1 10 16 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/822e6990c96688659d8bc89acb9ab9f4.jpg?Expires=1787184000&Signature=CBFqr6kqT0KBe1Vu6U-kSnpUw3O3HUbZY9fbrDm-R8MiEpbNTIMSXtgMFz6SI2L3Zd-lvWYoMaK-WH1ypO0NqN15IRLoztIy8fin%7Exi72y7ARV29wHI8tQG5vHwluhP4mhEQ8nh6rcJAFUmuZWK%7EeBssdXGJIP5o1mmh%7EWMXb9zAiUipwwiAtWfndmilU45vStUdXs%7E%7EqdGTWcZCn36Ut%7EM02oZ8ilc-FIYYJIVDV2oc8TJ56-n1yKPHlDJId7Qo5ESsyzTG8xOHOwPAJUWFlghmEJLSJFliaqrH0NuxtHR3A8km6eJ1nJroxnEF%7EFraPvHBrYkoezYXaHvKDZ1oGg__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM fc997aa3fbbc676fb42da8fa5a46819e Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Fyffe, John A. Collection Subject The topic of the resource The Citadel Military College of South Carolina Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Language A language of the resource English Description An account of the resource John A. Fyffe matriculated as a cadet at The Citadel in the fall of 1942. He received an honorable discharge in January of 1943 due to the draft. After his service, Fyffe returned to The Citadel as a veteran student under the G.I. bill in January of 1946 and withdrew in June of 1947. Our collection for Mr. Fyffe in The Citadel Archives includes letters sent to his family while a student at The Citadel and during his military service, as well as photographs and other documents related to his education and service. Contact The Citadel Archives at archives@citadel.edu for more information and to view additional items from this collection. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/67 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource World War II Photograph from the John A. Fyffe Collection Subject The topic of the resource Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina World War, 1939-1945 Description An account of the resource Photograph from the John A. Fyffe Collection dated November, 1944 with the text "Our tent - I made the windows and door." Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource image/jpeg Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Still Image https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/d9130c69de7bfa9caab36912eaca26d4.pdf?Expires=1787184000&Signature=H9Gu4wrj5Qydgz9EYVjVUPXUe9tJV7zmf8BNBHYPpFIpHHEmM7%7EvSyLyR9N72TCLCCihBVM6sgWaKNvj-kk8xB4Pz1N9Ume2o9sZP9TjxoE0vC8pVHOonZwWQT2TdWWUbmx1fGDTDBKhfZ%7EyQ39Ag1WMIF026w8iG6uin3lFW%7ETYXhm3f8nUXJ9id797gBQ4qFsneCO0Py2jCNEZckUq5sQ6brNKlViNE6JHMlhlTuqjC64Tzk8FSUStZj7tTuDDfRq7FdiZSAy7qGMMZE9aq5sisGyK12WBFWImyNRPzuOsfroAELepJqbJbq9pc%7Ei0MUsJg8Zx6bOvARegF1ZWIg__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 8f79b7cff236a9838e462678d6719f64 PDF Text Text l O[ PASS, '.'fas occupied but the twin pea.ks M FRF.DDI - M BENI and M GOGIOLA, M CANDA a.nd M CnLORETA surrounding it to thf"l North also had to be cleared. The 88th Div was employed on the riP,ht flank to drive toward !MOLA and reached M BAT"'IGLIA where repeated counterattacks and stiffened enemy resistance m,:,de further adv~nce verv difficult. The weiP,ht of the attack then shifted from the axis of the FIRF.NZUOLA - IMOLA Rood to Route 65 directed on BOLOGUA. M CA IDA was outflanked and :later secured, all these key features end m.'9.ny others were in our hnnds with the ~dvance continuing to rush forward as the period closed. 13 Corps relieved elements of II Corps, taking over the zone occupied on the right by the 88th Div, while continuing to attack Northeast l'l.long its front nnd genernlly conforming to the ma.in advance. In IT Corps sector PISA was occupied and the fKlt~ PISANO hill nnss cleared when the period opened. During the month ~·nilTE ft.IJ3A'N'O and the important tovms of PISTOIA, LUCCA and VIAREGGIO were ceptured. IV Corps continued to engAge light enemy forces by aggressive patrol action and constant forward rz-essure along jts entire front and preptJred to a.ssist the main effort by a strong P.dvnnce up the PRATO BOLOrrNA Road. ~he first BraziliAn troops to fight overseas entered the line in a sector near the coast durinR September. ]• Air Supwrt: A totel of 11~ mi~sions or 7416 individual sorties •~ere flown durin1; the rionth of September in direct support of Fifth Army operations on virtually every oonceivable type of rern.merative target. Despite much poor weather and ba.d visibility very ~ood results w~re obtl'lined. A total of 129 missions, 638 sorties, wer('! handled by "Rover Joe" on c~ll targ.ets request-) "'d by forward units for close support with excellent results f!nil much vriluable . time saved. . . ..R. 4 "-Qw--'t ; - . ~ -:lo q~ ~ t- ~r i.;'-' * ·~~~--~~- 'Pt., * * FLOR.ENCE--OCTOBER 1, 1944--General Cl~rk left his command. post shortly Rfter hi.s early morning conference and flew into the Futa Fass, lPnding on the road on Route #65 where he was met by his jeep nnd driven to the 91st Division in the vicinity of Sru1ta. Lucia. General Clark also visited the 85th and 34th Divisions. At 1/..30 General Clrirk met GenerRls Alexander, Harding and Lernnitzer on Route .%5 . The General returned to his command post at 16oO hours and entertain-,d members of his staff in the conference hut with n movie. General Cl.ll...rk today received the folJowini; messAge from General rv~cCreery upon his assumption of command of F.ighth Army: ",1'any thnnks for your kind message. It will be a great pleasure to me to work i.n the closest cooperation with Fifth Army during our r>dw.nce. 11 * * * FLORENCE--OCTOB'SR 2, 1944--Generals Cnnnon, Lernnitzer And Chidlfl.w came for bren'kfast this morninr,- and conferred w1th General Clark. The G"nerel spent the morning in his va.n ,,vorking on papers and conferring with rnembr-rs of his staff. General Yroner called to see General CL~r'k at 1500 hours and conferred �with him for an hour. Generals Lernnitzer And Cannon, after ri trip to the forward areA., cs.lled to see GenerAl Clark for a few minutes before they returned to Siena.. The General d:ined with the regulrr membern of his J!'ess, and after ninner played bridge with General Gruenther, Colonel Gray and Major Hunter. * * * FLOREHCE-..OOTOBER 3, 1944--General Clark, nft"'r his 0830 oonference, flew to the 91st Division cub strip in the vicinity of San Fiero, where he was met by his jeep and driven throu~h the Futa Pass up Rout,e #65 to the 91st Division CI- located in Fietra.mala, where he conferred with General Livesny. After oonfening with General Livesay, G"!nerA.1 Clark drove to ffonp;hi<loro which the q1st Division had taken from the enemy the day before. There General Clark got his first view of the Po Valley and the snow-capped Alps in the distPnce. GenerAl Clark spoke to m,my of the men of the 3r12nd and 161rd Infantry Regiments, congratulat-/ ing them on their fine accomplishments. He storpa,d at the regimental oommand posts of these t,,-o outfits, ooMmand~d by Colonel Cotton and Colonel Mangill respect1. vely. /i l In Monghidoro General Clark stopped at n collecting stntion \mere he spoke to many of the wounded men who ht'!d just been brought in from the ba.ttl"lfleld. He then returned to the 91st Division cub field and took off in his L-5 for his Headquarters in Florence. At MJO hours General Dutra, Brazilian Minister of War, came with Generals Kroner and Wooten to bid goodbye to General Clark. A guard of honor was held for General Dutra. General Clark presented General Dutra with the gift of a carbine. Genernls Clark and Gruenth~r dined out with friem.s in Florence. A summary of oi:;erations for the week ending October 3, 1944 is as follows: 'l'he direction of' the ma.in attack was shifted from the axis of the Fii.ENZUOLA IMOLA road to Route #65 on RGLOG\TA. Relief of II Corps units on the right was being accomplished by elements of lJ Corps as II Corps attack to the North was continuing to ma~e sntisfnctory progress despite adverse weather conditions t>nd stiff resistance ns t}e period closed. IT Corps was advancing well along the PRA'l'O - BOL0<1°t'UI. Road nnd Northwest towarc1s PIF.VF:PF.LAGO wb ile vigorously pa.trolling along the entire front. * * FLORE1TCE--OC"'OBER 4, 1944--'T'h"' General i:ipent the entire day in his van. General Almond, Commanding General of the Q2nd Division, crone to see General Clark. · In the evenin~ General Cl.ro-k was greatly elat~d by the capture of Mount ~ ~1enere, the last high ground before the Po Valley. Genl'lrA-1s Clnrk and Gruenthe: \ attended the Antiaircraft Pnrty given by General Bradshaw at a villa in Florence. General Clark remained until 1030, at which time he return....d to his oomrnand post. �General Clark today received the follo,ving reply to his request for naval gunfire support: "All cruisers at present fully employed ~md Jater required for projected events. "One may be Availllble a.t a Jater date but not accertahle to operate in water between '7 - 10 fathoms wtthout necessary S\-veeping which is not at J res• ent poc.isible with Mine sweeping force available. 11 * * * FLOR-;;;tTCE--OOTOBER 5, 1944--General ClP.rk saw Lt. Col. Gre.y, Fifth Army Judge· Advocate, this morninR shortly after his 0830 conference. At 1100 hom-s General Savin, French representative to the Allied Control Commission in Italy, calleo to see General Clark. General Clark spent the afternoon in his van conferring with members of his staff. The Army Commander presented the Bronze StAr to Colonel Lyles of the G-1 Section who was le1:i.ving today for the United States. In the evening Generals Clark, Gruenther and Colonels Saltzman ~nd Porter attended the play 11 0Ver 21 11 at the rear echelon theater. Operations Instruction #35 was issued today and reAds as follows: n1. The nim of the Allied Armies, which have now penetrntt'!d the GO'T'HIC Line positions, continues to be the destruction of enemy forces in Italy. F.ighth Army cc1>1tinues the attack against forces opposing it on the Adr:5 atic coast. ' Fifth Army, upon the successful accornpl:i shrnent of its current operntions, will debouch into the PO Valley on a wide front, generally extending from ,just V1est of BOLOGNA Enstward to the vicinity of FAEWZA. At the same tjrne, elements of Fifth Anny on the Mediterranean coast flre :in position to capitalize on enemy withdrawal in that area. 11 2. It is still necessary to consider two different types of r-ction for the Fifth Amy forces which reach Highway 9, the BOLOGNA - FARNZA road: a. Assumption 1: Enemy forces still rema.in facinp.; Eighth Anny in the pocket formed by VAIJ,E DI er MACCHIO ~md the APF.t:itJINBS. b. Assi.JJm)tion 2: Enemy forces have withdrawn from t r is pocket and the main forces of Fifth and Eighth Armies A.re in contact. "3. Under e:Ither assumption, when Fifth Army troops first debouch on H:i ghway 9, the i.mmeqia.te oreration will he to e stabl:i sh a bridgehead in the FlOLOG~JA area (See overlay) of suffic:i ent sizl'! to cover the buildup of· sup... plies and the exits of' the roads through which these suprli"s must oome. Fif'th Army f0rces on the nediterranea.n will rush on GRNOA and FARHA in order to destroy any enemy rear guards remaining in thos" are1,.s anri op~n a rort and road to the Vnlley throw:;h ,-vhich supplies must come for subsequent or~rations • �in Western TtEily. 11 4. After establishment of the BOLOG~m. bridgehead: a. Unr'er A<lsnmption 1, Fifth Army troops which r~ach the Valley will push on rapidly, ma.king their main effort towards FE~RARA in order to block the withd:rawt-il of ent,my forces "rom the VALIE DI C0H.ACCHIO pocket. At the s~t'! time, elements '\'ill turn f'est -"ron the bridg~riead rnd push out nlong H:ighwny q towe.rds PAR?'!A to block the withdrawal of any enemy forces "'till facing J Corps. Sinultaneously, elem!'!nts debouching on Highway g in t'he D'OLA. - FAJ.:N7,A area will force the ent'lmy -into unfavorable terrciin v:hich will necessitate his withdrawal through FERRARA. ]2. Hnder Assumption 2 9 Fifth Anny units which reach tre Valley, usin~ light forces, will mnint8in contnct w:i.th the ,.nemy to c'leterrnine his intentions. Reconnaiss·•nce eJ.,ments wil 1. be d'irected Westwards tcwPrcls JAR.HA and ~orth to the PO, advancinr; only whJre r~sistrmce j s l~g 1t ti.nd m1nir.rum forces need be employ"d• ·'la.jor units of the forces rlebouching in the V~lley will be prepared to Rtta.ck from th hridp:ehead on Army order. If the enemy v.itl1r1rt:1w to the ''orth bn.nk of the PO, reconnaissance ,·111 devl'llop the rivl'lr to rletermine suitable cro"'sing sites. Fifth Arny's ,~ ssion contemrlates securing "A ~rroVA ar,d 7EB.G' 1 A a,rter t"!rossing in the area between BORC'iOF(I'{T}.; and CSTIGLIA but Engineer sturlies indicate that, At this season or the year, sue 1 a crossing is likely to r,e impracticable with equipnent available. It r.ay e nocessary to seek anoth"'r area. .,,he rl'lsults of f'urth~r studies v:ill be J11ade lmo"m ns they become avaiLqble. 11 5. Detailed missions under Assumntion 1: a. (Enemy still in pocket). 11 Corps will: (1) Screen the right flank of Il Corrs elements directed on FEF.RARA, relieving II Corps troops which nPy be rerrorming this mission j f they have de1nuchfl!id 1"irst into the Valley. (2) Advance rapidly to destroy enemy "'arces within :t ts zone of action. (3) Gain co11tact with the left elements of Eighth Army's main forces. b. II Corps, employing a maximum of one 1:irmored di vision nnd three infantry divisions, will: (1) 'Establish a hridge~ad in the ICLOCHJA area (SM over]py). (;,) rush rRpidly on FERRARA to block the with,}rmval o: enemy forces opposing Ei~hth Army and destroy them. (3) Protect its own flanks unti 1 relieved by adjacent elerients. c. Army tr.oops: (1) 6 S0uth Africr>n Armoured Division will: (a.) Assume responsibility for thr-t portion of the bridgehead i/est of OOLOGNA (SM Overlay), relieving II Corps troops which may bl"! perforn:i.ng this mission if they have debouched f:i.rst into the Valley. (b) FrotMt the left fl~nk of' II Corps' farces rr.oving on FRR.RARA. �to5 (c) Tu'T"n ""!est on the genernl nxis of Highway 9 nnd push rapidly towards Fl\RMA. to block the withdrawal of any "'nemy forces reJM.ining in the AFENNI~~s. (2) 1st Armored Division, staging forward as rar,idly as the situPtion rermits, will prep~re plans ror employment under II CorJlS in an exploitation role with the forces direct ...d on FF.RRARA. "6. Detailed missions under Assumption 2: (Enemy wi thdravm from pocket). a. 13 Corps may revert to Eighth Amy~ ortly ~fter r~ntact between Fifth anrl Eighth Armies is gained in the Vall,y. b. c. 11 '7 . IT Corps.~: (1) Establish a bridgehead in the BOLOGNA area (9ee overlay). (?) Using li~t forces, push ri-connaissance el--~ ts forward towards the PO Rjver to maintain oontact with the enemy rnd detorm;ne 1 ~e plan of action. (3) Tn the event the enemy withdrnws to the Jorth b0nk of the PO, conduct reconnaissance .,.or crossing sites ''lhi ch will facilitate the advance on "lAN"'OVA and VERONA . (4) Be prepared on Army order to resum"' the attaclr in fO'l"ce. Armif tromOP§,: 6 South African Armoured Di vision will push reconnaiss:ince towards PARf'fA to determ:ine enemy resistance anCi to gain contact vith IV Corps. (2) 1st Armored Division v1ill stage f'orward ns rapidly ::is the situation p"'rr:dts to the IDLOGNA bridgeheri.d where it will be initially in Army reserve. (1 Under e1 th•~r a R"Umptl on, a. rr Corps will: Push forward to seize nnd/or occupy 1,.\ SI-EZIA and AULLA. ·b. Subsequ"'nt ly, send forces to open the roads IA Sf H ~ZIA - GEHOA ancl AULLA - FARMA. c. Gain contact with 6 South African Armoured Division in the PARMA d. Mop up any enemy elern--nts r!'lmaining in its nrea of op'°!rations. area. 11 8 . 01mdaries: * Later, depending on the situPtion. 11 * * FLORENCE--Qcr"OBF.R 6, 1944--Follo,,ing the early morning conference, General Clark drove in his ,jeep to Lofano, stopping enroute at II Corps Hea.dquarters to talk to General Keyes. General Pritchard, Commanding General of the 1st Armored Division, was also there and conferred with General Clark . After conferring with these two comna.nders for ha.lf an hour, General �Clerk drove to th~ 85th Division in the vicinity of Carpinaccio where he lunched with Gl"!neral Coulter a.nd members of his staff. After lunch the General drove to the 91st Division, one mile oouth of Honghidoro. General Livesay joined General Clark :in his ,jeep, and they drove to the comma.nd post of the 362nd Infantry where G"neral Cla.rk decorated Colonel Cotton, Commanding Officer, with a Legion of Merit, and made a combat appointment to Sergeant Brooks to 2nd Lieutenant. General Clark then drove back to his headquarters in Florence, and en.. route met General K~yes and talked for a few minutes. General Cla.rk dined out with General Gruenther and Colonel Sal tzrnan. '1"he Arrrr:, CoMmander today sent the following calSle to General Devers regarding replacements: "Infantry replacement situa.tion in Fifth Army is so critically serious that current operation may be l'¼ndangered. Supply of infantry replacements and infantry overstrength in divisions only sufficient to maintain divisions at T/0 strength through 9 or 10 October. Losses in my four infantry divi• sions during pa.st five days have averaged 550 i::er day over and above returns to units. Heavy fighting continues with enemy appro-ently rushing all a.vailabl~ forces to halt our advance on BOLOGNA. W ithout additional repbcements infantry strength of the four infantry divisions will be reduced by approximately 5,000 for each ten days of fighting after 10 October. Infantry rifle compani•!S will thereby be reduced so seriously as to crePte an extreme opera! tional ha.ndicapG All divisions have been engaged in heavy fighting 23 to 26 days under anverse weather conditions. Continuous supply of infantry replacements is imperative. This situation has already been presented orally to your headquarters. I urgently requ~st thitt it be brought to the immediate attention of War Department as a rrattt,r of operational emergency. 11 \ Regarding the above cable, General Alexander sent the following cable to General Gammell who was at SHAEF at the time: "Grateful if you would show Fifth Army signal number 8839 (above) of 6 October regard.:ing n. S. infantry replacements to Genero.l Alexander and ask him to discuss with SAC-in•C any further possible action to support General Clark's request." General Clark today received the following memorandum from General Mar- shall: am 5.nclosing pages 10 to 14 of the Surgeon's statement regarding the prevention of loss of manpower from psychiatric disorders. I am taking this direct method to reach you because I know how deeply immersed you Rre in the conduct of actual operations a.nd their log.i sties as well as relRted administrative matters. Please. read these }'Ages. 11 I tir ha.ve formed no conclusions myself except thRt I am much impressed with whatever can be don,, to break the Atra.in of too long employment of the individual in active operati.ons. \ \ �11 I nm sending these same pages to Eisenhower in France and to 'lacArthur. 11 The Army Commander today replied to G~neral Marshall's memorandum as follows: "Thank you f'or your memorandum of 22 September. I have read with great interest the Surgeon Genernl's report which discusses the prevention of the loss of ma.npm,er froM psychiatric disorders. "The p:roblP-ms involved in psychiatric casualties mve been of great concern to me since l1lst winter. The i.ncidence of manpower loss from psychiatric causes began to be felt in Ja.nURry, when the oomh=it forces availt=tble to the Fifth Army were so limitl'ld thnt i_ was necesaa.ry to keep infantry units in the t line for very extended periods. As you will remember, our assaults against the fortifications in the mountainous Cassino region were made with divisions which became materi~lly understrength and could be given little respite as we pressed forward on our mission. As a. result, our casualties from psychintric causes were fairly high. 11 A similar situation confronts us to day in our current offensive in the Apennines. My troops have been m gotiating the most difficult mountainous terrain we hav~ hRd to face in Italy, involving the bitterest fighting since we landed at Salerno. As you know, I have four American inf ntry divisions in the II Corps and they are making the main attack on Bologn_'l.. We are attacking on a broad front against heavy resistance, and it has been necessary to keep all four <livisions constantly in line. Our only chance to rest t},e troops is within the divisions th~mselves, where we utilize every opportunity to pull out a battalion or a regiment 1henever thn.t is possible. ':'he decision which hns faced me is onf'! of halting our attack in order to rest, or of pushing on in an all-out effort to g~in our objectives before winter catches us in the Apennines and thus contribute to the shortening of the war. To me th~re is only one answer to that choice, and I am proud to be ~ble to tell you th~t the Fifth Army troops rmve :made sif?'}ifica.nt advances ev,,ry day for more thnn two weeks. The enemy is movin~ every unit he can make avai lrtble to the II Corps front in order to halt our pro~ess. Speed on our part is abr-'.olutely essentie.l. That action is especially necessary when one realizes that the gighth Army has been practically stopped in its tracks for the pti st ten days. 1, "I _ not yet know the answer to the psychiatric rroblem, but you w:ty rest do assured T shall continue to study it.. It apy-ears clear from tre report which you sent me, which was based largely on Fifth Army experience, that susceptibiBty to psychiatric breakdown is directly related to length of time in combat. I shall continue tn tA,ke every practjcable met-isure to give my troops tre opportunity for rest. At tho present Hrre we are operating tv·o rest centers for enlisted men, one in Rome and the other in Florence, and they have been extrerrx,ly beneflcie.1 to the thousands of Fifth Army soldiers who have visited them. "You will be interested to lmow thiett in spite of our si,vere fighting under extremely ndverse weuther conditions, we have hqd few psychjatric casualti"s \ sjnce our attack on the Gothic Line began. I attribute this condition largely to the hieh morale of our troops. Although the Gflrman is still fighting well, our men know thPt we can whip him wh,,rever we rind him, :mr' that lmowledge buoys them over many difficulties wh:ich might oth-,rwise nrrear insurmountable. I �realize, o~ course, that the strAin on the individual must be eased soon, nnd I hope that some reHef will be possible. "No doubt you have rend the ne ssages sent to the War Departrrent by ~rATOUSA outlining the critic~l shortage of Infantry replacements for the Fifth Army. 'JA'T'o·rsA has available for Fifth Army only 2,200 inf'antry replrc,.,ments, an<l th1'y have n/ivised us that no further shipments P.re oontemplated from the U. s. I now have n slight ov~rstr~ngth in each di vision, but if the present caswu ty rate continues (net loss 500 per day ) the f'i.c;hting stren!Y,th of my four divi\ sions will be down to T /o strength nbout October 10th. Thereafter, the four infantry divisions will be re0uced in strength Rbout 5,000 infantrymen every ten days of f'iP;htin~. This !"'cans that each rlfle compnny will be reduced, on the average, Aboul; 40 men every ten days of combat. Such n reduction represents ~ serious op4'ra.tional handicap which will be most difficult to overco'l'1.e. Three of my divisions have been in the line '?4 days, the fot:rth 16 days. Naturally the men are becoming tired. I oon9ider -it absolutely essenti~l that we receive a conUnuing supply of infantry rern cer:ients or else we sr all be in grav" danger of' being unA. lr- to accomplish our Mission. For yo·u· informntion, the casualtiM in the four infantry divisions since 3epten1ber 10 ha.ve been 9,000 ba'Jtle and '"",1~00 non-battle--a total of 16,L;00. "The Brazilian troops hn.ve given a i:pod account of themselves in their lim::.ted de,..~naive role. The:, have hnd 45 battle Ct'sual tiP-s thus far, ond have learned a great deal. ~~neral Dutra expressed r;reat sat~sfaction with tre wny the "3razilia.ns have en handled by us. You rriay have 11ot::.ced Yihere I plrced him in commnnd of the \V!"!st.ern sector f'or e few days. He derived a g.ri,at thrjll from that assignment. 'T'h,. balanne of tl1ii, division will start unloading in Leghorn on October 10th. 11 ,,,he 370th RCT of the g2nd Division hns been in line in ::i. quiet sector on the western flank f'or 5 weeks. I l~ve placed General Almond in oommnd of a \ task forM consistin~ of the 170th RGT and an American-Br:i tish AAA force nith I I the mission of atta.~king along the western coast to carture HASSA and to advrmce to tl-ie northwest in order to hold every Gerwm r,lement in tbat area. The attack jumped off this ~orning. I'll hove a good idea of the offensive capabilities of the color'"!d troops within a few days. ~,sed on treir rerform,mce in the defensive phase I anticipate th-it they will do an average @on job, but not up to the standard of "lhite troops. 11 I have ju~t he~..rd over the radio of your arrival in France. I am s~nd ing thi.s letter to you tr·ere in order that you may know of our sitm tion. I sincerely hope that you will come here and ray us a visit. It would mean a lot to all of us in the Fifth Arrny, and only can one understand our real si tuntion by see'in~ it. I consider the fi'{hting we have had for the past month as difficult as any in Fiftr Amy experience. Mhe 1~en have rerformed miracles in crossing the Apennines. There is nuch good you could do for us by A. short visit, nnd perhnps we can show you Bologna. 11 * * * FLORE~CE--OCTOBF.R 7, 1944--Genernl Cl-,..rk he1d his 0830 conference tr, is morning, following which he snw Dr. Peter Odegard, Assistant to the Secretary of' the �\ 09 "'rea.sury; Mr. Harbold Thomas, Chcirmn of the WPr Advertj sing Council; Frrink Isbey, Chairman of the Y1nr Finance Division. Genernl ClA.rk or:tenten these eentlemen briefly on the cm-rent Fifth Amy situation. Tli~ Generd s~nt the rernni nder of the day oonferrinf'{ 1i th various staff members, dining in the evening witb the regu1Fr members of his 1:1ess and retiring early to his van. * * FLOR'S1ifCE--OCTOBER 8, 1944--General Clnrk was ronfin~ tn his v:,n tcxlny with a head cold. The Generl'll spent most or the day taking care of an accw.ulation of paper work and conferring on the phone vri th his various subordinate conunAnders. General Cl,"1rk today received the follow.i ng cable from GenerAl Vasiliev: "I oongra.tulnte you with the reward of the Soviet Government which decorated you with the Order of Suvarov, f:ir st class for your · outstanding military work in conducting operations of the Allied troops in Italy in the struggle against Hitlerite Germany. Wish further successes." * * FLORENCE--OOTOBER 9, 1944--Th~ Army Commander was still oonfined to his van todny. However, the General din confer with Lt. Gen. Lloyd, GOC of London District and the Brigade of Guri.rds. The r~mainder of the day was spent in conferences and Rdministrati.ve work. General Clc'U'k dictated the followin~ random notes for inclusion in his dia.ry: "The first plan o-f' GenerRl Alexanner was that Fifth and T:ighth Armies crack the Gothic Line at the saMe time, side by side, from Florence to Bologn,-.1 trnd slightly to the east thereof \7here the mountaj ns are not as yTecipitous as in the west. '1eneral Leese, ]mowing the wenkened condition of l' ifth Army due to its losses to Seventh Army and knowing that Fifth Army would cnrry the ball as usual and beinr, rnrticularl;r v,ell trai~d for mountain +>j_ghting, decided that Eighth Army could not attempt this crossing of the rnonntnins. Alexander agreed and shifted the Eighth Army to the east. A me~t.ing was held 1-1t Leese I s headquarters on Aurrust 10th where this nt'lw plan was discussed. I aP,reed, but when Alexander tol<l me I ,vas to crack over the mountains ru.one with 13 British Corps in the Bologna area cooperatinp;, I deMnded thnt 13 Corps be E> ssigned to Fifth Army. I Jmew full well th:i.t it would be of no offensive vnlue to me, but if T wns to mnke the rmin wallop over the mountains I could not be 11 cooperAtin~" with a British force immediately 11.djncent to me find 100 miles from its oommnnder. Leese objected but finally gave in, a.nd 1'3 Corrs was assigned to me. It has been of littl~ value to me since. "Hy ori~innl in.en wns to m1'lke my direction of nttack g "'nerally from Flo'.l'"ence to Bologna, but due to the fact that I env1'loped the Altuzzo resistance by an effort through Mount Acute to the north, I found weakness and rushed to get Mount La Fine and Mount Battar,lia. This proved a ~rent thrert to tb e �\ \0 Germans, as it P,O.Ve ne a secondary route to move on in the directj.on of Imola. I might have sent two divisions thr,t way, had I had more troops [ind h~d the rains not interfered. The Firenzuola - Cast~l ael Rio ro~d has been under water since the heavy rains came on many occasions. At one time during the past two or three days it has been 4-l· feet under water, and we were forced to supply our troops to the north nnd bring back our wounded by a cable thrown over the river . "It hns always been apparent with the bad weather that I must stick to t},e main road, Route #65; it being a two-vmy, all-weather rord to Bologna. J "I hnv~ re~eived little support in this orera.tion from AFHQ, particularly Devers and his cohorts. Devers, due to his dual capncity,- has diverted troops badly needed in thls theater r'or his own use in France, guided entirely by a selfish interest, in my opinion. The Japanese-American troops should never hnve b~en taken. He tried to tA.ke all my heavy artillery, and only throur.;h the greatest rrotest throup;h Wilson was his plan circumvented. No, I am confronted with a shortage of replacements. In t:br~e days f'roM now there will be no infantry replacements availnble for Fifth Army, and I will lose from my four infantry divisions approxi.mitely 5,000 infantry for ev(')ry ten dr>.ys. It is inconceivable how such a disgraceful situation could confront a oomriander in the heip;ht of his battle when success is almost at hnnd after weeks of i:r,reat sacrifice and brilliant fighting. After all, I was directed across the Apennines but am not backed up in many respects. I feel thnt the American side of AFHQ has no interest in thj_s operation, have failed to sup:rort it and the true facts are not known in the War Dep(lrtment. In desperation, I am rndioing direct to Eisenhower, appealing for him to take over Seventh Arrrzy- requirements in order thnt some 5,000 infa'1try replncements now in the t,!-,eater but wr.ich Devers has earmarked for himself can e released to ~e. ' I I I 11 In the midst of my battle I received a letter froM General Ml"rshn.11 on psychirrtric cases, quoted in full in the diary notes of October 6th, indicating 1 the necessity of resting troops. rt is hnrd to see hmv I can rest my troops when J have f'our attacking divisions. I have attacked w:i. th them every day for a month and will do so for another month. We must take the consequences. I ha.ve had 10,000 casu.'31ties in this month. There is no &oice for me but to go on. I would not consider any other f,8th. It would be frightful to even consider stoppin~ in the Apennine Mountains for the winter. My only opportunity for resting troops is to rotate regiments with in divisions rmd batte.lions within regiments. I consider a fresh regiment now one thnt has hnd four nights• rest in this pouring rain in the mountains. "I am movin.g my command post into the mountains, notv,d thstanding the attendant difficulty in communication. I must get my headqur-irters set up with all its attendtmt faciHties in the mountains where they will aprreciate the ha.rdships bei..ng enn.ured by the other troops. I must also be as close to Bologna as possible when the reak-through does occur. "I have the South African Division on my left. Althour;h they indicate that they are more like the Americans than the British, they fight exactly like th~ British. 'T'hey got kicked off of ~~ount Stl:l.nco last night. It was vital that ~e hold it. They kept a ooy up on the mountain in order to rest the remainder of their troops. We don't do th~t. The 1st British Division �got ki ck"d of'f' Mount Ceco f 0r the same reason - a boy doing P.. man I s job. They th1n1< nothinlY of i t. A gln.nce at the mar will show hov far b""hind they art" on eac}, flank to the main American effort . The Americans hA.ve carried the ball every inch of the way in this battle, dragging the British troops on their flank up by their boot straps . ·ote the Ei~hth Army ' s irn.ct ivity for days upon days . They relieved Leese nnd put in a washout lik!'! M cCreery. He is a f eather duster type . I hPd him under r1y command for eight months . F.e held the ball on eve~r occasion. Vie nre exreriencjn~ the sn.me kind of fightin~ by RighU Army as w~s eirr1enced nll throua;j, the battle for Rome . 'T'hey were nlways miles ..,i:,~ nd, le:wi.nr.; my ri P,ht f'lrink unrrotect1a.d . They ha.ve verv T'Oor leadership. It is not the !"'en, -"or .;ndiv · aually they are brave an<l will fight co1 lectively i r mnde to clo so . General Alexander exercises absolutely no lnl'luence over the F.ighth Army. He :is not a driv"'r and is un.1.ble to make them go into an all- out attack. "I hnve P bout three kilomt"!ters to go and T _ will have tre last of tre hi~h a,round . When +,J:iis ·is secure I know J 1vill go into tJ-,e Fo 7alley, althouP'h it m:'1.y tnke r1e a little tirre to rest my troop:; for the f'inn.l drive . :-1ue to BrltiGh in,<>ctivi ty on tre Big},tJ:, Ar'f'ly -"ront , sev~-ral divi sions have bMn takt'!n away .f'rom that n.rer, and brou~ht to oprose me . Still thl'l -::i1hth Army does not nttac~ . I I I I v "I have wdtten to Gen!'lral r::1.rsliall 1rrr,ently r~q111'!stinr, th<1t he come here from France . I hn.VP- told h.: m th~t ]_--,,. Ctln l'lot be~in to realize the condi..tlons whicJ:, confront us without sedng trem. I hope to be nbl~ to cti..scuss tr,e,iter -problems with him w Jn he comes . ""here ~ s no excuse f'or hrivin~ a. 'IA"'OTTSA, an P.FU1 , ~ COJ'l"'11U'1ication ::>..o'l.e nnrl r,n AAI. I r.01 ,1-<1 e9tim~te thrt 50,ono military snuls :ire tied up tn trese actjyities con+ ,ributin~ 7 ittl,.. to the t,tl~ . ..!'!Ver were so few commA.nded by so many. 0 '"!y re'1uests ~o G neral C nnon f'or m"di.um air suprort hnv~ been r.,.f'used rereatedly. I have mn.de '10 iS'3U~, but yesterdny whim I received the follow~ n~ letter +"rom Gereral F~ker I went to bat . ' One or two of my o-Pficers were rresent at your rress co..,f~rence y"r;terdn.y and hnve told r'l!'! of t},. v~ry -Pj ne thi'lf"'J you h•c~ to st'ly about Chidlaw ~nd A.ir coorerntion in .c;eneral. ile rpprecinte wh:-it yo'-1 said t>n<l you cn.n rt":st assurerl tl-i~t y:iu will CO"ltinue to r-t all th"' a::r support we 'h.r>ve, inclt.ding the :1~diums anr'l. Vie H~avies ~s re1uired . 1 I am r'eli ,.htec1 that Chi0lnw is wrrkin~ nut so well . I hav rr.ce"'t confidence in riim 'J~C"'use, thou.qi not as exr-erienced ns Cannon a.nd Sriville, e is V1'ry l,ri !ht '1.n ' R 1ert and I "el t h" ha, su-l'f tciert under study of t11P. (,ld boys to e ~hle to do an effective n.:-1d satisfactory .job . ' ' T tr:at Ca nnon has moved be.ck over to tr is sire , I am sure you ftr"' going ow to :;,,t their undivided a.tt~ntion lmt i , by 1.;han ~"', you sh0,1lct get s-1;,uc 1c at any tire n."ld -"~Al you ne.,d more air l1elp, be c;ure to let me know . ' Give "7 ',i,st to Al l}ruent ,..r ar1c' A.11 your rardworkini-:; my el'lrn"st conrvatulatior1s on your 1·t,cent successes . 1 oys, and accept ��medium and entire fi~hter bomber a:i.r ~ffort he brought into the battle in clos~ support of my troops for our final attacli:: towards Bologna. Ia.mas= sured by Eaker thrit I will f;et this support, rmd Ale:x."'8.nrler has guaranteed to bnck up my requ"!!st. 'T'here is the constant reluctance of' most Air Corps commanders to use anythin~ 9ut fi~hter bombers in support of a battle. They resent any ~ound comrnrmder indicating any possihle employment of air. 'T'here is no question but that after the war there will be a sepnrate air force, and 1myone who hucks this "Villi. have his head cut off. 1 Jev!'\r will air forces be S'1bordinated to - g.r-ound conrnand. Un:::.ty of command, in my opinion, is lost -"orever. It is a i:;reat mistnke., 'T'hfll British bwe tl'lught us that bPd lesson. r could write for hours on the lack of cooperation by the Royal Navy in support of my ~ound efforts since Royal 1-Tavy forces in the Mediterranean came under Adm:iral ,Tohn CunninP,ham. His cousin coop1'ra.ted, but this man has stood on his poop deck end rl'lf'rained from ever doing anythinrt, th~t wns not accordinr; to the .best interests of the ~ravy. I hav• asked for n.aval gunfir;(, support on my west coast. It has been r~fused re~atedly, yet the Eighth Armv has it all the t:i.me." , * * * TRAV8RSA--OCTOBER 10, 1944--After the norning confer~nce, ~nerPl Clark decorn.ted ~;l~.jor Kendall, of the G-3 Planning Section, with the Bronze Star. r.1a,jor Kendall is return:i.ng to the Stl.3.tes for a new P.ssignment. Gi•meral Clar'k :<ilso bade g;oodbye to P.r:i.gadier Stayner, Chief of the Brjtish Incr~iment, who is being transferred to the Ei1:;hth Army. Lt. Gen. Clark, Brij;ish, Chil.'Jf Administrative Officer of 1\FHQ, ar:r:i.ved at 0930 and conferred with Genern1 Clark. 'i'oday G1•meral Clark moved his cormnand post to Traversa_ in the heert of the Apennines. (}l"neral Clari- srent the night 1:1t the Hotel Anglo-Americnn with Colonel Saltzman. 'T'he summery of battle progress for the week endini.; October 10th is ns fol- ct_~ tr~-' lows: -...... &i,\.~•·w,, 11 'i'he d1·ive continued r'luring the week against very d~~rm:inl.'!d t"!nemy resi~tance and hrmdicapped by unfavorable 1venther e0nditions, but_at the close our most adwmced elements were f'j ghting in the vicinity of J,<vergn~ astride H:rghway #65 less than fifteen miles from Bologna. 13 ~ . s s u m e d responsibility for the zone on the rip;ht of II Corps borderlng the Firenzuola-Imola. road, .<md :<irmored elements were assisting the main effort by pushing north on the left of Tr Corps. Re!Y,roupin~ of IV Corps units was completed and attack launched in the coastal sector. * * * TRAVERSA-... CCTOBER 11, 1944-.. r..enernl Clark arrived flt his new command post at 1230 and spent +,h~ nfternoon in his van. In the evening he din~d with the rei:sul:-i.r memb..,rs of his mess. �TRA"IJ'TI:RSA--0C'T'0BER 12, 1944--General Clark drove to Loia.no and enroute picked up General Keyes. The Army Commander and General Keyes <lrove to an OP north of Loiano where they could obtain a fine view of terrain f~atures. Artillery and fighter bomber missions could be observed. Gener1-1l Clark made special reference to Mount 'xrtmde to the northeast, which is the last importrmt high terrain feature before the Fo Valley. Generals Clark and Keyes then drove on through Loiano to a point on Route 65 just south of Sabbioni wher"' th~y could observe 11ount Rumici and r1ount Castellari on which the troops of the Qlst Division were fighting. Generals Clark and Keyes observed a heavy bomber missi on (npproxirnr-t~ly 200 B-17' s) flying townrds ob,jl"lctives in the Bologna area a.nd although they could not see the targets, they could hear bombs explode and observe clouds of smoke in the distance. General Clark then returned to his oommand post for lunch. Major General Peterson, Inspector Genl'!r~l, l'fo.r DepPrtment; Brigadier General Clarkson, In~ctor General of NATOUSA; fi'ajor General Sdwards, Deputy to General Eaker; Lt. Col. Van Zsso, Inspector General I s 0f'fice, War Deprirtment, arrived for lunch. Aft.•n" lunch Genernl CU"Jrk, with General leterson in his jeep, and Genernls Edwards, Clnrkson and Col. Van Esso follov,,in((, drove over the sa.me road t,hn.t General Ch.rk hnd passed this morning. Genernl Clark pointed out to General Peterson and oth"r of'ficers key terrrlin features. There was a great deal of air Activity, heavy and fighter bombers, ltl1 afternoon. General ClRrk and party returned to the Fifth Army c0mm<:i.nd rost where General Cl.,rk entertained the perty in his conferenee hut e. few minutes br,fore they took off by car for Florence. * * ~R~~r:;;nsA-~OO~OBER 13, 1944--General Cl~rk spent the entire day in his VRn today. At 1730 the Army Commander met with 1,lajor Neville, ed:i:tor of the Stars and Stripes and four reporters in hi"! conf ere nee hut and presented to J\'fajor Neville the Fifth Army Plaque and Clasp. General Brann came for dinner. Brann played cards. * After dinner, Generals Clark, Gruenther and * * ~B.AVSRSA--0C~0BER 11~, lQ4/¥- After the 0830 conference General Clark saw Major Brant of the 8th ;;;;vacuation Hospital, an ear, nose and throat specialist. 0 Maj. Gen. Royce, Air Corps with 6th Army Group; Maj. Gen. Walsh, with the American Air Force j_n Russia; and General Chidlavr, of the XII Fighter Commrind, came for lunch vrith G-,neral Clark. Before lunch General Clark oriented the Genera.ls on the Fifth Army sitmtion. Generals Royce and '1 1Jalsh left directly after lunch for Florence. At 1700 Genera.1 Clark held a conference with General Kirkman, 13 Corps Commander; General Keyes, IT Corps CoMnander; Lt. Col. Freston, G-1 of 78th Division; Lt. Col. Beggs, G-3 of 88th Division; Col. Willems, Chief of Staff of 1 �II Corps; Col. Porter, Derut:v Ch:ief of Staff of II Co?T, s; G1'nernl Gruenther and General Brann. A.fter the conf'"'r1mce General Clrci.rk served tea in the con .. ference hut to his F;tiests. Following are minutes of the conference mentioned above: nGeneral Howar(l gave th~ enemy dispositions opposite the most 11ctive sector of the Fifth Army front, and said that enemy infantry in this area were estimated as totaling 72 battalions with 16,200 men. "The Army Commander said that the Germans had been massing their troops to meet the main Fifth Army drive, which has now rrogressed for 50 of the 60 miles \ from FLORENCE to BOLOGNA. l 11 He said that at the present time the Fifth Army contains 133,000 U., s. troops and 152,000 British troops; thRt the II Corps has been making the main Fifth Army effort; thAt in the current offensive, which has been going on for more than a month, u. S. troops have sustain!'!d 13,082 bnttle crsualties in the four TT. S. infantry divisions \mich are available and A.11 engaged, while British troops hav" susto.ined 2,451 battle cas1»1lties in the same period; toot the four American divisions in the period ha:ve taken '7,087 prison~rs, while the British and South l.frican troops have captureo 596 prisoners. Be sl'l.id tha.t ther("l had been and coulii be no let-up in the attack which has been going on day and night. It has boien possible to attack without pause due to replacements which have been ava.ilable to the A?1'ler:tcan di visions up to the present tj me. The 9Upply of replacements >'rill run out on 15 October. From then on it is esti-mated that losses in the four u. S .. divis:i.ons will occur at a rate of 500 infan• trymen, net, per day. No more repl.eicements are expected for arproximately twenty days, which means that 10,000 infantry losses in twenty days ere Pnticipated. "The Germans have been engaged in sideslippinF; their divlsions from ot,her\ . ) parts of the front to meet our main attack~ "There has been little advance in the 13 Corps sector, vrhere admittedly the terrain was difficult. Sim:1.18.rly, we have made little advimce in the vicinity of LJVF.RGNANO. "General Clrci.rk said that General Alexander had assigned the 78th British Division to the Fifth Arrrry, saying thrt it must fight in an all.,.out attack and not be merely leaned up against the enemy; however, the Army ComM<'!nder thinks it better not to mix a British division with the TT. s. divisions in the u. S. sector, but to leave the 7~th Division with the 13 Corps f'or use in the latter's sector. · "Troops of the 1st Armored Division have been given a sector in the line to be occupj.ed by :its infantry. Most elements of the 34th Division 8re now coming out of the line, to return in a few· days to the attrcick. At that time an attack will be made in the TT. S. sector with five TJ. s. diitisions abreast, disposed as follows from west to east: elements of the 1st Armored Divisj on; 91st Division; 34th Division (two combat teams); 85th Div-:i.sion; and the 88th Division. "The Army Cor1mander said he did not believe thnt the 13 Corps would be a.ble to make a. breakthrough to the northeast and thP.t even if this were possible such �a.n operation could not be supported, in his op:i.nion.. Accordingly, he d:irected a new boundary between the 13 Corps and II Corps, and directed thRt the 1st British Division be moved northwest toward the 7~h Division sector. 11 '1'he four TJ. S. infantry divisions will oontinue their attack horth as long as they ar~ able. Meanwhile, the 13 Corps will conduct operations to provide a strong defensive flank. A critical and current objective in these operations would be the taking of M. SPADURO. 'rhe 13 Gorps should take over GESSO; it should make its ma.in effort on its extreme left next to the II Gorps, which will make th~ main Fifth Army effort. "The .Army Commander invited C'zen"'ral Kirkman to state his reactions and to bring up any dif'ficulties he foresaw. General Kirkman said he saw none, but mentioned thnt in sideslipping divisions to the northwest it is difficult to move mules except by taking them on roads to the rear and then doubling back to the front. General Clark said that the G-ermans had accomplished the same thing, and that means should be found for overcoming this difficulty. "General Kirbnan agr~ed that the Army Commander I s plan was the best one availt.1.ble. "General Keyes made no comment. 11 * * TRAVP':RSA-...QCTORER 15, 1944--The General nttended the usual oonference at 0830 tld s morning and. at 1030 bade farewell to four WACS of the Fifth Army WAG. T'latoon who "'.re leaving for home, two on rotation and two on temporary duty. At noon the Maharajah of 1 atiala a..rrivfld with his ADC, 8nd a fsU.t:trd of honor was held. At 1230 Alexander Kirk, Ambassa.dor to Itnly; a.nd 1\/fr. Cnrmel Of fie, American J'olitical Arlvisor to AJi'HQ; Mr. Horn, Ass:istrnt to Ambassador Kirk, arr1ved, and n 1;Uard of honor was held. Gen"ral Clark briefed the rnharaja.h, Ambassador ¥irk and other gu~sts on the Fifth Army situntion. General Clark exr11'1ined to the 1 hhara,jah his satisfaction with the splendid performance of the IndJan troops under his command. The Mnharajah presented General Clark ,v:5 th a letter from General Auchinleck, Comrnander-in-Gh1.ef :in Indfa, which General Clark read aloud to the assembled ~ests. Genl!lral Cl. rk entertained the Maharajah, his aide, Messrs. Kirk, Offie, Horn and Brigadier Divers for lunch in his mess hut. The guests left directly after lunch. 0 r General Clark WA.S still having trouble with his throat And retired to his van where he spent a quiet e,1ening. He, however, held a. movie for his staff office:rs in his conference hut., General Alexander today radioed General Eisenhower as follows regarding the replacement situ~tion: RN 942., 11 I know you rer:dise and apprecirite what we have done And rire doing here to keep German divisions from being transferred to the western front, but the time h11s now arriv""d when my armies will not be able to oontinue the o+>fensive much longer. 'T'his is mostly due to the fact that all di visions are very �tired and completely lack rresh replacements. Esrecially is tl is the case with Americ n Fifth Army. I have done everything through officin] cknnels to get r,aplacements, bu.t I hA.ve not succeeded. !vi'y :last chrince is to appeal to you personally. Anytl--iine you can do to help Clark will 1)e to our mutual ndw.mtage. Lemnitzer has left today by air for General Devers' Headquarters with full details of Chrk I s requirements." General Clark today dictated the following random notes for :inclusion in his dfary: "Further ..2.U..!!"&.le c~ents: l't,r efforts to br:i ng to th!" o ttenti on of the Har Dep~rtment my replacement situ.0 tion appirently w"'re futile. I am positive trnt Devers never properly represented my case to General Eisenhower. I am continuin~ to attack with ny four U. s. in+~~mtr:r divisions. They have had over 13,000 battle casualtie~ jn approximately one month. They hnve attacked every day. My only alternative is to discontinue the attack and remf' in in tl•e Apennine r·ountni.ns for the winter. Sue], a. solution is entirely unsatisfactory to me. Besides, my directive sends me to Bologna. Germ~n r~inforcenents ~rom tre Ei~hth Army front continu" to nood i..n front of my II Corps. Eighth Army does !lnthin~ to stop :it. Whl"rea.s the British strength i.n the Fifth Army is 152,000, as nga.inst TT. S. strength of 133,000, their b:"ttl~ casua.lties Wt"re 2,451 as against TT. S. casualties of 13,032 for the period 10 September to 13 October. Tlurin~ this s~,me period the TT. s. troops ~.ptured 7,og7 pr:isont'!rs, ns rgninst British rrison~rs a:r.iounting to 5, q86. ,.,,hese _figures indicate who is doi.nft the fighting. With tJ"1e present <le~ee of resistance the II Corps is encountering and with no repl~cements :wailabl~ "or nr:rroxirntely 20 days, the outlook i.s for me to lose at the rate of 500 per day a~ proximately 10,000 more infantry out of these four divisio'<s. J am faced with the necessity of r-lmost destroyi.n1-7, the future usefulness of four infantry divisions. "There was n. solution wrich T r.resentec1 to General Devers in the following radiograms: 8839, dated 6 October 1944: 'Infantry rerlrcement situA.tion in Fifth Army is so critically serious th~t current o~r~tion may b~ end?ngered. Supply of jnfantry replr>cen~nts rmd infant.•7 overstrength fo divisions only sufficient to maintain rlivisions nt T/0 streneth throuf'sh q or 10 October. Losses in iny four infantry divisions during pnst "ive days h .ve riverai:r,ed SSO per day over and above returns to units. Heavy fighting continues with enemy aprrrently rusld.nr, all avPilable forces to r1 a1t our advanc~ on BOLOG1-TA. W:ithout nddi tional r~placements ~ nf'antry strenf{'.:;h of the f'our i. nfnntry di vis .i.ons will be redu~ed by approxj"'ri.t!"!ly 5,000 +"or ePch ten drys o.r fighting after 10 October. Inf'antry rifle ccrr~pan.ies will there'~:, be reduced so c;eriously as to create an extreme operationnl handicap. All di visions lave b"en engnged in heavy f'ightin~ 23 to 2t, days un1ler adverse we,ither conditions. Continuous supply of infantry replrcements js imp rative. This siturtion has already been presented orally to your 1,eadquarters. T urgently request th,,t it be brougrt to the immed fa.te :i.ttention of War DeJ)<.,rtl'lent as f" IT' tter o+> opern.tional emeri:;ency. 1 11 'lN' 11 R',T 8937, dat~d 9 October 1944: 1Sripnent schedule infantry rey,lr--cements contained j_n VA'T'C'tTSA F35i¼S provides rel1ef early ro•,ember hut v•ill not alleviate criticA.l sPorta~~ j n :present vital battle r·o,.. '1ologna. 1.'.::::ti r,['t~ PJY four infantry Givisions will be 1own to assir,ned 'T'/0 str~nr.rth by October 14 and �\ I '7 that infantry srorta~e b:r rovemb"'r L:;t will 1)e ~,ooo. I urgently reco:rrrnend thnt ~ ~T0TTSA shipm .nts no•¥ scheduled for 3e·rn-rith Arny be r~lt'!nsed +.o FiftlA:rmy iMmediPtely. If these <1hipml'!nts htc1ve Plready 1-iMYJ. m"'l.de, J r.:tron~ly urge trat you procur~ 3,000 infantry r~rla.cerP-nts from SITAEF and ship them by air or f'ast wnter t.rRnsrortation to ...,iftt Army at r.prljest possi l" date. 1 11 Genernl 11 :1.'I Devers rir;plied as follows: FJ554/+, cleta,d 7 October 1944. 1Conffrn:inP, conVl"!rsation :vi t}, Colonel '\7erner today the following is sumnary of' ':7ar I:eJ)flrtnl"nt 1 s r ply to our teletype insistenc"' thrit Octo"J""r E>'1d "o'J"!mber i.nf'antry replrceT'!ents '.JJ shipped to us. "Decision t0 sMr no ;nfan.L,r;-, rt'lplr: ceronts g inst your Octob~r and 'Tovemher req11isitions ms h sed on rollowinCI' fnctors: (a) 11,000 v Jr"tren,crth in infantry rHvisions whlcr must e a sor :ied 1r,1c not r"!f l"";~ec1 • U~) ,.::.,000 general a:=;siP;nment enlisted m~n on }'Pnn in the tJ,ea:tor including 21 ,000 inf~mtry. Thes" figures RS of 1 Sept JTihe:·. CP sual ty roports do not ~ 1dicnte l.'1.i'G~ lo::;ses tc t,1,,.., tr'"'!f'..te1· since th ,n. ...rippinE; for r r,J.acements is not avai 1P 1Jle to now, any larf~e nu.ql1"!r to "JATO prior to 1 ~·ovemb~r. Fron your uessnge it is E1ssum.-ii t11P~, f'ftl'.lr that tir-" ETO will supply Sewmth Army a.YJ.cl VTill :"'nrtuisition r .plncements t:,~r~for. Alti10U~'1 v e do not accept tie di>ta presented in your "'\TIC as justification "or CC'ntj nuinr, r.-rlrcernent requirements e ar" s .ippinr, lv,000 infantr;r ri,:r lacemen ts on UG.:3 58 on bnsis of o~rational ,.mergency .- W:m t <lesti.n.ntion do you 1leair,; "or tr ece L~,000? Flease ans11er now. Request you su mit y cr>blf'OJ de~!'liled jnst~"icr-tion on which v1 can plan your continuinp_: replacel"i"mt requir~r ents . 11 1 t11Your gg39 of <i Octoher rersonPl to Devers \ as repeated ver ·atiJ'l to Vfo:r D ·F" rtment )Y teletyr,-l"l . 11 ' ''R?{ FJ5845, datr?d S October 1°44. '.Su•,sequ"'!nt to our FJ5'544 to you, reference repbcements, WF!r Dep['rtment hvs reconsider"'r1 tinr chinged its decision. 11le have cable t},is norning parP.phrA.s"cl ris "o llows: "Regardinf; the acditiom,.l sl-iipm•nts of -lnf'nntry rfl'Jsulting from coni>~rl'lnce o,.. n October, shipments will je wde as follows: '!'he l+,000 rerlf'lcenents cor1mitted jn tr at conference are cnncelll'ld. In t~ t"!jr stead ''le nre rihipping during October '5,300 as f'ollows: UGS 57, 1, '300; trGF 16, ?,?00; 'C'GS 5g, 1,800. ,,SOO of t>1ese s:rould arr'i ve on or before 2 iTovenber. le cr-i n furnj sh 7, 500 infnntry in addition to the 5,300 departing in Octobt')r, the 7,300 to arrive in tl eater durin~ last t~n days of Nover·ber, provided sh ipnent of equipment n.nri supplies can he c'efl'lrrl'\<l by you to m,'Jke q}lippim; ~r-ce :w'1.ilnbl~ for tr;e '7,500 replac!"!m,.,nts. If the .-dditionl"l 7,500 are n"eder' i:tive us c1estinations ilesi"t-"'Jd and numbers to h~ -:;~mt to e~ch. i'le are ~nr'envoring ~t once to obttiln "rom '":MO a f·ty-m dt'te <is to when they wi.11 take ov"":r r"'nronsibiljty for replacements to the Seventh Army''. 11 'We a.r" havinr; ?nd '"'.IX C(mf'er"'nce "Vi th 1 frir D'°'~rtr·ent oq1 SJOA and clnd fy the situation "urther, but t'1e sh i.pmt':lnts now rror.ise1l rri.<i terinlJ.y improve the picture.' 11 R'l'{ :Xl7/i,C/O', dated 10 Octohi•·r 19//+. 'Fully apprecfr•te situ~tion v;i th rerp-,ct 1·~rlncements 3flwmth Army is worse -tr an trnt oonfr0nt;ng Fifth Arny 9' nee Seventr Army's divisions arl" o.Jready we11 b~low T/o str~mi;th. Jn vie v of Co,,,,,h'ned Chi-.,fs ot' Staff priority to DRN'i'O'T Oper;;.tion, I c,o not �feel justi fi"'d in r"lel'ts; nf; to you the shipments set up for Seventh Army. However, I am asking ETOUSA vrheth"'r it is ready to tflke over ~t tbis time the replacement support of the Seventh Army -instead of rs of' l.Yovember 1944. If' it is ~,bl~ to do so, T will thl'ln cancel all f'urther shipments to Sewmth ~rmy frorn 1lAT(Y(TSA nfter the D /, 60 convoy except for R'T'U 1 s. 1 11 Tnstead of carrying the ball with force to Eisenhower rind representing my picture, Gi,neral D~vers has misrepresent"'ld the facts, in my opinion. The only solution wr:s to give me the two or three thous11nri r~lacements in Itnly which he hnd eRrmarked for th" Seventh Army, calling upon F,fa enho,yer to furnish Seventh Army rephcements. Without doubt they are PVnilable in the UK or F-r>ance. I ha.ve likewise reported triis situation to th,, Inspector Gen~rr,1, Gen~:ral Peterson, when he visited rere. I indicnt"'d it in a letter to General Vo.rshall, but he WP..S trnvellini?.; in France, and I have no wny of knowing if he i:; aware of trie si twtion. I t:>Jll "I have telephoned to General Alexaro er today to give him the si tuntion. confirming it 1n another ra.cliogram which is quoted below: 11 'R.~J 9002, d;q.ted 15 October J.Q44. 'Confirming m;r conversation with you tM s mornini:;, I consider it is important thnt you renliz "l situation in Fifth Army concerning infnntry r~placement shorta~e.. My four jnfantry divisions were reduced to sHghtly below strenc,th in .;nfantry on 13 October. Approxima.tely 500 usable infantry repl<"cements expected within next three dRys. Shipment of 2200 sched:uhd tn arrive Naples f'rom States on 28 October with 1300 mor" on I+ TITovember. B"liev-e October 28 F.troup can be pla.ced in line tibout 2 Povember. By thP.t date I estimatP my four d-ivisions will be short 8,000 infantrymen which means shortage of' 75 men per rifl~ company. This r~duced strength during critical period facing Fiftb Army rtlll seriously lm1er the operational ef'ficirmcy of my divisions. '<.:ven when ? ,200 r~placements arr:i ve :i.n errly November thl!':y will have,. ;to be absorbed by divisions which a.re al ... ready well diluted by new men. l'or exnmple, 91st Divi<Jion hc~s received 1,200 replacem,mts 13jnce Septemh,r 13, bulk of which have gone to infantry rif'le companies. "'In :ny rnessR.ge 8937, dated 9 October, to Genera.I Dever':!, I ureemtly ~ r!'lcommend\"1d thl'lt sh5.pments of" rl"lpla.cements from Naples for Seventh Army b-., diverted to Fi f'th Army but my requinst W?S not favornbly considered. I feel that if nenernl r.:isenhower ret'tlized the urg,mcy of tr is lTl,"1 tter and the influence it may have on M.s battle he might be able to furnish iffi1'1edi.Ptf':ly the 3,000 infantry replacements which I re'luested in my 8937 from SllAEF sources., I recommend thnt you present such a request to him. t nr have also intima.ted to Alexander that I am oontinuing the !'ttrick but. thnt if he pllllrm1ts W.ighth Army to sit on its tail with at least f'our British divisions out in reserv~ not attacking, I Jl18.y be u!1'ei.ble to go on. I told h:i.m he must require 1action by the !i~i1;hth Army which will keep the ;?f\th and 20th German Panzer Divisions on F.:ighth Army front. If they too come in against my II Gorps, I will probably be st,0pred. V "Yesterday I sent for Kirkmnn, Keyes rmd representatives of the 78th and Inasmuch as :Kirkman' s Corps has contributed rracM ca.lly nothing offensively to my battle and :in spite of my repeated screams -f'or at- 88th Divisions. �tack without ::mccess, J h,,ve dl"cided to utlliz,.. B Corps almost in a deflllnRive role, l;I'ttdually tnking over :mo holdin~ key terrtln features wrich the Americnn troops ce.ptur"", i.n order thr,t I cnn r:n ss tr·.- Arri"'1"ictm troops who will fight f'or the clecisive hlo~7 on a narrow front. I minced no words r>t this conference. I E;ave them the er sualty and prisoner -rigures and my rep]p cement situation as indic.'l.ted above. .,. told thrim tht'!y hnd to get into the battle in a more effecti1re wny. It is ahsolutel3r nppallinP,, anr1 only one crin know the situation who comm.ands British troops, thRt they wilJ. not att!'!ck ngf{I'essively and in ~-n ru.1-out manner, nor will th"'Y take the cr>sunlties. It is thf.l snme old manpower proposition and brittle weariness thnt n:f'fects thn entire -l"ighting m chine of the "3ritish F,mpjre. "After having tl'l.ken the Li vergtino escarnment feature, which w'4c s rui extremely touish nut to crt1.ck, the Formiche feature and the 578 Hill Mass, I have three more important terrain features to takl'!; namely, /')55, 62'2 ana Mount Grande. I htive recirled to ooncentrate on thest"! nne rit a time - put all my fi~hter bomber support on ,.,22 tomorro Y-, mass ,:ill tl-1e nrtilJ ery, ~ploy all the infantry 1vhich I ce.n rossibly brim{ to beP....r on it rind over rhelm and hold th~t feature. J will then next divert my nttention to Grttnd"'• W~th reference to air, I SJ!l p,ettini:; fine cooperation f'rom Ger."'lr['l Ch:idlnw. In -l'act, Ira El'l.k!"!r ,ma Cannon came in effectively to support me with th!"! Tcctic 1 and Strs.tegic Air Forces. I sent CFtnnon a mesSc'lge of appreci..-'"' tion wh i.ch is quoted below: "RN t.,297, dated 11 Oc+.ober 1944. 'Desire to express to you my appreciation of splendid air support of our operations yesterday. }le~se convey my thanks to General Enker 1 • "As an item to indicrttl'! furth"'!r lP ck of understan<ling of tl>f, Itllli.il'ln C11m•) pai~, all brou~ht n.bout, in my opinion, by Gen..,ral Devers' misrepresentP.tion of our picture, every gun of my heavy artill~ry is bein~ tAken away on the 17th to 1;0 to France." * * TRA'RRSA--OCTOBF.R lt>, 1944--FolJ.owing the 08'30 con-rerence, the General srent most of the morning :i.n hi.A vnn working on tidministrri.tive rm t.:ters. GenAra.l Alexander n.rrived ~t 1?15 "'ml conferred wit.h G~nerals Cl:eirk and Gruenther, a.ftl'!r wh:i.ch Grmeral Clr->rk entl'!rtrdn"d Gener"'l Alex:1.nder, Tiajor Grh1sley, his ide, for l1mch. Grm.,.rnl AlexFtnc~r J.t,,-f't <'11r,.Jctly nfter lu11ch. At 1710 ('~nernl Goodmnn of r-r;rBARK ,ma (l.enernl rrrite, with Colonl"!l l,lcCrnry, SOS N'A'1'0TTSA, called to see General Clr-rk. General Cl ..,rk hriefed Genernl Goodman on the current Fifth Army situ.,,tion aril ,xplained his greri.t sntisfaction in the wey the supply o-r his nrrny h"'S been handled. Colonel f'c hhon was the G,.neral 's JsU1'St -ror dinner t}, is evening. Gt'!nernl Clark tonif.:rht dictated the followinP, randoM notes for inclusion in his dj ary: �TIWe have indications tht!.t, the 2tSth Panzer Division is coming over from Eighth Army front. Already one regiment f'rom the 2Qth Prnzer Grenl'!.dier Division a.s com"' -l"rom tre ~; grth Army front to our front. It is perfectly disgraceful - tre im cti vi ty of ti'" T•:ighth Army. There is no will to -l"ight indice.ted. Over the phone yesterday I trl<l AleX23nder tl l"t 1 c id not understand how }1e could k4'ep four infantry divisions and one R.rr11ored division :in rest'!rve behind tr·e Eighth Army rt l'l critical time Hke this when the Fifth Army is fip;hting witr evl'lry m~m. Fis Fmswers were evt'lsiv~ but to tre effect that } e would job Mccreery. He did, t'lnd McCrMry rhoned m"', but th"'r"' was nothin~ I could say to r~ccreery. The l oles are to attrick on t'he left fll'lnk of Eigrth Army. I requested tha.t they SP'ed up t},eir attack, even if to the extent of makin:::; daylight movements in order to n.ttrnct tl--e 2!Stb Frmzer Division to it. There is no question in my mind but tliA.t 'Sj ghth Army and AAI as well will do "'verythinf; i.n their poY1er to bring 21':,tr h•nzer Division nnd 29th Panzer Division to my rront in order to give l<~ 1F;htl Arr,i.: tr e oprortunity to advance. If Finyone is to advJ1.nce into tr.e Fo ~hlley, th y much pre.f'er that) t11e Brjtisr Eiehth Army gi,t the cr~dit, ratr er thr-m the Fifth Army. 11 AleX!!.nder is coming to see me t noon, and lth1ugh I can indict3te ny disnppo:i.ntnent on the bck of activity by t}'e Eighth Arrri,y, T g~t nowhere. Vle are caught in the British Empir~ macJ,in/0!, ~nd to try to speed t''em ur rroduces no results. 0 11 ! sent r:tnotr1'r rl'l.diogr~m to Alemnder on r"'rl~cements, anrl le has ~ppi,a.led to ,isen 0"'1er. It is too lr:,te, for wl en t},ey sPipred t}ie last r~rJFcements out or Ttaly !>or France 1•1e missed tre boat. It is anott1er indiCllltion of AFHQ failing to back up the Fifth Army in its most critical situation in the Apennine Vountains. I run even nov1 confronted with curtA.iling n.rtillery runrnmition,) lO"i Fow·tz""r, bt">ca.use of lnck of credi.ts be~n~ ,..urnish1'd Fifth Arrny "or the next mont~ or two. "I m g'l"!'!atly disn.ppoi.nted in the 34th Division. The attPck of tre 135th on Monterumici is evidence ~f th~ir l~ck or will to slug it out as the new d5.visions ~r" do:i.ng. Gener~l Bo1te is a. surerior leader, but he h s inr erited a dise::-sed division; diseRsed bee, uc1e of the F'lmpering General Ryder gave it. I did not know this, nltl ou~,- I Wl'I.S soT:lewhn.t suspicious o:' it at tJ,e time Ryder left. "'here nre m:'\ny old m~n in the 34th Division who '.M.ve een witr it overse~s f'or t,.,o "l.nd a. half years. They ar~ h ttle-wise and btt+,le-weary. Tris \ is the di vision vrhich ras lonr' clamored to e sent :bome. T} e,y do not undersfarnd w y trr.v should be required to -<'ight one battlt'I after ~nether. Their small unit lenders ar""l poor, and it is a TM.jor tPsk -l"or P Division Co~nander and one or two ~ood leaders to crange tr e wl ole division. New men entering Vt'°! diYision as replncernl"!nts jmmedi~tely succumb to tris disease. I would relieVI"! hnr ~rt f'rom t1 e com>nl"l1<1 of the 135t}I Inr-l'!ntr:r except tJ,-,..,t I have no one to tnke his pltice. Fe r1i.s fn_iled miserably .in his l'!ttack on Mont"'rumici. I h.~ve evidence tbnt the 168th li'k-.ewise } tis no zip. The bt-st regiment in t• e division is tr~ 133rd, i:1nd this i ci onl:, 1 ecause Colonel r11un, wro is ,. nritural born leaoer, ras een put in command. As soon a.s this battle is over, I must take steps to clean rouse in thnt outfit,. 11 * * �TRAVF:RSA--OCT0ilr.R 17, lq44,--Tre Gen"ral ru:in is usunl 0810 conference-and at 1)00 went tvith his personal pl'ysician, r~~jor rA.nt, to the 8th Ev~cu~tion Fosrital flor X-r~ys of his ~rest, throat and teeth - a.11 of wl'ich \Vere nega- tiv~. TJ:,e Arm.r Cornti.nder spent t],e rest of the day in liis van and had Major rP.nt as' is dinn~r rruest in the evening. A suml"l1'l"Y of t} e battle progress for the week ending October 17, 1944, ollowa: is as Continued ~ains W(!lre made, alt',ough every effort to f!dv~nce w,i,s i--.itterly cont"'ste bv } eavr concentr, tion of en~m'V -i-orces. Rel L-f's And regrouping of cert in units wrs carried out by II Corp~ and 13 Corf'9• In Ii/ Corps sector enemy contact was maintain~d bv active pa.trolling and surre a.dvt>nce was achieved townr s "assP and Castel Uuovo. Gener11l Cbrk dictated the following materia.l for inclusion in ris diery: "Tl· e ?9ti Div·ision is ::i.11 coming to our froat. Eighth Armv could not hold it. '1e received a severe counter-~ttl"ck frori it in the Belmonte Pren \ toda v w' ere- tl " le!!ni 111 batt, lion of t1 e "!..1'3rd In.f'aT1tr~r had advanced to l;11st night. Our position wns held in spite of t e cou.--It.er-nttr:1ck. He r:. y be able to get through wi tr ·',' ,.dd"'d ?9tr Division, h1~ 'i ~ is touc'1 and go. General Fowl'!rcl ht:1s just rhoned i"e thr,t it looks as thougl 90 Ligr t is coming over from tl ~ Ei~r,th Ar11v fror+. TM_q is about more than we cPn htrndle. Our "Y" servj ce rns :ind::crted t· "' lead' n~ at talion fa now l".lnroute and will go into the Grande n.r~n. W attack th•t tomorrow. I o.m nf'raid tl is indicates thttt ·+) .- r.-at o~ the division will come. This see:,s more thm we can stanil.. "Eightr Army is not attncking, nnd, although trey are mE>king a feeble effort wit11 the Polis} Corps wl ich was scr"'dul"'d for attack tonight artd which I rad reperitedl,r urged be made l'lt nn earlier dnt", T receiv~u inc1icPtions f:rom General Gru"nth~r, a./"'ter his talk 'Vith General Farding, that the Folish Corrs was ~oing to again postpone its attack. This is outrageous and again indicl'.'ltes to me that Ei.grtr Army And AAI are perfectly willing to 'have tie additional German divisions come my vray in ordt",r to permit Eighth Army to ~Ake an adv~nce nt my expense. 0 "I telephoned to Gen!"!ral Alexander and told 1-iiin I understood t},ere was a dela:r in the folish Corps attack. re told me probablr there vwuld e bec~use it vrns r _inin~ over tr ere. : told rim it i ad een r11ining l'ere for a month, yet we a.ttacked every de:r and ever~, nigl t nnd tl 1 at someL'Ody b1tj. to \ \ make a cfocision as to wr etrer l e wrrnted us to ~o on, and if so t},e Zi.ghth Army must attack. I received the usual apologetic r,.rlies - no satisfaction no action. He finall,v said, 10f course, if "OU think you had better stor the attack, ~'OU do so 1 • There is no guido.nce from above. He will not tell the Zighth Arny to attr- ck. He will not tell the roles, so it is up to ?"le to carry on as '!,est I ca.n. I told him I would not stop, but there is a limit to our endurance And it soon will be renched if 3ighth Arrey does not show some signs of tictivity. re told l"l" he would re-study tJ,,e s::tuation in the morning and get in touch witl-1 me. In the me"1.ntime, we v:ill conti"1ue to attack." ' ��TRAVERSA--OCTOPER 18, 1944--F'ollowing tre 08'30 conference, Gener 1 Clark was interviewed Ht O ?30 y lillia1'l King of AF and Jack Bell, rerres-,nting the i~inmj Herald, Akron p,..ncon-JourMl A.nd the Detroit Free Pres"'. G"!nertl ClPrk left b:r jeep at 1130 for II Corrs FeadqU!.lrters in the vie· nity of Piamaggio . At II Corps General Clark net Gener ls Ke·res, C nnon, L1'mnitzer and Chidlaw . General Keyes entertained Gener:-.1 Cl~rk a.nd the other ofric~rs for lunch . General Clark then drove to the 91st Division two mil~s sout, of Loia.no where he conferred with Gen,.,ra.l Lives~y. The Army Conr:iander then drove mrer terrible roads to the 34th Division in the vicinity of Quin,::ano where he conferred with General Bolte. From tl,e 34th Division General Clnrlr drove to t1"e 85th :)ivision in the vioinlt r of Gragimo, where he conferred with Gener 1 Coulter, Division Commander. The Arm,r CoIT.1mt1.nder decorat1'd Colonel O1Hughi,s, CoT"'llt nding Officer of' the 337th I11fantr.·•, with tr e Legion of Merit. He !'.lso deco:rc.ted Colonel nruss, Corr,r,1a.nding Offic'""r of the 752nd Tank Datta.lion, with the Legion of Merit. i\t this s1~ll ceremony Genernl Clnrk oon,ended the 85th Division for their magnificent ~ccompl1 shments in t eir difficult battle. The Armv CommRnder U 1l"!n returned by jeep to his cor.unn.>1cl post, arriving at 1800 hours . He dined dth the reguh.r members of his mes'3. General Clark today received the following cable frorr Gl'"neral Imtr~ , Drazi litm 1 inister of w~...r: "In a fl"!w d:i -rs I will he ag:rl.n in Br zj_l, trucing with me the pleasant memory of h~ving been in your company. I take thin opportunity to thank you for the many personal favors you have shown me ~nd the party which ac- companied me . " * * * TRA1TERSA- -CCTOBER 19, 1944-.-General Clark attended his regular 0830 conference this morning ~nd shortly thereafter , at 0930, R"'rresentative Bdith 7-Jourse Rogers , Congres'Jwoml'l.n from t!assachusetts, arrived w·ith CoM.rrander Mutter and Colonel Forsythe of the Surgeon's Office NATOUSA, Captain Whnrton, Fifth .4rmy Hurse Director , and General Martin, F:i.fth Army Surgeon. General Clark briefed Congresswoman Rog"rs :vho showed great interest in the Genernl I s difficulties in eetting repL~cemen:ts. She offered to do nnything she could to help. A decoration ceremony was held at General Clark ' s h"adquarters shortly thereafter at which General Clti1rk decorated the following members of his staff: The followin~ received the Legion of Merit: Lt. Col. Thomas A. Lane , Col. Kenneth P . Zitzma.n, T/Sgt . Glen L. Wilson, T/Sgt. John C. Hrunmond, WOJG Basil 1 . Bodge, Maj . Elmer N. Holmgreen, Col. Stanley Grogan; the following received the Air Medal: Capt. Michael J . Strok, Lt . Col. John T. Walker, 2nd Lt . Raymond H. Porter , 2nd Lt . c~.rl A. Bio,rgman, 2nd Lt . !alter A. Holle . Generl'll Aaron Bradshaw received the British CBE, tmd the Bronze Star was pinned on Captain Paul Savary and Cnrtain ,James F. Graha.m. �\2 3 The General spent the afternoon in his van. came for dinner . * * Genl",ra.ls Brann and Lewis * TRAVERSA--CCTOBBP.. 20, 1941~--Gener 1 Clnrk left his oomma.nd post at 0840 fer his cub strip in F:irenzuola where he left by L-5 for the 92nd Division three miles south of Viaregeio . It was a flight of a hnlf an hour, and a ftne clear dti.y which enabled. the Gen~ral to observe the Alps to the north, Corsica to the west and the coast of France to the northwest . At 0945 the General landed at the 92nd Division cub strip south of Viareggio r,here he was met by Generals Crittenr.ierger ~ntl Almond . GenerP.l CJ.Erk and party drove to the command post of the 92nd Division in Viareggio. A guard of honor was held for Generul ClP.rk, consisting of one company from the 370th Regiment . G-.n~ral Clro-k decorated the following with the Silver Star: Capt . Allen L. Johnson, 2nd Lt . Millard L. Sullivan and s/sgt. Charles J . Patterson. Colonel Sherman, Regimental ComJMrrler , was rresented with the Bronze Star as were also Ca.pt . Jesse E. Jarman, Jr ., 1st Lt . John W Log11.n, . T/Sgt ~ J:1-rion G. mans nnd T/sgt. Frnnk 1hisonnt . Major Lor'-"nze , G- 2 of the 92nd Division, and Major Mac'iillie, G- 1+ of the 92nd Division, were both promoted to the grade of Lt . Colonel. The General then spoke briefly to the officers and men, congratulating them on the:ir fine ecco:r1plishments and explnininr, briefly the big picture and the important part they were playing in it. After the ceremony, General Chrk gr"'eted General Fhscarenhtis anr1 members of his Brazilian staff, and together the part ;r were oriented on the current situation in the 92nd Division area by the Division G 3, '~jor Shepard . - General Clnxk then drove with Gener~l Almond to en OP in the vicinity of Pietra Santa . From the OP Gen,..,ral Clark could plnjnly obs"-'rve ~~ount Gau.a.la , the immedi<'te objective of the 370th Infantry, and to the northwest the city of Passa , which is still held by the enemy. From the OP General Clr-rk and party returnf'!tl to the 02nd Division Headquri.rters where General Almond entertained Generals Clark, I~ascarenhns , Crittenberger and :rrr.mbers of the 92nd Division staff for lunch . Genl"ra.l Clc-:trk spoke briefly at the luncheon p rty tellin'; how proud he was to hr,ve the 92nd Division in the Fifth Army and how for tu.rr1te the Division wns in hPving such a fi.ne leader as Gen"'ral Almond . After lunch General Clro-k bRde goodbye to General Almond and his staff and drove with Gen"rnl r.rascarenhas and. Gereral Crittenberger to the staging area of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, two miles northwest of Pisa , wh~re he wns isreeted by a. guard of honor . General ,la.scarenh.'ls introduced Generrl Clark to staff members of the t ro new regiments of the Ih'a.zilian Expe<litionary Force . General Cle.rk trooped the line , reviewin~ 11, 000 newly- arrived Brazilian troops . After trooping th!'? line , Gen"""r'al Clerk ,:iro•re ·'.n hi"' jeep past the troops agnin and wns greeted enthusiastically by Brazilians singing their r1!leimental sonis . General GlPrk, accompanjr>d by Generals '1ascarenha.s and Crit tenberger , drove to the Pisn airport where he took off in his 105 for the Florence airport to meet GernJral Eaker . Upon ro~rivin~ ~t the field, Generrl Clnrk rnt Congresswoman Rogers and �l2 Y her :rnrty who ,.,ere nbout to take off for Gnserta rfter Dn extended tour of the Fifth Army sector. Genernl Chrk br-ide goodhye to Congres"'"omnn Rogers and her p:l'lrty and then ioinJd General Eak"'r in his C-53 where he oonferred for three quarters of an hour . General Clr-rk b11de goon bye to r.reMral Eaker ~nd left in his L--5 for the Firenzuola cub strir, arrivlng at his oommrmd post at 1700 hours. The General dined r.i th thA regular members of h:i..s rre ss rind r~tired enrly to his van for the evening. General CL,,rk dictat~d the folloV'r.ine notes for inclusion in his dfary: "I hnd quite a frank b.lk vr.i th General Bak ,r today in his plPne at Florence. I told him that we h~.d received no backing from Devers, and described the replacernt"lnt sit~tion to him, which he lmew about. J wanted him to get this 1nform~tion back to the Str-.tes. He is returning for a few days' visit. "From information he brought rre, Generals White r-md S wbridge, wrile at \ Devers' P'eadqunrters, sent i.nformation fo Eisenhower •rl- ich made it a.ppe:eir as though our casualties had been entirely too hea ry here. In th-is oonnP,ction, see Devers rndio to me E' nd my reply to him, both of which ('re quotAd elo 1. One only has to see this country, ronlize the mission, the ferocity of the fighting and tre degree of enem:r resistt>nce to undersknd it cnn not be do11e \'lithout hen-vy loss~s. 11 "Following is Genernl t·evers radio of 19 Dctober "'nth rc:gm-d to rer ]✓.,-. cements: 'I have ·juc"t seen your rtlported dnily crsunlty list. Suggest you rest a division or rAgiments '\'dthin Ft division ns is being done here, as yot.r casualty rate will break dovm Pny replncAment system. Fnve stopped any replrcements coming to Fr~nce ns of' October 15 rnd ~m trying to s~cure ro~ SHAEF 3,000 replt>ce~ ,nts, to ~e ...lo·m to :rou 'y nir nurn:i.shed by AAI. Your rro lem is one of usin•"; .?vt1·:.lr1 le troops to best Ddvrntage 11n1~ is th~ sa..'T!c rro 1~m you hr,d lrist FebrU,~ry.' "General Clark repli •d ris follous: 1 Yom· rrrlio ooncerning rerlncements inrHcr>tes r lack o" nrr-recirtion of our tnctic~l sitmtion, the t.-errPin, enemy resistPnce .-.,nd my mission. •,nfortTu"V"tel. • .rou '-,-,v,... ,-wt bP.en t' ½le to visit th· s f'ront in ap1,:--otlmotcly two months. I h1we b~"'n keenly aware of my crisua.lty rate and I hn.ve taken every rossibl ✓ opportunity to rAst regiments within div:isions consist"'nJ., w.tth Lhe urgP-ncy of my m·:ssion. ,..,1· ✓ rotation of regiments within di visions end battalions within rE'lgfr. nts is L1.bltu~lly prec+,iced in Fifth Army. In spite of these measures my casu[lltfos have 1~l"'et1 11ir,h because we are engag~d in Rn all-out. effort to c'l.estroy Kesselr::.ng 1 s Arm:i es so th~t they can not apyier>r :igainst Genertil 'j;"'isenhowor. E1emy is rushing a.11 available r~inf'orcements to meet •:;_s nnd lock us in the mount~ins for the winter. We r-ust nttack 'Vith all possibl vigor and t..hnt is ex.."C~ly ..,mt l:,h~ Fi.-"th Army is aoing. Our success no -r hnngs i.n th" bcll'!.nce, i•nc: our r,rowing l:runntry shortr~~e m y prove the decisive hnndicap. General AlP-xame1' took up directly with General Eisenhower c reques-1~ f'or 3,000 replr>cements. Generel Eisenho"er hns not:if:i ed us th·1 t they nre avaiL-"lbl0, r>nd m-rn.ngcments "l'~ under ,wy to fly all or r:irt of them to this theater, balonce to cone by wrter. I regret that you d:i.d not SM ..-i..t to release to Fifth Army the Seventh Arrw repl~ cel'lents ; n �I,ATOUSA Depot as requested in ny radio 89,7, dated October o. m:id you done so ond arrnrw:ed for Seventh Army supply from SHAEF sources it would have saved r:iueh tiFJe and obviated necessity of shipring replncepcnts fr-om Ifoly to France n.nd shipment bnck of "n equivalent number to Itnly. 111 * TRAV::::P..SA--CCTOBER 21, 1944---The weathl'lr tod8y wns 1.'S follO\rn: clouds throughout the day nnn rains in the lc1.te afternoon. / * ~3cnttered Shortly a.fter his early Fiorntng <Xmference the Amy Commrin::ler left by jeep for Firenzuoln. where he met General 1 irkmAn, 13 Corps Commarrler, nnd Briga.dier Lambert, Brigadier Generr::l Staff of 13 Corps. Gener1=tl l(irkmnn join1'd Genert-1 CJ.nrk in his jeep, and together they drove to the '78th British Division Main Headqunrters in Castel del Rio. There, Lt. Col. Preston, Division G-1, met G<,r..P!rnls Clark, Kirkmr>n and Brigadier V1 Tiber-t rind oriented them brfofly on the Division's cm·rent situation, nfter which Generals C1r1rk, Kirl::man an.d Brigadi,•r La:r.1bert drovo to the 78th Di vision Advnnce Hl2 in the vicinity of San Apollinare. TMs Hea<iqu,.,rters servl'?s 7Hth Division both as a TAC Headquarters nnd a.s nn OP and is urrler enemy obsl'lrvrtion. 'i'l·ere, General Clark was grMt"'d '·)y Brignd1.er Arbuthnot, Acting GOC, 78th Division, who explained brfofly trl"J currP-nt situation. Brigadier Arbuthnot, Tith Gererals ClRrk, }'j.rkman and Brigadier L'lmbert, viewed tr. e terrain from the OP, and Brig- dier Arbuthnot pointed out their objectivo hill features of i.1onte Spaduro, r~onte Del Vero, '"onte Slntn. and Monte Penzola to the norther st. . The Brigadier also pointed out n fin, view of Ivlonte Grrurle to the north in the 88th Divi ion sector. Il Genernl Clnrk bade goot'l1)ye to General Kirkman, Brigadier l.r:.mbert nnd rigadier Arbuthnot nnd drove in his jeep to the 88th Division oorrunand post in the vicinity of Villa di Sasserono wher~ he was met by Brigadier Genernl Kendall, ActinP, Division CorrirnRn::ler of tho gs-th Division. Genernl Cl.n.rk n.nde a combat promotion to 1st Lt. Dr>vid L. m.lson of the 351st :Tnfantry, pronoting him to the grade of Captain. Mer:ibers of the Division staff mre present at the promotion ceremony, and General Clark sroke briefly to them, telling them the outstanding .., chievenents the R8th Division h,_-, ve accomy lished in the Battle of the Apennin~s. Genf'}rnl Cl.'.':rk lunched ,-,~th Genert'l Kerrlall and members of his staff. Gcn".lnJ. Kend~.11 told Gener. 1 Clnrk that he hnd lost nine battalion cormnand ers in recent operations - three killed, two wo1mcted, one captured and three in hospitals. After lunch, Gener, 1 Clqrk oonferred with Gen~rn.l Kerrlall in his vnn for half an hour, after "rhich they drove to the regimentA.l command post of the 340th Infantry in the vicinity of Monte <1rande. Colonel Crmvror ,, Comm".l.ndin.1 Officer, rP-viewed his current situation with General Clnrk n.nd pointed out to the General the dffficulties he! W8.s having, due to the shortage of personnel. Colonel Crawford stA.ted th.nt in recent operations h~ hnd lost between three and four hundred enlisted men and forty of'ficers, including his three battalion commanders. Officer A.nd HCO replacements were not avtiih•ble, nnd h~ was running dry of oi"ficer ond ~JCO leaders to promote to h:i.[11er grades. Gen ~r~l CJrrk assured him th..,t reph.cenents were forthcomine rmd err.ph11sized th.nt, where possible, Colonel �Crawford should appoint good rrco I s to commission~d grac'i.es. Gen er- 1 Cl.., rk, wlth Gen~ral Kendall, then <"rove to the 35oth Infantry rngimental corunend post, where General Clark pt•esented the DSC to Colonel }ry, Regimental Comm~nder, in the rresence of sever~l members of his staff. Gen~rn.l Clark spoke to Colonel lt'ry and ris staff, telling trmn of th~ !TI1'lgnificent job they had been do~ng and how fortut1t1te they ,.,ere to hnve such a fine lender as Colonel Fry. Genl'!r~l Clr,,rk, 1:i th Genr>ral Kt<!rr:1 nll, drove then to the 351st Infantry Regiment, now jn reserve. GenP.rr,l Clark conferred briefly with Colonel Chnmpeny, Regimental Cof'Jmander, a:-'ter which Gr:neral Clark bade gt)odbye to General Kendall and Colonel Chrmpeny and returned to his oornmand post by jeep over Route 6520, the 88th Division supply route. General Clark dined w~ th the regulnr members of his shortly thereafter. * l'1' ss and retired * TRAVERSA--OCT0BER 22, 1944--The weather tcxlny was as f'ollows: and fog all day. * Light rains Gen..,rfll ClEirk did not ettend the 0830 conference th is morning but conferred in his van with Gen~r:ils Gruenther, Brann tind Howard. !\.t 1000 hours the A:rmy Comr,nnder met with General ffr-cGruder, G-4 of !1A""0tTS.A, Genernl Gruenther and Gener:-il "'ate, Fifth Army G-4, in his oon·"erence hut. At 1100 hours General Clnrk left by j"'ep with Captnin '~n Dyke, South African Linison for Headquarters of the 6th South African Armored D:!vision in the vicinity of Castiglione, arr1vin~ Rt 1230 hours. General GL.,rk wns met by Genernl Poole, GOG of the Jivision; Colonel De,,e.lf, Conrn~nding Cor1bat Comnand D of' th~ 1st !lxmored Division, now 1-1tfoched to the 6th South African Armored Djvision a.nd on their left flrmk; c.nd Colonel Eaggs, G-1 of the Division. Colonel Dewey ask9d Grmerril Clnrk for some infnntr;,r help, and Generrl Cl:1r 1 : told him he would try to get him a battalion of infantry as soon as possible. Gener 1 ClPrk conferrl"ld for hrilf .,n hour w·tri Genl"rnl Poole in GeMr"ll Pool~ 1 s van. GenersJ. Poole then entertrd n"l<l Gen0rr-l Cl,.rk nnd Colonel Dewey for lunch at his headquarters. Just hefore lunch, Generr·l Clrr}- explained to G,1nernl Poole's staff tJ,e over-nll picture on the Fifth Arm:r f'ront, pointing_ out the important pArt the f1th South Africi:m Armored Di vision were plPying in the battle. Genernl Clark p:-esented G~ner~l roole with a p8ir of the new U. d. Army issue shoe packs. Due to the low clouds and drizzly rriin, Goner"'l Poole could not show General Cl.,rk the hill features over wli:tch the 6th South Armored were fighting which could be observed fror1 Genern.l Poole I s He.<idquRrters on a clenr day. During the discussions betv een General Cll'rk nnd Gen':lr?l Poole, General Poole recor.mended trf!t Brjgn_dicr Cljve, Commandinr; the 24th Gu:=irds Brig1:de, be rel 1evad. Gnnernl Poole also re1111"sten more nir rhoto cover ge rnd nir support U' possible. Gen<?ral 1 oole also "'"-T'ressP,d his thr>nks to Gener:-1 CJ:,rk for nrrangin · to release to the 6th South A:rican Armored J)j vision one nrule �company. At 11~15 Genern.l Cl.,rk br-de ~oodbye to Generr.tl Poole and Colonel Dewey n.nd drove to the bend'1u"'rtArs of the 1st l\rmored Division in SFln Anr1rea. · Upon Ms arrivn.l, General ClPrk w, s riet by Generril Pritchard r>nd his Ch:i.ef of StPff, Colonel Howse. Gener11l Cl-1.rk, before an ass ,mbl~a group of the 1st Armored Division staff rresented 1st Lt. Rowe •ith .the D~Btinguished Service Gross. G.,nerr-1 Cbr also rresented L~gion of' Mer:i.t awards to Lt. Col. rovming, nrdnance Officer of the 1st ArMored Division, and ~t. Col. Edwin Russell, Comm.,nding Officer o" the 31st Recon. The General also mn.de the following rromotions: Sgt. Swri.rtzlnnder ot' t}-,p,, 1st "'nn"k Bnttnlion to 2nd Lic,uten'lnt, Sgt. Fuglett 0f the 14th Arrnoren ""'ttalion to ?nd Lieutenant, Cript. 1 /hitsit of the 701st Tank Destroyl'!r Bnttrili.on to Pnjor, ?nd L:t.-:uten~nt Pntter o+"' the 1st Tank Battalion to 1st Li'"lui;enn.nt, ;'.'nd Lfoutenant Riley of the 1st Armored EP I lntoon to 1st Lieuteiw nt. After the ceremony Gener.21 Clark spoke briefly to the stn -rr of the 1st Armored Division, col"1J1ending them on the fine _job tt e:r are doing in their defensive role a..."'l.d thrit h.., hoped shortly t},ey •vould be able to get sol"le reA.1 armored ~ction. Gen-..:r['.1 Cb.rk, v1ith Genert;l Pritchard and Colonel HoV1se, then confer:red in General Prit C:bnrd I s office. Gt""nAral Pritchard. requested ' Genernl Clr,r 1 c to Sl'Jnd Colonel J'owse to F'rnnce f'or ['nroximately ten d3ys to sturly armored tactics :i.n France. Genl'!rnl Cl~k agreed. Afti,r conferring il'ith Genernl FrHcha.rd for h,ilf nn hour, Gentirnl Clnrk too· of'f in his j~er over tr,e miserr>ble San Andrea - feJ.m"'ggio ro..,d to Route 65 nnd then bnck to his benr1qunr·ters. The G"'nernl arrived bAck nt his headquarters at 1730 and ht1.d "our ~uests for dinner, after w~ich he enterta~n~d Members of his striff at 8 Movie in hjs conference hut . * * * TRAilr:RSA--OCT0BE"R. 23, 1944--The we11thl'lr today wt>s overcast, cle"ring towar·d th~ l~te a~ternoon. GP-nernl Gl:'lrk spent the mornin~ i.n his van vrorking ::1nd conferring with members of' M8 stnff. At l:.>00 bours Lt . Col. Grr-y, Armv .TACr, c1>me to confer with Genern.l Clrirk. At 1600 hours G"'tl~ral Cl,,rk left f'or FlorPrice with Colonel Saltzrnnn and his AlC. Enroute to Florence, the Generrl met Gener!"l_l Lemnitzer :1ho a5 on his wa::r up to Army Headquarters. (}~n .r".l Glrir'l< t,-11{:ed to Gen~rrl L"'lrinttzer "or t"YJ. Minutes on the ro~c', and tren continut'ld on to the Fit"'th Arm:, Officer's Rest Fotel in Florence. At 1~10 (}"'!neral CL,,rk entertl'lined for cocktails ~/Ir. & Mrs. Guthrj e YcCljntock (Katherine r,ornell), Er. Bri:m /1.herne, l.liss rncy rnd :mother rnem,r of the cast of "'T'he Barretts of Wimpole Street 11 now rlaying for }'ifth rmy troops, and !1isees Elli, Logan anci ::Ulriney, , lso onterfoining Firth Amy ~ roops. ('ren~ral Cl<ir d-tned with Colonel Saltzoen 'l.nd his ADC, retu.cninfs shortly therer-tfter to 1is comru'md post j n mrnv~rsa. �i'R.AVF:RSA--OCTORBR 24, 1q44• ..t}i,ner11l Clark },ad hj_s usual 08JO conf"rence t:r.:.s morning, rit which General Lemnitzer was also rresent. At 1000 hourr:; ri;r. rancis I. ~ratthews, Supreme Knight of the Knigrts of Colut'\bus, cti.lled wit:i G•n~rnl Gruenther to see t'1•en'"'.!rnl Cll'l.rk in the con-<'erence hut. Gen,..rnl Cl"'.rk oriented 'r. ifRtthews on the cnrrent ifth Arey situation. At 1?30 r1r. Basil O'Connor, Chnirmm of +,he Red Cross, .. nshington, D. G.; Robert Allen, ~Tice Cba1rmnn of tre R~ Cross ; r.1:r. Sterling Tomrkins, Delegate o" th~ Red Crans in l, shiiv-;ton; Mr. Vf. W. Jeff,..rson, D:irector of' Ci. vilfon W!il' -:'lelief in the ttalfon ,,,h,..nter; n•lr. R ymond Healy, D·:rector of' Facilities in the Italian Theater; and Th:-. James ""e, ls, R"!gional Director of' t're It linn Theat"!r were G.-n"'rnl Cl~rk I s lund1Mn guests. Before lunch General Clnrk revie red the tacticnl situation on the Fifth Army front. 'r. G~me:.~a1 Cl.s-,r' · srent n qu.:.et rf'tel"noon 1n h's vrui until 1600 rours, at which t'i.me h1' l~r0 - _ to TI Corps HeAdqU:"rters in 'Dif-J•1nggio whi-re he conf err~d for three quart~rs of an hour with Gen":r:<'ll K,oyes. "'he Army Comrnnnder returned to his headquaFters ~t 1730 and entertained two rNests or 1inner, retir_i "lf; eE!rly to his VA.n. A surnwi.ry of battle rrogress +~or t},e week endinE; October 24, 1944 indicat~s +h~ followin~: Steady 1 ut cilo"1 advances ci:mt.;nued to 1-)e m,"¼de along the lin.., o" the main / effort in II Corrs, t1:tth flPnk uni.ts in 1J Corps ~nd () SA Armd :)iv seizing control of such tmportnnt ·"'eatur~s as M 3J Attmo on t:i,e right nnd Hill 826 and M / TEm.1nrr: on the left. The oo mmanding f eatur~ of M GR.A'[:; in r-i.~ht I of II ~ Corps sector v:as seized and "urth..,r .<1dvaYJ.ces rnt1d~ towArds Route 9 ir tr e FO Vtil ley. 'T'h"'J s~verely--f'ought for M rr~1r,~0·rrB feature El'l_st of Fi gr1wP.y 65 in tre left sector of n Corrs fell to our troors nenr th"'J end of the period. Enemy resistance cont· m1"'Jd •,tiff -in froi1t or the mP.in effort l'li tl~ many severe counter attacks bei~~ rerulsed . In the r1 Corrs sector activ~ rntrols continued to maintain contRct witt1 ~nerny el"m"'nts, with no indications of enetn:v withdrawal in sector front. -tr"" * * * ,..,RAV'!-::RSA--0'.;l'l'OBER 25, 1944- -The yreather today was rniny r-ind cold. G~nerR.1 Chrk n~t"'Jnr1ec Ms 0830 conference rnrl at 1000 hours drove cio m Route 't~5 to th~ junction of Route #~5 nnd the Imola ron~ wrere r.e met Lieutenant General Jfolfo_rney, T'a,jor Gen"'r<Jl ' 1ill"r Yihite, G-1 ·iATC'TTSA. G~'tlernl Cl~rk, with General r~c'Tarney, dro~.-e over the Altuzzo mountain pn.ss. Rnroute (1-{'nernl Clnrk poi-•1ted out key terrain features r-nd enemy forti-f'ications . ,,,h" ptirty arrived at Arm:, Feaclqunrters at 12?.0. G-n""rl'lls Grul"!n~her, Ft>r<'lin,:, Lemnitzer, Cannon rnd Chitll~w ret Generl'l nc·,:arnev, and then C'r~n~ral Cl11rk brit'lred General ·rcr--Tarney on t're over-nll. picture on 'Sighth n.nd Fi-l"'th Armv fronts, r fter which the ent5-r~ f'll'\v 1'!10 lunch. At l/~00 hours Gen,ral A1ex,nc'er :--rriv~d, at'--1 +,re entire f{roup co"t"errer• in th"' co>1'"er nee l ut. n~nerr1ls J\.l<"lxar.r er, rnrcinP:, LPrmitz"r nnn Cannon left at 1530, ~nd rr~n ,rals 'Jlr,rk n.nd r•c•·arney co-rif'erreil ~loYJ~ in the hut until 1700. �Gener al Clrrl.;: entt-rt aint'ld Ge11r,rals Nc"rarnt"ey "nd White for dinner . ral !'c·rarnr-y spent the n~ ,;ht in G~neral Cbrk I s ~est van . * * Gene- * ✓ 6 , 1944--The weather today was very poor with a heavy rain falling durin~ the entire course of the day. TRAVERSA--OCTOBER In the no;rning General Clark, witJ-, Gen~rals M cNarney and White , drove to II Corps where they were ~et by GenerPls Keyes ano Prit ch~rd ~nd members of the II Corps staff . General Keyes briefed tre JY.rty on tbe current situation . The pnrty tr en drove to tl-e 91st Division, wJ-,ere they met and conferred with General Li vesay. The Army Cornmi:mder and y:-arty returned to t1"e FiftJ-, Army command post direct from t:be 91st Division, arriving back at noon . Genersls McNarney and Vfhite departed shortly after lunch , and General Clark spent the remainder of the afti,rnoon in his van , working on a.dministrative roo.tt~rs and conferring with v,irious staff officers . In tbe evenini:; the GenAral had Generals Brarm A.nd Lewis for dinner . Gener al Clark today received th~ following memorBndum from his G- 3 with regard to resting, refitting And training Fifth .4rr.ny troops: " I. In order ments Absorbed a.nd be rested to areas accomplishing this 1. that Fifth Army troops be rested, re- equipred and rerhicegiven soJ'lle tr,dning, it is necessary to move t he units to "'ell bl'l.ck from tJ-,e front line . There are two met:bods of project . To move out complete divisions to rest areas. a. AdvantaCTes . (1) When o+'fensive operRtions are resuned , there would be availAblA possibly two divisions - with all personnel rested and best rrepared far a strong attack. (2) This method would give more flexibility to any plan to resume the attack. b. Disadvantages . (1) II Corps zone of responsibility is so wide and the enemy ~lon~ tbis ~rent is so strong th~t it is Most difficult to cover this zone witr two tired divisions . f2) All +>our of our infantry divisions are very tired . I believe that if any complete division, or even all of the infantry of a division , is withdrawn , it would 4ffect adversely the morale of the divisions left in line . ✓• mo move infantry regiments or battnlions and an appropriate percentage of othar units of all divisions in turn to rest areas. �a. "II. Advantages. (1) The enemy can be more easily led to believe that we ro-e in strength across his f'ront. This, it is hoped, will cause him to continue his withdrawal from in front of Eighth Army. (2) By leavin~ all divisions in line, tre responsihili t;v of th"} generl'l.1 zones they now control will be much easier th1m it ,vould be if two divisions held the entire sector. (3) W are in better position to follow up any e enemy withdrawal with parts of all divisions forward. Location of rest areas. 1. Our troops are both physically and mentally tired of fighting. They need :rest, but trey- ,ilso m~ed recreation, tre opportunity to walk on a sidewalk, see picture shows nnd relax. 2. Troops in rest areas must be under heavy tents or in buildings. AFHQ hRS recently announced the policy of using buildinrrs for troops whenever possible to save tentage. I am informed tha.t several thousand men can be put in build-lngs in f1 0~ECA'T'INE. It may be possible to find additional housing in PIS'T'OJA or FLCR'SNCE. 3. Any rest areas selected in high ground will be very cold and muddy. In addition, my bivouac personnel can not find any area into which a large number of troops can be concentrated in a tent caMp, except the FI'.1I'OIA - PRATO - SESTO area. 4. Troops bivouaced astride Route 65 interfere with the movement of supply trains and their w,hicles running out on to 65 carry so much mud on to the road that a ~eat number of men w.ill be required to keep it clear. 5. Class I, II and III supply dumps ::ire in the FLCRENCE area. heaV;r maintenance repair stores nre in the FLORENCE area. All 6. mhe a.dditional time requ:ired to move troops from their forward position to the FLOR.ENCE area over that require-d to move trem to some pl."!ce along 65 South of FU'J'A PASS is only a matter of a few },ours. This is more than compensated for by the fact that tr- e troops in rest areas will be very near Rll supply and JM.intennnce establishments. "III. Timing. 1. The date on which Fift1, Ar_my resumes its offensive to capture B0LOGNA must oepend to a great part on the German oper~tions during the next few dayfl. UnM.l Eighth Army carries approximately ebrt':last of CASTJi:L S. PIETRO, and, until some G'1rman strength is withdrawn f'rom our front, I do not believe we liave t},e capability of capturinE.; BOLOGNA. It is estimated t}•pt our troops, after a short rest, will be capnble of Pn effective attack for A. yeriod of about 8 to 10 days. Ava.ilabb nrnmunition will not support a strong a.ttnck �l 31 for a longer period. 2. It aprears t:ra.t once we begin resting our troops, it is to our t:idvantage to rest ns long as possible, cont~ngent on tre date Eighth Army is to cease opRrations to prepare +'or tr P,j_r next commitment. I will, of course, be~in at once to plan for a resumption of tre attack, but trese plans must be revised daily in accord with Gi?rma.n action. The only tring that rnust be completed in the near future is a plan to follow up any German withdrawal. "IV. Additional Troops. 1. Shortly a+'ter l!ov('!r,ber 1, additionA.1 troops of tr e 92d Division and BEF will become available for combat. Exact dates of t1vailability are difficult to determ-lne because tl--e status of equipment on bents now unloa.dinP, and some yet to come is not lmmm. I was informed tr-is morning thAt tre 371st ROI' of 92d Division would be ava.ilnble by November 5. It will probably be near 1rover.ib,,,r 15 before BEF can complete tl"e minimum training of one RCT and haV'3 i.t reRd:,r for combat. 2. The 6th RCT of the BEF, now in action, could be withdrawn at once from its present Eirer and attFJ.ched to II Corps. 3. The area in whic1' troops of either of t} ese units are employed must he carefully selected so that any withdraw<tl would not endanger a critical sector. 0 "V. Recom.~endations. 1. That troops of' Fifth Army be withdrawn to tre FLffiENCE area for rest. 2. Thflt personnel from all divisions be withdravm for rest. The number to he based on a careful study by division conrnandors o+' the necessary strength required to hold their respective zones of action • .3. That the withdrawal of troops in t he M. GRANDE area be based on our determining the Ger111c~n's intentions in thnt sector. 4. ThA t wren possible infantry regiments, plus A.n appropriate percentai;;e of other units of tre division, be withdrawn. When it is impossible to reduce the strenrrtr of any division sector by one infantry regiment, that one or r>1ore battalions be withdrawn. 5. That, in so far as facilities r,ermit, troops withdrawn for rest M quartered in buildings. 6. That as soon as certtrl.n operat:i ons now be·i ng conducted by British troops of Fifth Army are completed, they be directed to conforn to plan for resting II Corps troops. 7. That tre 6tri RCT of tre BEF be attached to II Corps and the remainder of t hat division brougr1 in as soon as possible. t �8. That the 92d Division continue rressure along t!-,e West coast. 9. That t}-,e A:rmy Commander and tre undersigned whole },eartedly perticipate in the rest period recommended Above." * * * TRAVERSA--OCTOBER 27, 1944-~neral Cl~rk had a conference with Generals Gruenther and Brann at 0930 in the conference hut and was joined at 1000 by Gen"'ral Keyes and Colonel Porter of IT Corps. The remainder of the morning General Clark remained in his van. At 1400 in the afternoon Gereral Clark h,ld a small press conference which was Rt tended by Colonel Grogan, Fifth Army PRO; Milton Br'ncker, New York ~imes; Frank Conniff, INS; and James Roper, UP, in the conference hut. ~he remainder of the afternoon Ge~eral Clnrk spent in his van. The G...,n~ral hRd dinnt"lr in the evening with .the regular members of his mess. In the evening General Clark dfotated the following random notes for inclusion in his diary: "I have received tr e following letter from Gen~rnl Alexander: 1 1. With reference to my CGS/4~9 of 10 Oct. 44, it is now possible to go a stage further in the developm~nt of future plans. In the f:irst place it is quite clear that no additional A.llj_ed forwtions will be avaiL.,ble for operations in this t'beatre now or in 1945. On the contrary 4 Ind Div nnd the Greek Bde haYe b~en taken for duty in GRr.;:E:CE, Hnd Rre not likely to r~turn to A.A.I. In addition 1 Br Armd Div and one British inf'a.ntry div will have to be dlsbande<l to provide su·"ficient repL-=i cement personnel to maintain the remaininr- British forMRtions in a 191+5 campaign. None the less it is the C-in-C's intention to carry out A. sustained offensive in 19!~5, a.nd he has rece~ved instructions to rnRke plans f'or a campaign on the ~ener~l 1:i ll"!S indicc1ted in para 6 of rrty CGS/429 . 1 1 1 2. Plans which will now be ttiken in hand will be based on the aseumption that durin~ the next two nr three months the advance of the Russian Armies in HTH1GARY, combined vith the opera.tions of our light f'orces ?nd the Farti~ans in Y1TG0SLAVT.A, ~ill force the enemy not only to ~ive up the ports on the DalmatiA.n coast o.t least as far nortl as ZARA inclusive, hut to withdravr from the mountains in trie hinterland of' trose ports to a line between the SAVA and the coast bet :"Teen ZARA and Filn£ • 1 3. It is the intention of the SAC -in-C to occupy the rorts of SPLIT, SIB~NIK and· ZARA with COJ'lll"lA.ndos and other ljp;ht forces as they are evacu.,ted by t},e enemy, and to develop operRtions in conjunction with the> Partis1ms to gain control of the roads running inland over the mountains. If these opera.tions nre successf'ul it should be po ·sible to develop the ports t=ind the road and rail communicntions from t'.rem, under the cloak of openinr; up the country, and under the protection of our li,:;ht forces nnd the Partisens. As soon as �l 33 these prepnra.tions are sufficiently advanced our mnin ho<lies '"ill be brought in as quickly t:i.n<l secretly as rossible f'or nn advance on L.nJBLJANA and Fim.£ . This is a g1m-3ral conception , the actual rlan will of course re'1Uire a gr/lla.t deal of detailed '1tudy, i=ind its final form must rwturally der,end on the situation at that time . This oreration will be the task of ~ighth Army whose H. Q. "'ill be reljeved of opArntional resron.sibility in tir1e to :plan it, rrobably by placinit n. corrs H. Q. directly u.mer A. A. I. in command of the Eighth Army front . 4. '!'he first object of Eit;hth Army ' s operr-tiorn will be to cut the enemy ' s road and rail comM1.mjcations through LJUBLJANA AS ri step towards the destruction of KESSBIBPTG ' s Armies . Th~ capture of' the port of FIUME ·rill be esciential f'or the rn11.interumce of' the tirmy." At the si:rr'\e tirrie these operr>tions will have to he coord1nated yrith those of' It,,rsh;:il 'T'ITO 1 s forces , a.nd. rossibly with those of the Russfa.n southern Pr'f"!y e.s well . 1 5. Suffident cra.f't <'or Pll MSA.ult 1:.1-f't of one di11ision for ferrying troops to the Dal:MP.tion ports, l"nd therenfter for Pmrhibious operations in conjunction with the advance up the coast will be R.vailable for Eighth Army. 1 1 6. 'l'he task of Fifth Arrrry' will be to continue the offensive on the main front with the obJect of holdinv, the enerey- +>orce"l in I'T'ALY and driving them north eastwards . EventuAlly the two rtrmies would complete the pincer riovement by conver~inl',' on GORIZIA nnd 'T'RP'S"'E f:Teparetory to a combined r-idvance into ATT'3TRIA . Even if this conception rrowis too ambitious f'or the f'orces llVAilable it will At least serve to contain the mRx:i.mur:1 enemy forces on this front which ,\Till be a very valll.ll.ble contribution to the overall Allied strategy. 17 . 'l'hfl target date for the openini:1, of this CPJnfaign is the beginning of FebruPry. .If it cPn he launched earl ~er so much the better from the overall point of' vievr . '1'he reli:itive tinin~ of' the orerations of the two Prmies , and the final allocAtion of troops nnd other re,.,ources t'lre matters f'or discussion nearer the time • .,,here Pre ho~ever certain qmstions which must be decided in the very near f'uture . 'T'hese flre cliscussed helovr . 1 B. .,,o o-ive f'ormi=itions time for essenti~l rest, reorganization Pnd trnin:inq- before embr-trking on another protrt.Jcted offen,.,ive campair;n, it is estir.iated that it will ,e necess:iry to "'Uspend the current of'fensiv~ about 15 Nov . More over rra.ctic1> 1.ly all formations in both Prr.iies h~tve now hrd long periods of continuous fiphting , and rnPny ha .. rea.ched the stage ,,,hAre "'urther effort without rest is rm unecononical rropositj on. On the other hrnd f'ailure to se cure BOLnGnA and RAVENHA before settlin~ down on 11 winter 7 in1J , will h11ve the most serious ndverse effect on rr"pr-trPtions ,...or re.,.,1..Tlling the offensive on thP. mn.in Italian front :i.n 104'5 . With B0LOGHA and ~VF?TNA in our hpnrls rinr1 suffic ent spP.ce beyond them to n~ke it rossible to use the +>ormer fl_S " rorid nnd railhead , Pnd thP. lntter PS .<i const\vic:e port , we should be Abl13 to huild up c:uf'ficjent sup:plfos north of the A~nnines to suprort r-n 11ttack on the ADIGE position ns 1 art of a contj nuous mover1ent . Inr-> bili ty to use th".lse Preps rind the co:mriru.n:iotitions of which they f're the term·nals for "dm5nistr2tive build up durin~ the vdnter mr-ty, and rrobrhly 1•rill necessitate P nel-,y of' two or r.iore months betw~en the capture of BOif'G!~ and an attack on the ADIGE rosition . The immedirite rroblem therefor~ is to oolPnce the advantages of' sncuring BOif)GNA and RAVRT\THA a~a-inst the need of' the troop~ f'or rest . ,e �T '9. The best way of iMprovin, our chances of' CApturing BOLOG11A ·vould s seem to he to ~rsuade th~ rmemy to "'love somn of his troops -rrom ~ ts defence. The following plan to thnt en<l ha.s befm su~gestect:- a. Fiftr Army to suspend t1 ctive opP.rl'ltions; :i thctraw sry two di visions to rest in the FIDR~tTCE AREA; and simulate to the wi thdrawAl of a third div ?nd prP,parations for defence. ]2. A cover plPn to be ini tinted to tho effect that Fifth /1 rmy had been compelled to i:;o on the defensive owj.11~ to exhaustion and he1wy casualties. £• EiP.:hth Army to continue their o-rfensive w5.th all avl'ilable resources at least t5.ll 15 1Tov, to draw enemy f'orces off Fifth Army f'ront nnd to capture RAiF?r»'A. g. Fifth Army t0 pr~pro-e n pl11n f'or 1:1 f'inl'l 1 all out i:,+'fensive to capture DOT.OGNA, and th('ln to move the divisions withdrawn to rest in the I'LORF,NCE area back to the f'ront +'or th~ purrose as quickly and secretly as possible as soon as the enemy hRd moved troops away and the weather was rropitious, or P .t any rate not later than 15 tTov. ~- E; g:hth Army to concentrate on the capture of RAVEtJNA. , If this plan f'::,ilP.d it is considered th::>t the disadvHntagP.s of not holdini:; Bf\LOCP·l'A and RA~WTA must be accepted, ano th~ best •vint!'lr Une exclusive of those r-JEcM should be held. Tr0ops jn ti,e lin" shouln t}-,en be t1'i:r.ned ,cind rest, reorP,Rnization ,rnd trniniri!Y ffi'1 ould begin An<l hPve rriority. If it is not rossible to capture Bf•LOGNA and RAVE!HJA before calling a hPlt in the present offensive it will be o:"' o-reat jmportrmce to secure FORLI to open up Route 67, 11.nd r"Cl!J'l'E SMT MURE (L 873q) to cover· the northP.rn F.lxi t of the t-flllimE AOO!: ~ tunnel. 1 10. 1 11. ":'h.-, ~ajor problcl'!ls to be settlr.n At once are therefore:- (a) r-row cHn BClL()(}NA and RAVEF TA be captured before 15 ~J'ov'? (b) If thnt proves impossible whnt is the best wj nter line to hold? (c) "fu.A.t assistance or further jnformation do Armies want +'rom A.A.I. at this stage to enable them to go Ahead ':'T.ith planninp; a campaj_ on the lines indicated in this lett~r, anrl 0esif-;ned to gn be~in eA.rly in Febrmiry 191~5? •va11 you please examin!'l these questions and any others connected vrith the pla.ns outlin~d herein trat occur to you Pt tri is tage. mhe C-in-C ,;,rill holr. An Army Co..,ma!Y1er's mect:'ng rit this H.Q. at 1100 1-i.rs on 2() Oct to a~scu"s these and anv other connected questions. VT ill you please inform mP. by 27 Oct if you have any points not covered by this letter trFJt you rish to discuss e..t this meeting, also whether the rroposed time find date a.re convenient. Army Commanders r.,p_y brin1: two staff officers with them to this meeting. 1 nr have dj scu<1sed this mtter with General Alcxand er, l'md it hApp")ned thBt ��135 Genernl McNarney vras here Pt the Sl'lrr.e Mme. T told .Alexander I was not in fa• vor of abrmdoninf!, our attack on Boloenl'l but that due to the lnck of all-out effort h;v the BiP:hth Army, the German hnd been permitted to mss his defenses opposj te Fifth Army to close the ej ght-mile gar b"fore Bologna And the fourmile r;ap to Route #9 in the Fo Valley. '!'he Germtm hPs removed his best divisions at will from the F.iP,hth Arrrry +"ront, Pnd Eighth Army has done nothin~ to help us except lean aga1-nst the enemy. The -;;;ighth Army has never, in my year of nssociation with it, indulged in an all-out attack against the ~nerny, nor will they ev~r do so, in my opinion. Had they borne the5r just burden of this Fifth - Ei£;hth Arrrry pnrtnf'!rship, we would ht>Ve been in Bolor,in. Th"l enemy woul<l not have found it rossi..ble to take al 1 the d:1visions from Eighth Arrrry front Rnd plt1ced them agi:iinst us. 11 ! agree ,,rj_th the proposal to launc}-, an AY!lJ2hibiqus operation into the Balkans by ~ighth. Arrriy"w.r-Ui.r'rrth Armyrefnrorced by Poles f!nd British troops attFJcking nf'!xt sp:rin(; across the Po pist Yenice and tovrnrds the Ljubljana Gap. As a prerequjsite to this a.ttack in the sprini:;, I must htwe Bologmi this winter in order to build it up as a. base for thes,., future operl'ltions. AAI ,•u1n"t,s to withdraw Sip;hth Amy by ~ovember 15th in or<ll'lr to rrepere f'or their 11r,phibious operation wrich will be nothing but a ferrying exercise without oprosition. My troops Rre so 1':x:hn.usted now that they J'!lUst rest ~or at least t}-,ree weeks, in order to absorb new replace.ments rind rerfect sm~ 11 unit teamwork. I Pm ~oina to a reeetin~ the day after tomorrow at AAI with the following proposal: (a) That r::ii:;hth and Fifth Armies carry out an 11.ll-out desrerA.te attnck ) on or about 1\Tovember ::>oth on Bolognl'l.. Eighth Arrrry nrust put rill resources into the ettack. (b) least H '!'hnt all air suprort, includjng strategic, is mHde availn.ble for at week -in adwmce and during the attA.ck. ( c) Th,.t the l oHsh Corps be mde avFlilable to me to attack on my left ,. fl1rnk to op~n up Route #64. / 'l'hRt if bnd vreath~r slows up the attack the Britfoh Eighth Army be ~ ~~~~~:: to remRin in this area a'1 late as December 15th in order to secure ~~~ ~ (d) "I11 the meantime, I am stopring the attAck on MY front, will move 13 Corps \ \ to the north to take over Mount Grande, thereby rel-leving desp('lrately tired 8~th Division for rest. "Amrnmition will be crit~ cal for the oottle, but by r[-ltioning during this lull until '1ovember ?oth, I will ruive enough for about two weeks I all-out effort. By -r-rovembP.r :::ioth my replacem~nt situation will be suf'fici.ent to bring rne up to overstrength and to me.intain r,e in a desperate battl" for approximately two weeks. If ~i~hth Army will attack, and they n1'V~r hr>ve yet, I will attack up Rout~ !!65, and "e have ~ood chances of' cartur:ing Bologna." 11 * * �TRAVERSA--OCTOBER 28, 1944--Genertd Cl..,rk did not have his usu.el 0830 conference this mornini:; but did confer for a short whil~ w:i th Gem~r11ls Gruenther 11.nd Brann. At 1030 the Army Cornnnnr'ler, a.ccompanit"d b;v GPneral Brann, depl'l.l1ted for 13 Corps Headquarters at 'licchio, where he conferred w~th General Kirkman . Follow;n~ this conference, GenP.ral Clark drove on to Florence. At six o'clock in the evenin~ the ~neral enterteined mrious of his section chiefs +'rom the renr echelon And a few nddi tional f'riends at the J\nglo-AmeriC8n Hotel for dinner. * 17 * TRAVERSA--OCTOP.ER 29, 1944--The Amy Commander left for AAI Headquarters at Siena, accompanied by Generals Gru"nther t'lnd Brann, to confer at eleven o'clock with GenerRl Alexander. The GenerAl returned to the hotel for lunch and drove back to his commRnd po~t, arriving at About 1615. In the evening the Army CommAnder entertRined memb~rs of his st11ff '"ith a perform1mce in the hut by Miss Rlltt Logan 1md her u.s.o. Show. The performance Yrns f'ollowed by a buffet supper for approximAtely thirty guests. * * TRAVffiSA--OC'T'OBER 30, 1944--Gener,i.l Cl11.rk srent the early part of the mornin~ wor'ld.ng: in his van and at !'!lev~n o I clock oonferre<l with Generals Gruenther and Rrnnn jn his conference hut. Previous to this conference Glllnerl'll ClArl<" conferred with Lt. Col. I'fllh.off and Col. Ellison of the Inspector General I s Depirtment. At 1430 the Army CoTm"lAn<ler held a conference in the hut rit which the follovr~ni; vrere present: Generals CJ.Rrk, Gruenther, Kirkman, Keyes, CrittenberD'.er, MascFJrenhas, PritchArd, Poole, BradshPw, Lewis, Brann, Tate, Bowr1an, Fow11..rrl, Chidlaw, Bri~. Divers, Briis. Roe, Colonels McMahon, Saltzman, Zitzml'ln, Ladue, Brayner, Lt. Col. Cooper, Maj. i'lalters, 1-\:'1.j. Th".!unisson and Capt. Case. Follovring /'l.Te notes on the conferenc"! compiled by Colonl"ll Saltzman, Army Deputy Chief of Staff: llThe Army Corinmnder stated that he had convoked this conference to describe the new picture which confronts Fifth and Ejghth Armies. He h~d received ., direct:ive from Ge~ral A lexarrler purs1mnt to which th~ bulk of the Ej /:;hth Arny will und.ertA.ke another mission during the latter pl.rt of December. General Clark stressed the necessity of CRreful security in this connection. l I 11 He stated thAt another Bttempt vrould be made to take BOLOGNA and that \ such rt drive by the Fifth Army nn1st he carefully timed Vl.r~th th1' efforts of the EiP,hth Army. "C'renE"rFil Clark c;aid that the Fifth Army has advanced to rositions on a 14ne generally throui:,;h LIVBRG"TAN'O and Tir1I'. GRANDE, wh"re it has been �13'7 stopped. The four divisions of the TI Cor s could not press the att11ck further without l"lnormous c.nsualties, e.nd it is doubtful if it would bl'! possible now to ret=i.ch BOLOG1-TA on account of' the lRrge r-i.mount of Gerynpn re inf or cements which hnd bP-en throvm opposite the II Corps sector by hringinr,; units from other parts of the +'ront, particularly from the Bighth A:rmy front. "It had been R.ssurned by Qf!!nerAl Alex~urler that f!S "re threatened the principal Germ1m lPteral highway the enemy vmuld not let us cut behind him. He therefore ht:id two alterm:1.tives: to 17ithdraw or to stop our attack. He chose the latter And put l'!leven divisions in the area of the II Corps. General ClRrk had planned a new effort with II and 13 Corps but decided agri inst it when the 1st German Pt:irRchute Division was brou~ht in. "The Army Comrm.nder explPined thAt it is now necessP.ry to devise the most effective mea ns o+' resti . .ng our troops in time to mAke nnoth~r nttnck on BOLOGNA) before the rleparture o+' the bulk of the Eighth Army. It has been decided in conference At Fer.dqmtrters AAI that 11 coardin-"ted nttack to secure BOLOGNA "''ill be launchP-d A bout 1 December. We mu"'t rest the troops wh.ich will rrovide the spea.rhead of the next Pttn.ck, ,,,.,mely, the four tT. s. divisions. Means of getting them out of the line would be discussed hy G,,nerRl Clark lPter in the meeting. r~erimrhile, General r~cCreery will continue to push h::i.s "Sighth Army of'fl"lnsive. "It is difficult to judge where the Germans will try to corie to rest; there ar4' wrfous rossibllities, and the 'Rii;hth Army ,,,jll have to find out in the course 0f its A.dwmce by drivinr: the G~rJ'TFns bPck and stabjlizing the Hne. This is :fully understood hv General Mccreery. As the Germr-n rulls back to a new line he becom-.s rrogr~r,sively stronger, ann if later PI'fePrs to be su "ficfontly stron~, there is a possibil ;ty thPt the coord~nated FifthEii:;hth Army attack miP,ht not be l"lP.de. "G~nerPl 0111.rk ciaid 'thAt in order to get the TJ. s. <livisioris out of their pr-.sent positions +'or r ,u rposes o+' rest, it had been decide<'1, nft~r P consultation with Genern.ls Alexander a.nd Kirkrnrin, to r"quire the 11 Corrs to take over the terrriin in the ,,icinUy of the MI'. GR.A1IDE feature. ,r,h" Army Co:r.nn,i:inder understPnds thi:it the 13 Corps '"ill have some transportation require:rients to Rccomplish this m:ission. Pe told Ge>:rieral Kjr1~n several da'Ts arso thtit F:ifth Army is prl'!pe.rP.d to assist 13 Cor:rs to the Brnit of its Pbiljt,, in rrmriding the additiorutl transrortRtion necessnry for rnaintenr>nce durin~ this mission. 11 'T'he Army Commander believes thf't the Germflns have hrid the cqiabili ty of MA.king P stronrr, cou.ntArPttt=ick in th is Prea but does not believe he will do it. He stated thPt seven b:<ittalions ::>re required for the defense of this sector, And th~t this comnitrnent must he ~ade b:v the 11 Corrs. He stated also tht:it if lPt ,r our r>ttack shouln go toward the lest, it is rossible th~t the 13 Corps mri.:v have to trike airer more terri tor:,. 11 '1'he 88th n;vision should be rel il'!Ved as soon as possible, the t!:'rget a~te for completion heinrs a week. Geni..ral K:i.rkmrm said he hr,d !!lreadv scheduled the relief for November 2-8, rind Agreed to do it os soon as possible. 11 �✓ Genernl Clark stated t ht=it th"'! 8~th Division had unrerisone 4 , 800 battle ca sualties; thAt the 85th ,ind ,4th would stA'' ~n the line "'or the rresent, and that the 91st Division hRs .t'l Jread" two COJ'llbat tePms out of the Hne . The 1st Armored Divi'3ion vrill take over a. larger sector than rit pres"'lnt . "Gtnnera.l Clark .':JtPted thi>t the 6th South Africi>n Division h11s been fi1;hting in hifsh mountl'lins , and thPt he understnnds General foole is still plannini:; to attemnt to take SOLE . 'l'his nas confirmed by General Foole . The Armv Commnncier said tha.t it ,,.,ould be v~r· helpful if SOlE could be CAptured; otherwise fewer batt.<1.lions cnn ,:,;et out o-i:- th~ line . 11 Gener<>l Clark ~uiid it was rlanned to brinf" thei BraziHPn Division into the Un"' alonr hii,;h:<1nv 65, one conbn.t tePJ'll to rto ;nto position ri.r;ht P.wa-:r Pnd the other 11s soon As pos'3ible, probnblv· tirouna tre 10th 0r l?th . The ?3?nd Germ~m Division is opposite this rart o'"' the lin~ , Hnd the Army- Commander felt thnt rro~ess could he rm.de there . He stated l"lso that he planned to bring the IV Corps ~arther to the East . I) · "General Poole stAted that SOLE is ti very strong position, stronger than CA.SSPm; th11t it is w,ry difficult to att,-ck. The min:ir.rurn scale r,tta.ck to tak"' it And hold it T'fould htive to be n two-bnttalion attack. He does not have two available battalions at the moment . The 24th Guards Brignde is tired nnc'I must hold a certRin shoulder with one battali on. He could make an attack '7ith one battalion and :i:-ert of Another . If the situr'tion stabilizes he coulcl add nnother oottFilion to the Guards Brigade . This opern.tion would be versr costl:v; the ground is hP,ld b;v two battalions of the SS disposed AS indicated by General Foole on the map . The seizure of SOLE would not be valUAble unless exploited to th~ northeast down a difficult mountain feature with R ni:f'ficult Ma~ntenrmce problem. To be effective this rrogress should be coordinat~d with the adv;:ince o~ the division on his flnnk . GeMral foole would like to r,~'ke the attack w~th three battalions but cannot r,aintain three battalions . General Clnrk said to hold the project in abeynnce for the rresent. 11 r~neral Clark said that he desired General Poole to ~et some of his units out for rest if possible, reAlizj_ thRt this would be difficult if the diving sion sta_rs in its present position and takes over the territory to his norrwl • boundA.ry. "'T'he Arny Comander invited Gen~ral YirkrlPn I s coTTJn~nts and su~gestions from anyone present as to any improvements in the outlined plan. He stated tha.t on" of General Kirkman' s divisions may leave the 11 Corps during ~fovember, and toot some of General Kirkman 1 s units ~ill probably be pinched out as the new line devia,lops, thereby affording rm op:nortunity for restin~ such units . General Ch.rk hopes to get 18 battalions out of t}1e line . "G•meral Yir1-:rnA.n dj scuss1'd roan difficulties Hnd pointed out thAt many vehicles of British divisions are u~eless umer th~ roAd situntion confront ing the 13 Corps . H~ had nA,de a roup:h e stimate thnt :in order to ~Aintain troops in the Hf' GRANDE c;ector he would n~ed 120 a.ddi ti onal 6 x 6' s a.nd that he woul<l need an additional 100 for six dA.ys to get his units into position . General Clark said thRt we would furnish thl'lm. General J{irvrnan stated that this estil"l:=tte includes no allowrmce for bringing up res~rves , replA.cing motorcycles which cannot he u2ed , etc . If he coulo get any more je~ps they would �-be ver;r u s eful for the Frovost, dispatch riders and signal re:rairs . taking awny jeeps from other divisions for use in this '3ector . l39 Re is "G~neral Kirkmnn asked what work can be done on roads b~r the Fifth Army, and ~n~ral Bo,'frnan discussed the work which will be undertaken. General "'ate stated thPt the U. S . vehicles which will b-e turned over temporarily to 13 Corps may use Route h5 and the RADICOSA-SKSSA IF,ONE Road (65.,9) . 11 Grmeral Kirkman said a. res,,rve would be provided from the '78th Division, and that the battalions on th"" east of the 13 Cor:rs sector vlill make such progress as nay be rossible . General Clr1rk said that General Keyes ' corps wj_ll assist th"" 13 Corps es much as rossible . He also stAted thr--t this hendquarter s ,vill prescribe a main line of resistance and a regimental reserve line . "General Crittenberger stated that the Fifth Army requirenents present little difficulty for th" IY Corps; thAt General ~~scar~nhas hl'l.s one conbat tea.m ready to move Pt once ; that ~ntiaircraft units will take over their sector promptly startin~ their reconnaissa.nce on the day following the meetinp;; thRt the availabil-ity of more Brazilian units depends on equipment; that he knt,w he was exrressi.ng General Mascarenhas ' sentiments in saying that the Brazilians a.re Vf!'lry anxious to get in action . "General Vascaronh.<1.s reJ')eRted that his ability to act depends on delivery of equipment; that his units would be ready five days after such de livery. "General Clark sai d General Alexander had indicn.ted th.<it he could m1>ke some Itl'l.lian combat units RVailable , and that hA had told the C- in-C that } 1 e would he glad to take them. "~neral Chidl1m said th1.t the XXII TAC has certain training problems and problems with respMt to tre Eighth Army d1n:-ing th~ reriod betwe.en now and 10 t!ovem ber . "The Army CoP1M.ander stated t.,_,A.t thl" date for t1,e next attack mtueit not be too ri;,;idly set as tre army rmst be in a position to tak"' advimtage of any (;'ood weRthAr , but tha.t December 1 was the deadline and speed was the watcl->word . He stated that the bulk of the artillery must be left in, though soMe of' the personnel r,ay bt'! talnm out f'or rurposes of rest . " General Cll'rk this afternoon dictated the following randon notes for inclusion in his diA.r:v: "In going to General Alexander ' s conferenr,e I intended to dernnnd an all- out effort by Fifth And Eighth Armjl'! s to capture Bologna before Eighth ArMy moves out in prepA.ration for 1ts other mission . 11 Bnroute to Ale:x,:i.nder ' s conf er•mce I visited Kirknmn hecause an essential }:flrt of my plan jnvolved 11 Corps' taking over the Mount Grande fea.ture. Thi.s requires the better part of an infantry division . By so d9ine. I would rnat""ria 11v help in the re lief of U. S . troops f'or rest , r"organizA·faon ~nd \ \ ��trAining prior to the next offensive. I was sl-iocked to },enr Kirkman tell me 10~1.sticall:r tjt was not on'. He could not r,n5nt'fl.in troops on Gra.nde. The fallac;v of his stAtement lies in the fact thnt we are alrtl!ad;v maintaining over a. <B vision up there in hell:i.sh weather. His argument is that his transportation does not havf"J the SA.me mobility as ours. He is somewhat correct. \ I went on to Al~,m.nder ts meetinf; wh-.r"" I talked •Tith Mccreery ahead of the conference. I was pleased to find trat he could not t=1ttack in an A.11-out effort for Boloi:;mi. until !lovember 30th. This, I thoui;ht, was the latest date thRt F.i~hth ArM~r could rem,.,in in this HreH. I r~nd jt ca.n remain until Decemb~r 15th and possjbl;v A little longer. This will ~ive me more opportunity to rest mv troops. Alexander, Stayner, Robinson Pnd Hardini; were mn-prised at Kirkman I s A.ttitude. With their backing, I ha.ve decided to or<ler Kirkman to occupir Grande A.nd '\"1'ill tell him so at rny conference this r-ifternoon. I will bring in tre Brazilil'ln Division to relieve the P,5th. I will use the 1st Armored Division, e!'lplo;-ring all its tank crews as jn.f'ant:r", and believe I can get out practica.lly f-lll of the ~5th and 8%h and the 91st, perh,i.ps less a cornbA.t team. 34tr will have to remain in the a.rea witr A. narrow sector and as reserve. One other division, probably the 91st, will be kept in the Futti Pass area, for the German, with 11 divisions massed on the II Corps front, r11s the capability of embA.rrassin~ me by limited obJective, strong countl"lrattA.cks eit},er to regain Mount Gra.nde or the Livl'!r~ano feature. I must li~wise see that Brit.; sl1 ,lernents are rested, but not to the extent of tre American units, for t} ,e U. s. troops rave had between fotn:' and five to one casualties over tre British. 11 "Althoug} J h~we told Toole of the 6tr South African Division tliat he did not ht'lve to take Sol~ if he thought it was beyond his capabilities. I Understand hi'! intends to attempt it. If he is successful, it will }-,elp considerably. ~fr i ..e,...::t' ~ t ) 1 I;-)~~ 7 ·,._,._ ... -1. ~ - ~ ~·~- "I will tr:v to get most of my U. S. regiments lm.ck to Monteca.tini under cover. "At the AleXA.nder conference it was decided that Eighth Army iiill continue its attack, pusr•in1; nn alrea_ withdrawing enemy in [' north,~esterly d,r rlirection up the Po Valle,,. I will let 11 Corys assist tre Polish atti:i.ck by makin~ a.n tl!ffort on their right. I hope that ~ighth Army, by continued stroni; pressure and attacks, will force the enemy hack to a line r,cross tre Po Vallev generally in the CA.stel S. Pietro area. McCreery wants to make his r,,rd n effort in the attack on Bologna around November 30th astride Route 119. ThA.t precludes the possibilit"T of m•; using at least one <livision in the Po Valle·,. 11 '1'h1' c0nference also decided thflt both flrmies v1ould Attack All-out for Bol01;!1fl And thA.t Fi.round December 15th, after f'ifteen da7S of further effort, if we },ad fail"d, all rernr>ininir P-lements •rould he turned over to me, and Eighth Arm:r pulled out f'or its new venture. "Mv schene of :Ma.neu,rer for tre November 30th attack is undetermi:na ble at tre present time. rtr m,dn job now is to rest the American units And then, dep~ndin~ upon enemy reactions dur5nt; the next montr, tre westrer, I ��progress of Eighth Army, I will decide \Tr1et~er to make my at ta.ck along Route #65 and to tPe west t0ereof or to demand th8t I come into tre Po VAlley astride Route #9. I have indicated this latter possihility to Alexander. "When I do attack , it will he my last venture for Bolognn. . I will deml'lnd all the P.ir support possihle . There is a <::;rowin~ tendencv flowing ge nerall·r from Genert1.l Cannon that the:' know how to eriplo~r tre air better trian 'l'fe do. There is a reluctance to accept our targets . I feel thl'lt '"" must blitz ,1ith Stra.te~ic, Tactical and Fighter Bombers right in front of the troops astride Route .J65 ••• just spra.7 in a line on either side of the rond . I will carry that all the way to Washington in order to get it . ttr am havinf', a. neeting of corps and division commanders and my key staff officers At 2:30 this a.fternoon in order to notify them of my plans for the future and to discuss a plan for puttinP- into effect the temporarv relief of u. s. units . " TRAVERSA- -OOTOBER 31, 1944-- Genl'lral Clt:irk spent t },e entire morning in :bis van workin-; on an accumulation of pl'l.pers nnd conferring with various staff offi- cers. At 1445 in tre nfternoon General Clark, accomptmied by Colonel Saltzman and rrent"lral 'Rrann, drove to Florence, riaturning to his comm:md post at 1700 hours . · The General dined \Vith the r.-,gu].(lr Mem"1ers of his mess and in the evenin~ played hridge with General Gruenther, Lt . Col. Eberhard end f;1r-ijor Hunter. A SUJ'nmary of operations for the vreek endin~ Octoher '31, 1g44 is as fol- lows: Advances continued durim~ the enrlv part of the reriod aga inst increasin~ enem;v opposition and adverse ,::ren.ther conditions with the supply of forward elements becomin~ A. difficult pro'l,lern due to v:irtuall;r impassable, muddy ro!'lds . Du.ring the latter pa.rt of the period some withdrawAls were r.-;ade in II and 13 Corps sectors to More favorable, less exrosed defensive positions; reliefs wer"l effected to rest Porward unjts and rehabiljtate equiprn~nt; en;;ineer efforts to improve routes of supply were intensified . On the extreme right of 13 Corps, in the 6 SA Armd Div :md in IV Corps sectors our forces continued to successfully Rttack and gain local objectives. Results of operations for the month of October, 1944 are as follows: Ground forces: Stead:-, advances continued along the front of II Corps despite stubborn enemy oppos·ition and terrain very favorable to the defender . Key points were captured or by- passed and , at end of period units were firmly astride Route //65 , M BEUDNTE was secured along with the important high . ground running generally east along M FAN'O to M. GRANDE and Hill 568 to the . north of M. GRANDE . 13 Corps continued pressure and secured the important feature M. SPADURO and the high ground to the southeast . On the right 6 SA Arrnd Div seized Hill 826 and M. TERMINE while IV Corps maintained contact and secured local objectives. All ge.ins were consolidated and determined �counterattacks were successfully repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy forces. At end of month reliefs ~ere in progress and elements were enroute to rea.r rest areas. Heavy rains throughout month handicapped operations considerably and maximum effort was required to keep supply routes open. Air Suppo1:t: Weather was generally bad during month and air operations were hampered considerably. Fighter bombers flew 685 missions with 31'76 sorties and li 6ht bombers flew 6 day missions with 72 sorties. Operations on a large scale were conducted on 12 October when approximately 6(:l) heavy, 300 medium and 177 fighter bombers attacked targets near BOLOGNA. * * TRAVERSA--~OVEMBER 1, 1944--At 0900 this morning General Clark decorated Colonel Guild and Colonel Hutchinson, Chemical Warfare Officers, with the Legion of Merit. At 0915 the Army Commander met the new infantry field grade officers who reported to Fifth Army Headquarters upon their arrival in this theater from the United States. General Clark left at 1015 to go up to II Corps where he conferred with General Keyes, Corps Commander. Following this conference, the Army Commander proceeded on to the 91st Division command rost where he had lunch with General Livesay, Division Commander. Following lunch, Generals Clark and Livesay went on to the command post of the 361st Infantry Regiment where General Clark promoted Sgt. Crafton A. Palmer and Sgt. Walter Werner to the rank of 2nd Lieutenant and presented Silver Stars to 2nd Lt. la.lmer, Major Eli Black and T/5 David C. Steinman. Following this ceremony General Clark briefed Colonel Broa.dlmv, Regimental Commander, and members of his staff on future plans of the Fifth Army and the 361st In"'antry in particular, after which the Army Commander inspected a QM area and then departed for the 34th Division. Enroute to the 34th Division General Clark met General Bolte, who continued with the Army Commander to the Dbrision corirnand post where they conferred briefly prior to the neparture of General Clark. Enroute back to his command post, the General stopped in at the 8th Evacuation Hospital and talked with several of the wounded men. General Clark had dinner with the regular members of his mess and played cards in the evening before retiring. * * * TRAVERSA--'tfOVEMBER 2, 1944--General Clark remained in hi'3 van durin<=; the entire da~, working on administrative matters and conferrin~ with various staff officers. The General had Generals Brann and Lewis for dinner and for cards in the hut later in the evening. �l43 General Clark today issued the following directive to his subordinate commanders: 11 1. a. It is apparent that the enemy has regrouped his troops to place his maximum strength astride the Southern and Southeastern approaches to BOLOGNA and thereby deny to Fifth Army the accomplishment of its Phase II mission as envisioned in O.I. #34, and amended by subsequent verbal and radio instructions. b. It is also evident that Fifth Army units, particularly those of IT Corps, after more than six weeks of continuous all out attack, during which infantry casualties have been extremely heavy, are sorely in need of a period in rear areas to absorb and train replacements, rest and re-equip. 11 2. Fifth Army will therefore: a. On the mnin axis of penetration, using minimum forces, consolidate present positions, withdraw maximum number of troops to rear areas for rest, absorb replacements, and carry out tr~ining program. b. On the right flank, maintain pressure Against the enemy, withdrawing troops as pinched out by advance of Eighth Army. c. On the left flank of the penetration, improve positions to secure a sound defensive line, thereafter withdrawing to rear areas troops vrhich can be spared. d. On the coastal sector, continue to exert pressure, nrvancine as means and conditions allow. e. tTtilize the -f'ortJ,corrdng reriod of active dAfensjve to regain combat efficiency ana be prep~red to launch a major offensive in conjunction ,rlth Eighth Army on or about 1 Dec 44. II 3• a. lt Corps will: 1) Relieve troops of II Corps on the M. GRANDE hill mass to include M. CASTELLARO (L 9933) and M. CUCCOLI (L 9832). Corps Comiw.nders will arrange details of relief and of boundary and forward agreed recommendation to this Headquarters. (2) Assist the advance of Eighth Army. (3) Continue ratrol action to follow up enemy withdrawal. (4) Submit rlans for relief and resting of troops pinched out by advance of Eighth Army. (5) Maintain contact with Eighth Army and protect the right flank of Fifth Army. b. II Corps will:• (1) Using necessary minimum troops, consolidate present positions. (2) Facilitate relief of 88th Division by units of 13 Corps. (3) Maintain crmtact and follow up any enemy withdrawal. I �Plans for offensive action prior to maj_n attEJck which involves more than 1 infantry company will be submitted to this Headquarters for approval. (4) Rotate units so as to w:ithdraw as many troops as possible to rear areas for rest, re-equipring, absorption of replacements and training. PlRnnen schedule for relief and rest periods of units and other personnel will be submitted to this Headquarters (Attention G-3) with the least practicable delay. ( 5) Provide every facility for comfort r>nd welfare of troops in reserve positions in forward areas. If practicable, mess buildings and heavy tent sleeping accommodations will be utilized . c. 6 South African Armoured Division (with CC "B" attached) will: (1) Continue preparations to capture M. SOLE (L 7829); attack to be on Army order. (2) Assume responsibility for defense of division zone of action, relieving II Corps troops now in the area as soon as practicable. Contact will be maintained with minimum troops, as many as possible being withdrawn to rear areas for rest and recuperation. (3) Be prepared to follow up any enemy withdrawal. (4) Maintain contact with II Corps. d. IV Corps will: (1) Establish small command group of Corps Headquarters in position to facilitate movement, reliefs and subsequent assumption of command of new sector . Corps Comrnanilers will notify this Headquarters when he is prepared to assume command. At such time, IV Corps will assume responsibility for incompleted missions indicated for 6 South African Armoured Division under c above. (2) Concentrate 6 RCT (BEF) in area n';;w held by CC "B" (1st Armored Division). As soon as practicable, relieve CC 11 B" and attached troops . On relief, CC "B", less 2d Battalion, 370th Infantry (92d Division) reverts to parent unit control. Movement to II Corps sector will be accomplished by mutual arrangements Corps Commanders. 2d Battalion, 370th Infantry reverts to control of 92d Division and will be moved on IV Corps orders. (3) After relief of CC "B", press forward along Highway 64 to narrow zone of action of 6 South African Armoured Division. (4) If, on assumption of command, M. SOLE is in enemy hands, prepare plans for its capture and submit same to this Headquarters (Attention G-3). e. 92d Infantry Division will: (1) Operating directly under Army control, assume command of new sector and troops therein (less 6 RCT (BEF)) with least practicable delay, coordinating such action �with IV Corps. ~otify this Headquarters when connnand assumed. (2) Coordinating with PBS, make ev8ry effort to ready remaining elements of the division at the earliest possible date. (3) Hold maximum enemy force in coastal area; continue to exert pressure, occupying any areas the securing of which is deemed within capabilities. (4) Protect the left flank of Fifth Army. (NCfl'E: Attachment and detachment orders of troops now in IV Corps and 6 South African Armoured Division sectors will issue separately). "4. Security - Every effort will be made to conceal from the enemy any movement of troops away from the front. Road movements of troops will be initiated during hours of darkness. The Army Engineer is charged with the necessary coordination of camouflage and dummy instalJJ:itions. The Army Signal Officer will issue necessary instructions to insure radio deception. 11 5. Bivouac Areas: a. 13 Corps - Corps zone. Troops will not be moved South of the ARNO River without express permission of this Headquarters. b. II Corps and 6 South African Armoured Division: In general, area SESTO - PRATO - PISTOIA - MONTECATINI. Assignment of bivouacs in this area will be the responsibility of Fifth Army City Command Detachment, operating under Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, which will open Headquarters in MJNTSCATI~rr at once. Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, will coordinate selection and assignmP-ht of training areas. Training directive will issue separately. c. 11 6. IV Corps - Corps zone Boundaries: • a. II - 13 Corps: 3 ~ (1) above. b. To be submitted for approval (See paragraph II Corps - 6 South African Armoured Division: No change. c. II - IV Corps: Present II Corps - 6 South African Armoured Division boundary will become II - IT Corps boundary when IV Corps assumes command of new sector. d. IV Corps - 92d Division: 250 E~sting. Effective when Commanding General, 92d Division assumes comMand of new sector. 7. Operations Instruction #35 is cancelled. fensive will be covere<l by separate instructions." 11 Resumption of the of- �TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER J, 1944--There was a heavy fog over the entire area today, and a slight drizzle fell during the day. Just before leaving the command post, General Clark conferred with General Cerica, Corunanding General of the Delegation, Italian Army General Staff in Florence, who came to the command post to pay his respects to the Army Conmander. General Clark left the command post at eleven o'clock for Florence and went dire tly to the Anglo-American Hotel, where he had lunch at 16J0 hours. Generals Gruenther and Lewis drove in from the command post in the evening and had dinner with General Clark. * * * TRAVERSA--N'OVEMBER 4, 1944--The General arose at about 10'30 hours and walked with General Brann to the Anglo-American Hotel whe~e they had lunch, returning to the villa at 16oO hours. General Clark and Colonel Saltzman stopped in at a small reception at the 13 Corps Gazelle Club in Florence in the late afternoon where they remained for an hour before returning to General Clark's villa. Generals Gruenther, Brann and Lewis had dinner with the Army Commander this evening. * * * TRAVERSA--NOVEUBER 5, 1944--General Clark arose at 1030 this morning and spent the early part of the morning walking around the grounds of the villa before going down to the Anglo-American Hotel for lunch. He returned After lunch in mid-afternoon and took a short nap before dinner. Generals Gruenther, Tate and Bradshaw were General Clark's guests for djnner, and all played poker in the evening. General Clark today wrote the following letter to General McNarney regarding the Fifth Army situation: "Thank you for your telephone call to Gruenther yesterday in which you expressed the hope that you might be e.b le to procure for us a few 240mm howitzers. As you well know we have an urgent need for heavy artillery in the Fifth Army, and I shall be extremely grateful to you for anything you can do for us. If the 240mm howitzer is not available the 3 inch howitzer is our next choice, with the~ inch gun in third place. However, we are in the position of beggars ann not choosers, and we'll be extremely happy with any heavy caliber. "General Alexander h8ld an Army Commanders meeting at AAI on October 29 to discuss future operations. In spite of the logistical difficulties of launching an attack in the Apennine Mountains in November or December, I urged that an all-out attack be made on Bologna by both armies before Eighth Army is withdrawn for its new mission. McCreary indicated that he could not make a full-scale attack in conjunction with Fifth Army until approximately December 1st. That date suits me, for it will give me an opportunity to rest my American troops and f!bsorb replncements before another attack. • "The plan, as a~eed upon, is for Eighth Army to continue its at- 0 �l L{ '7 tack along Highway 9 to drive the enemy back to a line generally through Castel San Pietro, and extending from there to the northeast. Once the German has come to rest on whatever line he has selected to defend Bologna, both armies will square up to it and attack with every ounce of strength they have. You know, I know, and Alexander knows that Fifth Army will do this. However, based on an experience of almost 14 months association with Eighth Army, I am doubtful that McCreary will launch an all-out effort. I fear that hls attack will be made with a battalion here and a battalion· there with the inevitable danger that progress will soon stall. ) I expressed my views privately to Alexander and urged him to have Eighth Army attack vigorously now so that there will be time for Eighth Army to readjust and make a strong effort in conjunction with Fifth Army on December 1st. In my opinion the German is willing to pull back on the Eighth Army front now if pressure is applied. "I have directed 13 Corps to relieve the U. s. troops on the Mt. Grande feature and the relief by the British 1st Division is now in progress. General Kirkman has expressed doubt that the condition of the roads leading to the position will enable him to support the div~sion. However, I am determined that we can solve that problem. "I am now carrying out a plan to hold my front with about half of the present strength. U.S. troops are being sent to Monte Catini, where we have buildings and bathing facilities. In thAt way I hope to have my divisions in fairly good condition again by December 1st. "My scheme of attack for the December 1st effort has not been determined yet, but it will probably be generally along Highway 65 and to · the west thereof. I nmst be able to support my main attack along an allweather road. "I have now moved Headquarters IV Corps to Highway 64. It has under it the 6th South African Division and the Brazilian Division. The Brazilians will attack along Highway 64. Almond, operating directly under Army, has been placed in command of the coastal sector west of the 25 Ea~ting. "We sent your headquarters lViessage #6566 dated 1 November, in which • attention was called to shortages in certain critical items of equipment. I have listed these items below with a tabulation showing the allowance per infantry division so, that you will see at a glance the significance of each shortage: NUMBER mM 6omm Mortar 81mm Mortar BAR Cal. 30 YG (Lt) Compass M2 Telescopes M4 Grenade Launchers Ivr? SHORTAGE 112 85 1,134 289 207 181 3,370 ., AUTHORIZED PFll DIVISION 81 54 405 121 103 41 1,598 �I know that you realize the urgency of filling these shortages before the\ December 1st attack. I' 11 be grateful to you for any assistance you can / give us. "I am proceeding with plans for the formation of an infantry regi- \ ment by disbanding AAA units, as I discussed with you when you were here. j From our understanding of the equipment situation in the theater it appears probable that it may be necessary to delay formation of the entire regiment. If the shortage is not alleviated in the near future it seems to me that we might be able to start with the organization of one infantry battalion and complete the regiment as equipment becomes available. I shall send you a message soon nominating the AAA units-to be disbanded. "I am glad to learn that the 366th Infantry will be turned over to us soon. Your speedy action is greatly appreciated." * * * TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 6, 1944--The weather today was foggy, but there was little rain. This morning General Clark, General Brann and Colonel Saltzman walked down to the Anglo-American Hotel for lunch. General Clark returned after lunch and took a nap in the afternoon. In the late afternoon General Brann held a cocktail party in his apartment, after which General Clark returned to his villa and spent the evening playing poker with his guests. * * TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 7, 1944--The sky was overcast most of the day today, but there was no rain. General Clark spent the day at his villa with members of Ms stnff. Generals Gruenther, Brann, Tate came for dinner and after dinner the entire group played cards. Operations for the week ending Uovember 7th wer0 as follows: Forward defensive positions were maintained wjth some local improvements resulting, numerous enemy counterattacks were repulsed and a rotation system of scheduled reliefs to rest units was begun. * * * TRAVERSA--T,J'OVEMBER 8, 1944--The weRther was cloudy today with light rains in the afternoon and evening. The Army Commander remained at his villa in Florence all day today, taking care of an accumulation of papers th~t were sent down to him from his headquarters by courier. In the evening the General dined with General Brann. * * * TRAVERSA*-NOVEMBER 9, 1944--There was a steady drizzle in the air throughout the morning developing into a foggy and cloudy afternoon. General Clark left his villa this morning and tirrived at his command post for lunch. He spent the afternoon in his van working on papers and conferring wjth members of his staff. The General had General Tate and Colonel Niblo for dinner in the evening. Colonel Niblo left Fifth Army Headquarters this evening enroute to the United States for twenty-one days' leave. �TRA"\ITTR.SA--NOVCMBER 10, 1944--General Clark spent the morning in his van conferring with his various staff officers. After lunch the General drove to his villa in Florence. Generals Keyes and Pritchard came for dinner and to spend the night . General Clark entertained General Keyes and Pritchard and three Red Cross girls for dinner . General Clark dictated the following random notes for inclusion in his diary: "I spent several days at the villa which has been fixed up in Florence. It gives me an opportunity, while we s,re resting our troops and preparing for the next offensive, to get some needed rest and also a. place where :r.iy commanders and senior staff officers can meet with me for relaxation and for visits to the Florence area. "Upon my return yesterday, I checked with G-2 and G-3 on the situation, and based upon information which reveals the enemy intentions to cling to his present positions, I made the following decisions: 11 (a) To continue to rotate U. S. elements of the II Corps into the Montecatini area to rest and absorb reinforcements . The best I can give the 34th and 88th Divisions is about ten days' stay at f/fontecatini. Afterwards they must go back into the line in order to get 15th and 91st out for an attack which I hope will take place on Bologna the first week in December. 11 (b) That the earliest day I can attack is approximately December \ 5th and this, of course, is predicated upon two assumptions - first, that the Eighth Army has attacked and progressed, and secondly, that they have withdrawn by the weight of their ettack German troops now massed on my front . "(c) I have directed G-3 to prepare orders for an attack along our west coast in the direction of La Spezia in coordination with Fifth Army's attack on Bologna. I discuss < with Captain Gray, my British nflval rep1d resentative, naval gunfire support for this effort. "(d) I directed that orders be issued IV Corps to have the Brazilian Division attack to the northeast on or !'I.bout the 20th of November in order to capture successively Castelnuovo and Mount Pero - this to facilitate the attack by the 6th South African Division on Mount Sole . Both of these attacks must precede my principal effort on Bologna. "(e) I directed G-.3 to prepare plans for the Fifth Army attack, main effort by II Corps generally west of Highway #65, utilizing Routes 64, 65 and the Prata road, and that 13 Corps, depending upon the position of Eighth Army, attack generally towards Castel San Pietro from astride the San Clemente road in order to draw enemy forces in that direction and away from the main effort . 11 As I see Eighth Army's effort, I am convinced that their heart is not in their attack. I have repeatedly represented my views to General Alexander and in a letter to General McNarney copied in the diary notes for November 5th. �lSO "I am preparing a letter to General Eisenhower in answer to two from him which will let him know our eagerness to attack, how we appreciate the contribution we are making to his effort and my worries with regard to the Eighth Army. I still believe that my e~xly December attack will never take place because Eighth Army will not exert the pressure they are capable of doing. The Germans have 15 divisions on my Fifth Army front 13 massed in front of II Corps. Their infantry strength is greater than mine. My restrictions on ammunition and replacements make a prolonged ___attack out of question. I must get superiority at one spot, and this cfa.n only be accomplished by forcing the enemy to divert divisions massed there now to the Eighth Army front or elsewhere. I am convinced that / Eighth Army and Alexander are more interested in a Balkan operation than in the capture of Bologna. A Balkan operation by the Eighth Army would permit a landing behind Tito's forces without opposition. Great ballyhooing would follow for the British Empire, leaving the bulk of Kessel- \ \\ ring's Army opposing me. The withdrawal of the Eighth Army without combining in an attack with me may permit the German High Command to move divisions to meet Eisenhower or Stalin. This might be fatal to their efforts. Our mission, as unglamorous as it may be, is to keep the 28 German Divisions here and gradually chew them up. They must not be permitted to intervene in the battle of W estern Germany. "I am pleased with the prospects of getting another American division. 11 If the Eighth Army is withdrawn and does not attack, there is nothing to do except hold my present position, rotate my troops, build them up and be prepared for an early spring offensive or to follow up or attack in the event the German starts relieving divisions on my front. I still feel that Eighth Army should continue to attack with more effort and both armies square up and smack him in early December in order to capture Bologna. Then Eighth Army would be free for a Balkan venture. "I am not entirely satisfied with the air support we receive. General Eisenhower masses heavy bombers in support of his ground attacks. There is great reluctance in this theater to do so. It stems principally from General Cannon. There is reluctance on his part repeatedly to accept targets in the Bologna area for his medium bombers. I am convinced, and will so demand, that when I attack in December my assault be preceded by all air medium, heavies and fighter bombers directly in front of the main effort and that this keep up every de.y. I will accept the responsibility for bombing my ovm troops. No more important targets exist in Italy. For over a year the air people in this theater have felt it more important to go after German communications than to support directly the ground ) troops during my important attacks. It is perfectly obvious from the results that their efforts on communications hc~ve been more or less futile, for the German has moved divisions at will, maintained them in battle. and fought tenaciously. I will go to McNarney and demand all air on my call for at least ten days prior to and during my attack. I know the air won't win battles, but it will do more good in supporting me directly than by being employed on Strategic missions far remote from the battle for Bologna. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, October 1-November 10, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from October 1-November 10, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/5a7b8464869c97d27466539e4fb78253.pdf?Expires=1787184000&Signature=hjKWrYaKvSIly4snjj0PiiaaNy69%7EpsWel7yLAHaaK8e8SISGEJvzgaZ-X19snWVlSbSIw9C6LzluGZlT060Sp1xl7VHDcsVh1ratNcPrckXSad5VuClFqPgJkels6jtF5WHpWRyeStAFeQBaraK25JSCFqd-6Vo-L%7EXHq5gzx1zsXrlL9UqDKubWsh-CS-Cc2Dy7vr2wnrk%7ECtWAMSa3IP3ohHGjYthioy1gWPkHMyP82t01PxaNxzsw0PbSpzhn5SiVKxo1zP6Lu3OQH-SMJIQXWSAeGR4Ypb0R0bUEe8eZTUZW8w3IvWN6T8UQZh7dr9jjSDa0Oh0g9whcymLtQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 739923eff63ac52106369f459d3390ac PDF Text Text l :'.:) I TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER ll, 194/t·•General Clark walked this morning for about two hours in the gardens of his villa with General Keyes. At eleven o'clock the Army Commander drove back to his command post in Traversa. Upon M.s return he conferred with Generals Gruenther, Tate, MacGruder, G-4 of Ml'OUSA, and General Coffey, Ordnance Officer of Ml'OUSA. Notes of this conference are quoted at the conclusion of today' s diary. Generals Tate and MacGruder were guests of General Clark for lunch. General Clark spent the afternoon in his van. Lt. Col. Blackford of the 8th Evacuation Hospital called to see General Clark. In the evening General Clark entertained twenty-five of his staff officers at a buffet supper on the occasion of the Army-Notre Dame football game. The notes on the conference today are as follows: "General Magruder explained that the purpose of his visit to Fifth Army Headquarters was to outline the ammunition situation in view of the information contained in Message No. LX-51825, received yesterday from the War Department. The ammunition situation in the United States is so critical that it has been necessary to resort to the scheduling of current shipments direct from loading and production lines to docksides. ' The War Department expresses grave doubt of its ability to meet the demands of ETOUSA and l\ITOUSA, especially during the next three to six months. Considering 105 Howitzer M-2 ammlll1ition, the War Department estimates its supply potential in rounds per gun per day as follows: January - 15; February - 17; March - 20; April - 20. "General Tate explained that when he prepared his ammunition analysis of 31 October, he considered that the total available 105 ammunition from 30 October to 10 January would be 1,054,000 rounds. After deducting a reserve of 200,000 rounds to be held for emergencies, there remaj.ned 854,000 rounds available for expendlture during the period 30 October to 10 January. Ammunition expenditure rates have been based on this premise. As a result of information which was brought by General Magruder today, General Tate now finds that the figure of 1,054,000 is too optimistic, with the result that if present rates are continued the reserve will be reduced to approximately 6o,ooo rounds at the conclusion of the 15-day attack now planned for December. 11 General Magruder stated that if we should cut our ammunition expenditure during the quiet period to ten rounds per gun ,er day, we would be ablA to have on hand a reserve of 200,000 rounds at the conclusion of the 15-day offensive in December. "General Clark outlined his plan for the December attack to be made in conjunction with Eighth Army. He stated that he was determined that this attack would be carried out if Eighth Army is ready at that time, and if higher authority considers that it vd.11 make a contribution to the winning of the war. He issued a directive to the Chief of Sta.ff to have a study made whereby ammunition expenditure rates will be reduced immediately." �TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 12, 1944--Today was a clear cold day. The General spent the morning in his van and at ten o'clock saw staff films in his conference hut, after which he drove to the 91st Division to see General Livesay and to the 34th Division to see General Bolte. Returning to his command post, General Clark stopped enroute at the 8th Evacuation Hospital to see General Bowman who was in bed with pneumonia. The General spent the afternoon in his van and in the evening Generals Brann, Bradshaw and Tate came for dinner. After supper they played cards in the mess hut. At the same time, the General had a movie in his conference hut for the members of his staff. * * * TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 13, 1944-•Today was a clear cold day, and the General spent the early pa.rt of the morning in his van. At eleven o'clock the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee arrived, headed by Admiral Richardson and including Rear Admiral K. M. F. Schoeffel, Maj. Gen. H. L. George, Maj. Gen. w. F. Tompkins, Col. F. T. Davidson, Captain Steele, Captain Hoover, Captain Rees, Captain Cole, Colonel Theis and Lt. Col. Robinson. General Clark oriented the committee on the over-all Italian situation, after which he was interviewed by the committee. During the conference a spark from the fireplace caught fire to the camouflage net over the hut, and General Clark and his guests were forced to leave the hut while the fire was being extinguished. No serious damage was done. General Clark gave to all members of the committee an autographed copy of the "Advance on Rome 11 • After lunch the committee left the command post, and General Clark, with Generals Brann, Tate and Colonel Saltzman, left for his villa in Florence for dinner and the night. Following are the notes on the conference General Clark held with the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee: "Admiral Richardson explained that three plans were under consideration for the reorganization of national defense, namely, organization with two departments, with three departments or with a singlE3 dep8rtment. The committee would like to hear General Clark's views on these plans and ask him a few questions. "General Clark stated that he f eels that there should be a single department with one man responsible f or all the armed forces. His main interest is that such an arrangem ent provide unity of command which would flow down to the lower echelons. Although unity of command exists in principle in this theater it is exercised only by the Supreme Commander. He apparently exercises little control over the Royal Navy. There have been several instances, chiefly during the Anzio operations, when the commander on the sp9t should have coJTJmanded both the naval and ground elements in that area. "General Clark stated that air cooperation with the Fifth Army had been excellent, because the Fifth Army has its 0 1:1111 air support unit. However, General Clark believes that the effectiveness of this support �would be improved if there was unity of command rather than cooperation. At the present time, for example, it is extremely important that Fifth Army receive more air sorties daily because of the critical shortage in artillery ammunition. There is a pull between making sorties available for close ground support and using them to cut communications in the rear. "General Clark closed these remarks by expressing the belief that with a central control and unity of command, operations would be improved. He realized the difficulties this system would present, but in general that is his belief. "When asked for his recommendations regarding an j_deal air-ground setup, Gen~ral Clark stated that he was in favor of an air support com• mand with an army which is prjmarily for the direct close-in support of the army. This air group should be under the operational control of the ground commander as an attached unit, not organic in the army. Should the a:ir be needed to support other operations, elements of the air support unit could be turned over temporarily for such operations. However, the air operations staff should ordinarily remain with the ground commander. General Clark stressed that his relations with General Cannon and General Chidlaw have bAen most favorable. There is a constant exchange of a:ir officers and ground combat officers so that each group will be familiar with the air and e,:-ouno problems. "The question arose as to how much of the air would be an integral part of the ground commander's forces, .and Genera1 Clark made it clear that he meant only to have as an integral part of the army the artillery liaison cub planes. General Clark believes that the tactical reconnaissance planes which are used for reconnaissance, photo coverage, and artillery spotting should be under operational control of the army ground commander. Under the system now employed in the Fifth Army area the Tac R squadrons, in effect, function under the operational control of the Fifth Army Commander. 11 It was pointed out by members of the committee that the recommended relationship of the air support unit is contrary to the doctrine published by the War Department but is based on actual experience in this war and appears to have worked. General Clark stated that the present system will work. All concerned have cooperated effectively to insure that it works. However, he stated that he still believes that it will be a more efficient system if the principle of command is substituted for cooperation, and that it should extend down to include the 11_ rmy. "On inquiry by the committee General Clark stated th1:t he believed that in a single department of national defense the Air should be an equal component to the Army and the Navy. Upon being asked his conception of the staff of the head of the armed forces in a single department, he said that he thought it should be generally small and tht:1.t there should be larger staffs for the Army, Navy and Air respectively. He recalled that in the March 1942 reorganization of the War Department an a.ttempt was made to place the larger staffs in the Ground Forces, Air Forces and SOS respectively, reducing the War Department General Staff. �"Admiral Richardson pointed out that under the proposed plan no assistant secretary was specifically assigned to the Army, Navy or Air, bu-'-, all were to be assigned to the single department as a whole. It was hoped that this would tend to make them all pull together. The U. s. Chiefs of Staff would be composed of the senior officers of the Army, Navy and Air respectively. The plan provided that they would present the budget directly to the President, in a body. If disagreement occurred the dissenting member would be able to present his views to the President in company with the others. In answer to a question from General Gruenther as to the position of the Secretary of the Armed Forces respecting the budget, Admiral Richardson explained that the President, as Commander-in-Chief would, under the plan, deal directly with hi8 military chiefs in this regard. "Upon inquiry General Clark stated that he believed that if the single department idea should prove unrcceptable the plan witb three departments would be rreferable to the plan with two, pointing out the present size of the air forces, and stated that he assumed the other two services would retain certain essential air elements. When asked the same question General Gruenther said that he preferred two departments to three, but was enthusiastically in favor of a single department. Admiral Richardson observed that today, although General Arnold is a. member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he is a subordinate of General Marshall's so that now our air power has not coordinate power with the ground and the sea in presenting things to the President. He mentioned that an objection which can be raised to the single department plan lies in the fact that it would give more power, responsibility and influence to one cabinet officer than to any of the others and would therefore tend to throw the cabinet out of balance. General Clark pointed out that in time of peace the Air has many planning and proparatory activities involving civilian aviation and would have a vast amount of work to do. "The subject of the use of marines to make the assault a.nd develop the beaches and then turn the operation over to ground troops was discussed and General Clark stated that he had not worked with marine forces but was of the opinion that this procedure was not desirable, as it takes too long to relieve units and there is the possibility of confusion on the beaches. "When asked whether the Army is capable of conducting the training and development of amphibious and airborne troops in time of peace, General Clark gave as an illustration the situation in North Africa in 1943 when, incident to the preparations for the Salerno landings, the question arose of who should command the amphibious training involved. Finally the Navy took it over after a species of joint operation of the training just prior to Salerno. He is inclined to think that the Navy should do it. Admiral Richardson stated th~t one distinguished witness before the committee had recommended a change in the role of the fleet ihrine Corps, so that the marines would make no effort to develop assault troops of the Army passing through them. The marines would handle landing craft training, and army units would be sent to them from time to time for training. �"Along this line, the question was raised as to whether or not the marines might not take over the duty of Rangers and Commandos. General Clark was of the opinion that this plan had many merits, explaining that he had had Rangers, Commandos and the 1st Special Service Force under his command, and althougb they had performed marvelously well with him they were too hard to maintain. Finding replacements for these units is a serious problem. They require an especiRlly high caliber type of soldier and sustain heavy losses due to their aggressiveness. "A committee member inquired whether General Clark agreed with the marines 1 contention that for the period of the assault of a beach more small arms and fewer vehicles are needed than in a normal army division. General Clark replied that more machine guns were desirable but could be arranged by the provision of extra ones for a particular operation, and that excess of vehicles had not been a worry to him as they had always been limited by the available craft. At Anzio he had sent in over 500 extra machine guns. "Admiral Richardson stated that the committee felt that initially the marine setup should be left as it is and be permitted to develop later. "Upon being asked by Admiral Richardson whether supply procuremP.nt should be unified or separate, General Clark said that it was a difficult job for one man and that it might be desirable to start out with one man doing the common items. General Gruenther agreed thnt this is as far as they should go. "Generals Clark and Gruenther in reply to a question stated that they thought the several services would be more apt to drift apart in peacetime under the two or three-department system than under the plan with a single department, and said that they thought a joint secretaryship and joint chief of staff, charged with coordination by law, would facilitate cooperation. On inquiry General Clark had no additional ideas to suggest for improving the single-department organization. When asked whether it would be desirable for the chief of staff to be responsible directly to the President on military matters concerning theaters and the home forces rather than reporting through the cabinet officer, General Clark said he thought it might be better for the armed forces but wondered whether the American people would like such an arrangement. Neither General Clark nor General Gruenther had additional suggP.stions concerning the three-Hepartment or two-department organization. "The question was put to General Clark as to whether the command relationships had been satisfactory on the amphibious flagships during the various landings in wh:i.ch he had participated. General Clark replied that in his experience the cooperation had been excell8nt but recommended that in the case of an amphibious landing the naval commander be in charge of orArations until the ivound com!lk~nder reaches shore and indicates his readiness to take over the command of the land operations. The ground commander would decide when he was ready to take over. As �an example General Clark cited the SalP-rno expedition, in which he had coordinate authority with Admiral Hewitt of the Navy and Air Chief Marshal Tedder of the Air. He felt that there should have b9en one commander. The first of fie er who had single command was General I:isenhower. To illustrate the need on that occasion of unity of command, General Clark mentioned the fact that he had had a floating reserve which the local naval commander (a British officer) caused to be unloaded while General Clark was in the process of determining where it could be landed with maximum effect. "In response to the query as to whether or not there was any trouble regarding loading arrangements prior to landings due to the dual control of operations, General Clark replied that instances had occurred where the Navy would refuse to load certain items required in the operation, and the first the Army Commander heard of it was when the material was already on the docks ready to load. This further illustrated the lack of coordjnation where the command is divided. As an example he mentioned a situation which arose at Oran just prior to the Salerno landings. Air fields were vital at the beginning of the landing and the air forces needed machinery, netting, bombs, ground personnel etc. The initial air lift was always an issue in the planning. The Navy refused to load bombs at Oran. A single responsible commander would work everything out ahead of time, making his decisions and taking his calculated risks. 11 Upon being asked whether he had 0A'Jlerienced any difficulties with communications resulting from lack of unity of command, General Clark said that he had not and stated that the command ships in amphibious operations had been excellently equipped; that their facilities had been his only means of communications at the beginning of landings, and that there had been no trouble. "Admiral Richa,rdson inquired whether there had been any cases of naval commanders being loath to take ships in close to shore for fear of their running agr01md. General Clark said that there had been no holding back of any kind at Salerno, but thA.t after the capture of Naples it was decided to make one or more amphibious landings in the form of close end runs. At this time the Navy turned down some of the projects for naval reasons, notably because of the hazards due to coast defense guns and mines. The Navy at this time was under British command. "There was discussion of the joint education and trainjng of personnel of the various branches of the service and of whether, for example, officers should spend six months training with another service; also of whether West Point and Annapolis students might spend a period of study at the other academy. General Clark approved the idea of the various branches of the service working together to better understand each other's problems and cited the Fifth Army policy of having Air Corps personnel working with front line units and infantry and artillery officers working with the Air Corps." General Clark today wrote the following letter to General Alexander regarding the ammunition situation in Fifth Army: �\51 11 1. On 11 Uovember I learned that the U.S. ammunition supply situation for all theaters is critical and will remain so for several months. Allotments to be made to Fifth Army for December and subsequent months for the most important types are listed below in rounds per gun per day: Jan, Feb. Mar, ~ 21* 15 17 43* 15 14 16 15 20 15 15 20 15 16 ~ 105mm Howitzer 155mm Howitzer 155mm Gun 9 * - Bulk arrives in theater after 20 December. 11 2. When Fifth Army discontinued the attack on 28 October, expenditures of the most critical typos of artillery amnnmition were reduced to the following quantities: Rounds per gun Rer day 105mm Howitzer 155mm Howitzer 155mm Gun 27 17.5 16.5 11 3. Upon receiving word of the critical ammunition situation throughout all theaters, I reduced Fifth Army allotments on November 12th to the following: Rounds per gun per day 105mm Howitzer 155mm Howitzer 155mm Gun 15 17.5 (no change) 9 11 4. My Corps artillery is very limited and, as you know, the 105mm howitzers of U.S. Divisions are only 1/2 the strength of the 25 pounders of the British Divisions. This reduction is a drastic cut and will affect adversely the morale of my troops, but I was obliged to put it into effect in order to save for my offensive operation. All runmunition in this theater has been allotted to Fifth Army, and there is no hope of securing more. There is no treater reserve. For that reason I have set up the following amounts of the most critical types as an army reserve to be held for emergency use only: Reserve 105 mm Howitzer 155mm Howitzer 155mm Gun 11 5. 200,000 45,000 9,500 By reducing the expenditure rates during the defensive phase �t58 to those enumerated in paragraph 3 above, and deducting -the emergency reserves enumerated in paragraph 4 above, there will be sufficient ammunition for an all out offensive by Fifth Army of 13 to 15 days. This estimate is based on a daily consumption rate slightly in excess of 25,000 rounds. It conforms to Fifth Army experience for offensive operations during the past 14 months. It does not allow for ammunition expenditures to repel enemy counterattacks during the defensive phase. "6. J have ma.de a thorough c;tudy of the enemy situa. tion on the Fifth Army front, including Ms strength, dispositions and probable intentions. I have considered the recent operations of Eighth Army as they have af'fected the sitm tion of Fifth Army. It is my esti ,..,ate that it is / improbable that a combined attack by Fifth and Eighth Armies will result 1 in the capture of BOLOGWA in a 13-15 day full scale attack. Upon completion of such an offensive it will be necessary to resume for several months the low rate of fire of approximately 15 rounds per gun per day for the 1O5rmn weapons. This reduced expenditure will preclude the continuation of the offensive. 11 7. I am bringing this matter to your attention in order that you may know of Fifth Army's reduced capabilities in view of the drastic curtailments in ammunition. I shall continue to give the matter my personal attention to determine whether or not further economies can be made in our ammunition expenditures." * * TRAVERSA--~OVEMBER 14, 1944--~oday the weather was cloudy with light rains. The General spent a quiet morning walking and resting. The Army CoPnnander lunched at the villa. At one o 1 clock General Bowman arrived with Lt. Col. Blackford. General Bowman, at General Clark's invitation, came to spend a few days at the villa to recuperate from his recent illness. General Clark inspected a mobile dentistry unit and had his teeth cleaned. G~nerals Gruenther, Tate, Bowman and Colonel Saltzman were guests of General Clark for dinner, after which they played cards. A brief summary of operations for the •veek ending November 14, 1944 is as f'ollmvs: Relief of 88th Division and elements of 85th Division by 1 Br~tish Division was completed. 34th Division was reljeved by 91st Division. New sectors of responsibility became effective and scheduled reliefs to rest areas were carried out. Positions along front were maintained and some advances on the right of 13 Corps were made to conform to those made 0y elements of 2 Polish Corps. Local improvements in positions i.n left sector were made by 92d Division. Contact with enemy was maintained along entire front hy active patrolling throughout period. ��ln°I TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 15, 1944--Snou began early this morning, but the : k ~ ~ cleared later in the afternoon. General Cla.rk left his villa at 0900, arriving at his command post at 1000 hours. At 1100 hours General Sousloparov, Russian Representative to the Allied Commission, arrived, accompanied by Lt. Col. Savco and Lt. Col. Lapkin. Th8y were greeted with an honor guard, after which General Sousloparov presented General Clark with the Russian Military Order of Suvarov, First Degree, the highest Russian military decoration. General Clark briefed GAneral Sousloparov and his party on the current Fifth Army situation, after which General Clark entertained Generals Tate, Brann, Howard and Colonel McMahon and his Russian guests for lunch in the hut. The party left at 1500 hours, and the General drove to his villa in Florence. Generals Gruenther, Brann, Tate and Bowman were guests for dinner and the night. * * * TRAVERSA--NOVEl!BER 16, 1944--Tbe ""ather today was cloudy with inte~~ tent snow and rain showers. General Clark took off by L-5 from the . Florence cub strip for Montecatini where he larded on the autostrada. The General was met by Lt. Col. 'Elam, of the G-4 Section, Fifth Army, and driven to the para.de grounds where the Army Comman:'ler was greeted by Generals Bolte, Keyes, Crittenberger, Almond and Kendall. General Clark received honors of ruffles and flourishes and the General's March. The 1st Battalion of the 16~th Infantry was formed in a gm.rd of honor, as well as 135 officers and enlisted men of various Fifth Army units who were to be decorated, promoted and appointed by the Army Commander. After honors had been given the Army Commander, General Clark spoke briefly to the assembled group, commending the 1st Battalion of the 168th Infantry who were to receive the War Department Unit Citation for outstanding combat performance. The Army Command er also addressed the officers and men who were to be promoted, decorated and appointed to commissioned grades, expressing his deep appreciation of their fine service and how proud the Fifth Army was of the outstanding job these men have done. The Army Commander also explained the important part the Allied Armies in Italy were playing in the over-all picture, containing and cutting up twent:r eight of the Germans best dj_visions. After GAneral Clarkts few words, he decorated a.nd made combat appoi11.tments and promotions to the follow'i ng person 1el: From 2nd Lieutenant to 1st Lieutenant; Elizabeth J. Smith, Robert E. Bowker, Helen B. Zasedil, Jacqueline E. Samuels, Urho V. Harvinan, Al Gutterman, Edgar A. Lyon, John 'T'. Sugrue, Thomas H. Randall, Hal'ry B. Muske, George H. Moore, John F. Mihocik, Kenneth Jorjorian, Benjamin F. Graham, Roccard A. Ferrante, James A. Cochrane. 1 From 1st Lieutenant to Captain: From Captain to Major: Joseph W. Walton, Jr. Charles C. Siegling, Jose A. Andino. Appointed to 2nd Lieutenant: 1st Sgt. Alexander A. Szymanski, T/Sgt. Donald R. Sprow, T/Sgt. Dewitt H. French, 1st Sgt. Peter DeAugustine, �S/Sgt. Robert c. Osborne, 1st Sgt. Joseph F. Tucker, T/Sgt. V.verett M. Flanders, 1st Sgt. Joseph B. Bracy, T/Sgt. Wm. S. Hicks, T/Sgt. Jos. W. Fry, 1st Sgt. Gilbert Bootho, T/Sgt. Frank Whisonant, Sgt. Luther C. ,Tones, 1st Sgt. Frank J. Rodrigues, T/Sgt. Clarence E. Ripley, T/Sgt. Frank A. Drazkowski, Jr., T/Sg'",. Mnrtin L. Gnemi, T/Sgt. Haskell H. Hu~hes, s/Sgt. Stanley F. Dosey, s/sgt. Eugene A. Borg, T/Sgt. James E. Mc11anus, '1'/Sgt. Boydell Hoffman, S/Sgt. Frank E. Smith, S/Sgt. Chester Loss, '1'/Sgt. Hughes B. Bennett, Sgt. Lewis L. Millett. 'T'he Army Commander pinned the Air M8dal on Brigadier General Guy O. furtz, and the Oak Leaf Cluster to the Air Medal was pinned on 1st Lt. Ralph O. Oglesby, ?nd Lt. Walton C. Schoonover and 1st Lt. Earle I. Coleman. General Clark presented the Dist:inguished Service Cross to Fvt. Edwin Lemke, Ffc. Jack E. Green, S/Sgt. Walton C. Westfall, s/sgt. Sam McGowan, S/Sgt. Wm. H. Eastland, T/Sgt. Herman Ledford, Capt. Wm. B. Fulton, Capt. James M. Doyle, Maj. Thomas L. Cussrms and Col. Gustav J. Braun. The Legion of Herit was pinned by General Clark on Col. Henry S. Blesse, Col. Kenneth F. Ernst, Col. Lewis W. Kirlanan, Col. FrRnk Y. Lef!ver, Col. Lee R. PiArce, Col. George 'T'. 1'food, Lt. Col. Caleb J. King, Jr., ~"/Sgt. Pete G. Cl8rk, T/Sgt. Harold 1:i . Branum, T/Sgt. Whitney W. Frost, T/5 Harold C. Brmwart. Genere.l Clark also pj nned the Silver Star on Capt. Francis J. Kenyon, Capt. Ian F. Turner, 1st Lt. James R. Blount, Capt. Cleo W. Buxton, Capt. Alvin T. Colbus, 1st Lt. James E. Henderson, 1st Lt. Irving B. Fesetzky, :?nd Lt. John F. Mihocik, 1st Sgt. Thomas E. Zukauskas, T/Sgt. Robert D. Wt:1.goner, S/Sgt. Ralph D. Baker, S/Sgt. John H. Czuk, S/Sgt. Lealen R. Martin, S/Sgt. Sa1vatore G. Viselli, s/sgt. Vade G. Cash, Sgt. Chester S. Gutkowski, Sgt. raul N. Kemmler, Sgt. John W. King, Sgt. BenJamin F. Lambeth, Sist. James D. Susalia, Ffc. Er1ward Shadd, Cpl. Murcilio Juiz Finto, Sgt. James R. De~ton, Ffc. Clarence E. Dickinson, Ffc. Joe H. Hoogerheide, f Pc. Joseph Pucek, Fvt. G. Vf . Bulkin, Fvt. Robert D. Gerstenecker. 'T'he Oak Leaf Clw:;ter to the Silver Star was awarded to T/5 Louis L. Schafer and Staff Serget:mt Douglas M. Dickerson. General ClArk presented the Bronze Star to IV!aj. Arthur R. Schmidt, Maj. John M. Walker, Capt. John L. Kay, 1st Lt. Ralph H. :Major, 1st Lt. Ravmo'1d Arriza'l-ialagB. Jr., ?nd Lt. Cunningham C. Bryant, T /5 John F. Flahive, rr/5 Andrew J. Gi:rolami, Fvt. Edward Jaeger, 1st Lt. Cora i1. Foster, Capt. Brmani Airosa DaSilva, Cpl. J'1etro Re, Ffc. John S. Downer, Maj. Harris J. North. The General also pinned the streamers on the guidons of the 1st Battalion of the 168th In"'antry and presented them with the War Department Unit citation. After the ceremony Gent"lra 1 Clark gave a luncheon at Montecatini for �for approximately 100 officers and enlisted men who had been decorated, appointed and promoted. General Clark sroke briefly to the luncheon guests, telling them that he had rmde arrangements for all of them to spend three days at Montecatini before returning to their units. After lunch General Clark, with Generals Gruenther and Brann, drove to the air strip on the autostrada where they took off in L-5 1 s for Florence. General Bolte and Colonel Braun, with Colonel Wood and General Bowman, dined at the villa, and General Clark and Colonel Saltzman dined at the Hotel Anglo-American. * * TRA.VERSA--~10VEMBER 17, 1944--The General spent a quiet day at the villa. In the evening the General dined out with General Brann. * * * ~RAVERSA--ijOVEMBER 18, 1944--The weather was clear today with scattered clouds. The Army Commander left the villa at 0930, arriving at his command post at quarter of eleven. At 111~5 Genert1.ls Harding, Clark, Gruenther and Lemnitzer conferred for about an hour. Generals Harding r-md Lemnitzer had lunch with General Gruenther. Mr. H. V. Kaltenborn arrived at 1230 and was briefed by General ClHrk in the hut and remained for lunch. The General spent the ~fternoon in his van, conferr,ng w:ith Generals Keyes and Crane, Artillery Officer of AFHQ. In the evening the General dined with the regular memb~rs of his mess and after dj nner played bridge w:i th General Gruenther, Colonel Eberh.<ird and Colonel McCall. * * * TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 19, 1944--'l'he weather today remained clear with scattered clouds. 'l'he General spent the day in his van conferring with various members of his staff and working on administrative matters. In the morning General Cllll'k was interviewed by Sergeant Derry And Sergeant Scott of Yank Magazine. The General spent the remainder of the afternoon in his van and dined wi.th the regular members of his staff mess. General Clark today sent the following letter to General McNarney regard:i.ng the Fifth Army situation: "Received your letter of Novemb,~r 11th and aprrecinte the efforts you have made to secure additional heavy artillery for Fifth Army. I hope later on you can /:t ~t some 240 howitzors. We need them badly. �"I am thoroughly f-amiliar with the o.mmunition supply and appreciate that if 11ny effort is to be made later on, oonservations must be made now. To that end we have been firing approximately ten rounds per gun daily of 105mm and m.11 continue to do so until we attack . I can fire no less . If 105mm ammunition arrives as per schedule, and holding out a minimum reserve, I can attack for from thirteen to fifteen days and might, with luck, be a'hle to go on for four or f'ive days longer without touching the reserve . "I had a long conference with Harding yesterday. I have been worried, as I indicated in my letter of Novemb~r 5th, concerning :Sighth Army activity. They seem to be coming up slowly, and I do not know what shape they will be in to launch an offensive in early December. I get indications that they will not be ready quite a-t that time . However , we will see the results of their forthcoming attack and then be able to make better plans . I am most anxious to attack on Bologna in conjunction with Eighth Army. I feel their attack in the valley should precede mine, and my wallop should be turned loose at the a-r,propriate moment. I am meeting with Alexander and McCreery in a few days, at which time we can better work out the timing . The main thing is to get an agreement that both armies will attack with all their might. r am delighted that you are getting the loth Mountain Division for Fifth Army. I think the arrangements you ho.ve made are fine . We can give them the additional trainin~, and they will be better off motorized than all mule . 0 "Am also pleased with yonr efforts to obtain special critical items of equipment which we need . With what is schr~dul 1'od to come and with some minor improvisations, we will get along nicely. "Received your letter with regard to errors in reporting men "missing in action" . Am F;etting all the dope and will reply shortly. "All your asJista.nts have been most helpful . we are delighted to have them. Many have heen up, and "Will be glad to see you any time, and I will keep you posted as to the timing of the attack and my plans . I run trying to work it out so that I will have some continuity to my attack, for it will be a tough one . In the meantime, will start my attack with the Brazilians for limited ob,iectives which will help the big push later. 11 co:~ '!'RAVERSA--N~MBER 20 , 1944• -~he "eat:er today was rainy and Gene- \ ral Clark saw Colonel Johnson and Colonel Gray of the Jui:Ige~e ' s Office and 8,lso saw Major General Rooks, Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ, with whom he conferred for half an hour . After lunch Generals Clark and Brann drove to 13 Corps at Scarperia where they conferred with General Kirkman . The General then drove to his villa in Florence, stopping enroute at ��,q liovember 23rd . Jtf Following personal Mai~ !:'i~ t , from Prime :,.:inister to General Mark Clark . It gives me the greatest pleasure to te11 you that the ?resident and his military advisors regard it as a compliment that d . ,1 . Government should wish to have you command the 15th Group of armies under General ALEXf':NDBR, who becomes supreme commander owing to the appointment of Genera 1 VITI.SON to succeed Sir JOHN DILL in WASHINGTON . I am sure we could not be placing our troops, who form the large majority of your command., in better hands, and that your friendship, of which you told me, with Gen eral ALEXA1DSR will at once smooth and propel the course of operations . When I saw General EISKifHO'JER last week at his headquarters I spoke to hi;n about TRUSCOTT succeeding you in the conuand of the 5th Army . He promised to release him if in due conrse he is approached by the U.S . aut~,ori ties . I expect this will be agreeable to you and General ALEXti..NDER specially desires it. Every good 1,vish in your new command . We have the utmost confidence in you and in the goodwill which has alwa ys guided your conduct with your Bri tj_sh comrades and Allies . Time of origin 231800 receipt- 232325 Decode - 240020 �I will be deeply honored to command the 15th Army Group . I fully realize the responsibility this assignment entails and the compliment ll . ,.; . Government has paid me in 9onsenting to place your glorious Eighth Army under my command . Please rest assured that its welfare vrl.11 be carefully guarded . I ar.1 proud to continue my happy association with Generals Alexander and :cCreery . 15th Army Group 1vill be eager to resume the all-out attack at an early date in order to destroy the Cerman armies here a~d prevent tmr intervening in battles in the East and "lest . Please accept my great appreciation for the confidence you have always placed in me . �the 24th General Hospital to see Colonel McMahon, G-1 of the Fiftb Army, and Colonel Roberts, AG, MI'OUSA, who hr-i.d been injured in a motor accident this morning. General ClF1rk entertained at his villa Colonels Smith, Nygaard, W alker and General Bowman for dinner. The Army Commander r etired early in the evening. * * ,,,RAVERSA--NOVEMBER 21, 1944--The weath"'r today was fine. The General remained in bed this morning with a head cold. Major Brandt of the 15th Evacuation Hospital, ear, nose a,nd throat specialist, came to attend the Army Commander. General Sullivan and Colonel Bruce came for dinner. General Clark today received the cover plan for the attack, scheduled for the first week in December, from AAI. A summary of operations for the week ending November 21, 1944 is as follows: Some small gains were made as patrols continued active operation, defensive positions were maintained and enemy efforts to penetrate our front lines repulsed. Reliefs proceeded according to schedule and units in the rear continued a program rest reha,bilitation and further training concurrent with the absorption of new replacements. * * TRAVERSA--WOVEMBER 22, 1944--The weather today was cloudy. The General's cold was much improved today, but he was advised by Colonel Bruce and Major Brandt to stay in. General Brann came to see General Clark this morning and also General Hume, who has just returned from France. General ClRrk lunched at the villa with General Brann and his aide and rested in t he afternoon. General Gruenther arrived At 1700. General Cle.rk gave a small dinner with Generals Gruenther and Brann and three sr,uests. The Army Commander rl"ltired shortly after dinner. * * TRAVERSA--NO'\IEMBER 23, 1944--'T'he weather today wa,s rainy. Genera,ls Gruenther and Brann spent the morning conferring with General Clark. General Clark, with Gen , rals Gruenther and Brann and his aide, lunched at , the Anglo-American Hotel. Generals Clark e,nd Gruenther after lunch drove to the command post at ~raversa. This evening General Clark gav~ a Thanksgiving dinner at which the following were present: General Howard, Lt. Col. Iorter, Major Houston, Captain Crawford, Lieutenant Bajenow and Lieutenant Berenson. After �dinner the General retired early 'n the evening. * * * TRAVERSA--NOVE:tv'IBE:11. 24, 1944--The weather today was drizzling and rainy.) The General spent the day working on papers and conferring with membe~s of his staff. After lunch Gen~rlll. ClRrk jnterviewed ten field grade offfoers who had just arrived from the United States to be assigned as replaceMent battalion commanders. · Gimerals Brann and 'T'Bte came for dinner, and after dinner General Clark played carrls wjth Generals ':'ate, Brann, Gruenther and his aide. * * * TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 25, 1944--The weather today 1ms rainy. This morning Brigadier General John M. Greeley, Office of Coordinator of InterAmerican Affairs, who had just arrived from the States, called to s~e General Clark. General Kirkman and Brigadier Archibald, G-Ops of 13 Corps, camP- to confer with General Clark and stayed for lunch. General Chidlaw called to see the Army Co1'!1r:1ander this aft~rnoon. The General left for his villa in Florence at 1600 hours. Generals Gruenther, Bra.nn and 'T'ate dined with the General and after dinner play"'d cards. * * * TRAVERSA--N()VEMBER 26, 19/"4,--Today it was raining. The Army Commander spent the early part of the morning at his villa, conferring wUh Generl'l.J s Gruenth""r and Bra'1!1. In the early hours Colonel La.due, Chief of Staff of IV Corps, came to report to the Army Commar:rler concerning a repulsed attack of th~ ~nd Battalion of the 370th Infantry, 92nd Division. At 1145 hours General Clark attended a conference held by the ComTl'\ander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in Italy, General Alexander, flt the Florence CoMmand. The following officers atten0ed the conference: Gen~rals Alexander, Harding, Lemnitzer and Robertson of .l\AI; Gen~rals Clark, Gruenther, Brann and TR.te and Brigadier Divers of Fifth Army; General McCreery and Brigadier Floyd of Eighth Army; Generals Cannon and Chidlaw of the XII Air Force; A:ir Vice Marshal Dickson of the Desert Air Force. Following is the gist of Gimeral Clark' s comments at th is conference: "The Fifth Army will be r8ady to launch its attack by 7 December. Never has the Fifth Ar-rrJY been faced wi.th a more difficult ta.sk than that presented by the coming a+,tack. Enemy strength on the front o~ the Fifth Army is proportionately i;;reater than ev('l)r before. He has excellent roads which give him great flexibility and permits him mov~ng reserves to meet any threatened ar('l)a. Bis units are well up in strength, �rested and in as good condition for battle as my own. The Fifth Army has ammunition for a 15 day all out attack, and it is possible that the p~rjod may be extended about three days by the arrival of additional ammunition due approximately 20 December. I am ready and willing to launch this at.tack and will throw every man that I hav"' into the battle in the hope of capturin~ BOLOG!IA. nwhen asked whether 13 Corps should operate under Fifth Army or Eighth Army in the coming offensive, General Clark replied: 'In my opinion 13 Corps must continue to operate under Fifth Army. It is true that the operations on the right flank of 13 Corps are cl0sely allied with the operations of Eighth Army, but logistical reasons, such as the necessity for Fifth Army to furnish 13 Corps U.S. transportation and U.S. 'Enginc,ers in order that the divisions in the Mount GRANDE area be maintained, it is desirable that no change in command be made. I run / ready and will:ng that 13 Corps do ev~rything within its capabil1ties to assist the ~dvance of Elf;hth Army and will direct that Ge11eral Kirkman comnunicate direct with General T-flcCreery on the arrangement of details for operations to assist Eighth Army. I hope tha.t in a later stage of the operation I shall be 11bln to use rart of 13 Corps to assist the advance of the II Corps.' "The Gimeral was aske<l for comments concerning air support for the com1n~ offensive and stated: tit I nMd all air thtit I can possibly ~et for this coming event. By that, I mean "'ightr,r bomber attacks, Medium attacks and heavy attacks to begin possibly one day before the offensive -ls launched and to continue throu~hout the period of the attack. We h~ve prepared an air program for the initial attacks of the first two or three days and will continue to search for suitable targets for continuous air support. In this coming attack I consirler that the air is our only great Emperiority and that it must oe used to its maximum carabilities. I have notice<l that in France they are using as many as 1,200 heavy bombers to precede an assault in that theater and desire that the same t;vpe of air support be given Fifth Army in this offensive.' "Gimeral Cannon commented th~t the fi ~hter bombers and medium bombers would be mare available and that he anticipated no trouble in getting the heavies if proper targets could be produced. He further st~ted that the air was ready at ruiy time to support the o-f'fensive whenever the ground troops were prepnred to follow up the bombardment. Gen(",ral Clark stated that his troops were always reacy to follow up the bombardment and would do so in the comin~ offensive. "General McCreery Mncurred with General Clark. It wAs mandatory thi:i.t this of'fensiv~ be supported by the maximum air effort a'1d thnt, in his opinion, the air should not be too selective in the selection of targets because in many instances targets which did not appear to mAet all the requirements <lemanred by the Air on air photos were, in fact, quite sui tR.ble targets when examined on the ground. 11 �After +,he conference General Clark gave a luncheon for Generr-1 Alexander and fifteen of the off'ic"'rs who attended the meeting at the An~lo-Am~rican Fotl'!l. Just bef'or"'l lunch, Air ir-tce Marshal Dickson, before the assembled ~roup of officers, prAsP,nted the DFC to Lieutenant Jones, Co-Filot of General Clark 1 s C-47. General CltITk af'ter lunch bade goodbye to General Alexander nnd other officers anc returned to his villa. General ClPrk dined in Florence with General Brmin this evening. General Clark today wrote General McWarney as follows with regard to battle casualty reports: "I have received and given cnreful study to your letter of 13 ~-rovember regarding corrections of battle casualty reports of men initially reported as mi1sing in action. !'I fully realize the seriousness of the requirements of speed and accuracy where battle Cc'\Sual ty reports a:re concerned, ann appreciate our responsibility to next of kin. As you know, successful action has been taken in the Fifth Army in recent months to improve the general efficiency of our battle casualty reporting. I run undertaking at once to improve the situation mentioned in your letter. "In accordance with your instructions, tl1is problem has been discussed with each of my division commanders, who have been directed to discuss it peirsonally with their subordinates along indic::ited lines. Jn pc,dition, my G-1 and Adjutant Gen~ral have <liscussed the problem extensively wit}; division staff officers and regimental commanders, in an attempt to disclose the fundamental elements of the problem and to develop remedies. Small unit commanders will he impressed vri th the seriousness of corrections in this type of report nnd will impress upon their men the unfortun.Ate results which flow from their unauthorized absences. Stops will be taken to locate more promptly indivic~uals who become separated from their units during combat. In addition, ,,.,e a.re studying actively practical means of improving the general orientation of rP-placements before they actually go into combat, as it is belie.ved that straggling and AWOL is not infrequently due to new men not having had proper opportunity to become sufficiently a.cquainted with and known by their units and leaders. "Achievement of accuracy in the report-ing of men who are missing in action is, to some extent, oomplicated by a conflict of the needs for speed and accuracy. Units have been disposed to submit these reports soon after the c"isappearance of the indivinu.al, not only to insure that the casualty report is forwarded promptly, but also to be able to obtain quickly replacements of men actually lost to the enemy. The solution to the problem appears to lie not only in improving the initial dia~nosis of absence, as between actual missing-in-action cases on the one hand and m~m who are stragglers or who have gone AWOL on the other hand, but also in adopting measures which will reduce the number of ille~itimat~ absences. �nr have given instructions that battle casualty reports of men believed, but not confirmed, missing in action will not, in the future, be submitted by combat units until nine days after their disappearance, as it is believed that a considerable number of corrections will be obviated thereby." * * TRAVERSA--ijOVEMBER 27, 1944--The weather today was fair with clouds scattered over the sky in the early morning. This morning BBC prematurely announced the news of General Clark's new assignment as Commander of the 15th Army Group and of General Alexander's appointment as Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, and General Wilson's appointment as British Military R~presentative with the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington to replace Field Marshal Sir John Dill. General Clark returned to a very excited headquarters this morning. At lunch today Gen~ral Clark told Genc~ral Gruenther that his new headquarters would be a tactical rather than an adm::1ni_stra.tive set-up and that General Alexander had agreed that the biggest part of Eighth Army administration would go directly to AFHQ rather than clear through the new 15th Army Group Headquarters. The General also stated that he would probably move the headquarters from Siena to Florence. Th:ts afternoon the G~neral entertained members of his staff at a movie and also showed the Battle of San Pietro film. Misses Moen and Berney, Fifth Army Red Cross girls, came to supper. The General retired early this evening. General Clark today sent Field Marshal Alexander the following cable: RN 6897. "I express to you my most hearty congratulations on your richly deserved promotion to Field Marshal. It has been a privilege for me to serve under your command here in Italy for more than a year now, a...~d nothing could give me greater pleasure than to see this fine recognition of your outstanding ability. I wish you continued success in your nevr and more important undertakings. I am happy and proud to continue under your command in my new assignment." * * * TRAVERSA--ijOVEMBER 28, 1944--The weather is clearing today. At 1000 hours a guard of honor was held for General Bencivenga and 14 Italian officers and men who had come from Rome to be decorated by the Army Comm:mder. General Clark decorated General Bencivenga with the Legion of Merit, Degree of Commande~, with a citation from the President of the United States. General Clark also spoke br:iefly as follows: "Welcome to the Fifth Army. I am glad to have you at my headquarters today and to have this decoration ceremony where, in the name of the j �110 Pres~ dent of the United States, American decorations for ~ritorious service in direct support of Allied operations and for valorous conduct on the field of battle \"lill be conferred on Italian personnel. "The knowledge thrit this ceremony has taken place this morning will give little consolation to our hated German enemy 'l'tlo will realize the collaboration and close cooperation which exists betwn,en the Allied Armies in Italy and the Italian Armed ForcM. "General Bencivenga: You and your assocfa tes assioted rreterially th"' Allied Forces in the battle for Rome and :in our occupation of your great cj ty. Your continued increasing assistance will help to bring the complete defeat of the Gl'lrmans in Italy and bring the peace which the Allied world deserves. "I want to take this opportunity to express my apprec:iFtion to General Cortese, Commander of the ?10th Itali~n Infantry Division which has been with the Fifth Army for some time. His comma.no has assisted the Fifth Army materially jn our advance to the north. 0 we will now read the citations." General Bencivenga responded as follows: "General, gentlemen, "You will excuse me if, owing to my lim:ited knowledge of your language, I am not able to tell you in person the feelin~s of myself and of my collaborators. "My speaker will be my former executive who possesses, to the highest degree, the qualities of a ~allant patriot and of a fine diplomat, your friond Colonel Count Della Rocca. "I am an old soldier, on whom the Goddess fortune hns frequently bestowed honours and awards. But I will tell you frankly thtit never before have I known greater happin1'ss and pride. Pride, because this high award, graciously bestowed upon me by your great President, is handed to me by you, Gen~ral, the gallant and genial leader whose name is lmown throughout the world for having preserved with brilliant tactics, the City of Rome a patrimony of mankind, from the horrors of the struggle a.nd from final il.estruction. ttHappiness, because by these awards and b;,r this memorable military ceremony you have given us a testimony of your feelings toward us, the feelings of comrades - in - arms, representing a ne~ step towards a full alliance and towards the closest cooperation in the war e-f'+>ort. "To you, General, and to your valiant troops we express our greetings: We know that you will lead your "'P..mous Fifth Army a.s well as all the warriors of your new high command to new victories, and that new laurels will be added to the ma.ny battle honours you have already achi,.,ved. �11 I "Good luck to you, Sir and to your gallant soldiers in this epic struegle; good luck to all those who are engaged in this historic fight for the ideals of freedom and democracy." After the ceremony General Clro-k entertained General Bencivenga and the oth-.r officers in his conferen(!-, hut, serving them cof:ee, sandwiches and drinks. The party left 3t 1100 hours. General McUarney and his aide arriven. by car at noon. Gen•'lrals Clark ::ind McNarney conferred for an hour before lunch. After lunch the Army Commander, with General Mci{arney, drove' to the II Corps Headquarters in the vicinity of Pietramala where they met and conferred with General K~yes. They then drove to the 34th Division command post in the vicinity of Loiano where they met and talk~d to General Bolte for about a half hour. Generals Clark and McNarney returned by jeep to General Clark's command post, arriving at 1730 hours. Upon entering the command post, a JU87 flew cHrectly overhead and dropped on~ bomb in the Heac,quarters Company area, wounding several ana killing one Italian civilian. Several bombs also fell along Route 65 adjacent to the commann post. Before djnner General Clark dfacussed with Genf:'!ral McNarney the question of soldiers marrying Italian civilians. The Army Commander told General MclJarney that he felt strongly, and has dictated thE'\ policy wi.thin his Army, that American soldiers should not marry civilians. General McNarney agreed with General Clark and said tha.t he would issue a theater order on this point. The Army Commander entertained General McNarney ford.inner, and after dinner G~nerals Clark, McNarney and Gruenther an0 Major Elliman, General McNarney1 s aide, played bridge. AAI Operation Order No. 4 was issued today and reads as follows: INFORMATION 11 1. 'T'he Enemy cont1nues to contest every inch of the ground, and although he could shorten his front considerably by w-i.thdrawing his left flank to the VAIJ..I DI crr,JA.CHIO, he shows no signs of doing so except under heavy pressure, much less of carrying out any g~n~ral withdrawal voluntarily, though plans and preparations for sucli action have probably been completed. "2. It is appreciated that the enemy will continue to carry out a fighting withdrawal with his left wing until he has been farced back to the position he has selected as his main line of defence connecting his present positions south east o+> BOLOGNA and the VALLI DI CQr'!Iv'!ACHIO; that thereafter he will give battle with all his available r~sources in the hope that he will be able to wear down our offensive in those positions, and so retain his hold on BOLOGNA. "3. As regards our mm troops Eighth Army have sufficient resources to continue o+'fensive operations for another 1 - 4 weeks according to the :J.ntensity of the fighting. Fifth Army will be ready to resume the offensive after 7 Dec, but their offensive capabilities will be limited to about 15 days intensive fighting. INTE"r:t'ION 11 4. To afford the greatest possible support to the Allied winter �t7 2 offensives on the Western and Eastern fronts by bringing the enemy to battle, there~y compelling him to employ in ITALY manpower and resources which might otherwise be available for use on the other fronts. ME,,,HOD "5. Eighth Army will:(a) Continue their present operations to drive the enemy west of the SANTERNO, and SP.cure bridgeheads over that river; and th!'.!reafter (b) Develop their main thrust on the general axis IMOLA BUDRIO; with a subsidiary thrust on FERRARA by ARGENTA, if the condition of the ground on that axis is found to be favourable. The date on which operations we stwards from the SANTERNO are to begin will be left to the discretion of Commander Eighth Army. Hq. AAI and Fifth Army \"ill be given as much notice as practicable of the date selected. 11 6. Fifth Army will:(a) (b) 11 7. Develop operations on their right flank to assist Eighth Army1 s Advance to the SANTF.'R.NO and subsequent thrust on BUDRIO. °'tailed arrangements for th~se op~rations will be made by direct liaison between Eighth Army and 13 Corps, Fifth Army being kept fully informed. Plan and prt'!pa.re their main thrust on BOLOGNA by the axis of Route 65. This operation to be ready to be launched on order of C-in-C, AAI at three days notice from 7 Dec 1944. Conditions for attack. In view of the limited o~fensive capabilities of both e.rmies it is particularly important that all attacks are launched unner the most favourable conditions possible at this time of the year. Full account will there.fore be taken of the condition of the ground And the weather, and no attacks will be launched unless the ground and weather conditions are favourable. "~. Air Support. Fifth and Eighth Annies will continu~ to be supported by XXII T.A.C. and D.A.F. respectively as heretofore. In addition C.G. M.A.T.A.F. has agreed to arrange a0ditional support by medium bombers, and if necessary heavy bombers as well, when the armies nre actuAlly attacking and the targets are suitable. Annies will continue to submit their requests for air support of all natures to their respective support~ng Air Force, and will also notify Hq. AAI of any special requests. In cases of conflicting requirements· priorities will be decided 1)y crrc, AAI. A•--,,_,,·.- ,tvi\-~~- . . •. .. ' �t73 Amrri:rrs"'RA,,,IVE .ARRA ~JGEM'r.:'J'l's "9. The instructions contained in this order involve no change in existing administrative arrangements. IN'1':SRCOMrlU'!\TICA'T'!QN "10. Hq. MI will remain in its present location until the new 15 Army Group Hq. has been forrred and is in a position to undertake the day to day conduct of the battle. 11 A brief summary of operations for the week ending November 2R, 1944 is as follows: During this period the relief and novement of 85th and 91st DiviAion to rear rest nreas was completed, their sectors being taken over by the 88th, 34th and 1st Armored Divisio~s. Advances were made in the 8 Indian Division sector to conform to advances of Eighth Army units on the right flank. Limited objective attacks by TF 45 were partially successful but resistance was sti~f on the right of the sector. Active patrols maintained contact with the enemy across the entire ~rant. * * * TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 29, 1944--General McNarney left after breakfast this morning. General Clark was interviewed by Mr. William King of the Associated press and later by Mr. Dawso:1, ~ditor of -:he Johannesburg Times, and Hr. Decock. At 1130 the Army Commander held a conference of' his corps commanders, General Keyes, G:meral Crittenberger and General Kirkman. Also present were Generals Gruenther, Almond, Brann, Tate, Brigadiers Divers and Archibald, G-Ops 13 Corps, and Colonel Ladue, Chief of Staff of IV Corps. After the conference General Clark entertained these officers for lunch. Before leaving for Florence this afternoon, GonerRl Clark saw Major General Mccoach, EnginP-er Officer of AFHQ, and General Bowman, after which General Clark and Colonel Saltzman drove to the villa in Florence. Generals Gruenther and Almond dined and spent the night at the villa with General Clark. The General plaJP.)d cards in the evening and retired early. Notes on the conference held today are as follows: The Army Commander stated thPt he wished to discuss the ground plans for the forthcoming attack; that the air was not represented at this meeting because plans for the air were not yet complete but would be developed in the near future. 11 "He said that th'3 prospect of the offensive being planned was as difficult as anything yet undertaken in the Italian campaign. He has had comparisons made of previous o:P'rations, including Salerno, Anzio and others, from the standpoint of enemy strength, terrain, etc., and �that this appeared to be the toughest task yet attempted . 11 Both the Eighth Army and the Fifth Army will make all-out attacks . Commanders must think in terms of going as far as maxinrum use of available means will permit . The mission of both armies is to keep as many German Divisions as possible here in Italy end to effect the maximum destruction on these enemy forces . "D-~ is 7 December . 'l'he attac1< will not be launched unless we get a spell of fine weather. The timing problem in the operation rather resembles the one experienced at Anzio; i.e ., a decision will lave to be made as events develop as to the most favorable moment to launch successive phases of the offensive . This offensive will consist of a series of impulses from east to west with the Eighth Army assisted by the 13 Corps opening up, followed by the II Corps attack. "Corps commanders must take strong steps to conserve ammunition. Beginning with 7 December the American troops have available ?7,500 rounds per day of 105 ammunition. There will be 200,000 rounds in reserve and 116,000 rounds at the ports . The Army Commarrler believes that he will consequently have about 20 days' supply available. Brigadier Divers confirmed that the British forces in Fifth Army will have about three weeks' supply. The Army Commander mentioned that the 34th Division has had some success in salvaging ammunition. "As to the scheme of maneuver the Army Commander Eighth Army will start the attack on 30 November or 1 Canad jan Corps, the }Jew Zealanders, the 46th Division line . This is to be a vjgorous attack which is hoped Eighth Army to the Imola area . He has offered to the possible assistance from the 13 Corps along the Imola is desired . stated that the December with the ancl the Poles in to bring the Eighth Army all axis as soon as it 1 "General Kirkman described :in some < etail his contemplated operations in support of the Eighth Army, to start about 2 December. Parts of the 7'1th , 6th Armored aml 8th Jndian Divisions will be used. "General Cl~rk pointed out that Pfter the Eighth Army attack gets under way means will 11 sought for the best use of th~ 13 Corps to aid e the Bighth or Fifth Army. "The Army CoITlil1a.nder stated that it has been agreed th~t the attack will be made on three days 1 notice . ttHe stated that the II Corps attack will be preceded and accompanied by considerable air support and that the CG XII Air Force he.s told hjm that he hopes to be able to furnish 500 f:ighter-bomber sorties per day. "In the II Corps attack a C.T . of the 92d Division will be brought over to aid the II Corps; it will be unoer the 8~h Division and take over a defensive sector . "The first phase of the II Corps attack will fovolve a lim7ted �objective attack by B8th Division. General Clark pointed out that there is to be no prearranged stopping between phases but that all units are to go as fast as possible. One C.T. of the 8~th Division will be held in reserve for any use the Army Commander may wjsh. He described the first objectives of the 34th, 91st, 1st Armored and 6th South African Armored Divisions and stated that simultaneously the Brazilians will make an attack to their northeast. "General Keyes expanded the details of employment of his units. He stated that instructions have been given for conservation of ammunition and stressed the need of air support. 11 The Army Commander instructed the commanders present to take special pains to have all their subordinate commanders talce positive action to combat a feeling of futility on the part of troops who may f0el that this is a tforgotten theater'. There must be impressed on all personnel the extreme importance of our present mission of oontaining and destroying German forces which might otherwise face the Allies on other fronts. He used~ football simile, comparing our forces here to guards and tackles who enable backs to score. "General Ori ttenberger presented the present situation and the plans for TIT Corps stating that the IV Corps operations would involve three phases. The first phase, now in progress, incluiles securing of the Belvedere-Costello ridge which must be occupied in order to secure communications and to open up the operations contemplated for the South African division. He mentioned that the last battalion of the Brazilian Division comes in tomorrow and that General Mascarenhes ,vill thereafter assume responsibility for an indicated sector. The Brazilian attack which began this morning is progressing. The second phase to begin on J December involves an attack in difficult terrain for the Brazilians. In the third, the South African division will attempt to secure the Sole featurA by D-Day. ttGeneral Brann queried General Keyes about timing and was told that IT Corps estimates that it will be eight days from the jump-off until the first objective line is secured. 1tGeneral Tate staterl that rockets and 10,000 rounds of ammunition will be available for the operations. "On -inquiry as to the status of' 48 25 -pounders of Italien artillery, General Brann stated that a conference on the subject is being held today. "General Howard said that indications are that the enemy will hold tenaciously a.nd perhaps bring in additional troops, mentioning that the 71st Division may be brought down from the north wher~ it has b en resting. 11 The Army Command er mentioned that he would like if possible, in later phases of op~rations, to move the 92d Division farther to the east to make an attack of its ovm in oome sector. He said that ·'n these operations re proposes to make any adjustments of any kind which he �thinks might favorably affect the battle. "Relative to air support General Clark said that air efforts must be closely coordinated between the Fifth am Eighth Armies. Activities to locate good air targets have been in progress for oome time and certain targets will be given the XII Air Forc,, at once. Medium bombers as well as fighter bombers will be available as well as heavies if necessary. "General Kirkman asked for the services of Rover Joe before the II Corps attack and was told that they would be furnished ~nasmuch as practicable. "General Almond was told that the C.T. of the 92d Division which will aid II Corps should be ready to move as soon as possible but that it should not show up in its new area ahead of time for security reasons. "The Army Comman::1.er said that a confjrming O.I. will be issmd covering the operations. The Operations Instructions (#36) referred to above was issued today and is quoted below: 1. Since the beginning of the operations of Allied Armies in Italy, the mission has been to destroy the enemy forces in this theater.· That mission remains unchanged, but in addition, it is imperatlve at this time that operations be executed irunedia tll!ly to engage the enemy forces to prevent the withdrawal of any IE,rt of these forces to strengthen the German 0efenses against the major Allied offensives on both the Vlestern and Eastern fronts in Europe. 11 2. Eighth Army continues its attack generally NW along Route 9. If weather conditions ar~ reasonably favorable, it is estimated that it will reach the SAH'lT,RNO River about 7 December. 11 "3. On or about 7 December, exact date to be determined by the advance of Eighth Army and predicted weather conditions, Bighth Army and Fifth Army will la.unch a major offensive to capture BOLOG'iA. 11 4. Fifth Army operations will be divided into phases as follows: a. Ihase I - Objectives. PhRse line and bou:rrlary, see overlay. b. Phase II - See overlay "'or directio11 of principle efforts of Corps. Phase lines and objectives later. c. Phase DI - The objective of this phase will be the capture of IDLOONA. Details of execution will be issued later. �"5. 13 Corps will: a. Assist the advance of Eighth Army as follows: (1) As soon a.s possible launch an attack astride the CASTEL del RIO - IMOLA Road directed on IMOLA. (2) After the attack on IMOLA has been launched b" prepti.red on Army orders to launch an attack generally astrico the S. CL~MENTE CASTF.L S. PIE~RO Road directed on CASTEL S. PIETRO. b. Capture objectives sho1m on overlay. c. Maintain close contact with Eiehth Arn.y. tion between 13 Corps and Eighth Army is authorized. d. Direct communica- Protect right flank of Fifth Army. 6. II Corps will: a. Capture objectives sho.vn on overlay. b. Initially hold 35th Division in reserve. c. Hold one infantry regiment 88th Division in reserve; not to be employed until released by this Headquarters. d. 7. Haintain contact with 13 Corps. IT Corps will: a. Capture objectives shovm on overlay. b. Maintain contact with II Corps. "8. 92d Division (less one ROT) will: a. 1'19.intain pressure against enemy forces in its sector. b. Maintain contact with IT Corps." * * * 'T'RAVERSA-•N'OVE:MBER JO, 19/44--The weather today was rainy. Generals Clark and Gruenther left the Florence cub strip by L-5 at 0845 for Pistoia., arriving at 0900. The Army Commander was met by his frickard and jeep and drove to IT Corps headquarters where he was met by General Grittenberger who orient~d him and General Gruenther on the current situation. Gen~ral Clark, with General Crittenberger in his jeep, drove to inspect a battalion of the BEF about to go into the line. Here he was met by Generals Jbscarenhas and Zenobia and General GrAeley. General Clark reviewed the troops an<l shook hands with many of the o"ficers and men. Th~ Gen -,ral commented to · General r;Jasca.renhas on the light clothing 'l)eing worn by these troops. General Mascarenhas explained that they had �come from Brazil without the proper warm clothing. G~r, l'lrDl Clnrk immedf diat,.,.ly ordered combat jackets, winter underwear and shoe picks be issued to all Brazilian troops and to be delivered to th~m tomorrow. General Clark w· th G"mt'!ral Mascarenhas and party then drove to an OF, but unfortunately the terrain could not be observed due to the heavy fog. The party was met by Colonel commanding Task Force 45. The Colonel explained his situation to General Clark, pointing out on a map the location of his troops and their activities. Returning from the OP to the Brazilian headquarters, General Clark stopped to inspect tanks of the 751st T,mk Batta.lion now being used as artillery in support of the Brazilians and Task Force 45. General ClPrk shook hands and talked to many of the men, telling them of the fine support and the important part they were playing ·n the big picture. Generals Clark, Gruenth~r and Crjttenberger were th~n PntertainP-d at lunch by General Nascarenha.s at the 73EF Headquarters. After lunch General Clark, with GenerRl Mascarenhns, visited another Brazilian OP where the General had a good view of Mount Belvedere and the vicinity. General Hascarenhtis pointed out on the ground his next plan of attack on Mount Belvedere. General Clark made suggestions to him and encouraged him in his mission •• The General then drove to inspect Brazilian units, returning to IV Corps Artillery Hea,?.quart~rs where he was met by General Crane and Brigadier Haunsel, Commanding the 6?nd AA Brigade attached to IT Corps, and several artillery staff officers. The General had a warm drink, bade goodbye to General Crittenberger and members of his staff and drove with General Gruenther to Fistoia where he and General Gruenther took off by L-5 for Florence. General Clark entertained Grmerals Gru~ntht"lr, Brann, Mr. and Mrs. Charini and Mrs. Sartori for dinner. * * * ~RAVBRSA--DEqEMBER 1, 1944--The General spent a quiet day at the villa. Colonel Johnson, JAG, called on the General to discuss several outstanding court martial cases. The G~neral lunched with his aide at the Hotel Anglo-American. This evening the General spent a few minutes at a party given by G-3 at a villa in Florence. * * TRAVF.RSA--DECBMBER 2, 1944--General Clark left the villa at Aleven o 1 clock, arriving for lunch at his command post. Afte};:_ lunch the G·m eral conferred with Generals Keyes, Gruenth~r am :rrann. At 1700 hours the Army Comrnarrler drove back to his villa in Florence and this evening gave a buffet supper for forty members of his staff on the occasion of the Anny-Navy football grure. General Coulter, Commanding General of the 8 5th D1v1s1on, and G · · · eneral Livesay, Conmanding �119 General of the 91st Division, spent the night at the General's villa. * * * 'T'RAVERSA--DE0EMBER 3, 1944--This r.iorning the Army Conm,ander was to have flown from Florence to Rone in General Cannon's C-47 but due to heavy fog in the Florene~ area the General, with his P,Uests Colonels Grogan, Smith, 1rygaard and Saltzman, Captain and Mrs. '3avary, drove to Siena. At 1100 hours the General and his party took off from Malignano Airport, arriving l'!.t the Littoria airport jn Rome at 1230. Alexander Kirk, American Ambassador to Italy, and Bri'5~dier G~n"ral T. K. Brown, Cornrm.nding the Rome Area, met the Army Comrna.nder at the airfield and drove with him to the Hotel Excelsior. Major John Boettiger lunched with the Arrny Commander ,md conferred with him privately for an hour. Major Boettiger, son-in-lA.w of the President, n.elivered to General ClPrk a personal verbR.l messrge frorn the Cor.imnder-in-Chief of his appreciation and the apprecir"l.tion of the ATJ1erican J'!'!Ople for t he outstanding accomplishments of General CL-'lrk and his Fifth Army in ItR.ly. At 1700 Mr. rnyron C. Taylor, l !"!r sonal Repre srmta ti v"' of the Fre sident of the Tfnited States of A~ri~a to m.s Holiness the Pope, and Mrs. Taylor gave a tea in honor of General Clark. During the tea General Clark told the Brazilin.n Ambassador that he hRd issued to the Brazilian troops warm winter clothing. The Ambassador expressed his deep thanks but explained to General Clark that he was r.iost indignant at the shortsightecsnese of soMebody i n Braz:i 1 not having this equipment for Br~zili~n troops before they cane overseas. He told the Army Conmvmder he would make an issue of this with his goverMent at home. General c1~.rk told the Ambassador that he did not wish Mn to do this; thPt the troops were now well taken care of by the Fifth Array and to forget the issue. The AMbassador promised that he would. This evening General Clark was entertained by Arnbassador Kirk for dinner at the }alazzo Barberini. Sir Noel Charles, British Ambassador, and many distinguished lsllests were present. * * * TRAVSRSA--DF.:CEMBER 4, 1944--At 1100 hours this morning Gen~ral C:18rk was int-.rviewed by TTi,. Durrance of TIME and LIFE Magazines on his MW appoint, ment as Co"T!manding G1'n~ral, 15th Army Group. At 1200 hours Adllliral Morse flew in from Leghorn to call on Grm"'ral Clark. The G~ne·ral spent a half hour conferring privately with Admiral Morse. Admiral Morse offert'ld any assistance he could possibly render Gen~ral CL..,rk :in his new f'.ss:1gnrnent. The Generl"l said that he might call on Admiral rlorse for craft to help cross the Po when the time crune. In addition, he asked the Admiral if the Navy had any guns with ammunition which were mobile and could be used as artillery. Admiral Morse said he would look into it and advise. Ambassador and Mrs. Taylor entertained General Clark n~d Prince Hntberto f'or luncheon. �After lunch, the General was interviewed by Herbert Matthews of the NEVf YORK 'T'!r-l!P,S and ln ter by Reynolds Packard of' the UF. General Clark gave a small dinner this evening with Colonel Saltzman, Frincess Colonna, l'larchese f"arconi a.'1d her brother and child. * * * TRAVERSA--DECEMBER 5, 1944--This morning Gen11Jral Clark went shopping and bought Ann two angora sweaters and a pair of gloves and also visited the fa:mous jeweler, Bulgari, who showed General Clark through his shop and displayed for him his ~ost precious jewels. General Clark with Colonel Saltznan, Harches"'l Marconi and Princess Colonna made a short ~ight-seeing tour of the cjty. General Clark wn.s entertained at lunch at the Villa Medici by Genere.l A gui,rd of honor was held for General Clark upon his arrival. After lunch Gen-,r8.l de Couteulx de Gaumont and the French A"b!'tssador, Mr. Henri Coure de Hurville, walked through the gardens of the "iTilla. Medici, during which time the band played in honor of the Generel, de Couteulx de Cn.unont. At 1700 General Clark, Colonel Salt zmnn n.nd his aide called on General Souslopnrov at his villa. 'T'he Gll!nereJ. told Gl"'lneral So-qsloparov that in his capacity as Commander of the 15th Army Group he would do everything possible to contain the German divisions on his front, "Vhich he hoped would greatly assist the !llagnificent nussian arl:l.i-'S in their drive through the Balkans, as well as Gen~ral Eisenhmrer on the we::,tern front. The G~neral also mentioned that he was most anxious to M~et ood excha.nge ideas w:ith the Russian Commander commanding the troops in the Balkans. General Sousloparov said that it could be arranged at any tine. General Clark explained to General Sousloparov briefly his plan of operations in the m~ediate future. General Clark gave a sma.11 dinner this evening with the members of his staff who accompanied him on his trip; namely, Colonel Smith, Lt. Col. Nygaard, General HU111e, Colonel Saltzman and Colonel Grogan. A brief summRr7 of operations for the wee:< ending December 5, 1944 is as follows: Good advances continued on the right of 13 Corps sector and limited \ gains were made in the Corps sector by Brazilian troops. Heavy enemy: counterattacks on the left flnnk of 13 Corrs res11lted in tl•e loss of M. CAS':'ELLARO and forct'!ld a withdrawal from M. B"'";LVEDERE in the center of IV Corps sector. Otherwise defensive positions were maintained and aggressive patz:ollin~ continued. Resting of combat troops was completed and regrouping for future offensive operations was in progress. rr * * * TRAVT1tSA--DECEMBER 6, 1944--General Clark telephoned Mr. Taylor and Ambassador }(irk this morning to thank them. f'or their kindness to him while in �IZ( Rome . He then drove to Champiano airport where he took off by General Hune and Hr . Van Lear ·woodward of the U. s. Conmercial who is visiting the war fronts . Due to heavy fog and rains in Florence arl'!a , the Array Conmander was forced down in Siena and Florence , arriving at one o'clock . B- 25 with Council the drove to He lunched at th~ Angl o- American Hotel end after lunch went to the villa. . At six o 1 cl ock General Sir J"aitlnnd Wilson, Surreme Allied Commander , Uer'iiterranean , the Governor of Gibraltar and Brigadier Gort arrived at the Anglo-Araerican Hotel and conferred with G~..neral ClRrk for two hours . The Gen•ral din~o qui~ tly tonight ~t the villa with Col onels Saltzman and Smith and two guest~ . BBC today announced that Lt . Gen . Lucian K. Truscott would take over the coI!Ulla.nd of the Fifth Army upon the departure of Gen . Clark to take up his duties ~s Command i ng Generttl of the 15th Amy Group . * * * TRAVERSA--DECEMBER 7 , 1944- -The General left the villa this morning at 0930 , arriving at his conunand post at 1030. The Army Commander conferred this morning with General Berardi , Chief of Staff of the Italian Army. After lunch Mr . and TJ!rs . Tompkins, Regional Directors of the Red Cross , 12..nd Mr . Stevens of t~ Fifth Army Red Cross carne to see G neral Clark. Mr . Woodward came in this eveninE; to say goodbye to General Clark before his departure ~rom the Italian theater . General mruscott arrived in Florence this afternoon and called Gene ral Clark to say that he would arrive at the Fifth Army command post toJllorrow . * * * TRAVERSA--DECEMBER 8 , 1941+--'::'he weather today \ms rA.iny and misty. Gene ral Clark and General Brann droYe by jeep to the Headquarters of the 6th South African Armored Division where they were r.:et ·,y Generals Poole and Crittenberger . General Clark , with Generals Foole and Crittenberger , • drove to an OP from which they could clearly observe riount Sole , the immedfate objective of the 6th South African Division. Thl'l party then drove to the cornrnand post of th, 24th Guards Brigade where Genrral ClArk was introduced to Brigadier P . D. =:rskine and ne nbers of his staff and had a cup of -':.ea . General Clark spoke briefly to t:1e officers eX} laining to them tl,e important role that the 6th South African Armored Division was playing in the over- all pictur..,. The General \Vi th General Poole then drove to the command post of the 12th Brigade where he net i3rigac1ier R. J . Palmer and rn.1'mbers of his staff and talked to them briefly. He th•~m drove to a battalion command post for six miles over a road which was completely under enemy observation where h,, could observe Mount Sole from a.11 possible angJes of approach . �At the battalion headqilllrters General ClP.rk spoke brif'lfly to tl•e officers, encouraging them on th~ir next mission. The Army Commander was then "'ntertained at lunch at the lieadquartcrs of the 6th South African Armored Division. Before lunch General Clark promoted Lt. Col. Clark, Cot'l!!l8.nding Officer of the 1108 Enginner Combat Group to the grac~e of full colonel. General Clark also presented Generru. }oole with a carbine. After lunch the G"'neral drove, with General Poole, to the rear headquart"'rs of the 6th South African Arnored Division in Castiglione, where General Clark met Brigadier Thurstenberg, Cor,~anding the 11th Brigade, and several of his staff officers. After this General Clark departed for his headquarters by jeep and as a bridge had been washed out over the short route, the Army CoJ1Ul'l8.nder was forced to take a three-hour detour in r:eavy rain and fog, arriv·ing at his cormand post at 1830 hours. Upon his return Gen"'ral Clark met GenerM Truscott who had just arrived at his headquarters. Gen~rals Truscott and Carleton were guests of the Ar~y Commander for dinner. * * * TRAVERSA--DECEMBER 9, 1944--The weather today \"f1=1S cloudy. General Clark conferred with General "'rus cott over maps in the hut during most of the morning. Genernl Chidlaw, with Colonel Wise, his Operations Officer, carse to confer with Gen,1rals Clark 1md Truscott. At 1030 hours Gen~ral Theron, GOG Administration Union Defense Force, called on General Cla.rk and conferred for a~out half an hour. After lunch Gemra.l 7an Deusen, of the Signal Corps, called with Gen"ral rv:oran to see General 01.."l.rk. At 16oO hours the Aray Conmander drove to his villa in Florence and had Generals Gruenther, Brann, Lewis and Bradshaw. for dinner and cards. * * * TRAVERSA--DECE!,1BER 10, 1944--The weather today was fine and clear. The Giimeral ,.,ent to see Colonel McMahon at the 24th General Hospital, after which he walked with his aide for two and a half hours around Florence, sight-seeing nnd looking in shops. The G1'nertl lunched a.t the Anglo-American Hotel with Colonel Smith and his aide. He spent a. quiet afternoon and h~.d three guests for dinner. * * * TRAVERSA--DECEMBER 11, 1944--General Clark left his villa this morning at 0900 hours, arriving at his headquarters at 1000 hours. This morning General Clark prol'ioted Colonel Duff, Assis ta.nt Divisional Corarmn< er of the 10th Mountain Division, to the grade of Brigadier General. �l8 3 At 1200 hours Air Minister of Brazil, Mr. Salgado, and a pRrty consisting of Brigadier Aplmar Mascarenhas, Major Genfll>ral Wooten and five other officers arrived. A guard of honor was held for the Air Minister, after which General Clark briefed the Air Minister on the current situation a.nd entertained he and his party at a buffet lunch at which the Ch:a's of Sections of the Arny Corafflander 1 s Headquarters were present. In the h.te afternoon the General drove to his villa in Florence where he spent the night. General Clark today sent the following cable to General Mascarenhas, Comna.nder of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force: "Best wishes for success in tor.101Tow' s operations. Have every conf idence that good leadership and the fighting qualities of the Brazilian troops will carry ob.jecti ves. 11 General Clark also today sent the following cable to General Alexander regarding the food situation in Italy: 11 Since exchange of telegrams regarding civilian food si tua.tion in Fifth Army area ending with yours undated Reference #CAO 341, there has been virtually no inprovement. The ration is still 200 grams of bread per day per person supplemented by 600 grar11s per :month of flour for spaghetti or the equivalent. Besides this AMG has been distributing 250 grl-ln!s of dehydrated soup and 400 grams of dried peas per month but only in cities of 50,000 or more. However telegram froa ALCOM #6898 date<l 23 November orders that there be no distribution of these la.st items during December except occasionally in newly occupied villages. This insufficient amount of food will not support a normal individua.l. Chronic undernourishment is givlng rise to unrest. There have been recent demonstrations demanding a minimUJA of 300 grams daily per person. That amount is now being distributed -i n the south of Italy, a fact well known to the public in the Fifth Army area.. The Italian. press be. s widely quoted a Washington dispatch dated 3 November that President Roosevelt had given instructions that Italians throughout liberated Italy receive at least 300 grB.11.s of bread per persqn per day. I am infol;'nted that the continued failure to provide adequate food is likely to cause militarily serious unrest particularly as the weather grows increasingly cold. The whole sitW1.tion is much aggravated by the acute shortage of transportation. It is appreciated that SAC MED has made specific recormendations to Con.bined Chiefs of Staff to obtain necessary minimum ration. Inforlllation is requested as to the prospects of finding n,.eans of providing .300 grams of bread daily per person. 11 * TRAVERSA--DECElffiER 12, 1944--General Clark lw.d a meeting at the AngloAmerican Hotel at which the following were present: Gener~.l Harding, General Mccreery, General --::'ruscott, Brigadier Flo;yd, Genl'!ral Gruenther a.nd General Br~..nn. After the meeting the General lunched at his villa and drove back to the command post at Traversa. The Gen~ral dined with General Truscott and retired early in the evening. �A brief summary of operations for the week ending December 12, 1944 is as follows: Some gains continued to be made on the right of 13 Corps sector as forward positions in other sectors were rna7ntained, enemy counterattacks and aJ,tempts to infiltrate were frustrated, training was continued in rear areas as plan.red reliefs and resting of front l:ine troops Wl'Jre also accomplished. Local attacks comrn~nced as the ]:)'riod ended. * * * TRAVERSA--DECEMRER 13, 1944--General Clark deµi,rted from his command post by jeep early this morning to make a farewell Will' of the II Corps area before relinquishing command of the Fifth Anny. The General first stopped at the S~th Division Headquarters where he spoke briefly with Gen~ral Kenda,11, Division Commru1der, and members of his headquarters staff and presented a Distinguished Service Cross to a member of the division. From. the 88th Division the General drove to the command post of the 91st Division where he presented two Silver Sta.rs, four Legion of Merits and coamissioned an enlisted man in the grade of 2nd Lieutenant before saying goodbye to the Division Commarrler, Generru. Livesey, and 111embers of his staff. From the 91st Division the Army Comma:rrler proceeded to the command post of the 34th Division where he lunched with Gen~ral Bolte and members of his staff. Following lunch the Arny Corn.rtander presented seven decorations to members of the 34th Division before taking off for the 1st Armored Division. At the 1st Armored Division command post General ral Pritchard, Division Commander, a:rrl members of his one Distinguished Service Cross and one Silver Star. also coaaissioned two men of the 1st Armored Division 2nd Lieutenant. CJ.ark spoke with Genestaff and presented The Army Commander to the rank of Moving along to II Corps Headquarters, General C].p,rk was greeted by Maj. Gen. Keyes, Corps Comm.arrler, who he presented vr.i. th a Bronze Star. The Army Comm,:mder took this occasion to make a few remarks to Gen(")rnl Keyes and his assembled staff officers, thanking them for the fine cooperation they had given Amy Headquarters during th-3 entire period that they had been with Fifth Army, congratulating them on the succe§s they- had achieved time and again j_n taking objectives assigned them and finally expressing his regret at leaving Fifth Arny but indicating the satisfaction he would feel in still having the Fifth Army with him in his new command. The General departed from the II Corps coriuM.nd post and headed for his command post, stopping at the 8th EvacU:~tion Hospital on the way back to say goodbye to Col. Kirkman and Lt. Col. Blackford. The Army Commander had dinner with the regular members of his mess and retired early in the eve · �General Ma.scarenhas today iITote General Cl:-i.rk as follows: 11 It seems appropriate to me in the delicate situation through which we are now passing, to get in touch with my illustrious chief, in order to focalize certain special aspects of the action of the Brazilian s~peditionary Force on ItaliP.n soil. nAs a commander and above all as a soldier, I will carry out, at whatever sacrifice it may cost, all the orders emanating from rny superiors, allies and friends. "But the situation of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, as you well know, involves a political problem, of the gr("!atest inter~st to the present and future constant and friendly relntions beb 1een our countries. Under these conditions, if missions were given us, thnt were in a certain sense precipitate, which might bring about a premature expenditure of our forces, it might, p~rhaps, bring about a situation prejudical to the political aspect of our activities. \ "We wish to be employed, and we must fight for the common ideals of our countries, but with our eyes upon tomorrow, for our continent, and upon the Peace Conference. "These are the considerations which have brought me to write you these lines, ronfident in the esteem and confidence in 11,rhich I hold your decisions. "Certain that you will understand my position, I am. 11 * * * TRAiffiRSA--DECEMBER 14, 1944--General Cle.rk rlep:."-l.rted early tr is morning by jeep to make a last trip to 13 Corps before taking over command of lSth Army Group. He arrived at 13 Corps Headquarters at 0900 and was met by General Kirkman, 13 Corps Commander. After talkiiig for a short while with the Corps Com:mander, General Clrir·k departe0 with General Kirkman for the 1st British Division where they w,,re met by Maj. Gen. Lcewen, Division Conmander. General Clark spoke to Gen. Loewen and several of his sta.ff off·' cers, e:xpressing hi::1 regret at leaving Fifth A-.rmy, thanking them for their fine cooperation and congratulating them on the succ~sses th~y had achieved in the past and which he was sure they would continue to gain. Before leaving the Divisional oorm.and post, General Clark presented Gen. Loewen with the gift of a carbine. Generals Ciark and Kirkman departed for the 78th British Division and upon their arrival were rll'Jt by ri!aj. Gen. Arbuthnot, the Division Cornrn.ander. The Army Commander also spoke to the members of the division staff and presented Gen. Arbuthnot with a carbine before departing for the 6th British Armored Division. �General Clark had lunch at the 6th British Armored Division with Maj. Gen. Murray, Division Comma.mer, and after lunch talked hriefly to members of the staff and presented Gen. Murray with a cnrbine suitably inscribed. Just before departing for his own headquarters, GenAral Clark presented General Kirkman with a carbine also. General Clark then drove back to his oomman<l post at Trav'3rsa where he spent the remainder of the afternoon and early evening working on administrative matters. The Army Commander dined with the regular members of his mess and retired early in the evening. General Clark today wrote the following letter to General McNarney on the subject of the 92nd Infantry Division: n1. It appears appropriate at this time to submit a report of impressions which have been obtained to date of the battle efficiency of the 92nd Infantry Division during the period in wti ich it hP_s been in combat in Fifth Army. The approxirre.te lengths of combat service of the division1 s regiments to date are: 370th Infantry Regiment, three and onehalf months; 371st Infantry Regiment, one month; 365th Infantry Regiment, twenty days. "2. Given the fact that the various elements of the di vision have been going through their first period of actual combat, they have performed excellently in supply and administrative rra tters end in such tactical operations as do not require sustained demonstration of' initiative and aggressiveness on the parts of junior leaders and of the rank and file. In these latter aspects of combat certain sho:ctcomings have arpearfld which will bear close observation in the ::'uture oporRtions of the division. "3. '!'he ma,jority of the junior of'ficers of the di vision have -~ailed so far to show the <legree of leadership, init:iP tive, responsibility a.nd aggressiveness which is requisite if infa~try units are to achieve their objectives in offensive combat ngainst determjned opposition. SimJlarly the majority of non-commissjoned officers have appeared un~ble, due to the same nefici'mcies, to lead their men successfully under fire in the absence of forceful officer leadership. 11 4. Enlisted men of the division m ve exhibited more nervousness and less aggressive will to fight in the face of danger than do white soldiers in comparable circumstances. These cioaracteristics af'fect adversely their ability to conduct successful patrolling activities, and in particular to hold ground against counterattack after they have taken it. They appear in many instances to be lacking the mutual oonfidence a.nd team-consciousness which is essential to successful offensive com- bat. "5. The division commatrler and his senior subordinntes have found that it is necessary, in order to induce vigorous team action, for them to lead and supervise their troops much more in detail than is normally the case. Experience so far has shown that unless the men are under the immediate control and guidance of effective leaders they are apt to shrink �187 from danger and to fall away from their units as they close with the enemy. The more flagrant cases are malingerers who, in several instances, have been found to have hidden rather than go forward. In the period between 2 October and 18 November there were fifty cases in the division which requi.r8d general court martial action for offenses involving misbehavior before the enemy. In this connection it .is of interest to note the experience of one of the Division's infantry battalions in an attack on 24 November. This attack was made over moderately difficult mountainous terrain with open sloping hillsides and comparatively good roo.ds and trails. The battalion entered the attack with 411 enlisted men in three rifle companies. Twenty-four hours later there were 70 enlisted men left available for duty in the three rifle companies comblned. During this one-day period the casualties of the three rifle companies consisted of one killed, fifty-nine wounded and four exhaustion cases. By 1530 hours on the afternoon of the 25th there were left a. total of approxi mately five officers and twelve enlisted men in the three rifle oompanies. Three wounded passed through the battalion aid station on 25 Povember and three on 26 November. The total wounrl.ed for the three dnys was ®5, including 2 officers. This battalion entered this engagement well equipped and 1Jriefed and appropriately supported by artillery. A report by the Inspector Gen,::,ral of IV Corps, from which the data given above are taken, indicates that investigation disclosed a lac1c of desire on the part of this personnel to advance under artillery or small arms fire or to close with the enemy. 11 (fu. 7. This division received mitted to battle. It had a long careful indoctrination, and each relatively quiet sector. I feel no handicaps. 0 excellent preparation before being comtraining r,eriod, O)mplete equipment and unit has been init:ia ted to combat in a that the div:ision entered combat under 8. It is appreciated that the division's combat experience is s till so brief that impressions gained thus far are not conclusive, and that the division has still to demonstrate its combat value. This is necessarily in the nature of a preliminary report. The Division Commander, General Almond, is very alive to the capabilities and cha.racteristics of his personnel, and is working continuously to improve the leadership, training and performance of his unit. It is my intention to give the division increasing opportunity to assume combat responsibility and to demonstrate its ability to carry a full load in offensive operations. A further report on this subject will be submitted on the basis of future experience." 11 Major Walters, General Clark1 s personal representative with the Brazilian Expeditionary Force,today submitted the following report on the recent action of the Brazilians: "The recent attack of the 1st Brazilian Division against Mount Castello in the Reno Valley was thrmm back by the Germans, as were the two previous ones. During this attack, I observed it both from the Division command post and Vat'ious observation posts. Like the two rcr:-evious attacks, it seemed almost to have achieved success when suddenly the attacking troops fell back to the line of departure. In the latter stages of the �183 attack, I was in the divisional command post and carefully followed the messages coming in, which gave no hint of any strong Gernan reaction until the Germans put down their artillery and mortar barrage. "The Brazilian attack seems to have been r'riven off almost entirely by mortar and artillery fire. During all tho ti m I was in the obsere vation posts I heard no German machine gun fire, while ours was plainly audible. The reserve battalion vras not ey,.gaged, inasmuch as General Zenobio stated that he could only have gotten into a position to act at about two o 1 clock, which would have made it difficult to secure any definite result starting from the line of departure again before darkness. The attack originally scheduled to start an hour before dawn e ctually got under way very shortly before dmm. "The signal communications during the latter stages of the attack apparently did not function as well as might be desired, and t here were frequent long gaps with no inforl1'f!tion. 11This attack, with some variations, was almost a carbon copy, with regard to the result, of the previous attacks, with the exception that in this attack there were four battalions in the attack; two in the attacking echelon, one in local reserve and one in division reserve. ""'he failure of these attacks seems to be due to a variety of causes: 1. The junior officers do not seem to be able to hold their men together under mortar and artillery fire. 11 11 2. Orders not to withdraw are not obeyed. General Zenobio told me he had refused permission to the battalion commanders to withdraw, but that the withdrawal had been carried out any\Vay. 3. It is my impression that there exists a psychological feeling of inferiority in the Brazilian soldier with regard to the Geroo ns . 11 "4. In spite of having been in training for many months prior to embarkation, these men do not appear to have hD.d more than basic training and do not appear to know how to use Arrerican weapons to the best advantage . "5. In the previous attacks the troops arriv~d on the position at night and attacked the following morning without hav:1ng had a chence to familiarize themselves with the terrain nor even to have a hot meal prior to the jumping off. This was also the first occasion these troops have been in combat . 11 6. The difficult climatic conditions - much colder than anything known in Brazil - appears to have an adverse affect on the morale of the troops. 11 7 . The Division Cornrnarrler does not appear equipped for the position which he holds. He is very mercurial in character, passing from \ I \ ) �periods of great optimism to moods of great depression. Arter the previous failures, he, in my opin5on, had already lost faith in his troops and was beaten before he started the attack. Th5B lack of confidence on the part of the Division Commarrler is transmitted down through the junior officers, and to me the similarity of the Division command post on the eve of the attack to an undertaking µi.rlor was striking. ns. One of the basic reasons for the failure to remedy other defects is that it ap:r;ears to be an accepted custom for a junior officer or non-commissioned officer who fails to carry out a task or mission assigned to him, to present a long sDries of alibis and excuses which are listened to by his superior, and a prolonged discussion then follows. I have heard lieutenants interrupt full colonels to make excuses. After the failure of the attack of December 12th I heard the battalion commanders giving excuses to General Zenobia, Commarrler of the attacking group. I heard General Zenobia giving excuses to General MascareILhas, and the three Brazilian Gen ,rals then went to IV Corps Headquarters where they proceeded to give the Corps Commander a series of excuses. "9. Verbal rebuke seems to be almost the only accepted form of punishment for failure to comply with orders, and there is great reluctance to relieve officers of their command - especially officers of field grade. 11 10. The Brazilians, as a whole, do not auparently yet have a correct perspective on cor.ibat. lOq~ losses seem exceptionally heavy to them. "On the evening of December 12th General Mascarenhas and General Zenobia and General Cordeiro went to IV Gorps oomrmnd poot to see General Crittenberger. They explained that the failure of the attack was due to the intense mortar, artillery and machine gun f:ire of the GC;!rtmns from weapons deeply dug in on Mount Castello in positions that could not be neutralized by the artillery they had. General Crittenberger then asked General T:Tascarenhas if he could attack again on the following day, and the three Generals emphaticaJ_ly said that they oould not. General Crittenberger then asked when they could attack, and General Nascarenhas said that his division would not be any better than it had been on the eve of Mount Castello. Genera;L Mascarenh~s f1nally stated th8t he did not believe there was any offensive capacity left in his division. The Commanding General, IV Corps, then asked General Ua.scarenhas whether he would not rather consult with his staff officers and check on the condition of his troops before committing himself to this definitely. General Mascarenhas said that it was not necessary and that he could state that with his present front and means, his division was not capable of any further offensive action. The Commanding General, IV Corps, then requested the Commanding Gernral of the 1st Brazilian Division to give him his suggestion as to the employment of his division, which General Mascarenhas promised to do on the following day , after consulting with his staff. "On December 13th Gemral Mascarenhas called me into his office and stated that he was now going to trust me with the grave responsibility, as Genernl. Clark's representative, of conveying to him the situation of �l4o ~ 'V"J the Brazilian Expeditionary Force. By implication he admitted that he did not think his troops were capable of much in the way of offensive action . He said his di vision ~ nfantry was nearly a thousand men under strength and that if the division was 'annihilated' it would be a disaster not onl:, for Brazil but for the TJni ted State'3 . He said he h,=id no complaints against General Crittenberger , who as a Corps Cow.marrler had used his division properly from a strictly military point of view . However , his division was of greater political and military importance . He said to me , 1 You know we crune over here for victory and prestige, rather than to be cut to pieces'. He stated he lmew how difficult it was for the Allied Commarrler, due to the shortage of troops in Italy. He stated that the German propaganda regarding t.he Brazilian Exped~tionary Force had had such a disturbing effect that the President of Brazil had sent a special emissary to see him. He stated tl-iat if the Brazilians lost prestige or were disgraced in Italy this might provoke Argentine aggression against T3razil. Fe stated that Brazil, if it were to lose military prestige, would be a useless ally to the United States at the peace table and that a disastrous crunpaign for the Rrazi lien Exred ·'tionary Force would be so much fuel for the campaign of those anti-American elements in Brazil seeking to draw that country away from the United States . He stated that he felt sure that General Clark u.rn erstood the political importance of the 1razilian Expeditionary Force and requested me to convey his appeal to General Clark that the Brazilian Division be so used that it not have any repetition of the previous failures and, :lf possible , in a quiet sector and that if this were done for some time and he was able to rebuild the morale of his troops and get in his replacerrBnts, he felt sure that the Division would eventually be able to take its share of o~fensive action. I)" "To quote General T-1!$scarenhas: t We are in a training course here in Italy, and the course is going too fast . If the course vrnre a little slower and less arduous, I run sure rve would learn more by the end of it'. "General Mascarenhas req'llf:! sted that I speak to General Clark in the greatest confidence, as he knew that the Army Commaro.er was a friend of Brazil and would understand the serious position in which the Brazilians found themselves." * * * TRAVERSA--DECEtffiER 15, 1944--At 1000 ho1lrs GenerPl Cl~rk drove to the headquarters of the ~5th Division where he decorated And promoted several officers and men. 'f'he General made a short farewell speech to General Coulter and hj s staff on his departure to 15th Army Group. After the ceremony the General returned to hjs command post. In the afternoon the Gen9ral had pictures taken with his chiefs of sections on the occasion of his cleperture today for 15th Army Group. He then decorated and promoted approximately 100 members of Fifth Army Headquarters staff. The General spoke to the assembled officers and men of the headquarters telling how p;rntified ann rroud he was to hrive hnd the opportunity to comm,md such a wonderful team as the Fifth Army. After the ceremony the General drove to Florence and spent the night at his villa. ~ \ \ ��SIENA--DECEMBF:R 16, 1944--General Clark f'lew to Siena this morning w i t 9 General Gruenther to open his new 15th Army Group headquarters which officially opened today ?.t noon . General Clark was met by General McNarney and a guard of honor was held for the new Army Group Commander. After visjting Ms office, W"8ti ng members of the staff, the General drove to the Comm~d:ing G e n e r a ] . ! . . . s _ _ ~ from Siena, for lunch, after which he flew back to Florence, landine on the Florence rjrport. There he met and greeted the House Military Affairs Committee who arrived in C-47 1 s from Rome. General Clar1< was introduced to all members of the psrt:,r, spoke to them hr'efly tellinr, them that he would take them on a tour of the front tomorrow. The Generrl then returned to his villa in Florence and had as his dinner guests General Sullivan and Colonel Saltzman. General Clark today sent the following memorandum to Gen. Truscott: "1. As soon as J have had A.n opportunity to deterrrine the ac'lministrati ve procedure which should be followed in the 15th Army Group I shall send you a letter covering the matter in more detail. Pending receipt of this communication I desire thnt the following mP.tters be referred to Headquarters 15th Army Group: R. All recommendRtj ons for promotion to the grade of general o~ficer, to reach my headquRrters byte 10th of each Tionth. b. All transfers of general o:ficers or officers occupying position vacancies which call for genflral o"ficers, excert in emergcincies when time will not permit. In such cRses ass1.gnments will be made temporary, pending my approval. c. Recommendatj ons for the Rward of the Medal of Honor. d. Recommendations for the award of the Distinguished Service Hedal . e. Recommendations ::'or War Department unit citations. f. Requests for allocRtion of P-dditionel units, and requests for changes in priority ~or equipment o" units. g. Requests for ·nactivation, disbandment, or activation of uni+,s; or for reorganizatio'1 of units under a di~ferent T/0. h. Recommendations for changes in T/0 and E. n2. In general, supply and edministrative matters will be handled directly between Fifth Army and UJ'OUbA, with information copies .i:-urnished 15th Army Group. This is substantially the rxocedure which is already in effect. I am esp8cially desirous, however, thP.t e.11 subjects which hee.r in any way on tactical operatio"ls 1 e referred to TIY headquarters." �SIENA--DECErEBER 17 , 1944--This morning the General left his villa at eight o'clock and drove to San Fiero where he met the House Military Affairs Committee party who arr::ved in a convoy of arproximately 40 jeeps . Congressman John Costello of California, Acting Chairman of,the Committee , with Congressman J . P . Thomas of 'Jew Jersey and Congressman Overton Brooks of Louisiana, joined General Clark in his jeep, and the party drove over the Mount Altuzzo road . At the summit of Mount Altuzzo Congressman S:p3rkrnan of Alabama, Congressman Paul Kilday of ':r'exas and Congressman Cliff Davis of Tennessee Joined General Clark in his jeep , and drove to the Fifth Army command post in .,,raversa . Enroute over Altuzzo General Clerk stop:ped several tines , point1ng out key terrain features , explaining to the congressmen how the troops of the Fifth Arr,r;r overcame this heavily defended mountain barrier . Upon their arrival at the Fifth Army Feadquarters, the congressmen were greeted w:ith a guard of honor . Mr . Costello , Acting Chairman of the Committee, stood on General Clark's right side, General Truscott and other members of the Committee to his left . After the honors had been given , General Clark introduced the party to General Truscott, General Cannon , General Keyes and General Chidlaw and then took them into the conference hut where he 1~riefed them , giving them the over - all picture and explaining the tremendous problems of the Italian campaign. Among other things , General Clark mentioned the possibility of unrest in the rear area,~ due to shortage of food which might force h:im to take troops from the front lines to quell any such uprising. He stated that anything that could be done to increase the food ration for the Italians would be a great asset to the Italian campaign . After hot coffee and doughnuts , General Clark , with Congressman Sheridan of rennsylvania and Congressman Winstead of Mississippi and Congresswm Rooney of Few York in his jeep and accompanied by the rest of the party drove forward to Uonghidoro where a church service was held in an old bombed-out church . After the services, the General, with the Congressional party, had a K ration lunch . During the lunch, Generel Cb.rk talked to all members of the party. After lunch the General asked ongressman Schaeffer of Michigan, Congressman Elston of Ohio and Congresswoman Luce of Connecticut to join him in his jeep . The rarty then drove on to Loiano, which had been under heavy shellfire the day before . The General did not think it advisable to go any further forward , so the party turned around at Loia.no and drove back to Monghidoro where they stopped, and General Clark invited Congressman HPrness of Indiana, Congressman Farrington of Honolulu to ride with him. The General then escorted the party to the 8th Evacuation Hospital in the vicinity of Pietramala where he bade goodbye to the Congressmen . 'l'he General then drove to his villa. in Florence and spent the night . * * * SIEIIJ'A--DEOEMBER 18, 1944--General Clark, accompanied by General Brann, left \ �by rofld at approximately 0830. General TAcCreery, Corm1anding :3ritish Eighth Army, met General Clnrk at Castrocnro on Route #67. Genertl Clark drove with General licCreery to a ~)ui ldine in Forli where they conferred on forthcoming operations. After this, the Corps CoT'lmanders of Eighth Amy; Lieutenant GenPral Kei~htley, Commanding 5 Corps; Lieutenant General Foulkes, CoT'l!nanding 1st Canadian Corps; and Lieutenant Geni:>,ral Ander,=,, Commanding 2nd ?olish Corps, arrived. They were introduced to General Clark And talked to him for a few minutes before luncheon. General McCreery then entertained General Cl~rk at a light luncheon. Generals C1Hr1< and Brann left by road at epproxirrR tely half past two and drove back to Florence where they dined and retired early in the evening. * * * SIE'TA--DECEMBER 19, 1944--This morning the General left his villa in Florence nnd drove to Siena, arriving Bt his headquarters at 1045. General Hamblen carrte to call on General Clark this morning. General Mn.scarenhas caMe with Mnjor Walters to call on the General and stayed for lunch. At 1700 the General gave a cocktail psrty for his Chiefs of Sections of his new 15th Army Group Headqunrters. Approximately 40 guests were present. Generals Brann imd Tate stayed for dinner and after dinner the General played cards w~th his guests and retired eArly. * * * SIENA--DECEMBER 20, 191+4--This morninf, General Clark worked in his office on administrative matters and oonferring with officers of his staff. After lunch the General, with General Gruenther, Colonel McMahon, Colonel Grogan and Captain Bajenow flew in a B-25 to Rome. At 2030 hours the General gave a broadcast over CBS on the occasion of WAC Week. The General also made A BBC recording about the Allied effort ~n Italy to be used at a lA.ter date over BBC together wi_th record·;ngs by Field Jt,arshal Alexander and GenAral Mccreery. General ClPrk today sent the following letter to his two Army Commanders, General McCreery and General 'T'ruscott: The time is rapidly arproaching when I shall give the signal for The primary mission of the attack is to bring to battle A.n<l destro:r German forces in Italy and thereby prevent the withdrn.wal of Major enemy elements to other theaters. It is evident that the mission can be accomplished only by an all-out o~fensive by both armies. The specific military objective of our coming battle is the city of BOLOG''1A. You are hoth familiar with the ammunition situntion e.nd other factors that limit th9 period during which we can wage an all-out battle, and of the gren.t importance to the AlHed cause of our capturing the city of BOLOGNA 1Jefore we are forced to st0p. 11 1. a comb:'..ned all-out attack of Fifth and Eighth Armies. �2. The factors which fix the date on which my decision to launch the attack fo Illf!de Are three: favorable weather, the disposition of the enemy f'orces, and the location of the main forces of Eighth Army. Eii;hth Army, b:,r its successes of the past few days, hes drawn to H from the FFth Army front and from reserve positions in the 30100-NA area suffic: en~ enemy forces to permit Fifth Army reasonable chances of success in its attack. 11 "J. It is my desire that Eighth Army clear up the area between the LAJ\.~o~~ River and SENIO River and be prepared to launch its attack to cross the SE1JIO River at the time Fifth Army launches its attack. I consider a simultaneous attack of ·:;i--eat importance but I }1!' ve decided that favorable weather to permit an all-out attack by the heavy bombers of the 15th Air Force ::c.nd all medium and fighter bombers available to ~!JAmAF to be of greater importance. It is therefore directed that: §;• The CornrnFlnding General, Fifth ArJriy, will: (1) Be prepared to launch his attack on 48 hours notice after 22 December. (?.) Direct Fifth Army's main attack o~ BOLOGNA West of Route 65. (J) Direct that a+,ta.cks be launched without delay astride the routes Castel Del Rio - Imola ands. Clemente Castel S. Pietro to assist the advance of Eighth Army. (4) Direct 9?nd Infantry Division to execute limited objective attack in conjunction with the main effort. ,h. That the General Officer Commanding, Eighth Army, will: (1) Proceed with current operations with the object of launching an attack to force a crossing of the SENIO River in conjunction with Fifth Army's attack. (2) Drive the enemy thereafter West of the SANTERNO River, secure bridgeheads over thRt river and develop a main effort on tbe axis IMOLA - BUDRIO. (J) In conjunction with the main operation, to force the JA~IT~~NO River, make a strong secondary effort on tbe axis LUGO - ARGF.'JTA - FERRA"U . Plans for this operation will include provisions to develop this attack as the prir1ary effort if the sitwtion so dictates. ,g. That D Day for the attack will be the day on which Fifth Army launches its attack to secure M. SOLE. ,g. The inter-Army boundary will be extended by my headquarters in accordance with the development of the operations. In general, until Fifth Army can cut Route 9 wjthin its zone of action, Eighth Army will con- �tinue NW on that route with suPficient operational areas to the South of it. 11 4. Every effort hPs been made to convince the enemy that Fifth Army was so exhausted bv its recent offensive thPt it is not carable of Attack in the near future: It is directed, therefore, that information concerning Fifth Array's attack be considered TOP SECRET and not disseminated except as required for the operation. "5. I ru:ive discussed in detail with you both the great importance of the comj ng battle and the slight superiority in men and Arms available to our nrmies . We do have a great air superiority and the Air Force has plec'l.ged its full support in making this powerful weapon availHble to you. But even with the full cooperation of the air it will require the maximum effort of every officer and mnn of our combined armies to insure success." * * * SIENA--DECB?.ffiER 21, 1944--General Clnrk spent the morning in Rome and in the afternoon returned to Siena by B-25, arriving vt his headquarters at 1530 hours. The General spent the rest of the afternoon in his office conferring with members of his staff and working on an accumulation of papers that had been held pending his return. The General returned to his villa at 1800 hours and dined w1th the regulAr members of his mess . Brigadier Packard, British Deputy Chief of Staff of the new 15th Army Group was the General's guest for dinner 8nd cards. General Clark's radio sreech of yesterday is quoted in full below: "In the Fifth Army we 8re proud of our WACs. They joined us in Italy a little more than a yeAT ago--the first oontingent of WACs to serve overseas with an Army in the field--and they have marched straight up through Italy w:.ith us, through some of the worst weather nnd over some of the rou(shest terra,in that hns been encountered by any Army in this war. "To 011r VlACs, just ['S to our fighting men on the "'rant lines, this war is a deadly serious business, and they are fully aware that they are in it to see it through. Although working under the most difficult field conditions, their enthusiasm coupled with their ability has enabled them to perr.orm efficiently the varied administrative duties of a l~rge Army. 11 Fifth Army WACs do just about everything tmit a soldier does around Fi th Army Headquarters except heavy physical labor . Mainly they serve as stenographers and clerks in the various headquarters sections, in perso:1nel, intelligence, plm,nin1; and operations and suppHes. Many of them work vdth our conmunications staff, helping to orerate a telephone and teletype network that would do credit to a good-s:i zed American city. And those with whom they work will tell you, as they have often �told me, that the WACs here are very nearly indispensable. "All of us admire them for the ch9erfulness with which they go about their work. And we respect their ability to 1:1 ccept field conditions, reg~rdless of the season or the weather. "Fifth Army thinks so hi.a,hly of its HACs that it hns presented the entire detacr.mAnt the Fifth Army Plaque in recognition of their valuable contri1,ution to the campaign in Italy. And our WACs have received a high quota of awards and rromotions. "Fifth Army is deeply indebted to its WACs, for the inVPlu.able help they have ~iven us, ~or their good spirits - which have infecter us all, for their rdgh standards of discipljne - and f'or their earnest determine.tion to participate in the actua 1 winninF; of this war. I hope thHt I shall 1,e a½le to have a WAC detachment in my new 15th Army Group headquarters. We could use many more. They are worthy soldiers." * * * SIE"TA--DECEMI3ER. 22, 1944--The General spent the morning at his office and after l 1 mch flew to Florence to meet General 'T'ruscott 11.t the Anglo-A0 :e:rican Hotsl. G3:.1.eral I3ran·1 was also present at the conference. The General then went to his villa where he spent the evening quietly with Genernl Drann. * * * ~IE'JA--DECEr.iBER 23, 1944--7he General spent the entire day i:it his villa, working on papers and resting. In the evening Generals Gruenther, Tate, Brad.Jhr,w, Lewis, Colonel D1 Orsa and Lt. Col. Walker came for dinner and cards. General Clark today sent the following letter to General HcT{arney: 11 I am inclosing a report which I directed Critten:)erger to r:-ia.ke to me on the last action of the Drazilian Expeditionary Force. It :Ls quite complete, as you will see, and should give you a fair insight as to their offensbe capabilities at the present time. I am sending this to you persunally, for obviously it must be gjven only very restricted circulation. I believe it will substantiate -';:£ .'._ilf 01'r.ia tio:,. I ba ve a1r eady given you. 11 The :Jrazilian Divisio"1 now has little real 0L1..ensive combat value. It has been given every orportunity rmd nursed alone, so there are no alibis. Their troops just cannot slug it out and take the heavy punishment which is so necessary for successful offensive action. fe must, therefore, give them a defensive mission for the time being, as we have requirements f'or them in that role. There they will have an opportunity to gradually develop such of'fensive capabilities as they may have and dur~ng the forthcoming attack be prepared to follow up aggressively as our main effort succeeds. I \ �"I have had a long ~rsonal talk ni th i."ascarenhas since his last attack. He thoroughly understands the necessity for his troops to attack when the occasion demands, and although he is not a top-notch fighting soldier, there is no point in trying to replace him at the present time. Tinless you desire to send this file to General Iv'.arshall, I request you retm·n it to me. 11 11 * * * SIE'.JA--DECEMBt'STI 24, 1944--General Clark drove back to Siem this morning. The General spent four hours at the office and returned to Florence with General Gruenther for Christmas Eve. * * * SIE~- A--DECEMBER 25, 1944--The General returned to his headquf'rters in Siena J about noon. After lunch the General, with General Brann, went partridge shooting. The General and General Brann managed to shoot one partridge and one rabbit. This evening Brigadier Packfl.I'd and General Brann came for Christmas dinner. * * SIEHA--DECE!1IDER 26, 1944--The General spent the entire day in his office in Siena. The General returned to his villa at about 1800 hours and retired eadly. * * * SIENA--DECEJ,ffiER 27, 1944--The General spent the morning at the office and at noon flew to Florence. This nvening the General, with General Gruenther and Colonel Saltzman, dined at Mr. and Hrs. Arturo Grassi' s home. * * * SIENA.--DECEMBER 28, 1944--This morning the General was forced to cancel a scheduled trip to Polish Corps, due to severe stomach trouble. Colonel Bruce called to see the General and confined him to bed for the day. * * * SIE~JA--DECEMBER 29, 1944--The General's stomach was considerably improved today. However, Colonel Bruce advised him to stay in bed. General Brann came and dined with the General this evening. * * * SIE!JA--DECEMBER 30, 1944--The General was feeling well again today. �Generals Clark, Brann and Gruenther drove to the Anglo-American Hotel where they met GenAral McCreery, Brigadier Thomas, G-Ops Eighth Army, General Truscott and conferred for abou-1- an hour. After the conference the General roturned to his villa and rested in the afternoon. The General hc'l.d Generals Brann, Tate, Lewis, Colonel D1 Orsa in for dinner and poker tonight. * * * SJENA--DECEr- 1PLR 31, 1944--The General spent the entire C::ay at his villa, 1 resting and walking. For 1:ew Year's Eve the General had General Gruenther, General Brann, Mr. and L'<rs. Sartori and Mr. and Mrs. Charini a.nd five other guests for dinner a.nd to celebrate the Uew Year. Shortly after midnight the General retired. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, November 11-December 31, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from November 11-December 31, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1640 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/91daa1dc6425ec62f434935157c325f5.pdf?Expires=1787184000&Signature=mW87UfDofR%7EbKeO1URGYetNbsQvy894-muRZ1ORP8WW%7EgWeC4HzzM5yOdhCBTnsTftv8YMwuoXuF3kxLuTvfncDSbIqo7AQxDdG-xqSn4wCdZ4q1evMLIvJQ3L%7E6iDdw6JJKrVH%7EidyuiHHStdqlhXSHBk%7E1LoJzPDsqv68vokx5xmDZxJ4sGdAkq-8dkuD0QUxHtDCeExa4bw5cD8tvRPJPgqx5pydtNJT0ULgVOux2UvkZRRnvbp7gs8H9hoyMGLJCe43%7EqftHRegEStSvCnRogAdzgS3WWanERy9JObvN%7ElkM2PRrvDpb9Js28bLU5MUkHLods5VmfKz2Vz5Vrg__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 88feed208ede6fb0e32344327f77fcfe PDF Text Text :)) ,. 1,A. and thnt he does not consider that any other attacks will attain 1orthwhile results. He advised ne to concentrate on rlans for that atfock and said that if and when he ordered the attRck, he would give me ever;r support that I considered n"cessary. He also said trP,t he was most anxious to give me the '36th Division. I stated to General Alexander thAt my greatest concern was the timing of the attack ·"rom the bridgehead and the object to be accomplished; that is, vliether the object was to be accomplished with T'l"tms now existing in the bridgehead or wit}, the additional division. He informed me he had re/ _.,, served to him'1elf the decision as to tbe time of ln. 1 mching the attack from ~ the bririgehead. Since I believe there is P rossib~lity thrt the Sezze operation may be desirable, I nm continuing all out preparation for that operation. In view of' General Alexander's statement, I a,,, concentrating as first priority preparation for the Cisterna-Cori attack. }lease advic,e me if this meets your arproval. I rissune that you l'.re fully cognizant of General Alexander's ideas on this su"l:>ject but I want you to know whr-t '1.e has told me today. If you desire a.ny action on !'W part oth"r than ~ ndic<ited here, please ndvise me bl'lcause you lmow -thn.t I am with you all the way. 1 I I wnited until Alexander 1 s return and then had Gruenth~r call Lemnitzer. Lemnitzer stated that Alexander was calling Me t't nine o'clock. He did not phone so :r phoned Lennitzer 1md told 1 irn how cieepl;r I resented Alexander's issuing instructions to my subordinate com.~anrjers, particularly those which are in conflict with mine. Lemnitzer told me trat there was some justification in the radio which mruscott sent me. I then asked thAt he bring Alexander to tre phone. When Alexander came on tle phone I told him I ri.a.d received a radio from Truscott which thoroughly astounded me because Truscott repor-, ted thn t he had issu"d instructions to h:i m which were contrary to I'line, and Tru~cott, being confused, asked me for cJJ;i.rification. I told fllexander th:=it if 7ruscott 1 s report was correct I resented deeply his issuing any instructions to r,y ;:iubordinat'1s; that if h1'3 did not lik~ the manner in which I was carrying on the functio11s of the VI Co111s Ln should issue ariy orders to the contrary through me and thPt uncler no circ11r1stances would I tolerate his direct dealings· with suhord.:innt~s . It was rerfectly appn.rent that Alexander had a guilty conscience, and he assured m, thRt he had no intention of resc:indjng "lY order; thPt he thought we were in oonplete agreement and th,,t if, efter I talked rith ':'ruscott tomorrow, I ./"elt that there hrid been any underhanded dealings, I ms to tell him frankly o: my oonclusions - wlicl I ~ill do. This is a small matter, for it hn.ppens that my rlans for the l'ltta.ck from the heachhead and my views 1'1S to the v1ny thrt battle shoul<t be run coincide exactly with those of Alexanrler, but it is vell that I 1 t him know nm, as I have in the past, that h"! will deal directly witli me and never with a subordim:1 te, wl~ ~ c:r he is· so prone to do. I lmow factually thAt there are -:nterests brew:ing for the Eighth Army to take Ro"le, and I might as well let Alexa.nil.er know now thrt if he nttempts any thing o~ that kind he will have anothl'!r 1111-out battle on his hands; m1melt, with me. * * * SAN 1~RCO--T1AY 6, 1944--At 0900 General Clark had a small decoration ceremony \ I I I �'{ .,,,f,,::-·~ "'. .-'} ,• for two mer.,bers of his staff. He pinned th~ D::istinguished Service Eedal on General Brwn, his G-3 . This e.warcl was ver;t deserving 1,ecause General Brann carried a terrific load in planning the operations for the landing at Salerno and th1' subsequent crossing of the Volt1-irno. The next officer to be decorated was Colonel arker, Army Ghef"ical Warfare Officer who received the Legion of 1erit Hedal . Colonel Barker is to leave srortly for the United States to take over co:mmnd of the 1':dgewood Arsenal in New Jersey. After the ceremony General Clerk returned to his van and confer ·ed with Gene~al Gru~nth~r. He left tl:e command post Pt 1010 for Lago field. This was done in an L-5 cub and from Lago field e took off in a C-78 for the beachhead. He :irrived at ~rettuno field at 1145. Fe was rccomprnif"d hy Lt . Col. Drarer, his aide. Imr1~diately upon landing l't the .airport, General Clar}:: •rent to the VI Corps command post wh"'!re he oonferred and had luncr with General Truscott. A~ter lunch, accompanied by Colonel Hine and Colonel Draper, he visited the 1st British Di vision, oommPnded by Gener~l m~wkesworth •. _ He went over the division I s dispositions and pl ans for the next big attack. After . leaving tre 1st British Division , he proceeded to the 5th British Division where he had a similar conference with General Gregson-Ellis, Division Corunander . After leaving the command post of the 5th British Division, General ClArk, aceoripanied by General Gregson-Ellis, Colonel Hine and Colonel Draper, went up to the front lines and visited the co"'1Tl\and post o~ the 2nd Carneronians under the corunand of Colonel Graham. General Clark was very happy to Pleet Colonel GrahaM, for his father, General Graham, had served under General Clark during the Salerno landings. General Graham corunanded the 56th British Division during th:it or,eration . 1 After visiting the 2nd Cameronians, the party proceeded to the 2nd Inniskillings . Here he met Lt. Colonel Slene, Cor'7anding, Pnd discussed the situation immediatel;v confronting th is battalion. Vis1bility was poor, and there were very little inco!'ling shells during the visit . A.fter droT•ping off General Gregson-Ellis at the 5th British Division command post, General Clark, Colonels Hine and Draper, proceeded directly to the VI Corps oornmand post where they pick~d up General Truscott and proceeded to a demonstration area in tl:ie vicinity of the 1st Armored Division where they saw tank retrievers pull out tanlcs , that had b~en stalled and broken down in minefields. The tank retriever consists of a tank with a front cram" 1.'lb ich drops and hooks onto a cable in the rear of the stalled tank. ~he whole process takes very little time and quickly moves th~ tanks back rearward frori the minefield. The next part of the cemonstration was what is knovm as the "snake" . A tank pushes forward whn.t looks like a huge boa constrictor . It is really a long segmented piec~ of metal tubing bolted in the center with each side capable of rr-icking 'l.'IJT. A guide runner is out in front of this linked metal tubinr, so tht>t it follows the terrain quite readily as the .trnk rushes it forward . The snake is 100 feet long. One the tank has plrced it in the minefield, it detonf!tes tte snake by firing one of its machine guns into a target detonator in the rear end of the snake. The last 20 feet of the snake :is lor-iiled with sand so thAt no harm is done to tre tank. As soon as the snake is detonl'lted H destroys all mjn"s .<as deep as 5 feet e.nd clears a pat}, wide enough f'or a tflnk to go tlirougr. Follow up tanks witJ:, additional srwkes pusr. through lllltil eventU81ly a gar has been made through the entire minefield . ... After witrn ssin~ tr is demonstration, Generals CJ.e.rk and Truscott left to �53 visit the evacuation hospitals. They visited the 11th, 94th, 15th and 38th. All commanding officers of these hospitals 1mow General Cl1cr1<- and received him enthusiastically. General Clark went through tr,e battle casualty wards and talked with each man that was physically able to talk. They all seemed cheerful, and it was appArent that they got a big kick out of talking to the Army Commander. The G"neral a(ldressed all of these men in a very f'riendly and infernal marmer, wiflhing them all good luck and saying thl"t our hospitals were rivinv them the best ana thPt they would soon be well. After visiting the hospitals, GenerPl Clerk returned to the Fifth Army Advance Command Post between Anzio and Nettuno, }:md a before-supper drink with the members of his staff there, l1ad supper and retired erirly. General Gruenther dispatched the following cable to General Clm-k today: RN ~804. "Operation order received this afternoon from AAI gives Fifth Army mission for main Pront PS previously known. For bridgehead it prescribed attack on general axis Cori-VPlrnontone to cut hj ghway #6 in Valnontone area.• No alternative direction is innicated. Attack from bridgehePd ~~11 be ready to be launched on ?4 hours' notice flt Pny time from D plus 4 day inclusive. 36th Division to be comriited only o.f'ter reference to AAI. 11 * * * SAN MARCO--M.(1.Y 7, 1944--General Clark nrose early flt 0615. The night was At 0700, accompanied by Colonel Draper, General Clark went to have hreakfast with Colonel Marvin, Comma.nding Officer of the 540th Combn.t ~ngineer Regimcmt which maintains and runs the port for 1mloading the Liberty ships. After breakfast General Clark •inspected the port installritions. The rort personnel }-,ave done an excellent job in unloading supplies by dukws and laniling craft frow the Liberty ships in the harbor, and they have done this type of work uncer most adverse conditions, including weather, hostile shellings n.nd bombings. After inspecting the rort, General Clerk then met General Truscott at the VI Corps command post nnd proceeded directly to the 3rd Division. This division is now in a rest area, and General Clark made a general ::nspection of a battalion ) bivouac aree. Her: he saw several m~del tents for enlisted rie~ ~rhich <:'m'listed of a pup tent dug in to the grouno with only the top part sh owing. This gtwe the men protection from hostile shelling vn1ile they slept. After going through the battalion bivouac area., General Clark discussed with General 0 1 Daniel his plans for the next attack. He discussed the BUFFALO and GRASSHOPP'i.ll plans. The BUFFALO plan is the one vmich AAI hi=1s directed to be worked on in oonjunction wit!-· the attt>.ck on the mm n battl~front. Thi.s calls for an all-out drive toward the direction of CISTFRNA. ':'he GRASSPOPfffi plr->ne is an alter·nate plc'ln which attacks in a direction to the left of the B lFFALO plan. V rather quiet +>or the bea.cbhead with very f~w incomjng shells. General Clark then left with Generals Truscott and 0 1 Daniel to go to a demonstration area where he sav tl'e brttle sleds that' the 3rd Division will use during the next attack. The br1.ttle sled consists of what looks like ordfoary hot water boilers cut in half, linked one behind the other and placed in d0uble rows. There- P.r~ l? sleds, 6 on each side, which are hooked on to the back of a tank. The r..an lies prone on the sled with a small amount o+> armor protection in front, P .nd as the tank now•s forward it pulls a oomplete infPntry squ11.d behind �SY it . When viewed from the distance, the s1eds 11re scarcely noticeable , e spe cially as they go through any grass , at all. By tr is means , men cfln quickly follow up and hold terrain features which have been t11ken ½y tnnks . The next part of the c" emonstration sh owed what was known 2 s a "mangle buggy" . This was what looked like en old farr, bayrack ay,.le vtith a jeep motor on it and a trail gurrd in bac:k-. This arrangement towed in rear of it a long strip of primer cord, and as the clriverleu~ contraption went over bnrbed wire it towed the primer cord tail. The ~.§:.i~ cord is detonated, thereby leaving a space for infantrymen to go through . It would ro.ve some e~fect on anti-personnel mines , in addition to clea,ring a rassage through barbed wire . j After tbis demonstr[ition , Generals Cl£ rk and Truscott and Colonels Hine and Draper left for the command rost of th~ Special Service Force . There they met General Fredericks, his staff and regim~mtal cornrrmnders . General Clark talked to them informally for about 10 minutes :md left immediately for the 34t h Division . Gen~ral Ryder was in Sorrento for a rest, so General CJ.ark discussed dispositions anr rlans for the next attack with Colonel Sherman, the Assistant Divis i onal Commander . While there he also met General Tate , the new Division:11 Artillery O""ficer , who flew back from the Stl.'l.tes vrith him. He also met Colonel Boatner and Colonel Childers , regimental commanders . From the 34th Division the party proceeded to the 45th Division. Here General ~ruscott left , and Gener~l Clark tal~ed for quite a period of time with General Eagles , the Division Commander . The tt>lk concerned principally the replacem~nt a s Division Artillery Commander , ,romotions, Legion of Merit cases and pl ans for the next offensive action. Toward the end of the visit , General raschal , Assistant Division Cornnander, brought in the three regimental commanders ; Colonels Dul:mey, ·iy~rs and Church . Af'ter talking informally with the regimental commanders , General Cl8rk left for the 1st Armored Division where he had lunch with General Harmon . He tnlked briefly with General Harmon concernjng the next attack. Genern.l Clark witnessed demonstrations of three types of treadway brir1 ges to be r l eced e cross sl'l'all streams or dry creek beds . The first one was improvised by tlie division engineers and consisted of a tank with a crane on tl e front holding the bridge and rlacing it where desired . The next was the reeular issued type of treadway bridge with a trnck and crr-ne . The difference between these tv 10 "IRS trPt tl1 e one w:itr t}-,1') truck left the operating personnel much more exposed , not having the rrmor r,rotection of tre tank. rrihe third was th\"! :'loat tYJ'.'e on rubber rontoons . The nl'lxt ff! rt of the demonstretion consisted of a 60mm mortar firing a h~rroon into a minefield . This harpoon carr~ed in jts flight through the air 3 rrimer cord rope which , when it fell to the grolmd aril was ignited, quickly cleP~ed bot}, tne grass and vegetation and , in addition, any anti- personnel minl'ls . lhe rath thus creeted was strv.ight anc1 went for a a: stence of Pbout 5r, feet . In tl'is way, by firi.ng successive harpoon prirn"'r cord snakes , a treil for single columns of' nen to go tl rough r,inefil'!lds A.nd high vegetation v1as quickly mPde . Next t},e General saw tanks fitted wit11 growsers whicl gave the tank 1J1ore :"lotation and grip over difficult tl'lrrain . From t l'lre he -nroceeded to a tBnk rrrich mounted an 81mm r ortar and fired out a lanced harpoon, taking w:t', it tbrougr tl,e air .a cA~le wMch W8S quickl:r relt'l8sed from sprockets on t;he front rart of tre tenJr . 1 he idea of t}1-ts was th.,,t the cable would lodge itself in bn.rbed wire ; and by the tank movinr, to the rear it could easily dreg wi+,h it the bnrbed wire a11d clear a place for cttac1r· rg troops to pass through. In acdition to tris ,,,ortar 0 1 0 �harpoon method of pullinr: out b2r~ed wire, ther~ was Anotr:r t~nk rigg~d v.rit~ a three-prong~d anchor tyyc hook. 1 he tan1· n~gotrntes the vnre 1.tself, arops l,he look over tre barbed wire and tren turns around a"'ld comes forwarc , pulling along wit it the barbed wire remaining on the ground . I General Clerk ie~t the demon;tration and proceed~d immediately to VI Corps to a decoration ceremony. He r resented four Dj stingi1:l shed Service Crosses to three of'ficers and one e,,:!..:sted man : Captain \'Tilson of the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment , 1st Lt . Hodgdon of the 15th Infantry R~girient, Capt . Kimball of the 135th ~n~antry Regiment am Sgt . Broriley of the 133rd Infantry Regiment . He prese!ltod letters whicl. he had brought bacl< from the Stetes personally to Major Austin of the 645th TD Battalion, Lt . Kile of the 69th Field Artillery Battalion and Captain Ballantine of the 33rd Field rospital . He talked briefly with these offfoers saying th t he was glad to have had the opportunity to bring t} em letters from their families . 0 A:.'ter the e1ecoration cereno:"lJl, the '!,and t'lryed t½e Jrd Dj vision song ,;rhj ch has a very catchy tune. General Clark, accomranied by Gener~l mruscott rnd Colonel Draper left immediately for t11.e 'Jettuno airfield wher~ General Clark and Colonel Draper took off in a C-78 . At the airport also wer"'! Generr>1s Br11.dshPw , Sullivan and Bowman, who also flev1 back to Lago fi~lcl. An additional C-78 was sent· to the 'fottuno airfield. for this purpose . After landing et Lago field , General Clark v,ent directly to his villa at Hondragone and relaxed on the beach after a very diffic,1lt two days at the beachhead . He invited some of his staff to supper, and a::ter supper they returned to th~ command post wbere General Clark \·:orked on some adJ"'inistrative papt'rs end retired . General Clark today received the following letter fro~ General Truscott: 11 1. I am prepared to do the BUFFALO Operation under conc'i.tions now existing on the ·1eacl head on 7 days notice . 0 ,g . r1.ans have been drawn and preparntioris are noV' under Y!ay. Upon comrletion o" these prep~rritory steps everytring virill be set ur and reac'y to go except for tbose things that can be accompl5 shed only j_r, the l1:1st L,8 hours pri.or to D day. 11 2 . When present work has been finished I will be prf"pared to lPunch not only BFFFALO but P,ither GRASSHOFPER or Tlffi'rLE within 48 rours . However , if definite preparatory cornmittment js made to either G.B.ASSHOPF:::R or BUFFALO and I am required to launch TUR,.,,LE I will need 72 hours in which to Make the necessary shift and launch the attack. 11 3 . I do not consider trat any operation :now envisaged will product worthwhile results with the troops now under my cormand agE> inst t1 e enemy ros; tion as I know it and in which I expect no chringe prior to D day. 4. I feel thr,t I must have at least one additional InfPntry Di vision and that that Division or Divjsions must beein rnoverient to tl--is erea "TitMn the next two days . 11 11 5. In undertaking the preliminary work outlined aoove Pnd tabulA.ted in ~ , �the attached, it is to be pointed out th2t secrecy is sacrificed! or. at least jeopardized. In addition, artillery coverage of t~e.Beachhead_l~ne is gravely jeopardized if artillery is noved from p~esen~ position to pos1t1.0~s for t~e attack and then remains therein necessarily silent, for a long period of time awaiting announcenent of D day. 11 * SAN MA.RCO--N!AY e, J...- * * 1944--General ClRrk worked on administrative matters and conferred with GenerAls Gruenthe,r and Brann prjor to leaving by cub for Caserta for a co'1.ference with General Alexander,. CDJC, AAI. Details of the conference are covered in General Cui.rk I s notes for the day. He returned frori. AAI at 1045 and went back to his van where he received Gemer21 Larkin, Supply Officer for SOS at Oran, and General Stewart in charge of shipping in the Mediterranean area. He lunched nt 1230 and depa.rted by cub for F.ighth Army TAC field for inspection of Fifth Army artillery units. He was accompanied by General Lewis, A.rtillery Officer, and Colonel Draper. General Clark's jeep met him at Eighth Army TAC field, and the party proceeded to the 194th Group command post at San Vittore wbere they were met by Colonel Banks, 13th Field Artillery Brigade Commander, and Colonel Cook, 194th Group Commander. He inspected the command post and talked with Colonel BPnks with reference to a replacement as Division Artillery Commander of the 45th Division. He explained to Colonel Banks that he had several officers in mind, two of whom were Colonel Cook and Colonel Meyer. He wished to see Colonel Meyer at the 17th Field Artillery Group oommand post later on. He also told Colonel Banks that he had submitted his name to NATOUSA for promotion to Brigadier General and that NATOUSA had approved it. In d.i.scussine with Colonel Banks the 194th Field Artillery Group's participation in trie next attack the latter confirmed that after the pre-arranged fires for the Eighth Army, mostly counter battery, .had been completed at H hour, the group wouid honor only those requests for fire that had been cleared through the French Corps with one exception. One battalion of 155 g1ms would answer calls for fire direct from Eighth Army providing they were not firing for the French at that time. The Eighth Army has more artillery than it had a week ago and is even in ,a better position to fire. contingent missions for the Fifth Army. From the 194th Group command post, Colonels Banks and Cook accompAnied the pa.rty to the 698th Field .A rtillery Battalion oommand post. This is a 240 howitzer battalion and is commanded by Lt. Col. Clifton. lf'hile at the command post the battalion fired a counter battery mission requested by Eighth Anny. General Cfark found this very interesting and had the map location of the target pointed out to him.· Upon leaving the 698th command post, he met three AMG officers who were in San Vittore arranging civil affairs natters and looking into the possibility ·of opening the schools. This to~m is still subjected to enemy artillery fire . The General inspected a 240 howitzer gun position on his way to the 633rd Field Artillery Bc'l.ttalion oommandeo by Lt. Col. Halliday. Upon arrival he inspected the command . post and chatted with enlisted personnel present and shook hands with them all. ..._,I From tbis comma...11d post he went to a 155. gun position which was just about �to fire a mission. GenerPl Clark stnyed while the mission was fired. He talked to the gun crew and told them that they would chanee positions soon because the attack was going forward. From this gun position the pl'lrty proceeded over a long, dusty, tortuous road to the 17th Field Artillery Group oommand post. He was r.et by Colonel Meyer who had a small honor guard w},ich was presented to General Clnrk. He went up to Colonel Meyer's oomr,and· post and discussed with him his dispositions in preparation for the attack. He also told him that he had selected him to becone Artillery Officer for the L;.5th Division; thet hP could make plans to go there soon and trike with him one additionEil j1mior o-f'ficer who could become his ajde vihen he received his star. From the 17th Field Artillery Group the ra.rty rroc eeded to the 17tr Field Artillery Battalion, stopping enroute to see a 155 howitzer brttery of the 933rd Field Artillery Brttalion. At the 17th Field Artillery Battalion, Gene- · ral Clerk walked to a battery position, passing through the battalion area which, at the time, was busy vdth cannoneers getting their supper. Having inspected the battery position, the party then rroceeded to the 13th Field Artillery Brigade command post at Sipiciano. There General ClPrk was presented to the staff and enlisted men of tr,e Br:igHde cor1 man0 r,ost. He insrected the fire direction center and counter battery section and the command post proper. The coruna.nd post is in a building which has an excellent view of the major terrPin features on the brttlefront. From there he left Colonel Banks and, accompflnied by Genercl Vmis and Colonel Draper, proceeded back to the Fifth Arrn;:r command. rost, Prri ving there at 1800. General Cl::i.rk dusted himself of'f nnd received William Randolph Hearst, Jr., a war correspondent now in Italy. Mr. Hearst was accomp1mied by Colonel Clark, Fublic Relations Officer. Generril Clark dis cussed with him Ms recent visits to all Fifth Arny troops and of his beach installation rit Morrlraf;one whic'r is available to Headquarters officers of the Fifth Army. He also tnlked about the l"lnlisted men's beach at Bagni ninerali. Fe told Mr. Hearst that he could come to his :rress conference whicr he was holding the next day at 1600 for war correspondents attached to the Fifth Army. He stated that t},is was an (ff\ off-the-record talk and that he was going to explain to them the forthooming ~ attack. 'l.r. Hearst and Colonel Clark were jnvited to supper where conversRtions cnntjnu~d concernjng Fifth Army activities. '-l. ~ ;; l ' ~ 0 \JJ'\ After supper Generfll Clm' 1r conferred brj efly with General Gruenther and worked_ on administrative J"'1attt'lrs 1mtil he r~tired at ?200 hours. "',J>I c,._V ~ V,.P I' \I"~ \\! ' fr,( eneral Clark dictated the following notes for inclusion in his diery, "As a result of riy vi sit to the /\nzio benchhead for two days I learned rom General r•ruscott that General Alexander had conveyed to the fact t~at he was to run directly the VI Corps attack; thrt J~e would reinforce it with anyth:ing Truscott wanted and would set tre tjr,e and cH r ction of Pttack And the troops involved. He also conveyed to Truscott the fr'ct that the instructions I had issued for alt errn:i. te 2 ttacks were not in accordance w.; th his h~r/ 0 �53 . ' '),t '~1,, ~ ;.,(t·t"~ • ,;' ,,,.!!"':·~·1"Jli'.'-~ . . . desires and that there v,as only one .<1.ttack envisaged tma.rd Cori-Valrwntone; that to preprtre other alternate plans tovmrd Sezze and to the north along the l\.lbano-Anzio road was sheer waste of time. In other v'ords, General Alexander, before a civilian mP-mb<;r of rarliament, and to General Truscott, with General Lernnitzer present, embarrassed m~ by in~icating thRt he was not in accord with the instructions I hBd issued. "Upon my return I asked to see Alexander and had a conference with him this morning. I told him he h,id embarrassed me. He replied that h0 h8.d no intention to do so :md was surrrised that Truscott +'elt thP-t he hP.d countermanded my instructions. ''I told Alexander that, pursuant to his latest instructions to attack on 24 hours' notice, we could not do so - 1,,g hours vms the rnnirmm. I also told him thPt if we complied w5t'r his D plus 4 att8ck orders from the beacl1 heAd, tl e '36th Di vision would rn vc to move tomorrov,. 11 Alexander immed:i.Btely jumped to tre conclusion thPt I ,vrs 11ot all out for the attack; t},nt I did not e,rprove of his plans. I assured him tru1t the Fi~th Army attack would )('!) as aggressive as any rlan or ~ttrck he had ever been in or read of. "I told Alexa11der that I wanted to Rttack out of the beachheRd with every- \ thing I ha0; thPt if conditions v1 ere rigl t I wanted to attack towards Cori but , I that what I was guarding agriinst vras pre-conceived ideas as to wh..,t exnctly was to be donP. and thPt ri1e felt tht1t he Rnd Hl:i.rdine hrd such pre-conceived ideas. I told him that I thought there was ri crnnce for a great victory if l i we played our cnrc1 s right and did not attack rrem!"turely. He kept pulling on me the idea that "Ve were to annihilate the entire G8rmrm Army and did it so many times thflt I told hi.m that I did not bel:ieve tlrn.t we hnd too many clwnces f '" f to do that; thA.t the Boche WA s too snart. He HgP j n seized the orport, ni ty to .~. J accuse the Americans of lack of aggressiveness. T vras c'i sgusted vnd disap\J pointed with my conference. He has a pre-conceived idea to do something to v" avoid criticism at borne. This was brought out in the conference. I told Mm thr>t inasrnucr as the attac}· was to be Pll-Americnn I would strongly recoml:"end /\ thPt we sit t:i eht, maintain our +"lexibility and under no conditions should we § permit the main attack to be stalled and tr.en try to save our face by a rremature attack out of t}le beachhead. I told },im that I had d:irected Truscott to give first rrfori.ty to tre Corj attack but th, t he would contj nue plans for the attac · t0 tre west of Colli Laziali. I wanted to have rbns rr8pared to meet any eve11tuFility, keeping ny m·nd free of Finy d0finite cc•mnitment before tl~e battle started. JI I I fI "I em thoroughly d~sgusted with him and w:itr h.; s Pttitude but hnve tre satisfaction of knowing th11t I told him exactly the fFi cts as I see then. 11 * * * SAN HMCO--MAY 9, 1944--General Clark started the day by working on administrative matters. Due to pressing duties at t!-ie col"IIJland rest he decided not to visit troops under bis commnnd tocl ay. He received a classlTfl te of his, Colonel Wooley, Signal Officer of Sewmth Army who dropped in to say hello. Shortly �after Colonel Wooley left, Gen rals Gruenther and Brann conferred with General Clark brfofly concerning ma.tters wrich were discussed between General Gruenther and General Harding, Chief of Staff to GenerRl Alexander, the CINC, AAI. General Harding came to see General Gruenthcr with reference to GenerRls Clark and Alexander's talks the day bef'ore ruid to button up staff rrocedures concerned with decisions of their talk. Shortly after this conference, GenerPl Clc.,rk stepped ont of his van and -rinned ?nd Lieutennnt bA.rs on t •,o Air OP sergeant pilots, Sergeants Holle and Bergf'lan. General Lewis Rnd his r,rtillery section were rresent, and all congratulated the two new 2nd Lieutenants after this ~nformal ceremony. Shortly after this General Clark conferred with Colonel Gray, his Fifth Army Judge t dvocate, who rresented 26 court ma.rt:ial ca.ses to General Clark. This ~cessive backlog of cases has built up due to General Clerk's visits to his troops prior to the attack. He just didn't have time to fit in everything. After Colonel Gray left, General Clark ~orked on decoration cases which also have accumulated in the aides' office. After lunch General Clark received General Saville, XII Air Support Command Gomnander, and conferred with him brjefly concerning close support air miss:ions to be given durinq; the attack. General Clark desired to assure himself that General Saville hrid :ironed out any rnisunderstr>nding and had coordinated his air efforts. He then vrorked on adrlinistrnti ve matters and, in addition, his talk to war correspondents which would take place at 1600. Details of this conference follow: General Clark entered the hut at 1555 and the conference strirted. 31 correspondents had already arrived and were seated. General Clark opened the meeting by stating that in the forthcoming operaHons the beachhead forces would not be irn,ediately involved. He stated that he wished the rress to be familiar with all plans and to have a complete understanding of the objectives of the operation. He emphasized that no quotations would be permitted, r,nd the information to he disclosed was secret. The General pointed out that the Eighth Anny is now concentrated in the Cassino area. The Fifth Army is concentrrted along the GariP,liano. Courses of action open to the Allied planners are: (1) to attack from the bet1.chhead (2) to attack :'rom the ~io:hth Army area first and follow up by an attack from the Fifth Arf",y area later. Both Army Commanders, however, agreed that this should be an all-out simultr>neous P.ttack of both armies along the entire front. General Clnrk emphasized tha.t the situation on the beachhead vras excellent. The morale o+> the troops is hif'ti, and all Pre eagerly awaiting coming operations. He furthP-r stated thl'lt the supply situ1>tion in t1 is sector is in very good shape. The General outlined the enemy order of battle, stating thPt there were 23 German divisions available in Italy and furthP-r rointed out "'here these divisions are now located. The General asserted that his discussions wj th General Leese and the Eighth �1"''-'' 1' • Army staff were most cordial. on details of the operation. ~~~(fl~:-,,~ ... ~-" , , < " ' '1'"" The two Army Commanders are in complete accord In the French Corps 4 French Divisions · are available. In II Corps 2 divisions are available, the 85th and 88th. The 36th Division is in reserve, but the General pointed out that this division is r.. ctm1.~ly in MI reserve and May not be comri.itted without the autl ority of GenerPl Alexander after consultation with him. 1 4 Divisions are available to Eighth Army :in 13 Corps plus 2 divisions in Polish Corps and 2 Canadian Divisions in reserve. The immediate objective of / French -Sxy,editionary Corps is the capture of Mount Majo feature; the first objective of II Corps is Haunt DaJ11iano. The General st11ted that while each corps has sub-divided the operation into tl-.ree phflses, the units are instruct- ( ed that immediately upon aqcomplishing the first phc~se of the mission they 11re to immediately rroceed with tri~ second ~.nd third pl ases of their mission regardless of vh~ther or not flanking units have reached th~ir objecti'les. The 1 Fifth Army, it ~ s planned, will rove un the Ausonia Valley to D1 0ro, Pico and Itri. On the beachhead we have six divisions, including one armored. Here there are three possible axes of attack: (1) North +,oward Rome (2) soutrieast (3) northeast in the direction of Cori-V~lmontone to cut Route #6. Of these courses General Clark prefers the third. He emphasized that the bridgehead attack must depend on operations on tre main rant. Soon after operotions comnence the coITll'.'land echelon of the Fifth Army will be transferred to the beachhead '1h",r it lrunches its attack about 15 Hay. General Gruenther will rennin here Ls GenerRl Clark's Deputy. G~neral CJFrk ras prepRred a letter to all troqs in the F:ifth Arny to be released immedietely be~ore operations get under way. General Clark stflted. · hat we are in eYcellent shape with respect to Army artillery witr 240mm ho vitzers and 155mm rifles [lnd 8 11 howitzers. He also emphasized that we are in an excellent position Yrith rl'lspect to our reserves; i.e., we will be in a position to employ them amphibiously if this course proves to be best at any point along the main front. The Army Cornriander disclos~d to the press his recent visit to the United States and stated that he had an excelle"lt opportunity to discuss with the Fresident, with GenerDl ·!arshall and vTitr various members of Congress, all phases of the Italian operation. After General Clark had concluded tis expos:ition of the plan, severnl questions were asked by the correspondents. The conference ended at 1700. After the war correspondents had departed, Gerteral Clark worked on more administrative matters and correspondence and received na,ior Duncan Sandys, Under Secretary of Surply for British Ground Forces, and Colonel Post, one of his T-lr:i tish Army representatives. He had invited -~hese two Britishers for supper. Friar to supper, Genernl Gruenther, Colonel Galtz!l18n, Colonel ✓ Draper and Captain Lampson were present with General Clnrk and his 'Jrit ish �Col guests for a before-dinner drink. Generals Clerk and Gruenther talked ¥'ith Major Sandys concern:ing the big and over-all picture of British supply. In addition, other small, -informal talks centered around vrrious other subjects from the 3rjtish viewpoint; such as, women workers in war factories, women ATS and the British lik.'"l.npower problem. After supper had finished and his dinner guests depPrted for CE'serta, Gener~l Clr,.rk visited wrious staff sections in his command post, returned to his van and retired. * * * SAN MARCo--r:AY 10, 1944--General CL<>rk worked on important dispntches from the time le a.rose until he hf!d Generals Gruenther and Brann in his van for a short conference. The C-in-C, Gener~l Alexanr1er, was to arrive at the command post at 1030, and there were last-minute details thrt Generf'l Clrrk wanted to discuss with •his staff concerning the attack before he talked to Genernl Alexander. General Alexander arrived at 1045 a,nd talked briefly with General Clark before leav1'1g to inspect Fifth Army units. Gener8 l Clark accoMpanj_ed General l le:xander in his cpr to the French Corps. They arrived there at A ,hout 11 o I clock and were net by General Juin tmd the usual p-uard of honor. mhey went up to Genern 1 Juin I s office where they djscussed briefly Frencr Corps' partjcipation in the Attack tomorrow. General ,Tuin gave ti brief surnmnry of his rart in the operation. A small point arose which caused some discussion. General Juin had heard that General Ke;res '"las moving :in sore tanks from the &m Lorenzo nrea tonight. This would, of course, obviously be against security and tre cover plan. After consulting with General Keyes, Generrl Clnrk found th,:it they were movipg in some tank destroyers, wrich were rract1CAlly t\-ie same AS tanks, and he requested General Keyes to call it off. From l<'rencl> Expeditionr>ry Corrs the two GenerPls went imTiediately to II C9rps. General Kt"yeS rresented General Alexander to all members of his staff. This took r.;bout 20 minutes, as Gl'mcral Alexander shook hPncts with eacr of them and questioned them briefly concernjng their function :in the comman<l rost. Immediately from II Corrs Gen~rals Clt1rk and Alexander left for the e5th Division and after thrit for the 88th. At both divisions General Alexan<ler met merely the ~enernl staff officers 1:1nd discussed briefly witl1 each di vision commander his operAtiom11 plan for the attRck tomorrow • . Generals Clrrk and Alexander arrived rit the Fifth Army command post At about 1330 where they had lunch and cont:inued discussing briefly and inforr.ially activities of tre troops on the Rttacking front. After General Alexnnder left, Generl'll Clrirk work~d 011 snr1e importn,nt dispatches and also on some decoration cases. He left nt 1500 by L-5, acCol'lpanied by Colonel Draper, for IV Corps. He vrns met Ht IV Corps cub field by General Crittenberger vrho took h:im il'lmedfately to the comJMnd rost r>t Pozzuoli. After conferring briefly with General Crittenberger, General Clark met the entire staff of IV Corps. He tRlked to them briefly but quite significRntly. He reminisced thrt a year ar;o tJ, is Mrne his Fifth Army str>ff hnd �not entered combat. They had worked on many plans and were impPtient to g t into battle. Finally the chance came on the Saforno landing, and they became indoctrinated fast. He assured IV Corps that it would not be far off before they would f1mction as a staff in combat and not to lose heart because they were in a rear area and just working on plans. After his tnllc, Genernl Clarv i.nsrected the command post proper, going through all of the G sections, AG, Engineer and company Preas. Fe returned to General Crittenberger 1 s tent wht'!re he wrs served a refreshlng drink. Present were: G"neral Crittenberger; Colont"'l Harrison, G-.3; Colonel Sims, G-1; Colonel Gillette, Engineer Officer; Colonel Nance and Colonel Draper. This little gathering brought forth manY interesting points, and GeneralCL"lrk corimented thPt it was now practically the twilight before the battle and that naturally he was anxious for it to start; thr-t he was sure it was to go, but he wasn't too optimistic ~hout the Boche not standin~ up to fight. He felt certain that they would do so; thot Here wasn't any indication of any withdrt1wal at ·rresent. He stated thrit it was his prime desire to vindicPte the beachhead, Pnd if it vms the last thing he did, he would do it. After this informel conference, Generr->l Clark left imriedi, tely for MondraP.'one where he, Colonel Draper and the tviJO r,ilots went in for rin evening dip. The water vms col<l but refresM_ng and rTde everyone feel very alive. The Genernl returned to the com~and post rit 1845 ~nd met his dinner guests whom he took into his win. They were: Generals ~•oran, Tate and Brann. A-"'ter supr,er they tnlklll<l informally ;Jut side, walkinP' l~isurel;r riround t,he command post. General Clt1rk ret:ired early t1fter a rather strenuous day. General Clark rec11ii ved the followinP, cable from General Freyberg, Commandin~ the 2nd }Tew Zealand Division: RK C/1?66. 11 0n eve such important bA.ttle we of 2nd New Zealand Division send our best wishes to your Army in which we were privileged to serve." * * * 1 YlRC0--~1AY 11, 1Q44--Genernl Chirk worked on rilitnry disratches until 0900 when he l("Jft +-or the 16th Division cub field accom:rrinied by c~ptain Lampson. He arrtv"'d there in 2bout tw"!nt:v n-lnutes 11.nrl W:"lS tr1cen over to tr e ceremonial <"i.eld wrere ab0ut 1,000 r1~n of tl'e 16th Division were in :r-iass formation facing General Clark. In front of the mass -l'orl""f1tion were the decorees. General Clark rresented thf'? 1isti:ripnished Service rnedal to Genernl .. alker, three Dist"inguished Service Crosses and twenty one Silv"'r Sbi.rs. He ar'ldressed the troops and decorees br:i,-fly and prnised Ge111'\ra1 Walker 1 s efforts as Division Co:rimander for t,},e pnst two yenrs. A.ftl'!r the decorations h;d been awarded the decorees rlaced tl~emselves to the right "lank of Gen.-ra.l Clar}·:, and the troops passed in review. Af'ter the last p:roup rad p1ssed in review, General ClPrk left imrn"!diately to tr.e cub fi.-ld where e took off' for CPpo--lichino airport and arrfved there at about 1015. He was guided to the 509th I 2rachute Battalion 1 s ce:ceT'!onial fielrl where +,h~ entire battalion was :ined up in r'iass formation in front of hiM. The decor.,.es :vere rlaced in f'ro"l-1:. of tt,e battalion, rind prj or to the a rarding of the decora.tio-1s, Gl'lneral '.Jh1rl<: sroke warmf.y of the battalion 1 s ,fforts in battle and rraised tr""n for their exrloHs. He then awarded tre decor2tions, af'ter wl ich the decorMs p1£ced tremselves on the le ..t o-"' Gent"'ral ClP.rk, Pnd tr e bt-,ttalion nt1ss.e d in review. He awarded five SAN �Dist3nguished 3ervice Crosses, five Bronze Stars. O'Yl_. Legion of Perit, twelve 3ilvl"r Stars and Il'!lmediatl'lly after tl e ceremony G"'"'l'''ral Cl"1rk and Captain Lampson returned to Capodichino, from vr.icb point -1;,hev flew bRck to the Army command post., arriving fit 111+5. Gl'lner, 1 Clark went to his van ['ncl confl'lrred with Genl'?ral Gruenther. At 1'345 Gen~ral Jevers nrrived ot the cor-!'J.a:•1.d · post, nccompanied by hls pilot-aide, Lt. Col. ;rormel . Gen~rals Clnrk and Devers conf1"'rred in the confl"rence hut f'or ~bout half an flour rmd then had l1mch together. At lunch G~neral Devers iscussed th~ r1P..npower shortr ge in the United Stntes nncl stated that as :.'ar as his administrative functions were concernl'ld, in the Mediterranean Theater he was going to adhere strictly to Vlar Depirtment requirements and inactivate provisional units. If the nl'led required, they would be reactivated not as provisional 1.mits but as T/O orgF1nizations, and other units would have to be de-activnted to tak~ care of th,.. new act::vation. General Devers also stated th:_-,t re h8d tal 1i::ed to G y, Jral V7ilson, who had just returned from England, and he said that Ge11:eral ~: se>1hower was very optfristic concerning OVF:P.LORD; that he thought it would definitely go and th.Pt we would have a complete victory. Genernl Dev,..rs -1-1- en discussed the rossibilHies of Operation ANVIL taking place and went ~nto some of the rari~icctions of ~he French political and military oorunand in !fortP Africa. Initially they would not ~llo 1 a French Army during the initial stas:;es of the operation, but eventually, for the rayoff, a M'rench Army Co!"mander would 11e in romM~nd of fa o French Corps. The .\rny Co,'!mnnder might be Gen,..ral DeL..,tte. In all probability Gen~ral Juin culd not be chosen because he was not in very ~ood :avor with General DeGnulle, due to his :l nitial stanrJ on the landint: operations in :rorth Africa in 194?. The conversation then centerJd Around the n.ttack tris evenjng. After luncr Gemeral Devers lf".!ft "'or II Corrs, and GenerA.l ClPrY returned to his vim whl'lre he worked on r,ore rilitr>ry fjsrrtches. The rest of tre afternoon General Clark ,rorked ir. Lis va.11. ar d confer:ced with }l"'neral Gruenth"'lr. For dinn r gu..,sts the General entertflin'°'d Major Knjp-ht ~..,a Lt. Col. iorter. Aft..,r dinner GenerPl CL<irk wor}-..,d on ad,.,,~nistrn.tive nf1tters Pnd left 11t 1000 for French Corps where :he vif',wed fror. the observation tower in the castle at the French Corps comman"l. post t're beginnings of tre great offMsive to he launched against German positions along the Pront . Ee return..,d at nbout idnight nnd retired. General Clark cabled ~"-'""ral Leese today as follows: RTI 7523. "Best·wishes fror. FFtl, Arr'ly ror complete success in the COT'linr, operation. I an. deerly grat"'ful to you f'or wholehearted ccoperatio:'.1. in planning rhase. 11 General Leese resronded as follows: R:J 794. 11 Greatly aJ precit>te your kind message. It ras been a great plea.sure to work w:i .L}1 you throughout, ~nd we very mucr. apprecfate the concessions you al"d General Juin made to concert tirdng. We all in Eighth Army send your Fi.f'tr Arri.y 0 1Jr cordir•l eood wishes and look confidently forwal"d to advw cing shoulder to sl1 oulder together . 11 ', ��\/1;-POfi"-. fa;:;. Ii f~a.__ ~ / ' ~ l °"'.;;.-. sA1~r1A.Y l? , 1944--Tre British Eigrth and the AIT'"lrican Fifth Armies , ) lamched treir hi~ offensive at 1100 hours last evening . General Cln.rk arose early this morninr, to receive rerorts concerninr· rrogress rnerle . The French Corps inade some rcr-o~ress durinrr thl'l nigbt rind increased its rositions towa.,,..r1 tbe west somewi1at . i~ount Fa-:to was tRl,.en ancl h!"!ld after bitter +"ighting . By l40C tl,.is afternoon r~ount Frd.to ·ms firn, end the ?nd 1~oroccan Division was rontinuinp; its r-ttack on otrer objectives . Tre 1st Poroccan Division on the rii:;ht at the hridgehM.d WPS ri?kin.t:s no progress . It rad a couple of trnk companies nortJ, of its r,res"nt lin"'s tut f'j ghting was bitter tind enemy oprositi.on to(\ great to ronsidl."r any progress as havin~ been Made . To the soutr in t}:e Frencl sector the 4th r:ountain Division was having mnch dif:'iculty in mn iri~ rroP,ress toward Mt. Ceschito . On the left of tlie Frencr Gorps, II Corps h~d taken rractic,...lly all of its initial o½jectives. Th~ 150th Jnfa~try of th~ 8~h Division had taken and held Da!'iin.no fir"'l . They were in V"ntosa and ready to go on as soon as the Francl,. had nroceedea south toward C"'scr·to to Rotundo . I Company of the 350th ht'!ld Cer:icola . ':'he 151st Inf'antry hRd 1110ved f'orwRrd about 1 , 000 yards find was stopred toward t! e entrance of' Jantn "r,1·i.r, Infante . They had -ianaged to ~et a few tarks .-:D.to the tovm anrl sorie infl'ntry +, .... oops . A coordinated attack to teJ" the town is ·r. rrep1,ration, 1-,ut th~ to 1m PS yl"'t has not fallen . F,lements o.f' the 139th Infantry ?dva:>1ced -f'orward as far P.s Gan !'artino and the two hill masses /t66 anr #69 , known as the Clle. San •;artino . There was ri~ tter f'-': ghting tr ere duri. 11f" the riorn-i ng. .Arou.11d noon ·:~ 11 #?.;q was tri.ken and an attack planned to ,vrest Hill #66 from the Gl'!rm..,ns. B-itt(')r counterattacks were lmmched by the f}"rrans t.l.l'oughout th~ dav on th"'se positions . Further south a'1c'1 to the coast other eleT"ents of the 85th Di vision had rroceeded for ward about 1,000 yards and were lam1.ching aggressive combat ratrols to feel r out ene'1y res~ ,;-::;&nee . In ;~enerrl t},e tempo o:: the attack shortly r,fte:r daybreak slowed down considerably, 8S the 1oche was putting ur bitter resistance . He 1 ad accepted battle as had · "'!e11. anticipated , t:1us rreventing tl," seizure of all objectives as anticipat~ : . Up on t,e -r::~_ghth Arny ~rant the Folisr , Corrs proceeded southwest from rositions nortl of the ncnastery and rrad" soTl'le -rrogress , hri.vi11.g !'laced el..,r'lents on FrantoT'l B.idge whicl~ underwert var:..ous 1 cr-·D.terattad~s all c ay lorg. In so. r:2ses nP-~ther Ue 7oche nor the foles actually possessed rarts of ~f''"' rid ;A. . To tbe S0'1tJ-,, across th,. ~-EJ: ldo, the Eii:;hth Arrny had pushed 8bout eir;r.t 1 )at~r>lions e cross this river eith r by n,eans of' class 30 ferries, r,qfts er bridges . South of ::;an J\.ngelo two 1,r:idges ht:1d been constructed across the lZaJ ido n.nd triree sq1.1adrons of tanks, in addition to infantry troops , had been rushed in+.,o the vr-tll"'Y• Tr.e:ir advance .-:n c'epth was lim:tted to ariout 1 , 000 yf'rds . Reportg continued to cor,e in durinP, the day, some confirmed and some not confirmed, indicating t:b1.t this ev~ning ard tmorrow would clarj fy 1'1any sit1.W 4~ions w:hich rlevelop!"ld durin~ th~ ...irst dey o; tre attack . ! Ge'1.,.ral 8lrrrk co11.ferr~cl w:i th Ge'1.ern.l Gr·1enther, his Chief of Strff, arrl General Brann, ½is G-3, on nun~rous occasio11s . :~ajor Gen"ral "Tate Twin:irc, Cor:rrnanrii11rt, Gen rel o-f' the ~trater;ic Air Force, v;as -tnvi.ted to l1mch. qe discussed 1:r-il'lfly the Strate1:;ic Air Force I s role in hi ttin~ targets in central Gen~ny a~d int~~ ree~ arees o.P It~ly rnd in ~oumania and Bulgaria . He nlso dj scussed sr:ri1' of t1 e h,ly that h,. ,res gjvi~g to the XI! Air 3U:i:,J.ort Com_,and, under General S::i.vHJ.-,, w{th l'il.rts of the Strategic Air Force. 1 G"lneral Clark co:1ti'1ued to o llow th~ battles closely throuJrout t:1e ef- ~ ~ •" • !llt/l-ft< - - �ternoon and evening. The lack of rrogress ~n the French sector might require the 3rd Algerian Division to vr,ry its rol~ in trie rrorosed rlan rnd pass through eler,ents of the 4th to accomplish obj"' cti ves north and nortl:.cast of Castelforte to seize end hold Ceschito, Reali, Rotundo and Siola. Orders of th"! day irsued by Genl'!rals Clark and Alexander are quoted below: General Alexander ' s messrge is cs follows: "Soldiers of the Allied Arnies in Italy. "Throur-hout the pest wjnter you 1rive fouapt hf'rd r,nd vnlfrntly end killP,d many Ger~ans . 1~rrinrs you Pre disarpointed that re h~ve not been abl~ to advance faster Pnd .('arther, but I rmd tl:'ose wl-'o knou, realize full well how !Il8gnif'icently you h~Ye fow~ht amonr;st these Plmost insur ,oPntable obstccles of . rocky, trac1·less ~ounta.:L-'l.s, deep i.n snow, and in valleys blocked by river::; ri.nd rud, against a stubborn foe . "The results of tr•ese prist months may not ny:penr srectaculPr, but you have c1rawr into Ttnly Pnd mauled rmny of t:b~ enemy's best divjsions "1Mch he badly '1eeded to stem th"? ad.vnnce of tre Rmsfan Arr,i"s in the East . Hitler l as Bd.mitted thE't Ms defeats in the East were lrirgely due to tre bitterness of t:i-,~ fiP-hting and is losses in Italy. This, in itsel""', is a gr"'ct 8 cl ievement and y0u ma~,r well be ri s proud of ;vout scl ves Rs I e rn of you . You have gafoed the rdmiration of +.he v10rlr'l Pnd th(> i:,;ratitude of our Russir,n Allies. 0 0 ''Today trie bad tmes are behind us and to"llorrow we crin see victory ahead . TTnder the ever increr>si11cr blo"'ls of the 1c1ir -f'orces of tre United Nations, which are mount~ ng every day in intensity, the Gerr,an war r.a·cliine is beginni"l:lg to crumble . The Alli"'d Prmed forces 8re nm1 ~.ssembling ·"or tre fjnal b0ttles on sea , on lrmd, P'1d in the air to crush the enemy once and for all. Fror the East and the West, -f'rol:' the Nortri and tl· e South, blows are Bbout to fa.11 which will result in th~ final rlestruction of thfl" •·razis and brirg freedou once n.gain to f>:irone , 1md hnsten reace for 1m all. To us jn Italy, las heen given the honom· to strike tre first blow . "We nre going to destroy tr~ German Armies in :;:tnJ.y. The fiishtjng will be lwrd, hitter , a.vid p~rhaps long, hut yon 1.1re warriors and soldiers of the highest order , who for more t1 r,n n. yeay, ~ ve kn01·11 only victory . You have courage, <1eterrni11.Ption enn skill. You ,-ii 11 he sur-rorted by overwhelming air forces , and in ,C!1.ms and tn.rks ue far outnumber t:re Gl'?rrrans . No Armies rave ever entered battle before with a more just t'1nd rig! teous cause . 11 80 vrith God 1 s ri~lr and ½lessjng, we tnlr~ the field - confident of: vic- tory • 11 The text of G"'n~ral ClFirk ' s 11 TO: ~ ssage is as follows: The Officers and Men of thl'! Fifth Army. "During the ei.r,ht months th..,t have pt>ssed sj nee your inv11sion of the -·-,. .l:J. �Italian mainland you have accomplished results of majqr strategic e.nd tactical importance to the United Nt>tions . The entire world , including the Axis , lmovrn the success and significance of your Salerno landing against bitter opposition , and of your subsequ\"nt capture of Naples :in the fact of the enemy' s deterrnination to deny to us the port ,t, ich was indispensable to sup~ . port our further operations in Italy. After tbe fall of Naples you pressed your attack relentlessly and without delay, forcing the GerrEns to continue their retreat until they had reached crrefully prepared lines, where the exceedingly difficult mo1mtainous terrain provided extreme advantages to the defender . Notwithstanding the obstacles of nountnins, lack of rce ds , bitter weather '111d concrete defensive fortifications, you have in your various wellexecuted nttacks forced the enemy to reinforce heavily his 1:1dvnntageous position at the expense of other comrlitments and have hs rassed him continuously. "At the san,e tiMe you ha,re established firmly a strong beachhe2cd in the Anzio - Nettuno area, where you hav"! provided a·serious threat on his lines of communication which he is attemrting to neet by the diversion of a large force from other operations . 11 It may appear to you, s:i nee the Fifth Army ' s progress in terms of territory gained during the past few months has been slow·, that our campaign is no longer a major one or that it is not having significant success in the war es a whole . rfothing o:rnld bl'! furth~r from the truth. You bave :c:/'."de n conspicuously successful invasion of the continental fortress which the Germans · boasted was impregnable . You have required the G.e;rBPns to devote more than twenty divisions to the costly and losing task of reta.rdjng the Allied progress to tJ,e north . You have inflicted heavy losses upon their troops and have taken more than 13, 000 prj_soners . You 1:mve plPced the enemy in his present distressing' positj_on of trying hopelessly to hold back the Allied forces, which he knows will eventually overrun him from two directions . nr have direct personal knowledge the.t the accomplishments of the Fifth Army are understood and Appreciated by tr e governments 8nrl. peoples of the United Nations • . They apprec:iE te not only th.at you have accomplished n.s much as was possible witr. the strt'!ngth of your force, but also that you hPve co,1tained in this campa.ign many thousands of German soldiers whom the Nazis have needed desperately in their attempts to stem the Russian advance and to prepare themselves age.inst inva.sion in other µirts of Europe . 11 For some weeks there has been a period of comyiarative cr-ilm, during which therA has been opportunity for replenishment of men and equipment . We shall soon fl gain resume the offen si ve and lPunch the 2ttacks which our appre hensive enemy expects and dreads . You have what you need to strike smashing blows and to follow them through to conpletion: thorough training, superfor equipment , heroic courage and the knowledge that we can and will destroy the German armies . ttI have full ,confidence that, as in th" rast, the men of the Fifth Army will meet the tests to come Ps true soL:iiers anr thct with God 1 s guidance and help you will press on to great and decisive v.i.ctories . 11 \ \ �SAN r,.V\.RCO-- MA.Y 13 , 19/44- -Reports concernin;;, the prodess of the battle came in during the en.rly hours of the morning 11,nd continued to come in throughout the day. - General Clark studied his map and progress rede during the past night . He had General Brann up in his v~m and conferred with him concerning th~ Attack. He talked to Gener9.l Saville on the telephone and later saw him personally concerning the air effort . He vlishod to have the air abandon part of the effort on battlefield isolAtion and attack targets that he considered more important . Some difficulties were involved with AAI and TAF on calling of'f battlefield isolation objectives allotted to the medium bombers. ) Shortly after lunch G-eneral Clerk, accompanied by Colonel Drarer , left for the forward areas . · They first visited the 85th Di vision advance command post at Minturno where General CJErk discussed with Genernl Coulter , the Division Conmander, the progress made by the division . He reviewed briefly the seizure of hills #66 and #69, known as Clle San Martino; the fact that the Division had two companies in Cave d 1Argilla, and the dj sposition of the Division in front of Santa Marfa Infante . The minor change in the Division boundary, as ordered by General Keyes, was alsci discussed . GenerPl Clerk asked about the casu.H.lties in the Division and was told thPt.. about 956 passed. throur-h clearing stations, but General Coulter trought that probably there were a little over a thousand . However, th~se figures could not be considered accurate, and JEter developments will cfarify them . From the 85th Division command post General Clark then vrent to visit Gene- · ral Sloan I s oommand post, the 88th Divis ion. There he reviewed the 88th Division I s efforts from the beginning, which included the capture of Damiano and Caracoli and the Division I s efforts north toward Santa Marfa . General ') Sloan WA.S disappointed vnth the lack of aggressiveness HS shown by the tank commander who was hesitant to take his tRnks off the road and really push theI!! forward, helping the infantry. General Sloan assured M.Jn that he was going to require the tanl'::s to work closely with the 351st InfHntry, corrJ11anded by Colonel Champeny, in the preparation of their next attack. He discussed briefly the atta.ck nol::'th from Damiano with the ultirn.te objectives of Bracchi and Cerri . · · After leaving the 85th Division oornrnand post, General CL'lrk proceeded immedi ately to the French Expeditionary Corps where he conferred with Generals Juin a.rid Carpentier . While there he learned thP_t the French had taken Majo and Rinchinso and had rroceeded south and held Ceschito and Rotundo . At all command posts General Clark expressed satisfaction to comm-anders for_ the excel-) lent work that they had accomplished so far and was very pleased with the Aggressive action of the French in reaching their objectives . Upon his return , to his command post he learned later on that the 1st DMI had rroceeded northward and had rre,de a, junction with other elements of the di vision where the Liri and the Garigliano met . · The French esMmeted thRt thev would have about 1 , 000 German prj_soners b:r night . As soon as Genernl Clc.,,rk i:-eturned to the command post he issued orders to Gener.al Keyes , II Corps ·Commander, to speed up attacks tonight , regardless of previous schedules or plans . He desired the R$th to attack tonight , regardless of previous schedules or plans . He desired the 88th to attack ;hunt Bracchi tonir,ht .from three directions P.nd to rush fa.st for the town of Spigno in order to take advantage of the Gerrrans being off balance from Fifth Army successes tocl ay. �After supper he conferred with Generals Gruenther a.nd Brann concerning new developments of the offensive which he.d apµ,ared• after tod_ry's sucpesses . After this conference he retired early. * * * SA~,T HARCO--HAY 14, 1944--Last night enemy bombers bit Naples and strafed Highway #7 . A few bonbs were dropped in the hosnital areas in the vicinity of Carinola. General ClHrk r>rose early, acquainted himself wit'b early morning dj spatches and progress made on the Fifth Prmy front. He conferred with General Brann concerning future actions of th('.l Fiftr, Arny, specifically II Corps . They dis cussed in brief the 351st Infantry assisting the 349th in takin~ Mount Bracchi and then continuing vrestward to take and hold Spigno . The 34gth wos to take Mount Bracchi and thr~n go westward to seize and hold Mount Civita . II Corps was to speed vigorougly west nnd cut the AusoniaScauri road nnr'l prevent mP-my withdrawals from the area or reinforcements being pushed in . - During th is conference General Gruenther brought in Colonel Zeller, Deputy Chief of Staff of French Expeditionary Corps . General Clark rendered a decision to allow the French to use the road Minturno - S. rJarfa. Infante - Ausonia, part of which is in the 88th livision sector . This 'could allow the i:;trench to :iove in their supplies to Ausonia by this road . He discussed br:iefly the 1st DrIT sweep westward , seizing and holding dominating terrain and assisting the 3rd DIA in taking Mount D1 0ro . · The 3rd DIA is pushing up toward Esperfa. to attack and' seize Hount D1 0ro. The Gou:r1s will be pushed westward, by-passing Spigno and filtering in to the mountainous Petrella mass ~ ~ General Seville came to confer with Gener<Jl Clark immedie tely A.fter this conference, and they discussed air support. General Cl11rk ,.ranted the Esperia area bombed to complete isolPtion of tj e battlefield and to dislocate enem:r concentratim-1s fi lterjng back m1d forth tr rough the to '\'n. He also discussed f'uture reguirernents f'rom the [;,ir f'or ground_ support . After General Saville had left, General 01:9.rk went to lunch . General Cannon carie to see him 5n the early part of the afternoon and discussed briefly with him the effectiveness of' the air support being gi1.ren by the Tactical fdr F'orce . After l}eneral Cannon had left, General Clark worked on adnd nistrPti ve matters unbl General Alexander, cnrc, AAI, came to see him. Generrils /\lexander, ClRrk, Gruenther and Brann went to tr e conference hut, wr ere General Clark oriented General Alexander on Fifth .Arr-iy results to date . General Ale~ander was very rleased with the results and so ~xpressed himself. He also said he believed the Boche were esta½lisbing a (efemsive 1" ne from Cassino - Pignataro . He hoped t:bey did, as rositio11.s gained by tbe French would out-flank this position. The subject of novine; the %th Division to the beachhead was brought up by· General Alexander ~or an all-out 'lttacl, from there to the cne"'V 1 ~ flank . General Clark d:i ssuaded Ge11eral Alexander from reaching a decision at this time as to exact dates to nave the, ?,Sth Di vision to the beachhead. P-e said he would like to rlefer a ,lecision as to tre e•ract time for tJce nover,ent rending later developr1ents . After General Alexander l~ft, G-;yieral Clark went to bis van and worked on �more administrative matters and continued to receive dispatches from his forward elements . After dinner , the movie nnoly Hatrimony" was shown in the conference hut to sonc rierbcrs of the Fifth Arrr1y staff. Gtmeral Clark dictated the following notes for inclusion in his diary : HThe Fifth Army ettack has bPen characterized by great aggressiveness and dash on the rart of 4:,Le "?rench ~xp~dltionar:r Corps . Our plans were well conceived nnd have been executed as previously planned . French units push on, passing by isol11ted Gerrien troops leaving rear Frencl' elements to nop them up. By so dojnri_:, the:r have not lost the inpetus 0 1~ their surp;~~~ ... \. :-t-. ~ r-cvJ tack. \ ;t,lP -~~ , 'The situation on the II Corps front hns been somewhPt <'1ifferent, for our attacv was not initially :in tle J:J.ountains, but as vie adv~nced we approached the mountains . The French att·ack str-trted in the P1ountn.i11s, their ::irst objec1 tives being the highest pea}s . I arn c :: sappointed in the rigidity of II Corrs plans . They hs.ve not shovm n flexibility of m'nd and an aggressive r,ttitude. In !'1Y· opinion, with the strenr:th we had 1".vailable a~~ Santa til'lria Infante that resistance should have been elininated by-mid-day yesterday. As it was, tanks ( and the 351st Infantry, again in.my opinion poorly commanded by Colonel Champ8ny, permitted thenselw•s to he held up e'1d pernittcd G8rnans to withdr·aw from the Bracchi pocket during the n:i-ght . If it had not been for my intervention last evening to speed up th"'.l r-ittack on Rotlmdo imd to mntinue it on to Bracchi and tc- speed up the attack by the 3/,qth on Bracchi, we probably would still be sitting further back thj_s morning. I r,nve oomrnnnicated with General Keyes and sMn both Division Co1'1me.nders yesterday at their forvmrd command posts and urged sr:eed of action . I hPve directed Keyes to use the 349th to attack immediately this mornjng fron Scmta i'1aria in the direction of Civita, t:be higr; r:round north of Spigno . During the disruption of the enemy we must break into his ljnes and g~t -thet high ground . v "Again, I am greatly dj sappointed by t're lack of aggressiv.,,ness of II Corps . I am also disappoint1'd :in the apparent timidity of the tank commanders to shoot their tanks in an all-out attack. Fractics.lly p.one have been 1':l'l.ocked out by enem;r action but 1'y indecisive piddling around in rear areas, throwing tracks and, in one or two cases, hitting mines . nsent the following messr,ge of <X'nr-;ratulAtions to General Juin last night acconpanied by two bottles of, whiskey: 111 My sincere congratulations on your important accomplisriments in the present offensive . The capture of essential and dominotfog terrain hy the F'rench troops is of naj or VP lue in tl is ore ration vti ich the Fifth Army is carrying out so ··igorously. I know that you will continue to rress on witl-ollt pause in this phase of our c2.r1paign for the destruction of our enemy and tre ultimate liberation of France. You are proving to an anxiously awaiting F'rance toot the French Army has retained sacred its finest fj ehting traditions . It is e.n honor to have your troops in the Fifth .Army. 1 0 11 1ile should have Spigno b;v tonight . 11 - ' -.,: ; '"\.}-'~' .J • • ~' ' ~,i: ' ) / �General Juin today issu ,d the follow· 1 ng order of the day: ''After two days 0 1: -f'ip.-hting against positions tllet the enemy thought were impregnable end in spite of "ierce r~sistance he is retiring, disorganized and beQte~ . ''A large orea J:,ns bMn conquered. A position of vital inportence the rt. ~lAJ0 is jn our hnnds . Hore tr an 1000 rrisonP-rs hrve been taken including 18 offic~rs . Our edvance continues. "I call upon all for a r~doubled effort [lnc' renewed vigour . YesterdA.y1 s r-D,,-iificent success is t} e rl"!dee of assurance for tnr,o~row' s victory. "Forward." * * * SMT HA.RC0--HAY 15, 194/+--General ClPrk :-rose Mrly and r;tunied disrrtch~s from th"' "'ront l:ine units. .Action durinf; tJ:,e night and rrcceed-inr, throughout the day by the 88th Division res•1lted in Srir,;no, the high hill I".a.ss of nount La Civita a.rr1 southwarcl +'ailing jnto our hPnds. A II Corps B.ttack in th~ r,+'t~rnoon, el"\rloyino; tlie ~5th Divir:ion, southward cau.,.ed Cestellonoroto to fall in our hands . Trt"- ?~d and ,ra. Battalions of the ,17th Inf'antry hrv~ establ:'°L'''h""'d them"'elv"'s ...- 4 ,,.m ~n t}-,e to·m P'1d on t},e higr ground to tl">e south of the tovm. T:1e 'llst Rt"!connaismmce 3quedron, r1ttaclred to tbe 85th Di vision, will pass throur,1· -1:.1,e 1st Battalion of tre 1'3Qth anc. gp, in contact ~ith enemy eler-ents in Scauri a11.d, ½y ~ggressive actior, push the~ out. This wil] be ci 4 multa'1e0us 1"':.th Pn attac'I{ "by tb•· ':\J~th southwest to the rorid junction at San Croce. It is felt thnt not many Gern..,ns remain in th~ town of Sca,ll'i . By tomorrow tlie Scauri area should Hlso be in o•u- hands • . General Clin.. k c0nferred wi tr Gent""rr ls Grul"::rr+;h"'r r nd ~re"'.n trrour,hout tlie '7ornin,;. Later 011. they Tient c1 o' m to th"' G-3 Section to discuss .:-uture operations by Fifth Ar...,y on the rnu<l relief P.!ap which dericts the no..mteinous t"lrrain in minit=ture as it is. Af'ter this conf~re11ce Gtmeral Clark had lune •• Dur 4 nr, luncr Gereral Keves came ar.1 conferred ½r" +'ly with General CL~rk. ~ot"Js concerning this conference are discussed belo. Dur:!.ng ....,he ['fternoon General CL"rk ..,t,udied closf'lly the progress of the battle. Incor-ing dispatchAs continued to come -ln shovring our successful efforts to take ancl c,eize Castellonoroto . The Fre~1eh Corrs continu,..d to follo11 up wi~h r>.ggressive f'ctions throughout tr~ day. mhe Gou"ls hac'l pP..ssed westwar•l and were into t}-,e mo'mtains in and north of Spigno . Ele,.,ents of the 3rcl Algerian Division were pushing p11.st Ausonia on the road to Esperia. Elements of the 1st DMI were rroceeding southward from San Giorgio on the road to Esperia . Details concerning f')Xac·1:, location of these Frencr elements are not ::i.vailable du~ to difficulty of maintaining coruiunict'tions through this ountainous terrain. ��11 1......4 After supper General Clark visited -.rarious staff sections in the com!'l.and· post and retired early. General Clark dictated the following J111:>.t"rial for inclusion in his diary: "My fears that the enemy might react to our lack of Pggressive attitude toward Spigno did not develop . We hove occupi..,d Spigno and the key terrain to the south known as La Civita . Our good fortune does not minimize the fa.ilure on the part of someone in the g8th Division to carry out orders with energy. General Keyes is investigating this delinquency and when I get the whol ~ story I n.ust take r>.pproprfo.te action . I have congratulated General Keyes and his tT"O new Di vision Commanders as follows: 111 ·congratulations on the success which the forces under :rour command have acr-foved dur:rng past three da~rs of intense fighting . I especially desire to co"!linend the 85th and ~8th Divisions which are engaged in of"'ensive combat f'or first time and which bave conducted ther,sebres in a glorious manner, true to the traditions of the United States Army. J leasy congratulAte Sloan and Coulter not only for their current successes but also for tle mann~r in which th~y have trained their divisions in prepnration for these eventful days . Great victories are in store for the Fifth Army when it is composed of troops of the caliber of the II Corps . ' ~ "I am also sending a message to Genf'-ral McNair, telling M.rn hm1 prouc, I am to be the first comrm.nder to employ his new civisions ill combat . It has proved' the method by which thl')y W('H'e originally fornl'.'d and later trained . I, o,.. course, am delighted with the great punch, initintive P_nd l'bnergy displayed by the French. They are really carrying- the weight of tbis battle . I am ~ disappointed in the effort of' the Eighth Ar1-..y. The Fifth having taken the \ Apollinare - San Giorgio area should permit tt~rr. to advance without opposition at least as far as Pignetaro . I am tole' tney rre commiting parts of the Canadians and of the 78th Division , which should help ., "I am delighted with our efforts to get into the mountains. The Fifth Army 'mows how to operate in the :iountains and is trnined for it . The Germans dislike the mountains , and I prefer to work jn tl em to the valleys where the German has prep2red defens1's , mines and other delaying obstecles . 1 11 I hffve directed Keyes to push with all the en~rgy ;md speed he mm muster from Spieno directly across the mountnins to Itri, en.ploying the 88th Division for this purpose; at the same time to attack with the 85th to capture Castellonoroto which , in turn, should bring ribout' the collapse of the Scauri area . I have authorized Keyes to use the 85th in advance of these areas as far as Nount Campese but no further . I have told him the.t I anticiprite the 36th Division will move to the bridgehead , cor,nencing in about 72 hours, that it will take another five days to complet~ tl1e move . At the end of this eight- day period I desire to start the mov..-ment of tbe ~5th Division at full strengtr to the bridgehead, together with sufficient command and conmn~~ication ell!"Ments of Keyes' II Corrs ~ Hence, the 85th Division must be ·employed in limited objectives from now on, with the 88th carrying on towards Itri. "I will put Crittenberger 1 s IV Corps in when I take Keyes out . Gritten- ) berger is already with Ke~ecoi'ning familiar wjth the situation ra- �7J pidly. It vrill give Cri ttenberger an entry into combPt under favorable conditions . 11 By moving the II Corps with me into the bridgehead, V:hen I do attack I can attack first with the VI Corps , followed immediAtely by the II Corps with the British, 85th Division and 1st ArP1ored Division, after I -pull it out of the VI Corps attack. This should have decisive results . " * * * SAN 1 ':ARCO--MAY 16, 1941+--General C~ark arose and studied :military dispatches . Operations during the night were a little disappointing in that elements of the 85th Division had not been nble to gain the hill mass of Scauri and trap the few remaining Germans left there . At .0900 the GenerBl left the command post to visit the ew:1 cu.ation hospitals and see the wounf1ed from the 35th and 88th Divisions . He first visited the 56th Evacuation Hospital where he awarded 21 Bronze Stars to hospital personnel, including nurses, for bravery during ah eir raid at the beachhead . 11.fter this ceremony he went througl1 the various 1i< ards am• talked to the wounded . Leaving the 56th, he went to the 95th Evacuation Hospital where he decorat ed four medical personnel with the Bronze Star for bravery during the initial landings at Salerno. After the ceremony he went through the casualty wards . Following this visit , he went to the 93rd Evacuation Hospital and awarded one TJistinguished Service Cross to Captain Stone for his courageous actions while accompanying a front line unit Ht the be2chhead . He also awarded two Bronze Stars to medical personnel for bravery at the beachhead . In all of the evacuation hospitals that he visited, he found the wounded cheerful and with their chins up. 1 After leaving the 9Jrd Evacuation Hosp1 tal, he went to the 175th Engineer area where he awarded five Bronze Stars . Upon returning from thj_s tour of the evacuation hospitals rrnd engineer unit , he v;ent into immedia.te conference with Genera.ls Gruenther r,nd Brann. After lunch General Clark, Pccompanfod by Colonel Draper, left for the front . He went directly up Highway #7 through the town of Scauri. Thj_s was bej_ng occupied by the 339th Infantry. Vlhile the General was there , one sniper prisoner was being passed through the town to the prj_soner of i'lar cage to the rear . From the town of Scauri the General proceeded further along the highway to the vicinity of the crossroads at San Croce . While there , a plAtoon of light tanks of the 91st ReconnHissance Squadron passed along the road but were forced back by antj_-tank gunfire $ General Cli:irk stopped the platoon leader and inquired why he was withrlrav1dng his platoon, and he stated that one tank was put out of action by four well-sip;hted anti- tank guns l'lnd Also thPt scattered Germans were throwing anti- tank mines on the road '1S they passed by. He stated that he was brin--:jng his tanks back to snfety prior to pushini:; forward so that he could call for artillery fire on the anti - tank guns . While in th~ vicinity, thl'lre was considerable small a.rms fire up ahead and both hostile and friendly Artillery fire in the vicinity of Mount CRmpese . After seeing everything thrit had te1<~n place in the vicinjty of this �crossroad, General ClBrk proceeded back to the ~8th Division command post southeast of Minturno. 1Vhile there he conferred with General Sloan and discussed positions of the elements of his Divis:ion proceedjng forward over the Petrella hill mass. After leaving the 88th Division, the General went to the 85th Division to see General Coulter where he verified disposition of el~nents of t}1 is Di vision in their push westward to Hount Campese and cleaning up operations in the Scauri hill area. From the 85th Division, General ClRrk went to the II Corps co~ma.nd post , ,hich had r,oved the night before from theJr location east of Minturno to a new location northeast of Minturno. The coMmand post was Moved to a quieter place and to get away from the congested traffic in and around Minturno. While at II Corps he discussed with Gensral Kl'lyes and General Crittenberger of IV Corps the rrovisions of Onerations Instruction #18 which had just been issued. This Operations Instruction confirmed the verbal instructions issu~d the day before by GenerBl Clark to General Keyes. rrovisions 0f this Operations Instruction were discussed in the Army Comrnander 1 s notes of yesterday. In brief, II Corps was ordered to attack and capture Castellonorato without delay and push the t1dvance westward to Itri. The 88th Division was to be employed rapidly tl:1rough the Petrella mass, pushing the German forces from Campese and moving on to Itri. The 85th Division vras riot to be employed in operations west of Campese without approval of this headquarters. -Sffective at 1200 hours 16 May the Commanding General, II Corps, was to he prepared on 72 hours' notice to begin withnrawal of the 85th Division from its present zone of action preparatory to a water movement to Anzio. Tentative plans for the withdrawal and movement of this Division wcire to be made so that the coMplete Division could be closed in Naples stagjng area?'? hours after the vdthdrawal began. The Commanding General, II Corps, was directed to prepare the following plan: (a) To turn over to the Commanding Gen~ral, IV Corps, the present zone of r>ction of II Corrs. (br PlPnS for the movement of the following units from the present zone of action to the Anzio beacJ-1 h~ad on 2L~ hours 1 notice on or after May ')2nd: Hq. and Hq. Co., II Corps; Hq. and Hq. Btry., II Gorps a.rtilhiry; Military P r,lice platoon, II Corps; 53rd Signal Bn.; 54tr. JITedical Bn. 1 After supper the GenerPl workeid on adninistrative w.atters and military dispatches a.nd retired. General Clark today received the following reply from General Keyes to his congratnlatory ceble of yesterday: "II Corps is appreciative of your fine congratulatory message which will inspire all to contribute their full share to the victories destined for Fifth Army. 11 * * * SAN MARCO--MAY 17, 1944--Aftcr havinf; dispensed with early morning dispatches from the front, General Clark conferred with General Brann, his G-3, artd his �Chief of Staff, General Gruenther, concerning future F:ctions of the battle . Following this conference, General ClArk r~ceived Colonel Gray, Fifth Army Judge Advoc~te,and reviewed nine general court martial cases. After Colonel Gray had left his van, GenerPl Clark walked down to the G- 3 Section to see General Brann. v) o.1r, At three o'clock General Alexander, his Chief of Staff,,GenerrlrHarding, and his Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, Genernl Robertson, came to see Genera.l Clark. General Clark brought, ther1 into the conference hut, where his G-3, GenerA,l Brann, his G-2, Colonel Howard, and his Chief of Staff, General Gruenther conferred concerning progress o~ the battle . The actions of the Eighth Army to date were discussed, as well as the movement of the ,6th Division to the bridgehead and the attack from the bridgehead. General Clark also brought up the point th-:it he vmuld like to have the ,French Corps attack from fjco toward Ceprano to cut off 2s much of the German Army ) facing the British Army as possible. In order to do this, he brought out that it was necessary to change the present boundary as t:re Fifth Army would necessarily have to go beyond its limits. Details of this conference are covered l)elow in +..he Army Comll18,nder 1 s notes. In the l.<>tter pRrt of the afternoon GenerAl DeGaulle, Head of the French \ State, accompanied by his Chief of Staff, Genern.l Bethouard, General DeLattre \ de rriassigny, Corunander of the ?nd French Arrriy; Mr. Dietholrn, Commissioner of' War; and General Juin, Cornnanoer of the French Sxpeditionary Corps, came to pay their respects to General Clark. General Clnrk and Generrtl DeGAulle, accompanied by r1ajor Ridgway Knight, interpreter, went up to General Clark's van, where they discussed the 2ctions of the French Corps and the situation on the Fifth Army front toget:ber. Genera.l DeGaulle was very enthusiastic and pleased with the progress of tre battle. The remainine;GenerPls . were in the conference hut ,1rhere General Gruenther, Colonel Snltzman, Colonel Porter, Colonel Draper and Lieutenant Bajenow talked with the visiting French Generals while Generals ClPrk and DeGaulle conferred alone. Hews photogrPphers took pictures of Generals Clark, DeGaulle and Juin together and, after a very brief stay, the visJ ting French Gr-merP ls left for the French Exr,ecH tionary Corps commanc1 rost at Sessa. Battle reports today found the French Corps pusl ing northwestward Y'ith advance tank elements reported in Honticelli. The G01,m1s, with other elflnents of the French Corps, wer0 pusMng westward and passed the Revole hill mass, leading elements reported Ps hrvfog cut tl-ie roAd Itri-Fico. In the south, II Corps reported RS unconfirMP,d that leading eleT'lents of the 85th Division were in Formia where they r,et sligrit resistance. Hostile f'rtillP,ry which,hacl been firing from the vicinity of Gaeta had lifted, indicqting prcp2rations for enemy w2thdrawals this evening. The 88th Division had reported eleJ11ents past Mount Ruazza anc pusbi11g down toward the direction o~ Itri. Where::i s all of these reports were nnconfirned, it inc'lj cntes, hovrever, th.<>t the Fifth Arny is on the move and th"'t they have forcl!'ld the Poche into a gen"lrPl vd thdrawal. General Clerk's notes on trie day's acti,rities are as follows: "Generals Alexander, Harding and Robertson ceme o call on me at three o'clock as pre-arranged. Su'½ject of conf.,,rence was current battle and roove- �ment of '36t,.,, Division to bridgehead . I ·explained thnt we v;ere in the outsldrts of Fornia; thet J hoped to have Itri by tomorrow ; that we had captured Ti:speria and leading t2nk el0ments of the 3rd DIA were reported at Uonticelli , to all o:' which Ge:vieral Alexander srowed great elution - as he should. I told hin that we Lad 3, 000 prisoners in the Fifth Army. 1'TTe theYl asked ahout the 36th Divisio,.,. I told him I had vdthr}rawn its artillery from the battl e , was moving it to the rest of the Division and it would be prepared to load on his order . He gave no order to load but indicated that 1-;,e ,•rould na1rn the decision , probably tomorrow or the next day. He indicated that hn felt the time was rapidly approaching 1'Then we should get ready for the attack out of the bridgehead . He thought when Cassino foll he would order the 36th to start its movement up . He seemed to think that the Gernans would not stand on the Hitler Lino . I Pgree , but the only reason it will not is because of the flanking action cf th~ifth Arl"ly_on_!11e south. 11 I ------ - then brought up the subject of direction of attack out of the bridgehead on Cor:. and VP lnontone . He remains ada.rant that that is the corrl"!ct and only direction of attack, regardless of the enemy sitUFtion. I drew a circle on the map , projecte-d my VI Corps into the high ground southwest of Valmontone and ask,"'d him where I would go fror1 there; to which he replied that fast , r1obile patrols '.'muld operate to cut the routes to the east. I rP-plied that in getting to iTplmontone I had gone over the mounta.ins, ha.d ab,.,,olutely no roads and i'!culd only have foot troops and pack equipment . He brushed this Aside . I poj nted this out ''ecause I want him to evalw:1te the situation v,hen th~ time to attacl~ approaches, in order that we can attack in the right direction , and the Cori-Valmontone t1.P:1' be the wrong direction . · tr:::- then pointed out to h:m the rles:Lr£1bilHy cf Fi+'th Army attacVing from Pico on Ceprano in order to cut -in 1Jehind the Eighth ttrrny at the narrowest point in the Liri Valley. He was cleli;;hted and told me he would issue instructions accordingly. "I hn.ve issu".!d instructions to my Chief of Staff and G-3 to hold the 85th Division in its present position in the Fornia area , to push the 88th first on the high ground northwest of Itri anr:1. then to the northwest on Lenola . It will then be prepared to push either to the west or to the north, if the latter - to protect the left flank of the Frenct Corps in its advance from Pico to Ceprano . I certainly would like to join my II Corps up overland '!lf~_tb the bridp:ehead . I may i:;et the opport1mity. I talk~d with General Alexander about ANVIL. He thinks it is not "hot 11 • I am told otherwise by Colonel Jenkins , AFHQ planner." 11 General Clark today received the following cable from General Alexa.no.er: "If, as seems likely, Bighth Arr,y have not been r_ble to draw level with Fifth Army by t:ime lntter reach Fico P-rea, CP\fC directs Fifth krmy to strike northwards by San Giovanni on Ceprano to cut off v,_;thclrawal by Highway #6 of enemy forces still opposing Eighth Army irrespective of existing jnter-Army boundary. In thet event , boundary will be adjusted by this Headqwrters in consultation with Armies to suit result:lng situation. 11 �. ~ r \,~•"i . t,, \~; . Gen~ral Clar.k disratch"d tl e "oll0w~ ni:i; lett":lr to General Tu''-'rshall today, reportin, upon the initiA.l action of the 85th and 88th Divisions: 11 K"lowing your r;reft interest in tl 13 new. dj visions t hie}, wer!'l created in tre TTnited StRtes , I an writhg you brfoPly to tell you of th .ir debut in offensive conhrt wi. th the Fift"' Arny. 7 "The ~5th a"ld 8Af-~ Inft:i.ntry .Jivisions ~nt"'recl con.brt un·ler ideA.l conditions . Upon thrdr assi~nmPnt to Fiftl• Arrny, "I pli>ced th~:ri in the new Fifth Arr1y s1'ctor alonr, the GarigJ iano Riv r . The sitwtion was c;tetic "n0 the 1 fro'Ylt rclrtiv ly qui~t . Botl1 c jvisions hnd ari opr'ortunity to heco:"e rccustom~d to trP.~ r battla, sectors grri.dually. -)'urinr; t: 1 is r!'lrioc' they executed extensive ORY l'nd ni~ht rA.trolling . 'T'he, r soon becare P11mili "'r vri th the tl'lrrain over wl-iicl' they are now A.ttacld.no;. On the night of ~!B.Y 11th, at 2300 hours , they jumped off . They "lave dnne rell arid hnve r->ttained all thedr objectiyes . FiP-htjng !1rs been severe in r:aces . Casurlties in these two divisions for the fj.rst four days of -f'j r;hting arn ti.s f ollous: W01mded Killed 107 87 1316 658 194 85th Division 88th Division 1974 ':'reir Morale is rigl-' . In one ::instance , an inff!ntry regiMent of the 85th Division was driven of" its objective three times . "'::2.ch time it counterF1ttacked find. finally re- took the hill with teavy losses to the enemy. The tenacious , deterr~::ined sort or fightinr· wrich trese a;visions hqve shovm speaks well of thejr tr8ining 11t hone. I lmew you anil Grmeral ircnair would be interested , as I am, to see the result of' the War DepPrtment I s e-r-fort to build nev, divisions ·"c.:r battle . They hDve met their f'nal test in corbat with complete success . Unfortunately, it was necessary for the division cor,manders to reco"'1mend the relief of four o<' the regir,ental corunanders - -for a corbination of Ag~ and rhysical reasons . They were replaced by yotmger M'9n prior to tee stArt of the current b?ttle . "The brj dgehend is poised for an nttnck 't't'P1 tirrdnf" SM"S appropriflte . I shall first reinforce it . Prior to th?t attack I v ill move my r>dwmce headquarters into tie _-i,ridgehead where I feel our efforts r1?y be dedsive . There will 1-le considerable tanlc nction , An<i , in order that infantry nay follow pro!'lrtly behind +,1,e ti:-nks , v1e hi:i.ve devised whrt we. call an "infantry bl,ttle sled 11 • "':nclosed are photograplrn to illustrate its emplo;ment. Fifth Arny ornnance naintenance coupanies hrve bujlt enour;J:-, to tow 30 <:-1U."'r1 s bP-h~na Bttacking -1:.imks . He have experimented vdth then and feel thf't the fjrst time they nre used, with tre elenent of surprise , they should be extrAnely helpful . I will rurnish you more Jnformation on them r>ft~r we h(lve trind the:-1 in conbrit . 1 "I saw Captain Clifton Brown tre otr-er dny. He is fine , in good spirits and ~nt' usinstic over his wor'k here . He sends his vmr!"" regr•rds to you am' Hrs. Marshall. I hc>ve already v.ritten !'h's. rbrshnll about Lt . Allan Brm,m • .... . ' �"I want to thank you -f'or ,1nkinr.; ~t poss5bl~ f'or me to r~turn for ny short v~ sit . It gave me a werit 1~ ft to see my fPmily rg:,in . I know it m~ant os ~u~r to them. 11 I am deli.r;hte-c with tl e five - day results of our Fiftr Army attack. We hr,ve brok!:!n the Guc;tnv Line jn several pl8ces by attecking over the mountains . "re have ren tr<ited to n distl"nce of fourtr-,en rniles on both the II Corps and French Corps fronts . Fifth Army has capt'Ul'~d appro:irim~tely 1 , 000 pr:i soners to of'te . The Fren_ch are ,..j_g},t;ng splendidly 11i th our U. S. equipnent . We will continue to m(-lke progress . 11 * * SA"f\T r~JIJWO-- MAY 18, 1944--After dispP-nsing with earlJr morning disprtches , Gener1"1 l Cl0rk had Genert1 l Brann, his G-3, t:ind General Gruenth"'r, his Chief of Sb.ff, in his van to discuss present developments of the bPttl~ -rrfor to the arr:lvl'll of GenerPl 7,Jilson, CTWC, AFHQ .and GenArPl ::Jevers, :JCI:JC, AT<'H'), . Gen~rels Hilson a.:ri<l. Devers nrriv0d at 0910 and were accompanied by General Alexander , CI 11C, AA.I , end General Lernnitzer , DCS, AAI. Genernls ·c1ark, Wilson, Al~xander, Devers, Gru~nther, Brarm and Lemnitzer went into the conference hut where Gerieral Clnrk outlined the progress riade by the Fifth Army since D day. He coMpletely orient~d G~nPr~l Wilson on the Fifth Arny front . The discussion also 1.nvolvP-d 8ctions on thB Eighth Arr.y front and present GcrM"n re~ctions to the nll-out attack. One o~ the highli~hts of the meet;ng wap Gen""rE>ls GlR.rk end /llexander 1 s request thrt they did not wont the Ah 'orce Tran'3port Group to be ta1ren awry at this ti!'1r-, for they vere needed for supply5 ng troops "nd also a contemplated pl'l.rachute drop . General /jlson immediotely put ~n a telephone cell to ~ake certain that the Transport Group was not triken a.vmv for operr>tions r-ilsewhere . After the conference the v~ sj_ting Ge11erels broke off into small groups and Gereral Clr-irk received General R"rrnon , Co~"nding General of the 1st Armored Division at the l:>eac1'head, in his van where they a~scussed the .Armored Division ' s conte'"'lplated cf+'orts in tre t>ttf'ck f'rom the beachhePcl . Later on in the morning, Genr>rsils ClP.rk, Gruenth"r and Brann revj ewed t:re Plan BUFFALO . General Cbrk desires to see General ,,,rucicott at };is comnand post tonorrov, and sent him the radio v1hich is quoted at the conclusion of' today ' s diary. This cnble sumrnarizes the results of the conferonce on the rlan BUFFALO , which is the attrck from t1'e be8chhead jn tre direction Cori-Valr1ontone . General Clark had as his guest for lunch Generrl Sr>wbricge, G- 1 of NATOUSA . During l1mch General S:=>wbridge spoke of his recent visit to th0 United States and talks thPt he had with General 'larsh~ll concerning G- 1 matt~rs . Shortly after lunch Generel Clnrk left by cub pl1:me for the II Corps 1-=drfield southeast of' Minturno "There he conferred ni th G,eneral !f eyes concern:i ng future offensive R.ction on tJ-,e main Fifth Army front , the att.nck from the bridgehead and movement of the '36th Division and elements of II Gorps to the bridgt9head prior to the attack. Jn the latter part o+' the t1fternoon, General Clrir}- rec.,,.ived GenPral Loevren wl.-io is to replace General J-fawkesworth , Comnanding the 1st British Division at ' �the bridgehead. Genc-:ral Clark had as supper guests Genernl Brann, his G-3, and General Lewis, . his Artillery Officer. A brief sUJ11mary of the day's events on the rrogress of the battle w11.ged }>Y both armies is as fallows: 0 The Polish Corps took the monastery in the latter part of the morning, and elements of the 1st Guards Brigade were mopping up in Cassino town where all organized resistance had ceased. The Eighth Army front surged ahead somewhl'lt throughout the day when German resistance slackened considerably along the whole front. The French Corps had taken Mount D'Oro around noon and occupied·Monticelli and were pushing elements to the north and east beyond the tovm. The GoUJns had raided the Itri-f ico road dur:ing the night and withdrew during the day into the mountajnB astride the road. Elements of the 8E!th Division had maintained contact.and pushed to about 800 yards east of the Itri-Pico road. Their advance over this difficult mountain terrain had caused them, according to unconfirmed reports, to be short of amnunitjon, food and radio batteries. Lqter on in the day they received necessary supplies, 2.nd the 350th and 351st Infantry Regiments ,7ere prepared to launch an attack acro8S the ro2d with th!'! objective of sej_zing Haunt GrHnde to the northwest of Itri. Elements of the 85th Division had reached Formia and by afternoon the 338th Conbat Team had completely occupied the tovrn. Hostile enemy artillery fire frorn Gaeta continued to harrass columns along the ScauriFormia road. By late afternoon counter-batter:r Pnd navr:i.l gunfire had silenced most of the artillery nre comini:; from Gaeta. The 337th and '338th Regiments of the 85th Division had maintained contact and were on a north-south line about a mile west of Marinola. The following important messages were received and dispatched today: . AAI to CG; Fifth Army. RN 247. 11 CINC considers the time has come to \ move 36th Division into the bridgehead. He therefore directs that the move J should begin forthwith." . Clark to Truscott. RN 5791. "Movement 36th Division to bridgehead starts immediate:j.y. Shipment will be made in four lifts. Expect to move six LST 1 s tonight. Further details later. It now appears probable that Operation BUFFALO will be launched in nbout six or seven days. Time is only an estimate. I will keep you advised of developments. Progress continues to be satisfactory on main front. We have Mt. D10ro and Monticelli. Cassino anc1 monastery have been taken. 11 Clark to Truscott. RN 5792. 11 I desire that you be at r1.y headquarters by 0930 Fridny morning for conference concerninl." future operations from briqgehead •. C-78 plrne will be on Anzio field at 0800 Friday morning to bring you and ty,o stnff officers, returning after conference. Be prepared to discuss feasibility of continuing 3rd Division in Operation BUFFALO to take objectives #1 and 1/2 instead of passing the 36th Division through." Eighth Army to Fifth Army. RN U 312. "II Polish Corrs to cor:iplete clearance of area of monastery hill and west of it and to push towards Villa S Lucjp.. �13 Corps and I Canadian Corps to •,pke contact uith Hitler Line end break trrougl1 if possible without '"'elay or if strongly held to tap in along front to discover 11eak poim,s . All inform1?d . 11 Clark to Truscott . RN 5822 . 11 Wl1 "t tirm vlill you ~rrive on Friday? At conference please be prepared to discuss feas~bility of following operation as an alternative rlan. BU'''FALO att~ck to he launched es now planned to "nclude capture o~ objectives }l q~d ¥2. Special SArvice Force would continue toward Artena and Velmontone. Ac-~ter cnpture of ob,iectives '1 1 ~rnrl '.'2 regroupin½ woulc take place and new attack :::..r,mched north~1est -f'roI'l. Cisterna area . " * * * SA ..J fVJlCO--Jffi.Y 19 , 1944--Genere.l Clark :rose enrly nncl studied militery dispatch s cc11cerning irogress ri,..,de by Fift}, Army 1.mits during the nj ght . At oq10 General Truscott, VI Corrs co~,.nanrler, P.nd Coloni;l CPrlson, his Crief of Staff, and nn Assistant G- 3 arrived Bt Fifth Arr,y forvmrd co"'rriand post by C- 78 from the bridge'beA.d to confer vi tr Generf'l ClPrk on Flan Btr'FALO, t7l-iicl-i -is the attack at tl e bridgeheaa in the direction of Cori-Vn.lmontone . In addition to Gcn--ral Clr->,.:r'c nt t 1n conf ,rence \crere GenerPls '"'rann, Tate rind Colonel Howard . :'rior to di.scu.-,sirig Pl1m '"llITTALO, Genernl Cl1>.rk outlfo" ~ tr Gen,~ral '.I'ruscott thP, rrogress to d<itc r ade by the Fift}-, Army 1:md the implications trat c: t would hn.vc conce:;_~ning the ettc.ck fron t'r e briclgehoad. After orienting Genoral T1~c1scott, Gemrfll ClRrk stAted thPt Gcnere.l Alexander .ad, -rror,, the beginning, a rre-conceived rlan of the e.ttPck from the 1-)ridgehead to <;mt Route //6, harrass the enemy r~s.r with ligr.t colurms avid ev·wtually annihilo.te the Gernan -rorces. Generr>l Clark emphvsi zed thFJ.t he, in his planning , wanted to naintain flexibility; that the Plan BUFFALO would be carri~d out as plan"lod but the.t he wanted General Truscott to be flexible in 1'is plans and e prepared to change the direction of the attack north frori Cori- Valr.ontonE' to ar attack to tl---~ riorthwest toward Rome. Huch dep ,nded upon tl 1 e Gern1an reaction to the attack on the main Allied front . If the Hitler Linc 1•rere pierced and th0 rmemy with(lrevr to the -:Jnction Line just soutr of :tome , then there would be -¾:.he possibility thrt the 8ttack to the northwest ,vculd "l)e successful. He said that he :r·:'lself was gojni; to the )Cachhead wi tl, a snaller , conposi te staff group, begirn~ ng to move probably tomorrow ?nC completbr; it Sunclay. from there Fiftr Army v,oulc1 ta}-e under tl eir corm:anc.· tr e two Br5.tish dj_vj sions anci leave VI Corrs the -ri::rnion o" carry:1 n1 out the l'lan TJFFALO . In the very near -r.'ut1ire },e rad pln.nnec1 to nove up II Corps He8dquarters and 8Ccor,panying troops as ordered in Operations Instruction '18. I: Corps, once established jn the briclgehend would then Lave undi:,r its comriand the two Br~ t ish di visions and the 85t Di lision, if moved up to th~ bridgeheaC. All plans :'or, tiie necessary lifts of' trese dj visiors · ·m,e completed, a:r1d bP- directed his G-3, Ge 1er1'1 l Brann to -"'ix up a dP ily schedule sl o :1:i ng J'10Y11ments of all units until they had coi,.pleted trcir ~ovcments to tr.e ')ridgel el?'d . , This would enable Ger. iral Cl-~1·· to rlan tr is diversionrry etta.ck by. II Corrs and thFJ troops under it . G0PPr[ll Clark, in t8l'-dr~ to Ge'10ral 'I.'rua,cott, also 1 ' �srPd hj_n to ,,,..,}:-ri rlri11s for a 1,,,racrutc <irop by the 509th Sep"'rr'te Frrachute ,,, Battalion south 1est o:: Littoria . Imr edinte plPns to hr.ve tris rrrachute ✓ drop a r-:a1·ty wouln hri.ve to be clelr.yed due to c~ "+'iculties !'THh the Air Corps in obtaining tre necessary tr1:insport plan s . In discussing the time for th,~ attack , Gcr,,ral Clr>rk risked Gcn,.,,ral Tru,,cott v1hen ·,•rould -..,e the earliest re coulrl attac 1r if be were told to e.-ttack t0nj P-rt . G~neral Truscott sa-i rl thn.t the ea.•liest he could n.ttacJ, ,1ould be Moncln;v norning and. tb'1t H lour woulc1 be ah0·1t 0630 . General Clar·~ told G<>ncrPl Trw·cott thr>t at the beginninf th ,{)th Division woulr' have a strine tied on 5t by Arrn.y; thRt he vmnld k~ep it in Arny reserve rt <-'5rst . GenerrJ. '"ruscott stPted thnt GcnerPl 1 Frec'ler: cks of Special Jervice Poree would like to c ror by p>racrute sorne "'ield artill.-,ry observers on the r:igh gro1.mc east of S('rnoneta :ln order that trey could observe artillery <-'ire for trA rttack. G·~'1.er11.l Clark st..,tcd that if tl·.e necessary transport planes co11ln. not 11e mere available by the Air Corps , re would release his tv,o C- 47 1 s ~or t fa purpose . Genercl ':'ruscott . le-f't ",..,riv~d~atel-.r after t,'1e conference for tlie br;d,o:e>head to call a comrnandersj mP,eV 11.:t anc to complete Pll nrrangrirul')nts for ar erirly attPck fron the brj dgehead . .._____ w~ 0 In th1 11-"ternoon General Clark left for the French :'xpeditionary Corr,s co"lriand post at Sessa . Fro::" tr.ere , re , .<iccomranied by Genere.l Juin , went by jeep via Castel"'orte, Corene , Ausonia to "s11erifi.. At Esper:ir:: tbe rarty mP.t General De,1o'1.tsabert , Garrand i ng the .3rd A lgori.an Division, who was dj rectinr, advance el rments of r is division from ifonticelli to Mount Delrmndrone . The latter f eature had bee;1 occupied y eleM~nts of thP, '3rd DIA after severe fightin~ . rresent with General De;'Io11tsabert nas Gemiral DeLarmjnat who was acti..>1g as a deputy for General Juin . General DeLP.rminat has only two staff officers in Italy at tte present moment . General Clnr 1r d-i s'cussed ~,-:th G~n~rri.ls Juin and De:irontsabert the A.ctions in progress toward F ice . :"ro!" :srorfa. Gen~ral Cl8rk went to San Giorgio , where he flew 1:>ac'k- b~r cub to the Fifth Arr'ly coMmn.nd post . Dur:'. ng the ri. "ter noon it h1cl ra~.ned quite J:ieavily, and Gener1=a.l CJ.Hrk I s / 1 return to the adV'ance cor'l..™and post was c'1011.n with poor v:: sibility e.nd during a dull drizzle . Whnn GenPral Cbrk returned to the commnd post, all arrangements hRd been nr>rte to move his co!'lposite st,ff eroup to the hridgehead on SPturday a'1r1 completing the r1ove on Sunclay. A<'ter supper General Cll".rk went to Naples to see Colonel Tully, his classn9te , anrl severPl oth0rs of his class 8t West Point who were f.1sser,bled in Colonel Tully' s apartMen~ . Hir,hlights of tor'r.y 1 s -rrogress showf'd th"' 3rd DIA and 1st D:.lI rushing past Mou.rt Delmandrone to 1T1rd Fico . G~ner['l Guillaune I s Group of Goums hP.d taken the town o-" C:-impodjmele nnd had cut the Itri- Fico road . Other elements of Lis Gouns were pusMng northwar d froM · ~iount Croce and r'ount Fotttan~no . "'hP- Groupement Lonchet had taken ·rount V le west of the J.trj -1 ico road . The 350t h 8nd 351st U. S . Infantry Regi"'lonts of tre 88th :!)ivision .had taken ;,Jonte Grande . The 34%h In+>~mtry of the S38th was cleaning up the torm of Itri. The 33'1th InPantry of the 85th Division had bken ;.1ount Cefrla west of the Itri- Formia road . "'he 138th InfPntry had· taken F,Tount DragonP- FJouth of r1ount �Zl Cefala, f't1d some of its elements were nlready in the town of Gaeta. In the Eig:bth Army sector it h:>d advr,nced to a genP.rPl line I iedmonte-Aquirn,Pontecorvo which j s in direct contact with the Adolf Hitler Line. Operations Instruction # 19 is quoted below, as vrell as fl personal telegram frorn Gcn(>rf'l Leese. Operations Instruction #19 follows: 11 1. Upon t:be compl0tion of the mission given in Field Order f}6~ Fifth Army on the main +'ront rer;roups its forces and prepPres for further offensive action to destroy the enemy forces oprosing it. 11 2. a. II Corps vtl~~: (1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5) b. FEC will: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) c. Consolidn.te 38th Division positions in the Ml' GR.A IDE - Ml' LARIGNO HiU Hs.ss. Regroup its +'orces nnc'l be rrepnred, on Army Order, to: (a) Continue the adwmce on the J"'P:'.: (!1 6098)-FC 'IDI (G 5106)-'1'.,'1:RACI'~ (P 3698) Axis towards the AUSONI Hill Mass, or (b) Advn11ce tc the 'M on the ITRI - FONDI - 1·~:NC!,A ( G 5411) CAS'l'RC D~L VCLSCI (G 5023) Axis. Complete plans for dthclrawal of tre 85th Division and accompanying troors a.s directed in OperRtions Instruction No. 18. The 85th Division, less one RCT, will not be employed ,1est of vnmrrA (V 6795) wHhout permission from tM.. s Headquarters. One RCT, 85th Division, may be used for Mopping up the ITRI - GAT'JJ'A (M 6390) SF'FRL(' {GA (r.1 5?95) Area. Protect the left flank of Fifth Army. iSaintain contact with FEC. 1 Continue the P-+,tack to the 11w to secure the righ ground in tre vicinity of PICO (G 6116). ConsoHdrte its positions ~n the PICO area. f'Jaintain contact witl· ,;i8rth Army. Protect the rigut flank of Fifth Army. Regroup its forces and be prepAred, on Army order, to: (a) Advance to the '1W to cut l'ighrmy 6 in the vicinity of CEFRA!ro (G 5926), or (b) Advl'nce to the west to secm·e the GISERHO Hill mass. VI Corps will: ConMnue the mission assigned in Field Order No. 6. d. The 509th Paracrute In"Pntr:,r Battolion ·rill rreprre plans to drop, on J.rmy Or er, in the AU3flNI Hill Hass anr' facilitrte the l'!dVPnce of the II Corps via the I'1'RI - F0'11DI - TERRA.CI!~ Axis. "3. 36th Division, in Army resArve, will be pro}Tred for moverient to the AHZIO Beachhead on e~ght hours' notice. �11 4. Boundaries: See ovGrlay. 11 Leese to Clark. RN 70. "Thank you for you.r kind congratulPtions which I appreciate very much. He all realise how much our success a.t Ca,ssino is due to the hPrd fighting n.nd the rapif advances richieved by the II U.S. Gorps and the French under your command. The previous hard fighting of your troops in that area paved the way for t},e final capture of Cassino and thus its fall is a symbol of our joint Anglo-American effort. The progress of our two Armies side by side as a result of' the close cooperation there ha.s always been between us ,7ill, I feel certain, lead to even greater successes in the future. We look forward to great results wl,en your decisive push from the bridgehead comes in. I send to you and the Fifth Army the grateful thanks and good w:i,shes of the Bighth Army." Keyes to Clark. RN NR8A. "Enemy resistance overcome and our troops took M. Grande. Enemy resistance · sli~bt to our capture of Itri. The ridge M. Dragone (611932) - M. Cefalo (6o9956) taken without resistance. Unconfirmed reports indicate that S!Tk'lll groups of enemy were captured on Gaeta. 'Snemy road block 1500 yards south of Itr:t }v-,.ld up our advance. Pw 1 s from 7th Co. 620 ·o st Bn., and 1 Bn., 194th Artill 1ry Regiwmt were captured west of M. Mola." - Yesterday General Clark sent the following cable to Admiral Hewitt: RH 5786. 11 Understanr1 that you would like to visit the French ;J.1rine Cannoneers now serving with the CF.Ji,. Hould be most happy to mal-ce necessary arrangements if you will notify me when you desire to come. 11 Admiral Hewitt replied today as follows: T\JRN. 11 .1\ppreciPte your message. 1:'lould much like to visit you as 1vell ~ s CPnnoniers sor1etine later when I can arrange return Haples. ~lhilc it would have been highly ~nteresting to me, I did not feel thPt last week was a · proper time for you to be bothered with outsiders. Congratulations on your successes." * * SAN MA.i"lCO--"~AY 20, 1%4--Gt"lneral Clr'r'ir rer,p.in'°'d ~ n tr!'! co1,mand post during the entire day. 'L conferred :':n t'he morning at greet length wit!1 GenerPls Gruenther and Brann. The J"love to th"' hr' dgehead of adv[lnced el~r,ents o.: General Clark's staff continu-,d e::-cept that selected war corresrondents, Section Chiefs and GenerPl Clark will not Move up, as plannl"!d, tomorrow, Sunday. Jetails of General Clark's decision to delay the attack at the bridgehead and to have II Corrs continue its ~fforts on up through I'ondi are covered :i,n General Clark's notes of the day. Tl-ie Army Commander conferred YT.:i th Gen ·,ral K,-,r.. s at noon PJ1d j mri ted him to l1mch. After Genernl K~yes depart~d, he worked on administrPtive Matters and studied II Corps progress up to Fondj and French Corps advances toward Pico .. At six o I clock Gl"lneral Alexander, acco ",pani~d by his Chief of Staf+', General HP..rding, cam~ to conf' 7' with G""n'°'ral Clar:!<. D~tt=dl2 of this cc nf rence are cover"d in General Clark's notes of today's conferences. ~ �Highlights of today's battle reports fou;nd the French on the outskirts of Pontecorvo and abcut 1,000 yt'lrds northwest of Fico, which had fallen . All of the high ground dominating tbe Liri Valley un to Tice is now in Fifth Arny hands . On u,e II Corrs +>ront eler,l'lnts of -the 349th Infantry ht=1d taken Fondi and elements of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron v-:ere edvPnc::i ng dovm mghway //7. Exact locations of tht""se ""1.e1'ents Pre not kno1•m at this time. C Troop of tr.e g1st TI.econ vm s reported ,just nortl, of Lrk" L, 1ngo, rue south of Fondi. GeMral Clark r'iictated the following notes for inclusion in his diary: u t S , ~ . Q u,... ~+J, ,,;x-.,>-f1 . 11 Yesterday General Le:mitzer/\delivered the folJ.owinf.; !"lessage: 1. The C-in-C directs tJ,,.-,t the P.tt11ck from the ANZIO bridg-,herid on CORI and VAUif'\TC NE is to b~ lmmched on thi"! night of 21/22 Mt=!y or on tr,e mornlnf'" of 22 May according to wheth~r you hPve decided on a night or day attack. 11 t ✓ 2 . Will you rl ,ase rerort for the ~nforr1ation of the C-in-C the hour and date on w} icr.. the attack vrill be li,u.nched, and r,t the same time inform Co:mnander Eighth Army by letter . This H.1. will inform C.G. M.J\.'T'.A.F. 1 1 3. rlease acl::no Nledge receipt of this order'. 1 1 11 T was shockl":d wren: received it to think tht a riecision of this i~portance would have bl"'en rnac1e witl10·t't reference to l"'e. I sent trPt word b~ck to Ge11.ernl Ale:1."llnder, who r.,pde the weak excuse thnt he felt thAt we h~d discussed it f'or the past thrM days. "General Lermitzer said that the decision was !'IP de Pt the ten o I clock rn.eeting in th,_,. mornjng when a rerort hPd cone in thrit the British had broken 1 the Eitll'lr Line at Aquino . I am sure thnt this vas erroneous, and General AJexander now knows it . Also, so~e air officer at the meeting had indicated conf'lSion in rear of the G"rnan f'orces sirdlar to that wtich pr"'vnHed at_ T1mis. These over ortjr:'listic reports resulted in this nomentous decision. I replied that the 22nd was the earliest d8te that I could ~ttack out of the bridgehead . I \ ( "I had been in conference with General mruscott, whom I had sent for, and issued jnstructions accordingly to hi111.. "Today the wel'lther "orecast is bad for air operations on the ??nd. I feel that en all-out air effort must r,ccompany the ground Attack. I also COM.rmnicated with General Lenmitzer, sayin~ thrt th"' d/11\cision handed r,e in writing yesterday should be carefully reviewed each day in view of' the fact that the BrHish were not attacking Rnd had failed to r.en~trate. the Hitler Line. In fact they had oeen push1'!d:-ttrck at 11:q~uina and Piedmonte . I also indjcat~d that the air outlook was bad for t,he ,22nd. As a result, Genl"rnl Alexander is coming to see re tJ,,is afternoon when .I will tell him thet in my opinion the decision to attack fror1 the bridgehead is prem0 ture, based on erroneous information And wishful thinking; thrt the soonest we should attack is ;>rhen both Fif''th and Eighth Arrnies are in desperate grips with the 1 �Hitler Line, at whic:b time the German troops on this front would be so heavily engaged that they could not withdraw to influence tr.e bridg1'heatl battle. The mere fact that the 26th Division has noved do m is no justification for tJ,,is premeture attack. It should be given a ch~nce to get heavily committed on this front. I will also tell him that I must have air support, which the weather forecast seems to preclude at the present tirne. 1 nuave just conferred witr General Keyes. I am torn between two desires: To let his Corps with all its present nea.ns push on to try to penetrate t h e \ ~ Hitler Line in thf'l vicinity of Fondi; or to rush up to the Hitler Line at Fondi without an attack withdrawing tl:ie 85th now and other corps troops with possible movement to the brj_dgehead. I have decided to do the forrner - to pnsh on, and ha~re so directed hin1 wj_ th all the effort he can muster. If I cen crack the :Hitler Line in the Fondi area with airborne trooris north of Terracina and perhaps a small amphibious landing in Terracina coupled with a · small task rorce pushing out from the briclgehead, I may join ur. 11 FollowinFY, General Alexande:r:'s visit, General Clark dictated the following material: .~t "ti ,_,.,..; 'ff'" 0\// r / l /"' r ,,-.1 n.rl. \Ud 11 rf".11) (I'.~ ~efr- ~ ! ( .," .f' ~ IF~-· c . if}., ~~ , - . , • I ttGeneral Alexander just came to see Me with Harding. Fe told ne that G ,neral Leese would not be able to attack until probably the nj ght o.,. the 23/~th and then with one divjsion - the Carno.dians. He asked me hesitatingly if I could l'.lttack and outflank tre Germans, "'laking it unnecessary for the Eighth ArT"iy to attack. He said he desired tc conser·;re losses. I told him to con, serve losses in one r,lace we would have them in another; n.f!mely, the Fifth Army sector nnd that I strongly recomMended that Leese speed ur his attack and that both a.rmies attack all-out at the same tj_r,e, but if the attack was at night as Leese wanted it, lt would conform to the Fifth Army riain front and thnt the bridg"!head attack should r;o the follm'Ting rnorninr;. agreed, although convinced that Eigrth Arrny will hold their attack and let the French carry the ball for them es they have done so far in this battle. He l I a,, ttAlso told Alexander thnt I had come to the conclusion to delay the bridgehead attack ?4 and possibly 48 hours, for the weather outlook arpears bad for their effort in support o"' the bridgehead attack. I told him that I must accompany my attack from the brj_dgl'lhead with strong air effort. I also told him.that each aft~rnoon at five o'clock I must lmow for the ~econd mornj_ng follovnng for the bridgl"'head attack. He agrieed. I also told hJrn. of the progress t ~ 1 north of Fondi. Twas going all-out and w1'1S goinr, to join ur. He has always ¥ J> /. been opposed to MY southern effort, and he apologj_zed today, l'!tl'lting thR.t he /V J ' ~ never drearned that we could make tre progress that we have through the moun- . tains. He congrntulated T'ie on tr,e progress of the Fifth Army. I e.lso told (JV~ l him of r,y possible plans for use of the airborne 50Qth Farachute BPttalion on ,ti,. r· the Mgh ground north of Terracina. .l#~ lJ . . ,,r["1 pl". "I believe j_f the Eighth Army will attack the Hitll'lr Line in the Fontecorvo .fo region in the next two days; we hit it north from fico all-01.1.t with all our forces and the br:i.dgehead tre next mornjng, we will fold up the German Army in S-,1 / ·1 Y ~ 1A-'·r "' ,,.i.Y p-° Italy."~ d'--. ~C\.,.,!~ ~~•if~ _,.~,.,,.,-~ .-~ ~ I~ wv• - - ~ - ~ 6V\. v-,>.r ~ p ~ ;_7- ~-_,1 Oil :lo &oJ_+~7J - u fq- ~,At"' it\. ~ ~ h . . ~ . -~ - . ; ; { A , .. I.A.~--t. ,.,. ~~ t ~ ·~ r ~ ~-,,~. c> . . M-t> - ~~ ~~t ~ ~ . - �Followini:; :Ls a cable recei-ved by Gener.sl Clark from General Truscott: RN. T052. "All scheduled movements last night coripleted without incident li f·reparations continue according to plan and on schedule . Ever::r indication that cover plan working successfully. "Reference your 7701, will have task force organized and prepPred for operation on east +'lank after H hour . Did not understand your '1lessage concerning Yarborough . Will he be availDble to drop any ti.r•~ af.t"r daylight or s1'1ould plans disr~gard r,ossibility or hi~ ernploymen+; ~ntirely? ur hope- progress on south front, particulPrly Eighth Arny continues satistactory. Do not heli~ve NY attack should be launched until withdrawal definitely ½~gins . Any delay after preparations of' tonie;ht will 1,e hazardous." General Clark cabled General Truscott today as follows: RN 3073. 11 Attack from bridgehead is postponed 24 hours. There is a strong probability that it .-,ay ½e postroned an additional 24 rours . I shall advise you .'.'urther on this r,ojnt rrior to 1700 hours on :'1st. Acknowledge. 11 General r1cGreer:r, 10 British Corps Co,.11mander, wrote G~neral Ch1rk today as follows1 "My most sincere congrat J.lations on the P,J.·ea-: victory ;;mu have Pcri1"Ved with F:Lt"th Army. 10 Corps, t:':t"'t"'Jr our long , r,ncl harp:r association w:lth your Arny, are really delighted Rt tris great success. As you can imt.:igin~ the ex:rloits o.-:'. II Corrs and FEC these last eight dr17s hrve rind an exceptional ::iY1t1'rest for ~1e, know:in'; the lower Gl'riclieno sector so we 11. 11 11 TJ~ tlirnino: of tJ,,e Hitler pos-ition will :~ed to big results, imd your rapid progress soutr of R. Lfri has undoubtedl:-, helred Eighth Arny to a very large extent. "We in 10 Corps ",,..el now tht"t th('I bridgehead position e cross th"' GPrigliano which we put in JanUr'J_ry anc' early Febru,qry has nov• priH a handsol"'-i divid"lnd, which ii,ore thPn makes up for th~ disaproint""lent felt nt the time that we were not a½l" to exploit further. "I know rm•, thrilled both TeY'lpler am' Hawkeswortr , rill be at tris Fifth All best "'ishes for your future operations, and ny kindest regards to Al anc1 oth~r old f'riends on your sta-Pf .n · ArMy victory. np1ease do not dream of answering ti'is . 11 The Array CoME>ander replied to General ~TcCreery as follows: ttYour letter hr> s .iust h,,..en deli vercd to me by :rorr liaison officer, and . I read it to Al and Don Brann, who hRpf1•med to be w,ith me in conference. We �can 1 t tell you l.ow muc:b 'Ve A.;_1rrecirit"" yom~ ttougrt~l11ess in vrriting, and prirticu1<>rly the C'in1' trings you SAY ...r the Fifth Arry. .,. "ant you to mow that RS T "'lew ov,..r t½rt area ;v:esterc'ey on y r"'turn Prom a vi.sit to the Frend- mmr Fsperia, I could not re lp but gi Ye a rrF f"'r of thanks Por the fine pfonMr work w1~ic. 10 Corps did for Fifth Army ~n obtaining the rir~eriead fro "lh~ cL we de ouched . As I Ple I alon'; the Gf!rigliano River , y tho11ghts went back to t':le hr"'d "i.ght:in,:; wh~ er your 3ritish troops perforl"l."'d under your cor:~1and in crossinp; thnt rjv"'r and ,stabl:i hing tr..,mselves on the heights beyo 1d, in th" face of s·1cr ,ne:r1y r~si~tr-nce. You gaY1' us t:re c;pringbo:ird fro11 r1hicl. we were Abl,.. to launch our successf'ul attack. 1 "This Y'lorning II Cor}"s troors ar(" about four m:iles northwest of Itri , o inp; on Fo:rdi . French trooJs pre eeting incrensed .,..es::stance nortrwest of San Oli va . We will keep on r,oinr.;, however, and, of cours", the riridgehead is no source of cc11fort tc the Boch..,, for it i.s strong imcl rearly when needed . nl:: you n.r;aih Per your good w:i.shes . Al and Don and : send onr war re~rrds to you a'1d 111f'lb~rs of' your staff . TTe hor~ anoth~r opportunity comes for us to be associllt"d together in battle . J-leas, ~ive our esrecial regards to Cooki.e . " 11 T} * * SAN r~ARC --~flAY 21 , 19'11+--Gen~ral Clnr'c sp..,nt a 1;ood rortion o:f tre day v:i sitinp; forwarc1 ele ents of the Fif't'.r Ar y. At 0900 re left f'or ·the --:ir,hth Army ~AC by'ris L-5 light ~ll'lne . At Bighth Ar~y ~AC re conferr~d with General L~ese, Co 't:>.nrler of th, Eighth Army. Fror, ~i..grth Ar.,.,y TAC he flew to a cub field due west cf S . Giorgio where he was, i,t by General Juin . He ~cipferred with Generel .Juin rt teie r~ l'lld and tren made A short side trip befond Bsreria . ,ihile tr ere he saw 0oncrete e icence of the eff~cts of our Prtillery fjr~. Elenents o~ the 90th Panzer Grentidier Regiment were cPu~ht on the road nortrwest of '3speria by our P.rtillery fire . mhere were trucks , tanks, guns and perso11nel carriers whic1" wer• conr:-letely cte1"l0lished. Tliey },nd evidently b"!en r,oinp, dovm the road at closed intervnls whim cau17,ht in successive artillery concentrations frorn our guns . In order to clear tre ro8d, the Frenc}, had to bulldoze ehicles 8nd Gerrmn dead, sweep5ng theJ11 over to the side in order to let French ,.lements pass by. A Fr.encl' cartain, who },rd been R Gem,an prisciner <'or two days, told o how the Ge:rrans were very s:~ort on aMrrun~ tion; ti ~t sol"\e divisions were only a11.ow-t'1.g 10 rounds per indivjdual ~r day, anc ot},1'rs only 5 . From French Corps General Clark flew to tr~ II Corps cub field in th~ vicini t;r o~ Argenta. Fro. t 1ere he took ri s j~ep, storped riefly At n Corps comf'!and post nort½ of Arg"!nta anc thl"!n proc,eded do rrn '..r~ 11rway ;i/:7 to Forl"'ia where he conrerred with General Coulter, 85th Division Co. manrler . Frnm Fori,fa he continu-,d down Fi rrhway #7 up toward Itri . 011 tris rm:1.d Rhove For ,ia a oobv trnp exploded at a'l,out t},e sru ~ t~ Me that the General I s j~!"lp passed . Troo:rs were cleaninr out part of t½e road where an anti-tank gun 1 as . Anparently on~ of tre soldi"'rs worki11g Freund t e p;un had srrunr: a booby trap causinr, a violent. ~xplosion just ~s th~ General's ieep went hy. One soldier was killed and two ,.,ounded. The ~nerril f s jeep escriped unharrn~d. General Clrr~ storped bri"'~ly at the gpth Division cornnand post just north of Itri , but General Sloan, the Division Co~~ander , was not in so Gen~ral Cl~rk �/" proceeded on towards Fondi to find him. While in Fondi he talked to Colonel Jacobson, Division Artillery Executive for the 88th Division, who pointed out the direct support artillery positions in the vicinity of Fondi. General Clark then proceeded up the road from Fondi toward San Biagio - a small village at the foot o:f.' Monte S. Biagio. There he met Colonl"ll Hughes, Commanding the , 137th Inf'antry, ·vhich was in the process of attacking this higJ:-, ground. - He discussed the situation with Colonel Hurhes, who said thrit his troops were receiving sone opposition which he estimated to be P..bout 100 Germans who vrere dug in in the hills. Colonel Hughes was coni~iclent thflt he would have the high ground in a few hours and was Pt this tinte fY,Oing beck to see his Division Co:m:Mander to push on f'urt1->er up the hill mass to the northwest. General ClPrk, after conferrine; with Colonel Hughes, retraced his steps and rroceeded bt>ck down Jfip;hway #7 to Gaeta. Enroute h!"! l"let General Coulter of the 85th Di vision going up to his forward el~"'ents and discussed with him briefly his conversation with Colonel Hue;hes. General Clark thoui:1,rt that Colonel Hughes 1 desire to pusri on forwa.rd was excell,,.,nt nnd told General Coulter that he could discuss the matter when he saw Colonel Hughes up the road. In Gaeta General Clark went dciv.11 to the point where he met Colonel Safay, Corn:Mandine- the 338th Infantry of the 88th Di vision. Colonel Sa.fay's regiment was about to begin a movement by water in dukws to Sperlonga. Genern.l Clark went down to the beach from wh,,.,re they would depart and saw Rn engineer company svreeping the beach for M~ nes in order to make a safe lane for the dukvvs to p;o down to thi'? water. Quite a f'.ew rnines were found in this pr-irticular beach. General Clark said he was glad to see the 1-,each because he had planned at one ti1"11.e to send in a Ranger Battalion at this particular point in the beach to scal"l tre r.eip;hts and take GAeta. From there General Clark went back d 1 ri"Jctly to the cub fjeld where he took off in his L-5 to return to his command post. During his trip ur P:i<shway #7 the militRry traffic was very congested, ,vith .,,,any 1"1.otor vehicl""s and Italian pack units noving up toward the front. Gaeta and Itri had suffered quite heavily· froll\ our artillery fire and bombing. At five o'clock ~Tiss Curie, daui?:hter of ~1aclame Curie who discovered radium, ca!"le to call on General Clark. Sr e is now a French WAC o.i:'ficer and j s over here in Italy on an inspection trip. At six thirty Genera.1 Clark had as dinner r:me sts Mr. Irving Berl in, of the show, 11 This Is The Armyn, Major Holmgren, his business r.anager, 1md Wri.rrant Officer Wasser, his Fublic RelAtions Officer. After supper ~'!r. '3..,rlin came down to the conference hut where he played J11any of th , tunes thnt he had written for Gener~l Chrk. He also rla.yed the Fiftr Arny song thet he had written, a new infantry song and other ,,,ar ballPds which were very good. Hip;hlj t;hts of the day's battle news were increasing rrogress by the French northv•est of Pico and Pontecorvo. On the II Corrs front Monte S. Biagio l"a.d fallen, whicl\_}'Vas abont three miles west o':' t1,e tovm of Fondi. Also, elements of the 91st R connaissance Squndron had reached the outskirts of Terracina. Notes concernini; General Clnrk 1 s visit to General Leese nnd General Jv.in will be quoted in the diary for tor-1orrow. · �In the lRtter part of tl"e afternoon Geri~rol ClPxk, accompanied by Brigad:i.er Goodbo<ly, went to tre 1st Bri.tish Division to confer with Generril Hawkes-· wortr, Division CoMmander, and GenerPl Gregson-Ellis, ConMander of the 5th JiTision. Also present was Brigadi~r Loewen, who will tnke over c~n~and from Gen"'ral Hawkeswort , who is leav~ ng to take CC"ffland of the 4t>th British Divi, sion w}'ich is in Egypt at the present rnonent. General Clrirk made arrangements for General Hawke sworth to leave tonorrow and turn over the conm111.nd to Brigadier Loewen. He also d-iscussed wi.th these British Commanders f'n attack plan for the two British di,isions i.n conjunction wi..tr attack by our 45th Division and 1st Armort"ld Division. The ~--neral scope of the plan is to h(.lve t:he British 5th Division, w:it1, the TJ. S. 517th Farachute RCT, the 551st F11rPchute Bn., and the 55oth Glider Bn., take over tre entire British -f'ront, Makinr: fl holding t1ttack, whil"' Ue "qritish 1st Division, with the U. S. 45th Di ision on jts rigrt, attackin~ in a northwesterly direction toward Rom,. In Co"1junction with tris attack-, t},e 1st A:i."mored Division will make an t'lrr,ored thrust to the right bf the 1T. S. Li.5th Di vision. J l;:,..11s for tJ-,is Rtt[\ck Hre being made in detailed form, b11t the exact time is not definite. ',!fuch will r1erend upon tre progress of the rrese"1t be~clhead attack in tre rirectioP Cori - VPlJ,,ontone. If this attack bor,s dmm in tP.e Cori area, or i-(' the Bo ere falls back to defend its Unction Lin<'"!, t!1en U·is combined Brjtisr and AMerican attack riigl.t take place. This attack is in conjunction with G~neral Clark's desire to be flexible and meet any contingency that tlo Boche might offer. Tht"l Arer:ican p~rac},ute and r,Hder troops contemplated to be used on the present British front will rrobt1.bly 11.rrive flt t:1e beachhead by 3 June. Later in the eTening General Clark called all Hs djTision coM::mners on his field rhone to discuss witr th"'Tl\ the situntion j n their zones of ri ct ion. He retir-,d Ft ~130. The -f'ollowing are tbe i:rrportant messages recei"'fed and cl:ispatched during the course of the day: Gruenther to AdTance CI • 'q_M 152. "French rl'ly,ort their attack jumped off on schedule. No locrtions y ,t. Heavy fiehtfog in Lenola area during nir,ht." Gruenther to Aovance CF. Rt{ 153. 11 Eigrth Army jillllped off o630 rreceded by forty r·1 nute artilJ ery prerr-r['tion. Attack prog.ressjng accordinr, to :rlan. They rraintajred co':'ltact vr~.th eneMy throughout nigl t and state that enef'l.y shows intt'!nt:i.on o-f' holding. 11 Clark to Gruenther. RN l4lQ. "Situ::-tion looks good. Co bat COI"I" nd A just srort o"' railroad. B pro -T .:.; -~ni;; ,.,ell tl-r011gl minefield l?OC yarcss in rerr. 45th Division Pbout on i.ts limited objective. Otherc; rrog:ressing slowly. Reference Eighth Arny's proposed new boundr>ry, 111Pke no cori:mitI'lents. Do not lik~ it. It ,ives us absolutely no ro,d. I ould like to do a little purs11ing too. Detailed answer to you this 1d'ternoon. t1 1 Ch.rk to Gr11enther. RN 1424. 11 Bo·mdr->ry proposed by 'jighth Arny is unacceptable. It is Pbsolutely necessf!.ry for the French Corps to hr>ve a rorid north of tlie Lepini r·ountains. Frorosed boundri 1~.~ 0·1ld force ,..,e to pincl out Frencr Corps and hr,ve them ::'allow :::I Corps throu ,h AT"'k<i.seno Vrilley to route 7. �I do not bt"'Ueve 'Sighth Army could o<lV."lnce throug1~ Liri Vnlley unless French cover the nounta-ins on the Eighth f..rmy le-"t. IIighwt=>y 6 nrid tre !!'.any routes north thereof should meet Ei~hth Arny need. Make strong representation that present boundnry be changed as follows, all points exclusive to Fifth ArMy: · From present boundary at strerim j,mction (369182) - hill 215 (265461) - hill ?69 (09850~) - hill 773 (Q50556) - point (~90610) rnd then continue on present bou.ndPr~v- as set forth in op ,rrtions order number 1, AAI, 5 -rtay 1944." Clark to Gruenther. RN 1443. ttHave just visited ravrkesworth, GregsonBllis, Loewen and w~s ~cco pani~d by Goodbody. The l~mited objective attacks by these two d~visions have bee~ completed 8nd no~ is t~e time to let Hawkeswortr return. I will send him bqck in one of MY C-78 1 s tomorrow unless General Alexander desires otherwise. Acvi 8e. t-rove me e it rlnin to trese conrnanders t!'lrt the Bri tisJ~ Divisions will re1·ticjrate in the next Pttack. They are i.n accord n11d we f'.rl'l . nlcin11 pl1rns accordinr,ly and will outline t1'em to you at a lt1ter t-ime. ttUp u11til 1600 11.ours to,1ay 7-qq bP-ttl,.. crsualti~s hrve bl'!eTI admitted to eTacuation hosT':tals. This "'ncludes 98 Brit~ sh casualti~s. 11 Gruenther to Arlvance GP. RN 165. "II Corps news good. Our ta'1.ks and troops now fighti.nt; in T .rracina. 350th bes tvo bE1tt,,lions r,ener< lly in Mount Curio area. Eir,hth Arny now stnte tl-'"lt sirns 0f enemy withdrawal have not b~en confir ~d. Canadian ar~or will 11ot be nassed trrour,r toni~rt ~s prev:5 0'1sly pl.a n..1ed. 11 Ger~ral CL.,rk this afternoon dictated th11 f ollowj ng men:orandurn. to Gerierol Grul'!nther: 11 Hansborou ,1 is here and rill return this to yo·1. Th~ nr,s seem to be going well here. T r.:ot up at 4 A.f~., vnd went to a forFard or under cover of darkness and. :atched tre rr ,rt>rPti.on anc1 tJi- ~niti,,l t,., 11k n.ttt>ck. Th" rreprPtion was srlendic. ~fo reply from t:re ene y. I h-1.ve t~lked with J-r.r-r,:,on, ,n1,ose Con-bat Col" r-md B, 'on tre r.1 ght, has htid ,u ffic·1lty w:;t~ r~nl"'s. He hf's lost ten tanks on min~s. His Combat Conmand A, on the left, lwd :nore success r>n<' Pt ~bout ~: 30 had covered half tre distnnce to tre rn·· lrord ,., anrnent. :::t 1-iad ,,sed snelces success+'ul1y. n7 Combat Co~Rncl B did not use then i."1-itinlly ::: do not know, but ~t .i.s Mo· inr; t:1el? up now ~n t'l'1 effor-1:. to clePr tre nines. Tre 45th Division arp:ir~y,tly has reac1'"'d -.;ts :~rniterl object-ivt"'. '3rd D-i ision and ~,ecial Service Force rave eacl' advenced 1,000 to 1, '500 yrrds. I'a-1:.urally, reports Rre mear;er rt th, present ti.e, hnt I wo,1ld s~-.~ it -is '?"lror:r,ssing ~n good shape. "':'here ~s R nrinll tas,· +>crce o+' a reconnf'lissance unit, sonto: TD 1 <J ,nd ~Y'r;ineers, prep?-rec' to ,ovi, 0'1t on +J,e south flan¥, but : ,rant to hold thPt until it can ,e coord:natec'l vitr an e"fort o-" tre II Corrs anc'l perh:::ips P 11 rop b7 '\'.'nrborouv}•, if •e decide to do t at. ::: am reluctant to C0""111it Y,;.rboro"1r,h now, althour,h the rlan B wMch Don h~s v:ror'\reil on looks +'E'irly proris~ng. .7e have told Yarborougl' to be vr-erart"'d -"or thr-t Thursday rorn~nr,. I won 1t rull -it unfoss conditio'1.'3 are r-i.1;ht. "A . delir,½ted w: .J.;l +lie rrc- ress of tl "'l 9 8tr ""ivisio'1 orito Mow"lt Alto. Looks as tr•ou;;-r tr"'r"' is a ros,:;i b::: lity of bPgging so""e Ge-1--mens tc t,._(I\' soutl, tfereof. - '' Y??Z . ·~ . �9D Your radios are cor11ing in well. of that II CorJs . Be sure and keep Ml'! rested on the progress Havl'l not had a r"ply from you on t'bis censorship b,1siness . You go allout in set"\inP- trflt ti-,~re is no restri~tion rlacf'.'ld on v.y whereabouts . I have always trav~lled rit .,.Till in rry Fifth Army sector , and, when appropriate , it has be~n arno'mcr".d, and ::: do not i11tlimd to 1, ave any restriction p1Pced on that now. Y01.:. tear anybody to pieces who r,ttl':npts to c½.ange tb,; s . The censor here , due to soMe damn fool idea , tl1in1,rs th<"t r-iy presence in t},e bridg~head can not be rn_~ntioned ,. Yo11 riust ? ct on t} j_s pro""'T't ly.. I am wond l"rinr; v·hy I ½ave not receiVl"'d a reply. 1r"'dt},nr 'have we received the co:rmunique . ;Je sure trat trat is properl7 word ,d and tl"9_t it ~ s a Fif'tr ,\rrrr shovr . I do not want t'b"" first a"lnouncement r,f this to come out to the e-'"'f11;:ct thPt Alexander's troops hav"" attaclred fron +he bridgo}'ead. This all should have been straightened out 1:iefore I car1e up here . j ki1o"i you can handl,. tl-is ~iploratically. 11 11 General Gruenther sent General Clark a neno:..·andun wit]:, regard to the witLdrawal of certain troops from FiftL Arny. The Arr1y Commander plans on taking up this r1atter ·after he has accomplished whfat re set out_ to do ~ Clark to Gruenther . R;J 1429. "I agrE'e that l:":ly~s 3 s r11 1shing ris ettack to th~ utmost . Fn.:i""!r no c:'rci_nnstances do I d""sire to div~rt his Httac'\c in trie direction of Ceccano . On tl-ie contrary, it must be pushed along the h1.gl· grotmd in the direction o.~ t:lv b:;.•idgl".!Lead with all spl"ed possible . 11 v General Clark sent Gen1'ral Grurnther th"' following note with regard to tr e coordin,'1.tio11 o-"' the :'r1'nch Corps and II Corrs attack: "Sending this by courier . Just rt'!ad thl" r:..a.ns c-1"' tl e FT::C with 4th Mountain Di11ision going +'rom Lenola ,.,,fa the m.01mt;,,ins to C1'1stro di Volsc, vritr the II Corps moving in the direction oi fip~rno . You ce.n see th?t .the two corps F<re diverging from each other, leaving a W'T 'Lt"reen . I an, worried for fear the right flan"l.:: o-1"' II 0orrs Y"'ay beco,..e or~m . It seem to me that 88tr Division sho11lc co11,s0Hdate its position in the Tlount Alto region , pushin[" on to the no-rtbwest so tei.at it controls the rig}, ground just south of' the F . Amaseno 1~iver , wi.th its tail echelo11ed in, the direction of the F"'C . Tl•,,t woald rerr it 85th Divi;,:;ion on t}-,e soutl, to continue on to tl1~ Li,;h 1yound ,,est of r iperno and rerhaps on to Sezze . If you draw this out on th~ mar you will see th.Pt the II Corps t1: en is f"i 11 ~ ng th"! ;ar between the Frencl, and VI Cor-rs and any advance by Special Service Poree to its area #3 south of Cori will put us in fine position to join up . "I~ow ;vou are watcl:ing this . this . n 1 lease let ;;e -:now vhat you are doing Pbout General Gruenther rep lied to the 13 boi-re as :'allows: 11 T have spei1t 13 ccmsiderable amount of tlne toclay in order to !"Void the creation of' thriJ gap wl icr you referr~d to in -your riote thet car,,e tonic;r>t . I do not claim that we lave 11rrived at tLe rerfect solution , but I ari quite certF<in that botl: the EC and the II Corps are aware of th•• :r-roblem, and thRt botr of them Dre doin[; evervtr j_ng possible to [',void our beine :rlaced in a position where t:r"' gap ~Jill embarrass us . · 0 �9/ "The Frencl. plan of advnnce is as follows: 4 nm~ wil1 advance on the axis LENDLA-VALLF.Cr,RSA-:''OP.1T SISER'JA, ?nd DIM on axis FASTEHA-CASTRO DEI VOISCI, 3rd DIA on axis FICO-SAN GIOVA\fTTI, 1st DMI protecting the rir;ht flank of F-r;C 1mtil the Ei~hth Arr1y arrives, 11-ft ,r wrich it will rr-sv!'"-rt to corps ,reser'V'e. "The II Corps plan is as follows: The f'"P:th Division to capture tre mtmr CTJRIA-FO'JTA DE Gf.J~I area; then advance to the northwest cutting the AMASENO Valley road. The ~5th Division to capture the high gr01md v,est of PIPERHO (I RJVERHC on so~e naps) ; th..,n nd.,rance to the northwest on S~ZZE and 'IORiffi.. "'l'hr, Frencri operations are proceeding accordin.i-; to plan and no gar has developed yet, but t'ris ·is chiefly bec~use th relief o:f' th~ 351st Infantry on HC'U rri CHIAVI'JO has not bMn completed y,t. 'l'he Frfl'lncr (General Carpentier·) insist that it has taken -place and th~y ar~ c}eckinp; vigorously tonight to prove trqt a battalion of the 4th DMH occupies that hill, but Porter hftS convinced m('l that tre:ir lnformation is viot t>b"'olutely- correct. It is tr,1"'! thrt th, French this aft!")rnoon had troops on T'fTNT VO'JA and M01Nl' r:zzUTO, but the enemy sent in sore troops between :num VC '{A and r:'.OTJl''T CHIAVINO ur ich prevented the relief, and the troops - l::>oth Am~rican and :::-'rench - are attempting to clear up that sitmition tonight. Rega:;.-r1less of the stnte of confusion - end it is only minor - which exists in that part5 cular area, tr e fact remP ins that no ga.p has developed and the II Corrs is rrotectinp; ~ ts ovm flt>nk es well as assisting the French. The reason one can say th1:1t the II Corrs is rrotecting its fhmk is because it 1w s the 35oth Inf entry genl"rally in the MOUilT CURIO area; the 349th Infantry gen~rally in the f'f0tnl1T ROTFNDC area. (Exact location llllkno,,m. Crawford has ;nstructiohs to nove an fffl'J:'A I''::: CAHFI, but he has b~en delayed in arriving there). 11 m1at the II Corps want to <lo now, and they have pushed r,e vigorously all day on this point, is to free their 351st RegiM.ent in order to be P.ble to rlace it in corps reserve. 339th will attack northwest regardless of 351st; Ps will the 337th and 338th as soon as they take TFJffi.ACINA. In thPt event they would then continue the attack of the '339th fro'lt f.ONNINC' toward the northwest toward PIP"":RNO. The 337th and ,3gth, still fighting in the TF.RRACINA-r-'DUW LEANA area, would proceed toward FifF.RNO while the 151st would be held under corps control in a central position to be used as the situl'ltion demands. I believe thr,t the entire problem will be solv~d as soon P s the siturition in the CHIAVINO-VALLE CORSA area clears. The French are not at all worried thn.t there is any danger in the so-called gap area and I 1u1 inclined to ~gree with them. Howev-er, I can a.ssure you that we area, not being conplacent about the matter, and thBt I am · followinr, it up relentlessly. rood is thoroughl7.r cognizant of the problem, and he is givin1; it hi3 very careful 8ttention. "It seems to me that we should now cons:ider extending th .. boundary between the FF,r, and the II Corps. I have not had a chance to discuss it vrlth either headquarters yet, but I suggest that the present boundaries be erlended to the northwest so that the road FIP'"RNO-Tf'YI'"SIANICO be given to II Corps. I realize, of course, thnt the boundary derends on the use you intend to make of the II Corrs when :it reaches the brjdgehead, but J believe that this boundary will at least orient both corrs in the correct direction. I will talk to G~nernls Keyes and Gr,rpentier tomorrow on this subject in order to ascertain their views. 11 �SAU MARCO-A •;crc--r:A.Y 2?, lq/44--General ClFrk this rnorn:ng dictated the following notes regardin~ his trip yesterday for inclusion in tr.c diBry: "Yesterday I flew to see Ge'1"ral Leese in [ln effort to coordin.'1te our ntAlthougP he professes tlwt Ms Pttack will be all-out, it is eing r.l"de by one di ision. I .cor.m:ented as well as I could on the weakness of the attack, but +,hroui:i;h qnick talk he indicated a great massing behind. All t:beir ections are always dictated b:, their rlesire to SP.Ve mnnpower and let someone else do i.t. I pointed out the a Jsolute necessity of eTl"lryone attacking all-out at tre sane time. He agrMs in pr--:nciple but will not do it in fact . I then flew to Juin. He is r'!ost eap;er to Rttack on tre ?3rd "ut will not let up his attacks in the nM.ntine. He exy-ressed surprise nt th..,. weakne9s of' the British attack. ne told Me ti-mt Fontecor-ro was rmoccupied and tht1t he was in th'-" outskirts, yet tre Canadfrns would not go in. He hPs born~ th~ brunt of tJ:,e Liri Valley battl'-"'. I am issuing orders co11.firl"l.-'ni,; M.Y 'Conversation with him in order that his r>ttack toMor:cow, in conjunction witr the Eighth ArMy, will a,,.,.. i.tsel" felt over pnd above trose t1tta~ks of the past few dl'lys. tacks <'or t ,e ?3rd . - "I visited a battle~ield west o~ Esp~ria witr Juin. It was ~s concentrPted n destruction of G1'rman rerso1mel a'1d T"l'l.teriel as I hA.ve ever seen. It ,,as nat;ni~5cent. Froba~ly 100 vericles, r,ostly vrmored, were destroyed. J tren flew to Scauri Rnd vi.sited in turn Ferr ia, Itri, Fondi and several riiles west of Fon:ii wrer" tl e 11attle , as taki.nr, place east of 'fonte San Bfap;io. II Corps is rnak'tr,rr vood rror;ress. I tl-i,-n w~nt to Gaeta an,, observed a lx=\ttalion of the 138th a)out to take off Por Sperlon,a in dukws. I urged II Cor~s to be allout in their forward move. e'1t. He . ust r-et the M. ;r ~ound '1orth of T~rrr>cina rrer~ratory to join;nv, up. "Upon "IV return by air I phoned Ge:reral A7evanil"'r, told hi1'1 of my trip and of rny plans to rush the II Corps to t!- e hi.gh rrro1md nortr of Terracina." General Clark c0nf~rr~d with G"'neral Gr,1entr~r Pnd GenerPl i'.lrl'lnn duri.nr, tre rnor.~n~ rr~or to his Move to ~re ½eachhe~<l. At 1100 re, G~ner~l Brann Pnn Colonel Drapl'!r f'lew to tl e beachrMd. Tpo'1 hfr Arri wi.1, Ge'1erel Cl.,,rk Fen+, ,im- . redirtely t0 hi.s Arvrnce Co:r,T"rntl Jost, had lunch flrr1 l~"'t with G~n~rl'll Bra"U'l. ror VI Corps wr"re hJ '.!onf'err'-"'<l 'fl'~th Ger"rE-1 '1' 1-uscott. Fro the VI Corps COl"'Mand post he :sited General Harl"l'Jon ()"" t1", 1st llrnored r-;vi.s5on, General 0 1 I1a'1i.el 0$' tl e '3rd Di.vic:;ion, rr~nerel Ryder of tl"' 14th Division and Gl!'n"'rrl 'tilker o" tre 1/,tJ:- Civision. All co and"rs wer~ .;n 1'1'0od ½eart ~'1d were ,., ,er Pn<l fl..nxious to jUMl'.' off .;n t1-_ 0rn~n-; nt 063C' lmmc:'Yi"1f! tle Dt°'PChhead attack. r-Po'1 h--1 s ,,..e+.urn to his co;-, and rest, (},•:nl"'rP 1 Clnrk, f'renerr>l Bra:r.:1 e"ld Colc..,e:' Yoward disc'rnsed br•-',..f'ly th• en ..my si.twtion. Tl·e fact +rrt t}-1"' G-errrrm 2i::,t:r Di vi.sion · '1 the Cori ?rea bid ee:>1 brcurrl t so1 t1· and tr~ q('t}, aTJ.d 29tli Divisions nortl of" Rn to the 'li' :rtl~ Arrw fl~fl front FJ.m so el mf'lnt trri Tl1.v1 ... siono on t e Adrir-tic s~c'le op 1 ositfl! the Fritis}:, 5tr Div!.sion v"ere discussed. ~1--at U e Gei-.an reac+j on would he, to t", contimlP.tio:r. of nn all-out attf,c:k from tr~ ~a·n :ront 8nd from t~e beachhead could not be defin~~elv v,lwted rt tlis t-· e. :Jo '-"' i:'."ldicP.tions were th.<i:1., th" Gernan was wi+,hilraw~r.,.,.: Oth,..rs indicPted th-it h"" in+~11c1 d to a~~ ,pt bF.tt1e P'1d d"'ren.rl v•-.-y ~lose tr- h-' s present J os: tions a3 of tc:-r1ay. �93 hnurs. At this confer"'r.ce he gave a.n off-the-record talk on "'V~nts thFt were to take plac/1! to""1orrow. In brief he exrlainl'"d row the attack on the Fifth Arm:t main t'ront was to b~ cortinued tomorrow 2nr1 rt 0630 the beacrhead forces ~ould lr 1 nch its attacv jn the djrectjon Cori - Valnontone . He emphesized that th is attack was planned to cut n r:hwa;v /16 r rid to 1 1.sh ro lu""ns nor-':.h a11rl Pouth wit} the ultirir>te obj1-ctives of r1 estroy~ng es l"'l"DY Gio-r:":Pl1.S as possible . General Clark stated that he. was not rrepl"red to say exactly wfo:,t the G6rr"E.n reaction would be and that he had a flexible mind, e11c , dere':.C::.ii.~ upon what tl:>e German did , was prepared to r,eet sev~ral "!Vent .mlities ••••• on~, a chanie in the direction of attack f'rorn due nortt to northwest. :L "ncicat~d thnt the beacr'head attack did not have as its p~ll'pose to capture Rorre . He explained }-ow the 45th Division ,·rould launch a li, ited obj~ctive attack on the lef't wit}. the 1st Ar:r,ored on jts right, leadin:r ler-ients being its tanl:s and its infantry f'ollowin,; up . On ti1e 1st Ar:"ored Di vision's right, would be the 3rd Division , trhicli w011lf Pttaek +re CisternP Pren which would -rrobably be heavily def'ended . "'he 36th Division ,ms to be prepnred to pass through the 3rd Di v5 sion if it was necessa1.7 to re-gi~oup and clean out the Cisterna area with the 3rd Division. He emphe.sized that the 36th Division, however, would not pass thrN1.~h unless the situation warranted it . There would be a thirtyminute a.rtillery preparation y.rio:r· to the attact:-, concentrated on the front of the 1st Arnori"'d and 3rd Divfoion in addition to count"'rbattery. The air also would play a heavy role, '1otr light, ,.,.,.diun end hea11:r borAb,.rs of the Strateq;ic Air :"ore~ . 'rhe weather forecast appeared ':'avora~l-,, and General Clark was corfident tLat rlans had been well prepareri and thPt the attack should go . He e:q,lai'Yl~d tret tl-e t rm Britisli Divjsfons on the hft were 1 mder Fifth Ar111 y control ar.c1 would hold t! eir positio!'ls with linjt Jd attacks only. The question arose as trJ vfrether or not tl-ie Ari y's left flank ms vulnera1:Jle to a l}"'rr:an attar::k +"rom t: e S'JUtl, since he had a1railable sev~ral divisions thPt could be b:>'01 1r,;J-it down with:in 24 hours . G~ner2 l Clark saic. trat this was always a possibility but that he tJ-iought thet if such an attsc},;: did take place we could hold it because we had done so before . He answered several questions fro;"' correspondents ,,ho wer('a, very entJ:,usiastic and pleased tC' be ½rieferl on -':.he attack taking place tomorrow. After U,e conferf"!nce General Clark saw Ge1'1Lral Horan, Signal Cf'ficer, and Gen"ral Bradshaw, AA Officer , after wh:5~h he r~tired early. 1 1 An estimated total o: prisoners of war as of 0625 this morning was 4,748. The following irportant mess~ges were received and dispatched today: Gruenther to Clarko TI.N' 142. "Eighth Army Stratton reports that Canadian progress in Fortecorvo Prea procl'leding satisfactorily. Believes that Canadians may be 8ble to 0 1t"'lank fixed defenses Pontecorvo area todr,,y. They consider it likely that enemy may start withdrawal front Hitler Line toniglit . So entr,usiastfo are they that they are discussing pursuit plnns and have s116 gest"'d boundary J'llodification a·"ter -':.he;-r net b'°'yond Cerrano . We have Jl'l.8.de no comr,itments . Will keep you advised . " 1 Gruenther to Clark. R'·J 14/ ,i-. 11 rren ::h re:rort thHt German withdrawal frol'I. Fico and Fontecorvo areas continues tc :increase. Brosset Division observer states that G~rnans appear to be in .confusion. Saville is sending out heavy armed recces . t•reather deteriorating . French occupfod :.enola. Now :rushing towards rastena and Snn Giovarni . 11 �CL"-1.rk to Gruenther . RN 8033 . 11 Your weathP,r message received . We will attack as s,heduled . Mnke every effort to carry out fighter bomber and light bomber missions at tjmes agreed upon. Weather ,iay look bad there but be good here . ~1issions cancelled should be mede available w en weather perr,its . " FiftJ; , Ar□y to Fifth Arm:.r Afhrance er. · RN 148. "Eight:b Army has requested AAI to adjust boundary forward o"" Cecca.no as follows . 'All incl Eighth Arrny Patricia 3833 - Supino 3535 - r1orola 3337 - Scurgolfi 2941 - rd junc ?242 thence Sei::;ni and your orir,inal bo1.U1dary. Both Fifth Army and ~ighth Army will probably be interested in routes through Ceccano 1 • AAI has been requested to rnake no cl ange for the present . ti 1 * ANZIO--M.AY 23 , 19/44--General Clark arose at 0430 , had a quick bree..kfast and went to a forward observation post to be on hand at the front rrior to the artillery preparation . He was .o:nided to the OP by General Butler , Deputy Com- · mander to General. Truscott . The trip out was quiet Rnd continued to be so until 0545 when more than 5CO guns opened up on the half hour's preparation preceding the attack. Soon after th"' cannons started firi:n.<:;, visibility -became very poor , due to smoke and morn:ing hn.ze . Little could be seen, but through the din and roar of the g1mfi1~e, tanks could be heard ~oving up into position ready to attack. At 0615 the dull rul'llble of our aircraft proceeding to drop their bornb loads on schedule could also be heard . At the forward OP , in addi- tion to General Clark, were General 'i'ruscott, VI Corps Commander; General BPehr , Corps Artillery Officer; and General Lewis , Arny Artillery Officer . General Clark remained at the forward OF 1.mtil 0730 when-he started bnck t'o his adYance command post. The return trip was mA.de in a dull drizzle which lasted for about fifteen ainutes . Upon his return· to the advance comme.nd post , General Cl.8.rk remained in :bis office the entire mornj_ng, receiving reports of the progress of the battle , both on the beachhead front and the Min Fifth Army front . He conferred fre quently with General Brann, his G- 3, concerning future plans . Copies of messages sont to General Gruenther , Chief of Staff, report hlghlights of today ' s events and future actions . 1n brief, reports of rrogress made came in rather slowly during the day. The 45th had rractically taken its limited objective . The 1st ArMored Division had ·passed the railroad north of 0111' front line , and the 3rd Division had advanced its position about 2 , 000 yards , and the Special Servjce Force had pushed elenents across Highway //7 but ,,ere driven back lPte in the day and evening. From the main front , II Corrs had still not taken Terracina, but the 337th Infantry had takeP Mount Croce to the nort1' of the town and was planning an enveloping maneuver from the north to take it . Other elements of the 85th and ~8th Di.visions were Naking rarid rrogress through the mountains to the northwest . F..arly this afternoon elements of the 88th Di vision reported that they could see motor Movements on the east-west road north of Ir.iverno . These elements were probably on Pount Curio . The French Corrs was having sm-1e tough fighting , and the report that they had captured Mount Cerreta was not correct . They were still fighting for tM.s high ground . The attack by the Canadians on the Bighth Army front had no aprearance of being all- out and WHS rather disappointing. Gonf~rPll'ld reports of any progress they had n2de have not been received . �As of r,idnight tonight casuPlties in th!" Anzio area ran up to JJ1-90 . * * * A' 1ZIO--t'!AY 24, 1944--General Clark arose early to study communiques concern:1 ng progress of tl-i."'l battle on botl:i fronts . Inforrn,.-,tion concerning the beachheail. was r1eager in the early r-orning hours. G"'ner81 rarrnon I s 1st Armored Division had passed some ele,..ents e cross th"' railroad who held their positions 0'1ring the night . The only point wherir: enemy counterattacks · push1'd our e 1e:'le'1ts back were in th~ Specfa l Service Force eree in which 'mi ts were forced back of Hi~hway #7. Durin,o; tJ,,e d2y, however, the 1st ArJ11.ored niv1sibn had 0dvrmced past Fi ~hway }7 and h"l.d rrflct1cally reached its fir st phase -1ine, the TI line, by nightfall, nort.h of Fig,.'1way ,¥7 . The 3rd Tli_vision, ,vhile not D ctuD lly occupying Cistern2., 1-iad :~us1..,1-d elel""1'nts on botr Jtc1 -'s of jt •ell nor-tr- of righway /17. On +,}- e naJn Fiftl- ArBy front Terracina liar'l fallen, ard m.otoriMd reconnaissar:ce elements were fay,:ning out fro., Terrac':na or I'ighway ¥7 and on lateral roacs toward the bridgehead . Frogress j s slov: 1,ecause of !:'any der:.olitio:ris encmmtered. Ac'~mnces were -Ede along th'!! entire II Corps front., 6 iving us practicall:t all of tbe h~_gJ., rrouna east of th!": ljne fjperno 'T' r:::-acin11 . Frer1 ch Corps ~1ad , so, e :r.,...or;ress on th"' rigl•t Jlnnk, · :nota'l-,ly 1 aving- cr'1W_11.r::ed as far as Vall~corsa . On th,..ir r::gl"t pr0gess was slo".r be cause of bitter res:Lstence . aeports indicrted that t:1e Eighth Army had rushed "'iooil,... 1:"lements as far as the Mel.fa River. At 0840 General Clerk left for the Srecial Service Go~rnand Post where he decorated Genl'!ra1 Frederic 1-:: vlith the T.listinguished Service Cross . Prior to t':11'! awarding of the decoration, General ClPrk d:lscussed with General Frederick diff>iculties thPt L" had encountered the preceding afternoon and evenin ,. ;::)eterrnined counterrtti:icks by 9.r:nor fo:-ced General ""rederick to w~ thdraw his forces sontr of Hi,.:;hway #7 . I.i'ror, th" Special ~lervice Force, General Clark went to the 1st .Arn1ored Dbrision where be co"lferred with General Harmon . He first learned here that tank elenents had crossed Hic:,;hway #7 . Upon leaviw; the 1st Armored Di vision comr'land post, he Met General 0 1Daniel, Cormanding General of the 3rd Divj_sion , and acconpanied him to the 3rd ::Jivision corm.and post, where te discussed with him condjtions on the 3rd Dh'ision frcnt. Their progress was slower , due to heavy defenses in and around Cisterna. After leav5-ng Genl')ral O'Daniel , General Clark went to the Y~tL ·:va.cuation Hospital where he visited his Fifth ArM.y soldiers that had been wounded withi:'1 the last two days . He cr,a t ted .. with many in tLe casualty wards i:rnd elso visited one of the operating rooms . From the J"J;th I'vacue.tion Hospital he went directly bacl: to the Fifth .Arny advance com:"land post ,il::ere he went into c011ference with Genl"r-al Brnnn. Faramount in his discussions Fith his G-J was the possibility of joinjng the bridgehead forces from the west with II Corrs +:'orces aprroac1'ing fron the east. He took the 16th T'.::i-igineer Reg:i rent frorn unde:r VI Corps control and took them under his co1 mand, allo~ving General ':'ruscott to ·1-:eep his eye straight ahe1id toward 1-lis ob.i~ctives in the vicinity of Cori . The 36th l~ng~neers had attached. to it the Brett Force , combination of a British recce unit e.nd sore American tank destroyers . mhe 36th Engineers vdth its attaclun"lnts under corn:r1a.nd of Colonel �Stanl-,y will jur::p off early to:-ior-row "'orn~n with elements of II Corps . Important erstwerd, e:;.'T-,ctinr; to join ·,1p essages of the day are as follows: Gru~nther to Clar'• . R'' 167. "Tio,rracina is ours" . General Gruenther this morning sent General ClFrk the followinr, rl, e orl."n- : "I h'l e just 'lert you a ,..lr:tsh thflt T~HRACPIA is now in our rossession . We hav~ rad th., wh~els reased sine, last nir,ht that as soon as it ea.r1e into o•ir i:ossession word would bJ piven to e i ediately. The ressR.ge was on its way to you within five minutes of the -ti.me tht-1t II CorJ s learned of the carture . "':be exact position of t'1e 1313th on Monte Leano i.s not !c"lO\m but it is helieTl'!r" to be ot1 tor of th!" M.11 oving west to cut t, e ro::irl and bottle 1 1r any Ger :'l.ns still i.n +,re a.rel:'. , · •v~e~s entered town w-:tr the i.nf'·rntry &d are ull-dozing a path throu11;h . GenerPl Keyes w:i.11 ress so I'." artille:r-y tlu-ough first hecause he hA.S snre positions just vest 0f the tow:r w'r ~ er he is T"'ry t"ag~r to occupy. 3;.,,.111ta"11.eously !'!ler •r.ts o:' th"' 91st R~cn . Sqmidron will ;ass throng}, in an l'!J"Ce[lvor to dash on to th.- 1-)ridr,ehead area. Get11'!rt': l'"'yes has thorour,hly j hued J,,js troops wit tr" ~rlea o-f "rescu~nr; trl" ½r-td,ahead" anrl ~twill not surprise me to refl.r thfl·t c0!ltact o+' A. sort is ar'e wi th:in tl-il"\ next 24-36 hours . T'/an'11.a bet? 11 T'n "The 330 :n..,antry has <Jent a :force t0 cPrb.1re the western end of the r~onte ORSr tunnel . J+' the -tmml"l can be used it will g.reatlv facilitate tre mov"' eP-t 0f troors and supplies to t,e FIP~RNC' area . "Gen ,ral Ori tt"'nberger :has askfl!d for autrority to .ov" his command post to t},l" area :.'orm~r:i.y occupii,d by II Corrs . I hav~ a-nprovfl')d his r"'qu-,st and the ~ove fill be ade within a few days . Gfl!neral Critte11r- ,r ,er told e thrt h., has just rec1'iVl"d newspar-,r clip r-in ,s 4"rom t:1e States f'ron Hay ll anc l? n.,wsrap~rs ard thiot the universal attitude is one of extr~ne corf:ldence in th~ rbiE.ty of the Fifth Arny to accomplish its ~ission . 11 G-,!'11!ral Alexander is most enthusias+,ic- over the rrogress of tre Fifth tr e brid,,ebead yester,fay. He has as'.<ed e to extio,'1d h5.s best wi.shes to you . GenerPl Alexnnder will dehi.y his decoration of General K.,yes and General Juin until you can be present.11 11 Army and esrecially th"' advc.nce mane 1n A r,risoner o-f' war report as of 1 :30 t1,is afternoon showed the li'ifth Ar ,y as takinn; a total of 7 , 304 nri soners anc' tre ::a ,hth Army taking ,., , '3 50, aking a to+,al of 0, 654. ~his .Piriru:re rerresents the total prisoners taken since the egjnninp, of the all-out offensive on the night of r!ay 11- 12 . This l'.f'ternoon General Clark sent the .c>ollowing rnernorandum to General Gruenther: �ii/(' ~ ~ .3 "The joininr, ur of II Corrs and Fifth Army bridg"hMd forces may take rlace at any time, Ps you know. Witri the thr"'at of the II Corrs in the rear of 17tr Division, ·1:,11,., Boche will be reluct;:int to kMr iraport~mt <Xl~""itments south of Littoria and south of Route #7. "As you know, tre joininr, up of ny two Fifth Army forces will be one of tlie 1'-' ,..,lir;hts of' tJ:,e Fifth ArMy 1 s career . rt is rrimnrily a Fifth Arr.y M.tter, nnd I want you tot 11 Generfll Alexander thr-t I want autl::ority given me i .ediPtel;v to -issue n sil"\ple oomri~m:ique +>ref'! rere as soon as II Corrs t~oops have moved overl11ncl into the bridgehe['.d . "'he rebuttal they may ii;ive you that a teTipornry joinin~ up noes not ~ean a permanent one - is unimportant, for tl'e story, arrl the big arrunent, is ·1hen Fifth Arny main front troops Move ov""rla.nd into the hrideehead. The bri<l~ehead is entitl~d to this story, and if we have tc wnit .,,.or a commmique .~ro. A.AI, Alr;iers, Naples and all the r~st get the story before tre ~en do rer,. All I ,culd g;ve would be a simple st~te~ent in a coJ!l?llunique that troops o~ t 1 main Fifth Army hr:i.ve broken into the bridgehead ovt""r1Fn<l . As soon as thr-t stnte nt is r;iven, I would radio to you in order tl:-r>t AAI could rut out ?. siT'lilar co. unique . J lease hA.nclle this +>or me and ins~ st, i+' you cnn, upon riy request being ~anted . "I hn.ve visited advance cp ' s of '3rd I)ivision, Special Service Force ['nd 1st Ar,nored Division this morning , and, in addition, talked to Truscott . The "ight ing is se-ver"' on l--oth sides of Cistena. Special Service Force had a tough time last evening. Tanks Pttac1cl'lri it and "nf'l.icted rathl'lr seY"'re casualties . The 133rd Inf'antry took over 1ts f'r-0nt w~ich hrd been r-ushed back south of Route #7. S~cial Service Force wrs bl'ling rMrg1:111.ized and by this t.;_,,,e should have juriped off in thP- attr:i.ck again, for tre 3rd Djvision has rusred ur across Route //7 on its left . I wa<J et '":rnie r~rmo:'1 1 s CP tris norning ·,hen news cane in th,... t two of hts 1st Armored tnnk comprmies were astride Route #7. Tr.l:'t was ITOod news. I exrect ~ore to follow . The 5th Division's Sl'l!flll effort yesterday on tl.e left "'lnnk rnet wit}, a counter attack last nir;rit which pushed it beck across the river. Tt is bi:>ck wh"'r~ it str,rted. ITren I r,et additional parachute troors, u.s., I will lwve 5tr. Rritish Division take ovl'!r the entire sector of the two British :::)ivisions rlus fPrachute troops and perhnps the %th En ,.;neer, if we close in with VI and II Corps. Then I am prepering y,J.ans to use the 1st British Di.vision with the 45th for an att ck northwest astrice th"' railroad track. This is j,1st r plan, but if eTentue.lities require :tt, ~.t is well to ha e it in hen1 . :: e0uld support it with tanks . "I would say tl ere are about ? , OOO battle cti.sualti""s to date. I visited one evflcuation hospital tr:! s nornin1;, and fro, reports I would sny th:::i,t is about tre score . It May run as high as 2,500, including.dean and wounded . 0 "I arn wonder-:11~ where HG Division will go. If he is s"'.art, he r.ill put it in the Vflll'lontone area, or he a;r brlng it in southwest of' Velletri for a co•mterattack. • 11 Vlith re-rerenl:"e to t e comnmnique referred to jn tJ-,"' sec0nn p:::iragrarh, if, f'or any reason and : cnn t 1 1Jnk of none whi..cr is justifiable, A.AI will not r;rant :re thPt [l 1tl·orjty, you r:a,<"' fflrnn sur,. thf't their commmi<J_ue is prorerly worded, making it cl, Fifth A-.cn.y s>-iow, for thrt is exactly whPt it is. 1 "Have Stanl"'Y of tr~ 3bth .,Tt,r'reers ;n lier~ now, so as to talk over ways �and means thf1t he might move out of the bridgehead if required to meet II Corps .. I would pref\")r that II Corps ca:r,e in. HReceived your notes' on detachments from Fifth Army at a later time,. will think about that e fter we hmre accomplished whet we · set out to do. "Delighted the way Keyes is pusring his II Corps. which you give him. 11 I I know the impetus Gruenther to Clark. RN 171. "Keyes has just returned from cub reconnaissance west of Terracina. Denolitions are extensive. Improbable th8t reconnaissances squadron ca.n start north today. Western "'.'nd of Monte Orsa tlmnel blocked.. 349th in contact south of Mo1L'lt Rotundo." Clark to Gruenther. RT-I H-19.. "Reference your NR 171, reconnaissance squadron should not wait to Move north. They should go as fnst as the~r can go, stopping only as demolitions ere encountered. Your message indic8tes that they will vrait unt-' 1 tomorrow or s0J11e other t:i me to start. Get them going and let the demolitions dictate tl-eir rate of speed. Our cub reconnaissance ov~r Route through Bergo Grappa does not indkate heavy derwlitions. 11 At 1650 tl is afternoon General Clark sent tte fallowing e:-1orandum to General Gruenther: ';I have taken Jt8.nley 1 s 36th Fngin1'ers snd its sector defense over to Army control in order to further relieve Truscott from lookiYJ.g over his shoulder. I want his eye on tr e ball ont in .,.ro11t - Cori - Valmontone WJY. I have put the so-called 11 Brett 11 force under Jtanl~~~. Stenley will still have his sector defense responsibility, whic~ ~ill gradually dissolve as the Boche pull out of the Littoria area. As Keyes• advance elenents advauce Littoria way, I will shoot Stanley out. Stanley thinks it will be a pushover. The Boche has fired a lot of ammunition on that sector today - I think, getting rid of it. As soon as the 85th Di vision has secured the high 6rol.md in the Sezze area, I will bring II Corps Headquerters and corps troops complete into the bridgehead. The faster Key..,s cen gnllop his hors,, the ',etter I will like it. By that time the Frencr should have pushed up, pl'rr:.itting 88th to push up, relieving th~ 35th. 85th will then come into the bridgehead. I will ass'ign the 45th Division, the $5th, the two British Division, 16th Engineers and tanks, perhaps some from ITarmon but not if' his going is good the other vray (Herman Goering w!.11 help c1 "'cide tJ:,is), and II Corps will prepare "plans for an all-out ol.:ensive to the northwest astricle the newly gained railroad ernbenl:ment which is outside o.,. thdr principal !'lined area. rJ Coll)S will take over the Sezze - Fiperno sector. Just want"d to let you know what I s in my mind., "If things M.ove as raridly as I tr.ink they will with regRrd to the joining up, I see no excuse for moving the rear elef'lents of our F5+'th Ari y CI into the Itri area. I ha"'te just talked with Uoran, who 11.grees. We might go to Littoria. I 1'>.1\1. a::'raid that 1 s pretty well smashed. and probflbly a heavily nined area which would not facilitate our spreading over the countryside. Dick is working on it and will let you ::now. nr hope we will eet Cisterna tris ev-ening. ~ ~ ' - Ernie I s Cor"lbat Gol"inand A is on �the Ti line and B is approa cl ing it . As I told you, his reconnaissance eler,ents e.re work:i.nf!, slo·,vly northward. He is pushing some light t.<mks to the east. I mn optid.stic. I estii"'l8.te 1500 p'.r'isoners haV'c been taken up here since the beginning of the attack. It may run over that. 11 Enc1osed is a note for Lem, as you suggested. u The Army Chie~ of Staff sent the following Memorandum to th~ Army Commander: "I hHve your letter written at 1/410 hours this date. 11 I have just been cble to reac:b Lem '7i thin the -rast few :r::inutes and I • discussed the special coro:m.mique request vr~ th him. He is i:;oing to get the feel of it w:ithin the next two hours Pnc< call ne back to give rne the reaction. :rt is h~s belief thnt there will he oppositfon to the issuing of a special comnnmique direct fro,., tre Bridgehead. He do~s, however, feel con!'iclent tlk"lt we can probably write our· own communique in r1dvance so that it can be released simultaneously here ano at the Bridgehead. t shall hold out for the issue of a simple comrimiq11e .,..rom tre Bridgehead couched in such lengu_.qp~e as will +'it t_ e siturtion wrich occurs. rowever, I suggest that :rou l,ave Ken Clark draft a suggested cor,,rnunique and senc1 it alo11g by th1&, 8 o I clock poucr tornorrow norn5 ng. It arpears n011, I regret to say, thrit the Reen Squadron ni 11 :not pet to LITT0RIA as soon as vre bP.d roped this morninr,. Gene:;.~el Yeyes reports thrt tb•, (' enolitio:n wori< has tl1'en very th0roui:;hly dont:. He has sent more eng'ri~ers up to pusr the wor'k: energetically and he will g,.,,t tl1rou:;! Ps fast as he possibly can. Fov'ever, P.t this writin · l e can not gun.rantee thEt the Reen U..."1~ts wil1 be stf1rted by r.iorning; in fact, h~ is alnost certain thPt they w:n: not. I Br following this matt"'r u:r ccnst?ntly and I s½all k~er v-0 11 advis"'ld of the rrogress of the rerair work, b~ca.use I know how r-uch this join-up Means to the Brjdeehead forces and to t½e entire Fift ArMy. 0 0 EXTRA SFBCIAL FL.ASE~ "G"neral Carrentjer just telerronl"ld (1705) to sta.t~ tr.at V1>llecorsa is ours. I aJ,, hapry about tr~ s in nore ways thari one, because now Generril K"'y~s should be satisfi"'d thflt the Chi.avino-P1zzuto a:cea is secure. He will now be a'l-:Jle to rove ris 351st aro·md to tre west•rn flank to give extra ~!'Ip ,tus to }ris rus1' th~re. I sent you a r,essage 15 m~.rn1tes 1:>go tl 2t the St, ArI'l';y has reported whPt 0 mounts to a break-ti:--rourh of tan1,s to the Vi'LFA River. Tl-iey clai,;i t},at there is e ~ai:.-·l~f 1£.rr-e ~nl"!!'1Y .('orce ., n the A'),FHTO-r:rn-r•~o'IT:C area a~1c Hey now h--,ve hopes of a r,ooc~-size G•r,,on bag. : jl"""ediately got in · touch with Gen"ral Car·entier to give him tl·e news. Ht" checl'ed ,,:th the 3rd DIA and th""?y r~ported that there has ')e"'n no decrease in 1'ne1::- r4'sistance in the SA'-J GIQ1Tfi>JNI area. However, wit}' t!1e news o-P the ''l'ri'LFA River- brer.k-thro'_1gh, tLe French are now go:.n: to pus} nort 11 W"th r"r,l')wed v:l p;or. Unfortun/0 tely, of course, they are 11ot at all certain +.l1nt t]1e ?th Arry r-•port is correct. C':i.·d~11arily, :r wouldn't bet a nickl, 01 that ""~tl·er, but in t!1is case I believe tLe report is e"ccurate. -..le shall see! 0 doubts that ,,e will be able to get the parachute battalion and the glider battalion ir1 addition to the parachute 11.CT. '.'"! tr irL',,:, ,.:,hat AfH,i will 11 Lem 'td) ;· /~ ,"'., .,,½:_ "',,. ,'," \ '~ /i ~;y,, >~· �100 insi.st ~n si-nding on~ or +,:1e ct,h\"'r of th1'8 1111.its -C') tr e Airborn~ "'rchl.ing Cert\"'r ·,.., ediately. 'fowevl"r, I told '1 4 t:r11.t JOU rac!. t-- hEve bc,+h of tre. now and that AAI should not cons.::d"r a co J..,.c r.:s\"' wr-ile th" b1:ttle is in its pres1•nt critical stage . He says they wil:.. rusr the atter for all their worth . "He are all 1: ,hly alrted v,.: t·1 t>~ st'r'Cl"SS o~ th~ R:"'idg"':bead etti=wk • t~.a-:. , e ca 1 gi e yo,:;. t' e necessary ass.:s+ance from this end • .- .,. on";.v 'op\"' '"!11:'.rk to Gr·w-.ther- . RT· 8j_C7 . 11 R~fer~>1~e sped al co ,,,,mique , I R~ w-"Ui•1~ ·r ·)e;r -'ns··s~ to a si u:.to.~.-.ous iss...1e . I s-..1t~gest "';he fo:lo1ing com-·mique: ' Jlimaxing F srectact l8r d •tmce 0f 6o iles in pnly blf:·nk days , Fi"th Ar y ~roops f"':co -'-;l e ain fron.t j a.: r\"'d ur tc 'r- y vri. th F:'...ft. Ar y All;"'d fcrces w1--,~~· r" · 1:'l~oken out o"" th, l)ef>chhead . 1 1Tr~ -!;roo1 s -"ro tl e ::::-•1t' , ov rcom-i 1r, ro "'rful erl"ny rl'lsistance , . ave +'ou~ht th~ir way sin~e t11e ·1i l + c. f ::a- :2 J'iay over so e of tb"' most <liffic-ul-:. 0·1'1-:.ain ter1·ain of the wrole Palinn . carirpai -n . ' Tle c'r. ati.c .~urcture of the t~o :'-:l.-l"tl Ar ~,-,..r0rts riccurrl"d a '"',,.w ,iles soutl east c" t'1.- 11eachhead on -+;l,t"' '"!O, str 1 ·h: gl war ru.nr::..n ~-:.wei,r. T\"'rracira ~nd A~zio . ,,.,.. e jun.c4:.ur~ o., the two f'orces i:;iv1's riftL Ar y •m.:.nterrupt\"'d lard co _ _ , :>1:;..caticns "or the "· rst t · , si 111"' th"I '1c£' chreac O;' ,rp+,io11s 1i,gan on 22 .Ta'luA.ry. ""'•ir·n" +,'1e • rt"'r-;--:.. '3.11 t,~oors; equip ~11t e"lr' surrlies hr-d to e tra""sr 01·ted ov..,_,__• : czardcu3 sec. r0•1t-,s . 1 1 11 You will note thrt I lav,,. left blan" ~1 A number o~ days i.t took to ~oin up . Each readqwrter<i cc"tld '"'i --nire th:i-:, s+,artj n, "rom -!;r.., nigrt 11-1? ~n<1 co mti.., tl I" 12t"h es +ne fir·st day enr'l t1·-, c F.' ~ nf ~oi.'1.~r -1p t 1 ,e l.<tst day. Re sure thf1t ·nstr,1~tioris Eir~ i<1sued :i edia... •ly to censors here to pass stori,.s "lasec1 on t: is speci · 1 corir·unic:'1• whfllln I ci.v" tl" authority to re:..e1'.lse them . After joinin.~ · r I would f 1 P sh r !'I ssage to yo'J. and giv" yo·.1.the ti e t '1pt we wofrd r~lerse here, p·obably an hour's not.!ce. I a stRrti.'l y '°'rec' al task fore.., •md"'r 3tanLy o·lt 0f tre br ~ c1 ,1"'1-iePd at di:' li 1~t tc. o.,,. ,cw rnornir . -~ K~yes r,ets on ris horse, junction Rt lePst 'y ~oot l"'le~ents srould take J lace befo-~e roon tomorrow . C:orfi rm thPt +,I-- ese "rran ,enents ar'!! sE'tis factory. '' Lat"' t1,~ s e ',n_:nc General Grul'lnt'ber sent GenerPl Cl;:ir'k- tr~ following e~o.ranclu!'l: h.'"'Yfllls call1'd tonight to flC.Vl"'e us of th"' -!; ·,....ing !'or the next phase or ri.-:; O}. eration . He rill attacl-': on ?6 nay - prob~ )ly l'!arly orning on thPt da. · - to capture th, ~'T . 3AIA'JO hill ass (;:H~-18) . Tris mir;sion will l)e ~.: "'e'"1 to the '1t:;tr Di~·ision. The "339th In-"Pntry -: ,-:; in t11e [.0~"'·:-·m area YJ.ow and. will lean tPe attack. T' e 13ntr. Inf~ntry will be ov~d tonorrow so it crn i"'l'rV c ~rat~ , P7.trour(1 G~rP.ral Yeyes is not certr:i:in thrt -it will be t} ere in t · m~ -l"o:r th-, jl.ll'lp-off . The ".<37th wi.11 1e used .:r "l.ecessary. Yo·1 l'rf~rsta11rl , o:: course , that th• ,37-t.!1 t=:nd tl1' -:i3'1-1-,h A.re still 'r the T•?ffi}CIFA.-f'T. :..C,A..TC area . Tl-i~:-r will be oved nortr +,ornorro • Aft .r rrr . ,AIA 'IO 1.r.s b ~~n se~ured the ~5ti D7 Vi.sion wil: car~ure t~e r~~ r,rotn~ in the 1~ZZ~ area. Tr~ ~8th 11 G"'n•ral �lDI Divisioy, will assist the 85th on 26 '1ay - in a oo.nner which Generril Keyes has ·'lot indicat~d yet - find will be rre:rrired to attnck on corps order in the direction ~'IT'. CT1RIA-R0CGAC'i0RGA . Gen~ral Keyes does not n.nticiprite tlm.t the. SSth Divisio11 will arivance across the A1·1ASI:NO Valley on 26 May unless the French are abreast of hi!!! at thrt ti, e - a:r1 faprobabl~ situ:otion . Gen~ral K~yes is sorry thFt he cannot launch this attack until the ?6th, but a consiclernble anount of regrouping has bt"!en necessary as fl result of t'1e f"ighting in the TERRACINA area . HoreOirer, he has h11d to displace his artillery in order to support the attack . A considerflble pRrt of it wilJ. bl") placed just west of T1?.RRACI 1~ . As I expla:.ned to you in the n~ssage ton:i ght the 91st R-,connaissnnce Squadron started this mornjng ~n the direction of LITTORIA . Hm1ever, the' demolitions have hpeded progress to such r-i.n extent th?t in my earlier !"!essage today J f'elt it rdse to indicate that the advance to t:re north had not yet started. Actually, of course, it has be~1m, and your 4 nstructions thr..t th~ rate o:' advance should be determined by the denolitions are being followed implicitly. The 117th Tteconna'i.ssance Squadron is also available for this assir,nr!IP!nt i"" :!t is n"leded . As it sfrrds novr no inffantry has been assigned for the reco"lna:i ssanc~ , a..'1d 11one will be unless it becomes necessary, since General Keyes f'eels th,.,t h~ t,ill probably need all of his infantry in the attack toward SEZZE . General Keyes does not admit th-it his divisions are tired , but some of our staff officers who hPve seen the 137th and 318th indicate thPt thev are quite tired. 11 I told you in my 23 May letter the 4th Dr 1M is attacking :in the direction VALLECOB.SA-IR.OST~EDI . General Juin visitl"d the 4th DMM today, and rt,P.Ve then hell because the:v hav~ b~en :l!oving so slowly. Gen rel Carpi-.ntier predicts that we shall see a fast1'r rete of advance tomorrow., 11 As "I told you that j would let you know further f bout the rrorosed e:x-tension of the II Corps- FEC bour1dary. This is our suP-gestion: Brlend the rresent bo,m<lnry- to Ml'. s. '',\HTPJO (32-?6), thence west to rrr . GASTc;11or.JE (26- 27), thence northwest to HI' LUPONE (16- 38) . This boundary is agreeable to General Keyes . It also has the concu:t'rence of General Carpentier, but he has not had a chance to discuss it with Gen~ral Juin yet. He will let me have General Juin ' s comments in th,.. morning . I ~xplained to both General K~yes and General Carpentier that trie boundary had not b!"!en referred to you ttnd thr-,_t it m1 -:;lit not fi. t in with your r lans . "Speaking of boundar:i ,s , General Juin sent in Colonel I<arnr~erer to se"' me this Hfternoon to suggest to you that you con sider tl rl ndv-isability of proposing a change in tre AAI maneuver . He belj eves thAt the sector assir;ned to the Fifth Ar:riy is too restrjcted for the mmber of di visioris in the Pr~y. He believes thl'lt the boundary should b"l 111odif:ied t0 give t o t1'e F ift h Army the road: GEFRANO-F'1.03IN'ONE-STTPIACO-RC'VIA~TO-TIVOLI . Uith such a zone of a,ction the French Corps could swing wide to the rir;ht anrl execute an ~nveloping attack in the direction RrVLti.rro-rr,IVOLI. Under this yianeuver the Fifth Army would avoid a frontal attack and should. secure d~cisivl'l results . Oh yes, I forgot about the ~ighth A:rmy. It will sv1ing very wide in the direction ARC~AYEZZA'm-RIETI- TBRNI. (I rather suspect thAt there is some r0 ~thod in his Madness in send ~_ng the Eigbth Arny on this ,vide end run . The CanadJans fj red a 0 �lOJ. few ~hells i~to th~ Frencr today, killinr, severr! m,nbers of tre Brosset Division). I told Colonel Kam..,,erl'lr to advise Ge"lerPl Juin thrt I would present an out1 i.ne of the plan to you. I und~rstand tht 1 ~fapoleon I Br~mn and his planners are in a lull at the mommt, ·and I f'm s·rre t Pt they will be more than ear.er to play with thj_s latest scr ,rne. 11 Genl"'ral Juin still has C'EIRANO as his object~ve. re hRs no evidence of any wei:ik1•mjng or t11.e eneI'ly resist~!lce in th~t sector. If, howe er, it should col1flpse anrl the 'Sir;hth Arey rroMed up t'1e Vr>lll'!y before the French crossed j>1to tre r.ig'1tr Army zrne, Generr:.l Juin will stop tre 1rd DIA and plRce it in corps reserv"'• Be is ,oin~ to place thl"' Bros3fllt !Jivision in corrs reserve tomorro ,, any.how. '!'he Ti're!'lcli would trif"n rave two divisions e"vr-ncing to the northiest, the Dody Division in t1e direction IAS':'t:NA-CAJTRO DEI 'CLCESI, and the /¥th flMM in the 1rection VALL~ CX'RSA-PRO'lSEI'I. "I feel th"lt evt•n·;vtJ..ijnP" is rrop;ressi'r1g sati.sfa.ctorily on this Pront. I re~ret that the Ke-yes attack could n0t e made fll!~rl~er, but I believe trat his l~-hour lmlt was necessnry i'1 view o+' the scr-tt.,.red co11.dj tion of '1-ij s two di visio11.s. f P,rsonally .,. ha e ;"ly dnubt'1 whethflllr fl' will 11e ahle t0 attack fro!'l so•;HJNO on t norni::1.r, of trie 26th as 11e now rlr-ms. If. he esti, n.tes thi:--t tl e attack requires two RCT I s attecldr..~ si.TT1ltanl'!ously, I am almost certain that he cA.nnot do i.t e,t thPt tjme . He will submit his rlr-n tomorrow, and as soon P.S it arriv.as I shRll fo E!rd it to you. 1" 11 ! just talked to W lsh, Ei,hth Arffly, to brin~ to his attention th~ erratic artiller.r fi.re of tl·e Canadians. He l'a"' rro isf"d tn takt".! proMft C<'"'l'rective action, and has request'°!d t 1nt I convflly sincere r ,r;rets to the Frenc' • It 'is true ~hat tre Canadian armor res reached the !~LFA RIVER. However, i Boche st~11 holds on to A rrrm, and Ge"l.<"lral Leese ;s i.ncl"ned to b~l~evfll! thnt tl·e ene-rny will delay at t.1t·r•ro as 1onr, ['S rossible-, l'lnd ill tr,..n ease out via t e CAS?RO CT~LO-RC'CCAS":'iCA ROA") to tbl'l north test . 'lf,lsh is not at all certein thc,,t the Ei,,.rth Army can rrfllvent tbis o,re. 1Ie says tJ-rnt trie tanks are havi"lg hard going -tn tr!'! r .LFA VAIJ,F.Y, nnd t},rt . 8!1Y of the ?re bogged do m. 11 The total m: ber of rr · soners t 'ken dm·ini-; this oreration as of eleven o I clock tr is even: ng is 10,715, or w},icr 2, "3 50 }',9.ve been tak"'n by Eighth Army ancl the reminder by Fift Army. * * * A11lZIC--MAY 25, 191.4--Generi=il Clerk lert · h::s cc nil rost at 08'10 to r,o to VI Corps here he conferren brie ly with GenerFl "'ruccott concerninr, tre progress of the VI Corps attack E1nd possibility of div"'rting the 45th, 34th ~nd 36th Diisio"'ls to a+tack in a nort}, restf';rl v direction. towErd Vfll1-letri and to its south, while at th,.. sam~ time the 3rd DivisioB, Sp,..cial Service Force c0ntinue north to Valmo11.tone, t' e 1st Arrored Division to support both attacks witr its bulk goi"l.g to the attack tom.rd V,.. l.1etri. He returned to the F-;.fth Army Advance col"'Pnd post where he co:i1."'errl"'r'i. brieflv ·rri tJ- Ge:1err.l Brann anrl left irmediEtfllly -/"or the Y-i.cin-14:;y of' Borgo Gran"'a h~r"' he was to se,.. the overland juncture of II Car-rs a11n bridgehead forces. He was Pcco panie-d by 8bout 25 correspondevits and photof"'l'.'Ftphers . "'he juncture of' th-, br~cg~head fo:-cces vith tre . a.in Fifth Army front w:ci.s a ITOMento,1s occr-,sion. It occ,ll'red fourt"'en days ::i:."ter tre l""'ain F" fth Arny .i:-rcnt wr-i s unmched on tre 11th of I ay. 1 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, May 6-24, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from May 6-24, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1633 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/c5b896450960d606a68b88eeb1b188f9.pdf?Expires=1787184000&Signature=HrfDIUr5Yrq8PUDGi%7ErPPZEHKnZ2k3IlkKoCHCk0G3RrwsMsfaB432%7EUjUU3-jWQimpf6XtmW0RALi1fiVFof%7EGnhT9ofC3Gjy8Wu51jYoD8zK1ukGY41O3Pq7AB-ClJOF2BkVVJFLZbLGWTnVPBxcz8qCCiLnebDUTFa3hJ7j6eytdxXbbDPZqlUV7o7Z%7Ey8tamFl4xRnLCktdtUHEZcT14B7xG1g8bQ3GpufDHk5SqKVIZoNIKpLfDOMYDVWekU-VapBFeum7AWU1vrfpcHwf8HM80ufahDrHEy4HrnxHfO9zAz%7EAtUS5WKnZLfVgv07OCRZDh3162UEbMtosYww__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM f9e8392380b959ea1cbec2e5966b76c7 PDF Text Text lOJ few shells irito th" French today, killing severril ""leJ"lbers of the Brosset Division). I told Colonel Kanu".'1er1'r to advise General Juin thr--t I would present an outline of the plan to you. I 1.mderstnnd that 'Napoleon I Brnnn and his planners are in a lull at the monent, and I am sure thtt they will be r,ore than ea~er to play with this latest scheme. . "General Juin still has Cf.FRANO as his obj,•,ctivee He .h1:1s no evidence of any weakening of' the enemy resistance in that sector. If, however, it should collapse and the ~ighth Arny proceed up th('! valley b"'lfore the French crossed into the ~ighth Army zone, General Juin will stop the lrd DIA and place it in corps reserve. He is going to place the Brosset Division in cor:rs reserve tomorrow anyho-v,. The Vrench would then have two divisions advr.ncing to the northwest, the Dody Division in tbe direction FASTENA-GASTRO DEI VC'LCESI, and the 4th Dt,J in the direction VALLE CX'RSA-PROSSEDI. *'I feel tfo,.t ev~rything is progressi"lg satisfactorily on this front. I regret that the K~yes attack could not be r,ade e11rlier, but I believe t,,,,at his 4q-hour balt was necessary in view· of the scattered condition of his two divisions. fersonall:r I have r,y doubts whether ½.e will be able to attack from SONirrNO on the riorning of the 26th as he nov plans. If. he estimates thAt the attack requires two RC'.::''s attacking simultaneously, I am almost certain that he cannot do j_t at thr-d:, tjme. He ~vill submit his rlan tomorrow, and as soon as it arriVAS I she.11 forward it to you. 11 ! just talked to Walsh, Eighth .Ari~y, to bring to his attention the erratic artillery fire of the Cenadians. H, has pronisl'ld to take y,roMpt corrective action, and ha.s requested that I convey sincere regrets to the French. It is true that the Canadfan armor has re11ehed the 1i'F.LFA RIVER. However, tht'l Boche still holds on to A'WINO., and Ge11eral Leese is incEned to believe that the enemy will delay at AJU:~•TO as long as possible, 1:1nd will th,..n ease out via the CASTRO CnLO-RC'CCASSCCA ROAD to the north,1est. Walsh is not at all certain thc-,t the Eightr, Army can prevent t'ds I"\ove. He says th1Jt the tanks are having hard going in the MELFA VALLEY, arid tht>t ""a:1y of then are bogged dovm. 11 The total number of prisoners taken dm·ing this operation as of ele...ren o'clock this evening is 10,715, of' which 2,350 have been taken by Eighth Army a nt"i the rerrainder by Fifth Army. * * * Al\TZIO--HAY 25, 1944-=GenerR 1 ClPrk left · his co:mJ'lland post at 08"30 to go to VI Corps where he conferrerl briefly with General Truscott conc~rning the progress of the VI Corps attack end possibility of div~rting th~ 45th, 34th and 36th Divisions to attack in a northv1esterly d1rection towerd V·~lletri and to its south, while at the same t"me the 3rd Divisioa, Spec:L-~l Service Force continue north to Valmontone, ti1e 1st Arriored Division to support both athtcks with its bulk going to the attack toward Vl'llletri. He ret'Ened to the Fifth Arny Advrmce comrn.11.nd post where he conferred briefly with Generl'l.1 Brann and left iMMediately for the v:i cinity of J3orgo Grappa where he was to see the overland juncture of II Corrs and bridgehead forces. H<'! was Pccortpanied by about 25 correspondents and photogrA.phers. '!'he ,juncture of the bridgehead forces witt tre main Fifth Army front was a momentous occasion. It. occurred fourteen days r->fter the main Fifth Army front was lal.lllch"d on the 11th of May. �[03 ? t. Gtmeral Clark return~d to the Fifth Army comriand post where he conferred with General Brann concerning the continued VI Corps .<tttack tomorrow. General Keyes a:r-rived at the Fifth Army advance command post fror, the bridgehead overland, hav:inp; come in his .jeep frort his con..111and post northeast of Terracina. The purpose of General Kl'lyes visit was to djscuss the irrm1.immt r>1ove of the II Corps to the bridgehead. General Clark also discussed with General Keyes the progress ~,a.de by the 85th and 88th Divisions. Immediately after General Key~s left, Gen_ ral CJ:9rk flew back to the Fifth e Army forward comnand post in t 11e vicinity of San r,1arco to confer with General G:ruenther. This was his first visit b~ck to confer witP his Chief of Staff since·his movement up here on May 22nd. At ?030 Gen~ral Truscott and his Chief of Staff, Colonel c~rleton, came to confer with General Clar Jr, Gen~rnl Brann and Colont-'l Howarcl concerning the VI Corps attack tor-iorrovr morning. Details of this Ptta.ck are covered in the cable sent to General Gruenther. A"'ter Genernl Truscott 1eft,Generril Clark worked on f!dministrative matters, conferred bri~fly with General Brann and retired. Anotrl"!r exanple. of ho"' slow th,. British react to the offensive spirit occurred whim Brigadier Good body, Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for British troops, said that the two British Divisions woulcl be unable ·co srift positions and participate in tre attack tomorrov1 'l)ecause tl-iey required 72 hours to move one brigade. General Clarl< orderl'!d, nevertl-ieless, that they take over from the 45th a SM.all pPrt of their front and be rrepared to f'ollow up VI Corps Pdvances to the northwest. The Frisoner of War report showed 9,018 Fi,..tr Arif prisoners as hi:iving been,) taken since the beginning of tl--ie presert al1-011t offensive. Qeneral Gru~nth.er this morning sent the following memorand1m to General Clark: 11 I have been push:i.nt; the communique subject since early tl:is rnornjng. It went to General Alexancle:r for decision ff 1c I received a CPll back a few :minutes ago that Generi'l1 Alexander desired that the co:r.,r.,uniqu"'! be issued simultan~ously at 1400 hou:n today. Trarcling states t1'nt ris rePso,n for thr>t tim..- was to prevent Ue 1cillinP, of last night 1 s co""" unique 'l i ch was releasnble on tre radio "or th~ f'5rst t:l"'!e at a:rproxhmtely 10:30 tris morning. An earli"'r rl"leA.se would prtictic8lly eliminate trose stories.. \ 1 0 11 I a,,.. l"!nclosinr; copies of th~ Co"1munique as chPnged. Grme:;_~21 Alexanfer \ felt tl~t th, comr-1.miriue as word,a,d by you gnve the jl"lpression t1'at lFrr;e forces ) ht:1d jo:nef-, wh~reas }1e desired thPt tli~ inl.tj:11 rel"ase should indic~te th1' joj.nup of patrols only. \.,.__,/ 11 ';:'h"' last sentence referrins to th1' 1 Hazarrfomi sea rout1's 11 was del"t'"'d beCPuse of en Pgreement w:i th ':.he "'fovy. Harding says thnt the '!Pvy desire8 to issue --tts own cor1nmiques. I arg,1ed ar;rdnst· that on the fsroun 1 thPt this comnm-nique wo_ ld get the big rlay and that you ~anted to sM the "!avy ;et credit. He u said he would take up the r1atter with Aclmiral Cunningram but he was quit" certain �that the Navy would not agree. If there is a change in this I shall let you know. "The report which we h::ive from II Gorps is that the jluicture was made by elements of the 91st Recon Squ.adror. nr.c1 a B:ritish Squadron in the LITTORIA area. J-i:' that is true I sugg""st that you authorize r---~ to give that inforraa- tion to AAI so that the British correspondents here can give a little pl11y to tr.e British side." 'l'he special press CO"'"'illlique 1'mnouncing the juncture of the two elements of Fifth Army is quoted below: "Patrols fro 7i~th Army I'8in front rnade contact with patrols from Fifth Arriy alHed bridgehead force in the early morning of 25 May. This brings to a cl:t:r.iax tht"' spectacular advance of Fifth Arm,v· of rqore than sixty miles in only fourteen cays. Th"'l dranatic juncture of these patrols occ 1_xrred a few niles southeas+, o i:- the bridgehead on the cof' stal highvtay- running between TT'.JL1ACrTA and A~'ZIO. Thus ~i,ftl Arny have t""Stablisht"il. lane corsrmication -riith the bricg1~'het'ld for the first tj I:'~ sirce tt"' li-mdi-'lg ~1hich was made on 22 Januery~ 1 0 "The. troops -"'ron th, ;".a" n +'ront, c-v~rcorrint:: rowerf1.:.: ene ..y r1'sistance, , hmre "cm,-,-}--,t their wa, r forwarc1 rell"ntlessly s~ nee tl e nip-ht of 11-12 May over sc:"!e of' the r·ost d:1 fficult t('>rrain of the wrole Italial'"l campaign. L 11 The troors of th~ br-tdr;eh"tvi ha~re broken tl,ro"J.gh :he porerful defenses bu:_l:. by the <'lnemy +,o rrevent tr~ br:trlgei1ea.d force · rarticipating in our Pdvance f"roM the main front. 11 The followinr; importa11t course of the day: essages v,ere received an<~ disp::•tch~d dur·inr:; the Clark to Gruenth,er. RN 14°2. 11 'fon that we have joinl'ld up, ,s2re restrictions on 'S'l.iscelfa.neons individ1.1als visiting this area apply. The one 1~oute we now ha- e te'!"porarily repaired will riot stand other than. essential traf?ic.. Do not rermit ""'iscellan~ous activiti_,..s to pile in here in rrl"r[lratio"'l for oar advance to Rol1ile. Fe n11st control trat verv car·e!'uJ.lv. 'To i ndi vj d 1als to co·,e in l,y car, air or sea without prior ari:roval from ne. 11 0 Clar}-- to Keyes. R;'J 1494. 11 I desire to cc""'m.end in 1 irr,h~st t"')-r,s tre -=,,->gnifjcent op('Jrn.tions of yo1•r co :"1and since thl"J beginnin,.; of tre rresent offensi·.re on r~ay lltl by vi' ich it cs effected Ue ,;unction 0f Fi-"'th Arm~" "lain +>o:c'ces aPl'l the Fifth Ar,y b"'achhead trocps. You hve ~:r~cuted tl,ie nission w1 th sur"'rlative ar;i;re.,,siv1'ness ~~rr•r-tn~; the fi1ht w5trout rause to a clo-:;gec' r,nd deterndn~d erL''lY, re1 elling prornrtly his re1 eu.t~d count~rattacks a"ld r~fusing to 1.e r::iela.," ,c' ('r ob;;;trL --ted. by his strong defe:rsive pot'tions, by the fatigue of your troops, by his mines and demolitions or by the difficult terrain over, which your continuous advance has been conc.uct"'cl· ::;:n driving rim back fron :;:.osH:ion to rosition you have '"'lade hi111 ray a heavy price in casualties and pr~_soners . This brilliant aC.'/an~e wLich rms ~en exec,rted co:r-:-:iruousl~~ and persiste'1tly :'or 14 days r~ 1 :;__~es~nts a :;reat victory for the rifth Ar"'-Y a-1d e;an not fail to have a najor effect r.ot onl._-r upon the Allied ca~raign in Italy but upon the whole we.r against Ger·1nn7. :I'le:oasA. conv~y ,..y conrretulations to all �l OJ the rersonnel of' vour co '111.d as e, 1 as t' "" e;q. r~ sio"1 your sp1""'1d~cl rm~ts ~n trt" Y,jfth Arr,.y. " o: . . . J rride in ra i~g Clark to J 1in. R'I :1-1-~·.'.5 . 11 : rave j•1st c'ispc,,tched to Ge11.~n-al r"yA; a rr.es sage of con7·at·1lat..:.o,,.,s on t. e r:rilliant op~rftions by hie ~r:.,..re has been ~ffe'1te:i a junction witl J.,} e F~.fth Ar .•Y beac'.1head Porces . I wis :.c, congro.tulate you and the Fr~rch T,",:;q: edj tiom ry Corrs rm t1 f'l • r if~ cert n-rnner in wl ich si'l,;e +:.} e e ,jrn;l..1, , of 01.u- present dr~ve on '"ay 11th you vave car:~ied out yow.· offersive w1 i.c • .as arle :ross~ble +'1is union o" Ue Fifti- ArB:y·forces . In your raJ hl a.,cl cc 11.t~ r. 1ous advar.ce 011 'ha e attacked continuously, stea~ily dr~ ..-::..r , ac' · the e.1e.• "lot •ithstAnai• 1; his s't~'on o.ef""~sive rosit,j ons s:i:,d ~n sn:.te o: t ,e c · ff:i-::mlt cmntA.i11.o• . .s no• n+.-r-.r t: rol_ ,'r- wl.ic' you 'ia,r h£.d to acvarce . You l:.ave rei.•mJ.,l~esly forced h~m to pay a !1eavv toll of his for n"s in t '10•1st"n'1s o"' c&sualti.!"s an<l p~:: so" ,rs . FLase trar:=.rr i+, ·::,o all the ti-•1')01 s o your 00 • a iri ry co11. ,rEtnlPtions on t' ir . Hlorous echieve, P!r.ts •hich heve cortr·· bu.ted ir snci- g-::- .at ensure to tl , FL'tl A,. r I s vi n":.or: t1nd to our rrcgr--ss -1-owar +: e libers.+io11. of Frr-.nce . T f'. err rrou~ trat tre r:·1•n:.ch r::xrier1 • tiona.ry Co,,.::-'E' j s part of l1e Fift Arr:iy. 11 J r:::e.rk to Gruenther . R'r h 2?. 11 Ju.'lction took rlace tli::s or-ciin 6 nt 1('10 lours on Anzio-rn,..rraci.11c road ~b, 'l+. 1 or iles n"rth ent c,.. norgo GrepJx't by r ::- Corr s f'm,•c-, ~0nsistJ•1g 0f "'lenents of tte 4"t .....,ng.;neer Regiml"11-':. and o" the 01st Recon:-1a.;ssance SquPdron a11c! :;;, tEisk fo:;,·ce L·orn t: e '1eachhead under co '1rd of' Co avid·r Officer nf 36tr. "::m(neer •..- · "'11t :'l.rc ,nc: ld-lnr, :r. : :. . ta"l1 r c""'stroyer e ....t"r:i11mts anc' e1e ents of tr,- recc,rp-1a.issru1ce wit of t:,e 1st Br-:.tish ·Division. Arr1.. n ,e t'::"lts seti..sfactory. 11 1-;- 7 Clark to· Gr11~:dher . R'T 1513 . 11 H8v.-. di.rect"'d I Cor-ps to a4:.tac}· PS f'ol~ovrs rrior to "loon to crro • 31"' Ji · s~ or. e11f' JpeciE>l Sf'lrv.; c~ Force rush ~ igorously fro Cori Arl"!a on a lY-10>1.t,.Yr~ j a Arte-ra, ..,}er ents l , 1 st ftr:""lored ·Di vj sion i:r1 s·1rport . 14th ard /;5th I,~ isionsa,+,tack north:vest, folk• ed by 36th Ji vision echelc11.""c'1 tor.; ,1-it reer . Obj.active r::<lr,e rn'1nin, fro CrupolJon"' ...>tt"tjon to La:riuvio . 1")t'I- o,... 34·::.h, t?S s·tu<>tion warrants , to be nrert1.rl"!t' to tur11 i,,., tc a":.ta~l- i, i ,h :rou'ld 11orth of .-11e+,r-t <'rom e::;t, bur~ of lf't Armored Divi sio:-1 in sur;ort o"' tris Attack to nort}wl"!st. B• "tisr rf'llievj11.g 45th fivis:cn sout,r of road r1:ir .... -·...,,.,; ti-roun;:r Carano. B:rHisr Ilivis::.ons to ½e rr~pc'lr""d to f'ollov.r ur as I Cor· s advancfl\s to rort,i,,w~st . Have tolc1 '9rnrn to ;,,, ,... st,i ,Fte rossib' lity of drorr.;~, 'iO<'.tth i~ Co:.li Ll'iziali nr~a ""<'rn:·n, 27th. A.;r 17.ill ]:'re,bab,y object, nu to r1~•-c cn:rid·tions . C'tl ""1-~s.., will br~r S09th in ovf'lrl['"O. or bv boet. Aho1 1t SOO p. so11 ,r"' .J:.~J. .!' in C1 ste1·nr . 0 1 DaniP:!.. t,,11:3 " tris ~ven·rg tl: at Ppp·ox.;r.nt""l 100 more tal fl\U 11 ,t Tl'?er. Cist~rri•1 e11r1 Cori. 3rd n~vis'cn rrEct~callr on i.b; o"1iectives ore r"ld t •o . S;reciA.l Sl"!r·.rice F·orce on three. 1st Ar ored1 PA.d toup-,r r,-oinr; jn the dirl'\ction of ""lletr:i . I r launching t'1"1 s new !l.tfa,ck w1tl 1111 sreed J'ORsi1'le in <'rd~r o ta},;~ t>dYDnuige of ~ r•tns ot our "rlvance an 1 in 0rder to ov~rwhe:1n tl1e enemy i.n v.l:-Pt I11'lY bt'l r ·erion·lized conditio"l at ti1e . tresel"t til'i e . Vcu can assure G .. "ral Alexen<ler t:rrt tr::s ~ s a'1 all- out attrck . I e Fre shoot ·11~ tl e works . " , __ 1 1 • I r Gru~nt er to Ac'I anM CJ . ::rn 1~5. ''Troop Carri.""r Cor ar.:'I r•rorts tr..nt ht"!a .r fla'• r,,13.l·~s 1"Prb0rour;r >1rop i.mrractic<ibl"' f'o:r ?Sth . G--in"'r[ll Cannon will a' e t"1orou~i- study o" flak situF.tio11 to arrow ~n cr"ler to settle confl·· ctinC;s . ' 1 Gru,..ntl-ier to Advance GP . R'J 7~12 . "Assu e trat no decisi.on has been roached ooncerninCT ~srac"ute ~ ou. I" • ,~ ,rronr, ae ine ur,rently.' -------.;. �~ As of this e •P-in~ ther" have been 1,357 casu.nlties Fon~ Fifth Ar~y for ces on tr."! 1)eecrihead s-i hce ti1e 1ep;inning of tre all-out offensi e '!ay ?J, 1944. Durini:: t t same reriod o" time 2, 633 prisoners of war have been tak"n in this sa"' sector . * * * ANZIO--!¾.Y 26 , 1q44--0rer1,,tiol"s Instruction #?4 1.e.s issu."d today. This dire cts I Gorps to attack to_ thi-. north!!est, c:;e~ z-= n , the rrl'lni-.:.."Rl line Lanmrio - Ca. poleo e station and fro thri.t r: r'•rPl line rress on vigorously toward Rome. The attack, as outlini-.d in this Or-.r~tions Instruction, div~rts part of the VI Corps force i'.'1. a new trr 1st northwest tol"mrd Rone . Th~ att'lck toward Valmontone still continu•s a.s in t¾e ori inal rlan Btfi'I~ALO . 1 At r915 General Clr>rk left with BrigP"li..er Goodbodv and his British aide, C1mtnin Lnnrson for tl e 1st 3:ritisr ~1ivision where he conferred with r-t ,adie.r Loewen ~nd General Gregson-Ellis, Connander of the 5tr British Division. mhe · toric o~ discussion was t:be f8rt that the 31:itiqr Div~si s w~ll play i..n tl.e attack . T!1ey are to .r>.ssif:t tl-e attn.ck 11 rusl in,:,; ~orward stro.,,_,~ co. oct petrols a11d increased fir"'s 8lo:'1~ the entire rront. Bott ~jvisions will conform to tre advance of "tre Divisions on treir ri ht . Gtmeral Clark return~d to tr e co1"111n:nd i:ost nt 1030 and hed a press conferenc~ at wricl-- ,~ or-ien-l;ed t:1e rress on the new Attack to kke :rlace later this orn~n ,. He exrlA.~n~d to thel'! that !;r is attR.clc ,as a direct threat towartl Rol'!e a:>1d tru 1 t it would e push"'d vigorously - that it WPS an all-out 2ttack and th<it h"' was shootirr, the wo1~'rs. Gt'!nl'lrt,.l ClPrlr brou rht out thf!t the German was in a bad rosition f>.nd thPt tr 1 s n""w attaC'k was launched so tbnt we do not lose nny impetus to t!-1" ,, ins already rnc>de by tr'e brid ,!'!head ~orces. ':'his attack pusr ing YJ.o.,,.th rest c~n r,ain for u11 tre hi.11h r;round 110~·th and soutl1 of Velle tri wl-iich would force the G~r:--ia:1s to withdraw fro. tr e entire area to the northwest and v :rus}1.inr1 vigor usly northward towRrd Rol"le ,e rd.r,ht craclc a svdtcb rosi tion which we knov1 to bl"! prep:'1red bet een Lake Albano Md tl-e Tiber. The press as'ked se eral questions whic:1 Gen,.,ral CJ.Fr', ansvr'"'r""d frnnkly and to the point . At 1115 Gen-,ral Devers t=irri V1'd by cub t>nd CE' ., i 1'di:>tely COJ1U'l4nd post . General Clnrk orjented General Dev~rs on and what he contenplr-ited to do as t11e ::>tt1:1 c1,(" todny rrowessed . le+'t tod4y Pt noo:>1 and ~ent direct tot~ VI CorTs co~-and post Clark 1 s to G""n!'!r~l events to date Gen~ral Dev ,:l's at Conca. General Clc--rk cmf""rrer1 with G~neral Brnnn Pnd stud.:.ed rrogress of the b~ttle in the •arly f8~t of tre a.:'ternoon and at three o'clock left for the co.Mand rost of the 45th and 1st Armored Di i~ions . !Ie discussed with tPese Division CoriManders -l;le siturtion at t eir i ..; ::ate fronts ~c" ::..eRrned first hand how the attack as pror,ressi".l.g . He r~turn•d to the co 1a11d post at 1745. Highli :hts of t:., Fifth Ar .y 1 s pror;ress toc-iy were thrt reco-rnpissance eleJ"lents had r~acPed Art.,na. Th"' 14t~, 45th and 1st J'rmored Divisions read made r,;ains or abo1 1t ,., ,ooc yarc s to tl1~ 11orthwest. T "' '3rd ;)i 1.sion anc1 Special Cervi.ce Force w~re also :--•.1shing northw,,rd. r:1-, ents o~ the '3J~d :Ci-vision were just sout.1 of. Artena . On the TI Corrs ~"ront the hir:h P,"round to the i'lest of J irerno was t.... <i.ken bv th!'! 139th In+>antry. We had r/1\connf'i•~s nee ra.trols in Sezze. In �lt 1,_ l.P the French sector some advances were Made , ,sr"lcially on the right where ele ments had passed through San Giovanni to the north . On the 1!:igrith Arf'l'y sector two bridgeheads have been established ncross the Melfa River , and tank units were rushing out to the northwest . The following important messages of the da;::r are quoted below: Clark to Gruenther . ·RU 8124. "Represent strongly to S-"ville the fact that ten cases occ11rred yesterday where.our ai:- ~ttricked our own troops in the bridgehead area . Brann ;1as offered a solution. Flease see that imr1ediate steps are takl'!n to correct th is d:lffi culty. Last night at about 7: 00 P . r.,. , eigl1t f' - 40 • s attacked 3rd Division colullln 1)e'0ween Cisterna and Cori, killing three and wounding twelve . Those ,.,,is sions 'nhich do not check in with our forward control nust keep clear, ~,ust give this place a wide herth. 11 Leese to Clark. WT 2609. "This is a great day for the Fifth Army so finely er.r-ned . On behalf oft):-,~ "":ighth Army I most heartily congratulate you and your troops . 11 Clark to Leese . RN 8170 . tions . Hany thanks . n 11 Deepl;r appreciate your raessage of congratula- General Gruenther sent General Clark t1'e following memorandum at noon today: "General Alexander arrived here at 11:15 this morning and reriained cbout twenty minutes . He was acconpanied by Lerm1,itzer . He ask~d if he could drive toward ':'-:-:RRACI'JA , and I told him 'certainly, Sir' $ Iie is i'Tell pleased with A.. f'l C. the entire situ.c'ltion, and was w:,ost compliFentary in his references to the Fift,hl. Army and to you. T explained the plan of today ' s atta.ck in the bridgehead as outlined in your radio, and as :1"urtrier amplified by yon while you were here yesterday. General Alexander agreed that the plan is a 1sood one. He stated, 1 I am for any line of' action which tre Arr·J Conw,nnder believes will offe:r a chance to continue his present success 1 • Ahout five l'.'.'linutes later he said, 'I am sure that the Army Co:mr1ander will continue to push toward Valmontone, won't he'? I \:now th.t he npprecfrtes tre r'portance of.' e:iining the 1-igh ~01.U1d just south of Artena . As soon as he captures that he ~ill be absolutely safe. 1 I assured him that you had that situation thoroughly in "'lind, and that he could de .. l');r. pend upon you to execute a viigorous plan with all the :!"ush in th~ world. I am certain that he left w:Jt}-i no r:1.ental reservations as to the wisdom of your attack. He stated that if you are able to capture the hieh .c;round north of Velletri it, would put the enemy at a serio11s disadvantage, and would practically insure the success of tl1e bridgehead attack . He j_s looking forward to his visit to the bridi;ehead tori,_orrow . 11 .i/-. "Joe Cannon called to find out the status of' the parachute drop . I advised him that Plan 1 B' was definitely off, and that you hnd SlL"IW!oned Yarborough for a cor"'"'rl'mce to c'eterrnine tte f'easibilit;r of a dr<?r in the Coli Lazzoli area . ---Joe is .,...ost eager for a dror . He sup;z~sts, A.s did St-'lville yesterday , a drop north of Rome . I told him that you had given tru:t Fiatter careful consider~tion, but at tMs noment such a mission see, s inadvisabb . Joe said that he was "1 �going to keep thinking of other possible missfons, And thl"t he vrould probably be offering lousy su~gestions :rorn time to time. I told hi~ to go ahead because you were always glad to recei-ve new ideas. 11 General Clark later in the afternoon replied to the abov-e memorandun as follows: 11 Your 1?20B memorandw. of the ?6th has just been handed to rne. I hope you have been able to tell General Alexander by t:tis V'Tie thPt we have Artena and are no doubt pusriing well on towards Vnl;,,ontone. I did not deter from sending a strong -;:...orce in that direction in compliance with his instructions. The other advance is going well. I am a. little confused as to vihether the enemy is going to ""ake a stfl.nd on the prep..,red f'OSition running east and west through Velletri. Ee must, or lose considerable of his force. "I visited the British Corinnanders this morning and urged thern to in= creased effort. I b"lieve there is only a shell in front of tbern. "Devers spoke to me th:i.s rnornjng about the parachute drop. ·I told him I was not going to be stampeded into a 1 two-bit I effort under Plan B in the vicinity of r1ount Malaina. It would contr:ibute nothing, in my opinfon, and just satisfy sor,,e of these birds who wnnt to see somebody drop~ Besides, the nir screamed 1 flnk 1 at that point. I would like them dropred on the Colli Laziali, but I can ir.',a.gine how far I will get witl~ the flak holler. Yarborough has been here, an<l I have told hiM of _my desires. They are studying it. ttrn would b'°' I can do zation. head and my opinion, to drop the handful of ~rachutists, 500, nortr of Rorie perfectly futile. I will dror thent when the situn.tion dictBtes and some good by the e:xrenditure of at least a part of that 4'-ine organiIf son"tring does not show ur soon, I will bring them "nto the bridgeuse thel"' as ground troops. T told Ile'V';l!)!'S all of this.tt Clark to Gruenther. RV 8165. 11 VI Corps just re:rorts bornb:Jnis of our tank units in the Artena area wi tM.n t:he 111st two hours. This is seriously affecting morale of our troops. They report oth~r instances have occurred today. I insist that air units wro CA.n not :identify our troops k"'lep out of this area. Please take drastic 2ction to see that this is done. 11 / At 5:30 this evening General Gruenther dispatched the following menorandum to Gent"!ral Clark: 11 I am very much disturbed to learn that the air is bombing our own troops \ again. I got in toucr with Ge"leral Sr>ville imrnedfr,tely, end he is taking every possible :ri.eans to see that such jncidents do not recur. He has forbidden all air to enter the line included between t:be following linits: Bomb line Valmontone - Fighway 6 to Rome; thence down LMa Ror1a; along the coast to the bomb · line. According to the 4 nstructions he has issued no planes will or,erate in that area except the control bv AGORif, "J"'icD is the forwrrd control in the bridgehead area.. 11 G"lnera.1 Sairille is very eager to get further details of' the Artern1 bonibing. He is thorou~1ly cooperetive in atteT1J.rt:ing to avoid it, but I get the impression that he <loesn 1t 1mo"' 'V:at to do in addition to th"l instructions he has already laid down. �t09 11 General Keyes has just left here. Fis attack in the Sezze area is going very well, and there is at least e reasonl'!ble chance that he will be on the Sezze heights by e11rly riorning. We are "'10W rla"Ylning to have General Crittenberger take over coy1rnand at 280001. · e shall know by noon tomorrow whether or not the transfer at that time is practicable, but as far as I can tell nmv it is quite feasible. Generel Keyes, will have a small advance party at your headquarters by ~ o I clock in tl,e morning in order to be oriented on the operation wMch YOU des1.re to hrw"' him 1Lndertake. 11 Your 1530 memorandum just arrived. We are rill very rleased over the pro.:;ress ,wM ch the bridgehead attack is n:'lking. "Genl'Jral S2ville f .. els thPt there is a reasom:ible chance th~t the bombing of Artena was done by an ACCR 11T mtssion. 11 Gruenther to ClPrk. R:lf 18'7. n-•aville has cancelled all Pi.neapple mission south of' Hir;hvnly 1 and Hi~hway 5, and issued orders to close down Acorn~ This is from 5: 30 memo. 11 The total casualties in the beachhead from th·e opening of the present attack to mid!J-ight tonight 1'.mount to 3,579 American a11d 199 British. Gen1'ral Juin today issued the following Order of the Day to his troops: 11 With thl"\ end of the first phase of the offensive T.Jr"rked by the total defeat of' the cnemiy who opposed us and by the Junction of all Fifth Arri.y Forces, I salute piouslv our r:;lorious ·dead, ,,.,110se n.<=tnes today, ,join in the Legnnd, tJ,ose many H~roes of our rnce wr o fell on Italian soil during the centuries of hj_story. "I express my sn.tisf'action encl grrititude to t"be troops stpffs and services who carried -'rnto battle so '1Uch courrge, faitr, intelligence and abnegation. "Rivaling with audacity, tJ.,e units o+> the Fr<"'nch E:x11editionary Forces sue .. cessfully cracl,:ed two strongly organized ene:rny positions and fought continuously and without rest side by side witr our gel lant Allies. "A deep advance wMch has already attained /,,,5 kilor,eters several ene-rny Divisions annihilated, "lore than 4,000 rrison~rs (of wrich there were 110 officers), and nuch "10re jri:rortant enemy mnteriel CR.ftlJI·ed, sue}" is th~ result, to date, of the ~J'ictory gained by the F.F..C. The echo of this vi;:tory, charged with hope so'mr'ed in the her,.rt of all r'renchme:'1 and elevrted the B.dmiration of the Allied Co"lllanders. "Another phase, ,rr:tch will tn.ke us fnr is now openinp;; the F .E.C. will continue to 1 1old hi.P,h tre> proud colors w1,ose Appearence on Mou'1t 1Majo I terrified the Gnrman and signaled his i'etreat. "For1vard always forward. 11 T1'""; HC'HR. ()V LIB~'l'I0>;,T IS '-IEAR. 11 �l1 0 A'"ZIO- -·•\V:- '27, ·19/+4-..farly -':.:bis rorn1ng 'ontill'.3 :;-lA.nes flew ov6:..' th,, port ar8a a.nd 0.rorr0.cl sol"le bo~bs . C""fice1·s ann "'18n. rtayi nf! thP c~ stle urstairs were -f'0rce{ do"ll into t 1 1e tunnel. The a;)..ert last11c:'l f'or a..,0ut Pn 1 our . Ge11eral Clar', arc-se early ancl stt'c "ed rro resc- made "'Y t:10 1,eachhe c1 +>crces durinr; tre Tl~ ,~t . There were i"lany v·sitors to trP col"''T!a'1r' post today. First to arriw, wps .Go-'1°rr,J. 'foce, G-3, .AFHQ. Be conferred vr'th Gene:N,l C Prk ,r' efly, w110 oriPnted him rr. t: e situation, and then left to visit frort li~e di.visions. A'"te:,.~ GenerPl •roce left, G~r8rf'l Sn,•·tlle caJ"B in to c'H sc'lSf' with General Clr:ci tre ~rci.<lerts wl'" d1 c-ccurred ir -rrl- ic'1 C'U~ tr.oors r.!ld beer. bC'mbed by our ovm aircra..:t. A bor. 1 ~110 wil: )e Astabl isrnd short of wr :::.c. forward .cm1t:col ca'1not Ni:rn~ t n11y bcnibing sorties. After GenArr 1 J,,,ville left Gen8ra:.s Jo11·1pon £rd Fur,A cr;1Je t, co'1..f'er witr. Genert>l Clark refcr,mce t e O'!';U}."'l'tion rf' Ro"'!? b. tl e F:i.ftl1 A1•y,y. GenPr~l Clnr'l- ~~ntE'd t0 or-tent tl1 eP1 1uic'.klv ""1r1 ra,re tl1em rre1 ared to accoFpany him -into Rc:ne s0 tl Rt re cou~_d ··Y'!mediate1_v re-''er 2."l ,Ptters 0-r ti,.,, city f'dniin-1 strfl.tior. tot er. AftP-r Gonr~~ls Johnson ['nd qumq 1e~t, General Gammell, Chi~f of Staff t0 Genern.l 'Hlson, CI {C "'editerr~n'3an Tl:9<1.ter, arrived to vi. it t. e two British Div::.s::'..011s in Fifth A.rry Pr>d tc corfer briE'fly with GP,nPrl"l Clark. ~e Wf!S acco~pan-led by rigRniPr mronpson. At 101(' General fl.lexander prrived Pccr'"'~nind by Gorerrl GP non aYJ.d Bri.gad i.er 1 •cirreri.n~. General ClA.rk or:· entBd GBnerr- 1 Alexann.er a11.cl Ge'."leral Ca"l't'lon 1Jriefly on events to dP.te at tl:-E' 1,eccl ead front, and the party left , imnedj ately' b•r jeep for tre VI Corr<'! c0"':mand no'1t rere tl.ey con''erred with GenP.ral 'T'ruscott . From tr e VI Corps cor>1mRnrl ,-~st the rarty ;ent to Cisternn . Tre to,m vas comrJ etely 'l~eclred and in s am'-ilo. • Abandoned arc destroyed GerTan 0quirnent were strem on the roarlsi'.ies, , ·' ,.,T".mu..."li.tion wt>s abPndonen . Tre scrme WBS t;,,'J;'~cal of' many areas f'rom 1,1c:b thP Gflrman hfl9 bee11 driven by t '1e Fift1 Army. From c:ster'iR t' e rart went to tre 45th Division comT".and post to rliscuss tl e sitwtion on tre:r front. Fror- the 4Sth I..ivision cor"'lft.no rost tre YJ.ext stop was the 1st Armored D~vi.sior vrrere Generc-1s Ckr'I" and. Alexander discussed w.;t1, GenAral PPr,.,,on thA 1st f\I'Jrlored e"forts rdnce tl e beac head Pt tack e ,an. The 1st J'lrmored was in thP rrocess of regroupinr, foinr, back into rear areas in rrerPrA.tion "'or an all-out attac1:: next 'kmdey to:ward Rome. Fror the 1st Armored com.mand post the rarty went to tre: 5th British Division and frori there to the 1st British Divjsion . ~eneral 'lexander an➔ h~s rerty left iT'1111ediPtely upon treir r8turn to tre Fi.ft Army adw nee com11and rost +>or AAI Headquarters in c~serta. GenP,rr,l 1 Cl1'1.r1r c P,cide>d to. i'ly bPc' k t ,8 iftr Arrv corlr'end post in t fl vicinity of San •rarco in order to d::: scuss with his Chief of Staff , Gen8ra~ Grui=mther , 1.m:rorta:"lt mritters concerning the II uorr,s a11.d Frm,c}, Corps "rents. He wished to discU~8 in pnrti cu1t"r w~ tr GP-neral Juin tr e rossil)ilities of send~n~ up a Fren-JJ.1 Division to tl e beE!ci he11d to assist ·i.n rushin~ on into Rome. Re also wi=mted to P.xpeditP. f' move111en-f; of r::: Cor-rs to tre beac1'.hevd f'roT'1t "in cr der to utilize II Corps Headqu.:"'rters in a drive towi.rd Rone . He intends to fly back tonorrow T11orn-1.nr, P"'ter these d.! <Jcussions take pltice . ~ ~ �ll l Hir:hlights of todAy 1 s battle progress were HS f ollons: Limited P dvances were rrede by the 45th and 34th vivisions Pgainst determined GermPn resistance . The 36th Division had relieved the 1st Arnored :-Jivision, and the 3rd Division had rushed "1ore of lts units up into tre _~.rten.a area. A new task force was formed, called Shepherd T2.sk Force, wliicb coi-i.s:i.sted of the 15th Infantry less one battalion and with one b;:ittalion of med.i.um hmks . Its mission is to attack vigorously tovrard. Valmontone and seize and hold that locH.li ty. On the II Corns f'ront Sezze had been occup7ed and rdvrinces were made to the hi.gh r,round. further to the northeast. In the French sector, although prof:;ress was slow, some advances were made . On the Bighth Army front the 5th Canadian Brigflde hr d tA.ken Geprano and was pushinc• forward on a new objective to tre northeast called Pofi. The seizure of Ceprano by the Canadians will relieve to some extent pressure on the French r:l1ht flAnk rlong the Sacco River o General Clark's notes on today's Pctivities are as follows: "As I have often indicf'ted, the direction of etteck assigned me for the Anzio effort vm.s in the direction of Cori - Valmontone . This w2s due to a long-standin~ , pre-conceived idea by Alexander , instigated by his Chief of Staff, Hardin~. It was based on the false -premise that if Route //6 were cut at ValmontonP a German Army would be annihilated . Tris is ridiculous, for many roads lead to tl-,e north +'ram Arce, '7rosinone and in between. I was forced into this attack, but it had a 6ood feature in thrt it took Cisterna and gr:ive us the o½servation in Ue area of Cori. If the going became tough on Valmontone I could shif't the weir•ht of my attack to the northwest . ::xactly this has happened . All German troops "ithdrawing from tl--e Cisterna area have taken a position between Velletrj and Va lmontone . This area has been reinforced from tl e Britisl" ,"est flanl· ~rea and b;· t½.e Her:mi->n Goerin~ Dj_vision. Once we advanced to Valmontone it would be difficult to turn west ~n road via Route #6. Cornri,.mications alone would r1ai:e this impracticable . I therefore directed VI Corps, as indicated in Operations In"ltruction.#24, which is quoted below. The attack is pro':;I"essin~ slowlyo We will hreak the Fnction Line to wrich he is withdraw:i· . .,., and 1rre will ca.pture Rome. It i.s just a question of time now . 0 , . t1The j1mction of the two forces day before yesterday was a grand event for the Fifth Army. It completed a si.xty- mile drive through the mountains by II Corps with two newt:' . S . Divisions . I had to be on hand for tre official Junction . It meant more to me thrin anything since our success P.t SPlerno . I have now ordered II Corps into the beachhead with ' t} e view of putting t,"O corps into the attack with an all-out drive to capture the Colli Laziali area w}ich mean:c:: the early fall of Ro,,,e . It will be desperate figJ,ting , but I must maintain the impetus of 011:r attack and take advantage of the remornlized, shatterecl condition of the enemy. Fifth Army alone has captured over 10,000 prisoners in two weeks , kill0d ano wounded as many and destroyed great qu;e,ntities of enemy equipment. The enemy will have diffic11lty mriking a deterMined sta11d wHh l1is hodge- podge mixture of units against the trrust of the Fifth l\.rmy. 0 11 1st Armored Division ' s efforts were not success.ful yesterday, due to great resistance Mouth of V9lletri and poor tank terrein. Truscott has put 36th Division in ~ts place , regroupinr, Harmon in order to c1rive in the 45th �l l 2. Division sector wrere the terrain is better. ThPt shoul1 t~ke plRce tomo~row P.nd lT\PY break th0 c~mel' s back. nr _ave continually telked with my British Co...,,,.,.an.ders in an e-f'fort to en~r~ize trP.~ ~~to Pn Attack. There i9 Po P~tac left in them. Tre 5th Division· is poorly led by Ge~ern.l GrP, ,9on-"";ll is. :re h~s no oNensive 1yd.rit . Brit;Pd-· er ;,oewen, wlio has iust 1nen put in co:r.rnpn<l o-" t 11e J:st Division is better, alt 1oup:h new <>nc: yo,mg. I f'TT\ sure l-ie dll rus:-1 fo:t""Tard witr :iore vigor. 11 1 Import~nt nessa ,es of the day Freas follovs: General Gruenther this r,iorninr; dispr>tched the following nemorandum to General Cl~rk: "Four dPys p ,o I took up A.t;Pin with AAI the question 0:f speed:lng up the arr:vBl of tre J.<'1l8nce of tle Qlst Pivision. I vas advised that they are still scheduled to Pr~ive rere ~hout June 15, ann that this date can not be adv~nced. Yesterday: spoke to GenerPl AlRXP~der E'~out it, and hP, sai<l r.e certPinly agreed that we needP,d it row on' th<>t he woulr do everytl-dn he could to get it. Last rie1 t re sent a !'lessage to Al.,.,HQ !"""'kb, "!:.re request. :::: Gfoke to G~inel aho11t it 1est nir,ht anc' he saii t! Pt --1;1 e instructions fron the Combined C' ;efs of Ste.-i--"" conc0,rninc- tre cover r ln~ 1 ere so de"i11ite t}'f't le r1oes not soe how it ~n ossibly 1:-e r ade evailr-hle to us Ft t' ·is t5m 0 • All o-" t rt, I believe, is 1baloney 1 • I su,;eqt tl-iet you tak~ the ~atter up wit~ GAner~l , Alexander todny and A.lso dt: 'foce anrl Gn1mel. Inc.; rlentr,lly, L"'nmitzer st::-tes that it is his uncerstandirrr thFt the balance of tl e 91st vill not leave forth Africe 11..11--l;il June 15; :!n fnct he is 1ui.te cnrt~in of thE!t. Hovever our -inforrztion :is t½at it will arri. ve here Junn 15. 11 G8ner? 1 De·:ers ca 11 ed 1 ti st n.; rt to 8tate th, t ' e shall get -:. e 517th Parachute RCT as or:: t(~E.lly plenned, but t-i-Ft o'IT ~eq'1est fo.,.. tl:o 5"i0th Glirler Bn eni the '551st Ferachute ~"l will ½e d.; rPpproved. I tMnk th=it these units are to be tr~in"'d for 7tl Ar~y use. I suggest t Ft you Plso <li~cuss this nQtter wi. tb ./1 le:xander, Gm,mel t:ind i'oce. P. s you ~; 11 reme"'lber t:ra 517th "'s e :ng ,ive:'1 ,o us to 0btain P :rnri..o 1 of h:1.ttl e-qier :nnce. "t seems to Me tb1t the sarre ar"1.L'ilent ~roulrl 1.1n-r.l for t1-- ~ S5Ctr f'n -J. t' o '.>5lst. 11 GenAi."a1 Ale:ia>nc'er ,~ 1"' derf'rt c::h0rt:.y <ifte,.. ! ~ s c,"lf'eri=:rce. Le.I"" estiT"'atec:: tl--iPt tl1e der 01 rtl're t,•,.,,, will be 10 o 1 cloc·'"• Cannon will be v:,·t1 1 i!'1 bu-s it haa not -yet be3!' c'eci.rlerl -i-:r f>t P,r or '10 4; ~1[,rr"'rir-<; vrill be ··1 -tlin Jcirty. "I ta""',.P,d to 'i~rhorou a'1t Idr~s 1':'"""oor Ct>.,..rie:r Cor"lf11d) .,-este""'ri<i.7 f'f,errioon Pbout tJ:-e, Coll:i kzzol· dror. '!'le' ~re cP.rt1.11.n:y "lot ent1,·1c;'=<:i.sti.c o er t e ros ... ect 0"' dror~i.r , ·ln t 1Pt area. "I ha e just veri ,.iP.d t' ~t de}x'r Africa f' ho·1-t -Ju"'e 15th. 11 1 -ir~ ff'te. L8rr. i.s ri '1t. ThRY sail .p,,.o:-, •rort A report rrom G-? today nulTl~er~d the rrisoners as 0-P ?100 ~6 r~ '1,850 taken by Fifth Arn;~ R•y' 3,?lt tn -,n y =·i ,hth Arny. As o.p '100n today 1,B43 Amr,r~.car bat+, 1 e cas·ta lt~ '"'S been ad,itted to osr~tf'-~ ~n t e rz·o are&. . ~ · ·. ' . ,c •< .. . ~ ... .. . _ F'1C rs "l~ B:--itish ave �1 l3 Gei19ral Clari.. this afternoon sent the followinc T'."enorandum to General Gruenther: ttGertainly hav-e bee·'1 bomb rdec=t with hrass h.0o.ts today. Believe ::e have st:::a~ r;hte'1erl out tl'e nir contro,1 9rsy with S8ville . He will tell you, of course . tiave he'ln all aro'r.'lrl tbe fro:1t »r:ltl1 Alex, and l e see'!"ed neetly f please.:: er"1 ,,e·('y flatteri''lf; i r H s rci:rn::ir 1:s of Fift1,, Army., I a skec1 },im to } prod t!-1.e two BrH:l sh Div~ sio:rs, ahic) 1~"'! did. le ere making prc,-;ress with 34t:1 a 1d 45tr. . '1:'re.r nig1·t cc '1Cei'7'!lt'llur 00 on tr8ir Carnroleone JtPtion Laninrio objef!tive toni 11t hit l1P~re ._;us+, seen Faul Faschal ur forwarc' , and he t½.inJ.s not . T' ,1~e :l s st:::-ong opposi tior, ,: n tre wad dies ..,rom machine gux1s , self- propcllec Y'lOU'1ts . Trcse are p9r: ar s d9la;v:nr- dc,t,wh"'lents ,+ile the mai'1 h')cly r;oes back tc tle T'nction Lin,~. The rressure 1,y 34th and 45th st..o"J.l:l out-;riaY19 1 1vc,r tie G9r,"12ns -'11 :'ron+. 0:' t' e :st and 5th '"'1~-ttis 1 :8ivisio·'13 . 1st ~r~ t · .J, is pus:.::.11..-r on in confcrmit.l ith Birdie I s ndvance . 1 0 4 l 1 0 11 Just received your not-3 rc,com.11end:5n~ ··nlease of II and VI Corps . What ·i 1s1-,irrscl :fuJl" recor-mendation·1 I :,a7e had it in :mind and intenJ to do it, 1-m-i-, I ju::t wonderc,d : f bJ any cLrnce JeVf'lrs Lad discussed it. Tte :Jecretary of Har all·eady announced the II Gorps, so Keyes is al1 eady ir. t~1e clear . .,,ruscott I s nane 'ms l-ieen released as co:r:n1andin~ a forr-1ation, and as soon as h~ Las r:m1pleted a phase of his attack .,.. intend to corT1E:md him and the 'ifI COl],S and ther announce it, but I do no;:, t0el that his o::.s.rpl.oits 1 12.ve 1 188!" sufficiently outstandh:, yet to warrart +hat coT'lmondation. Yo·u. know 1 ha7e always waited 1.n1til soret} ::ng l:'as reall,t happened before : conne'·1d . Incicle11tally, I discussed with Alexander the releasing of ..:..loan and Coult:r vcitl t' 8 :numbers r/: their divisions . Follow up . It wo,1ld be a great 11oost for training norP.le in the 0tates . 1 1 > HAn1 letting Don cori.e do,vr1 fo1~ h.is Sat111~c1a~r n::.r+~t . Ile will be bac]{ i.n tl'e 111orn~ ng. I may conceivably "'ly down lrater l',u.t rrobably v·ill not . There 'is notl ~ng oim; on l er") of a sensational nature . 11 C' Drniel 1s Affort to cut ac1·oss to Valnontone h8s been held up , due to some clean5n~ up of 'Jocl,e in tL., Arte11a area . ]e l"opes tc send the 15th In<''antry, less one ,1.s.tt&li·'J,1., and witl1 a 1:xitt.alion o-P tan-;cs, td 1 s and eri6 i \ 1ers, to c11t tre roed to Valmo"ltone to11ie;ht . It will a lmzardous task . ½e t1: have ',een 't'ery leni~nt in perr-,~ t ting r eople to cone ur here . I spol~e +:.o Alex "'bou4:. it and said 1e must TT'a; nte ir. tl e rr-lnciple th.ot no one ca'1. -:;ome witl:cut n1y 11.utLo:city. ,!hen th· bi,; 2.ttac'lr is on here for Rone, I will +;ry to s1 ut dcwn except for Alex if he ins:: sts on coning . HHeve ordered Johnson and Hu.me to bring their gan,:, up . As the time shortens 1,ef'ore our ent:r-ance to Romo, I rmst h2ve 8ccess to those people ns questiors cone up . Tliey will nove t 1 0i:;:· 7,00C stront:, outfi.t ir. to an area des: ::,1ated by Brann, yresu.rnably e.round Li ttoria . "fith Don away tl is evening, I will stay here and may fly down tomor~ row and get a swim. H G·ffriern.1 Juin today issuec tr·e follovd·11; ;11emorand1:u;; to bis cownanders: fl �l l4 111. The G2rerRl Corr.'01rncFng I"re 11ch Expect-· +.ionary Corps 'ms been shocked by the compla;11ts made by 1• • ".G . relAtive to tl""' attitude of certain elements o+' ..-:irPncL Troops toward the Italian popui:-.,+,ion in the course of our recent advFnce . Acts of br5 p,ndar,n have bee11 cc"'lmitted . Armed roo Jery and rape hl've rous-sc~ the people vko 7 i ve in forward areas and Wl7 o are cot1plaining l-i+,terly to tre Lill fod autror:1..,_ iAs . Tl'-ere is cause of course to make allovrances f'or exaggeration, but sue) fncts rim the risk of d-'Lscr9dit~ --:r:; an army Fhicl: is composed pr:iJ"'larily of Colonial troors . · 11 2 .. How8V'er strong 0 11r :eelinr;s 17ay he ar,ainst a nation F 1 ich treache rously betrayed France, we must m8:n~Pin an attitude c~ di~nity. T 18 :-'rend~ army hes gain9d the respect of e~:eryore on the Ital:._an battlefield . It should be easy to cement t>is rerutatfon by adopting a correct E'_ttitude in ,1 con.::pered country toward n. people who are experiencing at tris ~10111e 01t t1'8 t'1ost terrP)] e horrors of Y!ar .<>nd •rhose lot is pitiable in the e:,res o:: our ollies w} o are charged w:it':1 the edmin5_stretive resronsibility. 11 3 . Divisional Oor.-illm.nclers nnd the Commandinr, Ge 1eral of tre Gouns will take forthwith all tJ--.e necessary sters wrich are required to rut an erirl to all acts w}i.ic11 are detrimr-mtal to tr e morr le ri.nd :,l,e di ';lli ty of the v:tctor . 11 1 Operations Instruction #24, issued yesterday, is quoted below: 11 1. The enemy forces orrosirg the beachhend offensive in the CI3TER 1•TA CrYJ.I Area hl've been decisively defeated . The ber,clthead and main :!:'ifth Army forces :bave _joinerl . Tr.e. overwhelming success of the current bc..,ttle mr 1:es it possilJle to continue Operation BUFFALO with powerful forces and to launeh a new attack alonrt, t:1e most direct route to RNiE. 1!2 . 'Jot later than 261200:S J'Iay, VI Corps will attack to seize initi.nlly the 1;eneral line LAUF\TIO - C:' Il'CLEff\JE Station an¢1 from that general line press on vigorously on RC' •E . PlaPs +'or this operation ,d.ll include an attack (on Army Crder) generally +'rom the area of LA\TfJVIO to s9ize tl'e COLLI LAZIALI mmmtain mass . Boundar:1 es : Boundary between VI Corrs and 1 Inf'antry Division (Br) F g193OO ,_ r 010310 - F 892334. ether oundPries no change . 11 3. 1 Infentry Division (1'.3r) will by first Eght 26 May relieve the 179th Infantry Regiment . Acturi.l time at ,,,, ich 1·espons~bility :t'or thi:3 sector will pass to 1 Infantry Di vision (Br) by agreerrent betwP.en Di vision Comr-1anders concer11ed . lhen VI Corps attack is launched, 1 Infantry Division (Br) will as = slst the P.ttP.ck by push:ini; forward strong combat patrols and by j_ncrePsed fires alonrs the e 11tire front . As VI Corps attack advrmces , 1 Infantry Division (Br) will co'1form with the a<~vance . 11 4. 5 Infantry Division (Br) in its present zone of action will assist �\l5 the attack by pushing forward strong combat pntrols and increased fires along the e~tire front. 5 Infantry Division (Br) will conform to the advance of l Infantry Division (Br) • 11 * * A1TZIC ... -MAY 28, 1944--After conferrinr; with Genera.l GruentJ,-,er during the morning at his forward command post at Stm T1arco, General ClPrk flow brwk to hi~_ advance comr1and post in the vicinity of Anzio and arrived there at 1430. , He went into an immediate conference with General Brann concerning the continuation of the attack from the old bridgehead ::ront. II Corps comm1:md post has already been movec1 and is now located about tr.ree and a half mjles northeast of Cisterna. II Corps will take over the 3rd Division Reinforced, Special Service ,;,orce and the 85th Division, 1.1'.J'hich will be moved up immediately with other attachments. The attacr,wmt order is quoted below. II Corps will be charged with the responsibility of attacking northward through Valmontone and attaining the hish ground in that vicinit:r, thereby cutting Highway ,¥6 and preventinrs its use by the Gerrr.ans. It will then cha.n~e its direction of attack to the northwest toward Rone, seizing tind holdin1; the high ground 1mown as the Colli Laziali and then continuing northwest toward Rome. The VI Corps , will attack in the morning, employing the 1st Armored Division and pushing its attack to the northwest and south of the La~o Albano ~rea towarc Rome. At th5 s moment what the German reaction will be is not definite. Genr'lral Clark's intentions are to push these attacks vigorously so that their thrusts go to the north and south of Rone respectively, thereby isolating and bypassing the city itself. 'fuether or not the German intends to fjght in the streets of Rome is not lrnovm . It is improbable, however, thPt he will do this. General Keyes came to his advance corimand post to confer with General Clark concerning the new operations that II Corps will rmdertake. After supper General Clnrk flew back by cub to hfa forward comrriPnd post to confer with General Gruenther. He will hPve Generr, 1 Juin at his comr1and post there tomorrow at nine o'clock to discuss the movement of a French Division to the ,1ew II Corps front to assist in the attack toward Rome. General Clark also will discuss with General Cannon while there his contemrlated use of the 509th Parachute Battalion. He was very upset by a suggested plan of General Cannon to use the 509th Faracrute Br.tt2lion in a crop to assist the ad .. vance of the Br~tish Eighth Army. General Clark wishes to ta.lk with General Cannon concernin~ this and frustrate any notions wldch have been o:r might be taken to use the 509th Parachute Battalion in a fruitless and westeful mf,nner. General Brann has been working on plans for a ,"1rop of this battalion north of Rome but tl-e tine has not arrived yet where such a drop is feasible., The rJ' Corps ha.s taken over the old II Corps front and for the time being• after the 85th is attached to the II Corps, will have only th~ SB-th Division. The 91st Division, :Vhen it arrives in Italy, will be moved up under IV Corrs control. Highlights of' today's battle pro~ess were as follows: The 34th and 45th Divisiohs had moved forvrard about tr;o miles. This forward movement enabled the British to tnke C8rroceto on their north flank . Pl?.rts of the Unction Line have already been pierced by this attack. Velletri is not yet in our hands. �On tl-e north of the VI Corps f'rcnt the '3rd )iv~"lion 1md Spec':il Service Force ha e pushP-d Pbou+ r1ile ::iorth o+' Artenc. On t1ie IV Corps .-f'ront tl.e 88th Division conti..nued :lts attack northwest thro 1gl' tre nounteinous terrrin. The French were rushin~ steadil northwest and r.ad kkAn Villa S. Stefano and Y,iount '1iserno. The,- hrd also occupied Crstro Dei Volsci and 1bunt :Jero south of tre ('1>1'lcc0 River. '.:.'he EiGhtr Arny rr:ade some a:i:vrnces ',vest of Ceprrno. 1 Important messa;es of the d~y are as follows: General Juin tod, y sent tre followin nemora.nclum to Generrll Clark: 11 T1·e U::ip;l tr /i.rmy ..,s crossed t' e Lir:i 11iirer Pnd -ts c1.eboucrin towar•1s Frosino11e. Liaison 'BS been estAhlisl1Ad w-i_tr t e Anzfo Br-idgehead Forces. T1 e ~irst ~r~se of tPe battle 0f ItPly is nor ondin~. nrn a very ahort whilf', should we cc,ntinue on the same several axes, a l:=irge number of' d"'visions will f'ind tlemselves l'1P'3sed in front of Rome, or, in ot <"r words, on an extrenel nPrrow f':ro11t, poor in col"l!l'unicr-tions. 11 TrP.re+'orc, it is irnrort~ nt t'l-i t f'rom no·, on everyone I s mission be clei:1rlT cletcrr-ined i.tl 111 t' e "r?menori.;: of the Army i=ind the Army gr-ours o;err-11 P1aneuver; other ise, ti--0.re would 1--ie "the risk- of a te .... ft-le congestio11. o:: ~t~norari0s which 1 ould cri·ise f:' coTiplete 1"'-c1· o_,., po•1er nf"r'inMt l'n eneny ,·hose onl ~ 8illl is to ~r in ti.'!TJe. ri A 0 clecision rust t eref ere be nit1de soon. 11 Concern:n.-, the (j_.,.,., 'it -l"ollom-s t' e sc•ut½ern ba11k of t1 e -iricco from S,,-vi l'-i_o,ranni to r~ount 3iserno. Tomorrow t:1e CEF will bP in front of Ceccano and therP- buttressin, itself towards the west nf"E'inst the AYJ.zio fm:•ces anC: the Fourth T• . J. Arrv '":orps ' ill only be able to ·ait for the Eir,;btl-- Army axed on roari 16. "Orders hn e been ,brer for tr e 2~tl i'i'hic srould 1 ea.d tre CEF west of the .,,,r·or:iinon":! ljne of corrr"1mication between rrossedi and Tor-acella. 11 It lws not bAen -noss':.blo to moJre rlAns for t' e ?9+,b and PS tLi11 ,s now stnnd onlv P. secondPry oreration ~-s eing thou-r}1t of w ich would hve ns its goal t. e freei"lg o+' t '.e road Jri ·erno-r1ontelanj co. 11 IYJ. riy opinion jt would be desirable tl1 '1t from Frosinone on tl e left, of tlie '"::i~ th Army +,ake t!-.e rrerPrBl direction Sub8:1co-Rieti.-Terni ard t:bFt the left of the CJ,;? orient itsel:' on t' e axis frossedi-G1'lvignano-Tivoli Pnd "'rom there FPJ-:e tts way to Ve 3abine J--il:!..s . 11 : tl 1 A see the followin~ ad~rintr ,es i.n t is a~rection: "l. Should there e a lest battlA f'or Rome in t'l-ie gap of Velmontone c:;;:r,' couB t'ien be used -l"cr a n.rmkin, Pction erist of Vnlmontone. Ti'or tre fo :J owi11, O},era-1;~ ons rnd the y-ro ,ressior tmwrds the north, j1e G'•'?' uouJ<i t'bus nnd itnelf agnin in its ·10·,,n,'ll nos.;+,ion in tle nourtains 11 2. a,;,, . . �to tl·e east of the Tiber. 11 As of midnight toniePt the total battle casualtiAs since the opening of tre offensive fron tbe Anzio area amount to 4,458 AMorican ~nd 357 Britisl:i. Frisoners of war since tre beginnin; of the all-out offensive on the night of 11-12 Hay- total 11,030 ta1rnn by Fii'tl:: ,Army and 3,2Q5 tA.ken by Eighth Army. * * * A!JZIC-~MAY 29, 191.4--General Clrrk flew bl'lck from Ms forward cof"mand post at Ban ·t<i.rco to his ad.v<1nce co!""rr.ard post :'it Anzio r-t eleven o 1 clock. .t11s mornin, was s:rent co11:t'erri.nr; ,,1.::th Ge'1.Crr> 1 C'rrne"'1th<ir, ]1~ s Chief of Staff, General Juin, Fwmch Corps Cor,mander-, 1:1nd '1en.ernl Alexnno.er. Upon J:iis return to the ad,r nee crrnmand rost, '1e received 3ent<>r::i.l 1 ilson, CorinPnd:i.n; Ge-1er~l of IRS, concernin~ move:n1ent of the bAse section Dfter Ro1'1e is taken. · /\fter Gener.<il Wilso 1, he rec~i ed Colonel Gray, his JAG, a1d reviewerl ten ~en8rHl court martial cases. After lunch Generfl Cl?rk receiv0d v~ce Air •~rrshl"l D'Albie.c, Deputv to Ge"\1,,,,...,,1 Cannon of TAF. ::n mid-rfternoon Generrl Cln.rlr left by jeep for the advance command r,ost of' thP, lst Arrored :JiYision where he cijscussed prorress o-f' tPe tanv battle. Forward elenents of tPe tPnxs had arrived at a line just beyond Valle .Ariccia and Cnmroleone. Tenk losses have been rat.er heavy. mhe proir.ress of' the tn."1i-s h1d been steP.dy a:rd f8ster t} an the infant,.,.y l"nd l1r-rl nrorrresserl A. considerable rlistrnce tieyon--1 the ~nf.,,ntry. General Clar1r was very ?r.cdous t•.rt tlie _.nfn.ntry elemerits 0+: tl e 45th and '34tr 7i dsio1s 1-:,e pus' ed .('orwar·d, o~cupy imc'! hold tl'e H ) TOU110 alrerdy tPken by the tan'rn. J'e d-1 scusc:;ed rri. th G0,11errl rl"rmon ruture ~ctions nnr t?nl:- tLrusts to the rorth,·rest. On his way bl:'c',. fror: t 1e 1st Armored Division cormf'.nii rost General Clnrk otorped General T.JutJ.:,r, ,..erutv Corp~ Commander, VI Corps, Pnd discussed t11e pushin of i'lf2.ntry elements up to the Osco..r Line. Fe also sto·c,ped General Fasc 11al, Assista:'lt Division Commn.nder of the 45th ::Ji-.rj sion, who was r;o-;n~ forward to see Gern~r,l Har!"lon, and talked wi..tl-i ri-rn n.1:>out this same '~atter. General Clnr::<: returned to Ms comri.anrl post at fi, e o I clock a.mi found his Chief of Staff, Ge'1eral Gruentrer, ~,ho 1rn.d flovm up -"rom the i'orwArd commri.n<l post at San ~rco. GeDer::i.l ClFrk :.ren tent into imnodir:te conference with Gn.:rf!rDls Mruscott, Keyes, Gruenther 8Pd Br"'-nn. Tris conference wF:s called to coordinate a cortinm,tio:".1 o+" the attacl< by II and V'I Corr s. This attack involves additional , ttacJ,mEmts to tbe II Corps t::iken "1~om tre IV Corps +"ront. The order issued to cover these attacrr.ents is quoted below: 11 1. Eff'ective on i.ssurrption of' comrand ~n new II Corrs zone of Pction, the follovrinr, units r.re re1iev-ed from f'ttrc ment to VI Corrs and nre attached to II Corps: 3rd Tnfi·ntry Ji.vision 4L~lst A..4.A AW Bn (ST) 6olst Tank :Jestrover Battalion Howze Task •orce 13t~ Arnored Reg~ment (- lst nnd 2d Bns and Ren Go) �118 Det 16th Armored =n~:neer Battalion Det 47th Armored Medical Battalion 751st Tank Battalion (-Companies A and D) Company A, 805th Tank Destroyer Batta.lion 84th Chemical BAttalion (Htz)(- Companies Band C) 1st Special Service Force 463rd Pr>.rachute FA Battalion (- BHtt8ries C and D) 24 Army Field Regiment, R.A. 36th FA Battalion (155mm Gun) Det (one 8 11 gun), 698th FA Batt1:1.lion ?. E+'fective 2900018 May, the following units ?re relie'1ed from attachment to IV Corps anc1 are attach2d to II Corps: 11 760th Tank Battalion 776th Tank Destroyer BA.ttalion 105th A.u.A AW Battalion (SP) 2d Chm'1ical Battalion (r-rtz) Headquarters and Headqunrters Battery, 6th FA Group 59th Armored FA Battalion ( 105mm SP) 93rd Armored FA Battalion (105mm SP) 11 3. Effective on arrival ft TfZ'O, the following units ere att['ched to II Corps. 361st ROT 361st Infantry Regiment q16th FA BattaHon Company A, 316th Medical Battalion Company A, 316tr Engin9er Battalion 517th RCT 517th 1 arachute Infantry Regiment 460th Parachute FA Battalion 596th Airborne Engineer Company 11 4., Effectbre on assumption of command in new zone of action, the following units are attached to II Corps: 91st Reconnaissance Squadron (- one Troop) Headqm1 rters and Headquarters Battery, 36th FA Group 932d FA Battalion (8 11 :riow) 937th FA Battalion (155mm How)". Important messages of the day are as follows: General Gruenther sent tle follouing memorandun to General Clr1rk in tbe early afternoon: itGeneral Hn.rding just called up ~rom Eirsl1t1' Army 'N1C and str1ted that the Commnnder-in-Chief has no 1 considered carefull:r your proposal for the French to ndvance on "'erentiro, anC: thence '1.orthwest nlonr FicJ--.vff'Y 6 to..mrd Valrriontone., He weJ comes vOill' proposal to advarice on :'.i'erentino, but }1e c'esires to rqake it 0 �clePr t½f't the F'iftr Armv -u"'t Jree:r t1 e Ferentino - Vvl~ontone Ro<><l clec.r for t' e use of th~ ~:.(!bth "-rrv. I tole' Yard~ nr; ~ '°t "'s "EJr P s - could "'ee , t .is hd t' e e"fect o-r co"1pletely nullif. in w' ,,t GenerP.l A:exawler "d tolr" you this '"'10rni11 ,. i-Ie rer-li-ed, 1 -o, tl-r>t i'3 not true . He ,•_11 be 7er,y r,lPd to 1 9Ye tl-e Fre11cl1 l'lnvrnce on F'ere~tino. He conc:;ide-•·s t,h.-.t ~uc [l :,o--e wou~d 1 p• e the e ,...f'ect o, '_elrh1 ~i 'it ! rm alo11F . But ' e noes in ... ist tht thR ro"'d from ,.,erent~no to 'J'l"lmonto'1.P. muc:. remfl;n c,e"r for t' e "3j ,:htr Prny. Ctl er 1ise it rri. t ',e irro"sible to ,..,r·11, t' e .,.,i ht' Army ~o "'enr ~n t 0 bPttle :'or J.ome. 1 1 e srent ten m·11utes ar 1..·~rin; t P. r,a+ter bee)-' pffl fortl, l:>ut F~rding, in tre nf'.me or Gn•1err 1 ! le""ffindP..,.., stood f; rm. Fe d.: d, 0 eve.,.., Rdd t :! s statement: 1 If the Fi·"tl /rTY\Y -ts ble to cr.,.,,turP. VrJ.n1011tone, GerP.r"l /llexmr"er ,...,1t'orizes t e ~.: ftl- /lrmv to '1se r::.rr} · ay 6 i.11 the c0rti.mmt.;on of its attack on RoT'ie . IIe will +, e"l d.;vert t' e ~ir;l•t tirmy <>-!:; Vri.lr.·1'"'tor0 tor1nrc' !Flestri::1.P f'nd Tbroli. 1 1 0 "As soon as General Ht:.rc.; ,,g 'm1rr u:r T ce llAd C· rpmtier v:r' •c, of course, does not likfi tl e i.del'l of '10t ">e.;11 <>blA t,.., me T-iir-1 w::v (,. >-Ie in turn ,rro,osen . trat t 1 e T<'renc ½e allo•vecl to rroceed towE'rds ...,0.renti.no .?nn n',ter c· yturfn 1<1erenti110 tle'1 cl'O'>S }.; h 'a.r 6 ..,~rl flrlvPnce to•rprds 1-'llestri.na ,,,.:t'-out usinr,; l'.fi ;hv"l.r 6. PA "(\Y3 t nt G,~"l"'rrl Juin rJll ;"l'OlsiP"'l ,lDl'PY\tee t ,.,t 'e CPU J.<9er aheod of t18 Rrit.;st-. I:" Grmerpl Ale"":ander rP ,,,i.,.11 "ir ;n ·.::_:: dec'qi.o-'l t:b-,t vre !"Ust keep t'1e Fm-.qrtino- rpl"'o"l-:.one ror,d '!lear ~ c oubt erv ,..,uc t Pt • 9 nill allov tbe ""renc "to move no1·t <Y·.r0r "'i.l"'' WA,' 6. m•,e "'r·e11.c' r,,; 11 '1.0t j "Sue tl-e order ""'or t 1 ie Ferqntino adw 1co until to11· · t, so no ac~u~1 hnrm .<1s been d0'1e y0t. T t' jn'· t'v•t you s' oulrl direct r'1e '-,,... mn1 8 P •.,., 1orous -re"uest to be ril .,_ovrect to cont~ nu8 witl-i the plan " i c' tras Putho.,...ized b. Grmer.?l ~1P-xa.-ric1 er thj"' I"'orninP,. I sral1 a";~ i. t f'U'-S' er vord from you. 0 nlrn tc execute t e Ferent ·no acvf'nce 011 t' e norni'1 of '31 ~r-.y. GerArel FPrdin" c:tr>tes t _Ft ~t Arrnv est-im~te th,.,t tier rill capture ""rosinone tor: · t. T '; FrP>1C "lay t <1t t i.s i:_:, r11. nnt 1s::~stic nrd urn1<1rrrnted esti!"'l.te. ·1 nT 1 e Freno· 1 Gruent er t0 kod . i. ~· -;r-i ~tel"·. 11 h 1654. 11 Pove 0·1e tank 1-i::itt.,:,l'on -":;. or-1 1i're:rc 0 Gr1.'ent'8r to llood. . n~T liS55 . 11 Tirir,.,..o'1 n<"ecs ~o Frobebl·; v-'11 'n-.,.e tc tf' 1 'e L'rom 752nc' Bi:-tt~lion. 11 tDr'r to Anzio crews -i'Jl.TlJE)d·titely. GruAnth9r to 7lood . R"1 2q . 11 :s~ ue orde1·s f' ssignin om RCT ~8th Di v:i sion to '.::'I Cor"'s . Tt1'1t r,ove ,-;t1-,out c'l0lrpr. ,.,ell IV Corps t rt b~l,:nce of' di•rision :ess on7 RCT wi.11 fo11o-· soon . 11 Gruent er to -ood . •t:"i 1656. 11 "otif Frenc CPlled . ...,urt' "r rl.etni.ls w' en I retur"l toni ,;' t . 11 t' nt Ferent-ino attnc1---- is cr.n- Gruentl er to Clrrr 1r . R'J ')16. 11 149t RCT rer-cl • tr move . li ll issue order on belnnce o-r 'iv' sio-1 less one RCT tomorrov, . ?0 tan1 er •'vs vill. be t' ~re by noon ,. ""'uesdri Y' or else . m~n1,. battn lion :7ill bA •·ent ··it'.0·1t riel,, • 11 Gruenther to ClA.rk. Rr 7g5q . be sent to Anz · o ;:i_r,;in Pt t is t"rie . c-~errnnent . n~no r o 110'10 . 11 11 Gen.8ral Juin 1 esi..res He c~n riot iust·Lf'y tl f't ~rd Di~r·is~on not t1--.,, -l:;r"11ci,..er to his �\JD Genert:'l Qruent' ,1ir,11t ton-: ri:tt. "?l' sent t' e follori.'1rr Fer.-or'3ndum to Ge'1Ar;:il Cl11rk Pt r-:id- 11 1 te1ep' on8cl Gf'n ~r~::. Juin tonir -: <1.11.d tolcl J,-,-":m of our extrene di.sflproint""ent w' e'1 you le9rn8d tl: 'lt G·=mer"l A. lexm1der lrd r·econc,i.dered '1is e".rlier decisio'1 to pernr't t e f'dw1 nee of thP F'rencl Corrs_ in tl e dirnctior.. of :'8rentino, and t 3nce nort',,ve"'t 10,..•tii o ~ ~-: · · "'Y t6. I exr lni"led t0 t· nt your rl2n nov, is for tiie rime 'Jorrs to arl. •~nee to tre nort vrest v1itl in its rreset1t z0re, A'l'J.d ti-·~t PS 1con ns jt 9rr::ves 1n ~• e :-irec sout1 P-r>rit of' VPlmonton,c!, you ,·ill, i.n rill rrc )A hi. l i_+, ", PrrPn e 1,y rok or 11 crook to ' PVe it cross T-I~ "; "Ia,~ 11:6 o.n<l to cssi9t the Pttric'· of ti e 1: : Cory" nort est frc·::11 VPlT1ontone - boundf-r r or no boundflr;v. Go.,,nrel ,Juin "lbbd t',et r8 ,·ps T"Oc,t un rp to leArn t "t t' e su estion for t'1a F re1ti110 A.dvttnce }<>( ~9er rE''ecterl, '1,t +,:r,.-.t P. rould rusr 811 out in tb'> direction i.ndicated b. you, an~ t 'lt yo1 1 cou1c. .cest · rsured t' Pt you ill rec9.: e lOC''"j rerforr""'lt;e nror11 +;"" ...,renc' Corps. u 'h~, 1 0 ed t0 '·. Uvt jt' ~'e "re' '1lnr ia no"! jn pror,ress fr tle fnzio area, rou ne"'t it -'Mnernti.ve to 'a·•e •n1ot""r Civision ti-ere :. ""''3di ... tel:v -'.n af.di.tio'1 to + o qi:,tl r,nrJ. the 8%h, botl of w1 _. c' noulrl re co!:lrni tt"d "'it in the next roew dnys. I tolrJ ·n t}" t you v,ere reluct.,nt tc '1rinf up nr,<' in t] e question cf t' e s 1f't o.(> the 1rd nrA, ,ut +,' rt you "'e~t +,' n necessit r for it so .c;rert t 9t ;rou must no·, roriRVJ' t' e request to h<>ve lt ~e.,+ tC' t 1 e 11r_. ,1ce 1 eP'l v1i th all po~s~ ble <"need. "'"told l·'r- t' nt vou ?Ylt~cir"ted, ·it' -:,•9 one P:",jor rttRck nmrr in yro~ress a'1d tl e ot 1 er nbont to he 1 "1 nr:',erl, ~• Pt -rou 'cu1r1 100n "Ve t' e :r-iost ur o-rt need frr a11oth0r divisi.on. I rlso t0l' 1 1-'m t .,t you 7ere brinGing -''1 all srrre prrt 1 eleI'l8;1ts t --t :vo·J. coulrl po sib:;_v r··'1r', · nclud~n~ t' e J 11r~c' ute RCT t'nd the RCT of t>J.e 01st r-.:•rision, -tn order t0 -ive tro necessvr ~ ,,e-' ,-'. t to t' e ..,ttrick. I f'urt'I· er strtecl +, nt .,. rns mn·e t Rt the ':..eCe"'~~t r for ar:. <-dditional Ji.vision to hP. 'P.ld 1 <I ,;S in rrmy resP.rve W'S ev-ident to irn. f"' 5 tr11 I P.'CTlil 0 ,t ' ~ is br' ~ "Grmerr-1 J·1in repl'.ed t 1 ,,t re \ rnted you tn know tl nt hi'> lo ~1t,~ to . ou U111_uer::tioY1et1., .,nd t 1 Rt 1 P m·1ld pers0r 7 ly ~ i1.;:8 very nu"!. to do , ou r f', vor. (" ~ ;;o 1ever, e loes not fee1 ti t hE' co11lcl ro"'si.1,1 v- justify t· e trans:er cf a divi~tis~_on to l is n-o:crrmrr t, nf' i=>ci~lly "n •• ~ w ('.., t o r• f'u1f'l r,.f' Ge.,crnl Alr.>X1"•1r,er to nccert rour S'l; ·,sted Ptnenver for t o AI!Jflovn10 11 c,r:, th1 ""rJ c' Corrs. ·re f'ur-' t' ~r Pddeci tl t the O er:=itio:'1 1l~ich r'8 ~cl ciu ,est0c1 -:'or t' '3 'rend Corr 3 ~·ns R mo""t P znrdous op9r<iti.on, "'n' t} "t t1 ° Car ,s stoo11 ri ·oo,' c· f'!l.Ce of su"'fering heaY'"' c11suriltil)S in tl ~t orierTt·i o'1. I11 sr:ite of it3 cl~ ~ficulty, ho•mv'1r, t e ..,r9nc' FerP. ri.-, in- +.o "18 ':E' +,} js Sf'Cri:':'. ce 'n ord"'r to f1n•t' r J.; E' ;\lli0.c cnuse. •fo "'.<i:;.d, 'I ,i-ut rlo not ro0el tl t ~ coul~ ever exrlfi'1 t'e t~•q,,,.."or r,f' t':~ c'ivision to e11otr.:ir "ro:--it ~ n vir>1/IJ' of' the r8jection of: t' ~s n"'turf!l , r lo ;ical ren uv ,r. I ccnro"' crnc·.n- ·n ·'tn ~ra.,.,s"'er 'mlo2s an nxt·e. e emer e11cy e-·~ets, ard I do 'lot bnlieve 4:.' nt t' ,r8 ~ s ::;1 c' a s.;tun+,i.on <>t tbis t.:.m1=;. 1 0 0 1 0 ""'" n e t:r-' .' t" et 'o 7 d of' KPmnerer to secU1·e f'u:;:·t 1 ".' c:'etri.7.., ~, '1C'r·n:n rfll. Juir 1 n rn,ctio'1, ½t·t t•,.,,...e is P hri 1 , •p:-'lc .;r.. rro~··"sJ -nr':.. rr,·p ·~ot 8"''1 "ble "-,c telk to 4 ~-1t. lo ev'3r, ~".!r ~.P-1~.'1 IDA tlrt c-r t' n r'de t o t e cub fie lri +,~1. '3 F"r-,~; !l ~f'tnr . S r.'"'"'t-i '1 r' ;;' you, :},r:-,:,1 l .Jui:n qvrre "S JC, '<,l bt tl nt Ge,_,_..,rrl ~. 7 r-"{""rider roul.rl [CCe'"t o·rr ,..::'OJ .... : . ·re 9 ,rir.r ~:ncicn"-,-ion ··11 , c> n rnrsn.t·· or t• rt ' e '(') i · • ',e mor-;+, Prnoy~r·, i.f 'e r1ce·1 pr' ,- t· ···n- :om, · E"CPUSe 'e ')el:· vec' +,'<it t, e i. ~U"l YA.9 mucl ·~r-rtr-r +, "'1 f' ro7·"ti.c<il 0'18. ·e ..,r· !:,'nt 'o +' 1· 't, rolitic~::. mn.t-':;"'rs 9 Ol' 7 r' ',1, l"c· ottPl"l rt t :is "!r"t·'cnl ~··s'3 oft e (}A, --~n r �battle . 11 Althou,;'· '1-e'ler21 Juin t'lesi:~es v ,r • n1.e; 1 to ''"'0:1 d d et;, c' in; R di vision to be se'1t to t e Anzio f're2, : :1."3 ? "nii~8.tion evirl r-esrect for :rou 'Te so ~TGf't trr-t 1 e v6 ll ,.,e8 1 ,en :1 f' _ :rou r8.i se tl1e "'."Oint .., ·a in. I "'.m '7illing to 1·,n ~;er r r-;ood s-Lzed sum thPt if yol'. s' ould say, 1G,-,,, 'l'Pl Ju::..:1., T l rve •i-·en .rou R.n opportuni_.} t·· to 0:;q~-r:;2s -·our v"ew "n t 1 is rrtter, rnd T respect your judgr1Pnt very rruch; :-•o,e,er;ue situ,,tion :ls so critical thet: arn no"r COF;Jelled to or·er you to tlj sm1d tbe rl.bdsion 1, S-on"ff•al J·1ir: would stn.te, PTery , ell , I a.Pt P goori solr'.ier; . z_ I s"1all cooperate 1 • "r sur;,.,;estj 0:1. iR thPt you J_et the natter 2ir1r1er ::'or another \\uti da~-r. Tl,e roads to II Gon)s '"::..11 1:.18 ··rstt;r vrell cmvested f'or t>e next tJnree days 0n r} o•, ujt 1 tt~e r1ov-e;:nent of the ~5tl· and tr e :C:Str T'i j sions, tre tm,.1': 1 1 ')rtta1 f1~0F1 tl e rJ Corps . lion , end t' e 2rtill,...r:--· ,attDlions v'.:: c}· ore beino; tr1r1sferrer I'.:' torn.o-rrow ni '-.t you still feel trnt ;rou must ha Ye the :7renc' di ,r-i sion, I em coDfident tl at you -vill be able to get, it . 1 1 1 "I t[l_lkGd to rr~rd:in.,. tonif,},t 2.nc~ ex-plained to hhn tl.flt you felt it would be very di "f~ cu 7-t, to GtErt t)· e :::'renci,., Corrs to1"ard Fe1~ent ino , r nrl then stor it ri s soor, PS it p' o•-r"ld any te 1.c1 enc. • to cross V:i r;h1vey 46. Be safr1 "'.e 1mc1 erstood t1'at v difficnl ty. He f 1 1Tt: .--.r "teted tht n 1~r2rentl;sr General '\loxanc'er >1."d not unr'er - 1 i~ stood ,'four proposal wl:-en JOU -':,al~:ed i'd t: , ~~m tM.s :r:r1ornjnr:;. I told hin thPt was ~,,Jv&-' 1."erv 3trPnr;e to me , ~)<:>cause I was present ·ihen you tr JJcr:ir'l. to Gener2 l .!',lexrinder , P-nd .,. ·ot the cecired im:rres~io 1., ,..rm1 l i. -:;tenin · to your ccnv,3rsation, that there was a 1efini te meet.:: ·1.p- of t 1,e :1ind,s . 11 ,,,p •f 1 1 As of midn:ir;l't toni:;rt A111ericPn forces in tLe Anzio are2 r.P."!e quffered 5,116 battle casur-lti9S rnd hnve coptured 4, 97'6 prisoners since t' e open:1ng of tr.e of fensive on the 111orn:i np; of the ?3rd of May. * * * A'{ZIO--T".1-\Y 30 , 194/4,--Genr-ir<i.l Clar:V A.rose erirl,r, stuc1 :ied the dispatd 1 es on bd,tle pror:re~s and conferred Tl tL ,.,is G-3 , GenerP 1 Bre.nn. 1-fo P lso work0d on H 1-Temorif.l Day speech which was given rit tl,e ·retbmo cernetery. !~t eleven o 1 clock GenerP.l Ch.rk -,ont to tJ~e Nettuno ceneter:r w>ere a very- i:wpressive Tvler10rie,l Day ceremony vms hold . 'ince there are :'iritisl. en,' Canadirn nead in t"'e cei, ,:;terJ·, 1:)ot:1 tLe A:r-ierican end 0ritish f1R.gs ~rere carried , and botb n::itional a:1tlv~ms nere played . One enlisted m2-.n per company and one officer per reg:' ·aent of A,-,ericrin troops were assen1 )led rt the ceneter~· . T>is :: ncluded trcors frof' all tl~e divisions , as well as ot}-,r,r ~ttacherl m1its; sud as , medical , orc1 n.'1nc0 , 7_11.Brterf'!rister and engin' ers . Altore:etl1er tl·ere Fere 1,etvrnen 400 and 500 rerso ..,s re;:;resent•inrr all uni ts in thA Fift' Arrrv TxirticipPting on t'·,is front . T1~e Britisl' IncrPme•1t Pnd a snPll body of men fmd offj cers , ,,,,1,0 vere headed by i,h;jor Gener"l Gregson- Bllis, Cor'nAnder of the 5th Britisl . T)ivision , vmre fll9o present. Taps was blovm Pnd a f:i ring souE.d dired three ·1olle;rs over t} e ,raves . fter tl-ie cl'r>rlai.11 1 s blessin;; , Gene 1 "Tas :htroduced b~r Gen0ral Truscott , Commnnder of' t} e VI Corps, a.nrl gtive ra l Cl2.r { a ver ~ inspiri:·1e; speech wJ-iicl is quoted 'oelovr: 11 This is ~lgmorial f,ay , wtich , as ;rou 2.11 1:110 1 , is dedicated to tJ- e riernory of our -"irthtinr.; rersonnel who have given their lives to their beloved country. At all our otLer cemeteries here in Italy ,ve .-:ire likewise payini; tribute to our nen vrho h8Ye given t 1,eir all in order thit t11 e :?iftli Arm? night continue to advance . 1 ... �'IT' js i~ fl da;u· ch cee:rly tou~h~s tl e he,,rts o::: r>ll of us r>s •e stand before t 1 ,ese V<J.lia11t men restin : erA . I want you to fcel , as I do , ti-flt t' is is r10t a noMent of sad 11ess no,,. sorrow but rather a t·"le o-f in,p:Lr 0 tior.. to 8pur us on to the t2.sk '11 ich ! ns been S"'t :'or us . le s 11ould use their r-spirPtions [l'1d fi,.,1t·inf sni.r-tt to drive u::; ""orv:arcl PS J'\m~.ricr1 np PVe ehays done in tl e re.st 8.:1.d 2cs r1;n o::' t e :-'iftri Ar: y 1 <'-,e c_one in Tb 1. for ti- e T ast nine months at Sal9rno , Rt 'fripl9s , across t: e iJcltm.'no , a.lonP- t c Gflrio;liano ::i.nd in t he Anzio ber,chhead • .lit 1 Gorl ' s 1 elp vm &all c3.I':ry on t' A tasJr w' jc' the:, began . 11 A li \tl9 r:iore t an fo·rr- r-iontl s ago A1liAd troors care Bcroc s the beriches 11ot f'pr rom tri s sa,cred 011.rid . -.-:;- Rr si11~e tb,t t ·nr, t 1·A ""'i:'tr Arny troops in tl-e '\.nzio beochl•e11d 'mve been n C( nstent l'nd f'"r:iovc t:breP.t to t'•e e:1erv 1 s l.:.1rns of comrnmicotion. '1' 1 e · r"' ·e ""'l!l, red 'l.:n imrortrint role i.n tl e strnteey of the succe9s-':'nl crimpPi';Tl we are no· r cnnr'uct~ '1 ,. Tl1.o:=ie pl o lo'"lt treir lives ~n t} e 1)each1eed s~nce tbt 1,-:ind;no; 1.1.:ca rest"'n · · FJre, r>nrl it .is to -1-; er" ttiflt "e Df\Y tribute t -i S d!'l:- . Others 'nve l Ucil-ed C'll "';drst t' l f"10T"Y , anc' d 11r"'n- -:-1-e interve.l the beac'1her>c hrs ~ssed into 1··istory vi..tl t e join~n-; of tre two :':Lft' Arm:1 fronts on "p;r 0 '5tb... le • · e '1uilt ur o-.ir streno-t' , rin<'l we r•J.'e no'· r--nr.i;" t;ed in P ,-;refit o"fe 11si 1e th1t is pvn:i s' i~n- rinc cle9troyin1" tre eneP1y 1 s hest troops . I'-: ft! Army soldiers fror. tl c main 'ront 1 PVe nlready joined i..n t 1 e qttr>d: on Rone . "Our Fi-l'tl Army h-is b"'en e Tiio'1 er "'or ot! ~r .Allied victories t.·<>t Eire to cone . Curs hl's bo8-1 ~;rul.- 311 Alli8tl Prn7 . Men w. o 1-;--·-ve c 1 erished ::1ibr;rty and "reedor-, n.s 1-i fe itself , h::-ve cnf'!e fron. many rarts of t'. , orlc... to form t 1 ~ s r~,-,1 t~n; te.,-,,..,_ 1:lore jn ·-t l;v. 0vr '"lritish and c~"l.edian Fiftl· Army comrPn-ions rest heJ~E' "'J or.-;side of tl P:: r Americ.<>n -:.em rne tes . L · i·ewise t 1 rl.e.<>.q of our eP 1 1e 1.P nt 'l.'rench forces lie ::. n otl er cerietqrif's · n :tr> ly. 0 0 11 '1'!1is success:'ul o"frmsbre las rer,resent--:i,' "u 11 cooperri.tion of .Allied -f'igl t n forcAs on t 1e 7_:ird. nr rl ser-- 2"1.rl in tl e n ir . (;i1r Nrvy nr,t4 J...ir Forces hnve ~up portPd us T"1<J.'1"1:f'5 ceritly d.ur:ng ou:c curre,1t 01 ~r, tfons . "You men o.c, the Fift> nrmy '.ri.ve overcr,nr soMe c: the rost diff:..cult obstacl"'ls ih. n~litary on8rFtions . You ccrne 11.cro<1s m~les of sen to la.no rt Jr lerno against,, s-1:rongl.- e11trenc-'ec1 Pnem:,-. You l"'ve crossecl rj_1p,r•s ::,nr' fcur-'t .rour w2.~r over mou'1t"inous terrr--i,1 . Yo·1 "Ve ,.•ti-stood t1~ ri o::.~3 0f s1ow, r:-i.::..n r>nd r~·1d . You k':.Ye ,.,,,,r shed n"tur:o 1 cA""'Anse ros it' 0•1s , · t. fe r-l'r[' :1 ls :in t' E" 1 istor o? v•ar<'are . You i ave c'L''1e t· ese t' i:!'1..,.s ,.,·trout t· oufht of y,~rsonrl aa cri -fi ce beca1 1se ·,n :,ve 11.ovm t rt it is onl.r ori.r v·ctorious "r'"'re"! t Pt ~11 restC're P worlrl. 11here hu.m8n 1-Jein ,s crn 1.'ve ·n riece.c , :_-,eace rnd l:.arpiness ~•"'t ti eir "'ellow men . 1 ·, 1 7e strnd non on-:.' e t 1 res: '-old o:: Ro e . Before mri:::i.r C1""S lE1ve pi:issed 1e shB 11 ',r;e "reod t' ~ s :!'-·rst o" t} 1 Euro'r)er 1 crp:' tals .:'ror hzi. dom-i_n"tion . 111 "I ¥ill '10w '"'lr,ce t} is vrreatl on ·•~: {n lloued "'Tounr'l ·~',tl t' e r;,.ed ;e to t',ese me-1 w1 ,o ~_je be::ore us thr>t tl e .,ifth Arry sl•ri.11 co'1t-°nue t· e fi •'1t ·,: i:-:re the• 7_eft off , w'th tre;1· srjr·itc-; rs our ,lide, till v'r>tor;v- 1s rnll'', . " After t e Amori"l Service, Gener...,l Clark returned to '; s cor"l,rc' ro"'t r,!ld work'id in · · s o:"f ice ·mtil [' bo'1t 1_ 430 . 1 Ie co11.f erred br·' c-fl •-it' Ge11err 1 Jrann 2'1c' 1 e~t by c-,1b fol' II Co"''t:'3 field to c, '1fer i7:itl Gen°r..,l K~JP,s . '·hile v1itGeneral he ~es ,, ~ rent un fol"rrrd to t' n 1rrl. J:i, isirm 2,n<l Speci..c 1 Jervice 'orce �a . illr i , area ,. As soon 8S tl e 85th Division is moved in, tre II Corrs wil l continue the attack toward Vr>lmontone to the north and north,mst . The 85th Division ,:ill close tonight, a,nd the 8-ttack T•ill tn.l.,;:e rlace the followin,; morning . Hhile up forward GenerP.1 Clark was told by General Frederick, Special Service Force Commander , t hat last night the:' hnd received the hea·J'iest l7 ostile sl'elling of t 1 1e entire carnpr.ign. General Clark returned to bis comme.nrl post e.t 1610 where he vm.s met by Gener<' 1 Gruenther , l is Chief of Str ff, who flew up from the forward command post . Gen2rals Clark, Gruenther 2nd Brann went i.nto immediate conference concernin"' tre aJl- out effort to be mr->de d1..u~inr; tl e ne:x-t three da;rn . These dri~rs 'Till be critical end will require bitter :Pi ,}"ting. As soon as our forces advance A.nd tBke tl,e bir,:J, --rounr 1.aiovm as the Colli Laziali , the GermPn rlill be for c ed to withdraw north of Rome , becamJe we will comm1=1nd all of tbe high 1;round overlookinp; tJ-ie city and tJ.ie routes tlv~reto . ·c-:very indice.tion turns to tre fact t hat the Germai1 vrill bitterly resist 01.ir ;c1ttrcks to gf1in tl-iis commnnding terrain . 1 1 \fter the con:'.:erence Crenernl Cln.rk hnd supper Pnd retired to 1-ds room 1Yhere he worked until 110 retired to his nuarters . Fighlii:;hts of today ' s battle proGress yrere sl:Lgbt advHnces by· our rirmor wi tt t:,e infantry following up r:md hol riing the ,:;round taken by the ;:,rmor since yesterdav 1Yhcm the attac1, wes renewed . The gains n;:ac1e by VI Corps r,re,.,tl;f fa ciUt ated the British 1st Dic_rJsion I s move up on tl-1 eir left flank . The British 1st Di"ision was ,..,racticnlly in Hne witL the VI Corps rc':lv:nnce elenents . The 5t} Bri tisr Divis ion , Low ever , was still meldn/~ slmr rro,Tf'ess and hr d not conformed r:rith VI Corps ;r,0_vnnces . There ~,rere no outptnnding grins on the II Carris or IV Corr,s fronts . On tl'e IV Corps ,~·ront one battnlion of tl·•e 151st hrd e.dYenced f'.8 .,..nr es :·font8 SempervisB. , ren.c'. jnt; further to tbe nortl::rest on tl'e high ground. north of Sezze . The Frend· rid'il'Pnced up slightly past Ceccano . :'.::;lenents o:'.:' tre lritish 13ir;htb. Army hPd rished rhout D mile p:1 st }offi. The 88th Jbrision , less a combat team , rill be moved up to II Corpn front tonir·;>t end tomorrow . Tts wei;;ht 1crill be th.ro'''n in on whatev er corns front is i:; needed most. At tbis tirt1e no decision ns to where it will be employed has been nrde . The Ar my Commander dictat ed t1--,e follo,'finc notes todc.y "or :nclusion diary: v1orri9s ta"'✓e r1ot!1i!1o; to do ~t} t~ e j_rTI_''J--diElte battle . Tl~.,:\f . -,_re riatu.re. 1 ~7il1 nPr:1e ,l1er1 i:ri ()l'd81~ of t:-19 t1~ou'-;le tl ey ceuse ~10 . ur_ort o:-: F! 1· olit~ cal i11 1 in 1· 1 _ !!T'irst , ti1e T;r··tis1 1 ..,.,.,.,., tl r.i.r F,le 0"1 ;:.cr 18, rict1-ritl-•st0nc;,i-·t1; Ale~::e.nfer' s co}1st2.11t [~~~: 311.ra~1ce to 1:1e tI'Pt l1or19 :~ s 5.n t:.o sectur of t 11e Fl/tl Arrr"". ~! ~v· '10.~·e 11ra1r1 t e Arm:, bound"r. · sout 1 o: :lo1-1te ;/-6 ju.st to tl 0 out:=,·'drts· of J.om~ and tl-iel1 V'•~erod it to t e --- 0I·t! " r:11 e "M:i_r;]·t}, f\r~vi..:r "'.i:1.S ...:une littl0 ~ ~_[_:L.tinb . ... :t ::as lPcked e.r; T0s,sivrm.ess 2.n" railed in it,3 ;:,cert in t 1 is conb511ed Allied effort. '"et , m.·· e-Pfort to ,1:litcr t' eir boundnr:-· east "",et v,:t-~J- "· rr-r~-:· ·ntl:::.c< t:' n; tl d~ tl e 1 tl ,....~~ ArLT/ rnust ~,e.rt-~ cir)nte : ; 11 -l:-}1e l>P.~ttle Zor Rorie . 1 1 1 1 0 nSe er rrl , T" I'renc' Corp 3 -is ½ein:; i inc; ec: out . A :rore ga.11:mt fi ,, ,ti-n_~ orr;a'"' iz2.tio·, nev:ir 9-Xis+:.ed , .;et n,.r o~f:r fc,r -t to attE.c1r :;:'t;::c2.nt1no , :,-ro··idi:1i it • could use T{oute ,16 to the y:est , was 1roroptl;i tm ·1ec. dovm. GeYJera1. /.le"':c:,c' er in r1-tcate-:~. t}"Pt,-; vJ01.1lc~ l\e --_eli;lted ~01~ Y'1e tr:· tn,1:e :,1e;r,qn_t:i110 to -:P.C~Llitp,_te t~ e 1 �l14 u ,t r: t' RO.vc 11-::~ <:,,.. t't o "":::_ ;' ~1 lr :, ,,t t" ,.,t qf~ ➔r .; ~: .. .;_ · t, to~rt !"".1 trc,o_ ·_11 u : t'1 o.n ti ; ~~ct t~~~, 1 r•a,, tr t, - 10 r':.i Of 1~ t 1 ~ r-on,~ 3 i • r_·/ l r{ cor fJ .,.. t r0 . ,..• Cor1s, P,.,te.,· ta1:-1. ):---r:+,--·ro, wild 1)e t'l-~rt, LT "or~· ="l,:cs in dT r:::..11, -'-,o ' :, J•1-:r. TT-, -;,_, c ~o of tc :_rnc' •. r,l_f'" '"lts () ~ t 1 (' i. •' t l\:..-r1 • )·"' 1 1 :,:. t.i. e r1;1 s "c:- ""' to yiol~t0 bet 1"' .L , • ,l0v,.,,',r 1 • ·r,tru'"·t·' s, ,0 0 . " ')A."':.tl , or to 1,r~ , , , r of · '",.:v~sio·1 ~nto ", '; A>1z-io E'~'8f'l. :'m· IO ..,::rlc P,''" ~ .,oitt,,tio:"l 1",e ·r 0•1 o~ r ~nor· ccir. -::orps. •I, to ~_rl. r '3 l i · ovl':rill'l0"l"v , ulJ e "st --~E::i..uc-tant t > et 1se:nt ·':,ct' '1 1.-,ttr,r ...,c"':,'.:;ion. - CFllecl o~::: ':.. "'er"nJc•no rtti:ic 1r an:. <>n directi1•' ·.m, ,j-!:;' i'1 ,~,, :c 'Jt:·~c-tecl mo•u,-tnin zo:-1·, o:v1 }jo-1-)inrro -1,,,re th0 Tl"om+ain roPS: r-AMcres Ro·1te ,'/:6. - t', 1, br ::.·i ' t C)~., inert c1o"'l9in, ,::i_ 71 I slon () T"r I ~ r.to -r.:_ 1 t 1 :-,,-.-,, "l'"l"l., USl11'p Route 'f6 .q_nr' rut rirr: 'n rr u nort 1 rer-d9d. ... er· Ro ·e. T "eel t"' ,re : . . , so ~ _...,c: inr-i.tion on +: e 1 ".rt c,f Alexan 'cl" tn conrnPnce flli~or , -~s •~: ·1 tl 1 n1,... : rth~ ~::,,e ij,1c1· cr"'j-ions t,l-;:,t , ~ .: -; r ... r,.; J F1'1 ""'t.. t,p C 1d"l ' to c ~·ds :to· :) ·h it encl O" -C' P , ::; 1- ,,.rot....1Ct ~ 1::. t' e Colli .J.' Z. f1 l i f 1'')!1 • 1'8 is iron~. T B~r:r· c·ft8 t' 0 ~ni,.or-':,<1r,~e c.," t· ~, i , tqrrf1in "nl1 r.[l-.:-e ,.:.rectn,d [l .. l of ~ r f1Ubor li.-::-tes to tr·-~ ~-!:;. '1 "'""~nr1er ·i ' nr-ri•.:c' tr rt I ' ,., "e Sf' ½otl" rreC: · .i.s l1°rccti e -1-0 'lt.t..<i.~·,. Valrie ,to,r. e.. ... net C.:0.,..,e so. I ,, rn tre ?rd ~i-•isio>1 pc' ,;;ec·c11 '"'er"::lce rorc~ yr~~,·rel to ett1=1c 1< int' Pt directio:'1 es soon PS : c2·n. ·r,t t',e ~5t' Dj ,.,.~ sion ... 1 -its lcrt t-:, sup 'o_·t it. ':'l'e Di,.; sion does :v1ot c0rTlete itc; r-0ve rntil toni.,l·t. , ·~;1: F1tt1;1c1 +,,p "ollo~·i1· ·orrin. V::-1<: r-crto.,.,8 ::·1: t' P. l -· ' -round to -'-,' P ~a~t , nnc' to +; 1 ;rest .:s so "'tro , 1-r r, ld r u:1 ·r -1-,., e1ery 1s •'lir c'~f8>1--:e or•J_:/on tb t i,o ,rncl er' c'"v:.s1o"l +r ";'r, orJ..;: -1010 •ou lr: r n"t w:i. ·tl c' j ::m.s-1- o:.". 11 'h :5r. 0 -~_,t' "T jwt f 0.1)0. to "'ruc-ocott, FPl•ro,1, ,rl"'l"''l, ::nrl ~c <"•ier tote,, t e- I ET rlisr.rp0i_:rt d ~·-·t 1 t~oir 0+:'·"or~s toc1f'. - ti-rt OE' er tnc T"Ore 'n-s of Rll-out r-tteci, C!Ourl~cl .;t1 t' P rttr->c'• to·y~ ' t C"' t' 8 ,l'>tl "'~-·isio:'1 MYJ.r 1 ,~+, t}p '1ttPck SC c-d·1l_.-..,' t' "3 foJ.10 rjr : "'Or,1:r; r:· tl l IT -::errs T1[ - ~.,..., c" tJ:-:;_c, ' 0, ~ GermF '1 :t-Os·_-1:,io 1 in tJ--.~ Col.lj -,n.zi::i.l:i "'re11.. I ' · -·e lU'.,.Pil t; er to Tflrter e-"'fo..,.ts tonorrow ri. 'l 1 t' ---:i next dn,r. .,. <l'\t': , ttr c Pel tl e 1st -.:r--: tisl )i :iir,ion to t' e • I C0r1 s n,-,•· t'1Ft ~,,.. r Pr, out o"' t· .-u· c'efenni e 1·ole. To attnc 1 t'" 5tr ·;ri-1-,,;:;1', :i· ::i"i.or to t' e •r: Corrs ~oul - bf> 7 ik-e ·:.·r-ir , r- poor ,"'l:!1 "' d;rt sr:lrt. Tre r r e r o of~oni ve . nc:.. ·.nrtio 'l.S. - bR lie·re t' l "'t ..,.,..~ +,is' Di• is~ 0:r. . 'ill 1 "lr' or j t S001Jl"' to 1 "Ve ~ts tri.l up. 1 <C eV':"vt} :n, T 11f'-·o into t,' ::'s 0A.ttl~, • oy-·:'1 to cr<ic 1r t 1 -:_ro l· .y it nece"sr\.I' for Ye'1·:nlr•··-., to srit: drr hotl o-f: ris i:irri ·es to t e north of ·1or-ir • "'l e Gerr·..,-1 i. r <i 1 .:~.o; r eterri.a()d ef'fort to SP v0 F.0 .e. M',ere rre irid:"cn~io1s tl~t l1e ~., :rour:Jrr, i.n re:iJYorcer'Ants fro"'! t'e north. If I do rot Cl"c· t· ·s position in tlrP.e or f'our fr-s I ~,p.- l-;-,·e tc- re-orgnyize, ?<i.it fr,r tl-iE' >' ·} t' Army ::mc1 ,o ['t it 17it', n coorr'-"r/'tecl ~ttncl,- • )ot' Mrr.iies, but I fear -the c~.me rPs11 1.ts -rror ~"1. );-ti \rmy. ..,.t rill rot p11t in its full e~fo1--t, for i-1:. never ras. 11 11 .,. <11" ~:row:in }>O<iit.:.0'1. '\'J1 icr- l'dlJ :"'k'l1 'C T r 1 AAI tc Hl 8o"lcerne'i - "I 0-2''20. •r 1 i.le (;T'JC •relco 'W ~o IT " .... opoq.-,} th.t 'I:C s'·or-:.cl r'le--:elor on 'rr-tion° ro:-t' o-'" ~.iv,r ).ACCO c"ir cted on Ferent:i.110 n.nc' rot<'l"l ~t 1~_11 be TO'>Si 1)1~ to yut it ·,..-:,o 3f::'ect he CP"lrot ..,,,.ree to rllot ti,e :~oad Fercnt:iro-'J~l~onto·,,, to Fi~t, Arrrvu'11A,s or until ;t beco ""S clA:=-<r t.';:,t r,;i 't>-t 0 �Army "!ill not be required to cooperr>te in Your Pttack on the VAlmontone line . In this case he will be prepar9d to reconsider matter . Road Valr ontone-Rome is ro"rever allotted to Fi.c,th Army. 11 0 Gruenther to Clark. R'T ?1~. "General Devers called. Corps corrimancl post "md then proceed by- jeep to Tforma area. ,,,',ether or not he will f,8t to your command post. 11 qe will fly to IV They do not lmow Gern•ral Gl<>rk sent General Gruenthsr the f'ollowinr; m9morendum at noon --':,odn;v: 11 The action taken by AA I rtoes not surprise me. I r,,nticip,:,ted it. Do not raise the question of the boundar.v between Ei%;}1th and Fifth Armies beyond Valmontone ~mt watch it ver·· cRrefully when t} e question does come up, so t:r-ot it is not dravm absolu+,el;r alonp; the north edge of Route //6. I would say thAt it should ~o from Valmontone to Palestr~nP 11nd Palestrina to the Ti:i.c;hth i\rmy. Valmontone will haVP to be used jointly. From fR.lr-istrj_na it shou1d go the most direct route to Tivoli, ":i ,.,in~ me an opportunity to mPneuver to the north of Route 11 6 as we appro1:ich Rome . I must have the road that ~oes trrough Casal Santambro~io at q166. :rn other .-,orr1s, t} ere is no eycuse for their runnin-; the 1,oundarv too close to '!tome . 11 With regard to the Frencr, I w~ 11 defer any .r.iction on tnkin~ a French Dision. Fo'vever, ha'te directed ti-.is morn-i np; thrt t½.e '7rench tnJce ower, with one corrJbat team or whatever they feel is necessary, 88th Division positions north of Se'3ze so I can brinE: the 88th Di vision :in for tl e final attack. VJ 11 H:<J.Ve just JM.de a talk out Pt the ceremony. affa.ir . It Wf'l.s 1uite rm imnressive "I do not blnme you .c>or ettinP.; a little provoked in talking to 1fording with reference to t},.e ½oundary. AppA.rently- the tacticn.l si t1.wtion is not dictatinr; the decisions . " L As of ei~ht o t clock t'.llis wrenino; ~llied forces in the Anzio area had suffered 6147 battle casualties and captured 4615 prisoners clurini:; tl-ie recent offens: ,e. * * * A~JZI0-- Hli.Y 31, 1944-- At 0930 General Clarl, held a rress conference . T'1is is ti1e third press con:'erence t~1Pt Genernl ClA.r:V has hAld since the day before t' e offensive stA.rted on the 11th o+' May. It was an off-t1~e-record talk for 1'1. back~-r01md for tl .e correspondents for the next pht=ise of tbe fi<)"hting . General ClArk e:;..,'J)lained ho··r h8 hnd Pttached ti..,e 1st British Division °to the VI Corps, ,c,;i-<rinr; it the 1st l\rmored, 1+5tl, 34t:r, J6tl and 1st Brjtisb Divisions . VI Corps will Pttack northwest toward RoT'le, its rj l\°ht te..kinf the hi<;h €{round 1movm As the Colli lazial:i and its left proceed:i n~ directl:v northwest toward RoY'le . On the rip;ht of VI Gorps, II Corps V'ith t},e 85th, '3rd Di-.risions and Special "';ervice Force . The 85th Division is to attack tomorrow morning northwest wHh the high ~ou.nr' ih the vic~nity of 1occa Priora as its initial objective . ':'he 3rd Division and :;pecial 3ervice Force will spearhead_ ".lorth to the ri~l-i r,;rolmd nP st VRlmonto"le nnd cut 'ioute ,%. General Cl8rk emphasized that 0 �t 1 is Ptt"'':),,. doPs not hrve Rone pc; ~ ::.s rrili'"ry objective b·1t to kill :?nd anni' ill:1.te as "'J,ny o-" the Qqrmc1.ns as po,::;sible on our -F'ront. He SPid t}nt re did not, owever ,' lose si · t of t 1e fp ct -1- pt, :.}•e c; tv of Rone Mifl t be /' ined ,, s fl rAs•1lt of t' :l c:; Pttn.ck-. •·any -iuesti ons 'r,re r>sked by tl e corresroY" 'e>1ts wi ; ch Ge 1r=irPl r:lF,r', P"1Sv"ered <ts ·"r::i11.kl,r P s e CC'"' 1 ,:;. So-me '7ere di.rect'":ld concerni 11.. the occ11rnt-l0n of Rope [Pd y w1 nt trOOT'<::!. G<>11ernl c1,,-rk SB 'd thPt le could not sa.,,- l '"'t troor:i mule" ente.,,. ~;rst, t ,t -Lt r'e-,endod r,n wrich ones drove t} e ::<rdest. As to T;:i 1-t' l:\.rmy troops, t} rt would he P r ecision r,~rie y A.AI. Ger-?ral '::lnr 1 nar·e it un ·erstooc: th"t ns "Etr l'lc; t'h0 City of Rcme itse:..f w1:1 c; concArvv~d, re was not interA sted e""c8-rit to secure t' 1 e c · ty, am' A.S soon fl s ti rt •vie b,qer r'J.o:>1P, he ryrmld +>pn ' is .('orr;es out to tie nortl east .<ind , est for fu"t er -~J.sres. A-Pter -1-,''"' l'ress con ... -:ire"l.ce, Ge11errtls Ca11.non find ~avi 1-ln CRr-e ur tr- cc•1.f'er wi.t' G9r-erf'1 "!li-cir1' Cl"'rcer>1'n,.. t 9 ['ir suprort ,,~ en to t1 e rP''18"'7ed Ptt;:,c"l( • bo'1t noon Ge-1e1">l Cl"rk tele,' o'1ed /}9'1.er;:,l rr,,.,1"cctt "no. c: ·.3cussed vdtl 'dm -:,' A situntio'"l. /18 ~t '10V' "'X:1 stPr' • Fe c'irecteC:. Gem,ral nr'lSCott to ·i e hi'1 ci-v·hi_or11l ccr.r'lc""l'lers 4n n.c1d.'tio11"l s} ot in t!"le Prr~. :'-om no, on for t1 e neY.t "''3w r1q ; ,,13 need to mus+.er I'll our efforts "ln' ~nush tre r>tbick -v1..,.or0-,slT. He also r'Hr0cted t A.t t 11e I1 Cory-::, attA.ck by t''"' ri-5t1 D.:. 1.sion hR 'f90ded up. 'I'he attE'~k W"l. "re ...,d at '1,,cut 11+00 '01rrs +, is n".l.9rv:.0or, q">' ~ts 10c1yrncf' '--is ·,1ro ,.C9'1 '9G. ·r. co -~o.,. ·tr it1 +,' c-se t:'de ..,y -1:l"' 16th Ji ·i3 4 on on. its le~"t. Pt 1330 'orl W8S r9c-'3ived ':-,,,A+,+' A Britis 'Pc' occu1iec 'i'ros·nor,0. No res··~trn0e ""'1 P11.r:o-mtsred, 1--,1t ,ill -:.r-ci "hrid·es 0re ''lo'", ,,,,,1 t'e +oin ·.q,s 'eriv·1· ..,,·'1nd. At 1430 ';.e11°-~q1 K,y0s err., to r:o:rf,r 't' (}eYl,rfl r;:rr}-. t +,J is +, imA 'e <'ccic' 'c.' t' ...,t t' '3 1"t' n~ Yi<"'iO"', lw,s rre co· bnt +,eRm, w::is to be attAc 1 cd to I: ~orrs ,, c' wo 1lrl JU fl -its r-ttec>' 0'1 t' '3 (1,5t' 1 s ,,-: t .(':flnk nC'rt 11 lP:rd. 1 G-=1r0rr>l ClqJ~i,-, aft r co1n9r-r''1 -'t' GPYlPra~ B""'<1'1n l'r;n, +, ': hster r~rt r "~9rno0r ... ~;:"u d q '1'3W (hprr.ti0">1'1 ::-n"'tr·1ctio'1 '?5 . c' i<J ,..,10t"i h"'lo, • ftc,r ,u !"Jr It. Col. IJln.r', bro 1:t ·11 ~::r. :i·orman c" t e c·~cfl o "r~burc.. o·""' t e 1 •• 1~Nhts o"' t' A h s '-attle rrr)"T0S9 W8.S "-_,' A 8izure 0f T<"lrt o""' t'.e,-: b \.ro· rs -f;he Cnll-'_ Lrz·,.::.-: 1""J, t,;.:s ~")t D"'~jsion. So. 0 ;-i'1s ,,.,re 1"'1",·e in t· '3 Fr';r-c s.:ictor it' 3"_0~ ', 1t .,tgac: • r,YTe ,:; to ~, e ·1.o.,..t 1 rnt. r;,• 0 ..,:;.~en~' we:;.~0 ·r::pPri en""' j 1 ' i 1. SOJl" ~ ~ ' b:i i1C8S' y +, ter re 1. stR nee' 9 S" (,cir 11 ":t'Oi"'i ti eir r :_ t J'."'lRnlr r0---t, of t 1 e r ~co ~i "f'er. •T.' r011r Ga'1er.q_j_ Clark 1 a notes or. +, 9 1 '1., 1 s r> cti • :.ties '""'o llow: 1 I Co~J3 attPc:k is no~ uri, ')oi~ · ell today, I1Aet:.n "ri~y st:.rr resis-':,fnce. 1st Ar"'o.,..nd has '7::-de very little '1eadway. '.:" "l. Ar tired, '1eed mH-:'1t9'-Y"'Cf-, ard e,:c'3 '3 in ' A.r/assed by Sr- 1 s fro". t e ' ~ ·' Tci11.r i souj' o ·: Lake Albano. Truscott is r1lli~ ... , '3 1:C"1or ack tor-' 'i:, ., eav" 1 , .i.; , -· 1fa'1t" .:n a'1d i ·i 1; ~"' ,18S , is full Di · .1 > , t 1 - ush ,..orwm-d.. 0 ~ 0 0 "Doc .,rder an ~.q_de no 1 rr,~ess tc, 'ay. T' t' e 3"J"':. i ·s::.011 shou:rl assL·t i""1 tor>ll'row. 3 -''lank:'.n, . 0 ~!'lent, '., \lr 11':er o-!: n.l\:,r 'a.3 , cn0 ,1ell. "'}0,1.~rA.l ,loan ~l'l~,9 ~:'1 i=m riJ.l ',ye rll ·'s ~8t' J;v-i.s'_on ,sse"'lb:ed 1 ) dPyli '-: to::-'o~row. It i, tirec1, , l t : 1•.:.11 ':.L.row :t into ,)ri.:;tJe ·n .1., e II Go'fs sect01~, f'eE'l~1 t· 2t : 'Ill' ·t 1 l"'3 evfr ounc--. ; . , r e"~r · • r Cn.nmU'3u')' r._, .,vl--i, "'.;'me. .,_ ,. _ r "'' �. +. · + ' • ",--,5 , It ,uill attack to +.he north. I ,.,J1,e issue d Op:ira..,ions I ns0ruc-c,1on Jr. t octay, tell -in.,. rrr su1,-)ordi·::ate com,vrnders tLr-it t'.Y~::.~ fi::·st "1issio,.., Pfter takin~ the 1~::: p 11- ~ou..;d in t'·\e Colli LaziRli areP is to r'l_estroy t: e enem;r on our frO',t vrl ile 'at the :oame tine setting- up 3. task force under General Frederick to move east on Fi ;hvmy !J6 to disrupt and destroy the en ,my movin[; out from in front o" the 'SightJ- Arm~' Hnd the Frenc'" -;-;,g~prljtiorw.r;,;r Corrs. llJl.pparentl." the -.::: --ft' J\rr:1, -, hei11.,; rror ded fron tl e Frime Hinist r down, is srordn,r; a little :-'lore 0neri:~Y• It 'ms f:1nally taken 7 rosinone. The, enem;,t hacl evccunted .. 1 1:r, 0 11 1"1here is rmc'i p.~essure uron r1e, alt} oug,., it is not bein to 'ave -::: r;'1tl: ,\rny -:_n on tl e bntt1e +'or Rol'7e. 0 Pf plied direct- HJ am worri("'d about t 119 future of the 'Frenc'~ "Sxpeditionary Corps. ~Jitb the restrictio".!.s t}rt Alexancbr ;•2s r,l1°ced upon rne, their zone of action is narro 11:_n'~ llOVm to noth~ nr;. I :,opA to squeeze t'1.em nort1• of IIi r;h,•r9.7 /6 in t e attac;, on Rome. It pro'xi.bl::r 111ill 1Je violr:mtl:r o"posed by AAI. 11 I am ettackinn- across ia ;hway ."6 tomorrow to tal,e Vn.lmontone Hnd some of the hi} rmmd to t'~e north. :: must take t' is hi,r,t -o;round j_f I Pm to naintain myself F>.t Vr-ilm...,ntone. I rather 1,elieve thnt tbe decision will come in the II Gor:;:,s fro,,.,t and t/ r•t I qa;r 1.Jreal, t} :rough triere. T·1e next two d-:iys !!'Till tell t½e tale. 11 GenerPl C1?.rk today issued tne follo 1~in~ operF>tions order to 5t1 British Division: 11 1. 5 Infantry Division (Br) will attaclr wH'·out , elay to Cf'lfture t: e 1 line Hill 104 (756434.) - RJ 751427 - Hill 103 (751419) - fRATICA J1I •:rtHE (73L,1). F' en nbove line las been secured, mqloitf1tion f0rwrrd will be nPde wit} all possible speed to secure t'. e folloninr: objectb1 es: a. Are8 et bend in ro1:d 71.5504. b. Road ;n 8J'."ea_ :;755. ' c• Road between 615531+ and 585515 . .Sreed in e:xyloitinrr forwc'rd to sec1JTe t} e lrtter t1::ree objectives j_s esse:ntjnl in order to: a. 'f'TPFP. before Destroy nn;r enemy remn.ininrr between tl e 1+2 Nortl~ing and 7.iver ey can cro"'s t' e river. t: b . Freve:vit t1 e enem:,. on 5 Infa,,tr;ir '>i-,j_ sion (Br) front from ,·it; dra,ring to tl e norU1 ef:I st to rnm the s,, itc' line runninp rpproYinntely norti,_ west - sou-f:;keast 1Jet,vee:1 88/,.4 - 7158 . "3. Effecti~re et once, t' e '10undrry betwee·1 5 Infa•,tr;;·· Division (Br) and VI Corps ( 1 Inf'E1ntr:r Division (Br) will be: .,.nclusive to VI Corps road A''TZ:'.:O - AIBP.I'JO to RJ 865326 - t: Ance �railwr--~r bed to track jlJnction '3?3154 - Sci.ddle 806367 - Hill 55 (80?374) CR 786391 :1..nclusi~re m 11 62 (7973~1) exclusi ~·e ;:,pm~ 801377 RJ 771/+47 - llJ 737536 - RJ 738564 - RJ 7051=i89 . "i" . 5 Infar-tr, Divisior- (Dr) 17ill be respc-~s' hle f'or rrotection of t 1 e left +'1211}: c,,.. , and r:1P.intP~ 1inD" crntPct Fit ' , 1 ::r:r.f'antr;r Division (Br) on t eir rirl t . 1 11 5. Fo~nts o·"' junction bet·,een l a,,,d 5 Infantr:· Divisions (Br) 2re: a. Cros.sroads 78739?. c. Crossroads 7711+!+7 . e. RJ ri37s32 . C\ erfltio·~s :rnstruction =1ssuec1 tode./· e.1s0, reacls PS follovJs: Fi"tl i'.rri:r +:'orces re ''.lO~' ·'n ro"'~tio·1 to :!_p il"C' ,,, rt cs ~,,,t,e~cid,d to 1-ie t• '3 -"'~nal ,. · r• se of' our or0rat::.o•· s Bo.st cf RO'~ . 1 June VI Corrs will str=.Je 0"1+, ~1it'• Pll +-; eir "'orces in cortixrmtior of t' sir successes of t 1 e rr'st O cl2c_~s . II CorJ s -.~111 lPPnc' a ren offens::1'e "ron :lta rresent rosi tio~1s . 11 tt:1sio~1 o:~ t 1 'JSe !~1ttt?c: s ls +,o cr·us' t, ~ :?01irtee~t} Gorr~e...'\'" !11.... F:r foci "1,.: o'J.r A'TZ.,.O ?nrces rc,.:i t,o P:T lo:i t 1,~' al1 ro ,s: 1.10 neans o'f'""l7 orr,or·tunit . trs r'estro - corirlet,31~· t; p ""1.P'7.:f 1 '1 .forces B.1",' ~Pt"'r~ el. '!'o accor0 1 lis 1 t js , -t_t is d_r'3cted t~et : u1. 0 1 II Corps 'V~ll : A:'."t,-,r · f'';:·np secv.red t' 1e :-i--;;1, R;r01.md nort:, of Vl\LJ;r,·r'C'NE , blocked all traff~c tlrour:;' 7.ol1 te j ti'irl "ecurer' -:, 1 f't ~"Tt c" COLL!: L..ZIALI t '3:t lies nit1in ~ts zon9 J '~o :,rt;}a.red on Armf Crder to yt1rsne and rnnili lr.te G-err'a'1 :'orces w!tl dra .~n[r nort' west a•y" ''Jill se"ld 1 t,rd · itt-ing mobile r-Ol"CGS 11.D 'er ••.• roro11s le2.der _;: J1 --~ p Route 6 on r-:rCI:'J'P10 to C/'lJ tur-=i o:c ciesti--ot.~ a11- c;_1e:mlt -~c:.-·:le~; \ ~t'-.d~a'tI5_rz ·~ror~ 1:: o :rcr1ts '-~~ ~=-r,t A.J'r·:- an0 a. 1 1 1;'1 rer1c~ 1 ,-:Jcpeditionar:~ CoI"I s. :,;. VI Gory s wj 11 : ::-"'ectu e -1::.' 11.t y.art o:' COLL= I,,.t. ZIAL~ b Hs zone 0:' act5_o•· and dri··e -'"'orrmrr ,,;'t' tl P; utnost ·,reed t0 Cllt t 1 e routes o: ,-it1-,"TeW£,l of -~ner·,u· forc'l'.)s -':,1 rou,:,·' 1:C lli: anc' t· en -'-rn°n stron"; f0rces c;ou-'-,' ,·est to pv,n_i'. 5 late t'. e e'1ern; ap;a:11'.lst t' e ,..,TB1°R :'.::i ·rer . Lo-1/ :.. n.n-:e rrt:p_lery ilJ. te used to interdict an:-" cro0si"l"' sites b'T vi' ic} +, 1 0 ene~.- ''a,' rittemrt to VIitrdr-m c:,r t 1 e rn-nER Rj_ rer to +j-- e "Test • 0 1 0 �Fress +>orwarc1 s,-j r;orousl,.' 'rit">in t'•eir zo110 of action to secure t'e 'ig c-ro1.md in t'e ·,ricinit;r of 3Errrr (G 1ri44), protect t:e r::1.-;'t flank of .,..I '.Jorps arid ;,' '.c nt' ArT1,,- ard fpcilitate t· 6 B.l1.-ance of ,.:~_i:-' t' Army. 1 d. 5 :::nfantr:, Di· ision (nr) will: 0 rress :::'orwarc: rn.1:i.cJl; towards t' 8 TIE' :r. Riv"ff tc c11t off e.11c. destroy sner-;' forces t' et · E!Ve b1=,en turr;ed sout1 ~:" t\e ,rr Gol'I s . ArtilJ.~ry - -· , . , t ule will he ,,:er t ·,rc-:)LL f.crwara in oroer t o . n·ercJ.Cv cror3s1,.,g sir,es over +' J. ... • • ' 11 ?. . Defr ils on sec+,ors ol resror s:; bil~ t~- for seizing t e anc:. ac.-vPnce to t' e rort' later. 11 Cb.rl- to G-r1 1.ent1 er . JJr 1714. HJJ,2 Pnc? 143 prog:ressinc satic:fcctoril;r on ~:onte ArtPmiso on t' ejJ_' first oi.-.jective in +,'··e -vidn::_ty of 9646. 85t' f~,·i8ion junped o·nf et l I.:'., occupied. Lar:lBno 0J48. Tell Juin: understand ' is situn:l::.ion. Will jur1p off tonorrovr r;ornine; rriti 3rd Di vision and ::ipec:.1.11 .;,erv--: ce :'orce tl~ occupy ~ ir 1 ground j· ,rnediatel, · nort 1• of Vnlmont,one . Sloan is '-er,=i . Fis di··: sion wil.1 be 0 s,;enbled ')~r d.n;rl:ir:; t tomorrow morn:~ng . Re sure ;1·011 ~,ate' qu,=ist:i.on of bou.,.'1.dPr:,. fro"' Vr lr10rtone northwest . 11 0 Gener-al Clark toc1r.· sent t 1 e followin~ menorandul'l t0 GenerP.l Grmwt er: 11 I 1 ave c1ecid9cl to comr:.t t: e 88t' Di~1 ision in t' e II Corps w'·ere one cor~bat +e1;r,, Rlreo.r::r is . 'T'here is 1_uite /:'. ger bet reen t' e 3rd 8I'C1 t' e '";8th :Ci-visions . 88th will attack tomorro'i ~Ln t1·rt [;Pp gener.,lly· nort: • ::: 1 c-ve directed Keyes tc set up a tas'lc +>orce 1mder :::'rederir!k; a fast 1·itting , mobile llnit '7:.t' ris ..:>pecfo.l Service Force, TD I s am' tt=:inks to rroceed east along t?.oute /!6 as soon ns we cnn t;et on to it . Its nif'sion is to ('estroy, discm.u~age , disrupt, disorganize, Pno P.n:r ot\er d's you t' ink of, r-ny enemy forces in t' Pt area opposino- Eig:.t: Army or F-SC . .... I kn.o"' of no "ro.,· to emrloy tLe ,:\8t 1 Division better. If I rut lv in the VI Go11,s t' ere "muld 'PVe :-iee11. P 1assage of ti~e 1 i_nc')s, nd it vould e time - consur1ing . ''it. t} e success of t' e ::St' Division '?.nc t, e vvr:,y 85t' is goinp-, I p,yn c0.,,"ir,c0cl t' Pt is t' e t' in; to do . 0 •0 11 I i,,,...,.e iflsued an OI w~ ~ c: instructs Ke;Tes to set up ti is Frm'ierick Task Force rnc1 c1irects tie tvm c0rrs P.nd 5t Di-ision, P.fter Colli LP zj_ri.li is cPp turec1, to r'estroy t' e l4t: Arn;r in our :'.:'ront . In otl•,Tc worc1 s, t} --it is our 1 P :i.ssior, r"t'er t 1 .<in '-:Justinp; into Rone . You rrill get a cop:· rronrtl;r. 11 : cert?inl:r will feel 1 ,etter ,,,1-e11 tie F'':C pus1 e,s up r•8st Po 1te LPn.ico, for 1'1 en 1• 1e rittacl: wit' t' e 3rd Div:i s5.on a1:1.d >pecial ,..,,ervice Force our wl1 ole rir-' t flank is open excert for t! e 91st R,conneissance . 11 1 GenerP l Gri.entr er disr,ntc1 ed t'. 8 follo"rin_u neI'lor 0 nchm to Gr-nerrl C1Pr1 r: 11 1. ! i'PYe bnen r1.prlyin2; a '.l;e'"1+;le sqt1eeze on ?'SC , stressing t' e vittc1l contribution t' ev- cPn ffl::e i_n connection Fit' t 1 VAJPC7>frr ,]E Gtt? ck if t'"e:r ·e ct>r> W'.nn-o.;e some' O''! to r-rnt t1 ere in time . �11 ? . Gennr<J.1 Juin is becor-,ing fea:t'f'u.2. t.,rt you mPJ be e:xrecting too mud from 'im, so , e '. ,-,cl Colonel Zellar teleplone tl is Dorn:..r·n; to say: 1Generc\l Juj_n believes t} 0t ,·m Pre nxrectinP, Frenc: Gorrs to buttress Genera.I Keyes I riglrt . Genera.I Juin is exceedingly Anxious tl:,t,t '"8 not count on '. is sup:;ort w'•9n, in fact, 1·e will be unable to be in lin,3 wit'. Gener,1 Ye:ms by tl1 e mornjng of 1 June . 1 At present t'e Frenci li11e r1ms as ::ollows: 'T'he 1 eft is secured on CARPI'1JETO and tbe right is from three to fom· kilometers nortl-- of C:CCCA "JO . 1 1 The terrain is difficult and the Frenc:1 Corps is still neeti:nr; u:it,- 2.prred.a11le resistance . .)\oulil t 1·i·'1.F"S continue R.S ,eJJ. as t' e:r "'re going now they would need about U•ree na·rs to '')e in a position to cehoucJ,, in tl•e GAv:rrmANO area . In ot 1 er words, FEC can prob2bly be t 1 ere eit, er in tie eveninp; of ~ June or :mornini:; of 3 June . Should resistance sti "fen the date 'muld ',e correspon<lirn,:ly JB.ter. 1 1 0 Colonel Zeller P r;n in :i.nsisted on Generrl ,Tuin I s desire to make sure ti1a.t Gex"~rr.l Clark does not court on :bim in connection '"it t, 1 e Keyes o-oerRtion in an p.rea yr,. ere ' e cr-.n not possibly be 0t t' e time of t~e sc:1eduled orerati.on (1 June) . "3 . ':::'h~ news of t} e ,mccess of' tle ?nd Battalion, 111,?nd In-fan try h:1s caused all o:f' us to turn landsprings . 11 Clnrk to Gruentl 8r . rn 1706. 11 'l'wo regiments of 16t' novr on Honte Artemiso . 1:.iav-e 01.rectec' 85tla Djvision to atbc 1r along;side of '36t} . Attack s1 ould be launc: eel by ? r. •~. It will r;o for t',e ; ig' r:round in tre -r;icini ty of 99. 5 49 . 5 Pnd to t. e nort up to r.Tount Ceraso . IIPve triPd to speed up <' 1 Da.niel 1 s a.ttP.ck to t' e 'ig'. P,r01md north of VRlmontone, :)ut it rrobr>bly can not get off earlier t 11an duJ'.'ing tk.e n::ig' t . T½.e lfovrze Force reinforced will fill t'. e &;ap hetween U e !:5"5tl and '3rd Divisions. Still sticky in tl .e h'1.mnri.o area ~ 88t'1 less one CT will he in Army reserve until I see w'•ere t}rn ~oinP, is F!ood . It may be in tl e II Corps. T:Jhere r-ire t' e Frenc~? }us} t' em up w:1 t: all possible speed . '' General Clark tlis evening sent t'e following memorandum to General GruenthPr: AttPc1 ed is rm HdditionPl cormmmigue vrl ici., cr.J'Je out t1-is evening and w':i.c evoked some co::-:i.nent from t' e rress, rerticulnrl•r t 10 e vrriters for t1 e morn:i nP' n:npers in t'·e States. The,- claim t' Pt t;-"ere is Hn excellent story for ti e BritisJ,-. papers but not one vrorc;. '1B vin,c- been said about the lend battle on t},e Fiftr .~rmy front. They ]'.ad not' :nf" to ·,rite r:.bout. C'f course, I realize t 111>t ,;:i..,en t} ey put t' e special cor r,nu,irrne out on tl e joininr, up of t} e '"r:ldp;eheod ·f'orces ti·e lritisl mi';ht rve rid t 1-e same comrlP:int : ad '"'e 1 ad lritisb not troons in tl e ;joir,-up . 11 1 10 1 �11 Ti is ½rinv,s T"\e to a suggestion •v' 1 ic• you 111iP-,ht discuss informally first 'Nit'· Lem, nnd thnt is th9t d11.dng tl1ese tense tj mes w' An t}·e siturtion is moving rapic1 ly, ever-" afternoon b:,r t 1 rr-ee o I cloclc tbere r-J .o-',t crnne out an addition to ti,,e on-tr,e-record br>clrgrounc in 1,il icl:i they could mention such items as our c1mtu1·e of t' e ' ia;b P;round bnck of Velletri. Tkm.t is a tremendously important" 10nnouncement, n,nd b= getting ere in mid-rifternoon it gives the morni np; newspaper corresrondents Pn opportunit:r to get t'·eir copv b::-.ck in time for first-pafse U. ' • publicA.tion. 11 Flease do not start a controversY ,ret, but first !ave Lem look into it and see wl·,:,t cr>n be done. It soui1ds reasonable to me. inp:s seem to be r:oin,:,; well t"j s evenin,:,;. Brnie I s tanks ore coming rrtey are 1:111 in and need a rest. His inf Pntry wi 11 stn;--r in, and ~P ~les 1rno Doc 11.yder "'rill pus1 on to:morrov'. T1-eir attack, ':rit' trose of t} e II Corps And 36t1 Di vision, ma;w begin to .a:et decisive results. I prPY it does. 11 11 T' out. The addjtionnl CO""lr,uni(l_ue mentioned in the above memorandum is quoted belovr: 11 Tbe enemy continues to f2,ll beck undP.r pressure of our nd-vandng Bigbth Arm;sr forces "ft icr are astride ½ip-1w1a~ 6 on P broad front ;:ind h<1ve reac1-oed t~e outskirts of :r;'rosinone. 11 troors Tt may no1;1 be stPted ti·t?t P b£1tt2 lion of tl e Black Ha tel was e.monr, the wi ic•· made tl,e originP 1 hridge 1 ead [icrorn the Rapj_do. 11 11 Fip·1 +,9rs and lir,1 t 1 XJmbers founc:. onem: flPk exceptio:nall7 li,o:ht tooRy as thev bonbed rmd stro feel troops, bivouac arAas, gnn posit ions and enem7 l eld tovms in t' e bittle nre~s. No r10venent of enel"'' traffic was seen in the bPttle and Rome areas. nvP.rhavrks, T}nmder 11olts, Inwders nnd Bostons drorped 1-nmdreds of toI1.s of bo111bs on troors, isnns and bj YOUc".c areas near Albano, W' ic1' we.s rractics lly covered in smoke by bombinl!,. 11 Soutl west of Velletri T ·•underholts bombed nnd set fires in the town of Lanuvio. In tie Rome narsl·•p,llinf ~mr·c1s tJ:oe · strafed a locomotive nnd left it , • ournJng. II As of midnj gt t tonight the da:r 1 s battle casualties amounted to 633 men in the Anzio area, with a total of 1811- rrisorers taken. * * * ANZI0--,TTPIS 1, lq/-1-4--At 0800 General Clark \"e1t dovm to tl'e port nrea to vmlcorne tbe '361st RCT wl-:i c1 was lP.nding in LCI I s from t' e Naples oreri. Re met Colonel Bro['dlow, t'1e Regimental Cornms:r1.der, and wptc} ed so111.e of t} e troops debark. At 0900 3rlgadier Gooclbod:' came in to sr, • ,o;•-iodb;we to GenerPl Cl0rk. He is leav-inn· to join 'is Prmored brip;['ide. He hrs been wit' VI Corrs for tr.e pst ten weeks , and just recently Cf!me to t1 e AdvPnce Fift'. Arr1y Corrr110nd Jost AS Britisr M 1visor to t: e Army Comm:mder. Genernl Glrrk co11.ferred ,':'reouentl:v with Generr-1 Brnnn, : is G-3, for tl e re- �rnainrler of tt e morning, we.tel inf closely t1,,e bRttle ~rogTess rnAcle b:· II and VI Corps. He called General 'T'ruscott, GenerPl ~,ogles ~md General 'f,-,lker on occasions to P"et first hPnn_ in:"ormation on ti-,eir progress. I At noon Gener,.,l Gruentl er flew up from t 1 ·e forwr-rd con'nl:'lnd rost to confer wit' General ClBr}r. He, GenerPl Clark and Generr-1 Brann remained in con.eoerFmce for about 1 nlf an 1 our. 11_fter tl is conference General Clr.rk received lTajor Green- rilkinson of t} e ~ip;}'.th Army. Ee was sent up by General Leese to explain t' at j_f trie ?iftl· /1.rrry W"S ;:,ble to teke Ror1e witl- out assistance from tl e -r;ii:::;' tr Army·, t1 e ~-; ~l U A.rmy woulc continue its attacks further to t' e nort' of Rone in t' e d~irection of Tivoli. J\t 1400 General Bl'rr, G;;l.ief of Steff for General Devers, came to visit General CL•1rk • •After General Barr tr d left, Geri eral Clr, r l" 'vvent up to see Genernl Truscott at 1 is VI Corrs corJ11P:1d post. Later on in t e ;:,fternoon ; e received Generals Brads'·-aw and 1.amey. Fe discussed wit 1 Ge 11eral Brn.csbi.v1 anti-aircr~ft 1 matters. l\.fter supper Ge:ner<il ClPrk conferred 1·1:i.t"' 1 is G-.3, Gener81 Brann. f urinc-' t' i.s conference ..,e made rl~one cells to General :-_::pgles, Generril Ryder, Ge11eral };eyes ancl General 'f'ruscott. Ee vrr.nted to empbPsize wit'. Pll of l'!is subordinate commanders t11e necessit.r for an R 11-out offend v-e tomorrow - that tomorrow was critical - t 1 rt t' e;' '"'t:id to r,us 1 to t"'e l:init rmc '.'re nj ght crnck t)·e Boe' e defensive line. 1 :Ug1 liP..:hts of today's rrogress were t' P entrance -; nto Tfelletri of %t1' Di vision troor,s in tle lrtter ~9rt of t1 e ,.,.;:,ternoon. 7- e 34t: And 45t:- nade little ri,...or:ress. ':' 1 e 85th D5,dsion h,.,d reac1 ed rronte Crstel Laccio. T' is hs put t,,.,em just si,,ort of their injtial objectiYe, Pou:nt Ceraso. Tl e 88th Division in its attHck to t' 'e northvest ad-.rnced about a r1ile 0nd n. '-a1f. T 1a.e 3rd Division 'he.d cut Hip-lw:ay /!6 just en.st of VA lmonto11e and 3peciR.l Ser-vice Ti'orce troops were pus 1 ing eastw~.rd clown Route ?6. T• e 'Frenc' · ave mPde some PdYr>nces to t1 e no·ct'. 1"est. T}•e 3rd DJA will pass t'."rougl t 1 e /,.tL ;)~,TM at J'ionte LPnico. On t1°e r;;i1:;' t1 P.rrr,7 ,..ront :Sritisl reco1·mnissrn1ce units were just s'•ort of "'erentino. Tl'eir Ac1 --;r,nr::e :,es not bc:;en ver:r rPT~ r" t' rou,:l out the camrx:iip;n and has not ke1t rince vit1 Fif't~ _'\.rE1y r,clvances t'rouo·'out t~e bettle. :mportant messB.ges o:f' the day are quoted as follow.s: Devers to Cli:,rk. R"T F53358. "Included in a messnge .c>rom Gemeral · e:r·s1 all to Generr,l DeY0rs r-0.s t' 9 follonin,· nesSPf:;9 icl we } '-'Ye been asked to 1 trs. ' 1 pRss to you. m, is was oontained in messPfe "-4407'2 of 31 May. Pr 1 all and I greatl,. arprec 0 rite your Pction onc1 messages refr-irding Alle-1 'lro·m. You ,,_,.,_ve been '"10st t' oufrtfnl W'cl cons1rlerrte, dosrite our tri:,PJ.endous resporsibil:ities at t: e r1oment I• I! 1 1/ 0 0 AG'il\Jt to Clark • .1:J ,;,53437. ":·'.Rrk • Cl,rk, Lt. Gen., f"'rn,e•1.ent HpJoint"1.ent Brigt1c'l-'.er Gener::il, Rog,1lar -irn\,., renk from 1 ,:3epte'11.her 41 P1nounced Tera 1, 7iDS'"' ''110, dP..tAc1 31 ''Tay ad...-ises AG"\JAR. 11 Gener .l Slar1 t· is efterrioon c,ent tl 9 follo•"'"n: rnessa,:;e to G0,1errl 0 Gn, e:1t: 9r: "I 1 .ave .iust rotl1.rned +'rom t8.lk~_ng ··r"t1 mrusc.ott. I wo"L..lc~ "'Ot let "'in �)33 .,. ul1 0·1t ':,' r Prrl ir'"' 45-':.' ~ -· •;'. Gio'i. tr ri. -· t' OT( :: +;, ' l UY•(' b tru.c'r +,' ro 1.o; Cj qt,,....,...,,.., u.,,. to 1re1' etr·, ,,, i£"' ~ ,-, 'c··~r i+ ~('Jt.urpr' n+:., ""'C' ?ebruc· it ·n 11 rev :·'. rP.ctio 1 t0 r-"ro ! tc t1 '"' 1 rt 1'ff,s +,. .,.-1:. I":' "''1.t v1 i +} 1.rn i. 1"-: ,:,v ontire F --: '1i0r. :lO'T "Uj, · 0'3 ,d +:.o 1) :r. 'esn0rc:.n ~l, ..ltric-1:. .. , ..; t 0 OT'0::".,., 9ir:esli·nr ir +,1 "' "'r · ' i. s· o ";_:' r>'1c' .1.,1- 0, :4t to t e rest - 8. 71 i 11. c. rb=i d - v---ry screwv r 1d err _;__nro',',1- ,1F> ~-•0]11 ~; p ;_(';J'-' tir:l'~ ,.,r ,1e. -;: -'{ .,Hi., c.~-tz/'.' . ~m to +R'·A +' o ". ,'7t' ~rom t' e 4S-':,' , rio-8 :. :, ' · +.rrc1· + w' ' t tr +; r- 'lell-==,tr-: r r Hl r,...erfre to • eve u tc t n, .-s·. e ,t 'n:.: ·r 1 letr-: -· fl c"..<Jf'r. I •ill "'all tc.,,. • · 1 t. -t -1 s '11' rcur.ckd. Conplnd. ·•ri.t: t' 's, t' e e•1-l:,ir~ ..,,,)tl n-:_y-:si011. to Fttt=10' a, soon rs 7P1l~tr" f,Ps fror r·o 1te ~rte iE:io t'u9 11r •t'P;st, r0~ii.wnt, dreRst, or -qc,rca r.:. ;n.f<J.. '.:'' i.£' • ·p-' t 'e c<ei:!i.3ive, c~.d 70 w;ll ,lo ·+,. L tc, 7(: 1 ·L :-- ,;nr, rli:3Fno~_rtPd in 1 " .. i<;' ....,j"lg r.c> t' {' 4'.>t ' 34+; a.11rl ls-:-.. Ar· or0C:. :.st ,'i~;. c,r~d · s nE' 10 to -o in toror.,..ow - r·1st wait 'l--ioi) ,r 0 4 'o''rs. It 'rd t· ·rt - P:_ '""rs Josterfr:· 9~ccrc.ing -'-,c, "'ruscott. Ri'P,[' p t ;r' 0 iT1,l10J.::,,...; 1 11 [,-.re. EJ,'3 juJt ccir..., 11. + Pt +, e • '.:>t' :rr"'artry i-a s ..,1t Route 'I"> just eG.st of Valr.iontone. Spec::!rl 0erl":ce :'01·c1; :s ta ;E"mt to ~t flY0 JUJ.,tirr; sr:rl::.. L'Lo in i+.. 'J;(j ... ,1~ 00""1B • ~ r,{' icles p:_•J ..,,e,, ro...-:.ng out of "alironto.,,.e ~o •~- .,ost 1:.cl,"r 9 ,;rr.c"',.. e • ."t' "'rr,C:"tt, .~ r ,11est~f t,i,+, ~..t. Col.=)()~ .'lr,, ~re. 11 : ~n-.av.try. ~·ririnrF1 r"--1.;;. ·".,, ,-':.. ..:.iee w i=t .0_1 Cfl.1 le abo1.1t riasiY1-; ./,eele hfc 1 -l-;c. t'E' 0t·+,n Jr r trr:'...1, - ~c.,0. 'l'r·1sc0tt 11lso tors rir, ['11 TBF i.-L 00ror,, t 12t }'p_.:non rtn' " 11 r1k fll,m <io 11.c..t ri;et alon ~ ~t f'll . j do "10t Vlf'ff':. -l-;c, ' 1rt f\.llP.r.. :t ..,,n~ , tc. , ; j 1rso;"a:. dif.. , c,A ·':,j'3s. T•r-rrnc,r. c'oe3 net tru~+,. ·m, Pn" - cleSS :t is ::.CG ""~'SD. 1r,r<ir6 A.• 9'18~.f{8 -':.c T';c"8i:c t rm... ,' n~Tr:•,iA, as}i- t 'in in' a C'l'YJ. use .iur.kAllo~l ir.. V. t1~r:i.· ~ 1p: job. "TE'l'!'lOri i:n,C:. r-I":.lE'C',tt recc, 1 :1.d ti <it Jol(. r l r'o ·ztl, 00 ,mf-1'1.L'ing t'" lJt' tr r~e1 ..,A/J' •nt, t:- 1 P, • ~,,~e. fC'lO '31.', +• 8 U• ..,.. ~, "nr :st Cl'l qn e"'rc" A.11:;e. : 3,, ....... Lt ...,:.,u ·\r-!.:, 1 . . . UY) 1-Lt ~Pl... ~. 1-Ie r'" el11. l'j''lc -1-,n:•L • -v· sio:,, Po to }"pr~1or ....,n C'L ' ~r -. -'it 1 - 1 1 :s, 0 1 1 ""') 'r 11 - srr'rn to "J[lYe 'l,:, f';'• ·'r 'el} Y'J•) '"'[e"l.i.t<'CP, J,,,:} zs·J~Pte 'l,rard uf t.1'3 Lnt:'on of P"r_.t "~on -1-,·~ee Frere' i:vtsjc,nR.J. Co ~<1•,C:.ers. le 'l=l.i.il i" T nnu:i.r' s: Pct '-• , a -~e'1,;,"'f;e ~fJ i.r ' + ~ +'err al reque1t, '-J ,,0·1~11 r,,,'-'o +,' 1 1Fir ~ ,par+, ,n l t a,y' r,Jc,ue..:;t ['} 1 re •rl, C:itPtion t''i ,9P-n. 'lo not ·i.rtenc" tr .L".JCO ~~ lG. Jui~1 ancl IJe~•ont'1"' 1 )F':l't f'f,a · 1. , nti l l'"t01° :-(oI"e · .'13 +'r lion, sc } l8n.Jn e11.d r ·.cf'dio i.n r1 't"t8.r.ie to ~T\nc·tt;A, req ior +ir CJ 1 i:-·c o . . .L' 890 SL flt I r1F"' m7Dlil t· ,m ,,_,<'.\_"'o"•e .L; z _'rf--1".!1 :o in aP-ri·1 -"c-r t',.,, 'bc-stl. 1 ,,f ::c 1e. c·tr-1:.i.ons wi .1 fo 1 lo,,. 1' 2/ ., 1 1. 7r\rv:}. llGene.1·al Alem:i-..l"J.er ex 1-;,-:,rn l·ts,... i lSUl.slP' -=in['h · x l.mdqr, ri_ i. 1r, l''=:ld ro--ir' t1 :_:_ · ,' Arr:-. 1\ l l <iY-A'l CC' ~'Ad J'•')[l_(" c,tPrti.nr, r+, .. J ?.G3/1--1l. Pore ,..o,_lo s.' 1 11~1pnt' er t0 :;1F1r1-::. order +,o 1: 1 -1-:, P~d ' 18 P'•'lv' '}rr•,nt J.' 1., r, • J E'"./., ;, A'l"C8 I", ..1..., ,, ;+, 'Y' to ., 0' 1\.1.•r •• • u nr "'~y e~1t' ... r tc ~: ''\:, 1 Cle rls • / ) :::.. i. RJ. -1J A. 1(,. R~ 1'Roac' 11.t ,~ . . t, RJ" Pt "773 tc 1 . USAC o s-~, ~'. n'T "rm~-_::, l,~~11 .. ~ 70( J.. " 6-3!,"'l t0 , r. 0 '7()()?. P ) .L1 u 11 G0r0.r"l '1 '~rrl o·rS 1~vC' nl,,t'.""" >~Ur olri to 'r. ,·1c 1 ·rr.til Ar,1,'. .,~J·o. II J" ..... ir( r:iy :1 _.:' --c hJ . "' ,; �l3L\ in -~iew of estirn<1tec1 strnn:-it' of '3nemu- in '!ri lP1ontone nre~. l r>rd:; ng stronf in ·,elief it is uns01mc to ,·j_·-a Fif't' Arn - red ror,1 but 1 believe , -om case is so loE;ic.ol t' rt -ou ce.n ,"orce ;_t tl rou.•,.., Generr1 Ale~carider . i'"rdim~ st;:,tes t'.. at 1:-' }2J c!str~na l_irt'_ ri:round s' onld b0 s-'::.unbl:·,o- bloc'"" s~tu['.tion can be reYie1·1erl Again vrit 1 nury,ose of 1:llo1T-':•c '"i'i+>t 1 i\rF ·- to exterr' to Y10rt' into t: rt 2rea . r1ore . 11 1 1 1 Gr11ent: er to Sl~n•k . J:l,r 7904 . 11 Generril Juin still feels it irn.perBtive ·"or Fi.,-.t 1 Arr~ r to V-'3 Jlrcl: lin0 b01mdrr:r. Fe 9H;'7"S ,UeXPJ1 er prorosal is little bettPr i;,1 an gr,~er. 1-immrlp•·· r «.nd 'rs r;rept c:i S/1.c'-Vanta ge of rreventj ng Frenc' mq7.euver so esse;1ti<il. to success . It v•ill force Frenc' troors to r:arade in front of lalestrina Tieivl ts w ile Britis' are still ten rrUes to reer . }Ie unrlerstrnds tl.ot you ''lill -nrob8bl.r aut' orize 1 i:m to t2ke Palestrina Hei,,;kts reg:?rdless of bourihry ½ut of 1ecessit:,- fOU will be f'orced to iss1 .e t' Pt order too late to ena Jlo ..,r,''l1C1 to swing wide . 'Tore . " 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 Gruent' er to Clark. }FT 7905 . n-~a-ve ju it tal 1 ed to T:21°dini=; P g:,in. He believet, t 1 at 1\le:r~:i.ncAr n;:v ~l.'" to see , ·0 11 Friday 2.:c-ternoon or '-i8tU1·d.a;r morning . I vfill advise ''OU la.i-,nr tcrc".. ;::d t . In view o"' tl At visit , I r ,co1:1nend ··ou accept Alexander bo1mdfirr t0nJgl.t wit1 out nrotest. .::.:iturtion existLw w11 en 'e arrives mav give o,·c:itioral vein·' t to your nri::tment . F.orr1ing states t 11r.t if -present Fi~t· A.rT1y attncl· s' onld bo g dovm Alexander will re:vert to orifl'~nal bouncRr;r to Higl w1:1:, 6 to Ti;:' ::;:'-t1 Army acv.once af'ter rerrouring_ lnunc}comb5ned :?i Pt' Arm_; !"JJ1d '}i p;1 t} attack. n Gruent' er to Clar}- . RN ~42 . "Your. appo:Intment r- s rpi•manent gTade Brige d:er GenerAl tc date from 1 Septem1 er 43 :,,mounced -"n ·t,,-,r DepPrtment srecial orders . Congratulntions . 11 Clar}: to Gri1ent1 er 4 R1'J /,,_6 . 11 ,'\:;,preciate your d-t.+"ficult job on tLe boundaI will 8Ccert Alexnnder 1 s proyiosBl alt· our";' it dor,s not i:o;ive me t 1 e necesst:i.r,r room to !"Fneu··er Juin. :=11clicrate t' ,et to 1 im but t' ri t I ,·rill acco17pJ.ish my mission wit in Lis restr · cted area . mell J 11in t:_e decision 1 as bPen l11:<Jde . Rave l im re:,ort to ne 8t rr;r er ~ P.re at 1000 om's tomorrow riornin~ if convenient. 1.Rdio ~'11A, and ' 8 '•ill be net . 85t now on Cc1stel LPccio at 00.5 52 . 5 continuin1; on to north-rest . Tell rarding we 9re ~lread;v- 2cross route 6 and ; ore to sta;r , Lenee revArsi.on to orirrinal boundar.r we ore will not be nece•~sar:". I ray ,ard tonio-} t . 11 r:r. 1 1 1 * * * ATTZIO-- Jtnf~ ;? , 1'144~-General Cla.rk tallr:ed over t 1 e pi one to Generals Truscott and 'fplJcer earlv t' is r1or:nin['" to GMpl asize t' et sr0ed is important; thpt tre attPc 1, toclr>.J must be rus ed to its limit . At 0'110 le rent b ,iAep to tnlk to the '31Slst RCT, vrelcoming tl em to Fift Army and e:x:plr infog to t em the importantpart t1 e 17 vroul 1. rlr:,- in t' is PTeat Fifth Army drive . T' .e RGT is compossd of t' e 116th FA Battalion, Coi"lprn:r A, 31f-it• Pnf(neArs and GompPny A, '316tr :red~ cal Battalion . At 1030 General ,Juin Prriv8d 1w cub irom ·is HePdq_uPrters for a conference wit 1 Gen0rcl GL"1r1c . .At l?J0 GenPrPls Alexenc"er ;one. H,,,rc!ing arrived. At 16!}5 General Glrirk ~lsiw to II Corps conmrnd post for P conf'erence 211.d also flew o-ver Ve battfofi9ld in is cub . After supr:er GenerP.l ClRrv.: rnd GenerPl Brann, i,,is G- 3, discussed tJ..e new 1-lOtmdPrv 1Jetween :'<'EC nnd II Corps . Br1ttle pro£,;ress i:i.nd toclay 1 s e· ents 0 e included in t: e Armv Co,.,,,mPl'lrler t s notes and tl e important messoges ~toted ~elow : 0, 11 �Ge:r.ern. l Clerk ti,,is mornin~ dictated the following notes for inclusion in his di.nry: \ "Am greatly c'!ist:'ppointed in Truscott I s attPck. His :rroposnl lPst night to rne to move 45tr Di;,::i sior. out o" the line rnd swing it Pround to Velletri was fantastic. I nut} orized ore conbat team to il.o tM. s job, and it is not vet in the P. ttpck. 'T'he "l.ttPck o+> the 36th Division f'rom r;onte Artemisio and Rocca di rPpa we. s delayed until 0030 .nnd then werilrened by tbP conf'usion of units in Velletri. I am greatly disappointed. I hrve directed Truscott to have the 1st Armored D-'vlsion rerdy on one hour's notice to ·l:ie thrown in when the seI'!bleDce of n break occurs. This is a rr>ce f',-;_;ninst time, v ith my subordinates failing to np1°reciate hm" close t};e decision will be. Two Germen Division9 !>re on the WH;7 dovm, wrich mill, o:= cour~e, swny tlie tide if they cone in before we tA..'ke the Colli Laziali. 1 "T hr,ve had Juin flown here tod1P to speed hiil' up ta, debouch on Route 6 1''ith his 3rd DIA and tl,en turn toward 1 alestrina and Cav~ • . GenerPl Alexander will -,1ot ·"'ive rrie thrit Mi:i;h terrr-in so essential to protect his ·"lank. "II Corps is mrikin/J' prop;ress. I l-r1 vc directed Fredericl<:: 1 s exrloitrtion "'orce noving east on Route 6 to fricil:itate the debouchment of the French Corps, "or I need thefr "reip;ht bedly on my right. 1 "General 1\leXA.nder and Ge:1eral Hr>rding co!"le to see me rt one o I clock. I will tell therri plP.inly ,'hat .,. think of the restrictions they rre rJ,,cing upon me in order to rti ve ,,: ighth Prmy the posit ion in t:be battle for Rone. 11 Follo,,dng Genern.l Alexancler's visit., General Clar1{ dictated t:be following: "Generals • lexRnder nnd 1{1"rding lave come to see me. They were '}Uite r,eek. I expected more of' rm Prgument f'_fter hrivinq; receiv?d certain word from General Gruenther toaay to t},e effect thnt re regerded l{ardin!; 1 s qotives with suspicion. 'ihen Alexander st"'rted tc tell TD9 thPt -if' riy Ptt"'ck didn 1t r.;o h8re not to ''Jorry; thtt ·h"" rm li• bring the ole ..,...'iiehth /,_rrny in, I told tim thrt my rttack w,"'S going, thr,t I w?.s putting t 1e French north o·"' Route rl6, that I rrobobly would be f'orced to t;:ike the 1'igh P;rotmc in tre· vicinit,r of Ialestrino becnuse I could 6-j.,.,.. not rely upon the ';ig;hth Army to be there wl- en I nseded them. I told him thnt ~\ 'l · the bPttle wo11ld 11ecessitate doing it. He said to go r:.ght ahead. I snid I ~ "1 t" would clear out o? thPt Ei..ghtl-. Army area vrl-,en tbe Britisb ca.ire along to tAke over t}ei. r respo,,silJiHty. I "ltK1e it ver· rlain to him th"'t 1-ie was sandwicring "'!Y French Corps in nortl., o-: Route ~6 nnd tr ere rrnuld :1e no room f'or the 7:ighth 'rr1:v in Ve Vrilrnontone <>rep. I ·-ent to the T'l<'P so thr.t there could be no misunderstRnr1~ng nnd pointed out ex"'ctly my underst011c"ing of' the red J ~ne b01.mdt,ry · rl'i ch f¼ru0nth9r hrs bRe:n d~ scussing rdt]:, Hardin,:,-. t-: < 1111.. 1 f HAlAxaYJ..c:er ;:iro;--..cAed conpletely in my sche'Tie c"' menemrer for tre II Corps.' r-1a1;dinc,, WP s m,=,ek rs <=i nouse. ...,_ "',"ith reference to the publicity on Ro'1e, thev left "'J'iti~ ne P copy of the followin'1'. letter (quote letter). I ,,,r.ceed to "t 911d r11>de it plain tl1 at when troops entered How'! :r "muld radio 1Fi f'th Arrriy troops :bPve entered Ron e 1 , ancl Ale,cancler 8PTeed that he v1onlc1 release it qjr11l-'-~ 11Rou<Jly ..,11 over tl0 e rorl:1 on mv say so. T lPter nould determine exActlv ,,,1 rt 'mit ,,.eacl,ed tJ,-,9re "'irst c 1cl -,r~uld so a 1mo1mce thnt. 11 ~ 1 1 Ii,. ~ •t �'T'he dir9c+,ivA from A.AI regn.rdirg rress reler,ses uron t1-ie capt-ure of Rome, 1"1,c,nti0'1ed aboV8, ~:..s quoted below: nrn orcle:c;\ + u •':!D~.n_u..,e tl1.8,t the ::,9v1s o·r"I th.e c2. .rtl1.J..~9 of Ro ...1e is L.i0-vic~ led c ue re~ri_rd to s~m.ultP'Y'IJ~ous 1~elease tLe f·o1 - in a sat~ s:fPc.cf~o=~~?" v-r12~riner '\Vit 1 1 1 lovri11g proceuvre ~,il 7- 'he -i.o.orte.-1. C<o 1sor stops rill be in:' tiated .f'o:, tl -. ::..t:. anc will 1Je o~errt::_ ve 1mtil covo:c ed b~, - releas9 h3r on reco::--cl •:r cLgrounds . n 1. 1 1 t:_rnir<; 0 ~ This ITrJ will 1-:ie guided 1,y you t:1.roughout the :xi.ttle rs to the .L:1~ release..:~ o: t; '3 f\.~')0 110 1~J:r 0'1 1,..1?-corC bt1 cl~r::ro1.Jn~se ·,ro i11Pntion vrill 1 'e 81loned of t;1s rrr\,-, rr:':,j_orialit.i, f'ormrtion, division er 1.mit wl -'Lcl1 ertsrs ]( :"~ first 1 mtil relensed b:- on record ,x,c:-g-I'otmd . 'u'",3quently e.11 co1 ~- H:i.11 1,e cu~ referr:.'rc; to any other unit other tl e..n the onP rel eased . Co·"n.·ln-1 "r, • Ge:-ernl Fift> A.rr-,;i" will inforn trjs TrQ as soon f's possible which fornation , un:'it etc., shoulc: ')e rnle~1 sed in co::.--,n0ctiov1 \ it: H?,. first e11tr:r ~.nto ~r,1'·rr~ . n 3., A speciP.l cor. 71.mi me vrill be issued sir·ultPnAousl.1 :ln London, t shj,~pto::--, ;"1_rlc'le r;Pst, AI"T!), PY'.C:c 1-ocrlly in :tt::,.ly r~no-,c_ndnt; th:cit ncrs is riori in 0 A11:ec h,'1:rir1 s . ':11.-~s cor1r 11r1~-011P wil1 1·v3 issl1ed Els 0On :·s tl..e Connanr.~nf; Cfe11e1 re.l ?iftr Ar~y c ecii:'es t1,2t T--7 -is su,..f-'~c·i 0ritly in our :-~nrl s P 1_0 ccnld not 1.L.11.der· Any circ1 1I·1.str,11.ces )8 retFw:ll'>'Jd }tl e tJn.er1:r. (1n re core~ l1r·.C 1 "" "rOl ri' anC_ 1 7-ec 1 :n tl e l'10r1·1rtl \/ia:r . t~ 0 3~f -~c~ !:._l CO":rr l?]l~ r~u8 ;iil1 be f1rrc 1I bey ; ill 9r1tviPte ::.'ror L 2 AA: and wil:c 1•e r0lee s0c' throur;l l ublic n,e1rtio·13 c::2· 1nels to r 11 co1.1cernsd sts:t'":; t},e tiI"c: tt / "d tle :;.~.-:;lePse ~s ,aY1ctio11ed . 1 0 1 -r- 1 ''4. t~l--':.k,u/ t'. o 'rorrlinP, of t';e 1-it=J.c1·gro'Pc. or t:.o sp9cie1 corrn1n~_q1..'e i'r!f:'Y be , {;l~e"Jd ·0v 7iftic Army arc' t' is I' 1 it ";•ill not 1,e pe.ssed by FiftL .Prny to t'1e tress cl·'. rect . u I:mpor-c2.r.t vessages of the day a.re 2 s ·'.:'ol1ows: G0 nere.1 '.}ruonthAr se t t},e .r-ollorri:1g rrci,,1or2nc1un to G9nArrl Clr>.rJ, tris norninr:: "Your mess[• ge (iic: not r,•et to :1e tmtil 1: 30 tr:Ls morn:· "'lg so I did not call '}•:lrETPl ;f'l1~d--tn..,. or GerPr/<J_ ,Tuin 11t t},,·,t hour ., :-: hr.d alerte,' Gm1errl Cr rr entier to ti.~ rrobnhility th;:,t yon vmu:lc 1•1P.nt Gererr.l Juin ,·t Anzio at lG:OO l\ . ;·. this '"101"~inp;. T h2ve om~ y,eople try 4 _ng to get I' r.:"11er9r to co.,,':'irn nou. �Tlny r.,..e ~:oinr: to rut 01.,.t P SJ 0c-ir-l 1on tl-,-: record 1 :-01.er e "t "b01:t lSOO tocay. '""'1°·· 'l w:l 11 ,o'•e t' e ")n"i'' r_p- 2rnrs fer 1 J·n,, but ::: t' .;n}• t'1"·:; it i'1r:-11msatisf'r-ctory p·:-rqnge ,t~rt. A"": '1as P ru:;__e thPt tr.e cC'nrun .. 1w ::,_nc;': C'1. tr 9 record mn~_;erif' 1 will close "'t noon, i.e . , evnrts ur unt:i 1 ncion • • OW0V";r, they rf'rely r:itjcr to ,I.' rt t'rin li: it, 1 1:1t t}li.s t.;'"'J.P, ~h1rer~'1.; ·1sod -tt 9.S PYJ. exc·-1rie, .:.t .'.'oms . I hn.d Lel"" .,__,ry t(: cr.rri~e ~'1ru1n,r~r v, b,1t witr 10 luck . - cljd no~~ c'l:.~~ f· rclln; bec~use - co'1r;~c'ered it irrrpro,,rir>te to T""tf',r~ [)Jl ir, 1ll8 0~ t,1ic-- C~Se. 0 ~'e c<qJrs +;. 1 1"t G,.,,er:il Ale'>~9.n, Pr h"s ir:1 ·os"cl tle tFel VP, O I clock ti,-,,9 "'...:i.n't ',P,(''lUS'"' 0-. ROT' 'l et·J:;9 T;"'t'1 '1 • ~i ;' tr ~r ;" to ! rve lr·l:.0 c ph•Y-os ·~1c> ·n: 'eri tr9,' '1,,,ve ,,,ot r-.lw,,~rs bee11. tco "'ecure . ·.,:e ,-1.,rJ.t''l t1~~ tl8 •r.-,r,,tri r91.8E'Sa ~ulc: }-'>W~ 1"'1 to 1.<>Vf' 8-GY'9rP::.. Alp"'rr/er ' " "rrrovr 1 . llLem :u<J'!- c..,1_::._,c1. 0 tc,lc1 L~·rn tc t91.?'0, ro n111·tl .-r --icti.o:'1 . .~tl tr is PX('8l i1=mc~ he},ind r,1e -- be 1.; ev0 I 1 11 1:-e "'ble +,o r nc... :.e t1, 1 1en er se F3E'~~. sf'" ctc,r~ ly ,. .Hl do it ,7~t' out '::P'lS~r~ A "·1ss . At PPY rqtn 1 1 r ·ive :i-1-; ~;,p r•rocl olc' col}9r,e t-r•y. It.,. 1 0 0 11 ::- nn do~-~ 11 ~Ad O"lG'l" YOU.I' -nro7vtion. You 0ertPinly r'lrned it. 11 ti~I to Al7 Co•1cerned . R" "'t 1115 . 11 Ger11·('l fl')XP'l'er r'"''1 r8Ci)j7"cl thP 1 1 l "'V8 rece·'. v0c. t'ie "ollo' iri[' ~esf'ollo ·ir.,. "'"'S"l"t'{P "ror, Gen'1rl'l f:i_}i:-011: 1 1 rer . sar,;e ·ro7 GEnerP.l isT1ro .,,eP-i~s. Battle h,~YJ.ninP' in TtP.ly or. :•::-;r l:' l1~s rJ.rePdy ,·rC't:;r~rnsed f,9,r 0 >1ou·1 to cl,..sJed E'S c mr:-j0r A.llied vi.ctory. r"'fi.c"rs rn' ot:1fir r""l' s o·" ~11 ,._} re~ s~·-vicee cn l of• all }lE'rticiratiris=: n..,tio:vial .;t-'."''1 11:=>ve r0acon tr f'eel ;":i. "Ud of t;w f'"J''Vice they r"ve rf',rder8d tr-e co~10:1 C'1U'1e . C0.,..t11inly t11jr ur.ol9 co.·,ari is roud of tr.en . Ile:=i.se ,o;ive ny rersorial "'elici.ta-l:;for~ to t'1'} Cor':r11JrU~rs o": all three C:"!rvices. bnc.s . I !'<'IV<") repl-;Ad ~r ~b:> nollou:lnr: t~'Y•r.is. 1ei:;:rs. er, 1 Ah.-,p' of e:_::. rc'1'reo QC> the tl:c·Ae S"''·v~ces -:ie-"Vi"l~ ·YJ.-;;L~ ~:,.,,lit~rr"n <tr t.r'£'Rtr0 I -::-'1!'1''1-~ you or your "'elic'btions .<>nd Prrr,:,c~;:,t,ior. o ... -:r"'ir e~fort in tr e F"'sent b<>ttle. ~ve17one ~l'J. f;fertt i-ieart nYJ.d deter!"linn.d f'·'.nic;h onf thn CPIDfl"i[;n , Tl~e f-':rst pl'"Se of nl., ch.\ PS 'JC' snccesci ' ..1:1_ tmd~r VCPu· ccrJn"nc· l"'st :rer:r. 'nc,c;!'' 0 ,A 1 Genor('l rrrucmtr.-r S"nt tl0 .::'ollo·•ir,;todt=>y: enorrrc:.1u1 to rP.,.erE"l :1'1 riid-mornini:i; ''1 . I t11ll(0c1 to Ger,Prr>l 'fr-rrli:'1F' "'!""[11,n r few TlrJ onts (''";O . Ge110r"l flcxnric '"-'r hes 'ec'J.ed to 2'l'1fOrir t 1,e tnn0·mceront o+' .Lr,.,, "18U bounlnry until r,...ter :ii q cov,_ ... _re:'1"e ,, · tr you. Hn['r1'·hilo T ,,, ve '10t ifieo U e Fre11.cl~ of Ge11.""'rti.l ~lexander 1s tentr-tive oec~sion so t~Pt +,reir O'f'errt::or.s cnn 'ie concltcted in tre lirht o' +r,·t in~c,r1~<1t.,_on. ~ou, of course, ,,,ill "':Ve c'etc,iled iYJ.f'tructiors t0 G"'lri"TPJ Juir. vl•en you see l in tl is mc,rn:rg . Jn my c''<1cuss~ors witl' irprd~rig +,}e J01nt •rp not f'ettl0c' to ,.•ve us ]:l, -t l " :,o lcl me reP 1 ly amou,,tec! t},e ..-r-=e•1 boundr rv l>ey0ncl. tbe 'T' i vc li rrer . tot'"s: "'h,t Fll d' t, 3 r>r<>p to -1,l e :--rt r f th, roe' 1 ·De rtr.,,,-t-.;_np ,ri_t½ the Ii ,:l •rpy 6 roFd jul"'c-l;io:-1 ·-oPlC' he cv~i. 7 ,,11le +o us . In :: 1 "tPr di ,cuss::.on 1 e jrcl-icBti=>cl tkt ~;igl,tJ,1 Army w0ul<l :'1PCd s re ror>d'l -'-;o tre 1e':'t 0~ the r;reen line �_,vl e 019:""Elt· .. 7 · _,_ 1.OTlA._ 1·0n1.c:::,.r9renvS O ~ .._, e -r.i•r-1-,. JAr,.,..·r lt- ,., d been"' t·,..-"~ed • I took ,, ~ 1.,r I'.'. ofl J ,:,.L-' -that -i-,c- ner..n thl"t, he "rris prer-u·.:.1g " 'PG~e c;o ·!:,J-.-:-t t:1e Eighth frny bourdrry cculd ,1fl sriStnd clo'1'1l' townrd t:19 ori[":im:il on' Pt suer time PS r:ip-1 t be exr-=erH i:-rt "'er '.iP"l~t· Arey. I djn rot ,'iYl rflr0j11 g c1o::'1 on tH_s roint bec,.,use t't tl'·e time 'he brouP-l·t it ur- ::: ·mew t: --t Ge'1ert1l Ale:xrnr'er n>..s going to see you +,oday, Pnd :r f'elt thRt it VTas n ratter t11r>t you coul'l 30,ttle quite ersil y wit:~ him as yo 1r co'1 'e:rerc1-; developed . : rry he e'1+;:·rely wrong in estir.rtino- r9rclir>" 1s ;ntention in tl-:i f' rnrtter but I r>m incl.;neC:: to regf'rd hi"l motive w-i_tl; •·usric·ion . 'fril·e my o"'inion for v1hrt 1t rP.y be rort''l . .L' 1 n3 . vn1e1 I tol(l TT~-;_•"i11P- ti-js morn.;nr tb=it the AleXcnrler bounr'<iry does not r-.;ve vo11 the n-,cessai·y room to TW'1E"1Ver tre T-'re11cl1 he +,cld rn th!'t GenerPl AleJmnder ray ru ·ge"t [lt t1--1P. con{'erenc8 tod<:i.:, tl-wt ~le T're'1ch Gorrs t!'J<:e ()Ver some o:' tl'e nreP. ~.on occup.:.Ad by II Corrf' .;'1 thP vicin~tv of v~Ln J::.'( -C . 'T'l is s}ift ·muld P,T'"lble t'1e II Corpri to co"lcentrri.tP P. h:,!J.v:lPr ef~ort in tl,e ::-tte.ck on '::olli LE'z:.flli . re furtl,er strted tr--it -1-; i_,, rrrri11-;e"1t'nt r-~ ,c;ht enr'ble vou to const.:.tute an Arry reserve ,,hicr •rou.Ld ~er!"lit you to hPve cont'nuity o-n ntt11c'c. I [''lSUl'ed l'i.I'!l t1 ,.,t you T ere nt..11.r aw::i.re o:" t 11e imrortPYJ.Ce of' C1-1f't11rjw tle Colli lFziPli ;"'ea·;:.ur8 nrd Urt you 11ere :;ush:n: th;:,t Pttack rd th alJ. o,.. ti,e vi ~oi- vou t assess . "IA ,~urther sbted th, t G•;nernl A::.eXBncler consj derHd t,' 1at , f' 1 tl-iough our trooT.>s l r"/8 '1."de a J "'netrntion of tl e er.eriy de fsr"'e ;-,osi.tio11 , ·t } rs not y9t bee"! (eer ,,...,_OUP"1 to ~1'..sure tl1.c-t 4:.l:-'3 enemy ,1ill not be Pbl.e to sel'l ·t o·n"' • : ~nterrrP-t d t',js ...,i1 ... se 0 • ~l·e diocus-:;ion PS an rttA"1pted .,..,e:r talk on t1e necessit·..r ~f e.xrloit.;ng c11rrent S'lccesses in t17.e Cori Laz-'al i erea . 7 mn cr,11"'-idert t'1rit ;,rou ·.rill be :>ble to 'l1r'ke en ader,uate pref' 1=mtRt:i.on on +,l is ;i1b5"lct 1 /!'e"l Gerierr 1 J\le,canc' er arrives . 0 0 11 4. I told you lnst nir'l t trlf't G2:-1.err-i 1 Al8XFnder w.ill rrobMbly A.rri V':l "'bout 12 : 30 n . ri . too.:ciy. : <>rc'U.nr; now st,.,tes th~t Generrl U9XFr er is hr>ving SO""A Polish di.f'+'1.c·1.lt11-;s Pr.d th'1t l'is arri.v<>l 'rill rrobr,hly be clelnyAd . :re bas -:~ve:1 an -;TA s:10rtly r>:t9r 1:00 r .m T shell k"e:r in cny,stant touch ,fith . ldm, bec,.,use I rep li.ze how this lmcertnin arrivrl ti::''e "Till t 4_e yoG to your o 'f~ ce . -r ,·ill send you a nl.? sl. -~· ~ inute - c:m g:i ve you .?-. 111ore ·i ntelli r;ent esti. w-2te . 11 0 Ge:rierrl Clrrk sent tl-,e +'ol 1.ovr~ng ne111or1>n<lW1 to Gener, 1 r..rt..enthsr this qfter11.oon : "Received yo·rr r',rr:or11r. :u-1 of ::.015 h'JUJ'S encl 1·rr-<1 ,.,.7_,Mr1 : rr>cl. :5t ')P.fore Alex and Fn•rlinf" Prri ved . A'1 sn0r es ":.l e,f CF:'1P. 1 l!PVe Al PX tl e situRtiot1 , ,r} icl rle1?s8c< M.n gree.tly, ard he indicrted conrlete "Ccod 1?nr1 P.Y1thusiN1m 1it'1 ri:v emrloyme11t of II Corr3 , r,ar+.ic·J.1.rr·l y , A.nd o:" +,: e effort of the "'"1th Pivision ·in the VI Gor:is . r.:re rrtrer ~'1<l: ctitec'1 V1"'-+:, i" I did riot ;,,rih:i 11 ro of tri s ~1ot to •r0rry, thrt t,},e ~;iphtr frri.v "'oul1 <>gc~in C()re tn r·r rescu"l . I let t~1 P"1 lrve :lt pl,ntv rt -!:,l1Pt-ti"18 . I tol~ then t} rt J} l'IG_ 'hr r Ju:in lerR , WPS rutt"'ne; }1im in e11.1:,t o+' V:1 lnontone <ind nort' of R011te ·16, t;irt le •· oul<l trlre the h-' wJ-, -~L•011.rc" in the Palestrina ernP 1:-ecriw·e +}-,e Jritish 1 :oulrl n"t be tr ere . Tie ::;a-:d 1 ri_u~te rill r~ght 1 jus~ so-:" got out o+' th3 wFy :i.n thRt Rrea wlien trey did come un . He su-;r·ested I us9 the I'rench nflrt w2 r soutr of R011te t6 . I to 1.d h-i m "I ,oul.d rt8 0. mv mm corps bounrl-"l.r-i "~ "c; tri.P sit urtion r"eve:.oJfi<:'l '-,,lt thr-~, qssuredly the Fri:mch rro""bly could rele 0 9e -':.re ?rd D:ivision to me for oth0~· use . 1 1 �139 11 '.::'hP~r as:V.-ed "'IY r-rrrovF>J. on a IRC relee.se on the rews of Rome. I quite arrr0ed Tiiti1 lt pnc,_ nrir,e tre 111.tin tl:'At 0'1. "'IV \'lord to t} em they would relerise 1hnt :. '1'11red f'or. 1 11 Ju::..n v•as t·11e n.nd tr.oroughly tmd0.rstoof.. my rosition. I told Mm ~·e uould conf:irn my instructions to hiT'l in an CI and th t as re found it necessary to go nortl: into tre Br-i_tisl' sFictor l,e ould do so in accordance with t 11e si tun.tion. "fart of tl' e 7t:1 In..fantry is goin~ t0 ?ttr:-c1r PPlest:d.no t'ris ;,fternoon. AnotbAr lx>ttelion is go:ng to .:-ttac1 Cnve. "'hey rire cl_ose to t ose two roi:1ts Pow. Howze ras been directed on t:re road junction on ~.oute J1,S at 01.,.. 5 5 5. 7. ~en I t h10w d en h"' ni 11 get there, hut s ,e no rearw11 uby he sboulc' not be t1'ere by :1ovr. ~in.lker I s two re,:,·mo11ts iu.n.,..ed o,..f frir Racer; J.; I flrr t½.is norn" ng f't rbo 1 1t 0()30, and they l:rd '""'de slovr rrop-ress accord::r.,; to t'·e ::.Pst rerort, du"' to difficult terrain. Heve i'u:t +,H~ed rith r-r,ruscott who .Jays ·;alker -· s con~ident he rill rePc1 ½_js obj~ctive • .,. ½ore '1e i'1 rir,l,t. Still stjcky witr tre '34th and !/>th. 1-re1TM prepElred tr go bflck in wl1 qn the 4'5th hr:is nc.Vfmcec:1 ri little bit fnrt:""'r• "'1 ere 1 s too much +'fr:inr corfre; fror ~t. 11 T ?ddresserl tl-e '361st Conbat r"enm t} is r10rr. ·nr·. H2ve about decided to £!~.ve -;:,} en tc Luci,m to be ·n a ce-f'enr;j ve role ·11ortr of Velletri while tre r:bole 36ti1 poes 011 its vray. "'hrt leaves =8 ~p;r :in Fi.tr. Jon, Chr-ncy F.nd Fal as riy l\_rrrv reserve. , ., 11 Sure will be p.:lrd w}f'l"' we p.;et tof$etbr.ir. It ,d 11 ei.ve r1e an orrort1 mitv tc, n!'ly you the '10 w~li cb yo'l 'lPY I owe you flnd w' ich I, as a cif~Di .:ied rer,,1a11ent Ge~er2l, could not 11:ford to c<eny. IJm1 l P s consnnted to ½e riy aide P fter tr e vmr ,: en 1-" ,.,.oes b.<1 ct to heinf a rer~~rent I~jor. Keep up th ;cor ucrk! 0 11 F. S. I LPve jmrl, reBd ·•nrc1.:-~· 1 s directive to ··,e - tuhject, -ress RP leP ses - Cart ure of Ro"'1e - Ar. send · np; you a cor. - of it. You cnn l r:, ve [' corv Il1f'c'e "or ;vourse 1 :::· nno retur 1 this vre tc me. You T,rj 11 riote in f'BTt>P_;-.caph ld i e P"'nounces that 1fl.o~·,e is ro r ~J,. Alliec.. Lnnds 1 • } 9rpgi'1.phs b and c rAad I Cur P.dvancec< eleren+ s I etc. I 2 s1':ed LnrdinF anrl ;\ 7 c:irender i.:' ~.;hey meant thflt tl1e '11'1"'1e o:f the /Jrrv ·vras not to be rAle.0 s,t', anc they "aid 1 0h, no I fine told rr thet ·, woulri. send in a stt.te"10nt to th~ effect t'l-i.nt adw rce elerte11ts of the ';>j ftr Arr-y nre nou j n Romo, A.l1l' lA.ter, Ror '1 is 11r1vr in F · fth Arr1y r111nfs. The r ni.--rPed t},1t Fi t1-, !'lrriy vroulc-1 be used. roTrever, in this rar,r yoll no+,e they cn.re+',1Jly flVo:~c tlP use o!' 1:::-'ift: Arrry 1 n.ml ,r,v 1Allies 1 • You en 11_ r. rclinr . ; rL"": •d.iP+,Bly, tell him :- r' on I t "'r-rree to -!-;his rcrer .. . ; tb regflrd to rrir8g:rqrl 1, nnl9"'S +,hey nre, -'.1::.~n/'; to ·nclur'e in +J:9ir stn~omrnt t 11rt t' e advrnce 0ler"';nts 1,elonr, to Fi :'tr· Arr1y. Yo·, ':row I don 1t l nve m1...ch cc:rfj/ence jn :iim re1d wulr r.ot ')e surr:ri.sed ·1 f tl-ey oPJitted tl-e .:-i"'tli Arny. ""'Kl -!;}is ~)oi_v;'- clear +,o •1;.,,; tl[t TTrnr. Fi"th Army nfvcnce elA"19i'ts e-rpror-c-r, er.tP.r a'1d SF'C'll'~ R0,..,, e '"1e giv011 t'1e full credit :'..n t',e ~irst stRtenrrnt rr,d no orriittinr, Fi "tL Arr)". 0 1 0 · 11 ~ou •il::. P.l"'o ..,cte n ~9.rr ;rql? it i='f'Yf 1 rc "1"':rit5or w:ill 'e elloved oft'~ A:::•rl'T, r'l.tior lity ••.•.•.•• until r ler ed b_r r,~ t' E rec01nrl ½ c 1 ;ronrd'. ·•,,,· n ~1U'e thPt 1h')11 ::- •o-,d t:ier1 t"'E" +'~.Y' "t ·r ~orr-Ptior r 3 ' o·• -1-1 n ., ncor- · 0 0 0 1 �bac,:ground anc1 sb.te t'e:;ri. J,-:ly th.rt Arosr:'. C' 1 ,,::;,_e,,,e:1ts · e:~" t: e :ir-,-+;, t:1"y be -twm +,1 e crPd;t. 11 :t. Cl.81+ to Gru0 nthor. T " tlf>r~c~al · , :cv~LCe Force' 0. t to Colle Ferro. Too'• 200 pri.,0•1f-r.; w " bAve jc ~ v • 'rencl_ t' ·r ,. T9" l Juin to us} ~ e·•or+,spbnrt 'it'1 r Jl ~r00 l ·11i R.0•1' 0 () tcvrrrrl. VPl.1110,1tone. •Te tcrw lr ,,.., le:.r E "ert : ned~Ptely. ,., '"'V"l .1..<i.'·0r ••o mt CPr9.so ..,'1, F~or0 1-::,t· oen 0'; rr' 00 erst_· bs rrC::. 0354 rc.,..tri::1 s. ~5t>1 i'Tl 1es or ~ro'i1 +; "".'9 on Lr ..o tP''Ylcla 0.456 "':-o::-·i ·rt. :1nn8n':.s 351 Pnc' 1,,99 astrirJo :lout,:;'> bPtW""'n ()') EYi.c' C,~ 8a-,t·rgs. TPn 1 'S be1- j11.' -i-; -:n. :f-;qve d-t..rectod Troyes -i-,0 rus', · "'st v~ c-nrourl:~ ,i.lc"~ "'cute 6 tc'7orro • r•rve citor<'.3: '3rcl :5":·'"'~o'.'1 1 _.. ~usr on CPve A. r" r~:ns ...,ri·· . . . ill :et '3rd cort··nuc 4:.'1'lt. 1 0 Clfr1 • 4io l"'r1...~ntlor. l' 55. •r•r.,ve ':Ve1 ,,,>l CIT' to "\TT Cor1 s to hld "irn he se "rtr- -~t("'"'i ·1 01 ld.le Y'>th "d*!7C8S. ~St 1 [T ro--~r-"tely 1., ~-f'way Ero ... tl~re to Roccn I•: }A.pi.• ''o"'e ~o --;"'"':. '".l•no:1 ·n PP.;ri..11. tono-r•:..·ovr if 4')t: r'1W'nces. ,t:icky the:ce to 'ay. J <:ive ~01,1 r C"Pr": 11.0', to -<11-e any 11'(.:r-c rB pests 1 withort rrr R,1t' or~ty. ,:1rn I r 1 ' -"o= the.i r:iref':ter, yo1... tel: ·:.,: 3m T want trcr a:r prove(. ·tr r•ques4:.s 11ill ~e fe r nrc: far )Gt\ "E'n . J"' e .cr1y not reir norcod i'' ~-,,v·t 16 ro·u·s ·i:J. 1°or'"' tc crt"'!'- '1~n h,re. If 1," :.s "e~11?0rced ,1 ii::. err c:. \-' :"l arrywe.y. 11 0 ~ 'J:u1 r·al Gru.entLer ..,c :. t1·e folloni_ng r omorandnr to Ge~1or11l ClPrk late t):iis evening: 11 ·1any thanks for yo'IT 1520 r:,er;-:o tM s c'ate. of your corference -:r.i. th Alo:>."Ul'lc1er nm Hr :n1 'ne. It ga"'c'1 ' r ,_::(; :rL ·t. T :tc-' ·.:.. - "Len brought rie a cop:r of tre ' rress role:,se--copture of Ror,e I rarer tl·is Pfternoon. :rt is quite n coincidence t1 2t I raised the sane c::uPstion: 1· There is riftr ArP1y r:.~ntioned? ' Le~1 has s:5.J"Ce ndvised re th:ot the Fifth Array refere'1ce w~ 11 1')e T"'ndA. 1beyonc1_ t, n sh~dc' · of E doubt 1 • Ye says tht Paimvarin-,; 1·/I'ote tre raper, e·1d was a bit dizzy--not m<'llicious --at the time. L9r ~ s qui tc certr, in thrt tr.e lett0r hri s G1 renlv gon0 out, but he i3 ch0c1<inr,. I can 1t get F2rd:i n(l' no1 T, bi1t ~ sl1nll talk to him later toni~ht or first thin[ in tri=, rnorn:'nr: concerning tr is rmtter . 11 Fard1ni:; cellPd r~e sh,rtly a.(>t0r t'e returnnd fror H.r Anz:1 o vis~t rnd str>tef th.nt GenPr1:,l Alexander hrc1 notrj nq but the } : vhest rrEJ~ se :'or the v;r~y in ,,.,HcJ~ t 11e Anz··o or"'rntjons are 1,ciritt co"'ducted. Ve 3t:-'ted it \··t1 suer a s~ncere tonn thrt I :>m certein hP r-eprt w}rt Lo "kid . l'o" could ::i.t 1Je c,trer'Yi.se? To'1~ght :- a'r~ reell7 most opt·ir'!:istic . ~ t}in}--tkt tr9 success ,•,.ich ne h9ve )wd vesterday r>rid torlay has "11 rkcd tre t1rrninr: rofo.t ~:n tl~in bf'ttle. For ri:• p.-,,rt I ['m th~011~ 1~"' r~y }-['tin tre 'l:i.1~ r,nr' vellin- 17 Tip Mp roorey '. ··110th9r T an unrhf'L:r optin~ st:i c or not, tle nAxt feu do -,,, ~·~ 11 tell. JTorr0ver , I rust tell ;ro11 t'. 2t I '"'"'Ve r,b,ol1 tte Cr'11f'i,1 ,:mce tl·,,t you b,ve d~rectec1 the bPttle ·n n r1astorful fashion . I 1;:no·.. th· t G"rr-rn rA;i.1~f'orcomm1ts ar0 on tl e vm-r nrd j t :ls 'Y'O..,r>bly a tcuch-rnd-go •;•tt:r ,, tl r tlA' ":..lJ. rrriv9 in tine or not . Fo•1ever , n7 r:onn~r is on ~.?r1· · 9Jrne Gon"'lrPl Clt:,r'= first, 111st trd alnavs, and I rm only one of tlousarcls who ere ;:,inp~ng yo1Jr yrr>:'se. :: note vd th pl,-,asure thPt the 1st Arr.ored Di vii=;ion is r bout reM':r tc, go bac1( 'n tJ~o 0 ray. "?ro:-1 t'lis detrch,d t'lP.d inaderiu:=i.te observri.tion rost I nm �J:,op·· ng tb=1t th0 cc nclitions "rill be suer as to "'[Irr rt y0l1r :---uttinr Harmon in on tl c richt fl;:,nk . I feel thr>t -· s ,1}1 er0 ,rnin c11n 11 'mch the kr.ockout blou . 111 e-;.7'."ect to f'ly to our n ,,~ c0r'""Fnd }'O,t tnno~·row ev9ni.n · nbout 8:00 rrovj r1.ed co' rn.m-i crit-' ans are F<'•r'dn~ et that tine . e sb:i l l h_.-,ve everytr:'vict -'n rearl:'ness for ',ou by noon on Su,vic'n7. Yonr v, n nill :'_e[lve SPtnr dfl" P1orninr;, Pnd sllonld be instrlled ·n.ot later thnn 7 : 00 tor1orro 7 evenjng. \'9 s1- all Rll be mrn:it haprr to be to1ether o::;;ein. It has been a rather he ctic t"TTie but our 11gony hRs been noth-'nry conp;:-rec1 to yours . 1 11 T note th t you :u•e hu~lding ur a defense :'n connection w:th the py-:""·:mt o+' th1:1t '10 bet . I 1-:no'T tkt it ust be c,wbarr[iss;ng tc- ;;ou to contenp1tte t',e nonotonous refJ'ularH,y ·-rr,icl marks tl~e success of rlnost fill of •w P,Amblin': venturDs . In ~ 1 is ccse I r-u.~t ric1nit that I r:=>c' P v:i!'tuti.l c:.nch . Hitl• the F1ith Prrn:r C['I1f"'i.gn r,oing so 'ell ~t was .;n<wit""bJ.0 tl,,,t you s}•ould 1·,e conf~ rned prior to Ju"lc? 15th , so :rrc con scit=mce really botlvTs ne . I 1 11 .. te 1 l ~rou ·-rhPt we'll do . Orie of Colonel ru.nt~nf,-ton 1 s friends brought a J'l'lCh:-p.;e ;ve-=itcrdr-r sa~dnrt, ' I ' ve brourht soT 1 0 linuor for Generl:'1 Cl::irk and you '. ''h0.p I orn:med the fPC 1 :cge I fourd t}.-,c-t tl-~re ,... ere three bottles of bourbon . 1 ror1 1101 1 in +l'f~ ~wrld can ,,e divide up t}u·ee bottles anoru5 t•"'o people? ~,fter cons:.derable coi;itation I hnre "rr·· ved rt U 1e solution tb1t one ½ottle ~-rill go tr you , one bottle njll cto to ne (a:_;:,:=-;, :tt h~s n.lrord;t bee-,1 c( nsur.1ed ! ) rind tre t 1 ird bottle vdll he 11s0d "'or c cel9brat7 on- -let I s say on f'-onr:a~r n:l ,.,.ht , then "e ' 11 cancel all bo~s . Ho'' about it?" * * * A'TZTO--,JTPP. 3, 19/.;,L,.-- Aft er sturl~·inG bP.t,tle rerorts [Ind crrfcrring w:th Gene ral Brann , Gerern.l CJ.ar 1' left to visit e.11 di. v:sion coI1!'le.ri(1ers of the VI Corvs . At 0010 he 3tor,J eel at the lot Arl'lored :Jivision conFmd rost r:rd tall:ad v :lt}1 General :I8r111on . Gen0ral Hr>;rmon he.d "SSer1 bled his unj t cori1Yn' ers arcl '"Jas prep"r8d on ver-r short notice to coI11nit },j_c; di vj sion on the left of t}1e /,5th Divj_sion sector . Generr 1 Clrrl· disc11ssecl his r 1r ns c nc1 emrhrisized with Ge 11cr2l r:'rron He necessity -ror ri;,,-rensiveness , tl 1 "t t,nr1 ry ·,p~ th"' clry th;-t ·~o mu'1t TTP 1"9 nn all- out ef'fort lv:if orP tl 8 Bocl e co ult' br' n 'I UJ l,~::; re i1:."orcemcnts . Aft0r .b8 7 e+'t t is cor rnncl rost h:., "ent to tJ10 !~5th D~ vision COFman.rl. rost p·'>( t:11)-0<'1 •;Ur Grneral Br ;r;les . } e [ [;l' in er rhr si?:ec1 the n0ces1=:d ty of ~-us1,,ini:.~ all - out , bri.nging out, th~ fact t1crt jt, was ;mperFtivR thrct t}·e :1.dvn.nce CC'ntinue to +1 9 1orthrrest. Fro.,, the ., :;th i1ivision commr,,-y:i rost ~10 ,-,e.-1t to tlw Cf o.c> the 'ii.th Di vision -here J-e conferred ni th Ge'1er£' 1 Ryder :=i.nd ::ipr·in enpk1s, zod tb:~ nece--;sitv ..,or nn all -out attrck toce_y. The rords wern v;;,rv c',,sty, f"1C t,} r,r<; ,.,:,s rnuch !trtillcir;,r ·f'~rirg throughout tb0 division arert·s . 7 :'ron t},e 111-th I'ivision GP he rroc8er]ed irr.""ediritely to trc 16th Div:i.sion rost norti·, of VelletrL T'nrout~ to tr P, -;:6th Di vision ttere 1,ms "'Virlence of nucl· clestrnction of Boche rr.et0r" '".ll. Bocl"A Pnrmnition mis left ,'long t}'e ron(1s-' de , rnd tr ere "'ere ,tj 11 so-·1e G-ernnn deivl tr",t rP<.:i not been dis posed o"". At th" Y)th Division corr•''"'Pnc post h'=l trilked · jt,11 Ger,er"l 'r,l1 ~er concern-inc• th~ 8Xcell8nt •Tof'!'CSP t 1 1rt Ve ·~6th Division hN1 rrde . "}1ey hed secm·ed pr act icri lly tre entire sout11err, ::--ortj on of the Co111 Laz~ r li and r ere pus 1·ing ahee.d to t.11e north~;est . He enphr,sized ;:'.th GenF!rPl FPlkt?r the comror;·nd 1 �necessity of rushing ahead vir,orously and at the sano ti.."le ·wiping out all Boche pockets of resistance between Lave Albano and L ke de 'fomi. Gencm=il Clnrk then rroceeded from the 36th Division co!'lm~nd y:ost back to his cvm cor1ma.vid rost at Fett1m.o. Be arrived thArc nt obout 1330 and conferred brjefly Tith Generr,l Barr, Chief' of Staff to General Devers. At 1430 GenerP-1 Sevill9 caF!e in to see him and talk about tbe air effort that was being "lade. Tac R had reported heavy GPrrnan '"1thdrmw1s to t1,e northwest toward Rome. Our artillery fouJ'ld rany lucrative trrgets on '-{j ghvmy #6 and plnced nurderous co:"lcentrat-ions on c0pn;Aste;d Gorr<-r, traffic on th"t Mr-,h my. The ~ gl-'ter hornhers rnre also ",rking on thi"' tr1:.'''fic. After GenerPl Savil19 left, Ge'leral Clrir;r cor+>crred i.1i+, his G-1, G::rv,or;:11 BrPnn, for the balP.nce of tl e afternoon. 1 Colo'1el Clr>1' 1 , Fift!, Ar-my l RO, CR.me in on sever::i 1 occ8:1io.,.1s to corf er with Ge:r8ral CJrr 1• reference on-tJ1 9-record hncb:::round cOTrr u..n.i me:=- to bo role1: s9d ~nr n 1 so to ...,~ 'ce arrcnP-e:-r-9nts for r 11otot',--raph3rs [ind c, rresponde'lts to acconpan;r qeJ'1f"'>i'r> 1 C1Pr1· -into 1.or.ir> 1,;hen the Fiftr Arr1y enters the city. After surror Go''i?ral Cl['r' · con+>erred son8 r,oro w~u, his G-3, General '9rann, and Ms G-?, Color el Hana.rd. Ge,1ernl Cl_prk was a little Pnrehensi ve "'bout th0 right nortl ern flr>n 1,. of' II Corrs, and he taU·od \"~th Generel Y.oyes on several occasions concernin?- t},is r;-atter. He wanted General Keyos to be co,~tinuall y m'l11re o ... tbis threat. BA al.Jo tr 11':ed vrj t, G "'Oral Gruenth,.,,r and ··anted tl c Frenc}- Corrs to s1oed up t}1 e 1rd DIA to add Pdditionrl ,rei1.:(1t to t'ri s t}-!re;:-t to tr e nort), f1Pnk. 0 1 1 I-Tigr]j d1ts of torlay 1 s bEittl9 rros=rress indicr-te thPt tl e p-ercrrl brerikthrough t0nard :,.ome vfit}, all of t}'e Colli L."l.zia1i in our lwnds a"ld the Bocbe in a prec['rious rosition. He still offered cons~ derc>ble resistrnce :in the /+5th and ~4th rnvision sectors sout}, of L.-=1ke AJ.bc no. 'f'here wa,; tre y-rob_ .,_1,il~t" thrit t>1 0 encny 1 s commu11ica.tion syst0-m had fDiled co:rny1etely and thrt these isol2.ted i:r,i~oups in the south vmre U..""l[1rmre o-f' t• is brePk-through to t' o north o•" LaJro AJ.b0no. Tndicctions are that tl is resistance on the noutl wil1 witrdra':i- tonid·t r-nd trvt our o,dvnnce to Rol'""e .rill be fast. Important messages 0f tho day Pre as ro11o,,,s: AAI to All Concerned. W-J O.?851. 11 To enable Fiftl· Army t(' dovelor its operatio'1S in trA Prea. west o:' Vn J.Jnor:.tone the inter-arr(, bcund['ry , i 11 be r,oved '1ortrwerds to t''A fo1.loniri:; i:ren0ral line inclusive Fiftr Arrny ro;,d junction 2634q2 exclus 4 ve Fift), Arr-:r rc::id jru1ction 2':,?L.82 exclusive Fifth Army ro::1-d Fnliano - Csve - F· e:.::trfori - GPll ~ ceno - Ro::i/l junction cnorn2. Fi.-:.'tr /-rr:yv,ill howr;ver hnve tnrninf" rji:;}·t 011 rc,rrl C·vo - In1-1strina GP 11; cr-,no till "":ighth Army troors ree ch tb~ c~vc 1.rct1 \7t An th1t roPd ui11 poss to complete c0c1trol of "'ir;rth ftrny. If CG, F 4 +'t}, P,.rm'r f-in,'s : imself unPble to drive thA ener.w off th0 Colle I!"lziali fe;:,tu.,..e c1l,r.;11g the next few da;,rs h~ ·-•ill rer,ort tl'iS fc>ct b-· most imr~0d' "t'-1 s:: p,nal to ti is reN qm,rters reronti.,.r; to Eig},th Ar'"!Jy. In th.'."t P.VeY,t ~i~},th Army Fill trlrP. over the front dmn to the originrl tn+,0.r-Arl'ly boimdrn~,,,. fl'1.C1 " coribfr,~d r-tt1" cl' by botr Arr'l"' es ,1ill be ctP "'ed. I:1 1:1ny ovon.t wheri the '"''19ry hr· s 1)e<>n north of tro roPd 1lome - Tivoli t} e origi.,.11A.l ~nter frny bound ry "ill be ro·n.,.tituted to "mal,le r~ r.;rth Arny to r1['~ ntriin its form,,,tions in th,,,ir 110v"11ce northvmrr's." 1 �Gruenthor to Clark. R'I 361g. "Your instructions delivered to DeMontsabert by Juin. Jrd DIA has eler1P.nts 011 re ilror d bet, ·een 15 and "0 castings. Repu 1 s~d strong counter fl ttack f'rori east on M Ii sso but lost 5 ligl,t tr- nks . AdVl1nce rrill be res·tnod 1:1t first 1 :i F;rt to ,r>rd Valno:rtone to nnk0 co'1t;:-,ct with 0 1:raniAl. 11 Gcnr,ral Gruontrer tr-is mornjng sent the followinf r.1nr1or;:,ndum to General CLnrl-s: 11 AAI received the follo"ing telegr, rn from AFHQ tris nornin.c!': 1ItequAst li.£ s been r.r de bv r oli sr' Co:t1tG;-:ir,der-in-Chief in London ancl indorsed by GIGS that a d~trchTient of the II Polish Corps p1rticiprte in tl~e Emtr;,.r into Rome. Please conf:irn th,t rtecessary action "fill be tn.ken 1 • I told u~rding that you werA not planning on any formal entry into Rorie; thrit you were r,..~marily conc'3rned w-:th the r,,il1.ta.r7 situn.tion, and thrt suer entrance o:£' troops into RomG ns ··rill talre rlrce ·'fill 1,e dictated b:r the tactical situPtion. I also told him thrt 7hen it cPrie to tre ri.uest:_on of r,uerding Ror1e thnt you will rut part of An An:erj can dj_vision tbere so that tl e necessflr:,r transrortf'tion and other facilities which HAT0USA cannot rrovic'le will be avail~ble to tre Area ConnPnder of Ro~e; trat it is your pl~n to also rttach to t},is force a battalion of "'rencr troors and a oottalion of British trriors. AAT rrefers thn.t tl is battalion be t1;1um f'ro!'l 1st f'ivision if rracticable. tJprding is not insistent . Advise Don if you concur '30 tJ:-pt on"' can be tent~tively earmarked . 0 npardj ng strted thrt your J'll'-1'1 is exr.ctly in Pccordance with General Alexanr'er Is desires . Hovrever, J-io ½elieven thrt Ger,eral Alexander has in mind a formal parade o:f' allied tr0op3 at sone later dnte. Fe conteripli-tes a ceremony similnr to the one vrrich vms held in Tunis. The r~rade there was held about a wee 1r a.f'tor Tunis was captured. I told Farding tri['t I would p;:iss tris informntion on to you. 11 Hy recoy,T"',:indDtion is thrt you jnstruct r:ie to tell A.A.:. that you definitely do not desire to l1 ave any r1isce llPneous detr> chments ( the Ind inns enr1 the ~revr Ze11lcinc1ers ,;jll f'lso put their bids in, T an sure) entBr·YJ.g Rome during +re early days; that if General Alexander c,esires a formal rarade some days after Ro"!e is cartured th.,t you will subrdt a pl;:,n vrl'ich rill rrovide for the inclusion of allied troops.n General Cln.r:V rerl; cd to General Gruenthor I s memorrndum as follons: "Sure enjoyed your note of 1030 I.·-. ve..,terda~r pre dion 1 t enjoy so ruch your one of' this Forninr r£~:f'erenco the T'or1;. See if ;,rou crin -:et me a courle of thou.sand Swedes to rnn tl,rcugb t}0. ,~coos :h1 Rome, then I'll be :,11 set. You roli tely tell t},er 1 th,t T 11r not "'reminr; the tri.cti CP 1 entrn.nce of troops jnto Rome. God and the 13oche ::re dictPting tl;::,t. : wouldn't lcnou wrere the hell to plt anybody to ~et t 11ere first, the chPnces :ire so even 11etween VI rnd II Co..,y;s :vitr m:r mon-,y iust ::i. shade on II Corps. Tell Alexa:rrler I co11e11r in his idea to bwe e big pri=ide about i=i weal· ll"ter, but 1 et I s p;et through ar..d exr lo1 t our success to t1-ie nortr r>nd Civiteveccl ia before re thinv- of rarndes. �Also , tell Pt1rding and Alex if necJssary and Lem to please shut off jmportnnt f j remen who want to run up here as soon es the capture of Rome is irrnninen.t . I insist ths.t I be f' sked fir st . I don't want to cause l'my more trouble nnd kno'.'r you CR.n do it diplornntically. 11 Got it SP.Wed up a million :rer cent g11Prn 11tAed tb::it the first comrmnique which :indicates troops ~ n t'be outskirts of Rone :includes tbe stPtement that the;,r are Fifth Arr~;r troops. Also , the first stA.tement tb2t they have occupied Ron"'l must include Fiftl Army. I ',vill ste.ke everyt:bing I have got in cor>1batting any ne.rrov-minded individual who will not :=igree to tlis . 0 1'Tfow , in order that vou can yell 1 uhoopee 1 , the news is great . I hPve just come f'rol:l visiting ever:v division in the VI Corps up on the high ground north 0f Vclletri with Walker and all. over . 7/elker hP.s the high ground at Rocca Di Fe.pa firm. Ee is continuing the attack in the cUrection of Rone from Hnrino . One of Ms battalioris should now be firn betueen t:be two lakes on H. Gent iles . Howze tas1{ force is on Route 1/6 under Ti'rederick nith two batfo.lions of infantry and 100 tanks nbout ;phere the 97 easting crosses Highway 1/6. 85tb Division is abreast of J6th Division. A French battalion is in Falostrino and a French battalion in Cave . The 1.rill is here, and I have just i•:;sued instructions to all of my subordinate cor,nnnders to rursue relentlessly and destroy the enemy and not think of Rome . 'T'here is still tough figliting , parM cularly on the front of the !,5th Division. Harmon is in the act of being corrritted no'7. Flease do not com1m1nicAte tM.s over-optiJ11i'3tic news to AAI under :my circ1 mstl'lnces; on the other licnd, indicate we rire rnaJdng ourselves firm on the high ground on bot}, sides of Rocca Di l'l"rn and thPt the Fov,ze Force is pusring out on Route -/i6 against oprosition. Let them know I consider the goini:; satisfP ctory, but you knovr hov, rerred ur they get, l'!rd I mriy be a little overl;r OJit:i.mj stic myself . 11 By all Jlleans come to the new command rost knight if it is hwnanly possible . I will fly over and meet you there . If communications 2re in it will be f::'i ne to hflve you there . If ,.re sho ld enter tre out skirts of Rome tomorrow, remeriber you Pre to go vd tr> r1e . 11 11 Remenber the young bu 11 vrho j tunned the fence? Re 11, I t 11 g: ve you tr1e :tlO and drink both bottles of booze if tM..s i1orks out like I think it will . " t}, is General Gruenther sent Gem,rnl Clnrk the following memor,?ndu,'TI at 1615 rours D fternoon: "The Command rest hr.i s gone to ,hell . 'fo one is doing 2.ny wor1r here tr is eSternoon . .4.11 semblr>nce of ,~focipline has broken dmm. Although the G-3 Vfor Roor1. r,urposely shovm only a noder;:itely conservative 1,icture , every pilot-ever,rone in fact--vrho has cc.rte from A'TZIO since 10:00 o 1 cloc1r tris norning has brought back a prd.r of' pants full of snts with the result th;:it this unsuppressiblc wave of optimism l'nd exrect.Dncy hP s swept t1~roug} the headqurrters . I try to wear a loni:; +>8ce riyself but I Pm hevirw H devil of a time dojng so. 'w picture to FPrding hPs been: •The condition is favorable . Generrl Clrrk is quite happy mth the situr-tion but he vdll make no rredictions . His big Prnbition is to kill Germrns and then more Gcrmrms . 1 General Alexander made several complimentary stPtements in his r.1orn~ng conference ebout the way you Pre conducting t:re bettle . �"Yonr 11.15 lettP.r just rirrived. It cont1c1ir1s suer verv fine ne rs th"t I ':lP.lfi 1hly goinr, to ceep it to T'i;fSAli". I quite q,;ree l:"~th you tl1"'t H j s "i nadvisabl9 to rns3 on r>ny of that inform::ition to AAI yet. DI'1 11 'l'he directive on rress release wl ich :rou discussed nith Geri 0 rr>l l-fr•rd:tn~ yesterd~v ,..Rs r~ceiwid here officiall;r this nornjn1:;. Lem hrid told me lPst evening th"t he "m.s quite sure it had Plre:::>dy beer> i ssu0,d in the f'orn sho·•:n to vou. T hrv'3 p tl oro,ir;hJ.y cler:r undcrstr:nding ·•it:li Gen0rril Pr:rd-'ng thAt any cor~rr.1-mique wM er i e; j c;suP.d rnnouncj nr- the entry of Fift:l'' A:r'f'ly troops :l nto n0 1 ~ or into the outsldrts of Jl.O'E will g:i ve cr'3dit to Fifth Army. Hrrd:ing stntes thfl.t he l'"S r-iwm :instructions to tl is ef'""'ect to '1n.ini-rr-ri.ng. :r hrive co'1f'i:rm d. thrcu ;J. Lem thflt " c}~ instructioris have bPen i su c'1, l'H"'C1 th,,t there i, r.o evidence o<' D'1:v t~ndcmcy to g::p the Fifth Ar1n:r in Hs our o"' triumph. The com:nmique writers, ;nclui4inr: Goneral '"upper, Arnric"'n t'RO at •TAT0USA, aro tr;v-inP" their hr>nd at r> few dri.ft cor·,.,unjques this 8fternoon. They will be suhmitted to us -Por our co,..,mff•1.to. At tJ,is v:ri ting three J-i,we heen suggested: 1 1 0 1, (2) R.rT"' ?.i\LLS "'O FITTP ARl'Y "Len teJ.ls r,e thFt there rire Plso soverr-1 lon~er v9rsions -in tl e rnill. '!'he ehove e:xpmplPs v~ s 1pl :i zo rin unexp~ctedly r.opid entry. Lem thinJrs u,,.,t i_t j s ~r1rrob,.,ble thr>t sucb a sho,...t flas!1 ,ffill he issu0d. T ri:ove sent you P l"lessat:;8 sw•p;estinP" t},"t Ven O]Frk rrepare P drrift. Len sa:vs thrit such a drnft will 1,e "BlCO""'?d by AA1. You riny rest "'""·~u:recl trat it wil) be tioorougl·ly vmr 1~8d over, by everyone in the HeAdqu...,rters ns rell rs by the AFR~ cro rd, but it won't do any },arm to rut in our idePs and it rir>y do some good. 1 Pfrrdinr- st,,tes tl~"t ;,rou rm.r count on Ge,..,errl Alexr>rtder 1s PulJ cooperation in 1:eepirg visiting husv-hod7 brass hats +>rom tl e R( f"E areP.. I PT'l ~onvinceo Uwt he Hill do evor:rtMng he can to cnntrol this l"love:"ent. Yesterd:-,y, for examr:J.'3, ;v-our ver,r close .c,r-irmd., on-re f''t~D, sent p stn.+'f officer to AAJ mith lll'gent request th,1t the staf"./" off.; c0r bB allovrerl -1:.o enter RC ~!F. shortly fl "'t~ its capture in order to select sdtf-lble 0,..f'jc9 "nd livinr- 9cc01-:r'"od11tjo1'1s +>or the crrc r=n staff• The 0ffic0r CHJ'18 pr9p'."•red tc l"lOVe to RC''E ir "'1edit>tely. rr~rd:ng sent him 1:-Eclr to tT'J T.J~S •r'tr a 1 no sottp 1 Ri'\Svrer flnd r1e hrsn 1 t been herrd ~rorn sin8e. Of co'.irse t 1 ere 11re go~n<; to be lervs, hocruse the rressure of VPrious ind~vidua1s tr;r~ng to enter vd.11 be terri.,,.;c. vo,;ever, I belfove thrt tle sitll.3,tion is gen°re.lly rretty "ell unrler control. As a ,r\f'tter of ~ntr:,re.st, th"" Greek Arm;l has npr l:i ed for rermission to c• c:nn n Greek detr er nent for the ~ ni ti.- 1 occupr1tion o:' P 'IE. As I told you ~ n my letter tJ, is r orn~ ng th~re is "OV' a thorough meeting of tl e mi.nc1 s at AAI that no detr>crir'lents of Greeks, I oles, IndiPns, New Zef:l.lrmr'ers, 0r what-nots will enter Rome until tLe f'orrml t,:irade is rield. Gen°rrl Alexi:mc1 er will consult •rou concern-' n<; the -"'orMnl l f-lrnde. A ft-3r I sent you ny morn;nc- letter he mPcle tbe remPrk: rrn1,e formal n-...,r11d.e May not ta 1,o r)pce untjl as lrte as t"'O '1 ePkS rifter the Cc'Tture of"<('"'";. I am convinc~d tt"t the dr>te must rlepe'1d eritirclv on tr·c tPctic~l ~jtu tion. 1 I v.nora- t}Pt t1,,is er-resses ,r01ir roin+. o" view exe ctly, A.nil .,. do rct believe th~t ·r8 shRll li...,ve :-,ny trr-uble on th8t score. 0 0 1 0 1 11 I expect to 7 ePve here 1:w c11b at about 7 :00 o I clock tonj P'ht. I 1 11 tele- ��phone you as so0n r-s I arrive trier'). Jt is quite ro""s.;ble, of cnurse, thr.it .'.'lt the last rrdnute I rn'Y r1ecide not to CC>'""8 if I feel th,<>t I PPl n0eded ],ere. 11 Clar, to Gruenther: iJ 57 . "In .'.'ln OI today l'lm setting ur 3rd Di v5 sion less one coTrJ.1-iat terom ,,,.,.jth the ,..,rench battRlion you }'PVC designrt9rl rlus one British brttalion from th<=J 1st British Division 11s tr1e troops to garr~ son Rome. Both seprate hottRlions 'Till b<=J ottnched to the 3rd Division and all under the command of Johnson . He has been notified . J lease inform Brnnn o+"' tre bat talion selected ½y French to <=JntAr Rone. 11 General CL~rk sent the +"'ollowinp; menorwdmn to Genc--rrl Gruenther ,iu'3t 1)efore <ljnner this even"ng: "A Lt . Col. Olson, rr. S . , from AAI h,.,s rrrived r-t ny J-endqwrtors with five Yugoslavian officers vritl' ~:1structio:1s fror'l Brigndier P'!Pnn0ring thrt they rre to tour th'3 front. ''hy A.TI I not cons1 ·ltecl, an" -rhy "rP. peor1e thrust upon ir1e ·•t such 1'1"'1 im1 prropriatA tine? They brouf"ht, food And bl."nvets w1.tr them and ""'rP- told to sta:r as long PS they 'Fished . Due to the hectic sto.te of traffic Pnd tl'e munber r·"' M.en. involved, I am unR.½le at tM s time to p::irnit these officers to wP.,,Hfor rt '-rill tl rou;rh my ·'\--,r,rrd r-rea. This throws t ·e burden o<' findjnr sleepj"'11". flccorioclet 1 ons .. or tris mo½ t>'> well E's r~~edinr, thPr.1. 11 ':ou roust m;:,}re it clear to Jhnnr➔rjn<; thrt h9 has no hl...sjrwss tc, do tliis rrithont 1ett~np; l'le 1rno"', a.. 111:icl he s 1:ec mo, ~ '""Oulr; r;ro~ntly hnve t 1.rn"d it '1.d do '\TD as tl A nost inr>ppropriate tfrn trrt :f l'tlo l o.(' to bn.ve tl 0111 CC'I:Je here. Tre r;rst +,ri'nr; you 1"110''' +,1,e claiM ·ill be tht tl'e Yu17oslr-:virins ''er0 trie first to ont9r Rr•me . 0 1 TTJ ar, 1;oing to tell Lt. Col. C'1son trr>t r1e can look f-'rounc1 the old 1-JriC.ge- herc t'rea t 'is evenin.r, <i. ' ,.,13 v•ill tr" to [ ccomod;:ite trer r-orr1"'r lrce, hut I 11 'tot P'1thorize then to r-c forvmrc . nf my Any "'ref' r-t tl ; s tiI'le. 11 '7~ Cl:=irk to Gruenth-,r. 11"T 53. 11 Referenc,:i MI ·o. ')851 on ass; r;ri:1 ng nff" bouncl11T'ies, rlArse not:ify AAT thc1t I rn hrtpf'"T to str-te that Fi+'tJ, rmy occurios the lnl"k: of Colli Laz5 ali t Lus rif'kinc:- it unnecessr1ry for AAI to re~:nstnte the old ho1mdPrv as indj ctcited . n Gruenther to ClRr"k. RT 3643. "Rardinp- w<1nts to vnow whetber time hns ~rAlso to i"'1struct these resistrmce groups by radio broRdcast tonight • 11 rived to drop 1eRflets to resistance groups in Rome . Gem'lral GlPrk gave the "go ahead 11 sigmil to tris request imrnedL tel~r. Gruen+,her to ClArk. R~-r 3644. 11 AleX13.nder desires to relea3e srecial comrnuniq11e no1"1 th"'t Ji_fth Arny tr"ops hPve broken tl·rough enony d9fenses l"lnd flre appro:::i chinp; outskirts of Rorne. Do you concur? Rerly. n Gencrr-1 Clark denied tbis request ;:,11d sent tre follo•,,ing rrorosal: "Fifth ,rmy troops hrwe hro rnn through the G<=Jwan deferses southeast of Ror1e in sever11.l plrces . Fi "th Army troops 11.o~' occupy t. e bulk of' Colli LA.ziali wriich doni.nrites tre <1t'T'rnPCh8S to Ro"le. 11 Total battle C8surlties since the openin~r of the Anzio o"'fensive rrmou..YJ.t':ld to C'J,1q5 A"ler~cr>n 11.nc: 1,001 British. ��sri::m1n'JSTA--JTJNE I+ , l '1L~4- -Goneral Cla.rk left s.t 0830, a ccor,1prmied by Generf' 1 Brann, l"is G- 3 , and tvro Rides , Lt . Col. Draper and Cartain kmpson, for Rone . Colonel /Jlar}- and renresentatives of tho nress and GJC personnel nlso accompanied him. 'T'he rest of the convoy, wM.ch rnov~d from Nettnno vir-i Cisterna, Velletri , Artena , Valmontone and nort}1 1·;est on EiD",lnrn.y ;!J6, consisted of two rr>11ored C-"rs and six jeeps . About five mjles :f'rori Rome General Clerk Met GenerPl }<,:eyes on the roeo, and the co"'!voy continued to the outskirts of Rome. Just nrior to arriving qt, the outskirts of th9 city, General Jlrrk ,'1et General Ii'redorick of' the Sreci:-i.l Service Vorce ,-rho alread:r hPd elerne11ts jn the Pester'") 'Jdge of tl e c.;ty. The Gsrmflns }wd a11.ti-tank q;,1:J.s 0~d r>bout ?00 infantry w110 were opposing our entrance :"nto the city. The resi..stance o"'fered WPS stron.P' 01101J;=;h to delflv additionPJ elonents from going into the city. There wa,:; shP.rp fighting in spots, and it wes Avir1 ent tlKt the entrance into Rome tociay would not be rossible. 7 VI Corps, on tl· e left, had made "'9me PdVP11ces past LR go Albano, but the II Corps had pushed wel 1 to the north ·rest e 1c1 ''ere on the outskirts of Rone. Elements of the 3rd Divisio11 and 88th Division ,· er9 waiting outside and were clerloying to pusl out tJ,e enennr pcc 1"ets of' resistlince '71 ich "rere orgr-rnized in the outskirts . GenPral i";lrrl' p0rsonally ··nsrected t:be frc'1t-line elements thPt ,rere rus1~ing into tl)e cit:v. Snall arrs f':ire was plainly hen.rd, and tlere rere ,;till snipers in t:re vicin-i ty. F0ws pl,otographers Rnd wr-r correspondents took pictures of GenPrril Glark, General Frederick r,nd Ge11er11l Ye;res discussing the opposition conf'ronting our troops Antering the city. 0 0 1 The French hP.d made satisfactory advr-i.nces to the :north of II Gorps and were in a posi..tion to protect the Army's right flr:mk . The exact locatfo1ts of units is not exPctl:v lmovm . The advance command post r1oved f'rom Anzio and joim,d th8 forward con:'land post, ct Sermoneta . CoJ1nunications with front l 7ne divisions is lackinp;, due to their raphl advances. }Iovrever, it is lJelieved thet b;-:r morn~ ng vre 1'7ill undoubtedl~v have rost of our advanc8 elements in t:re c:i ty. General Clerk flew hwk :f'rol'1 the outskil~ts of Rome bY cub a1,,d landed et his cub rdrfield at the new conrnana post . He immedj 2 tely went into conference with Ge11eral Gruenther ,n >:d nade his plan for his entrance into Rome tomorrow. rracticr:. lly tr1 e same arrangel'lents thn.t 'Tere ',et up for today will be CflPried out tomorrow . u • * c...., * * SERMliP,TA --JUN1~ 5, 1944--General Clark left his cov1mand post at SermonGta at 0730 fly bv cub to Rome . At Rone he met the following convoy •,rhich loft the comma:nd post at 0530 this morning: Gen0rals Johnson and Hume in one ,jc~ep, General Beucler and Colonel Britten in anotJ,Ar, three pl,ot,ographers and Colonel Clark, r1n, two counter-intelligence officers 8nd an officer of the G- 2 Section, two armored cars and four of the Gen"'rnl I s personel guards. ' l' to ~' 1 '· As soon 11s General Gle.rk lnnded tJ,e cc,nvoy started out and entered the City of Rome . Th,.w entered on Route #6 and proceeded rast tbe Coliseum to the Campidoi;lio and up to Capitoline Fill . From there the convoy rode through w,rious str:ets in Rome and were accla.irv=id by the :i.nhsbitants who lim,d the streets , wav1.ng f'J.Bgs, cheering and entrusiasticelJ.y rrel_comir,r; GererF'l ClRrk, tl~e Army Gori:rnanoer , t0 the ci t;-:r. The scene '"as rem:iniscent of Arri st ice Day in 1918. mhe crowd seemed carried e.way 1r 1 t:r <1motjon cnr" was hysterj cally hn.pry. ��~ 1-t e I>'t .. ~;)- ¼ rr-r ....-v r ,.J,' H, 1: ?( ~,~ ~ " ql ~~ ~~~~l --~~ v-r»- ~ yr-~ ~ 1 u.Qr-~ /i;;. ib- P "¢. ~t\ At 1010 GenorRl Cl0r 1, r'9t his Cor'f' Co"lrl8'11'1 Prs r-t Cnritoljvie Hill in the . ~ OS f.l'eadquRrters ,.,, icl-' "7ere in thP To"m ·1 p11. At t!-'"s reet:inp; "ere Gennrrls ~~ 1 'rro'1c ott , Yn~r.es a'1d (}r>n rP l J.uin . P,ach one ri~cussed } is situetion prr1 roint~ed~ out the artvances nnde b'T t1'0ir +,roops . All bridges across the "'iber had been ~ secured n11.c1 adv, •1ces rr>d bnen rricle r .,,.ff' miles .,cro"'s tre ri,mr . ThA Fron.ch Corps l'"<l been rkcef1 jn a r1 , "fic1 1lt ..--.ositj on in th"t triey rir>cl bi~en +'creed off ut(l'J:i•m.y 1/:t; +>or ro·rar,,mts of tl oir tronps . TMs s.; tnrtion ·as A llev;a ted by req11iri;1<; II Corrs to clef1.r th~ir ror>d·., b;-r to!"orro"l' .('or use of th0. Ti'rerich Corf':.:- . "'he ol<l ½onndriries botve<Jn 'ighth and Fift1 Army "ent into ,f.c>ect , •},j ch f'"VG F 4 rth q,w S to t} P, -r;; rl tr Ar"IYJV r "'ter Fift1 Arny troops hfl, f'"' ssed tlie·~r trf'op-. thrm O'h +1 P city nnd on •~he c-tr"'r sjde of tl 1 0 Ttber . r<1ny r:boto graph0.rs nrid vmr corre:=ipo"a•=mts 1·mr,9 rr0s,..nt talc'nr rictures on tl':is ri~toric mPeti'1a; o.,.. <1"''1"'r9l Clrr1' r>11 • his Corps CorTr.irinrers in HoTfle. 0 AftPr tl'e conf'err=mce on Cr-ritol.:ne Fill Ge,:,r.rrl Clrrk ::i:rd rd s Coe.TS Comrvnrl:rs 1e11+, tc t:bc, -r::"c3l cior rotel ·'~c,re f19y,,,ral Glor\:. v;-ill set up ri terpora ~ r•r C("·nand post 1mt~ 1 t}->9 ar'lv.s:r1ce COT1."'f'l1rl 1'0:"t is set ur "Il the v~ 1111 Srvoia . }- 1/ "'he fol 1.ouj ~g wgre th=J l1incheon '""'1?sts of' t110 Co.,.,,rrnrl.; ng Grneral : Geri0rFls ~}°' ,.,, Keyes , .Tuin, Johnson , Hure , Beucl9r , Rrnnn , Cr1rpe'1ti0.r , Gruenther, Bro·m end /' Colonels Brj ..,ten , Kn.m~"'rPr <1nr ::)r3p~r. Aft0r l11ncl1 GonPr01 CfarJ· rl" scusned ~j1 edrl.:n· s-1-r,.,ti..vc nritters ~d_th Genrirp,J.s Hm 1 e ~md Jol~nson . Ge"1ArPl Jobnson ill )I be mil"tr>rv c"rnrPi-ic'or of th9 dty, ;:1nd Genr,ral Hurne is I'ifth Army Ar·G o"fjcnr . /)'/ 'f'l,e :;-ror1lens r-f' trkj n g OVPr -':,hn ['( J:'l~_n~strPt:1on of thP cit;r "Till t)") r:,any; feed ~ in; tre civili•n1~ , get ti:ni:; uti.litiP.s in order, recrr>rition,il +'pciljt"cs +'or tr 0 o:;-'1 rnd o+'ficP-r s . All of -1:,~ese ·roble;rnq 1 ·Are 0•:c;cn-:;sed. '(} 1 1 1 At five O I clock G9J:'(~rP 1 Clrr'· .c,7 el b,, C1' tr r.i9 CO"'"':' c' ro'"t 8t S rmonet~ A,nd di"'cti.rised ; 4J1 1 is Chief of ctr,"~ thi "'OVcmw1t 0f' h:: s c0-rrn11. :;-ost from q,~rmrnetP to Ro..,e . It rill talre rlrce ~n -1-re ·•0r nerir +'1,t.lU'e, -rob·1hly t}>e dr> v 11 -<'ter tcriorrC'V' . 0 1• r.rigl•l i~hts of th., hatt1e rroF;ress centered r>ro,,nc1 e] enientc; hr v~vig "P c;sed c5t:r ::incl Vie estri 1li.M' -,,11t c,f' l' 1 )rir'i-;el'e:0 d c,, +J~e 0th r ""de . L~-'-tle n.1=>tr~L, 0 ' 4ib"l -+;roop ""0v0~ 0rnts were 1 TO'm 0r PXPCt rositiore; . • 0 1 ever , it 1nis r>scertn.in'"-'d thr1t th,~y rrd "dva11ced aho11t trro r~ J.es I rist 4;110 city. Thi:: dav in i tseJ f rri s 8 ,,orinnto11s m 0 pnc' ,.. 0'"Te '"'rted "11 e>1orrou'1 v~ ctory +'or the •if>t), A.rrv-y •·11 ich h,d hrvm so Fbly led 1,y Geryirnl r:a~r1r . Tres;cient Roosevelt crnveyen } :.s rers,mril C"ngrnt11l"Vo...,·'"' to G1=moral Cl:,,rk jn P verv sincere rianner , str-i.t: nr- thn.t t}·e AnAr5 ca n reople -,ere V9r7 PJ.•nt9+'uJ. for t'· is rnornr-r tnus "'Ve>1t in t,]:v, Cf ftUre o':° :1.omr; . ~;:--.::·011,c:l the 0 G- 1 todn,r r"3rorted t:re fc llo,,,rinr; crisu<1lty f'ipures for the orerc1tion: Yilled in nctjon founded 1 "i '1Sing 'T'otfl 1 1.. , L.68 ?l , 045 ? , J~?2 V ?7, 035 GrnAral H"rding s9nt tJ:,e :'ollow-inp- r:emorflndmn to Grmern 1 (:lr:irk to af'f[lirs •;.:-+:,], the V,tican: j_th rogrird '1 "'h8 C-:ln-'.:!, AAI hns r0ceived tr9 'ol.loyr~n,... ,.,ror. Ami • It js rass0d to yo,, .,..or such ['ction as van r1n7 C"Yk,ider rlesirri.bl9 or 110cess,,,ry. �•VaticB.n Aut,},orities hrv8 Axrressed r,nxi9ty over ir1tervrl thrt will elarse hetween Gerrir>n PV'1CU<"tion n.nr1 'lli8d occup1 tio"' of Rf '"E. Thwr stress rece-::it;r for efft•li.0::t rossible ,1 9Spfltch of smf'll All::ed force to s"r 0·1 Hself r>t central roi11.t of town. They believe such action -,,ou1d rlel"'onstr?t,e irrirenclinr; Allied control rnd '1dministrr-tion, and serve to rvert d:1 sorderG. 'H. "• J\nbr s::irdor sur-~0sts errl;r r:esture of resrect to Vrticrin ···ould ~e "'ir,l 1.7 n-•'yrecjnterl, for ~rstrnce i.., British Pnd J\T"'9ric::>n officers could bri trihC?n ~iv l im rinc his Arri.eric"n c0lle;:.r;i1e P s soon n.s JO"'Sible to see Cr"rd~rn1l Secr,")to.r;r r.f' Strto, ~n ,,rcer tr cr,nvey l""essr-i_ge from All.;ed Cor1nrmrlers to tr.A rope, and to info~·m Vrticr>n Autloriti,,,s of contemrl[lted A1 lied rier>res (r1oves?) i.n c011.11~ction ·;rith J.( J'E . 111 * * n,-1i~--Jl;'IE 6, l 0/i-L~--Gerier~l Clr,rlr r9tnrn°d to Ro=8 ':r cub r fter confcrrint; the r:reatPr rrxt of t•,e T'lorn~riP- ,7ith liic; Chief of 3t..,""f, G.-::nerel Grw=mt'her. re "ms arconrf'nied by r'iS G-3, Gen ,r[,11 "lr::,nn' arirl Colon8l )? ltzrrfln anc'l C!'lne directly tC' trP ~~'"celsior '"hAre; corys 1irison o"ficers l'rd rerorted 'vith 7, test in"'ormntio-r.. on tlie rror;ress of th--ir ~ort s Pcro,s t ,p, :riv9r. P.dv, ce r-lPP"ents had :rPPCh"'d P Doin+ "bout trelw~ 1'1il8s_rpst 4-,110, citY, Fr_intri:ring contr>ct r.ind in sor<: c11ses h"v;n(1' cr•nsidernble resiC"t~YJ.ce tc tl,e~r f'dv::mces. GA"1PrPl Clerk cr-·1.f'err')CT r•,t,h h1s G-1, Gen9rP1 Brann, Genercol Johnson, Co •1'JAnr1er of -'-,) 0 city o+> Rone, C:P'l.d f}p· er,.,1 r11m0 , hi.~ Fift!:' Army A'~G officer. Colonel Tully of the '"ili trry RP il, ay S0,rv; ce r0:r,,ort0d to 'renerPl ClPrl< ancl qtntec' t},f>t reconriaisfTncA 1artiPS bd nlrerrl;v flrrivl"ld ~n t1 1 e city P"ld 11 AY'n str,rting tor1orrow to rut ··nto onAr:ition tl e r::,, 7 .rwds. Colonel Tu1ly r8C0r'"' nded tl rt hi9", Triority hr> J""ade PS "'r'on ~s possible to orfmin': the r~ilror-ds from !Wzio to Rol'Y'e. In abo11t 11 nol"t}1 ro · lro110 7_: nAs continn~d from the G~rj r;liano to t 9 Ro,.,.c rrea couln '1-)e comr leted. · 1 1 0 1 G<"'rerfll 1<,.,:res, II Co~ps So"=Pndcr, c[lr,1"' to ~P,e G<=>n~rfll Clnrk e:r1d di.-;cussed '"'Tith 1'"!'1 +,h'3 c;itn.,,tio11 o"l. his corJ,3 ...rort. Ge·-iaral 0 1 J'lniFl1, Co=lllE'nrler of the 1rcl Div~ sion, Plso cnl"e !;o er i-"er "it}, Gem,ral Clrr1·. Bis riv:i 1io11 hr.s l'ttnn.red f' Frencl t'nd Brjtisr brtt~lion "'or r:r--.rr' r,onin-; .+J1e dJ,y. Th8 site +'or the new ro::.-t in t],e Vjlla q;cvoi'< hrrl l,eeri ric'lreri, rinr1 ~tPrtin'; iPJJ\'18d:.r-tel;:r ~,itr rreprrPtio-1s -for tl,.e Y"!ovcment of trie ric'lvr,nce 9ln• ents of the conrrnc1 r ost tor·orro· • COT"Jl'J.PJ"'0 tre lfeMlri,un.rtl"lrs CoririPnr1,9.'1t ·1qs G8nAral Cl,,r'· bad as dhiner ruests Gem~rrls Johnson 11lly. * * :'Dr~ F11.r11r; 11.nc' Colonel * ROTE--JU' ; 7, lqM~--Gcn"'rPl ';lr,rk -x n-"0rr"d 1 rith Genrrril Brllnn, his G-1, .-,tn 'yin.a; pro,c,-ress T"'Pcle 'h,r c-u~ trooi s 1orth o ... Ror-0. llr1 v,nces Yl9re r?J ic1 • Civitavecc~,i_<, on '"'le cot<st l·2e1 +>allen to our trnor s, and they ·Are r1rnhi~~ rri.st t},is jnpo:"'+,Pnt rort nrea. /It 1010 Gen0rrl C1Pr 1, /'111(1 h.;s G-3, Gow,r,il Brc nn, lef't by ,ieep to vjsit IT Co,..ps rnrl. VI Corr'> wr8re t,}·e•r cc'l."'r-rrec'l ·jt,1-, erch Gorrs Com'1"nder and r0vie '<3rl +r" '1itu"ti0n on ~bc.ir .('rent. I rior to re+,urnini; to t: 9 .,,xcelsior, +J-1 ey c:topred rt the non c0T'lnrnd rost rt Yillri c•,voir wl icli ·'lp~• being �set up tcdny. After Gen"r.nl Clnr returrP.d to tf'p i'YJ. to conf',.~r i"iti-, hiM. II Corrs ancl VI Corps "PTj 11 ccme in wi.tl1 :'ranch Corrs oY\ its ri grt. II and VI for a lonr- ti..rie, VI Corrs l·n.v.;np; b9en "n since thn ; 0tol, G0n0,r['l Truscott cr"'le ru7 l ou.t, :-ind IV Co-1"} s ,1ill Cor~,s hf'Ve been in brttle 1.nndinr- ;:it, Salerno. G0,n0r.'lJ. Gr119nthr>r Prrivcd from t,1-ie for,r9rc1 copr>f:lncl post rit Serrnonetn and hn.d lunch v,ith Ge'1er;ql ci..,rl,;. Gener8l m.nte, the G-4, Plso +'lew up on sur,ply ,..,,,n-tters. "'h0 rar:id 11rhr"'nces of tho Arny 1'.?Ve extenr<ed our '>urply lin"'s, rrk..,king the suppl r rrohlem di 'ficult but not w1t} out .n solution. 3urrlj0s ··•ill be brcu<?"ht into Anz~ o n11d trucked ur to tr9 front, nnd in th, nenr f 1 1tm~e sor:,e nrill be tRkm from lfriples to r.::1vit;:iveccL.ir- and brou~ht forw rel ovr-rlr1 nc +'ror:1 therA. Tre des tr, "tion of the rri ilrou1~ b~r tr e GeTI"rns will rrr-1m it :'. nr,oss i blc to extend Ue railroad 1-inns i7'I"'Pdirtelv up to the PttFcri~o; -<"ront from the renr nrec1. ~•n. io,,. G9.,.,·,..r-l Greri;so 1-,.,llj "l of' tl A Stri Rrit,j s\ rivisio', Cf'rn0 :i.n t0 sn,y f'Ood1:>;re to Ge110 r:ol Clrr~:. r•;s Djvi<:ion ... ill be detrcr'ed -<>ror,,, Fj4"tr l.rrw and r,:.1..Pcecl under cnrJ~r0l cf 4.. I. 1 Ge110.rc1ls ,To 10 1son A.rc1 F1me cri:r.e in ·ust r,rior to luncr m.r1 r-i "'cussed .,.,,iF!tt~rs riertoininr; "'::.o t}v:- ci-sv o::' Ro"1c w~ th Generrl Cl."rk. GenPrPl Furi.e hrs arranp-ed for R visit to t},f~ Vaticm1 torriorroT witl, Pore J ius XII. mhe /1udj once "'ill tck-e plri.ce at n-i..ne o I c1ocl• in the • ort'i.nr:. 1 At noon DAW i. 11.:_;tructio11s rP.ceivod -"'rori AAI HeE1dqur-rters required tre Arry tr rusr <'~,rwircl rA.r-ic:'ll~r rmd c::eize r, li'1<; r1ur:''1,: AP.st-west trrou£,11 ris2... Th:is d1rective is quoted below. r, Ge11erals Clar Gru~mtlrr a11.rl Rrf'.nn n·1 "'c1i-:1sed the I!'"rr.P.r j r. wt· i.c" tli:Ls direceive ,;;oul.o be ca-ri8d out. It req,lires f'nri->'t nnd nggressive rirrs·1it to trke dvantage of' t1 e • ·eav,med G~rni:in ,1ho fr rithrrawing rP-ricly to tre rortr. 0 Arol'nd f<,ur o 1 c1ocl: Gc;neral Crittcsnberger ri 1rl. GenorRl Cr, . . P. err" to confer "i.th Ge'leral Clr>rk rA+'erence th, rr Corrs takirf" over bot}~ the II rncl 'II Corrs fr('"\nts. GenAraJ. Cb:rk rlmmc,d tn tPJr0 tre l.5th ';ivision out c.,.. t:re line a>1d place it in Army res~rve. All Divisio~s ,.,ill ·,e given ~' ch'U'ce t0 tn 1c'" nlv;:,nt1:1f"e 0:f t',13 new rAst center ·r' : cl1 yrill be set ur ~11 Rol"le • It .-rill he ablA to ta1·e CPre o-1" <'Ver lC,OOO soldi0rs Pt a tirv~. ~rou,1d -"ive o 1 cloc1: G rerril "pc.,.,<>rlBne o-" ACC came in ~~o co•1.,.er .,;_+,}-, +,J...e Arrw Corr:.ander. Ju ,t rri.or to d~ rner GenPrf'l Cl r 1• 'Y'P,C"iV"-'d pn A er..\c,-,ri '1()1"'9D •rho h,'lG. rrrriod r.n It91-l__;:,n, r,drrse ·u,..c} esa de Bon-Is. '1ro ...,rintGd to "~et Gen"'rl'l J. CJ.0r}· r>11.c1 c<'>1':7'Ptul[lte 1-:lim on 'his "hilit;r as v great nilitar:r leader. 0 0 ri., For dinner Ge11.orl'll CL<lr1· ]:-,pd Generi:>ls Sulliwn, his T~ o-"'ficnr 8....,d ':'cte, G-1+, ris p-,1ests in ac'ldition to hjs r0~ 1 lPr r1ess. A.AI to A11 Co>1c0r'1ed. "?_H O?OOCJ. 11 ':'he ener,iy hn s h~en r;rer,tly v.ren 1'ened. by tre _,..if"ht:i nn; since 11 I!ay c:nrl ::.;J non tl orc,ur;•1l;r ,1 4 sor'".'.'l'lized. I'e is certr inly in no position rt rres0nt t, l111 nci1 /1 s~ri.oun cmmter ettrick. re ..,~ 11 ccrtinue to su,..f"')r n9r~ ously d11r-inr his r"trert fror rttackr, b,, 0ur 8 :Lr -l'orces £inc' adv, ncir,r• c0lurnns. 1 �l :> I THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY ***** From tra Gennan viewpoint it is incomprehensible why the 34th Division on the evening or 7 Jtme and the F.irst Armored Division on the evening of 9 June were withdrawn from the front. Whatever were the reasons, it is sure they all accrued to the benefit of the Gennan high cormnand. ***** The middle am the east wing of the A:rm:, was forced back further during the period 12-14 June due to the superiority or the enemy. As a result of the commitment of the 26th .Armored Division and parts of the 3rd Arraored Group or the 4th Parachute Division, in the area of the 356th Division, it was possible to hold the Orvieto Bridge open long enough far all units of the XIV ~ored Corps and its attachments to reach the western shore o£ the Tiber. Qrvieto itself was lost on the 14th of J~• The French Expeditionary Corps, newly committed, and at present on both sides of the Bolsener Lake, which at the beginning of the Allied May offensive had so distinguished itself and so greatly contributed to the first successes, was now not so overpowering. This can probably be attributed to the fact that the Corps lmew that in the not. far distant future they would be withdrawn for the invasion of Southern France and that they wanted to con"Berve their power for use in combat in their homeland. This is psychologically self evident, but it is questionable if it was necessary or suitable to relieve the .American ___ j II Army Corps by the French Expeditionary Corps. *** ** Signed/ Wolf Hauser Major General • �Rode u~J in jee, •-:i:,'1 ':en. Gruentber (Catholic)--saw priest walking across street who carre up an1 said in '"::rglish "'"elcome to R.ome. \',hat can : do for you? 11 1rfuere is Capotiline 1 il1? 11 ' 111J'e are certainly proud of the A·· er.icar. 5th Army. ?,y name is 11 !y nar.,e is Slark'' m"'l1at di.i you say your name was?" -- - -" Little crowd had iathered. A youn~ rran on bike. Priest toid people i~ :talian it w~s Clark. The young man ,zot on his b-ike and a.::inounced all the v~y along to the crowds that it was Clark. Dig crowds, ;;;reat excitement, 0 irls, flowers in muzzles, et«. Jeep got stuck in crOYrds dowr by usscl.i.ni 1 s baL uJ'.. TLe:: wen:, t1:J Cap , ill --r1s;uc...i.,,r tl1e:re. It :s ~~r,ind '1eif ,..olossiewn--cit:r :~:::l} :,r. to1J, \":as a-~et.:.11~ corps commanders there. -··as the :Jlace wl ere '1eneral Roberto ...,er.civcnto--[reat cooperator--held forth. Pounded on door--finally ope:ied a c-rack--::talian __,eneral came out--great patriot on American side. T }IOTEL EXCELSI0R: , ere somevrhat. afraid of :err-.an traps, and investigated before they went tl-iere. It had been .:esselring I s hdos. took over as 5th ar ~ !'es-:. center for officers. took over 1Lsso 1 s sports forum for erlistcd men--2O buildings-indoor and outdoor pools, one upsta~_rs on second floor with slidin_; ceiling 1· asso 's special pool. 3-4- square blocks '.Jig. "very sol:iie!' -vrho .?artici?ated in the long drive for Rome vrc_1,1 __,et several days furlough in Rome. At the Sxcelsicr Clc,r1< v;er t in the bedroom o~ ~he suite--knelt riown t" s'3.y _?::'ayers, th_:__rJdn'"' :e Y,9.s , 1 0'1e. ~'elt a hand on hi.s shou Jer. Gen. Jo·1in in bathroom said "I just lid t•.e sar:1e tl-iins. 11 Glark-s hclqs. ··1ever in b 11i1Jin..:,s d•,r ir:__, the -rrar. :~::J:IUO: 'Jer2r ucll i,r._Jresse<l--rather youn'"', concerneJ about wife and children who 17ere in Switz. 'Sx1)res[ •1 rezt ._,ratit 1de .for liberation of Rome without darr.ac.;e • .1antecl to cooperate. 0 1 PCP'"': Jrove up tc Vatican :..n jeep and G.I. clothes. Swiss ,1uards, etc. ?ope wa::-ited to see Clar 1c alone--711 ch lrr,pressed--::>ope ove:r:·wLE:.1-ied. wLti: '---'ratitc:.dde-eYt6nded invita.t·i rm to all sold.iers to visit hirn--'::la:rl{: said w-o..:ild make arran ements-•T)c•p ~e smr tr-er.: every da:r--tho·1sards of tl-em. 11 ::::: ·m..ierstard your hdqs. will be :1ere in Rome. ]ow lont r::..11 you tc tr'-.i.K here?" I ar f'ear:'ul it will brin re percuss Lons from the Germans." Clark diJ riot think so, bit couldn't help it ar.-:;,··way. Pope ,asked if Clark ad ha i any contacts witr the Russians--dic11 1 t krow ar..ythin...r except they were £'i.;htint, like mad. "li'xpressed at one time reat concern over communism. Two or tl rce clays later wdnt to see Pope a<->ain. Still wor1:·ied about hdqs. bein.::; in Rome. how v;as tre bnt.+,le .;cir.g--our locat:..on-when WJ uld w-e move? Story about Pope thinkin.; American soliders didn't likl him. Rt. Rev. , ans.· .. alter s. Carroll, secretariat of state, vatkan city, had been liason man with t 11e 5th ., l}. thro..1gh the figLting 11;, throurn ~taly. 0 0 0 June 9-story about Clark's narrow escape in a plane -inspecting Sevida. Vegg-5...?J., wtich had just been captm.•ed. It was the port of Ror & , _nd needed for s .19plies, which t:1c.l previc., s\>- haJ -to be 'Jrougl.t '.iYJrland all t,he re. ~r.::,::- "aoles. He and pl.lot Jo .• lookir,1;:; out w'~er :=;u :den c:-.:.sL. :.a.i run iato cabie suboo:ntir.~· bar-::•a:-re balloon w; icl:. had. ju13t been put up. uas leaYin.;, cable slidin__, alon:, etc: .;~cku pulled throttle wide open, cable tiroke. shut off ..1otor and gli1ed intv o v7'1eatfiel:i. Plare tJroke tl:e cable. Sur.)rl.s~r,g t:iat tM lethal device under eacn a'olloon o.iJ.11 1t go off. Probably because tLe3· were :,oin6 slowly and in a li__,rt ?lane. i?robably circled around cabl3 tow or t".ree tirr.es. r~all~a:r.s or southern fra."lce, etc. Toid :l.rsl'-811 ::e ·.ad .:.nte,:-1:'ated team sj--.ich t.::i.o. dE. velopeJ the L3.rd --.vay. 'J-ermans were smas1~., :.tc. air S'.;"~rt w.:m.Jerful. Sasr"i wr0r__, t.o break up this -!:.earn m:cn it ·ras ---◊i . . , s, , ~11. T'lk;c.d a0out landing .i.n southern /ranee ar, · w0:1 ~"'red r::y it ·--~S:IALL: �Td:S :?IFTH ~P..:.("'.[ 'S •.'!HERE ''Y. Hr.ART IS - by Irving Ber lin (Introduced in the overseas edition of "This is the Army" Verse: I met her in f· merica about a month ago She asked me if ~ 1 d give her love to a certain GI Joe . She said when he returns I 1 11 be his bride I asked her where he was and she replied: Chorus: Not the First, not the Second, not the Third, not the Fourth , But the Fifth Army ' s where my heart is . Ee 1s somewhere on a beachhead which must be lots of fun. I can see him in a bathing suit basking in the sun . From a cute signorina he's been learning to talk like a real native of Rome. She I s a very tasty dish, but my baby 11 :Io capish" til the Fifth Army comes home . Chorus: Not the First, not the Second, not the Third, not the Fourth , But the Fifth Army 1s vm.ere my heart is . Vfo landed in Salerno and kept right on the go, As we fought our way through Napoli into Anzio . ~ile by mile we've been soldiering The hard way it s eerns On the road leading to lror..e . And wit r1out a single doubt There ' ll be things to shout about ~vb.en the Fifth Army comes home . • �To take full advantage of this situ,,tion Eighth Arny vrill ac1wmce TTj th a 11 possible sreed dire ct 0 11. tl"e general areR F isR - LuP ca (?) - r istoia. Armies vrill T1aintain gener:.:, 1 contP ct on their inner flanks but will not "'ait on each othr}rs advPnce. Eneny resistance will 11e by t'R.ssed vfrerever possible in order to reach above vitPl 11reAs quickly. Ei~l1 th Army vd.11 be respons'ble for any protection that may be necessary on its right flrmk. 11 11 '.l'o save transportl'ition resources r>nd bridging rrRt9rinl 5 Corps will not f'ollow up t1"e ,3nemy on tl~eir "'ront. If the Pdvrnce of Eighth Army f'eils to fo-rce the onemy tc abr,ndon An conn r olish Corps will be novod form:ird later on Eio:hth Armys rear Prmy ,:,astern axis to take Arcona from thP \'Jest. "CJ ITC aut' orizes Arm7 Cornnenders to te1(e extrAJ11e r5 :' 1 to secure the vital <s strHtegic p,.reas nentio-r-:ecl in paragraph 2 rbove before tLe enemy cPn reorg;:,nize or he reinforced . 11 * Hr1 r'.!E--,JU'1E 8, 10Mi---T>;f"rly tl,is rnorn~np; tho liaison o-"'ficer from Eig;hth Arny CHITtG in -;rith a personal nessPge Prom General Leese to Generrl Clrr1c, askinr rermission to use t}·e road Vall,erano-Viterbo-F,acborep-io. 'I'h1s request by the 'i;j r-ht:b Arr,y moPnt the virtur 1 stoppR ge of II Corrs sector upon relieving II Corps j n the~ r zone of action . Gen oral Cl&rk Is reply' yrh_j_c} is riuotod belorr' 0~ covers h:i:s answer to GenPral Leese's request. At Ofil,O General Clnrk, accompan:iec1 by Gen.r'rals Gruenther, Jo],nson, Hun1e Beucler, and Colo11el:; Rri tten And R;ran 'ryent to tho Vatic,"n where tlrn:r htd an i:n1die11ce w~th Pope nus XII. Gen?rel Clnr1r hac1 a :::;erarr>.te -!ntArview ,.,-jth the rope :f'irst and tren ~ntroduced tho ctrer menbers of }1is ye,rty to the Pope. D11r1np: his -interview with the Fop:, tl'e latter aslrnd Gereral Clr}.~lr to 3end a messar:e to }resident Roosevelt express::'.np: to Mn l is most sincere regard. :F'roll' the ,Ta ticnn Gener,, l Clarl' proceeded inl'lod:; ate ly tc h :is neF cor:imanc1 po st et the 'lilla SAvoia . 0 Shortly Pfter Ms nrrival here General .Alexander flnw ur frori Caserta to see General Clark:. He was accorir,::,ni0d by Generrl Robertson, his G-4. Gen"'ral Clark d:i scussed with Genernl Alexander the Eighth Army's request to use a road in II Corr,s sector r-md othsr ml:ljects leading to th9 fu:rtl~er offorn=:ive northward as well as natters concerrdni? llor:e. 0 At l/;,30 Gener8.l Ckrk had a fecorrtion cererrior1y Rt his new cor1r1end post. Du.ring- this decoration cerenony Genr,ral A1.exr,nder presented t} 0 Conf'l.Pnd of the B/'lth to Ge'1Prn ls Juin and Xey""s in t}ie nr->me of Eis r12.,jest;v Kj_ng George VI of Englc.nd. Ge:rnrnl C1Pr1, thi:m rreseYJ.ted two r,edals o'' ronor, one to Ifc. Knappenberger of tre 10th Infantry Regfr,ent Plnd Staff Sgt. Huff of the 50Qth Faracr,ute Bf'ltt::ilion. He also rresented Legion of r 1orits to Ge-re.rel Dod;r, General flrosset o.:nd Gensra.l Carrentier. Legion of nerj_ts were a1so rreeiented to Gene..,,..A.1s '1 r->rtin, Sulliv<>n rmd other officers and er,lj st0d men of tl 1 e :r1rt}1 Arny ::'taff. In ri ddi t ion., DSC I s, one DFC, one 3oldier' s :kldal r~nd enc Brcnze Star ,·,ero also presentod tc o:f'ficers and sold·ers of his comne.nd. The ceremony was q 1 dte i· 0pressive. A compos~te ?'oup of' two Al'lericr,n, one ' 1'rer1ch and one British plPtoon coriros"ld the revj_0v7~n~; troops. '·'rench, British and Jq.,,ericen .,...lPf;S were included· in th0 cclor vuerd, "nd all thTne national c1ntherm were 0 er 1 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, May 25-June 7, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from May 25-June 7, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1634 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/04d0c79ec217dd53a07a86ca40e41a26.pdf?Expires=1787184000&Signature=gdB787g4%7EQfomIcT6T02ix4SqZ6B5rFr93jjv%7E3q65TV5gS9MYTDYDXURQRzc-Tv259yNK1X20Rzo6lt1ZmtUnG4jnHZO9teYA8HeuNErsE-ONvWhdiGLNjXIvwH2WirLHIVPZcILXctuNWbaS7Cgqnqt0VA%7Ej2IWlzm6eohpoPEGN58KaA1HKs-5oo0t%7EEqU8S-YUEU-i9CfKAZHbBw9CUIQpOB02khHR1hjsZFEgPFLVFFRdHHgFHim%7EAnRVGqx2xonySNMqdENYBsKZy%7Eu4TM9HPCTWucuRFKvkLQm889FxV-3%7Ez5MbMgh%7EDUolY9B8fF4615kdCnq7UTV7tNYg__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 03adcc634f09a4535f76ec6eb5c4ffee PDF Text Text lY9 back to his coMP1and post Pt Presenzano, arriving th0re at 1650 .. G8neral Clark this evening cabled General Truscott as follows: RN 7961. "Attack on Cassino took pl2ce today vrit}, all out air effort from 0830 to noon and heavy fighter bonher effort this afternoon. Bonb:i ng appeared to be effective aJ.though tanks hwe not been abl"o to rass through tmm yet because of debris. Attack to take Monastery Hill will he mode tonight. Progress generally satisfactor7 although slower than ant:icipated. TAC R spotted heavy rioter novenents from Frosinone area tovmrd Cassino late this afternoon. 19th is earliest date for your attack. fiill k8ep you advised. 11 The Air Support Control Sectfon reported today on the bombing of our troops by our own planes. Their report may be sUTir:1arized as follows: On the 15th the first bonbs dropped on Allied troops on the Cassino front fell on 0930 hours, and this "friendly11 bombPrdl"'lent continued until 1130 hours. The bonba.rdr1.ent was quite indiscriminate, as the Folisl1 Corps, the New Zealand Corps, tho French EYfPditionary Corrs at Vl'.lnafro anrl. Eighth Army Headquarters in Venafro were all, turn and turn about, the objects of this bombardment. In all, the Polish Corps lost 3 r1en wounded, the Bighth Army Headquarters lost 7 men wounded, the French Expeditionary Corps lost 1 officer and 5 men killed and 52 wounded, the New Zealand Corps lost 11 nen killed, 2 offj cers killed and ?.4 mi:in wounded. l I \ \ l General Juin turned in a separate report for Ue French vfr•ich can not be entirely reconciled wj th tho Air Support Control report. According to General Juin, on the 15th the first bar.bing of the :F'rencb occurred at 1000 when one or two Fortresses dropped B bombs on Macchia d 1 Isornia, causini; no casualties, and tvrelve hombs were dropped on Vemtfro and vicinity, two of wt1ich fell on the 1-1 ills overlooking the cor:1nand post and ten on the town itself. The Venafro bor,,bing caused two sold51;r and q1Jite r-,. few civilian casualties. At 1020 one or tno Fortresses drorred about thirty bombs in the J'ozzillj_ area, killing 4 French, including a battalion cormander, and woundJ ng 34, includj ng two officers. At 1125 about 15 Fortresses bonbed the Volturno valley from Macchia d I Isernia to a point just south of Ven~fro, re,sul ting j n one French soldier killed and eight wounded. The total casualties come to~ killed, including one officer, and 52 wounded, including two officers. GonerF,1 Juin also reported that at Eighth Army Advance CF 10 British 1vere killed and the losses among the civilians at Vena.fro are esttnated at 40 killed and 100 wounded. (The General adds a footnote to his report that on the 16th of March six New Zealand fighter honbers bombed and strafed tl1e Frencl1 at Belvedere and dropped leaflets inviting the Germans to surrender.) * * * FRESENZANO--MARCH 16, 19/i/4--Today the rrincipal subject of interest Y1as the rrog-ress of the attack on Cassino. General Clark received frequent bulletins throughout the day, and in the afternoon nont by j~ep to Sradger 1 s OP where he checked for h·iMsolf tho gains being nade. Irisonr,rs of war indicated that tbe bonbardri.o:nt had caused considerable casualties c.nong the Gernans. One difficulty arose througl, the trouble the attackers had in rJ'etting tanks across borb cratc~rs and throup;h the ruhblo filled streets of the town. One crater had to be bridged by engineers before it could be crossed. Dt:irjng tho course of the �~~~~;~~~.~~6 .:~~~ f=\.ct- ~d°q- ~~·r. ~~·- day, Hill 193 continued in our possession and a relatively sr-a.11 pocket of enemy resistance remained at the southwest corner of Cassino . The unfortunate bor,Mng nistakes continued today. Air Support Control re ports that at lL,15 and 1445 hours on the Belvedere and Belr10nte rol'.ds Allied fighter bonb,.,rs killed 2 and wounded 12 French soldiers . At 1505 hours , be tween San EliP and Cervaro, the Frcncr' sustained another attack by P-40 1 s, but no report of casualties has be?en received. At 1515 rolll~s 6 B-25 ' s borbed thei French Expeditionary Corps and the Nev, Zealand Corps in the region of I ortella and San Micbele, resulting tn th" death of 1 of"'fi_cer l"nd the wounding of 18 enlisted nen o-r the New Zealand Corps. The aircraft engaged in these r,istaken bonbings yesterday and today i:rere of :>any rliff erent types . Yesterday they were reported to be B-17 1 s arid B-24 1 s . Today fighter bombers, P-40 1 s and B-25 1 s were reported to hove caused the damrge. Today a messHge fron Gen3rr.l Truscott j_ndic: tcd that three companies of the Y1ng 1 s own Yorkshire Light Infantry had been captured by the Gerl"'ans, rnd Gonerr.l Clar1r, concerned lest this have sorsc effect on Gener11l Truscott I s attack, sent him the following cable : RN 5534 . "Advise immodietely ,.-rhether or not you plan to Pttack on 19th11 • 0 The follow5ng cablo was received fron General Alexander: RN CGS 289 . 11 CINC considers it ~10st important to take advantage of' the cneny 1 s preoccupation with the attack of new Zealand Corps to lrrnnch the attack from Anzio bridgehead to recover the ground lost in the Carroceto area , plans for which CINC unclerstands have now been fully prepared . Attack hy VI Corrs will therefore be launched at earliest possible date . flease report :'.:'or inforrnPtion of CJHC the general rlan of attack and tl1e date on which jt is rroposed to launch it ." Gerno;ral Clark replied to the above as follows : RN 6538 . "Detailed rlans for attack toward Carroceto were O);.-plaJned to Brigmlier Mani'ering this afternoon . This attack scheduled for Marer 19th and will require extra heavy atr effort on r1arch 18th and JQth. I may n,~cd your assista.nce in getting sor .e strategic 17issions on t}10se days. 11 0 Gen0ral Freyburg directed a r~essage to Gencrel Snvillc congratulatjng him on the aj_r effort on Ce.ssino, but General Clark d~rected Gener;:,l Gruenther to hold this and not allow the original to get out . Other tmportant nessagcs of the day are as follo·.rs : F'Arsonal Truscott to Chirk. RN 1116. 11 Air attack 0700A - 16 plPn~s . Our AA report four probables, minor da1,age . Unfort1mately fjgl1ters hecld back hy ground hRze did not arrj_ve until just aft0r attack. I would apprecfote being 'kept :infornod on Cassino action . First word received here your personal OU 7961 at 213gA . AT" altering r;y plan slightly to r.i~et changing situetion. Will be reacbr to go when you say the ·vord . rr Fror, FLJIJ'lBO to Fiftl- Army. RN CAO 23371. 11 Following pcrsoY1al and secret fror Frj_ne Min~ ster to Gennral Alexa.nder. Fray congratulate all at work et brjdgchead on record fif;Ure cl:i.scharge at Anz5.o 10 Harch. 11 �I ':) l From VI Corps to Fifth Arny. Rr,J 1128 . nMap reference Italy 1 : 25 ,ooo. Attack by 1st Div. night 1/+ March to se izc FOSSO DI C,~RANTE and FOSSO DI FUl\lTOHI (8S6298) as lim"! of rleparture failed with loss of J compenies . Owing to incroaserl Gernan ground organi zation and strength , partjcult'rly along ANZIO road , I do not believe original mhrnion contcr:1plated for 1st Div . is within its capabilities . I have therefore r".odified 'r'\Y rlan for attack as follows: D- Day, an attac:V by /+5th Div . and 1st Div . to seize the line 914320 , 904320 , 891318 , jnclusive to 45th Div., 890298 M 854300 to the ':Test the 5t h , Divis i on will sc:izo the streal"' line to its ,junction at 815311; D plus 1 , 45t h Div. t o extemd the line to the line 9?0333 , 915334 , 908330 , 904320 . 11 0n this line I ,'ill rog-.coup to ma1'::J~ 1 conbat team avaifable to attack wJ t h Harnon to capture l'!J'tCCFIA DEL CASALS (895345) and tr> n C/l.JUWCETO area. , assist ('!d by 45th Div . and perhaps 1 brigade e:roup , 5th Div. I will forward de tai l ed plans later . I anticipate that regrouping "fill require 2 days , but I do not see how sufficient strength can be T'1nde avail able ot}1erwise . I will be prepared to use Harmon eRrlier in tho nvent of unexpe cted success . Part this plan nec essit ates slight nodification in air plan. I will notify Brann of req1J.irer•mts ,Jj thout delay. nr hope your CASSINO attack is making progress . except your radio last night . 11 I lw:110 heard nothing Personal Clark to Truscott . RN 6536 . "Dat e for your att a ck is March 19th. Extr a heavy air effort will bo r,rovidcd on March 18th as well as 19th. Confirm that your attac k will be riade on 19th . 11 "---✓ Personal Clark t o Tr us cott. RN 6537 . "Progr ess in Cassino area today has been s l ow . Tanks are havi n g great diff i cu l ty gettjng througl, c:ity • . Hi l l 435 capt ured . At tack on Monastery Hill will be rosur:i.ed t onight . 11 'rhe A riy Co:"nr,.nder rec~_ ved the f'ollovdne; letter fron Lt . Gen. HPrdjng , r d General Alexander ' s Chief of Staff , on the subject of "Air Bol"bard:r;ent of Land 0b,iectives rreparatory to Assault. 11 "1. Without vraitjng for detaJ.l~d reports , it '!ms c lear frof'l ,;,h/'1t could be seen nf the op"rations in the CASSPrn Brer-i on 15 r,~arch thnt bor:;barc'lnent by heavy and nediur1 bonbers of land ob,i!"lctivcs rreparr,tory to n ssault by land forces offers conslrl ,~rable scop,n, for the f'uture . 11 2 . J t is also cle2r tho t son"' aircraft had difficulty -in recognis:i ng the target as n nUJ"'ber of' bonbs vrere rlrorred :inside th~ bo,.,,bline , Pno son~ 2t 2 consider1:1 ble r•istance fror~ t},,., farget . F'ror1 thl"l roint of view of' th~ lanc1 f'orces, it :is realised th11t sor1c r:istakes are bounc1 to occur and thnt rjslz js accepted . At tre sar,e tir,e it js obviously riost :irirortant fror1 f'"Very point of view to ensure that rwerv l"Jffort ano device is l"1ade use of' to obviate suer l"1istBkes in fut1rre . The C• in- C considers thr1t land forces can be of' c1efinite assistnnc(;) to the t>ir rorces in assistinP" thl'ln to f'ind thl')ir targets . Arti ficial L<rnd r<orks and 1 i ~ht sigrw ls hPve heen snccessfully 11s""d for this purrose on occc1 sions in th"' p=:st , ond. tr!"! use of a. row of colour~d searchlip;hts set out in som~ rrearrrnged r~lntionshi:r to thl") target has bMn suggested for an or~ration o:f' th~ tyre carried out on 1 S Mrirch. L .,____ l! 3• 'T'h~ C-in-C would be G:lrd to 1"now i:1hrt Armfos a11d ~'!ATAF think on t}, is J �question, f'nd on rny other roints connected with coor~ration between ti,_,, tvrn servj ces in s1ich orerations , that nrise out of the attac1{ on CA.3SPJ0. Will you rl~ase for,:roro your vjl'lws as soon rs ro:-;sible. .After r~cc 1 rt of all rerli~s it is rroposed to hold a "1eeting to c'H scuss all roints rut forward. 11 * * * fR.ESE"JZANO- - rTARCF 17, 1944--Th~ rrogr~ss of' th'> rittack on Cassino contj nued ton1:1y ns t}1e ne1:1 Zealand Corrs rushed on through th~ to·rm. ,/\ft~r an ~arly rornjng conf")r,~nc~ ",it:b his CMef rf' Stoff , G-3 and G-2, General Clark re ccj Ve'!<:' f1aj or n-rny, Acting Arny Judge Advoca tc , nho rcviewod ,.,.j th G"'n""ral Clark 25 court 1"1artj_al cases. Jhortly hefor~ noon G"'n~rals Cannon W"rl I l'lT"'nitzcr arrived for a conferem ce zrjtr Generf11 Clark rbout the ai:r situation, and a f"w T'linutes late?r Cren"'ral Mason-MacFBrlane and Colonel '}elson !l!rntfort , his Arericen personal staff of'ficer, nrr~ved . G":n~ral Cl2r1 '.'lnt,,rtairnd ell tr,-, v~sitjr:g officers for 1uncheon. Gen"lrEl ftason-Mac1"arlane spoke cf sonc of tr,e er-barrassY:ents ar5 sjng cut of t'is r""-culiar position. Honinally, th~ nrrd.stice vritl--i Italy was ..,nde by Russia , Engltmrt and the Unitl']d States together, and , accord1ngly, as I res-i de11t of' th" Allied Control Corriission , Gen~ral Mason-Mac:F'arlane acted for nll thr~e countr-i!"!s . Hcw,ever, he had just been scooped by the Russians v1ho had ""ade Rrrang"'·rients to exchange diplor,•atic representA.tion with tJ~e [;overnment of Yinr '\Tittorio El"'Mtmu~le wjt}1out letting General MasonMacFPrlane in on the transaction at all until it h~_d becor:e a fait accor,rlL r Genl"!ral Clarl<: d:i ctated the following naterial for -1nclusion in his diary: The r.,attl~ of Cassino is progressing slowl)r. plans are not l:~:eping up to hj_s tiJ11e sc},ed11le . Freyburg ' s enthusiastic 11 nr witnflssed t11e bor'bardr ent of' Cnssino in coripany vdth Gl"!nerals Eek~r , Devers, Cannon and oth,~r Aj_r Corrs orf-icials. I vrould say t}1at apyroxJn8tely hp,lf of th,-, boT"bs rlid not fj nd the target area. Ferheps 60<:s were in t}1 A prescrjbed area . The oth~r 40°~ fell in tb") f'lats w:i tr1 no damage , in T"IY opinion, to th, eneny. Many bor"bs, on different occasions 8nr'l :in d:ifferent rl;:,ces, vrere dropped on our troops . Rorbardm~nt of cur own troops fron Isernia throui:;h 1J~nafro e.nd-~all c1round Cervaro took :rlace with casualti"s 11.prroxirr:atfo_-:,; 75 1~:illed rmn around 250 r,mmded . This is appalling rnd can be attributed only to roor trainjng end j nwleqmttt"'! briefini:; of crl"!ws. It was a beautiful day, bo!"'b:ing taking rlace fron low altitudes wHh Mount Cairo And Cassino well defim•d . J can not rossi bly un,:'1~rstrnd J-1ovr th~se errors occurred . It hR.s brought forth v:igorous rrotests frorct th" French and oth"lr Headquarters and created a lack of' confj_dence jn our air ar1ong mLr i'ro,1t line troors . 0 nr hev'-" rt'!pe2-tedly told Ti'reyburg frorr: his :incertion of this rlan that .\ a~rial ho~bardn,,.,nt e lone n"ver hR.s and never v·ill drive a deterr.1j ned · enerw fror1 his rosition. Cessino has agein rroven this tJ-,eory, for, altrough no doubt h11.!8VY casuslties 1"Iere inflfoted upon the ene1"1y in Cassino , sufficient I have rl'?rndn~d to hold ur our advance and cause severe fighting in ~e town for th!'! past two days . CJ ~ .~1~(-~ • t.,,f'Vl\,,o() (\»",,, . ~ ' ~ (: o.,a...-1.,v1A.i) / ~ QJ-"\ " ,t.. ~,~...L"{~ ~ A.HrY"'-ir'"":.~ ¾ ~f u~~~ A,,' (fl �l53 \ "Freyburg ' s rrindl·i ri.r; o-r t1'c ~ris 1ing attacl• rps hr--eri. cbl"'re cterized by indecision nnd lacl· of r,ggress::lven"'ss. Fis rlnri t o have t he Indians attack fror. TTill 503 ·dth te.n1rs has !"'ot ,...,r>t,..rialized , due, I 1--i~ljev~, to objections on tbt"! rR.rt of G,..n~ral G:<1.llovray, the Indian Division Co,...,.,.,anrler. In ry conv,..rsat1o11s ,-,; th the l:=itter , I ,-stfr1ptl'} bir, to bl'l a r"'fel1tist . Every ti"'le he sees ri~ he er.1rr;asizes th~ seriousness o+' tb.. +"ighting . I f'f"el, and told r:>reyburg last ni~ht and ngain this riorninr;, that it is essential t1'at he attack thl'l riomistery sir,ultaneously from Hill 5q3 and Hill 435 vrith the Indians . Fe js not ~nclin~d to do it . 1 "The British cr,..,rP ct,..ristic of } oldj "11" ob,i,..ctives gaj n~d Vl!'Jry lightly ras again coT"'e to tre +'ront . I11. th"' case of ~Till 165 just west of Cassino , this was countl'lrattacked by the Gr-,rJ"'ans last nigh~ and wr('!sted frol"'l British con trol. ()rders J,,av, been issul'ld to re-tPk'°' it , b11t tris slovrs ur the yro:;ress . 1 Yesterdnv, not bei'l'lg ::irile to r-et any accurllte inf'orp,rtion as to th~ state of affn.::.rs at th!'! hridr,c over tr~ Rarido on Fi 1s}111u1y //6 , I f"'::rsonaJ.ly 'Vent to thnt ro:i.nt and f'ound tr,-,t only o'l'le tank rad gotten across , ,-;rer'"las rereated reports inr1 4 cated thr~"!, a11d Frevburg ad told Me two squPdrons . Th" brid~e wa 9 unr1"'r hel:'V:V ,.,ortn.r f'ire . I th"ln rmnt to see Freyburg P gain nnd rece-i v~rl tre sitw,tion fron him. I snv,r,estec1 to hir, t're use of Hi.r,hway //6 to riove th"' 78th Divisirrn across by co,..,bnt ten1;1 to r:et riore in-rantry ~ nto the soutr . Fe did 'l'lot lik,.. tris idea . T exrressed to hin r,y dj:,arroint,..,"lnt jn J-d.s not n.ttackinr with tc-nks enc1 infantry fron y,3 in coorrlinf'tion with th~ Incl.fans I attn ck fror, Hcmgman I s Fill. He t0lc1 ne he intenr1ed to rip lre tbe tanlr nttac1(', and I ,mr1erstoocl infrmtrv, +'roT'I 5q3 . Last nir,},t, in trlking with G~neral Gru""nth~r , he contradicted himself . : rrd Grul"'nth.,r rhon~ him back and tel l hin of r,,y disaprointr~nt in not attr-icking .. rom both directio11s . 11 11 Todn:v I bv~ tal1~ed "~th G"'n~rn l F,,.l"Jyburg on ri~my occasions . Arrrrent1:,r G!"lneral Gallo- •f1y, the I'1dian Division Cor""ander , docs not v•nnt to Attack v:i.th J,,is +'ive batt2Uons froM 503 .n.nd th righ c;:round northeast of tlie r1onas tery. T told Freyburg th~ tanks to be errloyed were t t"~rican , and h~ could los~ th"'"' $.l l and I noulrl replace ther1 within ?L,.. hours . I sent BrRnn to see rim . It is now lf->15, Pnd I hf"ve talked vdth hilll nany tjr-,")s sine~ , and he sti11 js opyosed to an attack fron th~ north . He },ores to reinforce tre Indjnns on Eangrnan 1 s Hill tonigrt Pnd nttack towarc1 s th~ Monast"3ry. Durjng the day ,.,e MOVed t1=m1':s And -tn..,antry into the railroad station soutr of Cassino . \ If we can clear tl-•~ srorad:ic resistance out of t ,~ town tr"! situ1"ltion will 4 r.irrove raridl 'T . 1 r "Due to G--neral Ale'-Trnier 1 s cHrl'l c t rleaHn,.,. "Tith Freyhurg and tre fact thnt tM s is an all- British show, J an rf'luctant to e;ive a direct order to Freyhur£s to put the- 78th I'i vision over Route /16 and to attack fror, t}1a north fror 5q3, b")cau se he h::is rr,pMtedly ~ndicn t ec1 thrt h, is orrosed to these rlans . If ht'! were an Arierican Cor ps Cor~mander with Arierican troops I would have no hesitancy in P"iv~ng such an orrler . I have just now t~ler-hon•d to Gt•n1eral Al exander , 11hom T noulr1 nl"!Ver ;:ro to on snch r ovc if it ,•rere not for th~ deHcate ~nt,,.rnntional relations involv"'!d here . I exrlnined the co,.,,rlete s:itm1tion Pncl ,..,,y v 4 "':WS anc1 told r jr, ::: would not issue a dj_rcct order contrar;~ to t.re vie rn of' th~ British Corps a'l'ld Division Co,...,!""Pnders . 1-+e quit e agreeci and did not in any way seen excited Aho11t the siturtion . O 0 l �l5Y "As previously rerortecl in tbl diary, Al\'lxander directed ne again to attack in the br i dg~head to tc1.ke ndvPntage of the conf'nsion in the bridgehead Prea . This had al;eady heen arrang"d for, but toda:r ! ,~et new word fron Truscott that he must alter his rlPns (as indfoat c,d in cable ;/1128 , quoted in yesterday ' s diary) . I have passed th:is word on to G~neral Alexandl":r, cs it ne.y nlter the date of the attack . 11 I hPve hrid quit"! a conference with Generals Cannon and L,~mnitzer toda,y. Cannon nnd. I are in conplete accord with the use of afr to support ground troops . rrruscott has ask"\d f'or a r:lrl:iculous ar1ount of support , totP lling sone 80 groups if Pll targets are cov"lred . :r have decided , in accordance vrith the air CToup , that no strategic should be nscd in sup:rort of ':l'ruscott 1 s lir,itcd objective attack; that it can b"! used r"ucri better on strategic nissions but thrit 1•re will use all the XII Air Su:rrort , reinforc"d by the Dest'lrt Air Force and s 1 1.ch J110d:l.um hol"1b~rs as we have suitable targets for . This will probably Fllt -,r rrruscott I s recoT'lri.endation for an attack, although Alexander agrees with ne completely, Pnd I Rr1 s1.ire v,ill require that we put it on . J 11 The Air Corps are quite upset vrith the rl')sults of their boribing our own troops . f'uring the rast 48 hours l:mndreds of bonbs on at least seven different 1 oc casions have been crorped i.n our own areas with rat1'c-r heavy losses . General ~ Ealrer is takinr; drastic action to fiY th~ resronsibility. , . tt::"., ·~- ~~ nsone decision must soon be nade b:r th~ Co,,,,b~ ned C!-1,:i ef s or. Staff as to ~ A.~,JVIL for it will soon begin to take air sup:rort fror, this critical si tuntion . The lack of coorcljnation and hesitancy on the rart of the hir;h cor"land running t},j s war is dis graceful in ro;r opinion. o1 pivv-~ "The capability of 0lernents of VI Corps to attack beinr; doubtful, Gl;lneral Glarlc cabled General Truscott tnrice to(fay , RN 5534 r-md RH 5537, in an effort to deternine wh,ther or not rlans wer~ r;o:ing ph•1r-,d for the r ttack on tbe 19th as h~rctofore schednled . n 0 :rmportant nessages of t he day are ;:,s f'ollows : Persorn,l Clrrk to Truscott . you plan to attack on 19th . " R"~ 5534 . flAdv!sc :i.r1M,~diately yrhether or not P~rsonal Clnrl- to Truscott . RN 553'7 . "In vi,,.w of vour 11?8 it is not clear ,,}1,..thA:r or not you "TilJ be nhlr, to attac)r March 19th . Arvise 5rnedi ntely." r~rsonal Clar1r to Truscott . Rl'T 5570 . 11 Detailed yl1=ms Pre being rr~rared +>or er1rlor,.ent of f:i~rt~r bor·bers , lir;ht bonbers Pnd ~1l"diur1s in surrort of your D- 1 9ffort starting on March ].'1th . TITo strategic P ir '"'ill be a.wdlable for support of your Pttack . Hor vrill 5t be possible :in future to secure E:3trat Air Force for close support ~xcer,t in <'.;ri'lP.t !'!ner~"!ncy. 11 Personal Truscott to Clark . R~.r 1134. "Ref•~renc,:,, '::SD 536 . I ,·,ill nttack 19 H0rch . Since r-dr sur,..r:5-orHv is the s.;n::;l"' factor thA.t justjfies my attack, I ,·rill require th~ P ir r-; f'fort on 18 r11arch , continuing during attack . 'Sxtr a l,eavv air e:f'fort requfr~d Mar ch 18 , 19 and 20. After regrouping, a p~riod of probably 2 days, extra. heavy A.ir ef for t will proba bl y be required for a n additional 2 days . There is no change in air plan for D l"linus 1 day. Corr ections �I ::>5 for a5r plan D and D plus 1 by radjo tooay. "Am sorry n.hout slO''l rrop:ress of CASSI'TO attack. Hop"! yon are not expecti n[; r,y attnc1: to r Pfect s.; t1..wtion tl "re. I do not believ~ 1t can J-in.ve P."'lY ef'fect on tJ-,P.t ;;i tuction. 11 Detail!"Jd rhirs to you b;,r couri~r today. 11 F.<?rsonnl "'ruscott to Clark. RTJ 1136. "In rerl;r to your 5537, I will be able to attack 19 J'Prch. My 11?8 described chang~ jn plPn whicli A rfMts Briti.sh objectives only. feath1'1r report r~r"' indicates detcriorati..nG weather tomorrovr. Air sureriorit;r single factor tret justi.fies riy attac1r . I will attack if weath~r r,ri•its a:i.r on D-1 and!) days. 11 * * * FlESF: 1 TZANO--MARCH lP:, 104/~--Th~ tvm cntstanding fePtures of t},e day · "'re tr,. conti.nuance or the rittl".c 1e:: on Cassi.no r:nd tre oecision by th'-'l Arr:;y Cor ~;flnrcr to def ,r ,mtjl furtr r :rot:i ce th(~ rro.i cterl attnck by VI Corrs in tre br5clgeh"Jad . 0 Th" P..ttack on Cassino continu~c1 slo" l y, rs rocY.l"\t"' cf' G0rrn,ins in and ri.round th"J to,m rut up desyernte redsta-1ce. Hil11ri3, to tl-,e northvre:-;t of tl ~ to' ;-n a few G_,,rnans cont1 nu~d to holrl c ff cur troops. G"'n,:,rfl 1 Clr>r 10 in tr,.. r-orn-:nrt ,~l"mt hy j<')er to tre 'Tevr Zenhnd Corrs Heaclqmrtcr::: and th<'lnce to U•e 'Tew Zl'\Pland Corps ohsnrvation rost, wh"'r~ rl"! ''TP.s abl~ to vi~w the Cassino hPttle. Th .. r.ionnst ,r:.r i'l still h""ld by the Ger,,,rns. Thfo nfternoon an n.ttenr+: rms r-:ar 1e to r~-surrly sone o-r th(' Indj ans on tl-,.. slop~s A.bove Cassino b;r air, RS y,Pc1:inr RM'7Unition, food n.nd -r:rt"'r ur tr,,.. l1illsjcL unrler fire was rroving inross1ble. The drop \''as only rrrtil'll;r 3uccessful, r-s tre green snok. signa 7 s 11Mcr the Ind~l'nrl should hew, d:i SJ lt1.yed to mprJr tr" srot for the clrop "rere lat":'. Th~ 1'lind ' cnrrie-d !"'rn:r of' the loeds av;py fro1"1 the trcors for whon th("Jy •mre int"'1nred, nnrl, jn son~ --'nstnnces, l~t th~m fall aT'long tre G"rnnns . ' 1 f \ \ In tJ,~ l Ate Pfternoon, General ClPr'k flew by cub rlPne t0 the rond at Caserta Pnd "ent by cA.r to tl1c 3Atb General Fos:r: t11 l vbere h~ took to Lt. Col. T'offitt, Executive Q+'fjcer of th,! Crdnance 0ection, wro was ill 'vith fn"!U1"10nia, TI"''-'1 S thnt 1,,, },,,,c1 been rror-oted to tl--i~ rpn1r of Colonel. Gen~rc1l Clar,,. bnd y,rystin,rdriy ca.bled to ~i.AT0FSA n~ws o 0 the Colonel I s desrerate conditi.on and reCO!"'r>Cnded V1at l-1 ~ be rror-ioted as it r-i.r;rt ')nCOUt'rJfsC rim. 'fovrn of th(" rronotion arriv~d tris r·orning. Gen~ral Clarlr Pound Colonel 1 1of'f'itt with a H gr teN:rereture and E:t t-im"1s c1elirious, but the siclr man vms able to greet th" Army Cnr"'!ander and was delighted -rith the n•,vrs. Unharrily, dnring the evening '"lord ··ms rece-ived thPt Colo>1el r1offitt hacl died . 1 1 G"'n"lrnl c1nr1.r, on :bis return .c>ron t!:is trir, "'1"!t A grour of riiHfory Pttac}-,es to tre Frencrl Ccr,ni ttee of 'rational Li bnrrtion Gov~rnri.•mt mho ,·,ere tourino- the front, accoT1panied by two Frencb of'ficers . Thes'"! ,·,ere: Colo 1el Bula.ndr, Gzecho•3lovakia; Colon0l Colocoetronis, Greece; Lt. Col. F,,,,sen, Jorvra;v; Lt . Col. Forrret, C2nada; :::.,t. Col. Deslo~es, Canada; 1 '.r j. 'lziP.sPno ski, Joland; ~hj. ~onjoie, n,~lr;ium, 1 'eJ. CPyo, rcru; 1 ~nj. A1lcrinnr1 and Ca.rtf,in d"'Croix, Fr~nch accor-ip:inyin1; of'f-i cers. 1 1 \ \ l �l Sfo General Alexnnc1cr arrived at Gen"lral Clark's cor'1nand rost in the late afternoon, rmd GenArol Ch,rk read to h5r, r~rsonally UH': following cable v'hich he ha.d just drafted for t..:i isp=itch to the CPJC: "Truscott , }1as radioed "'~ durj ng the past 48 hours tbat air sup,":riority vras the single factor that justified his attack, thPt he 1·ms forcod to change l1is attaclc plen because the rission assj ~ned the 1st British Division vras not ·ritrin its carability, anc1 that he did not f'eel that an attB ck in the bridrshcad vroulc'l contribute tow2rds the attac1c in +,he GP ssino area . After receiving this inforl7P.tion, togeth,,.,,r vd th anoth0r report :'ro"'l m7 senior Fifth .A.rr,y representative in the bridgehead that scir e cor,1r,am1ers and staff o.c>fic'."rs of VI Corps ,,_,ere not rappy about the attack, I sent Gen'3ri:tl Brann, ny G-3, this r,orning to cJjscuss the attack with Truscott. Truscott rocor -r1ends cancellation of th~ rrorosed li1:1it".'!d objective c1ttack based on the follo1rring 1r.nown f11cts: (a) The attacl' will noct aprro~"irately equal eneny str~ngtr in well rrcrared ros:i tions, a'igmented by mines and vrire (b) Thrat ~neny artillPr:r is appro"'.:i1;1atcly equal to th:cit of the VI Corps with I superj or observation ( c) That tho anount of air availahle fror the XII Air 1 Support Cor1r.Pnd , a 1 1gnented only by certain nediun bo,.,1bcrs is not sufficient I to create thei overwheln1ing air support he bcJJ,w0s necessary for the success \ of this attack (d) '7ithout such an ov"1r :rhelning air Attack the odds Pre against a successful acconplishr1ent of the planned attack (o) That trc attack TTould be extremely costly in personnel and r,ight r-:Jsult in a suitDble opportunity for an enemy count~r offensiv~ . In this connection losses in British troops can not bn 1:1ad~ ,g;ood (f) After thf') rroposed l:imit""'d objective bas been reached, ener1y :3ffecVve fire can still be yleced throughout the entire brid.-i;ebead. 1 ~ 0 0 1 11 I concur in Truscott 1 s co>1clu.-,ions. ::r Fould }1ave cance 7~ led the attack irnediat':lly had it not been for th~ :instructions contained in your radio CGS 2~9. I, tJ,3refor"l, recoro"~!"lnd th?t the attB ck scheduled f'or to:norrovr b"" Jostroned until aft<:;r t0e 2rriw1l of th~ 34th Division Pnd a re-study of the enemy situation at thPt timJ. n General Clrrv dictrct"'.!d the follo-rrinr; not?.s for inclusion -in }7iS diary: "'Sl'l,rly =orning r"lrorts f'ror 1 Freyburg indicated that little or no rrogress was hein"' n,de . In fact, slt,lwtion 0f Indian battalion on Fangr1an I s Fill ' secried rr'3CRrious clue to lack of supply. I ,·1,:mt forwBrd to see Freyhurg and again 11rFscd 1--iin to "lrrploy !"'ore troops in GPssino. re w;:is cor1i:ng to the decision at that ti"1A to rut the 5th Brigade ovr,r Route !/6 into t},'" town. I urged haste but have little assurance that speed will be usep_. I Pgein pointed out the d~sirability of pushing a brjgade of the 78th Division over the railroad bridge past th2 r,ilroad stAtion ov~r the Gari River to get a briilg"'head to perr;it tanks to follow . I tl~ink I r-!ade sop~ progress along t:-;ese lin'3s . Tliscus.sed w:i.th General Gallo Nay, Con:"!Bnding Q,~neral of the Indian Division, tho use of t11nks fron CPiro 2593. He hopes to do th0t first thing in the rmrning . Arranp;9d, at Ga.110,-:ay' s insistance and Freyburg 1 s request, tc, dror suprlics by planes on Hangnan 1 s Hill Uis afternoon. Frcyburg is not P.ggressive; is ponderous a:rd slow . I net Alexanc'lcr on "'Y ',ray bac 1{, revievred tbe situetion with hirr, told bim of riy diffj culty in ordering a Hew Zealand Connander to er;rploy British troops in a nanner he did not like and urged Alexander, when reapproved of' r,y sugg0stions, to rrod Fre7burg a little into sone ACM on. He said he would do so and was quite disP.ppointed at th: slowness of his a.ction. Alexander feels as :::: do thPt tJ-,c ,many is waiting to see ..,}-,pt, rre do before counterattackinr; or rulling back . Vii th r~gc1rd to thP- Ptt8 ck torriorrow in the 1 I \ �bri,1(-;ehead for a lir-dted ob,i~cti ve, I rointed out to Alexander, who is riost pnxious thet tbis attacl· take rlPce, that it had certain drawbe.cks as follows: (a) It nould not talre any fire of'f of tho rear ereas or the rort (b) It was ae;a in:~t a strongly defended rosi tfon ·;ri th 11.t least equal Gcrnan tr0ors orrosinG; us (c) The G'}rr an had sll the observation, 1111.d we attacked over cren terrain (d) The casualties we r'if;ht suffer would be quite a sctbacl< to us in vfow of the difficulty of securing British rcinforcem~nts, and we can ill afford to take heavy casualtfos a.t this tir1c . Of course the advantages nrrJ rolitical, and Alexancer "'."~eels th2t it night offset another Ger:rian attack . Anoth0r edvantage is thPt v,e do secure a little nor,., fRvorabL~ tGrrain ay,d give ourselves a littl<; ,..,,ore roan, if svccessful , in the bridgehead. In viPW of '17ruscott 1 s radio ton~ yesterde;r th2t the 1st British Division , due to recent losses, (including thTee conranfos cartured) was incarable of offensive action and that the only reason he was justified in naking the attack rms duo to our great air f'lffort . I sent General Brann to see rj_'TI today to get his real thoughts on th~ subject . As soon as he returns I will decide ,,rh~tl1~r I will rake the attack or recorr1end to Genoral Alexsnder thPt it hf"J rostroned until the 34th Division ,;ets in. Due to the inability of the 1st British Division to attnck, it mePns tlwt the Rttack will he r'1adfl by Anerican troops, wr,jch arrarently the British are rerfectly willing to do . I must see tb:it "'C r;et targible returns for the nen I en Hable to expend in this limited effort . Alexander indicRted to nn that he was :rositive tJ,,at it rmst be done. 11 1 7996. Genl"lrri.l Glarl,. this afternoon cabled General Truscott as follows: "Yoll.r attack for 19th cancellr-id. Will see you soon. 11 RN 'T'hc following cablA was received froP NJ\TC\USA today: RN 66275. 11 Nar Dr.•n,artr1 ent ('ecision is to retain Ranger battalions. Sep2rE1te action this l eadquarters will transfer first, third and fourth Ranger Battalions to the United States with veteran pArsonnnl only (137 enlisted nen and 19 officers listed your 534 7, r'arcr 10, 1041,) . Transfer non-veteran p~rsonnel of these battalions to 1st Spccj_al Service Force . n 1 * * * FRESENZANO--P1A,.1i.CH 19, 1Q44--This r1orning General Clark left by cub at 0900 for' the beachhead . .Acco.,.1panying hin j_n the second cub was Lt . Col. Draper of the Artill'"ry Section . The General reacr1Rd t1-1c beac}1 h0ad at ar,rrmdnPtcly 1015A and irm-iediatcly went to GonAral Truscott I s headqur~rters vrhere hr~ conferred with rin about the beacl1hcad situation. He read to Generals Truscott and F.ve,legh r~rsonally the draft cable to GennrA 1 Alexander, riuoted in yesterday ' s diary, and they botr heartily concurred . Tr,~ Jtrny Corn"'andcr nade only a short stay at the beachhead , however, and left on 'ii s return trip a few rij_rmtes rifter l?OO, flrriving Rt the Fifth Arr:y cor.nnnd post at 1315 . The G·~neral thsn went into conference ,,,~th Gern;rAl Gruenthnr on the ste. tus of the CRssi110 attack . The G~rnons had twice counter-attacked on Hill 1q3 , their attacks hejng cst:iT1a.ted to have been by as rany as 300 ~en . The Gerrian pocket :In t}1e southwcstGrn corner of the tmm sti.11 contjnues to give trouble . Two Gernan tanks haVt9 taken up positions j_n "rhrt was the lobby of the Hotel Continental. By the close of the day a Brj tish tank had 1rnockcd out one of the Gl"rnan tenlrn, but t'rie otl~0r one continued to fire fron the �l'.JT"battled lobby. At 1500 General Frcyberg arriv,)d to discuss the difficulties }se was exrerhmcing in his Cassino attack. To add to his m,berrass•,"lnts , an apmmition durap on Route #6, ,:hicr had accidentally taken fire, began to blow up just as he rassed it on his WAY to tr,e cor·1r1and rost, and the rest of the afternoon v1as punctuated by the sound of n:xrlodinr, shells . At 1515 Generals AlexA.nr'1er, Hardj_ng nnd Lormitzer arri vod and joined G;~nerals Clark, Grucnth,-,r and Freyberg in tho hut in a discussion of the Cassino situntion 1:p1d "•'hPt shoulc'l ½e done to ridvance the attack tb,,re . The British officers left with G,rn~ral Lermitzer at about 1700 , end General Cli:irk left by auto,,,obile for Sorrento wl1ere he dinAd with friends at the Cfficers 1 Rest Center and returned after dinner to his cor1nand rost . General Gruentrnr sent the following two he 17as f'..'t the beacrihead : RN 6562. hill 165. 11 CP bles to G!-'3neral Clrrk nM.le "Attack fron HanP,nan I s Hill has not started yl'lt. Ener'y holds R~J 6563. HGr'lncral r'reyburg has ash~d to cone and see you tris efternoon to discuss present attack." * * * FRBSENZAl'JO--rnJIRCH :?O, 1944--This :morninr.; the funornl of Colonel Moffitt, Bxecutive Officer of the Ordrn=nce Section, wAs held in th~ Aneric:m military cenet~r~r in Naples. As General Clark had conferences scheduled whic0 could not be :rostpon8d, lie directed Lt. Col. SutherJPnd to r~present him at the funerPl. This was done, :=ind a lari;;e wre!"th wr:>s plAced on the p;rPve from GemerPl Clark. At llOO Generel Clark received a call from General Saville, Comrnnding At this conference it wfls a gr Md thi-i t the XII Air Support Col"w1and couJ.d rlevotA itself to destroyinR ene"l;T comr1unicAtions, srive for 11n occasiona 1 mmber of sorties ( supposed to be 96) reserved for support of ground troops • XII Air Surrort Col"lFm no. .Pt 1130 General Mccreery called on Gen('}rr-1 ClRrk to dj scuss the rroblens involved in the regrouping of the Fifth Arny and the withdrnwal from their present sector of 10 Corps. Cartnin H:i_lbert, u. S. Navy, CB.me to lunch. He had recently COTae from the United StAtes , where he hnd seen r.itrs. ClRrk. At 1600 Colonel Brfan, Inspector Genl'lral of II Corps, arrtved 11.nd discussed with Genc'JrAl Cbr:k the op-'~rrtions of 16 Decer~ber before San Pietro which he WPS investigatin~ for II Corps. General Clark hfld been rresent on thot day And observed the T".lovement of :forirr...,rd rlatoons of the bptfolion vrhich hBd just been emgav,ed in tpe AttRck on San Pif>tro. At 1630 hours Lt. Gen. Burro,rn, British Arny, called to see Gimeral Clark. Fe is on hiA v-rny to Ru~sia to heAd the Br:itisP Mission there And discussed the 'Russian sjtul'l.tion very inter,.,stingly. He eAi,ressed the op:inion thr-t the f'i~htini:; on the Russian :front WPS nlr-ost non-existe1mt Pnd thrt the Gernr-,ns were ,yj t'.bdrawinP- voluntnrily. '!'oclF.y Genc,ral Cli-irk 8pproved a recor,,r,~nc'lf,tion of Colonel Rob:inson, Fifth �ftrriy .A.ntirdrcrnft Officer, for thr; followinr:; chnnges in antiBircreft officers: Colonel Rob:5.nson to replricl"l General Tovmsend with the French ExredJtj_onr->ry Corps, Gen~rnl Townsend to rer ln c ~ Gen•"'l'.l"P l BrRdsrr-,w v;j tr the '35th AI\A Brj r;rde And GenA.rl'1.1 BradshR.''l to rey,lrice Colonel RoMnson A.s Fift}, ArPly Antiri ircrPft 0fficer . Important messPges of the day ore as follo YS: 1 r ersonal ClPrk to Truscott. RN 56//1 . "Sjtu..,tion in C11ssino continues to he ,Hfficnlt . Enery a:rpeers to have been rejnforced. Heavy enemy shelling on tovm todny. · Our troops still occupy reilror,d stf>tion, Hill 435 and Hill 1Q3 . Rnen:v occupies hill 165 1md strong roints on southwest side of tm"n. Surplies dropped successfully by 11ir todny for troops on hill 435. nur t:cmk attack from hill 5q3 yesterrl.a;r was unsuccessful. n Personn1 Clar1-: to Saville . RN 5651. "New 7,ealrmd Corrs reports thPt supply drop for troops in area of hill 435 today constitut~d a model of perf~ction . T'lease nccer,t r,y sincere thanks for tM_s outstr-inding achievenent. n Pe:rsonnl Clark to 'T'ruscott . RlJ 5617. 11 MP1rirjp control officers 1,rho hr>ve visited ~nz5 o repo:rt thr,t it shouln not be necessr-ry to strirt 11tr-ibrinA br:iforc April 15th . Arr,y Surw,eon ,,,ill visit you on MPrch ?1st or 22nd. If rfter your conference vdtr him you ,3till deslre to stort atabr-'ine on t'lPrch ?5th you are p11thorize0 to start on that date . J h1'1.ve ::irr::,nr;ed tlwt r:osqnito net,s, he~:i_d nets and insect repellf:lnt 1'!ill be r,M_pped to bridf;eherid within next fevr dPys. ff From AAI to Fifth P.nd Eighth Arr:,y Conmr>nders - R1,T CGS300. 11 The slow proPTess rnrir!e so fpr jn clearint; the to1·rn of Crissino wjtJ1 t}1e consequent delriy in buncM_nP" the rittnck on the monPster1 r cor1bin0.d wj_th the necessity for prernr5 ng the PV'Xi:rur, forces for ri fnll scri le of'fensj-ve in the second ki lf of' Aprj 1 □Rkes j_t essential to decide in the course or the next '?4 or J6 hours wheth,,.,r (a) to continue wi tr the CP ssino operr,tfon in the hope of cPrturfog \/ the r'!onristerv durjnp; the nf')xt three or f'ou.t' dr,vs or (b) to CPll th") Of?:rr-,tion l off f1nd to consolidrite "1UCh g2ins of p,round as Pre import1:1nt for the renewrl of the of'fensive later . It is rilso necesm:ir;v to decide when Ei~}lth ~rr;v is to tA.ke over resr,onsiM.li ty for or,er8tions on the Cr-i ssino front nnd when Hq. NZ Corp<; is tn be dissolvl"ld r-ind replaced by Hq. 13 Corps. In the C-in-C 's view Eighth l\rrw Pnd 13 Corps should Pssume responsibUity for the CPssino front as soon ns th0 monnster;tr has been captur~<l r-mo consolidPted or P ltArnf'tively ininediately it is decided t o cPll off the present offensjve but h"3 wishes to dis cuss this point with Arn,;,r ComnAnders before rea.ching A fi nal dec ision. Consequently C- in- C hl'l.S dec1_ded to hold A neeting of Army ConMPnders at Hq. Fif'th Arny At 1530 hours 21 March . He wishes GenerRl Ti're;rberg to be rrMcnt to give a det1=dled rrJport on the situf'tion on th<o Cassino front. As decisions regarcUnP, the r;rounrl to be consolidated w:Ul dfrectly affect tb~ future opP-raMons of' E:5-ghth Arr1 y, C-in-C vd sh~s Co,..,nrmder ~j_ghth .~rny to be prerrred to give his views on tbr-t point in the hro possible crses rYmtfoned under (a) and (b) l'lbove. In that connection Coml""nnder E:i.ghth Arny r,,ny, jf be ,,rish"'ls, bring Conn<>nr1 er 13 Corps to th~ r10etine:. Ac1rnovrledge. 11 �FRgSEHZArsrn--MARCH 21, 1944--General Clrirk left his CO"'l.r1Pnd rost this r1orning at 0910 by ieep, tl'lkinr; with hh:1 Lt. Col. Drrrper whor1 h~ hns selccted to be his senior e ide upon th1' deprirture of Lt. Col. Sutherbnd. Tho General went directl:v to the New 'Zealnnd Corps observation post wrere ho met General Freyberig an<l his division conT'!Pnders, Gencrlr.i rrirkinson, Kei1shtfoy nnd GRllmvc1y. Gen".'lral CJ.rirk asked the Corps and Division ComrnPnde:rs to i;ive their impressions of the present state o-1" the battle at CA.ssino. GenerPl Freyberg sio.id th,,.t in his opinion, based on his battle ~x.rerience to datt'l, especially in Tunisia, where !'l'lountA.inous terrnin was hr:ild by the Boche, one hBd to fight ) for one's ob .j ect:i.ve, And it WA.s us~m~l:v slow going. He was not -~ssimistic about the eventui:i.l outcome and def1n1t!"!ly stated th:,,t he ;,ms not J_n fnvor of call:irni; of'f the Attn.ck. A short discussion of the existence of a tunnel used bv the (}erT'lans indicAted thnt GenerP,l Fre7berP, -mrA.s not too faMiliar w:l th its existence. However, Division Corir1Pnder8 hrid hePrd of the wherenbouts of r:1 tunnel, which vms eln.borated upon bv Brir;A.dicr (Juer~,e, who stated thPt from prison~r rerorts h~ felt thi:>t its existence was mRinly legt!'lndary and thPt the Boch.-, did hnve, undoubtedlv, n"ltworks of s:r1.r,ller tunnels but nothing BS gr~at in len~i;,h as the one M" rk;d on General Glrirk' s photo. G~neral Clarlr P sk<"ld General Gn,llov'nY to pr,j_ve him an estirl',te of how 1"'lany bri.~l'ldes would be n~cessary to rush forward froT"! Hanf;!1P n I s Hill on th"- Monastery to seize that ob,iective. Gen~ral Cl11-rk Pt the time stated that he did not have the r<"linf'orcenents to do it, but he was curious to have Gener['!l Grillm11a71 s est4,.,r,te of how rir,ny [1oditionA.l troops would be n'."~Cessar:1.r to rush forvmrd. Ge'Yl,,,rrrl G.9JJ_01.7r,_y estiry,ted thrM brj fV1des. Th~ group of r;~nerals f:1 nally S".lpr'rf-'t~d into a few sr1Pller groups and ciscuss"':!d w 4 th eri.ch oth"lr their -riarticulRr front. GenerR.l ClPrk r,ov(')d fror:1 on~ C'roup to another li st"'nin1;, and on sone occR.sions P skin0' nertin~nt t1Ue8tions as to conditions und~r thl'lir personal co.,,.,,..,~_ nd. G~n~rPl Clrir'l!: m:mpA.rod the New ZeolP.nders and the Boche to two heA~rr,reight fir~hters in the ring, both ~o-;g;r, with edth"!r one in a position to lmoclc out the oth,-,,r. · Genern.l Freyh~rg irnriediPt"!ly reacted to this ancl sr-i.id thRt he nj dn 1t consider th~,t his troops -rrere f:'"I'ogiz:r y~t flnd thPt in his opinion the attack should continue; that the present sitmition di(l not seen hop1>3less to him in the least. Gent':ral Cln.rk left the !\Tew ~e11.land OP and, P c~oripanied by Lt. Col. Drarer, proceeded to tre vicinity of' the bridge at Cassino to l';"'t a close viewv of cond:itions in the to''m. The Ger"1,-ins were sh"lling thl'l brid1;e 1uite heavily and its A'1Virons. lifter about 15 "1inutes G,m~rnl Cbr'k n.nd Colonel DrRrer returned to the Fifth Ar'ly CP. A conf"'lr~nce hr-id b~en CE'.ll•'!d today b;r Gen,~ral A.lexr,rn'1er, P s e.nnounced in Cable CGS 300, to be h'\ld at the Fifth llrrw C0"'11"\And post, to deterr1in"l v•hether the attack on Cassino .••.nr the ;1onasterv should be continued or ebrmdon':'ld because of' the strong Gcrl"lnn oprosition 17.ct vdth. At l1mch today General ClPrk entertain~d Gc:n'"rP 1 Juin, Gen';ral Carncnti l'lr and Colonel Kar~ncr~r :in order to hRve A. chance before th!':! confer~nce to obtain th.,, v:i ':'lWS of Genor2.l Juin ::,bout thP- Cassino opcrrttion And its effect on the r"l~ li"lf of' the 3rd DIA. In a short tl1lk before 11mch, GeneirPl Cl;:,rl· nskAd General .Tuin to state frnnkl~r his :i neas on this snb_j,.,ct. Generri 1 Juin said thP.t in his _judr;1c1Ant the attack on Cassino WP. s rrovint; too costly and should be dropped �\ Gl I and in its stead a mP.neuver to the south of Crissino cihnuld be c~1 rr1n-d out PS soon as the Fifth Arn:r had occunied its n~w sector. In this we.y, GenAral Juin s~dil, the r(mt"'s bv whkh CA.s8ino is supplfod c ould be cut off rind the to,m c0uld be starved out . Generril Glr.r1r then said t½"t in his estimntion it wr-i,s quite likely thrit if tJ1 ,~ attack on Cnssino shoulcl be rlropped the Bri= tish would ask thrit the 3rd DU. r"')riHin in th~ l:i.ne instear1 of beinr; relieved 11.nd cor1e 1mder co-r"!rnand of' the '8i~hth Arny instl'JPd of the Fifth. Generri.l Juin <>t once th"t h"'! should rl'lfuse to serve under those circur1stri.nces ~nn th1:1t in his estiMPtion it ·•m.s i_nperPtive thn.t tl-i.e '3rc1 DIA be relieved 11t the ea.rliest possibl e mom~nt. GenP.rri.1 Juin arlcl"ld thrt nriturP.lly if it wns a case of h~lpinr; out with the services of I'!. T1ivision for A short tim~, J,-, 1"oul0 be thorom;hly coop"'lrri.tive, n°--id h~ reriliz~d thnt :i.f the Cassino atfa,clr ·1ere PbPndonc d the reli"'f of tl1"' 3rd DJA must be rlefcrr<'ld for A. rcncionr>ble time; but he had served under Gen~ral Anrlerson in the F"rst Arny in Tunisin nnd did not vrPnt tc hnve his Cory,s cut up and pnt o"' :.tt s~rve under the British F,j_ghth Ar,..iy in this therrter. General ClPrk snir thrt h~ was 1:;ratifi"ld to het1r this on inion of GenerRl Juin ' s; thPt h'?. had invited Gen~rRl Juin in order to obtain his ir'leas on th~ s11b,iect and th,-,t they were exrctly the se.:1e n.s his o"m Dnd thPt hi<, proposed to insist ''dth Gen~rnl Alexri.nder that the 3rd DIA be relieved, and thet it remin part of the ?ifth Arr-1y. I I Follo1Jvin»: lunch, the Fr"!nc}, officers Pnd Colonel Ka·1rierer left for their co,.,rirmd post, and the officers C811Ad for the conference gradunllY Psser,bled. GenerPl i\.leXA"lrler Prriverl r>t 1550 . There ,·,ere r-1rcsent b(':lsides Gen0r'11 Alex.,nder, General Clark, GenerPl T,~ese, Cornr-mndjn,<; the Eighth Arr,y, Gent'lrPl Herding, General ti'reyber1;, General Gruenthl"lr, GenerPl Lemnitzer, Gen~rrl i"alsh (Chj_ef of Staff of GenerP 1 Leese), GenerA.l Kir 1<:man, General Tate nnd General Bra nn . At Genert1.l Uexrmrler 1 s request, Generr>l Prcyberg stated his r,rASl'.'lnt situ11tion . He said that he had six bA.ttri.lJ.ons of the New Zeri l<Jnd D:ivision in Cassino tovm . The rpj_lror>d station vms actually held by the 78th Divi 9 ion. Resistance, hO''.Tever, WPS continuini:; at the westerly edge of the town, and Pt the cliff free be~rond it. The;r hnve trdrnn fror, 200 to 300 rr:isomrs out of the town, and Gen0rP.l Freyber1; thinks thrit they "lust be gainine-r, access to their positions by tunnels . The comnanding officer of the bntt2lion now attecking the Conti n"'lntal Hotel says th2t ho can not R,'Ul"_ rrintee th"t he will hnve th".l hotel toni!t!'ht or tnriorrow niF,ht, but fAels ver~r hop~ful of taking it. The New ZealP.nd Corps ha s thus far h,,d 1400 casuAlti~s. Yesterd0.y th,n,:,r had 120 casueltfos j_n six brittelions, 1. hich Genern.l Freyberg did not constcler large . General 1 Alexander re"'lnrk!!ld thrit jf' we CAn k~ep pic'ldng at the eneny for 24 or 48 hours he T"W -v co llapsA, "rhr,reupon Gener;, 1 Freyberi; stated tlv1-t the Boche was becoming short of food and "'"' s in a v~rv diff'ic11lt -position. Generri.1 Clr,rk then st11ted tho.t h8 hn0 felt discourne;cd this rnornini:; ~mtil hn talked to General Freyberg' s officers on his visit in the Cri.ssino aree. . l\fow he hns becoMe encouraged and said thnt h'3 -reels thi-i.t no 0ecision should be mane today to -rull out. GAnerAl Leese stated thnt he wrs or thA sry•e wriv of' thinking. Gen"lral AleXRrider then said thnt he felt thrt jt, ~ws unw·i se to call the attack off toc18y. He felt that thP, situr,tion should be reviewed PJVery '24 hours in order to permit a decision on thAt snbj'l)ct to be made. Gen~rP..l Freyberg then said that he "rould 1rno'7 by 1000 tomorro•rr whPt his siturition "'-'ns, flnd GenerAl ClPrk sPid thP.t after he hPd ta.11<ed wi.th Gen~rRl 4'reyberg in the r1orn1nr: h"l would tf'llephone GcnnrPl Alexonder . GenerA.l J\lP.XRnder then rois~rl tbA 1_11".lstion of' t 11e relief of the 3rd DIA which Gl:"lnerAl Clri.rk h;id discussed r,t lunch witJ-; GenGrt1.l Juin, r>nd, ri.s he.d I I �been pr~clict~d, r1~ntioncd the difficulties of' 0~ett 4 n1; thcr, out. Gen9rPl Clar1c innedfotely stressed the length of ti "'1 e thPt the French hr>d been in the line r 1.d the ir,n,Cr"ltive necessity thPt they be relieved nt tbc ePrlie st po,rnjble nor-ient. G~nernl 1\loxanrler was "'lvirl~ntlv imrressed with this view, r,no st;:,ted thr>t h0 would fr1,.,edint"!!ly tPke up tho question of f:indin1; sone Division which would be used to relieve the Fremch. Gcnerr,l Leese undertook to studv the qu"'!stion nt once. 11 There was then sorie discnssio11. of air supnort as the Cri ssino oper..,tion pro.gressed Pnd of the continued dropping of suppEes. GenerP l ClPrk sent for Genernl SPvill~ rind, followin~ th0 0 cr"rture of Genr)rn1 AlexPnder, G")n~rals Snville, Cl..,r1,::, Gru8ntr'1r P 1d Brann di scusscd nt so"lc length the n0cessarr A-ir support for the continu0nce of the Cn.ssino or8ration. 1 General S,ciyille then left i'nd GenerA.1 Clnrk at once notified General .Juin thnt the nttnck on C,?ssino wri.s to continw, subject to ra r"lvi-:m tomorrrn"T. Barl; r;r in t},e afternoon, durinl his !Y'nversntion ?jth Q;-morol .Juin, Gr:meral Clrirk ni':'lntj oned to him th~ fr.ct thr, t he wr, s r:i v; ng serious conversP tion to us:i.ng two of the thrAe c0nhPt tew1 s of th~ 3L;th Division to join in the ".lttaclr on Monaster7 Hill fron Hill 591 because tht'.l troop:~ of the IndiRn Divj_sion n.ppoared to him to be lackin~ in dash and jnj_tfative. 1 The fo11owim; cs.ble WP.s received toda;r frors Gr:m8ral D~vers: RrJ 67311. l11'ThRt j s vonr estimnte of Brig. Gen. Raynond S. McL9.in, 45 Division, rts nble prospective Division Co'7m1nder for OVF:RLnH.D? On"l VTP;T or nnoth<"Jr '7ashin2;ton has received very fA.vorablc r3ports r<"JgArdins hj,.,, but not5 ced he was not given the Ii-5th Division on }.'iic'kl1Aton 1 s withdrawnl. 11 General Clark today received the fo1lo"7ino; llT'preci;:-,tion of the enemy situntion in Co.ssino fro~,, Brigadier A:irey, G"!lncrel Alexander's B.G.S. (I): "l. The cnermv hRs so far left the defr:mce of thl"l CASSPTO nreP to 1 }lara Div. 3 Para Rer,t is responsjbl:'l for th"'l defence of' tho town and MonPsterv reinforced hy the Pi,ra M.G. Bn, th"3 Fern A/Tk Bn, I Bn l Prora Regt and II/:U5 G.R., i.e. a totPl of seven bns (but the M.G. ,,nd ~/T1( Bns were probably rath0r under strength at th~ tiMo tre battle began). 4 Para Regt ls hold511.~ f'urther West hut S"1e:1s to hnve sent its II Bn to tho assistance of 3 Regt. It should be noted that th0re hns been onl;r one SJ"rill inf re~nforcerient (i.e. II Bn 115 a r~hAsh of II Bn 129) and that this wr1s not sent from re servo, but 111,,rely sidestop:red frol"1 South of the LIRI where no at ts ck was ta1dng r,lace. 11 2. 'l'he SUC'~ests that base his reRl latter vlith a fEtct thnt the i")neny hRs not sent r 11y furthm~ re:inforcen~nts he int•~nded only to rlela~r as long 2 s possible in CASSINO and oefence on the AIOLF PITL1i;R Line. He has probably r~£Jnn~d the fornPtion brought up from the 14 Arry area. 3. Th8 prrncbuti~1ts hr.vti defrmded and count:1r-attackec'l w~ry stubbornly but ti,ere i::i s<r~ evidence thEtt tr>ey are i'.;'TO"ring wc11k,r. Alread~r by 10 March cnsualties in CASSrTn WAre reported as 11 very hir;h 11 • On ?O March one Gov was reduced to one officer r>nd thirty !"len and another to ten ncn with on~ LMG A.nd three tom.my-!;1._ms withont 8.l"iT"!tmj_tion li,s:kimr, for snake-cover and 11 �perrd.ssion to withdraw. Th11 G~rrrPns were b,~ginninr; on 20 I1JPrch to tiilce 11, pessiT11~_stic viewr of the situ-"tion as the tanks were reducing thedr strong points on~ by one. (They stil1 think, hovrnver, thet they hold Pt •• 193). ). tt 4. The course of events seer:1s to be thFLt when tl1e attack stPrted the ene"'1;7 were prepared to give up CASSIN() after a '.'ltubborn resist.<mce and 11dthdraw to the ADOL't'i" HTTLSR line; when tlv=iy S8"1 their defence was being '!'lore successful thnn they :first expectecl they decided to hang on and trv to restore the situntion by local counter-attAck, and thrct no,rr they Pre h1mging on in th,:; hope throt we '7ill ~i,,e up first. In spite of its fierce resjstnnce and outstandini~ tou!Shness, 1 Para Div is certrdnl:r now ,,cry ,reduced in strength and must be r;ettin1; tired. Th~y cannot be exp0cted to continue indefinitely· if we go on dev"'lloping the strength of our thr~e availabb divisions against then in thoir pres,"lnt state. "It is true thRt they are now receiving r1ore arty and ..,,ortar surrort than before, but this c~m only be Vl"lry s'"1all co17pared with our large resources both in runs and armrunition. 5. In cimclusion, tri(iref'ore, I feel thrt nssm'ling 1rrc continue to ntta.ck with the suynrior resources 1,,liich n.re awdlBblt':J to us, the Gerr0 n.n 1 Para Div is fe,cing the a1tcrmtive of n.~struction or ,_,r:ithdrai:<ml. 'Ve hP ve alre'ldV sho'm that (up to last ni~ht at lenst) there vras no indication of it beinr: reinforced and the enemy can hnrdl:,r brJ expected to allow his best di,rjsion to be~ dAstroyed and at tho SD''le tj ,.,c los,~ the position. On the other hand it must nlso be re!"'e""lbered thE't the enen;r rill be quick to take advnntai;e of n.ny s111;11 of "maknAss on 01ll' part in order to regrdn the initiAtive." 0 * * PR8,SF.'TZA]'.m--MlL'lC:R 22, 1941~--/\.t ocno tl1is norninr;, 11.fter ta1dng CA.re of urgent ad,..,inir:itrntive "'!2tters, General Clark, 1:1.ccomprnicd by Lt. Col. Draper, ,;rent for,wrd to the ?1st Tl!ew Zeeland Battalion Rear CP nbout 1,000 yards south of Cassino bridr,e. Visibility vms poor, due to nist <>nd Rr1oke. The f.Prty th<m proc1'eded to the co1'1r1ri,nd rost of' the 5th ~Jei,r Zealand Brigade, nnd GenerA.1 Clark discussed the Cassino situetion with BrigRd:ter Burrows. A. Gerrian t Hnk, intAct w7th crew, W,9,S found in the rubbl"-l of Cassino, r,uch to the forward ell"lr,cnts 1 Rrtrprisc,. It 'l'T!"S tnken 1mcler fire n.nd destroyed. The s:itu;-,tion in tho town was not definitely h-no•m, so the Gen0rel nnd his y,nrty :r1ov'9d to the 2nd 1'Jew Zealana. Division OP north of' Ccriraro '"Ihere the situPtion was discussed with General Parkinson, Co"'ln.and:ing the ::>nd New ZePland Division. G~neral Fnrkinson thought it best to continue the attn ck 2s planned for Rround noon tbat day. The JX:1 rtY then proceeded to G"'lneral Fre;1rburg 1 s Cori1"'1.ond fast , 11 Pre General Clark 1.unchAd H:1d discussed continuance of th~ ntti:rnlc. At 1?45 our artiller:,r opened up ,y-ith a violent bri1:;f µ.rt':rmration. .C3hortly thr.;rePfter ene111y l'jr A,Fr,eared over our rear areas. Our l"ntHnrcraft rencted i"J.Modfa_tel~r end sent up hcnrr f:ire. One Ger""'an r~lPnc r,rn.s seen p;oinr; d0 m. LPter, it wP·S reported thPt seven or ("!i ri;ht enemy rlanes were destroved. 1 General Clrrk And Lt. Col. Draper then return~a to tJ,e Fifth Amy Coml"'ln.nd Post wher~ G,".ln0ral Clnrk went i1"'l9Gd:iPt~ly into conJ'Arence icrj th GeY1.orril Gru~nt}1er. Dur:ing th/;) nftr-,rnoon G~norrll Cl:>rk work~d on Pdninistrntive nRtters and had ns his f;l..l8Sts for dinner t}1is evening Genersil Moran and Colorn=il Kio'"ell of �the 8igna1 Section. HDecisions r1pde at yoster(fr1yt s cnnferenc~ with Gen~ral Alexander required thAt I p;ivc hin n reco"'!J"l!">.ndPtion torlB;T as to thA oonHnuation of the Cr,ssino battla by the New Zealrmd Corps. In order to obfain first hnnd infornPtion, I nroceeded tn ili scuss th~ sjtuntion with Brig~clier Burro1"s, ConT1andj_ng tho }Tew zer,land 5th Br-i_1;arle; Hajor Gcnr;rnl nnrkinson, Corir:Rnrler of the ;)nd Nl"lw Zel:llnnd Db,1.si.on; r1~1.jor Gemrr,.l KeiC;btlev, Cor1r1,rinder of the 78th Division, and LieutenFnt Gen')ral 'G'reyberg. 1''hcreRs no clef'inite rrogress ru> s been nr1.de since yesterda:r, r 11 wr3re in f'~wor of crntinning the Pt tri.c k. Cn snnl ties were light in the Cnssino nrea 7~st('l)rday, m1mr)ering 73, a.s rerorted hy General Pnrkinson. An attack to clenr the slopes of Hill 1g3 wes ::icheduled for. 1100 1c!"ith heavy artillery surport. Farldnson felt this h,c,d good chences of '.=;uccess r'nd, when successful, '7ould cnntribute M.Ht~rially to the:ir position in Crissino. Freyberg reported tl:v t the troops on H11ns~mR.n I s Hill were stj_ 11 jn r;oorl heart and, althoug-h :r hnve no defj_nj_te feeling th0t greA.t i r,prove"'ent ,-r:i. 1]_ trko pbce liy our action, J concur in the r"co!'lnendPtion of these cor.."'11'1.ncl ers to oontinue t:r e attack for rnoth 0 r tmenty-four hours, for so ~'luch is rt st10ke. I ,;rive thjs :infor"~ation to Ge:mcral Alex::inder who herrtil;r concurr0:d :in F'c;T r,"co-c,r~end~ition. I then nassecl this "rnrrl. on to H'r"'ybn~g. He sRys he ,·-ill give it evE'!rything he hns e;ot. '7e hnve J~jd on a heavv ~ir RttacJr, but rue to tr..,"! disi:1ster to the plnnes on Pol'l.pei field b:v the eruption of Mount Vesuvius our air effort will be ~entl"T cnt do1.Mm. Th•:q r"!lport that ov~r 80 B-25 1 s hrive been dar~ar,ed or destroyed. It seems inconccivriblc, wHh this eruption tA]dnR' plnce in th"'l lrst week, tr'lt theY woulo 1 eave th,., nlnni;s in such nrox:i."1ity to Vesuvius. 1 11 ! hf'Ye indj_c:::it~a. above thrt I no not fee1 trnt tr is or~rl'1tj on 1·,ill be suc- cessful b:1r 01ir efforts r,J.on"' if th-~ ene 11y continues to r'"sist, nnd reLnforces , as be is doin:-;. P°o' 1cver, jntelligcmce inoic8tes tri,.,t he is not too h2rrY, thr,t he is h~1.vi'1.IY, her-v 7 losses, thnt h<"l hrs heavj l;r roinforc".d the Hitler Lin") so that the sj_t11ntion mny b~ 7_i1ce bro h~rnr;rr~j p;hts jn th... ring, both ."bout to topple ov~r. It ~n.y be tlint if we continul"l to nttnc1· a.t not too great expense for nbout th~ next 48 hours, we my succeed. n Th0 frriy Gor11Pnclf'lr today d-isprtchod t},c followim,· l.ritter to Lt. Gl"ln. Devors, Deput:r Suprc:1e 1Ulil"ld Cor:,,P.nd er: rtYour J_ritt"lr of lB MA.rch },p s been received. "I Pr pr<"lpnred to lo01F'l the VI Cor:rs 1•rith tri!'l 3rd and !~5th Divisions Rfter the Main Fif'th Ar"'ly fore,, hns ioincd up w:i th trio brjrlr,;ehead force. I undeirstr,nd thnt General Alex~mrler he.., s pr~pProd A tentat:i.v,, t,j ri~ table for tris rnnAuver and that 7011_ have a copy. I hA.vc not received a copy yc!t. My o··rn esti nnte is that we shall not be Rble to launch n coord:innted nttack bv the:: t"'O arnies until 11bout '1e.v lst. T believe j t ,7ill require at len_ '3t three, reeks befor~ w~ cnn reA ch the bridgehead force. Jf you them ad.d tl~ <3 t5 ""'" to f.;l"lt the VI Cor:rs out, A.nd a r ,rj od of rest nnd r~or1;13nizntion you vdll be vr,~11 into the su-,,,ricr, n"1d it r,ay bo too late to cnntribut"'- ""UCh to r,v1 ;;F.LnRD. Ho •revcr thn t is a natter beyond '1;f scope. 1 "I h~licvc yon nre mistri1zen in yo1rr •"!stin•1tA of B~rtholf. I con'·ider thRt he is rloin1; a eood iob. T'fhen ~rour l~tter arri vcd ~sterd;-1y GrnentJ1 ,1r h:1 d the �Chi~f nf Str>:f'f of' tb'l TI Corrs ch~c1< rrivPtelv nit½ th.e G-l's of II Corrs, 1/+th And 11Sth Divj sfons to nsccrtrdn ,,,.,i,_,..thnr nr not thE' ~rr,y G-1 s~ction nns i;ivinr; sati sfr:1~tory erv:i c~. ""ht"! rerort of 1111 trr"e G-1' s '7r s th,.,t th~ :,r"~r G-1 Section h::,s ,., s~.'J'\prithetic ,md~rstrnr1 in~ o+' the r"'rsonnel rrobl""-l"'S ,--;thin trc cl;visjon ,.,nrl is ril··,,,•rs "'ager to assist in th'"!~r s::ilution. Colon~l '3."ltzr,rin, ny PerutY Chi~f of Striff, ::ind en 0utst11ndi np; officl'!r, is consbntly on tr~ job su:r~rvisj nr; G-1 r,r>ttl'!rs f'or th~ Chief of St?ff. Fo-•<"ver, since vou h11ve .,.,"mti oned the '"latt"'r, T shn 11 b..., on t1-- c al~rt to ascertr'.in ,,./r'ether or not ne hnve a Feakness in the G-1 Section of 1 ich T pri not ermre. "I do not l-no'"' tr1' b",d.s of' :--ro11r belief thrt Bertbolf dons· not senri to be to ~lve •1011 correlct fi ';)ITes. I bel; ":!Ve th Pt your hen.dqu11rters is faMilinr ...,;th the !l.,ture r>nd sources of our reri odic rerorts, ri s rerresent1>tives of both yo11r G-1 nnd c:tntisticrl of'fices hr•ve hr,d occr, sion to ~o ov~r the,, with :r.w G-1. In A. l~tt"'r on l F"'brnnry 104/., Se1bridge ~P,ntion~d to Gru~nth~r sor~ nrparent incons~ st"'nci"!s in fj_n•nr~s ,,rhj ch w~ hnd .,.,irnishr!d, but these ''!~re exrlriincd in detail in (}ruenth"'r's repl~r of 7 Fcbrunr7 -inc ns fnr "'SI 1mo11 thcv ,·,ere rccept'!l<l ,, s correct. I do not lD7-oW o+' A.n7 oth~r instanc"s in ·JY1 icr our figur~s hAV1' b~cn sPid to b~ inl'ccurrite, l"nr1 J uncl~rc:;trnd th . . t S•wrbrid.'1'e oic not indicr>te di.ssritisf11ction "Tith the'~ jn his r!'!Ce'1t visit to this headqurirtf":rs. c1 ble 1 "You Mention th"' rl'riclity ·lith wJ, icr I rut r~rlr>cl'.'.!rimts into divisions i:1nd then ;,.,_to co,..,bat. 'l'hPt, of cours~, hns b"len neccssr·ry ~n th"' brid~P-rte"d and in the 14th Div1.sion vrrich r--ust f';O to J\nzio nt once. Had ·,~e benn "bl"! to secure rerlri cer,ents wh~r r:re ost n~~ded tr>e"", thcv would hrivc been n ble to sr~nd a rea"'onable yicr;od of ori1mt,,tj_on before s~einP ..,ction. The r~rlr-ccr"ent situ"'tion no", 7 ooks t-;oor, but it h::, s b~en fpr fror S" tis fr, ctory in th"' rr st. "You ...,ention b"i'1."' shodc.,d ':7ith t}11" sl.onnl'>SS of the r,ttn c}r • I r,r too' but probabl:r not to the "'xtl:!nt thrt you nre, f'or I h:·we se~n for tr., :re <1t '"!icrht 11onths, r>ncl hric'! il"'lpr ,sscd 1rron .,.,.,, thri re.,.,sons f'o:r tb"l slowness of om~ rrogress in JtPJ.y. The:r Pre: 'T'errrdn, YTePth~r, cr,.r,:;fnlly :rrAff'rcr c4ef~nsjv, 1-oc::itions in the r10 1 mtrdns, rcterdn,;d anr, '"cll-train,.1d rmer,y troops, ;;rossly in"derp1rte ...,e."'ns nt our oisr,osr,l wr51') on th") offensiv"!, witr arnrox:i,..,rtely (>.qual forc0s \ to th~ dl')fender. I hPVe scf'!n, fror, actufll exy,criencc on l"!any occ10sions, th~ 1 air feil ropel'l.te<lly to rlrive c ,.,t-:;:r-r1:in"'d in_f,.,,ntrv out of n~frmdl'lr locPlit5 "!s. You J:,r,ve 'Jerm it dA"'1onstr..,ted at Cassino. Plrnt;r of Gernan in:";-,ntry re"'l<iinnd in the to"m, " ith tt=1nl'r.;, .,,f't~r t 10 c borib'i.n~. I :F1 not sAtisf'ind ,,,ith tho ''PY ll'r ... yberg hes h,.,ndlec, th':! si tuPtion, but you nuc:t undcrstP.'1C1 the deli er c:,r 17ith vrhi_ch ::r Must ne<il. 1 rith hi.,.,, r'h1c to -instructions T hrive received rersom1lly on this M 0 ttcr fron General ~lexr,nder. l;'reybcrP, hPs 1,-,cked ng~ess:iv~n~s~, and I hnv"' so -inoicPt')d to !\.lcxr-nr er. Fe hPs br-,.n rc1uctl'lrit to errloy th'°) troops !1V•15 lable to M.T'I, ,-,11 of t'Thich ',"?r~ Br:i tish. T h~ve dPil;r oontacfod hi" And 11rgcd tb" use of "'ore rrerr ~AP 11:ind troops in the to,·'11. , l'l.n Attr c1r b:r the Indians fror.1 the north surport"'ld bY tri.n 1 ·s "'nd the cnri,.,.; t,.,ont of tl e 73th Di vlsion to . ush rronnd th~ brise o.i:> the h:ill. 'J'onn of th~se "ere 11tte"1T'ted, cxc~rt rfter t,-ro days' dP-l11y noditionRl Nl"lW' 7:enl::,nd troops "mre used in tho village. 1 0 0 "You Mention ti,"' t t 'hP, G"'rririns ~°-""" to bP, P ble to tr k.-, it ; n r bi,.,. n:,..y. 'T'her._• hf-Ive done so to -ri.y 1,:no=l -1d~"- f' or rr> n•.r '"'Onths r nc rr , c ortrd.nl~r c oin~ 1.t :ln Cassino and h"ve nl.P c~d therf'? the 'Jr-st rind tr"' riost I'1.l/"f,"d troops nt trci r d; srosril. In riv opinion, tho 2ttc'lck by the Nevr Zl'l~lRnd Corr::i "rith ti.e r0stric- �tion of trc use o-<' t'1c 7gth f'ivision rs jT1J'oMc1 b,r t\J.l"Jxnncer , ,-,e rr, not ~ing to siicceecl in cRptur;np; t h':'! Mo:nrstl"Jrv but wjl]_ prob:=ibly hoJ.rl thP, tovrn , the raiJ.ror,d 8tAtion t0 the soutr rind h,.-, ve r- snrll briclt;"he:=id ov".lr the Rapido 'R.i ver to fr,d11 t et-, future operntions b~r the Rin;htr ,hrriy. This of' course is not s;e,tjsfri ctorv to Me . to "Ar:i p;J.nd Grittenbl'lr,:;~r is b11:i -n"" f'ittcd out i:-rith n strff . et hi as s0on ...,s vou cnn nrike hiri aw•ilRblc . T ,~ill be glrid 1':rith r ef8renc" tr, rw conversntio1'1 1:ith Bull rbout fl new !)iv:ision Cor'"'1::inder . Hull ~ 1'1d-i catcd thrit Gemern 1 •i,,_rshall hno s0~e Division Co,.,,,.,Rncl ers irho, he 'l''A s f'·0xious to tret into conhnt rind ~ sk"<l if :r coulcl us~ on!".l in ~m unoerstudy cPraci tv. T s11id "v~s" . It :is of no nor,~nt to me . "I fL"r :into tho ber-ichhel'l<l yester01:i;y tc, c eek on tre ~iturition there . The li""itl'.'ld ob j octiv" ntt ...,c1' schedufod +'or th~ 10th ,ws crnccll ,cl on r,y ord3rs upon tn'1 re co,..,.,l")nd<>ti.on n-P "'rnscott , d-10 hod to altAr his r,lnns for tr~ rittri.ck h·· scd upon Ms conclusion thr,t the 1st British f'iv:i s:i.on Jpck~d th:~ cnpbi 1 it;v of its offensive iob . t-tc fnlt, n.nd I "~Md, th"t he nrs nttric1dn~ ,-,;th rirrroxi,..,r>tely even nnr,bers , throu"'11 tl,e on'1n, Pnd thrt he ·,roulrl. hnve h ,rivY CRsnrltfos •~:bi.ch 1"oulrl he :i.nsi 'T'11.ificr>nt . Tt •ould not trlr.., nn:,, 11rtill'"'r:.r +'ire of'f of nny pRrt of trc be."c'hAP.d . "L~ rir~ r,ovin-, tlie 14th Divisio"Yl in , bce;inn:i.n,... toc1Py . It ':i 11 Bll be in in t::m d11ys . Then,-,~ c<>n rotate son~ troops th11t rirl"! t1red . Unl oad:i_nr is ,:oi11"' well. I ra~ O"'ntinuin:' ··ii.th r-:r rilan to r-int PnothAr Div:ision in at a lnt~r t iriA if the r>nC"'Y situ..,tion ,iustifi~s . Tfoirever, 11.lexrYP ~r told r1e yesterday thn.t he T"'P '3 T'UttinP' out instructio11s f'or t:r~ det.., il"d r.tt'l c1rc bv both cle "'!cnts nf t:rc F5-f'th and ,:;_;ir;hth .J\.rr ies . 0 "101,mlJ. R.oo'\cs told Al th:'t you 0btain~cl t1-i., i rprcssion fro:-- G~nern 1 T:'r,.,,yb""ri; thnt ',e hri<l " ti"Me schedule to join un 'TI. th t I'! briogehcPcl forM by Mnrch ?Jrd . nf'litb'"'r .,.,., stnf'f nor J ..,t llny t;...,'" "!ntertninr,d such optiriistic hop0s . It is 1truc thrit G~neral Fre:,rberq; rad r;rert strnt8~ic p]pns for ru::;J--inp- througr to ) Roi,8 in a hurrv but P.Ven h~ rerlized t}-•r,t hn wr s induli;ine :in 11:i r;hf'u1. tr inkin~ . t1 rther i Mrortant "lssnges of the dry follow: Hf), At.I t o FI,A 1 1B<), rcrent<'lcl Fi"th Ar'fl:r. RH SD 601. nrt is ess,,,ntinl thrit th., RC,,., o:" L. D!'M in Corsicn. n.rrive in .lr-ples hv 1st April. Since rres,~nt 1;-<'t i"' n.ot S'.tPfici~nt to "Ssur~ tr·s, FiY~ ~r.,.,y r.Ps ,...,~l"'"d thPt h"'cs.11se of n:l cessit~r, th ,:T [l"t'e r"'~T'"rl"!d t o r~lr-rn.se i.-r::iricd:irtel_ ~7 r;ht L'"'.Ts :f'ror> tr~ ~nzio run f'or ,r one t 1 1rn 'lTritmd erich . Tlc:is" rrrrinr•~ ,~ctrils. This =u'1t not :i.nt"!rf..,:r-e ,~it}, rove of 1/;, T)iv i c;fon nor return of 50/;, FrcJ-,t RCT . t1 F'r o,., Devcr<1 t o Cl "r1, . ~M '17311. 111•rhf-,t ; s 7O,1r "'Jt;~r,te o:"' Brir"c :i.l"!r Gr:-ner:c>l R.rwr,onil S . r1cL,.,:i.n , L.5th "livi.sio"l, r,s rbl" ros:rectiv"'l f:i.visio-n Co--r-1ri11der for n 111i-;R,Tr"'1.D? rn"' H'"'T n"t' rn0th"1r, •-r..,sr:inp-ton hrs rr?c~iv,.,,d vJr- -"MTOr"hl~ r~rorts re~crn.-i.n~ hh• h11.t notice h, -.,-, not --;iven th"1 !.. 5th 1Jivi"ion on Mi,'r!leton 1 s ,-;1 thdra'"ml . " G"'n~ral Cl"r1, 1 s r"'rly t0 th~ ,, bov"' is ,, s follo···s: ~n ,S,SJ.4 . 11 I tl-·:i.n!r 'R"t' ;,.,...,di.11r Gl"'n·~"t'tl Hc L..,in, 45 n; y;_.--:i on , ,·rill Mr1rn :: -:0od f'ivision Cor-ri,,nc er in c o"'!brit. T rlic'l n0t "'jv~ hi:, th ':J Division -c• en Mir r'l"lton l~:f't bec~,Fe i;;r ~l"ls ,...,[' s '"'Or~ r:~s"'lrv:inr "'111 iM iedi:•t~l•r ~v-dlnbl"l . 1Tr,11r,v~r , s•rh')n T<;· "'l~c; b~C~"'1~ siclr a 1 �short tir'l~ :"F.;0 in th~ brir"'l'3he..,r P"1r j t 1ook~cl P'3 tr 011';'!' he ni.n:rt b"' inc.'.'raci-\ t?t~a for f'urth"r dutv, T hnd COT""' tr the ccncJ usion that McL..,:in <::hould ,o;et the Di.vision. "P'heri,ris I ,-,ould hrte to 1_ose McLnin, I riro 1villin~ to l~t him go for this nese!rV~d pro,..,otion. 11 Cable from HQ AAI to Fifth Ar y . R".f RE/166. "'R.oA d fo,.-,,_p,,lii - S0 ll"lrno cinder covered. Scafati tJocera 6 inch to 1? inc},. "'Tocer·:i CP~TP 4 incr to 6 inch. C,9VA Sril'"lrno ? inch to 3 inch. Rord fASs?ble only for jo~ps. Diversion po,..,s:ibl~ SAlerno t\.vcllino - NPrlr-s. 11 General GlPrk tociA.y "IT'ot~ to CG, 1-JATOlTSA, rccor-i ,ending the pronotion of Bri<;. Gen. John li. 0 'Daniel to Maj. Gen., nnd the follo 1.' inr nnn~d Colon~ls to th~ r['n1< of' T'lr 4 r. Gen: Cnl. u,,rr-r B. Sh,,rt'lr-in, Col. C<1.rl C. Brn'k-, Col. Urb..,n 'J:iblo rnil Gol. R~uben l-T. rruc1r~r. * * * rB.r:S1~•rzA.'TO--fifl''R.CTT ?J, 104/+--Gcn"lr<>l Clrrk rcs~rv--d th ""orninc: +'or ,r1r-,i.nistrrtive ""nttcrs and f'f;'Oin.+,n,..nts. ft 0015 Pri!lcc Hr:,berto F-id Ms rcsr>"Cts rnd rm·rincn +'or rbont on~ ho11.r in tr, Gen.err>l 1 s ven. At 1115 Grnerril Coult r, Co..,T'r'1d·'nr-: th"'l ~5tl1 f\1.v:i.sion, ,.,1--,icr is "'OOn tc b"lc0-)"' rrrt of t"'"J .,.,jftl--i ~ !'"Y, I'"-: d J-,-i s rr"Jsr,P-cts P'1r' con+>-,rr~d for 1/i ,.,j_nutes ,,,.i_tr n~nl'\rr 1 Clrrk conC1'r'1in ~ 11se o-r t e d 4Vi"jon, r,rrt of' Flier hr~ p1r-0::ir1:v 0rr1v~d in Ttrily. tt tl-\-:i ~11.,1 o-<' Ms confnr-,ncf" "5tr G"l'1~rcl Cl11r1r, r~ rl";r-dnryc1 +'or l1~ncr rnc'l l,ft 11.t Pbout 1130. Snff--r f'ell (1nr-1nr.; Most of' t,._,,_ ""'orn:in";, but it r,,-,.lt"'!d soon ,-,ft.-.r hi.ttinr t n ::-round. 1 H~"'S f'ro,., t},,ry Grssino -r'ront ,....,s ;n('lr;f'-:,,it~, :-ind G~c1.rirril Clrrk refrnincd +'ro!"! goi.n,.,. +'0r "ard, 1mo,·r-in,.,. thr+, Grmnrr,l Alcxrintler rTa.s ,,:tsitinr; G~n~ral Ti'reyb~r~ "nd rmnld retnrn ~ ith a cccision conc"'Jrninl"' ,··!1 cth0r or not to continue th~ attrck. 1 /1.t 1'345 G~n"'lral Ho1s1-rorthy, n'.",r Co..,,.,rrider o+> t e 4th Jndi8n I'ivis:ior, c;:il.l,'ld on G""n~r,,1 Clr-r'k. G•w~r..,1 TTnlsvrorthy is r11rlPc:i11..,. Genr"Jr..,l Gr-llo'''r;r, .,.,,10 ·•rs r1!t i"l t"',.,-rorrril~r ,·+".ln the old Division Co,.,~1!'.'ndor hrd his foot blo'·m of'f bir f' box min~. Gc11err-1 G1Pr 1: crnt~nu'"'c1 tr -i.ft"lrnoon ..,nc~ took P short '""O 11-c. .,,j_t]-, prl•in;"'trr>tive r-ntt~rs c'!11rjng At l '70() f'o11:r Brr zilfr '1 o-''fic~rs "rro hn.r b"len servi n- 1rit}i th(") Ferilriu~rtP.rs pj_+'th /\rrw CfH11") to F''r thl"Jir rt";lf"lCts t,, G~n ~rrl Cl.rr1r rr~ or to 1-,1:ivjni=; for Al-::t~rs, 'Ji-. ,r~ the7r ,dll pr".lrrre to rMf-"live ri B:rt-zilirin Corrs tlirt ,-ill rirriv~ in ~forth ~ fr:i CP rrithjn trie n ,xt f 'r ...,,mtrs. 1 At 1R1O r.~n~rrl A. 7 ""xnnr1 er, l'lCCCH'1T[ln:i,~d hv G"'....,A,r~l L,.,,-nj_tz")r, cr""'e to th'! Co,,,,.,,. ..,,.,,.,,d;n~ r.,..nr>r~1 1 s h t r:1.rl vmt -lnto ir"'0d:l:--t~ ccri:"cr1mce -":1th r.e 1,rrls Clrirk and Grnenth--r re7rdinr tJ:,n n ct ion ,-,t C0 ssino. Shortl7 riftcr G<1ner~ 1 Alexnnclcr I s ar:rivl'll, (}en-;r:-:,1 LA.esc, CoM- :-,ndinr; 0-"lner..,1 o-<' "":i ,.,ht!~ Arr''", rnd on~ of his staff off; cr"Jrs rir~jv,.,d to r,rrt:i cir-=it" in tr,~ ,1; ,cussion. At 1010 th·, crn-"'~r~nc~ '"n 'ed, P'10 C11'!nerrl Clr•rlr !">'7.(~ hi~ Ch;"lf of Stpff', ,r;t:r Pi.res, rl")rrin"ld jn t,hc con:f'ercnce roori p110 discussed ~vents ,.,} ich hrd tr.,,nsr,irt"ld durinr- tre 7-Pst hour. 1 0 cuss ,Aft"'r '"'1.lf'f ir ('.,..,,~r."l Glrr 1r dociderJ. to t~lrC' rt brief "Trll• r-nc' tc f'1irtr9r r1is'"1 7 tr Gen~rPl f1r, 1 "lntli"'r th') d~vclorr"1nts of the day. �"It b~CP!"'~ rrrnr~11t tori~v, in r,y conversFtionn ,fith General "F'r'"'ybl"lrg, thnt t)1c rre,.,. 61"lB1Pnd Div-l <Jio"Y'I h,d ,hot itP bolt, PS ""!11 . s the Inrin 11 Division, and thnt the British Hir-;h Co,..ri!'_ncl '7PS r~luctE1nt to t 11ro= the '7Sth Dj_v:5.sion into tr~ C" ssino r>ren . -Pr-~yb~rg nnnur-1.ifiedl~v reco-:yv:mchd thrt t -i attac1· cense • nd ' th1:1t the Ind; "'DS on Hnnf!mnn ' s Hill bl'>, '"7 thrrnv'TI. T [1 r-reec' b11t 1rno1•rj_n..,. th 0 t Alex..,.,11rler ,rras ~nrout" to tl is hencrpJ.rirt~rs, T told li'rnyb,.,rg thr>t I ''Ould conflrn T"'Y orcl ~r to hi to withrr~r t}11"l Hanr>;nA.n I s Tiill fore"' . llAll"lXFlnrler r1 -id not cor,."' to tH_s hePr-1qu,..,rt~rs hut •-r,mt clirect to ?r<~yhl"lrg and S"lent th~ dnv. n"" r'°'turnnd hP-re c1t 1810 Pnn cr,lled r> ,, t'!tin~ r" t:r Leese 11.nd .,..,ys"llf. He hr-tl')c1 to coll o-ff tho rittr,ck but f0lt th,,.,t tl•e Mew Zer,lr>n°ers had l--1'1Pde no rror;rcs<J rn(1 hnc no furt:rl"lr off~nsive riction . Fe 1meTT tris to hr, the cr>S/'>, vrith th"'l 4tr Tnd:i.en nivision. J n•1 convinced trat t}1 e rJew Zealnn( ers hr>Vl"l n0t br,en -fi..,htj_nr_; tonri cj onsly j_n t 0 ci.ty, but I ,,rpnted tr"' r~co,...,.,,,~ndr,tion to ( cr-i lJ. ot'f the f1ttack to cor,P'J fro,,, the British, 11s [111 troops involv d ,., re Bri tish . "It ·ras rlecidl',ld by A1c,a.,nrl~r rt tonipht 1 s :"~"ting thrt the Hrn,.,,-irn 1 s I-fj_ll eroup would b"l =ithdre,m but if rossibl~ to r,aj ntnin n S'7P.11 rost in thr>t Prt"'P; thrit Hill 1113, the rP "lror>d strition ""nd t},"" -rr3s"mt line in Cr>ssino he ,.,.,intriined; th::-t t_ l"l t 1.rnov~r fro!"' Fifth to T<~j_~hth Arr1fos ,ould tr1r~ rlnce irr .dfrtAly PS arrPno;n.d b~t ,Mn I.eese rinrl "1YS"'1f . ,.le heve rlecidcd thr>t tJ, is rrill tP1-c~ rl<>ce "t noon Sunrlny, Parch 26. Leese "'ill rut tho 78th Division in to reljeve the 4th Indian 1mcl th" /+th Brj_tish Division to r~li~VI" th~ '3rd DH. (Frt'.'lnch) . 1 1 "I l'T' ,-,or 11.nd ~ore convinccrl, rnd so is /\.lexander rind Lees~, tbrit the coriinr; bi? attrick of th!<) t .'"'o r-r,...,jes cPn not he riricle h~for'3 Mrq 1st ['nd tl·at ,.,h~n it does t111.-,,., rlricA, insterid of the T'ifth t-r~y exccutinfl' r subsi0i8ry role, it '"ill h1we to cBrry tr~ br>ll throu~r t} '3 nountnins r- s ·~w,1, for I ny, of the rlefinite opinion th,.,t the --r;;irhth Arrw vrill not ridvance throur;h the Liri Vri lJ.ev P-XCept as asqist~r~ b:,T the Fifth Arny attack. 1 1 "I hritc t o see the Cr-ssino c;ro ·r -flop . It has been ,, !"'ost difficult sHul"tion thr>t T h"'V'-' been in , due to the f,.,ct thnt r>ll troors jnvolv~d 1r·ere British , itJ.-, a British chrnn~l of corriand · ,xt ,nding -f'rom Uex->n<ler, in 'tany inst1:1nces, dire c t to "F'r~·rberg . The Ner-r ZePl.,.,nc'ers a.n<l TncHr•ns hnv"l not f0ught vrell . FreyberP-, T'l'ht1r~ri.s h~ is ti courp r,;cous nnr coor~rntive corrn;:i,nder, j c1 11oefully <foficient j_n j_nt~lli.<;enc~ . 'R"i.s nritisr suboroi11<"'tes do not --irlriirc his leadership, And it hPs b~en nn nnhapr,Y situ,..,tion since Alexrinrler crent~a 1-i'reyhJrg ' s rrovisionRl corps. '!;'re,rberP" is not 'l_llfllif'i--ir! to oorinanr it, nor fo~s he hPve the staff to i""rl"!M(•mt his in- tructions. r1y on~ ,·,orry is tho.t n,vers J-,,-,fl fr-il-id to portr"Y tl~~ trur, rictu:r~ to thf"-? r~orl<1 in the '.'lnr Deprrt~,cnt . In fret, I nn convinced 0f thnt . 1 0 "I p~, riost --inxious to "'tart th" r~ or~P11:ization , for J AM .ri cr,ns ann Frencl- toi:;et}l')r we vrill PdVPnce . " 1 pr, sure th<>t r-Titl1 the r �Two important messages of the day are as follows: Personal from Devers to CJark. RN l:?814. "Is Eagles still in cor1rn.and of the 45th Division? Is there any danger of his being removed bPcause of sickness? If there is a chance of McLain I s ComlTll'lnding the Division, Ms.rshall desires th::it he be consulted as to his rersonel rreference as to remrdning with the 45th or going to another Division in UK with view of commanding it." Personal from Clark to Truscott . RN 5719. "Inquiry has been received from War Department as to availability of McLc'dn to commtmd Division in UK. Before replying, tell me of EP.P-les 1 health. Is there nny ch1mce that Eagles can not continue on account of health? If so, McLain should be held for possible cor:imand 45 Division. If Eagles in good health, will recommend McLain for ill( assignment with view of la.ter comrianding a Division there." * * * PRESENZANO--MARCH 24, 1944--At last nj ght 1 8 mnet1 ne GenerAl ClArk invited General Alexander, ris aide, Ceptain Grjmsley, General Lemnitzer r>nd General Clark's British aid0, CPptain Lnmpson, to breokf[lst, and the conversation at the t,able centered around GenerAls Alexancer, ClPrk and Gruenther, who discussed mainly the rresent st~tus of the Italian ct:unpnign. At the completion of the breakfast Generfll Alexander, }-,is n:ide 11nd General Lemnitzer proceeded forward to the comJll..and post of General Leese and from there to General Freyberg 1 s Headqwrters. Before leavinp: the Fifth Army command post at 0950 from the landing strip, General Clark c:rent the early part of the mornj ng disposing of Bdmjnistrntive TTR tters in hifl vRn. The Army Comnander visited the 88th Division at its front ljne rositions on the left flank of the Fifth Army front today, making his first formal call on this Division since its arrival in Italy. Arriving Rt the 88th airfield, General Clark was met by l'Tajor General Sloan, Division Commander, and after visiting the command rost he went to the command posts of all three regiments and conferrPd with the Regjmental CommA.nders. Although the R8th Division hr-is been in tJ-ie line for approximately two weeJrs, jt has seen little nction, gj nee it is in a sector thr>t h1rn been extremely quiet. The Division hns had an.excellent oprortunity to become indoctrinnted into battle action because of the ros~ tion j n wM ch it VTP s plnced. • · Flyinr b"ck to his commPnd post by cub Generrl Clark reached Iresenzrrno at 1?30 and immediP.tely 1"ent to luncb an0 discussed l'is trip vri th General Grnenther during the rreal. The nfternoon vas spent in conference ·i:i th ,mrj ous HeF>drpmrters Section Chiefs and in disposing of vital paper 1·rork. At 1620 General Clrrk flew· over Nnples and around tr e slopes of Mount Vesuvjus so hP- could view f'rol'l the air the damage caused by the volcano's eruption. After this aerial reconnnissance of the volc1mo rrea, General Clnrk landed Pt Car,odicMno airport, }Japles, �where he WPS net b;v his cn.r r'1.d tflken to "'faples . He had dinner vrith three of his Hest I oint classmPtcs - Colonels Tully, M2.rkoe and Nygaard, returning lrter in the evening to his cor,mand post . Following are the importnnt messages of the day: ersona.l Truscott to Clark. R:T 1259 . "Mess~t=;e from FRO, AAI, #783 to PR g, received 2350 yesterdry, states CPssino battle has been called off but withdrawPl will not be completed for 4~ hours and thAt the w~thdrawal of units from 435 and 202 "'ill be difficult 11nd will be made !'lore so if any intention reaches enemy before completion, also states this to be off record background . I have received no word f'roM you relAtive to calling off Cassino ba.ttle and aJ11 surprised thr>t stAff ch:mnel should receive such informHtion before I do . · Request you inform me whether or not TRO message states facts . Termination of battle under circumst:rnces indicated hRs serious implications here . " Persorn:1.l Clark to Truscott . R'l 6701. "I am ristounded thrit AAI FRO is communicating direct with your fRO and have rrode ~trong representations thPt in the future all such communic11tions will be sent by my Headqw=irters . Reference your 1259. I issued instructions that j nformation concernj ng Cassino battle be sent you last night but through staff error you were not advised. Only change in battle of Cassi no i"' withdrawal of troops from hill · 435 , which we hope to accomplish tonir,ht. Their strength has bP.en reduced so as to make an attnck on the monastery impracticable. Hill 193, the rf'ilroad station Rnrl the bulk of Cassino will be retained with the troops as now disposed . Effort to eject Boche from his remaining few locnlities in Cassino will continue. Impetus of the attack Las died down due to exhaustion of troops ·nvolved. Do not understand the serious implications which this has on your situation. Wish you would be tbink.:.ng of an eRrly attack on Cfaterna in order that '.',e ray d-iscuss it when -I come up in the next day or two . Th::nning out on your front would appear to make such an attack practicable." * * * FRESE1'JZAN6--r,iRCH 25, 1944--After cispatch:ing important adm:i.nj strative rn:i:ers, General Clr-irk rnade a study of a ffemorcnduPJ submitted by General Brann, Arr":Y G- 3, concern:·ng Fift}1 Ar1:ry operations . At 1130 Captain Lindsay V Jrtson, a French officer who Met General Ckrk Pt the beach at Cherchel when he landed by submarine , came to pay his respects to the Gerieral . General Beucler and Lt . Col . Draper accompanied Captain \latson to the Genernl 1 s van. General Clark and Cartain ' Ptson reminisced on this hazardous adventure, and General Clark signed his narne on a thousand-franc note which already bore the signature of Bob Murrhy and other persona.ges at this historic meeting. Shortly after Captain WAtson left, General Keyes reported to General Clark and lunched with him . After lunch both of them went to Genera.l Clark 1 s van where they discussed the regrouping of the Fifth Army and its future plans . After General Keyes left General ClE.1.rk bunied himself with admjnistrative rretters, took a short nap and then, accompanied by Lt . Col. Dra:rer , walked to the village of Fresenzano . The climb up to the village was noteworthy in thRt it was made in a brisk wind and blinding snow flurry . Upon his return, General ClRrk signP.d so!'le decorations and cor.iP1endations and Pt 1g15 received Ernie Iyle, ) ) �Vt t 1 Scripps-Hovmrd press correspondent, Ed Kermedy of the Associated J ress, Sherman Montrose, Chief of the Fhotowaphic Pool and Lt. Col. Clark, PRO Chief. This was an informal gathering, 11nd aftervmrds the entire party had supper with the GenerEil. Du:d ng dinner General Clark exr lained that the Fifth Army was now taking up a new +'rant on tre left flank and disclosed, off the record, to the corresronr' ents thnt the Fifth Army was receiving the 85th Division and it would also receive Headqwrters of the 4th Corps and there was a po'.:'sibility that another American Division would join the Fifth Army within the next few months. The correspondents asked a number of questions, including a . general evalu::1tion of the situation at the Cassino and Anzio regions, and he answered trem frankly but not for publication. A very friendly atmosphere rreva~led throughout the evening. The correspondents left at ?030, and General Clark retired to his vrn n1:i th GEmeral Keiser for further discussion of the day. General Clark dictated the following materjal for foclusion in his diary: 11 My belief that the New Zealand and Indian Di visioYJ.s did not fight well during the Cassino battle hes been further strengthened as a result of the withdrawal of Indian troops from Hangman's Hill in suf'ficient strength to warrF1.nt an assault on the monl'lstery itself. Rereated efforts of the New ZeAlanders to reach Hangman 1 s Hill or to make nny progress in the town failed. Reports from Freyberg and tee New Zealand Commanders were thrt the troops could not advrnce. However , all the troops on Eangman 1 s Hill car.1e off the hill last night without any di1'ficulty f'rom enemy action. Arparently the urge to attPck up t]:-,e hill WP.S lacking. I a!'1 conv:i need that the New ZeA.land troops in the tovm were roorly lead 11nd shm•1ed absolutely no offensive sp:irj t. From apprmci mately Uie ffrst day of the Cassino sho,, the Indinn Division had totally lost its offensive rower. I attribute this, in greBt part, to the defeatist attitude ::,nd lack of initfr,tive of its commander, General GaJ lo,ray." The Army Commander today dispatched a letter to the Corrmrndfog General, NAT0TTSA recorrirending the promotion of Lt. Col. R. J. 17ood , executive officer :ind rrincip=tl assistant to the Army G-3, to the rank of Colonel. * * * SAN MARCO--lVfARCF 26, 1944--After taking co.re of the accumulation of lPst night I s important r,11rers, General Clark left his oommand rost for Harles , y.rhere he dined with sever.!1.l of his West r oj_nt classmates - Colonels T-Tr,rkoe, Tully . and Nygaard - and then left to join General Gruenther at the Officers' Rest Center for dinner and the evening. Imnediately following the General's departure, hi::i Pides and tre enlisted rnen of his section broke camr i:md set ur his new rommand post in the vicinity of $an M&rco. * * SAN T,Llu:"1CO--nARCH 27, 1944--General Clark remA.ined at the Officers ' Rest Center at Sorrento today in coMpany with General Gruenther. Viork continued �today on setting up trie now cornand rost and by sundown the CoMManding Gene ral ' s Section was comrletely orgnniz0d n.nd ready for operation. Word was received today that General Giraud , Comnander- in-CMef of the French Expeditionary Forces , would CPrie forward tonorrow afternoon to inspect French units of the Fifth Army, nnd arrnngements were mule for h..;m to see the Army CoPLrnander at the Fifth Army conmand post at 1630 . The following import ant mess,ges were received today : rersonal Devers to Clark. RN F 23198 . "I am submitting to GHQ , War De partment proT11otion recoT'lmendations for the rromotiom; of O'Daniel, Bank, Sherman nnd JJiblo for vacancies existi::ig in this theater • .l\.lso I am subnittinP" tre n.-.,me of Tucker for rroT11otion providing a vacancy esists :in the United JUngdom or elsewhere with the statement that Tucker is a ccomranying the 504 J'arachute Infantry Regiment to 'ill( . I hn.ve told General iiarshall that I realize that we have T. Brown and Rufus Ramey to yet absorb and that it is my intention to absorb thAm as soon [1S they have rad a little battle experience by attachment to divisions of Fifth Army, but that I do not feel tho.t their presence in the treater should deny Sherman his pronotion. 11 •<. AFI'Q to All Concerned . R'J F23714. "Herewith jnfornation requested in your SD 608 dat ed 26 f:arch . This HeadquPrters hes asked AG1ilAR to ship maximum possible number of J,ersonnel of 91 Div direct to Italy. Equipment is planned for shipP1ent direct to Italy on UGS 39 . rresent jndfoations are that 10 , 000 personnel will r.iove direct to Italian or Sicilinn ports with remainder to 7forth Africa ports . The latter will be transshipped to Italy. Estimate that Division l'dll clone Italy approximately 15 May and will require 1 month I s shakedown before it can be orerational. 11 * * * SMT Ml\RCO--MARCF 28 , 1944- -General Cl['lrk returned from Sorrento at 1230 today where he riad rassed Sunday and n;onday with General G:ruenthP-r . The brief sojourn that the General had at the Rest Camp stowed that it hnd done him much good . Shortly after lunch the Generr->.l vrnrked on iT'lport~nt rilitary dj spatches tm.til 1630. At tlwt time General Giraud. , accomranied by GenerP.l Juin and Colonel ICammerer , came to confer with General Clark . General Gruenther and Lt . Co.ls . Draper and SuthcrlFnd were also rresent . The conference resulied in a discussion between General Giraud and Gener1:1l Clerk for the next great offensive oper ation of the Fifth Army. General Giraud presented to General Clrrk a 1rorosed plen for coord{nated / offensive operl'.tions between the French and Ar.mricans j n conjunction vrith that of the British Eighth A:r:my to t ,e right of the Fifth Army. The rlan vras based on the worst possible situntion; namely, thnt the British Eighth Arrr1y would not crack the Cassino line . r orces ava:l lnble to the Fifth ArMy were four French divisions, one mountain , two infantry and one motorized division not yet arrived in Italy, two groupes of Tabors and three AmericP.n infantry divisions , exclusive of bridgehead forces . General Giraud proposed that one French mountain division , in a reriod of four days , would negotiate the mountainous crests via Luga , Spigno , retralla , Ruaz zo to Ii:.fi. He emphasized thet this mountain division must reach its objective within four days, due to the fact �that all of its supplies , wa t er , materiel , amnmnition , food , would have to be carried by mules . In conjun ction with t}, is operation , another French mountain force would proceed from Ausonia toward Esperia , followed by the t wo r emaining French divisions . Simultaneously, the three American divisions would attack :tn column along the co2stal road from Minturno toward Gaeta . The pr ogress of the American divisions would be facilite.ted by the fact that t he French mountain division, nith Itri as its objective , would so surprise the Germans that they would be forced to withdraw rapid l y , thereby not having t ime to thorough l y mine the coastal approach . This coordinat ed offensive of the Fifth Army vmuld have as its object ive the north- south communication r oute from Itri t o Ceprano a..'1.d Arce . G,:meral Giraud believed that four days after the mount ain division arrived nt Itri it would. take an additional fif teen days for the Fifth Ari:1y objective to be reached , due to the fact that once the surprise of the movntai n divi sion had worn off the Germans would more determinedly resist the seizure of the Ceprano- Arce objective . He bel ieved tha.t one month after this objective had been reached the Fifth Army w01ild be in Rome . He believed that there was the possibility thrt once this objective was reached the !"rermans would disengage some of t}1eir forces at the bridgehead to meet the Fifth Army ' s threat toward Fros:i.none . At th5.s par ticular point a determim"d offensive action by the bridgebead forces would force a general Gernan withdrawal toward Rone . General Giraud wished to emphasize that this vrhole plan was based on the success of this mountain division seiz:i.n g Itri, seizing it within four days and by surprise. He felt that this mountainous country would not be strongly defended by t he Germans , nor would they anticipate that any of our forces could negotiate them in any type of offensive ac~~ion . He realized that the terrain was very difficult but that such an offensive was possible and could be carried 01,t . At the same ti:ne he stated that the Eighth Ar1:1y must launch an attack at Crssino . If the attad: of the Eighth Army was s uccessful so muct' the better , but as suming that the Eighth Arr,~y could not advance f'l'l st th8 Cassino line, he still felt that a successful Fift:h Army offensive reaching the rain objective would force the Germans to withdraw from the Cossino sector to the northvrest . The quest i on of the da.te of attaclc aro13e , and General Giraud felt that snch an offensive➔ not be launched before the 1st or 5th of ti<Jy for two reasons ; that the French division being brought in would not arr5ve before April 15th and vrould require a week to organize itself , and that such an attack in the mountains would require a good moon which woul d not appear until t ht) 1st of May. He , therefore , s et a date for this offensive to be between the 1st and 5th of May. General Giraud a l so felt th;, t by seizing tliis objective the port of Gaeta would prove of immeasurable assistance in s upplying a further push toward Rome ; that after the port facilitie s had been cleared for vess els to debark supplies it i:rould considerably lessen the time of jnland suppl y routes to maintain offensive orerations . ~11'~ General Giraud made a further staternent that this offensive action , if successful , might conceivably end the war in two ways . First , it would be a great tactical setback for the GArmrns , and , seoondly, the seizure of Rome would be a great political victory. At the sartLe time , a successful Russian offensive from the east and a successful cros::dng of the channel by Allied forces would require that the Gerr'l8.ns use reserves either to resist the Allied offensive a cross the chrmnel or a successful Russia n offensive . Confronting �all three of these situ:·tio11.s, he believed th::>t it would result in a military defeat to the German Army. Sud· a plan, as discussed by GenerPl Giraud and General ClPrk , would require vigorous a11.cl courageous offensive Pction and quick cleaning up and folJ.owing through of those divisions in the re2r . The p~an as rresented by General Giraud is submitted here in its general scope only and not in detail. Only gener11.l riirections nf tre attack rre mentioned and in a broad sense o-f' tre maneuver . General Clark ,v:i_shed to point out to Gener~ 1 Grr aud that he real 1 zed thnt t P- G0rman s •rP.re a smart enemy, and they had so d:i sposed their troops so that f'rom onr rresent 1~ nes they would 11.ot cl.isAngage any forces from tl-ie bridge}· en.d to meet nn AHied attack. Eowever , he did agr0e thet if the Itri - Arce objective was reached tLe Ger1 I'l.< ns ~id1t coYJ.ceivably withdraw sc,me of its bridgehead forces to n eet this threat. General Clark then tLanked General Glraud for his tacticel e'<y·osition and stated thn.t his staff r·1d thnt of the French would co'1.sider this plan in more detailed nnd joint confere ces . After Generals Giraud and Juin lF.ift , General TJicCreery, Corinancler of Britisb lC Corrs, ceme to ray his resrects to General Clnrk. General Cl8ri: yrosented to G9nernl r'c'Jrflery a personal lettPr , tt•anking l''iP' and corunendinB h2.m :'or his out stand~ ng v:ork under Genernl Clark I s cor-r1aric . Ge ,1ernl Clark stBted that there WE"s a rossibi1ity that Gener£' 1 '1cCreery m.- ght be givon A cor1mand at t1,e beachhead; tlmt he recommended that le take a B1-it:i sh Corr s once the beac head force initiated. a lnrge scale offensive action . Ge erEl licCreery appeared to be g,:muinely sor:ry to leave General ClarJ.:- 1 s comnand and eave the aprearance of being none too srtisfied with '1is new assignnent uncler the ;.ightJ1 Army. He extended to G,::_merals Clrr}· and qruenther an j nvitcktion to din..ner after Ms return from a tvro or trree days I rest at Sorrento . Generals Clar ancl Gruenther accerted when General HcCreery v ould nn.me the date . 1 After Gennral ricCreery 1 s co"t+'err-mce , Generr ls Clr r'l-:, Keiser, Drn.nn Rnd GrnenthPr asrienl)led in tJ- e con""'erence rut for, a before-din'1er drink and dis cussed U•':l talk with Gen0ral Giraud . General Clr.r'l.- rrdteratecl a statement thr,t he mr>de to General G:iraud I s question of what forces would be evailnble to tre 'Rrj tish Eighth Army. General Glarl: 1 s re~~ly ,,.rs that trey ,,rould have sorie Folish troops, S0''1e Canad:.an troors , 'Jew Zealand troors, Indian troops and rerhars sorie r:ngB sh , and furt er that tl e I olj sh and Canadians would probably bear the brunt of the Rttack. The fcmr eenerals nnd Colonels Sutherlt:>nrJ and Draper bad dinner together . Gf:meral CL"'rk broke out three bottles of ".'rhite wine which tie decided , after drinking, vras del'cious . The ul,ite _wjne was fror'l Verona . A:"ter supper General Clar\-- vent bacJ.< to } · s van to v•ork on more adrrr'cn:t strr tive rat tors . 0 General Cl8.r·: today recei vr.~d He folJ.owing c2ble frori General Devers: 11 I have just rnceived tl-e fol1owbis eyes only cable which I am paraphrasing to you: '1'J :"?3?86 . "Late Secretary of the War Department General Staff, Colonel William T. Sexton, is enroute to your theater. He has taken course at Fort Sill and been assigned to a Division during recent Louisiana maneuvers. As able member of division on duty with artillery, I now want him attached to a United St8tes Division in the line in Italy, not as a liaison officer or observer. He can be made subordinate to a junior in rank as his assignment is to be made without regard to his rank. �l15 "To offset his long service to me here in the office, I want to give him the experience in field as a final step. Thereafter he is on his own. We will assigr,. him to a division training in United States or you can keep him." "On Sexton's arrival I will assign him to Fifth Army." * * * SAN MARCO-•MARCH 29, 1944--General Clark left for Anzio at 0900, accompanied by General Saville, Commanding the XII Air Support Command, to confer with General Truscott. He visited front line units and just prior to his taking off from the airfield at 1625, about 20 German bombers swooped down on the beachhead, bombed it and returned. They were met by heavy flak, three of the bombers being downed. One British Spitfire fell very close to the airport, killing a pilot. Shortly after this raid, Generals Clark and Saville flew back in their two L-5' s to the command post. They arr1ved at about 1710. After General Clark returned, he invited Misses Berney and Moen in for a drink and supper. * * * SA~T rM.RC0•-11.ARCH 30, 1944-General Clark V10rked on administrative papers, until 0930 when the Army G-3, General Brann, visited his van. After discussing future operations in the van Generals Clark and Brann went down to the G-3 Section where General Clark studied with his G-3 a relief model of the mountainous country which the Fifth Anny will confront in its next offensive action. General Clark was particularly interested in pointing out to General Brann the boundaries between the French and the American forces in the Fifth Anny zone of action. General Clark returned to his van and worked on more administrative matters until he received General Sibert, G-2 of the 1st Army Group in the United Kingdom. General Sibert stayed for lunch and was asked several pointed questions by Generals Clark and Gruenther. General Clark wanted to know how many German di visions it l'lOUld take before OVERLCRD would be called off - that OVERLCRD was so intermingled with political factors that it would have to go on._ General Clark wanted to point out that air power was not enough, as learned by the lesson at Cassino. A discussion of how well the coastal regions were defended was also brought up, and General Sibert believed that they knew practically all of the installations but that it was impossible to be sure of each one as a certainty. General Clark wanted to know the rate of di visions landed per day, and General Sibert answered approximately two. General Clark believed that, as a result of his previous landing operation experience, it was important that troops be landed quickly and in sufficient strength to force a beachhead. Another qw stion asked was on how wide a front were the landings to take place, and General Sibert responded about 4fJ miles. General Sibert believed that they could expect a. counter attack by' one infantry division about 48 hours after the landing and a large scale collllter attack within �four or forces. stating and the t five days which would have to be net with determination and superior General Clark closed the conversation in rather a light vein by that he would gladly gi.. ve as opposition the Herman Goering Division 1st Parachute Division which he has faced during the Italian campaign. After lunch General Clark, accompanied by Lt. Col. Draper, went by jeep to the II Corps command post at Piedmonte where he conferred with General Keyes at his van. Just prfor to leaving the II Corps comnand post General Clark and General Keyes climbed up in the rear of the II Corps command post where an excellent view of the future battlefield was revealed before them. The route taken back to the Fifth Army command post was around the coastal road through Mondragone. On the return trip General Clark stopped off at the 38th Evacuation Hospital to see how their installe.tions were getting along. They had been installed there for about ten days and were in excellent shape. They had only seven patients in the hospital. Upon his return to the command post General Clark went to his van and worked on more papers until General Sullivan and Chaplain Ryen came for supper. Generals Clark, Gruenther, Keiser, Sullivan and Chaplain Ryen had a before-dinner drink in the conference hut. The principal topic of conversation was American cemeteries; the fact that in order to conserve wood the white crosses ·had been done away with by the w~r Department, being substituted by a straight stick or wood flanged out at the top. The discussion also led to present regulations which have forbade cemeteries or graves being photographed end the inexcusable manner in which relatives of soldiers who have died in be.ttle have been delayed in receiving details or their death and where they are buried. General Sullivan said that he would get a letter off to Washington stating the problem and ma.king necessary recommenda• tions to be certain that relatives were notified of circumstances surrounding a soldier's death and where he was buried. The group had supper and later returned to the conference hut. General Clark went to his van at about 2100, worked on important dis~tches and retired. * i * * SAN MARCO--MARCH 31, 1944•-General Clark arose early in order to be at the French Expeditionary Corps command post at Sessa by 0830. He checked a few important dispatches prior to leaving and left the command post at 0800, accompanied by Lt. Col. Draper. At the French 1!,'xped:i.tionary Corps he was met by Generals Juin and Sevez. Led by General Sevez the party left in three jeeps for the command post of the 4th DIM at Cescheto. From Cescheto the party proceeded along a. rough and dusty road across the Garigliano to the vicinity or Tiboldi where they dismounted and transferred to horses. Prior to leaving Tiboldi, the PRO photographers and Sargeant Thomas, General Clark's personal photographer, took a number of pictures of the General starting off on horseback. l The party proceeded along a tortuous and rocky mountain trail to the vi.- I cinity of Suio where they dismounted and went by foot about 500 yards to an / artillery observation post in this small village overlooking the town of Castelforte. This observation post was only a few hundred yards from the front lines and afforded an excellent view of the ten-ain held by the enemy to the �immediate tront. While in this observation post, General Clark, General Juin and General Sevez discussed in detail the French d1.spositions, paying particular attention to the bridgehead held by the French across the Garigliano. The activity along the front in the French sector has been confined mostly to local patrol action by night. In front of the town of Suio the French extend their lines a.bout 400 or 500 yards from the town by night. They w:1.thdraw back into the town by daylight, during mich time there is little activity except for mortar, small arms and artillery fire. The 2nd Moroccan Regiment, with three battalions in the line, hold the left sector. The 6th Moroccan, with two battalions in the line, hold the central sector. A regiment of dismounted cavalry with American mechanized equipment hold the right sector. The party proceeded be.ck to their horses and again followed rocky, tortuous mountain trails to the 6th Moroccan eommand post. Colonel Buot de l 'Epeine, Commanding the 2nd Moroccan Regiment, accompanied the pe.rty to the 6th Moroccan sector. There, Colonel Cherriere, Commanding the 2nd Moroccan Regiment, met General Clark and discussed briefly with him the troops in his part of the line. Colonel Cherriere had just received a minor wound to his right wrist and was be.ck for full duty • • From this point the party left their horses, got into their jeeps and returned to the Garigliano River over a mule trail which had just been improved into a jeep trail. In the mort time that the French hs.d been here, they had transformed this British mule trail into a satisfactory jeep trail by dint of hard and fast \llOrk. The party proceeded back to Sessa and arrived there at about 1130. At the French Expeditionary Corps command post General Clark immediately participated in a ceremony wherein he decorated seven French officers and two enlisted men. The ceremony took place in the courtyard of Prince Umberto's Palace. It was a very colorful ceremony and lasted for aQOut 30 minutes. Among those decorated were: General Beucler, General Poydenot, General Guillaume and Colonel Pia.tte, all of whom received the Legion of Merit. One DSC and six Silver Stars were given to the other officers and men for bravery in combat. There were several absentees among those to be decorated who were unable to attend inasmuch as they were hospitalized. After the decoration ceremony General Juin had a very delightful lunch at which the following guests were present: General Clark, General Ke:ye s, General Poydenot, General Carpentier, General Beucler, General Guillaume, Colonel Piatte, Col. KamJ merer, Lt. Col. Draper and Countess Duluart who is the mother of General Gruenther's aide, Lt. Bajenow. She is a very charming French woman who heads a mobile surgical unit which is doing excellent work for the seriously wounded soldiers. Her hospital unit treats both American and French sold:i.ers - the bulk being French. General Cl.ark had known the Countess in Oujda. The guests at this luncheon left the table at about 1400, and General Clark and Colonel Draper proceeded back to the Fifth Army command post where Gene. ral Clark worked on important military di spa.tches. At 1530 he received Colonel Sexton, former Secretary to General Marshall. Colonel Sexton is over here to gain combat experience prior to an assignment. After Colonel Sexton's call, General Cl.ark looked at five combinations of uniforms for Fifth Army MP's and decided which one would be standard. �Just prior to dj_ nner this evening General Clark had General Deford, General Brann end General Moran into the conference hut for a before-dinner drink. The entire group then stayed for dinner. General Clark discussed with General Deford at great length the possibilities of air power in support of ground action. General Deford gave some interesting facts and figures on air tombing against Germany, the relative strengths of the German Luftwaffe end his ex• periences in the Pacific where he oommanded bomber units which operated against Attu, Kiska and Parima.shiro. After dinner General Clark returned to his van where he conferred with General Gruenther, worked on more administrative matters and retired. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, March 16 - 31, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from March 16-31, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1570 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/0803cdcf198496288e9f02707583f7c2.pdf?Expires=1787184000&Signature=kD9BQwdScZd4sbuAq7YWbn1dX5DP3s4c9G6am59Js3jdPY0dJfIzz2WD3DaneH6I2r4xiQAeJyU1f1utRSQr6oxvTcDViXDkA8EOWIXIjqXFpaKGQz2xL5P4xJizyX7sFuYFqI5hit5qBAsrcUgb3wRLxAxZBJwkC1Q46PhE8YaAOebqtFql4n2MXmOq0QcRdKEewpHoaKpd5N6%7EtgM%7ExMKNXbn2Swy%7E0OHYDn2hKn%7EyKBocv37KnufE5xal6HeBhBDiZ8FXOvYaXPFxocGbpikLqYzJrsxj2javBz-ZqIKWCcujWfo2GBCv-pGobgGqGMoiOiVqp%7EkBT1KS8bnnzA__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 14e5d7e5190f13b6f3bf4d7e39b5fbf5 PDF Text Text To take full advantage of this situ,,tion Eighth Arny vrill ac1wmce TTj th a 11 possible sreed dire ct 0 11. tl"e general areR F isR - LuP ca (?) - r istoia. Armies vrill T1aintain gener:.:, 1 contP ct on their inner flanks but will not "'ait on each othr}rs advPnce. Eneny resistance will 11e by t'R.ssed vfrerever possible in order to reach above vitPl 11reAs quickly. Ei~l1 th Army vd.11 be respons'ble for any protection that may be necessary on its right flrmk. 11 11 '.l'o save transportl'ition resources r>nd bridging rrRt9rinl 5 Corps will not f'ollow up t1"e ,3nemy on tl~eir "'ront. If the Pdvrnce of Eighth Army f'eils to fo-rce the onemy tc abr,ndon An conn r olish Corps will be novod form:ird later on Eio:hth Armys rear Prmy ,:,astern axis to take Arcona from thP \'Jest. "CJ ITC aut' orizes Arm7 Cornnenders to te1(e extrAJ11e r5 :' 1 to secure the vital <s strHtegic p,.reas nentio-r-:ecl in paragraph 2 rbove before tLe enemy cPn reorg;:,nize or he reinforced . 11 * Hr1 r'.!E--,JU'1E 8, 10Mi---T>;f"rly tl,is rnorn~np; tho liaison o-"'ficer from Eig;hth Arny CHITtG in -;rith a personal nessPge Prom General Leese to Generrl Clrr1c, askinr rermission to use t}·e road Vall,erano-Viterbo-F,acborep-io. 'I'h1s request by the 'i;j r-ht:b Arr,y moPnt the virtur 1 stoppR ge of II Corrs sector upon relieving II Corps j n the~ r zone of action . Gen oral Cl&rk Is reply' yrh_j_c} is riuotod belorr' 0~ covers h:i:s answer to GenPral Leese's request. At Ofil,O General Clnrk, accompan:iec1 by Gen.r'rals Gruenther, Jo],nson, Hun1e Beucler, and Colo11el:; Rri tten And R;ran 'ryent to tho Vatic,"n where tlrn:r htd an i:n1die11ce w~th Pope nus XII. Gen?rel Clnr1r hac1 a :::;erarr>.te -!ntArview ,.,-jth the rope :f'irst and tren ~ntroduced tho ctrer menbers of }1is ye,rty to the Pope. D11r1np: his -interview with the Fop:, tl'e latter aslrnd Gereral Clr}.~lr to 3end a messar:e to }resident Roosevelt express::'.np: to Mn l is most sincere regard. :F'roll' the ,Ta ticnn Gener,, l Clarl' proceeded inl'lod:; ate ly tc h :is neF cor:imanc1 po st et the 'lilla SAvoia . 0 Shortly Pfter Ms nrrival here General .Alexander flnw ur frori Caserta to see General Clark:. He was accorir,::,ni0d by Generrl Robertson, his G-4. Gen"'ral Clark d:i scussed with Genernl Alexander the Eighth Army's request to use a road in II Corr,s sector r-md othsr ml:ljects leading to th9 fu:rtl~er offorn=:ive northward as well as natters concerrdni? llor:e. 0 At l/;,30 Gener8.l Ckrk had a fecorrtion cererrior1y Rt his new cor1r1end post. Du.ring- this decoration cerenony Genr,ral A1.exr,nder presented t} 0 Conf'l.Pnd of the B/'lth to Ge'1Prn ls Juin and Xey""s in t}ie nr->me of Eis r12.,jest;v Kj_ng George VI of Englc.nd. Ge:rnrnl C1Pr1, thi:m rreseYJ.ted two r,edals o'' ronor, one to Ifc. Knappenberger of tre 10th Infantry Regfr,ent Plnd Staff Sgt. Huff of the 50Qth Faracr,ute Bf'ltt::ilion. He also rresented Legion of r 1orits to Ge-re.rel Dod;r, General flrosset o.:nd Gensra.l Carrentier. Legion of nerj_ts were a1so rreeiented to Gene..,,..A.1s '1 r->rtin, Sulliv<>n rmd other officers and er,lj st0d men of tl 1 e :r1rt}1 Arny ::'taff. In ri ddi t ion., DSC I s, one DFC, one 3oldier' s :kldal r~nd enc Brcnze Star ,·,ero also presentod tc o:f'ficers and sold·ers of his comne.nd. The ceremony was q 1 dte i· 0pressive. A compos~te ?'oup of' two Al'lericr,n, one ' 1'rer1ch and one British plPtoon coriros"ld the revj_0v7~n~; troops. '·'rench, British and Jq.,,ericen .,...lPf;S were included· in th0 cclor vuerd, "nd all thTne national c1ntherm were 0 er 1 �\ 55 ,played at the conc7 usion of the cerenony. Af+,er retr1rn-tnp; -f'rom t!- e decorPtion ceronmy, Genort>l Clrrk, rAving sP:ld goodbye to Genere 1 Alexender, 1crent to t}1 e l ort11 l io whore }10 reviewed a h., ttalion +'ron tl"e Duke of' '';ellinr:~ton 1 s 1.egi1"'1snt r:1 ,.'ch is attachxl to thA 1rd Division RS garrison trnors of RcE1A . This h=sttalion rassed by a sm,-,11, hastilycorstructed rev:lewing stand_ wl ich W['S erected for General Clark. LeaclJnp, the battRlfor> ·,m.s a ScottisJ~ Fife aJtd Druri Corps . After Ger1eral Clrrlr hrid reviowec1 t}- is b::=1tt0 lion he wr s met by Colonel Fisk ,.f t11e ACC and v,P.s cnnducted on or hom~ 1 r, si p;ht-see-·,..,g· trir of Ror1.e at tl'e <;nd of v•l,:l ch he vm.s taken to lrince TJnh3rto I s } !"lrtee in tl~e iUir:l.nel. Tris vj sit w~t,J-, fr:ince "mh:orto, v+o is no"r Iirmten::,nt Gs11oral of the "~e2,lm, lPstecl for n.hout 1/0 PD hour. Gennral C1Ar1' proceeded irnr-ec'iatel;r brc1, to his cor>:n2nd post Fhere he worked on ad.min:' strative n2tters r>.nd studied latest battle reports . JT:i.gbl.; gbts · 0 r> tl1 e kttlo fTorrr3~s tor Py Fee, a furtl 1 •'r rushing to tlvo rorth of all elements of t}P Fifth and Eighth Arr,1ies . To date tho:ir edvance hes met VJ" th very little oprosition . J.occnna5_ssance "-ilr-w,ents h2ve proceeded consirlerably a}:ea.d of the rpin hod:ies f'D(' are "'ell to tbe north ge:n9re,lly in Pn east- ,rest line through Viterbo . General Clark today received a cor:irr.tmicPtion from GenerA 1 Leese asking tr Pt "':-ie;hth Arn;r elements be peTir1itted to use the ro[ld V11llerano - Viterbo - Bsgnoregio. He rerlied to General Leese as follows: 11 T hPve your lfa_:i son officer here vr:l th your last ,nessag,~. I see no solution excert to hri l t n'y II Corps in pln.ce rind po.rmit you to use the ror·d VAIL' :RANO R,J J.,,,94'?211-, eastern route through VJTPJrnr. - BAG"·JQDr.:GIO 1.348. An intolerrble ~itu21 tion would dev9Jop if both Yir 1anan I s "'orce and J:eyes I II Corrs troor,s reachec1 tl'·e road .junction Pt f+0./4221,, as tho·r ::>re rir:)()ut to, at the sAme tiP1e end .;f both Pttempted to use the roPd 1erid"ir,e- .~rom thnt roe.d junction to VJrr>ERBO. 11 Klrkman, Y'eyes nnd n:r rorreGentatjve hrve b9er, torsether. ~ lBve just talked vrith Yirkman on t1-1e pJ~one , :ond also to Keyes , 1=1rcl told them both that Yeyes "'ill halt in rlace. Yirknan '•ill be p:iven the road VALJX::RAN'O - VIT:~I?.BO PS ;rou desire, hit I do beseecl- 7011 -t:.o speed up Y:i:r1°T"!rn I s use of thrt rs rmch ro s po·0•sihle so th,,,t II Corrs can r,:et c:cing :in rompli"nce rd.U1 our directive to ,·,ush vigor ously to the r.rrth . T hope '"irkman cm f~ nd suppl', rc•utes rfter he he's pass0d his comh'lt elements throue;h VI,,.,·~RBC v:rhich will tfl1(0 him on roM1 s to the east, thereof . 11 Do not feel disturbed tl1 8t you rove bothered me. I ,·ant you to 1'no,· 011r interest is to fac:il:itete ,;,l,ir,ping th: Boche in his demoreHzc,r1 conditjon , re gnrcJess nf who does H . I ·"'ill arprec3Pt0 it if :rou "!"•ill h2 ve Yirkman keer Ye3res advised '1J~en he "rill. terminn.te his use of' 1r1.,., ;nnr . 11 General Leose re:rliGd to General Clark as follows: 11 . TharJ: ;mu for seeinp: Green- 1 :ilk:inson tbi~ norninr; and for your' ~elp.ful reply. 11 1 u.nd0rstand thrt A..4.I hf'1Ve issued rm order , asking you to help us to get ��to Orvieto. "I am sure that our noves Jceep ePst of any suprl;y routes of yours. The only renl difficulty seems to be Vi terbo, find on the 50,000 r1ap there nre two red roads - one movinn• ea.st of it and one nest. So I do hope ,:re can reach ar,;:reenent over th is. 11 It seems to me so terribly important for us bot]~ to drive on, wr ~ le the GerJ11ans Pre split jn tvro anrl before he brings dovm the expected further divisions fror.1 the north. And p, s I saic' in rny last letter, it ,,,ill s:we da;:rs if B Corrs cnn operate west of the Tiber. "As soon as I get the 'Tnrvi - Orv:ieto road clear - we '"rill of course s"dtcl, our supply PXis back to the route east the Tiber. A rnpid advRnce to nrvioto will do '"'!Ucr· to help clenr this area - and I hore we sliall !'1.ake rrogress 'vith 1~ Corps to 1711rds Terni - which wj_l1 help at the other P.nd. 0= HHith many apologies for giv5ng you tr is trouble - and my most ePr:ne st hopes thr,t ,ye mR;T cooperate togethr:ir in t'·is problem, to gain positfons ,·,herefrom we can both nnintain the impetus of ;rour p;rent "'dvance on Rome. fl * * * R0 11E--JU'JE 9, 191✓+--General Ckrl• received Gerieral HpcFarlane of ACC at nine o'clock. After GFnorel rracFnrlane left, he conferrAd V'5.th GenerPl Grurmther bis Chief of Staff. I1e ''!BS ver:v enxious to go and cnnf'er nith G,=iner1:1l Harmon, Coni~'"nder of' tbe 1st Armored Di~ sion, but telephone commun:icetions "mre out. - Our units ::ire r,ush'ng so fast to tr•e north thnt 11s forward r1 e2dq1mrters advance 1t :is clJ "f-; cult to mai"ltr.in sati sfR ctorv telephone comrnmj c• tion. It was not lmtil Rfter llmch that }'is cub pilot, nhjor TTalJr..er, inforP1sd him that J,e cnul,1 tri lre him to th1 1st !\.r"lored Divis ion cub field which Yras very close to t.he commpnd :nost. Gener0l Glrrk +,h::Jn flew to the 1st Armored Div,; sion comrnan.d post whire hA conferred 0·,ith GenerA l HPrmon conc0rning t}·,e situr1 tion on his front. Armored reconnaisscnce elmnents had r,assed t}'rough Vj_tc.rbo, 2_nd the city '7as now an 2ur h::-:nds. -a,~;... t.-~~J... ,2.,.:,.t:tL fo-.l:- .t:-;Jf "}~ J.<M ~~ t;. 4 ~~ - 13..~ "3 V4 2-v-ti#4 ~ - 1.,J,,J- O'"W',\ .e,.....t.~ - () .....+ f.-...,..1 'ti After leH,rinr: Ge'.1.8ral Hr>rnon 1 s comrn1::m,-1 post, Gener;::,l Cla:r+ flew OV8r Civit.svecchia to insnect the r,ar1,or jnstaJlPtions and terrein surrounr1 ing the area. ''hil,:i flying ow,r +,} e 112rhor, M,., rlr>ne bit Ft bRrrF,ge h"lloon 1 rire wl 1 ch might hrve ended in ri. ver;r ser:ious r ccident. ,,,he lx1r b r,ttached to trie bnrrage bRlloon did not exrlor'1e, 0 nd the T,].r,ne hed r;re 0 t c!inf'iculty in breakinr: P''!P~· :f'rori tl 0 "'~rp ,,J,5 ch ,,,as i.,el,1 triut h:,r th0, buoyn.ncy of the -inflr<ted belloon. 0 0 Generr-1 C1Pr1, 1anr1 ec1 nt I i-"tori0 Pir""ield wl-icb is close to bis corin.3.nd post s.t Phout 1730. AftPr he landed, be ccnferr,:,d hr~ ~"'fly "'ith GonPrFi1 Wilson, Cor· r1>1nder n.o IBS, rrl:1 0 hen. j1x1t Prriv'9d back frorri Rmns to fly br<ck to Hap19s. GenorPl t'filson •·rj_'"hod to d'scuss "Titl, him briefly P'rted:it:ious means of routine; surr,ljes to di .r:isions vrho Fore edw,nc"r:g so re:~cllv to tl1e north. r:re ,-ranter: to send true}: corvoys dir9ctly to t,roors from Anzio by-passing llrrny clumps. Gen,"r~l Slar1- told b:hn to ,;ork closely V'ith his G-4, Generel Trte, PYJ.cl sol•rn the rrnblem. 1 0 A new bound.~ry has bc=ien °:et between II nnd VI Corr,s today. TM s bon1dr•ry �'..ill b0co•n.e on 11 Jtme tJ.8 botmdrry betv1een Frend, Corrs r nd JV Corrs r'fter II n°1d 1TJ Gorps l~Ft,re been reU9Ved . Battln nrocTer;g tor1qv "-i:rcls rmr troors -in rossession of VitF~r1:io and '2'Pr~111L"Y1.n . 01.n"' p(1·vrrce to tl-1~9 nortr ,,1ns 1J,qen r8.J):i_r1_ nnc' Yins de 11eloued into the pursuit sbQ'.A . The Gorr1P.ns are fp llin~ bac 1c rPridly. nurin·· the ''1.0on hour GAneral Clerk cr;nf9rred ,·,-ith ·-~T . Tucker , n. WP.r corresyio11l(mt, ir}10 ".sv.:Jd for in-'. onrir--tion concerning his nurUence '.·?ith the rope . Generq 1 Clark rern:i ttPd nr . muc1mr to "ri~·it8 ur hi!-, Purlience witb the Pope . Col . Clark, 10 is rublic R9lntio 1s l "'ficer, submitted it, to tre V..,ticrn for 2p:orovel r-mc1 rmbsequAntbr reler.sed it to Ari,=,ricrin corresponfents. '1'he ::interview , as de:'3cribed by General Clark , ,~as submitt"'d to the F'ope who approved it pract ically as ,7Titten and autroriz9d its release to the corre,,pondents . 0 The P'tO Corrim1-mique releasing Gener~l Clnrl;: 1 s interview quot8d below: 11 'T'hB follow:ing r1ay be f!ttr:ibutcd to General ClnrJ<-, but 11it}1 the Pope is may not be quoted d3.rectly: Hir-hlic:hts of the "nterview of' Ge11er1:'l Clrr\: ·-,,.; th the Pope, P June, follow: 11 1. Generc> 1 Ck.r1: was deeply impressed, as were oth~r members of his staff , Ar1"lr:i can, British 8nc1 French officers, .,,~ th trsi interviei:r with His Holiness . The rope "ms ~ntGrested in all mankinn;, regardless of' nPtionnlit,r, rn.ce or creed. It wn.s the Tape ' s interest to J,9J.p nny onn "rho ",as in difficulty. 11 11 2 . r2he Pope e:xpresc;ed streot Sf'tisf'action i"'itJ-, the sreed wj_t}, ·+jch the Allied ,Jil:itar;,r GOi.rernnent rwcl elre:,dy mP.de rre:rwrator;r relief arrrngements in cooperation rith the relief ag,mci "'S of' the Vr-itican. n3 . 'T'h0, Fop9 renhi~ seed ·Iith GeYierr,l Cl•cs1~\: at ,r,.ceat length on his visit to Amer:' ca , hou lovely Arier~ en TTns, how mv:ielfish "ere its peopl,:,. The Pope spoke 0 1" hi, vjsit in LotF' :slanr1, and of ri" f:1-tght to the ·est .Gorst. "4. The rope !1S 1rnd Genertll Cl.Rr> tc, C'""'•ve:r his warri regf'lrds Pnd :•·j ;,h0s to !'resident 1foosevelt . f fter the ~nterview , GenPral Glr.r1'" sent :c ce½l,,,. to the ?resident, to cnnvey the Fope ' :, messer;e . "5 . As Gener,.,l Gl'-"rk rras rbont to leave, rin attendPnt tclr1 tl•e Fop0 that th=)re ,~ere 800 Fi.,..th Arriy solc'iers nn~ tin~ in nne of' the rcons o:'.:' th,1 Vrtic:on, hopinp; to 3ee the } ope . t lthoncrh Uce I or:e had ni~ny engqg,3rnents, he ir1Y~0d:t~tely renl:ied thct },o "'ould see tl..,em. General Cl,,,.rk ~mJ-i.cated to Fis EoJj_ness · h t a .,..,1easure :;t, was tJ:--,-,t he WP s takfr,g so rnucb of' his ti:'le to s,~e our Fi "tr Arn·v Allied mm", .c>or the Fopo hr>.s seen r1~ny troops ra:x1 p;ivc,n them his bless;ng. 11 " 0 0 Ge111'3ral ClPrk received a letter ""rom G'=)n9ral Dev,,,rs toc~ny v,' t}1 regard to Fi+'th Arm:v troops f'or other or,srntions . IIis rerly is quoted belor1: t,l,r-, 'Ti thdra1-ml o!' �\ 53 11 Your letter of .Tune l+th hns bPen received, and J. v,ent to tell you ho= deeply I apprec~ ate the 1-:ind t1 ~ 1r,;s you say of' tl,e F'ifth Arny. Your message '"·ill be ['pfr8ciroted b:,r 8Ver·sr riember of the :F'i""tb Arrw. :.': can ass11re you thrt ''e will k3ep up ou.,,. relentless rressure :\ga:iJ:1c:t t},9 '"lnemy and fight him ,=ireever ""re f':' nd him in strenp;th. 1 11 In rmticipntion of oth --r req11ireT'le11ts, T hr,d ordered iJI Corpt:1 rel.; eved by TV Gorps effective noon Jurv':! 11th . An;r tine 2ftm"' t1--i;:;t hcmr FePdquqrters and Headqw1rtP.rs Conpany, vr COJ'.'f3, is c,vailn.blc, for movement elseuhore. I am leav·' ng Butler w: t}, YI Corps HeadquPrt8rs. You }::no· l·on highly I regard him , but I hf've no im.."!l.edinte job in sicht . I am attach:ing the li.i+?nd Infsntry to Doc B.yder 1 s D::vision and c'ill riut Rare;r as an extra Brigndior in that Division . I hr,ve been 1meble to f-i nrl P suitable job for T. K. Brown. If there ; s no assif\'n,·~ent for him in the:! ,)eventh Army I s1w;gest thrt re ')e rerorted to tr;e '.lar Denm~t:rnent P s o.va ilable -!:or 2 rn:iw P ssignne:nt . He has hc,en :i.n the tbeatre sj nee Februer;r ? , J_q/,/t 11.nr' he 11"' s done well. He was '·ith the '~8th Dj vision clurinp; its recent B.dv<1nce "rom tho CradgJ.:iano 'liver . I believe he will bo of p;reat v11.luc in a new djvision. "L!-5th Division is out o'"· the line . 3rd Division is likerrise out but is n0eded fnr r> ,,rMle lonr;er in Rone to holp control the situetion here . /4.5th Division can go at n.ny time you want it . I g;:i.ther th2t t1'e 36th Division hris been selected as tlie third division hecause a requo st v;as received from your hendquarters to desi,0;nate two nembers of the 1 6th Division staff to go to U. K. :: had u.nderstood that you 'ryanted ,'8 to select the third division, but if you want either the ? ')th or the qlst T shall h'l ve no objection . IIo1Yever I should like to "know of the decision soon . n In this conn°ction Genornl Clark wrote the fol1owin,,; to Ger1eral Ryder: nr am attachinr t11'1 .442nc'l Inrantrr to tho "34th Division. Hm; long I will keep it there , I do not 1 --no''', but I have no o+,h0r plru1.s than to leave j t with you for the time be:; ng . You liave h2d such success in hr.ndling the othGr H.A.w11iian- r,.r18r"ic.sn 11nit tbnt I feel qu:_ te secure ~n rlacing it in your good hinds . "I hcve 7rigadier r'reY1err,J. :-l:• rr:r nho is assirr,nr-'d to tr e FF't}, ;1rrny. I },eve no job for him . I Pm asrdgnj_nr; him to :~our TJ:'.vj sion :sc, a.ri extre '3G . Fe "'ill not bA the Assistant Division ConrPnr1 er ')Ut will be sn e-;::tra on-' "or you te use PS you see fit , '"12.rticula.rly l.n view of the fact that :you will 1-T ve four regir1.ents . T desire yon to cooperate -i_n tl is matter ')7 riaking use of him , wl:,ich will r;5 ve hi· eYperience wl'.'en I do need r,r10thr,r .Assistont J1i vision Corimr>nder. 0 0 11 You have done P errand job, n:nd J Qm looldng forward to see;ng you real soon . If In response to a request by th'! rope, General Clnrl- sent the follm;"ng nessRge to the ]resident: 11 It ""Vas my rleRsure yesterday to he received hy the Popo v1ho asb"d , bout you Pnd •·equested r1e to convey to you J-,is bless~•-,g and vrr,rm- regarc;s. He reculled ,rith pleasure bis visit with you Pt Hyde rark . FP. expressed s2tisf,. ction at tre way Allies aro distri' utin.p: fooc'l in Rone e.rea . He is of course greatly c'istressecl over tl,e horrors of' rar . Fe appeared t0 oe :in eYcelle:nt heelth. u �l59 ROME-•JUNE 10, 1944--The General spent the day in his van conferring with mem• bers or his starr and in the afternoon proceeded to the Excelsior Hotel. Late in the afternoon General .Clark gave a reception at which approximately fiftymembers of his staff were present. The General spent the night at the hotel. * * * ROME--J'tJNE 11, 1944--At 1000 in the morning General Clark drove to the Church or Santa Maria degli Angeli in the Piazza Esedra where he attended a solemn high mass or thanksgiving for the fall of Rome. This high mass was celebrated by Chaplain Ryan with a French military chaplain as Deacon and an English military chaplain as Sub-Deacon. Cardinal Tiesserand, Librarian of the Vatican, was present, as were all general officers of the Fifth Arrrry. Nearly all French Generals and high British officials, members of the diploma.tie corps of the United Nations accredited to the Holy See were present and were introduced to the Army Commander. Approximately 10,000 officers and enlisted men of the Firth Army attended this mass. General Clark then returned to his command post where he had lunch with General Juin. General Gruenther and Colonel Saltzman were present with Captain W alters acting as interpreter. General Juin then left and the General received a number of visitors in the afternoon, among them Colonels Gray and Bruce, General Shekerjien and Colonel Barker, General Mason MacFarla.ne and Sir Noel Charles, British High Commissioner of Italy. The General then visited his new villa, accompanied by Lt. Berenson and returned to the command post. General Clark today sent the following letter to General Crittenberger, Commanding General of IV Corps: "I am delighted that tomorrow you will assume command, with your IV Corps, of activities of the Fif'th Army on our west flank. It is my desire that you push the pursuit of the enemy with the utmost vigor. He must not be permitted to regroup. Please do not use 34th Division at this time. It must have at least a week's rest unless some emergency requires its use, in which case please advise me of your intentions. "Intend assigning to you in about two days the 517th Parachute Regiment fresh from the United States. This will give you five regiments plus reconnaissance elements and auxiliary troops. I assume that you will employ the bulk of your strength in the western part of your sector while using a task force in the eastern part of yom- sector, thereby maintaining close contact with French Expeditionary Corps. Perhaps I am wrong in these assumptions. Please advise me earliest of your plans. Will see you soon." * * * ROJil!:--JtJNE 12, 1944-Arter breakfast General Clark drove to the command post of the IV Corps and conferred there with General Crittenberger and his Chief of Staff. General Clark then drove to the cub strip where he met General Wilson, Commanding General of the Peninsular Base Section and conferred briefly with him. General Clark then returned by cub to his command post in Rome and spent the afternoon and evening in conferences with various staff officers. �General Clark this afternoon dictated the following notes for inclusion in his diary: "From time to time I have received indications that the German might, when pressed sufficiently hard, employ gas. Realizing that his best op~tunity to do so would be when large numbers of troops were compressed into a small area like our Anzio bridgehead, I directed before the attack there that all troops carry their gas masks. Also brought into the Anzio area protective clothing, boxes unlabeled, and stored them with the knowledge of but a few officers. "Real:i.zing that it would be very foolish for the Boche to use chemicals but that he might be forced into it by a fanatic Hitler, I gave instructions to my two Corps Commanders in contact yesterday that they would require all troops in contact with the enemy to carry gas msks. I told them this must be done quietly with no written orders of issue, and they both thoroughly understood. I called General Shekerjien and Colonel Guild, my Chemioal Officer, and asked for advice on protective clothing, my idea being to keep it in forward dumps readily available; told them that I had ordered 'troops in contact to carry the gas masks but that others in rear areas would not be required to do so but must have them so they oould get them between thirty minutes and an hour. These Chemical Warfare officers agreed with the measures I am taking. "One of the projects closest to my heart;· upon the capture of Rome, was to secure adequat. rest center faeili ties f'or both officers and enlisted men. e I StL'llmoned all my activities connected with these and directed that .suitable places be found immediately and started up. Th~gsollni Forum has been taken over for enlisted men and starts receiving 2;roo-enlisted men tomorrow. The Excelsior Hotel has been taken over and is receiving officers now. I told both Generals Robertson and !la.cFarlane what I was doing, e.nd neither interposed any objection but apparently they went to work on Alexander who has indicated that he wants no rest center facili.t ies in Rome. Neither MaeFarlane nor Robertson had the guts to tell me but casually mentioned it to my General Johnson who, tmder me, is the Rome Area Commander. General Harding is here today, and I told him what I had heard and for him to tell General Alexander that if he interposed objections to these rest centers I would resent it deeply; that they were already started, their establishment had been published to the troops and that the men who captured Rome at great cost of life should have these facilities, and I intended to continue them. I made it as strong as I could, and Harding understood the seriousness with which I view Alexander's attempt to close them. "Yesterday an officer came here from AFHQ with regard to list. They had indicated by numer:f.cal designation some uni ts involved. I protested; saying that the numerical designation me; that I will make available any troops desired, but I must ing. This has been agreed to by NATOUSA and AAI. "Am glad to get VI Corps out of the line. ANVIL troop which would be must come from do the select- It was the most difficult corps rrr:, staff had to work with, for Truscott is not a cooperator, nor is his Chief of staff. As a result of the1.r Anzio experiences, the whole gang have become a gang of prima donnas. I would sooner release that corps before any others. �"Gave certain instructions to Crittenberger by letter yesterday as quoted in yesterday's diary and confirmed them today during my visit to his sector. He appeared to have the situation well in hand." * * * ROME-•JUNE 13, 1944--General Clark spent the morning at his van and after lm1ch General Robertson called and conferred at some length with General Clark. After General Robertson's departure, General Clark drove to the Foro .Mussolini where he made a speech a.nd opened the enlisted men's rest center there. He was accompanied to this by Generals Gruenther, Brann, Poydenot and Colonels Britten and Saltzman. The General then visited the installations at the rest center accompanied by Colonel Bertholf and went for a short swim in Mussolini's pool. General Clark then returned to the command post and shortly thereafter proceeded to his villa where he had dinner, having as his guests Generals Gruenther, Brann and Saltzman. After dinner General Clark proceeded to the Grand Hotel where he pinned the stars of a Major General on the Commanding General of the 3rd Division, John w. 0 1Daniel and the eagles of a full colonel on Colonel Johnson, Chief of Starr of the same division. General Clark's notes on the day's activities are as follows: "There has been considerable discussion by British senior officers concerning the Fifth Army Rest Centers. Knowing there would be this pt"ejudice, I told Alexa.mer, Harding, Robertson and MaaFarlane of my intentions. I told them immediately after I entered Rome so that if there were objections I could be advised. They did not challenge me, but I heard rumbling of their disfavor which finally appeared in orders which have never come to me. I told Harding that I heard orders were being issued denying me this pt"ivilege and that if such orders were issued without my having a chance to discuss the subject with the Commander-in-Chief, I would resent it deeply, and it would cause me great embarrassment~ SU1"e enough, the orders have been issued denying the right to have rest centers in Rome. "When I heard this, I sent for Robertson and gave him my views very forcibly. He assured me that the Commander-in-Chief had no idea of embarrassing me nor of changing what I have done for the time being. I am continuing to run my rest centers and w;l.11 not give them up without a terrific mttle. The order also prescribed that no enlisted men can come in town at night. I have challenged that and issued orders that my men can stay in until eleven o'clock and will not be severe on those who remain in over night." * * * ROME-JUNE 14, 1944--During the morning the General conferred in his van with vs.rious staff' officers, and he continued this into the early afternoon. Later in the afternoon the Army Col!'.!Jn8.nder went to his villa where he had dinner and played bridge after supper, having as his guests General Gruenther, Colonel Porter and Captain Jones. Major Roberts also called and discussed the pictorial history of the Fifth Army with General Clark. The General spent the night at his villa. �ROHE--JUNE 15, 1944-After breakfast the General drove to the 45th Division command post west of Rome where he was received by General Eagles. The General then proceeded to the area of the 157th Infantry where he presented battle streamers to the guidons or the 2nd Batte.lion of that Regiment. The General then drove back to Rome. During the ,afternoon the General co~erred with officers of his staff in his van and at 1630 General Juin called and conferred with General Clark, Captain Walters acted as interpreter during this meeting. The two Generals discussed at some length the General's per· sonal future, General Clark stating that he would speak of it to General Marshall in his forthcoming visit. General Juin seemed a little bitter at his fate and said he expected. to retire to his farm. General Clark told him how much he appreciated the fine cooperation and the work of the French Expedi• tions.ry Corps and General /uin in particular and how eager he was that that cooperation should continue. General Juin then left and General Clark attended a party given in his honor by the British Increment on the occasion of their departure from Fifth Army Headquarters. At this party General Cl.ark was presented with a table and engraved plaque by the British Increment. General Clark dictated the following notes this afternoon for inclusion in his diary: "I have known, of course, for many months of the impending ANVIL Opera-tion. I have known of it for I was its commander for a long time. It was indicated to me that the VI Corps with the 3rd, 36th and 45th Divisions, which I nominated, would go as soon AS we bad captured Rome. I had planned, of course, on it and am prepared to release them immediately. I also knew that the French Expeditionary Corps would leave me. I Assume that the Combined Chiefs of Staff ma.king these decisions know what they are doing and if ANVIL is launched feel that it will contr1bute much to the invasion and the second front more than our continued effort in Italy. I am convinced that the CCS are wrong, for they ma.de their decision to prepare for this operation without realizing the great success the Fifth and Eighth Armies were to ha-ve in Italy. The' morale of the Fifth Army is sky high. The Boche is defeated, disorganized and demoralized. Now is the time to exploit the success. Yet, in the middle of this success I lose one Corps Headquarters and five divisions - three immediately and two within another two weeks. In other words, to prepare for the eventuality of ANVIL they are sacrificing a great victory here. It just doesn't make sense. I am convinced that the Fifth Army, with its present means, with its high esprit and with a great victory under its belt can march into France overland sooner than any amphibious operation can be started. "The depressing part of this is the case of General Juin. He is a superlative commander and leader. He has performed magnificently in combat, has cooperated 100% with me, and we each have mutual admiration and respect for the other, as do all our troops. This egotistical DeGaulle, impelled by ambitions and guided by political feuds, is ca.sting Juin aside. Juin has heard nothing f'rom his government, but he has received indications as to his fate. He and his whole_staff are depressed. His state of mind is bound to reflect on the battle, so again we are losing the battle we have won so dearly. "General Marshall is coming Monday to see me. I will spare no words in �telling him of this deplorable situation which now confronts the Fifth Army and its French troops. "I have direeted Juin to keep on pushing as hard as he can, forgetting the clouds which threaten him and that I am sure that things will work out soon. He has promised to do so. "This evening I attended a farewell cocktail party given by the British officers who have served on my staff so long and so loyally. They brought up the enlisted men who had made up a ca.rd table out of metal from a German plane and the wood and glass from materials taken from the battlefield. It is beautifully engraved, and I appreciate the sentiment it expresses." Captain Walters, aide to the Army Commander, was the interpreter at General Clark's conferenoa with General Juin, and he made the following notes: "General Clark received General Juin in his van in the Fifth Army command post at the Villa. Snvoia in Rome today at 1645. General Gruenther, the Chief of Staff, and Captain Walters, the interpreter, were the only other persons present. General Clark began by stating that he had received some information that he wanted to impart to General Juin. He stated that he had been informed that two divisions were to be withdrawn from the FEC for use in other operations. He stated that he had seen General Devers earlier in the afternoon and had endeavored some definite information concerning this from hiin but that General Devers did not have anything definite on it. General Clark stated . that he did not believe that a definite decision had been taken regarding the carrying out of these operations but that he believed that a definite decision to prepare for them had been taken. General Juin indicated that he had had indications of something or the sort. General Clark then stated that two or the Frenoh Divisions were to be withdrawn from the line and sent to Naples where they would pass under the operational control of the u. s. Seventh Army. "At this point General Gruenther specified that they would be infantry divisions, and that this would exclude the mountain divisions. General Juin stated that he had not had any instructions and that naturally he would have to communicate this information 'to General DeGaulle. General Juin expressed strong disapproval of the idea and stated that this would be tantamount to withdrawing four divisions, as when the FEC arrived on the Appenines, the two divisions would be tired and would have to be withdrawn to rest and that there would be no units to replace them and this would be equivalent to withdrawing the whole FEC. General Clark heartily concurred and stated ths.t he thought it was shameful. He stated that he also would lose some American units as he had already been notified or the withdrawal of the VI Corps, the 45th Division, the 3rd Division end the 36th Division and other supporting units whose phased withdrawal date he would be notified of later. He then told General Juin that one or the French Divisions was to be withdrawn on June 24th and the other one in the first week in July. General Juin reluctantly stated that he could do this . and then discussed with General Clark the details of movement. "General Clark expressed his regret that art.er this great victory in Italy they be not allowed to exploit it fully and thought the whole thing shamef'ul, he added that he had tried to obtain more details but had been as yat unsuccessful. 1Very secret' comented General Juin drily. General Clark stated �that some definite decision would have to be reached soon. He then stated that he was getting the 9ls.t Division from the u. s. and possibly the 92nd. General Juin stated again that ~e would have to notify General DeGaulle for after all, in the final anal:,sis, it was his (Juin 1 s) government that controlled the troops. He stated that he had heard rumors to this effect some time ago and bad written General DeGaulle expressing his opposition. General Clark then stated that he believed that General De Lattre de Tassigny had been designated as Commnder of the French lmits in this operation. General Juin nodded and asked w hether there would be a French Army. General Gruenther, stated that he did not think so at the beginning but that there probably would be later. General Gruenther also asked whether there were any other French troops available. General Juin stated that there were not to his knowledge, there had been a Third Corps, but it had been dissolved. He stated, however, that it might be reconstituted, as 'after all, the:, have got to hRve Army Corps'. "General Clark then told General Juin in great confidence that General Marshall would arrive in Ital:, shortly, perhaps Sunday- or Monday, and that he was coming from a visit to General Eisenhower. General Clark added that he would bring General Marshall to visit General Juin at his headquarters, or if General Marshall did not have time, General Juin could see him at General Clark's headquarters. General Clark stated that he thought that until he had spoken to General Marshall that they (He and General Juin) should continue to push on just the way they bad in the past along the established bolmdarias. He stated that he knew that the proposed withdrawal of troops would leave the FEC with too wide a sector and that he would also find his American elements in the same position and that in consequence he would have to ask General Alexander to reduce his sector in conformity with his capacity to advance. General Juin stated thRt he also felt that this would be necessary as all he would have left would be two divisions and the Goums. ? "General Clark then told General Juin thBt General Alexander did not yet even know of this decision, and that he (General Clark) had just spoken to General Harding about it. General Juin expressed his surprise at this and asked whence came the information. He was told that it came from AFHQ and General Clark added that even General Wilson was opposed to it. General Juin stated that in his opinion it was a great pity that a tentative operation against the Mediterranean ooe.st of France in perhaps September, should paralyze the exploitation of a great victory now. General Clark stated that he believed that General Eisenhower was holding this other operation in case he needed it. General Juin replied that this precaution would ca.use us to lose the battle or Italy, and that it was too bad as it was in the 'plains of the Po' that we must destroy the German reserves. General Juin stated that there the enemy would have diffioulty in supplying his troops due to the passes in the mountains. General Juin stated that history would judge this decision severely-. General Clark agreed emphatically and stated that he had protested, but that now as a good soldier he would obey orders and release the units as requested. General Juin commented cryptiea.11:, 'well, events will turn out as they do'. He repeated once more that he would have to tell General DeGaulle about this decision, and stated once more that this was a 'be.d plan'. �"General Clark then stated tha.t General Carpentier had given him to understand that General Juin would not serve under General De Lattre. General Juin shrugged his shoulders and stated 'No, it would be impossible'. General Cl.ark then stated to General Juin that if they were allowed to con• tinue they would get to France, Berlin or anywhere else thRt they would buy them a ticket to faster than anyone else. General Juin agreed. He further said that he wouldn't stay with two divisions, but would turn over the command, perhaps to Larminat who had a big staff. 'I will retire to my farm' he said. 'I'll buy a farm alongside of your_• said General Clark. s General Clark further stated that he had not given up fighting and would talk to General Marshall and tell him that we wanted General Juin alongside of us as our relations had always been very close and most friendly. General Ju1.n said that they should do what was possible against the plan but not to worry about it; that they were interested in him, and General Clark added that in. war personalities do co'llllt. "General Clark then stated that it was too be.d that the exploitation of this great viatory should be interfered with by politics and so forth, adding that General DeGaulle saw this operation as the quickest way back to France, with consequent liberation of a portion thereof. General Juin nodded his head in agreement. General Juin then said that he would always be happy that he had fought the Germans in Italy with General Clark and he had fought a war of movement, and that this was all a General could dream of. General Clark then stated that he felt that until he had seen and spoken with General Marshall they proceed e::matly as before along the newly established bo'tllldaries. General Gruenther then stated thRt these bo'tllldaries would go into effeat at 0800 tomorrow morning. General Juin agreed. "General Juin then asked some questions concerning motor transportation that he desired to have to move some of his troops, and General Gruenther stated that unfortunately motor transportation was causing a minor crisis. He stated that three hundred trucks had been borrowed from the -45th Division to move supplies but that the trucks had to be returned today. General Juin, who had an appointment for a ptrade then rose to leave and was accompanied to his ear by General Clark and the two Gem,rals parted cordially." * * * ROME-..JUNE 16, 1944--General Clark spent the morning in his van, conferring with various staff officers and taking care of an accumulation of administrative matters. In the afternoon Generals Keyes and Harmon called on the General to discuss the pending assault of the 1st Armored Division. General Clark today received the following letter from General Crittenberger: "I am taking this means of reaching you because of the pi-esent i.mcartainty in telephone connections. "The 36th Division as you know, has been fighting continuously now since it broke out of the ANZIO beachhead May 23rd. Since the capture of ROME, it has advanced more than eighty miles, and still has considerable fight left in �it. However, with a view to maintaining the present impetus of the advance, the relief of the 36th Division by the 34th Division, sometime in the future, deserves consideration. The 34th Division has benefited much from its stay in the rear area since June 9th. By June 23rd it will have ha,d two weeks of refttting, rehabilitation and recuperation. Therefore, it should be ready sometime next week to replace the 36th Division. The exact date of such a passage of lines will depend to a great extent on the situation at that time, particularly with reference to the hostile strength which we may or may not find in our immediate front. "In the meantime, the 1st Armored Division has been directed to be prepared to reenter active operations on June 18th under command of this Corps. As a result of a conference this morning with Harmon, it would appear that the 1st Armored Division, if it is to be used, could start its narch up to the front by separate Combat Commands either Sunday or Monday, June 18th or 19th, closing in the forward area the night of June 2oth or 21st. If there is no greater urgency resulting from the hostile situation than now exists, this "'rmored march forward might be delayed until Monday the 19th, in which case the division would be closed up here by Wednesday night, June 21st. "In considering plans for the employment of the 1st Armored Division and after consultation with Harmon, I am of the opinion that once we break through whatever hostile resistance we may find on the GROSSETO - ORVIETO line, the lat Armored Division reinforced by some additional reconnaissance, self-propelled artillery and infantry might be shot forward through the gA,p made by the infantry, and with a fair chance or making rapid progress to the NORTHWEST. It would be the plan for the armored advance to be made in two or more columns on roads inland from the coast, where it is believed there will be fewer demolitions. As the advance to the NORTHWEST gains momentum, sharp hooks down hill toward the coast might very well result in cutting off hostile troops along Highway 1. "Following the 1st Armored Division and also on at least two or more roads, would be the 34th Division, which by that time could employ the Japanese ROT and also the 517th Airborne ROT. "Such a plan would be bold, and should increase the tempo of the advance. In order to succeed, preparations for it should be made in the greatest detail, and coordination should be as near perfect as possible. This means that the French Corps on our right, informed of the plans, might find it possible to make corresponding gains by closely following our armor in their own zone. Also it might be possible to incorporate in the plan a short quick amphibious operation as you described. "In event it is not desirable to employ the 1st Armored Division at this time, it would then appear appropriate to relieve the 36th Division by the 34th Division sometime during the period Jmie 21st - 24th, again depending largely on the hostile situation on our front; and continuing the employment of a mobile, hard-hitting force in the right of the IV Corps zone. This mobile force might be made up of one Mechanized Reconnaissance Squadron, one infantry ROT, one battalion of self-propelled artillery, one tank ba.t talion, and engineers, etc. If the hostile resistance does not increase as we advance northward, it would be reasonable to expect that such a plan would �result in an advance at approximately the same rate as that of the American troops since crossing the TIBER. "The above plans in tentative form are submitted to you for your consi• deration. Within the next day or so, I hope to be able to see you and learn of yo'ID." desires." The following cable was received today from General Alexander: "l. I fully realize that the withdrawal of divisions as ordered by AFHQ from your command at this stage must create considerable difficulties for you. At the same time we should lay ourselves open to a very serious charge of impeding the overall war effort if we continued to press for the retention of formations which in my opinion we cannot fully employ during the present phase of operations. "2. When we have captured Florence and Leghorn and have driven the enemy back to the Rimini - Pisa line we shall I consider be in a strong position to press for the return of all the divisions you are now being asked to release to enable us to complete the destruction of the enemy's armed forces in Italy by another all out offensive. I have already represented this view strongly to the SAC-in•C and will continue to do so. I am also urging that the instructions for the release of the second French division should be mod1.fied so that that formation will not in any case have to begin to leave the battle area before 8 July. By- that time a decision may have been taken which will render the move back of the second French division unnecessary. "3. Pending a decision on the proposals for future operations which I have made to SAC-in-C I must ask you to meet the requirements of AFHQ as regards releases, except in regard to the second French division, and at the same time to press on with the pursuit of the enemy and the capture of Leghorn as fast as you possibly can with the forces that remain with you. No action to effect the release of the second French division during the first week of July will however be taken without reference to me personally." General Clark replied to General Alexander as follows: "I am in agreement with the views expressed in your MA 1421 with regards the ultimate retention of Fifth Army formations now scheduled for relief. I am afraid, from reading your message, that Harding misunderstood me yesterday and carried back to you the thought that we needed urging as a result of these withdrawals. I can ass'ID."e you that the Fifth Army will continue to push forward with the same determination and vigor which has always characterized its operations, and this in spite of the scheduled relief or units. "The point I tried to make to Harding was the disgraceful manner in which Juin is being treated, which has cast a cloud of doubt over his headquarters, and which, I am afraid, may dim the enthusiasm and ardor with which the French have always fought under Fifth Army command. I conferred with Juin last evening and made it cl8f\r to him that the all-out advance continues. "I am glad you have taken steps to hold the 2nd French Division at least until July 8th. That will help." �TUSCANIA-JUNE 17, 1944-•After breakfast General Clark flew to IV Corps and visited that organization as well as the 36th Division, retm-ning thereafter to his villa in Rome where he hRd lunch. Arter lunch the General drove to the Hotel Excelsior where he conferred with General Ryder and Colonel Bruce. The Army Commander then retm-ned to the villa where he had supper with some of his staff officers. The command post today was moved from the Villa Savoia to the town of Tuscania, 72 miles north of Rome. * ~A Jf i.?~ :r rr1:. ~ * * T._USCANIA--JUNE 18, 1944--After breakfast General Clark drove to Littorio airport where he met, upon their arrival, Generals Marshall, Devers, Handy and Colonel McCarthy and also saw General Arnold prior to his departure with General Cannon. The whole pa.rty then drove ~round from the airport to the new Firth Army command post in the vicinity of Tuscania where they proceeded to the reception hut. Here General Marshall was introduced to the Divisional and Corps Commanders, both American and French. General Marshall then gave a short orientation talk and refreshments were served. General ~~shall then pinned the Distinguished Service Medal on Generals Juin, Sloan, Coulter, . 7 Eagles and o•Daniel. General Clark then presented to General Marshall other officers of his staff and Section Chiefs. The party then left by car and drove to the IV Corps command post where they were received by General Crit-· tenberger. Changing to jeeps, the party drove forward to the ,6th Division where they were received by General Walker. The party then visited forward elements in the vicinity of Grosseto, returning to the 36th DiVision cub strip. From there General Clark flew back to the. command post at Tuscania and the other members of the party retm-ned to Rome. · /- * * * TUSCANIA-•JUNE 19, 1944-General Clark spent the morning at his command post conferring with his staff officers, and after lunch he went by car to the command post of the French Expeditionary Corps to confer with General Juin. General Juin was out visiting his divisions, had not yet retm-ned, and the Anny Commander c0nferred instead with General Carpentier, General Juin 1 s / Chief of Staff. General Carpentier received General Clark and showed him through General Juin 1 s trailers, Captain Walters acting as interpreter. General Clark, also accompanied on this trip by General Gruenther, discussed with General Carpentier the effects that the removal of service units for Operation ANVIL would have on the operations of the French Expedjtionary Corps. Generals Clark and Carpentier also spoke at some length regarding General Juin 1 s personal future, and General Carpentier explained that while Juin and De Lattre de Tassigny were of the same class ~t military school, Juin had always been senior, and he had always been promoted before De La.ttre. This would make it impossible for Juin to serve under De Lattre. General Carpentier stated that General Juin had been about to send him (Carpentier) to Algiers to see DeGaulle when General Juin had received news of DeGaulle's impending visit and had decided to wait until then to see what the futm-e held for him. General Carpentier apologized profusely for General Juin's absence, and General Clark returned to his command post where he spent the remainder of the afternoon and evening working on administrative papers. . ��GeneTal Clark today dictated the following .notes for inclusion in his diary, "Yesterday I met General Marshall and General Arnold at Littorio field in Rome. I drove with General Marshall for two and a half hours to my com• _ mand post. · During that time he oriented me completely on the Pacific y, situation and Eisenhower's cross-channel operation. He wanted me to know ~ the complete background and what the big picture looked like in order to receive from me my recommendations for future operations in Italy. Eisenhower ✓i is most anxious that a landing take place in southern France--ANVIL-•as soon \ 1 )~ as possible, preferably early July, with the mission of cutting across France d t" 1 /'I to capture the port of Bordeaux in order that additional troops can be ,,.,(. t' brought in from the United States. Knowing Alexander's views - that all ;' JJ;jl') 11 Firth Army resources and Eighth Army push on in Italy into the Po Valley - I /~, .t,., wanted to get General Marshall and General Eisenhower's views before stating r f my own, Once I knew that it was all-out on Ike• s part to land in southern France, I threw my weight in that direction, for I knew I couldn't change it. tt"'I told General Marshall that taking troops from me now for ANVIL threw a . crimp into the victorious advance of this army. I just wanted him to under/~'./,./, stand it. I told him that with my Fifth Army complete and without the Eighth if t./v Army I could go across the mountains at Florence into Bologna - that I knew ,j f}7 A the Eighth Army could not do it without the Fifth Army. r 1' /VY ~ "I told General Morshall ~retire rather than servein which Juin was the disgracerul manner ~~~ being handled and that he would under DeLattre de Tassigny. General Marshall asked me why Juin 1 s FEC couldn 1t make the landing in France, backed up by an American airborne division, all under Patch's command initially and using u. s; landing era.ft and augmented by certain u. s. service and auxiliary troops. His fln•ther suggestion being that all u. s. · troops be left in the Fifth Army until we entered the continent - that he ~ ~"?'_,.;-- would demand tha.t Juin command the landing of French troops rather than De _,_JJ- \:,I, tattre de Tassigny o:i:i the basis that they needed a battle-proven leader such t ·'« ✓ as Juin - that once the landing had been effected, DeGaulle could place a Jf 6 'f. French Army in the field under the· commander he named when the time seemed ~ :~ appropriate - that then all U. s. Divisions in the Mediterranean would follow ~v into southern France and go into the Seventh Army. At that time a group of Q" "\ ~ arm1.es would be set up under American command to control the U. s. and Frencl\ ,:r-t"' Arrrry'. I told him I believed that was a solution whereby he could have his "cake and eat it too". However, the French are not fully trained at landing and it might not work out. Nevertheless, I am full out in support of Ike's desire for this landing, knowing that we will follow in at an early date. ~ . , r_ "Already demends for service units, auxiliary troops and artillery are being made upon me in addition to the VI Corps, and I have instructed my staff to give them everything as fast as we can and speed up this next operation. "This will be a great blov, to Alexander, who wants to keep the American and French troops, knowing that they will fight and preserve his reputation, for we made it for him by the conduct of the Firth Army in the last battle for Rome. His Eighth Army contributed absolutely nothing but grief for him. I must tell Alexander thet in the light of these withdrawals, he must have the Eighth Army carry the ball from now on; that he must give the Fifth Army �l "7 o a narrow sector of responsibility commensurate with its means and that we will conform until such time es all troops a.re taken out. This will never work, I lmow, for Eighth Army is incapable or carrying the ball. "General Marshall was high in his praise and gratitude for the conduct of the Fifth Army." * * * TUSCANIA-JUNE 20, 1944-General Juin arrived in the morning and conferred with General Clark, Captain Walters acting es his interpreter. General Clark and General Juin conferred at s~me length on the withdrawal of service units for the ANVIL Operation from the French Corps. Genera.l Clark assured General Juin that after these withdrawals he would give careful study to the service units remaining and would distribute them in such a manner as to support four divisions he hoped to keep in the line - two French and two American. General Clark then informed General Juin that he had previously discussed General Juin's personal future with General Marshall and stated that General Mershall had expressed great admiration for General Juin. Juin said he was mst grateful but that victory end not personalities was his main interest and begged General Cl8rk not to bother about him. General Juin left, and General Clark remained in his van during the afternoon and conferred with various of his staff officers. Genere.l Alexander arrived dur5ng the course of the afternoon and conferred with the Army Colllill8.llder. General Clark's notes for today follow: "I received yesterday an appreciation from General Alexander for the Firth and Eighth Armies to cross the Appenines and capture ,Bologna. The study was based upon Firth Army retaining all its troops and not losing any to ANVIL-a very improbable situation. However, a zone running generally northeast from Florence towards Bologna. was given as the most desirable terrain over which to make a penetration of the mountains and capture Bo• logna. and enter the Po Valley. Practically all of the favore.b le terrain zone was given to the Eighth Army as was Bologna and the principal road that Fifth Army was to use to approach Bologna was ta.ken away from it five miles from the city. Fifth Army was then assigned the role of turning to the west in the Po Valley end protecting the flank of the British Eighth Anny as it went into the Valley· of the Danu\>e. Later, Firth Army was authorized to attack into Germany through the Brenner Pass. The pla.n was so lopsided that it was ridiculous. "I telephoned to Harding and told him that an appropriate assignment had not been given the Fifth Army. He told me he would come up and did so, · bringing Alemnder with him. We thrashed the thing out. I told Alexander the Firth Army should advance into France over the mountains rather than remain idle in the Po Valley. He agreed. They also reluctantly indicated they would change the boundaries between Armies crossing the mountains so as to run jt through the middle of Bologna. I told him a little competition between armies would be a go9d thing. �111 "The rest of the discussion dealt with the merits of ANVIL versus the Po Valley Operation. That decision rests in the hands of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and it is disgraceful that some word has.not yet been received, for the pulling of troops away from Fifth Army to mount ANVIL is seriously affecting my ability to move north. I am convinced that ANVIL will be put on, and in order that Fifth Army in some capacity get into the French picture under Eisenhower I have directed that all units of the Fifth Arm? be turned over to the ANVIL Operation as rapidly as possible." * * * TUSOANIA--JUNE 21, 1944--General Clark spent the morning in his van taking care of accumulated paper work and at eleven o'clock received Ambassador Murphy and Mr. Offie and had them to lunch. After lunch Messrs. Murphy and Offie left, and Genere.l Livesay, Commanding General of the 91st Division, called on General Clark. Generals Keyes and Shekerjian also called on the Commanding General during ·the afternoon. In the late afternoon General Clark went fishing on Lake Bolsena with Colonel Saltzman, Major Riggs and Lieutenant Berenson and returned in time to have dinner with these officers. General Clark today sent the following letter to General Harmon, Commanding General of the 1st Armored Division: "I was very muoh disturbed to learn yesterday that your representative introduced at an air•gro,md conference at Fourth Corps Headquarters · a memorandum purporting to represent your views on the ability of the Air to furnish close support to an armored di vision. While I have not seen a · copy of the memorandum I understand that you requested that no attempt be made by the Air to furnish close, support to your division. "I talked to your Chief of Staff, Colonel Dewey, this morning and he assures me that you are in thorough agreement with the procedure which Saville is attempting to perfect, and that it will have your wholehearted cooperation. I ·sincerely hope that Dewey has correctly represented your attitude. I consider that the introduction of your memorandum at yesterday's meeting was most unfortunate. It was certainly not conducive to the development of the close relations which must exist between the air and the ground elements if we are to have effective close air support. "I strongly urge that you personally see General Saville at your earliest convenience in order to correct any erroneous impression which may have been created by your note. Please understand that Saville has not com• plained about your memorandua. However, from my long a~sociation with him I know that it can not help but have a harmful effect. That situation must be cleared up as soon as possible. "I hope to see you within the next day or two. General Crittenberger tells me that your plans are in excellent shape, and I am looking forward to the usual fine performance from your division." �TUSCANIA--JUNE 22, 1944•-In the early part of the morning General Clark new to IV Corps Headquarters and conferred there with General Crittenberger, returning late in the morning to the command post. Arter lunch the ambulance donated by the Mornings of Diversion Club .(the money for which was raised through the efforts of Mrs. Clark) was brought up for the General's inspection and photographed. The General oonferred with staff officers during the afternoon and conferred with Colonel Kirkwood. Later in the afternoon the Army Commander saw General Rooks, Deputy Chief of Starr, AFHQ, and conferred with him at length regarding various operational matters. * * * TUSCANIA-JUNE 23, 1944--During the morn1ng General Clark held a conference of his staff officers in the conference hut, discussing rnB.tters he was to take up later in the morning in his conference with General Alexander at AAI Headquarters. Immediately after this conference, General Clark flew to AAI Headquarters at Frasca.ti accompanied by Generals Gruenther, Brann and Tate. The General's car met him at Frasca.ti after the conference, and General Clark drove to Rome immediately after the meeting, spending the evening and night at his suite in the hotel. * * * TUSCANIA--JUNE 24, 1944-General Clark remained in the hotel today, conferring with various city administration and MinOT officials concerning the handling of various civic problems entailed in the administration of the City of Rome. During the afternoon General Brann arrived and conferred with General Clark. The General gave a dinner in his private dining room in the hotel for Generals Tate, Brann, Lewis, Bradshaw and Colonels SaltzrnB.n, Nygaard, Tully, Captain Walters and other guests. * * * TUSCANIA-JUNE 25, 1944--General Clark remained in his suite at the hotel, taking up administrative matters with his G-J, General Brann. In the a:f'ternoon General Clark visited Marshal Smuts a.t the Grand Hotel and had tea there. Marshal Smuts introduced General Van Ryneveld, his Chief of Staff, and other officers of his staff and his two sons who are acting as his aides. Marshal Smuts then recalled the last time he had seen General Clark in London in preparation for the landings in North Africa. General ClArk stated that he recalled that meeting with great pleasure and satisfaction. General Smuts congratulated General Clark on the fine achievements of the Fifth Army, stating that he had been the tower of strength. General Clark then stated that the fine showing maoe by the two new di visions i.n the Fifth Army, the 85th and 88th, had, he felt, had a most beneficial effect on the new American di visions waiting for the invasion in England. These two di visions hed shown that the new American divisions were more than a match for the German veterans. Marshal Smuts replied that he had heard that the new American divisions had acquitted themselves very well in Normandy, and he was sure that this morale factor had played a considerable part in their success. Marshal Smuts stated that he had visited the Normandy front with Prime Minister Churchill and had found that visit most satisfactory, and everything proceeding �exceedingly well. He stA.ted that losses had been far below expectation. MB.r shal Smuts stated that the fall of Cherbourg would have a most far-reaching effect. General Clark concurred, stating that it would then be possible to bring fresh divisions direct from the United States. General Clark also added that it has been our experience here in Italy that the Germans had lost the art of the counter attack. They have launched counter-attacks piecemeal. General Clark recalled that at Anzio on one occasion the Germans staged an attack with six divisions using two battalions of each division. He stated thet he believed this was due to manpov,er conservation. Marshal Smuts expressed his admiration for the stand ma.de on the beachhead under most trying conditions. General Clark then stated that although he was losing divisions here in Italy, he was doing everything possible to help General Eisenhower's opera• tion. Marshal Smuts stated that he felt that the campaign in Italy had been of very great value to the success of OVERLORD, both a.s regards morale and material factors. 1 General Clark then drove directly to the Littorio airport and returned to his ·command post where he had dinner. During the dinner he informed Sergeant Holden that he was returning to the United States tomorrow morrdng on a furlough. General Juin today issued the following memorandum regarding the attitude or French soldiers toward Italian civilians: Certain Commanding Officers of American Units which were attached to during the offensive, have · been very d5sagreeably impressed by the attitude of some of our men toward the Italian population. They have complained about it to the Commanding General, Fifth Army. t•1. F.E.c., "2. Unfortunately, it is exact that a certain amount of regrettable incidents have occurred. The Commanding General, F. E. c., is aware of the drastic measures taken by the l~ge unit commanders in compliance with instructions issued to that effect (memo 5911 CEF/1 dated 27 May 1944). He is aware also of the efficiency of these measures. "3. However, these additional complaints require that Commanders of all echelons do not decrease in any way their surveillance. It must particularly apply to small isolated detachments." * * * TUSCANIA--JUNE 26, 1944--The General spent the morning in his van taking care of accumulated paper work. At 1100 the Soviet Ambassador to the French Committee of National Liberation and Member of the Advisory Council to Italy, Mr. Alemnder·Bogomolov, and the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Mr. Vidia• sov, called and were received by the General in his van. At 1130 the General, accompanied by the Ambassador and the Secretary of the Embassy, proceeded to the cub strip where a decoration ceremony was held. Ambassador Bogomolov presented Soviet awards to two Fifth Army officers, and General Clark presented American decorations to a number of other officers and enlisted men. General Clark, the Ambassador and the SecretRry of the Embassy then returned to the command post and had lunch. After lunch the Soviet officials departed and General Clerk conferred at some length with General Brann. �General Lenmitzer called in the afternoon to confer with General Clark. Colonel Gray also called to discuss some court martial cases, an~ later in the afternoon the theater cha.plain, Chaplain Beebe, accompanied by Chaplain Ryan, Fifth Army Chaplain, was rece:tved. General Clark today sent the f'oll<>wing letter to General Eisenhower: "I know you are busy these days and don't have time for long letters, so this will be short. "We are all pulling f'or you and tremendously pleased with your progress to date. Hope we can help. You are the only one who knows how we best fit into the big picture, so get a decision and tell us what is wanted. You can rest assured you will get our full support. Lack of decision now is slowing us up and not helping you. You know you can have every single unit I have, and they will leave here the minute the request is made. I have told my staff to give you the best we have, but don't forget the rest of us, if you take _most of my outfit, for we want to get back with you and wind this thing up as fast as possible. "Thanks f'or your radio. We were all delighted with it. "Secured, through Hap Arnold, a C-54 to send twenty of' my oldest people back home for two weeks with their families. Al headed the list, and officers and men are now enroute. "Best of regards to Bedel." * * * TUSCANIA••JlJNE 27, 1944-•In the morning General Clark flew in his L•5 to IV Corps. He spent the morning a.t IV Corps and returned to his command post at 1400. At 1500 General Donovan of OSS called and was received by General Clark. The Army Commander spent the rest of the afternoon in his van and conferred with various staff officers. * * TUSCANIA-•J'UNE 28, 1944•-General Clark spent the morning in his van taking ca.re of a large a.mount of paper work that had accumulated. Shortly after 1300 Major General Henry, USA, Ret., arrived by air and had lunch with General Clark. General Henry arrived alone and left after lunch with General Keyes. General Clark conferred with General Brann after this meeting. Shortly after 1800 General ChBrles DeGaulle arrived, accompanied by his Chief of staff, General Marie Emile Bethoua.rd, and General Juin and several other officers. All of the party except General DeGaulle and Gene• ral Clark went to the hut. General DeGaulle and General Clark went to the Army Commander's van and conferred there with Captain Walters acting as interpreter. After exchanging greetings, General Clark expressed to General DeGa.ulle his admiration forN the magnificent part p~yed by the French troops �l15 in the victorious advance or the Fifth Army and stated ths,t they had earned a well-deserved share of that victory. General Clark recalled that the last time he had seen General DeGaulle, the French General had said "You must win a victory", and, added General Clark, "Now we have won it". General DeGaulle stated that victory had now been won and still another one had been won when the forces that had been in the bridgehead broke out. General DeGaulle then discussed the ANVIL Operation. He stated that the French had agreed to the campaign in Ital1 but had always felt that af• ter the Battle of Rome they would like to fight in France. He said he believed this was quite natural, and he felt General Clark would understand this feeling. General Clark stated that he understood it but believed that in the case of the ANVIL Operation speed was of the essence. General DeGaulle replied that the plan did not seem to be too speedy, and although it had been somewhat accelerated recently, it was still quite far off. General Clark then asked General DeGaulle how soon he intended to withdraw the two remaining French Divisions. General DeGaulle sta.ted that he did not know and that it depended largely upon the ANVIL Operation but that if the order came to withdraw them it would have to come very quickly. General Clark then stated that with what would be left or the Fifth Army he did not believe that we could m-oss the mountains. General DeGaulle agreed that he did not think this was possible either. General Clark then expressed the belief that General Wilson might try both operations ••••• ANVIL and the continuation of the pursuit in Italy. General DeGaulle stated that he did not think both operations could be carried out successfully, and General Clark conc~red in this. . General DeGaulle then stated that he was taking the liberty of asking General Clark some personal questions because they were of great interest to the French. He asked him what part he personally would play in the ANVIL Operation. General Clark replied that he felt that eventually all the American troops here would be put into the ANVIL Operation. He stated that be believed initially there would be the Seventh Army, commanded by General Patch, and the ·French troops would constitute eventually a French Army and that they would probably be formed into an Army Group but who would command this he did not definitely know, and General DeGaulle nodded without replying. General Clark then stated that he would like to ask General DeGaulle a question but did not want to give the appearance of interfering in any way. He'stated that he felt sure that General DeGaulle knew the great esteem in which we held General Juin. General DeGaulle stated that he was aware of this fact and that he personally had a great regard for General Juin, but he said, "As you must lrnow, I wanted to give General Juin his chance in Italy, . and he has certainly taken magnificent advantage of his chance. We also have General De Lattre de Tassigny, and we want to give him his chance also. We only have one Army, and it is a small one, but I am sure that within a few months we will be able to give both of them a command worthy of them. As the operation progresses we will be able to build up our forces so that they will both have a command befitting their ability." General· Clark then asked whether he was going to take General Juin out of Italy immediately, and General ,DeGaulle replied quickly, "Oh, no! He will �remain here as long as he has troops fighting and after that I will take him with me for a while". General DeGaulle hinted but did not state plainly his preference for General Juin over General DeLattre de Tassigny-. He added that he felt sure that the ANVIL Operation would be carried out, in which General Clark concurred - the latter stating that he desired to do everything possible to help General Eisenhower. General DeGaulle then stated that he believed that after the landing things would go quite rapidly, adding "The Germans are very tired". · General DeGaulle spoke of his visit to Normandy, stating that things were going quite well there and gave the impression that he was very satis- fied with his visit to the western front. General DeGrulle then stated that he intended to present some decorations tomorrow to some American Generals and hoped General Clark could be present, adding that he hoped to have the honor of pinning a decoration on General Clark. General Clark added that he would be very proud and pleased to be there. The two Gene• rals then left the van together and went to the hut where they joined the other members of the party. On the way over General Clark asked General DeGaulle in French whether he did not expect to go to the United States very soon - some time in July. General DeGaulle stated that probe.bly that would be the ease, but he was very vague about the date. Shortly thereafter General DeGAulle and his party left for the French Expeditionary Corps. General Clark then had dinner with Mr. DeRochmont of the MARCH OF TIME and Carl Mytlans of LIFE, after which he retired to his van. * * * TUSCANIA--JUNE 29, 1944-In the early morning the General remined in his van and at 0930 took off in his L-5 and flew to the French Expeditionary Corps field at Sasso Ombrone. The General drove from the field to a parade ground where he was decorated by General Charles DeGaulle with the Plaque of Grand Officer of the Legion of Honor (This plaque belon~s to 88-year old General Priowc and was borrowed for the ceremony, being returned e.fterwards by General Clark). At the same time General Clark was decorated with the Croix de Guerre with a Palm. The General then expressed his regrets to General DeGaulle at being unable to remain for lunch and flew in General Juin 1s plane from the parade ground back to Sasso Ombrone. He proceeded from there to IV Corps in his own plane and conferred with General Crittenberger. Ge~eral Clark then proceeded to his villa at Mirina di Grosseto. He took a quick dip and then returned to his command post. * * * T~SCANIA--JUNE 30, 1944--General Clark spent the morning in his van conf'erririg with General Brann, Colonel Smith, Colonel Bruce and Colonel Lee, the new Finance Officer. At 1030 General Alexander, accompanied by his Chief of Staff, General Harding, arrived by air and conferred with General Clark. They departed shortly thereafter and returned to AAI by air. At 1130 Generals F,aker, Cannon and Saville arrived by air and lunched with General Clark, conferring with him ·during the lunch hour. They left �• early in the afternoon, and at 1330 General Clark took off for the 85th Division command post at Castel Porziano near Rome where he decorated personnel of that division. Upon the completion of the ceremony General Clark returned to the command post by air and spent the remainder of the afternoon in his van conferring with various officers of his staff, including Generals Brann and Moran and Colonel Bruce • General Clark today sent the following letter to General Crittenberger, Commanding IV Corps: "l. There are elements of eight German divisions on the of Fifth Army. It is estimated that the combined strength of sions equals a.bout. that of three divisions of full strength. that the intention of the enemy is to create maximum delay on defensive position. present front these diviIt is clear every suitable "2. Through the splendid efforts of your Corps it appears to me that you are in a position to break through to the ARNO River with great speed and with luck you might secure a bridgehead over that difficult military obstacle and seize the hill mass east of PISA. The high ground north of the GECINA River between the roads CECINA-PISA and POMARANCE•POMEVERA is the critical terrain feature that you must seize to assure the rapid success of this operation. "3. To accomplish this break through I believe that you should make your main effort on your left with the 34th Division and the 442nd RCT. I plan on withdrawing the 361st RCT from your command within the next day or two. I will replace it•with the 362nd RCT on or about July 2 but desire that you use this fresh combat team with the 34th Divjsion rather than the 1st Armored Division. I think the operations for the past few days have shown that armor is not appropriate for exploitation forces and that we can accomplish more with infantry in this type of terrain. I believe the 1st Armored_with its organic infantry only should be employed on the right of the , 34th Division to conform to the movements of that Division and protect its flank. I propos.e directing FEC to conform to the movements of your Corps. "4. I would like your comments on the suggested operation as soon as possible." General Crittenberger replied to the above this evening, and his letter is quoted below: . "In compliance with your request for comments on the contents of your letter which was received tonight the following are submitted: . "1. It is hoped that the further advance of the IT Corps to the ARNO River may be continued with speed and effectiveness. "2. The possibility of a rapid advance to the Northwest with the subsequent securing of a bridgehead over the ARNO is recognized. To that end, plans ere being executed to seize the critical terrain features between the CECINA-PISA and POMERANCE-PONTEDERA roads. In this oonneotion every effort �is being made to facilitate the rapid advance of the IV Corps. Subsequent plans for the crossing of the ARNO and securing of the hill mass East of PISA are the subject of the minutest study by this headquarters in view of the importance of 'this pending operation. "3. Only this morning, plans were well underway for e quick thrust around the hostile flank and rear by a task force composed of infantry with some armor. However, the developments duri ng the last twenty-four hours have made this unprofitable inasmuch as elements of the 1st Armored Division mov~d up to the CECINA River and crossed it to the North last night. "4. Your desire to accomplish a break through to the North is well understood by all ranks of this command who are devoting their greatest effort to this mission. When the 362 RC'l' is made available, it will be attached for initial combat experience to the 34th Division to make that effort. Following what I believe to be your desires, both the 34th Division and the 1st Armored Division will drive to the North with the latter conforming to the movement of the former. In this advance it is hoped that the FEC on the right will be able to conform to the pace of this Corps. "5. The ARNO River presents a difficult obstacle but not one thnt is by any means insurmountable in the attack and crossing of the rlver. It is believed that two :i.nfantry divisions should be employed. Ma.y we therefore expect that a second infantry division, possibly the 88th Division because of its expE".rience, be made available for that operation. With this fresh division, it is felt that our plan to seize the objective North of the ARNO as indicated by you, will be entirely successful." � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, June 8-30, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from June 8-30, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1635 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/4cefb8b0b9433d9d5ddd23d13a77c0f9.pdf?Expires=1787184000&Signature=UGKXefNw7KxFpGFQVLx-qpuUYdTpmtKkWQBsA-uKEMbJ3GBmwrAItlYos8xQKV2vogfFvWZ-4-0BKLr5xFtDT1bsYmglyX%7EVxcfhsUpIMAGftO6sFD-XAz5G-sA8jjvQBGtzipYRt34HSphOsvTpvBK241IClSPfDIQTNQb6gKGBui80ip7HSPz48BTs4cjvrOmBaGyDS2uLmEREhN4D6baQsToUcl7syuoxlR5zrNCrR0EkGT4j%7EEh%7ESjvbfoPY6fe98bj%7E3jbKx6ymF2D%7ECbgsvt9Zt45CNc1lD012JSCdQsGU3TSGkgUxNG%7E6i-jFSWufjy0a%7EyKP-TidmoZczg__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 4196cc5fadfb3aeaa86ef165df57df78 PDF Text Text \ This is Velume VIII of the Wa:r Diary of Lieutenant General Mark w. Clark. Volume I, covering period 28 June, 1942 to Sep- tember 24, 1942; Volume II, covering period 25 September 1942 to 5 January 1943; Vol,me III, covering period 6 January 1943 to 6 June 1943; and Volume IV, covering period 7 June 1943 to 29 August 1943, are held in safekeeping at the Army War College, Washington, D. c. Volume V, covering period August .30, 1943 to December 31, 1943; and Volume VI, covering period January 1, 1944 to March 31, 1944; and Volume VII, covering period 1 April 1944 to 30 June 1944 are being held in safekeeping in the Com• manding General's safe. --------.. ' �ROCCASTRADA--JULY 1, 1944--The General spent the early part o~ the morning conferring with some of his staff officials, including Colonels Saltzman, Smith and Bruce while preparations were being ma.de to move the command post. At 1000 General Clark, accompanied by Colonel Saltzman, flew to the General's villa at Marina di Grosseto and spent the remainder of the day there. General Clark also spent the night there. The command post was moved today to the vicinity of Roccastrada. * * * ROCCASTRADA-•JULY 2, 1944--The General spent the day at his villa at Marina di Grosseto conferring there with Colonel Saltzman, ~is Deputy Chief or staff, and other officers of his staff. In the afternoon General Clark returned to the new command post in the vicinity of Roecastrada and there received several staff officers, among them General Brann, Colonel Saltzman, General Hume and Colonel Smith, his G-2. * * * !.9CCASTRADA-•JULY 3, 1944--Early in the morning today General Clark drove to the 34tfi Division command post in the vicinity of Gecina and conferred there with General Crittenberger, IV Corps Commander, and Genera.1 Ryder, Commanding General of the 34th Division, and various members of their staffs. He discussed forthcoming operations with them and the progress of the fight• ing then taking plaoe. He also disaussed with them the detPils of the forthcoming visit of Secretary of War Stimson and arranged with them that a good show of artillery be put on for the Secretary in the vicinity of the command post and also arranged for the Secretary to drive,past an infantry battalion on the road. General Clark stated that he did not want them in anyway to interfere with the tactical operations because of the visit of Secretary Stimson, and they stated that this could be arranged without in any way interfering with the carrying out of operations. General Clark left the 34th Division command post and drove forward to the fork of Highway #1 at San Pietro in Palazzi north of Cecina and about two miles from the German lines. General Clark also spoke to a number of soldiers of the 34th Division and returned through Gecina. The Army Com• mander stopped in Cecina and spoke to a number of Italian partisans there. \ They were wearing red stars and other communistic insignia and greeted the . \ General with clenched fist salutes. The leader of these partisans was a very small club-footed man, and he informed the General that there were 29 partisans in Gecina. General Clark asked them whether they had killed very many Germans, and they stated that they had but were unable to give the number. General Clark then asked them how many partisans there were between Gecina and Livorno, and they stated iibout 200 and that they were under the command of a Captain Testa who was operating out or Marina di Cecina. General Clark then thanked them for the aid the partisans have been giving the Allied forces a..nd stated that he believed Livorno would soon be taken. The partisans agreed that it should be liberated soon. The General then asked them if they needed anything, and they replied that they did - that they were trying to bury the dead and essure the policing of the city. They requested some medical suppli.es and food 1 and the General stated that he would send an officer up to look into ~he matter. The Army Commander then ��drove off, and the partisans presented arms in an amateurish vray. General Clark then proceeded to the 34th Division cub strip near Bolgheri and returned by air to the Firth Army command post. The General then received General Hume, Colonel Smith and Major Roberts and shortly thereafter proceeded to his villa by air, where he gave a reception for a number of officers of his staff. After the buffet supper General Clark returned to his command post and rP-tired early. * * * ROCCASTRADA--JULY 4, 1944-•The General spent the morning in his van conferring with his staff and taking care of accumulated paper work. Shortly after lunch the General took off and flew to Rome where he met Secretary Stirn• son at the station and attenc~ed a flag-raising ceremony, returning there• after by L-5 to his command post. In addition to Colonel Saltzman, General Clark had as his dinner guests Captain Walters and Lieutenant Pedley. * * * ROCCASTRADA-JULY 5, 1944-•This morning the General had a conference with General Brann, Colonel Saltzman, Lt. Col. Clark and Lieutenant Berenson, at which time plans for the arrival of the Secretary of War were discussed. At 1130 the General departed for Siena, accompanied by Generals Brann and Beucler. He arrived at the airport at Maligns.no and drove to the Excelsior Hotel in Siena.. There he met General Carpentier and then went for a sightseeing tom- or Siena.. He visited Chigi Palace and ,ms shov.rn over the pa.lace by Prince Chigi himself and then returned to the Excelsior where he met General Juin and lunched with him, Generals Carpentier, Brann, Beucler, Hume, and Major Noiret. The General also met General DeMontsabert who took his leave of the General. General Clark congratulated him on the fine work done by the 3rd DIA. General Clark then visited the to,m hall with General Juin who showed him some paintings of historical interest. General Clark then returned to the airfield and took off for the command post. Upon his arrival at the command post the General conferred with General Saville and Colonel Tully. The General this evening entertained General Brann, Colonel Saltzman, Lt. Col. Porter, his two aides and several other guests at dinner and then retired early in the evening to his van. * * * ROCCASTRADA-•JULY 6, 1944--General Juin arrived at the command post at 0845 and was met by Generals Clark, Brann and Saville in the conference hut. Generals Clark, Brann and Saville walked from the hut to the airfield to meet Secretary Stimson who arrived at 0915 with General Kirk, Chief Surgeon; General Sm-les, War Department PRO; Mr. Bundy, Special Assistant to the Sec• retary; and Lt. Col. Kyle, ADC to Mr. Stimson. The rarty drove from the field to the hut where General Clark gave Mr. Stimson a short briefing of the current Fifth Army tactical situation. Shortly thereafter General Clark called for all Chiefs. of Sections who were brought into the hut and introduced to Mr. stimson and his party these l/\ ��, ·/. ~ • (1,,JCN ~· / .J tr fr ~ ~ t JY"c ...t •) } ~ r. ~ / t;l() ,r" ..,, tlf / ~ H ~ ;.,,-:\ ,l_ ty/~'1 <~~.,'~._' rt~- ~ ;t ~, ,s:,,r tr?"/' l 1/ ~ c,J"h / · /fr,;, ✓ .,,- c(' .. ,,,,,. ~ 1 ~ t ✓ ,.,,.,.J'[ t Y., ✓ ,,Le) ~ ; . f i._Pt,.fT /' AA/Y I ') 3 r Officers. ~.,_,.,t<.. <..~f ~ CI I" ,,.,,. J /~ j,r :( r {}F . V f', ;A ;, General Clark, Mr. Stimson and pa.rty ·left the hut for the airfield where they took off in L-5 planes at 0956 for the 34th Division. Mr. Stimson flew in General Clark's plane, piloted by Major Walker, and General Clark was flown by Lieutenant Holle. The party was escorted by eight Spitfires. Immediately upon landing at the 34th Division cub strip near Bolgheri the party proceeded to the 8th Evacuation Hospital where they were received by Lt. Col. Drash and General Martin, Fifth Anny Sm-geon. The Secretary visited some of the wards and spoke to the wounded. The party then retm-ned to their cars and proceeded to the road junction north of Gecina at San Pietro in Palazzi where they were met by Generals Crittenberger and Ryder. From there they proceeded to visit field artillery batteries and then left for the 34th Division command post where General Ryder presented officers of his staff and discussed the situation with the Secretary of War and General Clark. The party then had lunch and drove back to the 34th Division cub strip from where they took off for the Fifth Army command post. Arriving at the Fifth Army command post field at 1400, the party imme• diately transferred into Mr. Stimson's C-47 and departed for Tarquinia airport at 1405. Enroute General Clark talked at length with Mr. Stimson, Mr. Bundy and General Sm-les. Arrjving at W5 at the airport in Tarquinia the party was met by General Keyes, General SloR.n, GenerAl Livesay and Gener11l Coulter. An honor guard of the 351st ROT of the 88th Division rendered the customary ruffles and flom-ishes. General Sloan introduced Colonel Champany, Commanding Officer of the 351st RCT, to Mr. stimson and General Clark. General Clark, Mr. Stimson and. General Sloan rode in the first jeep, followed by a large party in jeeps, and reviewed the troops, after which Mr. Stimson spoke brjefly to the officers and men of the 351st. At 1455 Mr'. Stimson said goodbye to General Clark, and he and his party departed at 1500 from Tarquinia airport. General Clark talked for about ten minutes with GeneraJsKeyes, Coulter, Livesay and Sloan and departed by L-5 at 1510 for the villa at Marina di Grosseto where he swam for .about an hom-, retm-ning by L-5 to the command post at Roccastrada. at 1715. * * * ROCCASTRADA-JULY 7, 1944--General ClPrk spent the morning in his van and shortly before lunch received General Devers. He conferred with Genera.l Devers who remained for lunch with General Clark. The General spent the afternoon in his van, taking ca.re of administrative matters and conferrjng with officers of his staff. * * * ROCCASTRADA--JULY 8, 1944--After breakfast the General flew by L•5 to the 88th Division command post in the vicinity of Poma.ranee and there decorated Colonel Champeny, Commanding Officer of the 351st Infantry Regiment, with the Distinguished Service Cross. From there General Cl.ark flew to the 34th Division command post where he conferred with General Ryder and decorated the cotnM.ander of the 133rd Infantry Regiment, Colonel Schildroth, with the Distinguished Service �Cross. General Clark then flew to his villa at Marina di Grosseto and went for a short swim. He then returned to the command post and conferred with a number of his staff officers • . General Clark today sent the following letter to General Devers: "Confirming our conversation this morning, I am furnishing you herewith my estimate of the capabilities of the Fifth Army to cross the Appenine position alongside of the Eighth ArTrty in order to exploit in the PO VALLEY. I am writing this letter personally to you, for it contains certain information and statements which obviously would serve no useful rurpose if they were brought to the attention of our British Allies. I, therefore, request that you handle them in this confidential manner. I will furnish AAI a separate letter giving my views on this subject. "When units now on the ANVIL troop list, are removed from the Fifth Army (and I estimate that all will have left by August 1st) there will be remaining in the Fifth Army the following major units: 2 - Corps headquarters (each with Hq. Co. MP Platoon, Signal Bn and Hq. and Hq 4 - 1 - 4 2 2 - 2½ 3 5 - 51 - Btry Corps Artillery) Infantry Divisions Armored Division 155 Howitzer M-1 Battalions 155 Gun M-1 Battalions Signal Battalions Engineer Regiments, Combat Engineer Regiments, General Service Tank Destroyer Battalions Tank Battalions 4.2 Mortar Battalion (Chemical) "Service units to support the above force in the contemplated offensive action against the prepared PISA-RIMINI line are inadequate to the extent indicated bel,ow: 1 - Engineer Maintenance Co. 2 - Engineer Bridge Cos. 1 - Chemical Maintenance Co. 12 - Surgery Teams 8 - Truck Cos. 1 - Engineer Depot Co. (less 2 platoons) 1 - Field Hospital 3 - Shocks Teams 4 - Mule Pack Cos. (Italian) 1 - Graves Registration Co. "As you know, the Fifth Army is meeting increased resistance along its'\ present front. There are nine German Divisions opposing Fifth Army at the } present time, three of which are the new ones brought into Italy from the German strategic reserve. These enemy divisions are the equivalent of approximately Jt u. s. divisions. The 88th Division is being committed to battle tomorrow and all of the 91st Division will be committed within five days. The 1st L Armored Division is being withdrawn within the next two days after �5 rather heavy losses in leaders and in equipment. I plan to reorganize this division as soon as it is withdrawn. It will take a.bout three weeks for the reorganization. The present mission of IV Corps is to drive rapidly to the ARNO RIVER. FEC is to conform to the advance of the IV Corps, protect its flank and maintain contact with Eighth Army. I hope the situation will permit a rapid crossing of the ARNO without pause, and plan to accomplish this crossing and seize a bridgehead if I consider it possible without extremely heavy losses. If however, the enemy elects to defend in strength in the ARNO and the Eighth Army is not abreast of my troops, it may be necessary to stop when I reach the ARNO. If I am forced to stop, FEC will be withdrawn for ANVIL and the-entire situation will have to be reviewed. If I am fortuna.te enough to force a crossing of the ARNO, secm-e the high ground northeast of PISA, a period of at least fifteen days will be required to rest the troops, bring in replacements and build up supplies using the port of LEGHORN as a base for the attRck into the PO VALLEY. "In order for the Fifth Army to participate in this PISA-RI:MINI attack with reasonable chances of success, the following requirements should be met: a. in Additional trained combat units should be made ava.ila.b le the Fifth Army area by August 1, 1944, as follows: 92nd Infantry Division (colored) 3 - mnginner Battalions (Cgrnbat) 1 - 4.2 Mortar Battalion (Chemical) l - Battalion FA 8" Howitzer 1 - Battalion FA 240mm Howitzer 2 - FA Gp Hq and Hq Btrys , ]2. An appropriate and greatly reduced sector for the crossing of\ the APPENINF.,S must be assigned Fifth Army - this sector to be a one-corps J front with two divisions plus in the attack, three infantry divisions assigned to the corps with one armored and one infantry in Army reserve. The ~~ 92nd Division will be used to protect IEGHORN and Fifth Army's left flank. ,,,. As I told you this morning I will employ the 92hd Infantry Division (colored) in appropriate combat. I do not feel that it is wise to count on its offensive ability in a slugging mtch with the Germans to the same extent as a ; white division. You can rest assured that I will give it every opportunity to develop its full 10m offensive power if it has the inherent capability of doj_ng so. "The object of crossing the APPENINES is to go into the PO VALLEY, and exploi.t our success there by capture of the key centers such as VERONA, MILA.N, TURIN, GENOA and LA. SPEZIA. Arter occupation of these points, to be prepared, depending upon the over-all picture, to push either with both armies into the VALLEY of the DANUBE or to split armies, the Fifth turning to the west over the MARITIME ALPS to assist the Allied effort in France. "There is every indicPtion that the Germans will prepare the APPENINE position in depth and attempt to hold it to the last man. The Fifth Army effort, with only four infantrz divisions available, will be costly and without doubt will lea~ese divisions ""f n~pli'B~furth.er effort without rest after the PO VALLEY is reached. It is, therefore, necessary that additional �/ u u. s. divisions be brought from the United States with their appropriate sea.le of reinforcing auxiliary and service troops and be ma.de available for battle in the Fifth Army by the dates indicated below: First division Second division Third division - September 1, 1944 - September 15, 19Lil+ - October 1, 1944 "In order that chances of success of the Fifth Army's Appenine effort may be increased, adequate air support, both close and strategic, must be ma.de available. "On the logistic side, we cannot count on the railroad to supply the Fifth Army. It will be 31 July before the railroad reaches GROSSETO. This is roughly 100 miles away. Supply must be through ports. PIOMBINO can be used to support the Army until it. reaches the RIMINI - PISA line, provided 25 unloading craft are left at.that port. When this line is reached, it will take at least two weeks to · build up supplies to support the at ta.ck. LEGHORN port must be developed prior to the attack on the RIMINI - PISA line. Fifth Army must be assured necessary supplies and replacement equipment from Base depots to support its operations. As the line extends northward from the RIMINI - PISA line, additional truck units will be required to move supplies from Army depots over the APPENINES to truckheads in support of forward troops. "I he.ve had considerable experience, as you know, in having Bt-itish troops under my colllI!la.nd. A natural solution, which will be suggested by General Alexander, will be to build the Fifth Army up by a Bt-itish corps. Naturally this must be accepted if the Cpmbined Chiefs of Staff desire to go back to the complex situation which existed during the time that the 10 Corps we.s in the Fifth Army. My r.ecommendation is against using British combat troops in the Fifth Army~ If the decision is to leave the Fifth Army in the Italian set- // up, every effort should be made to make it an all-American Army. JI "I fully realize the extreme importance of exerting pressure e.gainst the enemy in every conceivable :place. Certainly Italy is one where the pressure should be kept up if it is humanly possible. There is doubt in my mind that the Eighth Army will be able to era.ck the PISA - RI?vITNI line without the as• sistance of the Fifth Army, and I mean a Fifth Army composed of American divisions. The Fifth Army should not, under any conditions, be put in a position where it has in.a dequate means to accomplish its assigned mission. If we Rre) to go along into the PO VALLEY we must be given the tools to do the job. I have indicated above my minimum requirements. I fully appreciate that ANVIL is the main effort. I believe tha.t the decision to execute -ANY.llc..was .wi§e and I feel that all u. S. means 1n the Medrterranean should be used to back it up. Now if we are to do the APPEND~ job as well as ANVIL, additional mea.ns are necessary. Given these needs, I assure you the Fifth Army will go where it is directed. • "In conclusion, I recommend that if the additional U. S. troops as indi- ~ ca.tad above are not made available at· the time specified, the Fifth Army not be directed to cross the APPENINES and that it be removed from Italy a.s fast as it can be assimilated in the ANVIL sector of opera.t ions. Under such a condition, �1 by an all-out effort of the British, I believe they have the means to . contaJ the German divisions now in Italy." * 7 1 * * ROCCASTRADA--JULY 9, 1944•-The General spent the morning in his van conferring with Colonel Smith, his G-2; Colonel Robinson, Commanding Officer of the 34th AAA Brigade; and General Bra...,m, his Acting Chief of Staff. At about 1130 General Clark, accompanied by Colonel Saltzman, drove to his villa at Marina di Grosseto. The General had lunch there and spent the anernoon with a number of ·guests. A buffet supper was served, after which the General returned to the command post by car. * * ROCCASTRADA--JULY 10, 1944--The General spent the morning in his van conferring with officers of his staff and at 1000 hours decorated Colonel Kidwell, Executive Signal Officer, with the Legion of Merit. Colonel Kidwell is leaving Army Headquarters a.nd returning to the United States. u At 1145 Ambassador Myron C. Taylor, personal envoy of the President to the Holy See, and Mr. Tittma.n, Charge d'Affairas to the Vatican arrived and lunched with the General. The General received them in the hut and discussed the tactical and strategic situation with them as well as the over-all war situation. After lunch these officials left with General Hume, and General Clark spent the remainder of the afternoon in his van. General Clark today received the following letter from General Truscott: V "I am deeply grateful to you for the sentiments expressed in your letter dated June 21st relative to the VI Corps and to myself. I hardly need tell you that leavj.ng the Fifth Army was for me and for VI Corps very much like uprooting an old oak tree - not an easy thing to do. We will always remember the consideration we received at your hands and the hands of your staff at all times and we will always be deeply grateful for the complete and invaluable support which we always received. That this corps accomplished anything is due to the complete support given it by you and your staff. "At the present moment, these sentiments are rather underscored, so far as I am concerned. Breaking into a new operation with the experience we have had presents so many difficulties because of the necessity for establishing new relationships with those who have not had similar experience. However, personal relationships are extremely pleasant and I feel confident that all problems will be solved to our mutual satisfaction. "Remember me to Al Gruenther and Don Brann and the other members of your staff. With all best wishes for your continued success and the hope that I shall have the pleasure of serving with you again in the not too distant future, I run." The Army Commander today wrote the following letter to Mr. Robert Murphy: �"Your letter or June 29th with its enclosed copy of a letter to Alexander has been received. I would say that the stand ta.ken by the State Department is sound and one that can be carried out. I am particularly interested in the rest center problem, for, as you know, I hRve maintajned the position that the officers and men of the Firth Army who fouf,;ht, died and bled to capture that city have the right to visit it. I have arranged for them to do so by the establishment of Fifth Army Rest Centers. I have done all in my power to see that the discipline is correct. Natl.ll"ally, at the beginning there were some minor difficulties which were to be expected under the circumstances. The behavior of my men has been splendid. I intend to insist that these rest center facilities be maintained. "I understand, and I may be wrong, that Mr. Kirk reported this situation to the State Department. Do you know anything about it? I took the matter up with the Secretary of War when he was here, explained my position fully, and Mr. Bundy, who was with him, assured me that the Secretary approved of my views 100%. "Next time you are.up this way T want to talk to you; have a little question about Italian decorations. Please do not discuss this with anyone until you see me. ttKnow you are always welcome, so come on up and pay us a real visit." * * * ROCCASTRADA--JULY 11, 1944--Af'ter breakfast General Cl.A.rk flew to the 34th Division airfield where he was met by General Ryder. He proceeded to the 135th Infantry Regiment where he pinned the eagles of a full colonel on the Regimental Commander, Lt. Col. Ashton H. Y.anhart. General Clark then proceeded to the 91st Division command post where he conferred with Generals Crittenberger and Livesay. He then returned to the Fifth Army command post by .air, spending a short time in his van and later flying to his villa at Marina di Grosseto. There he went for a short swim, after which he returned to his command post and conferred with officers of his staff, including General Brann, Colonel Saltzman and Colonel Bertholf. *· * * ROCCASTRADA--JULY 12, 1944--The General conferred in the early morning with General Brann and Colonel Saltzman and then proceeded to the air strip where a promotion ceremony was held for fifty officers of his headquarters, including Colonel Bruce, Colonel Smith, Lt. Colonel Vlalker a.nd Captain Lemaux. Shortly after the conclusion of the promotion ceremony, General Gruenther and his party returned from a short visit to the United States and was received on the field with a guard or honor by General Clark. The band played "The Gang's All Here" as the General received his Chief of Starr. General Clark returned to the confer~nce hut with General Gruenther and shortly thereafter Generals Alexander and Harding arrived for a conference with the Army Commander and his Chief of Staff a.long with General Lemnitzer, General Alexander's American Deputy Chief of Staff. �9· In the afternoon General Clark worked on administrative matters and conferred with various staff officers, including Generals Gruenther; Howard, Bradshaw and Hume. * * * CECINA--JULY 13, 1944-•In the morning General Clark flew to TV Corps to confer with General Crittenberger, returning later to the col"ll'll8.nd post where he conferred with Gener~ls Gruenther, Brann and Howard. In the afternoon the Army CoMlltander flew to Rome while his connnand post was being moved to the vicinity of Cecina. He was accompanied by Generals Gruenther, Brann and Lewis and Colonel Saltzman. The party was met at the airport by General Johnson who escorted them to the Hotel Excelsior. Immediately upon their arrival at the hotel, Generals Clark and Gruenther went into immediate conference with Mr. Murphy in General Clark's suite. General Hume all'lo called on General Clark late in the afternoon. At eight o'clock General ClPrk, accompanied by Generals Gruenther, Brann, Lewis and Colonel Saltzman went down to a dinner given by General Hume. Among the guests were Mr. Myron Taylor, Mr. Robert Murphy, General Hume and several important military and civilian Italian guests. General Clark sent thA following letter to General Alexander regarding the capabilities of Fifth Army: 11 1. Confirming our conversation yesterday morning I run furnishing you herewith my estimate of the capabilities of the Fifth Army after LEGHORN is captured and our troops occupy the high ground South of the ARNO River. 11 2. When units now on the ANVIL troop list are removed from the Fifth Army (and I estimate th8i all will have left by August 10) there will be remaining in the Fifth Army the following major units: 2 - Corps Headquarters (each with Hq Co, MP Platoon, Signal Bn and Hq and Hq Btry, Corps Artillery) 4 - Infantry Divisions 1 - Armored Division 4 - 155 Howitzer M•l Battalions 2 - 155 Gun M-1 Battalions 2 - Signal Battalions 2½ Engineer Regiments, Combat 3 - Engineer Regiments, General Service 5 - Tank Destroyer '98.ttalions 5 - Tank Batta.lions 1 - 4.2 11 Mortar Battalion, Chemical 11 3. As you know the 34th, 88th and 91st Infantry Divisions are ~t present heavily engaged and are progressing, but very slowly. In fa.ct, increased resistance indicates it may be necessary that I commit the 85th Infantry Division in order to secure IEGHORN. At best, after the capture of LEGHORN and the high ground South of the ARNO, 3 of my U.S. Infantry Divisions will be tired and in need of rest. The 1st Armored Division is now �\0 . in the process of being withdrawn from the battle for a complete reorganization which will require 3 weeks to a month to complete. Several units of this Division must remain committed to battle until our immediate objectives are gained. This may delay the reorganization of this unit. "4. After the capture of LFnHORN and the high ground South of the ARNO River by the Fifth Army and FLORENCE by the Eighth Army, it will, as you steted yesterday morning, be necessary to review the entire situ,ation in order to decide what the futtn"e operations of your forces will be. In order for Fifth Army to participate in any further offensive operations after the capture of the immediate objectives, the following requirements should be met: a. Additional trained combat and service units should be mde available in the Fifth Army area at least a week before the offensive is initiated as follows: (1) Combat Units. 3 1 1 l l (2) - Engineer Battalions, Combat 4.2 11 Mortar Battalion, Chemical Battalion FA, 811 Howitzer Battalion FA, 240nnn Howitzer FA Group, Headquarters ano Headquarters Battery Service Units. l - ~ngineer Maintenance Co 2 - Engineer Bridge Cos 1 - Chemical lblintenance Co 12 - Surgery Teams 8 - Truck Cos l - Graves Registration Co 1 - Engineer Depot Co (less 2 platoons) 1 - Field Hospital 3 - Shock Teams 4 - Mule Pack Cos (Italian) ]2. An appropriate and great~v reduced sector for offensive operations North of the ARNO must be assigned Fi:fth Army - this sector to be a one Corps front with two plus Infantry Divisions in the attack, one Infantry Division in Corps reserve and 1 Armored and 1 Infantry Division in Army reserve. 5. If the enemy defends in strength on the ARNO River, a crossing in the zone of action of the Fifth Army would be a most difficult end costly operation. The river within this zone is a serious obstt-icle and the high ground East of PISA appears almost impregnable to frontal attack or close-in envelopment. In my opinion operations by Fifth Army to cross the ARNO River must be secondary to major attack by the Eighth Army to capture ~~ount Albano and the bigh ground east of FLORENCE. rnce over the ARNO, the att:=i.ck should be continued 'llithout priuse direct ag1dnst enemy positions on the RIMINI - PISA line. The continuation of the attack, once the ARNO is crossed, is considered necessary because the flat , terrain imnediately North of the river is dominated by the heights along which enemy prepared positions are known to exist. �ll "6. Please note that I have stated my capabilities and requirements for additional supporting troops for a ~ Corps front. If it becomes necessary that in addition to this offensive front I hold defensively additional ground, my requirements of course will be increased accordingly. It is highly desirable that I have thP- 92nd Infantry Division (Cld) awiilable prior to any offensive a.gainst the RIMINI - PISA line. If this Division is available when the offensive is launched, an appropriate assignment for it would be to hold defensively on my left flank and protect the Port of IEGHORN. There is every indication that the German will prepare the RIMINI - PISA line in depth and attempt to hold it to the last man. An attack by the Fifth Army with only 4 Infantry Divisions available will be costly and without doubt will leave these Divisions unable without rest to progress after reaching the PO Valley. It is, therefore, requested that at least two U. s. Infantry Divisions in addition to the 9?nd Infantry Division be brought from the U.S. with appropriate auxiliary and service troops and be made availr-1ble for battle shortly after the major offensive agpinst the RIMINI - PISA line is launched. "7. Unfortunately I have little infornation on the supply situ,:ition from command channels but I have been informed through administrative channels that the supplies for future offensive operntions of Fifth Army are to be furnished on the basis that Fifth Army conducts an active defense. If this is true, it will have a most adverse effect upon any future operations. 11 8. I fully realize the extreme importance of exerting pressure against ' the enemy in every conceivable place. Certainly Italy is one place where it should be kept up if it is humanly possible. I fully appreciate that_Operation AWIL is the main effort and that such Mediterranean resources as 08.n be employed effectively there should be used to support it. However, in view of the weakened position of Fifth Army, additional means and a reduced sector are necessary. Given these means and a more narrow front, I a~sure you Fifth Army will do its share in conducting any operation you may direct. 11 * * * CECINA--JULY 14, 1944--At 1030 this morning the General conferred with Mr. Murphy, and the General asked he and Mr. Offie to visit the Fifth Army command post and also accompany him to the French Expeditionary Corps in the afternoon. General Cl~rk also conferred durin~ the morning with General Brann and Colonel / / Saltzman. The party left Rome for the new co~nd post at Cecina, arr1ving there Pt 1400. General Clark, Mr. Murphy anaMr. Offie had lunch at the command post and departed for French Corps at Siena at 1615. J..;,~ ~(}, The~ arty arrived at f,1a.lignano airport at 1645 and met with Generril Ale:xan/ f~(der who was already on the field. Genernl Clark then drove to the Piazza del Q_Or- ?a.mpo in Siena where he was greeted by General Juin. Shortly thereafter General Alexander arr5ved. The three Gener8ls then took post, and the national anthems of Great Britain, United States, Soviet Russia and France were plnyed. The three Generals then reviewed the French troops massed in the square. The party then proceeded to the terrace of the Municipio where Generals Juin and Alexander made short speeches. General Clark chatted briefly with General Juin, General Carpentier, Mr. Bogomolov and other dignitar:ies. The General then went down to the second story of the building wpere the ' representatives of the various quarters of Siena dressed in their medieva! costunes performed the flag dance in �his honor. General Clark then returned to the airport and took off for the command post. The Genere.l had dinner with Messrs. Murphy, Offie and Genernl Gruenther shortly after his return a.nd rP-tired to his van after conferring briefly with Mr. Murphy. * * * CECINA--JULY 15, 1944--At 1030 Air Vice Marshal Dickson, Commander of the Desert Air Force, arrived and conferred with Generals ClP.rk and Gruenther in General Clark's van. General Clark then said goodbye to Mr. Henry Griffir1, AP photographer who was to leave shortly for another theater. At 1130 M9.jor Generals Pritchard and Bolte reported for duty with Fifth Army and conferred briefly with General Clark, remaining to have lunch with the Army Commander. After lunch the General worked on important papers in his van until the arrival of General W ilby, Superintendent of the Military Academy at West r oint, at 1715. General Clark talked at length with General Wilby and then retired to M.s van where he had dinner alone before retir:tng for the evening. The following are the important messages of the day: Fifth Army to AAI. RN 69f!:7. "l. This hea.dqtwrters is considerably disturbed over the implications of paragraph three of AFHQ message FX 136700. We have made every effort to release promptly all units required by Seventh Army and will continue to do so regerdless of the effect on our operations. AFHQ message appears to have been dispatched without rAference to previous messages on same subject. "2. 501 Truck Battalion is attl'lched to PBS in Naples and not under Fifth Army control. 501 Field Hospital was authorized by AFHQ FX 70378 July 9 to arrive Naples by 30 July. It will arrive there by that date. 806 Signal Batta.lion was authorized by AFHQ FX 70478 July 9 to leave Fifth Army by July 20. It will be dispatched so es to arrive Naples by that date. 1st Battalion 201 Pioneers will arrive Naples by July 17. It had not been ordered previously because AFHQ number 67534 ordered one bl'!ttalion (blank) pj_oneers. This headquarters suP,gested (our 3073' July 8th) use of 2/8 or 4/8 Pioneers due in Naples for FEC's. No reply was received. 323 Gestion de subsistence authorized to close Naples on 30 July by AFHQ FX 70378 July 9. It will arrive by that date. It is needed here to feed French until major units a.re relieved. Groupe d 'Artillerie of 4 DMM has been ordered to accompany Gourns to Corsica. It is awaiting e_ vail.Pbility of craft to carry it from Civitavecchia. See our 7680 July 131400. 101 Engineer Regiment and three sections, 521 Traffic Regula.ting Group �l3 are expected to close Naples area not later than 17 July. "3. The su~gestion to use Headquarters II Corps to replece FEC will not solve any of the difficulties created by withdrawal of units referred to in AFHQ 136700. Headquro-ters II Corps has already been stripped. of essential corps service troops including signal battalion in order to continue IV Corps operational. If u. s. troops had been available this headquarters would have furnished them to FEC. 422 Evacuation Hosr1tal departed 13 July." Cl.B.rk to Devers. RN 6994. "Although there is a.t present no vacancy for a Major General in the Fifth Army, in view of Gener~l Eisenhower's recommendation, I shall be pleased to have Major GenerEil William c. McMahon assigned to Fifth Army as an extra genert1l officer. I have knovm General Mctt3.hon for many years and I have formed a high estimAte of his ability. If assigned to Fifth Army I shall probably use him as a special assistant for eyes only missions pending occurrence of a suitable vacancy." General Clark today sent the follovdng letter to General Ju.in: 11 1. It is absolutely imperative that the units referred to in our radio Po. 3132 (101st Engjneer Regiment; 3 Platoons Regula.trice Routiere 521; 1st Battalion 201 Regiment Pioneers), dated 14 July 1944, Rrrive in the Naples area not later than 17 July 1944. Similarly 806/1 Signal Company and 806/3 Signal Company must arrive in the Naples area not leter than 20 July 1944. 11 2. If the removal of these units from your comMand makes it impossible for you to execute the offensive mission which has already been assigned to you, you are authorized to assume the defensive. 11 3. My instructions from higher headquarters wjth respect to the dispatch of the above mentioned units are so definite thE1t their movement can be delayed no longer. I regret, more than you will ever knov,, the necessity of depriving you of means which mPy be crjtically necessary to enable you to accomplish your mission. However, I ~m sure thAt you will realize that our failure to meet the prescribed dates may prejudice in a most serious manner future operations which might have a djsastrous effect on the outcome of the entire war. I run certain that I can count on your whole hea.rted coopere.tion in this matter." * * * CECINA--JULY 16, 1944--At 0830 General Clark bade goodbye to General Wilby and worked on adninistrt=ttive mntters in his van until the arrival at lll5 of Lt. Gen. Giles, Chief of Staff to General Arnold of the Army Air Forces; Major General John E. Hull, Assistant OperPtions Officer of the War Department; Major General Clayton Bissell, G-2 of the War DepP-rtment; and Major General Franko. D. Hunter, of the 1st Ai.r Force. GenerRl Cl~rk greeted these officers with an honor guard and then briefly oriented them on the tacticel situa.tion on the Fifth Army front. The party then drove to the cub strip and took off for IV Corps command post, arriving at the landing strip south of Saline at l'J.40. General Crane, IV Corps Artillery Officer, greeted the party and guided �them to the IT Corps command post situated two miles northeast of Laiatico. General Crittenberger and members of his staff greeted the party, tmd the Corps Commander gHve a short briefing of the situation to General Clark and guests. The party had lunch while being briefed e_ the IT Corps command t post and left IV Corps for the 88th Division, arriving there at 1305. They were met by General Sloan and members of his staff, and briefed on the situation on the Division front. Upon their departure from 88th Division, General Sloan received a message that German column was moving along a road north from Palaia, and General Clark assured him that he would have immediate action taken. Enroute to IV Corps cub strip General Clark sent a message to General Gruenther as follows: 11 At 1315 German column 5,000 yPrds long moving north from Palaia.. Get Hansborough busy. 11 Arriving at the IV Corps cub strip the r,a.rty took off for Gecina airport to join their C-47, while General Clark return9d to the cub strip Ht his command post. Upon his return to the Fifth Army command post, the General went for a quick dip in the sea behind the corunand post and returned to his van where he conferred with Generals Gruenther and Brann and Colonel Saltzman. He then had supper and attended a movie in his conference hut before retiring to his van for the evening. General Clark today sent the following cable to General Devers: RN 7711. "General Prjchard will assume command of 1st Armored Division on 18 July. General Harmon can be released for return to United States immediately. I understand that there was some comment in War Department as to reason for reliefs of Harmon and Ryder. As you Jmow they were releRsed at your suggestion jn order to return to United States Division Commanders with battle experience. I hope that you will make it perfectly clear to War Derartment that I have been reluctant to lose these officers and that I strongly recommend each of them to be a Corps Commander." On June 19th when General Clark called at the French Expeditionary Corps and spoke to General CPrpentier, as well as on June 20th when General Juin visited General Clark, General Carpentier on the former occasion and General Juin on the latter occasion had stated that they had received orders that certain supporting units were to be withdravm for Operation ANVIL. At that time General Clark had stated that he would do his best with what supporting units were left over to assist the French in the difficulties in which they would find themselves due to the lack of signal and engineer personnel particularly. On July 15th Fifth Army received a message from AFHQ, FX 136700, regarding the ,•fithdrawal of these supportjng units. General Cl?rk sent a message to AAI informing them that every effort had been made and would be rnBde releasing units for Seventh Army. • On the evening of the 15th at about eight o'clock GenerAl Carpentier, Chief of Staff of the French Corps, called and asked to speak to General Gruenther. Generel Gruenther was in the hut attending a, movie and cmne to the aides tent vrhere, with Captain Walters acting as interpreter, he discussed the withdrawal of these units with General Carpentier. General CP.rpentier stated that ��· r1·1/ 2 upon the withdrawal of these units the French ~ i t i : y Corps could n ~ l longer continue its offensive mission and requested permission to go on the / defensive. General Gruenther stated that if this was the case permission v1 s granted. Carpentier replied thet orders would be given to tha.t effect but that nevertheless the French would attempt to take adva.ntage of any local conditions which might develop. He then stated that these units would be withdrawn from the line the following day end would be in Naples on July 19th (after the deadline set by AFHQ). General Gruenther then asked him if it would not be possible to have these units in Naples by the 17th, and GenerA.l Carpentier stated that this would be impossible - that they would be there on the evening of the 19th. General Gruenther then urgently requested that every effort be mHde to expedite the departure of these units, and General Carpentier promised to do this. General Carpentier then also stHted that a letter had been sent from General Juin to General Clerk stating these facts in ,,riting and that the letter should reach us shortly. In this letter General Juin stated that against his will he was compelled to stop the a.dvance of the 4th mm and the 2nd DIM and establj_ a defensive situation ,mtil relieved by the 8th Indian sh Division. * * * CECINA--JULY 17, 1944-General Clark flew to the 34th Division and returned just before lunch. After lunch he received the militery attaches to the French Provisional Government. These attaches were as follows: Lt. Col. Ebbesen, Norway; Maj. 1!ontjoie, Belgium; Lt. Col. Pamanes, 1~exico; Maj. Cayo, Peru; Col. Colocotronis, Greece • . The General later conferred with General Gruenther in hjs van and then went to the beach where he received General Mast, Resident General of Tunisia. Generals Lewis, Tate, Gruenther, Horan joined the rarty at the beach and later had dinner with General Clark. * * * CECINA--JtTLY 18, 1944--Immediately after breakfast the General attended a formation and guard of honor for General t1ast, Resident General of Tunisia, who then left by car for the French Expeditiomiry Corps. General Clark, at the same time, pinned 2nd Lieutenant bars on two we.rrar1t officers of his headquarters; Chief �Warrs.nt Officer Wandel of the Quartermaster Section, and Warrnnt Officer ( j'g) Hughes of the Ordnance Section. Shortly thereafter the Army Commander drove to the ~4th Division where he conferred with General Ryder and proceeded from there to the 363rd RCT. At regimental headquarters General Clark was briefed by Colonel Magill. After a mort briefing General Clark in his jeep drove towards the front lines to observe a battalion of the 363rd on their way into the line. The General spoke to the battalion commander, several of the officers and enlisted men as they marched up the road going into battle, encouragin~ them to drive on to Leghorn. Colonel Walker landed on the road for instructions from General Clark. General Clark instructed him to fly back to the 34th Division cub field to wait for him. The Army Commander then visited the command post of the 135th RCT of the 34th Division where he was briefed hy the Regimental Commander. General Clark told the regimental commander of the 135th Infantry that he had just visited the 363rd RCT who vrere well on the road to Leghorn and that it was a race to the finish as to which one would enter the city f:irst. General Clark then returned to the command post of the 14th Division where he conferred with General Ryder with whom he reviewed the situation as he saw it. He then took off for the 34th Division cub strip and flew back to his command post. In the afternoon the General remained in his van working on administrative matters. At about 2030 General Ryder called on the phone to advise thet elements of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron had reached the outskirts of Leghorn. General Clark today sent the following cable to General Alexander: Ov.J-( -J 1', r' ,v JI RN 7031. "I have examined carefully the question of continued pressure by the French raised in your 1504 to General Juin. I instructed Juin to release units specified in AFHQ BX 13670 on dates prescribed even if their withdrawal would force French to adopt defensive role. General Juin decided that removal~ of these units and character of resistance on French front made it necessarv to assume defensive vdth provision for follow up of any enemy withdrawe,l with light forces. I consider that Juin is doing all he is capable of accomplishing. The Army Commander today received the follow:ing letter from General Devers: "Reference your cable 7711 of 16 July, I do not know who your informant was but any statement that there was so~e comment in the WP..T Department as to the relief of Harmon and Ryder is loose talk. Both of these officers were highly recommended for corps commands with your concurrence, and General M "rshall has been so informed. "I do not consider the position you suggested for Major General McMahon justified. However, I have informed Eisenhower that I could use him in a staff position as a. brigadier general. If Eisenhower approves, I will assign him as Deputy Chief of Staff, NATOUSA. "For your :information, the following cable, classi.f ication secret, wa.s re. ceived from GenerAl Marshall today: �At my suggestion, General Eisenhovrer released in series the names of Corps Commanders and then Division Commanders whose Units have been identified. It h~i_s created very favorable publicity here at home with considerable \'Vriteups on each ind:ividua.l. He has now agreed to my suggestion to have General Bradley propose every few days the name of some Unit Commanr er, Company, Battalion or Regiment, whose organization has done especially well in some current operation. 1 'This will be released in the Theater as Pn item of news, referring specifically to Commander, Organization, end incident. Further, Theater Public Relations will send Wa:r Department Public Relations a detailed account of the specific opere,tion in order that more extensive writeups can be managed on this side than are acceptable over communication channels from the Theater. 'Please institute such procedures in your Theater but due to smaller size of your United States Forces, rele,,ses as frequent as indicated Pbove would not be appropriate.• I rropose to institute this procedure just as soon as possible and would welcome riggestions from you." , + , 11 ~~ ~r'" i'tc ~ 9 9'y o ', 0 LJ~ "'1 .t ;;~~*~; ~ ~r' lr c,q 1V ki \ * CECINA--JULY 19, 1944--General Clark left the command rost at 0630. and flew to ,, the 34th Division cow.mand post where he stopred for a moment and then flew on to a road northeast of Livorno. He landed on the road and rroceeded into town J in a jeep and spent part of the morning looking over the city ot' ,Livorno which had fallen to American troops. In Livorno he spoke to General Williamson end also to a number of the reporters and cameramen. The General then return~d to his plane on the road and took off, circling over the port of Livorno, examin~ng the conditions in the harbor. The General returned to the command post at 1010 and went immediately to General Gruenther's office, where he met General Chidlow, executive Officer to General Saville of XII TAC; and Air V:i.ce Marshal Dickson, Corr.manding the Desert Air Force. At 1300 Generals Juin, Carpentier, Sevez, Beucler and Keyes arrived for lunch. A guard of honor was held for General Juin and his party. General Clark gave a lunch for the above French o~ficers and guests and also had General Gruenther, General Brann, Colonel Saltzman, Colonel Kammerer and Lt. Col. Porter as additional g"Uests. After lunch General Clark presented General Juin and other general officers of his staff with letters of farewell. General Juin was greatl3r moved by General Clark's letter, embraced him and expressed his gratitude for the many kind things General Clark had to say and his sorrow on leaving General Clark's command. The French departed from Army Headquarters at 1500. Afterwards Generals Clark and Gruenther drove to Castj_glioncello to look at �the proposed new Fifth Army rest center. The party was met by Colonel Smith who showed General Clark several villas, one of whjch General CL~rk picked for his use in the near future. He then rettn'ned and retired to his van. General Clark sent General Marshall the following cable today: RN 7740. "As requested by you when you were here in June I have taken measures to increase publicity given Jepanese-American troops. 442 Infantry will be mentioned in connection with capture of Leghorn. 100th Battalion will be used to garrison Leghorn. Also, in accordance with your suggestion to General Gruenther, I have today awarded War DerBrtment citation to 100th Battalion for distinguished service in Leghorn campnign. Release of that award will be made to press July 20th." General Alexander cabled General Clark as follows: RN UA.1519. "My heartiest congratulations to you and your fBmous IV Corps whose brilliant fighting during these last days has led to the capture of the port of Leghorn." General Alexander sent General Clerk the following letter with regard to future operations of the Allied Armies in Italy: 1. Nmv that the skill and hard fighti.'1.g of your troops has resulted in their reachin~ the ARNQ at P0NTEDERA anr to the east of thAt place, the time has come to decide how the task of driving the enemy back to the GOTHIC line on that part of the front west of FLORENCE can best be divided between the two armies, and what the inter-P.rmy boundary north of the ARNO should be. 11 "2. As you know my intention is to proceed with the destruction of the enemy's armed forces in ITALY. The next step to that end must I consider be to drive the enemy back to the GOTHIC line as quickly as po-::sible, so tha.t we can bring that line under fire; interfere with further work on it; and obtain detailed information about it prepAratory to an attack. 3. As I have also previously explained, I intend to penetrate the GOTHIC line roughly between DICOMANO and PISTOIA. In fact the general areas of which these two places are the centres will form the outer pivots of the attack. It is therefore essential to secure them quickly, especially the very important road centre of PISTOIA. Once that place is f'jrmly in our hands the front between it and the west coast can become defensive, provided of course that the high ground north east of PISA, which I refer to hereafter as f,1DNI'E PISANO, is also held by us to cover the approaches to the port of LEGHORN. 11 "4. From a stud;r of the map it has struck me that unless the enemy holds the line of the ARNO very weakly, in which case I hope you may be able to rush THE MTNTE PISANO feature, an attempt to force the passage of the ARNO west of POtn'EDERA would be both difficult and costly. I therefore suggest that the best way of developing operations across the ~"i.NO would be to force a passage somewhere betw en EMPrLI and PONTEDERA, and then to develop two thrusts, one on PISTC'IA and the other on LUCCA which would have the effect of turning any enemy positions on the high ground south of those two places. Possession of PISTOIA and LUCCA would give us control of a good lateral road and a line on which we would 0 �\9 constitute a sound defensive flank whereby to economise troops for our offensive against the GOTHIC line. rworeover the line of the ARNO between PONTEDERA and the west coast could be held vT:ith comparatively few troops, while the bulk of the forces available were concentrated for offensive operations to secure PISTOIA and LUCCA. "5. Apart from the fact that Eighth Army alrearly have a very long front to hold, and will have as much as they can do with the forces at their disposal to drive the enemy back to the GOTHIC line between the east coast and PISTOIA, the configuration of the country really makes the area between a general line from LASTRA - PRATO to the west coast one tactical area, and separate from the area to the east. It would therefore suit me best from every point of view, if as your next task you could undertake the capture of PISTOIA and LUCCA, and the establishment of a defensive front on that general line. 11 6. I fully realise how much your army has been reduced in strength, ) and I have made a personal request to the Supreme Allied Commander verbally and in writing to supply the supporting and ancillary uni ts you have asked J for, and to accelerate the arriw1l of 92 Div and the Brazilian division. So far I have received no specific reply but I understand that the first R.C.T. of the Brazilian division has already arrived in ITALY, and that another R.C.T. is expected shortly. 11 7. I also realise and deeply apr..reciate the fact that three out of your four remaining infantry divisions have had a great deal of heavy fighting, and that ycur armoured division is in the process of reorganisation. At the same time I feel that the enemy is in no stete to launch a serious counter-offensive, and that on defensive parts of our line we can and must accept the risk involved in reducing our front to little more than a line of observation backed up by mobile reserves. If you agree that that will be possible on the line of the ARNO between POH TEDERA and the sea, I have A feeling myself that it will leave you sufficient troops to force the passage of the ARNO east of FONI'EDERA, and to capture the very important road centres of PISTOIA and LUCCA, thereafter establishing a defensive front between PISTOIA and the sea. 11 8. I should very much like your army to play a part in the attack on the GOTHIC line by launching an attack on that position in the area north of PISTOIA in conjunction with Eighth Army's attack further east. I realise however that we cannot make plans for that stage of the campaign until we can foresee more ~clearly in what strength you will be when ycur troops reach the GOTHIC line. "9. For the present J would be most grateful if you would examine fully whether you think you can, with your present forces, undertake the capture of PISTOIA and LUCCA. If you think ycu can then I suggest that the inter-army boundary should be re-drawn so as to make the town of tDNTELUPO, the hill mass MYNTE ALBANO, and the city of PISTOIA inclusive to you, at any rate until we see how your operations north of the ARNO develop, and whflt your losses in the recent fighting have been. 1110. I have put these problems on paper to enable you to consider them fully before we discuss them. If it will be convenient to ycu I should like to come to your H.Q. about 1100 hrs to-morro~ 20 July to settle the matter. Will you please let me know if that will suit you. Meantime I am confident �you will do all you can to secure the pass~ge of the ARNO, end to press on north of that river irrespective of boundaries. It is of supreme importance I am s'l.ll'e to go all out to get PISTOIA and LUCCA before the enemy can recover from the heavy blows you have given him in the fighting of the past few days. By to-morrow the situation may of co'l.ll'se have developed f'l.ll'ther, and other factors may have been introduced. I will however come and see you in any case to discuss future plans unless I hear from you that tomorrow is not convenient to you." * * * CECINA--J1JLY 20, 1944--Today General Crittenberger arrived a.t 0945 and conferred with Generals Clark, Gruenther, Brann and Tate, using the G-3 situation and tactical ma.ps to clarify his points. Gem~ral Cri ttenberger left at 1030, and shortly thereafter Generals Alexander, Harding and Lerrmitzer arrived to confer with the Army Commander and key members of his staff. This conference continued until 1210 when General Bolte, new Commander of the 34th Division, arrived and was introduced to General Alexander and party just prior to their departure. The General lunched with Generals Bolte and Brann and then worked on important military dispatches d'l.ll'ing the entire Rfternoon. At dinner this evening General ClPrk entertained Generals Gruenther, Sullivan and Colonel saltzman for dinner and efter dinner saw Pathe and Paramount newsreels of the Fifth Army's triumphant entry into Rome which were brought back from the States by General Gruenther. General Clark this afternoon dictated the following notes for inclusion in his diary: "The following letter on future operations was received from Genert:tl Alexander yesterday with the request that he see me today. (Letter referred to in the preceding sentence wa.s quoted in yesterday's diary). "When General Alexander came, I told him of the situa+,ion with regard to Fifth Army troops after the capture of Leghorn; namely, that the three infantry divisions, the 34th, 91st and 88th were somewhat used up, particulPrly the 34th, as results of the last three weeks' battle. I told him I would take on the mission he requested of the Fifth Army; namely, to cross the ARNO River and as a first phase, preliminery to crossing the Appenines, to capture the line PISTOIA to LUCCA. "General Alexander's letter to me in no way indicPted the intentions of the Eighth Army. I made it plain that the old French sector would be occupied in the next two days, but British Eighth Army troops must rush up and sec'l.ll'e for the Fifth Army a line of departure for crossing of the river in the EMPOLI - SIGNIA area - that there were absolutely no American troops avPileble now to do this job. He agreed to this. As a further requisite to Fifth Army's attack across the ARNO, I made it plain that Eighth Army must have already captured FLORENCE and be prepared to attack abreast of Fifth Army to occupy the area from DIC0MANO to PISTOIA exclusive. In other words, Eighth Army must skirt the high ground north of FLORENCE and towa.rds PISTOIA as Fifth Army cro,· ses �between EMPOLI and SIG NIA. He agreed to tli is. "I told him that I had a dirty job ahead of me yet in cleaning out the pocket between the caml north of LEGHORN and the river near PISA. This must be done immediately or work on rehabilitating the port will be hampered by all types of enemy fire. I have di.rected IV Corps to do this job with the 34th and 91st Divisions. I ha.ve spoken to General Bolte, who will take command of the 34th Division tomorrow, and he feels thAt his Division, reinforced with the 363rd CT, has that capability. IV Corps has been somewhat remiss in failing to start this task sooner, for I had repeatedly given direct orders to Crittenberger that 34th Division was not to be rermitted to be drawn jnto I.EGHOR~ but after its capture to rush up into LEGHORN within its sector. This, I am afraid, Ryder has failed to do. "As to the future zone of action of Fifth Army a.cross the Arpenines, this will depend upon the stPte of my troops when I reach my first objective on the PISTOIA - LUCCA line. "General Keyes I corps 111ill relieve IV Corps within the next fj ve days in order to tackle this next job. 1 will be unnble to cross the AROO in force until my troops have had about two weeks' rest. This, in my opinion, will be before Eighth Army is ready to do its share of the job. 11 "I told General Alexander, and I had rrev:ously notified my staff, that \ every improvisation possible would be resorted to in order to m~ke up deficiencies in the Fifth Army. These include use of Italian troops where practicable, the use of tanks, TD 1 s and anti-aircraft as supporting artillery, the use of British artillery and engineers. I do not want British divisions, / for they do not fight like American troops. \ I realize that this next phase of the operntion will be a difficult \ one for the reduced Fifth Army, but I feel it should go on and that we should contribute our worth in view of the pressure wrich is being put on the enemy 1 from all directions. He is fighting under severe hendicaps. Fis morale is t low. The end of the war approaches in my opinion. We must take chances and pound him from all directions. I am heartily in favor of continuing on with the means at my disposal. 11 "I told General Alexander of General Devers I prognostication of the date of reaching the Po. He agrees with me that it is lack of battle experience and understanding on Devers' part. It is pure crystal gazing." General Clark sent General Devers the f ollovring letter today: "I have your two letters of July 17th and lgih. T"fith reference to the July 17th letter, most of the subjects contained therein are comrond matters which I look to General Alexander for solution. He is fully aware of my minimum requirements and will make every effort to obtain them. After knowjng what means will be a.vaiJFble to the Fifth Army, I will be better able to inform him of our capabilities. It is natural, from where you are you �can not know exactly what we need and whPt we do not need. For example, your \ statement that we have adequate artillery to support my army in the offensive contemplated is incorrect. I have alrea.ay arranged with General Alexander to get the additional artillery required to do the job. 11 With reference to conservation of supplies, I assure you that I and my staff are fully allergic tu this necessity. "With reference to the German wea1mess, we who have been in close contact with him in battle are well able to evaluate his defensive ability. It rather surprised me that you should urge the Fifth Army on to bolder action, for we have always demonstrated just that in our many months of campt=dgning and our willingness to tackle things on an "adhocll basis. You need have no worry on these scores. "I am wondering upon what you base your statement thet the Allied Armies will be on the Fo River by August 15th. Certainly it can not be based upon the facts as we know them in the field. When General Alexander was here today, at which time we decided upon future orerations, I e.sked him if by any chance you could have obtained this date from him. He was as surprised as I am and was in complete agreement with me that no such schedule as you have in mind is ca.pa.ble of accomplishment. He thought perhaps you had seen the old estimetes which he submitted to General Wilson based on conditions, none of which are present at this time. "With reference to the publicity on comm~mders of subordinate units, I think it is a fine idea to release the n~mes of smaller unit commanders, together wjth the successful job they have accomplished. We have done that in the past and are prepared to send stories on to your headquarters on any schedule which may seem desirable. I will discuss this further with my PRO and give you additj_onal comnents. lfSawbridge told me of your decision on Grogan. I regret this exceedingly, for I do not know why you are exceptionally interested in officers I desire on my personal staff, particularly when they have demonstrated their ability as Grogan has, and when their transfer here is agreeable to the VIar Dep::irtment. Surles is anxious that he get a break with a combat unit after his long service in the W Department and is glad to exchange with my man Clark. I rear quest that you reconsider this rratter. 11 * * * CECINA--.nJLY 21, 1944--The General conferred in the early pecrt of the morning with staff officers in his van and at 1000 decorated a number of French officers with the Bronze Star at a ceremony hald at his command post. After the ceremony the General received the officers in his hut ;:ind lAter conferred with Generals Gruenther, Keyes and Ryder, all of whom rern,~ined for lunch. After lunch General Clark pinned 1st Lieutenant bars on his Aide-decamp Lieutenant Robert L. Berenson. Shortly thereafter GenerAl ClP-rk flew to Rome in his C-47, accompanied by Generals Brann, Bradshaw and Colonels Saltzman an<l Bruce. l ) �Operations Instruction #29 was issued today A.nd is quoted below: 11 1. When Fifth Army troops have rePched the ARNO River across the entire Army zone of action, anoth9r phPse of operations will be concluded. 11 2. The mission of Allied Armies in Italy continues to be the destruction of the enemy's forces in Italy. Future operations to accomplish this mission are divided into rrwses, the first of which is to drive the enemy back to the G0THIC Line and the second, to penetrate that line roughly between PISTOIA and DICOMA.NO. 11 3. Operations to drive the enemy back to the GOTHIC Line will begin after Eighth Army has captured FLORE1'JCE and reached the ARNO River West of FLORENCE. Fifth Army's mission in this operation will be to force a crossing of the ARNO River with its main effort generally in the vicinity of NDNTELUPO, capture M. ALBANO and secure PISTOIA and LUCCA. Simultaneous with Fifth Army's attack, Eighth Army will capture the high ground generally Earth and Northwest of FLORENCE. The proposed bounda.ry between Armies for this operation is stream and road junction 637695 - CR 633739 - thence Rout~ 66 to CR 601770 - thence 60 Easting grid. Fifth Arny will take over that part of its new sector now held by Eighth Army after Eighth Army reaches the ARNO River. 11 4. Instructions for the second phase - the penetration of the GOTHIC Line - will be issued later. 11 5. It is d:rected that Headqunrters II Corps relieve Headquarters IV Corps without felay. Date and hour when Commanding General, II Corps will assume responsibility for IV Corps zone of action will be determined between Corps Commanders and reported to this Headquarters twenty-four hours before effected. Assignment and attachm0.nt of troops will issue in sepl:'rate orders. rr6. Pending movement of troops into positions for attack, the entire Fifth Army zone will be the responsibility of II Corps. Decision will be made at a later date whether or not it is advisable to relieve II Corps of responsibil:i.ty for a portion of the Vlestern part of the Fifth Army sector. "7. It is est1mated that the D day for operr-tions to cross the ARNO will be between 5 August and 10 August. In prepnrPtion for this attack, it is directed that every effort be ~ade to rest the troops. To accomplish this, it is desired that forward positions be held with the absolute minimum strength, using troops other than those of our dlvisions wherever possible. If requested, the infantry of the 1st Armored Division and the 39th Engineer Combat Regiment can be m=ide aw>ilable to fP.cilitate the resting of infantry units. Tanks and tank destroyers will be sited as artillery as far as possible. The tanks of the 1st Armored Division mRy be mde available if desired on completion of present reorganization and maintenance period. "8. II Corps will rcr:-epare the necessary plRns for the first phase attack and submit same to this Headquarters as soon as practicable. "9. IV Corps will make every effort to expedite the completion of 34th Infantry Division's present mission in order to facilitate the early �relief of this unit. As soon as the Division has reached the ARNO River, it will be relieved and :r:ass to Army control. 11 * * * CECINA--JULY 22 , 1944--General Clark returned to the Fifth Army oommand post from Rome at 1700, had dinner with General Brann and Colonel Smith before retiring. The two following messPges were received today from French Corps: 11 At the time when staff of CEF ceases to exist are renewing our feelings deepest sorrow to be separated from staff Fifth Army with which have been in closest cooperation in atmosphere of friendship and trust dur5ng over 6 months. Common victory has indefectibly sealed links of mutual liking formed during this campaign . Will never forget material Find morRl help you gave so heartily to our work. Are forming wishes of neeting you again soon. Rendezvous for final victory of both our countries closely associated. Long live Fifth Army. Long live the United Sfotes of Arrerica. 11 "The present message - last to be delivered to Buffon by Annibal - is carrying to you once more tokens of friendship. Au revoir, Sir, may God one day restore this splendid Franco-American team, on the rath to victory respectfully yours." * * * CECINA--JULY 23, 1944--The General left the conmand post for Castiglioncello in the morning where he spent the morning reading, swimming nnd resting. At 1600 hours the General received twenty-five guests in his beach villa for a swimming party and buffet supper. The guests included most of his Section Chiefs and ten guests from the 8th Evacuation Hospital. * * * CECINA--JULY 24, 1944--General Clark spent the entire morning reading and swimming. At 1500 hours in the afternoon General Brann and Colonel Saltzman arrived at the villa for a short swim and supper. * * * CECINA--JULY 25, 1944--The General left the villa at eight o'clock for the command post, arriving at 0830. At 0945 Generals Clark and Gruenther left for a naturalization ceremony at the rear echelon. General Clark spoke to 90 enlisted men and l nurse after they had been administered the Oath of Naturalization by Mr. Horrell, American Vice Consul in Naples, congratulnting them and rraising them for the way in which they had earned their citizenship. After the ceremony the General returned to the oomma.nd post. ArchMshop Spellman arrived at the oommnnd post at noon tmd was greeted by General Clark. Generals Clark and Gruenther, Archbishop Spellman talked in General Clark's van for an hour after which they lunched in GenerAl Clark's mess, the other members of the Archbishop I s party, Colonel O1Keefe and Major Moran and �Colonel Ryan, Fifth Army Chaplain, lunching with them. The archbishop presented General Clark with a letter he had brought from President Roosevelt. After lunch General Clexk took off for the villa at Castiglioncello where he had as his dinner guests in the evening General Brann and Colonel Saltzman. * * * CECINA--J1JLY 26, 1944--General Clark spent a quiet day resting, swinrrning and reading at his beach villa. Colonel W ood, Commanding Officer of the 38th Evacuation Hospital, another officer Pnd three nurses came for a swim and dinner with the Army Commander. General Tate sent the following memorandum to the Chief of Staff today with regard to the allocation of ammunition: 1. The limited administrRti ve means availa.ble to Fifth Army in the fu- ) ture will not support the actions contemplated for IV Corps in paragraphs 4 ~ / and g. Operating Instructions !v'\unber 30, dated 24 July 1944, and at the same time carry out the action contemplated for II Corps, as outlined in paragraph 5 of this Operating Instruction. There axe not sufficient Service troops; notably, Signal and Engineers, to support an A.dvance on a two-corps front. Also, the future supply of Artillery ammunition makes it necessary that fires be concentrated on a narrow front. Strict allocation of ammunition is to be applied by SOS, NATOUSA beginning l Au,,~ust. We cannot expect Pn increase in monthly P.rmnunition allocations in view of priorities estabHshed for other operations and the limited production output in the United States. NATOUSA and SOS, NATOUSA have stressed this point. 11 2. Adm.i.nistratively (Service troops and supplies), Fifth .Army now has \ only sufficient means to support ow~ corps of three divisions--two divisions operating offensively, including pursuit, with one division in reserve. Artillery ammunition supply in the future will not be sufficient to continue the heavy artillery concentrations employed in the pa.st in support of adwmcing troops." 11 The following , report on conditions in Livorno was received from General Hume soon after the city's occupation by Allied troops: "l. First AMG officer, Major Carl Kait, Civil Affairs Officer, 34th Division, entered Livorno v,:i th adve.nce patrols of infantry troops at 0630 hours 19 July 1944, and establ:i.shed military government at 0700 hours at the temporary headquarters of the Committee of NRtj_ onal Liberation in Ardenza. "2. Preliminary surveys were oomrnenced at once, in cooperation wjth officials of the Committee of National L:i.beration, to determine the prhnary necessities of the remaining population of the city. It was estimated on questioning civic offfoers that only 35,000 constituted the population of Livorno, a. city which usually numbered 138,000 persons. 11 3. At 1100 hours Brig. General Edgar Erskine Hume, Senior Civil Affairs Officer, Fifth Army, his ADC, and Ma,jor Elmer N. Holmgreen, designated as Civil Affairs Officer to replace Major Knit when he moves forwRrd '"itJ-1 the d:ivision, entered the city of Livorno and, after a reconnaissance of conditions within �the city limits, went to Ardenza to rreet with Major Knit and the officials of the Committee of National Liberation. n4. It was discovered, on conversatj on with Avv. Adolfo Agus, Secretary General of the Commune and acting mayor, thPt three-fourths of Livorno, comprising the area around the port and extending inlend, had been evacuated of civiliHns by the Germans in November and had been designated the "Zona Nera", or "Black Zone" by them. This section was blocked off by demolition of houses around the line of de:rmrcation in such a way as to make streets impassable. Barbed wire had also been erected, and signs posted in German and Italian warning civilians not to enter. No civilian had been in the Black Zone in almost a year and had no idea what conditions existed there. Committee of 1-rational Lfberation officials said the area had been mined for many months and was said to be the most heavily mined area in all of Italjr. "5. It was decided to keep the evacuated zone free of civilians until such time as military A.uthorities permit reoccupatfon, but that the name "Black Zone" was not to be applied. Although retreating Germ,<>ns had taken down the warning signs in the hopes that Allies ~~uld disregard the blockades and enter the mined areas, Committee of National Liberati.o n men had printed posters in English and Italian which they had affixed around the perimeter of the zone. They had also prepared an extensive map of mined areas. "6. The majority of civilians thrown out of their homes by the Germans had fled to the Provinces of Pisa and Lucca, and it was thought probftble that they would attempt to move back into the city, thus creating a serious traffic and refugee problem. Consequently, AMG officers dn-ected the Carabinieri into the city to prevent the return of the tovmspeople until such time as permission should be extended by military authorities. The Committee of National Liberation volunteered to send messengers to nearby communities to advise Livorese to remain in their temporary quc'lrters until they should be allowed to return, and posters were put up forbidding the return of civilian f11milies. 7. The food situation is not acute, PS supply now exists for at least three days and 200 gre"ms per day of bread had been distributed to the remain;. ing population, so that no particular problem exists. Ration cards ere sufficient until l August 1944. Major Ka1t reported that enough grain for ten days is in the warehouses, and that a saw mill is being converted for grinding the grain into flour. The Alimentazione system of food distribution had been functioning efficiently until two days before the Allied occupation. 11 8. Greatest ANG problem discovered was the lack of water, for two of the three city aqueducts bringing water are in territory still in German hands. These two water lines are not operating, and the remai.ning acqueduct has been severely damaged. There is no acute suffering for lack of drinking water, as cisterns and wells are still supplyi.1:g the population with their minimum needs. Not enough water exists for washing and other uses, hm'Tever. The .last water Il'.ain was blown up five days ago. The city engineer of Livorno has promised an adequate supply of water from the remaining water line within several days, end MJG engineer officers Pre working with him to effect this as soon as possible. 11 "9. General health conditions are excellent, being in keeping with the minimum of good water supply. Some 450 patients are under trei:ttment in the �large Ciano Hospital which has 11 cr,pa.city of from 1500 to 2000 beds. When the Germans evacuated the city, they took much hospjtal equipment, including bedding Rnd linen, tlS well as surgim~l jnstruments, microscopes, P1edicines, etc. Chlor1.nation is planned for the cistern and well water now being used by the civilians. Uo enemy or Allied wounded were found to be jn the hospitals. 10. The city itself has suffered from shelling find bombjng, a.nd all brj_dges were mined ti.nc'i blown up before the Alljed ontry, trius hindering transportation a.s r1ell as repair of water lines, for m11ny pipe conduits were affixed to the bridges. 11 11. Fublic order was satisfactory, in spite of the fact thPt the only city police force, The Republican Gw.rd, left Livorno with the retree.ting Germans. A force or 150 AMG CArP-binieri hes been te.ken into the city by M~G. There is also an American Military unit engegecl in Military Police duties. The Civic Police Chief nnmed by the Committee of NPtional Liberation said several hundred Carabinieri were in hiding and shortly would return to their posts. They will be vetted by C. I. C. 11 12. All remaining stores Pnd shops were opened and looted by the Germans before they left the city. When the Germans had taken what they wanted, they turned the Fascists loose in the shops and took motion pictures to show how well they were treating their coll,qborators. This report was made by the Committee of l!ational Liberation. 11 13. All banks Rnd post offfoes were closed twenty days ago, and it was said that many of the funds were hidden from the GerTWns. AHG Finance Officers !118de an immediPte reconnaissance with a view to opening the benks as soon as possible. 11 "14. As most of the active Fascj sts And Fascist collPborators left the city on 20 June, only a minor political problem exists. The Committee of National Liberation recommended the keeping in office of Avv. Agus, for fourteen years a civj_l servant and Secretary General of the Commune. He is now acting as Mayor in the absence of other appointments. A committee was named prior to the Allied entry, consisting of a city engineer, publfo hoolth officer, firemen, civil works officer, etc., to assist AMG officers, and both ~ ajor Kait and Major Holmgreen have been working with them. A fine spirit of .' collaboration and assistnnce has been discovered and put to good use by Allied M ilitar~r Government. Appointments remain to be rmde of Prefect, Federale and Permanent Mayor, for all such officials left w:ith the Germns. "15. Telephones and electricity Pre not functioning, although it is believed thet the;T can be 1.n operation in several weeks. All tE'lephones were disconnected ,r,nd the apparatus removed by the Germans last fall, but noserious damage was done to the main offices. 16. The prj sonars in thP jails were removed to Fisa, thus ~ivjng no problem to AMG such as was found in }Tap lf'ls ru1d Rome where the GermAns released all civil offense prisoners to rrey on the cormnun:i.ty. 11 11 17. In sumrnar;r, the sit1mtion in Livorno is not as serious as has been found in other c1ties of similar populations. Flans arc already in oreration �to halt the possible move of refugees back to the city, and AMG officers speciaB zing in the various Public >relfare and Utilities are on the. scene to assist the city in returning to normal. "18. The representatives of the 'Patriots I and 'Partisans I are numerous and wh:..le they offer every assistAnce individually a.nd collectively, it is feared that they may Cl'l.use trouble in not being willing to surrender their arms. The;r were promised certificntes of merit ~md expressed pleRsure at this. Such documents are way ov0 rdue and hP.d not arrived by the day the city was occupied." * * * CECINA--JULY ?7, 1944--The Genernl left his villa and drove to the command post where he conferred briefly with his st~rr officers. At 1015 he drove to Vada where he conferred a War Department citation upon the 100th Battalion composed of Hawaiian-American troops of' Japanese descent and Also decorated Sergeant OhAtP of th:i s unit with the Distinguished Service Cross. In a brief speech at the cererrony, General Clark ,varned against the belief that the Germans are about to throw in their cards and cited the recent stubborn fighting as proof thAt there is still fight left in tr e Boche. General Persons accompanied General Clark to the ceremony and reme.ined there when the General returned. The Army Comman(1 er returned to his command post !'lnd spent the Afternoon in the area. Admiral 'forse, Flag Officer We .,,tern Italy, camP. to ~ee General Clarl<: and talk rnatters over with him. The remainder of the 11fternoon was spent in a series of staff oonferences. Ju"lt before dinner the Army Commander went for a short dip at the beach ..-.i_ th Colonel Saltzm~m and returned in time to have r1inner with Archbishop Spellman. Following dinner General ClPrk conferred with GenerHls GruenthAr a.nd Brann before ret 4 ring for the evening. * * * CECPJA--JULY 28, 19/+4--In tJ:,e early rert of the morning Genera.1 Clark went over thFJ prepnrations for the visit of King George VI and then went out to the RAF field near Cecina. At 1110 the King arrived by plane accmnpanied by General Alexander. A review of RAF rersonnel was held at the field and the party then proceeded down the road lined with troops to the Fifth Army cub strip and airport. Here General Clark, accompanied by the King and General Alexander, trooped the line of soldiers massed there for the occasion. At the conclusion of' the playing of The Star Spangled Banner, which marked the end of the ceremony, the party proceeded into the connnand post to the area immedfately adjoining General CJ.Ark's van. The Kini:,; then took his place in the receiving line with GenE~rals Clark B Alexander, and GenerJ:11 .nd Clark presented all of his genAral officers and section chiefs to King George. British personnel in Fifth A:rmy HeadqUBrters were also rresented to the King as well as the press. The King then :i.nvested General Clark vrj th the K.nighthood of the British Empire and Generals Gruenther and Keyes es CompPnions of the Bath. The King and Gener::i.l Clark then entered the GenerAl I s van f'or a sJ:, ort ��~ G IL ; / ~ Q; e;"" -# I ~ ; 9 ,r-~/>p,. ,,l.,.., talk and were joined by General Alexander a few minutes later. The three conversed brfofly and then came out of the wm and sat down to lunch. They were joined at lunch by Archbishop Spellwan and Generals Gruenther, Grittenberger and Keyes. After lunch the Gimeral accompanied the Kjng to his plrme and saw him of'f, returning subsequently to his comrri~nd post. He then conferred vrith General Gruenther, bade farewell to the Archbishop and then proceeded to his villa at Castiglioncello where he spent the remainder o-f' the afternoon, returning late in the even:ing to his oommand post. General Clark today received the followin~ cablo. from the King of EnglPnd: "I sincerely thank you for my enjoyable visit to your heAdqunrters todey. It was indeed ~" pleasure to me to see detachments from units which h1we so dist5nguished themselves in this theatre of war. V/ill you please convey my good wishes to all ranks under your col"'!mand. 11 * * * CECINA--JULY 29, 1944--Genera.1 Clar'\r rece:ived Mr. Schoninger, m,tional Cor:mPnder of' the VP-terans of Foreif$!1 W:--rs who conferred w;th him for three-quarters of an hour in his van. Following the dep?rture of Mr. Schoninger, GenerAl Sosnko~ski, Polish Commander-in-Chief, arrived Pccomp~nieo by Lt. Col. Szympnski, American Liaison Officer with the Polish Corps, Pnd Hajor Miszke and Lt. Lubanski. These f;Uests had lunch with General Clark. In the afternoon the Axmy Co:mrne.nder conferred with Genernls Gruenther Pnd Brann. Colonel r.~cM::,hon, classmAte of the General, called on the Army Commander in the 8-f'ternoon. Lily Pons, well known f"etropoljtan Orera artist, and her husbrmd, Orchestra Leader Andre ¥ostelanetz who ro-e m~k.ing a tour in the Fifth Army areP, called to pay their respects to the Army Commander. Generel Cl,irk received them in the hut and spoke with them at some length. Miss Ions then sang "Estrellita" for the General and his guests. The re.rty, consisting of those mentioned previously and General GruP.nther, Colonel r~cMahon, General Hume, Colonel S8ltzman, Lt. Col. Porter, Lt. Col. Clflrk, Cartain Walters and Lieutenant Berenson, then had d~nner in the General's mess hut. General Clark went for a short swim in the early evenin~ before retiring to his van for the night. General Cle..rk replied to King George's cable of yesterday as follows: "The Fifth Army jg most apprec 'aMve of tre sj gn.1-11 bonor which your Majesty bestowed upon it by visiting its command post yesterdriy. Your Mt1.jesty' s grPcious message is being colllJ'l'lunicated to all troops of the Fifth Axmy 1md will be deeply appreciated. Your f-'!ajesty may rest a.ssured that vre will neither rest nor relax in our efforts until the col"'lmon foe is decisively defeated." There has been a great deal of question as to the roqsibility and pra.cticabilit:r of the enemy's using the Tower of Pisa as an obserw:1 tion rost. Following are a few memoranda submitted to the Army CommF!nder on the subject: ��Report from General Crittenberger, IV Corps Co111mander, reads as follows: "The following facts regi:irding the report thrit the enemy has been using the Tower of Pisa as an OP are submitted for your inform11tion: 11 1. Lieutenant Colonel Long st~tes he wns J11isquoted in the •sters and Stripes•. 11 2. Observers with field glasses were seen by two officers in the tower on the Mornjng of July 25. Although a close observation has been kept on the Tower sjnce then, no further observers heve br>en seen in it, and it is considered quite po~sible thAt the observers origj_naJ.ly sighted mPy have been in civilian clothes. 11 3. A partisan yntrol last night (July '27/28) crossed the river jnto Pisa and reported only 40 to 50 Germans in that rart of town. "4. Brige.dier General Raymond E. s. Williamson, Commr-mding troops in \ south Pisa, does not believe it a.avant11geous for us to shell the Tower at tre present time. 11 5. The IV Corps Artillery Commander, Br:i. ge.d ier General W. C. Crane, investigated the observations of the 77th Artillery Group, 34th Division Artillery, 91st Division Artillery, Air OP' s and 15th Field Observation Battalion, and found from them no definite innication thrt the Tower is being used as an OP this morning. Two field artillery observers only, have within the ra st few days noten unidentifiable persons in the Tower. "6. According to General Crane, the Tower is in no ""ense an essential artillery OP, as there are !"!any points both within and without the city from which better results could be obtained. 11 7. I have been in the Pisa area every da.y for the last three days during which visits there has been no unusual hostile shelling. In ~Act, during the times I was there not n single Germfln artillery shot was heard. Although there have been three oott~lions of our infantry in the fire,,, one in the town rind the other two outside but within range of GermPn artillery, none had received concentrations at the time of my last visit. "8. The casualty report for troops in the area is as follows: Ml! 26 July 27 July 28 July KIIJ,F.D 2 0 1 WOUNDED 3 4 7 "9. This Headquarters is in close i:>nd const1mt touch with the sitw,tion:J Nothing hrts occurred so far to justify shelling the Tower of Pisa. If in my opinion, shelling the Tower subsequently becomes justified for military reasons I shall so recommend. 11 G-3 prepared the following memorandum on this same subject: �3l 11 1. On July 25, 2 Germans with binoculars were seen in the tower by 2 officers. ('T'he nt=1mes of these officers are bejng secured by IV Corps). The tower has been kept under close observation And no one has been seen in there since that time. 11 2. Col. Ladue sttites thnt IV Corps hBd instructed 34th Inf Division concerning restrictions of' firing on Lea.ning Tower of PISA. 34th Inf Division felt there was no necessity for fjre. The feeling in Task Force Williamson is thBt it is not necessary to shell PISA. Yesterday• s CflsURlties: 1 killed, 3 wounded (TFW). IV Corps does not believe there is any reason to change their policy. 11 3. Col. Ladue further stated there is no ~sis for believ~ng the toTTer if used as an observation post, would cause fire And resulting casualties any more than the use of hip;h buildings or the high terrain to the Northeast. At :rresent there hns been no lmovm casualties from fire thet could be attributed to observational control of fire from the tower. "4. The story in Stars and Stripes WAS written by an enlisted man on the staff of Stars and ctrires by the name of Al Cohen. This man writes human interest stories and jnterviews given are personel only and neither Division, Corps, nor Army have any control over them. The field censor with Stars and Stripes is final authority on what is rrinted. Col. Lang was ~isquoted by Stars and Stripes - he did not see any observers in the tower. (Written stA.tements to this effect are bejng secured by IV Corps). 11 5. Partisan parties into PISA across river think Germans heve eVRCUPted J)flrt of the town and estimate only 20 to 30 remain. Gerrmns are still to the East and West of town. 11 6. Col. Burrill 1 s report on arty reaction is being prepRred. 11 7. Reco!'lmend that any decision to shell or bomb PISA Pincl/or the tower be deferred unMl further evidence is P.Vailv.ble to ind~ c~te the military necessity for so doing. 11 A.s The report of Colonel Burrill, referred to in paragraph 6 Pbove, is quoted follows: 11 1. All the field artillery forward observers, Air OP's and TD forward elements in the IV Corps were in~tructed at 0()()0 hours, this mornjng, to observe high buildings in Pisa, especielly the Tower, with the o~ject of determining whether or not the GermHns were using them P.S observation posts. "2. At 1600 hours, today, All observers, except two, reported toot they had seen no evidence of buildings in Pisa being used as observation posts. 11 3. Two observers reported thAt they hl'ld seen unidentified people in the Tower of Pisa during the course of the day. Their rerorts a.re in no way conclusive evidence of occupation of the building as an OP by the Germrns. The detailed reports of these two observers are as follows: ~- A forward observer from the 125th FA Bn stPted th~t he sl'!,w some �movement Rt one of the win<foY'S in the Tower but could not tell whether or not they were civiliPns or military personnel. The observer was stationed At 123627 and was using field glasses. b. A forvrard observer from the 347th FA Bn, using a BC scope at a distance of-600 yards from the Tower saw unidentified people in the building between 1300 and 1400 hours. He also reported that something resembling w:ire could be seen on the outside of the Tower. 11 4. Lt. Col. Casey, Artillery Section, WEts orderAd to rroceed to the farthest forward TD OP to determine whether or not observRtion from buildings in Pisa was troubling our foremost elements. He mPnaged to contact an outrost position at C. Ghignoli BadiP at 15-6?.5. He states that there Pre two church steeples nearly as high as the To1•rer Pnd mtrny buildings in the tov,rn thr>t could be used as good OPs. He observed the buildings continuously for a reriod of four hours ;:ind could see no indication that they were being used. He stated that the troops contacted on the outpost line djd not believe that the Germ,ms were observing from the tovm but that they were utilizing the hill mflss to the northeast for obserw.tion posts. 11 5. Captain Wilson, /lrtillery Section, was sent to the outpost line and got as far north ass. Lorenzo alle Corti, about 1000 yards due east of Lt. Col. Ca.sey's position. His report is su,bstantiFilly the same as Lt. Col. Casey's. 11 6. I flew in an L-5 along the Arno River from CepronA over Iisa to the sea.. I saw no indication of any milita.ry installPtions, such as wjre, radios, observing instruments or personnel on any of the buildings. The country around Pisa is very flat and the only worthwhile observ8tion from a military view point is the hill mass northeast of the town of Pisa. 11 7. I had 11 conference with General Crnne, Artillery CoJ111nander, IV Corps. He stated that he does not believe the Germ:ins hPVe installed observation posts in Pisa but believes that they t=ire f:111 located on the hill ll'aSS northeast of the town. He :further reported that he hqs received no reports of locations of enemy guns, supplies or targets in the tovm. He further st11ted thrt he does not believe it would be worthwhile, from the inform:i.tion he now has, to f:ire on buildings in Pisa.. 11 8. The Deruty Chief of Staff, IV Corps, stated thPt both officers quoted in the Sta.rs and Stripes claim that they were misquoted by the rerorter Pnd both claim that they have no evidence to rrove thRt . the Ger!l'f?ns Pre using buildings in the town of Pisa. as observation posts. tt9. From my investigation I have arrived at the following conclusions: §.• The build:ings in the town of Pisa. vrould not be good observation posts. ]2. The Germans have not installed rermanent obserwtion posts in the town. There may be a few scattered OPs Ill8nned by Ttr>lian Fascists or German infantry units to overlook the imrnedia.te front in their vicinity. ,Q. " I �,g. Thet the main observation posts are installed on the high, 1."ooded mountain nF.Rs to the northeast. 10. Recommendations: ~• That the buildings in the tovm of Pisa be not teken under fire by our Rrtillery. ]2. That IV Corps be instructed to keep continual observ11tion on the town and immediately report any in0ication of German OP instAlletions. c. That the hill mass to the northeast o.,. the town be searched by air OP observers, Tac?R pilots and ground observers for fORsible locations of OPs. g. That if it is decided to fire artillery in Pisa, 4 t be coordinated with a heavy air bomb8rdment so that the entire tovm is leveled. If one high build 4 ng is demolished by artillery, the Gernnns h11ve Access to many others that would serve as just as good an OP. In other words, if the decision is made to knock out OPs in Pisa, the entire town would have to be leveled. 11 The Engineer report on this subject is quoted below: "In reply to your verbal reqrest, the following roints in nnd rround FISA (see ettached Maps) appear from a study of me.rs and air rhotos to be suitable O.P's, looking to the south and southwe~t for the enemy. This HeadqUPrters has no infornation on sites which are l'lctually beinp: used by the enemy. I. II. III. Q096658 •••••••••••••••••••• C1:ithedrel w:i th high dore. Q097658 •••••••••••••••••••• Museum with belfry. Q698658 •••••••••••••••••••• Leaning Tower of Fisa. These three, buildings are in an east-west line tind A.re of approxinfitely equal heights, four stories higher than any other building in PISA. There are numerous four and five story bujldings in PISA that line the north bank of the ARNO River. Buildings of equr.l hei~hts on the south bank neutralize any effective observation. IV. There fire numerous small hills in the PISANO HILLS tru:it may The best of these is rt Q208635. LA ROCCA is an old fortress on a rock ci:ir of M. VERRUCA with Pn elevation of 1824 feet." be used as O.P 1 s. * * * CECINA--JULY 30, 1944--In the mornjng General Clark conferred with various of his staff officers. At 1430 in the afternoon the General rent with General Gruenther and other of his staff officers to the speci~l concert given at Fifth Army Headquarters by Lily Pons and Andre Y:ostele.netz with the 1st Armored Division Band. After the concert, which lasted About rn hour end a half, Generals Clark and Gruenth8r "'nd Colonel SaltzM~n drove to the General's villa at Castiglioncello. GenerA.1 Lewi,., Colonel Burrill and Colonel �Q'Brien came for a swim and for dinner. After dinner Genertils Clark and Gruenther went to a dance given by the WACS at th9 Enlisted Men's Rest Camp Villa at Ca.stip;lioncello. He spoke to 1'18.ny of the WAC officers Pnd enlisted WACS , srendini:; ~bout three-qul'l.rters of an hour Pt the party. At about ten o'clock the Generr 1 returm~d to his commend post. * * * CECJNA--JULY 31, 1944--General Clark left the cormn11nd post at nine o 1 clock, accompAnied by General Lewis, arrivjn~ ~t LorenzPno cub strip at 0910 where he was met by General Rutledge. After cnni'erring briefly with Genf'.ral Rutledge, the Army Commtmder proceeded to Task Force 45 where he was oriented on the situation. He then c'lrove from Task Force 45 command post to IV Corps, arriving at 1030. The General spent about half an hour at this point conferring with General Crittenberger, IV Corps Corr,r,pnder. GenerAl Cl/'lrk then left for Task Force Raml'ly v,here he srent fifteen minutes, After '.'rbich he rroceeded to 10 AGRA in the vicinity of Cevoli. He was r.iet by Brigadier r•axwell and conferred with him for About fifteen minutes. The General drove to the IV Corps cub strip from which roint he flew to the II Corps eub strip. Generrl Cll:irk lunched at II Corps with Generel Keyes end returned to his command post by air at 1400. The General oonferred et 16o0 hours with Generals Gruenther and He.rding for about half l'l.n hour. Shortly thereafter the General went for a swim, conferring upon his return wjth Gereral Moran. Colonel St1-unps of the Milita.ry Academy at 11fest Point, Colonel McMahon and Captain Cfay, son of r::ajor General •Clay, had dinner with General ClRrk this evening. G-3 today issued PLA.N ARNO which is a camoufmge plan to conce:::il the movement of troops and to give the impression of a defensive build-up in the west rather than an offensive build-up in the east flank. The plan in full is quoted below: "1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this pl1:in js to gn.in surrrise by Fifth Army in its attack agA inst the ARlJO River line. 11 2. RBSFONSTBILITY. Within Corps zones, Corps Commanders e.re responsible for the execution of this plan. Between the Corps and Army rear boundaries Unit Connnanders are respondble within assigned areas. CamouflBge troops have been attached to Corps to give technicHl advice and assistance . Full use will be made by Corps and separate Unit Commtinders of the advice of the Army Staff. This particulrirly applies to the Army Engineer, Artillery and Signal Officers and to Camouflage and PRU experts. 3. GP.HERAL FLAN. The general plan is to gRin surprise hy concealing the transfer of units from present locations to new areas preparatory to the attack, by giving the impression of a build up of the West rather tran the East flank and by creating the impression of a defensive rather thnn an offensive attitude. 11 11 4. DETAILED 1!• Reliefs. PLA.N. �(1) Routine reliefs will continue in the same manner as now carrje d out. (2) Reliefs incident to the atteck will be executed w:ith the utmost secrecy. The following steps will be taken: (a) (b) (c) b. Reliefs will be imne at night. Ch,-'1nges in gun positions will be kept to a minimum, and when made, will be thoroughly camouflaged prior to daylight. Hormal sounds and activity will be maintained durjng reliefs. This vtill necessitate such measures as moving heavy noise making equipment while artillery concentrations are fired and Making reliefs in small j_ ncrements. r,,~ovement of Units. (1) (2) Hovements to jndicate a build up of the left flank will be made during daylip;ht. (3) c. !1ovement of troops to new areas preJ)(lratory to the attack will be made as far as possible at night without lights except lights may be used in rear of Corps light lines unless red alert blackout restrictions are in effect. Direction and other signs indicflt:ing movement and location of units will not be displa.yed. Signal Comrmmications. (1) (2) d. "'formal radio activity will be maintained in an area from which a unit has moved by leaving sufficient radio equipment and personnel to simulate routine operations. Radio silence will be I'laintained in the new location. Artillery. (1) Corps Cor.unimders will coordinate Rrtillery a.ctivity to insure th~t there is no general increase in the volume of artillery fire on Corps fronts, (except to repel a counter attack). Artillery in battle positions prior to receipt of this order w ill continue to expend a normal number of' rounds per day. (2) Division artillery not in position by 1 August will he gradually moved forward into position. (3) M ovements to new positions will be made at a.s lAte a �date as possjble. (4) (5) Registration from new bA.ttle positions will be limited to one (1) gun per battalion 11.t HS late 8 . date Rs po~sible. The remainder of the guns will not fire unless srecifically authorized by Corps Coml"nders to rerel R counterr:ittack. (6) Battalion::; now in attack positions will register one (1) gun daily starting 1 August. This will in no way restrict normal registration. (7) New gun positions and neV'r ammunition dumped in bc-1ttery rositions will be carefully camouflaged. In old positions camouflage will be left in plD ce and activity will be sjmulated. (8) Reconnaissance parties will be restricted to essential personnel. (9) e. Units now in rest areas will move directly to their firing positions. Advice and assistance in soun0-and-flash simulation at dummy positions will be obtained from the Army Engineers. Administrative Moves and Installations. (1) (2) Camouflage of dumps in, and in rear of II Corps zone, will be such as to T'laintain the same appearance as on 1 Auisust. Dumps in rea.r of IV Corps, especially along Highway 1, will be made to show a gradual build up. The advice of the ftrmy Engineer will be secured in this connection. (3) When possible, newly constructed roads to dumps, artillery pos1tions and other similar installations will be built along covered routes. (4) f~ Adminj strati ve moves which jndica.te changes in location of troops will be made at night without lights except thr..,t lights may be used in rear of Corrs light lines except during red alert. Hospitals will be displaced forward of rresent positions at the latest possible tine prior to D-day. Control of Civilians. (1) Civilians will not be allo Med to pass through our positions to the Germans. (2) Civilian movement in Corps areas will be restricted to the minimum. (3) Civilians who interfere with operations will be evacUPted. �g. General Security Measures. (1) All personnel w:i.Ll be thoroughly instructed in security measures. (2) Operational plans will not be divulged to anyone who does not need such information to carry out his assigned mission. This is espec:t ally applicable to tj_me, date and place of attack. (3) Corps Commanders will decide when units will be br1.efed on the details of the operation. h. Smoke. IV Corps will maintain a smoke screen between LEGHORN a.nd the PISANO Hill Hass to aid in creating the impression of Rctivity on the left flank and to keep observed artillery fire from IEGHORN. i. PRU. Fifth Army FRU will photograph the entire Fifth Army zone on 1 August or as soon thereafter as possible and will repeat two or three times between then and D-day. Results of interpretatton vd.11 be furnished to Corps and to the Army Engineer. The latter will then advise Corps Engineers 2nd Army units as to cnmouflage r:ieasures which should be taken to conform to this plan. j. Camouflage Projects. No major c11mouflage rrojects, other than routine maintemmce of old artillery Bnd unit positions, will be unrertaken without consulting the Army Engineer to insure that Corps plPns conform to the general Army plan. This particularly applies to the use of sreciBl dummys and of sound-and-flash simulation on a larger scale th1rn routine simulation of 11ctivity at old positions. k. Patrols. (1) Patrolling by front liw::, units will not be increr-sed. (2) Reconmdssances in force will not be undertPken without approval of this Headquarters. (3) When a unH is relieved from front line duty for movemFmt to a new location for the attack it will leave sufficient rersonnel to conduct patrolling in the old sector. 1. m. 5. Preliminary Attacks. No rreljmjnpry attac"k:s will be mrde without tipproval of this Headquarters. Present Defensive rosjtions. In order to create the impression of a defensive attitude present defensive positions will be improved by continuing digging in of weapons and preparing foxholes and laying wire and dummy mines. SUPPLIES. Additional ctimouflage materials necessary to execute this plan may be obtained from Army dumps. Requisitions for this materifl 1 will be submitted to the Army Engineer." �CECINA--AUGUST 1, 1944--At ten o'clock a decor11tion ceremony was held at the command post at which General Clark pinned the Distinguished Service Medal on General Tate and the Legion of Merit on General Brann. Three other officers were decorated with the Bronze Star and sixty six men of the 61st MP Company were awarded the Good Conduct Medal. After the decoration ceremony Generl'11 CJ.Ark received General GaT'lI1lell, Chief of Staff to General l':ilson, and oonferred with him for about an hour in his van. During the afternoon the General mrked on administrl'ltive mtters requiring his attention and later in the a.fternoon went to his bee.ch villa accompanied by Colonel Sal tzm~n And Lieutenant Berenson. The lull oontj nues along the Fifth Army sector of the front wj_th patrols from both sides µ:-ob:ng the Arno Line as wBjor elements of the Fifth Army continue to move eastward in preperation for the Arno crossing. * * * CECINA--AUGUST 2,-1944--Gencral Clark spent a quiet mornjng at his villa in Castiglioncello with Colonel Saltzman. General Bolte came for lunch and a swim. General Clark rested after lunch and in the late afternoon GenerP.1 Gruenther and his aide, Lieutenant Bajenow, Pnd two other guests came for dinner. * * * CECINA--AUGUST 3, 1944--Gereral Clark spent a quiet morning at his villa swimmin~ and reading. The General returned to his oommancl rost after lunch where he conferred with General Pritchard of the 1st Armored Division and several of his staff o.i:>ficers. At 1900 hours General Clar:k- v1ent to "Accent on Fun", a stage show starrjn~ Jack Haley ~md Mary Brfan, after which the General gave a btL:fet supper for the entertainers plus eighteen of his ste~f officers. General Clark today received the following ~ble from GenerAl Devers regarding the change in Fifth Army PRO : 11 In view of important assignment, will you pleA se order Colone 1 Clark, PRO, to report to this headquarters not lrtter than the 6th? I assurie that there is a second in command who cAn carry on for you until Grogan arrives." * * * CECINA--AUGUST 4, 1944--The General spent a quiet morning in his van conferrin~ with General Keyes, II Corps Commander, at noon and durinr, lunch. In the early arternoon General Royal, carrying~ ~essage from Assist~nt Secretary of War McCloy to General Cl~k, arrived at the command post and, together v:ith General Tate, called on General Clark. At 1600 Air Vice Marshal Dickson, Commander of the Desert Air Force, CP.me to discuss a:i.r support problems .,.ith General Clark. Shortly after the Air Vice larshal' s departure, Genernl Clark 11nd Gener1:1 l Brann went down to GenerP-1 �Clark's beach for a quick dip before dinner. General Clark had as dinner guests, in addition to the regular me:r1bers of his mess, Gener~l Brann and Lt. Col. Porter. The Army Cormnander conferred br1efly with these officers after dinner and retired to his van early in the evening. * * * CECINA--AUGUST 5, 1944--General Clark spent a large pn.rt of the day in his van working on an accumulation of papers requiring his personal handling. During the course of the day the Army Commander conferred with General Elliott, AFHQ Engineer, who was accompanied by General Bowman, Fifth Army Engineer. General Larkin, SOS NATOUSA, also called to see General Clark and discuss various supply problems with the Fifth Army Commanding General. At 1600 Generals Alexander, Hardj.ng and Lemnitzer, who were scheduled to arrive at 1530, arrived and conferred with General:3 Clark, Gruenther, Brann and Howard in the conference hut. These officers departed shortly after 1630, and the Army Commander departed immediAtely for his beach villa, accompanied by Colonel Saltzman. * * * CECINA--ATJGUST 6, 1944--General Clnrk spent the entire day at his beach villa at Castiglioncello working on papers and resting in the sun. There was little activity at the command post today, the front being relAtively quiet. AFHQ today sent the following cable to the War Department with regard to additional battle stars for the Italian campaign: Battle participation award is subject. See your W71734, 28 July 1944. This headquarters agrees on date proposed, termination of first campaign on 21 January 44, second campaign to start on 22 January. Request that later consideration be given to award of third star for servjce in Anzio beachhead where conditions were exceptionally difficult and hazardous." 11 * * CECINA--ATJGtJST 7, 1944--General Clark returned from his villa at the beach at 1100 this morning. Major General Harrison, Chief of Procurement and Distribution in the Office of the Signal Officer, Washington, D. C., called with General Moran on General Clark. Major General Rooks arrived at lunchtime and had luncheon with Generals Clark and Gruenther. After lunch General Clark conferred with General Rooks for hAlf an hour in his van. At 1530 General Leese, Eighth Army Commander, arrived and conferred with General Clark for one hour in the General's van. At 1630 Colonel Sarnoff, Signal Corps, former Presjdent of RCA, called on General Clark with General Moran and conferred for li.alf an hour with the Army Commander at which time General Clark asked Colonel Sarnoff to accompany him on an inspection tour of front line units tomorrow. �General Clark today sent the following letter to Generril Devers regard- ing the release of sw,11 unit commenders to the rress: "As I e:xpL-.,ined to you in my letter of July 20th, we have already in operation jn Fifth Army a system for the release of units And their commanders, as su,rrgested by Gimernl Marshall in his July 18th ce ble to you. Under the existin~ a.rrt=u,gement, when I determJne thf't a unit end its corn.mander should be released I obtain a clearr,nce from the AFW1 Chief Press Censor. A story of the mer:itorious actions of the selected unit and its commander is then :prepared by my PRO. A copy of the story, carryj ng an advance release date, :is sent to AF'HQ so tl,at it may be distributed to the rress representatives a.t AFHQ ancl other points in the thePter at the same time that it is given to rress representatives servjng ~t Headquarters Fifth Arny. Copies of all released mater:l i:,l 2re P-lso for"Iarded to the :· rr DepPrtj,lent througl1 AFHQ for additional use by the Bureau of Public Relntions. 1 11 Your PRO called Gruenther triis r1ornfrg and lnd:i cated that the foregoing arrengement is setisfactory to your he2dquarters. "I run having rE1ler-tse JTI,;'lterivl prepAred on three units nov· -- two regiments and a battnlion - ... which will reacri you wj_thin a few dAys. I rlan to rrn.ke a sjmilar release each week. 11 Operations Instruction 1tJl, J.ssued today, reads 1'1S follows: 11 1. ~• The mission of the AlH ed t,rmfos continues to be the destruction of the enemy armed forcf'ls jn Italy. ]?. Fifth tirny has developed the enemy rositions alonr, the ARNO River and in pr8pAratj on for the attac1r contfoues the movement and resting of its troops as outlined in O.I~ •s 2() 8nd ".JO, which instructions contjnue in effect until D-Day of tJ-,:i.s order. _g. Eighth 1\rmy cont::inues operations to secure tl,e Mgl, ~ound north and northwest of FLORSNCR and therenfter, sj multAneously '"Ti th Fifth Army's t:>ttack, to attrclr to the north and north,"est Pnd secure the h~ gh PToun<l northeAst of rRATA. 11 2.. Within jts new zone of e,ction Fif'th Prmy, on D-Day, :ria'tdng its nain effort on the ri~ht, attacks with Corps abreast, II Corps on the right, to force a. crossing of tbe ARNO River and t>r1vance to the north and northvrest. Vlithin its zone of Fl.ction II Corrs v1ill: • (1) Force a cror~sing of the J\JlNO River in the vicjnjty of J't' liTBLUPO. (2) Coordfnating jts effor-t V"ith that of 13 Corrs, capture riff. ALBA,,,JO and secure the arfm vfoinity Hill 493 (Q 4781). (3) Subsequently, be prepnree1, on Army order, to attAcY to the northwest from the FUCECCHIO - PONTE DI '".ASINO Prep and secure M. PISANO. For this oper<"tion, the 1st Armored Divj sion and the 3/~tb Infantry Division wjl1 be T'lPde avP ilable.. I ]..Hn8 will he coord j n1=1ted with IV Corps ano chenge in inter-corps boundary for such an operation will be re- �l-f{ co:mmPnded. Direct communicPtion for rlannjng rurposes is authorized between II Corrs, 1st Jsrmored 1ivision and 34th Division. (4) !hintain contact vrth enemy forces and b0 rrerrired, at any time pfter the successful completion of the M. ALBANO operation, to follow up a withdrawl action vdth all possible speed. ( 5) Protect the right flank of Fifth Army. (6) Maintain contact vrith Eie:hth Army. ]2. Within jts zone of ~ction IV Corps will: (1) In conjunction with the TI Corps foitfol attack, sirnulPte crossing of the ARNO in the t1rea FO'ITEDERA - CASCI"TA. Frotect the left flank of Fifth Arm_y. Hain't.c"l.in contact with II Co:rrs. Jaintain contAct by ratrol l'lction nnd be rrepnred, at nny time a-f'ter the in~tial attack of II Corps, to follow up any enemy TI1thdrawal with all possible speed • t=.: (2) (3) (4) .£. Army Reserve: (1) 34th Division will be att8ched to II Corrs by sepPr~te orders at the prorer tj me. : ending such orders, present instructions on coastlll :ratrol t>.nd alert of units for possible movement to IV Corps area reri!'in in effect. (2) It j_ planned to make the /~2d RCT (less AT Co) Pvailrble s to IV Corr,s when tre 1st Armored Division is withdravm. (3) 37oth RCT (92d Division) wilJ be J11Rcle avriilable to IV Corrs on arrjval in t~e Army area, estimc~ted 2bout 20 August. 4. Instructions -f'or coordint>tion of nrtillery fires will be i ·~sued sepArl9.tely. 5. Boundaries: ~• J"nter-Corrs: No change • Tentative Inter-Army - Effective D"."Day: All ··nclusive to Ei~hth Army, FnCCAS'T'RAnA - thence Route 73 to LA COLO'JNA road junction Q 706089 - thence road to COLLE DE V~L D1F:L8A - thence Route 68 to FOGGIBONSI - thence rll inclusive to Fifth Army, roe<'! junction Q 676352 - thence road to road junction Q 656380 road ,junction Q 663389 - road junction 698420 - '710456 - 680500 - crossror,cl Q 6q2528 - thence road to q 675580 - crossroad to CERBJ\IA (Q 6855q2), where roP.d junction ,vill be cormnon to bnth armies - q 7:?0630 - junction of R. rrIBRONE with R. ARNO at Q 636696 - thence R. OMBRONE to roriero (Q 6374 - thence rord to Q 570820 - thence north along 57 Easting Grid. .£2• 6. D-Day: Irepnratiohs will be oosed on 19 Aui:;ust; conf1rm..,tion leter. 11 �42 CECINA--ATTGUST 8, 1941~--General Cle.rk took off, accompPnied by Colonel Sar .. noff, at 0845 in the morninP,', proceed:1ng to II Corps, IV Corps find 91st Division. He arrived at the rr Corps strip and was rnet there by Generl'll Crittenberger. He then went to the IV Corps command fost where he conferred with General Crjttenberger who introduced sever~l of his staff members to Colonel Sarnoff. GenerRl Clark also pinned insirrnia of nmk on several IV Corps staff of'fjcers who had been recently promoted. The Army Commander then returned to the cub strip and flew to II Corps where he was met by Genernl Keyes. He conferred at II Corps with General Keyes Pno other Members of his st8ff, introducing them to Colonel Sarnoff. Then, accompanied b:r General Keyes, the pPrty drove to the 91st Division command :rost where Generr-1 Livesay introduced several members of his staff to Colonel Sarnoff. The party then returned to the II Corps cub strip from which point they took off for the Army command post at Cecjna. Immed~fltely upon his arrjval back in the commPnd post, GenerAl Clark had lunch w:ith Colonel Se,.rnoff e.nd then spent the remainder of the l'lfternoon working on important papers in his van. The General had a quiet djnner with the regulrir members of his mess :<>nd retired early to his van for the evening. The following cable was received from AFHQ yesterdPy afternoon: "Secretary of Navy Forrestal will be jn Rome tomorrovr 8 August~ Would If agreeable please a.r vise where and when he should land.u 1 ~ke to fly to you on Wednesday. �43 Genera.l Clark replied to the .ceble mentioned on the preceding page as follows today: "Delighted to see Secretary Navy Forrestal on Wednesday. If he is Able spend most of day here and visit forward elements suggest he arrive 1000 hours . I will arrange suitable itinerary. If his time is more limited sursgest he arrive 1130 hours and reID':l.in here for lunch. In either event he should le.nd on our strip which will take C-47 and is located west of highwe.y #1 and is 11 miles north of Cecina air field and 1 mile south of town of Gecina. Advise plans and number in party. 11 The Brazilian Expeditiona.ry Force has arrived in Italy and is bivouacked inlril ,. the vicinity of Civitavecchia. General Clark sent the following memortmdum to General Gruenther with raga.rd to these troops: 11 1. I have told Captain Walters to have the Division CoJY>Jrtander and RCT Commander, with two additional Brazilian officers , here for lunch on Friday. Wal ters will go in my plane and bring them here. Handling of the Briizilian Expeditionary Force is a very delicate subject and must be done right. I do not wrnt the JRC Training Team tb exercise any training control over these troops . I want Colonel O 'Br1.e_ , with a selected group of assistants , to absorb this JRC n Group and to conduct the necessary training. I do not want all the inspection team to come from the 34th Infantry Division but to be made up of exceptionally well qualified and selected officers from all our j_nfantry divisions. 11 2. As soon Training Group to ing and readiness spection, we will as the RCT has received its equipment, I want the F'ifth Army conduct a thorough inspection to determine the state of trPinfor combat of this RCT. Based upon the results of this inthen prepare our nroper training program. 11 3. Please expedite the setting up of this inspection group in order that I can explain it fully to tte Division Commander when he comes Friday." * * * CECIN'A--AUGUST 9, 1944•-After breakfast General Clark went out to Cec1na airport to meet the Secretary of the Pavy, Mr . Forrestal. However, the Secretary landed by mistake at the command post field. The Gener~l and his Chief of Staff met the Secrete.ry here and took him immedjately to the command post area where they inspected the guard of honor and then rirocoeded to the hut v1here Generr11 Clark oriented the Secretary on pla.ns for future operatjons . The party then returned to the cub strip and took off in L-5 's ,.ma flew to IT Corps where they were net by Generflls Keyes ann Crittenberger an<'l then drove to the 91st Division where they had lunch with GenerPl Livesay. They also visited an artillery position ana then returned to the II Corps cub strip whence they took off and flew to Leghorn. At 1405 the party arrived at the cub fjel~ three miles north of Le~horn where the:,r were met by Generrls Tate, Hume and Rutledge, of the 45th AAA, Captain MRckenz1.~, RN, NOIC of LAg._horn, and Colonel Grogan, new Fifth Army Fublic RelaM ons r·fficer. General CJ.nrk ancl :rarty drove from the cub field to the Navy Fouse in Leghorn where they were briefed by Captnin MPckenzie and General Tate on the conci tion of tl1e rort of Leghorn from the first da.y the Allies entered the rort up to the present date, and future plRns for the . development of the rort. Captain f:Bckenzie stated tbPt by tbe 28th of August there �would be six liberty berths in the rort am'l by the 15th of September there would be twice thAt amount. Captain r1ackenzie explained the tremendous problem of clearing mines and sunken ships in order to make a che.nnel through which vessels could be brought ~nto Leghorn. Generr,:,l TPte discussed the problems of port clenr1'mce, the developr0 ent of dumps and <"erots in the Leghorn arel'l and i:;enerally brfofed General Cll'lrk and the Secretary on the -rroblems with regi3rd to the re storr,tion of light, water, telephone in the city proper. After this fifteen m-inute briefing Generrl Clark, with Secretar;,r Forrestal, CEptain Mackenzie and General Tate 1n one jeep, followed by rort offjcials and staff o"ficers, thoroug},ly inspected tre rort. The part~r stopped at several Britj sh anti-a:ircr2ft b2.tterfos in the rort area, and Gener,:,l Clar}- introduced the Secretary to the commAnding officers. i:.:nroute between the old port of Leghorn ['nd the new, o matter of two miles, a company of the 100th Infantry wr>s forned, and Generr-1 Clnrk rmcl the Secretary reviewed t},e troops ancl :interviewed several of the soldiers who had been decorated. The Generr-1 introduced Secretary Forrestal to the Commanding Officer of the 100th In:f'entry nnd th,·m rroceecled on to insrect the new port of LAghorn. After completing the 1nspection of the port of Le.c;horn, General Rutledge joined the party, rmd they all returned to Leghorn. Genere1 Clark's pnrty cont 4 nued on to the 4Sth AAA ~dtuated on high ground overlooking the frno VaJ ley - fifteen miles from Leghorn. Gener:.:, 1 Rutledge 'i.ntrorluced Secretary Forrestal and General Clark to several of his staff of'ficers and briefed Gw1er~l ClHrk's rarty on the current situetion explaining tbe problems of conversion of artillery troops for use as infantry troops. General Clark ex_rl::dned to Secretary Forrestel his reasons for pu.ttirig AA outfits in the line at this time in order to relieve bis well-deserving infantry di,risions so th::.t they could rest. Aft0r the briefin~ General Clark and Secr, -tary Forrestal returm"d to the cub strip two miles north of Leghorn where they took off for the Fifth Army command post. 0 Upon arrival at the command post, General Clark, Mr. ForrPstal, Captain Roper and stof'f officers went for a swim .. The Genernl entertnined the pa.rty for dinner and conferred after dinner wjt,h the Secretary for an hour before· ret:ir:ing. * * * CECINA--AUGUST 10, 1944--General Ch.rk had breakfast with Secretar;v Forrestal, CA,ptain Roper nnd his staff of'ficers. Due to brd flying weather, Secretary F'orrestal, i"Tho vras due to leave at 0930, could not te1<e off and so General Clark su,,,.gested thHt he visit the 8th Bwcuation Hosp5to.l. The Secretary vfoj_ted this unit with Colonel Bruce and "lCS met by Gener~tl Clark at 12 noon upon hh return to the coilll"!and post. General Le:rnnitzer l'l.rrived at 1200 and lunched with Generril Clark, Secretary 'F'orrestal and others at the comrriand post. After lunch Generrl Ch.rk escorted the Secretary to the airport nnd bade him farev.rell. At 1420 the Army Co:mmander, with Generals Gruenther, Lemnitzer an~ Brann, left l:i;, 1-5 for T.roC Eighth Army for a conference with Generals Alexander, Leese and Harding, returning at 1700 hours. �At lB00 hours Genernls Clerk, Gruenther and Br~nn left for General Cle.rk' s beach villri where they sw:-:im and dined, r~tiring errly in the evening. General (}ruenther submitted the follovring notes ref;r>rding the conference at Ejghth Arrriy Headqur>.rters today: "Last night General Hardini:Y, called to ~my tht1t Generr-1 Alexnnder desired to have a meet~ ng .,..j th the t rm Army Comnanders Pt the Eighth Army TAC Headqurirters at 1700 hours today. He '1tated that L.:irmitzer would be at our l·eadquarters by 9:00 o 1 cloc'k- tJ,-,is morninl! to tell Gener"l Clark of the subject to be di~cussed Pt the conference. He said trnt 1no drastjc chnnge is contemplrted; it will be chiefly a oiscussion concernjng timings 1 • "TM s rnorninp: nt 7:15 Harding called to strite t:rr-t, Gererr:il Alex.'111der now desj red thrit the reetinr.; he held at 1500 hours today, insteRd o-r the 1700-hou:r tiMe rreviou~ly arrnnged. It ,Ps r:,injng very hArd rhen he rhoned, £i.nc1 T told him that Lem should check vr 4 th us before he derrirted, because I was quite certain that our cub f'fold 1..,.ould e unserviceable until at least 10:00 o'clock. "The rain continued to fall 1.mtjl nbout 9:00 o'clock. At 8:3C' Lemnitzer I s aide called to advise that Lem had left A.AI by nuto at S: 15. He reached our headquarters at 11:45. I called Don, and the trree of us rroceeded immediritely to Gern:iral Clark's van. "Lem tol<l us t},at the rlan which Ge11eral Alexander woul<l a; scur,s at the 1500-hour conference tM s aftArnoon v:rould be nlon~ the folJ.owinf!, ljne: The Eiehth Amy attack will jump off on Aurrust 25 e.s rreviously rlanned. P.o"ever, under General A.lexander 1 s new rlan it lill ;crecede the Gttack by Fifth Army rnd 11 Corps from the FLCRF: TCE area. Furthermore, GenerD.1 Alexnnder considers that the attack towaros LUCCA is inndvisPble. G0nerPl Clrrk should be r,reprrE!d to recommend the direction of' ::ittack by F:i!'th 1 rmy northward from tl-ie F IST0TA area, or -"rom the TRATA - FL0RE~rcE rirer-. "This concept :ls an 1-mtirely new one ::.n tvro ir.:rortrmt asrects: First, it clwnr,-es radically tJ->e timin,t; and secondly, it chnn~es the objectives preYiously rrescrj bed for t 1 e Fifth Arrriy. The Secretf'xy of the Favy, lr. Forrestal, ws a r;1-1est oP Ge 1erE1.l Ch.rk 1 s Tihen Lem r-rrived. revertheless, General Clarl{ studied the plan PS tr0roughly as possible, under the circUJTIstances, and left by cub rl~.ne -ror the conference shortly after 2 :00 o I clock. He ms accompanied by Brann, Gruenther and Lermitzer. 1 "We arr-'ived at Genercl Leese's TAC Hea0quarters rromrtly at 3:00 o'clock. (}eneral Leese f;I'eAted General Chrk with the '"'tn.te,.,,ent: 'I am r;bd to see you, Clark. I thought it would be nice if e hnd our meeting in the dell'. Vle foi.md thPt the conference lmd been (lrrr-nged in n very pleasant grove. rresent were: General Alexanc1 er, GererPl Clnrk, Gener(ll Leese, Ge"1er11l Harding, General Lemnitzer, General Gruenther, General I3r nn and L:'eutenant Colonel Kent. General Ale:iroJ'1det opened the :rr0eting with the following surn\ mary: 1 You fire aware of the change in plans wl1ich occurred sever11l days ago whereby the Main attack of the Allied Armies in ItA.ly was shifted to the Adr·iatic coast. I am quite satisfied thPt this is the correct solution. At ) / �4c, the same time jt was dec:i ded thrt Fil"th Army should EJ.ttack to gain the FISTOIA area, and the LUCCA area. Upon further consideration I have decided that the atta.ck to gain the LUCCA area is an error, in that it will dissipate the already reduced resources of the Fifth Army. I have also come to the conclusion that the attack by the II Corps U.S. and the 13 Corps British, as now planned, will be launched Pg8 inst a very strong Germa.n posj_tion,. and that it has little chance of success with the German strengtb disposed as it is nt this time. I believe thrt a better plan is +>or the "Sighth Army IM' in attack on the ADRIATIC Coast to rrecE!<l2. the attack by the Fifth Army and the n Corps in the cent.er. Jt is my idea thnt the ~ighth Army mair:i attack should be launched on August 25 as rreviously planned. The.n the attack in the center by Fifth Army and by 13 Corps should be launched on my order rt a later date - say about September 1st - when the enemy has reduced his strength in the center . In that way we would have a boxer's 'one-two runch'. The direction which the 2ttack by Fifth Arm;iT a.nd 13 Corps shoulr! t,a.ke is a matter for later dj_scussion. I should now like to inquire of the Fifth Army Commander whether he agrees in prindple to my ne\7 plan' • · "General Clark repl:ied: 'General Alexander, I think thnt your change in plans with respect to the timing of the two attacks is sound. If we do not take the PISANO Hill Nhss it will mean that the Fffth Army will have a very long and somewhat exposed f'lrmk alone>' the ARNO River. Hov:ever, I am quite willing to accept that responsj bility. I believe thrt we will be able to hold that front derensively., As to the direction ·in which the attr-ck by the Fifth Army and 13 Corps should be made, I feel that it is essential that the t,zo attacks should be launched as one combined effort. If we attack northwest or northeast from PISTOIA, flnd the 11 Corps attPck nortJ, from F;LORBNCE or FR.A.TA, vre will be separated by a considerable d~ stance, and our .i o:l nt effort will not be mP.de in tr,e nost decisive mirnner. It f'urthermore seems to me that the two forces should be under single opera-tional control. In that way, and in that wtiy only, can '"e strike an effective blow. I believe that the direction of 2ttack should be in the direction FLOR.F.NCE - BOLOGNA. 1 "General Clark further sfoted thnt the increased length of flank under such a plan would rrobably necessitate the use of an additfonal British division along the ARNO in order to rrotect the left flank of the Fifth Army. "General Leese stated that he agreed completely with General Clark; that if Grmeral Clark would only indicate the sector along the ARNO to be held b:r British troops, he would make every effort to make them avr-d lable for that purpose. He furthermore stt1ted thnt he planned to make GenerF>l HcCreery a provisional group commander commandinp the 13 and 10 Corps; tht:1t General HcCreery would be on the same level with General ClFtrk, and that C,ew'!ral Kirkman would 1-ie on a level with General Keyes. Under thf't plan General Clark would deal with General McC:reery as regr-:rds the operations by the 13 Corps. There ITould be ve1~;.,r little need for General Clark to confer 'lldth General 1'"ese, who would have his heA.dquA.rters on the ADRil\TIC side . While General Leese pledged complete coorer~.tj on on severe 1 roints during his talk, he was very ca.reful to avoid any reference to the rlac:L-1.g of Britfah trooyis under Fifth Army command. �"General Clark stA.ted th·t this arrangement would involve many complications; thnt the opnr8tion by thP- II and 13 Corrs wr>.s one wrich must be controlled by one commander. The nrrnngement wherehy General r 1cCreery would be on hand to represent General Leese would at best be compara½le to a 1 half interest in a wife'. General Leese repljnd that h~ understood Generrl Clark's/ point-of-view, and that from a strictly nilitary considerPtion it wrs probably\ correct that the 13 Corps should pa. '3S to tl~P. control of Fifth Army. Hmrever, \ Eighth Army had been split on sever.til occasions, and it was only ,Iith the greatest difficulty Uat General Leese had been able to rebuild a real "'ighth 1 Army esprit. To spl:i.t the Army again at tr-is time vrould undo a grer->t deal of \ the riard vork trrt hRd been spent in welding the Army into a unified group. / He believed that the snmc :i:ractfoal effect could be obtained under the pll:"n ( whicJ,, he a<1voc11ted. He stated that Genernl Clrirk would always be considered \ as the predominant p:1rtner of thE> center force, and thn.t General r,1ccreery would be expected to follow General Clrrk I s "1ishes. He stated thnt instead of considering it ns a case comrnrablf! to havjng a 1 half interest in a wife', he felt that Generel Clark would have at least 1an 85~ interest in the wife. 1 "Gener8l I.eese 1 s fiMl plea was that it was quite i9)ortant that he 'control the ultimate destinies of the d-ivisions of the 'i!ighth A:rrn.y 1 • "General Alexanr'er stated thnt he understoo<l the two points-of-view; trrit it was extremely important tJ,,..,t the matter he dj scussed +"r;,nkly "'ithout either inferiority or superiorit:,, comrlexes, rnc completely •ithout recrimiw,tions. He said that he would tf'lke the r,atter under a<lvj sement and would give a decision on the follo7inr, day. The situation apreAred to him that on the one htmd we hnd a case of cold logical military reasoning, balRnced a~:=d nst a strong psycholop;icnl sentimental vriluf!, which could not be neglected. / I ":::1urjng most of the Leese-Clnr'k-Alexander discussion Gcnerr,l Leese was ly:i ng on the gr01md stretched full length d th his Fms e kimbo behind his head, facing General Clerk and Gener~l Alexander. General Cu,rk mDde his final point by stating: 'General Ale:,mrrler, you have heard my argurrient; you have heard General Leese's. It is a mfltter of considerabl,.., enbarrassment for me to suggest tJ,,at a British corps should rass to commPnd of Fifth Army. I make this recommendation only because it is my sincere belief that it is the onl:,r loP,'ical and correct decision in tr is situn.tion. I shall say no more A.bout it; the decision is yours. I shall cheerfully abide hy any decision which you reach. 1 "Genernl Leese replied: 'I run inclined to believe you ere right. I em ( willing to pass the 13 Corps to your comnand. However, I would like to think \ the matter over for a few hours and let Gener,11 Alexander hwe my recoJ11II1endation in the morning. "General Alexander agreed the.t the delay "rould be sat:i sfactory. "Casual conversation tren took place, during rrich General Leese and Lieutenant Colonel Kent withdrew from the conference. They returned a few minutes later, and General T..,eese Announced: 11 heve decided that for the be:::;t interests of all concerned the 13 Corps should rass to control of the Fifth Army. I am therefore will:inr, that the decjsion should be 1T1nde nov.r, e.nd I reco~mend that 13 Corps pa·~s to Generel ClB.rk's cornnE.nd for tris or,er"'.tion. 1 �"General Alexander r-nnounced thf't sh1ce Pn rgreement hrd been reached on this point, such would be the decision. "General v~ese stnted thnt he desired to have a clenr und-erstPnding that the 13 Corps would revArt to ~iv,hth Army control RS soon as the BOLOGNA area had been reached. GenerPl Clro-k ar1 swered thnt this was entirely jn accord with M.s underst11nc'1fog, and thet he h11d no desire to ret~in control of' the 1_1 Corps indefinitely. Generel Ale:xancler strteil. thrt this rlso was M.s under::,t, nding. "General Alexander rinnounced thn.t 13 Corps would rs ss irnriediately to control of Fifth Army f'or planning rurposes; trat tJ-,e dnte when it would pass completely to Fifth Army control would be 0ecided lDter, but that it would probably be between August 15 and August 18. General Clark had rreviously mentfoned a serious ndministrative difficulty which would confront the Fif'th Army in the new rlt"n of attack in that the rort of L"'"':GH0RN would probably not be operrtive, nor would J-fir,hway 67 be useable. In that event supplies would have to continue to oo received tr-rough the port of PIOMBINO. As the a.ttac1'" yiroceeded over the AFI'E TINF.S this arrengement "OUld involve rn extremely long line of communications, 1hich would rrobcbly requ:ire more trucki:- than those nm-" avnilable to Fifth Army. Pe estimPted that he rrould probably need rbout 200 trucks, and that he saw very little hope of being able to rDise those from Fifth Army sources. GenerPl Alem:inder asked General Hrirding to examine this matter 'lith a view to determining vrhat trucks could be made available for the Fifth Army from British resources • . "General Alexander stated that tre qw:!stion of ooundary between the Fifth vnr'l Eighth Armies should be discussed mutue lly bet'\':een the two Army Commrnders. In case of cHsagreement he would make the decision. 11 Tea vras then served and the meeting rdjou:rned at 1635. "It was my impression that the meeting was A most successful one. Gfmeral Clark h"ndled his case very E>droitly and rresented his argur'1ents in an extremely logical mmner. ,..,hey ··ere "irrefutable. On the other hand, it was quite clear to ne thnt Genernl Leese was T:"'ost cooperative i.n his approach to t1 8 rroblem. He ree.Hzed early that his PrP,Ument was largely sentinenta.l. Fe readily receded from his roc:ition and rledp;ed Generrl Clnrk 100'~ support. As e were ~bout to leave, GenAral ClrrJ.r \''armly thE>nl{ed Gen'3rRl ,eese for hi.s unselfish arpror-c}, to the •roblern. 7 "From this conference there developed a rlFin whicb is fnr more e-"fective t}wn tJ-,e one which hP..d yreviously been decidl'ld upon. The ir; clisadvanta~e in the new plan is the delay. It is too early to ewlmte the advantage 1·1h:i..ch the German will be able to take of that relay." The following ceble was received today from .A.AI Headqurirters~ 1. Confirmjng decisions ~iven v"lrbally b;,r the CrlC tod"'~~ 13 Corps will come 1mder cori.m~,nd Fifth Arny for rlanning 'urroses VlEF 11 AuF:Ust r>nd will rass to comn:and Fifth A:rrny for orerritionfll [n1d FB-i.ntenr,nce :rurposcs between 15 :-ind 1~ Auo;ust rt -i tine to he r1 ecided by rrutur'l f'rrangnment betv1een the ~ Armies. Instructions r~gard:in~ the administrr>tion of 11 Gorps 11 I I I I I �1 when lt passes to orerotionri 1 corrm1"nd of I<'ifth Arny wi:J-1 be issued by CAO later. 11 2. The Inter Army Bound:,ry suggested by this Hq to come into effect ,hen 13 Corps pqsses to operational command Pif th Army is the R 05 Easting Grid 'forth of the r;o North;n~ Grid. Ar1'1ies will s:ign~l tl1eir agreement or comment. 'J'he J ater Army Boundary in ReRr of the BRttle Fr01,t will be settlec1 by direct a; scussion bAtween Arm:i es onc'l rerorted to tr is Headqur.rters." * * * CECINA.--AUGUST 11, 1g44--Genernl Clark returned to his commrnd rost this morning et 1000 hours. He o~fici? lly r.,-eeted Colonel Grognn as his new Fubli c Relations Officer nnd spoke to several of his ste ff officers j n his van. At 1210 Genernl Pascarenras de Poraes, Generr>l Zenobio da Costa, Colonel Limn Brayner and Lt. Col. Freitas of the Brazilian Exped:itfonrr:r ::.-'orce :,rrived rnd were received hr Gen~ral Clnrk with a , 1ard of 1'onor, ofter which they rroceeded to the hut where Gener. 1 Clark oriented them on th~ situt'tion and pres,=mted Vl'lrious mmnbers of his staff and chiefs of section. Following this orientation, Gener:1.l CJ.ark- e-ritortr>.ined the :3:razilian offic( rs l'!t llL'1Ch together with G0nerol C'rruenther, Genert>l Br?nn, Colonel 3nltzr-m.n nnrl Colonel ~TcVa.hon. Captain Wn lters acted ns interpreter. After lunch the Brazilians visitnd the G-2, G-~ and G-4 Sections, af'ter w1 ich thAy took their lea.ve of Gen,cirr-1 Clnr1r anr1 returned to their crunr at Tr.rquinfo. :iJi1r..,ng t .e conversation Ge"eral Clarlr sfoted t}· at he woulr1 do ev.<rr;rtli-1 nr, possible to speA<l the Rrt'.zili::>ns I entry into trie line. "'he~~ replied t:rrt thA~y were ri0st rnxious to get · nto combat as soon t" s rossiLle. GenPro 1 Cl:lr r strited thc,t if th~ war looked as th0ui:;J it rere .., 1xrnt t0 "'nc'l, he :vould sAnci ht' ck sorne trucl{s r-.nd brlnp; up tlie Drazilfrns so tlif't they could r.i;et ~nto t e fiP,"ht before it w?s \ over. ,,,he nr[l zilit1ns inforl'lm, Ge11<:rr 1 Clf'r-1<" trat they exrectec Generr 1 Dutrr, the 11raz11 bn Var r.1in~ ster, tn visit tl· em i.n the ner-.r future. They st:- ted 1_ they •rere very satisfied wi tr tre Wf';r tr e:r vere receiving tJ-,eir equirment and hoped to 8Ve n 7_1 of' it b•r the e:':1d of t1 e coming week. They e.::pressed sr:>tisf8 ct ion at the va-:,r they },~a been treated f.lnc1 spoke wrrrtl.y of t, e genert1.l admiration i.n Brazil of Genernl Cl;,rk. 0 Gemirals Keyes r-.1,rJ Crittenberger arrived r>nd conferred witl1 G'"lrer~l Cbr1, "'or an hour. The Generf'l srent the rest of the afternoon in his van and d-tned with General Gruenther. General Clark to<l."'~Y received the f'o llovring letter from GeYJ.eral Kirhnnn, General rfficer Commanding British 13 Corps: "I saw General Alexcndr➔r today :>nd he and Generrl Loese told re of tl-ie new rl.nns end t1-H1t '.:r Corps •·,as shortly to cone under your coTnT"n.nd. I look fori•m.rd wlth confidence to t! 1 :t.s arrangement o..nd telcorne the oprortunity of fh;ht:ing in close cooperation v:ith your gallant troors. "'J'houi:;h stiD f\t the r:1omer1 t tec},nically under Ej vhth Army, I f'.m of , course entirely .?t your disrosal from now onwarns f'or plflnnh1e; rurposes. �5D Though I am tellinP: the senior members of my stPff and r.w Divisional Conmander s of the new arrangements , I am issuing orders thr>t for the rresent no one else is to l·no'1; I think you will agree th~t it '"ould compromise securit y j_f it was to get about that we were cominis under your commend, as it "rould be an indication to the enemy th1,t the main effort of Eightr .Arr~y was t o be made elsewhere." * * * CECINA.--AUGUST 1 2 , 19/44- -At 0900 General Clark conferred with Generals Gruenther and Brann, studyipr~ or0rn.tional rriaps in front of Gen0ral Clark ' s van, for approxirratel y an hour ., At ten o 1 clock Genern.l Sulliv:m, with GenerPl Ramsay, 11.FHQ and r,rt1.TOUSA 111JwrterrnAster, called on Grmerel Clnrk. Lt. Col. Newton calJ.Pd to say s:i;oodbye to General Cl;c:,rk and vra.s rresented with the Le gion of Merit . General ClBrk also conferred vd.th severe.l ether of l,is staff of'ficers , including Colonel McClain, new Fifth Army Judge Ac~vocate, and Colonel Ryan, Fj fth Army Chaplain.. At 1215 Genernl F:i.rkman, C'·OC 13 Britjsh Corps , i:-,rrived f!ccompr-mied by Brigadiers L"'mbert, Roe , ·7111.tle;r and 1.nJJdey, his G- Ors , QM, Engineer rrnd Sii:p1Pl Officers rospect:i vely. General CL.,rl<: gr-eetea GenerP 1 Yirkman nnd Brigndier ' Lt>mbert end took the~ to his van with General Gruenther whPre they conferred studying operational mars for half an hou-r . After this co,nfer,,nce , Generel Clark escorted General n.rkmr 11 a.nd his . staff to a gua.r,1 of honor for the Brj_ tfah visitors . After tbe f,'Uard of honor General Clark entertained at lunch these British offie er s , several rnembers of ris staff and Gener~ 1 Lemnit zer , who had just arrived at the command rost . General Kirkm..'1.n and st2Sf left at 1445, after which Genernl Clerk rnd Colonel Saltzman left for Gerieral C1Prk 1 s villa at CAstiglioncello . General Clarlc had Genernls Hume, Gruenther, Sullivan Pnd Colonel Saltzne.n for a swim and riupper . General Clark srent the night at the vj_lla . Genere.1 Clark today received the following letter from General Leese : 11 You asked me to ,..,,rite you a short note on the state of tl:e divisions that come to you in 13 CorrJs . n HO 13 CORPS Is an extrernely ef'ficient Corps in every wB.y. General Kirkman is an excellent Corps CoI'lmander; M.s h.,., c kground mil ite.ry 1<novrledge is of a hi':';h order . Fe plans well e.nd his tactic....., 1 ht:',ncling of formations in the field is excellent . mhe dj_visions✓ work ,extremely harmoniously in the Corps . I rove been extremely satisf'ied with 13 Corps as a 1diole throughout the operc.tions . They have borne the brunt of the f'ightjng . 11 6 S. AFHJGA r,J J\Rf~011RED DJV Joined the Bip;hth Army Pt the beginnin? of J1me , a newly f'orried division . It hns fought mflgnificently throup;hout the entire ndvr>nce from ROlE to FLORB?JCE . It has had some 2 , 500 casuelties, including the crisualties (some 700) in the � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, July 1-August 11, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from July 1-August 11, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1637 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/6b8209d3e75dd83037250ca7ccd8c173.pdf?Expires=1787184000&Signature=WOvPBK7r8rmvUu5wed2T8mp3fba2s3Tnp0VS87SEtzRZSIYiQrbXUZJgbdhskK3e4jTAMFeMuwu7dhnYMMHy3LuSK%7E0qPx49UO%7Erm0FpCbaVF65pr7mdr276z8Cl%7ErNcFF2%7EZdILSJtdQsztnUQbd7WgCPW5doj57qWqPxiNkgmziJQCRH6ODpq2Ya3SKjW72pu9f53n0TUiytMt8db8j2uTguRPrSXqADRfuGepyj2vHopudIjvxY%7E1%7EYJhliZMqmai7ZuDszOr6c2wpL7xZXvFRljYXaau%7EiidL-5G-Noyq0ZPn1MGtTHT7Fjpw3ug38FGsrWET1ncN3vbhrgrqg__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM e471d6d541fdedebba7141f82204a9ce PDF Text Text 50 post of Generi=tl Lucas . General Clri:'.'k conferr9d with the VI Corps ConnP.nder Pnd ~rged upon him the necessity of .sn ir,1mediate attP ck which he fixed for Sux1dny morning. He pointed out to Gc:merrl Lucas the fPct thPt full ridv2ntage of the landing could only be tAken by bold Pnrl aggres"1ive action,ay,rl thPt delAy now •rould only perr'lit the enemy to build up forces orrosite the Fifth Army amphibious force . 0 Following this conference GenerPl Clr,r1c re-ernbPrkAd rnrl returned to the Volturno mout h, transferrinsi; to storn boat and crir successively Hnd reaching h·is comnHnct post ~,et from sprry anc1 waves v1hich he.d been shipped in the storm boats . Today the N 1 v;cmce party for Gen0rn 1 012 rk I s personal section at the TP c tical GP a.t the new beachhead was embarked . This consisted of Sgt . Don, CpL Shusteric and Cpl. Yermolovich, with the General I s jeep, on MP ;jeep, a second living van and the radio jeep with two operators . S MP 1 s were also taken along as a personal guard for the Gener81. This p8rty accompanied a group of officers and men selected frol'1 each section in the 1-TeadquJJrters necessary to the operPtion of a small Tecticn,l Conmnnd Fost . GenerPl Clrrk plA.ns to divide his time between the regular command po,;t end the be2 chhead comwnd post. At General Clark ' s direction ris conmancJ rost ras moved todriy from the palace gro1Jnds at Caserta to n hillside Just south of Presenzano-., The r,1oving W,9S done in the absence of GenerPl Cl'="rl~ on his trip to Anz:i.o , a,1;d was largely completed by the time he returnecl . I 'T'he following important messRges were received anr1 dispatched today: For Lucas fron Gruenther . RN 2005 . "CIFC, T'!F'.D believes coordination be tween Arm.~r and 1\dmiral 10,n·y not close enough . :sspeciall;f as regerds 2bility to receive shiDping . See Lowry and 8dVise . u From Lucas to Clark. RN 72 . 11 Recent inform<>tion incHc~tes 45th Division enroute . In accordance with my messe,ge 60 , will start corps attack tomorrow . 11 From Lucas to Gruenther . rJRN . "Armored counterettack force from 1st Arrnorecl Division now available . Consists of 2 br.ttali.ons tanks , one bPtt a l ion of 0rtlllery, one battnlion of infrintry. 11 Gener2l Clrrk today received a short note from General VJilson , Comrr;:,nrier-inChief, Allied Force Heec3']unrters , thanking him for his many courtesies during the latter's visit to Fifth Army Headqurrters rnd extending his best wishes for the present campaign. * * * FRBSE 1,TZANO--JA11JUARY 29, l 9M.1---Today General ClArk re!"la ined Pt his command post except for a short trip by jeep to hnve a discussion with GenerPl Welker, Cof'ln°nd.ing the 36th Division , concerning the pror;ress of that oj vision in its rittack. l\.t 1130 General Devers rrrived, conferred 11dth Gener11l Clark Abont t}'ie org1rnization of the ~rnerican forces in the theater Pnd about the rro1sress beiri.c; nr->.de in planning for /\. 'f\iIL rmd OVV:RLOR.D . Throughout the day the General received f'reqmmt r1 essar;es concernin~ the �.:) \ situation on the VI Corps -"'ront . In the pf'ternoon Gen0ral Clrr1 r r!et<Jrnineo th~t h':l "0" 1 ld go in the 1'1orninp; b7 plane or y lT bof"t to the Anzi.o front i_n order to 1'1A.ke sure thnt P grePt effort to push +>or,vard "es b0inr: r.arl.e by the VI Corrs . As the lrnding strip a.t Anzio wris reporterl unf1V, j_lrble , tre Gener~l deter,.,.,irv':lc to ~o by fT bort Pnd al9rted the ti"o era t sta•1dj n~ 'ri:r at Ic-;ch:i n. to be rePr'y for a trip the fol l o !'1; nr: day . DurinCl' the n;r-r-t , a st;:,ff o+>:::'icAr froT"l tb, II Corrs brought :in P mcssag8 to Gen8rnl Clnrk thn.t the 1rc" Alrreri i:in Di vision 1° 0. ,,..8., ched P roint cc 1 s~_der P bly in ar1 wince of' tln 14th D"vision on ·:its 18ft And thnt the Algeri"'n Division hrid this uncovP-red its le.,..t flnnk . It '7ould ½e nn.,bl to hold thPt position unless th0 3/_th ::-i:tvision vras rble to "dv•1 nce to r correspoYJ.ding eYte 11t. Thj_s SR."1':l 'n.f'ormr-ition had ril-ren.ry, hour0ver , hAen rn.ssed on to tb.e Arny G-3. 1 0 0 To remove th-i R thrent to t, e left fl1:nk of' tlie 3rd Alrseri, n flivision , the 1/}?nd Roginentn 1 Corr bn t 'l'ean is orrlered to r~ove "'ronnrl the b- ck of the 34th Division , pass ow~r the RP"Y"Jjrlo Bt the French br-id'"ere:=id rmr'I tPke ur 8 rosition to nrotect tl·e left flar 1~ o.,. ➔;he 17rench Pnc" fill ~n the rossjblv d.8n15erous W'P bet ,,.,een the 3rd P lp;8rir>n ;,.-,,c" t}'c, 34th 1 ivisions . BecPuse o:.' the concentration of' t r oops in f ront of Cnsaino , the l4?nd cl'ln be spi.red to alli=ivir,te tl--iis thrert and also give g-.ceater rmnchi.n1r ro,nr 011 tr8 drive towPrd Cairo 1:nd Vaunt Corna . Th9 follovrin½ if"rortant r1 essaP-es vere receivod P11d r'isp1 tched today: I'ersonPl to Clar1-c +>ron Lucas . R.J R5 . 11 All r.vnilrble L..;T 1 s unloPded by lf:~00 . Exrcict othFJr 9rrivP1s .r.-roT'l ·rarles br 0 ?00 . )T'lendid. resiilts i.n nnlo:or'ing are c'ne to nArfect c0orc'H m"tion bet·veen Army :1110 !Ta·ry. I p3rsonn lly con "'erred "'it,h Lowry v0sterdr, , and ·re £'re :!n troro 1g' nccord on R.11 c- 1,ir:;-ing detrils . F~v·1l str--"'+> .<>11d my rerrese11tati.ves nre in .,nti,.,,8.te rJaily contrct n."lcl 10r7, in close hr>rrnony 1111d close coor0ration nt '111 tir1es . 11 Pers0·111.l to L11c1>.s f'ror1 Clnrk . R'' 59ES . 11 lhve t·,m jPers f'nrl nn offjc9r mlic'1 e rnet lt-A'1Arn 1 Dev8rs r, nd Ge11ern 1 F.;,:,ker R nc" t ·ro ot:b =:r offic9rs r> t LCT A.lonps ide ½ertr in port of Anzio m~oo hours Sundriy, 30 J9nu~ry • 11 1 }ersorn~l to ~1""rk -f'rorq Lucas . nr>y . 11 ,;P,rithP.r clenr . Sef"> cr,lm. Lerdjng elements !+5th Divis'i_o~ (le3s 1'7qth Tn-"rintr,) st9rtin°, to debnr1· . Good proi:;ress in unlondh1G buU· carP·o -rrom Lib8rties duri11(1' ni~ht . ::neJ11y 9ir ti-ds !'"lor11iYlg fail8d to dam., n-e Dort . 11 Perso11Al. to Clflrk fron Lucas . R r 05 . 11 In furtr0r0nce of Corns coordinrted attn ck, 30 ,Janunr:r , O"'e aivision nttPc cs tonif~:bt to secure line of Ro"1e - Ci sternr, r11ilroad so ::i.s to n'ain roan fo:r f\9ssnr;e of Armor . ,ituntion bein~ developed on the 11est flPn 1<:: . TTarmon in:ttfotes pctjv., r~cmmnissance tHs rfternooYl north,,est of Gorrocr-ita 8601'30 . /ill rro all m t toF>o,,..rov or nt nnce j f co 1di·~io·'ls warr<Jnt . 11 1 1 fer.sonr,l to ,1cA.s "ro~ Clnrk . 'JR' . 11 Ho,e yo,1 "l0re ::-ble to jni.tirite n.r,gressive r>ct~on by 1st 11nd 1rd Divic:ions rursur-i'"t to my ·'"""'+;ructions esterr'!ny. Reports from ~rou i. 1dicrite li.ttl8 nr no rrlv!lnce . Adv'i,"'0 . "il1 see you tnmorrmr . ~T lr-iter . 11 1 �5J Jer'1onp l f'rori Lucas to Cl rk. -i:p qa . r lease 1~ef Pr my 0 5. 11 HAp;~0sc;iV9 Pction Plre11d initinted . Re f,=n •9nce yo'J.r 577 , ferso'1al f'ron Luc'l.S to ClPrlr . R'T 101. 11 2L, L~T ' s 1J.11loP.'1ed this dnte . I1Tr,v-_r re-rorts these :,re the onl y "hi_ns of' th.is t .mo in the An z i.o aren . Im-r9r2tive tl,rt the remrind.er Li.Sth Div'si~11 2nd oth9r rPrrin~ni'lP' Co"'b t troors be '"or»rrded ,Jithout r1 el.?y . Request th t ou -rush sbjf""' 0 nts -"ro,., 1 Tarln.s RTA" ,·hile ..,e, th'3r ,nd sea cnncl ~t io11.s renPin f'rivorr½le . 11 0 Ge>1rm'< l Four-e , CoT"mrndi.ria the I.II Air Support Co"""'Pnd , clisratched th3 f'ollm" :inr. cPl) 1_e to th.e Cor:..,,,, ndinn; r--"ficer , '7Qth '}roun , P'1d '1ent 0 cor,y to Grm0rPl ClArlr . 11 }leRRe co11.vey to Co~..,11.11.d ~nP" r·"f'_•cer , 9Crth Sf.lnrdron , 1--iis ilots 11"" mechrirics tr e /ln z io ~re., . Srlondid . K0ep ~ac1-i en9n, r rlrn~ sbot rin'-:-n '1f88 's the reirrf'orcerP>1t rnd ridvn.nce o" the mv conc;:r11tu1°ti_ons -f'or r,-,sul ts obtr i.ni:ic1 OV/"3l" shoot~n~ . Fifth Prry. 11 Tod.ay, i'1 rec1ronse to Fl CF1 1,l8 f'ro 111 Lt . Gen . Frrr1 :::ry•, Chief of Jtnff of tre All ied Cent ral ~edit8rrD110A.n ""'orces , G,..,'1'=Jr."1 Clr-rlr c,ent ' 1 long lettAr to Generr,l !\.le:,rnnc'ler in whi.ch 1'8 descri'bec! tlie -nifth ~r,,,,~r C'iturtion 011 n.11 f'roritri , the Pnemy situr>ti.o::i , Fi+'t h ! r ny nlnns "':or tl e f'11ture , rrobrble 3nemy int".mtio'"'3 Pnd his .,..ecomrn9ndnti.ons . * * * r 1P.'31~ T'3ll. ·JO- - TA. TTT!\.P_Y JO , 1 "4l. --~" rly in t}-,e ,..,ornirw , rs soon "S flyi11.r; WPS ,~ossil-le , Ge-nerP 1 Clr>rk sent Lt. Co l. Suth,~rlrnd by cub rl."ne ~o fhd. out tr e st:-te of the sr-,2 flt t',e r 0·1th of the Volt11rno , in or der to decide 'Jhetb3r wa'b:>r1r,,tion T:-os ros S"hle i.'1 stor;;, boPts . Tr•is report beinr; "avorRble , th8 G"'terMl rnr1ioed his t"ro T,,., 1s to '":,..,et hi.m o-F'f tJ,e T"outr o:' th," ri V9r Mt l? o I cloc 1 noon . At 0900 th0r0. :,r { ri ved V!> ior G "1.,:irfll Slo0n , Co"''nnnc'Jar o+> tJ-,9 B8th Division no"T in 'forth Afrjcp , "nd P.ric;,,.,ciier Ger.9r;:,l Kurtz (}-,j_.-, rrtillery cor-~rnr1er) . The Q,9nerql riscu-=-sed t ese o<'fic,-,rs V"'r i o' JS 1 1 nstj 0'13 co'1c8r11~ n.c; t e .>3,'th Dj vision ond jts co"'cH tion "\'T i t rGsr8 ct to e'7lr7oV'"'J.e'1t . At noo tr0 G-fm8rF1 le£'t J-ijs cnrw1."'11d rost '),r cub p l P.11.e ::i11.c" +>J.,= to r. s t Al Volt urno , ,-,}i9re he 1~nd8il. 011 . ., roFd tnct ·ms riGt by ri C"'r n find trilrrm to tl-ie r~V'3r '~i.il.e . ' TerP , r,.9~0rMl Rr"nr , r t. ~ol . Sutr9rl..,nd , r:r . ,er>cb , Sp;t s . 'I'½o'"'9" , Cb...,ney and Tfolden hr>cl "lI'9'lrl.' Mrrivor-1 •inc" ·r0re JT9rr·red to e"bqrl: . ':'he :rnrtv "e-i.t cfo=n to the :ci.ver mouth -in stor·, ho!>ts rncl T~et the I'l' 1 s Rt l "05 . 1 '"'jt},) 0 0 GenAra1 Cl:or1i: "'rriYPd ;-,t ,hzi_o Pt 1515 n.nrl Pt once weYJ.t to th,-, new }'j+'tr l1r,-.,_y 4.dvnnce Co111~ .,y'J rost , '-jc1 h:-id beGn 1ricl out th9 rrececti..n,:,; n-"t9rnoo-i. flnd in the \ 8"'rl~· -rqrt of tod1.·r i.n A. p-i:r9 ,..,,.ove. 7'1 t e rrrc1i.rd, of' t,l--o r...,1PC'3 of Jrince Bo_rP'hese ' ju ,t nortr. of Tett, 1 no . .;-Pn°r 1 r:1r-,-,l• rt 0nce '9''t to vj -;j_t Vt Corrs ·1.nd ti,en the 1st frmorer'l T:ivi.sion . •·e f'onrd t},o orro"'~tio,.., +o tr0 VI Corrs st,~oni:-rer -tl-1 an , '1d hren ~nrJic·ted ,,v ti.,,A re'"'ort~ se11t +,o . :::-osenznnc , ncd r0. f'lso fo'u1_,_ th['t tJ,13 z""•~l'1"'1 1)u-i lrl-up liad not Ci rii. 11i 3},9rl t118 .,..orC8S OTTO' ., r '": the Fi {'tr ArrriY OP the Cn.ssino {'rant ['S 1 .,~ been hope , rs thP ~e~M..., n -"orcos orr0~i"a tl-ie he:ocrhe,.,d rere lrr~el~.r -"rr~ ,..,·~or~ elsff·l--i rn . 0 0 Generrl CJ.n,~', rirnCTt"'C1 C,,hle '!°Cl0 to +,;1 e F'ift JrMV r,~ ,.:tirecVrvr 4:,h.-,t f' ""8(~1. cr 1 of'f'j C P,' ~ nitb '11.l.i'l'.';rJ"'nt nnc1 h0lr be ,e11t +,o ti10 AdV..,'1C'3 ':I 1~y .,..irst "Vr il" le tr'"'.11srort rtion . 0 �53 Cable J1006 +>roT"' Fiftt Ar-m..y CJ to CG, VI Corl s not·i f'i<>c< rll c0,.,c9r110. t'1rt the 16Sth Br'1e Gro,1.r ·ri lJ i:1ov9 to ST"C'rI.I', "''1'1 corie under co,.,,rrv:ind r/' VI C0rrs rrovisjo'1ally 011 the rii17ht 1/2 .,.,Phru~r:r. A s;-1,,,ll "nrnce :r"-rty, ~ncl1 J.di11g the Bri gacle Cor1N1'1d0r, "l.rri ves S":::Hr,.L]~ 1 r~ 31 Jan1 1Pr7. G9nArA l C:!.rirk 1 s o f' Pl. notes -"'nr toda;v "'ollow: go: ' All i_,1+>or:"'~tion ~ncic<>t0c t'-,~t tb, c,ne,..,,., is hivjnf-: ci•rr~c,11ty -ln P'"1senbli.ng forces 0'1 "'ront of' 71 Corrs. r,:;-,·c con'>~ rl0rs it o.o v~ tr 1 ·i m:•ort· nee to t'l 1~e eve,..,, Pdv-=:intr ":9 o"" tl-~ s f~ct by pres1i11r, 011r 11rlw·nce •·dth th9 utmost enerr;;7 so r,s to estroy tl e rmeri;v forcc_;s in c'letPil "'S t"l'\'l rrrive in t e 1).qttlA r-irea nnd to r.reve11.t :r---~n1 "'ro1'"1J. hold:inC' ur our r-tt11C 1'S vrith cor:irer~t:ively ,renk f'orces behinr1 Hl icb he c~n co11ceritrrt9 +>or E' r!'ljor cou'1t9r "'ttack. 1 Tith thn, rosp')ct o"' th8 b::iJ.ance of /1,5 Div . Rrrivi.nP' in the bridg9heaii sbortly, r,:;:nc C()l'nicJ.9rs sorie .,,.isks c::,n 1 trik9'7 [ r-d re s11f"F;ests thrt r.Jll ef'forts srould now be ur.::-ently Je c011centrnted on +'ull seal:: cror--:i1111-l:.ed Pttrc 1rs to cPrture C1..,Tffi'IA a"YJ.d CA~TOL ~Ql-r<; -rollo-red hy A. rpr-id nc'v"nce o'1 V"'LLSTRI. CI'TC nuld liYe G9nerrl Clrirk 1 s PpfrAciA.tion on rres8nt situ~tio11. c,·rc is c~ncArned Pt l"'.C1' o.t> up-to-c'lt:1te in+'or~~tion fron th9 hPttl9 nren esrec~::illy in r9g~r0 to tre stren1th and nrture of tre o-r:rosi.tion "nrt th9 5q,ressio11.s ,,,nr:i rlPns of Cof'1m9nder VI Cor's 'Vithout wrich ~t js dif .. ic 1lt to dfrn,ct and rlr11 o:;erPtions c'1 the r~st of the f'ro11t or to ensm~o the T'1ost ef'fective use of th.e sir f'r,rces PV'.li.lflble to surrort tre oper1.t10:1"' . 1 0 1 11 T 1 1. repliAd ['S +>oJ.10•7s: .,.,,"· f''Y '1'.I'R'.."TG';'H Al'ZIO rECT'I' . En9r•y f'orces ~n the ANZ 7 0 D.reA. Are e1 11-iw·lent to 3-rlus riivi~ior<' ,·,i..th c>bout 175 knvs . Tt is esti'11Atec1 tr"t the enemy c"n incr2~se tris "'crce by r,p:rroxinrtely thr'":e :>ck!itio'1,"'1 cliv·1 sio1.s ry 5 rebruPry. 1st Tn+'r,.:ritr,r :8iv:ision (Dr) 1rd Jn+>R.ntr~r :Division 1 Rc.nr8r 7311.s rlus SC' 0 th J'rcht Bn. 5C'/¥th Ircht ReO'irvmt 1st Armored Division (less CoTT1½nt Co1'11['ncl 170th RCT 11 B") _"b . n.y 1800 bours, 30 ,Tam1r>ry it is expected thrt ½r lnnce of 4 5th Division ,,,~11 1-iflve l0nded . VI Corr<' nill have 1t thnt tiriP the 0quiwi.lent of alr:'O ;t 11- <liv 4 sions, •·rith Pl•rroxiro'ltely ?L1-r, tnnks (150 tCJ.n 1rs ''ith 1st .'\rmored ;)ivision) . Six divisions. ('£' these all but 0118, i:,he 71st Division , CFr.. be ex- �pected to hPVP .§. . o 1"10r9 thn11 t\· o-t i_rrl c; "'tre-1.clh • TI Corns : 3/4-th Division. (short l/-1,00 in°">ntry) ,~th Division (short 3~00 inf',ntry;? regts . 141st bPdly C 1.t ur) Comb:o t Co,..,rriand "B" R11d 143rd 3rd DIA (short lC1CO in-f'pntr:r) ?.rid nn~ (short ?000 ..: nf'r -ritry) 5 Division (short 1700 i11f'nntr7) 1()()0 in-f'"ntry) 56 l1i vision (short 11.00 in:"i'ntry) "3rd Ar 1o'~ed Bri o;ade /1-f) Division (short f. "nd \Je ' Zealrmd Di visio-ri (ACFF Reserve) . ~ • .hile th9re rre flrrroxiy,,ntely ~-1/2 All -i 8d division.s orro;:}ing six e119ni;,r nivisions on +1-,..: s .,.ront , t},e AJ.li9c'I Ji ,,i_sio"ls }irve lo'"'t c011-:;:i.derPble of t 1 r:ir effectivoness beCP.llS8 o+' s'l.ort..., r,es in erso"lne 1 <1 nd b9c1,1 re of th8 long ; 0riocl of c~nti.nuous henv:~ -f'i,-.htj n~ . All inrlicPtio11s ojn.t to tre enerw 1 s .lrn to bold RC- rit "11 costs . The orip;innl est..; •·ate th,.,t h9 ·1culd weah:,11 tr,9 GAR!GLI.A 1-ro-rtAl WO front to meet the a"'lphibious lrnd..; YJP' , to ~-n 9xtent ,·,hic1-, "1r01·ld n0r,..,it t 11e n.c1vnnce o +,re t"i +'th ArrY to t 8 FR(" r•0nP A.re~ , lr 3 not y9t m"'tP''in liz9d . :rrn:rber>d , the -:me1 1w '~as dee~ c P-C1 to li.olrl t1'e G~F ,-GJ ,- no-R '\} Iff .,..ront ( s; v dj vi ,:dons) end rt the sam9 V ··e h.9 l'P- 3 rei nforc9d th9 r JZIO 1:1ren b7 ..,.- thdrn V"' ls ""ron the GAP.IGLIAIJOR } T'" a 11d U:irrhth P.rriy f'ron.ts, nnd 1:Jy r""inforc0-rmts "'rom th9 north . There h"'s bee11 nn 1in1.v0idPble delf-l~T in "'ttrc1d1'1"; the COLLI-L~ZI!\LI +'Aature C"11Sed bunf'p.vorahle we..,th'"'r rrich res,1lted in a dele;r in thA I Corrq build-up . 1 ) , ( VI Gor-ris Pttac1·s 30 ,fanunrv to c,spture 7 1~LL~rn11:-~LBfl ro-"'R/1,,;CATI. The '3rd Tnf"'ntr • Divisi.on ·,iJ.1. centure CI T~RJII/1 anr then r:idvrnce on V 'LL•;TRI. 1'1t Ir1+>r1ntry Div' sion (Br) · ill cnrture birrh ri;ronnc' 301,tJ:-,,rest o-f' GT~·rzA O nncl then ndv..,nce to ALB~~H() . 1st r.,.ored Div:i s..;_on (less Cor1br-t Comro..,nd nBtt) will ,..,.,_ss thrornrn t1'9 1st n.,.r-i_ntry Division a"ter it hrs cnrt,1r9d CAI'EOLT~O-IB r,nd vill c·,:ecute r, fl,,,nking '70V9n9nt to t1,e left of 1st Division r+,tnckino; FR!\.JC''T'J .,.ro11 the ·rest . Reqm'lsts h;:ive b?en ·mbrnitted +'or n.11 "'Vf':: Ir.bl'.) air rA"'ources 1 , �to support this att:,,ck . The "'rench Bxpedi tionrr;r Corps, 168th RCT and 142nrl RCT Pt tacked early tod8y (?9 Januflry) to cnpture tJ1e high ground north of CASSINO . fresent inclicritions 2.re thr,t the att1rnk is encountering strong resistAnce . 10 Cor:rs attac1r is in progress to extF>nd its bridgehead over tl~e lower GIIRIGLIAT'JO River and to advance north in the direction t,TJS0 1nA - .S. GIORGIA . Combat CoVir and 11 B11 is in II Corps reserve 8VAilr1 hle to cross the R/IIIDO River RS soon as the enemy position at CASSIT1TO is outf'lanked . 0 17 . C01'JCLTTSI01JS. ,2.. Although a fully coordinPted Att8ck, employimr all PVail2ble armor, and all other means, will be lrnrnched on Janur-1.ry 30th b~T the VI Corps, the strength of the enerw force in the COLLI-LAZIALI B.re11 n,-,y be such thet rrogress will 'be slow . AnticipPting the Prrival of a British 13rirsRde Group in Italy, · it is planned to re:l.nforce the 1st InfAntry Di vision (Br) ni th one British Brigade Group from the 10 Corps . If practicrible logisticP lly , one RCT (US) will also be taken -"'rom the II Corps for use as VI Corps reserve . The nrrival of these groups in the 1-:iridgehe;:id will bring the VI Corps to the maximum strength th2t can be maintained . ]2 . If the enemy is able to bring j n suffj_cient reinforcenents to rre verit the VI Corps from securing its objective, it 7il1 p:rob,::;bly be necessary to assum8 the r'efensive in the Ai,TZIO area until fl hrei:fr-trrough c:cin be effected on the GAR.:"CrLil\.FO-F~/\J IDO front . A rl.efensive line of r>ction would be indicated unless means are found to T'laintain r> lRrger force in the A~;zro area . 1 £ · The attack tc secure tbe J1igh ground north of Cl\<'.:'.'3INO njll rrobPbly req1 lire all availab19 -"'orces in the II Corrs and French Corps, with the exception of Corih"lt Connand "Bn Pnd weak elenents of the 36th Division . There •-rill be no sni table unit remrdning for furt:ber sustP ined ef'fort "Jest o.c, the RAI IDO River unless the ~nd new Zealand Division is usec1 for this :rur:rose . £1. If the ?nd 'Tew Zealand Division is used PS indicated e,boV8 H is estinnted tlint r•r1ditional troops 11:ill be needed for e:x:rloitation in the LIRI Valley and to gain contPct with the VI Corrs . ~ - The 88th In-0 antry Division "rill not be ready for conbr,t rrior to Marer, 1 , lGLi,L; • .§1 • It is r,:,conmended that the followinp; pdditional troors be rnPde able to the Commnnding General, Fif'th Arrriy , iMr,ediBtel;r: 0 vriil- (1) One British Division ·"rorn Jighth Army. 0 " rrenc h t · · · . ne ' ;1v1s1on (3) One British Brigade Group to rerlace the group to be taken fron the 10 Corps . 1 ,-., \ ?... ) ]2 . It is recomnended thPt the Bighth Army lPunch as strong an :ottAck PS �roris~ bJ.8 nt t ,3 '3r>rliest rossible clP.te in ord8r to hold trie mrizi,~um on that +'ront . 1 en8 □Y +>orce "I l8+'t +'or the Rome fro,1t wjthnut, contecti11r; Gs110r~l t.levp,1d8r i,ut J-,r,ve juc::t rFJceived word f'rom Gruenth0r to t11e effect t11...,t Alexander is tr,ri11i:i; bis best to conirl:v "it}, all o+' rw r "''1uests . 1 "I c,:ir,9 1-)•r FT bor-it to Anzio tocln7. '-1°F.d horecl to f'l;r in my C- L~7 , but due to short rrnT'TaV 011 nevr Pirfield , G8 1errils ··01re :.:inrl CP11non pc'vised "P'Pin"'t it . Tio·'"'e to bring the phne ln Tucsdr>y in order to fly br>ck. The trip here to<"ay ,ras uneventful , in P,TePt contr:ist to our hectic trip t"m 0 r.ys nl"f'o . Incide11ta1 ly, two o+> th0 five 1 1}'0 'ere \101mcled. on th· t trir <'lied of wounns . I 2!"1 cor1m1.1nic~ti nr; '1/ll'ith~ tl1A A.....,9ricr111 •·.rr;-.V"r , P-j~1i11P, ttlen the fncts in the cn..se ~.s I SPTIT theri, and StRtinR' +'ror /l lr-i:vr~r-in 1 ~ point o.C• V"erJ thrt it .ris rs '"'lagr:=>nt PD error of iu,lgrnent on th8 pirt o"' n commPncler P s I have evr-ir seen. 1 "I left th8 s0u-L}v,r:r1 frrmt i'1 " eotnte of ~ ndec' sion . It i '3 lilr0 t"o ',oxers in thA r:inr-, ½0th qbot1t to collRrse . I hrivo c01mnit,ted my lrst res9rve, r.11d I Pm s1rre tre Bocl~e hPs don-3 the srrae . I P7 o-rentlv rl 1.s1:1rroint od in Gr,nernJ Keyes ' ef'fort to coord:i.nato the ntt nck of t he 142nd C01 h.,t Ter-T11 vrith thr,t of the 3rd P.l,,.~r~"n Dhrjc;ion . For four c'ry"' no1'T, V·is rttnck ½Rs been neleved . The :'."rench ,.,re criticrl o-" the -initiritive o+' tl-ie l4?nd Co"1b'"'t TeP'1 and of the 34th Divi3ion on its sc,uth . So am I hPd intonclP.c to r9in:force success , rl"'ther th1m fn.ilure <J.nd rir, r-1 4 sarroi11ted thrit r, •1ore coord:inl."'ted Fr;:,nco-1',.r1ericr,n e "fort could not "'.fl'Te tn. 1rnn rl0ce . I vm.s rpd.te h11rsh '7 7 tb Keyes todriy P11d hope th8t H 1rill rrod11ee th8 res•ilts tl-i.Pt the Pttricl,;: "'8S rusb0d ho''le v,itb vigor toc!P..y. nr have b8en cl 4 sri-rpojnter! for several days b7 the lrc 1,;: of Pggressiveness on the rert o+' the VI Carr's, 2.lthouP"h it wo11l' h"vo >y,en VIT0"1? , 4 n .,...y opinion, .to attack to cP..r.ture 0 1 fi.nal objective oJ'l this +'ront . :::l8CO"l'1"' 1 "c'r-nce in force J.r ..,j-1:,}, tanh; slould 1-irve bee11 r:ore rio;gressivA to crrture GI ·rri,;R :Jl , nr G'\'}(LFO'~. ~l.epe::-itedly I hn.vo told Jue.rs to rush v~i:;;orously to g9t those locrl objectives . Ye hns 11ot i.11"'-lsted uron thic; rrith the Divisi.o·ri Corr-iqnflers . TTi,0 11 my arrival here -l:,oc'l"'Y, I --1As oisrp} ointed to "'~11rl th<>t nbnnt J:-,ql f o-"' our :1vribble errior o+' the lot !trJ"lored D·ivis 4 on 1 '.ld b0en cori!"·tter1 to the rrotection of the 1st Briti3h Di vj sion I s left flrn 1' . I 'I-Jone to e'·tric0te these coEnj tments in order to launch ::i. "'ull-out rrmor8rl. "'ttnck to th8 northuest f'rom CPrnpoleone to"1orrow. I v!n.s likewise distrec;sod to +'ind tb,t th8 '3rd T'ivision h':d led with tr e R"n:::;er force in jts ::ittrc1' on CI ;rn-:;n•rA . Thi, -v :=is a c"efinite error in ,jur·P'JY"ent , f0r t'he '!:?t:ngers do not hrve tre surrort '"'8"]"0"18 tr ov~rcn'"'lr; tJ--e resiGtPnC8 .;nnicrtec'!. Tlie fq_J_J_ncy of' t11i..3 co:--w•itrn,'3nt ),,:is been horne out by -1:,be 1Pc 1c of results toc1oy. I hP.Ve been ht>rsh vdth Lucns torla;", rruch to ny rei:;ret, 1---,1t in ?'1 e+'f'ort to energize him to grenter effort . 1 11 I r,_ri wr,tchinv the 1 or-;.;_<"Jtic"' l huild-ur, clo ely, 1ith thA bore tr."t r;ood •:e,-,tb,r na:r -n,,r:,~_t U'> to l"l.7 in rm oxtro stor0 o" surrlies . If I cn.n gr;t "her>d ·11t}, t•18 H"'l;ted sMprino- 11vaibble to rr.e, ·1 hor8 to bring 4 n rm f-lr"ditionPl 2t,..H:i'"P' Poree +'or .,..,eriod of ton d::1v•,, in ord0r to obtr in rlecisive results. At t}e er1r1 o+' thrit V"'lc, I cou1-d rryove it b,c,,. to +,'-Jo, otrAr front. It <>11 dep1=mds on 0 1 rr r-i."bility to ciuc;troin it v-},~le 1, 0 re . It rouc-;t be unr'erstood thrt tho port cr11acit7 h3r8 1-i_.os a def;nite cejlinP;, end ·e crn ""rintn.in 0'11,r 'lT'rrovir,,,tely "'our divis".ons . P-nv cxtn1 I im"ort for a sn{3ci~1 :,ission rmst bA wdntPinr"Jd out of surrlus store;d up dur~nr; p="riods 0 ➔1 good wer:tl:v"r. 11 a �FREs,-;,•r7,AIJO-- J:'I eITJ~'llY 31 , 1 g4L,---r:-,rly this morn-i ni:r Gc"1err J. Clrrl· .. e'lt to the 3rd Divi ion er, n):-,fo}1 is locrt8d "t Bor~o 1 "ontello on tre ror.d f'rom ·rettuno to ';isternr>. . Her8 he t8l1 red ,·fith GPn9r':l mru"'cott , Genernl fawns , Gr,n~r-il T~:--P'les :CJ,"').(1 Colo-1. 1 Dnrb ~. }fe :'.:Ol'"J.(1., to his ('lj stre'-'r,, thr>t t 10 b11ttA lions of DrrJ.:i;· 1 8 Rrngers ·:rl·ich hrrl. n+,tf'l.cl.;:ed Ci -,tern:-- vesterd:,,.y mor'1.i np; lirid been cut off an~. rnu"lt be crmsidered 8S entirely lost . Tb.e 1rd Division rerort'3cl throt it 1·ms rl()eting heav r res·:str>nce, not merely 3cntt0r~nl1' or:nosi_t~o11 . Gr·1.0r"l Clr-r1, then went to the Feadriuarters 1st .A,,.P'-0•'ed Di ric:ion 71--t-,re kl net Ge'1"'rr 1'1 Jinrrion rnd I enney. Gen'"r:il J 1cns "llso C".me to tJ, is rnreting . G0·1."r,"l I',--rron wrs rl,out to lrunch PD attPck ton11rd Str7.ione di Cai-oroleorn~ . f.f'tpr Ge'1.9rnls H"r~on ann J enn9y hf'd 11'1-ree0 betw e""1_ theriselves 0"1 certPin 1.uestio·,1S rl.eelinr:; with Generr>l µ,.,rf'on 1 s re.ssn.P"e thrru':h the l'.lri tis!l l st ,·Yvis ion, t]~':l col1.f'ert=mc"' enr1ec'l and Gen9rc- 1 Cl;:,r 1 rGt1rrn°d to >1is Corrmnnr'l Foc-t . • 0 1 0 I 1 1 1 0 Lnter in Vie r,+'ternoon G0n9rPl Clrir 1:: le'1rnnrl thrt Gen~rrl Prr~·on ½Ad ""et heavy oproc;ition ,:,11cl m['.ffT "'1nns . I'is effort wr> s U'1.S 1cc9ssful, Rncl i,., Pd withdra:rm. 1 I I "T½e situ... tion \-ii;rn ~"' -U+'fjcult . Th9 9'1.emy l'1 rolrP·'1_q bis rrP.S8'1.t f'ro:it i.n co::::rtnct n~t 11 our troo s ·":ith tre /,th Pirborne Divisi.o,... , the 1r~1 .:)ivi::;ion re~nforced r,-ir] ,. "th tre rer""rn f;.oerin:" D:ivi '4on . ':'r'1.1rs nrA A1cmint9red on all front"' . heprcl. , +'or t;e f'irst ti..,e tr~c; ,-orniyr, thrt 3rd J:iV'J..sion hr>rl em:ilo;ired -'::.wo Ranger bn.J..,talions --: n t1~0"r 2ttr,cl' r.i_.-1--,t before 7.nst on Ci-.ter'1.c . Roth o:-~ tl ese bn.ttalio:11s 'T8re "nn-:.hilated . I thin1' thP.ir pL.<>nninr; wrs frulty, altho11r,J-, Luc;cis , tru::;cott and f1r,r1Jy e.11 e~Tressf')d their op~nions t o ne thAt the plans ',.'er0 •1ell thou½ht out. To enploy li.<;ht forces in such an rttPck , in r,y orinfon , was 1msound . 3rd DiviGion attacked Ciatrirnn tJ,is ..,+'ternoon ' ithout Rir ::mp,..ort , rl.11e to brd v1en.thr:ir (Ps a1Jeged by tr·e Air Cor s) . !eather vms ,ntirely -~-vorahlo h9r9, r>nd :'.n e ,.,.,ess"W' .,..rom Gru9ntr.9r to ·e , he rerortecl m11ther cle .... r ri.t ot1·1;Jr end . f..t 190( toni,..,.it Tru,cott rnrorti'ld to ,.,.,e tl. . Pt the si.brt:i.o'1. '7f'S '"tfo':y ancl progr0ss ,...o,..t cUf'ficult PP;.' i 11,..t heavy r0sist<'nce . He told r,r:; ti,-' G morn~ '1."' t-:,...,.,,t th., +'::_O'ht-i nr: tl'e 3r :;-li vi"lion h"c1 n, 1countered ·,,,,s the -r:iost dj: .,..ic·1lt it 't d e:x:1."'91~ienced d1 1rins the rr9s,=mt wer . For tre 1rd Division to maJ·e th-is p('lr~-i ssi on ~ s i11.r'~ crtive o+> tlie rlet9rl'1in, :.ion o" the enem-r to hold . 0 1 0 Due to +.he lf't9n.8S'3 of tl10 dPte of' rttnc 1 ri]l el8rrtAl'ltS 0~ t: e 1st A.rr ored -, [' 1rl the f'n ct t',r t ·\l1ey G"1Cl"Ul1.f:.Arcc i.ne 3 in th0 I",rir o+' t ·. . ri 1st Br·• tic· h f"'v·ision, their efforts tn burst fr ::--th Pnd hrrfass the n,11.eny cid ·-iot reP.ch "'irst 0 Dj vi '3 ~ O"'.. 1::>a 3 9 • I a.ttcnrl,,rl a co11fer9rce "bcut noon i>.t 1st Ar,.,,ored D:lvision, ··,here :,ucas discuc;sed th9 situ."'tio"1 •ritl--i Ten:n--:Jy and ;·ar" en. I w.,,s 'orri"c' ever t o. enerv hu~ ld-up 011 0 1 1.r "8St "'l:i.n1• :inr1 tre odge od½9 s~tu"ti.ori in the VI Cor-::.'s on tl 5 s front . 3;;t}i ~n()'incors , rf[1r, on 1 s ~n.c>p,,rtr:~ rYJ.r1 so~·e Brit-i.sh ·rr>r3 J::olcl-i11; tre line a;<>:::"s·t, "'ti ~f resistance . T-:le'Yf'"mt--: o.t:> trc '~>5th "nrl ·n 5t½ G9rr•on '"livisi on hflve )Oen iclent:i -ri8d on t 11 :i.s ·"'ro11.t . These, with -l:,1---A Li.th f 0 rn.chute Divis::_o'1., int1.ct 0"1 t},r,t f'ro'1.t i'Y1 ic-"'te to J11e tre -r:oss:i.b~lity of a GAr,- n trrust f'':;"i.n~t tris '19Ctor. --r sucl• shoU 7 '1 occur, •;9 hrv-, li.ttlo to orrose it . Lucns jg re-ori;n~1.iz~hP' 8nd lias ,.., ,_.., cod the 157th Coribrt Te;,_m ~ n th' t , rec' . The 170th is beini:: "Ii trdr[~•m :'rorn the east f'l11nk ."nCi r,.,, 1,~c,~r'l by the 1Gth ~11C'~r1°ers. TH'3 rrill -ut the !,,5th Divjsion, l9ss 0 1e co~l-)pt ten,, i'1 Corrs reserve . 1 �11 It is ny est i , te, Pnrl I hrve "nriic· ter, to Lucn.s tJ,-,,,t ,·,hen Cistornr is reR.Ch'3d and tl'e l:1t 1riti c.ih Di vision J.:t..-,v · YJ.P: reR.cred CE1r-:ro leon8, ~nrt]r,r offensive eff'oc:t by the 'TI Corp"' is out o:f' the nivrntion -Por t'1e t2..rr0 bi=dn ,;. There r-i.~e t, 10 e-rieri.y· rlj vi .-;ions on e ·.tr "'r c;j rie cf' the road 7 ,,r c -; n~ north "'r m,, nzio . If tlLse struc 1r sir:ultn.neously t 1 1e situ, t,; on 1 10uld hCJ rlFficult . It is rw be lief th..,t ·e r,ust tpl,:e a rosition in rerd; ness, ""i.nirnizing the dcneer 0·1 the east f'1Fm 1· , enphPsizin"' it on th"o "Ost -"l..,11 1• ·rit'.1 tb, '3rd Jjvision in dertr in tJ1e Ci~tA1~r..p rrCJr ~,r r,,•"nr1 tn cou-'lter,,ttrcl.c to the 'ec;t, ·•:ttJ-· f;J,e 1st Britisl-1 11iviflion in r~e,·t11 in tl'e Cr- ,olAnne ['T'(Jf' nrepr:~e,1 tc COU'1t r'-'tt"c1· in either r1 ire ction with t},e /i,5th Divi,:;ion bss ::i. cor1rt te/lo in cor:rc.i resr,rve nell 11.orth of Anzio enr1 ·1ith rarnon just ~n th9 rear n""' the 1st British Div~sion pr"T"red <'or a li,.,,itecl o"fe'.1s;vc t !'1-1',t to r"~,orr--orjze tJ-,n oro'7y l"'nrl :in a co1 mtGrettacJr role to Aith9r fl.~nk . llSt<>r t e '1ffct Jritisr. br-'g.,.-,,'e r,;roup comes in , I rrorose to brin~ in on9 ~,or3 British br-i 2:, de ';!'our rnd :m Ji;r1 e:l"icPn. co"'!bnt tean . This ..ril1 rPke the hri ip;"hn.rc1 more secitre, altl-ioup;h ov rt1-1z its sur,nly crir,bility flnd 0;ive us a cl-:trnce for offensive Pction. 0 0 0 "The ~e;r~"Pl 'h<'S ~rrro•ri,,,ntel, "~ve d-'vi:-iors cnnf'ront-inc; us no", with c,·1other j'YJ. q-: r-11t, P";<-in~t our four . le hrv9 1.0 C'l"nce , in 1-riy op~nion., to re2ch Colli L2zi,'-'1i rire'1 Rf:;Hi'1e;t the orrositi.on "'a::sec1 jn th-t vidn"'ty. Should U~e enemy r8.:'1.ize 011r ~nr 1ili.ty to re2cr this ob,jective , Pnd ·:ith ris i:-rr,nrent c> 1)il~t:v to "10ve c1ivisio"1S f'ro11'l tJ.ie ....,ort]~ .. h never r quired , b~ r ay c'lecide tl~"t t 110 onort'mitv :is present to ri;ive tlie Alli9s R. r"lvArse. Should . e r,ovn., rnc' I an s1-tre he hns the CP"''l.b:iljt:r, t 1'!0 or t},ree r1ore divisions i'7to this ~ren , ,'e \ ·vwild h;:,ve d:t-'"ficulty r,<>j·1tri::nic1~ mi.r;;CJlves . : hr've r· sol11tio>1 ',hich I nf:ill .,..res9nt to GenAr" 1 7 ex2nc'er toriorro" t}, t 9n-,:: S[' ~es ., celn.y in fa'TVJL bec,.,use it i'"' rerfectl; 2pr"r9nt t'ht thA VI Co:r''"S TreRc1 ·1u11rt9rs My' th9 3rd P'1ri /,5tl" Divisions C"'11 not b9 evtr1crted i11 +,i.me. It brinn;s 1 1S f''lce to ""2ce FHh tre rerilization thrt '70 n"'ve n. co"!r itnent en om· hrnds ··r1Jic'1 ""ust ½e "'urrlied rnd •_p'YJ.trined throu,:,}, l 81:111S o-"' crrft :f'or sone t~"l8 mtil tr0 Cr:::-sino +'roYJ.t is built ur sufficiently to bren k t~1rourh . A better pl" n , in -,v or~ nio;1 , ~ould be to l"!ass I" 11 me"ns jn thn l'ed.itc~rn..n1;ri.11 - 11, D11 il;~ou1, n"V"'l anri Pir - "nC lr,uncl" rnother Cor:;-s rmnhibious [lttaclr of' t 10 cl-ivision.s , 1ref2rr½l, t,J~e /~t}, Tnrlif'n, or~ Britis}, div:isio11, n..nd tre 155th 11ot 1<>ter tl"Yl Ti'e1,rurr· 15th in 11n rttPck on C:.vitr-ivecch:La . It 'l01J. 7 rl 1-:ie "'racticr71y- unoprosec . I should r" 1<9 fl lrmc1 in1s on the b81lches at ei.th0r side . One clivision could hold tl e rort, wr:118 anothor noved rr~idly on Rorie to 1,J.oc1; the vri.thr1 rPwal of troor, orvosin/"1' tre VI Corns . In 1'1:V orinion it hn.s sreRt rossibilHiAs rind shou 7.d be dnne . ThA 'Javy '"Jill sr>y, 11 imro~si'Jle 11 , but :it caY\ ')e rlcn-. "n( 10 1li ';iife us F clrnce to tr['r t' 9 Q9r,nrns on t1--e Cr ssino f'::-cmt. I '1Pve iust tro'1--;ht o·r +-,ri:1 } lan and "lill ~ive it norCJ st1 1d r torri~ht , r11d if I r:nr11101'.nsurmo·ntn.ble obstPcles wil1 prese11.t it to AlexRnrler to orrow . FRir • eather ;''Ve us 0 noth9r orport11'1~t - to U'110P.C1 [' J.pr~e l'I'l0·1nt of "urrlios . e r,re i'1 .ctoorl. shRne, e-rcept f'or pr~mun5tion. 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 Perso11::>l Cl"rk to r:ruenth9r . fl.~T OQl{. 111 101"1 crn Spadgor Corr>s o+> ? Divisio·1s Cl".lrT'V' 0-1 tl--ie jmp9tU3 of /~~ roes ~l8X,"11('9r unrlPrstn.nr1 thP. no.,,ible nece sit;,r of ,ls:lvi:-: ro;,,e of trj_s force if' :;,resent 1:tt11 c1c1 "re ui1succe3sful? 11 i'erson11l Gr 1ent)1er to Cl. rk . R1J 657 . tt1Ar,,.nitzer i·1dicr1tes thf't 'l.lexa11der •1ill rrobn.bly be rl:llucta"'lt to coT 14 t rr->rt of Spac--;rir Force rs surrr;ested in ~'our �59 r~7 i·'p'essio"l is t 1r t \leYDnder visu:--lizes fl sit1rtio·, ,..,,1ereb;r Jrad½"'r Corrs rjF-;ht 1,e forcec to trih? over sector no'r occupfod by 3rd J1I>'\. and 1/,.t:t I"ivj sion . ''ill niscuss r0ints r::,isefl in :ro'n~ rries::1pa9 -1l'en Lerrinitzer cones J-,ere U is Rfternoon . Your GOJJ.. ccr10 sl5 r;},tl:r garbled but : believe 1 nnderstr>nc_ your c1e-:,ire. See rw next ""8SS"C:8 reference TndiPn Jivjr;ion f'or non p9rsonr>l flddress . 1 Frorri Fi"t:1 "..rni;,r to FFth rr-iy Pdv Cl - R'T 65? _tt}'0urth Ind1n.n Division has been ordered f'rom T~j_r,hth Army to Sradger Force . rove,.,,ent \"ill be1dn t(might . tt rersonnl Glnrlr -fron Qrmmt},er - R' 701 - 11 Ler'l Y,88 'ln"bln to throw •ouch 1:-l l"ht 011. Ale".'1nder rlrin e"'CP-,t to co..,f';,,..r ,,..eluct,.,nce to use pr rt of :;rndi:;er Corrs . In f8rsorv11· riesseg8 to I eese, l\lexP.nd r st,-,ted , 11 1 r1J:in to er-rlov Jew ?:ealancl D.;vision north of C:Rssino r1~rect8rl on /lrcGtt . LeM sq-r--:; tbere h::-s 1)een 1 no rlisc1rsion o-"' S''.Cf' a rJr>n . He bel iPves th"t Ale' rinrler his no c efiY1ite plrn but is w 1..,::ti11g d8VeloF1P.nts rn 'Till triH· to you rnc' f'l'rlger . Srrdger v-isit8d ..-,rench Corn" n.nr1 II Go,,.rs tod::i y . 'IP. sa"' Juin but 1ot Keyes . ft presfmt he ar T'9"T'"l to be coy,rluetinr- recc:--•1n1:1~<1scnce only f'nd hris o-ivon no i11,"iCPtion of' hjs in..,entions . Alexandc,r 1 s decj sio11 to gc- to /lnzio to,,i rht ''f1S n SU(1den oYJ.e , but he [l ssur"'ld 1811 ~ t /1.S notr; nr to clc vr~ t}, s lowne'1s of VI Corrs a,1 v:-,nce . }Te S" id h0 ,just wn.nted to tPl 1,,. to G nerPl ~lriri• . He l'F'Y re.-,"in rit Anzio Tuesday nig t . He js •,rina-i-no; h"'"' 1,it J unc'erstr1r1d . }le v:isited T'cCreerr this e~"ternoon. I w1s 1 11jte pess:iristic ov1c1r s;tuqtion here lrst nip½t ,,.Pter I returrn~d fro1"1 Juin Keyes conference . T feel Jetter r-bn' t ~t tonight . -,nem7 )'"S everyth"np; cornr-dtted , Pnd : bcilieve "le will tri.1'.:e CAssino . Vo '9VP..,.., no blitz is 1ndicrted . Keyes "Ji 11 p;iwi no 9S-Si~Ate . "'ine j s Febru,.,ry 6tJ- - I J-,ope . 11 0 0 * 1 RSS~F'l,A'TO-- F~B~TT~RY l , 19/)j.--G ,n~rnl J\l ,:Pnd,.r .nrriv d b;r destro.r0r pt, the con•rorinc' ro"t 11.t Anzio at about 0730 ancl cr "l Pt once to Gener,.,l Clar'k: 1 s co· r-nn'' post . '7ith hin uer"l ~e'lt"!ral }'nrding rrir1 his 1--.i1it8TY Pnd nRV/'.11 rides . Cr .n~r"l Cl,,,rk at once hr>d t:1 S"lrious cnri.versetiori. "-"Tith ,...,..,nerPl Al-:ixBndl')r rbout th"' J.-,tt ... r 1 i:- sup- rosition thrt '31-T 'G-LE hnrl not 1,,"'n e:,._'T'loit"ld n.s rnrinl'r "S icir: t h~·ve b"'!en the .f C"se . G"rJ.~rt:'l Clr-rl' noint~d ont ti--,..,t s""ri0us orrosition hAd b en m,t b·,. thn VI Con1s , r>n-1 +,hrt there '"8.S no vrlid. r;ro1ryi -"'or rli_ssqtj_;;':'Pction ,,-·th th, rrocrress \ ""ade . 'I'h"l G,..n")rr l nent on to outlin~ +'or C'r ,n,,r" 1 A1,,., ~AnJ0r tbe rro•,osed o:--erc ti.on At Civi.tn.vecc ~iP descri', ,cl in ycst"lrcl.<'Y ' s diRry. G"lnerr, l /1 lev-::md""r nnd G~neral P..,rd"-nq; ap.,..,,a,,..,d to l,e tri1·cn nooc1· by tre sur;p;"'!stio'Yl ,-ind cc,uld only state thA.t it :nres"nted 7 or-i--:;ti.c,:,-il dF'ficnlti~s . ·.ro this G~·v"r:> 1 Cl<>r 1r.: sa ~a , "C v .rco!"e tJ-, ... ! 11 P'"l fl" id trnt ,., 11 tr"t , 0,1lc' ~ n111cess"r r ,.,.011ld be for Gen,,rr 1 Alexenc'"lr to P'1"t fn,...iral Cunnjn'"'·r.,"' nnd ttrub his nose ·h11 tr,e rroposAl nntil the l'r11-1irr-il coll,:,ct'1d th, n,cessrir" crnft tc lrnd ,:it th~ ro-5.rits ~n r:pJ.estion . Th'1 results, G':)rt"'!rol Slsr'· said , wnnl.rl. ITT'~Rtl:r ,ri.hnnc"' Gn 1."';rP l ·"..l~'':Elnd ,r Is r~ru+ntion n s ". il~tary co .....,..,n.nrll')r . G"YJ.ernl Clr,...1 "'u.rt'h r srirl -t-;J-,rat r,, hed no ennc""rn ris to ·vho (' cor--,...and,d th~ or,r'-'tion or vho <;ot the cr,oit +>or it; wh~t h~ · :~bed to s"e WP.. S th, r ."''llts . "o ,,,.v,r , Qn11,-..r~l C1Pr 1". snjcl ... ;..,,...,t i.f G,..-1.r'lr,.,l ~lJ-~pnr er ·ish"d hi to t'lk"l th-is n~1 r,r0i ,ct i1e 011ld do it "rrl 1cu1 r1 sncc~ed in it . In "'nY 9V"'YJ.t , frl"n"'rRl c1...,,~,, s.'."'id 1 df'y sro·1lil. b" Febru"rv JSth "n.d ,wt lrter , "'S til'le i_3 rrecious , and t. 11'~ op,..rntio11 ~ruln b" ~ onrit"'ld b. th"t t~r r'; ~ {' s•1f'f'i_c~ "'nt ,n ,rr:y 'l re, •~isrl "V~d . l G~n rPl !le"Ca ,dP.r P'1(1 Gl')n~r"l ;r.. rdiri,-r ½otr sric'l th"l. th"'l r ,<itter v0rr '1"')rio1rnl~·. 1 7r 1 1ld hf'V to ccris5cPr �Fol,_o"".;1'10" t11-t.s tr11( , G~nf:}rr>l Cl,r1r , G"lner'1.l P.l~'rancer rind G·,nl"lrRl rrrding vi"'it~d the CF o"' VI Cor,..,•c,, '3rd D.;vi<,ion ,,,...,,~ the 1st Ar11ored Divic:ion. Th ,,'f th "ll return"ld to lllYlCt"' [: t t½, CO"''•qn,i rost . \ +'ter lw1ch G~n4'rE' 1 Cl nrlr, ; ho bnd S1lJ11"'oned .; s G-/,,7 to t 1'1" '11"J' ly-coT rl~t~a lPnr'-'1,,.,. 9+,,...ir rt r . . ttuno , -int .r"'fl. 1°:i s rl~'1e Pnd set oPf f'or 1 '""rc·ir'ni~r; , JSCorted hy f0ur Sr"tfirf'.'!s ,v'~ich ,..,,d been on t ., lrm.ding strip ""nd lrd b"'l1"'1 hci tily ordered to t,"'ke off . Thfa '111.provised escort ·ras Dl"Jcecgrir rs t " ,"'Cort -:-r"lvinusly, 1•rpnr,ed ·ritl: th"' •rI= J\ir ~urp0rt C0"1""Pnrl h-1d. f'n.:lE'!d to nrriv~ , (lll~ tot!-:~ "'urrositio'1 ('"'1 tt,.;r r~rt thPt the weath"lr 1.ade .(>lyinr; .:rrrPcticaol,~ . G.n ,rel Cl""r1r "'i"lC. r~s escort lrnd"lrl S"::r-ily £'t Parc;"'n1se ,..i~ld , ri11.c G.,n"lr,l Cl<>r1 G"mer;-,} :,~'7 7 8 '1.nd Lt . Col. 'intJ:-11•rlrnd ::, r,t,n·n"<l. to tlie co """Pnr rost jn cnh~ . I ... ,d-'..,t,ly uy;on ri8 r"lturn t1"3 G n r"'J. c1-ir;cu<1s d ,,.;th '}~r.rPl ,rU"''1+r.,r +,i-, •·ln.n ·rH-;h f'"' hrcl proroq,c_ to G,n,rP.l Al~~-ann".lr '"no. obt . . ~1,d .-,ro·• G "nrt=il Gru,ntl~ r the J~test r~rorts on tre C,ss:i.no oper"+,-tons . 0 r -rsn"1nl to l\lexanc'l"r "ro"' Clrirl:. :?.'I 1117. "}reSPF1t '"'(1 -icrot~cns .,..," -'.:.rot CasJi'10 h i··h+,s -,;_ll ,~ -;~;:-'t1T:' v~r;r soo,, . :;:+, "u,c ;1,si--;t 'l'" T"<>terfrlly ir, -ror-ul"'ti."'<"' ,T'f "'nt11••p ;- 7 "'"'8 i+' .ro11_ C0'1 1.ci ~,,,,q-i_cr-t, no r -1) ,.,,~ss'o·1 'ric1 you cont •11 1 ,t'.'.l for tJ-,"l >m1 r;- .r "'ore, . I d,-,~r, to rit:ov V1ic; "'ore~ to --1v""nce nortr·:rest i·1. +,},~ Llri V- ll~y 'l;'~'W tlie II Car:-''' to Jl'"'tect t'1~ r~ c"}-t -r:::_nnlr of tr, 0DPC1 ger Fore~ . II Corrs ·,ill rirlvsYJCC -: n th" r'~.rectior T"re 7 l4'-Ro°C'1. )~CCP <>·1d "t . C<>st ,llo "'J - I~'°'d~~0·1t ,-Rocca ;l"C'CA. . ·r 'ncl• Co:,,r, J.:;o Pdvrnce 011 ttirn Pnd t r--·1c~ on ..;o:-P . JJec-·<:.-:o- nn ':•r,d'=-~r Fore~ 3}'0'1ld ,..,, rcr·ched Ft 1d rut i.11to "f'f~ct fr'"J'A'J.i,:,t~ly 1.11 order t:1rt l'T}'rit "'Y"f' ,t'J.s t 11~r"' 78 l,..ft to Fi::'th Arc;/ s011tli')rn e.ttrlc'r sJ,-,011ld not b" lost ." 1 1 -x- * * Pr~s /'1ZA'J(~--1<"8BF.Uil.RY 2 , J_0/,4--'ft ,r t8 1-:::::i_ 1 ,.p; err' o·r 8 hervy p CCUT"UlF tio'1 o+' Fr .r •s10r'r r·-yl b:l.c"cl-i"1.0' ...,.ooc'by, to 1 "j . G~n . ro11,:; ,, is r-,turni11rt to the 'n:te<1 Str-tes rp,cl to Drii:;('l.diF-r Geri, ral ''ax ro ~" ,ro p-oin,: to join tlie 8:-'11.d 1\.ir1,orn, Division iJ'l ,n'1'1Pnc1., f}nn"'ral CJ,.,r'" l~+'t 'is ·!"'a-1 ,..,u,•~'t,rs ~.t lJ.C'() iours to ,,~nit t·,o o"' 1·.::'s Corrs Co~J1rincfors . At the II Corn:: CI, G"l"'erf'l Cl.<>rk con±:'"lrrec vritli 'rij . G...,n . Kcy~s C0'1C i·nin<:; tl • si-SUA.tion Pl0'1P' t½"' II Corr::. -"'ront, A.nr' rlrinr for tJ e i'"-~ediPte +'uture . The situFti.on is -reirly gr,od, fllthougl· tre Ger,.,,nns rre still resi-tinrr stuhhornly, r2rtic 1lPrlv 'l.rO'P1r th-· lr~y c1P-f ... nse roint of Cassino . (}rm ,rn l Clrr 1 told G"!·-1 ral Y~:ns thr>t r'~ nrofos~d to r-ov : th"" TStri Di vj si.on f9rthe:~ to th~ nort'') so tJ.i.rt 5t could strik, west alonn; t 1 e r ~ g0 p:round nc.rth of C:::;_ssino . GenJrPl ~"r<"}•rb11rg 1 s 'Jew ZeA.lr-ncl Div-: sion ,.,.ould tl "''1. h us~r' to c<ttack alono- th~ Liri River 1o rl.<>nrs . The _3/{,th Division ·roulc'l join th, 16th jn this vest"'rn thrust north of Grssino . G"ln""r·1l C1Pr1c l1incr."'c1 with G.. n~r"l 1:~_.,..s .,nd sc"'- of ~-"' stn.-rf o"'fic"'rs r>nd th""n left -"'or the Fr~nch ":Xf"lditionrr.r Cor::--,s corr, r..,n'i :~o-:it iust rl-iove V""r"-rro . l\.r·,,.iv~nr; ~t t1-l"! '"rrincr Cor-rs , G~n.. rPl ClFrk '7Ps rn ,,t h G~n"rnls Juin , 11d il.oosev 1 t, nnd '1"'! ,.. ,nt · r , ~ai~t~ly : nto tJ, , corps ap room to i1~ SC'lSS plflns rith G"!'1 .rel Juin . Th., t"7o :-'re11c1- djvisio-1S ·~ill no i turn t'h jr R.ttack northvmrd striking e lo:rig the :riorth- soutr ronf ler.di'1': to ·prd J\t:: nD . G.... n rr>.l Jujn -:mirl th1t ;~e hf\d rec.,,.iVeQ l , 000 '1ntive replPc ,~ent::; ,~rort TTorth A"ricP r.ind t11r>t r_,, wns r')ady tc-, jur-r off 0n tle 9+,tac1, at i=my Vye . G,n~rnl Clrir-: sa~.d tl1""t th. otr r divis:lo:ris jo-inil'lP- .;11 .l,:,h, ntb.cl: conld not bt'l Y'c<JPCY 1uite so quickl:,. In fnct it rrobrhly '1011lrl be :cm·· or f·'.ve cfavs bP-+'or~ the ne' offrmsivc co 12ld ,~ lf'·mch~d . Tn1n~::--inq 11bout •-.rencl-i r ,fl"ce "nts , G"'n"'r~1 'P<i rl_or , 1 J �Clerk learn ,d thn.t 0t!1r-r nntives nrn rca(v to sriil +'ror "orth 11:fric<"' but thrt the rrincinal -r,,r"'net' rl'lrlr..c~r ~nt nrobl~n ''P'S in Fr ,nch o•~f'ic"rs r,y' non-corwission~d o.c>fic~rs . T11"•ir" nr~ -rew r~rlrocem.nts for t 11es~ '""l")n , nio"'t of \-'orn hnve J.rd to sca·0, fro fr;~nce . G~n~rc1 l ,Tuin rromj sed t rt his Gonr11s v;culd take r1011nt c.- :ro nnd that tre"T 11ro11ld rln11t the '1trrs n.:r-cl ~tripes n.nd the French Tricolor on the crest o:' the 'll01A7.ta;n . G~n..ral c1~rt: SP.id tbrt if' 7,he Gourns took t..,e !"ountain he want~d the ricolor t0 fly f;,bove tre Jters anc. 3trip,s . G"neral ,Tuin c greed vigorously nith G~n"!rn.l Clprlr tbnt 11 He .,..,rt 1reep the ½riyonet f'°!rr~tur lly in tl·e r·un ' s behind" , if 1e r1r~ going to s ove 1--d r:- bn ck raridl Y . Gen .ral Clnrk also lenrn .d thr>t "' Gnn rnl of th~ /~th I"ldinn Divisio:-1 WP. s in thf'! French a::..·en torlay lookinc- oveir the t~.,..rn.in to see if Tndi"'n trr,ops could Pight in th':l countr;v Fh~re the French di.visions nre now rushing +'orw[lrd . G,.,n~rril Cl;,rk l"\;{fTessed ris objec tion to tres" o-"'fi_c ,rs goi11r; ~ nto th., section whrm "t ms not his :;1:-n to employ eith"lr th~ /!,tr- ·~"ldfan Divi3iori or t11c ~ evr ZP,[llPnd Divi ~ion in this f'IOuntPinous country. G~n~ral Clar 1• 1.-,ft th-, Fre11cr Corra reric.quarters n'1.rl :,--etnrn-n.d to his 0'7n advPnc~ co r "'nd post Pt Fr~se'1zr-no . Upon returnin-,, he ~nform0d GencrPl 1ru,nth ,r of' ris d"scu-::sio'1s with G ner<>ls K"'Jy ,s R"'.(' Tuin a11r• t.11 ,n cnri.ferred br:i~f'ly 'Vith Colon~l Sul7_:ir11, th"? Arry ';ut=1 rterr,,ns~ ~r , · ho 11r d cone up "'ror~ th : r~nr Jche lon, ri bout nro hl~ s of t rr;•y sur l·r. * }-ff-; )r; T7A'Tf' --Y ~3FFFIRY 3, 1944--G"'"l rnl ClPrk too1<- off +>ro~, tl"e ;:;'ifth 11 r,,,.,y- co' rand rost strip 1-:Jy cul) t>t OR/!,5 t is r orn1ng. B:19 arr-:v~d nt th, JO CorJ s striT' 11t £> bout 0900 l 1ours wher" ' ~ , JI? s r•"'lt ½y G.rin~r" 1 cC:r er;r th , Corr s Cor '"lntl.-,r rnd proc .,dee! tn T{ePri.'JU"'rt ,rs 0 01 Gu:-.rds BrirrR.de 1h .re 11, ,1_,,t F2j . Gen . Gr")gson-Ellis , Co.,.rrnd-:na th., Sth British Divjsio"l , Ms Brirr::idJ Co"'!"a11r1,,rs ,-.-rir1 oth r o+'fic~rs . P.-"ter ::i )ri"l-r c0·1,:_rnltE'tion ,jt11 thes~ o""''ic,rs, the A.rrv Cor anner rroc~ccled to Tufo wher~ h~ sp ,nt snT'l, ti,•e in two OP 1 s o½s,.rvi'1P' th, terr['in rind discussi'1n' tr e 10 Corps Ptt;:, c'r ..,:i tr +,he Corrs Com•!J.nc,er . G~11~rr 1 ClPrlc took of'f fro'! th~ sb· ip , r~turn-inF to >1,s co.,.,,,.,,Pnd post Rt 1175 . 1 1 G .nern.l Alexrind"'r hr>c1 exrresscd n _,rish to r -i<::cuss '7it11 G".!n rrl Cl"r 1,.,. t11e \ VA.rio11s "'rohl ,l:13 fpcirir.; tl1 "'\ ~.rrriy Co :r2nder on tre nz-i.o and Cr>ssino :ronts. Accorc'l-i•1r;l:0, ..,t RP_ roxill'atelr l//)0 G .n r l Cl"'r-!{ fl"li•r by cub rlr->nl'l to CE>sertP , "'h ,re le lPnded b~• tl-i"' Hat .. rfr 11 ::rnrl "ent b~f CQr to Genl"Jrf11 Alex3.nr1er I s hMd q11art..,rr1, •1rh,r"l h, co11f~rrt"lil -"or aqrox" "t,ly i=i.11 hour ·ith Gen~rals Ple'Cf'1,ler and ,-,re; v.rp· b ,-"ore l'')tnrnj nrr to ris CO"'r•pnn post by Cllb . 0 The frr,.y Cor'"Pnoer re-c•')ived t h , f'oll◊'·;'1ro- T"CS ra') "'rori }1js Chief of -·taff tl-Jis r>ft rr:oon ''Tho W"S up Pt the new brir'geheRd rre8 checki.,,,g 0;1 the ituation . Rr . 18°. 11 Fnve seen Lnc:Y, . H~ feels .,,£'irlY cw·fortnblr, r>bout ,~resent situr> t"on. ~Jo 1 nd:cr>tio11s y~t o-r- rajor attnc\: . Does not nlen to ·-,~thdraw 1st Div., but ''il] be n"'cessn:c,r to ,dthdrAvr '.lrd Div . JiouP'hnuts r>ml linuor h"'V"'\ hnd v'oncerful ~"".l:>ect . 11 0 TTpon l'l"!C"lip+. of .._,r~ 8 bove C' bl~' th~ ~r1117 Co•'1~,nnc1~r disr:>tc1~~r1 the .,..ollm inr- cicr)l., to Gn,n~rr.l Lueras . PJ 14/,/!, . "Gru~nth~r r~rortq sitw tion ·rell in h<Pnd . .,,"{r.: .ct to fly up cAturc'.~y riornjnr- nnd loo1·' the ciiturition ov~r . Arn 17,lPd 3rd Division is b~i'1'; orrr,rin-1zed nn_ T'l"ced in ri P1orJ coi"p"ct situr+.ion 'h<1r~ it can ~ith"lr rep ,1 collnt.,rattack or later, at Pn ar ropriat~ ti , , ,.,1{e Pn ::ill out e.ssr-mlt O"l Cister'1.a . 'ir- 11'\a}~in~ r,lnns .ror "JJ out w·srult h~re. ill "'ivc you 1 1 �the details 0.,1 Sr-turda'r. lt .~r-rds . 11 G~n rl'l Clf'r1" .,..,iceiv d r- C"rile +>ror, Adnirnl Lo'TY th 1 Con•.an<ler of 'I'i:,sk Force ;¥81 in , hich r"' ~}.Tr~ssed rd.s ple,,sur~ f't norldnP, ,.,jth tl,e Fifth Army P.nd :bis hop'"! for R aui ck junction :l n Ror ,e . G~n~r!':'l Tl'te , Fi+'th ArPly G- k , todPV subf'!itt1'd a rl"'rort to Corr~anrl'!)r r,-,p;nrfli.na trc '~ur,pl "';_turition Rt Anzio . The rerort th-, suppl • 9itw,tion in g ,n"'rl' 1 -is Sl'l.t:i.sfr- ctory for the troops excert for E>rtiller:, RP"'mnition . Ad justT'lcnts in the surrly of nition ar, ~i11~ ca.de driily 'by tht"! 1c;rr - trucv n<1tror . the Fifth l\rr y .<>sscrted th0t no ::r in th.._, ar1'P nrtill .r.r Br rm- The ~ nfnntry r"'rl::> c"..,,~nt sj tuntion -in Fifth Army is b"'cor,inrr r11or, :, cute ev .ry rla.y. A+.'ter co-1siderf'ble ,tuc1 y o+' the nrobl ,ni, G('mernl Cli:irk c..,1-iled G,Jr~ral Dev~rs as f'ollff1s: 'R,'T l/~09 . 11 Inr~r>ntr rePl'"'Cr)T ent s-itu0 tion in Fifth rr,y is ~xtr(Y el-r s~rio11s . Fresfl:l'1t srortar s i 11 6 i. vi sio'1s nm· ,Yceed <S , 00C' . Nunh•·r rr"s~ntly f'W,~ lPbll"J in r'"°'rot is 800 , whicri ~ncludes '3CC ..l ich hrve been co werted to i nfPnt:r-y from. oth"'r bro.nch ,s . CP sun lti,,,,s j n tl-ie 3rd Di vi 1ion c1.lone totnl ?L,00 of 7},-i ch only 900 c1re non- bri+,tl'1 . Total United Stftt~s er sunlti~s in VT Corps nre rro . In-~rntr:r "'hortn½e :n '3L.th liv:5sion is 1'300 . In '36tr Division '3000 . J r~sent o-r~r tions involve sirnultn.n~ous U"e of' all di.visions "nd re q,1-i.re tbrit T /o str na;ths b"l • a.:ht.., in":!d . 1 1 0 ttr urgentl:r r1'corari~nd BS n ,..,,,.,tt"'r of Of"!rPtj onn 1 n~Ce"'sity thrt 1000 infrn tr~r rP-plncl':l'llents ')~ t.ri}cn f'ror, 85th T)ivision r>nd "'r~rm .d h"lr~ b:r f;:,stest nvnilnble r A1ns. I 1-iPvc fllr'"lndv r'lir~c+,cc1 that infantr:r r,.,.rlrcer ~nts b, t£1k"'n ~rm~ 88th Divis-ton "n~n :t nr-rjves , ½ut I desire to liriit thPt nu.,...ber to minirnu,'ll Pbs0lutcly n~cesser·r. Th,re rr~ rlso shorter;es in artill~rv, P"!d;_ccil l'nd enr;in"!ers, but t "'Y P.r"' not y"\t r.rjtj cal. 0 "I ;-, lso 1 1rt-:~ thr,t cverythhi.r• rossihl~ b"' dnn~ to ~1ove u-r th~ F~bru"ry r>nd ~•o;_rch li f'ts o+> r~r'lncer-~nts fr01., th~ Un:i tcd Jtc1tes rim' +,o e'r.-,edite shipPent to Itn ly of RTUS fro, ·rorth l\fricr . } leP s~ E>dvj se ~ct-ion t<i 1,.""n• 11 * * L,, 1'1'"'cE,gA' 0 - -Ti'.,..,B,'tF~qy 1944- -At 0G00 tMs ,...or11hw G,')l•"lrrl Cl;-,r 1,. r~ceiv1'd G•n~r, 1 I Ke•r~s, .Tu jn f''1d R")11Clt"lr i.n J.-,~s hut . Th") '":ll[)j~ct ().(> tris conf""r"'1C~ ,~<>s thr. rro- \ ro:;,d r"'nrrl'nr,~:--.-int oft},,. forc~s on th~ Cr>ssino front, in vi~·~ o+' -:.he Rrdw·l r+> th~ 'L' '.fonln.nd Gorns, Cor n_,yl..,d b· G~n~r,,l Fr~•hurr, . Bri~f'lv ,t.-.t"'rl, G.. 11,rnl Clrr1" 1 '3 tl-io110'ht, n,3 ror0s~d to G,n,rPl .Tuin, ''PS ti-nt 1-ir-i 3J.-,oulrl Ce'"'S') to ,....0ve 1-ii s Corps on At.-i.n;:, 8 nrl r .-ori_Pnt T-ii s e+>+>ort to-erd Ter~lle - 11.occa .,.eccr . GPvi~r;, l Glar 1( propos"?d to reJi ,v~ th, -:i;t11 DivisioP fro,.. ~t:J rr .s..,11t ro"itionP ['3 soon r>s ;os~ibl"' 11 '1rl disrhc~ :it. north of th, '3/i-t • JT_ th"!n T'ropo'l"'f to rut the ·rew ~eelrnG D-ivision in jnst s011th on trc Crssi.no +'')<1t11r~ FITJ.d b8Vt" ~t strjk~ north,·est,..,~,-.i1 up ti-ii'\ I ir-i iT:,11.-n. Gen~ral Juin ir .,.,~dilltel:v '7'!'8Sn"'r t'fi~ fnct t1-i_nt this rlrn i.nvolv"?d P r1 esir11.})l_~ CC'"lC ,ntr['ti.0'1 of' norc rl'1t'h"'!r· trJ:1'1 1licr~rsi.011 of jt. H"' st;:ited, ho ·•w ,r, thrit h, .,.nst 1-irv~ r-rot, ct-i.on on tr~ nort'fi 0f l,i s rr~s~nt position ·h":\r~ ~_+, :=i.r•join .d the ";-iP-}'th t\rllly. G~n~ral Glrr1' rrordser1 to lnok into tlie 1Jucstion of' Its. 1 "irn. n.'1.c: ro'"'s-ibly so e .l1 m"ricr'1 troors to h lr the si'1~le co,.,,bat t,.11 , 11.i er f'}~,ii-r<- 1 Juin ·,rps ri hl , to l""f v . 011 tl c n0rtr. �G 3 nu ,st-ioYJ.s -j,-wolv"'d :i11 th"! ~r,,rlo~:fl'.'lt'mt o.,.. th, l,T"'w 7,en 1 r'nd Corps. G~n"'lrr:l Fr,.,yburg ) stater thrt 'r:i:, r~conneissorice 'R.S in proP-r~ss ,110 thrt i11 two cir '3 he could get th'3 'Ie·'T 7,e" lanc'lers -in rosi tfon r;outri of Cassj rio to 11:oVl'; north'"'"'st ur the Liri Vr,l 1 J.T . At luncl1 GenP-rnl Cler1c r-ece:i.vcd nn.ior G"ln rr>l r·cI"n.hon Rn,'l. ;h,ior G•nerc>l Rob"lrtson , Co....,'""Pn<'F"'P: the ~th and "nd TT . S . Jnfnntrv Divisions r1'spectiv.,.ly. Thl"lse o+'f'icers, ·•hose 11.11i.-':.s r>,re 'lo.., in th!'! lritish IslP,s, hn.v"-' co""e wjtr '1°rue of their 0°"fiCC"Y'8 to Itrily to studv actual or~rp-'",~ ons . G... ri~rn 1 01::T"lr "'urnishcd t},eTII w'th ,je"lt'S ['''.\d recor'1[-)7"'Si1.'1Ce CATS Awl <J.rrflnrr.~d for tri~ 1 1 to visit II Corrs where tr"l~r would o-,,.t experience ~ n actual ,mrfare 11s c0nd11ct~r "'.:,oca.r. In the r-> "'t,.,r-r1oon GenPrnl Juin r ,turn~d yrj_t}, G1'YJ.l"!r,l CPrpl'!ntier f1ncl Colon~l Cherriere . G~ner a l Cl Arl,. to l d G~n"lrnl ,Tuin thnt "' hprl fcund r flllw rundred Itqlirn troops to reinforce G~ner'11 .Tuin 1 s north~rn flPnk . G .n~rr,l J,1in erir:erly strotecl thrt YJ.f"! 'WS renrlv to ta," ur the n,w r>ttnck Terclle - Roccasecca . G.n~r~l Clr:- 1r, rr"'n"!r::il Gru.-mtr~r and Gen ,rr> 1 TPte P 11 v~ o;orousl7 a::rner-tcn , howeve r, t hr-i t thl"?rc , •ust b" econoni.~r exerci s~d by G"'n rn 1 ,Juin in tl-i~ cc11c;u~ption of artill~ry 11.n11,unition , as r, hrd h~en b 1 1r'1in½ nor"'l thFr ::>n;r oth ,r nn:'t . Genr.,r"'l Juin s11.id thf't i-,.., 1rn ':V it , ')ut' ,~1-i"'l'1 his soldiers su":erec1 hePVY cr"'!urltj~s r·1r'i 9till hnd to hold on , the onl-r rr-y 1 1, 1 ,m~',r to ricco·-:rlish it ·'Tpc; to use artillery on t:re G~rr-Pns . 0 At din'1cr G"'n~rr l Clnrl~ ""'1t"'!rtr-i in"'d Gonerri 1 P~uclAr, Golo'1el S? ltzri>n and Lieutenant Colonel }orter . I>1.rl7 in the ev~n:inp.: Generl?l Clrirk clictoted th~ f'ollm1iY1g +'or in ½is dia:r: llVj sited 10 Cor·· s yest':lrrln:r 1w cub, ,~ns """lt by G ,n~rrl , ccr--er7 :1nc tqJ·en to the Hint11rno Pr•r1, -rhr>rc I visited thll! Sth Divinio'1 ::ind ...,,"lt its ne·.,. co~"'nYJ.cl"r, T½.j . Gen . Gr,o;,0'1-ElliP. Pe ?nd his prLncip~l s bord 0 nrt~s i~nr s~"')d ~~ A.s being, h-i P,'hly er-ficient 1:i->1.d likeable ch'"lfS . I 11is:i.ted tre Tu:"'o Prer> -::bere, fr/")'l\ an OI I hnd P onoc'l. loo c flt thl"!ir '1~xt ob,ject5v"' • TTrg ,rl l'cGr•cr~r tr lnimc" an rttrc1~ 2t the earliest possibl, drte . He fP-els hl':l r,ny not be r>ble to do it b~forl'" th.e ?th. ,rq~turned 1 cub to my co~, ,1n<i rost . Flew 1"'t 14 30 to R confr!rance v,j th ;y G~n~1~91 l\.l,xRnd~r rl.l1d G~n1'rr>l Fr~:~ourg r>t Cf1sertR. G-,n~rr1l :!:"revhurg had been d~rected by Alexr,nder to rrep::1rP reco.,.,,Pl"lndi;tions fer h-i s e.,,.;-lo; ent -: n tJ-1~ Fi f'th I Ar:-.,.v frr.nt . Frevburp; hPd do'1."l tr is ·ajtl'out re-1:er~nce to Jll-,. Ji le~rrinrler hd like·11is"' :mnr'1c nlr>ns, n.11 of v;},ich emit~ un"'Jtric;.-,11-r, f'or .,-,f't~r r>ll it is T"Y job to pr~rrre the tPcticP>l '"'lnns PYJ.c conduct the or.•~rr>tions of tre li"ifth Jrrn:y. It ·,7i;,3 EJr.rar'!'1t at th~ ½eqi11n; n,~ o ~ tbe ,.,. eti '10: thrt 15th l\:r:rr.y Group P':.d """revburg 1~re p;oil"J.P' to tell m~ ,just Po', ni-r n xt [lttrrc 1.,. 1 ould b~ r 11de . ; ob.j ,cted rs dirlo:niF' t~callv PS no_:si~lP- . D-iffe,...~rl ~ntir.~l • 1it. h rre:rburr, 1 s end ~1.,,rmncle.~ 1 ~ v:ie1 s on ti"'~ er•rlo, e-110 01 the YITevt lealand Corns Rnd told ther, th"t, in my orin10'1 , the Few '3-,13. la."lriers and TndiA.ns ,-rould not get to f'irst bn.so 1wrH no; in tre Cr ss5 nof"o1n,:t Cniro "ou~1tr>inr;, t½r-t the II Corr,s 11.nd Frrmch sho1 1ld r,imin in th')re Pnd the 'ew z~olanders car~ i.tt!'d. to thri Liri VRlle:r ,,hen tl,,,y could .,.~t "Cro"s the Pqrido without too ""UC½ .:'ir:;htj ng . I nrg"'d thst Freyburo Rnc1 hj s co, "0 n.d be f'.lc>Sed to 1':V control ir,,difltel,r . Thr,v fina11;,r Po/~er- to y rl<'ns, n.nd Fre.rburg VPS pl,,ced unc1 ,r rrrr C'Y"", ,;i_11d . I �i, had in handling the t.revr Zealander Bx-plaining thPt they -rere territorial troops, responsible only to their 1?overnnent a.nd v;e ht:'d to get Along rri th them. I assured r.im our relations wouln. be happ:r and th::it "'e =ould T'i8.ke a go 0 1 ' "In view o:"' certain intelligence·I had r11ceived th'.'l nir:ht before on enemy intentions in tl10 FFth Arny l\.nzio bridgehcHd, I sent the following rad:i.oo;rRfl'I to GencrPl Lucas: issued to you to :=i.dwmco ;,rour left and to cr1pture Cisterna 11re hereby rescinded . You sh011ld novr consolid2.te ,·rour bePchhead and mrke suitable disrosjtions to neet Rn attrw 1-:: . You PP~T withdraw 1st Division far th~r to south if vou consider thRt Action nclvisable . Ar<vance on ow objectives will be r~suri'"ld later . "\::if'th~r v~rf'li tting Gru"'11th0r rill r ee ch your HePdqm1 r ters nt 1130 tor1orrow to give furth?r d"tails . Ackno··rledge . 1 1 I nstructions 11 T also sent Genornl Gruenther th~ following cl,'-'y to give hirn T'Or(~ detPils •. I hav"" felt .Por sor•? ta no thHt it '78.s foolish for us to co11tinue to 1.raste our stren~th on an Ptt"" ck 011 Cisternr. G8nl'JrP 1 l\.l~xanr:"r has co•1trar;7' views. I told G'merPl Al".)xandt"lr yesterdPy -ift0rnoon th:-,t I }v .d storped th~ att~ck on Cisterna, <>.nd h~ uas gre2tlv clisturbed . Ifo urg,:;d w, to bf>, rrep"T':ld to attack with that division in an all- out effort to F•~t •:isternP on 48 hours 1 notice and tolcl '"'l.e a,c,;ain that the Gtirr 1 2.ns '70uld not P.ttack in force . I differed agr in and told hirn thnt I would not i"'astc tbe 3rc1 Division, which hPs P.lreBci.;,r hr-,d ?L~OO losses (500 losses for the entire VI Corrs) , but th"'t I would dispose the entire corps to Peet P co1 mter1;ttack in stren~;, nnc thrm bA rrcpered to advance . 0 "Last niirht additional corroborating enemy intelligence indic~ted strong General Alexander received the sm,r~ infor:r",'."tion ,ond lvd hia Chief of .;t,e:,ff t,·lephovie at 1"'idnight, to "rnrn ne of ·7t. I tnl1"ed '"•ith Alexander this T"orn:ing , Fmd he vras delighted th:-,t I hHd ta\:en the defensive rttitudo t~nporaril;,r, and hrid chrnged his •vhole opinion . 1i "l.(r:,lj hood of a.n ~ner,1y attack j_n force FE< inst r,.y bridgehe8d rosition. ur j,1fornf3d Pl~xand~r th2t J had heri "'revburg Pnc liis stef'f in confer~nce 1 this r·orn~_ng 1 1ith Juin , K,;y,es and my stpff rn.C: bad c irected Freyburi:; to rr"1m a r~lief in the 16th Division sector to"1orro nio;ht A.nd thnt toraorrovr, Pt a tir~e to b0 mutun.lly n r,;rccd upon bet,,,.,en II Corps and Fr3yburg I s Corrs the cor'T'!and \ vmuld pass to the latter . Ti'r~yburg is sort of e 1 b•111 jn a chirn closet 1 • He feels h~ is ~oing to win th::i 1·:nr , r>nd ''lith his 15 , 000 V'?hiclcs is going to clutter up the rmtir~ Liri Vf'lley c1rea . Fe inr"diately clash""d crith K'3yes ,-hrm ho 1 ndic2ted wh·c;re he ·-res '""OVinr,; artill~ry , his rrew je.<>lcnr~rs, his In6irms Pnd other ir11p,dimenta . I turn,~d it ov,;r to r,y st2.ff, tellin'{ ?rl'lyburg that he could noYe :into no areas until he had coordjnatcd ,-,it)~ Pll Fifth Arriy activiti ;S . I WPS disappointed in K iyes I Attitude tov.ercl P-re:rburg r'nd sent hil" th~ follor,ing ~ J_e ~~ ! 1, ver 1: ' 1 ' I tried to 1r,ic1.te to you tris "'lorning the i"~oortence o+> +'ri·mdly Pnd coopcrntive reJ.r,t:: ons 'Tith Gencr~l Vrcyburg . 1I j 1 arn constrain~cl to tell ~rou thr:t I ..-as 2 littb r'lisaproj·,"ted in your \ �scTJJ.,'"'hPt br-ll-1g~..,,,,rt .?i:.titude to-.arr:1 h~•• t 1,j"' nrn:l'l'lr; . T '1.0.i. .d "'t , n.nd G '11"rP1 Fr, rburg s:;ok, to of it , "'1.d lrit ,r r;ro 1c to G,,.n,.r~l Gru-,ntb r conc,..rnin<" it . T arrr .ci t, 4:-11 "rl,n( id job r011, >1riv~ b"!e'1 rloj'"'t , th ... 10·7...,. 'hc•l'r" u,pt OU "re 7 "' -fo'Y" Cr>.ssino , rirc'I thrt tl , rov .... _,n~~ of tl·is Sft<:Cial out rutt··n3 i11. yo ·r , att ""it on to of you rr~~~11.ts rm co~~ l ,'ci'1.g r.,..-o½l"'PlS . A 1 tl e ott ,r 1--Ja.nd , .c,: ~'le '7:··~ rlo -j nion .i..1~oops ',}- 0 a:,:·'") V ry j Aq_lous o~... th~ir pr·,rogativcs . The Br itish hav~ -fo 1 md th~m di:"!.'ic11lt to . [>nc'le . The~r h11v, al 'a.rs b,,'c'l "'.-''7"''1 ::::rec,;i.al -::0•,L;:lcie:~.-, ·tjon ..i:ic"' e r1· 7 c' 'lot r--'v, t0 cur ovn troops . rl~?Se ) nr '·,',-' S :'.'..'1. -' "1_(1. I -',-.t,,.,.,,, ":,r .,,.,,. ,fl")"'r r ,lat-' ('•T1", ritli the 1 l';C'Y'"'.,..'ll e1·~cl -niftl, Arr,o . "r· 'lrl harry, P'1d -ol' "'U"t h~lr r11~ ell ,·ou ccn . I, ther fore , loo 1r: to ·on -t.o ~o ,,11 01 1 t o,.. .·orr "lf' iri orc'"'r tc r•,c,1r" y jo "')<isier. }1.erise see tre1t .ro1n• =-te1+'f (1 0~S 1,:1{,ris~ . 1 On r, "' ' You cen ,,,,,crt ssnr"'ld t½."t · rrill 1,r•s Pr:'! r-ive'l "ull ,,.ei,,ht 1 ,re . 0 -"'ir~ ~rd ju t :'1. '11o,...i· g t'.',t yonr rrob- 1-:, 0 0 UPnt to [' ,"in tell yn:.i ' 1 0'"" c'e~, ly I arrr"'C~qt, ",re srl",'1did ;·cr1 : :·ou, ~•ell'~ ~ta·"'" anc ·our ~orJ s ' 1riv, 'on, on t' ~ Cassino ..,ront 11 11c1 ~r l"xtrP.r-el,:r t ~y:::1g corrl~ t io11:J . 1 1: 0 11 Todn~, :: n stec' Jl'in to c , t~ s~"l "f l ., cc-ulrl c i.rect h:.'...s Fr nch Corr s 1 i11 the c'ir ,c";ion f"f T"'"-"' 1 "!-'tl,occ1,,secc11, inster-r' of' .;n th, direction o"' :J.tt"IC ?" B l·onte-Ati"''l . I }1"V~ ius t m"'t 'H'1 Mr• r,o-qjn , ·nc1 re },qv~ P.rrn1.g"'C' tris . Py t--"'fort :is to conv~rc; tl·.,. F-r nc Gorrs , t 11~ II Cor,..," , Fr ,ybure; 1 s Corrs and the 10 Corrs into tl~e Liri VaJ.ley f'or P :'inal rune, • (See OD0r tions Instruction '11, nl1 ic will be publisher1 to""torrow) . 0 "I no'-r ly•ve •'ive corrs under ,..,y cor"'k'l:1d , 0·1lv two of v:li.ich r>re Arn9d cr·n, all othnrs o+> diff'0r8nt rtioneliti '"s • I t}1inv ''f1po1Pon wn.s rie;ht ·rJ,en he C'"'1e to t 1e conclusion thP.t it was better to ::'if,1-it Allies thl'in to h=~ 011.e of them . " * * * FR"';,S'RHZf\. ~ro--F ~BB.TT-\R-l 5, 19/i/4-- In t e rnorni"lg Gen9rPl C:l"'r'-: ·rent by ;jeAT' to vi sit tli.e Co'1I'1anrl post of' tl-ie 34th Division r-it Serv2ro anc1 gPi'1'3d a +'irst hn.nd .:def' of the rro/7:r'ess o-r tli.8 brittle "or Crc:sino . Troop'> of' tre P3rd Infontry bve reo.c>1Ad the outs\:irts of tt ci to· m but ri.ro m0etinq: bitter P nd det0r,.,,; ned resi s tPnce from the Gerrrns rr o r-re dug in in th0 tovm . On tl e road U:e Ganer-1 net anrl t al1 :ed for a ·vhiln FHh Ge 11erel Yeyes 'Tho h0 hrs directec1 to re- group his forces as decided in 'Teste ·driy 1 s co 11:f'erence , puttinrr the 30th Division in north of Cassino to tri. 1re tre ,-1ountrin Vir-iss trer,3 . 1 ::;:n the rtfternoon the '1'1n"-r 0 l rer1dned <>t t½e ccr.n~r· d ro""t, c isr-,osj11.p; of r-id rrinist~at:lve 1"1a·\,t9rs . The Qqnerl rietermined to flv to /\.:"lzio i11 tre M.orn:inr- rind tissure M.nself' thrt th-i•10's fl.re ,:i;oi"l.g rrorPrly ti,0rc . I1:1 the n"'t9rnoon re went by jAer to the 3Rth 1.~v~cur-tion Por;pH::i 1 , · h<1re he visited m;:iny pPtirmts wounded on the Cn.ssino f'ront i'1 recent or9ratio-1s . At rlinYJ. ,r J-,0 0ntertnJned Lt . Col. Wood , r.:o,,:,Pnd 4 y; (V'ficer o-r the ''103ritrl , Pn<' ~hree of h:ls of'ficers , togethPr "lith t•r . & Trs . tltev0nso·1 of the ''7eric"'n Fed Cross . ()r,erntior,s Tnst::1uction 1tl/1- wc1s i '3sued toc'IPy ::i.nr' is 7Hoted b~lo.r: �1. Upon t 11e c11ptuse o;-~ GA,)cTfO J-,nj_ghts Pnd the occupr>tion of n bridgehead j n LJJU V::- Uey sonth of Ci' S 1rro, Ti'i +>tr ArY'ly on the G.A.RJG-LIAJJO-~./1 I IDO front continues tb~ -ittn.ck to the north '-''1.d .,,.,orth,vest . 11 9.. F,.,ench "':'T;ed:i tj_onPrv Corns , cons· r:tinr; 3d Alp;erj"'n Divisions , :.~einforced, will: 0"" the .,nd :!orocc::m and (1) Attack to the ·rest, within i..ts zo 11e o-" Pction , riwJd np; its r1n.in e,:,"'ort aloni:; the m-,'P.-SIJ,1';-n()CG ~ crr,;ccl\ tY'a il , seize RO"iGA. '3ECCA A.riri the high gro1mr east o.(> the '"Alfa River . n tt1e~ d~_rectfo·1 of ATrrA. (2) Cont~nue pr9~s1,1.r0 (3) Vin.int<> in cont"' ct ..;j th F:ishth Arri:r. 2• II Oorrs , co11si st.; rig o.c-- tfle -~/4,tr nnO 16th Divisions nnr1 Combc't Cori1"1P'1d n'9" , 1st frrnoreCi I'iv, .... 9~7.+'orced, 1ill: (?) Assi,.,t t 1e "ey 7.ef"l'\11Ci Co1~·r:,s jn its cros2111f" of tbe B..t} IDO and debonc11•--,ent "nto the LITIT V"lley. (3) r";ubseriurmtl~r att13clr to t}-•9 r1orth"est vri trin its zo'1e of' l'ction. c. ,Jrr:r Ze,-ilrmd CorDs , consistina; of' 2d 'Tew Ze'"land anr L,tb I"1dfon DjvisionB, r'3~n"nrced , '·rill: (1) A<,<,enblG -in the "T TP.C'(!CTTIO fl.re:> er'>t of tre R!J IDO . (?) Be '"'repnrec, on Army ord0r, to debouch into the I.I11I Vr:i lley, t}1 ro 1 1_r,h oleri1ents of IT (!orps, 8.'•.ri rn0k'y ~ts rrin e+>fort n.lo,1g -.;f"-;[1','l['Y 6 attac 1c to t},e 11orthwest ,-,ithin its zone of act·o11 . J)R"lS ,d. 10 Corns , consistir,c,; of' the 5, 1/i, ".11r 56 Divisi.o"'l.s (less 168 Pr:i..g) vrill: (2) CC'r stP 1 ljr-ht forcAs , r:1n..;nt1=dn cont..,ct vdt rand .; n tJ...e direction o+> 1-,vw IA. 1 J2i'1P" (3) rrpo"1 cnrtw·e of' 7 GTO"P.GIO bo prep['rerl. to the nest 1:1nc1 '1o.,...tr"est . (netr ils 1 rter) . 011 th,=,, 9neriy on the Arr1y orrer to e:;.,..,,.lo:t �U+) 11 !~ . l rotect le:':t f}.[1n}r of ::'jf't'- Army. +,"l"'l Iristructio''.'3 f'or coorr1in"tioYJ. c,f ['rtillerY f':ires 11ill be isr:ued sep- nrately. " * * fR.,,'"'F.'•IZAJJ0 --""'-;:9".U~'R.Y (, , lr:J!i/4,-- Gem:rA.l Glnr 1 " 19ft f'or tJ-i9 be.,chherid h:r C-/+7 from l"arc;;,nir;e Pirroy,t, to ,-,l icr h9 flew 1)y ~ub . Fe "'PS accor-r~·ni0d ')y Crrtriin LRmrso11., 'r· . Peach, c;ergennts rolr1en An' ~;uitte:1-nen anc1 triA frdtbful ,J~rg1;ant Chr,ney. Jn thr:, rlane '7ith the r.,rty there also 1ent G,~nerr,l Brpc,shaw rn/ his 1:1.ide, Lieutenent Re'1le'r, a.:nn ·~a.jor Ross, of the G-1~ Section. 1 Soon Rf't0:r- arrivii:1i:; Pt tre .,,j +'th Armv A1'w1 nce Crrrir>Rncl fost r>t AYlzio, G9vie1 ral ClPrk c enPrtnrl to visit VI Corrr--, 3rd Divisio'1 , 7-st :9rittsb D:vision, 1st rmorPr Divi:--:i_on a'1a the Speci~l '~nrvice ..,orce, T'r:,turnj•1.o; to hi-c:; comfl['nd rost jn m~d-.,+'ternoon <>-"ter rriv:i 1'"' dj,c,Fsed t)113 sjtiction vrith the vrrious COl'll"!Pnr18rs o+> t 1 ,e'V3 1m~ ts r>ncl "1emb9rs of' tJ-,e5r st8 ffs . At 171. 5 G(m--ir" 1 Clic-rk clrove by jee to thA VI Corrs co,~~"nd r 03t "rl---erA he hE>d d:l nner ;7ith GP:riciral'1 Lucas and Feiser, rP.tllrn1'1r to } is corrr.f1nc1 r,ost pt, riooo rours . 0 T'ris AVG"l-ing GeYlPral Clarr receiv d th9 -"ollorjn,:,· s:itu,-,tion rero·~t on the \ Gn.ssino ,.--.ro11t +>rori G0neral Grwmtrer . E~; 1533 . "H9RVY f-i .c:;hting c011tirn19s in the Ccissino nr8n . 115 P,e.aimeYJ.-1; ~s ner:.r "':C''11 stnry·. :1_;7c"er i-,~s hopes of surrounding it thfr aft9rnrovi . XeyRs esti.,, tes ti.~t 1/, Tlivi'1ion ,-rill not be strorP, eno11p;h to t,R1:e Cnssj_no nn-1:,il trr-o-r;:; ;n Tere 1 .l8 RT"lr Cf'n be relieveil rm' tJ:,ereby ( be f'r9e to 13c;sist i·1 Gassinc, "rer nttack. 3(, Div~ sion "'trrts relief' i·'1 Terelle areri toni P,ht . Frenc'.1 sector ,7uiAt . A-',r reports r Jtrn:1 rby. Res11lts rill be 1movm l nter . ()" e:i 11 wi 11 ry~et you oq30 :'on,l2v r,orniric- . ll 0 1 0 1 ThP /\r ;' Corirr1nnc er to,1 rY recejv 0 n P P1r>mor nc1nn from 1,~, G-/, rointi11r out tre crjti~Pl slortP~8 i·,1 prruTm~tioYJ., r.<'t1o"S qn,1 "'1:ir·oline . 0-" ec:r--:;cinl note is the -"pct t:>-ir-it evr enrn tuT0S of cr'1T7Ul1ition "l!''-3 now res+,ricted to ?5 T'OU'1c1S p dRy poncHnp- tJ-,e Prrivc1l_ of ,'l ,,rec;;:iJ_ sh-"r,nent Prom the tT . S. ,r:rich is :1ched ilecl to 2rrive i~nrc'1 1rd . Ge'19rrl G1Ar 1• t',~s riftr-rnoon rl;spqtcher; ti,e :'ollo·I:ivi~ cl"ble tc G-e'1or~1 Gru<>nthor . R r '"J5.S2 . n:-rnrn i:1,::; 8Cter1 entirA "ro'1t, iric7.udj:nr '"', 50L"th, 1rd, /~5th , 1st \rr,or9d rrrl 7.c:t Brit~sh Divis 4 o-'1s. •ro Pct'on torlr-iy. · :i+urtion i:ipr9rr, to be ----rirlr,ell in rPnC -,i.th th;n srotc; bet•Aen ~:cm·cott A.DC' }enne~r. '-ipd not rtrlizec'l Y1ur1½Pr of' Prtj-tp11-1 • P,l:'.1S lo"'t ½y Jenne" • ThBSR rrnnt bf1 mr de up i•1rner'-i_rtel' 7 • A"! cr w·1 -1cerl_ -'-,i-,~t, ·re T1u~t c-et in rnotber Br~_tisl:, briri-,,r'e p:rour or TTn:i_tecl :t~tes c"nk·t te.?m, rr9f9r 11ly t' e -"or 1 er. TH s ''l; 11 ;1'1r;0 i t 8 more 7 ·,ui)sf:.a:rit:i.nl c e,~en-:e l'lP"P inst a stroYJ.P' a ttr c '~ P -ric• ~; ve us •7or0 n "·"'9'1 si ve ro·--er lpter. e ""U"t hrve :>rotl r l.'55 PUn b<>-':,t~lion. r;:'ruscott "'11ort ?/.,,00 nen. 111 rossibl·'"> .-,+,"-'r2 ru.,,t b9 tr 1:en t0 9Xp9d~te th3ir rrriV''l h'1r 0 , j'1cludi'1f YO'tr investi,,.etion 0f seri":inp; th8n -in b" d_r +,rnns:-iort, r-erhn-rs ?O f 7 "'nes ~ dey each ri-i1•i"',[l' t ro 1~r:i:-s rt ~.,,tArV ls. re~~i.-nr"' thi" j s not } r,:,ctic~l_ . r-rrv0 <"1 ~c-nsed "ifi1.l,tenn:rce ,·it 1-i D 1C'rsa l"n o-1:,h"'r"', ~ri/ ·e rre crnvincec1 \78 C, n •nint:-i.in these 1 1 0 1 �a0rlitio11Al unit'>. r,:;_~11 "'t, Y•ust be T11:-1.r1e "VE'il"'h1"" for th"'>Vi "rid for th,,dr "c'ded 'orley '1Ri 1.ten"'nce. rJill r9turn 1-:iy C-/"7' 1,_y"J~no; r0r0 ,,t 1000 hours tor-10,,,ro 7. ~Oll C ec \r -for ""'-i P:hter COVP,r • n has heen inf'orm00. 1 1 * :rn ;c-rFZ..A."'0--..,.e:BR Tr.RY 7, lq/v"--This nc.,,.n:'ng Gen0r11l Cl"r 1 lnft his Anzio cor~rnP.11.rl rost by j er, in thn c"Jmr"'ny of' Colonel Fu0 nleston, VI Cor.,.,., --;urr-eon, Pnd visitr.:id the sSth, 03rd Pnrl. 95tri BV"ClJntion Hosr;tn:..~, t"l1 r:i11.1?' to m'ny Vjftr Prmy solriiers rho :b d b':3en 'ounded i11. r>ction dur-i 11.p the 9,were f':: ghtino; in the i:rr;Giz~ c re~. r 0 "4:9 hrd S1JT1T'J011.8d Gen9rel rnr11<"'cott to '"')';0t J.-,jr, rit the ::.irrort, nn iu"'t before leaving t11.e f'-ieP ,~i'1.nod on <1011c,r'l Tr1 rcott 1 s jricket tre f\ist'ni:;t.11shnd <:erv-ice Cro"'s. '1en0r"'l. Clrr', '1ric'l 1':no ·11. of t"is ,"'·nrd +-or"' 11.u:nber of' c1riys but S"'Ved tl-ie act1rl_ r--,,.esfmtrition ·mtil hn -f'el +, +,} <>t i~ ''oulrl de, tre n·ost r-oorl. Gennr[' 1 'T'rtl"'Cott hP'i bAeri. snm0, 7h"t n9r,rAsser, '·w +,} 9 l_0'1S o+' +,"A two Pr:inp-or Batt9 lfors r>ncl, ."""'to-r ,,.:vi11rt J-,jr1 the Cross, Gr;n9r::>l Cl...,r1· tc·ld l-i'm 11.e thought J,i~h1" o·" ½i"' n-~on ,·rorl• r11r1 11ro-An l'il'l t,n P-o b,,c•- "'1.C' n-iv9 t,11_9 G,rrr"'11.s ri be..-tinr,. The Ge-11Pr:--l f'le"l bric 1: in ri~ nl'l.YlP, to ~··rci""l~S"J "h9Y'9 he "'PS n10.t b~r flrjor [..,_l1rer 8.nc'l rP.+,,rrn9r{ to } i.'1 coM~,r,nd rost lr cub, "rriv:::1,,. ,.,t Pb"ut 11 O. E9 ')11.tertri ined •r11 -io:r G9rnrf' 1. ' c '.j"1.l1on j'.l.t lnnch. Yn tli.9 :ifternnon tr9 G""n"'r,;l r cA,v '4 ,, cnll :'ror" G9W-'l'.'C,_ V,syes rnd oyr,lnined t0 1 1~..,, C"ref'ulJ..,r ,r},..,t hn ev-~"ct,•"d o+' r:- Corr.,. TTe to]rl th0 Gpn_crrl trrit re 1mew tl e troors 0~ ·•,h~ lL,t' ~11(' l\t11. D5vi-,ions VJ9-~ Prnrl o.f' Touc', -;:-· r,1,t~n,.,., bnt he S"id tl- e '3/<J'lP, '"Jfl s t.,..U9 o+' rll ::'ifth t l'T'JV troc,Y•<"'. F9 tolr' Gr>nrY "nl Ynyns r,ot to ~,orrv .bout tr 1ri•r Fiednont9 1,ut to cr'1.C9"'t"['te O"' trki11."' t11e ri-;11. g1"onncl inmedi"t"l:r north r,f C<F·sino. T;if,J.-, th~~s crcint,1r9d, t},9 cro"s of t e Ro··ido bv the '>:ri=i.cr-;er 1·'orce i--itc tli.e Vri Vrllev b9lo'7 Cr-;;:;i·10 "01 1lr'l be !'.Te"'tl:v- fec-i".;tPteri, anc' tbe IJ Co;•--f' "10·11 -J. !lP7e :=i.cri0verl i+, i· T'!P.di::ite l'li sion. Geriel"'l Gln~l nt,,rta-inAd Ge'1.r>rPl ·nr:=i.11., thA Ar'1.y 3·iannl ('-l"'ficer ""er dinrer. 0 0 0 1 0 t1 i S 01 0 1 Th:_s -ft8rnnon General Clark c ictA.ted the follovri"lg natAr~al fer ;'1.elusio,~ 111 nir.ry: "'JisitAd Anzio brid~0ree..r1 , est0rc1 n • "'nd SfP.rit tr,, d· y visiting all forward units nnrl c'iscu•:ni'1.n- tl-v'.3 s1tu.,tion ·•:'tb COT'1"1Pc'1dAr • Conc'.~_cerrr ') "111rroV<,"'ent hqs tPk8n nlpce 'n the r,e.,''-,,yy,jve ciet-u. • 'r ,l'Ae }-!r,n P1'9 '"i"l" JT8f"'r9d - the pre,e11.t f'ro"l.t 1 in°, t,}•9 . '1.tc::r"18di te 8.11.'1 t,ly, C"n£ 1, tl P, l8ttar 1y,~inr: ,-,,i nerl f'""ld prnp<1r":lc'l -,;th bn1~hed ---ire. "':-c, '3rd J~.Vi'"'it'n ""> n;et,e,"Ylf" '°'trfiahten:,;d out, ,.,,lthourth it ,s thin on its ''lest ..c,1ri'1.1 . r · "It ··s rinly after -':,"11-~YJ.P ·ith GA:1,PrA.l 1enYJev thrt T b0.,c;r11. ,~r: 1~r; u, ,0'" 0f t e lo<1ses li8 lnd usta-1~130 i_r try-i11.,,. to frctr"c.cite his 11 te,1t frc-"" t,br, --1riYJ.';er 11 • I J:y·cl '"'U·..,~este")i'.' tr TuCMl to ··ithdr~i,•r th"t sA.liPnt. Jeri-ney "'FIS rAluctrnt to do so becflu"e nf I l9YPn• er', jnf'J 1ence, trn l,.,tter hrvi,1"' "'e7.t th~t the "'1871l could 11.ot attn~'-. :'n.wt"'-r lo<;t rhcut 700 or 8rn '"191", 7 " tr,--. 1 - , 'P1.rl 11 '3iY-rou'1.C1 8r r'1.titQn1< l'.;ll'1S. :re S"er1,:,d 1uite cor,rlacent f 11.cl +'9lt tbrt '18 ..,,.,3 111:ite l_11e'cr not to '1rve 1o9t 'l •}olG b:rjrride. D:~cu.Jserl siturtio11. --ri.th r.;..-.~~es "'n'l 'Trrr'Jn11., rinc1 -it ~s a sou,...ce of srtisf- ction to 1-no r tlcrt tl,ose t•m .nhl0 co-m,.,,pnr1ers f'T'O -in re·n·,-.ve cJ1.'1 r-pJl~na t0rrotle3r. �HLucris nes not r:ro ~nt-:; detriil., . I 111'P-8d h;m to rl1:n"1n"te HFlrrnon rs his 'h.n .. llesty,o-rer rinc, 'T'qnl· O.f.'fi ':!<Jr .1..,0 c orcl7 '1Pt9 th9 11019 d0f911se . Fe rrr"'rently r''l'3 no '"'!Oh;le trn'· c'est,r1 -r9r un;t tc r 1 1"h ""ror-i '"'lace to Pl"Ce t:"3 thr' sit11rition rerpire" ; t . :r t,07.11 Lucris +,o use ~r"r1 shf1., 4n -t,},,-_,t co ··1n°ctic'1, +'oy, 'lnti- r>ircr~ft mms c::iri hr: used ; n an rintl - tfl'1l:: role . Al 7_ the o;non I .c;ot +'rom thAt su,.,.P-0,tion V-8.S p crihl" -<>ro,.,, 111.l;I to qf,mrl 1,;., an.oth~r 'lnti-8.;_rcr.-,f't P-1.m bc+,t,lion. I know it, r,r-n not be ~1p4nt. ;n90 4 n t 1y,t rire"' . It rou:r1 1Jc e~si!"Jr to send hil'l a ':'D Dr>ttPlion , and I P!"'l s,r-i:1cHng h 4 'f'1 t 1·m C0"1"r'rni<;"' '1'1'1 r>10tJ,nr hatklion of 155 ~uns for co mt0r-battery "rJor • A.r-i '1.lso r:etti>1p; r 4 T"' hi3 rerl,,c0rirmts ~mm0dirt9lv 8.nd setti"rJP ur +,'·0 ·"i,-,.,.t co,..,,brit +.erim o-" the R~th rnvi"'ior>· tr r,c 4 ntr -'.:,},9 bridP"0h0ari . 1" 1 1 1 11 Dur~--i~ mo"t o"' :resterdP.v- ,,..-..t".lrnoon tbor0 vnc; lo11r, r-:inrr9 r:hn 7 ljnr-• of the Anzio- 'Jettu.no flr9ri. , i·-icl,ir1 ; r>~ om· CO'"""'J, ·10 poc::t . ~ev9r[l l r;l ,-, , 1, 7 ...,11cled 4 n the comr~8:1.rl nost . A4 r r:!tion ..ms spor-:.c'lic , 4 r!clurl""l.;J' loF-level bo"'l,J7YJ.g flttr-c 1' in N9ttuno t1-i;s "10rn.;.,,,g , destrov;r1 r;ev'3r!11 P"'lrnun"tion truc 1·s r>'7.d C"'ls:ina C"SUPlties . Visit0rl '3St•1 anc'I q5th r•vec11.r-tion i{os-ritrls , "9lec;s0 rinQ •.,uer r sr0ct~w~ly, end t8l 1rer1 ,·th tl e ,.,r,m,fod . 0 0 rriP.et ~,e p+, 4;h~ 8.ir+"'" 8ld nt o0 LS in orc'ler -:.o c'H 'C 1 1ss lflst- minute rn~~o+,t rnd a fr; 17 c-+' his ,,t,:,f'f officers rres0:r-rt ~ncl finned the Dj_qti·1 ,; hed ...,PrV" 0e Cross on ,..,ru'"'co+.t . 117 Tpr1 T uca, detai ::' s . T-fr1d t:rnhe nlaht wes ;_~et.J1n:·~ r0c+,; c, +'or ·re h...,d r0~9jy9c7 , fron rT'es11~,...,bl7 T'Ol i"hl9 so1rces , i'1c'ic-.:"ti0ns o~ "'n all-out a+,+,..,cl• ti,; ..... o,:-ni..,_,..,. _ -t r'irl rot r'evP-lo;, '111.t t,"o 'lrn"~ 7 er 11tt11c1-~ r1 ev loy,ed rhrri.nrr tl-ir; 11~ r, t on tl 0 "'ro11.t o tl e l S7th I'1.-f'r-.ntry <inrl 0-1 thn +'r 0 nt nf th~ 1st 1'.1r.;t:i,1-i Div"-;ion . :30+,1 •,nrq .,...0.,.111,ed . 0 ~ 'l'Y\f'3n.Y'ls . ' 1 1 ...,I" r1 4 S'l.fro··11.+,0d ;n tl-iP. flir ef'fc~t . I foel t.het rlerrnds c;ho1 1ld be nirde for t½.e ::i+,r.<>te ic h~mh0rs to h0 us0d -:n clo e b::1ttlefi,,,ld ,urrort; it ...,ny do snmo, gooc1 ti,9re, n.1tho'1P'h strPter,ic bn:'lb..,rr1m81t m' b0 c1 c~·1 so;~e r;cod h1 c ttjn17; :_•q-': l CC'J"'1rimicPtio,..,s, "or si X 'T\O"'l.ths 0'1 mY r,ro11t 1. t l1n S :not nr0vented the r>nerny f'rctm mov~ 1~ in addit 7on.n l trOO;'S p ni sur-cl:1 8S fl. t , d 11. l "Di -rect 0 rl. rrr ri.clir-:in0e co...,, 1 a11.d * ost ')O "lC''•c,d t0rlay. n * * PK,c..r,:~nA 1 TO-- 1.:9RF'RY q, 191+/j,- -Genernl Clnrlr sp=mt the dry rt the CO'""TTJRncl rost in conferen.ces ":i th v<>.rious ~•:me1~.., l o.,..""'icers 11nc st1-1 ff offi.cers . Fe j s suffer_i.np- fr0'"1 a. verv ½nc. cold r,rr1;rrv:-:ited by hi~ eino; ur ell njisht O'1 his lP-st visit to the 11enchhead. 1 rhen tre shellin~ 1-:as co-n_tinuons n11d heRvy . He '7r>s visited to dn.-r by Colone l DRly of the 16th r:v11 cuation Hospital ,.. ho '{"Ve him thA necess,- ry treatJ"11811t . 1 Gr 1eral 3.'.'. v::Ule , Co":·~prd. · ''11 the XII /\ ir Sur-rm~t , cn..ne in ancl r'li8cussed the . lnns -"or !15_:;:- su:rrort on tJ:,e main ""'ro11t and tre bel'chhead front . 1 Gener,,l Tate v:i sited l}e'1.8rnl Cl11r -c and discusser1 t:he amrmnit ion situ,,tion) It had alread;,r ' ee>1 necessar;r to curtA.il tris rA.te of fire of' 155'11ITl ;rowitzers , l"lncl now 105mm 11rnmunition 8.frenred to be setti11.7 s1-0" t,- n S3rio1 7 situntio1 , R) �this aTI'7unition is used by the direct infn.ntry sunnorti'1.g battrlions . At JJ.30 General flexanrler , G9n~.:::--rl Fardj'1,..,, ris Ch;ef of _,fa.ff , ~nd Gener['l G<J.,..,r1ell , Gnnernl r;1son 1 s Gh;_ef of 3t<J.f.r-, ce~ri to c8ll on GenerMl ClPrk. T1'ey djsc,1ssed the rlr>n'3 for th0 rrospect·'.ve em loyment of' tre vrriou'> corps y-,pking up the Fifth Arrriy, ,ri th r8rticulnr refer'3nce to · t)y~ F-w1 Ze" l<>YJ.d Corrs under G9n9rc1l F'reybu.rg ,.,hich is ri1701 1t to go into Pction. After o,J.<-cu~sin'?; the stubborn defense the Qgrmnns w~re putting up in rnrl ['ro ind C2 ssino rmd the wer>r:i.ness r>nc'l derletion t 11£1t ''rere ::f'fecti:1g the 34t}-> Div"sio11., it "ff' clec~ded thPt t]:-,e di·~posi tio"ls of' the :e•;r Zealand Corpe, would he cr:inr·e0 so 8 s to 'ut .f'resh troors jnto ) the Cassi110 ?ttaclc. The 1/,.th Division is to '"J8' relieved in jtg :rresent nosition b tl,e 4th IndiPrt Divisfo· ''Thier "rill continue tl'e rresent attr>ck of the 34th . The 34th i ill h0 displaced "lo ~t1· 1arrl to the rj -;l-1t of the 4th Indi".n . The fow Zealnnd Wvfoion Pill continue in its r,ositio'1 at the '.1ead of t11.e Lfri Vrlley rerdy to push ',estward thro 11gh thPt corridor . 1 0 0 :'ollo"d11o; t! is co11.fer<:mce, G2nerP 1 Keyes r>nn Ma ..,e ··ut;'T Cr-i ef of Jtpf'f , Lt . Col. forter, stopped to see G81'1"'.,..l11 CJ"r r .,-1d briefly r'-iscussed t},9 -·ror:res"' o: 10 Cory-,s 1n its Pttac 1,. on C,., ssino nc'l tJ.,9 hi f"l- r;ro mcl controllinc; :20 1t9 '1?; beyo"ld 1 1 0 1 1 :tt . rnoday Genr;r<1l r:i.-,r 1o:: '.'lr"'l , ~ePtl;y cc11cernr>d to "..ef'rn th:ct t e GPr'72.11s b&c' h,ribed thP r:istr. ;vric'1rtion rosp-itn 7. w~st9r, ":r inst pfter he ly,d left the be::chhePd end A½out three ho1 rs rfter 9 h d loft tre 10s1-'tal. Colcnel '"uer ,,..,d been wo1r-1c1ed, 0 3 pff•·· so'1S "rir1 1,9e-n '•:i lled, · ·,0luc'l ir~ r 11 of:"-: Cl';~, three '1Ul'se s, , Red Croc;s fJ'--'_rl, ')Oy ., corr-s r1en Rn.cl r"t:rmts, /1'1C 'S 0 .-.c1 been ··01.,n.dod . Th=i hm b b'.d 1 fa 7- 8"' on t 11 9 JTos1 5tri.l r0criTl"rters' 'l 1 1 ' 'v,s--' r ec ·H,0 , 03"1 O'n f'3l'S0'-'1f'9l, m10h of the l osritnl "'1uirT'1e11t, -':11cJ1e'·,,,r; "{-ra.y i.'1~t&'1Pticr"', ra( b0e-r 'estroyed . 1 1 11 1 0 1 1 Toc1 n.y +/10 t rmv Comriander rece:i ved tr e -"ollo-rri_r g 1 e;t ter -"ror'l tre GOC, 'Jew Zenlrnd r.:orrs, Lt . Ge·1. F'reybi1.rg: :~"bl5sJ--,:h.p yoiir letter ::n fl ... recir>l rrr r,r tc •\11 rr,-,lrr (\.c> t e 'J9rr ZeRl/:nid no:r.,· s . I 1 .1 'Your wn-,,,, riessq gP o: · ·e 7 cc · e n.'1rl ,...ood --fishes dl:'.. 1--ie "'10 re. d uitJ--,_ a sen,·e of ;r"r1.e n.11r' E:fTreci~ tio'1 l)Y ev,:iryone . 11 1 'l"l 1 11 nsince "Te r·ave bee'1 }19re no l1'=ive seen your brttlefields ,..,., s0~G f'f t1.e "if'"ic'tlt-Le--: :rm, h·we ha.d to f'pce . VTe re1"life VThr.t the 'UV, f.rr y h9s r-crjeved, pnr'l tre C "fic rs fTr' 10 en of tl1e Leth Indio.11. Divis:i 011 rnrl the 'Jnd ·re~J ~8/llrnd Iiv;s1.011 ·1ill bP r,roud to f'ii:(1t elonr~side the Arericrn, :::>ritisb r'1d .,.rench troops under your co,.,,;1a'1.d . I '70l'l<' also 1~1(8 yo1 to 'enc ro---r much we r"v0 ap1 rreciated t. e "riencly cooperrition and helr ·e iia.vP hr.d from your sk f'f Rnd ;11 t"'9 :."'ormntio'1S 17itr vrrd ch ·,re hP.Ve been i.n touch . 1 0 1 w 'e hore thrt , ·e -rill be f'l:JlP, to plri~r -, 11seful part i·'1 tre di""'icult bFttle lies ~1!T·~c 8h8t:\C~ . f! The folloir-1_ng cr>ble, .'J ;,011, vr s received tod?y .(>rorri E'2 P.Cl'F: ."r- r;r.rc has c.ecicJed tr,.,t -if' ::=i. recisio11 on l'i.,,th y ni1 in front c, nnot be ~btri11ed. 5.~ ·1 ny <::_th9r ,.,.,r-r 'ie ''lill .,...:ui('r'1,r 71 Divisio'1· ,"'ror, l::ighth Army n.nr use :it to r9in'.orce '.ew Zen.l1mcl Corrs. As already arranfs"d by ~i~l,th .Army, 7g I)jvj 11 �1/ sion -rill t!1ere;fore be kert ot '21~ hours notice to !'1ove to Fi·"th Army ,-1r0° Pnd. nll"ns will be coF leted flt O'1ce to e'1f'bl8 such l:'. move to t~ke rlr,ce R.'> '"l 1 1ic 1 ·ly as -cossiblo j f orrler9c1 . To rmsure 70: Div:sion is fully in touci1 •ith •r.z. Corps pln.,..,_s Cor1d 7g Divisio"1 rind :recce ::-,,rties will report .z . , Division C{eedr:n1rrters <>t G qc~o1 '30 errliest rossibl8 IJ'll.(1 ·i:!..l th9r9r.c,tcr "'K'l.int in closest touch ith situ tion on '\Z. r:orrs front ,o th t the '1-ivic,ion crn be emplo;ved if.:' required .,~th lenst rossi 1 lle c1eleY. '~ighth Arriy will sif718 l -~TA N. Z. Divisio11 r;:eadaur.rters of Co,.,,rl rnd recce pcrties 78 ::Ji.vision . crm h::,c: also r1ecided that .:my 1.tlditionrl stE1P-f or sianr1 l rerrniren:mts of T Z. Corrs ,-ill be . Y"\et es 2 t0T1pc-,rar;,r meesure fro'TI -.ifth Cor'"'S r1 rind sipnrils. :?F'th Army w-I.11 noti y rll sucb re1 lfrerents to thi~ i:.r'1. who mill ..,rrPn[:r:i for ~revision c'irect with Fifth Corrs 1-::eepi11"' -:1 O'hth rmy f illy i 11-t>or·w~c . tr T 0 0 0 1 * }R SE'TZA.' 0--F~BP..lTAF.Y 9 , 194!;.--Gener~l Cl:ark spent t},e d'\'T Pt hjs conm nd ~ost in a series of ccn+'erenc,1s . GcmerA.l r,:,y 11r,,. ·i th a number of str ff o ficers , errived ot 1030 r ric1, ·rith GP.118rc-ls CJ.rr 1r rricl Gruen·~}-ir.r, rl:Lscussr:id nt lenr:th tJ-1e qission o.., t'1e 'Ten ze..., lri · 1d Corr s fl'1'1 t.re arr,.,nr:rments -"or er:rrloyine; it aro,md Cassino . Gener;-,1 Fn:-iy',urg , rmon~ other th~rn;s, e::s, ,ressed sc'ne arpre hensio:ri thPt the TTJO'1-" st8r;T bvj lrlin,~s ·ould , e used by tre G-9rmrns "'ncl "'t"ted t):,nt in ris opi'l.~on , i ~ J19Cessr.Y''y, the r s½ould b': ')lo'm do '1 hy artill'3r.r +'ire or hoT'!k.rdnent . Gen0rFl Cl,.,rlr decidecl to P'~Ve him ri written directive to tr..e effect thnt if in his judgment milit"r" necessity rlictated it, he wes erected to fire on tl e p10 11.rtster1r 1,uildinf. 0 1 ) After Gener"'l Fre~rht.1.J'.'f, h<>d t2lv:Ad for ~on, t-:r,e ,,,tri GPn9r"l Clr-rv- jn his vDn , G9nerf'l Vrevburg "ent to t;l·ie conf'erence hut nhere n long coriversr-ition W"S hAd bet !Veen General Fre r1mrg ::ind his stnf:· orf'icers ;-,nrl treir corresrondh1.g Fifth Ar-y ster'f o-l>fic8rs . I·1 -:.J,o T")eant~nie, G9ner"l Clrr 1' in his V"11 rec•~ivarl the nembers of a 'J9tt1P.rbnc1 s Armv mi c:sion vi:=dting the bA.ttle+'rorit - r '1.,j . Gen . Phnff, Colonel Vnn Der F- l ssche end c---..tr in Dr-dtenstein - to(J'eth'3r ,. ith e. TJnited >tPtes acco-mpAnyi.,..,_F: oc>ficer , f'njor Rr>nc1 olnh . AL'tor trese c::in-..,er9'1CeS , Generr J. (;lrrk c' pn in Ciscu.::sed the 1)ric1 p;ehorid sit,rtion with Gen9r"l l}r-1enther . Tri-=3 G rnrins Pre nttrickinc; 0Y1. th0 rirlr;r,hePd in SC'~1") norce, £'nc1 '}rrn0r"l Clnl", is nrrt~c,ilrrl:r desirous of r;ett··nr, <'ll the air support rossible , not onlv +'or -'ts r3sults on tr.e Q9rr1Pns but becriuse of the ' oral_ supr,ort ~;1 ,j_cl -it '"ill. f;~'lO to c-ur troOJ'1. ':'o h lr ::-ttr>in tJ--is (1'1.d, be invited /}e'19r~1 ;. v:il_le to ta1 :e lun~J-i ·-ri+, ri·1 rnd Gevinrr,l Gru9nther, nr,d at l_unch YFJS verv emrl1ritic rith G0·1er:0 ] ,2ville o'1 tJ,e necessity of' i"'lmedi~tely suTPrnoni·F; the '>trri.tegic Air Force tc, riic' i_·1 tr9 brttle r>t the br~ dgr:ihend . Generc l C1Rr1? srdd t}-r,t re lrn8W V""rY 17el.l tirt concen.t,rrtiors d' G-;rrn.an troors "nd r1Pteriel "ere not trn,'iti.cri:=il targP.ts f0r t 1-e _;tr"te-;ic Air Force but thrt 11t tre rresent ti,.,1 0 bnmb<'.'rdnent of ball- be£>rin(J' fRctories or r<'.'il junctions in the nortl:i of Ttaly hAd no 9ffect at 1111 on tre bridf,ehead battle . The nermRn troo s \ were 8.l'~CJRd'r jn tJ,9 'er>cl,heP0 11re" , l'.nd t'~•"'li.r e1uiprn9rit vr, thr,r8, rn/1 -·t WPS tre Ge11nrc 1 1 s r es~re to cnncentrat0 every "V<1il"11le .?jr bor1brrdr1ent resource, h9t}v"r str"te<;ic or otb0r ri-;e, OYJ tPrget"' within th9 ~11z-:_o --ren . Ge118r ls G:ruenthnr ;:i11d S"ville sr,~d thnt they ···Are hendinfl' tbeir effort-: i-ri tl'.nt dj_roction . Ganer,l Cl:ork r<;re,-,ted t rt -1-,1,e ;-r,ntter 17"S e:xtremol:17 si.,.,,nle in his ;11ind; re siriply ventod f'l] qvril,,hle 9.ir -..o·rel" C"PCentrrtec'l 011 the Gcry,,r,ns i.n the Anz-i o b,ttle ;;,rea . 0 0 0 0 �A little l.nter in tl~e [':i"t8r100·'1 tbe Generr,l Sup:rort Co,,m.,Y1c tbnt t½i 9rK1 t'Pc'l berm P chieved . 1 VT"S ;nforn9d by the XII Air C" G0ner..,l Clrrk r't tl e clo~e o·~ the ,-:,fternoon ct~ctnterl the '..'ollo-:ing rend1u0 for hi"' r i ..,ry: 1 t 0 eno- HJ hE>ve b8en some'vhr>t .,-,0rtur x~d torfr,~r bv tre ne 'TS -"'rom the Anzio beP ch:heed . Gene::::-::il LucBs "ent I'lR the -"'ollmri"lP' message: 1Fressu:re 11,crei'tlst Prit-"c-;J. 1st 'livisio·1 cnntL'1u~n~ . Enr:my rP.Tortec1 at CR 873'3 . Sitiwtio•1 not cl'3nT and e:xect loc.'ltion of lin':l undeternin0d . ~ppenrs necessPr r to er:irloy e.rditional ~orce2 to T"Jrint::iin front . li11 keer you advisec1 . ~eriuest 811 avnilrul0 n~r in1d nr:v..,J suprort on nort rind north"Test fronts of sector . Request iT"L'"'!ed·i_pte r-l2ns 1)e niride for tr0 shipment o-1" P'1 <1dditionr,l jnf'11ntTy division Pt the eA.rliost rossihle ·noncnt . 1 1 11 1 rePlied as ~allows: 1101.1.r ?'18 received . Keep T1e -ro,:;ted O"l the sjt,urtion . I f'eel yon C"'n stop T'1ost "nyt1-,··nr '7ith the 35n t11n1·s you hwe . hen you r'?,uest ~ir , try to gi'-18 loc1.t~o11 and n"'ture of ts:;rr;Pt-, . 'e1cthP.r -n9rnitt~1,r , entire '-'-tr effort of' XII Air Suy.;rort TPct5 C" 1 and Str..,ter;;ic ,ill be concentr,.,ted on your front Thursdry. 'le h;::ive a.lerted 1 rr-ivy. } res1me ~rou ri.P'~e your rer:i. 1ests "or nRw 1 su1 :rort tr.rouc:;h Lo..1.·;r. You T"lUSt reri]:i ze tl e 1•• -r,r.,cticPbilitv of' 38ndin~ ;v-011 Pn pr'ditionPl inf211try di vision ..,t 0'1ce . Shipping, TT\f' i -1:.enr>nce ririd "V":.i 1r>bi litv o cliv~ sions .,re fn.ctors to be considered . I :1:-ive 01·dered this rl~te Another British briP,Pde group to irour front . Everv e-l"'f'ort vill be ,.,,,,de to e:x edite its R.rrivnl in your area . ~ wo 1lrl 3A.Y vou crin eJ'""lect it in P'lou~~ Le or 5 days . :::t · il1 b8 167 Bri<;Pde fro"1 the '56th D-lv:lsion . Tbj 1 vdll r;jve -rou t,,o ri<?'F19s of tl1js divi,ion, and ,.,t .-1n e::irly dPtc I conld ""OVe in t'1e 56th D:ivision T-J:en.rlriuPrters . Keep ne posted on your R. )il-i.t7 to SUTP1' ac'ditioml troops. I PT'l "'till ';'11:inninP' on "'ending E'notl:or crrnhPt te,.,T1, 9itl1'?r '1riti h or Amer:l.crn , ::i ter the 167th. Ani "s1dn~ G r,era2- "c'"nhon to rw1r.~r 7ith yo 1 tenporf"rily to act :cs vo 1r ~)eruty. "'0el 1-ie will be of gre,.-,t ""'s-~stance to you . Fleese '"lo r",snrec1 of' mv comrl.c>te of'.,..ort to suTJrort :rou jn ever r no'1s;bl9 r.:r.v. I 11n19 ~ull cc.,.,r.;r'ence : 1 succec,C)f'ul outcoc-1e . 1 0 1 1 1 0 7 1 1 "He shoulr 1 rnon etter trPn to derrnd <inothor :'11.fflntrv divi~ion, realizing f',111 7e11 tl,nt co not 1F1Ve t½9 div:i sion, e~·cert t' ose t½Pt Ar8 tired "nrl comnitted to b~ttle; nor do I kwe tl'e sM.rri·1a, nor co11lrl it be .1r·i_ntd.ned loi;,;ic:tiCP' ly in t'~e 'JeP chh .ad . n In coming to t'1e cr'nclus;_on tly,t , Bri ti '"'h by,ir;ade p;roup sbould be <>ent, I vre~ p-hed crrefully th, Y'ARuJ.t<> on tJ·,e 10 Corrs A.tt,..c1: . Thrit corr" hr•s ..,,pr'e J.ittl8 pro'!ress, so t:c'l<inf; "'nothr=ir rio-,qc1,e fror1 it '"'roulr' m::iJre littlA c.iff9rence. It ~o 0·1t of the li Y1e , ~ nd, "'ccm~d1110- to the Chief' of Staff I s rerort (1'3ri.g?r3.ier Cooh~) H 5s in pretty cor' si,"T''1 . Ro.,,lizin" thP. implic.,tio11 o~ t.-,1dnp; this '!Jrjf;;:-de and its r9percussions 1 dt 1 lexA."lrler , I phon~d hh11 t0 +971 him of my decirion, rnr1 , l'l.lt½o 1~h it tno\:: him bv S1l.Y'T'rise, h8 ren(ily "gre':!o . I r"'l kkj11; tro ]_()7th Brigr,ce, "'or tri:i lfAth or the c,r-17e '56t1, ni.visio,, is ..,lr0"c'y :in t11e be,,crbe . . ThP.re.,d fore , I cr,n se 11c1 the 169th up bter , hi~', ,Jill 1 rt t 0 •·· ol9 rF vj "'j 011. ::n. 1 "Gwv,rn.l J\Je'"'ln( er rho11'"Jc'! TJI';) /1 +'0,,, m~nutes rwo , 1"r0SU."'1rblv influ0'1ccc' by Harc1 ino- '1.YJr ,fteT tel~:'..11g •·ritr "cCreer7, to t87l "'1e tlr>t he horied ':Y sendin"' the I �1-S?th in ;rs to renlnce i}1e :nost tir8d rme of t 11e bt British Division F"lC tbr>t, trerefore, only the rersonnel neec1 17,0 U;", tn 1ce ovnr t e 1st British l'ivision e:mirl"l9nt And thrt rerso'u"'lel come out, o':' tre berchhe?.d. I infornecl him thr-t this was ent:i:!. el'v contrrrv to my i'1r:ia'1 -"n•l thr>t I clirl not r-roro"'e to do jt thr>t vmy, th"t ~ ,-,as se11di'1g anotror bri.:-ade "'.rou:r up because I f'elt thnt I needed thf't extra i'1surance :in thflt aren. r,nrl thrt lrter, Hhen tre s-·turtion "lPS nell in l,;:ind th,:,re, I 1oul(l ',e P'lR.d to rota,te f8rsonn.Pl out o tho ½riclgehead. He insisted, rmd ::: strermously olJjecterl r>nd tol(1 thPt -· f rny of the 1st B:dtish rivisio11 wns to c0:"!A out of tlrie 1::Jr-ir:gAhe,:i,,d nor' : t ",ts ov9r I'lY trongest obji::>ction rnd thet he v1011l•' bnve to g-iv0 me rin order in ,•rr.iti-'1IT. ·re told ~ e tJ:,e British 1st Div~ sion W,"3 tired. I tolrl h:i'1 so the '<rd Division but tJ,,,t if the situPtlon f;Ot crit:i crl thRt all V:'nulc1 hr.v':l to +'i ;ht nri9th'or theY r:ot tir9d or not. I tnl0 l1im none o+' tl7 e troors '!ere OS tirec'l 93 tl1e French or t're :::r Corn, . :re also told me thrt h9 hPd cPlled 'cCreery, o- 'e of I'l7 cubordinntc co~··r·~-:ers, ,..,nrl ok 1d -my orrlors. I told H~·' thn~ I obiAct9d to thi", f'or I hrve tli.e Putbority, ns an Army Cor:, 1r11c'er, to i,sue the order th"'t I hrd c,j•ren . Fe r"h:)d for '19 to 1119et h-tm at ;1oon ~t r·ccr9ery 1 s VeridquPrters toTTJorro' • I 1 1il1 strenuousl1 ob_iect to b:ringi,1p- qny troo~s 0 1 1t o" tr'A l1r:ic.c;ehePrl untjl t1 P s 4 tu,..,tion :s ,.,,nre cl,..,ri+'ied there . I '1'"'\ [;orrv this (:iif'f'ere-0co of orinion l-i;:is l"r~se11, f'or it onl~r [lclds rcdition::il IO;~ric,s tn t'rie rwnv I pJ..:~e-"'1 Y lyv':l, ½11.t I 11il: rec:ist, "ith .?11 t\-ie energy I hrvo, 1-is co,.,,---;rnc i:r£; r.iy Ar'"!.y.n 0 1-,~, 0 0 0 F~-" 1 1 1 At q•)o11t lTlO GAn9r>1} ClrY•k 4 nform,:v' J:,is rideq ,~1,,:,t /1 trir to GenPr<1l 1 'cCrAery 1 : Feridro'JP-rtr>rc; ½y r,ub ·~as to ,e Elrrrnc·er.1 tre follo ,~--y, r1 "7r ~t 11c0n :n orc'er to r~rr,jt hh,1 to flttc.md A con"'erence l7~ -':.L Gener~ ls Ale:x-Hnder rinc' ·•ccreerr. Sbortly tl-ier1y1 "'ter, G8·•1 ')r'll -.- 0.m11-i tzer C'l 7 l'"~cl Q9n0r~ l Gr 1 1enth"'r ,J10 sr if tr•<>t 1 e Ut1('9rstoorl +,hrt +,be er '1f'erenc9 to..,orro'"' '"n s to 1,8 r r:, ln to ;,ett le +,},P, question ns to •h_et11,3r tr'e l'S?th Br~_p;rrle , ,0,,1 d rnr J_r1ce troors of' tl'e 1st Brit-L"'h Division or ',011lr' ')1: rin <>dn~tion to tPP"". G,.,ner"l Clr>-·11 • cr• 7 1":ld Gen0.r"l T--1'rrc1in~ to reF<::sert thrt 1 e hrrl m·i •e ap l: s m:'.nd th"t t 1-r:_s Pou1c1 b9 "'1 'rlrJjtion "'nc: -,,_ot r re1 lnce"'!0YJt . G:rriP.ral ".rr11r, "Tho -is no .1 rt the Fi i:-t,h ,\rr'ly !\dv<>nce ConnPnc F ost, sent tr8 f'ollowi:1P- cq_bl9 to G<:"erril Gruenther tor'":>r rer;"rc1~11p- t,h3 s~t,.1ntion on the fnzio f'r0nt: 1 m·. 051. 11 ""'119J11Y cont:inU•')S reM :r ,79r3•.1.,~e cr""~'1-t 1st D-ivisio'1. Th5s ,njt h"'S s1r''fer9d i1e~ V'"J losses, r nrl Corr"nder rer orts 1-Je c' n not holrl ~rese11t front. 180th Inf'rntrv i beinn; put i'1to lino 1J1:lt'YeAn 1st Div~ sion ri:rv:i lrd Divi -iio,,,, trkinr; over :r 0 rt of rresent 1st Division +>ront. ·-rrrrr:on will e""lrloy t"m COT'lfPnies 0i:- l:5_rrrt Pnd one ;)Pttqlion of "0rliu:1s this' r-"'ternoon to rssist on reestrblishing front in 1-st Div·sio11 sector. ~:verv effort ~1101 170 be 1'1'\M'e to 0-:r'3dite RGT o-;: 8Pth r-i,r:i,sion . T,on~ r"'DP'9 r,.,.t:111,..,r;r ' 1it ~nothcir "',1nu11;tion rlm1r Pt 1100 bonrs. 1' 0 G3n9r2l (;Jnr1r cnb]Pd 6r1P'lirrl ~>1nn;11r-J.vr1 ti j _ , ~ft9r'1oon, F'J 1143, thr") ·in,; \ jyn -"er t,l;,9 rrnT1rt st9--,,.. t~ l,911 to ,,-rc-v:i_de 'Y' Vr' 1 ,~m-~irA snrr ort f'or pj ft}, f rrn:r oper.?tions. * * �noon ~· itl'l Gennr;:,ls ~lexrn-v'er ['Ylr'l r~cCreerv ,-,t 10 Cor:;s re'lc1 r;u"rters at Sessri, ceciaec to flv ,-'O'T. to Car-;ert'l by cub •n1cl ccnf8r ,-,.;th C'r9n9r"'l A.lexrnder th8re. rre cen1Jrtcd +'ro"'l ·\hp '";"'" 71 C"'t\ -"i9:d 11ertr t "e '"'i ~~tl ArT"i.y Cor,.,,E>n l ! ost at Pbo-ct 0900.· . :t8 l"'nded :in the old 4'erriil.;nr ror'l .;n f'r0nt c,.c- t½,9 forJ'!ler Fifth Ar'"'ly for rarc1 Coram.., n,1 F Ost ,-, 11(' rirove Oo··rn t0 tr 8 c-=i c:t le ,-,]-,ere he i rnmer j ..- tely 'ient irrto c0nfer"mce ,,.;th Gen,..,rnl Ale:z::-'1cler. Genernl ra,-,r 1r1 s 0 1 ·rn notes t½is con"erenc8 follow: 0>1 = ' 1Th-ic; rnorn.;n--:..,. nhonec1 G,mer,.,1 Al8':"n'er, telljng 1~jM th,,t VIPS reluctrnt to ·-rai t ,mtil p O I cloc, to '17 'JCUS'1 ...,;th !'1"' U·e build-ur :i.n ths briclw hP,tVl. T d.;d tl~is h,c.n1we l ~,e.s relnctnnt to r2V8 t'~.," w,+,t9r di scussec with J"'P, before .. cCr8er7 vrl:iA'1 -'-,:,0, lA.tter h"d no+,'hi.,,_c- to rlo yr-ith .;t. J fle-' to Alexrnc1e:r- 1 s 1 Heerl'l_11<1rtr.;:rs on,' +,0ld rini, l,ef'o-,-.9 ·:rir"inr [')1'1 L8"'nitZ8T', 1 0 l unaltPrnbly I 'c!PS OF"OS.(' +,o ru+ti·1,.,. '1r.;t~.:::'1 51'.'>th Division 1"1"its .;nto t 1 e hrirl.ctnherrl ri:vl '"TithcrP'Ii"lr "''1 ,s111.r'l m::i.nber o-1: 1st Britisli Di,1isio·1 u,1-lts. 1'.:r~.,.,..9ntly 1'9 h d '"leen tl,e i sdoT" d1iri11~ t~·e 11-i __, +,, -"'or T 1"rd •10 dif-"-l r,ult•r -in putti'1~ ovqr =y 1 lrn. 'To dou',t L 0 "'1nitz8r 'ircl contr 4_',uter' to 1.'·r-rr1 -it. h '1n-:J:•eed to ·-ut ~n t e e-·1tire S'Stb Divisior :=pvi_ : 9PV'3 t"e 1st 1iT'; t~ sl: "'1ivision; tl-irt wo11lJ c::::ve r~e t-m P.ritish .,..,ivisio11s 4 11 th-=, hrid.gnlerd ,nr two /\meriCPn In.c,'ntry I,ivisions, r,1'1S :rarmon1s "ore<> !J.VJ." m~sc9llL.YJeous units . I sent the follovring rar :iocram to Luco.s: 0 1 0 1 RN 1816. ",fill senrl -~e.,,,r ·i. nr' er o+> S S Brit isl' ::Ji vis :.'.o"l M f'r st :1.3 sh:Lpring 7 is rvc1il:>bl i . TJ-,is :)-'.vis.;on :,.;1_1 then cor,sist of 167, 163 [inr: lSq Brir: c es. 1 1 c-ut o': 1 ere 'by tor1orro" 17.0r"irr; l'J7 1!'i1ar e "roup sho'11d be cor-rlntel,r lordec a...,,l .;r "Our ::incls by tomorroF 11.; <t}•t. 169 lr.; r-rcJe rrc~ :iv.; sion r..rerdrp1r:cters ,·::1.1:::. folJo-' it 7..'7:'19di,-,tely es en ft r,3-t,,ffns. •re "'ill '1..-,n 011 t'ro Briti3h In"A.:1.t'"'•r err +,,;o r~~':,sd ·t~t s Jryf'pnt::-,, Divi;:;·'.or, ~'1. 1)riclgeh8ac1 plus ·: rr.10'1 1S "o:---ce :nc1 in Pdclit~o'l to ,.,,.;sce11,meoue 'lni+,. I"' l_o?i;tics · -lJ: rqr-,'t, ~ ,rjll add i11""l.C 'l' 11,,· t,r ,~rJT"t1i·1d ,~ 0" the ::..st fr·1or1xl '. 4 -ri.r:i.on ~r;tVP'"" :~r.;:w",- " T n-f:e11.sivP. r>ctio--i. ~r '"'1lt rjr "),..,..ort on 70lJ:' ~r,,nt todPI • • r8C1U'"" Tl)U 11PV9 nrw1.l f"1mf':i--,-.e su-:-1.·or+, •ro 1 1 ri9S~r8. Co1 1l" ',('tn9 +;p,,,_:,,~ be ro·c>-itr-t')J.y e""ploy9rl, rlu~ .;i1 -in sur,-,c:rt cf .,.,rort roc-iVLOn..J? A."i snro /i,5 l].'Tis·io11 ·-yill star 0np:1r R.C'l,'n.ce." 0 0 0 0 7 "AftA::.~ hnd "'"'1'1.0"9T'J911t ·1 ·,½n "'18t 11od for ld Y1 to 1·1 ~V9, "c•r '1!rri 'IG v--.; '1 r'c_<'c•i_ssi.on :;: f'T0 '•'3 , Jith '}911erc 1 AJ.ex,"n~rn• T "'I'3011P llJ rind told to ½e f'rr11l- 9.-i_d th·t l rrt,,.,<;r ',ac} .~,,,lt sr:nrY: ~t rr:n+,"l"'j Ct";d jn rriy· o+' t}e l<'i·"'tl, Arrri:r 1-iscriuse nf hPv~_ ":O ·~A.ny \11 iAI'.' Cor-0-i. T told. 1,.,5,.,, 1w 07, 1,-; ,:;1 1 '; <1c;sirrn°f tl--9 1•9,., Ze,"lrnderJ t,h9 7g WO, :V'119i"h~t •muc:url te 1..: Tn9 ";~:ri ctly ro , to 8''1 -ilo;r tri0m. : rut cvcir rw } o·· r,t "':~11, I beh=i 1m 1 erstoocl. n 1 G8nerril Clrr 1 '" retur'"l=ed to 1-i, l-ier1d,iurirtcrs <=>t 10/;5 rw1 , ~-"tor ~.,forF:i'1p; Genorf' l fi-rll<"nt118r ('+' 11,ad h<>d oc~ui••n~d ,,t t I} r:ieet: 11[' ,- ~ t' /"}0°1.'"'r[' 1 II l ';'cE' nder' 'i1J"911t to n13 VP'} ;1.r1 ·-ror 1"00. OP fE'""'9l"'S un"t,il ]110, 'Jh"ln Colonel'1 T'";.r'!zo9 ;,n_n '~y7nrc, ·1ho hail. 0 1~ 0 -✓ ~'1 up "T"C"' 'rA.r l"'s, 1/1['( 8 [' :re;r'~On"l_ C, 71 011. ri.n, st?yi"lg "or l1 1nch. 1 Ge>1ff'r>"l (:1_,:,r•)r i'1 -=:;u""'e,-.-i 1g ",-.o, rf'th0:2 01'"' C'1lr'' '1.11(' ],8 "')<;n-1; thA rP.st of the E1.,.,t9rn00'1 ,,r,r1:-irip on pt'pi:,rc; cnrl lrri vrr~ous section c½iPfs in. r, �The hecV1/ ni_:~ rroCT'>J" ~cl--_9(:>-1led irest0rr1p7 t0 b:---e,, 1• 11r Gerr'l,nn tl-ire,,+,eni11r:- the Anzio beBc1 1hen.d '7as ,lmost totGllV ~trillnc:1 ,,.,y -'-,r" rP l Sl,,rk raa n crv, "9rrmce let9 ·in t, 1,9 R +'ternoo'1 --i tr G8'19r"' 1 '"'nv to ri~TTJ thf1t hePV7 C0'1C9ntrr't~.on of' n-ir rnu~t stri(e p 7 ni:r1:·t ~- lzio ' 4 t is c7irri'lti-::ri117 nossible . I ccnceritr<>tioY\S ,·e2th0r . Ge'1e- \ llo ~n ",tressed U"t [!S roon PS 1}0ner1.l 0,l<ir1, toda:r ''eceivnd 9 criblA -"ran ArlmirPl Lo ::;:-y, R.n '355/10, stating tl,nt, the PT ?(ll l''lS b09n sent to Pi_?;9rte -"nr r13rairs Bnrl tJ,~t " rerl-,cei7<'mt ,•rp,3 bPi"'P' Se'1t to • P'""llAs ;.,,111.,di..,+~1:r ['8 p rer 1~c0,..,e'1t . 1 Ger8r.2l T,ucas cahl90 toc1Pv, '"'.F '3/,1, thr-1:, furth9r siell:i'1C;' 0f lio~rit"l 11re"S 1-wd occui~rc;d ~n tl19 1\'1z-io brjcrrerer.icl ,,reP. As ri. r8s11lt 0.., tl-i~s , 11.e rps decided to riove +,}·, • cs-.. ~+,P.1s to +,be ef'st f'l~ ,1• C'.., +,J,., sector tn"10-r•ro1·' • R • '3?? . "Yon,,. r1 ec~ sion cc"'c8rn-inrr l'S7 Bri;rrde fAr3011fll Lncr,s to 0,lPr 1- . Group c0nc11rr9d ;_ri . Th~ "l 'lriP'rrlo r:roun "hon1r1 ccvn3 i.,, -Jquipped r"1·l J'9r>cly ·"'or COI""bat . T'fo hrin-n.de '-'l'.'om1 to 7 eave 1-ieri,c her,d . 11 Per Pn"l C]prv to Lucri-:i . P'J unr,. !IT'fill se11c't -r'AT'1.."iYJ.cler of' 50 Brit, sr f'~vjrir; fR,t '0 s1'-i_r:j11F· is rv·,-ilrhl9 . T11ic; 1ivision "I-ill thc".l C"'1sist o-"' 7(,7, V,8 <>nd 1(;g Brio-rdes . 1S7 Rr-irrtde Grom"' sionJrl 1:)9 cnr1rl,.,tr,ly 7.orred out c+> her0 ')y t,,'10rrcn mnr.,,.,,,~~ 7"'1, Y01U' 10 ,nrls lyr tomorrrwr Y\~r·l·t . 1/)q Prig'lcl9 [1'10 .)-ivi'3ion Fe c'l1uart"'rs ·-rill follo~1 iJ~ in;1edir1 ,..el· PS cr<>ft retur'1s . •:e "'ill plPn on -L,vm Rr'tis}1 In PY1tr7 l'W~ t ro 'Tniter1 ft.cites :n+>rintr•r T)-ivisioY\S jn l,rj('lr,:~horir1_ nl•1s '!rir'"0'1 1 S +'01~cA P'1d in Pr!c-itio·1 to n·1cA11"'19ous units . P' lo.,.istics vlill nr:,:rr1it, I ~-,ill r-ild rrri<ln,.,Jl~r th"l ,,,erin.5nclor of t,ho 1st rr,,or8d ··1vi~-ion .o;ottinr; reP<'1V for o-:'fensive net-ion . All 011t 1.ir eff'ort on .7O1 rr f'ront torlr•r. 1res1•ne vou i,,., ,13 nr-v::il mu,f-ire ,,,,lrpo-,,,t von des-tr0 . Conlri 80m8 tnnJrf'l be rrof'• t hly emrl oyecl , dug i11 -ln surrort 0f +>rant roc;itjons? Am sure 1~5 Div 4 sion 'ill stop 3llA'TIY flrV" YJr;e . " 0 sion ,..,_a 1 The llrny CoP1mR 11der todnv dict8tocl tl-9 +'ollo,·r,rf'" ,.,,87"or.?ndrn'l for hi'.3 Chief of 3tri+>f ~ ith ret;"rcl to f ltu.r9 off,=msi ve oper~tions: 1 "l. 'jt}, the remov'"'l of tr0 S/)t), Divi -;in'"l P,,,o,,.., t,½9 ]_() Sorns f'ront n11c0 trio exchf''1<";8 o,,. t,l•e !/,t11 Br~·':/ sh Divi3ion by the !,th Divis:i.on , we rnu--:t mor1ify our rJrrns . } l0Pse hrvr::. G-3 ,-,.:.9r::-r 0 r nr,w set of' i11s+,.,..uctio>1s .,t j ch · 1ill rrovide +>or tro fol 7 0 17~ 11rr: ~ §; • ,-,,he t<> 1-~n'; o-"' C'l.Ssi·10 f-lnd tJ~e hi r,', f"""('OU 11r nortk10st t'1.,..r<>ff.- b•r t e 9vr ZeRland ".Jo·•TS in the PVCJnt t 1 P.ttriclr toJ11orro= bv the V+t1' Ji vision fail.-. . 1e 2• 'T'he co-ritjnuPtion 0-" the <i.ttMck 'w t,hp French 011 tre e-:ds T0relle ~oc0Aseccr , Pssist0c'l l;y th9 II Corrs jn 'l nrirro•r zo11,e routh thereof Att1:1c1ring in colurm of' rivisicw1 s . Th:i.s will n-ive the II Corrp ~n o'~porbmity to ··•Hhc'lrPw one c:li.visior frorl\ tl-i"'i~ li'19 +'or r9st P.'1C r9f'ittin~ . c . Tl-ie rittnc1r 1y tl·e 'Tow ZeP1'l'10 Corn:?, ross~bly re-li-i+'orced by ,..jvision- (British) i'1 tl'9 Lfr 4 V1:l10y. f. t}-P, 7qth A holc1 :ij7f; ottcic'r i-nintA.ininf" stron~ rrer-mre by +,h8 10 COTf'3 i'1 thP r•;rtiir110 1:1re:1 '"Ii.th on0 d~v:iRion, th"l otrA"' r1~vi3ion b0i11q ,-,~tr.0rr ..,11 f'or rest c'nd �for ult,rriPte emrloyr10nt ir th0 Liri V8ll3y. ~• VP. lley . ':'o hold tre B'~tb Division i"l rrr1y re-:;nrve f•or GXI loitctio11 in th0 Liri f . To holrl · t½e J 8t,b "RY'iti sh Br~ r;Mde Grour out o+> the li:ri.9 for ro~sj ble eT11ployment for rel_ief n.t thr1 brirlp2hearl or lrter ev-r-loitation nros1 ects . "Let I s try to o;et :., pla11 v: . : cl1 -,~rovic1es ,~or P".l P 11-out .,.,i f'th A.ryiy effort i'1 one vi tn.1 a re 8,, ·-,hile ,old~ •1p in others. l le11se e-vTedi te this. 11 Perso"lrl Lucf's to Clrir1•• R" 3rig . 11 1119 to r.rese: t Rl ortrge of infn'l'ltry to ::::ur:;ortinrt arrs in B:d.t:i..s T'i7isior. reco-,-~,,,1c th:;t 167 :n~rntr:r Bri;:;~l'e '7ove to t, is sector at lj_p-rt scr> le onl~r c'1d not Bd_f~de Group . '"a"~_mun r mr mjtion should be brou1;i1t . Otber c111its o""' Drii:,;<'<le Group crn ',e c<'lled forurird later. 11 0 1 1 * * * IR.Er;~,~;TZA1'0--P~B7.TTJ\RY F, 19/_)~--Because 0 f' his cold, Gci,,,,,erfll ClPrk did not Jer->ve the w=-vi tb-,.,our,b011t th9 entire rriorn:: ~e1 . ne r0mf'jned 8t '1:is des', "10r1dnr- on vn.rio11~ 1JJ~v,ertt r.intt9rs , :i ncl..11.ci11p; str ,,_ctl1eninr of' the A:r>zio be?.chherd ·;ith P British Br~g~de Group . 0 0 At 1110 he receivec1 n,, jor GenP-rrl F cH['ro11, CorJnrncler of' tbe ~tr A..,,ericrin J11.""~F1try D~ vision , ,·,ro is in It" lv on rn in3rection tour . Th0 Division "'t rresent is in ~nr,land . Later, Gnnerr ls Gbr"lr rnd Mcf''-1.hon ·•rorc joined bv I'r,jor Genern.1 Robertson, CoT'1mander o-':' tre ?nd An2ricrin Inf'rintr;r D-i vision, "rhich is P lso in F,nglnvid . Gew:ir1:1 l •~ci.'lP.hon returned yest9rd'l~T froT"'l the Anzio bridr;ehe'-"'d, rincl he f;PVe (},=mrmcil Clarl,c a f:irst kmd re1 ort on hi3 :i11rressio"ls of the situntion up there . Gennr,9.l Br1:inn n lso returned from the hr-i d1;1>he:id yesterdr.y. The si tu"'tion up t:iere hrs j_mproved a great deel d'1.ring the p 0 st ?/.J. hours , Pnc1 the German thren.ts hrve been beateri bn.clr . Lnter in tl· ~ cfay Ge 11erri 1 1wille n.nd Air Vice Fa:rshrl Dl' lbiac conferred witb tl1 e Ge;1erPl. Genernl Clrrk clictr>ted the followini:i; with regf:lrd to air support oi' the l<'i.fth Arrriy: vrns only as P -result of my P 11-out ef'fort to conce!ltrr>te n 11 tre P ir in \ this therter on my -'"'ront th::it tho CP'C rutl·oriz9d tbis the dny before yesterclr:>y. I 1"\a·1 ntained that for six T'JOnth;:; the Str:=i.tegi c Air hri s been j nterrupting eneT"y lines of corirrunicPtion bnt not su+'fi c:i.cmtly to r•revent h~ s oringj n; down wrirtever di visions hn neeclec'l , suppl~ : nr; them and -'::l gr tine; with thoP1 . Never yet has air preventecl 11ove11ents or sup,lies beinr- riwiiln.blG in ordAr to rerri:it suffic~,mt -f'ip;htin£; on the pirt of the e!1e17y to stop us . 11 It I As r rGsul t of trie cecision to use r> 11 tre 9.~ r, my stP ff, , ror"kinf, wHri XII Air Support , lri:i.d on £' fine rrogrrm for Stl~ategic , TPc 0 nc1 YII Air ..::u: r,ort in clirect sup:;ort of' the Anzio brittl0f::ela. _,..or JTester(;"'Y. TTn..,ortun,,tely, weather closed in ['t 11 o I cloc 1 , ;:i_nd 011],, rt out 1/1.~ o+' the 1 roP-r'lm n.s pit ; nto effect. : TTord fro1TJ +,he bridrreheecl s 11ow9d bov1 it b osted thP.jr riorale enc how ent;.usfactic the troors ~;ere to see i11cicc1tion8 of close •·ir nur,,·ort. ';8 r,:,·;ri"l l"id on yrrntGrdGy-1 s incomrleted pro~rn.n ""or ~~od'ly , l,1.1t v!et1thlr J-,as not fAr1,,itted its execution . 11 0 HTod.s.v, J.ir Chief n'lrSh£'1 D 1Albi1.c , TrP i>,h,~r ' s Depu+,y /\ir Co•~r,,r>nr1'1r, 8ncl :::MvillC:l ,iu,t called on ''IP., nnf in 2 cr>s1J1"1l_ co:'1.v0r2ntjon, told rie th t the r,eci- ~ sion b1<'1 1"'9en r1tirie t'·d s ~,orni11o; b~r t}-,9 .?ir , ·7ithout r~ference to m<-), th"t the )\ 0 �Str::1tegic, I told t1'e nrese1ct my reriuest to or h0aviP-s , would. ~o br-clc on their old co:-imu11icn.tion job to,..,.orrow . \ ldr ··arsbn l tb.Pt I v1r>s l0C' ~ opposer.. tc this rila11. ,ind hoped he would \ vir=ns to E8 1rer 1111d <"\lessor , trirt I mnde t1-rour;r rin 2.n official lay on one d"'y ' s <ill-out air pron:r:,m -i_n snrrort of' riy bric!1.;-'3heed . nr nr r0cordi11r-- t}-1: s to 1ndicnte thA +>8ct thPt teie 'pj_r oftent~_nes run their Om -mr, ,-rbic: is not ,"'l"JP'fC conrletely coor!i:l.nrted dth tre ITT'.'ound . I L"e.i,1triin thPt O11e 0ny 1 s 811- ont ~Jr effort in close surrort o+> the bridgehe"d on 1·11011m enemy concentrE1tio11s , nrtillerv- rirori s , c'u,1rps 01 nc'l cor,~unic'-ltion centers will cert,,,inly slow nr Pr.ri r<j~courrp;e his +'urth9r P1.ll-out nttr,c'c nhich re is bound to make . At len st we s:~oulrl r:-j_ ve ::1 t a try. I doubt if the.· wi 11 comply vlith rrn request . u 1 7 At 1530 G"mer"l Fre:rburg rinrl menbers of h"s taf'-f' nrriver:'l, c>YJ.d G,mern.l Cl11.rl;: V'ent ~YJ.to co:r.feronce rit 1'1 tr.en jn t},-3 con+>errnce hut . Tbe t:;rour · hj ch al,30 i11cluded G,.,11eral Gru,-=mtJ~0r f'nd ~3mi,0rs o.C: w-rious F-i Pth Army ::;ectio11s , discuc;sed tJ,9 co"lin~ srirloynent of +.re ,.,nd ~i8'1 Ze[llr11rl DivisioYJ. Elnri the Li-th Indian Division, wh.:ch conrrise Gener<>l ..,reyhur~ ' s 'Jew 7,ealf'nr1 Corrs . Followin,s the co 1<>erence , Q9rerrl Clnr1r returned to ris vn.11 to n.g,,jn nork on lo ,isticrl rrobl"'l:11s v·1 ii le GFm8rri 1 Gruonth"r refl" ~ 'lr>d i.n tl~e l ut to act P s host to Goner 0 1 :::"reyburg nt tre t:raditio'19l British late cfternoo11 te8. . 0 1 GenerqJ Clr-r1c fllso receiv0rl in tre late pfternoon P.n intollifence report from Colonel Howard. . Colonel Ho'-ra.rc1 sqid thPt tre siturtion i11 the bridgehead area V't=>S rruch i-proved . For dinr,er Ge·'le}~Pl Clri.r r had Lt . Col. :Port0r, SecretFry, Ganer"'l 3t2ff , as his guest . General Lucr>s rAnorted 011 1'is situ"'tio'1 2s f'ollo'rs this morninP": 1m 353. En°my comrrirntively -i n,,ctiv0 r'•.1.rinP' r.ig'~t . B.elief of Gur,rds Bri p;1=1de by BBttri lion 179th aCCOT'lpHshed ::.--TI10othl;y. EP.rly r9rort on ."'tt,,c'r of 45 Diviecion Pfperr sot::isf-"ctorv, rilthoug]-, heavv f'j_r,hti---i-,_; is in rroF,res-, . At 08'30 h.ours lenling cor:p:,nv- 179tl1 Inf:rntrr hPd reoch9d fPctory . '7 tc:.,-,~·, '"J9r8 puPhed through olc. rrilronrl. 1mderrrss, ? knocked out ut 5 co:-1tinue ~n cJose surrort . Con"icerrble German act::vit;r, co•1position rnd strcn::rtJ-i un'ri~o"m re:rort9d north"•est of f"ctory . Porrion 1 s trin'rs c1~sroserl to surport f'DY act5on "S rirti..ller,r -f'rol"' rr0.rri.rerl ro'"'ition or to f'Ssenble C1'1icJrly to r1eet r t,=m1,• threrit . 11 11 A lriter report frorr G9rerA.l LUC!" c, r' i"' closer' thA f'ol lm~inG -in "'orr1" tio11: 1N 3rSl. 11 Frogress o-f' !1-5 "1ivision c1ttac 1 cn,1ti"1ues -f, vorF.1bl0. . F..,ctory Pf]Y'rentJ.y set 1'1fir9 by our :=i.rtillery n. 1d tr111rs, eltho'F';h erri,,1.::i..1 :imount of r""'CI'ine ~m rind rifle fjre still comjn['. from thnt Pre? . Cur ten','1 on 1'111 sides o:' -"':::i.ctory rositioYJ. , b 11t m.<>in bod;r o:' ene"1Y Prpears to bP to tl1e YJ.orU . ''fo furthr:r h1-f'crr1r->tion co·1cern~nn; :;nef'17 force rrevio'1s1-.- rerorterl to t 1· e no:..•th ·est . !}5 :8i.vision 1:i ll c011tinuP to rusr to trie "lortl' . Rough r-·1r1 he11vv- scris r,rev9nt Pll iinlorriin~ ~-1cl'1J.inr; L ~TS in 'lzio h<'rbor . rr r 1 * * Il'ES '."V P0- - '2~RRT'Al.7.Y l? , 194/,;,--G'3nerP 7 f;lrrk left hi o. COTY\m nr· ro"t !"t 0,..,50 houl's 'Pld le,_-.+, the cu', "ield :i.t ()()00 , "lvin,,. to Pqrc~rni,.,e ··~th Lt. Col. utherlf'·'ld. T:r-iere lv~ met i' "'j. Gen . Crnnon .nnil le"t by Hs C- L.7 , riloted 1,~- 'r io.,... lorle ~, f_'or the n.~rro:rt ['t "8ttuno . Tre v,l,.,'1A ~rr::iVA0 th,:,re e"'ter "n 1 mevent:f'ul journe;r Pt 1035 . I �General Clrr1r hnl"'edi::i.+,ely ni:mt t0 the rePcl.ou; rt0rs VI CoP'IS 'VP c:re ho hPd ) lorig talk ''Tith GP110rrl L11cn.s. VI Corps l.e"'il'1_urrter3 is 110w loc"ter' jn the cellrtr c,f q 1uild-'ng in Nettuno. Foll◊"'"n,,. tM.s, tho Gi:mer:ol 'rent, ;:-uided ,,,_,y r"a.i. Jr cl:,on, to tre c0r,"'1r'1d r,of',t o.,,. tbe lc-Sth ...1jvj sion, 1 crricl is locnt0d in r f· rr:thonse ju t to t,i,e 11ortJ, o ~ tho ro' d ..r} icl' P.083 f'ro"l ~Tr,ttuno to ll'rGc<>ncelli. On the "Pl.Y GPn,srrl C:!.nr 1, T'fl.SS<;d !l err crrt..,in:in,.,. Gonerrl 'T'rurco~t e11rl -to:rred +'o-~ R sl-iort t1.ll•. fiurinP- ths r"rive t-,c p-rrn-n::: o"' '8-17' 1 s ~ere ohc:-erved bombing) tarp9ts +,o tl-i.e nec;t of tbe b"l~cl-t"l9"ti• The G-er""Yl .!>7r 1 v•ris iiecvy, rnd "t lorst r one B-17 wns '388"1 s11ot dovm.. \t the /.,S "-'~vis·ion Cl Q9rv,r"l Clnrlr }cd n t::1lk vd th G"'nern 1 r.:r 1les ,:n,o_ G.::,nerP 7 .,.._.., SC"' 1. The 179th Tn.t'.>rintry }1r,d successfully tA.hm thro tob..,cco -'-'::i.ctor'T r t Cnrrocetc· t½e PVeni"1 7 bPf'ore, but t 0()0(' t~js morni'1r_; tre Gerrrnrs "P,£1iTl re-too 1~ ··t. Colonel }'Prrerer -rrorosed t0 p;o ½Pc'r 1.11cl try O ,.,.q in. 0 R 0 0 Follo·,in<:; t}1i =- cn'l.,..GrA11".le G8·'1erf'l Clc-rl· •qent on -1:.o tJ-A '9:en(111 rrters of tl19 1st /\r"'lor8c Div-l sio11, locnte<i :,,bout .:-.:ve ..-,i les nort):, o-"' 'Tettuno -in a ine woorl s. Hr--re G8ri9r'17 8 Cl" }~1.;: arid C'1 <1no11, r nc1 ~1'8 nc>,-.icers r ccornrn nyi nr, th8ri, h8cl lunc11 'rith G9"19l1"1 irf'rrno11. rmi c1.:scussed hi.c- s.:turt-1..on. Tl,e G0n0r.<>l hf'd 11Pd '30"!9 cnqupl_+, 4 1"''3 tJ.--8 r-i~'-t ""3·"'cY"8 k r rip'1 ·111rs-l:.~YJ.g '1bell2 ne2ar r5s CI but ··[;'', in P'OOd ''ifj.,..-lts "l'1d CO"\p~c e 1 t. ~f'tr')""" l0,vi.·1p- (}''1~r:ol J,rr!'Jon 1 S CO"'lmRnd rost, Go,1er"l t;l[lr1:, · 14 th Gr>nnr"l "" 1v1on "'nrs t, e cth-,r o.,.,f'icers, ,~ent to t e Ci o+" tho :SrH:1.sJ~ 1st I'5.visio,., "1lier9 Ger...,rnl Clrr 1c tnlh,d w:ith G-8nor"l Tenn0y. ThA 1st Jivis~on su"fer8C1 hervr }oc- es J'8S'llV'1", nt l8n'3t in rrirt, fro' i'lfiltrPtion of '.}0rm"11S h9t'ree11. Prit·;_sr 1 mits so t11,-+, t},9 British ·r,r9 +,r"lr"'YJ. jn t:1e -"1P'1 'S prd •9nr ""lrl '·:..Jled or cn.rturec". G011.9rnl Gl·r1· r'ecided to pull this clivir;io"l out :"lc1 i·•1rlrc9 it b:r a-iothr;r r':;V)',1.('r'' rcrr}•<irs thr, 5r,th, "S soon fS por-;s:..ble. 'r2ne,,..A.l Cl"r': t 1 19n lrove to t'1e ,,.,-j·"th A_rmv ~ hr 1~e C}, ·10 loc1-1.t9d 1 jn .i.,,,e h::sorr;:nt o'., the "Borr,.hcse I'P)-nce 9.t 'Tett,_mo . TbAre he c iSClLBsed su;11~ ~ro',-1 er,s r1ith Colon8l D 1rrsa. At : hout 1530 110 lPft tl~Cl cor>"l/'T,d post p:•-irl ·rnnt to tl·e P.~r.,,.hld ,T1 s9re be tal 1 r,d ,,ith Genernl Lucas Yho hed met him there, and also with GenerPl Templar , Co1'mn.nd:Lng the Brit:i.sh 56th Division, who h'.c1 just arriv9d b:,- pl,ne ·7ith :::;cno of · ~::; str "f o"fic9rs to lool: ov0r t,J~e ,70 ,,,,c' -.,i...-': ch t11e 5/)tr vas to occur;t. ?ol10"":1n, ti is th9 G(3'1.8r'l::.. :.~ turmd to h~ .... SI- h;/ S-4"' an.r c1 11, , ~rrivt11~ ~t p'l-.,01,t 1700. }TPre 118 w,t G'"''1Pr''l'3 "lexrn.der rnrl :•rr,1 ~11c; ncl ,-c=J r h:-~9:' tPl''". '.:'here,f'ter, -:e9li.n~; -i,.,r'lsnos8c1, Qr,·-ier'"'l ClPi~ 1 , r9·~:I.red 1 1 1 t,J 11'q V8D 1 -r'o-r t11e 0 9V9n~'1C; . 1 RE i-r:TTZ\ 'TO--r \ ~,r~r~ [ 13, 1:4/,--i'C'<hy GnYJ.er" l r,1, r 1 - , 1or-"'':1l-<-t in, :;.sposed, rer,c.: nPd in 11is V"r, qll ''lPY. He recoiV'3d H nu,~'Y,:t 0~ crll J~s, ho·;·9ver, 1v10. r+,t3 1cled :,o A.d..,icr:str.'.:'tive ,,,,rtte-r-. 3ennrnl Cn"'11on, Co~·•cinr1-i--p; t½e 1°tt fir Force, v5 ,i:.9c1 tho t\.T'",r Con... ::i.nrler T ( -"'·'.~-.,13S'30. .. ~-'.:.r i-,..;"l t,h, ,ro·,1,-,ms ('~ , i.:r suprort o.(' t}'e "'iftl Arri. activ··t 1 es. It. :::ol. Dal:r, Co•1n:.:rr'~nc; +,11_9 l':>t', -r:v~cu· tion nos;itel, G;one:ri::il ''nrti:ri rnd Lt. Col. "lrnce e.lso cPllecl 011 Gn 1110r, 1 Clrrk . :}9nrir,,ls "cl rhon A.:rid "oh9rtso11 ~+.o:;red in 01•-i_9.r>l;, -l-,o s:p- <;oou.11 re to GenPr' 1 Cl<ir 1z, a,; tl 3y ·nre 01c 4:.1 si.r ·v::.,_r ·-.,ec1· to the Unitec1 K..;,,, ...,-r om P ~t'"r the~_r visit- tr the Ft .,..tl Arr1y :ro>1t. 0 0 (1"1"9r' 1 'Jl' r 1: ~ s ;-;rentl~,r concerrn}C. ow~r t,; e ~robl8IJ 0f' 1,r;~bir"" the Ably') r "'.t \ Cess..;no. Q,9r1D,_~q~ ,-,re;rb,,~g ..;'3 co•m-'·0cer1 tl·"t t}•9 (}'1r""rnc, "rP •1,:;·'1y,· tl-18 ~bb9'r for nr::_lit,,..,.,r p 1 1.r-"'oses. G8rerrl ,,ru<mthPr, ,t G-"YJ.Pr.,, Cl,,rk 1s c'irAct-·on, ,:1ct,qt,9d the .,..olJ.017 ·n[l' ""'P,f1C)"'P11,1l1J'l 0'1 -:,Jiis c;ub·'.ect: �;:,½011t lQOO :~ours on nt1u•rl:;, -, i"'0br·•nrv 1.?th , Qr,nAr"l Fr9•>-i11r,..,. t9leJ:,on9d -n-. '1'1cl sti terl, ' T resi:re J.J «t ::: he ';ive,,., 0 :•~ "'Hf"Ort to,.,,orro\·1 ln orr1 er to 'lC:ft~r t'19 c.r19....,,r Y'OGit50vi .!.1th~ CA'3'>: . ,.,~ ::--ren. : "rrit t1.1~t~e 'l:ljc s~o'Y'ls of l? rJ..r n'=>'l e2c] tl,e l;:,n91 to he ::.;_+,tv For1')9:c·, C"'rr-r:i.,,'s 1000 rou.nr1 b0mbs 1• 1 I tnlr r'ronc,ral .,.,,reyburg tb·-t t,}-,9 nr•1r C0''1'11'"'1r13r hf'n rl::lr9ct9d tr:, M 0 in <>ir eff'o··t .Pnr to,.,,orro''i be CC1'1CP Ttrrted on th·-i ··rzro hf'+,tlc,"'ro11t, ~,,_r' tb')t J ' [ l f '10t ;urA ·l <>th0r or r(Yt, •-re ·1011lc he ·1 1'ln, tc pi.•re .,.;,~ t},,,t r u-:11 «ir on the 13th. I told ":n trat tl1 P Arr1y Cor '"nr'er ·,0ulc1 rn.q·•r, P.V •r" '3+'+'ort to coricentr-=i.te ?:lr in surrort of t',e T11r1:La·1 J'ivisioP ..,,:;trc: 011 tre ll;.tr . Gr-i-r1A'l""l --,reybnrg 8m:;--h.,sized t ..,t .e vo11l 1 l iJr0 to }1 :c1ve 811 ·!:;hP ~ 'r ,,,., co11-1, ';9t O'"' +,h.-, 13th in order to "'ofte•1 th=; 01Ymy, Ancl thPt b8 boJJ.everl th9 th:res ni S"'ions r<:? i.u •sted ·18rA the T')-i_n .._:rmrn l {~('111i.re.,,,sntci . I r9r l~Ad t 11~t T . ,.,,, 7 " '1'0 ~nto thJ mrtt0:c rt OPCfl . ttnt 1 ; 1 1 1 1 0 1 "I then crec1·ed ,,::tt} Go'1cr;-,l P.r['17Yl n,~..:i Lt . Col. ·r,nsbc-r011~1i to detsr"1i·1e t e '1,ntu.t'e 0f thP trrn;At : s1nerits 'ltlich t]:-.9 t'S" :39,lA.'1d Cor "3 1--::cl 911bnitted t'1ro11v½ n.lr snrrort C}''1'1J1C 7 s. I ,.ounrl. t,h t j t m1 17.rl be rossiblr-i to f11' 1:'3 one ;".; r:}'t.9r- ½0"'1hnr S Jll,'lr'lron ['V" ., l·- ':ll9 ":o cur"0rt t t'E') tT9vr '3e~. "nrl Cor· S • I Cf' lled Ge11.9r,l 4 'rsvb1n•n; snc t0lc 1 ~"'1 that i.t ;1ould ")9 rossihJ.,, to P-iv0 rj.,,, C''1e s11 w.dro.., 0.,, A- 1-S ril" nP s carr ·i. ir 5or. ro1111d hor'lbS for Cl19 o<' -1:,l·v:i rn~ -sioYJ."1 7J.1~cl' he hMl subri~tted . I "sved h-i11 to rlesir;r1"te •rrich trrr;et !'e de irec' ,.,tt,,cksd. Pe rA....,lied 'T W'l."l+; the Corvont Pttr c 1n:id I• I tolc rim thr't .,. '"'rssunec1 },9 ' [ ' ~ re-"9rr-in; to +.hn f'o11.Pstsr bl,t ti1i=t th;c, -,.,~" not O""t '1-is list of tnrr,9ts . He rerli.ed , ' I r->rr1 r:mite sure it ,w-; 011. :r 1 ~st o+' tn~gnts, b1't in nn~~ r:rise I 7r>'1t ~Lt b0:ribed . rn1-,.9 otr r tarrt9tc; f'~e l'n~rrrnort;:,nt, hut tl-,'3 0'10 ~s vit['L ~h8 diviz:i_o11 conm"nrier ·-rl-o "S ""~ 1cinn- t1'8 nt,t11c f"e 7 .S th"t i.t i'"' f'n e ,-;ent; ... 1 tr get ~ind I Voro•1cthlv "qr'Ge r·rjt}' 'ini '. ::: tolrl Grn,:,rnl ~r.-,ybu.:r~ t A.t 1 )0C"USe of restr~ ctions in co'1n9ction ·7ith t},iG t['rcret I rroulrl h,VP to "',fl'rn a fw:·th'".)r ~heck to d0tern-:'18 the ~rny Co'~¥v,,nr"er 1 s "AsirP . 1 1 1 7 1 1 0 1 1 · , 10 r 0 ClP:r 1• ,;ri:is 11.ot «v?ilPble . .,. called Gen0rrl ~'frc'i'1rt B'"'C tn)f hiri 1 Ge'1errl 'reYbnrc; • qc; p-:;knd +,i,.,t the fbbe r o+> su1x,t-int.;~1Jy tl e f'ollo,;~ng: F~onte CH$Sino be bol'1 b9d toY'lorro-7 . GPn9r" 1 C}r .,.,,. ,.,~ 11 not be r Vf' :· L" ble for , ';out an 1~o·n·, so h') does not 1-no-r. 0~ t]~is rec1uent . Gr-in . 8J.Fr'- hR3 r.ir0Jr9n to Gr:n . Fre7h1 rro; on -it le:1.st t 'O or:~R'liO''S co'1r:Prn;ni:; th9 1<rl,Jj sal;i l·"ty c+' boMbino- the t"omist 0 ry. J:e to l cl G9n . k'revburg thPt r"ter co'1s1 11t~'1g Gen . Y:>.ye", tl::0 Cor'"'s Co~r1 nnc'ler, ?nd Gen . Ryder, the Sor.,,,rnder n,.. +,i--.9 11,th ~iv . , },p ccn::-ider.c>c1 tJ-,E't no militriry necess:itr existed "'or its clestruct~.on . '1en . c"reyhuro- e·0-re· sed tc Ger. c1.~r 1' 1 :i ,~ cr·ns~ r'91~9d 0 ·in.: 011 thrt th8 C.9TGru~Von o~~ tJ19 "on-- '1tr-,rv ~s r ,.,.il it,_,•,..y ;y!ces-;-ity, nnr' t11.rt .:t, ''!1.S unfrii.r to ass~~'1 to f1'1.'T M~L1it.-ir~r cor1r1rnr"0r the ~ic;si.on of trl'i'la ti1e hill , P'1rl pt, t.},., s~me t-ime not PTP'1t rPr'""'jp;s"on to bc,;nb tle rionR.story. ro·mver , in vjrn o" tre nrtur9 cf t' 8 t'"rr;et, r-11.r' i~}i'} i11~~"'r'1R.tiom1l Pnd r, 7 '/:;ious inrrlicPt:i.0 11s '>rrrlv8c1 , T c,h01,:.r l-"Y-'1 to f"nt 0 n e;q,rcssioYJ. o+' or·"nio11. -"ro.,,, Ar,r}' a.s to t',e •1rli1isabjlit•~ o" ... ,1t' or::lz·inp; t 11e ½cr1binq: 1 • G<m . 'I•rr··n,,. stRt90. h. ➔ m1 il l t[' 1 :0 tbe ,._,rtt9r ur ·ri.tl G9'1 . A.l8XP'1c1Gr, 1'1'1(' ·ro•11J' l 0 t "18 1rnm !}rm . Ale,~"'1rler 1 s vjG'·', shortlv-. ' 1Gc,ner2l 1 0 0 n"e"llTYhile I got i'1 touc" with Gen ~ Cl- r -, --,h0 tolrl n tl-1rit he consi.c1ered t 11e dest~ 1 1'"!ti.0'1. o+' tho ro1ri"t9"'r "RS not n ,,,,~litrar•r necessity, 'l'Yl tlYt I s:rnuld P!Pl,e tr'l.t r9rrr:;"'e-'1tE1tion to G0r . T'r -,..d,no- n 1 0n he c'>lled lrtor to g:Jve Grm . Alo· :varder 1s vi9 1 • Gen . Cl,,r'r ::>}so :=;tf'ted +;r"t t',~s Y'"3 a p,rttsr, l icb caus9d h:1"'1 so"19 P.m')f'rr<:13'"'· ,'3nt 3.n vi.9'V o-P the extremel7 str01.,0; vieT3 of G<:m . 1<'rr,vhurr; t 1~t t,1113 r estructio11 nf t>o "nnast9rv is R "'!ili trr•r necessit,r . G~ne:~'1.l c1,,r 1, +>e 1t th<lt 'illl-32S C'ren . Frtwburg recGder fror1 tris ror~tioYJ. ~t "0Uld rlPce Gen . Clrr1r 1-'1 2 very dj ~r~ cult ro-iti.or in tb2 ':;Vent tl1 r t tJ.,.~ rtt.., C1' ~11 0'11 cl "~j_J.. 10 1 0 1 �ttr crilled Gen . K0sreq rit Rbout 0 11-5, ·rho tolcl me t],l='t, he cjd not co11s:lder the rles-!:.ruct1on o+' tl'e ffonasterv to be r mi.li+,Ary D")CessitJ. Fe -f'1.JTtrr::;_n stnted thrt t},e bomb:ir1re o-"' t} e ]'0'1R,3terv "'Olll' rrol-i·0 ½1~, "'Phnnce its v~11 1.e ns R militar- obstacle, hecnu:-;e tre (}0rm:::-11s ronld t½e'1 f'e0l free to 11,e it '"'S " b?rricade . Gen . Yey0s !=Jtr>ted thc:it Gem . lty,~er , G0YJ. . Butler f''1d Col. Bortnnr were nn,c,YJ.·imons in treir opi nioYJ. tret the destru"!t:ton of' th-; building ·p11s not necess<iry. BT r,,a !}9n . K-Jves s"dtcl ""'1 to lis 0-'"', T.,t. Col. iElter, -1:-,o f'jnd 011t ;vbrit in.tell~r"'1Ce re-roy,ts h0 ½rid nn -1::,}•e b11-i.ldj11.,..,. . Co10110l ·;c•ltc,r ➔;old r9 tl,,.,t -Prom two civn.~r-m so~.i.rcec; re hNl rea;'O'1 to ½el 1 '"'Vo th['t t1-;_ere T3re r'>+'11P-nes in th0, t,1,1jld1-Yl<=;, 0ne re·,-,ort st.,ti"1.,. +,J.-int trere ·rere proly,bly a.3 ""any as ?Oro. Colonel 'Ir lter st ter' thrt f'rtill ..,ry CI I s h"l.d suh- 1 tted sev9rP: r0rorts concerninr, the u·::e o ~ the ..onr st8·~v as ,.,.'1 C'I , ½11:. thrit '1e }1r>d no r0, orts of rn;r P ct 1° 1 fire com-irr: from t,,13 build~ng . He stPtod thc:it the rwidence pointed to tho f,-,ct thrt there w'°'re :memy strongro:: nt2 vr=,r-r close to th':! ,"D lls of' the 1-:ll1" ldin'$ . 1 "At ?130 I telhod to /}e"1 . FPrc.~r>f" ·r~c ,trted su0stP'1t-i.<>1l;v rs follO'"S: li}e11'3r[' 1 l\lrn:ander r,f' s decided th~t tr e r'o>1r-> sterY sr 0'1 lr'J. lie 'JC""nbed if GP'18N 1 Freyburg consirfors 1 t as P militr>r~r necessity. He rer;rets thnt tl-e building sho11l rl h,, c' estro•red, but th t he hP s f'r, Hh :.n Gen . Fr0yrmrg I s .iun[;T'lent . If th9re is PYJ.V Y'eD.'3011.able "•robqbil itv thr>t t,lie ,,,,1il,H11_-; is bei11n- usec'l for · rilite.r • nnrro"'8S G""n8rP1.flexam'"lr believes tl'f,t its clestruction ::s 1Vf1rrant9d 1 • I tho'1 tnld Ge:-1 . r·,rcl~nP- th~t I }y,d leen ahl0 to tnlc to G8nerP1 Clf"rl, siYJ.ce my first telerhonr:, C"nv0rsrition. wi.th Gen . Fardinr- P'1c thr,t Gen . Clr>rk ' s view 1 Gen. Clr>r , does not thin"" thrt tr e '1,uilding was substri11.tif' lly P s .Pollo"IS: .sho11ld be 1,(1..,berl, 8 d trPt ;r- tJ,-,9 cor "'lrnrler of tl~e 1.:JPW Zet1lrnd Gorps 'Vere an Ani0ri":1.n cor;1n.:<inder ho •7ould c;ive sr-eci+'ic orriers thPt it vrould not ')e bombed . Ho"P.Ver, in vie,v of Gen . l?r9-r;)nrp; 1 s posjtio'1 in tbA British .,.,ynrire forces , the sjtu"'tion "'1S n. r'elic...,te one, P11c: Gem . Cl."rlr hAsit,-,ted tr f;ive hin snch qn order '7~thout first re+'errinr; the r:1-,"'",ter to Gen. AlezA.nrr,r . Gen. Clrrk is still o-"' tl 0 o. infon tr'lt no r1.il-'tprr YJ.ecessity e~'~ sts >'or th" ceRtr11::::tion of the f!'onr,PtArv. H':! ½eli9V'")':: it nill '3'1dR.n[;er +,J,-,r:, liYes of' rnr,nv c-'vi.linn refuisees in th8 1:iuildi.YJ.o;; '1'1.d tr· t P bo;1binfs r-ill not r'estroy its v~lue r>9 a forti -"icPtion +'or t 1 1e A11em;ir. In fact Gen . Clr-r1 •"eels tl nt tl 1: bo ,b~ ng "rill rro " br-1blv 8nh1.11ce j_t,s \}'c:i:!_,_rn . I Gl")'1 . FPrn5nr; st,.,tnr', ' Gen . fleYnnder h"'S mrdP, h:s position ri_uite clePr en t11is point . He rer;-.cets very T'J.Uch thrt the lonaster:· s' ould be destrove,:-1 , hut re !'l88S no other choice . If Gen. Cl"r:V r'esires to tP11-:: J=Ar sonr>ll•r to Gen. Ale~<rinu,r Pbo11t t,t,e --:u'lJject , J <">rrl ::11JTP. thr>t Gen . Ale~~ander "'ill be pleR'3"')d to dif'cu"s it T:tl- hin . 1 0 0 0 1 J rerorted [' S11mffi.'lr:; of' mY cnnvers"tion with Gen . I'"rdi.11; to G 11 . Cl,r1 r '7ho told T"e tr tell Gen . r'reyb11rp; thrt ,,11il"' h8 still c1-;d not co11.:;irler trrt it Y'9.S ri rnilitflr.' necessity to boT'lb tl e r'o•1rstery, he , Ps vr.i ll 1ng to defer to Gen • ..,re·rbur~ 1 s iud,vient i +' Grm . Fr8:rburg han evidence thct -' nr1:i c~ted tb1'1t the ''onn s ter.r shoulc! be bonbed . II 0 0 I CPlled Gen. Frevhurr; R.t ::>prrox"'r~tel•r 2?00 :ond prlvised ~"'1 as -"ollo"'s: Gen . Clar1" does not be 7 ieve thr1.t ri raili t'l.rir nece,si t. ~ e:vi st~ +'oy, tl-:te destruction o"' the 'On.,...,ster;,r. He :ls reluctf''1.t to ruthoi~ize its bomb-ing unless you nre cert1:1in th~t -'ts lestruc.tio 1 -;s 11ece"'Scl.''Y•' GenP.rf'l Proybure st,,tec' th"t re hPd ri:onn, ~nto tl1e natter t'hoY"01 1 Yh]y n-'t,r t,J,,9 cljvision coromp'1r'Or OJ"' the; /,th Indirn Dtvisio·1 8'1d tl "t t;1G '~vision coT'1T"rnder "'as riuite co•Wi'1ced thrt tl'e borribjnr:: of 11 1 1 �the r~omistery is necessPry . Gem . P1·0ybur~ furth9r st ter1 +,b,,t h9 d-id not be1 ieve th.nt it ~r0111c1 be SO1Flr1 to v:ve "11 ord9r to cn:rtu.,..e '011rsterr T':ill pnrl f't t},e SP"'l9 t; me den7 tl10 CO' rr,rny'pr ti 9 ri ;it tC' r8nove PD -i "'!Tortnnt ob·,t::i.'.:!le to tbe success o-" tris mission . Fe stPterl thrt ri'1:r hip-her cor:1nnnc1 er who re+>,1sed tc ::i.uthorize the l;o"'Jb-i nv, would hnv9 to be fT9p"rec' to take tre resr,onsib:'..1-i tv ""or P. r>ailure of th0 rttr>c}· . I told Gen . Frr,yburg tlvt the Arny Co,,.,>Jnander '''P q repnroc: to A11t'1or-i z9 tt e h----mbinr; o" tl-e tPrget i +> it WPS Gen. Frevburp.; 1s conc-;:lr1ered 0;1in-io·-1 trnt it WPS A nilitar r neces,jty. Gen . Fre·irurf! "ns·vered thPt i.t "l:'lS hj s co11sHer'.Jd opjnion thnt H is e rd lHr->ry neces1:it7 . I t11-=ir> told rren . Fre7b11r--:- t]'.1',t the fljr .;;ssion VIPS f1Uthorized, end th"t he sr.011 1.c'l A.rran1;e vrith Gen . Ke-res for the rernov'll o-"' II Corrs troo.,...,... ~i-io would be e11dri11vered Y t,hj s boJ11bing , ond th~t Grm . ~reYbur~ \Joulrl iet9,~1,ri.11e "'1 l1 om· "lhFJn t:re area v1ould be safe f'or th bombing . 0 0 11 I t1 en CP lled Gen • Brann [' nd to l rJ. !' ~ m to P rr<> nge 'Ti th tr O "ir +>o:r- t>1e bo'"'Jbin;r of' tre rI011r-istery c'1 thci r1or11i11e- of 13 Febru, rr; the exact ti"1e to bA riven later, b11t i:ri. no cnse should Ve born1,inr· be executed ,rior to 1000 hours on 13 FebruPry. 0 "At Grm . ra.crv ' '"' rer11J_p<;+, I (![' lled Ger, . Fn.r<"~ no; <>t ?l/,O 1-rnc: told 1ir1 substPn1 G-en . Clrr1 w·11 trH· to Gen . \leX'l'1.dP.r ~n tre n-:crn~ng contj ,::ill, r as f'olloirs: cernin's +,rFJ c,"'11,i'1's o-~ t} 9 ~011;-,st')r,r. T{e still +>,,,els th~t :Jt ~ s n11 '3rror to br;-nb it . He does 'Wt think th"'t there i"" suff':i.cient evir' nee to PrrPnt the> stntemP'1t th"t ~t -is n '"'lilitrir;r nece9s~ty to bo"1½ thFJ ~'.onastcrv , nnn -l:h~t -in vi"''"l o" tre ~9l 4 .c-io1 1s nnd int9.,,.n~tio11rl :imrlic,tio~s 0P -i+, e fni=lls th·0 t le shoulr1 discuss it wjth Gen. AleYander i'1. tl e r,r,rni."v: . ~-A"'1"hil8 ti, e 1x,7Y'1'~ mi<:>c,jon h"S been l'lid on . It will not be sch=irh1led before l0Gn rn' ~t can he cr,ncel1ed. ThP Ge·-1ernl f'Ae1s t.nt s-ince (}en • ..,r9T1 "U'f; +>:i0l ~ sc strc,,,r1·} - nbout it rnd -in vir:iw of G9·1er<>l .,..,re~rhc1rr 1 s 1-ositio he 1ouln li 1r'3 to t"llr. to G8n0rr-l Ale7°nr'er ·"')out it . Jf' it v1ere [lr,, i~er~ cPr corin"'n ler his c'eci.c::ion V'o 1ln be r-n easv oYJ.e n.11r1 r would not bother G9'1nrrl Plexrinder Pbci1t it, but he :ill tn.l{ to him in tre "'lorni11r.tt 0 1 0 rrcun le"'le11V,,"' Ge'1Gral G·eu9'1t 3r 1 , r,'eco::-cl o+' eonver::mtio"1., ('n ::"re ·blP'P: 1 s re111est to hnmb tre J'o·rirstPrir, Gener8l Ale"rinrer r11onP0 T'l8 tii--; '"10rriinc; abcl't 0015 . Fe told ">8 i1e 11nrl0r:?tond I did not .,.8el the r:,O11ri sterv ,..~1ould b8 bo"'lbGd. :::: co11+>ir"'1ed J,;_c:; belief on t e ,vo1mds th~t 4TTJ.ericPn Co,,,m9nders <'or soTfje ··,eeks now •rrl not -"'ound it "lAce~sarv. " h,:,r1 rio .;rlic"tion +,h-t tle rnonr->stery ·•1rs bei11,.,. user r-iy t1'e G0rn'1ns; t1,,~t our m::i.ny ""'rev~ o-;,, e "-fort~ to bnnl; f' bui lrl~ ng or locpljt,,,. to rrnvent its use hY t},e GFJr~wns hu' Al'7Pys "~iled, 2nd "f' ;t -;rs bombed it Wf'S a better def'e,1sive ~r>strl l <>tior, tl'an befo"e . I +.old ,-i"'l thrt if the GArriiins WAre 11ot in P'1C' :1e t,l·mu;lt tJ:-ev '7ere ~n, ti,eJ certf'inly "'cnlc1 go ~-n it ,.,f'ter our bo.,,bin"· . Trese r,,.re th9 m~l:itrry r9rir;or2 . 0 11 or rel:tr•j_o,1s P'1r' sP,rit,-iro9·1t87 re!l<;cw1c:;, H, is tno ½nrl unnecessrrily to des+,ro~- o.,,e o" the Prt +:.rA"S1IT99 of'+, e world. Bedrles, ·e h<>ve indjc~tioYls tr"t JT''l".lJ c-i,vili:in "/'Omen P'1<1 ch~ ldr9'1 ['T'e t" 1r:;.rip; .,: elt~r ther i11 . Tre eyhrit of our '"ir 9f'fort ,.,'~ici, we cr111 rut on it ri 1 7 ;-,ot rlestro"T th9 builc i r, r ',,1t ,~ ll rrierely ""iVe t},e G0 rr,r'l, 11'1 8'CCUS9 -1:.o USP, it . 0 Al8X1"rr]9r '7P.S 1111it0 i.n'l~strmt th,-t -it ½e boni'ben if "'rp-burr; WP:r>tec. it Pnoth9r evi. ➔ enr,'3 o,. ris undul·r ~ntc:;rf'8ri11 w't½ Fif'tl-i Ar~.· Activit-ies _qn' rlo~n,.,. 11 �business direct '.Vi th my subordinn.tes . It s:rows th::=it he is most reluctr->nt , even / over my objection, in doi11.1s A.nything in disspr,rov:i.nr; Pn Hction of' Freybur,q; for (' political reasons . I told AJ.exA.nder t1Y t j f ~t ,,,as en A·~ericB11. Conmwr'J.der, PS j t had been in the ;)A.St , I would re:'u se to give the PutJ-.ority, but du2- to the noliticnl daintiness ,,,jth vir•ich "re h.rd to bmdle the 't>Jew ZePlanders and ?reyburg, I was reluctR.nt to cause a. najor issue Pt t½e present tir e . 11 0 0 Last even-in[' •srorc. cc=nne thDt G·enerel 'r;'re:,hurg h['.d re lli''JSted t 1 Y"'t the bcw']_>)r-rdrnent he de+'errecl tenporar-i l:;, r<ue to the f2ct thr>t r, oiscu.:;sion bet1 rnen him and General Ye;/AS hAd developed th rrobP.bility thrt II Corra troops "mule'. be injurec' i:" the bc~11);::.rdnocn1t - rprr; cr> ried out ~t t 11 is t~ me . Hm1ever , the rrospect of bor'l1:>"rdme~:1t is still il'.'.lFtinent . 0 11 Today a nessage frori tl~e beachhead announced thPt f-'. jett:isoned Germrn bornb harl_ s~L1 1'..c1r in t)· e other r:r -.;ound: '1F; ~9r,1e,~ nt Do'7' the rPdio orerator 8.'10 r1 r:' ver o'"' tr,e rr-Ldio j,)er r:.--y' +1·,ree o,... tl1r-, eic-;]1 t T'.F 1 s ;1.0 J-,r,,1 been taken up to the br~ dceher,_d last 1veek P s ri. p;uard for General Clt1rk I s imnedlnte C} . T1.--o of the Gcmerr,1 1 s jeeps h9d been dameged by i'ra~r,rmts, anc1 his van, r>.lt'-i01rnh rlaced in a tnnnel near +,he r0Jazzo Por 0 :hese hrd been dnmager1 1,-;; blR.st . I 1 \ Gener.s 1 Clark +,oda r rGcei vr:,cl tre follow5 nc:; cA blr-; fro"! G--i1P.rP 1 J\le-'rn.nu.er . T'A 1007. 11 I have rt'eceived the +:'ollo 0 "in,q; r;1essag fror:·1 General -~isenl 0 1 19r . 1 All rorr last ;,rear I s terT'l'T!etes now 7 n the United 1~i n.-=;dori. Pre follo"ring :lour operAtions 1.'ii th 1 :een r9ri J.ization of the innurnere hle o bstP. clec. you Rre encountc~rj ng rnd with comrJ.ete +>p:ith :i11 ~¥"c:..:: ahilHy to remove them . The unbre8h1ble solidPrit:r of the '"eciiterrono,c,n "'.rounr1 , navnl, P5-r cornr'lflnd ·,ill win through to total victory just as it emerged triur'1phant :f'ror,1 tre discour::i-:;ing cJjfficulties of Jast winter I s Tunisian car,'paign. We dPsire especially to conve;r to :rou Pnd to GenerPl Cl.,.,r 1" our lasth1e; con+'5_clence ln your leac:er•Jhip a 1d our :rride j n your FJap;n:ificent troops . Cunnin1=;h2m , Teclder, Srdtr Gnc1 P.11 the oth0rs here share m;r regTet that we can novr be with you only jn spirit 1,ut r,11 of us send 2.. rroud salute to :rou 8110 to all the Allied o·~f:i cers 8nd men that mak:e up your great f'ir;ht:i ng co:ri:riaml. 1 n n.r-r 0 1 1 111:~ ..:•-r:; 1·JZA u0--F1 :rrnJ.A :,:y 14, 1944--Genern 1 Clnr}:: toctwr, still :;:·,c;cow,rin~ "'rori his cold, remained at his comrr1.'.,."lr1 rost vc:-n nnd Pttsrrideo to Pdr1 4 n.:istr,,tive ,~Ptters and held a number of' conferences . At lCCO in t 1"e norni'1.p; r,9 tPlked ui tJ--, Colonel Hj ckel1r1ait and reviewer] '7ith him n number of r8cords on court mn.rtir..l cases . At 1100 L~ entenant G8nernl Pnders o-f' the -Jnd Folish Corps and BrigPdier :c'rith, British Liaison ( Pficer , togeth<;r ,,uh Lt . Co1. Szym<"nski, c"lled on General Clark. The GarpPthian Division o-f' the Fol:ish Corns adjoins the Fiftt, Army on the rj ,·ht, ½einG the left :lan], 0lement of the 1-;;iR:hth FTFJ.:f. <\ f'ter lunch the C,AnerP 1 received P call ,:>rorn GenerR 1 ?rev1,urg v ho cl-i scussed at sorre len-rth thA rrobl0m of bomGing the Abbey l"t Cassino . GenerP.l Frevhurg sa:ic1 thrt if he was to tRl:e the r~onr ster:,r Fill the \bbey- •'To11ld hn.ve to be f'lAt tened; h8 conld not be responsible :or the cnrture or fRilure to C"pture ·if tl e .A½bey 1vere left as Rn obstPcle . As 1 ';:ener,:il Freyhm·g was le,.,,ving, Gnnerc1l Jnin arriV8d , Pho the t"rO had a short tal1(. Gener2l ,Juin expressed t};e ide2 thRt fla+,ten5no; the Abbe;r wns unnecess,g_r,, n.s troors co111d by-rass :it nno tlvm smoke 0 1 0 I I �it ,·he'1 tJ1e +>·-.,11.1 rlcc-':s 4ve 7 n,,.,tt9r ·rqs rll c ec 4 dec1 . ""UC\ rn_q r-ut GP.nerrl ,;,.,,,,, ·bur,.,. 0"' . "'['j_(' tJ'1rt tbe Generel Juin 7, Pll ·ent u-~ 81Y1 1-~d fl t.nl1" ·:itl-i r',<;n9rrl c1~rk . Qr>'1 ,rrl •vr,•, jYJ. f'rvor of ST'eer1·• rit,tp0i- . F9 3w·c1 "''1Ce l O"'Rstery Fill wrs rer1 ced a', ~.l'1"1CJdi,-,te rush +>or•Aro ,.,.' 4 1,, ... , 9 r9T""<l'1'1 ·ere -till ',roren "1 4 P-1,,-1- rrocuce sr10 '1cl4n re""ult::; . T·e sP~c1 , h0 ever, ' e nul'i 09:'.:'lor0 " lcY'"' r:-=,riod of orw 11.~ i.nt4 011. ·"ollow" nr: t} "l ottr"c1· 0'1 t e h 4 ll before tl"e ~ :ri~ral atk c 1c 11ent ""OT'"/U'O.. G9;1e:Ml Cln.r1r S"'id to G0;,"9rnl Ju-'..n tl-iPt h-"' ','T"S t"c 0'18 bri~ht srot jn R tou,c:;'1 ('!'1 a"1(1 tr<>t he, C're>1crPl vlRr'r , '""S iu~t "'S rn..xious to att8Ck %"It tre e,rlies+, 1o~s::.'1le mo nnt f!S Qr,119r~,1 Ju:;.n '"'A.'J . .Tuin I I G"'nerrl CJ.'•rlr t 1~11 ''rent clc m • _.t G0n0r"l Juin t0 tl 8 but "''1.rl wve hi.n t•m '~ottles o.c> c' "'"T ~'lfl, "lld nll hpnrls hrid a 1 rin1• o+> "'herry to thn s,wcess o" the f'rrt co·ina rttRck. Gon.9r<>l crville tb9n cr>mc tc s9e (}nnArR 7 Cl-or1r, P'1C t ey hPd a t~lk ::-bout F1jr surror~ f'cr +he -i'ortrco"!~ri • op"r:1Vo11s of t e -nifth trn:r. * * * PRESENZANO-•P:EmUARY 15, 1944-Today the Anr:, Commander remained at his command post attending to administrative matters. The air program JrOT.ided tor bombing Cassino monastery with tour groups of "Fortresses" beginning at 0930, and the large tormtions passed directly- over the comnand post. As the planes were eoming over, 16 bomba were released by mistan. One or these hit near the com• •nd post, sending a number or fragments through the Commanding General's area. Fortunately- no one was hurt. The ••sages f'rom the beachhead during the day- indicated that the night 14/15 was fairly quiet bat that air activity- b7 the Germans built up towards the close of the da7 and finally- caused considerable damage in the port. At 0230, RN 5860, VI Corps radioed that the night quiet and that there we.a nothing to report. •s RN 5886, from VI Corps, reported patrol actions at various points bat a quiet night in general. By VI Corps message RN 443, an air attack south of Garroceto was reported by 12 ME•s and n•s with only slight damage. A message f'rom General Lucas at 1750, RN 452, reported three bombing end strafing attacks on front line troops with one rE 109 shot down. At 2055 the following dispatch was received: RN 461. "Air raidl!I port tonight destroyed one LCT with gasoline. One Liberty, Yale, had ,,.o ne hold damaged by fire, other re,rts of Liberty may be damaged but are under control. Air activity of enemy noticeable during the day. Several ME'a shot down. Frederick reports enemy front lines closer in and more strongly held on his front. Power reports our artillery and mortars have caused man:, enemy casualties in factory area." * * * �PRESENZANO-•FEBRUARY 16, 1944•-General Clark's notes of today's activities follow: 1 "This morning I attended a conference with General Alexander. The first subject to be discussed was his disa~int~nt in the way Lucas was handling the Corps Commander's job in the Anzionr:ldgehead. I knew this was mming, for he had discussed it with me previously and, to be perfectly frank, I am not 100% satisfied with the hold Lucas has taken on that situation. When Alexander told me he was dissatisfied, I asked him to tell me why, and from what sources he ob• tained his information. He told me that Lucas was older than hie age, he was old physically and mentall,-, was tired, had no flash and was not at all familiar with the deta.ils of' the situation. I had found Lucas, on my many- trips there, unfamiliar with many details, and I had urged him to send out members of his staff' and to go out himself' and satisfy himself with conditions as they were. Alexander had to admit to me that moat ot his inf'orma.tion came from General Penny, Commanding General or the let British Division. I told Alexander that as long as we were discussing personalities and being perfectly !rank, that my trip up there a few days ag0 had revealed from Lucas, Truscott, Harmon and Eagles that none or them had any confidence in Penny. This shocked Alexander, and he repl1.9d that he had confidence in him, to which I replied, "Nature.117, tor you appointed him". I told him I was making no request for Penny's relief' but that I did believe that a change in Lucas would be advisable but under no oircumstanees would I hurt Lucas, for he had performed well as CoJllllanding General of the VI Corpe from Salerno north and in the initial landing at Anzio. He had la.eked some aggressiveness after the landing, al.though allegations that he could have gone to his objective or to Rome were ridiculous, for had he done so with any force he would have been cut orf from his bridgehead. •r told Alexander t~t I would put Truscott in aa Deput7, 0 1Daniel to commam the 3rd Division, Sherman to be second in eomnand of 3rd Division a!!rl Darby to command Shermn•a Regiment, the 7th Infantry. Alexander asked what staff' l would provide Truscott with, and when he appeared to dictate this, I told hi11 that that ns a matter that I would handle. "I haw sent the following radiogram to Lucas: RN 1741. 'Orders issued this date as follows: Major General Truscott re- lieved from command of 3rd Division and assigned as Deputy Commander, VI Corps. Brigadier General O'Daniel to command 3rd Division. Colonel Darby transferred trom Ranger Force to 3rd Dinsion. All assignments to take etf'ect 17th February. I desire that Colonel Sherman be designated as Acting Assistant Division Comtllfimer and that De.rby be placed in command of Sherman's Regiment. Acknowledge.' "I told Alexander that l would not relieve Lucas in the middle of the battle ) which is currently taking pl.ace for, while a change seemed necessary, it might make matters worae to do it at the present moment while the Germns are attacking. "I urged Alexander to release the 169th Brigade of the 56th DiVision to me immediatel,-, and told him again how I disapproved of hia ~equirement that it have 7 da711' recreation before moving to the bridgehead. He t.1.nall7 gave in. •r told Ale:xamer that 1n the current situation 1n the bridgehead I was taking all Ill Air SUpport off of Frey-burg's Cassino af'f'air and diverting it to the \ \ �bridgehead in aeoordance with Lucas• request. He was displeased, but I told him that it was 1IY' f'irm desire and that as Army Commander I would indicate m7 priorities to the air. I also asked that tomorrow, the 17th, an all-out air ef'fort be made in the bridgehead, including Strat•a, Tactical and llI Air Force, aa well as the Desert Air Force. I told him I was desirous of maintaining the impetus of the attack in Cassino and 110uld attempt to put some Desert Air Force on the Cassino front this af'ternoon, which I did to Freyburg'a satisfaction. I also have arranged for Freyburg's missions to be continued tomorrow in the Cassino area by some of the Desert Air Force, the balance being added to the all• out air attack in the Anzio area. "I told Deirers, who happened to be here, of my prnpoeed changes in personnel He agreed that it waa a good idea. 1 in the Anzio area. I.. -1 •I want to record m:r definite feelings that Admiral Cunningham has been as uncooperative as possible in this SHINGLE Operation. Yesterday- Lucas asked for cruiser gmf' re support am did not get it. Today he asked again. Admiral Cun- 1 ninghu will give it onl,7 if' it comes from Lucas through his liaison of'fioer, not honoring 'lfl1' request.• In the af'ternoon General Cl.ark received a call from Brigadier General Sewez the French Arnr:, who commands the 4th r.oroccan Mcuntain Division. The first of the division personnel is coming in, but its mules, which are an essentiel part of' its equipment, will be very slow in arriving. However, General Juin proposes to put the first combat teem, with General Sewez in command, under General DeMontaa.bert as soon as it gets in. · or General Clark today received a copy of' the fb llowing cable from Admiral Morse to the British Naval Liaison Officer of' VI Corps: "Following received from Nava.l Officer in charge Anzio begina: 'Shelling or town and port has increased. More than one gun ta.king i:art and firing more accurately-.' Request you will bring this to personal notice of G.o.c., VI Corps. Should shelling of port continue the maintenance of Army will decrease, am that the only remedy ia action by our own forces to silence these guns and thus prevent your vital line of' snppl.,- being jeopardized." General Clark cabled General Lucas as follows: RN 1740. "If you will eub111it target requests thru your Naval Commander 1ilich justify second cruiser, Ad• 1tiral Cunningham states it will be sent. Advise action taken." Personal to Lucas from Clark. RN 1738. •weather permitting an extremel.,heavy all-out air program will be executed on Anzio front tomorrow. Let me lmow earliest possible time the natur8 of request you made for naval gunfire support for today. CINC MED of'f'ice here sa)'S that no request tor cruiser was received from Naftl Task Force Col!Dll&.nder in Anzi.o area. Possible that Commander estimated that he could provide necessary support using destroyers only. I shall follow up this failure as soon aa further information is received from you. One cruiser surely will be aftilable tomorrow. Am endeavoring to arrange for second one." * * l * PRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 17, 1944•-This morning at 0930 General Devers arrived by cub plane which General Clark had sent to Mareianise for him. Gemral Devers conferred �all morning with General Cl.ark and sta,ed to lunch, together with Generals Keyes and Crane. General Clark's notes on the conference with General Devera follow: "Had a long talk with General Devers this morning. Items were as f'ollowsz UJ..IEF OF LUCAS "He feels as Alexander does - that General Lucas should be relieved. His estimte of Luca.a ia that he is extremely tired, mentally and physic&lly, and should be taken out. I told him that I bad already initiated steps in that direction. I will assign Lucas as lff1' Deputy, but Devers will attempt to have him returned to the United States without in any wa-r hurting him. l INTERFERENCE FROM ACMF "Told Devers of the increasing interference I was receiving from ACMF in operational and logistical mtters pertaining to Firth Army affairs but that I could handle it. m.§CU§SIQN OF A ~ "H• indicated that, whereas no decision had been arrived at on ANVIL, it looked aa though it would not amount to much a.?Xl feels that I should remain with the Firth Arrq, whioh, of aourse, suits me. I told him that was a matter tor det9l"lllination by the 1t'f: Department. I had no other desire than to command the Firth Army in bsttle and to the successful 00ncl.usion of this war. "I explained to hint the difficulties in this allied command or having Bri• tish subordimte commanders do exactly what I desire. I told him in man)" cases it was almost impossible to handle them like Ameriaan oomma?Xlers where orders were giV9tl and compliance demanded. ACW TAKING OVER MANAGEMENT OF ANZIO BRIDGEHEAD "He indicated to me that there was a feeling that ACMF might take over the management of the beachhead. He did not feel that it should be done and asked for my opinion. I told him that was a matter for higher headquarters to determine, but later, after I had thought over the matter, I told him that from the administrative point of view it would be most difficult for Alexander to handle the American units in that area. I think it is the desire of Alexander to disassociate Fifth Army from those troops in the Rome area. It might be a good solution to do it that way, for I feel that Alexander is not using all the means available - namely the Eighth ArJey'. Either a solution of Eighth Army taking over this front and Fifth Army the bridgehead, or ACMF taking over the bridgehead might be a ePod solution. I can state that it certainly is a tremen• dous burden which I am carrying with five corps, one of which is isolated by sea some 100 miles away. I :feel that we can do it, end hope to keep it up, but if' a ' change is ma.de I have no objection. "De,rers assured me of his desire to assist in all ways he could. He seems to understand the difficult position which we rl?Xl om-selves in with the entire Mediterranean now in British bands. I explained to him my difficulties with the New Zealand Corps. I also told him that, although the replacement situation was �getting better, it was still far t.rom satisfactory• that I have the 34th Division with approximately 4,000 replacements required which S1ould go to them today, and I won 1t be able to get any to them for probably a week, resulting in a week's delay in the return or that unit to oombat. "I urged Devers to get the Fifth Army 111 th all American units in it, with none other except perhaps French, and that when the French can bring in enough to form an Arra:,, there should be three armies - The British Eighth with all British Units, a French Army and the Fifth All American and that with those three armies, forgetting ANVIL, with the 85th and 91st Divisions added, we could drive up to northern Italy. He agrees with me heartily', but let• a see what ean be done." In the afternoon General Cl.ark received a call from Colonel Eddy who is the officer in charge of development at Aberdeen Proving Ground. Colonel Eddy is making a tour of the battlefront to exhibit to American officers new items of equipment which have been developed. He put on a demonstration of various weapons this morning and a motion picture for selected officers this afternoon, showing the technique of emplo,ment of the new developments. During the tomorrow. L•5 cub planes, making the trip head evening General Clark determined to make a trip to the beach• For this trip he set up his PT Boa.ts, his C•47 and his two new in order that he might select the most appropriate means for in the morning. * * * PRESENZANO-•FEBRUARY 18, 1944-•By 0530 General Clark was examining the latest dispatches from the beachhead. He determined to make the trip by cub and left the cub strip piloted by Major Walker, with a stand-by plane following him, at 0830. He arrived at the beachhead approximately an hour later, landing on the Nettuno airfield. The airfield was un:ler shellfire, but no shells hit on the strip as the General was coming in, and he landed safely. General Cl.ark's notes on the trip follow: "The situation was tense in the bridgehead, so I flew by cub to that area. I was escorted by two Spitfires up and four be.ck. It was about the only way to get in there fast, for the airfield was under heavy shellfire, and I had to go in some plane in which I could come down on a road if the field was being shelled or damaged at any time. The trip was uneventful. Went immediately to ~ Lucas, where I soon met Harmon, Eagles, Truscott, Eveleigh, Baehr, Keiser and Lewis. The situation was confused. Lucas is tired - very tired - but I did not take him out because it was in the middle or a be.ttle and although Truscott had reported the night before he was not sufficiently into the western sector picture to take over. It would have been a great mistake, in my opinion, to have me.de the change in the middle or this p1,rticular fight. "The situation was confused. The 179th Infantry had not performed well - \ Eagles admitted it. I suggested that he relieve Kammerer and that I would put Colonel Darby in oomnand. This was done. In the western sector a heavy German attack had carried the line to the final bridgehead position, where the British were apparently in good shape, but the 179th was disorg8nized. The 180th Infantry stuck out like a sore thumb to the east. The leading battalion of the 157th �on the west was out of contact with the rest or the regiment and was short or food and ammunition. Efforts of the 3rd Battalion, 157th, to join it had been f'utile. I was afraid that it had been cut off. One battalion or the 6th Armored Infantry had been committed at the underpass to ease the situation. l "At the conterenoe, Lucas and Truscott wanted to mke a counterattack and decided that Harmon shot1ld counterattack that afternoon. I felt that a proper counterattack could not be coordinated in that short time. It was then about 1030. I suggested that they hold the shoulders on either side or the penetration readjusting in the 180th sector; that all commanders go forward to their front line units and take hold of the situation and make it plain that they hold to the last man on the final bridgehead position; that Harmon's 6th In• rantry, less one battalion already committed ( that made only two weak batta• lions or his - 550 men in each) reinforced bya battalion or the .30th Infantry in reserve and supported by tanks, attack from the general area 9128 to the northwest with the tanks along the road and the infantry veering more to the west, and that plans be mde for the .3rd British Brigade and 169th Brigade to make similar counterattacks from the underpass area to the northeast, should this become necessary. This plan was adopted. Lucas issued the instructions., and the commanders lef't. "I discussed with Lucas the possibility of a parachute drop in his rear area and that careful planning should be made to break up any nuisance raid like this without alarming any of the bridgehead personnel. "I checked carefully on the organization of their final bridgehead position and am of the opinion that it was not thoroughly followed up by Lucas or his staff. I may be wrong on this point. "I discussed with Keiser the necessity of organizing other units, anti• aircraft and what not, for possible reserves in an emergency - this they had thought or. "I went with Truscott to the 45th Division commnd post where I saw Paul Pascal, second in command of the division. He con.firmed the situation on the front of the 45th Division and had already taken steps to readjust the front of the 180th Infantry to conform to the withdrawal or the 179th. "I then went to Harmon's command post, where he was calling a conference of his commanders to prepare the plans for a counterattack in the morning. Harmon told me that two companies of his tanks had operated on the road running northwest from 9128 earlier in the day and if it had not been for his tanks there might have been a minor crisis in that area, for a battalion of the 179th had withdrawn precipitously to the rear when confronted by superior German forces. He told me his tankers had killed about 125 Boche. All during the af• / ternoon, f'rom latest reports, his tanks operated successfully in that area. I then returned to Lucas command post. "I did not go to see Templar because Lucas and Eveleigh and at such a tense period I felt it unwise to inject myself post at the same time. I again discussed the situation with and told Truscott or m:, plan to put him in command of the VI Lucas into my Army as Deputy until something else developed. were visiting him, into his command Lucas and Truscott Corps and to bring I told Truscott �that I would take out Keiser and Hill at the same time, and he could take Carleton as his Chief of Staff and his 3rd Division Deputy as his G-3. He asked for Campbell as his Artillery Officer, and I denied him that reqmst temporarily. I returned by plane to T'ltY command post in the afternoon. That's quittl a lone• some trip in a cub, but it is a quick way of getting up and be.ck. "At night I discussed plans with General Freyburg. He oould not continue ~ his Indian Division attack on the monastery until the night of the 20th. I urged him to speedier action, knowing it would be to no avail. You can •t hurry these Britishers." The General returned to his command post at 1515 and innnediately summoned General Gruenther, and after discussing the tactieal situation at the bridgehead and on the Cassino front, he called in General Saville and General Brann and went over the situation with them. The attack of the Germans against the beachhead is in considerable force and is potentially very dangerous. General Clark today dispatched the following cable to Admiral Morse. RN 3590. "Fully appreciate present difficulties of port of Anzio 110rking under enemy shelling. We are doing all we can now by counter battery and air attack to deal with enemy batteries and intend to resume offensive and enlarge bridgehead at earliest practicable moment. I am deeply grateful to the British and American personnel who are performing difficult tasks efficiently and cheerfully. I am especially appreciative of the work of the port parties under the leadership of Captain Turner." Later in the day the following reply was received from Admiral Morse. RN' 1175. "Message is tremendously appreciated, most grateful. It is being passed to all concerned. Good luck."' * * * PRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 19, 1944--General Clark remained at the command post throughout the day where he held a number of conferences. General Clark's notes concerning the activities and conferences of to dny are as f ollolvs: "I received the following letter from ACJF: IDST SECRET STJBJEC'l': Regi:ouping. TO Fifth Army. : H.g. -1, A. ••C. M,F. 1. Now that N.Z. Corps has been comrni t ted 1.t is essentiitl to carry out further regrouping to provide a fresh reserve with which to continue the battle. 2. The main factors in the solution of this problem appear to be:- �96 (a) 88 U.S. Div. is the only formation not yet committed. It has, it is understood, one R.C.T. fully equipped now and the rest of the Division should be complete between now and the end of February. It has had no previous battle experience and should therefore be put into a reasonably quiet part of the front to start with. (b) 34 and 36 U.S. Divs. have had a period of very heavy fighting and require first a period to reorganise and then a per1.od in a quiet pa.rt of the front. (c) 46 British Div, will very shortly be i.n the process of being relieved by 4 British Division, which must also be given a period in a reasonabl.7 quiet sector before being committed to offensive operations. (d) 10 Corps Fro~~ will for physical reasons remain the most quiet sector for some time to come, and offensive operations there can be confined to brigade attacks with limited objectives without detriment to the general plan. (e) No more troops can be withdrawn from Eighth Army front. (f) 5 Br, Div, hes not had a very arduous time since the fighting around rAINTURNO died down, and, after a short period out of the line, should be fit for offensive operations. 3. After full consideration of the factors set out in para 2 above, the C in C suggests the following as perhaps the most satisfactory way of creating a new reserve:(a) General Intention, (1) 88 u,s, Div. to begin to relieve 5 British Div at once. Reli.ef to continue as fast as the components of 88 Div can be equipped. (ii) 5 Br. Div. to come into A.C.M.F. reserve on relief. (iii)34 U.S. Div. to relieve 46 British Div as soon as the former can be got fit to take its place again in the line. (iv) H.Q. 2 U.S. Corns to relieve H.Q. 10 Corps, command to pass with relief of 46 British Div by 34 U.S. Div. (v) 36 u,s, Div, to be withdrawn into Fifth Army reserve as soon as its extraction from the line can be effected as a result of the converging advance of N.Z. and French Corps. 4. The C in C wishes to discuss the above proposals with Commander Fifth Ar1If1 as soon as General CLARK returns from the bridgehead and has had time to study the problem. Please report by telephone when General CLARK is in a posi• tion to discuss the matter. Meantime the C in C suggests that plans be prepared to put regrouping proposals into effect in the shortest possible space of time once a definite decision has been reached. It is vital to the maintenance of the momentum of the battle that any relief to be effected should be completed �91 without loss of time so that the troops required for further offensive operations get the maximum time for reorganization out of the_ line. /s/ A. F. HARDING Lt. Gen., C.G.S. PWM/gb ~9 Januy, 1944 (Changed by yhone call from 18 February, 1944 ACMF /s/ Wood) INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: M.A. P.A. P.A. Gen. to C-in-c to C.G.S. to D.C.G.s. ROBERTSON B.G.s. (G(Ops) "It really shocked me. There is nothing in it that I agree with. It is indicative or ACMF's willingness to delay this operation indefinitely. In compliance with its le.st pers.graph, I called General Lemnitzer and told him I was ready to discuss it at any time - the sooner the better - and requested that General Alexander, who was visiting Freyburg this morning, to drop by this afternoon. I later received word that he would come to see me tomorrow morning. "I am convinced that we must do something now. I have been so hamstrung and jockeyed by higher headquarters that the Firth Arrrr:, has lost a great deal of ) its power to control its own tactical operations, but I will insist, as long as / I am Comnander, on presenting my views and demanding their execution as far as possible. "I intend to recommend that the French attack toward Atina, the II Corps, leading with the 88th Division, making a holding attack in the direction TerelleRoccaaecca, with the Indians attacking from the Monastery towards Piedmonte, with the New Zealand Division and the 78th Division attacking abreast across the Rapido up the Liri Valley and with 10 Corps attacking from the Minturno area after re• grouping in the direction of S. Giorgia. This will meet opposition by Alexander, but I am convinced if we are to get going it must be done this way. It is abso• lutely impossible to mass for an attack doffll the Liri Valley without first se• curing the commanding elevation on one fiank or the other, particularly in view of the heavily defended defenses prepared after months of German occupation in that area. "I called Keyes and Sloan, Commanding General of the 88th Division, for a conference, and they agreed, as do my G-J and Chief of Staff. "I conferred with Air Marshal Slessor and Major General Joe Cannon, of the TAF today, urging all-out air support of the battlefield in the bridgehead. I &eked these air experts if they could make it possible, through air power in direct support or my Army, to go down the Liri Valley without securing the elevation on at least one side. They agreed that they could not. "Gener&l Wilson called on me this morning, and I had a very frank conversation with him. He is always considerate, and I feel wants to be helpful. I �explained the situation in detail in the bridgehead and told him that he, the Navy, the Air and the Ground had a. commitment there which they must appreciate ) and support. I told him the Navy had not given me support and had acted in many high-handed ways, particularly in trying to cut my tonnage when I must have a certain tonnage there to support the necessary troops to hold the bridgehead and to build up some small reserve. As an example of interference, an I.ST loaded with equipment for the 169 Brigade, which I had rushed into the bridge• head, was in the port of Ando last night when a mine scare was raised by the Navy. The naval officer promptly closed the port and sent this I.ST with its valuable cargo· out to sea. I told General Wilson that I needed the 85th Divi• sion. He said he would send it early in March. I told him that this theater was being criticized for not massing our means. I asked him where my means were with which to mass. I explained my entire plan of maneuver in this area - the Liri Valley attack versus the Mount Cairo attack, coupled with a Liri Valley effort. He agrees that it is necessary to secure the high ground before sticking one's head into the Liri Valley trap. I told him of General Alexander's propo• sal as contained in the re-grouping letter referred to above. I rather felt, although he did not say so, that he did not agree with those proposals. "General Wilson asked me what I thought of General Penney's handling of the British 1st Division in the bridgehead. I told him that I was not too satisfied with it, nor were the other American Division Commanders with whom he worked. General Wilson indicated that he did not think Penney had handled his job well. I told Wilson that I had so reported to General Alexander. "Word from the bridgehead today has been increasingly cheerful. The counterattack arranged for yesterday by the Armored Division apparently has produced results. The "lost battalion" of the 157th is in contact with the rest of its regiment. Appt.rently the 179th has been relieved and is holding fast on its final bridgehead position. Harmon reports his tanks killed about 400 Germans. This is probably emggerated, but it must have been good shooting. "I told General Wilson that as long as the German kept six or seven divisions in the bridgehead area it would be futile for us to attempt to attack to gain our final objective at Colli Le.ziali, for we can not build up sufficient force in the bridgehead to overcome that much resistance; that I would lay in some extra supplies and import extra troops to regain more elbow room in the bridgehead and then dig in, relieving troop unit personnel to take over equip• ment of units going out and to build up in the Cassino area to join up with the bridgehead force. · "I have sent Colonel Bowman, my Engineer, up there to start advising on putting amnrunition dumps underground and on securing a bridgehead which can be held by defensive works by the minimum of troops." The following important messages were received and dispatched today: The Army Commander received the following cable yesterday, RN MI.479, from General Eisenhower; "Dear Wayne: In all the years I have known you I have never been prouder of you than during the past strenuous weeks. Despite every diffi• culty you are obviously doing a grand job of leadership with your chin up. I read the fine message ;rou recently" sent to your troops. Together with men like Al and Truscott you are writing history that Americans will always read with pride. Signed Ikett. l �General Clark today replied to General Eisenhower as follows, RN 3257: ttNothing in the world could have given me more encouragement than your message received during the last hectic night. I had just conferred with all comman• ders and visited units in bridgehead. British and American troops are fighting as usual with their chins up. I believe the Boche has shot his wad today, ) although I may be wrong. We are holding today and inflicting heavy casualties upon him. Air and Navy supporting us admirably. Thanks a million for your thoughtfulness. Al sends regards." Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 538. "Last night have closed port Anzio because of mines. I immediately contacted Captain Turner and notified him equipment of 169 Brigade on 3 ISTS's was vital tor today's operation. LST's mean• while had put to sea, and Turner reports despite all attempts to this hour he has been unable to reach LST's to bring them into port. If certain equipment does not reach 169 by 0900 hours this brigade may be unable to counterattack today." From AFHQ to CG, Fifth Arm:y. R1f R/35-3919. ttpart 1: Following under• water explosion l LST sank off Ponxa Island on 16 February. Part 2: Cruiser ,,,...Penelope sunk in same area morning- 18 February probably by U-boat. Hunt in progress. Penelope was returning from giving fire support with Dilo in Ageio area morning 17 February. Part 3: Destroyers pa.trolled in Vis channel off Menders Point and off the Albanian coast during night 16/17 February, but nothing was sighted. Part 4: PT boats intercepted the enemy destroyers or · minelayers off Capraia during night 17/18 February and delivered torpedo attack results unobserved. Part 5: m&S/M on patrol off' French Riviera attacked escorted M/V on 8 February 1 escort vessel believed sunk. 60 ton schooner also sunk by gunfire on 15 February." Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 539. "In your 3629, anti-personnel mines have been installed on final beachhead position and also on positions forward thereof held by our forces. Final beachhead position organized by continuous line of coordinated strong points with dug in positions protected by weapons, mines and wire except on right flank where Canale Mussolini is defended as continuous obstacle covered by weapons and by mines and wire at likely avenues or approach. Work continuing on this line and reserve line shown on overlay Field Order 22 this headquarters, 17 February. See mine data on overlay "Location of minefields 162400 Februs.rY" file Engineer, Fifth Army. Right flank canal mine installations not recorded at time above overlay published." Personal Clark from Lucas. RN 542. "Absolutely essential all-out air effort today. Have identified elements of at least five German divisions in salient. All roads into salient must be constantly bombed to prevent further reinforcement. In addition, enemy artillery must be constantly attacked. I believe heavy bombers must assist mediums and fighter bombers. Have made request for this support thru air officer." Personal Lucas to Clark. R?f 543. "Request you have sipply agencies give priority on shipping to 155mm gun and 81mm mortar (light) ammunition. If you can find some extra ammunition for 155 Howitzer M•l would certainly appreciate it." Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 544. "Situation as to progress or oounter• attack still indefinite. However it appears to have lessened pressure on beach- �head line. Will advise you when aco~ate information available." Personal Clark to Lucas. RN .3246. "7,000 rounds 81 mortar and 10,000 rounds 155 gun anmunition being shipped today. Have asked Newton to explain to 0 1:Yeill ammunition status which is improving. At any time that you feel your operations are being hampered by ammunition siortages be sure to let me know." Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 548. "Harmon's f'oroe making progress slowly having advanced about 2t kilometers on arc from point 90328.3. Several hundred prisoners taken. Our artillery, air and weapons fire has reduced enemy fight• ing strength considerably according to PW reports. Situation on 56 Division front remains generally satisfactory but some enemy infiltration has made con• tact with some companies obscure. Would like inf'ormation on Cassino front operations if' available." Personal Clark to Lucas. RN 3254. "Am pleased that counterattack has eased your situation. Apparently 45th position has stabilized. What is status and position of 169 and 3rd Brigades? Hope air eff'ort has helped. Feel you have done exceedingly well in today's fighting. Still struggling at Cassino where severe fighting oontinues." Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 551. "Essential that 54,580 rounds 105mm Howitzer &mmUnition originally scheduled f'or coaster but deducted from Liberty David Terry cargo arrive without delay and preferably by truck so that unload• ing may be assured regardless or weather. It is likewise essential that allocation and shipment this type ammunition be materially increased for period February 22 to March 3 due to heavy expenditures of past 48 hours and expectation that similar expenditures will be necessary in the near future because or tactical situation with which you are familiar." Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 452. "Counterattack by Harmon force highly successful. Pressure on beachhead line relieved. Estimated large number enemy casualties and at least 250 PW 1 s taken. Majority expressed f'ear our artillery fire and bombing. Will outpost line 887282 - 898295 • 903300 - 902.312 tonight and withdraw bilk of H force vicinity 915280 prepared to counterattack tomorrow to northwest or north as sitmtion warrants. 169 Brigade being moved vicinity 8430 prepared to counterattack to northeast tomorrow. Situation at present more favorable but all out air effort will be essential to check and break enemy renewed attacks expected." Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 553. "Due to S1ortage or infantry in beachhead and looking to accomplishment your fut~e offensive plans, I strongly recommend despite arrival of 18 Brigade, 24 Guards Brigade remain in this sector. The Guards, although depleted, are still a splendid fighting unit of great value in emergency. Suggest replacements forwarded here where brigade could be refitted and utilized in an offensive." Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 561. "Situation at present generally quiet and stabilized along front. Small air raid on port, no damage reported. Enemy artillery on both forward and rear troop areas increased during late afternoon. Advance of one ,oompany of Harmon's tanks north of underpass on Albano road caused approximately 150 prisoners. Small company attacks with some tanks one �95 let't flank of 3 Division, all repulsed. Air effort today accomplished superb \ results that cannot be simply expressed. Please inform all air personnel of the troops appreciation. 3rd Brigade remains corps reserve. 169 Brigade baa all troops and equipment ashore. Prepares to relieve two battalions 157 and second battalion 6th Infantry west of Albano-Anzio road tomorrow night, prepared to counterattack to northeast. Appreciate your news from Cassino front. Express our regards to troops there." Personal Clark to Lucas. RN 3276. "Thoroughly agree with your 553. Will do all in my power to comply with your wishes. Am expediting arrival of lB Brigade all possible." Personal Clark to Lucas. RN 3278. "Reference your 452, congratulate Harmon on his success today. Again I want to tell you that your accomplishments today have been outstanding. Keep it up. I think your proposed dis• positions of Harmon and 169 Brigade for possible counterattack roles tomorrow are exactly correct. We have laid on an all-out air program for tomorrow, the success of which is dependent on good weather. We are praying for that." Personal Lucas from Clark. RN 3279. 11 105 ammunition referred to in your 551 will be shipped by truck beginning 22 Febru.a:ry. Ship with 95,000 rounds due Naples tomo1Tow and will be moved to Anzio immediately. Will do everything possible to insure that you do not run short of ammunition." * * * PRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 20 1 1944--General Clark's notes of today's activities are as follows: "Called a conference at 0900 with General Juin, GenerAl Roosevelt and General Carpentier this morning in order to discuss the French Expeditionary Corps capabilities in the Fifth Army attack from the Cassino front. They are most anxious to go to Atina. I had always known this but knew that it was a divergent attack which may or may not contribute to the main effort. I also knew that General Alexander was opposed to their attacking in that direction. Juin indicated that he did not have the capability in his weakened condition to attack to the west from Terelle on Roccasecca. I find so many details had not been worked out by my staff I broke up the meeting, deciding I would see Juin later in the day. Met with General Alexander at 1030 with Harding and with Gruenther. Took up his proposal for regrouping and told him I was opposed to it. Whereas I had anticipated a stormy session, it worked out alright. I pointed out why the Americans should not take over from 10 Corps, mainly for logistical reasons. General Alexander had not thought out his plan very well. When I asked who would take over the Campoleone area, he did not know. He astounded me by being worried about an attack on the Eighth Army front by the Germans, positively beyond their capability. He further astounded me by indicating that if the bridgehead should be lost, Kesselring would bring all his divisions down here, and we could not hold them. There is no question in my mind that we could hold them under those conditions after a little regrouping. However, the bridgehead probably will not be lost. · It was finally decided that the French will hold in their present posi- �tion and take over Castellone; that the New Zealand Corps with the New Zea• land Division, 4th Indian and 78th will take out the Abbey Cassino obstacle and cross the Rapido into the Liri Valley; 10 Corps to regroup for pressure from Y~nturno on San Giorgio and an attack as San Giorgio is threatened by the 78th Division; II Corps will be withdrawn into Army reserve, consisting of the 34th, 36th and 88th Divisions. I will direct an intensive training and rehabilitating program for the two tired divisions." General Clark invited a number of staff officers and guests to come up to his hut in the evening, have something to eat and see a movie. The party numbered 2.3 in all, including General Bronn, General Tate, Colonel Saltzman, Lt. Col. Porter and others. The following important messages were received and dispatched today: Personal Clark to Lucas. RN .3654. "When the impetus of enemy's attack has slowed down, you should promptly retake some of the terrain lost on the 45th Division front. The extent to which you are able to do this is for your determination but can more easily be accomplished the minute his attack bas spent itself. Please advise me of your intentions. Another attack scheduled for tonight in direction of Cassino Monastery." Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 567. "Enemy relatively inactive during night except for aggressive pitrolling on front of 56 Division and light harrassing artillery fire in other sectors. At 0500 hours today enemy force not exceeding two companies supported by artillery fire attacked 1st Division. Attack repulsed. Greatly appreciate your understanding attitude toward our problems." Personal Sawbridge to Clark. RN 54011. for duty with a division in UK which has not matter bas not yet been presented to General you concur in release of Roosevelt. We have replace him." "Bradley wants General Roosevelt had battle experience. This Devers but in case he agrees will a Colonel Landis available to Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 569. "Situation quiet. Enemy artillery ac• tive on front of 1st and 45th Divisions, heaviest being on 2nd Battalion, 157th Infantry (85.30). Work our Air Corps continues splendid but in several instances p:i.lots apparently carelessly briefed have bombed our ground troops. Instances reported through air liaison. Damage not yet evaluated. Prisoners of war taken yesterday total 500." Personal Clark to Lucas. RN .3672. "All possible steps must be taken to further strengthen and coordinate the defenses on your final beachhead position, reinforcing with mines and wire. Has your sitmtion permitted your pushing out on the front or the 45th Division as suggested in my .3654? Believe one important factor contributing to the success of your stopping his penetration was that you held the shoulders. These must be strengthened against another attack. Regret exceedingly bombing of our own troops. You can rest assured I Mve made strong representations to air." Personal Lucas to Clerk. RN 584. "Every possible step has and is being taken to strengthen beachhead position. Reference your 3654 and 3672, situ.a- �tion today prevented our oughly agree this should be made to do so. Enemy in 1st and 45th Division pushing out in front lat and 45th Divisions. Thorbe done as soon as possible and every effort will artillery is now aetive age.inst front line elements sectors." Personal Clark to Sawbridge. RN 3687. "General Devers has been advised that Roosevelt is available. Landis is not desired as replacement. Shall submit name of recommended replacement for Roosevelt shortly." * * PRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 21, 1944•-General Clark spent the day at his command post engaged in administrative work and conferences. In the morning he received a call from three British military commentators: Lt. Gen. Martin, Ret., of the Daily Telegram; Mr. Brandon, of the Sunday Times; and Mr. Woodham, of the Kemsley Press which publishes the Daily Sketch. In the afternoon the Chief of Staff held a staff conference in the hut to explain the latest developments to representatives of ea.ch staff section. At the close of this meeting General Clark came in and made a short talk. The General said that he had not had as much chance to meet some of the staff offi• cers in the rear echelon as he would have liked during recent weeks, due to the pressure of operations which kept him at the front most or the time, but that he was conscious of and grateful for the fine work that they were conti• nuously doing. Today orders were received for General Roosevelt to leave Headquarters Fifth Army and report to Headquarters U.S. Forces in United Kingdom where his services had been requested by General Bradley. General Roosevelt had shortly before been cited for the Legion of Merit, and on his la.st visit to the Headquarters General Clark pinned the ribbon on General Roosevelt's tunic. General Clark's notes of today's activities are as follows: "Visited General Sp=idger I s Headquarters this morni.ng and discussed with , him and his Chief of Staff plans for future operations to take Cassino. He has weakened from day to day in his ability to take the monastery. We now propose to bomb the City of Cassino heavily a.nd then to attack it with fresh New Zealand troops. If successful, this will be followed by a push directly across the Rapido River in the direction of the railroad station. I urged that he expedite in every way possible this attack. He hopes to get it off on the 24th, but of course it may be delayed. 1 "I discussed with Freyburg, and directed my G-3 to prepare, the necessary alternate plans in the event this attack on Cassino failed. "Visited II Corps Headquarters and told General Keyes to plan for a withdranl of his Corps into Army reserve prepared to follow up the New Zealand Corps attack when it gets started in the Liri Valley." In the evening General Clark had as his guests ror dinner, Brigadier General Gar Davidson and Colonel Maddox of Force 163. General Clark today received the following letter from General Juin with �98 regard to :future missions of the CEF: "I have received notice of the new purely defensive mission assj_gned to the French Corps. "You wjll not overlook that this mission, undoubtedly imposed by serious necessity, is going to have the effect of prolonging the immobilization of my divisions - principally the 3rd DIA in very exposed positions, the occupation of which, to tep. you the truth, can be justified only by offensive intentions. "I do hope then that it is only a question of a momentary holdup to faci• litate the regrouping and putting in position of new forces, and that the offensive conception of the army maneuver will be taken up again as soon as possible. "Yesterday I had the pleasure of subnitting to you my point-of-view concerning the action of the C.E.F. in this maneuver. I feel that I have to consider again that it seems to me more and more impossible, with the new extension of my front, to continue alone in the direction of TERELLE-ROCCASECCA; "I should be required, in effect, to push out from a very pronounced salient at the extremity of my front and in prolongation thereof because they are dominated on all sides by the new position of the "Adolf Hitler" line, today well organized and strongly held by the enemy. "My" action cannot be started mtlesa it would be possible to oover it from the north by simultaneous operations, and the multiplicity of tasks which take up the means left at my disposal leave little to devote to the action of breaking through in the direction of ROCCASECCA. The intervention of the C.E.F. on this flank will be without force and without effect and the army maneuver might be impaired. "Not enough importance is attached, in my humble opinion, to the role played in the ATINA region by the defensive maneuver of the enemy. "This region is a vast hollow from the rear of which roads lead to ROME which are not at all menaced by the attacks of the Fifth Army. "From ATINA, the focal point, lead out communications which permit easy supply to all the enemy front from META to ROCCASECCA. The concentration of artillery which the enemy has emplaced in this region fires just as well on ROCCASECCA as in the plain of CASSINO - S. ELIA and on the COLLI road. "Thus the region of ATINA will provide a constant menace to the flank of the army. In neglecting it one definitely limits the success of the army maneuver and would always have to cover this flank under adverse conditions. "Therefore it is necessary to take ATINA and the C.E.F. alone is in the position to do it. 11 I also feel that there is some misconception on this immediate sction of the C.E.F. towards ATINA. There is some feeling that it is a movement which is divergent rather than convergent with respect to the principal effort that has been chosen. �"This action in itself can, in effect, appear to be divergent but the net result of the effort is what counts. My precise intentions thereby in directing my effort toward ATINA would be to shorten my front by anchoring it facing west (the north flank anchored to the high ground of META and consequently more easily defended) for a subsequent action truly converging in the direction of ARCE-FR0SINONE region. "This region being the true objective envisioned by the army maneuver, it is my belief that this is the converging point of all the army efforts and not R0CCASECCA, which is only a secondary converging point. "I restate my recommendations of yesterday, that is: 1. That it would be advisable first, while waiting, to permit me to execute the ATINA maneuver which will necessarily bring about, as you will have seen, a relief of pressure on my western defensive front. 2. If this is impossible at present, to give to another division when offensive action is retaken, the mission to advance in the direction of TERELLE-R0CCASECCA, my role being limited to covering this action from the north by simultaneous attack. It must be understood that I cannot, in spite of the best intentions on my part, assume all tasks on a front abnormally extended (almost half of the entire army front). "I am sending you my purely personal thoughts which may be of some value in subsequent decisions." General Clark received the following cable from General Lucas: RN 586. "Enemy artillery active during night on fronts of 3rd, 45th and 56th Divisions, particularly in the sector 179th Infantry. Up to this hour no attacks by German infantry. Considerable activity oonsisting of gunfire and flares at sea off peter beaches about 0120 hours. Navy reports small engagement with several E boats driving them off." Personal to Lucas from Cla.rk. RN 3299. "Do not return 24 Guards Brigade until specific orders are received from me. I am doing everything possible to arrange to have Brigade remain in bridgehead. I am reasonably certain it will remain at least temporarily. Replacement problem for this brigade still unsolved." * * * PRESENZAN0••FEBRUARY 22, 1944•uGeneral Clark left his command post at 0815 and, in company with General Saville of the XII Air Support Command, rode in his L-5 to Capodichino airport at Naples. The General's two pla.nes landed at 0850, making the flight from Presenzano in 20 minutes. Generals Clark and Saville got into General Clark's Packard and drove to Pier Bin Naples harbor where the two PT Boats, the #216 and #217, were waiting to leave for Anzio. The Anzio group was composed of 22 officers and men, including Generals Clark, Saville, Hawkins, Hays, Craigie, Martin and Moran. The trip up to Anzio was almost without incident. General Clark's boat swung shoreward in the Gulf of Gaeta so that a suspicious looking craft could be investigated. It was found to contain four Italians. While the F1' 1 s machine guns were trained on the Italian �lOO boat, the men were forced to pull back the tarpaulin covering _their cargo, which turned out to be nothing but sacks of lima beans. Just as .the two PT Boats were about to enter Anzio, "Moaning Mamie", believed to be a 170mm railroad gun, began to pitch shells into the harbor of Anzio. The PT Boats waited until the firing had ceased and then sped into the docks where the party and its equipment were loaded into vehicles. General Clark, accompanied by Generals Hays and Saville, went imme• diately to VI Corps Headquarters where General Clark conferred with Generals Lucas and Truscott. The remainder of the party went to the Fifth Army Advance Command Post, now located in a castle overlooking Anzio harbor, finding that the situation in the Anzio bridgehead was relatively good and that a German concentrntion, apparently aimed at a new offensive, had been broken up yesterday evening by artillery fire. The General then went to the 3rd Division command post where he talked with Brigadier General John W. 0 1Daniel, newly designated commander of the 3rd Division. From there General Clark went to the 45th Division, where he conferred with General Eagles. Following this conference the Army Commander departed for the command post of the 1st Armored Division where he discussed the situation with General Harmon. He then decided to go to the command post of the 179th. When General Clark neared the command post, a German tank some distance away laid four shells along the road down which General Clark and his party was driving. One of the shells was within 50 yards of the jeep. After talking to officers at the regimental command post and finding they felt quite confident of their ability to halt any further German attacks, General Clark / then drove to the Headquarters of the 56th British Division, where he conferred with General Templar. He found that the 2/6 Queens had replaced the 179th Infantry Regiment in the "hot corner" south of the 11 factory" and that within 24 hours the 2/7 Queens would go in to assist and ultimately relieve the 2/6 Queens. General Clark then went to the Fifth Army Advance Command Post, arriving there at 1620. After looking over cables that had come in, including a cable from General Gruenther saying that it was relatively quiet on the Cassino front, General Clark conferred a..t some length with General Truscott. Next he had conferences with various officers at the Advance Command Fost, concerning the particular problems they faced. Last night the Germans staged one of their heaviest air raids against Anzio. One bomb struck an armnunition dump and destroyed a considerable a.mount of 105 ammunition. General Clark instructed G-4 to get all ammunition pits below the surface of the ground as soon as possible. General Clark ate at the regular officers' mess, having as his dinner guests Generals Seville, Hays, Craigie and Hawkins. Following dinner, he had a conference with General Lucas, discussing with him the general plan for General Lucas' new assignment as Deputy Commander of the Fifth Army. General Aaron Bradshaw, Commanding the 34th AAA Brigade, which is charged with anti-aircraft protection for the beachhead, was the next visitor. He told General Clark that he was particularly in need of some special radar equipment to counteract the dropping by Germans of "window" which throws the �lO l normal radar machines out of adjustment and brings a number of anti-aircraft protection difficulties. General Clark immediately sent a cable to General Gruenther telling M_m to get this equipment on the next boat to Ando. The Army Commander then conferred with Lt. Col. Wells, G-2 at the Ad• vance Command Post, and later General Moran, before going to bed. General Clark dispatched the following cables to General Gruenther who had remained back at Fifth Army Main Headquarters: RN 9796. "Situation relatively quiet with sporadic artillery fire, mainly in forward areas. Second battalion, 157th, being relieved tonight by British. When completed will give 157th Infantry, less one battalion, as additional reserve. One battalion, 30th Infantry, being committed to strengthen position in vicinity of 9431. Will leave Anzio harbor exactly 1100 hours tomorrow. Saville requests you arrange air cover. Have two cubs at Capodichino 1500 hours. Have Packard and other transportation at dock at 1430 hours. Clear return PT trip with Navy. Don't let Spadger browbeat you. Acknowledge." RN 9798. "Eagles hopes there may be a vacancy in OPDWD for Churchill. Can we take him off his hands? Acknowledge.'' RN 9799. "Bringing Johnny back with me in the morning with two aides. Issue orders by direction of the President in Truscott•s case. They should confirm my verbal orders I have issued tonight. Send on my PT Boats on 24th Brig. Gen. Fred Butler, to be Truscott•s Deputy. Also send Colonel Shepard at same time if he is not sick. Request NATOUSA to send Brig. Gen. Ramey to me immediately by air. I intend to make him VI Corps Anti-Tank Officer. Have extra car at dock for Lucas. May send him direct to Sorrento for rest. Issue orders announcing Lucas as Deputy Commander, Fifth Army. Acknowledge.n RN 9800. "Bradshaw has urgent need for three SCR 1 s 584. Robinson familiar with this requirement. They must be shipped by LST tomorrow." General Gruenther dispatched the following cable to General Clark re the situation at the Cassino front: RN 3712. "Bombing attack on Cassino scheduled to end noon 24th. Ground attack follows immediately thereafter. Weather prediction starting afternoon 24th is unfavorable and continues unfavorable for thr~e days. XII Air Support estimate thAt 7 heavy groups and 7 medium groups will be required and have submitted request for thnt number. Spadger says that this force is not enough. He feels that the maximum effort must be placed on the target and that no whittling down can be permitted. He has expressed his opinion rather vigorously and there may be a minor crisis developing. I believe I can handle the situation." Total Fifth Army battle casualties as of today are 72,982. * * * PRESENZANO-•FEBRUARY 23, 1944-•General Clark left the command post and went to VI Corps Headquarters where he again conferred with VI Corps staff officers. At 0800 he left for the 56th Evacuation Hospital. He was accompanied by two American war correspondents, Reynolds Packard of United Press and Edward Ken- � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, January 29 - February 22, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from January 29-February 22, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1568 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/4405beb5486b36e1d8a6d22afcffc2ec.pdf?Expires=1787184000&Signature=bNsZbIMUng1JkRCRmnW4QwP9yOYwAX%7Ema0LO9pK05ru5EAl%7EFwvoNqbpkF%7EL-LMu1C62uF7D1CQ8ZCZ13luM3lI6D8%7EX-UsjftePkcK7ZfDkhsKPAveJ3QpHYAQBdy6gYjTnXDOpoq7iev5QZcnCMWC8uvewtA%7Ex2w8cbKg%7Ep7lI7WtD3E%7EU7-NmWvauI9yMv9I16nDxignH%7E9rNKDYbzH0FU7I8sCiMyftwf699RUyNwDiuPXC3Mia79sNjHH3iqr1KcBjlBjj0o2j00v5g4MUh8DKQ%7E34CvYWXZNhhA3N0QMVuLr6%7E03drKTw1UDEufKr1Ozp7U4g8a3skLjzPow__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM d86e20c1005ea7b0d0b109f3f49a1c20 PDF Text Text s ~ This is Volume VI of the 1/ar Dirry of Lieutenrnt General r~rk W. ClPrk. Volume I, covering p0.riod 28 Jun~, 1942 to September 24, 1942; Volum~ II, Covcrin~ reriod 25 September 194? to 5 JanuPry 1943; Volume III, covering period 6 Jimun.ry 1943 to 6 Jun"? 1943; and Volume IV, covering period 7 June 1943 to ?9 AuRUst 1943, rre h~ld in safekeeping Pt the Army 1!ar College, ·foshi"1gton, D. C. VolUJ'le V, cover- ing period Augu~t 30, 1943 to December 31, 1943 is being held in safekeeping in the Commanding Genarn1 1 s safe �OFFICERS ' REST CErT-r:;R, SORRPiIITO--JMWARY 1, 1944--NErr YEAR 1S DAY--General ClPrk r,pent the day r>t the Officers I Rest Center. In the evcninp; he dined with some of his sta.ff officers who ,,,.r~ rre3ent . During thi"' dr_y, motor messengers brought dispPctches do m fron the GenerA.1 1 s commnnd rost, and he discussed various r1atters by telerhone with his Chief of StPff. AMong the day's messages ,.,ere n.n acknowledgment by General Clrirk of Gener:, 1 Leese I s greeting, besides th~ following rnessr:tges from Gencrnl Gruenther who " rs still in Afric;:i; Persnna.l for Clark fro,,, Gruenther . RN 22103 . "My guess js thPt SHINGLE v'ill be cancelled . Rooks and '""hiteley feel thrt Alexander is bf'dly off bflse in this instance ." Personal for Clark from Gruenth~r. RN 22104. "Informe.tion from AcimirP 1 Cunningham indicates nen.rly all LSTS must be released on Febru:c>ry ?nd at latest . Concert h~re is th"t force must land with suprlies for eight dRys with no dependence on re-supply by ,wter. No craft can be furnished for subsequent build-up. General 1'~isenhower has r sked Combined Chiefs to Pllovr 504th to remain for SHINGLE . 11 Personal for Clork from Gruenthcr . RN 22354. 11 Concensus here is thnt SH:It'(\LE should be cr-ncelled unless AleXPnder and Clark can show that there Tiill be no interference with ANVIL. I assume th:ot you now hPve telegrl"'m reference Seventh Army. Suggest you hnve Ga;:r or Harkins report to you immediately to explain status of Seventh Army staff . Part of stnff will start to a.rri ve here .!orldny. 11 Personal Clark to AloY..ander . RN 6037. "fosition regnrding ll"ndine craft nov: clear . It is understood 20 LST 1 s -.rill be released for Feb 5 convoy Pnd 13 more LST ' s 10 dr:iys lriter . J lanning is proceeding on allocation of 88 1ST I s (14 - 6 davit) , 60 LCT 1 s , 90 LOI (1) 's, 6 LSI (1) 1 s, 2 LSI (M) anc' 2 AGC 1 s. Urgently request additional 12 - 6 davit LST's of ?6 destined for er-irly departure TJ . K. be allotted for OperAtion SHrJGLE . Alterm1 te rlrin being prepPred using these additfonPl 12 - 6 daYit LST I s • 11 * * * CASERTA--JJ\.NUARY 2 , 1944--Gcneral Cl.Ark left ~ ,orrento Rt 1100 a.nd arrived at his command post two hours later . Shortly there11fter Generr•l Gruenther arrived from Algiers , and Generals Gruenther and Brann immediately met -•-i th General Clark to discuss the jnformRtion w'lined by General Gruenther in Algi11rs Pnd its effect on future operPtio:r1s . A great rector in this discussion WP :" a cable, R'J' 22218, received at General Clark's commPnd rost this morning PS 11n jnformation copy of n cable from FR'?.EJ"Xlf" to 15th l\rmy Group . This crble, conpletely to General Clark ' s surprise , radically altered the nunber of crpf't :;ivrilRblc for SH:f'TGLE and so limited the time when they 1"ere avrilr-ble PS to render re supply P..nd reinforcement of the SHIJJGLE force iT'lpossible . This c~'!._')le re:.=id as follows : "At the Tunis conference on 25 December it ''IPS P greed thrt SHIJJGLE could be undertal,:~n on the follo"dng basis: !,. Thrit nothing should be allowed to interfere vrith the target d[lte of OV'i:JlLORD or ANVIL. ]2 . ThPt the build- up . into Corsica should b"l safeguPrded . Q. Thero vms no riuestion of r1r>intenrnce of tr~ force over the beaches . ]2. There wes no question of A subsequent buildup of the initial force. �"The following are full details of l"nding craft r>vailability: s_. 1ST. At the Tunis conference it was decideo thnt 88 WP.S the T1.Rximwn thrt could be mP.de awiilable. Since then: (1) Doubt hrs arisen r>s to ,~hether 8 of these will not have to proceed to UK at once to enable the r8fitting progrP.m for OTIRLORD to be completed. (2) 3 fast LST heve been ordered to return from India, and it is hoped thr>t they will arrive jn time. Thus in the best case 91 LST will be avajlable e.nd in the worst case 80. In l'my crse, ho1'Tcver, you should not plnn on more than 95% of the avPilRble LST being service8ble at the time of the operation. 15 of the 1ST allotted are of the six-drwit type, and it appears proh-'lble tht>t this will be increased to 16, which is the mnximum possible. ]. LCT. 35 T'!a.rk V and 25 rhrk II, III or IV are expected to be available and serviceable. Q. LCI(l). A total of 90 are expected to be aveilable t1nd this figure Plip;ht be increPsed slightly. ]2. LSI(l) 6 and LSI(m) 2. "It r.mst be clearly understood thrt the LST scheduled for return to UK must be releA.sed no ln.ter tran 3 Februriry reg,.,rdless of 3HINGLE D day, P lso that 16 LST must be relen.sed no bter thr-n 3 Febru~ry to be b"ck on the Corsica run by 5 February re-gr.rdless of SIIPJGIE D d11y. Certnin otr"'lr LST must be released ir.imediately after the Pssault for ov"'lrhriul, Pnd vm AstimPte thP.t tr is ,•sj 11 leave you 6 serviceable LST for ell ms intennnce rurnoses in Italy ;,ftcr D./2. It is estimated thAt 24 serviceable LCT v:ill be rvailA.ble for all mainten:rnce purposes in Italy after D/2. 11 All above (1 P,Toup corrupt) concernin~ landing craft do not tPke into account 'battle losses from present time onwards. "It is emphasized thPt there must be a return to the ngremnents of the Tunis conference :md if acceptabl~ pl::>ns c::>nnot be drarn on thPt hrisis the GOCI!JC 15th Army Group must so stPte in orcl.er th::i.t the recoP1nendrition to ce.rry out SHPTGL.Ti: can be recons5 dered. n General Gruenther informP.d Gencrrl Clark thPt a Comr.iander-in-Chief 1 s conference nas now being held in Tunis cnncerning th9 mounting of SHINGLE ::>nd ANVIL; that General Alexander WAS there and vms discuss;ng the avAi]p'l:>ility of shipping with AdT'liral Cunningham. General Clr,rk, therefore, dispatched thn fol::!..oninr; cr-ible to G"lncrril ~lexander. RN 8281. "As I stated to yo1 l rhon you rere here several days a.t;o, I am enthusiastic over outlook for Operation 3HITTGLE provided thnt nece"'sary meAns are made available. Conditions proscribed in Fr~edom message ??2rn, requiring release of ell but six 1ST by "'ebru~ry 3rd, ..rill probt->hly rflsult in situ tion which 'l"'ill :make oy,ern.tion extremel;.r hnzarcous. I urgently request thnt you m11ke every effort to hold Adequate number of crP.:i"t for SF=:'JGLE 1mtiJ such time "'S success of the opere.tion is assured. 0 "Vlith the optimum number of LSTS which :vill be avn.ilr>ble the two jnf8ntry divisions ;vill lPnd vrith grel'ltl;r reduced vehicle strenr;ths. For exnmple, the British Division will have 1?00 vehicles le~s thrn assr,ult r-c,.los. Ancricrin Division and all attached surporti11g units both divi"'ions Hil1 be correspondingly reduced. Corps troops with acequatc trnnsr,ort and eriuipment will be prricticrilly nonexistent. 1 "Another unfrvorable fa~tor is thnt smPll number of Assault cr11ft will permit lPndin1; only five 4 nfantry h'lttnlions Enrl one ranger h1tt2lion assPult ~ �loaded. Reserve battA.lions w1.ll not be Pble to lrind in assnult crnft. It was for this reRson thnt I sent you ce.ble 6037 (quoted in yesterday's diary) asking thP.t l? PdditionPl LSTS with six davits be r1ade avnilRbL. The alternative is to use LCILS for the reserve units. The NElvy co'Ylsiders this on unsl'!tisfPctory method in view of lmown beach conditions, and I concur. In spite of these difficulties I have bi,en willing to 12.nd the corps At r(~duced str ,ngth on the assurription thRt ue ·aould be able to retain P reasonRble nunbcr of LSTS for resupply purposes and to trnnsport the necessary v~hicles needed by the ass:rn.lt forces. Freedom nessage 22218 hr.s ruled out thPt assumption. Minimum nunber of LSTS 1•rhich must be ret8inod is 20. Ten are needed for Rn indefinite period for re-supply purposes a.nd. ten for a reriod of t 1To ,,,eeJrs for tr'-"nsportc'ltion of vehicles. If lJo. vy Hill not remove loading lir1itRtion of 400 tons per LST P. total of 24 LSTS will be re0uired. 1 "rt is my conccptfon of Oporrtion 3HI1IGLE th;:it vre r-mst coun.t on "'.upplying by sea for P. minimum period of 15 days rind probebly longer. The 0xr,.,cted location of the Fifth Army 11hen SHIJGLE is lP.unched is such thA.t it is highly improbeble that the two forces rill be able to gain confo ct in less than, thet time. I intend att1=1c'k in. gre<>test rossible stren<rth in L-i.ri Valley severnl days in adwmce of SHT'.JGIB ~,fitr the object of draving r1axin.um mmbcr of enemy reserves to thPt .,.~ront iind fixing then therP-. In thrt vm.;r and in thPt way only CB.n the SHFJGLB Force exercise a decisive influence in the operPtion to carture Rome. 11 If r~y idea of the opern.tion is sound it is essentiol that ··,c make rrovision to re-surPly the force ?S indicrted above. rry estimntc of ?O LSTS makes no allonance f'or craft to rrovide a build-up although it :is quitr-; conceiwible thPt the ener-iy situntion mP.y mPke thl'lt <>ction necessary. "Present estirr£tte is th~.t D Day will be Jrmwiry 25, Although T Pm making ever:r effort to adv"ncc thet sevoral days." Gener.:>l ClR.rk felt th'1t he was genu:inely e1'1~er to engrige in SHH-TGLF:, to \ the point of' committing in it units -hich he rroulrl suhsequently hnve to utiJ.:ize in K~NIL, but thrt, in effect, a. pistol was being held Pt his head becruse he was told, totally t0 hj" SW'prise, thrt if he wns to engage in '3HINGLE it must be done '"ith inadequate craft, thet the craft ,..ould be ev<>ilable for only two de.ys after the l.nndini:; rnrl thPt no re-supr,ly or rr~inforcement thereafter i7ould be awiil2.ble. In effect, therefore, he WPS Psi:0d to land two divisions et a point where a junction vith the h=iln.nce of Fifth Army was impossible for e ) long period, thereby leavinr-; tho t,ro di visions :i.n question out on a very long limb. L r2 Later in the afternoon Generr:tl IfoCreery called on General Clar}!- Pnd discussed the f'uture operations of 10 Corps. He also spoke of P conversation he recently had had vdth the General Co·1m~n.ding the 5th British Division, "hich is About to become part of the Fifth Army, and in particular rbout thrt officer's comment concerning the caswltics of thrit Division. Gener'l.1 ncCreery ) was struck by the comparativ~ly trifling c.nsualties vrhich h...,rl been suffered and by the light chPracter of the fightinp; on the Eighth Army front which this / indfoated. The follovrjn~ cnblo was srmt to VI Corps rind the Fr~mch Exy-,"Jditiom1r;7 Corrs todr-i.y. rm 6051. 11 Effective 031200 JanuPry French r.:xpca~tionary Corps riill relieve VI Corps find CG, F~C wi11 assur::1c coriT1r-ind of present VI Corre sector n.nd �..5 responsibility for current ~ission of VI Corps. "Assignmr,nts rnd 'ltt::ichmrmts ncntioned in Fifth ~rmy letter, AG file 11 Troops rrssignrnents ,nd PttPclir1<>nts1t become effective 031200 J::,nuRry 19f+/h 322 .1-Y dated 2 J,r,.nunry 19M+, "'Ubj0ct 11 VI Corps ·vill reconnoiter the flre::i uest of I\VsRSA-HAILES rord 2n south of 10 Corns reAr boundrir;r for bivoun.c are;:-~ f'or Corr-~ CI' n.nrl Corps Troops. Areris selected will be clearoa ~i th G-3 Pnd G-4 this her'dqurrtors , ·ho will arrringe contact"' rith FBS ''Ih~re necessary. "Effective 040001A January, 3d Infrntry Jivision ,.,nd rtfrch d 441st AAA A'"l Bn rnd 601st TD Bn is ntto.ch~d VI Corps." * * CASTillTA--JANUl\RY 3, 1944--Gen"'rn l Clerk tod::,y confl"lrrod j n the morning concerninf, pmnin,:,- operAtiori.s with Gcm~r"l J:9yes, Gen0r"l Gruenthrr, GPner~l Brrinn nnd G~n9r::i_l L9mnitzer. Gent'lr~l Keyes r>nd Gener~l L'jrnnitzer st~y"'d for lunch. In the pfternoon G9nOr"l LuCPfl cnr,c rind r1 jccuased J.j_s rrorosGn rll"n for the rount. nP, of SHIITGLr.;. On Jrinm1 ry 1st, by Gen"'r:' 1 Pattnn =rs relieved) fron cor1mf'nd of the 3cve'1th ArT"ly, r>nr Gcn9r~1 C1,,rv:: "'PS r,l2c..,d in comm"nd of it, in arldition to his cor,"lnnd of t}1e Fifth Army. The di:' y "f11'm h0 ,,;ould lay do 11m c6mnc'nc1 of the Fifth Army was left to 0ir> cleterrrdn.,,tion. Fart of the Seventh Army PlPnning Staff vr:'s r>lreaily on the wr,ter on its "'A.Y to Alfti-rs <>nd the Chief of StRff, Seventh Army was on his w>y to confer vi th G ,neri= 1 Clrr1r. The Grin~rrl I s int,,ntion vras to send Gemr,r il Brann ir:1I1cdirtely to Alir' ers to take charf{e o+' the I'lo.nninr, Grour anrl rt n:r eArly <lat9 he rropos9d to set ur his Army HePJ'l.quartcrs in Itn ly, ro· sibly nt Salerno, derending uron b ce of mountini; and tr" inint:; for A'nfIL. It would be di f'f'5 cult for him to retain more them ri few li::(ly reorle from his rresent sbff, - tentPtivcly his four G's and bis Sip;ml Of'fj cer, rr~ th & fc ,r junior officers "no, of course, his Chfof of Staff. The nio11nti:>1a of ANVIL vmulc'I be mr-de by four American Jjvisions and five or six -'rench Divisions. The /1.nericP..n Divisions would l110k>" the initifll 0ssault, and the rench Divisions tb..,n come in. The GenerAl is seeking to get nn airborne division in arldition 11.nd is seeking nn a.ppropriate Air Commander . 0 At noon today GenerRl Lucas rcl:i.nquished comMand of the sector in ,•·hich VI Corps had been oper~ting, and Generel Juin 1 s CEF took over the com.~and of the 2nd Norocctm Division rind the 45th Division. The 7th R.T.n. of the 3rd AlgeriPn hRd already start0d thc relief of tho 179th Inf,-,ntr;'{. GenerPl Lucas, following a ceremonial relief by Gennr.11 Juin at Prata, caml'! to t:be confero.nce with GenerPl ClRrk ri ✓ ntfoned r-bove rinc1 tr"•n '7ent on to set up his new HePdquarters at f"addaloni. The Prmy Co"1mrmder received r- cable f'rom G0nernl Alexanrler, !RN, stPting that General Alexander trill arrive Cap()dichino at 1130 to"':lorrow r>nr' plP.ns to return to B::iri th0 samn Pftr:?rnoon, 11nd 1-rill hPV3 ffcrty of' four. The fol lo"ri ni:s excerpt is f'lade of Cosi tintrop Ll78 frori 15th Arrriy Group, �RN o . 848 : "Fifth P,rmy French ~x:reditionrry r:orps (FBC) CF open".ld Prata Hl614 at 031::>00A hours . Relieved VI Corps . CG FEC ass11mnd comrr,"nd rresent VI Corps Sector a!lo resron::::ibilH;r for current m.i'>sion 0f VI Corps . 3 Al!'.;erinn Div movement to 45 Div Ar~P continues . Relief of 179 Inf :in are& Fl4,?6 by 7 .Alger Inf started todey. 2 1 'oroc Djv. r;e,,,thnr li~jt~d operf!tions . Security patroll5_np;. 4 Div Sno'" ext,r-;rie cold "'nr' rurrg,,0 t11rrrin hl=impering r>dv<>nce 180 Inf Patrols located enemy in Acquafondola H05?6. Ene!'ly still holding at G9727 9725 . II Co1'J)s . 1/i.2 Inf security ratrols only. No contact TFA strong combP.t patrols to G9L,16 - g515 met hewvy enemy resistt:>nce . 1 Armel Div less Hq One Corbot Comnand relieved nttrichl"lent II Corps 020001A hours reverted to Fifth Army Control. Povinp; vicinity Aqul'llirmo 1'Jl357. X Corrs . 56 Div. 168 Bde to M8798 found enemy. I'r.trol to bridge M 8594 niade no contact . Army 'I'f'S. 3 US Div less 15 Inf' reverteo to /irmy Con+,rol ::>921401\ Decl"):riber now closed in Area 2 rTiles T-Torth of Pozzuoli NlOL.6 . ~i.fth Army cr>sualtiAs to 1 Jan. Ameri can killed 2673 wounded 11010 r1issinP, '3366 . British killed 1682 ~rounded 7112 missing 2884 . Fr -nch 1-::illed ?28 wounded 144g missing 89 . n: by Ari.ericnns 2g95 . British 1686. French 118 . 11 * * CASERTA --JA~-lU~RY 4, 19l+L:---This morning G'"'n""rRl Gl2rk l"P.cejv~d calls from Brigcdier G"mor11l Sr•;1bridge, G- 1, A'.'Iq , rnd Brigadier Genernl Arthur Hilson , Comm""nd:ing ,13s. Tith Gener[il Srivrbridge he oiscussed the transfer of certnin rersonnel from Fi.r>th Arrny to Seventh Arr1y a:111 also the riuestions ;:,risinp; out of' certP in Legion nf T<irit 8 .,,,rds . JIG took up vr>rious ~upply problems in his ciocussion with GAnPrPl il3on . Shortly b~fore noon J::,e held 11 mr-,etinP ~t th"" hut Pt which tb~ro "'ere present Generr>l Luca" , G,~ncrr-1 GruP.nthP.r , Ac1r,irel Lo'"rry, Captain Le...,ds , Generc>l Truscott , Genf:'lral Brr>.nn and vnrious st<iff officers . Ge-neral Cl,,,rk stAtcd thr-t he '.7PS e-,rpectin?, P visit "'roT'l Gon'"ral Alexo.nder j_n A few minutes "nd th"'t the pre3c-,it mr~etine hr-d been cRlled r-s ~ preliminnry to the w:iet5.np- with GAneral Alex;:,nder . T-fe r1entioned the :mrpri~c •ri th vrhich he hPd received the message from <\FHQ (mr 2?;::>18 , quoted jn the dir->ry of Jf!nunry ?nd) r,lacinrr l:i r-d to.tions on th8 "mount of crest 11 VPilP bl': for SHINGLE and on the tir,e ,rhen the crPft ' ere awil,,ble could b"; US"'}c1 , Pnd stc t8d th['t under tho c0nditions of this messe.ee re-SUT'Pl:V r>nd rei f'orcerl\ent vras imross:ible . After 1 sone a; sc;1ssion of v::irious c et:clilP , the G~ner"l 1mr,1T'l11rizcd his nosition '"'S follows: "'"19 are supposed to go ur tbere , r1 ump t•."o di visions P shore '<ri th V.'hrt corps troops we C<'.n s~t ~ n, with r1 n indeterr1j na to nunber of craft without re suprly or reinforccT1cnt, and 1"[\i t for the rest cf the Arm:r to ;join up . n He then adned , 11 I am trying to find wPys to do it , not -rpys in which "''e con not do it . I ari convinced that -re r> re r;oing to do it, P n,1 thn t it -i s going to be a success . n The P s ser:ibled o:f'fj cers left uron the r rri vr l of G0nern 1 Alex~11.der , ,·,ho cemc with I"ajor G~nr:rR.l Rich.i:;rc'lson :::>nd Lt. Gen . HPrcl:i ng. Gen°rPl Robr:,rtson also came , a.nd these officers , ·rith Gencrl"l Grur.;nth,r E>nd G")nerrl Brnnn, discussed operntion rmI:TGLE . 1 General Cll"rk statPd to (km~rnl J\lexP.nder thl'lt th"} messae;e RN 2;)218, had corie P s r' cor,plete ourpri se n11d shoc1· to him, as no pr~vi ou'"> suggestion from General Ale7ander had rdnted at the linitrtions of riv,ilnb1e shipping ~1hich this nessage imposed . Gencr::i.l Clnr}r stnterl to General /\.lexrmder 1 s surprise / �thPt he , General Clark, had l'.11o"rn for three '"eeks th"t he hNl b0en selected to cormFind 11 1 1VIL and new~rthcles-:: , ,lesrite J,-,is nrtur2l interest jn conserving force for thrt blow , he r<1d "c'lnt.busiristjcnll:r ,nter d into C-:HI'mLF. rlP.nning and hPd nronosed to nut his 1JI Corps staff "nd .bis 3rd Infrntry Division , t",o of his fin~st rin;J T"!~st useful orgr>nizatio·'ls , ~ :nto the SVPTGI:~ Operl'ltior, ,=hicr 'WS one of c0ns::.dereble hazard in ,·:hich t.beir usefulness f'or .11.TIVIL nip;ht be considerably iripnircd . Gener;il Cl['rk furtblr ,tr>ted to Gennr"l AlexPnder thet he W"'S fully deter:riined on p-oi>-1g into jHr'GLE end puttinr, fortl1 evcr-::,r effort to rna1,:e it n. success , but it could not be done nitl1out tro cr;of't, originally Agreed on . Gen"rnl Almmnr1er then unrlertook to drn'·' r c.--ble to the Fril"le f'inister exnlE1inin1:,- tho. rer.Jnisites of srirr:inr.; for the successful confuct of r.;IUNGLE and had a difficult tin<:'! vi th the fr cts "nd figures unt:i. l G"!n<lrf' 1 Clnr], "'Ufplied him .,j th P copy of' cnble P.H 8?81 of Jl'lnw ry ?nd (quoted in thcit dey ' n diriry) ~•rhich General Ale-v:r-inder hRd hrc1 for tno dP;TS . GenerP l t lext1nrl~r , r0c0gnizing th,.,t all th0 n9cessrry datr. wa" contain,.,cl in Gen0rril Cli=irk 1 s c11ble , c'lrew a cab] e o,.. his m;ri tr, the Prime r~inister ndortinr; the subst1mce of' Gnnerfl l mm cable . lo ,l 0 1 (J G C Gr-meral ClE<r1'- tcld Generrl Alemnrler th::-t he rroposed to continue plflnning for 3HI rm,s onrl , cs 8 rossih1e c lternntiv8, 1rP.cp in riinrl r shorter ~nd run just north of Gaete Ioint to be pi<:rforned with one djvision only. However , G0nerr-il Cl..,rk further strted thrt in his estiMPtion :lt "TPS thP- ('unction of G<>n,,rrl Alexander to determine v;hother the number of Gern;:in Divisions prepPred to oppose tr1e lrirdinR; in 3HHTGLB ',ms too grer>t to per>"~-t r succcss,,.ul or'"rr tion Pnd that hr-i , G<>ner8l ClnrJ:, dic1 not rropose to rrirc-~ this question ::,ny further . He poj.nted out to GrmerRl Alexander thrt he understooc" thc-t the '.)qth P;inzer Gr0nr> dier Regj ment hPd just be(m noV!3d by the German cor,mand from the Fifth Army front to a position near Rome , •7hich n,dded rll.oth~r division to those in rosition to oprose the opr,ratfon under discussion. G"!n9rnl AlexrindP-r anc'l the throe officers riccomrnnying hin then left the cor.in;ind post by cub for Crpodi.chino airport nnd returnod by plP..ne to B2ri. / \ GencrPl Cle.rk ,,.elt thPt l't tho :nr:ietinr with the Prime I'fj nistqr in Tunis on Christnas D;:iy -·hen Gnneral Eisenhormr , Gener11l Alexander anc'l others \7ere I present , the Trime f'in:: ster had been :Lnrpircd --Ji th a desire to CPfture Rorie and bad determj ned thr>t 'HI'TGLS v;ould ta ·e plrice , Pnd GeniJra 1 Sisenho·· er "nd G0ne - 1 rel Alexand0r , ·ritrout detn:tled l:nomledge of the rro½l9l7!S involver , had r-greed / to it . n'1fortunrtely, in General Clrirk 1 s estimation, none of those rrho thus lip;ht hcartedly de c id.ed on tho SH:nTGLE Operation understood the detPils of shippj_ng end of loar'linf'" nl'"Jcessary to rut rshore the requisite .,,.orce 2nd nri"ntain it when once Pshore . The Genornl felt thrt G0n,,ral Alexnnder, even ,oft0r re ceiving GnnerPl ClPrk ' s 7JT 8?81, still did not n.rrr0.cirte the re,1uisites f'or a successful oper:=i,tion auch as SPIJ-TGL'"' , Pnd h11 had been hamper0d rt a Comm~:inder in- Chief 1 s con:'ercnce ulth Admiral Clmn:inp.;hPm on Janur>ry 0 nd by this lr>ck of informRtion. Gener8,l ClBrk felt thr-t ,•rhcn Gen(1r;:a 1 ft lexnnder hPd b0tm br,clly dis.s.prointed 1 at not gettinP' the 1•"'n.iterrPnean CoJ11Jnand , vice Grmer, 1 EisenhoT'T(')r , Pnd at not being selected to fo l low G'.mcr a l ~isenho"er to UK for a. comriand there , the Frir,e Hinistcr had ->ttcmpted to sr,othe his feelings by p,-j ving h:i.m the high s01mding ,,mt somevrhat empty title of Cor:imnnr1er- in- Chicf , Itrly, Bnd b;v ~iving him Lt. Gr:m . Harc1 ing as his Chief of :3taff , to G0neral Harding ' " oiseppoint ment cs he hrd hopcn to cor~111and his Corps jn OVT'JtLo-qn . ~lith tJ-,'3se other conc essions , the Prime r'inister kd 2lso , in Gener al Cbrk ' s estil"lr-tion, given l �General Alexn.nder P'"rmission to riount Ororntion ~HI TGLE vrithout proper consideration of the f,,ctors imrolvnd in the or'"rf1tion. The r,ritter 1c'as rendered more coJTJplex hy th~ fRct tr.Pst the crr-"t of ·7J-•:Ich the FriMe ' 1inister -r:1 s disposinr, "ere in large rrJeasure American ere ,...t And r>ot subj net to his control. _,, This evening P now phr,sc of the Fi th Army attn k "ms jnstitut'3d nhen the 3/+th Division, the Speci"ll Service Force rn~ th(') t)th ~rmorr:id Division pushed forvm.rrl. By thA close of the d<>y our troops ·;ere in S<Jn Vittore nhere street fi~hting hed occurred. Some -.,iw,nces hrd been r1c-ide on the M gh gr01md to the northeast. General Clark today rlispatchnd the follo 1'linr cr)blc to crrc, JFH'.}. RN R37?. 11 1. Decision by r,L I'130 precludes the loacing of cr.>rgo sJ-,ipr.ing at Fantaloon "or Operation SHil GI.E e:rcert for fPrt of shirrfog to :'3.ccorn.p.?ny assault convoy. This ruling nn.de because loading of ar'ditional shippi11.g would interfere rith rlrmned incorrtng tonnPr;es throui::h fort of f rnt.<:iloon. ?. Contemplate loading 4 fjtt~d Libcrtfos v7ith British Pnd Am~ricrm Ground Force Stores r,ric. 1 Cor-:ister .,..d.th Air Force supplies rt Fnntnloon because of the selective loading required anc because of non-avPilBbility of certain supplies in !forth Africa. 11 3. 'ill require 8 Fitted Liberty Ships eAch to he sprerirl loaded TTith BritisJ:, and Americn.n Ground Force supplies l'lnd ? Co9sters to be lof-1.ded with Air Force supplies in P 1forth A""ricPn Port or Forts cesignated by you. Am pr':lparecl to. Sl'!nd rGpresl'mtr,tjves ..,ith reriuisitions to 30S IJATCUSA and AFRQ (British And TQI"'s to fort or I-orts of lonning. 11 "Li-. It is required th-it four fitt"d Liberties rncl 1 CoPster loaded in North Africa a.rrive Pantaloon not later than ?3 Janwry and the brilanc" of 4 Liberties and l Coaster to arrive Pentaloon not ln.ter thnn 1 Febru,.,ry. 5. Request thA.t the Liberty 8hi:rs anr Corister be Ylomin..-ted n_nd port or rorts of loadh1g be designrited. forts selected f1ust be carabl•~ of lo::iding British rnc American supplies on the sr>me ship. Also re~uest deadline drtes for arrival in North Africa of reriuisitio11.s rnd representPtives. 11 11 6. New subject: Rerpv~st eXPrrdn1:1tion of Pdequ"'CY of stocks to be loaded on above shipping in t,rorth Africa for brilance supplying for ?O dAys of 1 Am1-,ricn.n , nd 1 Britisl Division uith supporti.n~ troops Fith particulr>r ref19rence to 0 ammunition of following calibe rs: British TyJ)es 5~ 511 G,m, 4. 5 Gun, ?; po1.L.'1der, l '7 pounder, 25 pounder, 3 11 nortar. Arnericr>n Types: 75 mm Gun 3'1 Gun 105mm Tfovri tzer, ft-2 155mm irowitzer, fi'-1 155mm G,m, M-1 57mm i\nti-t~ink Gun L~. 2 11 r 7ortn.r 11 �9 CASERTA--,TATTTTARY 5, 194L~--GeMr<>l Clnr 1{ re!7lainl')d at his cori:'lanrl post throughout th'-' day, stuc'vinrr, rlans for Opelr"tio11 s SHriGLE nnd A'TTJIL. ,7ork-i'1IT to fi.nd the nece"'sarv nunb~r of cr:i.ft for Operr>tion "HrrGIE, Gener:--1 Alexander sent a radio messaP"l'l to Gl'!nP.ral Clrrv, IHI 533 , telling h"m th"t he i"' pressing Trime T-'inister Churchill (By prl'l-errRnr;ement, the lril'1~ T~inister wes referred to :in this e.nd subse1mmt messr>ges as "Colon.el \r:=trdcn") very hPrd to get ur the necessary craft wanted for the expedition, and Us maintenrince . Gener,, 1 Alex::inder in-l"ormed Genernl r:lark thrt he hri.d suggestr-d r,oin~ by air to see the Prime l~inister Pnd asked thl'lt Genernl Clrrk be reridv to s~nd nn 8dequ.-.,te small st11ff , both i:\rmy and N11vy , armec1 with full plrin Rnd lording tabl.-,s in simple form so they can be expl11.ined to I'r. Churchill. During the nfternoon Gnnerr>l Alexander rgrin rt">dioed Generrsl C1Frk, R~r n. t'.'Jlegrrim -l"rom rrirne '1inister Churchill 1hicr indicates that .re r,r,y get thl"l crr.r-t re quired . He c sked Gener£1l Clark to nle?s~ continu~ to plan Opcrfl.tion "FJ"GLE on th·~ nss,;mption throt r full amount of craft uill b~ avn.ila½l" • He ask~d Gener'"'l Clnrk to fly his spec:ial, small SHrTGLE staff to r'Rrrrikech, rhere "Colonel V iard.en" is now staying . General Clark then issu~d instructio.,,.s to his Chief of St, ff to hPV" a smP 11 group of o-"f~_cers alerted for t,~e journe;r. A rrelin5n,"'ry discussion by the staff with Gener 1 Alexandor will be held Janu'c'ry 7th in 'arrakech, e.nd then the ma:in conference vith the Prime t'inister ,!!ill be held the following day. :'A/9~6, telling him thnt he had rccei ved 0 In A.nswer to GcnerRl C1Pr1,. 1 s cable of yest~rda.y, //8372 (quoted in yesterday ' s diPry) , l\."'FT:1 todn;r instructed FLf I"BO R ,J 23997 , to fly to Algiers immediate ly a r-"presentriti ve ,,,1.tr r8quic;i tion.s for th8 r.:ooo s of both ground 1'1.nd air, British anrl American, needed to lrn:>c1 the 8 Liberty ships rind the 2 Consters in North AfricPn ports . ',pott-in.p: P"ld loading 'ere to connence at once, Pnd officers · 1ere to be sent to arl.vise on loadj -rig methods . Anoth~r cr>bl0 receiv:~d f'rol"! Ali;iers, R'J 23999 , in reference to GenerPl ClPrk 's ;18372, Psks an urgent reply from 15th Army Group PS to vrhethAr or not the Comrnn:ider of the 8th A··phibious Force (Admiral Lorrry) h2.s Rgrecd to trike cars::;o ships in on the assault or if they nre to be in t}·e iIDI'lcdiPte follo :-up. Gcnerril r.ruenthr,r indic,,t0d on a notJ on tris messaw~ thr-t the Connrin er of the 8th Ar1phihious Force 1111d ~greed to ta. 1re the shirs in on the nsseult . 0 In the evenine n~nerRl ClPrk ha.cl rs his dj n•1er rue st r:iss Pnrge.ret Bourke White, the f'n.mous woman photogrApher . She h~ s 1),->,en t:oJ,:ine pictm·es for LIFE r~agazine along the Fifth .Arn;r front . She discussed her imrressions of fight inp; j n the Fj_fth Army sector ancl sr·id tkt sre, , rbo hPd been r-in eXDornmt of the tough life of the Air Corp'"' , h2rl learned from watch:i n1 vround troors how really tough war can be . General Levd s was nlso £J P,Uest . Other important messo.ges of the da7 ,·ere as follo.,s: For General Alexander ' s (')yes only from Clr>rk . R 1J 6203 . 11 A group of two Army Rnd one NavPl officer has been set up to accompany you to see Colonel Wardrm. I trust thnt the mettAr ,n1 be settl~d firmly within next 4g hours . 11 To crrc from Cln.r}'- reference your 23499 BIGOT . RH l:,215 . 11 Airborne divi·sions should b<3 orr;anized with three rarachute regir,~ntc1l combet terns 1rnd no glider reginent . Irt vievr of nrture of Oneration MI'TIL, I con ·ider it essential that airborne division l'.!ontain some battle-trained airborne el..,'1lent"' , 13.nd I �l() again urgentl y recomri~nd th<1.t 50/..th RCT remr in here to c onstitute nucl"'us a.round which to build new airborne combnt terns to be brought f'rom United Stnte'"' . Your directive to rne for Operntion AFVIL indic2tes two airborne RCTs will be rvailablP- in addition to four TJ . S . infantry divisions . I am count ing on four infr>ntry di visions . If I am forced to choose betvmen the fourt h infantry division and an s.irborne division , I definitely VTPnt the infnntry division . In that event :tt would be inperative thrit the 504th RCT be re t ained here "-l.nd th, t rt least one additionr.l prrachut e RCT be brought from United St ates ." 11 * * * CASERTA --JANUA.RY 6, 1944-- This morning at 0900 Genr--ral Clr>r], c111led e moet ing of officers prelirriinrry to the cl eparture of the Sm" 11 str ff wi..ich vm s to discuss 3HHTGLE with Generr,l Alexa.nc1er nnd Col onel Vhro.en . The meeting was held at the G~ner1:il 1 s conference hut , and thP,re "ere present , be'3:ides Genernl Clark, General Gruenth~r , Admirnl Lowry , Gcnerr>.l Luc3s , Genera l Brann, Cay,t ain Lewis , TTSTJ, Colonel T;,te , Col onel Hill , Col onel 11illiPms Pnd Lt . Col. O' Neill. GenerR l Glark told tJ-,e o"'ficers thrt when Gemral Alexander vms present he , (}enernl Clar1-::, had insi sted thPt he needed a l'linimum of ?.L. LSTS aft er t he Assault , 14 for n.n indefinite per; od 1rnc1 10 for rit least 15 days . These ·!ere needed for ri build- up in troors and r1nteriel. En snio that +.he o"'ficers who wer e 1soin~ to the conf'erence must stick to their figu:t' As in the conference ''Ti th the Fd.me i':inister r>1c'1 not be ca jolcd · into retrenting "rom them, as the de c ision must he ,.,rrived rt bn.sed on the a ctual meds . The GcnerPl said thrit the Fresident Pnd the Combined Chiefs of Staff ,·,ere hcsitPnt to t~ke any ster Til~foh M:i f:;ht i rip~ril A~ IL and OVER LORD , v1hile the I-rime l!inister felt t hnt it vas c1 es:i.rPble to toke Rome at almost any c ost . GenerPl Clark: rereatea thPt it wAs r'lso necessary to appraj_s" the i:memy situ.,ntion at the b.st no!'l'mt to detArmine -rhether enemy build- up was too large to be overcome . Admiral Lowry stA.t~,:i th;:it the necessary cr:1f't, for SITIITGLE must start at once :for this area - that it .,..rould be impos3:ible to \"'ait +'or Fl conference on the ,qth 7lith Col onel 'larden , a de c ision on tl e 10th rnc'l then stPrt the craft . Gcnf'!rP l Clnr'l{: str>ted thr>t th0re nust be n T::iv['l of-f'ic~r ct the conference , and Admiral Lowry stated thA.t CPptain Le"1is was needed hero for planni nr; ,·,ork. I-T owr'v'3r , it was decided that Ce.ptR fo Le'7i 'J could go to Algi P-rs , trlk over the situntio11 ,·rith Capt-in Olds , of /\.dmiral rr~,~itt 1 s stPff , and Captain Olds could then ~o on to the c0n:"'er'1nce nnri exple in th,q situr tion , while Captain Lewis return9d to Feedqunrters Fifth Army. 0 Colonel Tate reported th:=•t the rroblem of loadinr; Liberty shirs ve_s well in hand . Generel ClRrk then asked Lt . Col. O' Neill whrt his ri:nswer vrould be if he ,,,ere asked why ~4 LCT3 would not do as Fell as LSTS for re- supply. Co l onel O' Neill j mmedfo.tely saF thrit t1'e Pnmvcr "ould be that rn 1ST rnuld hold 36 trucks and an LCT ·rould hold 8 , a11d Goncrr l ClPrk r~minded him ag"in t het tr~ fnctors of weather , spel"d rn,.d turnrround of th~ different vessels were also important . Genernl Cl..,rk rcrent<;d th!'t the o"ficers v1'o go to the con:ference should mrike it vorv cler-r thrit uithout th"l 24 LSTS thP, oper2tion was not feasible; thPt Fore it frrrossibl'-' to rrocure them , 1-ic could try the landing just north of Griet::i Tith one division , if his staff found i t ro"'sible . �l\ Colonel Tate then cor;1mented on the fr,ct thrt the roRr1 net to Gaeta was hazardous , as it could be easily blocked by demolitions . As the General ' s plri_ne , piloted hy Captain 0 1 Neill , was waiting at Capo dichino to take off Ht 1100, the conference broke up shortly rifter 1000 , and Captain Lewis , Colonels Hil l and WilliPms and Lt . Col . O' Neill , who were the Fifth Army representatives , left for Capodichino and North A.fr ice. . GEmeral Clark spent the rest of the dEJY studying preliminary drafts of plans for SHINGLE and f ~TVIL . In the evening General Olrrk entertained Pt dinner Colonel Mickelwait , Co l onel l,jndner , Colonel Saltzman and Lt . Col. Porter . At about 2200 G- 3 reported thrit a II Corps message rmnounced th1=1t tho vill<>ge of Srm Vittore had been cleared of the enemy. The following j mportr•nt messages vrere received rincl dispatcht")d today: Person8l for Clark from Alexander . RN MA./973 . "I hPve received follow ing sign;::il from Chief of Combined Operations . ' try directive a.s CCO includes the study of the tactic.?l rnd technicGl prohlmris of amphibious opertions Find advice to the Chiefs of St aff . This cPnnot be done from 1:ifhi tehall Pnd re quires my stAff to keep in dir e ct touch with operat:i.ons . Therefore wbile realizing thrt spe ctators are usually a nuis11nce , I rr9quest your 8pprow:s 1 for Co l onel Langley and Commander Scott Miller of COE!'.~ to ,',itness operetion SHil'TGLE , including fina l rehearsals if possible in SNOL or HQ ships . Gener a l Yiil son has aprroved this request. If you concur request joining instructions . They wo11ld of course be avnil,.,bl e for nny duties you nm.y require . 1 I hA.ve ccmcurred Pnd ~ nstruct,~d these represente.tives to report direct to you . 11 Patton t o Clark. RN 822 . trif agreeabh t o you , desire visit your Head quarters Prrivinp; Pt Capodichino airport 1000 SRturday, Jan11c-iry 8 . 11 Per sonal to Patton from Clark. RH 8482 . "Delighted to see you S:1turday. Car will meet you a t time P.nd plac e specified . 11 Gruenther from Hill . RN 2/+899. "After talk with Rooks and Lenis , best estima.te SHP1GLE i s off as additional IBTS are not available . tr * * * CASERTA--JANUARY 7 , 1944--The situation alo_ g the front , particularly in the n area between Highway //6 and I?ilignano continu3d to go well today, with cle ments of the Special Service Force occupying t'tount Majo , one of their principal objectives . Dbvm by Highway //:6 the 135th Infantry Regiment of the 36th Division continued to move forwarc'l t,,.,yond San Vittoro, and the Fifth Army now holds the crest and tbe south and en.stern slopes of Mount PorchiP , one of the principal land blisters l ying in the Liri Velley just south of Cassino . The fighting continu"ld to be extr emely bitter , P.nd the Germ"'m:1 Aro put ting up exceptionP lly stiff resist ance . The Gerrnens countcr-Att Pcked Porchia last night , us i ng artillery and nort2.r fire , but the Attack failed . A drive hris also been started for r~o1-mt Chiaia , north of San Vittore , And it has progressed well despit e heavy machin('J gun and rifle fire from the slopes of this vita.l �hill. In generrl, curing the pst two dry::i, hePvy losses hrive been jnflicted on the enemy, P..nd nPny prisoners hPve boen t.,.,ken. Mount Chiaia shoulrl fall to us tomorrow. GPncrrl Cbrk received ,,err,_ early tr·:is 1orninp; th·· t Lt. Gen. G:-,orge latton, former Cor1mnnn.er of the 3ev"nth Army, would visit him tomorrow. Generals Clark and Patton nill discuss Sev-:inth Army IIeri.dquPrt".'lro ersonriel. G··m~ral FarI'!on, Commander of the 1st Arr,or"d 1Jivision, conferrer during tbe dn.y with Generr>l Clrirk concern::ine po,-;sible enrloyr,..,nt of armored forces in the progress of the Fifth Arny attack up Route '/6. Some arnored elements A.re already fighting in the San Vittore, '.cunt Iorchia, flaunt Ch:i.aia region and as 17e progress farthP.r up tbe Liri Valley, there "Till be r: chance to use some armor, but this j_s cerendent, to some e:rt~nt, upon th1; vreath~r. TJnlcss we h ... ve a long dry p•iriod, and sun a11d wind to dry 0 11t the muddy f'ields, the use of tanks will be restrict ,d since th~ir r,ovemcnt will be con: inecl to roads. General HBrmon told General Cb.rlr th11t he was most eager to commit as much of the 1st Armored as possible into combat. The 6th Armored Inf'antry Regiment is Already fightino-, but the tank groups have not been cbl~, As yet, to go into full STTing. The speciel VI Corps Plannin~ Group, under Gen~r"l Lu,~t>s, is ~oinr, ahead with detrils of Operation '3HITTGLE. The Fifth Army group thrt Generril Clrrk sent back to f, fric1:1 so jt could pnrticipete in discussions with Gener11l Alexander, th"n v1ith rririe Yj_nister Churchill, T•ras due in Marrakech this r:iorning. General Clerk is eagerly avaiting word from this group as to "hether or not the necessary number of lA.nding crR-ft vdl1 be availPblc. Genl"lral Cl11rk reccivl')d todav a rlirective to the Naval CoF1mander of Operation SHIFGLE. It names Admiral F. J. Lowry e.s the 'Tavril Corn1'1ander of t:bc SHINGLE Task Force. As his mHin dinner P,Ul':'!st GenerP.1 Cbrlr had Colonel SullivPn, Army nuarternaster, vrho is celebrating his 50th birthd1:1y. Alto8ethcr the Generr-il had seven guests. General Cl<irk dispatched the follm1ing Cflbl<J to Generr,l Alexander tocl8y. R°t\J 6?67. 11 As part of main land attack by Fifth Army, 10 Corps wi 11 cross Ggrigliano on 17 ,Tenuary, s~cure Uinturno area and attA.ck north toward S Giorgio nith h!O rlivisions. Important T'ert of Uis plan is smrill amrhibious operation to carturc area Ponte Scauri (rnl,.94) with three Corimrndos Pnrl to secure beachhead just north of Garigliano ·7ith infHntry force. Tan}::s And supporting erris will, if practicA.ble, be l,:,nded on this bench same night. me val bonbPrdrncnt will be required. "Frovisional estimate of craft a.fter ex11P1ir>.Ption of operation with FO'HT is tvo LSI (1:1) tvumty LOTS and thr~e LSTS with six dr-ivits. If Oreration SI"DJGLE takes place it ,·rill not be practicrble to P.llot more thnn three or four LOTS to the Scauri operfltion. However, it is desirable that detailed rlnnning be ini tinted so that plan may be executed on short notice in event SHINGLE should be cancelled. "Request you errange v:i. th c:n,JC nl'!ed for allotnent of necessary crPft 11.nd bomb<i.rding force both to be avrile,ble until end of Jrnu;:,ry in case of' bad weather. Full requircnents of croft and bnmbarding force vrill be sent by FO~'iIT �after detailed planning completed. F \iIT concurs in this message. Planning for Operation SHTHGI.E progressinp; well. operation will not interfere with SFPIGLE. 11 11 * * F lPnning for Scauri * CASERTA--JAi:TTJt\.RY 8, 19/+4--0p~ration 3HINGT.E is onl This word wris received this morning from r~arrakech. At least ?.5 LSTS will be avr ilr:lble for the follow-up, thus assuring an opporbmit:,r -"or re-supply and the bringing in of supporting corps troops. The '"10rd fron Parrakech alno in.eluded a declPration that January 20th is the target drtte thrt I rime f,'.inister Churchill desires. General Patton visitAd Gcnernl Cl,,rk this morning and cliscussed with General Clark the division of Fifth Army and Seventh Army staffs. General Patton declAred that his Seventh Army staff vm.s a fine one, and he gave G!'lnerPl Clar1':: a number of documents sho7inr; that h~ had recomnended a lArge number of his off:i.cers for proP1otion to generP 1 o-rficers. General Patton nsked GenerP.1 CJ.Ji.rk ;·1hat ho thour;ht h'"!, Gonernl Fatton, wa.s going to be arsi(?led to do in the future. Genern.l Cl11rk replied thet Genl"1rn.l Fat ton, in General Clark's estimn.tion, 1·ras going to corune.nd a fol] owup Army in OYSRLORD. Gen~ral Fatton said tb..,t thrt was a poor cornm1md for an officer of his experi.ence, but thnt if he did not p;nt sorne Army comrn.rmd he intended to resign. Genoral C:lark loaned Gemerr 1 fat ton his CP.r, and th9 former Seventh \rmy Comr1ander visited II Corps HeadquPrters anrl. the +>ront in the II Corps region durin~ the afternoon. General Cl,,rk also conferren toc1 a;)' uith G'3nerals Gruonther, Brann and Ca+'fey concerning General Caffey 1 s becoming G-3 of the Fifth Army, relieving General Brann so that he could begin work in Al1;iers on Operation ANVIL. Genern.l Caffey has already mov~d to Fifth A.rmy Headqu;-,rters r-md is world11g ...,.i th the G-3 Section. Generrrl House hiter joined thA conference rcgrrrdin~ Caffey 1 s assumption as head of' the G-3 Section. ,Just prior to the arrivr>l of General Fritton, Gen0rPl Clrr1r niscussed wjth General Lucns the new phases concern-ing Orerntion '"'.JIPTGLE. The Specirl flnY1.ning Group at Fifth f rmy near is no~, wor1.ring night ann dn7 to rcrfr"Jct rlans for the amrhibious end run just south of 11.ome. · Anoth1'3r visitor clnring th'9 day ,·as Bri@.d:ier Genernl Theodore Roosevelt who was called in by General Clnrk to r1 iscuss the innbility to obtri.in certain supplies, includinz lumber Pnd overshoes, :"'or French troops. The following T11essa~e WflS received this morning -"ro,IJ Colonel Fill. RN. SCC 602. "Shinr,le is on. At least 25 LSTS will be r:1vr:i~ lf'ble for follow-up. Prime f~jnister desires JRnlli"ry 20 P.s target d2tc.n Late in the evening G~nerrl Clnr1r drove his Buicv, v,ith Lt. Col. Suthr;rl~nd, to Sorrento "rhere he spent the night. �CAS~RTA--JANUARY 9 , 1944--General Cltirk left f.)orr~nto P.nd drovo his Buick himself back to his cor,rrv:anrl rost . He had lu'1ch dth Gen'.'lrRl Grurmthor , nd discussed with him the progress being r,ride in the prepflrfltions for SHINGLE . Immediately after lunch Gonern 1 Lucn.s , 1 d:"!iral Lowry, CArta in Leid s , General Brann and Colonel 1fo•-rard conferred 'rj th the GrcnP,rn.l about the preprrations for SHPrGr.F. . Immediately aftf'1r lunch Generril Lucas , AdmirA.l Lorry, Captr>in Lewis , Genernl Brann and Colonel Howarrl conferred d.th the Gen~rril Fbout the rreparfl tions for SHI rGLE , in order thnt all information night be 2vr->ilrble for a conference with Grmerrl Alexander ..,hose arrivPl was '"hortly expected . 11 At 1500 Genernl /\lexandP , Generrl }:r,rding, GP-nmrr,l Clrir1-c , G ,nerel Gruen✓r ther, Adr1iral Lowry, G"'lnerl'l Robertson , Gennr,"l Brann , BrigPdier Foster , Captain Fower of thl:l Royal Navy acK' a menber of .A dmirPl Cunnlngh mI s staff , and Lt . Col. Suthl"lrlrnd met in the hut +'or 11. conference . Genernl Alexander stated that thf~ meetin~ on the 7th nm~ 8th v ith the Frime fiinister had fiyed all 1uestions of craft r-ind oth"lr details ,71-tich rrd 0een settled to make ':Fr GLE possible . The fi~es ho.d now becone definite , and th~ Fifth ~rmy vms to get more craft thAn it asked for . AUVIL was affect,d by this . Of course , the Fresident of the United States ·rould have to be consulted, for PS a result of this rnP.tter , A11JVIL miisht be much smaller or might be merely a threat . The reason for all of this was that th8 entire Allied position was prejudiced by the succe1s of the GerrnPn defense south of Rone . Turkey "las thinking twice r-ibout her entrance into the war , and SpAin was harc<eninf; . 1' ccorc1jn~lv, it "r,s necessnry to make every effort to capture RoT'le . Craft on their ,,P..v from India for C'Vi~RLORD may hr-ive one av:,j 111.ble trip for us . Fifth Army needs r. follO'IT-up aftnr establishing a brir f;'"lheA.d for exploitation , P.nd the a<lditional craft mPy serve for this purpose . Gen&;ral ClHrk stn.ted tbPt for this f·,nction he hnd already alerted a combat teRM of the 1st Armored Division A,nd Pnoth"r combnt teri.m of the 45th Division. G~ner8l Al ":Xander st, ted that he hrcl. the 11 •-rew ZeAlanders 11 (The 2nd tfow Zealand Division) but thri.t he ,·muld like to keep them in his ovm hand to use if General Cl:1rv could m""kc a break through Pt C2ssino . Generr>l Alexrmder then str-ited that the tPrget date for 3I-TT 11rGIB was to be Ja.nur>ry ?2nd - not Janurry 25th - reg<>rdless of the e+'fect of this upon a rehearsnl. GonerPl Clrrk responded to this th.,t J:,e wn.s strongly orposed to a lnndinv, P~thout a. reher>rsP.l and reconMended against it . He ,-rould rather put trie lrmc.ing off until the 24th , if necessary. The miscella.11.eous craft assembled for tho rmterprise h: d never , orked to1;ether , and a r~heRrsal was necessar to coord.inste their efforts . Colonel '1',e,te sfateil. in this connection thr>t if the target drite 'WS the 22nd , a rehearsal ,1ould be impossibL~ . The lo11ding of the vessels "ould :r,rev•=mt . Gene ral Alexander rejoined thPt if the ,, e11.th"r should defer the trrget dr>.te +'or several driys after t.bA ?5th the oper"tion would ncvAr come o.,,.f ot ell , as it ,vould interfere '.'dth rVJ1.IDRD , and a.greernent hrid been reri ched bet,·rcon th=~ Prime r~inister , the President and '3t:1lin that nothi_ 11.g rit P 11 would ever i nt"lrfere with OVBRLORD . GenP.ral Alexander ,..tPterl. tkt somo other di "ficulties hnd to be faced; thPt fewer n.ir resources vro,lld be PV"iL.,bl":l frori nm' on 11nd the air would concent-rate on breeking up enemy communicf'tions . He v:arnec: against tPking too m1'1ny veriicles , st8ting th11t the L nding in the Azores lwd been planne;d ·1.th nore ve h~ cles thPn could actufllly be hPndled on the roRds . If any r1ore '!1ere needed he would see thdt they "mre made Pvailr>bll"l . He "urther said thPt up to four Liberty sl"'ips could be ben.ched for brePking "ratars "nd trePted '"'S exp ndPble . Arlrniral Lo TI';T coMment9d thrt the shallor; · ,at~r made this dj ffj cult, • s the Liberty ships would beach too far out . 0 0 General Alexander st"ted thnt rs r 0 uch e:ir supply PS pos'"'ible wo 1Jld b8 �utilized . Colonel Tate stati;d thf't it oidn 1 t Pdd up tc a grerit deri l. Gener;-,1 Cl8rk a.id thPt thorough o:z:pi=Jrinents hnd bPen crrri9d out -<>or 1:1 long tiJ:1e to exploit air suppl y to t~e grentest possible extent . GenerPl Alexander then rsked .,..rrien the frontal nttrck Pris going to be de liver c<l . Gcmerrl Clark answer ef1 that it ':7~S to occur on a. series of days . On the 12t h the r>rench would attrck in tlie vicinit•r of S . •Jlia . On the 15th the 34th Division , r>nrl on-9 RCT of the 36t Division (no"" -rut in to reliev0 the 6th Ar""'ored) "ould attn.ck to tali::0 'I'rocchiP . On the 16th 10 Corrs '"'ould at 1 tack across tl1e Gari.[C;Urmo Riv0r with the L6th , 5th end 5Sth Divisions . Cn the 20th it vm s plF111.ned to lnmch an Pttr ck hy tho II Corrs ,,or a bridg0head across the '9.apido . General Clark esthr.tccl thrt it v,ould re 7 uire four dP.ys of attack up Route 16 to clra•·r tb0 GF>rnsn force off tl 0 b<Jrichhead , pnrticulnrly the 29th PPnzer Grenadier Djvisio 11. , rn.-1 hence ho vrould su.rmcst th.-. 24th , r ather thrin the ?;Jnd , 'lhic}l is tr'3 rror:osed rnte of PttPck. Grmorrl J\.lexPnder them stated thn.t the ?6th ,w.s the e2rliest cP.te t11,.,,t trie i:'.e" zer,lan 1:lors could arrive , and Generril Clrrk corw1entn.d thrt he br->clly 11oedec'l Pnotl-'or rljvi"lion to pass throw,;h the 36th ; that +,hoy ··nuld ½e b:o.dl,r wo:r11. r'loi:m by thci" c:r·r,,,~'7 "' nf' the Rripido . 1 Gener11 l J'lexRrn~er theY\ r.aid , "I t1r1 fri~htfully k-con for a diversion rnd for a Conmr-inr:"o to crac1r into t 11~ outskirts jnto Rorie . " Generr,l Cbr]r sdd trr t 1 P.. c iversio'1. by n.,,v, 1 f;unfir e hPd ')eon rlmmed but thPt J.11ndinrr of nny T'lore t roo:rs os suggest ')c , ' "0 1 Jld <c i T'lpl y d~ ssiprte tr,e err ft ..,vr ilPble for t r- main push . l}encr111 Alex, nder P sked whether j t could be done the next nigrt , "'s he felt thr-i t it \-muld frighten Kesselring anr'l keop Rori,,., g::irrimned by trie G':':rnl"nS . G~nerrl Cl..,r1c said thn.t he vronld exnmin~ this question -very c<>refully. All tre o.,,.ficers t17 .,n left excert G"'nerr,l Clr-rk , Ge'1er.., 1 Alexanc1er '"'nd two or three senior Generr>ls . Grm~r"l Clrrk Psked GenerAl Alexnndr,r '-rhrt Gene rr>l Al ex:mner nctu::i lly tl:ou<;ht <'bout ~ 'TVIL , rinc1 Gen8rl Alexnnrler srio he triouo:ht it rnic;ht never occur . He •~r>jcl tr:rt in his estiT'1rtion it was n great nistn 1re not t o exploit the Tt'llinn success . Genern 1 Alenmder brought to Gene ral Clnr k a porsono 1 letter froPJ the Frir,e r'inist"lr . tr . Churchill congrPtulrited Goner'l l Clnr'\.c on his c~ corntion from t},e Fresident 0 '1.d on Ms "'Chi1;Vr::>l'1"Jnts in Ital y . Tl--te Prime E': nister , 'ent on to sr-y he sinc':lrel v hared th0 SHIPGLE rmeration could be riounted by ?2 ,fanu"ry, ewen if some of tho forces hrd t o be dir1inishod , ris jt wonld be disnstrous to J-,r, ve c. c"elr,y rec::ult in t:re crncellation of the operPtion. General Chrk thon,r;ht to h::ms!")lf th"t po"sibly G~nerrl "Sisenhower 1 s move to '"':uro:re nnd the re-exaMin.,tfon of the '"hole P~ 7IL proje ct might result in a rer,lizi,=ttion of t}1e •·rea1m~~s of the forces involved rnd <' reconsiderP.tion of the whole r:'fair . T-J:A did not wish to be withdrann fror, his Fifth .'\.rrny comnrnd Pnd be Ieft in s0T11e rlanning cornJ:1Anrl "bm th<:! •rnr rmded ~r:r tli~reby niss e c}lr>nce to mare}-, into GerT'lan;v at trie h~ad of his Arr11y. Gen~ral .Alex::md r 1'111d G~nerr-1 R"rc'1inr; le-ft a,"ter the conf'0rnnc~ n.nr re turnPCl at 1845 for n drinl.: with Gen~rol Clrr1< anc1 GAnerrl Gruenth"lr . Gen0ral Al exander os 1 red Gm1er..,l Cl.nd: •;hetri'3r t11e Ge::nerPl ··,ould consider tf'l-cino; him a l ong in his JT boflt in Crerrition ·1rrJHGIE , nlthouf;h Qr::merEl Alex?nder did not · ish to ~ ntrude . Gnr er'll Clrrl· said t:ba t , on the contrary, ric "ro,, ld be de lighted . 0 ~ �Aft13r,1ar0s, repec tedly had ther fluster. j •hen Generr,l l\..lcxr1nclcr h"r1 ~nne, Gencr··l Cl..,r1-:: S""id, RS he n the J'P st, tbrt Gon'"rr 1 Alexand0.r ~19 s a pc11nut and a +-ea1 Tho fo11o,:li-rirr cable, 'R.N 25773, ,vas receivAd +'rom the CPTC today: ,r'ncob L. Devers, Lieutenant G0n9r,.,l, o.r the Unit8d StPtes /\.rny, assumed corimand t orth ffrican Theater of Or<orrtions, United 5trit,3s }rmy, 1?00 hours 8 Janur>ry :r0r.r present. 11 11 "- Crble RJ'J 0 .1878 also was receivC'd f'rom 15th Army Grour ann is quoted below: "Target date for opening HQ now adwmced 48 hours to 1~ Janwry." The follovdng message , RH 6381, was dispatched tod, y to 15th Arrn.y Group, pass to AFFQ for Gir::md: 11 2 DHt sector quiet, normal e:<rchenf;e ~.nfordictor;r 11nc: hnrressing fire, one of our 1:,r,trols found enemy rt LA fl\.I'Ji•'P..f''S 992347, 3 DIA took command e,t 090900 of 45 Div sector. 3 RTA relieved troors of' II Corps on nr '•lc'\.,JO night e/9. nne Bn L, RTT ri.rrivryd staging r>reD lPst n:lp-rt ,·;ill reinforce 3 RSA toni~ht on TT/I.JO . Frc11ch losses for S JRnw,r;v, lzilled 1-S , 7ounded 73, missing 3 . TANK STAT,; - No changA . 11 The :lnrlicetion by,Gcn"c'rPl .Alc:xand~r thrit A' 1'VIL YToulrJ proh..,bly never ·trike place caused Gc:merPl Clrir to r~flect tririt h..,d it not been for the AUVIL plrn, he vro11lr1 unrlo11bt~dly norr hPvc hrd the !T~iTrTTSA commarn' which ,Gencr~l Devers hPs in his pln.ce. Fo~vever, offered the choice, Genernl Cl.nr 1,;: would certAinly h1cnre chosen his Army cor:inand r11th0r thnn go to rm ;,dninistrritivc rost . Furthcrmorc, he rronld '"'Ot ·ish to rclinqu,sh co,.,mnnd of Fifth Army Bnrt tal<A up h t , rluties "ritr a small pLrinning str+"f rnr pr.rh, ps hPve the ,-mr CC'IT'.C to ::sn end wh:i le he 1·r11s so "}nG" ~er!, lePvinC'l' so11.,,bocly "1se to lead tlie Fifth Arny north into G"!rri;, ny. r * * * Ct\SF.RTA--JA..lITJA'9.Y 10, 191+4--GAnerPls Alex.?nder and ratton both r'ernrted from the Fifth 4.rny CO'"lmr>nd post errly this riorning. At 0900 G~ner;::,l Cl,:,r met ·dth G""ncrl ror:=m to dj scu,s the sigffl features of SHITTGLE . ThcrcPftcr he hrd.., short conference v:jth Colonel Ryrn, Fifth Army Chaplr>:.n, anc r1onsignor Carroll v.rho h11.d recently co!'1e from Rorie and who tolrl the Ar'fl1.y Comrnanrler of conditions thf"re. Follo1crj ng tri is conference, Gener-=il Clark h2d a cell f'rom M"l.,jor Gnnert"l Corell, ~PH1 Surgeon, -;ho cane 'vith Colonel ·"artin, Pnd hriefly cliscussed thJ Fi:'th i'lrmy r,edicel problems. At 1000 Generpls T,~ogles and m,rmon c2me :in e.nd 0iscussed tb!') employri~nt of' the 45th fl.nd 1st J'rnored Divisions in the com~nr, op"lrn.tions of the Fifth Army on the present ":'ro-rit flnd in 3HJ'TGL'8 . Follo"jnrr this, BrigrHU'"r G,~nerPl Donovrin cnllcd 2nd cliscussed prosrcct5.ve oper- tions from the OSS anelc . At 1130 Lieutcncnt GenE'lrtd I'cCreery arriwid rmc'l discussecl '.1ith Generol Clr"rk the nmrloyricnt of 10 Corps in the comi"'lg , ttPck . �At 1200 the Gen~r"'l held 11 conference in his hut mith GFmer,,ls rcCreery, Juin, Y ,yes, Lucas, l}ru~nth~r ri;'ld Fouse, AdmirPl Lo,,TY, G~nerrls Roosevelt, Carpentier, Cri ~..,f~y, Bronn, Bri <;ndi. rs Cool·'.)~ e nrl "..iChP rr1 so>1, Colonel Keiser ancl L:i9utem.nt Colonel P.obnrt Forter, Derutv Chief of Stnff ('ractic- 1) of II ~or:rs, And Lieuten.-·mt Colonel Suth0rlnnd. The Gtm,ral outlined Oper."tion qprrr;.r.,E for the assenblecl offic')r~, roinV_ng out th"t the Rssnult '78S to be rnRde bv the British 1st Division, t'l7o bRtt?lions abreast, Pnd the American 3rd Divir:ion, thr-;e battelions "'hrer>st, ,·rHh three bettr>lions of Rr-ngers "nd one battalion of the 509th going in Pt ~nzio, and th1~ 50L~th Inr~ chute Regiment r12kinfs a drop inland to th<1 north of Anzio to :rr;"lvent GArrrn forces coming do•m on the beR cJ:-, bef'ore ri ".leachheed w1s established. Alterru tc reinforcer1ents by the 45th Div:i.sion or b;r a cnmb~t team of the 1st t\rmored Division "rnre r>rranged, cencnd:ing ur,on t:r,, situ..,tion. Admiral Lowry wr>s to be the over-1-111 n!"VDl conrrian<"er a11c'1 under him fldrnirnl Troubridge of the British ~b,,y is to cor~me.nc'l the n;:,w,1 force effect: nrr tre British landing. Due to the I rime fl} nister I s i-ritcrvention, ')P, LSTS were to be ma' e aw i L0 ble. A feint vas ci.rranged by n;:,w,1 gunf'ire <>t Cjvitr>vecchio. Cme Cor1rrndo WPS to land on tre night of D day just soutli of the Tiber 1'1.nd strike north to•7ard Rone. In the nrea of' the landing of the 21th J l'.'nzer GrenRdier R!'.lgim~"lt is no'.'' asser bled. lart o+' the Gerr19n 3rd Division vrill be there and t,~o brttnlion- of a Fleger Corps. It is est·mPt0c'1 thPt ~t the tjr1e of our l~noing Germr>n forces numbering 17,000 1"ill be in the are.,., , and at the e11d of 7? hours, 34,000. 0 1 0 In the meantime, a direct attack on the present f'ront is to be mBde in order to contain Els large a G9rnPn force as possible. On the 12th the French Corfs is to A..ttr>c 1, a.11 out towe.rd S. 'SliEl. Three dc-vs l::iter II Corps goes on to attacl: Trocehin, using the 34th Division, an J.CT of the 16th Division and P lso s 0"1P- P rnor. 10 Corps on the 17th or 16th will l'1 t tn ck Rcro s s the Gr, rigliP no wHh the 4{,th, 56th and 5th Divisions. Generql Fnrmon and the ArnorArl Di vi ~io"' Penoqu.,'<rt~rs, with one Co!'lbPt Corimanrl, pL1s the Qlst Reconnaissance ,qu"'dron Rrc to be rer>d;v to be used on SFrrGLE. Gen<1ral Alexander st.-.ted 111st night thrit t'berc might be still more troops Pvailr>ble. There nust be ~ood werther for SFIITGIE. If it is b.-:id, the Fifth Army vdll hPve to sit it out, but tht'l targ0t datl"! T'lust be the ?2nd, so th"'t a wait for good re2.ther nill 1"lot no.ke the attack too ll'lto. r~ jor G0nernl Crf1ne hns been set up to plan for the occupation of Rone. Fellington bombers ·'i 11 be set up for h38V'J n:l ~ht ?tto.cks in support of the ln.nding rnd also of the direct -cttAck. The G9ri.errl :!')Ointed out thnt he hr-id been requested by cable to sr-'re . 11 apr.l propnrtirrn, 1,nt, +,}'pt, there vrere n. o-re.nt n, ny brfr'p;es "cross tJ-19 Tib8r .; n the j_-•1.ediPte vi cin.;t;r of' r1r,ny :rripf1l rror,ertiRS ·7hi_~h would hA the onl:v c:br-nnAlc: h;T 11 r1.cl' Gernnn r9;n~... orceny-i:ritc; could c0rx~ rip;r:i!1St Y'j_"') on YrT"GLE:. The Generrl, nccord.;nr.;lv, sent a cnble ns 1dnr; pArn; ssion j f' necessi::iry to r-ittnc 1- thn Germnns "ll'Arewff +,re,r ·,ere, r9~"rc'lless of c0nse1uenc9s to fl"pnl rronBrties. Follo"'i"1/'.; tliis conf'9renc0, tlie G9>1er::i.l (mtertnined GP,n0r"ls f,icCr9er;,r, Juin, Keyes, JT01lse nnr Lucas, witr t-. a,1iral Lo"TY, f'or 1uncl'. f. t lnnch t r, Genern 1 sro l(e of the Oj f+'·· culty o: corrs -"'l::i,., 1r O'U" rd s' n.s efl ell CO'Y'nS 1--ir>.d di f'f 9rPnt nnt:i onri 1 i -':.ies on its f'lpn1i.:s. In fr>.ct, +,he G n9r0 l Sllf{fY,8Sted inster>d of hr,v; ni:s liPison ,.,,... ,"'icers +'rn'rfJ corrs to corrs, it ''loulri b8 "'referable t0 hr>ve nmb::>ssf'c1 ors. 0 �Gener11 l Prl:'mn 9ntP.rtrd:n.0 J..,l,0 re3+, r"" t1'8 o·'"'ficrrs · rho rrn attroYld9' the c0nferr:mce n:t th9 GeYl"3rrl Of'ficers ' Pe, . In -':..9 1<<'t8rnooY1 Ge"lerPl Cl:lr:V re ceivecl c,cills fron tno 'r)riti:"'}1 .l11r Gorr9"'rondents '"r . F'l.lls , o"' the Ti7r::s, r,nd •·r . Gordon of the C'unda;v Sxpress . In tbe lPte af'ternoon Gen'°'rrl Clrrk received n er 11 +>ron Colonels J".-,rl,oe , Tully and Hyr::-ard, clnssnr.t':3s of }'is at ·rest Fo-Tnt, and t),ese o:f'ficers stn.7ed :.:or dinner . As soon ns thr8e d;visioYJ.s shil] hrvA been lPndec' , Gener"l Clnr1r rroroses to now~ 11 S"'11'111 [ldv:,nce headqunrters to the be::ichhead, ~"lcludin~ hi:riself , his G- 2 , his G- '3 , an aide :~nrl rossjbly one or two others . GenerP 1 Cl::ir}r dispBtcr9d th':3 follovri ng er bl9 to Gen9rRl j lson , CTNC , tod::iy : R'·T gg5g _ nFor Orerntion sr:-w}L"; urgently r,questnd th~t vr•ter trr,ns fortc1tion be r:iri.de r-i.milribl0 for sreci· 1 orer['tio'1 .; 11v0lving -i"l.fj ltration of egents vicinity Rf'l'19 . :1oon rhrse requires use of' suhnnrine "·Mel· should be at B1rnti11 Corsicri b:r noon of Janu::--ry Vi.th for in:it:i.Pl operrtio11s nnd sho 1ld continue R.vailri'1le dnr-inr; cnntjnu::::.nce of ::lHUJC',L~ O:;errtio11s . If no suhr1"rine crn be rrJPre ~rilrible ther t,,·ro }T borits s'hould he subdituted but they ~7ill not be r0cpJJ.r9d until ,fonu..,ry l t,th since moon rhas9 'ill not -rermit use of.' f'i' bo:-it rr-ior to thPt drte . I+' rrr borts !']re srmt they should be continu'"d r>vriilnble until orr>r:otio11s corrirleted . 1~rinhPsize agr,in hr1rortance o:f' subnrrine f'or this operntion and ur~e you do utmost to fr1rl3ment my rAquest . 1 11 Cartrin FrcRtte , this F.er>f'l_u::irter" , now in Bc1stia to mPhi detriled rr rn.np;ements and ··ill be '•rrdti n~ :,t 'rival J-l'eBr1qurrters there for ::iuthorization. " Gener~l Clnrk today -issued ('rerntions Im+.ruction /JlJ +'or tre continwi.nce of' the n.ttRc 1r 1mr'ler th"l gener.,l ril"'n for OrerPtions Tnstruct ·i.on tll. This Oper.?tjons Jnstruction CC'Wlrs Vie nttacJ,. );r the '?rencb EYfc,djtiom1ry Corps , II Corrs n.ncl 10 CorT's, /'J.S 8A.'1'.'lni11ed by Grmerrl Cl.,rk nt the conf'Arence tor1Py. * * CAT~RTA --.JAr'TJAP.Y 11, 1 <)/;,4-- G0ner, 1 Cl qr Jr. tor:py irect<Jd Gener81 'lrr'nn to nA.ke prerPr::i.tions f'or tre l:mding of An Prld:itional cor,brit tePr1 nortr. of the Tib8r to strjke tm·•8rd Rora9 f'ron tre sr>me position v·her9 th0 Comr1nnc1os "re to lrnrl r,s pPrt of tbe rP.i"1 rl1rn of wrrGIJ~ . I nrt o<' tre rePson fer lnndinr: this c0,,.,b~t teAn at the ros.i tioYJ. :1 n ,1unstion. i o thP. rossibilHy tl ,..t tl•e G"'rrirms riry 0efend aloni:; the lj nP of' the ':'j '10r, ; ncJ.i.1dJ'"lg P nefense of tre city of Row=? its elf . Thi:1 ',vnu1.d ma're necessary eitlnr fl nire~t rittac'r 0'1 th~ cit;v , "itr c0nsequent outcrsr on all sides thnt srcren srrinris ",er9 being violr>te,1 , or else GOP19 sort o:f' rrneuver to force the GerTT>-"'11S to eV['CUPte . J\ccorclin1;l:,, the lnnf'ng o+' a coribn.t team 17ell north of thr~ Tiber is to be :rrer:.rect rs A ossibility. The Co:rrr-1rndos, "rho 1-,re to coJ'1e ~.n nre to hr've e goon '3Ufply of jeers ::i.s vell rs arr1ored ieeps . Genernl C11'1rk toilP:r co·,yf'erred vri-':,h 'Rr:1gRrlier C11urchill '''ro commrinr'l.s the t""ro Co"'!mannos in riui")stion P!lrl unr1ertoo'k to rr-; ve },j ;n a lr>rge nuT"her of jeeps, i '1c1u,1i. nr "'rrior~d j "GPf' tr>1rnn f'rom another lmi t . Witr tr esA Vie Cor1rrir,nc1os , nnrnberin.o; about .~oo, '"lll n['}rG P nu-=:h tO'"ard Rom9 on tP9 ":Venin.c:; of D dP.y , creatinP," as much ntir pnrl disturb,,nc~ as r.ossibl e . ·n,P.n thr>Y crin /?'et no furtJ--- r,r, th 0 ~r nrorosA to tr- 'P, tC' tJ--,9 )7j lls no:rth·7est of Ro"'le "Yl(1 rrerrire to defend trenselves until r0liP-V9~ . GenerPl Cl~rk hns Pl~o rlirected rrepGrrt;ons to be mride -:'or nr1 w"1.ces to th8 hiP'h PT01i:nd to t}~9 e"st a11d southerst of Ro"le with 0 �the irlea o~ se1z1ng the pro~inent terrAin ~eritures jn th~ re?.r of trose forces v1hich will be onr,os:i n1; the CEF, the II A"lericrin Corps rnrl the 10 British Corps i:i s they rusl~ forwqrr1 to·7arcl Ron0 fro,.,, th" ir prese>1t nosi tions . Gf:meral Clrri• spent thP da7 T"or1 dn~ on rlans for C,TTPJGLB . ThR Genercl has rlet8rrd ned tr visit tte 'WI',Tl}L'~ fron.t 0'1 1) da;r, c-oin1; up 1-:Jy TT borit . He has also directPd Grmerril Br.<1nn to rrepArG -for rn errlv nove of' r c:1releton heRdau,_9rters to the c;r J'TGLC front . In the <-fternoo"l r~ajor CrenerPl. Kenyon A Joyce , HSI\, ,...,ho is hein~ replrced as hei:id of' the {l.llied MjJ_itrrY Control. Conri"sion by G0n~ral Pr,son I1<ic"rrlf'ne of tre 'Ariti~h Army, caJ"'le in to have r tr, ll:. In th,.., evenj_n?, G"lnernl c1~r1,. enterta4 n-~d rt rlinner 'r . :::'nlls of the LovtrJon "'~Mes , ··r . Gorrso 11 of' the Lon.don Sundriy F>::nress , l'Rjor n;p;el Do11gc\9le , J~ of 10 Corrs and Lt . Col. CJ..--rk , Fi f'tb ArMy PRn. GenerRl Cl2rk rlisp."tcl rid the fo:. lo'v1.nc- cr>1-ile to G~nerri 1 Ke;res +,o<fay: 11 Congrotn1Ation-, on t,},9 successes you haYe Dtt~d.nec. in ~rou.r recent offensive . T nT'l esrn:icir'lly rleRsec ·Ti.th t 9 rron:re"'s :mR(e by t:re 14th Db.rision ~en s11ch rl i ffj e11 l t tt:irrn.in R.nd r "'.:t1.i.nst -SU';r' deterrni ned res ~stn.nce , rrrticulrrly in view o+> th9 short t·ime tr0 Divi."ion ·· rs ::1.:-ile to bo, 011t of the 1 :ine to recnrerPte Pnd re-fit . IJea"e esrtend ry co"1P'r..-,tulf'+ions to Generril Ryder . J rar1 1i.1cewis8 f;J'f'ti,,.i"ld " ith tre cont-inw=id ::-ucce">s o+> the SpeciAl S8rvice Force 1mrer Colonel Frederick. Plen.se tell h;m conf'~ dentiA lly t:brt I have recor "1e.1rled hin f'or r,ro,.,,otion to tr,e arr,cle of' Bri';nrl~ er GP-v,r£> 1. Also extend to Gern=,ral l'i.1len my conisratubtions on the ucce"''3 l1is f'orce has ntt;:iined jn its ;_nitiA1 rJebnt in the Ttfllirn c'l.rnrrii~n . Unner vou.r s:rfondid J.ePdership ::i.nd c'ir8ct io1-1 Yo11 hn.110 mo11ln.ed these thro.e orf'.;f'.ni7,ntions into "'n o~fensive +'orce ;r}lj ell the enern7 "'ill haw, r;rer>t cH f'f:l cult:r in '-"toprinr:r. Good luck for your future oper11. tio11 s . 11 R1T 64?1. 1 1 0 0 The i'rny CoT"\mPncler crbled CG , ',t>'f'nUSA ns follorrs: RF 64?5 . "In view of impendinr; orernV011.s, T cnnsi.r'er trnt 01:ir infrn~r;r rerlacement s}1ortar;e i"' cri tically serj ons . I-s is not rocssih1 e to rrov:tr.le nece"-'sary numher of -i_n:.-.rntry rerlacenients by cnnversion ".S ,.,,1thoriz9d jn ,ro 1 1r 0 ~1StSl , drited Jr,nuriry 10 . 1 e estirnrte th.-.t 9n r-i.dd:itional !, , C'OO 1 nr,mtr:r rer111cen,mts "rill be r9111.irei!., rrtbar thr>n '3 , 000 e:1tiP1rited hv ;vou in last PDTPf;rPph vour messPg9 . I 1rr_r:;8ntly recomrnend -1-hPt ?500 1n+>Pntr;r renlricerrienta be obtP:ined from ~5th Pnd 89itr Divisions anr1 shipped to Fifth Arn-r:r 11.t FlnrUest ross:i..hl d11te . They will not be used to fil1 re,p1isi tio>1s unl11ss Pbs,-,lutel1r 11ecessriry. rur orer.--ti on.s to dr>te have fr8'l'1.entlv bee'1. J~qn_rlicripred bv inFC'e1u11te c•urrlv of inf'nntry rerl?ce1cents ' ;,ind I +'13el thRt :tt ..muld be [l fQ.'"lVG 8rror j f ,e +'nj_lrd to reve on f1P>1d tre 0 500 re1uested . !\nrroxinPte rercentri r,-es of' spec:i fi_c,,t:i.on nur'11 "lers requirecl a-re "'s follows: 721, Sp,c JBR 7!~5 , 71, CnP,C 'JFR 746 , 5 1 Srec ·rnn 60'3, 5~ ST'eC ";JR ,S05 , 1 ~ Srec 'JBR 60!,.,, 6"~ 3pec 60'7 , 4; Sp9C ifBP. S04 . 0 Gener::il tad.Py wrote " lett9r to 1 ~<ij. Gen . L . 'I . P.ooks, G- 3 , A,.,IY2, in nhich 1,e rnade three in1portrint no~ nts: !1 • He ,-·;,, s 1mr ')19 to s<>"1.rl SPner::> 1 BrP nn to A"'PJ to coorl~ n2te Al"l.,.L r-ltmn4 nr; r>t t)-ijc tirie, bu.J. hrd sent Pirj r:;..-:idier Gener"'l Ca+>fey 5nste:ad . !?• Fe rw1uw,ted thnt tl'9 l;,,test ~n"o:rm~tion on ~FVIL be T}lP �forwarded him, as he hi=1-d received the impression from Genr':lr"'l 1\lexander th2t t},is operation was son01r~hr-1t of P "dying dog" and "'ir;r,t be relegPted into the re.<1.lm o:P a feint in that areP, rmd cert;:dnly not r,ore than e very smPll lPndinp; . c . He re7uested that Genern.l Rooks fpc:ilitr:d:,e :bis tP 1-iinr; severPl of bis 'ke~r st~ff officers 11ith him to the 3eventh l\rrriy; nPmely, Gener."ls Gruenther , Brann , Vornn , Lewis and Colorn~ls Tate Pnd Fowarfl , along with a fe,c; other junior officers . Genern.l Clark today receivAd the. following letter fror1 frime Pinister nhurchill: 11 I was very ;:;orr;:r not to see ;rou at the conf0,rence yesterday , but I feel vou ,,,r3re so closel7 e11g2p;ed vrith the eneny thet jt "'2'3 irnpossible for both .Alexander ,ci"l.rl you to be away- Pt the '3/'J'Tl"J t:ir1e . Your of'ficers idll tell JOU about the bro ""earci,.,in'{ discussions we hAve h,..,d , nnd I 1--torie "'ill reassure you cor1pletel:v about the aauatic suprort our gre.?t oner,.-,tion 1rrill receive . It may even ")e roc::sible to throv in ths eci.nivr'leYJt o+' Ft third div:1sion, "lhich ought to clinch nntteri:, . I Am deeply con:ocious of the : mrortr-nce of this brittle , withont "Jl'ich the cPrnp;:dgn in Ital::r ·viU be regnrrled PS h1wing petered out inglorjously. "nne thing I ½eg yon , n,..,mel;;r , to do evei~~rthing in -ronr pov,er to stnrt off on the ??nd if the 11eather is good . ~ver;r day ge :tned incre 0 .sed the use you will have o+' these invPlueble lrinc'li·'1o;-craft . If you R.re eble to begin AS ePrl:r as thPt, not 011ly r"laintenance but P lsrp;e build - up would be in sii-;ht . It 1 -,,-,uJ_fl even be hettsr to start vith three- 1uPrters on the 2?nd than ·ith full nur1bers on the 'Jfsth or later . Tt is inti-mden thPt ci 11 the lronding craft shall noJ.nq severn 1 vo:rages be+'ore they rlepart . The eorlier the7 strrt, the more they c:1.11 nt?Jce . Yo11r rerresen.tative , Colonel Hill , Viill tell ~rou the grea.t 5nportn.nr,e ,·re attnch t,,-, t'ris . I 1rnow you ''Jill 00 everythb.g h1 hur:1an power . 1 11 ! hnve been merming to write to offer you my sincere cr:mgrf\t,·lrotions on t11e signal hononr raid ;rou by the Fres-i.c1 ent jn c'lecorP+,jng you for vour :rerso11Pl bravery in the p-re t battle of Salerno . I have heard f'rom British c'-01..1.rces of the wpy in nhich you e~,,..,,.,osed :1rourself jn the "orw,.,rrl rositions to sustain Dnd P ninPte ;rour troops, And it is vnry l:i.l.r:ely th0t vour v:ir-;onF l intervention 1'"as decisive in ,.., bl=ittle of' which jt night rrell ½e snic'', as the Dulce of ''ellin,c;ton i.n efter J.ife S8id of the Bettle of '"Dterloo, tt:rt y,r,:,s .~ O-''Yined c l ose-run trdng 1 J 0 ThG Army CoT"!m2:nder r8plied to }rir:1e r"in~ st2r Criurchill as follous: rryour letter of ,January 8th was (1 elivered to me by Generrl Alexander . He and my represe:1.tr-itives wl-}o ottendec 701Jr conference P-;PVe r4e full deteils es to the decisions wf'ich vou arrived nt . U::r: PY~ deligr>ted vrith tre orrortnn~t;rr of 12.unching '3HPTGLE OrerBtion. I hPve f'elt .,.,or P long ti"le thr.t j_t WPS the decjsive ,m7 to Pprrorch Ror1e . This is the f'irst tir e the reans , incJ.udinr.; extra clivisions "nd cr9ft, hnve bee11 assenhled Jn sufficient qmmtitfos to do the job . I 2r, fully conscious of t're necessity for lPunchi· 0; the Pttf"cl: rt the e;,irUest ro'rnible drte rnc1 ½ave set J muc1ry ??nd PS the target dete . ''TeA.th'er permjtting, ~·e sl·01·lcl mnke ~t et thPt tir:e . There "'re many dif'fic,:lties coY1frontinr; us, but ,·e "re tirAl•e3sly 'm0 1 0 �deavorinr; to overccr .e tbem . 0 nr,ry rlans jnclu.de a third division rs <'.'1'1 j7nedirte folJm1-up . It r1ry be L'll-i11f'nntr7 div5sion, c)r ;:- c01 11)ir:ied ..,rnor-i·flP"'ntr · ta.s 1: fr:irce . Bot}, COJ;lb:l .,,-tioYJ.s vill be reoc':· to sciil, Pnd I ,'Til l make the decision as a result of my observation of the lnnc1:inr; , +>or I :i nt9'nr; to 1 r,r 1 )e ::n<;n.t At t'v, 7..r·nrl_ino; o-r the '.l'.)nd, nrtc1_ "rt0.r vis:.ti,,o; t'."0 ,_""_" co,,,r rio.0r':l rsl orA, ..d_ll trr,nsrdt the orrl.0rs ·"or the P 1Tror,:ri:---te ·"·orcc; to +'ollo·, ur . en 1 0 0 I wns d:1 stressec1 to h92'r cf srmn' illness 15 r;hted 2.t tho fi YJ.C, rrogress· ;rou P::c·e r"'k~_ng . 11 "ThPnl· y01..1 ·"'or vour cr'1rz.rr·ti1l..,tio 11s on the :Jictin.'7,11:i sred Service Cross presr-mted r,8 b:r tr,e } resident . "I C:'1,n n0ver e:,.::pTes:=; ~n Yrorcs my rleer 1=;rrtrtude nt the orport11,,j_t;,r 1,1}-ich I hriv0 h'7d to crnrrm=rnd Br·itish trcops. I 11i:,ve ,-1.evc;:i.:- sr;en f:i.ner "'en of f'll rnnks . The:-r f'r9 0 1 1tstr,.ndinp-ly c01ITPf'Gous , 2'.nd their "'lorrfo js high . The orTcrtunity for _An,3ric2.n D"1d Britisr_ scldiers +o S9rV8 iYJ. cnr1b"t nloy,~side of e0_ch other hris dev"'loped betvreen thr;m an 1mderst2nding of ea~h othPr "hich h'".S engendered notl--i~ng but T'iutual adniration . 1 t1 I hnve ev,er7 cm·S-i rl.ence U1r1t ve vri.11 procuce the rr~s11lts in this ne:zt o:rernt::1-on rhich ~rou so r:mch desire . Thr.nk you for "",P Jdni:; the ne2n s ri vailable to l"!e . I hope ~rou ' 1Till visit tre Fifth Army in Ro,.,,e bc:ifore returninR; to the 1 TT• 'fC • !t CA3~RTA --.T!~'T1F.RY J.? , 191/~--General Cbrk spent todP,y rt the co11mPnd rost and �1:1.t the office of' th0 nlanninp; ~our j_n tro rr-irir echelon ,orking on ~:rnnmu; . In the afternoon ro receivea :-i csll -('rom Lt . Col. 1,Jyr;nard 11ho hrs just been rlrced j_,1 clr1ri:re o{' Fift}, ~rTTJ.y v,rir )on.d s.:iles, n.ry1 0iscussed this s 1J.bject ,-,jth the Colonel. Gi:mernl Clnrk .£'>eels thr1t sPti 1fP ctory rroeress is bA-trr: Ic['de in the plenninr; for GFJ"TGLB ~nd th,.,t one by ono the necessr-ry rletPj lP rire bej n~ huttoned up . Tn the evening ('.:mer"'l ClRrk Pttended n cinner gj_ven by the Fifth Army chaplein for B out 20 ~rmy chaphi.ns . Todn.y the Army Cot'1"1Pnder r1isprtched n cnble to the crrc, AFH1, RI 8676, reouestinrr th,,t Brig . Gen . Holmes he assigned ns Chief Civil Ar-fPirs Cf'fi cer for Operntion A~TTTIL ancl th.t jf he mre not r>VP.' lable th11.t Lt . Col. Gerry h=i mac1 e Actjng Cl ief ..,ith tr,e 09finite unr1 erstn.nding thr,t an officer in chrrge , preferably Colonel T-fuT'le , be r'nsir;nn.ted e.t a l"ter dPte . 0 Genernl CL r 1< yesterdry received "ror<'l , PN '3125 , th 0 t Grm.er"l ·F'reyburg of the ')nrl 'T9yr Zealand Di.vision woulrl lil-:e to vi:3lt li'ifth Arrriy Pe--:d1uPrters 0·1 t're ll+th 1mr'i to<lP.;T cPblPd A re ,ly, PlJ 86B'3, ridvisi::-i~ h~.T'l. to ln.rid Pt Capodi.chino and to ::,c'lvis':1 ETA . 'J'he folJ.0·1-'"'lfl' c?b1e w11s receivoo from 15th Arriy Group tocJav, :N CGS 11 Gen':lral Frc:vbur.:; will probnbly ask for (1) ::i.n rirmorr;c1 cr,r unit and (2) a mP-dium arty regt to be rln.cerl unrler his cnmr1r1 nrl j f' rind :hen he is loosed on Pn exploitPtion tDsl'.: in frvmi.rRble cfrc'J_nstnnces I think (1) woulrl fP'T a rlividi::mt Pnr· (?) \·rould be necess11.rv for al"'lost 'lny tasks he might he piv<m hut these two 1mits could only be found hy drP\7inr; on 10 Corns . Hill cl-' scuss this -Purther with you •vhen next we rieet . 11 192 . * * * CASE'1TJ\- -JA'.TTJA.RY 13 , 1941.--Genernl Clnrk tbls morn-'n-s left his c0P1rn.Pnd rost hy cub plane :md fle 1 ·1 to Irat"l , ':rere he vislted the ffeA.rkpt"'rters of the Frenc}1 ~xp=;dj tionr-i.ry Corrs . A. t frn. ta. he t0 J.1u:1d t o Genera 1 J11in "nr'1 noted \Ti th satisfActj_on thl'J prop;ress the :Frencr Corrs ,·as r,r,lr-ing :in tre ,,ttricl,- v·hich had been lmmched on the previous day. He then flew to the II Corps lrrnr1 j nr; field in Iresenzano, "IrerA be ''let ·vi th GenAral Kqyn,s r nc1 -,ent ov8r ·•ith him the arrnng8ments +>or the r~ Corns attacv v}'ich w:=is to be lrnnched on the evening of the 14/15 . At lunch G9nerr,.l Clr rl.r entP-rtained GenerR 1 Penney , the Commnndj nO' Gener:11 of' the 1st ".ritisr ;)iv-ision and c1T'liral 'T'rouhridr;e oP t½e H.m1<,l TJrvy. ·,ith this or>ficer , h8 r'iscussgd r'etrii], of th9 nrorosed operPtion 3PT7f"rlvc; , as Acl mire.l 'l'rou'l)ridge is ~o comI"!Rnr'l thRt r,ortion of the n.av::il force ·1hich will support the British operation in SJII 11 TGL""; . In tbe r-:>ver,inq; Genorr>l Clr>rk rec0jved for dinner Grmeral TloX1rel1 T'lylor of the 8?rod Airhorne Division , "rho has re centl:r bee 1 on r'letR ched s0rviM ""i tr tte Allied Mili tn.r;r Control CoT'lriission. 1 Grmerq 1 ':!lr,rk torh,r r ispritched the following two cPhles vith rPg,rn to re cent successes of Frencl-i troops on the Fi Pth .rny front: �bers o:f the C-STi' on vonr Sf'l9nd 4 d successes in ~~1rie oper"tio-'1S no•rr in rrogress . In spite of stu½r,o~n onen;tr resj strince n.nd counter"tt" c 1's you br;ve <7ined Pll of YO'lr ~nitiPl objnctives n_r,_(1 f're coY1ti11uing to r1r1 1m eyc0Jl9nt rro~ess to the north . The courP~e , det8rrn4nrtion rinc1 s 1·ill derionstratecl by All members of your cmmrind Pre f1ildirii:; ::1.nothnr gloriom· chPrter j n th'3 long r-inil noble historv of -,-,ren~h nrr1s . France mav ''T8 ll l)e eternr>ll;sr ~rn.t')ful for th8 rnrt you are non -nlnyin<; i1 secnrj_nr; her l i b~ffrtion -f'r,-,,,,, t e GArT1rn foe . 11 "fi'iV8 A:rny to AFHQ Pass to G8nerf11 Giraml FersonPl fron C1Pr 1< o.nd Info Cor,r to t;BF I er on<> l +"or Juin frol'1 Clar le. "I desire to congrrtulrite you on the successes of the c·":F in its rresent operrtio"'s . Fightjng in PdV9rse 1•reather Pnd over the nost di ~ficult terrra in , th9 Corrs hns succGeded in cr-1.p tL,ri.nv all of its ::i_nitir-1 obj"'!ctives R;:t,riinst r1et0rnined GerT!lPn resistance nnd :is continuin'; to nrike eYcell ent rr0e;ress to tJ,q rorth . GenerPl Juin ,.,_nd his co,n:r1!:'.n0 p_re daily e.dcti:1g to the finest trp.r,itio of' Fr/'.mcr fifshtini:; men , and I am rrou0 to heve t,1--_qn n.s members of Fifth Arny. 11 0 * * 1, * CASER.TA- - JAJUAEY 14, 191~4- -This ';Jorni ''1/'.; GrmP,ral Clnrk conferred with his Chief of Staff, his G- '3 and G- ? concerning the rrogress of flP.nning +'er 01 eration SH:'" rr.LE . The prospect continues to b<=i fFvorPblo, Pnd there is evo,ry indica tion th<1t suhstn.ntjBl Gorrmn forces 'lhi ch r,ight heve been pulled a\'Jr>y toward the v-i cini tv of Rone wer8 beinP- conto ined on th3 J resi:mt +'ront by tl,e vip-0rous froYJ.tril thrust now in r,rogr9ss . Genernl C1Pr1• then recejved Colonel nurf'e , 1 with ';'Thom he c iscussed the mi lHPry ~overnf'lfmt rroblP-'"'1S in .... respect for Operr tion A''":TIL. Gengral Clrrk desires to hPve Colone) Fune r- ssir;ned to hean up this section, j f it cen be a.rranfl'ed , as it Ppperrs thrt General Tfolmes is una vail<" ble • G,:,neral Clr-rk c1lso discussed wHr· Lt . Col. Clr,rk pr,nc in~ pubHc rel,tioYls proble 1q anc wit], Colonel '3nltzrnrn quest-i.ori"' concernin<:; unit citatioY\s 11nd the award of' the new service unit plaque . At 101,5 thri Gencir~ 1 left his conmEnd post and ,·,ent to tre cuh f'ielcl , wbere }19 tooJ~ off ·dth 'k•jor 11'\lker for the beach just sonth of' the T"louth of the Volturno . FiAre he trn.nsferred to R cub on floats 1111.d flew to t} e b0ncJ.-, just south of th9 Tusc:ir>no, storrin<; on the 1 re vms J11et rit tr>e beach bv n, j . V!P.y at the >?.est Cent3r fl.t '1orrento for lunch . Ge-1 . Tenn9'T 0nr insp9cted tl')e trr<in:ing o-1' the 3dtish 1st Division. The G9neral t 1en r9turn0d to his coro.nnnd -r,ost by cub rlrne . 0 Tre /,rmy Gortr'1fl nder ent9rtrdnn.d for dj 11."'er th:i.s 9VGrii n~ G9ncrp 1 Freyburg of the ?nd '•'(,,'l Zealrind Jivbio11 ~ncl Rrip; . Gen . IB,is , Fi.,.th ,,rmy Artilbry Of+'. "icer. G")nn.r[' 1 Glr-rk discucised -;ith GonnrP1 Pre;•1,urr; tro rrosr9ctivA 8r1rloyment o-1' thn 'Jnd 'Tnvr '',o"11flnd Djv:i.sion cor1mfinded by Ge11.Arnl '.F'reyburo- riDd rrro:nged -rith Ge,1ernl Le'·ri s to P!Ake E'V,,.,i bble for Ge1-1er;1]_ Freyhurg n cub pl"" ne to r-ssist his reconnaissl'1nce of rosi tio11s ['''1,-1 J-,j s ,risit t0 units on this front . -x- * * CA9,_,,;,,.,~ --JA'JUi'P.'·' 15, 19/J~--GenR:r::i.1 Clr-:rk left his co·1r1r-nc1 fO"lt by cub rl1me at C'8SO nnrl <'l"'W to the 10 Corrs f'ie1d ner.r ()pF1rnnise, hero hri wrs ff,t 1::>y e �stRf'f' of'ficm' anr1 -l:,pv9n to 10 Sorps He11drJ_1trrt8rs. Fere General Cl::irk tAlked to the rrinci P' l o·nficer"' of' 10 Corrs ,. ho hr;r1 eo11 :, c:sernbl9d by Genernl ~c';reAr;r. G'"'ner1.l Clrrk, spea}:inr- f'rom P r1°r ,~hjch he hnc" hr>c1 prer-rec l,y 0-3 nn0 hro11 '"'ent uy-, bv GnptAin Vn!lrson, 011tlim1d the rror,osed --;pr T(}L Orerati.on a11d t,}-,1; nro"'ltal or0rations jn cnorc1iri8tion " 7 th it ['nd emrh,,sjzed the irrportPnce o+> the lC' Corns role. Fe nlso .,,..end to t,},e 1>ssembled o+'fic1~rs some letter, ""ro1"1 A'7ericnn solrFers rr,rorted in a p:->pi:ir "1hich he hr>d, 'Jrich inr':ic...,ted an e~·cellent +'eelin()' 011 the r"'rt of' t:re Aniericf'lns +>or their British brothers in ~rms. GenerAl Clrr}· lef't 10 Corr,s co!",.,,Pnd ro"t "hortly l,ef'ore 1or,o 1>11d returned to the 10 Cnrps cuh Airf'iel.11 where h:! •;c,q J"'1et by T,t. Col. ·utherl --ir7 wJ--o had bee11 ou+, b,r cub to locnte n lan11;n"' ,..,..,,.ounr'l close to U 0 lrr: Division cor'lrn['nd post. ,,.,he G,1-v1riT'n.l f'lcivr to +,J~j s f'j A 1.cl, th,t of' the '10th Arr ored Arti llciry near fozznoli, "rhere he wrs ririt by rr,m0r.,ls I,ucPs Pnrl Truscott. T--Ie \7RS 1>ccomrPnied b;r +,h':'lS9 o-"+>ic8rs to n nerr 1)y l"'i9lc1 wher'J, ~n t},e rr9srinc0 of the entire ass9rnhled lrd Divirion, he mR~e ~ short arldress nnrl decor1>ted ?l officers. FolloTing tris cer9,·1onv the Ge,p-ri:il returner! to 1-:ls C0"'1Jl1Rnd :rost y rl:>'t'le. 01 0 At lrS1O Genern.1 r:lnr'k receivnd Lt . Grm. "lerPro:i, Chief of' '3faf'f of' the Tt.,linn Ar"~', '"ith Colo11el ] nll.Pvj cjno f'"l_ti rne of i,~ s <-t,"'l+>f' of'f':i cers who srokA ....,n!":;lish. The l"]-ci11erf'l r1 isc 1 1~sed ··,ith Colonel T-Pllmricino the errirloynent o+> Itn-1.i<>n unHs on th9 Fif'th ArmY front. He told G0n0rril P,0rrr0i thrit the It? l i_nn ~otorized nr:tr::>rle hd not clone we 11 or Inn.c;o, its f'ir.st orerr1tion, n.nrl t½Pt th9 rnn.-n,-yir ~ n ,.,,,i ch +,}-,9 t-roors l-11:,0 riled out unrer r.,,..cssure from the TTermPn rroeril"J.P,' TJivisio:ri. ri"CT ref'lectA- no c.,,..e0i+, on th;::,vn, thoncrr, to he sure, rrtPny Ttril:i.r>n solr1j 0 rs in tht Action }, 0 <1 r'ier o:rill'""·.,_t1,r. Gen"lr"l r:1Pr1c further S.?ir' thr,t he hr>d P'iW~n thA Br~<;"'c1e f'IY10th0r cl rnc8 r,nn t,1-yt it r'?O 0one fnirly- \"'ell, ..-,1t1,o,1gh not rerll:r wel enou,a,}, to T""9t'it tb=i co~r~enrlrition v;hich he h:->r ,·TH,te11 tC1 GAn'"rPl 0rid.no in orc1er th1 t h9 rniP'rt ~iv8 encou.,,..11,a,erient to the Itriljan troors. Shortly the:r9a+>ter Gener.,l Cl,Mr 1r J--nc1 r"irected Gen0rrl I'nri..'1.o to tr> 1'e ov r t"1 rpli9t r1 ef'ensive sector ""'rAre n. Ger'"'lnn Ptt1ck on I? hill WPS ro"'s::ible ut 1'1ot likely, and Genc.;rf'l Darino I,r, 11 rerlied by letter, st11ting thrt his rrro1rr c011ld not rlo th:i job, t},qt he was },,wing heri,,y- des 0 rti0'1s 1:1n.d thr-t 19 shonld h 0 ~ent to the T'APr to reorr;r>n · ze. Generf"'l -Pe.,,-.Mrcl;_ s, id tht:>t Generel Darino ~,..,,,., he tho 1li'"½.t, A. def'eati..st in outlook rinr1 thrt he intended to relieve hi.TYJ. 1 0 Ger9r<1l ~1P-r 1r -1-1 r,n ,,..eceiw~d P c::tll ,~rom 1.nbbi 11ric 1'Tler of' tre ,Te,:risb Jelf<1rA '9orrrl anrl Chrln.-in t'l ior Lev o" thA C+"fice c" t•19 Chief of ChPrla~ns, u:ro was al'.!co,1rn11.yinc- noctor Br~ c 1'1v~r on ,"' t011:r ,.,<> the P-':,tl0f'ielr's. These officers cMrne to visit 0"'"1Gr£'1 Ckrlr w;tl-i GnJ.on,l Rvrn. fl"'t8r r1~n11n,·•, 11'-mrerrl Glc-,rlr ,,rent r'o"n to t 1 e o+>PiCA'3 of' t:re Iln1.ning Grour Pt the FM1...,ce ·~th G9rPr.?l GruAnt 110r, 1:1here Ge'19rPl Clark n/0ress9ri tJ,,e officers o-'"' ' 7I Gorps stfl "'f nho w0r, [I c;q9·,"hlPrl tlvY"'e c0·ncerni n.g th=i im 'ort,,nt r;"Jrt to 1,0 plri:,r<=Jd b•r 1TI Corp', in Or,9,..."tion srr GL--;. 'l'her0.""'t9r, th8 G-ori0rnl, f99li 11a- trr-at tris 'N/lS +,he last orrortn:rdty he ~LV9 f'or ., lor,_P- t•i179 to P-et "'1;' r 1st rv,ay Prori tre cc,n_-1-,inuous rressure of' 1,'tsiness rt Ji.is CO"'l""P.,,.,r1 rns+, -inv-ite,i Colon9l '"inltzr,rn .<i.nd Lt. Col. '>uth,--,r7_-,,nrl to orive ,,dth M.m ~n hi.s B11i.c"k- to ti--0 .,..,ifth Arriy C'""f'i.cers 1 Rest Center to ,·rnul.d �f',,,., ',n,1.r'"l . T:be rr'rt•r 10ft, Ge 1v,r"l r~l.<>Y' 1,c c'r·· v.,,,.,cr, r.nr'l I""ce very P'OOcl t,-':r,n 1111.til r>hout '18V8'1 rdl93 frorr ~orr9nto, wh0n th Blic1~ 1111..,ccountribly r9Pnsnrl +,o ro [tY\17 "'2rtrnr . Lt . Col. cut],,--,rlrnc1 \T"''"' r-',~r..,tcl-9cl to '"iorrAnto f'or helr on fl rr-i ,,c;i11.r1 Itrlinn truck , but ,.,hi.19 thr-i Gonerr>l riw,.,it0r! his return 9 i0Ar Pror~ +,h9 I ,=m:i'1<JU1flr Bn.s9 Se::r':.io11. Re"lollnt 0 9rvj ce , rri ve,1 , driv0,11 by S9rf:;er>rt n. . "estor~ 'H\ .., YJ.d t ct int:; SerP-A"YJ.t P.. . } lo1 rnher . 'T'hese t·im non- comriis,,,ionod o""f-i cers c;to1"r9d nn 'W'ffY ef'f'ici.e11.t •r nttP ched f' chr i11 to tr0 Generr>l I S CPr rind +,o••refl hi,.., to tre ( ff~ cors I P.est S011.ter . The G"'"'C'\T, 1 "P s c;;-ref.ltl y .; M:r,ressed by the ch0e~01l eff.;c1encv nP thes0 t~o non - con~i.s,..ionnd of'ficers nna a.;rgct~f th"t ,, l_9t,+,or ho -rrritten "'or 1-ii" si ,.,.n.,ture, cnr...,0nr1i.nr:r th9rri f'or their rtnod ror 1c. stf-l7 f'o,~ P 0 T e n.911.~r.,1 sr,9nt th9 11i ,-,.ht, ,,~,1 f'ollo"inC; dE'y resti mi: rit ,orr0nto nnd retnr11Ad to -1-,:r,9 com1...,n 1 rost on tt A ev9nin"" of the lhth . * * CI\SF,"R.T.f\ -- J4.'J1Tf, .. Y 17, 194L~--Grm9rPl r:l"r 1• to,'"'Y .,...ec9iV"'d <i crll f'rom G0,ri 0 r11l K9V8'1 nho ' 01 SCUSSP,( "itl-i hiri th9 rroc'res-:; of' +:,r, II Gorrs Of9rntio'1.~ rr,_c :its 9mrlo:m•,'1t . Hri t -,p rec9jvecl A. C9ll ·"ran G,"3r""rPl Luc"s ·rho ,rs joined (}911';rrl TJrnnn , <>nrl th(Yl9 o,,.Pi.cer-:i ,H r;c 1.ssen t,>19 .,,-rop;r9ss in mP 1dn--; thA f'in~J l_;=ms f'or Orer<Jtion ·:rrrGL.~ . Q9:rr..rrl CrPne, v~o is -rlanY\inp; f'or th8 nd mini strr-tivn rr0hle"l in tr9 ~it,r o-" no"9, tJ-,en ..,ic1 ,, 'hri0f' c..,11 on G<;nerr,l C7 rr1-::, r,110 , "'ol 7 o-••-iYJ.F; t 7•-is , Colonel '1ic 1 .relwrjt cn 1 led to rli--;cuss rend~nf.; co11rt <>rti." 1 C," SAS . -",1tiir9 bv 1 V9gt,9-rr "Y "10rn-i ,,_~ t 8 f'ollo"'jrir; cn 1,19 vms sert to 15th l\rmy l',rouy, f'ron-i t,h9 ~ilitnrr n.ssi.on •rith th8 Tt,nl-l1m AY'-r1y ,,1th P"l. -':nfor'Tintion cor;r to .,..,if'th Army: P,.'·T ClRO . "'irirr . rrt,; 1 i TTmh 0 rto tn'ms rver coMrn...,nrl of' 1 ·,otori Z"'r! Bde 15 .J"n yice T'lri . • Tl..,ni.no ·r~ncenzo . " 3b 1 YJ.l'.l'le Ty,+,911i,...9nce su, tio11 or er,e""Y t::r-oonq, " 1lil. it, Djv-isioY\ rnd tre ')Gth rnn7,er f,..ont:-1.l i:1,sr-i 1l+, of' th::i 7i->'tl-i t ion to ->.:r-.,_r~r---: . 1 0 ..,...,F mnr~r 'Q "'A.S is::;11.9r' torn,r c;11!""1°r17,1no- the 1iqrosj,,...,s ""9}+, tl-i.rt ,. ., n'T'8"t nnr+, of' the F9rrrirn Goeri11.g r,rerv,01er n·vis-ion rniv1-,t b<::i contr>jned in the Arn 7, tbus en.~i1·v:1 tbe pr9~qur9 o-F> eneny orrosi- r,., 501.th Cor1hrit "'9PM ,.,i9ld r rder ,tq v1r, s issw::id tocl::i7 nescrihing in detri il tre r';,'lrt ,., ,; ci,, the 5C:/.1-th Cof'lbnt Ten"! ,rill ::-1.r'y 1n nyer11t:ion C-:.HPiGIB . 11 T hr>ve been +><>vorribl7 im:8,T,J ;073 _ PArso'1<1.l "'or rrcGre8r;r f'rori ClPrk . ress<;r1 ');T tl-'e tl1orour:h119ss of' vo 1r lnnn~n1 for f'orthcorojna op9rat:ion. I .'l"' con-"ir19nt 70 1.1 'ill b9 -;uccessf'ul. Gond lu~ 1, to you . 11 0 * * r:~s:SRTA-- -JA1' JAR'( 1~ , lqLi-4- -In t,he ...,,orn;n:; tJ-,e G'~ner11 l r13crdved n er 11 f'ror r:o,.,,\'1A nrl i:ri P" t 19 !+5th D:5 vj -; j_o11.. mhe Gener/l 1 ,'i ~cu,s9cl -'-,he ross-:1-,79 enrlovrnAnt, n:' r" . . . t, of' th9 Li/5th Division to r0inforc9 ~ t 1·oors l'"'rrlirp; i:r +.h9 "irst rhrse of' n:,°"rn:tion JI'I'Jr;.LS . Th8 C"¼e'7.err, 1 next rec9 i V8rl n. "r 11 (1011 <::Jrn 1 T;r, rrJ.e s, v, �fror1 GenArr-1 Le"lnitzer ho discu~10rl i-iri0fly th~ iJ11!"l;n°nt FrrivPl of G0n°rtil Alexri.nrler 9nrl -+:,J:-0 0stohl ishrri0nt o 1-iis •lead 1ur:>rters nt CA.sertl'l. ~nstern of Bnri . mber9P Pter G~ner"ll V1r r; n ri.nd Gen°.,...'1 J. i= PYJ.C 0 en '1A to c, 11 on G,meral 0,lprk ?11(1 d1'1CUS9 tJ.-e 1uestio'1"l o+' suprly +'ro'1 tre ro-lnt 0{' ,,.:<JV[ o-f' the 1 Jorth Africrri establisrment"' cic; w9ll rs tJ,0 r,.,ninsulRr Rase '":ection. At 1 ')45 '}eneral Slr-rk- 1-i?d nn o-"+'-th0.-,,.ecorcl "Te3s cn.,,+'9rr.mce in +,re ½ut , 9.t ,..,11i.c"i he .:11r1 • cri.ted to 17 1vrr corr0sronr113>its , rh0+,or~P;hers R!'ld rnhl:i c relrt~ ons o"fjcers +J,.,,t c1 ne•,, bl_o"T '71"1'1 to he struck rit the Germr·ns . These corresronr1en.ts r8 1ervi nn- toniorrow to jc-.: n c-utfits rrrtj cip[ltini; in 01 erfltion ,PI'VH..E . ""'he G0'1eral rlid !1ot ;_,,1:Ucnte '7h9re OT' when th8 orer.,tion r,,oulrl take plPce h1t exrl, ·in")r to t O COT'r0.r;rondey,ts t'1,:,+, tre ...,if+,h AT''1Y w;.s rrepnring to 1tri"k:':l th<1 h rr'e3t ½low it }--,.ns y0t .?tr1u::: --;~nee the 1.rindinf; .,t Sr>lerno . Tr'.) 0en':i'"l out1in'"'rl +re ~j ➔,n'ltion 8.'3 it no'"' C''ists, e·"TlriinAr.l that tre ,..,rench l'Jorrs "'nrl str11cl• 11lon"' the r·i"'l1t f'l,.,nk ~n fl.n ef'fort to dr-o "l Merri GPr>,rn troors . +,o t ,,t E1roe, t'1Pt tbe T-lritish Corrs lrnnched 1.r o"'f'cmsivo ,,cros<J the Grri -~, i Dno ln.st nir; 11t i'1 ,,n e+'+"ort to Purther »re11.'\rnn the Gerritins I Cr ssino rosi t-i on rn rl 4:,hPt n 1 tb-~11. fl. c;hoT't t~·,0 the tr Corrs "1011lrJ P,''9rt more rr 0 '1sure in t,he c911ter c--f' the lir,<> . mhes": trree r1oves , 1-,0 sPi..r, 7err, P ~n~lude to rinother or-orntion th,t ho WPE' ;:orry he could not 9,crln 1 n ~n c'letPi.1. The,e thr•w corr,s o-reT'<itions "''3re designed to bririr; Yoore Gr::rl"'r n ::;+,renn;th dum to the 'l<'ifth !\rmy f'rc.11t cinc'l to tl1in out, if' ross~1--,7..e, l}err,rn -rorces th;t T".• P,ht orrose tre sreci.ri l operDtion . Fe s<i.id rc".d "1.j'J't' hor0s of the t'encli'1P' orer[ltion, '"'nr ,,hen 1 ::i.s 1(ecl if' this or0rrition 'ms not c esif{l1ed to J.ir, sten the f'r 11 of Ro , the ii'ifth PrMy Corrir~ppr]er renli8d thrt ever7 orer.?.tion th0 ,..,j_ftr J.rmy unrlertco 1• WRS de'<if;ned to sr,eed thP rlPY " en Allied troors ·011J.d erter Rorrl9 . Fe outHned to thA Co"'rec;nondents "O'M', n-" t,hn c°-l "r'i("''ll~ rn·i l-lt,:-r7 "' 11c'I '10n Pl: litn.ry rroblems thrt vro 1 1ld qr~<Je ,,~tJ, tre +,[-l 1ri'Ylf"" nf the ItRli Pn ~r~·-itrl. 0 0 0 "'e 0 , Ge.,,8rP 1 81 "'r,, no" ril"rs to 1-i'"'ve one> o+> 011.r corr.e,..ronde'1ts ri.ccornr"'ny him on the rm hcnt hen he dw,hes ur to the 8'111 rPn QSS"nlt Prea on :;' fr V . Tr is c0rrPsro11dent rrobr->"117 "rill be '"yron Snlzberr,er of the 'iew York T:im<=>s . ,_~ Th"' G0YJ.eral, Pfter cn 1 1tjouc:;l'r ;_-,,c'i.cnt-ina; thnt rin i.rriportrint str.<-te~ic "10Vel""mt WRS i1"1m:inl'-mt , tJ-re1•1 the cc-n-:errmce oren to qw=igtions . The corres ronclo.,,ts , -"ror,, t 11"':i r ci_ue-.:it ~ ons , "ere YCJost : -,,tere"lted in 'Then Rone won 1d be tri 1~en "'nr "'hRn the l}ener.n 1 exrected ,, juncture bet ·:een th<o tJ-,ree corrs now in cnP1bPt r,nd tre srec" n.l force (<1TIT TGJ:E). Th3 G,mera1 "n.id he ropec1 thrit this juncture •m111.cs 1,e "'1,,de '7itr.:n t,rn ·7ee 1rs ?+'+,er +,J-n [nsnult . Tre corresrondents r>lso ·•0'1(~8red i.,.. this srecii=il ii'i.f'th Arr pr oy,er.,,tion vrr,s i~ n.n:v 'il";l ticid in ··fith onerPti.o~s c,lsev.,here . The (}Pn9rr 1 tol-1 them thrt f'or <1c11e time hc, hnd been wn.ntinr>; to 8Xecutr:, '>11cJ-· r-i.11 orer,,tjon but thn.t until now suf'f"ici<mt crnf't hRc! not bnen rvn.ilrible . Th9 cr-"r"nr811ce ;::inded ,.,-J,cin G3n8rr-tl Clrrk hr>d to hurrv to "'noth9r :"'9eti11f m~th Gen0:rnls nouse 211,, Gr>11non . P;::i""or9 1.eriving, ho1ever, G8nerr>l C1."r 1,. F>lso to1,1 tl:-e corres-ron/lents th"t onc, of tre ..,ost ~l"!Jx·,rtrint +',9ctors th~t '!onld P-overn the Rssrult "•oitlrl he tre werther rnd th-,,t p;ood 11er>tber would hpve to nr9vPil +'or th, r:rerc1tion . He '"laid thrt , <>s yet, hCJ had received no lorin; rc1nP,'e rr11r'iction on h"t the weather ·1011.ld be on the 11lr.nned day. 1 1 1 rT'}i9 s11bjAct of his con.,..errmce ·ith Gcmernl Uouse a'1r1 Gener, 1 Cn.nnon VIf>S ti,9 rro:--oscid drop o+> the 50l+th . nrad ute Jn+'..,ntry 11egim0nt . Generr 1 Cl,,rlc WR s �worrieil by t"Jo c0nsir1errtio,...s "Tfectinr; this o erntio"l . In the f'jr--;t :lace , thA r.res"'nr:<J of r, force "ell +>cT''l,":rd of tr 0 1 rndi'1gc3 tc cut off the f'"'rrooch to the rieach by rr0rT11r>n +'orces is 'hifl'hlv desirri>:>lc "nrl , if' eff'r>ctiv"' , 1-:ould greatlv f'Pci litr>te the whole S:irTGL'":: Ororn.tion . On tr•, otl 0r 11;-,nc", ti-,9 two g,:i r r-onerc ls ro-i '1ted out tJ,~t no r -heAr,[il "0r the orer,-,tj o'1 hc=>d been T'O"' sible , trrit tl-io :iirborne troo:rs hrrl 11ot _rect.; cec r lr''1r1int; "'or a '1umh=,r of r1onths Fnd t,hn.t ti- n1°019 !l f'frd r, +>ror. t'he -roi'1t o+' v.; e· r o"' the r> ir , hnc'1 the n'1.ture o"' P'1 "mrrovi:v1.tio11 . -t F9.S ro~sP1le th.:t t. n prr cJ,utists r.iip,ht be '7idely sc,.,ttrired upon ln.ncHn"', b9 j,,,,P,ff9ctive as n delr>yinrr force 11.nd be rendered ther0nf+,er useless i'S ri forr:e for A-ny rurpose . Th9y nlso roi11ted out th,-,t th0re ~"011l_d ")e no T'\oon nt U'is ti:me . 0 The General , r,fter be2ri.ng tre r•ros ~1;_d ccns 0ecid0cl to ,:,-ive tl1 8 rn?tter 14ttl9 -"F"'t '?r c1'ns-irl0rrtjon . ~vrmt,1rll:'r be decider' to eljr~innte th9 dror 11d lonr1 th9 50/1,th from the sea . At 1330 G9r0rnl Alev:D 1d9r ,,,.,,.rived "lith Q,m9rnJ. ford4nr; rn0 Gonerrl J,e"1nitzer . G")""lernl lil9x:Rnder t"rowi his o',n jeep ur tl 9 rath to a po 4 nt in f'ront o,-, tre n j r1es I t,mt nnrl cnne to r da;;;hi ng halt . In th~ co-.-,f0rence ·Tith GA:>111rn1 Cl~r4 1 the Genernl di -::cussed the ::trtus of Or11rqtion r;rrr 1GLP. and the 10 Corrs o ~f'P.ris" V8 no,·, in rrogress which ap1 yier>rs to be mn l::~ n,, o;ooc. ·,rogres s c esr; te count8r rt tr c r:::; ner r th 9 T"louth of ,thFJ G~rir.:7 j nno jn tho vi.cinit7 o-" the villPge of' ''inturno and 4rgento . The Rr-itish "re berdnninp- to f8rr;r trin1rs :'Cross, :rnc Ui9 0 1 1tlook -':or ri rerosonr-l)ly s11ec13ssful op9r Ptio:r -ts 1,right . p 1 0 G,~"10rn.l Clr,rlz saic1 to GenerP1 Ale·-:and"'r, fl"'lonr; oth9r trh1gs , th:-t the t:iT118 would con.1~ ·+0n he hnd to ,fo so~rithjr,Q' Rbout th'3 number of visitors nho "ere descFJnrli·'1i:r uron him , 11sin1; hi,s C,'"rs , J- 4 s 1'llc'l:..~t9rs r>'1rl tn 1·::ln~ up the time of h:i""self' anc: bis stp+'f of'f'-icers hen they ,·;ere eng:-,p;ed in orer,-,tions . HA sn5d th,,t this rlid "lot Ap ly to Generrl J\lex11nr'er ·1ho , Pfter rll , 'ms ris direct co"111ar.r1 er, bnt he t ·ougl·t GsmerP 1 ~ l 3xr-nder should tr> ke tre onus of r,rotecti11.r him f'roJY> othr:ir ~,-wursions . Gennrril c1~rk r-dder ti,,.,t, PS G3ner2l \lexancler knew , re hnr'l thus f13r been extr emely r8certi ve t0 visitor~ , 1 mt tbe r1ooc1 hfld -"e.'.'lch'Jd tJ:.r" poi11t '7},8re c;ow,th 4 nfJ' J.-i,:,d to he do11'3 riho11t ·'t . Gener~l Alex8.11der sa ir1 ths.t he wo 11ld do 0ver:yth:; nP, he co 1lr1 t0 keep Gen9r"' 1 C}Prk frorn br,ino- ov,rburrl9ned . 0 1 A+'ter nn , ho11r I s cnnfercmce, Gener"' 1 Ale'm.nder left 1i.tr r r'1J.ide :rrovided by General Clark , to 170 to 10 Corrs TAC Fendqur'rters nerr Sessr ~runca to d5.scuss ,d_t}:1 General ,,cCreery the rroi;;ress o-f' t,119 10 Corrs nttl'J.clr . At 153C Achir11l Cunn'nP-h['m, P. 1, s- 1·c, ~~:r , nrr:tv~d ..,nrl <liGCll8S8d. v1ith GAn'Jral / :·editerrPnean , nn''i Captnin I o"er , Glrr 1~ the sea 1sr,ects 0~ the r}l-IItTGL:~ Oreration . Today ~t noon the 'Prenc'r Bxredj tionary Corp, rrovr>d j ts col"1r1r>11rl_ rost from 1 ratf1. to enpf'ro , thus r,utting it -in r J11ore fn:ror0ole rosition to control t},e r~ovris of th0 ?nri l'oroc c'ln Pnd 1rd Plr,eri:,n Divisions . At 171C Gener~l Clr-r 1r '.7ent r'1o"m to -'-,he r~l,,,ce ;-,nd h:-d P blk vrith Lt . G8n . Devers , Americ..,n Cor~l"'J"'.'1der-in-Chief ~n t½e treater , rep;-,rf;_nr" pro!"lotions ,..,_nd necoratio11s , urF;inF; upon G8nernl Y'evprc the fflct t rt o'1ce " quote of decorntions wns ceterT'J~ ned re , Q,:merPl Clerk, sho11ld h::"Je the decidinq voice �1 as to who sroul d b0 c ecorrted vri t hin Fifth Army. Gener.? 1 Dev-1rs was ~ost corrli['l one sta.tecl th 0 t he intended t0 rocomF1end G8nerril Clrr 1,,. .('or the commr>nd of' Op9r11tion A TTTIL . Ge,,,0rri l GlnT' sriic~ th,-,t ho FP s grrtef'11l for G1=me ral Devers I c0nsii4eration b,,t tl "t be br-td bee11 notified severnl ··reeks be fore thE1t he h:-:id been selected ·"0r th"t conm.ond . Gener11 l Cl11rk recrd VArl tr8 fol 1 o..:in'; rP.nio from GenerP 1 O::isenho ver yesterday : 1 1tr 7078 . w tre11. I '.31"' irl p•oor'l.by0 to you in ifrirlos : still held the hore th11t I rii ,.,.ht ~et to s0e :rou once More b9fore I left th:i tre.oter . r:;j nee thj s hn.s rroved impo"'sihle I an senilinr: this tPl0~ram just to c,n.y ag.oin ho •r f'leeplv grat8"'ul I r>m to you "'or tl-ie nPgnificent servi C8S you h1we per f'ormed trrou,.,.l~out the year r>nd n hr- lf th-ot hn.s 0l1>rs0rl. sirce you rnd I lef't lashing-ton . 1\11 A11iPd -"-ip:1tirio- '"1en nrA rrond of vou nnd ::i.re looking form.rd to a rerform~nce iri. your next grec't tris}r thnt will equal your rPst accompl i shm,,11ts . t'\r 1-i8st to yo11 , to Grue:o.thAr r>nf'l to :1y otht=Jr friends 011 Your c;ta"'f ancl in your Army. Goorl luck on CjJ:-TIFGLE . n 0 !!Yo'U' rn.c1jo re'lch0d ~ 0 vesterd"y, nnd I "ms del ip:htec1 to herr from you , 1 alt 011R;h c :isanroi nted that I m:ii:,ht not baV8 r-n orrortunity to s?e and tRlk vdth you f'or f' fei-r minutes . I h1'1rl hop3d to "'et -::O·1e 11'1te ·:ord on an:,r chRnl!es in f 1lt1U'e ev'3nt s, +>or thA -:nrlicrtio"'s I r: t hero , trrou~h Alex,.,11cier, arP. thfl.t mv tas 1• is on 'l ,rre:,tly reduced sc8l9 . 4o"mver, ··e ,ill do it, whntev"'r it is . J h, ve h2r1 no timA to r,-j_ve r:ucl· thouqht to thPt, for I h:.ve "l;T Pye on :1noth0r little ti'"'f::ii.r rc,re, wit•1 1 r1-ich ;rou are verv fF>mil-:Pr, r.nd bv tre til'lA tliis letter reaches yo1 1 '·e wi 11 -non th'" resnl ts . I rm goin~ alonp; on trn.t OT'8ration in order to obtl'lin +'irst-hrnd -:nformntj_o,,,_ as to its injtinl success, jn order tr<it ~ r~r7 t.<>l·e rc1vt1:nto[>'e o" orrortunitfes to re in.i>orce tb2t "ront in exrloitRtio11 of Pny orrortm1ities '1-iicl-J. might co:r1e to 11s . ( "I 11:no-·r yo11 must 1:)e husv. I hope tJ-,,-,t this otrcr ri. "fr, ir /?OAS t},rour:;h as you h"'d nnt:i cip~ted nnd ti,:cit I rnay have t},e orrortunity be"ore lo1tg to fl f5A in cnr,e unr1er ;irour conT'l.and. rrry r0qFrds to B9d91l r,nrl. the rest of my l'rlends . 11 A l1"1nni.,1ri; 0x,~rcise o+' tbc, 1rc1 Dlvision r.,ris scher1 11l80 for tl1 0 n:t 0 lt, b11t durinr, the late cwr=q1:i ni re; orts bep;" in to re:::• er Gener/' 1 Clnr}~ th,,t fl n' 1 rnb9r of losses o-: c,u101s nnrl. 105mm field guns hr'd occurred . The Gr:m<:Jrel rr-- s grertly concerned . * x- CAS P.TA-- .Jt'ITJARY 19, 191..4-- This nornjno; l}-9mr l Cl:cirk dictate6. the following to be :inserted in t11e dif'ry of today : 0 "LA.st nip-ht at 'T'ruscott . l' bout ten o I clock I r0cei ver1 the .ottr> chec'l from Grmernl \ 3hortly there"' fter , rlurh11s the n:l 1;ht , ne n trickled in -d.th re- �garcls the losses in equipment and JT111teriel ..rhich t e 3rd Divjsion Pd suf-l'ered j n ;ts r0hCJ<1rsal. The" nni.ounterl. ron ;hly to 1.3 dulcNs , 19 105 1 s includi n!'.{ f'ire control e1uir"'1ent , '7 57rim rmti- tronk f;'l.ms 11nd ? 37 1 s . Fre sumn.h1y s0rici co""munic"tion equirnent '8.s lost, but r1et.nils h11ve not yet been +'urni"hed me . l)11r5.ng tre nir,1-it :r directer'l that Goner" 1 Luer> s, General Tru~cott , '1."'vrl representn.tives , GenP-rr-1 ·olfe "ncl otrers be '1SS9mbled h0re in order th,,t ,te night discuss, roint by roint, di+'ficulties encountered and b.1,8 the necessr>ry ster"' to see tri"t the;r ,·,oulG. not recur in the oreration. "It has 9.lunys been my t} our-'1t in roherirsing +"or these oper~tio11s th.,t tl 0 dr;,r r'm srould be b,qd , rnri thrt r1i -:;tr :es occurring b8 correctecl before the final O:'er 0 tio'1 . Th9 overFhelming r,-i "'T'1!1nPgeri(mt by the "Jrwy in this cn.se arra71~d ne . I.,~ convjnced t½rt Dost o+' the ni"'ficulties encountered nere due to ln.clc o"' rroper plrnn~ng, ½uttoninr; 11r ~nc' b·rinin--; on the vrt o+' Vie r"'-vy. 0 'Thi, rnorninr I hPve c'iscnssed tris r"-"tter ":th Gener~1 Lucr>s, Gener...-1 Truscott l'nr-1 otl·9rs ['11( qrrrnr,r;n "or t':1°ri to con"ront the ildrir, 1'3 ~Ylrl th0:5.r a~rnistants (Lo··ry) ;n order to ov"rc01;'} tlvv:·e di"ficulti",s . ::: hPve just tr>.lkod on the telepr one ~Ii th Ar,riirr-1 Lo-··r;,r nnd ~r.formed him tr,~.,t I am ri sto ni S ed ri.t sud· ,.,,-; ~M..,1'1.aP,P,r1r,nt • '.!:'i·u. ,Cott ~ 0 I UC" S "'T0 on t 8 :,,,,- "o,-. confer9nce ,vjth hiri . 1 r 11 '.!:'he ,...A-;--1...-coment o"' f'l,1,li.fT'lA..,t nf trA "rc'l Div; sj on h ~ er1bP 1·r~q:.Jer' m8 17e...-tly. It "n~ n"'ce::>s"r7 "'or ~,e to t,rl,9 t"rese ri1.1~·rs .;-ro7 thA lC Gorrs , 'll'o n0er10r~ them bfldl:r in the G'rigliano River crossing . It rer:nr· thrt I cr>n not "11rn~sh the '3")th Dj_vision ··;ith tre ,_,, duhrn ·<-r•:ic11 they need so brdly in tho-ir cross~ne: o+" t}1e R:cipido. I h~ve hnd to t1> 1<:" m11toriel from the 45th Div~sion '-rr·i_cl, ":ill 11e hf-1rd to r9plcce . I N1 r9cord-l11r: t' -is hrief outl:ino of nction tr ken ~ n orr1er t 1rt it roy be in r7 p9r:io11al record . •Uso 11otified Ge11eral Alexanc1 er . 11 11 Q,:,neral Truscott sent in r,n offici.,l rerort on the rehe8rse.l ;:,nd also sent a brief note to General Gruenther . Botl-i of these 2re quotec' belo tr: 1 The note to Gennrr,l Gruenther: 11 1 ,"'T'1 ta\ing the liherty o:' ;:,endin;:; this to you so th;:,t you "ill lrnol' how .;-rincy this ev·ercise re0llv W"S . ::'urtt9r, 1 tine is so short thPt senr:li'-iF tl-ii~1 to you c irect rrir>~f pive you 1>ncl tr9 Boss 1e time to CC'nsjder i.t before you roceive tl- o<'f'jcfrl copr thrt I'r -forwarding tbrough proper chr.nnels . "I believe thrit you 1mow r1e v,e 11 enour;h to -mov1.' th, t I ,muld not r.[l ke such a point unlecis I n ctur1 lly f'i:~ lt stronrrlv 1:1 bout it . J+" this is to be 8 "forlorn hope 11 or a 11 suicir1 e s.oshnyu tl-•=m o.11 I rrr-nt to 1mo i1 t},f't f11ct I./'.' so , I ' m ro~itive t¼rt t'1ero ::.s no outfit in t 1-10 rrorld thR.t ci:m do it better thri".l ne - even tl"ou~h I reserve :!"ir;J.t (personally) to believe we :-:iight deserve a better fate . u 1 1.• GenerR.l Truscott I fl official report follons: 11 1. To m-i1:ttarv f'orce con hop8 to f'ssault r. ' of011ded bench rrith prospects 1 1 �of succes s 1mless it cnn be l 0 nc1 ed on sl:>ore in tacticr-1 order rind rroper co·'ldition to onga~e j n coT'lb"t . •,- ercise ,just conclud9d t ; '" dnte disclosed so "'lnn~r rlefJ ciencies in thes'J 1"9'1rects t l."'t t11e neec1 for ::ic'di ti.on"'l fr1v£1l train-' 11g and ;,~proved orgr,··izrt,ion i'1 r9rfectl:,r ohvio1w . This exercise hnc been plArmed for the JalP.rno beacres in +,he vicinity of' Faest1 1r1 and this area h1:1c'l been Hccepted by th0 ·Tnv7. Les 0, th:m 16 hours prior to the exerci 1e the areP 1·r s ch...,nged to British bePches nortl-i of the Sele River for Uaval reasons , in spite of' tl1 e -f:Pct th:->t t½.e Pre11 inlirnd wi:1s entirely unsuitable +'or rel1enrsing the militnry orerrition involved in the 3d Division's part in the 11 3f.I'TGLE 11 operfltion . 0 11 2 . nut of 37 LCTs assir,ned f'or t e opern.tion, only 11 ,rent on the exercise; q srec:iPic LCTs sreci1:1lly rerp1ested, cPrrying tanl•s , cornmunication.s equipr1ent, anr1 Di.vision hnadquR-rtors , "mre not 1:1vrilr1 ble; 1 LJT car rying one <J.snai1lt coTT1rany ·ras not Pv;:;.ilnble . Son8 of th9 rnore sed ons poh1ts noted in the execution of the e--::ercise ~re: (a) 'Jo si.m;lo hattr>lion Jrndod on time or in formPtion . 1 aer1ents of the bePch P,sanlt hrttn.Hon o.c> tl,e 15th Infrntry ·rere lrndod rs "'allows: 0/i.L,5, L Compl."'ny "''1d hnlf' of HeQdriu;:irtors Company; 0500 , K ComrPny and hPlf of 1· Company; 0800 , hrl-r:' be...,ch nssPult l,d,tP}ion , ·ps lPnded first , between the hours of 0405 Pnd 0/,50 . Tbe 1st BPttPliM , ··11 ic°!" srio11ld have been the lr st bPttnlion to lr>nr , wos l~ndec'l b8t•-reen 0/,?5 Pnd 0610 . Corironies were l11nr'l.ed 11+, Pll points on Green Beacr , "S ell PS to the north r>nd south thereof . (b) Tr"ne::norts 1;,ere so ,~t<r o f sl- ore thrt rssrult crrift re-mired fron 3 to 4- 1/2 hours to reach the beach . (c) DHK"lS required 4 to 5 J:>ours to 1J.3rch anc1 , further, s-t le11st 1 /, TFKFS carTYi'Y1.g ? 17nm P'1d 2 57"'lm AT runs, were sw11mred . rres"mt indications Pre tr.rt Pt least 5 others, cnrryin,r; 105mm Ho7 1 s 1·ere 1."'lso lost . (rl.) ?o single 9le•i1cmt 1 'Ir>s lr>nded in hPnd and on its correct be11ch . BeAchcs '''ere n:issen b:r as much as l,OC'O yards . (e) Iracticallv no b:"irntry trcticnl vehicles ·vere lcnded . (f) Ho :inf<>ntry anti-t~nk mnrons , rirtiller·r, or tr:mv-destroyer .a,,.:ms rere l'shore by daylio;ht Pnd in position to mP.et enem:r iwtion. (g) Assnult crri.ft hench8d nt ,,J.ow sp~ed c1nrl stonr<ed ·crl,en g-.ronnded, forcinq, troops to diserbrirv in deep water unnAce--;sriril;r. (h) v-:rs . 'In tan1rs ·, ere ln.nded . (i) Crp_ft f'::, j lnd to report to tc.ke rn~iT"1rmtril commm,r ers from Ci) Prnct-i ca 1 .ly no use '7f' s nJ?de of LCWs or LCA.s to ferr:r troops ashore "rom LGis , nlthouo;h t1,-~_s rrocofur9 is includ0cl ~n the plan 'ln,, will \ �3\ undoubtedly be essenti/"l 1 in the oper.otion. (k) Ship-to- shore conmunic."V ans were ••efed,i ve , if not tota.lly (1) Th9 r9h9rirsRl rrovidnc no test +'or CCH'1l1Unicnticns , r11rticmlr1rly with reference to 1'nvn.l P,11.n+'ire . (T'1) Troop o<'ficr,rs 111_...,rt 01·s not "r iJr ble to Army personnel. Army of'f:icers in so.,1e en.sec PS 1'8d to use e 11list0d mens ' l"trine n.YJcl vrore barrec .,,.r()Jn r.... rrlroon . "3 . Tl e ·r.,,vnl sjoe of the 0.~srult orerrtion ras controlled .,..ror.1 the Risca me by the 'T[' v'11 Cori11n.nrler . The Di vision Co:1r.:n.nder, ···ho P ctu.-, lly conrrncls the ::-sseult troops , is A.ssig"l d a nritis)1 L<,I as He2d111.rrters ship . TJ-,e so-cPlloc Derut-r to t,}-,9 ·rrv~1 Coruri..,n'ier (vrho J,<>s never been so desirn~ted in · ritin1Y) hfls Y10ither stP,...,... , n.or cilitiT'~ , nor co·~r-n.micn. tions "or control o"' t,1-,,. c;lyi_~-ninr: involver:'l . ~o -rr,r r,s 1::>~Htv to ~Ylfluence the nssr>ult oreration, the •):ivi'1ion Co,.,,r nnder, is , :in effect , rierely ~ F'3senP'er . 1 0 0 00 1 0 0 11 1, . To lrncl trds Divi.sion on "SVI'Tl}:r,Ett 0eaches 8S it ·ras lnY1neo during this rel-iearsnl !O'lld be to i'1vite rl:i_s~ ster i.(' tre i:mom:r sl 011lrl counterr-ttack at dr-iylight wHh /,0 or 5C' tnnk, . There is no doubt thrt the -=:uccess of the operation "rould b"'l jeopnrclized nor t.hr>t t},e loss o+> l.i+'e "nd mnteriel 'lOuld be excessjve . 0 11 5. (a) In my or1nion, ti,ere is i:;rPVe ne~d +>or 11cdition"l trr>i"d.no- to insurr, tJ, 0t AS'"'ault troop, ··ill be lPnded in cc,nc1 4 tion to "'Ccor1pli::ih their . m:isslons . I ,..ecOT'1.I'l8nd a r8herirsal. 1 (b) 'Pre corriwmd orgrni,rn.tion ~ s obvio1rnl;,r c efecti ve . The comnanrler of' the as"lm"lt T'ivioion hns the respons~bility f'c,r the assn.ult; he has nr-i:.it .or cow1unicr1tions, -1' 0 cil~ +,ies, nor :iccess to ,TP.vr l cor~mr>11d "'or j_nfluencinr the onoratj on rrior to landinfs. 11 1.r-'ni:; the nir;ht Gener"l ";lr,rl,: decider1 thrt hn "mnld not put on the pro rosed drop of the 50l;th Inrn.chute !n"rn+,ry Reg~rnent "n thA ·e0rlv 'iorni.m; of D day anc1 thPt insteocl h,., ·muld drop it ,·,jth:1.n our o•;n l:ines on th8 riight of D da.y. The rlecision to "'/"1 1·e the 0:ror i:rith:in our o·:n 1i113s v'lP.S sub,i ct to reconc;iderPtion i-1. crise the G-=mer;:-1 kter considerecl it un..,ise . 0 /1. t 0~30 GerierR 1 Luc::i s arri vx1 , in res:ronse to Gr.mArR 1 Cln.rk I s surrimons . GenerP 1 Dev"?rs , Gen0ral G.9rrJTI0ll and Generr 1 Roo}"1 nl,:;o E>-rri V8cl . nd hPd a brief tall: "Iith Gener"l Clrir1c. Ge11errl . Dev9rs tivm lef't -~ith Colon0l Hrrrj son rind Lt . C:ol. C"mphell o+' 11is r.ePC1qu~rtqrs to visit T.'rench Corrs , nnd Grmer<>l GR"'1"1Cll vrent with Cantain L"mpson of General Clrir:V 1 s stl:!f'f to visit 10 Corns . /1.t 1030 G0119rri1 Glar 1c c ecorr>t-,c1 '"'2 rien ,rith tGC I s, L<~gio·"s of "erit rnc1. Silver 3tRrs . Th8 cerewon-r trok r lac9 in the I'1endo1·1 in f'ront of the Chief of Str f'f I s V'ln ,,;j th a 1ruPr~ of honor , i;onsi sting of R co"1p1rny of th::i 101st MP Br>ttn.lion and the Fj_fth ArT'ly Band . ':'h9 o"'+'icers "'1d n"m to b"'l r1 9corrted included Colonel "lutler, 'Jnn in commnnc;. of th9 1/.i-th Di-rision , Lt . Col. Denholm, Bri~ . Gen . :ilb11r p7.rl Color,el Krimmerer . 1 I},en tJ--9 off·i ccrs [" ·'lrl 119n to b8 rricor..,ted v10re 1 �assembled General Clrr'lz, icrho vms About to go to his rositfon in front of the men, saio to Captain Be/'.1.rcvrood in P cor,m::cncl tone, fl Get dovm there E>nd strmd up with tl-•ose men to be decoroted. 11 Ca.ptt ~n BeRrdwood rlid not \,n.0 ·r thPt the eve11j ni:; before papers hP.c b9en comrleted to 1T''Jard him r,nd Cpl. Tn-,,nenbaum Silvnr 3trirs t:'or rr.olle.ntry At the Selerno lenr1 ing for bringing ashore vitally needed signAl eauipment . · He sair to GrmerPl Clr-rk, "'1JhPt did you say, sir?" 'i hereupon Genriral Glarl,c said, flDo as you r>re told" . C::i.ptain 13e~rdwood went do·m and stood with the men to be decorPted Pnd received his Silver Stnr at the h~nas of the Army Commander. 1 1 In the eveninFt, Grmeral C:l11rk hr,d t,·rel ve dinner guests. They included most of the hi~her militPry leac'ers o.f tre r1e0Uerr,.,nean the.?ter. Before going to d.:i nner the !'.:;nests met at the hut. Tresent ,-,t th0 dinner, in 11.ddition to Generals ClRr\: 811d Gruenth8r, were: From IY'J, AC 1 lF, Generals AlexPnder, Harding and Lemnitzer; from the Perliterranean Fenfquarters, Gener2!s Wilson, 1'evers, Gammell and Hooks; froq the Air :F'orce, Ge11er~1s Eaker, Crnnon o.nd House . The dinner, 1 rhich was s0rvr;d in Gen,ernl Clnrk 1 s unpr9tr-mtious mess shnc}i::, l8st8d over P'1. hour and si..,ortly therePfter, · Pfter returnin~ to the hut, the guests ,1 eparted. * * CA.)~RTA--JAHUARY 20, 1941.- -GenerPl Clark depPrtecl from ris ac~w,nce corn.mrind post at 09.30 this morn 1 ng and flew to II Corrs Heac1 ri_uflrters, where he conferred crith GenerPl }(r,yes, the Corps CommRnder. Returning by cub, General Clnrk arriv':!d bac1.r at hi:., Heaclqunrters at 1130. Instend of us:ng the sm11ll Caserte artillery a.irffold, Q9nernl ClPrk utilized n n11rrow roR.d in the comFrand post area as his t2l:e-off end landine; strip. TJpon his return, he conferred with Colone 1 rhillips, Public RelF1tions 0fficer of Allied T.'orce Feadqw,rters, rind Lt. Col. Clark, thE:i Fifth Arm~r FR(. ~rot Jrno,virlP; the stPtus of tbsi co:rnn.and o.c> Oreration A"TVIL, Col. Phillip:: had ,-.rr.:itten asking th~t Colonel Clork's services be turned over to him for a special operP_tion . GenerRl Cl11rl:, lmowinc; thrt Colonel Fhillips "!PS referring to A~flIL, the vory operetion thnt he is set up to comrr1rnr1, t."lked over public rel8tions plans ,·•ith the t.-,o public relPtions officer"' Pnd agreed to detach Colonel /J1Pr 1" for sp8cial plr-rnninr: for Op:"r"tion A',TVIL r,bout Fehrl1?r;r 15th. The Fifth t rmy Gomrnr>.nner i:i lso dj scusserl i: ith Colon8ls rhillips Pnd ClR_rk the release of informetion concernin<; the irrmirn:mt Operation ::mr'TGLE . He stressed th"'.t it must be brought forcibly to thP- rnblic I s attention thPt this is a Fifth Arny oreration, an integrnl mil.itr-1.r7 pnrt of the rusb Plong the, present front. Colonel Fhillh,s P greed to :3tre::s this f,:, ct in "'n on-the-recorc b,, ckground press conf'en=mce thAt ,fill be h0ld tomorrow. Generri 1 Clr,rlc noYr ['lens on takin:; two correspondents vrith him r.boPrc' the FT bo."t on D dny, one P.merican c1nd one British . 1 Generr:il Glrr 1 hr;d Colonel,:, ihill"ps Pnd ClArl, , flC'.' ,1is luncheon r-;,J.ests . Pollo,,inr llmch, G/'.mernl Clark went -into A. co>1f'8rence ,·,ith Q~ia~rrls Gruenther end BrRnn, and lPter they "rere joined by GfmerRl Luces. G'en8rP1 Luc8s had COJ'l1e f'or a lnst TT1jnute '-:ord from Grmer-:;1 Clr>rk before r;oi11g jnto "TA.plGs to board the vessel th11t ri1l tAke him on C'rerrtion 3IIrfGLE . 1 �"As " rr:sult o-f' tho J.rmy--~f:'VY ccnf8r'"3nC'3 ye'1t8rr!ry tc i1'1V:c,t:i.g:c.te misr,rin~P""Tf1Gl1t ci,..,f'l loss o+> 8auirra9'1t nn.rinO' r9herrsr>l of "r' i)iv~"'ion, rrPcticrlly f:11.1 ro:i.nt'1 ;n il_1.J.8Stio'1 ~mr9 r1 ~"'CUSS(➔(1 0 n/ srtic-f.-,ctor;r ,olntion'"' Prrived c>t •rrereby these S8.'."19 errors . ouJrl 1-ie r1in-'mized 0 ,1r-'11p; tr9 orer:>tion. I lir->ve t:'llked with G""nrir·l T,ucPc; tJ.i-'s rintr>, r:dor to 1 js r1 er'1rt1J.re +>or the "3hip, "nd l e is rtis.-.i0d tJ,-,f't evnryt1-1 ~nr; h"s been rlnn9 b-r the •·pvy to fr,c~.litrite the l::i.n,li nP' . GenPrP 1 Truscott has bee"' ~0ver to t 9 Biscr->yrY3 --~th f' sn°ll nurnber of ris :::tn"f . I hn.-re ~n:f'crwid Gennrr,l Luc"''"' tlrt I "'ill <1.rrive rt r1 out oqoo 0'1 D clay at tho iscn.'1'19 ·"or cr-ri.+>ere'1ce yd or to go~ ng ns'10re if tho tr> cticnl situr>tion p9,,.nits . 1 0 1 tt'l'h:i fr ilure o+> tl-i.0 .,ttP c1 0-0 t 1,e /"iStJ~ "'i.v-' don to reacb its obj octive r acrO"S t e Lir~ Riv'"'r t0Hr.rr"' tli8 Sr-ri .Ar11,,,.o,...,.io ,ms ri.11itr:i [1 ½lo"!. J '."'A.'1 +>e8r+'ul th'lt Gr:me:r~1 ·'rT1'8S"\"!Orth hric a "'9ntr1 .,,..93n>•vntio>1 ~s tc t)l() or;sjb-ilities o+> ciuccess o+> bi.f> or9rr-tion. Tt "08'llc to 1e r.n inh"r9rt nrr>ctj ce ,•j th liim to ttPc"k ·lith r1;nirn1m •·orc9s, ··itb the -,...esrlt ti~,t 9 ~3 re 11lserl ··ith 7o,ses, 0111 11 to "1£1 1,,.e :'.t '1.ecessPr~r to se<1d ;n r·erviPr "orcgs 1Rt"1r to do tl-iA c-,9r1e ,ioh. It is thfl 1uestion n+' "si::nrlino-.., ½ov tn r1o £1 "'l""n's ,job". Ie id tie <:!p"lp t},-·'1.,.. i11 +,he ratt,,c'· on ..mmt Gedro, ••·l--,-,re 0n9 or t· o cornp nies Fere se"lt, re:rulserl, anrl a l<>rger "orce sent in to c'o the job. ~ flP.n to TI Cori's, +'0elinF th,.,t ' t vrPs necessPr;r to d;sc1 .J.S" "!~th G'"n,.,...,,.,l i' 0 ye:s -1::,},P. results o+' this +'pilure, for " 7 +,1101 1 :~h t A 1,Sth Affort •-rc11lc Pot e11.+,ir9l· 1 "VA ·n rotect9c• ris lef't f'l['nlc, itci f"i1ure •·oul•' l_9r•ve :it Antirel·r uncovP.rerl r1ur:i. o- his crossi,,g o.o tl·e R"pj do Pi vnr . As e. res11lt o+' ny con+'ereYJ.ce 1 1~ tb K•Jyes, J h;:iv9 r;ent thP- -"ollo d·1p- clirectiV9 to Generrl r·ccr0er;r. 1 "I s0nt !}-"n.er"'l Gr119ntrP.r lw rlPne to see ''cCrnery, ho feels th"t the <>ttn.c 1 ' o-1' +ho Y)th .,.,ivi::don } ~ci little chm1ce of rucce"s on. ncconnt o+' tl--e '19nv r ,,ef',msj ve riosi tion of ti·1e A1:l.8"':r ..-•est o+' trr:i Re...-i_do. t rr iDt" in ti,,,.,t ~ t ·s 0SSA'1tiqJ_ t}v,t, T T•r 1 th..,t rtt'1C +'11lly A:;mect~_nr: }19QV" losses in order to 11.0 lr1 ,, 11 -':,] e trooyis on n:r ~rn'1t Pnr7 c rr.,. roor0 tn .· t, thPre i...,; cle~r-' nn- t},,, •·1ey f0r pr;GLB. The Pttn.c'r -~ S ori . 11 ri, _r "l. ::n orclAr to .c,rici.1~t<"lte th:i nttrclr o+' tre ''\J: ,0 P,iv9r ,, jch 'ill be eP11n b•r 1) 'J II Gorrs rt ')oro 1 cnrs +,l'is rnte H i"' di.rc➔ cterl i:,l,..,t the !"1S Divi cio11 bo ~ ssued ., n--;trur:t:1.0'1S '3 Pollo S: r !!• rro ½rvr:i t,.,o PC\ P.ri.p;Pd8 f'ni,.,:, .., cross~,,.1 0-!' the G'?IrrLIJ'PO Riv,9r to11icrJ,t 0 0/0 1 ;rn-ri1rr:r, in tb'l 1rrne Pren"" t,J-,nir rrs~ul_t o·" tlii:1 r:vor ·-r0 C'''11111.ct9rl ri rht 10/')o ,Tqnurry. ..--,V9-.CY effnrt . ; 11 be, 1"1'"08 to ; ,,, iC' +,c, thPt th;s ·•ill 11e q lrirse-scn1e oro ·sing . ]2. Fold onP brtt;lio<1 0f t'1<=i l . N Bri~"de rPndy on c"ll f'rom the Co 17 nin.n. inn; Gener"l, II Gorrs, to ''K'VP, i.11to tl-e ::>re" ''et •e9n ''a-'vcrr LIRI ~nd •i ver G".,,..igHano ( c,:_,nter of r>reR. GO.>S71?7) tC' -rr0t9ct ti,,,, left of II Corrs. '],is 7,n-':,tnlio·1 1 ✓ill not 1-ie usAr'l to r::-:;s.nult tl 's locriljt•r, but •·•i.11 br:i mow1d thGre tr relj e~_r9 r battalion of the II Gorrs vrhich will heve prcw5 ously occupied the area. �£• Be pr epr r ea to surport by .(>ire the II Corps f' t tPc:lr . netr,ils of this supportine; f'ire to be arrrnw~rl betv"A"1 the Cor1ririnc1 -i11p- GPr10r~1c;, '<')th J)jvision (rJ. 3 . ) rnd /~6 Divi:::io11 ( 13r) . "2 . II Cor:rs hrs hnen ,-:i11.t,l orized to ''moke 01:Jser v'l-<-ion south of the T{iver LTRI in zonn o+> 10 Gorrs . 11 FolJ.o•ri11r' tln ri-ieti:np; ··it:-- G"'nGrrl Lucr>s , Gr-,'1 errl Cl.,rk n,ceivnc1 his Jude;e l\rJvocr>t9 , Colonr:il ' 1ickr:1Yr::-iit . A dert' "'Ant0nce 1"'or t 1"0 Tt...,li"n::: -Pound r,1:lty o.,.. 9SfiO"f'C'9 hrs b,9e11 decrP.ed hy G"'ner'l Al0·,cfl 1Y1 nr, "'1d G·3rter 0 l Clrrk is crPrP,'Gd ·ith r.in. 1dn't -nl.!'.!'1:0 .f'or t:1e e:recutior . Th0 t•'T() :rt~l~pn, nre to go be+>ore a f':i_rinO" sound !"t 1000 tomorrow . T11ero 'ill be no rictu:re-:; ::--nd no WEIT corre.sronc011t~ pre::;9·'1t, b11+, r y11hlic relr -J:,j ons o"""icer vri 11 brief the corresr,ondents concerning tb11 e'recu+ ion . Lnte 111 t,J-,e ...,.r-t0rnoon Gen0rPl IJL..,r 1..- ::>lso co:nferred ,.,.•th Ge,..,nrr1 ''or,qn C0'1.Cern:in17 s~ rtnF 1 rr0hl 0"']', on. Crer,n+.ion <"'FI'.GLE . * * * GA::r"'-qTA-- .JArWAR.Y ?l, 19/J~- - Aln1ost bAfor0 be '7'1S out o+> b8d tris "lorri~ng, Genern l (a.,.r1 rece5 vecl P JFte · ,.,te 7.lj "9nc..., ;~ei ort 'from Colo11el HonPr'' . The ,;: ·ertl er todr.y is C;Oorl , •ritb orily 8 "'ll:ir,ht t,!:lzo nt nbout 10 , 00C' feet, ~no the i•y1 ic· t~cns Pr<'.J t'y,+, the •19pt,]-,nr <ill bP ,~it]:-, tl A Fifth Prrrr:/ nhrm OrerA t70'l. "",JPJGTZ'a i..s lannched ePrlytomorro" nor.,..,~11P". Colonel 1io•rird 1 s rr,Tort 1 sho'l''S th..,t tLe G0r'1[1ns nra d,il1 r0,i11.forc:lnr: c c:n ~n the Cr ssino-Rer-ido (}r,r:i.p-l.in.no "'eeion, nnr'l t js ~s f'l1. -;.,,.c]jc"ti.011. th£'t tl-e GPr"lPns ,<-·.-.e -f'rlE:nr; +>o:r tl is ""ove to dra:v troors "rorr. tl10 ·ireR. ~hPr8 the 'T J"'11,... ~ .-orce ·d 7.1 inv"d8 . 0 '::;hec1{in[l' ovnr 1'.' t rn~ nute rlr'ir ' Gencr<' l s1~r1✓- cori-f'errPC' "nr ~ O"'" trnn >1onr cluT.; '1c- the morn-; 11. c- ·-ith Gnnnr"t. ls (}ruenther f111.cl Brr nn. GrmAr~ 1 :'r nn y•ill he PCCOT"P<'D;T7 n (1-c,nr>rrl GlPr 1 r tn tl1 e ·in•TGL~ hP"crread -~0P1orro , "nd G"'1er"l Gru,.,rither 1ill b<3 rnr."in·nr rt "'·ftl1 Army J'e-vlqu..,,rtnrs . "l,.., I G0nerrrl Cl..,r~ receiverl GenPr''l Gu 7 llnn!'lA, Co,.,"'",..,ri'1P' C1n'1ertil of th'3 '1-ouris . GenerPl Gu"lltur1, ?rriv"!rl. in Jtrly v03tercry , "nrl 1,11 ·ill be ioinin~ G nerPl ,Juin 11 stRff . G0ner,l c1~r'r rl~CCTY'ed ··iti /}011errl Guillruri9 , vrho FPS r· r>cor'lpr>n-i.9(' to +,\-i9 Grmerql 1 9 '/"1n hy Gc:ine-r"l 1lc:il1Cl9r nnd Colonel Sr ltzr1Pn , tl-e emplo~1T1ent o-f' Go1mc; R.lonp- the I'i fth Arrviy fro11t . 0 Follo•·i11'1 the G11jllR' 1 "'1P c,~n.-"r"'·1ce , G"-'ner..,l Cl"rlc r0cejvocl his Iub1ic P."ll[lt1011s f .(>f'icer , Lt . Co • Cl..,,...,,, to obt, in , r9J ort on tr•e nr9s"" cor,.-9rence thrt G';'18rPl ~1il-,on held tl ~s =orn~11:-: ~n th,=i Crsertn. J.-,Jpce . Colonel Cl::irk rero-rt9r t},nt r'ren.er; 1 11 :i lson €;[''!'< t 1'19 corresronr1 P.nts 8. I101'8 or le" '3 detr- ilAd • .t:> • • "T,., b rl.P.Llng on n perP +ion ,,•T '"•-'·' ,qnc, + l' T,[C))'J tbn+, trjs "'lPS a h'ifth ~rPly,., OVl vn ( , fl. (iff\T9lor,,,'3rt o-"' th9 rres'3nt r'l"'t' UT' trn Liri Vr 7 l8y tow1rrl Ro-,,,9 P.'1d th.ot the f'j c.rhtj ng cnmmanrler 0 .. tri ':: S-r:9ci,"l or0r"tion "OUld be C'w1er;, 1 c1,~rk. G9rerr 1 CJ "r 1r '1 l"lo 8rrrovod [' srec~.., 1 C01"JT"U'1"; QU') OY\ CDP.rev on sµ::• GL~ th['.t Hill be re19,'lSecl tor.1orrow at "hPtev9r t 1 ''IA ~.s r1 0cic1 e0 ur,011 '1y G"'neral C1Pr1c. Anothr,r Morn.; 11,,. caller 11:-i.s GoJ . f'-i c 1re 1· r it , •·rJ:-o 00'1-r'i=~rrerl , rj th (},3r.0rP 1 Clur r c~ncer~~ nr: r-:mr:l D'' con-rt ,.,.,,.,rti --1 er ses . Th8 t •ro It" liPn -=-pies mentio11ed yesterdn.·r '7ere e'recut'3d rt 1100 l'01lJ'S th:i~ "1(Tni'1.P,. As Ms lunchPOYJ. ';Uest �General Glor· had r:S j. Gen. La-~ell ! • Rook", G-3 o+> ITeorlqurrt8rs CentrPl 1'.edit9rrR.n3.'1"' Forces (h0re:1,yf't,'3r T'P,ferrerl to r.s rn J\CMF, Gsmorrl r11s011 1 s 1 He'l( qu.,rters 9nd t]:,9 --;ncces::-or to A'i'Fn) • Ge>Y>r-:il Clnrl, c i sc11.'1s9d Yith f}nnor91 11.ooks the or"['niz~tio'1...,l l·iero.rcby E'S jt <'rrlies to TtPly. Gener9l G-rwmther ioi.n8d n-~11._.,r,.,ls 'Jkrk [Pl.rl Roc 1'"s ~-'1 r r i.scussion of orgnnizntionnl ~-,,.o')l8"1S "t th8 l1J_ncheon table. Durj"'f" the d'1.V Lt. Col. Sutho.,...1,-.nd .,,,erle J.rr::t r,innte rlrn2 for the depf'rt·1re nt 05(1C'A to~,orrff' of' the Fifth ~ rm:r C0"1ffi:'1nr1 er rn0 l1j ~ str>ff -f'or th9 re,a,jon of np0rPt·on t·TT,GLE. (}0ner...,l C;l,..r1· 'rill r;o b7 c~r to t}on to'm o+' CPstel ,Tolturno, borird a stor~ i--iort tr"re rnc' 0'() a~rroyj,11,ntely 1,000 V'f'rr's ·r,-,st the TTJOUt}, of' t}ie 'lolt11r'1.o 1-iere re "ill bo,rd the TJ • .-. • ·r!""IV'r rT llo"'t 1?01 ,nnd thAn speed nortli unler" --irec-i,-,1 t'1"r cover to the 'iT-ITJ\Tf'rL"L~ corriP-rv'l. s1,·r, the T"3isca:me. In th""J ln.te ,;1J't ,rnoon th8 G,..,nr,rri 1 receiv8d . ., cnll .('ror" Joe r;. Bro :m, Lefty Gor9z, '""rer1 Corcor;,n, Jrcv Shrr '--9Y ::ind 1, jor "ovotn;v. TrP Pirst four rnu1ed r,..0 t011ri'1!! tJ19 t,rcPter 9n_t9rtr-irdn-; <1oldi9rs. ThA Gr,ner8.l "8.S photogrFnhecl ·jt,h ti is grour w} osP vi--iit ""'PE' rP.nder9cl so~,-31;,hr-t r1 rf'mrt--:c hy t!-·'"e fPct t1'rit 'r. Bro..m's son h,ic-1 bf=Jen k:il --id i11. "ction jn th8 South T rc:fjc, wrirl "r. 'lrovm hrs cont~nuou::,ly devoted !-'in ti""e s_.11ce thrt v0nt +,oh-is rerform::,,·wes "s 9. ,~or~cl:i.nn for m0Vih"'rs of the nrriec' forces. 1, 0 :-:r the enrly eV8'1.iPr -1)18 A.rny Co"'lr-i,.,nder for :'1.S9rt::1on ~n his d"Pry: 11 fj ctr>ted the follow~ng r1 rt.,.,ri<>l :•atters "cc11.pyin,r. my Ptte'1.tion ,ri,...,rr:llv tor<>y ···ere [IS follorlS: t1As ·ws P 1t-iciyiR.t8d, henv•r resistrmce ..,.rs 11co·mtn.-rec1 to th8 '.3'1tr Divisio11 cro·1si11u cf' tl e Rrrido R:'...vor. ~cc1;1.rqto rme!'ly Prtjller'r .t>-'r0 destroyed brirlp;9s PS thwr ·nr9 9r9ctAr'. It 19c,.,r,., nece3sPr;v, 71:ter in the c'ry, tc ··it},r1ra,·r t,i1 e l/,3rd, but tl, 0 lL,lst, north of '3Pn ~1,~010, I"['--:nt,.,iY1.e0 its -rcsitio1;., nn.,1 r,·"'fOJ~ts to r0i11"'orce i+, 1••pr8 t~ tr ,.G r 1 rce t ~s rf't"'rnoon. ThA lL~Jrd v•As to an across ::-c;r"n r-it 1600. T hr>VA tr-i.l1'9d -,it,J-, I eyns prr.1 :rot o'1ly ~resterdr>y but tode:r d:irecteo h':n to be11d e1nry e·"f'ort +.0 ~et tn:•., 1·s ",-,a knl: cle~tro;trers across rromrtly. 0 11 Sorie "('VnJ1~03 118re nrr1o north [''1<'1 south. I look t0 t,i-.,..,t rittr'C 1 " to hold U 1 8 1rd J ;:,nzer G-renN1 i8r J!j_v:ision on thrt +>ront. :'." t'l sn looJr to co1 tinuf'ti.on of.' tl-ie attf'c'· b•r 10 Cor:rs to l107 cl the !-0rm11n Go9ri'1g, 'J9th f''1d 'l/"th Div=.sio'1.s :in pl"C9. It is o1,viou;:: to re rio7 tb,t t e he0,ry 0-.ie111y r0i:"l"orcer1ent o-f' the 1 Gnetn area ,fls c ue to ~~ s :rnp~essio,1 tl:['t t 0 f!ros::,inr; o-"' the Gcir:i ,.,.liFno Rjvnr io1 1ld bo cnrnb 4 riad ·ritl·, 9'1 Pmfhi.1)io11s lrnd:nr:- i"1 stren~h in GPeto Bty. 111 Te hrve no ind:.c" tio,-,,~, !1.S yet, +,r t t 1y, 0 Pernr l,f'V8 cl i ,3cover<;r1 tbem. In ·"?ct, there n~p no 4 nc'icntioriG o"' "1"1'T 1rind thrt rn 1·no·"J~ of our ~v~'TGLE lrndj_l'}P'. T 9Xf8Ct dur;1,s:i; -1~1 8 n.;(;rt 1 '18 will i:u,t SOJTI': ·rord of A. sl·ift in riG c'lis0 1 �rosition tc mnet this attP c1r -Jj th r1ore stren~h . TPl1'ed ,. :ith G- 4 rritr r81s~r<1s is ..,b~ ljty to urrlv the lrn_ ~ effort of the 1i'-ifth A.rViv shnulrl r-i rr,-,ic7 one'"'ly 'lith rP"Tf'l tnke rlri.ce . 0 "I hrve Put}1 orized hi:n to ~:i..-,n to trike truc 1:s +>ror, all units not directly enr-;"' ged :in t11e fo llo"-UT' . TrJlced 'Iith Brann ,,jtJ1 rem'1rc1 s the r>ror.Tess of hj_s,. 1;lnns for :i raricl followup of ·"''1 enemv ,rithr1rR.vrnl Pnr· t},e rossible utilizntion of 7 revburft 1 s 'Tew Ze:=>1'1nd Divisio·1 Fhen we rercb .tho Soprrino ~'rea . 11 Routo /!7 anroers to be out of the qur>st:ion, r>s the "'lnin rur~uit route . Innunr1 ['tiorts jn the rirl"shos anr' tl,e m['ny c11Jvert3 Pnc l:lridr;es in th['t Rre.o, ,·rill ,,.enr:ler it unusn.ble . Ho'·•ever, •··e 1,71.ll use it if possible . I hRve directed the Chief of Stnff , in m;v nbsence on SHINGL"S , to direct corrs to fo110'"l up V1.e P.l1.8T'1;T relent1essl ,r -i_n the 8V9nt of [' nithdrnyml. Discussed vrith r•tt the :'irct comf'!uninue . it clearod by 15th Army Group ,s -"ollovrs: 11 Har• I 1lritisli r11.rl ~rnericrn troops of {}e-ner'"'l Clnrk 1 s ?if'th Army lPnded eRrly t,his r,1orning on tb0 vrest COP st of ItP ly d9ep in -the rear of rresent eneriy "'ront l 4 ne ros:i.tions . ·raw 1 l"lnd -:i;_r -'-'orces c1re :mpnorting the ground troops. 1 1 7 1 The l· nc1ini was coordinf"'ted vrith strong rttricks ½y other n..11its of the ifth Army, :incl,1ding Briti"'h , •--rcmch and ,.,,,,3rfoan , in the LIEI Van,,iy. 'The nm-r.hibious r.ttncJ,. began before da·:m vrith Allied troops o+> the Fift],, Army ~o5_ng ashore fror.1 landi'W crroft nlong a beach front extending severPl mil9s fro '1 north to south . Br 4 ti"'h Corimrmr1os and AViericrn R;:ingars , re pPrtj_cjpntj 1r in tris assault . 1 1 ' The operations in It8.l~r are under the clirection of GAner::>l Alexancer , Cor'lmander o:" tl~e Allied Ce-ritrril 1".editerrrnerin Force (fornerly 15th ,~rriy Grour) . HI will try to rr>0io bf1c1" Ford to relerose H by 1000, rrovidi'1P' s::.tmition is sr>t:i.sfactory in :-WIIJGLE . If no v:ord. j s receiver1 from me , Pnd othr;r indj cations rece;_ved by the Grief of 3taff indicnte th..,t the lrmc1 jng is successful, he will release i_t pt, 1000 . Discussed ·1itr G- 3 tre build-up f'or SHJTGI/~ . rrvr Corns hrrn sent in th,:dr priorities for tu_rn riround of LSTs . Their pl?n Ppnears to be too hePvy ·i_n servi0e troo~ s . Ho,·mver , 7,,,. tre sj_tm tion p,rr its, I "rill adhere to their re1uest, u+, '"'nould conditions aeem criticrl , I ''ill substitutt"! the 179th Comb,.,t Tew~ of the 45th Division for certoin ser vice 1mits . 11 0 * 1 �f .J.. > . ;:.,.. . l:l., \ >' .... ~~ C, ,, " ..... . , u �311 ~ f'<'-°'Ji.s,.{.; ~ Ci SERTA -- JJl'TF~RY ?:1 , 194/+--In the snnll ho 11rs of J"lo rn _, "' land~nP' bep;nn to come in by rar'io . A courl8 of' rAr-rP.s'3ntritive on quoted: t:: ,,,_ At ()1C'5 t}ie ·' "'ollo"1in~ :r,essrige C"J11e in from GeY\eral Luca~ , Con,rrr-,nding VI r:orrs . As ['_ c iriosity , tl e orip;h1[' 1 of th" cr--,wmtional code bet"'een the GenArrils is quoted: 1 1 \ \ I \ I 11 "7eE'.tb,r clei•r , sea calm , little '"'inrl , our presence not discovered . inr.:s in prop-ress . no reports fro.,..., lA."'Jl i ngs yet . 11 11,nd- At 0'310 the -f'ollo T1.'1P' arHJ.tio 1Pl w~ssnge crrme in: 1 1 11 La.11dino-s '1fper,r to he rroc8cd 4 rir-; on schP-duJ.e . First troops hnvr., hit beach . 'To reports fron lf'nrPn("s yet . TrooT'S lrve 5tnrted to lr:.nd o~ yello·v 1,en.ch , red beach rind green beach . n At apnroxi"TJfltel:,r 0S00 the Generr>l left Ii.is co1°mr>nr1 T'OSt ::>nc1 joined G8ner1:l Alex8nder nnd. other stnff of'ficers nt the ralPce a11n w:mt to Castel Volturno -rhere the rest of tre pE>rty hacl n lrP-:>ny embarl-ceo. f'or the ITs . The rr-irty consisted of Gen8rPl GlRrl-c, G'meral A.lexa;1der , n-e,19r} :fouse, GenerPl Lemnitze,,. , Gener::il Brann, GFm"rril Do11ovnn , Lt . Cr;l. Lazqr , T"t . Col. 1nt~9rlnnd , Lt . Col. ells, ~'n ior .Tack-son, GA.rt~in Portunr•to nnr1 Lt . "9erl, USllT. T}1e rPrt-r ,.,,,mt to +,he fT T-loPts JJ')0l , ')16 P'1d ;::>1~, w•1d tb9 +'lotiJ la stnrted north -f'or Anzio nt 0630 just as thAr0 1 ·'AS liP-h_t enoucrh to 899 th9 ·,1ay. r-. ~-rit-"ir9 escort of -f'our flf'nP-s had b0An rrovided by the YII Air Surrort Cor m11nr1 , P11d thP- flotilh ,rps not molested by enemy nir attr,1cks o>-i tr9 w<iy. Of'f Gercio Joint tho e>1g:ine on 0Y\9 0·"" the es cortinp; SpiV'ires ...niler'l, r>nd th.8 T'ilot ntternpt0d to lr,nd on t½e sen . rrn.,c,ortu11r1tely h:i c11J1;e in rt n.11 [P-letle thr>t was sliri:rtl:,r too stee:i:, dove intc tl-e water :md 1-iis rlnn8 irnrri.0di.'.'telv sank . On9 of' the 1T 'RoRt'i 11'1n the otrer three Sritfires soArched tre rir9[', l111t no sii:;n of' the rilot or r.l.'.'''le w:=i.s seen e•,:cept for A. pool of oil . As the Arrw Cori,.,,nnder »roceer1 erl toward ,'\nzio, he received a number of' bullet:!.ns f'rom G9n9rP.l Gruenther, relryinp; to Generr> 1 Cl;:ir1r nessoees sent by General Lucas . i\t 0735 G9ner"l Gruentrer rPdioed to Generril GlPrk, 11 r0 AT Gr.:LS Y,:,~T, G'l'J'J' <;J/1 JnE'I''l'~ , 11 "1h:i.ch , being tr9.nsl11.t0d mes.nt , 11 1-'o tn.n1-cs :,et ::,cro<Js the Rarido but th9 '3ril Div'si_on q,,d 1st Jivision att,,,c1<s 11,...e oini:; ~ ell." At Of-550 Gerr,rp 1 Gruent]-;"'r rr,c1 ioed thqt tre 15th r>11r1 7tr 111.,rintry Ref;i"1ents we:re r lmost on their ol-:l_jectives 11nd trrit tl1 ere wa:, no enemy orrosHion. 0 I I I l Th8 flotilla continuer1 to tre nc-,...tlmest Pnd ,,;t]o11t inc:ic1 e'1.t re~ched the Biscry,-ie 11.t 0900 . There , (}nn9rnl Glark "rent r s,.,ort t.;~e in the nrerotfon_s Room ['nd, ;vas n1er-ised to hear thflt tl·e Jrrl ;"livision 'JPS cor1pletelY ashore, n.nd one Brigrde of' the Br:;ti.sh 1st Divisio11 "fl.S .o.shore on its "-Vm heRches . Tbe RPni:;ers h-"'d successfully lrinded rind U8re occupvino- A'1zio 'fl; ch vms receivinq '"p0r9r ic ~hellfire . Ge11erri 1 Cl/'.lrK tl" ~n left the 'RfacAyn~ on h-i s l T r.nd ~rent ri s f'nr j nshore fl s the derth of m.tor ,··011ld nermit . Lt . } atterson , skirr,9r of' the t?0l , hniled 8n LCI(l) ,•rhicl1 continued OY\ toward ::ihore untj 1 it ri;ro'mded on r b['r . Grm9rr,l c1~r1r then \ hR5 led .ri r;:i.s:=d.11.rr d11"l(!v, tre rrrty trAnsferr8d to t 1 ;_s vehicle and so cr,rne ashore drvshod at trie junction of R9d 2.nd Gr8en Beciches v,here tre 3rd Division hf'd �1Pnr1ed . 'I'he br,rbor Tif'-l.S "ill9d 11 -ith -hirdnf)" o"' <ill 1dnc1 s , wit Li':I ' .3 c'i'='ChRrgina- "'+,111:1dv ·":iles ()n solr'l.ierc •nho ",er e VT'"'r1jn'; "Sl·or3 , t}·.-,i 1~ r-i-"l11s b-=ild "hOV8 tJ19 ,mter . Du};:,·1s pnrl oU ""lr vehicles ·1-re ''"'9in-o- 1 ml o:<>, 1 ed, qrir 9 on r"rnr s rind "'O'll•" directly into tre F ter, !->er"! t ey !'"n f'C'l-o-,,,e, ·t),,.,n1rs to t}.")ir Yl"t9rrroof inn; . ''\1e rie"ch YIPS nnt C' 11f.,.,st<>rl . -~i.r8 netti.na rPd lv"en 1R-ir7 dovrn on P :coqd le'"ld:i.nr :across ·!)1n c;n>y1 rhnss -l_:.o· '":Y' l t,h':l 1rd .,. ivisio'1 CO"'lM"n.d ro---;t . The (}r:ner87 C0T"M-nr1Peren. r j8PT', r:1r', it11 (1':)'1f't''ll T"nn, ,"'"ent '"'bo11.t n riilA ,--'1d 'l fl lf ::inlnnrJ. to •ris-it the 1rr1 r··visio'1. C0"1IO'"tnd ror;t ,~ere]•'") ccnf'9,-r~r 'ith l}r-nerPl Tr•rcott . Genor"7 t!ou"'A, r;.,,nArri.l Do"O'/"'TJ. . r r1 ot)1<>r -trf'-f' o-"fic r.s nrited fer tre GAn.9rri.l on tl"e ·he<>ch . Tiro 1-io.,..1:i-i11"' rn-:c s occurred, onA .iu"t before <>Y)d one dnr-;_ncr tre Gen0rrl ' s vici.t F,hore - 0'1.9 rAruJ.tjnr, ~_n bo,.,,h r1PT'lf'!"l'P tor f'lor,tjng r"l""fl r.nd anoth0r estroyinr P.n LC: . The G,.._,,y,rrl ' s i 0 ep r:-s bit hy a lPrge r,ntj a ;_r~r" ·"t 91-11:i 71 f',,..q rr,ent , ""'o-,,,ti111."tol:r ~,~ +,hout dr mR ;., to 9'1'T0"1e in the Ge11er"' 1 1 s pnrty. At a>Jou-l::. 1130 tre f10ner"l rr:turncd to tl e conu-rnrl shir, Riscr-yne, 'here he rnet GA"!.errl Lucas anri Ad1'"1irrl Lo'TI'Y l'l~r' conf""lrrcd ·7it1,, tiv~m for "or,,,, tiT"le . G<=m9rr,l D0nov<>n le-f't ..,ith 1 T .11?18 011 "'1 1.ndependent :r1.i."'sion, "'1d nt ll.OO G0ner"l Cl11rk arirl GenerPl Ale;:21n0er, ... ~tr tbPir -resr·ecti,re rnrt-ie", left on 1· 0 01 rnd ·216 . 0 0 At lL.07 Gene:;rPl r:1_.,,,.1.-, -f'rom h~s I':' BoRt, r1 isprtch,d tr:e f'ollo"i'Ylg '7essPr;e .,,ic'~ ~ms received ½y G0neral Gr1_1~11trer ['t 1515: 11 3rd Divis:ior r-,11 '1shore on initial obioctivc . OnP hrir,;"de l"'t British .:'ivision wi.th ci.rtillery "nn tPn}:s rsl'ore . Losses ljght . 504th JE>rac' utA In-r~11trv lr-11.r:B11g Pt trR -rort of nzio . Port of' Anzio co'1dition unkn.o"m. ChP'1.nel "Iill be sFept bv 1600 . 'Qeecr O'Ood for LCT onl;,:r. Irior·ities for fol10 1 v-ur: 1 to 11; then, ??; then , ?I+; followed by/_/~ to 54 inclusive . " At 1700 rours the pPrtv renc','3d tr11 r"outh o-r the iTolturno , here they were picked u h:,r tre storm bort3 r-11.r1 t,-,ken ashor0, ,-rr 0 n0e they return9d to the comm,cp1r'1 '""nst y ~11tomobile . Rm orts co---.ti '1U9d to rer cl' G0 11Pral Cl11rv c .. tJ-,e continu0d ~,icc'3ss of' ': 1 P'GL r.:, ½ut the G~mer"l -relt t½at ria::dmum pre?sure '!lust 1 1e e"ertnd ')y t:be Frenc11 Corr..,, II Corns r1 nd hy 10 Corrs ~11 orrler to ~ontnin, insof.nr r>s Y'Ossjble, th0 f'orces -ric'"J onprs-in!'.; tne Fif't"h Armv """- ~ts lo·,,9r "ront .,11,' rer'""jt t½e T"r-rirmm P~'nloitrtion of tre succ0'1s of :'-'I'rGL'E . If +.l1 e r:rw311ire si-ould ~JA relaxed on the CH~sino front 1 A.11d the GPrmP 1s sronld be..--r')J· 1itted to dis9,-,g['ge substr>11tio 1 forces, their orro\ sitio11. to c)p.,..nar.,~ '''onld t'l9CO""e rnucri heavior, ci r-1 the di"fi cult;t o-" cuttini;,; off , / 1rillin("J' or cn.rturi11.n; r-, lR.rge part of the GerM:on ... orces orrosi>1r, tie Fifth Army would he f'T"lP tl7 ~ "lcre." sen . 1 General Clnrk , upon l i c; ret,1.rn, co lled in (}enArR 1 G-ruentl,,er to exnl2 in to him ·-,1,,,t o h"n '""'.le,,, oTJ. th9 '11"01p·ir 1 r>nc1 to ,..et tr.e l.:"test ~,,.,-"orrrtio11 thr>t GP'1.e ral G-rucntl:ler rqrl received . 0 The Army Comr1Rmlcr r1urjn!"J' tl'e evening received ._., copy o+' the follovrinP- cr>ble to Ge110r" ls TH son and Alexander f'rorn t1-\e Co'"'lh,; ned Chiefs of StPff . RH 7779 . e are wr,tcl in~ yo11r hrirrl. b:1.ttles in :r:'ALY nith 1.mc1e-rc;tr'nc1 i'1J:; interest p,d 'li"h you 1 ev0.,,.v success in the c ririnr:; operr>tion (" r-rrrG1-i:~ 11 ) ,,iiicl you ."re undert,,.,Jrjnq; . 11 (},:mernl r.lerk '"'lso r9co-ivAd a cory of TT 71'5? "'ro,,.., Ge11~rnl ·-::isenho· er to Ge 11T'"l Ale~rr>nder '1 ich ren.o ns f'ollo:vs: ttl}oor1 luc 1( to you ,n0 (;VRY. I ~'ill )e wn.tchinrr tho r9y;or-ts "or tJ--,o r,:rePt ~,F:c8"S you dese,rve RY\cl ,rill obtl"in. 11 1 �CAS~RTA--JA~TTJAPY ?3 , 1944--Follo-:ini:; ri11. early rnorni-ri.g conference ·vHh GenCJrPls Gr11rmth0.,... .<J.nd Br2nn , Generr 1 Clar1<: le+'t his cor:mR'10 post to confer rersomlly \ ,Hh his Cor·p:=; Co'1nn.nders nlon1; th0 FFth J·rny front to str0ss to them th.<it I they riust continue strong -rressure "'f;C.i11.st tho 0nemy at nll costs, tr·us engagj_np: n r1rtxirmm number of' ,-ernrin troops nlon~ the rer;ulPr -l"'roYJ.t "'nd rrevent r->ny reinforce'Dent by the Gormrins f'rom the south ag" ir1st the SPI 1 TGLE beachhead . The Gc11.er21 1 s own notes on t}-iese conf'ercnces are rerorted n.t ti-.e end of today ' s cinry. I He ceF1rterl :roJ'1 hj s rnn1·e - ;.;i-:" +'t cub ruffcr['_y - th.0 ro['d in fro::1.t of his comrnr,nd -,~ost :_ r>t 0915 rmd +'low ..,~t1, 1 'Pjor 7.-,,prer to the II Corps comnr>nd rost near } res,:mzano . her0 ho co'1-/'.'errr,d -"ith !'1l.,jor Gen"r~ 1 Keyes cu-,_cern:ing the situr>tion on the II Corps fro 1t . RAtnrnir<:T to tl-1e II Corrs cub field Generfll Clrirk too 1<:: off f"'or VenP+>ro, anc' tl· we conferred with GeYJ.er, 1 Juin . He then flew hr> ck to tho II Corps +'ield 811.d left b·r car -rcr the 1":>th Division co!11l'1rtnd post northeast of 'i.r..;n:=mo . TTe rrirrle the trir "rith Ge'19r"l J<'eyes who jojn9c. hjrn qt the :d.rf'i9ld . Arr-tvi11P- nt tlie l?itr :Jivisfo,, com!'J.:-,nd post Gr>11.ernl Ch'r: ·;ent into crnf'er,,mc8 vith Ge110r.,ls fnl1':er , r; lbur and Keves ccncerning the sitUc..,tion alonn- the 11':,ti,, Di•rision nroYJ.t . Qc-,"lAr"'l Clnrk- had the rlensure of i11.""ormh1r:t ColoriP.1 Hess , ''rtill9r7 O"fj_cer o-f' the '26th Divjsion, th"t his YJ.f1"1e h::,_d been sent to +1-,9 "An,,,te f'o-y, con f'irr,irtion ?S P. '9rignc1ier Gener" 1 . G"}ner-il Clark- then h<rl lune½ Pt the 11Sth Divi..sion mess ~nd c;er,art,-,a Pt l:"'15 f'or the 14th Division CO:rJT'Jf:lnc'l post . Just rs +,he G9n.Arnl 1 s jeer, con:-riining Grm"'rol Key0s Pnd CPpfain Bearrh10od, VP"l nprroAchin,o; the ,j11nction of Firi;hm:i_y #6 and the road cuttin~ o"'f to S8n Pietro on the r· i;ht , t -ro lPrge forwtions of nl<>nes vmre see'1 flfrror>ch inr:; "'roc1 the souther-ist . T.111') cr w of ::>n A.nti-eircrnft P,1m •r::is looking the r-l~ne over l'l'j ➔~h b~noculrrs, "ncl Gen9rr>l C1Pr 1• wi1:1r>r1<:ed thr->t the AA crew didn ' t n':3ed to "orr7 ::i.bout b0nb:' nr; becm1'1e the G9rmr•ns rrobably were concentratinr- their effort'J on +,re 'HJ •n1E beachhead . Just B+>ter turning on thtJ rond to s,-,n I fotro, se,mrA.l 1-,or1b3 lit on a ridge just northwest of tbe tom . The boT1bs 'mre rlrorred by AJ"'ie:ricrm B- 0 t) 1 s, ~11.d Gc'1.ernl Cl::ir1,. -:vas hi ,,.hly in ignant . The bcm1bs lnnded rbout f'. mile from Gr=mer1"'1 Clrr1r 1 c:; jeep , but they sent ur such splFl.tterings of roc'k and cebris trr>t •\ jor Prout , GA'19r<>l Ryder ' s aide, ~,ho "A..s ·1aiting .,,t a cro-srorr'l apr:ro::rim:itely n hr.lf-mile awa:,, ''lf'S rit j_n th"."l J-,11."'ld b;r rock f'rag:cnnts . 0 1 I 1 0 Arrivi11.c; nt the 31.th D5•dsion conir1n.nd po::;t , G·"nerPl Clrork rer1'rked, 11 ·hr-it ' s ) the mn+,ter , Doc , I 1 TYJ entitfod to a 17-gun sr-ilute, "'Pd tho,e bl-.., steri bcmhers only gavs 1"'0 Pbont 8? 0 Gener"l Ryder rerorten tl-i::it th9t r>s th8 sec0nd time tor'lpy thnt Americrn ')ombers hr>d crorped t½ejr lo::in ½e 11~_nc the /1rir;ric"n li.rn:is . The slopes of •~ount Limi:;o hPd been lrmbed enrlier in the norn1np; . Ge'ternl Cl,-,r1<. sici.irl thr>t he vrould take tl1 e mritter ur upon his return to the Fifth Army col"!mnnd post . 1 Genernl Cl'"'rl< t·hen 'vent into conferenc9 nith GenerB 1 Ryr'iP,r nnd Gener" 1 Keyes . Colonel Butler , AssistRnd Divisional Gofll'1,"'11.der , ...as cnlled over , Pnd Ge118rnl ClPr'k i.n+'orTYJ'Jd birri t11at his ni:ime hnrl b0en ~9rit to the Senrte for confj_rriation r> s a 'Rri e::idier Gener::i 1 . G-:i11erril Clnr 1z then c'lrove 'v, cl· to thP- II Corrs ri irfj_r~ld '7:ith GenerF 1 K9yes and tool,,;: off Rt 11+05 ':'or a 1Pnc1 inP, st"l"'ip at Sessr Jlurunca nerir the 10 Corps TAC Hee.rl.·:pwrtArs . GenerRl Clerv.: then rlrove to the ~1ritish Co.,,.ps Ferirlqu"rters Pnrl con"'erred with GenerFl r?cGr9ery. Follo"l . . nf' this con+"erence '"Jith Genornl r'cCreery, GererPl Cl~rv.: orice np;r>in rrot into hi.s cub pl"ne Pnd +'le": br>ck to Fiftr Arny ::end- �qw=trt ers Rt Caserta, errivi_ng at 1505 }·ours . Fpon returning , Go"leral Cl"rk- irnmediFltely took ur wjth Gen'"lrfll House the matter of' the B- ".>,,) 1 s bonbi.np; beMnd our ovm 1~110s ::ind issued instructio!ls to assure that tr.9re rou1d not be f:' r9c1i.rnmce of such P 1:>rientrble incident . i The siturition -<: n the T<'i+'tr. Arr~:r ' s ne- 1 br:'.dgeheod nrea remr ins '3trictly in our fRvor . General Cl.<>rk's troops ,..,.,ve f"'nned out tc '"'~den the beachhead and , r.s yet , the enemy has mride no counter "tt;:ic1, . Air activity is on the incre"se . _The 1,0_ Corps briop;AheacJ F1cross t"be Gnrir:tliano Tliver i,:, secure ., Pltbou~r there fo despernte "'.p'G,},tjng juc;t north of r inturno . The II Corr,s front }s r1ost ACtiV.£_ ··,itl· t1ie 11-errnrns thro-rinr_: ver~rthing theY h...,V8 in nn ef-i'ort to y,revent Pny sizeable cro~s:i.n"' o th9 n_,,,:-ido River . TherP :is ::>lso 0xtenc;jve ?ictJvity ,.,Ion~ th9 French Cfo171sfront . 0 G8110r., 1 Cln,.lr confe,.red in t½e late 11 ft8rnoon vri th Generril Gruenther to in-'.'orm him of' t½e nrranr~eme11.ts thrt h:-ive been !'1Prle for ti--e flttl"'ck nort}, of C:->ssino by the lrd Alr;erinn ::,nd JI.th Aw~rj cnn f'ivido11s . The G8rn,ns along the Cassino line hflve not :ret sro"rn irny indicr->tion thr>t trey intend to ,·,ithdraw sizeoble numbers of' troops because of our 1-ie~chhePrl closer to Rone . Undoubteol~r the cmemy is wa~ting to cou- ter :-ittrcJ,. tJ-,e bddg,=ihe8d ·1hen he h:-as b11:i.lt ur sni'fjcie"lt str<':mrt h to attrcl: with po"'er . I ) As lriis dinner ruPst GenerCJ.l Cln· 1-c h9d Colo11el Trte , his G-4 . It WRS sonevrhat of a celebration , since Colonel Tnte hris ½0en recomr11ended for a Brir,Rdier GenernlcY. The Germrm co"1Yl11mique at 1600 today s~;y's ·1 n rr,rt: 11 In the evening rours of yesterda~r An::i;lo - Ar:iericnn troons lRnded on ½oth sides of t•j nturno on the Tyrrh8nfan coast . ~ountAr missions Pre in rrofI'ess . ThA Luf'tvmffe successfully rcided the c.,,emy lr nr1.j ng f'l ~et ••• 11 The Anc;lo J\.JJericr11. cori'7unique strtes tor"ny, n In ~~he lrr~e scA.l':l aniph5 bious operrtion in '7r'ich British ?nd" Arr.ericrin forces of t½e ,.,ift h Arm? were lnnded south of Romri , a ,mbst::>11.ti::il beochhead WAS seized. This ber>crhePi1 11P'"' ber-m •-;id-:med rind deepened . The thrust S9riously threatens the enemy l ines of communicRtion lecr'j no; south <JTIC e"'st to t e mfJ i.n bPttlo line • •• Arrnricnn troor s l,nve enlrirged their R<irido Riv"'r hridp-,:,}•epr'J. . 1 l 1 GeYJ.ernl Glnr 1 todav c ispr1 tchec' th~ f'ollo 1·1 inrr cri½le to Gener'l.l rr.ccreery. , R'T 751+ . "In view o-" success of' Orer:.,,tio;" "FT""GU::: E' 1-:wlut l-r essentir'l 10 Cor,..,s co"l.tinue attac 1-c tc secure objActjyes p~,w:tcusly r'esi';n, ted . '1:i.11 try to see you this aftnrnoon . Tine later. 11 0 General '::lar1c I s Hre the f'ollowinp: . Nm ·1.ot8s 011. torlny' 3 nctivi+,iPS, n.ncl th8 conferonces. he h;:,d , ~1trough dictoted thA ?/~th . ':'hey refer ririinly to the ;1Jrd : nyg:-;T"11.DfY 1 0 TR.TI - 'te"'tewl"'y, 011 the ?3rd, <>fter h"'vi;i.rr rAtu.,...n0d tl"e night rief'ore "ron Jhzio , ·,· fl9w· b·r cub to t11.e throe corr-s cor:1rnr1 ers E'nrl to the 34th r>nd 36th Divisions -"or conf~rerces . I iPJ:T3ssed ~ro·:1 tb<1 corr~ commP.riders pers011r'·1.l•r tho vitnl 11ec3,sity for their rJrivinP" •r>or11Arcl co11tinuosly in the , ttri.ck · north to ,.,.iVP the enemy no rest :..n 1:.~_s ro'"'sihle ·•r-i·';hr raw",.l rnd -in order thrt the two 8lenonts of t},9 Ti'ifth /\rr:1.y ...,,ir,-ht jo-i.n h9rids rit tbe sarlir-,st rossi'ble mor{)nt. 1 �L\ l from a north,··e,terly r'irection to the ..,sst f'roP" t1 G i,_..; r:;h r;round nortr o"' Srn F,li11 to crr,turFJ tho '3eb,,.,der3 ol:ii8ctive '"Jec;t of tJ->e :ilnpido River . Jui 1 , ril'73-;T> coorer,,t:..ve <''1cl "'-~:X1.0ll8 to do all e crl'l to furtr er the Fif'th Arr v ricture , renlied thr>t he could T1Ph~ r cliv j sioY1.<1l coordint=>ted ,ntt1°cv thG Picrning of tre ?5tl--1, or a h,c1J.:f'-nssed onP c0"'s i '"'tinr; of O'.18 r0gj,.,,ent on t'1e f"!orninP' of tle ':/i,th . Altho11gl-i. speec1. ~s essent-i"l , J .. ,_,..-:; ~''climid to p;:l ve 1-dm the delrl.y, A.nd .,,hrm T r1 erarted told him I would ,..,P_,,.~ rw decj 3ion r>ft er t11.l1-d.ng with the II Corrs CoT"rn'111c'ler pn_rl 11yder of the '3L~th, f'o:c I r1 esir"ld t'y,t the 1r-itt8r divisio11. r.tt~c'< to tbe "est on the bi½b F{round north of Cr- s,ino in conj:mctfon •'Jith t 11e Frencl' 3rd f lo;r,ri.'7.n l'i7i3io 1, attrck on Belvedere . 1 0 "cn•Tf',.-:R...,'rr,B . IJ'.2H G•~:...,..,.., '\L,... yr:•~~;, ' 1ALPR ~ ~m ~'CJSR - I hrd rreviously flo 1-rn to !<'eyes I Hen.c1riu,:,r~-::; t.N 'T!ornino; r'Y1 (li ... cussed this "'ith hirn . I then +>:.ew br c 1 to Xey9s R"l th0'1 ~ ent to c-;ee R:rrhr , vrho could h,c,ve ottr>.c 1crid ' last nj~J.it, but "n orlditio11ril ?!; hours r-111 p·_}v8 him r> better oprortunity to coordinate 11~::i Pttrick •·Jit:1 thA ~rench . ::: thrm rne(e the decision thrt the 34th Divisio11. ronld rttacl, the hir, 1 r:rou11d north of C1<ssino ton' r t , r.ionda._r the ?/1-th , anrl the Fre11ch tivision on its 11.orth to attoc1· t:re ne:':t norning t 0500 . I o.ir9ct0d the t,·:o cor.,..>s commc1 richrs !lnr' 'i i vis ionr 1 co!"lmano.ers co11cerned to ·7or1.r out 211 of' the necessrrr c'etails bot ·een t'rernelves . A.t t 1'is f'O'lI' , 1000 , tM_s has been done . Also directed GeYJ.i=,r9.l Keyes , i':t9r the conference vr:ith Gener, 1 Tel}cer a.t hio 36th Division co11na11d. rost , th.-t :Y,th Division r'1.'> 1.,.e c1'.e r10··1str1:1tions and ·"ei YJ.t crossino;s o·~ th0 "R.ar ido , both ln.st nir;ht and toniD'rt , and support bv fire the r.ttac,. of t're JL~th . ·hilr-, at 'lP1 1:er 1 s T{end1_urrters, h·1-d the co,.,,me,Y'0ers co,,c,:_irn9c p;jve !1"' brio:f' Accounts of thdr unsucce.ssfnl efforts to esta½lish nrl rn11-i ·1tr_i'1 br~c1 isehen.ns OV'Jr t.h9 ~.,pido. In decid:i_np; upon thAt nttack SOY'le tir-e A";o , I '·nR'7 it ·-roulrl be coitlv 1:iut ,ras -:.nipelled to go ahead •,,i. th the E>ttncl• in 0rnAr tri"t :r co11ld draw to tH s front all ro "sible Germw1 rev~rves -iri order to clFiar t1 e -.;n~r for PI rm::: . Thie:: WE'S 8CCorn:;:lisred i.n , rn."8'J'1ificent T"rnner . Somr; b1ooc1 h"c1 to be S!)illed 0"1 °·th9r tho lnnd or tlD "TI".'JGL-C::: -"ront, ;.nd I grortl-r ~referred t 1 1"t ;t he on thn Ra ir:o, ..,here -7e "rere sec rre , rrt!~er thrn <>t ~nzio ..,.:t,h t110 seri ..,t our bncl: . I r,lso directed Ke-res to rom•p-criiv~ tl-ie 3?'.ith Divfrion P.ml nt "n n.n.."opri ,..te t 4 "18 to be rre ~-rireo. to f1ttnc1c across the F.nrido north of 81:m ~--1pel0 ·,hen th9 '3/+th hnd 11ccor1pl:i hed their ""i.ssion o-:' seizi11r; tre Cassino l-i.jgh ""round . ·,e nust ~0t A bricl.n-0hefld. over the R[mirlo i:1 ortier to r"'r--i t ti-,e debouch9ment of our tnnk f'orc'3s i-ri.to t!:-ie Liri V"lley. 1 0 0 0 ~F'r'',\L C0f'r."TT'f:C•'rn,n• :r:'R0;1 'FT 1 GL~ A"?.EA - I <Jm a little r'isturbed ,.,t the lPck of r1 etn5lec1 norcl f'ro'7 Lnces . Co11rnunicrtj_o11s +>ror the '1isc"";me J:-,nv9 been overlo. dRd ,,nd hnd . ~To•• thAt Lucns i~ estr'½li,c:hr-,d. fishc a , ,..e hPVe good coT'1T1unicr-i.ti_ons, and I h<ive sent 1-ii"l th,:; follovrLnp; "'lessp·ro: mr 427. 11 Ioor communic"tion hRs result0d in my 1rno";in[f li+tle of :ronr ::::.iturtion. FleRse ans"mr th9 fo, lo·•rinr, riuesti 0'1S at once . Hor• fElr hflVP. your n,"trols "mrh'3d? fh<it <:ire vour ~ntentio'tS "or imr1odiPte operRtions? 'lhrt is 70'1r est~r,hte of ener1y siti..wtion? }Y'CJs0nt ,,rid rr9dicted unlondi'1r; cn.racity o+> Fort of Anzi.o? Cn.n r;-;"'S unloa0 dryshod et Anzio? Is won.th<)r effectjng nnlord~ng? 11 Luc[\_s r1urt be c1g""ressive . He r11nt ta 9 ...,m,o chrnces . lie nust 1.ic·e the 3rd Division to rush out . 11 1,oon. 0 "E'-Ff'l'{ IT1'1'f.'":"IO' 3 - I still hrivA no rositive -inc"icr,tions of enemy -intentio"ls . Heather is brirl . J hrve no Pir reconnaisnr'1ce. Hence, I do not know the clegree of' his retr0r;rrde movements lr~t ni~ht . I have r:Urect0d PttPcl·s �1 flnd r9cn:rnn.issn1t~e in force in order thr>t 1 0 may 11ot get rwoy 11:itrout o;i.r 1rno"119dp;e . I feel t,-,rt h9 is; ,rreakeninv, the line 4 n +'ront of us i..n order to na.ss troops to nr~et SFJ',TGL.B rmd destroy ~t i.f r:o ~sible . Anoth9r 0 4 hours , r9rhl'rs , rill give me a better ricture of is incications . "!ITH G ~TRt.L ·i;ccR~'EJ.Y, GOG, BRITISH 10 'J0RTS - After cons11ltation with II Corps ;rest0rdn.,, I "'lew "'or n. ccn"'9rence ·1ith Gew,r<'ll ncCreery. Fe was in the r-ror;ress o-" r,R1"inr; rm ,-,_ttack . I vms stprtled ··hen he told me thPt the Sth Division needed a 1"eek 1 s rest . It hlls bee-n borne out V,.,e nnc1 ti,.,,c., f'f::c in tJ,flt the British Co!"lrinnders require more :rest f'or treir troops th1 n are --:;iv9n the P erican units . Ther9 'ig no ti"le -ro:::- restin{s nt this crit:1cfll r9T'iorl in this all - out bnttle . Fe rn1rnd !"le +,0 cbrn~e tre bnundrirr b~~tween II Cor"'s and 1() Corps in r."trolling the Liri and the G,"'rigli£ino arer, . I denied 1--iis request but did autror:i.ze him to mov9 the bulk of the 4iSth Division to thP. soutr, but ;t must be resro'1s-ibl9 +'or the rrotectio'1 of its entire Pren . 11 CrT~~r:;·•rGi<; \ r;.-;;;· 'ltl\1.9 ""'R ~ ':IHT A''ffl "OTlJ\ N, cnr.o'T'":L I3C "T'!I\_ ·r pr--;, LT. COJ;;. crrifer--mcP., th~-,; r1>1.te, ' rith Brrnn, r~orPn, 'imitr, i:Ir-1_ . CoMr1f1'1da11t, ai1d Bo'·ma11 , "":nf'{i.neer, , j th rep;rirds to nirvinr, m·r forir•;:ird corwnanr1 rost to 1 resenzn.no . I hri.ve so much "',ressu.rA fror1 h-1 P'hP.r 1--ienrqun.rters to the re::ir and p= aetting so frir ~rom the b:ittlefield tr.nt I feel it essent:rl to move up . I hrive rli.rected th:,t th9 co!'ll11anr1 ro~t Of'9D in the '.'1.0"r loc.,,tion by l?CO noon on Thursdn.y, t}-,e ')7th . I hrvP- decided to reinforce S]P'11LB to t 8 mRxj'n1L'11 consistent ..,; th its surr ly. I vrill move the e11tire /,.5th Di v2-sion nround tog0ther ·· ith HP.rmon I s Divisio11 , less one cninbat com~Dnd . I 1111.Ve d::i_rected th.-,t the Speci:il Service Force be alerted for imM8dinte "'1ovement . I have rr':lrrred my O"Tn TA'J Headqurrters , consisti11P' of m:rsel"', G-3 , G- ? and a Pev sii=;nn.ls, to be rreprired to "lOVe on ')/,, l101 irs I notice to tbe Anzj O Area . Thnt is Vll0 8re the bnttl9 1·Till be , 11,11d thPt is ·,rhAre I -int,=md to be locPted when our huild- ur in thPt Are;::1 is su..+-fici9nt to take tre on+'ensjw~ . I may ro~s~bly h1::mdle 1fc1rmon as an exploi ti:ri:: +"orce wit}-, ex:trfl :lnfn.ntry, tPr1·s ond trnk destroy9rs under rlirect ,:,ifth l\rri~r corunand , 1·rhile VI Corps '70V9S on its objective to•·mrds Rome . t1 Gr?'F''rl_~NSB Sf'TTf! - }Tqve hrd I"'l. P 0 11 0,.,FTGTAL ' 7TSIIT'CR.S PJ FC'fW~T:lT) !\Rt,~A.S - Bvery rlrice I r,o, I f:ind rw subord'nate cornJnrinders, r,ostlv corp:i , ::ire 1)9-111.,,. both,::rerl ½7 11 brriss h.,ts" fro'7 ArF~ , Air , Fq . AC'F (15t:b l\.rrw Grour) , ·r'1v etc . Trere h"'i.ng no otlv~r bPttle in the i'~di terrane'ln are::i, , r>ll hePr()uPrters , including General 'Tilson I s, Adl"liral C:::unninghArri 1 s , General ·,.,,l,.er 1 s, Gr:m.er.,l flev~rs 1 , Genrir8l AleYa'1cer 1 s 011d rr:Rny le~ser 1 i rhts h-'lve noved into Crs9rta on top of "'IJT henrlrp1::irters . 1 evPr ;)rifore, in th0 istor:r of' ,,,.nrfare, ~ e ::::o !_evL bP-:£!1 comprr11ded b~{ ,o "'L:'ln;y:. It does "'l.e no p-ood •-rhen : stic" to my g,ms A."ld rJ.9I"Pncl th"l.t ""Y 1ear1111rrters be the 'huffer between '7Y cinborr.:: nflte uni ts 7itr resp9ct to tr9s9 v~ 1 · t:i nr-; d i.gni tr-:d.ec; . I hr>ve requ,v~ted that in no case s 0 11lrl they be i,errriittecl to v; sit forwq_rd units in fl desperate battle without "l~v .,uthority. r, 1 11 ROTA'l':rn~r FnR. "": 1·!LISTT~D ''::::'T - I Prn imrr<JssGd ·1it'1 th9 nece"sity of soT'!e r,lan h8inr; ',orl::od 011t l-i:r tre ·rRr r-ep"rt;1~mt h5 c, will -rrovide " rotntio11 f'or more rmli"ted men af't8r r1n.:rrr "'trll1t,hs of comh t bn ck to t}-,9 United Str-ites . I do not 1mow ·vlirt the 'lOlution is , but I dll studv ~ t cnr9-f11lly to sRe j f some plnn ca'1. not be wor 1~od o,1t . 11 11 0 * * \ I �( CM?m.TA--,JAinJA'><.Y '?!., , 19411---Exr;a1.1sion of' the bric1 i:;9head south of Rome continued to 1;0 17ell , but thf"'lre fire inrlicrtfo,,~ thr>t tl-io Germrin is coilin[". hir,s9lf to strike RQ'.ainst General Clark ' s troops 'lho mPde tJ,-,.e 11mrhibious lr>ndinp; . ( · Reports received from VI Corps indicate that t},e Ariericnn and Brjt i sh trooris ~re no7r well inlnnr! and thPt trey Gre co'l.solidPtinp; themselves while the ~up'" lies A.re 1 ng 'orcur:1ht in . The weather torh.y is bi:i.d , with rn in squri 11s )8~ anrl heavy swells thr,t -rreve'l.t unloadinP" orernt;ons excert from li=mdjnp; craft . The seo. j s too rou,sh for tl e rlnkTs to cnrry o'1 treir ~huttk: service, ½etween s'.ore nnc-1 corF;o shins . There is conr-:-jderr- 1,10 r,ir r-ctivity toduy in tho An zio a,..ea . Dtrrin...,. tbe rl~y t·~o iles+.roy0rs ·Terc M.t by r=memy boT'!b9rs , fl.nd rit night a rerort cn.r,o in th8t tr0rc hPs h"len a he:wv aerif'l n.ttacJr .?go.inst shipring rnd thrit t,·,o hos ital srirs hrve 1Jeen Ii.it . Gen8ral t;ru"3ntb1r 'lnd sever,,, eotnf-P of'f'ic'3rs Ptterpted to r;o to tr,e bridgehen.<1 areP 'W } "' bor t this morn:i ng , ~ut they 1'lere +< arced to ·1urn around "nd go ~ bnclr to ·rarles 1-x;crmse of th9 !)9/lv·r S88S . There is rePv,r .co;_p,J,t:hr: n 1_1 "lo11n- the Fifth Army ' s c;r.utlrrn front . The bPttl'3 j s rPrt; culPrly vii:;orous riround San Croce on the Ti'rench CorT'2 sector, rtnrl Generf' 1 ,J lin re-r:orts he::>vy losses "hen the '7tl-:i. .f lger:'c.nn .,.n"':=mtry R0r;iri':nt was rriven o.,..f r~o,mt CnrAlla. .Jlrtillf;r'r ·"i.r0 • r>s '.riole11t in this Prep troughout the dny. Th9 II Corps re ortAd tr"lt 34th ::Ji.vision 1v1 trols ~ronsin,i; the Rr) p-i rlo River received stro11e A1 1torintic 7er>pon rnrl. sn1r ll nrms f'ire . 36th Division pPt:rols also cro 0 sed tre river but •rr=;re piat ·~i th J,en.vy mrc}1 ~ ne ITT.Fl 11.nrl n9be ]_vrerfer +'ire . II Corrs b"'] j m,e +,h,.,t the eneriw is :bolrinP", the P.rnido Riv0r 1~ ne j_n ,, strr-mP"th . , ;J 1,7 er \ r;. ~ ~ 10 Corns reported tJ~r,t enerw rctivity was conf.;nei1. to she 7 linp- of +'orwnrd positio•1s ~n +, 11'3 3~th Division 8Y'e" . 5tSth :Jjvision rntrols "'ent to Cflstel :i'orte and found it strC'nR;l, r held by G0rrrians . 0n the VI Corrs ~ront tJ,e 1st Br~tish n~rntry rivision rnoved to the high. r:;ro11110 so J_tJ:, of the r:010tta 'tivcr , rnd elerirmts of tbe 5C4th :'\.meric"'1 I:--r~chute Tnfantr:, ffl"'ned out as ·"'3r rs LittoriB ,., 1,l re:rorted no confrct . The 179th Infantry ~ep;ime:v1t o.<> the l+5tl1 TJ . , . '1ivision -i_s now , shore at tre b9f1Cl'hend P11d is !"s,e:nbli11n- to ::,o 111to action . F.ner, r ~,..,+,:r0lc; , co·1.si3t;nf; of" ric to '?5 rien in }'p]_f tr..,cks , ['Ccor1p.<tni_ed b•r ;:> or 3 c::el+'- prorelled mms or tr>n'n:; vrere rero,,.ted active 'lrour1r1 th"3 nP.rjy,v~ter of' tre cn'1Pl north of t e Anzio S'3Ctor . The enemy j_s rlso rer.orted to he h"stily dj_gp;in~ 0rnrlPceT19nts . Th0re 1 "ri-=; "cne rrtillery .,.,5 re rnc1 shells dror:red spor<i.dic" lly into Anz.; o . l? ener,y pln.nes "'9re reported drorpinp.: +.roops or sup11 l" PS •iy 1,,...,ro.c1,ut9 to r'.):i_r?orce G,9rmRn e lnnents ; n the bridi:;0reail Pren . fr9nerril Clnrk , "+>tor "rendiYJ.t:1 tJ:,e niorn-l np; lookinp: O''Gr tre situ:-itiovi , hn..d Grn0rnl Pc.oaks PS h.;s l mcheo>1 rn1est . Ve d:tseu:,sed wjth G-=,'18I'fl Rooks once apniri ~1,e ora-..,n_jzation.. of i\",1'1 in Itnl:,r. Gencrnl Cl..,rlr 1:lso r-3ceived a vi.sit +>ror, (Jp::,tain Le,·Jis o+> the n . 1. ~r..,v·•, and he exnressed to him t e deep tl1 an1rs of tbe Fift!, Arriy for tiv~ fi.11e ,y,rn.l surrort g·1 ven to t e forces lrncl;ni:r Pt ti..,e br-i.dgehend . Gf'rtain Lewis is r l)o1 t to rqturn to -!:;l1e rrnHed "t~tes . 1 1 Ge:rern l ClRr1• th n received n visit f'rorn Colonel3 E•vprt Pnd Dnvirl . Both 'Y!en rre S::,ec..: al S,.,rvices O"ficers . Colo 1el ~"A.rt :is P ssc-cirtc,d vdth frrnerri.l nsl)or''le ~n tho d:i.vjsion of troop r1orPle rnd c,ri mtntion. Genernl Clrr1<: di"'cw·sed ,···i.tli Colo11el Ew['.rt t 1'P 1 l9,+, n0tl-1orls o+' 1·9erh1g Aniericrn sr,J_rli9rs ..:nform3d of' the 0 �c::-lobrl situ...,tion ,<1ry'l ''OW th<:v CPn 9 ··,y,-':,i1l,..,d ·dtl~ r1efinite ir'e'"'s crw1cern~np; t1'ose tb"'1f.S +>or ,~iricr th-3 r Pre ,....;glt·h.r; . G0nt:Jrrl C7 ·r'~ 'n9-r Coloriel T>ert from f'orr:t:Jr ;--C"'soci_..,tions ,r11en t. e Fif'tl' Arrriy f;o'7r"'1r<er ' '1 S ~tn.tj_on8d rt t'1e ',r>r Crll9~9 in ·"s:h:in.crton . 1 G8n9t'nl 01f'r1rl s 119xt ~n_ller '7"S ('.-,.'1.-,rE 1 Utili who -i '3 '"'11CC99d.;nr:r G"n"r"l :Car~ no rs the C.o··,..,-,,1r3.Ar of' t'-le lf't --1:,,,_1-' '1.".l • oto 10 ized Group . Th-' s Itr li"n ) f'orc9 -', no..r r"'or;;:"·1.i..zing in ::i reP'~ ''r9ci., rnvjn,; '1-ic-.en +,r- 1 a~n out 0f' tl--i.e line t:'ollm-ring t'1e-Lr rH sastrou"' "-tt,,c1: E gr-:•·1st TTount Lungo 'JOl'F) VPJe "'l;O . GnnerPl Utili •·m.s r.0compan-i0d. b• 1~is c·,:2e"" of 8tr>:' . . . , Colonel Lo,.,.,1rr~j . 'i'l,o '70eting betvreen t½e F-L"th Arny Go~,,rrcJ9r an~ ·"1 c, -n'3vl ItR.lirn G-,•,errl ,·ras l·rgel~r one 1 G"'"'Gr"l Clrr}- tole Generel ctili t½et roynd the It"'lirms 0 -r - ,--,troduction . W01'ld ½e EJ½lc to ta 1re ., "!Ore ective J1f1rt in bringing r-bout the oe"Art of Ger r,r-11;,r. G9ner" 1 'Sue 1cnP 11 , Conriander of" the British 5t11 .:)i vis ion cnlled on GenfJral GlArk to say fare•·rell. He is bei'1g S'lt::Ce8dec1 bv G<:n"rrl G:rerson-Ellis . Gt:Jne~rtl Bncknall is uncle.,..tP l'irt , rinothPr co:rirr.ri11.d . 0 "'e A lr:i.te r'fter11oon cnrfer8rice wris ½alc1 111 t'np Generr1 1 s vs.11. bet,"een Gffrterr--1s Glrrlr, RobPrtson , Gr1nnth,.,r E>nc1 =:renn . T11 e oi'rnussion c ent8red ::,ro11.nd the ~uprbdn~ of troors, r"rticulrrly :in the ne,-rly-"on hridp;ehead rrea. The extent to ,7' icl' th8 ne17 posj+,io11.s c,n be explo~ted r"erends on "lll 7 nten~ncP Hrich must be atte11rled to vrith every d~liR"erice . * CASffiTft - -,JAJTTARY 25 , 191~4--Today Gen°rril Gl11r'' +>J.ew to t},e 1-ie 0 chheP,1 1)y cub , :r~loted by •~::i.jor ';a1 1rer . Tbe Grmer~l •s ovrr Bcco1nt of his rlqy 1 s "ctiv~ties f'ol1ov1s: 11 I TA i AGKC'l nv G-,., Ju L PL~"rrr -;,,. '.:'L .~ ccc" TA1w TT}T 0" A DD :;ri::oY~R TC' VI ,IT THR VI CO;:,.} S - 't!e PFfE'.,..E"ntl,r f'eels PS +,ho1 rrl ro is r11nn~!if:!: thrt "how. ?Jot much : CPn rlo "b0ut it . T)ur; t-- the f'orecast of bnd ... ,e?t}v~r , T _esitn.torl. to go vith him bec,,,use :: W8.S ree.rful t .n.t T coule' not go asl;ore on acco,mt o~ the 0 ea . I, theref'ore, c'1ecid.ed to fly 1-,,r cub, ,·,rich I cJid . It -is 1.11it':l r ;trip, "'hout Pn ho1 ir :1110 fl. h;-,l_f' ' 011t ever t}1e PerliterrPnen.n ur -;:,} '; cor st . Altbougr I hac'l requested air cover , t'"ro11o;r "iO'T~ ,..,i-v:-up in Air CorT s Nlministr0tion, none ..;rs furnished . I lrmcecl about 1C'10 <\.nr1 irnm0di,,,telY corrnr>rrl.ecred <i jeer L'rom the Jhore "Sngin 'ers rnd 1ent to the VI Corrs, ascertf"ined tl,e situRtion th~re nnd then 'rent to tbe conil'1rnr1 rost of Q911eral Pe-1,,,ey, Conimr>ndin/:; tl e 1st Brit-i sh Division . '"et Luers trere . Ant"'r fl.SCertn.ininrr sitwtion , nent to tl 8 rort , 'here I intervie"!ed Ca:rtr.in Turner , 7 ritish 'Ji:iv;-,1 ('f'f'icer in chRrge. Tre rort j"' c snlenc'1;ii asset, .?n,.:i -it, muct bA rrotected J~· more anti- Pircr0+>t . T will e.rr'lnge ti• t . By bulldozi11.s anc' 3CrP.f 1.:; son9 0f tle .jetti.s , ~ LJTS C"n :)e unlo<iclecl sirmltr:>1eo1.wly ::>t t'1e rnte of ~ L ;'T'S every 3 hnurs . T'h-i s requ~re;s r,erf0ct coorr1i nation, n.rd -in a ')4- h)"r reriod 1·1oulr1 give you 64 L::Ts . Surrose •-re cut thr•t in hal:"' -r>or s,.-r8ty 1 s sr 1'e, v-;e still could mPintf'in through th0 port t 11e force of' I+ r"ivisions, whi..ch I conteJ11plri.te '·;uildin~ up to . 1 1 0 1 1 R0turned to VI Corn8 Herrrlriuarters in ·'ettunf' r11.r1 t>-1en ,-ent to tb9 corn~and rost of the 3rd D~vis-ion . ,'3itu"tio1'1 is s.-,,V sf,,ctor7. '3rd D;visioYJ. is odw·l'lc~ ng on C1 "'ternP , ··rhile one Flri,c;::>tle Grour wi ti- t'·1e 1st Pr:. tish ;Ji visior is advrncing 11orth to the junction o+> t:re Anzio ro.c1c1 "Hl~ t},e m9in r··i lroPr1 at q?339 . The 179th Pr.T ·.g_s rsho::.·e ond esseribled . TJron "'lY rstur11, T c'irocted thr-t tbe hnl<>nce \ I �,,-,J of the 1st Armored Division, 1'nown a.s CombAt Comnn.nd A, and "lh1ch js novr with the II Corps, be alerted for a movement j_nto '"JFT'tGLE. I hPve Plso alerted the 180th RCT for sh:,ilar moVGT"ient, r1lso the Specie l Service Force . Th:is, within a '7eek, should give me three infPntr:r r'l:ivisions, one Rrmored division, the Rangers, Jpecial Service Force, 5O1.th I'arnc·hute 11.esiment rnd 509th fprachute ) Bf'lttAlion. I '"Jill thfm strike out and cut the German lines of communicPtions, forc:i.-r1g hiR withr.'ravml out of the CPssino area. ~'hen, I "'ill turn my Pttention to Rome. I propose to move in my advn.nce comrnFJ.nd rost, very srv:1 11, ''lith Brann, Howard and Signals Pnd set ur in a fevr dr;ys . I cen tlnn fly back r;nd forth, or go by lT boat, and direct the rsrincipal operPtions of the Fifth trmy. I probably will hold Harmon I s Division with S0"1e pt,tached :inf'1mtry as e.n exrloiting force directly under army control while VI Corrs goes after its objective . Due to the rapidly deteriorating weP.ther indicrtio'1S in thPt areP, I hristily took off et B?O, rmd in ,m hour ancl tl,irty minutes lPnded on the r,alnce pond. ncr 'JF'7 'lR'';D · fJTH G'~~n::RAL BR!drN - Upon my return cnnferred with BrPnn and called II Corps 5n order to ascertein progress o"" their Crssino attack. 'lhere as tl1e 14th Division has one br>ttPlion acroc:;s tl--e RP-rido, the 3rd AlgeriPn Division (French) to the north has just rhoned in thPt they brve t£>ken Belvedere, w},ich is a great success . "Te T'lny turn the G,"!rrrnn out of his Cr>ssino rosition froT'l the north . * -x- CASERTA--,JANU!>tY 26, 19M~--Gen<Jral Clrrk spent tocl.a:r in A series of conferences and in e.dministrrtive 1 rnrk Pt riis con1m2.nd post. His notes on the dPy 1 s P.ctivities t1re the following: "I attended a neeting this morning '"Tith GenerrJ. ~'ilson , GenerrJ. 1\le"-Crincler, Adriiral CunninghaM, Gener8l EHker ·1nd "lhout ?O to ?5 other officers, r1ostly Bri1 tish. Th8;' have two meetings a cay. :svery subject ciscu.ssed pertBine0 to the Fifth Army, whereas I arn the first Fifth Army officer who hrs ever r,ttended one of these meetjrJJ;S . AppArently nonA of these hearlarn=irters hPve ny other mission in life th::m to :i nterAst theJ11selves in n+'f1:1irs pertaining to Fiftr, Army - ''!hetrer a mrt should be taken in for the Pirfield? 'dhAt its priorities should be? Hh2t should be the build up? '.That sho11l0 be the tacticPl plan? All of ttese r"etn; ls were discussed. r,iy opinions wAre 1=1sked on none of these subjects. I T'lerely record this to sJ-iow how several heH~qurrters h"Ve ,..,,oved in on top of Fifth Army Pnd, having nothj_np; else to do, Pro grP'lU'llly tekin.c; over mrny of :its f'unctj ons . Again I n~peA.t, nevP.r "rere so f'ew corrimi:mderl by so rmny. 0 Aft8r the meetin~ I stPyed +-or PD.othc.r c0nducted by Genernl 'Nilson on tho subject of /1 HlfIL. AppA.rently Generri 1 ':isenrorrer has cl e~idecl thPt P·TTJIL is on in full swing . ::'.: 1.vas shocked to see how All of the British Com.menders '-rere sabotag- I ino: this :r 11:m. None of them are for it, n nd a 11 still feel thr' t it wi 11 not be executed. Hence, p11J.ling of units out of th.ts th.enter is r;o; ng to be ext'.f'em~ly difficult And will nlr•ce me in 1>.n emb1=1rrassing position ''!rile I a.m both conmAndin('j'\ the Fifth Army and pla,nn:inr for Pnother orera.tion. Admiral Cunninrhmn suggested thPt if tvro divisions v1ere used in the PP.SR.ult v:e could solve our trou1iles by hPv:ini- a French And U. '~ . Division from 'forth 0' �Africn used, neither of ··•}'j ch vrou]/l ever have b8e-ri in combat. :;: strongly rrotested , r'le,.,,<1ndinr- t}i:,t the 3rd nnd /+5th nt ler<st be t 1··0 of these to bA used . I foresee p;reri.t r1i"fj c'1ltv in ex~·,,.icati11.~ in t:i ne -"rm'! t1 ::..s tr enter the units •vl ic P.re to he set up . T recom·,enc'len. thnt t'1<=> 85tr Division , ne"' fr0r1 the TJnited Strtes, be trained in 'Torth tfricr. ri.t A:rzew "'nil t11~t the 3rd erd the 45+,h he withr'ra,m , co::'ne11.cj nn; [' xmt the ,..irst rvee',: ~-n ·•,..rch, to the Salerno area here I ··:ill set ur the 1nw1sion TrriininfJ' Ce,,t-,r r,.,,/ conduct nrererrtory traiYlinq; . It is '3SS9Ptirl tJ.i,-,t the 'iav r ..1orlr ~nto this .,.,lP"', r.lthoucrh Admiral Cunn:' n--:harr stro'1p;ly objected to novino; the •r~v1.l AT'1phi1Jious Tr ininC; Center to thPt area . "The II Gorrs P-tti'lc , f'ttn.ck.:in~ tre eRstern fAce of c,-,ssino hPs been held up . T cr>ll.ed KeyRs ;:,nr1 n.s 1 n"'!o. Mm if he con1n. AXPloit t,0 "uccess oc> tre 3rd Al~erj~n I"ivision by "lOVin.G' H. > Tr'"'ODS in behind the1"1 ['nrl att""c 1dnr:; to the • sc-uthwest. Fe is doino; thr't, co.,,.,rn~ncinr; to11~P-rt, "ut t}1e Ptt.c-cr cA.n not ~o 1 e ,.,ust bror, 1 t}·;rouR;r into the C;:,s oPf until tl1e d v o;:'tr:.,.. t0"1orro·r 111orni11P' . r s i.no :1 .ren . 0 ';leath0.r is lrmprffi,w; our unloenin~ in trfl 'r,ttuno bridgehen.d Prea, altl:ough I feel 1Prfectly sR.f'e in tl~? brid.~"he::od ,,i.th tre number of troops in there Pt t 11e nreseY\t -1:,; me . Hflrmon I s +'orce sh011ld be unloprli;,r soon, "nd ti-19 rest o~ the 45t11 Divi :ion, less th·, l8OtJ1 Comb"t '.::' ,Pn, rril'ly <""et ;_n th,re tonorro1 1 niD'rt . r7ith them in tb:irP. , riur hridr,;eh9,1.d ~hould be secure, "r'"1 j_+' the Germrm 1-mild up is not t/")o stro:rio- '"le "'il1 s11cceed in punr~no; out . 11 11 Gener:il ClA.r,. toc":.v 9rt':lrfoined r"'s c1"ssr,,r>te Brip;. Gen . ..0ce rit l1mch . In tr,e p·"'t9r110on r,e receivPd,., c"ll f'ro~11 Ge:rierr-1 Gir,.,ucl, 'me. Cr-t:roux (w o is }1Gre 0·1.., tour of Fre11.cl-i hosritnls) .,,,,.r1 Gener...,l DP.V'nck, G8nerrl Gir,,un 1 n CriP..,.. of StP"f. rrjtr Ge11Arsl GirP.ud, tl,e f',J-r1.-r Comnrnrler discussed r:iuestio11.s o.c:> the French forces i'1 :!°tR.ly rnr' the brhr;ing ~n of oth"r"' . GeY1erPl Girnud srid he vro·1ld "'end tre /,th ('•ountain) Divisfon nt once iP 09n0rnl Cl"'r1 i:isJ.:ed for it but th,.,t the r mules -Por ct1rrvh1p- its e,U~f"'1Ant 170'Jld be [1P1"( to fi"'ld chir:rinP, for - it rould require mo11.ths ..,5 ti, 4~re rresent ::i 'l" il" hl0 cr::i.ft . Grmerri 1 Cl:, rk sd_r1 ho I d be gl<>cl to rave t e Di. v:i.sion r-,~.d v ould st,1r'ly the .,,.,ul8 questj on . I erh"rs the 4th cculd r9ljev3 Rnoth8r c1ivision 11wl use its trqnc;port . G8nernl :,ucas se11.t in the follm•in~ cr>.ble "rit}' rr>gr' rrl to th 0. sj tur tio'1 j n the fort of' 11.nz~o . R'T 39. ff] revriilirif{ •me1tlii=;r , r,en.v;v r« ·n, sleAt, li,:,;rtning ri'"d stro--i.p; .,.; d.s . "TnJ.013.rli"lf, c f' Liberties Pn<l over benches ;~possible . Fo eir rc.iids durino- ni.rht but Anz:i.o J:iprbour «>nlled ½v ho-;t·;19 70'1~ rnnr;c rirtil11;ry. CnrturAd rloc11me11.+, incl icrites ,meny d13fr,nsi V".3 t" tti tune 0'1 +>rent of 1 '3t Di vi:1ion . J:o i=;vir1ence PS vet o" l}err1an couY1ter,:ittacv r>g"inst e['st +'lnnk. Flan to continue n 7P'ressi. ve !'econnn. i ssr>Y1ce "l'lr' loc" 1 attacks to i=;n ln.rge beF cl1hew' . Fire o:ri 1.'T 4,:,2 ·"T"'('r'3ntly r0sulte0 in sin1 "'lC ,:r-j oY• to 1mlo"c f 11c:. T" 1ill rP.:rort e"r ct f 0m,, re ·i lriter . tt 1 General Cl.Pr'\.:: tod;:,y cnbbd Adriiral Lowry, Co~'unn.nder of the Eiphth Amphibious Force, and General House, of the XII Air Support Comriand, expressing },is appre ciation for the fine '>Ufport tb 0 j_r respective forces hP.d given the Fifth Army in thoi.r recent l.ondinf;S at A"'1zio . * * * CA~~?.TA --JANU(IRY ?7 , 19li4--The Army Conimander ' s notes on todey ' s f'ctivities fol - �low: "Flew to 1:'rench ~xrer itionr>ry Corps this morni'1P' in order to encourri ge further atto.c 1rs b;r tl1e 1rd Al1seriAn Divj sion B 1d to chec1r on the coordinetion of thi:it 11ttrick ·1 itr t 1 e 14?nd Coribrit ':'ear'l. 'Jext "ent by air to Presenzano 17hore I went b•r jeep to the '31+ th ri vision 0f '"!h0re I observed the 168th Infantry in its attack acro:·s tre Rnpido River . It seemed to he going vrell. I imrressed upon botb tbe Fr1:mch Pnd the II Corps Co ,rnanc'ers the obsolute necessjty for rill out ePfort, th=•.t I hn.d s}:iot my wod nnr'l this 'ras my last chance to bre:i 1r throuph into the Cassino posit; on anc th'1 t I 1'new the Germans / were equally deter..,::.11.ec'l to 1teep us out. Upon rriy r0turn to my cornm:,nd rost at A.bout 1700 , I tele'Jh0'1ed both ar;A·n to inpress upon trmri the all-out nn.ture of this Ptt- c1< . I thfm nent from trie 34th Dj_vision or to the command rost of tbe B5th Jn-n~n:1try f"cing Cn.ssino . 1 Upon rw return , Gr-meral Alexander asv;:ed to see r10 . He is worried. Pbout \ the slo1 mess of the Pttac1,;: in t 11e north b~r the VI Corps . I "'m too, and 1,ave been ... or flt least 43 hours . Al tliour;li I did 11.ot tell J,irri, I 1movr thnt he has received a rerson, 1 telegre.m from the Iri~,e ri~.nister 'rho , from his rlesk "'t #10 Do.ming Str8et , is going to direct the bettle here in ItPly. The Frime wants an attr-ick , Rol"e f>nd fl vj~tory, not'"rithstanding- tncticf'l or logistical \ reasons to tlio cn'1.trary. !hen I told AleYr11,,er that I ·, s going ur personr'lly torno 7ow and woulc:1 stay up f'or severn 1 0a;rs, he H"-=; coripletely srtisfied for I told him it 1.'TP.s my ideA. to lay on an all-ou+, coor(lj n, tea corffl .'.'lttack support9d by tan1·s . 1 Gen9r'l.1 "'i lson A.sb::id 11n to comri to s9e him. After exrlainjn,;; the situation on both fronts , h~ told rie the rurpose of my vi'"'it "as to c'liscuss rith him ATTTTIL . Tnasnuch rs I am to co•i"'l<inrl tl1 •1t op"'rr>tj on, he -r~nts to deR 1 directlv wit11 rre and tc; P,et m:1 vie''TS . It was a r.ost s11tisf.-,ctory m9eting . I;e asked f'irst when 1 thought I riu,_.t leaV8 this battle in order to devote my full attention to A"lVIL . I rerlied sor~o tine Aro1md ; 1ar ch 15th or perhrrs later . He told me he was anxious for T"\O to remr in '1S lonr; [' s ro:--s; 0le, rJ.iich fits in exactly ,Tith my ic'leas . T tole him J ',anted to speA 1{ frankl7 , tririt the Fifth Army had lPnded rit 'ialerno , ta 1cen 'fanles rt11d h.,ttled its way to tre north tl ro'1r;h re 7 lish terrain ann with hlood,r los, e,; n..11d th..,t it was eY1titled 1mder s my conr1, nd to tA.ko Rome - th,.,t if on Vie 15tJ1 of 1 '~rch J ,,,as battlino; Pt the gn.tes of ~{0""e, under no c; rcm,st'lnces shoul 1 I be r,ulled. out . H~ nssured rne t hat under no cond ·tions would he do no . I f'\lno told hi m t h,.,t if 1mder certB.in conceptions that A'liJIL should become a "fart 1.n the dark" of one division spavmin the ~~erl.iterrn.n0rn ..,ith no intention of lying /:my place, I wanted no part of it . Be nssured "'le U-..,t it ·:vas hj s desire thrt I stay .<J.l''J[ly,; vJit], the Fi.fth Ar-my and never even look Pt A. JIL . ·-;e discussed t},e tr:>ining of the divisions, thPt I ••rould get the 3rd anrl the 45th, th-rit I ·rould get the French battle - trEl ined d.i visions th, t I ·ranted . m=i told me trie only difficulty 'ms thPt Robertson said two divisiorLS co 1ld not be mounted out of T;,ples . I told hiP1 thrt I hesit11tecl to challenge sucli 8 loo;istical ex:rBrt r>s Gener;:il Robertson, but thPt I Wf'S dan.n sure t:1at two could ,,,ithout interferjnu; with the Italian cPnipaii:~n. He expressed a desire to help me get such embers of my staf-1" as T .,,anted , t "t he · oulcl fly here rigcin soo'1 to discuss A'TVIL nith ne and. 11 s sured r1e of 1-ijs complete cooperation in , s sist~ :ng me in my effort. 0 0 1 GenerAl ClArk too.a:, '."ll'ote to Genorn.l Juin , of the French E'Terlitionary Corps ; Gen':!r[:ll Keyes, of the II Corrs; and Genernl PcCreery, 10 Corps, thrin1-::- \ �ing them for the spl8ndid J11anner in wh·:ch thPir c_or s carried out tl'eir role_ in facilitati11g t}19 success-1:ul lD.nclings of' our forces in Ue vicinity of \nzio. The Arm;! Com1"1Rnder has bee'1. disturbed by the too infrequent sitwtion rer,orts coming from 7I Corps rnd for this reason C"'bled Genern.l Luers, RN 53?, askinr; tl:1'."t brief reports be submitted f'reqnentl v, 0 n estirn:ite as to when Cister11r> would be ta1 :on, short stnte·"'lent bis ;rrrregsions nnd '~lans and the rr0o-ress of unloadin1;. Ferso"1al Luc"'.S "ror, Clark. RP 555. "If po.~s1 ble I desire thAt your rl"n involve coordinated r>.ttac"k '·itr use of f'rmor 0'1 Jrnu<>ry ?9th. Hill discuss details to'llorrow. 11 * * * FR~ >i.~rzA 10--JAl'Ul\1:.Y ?q, lq/i/4--Gemr:s.1 !Jlrirlc 1-rs felt +>or some tjTie thnt the force at Anzio is not 1Jr:>i11i:s pushec'l for,"r,1 -rith suffic-i_ent r <;rre"'Si veness and thrit orr-ort, n.;ties to "!a1rr-i JX'Orr'9'3, 11.orthF11rr! ''1j le the (;.9r]'1'1r n troors 'were as y9t disoro;"njzo.d rt t e ti'!"le are beino; lost. ./\ccorr'inn-lr, 1.e rietermi.ned to P'O at 011ce to tl e An.z~ o -"'ront Pnrl urge Generrl Lucas to 1njtiate rggressive action at once . ~~ He arose at 0345 this morning , breakfasted "Tith General Brnnn, Sflville B"l'' h:i s aides rnr1 lAft hJ ca:r- for tl e :rnoutl1 of the Volturno .,here he harl. arr1mp;ed to meet TT Borts /,hOl and , 1')lt;. His cwh r1:rtion by storm boat VTP.s very <ljf"ficult, as tl-te 1•,9.ves 1ere l"-ir;r, Pn' V1e orer.,tcr of hi.s boflt, unf8.mil"i.r,r ,,ith t},e chPnnel at the !"lout of' th9 riv""r, 1 it R bnr anrl shirred a greqt deal of ',2ter, 11etti'1,.,. t e Gonerfll '"'nr1 evr;r ro,9 ,.,-i+, him. -":ventu...,lly, mmver, the ho, t, wm·e r,ic 1red un, P.nd the r<irty -;ot 1mrler 'l!'iV c1t 06::>0, 35 "lirn1te•3 lriter th,nY' t:1ey li.c1.d beer ~chedulc:,cl to 1 enve. Gr-mer/'11 Clerk rncl General T3.,,..2nn, Colonel T-l'01;ar"', Colonel Bo•rrnpn, l;e:rit'1.in Pef rd ··ood qnd i 1r . Gerw'si,) of' Collier's, vrere 011 I"' oc1t (?01, 9nd on}"' 'R011t f?16 were Ge'1er11l '-i'"'Ville, ,,,.. /'JoJ.onel Fhr 1·er, Colo>1n,l Jjblo, CPpt~in Le' ;s, r. Fo rle of CBS, ri1d CPrt"lin L~rpson. The tri , rmt "noothly nntil Pbo 1 1t ,even "1:i lPs c,.outh of An.z:· o, "'hrm the :vr ''"C)l nas cha lJ engect b:r a nij nesweRrer, the A:1 l?C, then r bout ;::, , oc,r yPrcls to t,i-9 north. :St. Irtterson, ,..n17l"k"r.di'1,.,. the '1')('7 , 4 r,nedintel,r Cf"Used r:;reen '"'nr' ello•; -Plrires 2nc1 11 ,i11 on the blin1'er to be f'ircd PS 'mrn:inr: to the mi '1.es nerer trrt tre rrr ror> cM np- 1,o.,ts ·-,r-re Alli8d , hiit tre minesueer,or, supposing tl-ie t· o r'T' Bont-, to be Ggr,,,Pn.,.., boPts, orened f' 4 r0. fl. nu,..,,,ber o.,.. l+O·'l:'1 srAll w10 '5--inch shell -,8r8 firer., Pnd on8 ~hell struc1' thn deckhouse and GYrloded Phont 5 feet f'ror, Grmert:'l Clrrl'. 0 1 I I I All three r,,,,...,l o.,...,..icers on th9 sr.ip vmre hit, al3o tHo n"V'l rrn "s. one n.t the, ,--heel of' thP V8"''3el. T'113~Lr.r:n Rr-mson, 11ho hrd been hit I in the legs, nl"'-;110 1 1,,.1,, no orie 1->ut Ben'3on 1me" j t Pt t½n, tirne, ~ot to h'is feet P,11,n tool.• tl"C) 11-ir:iel o+' the bort . The rm 11 ?01 swuni:r 1.er ,:;tern tow11rr' t},e firin.g vessel n.nd, ~ "ter ;,one el<>y, sped a·vay _,.,rom tl-i8 shir. The IT t?l6, , hich was bring Frrroxim;::it11ly 1 SO :mrrls t'lstern ::tno to the stPrhoPrd of tl--ie '1 201 nlso turned and hegqn to 'T!a1 '8 P.. run for it. .All o.,.. the fire fron tbe vessel that wes shellini:; t. e F':' Bo-'lts ""S directed at the FT 1201. Poth-inq hit the lT ?16, ,vhich n.J.so brd br:ien blinkinP' tlie corrAct recogni- �49 \ rPr,onn"'l F1.bor-1rri t'be J T ''?Ol imn180i~tely p;ot out a fj.,.,;'t r, :i.rl 'rit Pnd rut sul:l:anilimide i:1to th9 munds o" th0 five n' vr 1 "t0n ::1nd triPd to tr 1•C<3 ct.re of t1'18rri. H'our o-f' th0 r11:m "T8rA on dPc ", and they ''mre 1:Jl8ed i_ng T rofusel v. t. lmost h<il+' of the deC1 " WA..3 COV8red 'ith r)lood. or tr'P -"j_VP, r.10'1 'ho 'TP,r8 hit, four were ~Jj_ thi:a 6 f0et o+' '}enernl Clark. ThA -"j_fth mrin "1rs belo v i;.1 tre tiny mess hri 11. he t r10 rT BoRts srcirl to-·mrd r; ve T"ines-·,eerers thrt hFd been se,gn to the soutt· r h"H' an hour be-f'orP Genl'lrPl Clrrk's t" 10 sh-:.r-s i:tot ,·,it},i"1 r~m;"l of the :-,ines\'leeper 1 s PUn. A-"ter "o e Pnxious ro,..,Gnts, dur::i'1f; ·-rrich the IT '90:1.ts 7ere .,l,le to iilent·:"'r tben"elves sat~_sfri.ctori_l•r to tre ninesweep3rs, the J·T 1?01 nulled 11lo110'side the Dritish r,-inesweer9r IT''S Acute. The vessel fortunntel.7 hRd A.. rloctor q1Jor-rd, A."'lrl, ,-,-"ter srrv1p j "f~ culty, t)-,e ·"ive ~101mded -;ere tr"'nsferred in l:ltters f'rom the l ':' "01 to the Acute. It '7rs discovered Pt th:i s t~rne thPt ~nsign Bfmson hi,d hrndled V1e : T Bo"'t desritc 10rious ·shell fra"'r,ent t'ounr1s in his leF;s. ':'he doctor, Pf'ter look::.np; quickly rt -,Jl tho mf'm on the shir, decided tb.t the .,ir'Jt '"lf'n to be ,..,e"'loved "'hould be F.nsign ~ori~lr'l, si.,....ce O11.e o+' 1-ii_"' leg ~rterios h'ld heen "'0V9red. Lt. Jr-l.tter2on, Com1?01, hnd su"f1;red seriou:-> shcill 10unrls in both le~s .?nd "11")!" ncer of the i T so hnd n -"r" r.tm~ed l 80'. '::'he rian do"-rn in th, nie:.;s room hAd been hit in the sto"1ACh rind Also had a fr"ctur"3d n<:Jlvis bone. The oth9r enlisted man h d b,d his lmce cri.p blo·m ,·r:-:i·r rind •".Tns in ITent rain. The skipper of the H. M. S. Acute is Cmdr . Andrew Edward Doran. hile the T1e11 ,-9,.-,e ½ein~ tr, 1ren off the Vi' hOl Pnd moved to the hosr 0 t,l Abo~ra t,h9 H1 B AcutA, Gener:-il Br:-,nn and 0,ri.. -tsin Ber>rcrood tri9r1 to ·erS1wr1e Gonernl C1Pr1" thrit re should "lot :::i.ttempt to 1:'f;f'in go :into Pnzio. Generrl \ Clr>r 1 decl.,,red thnt he hr>d to get in and thr>t )19 "'P s ~oing to tl,1,:e the chPnce, r ev<1n tl--i.011gb the l"-i.nesweeper Plir'ht ~ P'P in shell the two } T Bont"'. After instructinr: +,he Acute 1 s sk:ipper, CornPnder Doran, +:.o get tre men to '3. }osritP1, Gener"'l CJark ordered the t,·10 PT's to head once ag11in for fnz~o . Upon reqcrjn~ th9 aren "here they hfld heen shel1.ed before, th1; fT ; 1?01 agnin sent ur the proper recognition flr>res f'nd ½linked the sri'lle correct letter on its blin1rnr liP"0t . After soroe time tbe ship reco~nized the t -;o Aneric~11 boats and P,rPnted the 1"' /f?Ol nArrnission to cor1e alono;side. 1 \ 1 "hen tbe J T 11?01 '7aS vrithin haili11,,. distance, th~ skipper of the torpedo bo"'t, who hr>d trpnc;ferred roT'l the IT l/:'?16 to the FT 11 ?01 ?s she ''83 lylng alonr;sid e th !'\.cute, :i nforriPd the CaptP i 11 o+> the Ar" l "0 th~ t he hacl fired upon an Arierican 2hip ann thrit he hPd eUb1r 1 rill<.3d or '"ounded five Hn.vy nen. T½.e skipper, shouting t½roug} a negr>phone fro;ri the bririge o-" his s ip, decl"'red thRt 11e bad believed the two vessels 1·1ere Germa11 r: bor-ts, th"'t becPuse of' the slantjn_q rays of the errly Morn:inr; sun, do m which the two IT boPts vere trA.velinrt, he ~;:id bAen unoble to 0-i stinruish any- rAcognit1on sign, ls. •Iencc he had f'ired upo:1 tr ship . Tie r1ec}f'rl'Yl Unt b~ trcmght he · RS doi'1f; his cluty. J\130, be sRiri thet at the ti:18 he h d -r-:.r0d upon t 10 0 sl--i:-c's r r1011vy enemy f'ir rf'id on Anzio ·1as in rro ress, a;-1d he ind:ic~ted tbflt h'3 t 1"ought :rerhnps the bonbing had beAn ti:1"3d to coincide ''lith an attri ck upon hipr•ing h~,r enemy E bor=>ts • 0 0 0 0 .Af'ter snne rrgmnent bPc 1,;: A-nd forth, the IT //'201 to :,ard. A'1zio. Rnd heflded tt4 1 t:( ,, .Tu:-:t RS the Fm ½orts ~ot ~_nto th0 l1rrbor, the third enem:r nir rnid of the l"lorri:l ng strrted, "l."'ld t,l10 TT '1?01 Pncl / 1'21-S cru:i.sed ~rou>1d the }·qrbor 1rhile the enemy unsuccessfullv bonbed shipping. 11.t PlO the FT f'201 ~nil rT /!?16 drff'l up Plone;side shippine; tied "t i'11zio dock, '1.nd Q-9nerr-l ClnrJr nnri. his r"rty debrrked. rrr;:msnortntion ,"'3 rustled ur, flnd Ge'1err 1 Clrirk ···ent im..1119dirtely to the corrnnd ~ �50 post of Generi=tl Lucas . General Clri:'.'k conferr9d with the VI Corps ConnP.nder Pnd ~rged upon him the necessity of .sn ir,1mediate attP ck which he fixed for Sux1dny morning. He pointed out to Gc:merrl Lucas the fPct thPt full ridv2ntage of the landing could only be tAken by bold Pnrl aggres"1ive action,ay,rl thPt delAy now •rould only perr'lit the enemy to build up forces orrosite the Fifth Army amphibious force . 0 Following this conference GenerPl Clr,r1c re-ernbPrkAd rnrl returned to the Volturno mout h, transferrinsi; to storn boat and crir successively Hnd reaching h·is comnHnct post ~,et from sprry anc1 waves v1hich he.d been shipped in the storm boats . Today the N 1 v;cmce party for Gen0rn 1 012 rk I s personal section at the TP c tical GP a.t the new beachhead was embarked . This consisted of Sgt . Don, CpL Shusteric and Cpl. Yermolovich, with the General I s jeep, on MP ;jeep, a second living van and the radio jeep with two operators . S MP 1 s were also taken along as a personal guard for the Gener81. This p8rty accompanied a group of officers and men selected frol'1 each section in the 1-TeadquJJrters necessary to the operPtion of a small Tecticn,l Conmnnd Fost . GenerPl Clrrk plA.ns to divide his time between the regular command po,;t end the be2 chhead comwnd post. At General Clark ' s direction ris conmancJ rost ras moved todriy from the palace gro1Jnds at Caserta to n hillside Just south of Presenzano-., The r,1oving W,9S done in the absence of GenerPl Cl'="rl~ on his trip to Anz:i.o , a,1;d was largely completed by the time he returnecl . I 'T'he following important messRges were received anr1 dispatched today: For Lucas fron Gruenther . RN 2005 . "CIFC, T'!F'.D believes coordination be tween Arm.~r and 1\dmiral 10,n·y not close enough . :sspeciall;f as regerds 2bility to receive shiDping . See Lowry and 8dVise . u From Lucas to Clark. RN 72 . 11 Recent inform<>tion incHc~tes 45th Division enroute . In accordance with my messe,ge 60 , will start corps attack tomorrow . 11 From Lucas to Gruenther . rJRN . "Armored counterettack force from 1st Arrnorecl Division now available . Consists of 2 br.ttali.ons tanks , one bPtt a l ion of 0rtlllery, one battnlion of infrintry. 11 Gener2l Clrrk today received a short note from General VJilson , Comrr;:,nrier-inChief, Allied Force Heec3']unrters , thanking him for his many courtesies during the latter's visit to Fifth Army Headqurrters rnd extending his best wishes for the present campaign. * * * FRBSE 1,TZANO--JA11JUARY 29, l 9M.1---Today General ClArk re!"la ined Pt his command post except for a short trip by jeep to hnve a discussion with GenerPl Welker, Cof'ln°nd.ing the 36th Division , concerning the pror;ress of that oj vision in its rittack. l\.t 1130 General Devers rrrived, conferred 11dth Gener11l Clark Abont t}'ie org1rnization of the ~rnerican forces in the theater Pnd about the rro1sress beiri.c; nr->.de in planning for /\. 'f\iIL rmd OVV:RLOR.D . Throughout the day the General received f'reqmmt r1 essar;es concernin~ the � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, January 1 - 28, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from January 1-January 28, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1565