the .American
___
j
II Army Corps by the French Expeditionary Corps.
*** **
Signed/ Wolf Hauser
Major General
•
�Rode u~J in jee, •-:i:,'1 ':en. Gruentber (Catholic)--saw priest walking across street
who carre up an1 said in '"::rglish "'"elcome to R.ome. \',hat can : do for you? 11 1rfuere is
Capotiline 1 il1? 11 ' 111J'e are certainly proud of the A·· er.icar. 5th Army. ?,y name is
11 !y nar.,e is Slark'' m"'l1at di.i you say your name was?"
-- - -"
Little crowd had
iathered. A youn~ rran on bike. Priest toid people i~ :talian it w~s Clark. The
young man ,zot on his b-ike and a.::inounced all the v~y along to the crowds that it
was Clark. Dig crowds, ;;;reat excitement, 0 irls, flowers in muzzles, et«. Jeep
got stuck in crOYrds dowr by usscl.i.ni 1 s baL uJ'.. TLe:: wen:, t1:J Cap , ill --r1s;uc...i.,,r
tl1e:re. It :s ~~r,ind '1eif ,..olossiewn--cit:r :~:::l} :,r. to1J, \":as a-~et.:.11~ corps commanders
there. -··as the :Jlace wl ere '1eneral Roberto ...,er.civcnto--[reat cooperator--held forth.
Pounded on door--finally ope:ied a c-rack--::talian __,eneral came out--great patriot on
American side.
T
}IOTEL EXCELSI0R: , ere somevrhat. afraid of :err-.an traps, and investigated before
they went tl-iere. It had been .:esselring I s hdos. took over as 5th ar ~ !'es-:. center
for officers. took over 1Lsso 1 s sports forum for erlistcd men--2O buildings-indoor and outdoor pools, one upsta~_rs on second floor with slidin_; ceiling 1· asso 's
special pool. 3-4- square blocks '.Jig. "very sol:iie!' -vrho .?artici?ated in the
long drive for Rome vrc_1,1 __,et several days furlough in Rome.
At the Sxcelsicr Clc,r1< v;er t in the bedroom o~ ~he suite--knelt riown t" s'3.y
_?::'ayers, th_:__rJdn'"' :e Y,9.s , 1 0'1e. ~'elt a hand on hi.s shou Jer. Gen. Jo·1in in bathroom
said "I just lid t•.e sar:1e tl-iins. 11
Glark-s hclqs. ··1ever in b 11i1Jin..:,s d•,r ir:__, the -rrar.
:~::J:IUO: 'Jer2r ucll i,r._Jresse<l--rather youn'"', concerneJ about wife and children who
17ere in Switz. 'Sx1)res[ •1 rezt ._,ratit 1de .for liberation of Rome without darr.ac.;e •
.1antecl to cooperate.
0
1
PCP'"': Jrove up tc Vatican :..n jeep and G.I. clothes. Swiss ,1uards, etc. ?ope
wa::-ited to see Clar 1c alone--711 ch lrr,pressed--::>ope ove:r:·wLE:.1-ied. wLti: '---'ratitc:.dde-eYt6nded invita.t·i rm to all sold.iers to visit hirn--'::la:rl{: said w-o..:ild make arran ements-•T)c•p ~e smr tr-er.: every da:r--tho·1sards of tl-em. 11 ::::: ·m..ierstard your hdqs. will be :1ere
in Rome. ]ow lont r::..11 you tc tr'-.i.K here?" I ar f'ear:'ul it will brin re percuss Lons
from the Germans." Clark diJ riot think so, bit couldn't help it ar.-:;,··way. Pope
,asked if Clark ad ha i any contacts witr the Russians--dic11 1 t krow ar..ythin...r except they were £'i.;htint, like mad. "li'xpressed at one time reat concern over
communism. Two or tl rce clays later wdnt to see Pope a<->ain. Still wor1:·ied about
hdqs. bein.::; in Rome. how v;as tre bnt.+,le .;cir.g--our locat:..on-when WJ uld w-e move?
Story about Pope thinkin.; American soliders didn't likl him.
Rt. Rev. , ans.· .. alter s. Carroll, secretariat of state, vatkan city, had been
liason man with t 11e 5th ., l}. thro..1gh the figLting 11;, throurn ~taly.
0
0
0
June 9-story about Clark's narrow escape in a plane -inspecting Sevida. Vegg-5...?J., wtich
had just been captm.•ed. It was the port of Ror & , _nd needed for s .19plies, which t:1c.l
previc., s\>- haJ -to be 'Jrougl.t '.iYJrland all t,he re. ~r.::,::- "aoles. He and pl.lot Jo .•
lookir,1;:; out w'~er :=;u :den c:-.:.sL. :.a.i run iato cabie suboo:ntir.~· bar-::•a:-re balloon w; icl:.
had. ju13t been put up. uas leaYin.;, cable slidin__, alon:, etc: .;~cku pulled throttle
wide open, cable tiroke. shut off ..1otor and gli1ed intv o v7'1eatfiel:i. Plare tJroke
tl:e cable. Sur.)rl.s~r,g t:iat tM lethal device under eacn a'olloon o.iJ.11 1t go off.
Probably because tLe3· were :,oin6 slowly and in a li__,rt ?lane. i?robably circled
around cabl3 tow or t".ree tirr.es.
r~all~a:r.s or southern fra."lce, etc.
Toid :l.rsl'-811 ::e ·.ad .:.nte,:-1:'ated team sj--.ich t.::i.o. dE. velopeJ the L3.rd --.vay. 'J-ermans
were smas1~., :.tc. air S'.;"~rt w.:m.Jerful. Sasr"i wr0r__, t.o break up this -!:.earn m:cn
it ·ras ---◊i . . , s, , ~11. T'lk;c.d a0out landing .i.n southern /ranee ar, · w0:1 ~"'red r::y it
·--~S:IALL:
�Td:S :?IFTH ~P..:.("'.[ 'S •.'!HERE ''Y. Hr.ART IS - by Irving Ber lin
(Introduced in the overseas edition of "This is the Army"
Verse: I met her in f· merica about a month ago
She asked me if ~ 1 d give her love to a certain GI Joe .
She said when he returns I 1 11 be his bride
I asked her where he was and she replied:
Chorus: Not the First, not the Second, not the Third, not the Fourth ,
But the Fifth Army ' s where my heart is .
Ee 1s somewhere on a beachhead which must be lots of fun.
I can see him in a bathing suit basking in the sun .
From a cute signorina he's been learning to talk like a real
native of Rome.
She I s a very tasty dish, but my baby 11 :Io capish" til the
Fifth Army comes home .
Chorus: Not the First, not the Second, not the Third, not the Fourth ,
But the Fifth Army 1s vm.ere my heart is .
Vfo landed in Salerno and kept right on the go,
As we fought our way through Napoli into Anzio .
~ile by mile we've been soldiering
The hard way it s eerns
On the road leading to lror..e .
And wit r1out a single doubt
There ' ll be things to shout about
~vb.en the Fifth Army comes home .
•
�To take full advantage of this situ,,tion Eighth Arny vrill ac1wmce TTj th
a 11 possible sreed dire ct 0 11. tl"e general areR F isR - LuP ca (?) - r istoia.
Armies vrill T1aintain gener:.:, 1 contP ct on their inner flanks but will not "'ait
on each othr}rs advPnce. Eneny resistance will 11e by t'R.ssed vfrerever possible
in order to reach above vitPl 11reAs quickly. Ei~l1 th Army vd.11 be respons'ble
for any protection that may be necessary on its right flrmk.
11
11 '.l'o save transportl'ition resources r>nd bridging rrRt9rinl 5 Corps will not
f'ollow up t1"e ,3nemy on tl~eir "'ront. If the Pdvrnce of Eighth Army f'eils to
fo-rce the onemy tc abr,ndon An conn r olish Corps will be novod form:ird later on
Eio:hth Armys rear Prmy ,:,astern axis to take Arcona from thP \'Jest.
"CJ ITC aut' orizes Arm7 Cornnenders to te1(e extrAJ11e r5 :' 1 to secure the vital
<s
strHtegic p,.reas nentio-r-:ecl in paragraph 2 rbove before tLe enemy cPn reorg;:,nize
or he reinforced . 11
*
Hr1 r'.!E--,JU'1E 8, 10Mi---T>;f"rly tl,is rnorn~np; tho liaison o-"'ficer from Eig;hth Arny
CHITtG in -;rith a personal nessPge Prom General Leese to Generrl Clrr1c, askinr rermission to use t}·e road Vall,erano-Viterbo-F,acborep-io. 'I'h1s request by the
'i;j r-ht:b Arr,y moPnt the virtur 1 stoppR ge of II Corrs sector upon relieving II
Corps j n the~ r zone of action . Gen oral Cl&rk Is reply' yrh_j_c} is riuotod belorr'
0~
covers h:i:s answer to GenPral Leese's request.
At Ofil,O General Clnrk, accompan:iec1 by Gen.r'rals Gruenther, Jo],nson, Hun1e
Beucler, and Colo11el:; Rri tten And R;ran 'ryent to tho Vatic,"n where tlrn:r htd an
i:n1die11ce w~th Pope nus XII. Gen?rel Clnr1r hac1 a :::;erarr>.te -!ntArview ,.,-jth the
rope :f'irst and tren ~ntroduced tho ctrer menbers of }1is ye,rty to the Pope.
D11r1np: his -interview with the Fop:, tl'e latter aslrnd Gereral Clr}.~lr to 3end a
messar:e to }resident Roosevelt express::'.np: to Mn l is most sincere regard. :F'roll'
the ,Ta ticnn Gener,, l Clarl' proceeded inl'lod:; ate ly tc h :is neF cor:imanc1 po st et the
'lilla SAvoia .
0
Shortly Pfter Ms nrrival here General .Alexander flnw ur frori Caserta to
see General Clark:. He was accorir,::,ni0d by Generrl Robertson, his G-4. Gen"'ral
Clark d:i scussed with Genernl Alexander the Eighth Army's request to use a road
in II Corr,s sector r-md othsr ml:ljects leading to th9 fu:rtl~er offorn=:ive northward as well as natters concerrdni? llor:e.
0
At l/;,30 Gener8.l Ckrk had a fecorrtion cererrior1y Rt his new cor1r1end post.
Du.ring- this decoration cerenony Genr,ral A1.exr,nder presented t} 0 Conf'l.Pnd
of
the B/'lth to Ge'1Prn ls Juin and Xey""s in t}ie nr->me of Eis r12.,jest;v Kj_ng George VI
of Englc.nd. Ge:rnrnl C1Pr1, thi:m rreseYJ.ted two r,edals o'' ronor, one to Ifc.
Knappenberger of tre 10th Infantry Regfr,ent Plnd Staff Sgt. Huff of the 50Qth
Faracr,ute Bf'ltt::ilion. He also rresented Legion of r 1orits to Ge-re.rel Dod;r, General flrosset o.:nd Gensra.l Carrentier. Legion of nerj_ts were a1so rreeiented to
Gene..,,..A.1s '1 r->rtin, Sulliv<>n rmd other officers and er,lj st0d men of tl 1 e :r1rt}1
Arny ::'taff. In ri ddi t ion., DSC I s, one DFC, one 3oldier' s :kldal r~nd enc Brcnze
Star ,·,ero also presentod tc o:f'ficers and sold·ers of his comne.nd. The ceremony
was q 1 dte i· 0pressive. A compos~te ?'oup of' two Al'lericr,n, one ' 1'rer1ch and one
British plPtoon coriros"ld the revj_0v7~n~; troops. '·'rench, British and Jq.,,ericen
.,...lPf;S were included· in th0 cclor vuerd, "nd all thTne national c1ntherm were
0
er
1
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Clark, Mark W. Diaries
Subject
The topic of the resource
Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984.
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns.
United States—History, Military—20th century.
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Citadel Archives & Museum
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
CP Clark
Relation
A related resource
Mark W. Clark Collection
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
application/pdf
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mark W. Clark Diary, May 25-June 7, 1944
Subject
The topic of the resource
Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns
United States—History, Military—20th century
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from May 25-June 7, 1944.
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
CP Clark
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Citadel Archives and Museum
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
Format
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application/pdf
Language
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English
Type
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Text
Identifier
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1634
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PDF Text
Text
To take full advantage of this situ,,tion Eighth Arny vrill ac1wmce TTj th
a 11 possible sreed dire ct 0 11. tl"e general areR F isR - LuP ca (?) - r istoia.
Armies vrill T1aintain gener:.:, 1 contP ct on their inner flanks but will not "'ait
on each othr}rs advPnce. Eneny resistance will 11e by t'R.ssed vfrerever possible
in order to reach above vitPl 11reAs quickly. Ei~l1 th Army vd.11 be respons'ble
for any protection that may be necessary on its right flrmk.
11
11 '.l'o save transportl'ition resources r>nd bridging rrRt9rinl 5 Corps will not
f'ollow up t1"e ,3nemy on tl~eir "'ront. If the Pdvrnce of Eighth Army f'eils to
fo-rce the onemy tc abr,ndon An conn r olish Corps will be novod form:ird later on
Eio:hth Armys rear Prmy ,:,astern axis to take Arcona from thP \'Jest.
"CJ ITC aut' orizes Arm7 Cornnenders to te1(e extrAJ11e r5 :' 1 to secure the vital
<s
strHtegic p,.reas nentio-r-:ecl in paragraph 2 rbove before tLe enemy cPn reorg;:,nize
or he reinforced . 11
*
Hr1 r'.!E--,JU'1E 8, 10Mi---T>;f"rly tl,is rnorn~np; tho liaison o-"'ficer from Eig;hth Arny
CHITtG in -;rith a personal nessPge Prom General Leese to Generrl Clrr1c, askinr rermission to use t}·e road Vall,erano-Viterbo-F,acborep-io. 'I'h1s request by the
'i;j r-ht:b Arr,y moPnt the virtur 1 stoppR ge of II Corrs sector upon relieving II
Corps j n the~ r zone of action . Gen oral Cl&rk Is reply' yrh_j_c} is riuotod belorr'
0~
covers h:i:s answer to GenPral Leese's request.
At Ofil,O General Clnrk, accompan:iec1 by Gen.r'rals Gruenther, Jo],nson, Hun1e
Beucler, and Colo11el:; Rri tten And R;ran 'ryent to tho Vatic,"n where tlrn:r htd an
i:n1die11ce w~th Pope nus XII. Gen?rel Clnr1r hac1 a :::;erarr>.te -!ntArview ,.,-jth the
rope :f'irst and tren ~ntroduced tho ctrer menbers of }1is ye,rty to the Pope.
D11r1np: his -interview with the Fop:, tl'e latter aslrnd Gereral Clr}.~lr to 3end a
messar:e to }resident Roosevelt express::'.np: to Mn l is most sincere regard. :F'roll'
the ,Ta ticnn Gener,, l Clarl' proceeded inl'lod:; ate ly tc h :is neF cor:imanc1 po st et the
'lilla SAvoia .
0
Shortly Pfter Ms nrrival here General .Alexander flnw ur frori Caserta to
see General Clark:. He was accorir,::,ni0d by Generrl Robertson, his G-4. Gen"'ral
Clark d:i scussed with Genernl Alexander the Eighth Army's request to use a road
in II Corr,s sector r-md othsr ml:ljects leading to th9 fu:rtl~er offorn=:ive northward as well as natters concerrdni? llor:e.
0
At l/;,30 Gener8.l Ckrk had a fecorrtion cererrior1y Rt his new cor1r1end post.
Du.ring- this decoration cerenony Genr,ral A1.exr,nder presented t} 0 Conf'l.Pnd
of
the B/'lth to Ge'1Prn ls Juin and Xey""s in t}ie nr->me of Eis r12.,jest;v Kj_ng George VI
of Englc.nd. Ge:rnrnl C1Pr1, thi:m rreseYJ.ted two r,edals o'' ronor, one to Ifc.
Knappenberger of tre 10th Infantry Regfr,ent Plnd Staff Sgt. Huff of the 50Qth
Faracr,ute Bf'ltt::ilion. He also rresented Legion of r 1orits to Ge-re.rel Dod;r, General flrosset o.:nd Gensra.l Carrentier. Legion of nerj_ts were a1so rreeiented to
Gene..,,..A.1s '1 r->rtin, Sulliv<>n rmd other officers and er,lj st0d men of tl 1 e :r1rt}1
Arny ::'taff. In ri ddi t ion., DSC I s, one DFC, one 3oldier' s :kldal r~nd enc Brcnze
Star ,·,ero also presentod tc o:f'ficers and sold·ers of his comne.nd. The ceremony
was q 1 dte i· 0pressive. A compos~te ?'oup of' two Al'lericr,n, one ' 1'rer1ch and one
British plPtoon coriros"ld the revj_0v7~n~; troops. '·'rench, British and Jq.,,ericen
.,...lPf;S were included· in th0 cclor vuerd, "nd all thTne national c1ntherm were
0
er
1
�\ 55
,played at the conc7 usion of the cerenony.
Af+,er retr1rn-tnp; -f'rom t!- e decorPtion ceronmy, Genort>l Clrrk, rAving sP:ld
goodbye to Genere 1 Alexender, 1crent to t}1 e l ort11 l io whore }10 reviewed a h., ttalion +'ron tl"e Duke of' '';ellinr:~ton 1 s 1.egi1"'1snt r:1 ,.'ch is attachxl to thA 1rd Division RS garrison trnors of RcE1A . This h=sttalion rassed by a sm,-,11, hastilycorstructed rev:lewing stand_ wl ich W['S erected for General Clark. LeaclJnp, the
battRlfor> ·,m.s a ScottisJ~ Fife aJtd Druri Corps .
After Ger1eral Clrrlr hrid reviowec1 t}- is b::=1tt0 lion he wr s met by Colonel Fisk
,.f t11e ACC and v,P.s cnnducted on or hom~ 1 r, si p;ht-see-·,..,g· trir of Ror1.e at tl'e <;nd
of v•l,:l ch he vm.s taken to lrince TJnh3rto I s } !"lrtee in tl~e iUir:l.nel. Tris vj sit
w~t,J-, fr:ince "mh:orto, v+o is no"r Iirmten::,nt Gs11oral of the "~e2,lm, lPstecl for
n.hout 1/0 PD hour. Gennral C1Ar1' proceeded irnr-ec'iatel;r brc1, to his cor>:n2nd
post Fhere he worked on ad.min:' strative n2tters r>.nd studied latest battle reports .
JT:i.gbl.; gbts · 0 r> tl1 e kttlo fTorrr3~s tor Py Fee, a furtl 1 •'r rushing to tlvo rorth
of all elements of t}P Fifth and Eighth Arr,1ies . To date tho:ir edvance hes met
VJ" th very little oprosition .
J.occnna5_ssance "-ilr-w,ents h2ve proceeded consirlerably
a}:ea.d of the rpin hod:ies f'D(' are "'ell to tbe north ge:n9re,lly in Pn east- ,rest line
through Viterbo .
General Clark today received a cor:irr.tmicPtion from GenerA 1 Leese asking tr Pt
"':-ie;hth Arn;r elements be peTir1itted to use the ro[ld V11llerano - Viterbo - Bsgnoregio.
He rerlied to General Leese as follows:
11 T hPve your lfa_:i son officer here vr:l th your last ,nessag,~.
I see no solution
excert to hri l t n'y II Corps in pln.ce rind po.rmit you to use the ror·d VAIL' :RANO R,J
J.,,,94'?211-, eastern route through VJTPJrnr. - BAG"·JQDr.:GIO 1.348. An intolerrble ~itu21
tion would dev9Jop if both Yir 1anan I s "'orce and J:eyes I II Corrs troor,s reachec1 tl'·e
road .junction Pt f+0./4221,, as tho·r ::>re rir:)()ut to, at the sAme tiP1e end .;f both Pttempted to use the roPd 1erid"ir,e- .~rom thnt roe.d junction to VJrr>ERBO.
11 Klrkman, Y'eyes nnd n:r rorreGentatjve hrve b9er, torsether.
~ lBve just
talked vrith Yirkman on t1-1e pJ~one , :ond also to Keyes , 1=1rcl told them both that
Yeyes "'ill halt in rlace. Yirknan '•ill be p:iven the road VALJX::RAN'O - VIT:~I?.BO PS
;rou desire, hit I do beseecl- 7011 -t:.o speed up Y:i:r1°T"!rn I s use of thrt rs rmch ro s
po·0•sihle so th,,,t II Corrs can r,:et c:cing :in rompli"nce rd.U1 our directive to ,·,ush
vigor ously to the r.rrth . T hope '"irkman cm f~ nd suppl', rc•utes rfter he he's
pass0d his comh'lt elements throue;h VI,,.,·~RBC v:rhich will tfl1(0 him on roM1 s to the
east, thereof .
11 Do not feel disturbed tl1 8t you rove bothered me.
I ,·ant you to 1'no,· 011r
interest is to fac:il:itete ,;,l,ir,ping th: Boche in his demoreHzc,r1 conditjon , re gnrcJess nf who does H . I ·"'ill arprec3Pt0 it if :rou "!"•ill h2 ve Yirkman keer
Ye3res advised '1J~en he "rill. terminn.te his use of' 1r1.,., ;nnr . 11
General Leose re:rliGd to General Clark as follows:
11
.
TharJ: ;mu for seeinp: Green- 1 :ilk:inson tbi~ norninr; and for your' ~elp.ful
reply.
11
1 u.nd0rstand thrt A..4.I hf'1Ve issued rm order , asking you to help us to get
��to Orvieto.
"I am sure that our noves Jceep ePst of any suprl;y routes of yours. The
only renl difficulty seems to be Vi terbo, find on the 50,000 r1ap there nre two
red roads - one movinn• ea.st of it and one nest. So I do hope ,:re can reach
ar,;:reenent over th is.
11 It seems to me so terribly important for us bot]~ to drive on, wr ~ le the
GerJ11ans Pre split jn tvro anrl before he brings dovm the expected further divisions fror.1 the north. And p, s I saic' in rny last letter, it ,,,ill s:we da;:rs if
B Corrs cnn operate west of the Tiber.
"As soon as I get the 'Tnrvi - Orv:ieto road clear - we '"rill of course
s"dtcl, our supply PXis back to the route east
the Tiber. A rnpid advRnce
to nrvioto will do '"'!Ucr· to help clenr this area - and I hore we sliall !'1.ake
rrogress 'vith 1~ Corps to 1711rds Terni - which wj_l1 help at the other P.nd.
0=
HHith many apologies for giv5ng you tr is trouble - and my most ePr:ne st
hopes thr,t ,ye mR;T cooperate togethr:ir in t'·is problem, to gain positfons ,·,herefrom we can both nnintain the impetus of ;rour p;rent "'dvance on Rome. fl
*
*
*
R0 11E--JU'JE 9, 191✓+--General Ckrl• received Gerieral HpcFarlane of ACC at nine
o'clock. After GFnorel rracFnrlane left, he conferrAd V'5.th GenerPl Grurmther
bis Chief of Staff. I1e ''!BS ver:v enxious to go and cnnf'er nith G,=iner1:1l Harmon,
Coni~'"nder of' tbe 1st Armored Di~ sion, but telephone commun:icetions "mre out.
- Our units ::ire r,ush'ng so fast to tr•e north thnt 11s forward r1 e2dq1mrters advance 1t :is clJ "f-; cult to mai"ltr.in sati sfR ctorv telephone comrnmj c• tion. It
was not lmtil Rfter llmch that }'is cub pilot, nhjor TTalJr..er, inforP1sd him that
J,e cnul,1 tri lre him to th1 1st !\.r"lored Divis ion cub field which Yras very close
to t.he commpnd :nost. Gener0l Glrrk +,h::Jn flew to the 1st Armored Div,; sion comrnan.d post whire hA conferred 0·,ith GenerA l HPrmon conc0rning t}·,e situr1 tion on
his front. Armored reconnaisscnce elmnents had r,assed t}'rough Vj_tc.rbo, 2_nd
the city '7as now an 2ur h::-:nds.
-a,~;... t.-~~J... ,2.,.:,.t:tL fo-.l:- .t:-;Jf "}~ J.<M ~~ t;. 4
~~ - 13..~ "3 V4 2-v-ti#4 ~ - 1.,J,,J- O'"W',\ .e,.....t.~ - () .....+ f.-...,..1 'ti After leH,rinr: Ge'.1.8ral Hr>rnon 1 s comrn1::m,-1 post, Gener;::,l Cla:r+ flew OV8r Civit.svecchia to insnect the r,ar1,or jnstaJlPtions and terrein surrounr1 ing the
area. ''hil,:i flying ow,r +,} e 112rhor, M,., rlr>ne bit Ft bRrrF,ge h"lloon 1 rire
wl 1 ch might hrve ended in ri. ver;r ser:ious r ccident. ,,,he lx1r b r,ttached to trie
bnrrage bRlloon did not exrlor'1e, 0 nd the T,].r,ne hed r;re 0 t c!inf'iculty in breakinr: P''!P~· :f'rori tl 0 "'~rp ,,J,5 ch ,,,as i.,el,1 triut h:,r th0, buoyn.ncy of the -inflr<ted
belloon.
0
0
Generr-1 C1Pr1, 1anr1 ec1 nt I i-"tori0 Pir""ield wl-icb is close to bis corin.3.nd
post s.t Phout 1730. AftPr he landed, be ccnferr,:,d hr~ ~"'fly "'ith GonPrFi1 Wilson, Cor· r1>1nder n.o IBS, rrl:1 0 hen. j1x1t Prriv'9d back frorri Rmns to fly br<ck to
Hap19s. GenorPl t'filson •·rj_'"hod to d'scuss "Titl, him briefly P'rted:it:ious means
of routine; surr,ljes to di .r:isions vrho Fore edw,nc"r:g so re:~cllv to tl1e north.
r:re ,-ranter: to send true}: corvoys dir9ctly to t,roors from Anzio by-passing llrrny
clumps. Gen,"r~l Slar1- told b:hn to ,;ork closely V'ith his G-4, Generel Trte,
PYJ.cl sol•rn the rrnblem.
1
0
A new bound.~ry has bc=ien °:et between II nnd VI Corr,s today.
TM s bon1dr•ry
�'..ill b0co•n.e on 11 Jtme tJ.8 botmdrry betv1een Frend, Corrs r nd JV Corrs r'fter
II n°1d 1TJ Gorps l~Ft,re been reU9Ved .
Battln nrocTer;g tor1qv "-i:rcls rmr troors -in rossession of VitF~r1:io and '2'Pr~111L"Y1.n . 01.n"' p(1·vrrce to tl-1~9 nortr ,,1ns 1J,qen r8.J):i_r1_ nnc' Yins de 11eloued into the
pursuit sbQ'.A .
The Gorr1P.ns are fp llin~ bac 1c rPridly.
nurin·· the ''1.0on hour GAneral Clerk cr;nf9rred ,·,-ith ·-~T . Tucker , n. WP.r corresyio11l(mt, ir}10 ".sv.:Jd for in-'. onrir--tion concerning his nurUence '.·?ith the rope .
Generq 1 Clark rern:i ttPd nr . muc1mr to "ri~·it8 ur hi!-, Purlience witb the Pope .
Col . Clark, 10 is rublic R9lntio 1s l "'ficer, submitted it, to tre V..,ticrn for 2p:orovel r-mc1 rmbsequAntbr reler.sed it to Ari,=,ricrin corresponfents. '1'he ::interview , as de:'3cribed by General Clark , ,~as submitt"'d to the F'ope who approved
it pract ically as ,7Titten and autroriz9d its release to the corre,,pondents .
0
The P'tO Corrim1-mique releasing Gener~l Clnrl;: 1 s interview
quot8d below:
11 'T'hB
follow:ing r1ay be f!ttr:ibutcd to General ClnrJ<-, but
11it}1
the Pope is
may not be quoted
d3.rectly: Hir-hlic:hts of the "nterview of' Ge11er1:'l Clrr\: ·-,,.; th the Pope, P June,
follow:
11
1. Generc> 1 Ck.r1: was deeply impressed, as were oth~r members of his
staff , Ar1"lr:i can, British 8nc1 French officers, .,,~ th trsi interviei:r with His Holiness . The rope "ms ~ntGrested in all mankinn;, regardless of' nPtionnlit,r, rn.ce
or creed. It wn.s the Tape ' s interest to J,9J.p nny onn "rho ",as in difficulty.
11
11 2 .
r2he Pope e:xpresc;ed streot Sf'tisf'action i"'itJ-, the sreed wj_t}, ·+jch the
Allied ,Jil:itar;,r GOi.rernnent rwcl elre:,dy mP.de rre:rwrator;r relief arrrngements in
cooperation rith the relief ag,mci "'S of' the Vr-itican.
n3 . 'T'h0, Fop9 renhi~ seed ·Iith GeYierr,l Cl•cs1~\: at ,r,.ceat length on his visit
to Amer:' ca , hou lovely Arier~ en TTns, how mv:ielfish "ere its peopl,:,. The Pope
spoke 0 1" hi, vjsit in LotF' :slanr1, and of ri" f:1-tght to the ·est .Gorst.
"4. The rope !1S 1rnd Genertll Cl.Rr> tc, C'""'•ve:r his warri regf'lrds Pnd :•·j ;,h0s to
!'resident 1foosevelt . f fter the ~nterview , GenPral Glr.r1'" sent :c ce½l,,,. to the
?resident, to cnnvey the Fope ' :, messer;e .
"5 . As Gener,.,l Gl'-"rk rras rbont to leave, rin attendPnt tclr1 tl•e Fop0 that
th=)re ,~ere 800 Fi.,..th Arriy solc'iers nn~ tin~ in nne of' the rcons o:'.:' th,1 Vrtic:on,
hopinp; to 3ee the } ope . t lthoncrh Uce I or:e had ni~ny engqg,3rnents, he ir1Y~0d:t~tely
renl:ied thct },o "'ould see tl..,em. General Cl,,,.rk ~mJ-i.cated to Fis EoJj_ness · h t
a .,..,1easure :;t, was tJ:--,-,t he WP s takfr,g so rnucb of' his ti:'le to s,~e our Fi "tr Arn·v
Allied mm", .c>or the Fopo hr>.s seen r1~ny troops ra:x1 p;ivc,n them his bless;ng. 11 "
0
0
Ge111'3ral ClPrk received a letter ""rom G'=)n9ral Dev,,,rs toc~ny v,' t}1 regard to
Fi+'th Arm:v troops f'or other or,srntions . IIis rerly is quoted
belor1:
t,l,r-, 'Ti thdra1-ml o!'
�\ 53
11 Your letter of .Tune l+th hns bPen received, and J. v,ent to tell you ho=
deeply I apprec~ ate the 1-:ind t1 ~ 1r,;s you say of' tl,e F'ifth Arny. Your message
'"·ill be ['pfr8ciroted b:,r 8Ver·sr riember of the :F'i""tb Arrw. :.': can ass11re you thrt
''e will k3ep up ou.,,. relentless rressure :\ga:iJ:1c:t t},9 '"lnemy and fight him
,=ireever ""re f':' nd him in strenp;th.
1
11 In rmticipntion of oth --r req11ireT'le11ts, T hr,d ordered iJI Corpt:1 rel.; eved
by TV Gorps effective noon Jurv':! 11th . An;r tine 2ftm"' t1--i;:;t hcmr FePdquqrters
and Headqw1rtP.rs Conpany, vr COJ'.'f3, is c,vailn.blc, for movement elseuhore. I
am leav·' ng Butler w: t}, YI Corps HeadquPrt8rs. You }::no· l·on highly I regard
him , but I hf've no im.."!l.edinte job in sicht . I am attach:ing the li.i+?nd Infsntry
to Doc B.yder 1 s D::vision and c'ill riut Rare;r as an extra Brigndior in that Division . I hr,ve been 1meble to f-i nrl P suitable job for T. K. Brown. If there ; s
no assif\'n,·~ent for him in the:! ,)eventh Army I s1w;gest thrt re ')e rerorted to tr;e
'.lar Denm~t:rnent P s o.va ilable -!:or 2 rn:iw P ssignne:nt . He has hc,en :i.n the tbeatre
sj nee Februer;r ? , J_q/,/t 11.nr' he 11"' s done well. He was '·ith the '~8th Dj vision
clurinp; its recent B.dv<1nce "rom tho CradgJ.:iano 'liver . I believe he will bo of
p;reat v11.luc in a new djvision.
"L!-5th Division is out o'"· the line . 3rd Division is likerrise out but is
n0eded fnr r> ,,rMle lonr;er in Rone to holp control the situetion here . /4.5th
Division can go at n.ny time you want it . I g;:i.ther th2t t1'e 36th Division hris
been selected as tlie third division hecause a requo st v;as received from your
hendquarters to desi,0;nate two nembers of the 1 6th Division staff to go to U. K.
:: had u.nderstood that you 'ryanted ,'8 to select the third division, but if you
want either the ? ')th or the qlst T shall h'l ve no objection . IIo1Yever I should
like to "know of the decision soon . n
In this conn°ction Genornl Clark wrote the fol1owin,,; to Ger1eral Ryder:
nr am attachinr t11'1 .442nc'l Inrantrr to tho "34th Division. Hm; long I will
keep it there , I do not 1 --no''', but I have no o+,h0r plru1.s than to leave j t with
you for the time be:; ng . You liave h2d such success in hr.ndling the othGr
H.A.w11iian- r,.r18r"ic.sn 11nit tbnt I feel qu:_ te secure ~n rlacing it in your good
hinds .
"I hcve 7rigadier r'reY1err,J. :-l:• rr:r nho is assirr,nr-'d to tr e FF't}, ;1rrny. I },eve
no job for him . I Pm asrdgnj_nr; him to :~our TJ:'.vj sion :sc, a.ri extre '3G . Fe "'ill
not bA the Assistant Division ConrPnr1 er ')Ut will be sn e-;::tra on-' "or you te use
PS you see fit , '"12.rticula.rly l.n view of the fact that :you will 1-T ve four regir1.ents . T desire yon to cooperate -i_n tl is matter ')7 riaking use of him , wl:,ich
will r;5 ve hi· eYperience wl'.'en I do need r,r10thr,r .Assistont J1i vision Corimr>nder.
0
0
11 You
have done
P
errand job, n:nd J
Qm
looldng forward to see;ng you real
soon . If
In response to a request by th'! rope, General Clnrl- sent the follm;"ng
nessRge to the ]resident:
11 It ""Vas my rleRsure yesterday to he received hy the Popo v1ho asb"d , bout
you Pnd •·equested r1e to convey to you J-,is bless~•-,g and vrr,rm- regarc;s. He reculled
,rith pleasure bis visit with you Pt Hyde rark . FP. expressed s2tisf,. ction at tre
way Allies aro distri' utin.p: fooc'l in Rone e.rea . He is of course greatly c'istressecl
over tl,e horrors of' rar . Fe appeared t0 oe :in eYcelle:nt heelth. u
�l59
ROME-•JUNE 10, 1944--The General spent the day in his van conferring with mem•
bers or his starr and in the afternoon proceeded to the Excelsior Hotel. Late
in the afternoon General .Clark gave a reception at which approximately fiftymembers of his staff were present. The General spent the night at the hotel.
*
*
*
ROME--J'tJNE 11, 1944--At 1000 in the morning General Clark drove to the Church
or Santa Maria degli Angeli in the Piazza Esedra where he attended a solemn
high mass or thanksgiving for the fall of Rome. This high mass was celebrated
by Chaplain Ryan with a French military chaplain as Deacon and an English
military chaplain as Sub-Deacon. Cardinal Tiesserand, Librarian of the Vatican,
was present, as were all general officers of the Fifth Arrrry. Nearly all
French Generals and high British officials, members of the diploma.tie corps of
the United Nations accredited to the Holy See were present and were introduced
to the Army Commander. Approximately 10,000 officers and enlisted men of the
Firth Army attended this mass. General Clark then returned to his command
post where he had lunch with General Juin. General Gruenther and Colonel
Saltzman were present with Captain W
alters acting as interpreter. General Juin
then left and the General received a number of visitors in the afternoon, among
them Colonels Gray and Bruce, General Shekerjien and Colonel Barker, General
Mason MacFarla.ne and Sir Noel Charles, British High Commissioner of Italy.
The General then visited his new villa, accompanied by Lt. Berenson and
returned to the command post.
General Clark today sent the following letter to General Crittenberger,
Commanding General of IV Corps:
"I am delighted that tomorrow you will assume command, with your IV Corps,
of activities of the Fif'th Army on our west flank. It is my desire that you
push the pursuit of the enemy with the utmost vigor. He must not be permitted
to regroup. Please do not use 34th Division at this time. It must have at
least a week's rest unless some emergency requires its use, in which case
please advise me of your intentions.
"Intend assigning to you in about two days the 517th Parachute Regiment
fresh from the United States. This will give you five regiments plus reconnaissance elements and auxiliary troops. I assume that you will employ the
bulk of your strength in the western part of your sector while using a task
force in the eastern part of yom- sector, thereby maintaining close contact
with French Expeditionary Corps. Perhaps I am wrong in these assumptions.
Please advise me earliest of your plans. Will see you soon."
*
*
*
ROJil!:--JtJNE 12, 1944-Arter breakfast General Clark drove to the command post
of the IV Corps and conferred there with General Crittenberger and his Chief
of Staff. General Clark then drove to the cub strip where he met General
Wilson, Commanding General of the Peninsular Base Section and conferred
briefly with him. General Clark then returned by cub to his command post in
Rome and spent the afternoon and evening in conferences with various staff
officers.
�General Clark this afternoon dictated the following notes for inclusion
in his diary:
"From time to time I have received indications that the German might,
when pressed sufficiently hard, employ gas. Realizing that his best op~tunity to do so would be when large numbers of troops were compressed into
a small area like our Anzio bridgehead, I directed before the attack there
that all troops carry their gas masks. Also brought into the Anzio area
protective clothing, boxes unlabeled, and stored them with the knowledge of
but a few officers.
"Real:i.zing that it would be very foolish for the Boche to use chemicals
but that he might be forced into it by a fanatic Hitler, I gave instructions
to my two Corps Commanders in contact yesterday that they would require all
troops in contact with the enemy to carry gas msks. I told them this must
be done quietly with no written orders of issue, and they both thoroughly
understood. I called General Shekerjien and Colonel Guild, my Chemioal Officer, and asked for advice on protective clothing, my idea being to keep
it in forward dumps readily available; told them that I had ordered 'troops
in contact to carry the gas masks but that others in rear areas would not be
required to do so but must have them so they oould get them between thirty
minutes and an hour. These Chemical Warfare officers agreed with the measures I am taking.
"One of the projects closest to my heart;· upon the capture of Rome, was
to secure adequat. rest center faeili ties f'or both officers and enlisted men.
e
I StL'llmoned all my activities connected with these and directed that .suitable
places be found immediately and started up. Th~gsollni Forum has been
taken over for enlisted men and starts receiving 2;roo-enlisted men tomorrow.
The Excelsior Hotel has been taken over and is receiving officers now. I
told both Generals Robertson and !la.cFarlane what I was doing, e.nd neither
interposed any objection but apparently they went to work on Alexander who
has indicated that he wants no rest center facili.t ies in Rome. Neither MaeFarlane nor Robertson had the guts to tell me but casually mentioned it to
my General Johnson who, tmder me, is the Rome Area Commander. General Harding is here today, and I told him what I had heard and for him to tell General Alexander that if he interposed objections to these rest centers I would
resent it deeply; that they were already started, their establishment had
been published to the troops and that the men who captured Rome at great
cost of life should have these facilities, and I intended to continue them.
I made it as strong as I could, and Harding understood the seriousness with
which I view Alexander's attempt to close them.
"Yesterday an officer came here from AFHQ with regard to
list. They had indicated by numer:f.cal designation some uni ts
involved. I protested; saying that the numerical designation
me; that I will make available any troops desired, but I must
ing. This has been agreed to by NATOUSA and AAI.
"Am glad to get VI Corps out of the line.
ANVIL troop
which would be
must come from
do the select-
It was the most difficult corps
rrr:, staff had to work with, for Truscott is not a cooperator, nor is his Chief
of staff. As a result of the1.r Anzio experiences, the whole gang have become
a gang of prima donnas. I would sooner release that corps before any others.
�"Gave certain instructions to Crittenberger by letter yesterday as quoted
in yesterday's diary and confirmed them today during my visit to his sector.
He appeared to have the situation well in hand."
*
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*
ROME-•JUNE 13, 1944--General Clark spent the morning at his van and after
lm1ch General Robertson called and conferred at some length with General Clark.
After General Robertson's departure, General Clark drove to the Foro .Mussolini
where he made a speech a.nd opened the enlisted men's rest center there. He
was accompanied to this by Generals Gruenther, Brann, Poydenot and Colonels
Britten and Saltzman. The General then visited the installations at the rest
center accompanied by Colonel Bertholf and went for a short swim in Mussolini's
pool. General Clark then returned to the command post and shortly thereafter
proceeded to his villa where he had dinner, having as his guests Generals
Gruenther, Brann and Saltzman.
After dinner General Clark proceeded to the Grand Hotel where he pinned
the stars of a Major General on the Commanding General of the 3rd Division,
John w. 0 1Daniel and the eagles of a full colonel on Colonel Johnson, Chief of
Starr of the same division.
General Clark's notes on the day's activities are as follows:
"There has been considerable discussion by British senior officers concerning the Fifth Army Rest Centers. Knowing there would be this pt"ejudice,
I told Alexa.mer, Harding, Robertson and MaaFarlane of my intentions. I told
them immediately after I entered Rome so that if there were objections I could
be advised. They did not challenge me, but I heard rumbling of their disfavor
which finally appeared in orders which have never come to me. I told Harding
that I heard orders were being issued denying me this pt"ivilege and that if
such orders were issued without my having a chance to discuss the subject with
the Commander-in-Chief, I would resent it deeply, and it would cause me great
embarrassment~ SU1"e enough, the orders have been issued denying the right to
have rest centers in Rome.
"When I heard this, I sent for Robertson and gave him my views very forcibly. He assured me that the Commander-in-Chief had no idea of embarrassing
me nor of changing what I have done for the time being. I am continuing to
run my rest centers and w;l.11 not give them up without a terrific mttle. The
order also prescribed that no enlisted men can come in town at night. I have
challenged that and issued orders that my men can stay in until eleven o'clock
and will not be severe on those who remain in over night."
*
*
*
ROME-JUNE 14, 1944--During the morning the General conferred in his van with
vs.rious staff' officers, and he continued this into the early afternoon. Later
in the afternoon the Army Col!'.!Jn8.nder went to his villa where he had dinner and
played bridge after supper, having as his guests General Gruenther, Colonel
Porter and Captain Jones. Major Roberts also called and discussed the pictorial history of the Fifth Army with General Clark. The General spent the night
at his villa.
�ROHE--JUNE 15, 1944-After breakfast the General drove to the 45th Division
command post west of Rome where he was received by General Eagles. The
General then proceeded to the area of the 157th Infantry where he presented
battle streamers to the guidons or the 2nd Batte.lion of that Regiment. The
General then drove back to Rome. During the ,afternoon the General co~erred
with officers of his staff in his van and at 1630 General Juin called and
conferred with General Clark, Captain Walters acted as interpreter during
this meeting. The two Generals discussed at some length the General's per· sonal future, General Clark stating that he would speak of it to General
Marshall in his forthcoming visit. General Juin seemed a little bitter at his
fate and said he expected. to retire to his farm. General Clark told him how
much he appreciated the fine cooperation and the work of the French Expedi•
tions.ry Corps and General /uin in particular and how eager he was that that
cooperation should continue. General Juin then left and General Clark attended a party given in his honor by the British Increment on the occasion
of their departure from Fifth Army Headquarters. At this party General Cl.ark
was presented with a table and engraved plaque by the British Increment.
General Clark dictated the following notes this afternoon for inclusion
in his diary:
"I have known, of course, for many months of the impending ANVIL Opera-tion. I have known of it for I was its commander for a long time. It was
indicated to me that the VI Corps with the 3rd, 36th and 45th Divisions,
which I nominated, would go as soon AS we bad captured Rome. I had planned,
of course, on it and am prepared to release them immediately. I also knew
that the French Expeditionary Corps would leave me. I Assume that the Combined Chiefs of Staff ma.king these decisions know what they are doing and
if ANVIL is launched feel that it will contr1bute much to the invasion and
the second front more than our continued effort in Italy. I am convinced
that the CCS are wrong, for they ma.de their decision to prepare for this
operation without realizing the great success the Fifth and Eighth Armies
were to ha-ve in Italy. The' morale of the Fifth Army is sky high. The Boche
is defeated, disorganized and demoralized. Now is the time to exploit the
success. Yet, in the middle of this success I lose one Corps Headquarters
and five divisions - three immediately and two within another two weeks.
In other words, to prepare for the eventuality of ANVIL they are sacrificing
a great victory here. It just doesn't make sense. I am convinced that the
Fifth Army, with its present means, with its high esprit and with a great
victory under its belt can march into France overland sooner than any amphibious operation can be started.
"The depressing part of this is the case of General Juin. He is a
superlative commander and leader. He has performed magnificently in combat,
has cooperated 100% with me, and we each have mutual admiration and respect
for the other, as do all our troops. This egotistical DeGaulle, impelled by
ambitions and guided by political feuds, is ca.sting Juin aside. Juin has
heard nothing f'rom his government, but he has received indications as to his
fate. He and his whole_staff are depressed. His state of mind is bound to
reflect on the battle, so again we are losing the battle we have won so
dearly.
"General Marshall is coming Monday to see me.
I will spare no words in
�telling him of this deplorable situation which now confronts the Fifth Army
and its French troops.
"I have direeted Juin to keep on pushing as hard as he can, forgetting
the clouds which threaten him and that I am sure that things will work out
soon. He has promised to do so.
"This evening I attended a farewell cocktail party given by the British
officers who have served on my staff so long and so loyally. They brought
up the enlisted men who had made up a ca.rd table out of metal from a German
plane and the wood and glass from materials taken from the battlefield. It
is beautifully engraved, and I appreciate the sentiment it expresses."
Captain Walters, aide to the Army Commander, was the interpreter at
General Clark's conferenoa with General Juin, and he made the following notes:
"General Clark received General Juin in his van in the Fifth Army command
post at the Villa. Snvoia in Rome today at 1645. General Gruenther, the Chief
of Staff, and Captain Walters, the interpreter, were the only other persons
present. General Clark began by stating that he had received some information
that he wanted to impart to General Juin. He stated that he had been informed
that two divisions were to be withdrawn from the FEC for use in other operations. He stated that he had seen General Devers earlier in the afternoon and
had endeavored some definite information concerning this from hiin but that
General Devers did not have anything definite on it. General Clark stated
. that he did not believe that a definite decision had been taken regarding the
carrying out of these operations but that he believed that a definite decision
to prepare for them had been taken. General Juin indicated that he had had indications of something or the sort. General Clark then stated that two or the
Frenoh Divisions were to be withdrawn from the line and sent to Naples where
they would pass under the operational control of the u. s. Seventh Army.
"At this point General Gruenther specified that they would be infantry
divisions, and that this would exclude the mountain divisions. General Juin
stated that he had not had any instructions and that naturally he would have
to communicate this information 'to General DeGaulle. General Juin expressed
strong disapproval of the idea and stated that this would be tantamount to
withdrawing four divisions, as when the FEC arrived on the Appenines, the two
divisions would be tired and would have to be withdrawn to rest and that there
would be no units to replace them and this would be equivalent to withdrawing
the whole FEC. General Clark heartily concurred and stated ths.t he thought
it was shameful. He stated that he also would lose some American units as he
had already been notified or the withdrawal of the VI Corps, the 45th Division,
the 3rd Division end the 36th Division and other supporting units whose phased
withdrawal date he would be notified of later. He then told General Juin that
one or the French Divisions was to be withdrawn on June 24th and the other one in
the first week in July. General Juin reluctantly stated that he could do this .
and then discussed with General Clark the details of movement.
"General Clark expressed his regret that art.er this great victory in Italy
they be not allowed to exploit it fully and thought the whole thing shamef'ul,
he added that he had tried to obtain more details but had been as yat unsuccessful. 1Very secret' comented General Juin drily. General Clark stated
�that some definite decision would have to be reached soon. He then stated
that he was getting the 9ls.t Division from the u. s. and possibly the 92nd.
General Juin stated again that ~e would have to notify General DeGaulle
for after all, in the final anal:,sis, it was his (Juin 1 s) government that
controlled the troops. He stated that he had heard rumors to this effect
some time ago and bad written General DeGaulle expressing his opposition.
General Clark then stated that he believed that General De Lattre de Tassigny had been designated as Commnder of the French lmits in this operation. General Juin nodded and asked w
hether there would be a French Army.
General Gruenther, stated that he did not think so at the beginning but
that there probably would be later. General Gruenther also asked whether
there were any other French troops available. General Juin stated that
there were not to his knowledge, there had been a Third Corps, but it had
been dissolved. He stated, however, that it might be reconstituted, as
'after all, the:, have got to hRve Army Corps'.
"General Clark then told General Juin in great confidence that General
Marshall would arrive in Ital:, shortly, perhaps Sunday- or Monday, and that
he was coming from a visit to General Eisenhower. General Clark added that
he would bring General Marshall to visit General Juin at his headquarters,
or if General Marshall did not have time, General Juin could see him at
General Clark's headquarters. General Clark stated that he thought that
until he had spoken to General Marshall that they (He and General Juin)
should continue to push on just the way they bad in the past along the
established bolmdarias. He stated that he knew that the proposed withdrawal of troops would leave the FEC with too wide a sector and that he would
also find his American elements in the same position and that in consequence
he would have to ask General Alexander to reduce his sector in conformity
with his capacity to advance. General Juin stated thRt he also felt that this
would be necessary as all he would have left would be two divisions and the
Goums.
?
"General Clark then told General Juin thBt General Alexander did not yet
even know of this decision, and that he (General Clark) had just spoken to
General Harding about it. General Juin expressed his surprise at this and
asked whence came the information. He was told that it came from AFHQ and
General Clark added that even General Wilson was opposed to it. General
Juin stated that in his opinion it was a great pity that a tentative operation against the Mediterranean ooe.st of France in perhaps September, should
paralyze the exploitation of a great victory now. General Clark stated that
he believed that General Eisenhower was holding this other operation in case
he needed it. General Juin replied that this precaution would ca.use us to
lose the battle or Italy, and that it was too bad as it was in the 'plains
of the Po' that we must destroy the German reserves. General Juin stated
that there the enemy would have diffioulty in supplying his troops due to
the passes in the mountains. General Juin stated that history would judge
this decision severely-. General Clark agreed emphatically and stated that
he had protested, but that now as a good soldier he would obey orders and
release the units as requested. General Juin commented cryptiea.11:, 'well,
events will turn out as they do'. He repeated once more that he would have
to tell General DeGaulle about this decision, and stated once more that
this was a 'be.d plan'.
�"General Clark then stated tha.t General Carpentier had given him to
understand that General Juin would not serve under General De Lattre.
General Juin shrugged his shoulders and stated 'No, it would be impossible'.
General Cl.ark then stated to General Juin that if they were allowed to con•
tinue they would get to France, Berlin or anywhere else thRt they would
buy them a ticket to faster than anyone else. General Juin agreed. He
further said that he wouldn't stay with two divisions, but would turn over
the command, perhaps to Larminat who had a big staff. 'I will retire to
my farm' he said. 'I'll buy a farm alongside of your_• said General Clark.
s
General Clark further stated that he had not given up fighting and would talk
to General Marshall and tell him that we wanted General Juin alongside of
us as our relations had always been very close and most friendly. General
Ju1.n said that they should do what was possible against the plan but not to
worry about it; that they were interested in him, and General Clark added
that in. war personalities do co'llllt.
"General Clark then stated that it was too be.d that the exploitation of
this great viatory should be interfered with by politics and so forth, adding
that General DeGaulle saw this operation as the quickest way back to France,
with consequent liberation of a portion thereof. General Juin nodded his
head in agreement. General Juin then said that he would always be happy
that he had fought the Germans in Italy with General Clark and he had fought
a war of movement, and that this was all a General could dream of. General
Clark then stated that he felt that until he had seen and spoken with General Marshall they proceed e::matly as before along the newly established
bo'tllldaries. General Gruenther then stated thRt these bo'tllldaries would go
into effeat at 0800 tomorrow morning. General Juin agreed.
"General Juin then asked some questions concerning motor transportation
that he desired to have to move some of his troops, and General Gruenther
stated that unfortunately motor transportation was causing a minor crisis.
He stated that three hundred trucks had been borrowed from the -45th Division
to move supplies but that the trucks had to be returned today. General Juin,
who had an appointment for a ptrade then rose to leave and was accompanied
to his ear by General Clark and the two Gem,rals parted cordially."
*
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*
ROME-..JUNE 16, 1944--General Clark spent the morning in his van, conferring
with various staff officers and taking care of an accumulation of administrative matters. In the afternoon Generals Keyes and Harmon called on the General to discuss the pending assault of the 1st Armored Division.
General Clark today received the following letter from General Crittenberger:
"I am taking this means of reaching you because of the pi-esent i.mcartainty in telephone connections.
"The 36th Division as you know, has been fighting continuously now since
it broke out of the ANZIO beachhead May 23rd. Since the capture of ROME, it
has advanced more than eighty miles, and still has considerable fight left in
�it. However, with a view to maintaining the present impetus of the advance,
the relief of the 36th Division by the 34th Division, sometime in the future,
deserves consideration. The 34th Division has benefited much from its stay
in the rear area since June 9th. By June 23rd it will have ha,d two weeks of
refttting, rehabilitation and recuperation. Therefore, it should be ready
sometime next week to replace the 36th Division. The exact date of such a
passage of lines will depend to a great extent on the situation at that time,
particularly with reference to the hostile strength which we may or may not
find in our immediate front.
"In the meantime, the 1st Armored Division has been directed to be prepared to reenter active operations on June 18th under command of this Corps.
As a result of a conference this morning with Harmon, it would appear that
the 1st Armored Division, if it is to be used, could start its narch up to
the front by separate Combat Commands either Sunday or Monday, June 18th or
19th, closing in the forward area the night of June 2oth or 21st. If there
is no greater urgency resulting from the hostile situation than now exists,
this "'rmored march forward might be delayed until Monday the 19th, in which
case the division would be closed up here by Wednesday night, June 21st.
"In considering plans for the employment of the 1st Armored Division
and after consultation with Harmon, I am of the opinion that once we break
through whatever hostile resistance we may find on the GROSSETO - ORVIETO
line, the lat Armored Division reinforced by some additional reconnaissance,
self-propelled artillery and infantry might be shot forward through the gA,p
made by the infantry, and with a fair chance or making rapid progress to
the NORTHWEST. It would be the plan for the armored advance to be made in
two or more columns on roads inland from the coast, where it is believed
there will be fewer demolitions. As the advance to the NORTHWEST gains momentum, sharp hooks down hill toward the coast might very well result in
cutting off hostile troops along Highway 1.
"Following the 1st Armored Division and also on at least two or more
roads, would be the 34th Division, which by that time could employ the Japanese ROT and also the 517th Airborne ROT.
"Such a plan would be bold, and should increase the tempo of the advance. In order to succeed, preparations for it should be made in the
greatest detail, and coordination should be as near perfect as possible.
This means that the French Corps on our right, informed of the plans, might
find it possible to make corresponding gains by closely following our armor
in their own zone. Also it might be possible to incorporate in the plan a
short quick amphibious operation as you described.
"In event it is not desirable to employ the 1st Armored Division at
this time, it would then appear appropriate to relieve the 36th Division by
the 34th Division sometime during the period Jmie 21st - 24th, again depending largely on the hostile situation on our front; and continuing the employment of a mobile, hard-hitting force in the right of the IV Corps zone.
This mobile force might be made up of one Mechanized Reconnaissance Squadron,
one infantry ROT, one battalion of self-propelled artillery, one tank ba.t talion, and engineers, etc. If the hostile resistance does not increase as we
advance northward, it would be reasonable to expect that such a plan would
�result in an advance at approximately the same rate as that of the American
troops since crossing the TIBER.
"The above plans in tentative form are submitted to you for your consi•
deration. Within the next day or so, I hope to be able to see you and learn
of yo'ID." desires."
The following cable was received today from General Alexander:
"l. I fully realize that the withdrawal of divisions as ordered by
AFHQ from your command at this stage must create considerable difficulties
for you. At the same time we should lay ourselves open to a very serious
charge of impeding the overall war effort if we continued to press for the
retention of formations which in my opinion we cannot fully employ during
the present phase of operations.
"2. When we have captured Florence and Leghorn and have driven the
enemy back to the Rimini - Pisa line we shall I consider be in a strong position to press for the return of all the divisions you are now being asked
to release to enable us to complete the destruction of the enemy's armed
forces in Italy by another all out offensive. I have already represented
this view strongly to the SAC-in•C and will continue to do so. I am also urging
that the instructions for the release of the second French division should be
mod1.fied so that that formation will not in any case have to begin to leave
the battle area before 8 July. By- that time a decision may have been taken
which will render the move back of the second French division unnecessary.
"3. Pending a decision on the proposals for future operations which I
have made to SAC-in-C I must ask you to meet the requirements of AFHQ as regards releases, except in regard to the second French division, and at the
same time to press on with the pursuit of the enemy and the capture of Leghorn as fast as you possibly can with the forces that remain with you. No
action to effect the release of the second French division during the first
week of July will however be taken without reference to me personally."
General Clark replied to General Alexander as follows:
"I am in agreement with the views expressed in your MA 1421 with regards
the ultimate retention of Fifth Army formations now scheduled for relief. I
am afraid, from reading your message, that Harding misunderstood me yesterday and carried back to you the thought that we needed urging as a result of
these withdrawals. I can ass'ID."e you that the Fifth Army will continue to
push forward with the same determination and vigor which has always characterized its operations, and this in spite of the scheduled relief or units.
"The point I tried to make to Harding was the disgraceful manner in
which Juin is being treated, which has cast a cloud of doubt over his headquarters, and which, I am afraid, may dim the enthusiasm and ardor with which
the French have always fought under Fifth Army command. I conferred with
Juin last evening and made it cl8f\r to him that the all-out advance continues.
"I am glad you have taken steps to hold the 2nd French Division at least
until July 8th. That will help."
�TUSCANIA-JUNE 17, 1944-•After breakfast General Clark flew to IV Corps and
visited that organization as well as the 36th Division, retm-ning thereafter
to his villa in Rome where he hRd lunch. Arter lunch the General drove to
the Hotel Excelsior where he conferred with General Ryder and Colonel Bruce.
The Army Commander then retm-ned to the villa where he had supper with some
of his staff officers. The command post today was moved from the Villa
Savoia to the town of Tuscania, 72 miles north of Rome.
*
~A
Jf
i.?~
:r
rr1:.
~
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T._USCANIA--JUNE 18, 1944--After breakfast General Clark drove to Littorio
airport where he met, upon their arrival, Generals Marshall, Devers, Handy
and Colonel McCarthy and also saw General Arnold prior to his departure with
General Cannon. The whole pa.rty then drove ~round from the airport to the
new Firth Army command post in the vicinity of Tuscania where they proceeded
to the reception hut. Here General Marshall was introduced to the Divisional
and Corps Commanders, both American and French. General Marshall then gave a
short orientation talk and refreshments were served. General ~~shall then
pinned the Distinguished Service Medal on Generals Juin, Sloan, Coulter, .
7 Eagles and o•Daniel. General Clark then presented to General Marshall other
officers of his staff and Section Chiefs. The party then left by car and
drove to the IV Corps command post where they were received by General Crit-·
tenberger. Changing to jeeps, the party drove forward to the ,6th Division
where they were received by General Walker. The party then visited forward
elements in the vicinity of Grosseto, returning to the 36th DiVision cub
strip. From there General Clark flew back to the. command post at Tuscania
and the other members of the party retm-ned to Rome.
·
/-
*
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*
TUSCANIA-•JUNE 19, 1944-General Clark spent the morning at his command post
conferring with his staff officers, and after lunch he went by car to the
command post of the French Expeditionary Corps to confer with General Juin.
General Juin was out visiting his divisions, had not yet retm-ned, and the
Anny Commander c0nferred instead with General Carpentier, General Juin 1 s /
Chief of Staff. General Carpentier received General Clark and showed him
through General Juin 1 s trailers, Captain Walters acting as interpreter.
General Clark, also accompanied on this trip by General Gruenther, discussed
with General Carpentier the effects that the removal of service units for
Operation ANVIL would have on the operations of the French Expedjtionary
Corps. Generals Clark and Carpentier also spoke at some length regarding
General Juin 1 s personal future, and General Carpentier explained that while
Juin and De Lattre de Tassigny were of the same class ~t military school,
Juin had always been senior, and he had always been promoted before De La.ttre.
This would make it impossible for Juin to serve under De Lattre. General
Carpentier stated that General Juin had been about to send him (Carpentier)
to Algiers to see DeGaulle when General Juin had received news of DeGaulle's
impending visit and had decided to wait until then to see what the futm-e
held for him. General Carpentier apologized profusely for General Juin's
absence, and General Clark returned to his command post where he spent the
remainder of the afternoon and evening working on administrative papers.
.
��GeneTal Clark today dictated the following .notes for inclusion in his
diary,
"Yesterday I met General Marshall and General Arnold at Littorio field
in Rome. I drove with General Marshall for two and a half hours to my com•
_ mand post. · During that time he oriented me completely on the Pacific
y,
situation and Eisenhower's cross-channel operation. He wanted me to know
~
the complete background and what the big picture looked like in order to receive from me my recommendations for future operations in Italy. Eisenhower
✓i
is most anxious that a landing take place in southern France--ANVIL-•as soon
\ 1 )~ as possible, preferably early July, with the mission of cutting across France
d t" 1 /'I to capture the port of Bordeaux in order that additional troops can be
,,.,(. t'
brought in from the United States. Knowing Alexander's views - that all
;' JJ;jl') 11
Firth Army resources and Eighth Army push on in Italy into the Po Valley - I
/~, .t,.,
wanted to get General Marshall and General Eisenhower's views before stating
r f my own, Once I knew that it was all-out on Ike• s part to land in southern
France, I threw my weight in that direction, for I knew I couldn't change it.
tt"'I told General Marshall that taking troops from me now for ANVIL threw a .
crimp into the victorious advance of this army. I just wanted him to under/~'./,./, stand it. I told him that with my Fifth Army complete and without the Eighth
if t./v Army I could go across the mountains at Florence into Bologna - that I knew
,j f}7 A
the Eighth Army could not do it without the Fifth Army.
r
1'
/VY
~ "I told General Morshall ~retire rather than servein which Juin was
the disgracerul manner
~~~ being handled and that he would
under DeLattre de
Tassigny. General Marshall asked me why Juin 1 s FEC couldn 1t make the landing in France, backed up by an American airborne division, all under Patch's
command initially and using u. s; landing era.ft and augmented by certain u. s.
service and auxiliary troops. His fln•ther suggestion being that all u. s. ·
troops be left in the Fifth Army until we entered the continent - that he
~ ~"?'_,.;-- would demand tha.t Juin command the landing of French troops rather than De
_,_JJ- \:,I, tattre de Tassigny o:i:i the basis that they needed a battle-proven leader such
t ·'« ✓
as Juin - that once the landing had been effected, DeGaulle could place a
Jf 6 'f.
French Army in the field under the· commander he named when the time seemed
~ :~
appropriate - that then all U. s. Divisions in the Mediterranean would follow
~v
into southern France and go into the Seventh Army. At that time a group of
Q" "\ ~ arm1.es would be set up under American command to control the U. s. and Frencl\
,:r-t"'
Arrrry'. I told him I believed that was a solution whereby he could have his
"cake and eat it too". However, the French are not fully trained at landing
and it might not work out. Nevertheless, I am full out in support of Ike's
desire for this landing, knowing that we will follow in at an early date.
~
. , r_
"Already demends for service units, auxiliary troops and artillery are
being made upon me in addition to the VI Corps, and I have instructed my
staff to give them everything as fast as we can and speed up this next operation.
"This will be a great blov, to Alexander, who wants to keep the American
and French troops, knowing that they will fight and preserve his reputation,
for we made it for him by the conduct of the Firth Army in the last battle
for Rome. His Eighth Army contributed absolutely nothing but grief for him.
I must tell Alexander thet in the light of these withdrawals, he must have
the Eighth Army carry the ball from now on; that he must give the Fifth Army
�l "7 o
a narrow sector of responsibility commensurate with its means and that we
will conform until such time es all troops a.re taken out. This will never
work, I lmow, for Eighth Army is incapable or carrying the ball.
"General Marshall was high in his praise and gratitude for the conduct
of the Fifth Army."
*
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TUSCANIA-JUNE 20, 1944-General Juin arrived in the morning and conferred
with General Clark, Captain Walters acting es his interpreter. General
Clark and General Juin conferred at s~me length on the withdrawal of service units for the ANVIL Operation from the French Corps. Genera.l Clark
assured General Juin that after these withdrawals he would give careful
study to the service units remaining and would distribute them in such a
manner as to support four divisions he hoped to keep in the line - two
French and two American. General Clark then informed General Juin that he
had previously discussed General Juin's personal future with General Marshall and stated that General Mershall had expressed great admiration for
General Juin. Juin said he was mst grateful but that victory end not
personalities was his main interest and begged General Cl8rk not to bother
about him.
General Juin left, and General Clark remained in his van during the
afternoon and conferred with various of his staff officers. Genere.l
Alexander arrived dur5ng the course of the afternoon and conferred with
the Army Colllill8.llder.
General Clark's notes for today follow:
"I received yesterday an appreciation from General Alexander for the
Firth and Eighth Armies to cross the Appenines and capture ,Bologna. The
study was based upon Firth Army retaining all its troops and not losing
any to ANVIL-a very improbable situation. However, a zone running generally
northeast from Florence towards Bologna. was given as the most desirable
terrain over which to make a penetration of the mountains and capture Bo•
logna. and enter the Po Valley. Practically all of the favore.b le terrain
zone was given to the Eighth Army as was Bologna and the principal road
that Fifth Army was to use to approach Bologna was ta.ken away from it
five miles from the city. Fifth Army was then assigned the role of turning
to the west in the Po Valley end protecting the flank of the British Eighth
Anny as it went into the Valley· of the Danu\>e. Later, Firth Army was authorized to attack into Germany through the Brenner Pass. The pla.n was so
lopsided that it was ridiculous.
"I telephoned to Harding and told him that an appropriate assignment
had not been given the Fifth Army. He told me he would come up and did so, ·
bringing Alemnder with him. We thrashed the thing out. I told Alexander
the Firth Army should advance into France over the mountains rather than
remain idle in the Po Valley. He agreed. They also reluctantly indicated
they would change the boundaries between Armies crossing the mountains so
as to run jt through the middle of Bologna. I told him a little competition between armies would be a go9d thing.
�111
"The rest of the discussion dealt with the merits of ANVIL versus the
Po Valley Operation. That decision rests in the hands of the Combined
Chiefs of Staff, and it is disgraceful that some word has.not yet been received, for the pulling of troops away from Fifth Army to mount ANVIL is
seriously affecting my ability to move north. I am convinced that ANVIL
will be put on, and in order that Fifth Army in some capacity get into the
French picture under Eisenhower I have directed that all units of the Fifth
Arm? be turned over to the ANVIL Operation as rapidly as possible."
*
*
*
TUSOANIA--JUNE 21, 1944--General Clark spent the morning in his van taking
care of accumulated paper work and at eleven o'clock received Ambassador
Murphy and Mr. Offie and had them to lunch.
After lunch Messrs. Murphy and Offie left, and Genere.l Livesay, Commanding General of the 91st Division, called on General Clark. Generals
Keyes and Shekerjian also called on the Commanding General during ·the afternoon.
In the late afternoon General Clark went fishing on Lake Bolsena with
Colonel Saltzman, Major Riggs and Lieutenant Berenson and returned in time
to have dinner with these officers.
General Clark today sent the following letter to General Harmon, Commanding General of the 1st Armored Division:
"I was very muoh disturbed to learn yesterday that your representative introduced at an air•gro,md conference at Fourth Corps Headquarters ·
a memorandum purporting to represent your views on the ability of the Air
to furnish close support to an armored di vision. While I have not seen a ·
copy of the memorandum I understand that you requested that no attempt be
made by the Air to furnish close, support to your division.
"I talked to your Chief of Staff, Colonel Dewey, this morning and he
assures me that you are in thorough agreement with the procedure which Saville is attempting to perfect, and that it will have your wholehearted
cooperation. I ·sincerely hope that Dewey has correctly represented your
attitude. I consider that the introduction of your memorandum at yesterday's
meeting was most unfortunate. It was certainly not conducive to the development of the close relations which must exist between the air and the
ground elements if we are to have effective close air support.
"I strongly urge that you personally see General Saville at your earliest convenience in order to correct any erroneous impression which may
have been created by your note. Please understand that Saville has not com•
plained about your memorandua. However, from my long a~sociation with him
I know that it can not help but have a harmful effect. That situation must
be cleared up as soon as possible.
"I hope to see you within the next day or two. General Crittenberger
tells me that your plans are in excellent shape, and I am looking forward to
the usual fine performance from your division."
�TUSCANIA--JUNE 22, 1944•-In the early part of the morning General Clark new
to IV Corps Headquarters and conferred there with General Crittenberger, returning late in the morning to the command post. Arter lunch the ambulance
donated by the Mornings of Diversion Club .(the money for which was raised
through the efforts of Mrs. Clark) was brought up for the General's inspection and photographed. The General oonferred with staff officers during the
afternoon and conferred with Colonel Kirkwood. Later in the afternoon the
Army Commander saw General Rooks, Deputy Chief of Starr, AFHQ, and conferred
with him at length regarding various operational matters.
*
*
*
TUSCANIA-JUNE 23, 1944--During the morn1ng General Clark held a conference
of his staff officers in the conference hut, discussing rnB.tters he was to
take up later in the morning in his conference with General Alexander at AAI
Headquarters. Immediately after this conference, General Clark flew to AAI
Headquarters at Frasca.ti accompanied by Generals Gruenther, Brann and Tate.
The General's car met him at Frasca.ti after the conference, and General
Clark drove to Rome immediately after the meeting, spending the evening and
night at his suite in the hotel.
*
*
*
TUSCANIA--JUNE 24, 1944-General Clark remained in the hotel today, conferring with various city administration and MinOT officials concerning the
handling of various civic problems entailed in the administration of the
City of Rome. During the afternoon General Brann arrived and conferred with
General Clark. The General gave a dinner in his private dining room in the
hotel for Generals Tate, Brann, Lewis, Bradshaw and Colonels SaltzrnB.n, Nygaard, Tully, Captain Walters and other guests.
*
*
*
TUSCANIA-JUNE 25, 1944--General Clark remained in his suite at the hotel,
taking up administrative matters with his G-J, General Brann. In the a:f'ternoon General Clark visited Marshal Smuts a.t the Grand Hotel and had tea
there. Marshal Smuts introduced General Van Ryneveld, his Chief of Staff,
and other officers of his staff and his two sons who are acting as his aides.
Marshal Smuts then recalled the last time he had seen General Clark in London in preparation for the landings in North Africa. General ClArk stated
that he recalled that meeting with great pleasure and satisfaction. General
Smuts congratulated General Clark on the fine achievements of the Fifth Army,
stating that he had been the tower of strength. General Clark then stated
that the fine showing maoe by the two new di visions i.n the Fifth Army, the
85th and 88th, had, he felt, had a most beneficial effect on the new American di visions waiting for the invasion in England. These two di visions hed
shown that the new American divisions were more than a match for the German
veterans. Marshal Smuts replied that he had heard that the new American divisions had acquitted themselves very well in Normandy, and he was sure that
this morale factor had played a considerable part in their success. Marshal
Smuts stated that he had visited the Normandy front with Prime Minister Churchill and had found that visit most satisfactory, and everything proceeding
�exceedingly well. He stA.ted that losses had been far below expectation. MB.r shal Smuts stated that the fall of Cherbourg would have a most far-reaching
effect. General Clark concurred, stating that it would then be possible to
bring fresh divisions direct from the United States. General Clark also added
that it has been our experience here in Italy that the Germans had lost the
art of the counter attack. They have launched counter-attacks piecemeal.
General Clark recalled that at Anzio on one occasion the Germans staged an attack with six divisions using two battalions of each division. He stated thet
he believed this was due to manpov,er conservation. Marshal Smuts expressed
his admiration for the stand ma.de on the beachhead under most trying conditions. General Clark then stated that although he was losing divisions here
in Italy, he was doing everything possible to help General Eisenhower's opera•
tion. Marshal Smuts stated that he felt that the campaign in Italy had been
of very great value to the success of OVERLORD, both a.s regards morale and material factors.
1
General Clark then drove directly to the Littorio airport and returned to
his ·command post where he had dinner. During the dinner he informed Sergeant
Holden that he was returning to the United States tomorrow morrdng on a furlough.
General Juin today issued the following memorandum regarding the attitude
or French soldiers toward Italian civilians:
Certain Commanding Officers of American Units which were attached to
during the offensive, have · been very d5sagreeably impressed by the attitude of some of our men toward the Italian population. They have complained
about it to the Commanding General, Fifth Army.
t•1.
F.E.c.,
"2. Unfortunately, it is exact that a certain amount of regrettable incidents have occurred. The Commanding General, F. E. c., is aware of the drastic measures taken by the l~ge unit commanders in compliance with instructions
issued to that effect (memo 5911 CEF/1 dated 27 May 1944). He is aware also
of the efficiency of these measures.
"3. However, these additional complaints require that Commanders of all
echelons do not decrease in any way their surveillance. It must particularly
apply to small isolated detachments."
*
*
*
TUSCANIA--JUNE 26, 1944--The General spent the morning in his van taking care
of accumulated paper work. At 1100 the Soviet Ambassador to the French Committee of National Liberation and Member of the Advisory Council to Italy, Mr.
Alemnder·Bogomolov, and the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Mr. Vidia•
sov, called and were received by the General in his van. At 1130 the General,
accompanied by the Ambassador and the Secretary of the Embassy, proceeded to
the cub strip where a decoration ceremony was held. Ambassador Bogomolov presented Soviet awards to two Fifth Army officers, and General Clark presented
American decorations to a number of other officers and enlisted men. General
Clark, the Ambassador and the SecretRry of the Embassy then returned to the
command post and had lunch. After lunch the Soviet officials departed and General Clerk conferred at some length with General Brann.
�General Lenmitzer called in the afternoon to confer with General Clark.
Colonel Gray also called to discuss some court martial cases, an~ later in
the afternoon the theater cha.plain, Chaplain Beebe, accompanied by Chaplain
Ryan, Fifth Army Chaplain, was rece:tved.
General Clark today sent the f'oll<>wing letter to General Eisenhower:
"I know you are busy these days and don't have time for long letters,
so this will be short.
"We are all pulling f'or you and tremendously pleased with your progress
to date. Hope we can help. You are the only one who knows how we best fit
into the big picture, so get a decision and tell us what is wanted. You can
rest assured you will get our full support. Lack of decision now is slowing
us up and not helping you. You know you can have every single unit I have,
and they will leave here the minute the request is made. I have told my
staff to give you the best we have, but don't forget the rest of us, if you
take _most of my outfit, for we want to get back with you and wind this thing
up as fast as possible.
"Thanks f'or your radio. We were all delighted with it.
"Secured, through Hap Arnold, a C-54 to send twenty of' my oldest people
back home for two weeks with their families. Al headed the list, and officers and men are now enroute.
"Best of regards to Bedel."
*
*
*
TUSCANIA••JlJNE 27, 1944-•In the morning General Clark flew in his L•5 to IV
Corps. He spent the morning a.t IV Corps and returned to his command post at
1400. At 1500 General Donovan of OSS called and was received by General
Clark. The Army Commander spent the rest of the afternoon in his van and
conferred with various staff officers.
*
*
TUSCANIA-•J'UNE 28, 1944•-General Clark spent the morning in his van taking
ca.re of a large a.mount of paper work that had accumulated.
Shortly after 1300 Major General Henry, USA, Ret., arrived by air and
had lunch with General Clark. General Henry arrived alone and left after
lunch with General Keyes. General Clark conferred with General Brann after
this meeting.
Shortly after 1800 General ChBrles DeGaulle arrived, accompanied by
his Chief of staff, General Marie Emile Bethoua.rd, and General Juin and
several other officers. All of the party except General DeGaulle and Gene•
ral Clark went to the hut. General DeGaulle and General Clark went to the
Army Commander's van and conferred there with Captain Walters acting as interpreter. After exchanging greetings, General Clark expressed to General
DeGa.ulle his admiration forN
the magnificent part p~yed by the French troops
�l15
in the victorious advance or the Fifth Army and stated ths,t they had earned
a well-deserved share of that victory. General Clark recalled that the
last time he had seen General DeGaulle, the French General had said "You
must win a victory", and, added General Clark, "Now we have won it". General DeGaulle stated that victory had now been won and still another one had
been won when the forces that had been in the bridgehead broke out.
General DeGaulle then discussed the ANVIL Operation. He stated that
the French had agreed to the campaign in Ital1 but had always felt that af•
ter the Battle of Rome they would like to fight in France. He said he believed this was quite natural, and he felt General Clark would understand
this feeling. General Clark stated that he understood it but believed that
in the case of the ANVIL Operation speed was of the essence. General DeGaulle replied that the plan did not seem to be too speedy, and although it
had been somewhat accelerated recently, it was still quite far off. General
Clark then asked General DeGaulle how soon he intended to withdraw the two
remaining French Divisions. General DeGaulle sta.ted that he did not know
and that it depended largely upon the ANVIL Operation but that if the order
came to withdraw them it would have to come very quickly. General Clark
then stated that with what would be left or the Fifth Army he did not believe that we could m-oss the mountains. General DeGaulle agreed that he did
not think this was possible either. General Clark then expressed the belief
that General Wilson might try both operations ••••• ANVIL and the continuation
of the pursuit in Italy. General DeGaulle stated that he did not think both
operations could be carried out successfully, and General Clark conc~red in
this.
.
General DeGaulle then stated that he was taking the liberty of asking
General Clark some personal questions because they were of great interest to
the French. He asked him what part he personally would play in the ANVIL
Operation. General Clark replied that he felt that eventually all the American troops here would be put into the ANVIL Operation. He stated that be believed initially there would be the Seventh Army, commanded by General Patch,
and the ·French troops would constitute eventually a French Army and that they
would probably be formed into an Army Group but who would command this he did
not definitely know, and General DeGaulle nodded without replying.
General Clark then stated that he would like to ask General DeGaulle a
question but did not want to give the appearance of interfering in any way.
He'stated that he felt sure that General DeGaulle knew the great esteem in
which we held General Juin. General DeGaulle stated that he was aware of
this fact and that he personally had a great regard for General Juin, but he
said, "As you must lrnow, I wanted to give General Juin his chance in Italy,
. and he has certainly taken magnificent advantage of his chance. We also have
General De Lattre de Tassigny, and we want to give him his chance also. We
only have one Army, and it is a small one, but I am sure that within a few
months we will be able to give both of them a command worthy of them. As the
operation progresses we will be able to build up our forces so that they will
both have a command befitting their ability."
General· Clark then asked whether he was going to take General Juin out
of Italy immediately, and General ,DeGaulle replied quickly, "Oh, no! He will
�remain here as long as he has troops fighting and after that I will take
him with me for a while". General DeGaulle hinted but did not state
plainly his preference for General Juin over General DeLattre de Tassigny-.
He added that he felt sure that the ANVIL Operation would be carried out,
in which General Clark concurred - the latter stating that he desired to
do everything possible to help General Eisenhower. General DeGaulle then
stated that he believed that after the landing things would go quite rapidly,
adding "The Germans are very tired".
·
General DeGaulle spoke of his visit to Normandy, stating that things
were going quite well there and gave the impression that he was very satis-
fied with his visit to the western front. General DeGrulle then stated
that he intended to present some decorations tomorrow to some American
Generals and hoped General Clark could be present, adding that he hoped to
have the honor of pinning a decoration on General Clark. General Clark
added that he would be very proud and pleased to be there. The two Gene•
rals then left the van together and went to the hut where they joined the
other members of the party. On the way over General Clark asked General
DeGaulle in French whether he did not expect to go to the United States
very soon - some time in July. General DeGaulle stated that probe.bly that
would be the ease, but he was very vague about the date.
Shortly thereafter General DeGAulle and his party left for the French
Expeditionary Corps. General Clark then had dinner with Mr. DeRochmont of
the MARCH OF TIME and Carl Mytlans of LIFE, after which he retired to his
van.
*
*
*
TUSCANIA--JUNE 29, 1944-In the early morning the General remined in his
van and at 0930 took off in his L-5 and flew to the French Expeditionary
Corps field at Sasso Ombrone. The General drove from the field to a parade
ground where he was decorated by General Charles DeGaulle with the Plaque
of Grand Officer of the Legion of Honor (This plaque belon~s to 88-year old
General Priowc and was borrowed for the ceremony, being returned e.fterwards
by General Clark). At the same time General Clark was decorated with the
Croix de Guerre with a Palm. The General then expressed his regrets to
General DeGaulle at being unable to remain for lunch and flew in General
Juin 1s plane from the parade ground back to Sasso Ombrone. He proceeded
from there to IV Corps in his own plane and conferred with General Crittenberger. Ge~eral Clark then proceeded to his villa at Mirina di Grosseto.
He took a quick dip and then returned to his command post.
*
*
*
T~SCANIA--JUNE 30, 1944--General Clark spent the morning in his van conf'erririg with General Brann, Colonel Smith, Colonel Bruce and Colonel Lee, the
new Finance Officer. At 1030 General Alexander, accompanied by his Chief of
Staff, General Harding, arrived by air and conferred with General Clark.
They departed shortly thereafter and returned to AAI by air.
At 1130 Generals F,aker, Cannon and Saville arrived by air and lunched
with General Clark, conferring with him ·during the lunch hour. They left
�•
early in the afternoon, and at 1330 General Clark took off for the 85th Division command post at Castel Porziano near Rome where he decorated personnel of that division. Upon the completion of the ceremony General Clark
returned to the command post by air and spent the remainder of the afternoon
in his van conferring with various officers of his staff, including Generals
Brann and Moran and Colonel Bruce •
General Clark today sent the following letter to General Crittenberger,
Commanding IV Corps:
"l. There are elements of eight German divisions on the
of Fifth Army. It is estimated that the combined strength of
sions equals a.bout. that of three divisions of full strength.
that the intention of the enemy is to create maximum delay on
defensive position.
present front
these diviIt is clear
every suitable
"2. Through the splendid efforts of your Corps it appears to me that
you are in a position to break through to the ARNO River with great speed
and with luck you might secure a bridgehead over that difficult military
obstacle and seize the hill mass east of PISA. The high ground north of
the GECINA River between the roads CECINA-PISA and POMARANCE•POMEVERA is
the critical terrain feature that you must seize to assure the rapid success
of this operation.
"3. To accomplish this break through I believe that you should make
your main effort on your left with the 34th Division and the 442nd RCT. I
plan on withdrawing the 361st RCT from your command within the next day or
two. I will replace it•with the 362nd RCT on or about July 2 but desire
that you use this fresh combat team with the 34th Divjsion rather than the
1st Armored Division. I think the operations for the past few days have
shown that armor is not appropriate for exploitation forces and that we can
accomplish more with infantry in this type of terrain. I believe the 1st
Armored_with its organic infantry only should be employed on the right of
the , 34th Division to conform to the movements of that Division and protect
its flank. I propos.e directing FEC to conform to the movements of your
Corps.
"4. I would like your comments on the suggested operation as soon as
possible."
General Crittenberger replied to the above this evening, and his letter
is quoted below:
.
"In compliance with your request for comments on the contents of your
letter which was received tonight the following are submitted: .
"1. It is hoped that the further advance of the IT Corps to the ARNO
River may be continued with speed and effectiveness.
"2. The possibility of a rapid advance to the Northwest with the subsequent securing of a bridgehead over the ARNO is recognized. To that end,
plans ere being executed to seize the critical terrain features between the
CECINA-PISA and POMERANCE-PONTEDERA roads. In this oonneotion every effort
�is being made to facilitate the rapid advance of the IV Corps. Subsequent
plans for the crossing of the ARNO and securing of the hill mass East of
PISA are the subject of the minutest study by this headquarters in view of the
importance of 'this pending operation.
"3. Only this morning, plans were well underway for e quick thrust
around the hostile flank and rear by a task force composed of infantry with
some armor. However, the developments duri ng the last twenty-four hours
have made this unprofitable inasmuch as elements of the 1st Armored Division
mov~d up to the CECINA River and crossed it to the North last night.
"4. Your desire to accomplish a break through to the North is well
understood by all ranks of this command who are devoting their greatest effort to this mission. When the 362 RC'l' is made available, it will be attached for initial combat experience to the 34th Division to make that effort. Following what I believe to be your desires, both the 34th Division
and the 1st Armored Division will drive to the North with the latter conforming to the movement of the former. In this advance it is hoped that the
FEC on the right will be able to conform to the pace of this Corps.
"5. The ARNO River presents a difficult obstacle but not one thnt is
by any means insurmountable in the attack and crossing of the rlver. It is
believed that two :i.nfantry divisions should be employed. Ma.y we therefore
expect that a second infantry division, possibly the 88th Division because
of its expE".rience, be made available for that operation. With this fresh
division, it is felt that our plan to seize the objective North of the ARNO
as indicated by you, will be entirely successful."
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Clark, Mark W. Diaries
Subject
The topic of the resource
Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984.
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns.
United States—History, Military—20th century.
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950.
Publisher
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The Citadel Archives & Museum
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
CP Clark
Relation
A related resource
Mark W. Clark Collection
Format
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application/pdf
Language
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English
Type
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Text
Identifier
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mark W. Clark Diary, June 8-30, 1944
Subject
The topic of the resource
Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns
United States—History, Military—20th century
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from June 8-30, 1944.
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
CP Clark
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Citadel Archives and Museum
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
application/pdf
Language
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English
Type
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Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1635