2 10 16 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/04d0c79ec217dd53a07a86ca40e41a26.pdf?Expires=1787184000&Signature=gdB787g4%7EQfomIcT6T02ix4SqZ6B5rFr93jjv%7E3q65TV5gS9MYTDYDXURQRzc-Tv259yNK1X20Rzo6lt1ZmtUnG4jnHZO9teYA8HeuNErsE-ONvWhdiGLNjXIvwH2WirLHIVPZcILXctuNWbaS7Cgqnqt0VA%7Ej2IWlzm6eohpoPEGN58KaA1HKs-5oo0t%7EEqU8S-YUEU-i9CfKAZHbBw9CUIQpOB02khHR1hjsZFEgPFLVFFRdHHgFHim%7EAnRVGqx2xonySNMqdENYBsKZy%7Eu4TM9HPCTWucuRFKvkLQm889FxV-3%7Ez5MbMgh%7EDUolY9B8fF4615kdCnq7UTV7tNYg__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 03adcc634f09a4535f76ec6eb5c4ffee PDF Text Text lY9 back to his coMP1and post Pt Presenzano, arriving th0re at 1650 .. G8neral Clark this evening cabled General Truscott as follows: RN 7961. "Attack on Cassino took pl2ce today vrit}, all out air effort from 0830 to noon and heavy fighter bonher effort this afternoon. Bonb:i ng appeared to be effective aJ.though tanks hwe not been abl"o to rass through tmm yet because of debris. Attack to take Monastery Hill will he mode tonight. Progress generally satisfactor7 although slower than ant:icipated. TAC R spotted heavy rioter novenents from Frosinone area tovmrd Cassino late this afternoon. 19th is earliest date for your attack. fiill k8ep you advised. 11 The Air Support Control Sectfon reported today on the bombing of our troops by our own planes. Their report may be sUTir:1arized as follows: On the 15th the first bonbs dropped on Allied troops on the Cassino front fell on 0930 hours, and this "friendly11 bombPrdl"'lent continued until 1130 hours. The bonba.rdr1.ent was quite indiscriminate, as the Folisl1 Corps, the New Zealand Corps, tho French EYfPditionary Corrs at Vl'.lnafro anrl. Eighth Army Headquarters in Venafro were all, turn and turn about, the objects of this bombardment. In all, the Polish Corps lost 3 r1en wounded, the Bighth Army Headquarters lost 7 men wounded, the French Expeditionary Corps lost 1 officer and 5 men killed and 52 wounded, the New Zealand Corps lost 11 nen killed, 2 offj cers killed and ?.4 mi:in wounded. l I \ \ l General Juin turned in a separate report for Ue French vfr•ich can not be entirely reconciled wj th tho Air Support Control report. According to General Juin, on the 15th the first bar.bing of the :F'rencb occurred at 1000 when one or two Fortresses dropped B bombs on Macchia d 1 Isornia, causini; no casualties, and tvrelve hombs were dropped on Vemtfro and vicinity, two of wt1ich fell on the 1-1 ills overlooking the cor:1nand post and ten on the town itself. The Venafro bor,,bing caused two sold51;r and q1Jite r-,. few civilian casualties. At 1020 one or tno Fortresses drorred about thirty bombs in the J'ozzillj_ area, killing 4 French, including a battalion cormander, and woundJ ng 34, includj ng two officers. At 1125 about 15 Fortresses bonbed the Volturno valley from Macchia d I Isernia to a point just south of Ven~fro, re,sul ting j n one French soldier killed and eight wounded. The total casualties come to~ killed, including one officer, and 52 wounded, including two officers. GonerF,1 Juin also reported that at Eighth Army Advance CF 10 British 1vere killed and the losses among the civilians at Vena.fro are esttnated at 40 killed and 100 wounded. (The General adds a footnote to his report that on the 16th of March six New Zealand fighter honbers bombed and strafed tl1e Frencl1 at Belvedere and dropped leaflets inviting the Germans to surrender.) * * * FRESENZANO--MARCH 16, 19/i/4--Today the rrincipal subject of interest Y1as the rrog-ress of the attack on Cassino. General Clark received frequent bulletins throughout the day, and in the afternoon nont by j~ep to Sradger 1 s OP where he checked for h·iMsolf tho gains being nade. Irisonr,rs of war indicated that tbe bonbardri.o:nt had caused considerable casualties c.nong the Gernans. One difficulty arose througl, the trouble the attackers had in rJ'etting tanks across borb cratc~rs and throup;h the ruhblo filled streets of the town. One crater had to be bridged by engineers before it could be crossed. Dt:irjng tho course of the �~~~~;~~~.~~6 .:~~~ f=\.ct- ~d°q- ~~·r. ~~·- day, Hill 193 continued in our possession and a relatively sr-a.11 pocket of enemy resistance remained at the southwest corner of Cassino . The unfortunate bor,Mng nistakes continued today. Air Support Control re ports that at lL,15 and 1445 hours on the Belvedere and Belr10nte rol'.ds Allied fighter bonb,.,rs killed 2 and wounded 12 French soldiers . At 1505 hours , be tween San EliP and Cervaro, the Frcncr' sustained another attack by P-40 1 s, but no report of casualties has be?en received. At 1515 rolll~s 6 B-25 ' s borbed thei French Expeditionary Corps and the Nev, Zealand Corps in the region of I ortella and San Micbele, resulting tn th" death of 1 of"'fi_cer l"nd the wounding of 18 enlisted nen o-r the New Zealand Corps. The aircraft engaged in these r,istaken bonbings yesterday and today i:rere of :>any rliff erent types . Yesterday they were reported to be B-17 1 s arid B-24 1 s . Today fighter bombers, P-40 1 s and B-25 1 s were reported to hove caused the damrge. Today a messHge fron Gen3rr.l Truscott j_ndic: tcd that three companies of the Y1ng 1 s own Yorkshire Light Infantry had been captured by the Gerl"'ans, rnd Gonerr.l Clar1r, concerned lest this have sorsc effect on Gener11l Truscott I s attack, sent him the following cable : RN 5534 . "Advise immodietely ,.-rhether or not you plan to Pttack on 19th11 • 0 The follow5ng cablo was received fron General Alexander: RN CGS 289 . 11 CINC considers it ~10st important to take advantage of' the cneny 1 s preoccupation with the attack of new Zealand Corps to lrrnnch the attack from Anzio bridgehead to recover the ground lost in the Carroceto area , plans for which CINC unclerstands have now been fully prepared . Attack hy VI Corrs will therefore be launched at earliest possible date . flease report :'.:'or inforrnPtion of CJHC the general rlan of attack and tl1e date on which jt is rroposed to launch it ." Gerno;ral Clark replied to the above as follows : RN 6538 . "Detailed rlans for attack toward Carroceto were O);.-plaJned to Brigmlier Mani'ering this afternoon . This attack scheduled for Marer 19th and will require extra heavy atr effort on r1arch 18th and JQth. I may n,~cd your assista.nce in getting sor .e strategic 17issions on t}10se days. 11 0 Gen0ral Freyburg directed a r~essage to Gencrel Snvillc congratulatjng him on the aj_r effort on Ce.ssino, but General Clark d~rected Gener;:,l Gruenther to hold this and not allow the original to get out . Other tmportant nessagcs of the day are as follo·.rs : F'Arsonal Truscott to Chirk. RN 1116. 11 Air attack 0700A - 16 plPn~s . Our AA report four probables, minor da1,age . Unfort1mately fjgl1ters hecld back hy ground hRze did not arrj_ve until just aft0r attack. I would apprecfote being 'kept :infornod on Cassino action . First word received here your personal OU 7961 at 213gA . AT" altering r;y plan slightly to r.i~et changing situetion. Will be reacbr to go when you say the ·vord . rr Fror, FLJIJ'lBO to Fiftl- Army. RN CAO 23371. 11 Following pcrsoY1al and secret fror Frj_ne Min~ ster to Gennral Alexa.nder. Fray congratulate all at work et brjdgchead on record fif;Ure cl:i.scharge at Anz5.o 10 Harch. 11 �I ':) l From VI Corps to Fifth Arny. Rr,J 1128 . nMap reference Italy 1 : 25 ,ooo. Attack by 1st Div. night 1/+ March to se izc FOSSO DI C,~RANTE and FOSSO DI FUl\lTOHI (8S6298) as lim"! of rleparture failed with loss of J compenies . Owing to incroaserl Gernan ground organi zation and strength , partjcult'rly along ANZIO road , I do not believe original mhrnion contcr:1plated for 1st Div . is within its capabilities . I have therefore r".odified 'r'\Y rlan for attack as follows: D- Day, an attac:V by /+5th Div . and 1st Div . to seize the line 914320 , 904320 , 891318 , jnclusive to 45th Div., 890298 M 854300 to the ':Test the 5t h , Divis i on will sc:izo the streal"' line to its ,junction at 815311; D plus 1 , 45t h Div. t o extemd the line to the line 9?0333 , 915334 , 908330 , 904320 . 11 0n this line I ,'ill rog-.coup to ma1'::J~ 1 conbat team avaifable to attack wJ t h Harnon to capture l'!J'tCCFIA DEL CASALS (895345) and tr> n C/l.JUWCETO area. , assist ('!d by 45th Div . and perhaps 1 brigade e:roup , 5th Div. I will forward de tai l ed plans later . I anticipate that regrouping "fill require 2 days , but I do not see how sufficient strength can be T'1nde avail able ot}1erwise . I will be prepared to use Harmon eRrlier in tho nvent of unexpe cted success . Part this plan nec essit ates slight nodification in air plan. I will notify Brann of req1J.irer•mts ,Jj thout delay. nr hope your CASSINO attack is making progress . except your radio last night . 11 I lw:110 heard nothing Personal Clark to Truscott . RN 6536 . "Dat e for your att a ck is March 19th. Extr a heavy air effort will bo r,rovidcd on March 18th as well as 19th. Confirm that your attac k will be riade on 19th . 11 "---✓ Personal Clark t o Tr us cott. RN 6537 . "Progr ess in Cassino area today has been s l ow . Tanks are havi n g great diff i cu l ty gettjng througl, c:ity • . Hi l l 435 capt ured . At tack on Monastery Hill will be rosur:i.ed t onight . 11 'rhe A riy Co:"nr,.nder rec~_ ved the f'ollovdne; letter fron Lt . Gen. HPrdjng , r d General Alexander ' s Chief of Staff , on the subject of "Air Bol"bard:r;ent of Land 0b,iectives rreparatory to Assault. 11 "1. Without vraitjng for detaJ.l~d reports , it '!ms c lear frof'l ,;,h/'1t could be seen nf the op"rations in the CASSPrn Brer-i on 15 r,~arch thnt bor:;barc'lnent by heavy and nediur1 bonbers of land ob,i!"lctivcs rreparr,tory to n ssault by land forces offers conslrl ,~rable scop,n, for the f'uture . 11 2 . J t is also cle2r tho t son"' aircraft had difficulty -in recognis:i ng the target as n nUJ"'ber of' bonbs vrere rlrorred :inside th~ bo,.,,bline , Pno son~ 2t 2 consider1:1 ble r•istance fror~ t},,., farget . F'ror1 thl"l roint of view of' th~ lanc1 f'orces, it :is realised th11t sor1c r:istakes are bounc1 to occur and thnt rjslz js accepted . At tre sar,e tir,e it js obviously riost :irirortant fror1 f'"Very point of view to ensure that rwerv l"Jffort ano device is l"1ade use of' to obviate suer l"1istBkes in fut1rre . The C• in- C considers thr1t land forces can be of' c1efinite assistnnc(;) to the t>ir rorces in assistinP" thl'ln to f'ind thl')ir targets . Arti ficial L<rnd r<orks and 1 i ~ht sigrw ls hPve heen snccessfully 11s""d for this purrose on occc1 sions in th"' p=:st , ond. tr!"! use of a. row of colour~d searchlip;hts set out in som~ rrearrrnged r~lntionshi:r to thl") target has bMn suggested for an or~ration o:f' th~ tyre carried out on 1 S Mrirch. L .,____ l! 3• 'T'h~ C-in-C would be G:lrd to 1"now i:1hrt Armfos a11d ~'!ATAF think on t}, is J �question, f'nd on rny other roints connected with coor~ration between ti,_,, tvrn servj ces in s1ich orerations , that nrise out of the attac1{ on CA.3SPJ0. Will you rl~ase for,:roro your vjl'lws as soon rs ro:-;sible. .After r~cc 1 rt of all rerli~s it is rroposed to hold a "1eeting to c'H scuss all roints rut forward. 11 * * * fR.ESE"JZANO- - rTARCF 17, 1944--Th~ rrogr~ss of' th'> rittack on Cassino contj nued ton1:1y ns t}1e ne1:1 Zealand Corrs rushed on through th~ to·rm. ,/\ft~r an ~arly rornjng conf")r,~nc~ ",it:b his CMef rf' Stoff , G-3 and G-2, General Clark re ccj Ve'!<:' f1aj or n-rny, Acting Arny Judge Advoca tc , nho rcviewod ,.,.j th G"'n""ral Clark 25 court 1"1artj_al cases. Jhortly hefor~ noon G"'n~rals Cannon W"rl I l'lT"'nitzcr arrived for a conferem ce zrjtr Generf11 Clark rbout the ai:r situation, and a f"w T'linutes late?r Cren"'ral Mason-MacFBrlane and Colonel '}elson !l!rntfort , his Arericen personal staff of'ficer, nrr~ved . G":n~ral Cl2r1 '.'lnt,,rtairnd ell tr,-, v~sitjr:g officers for 1uncheon. Gen"lrEl ftason-Mac1"arlane spoke cf sonc of tr,e er-barrassY:ents ar5 sjng cut of t'is r""-culiar position. Honinally, th~ nrrd.stice vritl--i Italy was ..,nde by Russia , Engltmrt and the Unitl']d States together, and , accord1ngly, as I res-i de11t of' th" Allied Control Corriission , Gen~ral Mason-Mac:F'arlane acted for nll thr~e countr-i!"!s . Hcw,ever, he had just been scooped by the Russians v1ho had ""ade Rrrang"'·rients to exchange diplor,•atic representA.tion with tJ~e [;overnment of Yinr '\Tittorio El"'Mtmu~le wjt}1out letting General MasonMacFPrlane in on the transaction at all until it h~_d becor:e a fait accor,rlL r Genl"!ral Clarl<: d:i ctated the following naterial for -1nclusion in his diary: The r.,attl~ of Cassino is progressing slowl)r. plans are not l:~:eping up to hj_s tiJ11e sc},ed11le . Freyburg ' s enthusiastic 11 nr witnflssed t11e bor'bardr ent of' Cnssino in coripany vdth Gl"!nerals Eek~r , Devers, Cannon and oth,~r Aj_r Corrs orf-icials. I vrould say t}1at apyroxJn8tely hp,lf of th,-, boT"bs rlid not fj nd the target area. Ferheps 60<:s were in t}1 A prescrjbed area . The oth~r 40°~ fell in tb") f'lats w:i tr1 no damage , in T"IY opinion, to th, eneny. Many bor"bs, on different occasions 8nr'l :in d:ifferent rl;:,ces, vrere dropped on our troops . Rorbardm~nt of cur own troops fron Isernia throui:;h 1J~nafro e.nd-~all c1round Cervaro took :rlace with casualti"s 11.prroxirr:atfo_-:,; 75 1~:illed rmn around 250 r,mmded . This is appalling rnd can be attributed only to roor trainjng end j nwleqmttt"'! briefini:; of crl"!ws. It was a beautiful day, bo!"'b:ing taking rlace fron low altitudes wHh Mount Cairo And Cassino well defim•d . J can not rossi bly un,:'1~rstrnd J-1ovr th~se errors occurred . It hR.s brought forth v:igorous rrotests frorct th" French and oth"lr Headquarters and created a lack of' confj_dence jn our air ar1ong mLr i'ro,1t line troors . 0 nr hev'-" rt'!pe2-tedly told Ti'reyburg frorr: his :incertion of this rlan that .\ a~rial ho~bardn,,.,nt e lone n"ver hR.s and never v·ill drive a deterr.1j ned · enerw fror1 his rosition. Cessino has agein rroven this tJ-,eory, for, altrough no doubt h11.!8VY casuslties 1"Iere inflfoted upon the ene1"1y in Cassino , sufficient I have rl'?rndn~d to hold ur our advance and cause severe fighting in ~e town for th!'! past two days . CJ ~ .~1~(-~ • t.,,f'Vl\,,o() (\»",,, . ~ ' ~ (: o.,a...-1.,v1A.i) / ~ QJ-"\ " ,t.. ~,~...L"{~ ~ A.HrY"'-ir'"":.~ ¾ ~f u~~~ A,,' (fl �l53 \ "Freyburg ' s rrindl·i ri.r; o-r t1'c ~ris 1ing attacl• rps hr--eri. cbl"'re cterized by indecision nnd lacl· of r,ggress::lven"'ss. Fis rlnri t o have t he Indians attack fror. TTill 503 ·dth te.n1rs has !"'ot ,...,r>t,..rialized , due, I 1--i~ljev~, to objections on tbt"! rR.rt of G,..n~ral G:<1.llovray, the Indian Division Co,...,.,.,anrler. In ry conv,..rsat1o11s ,-,; th the l:=itter , I ,-stfr1ptl'} bir, to bl'l a r"'fel1tist . Every ti"'le he sees ri~ he er.1rr;asizes th~ seriousness o+' tb.. +"ighting . I f'f"el, and told r:>reyburg last ni~ht and ngain this riorninr;, that it is essential t1'at he attack thl'l riomistery sir,ultaneously from Hill 5q3 and Hill 435 vrith the Indians . Fe js not ~nclin~d to do it . 1 "The British cr,..,rP ct,..ristic of } oldj "11" ob,i,..ctives gaj n~d Vl!'Jry lightly ras again coT"'e to tre +'ront . I11. th"' case of ~Till 165 just west of Cassino , this was countl'lrattacked by the Gr-,rJ"'ans last nigh~ and wr('!sted frol"'l British con trol. ()rders J,,av, been issul'ld to re-tPk'°' it , b11t tris slovrs ur the yro:;ress . 1 Yesterdnv, not bei'l'lg ::irile to r-et any accurllte inf'orp,rtion as to th~ state of affn.::.rs at th!'! hridr,c over tr~ Rarido on Fi 1s}111u1y //6 , I f"'::rsonaJ.ly 'Vent to thnt ro:i.nt and f'ound tr,-,t only o'l'le tank rad gotten across , ,-;rer'"las rereated reports inr1 4 cated thr~"!, a11d Frevburg ad told Me two squPdrons . Th" brid~e wa 9 unr1"'r hel:'V:V ,.,ortn.r f'ire . I th"ln rmnt to see Freyburg P gain nnd rece-i v~rl tre sitw,tion fron him. I snv,r,estec1 to hir, t're use of Hi.r,hway //6 to riove th"' 78th Divisirrn across by co,..,bnt ten1;1 to r:et riore in-rantry ~ nto the soutr . Fe did 'l'lot lik,.. tris idea . T exrressed to hin r,y dj:,arroint,..,"lnt jn J-d.s not n.ttackinr with tc-nks enc1 infantry fron y,3 in coorrlinf'tion with th~ Incl.fans I attn ck fror, Hcmgman I s Fill. He t0lc1 ne he intenr1ed to rip lre tbe tanlr nttac1(', and I ,mr1erstoocl infrmtrv, +'roT'I 5q3 . Last nir,},t, in trlking with G~neral Gru""nth~r , he contradicted himself . : rrd Grul"'nth.,r rhon~ him back and tel l hin of r,,y disaprointr~nt in not attr-icking .. rom both directio11s . 11 11 Todn:v I bv~ tal1~ed "~th G"'n~rn l F,,.l"Jyburg on ri~my occasions . Arrrrent1:,r G!"lneral Gallo- •f1y, the I'1dian Division Cor""ander , docs not v•nnt to Attack v:i.th J,,is +'ive batt2Uons froM 503 .n.nd th righ c;:round northeast of tlie r1onas tery. T told Freyburg th~ tanks to be errloyed were t t"~rican , and h~ could los~ th"'"' $.l l and I noulrl replace ther1 within ?L,.. hours . I sent BrRnn to see rim . It is now lf->15, Pnd I hf"ve talked vdth hilll nany tjr-,")s sine~ , and he sti11 js opyosed to an attack fron th~ north . He },ores to reinforce tre Indjnns on Eangrnan 1 s Hill tonigrt Pnd nttack towarc1 s th~ Monast"3ry. Durjng the day ,.,e MOVed t1=m1':s And -tn..,antry into the railroad station soutr of Cassino . \ If we can clear tl-•~ srorad:ic resistance out of t ,~ town tr"! situ1"ltion will 4 r.irrove raridl 'T . 1 r "Due to G--neral Ale'-Trnier 1 s cHrl'l c t rleaHn,.,. "Tith Freyhurg and tre fact thnt tM s is an all- British show, J an rf'luctant to e;ive a direct order to Freyhur£s to put the- 78th I'i vision over Route /16 and to attack fror, t}1a north fror 5q3, b")cau se he h::is rr,pMtedly ~ndicn t ec1 thrt h, is orrosed to these rlans . If ht'! were an Arierican Cor ps Cor~mander with Arierican troops I would have no hesitancy in P"iv~ng such an orrler . I have just now t~ler-hon•d to Gt•n1eral Al exander , 11hom T noulr1 nl"!Ver ;:ro to on snch r ovc if it ,•rere not for th~ deHcate ~nt,,.rnntional relations involv"'!d here . I exrlnined the co,.,,rlete s:itm1tion Pncl ,..,,y v 4 "':WS anc1 told r jr, ::: would not issue a dj_rcct order contrar;~ to t.re vie rn of' th~ British Corps a'l'ld Division Co,...,!""Pnders . 1-+e quit e agreeci and did not in any way seen excited Aho11t the siturtion . O 0 l �l5Y "As previously rerortecl in tbl diary, Al\'lxander directed ne again to attack in the br i dg~head to tc1.ke ndvPntage of the conf'nsion in the bridgehead Prea . This had al;eady heen arrang"d for, but toda:r ! ,~et new word fron Truscott that he must alter his rlPns (as indfoat c,d in cable ;/1128 , quoted in yesterday ' s diary) . I have passed th:is word on to G~neral Alexandl":r, cs it ne.y nlter the date of the attack . 11 I hPve hrid quit"! a conference with Generals Cannon and L,~mnitzer toda,y. Cannon nnd. I are in conplete accord with the use of afr to support ground troops . rrruscott has ask"\d f'or a r:lrl:iculous ar1ount of support , totP lling sone 80 groups if Pll targets are cov"lred . :r have decided , in accordance vrith the air CToup , that no strategic should be nscd in sup:rort of ':l'ruscott 1 s lir,itcd objective attack; that it can b"! used r"ucri better on strategic nissions but thrit 1•re will use all the XII Air Su:rrort , reinforc"d by the Dest'lrt Air Force and s 1 1.ch J110d:l.um hol"1b~rs as we have suitable targets for . This will probably Fllt -,r rrruscott I s recoT'lri.endation for an attack, although Alexander agrees with ne completely, Pnd I Rr1 s1.ire v,ill require that we put it on . J 11 The Air Corps are quite upset vrith the rl')sults of their boribing our own troops . f'uring the rast 48 hours l:mndreds of bonbs on at least seven different 1 oc casions have been crorped i.n our own areas with rat1'c-r heavy losses . General ~ Ealrer is takinr; drastic action to fiY th~ resronsibility. , . tt::"., ·~- ~~ nsone decision must soon be nade b:r th~ Co,,,,b~ ned C!-1,:i ef s or. Staff as to ~ A.~,JVIL for it will soon begin to take air sup:rort fror, this critical si tuntion . The lack of coorcljnation and hesitancy on the rart of the hir;h cor"land running t},j s war is dis graceful in ro;r opinion. o1 pivv-~ "The capability of 0lernents of VI Corps to attack beinr; doubtful, Gl;lneral Glarlc cabled General Truscott tnrice to(fay , RN 5534 r-md RH 5537, in an effort to deternine wh,ther or not rlans wer~ r;o:ing ph•1r-,d for the r ttack on tbe 19th as h~rctofore schednled . n 0 :rmportant nessages of t he day are ;:,s f'ollows : Persorn,l Clrrk to Truscott . you plan to attack on 19th . " R"~ 5534 . flAdv!sc :i.r1M,~diately yrhether or not P~rsonal Clnrl- to Truscott . RN 553'7 . "In vi,,.w of vour 11?8 it is not clear ,,}1,..thA:r or not you "TilJ be nhlr, to attac)r March 19th . Arvise 5rnedi ntely." r~rsonal Clar1r to Truscott . Rl'T 5570 . 11 Detailed yl1=ms Pre being rr~rared +>or er1rlor,.ent of f:i~rt~r bor·bers , lir;ht bonbers Pnd ~1l"diur1s in surrort of your D- 1 9ffort starting on March ].'1th . TITo strategic P ir '"'ill be a.wdlable for support of your Pttack . Hor vrill 5t be possible :in future to secure E:3trat Air Force for close support ~xcer,t in <'.;ri'lP.t !'!ner~"!ncy. 11 Personal Truscott to Clark . R~.r 1134. "Ref•~renc,:,, '::SD 536 . I ,·,ill nttack 19 H0rch . Since r-dr sur,..r:5-orHv is the s.;n::;l"' factor thA.t justjfies my attack, I ,·rill require th~ P ir r-; f'fort on 18 r11arch , continuing during attack . 'Sxtr a l,eavv air e:f'fort requfr~d Mar ch 18 , 19 and 20. After regrouping, a p~riod of probably 2 days, extra. heavy A.ir ef for t will proba bl y be required for a n additional 2 days . There is no change in air plan for D l"linus 1 day. Corr ections �I ::>5 for a5r plan D and D plus 1 by radjo tooay. "Am sorry n.hout slO''l rrop:ress of CASSI'TO attack. Hop"! yon are not expecti n[; r,y attnc1: to r Pfect s.; t1..wtion tl "re. I do not believ~ 1t can J-in.ve P."'lY ef'fect on tJ-,P.t ;;i tuction. 11 Detail!"Jd rhirs to you b;,r couri~r today. 11 F.<?rsonnl "'ruscott to Clark. RTJ 1136. "In rerl;r to your 5537, I will be able to attack 19 J'Prch. My 11?8 described chang~ jn plPn whicli A rfMts Briti.sh objectives only. feath1'1r report r~r"' indicates detcriorati..nG weather tomorrovr. Air sureriorit;r single factor tret justi.fies riy attac1r . I will attack if weath~r r,ri•its a:i.r on D-1 and!) days. 11 * * * FlESF: 1 TZANO--MARCH lP:, 104/~--Th~ tvm cntstanding fePtures of t},e day · "'re tr,. conti.nuance or the rittl".c 1e:: on Cassi.no r:nd tre oecision by th'-'l Arr:;y Cor ~;flnrcr to def ,r ,mtjl furtr r :rot:i ce th(~ rro.i cterl attnck by VI Corrs in tre br5clgeh"Jad . 0 Th" P..ttack on Cassino continu~c1 slo" l y, rs rocY.l"\t"' cf' G0rrn,ins in and ri.round th"J to,m rut up desyernte redsta-1ce. Hil11ri3, to tl-,e northvre:-;t of tl ~ to' ;-n a few G_,,rnans cont1 nu~d to holrl c ff cur troops. G"'n,:,rfl 1 Clr>r 10 in tr,.. r-orn-:nrt ,~l"mt hy j<')er to tre 'Tevr Zenhnd Corrs Heaclqmrtcr::: and th<'lnce to U•e 'Tew Zl'\Pland Corps ohsnrvation rost, wh"'r~ rl"! ''TP.s abl~ to vi~w the Cassino hPttle. Th .. r.ionnst ,r:.r i'l still h""ld by the Ger,,,rns. Thfo nfternoon an n.ttenr+: rms r-:ar 1e to r~-surrly sone o-r th(' Indj ans on tl-,.. slop~s A.bove Cassino b;r air, RS y,Pc1:inr RM'7Unition, food n.nd -r:rt"'r ur tr,,.. l1illsjcL unrler fire was rroving inross1ble. The drop \''as only rrrtil'll;r 3uccessful, r-s tre green snok. signa 7 s 11Mcr the Ind~l'nrl should hew, d:i SJ lt1.yed to mprJr tr" srot for the clrop "rere lat":'. Th~ 1'lind ' cnrrie-d !"'rn:r of' the loeds av;py fro1"1 the trcors for whon th("Jy •mre int"'1nred, nnrl, jn son~ --'nstnnces, l~t th~m fall aT'long tre G"rnnns . ' 1 f \ \ In tJ,~ l Ate Pfternoon, General ClPr'k flew by cub rlPne t0 the rond at Caserta Pnd "ent by cA.r to tl1c 3Atb General Fos:r: t11 l vbere h~ took to Lt. Col. T'offitt, Executive Q+'fjcer of th,! Crdnance 0ection, wro was ill 'vith fn"!U1"10nia, TI"''-'1 S thnt 1,,, },,,,c1 been rror-oted to tl--i~ rpn1r of Colonel. Gen~rc1l Clar,,. bnd y,rystin,rdriy ca.bled to ~i.AT0FSA n~ws o 0 the Colonel I s desrerate conditi.on and reCO!"'r>Cnded V1at l-1 ~ be rror-ioted as it r-i.r;rt ')nCOUt'rJfsC rim. 'fovrn of th(" rronotion arriv~d tris r·orning. Gen~ral Clarlr Pound Colonel 1 1of'f'itt with a H gr teN:rereture and E:t t-im"1s c1elirious, but the siclr man vms able to greet th" Army Cnr"'!ander and was delighted -rith the n•,vrs. Unharrily, dnring the evening '"lord ··ms rece-ived thPt Colo>1el r1offitt hacl died . 1 1 G"'n"lrnl c1nr1.r, on :bis return .c>ron t!:is trir, "'1"!t A grour of riiHfory Pttac}-,es to tre Frencrl Ccr,ni ttee of 'rational Li bnrrtion Gov~rnri.•mt mho ,·,ere tourino- the front, accoT1panied by two Frencb of'ficers . Thes'"! ,·,ere: Colo 1el Bula.ndr, Gzecho•3lovakia; Colon0l Colocoetronis, Greece; Lt. Col. F,,,,sen, Jorvra;v; Lt . Col. Forrret, C2nada; :::.,t. Col. Deslo~es, Canada; 1 '.r j. 'lziP.sPno ski, Joland; ~hj. ~onjoie, n,~lr;ium, 1 'eJ. CPyo, rcru; 1 ~nj. A1lcrinnr1 and Ca.rtf,in d"'Croix, Fr~nch accor-ip:inyin1; of'f-i cers. 1 1 \ \ l �l Sfo General Alexnnc1cr arrived at Gen"lral Clark's cor'1nand rost in the late afternoon, rmd GenArol Ch,rk read to h5r, r~rsonally UH': following cable v'hich he ha.d just drafted for t..:i isp=itch to the CPJC: "Truscott , }1as radioed "'~ durj ng the past 48 hours tbat air sup,":riority vras the single factor that justified his attack, thPt he 1·ms forcod to change l1is attaclc plen because the rission assj ~ned the 1st British Division vras not ·ritrin its carability, anc1 that he did not f'eel that an attB ck in the bridrshcad vroulc'l contribute tow2rds the attac1c in +,he GP ssino area . After receiving this inforl7P.tion, togeth,,.,,r vd th anoth0r report :'ro"'l m7 senior Fifth .A.rr,y representative in the bridgehead that scir e cor,1r,am1ers and staff o.c>fic'."rs of VI Corps ,,_,ere not rappy about the attack, I sent Gen'3ri:tl Brann, ny G-3, this r,orning to cJjscuss the attack with Truscott. Truscott rocor -r1ends cancellation of th~ rrorosed li1:1it".'!d objective c1ttack based on the follo1rring 1r.nown f11cts: (a) The attacl' will noct aprro~"irately equal eneny str~ngtr in well rrcrared ros:i tions, a'igmented by mines and vrire (b) Thrat ~neny artillPr:r is appro"'.:i1;1atcly equal to th:cit of the VI Corps with I superj or observation ( c) That tho anount of air availahle fror the XII Air 1 Support Cor1r.Pnd , a 1 1gnented only by certain nediun bo,.,1bcrs is not sufficient I to create thei overwheln1ing air support he bcJJ,w0s necessary for the success \ of this attack (d) '7ithout such an ov"1r :rhelning air Attack the odds Pre against a successful acconplishr1ent of the planned attack (o) That trc attack TTould be extremely costly in personnel and r,ight r-:Jsult in a suitDble opportunity for an enemy count~r offensiv~ . In this connection losses in British troops can not bn 1:1ad~ ,g;ood (f) After thf') rroposed l:imit""'d objective bas been reached, ener1y :3ffecVve fire can still be yleced throughout the entire brid.-i;ebead. 1 ~ 0 0 1 11 I concur in Truscott 1 s co>1clu.-,ions. ::r Fould }1ave cance 7~ led the attack irnediat':lly had it not been for th~ :instructions contained in your radio CGS 2~9. I, tJ,3refor"l, recoro"~!"lnd th?t the attB ck scheduled f'or to:norrovr b"" Jostroned until aft<:;r t0e 2rriw1l of th~ 34th Division Pnd a re-study of the enemy situation at thPt timJ. n General Clrrv dictrct"'.!d the follo-rrinr; not?.s for inclusion -in }7iS diary: "'Sl'l,rly =orning r"lrorts f'ror 1 Freyburg indicated that little or no rrogress was hein"' n,de . In fact, slt,lwtion 0f Indian battalion on Fangr1an I s Fill ' secried rr'3CRrious clue to lack of supply. I ,·1,:mt forwBrd to see Freyhurg and again 11rFscd 1--iin to "lrrploy !"'ore troops in GPssino. re w;:is cor1i:ng to the decision at that ti"1A to rut the 5th Brigade ovr,r Route !/6 into t},'" town. I urged haste but have little assurance that speed will be usep_. I Pgein pointed out the d~sirability of pushing a brjgade of the 78th Division over the railroad bridge past th2 r,ilroad stAtion ov~r the Gari River to get a briilg"'head to perr;it tanks to follow . I tl~ink I r-!ade sop~ progress along t:-;ese lin'3s . Tliscus.sed w:i.th General Gallo Nay, Con:"!Bnding Q,~neral of the Indian Division, tho use of t11nks fron CPiro 2593. He hopes to do th0t first thing in the rmrning . Arranp;9d, at Ga.110,-:ay' s insistance and Freyburg 1 s request, tc, dror suprlics by planes on Hangnan 1 s Hill Uis afternoon. Frcyburg is not P.ggressive; is ponderous a:rd slow . I net Alexanc'lcr on "'Y ',ray bac 1{, revievred tbe situetion with hirr, told bim of riy diffj culty in ordering a Hew Zealand Connander to er;rploy British troops in a nanner he did not like and urged Alexander, when reapproved of' r,y sugg0stions, to rrod Fre7burg a little into sone ACM on. He said he would do so and was quite disP.ppointed at th: slowness of his a.ction. Alexander feels as :::: do thPt tJ-,c ,many is waiting to see ..,}-,pt, rre do before counterattackinr; or rulling back . Vii th r~gc1rd to thP- Ptt8 ck torriorrow in the 1 I \ �bri,1(-;ehead for a lir-dted ob,i~cti ve, I rointed out to Alexander, who is riost pnxious thet tbis attacl· take rlPce, that it had certain drawbe.cks as follows: (a) It nould not talre any fire of'f of tho rear ereas or the rort (b) It was ae;a in:~t a strongly defended rosi tfon ·;ri th 11.t least equal Gcrnan tr0ors orrosinG; us (c) The G'}rr an had sll the observation, 1111.d we attacked over cren terrain (d) The casualties we r'if;ht suffer would be quite a sctbacl< to us in vfow of the difficulty of securing British rcinforcem~nts, and we can ill afford to take heavy casualtfos a.t this tir1c . Of course the advantages nrrJ rolitical, and Alexancer "'."~eels th2t it night offset another Ger:rian attack . Anoth0r edvantage is thPt v,e do secure a little nor,., fRvorabL~ tGrrain ay,d give ourselves a littl<; ,..,,ore roan, if svccessful , in the bridgehead. In viPW of '17ruscott 1 s radio ton~ yesterde;r th2t the 1st British Division , due to recent losses, (including thTee conranfos cartured) was incarable of offensive action and that the only reason he was justified in naking the attack rms duo to our great air f'lffort . I sent General Brann to see rj_'TI today to get his real thoughts on th~ subject . As soon as he returns I will decide ,,rh~tl1~r I will rake the attack or recorr1end to Genoral Alexsnder thPt it hf"J rostroned until the 34th Division ,;ets in. Due to the inability of the 1st British Division to attnck, it mePns tlwt the Rttack will he r'1adfl by Anerican troops, wr,jch arrarently the British are rerfectly willing to do . I must see tb:it "'C r;et targible returns for the nen I en Hable to expend in this limited effort . Alexander indicRted to nn that he was :rositive tJ,,at it rmst be done. 11 1 7996. Genl"lrri.l Glarl,. this afternoon cabled General Truscott as follows: "Yoll.r attack for 19th cancellr-id. Will see you soon. 11 RN 'T'hc following cablA was received froP NJ\TC\USA today: RN 66275. 11 Nar Dr.•n,artr1 ent ('ecision is to retain Ranger battalions. Sep2rE1te action this l eadquarters will transfer first, third and fourth Ranger Battalions to the United States with veteran pArsonnnl only (137 enlisted nen and 19 officers listed your 534 7, r'arcr 10, 1041,) . Transfer non-veteran p~rsonnel of these battalions to 1st Spccj_al Service Force . n 1 * * * FRESENZANO--P1A,.1i.CH 19, 1Q44--This r1orning General Clark left by cub at 0900 for' the beachhead . .Acco.,.1panying hin j_n the second cub was Lt . Col. Draper of the Artill'"ry Section . The General reacr1Rd t1-1c beac}1 h0ad at ar,rrmdnPtcly 1015A and irm-iediatcly went to GonAral Truscott I s headqur~rters vrhere hr~ conferred with rin about the beacl1hcad situation. He read to Generals Truscott and F.ve,legh r~rsonally the draft cable to GennrA 1 Alexander, riuoted in yesterday ' s diary, and they botr heartily concurred . Tr,~ Jtrny Corn"'andcr nade only a short stay at the beachhead , however, and left on 'ii s return trip a few rij_rmtes rifter l?OO, flrriving Rt the Fifth Arr:y cor.nnnd post at 1315 . The G·~neral thsn went into conference ,,,~th Gern;rAl Gruenthnr on the ste. tus of the CRssi110 attack . The G~rnons had twice counter-attacked on Hill 1q3 , their attacks hejng cst:iT1a.ted to have been by as rany as 300 ~en . The Gerrian pocket :In t}1e southwcstGrn corner of the tmm sti.11 contjnues to give trouble . Two Gernan tanks haVt9 taken up positions j_n "rhrt was the lobby of the Hotel Continental. By the close of the day a Brj tish tank had 1rnockcd out one of the Gl"rnan tenlrn, but t'rie otl~0r one continued to fire fron the �l'.JT"battled lobby. At 1500 General Frcyberg arriv,)d to discuss the difficulties }se was exrerhmcing in his Cassino attack. To add to his m,berrass•,"lnts , an apmmition durap on Route #6, ,:hicr had accidentally taken fire, began to blow up just as he rassed it on his WAY to tr,e cor·1r1and rost, and the rest of the afternoon v1as punctuated by the sound of n:xrlodinr, shells . At 1515 Generals AlexA.nr'1er, Hardj_ng nnd Lormitzer arri vod and joined G;~nerals Clark, Grucnth,-,r and Freyberg in tho hut in a discussion of the Cassino situntion 1:p1d "•'hPt shoulc'l ½e done to ridvance the attack tb,,re . The British officers left with G,rn~ral Lermitzer at about 1700 , end General Cli:irk left by auto,,,obile for Sorrento wl1ere he dinAd with friends at the Cfficers 1 Rest Center and returned after dinner to his cor1nand rost . General Gruentrnr sent the following two he 17as f'..'t the beacrihead : RN 6562. hill 165. 11 CP bles to G!-'3neral Clrrk nM.le "Attack fron HanP,nan I s Hill has not started yl'lt. Ener'y holds R~J 6563. HGr'lncral r'reyburg has ash~d to cone and see you tris efternoon to discuss present attack." * * * FRBSENZAl'JO--rnJIRCH :?O, 1944--This :morninr.; the funornl of Colonel Moffitt, Bxecutive Officer of the Ordrn=nce Section, wAs held in th~ Aneric:m military cenet~r~r in Naples. As General Clark had conferences scheduled whic0 could not be :rostpon8d, lie directed Lt. Col. SutherJPnd to r~present him at the funerPl. This was done, :=ind a lari;;e wre!"th wr:>s plAced on the p;rPve from GemerPl Clark. At llOO Generel Clark received a call from General Saville, Comrnnding At this conference it wfls a gr Md thi-i t the XII Air Support Col"w1and couJ.d rlevotA itself to destroyinR ene"l;T comr1unicAtions, srive for 11n occasiona 1 mmber of sorties ( supposed to be 96) reserved for support of ground troops • XII Air Surrort Col"lFm no. .Pt 1130 General Mccreery called on Gen('}rr-1 ClRrk to dj scuss the rroblens involved in the regrouping of the Fifth Arny and the withdrnwal from their present sector of 10 Corps. Cartnin H:i_lbert, u. S. Navy, CB.me to lunch. He had recently COTae from the United StAtes , where he hnd seen r.itrs. ClRrk. At 1600 Colonel Brfan, Inspector Genl'lral of II Corps, arrtved 11.nd discussed with Genc'JrAl Cbr:k the op-'~rrtions of 16 Decer~ber before San Pietro which he WPS investigatin~ for II Corps. General Clark hfld been rresent on thot day And observed the T".lovement of :forirr...,rd rlatoons of the bptfolion vrhich hBd just been emgav,ed in tpe AttRck on San Pif>tro. At 1630 hours Lt. Gen. Burro,rn, British Arny, called to see Gimeral Clark. Fe is on hiA v-rny to Ru~sia to heAd the Br:itisP Mission there And discussed the 'Russian sjtul'l.tion very inter,.,stingly. He eAi,ressed the op:inion thr-t the f'i~htini:; on the Russian :front WPS nlr-ost non-existe1mt Pnd thrt the Gernr-,ns were ,yj t'.bdrawinP- voluntnrily. '!'oclF.y Genc,ral Cli-irk 8pproved a recor,,r,~nc'lf,tion of Colonel Rob:inson, Fifth �ftrriy .A.ntirdrcrnft Officer, for thr; followinr:; chnnges in antiBircreft officers: Colonel Rob:5.nson to replricl"l General Tovmsend with the French ExredJtj_onr->ry Corps, Gen~rnl Townsend to rer ln c ~ Gen•"'l'.l"P l BrRdsrr-,w v;j tr the '35th AI\A Brj r;rde And GenA.rl'1.1 BradshR.''l to rey,lrice Colonel RoMnson A.s Fift}, ArPly Antiri ircrPft 0fficer . Important messPges of the day ore as follo YS: 1 r ersonal ClPrk to Truscott. RN 56//1 . "Sjtu..,tion in C11ssino continues to he ,Hfficnlt . Enery a:rpeers to have been rejnforced. Heavy enemy shelling on tovm todny. · Our troops still occupy reilror,d stf>tion, Hill 435 and Hill 1Q3 . Rnen:v occupies hill 165 1md strong roints on southwest side of tm"n. Surplies dropped successfully by 11ir todny for troops on hill 435. nur t:cmk attack from hill 5q3 yesterrl.a;r was unsuccessful. n Personn1 Clar1-: to Saville . RN 5651. "New 7,ealrmd Corrs reports thPt supply drop for troops in area of hill 435 today constitut~d a model of perf~ction . T'lease nccer,t r,y sincere thanks for tM_s outstr-inding achievenent. n Pe:rsonnl Clark to 'T'ruscott . RlJ 5617. 11 MP1rirjp control officers 1,rho hr>ve visited ~nz5 o repo:rt thr,t it shouln not be necessr-ry to strirt 11tr-ibrinA br:iforc April 15th . Arr,y Surw,eon ,,,ill visit you on MPrch ?1st or 22nd. If rfter your conference vdtr him you ,3till deslre to stort atabr-'ine on t'lPrch ?5th you are p11thorize0 to start on that date . J h1'1.ve ::irr::,nr;ed tlwt r:osqnito net,s, he~:i_d nets and insect repellf:lnt 1'!ill be r,M_pped to bridf;eherid within next fevr dPys. ff From AAI to Fifth P.nd Eighth Arr:,y Conmr>nders - R1,T CGS300. 11 The slow proPTess rnrir!e so fpr jn clearint; the to1·rn of Crissino wjtJ1 t}1e consequent delriy in buncM_nP" the rittnck on the monPster1 r cor1bin0.d wj_th the necessity for prernr5 ng the PV'Xi:rur, forces for ri fnll scri le of'fensj-ve in the second ki lf of' Aprj 1 □Rkes j_t essential to decide in the course or the next '?4 or J6 hours wheth,,.,r (a) to continue wi tr the CP ssino operr,tfon in the hope of cPrturfog \/ the r'!onristerv durjnp; the nf')xt three or f'ou.t' dr,vs or (b) to CPll th") Of?:rr-,tion l off f1nd to consolidrite "1UCh g2ins of p,round as Pre import1:1nt for the renewrl of the of'fensive later . It is rilso necesm:ir;v to decide when Ei~}lth ~rr;v is to tA.ke over resr,onsiM.li ty for or,er8tions on the Cr-i ssino front nnd when Hq. NZ Corp<; is tn be dissolvl"ld r-ind replaced by Hq. 13 Corps. In the C-in-C 's view Eighth l\rrw Pnd 13 Corps should Pssume responsibUity for the CPssino front as soon ns th0 monnster;tr has been captur~<l r-mo consolidPted or P ltArnf'tively ininediately it is decided t o cPll off the present offensjve but h"3 wishes to dis cuss this point with Arn,;,r ComnAnders before rea.ching A fi nal dec ision. Consequently C- in- C hl'l.S dec1_ded to hold A neeting of Army ConMPnders at Hq. Fif'th Arny At 1530 hours 21 March . He wishes GenerRl Ti're;rberg to be rrMcnt to give a det1=dled rrJport on the situf'tion on th<o Cassino front. As decisions regarcUnP, the r;rounrl to be consolidated w:Ul dfrectly affect tb~ future opP-raMons of' E:5-ghth Arr1 y, C-in-C vd sh~s Co,..,nrmder ~j_ghth .~rny to be prerrred to give his views on tbr-t point in the hro possible crses rYmtfoned under (a) and (b) l'lbove. In that connection Coml""nnder E:i.ghth Arny r,,ny, jf be ,,rish"'ls, bring Conn<>nr1 er 13 Corps to th~ r10etine:. Ac1rnovrledge. 11 �FRgSEHZArsrn--MARCH 21, 1944--General Clrirk left his CO"'l.r1Pnd rost this r1orning at 0910 by ieep, tl'lkinr; with hh:1 Lt. Col. Drrrper whor1 h~ hns selccted to be his senior e ide upon th1' deprirture of Lt. Col. Sutherbnd. Tho General went directl:v to the New 'Zealnnd Corps observation post wrere ho met General Freyberig an<l his division conT'!Pnders, Gencrlr.i rrirkinson, Kei1shtfoy nnd GRllmvc1y. Gen".'lral CJ.rirk asked the Corps and Division ComrnPnde:rs to i;ive their impressions of the present state o-1" the battle at CA.ssino. GenerPl Freyberg sio.id th,,.t in his opinion, based on his battle ~x.rerience to datt'l, especially in Tunisia, where !'l'lountA.inous terrnin was hr:ild by the Boche, one hBd to fight ) for one's ob .j ect:i.ve, And it WA.s us~m~l:v slow going. He was not -~ssimistic about the eventui:i.l outcome and def1n1t!"!ly stated th:,,t he ;,ms not J_n fnvor of call:irni; of'f the Attn.ck. A short discussion of the existence of a tunnel used bv the (}erT'lans indicAted thnt GenerP,l Fre7berP, -mrA.s not too faMiliar w:l th its existence. However, Division Corir1Pnder8 hrid hePrd of the wherenbouts of r:1 tunnel, which vms eln.borated upon bv Brir;A.dicr (Juer~,e, who stated thPt from prison~r rerorts h~ felt thi:>t its existence was mRinly legt!'lndary and thPt the Boch.-, did hnve, undoubtedlv, n"ltworks of s:r1.r,ller tunnels but nothing BS gr~at in len~i;,h as the one M" rk;d on General Glrirk' s photo. G~neral Clarlr P sk<"ld General Gn,llov'nY to pr,j_ve him an estirl',te of how 1"'lany bri.~l'ldes would be n~cessary to rush forward froT"! Hanf;!1P n I s Hill on th"- Monastery to seize that ob,iective. Gen~ral Cl11-rk Pt the time stated that he did not have the r<"linf'orcenents to do it, but he was curious to have Gener['!l Grillm11a71 s est4,.,r,te of how rir,ny [1oditionA.l troops would be n'."~Cessar:1.r to rush forvmrd. Ge'Yl,,,rrrl G.9JJ_01.7r,_y estiry,ted thrM brj fV1des. Th~ group of r;~nerals f:1 nally S".lpr'rf-'t~d into a few sr1Pller groups and ciscuss"':!d w 4 th eri.ch oth"lr their -riarticulRr front. GenerR.l ClPrk r,ov(')d fror:1 on~ C'roup to another li st"'nin1;, and on sone occR.sions P skin0' nertin~nt t1Ue8tions as to conditions und~r thl'lir personal co.,,.,,..,~_ nd. G~n~rPl Clrir'l!: m:mpA.rod the New ZeolP.nders and the Boche to two heA~rr,reight fir~hters in the ring, both ~o-;g;r, with edth"!r one in a position to lmoclc out the oth,-,,r. · Genern.l Freyh~rg irnriediPt"!ly reacted to this ancl sr-i.id thRt he nj dn 1t consider th~,t his troops -rrere f:'"I'ogiz:r y~t flnd thPt in his opinion the attack should continue; that the present sitmition di(l not seen hop1>3less to him in the least. Gent':ral Cln.rk left the !\Tew ~e11.land OP and, P c~oripanied by Lt. Col. Drarer, proceeded to tre vicinity of' the bridge at Cassino to l';"'t a close viewv of cond:itions in the to''m. The Ger"1,-ins were sh"lling thl'l brid1;e 1uite heavily and its A'1Virons. lifter about 15 "1inutes G,m~rnl Cbr'k n.nd Colonel DrRrer returned to the Fifth Ar'ly CP. A conf"'lr~nce hr-id b~en CE'.ll•'!d today b;r Gen,~ral A.lexr,rn'1er, P s e.nnounced in Cable CGS 300, to be h'\ld at the Fifth llrrw C0"'11"\And post, to deterr1in"l v•hether the attack on Cassino .••.nr the ;1onasterv should be continued or ebrmdon':'ld because of' the strong Gcrl"lnn oprosition 17.ct vdth. At l1mch today General ClPrk entertain~d Gc:n'"rP 1 Juin, Gen';ral Carncnti l'lr and Colonel Kar~ncr~r :in order to hRve A. chance before th!':! confer~nce to obtain th.,, v:i ':'lWS of Genor2.l Juin ::,bout thP- Cassino opcrrttion And its effect on the r"l~ li"lf of' the 3rd DIA. In a short tl1lk before 11mch, GeneirPl Cl;:,rl· nskAd General .Tuin to state frnnkl~r his :i neas on this snb_j,.,ct. Generri 1 Juin said thP.t in his _judr;1c1Ant the attack on Cassino WP. s rrovint; too costly and should be dropped �\ Gl I and in its stead a mP.neuver to the south of Crissino cihnuld be c~1 rr1n-d out PS soon as the Fifth Arn:r had occunied its n~w sector. In this we.y, GenAral Juin s~dil, the r(mt"'s bv whkh CA.s8ino is supplfod c ould be cut off rind the to,m c0uld be starved out . Generril Glr.r1r then said t½"t in his estimntion it wr-i,s quite likely thrit if tJ1 ,~ attack on Cnssino shoulcl be rlropped the Bri= tish would ask thrit the 3rd DU. r"')riHin in th~ l:i.ne instear1 of beinr; relieved 11.nd cor1e 1mder co-r"!rnand of' the '8i~hth Arny instl'JPd of the Fifth. Generri.l Juin <>t once th"t h"'! should rl'lfuse to serve under those circur1stri.nces ~nn th1:1t in his estiMPtion it ·•m.s i_nperPtive thn.t tl-i.e '3rc1 DIA be relieved 11t the ea.rliest possibl e mom~nt. GenP.rri.1 Juin arlcl"ld thrt nriturP.lly if it wns a case of h~lpinr; out with the services of I'!. T1ivision for A short tim~, J,-, 1"oul0 be thorom;hly coop"'lrri.tive, n°--id h~ reriliz~d thnt :i.f the Cassino atfa,clr ·1ere PbPndonc d the reli"'f of tl1"' 3rd DJA must be rlefcrr<'ld for A. rcncionr>ble time; but he had served under Gen~ral Anrlerson in the F"rst Arny in Tunisin nnd did not vrPnt tc hnve his Cory,s cut up and pnt o"' :.tt s~rve under the British F,j_ghth Ar,..iy in this therrter. General ClPrk snir thrt h~ was 1:;ratifi"ld to het1r this on inion of GenerRl Juin ' s; thPt h'?. had invited Gen~rRl Juin in order to obtain his ir'leas on th~ s11b,iect and th,-,t they were exrctly the se.:1e n.s his o"m Dnd thPt hi<, proposed to insist ''dth Gen~rnl Alexri.nder that the 3rd DIA be relieved, and thet it remin part of the ?ifth Arr-1y. I I Follo1Jvin»: lunch, the Fr"!nc}, officers Pnd Colonel Ka·1rierer left for their co,.,rirmd post, and the officers C811Ad for the conference gradunllY Psser,bled. GenerPl i\.leXA"lrler Prriverl r>t 1550 . There ,·,ere r-1rcsent b(':lsides Gen0r'11 Alex.,nder, General Clark, GenerPl T,~ese, Cornr-mndjn,<; the Eighth Arr,y, Gent'lrPl Herding, General ti'reyber1;, General Gruenthl"lr, GenerPl Lemnitzer, Gen~rrl i"alsh (Chj_ef of Staff of GenerP 1 Leese), GenerA.l Kir 1<:man, General Tate nnd General Bra nn . At Genert1.l Uexrmrler 1 s request, Generr>l Prcyberg stated his r,rASl'.'lnt situ11tion . He said that he had six bA.ttri.lJ.ons of the New Zeri l<Jnd D:ivision in Cassino tovm . The rpj_lror>d station vms actually held by the 78th Divi 9 ion. Resistance, hO''.Tever, WPS continuini:; at the westerly edge of the town, and Pt the cliff free be~rond it. The;r hnve trdrnn fror, 200 to 300 rr:isomrs out of the town, and Gen0rP.l Freyber1; thinks thrit they "lust be gainine-r, access to their positions by tunnels . The comnanding officer of the bntt2lion now attecking the Conti n"'lntal Hotel says th2t ho can not R,'Ul"_ rrintee th"t he will hnve th".l hotel toni!t!'ht or tnriorrow niF,ht, but fAels ver~r hop~ful of taking it. The New ZealP.nd Corps ha s thus far h,,d 1400 casuAlti~s. Yesterd0.y th,n,:,r had 120 casueltfos j_n six brittelions, 1. hich Genern.l Freyberg did not constcler large . General 1 Alexander re"'lnrk!!ld thrit jf' we CAn k~ep pic'ldng at the eneny for 24 or 48 hours he T"W -v co llapsA, "rhr,reupon Gener;, 1 Freyberi; stated tlv1-t the Boche was becoming short of food and "'"' s in a v~rv diff'ic11lt -position. Generri.1 Clr,rk then st11ted tho.t h8 hn0 felt discourne;cd this rnornini:; ~mtil hn talked to General Freyberg' s officers on his visit in the Cri.ssino aree. . l\fow he hns becoMe encouraged and said thnt h'3 -reels thi-i.t no 0ecision should be mane today to -rull out. GAnerAl Leese stated thnt he wrs or thA sry•e wriv of' thinking. Gen"lral AleXRrider then said thnt he felt thrt jt, ~ws unw·i se to call the attack off toc18y. He felt that thP, situr,tion should be reviewed PJVery '24 hours in order to permit a decision on thAt snbj'l)ct to be made. Gen~rP..l Freyberg then said that he "rould 1rno'7 by 1000 tomorro•rr whPt his siturition "'-'ns, flnd GenerAl ClPrk sPid thP.t after he hPd ta.11<ed wi.th Gen~rRl 4'reyberg in the r1orn1nr: h"l would tf'llephone GcnnrPl Alexonder . GenerA.l J\lP.XRnder then rois~rl tbA 1_11".lstion of' t 11e relief of the 3rd DIA which Gl:"lnerAl Clri.rk h;id discussed r,t lunch witJ-; GenGrt1.l Juin, r>nd, ri.s he.d I I �been pr~clict~d, r1~ntioncd the difficulties of' 0~ett 4 n1; thcr, out. Gen9rPl Clar1c innedfotely stressed the length of ti "'1 e thPt the French hr>d been in the line r 1.d the ir,n,Cr"ltive necessity thPt they be relieved nt tbc ePrlie st po,rnjble nor-ient. G~nernl 1\loxanrler was "'lvirl~ntlv imrressed with this view, r,no st;:,ted thr>t h0 would fr1,.,edint"!!ly tPke up tho question of f:indin1; sone Division which would be used to relieve the Fremch. Gcnerr,l Leese undertook to studv the qu"'!stion nt once. 11 There was then sorie discnssio11. of air supnort as the Cri ssino oper..,tion pro.gressed Pnd of the continued dropping of suppEes. GenerP l ClPrk sent for Genernl SPvill~ rind, followin~ th0 0 cr"rture of Genr)rn1 AlexPnder, G")n~rals Snville, Cl..,r1,::, Gru8ntr'1r P 1d Brann di scusscd nt so"lc length the n0cessarr A-ir support for the continu0nce of the Cn.ssino or8ration. 1 General S,ciyille then left i'nd GenerA.1 Clnrk at once notified General .Juin thnt the nttnck on C,?ssino wri.s to continw, subject to ra r"lvi-:m tomorrrn"T. Barl; r;r in t},e afternoon, durinl his !Y'nversntion ?jth Q;-morol .Juin, Gr:meral Clrirk ni':'lntj oned to him th~ fr.ct thr, t he wr, s r:i v; ng serious conversP tion to us:i.ng two of the thrAe c0nhPt tew1 s of th~ 3L;th Division to join in the ".lttaclr on Monaster7 Hill fron Hill 591 because tht'.l troop:~ of the IndiRn Divj_sion n.ppoared to him to be lackin~ in dash and jnj_tfative. 1 The fo11owim; cs.ble WP.s received toda;r frors Gr:m8ral D~vers: RrJ 67311. l11'ThRt j s vonr estimnte of Brig. Gen. Raynond S. McL9.in, 45 Division, rts nble prospective Division Co'7m1nder for OVF:RLnH.D? On"l VTP;T or nnoth<"Jr '7ashin2;ton has received very fA.vorablc r3ports r<"JgArdins hj,.,, but not5 ced he was not given the Ii-5th Division on }.'iic'kl1Aton 1 s withdrawnl. 11 General Clark today received the fo1lo"7ino; llT'preci;:-,tion of the enemy situntion in Co.ssino fro~,, Brigadier A:irey, G"!lncrel Alexander's B.G.S. (I): "l. The cnermv hRs so far left the defr:mce of thl"l CASSPTO nreP to 1 }lara Div. 3 Para Rer,t is responsjbl:'l for th"'l defence of' tho town and MonPsterv reinforced hy the Pi,ra M.G. Bn, th"3 Fern A/Tk Bn, I Bn l Prora Regt and II/:U5 G.R., i.e. a totPl of seven bns (but the M.G. ,,nd ~/T1( Bns were probably rath0r under strength at th~ tiMo tre battle began). 4 Para Regt ls hold511.~ f'urther West hut S"1e:1s to hnve sent its II Bn to tho assistance of 3 Regt. It should be noted that th0re hns been onl;r one SJ"rill inf re~nforcerient (i.e. II Bn 115 a r~hAsh of II Bn 129) and that this wr1s not sent from re servo, but 111,,rely sidestop:red frol"1 South of the LIRI where no at ts ck was ta1dng r,lace. 11 2. 'l'he SUC'~ests that base his reRl latter vlith a fEtct thnt the i")neny hRs not sent r 11y furthm~ re:inforcen~nts he int•~nded only to rlela~r as long 2 s possible in CASSINO and oefence on the AIOLF PITL1i;R Line. He has probably r~£Jnn~d the fornPtion brought up from the 14 Arry area. 3. Th8 prrncbuti~1ts hr.vti defrmded and count:1r-attackec'l w~ry stubbornly but ti,ere i::i s<r~ evidence thEtt tr>ey are i'.;'TO"ring wc11k,r. Alread~r by 10 March cnsualties in CASSrTn WAre reported as 11 very hir;h 11 • On ?O March one Gov was reduced to one officer r>nd thirty !"len and another to ten ncn with on~ LMG A.nd three tom.my-!;1._ms withont 8.l"iT"!tmj_tion li,s:kimr, for snake-cover and 11 �perrd.ssion to withdraw. Th11 G~rrrPns were b,~ginninr; on 20 I1JPrch to tiilce 11, pessiT11~_stic viewr of the situ-"tion as the tanks were reducing thedr strong points on~ by one. (They stil1 think, hovrnver, thet they hold Pt •• 193). ). tt 4. The course of events seer:1s to be thFLt when tl1e attack stPrted the ene"'1;7 were prepared to give up CASSIN() after a '.'ltubborn resist.<mce and 11dthdraw to the ADOL't'i" HTTLSR line; when tlv=iy S8"1 their defence was being '!'lore successful thnn they :first expectecl they decided to hang on and trv to restore the situntion by local counter-attAck, and thrct no,rr they Pre h1mging on in th,:; hope throt we '7ill ~i,,e up first. In spite of its fierce resjstnnce and outstandini~ tou!Shness, 1 Para Div is certrdnl:r now ,,cry ,reduced in strength and must be r;ettin1; tired. Th~y cannot be exp0cted to continue indefinitely· if we go on dev"'lloping the strength of our thr~e availabb divisions against then in thoir pres,"lnt state. "It is true thRt they are now receiving r1ore arty and ..,,ortar surrort than before, but this c~m only be Vl"lry s'"1all co17pared with our large resources both in runs and armrunition. 5. In cimclusion, tri(iref'ore, I feel thrt nssm'ling 1rrc continue to ntta.ck with the suynrior resources 1,,liich n.re awdlBblt':J to us, the Gerr0 n.n 1 Para Div is fe,cing the a1tcrmtive of n.~struction or ,_,r:ithdrai:<ml. 'Ve hP ve alre'ldV sho'm that (up to last ni~ht at lenst) there vras no indication of it beinr: reinforced and the enemy can hnrdl:,r brJ expected to allow his best di,rjsion to be~ dAstroyed and at tho SD''le tj ,.,c los,~ the position. On the other hand it must nlso be re!"'e""lbered thE't the enen;r rill be quick to take advnntai;e of n.ny s111;11 of "maknAss on 01ll' part in order to regrdn the initiAtive." 0 * * PR8,SF.'TZA]'.m--MlL'lC:R 22, 1941~--/\.t ocno tl1is norninr;, 11.fter ta1dng CA.re of urgent ad,..,inir:itrntive "'!2tters, General Clark, 1:1.ccomprnicd by Lt. Col. Draper, ,;rent for,wrd to the ?1st Tl!ew Zeeland Battalion Rear CP nbout 1,000 yards south of Cassino bridr,e. Visibility vms poor, due to nist <>nd Rr1oke. The f.Prty th<m proc1'eded to the co1'1r1ri,nd rost of' the 5th ~Jei,r Zealand Brigade, nnd GenerA.1 Clark discussed the Cassino situetion with BrigRd:ter Burrows. A. Gerrian t Hnk, intAct w7th crew, W,9,S found in the rubbl"-l of Cassino, r,uch to the forward ell"lr,cnts 1 Rrtrprisc,. It 'l'T!"S tnken 1mcler fire n.nd destroyed. The s:itu;-,tion in tho town was not definitely h-no•m, so the Gen0rel nnd his y,nrty :r1ov'9d to the 2nd 1'Jew Zealana. Division OP north of' Ccriraro '"Ihere the situPtion was discussed with General Parkinson, Co"'ln.and:ing the ::>nd New ZePland Division. G~neral Fnrkinson thought it best to continue the attn ck 2s planned for Rround noon tbat day. The JX:1 rtY then proceeded to G"'lneral Fre;1rburg 1 s Cori1"'1.ond fast , 11 Pre General Clark 1.unchAd H:1d discussed continuance of th~ ntti:rnlc. At 1?45 our artiller:,r opened up ,y-ith a violent bri1:;f µ.rt':rmration. .C3hortly thr.;rePfter ene111y l'jr A,Fr,eared over our rear areas. Our l"ntHnrcraft rencted i"J.Modfa_tel~r end sent up hcnrr f:ire. One Ger""'an r~lPnc r,rn.s seen p;oinr; d0 m. LPter, it wP·S reported thPt seven or ("!i ri;ht enemy rlanes were destroved. 1 General Clrrk And Lt. Col. Draper then return~a to tJ,e Fifth Amy Coml"'ln.nd Post wher~ G,".ln0ral Clnrk went i1"'l9Gd:iPt~ly into conJ'Arence icrj th GeY1.orril Gru~nt}1er. Dur:ing th/;) nftr-,rnoon G~norrll Cl:>rk work~d on Pdninistrntive nRtters and had ns his f;l..l8Sts for dinner t}1is evening Genersil Moran and Colorn=il Kio'"ell of �the 8igna1 Section. HDecisions r1pde at yoster(fr1yt s cnnferenc~ with Gen~ral Alexander required thAt I p;ivc hin n reco"'!J"l!">.ndPtion torlB;T as to thA oonHnuation of the Cr,ssino battla by the New Zealrmd Corps. In order to obfain first hnnd infornPtion, I nroceeded tn ili scuss th~ sjtuntion with Brig~clier Burro1"s, ConT1andj_ng tho }Tew zer,land 5th Br-i_1;arle; Hajor Gcnr;rnl nnrkinson, Corir:Rnrler of the ;)nd Nl"lw Zel:llnnd Db,1.si.on; r1~1.jor Gemrr,.l KeiC;btlev, Cor1r1,rinder of the 78th Division, and LieutenFnt Gen')ral 'G'reyberg. 1''hcreRs no clef'inite rrogress ru> s been nr1.de since yesterda:r, r 11 wr3re in f'~wor of crntinning the Pt tri.c k. Cn snnl ties were light in the Cnssino nrea 7~st('l)rday, m1mr)ering 73, a.s rerorted hy General Pnrkinson. An attack to clenr the slopes of Hill 1g3 wes ::icheduled for. 1100 1c!"ith heavy artillery surport. Farldnson felt this h,c,d good chences of '.=;uccess r'nd, when successful, '7ould cnntribute M.Ht~rially to the:ir position in Crissino. Freyberg reported tl:v t the troops on H11ns~mR.n I s Hill were stj_ 11 jn r;oorl heart and, althoug-h :r hnve no defj_nj_te feeling th0t greA.t i r,prove"'ent ,-r:i. 1]_ trko pbce liy our action, J concur in the r"co!'lnendPtion of these cor.."'11'1.ncl ers to oontinue t:r e attack for rnoth 0 r tmenty-four hours, for so ~'luch is rt st10ke. I ,;rive thjs :infor"~ation to Ge:mcral Alex::inder who herrtil;r concurr0:d :in F'c;T r,"co-c,r~end~ition. I then nassecl this "rnrrl. on to H'r"'ybn~g. He sRys he ,·-ill give it evE'!rything he hns e;ot. '7e hnve J~jd on a heavv ~ir RttacJr, but rue to tr..,"! disi:1ster to the plnnes on Pol'l.pei field b:v the eruption of Mount Vesuvius our air effort will be ~entl"T cnt do1.Mm. Th•:q r"!lport that ov~r 80 B-25 1 s hrive been dar~ar,ed or destroyed. It seems inconccivriblc, wHh this eruption tA]dnR' plnce in th"'l lrst week, tr'lt theY woulo 1 eave th,., nlnni;s in such nrox:i."1ity to Vesuvius. 1 11 ! hf'Ye indj_c:::it~a. above thrt I no not fee1 trnt tr is or~rl'1tj on 1·,ill be suc- cessful b:1r 01ir efforts r,J.on"' if th-~ ene 11y continues to r'"sist, nnd reLnforces , as be is doin:-;. P°o' 1cver, jntelligcmce inoic8tes tri,.,t he is not too h2rrY, thr,t he is h~1.vi'1.IY, her-v 7 losses, thnt h<"l hrs heavj l;r roinforc".d the Hitler Lin") so that the sj_t11ntion mny b~ 7_i1ce bro h~rnr;rr~j p;hts jn th... ring, both ."bout to topple ov~r. It ~n.y be tlint if we continul"l to nttnc1· a.t not too great expense for nbout th~ next 48 hours, we my succeed. n Th0 frriy Gor11Pnclf'lr today d-isprtchod t},c followim,· l.ritter to Lt. Gl"ln. Devors, Deput:r Suprc:1e 1Ulil"ld Cor:,,P.nd er: rtYour J_ritt"lr of lB MA.rch },p s been received. "I Pr pr<"lpnred to lo01F'l the VI Cor:rs 1•rith tri!'l 3rd and !~5th Divisions Rfter the Main Fif'th Ar"'ly fore,, hns ioincd up w:i th trio brjrlr,;ehead force. I undeirstr,nd thnt General Alex~mrler he.., s pr~pProd A tentat:i.v,, t,j ri~ table for tris rnnAuver and that 7011_ have a copy. I hA.vc not received a copy yc!t. My o··rn esti nnte is that we shall not be Rble to launch n coord:innted nttack bv the:: t"'O arnies until 11bout '1e.v lst. T believe j t ,7ill require at len_ '3t three, reeks befor~ w~ cnn reA ch the bridgehead force. Jf you them ad.d tl~ <3 t5 ""'" to f.;l"lt the VI Cor:rs out, A.nd a r ,rj od of rest nnd r~or1;13nizntion you vdll be vr,~11 into the su-,,,ricr, n"1d it r,ay bo too late to cnntribut"'- ""UCh to r,v1 ;;F.LnRD. Ho •revcr thn t is a natter beyond '1;f scope. 1 "I h~licvc yon nre mistri1zen in yo1rr •"!stin•1tA of B~rtholf. I con'·ider thRt he is rloin1; a eood iob. T'fhen ~rour l~tter arri vcd ~sterd;-1y GrnentJ1 ,1r h:1 d the �Chi~f nf Str>:f'f of' tb'l TI Corrs ch~c1< rrivPtelv nit½ th.e G-l's of II Corrs, 1/+th And 11Sth Divj sfons to nsccrtrdn ,,,.,i,_,..thnr nr not thE' ~rr,y G-1 s~ction nns i;ivinr; sati sfr:1~tory erv:i c~. ""ht"! rerort of 1111 trr"e G-1' s '7r s th,.,t th~ :,r"~r G-1 Section h::,s ,., s~.'J'\prithetic ,md~rstrnr1 in~ o+' the r"'rsonnel rrobl""-l"'S ,--;thin trc cl;visjon ,.,nrl is ril··,,,•rs "'ager to assist in th'"!~r s::ilution. Colon~l '3."ltzr,rin, ny PerutY Chi~f of Striff, ::ind en 0utst11ndi np; officl'!r, is consbntly on tr~ job su:r~rvisj nr; G-1 r,r>ttl'!rs f'or th~ Chief of St?ff. Fo-•<"ver, since vou h11ve .,.,"mti oned the '"latt"'r, T shn 11 b..., on t1-- c al~rt to ascertr'.in ,,./r'ether or not ne hnve a Feakness in the G-1 Section of 1 ich T pri not ermre. "I do not l-no'"' tr1' b",d.s of' :--ro11r belief thrt Bertbolf dons· not senri to be to ~lve •1011 correlct fi ';)ITes. I bel; ":!Ve th Pt your hen.dqu11rters is faMilinr ...,;th the !l.,ture r>nd sources of our reri odic rerorts, ri s rerresent1>tives of both yo11r G-1 nnd c:tntisticrl of'fices hr•ve hr,d occr, sion to ~o ov~r the,, with :r.w G-1. In A. l~tt"'r on l F"'brnnry 104/., Se1bridge ~P,ntion~d to Gru~nth~r sor~ nrparent incons~ st"'nci"!s in fj_n•nr~s ,,rhj ch w~ hnd .,.,irnishr!d, but these ''!~re exrlriincd in detail in (}ruenth"'r's repl~r of 7 Fcbrunr7 -inc ns fnr "'SI 1mo11 thcv ,·,ere rccept'!l<l ,, s correct. I do not lD7-oW o+' A.n7 oth~r instanc"s in ·JY1 icr our figur~s hAV1' b~cn sPid to b~ inl'ccurrite, l"nr1 J uncl~rc:;trnd th . . t S•wrbrid.'1'e oic not indicr>te di.ssritisf11ction "Tith the'~ jn his r!'!Ce'1t visit to this headqurirtf":rs. c1 ble 1 "You Mention th"' rl'riclity ·lith wJ, icr I rut r~rlr>cl'.'.!rimts into divisions i:1nd then ;,.,_to co,..,bat. 'l'hPt, of cours~, hns b"len neccssr·ry ~n th"' brid~P-rte"d and in the 14th Div1.sion vrrich r--ust f';O to J\nzio nt once. Had ·,~e benn "bl"! to secure rerlri cer,ents wh~r r:re ost n~~ded tr>e"", thcv would hrivc been n ble to sr~nd a rea"'onable yicr;od of ori1mt,,tj_on before s~einP ..,ction. The r~rlr-ccr"ent situ"'tion no", 7 ooks t-;oor, but it h::, s b~en fpr fror S" tis fr, ctory in th"' rr st. "You ...,ention b"i'1."' shodc.,d ':7ith t}11" sl.onnl'>SS of the r,ttn c}r • I r,r too' but probabl:r not to the "'xtl:!nt thrt you nre, f'or I h:·we se~n for tr., :re <1t '"!icrht 11onths, r>ncl hric'! il"'lpr ,sscd 1rron .,.,.,, thri re.,.,sons f'o:r tb"l slowness of om~ rrogress in JtPJ.y. The:r Pre: 'T'errrdn, YTePth~r, cr,.r,:;fnlly :rrAff'rcr c4ef~nsjv, 1-oc::itions in the r10 1 mtrdns, rcterdn,;d anr, '"cll-train,.1d rmer,y troops, ;;rossly in"derp1rte ...,e."'ns nt our oisr,osr,l wr51') on th") offensiv"!, witr arnrox:i,..,rtely (>.qual forc0s \ to th~ dl')fender. I hPVe scf'!n, fror, actufll exy,criencc on l"!any occ10sions, th~ 1 air feil ropel'l.te<lly to rlrive c ,.,t-:;:r-r1:in"'d in_f,.,,ntrv out of n~frmdl'lr locPlit5 "!s. You J:,r,ve 'Jerm it dA"'1onstr..,ted at Cassino. Plrnt;r of Gernan in:";-,ntry re"'l<iinnd in the to"m, " ith tt=1nl'r.;, .,,f't~r t 10 c borib'i.n~. I :F1 not sAtisf'ind ,,,ith tho ''PY ll'r ... yberg hes h,.,ndlec, th':! si tuPtion, but you nuc:t undcrstP.'1C1 the deli er c:,r 17ith vrhi_ch ::r Must ne<il. 1 rith hi.,.,, r'h1c to -instructions T hrive received rersom1lly on this M 0 ttcr fron General ~lexr,nder. l;'reybcrP, hPs 1,-,cked ng~ess:iv~n~s~, and I hnv"' so -inoicPt')d to !\.lcxr-nr er. Fe hPs br-,.n rc1uctl'lrit to errloy th'°) troops !1V•15 lable to M.T'I, ,-,11 of t'Thich ',"?r~ Br:i tish. T h~ve dPil;r oontacfod hi" And 11rgcd tb" use of "'ore rrerr ~AP 11:ind troops in the to,·'11. , l'l.n Attr c1r b:r the Indians fror.1 the north surport"'ld bY tri.n 1 ·s "'nd the cnri,.,.; t,.,ont of tl e 73th Di vlsion to . ush rronnd th~ brise o.i:> the h:ill. 'J'onn of th~se "ere 11tte"1T'ted, cxc~rt rfter t,-ro days' dP-l11y noditionRl Nl"lW' 7:enl::,nd troops "mre used in tho village. 1 0 0 "You Mention ti,"' t t 'hP, G"'rririns ~°-""" to bP, P ble to tr k.-, it ; n r bi,.,. n:,..y. 'T'her._• hf-Ive done so to -ri.y 1,:no=l -1d~"- f' or rr> n•.r '"'Onths r nc rr , c ortrd.nl~r c oin~ 1.t :ln Cassino and h"ve nl.P c~d therf'? the 'Jr-st rind tr"' riost I'1.l/"f,"d troops nt trci r d; srosril. In riv opinion, tho 2ttc'lck by the Nevr Zl'l~lRnd Corr::i "rith ti.e r0stric- �tion of trc use o-<' t'1c 7gth f'ivision rs jT1J'oMc1 b,r t\J.l"Jxnncer , ,-,e rr, not ~ing to siicceecl in cRptur;np; t h':'! Mo:nrstl"Jrv but wjl]_ prob:=ibly hoJ.rl thP, tovrn , the raiJ.ror,d 8tAtion t0 the soutr rind h,.-, ve r- snrll briclt;"he:=id ov".lr the Rapido 'R.i ver to fr,d11 t et-, future operntions b~r the Rin;htr ,hrriy. This of' course is not s;e,tjsfri ctorv to Me . to "Ar:i p;J.nd Grittenbl'lr,:;~r is b11:i -n"" f'ittcd out i:-rith n strff . et hi as s0on ...,s vou cnn nrike hiri aw•ilRblc . T ,~ill be glrid 1':rith r ef8renc" tr, rw conversntio1'1 1:ith Bull rbout fl new !)iv:ision Cor'"'1::inder . Hull ~ 1'1d-i catcd thrit Gemern 1 •i,,_rshall hno s0~e Division Co,.,,,.,Rncl ers irho, he 'l''A s f'·0xious to tret into conhnt rind ~ sk"<l if :r coulcl us~ on!".l in ~m unoerstudy cPraci tv. T s11id "v~s" . It :is of no nor,~nt to me . "I fL"r :into tho ber-ichhel'l<l yester01:i;y tc, c eek on tre ~iturition there . The li""itl'.'ld ob j octiv" ntt ...,c1' schedufod +'or th~ 10th ,ws crnccll ,cl on r,y ord3rs upon tn'1 re co,..,.,l")nd<>ti.on n-P "'rnscott , d-10 hod to altAr his r,lnns for tr~ rittri.ck h·· scd upon Ms conclusion thr,t the 1st British f'iv:i s:i.on Jpck~d th:~ cnpbi 1 it;v of its offensive iob . t-tc fnlt, n.nd I "~Md, th"t he nrs nttric1dn~ ,-,;th rirrroxi,..,r>tely even nnr,bers , throu"'11 tl,e on'1n, Pnd thrt he ·,roulrl. hnve h ,rivY CRsnrltfos •~:bi.ch 1"oulrl he :i.nsi 'T'11.ificr>nt . Tt •ould not trlr.., nn:,, 11rtill'"'r:.r +'ire of'f of nny pRrt of trc be."c'hAP.d . "L~ rir~ r,ovin-, tlie 14th Divisio"Yl in , bce;inn:i.n,... toc1Py . It ':i 11 Bll be in in t::m d11ys . Then,-,~ c<>n rotate son~ troops th11t rirl"! t1red . Unl oad:i_nr is ,:oi11"' well. I ra~ O"'ntinuin:' ··ii.th r-:r rilan to r-int PnothAr Div:ision in at a lnt~r t iriA if the r>nC"'Y situ..,tion ,iustifi~s . Tfoirever, 11.lexrYP ~r told r1e yesterday thn.t he T"'P '3 T'UttinP' out instructio11s f'or t:r~ det.., il"d r.tt'l c1rc bv both cle "'!cnts nf t:rc F5-f'th and ,:;_;ir;hth .J\.rr ies . 0 "101,mlJ. R.oo'\cs told Al th:'t you 0btain~cl t1-i., i rprcssion fro:-- G~nern 1 T:'r,.,,yb""ri; thnt ',e hri<l " ti"Me schedule to join un 'TI. th t I'! briogehcPcl forM by Mnrch ?Jrd . nf'litb'"'r .,.,., stnf'f nor J ..,t llny t;...,'" "!ntertninr,d such optiriistic hop0s . It is 1truc thrit G~neral Fre:,rberq; rad r;rert strnt8~ic p]pns for ru::;J--inp- througr to ) Roi,8 in a hurrv but P.Ven h~ rerlized t}-•r,t hn wr s induli;ine :in 11:i r;hf'u1. tr inkin~ . t1 rther i Mrortant "lssnges of the dry follow: Hf), At.I t o FI,A 1 1B<), rcrent<'lcl Fi"th Ar'fl:r. RH SD 601. nrt is ess,,,ntinl thrit th., RC,,., o:" L. D!'M in Corsicn. n.rrive in .lr-ples hv 1st April. Since rres,~nt 1;-<'t i"' n.ot S'.tPfici~nt to "Ssur~ tr·s, FiY~ ~r.,.,y r.Ps ,...,~l"'"d thPt h"'cs.11se of n:l cessit~r, th ,:T [l"t'e r"'~T'"rl"!d t o r~lr-rn.se i.-r::iricd:irtel_ ~7 r;ht L'"'.Ts :f'ror> tr~ ~nzio run f'or ,r one t 1 1rn 'lTritmd erich . Tlc:is" rrrrinr•~ ,~ctrils. This =u'1t not :i.nt"!rf..,:r-e ,~it}, rove of 1/;, T)iv i c;fon nor return of 50/;, FrcJ-,t RCT . t1 F'r o,., Devcr<1 t o Cl "r1, . ~M '17311. 111•rhf-,t ; s 7O,1r "'Jt;~r,te o:"' Brir"c :i.l"!r Gr:-ner:c>l R.rwr,onil S . r1cL,.,:i.n , L.5th "livi.sio"l, r,s rbl" ros:rectiv"'l f:i.visio-n Co--r-1ri11der for n 111i-;R,Tr"'1.D? rn"' H'"'T n"t' rn0th"1r, •-r..,sr:inp-ton hrs rr?c~iv,.,,d vJr- -"MTOr"hl~ r~rorts re~crn.-i.n~ hh• h11.t notice h, -.,-, not --;iven th"1 !.. 5th 1Jivi"ion on Mi,'r!leton 1 s ,-;1 thdra'"ml . " G"'n~ral Cl"r1, 1 s r"'rly t0 th~ ,, bov"' is ,, s follo···s: ~n ,S,SJ.4 . 11 I tl-·:i.n!r 'R"t' ;,.,...,di.11r Gl"'n·~"t'tl Hc L..,in, 45 n; y;_.--:i on , ,·rill Mr1rn :: -:0od f'ivision Cor-ri,,nc er in c o"'!brit. T rlic'l n0t "'jv~ hi:, th ':J Division -c• en Mir r'l"lton l~:f't bec~,Fe i;;r ~l"ls ,...,[' s '"'Or~ r:~s"'lrv:inr "'111 iM iedi:•t~l•r ~v-dlnbl"l . 1Tr,11r,v~r , s•rh')n T<;· "'l~c; b~C~"'1~ siclr a 1 �short tir'l~ :"F.;0 in th~ brir"'l'3he..,r P"1r j t 1ook~cl P'3 tr 011';'!' he ni.n:rt b"' inc.'.'raci-\ t?t~a for f'urth"r dutv, T hnd COT""' tr the ccncJ usion that McL..,:in <::hould ,o;et the Di.vision. "P'heri,ris I ,-,ould hrte to 1_ose McLnin, I riro 1villin~ to l~t him go for this nese!rV~d pro,..,otion. 11 Cable from HQ AAI to Fifth Ar y . R".f RE/166. "'R.oA d fo,.-,,_p,,lii - S0 ll"lrno cinder covered. Scafati tJocera 6 inch to 1? inc},. "'Tocer·:i CP~TP 4 incr to 6 inch. C,9VA Sril'"lrno ? inch to 3 inch. Rord fASs?ble only for jo~ps. Diversion po,..,s:ibl~ SAlerno t\.vcllino - NPrlr-s. 11 General GlPrk tociA.y "IT'ot~ to CG, 1-JATOlTSA, rccor-i ,ending the pronotion of Bri<;. Gen. John li. 0 'Daniel to Maj. Gen., nnd the follo 1.' inr nnn~d Colon~ls to th~ r['n1< of' T'lr 4 r. Gen: Cnl. u,,rr-r B. Sh,,rt'lr-in, Col. C<1.rl C. Brn'k-, Col. Urb..,n 'J:iblo rnil Gol. R~uben l-T. rruc1r~r. * * * rB.r:S1~•rzA.'TO--fifl''R.CTT ?J, 104/+--Gcn"lr<>l Clrrk rcs~rv--d th ""orninc: +'or ,r1r-,i.nistrrtive ""nttcrs and f'f;'Oin.+,n,..nts. ft 0015 Pri!lcc Hr:,berto F-id Ms rcsr>"Cts rnd rm·rincn +'or rbont on~ ho11.r in tr, Gen.err>l 1 s ven. At 1115 Grnerril Coult r, Co..,T'r'1d·'nr-: th"'l ~5tl1 f\1.v:i.sion, ,.,1--,icr is "'OOn tc b"lc0-)"' rrrt of t"'"J .,.,jftl--i ~ !'"Y, I'"-: d J-,-i s rr"Jsr,P-cts P'1r' con+>-,rr~d for 1/i ,.,j_nutes ,,,.i_tr n~nl'\rr 1 Clrrk conC1'r'1in ~ 11se o-r t e d 4Vi"jon, r,rrt of' Flier hr~ p1r-0::ir1:v 0rr1v~d in Ttrily. tt tl-\-:i ~11.,1 o-<' Ms confnr-,ncf" "5tr G"l'1~rcl Cl11r1r, r~ rl";r-dnryc1 +'or l1~ncr rnc'l l,ft 11.t Pbout 1130. Snff--r f'ell (1nr-1nr.; Most of' t,._,,_ ""'orn:in";, but it r,,-,.lt"'!d soon ,-,ft.-.r hi.ttinr t n ::-round. 1 H~"'S f'ro,., t},,ry Grssino -r'ront ,....,s ;n('lr;f'-:,,it~, :-ind G~c1.rirril Clrrk refrnincd +'ro!"! goi.n,.,. +'0r "ard, 1mo,·r-in,.,. thr+, Grmnrr,l Alcxrintler rTa.s ,,:tsitinr; G~n~ral Ti'reyb~r~ "nd rmnld retnrn ~ ith a cccision conc"'Jrninl"' ,··!1 cth0r or not to continue th~ attrck. 1 /1.t 1'345 G~n"'lral Ho1s1-rorthy, n'.",r Co..,,.,rrider o+> t e 4th Jndi8n I'ivis:ior, c;:il.l,'ld on G""n~r,,1 Clr-r'k. G•w~r..,1 TTnlsvrorthy is r11rlPc:i11..,. Genr"Jr..,l Gr-llo'''r;r, .,.,,10 ·•rs r1!t i"l t"',.,-rorrril~r ,·+".ln the old Division Co,.,~1!'.'ndor hrd his foot blo'·m of'f bir f' box min~. Gc11err-1 G1Pr 1: crnt~nu'"'c1 tr -i.ft"lrnoon ..,nc~ took P short '""O 11-c. .,,j_t]-, prl•in;"'trr>tive r-ntt~rs c'!11rjng At l '70() f'o11:r Brr zilfr '1 o-''fic~rs "rro hn.r b"len servi n- 1rit}i th(") Ferilriu~rtP.rs pj_+'th /\rrw CfH11") to F''r thl"Jir rt";lf"lCts t,, G~n ~rrl Cl.rr1r rr~ or to 1-,1:ivjni=; for Al-::t~rs, 'Ji-. ,r~ the7r ,dll pr".lrrre to rMf-"live ri B:rt-zilirin Corrs tlirt ,-ill rirriv~ in ~forth ~ fr:i CP rrithjn trie n ,xt f 'r ...,,mtrs. 1 At 1R1O r.~n~rrl A. 7 ""xnnr1 er, l'lCCCH'1T[ln:i,~d hv G"'....,A,r~l L,.,,-nj_tz")r, cr""'e to th'! Co,,,,.,,. ..,,.,,.,,d;n~ r.,..nr>r~1 1 s h t r:1.rl vmt -lnto ir"'0d:l:--t~ ccri:"cr1mce -":1th r.e 1,rrls Clrirk and Grnenth--r re7rdinr tJ:,n n ct ion ,-,t C0 ssino. Shortl7 riftcr G<1ner~ 1 Alexnnclcr I s ar:rivl'll, (}en-;r:-:,1 LA.esc, CoM- :-,ndinr; 0-"lner..,1 o-<' "":i ,.,ht!~ Arr''", rnd on~ of his staff off; cr"Jrs rir~jv,.,d to r,rrt:i cir-=it" in tr,~ ,1; ,cussion. At 1010 th·, crn-"'~r~nc~ '"n 'ed, P'10 C11'!nerrl Clr•rlr !">'7.(~ hi~ Ch;"lf of Stpff', ,r;t:r Pi.res, rl")rrin"ld jn t,hc con:f'ercnce roori p110 discussed ~vents ,.,} ich hrd tr.,,nsr,irt"ld durinr- tre 7-Pst hour. 1 0 cuss ,Aft"'r '"'1.lf'f ir ('.,..,,~r."l Glrr 1r dociderJ. to t~lrC' rt brief "Trll• r-nc' tc f'1irtr9r r1is'"1 7 tr Gen~rPl f1r, 1 "lntli"'r th') d~vclorr"1nts of the day. �"It b~CP!"'~ rrrnr~11t tori~v, in r,y conversFtionn ,fith General "F'r'"'ybl"lrg, thnt t)1c rre,.,. 61"lB1Pnd Div-l <Jio"Y'I h,d ,hot itP bolt, PS ""!11 . s the Inrin 11 Division, and thnt the British Hir-;h Co,..ri!'_ncl '7PS r~luctE1nt to t 11ro= the '7Sth Dj_v:5.sion into tr~ C" ssino r>ren . -Pr-~yb~rg nnnur-1.ifiedl~v reco-:yv:mchd thrt t -i attac1· cense • nd ' th1:1t the Ind; "'DS on Hnnf!mnn ' s Hill bl'>, '"7 thrrnv'TI. T [1 r-reec' b11t 1rno1•rj_n..,. th 0 t Alex..,.,11rler ,rras ~nrout" to tl is hencrpJ.rirt~rs, T told li'rnyb,.,rg thr>t I ''Ould conflrn T"'Y orcl ~r to hi to withrr~r t}11"l Hanr>;nA.n I s Tiill fore"' . llAll"lXFlnrler r1 -id not cor,."' to tH_s hePr-1qu,..,rt~rs hut •-r,mt clirect to ?r<~yhl"lrg and S"lent th~ dnv. n"" r'°'turnnd hP-re c1t 1810 Pnn cr,lled r> ,, t'!tin~ r" t:r Leese 11.nd .,..,ys"llf. He hr-tl')c1 to coll o-ff tho rittr,ck but f0lt th,,.,t tl•e Mew Zer,lr>n°ers had l--1'1Pde no rror;rcs<J rn(1 hnc no furt:rl"lr off~nsive riction . Fe 1meTT tris to hr, the cr>S/'>, vrith th"'l 4tr Tnd:i.en nivision. J n•1 convinced trat t}1 e rJew Zealnn( ers hr>Vl"l n0t br,en -fi..,htj_nr_; tonri cj onsly j_n t 0 ci.ty, but I ,,rpnted tr"' r~co,...,.,,,~ndr,tion to ( cr-i lJ. ot'f the f1ttack to cor,P'J fro,,, the British, 11s [111 troops involv d ,., re Bri tish . "It ·ras rlecidl',ld by A1c,a.,nrl~r rt tonipht 1 s :"~"ting thrt the Hrn,.,,-irn 1 s I-fj_ll eroup would b"l =ithdre,m but if rossibl~ to r,aj ntnin n S'7P.11 rost in thr>t Prt"'P; thrit Hill 1113, the rP "lror>d strition ""nd t},"" -rr3s"mt line in Cr>ssino he ,.,.,intriined; th::-t t_ l"l t 1.rnov~r fro!"' Fifth to T<~j_~hth Arr1fos ,ould tr1r~ rlnce irr .dfrtAly PS arrPno;n.d b~t ,Mn I.eese rinrl "1YS"'1f . ,.le heve rlecidcd thr>t tJ, is rrill tP1-c~ rl<>ce "t noon Sunrlny, Parch 26. Leese "'ill rut tho 78th Division in to reljeve the 4th Indian 1mcl th" /+th Brj_tish Division to r~li~VI" th~ '3rd DH. (Frt'.'lnch) . 1 1 "I l'T' ,-,or 11.nd ~ore convinccrl, rnd so is /\.lexander rind Lees~, tbrit the coriinr; bi? attrick of th!<) t .'"'o r-r,...,jes cPn not he riricle h~for'3 Mrq 1st ['nd tl·at ,.,h~n it does t111.-,,., rlricA, insterid of the T'ifth t-r~y exccutinfl' r subsi0i8ry role, it '"ill h1we to cBrry tr~ br>ll throu~r t} '3 nountnins r- s ·~w,1, for I ny, of the rlefinite opinion th,.,t the --r;;irhth Arrw vrill not ridvance throur;h the Liri Vri lJ.ev P-XCept as asqist~r~ b:,T the Fifth Arny attack. 1 1 "I hritc t o see the Cr-ssino c;ro ·r -flop . It has been ,, !"'ost difficult sHul"tion thr>t T h"'V'-' been in , due to the f,.,ct thnt r>ll troors jnvolv~d 1r·ere British , itJ.-, a British chrnn~l of corriand · ,xt ,nding -f'rom Uex->n<ler, in 'tany inst1:1nces, dire c t to "F'r~·rberg . The Ner-r ZePl.,.,nc'ers a.n<l TncHr•ns hnv"l not f0ught vrell . FreyberP-, T'l'ht1r~ri.s h~ is ti courp r,;cous nnr coor~rntive corrn;:i,nder, j c1 11oefully <foficient j_n j_nt~lli.<;enc~ . 'R"i.s nritisr suboroi11<"'tes do not --irlriirc his leadership, And it hPs b~en nn nnhapr,Y situ,..,tion since Alexrinrler crent~a 1-i'reyhJrg ' s rrovisionRl corps. '!;'re,rberP" is not 'l_llfllif'i--ir! to oorinanr it, nor fo~s he hPve the staff to i""rl"!M(•mt his in- tructions. r1y on~ ,·,orry is tho.t n,vers J-,,-,fl fr-il-id to portr"Y tl~~ trur, rictu:r~ to thf"-? r~orl<1 in the '.'lnr Deprrt~,cnt . In fret, I nn convinced 0f thnt . 1 0 "I p~, riost --inxious to "'tart th" r~ or~P11:ization , for J AM .ri cr,ns ann Frencl- toi:;et}l')r we vrill PdVPnce . " 1 pr, sure th<>t r-Titl1 the r �Two important messages of the day are as follows: Personal from Devers to CJark. RN l:?814. "Is Eagles still in cor1rn.and of the 45th Division? Is there any danger of his being removed bPcause of sickness? If there is a chance of McLain I s ComlTll'lnding the Division, Ms.rshall desires th::it he be consulted as to his rersonel rreference as to remrdning with the 45th or going to another Division in UK with view of commanding it." Personal from Clark to Truscott . RN 5719. "Inquiry has been received from War Department as to availability of McLc'dn to commtmd Division in UK. Before replying, tell me of EP.P-les 1 health. Is there nny ch1mce that Eagles can not continue on account of health? If so, McLain should be held for possible cor:imand 45 Division. If Eagles in good health, will recommend McLain for ill( assignment with view of la.ter comrianding a Division there." * * * PRESENZANO--MARCH 24, 1944--At last nj ght 1 8 mnet1 ne GenerAl ClArk invited General Alexander, ris aide, Ceptain Grjmsley, General Lemnitzer r>nd General Clark's British aid0, CPptain Lnmpson, to breokf[lst, and the conversation at the t,able centered around GenerAls Alexancer, ClPrk and Gruenther, who discussed mainly the rresent st~tus of the Italian ct:unpnign. At the completion of the breakfast Generfll Alexander, }-,is n:ide 11nd General Lemnitzer proceeded forward to the comJll..and post of General Leese and from there to General Freyberg 1 s Headqwrters. Before leavinp: the Fifth Army command post at 0950 from the landing strip, General Clark c:rent the early part of the mornj ng disposing of Bdmjnistrntive TTR tters in hifl vRn. The Army Comnander visited the 88th Division at its front ljne rositions on the left flank of the Fifth Army front today, making his first formal call on this Division since its arrival in Italy. Arriving Rt the 88th airfield, General Clark was met by l'Tajor General Sloan, Division Commander, and after visiting the command rost he went to the command posts of all three regiments and conferrPd with the Regjmental CommA.nders. Although the R8th Division hr-is been in tJ-ie line for approximately two weeJrs, jt has seen little nction, gj nee it is in a sector thr>t h1rn been extremely quiet. The Division hns had an.excellent oprortunity to become indoctrinnted into battle action because of the ros~ tion j n wM ch it VTP s plnced. • · Flyinr b"ck to his commPnd post by cub Generrl Clark reached Iresenzrrno at 1?30 and immediP.tely 1"ent to luncb an0 discussed l'is trip vri th General Grnenther during the rreal. The nfternoon vas spent in conference ·i:i th ,mrj ous HeF>drpmrters Section Chiefs and in disposing of vital paper 1·rork. At 1620 General Clrrk flew· over Nnples and around tr e slopes of Mount Vesuvjus so hP- could view f'rol'l the air the damage caused by the volcano's eruption. After this aerial reconnnissance of the volc1mo rrea, General Clnrk landed Pt Car,odicMno airport, }Japles, �where he WPS net b;v his cn.r r'1.d tflken to "'faples . He had dinner vrith three of his Hest I oint classmPtcs - Colonels Tully, M2.rkoe and Nygaard, returning lrter in the evening to his cor,mand post . Following are the importnnt messages of the day: ersona.l Truscott to Clark. R:T 1259 . "Mess~t=;e from FRO, AAI, #783 to PR g, received 2350 yesterdry, states CPssino battle has been called off but withdrawPl will not be completed for 4~ hours and thAt the w~thdrawal of units from 435 and 202 "'ill be difficult 11nd will be made !'lore so if any intention reaches enemy before completion, also states this to be off record background . I have received no word f'roM you relAtive to calling off Cassino ba.ttle and aJ11 surprised thr>t stAff ch:mnel should receive such informHtion before I do . · Request you inform me whether or not TRO message states facts . Termination of battle under circumst:rnces indicated hRs serious implications here . " Persorn:1.l Clark to Truscott . R'l 6701. "I am ristounded thrit AAI FRO is communicating direct with your fRO and have rrode ~trong representations thPt in the future all such communic11tions will be sent by my Headqw=irters . Reference your 1259. I issued instructions that j nformation concernj ng Cassino battle be sent you last night but through staff error you were not advised. Only change in battle of Cassi no i"' withdrawal of troops from hill · 435 , which we hope to accomplish tonir,ht. Their strength has bP.en reduced so as to make an attnck on the monastery impracticable. Hill 193, the rf'ilroad station Rnrl the bulk of Cassino will be retained with the troops as now disposed . Effort to eject Boche from his remaining few locnlities in Cassino will continue. Impetus of the attack Las died down due to exhaustion of troops ·nvolved. Do not understand the serious implications which this has on your situation. Wish you would be tbink.:.ng of an eRrly attack on Cfaterna in order that '.',e ray d-iscuss it when -I come up in the next day or two . Th::nning out on your front would appear to make such an attack practicable." * * * FRESE1'JZAN6--r,iRCH 25, 1944--After cispatch:ing important adm:i.nj strative rn:i:ers, General Clr-irk rnade a study of a ffemorcnduPJ submitted by General Brann, Arr":Y G- 3, concern:·ng Fift}1 Ar1:ry operations . At 1130 Captain Lindsay V Jrtson, a French officer who Met General Ckrk Pt the beach at Cherchel when he landed by submarine , came to pay his respects to the Gerieral . General Beucler and Lt . Col . Draper accompanied Captain \latson to the Genernl 1 s van. General Clark and Cartain ' Ptson reminisced on this hazardous adventure, and General Clark signed his narne on a thousand-franc note which already bore the signature of Bob Murrhy and other persona.ges at this historic meeting. Shortly after Captain WAtson left, General Keyes reported to General Clark and lunched with him . After lunch both of them went to Genera.l Clark 1 s van where they discussed the regrouping of the Fifth Army and its future plans . After General Keyes left General ClE.1.rk bunied himself with admjnistrative rretters, took a short nap and then, accompanied by Lt . Col. Dra:rer , walked to the village of Fresenzano . The climb up to the village was noteworthy in thRt it was made in a brisk wind and blinding snow flurry . Upon his return, General ClRrk signP.d so!'le decorations and cor.iP1endations and Pt 1g15 received Ernie Iyle, ) ) �Vt t 1 Scripps-Hovmrd press correspondent, Ed Kermedy of the Associated J ress, Sherman Montrose, Chief of the Fhotowaphic Pool and Lt. Col. Clark, PRO Chief. This was an informal gathering, 11nd aftervmrds the entire party had supper with the GenerEil. Du:d ng dinner General Clark exr lained that the Fifth Army was now taking up a new +'rant on tre left flank and disclosed, off the record, to the corresronr' ents thnt the Fifth Army was receiving the 85th Division and it would also receive Headqwrters of the 4th Corps and there was a po'.:'sibility that another American Division would join the Fifth Army within the next few months. The correspondents asked a number of questions, including a . general evalu::1tion of the situation at the Cassino and Anzio regions, and he answered trem frankly but not for publication. A very friendly atmosphere rreva~led throughout the evening. The correspondents left at ?030, and General Clark retired to his vrn n1:i th GEmeral Keiser for further discussion of the day. General Clark dictated the following materjal for foclusion in his diary: 11 My belief that the New Zealand and Indian Di visioYJ.s did not fight well during the Cassino battle hes been further strengthened as a result of the withdrawal of Indian troops from Hangman's Hill in suf'ficient strength to warrF1.nt an assault on the monl'lstery itself. Rereated efforts of the New ZeAlanders to reach Hangman 1 s Hill or to make nny progress in the town failed. Reports from Freyberg and tee New Zealand Commanders were thrt the troops could not advrnce. However , all the troops on Eangman 1 s Hill car.1e off the hill last night without any di1'ficulty f'rom enemy action. Arparently the urge to attPck up t]:-,e hill WP.S lacking. I a!'1 conv:i need that the New ZeA.land troops in the tovm were roorly lead 11nd shm•1ed absolutely no offensive sp:irj t. From apprmci mately Uie ffrst day of the Cassino sho,, the Indinn Division had totally lost its offensive rower. I attribute this, in greBt part, to the defeatist attitude ::,nd lack of initfr,tive of its commander, General GaJ lo,ray." The Army Commander today dispatched a letter to the Corrmrndfog General, NAT0TTSA recorrirending the promotion of Lt. Col. R. J. 17ood , executive officer :ind rrincip=tl assistant to the Army G-3, to the rank of Colonel. * * * SAN MARCO--lVfARCF 26, 1944--After taking co.re of the accumulation of lPst night I s important r,11rers, General Clark left his oommand rost for Harles , y.rhere he dined with sever.!1.l of his West r oj_nt classmates - Colonels T-Tr,rkoe, Tully . and Nygaard - and then left to join General Gruenther at the Officers' Rest Center for dinner and the evening. Imnediately following the General's departure, hi::i Pides and tre enlisted rnen of his section broke camr i:md set ur his new rommand post in the vicinity of $an M&rco. * * SAN T,Llu:"1CO--nARCH 27, 1944--General Clark remA.ined at the Officers ' Rest Center at Sorrento today in coMpany with General Gruenther. Viork continued �today on setting up trie now cornand rost and by sundown the CoMManding Gene ral ' s Section was comrletely orgnniz0d n.nd ready for operation. Word was received today that General Giraud , Comnander- in-CMef of the French Expeditionary Forces , would CPrie forward tonorrow afternoon to inspect French units of the Fifth Army, nnd arrnngements were mule for h..;m to see the Army CoPLrnander at the Fifth Army conmand post at 1630 . The following import ant mess,ges were received today : rersonal Devers to Clark. RN F 23198 . "I am submitting to GHQ , War De partment proT11otion recoT'lmendations for the rromotiom; of O'Daniel, Bank, Sherman nnd JJiblo for vacancies existi::ig in this theater • .l\.lso I am subnittinP" tre n.-.,me of Tucker for rroT11otion providing a vacancy esists :in the United JUngdom or elsewhere with the statement that Tucker is a ccomranying the 504 J'arachute Infantry Regiment to 'ill( . I hn.ve told General iiarshall that I realize that we have T. Brown and Rufus Ramey to yet absorb and that it is my intention to absorb thAm as soon [1S they have rad a little battle experience by attachment to divisions of Fifth Army, but that I do not feel tho.t their presence in the treater should deny Sherman his pronotion. 11 •<. AFI'Q to All Concerned . R'J F23714. "Herewith jnfornation requested in your SD 608 dat ed 26 f:arch . This HeadquPrters hes asked AG1ilAR to ship maximum possible number of J,ersonnel of 91 Div direct to Italy. Equipment is planned for shipP1ent direct to Italy on UGS 39 . rresent jndfoations are that 10 , 000 personnel will r.iove direct to Italian or Sicilinn ports with remainder to 7forth Africa ports . The latter will be transshipped to Italy. Estimate that Division l'dll clone Italy approximately 15 May and will require 1 month I s shakedown before it can be orerational. 11 * * * SMT Ml\RCO--MARCF 28 , 1944- -General Cl['lrk returned from Sorrento at 1230 today where he riad rassed Sunday and n;onday with General G:ruenthP-r . The brief sojourn that the General had at the Rest Camp stowed that it hnd done him much good . Shortly after lunch the Generr->.l vrnrked on iT'lport~nt rilitary dj spatches tm.til 1630. At tlwt time General Giraud. , accomranied by GenerP.l Juin and Colonel ICammerer , came to confer with General Clark . General Gruenther and Lt . Co.ls . Draper and SuthcrlFnd were also rresent . The conference resulied in a discussion between General Giraud and Gener1:1l Clerk for the next great offensive oper ation of the Fifth Army. General Giraud presented to General Clrrk a 1rorosed plen for coord{nated / offensive operl'.tions between the French and Ar.mricans j n conjunction vrith that of the British Eighth A:r:my to t ,e right of the Fifth Army. The rlan vras based on the worst possible situntion; namely, thnt the British Eighth Arrr1y would not crack the Cassino line . r orces ava:l lnble to the Fifth ArMy were four French divisions, one mountain , two infantry and one motorized division not yet arrived in Italy, two groupes of Tabors and three AmericP.n infantry divisions , exclusive of bridgehead forces . General Giraud proposed that one French mountain division , in a reriod of four days , would negotiate the mountainous crests via Luga , Spigno , retralla , Ruaz zo to Ii:.fi. He emphasized thet this mountain division must reach its objective within four days, due to the fact �that all of its supplies , wa t er , materiel , amnmnition , food , would have to be carried by mules . In conjun ction with t}, is operation , another French mountain force would proceed from Ausonia toward Esperia , followed by the t wo r emaining French divisions . Simultaneously, the three American divisions would attack :tn column along the co2stal road from Minturno toward Gaeta . The pr ogress of the American divisions would be facilite.ted by the fact that t he French mountain division, nith Itri as its objective , would so surprise the Germans that they would be forced to withdraw rapid l y , thereby not having t ime to thorough l y mine the coastal approach . This coordinat ed offensive of the Fifth Army vmuld have as its object ive the north- south communication r oute from Itri t o Ceprano a..'1.d Arce . G,:meral Giraud believed that four days after the mount ain division arrived nt Itri it would. take an additional fif teen days for the Fifth Ari:1y objective to be reached , due to the fact that once the surprise of the movntai n divi sion had worn off the Germans would more determinedly resist the seizure of the Ceprano- Arce objective . He bel ieved tha.t one month after this objective had been reached the Fifth Army w01ild be in Rome . He believed that there was the possibility thrt once this objective was reached the !"rermans would disengage some of t}1eir forces at the bridgehead to meet the Fifth Army ' s threat toward Fros:i.none . At th5.s par ticular point a determim"d offensive action by the bridgebead forces would force a general Gernan withdrawal toward Rone . General Giraud wished to emphasize that this vrhole plan was based on the success of this mountain division seiz:i.n g Itri, seizing it within four days and by surprise. He felt that this mountainous country would not be strongly defended by t he Germans , nor would they anticipate that any of our forces could negotiate them in any type of offensive ac~~ion . He realized that the terrain was very difficult but that such an offensive was possible and could be carried 01,t . At the same ti:ne he stated that the Eighth Ar1:1y must launch an attack at Crssino . If the attad: of the Eighth Army was s uccessful so muct' the better , but as suming that the Eighth Arr,~y could not advance f'l'l st th8 Cassino line, he still felt that a successful Fift:h Army offensive reaching the rain objective would force the Germans to withdraw from the Cossino sector to the northvrest . The quest i on of the da.te of attaclc aro13e , and General Giraud felt that snch an offensive➔ not be launched before the 1st or 5th of ti<Jy for two reasons ; that the French division being brought in would not arr5ve before April 15th and vrould require a week to organize itself , and that such an attack in the mountains would require a good moon which woul d not appear until t ht) 1st of May. He , therefore , s et a date for this offensive to be between the 1st and 5th of May. General Giraud a l so felt th;, t by seizing tliis objective the port of Gaeta would prove of immeasurable assistance in s upplying a further push toward Rome ; that after the port facilitie s had been cleared for vess els to debark supplies it i:rould considerably lessen the time of jnland suppl y routes to maintain offensive orerations . ~11'~ General Giraud made a further staternent that this offensive action , if successful , might conceivably end the war in two ways . First , it would be a great tactical setback for the GArmrns , and , seoondly, the seizure of Rome would be a great political victory. At the sartLe time , a successful Russian offensive from the east and a successful cros::dng of the channel by Allied forces would require that the Gerr'l8.ns use reserves either to resist the Allied offensive a cross the chrmnel or a successful Russia n offensive . Confronting �all three of these situ:·tio11.s, he believed th::>t it would result in a military defeat to the German Army. Sud· a plan, as discussed by GenerPl Giraud and General ClPrk , would require vigorous a11.cl courageous offensive Pction and quick cleaning up and folJ.owing through of those divisions in the re2r . The p~an as rresented by General Giraud is submitted here in its general scope only and not in detail. Only gener11.l riirections nf tre attack rre mentioned and in a broad sense o-f' tre maneuver . General Clark ,v:i_shed to point out to Gener~ 1 Grr aud that he real 1 zed thnt t P- G0rman s •rP.re a smart enemy, and they had so d:i sposed their troops so that f'rom onr rresent 1~ nes they would 11.ot cl.isAngage any forces from tl-ie bridge}· en.d to meet nn AHied attack. Eowever , he did agr0e thet if the Itri - Arce objective was reached tLe Ger1 I'l.< ns ~id1t coYJ.ceivably withdraw sc,me of its bridgehead forces to n eet this threat. General Clark then tLanked General Glraud for his tacticel e'<y·osition and stated thn.t his staff r·1d thnt of the French would co'1.sider this plan in more detailed nnd joint confere ces . After Generals Giraud and Juin lF.ift , General TJicCreery, Corinancler of Britisb lC Corrs, ceme to ray his resrects to General Clnrk. General Cl8ri: yrosented to G9nernl r'c'Jrflery a personal lettPr , tt•anking l''iP' and corunendinB h2.m :'or his out stand~ ng v:ork under Genernl Clark I s cor-r1aric . Ge ,1ernl Clark stBted that there WE"s a rossibi1ity that Gener£' 1 '1cCreery m.- ght be givon A cor1mand at t1,e beachhead; tlmt he recommended that le take a B1-it:i sh Corr s once the beac head force initiated. a lnrge scale offensive action . Ge erEl licCreery appeared to be g,:muinely sor:ry to leave General ClarJ.:- 1 s comnand and eave the aprearance of being none too srtisfied with '1is new assignnent uncler the ;.ightJ1 Army. He extended to G,::_merals Clrr}· and qruenther an j nvitcktion to din..ner after Ms return from a tvro or trree days I rest at Sorrento . Generals Clar ancl Gruenther accerted when General HcCreery v ould nn.me the date . 1 After Gennral ricCreery 1 s co"t+'err-mce , Generr ls Clr r'l-:, Keiser, Drn.nn Rnd GrnenthPr asrienl)led in tJ- e con""'erence rut for, a before-din'1er drink and dis cussed U•':l talk with Gen0ral Giraud . General Clr.r'l.- rrdteratecl a statement thr,t he mr>de to General G:iraud I s question of what forces would be evailnble to tre 'Rrj tish Eighth Army. General Glarl: 1 s re~~ly ,,.rs that trey ,,rould have sorie Folish troops, S0''1e Canad:.an troors , 'Jew Zealand troors, Indian troops and rerhars sorie r:ngB sh , and furt er that tl e I olj sh and Canadians would probably bear the brunt of the Rttack. The fcmr eenerals nnd Colonels Sutherlt:>nrJ and Draper bad dinner together . Gf:meral CL"'rk broke out three bottles of ".'rhite wine which tie decided , after drinking, vras del'cious . The ul,ite _wjne was fror'l Verona . A:"ter supper General Clar\-- vent bacJ.< to } · s van to v•ork on more adrrr'cn:t strr tive rat tors . 0 General Cl8.r·: today recei vr.~d He folJ.owing c2ble frori General Devers: 11 I have just rnceived tl-e fol1owbis eyes only cable which I am paraphrasing to you: '1'J :"?3?86 . "Late Secretary of the War Department General Staff, Colonel William T. Sexton, is enroute to your theater. He has taken course at Fort Sill and been assigned to a Division during recent Louisiana maneuvers. As able member of division on duty with artillery, I now want him attached to a United St8tes Division in the line in Italy, not as a liaison officer or observer. He can be made subordinate to a junior in rank as his assignment is to be made without regard to his rank. �l15 "To offset his long service to me here in the office, I want to give him the experience in field as a final step. Thereafter he is on his own. We will assigr,. him to a division training in United States or you can keep him." "On Sexton's arrival I will assign him to Fifth Army." * * * SAN MARCO-•MARCH 29, 1944--General Clark left for Anzio at 0900, accompanied by General Saville, Commanding the XII Air Support Command, to confer with General Truscott. He visited front line units and just prior to his taking off from the airfield at 1625, about 20 German bombers swooped down on the beachhead, bombed it and returned. They were met by heavy flak, three of the bombers being downed. One British Spitfire fell very close to the airport, killing a pilot. Shortly after this raid, Generals Clark and Saville flew back in their two L-5' s to the command post. They arr1ved at about 1710. After General Clark returned, he invited Misses Berney and Moen in for a drink and supper. * * * SA~T rM.RC0•-11.ARCH 30, 1944-General Clark V10rked on administrative papers, until 0930 when the Army G-3, General Brann, visited his van. After discussing future operations in the van Generals Clark and Brann went down to the G-3 Section where General Clark studied with his G-3 a relief model of the mountainous country which the Fifth Anny will confront in its next offensive action. General Clark was particularly interested in pointing out to General Brann the boundaries between the French and the American forces in the Fifth Anny zone of action. General Clark returned to his van and worked on more administrative matters until he received General Sibert, G-2 of the 1st Army Group in the United Kingdom. General Sibert stayed for lunch and was asked several pointed questions by Generals Clark and Gruenther. General Clark wanted to know how many German di visions it l'lOUld take before OVERLCRD would be called off - that OVERLCRD was so intermingled with political factors that it would have to go on._ General Clark wanted to point out that air power was not enough, as learned by the lesson at Cassino. A discussion of how well the coastal regions were defended was also brought up, and General Sibert believed that they knew practically all of the installations but that it was impossible to be sure of each one as a certainty. General Clark wanted to know the rate of di visions landed per day, and General Sibert answered approximately two. General Clark believed that, as a result of his previous landing operation experience, it was important that troops be landed quickly and in sufficient strength to force a beachhead. Another qw stion asked was on how wide a front were the landings to take place, and General Sibert responded about 4fJ miles. General Sibert believed that they could expect a. counter attack by' one infantry division about 48 hours after the landing and a large scale collllter attack within �four or forces. stating and the t five days which would have to be net with determination and superior General Clark closed the conversation in rather a light vein by that he would gladly gi.. ve as opposition the Herman Goering Division 1st Parachute Division which he has faced during the Italian campaign. After lunch General Clark, accompanied by Lt. Col. Draper, went by jeep to the II Corps command post at Piedmonte where he conferred with General Keyes at his van. Just prfor to leaving the II Corps comnand post General Clark and General Keyes climbed up in the rear of the II Corps command post where an excellent view of the future battlefield was revealed before them. The route taken back to the Fifth Army command post was around the coastal road through Mondragone. On the return trip General Clark stopped off at the 38th Evacuation Hospital to see how their installe.tions were getting along. They had been installed there for about ten days and were in excellent shape. They had only seven patients in the hospital. Upon his return to the command post General Clark went to his van and worked on more papers until General Sullivan and Chaplain Ryen came for supper. Generals Clark, Gruenther, Keiser, Sullivan and Chaplain Ryen had a before-dinner drink in the conference hut. The principal topic of conversation was American cemeteries; the fact that in order to conserve wood the white crosses ·had been done away with by the w~r Department, being substituted by a straight stick or wood flanged out at the top. The discussion also led to present regulations which have forbade cemeteries or graves being photographed end the inexcusable manner in which relatives of soldiers who have died in be.ttle have been delayed in receiving details or their death and where they are buried. General Sullivan said that he would get a letter off to Washington stating the problem and ma.king necessary recommenda• tions to be certain that relatives were notified of circumstances surrounding a soldier's death and where he was buried. The group had supper and later returned to the conference hut. General Clark went to his van at about 2100, worked on important dis~tches and retired. * i * * SAN MARCO--MARCH 31, 1944•-General Clark arose early in order to be at the French Expeditionary Corps command post at Sessa by 0830. He checked a few important dispatches prior to leaving and left the command post at 0800, accompanied by Lt. Col. Draper. At the French 1!,'xped:i.tionary Corps he was met by Generals Juin and Sevez. Led by General Sevez the party left in three jeeps for the command post of the 4th DIM at Cescheto. From Cescheto the party proceeded along a. rough and dusty road across the Garigliano to the vicinity or Tiboldi where they dismounted and transferred to horses. Prior to leaving Tiboldi, the PRO photographers and Sargeant Thomas, General Clark's personal photographer, took a number of pictures of the General starting off on horseback. l The party proceeded along a tortuous and rocky mountain trail to the vi.- I cinity of Suio where they dismounted and went by foot about 500 yards to an / artillery observation post in this small village overlooking the town of Castelforte. This observation post was only a few hundred yards from the front lines and afforded an excellent view of the ten-ain held by the enemy to the �immediate tront. While in this observation post, General Clark, General Juin and General Sevez discussed in detail the French d1.spositions, paying particular attention to the bridgehead held by the French across the Garigliano. The activity along the front in the French sector has been confined mostly to local patrol action by night. In front of the town of Suio the French extend their lines a.bout 400 or 500 yards from the town by night. They w:1.thdraw back into the town by daylight, during mich time there is little activity except for mortar, small arms and artillery fire. The 2nd Moroccan Regiment, with three battalions in the line, hold the left sector. The 6th Moroccan, with two battalions in the line, hold the central sector. A regiment of dismounted cavalry with American mechanized equipment hold the right sector. The party proceeded be.ck to their horses and again followed rocky, tortuous mountain trails to the 6th Moroccan eommand post. Colonel Buot de l 'Epeine, Commanding the 2nd Moroccan Regiment, accompanied the pe.rty to the 6th Moroccan sector. There, Colonel Cherriere, Commanding the 2nd Moroccan Regiment, met General Clark and discussed briefly with him the troops in his part of the line. Colonel Cherriere had just received a minor wound to his right wrist and was be.ck for full duty • • From this point the party left their horses, got into their jeeps and returned to the Garigliano River over a mule trail which had just been improved into a jeep trail. In the mort time that the French hs.d been here, they had transformed this British mule trail into a satisfactory jeep trail by dint of hard and fast \llOrk. The party proceeded back to Sessa and arrived there at about 1130. At the French Expeditionary Corps command post General Clark immediately participated in a ceremony wherein he decorated seven French officers and two enlisted men. The ceremony took place in the courtyard of Prince Umberto's Palace. It was a very colorful ceremony and lasted for aQOut 30 minutes. Among those decorated were: General Beucler, General Poydenot, General Guillaume and Colonel Pia.tte, all of whom received the Legion of Merit. One DSC and six Silver Stars were given to the other officers and men for bravery in combat. There were several absentees among those to be decorated who were unable to attend inasmuch as they were hospitalized. After the decoration ceremony General Juin had a very delightful lunch at which the following guests were present: General Clark, General Ke:ye s, General Poydenot, General Carpentier, General Beucler, General Guillaume, Colonel Piatte, Col. KamJ merer, Lt. Col. Draper and Countess Duluart who is the mother of General Gruenther's aide, Lt. Bajenow. She is a very charming French woman who heads a mobile surgical unit which is doing excellent work for the seriously wounded soldiers. Her hospital unit treats both American and French sold:i.ers - the bulk being French. General Cl.ark had known the Countess in Oujda. The guests at this luncheon left the table at about 1400, and General Clark and Colonel Draper proceeded back to the Fifth Army command post where Gene. ral Clark worked on important military di spa.tches. At 1530 he received Colonel Sexton, former Secretary to General Marshall. Colonel Sexton is over here to gain combat experience prior to an assignment. After Colonel Sexton's call, General Cl.ark looked at five combinations of uniforms for Fifth Army MP's and decided which one would be standard. �Just prior to dj_ nner this evening General Clark had General Deford, General Brann end General Moran into the conference hut for a before-dinner drink. The entire group then stayed for dinner. General Clark discussed with General Deford at great length the possibilities of air power in support of ground action. General Deford gave some interesting facts and figures on air tombing against Germany, the relative strengths of the German Luftwaffe end his ex• periences in the Pacific where he oommanded bomber units which operated against Attu, Kiska and Parima.shiro. After dinner General Clark returned to his van where he conferred with General Gruenther, worked on more administrative matters and retired. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, March 16 - 31, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from March 16-31, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1570 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/c5b896450960d606a68b88eeb1b188f9.pdf?Expires=1787184000&Signature=HrfDIUr5Yrq8PUDGi%7ErPPZEHKnZ2k3IlkKoCHCk0G3RrwsMsfaB432%7EUjUU3-jWQimpf6XtmW0RALi1fiVFof%7EGnhT9ofC3Gjy8Wu51jYoD8zK1ukGY41O3Pq7AB-ClJOF2BkVVJFLZbLGWTnVPBxcz8qCCiLnebDUTFa3hJ7j6eytdxXbbDPZqlUV7o7Z%7Ey8tamFl4xRnLCktdtUHEZcT14B7xG1g8bQ3GpufDHk5SqKVIZoNIKpLfDOMYDVWekU-VapBFeum7AWU1vrfpcHwf8HM80ufahDrHEy4HrnxHfO9zAz%7EAtUS5WKnZLfVgv07OCRZDh3162UEbMtosYww__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM f9e8392380b959ea1cbec2e5966b76c7 PDF Text Text lOJ few shells irito th" French today, killing severril ""leJ"lbers of the Brosset Division). I told Colonel Kanu".'1er1'r to advise General Juin thr--t I would present an outline of the plan to you. I 1.mderstnnd that 'Napoleon I Brnnn and his planners are in a lull at the monent, and I am sure thtt they will be r,ore than ea~er to play with this latest scheme. . "General Juin still has Cf.FRANO as his obj,•,ctivee He .h1:1s no evidence of any weakening of' the enemy resistance in that sector. If, however, it should collapse and the ~ighth Arny proceed up th('! valley b"'lfore the French crossed into the ~ighth Army zone, General Juin will stop the lrd DIA and place it in corps reserve. He is going to place the Brosset Division in cor:rs reserve tomorrow anyho-v,. The Vrench would then have two divisions advr.ncing to the northwest, the Dody Division in tbe direction FASTENA-GASTRO DEI VC'LCESI, and the 4th Dt,J in the direction VALLE CX'RSA-PROSSEDI. *'I feel tfo,.t ev~rything is progressi"lg satisfactorily on this front. I regret that the K~yes attack could not be r,ade e11rlier, but I believe t,,,,at his 4q-hour balt was necessary in view· of the scattered condition of his two divisions. fersonall:r I have r,y doubts whether ½.e will be able to attack from SONirrNO on the riorning of the 26th as he nov plans. If. he estimates thAt the attack requires two RC'.::''s attacking simultaneously, I am almost certain that he cannot do j_t at thr-d:, tjme. He ~vill submit his rlan tomorrow, and as soon as it arriVAS I she.11 forward it to you. 11 ! just talked to Walsh, Eighth .Ari~y, to bring to his attention the erratic artillery fire of the Cenadians. H, has pronisl'ld to take y,roMpt corrective action, and ha.s requested that I convey sincere regrets to the French. It is true that the Canadfan armor has re11ehed the 1i'F.LFA RIVER. However, tht'l Boche still holds on to A'WINO., and Ge11eral Leese is incEned to believe that the enemy will delay at AJU:~•TO as long as possible, 1:1nd will th,..n ease out via the CASTRO CnLO-RC'CCASSCCA ROAD to the north,1est. Walsh is not at all certain thc-,t the Eightr, Army can prevent t'ds I"\ove. He says th1Jt the tanks are having hard going in the MELFA VALLEY, arid tht>t ""a:1y of then are bogged dovm. 11 The total number of prisoners taken dm·ing this operation as of ele...ren o'clock this evening is 10,715, of' which 2,350 have been taken by Eighth Army a nt"i the rerrainder by Fifth Army. * * * Al\TZIO--HAY 25, 1944-=GenerR 1 ClPrk left · his co:mJ'lland post at 08"30 to go to VI Corps where he conferrerl briefly with General Truscott conc~rning the progress of the VI Corps attack end possibility of div~rting th~ 45th, 34th and 36th Divisions to attack in a northv1esterly d1rection towerd V·~lletri and to its south, while at the same t"me the 3rd Divisioa, Spec:L-~l Service Force continue north to Valmontone, ti1e 1st Arriored Division to support both athtcks with its bulk going to the attack toward Vl'llletri. He ret'Ened to the Fifth Arny Advrmce comrn.11.nd post where he conferred briefly with Generl'l.1 Brann and left iMMediately for the v:i cinity of J3orgo Grappa where he was to see the overland juncture of II Corrs and bridgehead forces. H<'! was Pccortpanied by about 25 correspondents and photogrA.phers. '!'he ,juncture of the bridgehead forces witt tre main Fifth Army front was a momentous occasion. It. occurred fourteen days r->fter the main Fifth Army front was lal.lllch"d on the 11th of May. �[03 ? t. Gtmeral Clark return~d to the Fifth Army comriand post where he conferred with General Brann concerning the continued VI Corps .<tttack tomorrow. General Keyes a:r-rived at the Fifth Army advance command post fror, the bridgehead overland, hav:inp; come in his .jeep frort his con..111and post northeast of Terracina. The purpose of General Kl'lyes visit was to djscuss the irrm1.immt r>1ove of the II Corps to the bridgehead. General Clark also discussed with General Keyes the progress ~,a.de by the 85th and 88th Divisions. Immediately after General Key~s left, Gen_ ral CJ:9rk flew back to the Fifth e Army forward comnand post in t 11e vicinity of San r,1arco to confer with General G:ruenther. This was his first visit b~ck to confer witP his Chief of Staff since·his movement up here on May 22nd. At ?030 Gen~ral Truscott and his Chief of Staff, Colonel c~rleton, came to confer with General Clar Jr, Gen~rnl Brann and Colont-'l Howarcl concerning the VI Corps attack tor-iorrovr morning. Details of this Ptta.ck are covered in the cable sent to General Gruenther. A"'ter Genernl Truscott 1eft,Generril Clark worked on f!dministrative matters, conferred bri~fly with General Brann and retired. Anotrl"!r exanple. of ho"' slow th,. British react to the offensive spirit occurred whim Brigadier Good body, Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for British troops, said that the two British Divisions woulcl be unable ·co srift positions and participate in tre attack tomorrov1 'l)ecause tl-iey required 72 hours to move one brigade. General Clarl< orderl'!d, nevertl-ieless, that they take over from the 45th a SM.all pPrt of their front and be rrepared to f'ollow up VI Corps Pdvances to the northwest. The Frisoner of War report showed 9,018 Fi,..tr Arif prisoners as hi:iving been,) taken since the beginning of tl--ie presert al1-011t offensive. Qeneral Gru~nth.er this morning sent the following memorand1m to General Clark: 11 I have been push:i.nt; the communique subject since early tl:is rnornjng. It went to General Alexancle:r for decision ff 1c I received a CPll back a few :minutes ago that Generi'l1 Alexander desired that the co:r.,r.,uniqu"'! be issued simultan~ously at 1400 hou:n today. Trarcling states t1'nt ris rePso,n for thr>t tim..- was to prevent Ue 1cillinP, of last night 1 s co""" unique 'l i ch was releasnble on tre radio "or th~ f'5rst t:l"'!e at a:rproxhmtely 10:30 tris morning. An earli"'r rl"leA.se would prtictic8lly eliminate trose stories.. \ 1 0 11 I a,,.. l"!nclosinr; copies of th~ Co"1munique as chPnged. Grme:;_~21 Alexanfer \ felt tl~t th, comr-1.miriue as word,a,d by you gnve the jl"lpression t1'at lFrr;e forces ) ht:1d jo:nef-, wh~reas }1e desired thPt tli~ inl.tj:11 rel"ase should indic~te th1' joj.nup of patrols only. \.,.__,/ 11 ';:'h"' last sentence referrins to th1' 1 Hazarrfomi sea rout1's 11 was del"t'"'d beCPuse of en Pgreement w:i th ':.he "'fovy. Harding says thnt the '!Pvy desire8 to issue --tts own cor1nmiques. I arg,1ed ar;rdnst· that on the fsroun 1 thPt this comnm-nique wo_ ld get the big rlay and that you ~anted to sM the "!avy ;et credit. He u said he would take up the r1atter with Aclmiral Cunningram but he was quit" certain �that the Navy would not agree. If there is a change in this I shall let you know. "The report which we h::ive from II Gorps is that the jluicture was made by elements of the 91st Recon Squ.adror. nr.c1 a B:ritish Squadron in the LITTORIA area. J-i:' that is true I sugg""st that you authorize r---~ to give that inforraa- tion to AAI so that the British correspondents here can give a little pl11y to tr.e British side." 'l'he special press CO"'"'illlique 1'mnouncing the juncture of the two elements of Fifth Army is quoted below: "Patrols fro 7i~th Army I'8in front rnade contact with patrols from Fifth Arriy alHed bridgehead force in the early morning of 25 May. This brings to a cl:t:r.iax tht"' spectacular advance of Fifth Arm,v· of rqore than sixty miles in only fourteen cays. Th"'l dranatic juncture of these patrols occ 1_xrred a few niles southeas+, o i:- the bridgehead on the cof' stal highvtay- running between TT'.JL1ACrTA and A~'ZIO. Thus ~i,ftl Arny have t""Stablisht"il. lane corsrmication -riith the bricg1~'het'ld for the first tj I:'~ sirce tt"' li-mdi-'lg ~1hich was made on 22 Januery~ 1 0 "The. troops -"'ron th, ;".a" n +'ront, c-v~rcorrint:: rowerf1.:.: ene ..y r1'sistance, , hmre "cm,-,-}--,t their wa, r forwarc1 rell"ntlessly s~ nee tl e nip-ht of 11-12 May over sc:"!e of' the r·ost d:1 fficult t('>rrain of the wrole Italial'"l campaign. L 11 The troors of th~ br-tdr;eh"tvi ha~re broken tl,ro"J.gh :he porerful defenses bu:_l:. by the <'lnemy +,o rrevent tr~ br:trlgei1ea.d force · rarticipating in our Pdvance f"roM the main front. 11 The followinr; importa11t course of the day: essages v,ere received an<~ disp::•tch~d dur·inr:; the Clark to Gruenth,er. RN 14°2. 11 'fon that we have joinl'ld up, ,s2re restrictions on 'S'l.iscelfa.neons individ1.1als visiting this area apply. The one 1~oute we now ha- e te'!"porarily repaired will riot stand other than. essential traf?ic.. Do not rermit ""'iscellan~ous activiti_,..s to pile in here in rrl"r[lratio"'l for oar advance to Rol1ile. Fe n11st control trat verv car·e!'uJ.lv. 'To i ndi vj d 1als to co·,e in l,y car, air or sea without prior ari:roval from ne. 11 0 Clar}-- to Keyes. R;'J 1494. 11 I desire to cc""'m.end in 1 irr,h~st t"')-r,s tre -=,,->gnifjcent op('Jrn.tions of yo1•r co :"1and since thl"J beginnin,.; of tre rresent offensi·.re on r~ay lltl by vi' ich it cs effected Ue ,;unction 0f Fi-"'th Arm~" "lain +>o:c'ces aPl'l the Fifth Ar,y b"'achhead trocps. You hve ~:r~cuted tl,ie nission w1 th sur"'rlative ar;i;re.,,siv1'ness ~~rr•r-tn~; the fi1ht w5trout rause to a clo-:;gec' r,nd deterndn~d erL''lY, re1 elling prornrtly his re1 eu.t~d count~rattacks a"ld r~fusing to 1.e r::iela.," ,c' ('r ob;;;trL --ted. by his strong defe:rsive pot'tions, by the fatigue of your troops, by his mines and demolitions or by the difficult terrain over, which your continuous advance has been conc.uct"'cl· ::;:n driving rim back fron :;:.osH:ion to rosition you have '"'lade hi111 ray a heavy price in casualties and pr~_soners . This brilliant aC.'/an~e wLich rms ~en exec,rted co:r-:-:iruousl~~ and persiste'1tly :'or 14 days r~ 1 :;__~es~nts a :;reat victory for the rifth Ar"'-Y a-1d e;an not fail to have a najor effect r.ot onl._-r upon the Allied ca~raign in Italy but upon the whole we.r against Ger·1nn7. :I'le:oasA. conv~y ,..y conrretulations to all �l OJ the rersonnel of' vour co '111.d as e, 1 as t' "" e;q. r~ sio"1 your sp1""'1d~cl rm~ts ~n trt" Y,jfth Arr,.y. " o: . . . J rride in ra i~g Clark to J 1in. R'I :1-1-~·.'.5 . 11 : rave j•1st c'ispc,,tched to Ge11.~n-al r"yA; a rr.es sage of con7·at·1lat..:.o,,.,s on t. e r:rilliant op~rftions by hie ~r:.,..re has been ~ffe'1te:i a junction witl J.,} e F~.fth Ar .•Y beac'.1head Porces . I wis :.c, congro.tulate you and the Fr~rch T,",:;q: edj tiom ry Corrs rm t1 f'l • r if~ cert n-rnner in wl ich si'l,;e +:.} e e ,jrn;l..1, , of 01.u- present dr~ve on '"ay 11th you vave car:~ied out yow.· offersive w1 i.c • .as arle :ross~ble +'1is union o" Ue Fifti- ArB:y·forces . In your raJ hl a.,cl cc 11.t~ r. 1ous advar.ce 011 'ha e attacked continuously, stea~ily dr~ ..-::..r , ac' · the e.1e.• "lot •ithstAnai• 1; his s't~'on o.ef""~sive rosit,j ons s:i:,d ~n sn:.te o: t ,e c · ff:i-::mlt cmntA.i11.o• . .s no• n+.-r-.r t: rol_ ,'r- wl.ic' you 'ia,r h£.d to acvarce . You l:.ave rei.•mJ.,l~esly forced h~m to pay a !1eavv toll of his for n"s in t '10•1st"n'1s o"' c&sualti.!"s an<l p~:: so" ,rs . FLase trar:=.rr i+, ·::,o all the ti-•1')01 s o your 00 • a iri ry co11. ,rEtnlPtions on t' ir . Hlorous echieve, P!r.ts •hich heve cortr·· bu.ted ir snci- g-::- .at ensure to tl , FL'tl A,. r I s vi n":.or: t1nd to our rrcgr--ss -1-owar +: e libers.+io11. of Frr-.nce . T f'. err rrou~ trat tre r:·1•n:.ch r::xrier1 • tiona.ry Co,,.::-'E' j s part of l1e Fift Arr:iy. 11 J r:::e.rk to Gruenther . R'r h 2?. 11 Ju.'lction took rlace tli::s or-ciin 6 nt 1('10 lours on Anzio-rn,..rraci.11c road ~b, 'l+. 1 or iles n"rth ent c,.. norgo GrepJx't by r ::- Corr s f'm,•c-, ~0nsistJ•1g 0f "'lenents of tte 4"t .....,ng.;neer Regiml"11-':. and o" the 01st Recon:-1a.;ssance SquPdron a11c! :;;, tEisk fo:;,·ce L·orn t: e '1eachhead under co '1rd of' Co avid·r Officer nf 36tr. "::m(neer •..- · "'11t :'l.rc ,nc: ld-lnr, :r. : :. . ta"l1 r c""'stroyer e ....t"r:i11mts anc' e1e ents of tr,- recc,rp-1a.issru1ce wit of t:,e 1st Br-:.tish ·Division. Arr1.. n ,e t'::"lts seti..sfactory. 11 1-;- 7 Clark to· Gr11~:dher . R'T 1513 . 11 H8v.-. di.rect"'d I Cor-ps to a4:.tac}· PS f'ol~ovrs rrior to "loon to crro • 31"' Ji · s~ or. e11f' JpeciE>l Sf'lrv.; c~ Force rush ~ igorously fro Cori Arl"!a on a lY-10>1.t,.Yr~ j a Arte-ra, ..,}er ents l , 1 st ftr:""lored ·Di vj sion i:r1 s·1rport . 14th ard /;5th I,~ isionsa,+,tack north:vest, folk• ed by 36th Ji vision echelc11.""c'1 tor.; ,1-it reer . Obj.active r::<lr,e rn'1nin, fro CrupolJon"' ...>tt"tjon to La:riuvio . 1")t'I- o,... 34·::.h, t?S s·tu<>tion warrants , to be nrert1.rl"!t' to tur11 i,,., tc a":.ta~l- i, i ,h :rou'ld 11orth of .-11e+,r-t <'rom e::;t, bur~ of lf't Armored Divi sio:-1 in sur;ort o"' tris Attack to nort}wl"!st. B• "tisr rf'llievj11.g 45th fivis:cn sout,r of road r1:ir .... -·...,,.,; ti-roun;:r Carano. B:rHisr Ilivis::.ons to ½e rr~pc'lr""d to f'ollov.r ur as I Cor· s advancfl\s to rort,i,,w~st . Have tolc1 '9rnrn to ;,,, ,... st,i ,Fte rossib' lity of drorr.;~, 'iO<'.tth i~ Co:.li Ll'iziali nr~a ""<'rn:·n, 27th. A.;r 17.ill ]:'re,bab,y object, nu to r1~•-c cn:rid·tions . C'tl ""1-~s.., will br~r S09th in ovf'lrl['"O. or bv boet. Aho1 1t SOO p. so11 ,r"' .J:.~J. .!' in C1 ste1·nr . 0 1 DaniP:!.. t,,11:3 " tris ~ven·rg tl: at Ppp·ox.;r.nt""l 100 more tal fl\U 11 ,t Tl'?er. Cist~rri•1 e11r1 Cori. 3rd n~vis'cn rrEct~callr on i.b; o"1iectives ore r"ld t •o . S;reciA.l Sl"!r·.rice F·orce on three. 1st Ar ored1 PA.d toup-,r r,-oinr; jn the dirl'\ction of ""lletr:i . I r launching t'1"1 s new !l.tfa,ck w1tl 1111 sreed J'ORsi1'le in <'rd~r o ta},;~ t>dYDnuige of ~ r•tns ot our "rlvance an 1 in 0rder to ov~rwhe:1n tl1e enemy i.n v.l:-Pt I11'lY bt'l r ·erion·lized conditio"l at ti1e . tresel"t til'i e . Vcu can assure G .. "ral Alexen<ler t:rrt tr::s ~ s a'1 all- out attrck . I e Fre shoot ·11~ tl e works . " , __ 1 1 • I r Gru~nt er to Ac'I anM CJ . ::rn 1~5. ''Troop Carri.""r Cor ar.:'I r•rorts tr..nt ht"!a .r fla'• r,,13.l·~s 1"Prb0rour;r >1rop i.mrractic<ibl"' f'o:r ?Sth . G--in"'r[ll Cannon will a' e t"1orou~i- study o" flak situF.tio11 to arrow ~n cr"ler to settle confl·· ctinC;s . ' 1 Gru,..ntl-ier to Advance GP . R'J 7~12 . "Assu e trat no decisi.on has been roached ooncerninCT ~srac"ute ~ ou. I" • ,~ ,rronr, ae ine ur,rently.' -------.;. �~ As of this e •P-in~ ther" have been 1,357 casu.nlties Fon~ Fifth Ar~y for ces on tr."! 1)eecrihead s-i hce ti1e 1ep;inning of tre all-out offensi e '!ay ?J, 1944. Durini:: t t same reriod o" time 2, 633 prisoners of war have been tak"n in this sa"' sector . * * * ANZIO--!¾.Y 26 , 1q44--0rer1,,tiol"s Instruction #?4 1.e.s issu."d today. This dire cts I Gorps to attack to_ thi-. north!!est, c:;e~ z-= n , the rrl'lni-.:.."Rl line Lanmrio - Ca. poleo e station and fro thri.t r: r'•rPl line rress on vigorously toward Rome. The attack, as outlini-.d in this Or-.r~tions Instruction, div~rts part of the VI Corps force i'.'1. a new trr 1st northwest tol"mrd Rone . Th~ att'lck toward Valmontone still continu•s a.s in t¾e ori inal rlan Btfi'I~ALO . 1 At r915 General Clr>rk left with BrigP"li..er Goodbodv and his British aide, C1mtnin Lnnrson for tl e 1st 3:ritisr ~1ivision where he conferred with r-t ,adie.r Loewen ~nd General Gregson-Ellis, Connander of the 5tr British Division. mhe · toric o~ discussion was t:be f8rt that the 31:itiqr Div~si s w~ll play i..n tl.e attack . T!1ey are to .r>.ssif:t tl-e attn.ck 11 rusl in,:,; ~orward stro.,,_,~ co. oct petrols a11d increased fir"'s 8lo:'1~ the entire rront. Bott ~jvisions will conform to tre advance of "tre Divisions on treir ri ht . Gtmeral Clark return~d to tr e co1"111n:nd i:ost nt 1030 and hed a press conferenc~ at wricl-- ,~ or-ien-l;ed t:1e rress on the new Attack to kke :rlace later this orn~n ,. He exrlA.~n~d to thel'! that !;r is attR.clc ,as a direct threat towartl Rol'!e a:>1d tru 1 t it would e push"'d vigorously - that it WPS an all-out 2ttack and th<it h"' was shootirr, the wo1~'rs. Gt'!nl'lrt,.l ClPrlr brou rht out thf!t the German was in a bad rosition f>.nd thPt tr 1 s n""w attaC'k was launched so tbnt we do not lose nny impetus to t!-1" ,, ins already rnc>de by tr'e brid ,!'!head ~orces. ':'his attack pusr ing YJ.o.,,.th rest c~n r,ain for u11 tre hi.11h r;round 110~·th and soutl1 of Velle tri wl-iich would force the G~r:--ia:1s to withdraw fro. tr e entire area to the northwest and v :rus}1.inr1 vigor usly northward towRrd Rol"le ,e rd.r,ht craclc a svdtcb rosi tion which we knov1 to bl"! prep:'1red bet een Lake Albano Md tl-e Tiber. The press as'ked se eral questions whic:1 Gen,.,ral CJ.Fr', ansvr'"'r""d frnnkly and to the point . At 1115 Gen-,ral Devers t=irri V1'd by cub t>nd CE' ., i 1'di:>tely COJ1U'l4nd post . General Clnrk orjented General Dev~rs on and what he contenplr-ited to do as t11e ::>tt1:1 c1,(" todny rrowessed . le+'t tod4y Pt noo:>1 and ~ent direct tot~ VI CorTs co~-and post Clark 1 s to G""n!'!r~l events to date Gen~ral Dev ,:l's at Conca. General Clc--rk cmf""rrer1 with G~neral Brnnn Pnd stud.:.ed rrogress of the b~ttle in the •arly f8~t of tre a.:'ternoon and at three o'clock left for the co.Mand rost of the 45th and 1st Armored Di i~ions . !Ie discussed with tPese Division CoriManders -l;le siturtion at t eir i ..; ::ate fronts ~c" ::..eRrned first hand how the attack as pror,ressi".l.g . He r~turn•d to the co 1a11d post at 1745. Highli :hts of t:., Fifth Ar .y 1 s pror;ress toc-iy were thrt reco-rnpissance eleJ"lents had r~acPed Art.,na. Th"' 14t~, 45th and 1st J'rmored Divisions read made r,;ains or abo1 1t ,., ,ooc yarc s to tl1~ 11orthwest. T "' '3rd ;)i 1.sion anc1 Special Cervi.ce Force w~re also :--•.1shing northw,,rd. r:1-, ents o~ the '3J~d :Ci-vision were just sout.1 of. Artena . On the TI Corrs ~"ront the hir:h P,"round to the i'lest of J irerno was t.... <i.ken bv th!'! 139th In+>antry. We had r/1\connf'i•~s nee ra.trols in Sezze. In �lt 1,_ l.P the French sector some advances were Made , ,sr"lcially on the right where ele ments had passed through San Giovanni to the north . On the 1!:igrith Arf'l'y sector two bridgeheads have been established ncross the Melfa River , and tank units were rushing out to the northwest . The following important messages of the da;::r are quoted below: Clark to Gruenther . ·RU 8124. "Represent strongly to S-"ville the fact that ten cases occ11rred yesterday where.our ai:- ~ttricked our own troops in the bridgehead area . Brann ;1as offered a solution. Flease see that imr1ediate steps are takl'!n to correct th is d:lffi culty. Last night at about 7: 00 P . r.,. , eigl1t f' - 40 • s attacked 3rd Division colullln 1)e'0ween Cisterna and Cori, killing three and wounding twelve . Those ,.,,is sions 'nhich do not check in with our forward control nust keep clear, ~,ust give this place a wide herth. 11 Leese to Clark. WT 2609. "This is a great day for the Fifth Army so finely er.r-ned . On behalf oft):-,~ "":ighth Army I most heartily congratulate you and your troops . 11 Clark to Leese . RN 8170 . tions . Hany thanks . n 11 Deepl;r appreciate your raessage of congratula- General Gruenther sent General Clark t1'e following memorandum at noon today: "General Alexander arrived here at 11:15 this morning and reriained cbout twenty minutes . He was acconpanied by Lerm1,itzer . He ask~d if he could drive toward ':'-:-:RRACI'JA , and I told him 'certainly, Sir' $ Iie is i'Tell pleased with A.. f'l C. the entire situ.c'ltion, and was w:,ost compliFentary in his references to the Fift,hl. Army and to you. T explained the plan of today ' s atta.ck in the bridgehead as outlined in your radio, and as :1"urtrier amplified by yon while you were here yesterday. General Alexander agreed that the plan is a 1sood one. He stated, 1 I am for any line of' action which tre Arr·J Conw,nnder believes will offe:r a chance to continue his present success 1 • Ahout five l'.'.'linutes later he said, 'I am sure that the Army Co:mr1ander will continue to push toward Valmontone, won't he'? I \:now th.t he npprecfrtes tre r'portance of.' e:iining the 1-igh ~01.U1d just south of Artena . As soon as he captures that he ~ill be absolutely safe. 1 I assured him that you had that situation thoroughly in "'lind, and that he could de .. l');r. pend upon you to execute a viigorous plan with all the :!"ush in th~ world. I am certain that he left w:Jt}-i no r:1.ental reservations as to the wisdom of your attack. He stated that if you are able to capture the hieh .c;round north of Velletri it, would put the enemy at a serio11s disadvantage, and would practically insure the success of tl1e bridgehead attack . He j_s looking forward to his visit to the bridi;ehead tori,_orrow . 11 .i/-. "Joe Cannon called to find out the status of' the parachute drop . I advised him that Plan 1 B' was definitely off, and that you hnd SlL"IW!oned Yarborough for a cor"'"'rl'mce to c'eterrnine tte f'easibilit;r of a dr<?r in the Coli Lazzoli area . ---Joe is .,...ost eager for a dror . He sup;z~sts, A.s did St-'lville yesterday , a drop north of Rome . I told him that you had given tru:t Fiatter careful consider~tion, but at tMs noment such a mission see, s inadvisabb . Joe said that he was "1 �going to keep thinking of other possible missfons, And thl"t he vrould probably be offering lousy su~gestions :rorn time to time. I told hi~ to go ahead because you were always glad to recei-ve new ideas. 11 General Clark later in the afternoon replied to the abov-e memorandun as follows: 11 Your 1?20B memorandw. of the ?6th has just been handed to rne. I hope you have been able to tell General Alexander by t:tis V'Tie thPt we have Artena and are no doubt pusriing well on towards Vnl;,,ontone. I did not deter from sending a strong -;:...orce in that direction in compliance with his instructions. The other advance is going well. I am a. little confused as to vihether the enemy is going to ""ake a stfl.nd on the prep..,red f'OSition running east and west through Velletri. Ee must, or lose considerable of his force. "I visited the British Corinnanders this morning and urged thern to in= creased effort. I b"lieve there is only a shell in front of tbern. "Devers spoke to me th:i.s rnornjng about the parachute drop. ·I told him I was not going to be stampeded into a 1 two-bit I effort under Plan B in the vicinity of r1ount Malaina. It would contr:ibute nothing, in my opinfon, and just satisfy sor,,e of these birds who wnnt to see somebody drop~ Besides, the nir screamed 1 flnk 1 at that point. I would like them dropred on the Colli Laziali, but I can ir.',a.gine how far I will get witl~ the flak holler. Yarborough has been here, an<l I have told hiM of _my desires. They are studying it. ttrn would b'°' I can do zation. head and my opinion, to drop the handful of ~rachutists, 500, nortr of Rorie perfectly futile. I will dror thent when the situn.tion dictBtes and some good by the e:xrenditure of at least a part of that 4'-ine organiIf son"tring does not show ur soon, I will bring them "nto the bridgeuse thel"' as ground troops. T told Ile'V';l!)!'S all of this.tt Clark to Gruenther. RV 8165. 11 VI Corps just re:rorts bornb:Jnis of our tank units in the Artena area wi tM.n t:he 111st two hours. This is seriously affecting morale of our troops. They report oth~r instances have occurred today. I insist that air units wro CA.n not :identify our troops k"'lep out of this area. Please take drastic 2ction to see that this is done. 11 / At 5:30 this evening General Gruenther dispatched the following menorandum to Gent"!ral Clark: 11 I am very much disturbed to learn that the air is bombing our own troops \ again. I got in toucr with Ge"leral Sr>ville imrnedfr,tely, end he is taking every possible :ri.eans to see that such jncidents do not recur. He has forbidden all air to enter the line included between t:be following linits: Bomb line Valmontone - Fighway 6 to Rome; thence down LMa Ror1a; along the coast to the bomb · line. According to the 4 nstructions he has issued no planes will or,erate in that area except the control bv AGORif, "J"'icD is the forwrrd control in the bridgehead area.. 11 G"lnera.1 Sairille is very eager to get further details of' the Artern1 bonibing. He is thorou~1ly cooperetive in atteT1J.rt:ing to avoid it, but I get the impression that he <loesn 1t 1mo"' 'V:at to do in addition to th"l instructions he has already laid down. �t09 11 General Keyes has just left here. Fis attack in the Sezze area is going very well, and there is at least e reasonl'!ble chance that he will be on the Sezze heights by e11rly riorning. We are "'10W rla"Ylning to have General Crittenberger take over coy1rnand at 280001. · e shall know by noon tomorrow whether or not the transfer at that time is practicable, but as far as I can tell nmv it is quite feasible. Generel Keyes, will have a small advance party at your headquarters by ~ o I clock in tl,e morning in order to be oriented on the operation wMch YOU des1.re to hrw"' him 1Lndertake. 11 Your 1530 memorandum just arrived. We are rill very rleased over the pro.:;ress ,wM ch the bridgehead attack is n:'lking. "Genl'Jral S2ville f .. els thPt there is a reasom:ible chance th~t the bombing of Artena was done by an ACCR 11T mtssion. 11 Gruenther to ClPrk. R:lf 18'7. n-•aville has cancelled all Pi.neapple mission south of' Hir;hvnly 1 and Hi~hway 5, and issued orders to close down Acorn~ This is from 5: 30 memo. 11 The total casualties in the beachhead from th·e opening of the present attack to mid!J-ight tonight 1'.mount to 3,579 American a11d 199 British. Gen1'ral Juin today issued the following Order of the Day to his troops: 11 With thl"\ end of the first phase of the offensive T.Jr"rked by the total defeat of' the cnemiy who opposed us and by the Junction of all Fifth Arri.y Forces, I salute piouslv our r:;lorious ·dead, ,,.,110se n.<=tnes today, ,join in the Legnnd, tJ,ose many H~roes of our rnce wr o fell on Italian soil during the centuries of hj_story. "I express my sn.tisf'action encl grrititude to t"be troops stpffs and services who carried -'rnto battle so '1Uch courrge, faitr, intelligence and abnegation. "Rivaling with audacity, tJ.,e units o+> the Fr<"'nch E:x11editionary Forces sue .. cessfully cracl,:ed two strongly organized ene:rny positions and fought continuously and without rest side by side witr our gel lant Allies. "A deep advance wMch has already attained /,,,5 kilor,eters several ene-rny Divisions annihilated, "lore than 4,000 rrison~rs (of wrich there were 110 officers), and nuch "10re jri:rortant enemy mnteriel CR.ftlJI·ed, sue}" is th~ result, to date, of the ~J'ictory gained by the F.F..C. The echo of this vi;:tory, charged with hope so'mr'ed in the her,.rt of all r'renchme:'1 and elevrted the B.dmiration of the Allied Co"lllanders. "Another phase, ,rr:tch will tn.ke us fnr is now openinp;; the F .E.C. will continue to 1 1old hi.P,h tre> proud colors w1,ose Appearence on Mou'1t 1Majo I terrified the Gnrman and signaled his i'etreat. "For1vard always forward. 11 T1'""; HC'HR. ()V LIB~'l'I0>;,T IS '-IEAR. 11 �l1 0 A'"ZIO- -·•\V:- '27, ·19/+4-..farly -':.:bis rorn1ng 'ontill'.3 :;-lA.nes flew ov6:..' th,, port ar8a a.nd 0.rorr0.cl sol"le bo~bs . C""fice1·s ann "'18n. rtayi nf! thP c~ stle urstairs were -f'0rce{ do"ll into t 1 1e tunnel. The a;)..ert last11c:'l f'or a..,0ut Pn 1 our . Ge11eral Clar', arc-se early ancl stt'c "ed rro resc- made "'Y t:10 1,eachhe c1 +>crces durinr; tre Tl~ ,~t . There were i"lany v·sitors to trP col"''T!a'1r' post today. First to arriw, wps .Go-'1°rr,J. 'foce, G-3, .AFHQ. Be conferred vr'th Gene:N,l C Prk ,r' efly, w110 oriPnted him rr. t: e situation, and then left to visit frort li~e di.visions. A'"te:,.~ GenerPl •roce left, G~r8rf'l Sn,•·tlle caJ"B in to c'H sc'lSf' with General Clr:ci tre ~rci.<lerts wl'" d1 c-ccurred ir -rrl- ic'1 C'U~ tr.oors r.!ld beer. bC'mbed by our ovm aircra..:t. A bor. 1 ~110 wil: )e Astabl isrnd short of wr :::.c. forward .cm1t:col ca'1not Ni:rn~ t n11y bcnibing sorties. After GenArr 1 J,,,ville left Gen8ra:.s Jo11·1pon £rd Fur,A cr;1Je t, co'1..f'er witr. Genert>l Clark refcr,mce t e O'!';U}."'l'tion rf' Ro"'!? b. tl e F:i.ftl1 A1•y,y. GenPr~l Clnr'l- ~~ntE'd t0 or-tent tl1 eP1 1uic'.klv ""1r1 ra,re tl1em rre1 ared to accoFpany him -into Rc:ne s0 tl Rt re cou~_d ··Y'!mediate1_v re-''er 2."l ,Ptters 0-r ti,.,, city f'dniin-1 strfl.tior. tot er. AftP-r Gonr~~ls Johnson ['nd qumq 1e~t, General Gammell, Chi~f of Staff t0 Genern.l 'Hlson, CI {C "'editerr~n'3an Tl:9<1.ter, arrived to vi. it t. e two British Div::.s::'..011s in Fifth A.rry Pr>d tc corfer briE'fly with GP,nPrl"l Clark. ~e Wf!S acco~pan-led by rigRniPr mronpson. At 101(' General fl.lexander prrived Pccr'"'~nind by Gorerrl GP non aYJ.d Bri.gad i.er 1 •cirreri.n~. General ClA.rk or:· entBd GBnerr- 1 Alexann.er a11.cl Ge'."leral Ca"l't'lon 1Jriefly on events to dP.te at tl:-E' 1,eccl ead front, and the party left , imnedj ately' b•r jeep for tre VI Corr<'! c0"':mand no'1t rere tl.ey con''erred with GenP.ral 'T'ruscott . From tr e VI Corps cor>1mRnrl ,-~st the rarty ;ent to Cisternn . Tre to,m vas comrJ etely 'l~eclred and in s am'-ilo. • Abandoned arc destroyed GerTan 0quirnent were strem on the roarlsi'.ies, , ·' ,.,T".mu..."li.tion wt>s abPndonen . Tre scrme WBS t;,,'J;'~cal of' many areas f'rom 1,1c:b thP Gflrman hfl9 bee11 driven by t '1e Fift1 Army. From c:ster'iR t' e rart went to tre 45th Division comT".and post to rliscuss tl e sitwtion on tre:r front. Fror- the 4Sth I..ivision cor"'lft.no rost tre YJ.ext stop was the 1st Armored D~vi.sior vrrere Generc-1s Ckr'I" and. Alexander discussed w.;t1, GenAral PPr,.,,on thA 1st f\I'Jrlored e"forts rdnce tl e beac head Pt tack e ,an. The 1st J'lrmored was in thP rrocess of regroupinr, foinr, back into rear areas in rrerPrA.tion "'or an all-out attac1:: next 'kmdey to:ward Rome. Fror the 1st Armored com.mand post the rarty went to tre: 5th British Division and frori there to the 1st British Divjsion . ~eneral 'lexander an➔ h~s rerty left iT'1111ediPtely upon treir r8turn to tre Fi.ft Army adw nee com11and rost +>or AAI Headquarters in c~serta. GenP,rr,l 1 Cl1'1.r1r c P,cide>d to. i'ly bPc' k t ,8 iftr Arrv corlr'end post in t fl vicinity of San •rarco in order to d::: scuss with his Chief of Staff , Gen8ra~ Grui=mther , 1.m:rorta:"lt mritters concerning the II uorr,s a11.d Frm,c}, Corps "rents. He wished to discU~8 in pnrti cu1t"r w~ tr GP-neral Juin tr e rossil)ilities of send~n~ up a Fren-JJ.1 Division to tl e beE!ci he11d to assist ·i.n rushin~ on into Rome. Re also wi=mted to P.xpeditP. f' move111en-f; of r::: Cor-rs to tre beac1'.hevd f'roT'1t "in cr der to utilize II Corps Headqu.:"'rters in a drive towi.rd Rone . He intends to fly back tonorrow T11orn-1.nr, P"'ter these d.! <Jcussions take pltice . ~ ~ �ll l Hir:hlights of todAy 1 s battle progress were HS f ollons: Limited P dvances were rrede by the 45th and 34th vivisions Pgainst determined GermPn resistance . The 36th Division had relieved the 1st Arnored :-Jivision, and the 3rd Division had rushed "1ore of lts units up into tre _~.rten.a area. A new task force was formed, called Shepherd T2.sk Force, wliicb coi-i.s:i.sted of the 15th Infantry less one battalion and with one b;:ittalion of med.i.um hmks . Its mission is to attack vigorously tovrard. Valmontone and seize and hold that locH.li ty. On the II Corns f'ront Sezze had been occup7ed and rdvrinces were made to the hi.gh r,round. further to the northeast. In the French sector, although prof:;ress was slow, some advances were made . On the Bighth Army front the 5th Canadian Brigflde hr d tA.ken Geprano and was pushinc• forward on a new objective to tre northeast called Pofi. The seizure of Ceprano by the Canadians will relieve to some extent pressure on the French r:l1ht flAnk rlong the Sacco River o General Clark's notes on today's Pctivities are as follows: "As I have often indicf'ted, the direction of etteck assigned me for the Anzio effort vm.s in the direction of Cori - Valmontone . This w2s due to a long-standin~ , pre-conceived idea by Alexander , instigated by his Chief of Staff, Hardin~. It was based on the false -premise that if Route //6 were cut at ValmontonP a German Army would be annihilated . Tris is ridiculous, for many roads lead to tl-,e north +'ram Arce, '7rosinone and in between. I was forced into this attack, but it had a 6ood feature in thrt it took Cisterna and gr:ive us the o½servation in Ue area of Cori. If the going became tough on Valmontone I could shif't the weir•ht of my attack to the northwest . ::xactly this has happened . All German troops "ithdrawing from tl--e Cisterna area have taken a position between Velletrj and Va lmontone . This area has been reinforced from tl e Britisl" ,"est flanl· ~rea and b;· t½.e Her:mi->n Goerin~ Dj_vision. Once we advanced to Valmontone it would be difficult to turn west ~n road via Route #6. Cornri,.mications alone would r1ai:e this impracticable . I therefore directed VI Corps, as indicated in Operations In"ltruction.#24, which is quoted below. The attack is pro':;I"essin~ slowlyo We will hreak the Fnction Line to wrich he is withdraw:i· . .,., and 1rre will ca.pture Rome. It i.s just a question of time now . 0 , . t1The j1mction of the two forces day before yesterday was a grand event for the Fifth Army. It completed a si.xty- mile drive through the mountains by II Corps with two newt:' . S . Divisions . I had to be on hand for tre official Junction . It meant more to me thrin anything since our success P.t SPlerno . I have now ordered II Corps into the beachhead with ' t} e view of putting t,"O corps into the attack with an all-out drive to capture the Colli Laziali area w}ich mean:c:: the early fall of Ro,,,e . It will be desperate figJ,ting , but I must maintain the impetus of 011:r attack and take advantage of the remornlized, shatterecl condition of the enemy. Fifth Army alone has captured over 10,000 prisoners in two weeks , kill0d ano wounded as many and destroyed great qu;e,ntities of enemy equipment. The enemy will have diffic11lty mriking a deterMined sta11d wHh l1is hodge- podge mixture of units against the trrust of the Fifth l\.rmy. 0 11 1st Armored Division ' s efforts were not success.ful yesterday, due to great resistance Mouth of V9lletri and poor tank terrein. Truscott has put 36th Division in ~ts place , regroupinr, Harmon in order to c1rive in the 45th �l l 2. Division sector wrere the terrain is better. ThPt shoul1 t~ke plRce tomo~row P.nd lT\PY break th0 c~mel' s back. nr _ave continually telked with my British Co...,,,.,.an.ders in an e-f'fort to en~r~ize trP.~ ~~to Pn Attack. There i9 Po P~tac left in them. Tre 5th Division· is poorly led by Ge~ern.l GrP, ,9on-"";ll is. :re h~s no oNensive 1yd.rit . Brit;Pd-· er ;,oewen, wlio has iust 1nen put in co:r.rnpn<l o-" t 11e J:st Division is better, alt 1oup:h new <>nc: yo,mg. I f'TT\ sure l-ie dll rus:-1 fo:t""Tard witr :iore vigor. 11 1 Import~nt nessa ,es of the day Freas follovs: General Gruenther this r,iorninr; dispr>tched the following nemorandum to General Cl~rk: "Four dPys p ,o I took up A.t;Pin with AAI the question 0:f speed:lng up the arr:vBl of tre J.<'1l8nce of tle Qlst Pivision. I vas advised that they are still scheduled to Pr~ive rere ~hout June 15, ann that this date can not be adv~nced. Yesterday: spoke to GenerPl AlRXP~der E'~out it, and hP, sai<l r.e certPinly agreed that we needP,d it row on' th<>t he woulr do everytl-dn he could to get it. Last rie1 t re sent a !'lessage to Al.,.,HQ !"""'kb, "!:.re request. :::: Gfoke to G~inel aho11t it 1est nir,ht anc' he saii t! Pt --1;1 e instructions fron the Combined C' ;efs of Ste.-i--"" conc0,rninc- tre cover r ln~ 1 ere so de"i11ite t}'f't le r1oes not soe how it ~n ossibly 1:-e r ade evailr-hle to us Ft t' ·is t5m 0 • All o-" t rt, I believe, is 1baloney 1 • I su,;eqt tl-iet you tak~ the ~atter up wit~ GAner~l , Alexander todny and A.lso dt: 'foce anrl Gn1mel. Inc.; rlentr,lly, L"'nmitzer st::-tes that it is his uncerstandirrr thFt the balance of tl e 91st vill not leave forth Africe 11..11--l;il June 15; :!n fnct he is 1ui.te cnrt~in of thE!t. Hovever our -inforrztion :is t½at it will arri. ve here Junn 15. 11 G8ner? 1 De·:ers ca 11 ed 1 ti st n.; rt to 8tate th, t ' e shall get -:. e 517th Parachute RCT as or:: t(~E.lly plenned, but t-i-Ft o'IT ~eq'1est fo.,.. tl:o 5"i0th Glirler Bn eni the '551st Ferachute ~"l will ½e d.; rPpproved. I tMnk th=it these units are to be tr~in"'d for 7tl Ar~y use. I suggest t Ft you Plso <li~cuss this nQtter wi. tb ./1 le:xander, Gm,mel t:ind i'oce. P. s you ~; 11 reme"'lber t:ra 517th "'s e :ng ,ive:'1 ,o us to 0btain P :rnri..o 1 of h:1.ttl e-qier :nnce. "t seems to Me tb1t the sarre ar"1.L'ilent ~roulrl 1.1n-r.l for t1-- ~ S5Ctr f'n -J. t' o '.>5lst. 11 GenAi."a1 Ale:ia>nc'er ,~ 1"' derf'rt c::h0rt:.y <ifte,.. ! ~ s c,"lf'eri=:rce. Le.I"" estiT"'atec:: tl--iPt tl1e der 01 rtl're t,•,.,,, will be 10 o 1 cloc·'"• Cannon will be v:,·t1 1 i!'1 bu-s it haa not -yet be3!' c'eci.rlerl -i-:r f>t P,r or '10 4; ~1[,rr"'rir-<; vrill be ··1 -tlin Jcirty. "I ta""',.P,d to 'i~rhorou a'1t Idr~s 1':'"""oor Ct>.,..rie:r Cor"lf11d) .,-este""'ri<i.7 f'f,errioon Pbout tJ:-e, Coll:i kzzol· dror. '!'le' ~re cP.rt1.11.n:y "lot ent1,·1c;'=<:i.sti.c o er t e ros ... ect 0"' dror~i.r , ·ln t 1Pt area. "I ha e just veri ,.iP.d t' ~t de}x'r Africa f' ho·1-t -Ju"'e 15th. 11 1 -ir~ ff'te. L8rr. i.s ri '1t. ThRY sail .p,,.o:-, •rort A report rrom G-? today nulTl~er~d the rrisoners as 0-P ?100 ~6 r~ '1,850 taken by Fifth Arn;~ R•y' 3,?lt tn -,n y =·i ,hth Arny. As o.p '100n today 1,B43 Amr,r~.car bat+, 1 e cas·ta lt~ '"'S been ad,itted to osr~tf'-~ ~n t e rz·o are&. . ~ · ·. ' . ,c •< .. . ~ ... .. . _ F'1C rs "l~ B:--itish ave �1 l3 Gei19ral Clari.. this afternoon sent the followinc T'."enorandum to General Gruenther: ttGertainly hav-e bee·'1 bomb rdec=t with hrass h.0o.ts today. Believe ::e have st:::a~ r;hte'1erl out tl'e nir contro,1 9rsy with S8ville . He will tell you, of course . tiave he'ln all aro'r.'lrl tbe fro:1t »r:ltl1 Alex, and l e see'!"ed neetly f please.:: er"1 ,,e·('y flatteri''lf; i r H s rci:rn::ir 1:s of Fift1,, Army., I a skec1 },im to } prod t!-1.e two BrH:l sh Div~ sio:rs, ahic) 1~"'! did. le ere making prc,-;ress with 34t:1 a 1d 45tr. . '1:'re.r nig1·t cc '1Cei'7'!lt'llur 00 on tr8ir Carnroleone JtPtion Laninrio objef!tive toni 11t hit l1P~re ._;us+, seen Faul Faschal ur forwarc' , and he t½.inJ.s not . T' ,1~e :l s st:::-ong opposi tior, ,: n tre wad dies ..,rom machine gux1s , self- propcllec Y'lOU'1ts . Trcse are p9r: ar s d9la;v:nr- dc,t,wh"'lents ,+ile the mai'1 h')cly r;oes back tc tle T'nction Lin,~. The rressure 1,y 34th and 45th st..o"J.l:l out-;riaY19 1 1vc,r tie G9r,"12ns -'11 :'ron+. 0:' t' e :st and 5th '"'1~-ttis 1 :8ivisio·'13 . 1st ~r~ t · .J, is pus:.::.11..-r on in confcrmit.l ith Birdie I s ndvance . 1 0 4 l 1 0 11 Just received your not-3 rc,com.11end:5n~ ··nlease of II and VI Corps . What ·i 1s1-,irrscl :fuJl" recor-mendation·1 I :,a7e had it in :mind and intenJ to do it, 1-m-i-, I ju::t wonderc,d : f bJ any cLrnce JeVf'lrs Lad discussed it. Tte :Jecretary of Har all·eady announced the II Gorps, so Keyes is al1 eady ir. t~1e clear . .,,ruscott I s nane 'ms l-ieen released as co:r:n1andin~ a forr-1ation, and as soon as h~ Las r:m1pleted a phase of his attack .,.. intend to corT1E:md him and the 'ifI COl],S and ther announce it, but I do no;:, t0el that his o::.s.rpl.oits 1 12.ve 1 188!" sufficiently outstandh:, yet to warrart +hat coT'lmondation. Yo·u. know 1 ha7e always waited 1.n1til soret} ::ng l:'as reall,t happened before : conne'·1d . Incicle11tally, I discussed with Alexander the releasing of ..:..loan and Coult:r vcitl t' 8 :numbers r/: their divisions . Follow up . It wo,1ld be a great 11oost for training norP.le in the 0tates . 1 1 > HAn1 letting Don cori.e do,vr1 fo1~ h.is Sat111~c1a~r n::.r+~t . Ile will be bac]{ i.n tl'e 111orn~ ng. I may conceivably "'ly down lrater l',u.t rrobably v·ill not . There 'is notl ~ng oim; on l er") of a sensational nature . 11 C' Drniel 1s Affort to cut ac1·oss to Valnontone h8s been held up , due to some clean5n~ up of 'Jocl,e in tL., Arte11a area . ]e l"opes tc send the 15th In<''antry, less one ,1.s.tt&li·'J,1., and witl1 a 1:xitt.alion o-P tan-;cs, td 1 s and eri6 i \ 1ers, to c11t tre roed to Valmo"ltone to11ie;ht . It will a lmzardous task . ½e t1: have ',een 't'ery leni~nt in perr-,~ t ting r eople to cone ur here . I spol~e +:.o Alex "'bou4:. it and said 1e must TT'a; nte ir. tl e rr-lnciple th.ot no one ca'1. -:;ome witl:cut n1y 11.utLo:city. ,!hen th· bi,; 2.ttac'lr is on here for Rone, I will +;ry to s1 ut dcwn except for Alex if he ins:: sts on coning . HHeve ordered Johnson and Hu.me to bring their gan,:, up . As the time shortens 1,ef'ore our ent:r-ance to Romo, I rmst h2ve 8ccess to those people ns questiors cone up . Tliey will nove t 1 0i:;:· 7,00C stront:, outfi.t ir. to an area des: ::,1ated by Brann, yresu.rnably e.round Li ttoria . "fith Don away tl is evening, I will stay here and may fly down tomor~ row and get a swim. H G·ffriern.1 Juin today issuec tr·e follovd·11; ;11emorand1:u;; to bis cownanders: fl �l l4 111. The G2rerRl Corr.'01rncFng I"re 11ch Expect-· +.ionary Corps 'ms been shocked by the compla;11ts made by 1• • ".G . relAtive to tl""' attitude of certain elements o+' ..-:irPncL Troops toward the Italian popui:-.,+,ion in the course of our recent advFnce . Acts of br5 p,ndar,n have bee11 cc"'lmitted . Armed roo Jery and rape hl've rous-sc~ the people vko 7 i ve in forward areas and Wl7 o are cot1plaining l-i+,terly to tre Lill fod autror:1..,_ iAs . Tl'-ere is cause of course to make allovrances f'or exaggeration, but sue) fncts rim the risk of d-'Lscr9dit~ --:r:; an army Fhicl: is composed pr:iJ"'larily of Colonial troors . · 11 2 .. How8V'er strong 0 11r :eelinr;s 17ay he ar,ainst a nation F 1 ich treache rously betrayed France, we must m8:n~Pin an attitude c~ di~nity. T 18 :-'rend~ army hes gain9d the respect of e~:eryore on the Ital:._an battlefield . It should be easy to cement t>is rerutatfon by adopting a correct E'_ttitude in ,1 con.::pered country toward n. people who are experiencing at tris ~10111e 01t t1'8 t'1ost terrP)] e horrors of Y!ar .<>nd •rhose lot is pitiable in the e:,res o:: our ollies w} o are charged w:it':1 the edmin5_stretive resronsibility. 11 3 . Divisional Oor.-illm.nclers nnd the Commandinr, Ge 1eral of tre Gouns will take forthwith all tJ--.e necessary sters wrich are required to rut an erirl to all acts w}i.ic11 are detrimr-mtal to tr e morr le ri.nd :,l,e di ';lli ty of the v:tctor . 11 1 Operations Instruction #24, issued yesterday, is quoted below: 11 1. The enemy forces orrosirg the beachhend offensive in the CI3TER 1•TA CrYJ.I Area hl've been decisively defeated . The ber,clthead and main :!:'ifth Army forces :bave _joinerl . Tr.e. overwhelming success of the current bc..,ttle mr 1:es it possilJle to continue Operation BUFFALO with powerful forces and to launeh a new attack alonrt, t:1e most direct route to RNiE. 1!2 . 'Jot later than 261200:S J'Iay, VI Corps will attack to seize initi.nlly the 1;eneral line LAUF\TIO - C:' Il'CLEff\JE Station an¢1 from that general line press on vigorously on RC' •E . PlaPs +'or this operation ,d.ll include an attack (on Army Crder) generally +'rom the area of LA\TfJVIO to s9ize tl'e COLLI LAZIALI mmmtain mass . Boundar:1 es : Boundary between VI Corrs and 1 Inf'antry Division (Br) F g193OO ,_ r 010310 - F 892334. ether oundPries no change . 11 3. 1 Infentry Division (1'.3r) will by first Eght 26 May relieve the 179th Infantry Regiment . Acturi.l time at ,,,, ich 1·espons~bility :t'or thi:3 sector will pass to 1 Infantry Di vision (Br) by agreerrent betwP.en Di vision Comr-1anders concer11ed . lhen VI Corps attack is launched, 1 Infantry Division (Br) will as = slst the P.ttP.ck by push:ini; forward strong combat patrols and by j_ncrePsed fires alonrs the e 11tire front . As VI Corps attack advrmces , 1 Infantry Division (Br) will co'1form with the a<~vance . 11 4. 5 Infantry Division (Br) in its present zone of action will assist �\l5 the attack by pushing forward strong combat pntrols and increased fires along the e~tire front. 5 Infantry Division (Br) will conform to the advance of l Infantry Division (Br) • 11 * * A1TZIC ... -MAY 28, 1944--After conferrinr; with Genera.l GruentJ,-,er during the morning at his forward command post at Stm T1arco, General ClPrk flow brwk to hi~_ advance comr1and post in the vicinity of Anzio and arrived there at 1430. , He went into an immediate conference with General Brann concerning the continuation of the attack from the old bridgehead ::ront. II Corps comm1:md post has already been movec1 and is now located about tr.ree and a half mjles northeast of Cisterna. II Corps will take over the 3rd Division Reinforced, Special Service ,;,orce and the 85th Division, 1.1'.J'hich will be moved up immediately with other attachments. The attacr,wmt order is quoted below. II Corps will be charged with the responsibility of attacking northward through Valmontone and attaining the hish ground in that vicinit:r, thereby cutting Highway ,¥6 and preventinrs its use by the Gerrr.ans. It will then cha.n~e its direction of attack to the northwest toward Rone, seizing tind holdin1; the high ground 1mown as the Colli Laziali and then continuing northwest toward Rome. The VI Corps , will attack in the morning, employing the 1st Armored Division and pushing its attack to the northwest and south of the La~o Albano ~rea towarc Rome. At th5 s moment what the German reaction will be is not definite. Genr'lral Clark's intentions are to push these attacks vigorously so that their thrusts go to the north and south of Rone respectively, thereby isolating and bypassing the city itself. 'fuether or not the German intends to fjght in the streets of Rome is not lrnovm . It is improbable, however, thPt he will do this. General Keyes came to his advance corimand post to confer with General Clark concerning the new operations that II Corps will rmdertake. After supper General Clnrk flew back by cub to hfa forward comrriPnd post to confer with General Gruenther. He will hPve Generr, 1 Juin at his comr1and post there tomorrow at nine o'clock to discuss the movement of a French Division to the ,1ew II Corps front to assist in the attack toward Rome. General Clark also will discuss with General Cannon while there his contemrlated use of the 509th Parachute Battalion. He was very upset by a suggested plan of General Cannon to use the 509th Faracrute Br.tt2lion in a crop to assist the ad .. vance of the Br~tish Eighth Army. General Clark wishes to ta.lk with General Cannon concernin~ this and frustrate any notions wldch have been o:r might be taken to use the 509th Parachute Battalion in a fruitless and westeful mf,nner. General Brann has been working on plans for a ,"1rop of this battalion north of Rome but tl-e tine has not arrived yet where such a drop is feasible., The rJ' Corps ha.s taken over the old II Corps front and for the time being• after the 85th is attached to the II Corps, will have only th~ SB-th Division. The 91st Division, :Vhen it arrives in Italy, will be moved up under IV Corrs control. Highlights of' today's battle pro~ess were as follows: The 34th and 45th Divisiohs had moved forvrard about tr;o miles. This forward movement enabled the British to tnke C8rroceto on their north flank . Pl?.rts of the Unction Line have already been pierced by this attack. Velletri is not yet in our hands. �On tl-e north of the VI Corps f'rcnt the '3rd )iv~"lion 1md Spec':il Service Force ha e pushP-d Pbou+ r1ile ::iorth o+' Artenc. On t1ie IV Corps .-f'ront tl.e 88th Division conti..nued :lts attack northwest thro 1gl' tre nounteinous terrrin. The French were rushin~ steadil northwest and r.ad kkAn Villa S. Stefano and Y,iount '1iserno. The,- hrd also occupied Crstro Dei Volsci and 1bunt :Jero south of tre ('1>1'lcc0 River. '.:.'he EiGhtr Arny rr:ade some a:i:vrnces ',vest of Ceprrno. 1 Important messa;es of the d~y are as follows: General Juin tod, y sent tre followin nemora.nclum to Generrll Clark: 11 T1·e U::ip;l tr /i.rmy ..,s crossed t' e Lir:i 11iirer Pnd -ts c1.eboucrin towar•1s Frosino11e. Liaison 'BS been estAhlisl1Ad w-i_tr t e Anzfo Br-idgehead Forces. T1 e ~irst ~r~se of tPe battle 0f ItPly is nor ondin~. nrn a very ahort whilf', should we cc,ntinue on the same several axes, a l:=irge number of' d"'visions will f'ind tlemselves l'1P'3sed in front of Rome, or, in ot <"r words, on an extrenel nPrrow f':ro11t, poor in col"l!l'unicr-tions. 11 TrP.re+'orc, it is irnrort~ nt t'l-i t f'rom no·, on everyone I s mission be clei:1rlT cletcrr-ined i.tl 111 t' e "r?menori.;: of the Army i=ind the Army gr-ours o;err-11 P1aneuver; other ise, ti--0.re would 1--ie "the risk- of a te .... ft-le congestio11. o:: ~t~norari0s which 1 ould cri·ise f:' coTiplete 1"'-c1· o_,., po•1er nf"r'inMt l'n eneny ,·hose onl ~ 8illl is to ~r in ti.'!TJe. ri A 0 clecision rust t eref ere be nit1de soon. 11 Concern:n.-, the (j_.,.,., 'it -l"ollom-s t' e sc•ut½ern ba11k of t1 e -iricco from S,,-vi l'-i_o,ranni to r~ount 3iserno. Tomorrow t:1e CEF will bP in front of Ceccano and therP- buttressin, itself towards the west nf"E'inst the AYJ.zio fm:•ces anC: the Fourth T• . J. Arrv '":orps ' ill only be able to ·ait for the Eir,;btl-- Army axed on roari 16. "Orders hn e been ,brer for tr e 2~tl i'i'hic srould 1 ea.d tre CEF west of the .,,,r·or:iinon":! ljne of corrr"1mication between rrossedi and Tor-acella. 11 It lws not bAen -noss':.blo to moJre rlAns for t' e ?9+,b and PS tLi11 ,s now stnnd onlv P. secondPry oreration ~-s eing thou-r}1t of w ich would hve ns its goal t. e freei"lg o+' t '.e road Jri ·erno-r1ontelanj co. 11 IYJ. riy opinion jt would be desirable tl1 '1t from Frosinone on tl e left, of tlie '"::i~ th Army +,ake t!-.e rrerPrBl direction Sub8:1co-Rieti.-Terni ard t:bFt the left of the CJ,;? orient itsel:' on t' e axis frossedi-G1'lvignano-Tivoli Pnd "'rom there FPJ-:e tts way to Ve 3abine J--il:!..s . 11 : tl 1 A see the followin~ ad~rintr ,es i.n t is a~rection: "l. Should there e a lest battlA f'or Rome in t'l-ie gap of Velmontone c:;;:r,' couB t'ien be used -l"cr a n.rmkin, Pction erist of Vnlmontone. Ti'or tre fo :J owi11, O},era-1;~ ons rnd the y-ro ,ressior tmwrds the north, j1e G'•'?' uouJ<i t'bus nnd itnelf agnin in its ·10·,,n,'ll nos.;+,ion in tle nourtains 11 2. a,;,, . . �to tl·e east of the Tiber. 11 As of midnight toniePt the total battle casualtiAs since the opening of tre offensive fron tbe Anzio area amount to 4,458 AMorican ~nd 357 Britisl:i. Frisoners of war since tre beginnin; of the all-out offensive on the night of 11-12 Hay- total 11,030 ta1rnn by Fii'tl:: ,Army and 3,2Q5 tA.ken by Eighth Army. * * * A!JZIC-~MAY 29, 191.4--General Clrrk flew bl'lck from Ms forward cof"mand post at Ban ·t<i.rco to his ad.v<1nce co!""rr.ard post :'it Anzio r-t eleven o 1 clock. .t11s mornin, was s:rent co11:t'erri.nr; ,,1.::th Ge'1.Crr> 1 C'rrne"'1th<ir, ]1~ s Chief of Staff, General Juin, Fwmch Corps Cor,mander-, 1:1nd '1en.ernl Alexnno.er. Upon J:iis return to the ad,r nee crrnmand rost, '1e received 3ent<>r::i.l 1 ilson, CorinPnd:i.n; Ge-1er~l of IRS, concernin~ move:n1ent of the bAse section Dfter Ro1'1e is taken. · /\fter Gener.<il Wilso 1, he rec~i ed Colonel Gray, his JAG, a1d reviewerl ten ~en8rHl court martial cases. After lunch Generfl Cl?rk receiv0d v~ce Air •~rrshl"l D'Albie.c, Deputv to Ge"\1,,,,...,,1 Cannon of TAF. ::n mid-rfternoon Generrl Cln.rlr left by jeep for the advance command r,ost of' thP, lst Arrored :JiYision where he cijscussed prorress o-f' tPe tanv battle. Forward elenents of tPe tPnxs had arrived at a line just beyond Valle .Ariccia and Cnmroleone. Tenk losses have been rat.er heavy. mhe proir.ress of' the tn."1i-s h1d been steP.dy a:rd f8ster t} an the infant,.,.y l"nd l1r-rl nrorrresserl A. considerable rlistrnce tieyon--1 the ~nf.,,ntry. General Clar1r was very ?r.cdous t•.rt tlie _.nfn.ntry elemerits 0+: tl e 45th and '34tr 7i dsio1s 1-:,e pus' ed .('orwar·d, o~cupy imc'! hold tl'e H ) TOU110 alrerdy tPken by the tan'rn. J'e d-1 scusc:;ed rri. th G0,11errl rl"rmon ruture ~ctions nnr t?nl:- tLrusts to the rorth,·rest. On his way bl:'c',. fror: t 1e 1st Armored Division cormf'.nii rost General Clnrk otorped General T.JutJ.:,r, ,..erutv Corp~ Commander, VI Corps, Pnd discussed t11e pushin of i'lf2.ntry elements up to the Osco..r Line. Fe also sto·c,ped General Fasc 11al, Assista:'lt Division Commn.nder of the 45th ::Ji-.rj sion, who was r;o-;n~ forward to see Gern~r,l Har!"lon, and talked wi..tl-i ri-rn n.1:>out this same '~atter. General Clnr::<: returned to Ms comri.anrl post at fi, e o I clock a.mi found his Chief of Staff, Ge'1eral Gruentrer, ~,ho 1rn.d flovm up -"rom the i'orwArd commri.n<l post at San ~rco. GeDer::i.l ClFrk :.ren tent into imnodir:te conference with Gn.:rf!rDls Mruscott, Keyes, Gruenther 8Pd Br"'-nn. Tris conference wF:s called to coordinate a cortinm,tio:".1 o+" the attacl< by II and V'I Corr s. This attack involves additional , ttacJ,mEmts to tbe II Corps t::iken "1~om tre IV Corps +"ront. The order issued to cover these attacrr.ents is quoted below: 11 1. Eff'ective on i.ssurrption of' comrand ~n new II Corrs zone of Pction, the follovrinr, units r.re re1iev-ed from f'ttrc ment to VI Corrs and nre attached to II Corps: 3rd Tnfi·ntry Ji.vision 4L~lst A..4.A AW Bn (ST) 6olst Tank :Jestrover Battalion Howze Task •orce 13t~ Arnored Reg~ment (- lst nnd 2d Bns and Ren Go) �118 Det 16th Armored =n~:neer Battalion Det 47th Armored Medical Battalion 751st Tank Battalion (-Companies A and D) Company A, 805th Tank Destroyer Batta.lion 84th Chemical BAttalion (Htz)(- Companies Band C) 1st Special Service Force 463rd Pr>.rachute FA Battalion (- BHtt8ries C and D) 24 Army Field Regiment, R.A. 36th FA Battalion (155mm Gun) Det (one 8 11 gun), 698th FA Batt1:1.lion ?. E+'fective 2900018 May, the following units ?re relie'1ed from attachment to IV Corps anc1 are attach2d to II Corps: 11 760th Tank Battalion 776th Tank Destroyer BA.ttalion 105th A.u.A AW Battalion (SP) 2d Chm'1ical Battalion (r-rtz) Headquarters and Headqunrters Battery, 6th FA Group 59th Armored FA Battalion ( 105mm SP) 93rd Armored FA Battalion (105mm SP) 11 3. Effective on arrival ft TfZ'O, the following units ere att['ched to II Corps. 361st ROT 361st Infantry Regiment q16th FA BattaHon Company A, 316th Medical Battalion Company A, 316tr Engin9er Battalion 517th RCT 517th 1 arachute Infantry Regiment 460th Parachute FA Battalion 596th Airborne Engineer Company 11 4., Effectbre on assumption of command in new zone of action, the following units are attached to II Corps: 91st Reconnaissance Squadron (- one Troop) Headqm1 rters and Headquarters Battery, 36th FA Group 932d FA Battalion (8 11 :riow) 937th FA Battalion (155mm How)". Important messages of the day are as follows: General Gruenther sent tle follouing memorandun to General Clr1rk in tbe early afternoon: itGeneral Hn.rding just called up ~rom Eirsl1t1' Army 'N1C and str1ted that the Commnnder-in-Chief has no 1 considered carefull:r your proposal for the French to ndvance on "'erentiro, anC: thence '1.orthwest nlonr FicJ--.vff'Y 6 to..mrd Valrriontone., He weJ comes vOill' proposal to advarice on :'.i'erentino, but }1e c'esires to rqake it 0 �clePr t½f't the F'iftr Armv -u"'t Jree:r t1 e Ferentino - Vvl~ontone Ro<><l clec.r for t' e use of th~ ~:.(!bth "-rrv. I tole' Yard~ nr; ~ '°t "'s "EJr P s - could "'ee , t .is hd t' e e"fect o-r co"1pletely nullif. in w' ,,t GenerP.l A:exawler "d tolr" you this '"'10rni11 ,. i-Ie rer-li-ed, 1 -o, tl-r>t i'3 not true . He ,•_11 be 7er,y r,lPd to 1 9Ye tl-e Fre11cl1 l'lnvrnce on F'ere~tino. He conc:;ide-•·s t,h.-.t ~uc [l :,o--e wou~d 1 p• e the e ,...f'ect o, '_elrh1 ~i 'it ! rm alo11F . But ' e noes in ... ist tht thR ro"'d from ,.,erent~no to 'J'l"lmonto'1.P. muc:. remfl;n c,e"r for t' e "3j ,:htr Prny. Ctl er 1ise it rri. t ',e irro"sible to ,..,r·11, t' e .,.,i ht' Army ~o "'enr ~n t 0 bPttle :'or J.ome. 1 1 e srent ten m·11utes ar 1..·~rin; t P. r,a+ter bee)-' pffl fortl, l:>ut F~rding, in tre nf'.me or Gn•1err 1 ! le""ffindP..,.., stood f; rm. Fe d.: d, 0 eve.,.., Rdd t :! s statement: 1 If the Fi·"tl /rTY\Y -ts ble to cr.,.,,turP. VrJ.n1011tone, GerP.r"l /llexmr"er ,...,1t'orizes t e ~.: ftl- /lrmv to '1se r::.rr} · ay 6 i.11 the c0rti.mmt.;on of its attack on RoT'ie . IIe will +, e"l d.;vert t' e ~ir;l•t tirmy <>-!:; Vri.lr.·1'"'tor0 tor1nrc' !Flestri::1.P f'nd Tbroli. 1 1 0 "As soon as General Ht:.rc.; ,,g 'm1rr u:r T ce llAd C· rpmtier v:r' •c, of course, does not likfi tl e i.del'l of '10t ">e.;11 <>blA t,.., me T-iir-1 w::v (,. >-Ie in turn ,rro,osen . trat t 1 e T<'renc ½e allo•vecl to rroceed towE'rds ...,0.renti.no .?nn n',ter c· yturfn 1<1erenti110 tle'1 cl'O'>S }.; h 'a.r 6 ..,~rl flrlvPnce to•rprds 1-'llestri.na ,,,.:t'-out usinr,; l'.fi ;hv"l.r 6. PA "(\Y3 t nt G,~"l"'rrl Juin rJll ;"l'OlsiP"'l ,lDl'PY\tee t ,.,t 'e CPU J.<9er aheod of t18 Rrit.;st-. I:" Grmerpl Ale"":ander rP ,,,i.,.11 "ir ;n ·.::_:: dec'qi.o-'l t:b-,t vre !"Ust keep t'1e Fm-.qrtino- rpl"'o"l-:.one ror,d '!lear ~ c oubt erv ,..,uc t Pt • 9 nill allov tbe ""renc "to move no1·t <Y·.r0r "'i.l"'' WA,' 6. m•,e "'r·e11.c' r,,; 11 '1.0t j "Sue tl-e order ""'or t 1 ie Ferqntino adw 1co until to11· · t, so no ac~u~1 hnrm .<1s been d0'1e y0t. T t' jn'· t'v•t you s' oulrl direct r'1e '-,,... mn1 8 P •.,., 1orous -re"uest to be ril .,_ovrect to cont~ nu8 witl-i the plan " i c' tras Putho.,...ized b. Grmer.?l ~1P-xa.-ric1 er thj"' I"'orninP,. I sral1 a";~ i. t f'U'-S' er vord from you. 0 nlrn tc execute t e Ferent ·no acvf'nce 011 t' e norni'1 of '31 ~r-.y. GerArel FPrdin" c:tr>tes t _Ft ~t Arrnv est-im~te th,.,t tier rill capture ""rosinone tor: · t. T '; FrP>1C "lay t <1t t i.s i:_:, r11. nnt 1s::~stic nrd urn1<1rrrnted esti!"'l.te. ·1 nT 1 e Freno· 1 Gruent er t0 kod . i. ~· -;r-i ~tel"·. 11 h 1654. 11 Pove 0·1e tank 1-i::itt.,:,l'on -":;. or-1 1i're:rc 0 Gr1.'ent'8r to llood. . n~T liS55 . 11 Tirir,.,..o'1 n<"ecs ~o Frobebl·; v-'11 'n-.,.e tc tf' 1 'e L'rom 752nc' Bi:-tt~lion. 11 tDr'r to Anzio crews -i'Jl.TlJE)d·titely. GruAnth9r to 7lood . R"1 2q . 11 :s~ ue orde1·s f' ssignin om RCT ~8th Di v:i sion to '.::'I Cor"'s . Tt1'1t r,ove ,-;t1-,out c'l0lrpr. ,.,ell IV Corps t rt b~l,:nce of' di•rision :ess on7 RCT wi.11 fo11o-· soon . 11 Gruent er to -ood . •t:"i 1656. 11 "otif Frenc CPlled . ...,urt' "r rl.etni.ls w' en I retur"l toni ,;' t . 11 t' nt Ferent-ino attnc1---- is cr.n- Gruentl er to Clrrr 1r . R'J ')16. 11 149t RCT rer-cl • tr move . li ll issue order on belnnce o-r 'iv' sio-1 less one RCT tomorrov, . ?0 tan1 er •'vs vill. be t' ~re by noon ,. ""'uesdri Y' or else . m~n1,. battn lion :7ill bA •·ent ··it'.0·1t riel,, • 11 Gruenther to ClA.rk. Rr 7g5q . be sent to Anz · o ;:i_r,;in Pt t is t"rie . c-~errnnent . n~no r o 110'10 . 11 11 Gen.8ral Juin 1 esi..res He c~n riot iust·Lf'y tl f't ~rd Di~r·is~on not t1--.,, -l:;r"11ci,..er to his �\JD Genert:'l Qruent' ,1ir,11t ton-: ri:tt. "?l' sent t' e follori.'1rr Fer.-or'3ndum to Ge'1Ar;:il Cl11rk Pt r-:id- 11 1 te1ep' on8cl Gf'n ~r~::. Juin tonir -: <1.11.d tolcl J,-,-":m of our extrene di.sflproint""ent w' e'1 you le9rn8d tl: 'lt G·=mer"l A. lexm1der lrd r·econc,i.dered '1is e".rlier decisio'1 to pernr't t e f'dw1 nee of thP F'rencl Corrs_ in tl e dirnctior.. of :'8rentino, and t 3nce nort',,ve"'t 10,..•tii o ~ ~-: · · "'Y t6. I exr lni"led t0 t· nt your rl2n nov, is for tiie rime 'Jorrs to arl. •~nee to tre nort vrest v1itl in its rreset1t z0re, A'l'J.d ti-·~t PS 1con ns jt 9rr::ves 1n ~• e :-irec sout1 P-r>rit of' VPlmonton,c!, you ,·ill, i.n rill rrc )A hi. l i_+, ", PrrPn e 1,y rok or 11 crook to ' PVe it cross T-I~ "; "Ia,~ 11:6 o.n<l to cssi9t the Pttric'· of ti e 1: : Cory" nort est frc·::11 VPlT1ontone - boundf-r r or no boundflr;v. Go.,,nrel ,Juin "lbbd t',et r8 ,·ps T"Oc,t un rp to leArn t "t t' e su estion for t'1a F re1ti110 A.dvttnce }<>( ~9er rE''ecterl, '1,t +,:r,.-.t P. rould rusr 811 out in tb'> direction i.ndicated b. you, an~ t 'lt yo1 1 cou1c. .cest · rsured t' Pt you ill rec9.: e lOC''"j rerforr""'lt;e nror11 +;"" ...,renc' Corps. u 'h~, 1 0 ed t0 '·. Uvt jt' ~'e "re' '1lnr ia no"! jn pror,ress fr tle fnzio area, rou ne"'t it -'Mnernti.ve to 'a·•e •n1ot""r Civision ti-ere :. ""''3di ... tel:v -'.n af.di.tio'1 to + o qi:,tl r,nrJ. the 8%h, botl of w1 _. c' noulrl re co!:lrni tt"d "'it in the next roew dnys. I tolrJ ·n t}" t you v,ere reluct.,nt tc '1rinf up nr,<' in t] e question cf t' e s 1f't o.(> the 1rd nrA, ,ut +,' rt you "'e~t +,' n necessit r for it so .c;rert t 9t ;rou must no·, roriRVJ' t' e request to h<>ve lt ~e.,+ tC' t 1 e 11r_. ,1ce 1 eP'l v1i th all po~s~ ble <"need. "'"told l·'r- t' nt vou ?Ylt~cir"ted, ·it' -:,•9 one P:",jor rttRck nmrr in yro~ress a'1d tl e ot 1 er nbont to he 1 "1 nr:',erl, ~• Pt -rou 'cu1r1 100n "Ve t' e :r-iost ur o-rt need frr a11oth0r divisi.on. I rlso t0l' 1 1-'m t .,t you 7ere brinGing -''1 all srrre prrt 1 eleI'l8;1ts t --t :vo·J. coulrl po sib:;_v r··'1r', · nclud~n~ t' e J 11r~c' ute RCT t'nd the RCT of t>J.e 01st r-.:•rision, -tn order t0 -ive tro necessvr ~ ,,e-' ,-'. t to t' e ..,ttrick. I f'urt'I· er strtecl +, nt .,. rns mn·e t Rt the ':..eCe"'~~t r for ar:. <-dditional Ji.vision to hP. 'P.ld 1 <I ,;S in rrmy resP.rve W'S ev-ident to irn. f"' 5 tr11 I P.'CTlil 0 ,t ' ~ is br' ~ "Grmerr-1 J·1in repl'.ed t 1 ,,t re \ rnted you tn know tl nt hi'> lo ~1t,~ to . ou U111_uer::tioY1et1., .,nd t 1 Rt 1 P m·1ld pers0r 7 ly ~ i1.;:8 very nu"!. to do , ou r f', vor. (" ~ ;;o 1ever, e loes not fee1 ti t hE' co11lcl ro"'si.1,1 v- justify t· e trans:er cf a divi~tis~_on to l is n-o:crrmrr t, nf' i=>ci~lly "n •• ~ w ('.., t o r• f'u1f'l r,.f' Ge.,crnl Alr.>X1"•1r,er to nccert rour S'l; ·,sted Ptnenver for t o AI!Jflovn10 11 c,r:, th1 ""rJ c' Corrs. ·re f'ur-' t' ~r Pddeci tl t the O er:=itio:'1 1l~ich r'8 ~cl ciu ,est0c1 -:'or t' '3 'rend Corr 3 ~·ns R mo""t P znrdous op9r<iti.on, "'n' t} "t t1 ° Car ,s stoo11 ri ·oo,' c· f'!l.Ce of su"'fering heaY'"' c11suriltil)S in tl ~t orierTt·i o'1. I11 sr:ite of it3 cl~ ~ficulty, ho•mv'1r, t e ..,r9nc' FerP. ri.-, in- +.o "18 ':E' +,} js Sf'Cri:':'. ce 'n ord"'r to f1n•t' r J.; E' ;\lli0.c cnuse. •fo "'.<i:;.d, 'I ,i-ut rlo not ro0el tl t ~ coul~ ever exrlfi'1 t'e t~•q,,,.."or r,f' t':~ c'ivision to e11otr.:ir "ro:--it ~ n vir>1/IJ' of' the r8jection of: t' ~s n"'turf!l , r lo ;ical ren uv ,r. I ccnro"' crnc·.n- ·n ·'tn ~ra.,.,s"'er 'mlo2s an nxt·e. e emer e11cy e-·~ets, ard I do 'lot bnlieve 4:.' nt t' ,r8 ~ s ::;1 c' a s.;tun+,i.on <>t tbis t.:.m1=;. 1 0 0 1 0 ""'" n e t:r-' .' t" et 'o 7 d of' KPmnerer to secU1·e f'u:;:·t 1 ".' c:'etri.7.., ~, '1C'r·n:n rfll. Juir 1 n rn,ctio'1, ½t·t t•,.,,...e is P hri 1 , •p:-'lc .;r.. rro~··"sJ -nr':.. rr,·p ·~ot 8"''1 "ble "-,c telk to 4 ~-1t. lo ev'3r, ~".!r ~.P-1~.'1 IDA tlrt c-r t' n r'de t o t e cub fie lri +,~1. '3 F"r-,~; !l ~f'tnr . S r.'"'"'t-i '1 r' ;;' you, :},r:-,:,1 l .Jui:n qvrre "S JC, '<,l bt tl nt Ge,_,_..,rrl ~. 7 r-"{""rider roul.rl [CCe'"t o·rr ,..::'OJ .... : . ·re 9 ,rir.r ~:ncicn"-,-ion ··11 , c> n rnrsn.t·· or t• rt ' e '(') i · • ',e mor-;+, Prnoy~r·, i.f 'e r1ce·1 pr' ,- t· ···n- :om, · E"CPUSe 'e ')el:· vec' +,'<it t, e i. ~U"l YA.9 mucl ·~r-rtr-r +, "'1 f' ro7·"ti.c<il 0'18. ·e ..,r· !:,'nt 'o +' 1· 't, rolitic~::. mn.t-':;"'rs 9 Ol' 7 r' ',1, l"c· ottPl"l rt t :is "!r"t·'cnl ~··s'3 oft e (}A, --~n r �battle . 11 Althou,;'· '1-e'ler21 Juin t'lesi:~es v ,r • n1.e; 1 to ''"'0:1 d d et;, c' in; R di vision to be se'1t to t e Anzio f're2, : :1."3 ? "nii~8.tion evirl r-esrect for :rou 'Te so ~TGf't trr-t 1 e v6 ll ,.,e8 1 ,en :1 f' _ :rou r8.i se tl1e "'."Oint .., ·a in. I "'.m '7illing to 1·,n ~;er r r-;ood s-Lzed sum thPt if yol'. s' ould say, 1G,-,,, 'l'Pl Ju::..:1., T l rve •i-·en .rou R.n opportuni_.} t·· to 0:;q~-r:;2s -·our v"ew "n t 1 is rrtter, rnd T respect your judgr1Pnt very rruch; :-•o,e,er;ue situ,,tion :ls so critical thet: arn no"r COF;Jelled to or·er you to tlj sm1d tbe rl.bdsion 1, S-on"ff•al J·1ir: would stn.te, PTery , ell , I a.Pt P goori solr'.ier; . z_ I s"1all cooperate 1 • "r sur;,.,;estj 0:1. iR thPt you J_et the natter 2ir1r1er ::'or another \\uti da~-r. Tl,e roads to II Gon)s '"::..11 1:.18 ··rstt;r vrell cmvested f'or t>e next tJnree days 0n r} o•, ujt 1 tt~e r1ov-e;:nent of the ~5tl· and tr e :C:Str T'i j sions, tre tm,.1': 1 1 ')rtta1 f1~0F1 tl e rJ Corps . lion , end t' e 2rtill,...r:--· ,attDlions v'.:: c}· ore beino; tr1r1sferrer I'.:' torn.o-rrow ni '-.t you still feel trnt ;rou must ha Ye the :7renc' di ,r-i sion, I em coDfident tl at you -vill be able to get, it . 1 1 1 "I t[l_lkGd to rr~rd:in.,. tonif,},t 2.nc~ ex-plained to hhn tl.flt you felt it would be very di "f~ cu 7-t, to GtErt t)· e :::'renci,., Corrs to1"ard Fe1~ent ino , r nrl then stor it ri s soor, PS it p' o•-r"ld any te 1.c1 enc. • to cross V:i r;h1vey 46. Be safr1 "'.e 1mc1 erstood t1'at v difficnl ty. He f 1 1Tt: .--.r "teted tht n 1~r2rentl;sr General '\loxanc'er >1."d not unr'er - 1 i~ stood ,'four proposal wl:-en JOU -':,al~:ed i'd t: , ~~m tM.s :r:r1ornjnr:;. I told hin thPt was ~,,Jv&-' 1."erv 3trPnr;e to me , ~)<:>cause I was present ·ihen you tr JJcr:ir'l. to Gener2 l .!',lexrinder , P-nd .,. ·ot the cecired im:rres~io 1., ,..rm1 l i. -:;tenin · to your ccnv,3rsation, that there was a 1efini te meet.:: ·1.p- of t 1,e :1ind,s . 11 ,,,p •f 1 1 As of midn:ir;l't toni:;rt A111ericPn forces in tLe Anzio are2 r.P."!e quffered 5,116 battle casur-lti9S rnd hnve coptured 4, 97'6 prisoners since t' e open:1ng of tr.e of fensive on the 111orn:i np; of the ?3rd of May. * * * A'{ZIO--T".1-\Y 30 , 194/4,--Genr-ir<i.l Clar:V A.rose erirl,r, stuc1 :ied the dispatd 1 es on bd,tle pror:re~s and conferred Tl tL ,.,is G-3 , GenerP 1 Bre.nn. 1-fo P lso work0d on H 1-Temorif.l Day speech which was given rit tl,e ·retbmo cernetery. !~t eleven o 1 clock GenerP.l Ch.rk -,ont to tJ~e Nettuno ceneter:r w>ere a very- i:wpressive Tvler10rie,l Day ceremony vms hold . 'ince there are :'iritisl. en,' Canadirn nead in t"'e cei, ,:;terJ·, 1:)ot:1 tLe A:r-ierican end 0ritish f1R.gs ~rere carried , and botb n::itional a:1tlv~ms nere played . One enlisted m2-.n per company and one officer per reg:' ·aent of A,-,ericrin troops were assen1 )led rt the ceneter~· . T>is :: ncluded trcors frof' all tl~e divisions , as well as ot}-,r,r ~ttacherl m1its; sud as , medical , orc1 n.'1nc0 , 7_11.Brterf'!rister and engin' ers . Altore:etl1er tl·ere Fere 1,etvrnen 400 and 500 rerso ..,s re;:;resent•inrr all uni ts in thA Fift' Arrrv TxirticipPting on t'·,is front . T1~e Britisl' IncrPme•1t Pnd a snPll body of men fmd offj cers , ,,,,1,0 vere headed by i,h;jor Gener"l Gregson- Bllis, Cor'nAnder of the 5th Britisl . T)ivision , vmre fll9o present. Taps was blovm Pnd a f:i ring souE.d dired three ·1olle;rs over t} e ,raves . fter tl-ie cl'r>rlai.11 1 s blessin;; , Gene 1 "Tas :htroduced b~r Gen0ral Truscott , Commnnder of' t} e VI Corps, a.nrl gtive ra l Cl2.r { a ver ~ inspiri:·1e; speech wJ-iicl is quoted 'oelovr: 11 This is ~lgmorial f,ay , wtich , as ;rou 2.11 1:110 1 , is dedicated to tJ- e riernory of our -"irthtinr.; rersonnel who have given their lives to their beloved country. At all our otLer cemeteries here in Italy ,ve .-:ire likewise payini; tribute to our nen vrho h8Ye given t 1,eir all in order thit t11 e :?iftli Arm? night continue to advance . 1 ... �'IT' js i~ fl da;u· ch cee:rly tou~h~s tl e he,,rts o::: r>ll of us r>s •e stand before t 1 ,ese V<J.lia11t men restin : erA . I want you to fcel , as I do , ti-flt t' is is r10t a noMent of sad 11ess no,,. sorrow but rather a t·"le o-f in,p:Lr 0 tior.. to 8pur us on to the t2.sk '11 ich ! ns been S"'t :'or us . le s 11ould use their r-spirPtions [l'1d fi,.,1t·inf sni.r-tt to drive u::; ""orv:arcl PS J'\m~.ricr1 np PVe ehays done in tl e re.st 8.:1.d 2cs r1;n o::' t e :-'iftri Ar: y 1 <'-,e c_one in Tb 1. for ti- e T ast nine months at Sal9rno , Rt 'fripl9s , across t: e iJcltm.'no , a.lonP- t c Gflrio;liano ::i.nd in t he Anzio ber,chhead • .lit 1 Gorl ' s 1 elp vm &all c3.I':ry on t' A tasJr w' jc' the:, began . 11 A li \tl9 r:iore t an fo·rr- r-iontl s ago A1liAd troors care Bcroc s the beriches 11ot f'pr rom tri s sa,cred 011.rid . -.-:;- Rr si11~e tb,t t ·nr, t 1·A ""'i:'tr Arny troops in tl-e '\.nzio beochl•e11d 'mve been n C( nstent l'nd f'"r:iovc t:breP.t to t'•e e:1erv 1 s l.:.1rns of comrnmicotion. '1' 1 e · r"' ·e ""'l!l, red 'l.:n imrortrint role i.n tl e strnteey of the succe9s-':'nl crimpPi';Tl we are no· r cnnr'uct~ '1 ,. Tl1.o:=ie pl o lo'"lt treir lives ~n t} e 1)each1eed s~nce tbt 1,-:ind;no; 1.1.:ca rest"'n · · FJre, r>nrl it .is to -1-; er" ttiflt "e Df\Y tribute t -i S d!'l:- . Others 'nve l Ucil-ed C'll "';drst t' l f"10T"Y , anc' d 11r"'n- -:-1-e interve.l the beac'1her>c hrs ~ssed into 1··istory vi..tl t e join~n-; of tre two :':Lft' Arm:1 fronts on "p;r 0 '5tb... le • · e '1uilt ur o-.ir streno-t' , rin<'l we r•J.'e no'· r--nr.i;" t;ed in P ,-;refit o"fe 11si 1e th1t is pvn:i s' i~n- rinc cle9troyin1" tre eneP1y 1 s hest troops . I'-: ft! Army soldiers fror. tl c main 'ront 1 PVe nlready joined i..n t 1 e qttr>d: on Rone . "Our Fi-l'tl Army h-is b"'en e Tiio'1 er "'or ot! ~r .Allied victories t.·<>t Eire to cone . Curs hl's bo8-1 ~;rul.- 311 Alli8tl Prn7 . Men w. o 1-;--·-ve c 1 erished ::1ibr;rty and "reedor-, n.s 1-i fe itself , h::-ve cnf'!e fron. many rarts of t'. , orlc... to form t 1 ~ s r~,-,1 t~n; te.,-,,..,_ 1:lore jn ·-t l;v. 0vr '"lritish and c~"l.edian Fiftl· Army comrPn-ions rest heJ~E' "'J or.-;side of tl P:: r Americ.<>n -:.em rne tes . L · i·ewise t 1 rl.e.<>.q of our eP 1 1e 1.P nt 'l.'rench forces lie ::. n otl er cerietqrif's · n :tr> ly. 0 0 11 '1'!1is success:'ul o"frmsbre las rer,resent--:i,' "u 11 cooperri.tion of .Allied -f'igl t n forcAs on t 1e 7_:ird. nr rl ser-- 2"1.rl in tl e n ir . (;i1r Nrvy nr,t4 J...ir Forces hnve ~up portPd us T"1<J.'1"1:f'5 ceritly d.ur:ng ou:c curre,1t 01 ~r, tfons . "You men o.c, the Fift> nrmy '.ri.ve overcr,nr soMe c: the rost diff:..cult obstacl"'ls ih. n~litary on8rFtions . You ccrne 11.cro<1s m~les of sen to la.no rt Jr lerno against,, s-1:rongl.- e11trenc-'ec1 Pnem:,-. You l"'ve crossecl rj_1p,r•s ::,nr' fcur-'t .rour w2.~r over mou'1t"inous terrr--i,1 . Yo·1 "Ve ,.•ti-stood t1~ ri o::.~3 0f s1ow, r:-i.::..n r>nd r~·1d . You k':.Ye ,.,,,,r shed n"tur:o 1 cA""'Anse ros it' 0•1s , · t. fe r-l'r[' :1 ls :in t' E" 1 istor o? v•ar<'are . You i ave c'L''1e t· ese t' i:!'1..,.s ,.,·trout t· oufht of y,~rsonrl aa cri -fi ce beca1 1se ·,n :,ve 11.ovm t rt it is onl.r ori.r v·ctorious "r'"'re"! t Pt ~11 restC're P worlrl. 11here hu.m8n 1-Jein ,s crn 1.'ve ·n riece.c , :_-,eace rnd l:.arpiness ~•"'t ti eir "'ellow men . 1 ·, 1 7e strnd non on-:.' e t 1 res: '-old o:: Ro e . Before mri:::i.r C1""S lE1ve pi:issed 1e shB 11 ',r;e "reod t' ~ s :!'-·rst o" t} 1 Euro'r)er 1 crp:' tals .:'ror hzi. dom-i_n"tion . 111 "I ¥ill '10w '"'lr,ce t} is vrreatl on ·•~: {n lloued "'Tounr'l ·~',tl t' e r;,.ed ;e to t',ese me-1 w1 ,o ~_je be::ore us thr>t tl e .,ifth Arry sl•ri.11 co'1t-°nue t· e fi •'1t ·,: i:-:re the• 7_eft off , w'th tre;1· srjr·itc-; rs our ,lide, till v'r>tor;v- 1s rnll'', . " After t e Amori"l Service, Gener...,l Clark returned to '; s cor"l,rc' ro"'t r,!ld work'id in · · s o:"f ice ·mtil [' bo'1t 1_ 430 . 1 Ie co11.f erred br·' c-fl •-it' Ge11err 1 Jrann 2'1c' 1 e~t by c-,1b fol' II Co"''t:'3 field to c, '1fer i7:itl Gen°r..,l K~JP,s . '·hile v1itGeneral he ~es ,, ~ rent un fol"rrrd to t' n 1rrl. J:i, isirm 2,n<l Speci..c 1 Jervice 'orce �a . illr i , area ,. As soon 8S tl e 85th Division is moved in, tre II Corrs wil l continue the attack toward Vr>lmontone to the north and north,mst . The 85th Division ,:ill close tonight, a,nd the 8-ttack T•ill tn.l.,;:e rlace the followin,; morning . Hhile up forward GenerP.1 Clark was told by General Frederick, Special Service Force Commander , t hat last night the:' hnd received the hea·J'iest l7 ostile sl'elling of t 1 1e entire carnpr.ign. General Clark returned to bis comme.nrl post e.t 1610 where he vm.s met by Gener<' 1 Gruenther , l is Chief of Str ff, who flew up from the forward command post . Gen2rals Clark, Gruenther 2nd Brann went i.nto immediate conference concernin"' tre aJl- out effort to be mr->de d1..u~inr; tl e ne:x-t three da;rn . These dri~rs 'Till be critical end will require bitter :Pi ,}"ting. As soon as our forces advance A.nd tBke tl,e bir,:J, --rounr 1.aiovm as the Colli Laziali , the GermPn rlill be for c ed to withdraw north of Rome , becamJe we will comm1=1nd all of tbe high 1;round overlookinp; tJ-ie city and tJ.ie routes tlv~reto . ·c-:very indice.tion turns to tre fact t hat the Germai1 vrill bitterly resist 01.ir ;c1ttrcks to gf1in tl-iis commnnding terrain . 1 1 \fter the con:'.:erence Crenernl Cln.rk hnd supper Pnd retired to 1-ds room 1Yhere he worked until 110 retired to his nuarters . Fighlii:;hts of today ' s battle proGress yrere sl:Lgbt advHnces by· our rirmor wi tt t:,e infantry following up r:md hol riing the ,:;round taken by the ;:,rmor since yesterdav 1Yhcm the attac1, wes renewed . The gains n;:ac1e by VI Corps r,re,.,tl;f fa ciUt ated the British 1st Dic_rJsion I s move up on tl-1 eir left flank . The British 1st Di"ision was ,..,racticnlly in Hne witL the VI Corps rc':lv:nnce elenents . The 5t} Bri tisr Divis ion , Low ever , was still meldn/~ slmr rro,Tf'ess and hr d not conformed r:rith VI Corps ;r,0_vnnces . There ~,rere no outptnnding grins on the II Carris or IV Corr,s fronts . On tl'e IV Corps ,~·ront one battnlion of tl·•e 151st hrd e.dYenced f'.8 .,..nr es :·font8 SempervisB. , ren.c'. jnt; further to tbe nortl::rest on tl'e high ground. north of Sezze . The Frend· rid'il'Pnced up slightly past Ceccano . :'.::;lenents o:'.:' tre lritish 13ir;htb. Army hPd rished rhout D mile p:1 st }offi. The 88th Jbrision , less a combat team , rill be moved up to II Corpn front tonir·;>t end tomorrow . Tts wei;;ht 1crill be th.ro'''n in on whatev er corns front is i:; needed most. At tbis tirt1e no decision ns to where it will be employed has been nrde . The Ar my Commander dictat ed t1--,e follo,'finc notes todc.y "or :nclusion diary: v1orri9s ta"'✓e r1ot!1i!1o; to do ~t} t~ e j_rTI_''J--diElte battle . Tl~.,:\f . -,_re riatu.re. 1 ~7il1 nPr:1e ,l1er1 i:ri ()l'd81~ of t:-19 t1~ou'-;le tl ey ceuse ~10 . ur_ort o:-: F! 1· olit~ cal i11 1 in 1· 1 _ !!T'irst , ti1e T;r··tis1 1 ..,.,.,.,., tl r.i.r F,le 0"1 ;:.cr 18, rict1-ritl-•st0nc;,i-·t1; Ale~::e.nfer' s co}1st2.11t [~~~: 311.ra~1ce to 1:1e tI'Pt l1or19 :~ s 5.n t:.o sectur of t 11e Fl/tl Arrr"". ~! ~v· '10.~·e 11ra1r1 t e Arm:, bound"r. · sout 1 o: :lo1-1te ;/-6 ju.st to tl 0 out:=,·'drts· of J.om~ and tl-iel1 V'•~erod it to t e --- 0I·t! " r:11 e "M:i_r;]·t}, f\r~vi..:r "'.i:1.S ...:une littl0 ~ ~_[_:L.tinb . ... :t ::as lPcked e.r; T0s,sivrm.ess 2.n" railed in it,3 ;:,cert in t 1 is conb511ed Allied effort. '"et , m.·· e-Pfort to ,1:litcr t' eir boundnr:-· east "",et v,:t-~J- "· rr-r~-:· ·ntl:::.c< t:' n; tl d~ tl e 1 tl ,....~~ ArLT/ rnust ~,e.rt-~ cir)nte : ; 11 -l:-}1e l>P.~ttle Zor Rorie . 1 1 1 1 0 nSe er rrl , T" I'renc' Corp 3 -is ½ein:; i inc; ec: out . A :rore ga.11:mt fi ,, ,ti-n_~ orr;a'"' iz2.tio·, nev:ir 9-Xis+:.ed , .;et n,.r o~f:r fc,r -t to attE.c1r :;:'t;::c2.nt1no , :,-ro··idi:1i it • could use T{oute ,16 to the y:est , was 1roroptl;i tm ·1ec. dovm. GeYJera1. /.le"':c:,c' er in r1-tcate-:~. t}"Pt,-; vJ01.1lc~ l\e --_eli;lted ~01~ Y'1e tr:· tn,1:e :,1e;r,qn_t:i110 to -:P.C~Llitp,_te t~ e 1 �l14 u ,t r: t' RO.vc 11-::~ <:,,.. t't o "":::_ ;' ~1 lr :, ,,t t" ,.,t qf~ ➔r .; ~: .. .;_ · t, to~rt !"".1 trc,o_ ·_11 u : t'1 o.n ti ; ~~ct t~~~, 1 r•a,, tr t, - 10 r':.i Of 1~ t 1 ~ r-on,~ 3 i • r_·/ l r{ cor fJ .,.. t r0 . ,..• Cor1s, P,.,te.,· ta1:-1. ):---r:+,--·ro, wild 1)e t'l-~rt, LT "or~· ="l,:cs in dT r:::..11, -'-,o ' :, J•1-:r. TT-, -;,_, c ~o of tc :_rnc' •. r,l_f'" '"lts () ~ t 1 (' i. •' t l\:..-r1 • )·"' 1 1 :,:. t.i. e r1;1 s "c:- ""' to yiol~t0 bet 1"' .L , • ,l0v,.,,',r 1 • ·r,tru'"·t·' s, ,0 0 . " ')A."':.tl , or to 1,r~ , , , r of · '",.:v~sio·1 ~nto ", '; A>1z-io E'~'8f'l. :'m· IO ..,::rlc P,''" ~ .,oitt,,tio:"l 1",e ·r 0•1 o~ r ~nor· ccir. -::orps. •I, to ~_rl. r '3 l i · ovl':rill'l0"l"v , ulJ e "st --~E::i..uc-tant t > et 1se:nt ·':,ct' '1 1.-,ttr,r ...,c"':,'.:;ion. - CFllecl o~::: ':.. "'er"nJc•no rtti:ic 1r an:. <>n directi1•' ·.m, ,j-!:;' i'1 ,~,, :c 'Jt:·~c-tecl mo•u,-tnin zo:-1·, o:v1 }jo-1-)inrro -1,,,re th0 Tl"om+ain roPS: r-AMcres Ro·1te ,'/:6. - t', 1, br ::.·i ' t C)~., inert c1o"'l9in, ,::i_ 71 I slon () T"r I ~ r.to -r.:_ 1 t 1 :-,,-.-,, "l'"l"l., USl11'p Route 'f6 .q_nr' rut rirr: 'n rr u nort 1 rer-d9d. ... er· Ro ·e. T "eel t"' ,re : . . , so ~ _...,c: inr-i.tion on +: e 1 ".rt c,f Alexan 'cl" tn conrnPnce flli~or , -~s •~: ·1 tl 1 n1,... : rth~ ~::,,e ij,1c1· cr"'j-ions t,l-;:,t , ~ .: -; r ... r,.; J F1'1 ""'t.. t,p C 1d"l ' to c ~·ds :to· :) ·h it encl O" -C' P , ::; 1- ,,.rot....1Ct ~ 1::. t' e Colli .J.' Z. f1 l i f 1'')!1 • 1'8 is iron~. T B~r:r· c·ft8 t' 0 ~ni,.or-':,<1r,~e c.," t· ~, i , tqrrf1in "nl1 r.[l-.:-e ,.:.rectn,d [l .. l of ~ r f1Ubor li.-::-tes to tr·-~ ~-!:;. '1 "'""~nr1er ·i ' nr-ri•.:c' tr rt I ' ,., "e Sf' ½otl" rreC: · .i.s l1°rccti e -1-0 'lt.t..<i.~·,. Valrie ,to,r. e.. ... net C.:0.,..,e so. I ,, rn tre ?rd ~i-•isio>1 pc' ,;;ec·c11 '"'er"::lce rorc~ yr~~,·rel to ett1=1c 1< int' Pt directio:'1 es soon PS : c2·n. ·r,t t',e ~5t' Dj ,.,.~ sion ... 1 -its lcrt t-:, sup 'o_·t it. ':'l'e Di,.; sion does :v1ot c0rTlete itc; r-0ve rntil toni.,l·t. , ·~;1: F1tt1;1c1 +,,p "ollo~·i1· ·orrin. V::-1<: r-crto.,.,8 ::·1: t' P. l -· ' -round to -'-,' P ~a~t , nnc' to +; 1 ;rest .:s so "'tro , 1-r r, ld r u:1 ·r -1-,., e1ery 1s •'lir c'~f8>1--:e or•J_:/on tb t i,o ,rncl er' c'"v:.s1o"l +r ";'r, orJ..;: -1010 •ou lr: r n"t w:i. ·tl c' j ::m.s-1- o:.". 11 'h :5r. 0 -~_,t' "T jwt f 0.1)0. to "'ruc-ocott, FPl•ro,1, ,rl"'l"''l, ::nrl ~c <"•ier tote,, t e- I ET rlisr.rp0i_:rt d ~·-·t 1 t~oir 0+:'·"or~s toc1f'. - ti-rt OE' er tnc T"Ore 'n-s of Rll-out r-tteci, C!Ourl~cl .;t1 t' P rttr->c'• to·y~ ' t C"' t' 8 ,l'>tl "'~-·isio:'1 MYJ.r 1 ,~+, t}p '1ttPck SC c-d·1l_.-..,' t' "3 foJ.10 rjr : "'Or,1:r; r:· tl l IT -::errs T1[ - ~.,..., c" tJ:-:;_c, ' 0, ~ GermF '1 :t-Os·_-1:,io 1 in tJ--.~ Col.lj -,n.zi::i.l:i "'re11.. I ' · -·e lU'.,.Pil t; er to Tflrter e-"'fo..,.ts tonorrow ri. 'l 1 t' ---:i next dn,r. .,. <l'\t': , ttr c Pel tl e 1st -.:r--: tisl )i :iir,ion to t' e • I C0r1 s n,-,•· t'1Ft ~,,.. r Pr, out o"' t· .-u· c'efenni e 1·ole. To attnc 1 t'" 5tr ·;ri-1-,,;:;1', :i· ::i"i.or to t' e •r: Corrs ~oul - bf> 7 ik-e ·:.·r-ir , r- poor ,"'l:!1 "' d;rt sr:lrt. Tre r r e r o of~oni ve . nc:.. ·.nrtio 'l.S. - bR lie·re t' l "'t ..,.,..~ +,is' Di• is~ 0:r. . 'ill 1 "lr' or j t S001Jl"' to 1 "Ve ~ts tri.l up. 1 <C eV':"vt} :n, T 11f'-·o into t,' ::'s 0A.ttl~, • oy-·:'1 to cr<ic 1r t 1 -:_ro l· .y it nece"sr\.I' for Ye'1·:nlr•··-., to srit: drr hotl o-f: ris i:irri ·es to t e north of ·1or-ir • "'l e Gerr·..,-1 i. r <i 1 .:~.o; r eterri.a()d ef'fort to SP v0 F.0 .e. M',ere rre irid:"cn~io1s tl~t l1e ~., :rour:Jrr, i.n re:iJYorcer'Ants fro"'! t'e north. If I do rot Cl"c· t· ·s position in tlrP.e or f'our fr-s I ~,p.- l-;-,·e tc- re-orgnyize, ?<i.it fr,r tl-iE' >' ·} t' Army ::mc1 ,o ['t it 17it', n coorr'-"r/'tecl ~ttncl,- • )ot' Mrr.iies, but I fear -the c~.me rPs11 1.ts -rror ~"1. );-ti \rmy. ..,.t rill rot p11t in its full e~fo1--t, for i-1:. never ras. 11 11 .,. <11" ~:row:in }>O<iit.:.0'1. '\'J1 icr- l'dlJ :"'k'l1 'C T r 1 AAI tc Hl 8o"lcerne'i - "I 0-2''20. •r 1 i.le (;T'JC •relco 'W ~o IT " .... opoq.-,} th.t 'I:C s'·or-:.cl r'le--:elor on 'rr-tion° ro:-t' o-'" ~.iv,r ).ACCO c"ir cted on Ferent:i.110 n.nc' rot<'l"l ~t 1~_11 be TO'>Si 1)1~ to yut it ·,..-:,o 3f::'ect he CP"lrot ..,,,.ree to rllot ti,e :~oad Fercnt:iro-'J~l~onto·,,, to Fi~t, Arrrvu'11A,s or until ;t beco ""S clA:=-<r t.';:,t r,;i 't>-t 0 �Army "!ill not be required to cooperr>te in Your Pttack on the VAlmontone line . In this case he will be prepar9d to reconsider matter . Road Valr ontone-Rome is ro"rever allotted to Fi.c,th Army. 11 0 Gruenther to Clark. R'T ?1~. "General Devers called. Corps corrimancl post "md then proceed by- jeep to Tforma area. ,,,',ether or not he will f,8t to your command post. 11 qe will fly to IV They do not lmow Gern•ral Gl<>rk sent General Gruenthsr the f'ollowinr; m9morendum at noon --':,odn;v: 11 The action taken by AA I rtoes not surprise me. I r,,nticip,:,ted it. Do not raise the question of the boundar.v between Ei%;}1th and Fifth Armies beyond Valmontone ~mt watch it ver·· cRrefully when t} e question does come up, so t:r-ot it is not dravm absolu+,el;r alonp; the north edge of Route //6. I would say thAt it should ~o from Valmontone to Palestr~nP 11nd Palestrina to the Ti:i.c;hth i\rmy. Valmontone will haVP to be used jointly. From fR.lr-istrj_na it shou1d go the most direct route to Tivoli, ":i ,.,in~ me an opportunity to mPneuver to the north of Route 11 6 as we appro1:ich Rome . I must have the road that ~oes trrough Casal Santambro~io at q166. :rn other .-,orr1s, t} ere is no eycuse for their runnin-; the 1,oundarv too close to '!tome . 11 With regard to the Frencr, I w~ 11 defer any .r.iction on tnkin~ a French Dision. Fo'vever, ha'te directed ti-.is morn-i np; thrt t½.e '7rench tnJce ower, with one corrJbat team or whatever they feel is necessary, 88th Division positions north of Se'3ze so I can brinE: the 88th Di vision :in for tl e final attack. VJ 11 H:<J.Ve just JM.de a talk out Pt the ceremony. affa.ir . It Wf'l.s 1uite rm imnressive "I do not blnme you .c>or ettinP.; a little provoked in talking to 1fording with reference to t},.e ½oundary. AppA.rently- the tacticn.l si t1.wtion is not dictatinr; the decisions . " L As of ei~ht o t clock t'.llis wrenino; ~llied forces in the Anzio area had suffered 6147 battle casualties and captured 4615 prisoners clurini:; tl-ie recent offens: ,e. * * * A~JZI0-- Hli.Y 31, 1944-- At 0930 General Clarl, held a rress conference . T'1is is ti1e third press con:'erence t~1Pt Genernl ClA.r:V has hAld since the day before t' e offensive stA.rted on the 11th o+' May. It was an off-t1~e-record talk for 1'1. back~-r01md for tl .e correspondents for the next pht=ise of tbe fi<)"hting . General ClArk e:;..,'J)lained ho··r h8 hnd Pttached ti..,e 1st British Division °to the VI Corps, ,c,;i-<rinr; it the 1st l\rmored, 1+5tl, 34t:r, J6tl and 1st Brjtisb Divisions . VI Corps will Pttack northwest toward RoT'le, its rj l\°ht te..kinf the hi<;h €{round 1movm As the Colli lazial:i and its left proceed:i n~ directl:v northwest toward RoY'le . On the rip;ht of VI Gorps, II Corps V'ith t},e 85th, '3rd Di-.risions and Special "';ervice Force . The 85th Division is to attack tomorrow morning northwest wHh the high ~ou.nr' ih the vic~nity of 1occa Priora as its initial objective . ':'he 3rd Division and :;pecial 3ervice Force will spearhead_ ".lorth to the ri~l-i r,;rolmd nP st VRlmonto"le nnd cut 'ioute ,%. General Cl8rk emphasized that 0 �t 1 is Ptt"'':),,. doPs not hrve Rone pc; ~ ::.s rrili'"ry objective b·1t to kill :?nd anni' ill:1.te as "'J,ny o-" the Qqrmc1.ns as po,::;sible on our -F'ront. He SPid t}nt re did not, owever ,' lose si · t of t 1e fp ct -1- pt, :.}•e c; tv of Rone Mifl t be /' ined ,, s fl rAs•1lt of t' :l c:; Pttn.ck-. •·any -iuesti ons 'r,re r>sked by tl e corresroY" 'e>1ts wi ; ch Ge 1r=irPl r:lF,r', P"1Sv"ered <ts ·"r::i11.kl,r P s e CC'"' 1 ,:;. So-me '7ere di.rect'":ld concerni 11.. the occ11rnt-l0n of Rope [Pd y w1 nt trOOT'<::!. G<>11ernl c1,,-rk SB 'd thPt le could not sa.,,- l '"'t troor:i mule" ente.,,. ~;rst, t ,t -Lt r'e-,endod r,n wrich ones drove t} e ::<rdest. As to T;:i 1-t' l:\.rmy troops, t} rt would he P r ecision r,~rie y A.AI. Ger-?ral '::lnr 1 nar·e it un ·erstooc: th"t ns "Etr l'lc; t'h0 City of Rcme itse:..f w1:1 c; concArvv~d, re was not interA sted e""c8-rit to secure t' 1 e c · ty, am' A.S soon fl s ti rt •vie b,qer r'J.o:>1P, he ryrmld +>pn ' is .('orr;es out to tie nortl east .<ind , est for fu"t er -~J.sres. A-Pter -1-,''"' l'ress con ... -:ire"l.ce, Ge11errtls Ca11.non find ~avi 1-ln CRr-e ur tr- cc•1.f'er wi.t' G9r-erf'1 "!li-cir1' Cl"'rcer>1'n,.. t 9 ['ir suprort ,,~ en to t1 e rP''18"'7ed Ptt;:,c"l( • bo'1t noon Ge-1e1">l Cl"rk tele,' o'1ed /}9'1.er;:,l rr,,.,1"cctt "no. c: ·.3cussed vdtl 'dm -:,' A situntio'"l. /18 ~t '10V' "'X:1 stPr' • Fe c'irecteC:. Gem,ral nr'lSCott to ·i e hi'1 ci-v·hi_or11l ccr.r'lc""l'lers 4n n.c1d.'tio11"l s} ot in t!"le Prr~. :'-om no, on for t1 e neY.t "''3w r1q ; ,,13 need to mus+.er I'll our efforts "ln' ~nush tre r>tbick -v1..,.or0-,slT. He also r'Hr0cted t A.t t 11e I1 Cory-::, attA.ck by t''"' ri-5t1 D.:. 1.sion hR 'f90ded up. 'I'he attE'~k W"l. "re ...,d at '1,,cut 11+00 '01rrs +, is n".l.9rv:.0or, q">' ~ts 10c1yrncf' '--is ·,1ro ,.C9'1 '9G. ·r. co -~o.,. ·tr it1 +,' c-se t:'de ..,y -1:l"' 16th Ji ·i3 4 on on. its le~"t. Pt 1330 'orl W8S r9c-'3ived ':-,,,A+,+' A Britis 'Pc' occu1iec 'i'ros·nor,0. No res··~trn0e ""'1 P11.r:o-mtsred, 1--,1t ,ill -:.r-ci "hrid·es 0re ''lo'", ,,,,,1 t'e +oin ·.q,s 'eriv·1· ..,,·'1nd. At 1430 ';.e11°-~q1 K,y0s err., to r:o:rf,r 't' (}eYl,rfl r;:rr}-. t +,J is +, imA 'e <'ccic' 'c.' t' ...,t t' '3 1"t' n~ Yi<"'iO"', lw,s rre co· bnt +,eRm, w::is to be attAc 1 cd to I: ~orrs ,, c' wo 1lrl JU fl -its r-ttec>' 0'1 t' '3 (1,5t' 1 s ,,-: t .(':flnk nC'rt 11 lP:rd. 1 G-=1r0rr>l ClqJ~i,-, aft r co1n9r-r''1 -'t' GPYlPra~ B""'<1'1n l'r;n, +, ': hster r~rt r "~9rno0r ... ~;:"u d q '1'3W (hprr.ti0">1'1 ::-n"'tr·1ctio'1 '?5 . c' i<J ,..,10t"i h"'lo, • ftc,r ,u !"Jr It. Col. IJln.r', bro 1:t ·11 ~::r. :i·orman c" t e c·~cfl o "r~burc.. o·""' t e 1 •• 1~Nhts o"' t' A h s '-attle rrr)"T0S9 W8.S "-_,' A 8izure 0f T<"lrt o""' t'.e,-: b \.ro· rs -f;he Cnll-'_ Lrz·,.::.-: 1""J, t,;.:s ~")t D"'~jsion. So. 0 ;-i'1s ,,.,re 1"'1",·e in t· '3 Fr';r-c s.:ictor it' 3"_0~ ', 1t .,tgac: • r,YTe ,:; to ~, e ·1.o.,..t 1 rnt. r;,• 0 ..,:;.~en~' we:;.~0 ·r::pPri en""' j 1 ' i 1. SOJl" ~ ~ ' b:i i1C8S' y +, ter re 1. stR nee' 9 S" (,cir 11 ":t'Oi"'i ti eir r :_ t J'."'lRnlr r0---t, of t 1 e r ~co ~i "f'er. •T.' r011r Ga'1er.q_j_ Clark 1 a notes or. +, 9 1 '1., 1 s r> cti • :.ties '""'o llow: 1 I Co~J3 attPc:k is no~ uri, ')oi~ · ell today, I1Aet:.n "ri~y st:.rr resis-':,fnce. 1st Ar"'o.,..nd has '7::-de very little '1eadway. '.:" "l. Ar tired, '1eed mH-:'1t9'-Y"'Cf-, ard e,:c'3 '3 in ' A.r/assed by Sr- 1 s fro". t e ' ~ ·' Tci11.r i souj' o ·: Lake Albano. Truscott is r1lli~ ... , '3 1:C"1or ack tor-' 'i:, ., eav" 1 , .i.; , -· 1fa'1t" .:n a'1d i ·i 1; ~"' ,18S , is full Di · .1 > , t 1 - ush ,..orwm-d.. 0 ~ 0 0 "Doc .,rder an ~.q_de no 1 rr,~ess tc, 'ay. T' t' e 3"J"':. i ·s::.011 shou:rl assL·t i""1 tor>ll'row. 3 -''lank:'.n, . 0 ~!'lent, '., \lr 11':er o-!: n.l\:,r 'a.3 , cn0 ,1ell. "'}0,1.~rA.l ,loan ~l'l~,9 ~:'1 i=m riJ.l ',ye rll ·'s ~8t' J;v-i.s'_on ,sse"'lb:ed 1 ) dPyli '-: to::-'o~row. It i, tirec1, , l t : 1•.:.11 ':.L.row :t into ,)ri.:;tJe ·n .1., e II Go'fs sect01~, f'eE'l~1 t· 2t : 'Ill' ·t 1 l"'3 evfr ounc--. ; . , r e"~r · • r Cn.nmU'3u')' r._, .,vl--i, "'.;'me. .,_ ,. _ r "'' �. +. · + ' • ",--,5 , It ,uill attack to +.he north. I ,.,J1,e issue d Op:ira..,ions I ns0ruc-c,1on Jr. t octay, tell -in.,. rrr su1,-)ordi·::ate com,vrnders tLr-it t'.Y~::.~ fi::·st "1issio,.., Pfter takin~ the 1~::: p 11- ~ou..;d in t'·\e Colli LaziRli areP is to r'l_estroy t: e enem;r on our frO',t vrl ile 'at the :oame tine setting- up 3. task force under General Frederick to move east on Fi ;hvmy !J6 to disrupt and destroy the en ,my movin[; out from in front o" the 'SightJ- Arm~' Hnd the Frenc'" -;-;,g~prljtiorw.r;,;r Corrs. llJl.pparentl." the -.::: --ft' J\rr:1, -, hei11.,; rror ded fron tl e Frime Hinist r down, is srordn,r; a little :-'lore 0neri:~Y• It 'ms f:1nally taken 7 rosinone. The, enem;,t hacl evccunted .. 1 1:r, 0 11 1"1here is rmc'i p.~essure uron r1e, alt} oug,., it is not bein to 'ave -::: r;'1tl: ,\rny -:_n on tl e bntt1e +'or Rol'7e. 0 Pf plied direct- HJ am worri("'d about t 119 future of the 'Frenc'~ "Sxpeditionary Corps. ~Jitb the restrictio".!.s t}rt Alexancbr ;•2s r,l1°ced upon rne, their zone of action is narro 11:_n'~ llOVm to noth~ nr;. I :,opA to squeeze t'1.em nort1• of IIi r;h,•r9.7 /6 in t e attac;, on Rome. It pro'xi.bl::r 111ill 1Je violr:mtl:r o"posed by AAI. 11 I am ettackinn- across ia ;hway ."6 tomorrow to tal,e Vn.lmontone Hnd some of the hi} rmmd to t'~e north. :: must take t' is hi,r,t -o;round j_f I Pm to naintain myself F>.t Vr-ilm...,ntone. I rather 1,elieve thnt tbe decision will come in the II Gor:;:,s fro,,.,t and t/ r•t I qa;r 1.Jreal, t} :rough triere. T·1e next two d-:iys !!'Till tell t½e tale. 11 GenerPl C1?.rk today issued tne follo 1~in~ operF>tions order to 5t1 British Division: 11 1. 5 Infantry Division (Br) will attaclr wH'·out , elay to Cf'lfture t: e 1 line Hill 104 (756434.) - RJ 751427 - Hill 103 (751419) - fRATICA J1I •:rtHE (73L,1). F' en nbove line las been secured, mqloitf1tion f0rwrrd will be nPde wit} all possible speed to secure t'. e folloninr: objectb1 es: a. Are8 et bend in ro1:d 71.5504. b. Road ;n 8J'."ea_ :;755. ' c• Road between 615531+ and 585515 . .Sreed in e:xyloitinrr forwc'rd to sec1JTe t} e lrtter t1::ree objectives j_s esse:ntjnl in order to: a. 'f'TPFP. before Destroy nn;r enemy remn.ininrr between tl e 1+2 Nortl~ing and 7.iver ey can cro"'s t' e river. t: b . Freve:vit t1 e enem:,. on 5 Infa,,tr;ir '>i-,j_ sion (Br) front from ,·it; dra,ring to tl e norU1 ef:I st to rnm the s,, itc' line runninp rpproYinntely norti,_ west - sou-f:;keast 1Jet,vee:1 88/,.4 - 7158 . "3. Effecti~re et once, t' e '10undrry betwee·1 5 Infa•,tr;;·· Division (Br) and VI Corps ( 1 Inf'E1ntr:r Division (Br) will be: .,.nclusive to VI Corps road A''TZ:'.:O - AIBP.I'JO to RJ 865326 - t: Ance �railwr--~r bed to track jlJnction '3?3154 - Sci.ddle 806367 - Hill 55 (80?374) CR 786391 :1..nclusi~re m 11 62 (7973~1) exclusi ~·e ;:,pm~ 801377 RJ 771/+47 - llJ 737536 - RJ 738564 - RJ 7051=i89 . "i" . 5 Infar-tr, Divisior- (Dr) 17ill be respc-~s' hle f'or rrotection of t 1 e left +'1211}: c,,.. , and r:1P.intP~ 1inD" crntPct Fit ' , 1 ::r:r.f'antr;r Division (Br) on t eir rirl t . 1 11 5. Fo~nts o·"' junction bet·,een l a,,,d 5 Infantr:· Divisions (Br) 2re: a. Cros.sroads 78739?. c. Crossroads 7711+!+7 . e. RJ ri37s32 . C\ erfltio·~s :rnstruction =1ssuec1 tode./· e.1s0, reacls PS follovJs: Fi"tl i'.rri:r +:'orces re ''.lO~' ·'n ro"'~tio·1 to :!_p il"C' ,,, rt cs ~,,,t,e~cid,d to 1-ie t• '3 -"'~nal ,. · r• se of' our or0rat::.o•· s Bo.st cf RO'~ . 1 June VI Corrs will str=.Je 0"1+, ~1it'• Pll +-; eir "'orces in cortixrmtior of t' sir successes of t 1 e rr'st O cl2c_~s . II CorJ s -.~111 lPPnc' a ren offens::1'e "ron :lta rresent rosi tio~1s . 11 tt:1sio~1 o:~ t 1 'JSe !~1ttt?c: s ls +,o cr·us' t, ~ :?01irtee~t} Gorr~e...'\'" !11.... F:r foci "1,.: o'J.r A'TZ.,.O ?nrces rc,.:i t,o P:T lo:i t 1,~' al1 ro ,s: 1.10 neans o'f'""l7 orr,or·tunit . trs r'estro - corirlet,31~· t; p ""1.P'7.:f 1 '1 .forces B.1",' ~Pt"'r~ el. '!'o accor0 1 lis 1 t js , -t_t is d_r'3cted t~et : u1. 0 1 II Corps 'V~ll : A:'."t,-,r · f'';:·np secv.red t' 1e :-i--;;1, R;r01.md nort:, of Vl\LJ;r,·r'C'NE , blocked all traff~c tlrour:;' 7.ol1 te j ti'irl "ecurer' -:, 1 f't ~"Tt c" COLL!: L..ZIALI t '3:t lies nit1in ~ts zon9 J '~o :,rt;}a.red on Armf Crder to yt1rsne and rnnili lr.te G-err'a'1 :'orces w!tl dra .~n[r nort' west a•y" ''Jill se"ld 1 t,rd · itt-ing mobile r-Ol"CGS 11.D 'er ••.• roro11s le2.der _;: J1 --~ p Route 6 on r-:rCI:'J'P10 to C/'lJ tur-=i o:c ciesti--ot.~ a11- c;_1e:mlt -~c:.-·:le~; \ ~t'-.d~a'tI5_rz ·~ror~ 1:: o :rcr1ts '-~~ ~=-r,t A.J'r·:- an0 a. 1 1 1;'1 rer1c~ 1 ,-:Jcpeditionar:~ CoI"I s. :,;. VI Gory s wj 11 : ::-"'ectu e -1::.' 11.t y.art o:' COLL= I,,.t. ZIAL~ b Hs zone 0:' act5_o•· and dri··e -'"'orrmrr ,,;'t' tl P; utnost ·,reed t0 Cllt t 1 e routes o: ,-it1-,"TeW£,l of -~ner·,u· forc'l'.)s -':,1 rou,:,·' 1:C lli: anc' t· en -'-rn°n stron"; f0rces c;ou-'-,' ,·est to pv,n_i'. 5 late t'. e e'1ern; ap;a:11'.lst t' e ,..,TB1°R :'.::i ·rer . Lo-1/ :.. n.n-:e rrt:p_lery ilJ. te used to interdict an:-" cro0si"l"' sites b'T vi' ic} +, 1 0 ene~.- ''a,' rittemrt to VIitrdr-m c:,r t 1 e rn-nER Rj_ rer to +j-- e "Test • 0 1 0 �Fress +>orwarc1 s,-j r;orousl,.' 'rit">in t'•eir zo110 of action to secure t'e 'ig c-ro1.md in t'e ·,ricinit;r of 3Errrr (G 1ri44), protect t:e r::1.-;'t flank of .,..I '.Jorps arid ;,' '.c nt' ArT1,,- ard fpcilitate t· 6 B.l1.-ance of ,.:~_i:-' t' Army. 1 d. 5 :::nfantr:, Di· ision (nr) will: 0 rress :::'orwarc: rn.1:i.cJl; towards t' 8 TIE' :r. Riv"ff tc c11t off e.11c. destroy sner-;' forces t' et · E!Ve b1=,en turr;ed sout1 ~:" t\e ,rr Gol'I s . ArtilJ.~ry - -· , . , t ule will he ,,:er t ·,rc-:)LL f.crwara in oroer t o . n·ercJ.Cv cror3s1,.,g sir,es over +' J. ... • • ' 11 ?. . Defr ils on sec+,ors ol resror s:; bil~ t~- for seizing t e anc:. ac.-vPnce to t' e rort' later. 11 Cb.rl- to G-r1 1.ent1 er . JJr 1714. HJJ,2 Pnc? 143 prog:ressinc satic:fcctoril;r on ~:onte ArtPmiso on t' ejJ_' first oi.-.jective in +,'··e -vidn::_ty of 9646. 85t' f~,·i8ion junped o·nf et l I.:'., occupied. Lar:lBno 0J48. Tell Juin: understand ' is situn:l::.ion. Will jur1p off tonorrovr r;ornine; rriti 3rd Di vision and ::ipec:.1.11 .;,erv--: ce :'orce tl~ occupy ~ ir 1 ground j· ,rnediatel, · nort 1• of Vnlmont,one . Sloan is '-er,=i . Fis di··: sion wil.1 be 0 s,;enbled ')~r d.n;rl:ir:; t tomorrow morn:~ng . Re sure ;1·011 ~,ate' qu,=ist:i.on of bou.,.'1.dPr:,. fro"' Vr lr10rtone northwest . 11 0 Gener-al Clark toc1r.· sent t 1 e followin~ menorandul'l t0 GenerP.l Grmwt er: 11 I 1 ave c1ecid9cl to comr:.t t: e 88t' Di~1 ision in t' e II Corps w'·ere one cor~bat +e1;r,, Rlreo.r::r is . 'T'here is 1_uite /:'. ger bet reen t' e 3rd 8I'C1 t' e '";8th :Ci-visions . 88th will attack tomorro'i ~Ln t1·rt [;Pp gener.,lly· nort: • ::: 1 c-ve directed Keyes tc set up a tas'lc +>orce 1mder :::'rederir!k; a fast 1·itting , mobile llnit '7:.t' ris ..:>pecfo.l Service Force, TD I s am' tt=:inks to rroceed east along t?.oute /!6 as soon ns we cnn t;et on to it . Its nif'sion is to ('estroy, discm.u~age , disrupt, disorganize, Pno P.n:r ot\er d's you t' ink of, r-ny enemy forces in t' Pt area opposino- Eig:.t: Army or F-SC . .... I kn.o"' of no "ro.,· to emrloy tLe ,:\8t 1 Division better. If I rut lv in the VI Go11,s t' ere "muld 'PVe :-iee11. P 1assage of ti~e 1 i_nc')s, nd it vould e time - consur1ing . ''it. t} e success of t' e ::St' Division '?.nc t, e vvr:,y 85t' is goinp-, I p,yn c0.,,"ir,c0cl t' Pt is t' e t' in; to do . 0 •0 11 I i,,,...,.e iflsued an OI w~ ~ c: instructs Ke;Tes to set up ti is Frm'ierick Task Force rnc1 c1irects tie tvm c0rrs P.nd 5t Di-ision, P.fter Colli LP zj_ri.li is cPp turec1, to r'estroy t' e l4t: Arn;r in our :'.:'ront . In otl•,Tc worc1 s, t} --it is our 1 P :i.ssior, r"t'er t 1 .<in '-:Justinp; into Rone . You rrill get a cop:· rronrtl;r. 11 : cert?inl:r will feel 1 ,etter ,,,1-e11 tie F'':C pus1 e,s up r•8st Po 1te LPn.ico, for 1'1 en 1• 1e rittacl: wit' t' e 3rd Div:i s5.on a1:1.d >pecial ,..,,ervice Force our wl1 ole rir-' t flank is open excert for t! e 91st R,conneissance . 11 1 GenerP l Gri.entr er disr,ntc1 ed t'. 8 follo"rin_u neI'lor 0 nchm to Gr-nerrl C1Pr1 r: 11 1. ! i'PYe bnen r1.prlyin2; a '.l;e'"1+;le sqt1eeze on ?'SC , stressing t' e vittc1l contribution t' ev- cPn ffl::e i_n connection Fit' t 1 VAJPC7>frr ,]E Gtt? ck if t'"e:r ·e ct>r> W'.nn-o.;e some' O''! to r-rnt t1 ere in time . �11 ? . Gennr<J.1 Juin is becor-,ing fea:t'f'u.2. t.,rt you mPJ be e:xrecting too mud from 'im, so , e '. ,-,cl Colonel Zellar teleplone tl is Dorn:..r·n; to say: 1Generc\l Juj_n believes t} 0t ,·m Pre nxrectinP, Frenc: Gorrs to buttress Genera.I Keyes I riglrt . Genera.I Juin is exceedingly Anxious tl:,t,t '"8 not count on '. is sup:;ort w'•9n, in fact, 1·e will be unable to be in lin,3 wit'. Gener,1 Ye:ms by tl1 e mornjng of 1 June . 1 At present t'e Frenci li11e r1ms as ::ollows: 'T'he 1 eft is secured on CARPI'1JETO and tbe right is from three to fom· kilometers nortl-- of C:CCCA "JO . 1 1 The terrain is difficult and the Frenc:1 Corps is still neeti:nr; u:it,- 2.prred.a11le resistance . .)\oulil t 1·i·'1.F"S continue R.S ,eJJ. as t' e:r "'re going now they would need about U•ree na·rs to '')e in a position to cehoucJ,, in tl•e GAv:rrmANO area . In ot 1 er words, FEC can prob2bly be t 1 ere eit, er in tie eveninp; of ~ June or :mornini:; of 3 June . Should resistance sti "fen the date 'muld ',e correspon<lirn,:ly JB.ter. 1 1 0 Colonel Zeller P r;n in :i.nsisted on Generrl ,Tuin I s desire to make sure ti1a.t Gex"~rr.l Clark does not court on :bim in connection '"it t, 1 e Keyes o-oerRtion in an p.rea yr,. ere ' e cr-.n not possibly be 0t t' e time of t~e sc:1eduled orerati.on (1 June) . "3 . ':::'h~ news of t} e ,mccess of' tle ?nd Battalion, 111,?nd In-fan try h:1s caused all o:f' us to turn landsprings . 11 Clnrk to Gruentl 8r . rn 1706. 11 'l'wo regiments of 16t' novr on Honte Artemiso . 1:.iav-e 01.rectec' 85tla Djvision to atbc 1r along;side of '36t} . Attack s1 ould be launc: eel by ? r. •~. It will r;o for t',e ; ig' r:round in tre -r;icini ty of 99. 5 49 . 5 Pnd to t. e nort up to r.Tount Ceraso . IIPve triPd to speed up <' 1 Da.niel 1 s a.ttP.ck to t' e 'ig'. P,r01md north of VRlmontone, :)ut it rrobr>bly can not get off earlier t 11an duJ'.'ing tk.e n::ig' t . T½.e lfovrze Force reinforced will fill t'. e &;ap hetween U e !:5"5tl and '3rd Divisions. Still sticky in tl .e h'1.mnri.o area ~ 88t'1 less one CT will he in Army reserve until I see w'•ere t}rn ~oinP, is F!ood . It may be in tl e II Corps. T:Jhere r-ire t' e Frenc~? }us} t' em up w:1 t: all possible speed . '' General Clark tlis evening sent t'e following memorandum to General GruenthPr: AttPc1 ed is rm HdditionPl cormmmigue vrl ici., cr.J'Je out t1-is evening and w':i.c evoked some co::-:i.nent from t' e rress, rerticulnrl•r t 10 e vrriters for t1 e morn:i nP' n:npers in t'·e States. The,- claim t' Pt t;-"ere is Hn excellent story for ti e BritisJ,-. papers but not one vrorc;. '1B vin,c- been said about the lend battle on t},e Fiftr .~rmy front. They ]'.ad not' :nf" to ·,rite r:.bout. C'f course, I realize t 111>t ,;:i..,en t} ey put t' e special cor r,nu,irrne out on tl e joininr, up of t} e '"r:ldp;eheod ·f'orces ti·e lritisl mi';ht rve rid t 1-e same comrlP:int : ad '"'e 1 ad lritisb not troons in tl e ;joir,-up . 11 1 10 1 �11 Ti is ½rinv,s T"\e to a suggestion •v' 1 ic• you 111iP-,ht discuss informally first 'Nit'· Lem, nnd thnt is th9t d11.dng tl1ese tense tj mes w' An t}·e siturtion is moving rapic1 ly, ever-" afternoon b:,r t 1 rr-ee o I cloclc tbere r-J .o-',t crnne out an addition to ti,,e on-tr,e-record br>clrgrounc in 1,il icl:i they could mention such items as our c1mtu1·e of t' e ' ia;b P;round bnck of Velletri. Tkm.t is a tremendously important" 10nnouncement, n,nd b= getting ere in mid-rifternoon it gives the morni np; newspaper corresrondents Pn opportunit:r to get t'·eir copv b::-.ck in time for first-pafse U. ' • publicA.tion. 11 Flease do not start a controversY ,ret, but first !ave Lem look into it and see wl·,:,t cr>n be done. It soui1ds reasonable to me. inp:s seem to be r:oin,:,; well t"j s evenin,:,;. Brnie I s tanks ore coming rrtey are 1:111 in and need a rest. His inf Pntry wi 11 stn;--r in, and ~P ~les 1rno Doc 11.yder "'rill pus1 on to:morrov'. T1-eir attack, ':rit' trose of t} e II Corps And 36t1 Di vision, ma;w begin to .a:et decisive results. I prPY it does. 11 11 T' out. The addjtionnl CO""lr,uni(l_ue mentioned in the above memorandum is quoted belovr: 11 Tbe enemy continues to f2,ll beck undP.r pressure of our nd-vandng Bigbth Arm;sr forces "ft icr are astride ½ip-1w1a~ 6 on P broad front ;:ind h<1ve reac1-oed t~e outskirts of :r;'rosinone. 11 troors Tt may no1;1 be stPted ti·t?t P b£1tt2 lion of tl e Black Ha tel was e.monr, the wi ic•· made tl,e originP 1 hridge 1 ead [icrorn the Rapj_do. 11 11 Fip·1 +,9rs and lir,1 t 1 XJmbers founc:. onem: flPk exceptio:nall7 li,o:ht tooRy as thev bonbed rmd stro feel troops, bivouac arAas, gnn posit ions and enem7 l eld tovms in t' e bittle nre~s. No r10venent of enel"'' traffic was seen in the bPttle and Rome areas. nvP.rhavrks, T}nmder 11olts, Inwders nnd Bostons drorped 1-nmdreds of toI1.s of bo111bs on troors, isnns and bj YOUc".c areas near Albano, W' ic1' we.s rractics lly covered in smoke by bombinl!,. 11 Soutl west of Velletri T ·•underholts bombed nnd set fires in the town of Lanuvio. In tie Rome narsl·•p,llinf ~mr·c1s tJ:oe · strafed a locomotive nnd left it , • ournJng. II As of midnj gt t tonight the da:r 1 s battle casualties amounted to 633 men in the Anzio area, with a total of 1811- rrisorers taken. * * * ANZI0--,TTPIS 1, lq/-1-4--At 0800 General Clark \"e1t dovm to tl'e port nrea to vmlcorne tbe '361st RCT wl-:i c1 was lP.nding in LCI I s from t' e Naples oreri. Re met Colonel Bro['dlow, t'1e Regimental Cornms:r1.der, and wptc} ed so111.e of t} e troops debark. At 0900 3rlgadier Gooclbod:' came in to sr, • ,o;•-iodb;we to GenerPl Cl0rk. He is leav-inn· to join 'is Prmored brip;['ide. He hrs been wit' VI Corrs for tr.e pst ten weeks , and just recently Cf!me to t1 e AdvPnce Fift'. Arr1y Corrr110nd Jost AS Britisr M 1visor to t: e Army Comm:mder. Genernl Glrrk co11.ferred ,':'reouentl:v with Generr-1 Brnnn, : is G-3, for tl e re- �rnainrler of tt e morning, we.tel inf closely t1,,e bRttle ~rogTess rnAcle b:· II and VI Corps. He called General 'T'ruscott, GenerPl ~,ogles ~md General 'f,-,lker on occasions to P"et first hPnn_ in:"ormation on ti-,eir progress. I At noon Gener,.,l Gruentl er flew up from t 1 ·e forwr-rd con'nl:'lnd rost to confer wit' General ClBr}r. He, GenerPl Clark and Generr-1 Brann remained in con.eoerFmce for about 1 nlf an 1 our. 11_fter tl is conference General Clr.rk received lTajor Green- rilkinson of t} e ~ip;}'.th Army. Ee was sent up by General Leese to explain t' at j_f trie ?iftl· /1.rrry W"S ;:,ble to teke Ror1e witl- out assistance from tl e -r;ii:::;' tr Army·, t1 e ~-; ~l U A.rmy woulc continue its attacks further to t' e nort' of Rone in t' e d~irection of Tivoli. J\t 1400 General Bl'rr, G;;l.ief of Steff for General Devers, came to visit General CL•1rk • •After General Barr tr d left, Geri eral Clr, r l" 'vvent up to see Genernl Truscott at 1 is VI Corrs corJ11P:1d post. Later on in t e ;:,fternoon ; e received Generals Brads'·-aw and 1.amey. Fe discussed wit 1 Ge 11eral Brn.csbi.v1 anti-aircr~ft 1 matters. l\.fter supper Ge:ner<il ClPrk conferred 1·1:i.t"' 1 is G-.3, Gener81 Brann. f urinc-' t' i.s conference ..,e made rl~one cells to General :-_::pgles, Generril Ryder, Ge11eral };eyes ancl General 'f'ruscott. Ee vrr.nted to empbPsize wit'. Pll of l'!is subordinate commanders t11e necessit.r for an R 11-out offend v-e tomorrow - that tomorrow was critical - t 1 rt t' e;' '"'t:id to r,us 1 to t"'e l:init rmc '.'re nj ght crnck t)·e Boe' e defensive line. 1 :Ug1 liP..:hts of today's rrogress were t' P entrance -; nto Tfelletri of %t1' Di vision troor,s in tle lrtter ~9rt of t1 e ,.,.;:,ternoon. 7- e 34t: And 45t:- nade little ri,...or:ress. ':' 1 e 85th D5,dsion h,.,d reac1 ed rronte Crstel Laccio. T' is hs put t,,.,em just si,,ort of their injtial objectiYe, Pou:nt Ceraso. Tl e 88th Division in its attHck to t' 'e northvest ad-.rnced about a r1ile 0nd n. '-a1f. T 1a.e 3rd Division 'he.d cut Hip-lw:ay /!6 just en.st of VA lmonto11e and 3peciR.l Ser-vice Ti'orce troops were pus 1 ing eastw~.rd clown Route ?6. T• e 'Frenc' · ave mPde some PdYr>nces to t1 e no·ct'. 1"est. T}•e 3rd DJA will pass t'."rougl t 1 e /,.tL ;)~,TM at J'ionte LPnico. On t1°e r;;i1:;' t1 P.rrr,7 ,..ront :Sritisl reco1·mnissrn1ce units were just s'•ort of "'erentino. Tl'eir Ac1 --;r,nr::e :,es not bc:;en ver:r rPT~ r" t' rou,:l out the camrx:iip;n and has not ke1t rince vit1 Fif't~ _'\.rE1y r,clvances t'rouo·'out t~e bettle. :mportant messB.ges o:f' the day are quoted as follow.s: Devers to Cli:,rk. R"T F53358. "Included in a messnge .c>rom Gemeral · e:r·s1 all to Generr,l DeY0rs r-0.s t' 9 follonin,· nesSPf:;9 icl we } '-'Ye been asked to 1 trs. ' 1 pRss to you. m, is was oontained in messPfe "-4407'2 of 31 May. Pr 1 all and I greatl,. arprec 0 rite your Pction onc1 messages refr-irding Alle-1 'lro·m. You ,,_,.,_ve been '"10st t' oufrtfnl W'cl cons1rlerrte, dosrite our tri:,PJ.endous resporsibil:ities at t: e r1oment I• I! 1 1/ 0 0 AG'il\Jt to Clark • .1:J ,;,53437. ":·'.Rrk • Cl,rk, Lt. Gen., f"'rn,e•1.ent HpJoint"1.ent Brigt1c'l-'.er Gener::il, Rog,1lar -irn\,., renk from 1 ,:3epte'11.her 41 P1nounced Tera 1, 7iDS'"' ''110, dP..tAc1 31 ''Tay ad...-ises AG"\JAR. 11 Gener .l Slar1 t· is efterrioon c,ent tl 9 follo•"'"n: rnessa,:;e to G0,1errl 0 Gn, e:1t: 9r: "I 1 .ave .iust rotl1.rned +'rom t8.lk~_ng ··r"t1 mrusc.ott. I wo"L..lc~ "'Ot let "'in �)33 .,. ul1 0·1t ':,' r Prrl ir'"' 45-':.' ~ -· •;'. Gio'i. tr ri. -· t' OT( :: +;, ' l UY•(' b tru.c'r +,' ro 1.o; Cj qt,,....,...,,.., u.,,. to 1re1' etr·, ,,, i£"' ~ ,-, 'c··~r i+ ~('Jt.urpr' n+:., ""'C' ?ebruc· it ·n 11 rev :·'. rP.ctio 1 t0 r-"ro ! tc t1 '"' 1 rt 1'ff,s +,. .,.-1:. I":' "''1.t v1 i +} 1.rn i. 1"-: ,:,v ontire F --: '1i0r. :lO'T "Uj, · 0'3 ,d +:.o 1) :r. 'esn0rc:.n ~l, ..ltric-1:. .. , ..; t 0 OT'0::".,., 9ir:esli·nr ir +,1 "' "'r · ' i. s· o ";_:' r>'1c' .1.,1- 0, :4t to t e rest - 8. 71 i 11. c. rb=i d - v---ry screwv r 1d err _;__nro',',1- ,1F> ~-•0]11 ~; p ;_(';J'-' tir:l'~ ,.,r ,1e. -;: -'{ .,Hi., c.~-tz/'.' . ~m to +R'·A +' o ". ,'7t' ~rom t' e 4S-':,' , rio-8 :. :, ' · +.rrc1· + w' ' t tr +; r- 'lell-==,tr-: r r Hl r,...erfre to • eve u tc t n, .-s·. e ,t 'n:.: ·r 1 letr-: -· fl c"..<Jf'r. I •ill "'all tc.,,. • · 1 t. -t -1 s '11' rcur.ckd. Conplnd. ·•ri.t: t' 's, t' e e•1-l:,ir~ ..,,,)tl n-:_y-:si011. to Fttt=10' a, soon rs 7P1l~tr" f,Ps fror r·o 1te ~rte iE:io t'u9 11r •t'P;st, r0~ii.wnt, dreRst, or -qc,rca r.:. ;n.f<J.. '.:'' i.£' • ·p-' t 'e c<ei:!i.3ive, c~.d 70 w;ll ,lo ·+,. L tc, 7(: 1 ·L :-- ,;nr, rli:3Fno~_rtPd in 1 " .. i<;' ....,j"lg r.c> t' {' 4'.>t ' 34+; a.11rl ls-:-.. Ar· or0C:. :.st ,'i~;. c,r~d · s nE' 10 to -o in toror.,..ow - r·1st wait 'l--ioi) ,r 0 4 'o''rs. It 'rd t· ·rt - P:_ '""rs Josterfr:· 9~ccrc.ing -'-,c, "'ruscott. Ri'P,[' p t ;r' 0 iT1,l10J.::,,...; 1 11 [,-.re. EJ,'3 juJt ccir..., 11. + Pt +, e • '.:>t' :rr"'artry i-a s ..,1t Route 'I"> just eG.st of Valr.iontone. Spec::!rl 0erl":ce :'01·c1; :s ta ;E"mt to ~t flY0 JUJ.,tirr; sr:rl::.. L'Lo in i+.. 'J;(j ... ,1~ 00""1B • ~ r,{' icles p:_•J ..,,e,, ro...-:.ng out of "alironto.,,.e ~o •~- .,ost 1:.cl,"r 9 ,;rr.c"',.. e • ."t' "'rr,C:"tt, .~ r ,11est~f t,i,+, ~..t. Col.=)()~ .'lr,, ~re. 11 : ~n-.av.try. ~·ririnrF1 r"--1.;;. ·".,, ,-':.. ..:.iee w i=t .0_1 Cfl.1 le abo1.1t riasiY1-; ./,eele hfc 1 -l-;c. t'E' 0t·+,n Jr r trr:'...1, - ~c.,0. 'l'r·1sc0tt 11lso tors rir, ['11 TBF i.-L 00ror,, t 12t }'p_.:non rtn' " 11 r1k fll,m <io 11.c..t ri;et alon ~ ~t f'll . j do "10t Vlf'ff':. -l-;c, ' 1rt f\.llP.r.. :t ..,,n~ , tc. , ; j 1rso;"a:. dif.. , c,A ·':,j'3s. T•r-rrnc,r. c'oe3 net tru~+,. ·m, Pn" - cleSS :t is ::.CG ""~'SD. 1r,r<ir6 A.• 9'18~.f{8 -':.c T';c"8i:c t rm... ,' n~Tr:•,iA, as}i- t 'in in' a C'l'YJ. use .iur.kAllo~l ir.. V. t1~r:i.· ~ 1p: job. "TE'l'!'lOri i:n,C:. r-I":.lE'C',tt recc, 1 :1.d ti <it Jol(. r l r'o ·ztl, 00 ,mf-1'1.L'ing t'" lJt' tr r~e1 ..,A/J' •nt, t:- 1 P, • ~,,~e. fC'lO '31.', +• 8 U• ..,.. ~, "nr :st Cl'l qn e"'rc" A.11:;e. : 3,, ....... Lt ...,:.,u ·\r-!.:, 1 . . . UY) 1-Lt ~Pl... ~. 1-Ie r'" el11. l'j''lc -1-,n:•L • -v· sio:,, Po to }"pr~1or ....,n C'L ' ~r -. -'it 1 - 1 1 :s, 0 1 1 ""') 'r 11 - srr'rn to "J[lYe 'l,:, f';'• ·'r 'el} Y'J•) '"'[e"l.i.t<'CP, J,,,:} zs·J~Pte 'l,rard uf t.1'3 Lnt:'on of P"r_.t "~on -1-,·~ee Frere' i:vtsjc,nR.J. Co ~<1•,C:.ers. le 'l=l.i.il i" T nnu:i.r' s: Pct '-• , a -~e'1,;,"'f;e ~fJ i.r ' + ~ +'err al reque1t, '-J ,,0·1~11 r,,,'-'o +,' 1 1Fir ~ ,par+, ,n l t a,y' r,Jc,ue..:;t ['} 1 re •rl, C:itPtion t''i ,9P-n. 'lo not ·i.rtenc" tr .L".JCO ~~ lG. Jui~1 ancl IJe~•ont'1"' 1 )F':l't f'f,a · 1. , nti l l'"t01° :-(oI"e · .'13 +'r lion, sc } l8n.Jn e11.d r ·.cf'dio i.n r1 't"t8.r.ie to ~T\nc·tt;A, req ior +ir CJ 1 i:-·c o . . .L' 890 SL flt I r1F"' m7Dlil t· ,m ,,_,<'.\_"'o"•e .L; z _'rf--1".!1 :o in aP-ri·1 -"c-r t',.,, 'bc-stl. 1 ,,f ::c 1e. c·tr-1:.i.ons wi .1 fo 1 lo,,. 1' 2/ ., 1 1. 7r\rv:}. llGene.1·al Alem:i-..l"J.er ex 1-;,-:,rn l·ts,... i lSUl.slP' -=in['h · x l.mdqr, ri_ i. 1r, l''=:ld ro--ir' t1 :_:_ · ,' Arr:-. 1\ l l <iY-A'l CC' ~'Ad J'•')[l_(" c,tPrti.nr, r+, .. J ?.G3/1--1l. Pore ,..o,_lo s.' 1 11~1pnt' er t0 :;1F1r1-::. order +,o 1: 1 -1-:, P~d ' 18 P'•'lv' '}rr•,nt J.' 1., r, • J E'"./., ;, A'l"C8 I", ..1..., ,, ;+, 'Y' to ., 0' 1\.1.•r •• • u nr "'~y e~1t' ... r tc ~: ''\:, 1 Cle rls • / ) :::.. i. RJ. -1J A. 1(,. R~ 1'Roac' 11.t ,~ . . t, RJ" Pt "773 tc 1 . USAC o s-~, ~'. n'T "rm~-_::, l,~~11 .. ~ 70( J.. " 6-3!,"'l t0 , r. 0 '7()()?. P ) .L1 u 11 G0r0.r"l '1 '~rrl o·rS 1~vC' nl,,t'.""" >~Ur olri to 'r. ,·1c 1 ·rr.til Ar,1,'. .,~J·o. II J" ..... ir( r:iy :1 _.:' --c hJ . "' ,; �l3L\ in -~iew of estirn<1tec1 strnn:-it' of '3nemu- in '!ri lP1ontone nre~. l r>rd:; ng stronf in ·,elief it is uns01mc to ,·j_·-a Fif't' Arn - red ror,1 but 1 believe , -om case is so loE;ic.ol t' rt -ou ce.n ,"orce ;_t tl rou.•,.., Generr1 Ale~carider . i'"rdim~ st;:,tes t'.. at 1:-' }2J c!str~na l_irt'_ ri:round s' onld b0 s-'::.unbl:·,o- bloc'"" s~tu['.tion can be reYie1·1erl Again vrit 1 nury,ose of 1:llo1T-':•c '"i'i+>t 1 i\rF ·- to exterr' to Y10rt' into t: rt 2rea . r1ore . 11 1 1 1 Gr11ent: er to Sl~n•k . J:l,r 7904 . 11 Generril Juin still feels it irn.perBtive ·"or Fi.,-.t 1 Arr~ r to V-'3 Jlrcl: lin0 b01mdrr:r. Fe 9H;'7"S ,UeXPJ1 er prorosal is little bettPr i;,1 an gr,~er. 1-immrlp•·· r «.nd 'rs r;rept c:i S/1.c'-Vanta ge of rreventj ng Frenc' mq7.euver so esse;1ti<il. to success . It v•ill force Frenc' troors to r:arade in front of lalestrina Tieivl ts w ile Britis' are still ten rrUes to reer . }Ie unrlerstrnds tl.ot you ''lill -nrob8bl.r aut' orize 1 i:m to t2ke Palestrina Hei,,;kts reg:?rdless of bourihry ½ut of 1ecessit:,- fOU will be f'orced to iss1 .e t' Pt order too late to ena Jlo ..,r,''l1C1 to swing wide . 'Tore . " 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 Gruent' er to Clark. }FT 7905 . n-~a-ve ju it tal 1 ed to T:21°dini=; P g:,in. He believet, t 1 at 1\le:r~:i.ncAr n;:v ~l.'" to see , ·0 11 Friday 2.:c-ternoon or '-i8tU1·d.a;r morning . I vfill advise ''OU la.i-,nr tcrc".. ;::d t . In view o"' tl At visit , I r ,co1:1nend ··ou accept Alexander bo1mdfirr t0nJgl.t wit1 out nrotest. .::.:iturtion existLw w11 en 'e arrives mav give o,·c:itioral vein·' t to your nri::tment . F.orr1ing states t 11r.t if -present Fi~t· A.rT1y attncl· s' onld bo g dovm Alexander will re:vert to orifl'~nal bouncRr;r to Higl w1:1:, 6 to Ti;:' ::;:'-t1 Army acv.once af'ter rerrouring_ lnunc}comb5ned :?i Pt' Arm_; !"JJ1d '}i p;1 t} attack. n Gruent' er to Clar}- . RN ~42 . "Your. appo:Intment r- s rpi•manent gTade Brige d:er GenerAl tc date from 1 Septem1 er 43 :,,mounced -"n ·t,,-,r DepPrtment srecial orders . Congratulntions . 11 Clar}: to Gri1ent1 er 4 R1'J /,,_6 . 11 ,'\:;,preciate your d-t.+"ficult job on tLe boundaI will 8Ccert Alexnnder 1 s proyiosBl alt· our";' it dor,s not i:o;ive me t 1 e necesst:i.r,r room to !"Fneu··er Juin. :=11clicrate t' ,et to 1 im but t' ri t I ,·rill acco17pJ.ish my mission wit in Lis restr · cted area . mell J 11in t:_e decision 1 as bPen l11:<Jde . Rave l im re:,ort to ne 8t rr;r er ~ P.re at 1000 om's tomorrow riornin~ if convenient. 1.Rdio ~'11A, and ' 8 '•ill be net . 85t now on Cc1stel LPccio at 00.5 52 . 5 continuin1; on to north-rest . Tell rarding we 9re ~lread;v- 2cross route 6 and ; ore to sta;r , Lenee revArsi.on to orirrinal boundar.r we ore will not be nece•~sar:". I ray ,ard tonio-} t . 11 r:r. 1 1 1 * * * ATTZIO-- Jtnf~ ;? , 1'144~-General Cla.rk tallr:ed over t 1 e pi one to Generals Truscott and 'fplJcer earlv t' is r1or:nin['" to GMpl asize t' et sr0ed is important; thpt tre attPc 1, toclr>.J must be rus ed to its limit . At 0'110 le rent b ,iAep to tnlk to the '31Slst RCT, vrelcoming tl em to Fift Army and e:x:plr infog to t em the importantpart t1 e 17 vroul 1. rlr:,- in t' is PTeat Fifth Army drive . T' .e RGT is compossd of t' e 116th FA Battalion, Coi"lprn:r A, 31f-it• Pnf(neArs and GompPny A, '316tr :red~ cal Battalion . At 1030 General ,Juin Prriv8d 1w cub irom ·is HePdq_uPrters for a conference wit 1 Gen0rcl GL"1r1c . .At l?J0 GenPrPls Alexenc"er ;one. H,,,rc!ing arrived. At 16!}5 General Glrirk ~lsiw to II Corps conmrnd post for P conf'erence 211.d also flew o-ver Ve battfofi9ld in is cub . After supr:er GenerP.l ClRrv.: rnd GenerPl Brann, i,,is G- 3, discussed tJ..e new 1-lOtmdPrv 1Jetween :'<'EC nnd II Corps . Br1ttle pro£,;ress i:i.nd toclay 1 s e· ents 0 e included in t: e Armv Co,.,,,mPl'lrler t s notes and tl e important messoges ~toted ~elow : 0, 11 �Ge:r.ern. l Clerk ti,,is mornin~ dictated the following notes for inclusion in his di.nry: \ "Am greatly c'!ist:'ppointed in Truscott I s attPck. His :rroposnl lPst night to rne to move 45tr Di;,::i sior. out o" the line rnd swing it Pround to Velletri was fantastic. I nut} orized ore conbat team to il.o tM. s job, and it is not vet in the P. ttpck. 'T'he "l.ttPck o+> the 36th Division f'rom r;onte Artemisio and Rocca di rPpa we. s delayed until 0030 .nnd then werilrened by tbP conf'usion of units in Velletri. I am greatly disappointed. I hrve directed Truscott to have the 1st Armored D-'vlsion rerdy on one hour's notice to ·l:ie thrown in when the seI'!bleDce of n break occurs. This is a rr>ce f',-;_;ninst time, v ith my subordinates failing to np1°reciate hm" close t};e decision will be. Two Germen Division9 !>re on the WH;7 dovm, wrich mill, o:= cour~e, swny tlie tide if they cone in before we tA..'ke the Colli Laziali. 1 "T hr,ve had Juin flown here tod1P to speed hiil' up ta, debouch on Route 6 1''ith his 3rd DIA and tl,en turn toward 1 alestrina and Cav~ • . GenerPl Alexander will -,1ot ·"'ive rrie thrit Mi:i;h terrr-in so essential to protect his ·"lank. "II Corps is mrikin/J' prop;ress. I l-r1 vc directed Fredericl<:: 1 s exrloitrtion "'orce noving east on Route 6 to fricil:itate the debouchment of the French Corps, "or I need thefr "reip;ht bedly on my right. 1 "General 1\leXA.nder and Ge:1eral Hr>rding co!"le to see me rt one o I clock. I will tell therri plP.inly ,'hat .,. think of the restrictions they rre rJ,,cing upon me in order to rti ve ,,: ighth Prmy the posit ion in t:be battle for Rone. 11 Follo,,dng Genern.l Alexancler's visit., General Clar1{ dictated t:be following: "Generals • lexRnder nnd 1{1"rding lave come to see me. They were '}Uite r,eek. I expected more of' rm Prgument f'_fter hrivinq; receiv?d certain word from General Gruenther toaay to t},e effect thnt re regerded l{ardin!; 1 s qotives with suspicion. 'ihen Alexander st"'rted tc tell TD9 thPt -if' riy Ptt"'ck didn 1t r.;o h8re not to ''Jorry; thtt ·h"" rm li• bring the ole ..,...'iiehth /,_rrny in, I told tim thrt my rttack w,"'S going, thr,t I w?.s putting t 1e French north o·"' Route rl6, that I rrobobly would be f'orced to t;:ike the 1'igh P;rotmc in tre· vicinit,r of Ialestrino becnuse I could 6-j.,.,.. not rely upon the ';ig;hth Army to be there wl- en I nseded them. I told him thnt ~\ 'l · the bPttle wo11ld 11ecessitate doing it. He said to go r:.ght ahead. I snid I ~ "1 t" would clear out o? thPt Ei..ghtl-. Army area vrl-,en tbe Britisb ca.ire along to tAke over t}ei. r respo,,silJiHty. I "ltK1e it ver· rlain to him th"'t 1-ie was sandwicring "'!Y French Corps in nortl., o-: Route ~6 nnd tr ere rrnuld :1e no room f'or the 7:ighth 'rr1:v in Ve Vrilrnontone <>rep. I ·-ent to the T'l<'P so thr.t there could be no misunderstRnr1~ng nnd pointed out ex"'ctly my underst011c"ing of' the red J ~ne b01.mdt,ry · rl'i ch f¼ru0nth9r hrs bRe:n d~ scussing rdt]:, Hardin,:,-. t-: < 1111.. 1 f HAlAxaYJ..c:er ;:iro;--..cAed conpletely in my sche'Tie c"' menemrer for tre II Corps.' r-1a1;dinc,, WP s m,=,ek rs <=i nouse. ...,_ "',"ith reference to the publicity on Ro'1e, thev left "'J'iti~ ne P copy of the followin'1'. letter (quote letter). I ,,,r.ceed to "t 911d r11>de it plain tl1 at when troops entered How'! :r "muld radio 1Fi f'th Arrriy troops :bPve entered Ron e 1 , ancl Ale,cancler 8PTeed that he v1onlc1 release it qjr11l-'-~ 11Rou<Jly ..,11 over tl0 e rorl:1 on mv say so. T lPter nould determine exActlv ,,,1 rt 'mit ,,.eacl,ed tJ,-,9re "'irst c 1cl -,r~uld so a 1mo1mce thnt. 11 ~ 1 1 Ii,. ~ •t �'T'he dir9c+,ivA from A.AI regn.rdirg rress reler,ses uron t1-ie capt-ure of Rome, 1"1,c,nti0'1ed aboV8, ~:..s quoted below: nrn orcle:c;\ + u •':!D~.n_u..,e tl1.8,t the ::,9v1s o·r"I th.e c2. .rtl1.J..~9 of Ro ...1e is L.i0-vic~ led c ue re~ri_rd to s~m.ultP'Y'IJ~ous 1~elease tLe f·o1 - in a sat~ s:fPc.cf~o=~~?" v-r12~riner '\Vit 1 1 1 lovri11g proceuvre ~,il 7- 'he -i.o.orte.-1. C<o 1sor stops rill be in:' tiated .f'o:, tl -. ::..t:. anc will 1Je o~errt::_ ve 1mtil covo:c ed b~, - releas9 h3r on reco::--cl •:r cLgrounds . n 1. 1 1 t:_rnir<; 0 ~ This ITrJ will 1-:ie guided 1,y you t:1.roughout the :xi.ttle rs to the .L:1~ release..:~ o: t; '3 f\.~')0 110 1~J:r 0'1 1,..1?-corC bt1 cl~r::ro1.Jn~se ·,ro i11Pntion vrill 1 'e 81loned of t;1s rrr\,-, rr:':,j_orialit.i, f'ormrtion, division er 1.mit wl -'Lcl1 ertsrs ]( :"~ first 1 mtil relensed b:- on record ,x,c:-g-I'otmd . 'u'",3quently e.11 co1 ~- H:i.11 1,e cu~ referr:.'rc; to any other unit other tl e..n the onP rel eased . Co·"n.·ln-1 "r, • Ge:-ernl Fift> A.rr-,;i" will inforn trjs TrQ as soon f's possible which fornation , un:'it etc., shoulc: ')e rnle~1 sed in co::.--,n0ctiov1 \ it: H?,. first e11tr:r ~.nto ~r,1'·rr~ . n 3., A speciP.l cor. 71.mi me vrill be issued sir·ultPnAousl.1 :ln London, t shj,~pto::--, ;"1_rlc'le r;Pst, AI"T!), PY'.C:c 1-ocrlly in :tt::,.ly r~no-,c_ndnt; th:cit ncrs is riori in 0 A11:ec h,'1:rir1 s . ':11.-~s cor1r 11r1~-011P wil1 1·v3 issl1ed Els 0On :·s tl..e Connanr.~nf; Cfe11e1 re.l ?iftr Ar~y c ecii:'es t1,2t T--7 -is su,..f-'~c·i 0ritly in our :-~nrl s P 1_0 ccnld not 1.L.11.der· Any circ1 1I·1.str,11.ces )8 retFw:ll'>'Jd }tl e tJn.er1:r. (1n re core~ l1r·.C 1 "" "rOl ri' anC_ 1 7-ec 1 :n tl e l'10r1·1rtl \/ia:r . t~ 0 3~f -~c~ !:._l CO":rr l?]l~ r~u8 ;iil1 be f1rrc 1I bey ; ill 9r1tviPte ::.'ror L 2 AA: and wil:c 1•e r0lee s0c' throur;l l ublic n,e1rtio·13 c::2· 1nels to r 11 co1.1cernsd sts:t'":; t},e tiI"c: tt / "d tle :;.~.-:;lePse ~s ,aY1ctio11ed . 1 0 1 -r- 1 ''4. t~l--':.k,u/ t'. o 'rorrlinP, of t';e 1-it=J.c1·gro'Pc. or t:.o sp9cie1 corrn1n~_q1..'e i'r!f:'Y be , {;l~e"Jd ·0v 7iftic Army arc' t' is I' 1 it ";•ill not 1,e pe.ssed by FiftL .Prny to t'1e tress cl·'. rect . u I:mpor-c2.r.t vessages of the day a.re 2 s ·'.:'ol1ows: G0 nere.1 '.}ruonthAr se t t},e .r-ollorri:1g rrci,,1or2nc1un to G9nArrl Clr>.rJ, tris norninr:: "Your mess[• ge (iic: not r,•et to :1e tmtil 1: 30 tr:Ls morn:· "'lg so I did not call '}•:lrETPl ;f'l1~d--tn..,. or GerPr/<J_ ,Tuin 11t t},,·,t hour ., :-: hr.d alerte,' Gm1errl Cr rr entier to ti.~ rrobnhility th;:,t yon vmu:lc 1•1P.nt Gererr.l Juin ,·t Anzio at lG:OO l\ . ;·. this '"101"~inp;. T h2ve om~ y,eople try 4 _ng to get I' r.:"11er9r to co.,,':'irn nou. �Tlny r.,..e ~:oinr: to rut 01.,.t P SJ 0c-ir-l 1on tl-,-: record 1 :-01.er e "t "b01:t lSOO tocay. '""'1°·· 'l w:l 11 ,o'•e t' e ")n"i'' r_p- 2rnrs fer 1 J·n,, but ::: t' .;n}• t'1"·:; it i'1r:-11msatisf'r-ctory p·:-rqnge ,t~rt. A"": '1as P ru:;__e thPt tr.e cC'nrun .. 1w ::,_nc;': C'1. tr 9 record mn~_;erif' 1 will close "'t noon, i.e . , evnrts ur unt:i 1 ncion • • OW0V";r, they rf'rely r:itjcr to ,I.' rt t'rin li: it, 1 1:1t t}li.s t.;'"'J.P, ~h1rer~'1.; ·1sod -tt 9.S PYJ. exc·-1rie, .:.t .'.'oms . I hn.d Lel"" .,__,ry t(: cr.rri~e ~'1ru1n,r~r v, b,1t witr 10 luck . - cljd no~~ c'l:.~~ f· rclln; bec~use - co'1r;~c'ered it irrrpro,,rir>te to T""tf',r~ [)Jl ir, 1ll8 0~ t,1ic-- C~Se. 0 ~'e c<qJrs +;. 1 1"t G,.,,er:il Ale'>~9.n, Pr h"s ir:1 ·os"cl tle tFel VP, O I clock ti,-,,9 "'...:i.n't ',P,(''lUS'"' 0-. ROT' 'l et·J:;9 T;"'t'1 '1 • ~i ;' tr ~r ;" to ! rve lr·l:.0 c ph•Y-os ·~1c> ·n: 'eri tr9,' '1,,,ve ,,,ot r-.lw,,~rs bee11. tco "'ecure . ·.,:e ,-1.,rJ.t''l t1~~ tl8 •r.-,r,,tri r91.8E'Sa ~ulc: }-'>W~ 1"'1 to 1.<>Vf' 8-GY'9rP::.. Alp"'rr/er ' " "rrrovr 1 . llLem :u<J'!- c..,1_::._,c1. 0 tc,lc1 L~·rn tc t91.?'0, ro n111·tl .-r --icti.o:'1 . .~tl tr is PX('8l i1=mc~ he},ind r,1e -- be 1.; ev0 I 1 11 1:-e "'ble +,o r nc... :.e t1, 1 1en er se F3E'~~. sf'" ctc,r~ ly ,. .Hl do it ,7~t' out '::P'lS~r~ A "·1ss . At PPY rqtn 1 1 r ·ive :i-1-; ~;,p r•rocl olc' col}9r,e t-r•y. It.,. 1 0 0 11 ::- nn do~-~ 11 ~Ad O"lG'l" YOU.I' -nro7vtion. You 0ertPinly r'lrned it. 11 ti~I to Al7 Co•1cerned . R" "'t 1115 . 11 Ger11·('l fl')XP'l'er r'"''1 r8Ci)j7"cl thP 1 1 l "'V8 rece·'. v0c. t'ie "ollo' iri[' ~esf'ollo ·ir.,. "'"'S"l"t'{P "ror, Gen'1rl'l f:i_}i:-011: 1 1 rer . sar,;e ·ro7 GEnerP.l isT1ro .,,eP-i~s. Battle h,~YJ.ninP' in TtP.ly or. :•::-;r l:' l1~s rJ.rePdy ,·rC't:;r~rnsed f,9,r 0 >1ou·1 to cl,..sJed E'S c mr:-j0r A.llied vi.ctory. r"'fi.c"rs rn' ot:1fir r""l' s o·" ~11 ,._} re~ s~·-vicee cn l of• all }lE'rticiratiris=: n..,tio:vial .;t-'."''1 11:=>ve r0acon tr f'eel ;":i. "Ud of t;w f'"J''Vice they r"ve rf',rder8d tr-e co~10:1 C'1U'1e . C0.,..t11inly t11jr ur.ol9 co.·,ari is roud of tr.en . Ile:=i.se ,o;ive ny rersorial "'elici.ta-l:;for~ to t'1'} Cor':r11JrU~rs o": all three C:"!rvices. bnc.s . I !'<'IV<") repl-;Ad ~r ~b:> nollou:lnr: t~'Y•r.is. 1ei:;:rs. er, 1 Ah.-,p' of e:_::. rc'1'reo QC> the tl:c·Ae S"''·v~ces -:ie-"Vi"l~ ·YJ.-;;L~ ~:,.,,lit~rr"n <tr t.r'£'Rtr0 I -::-'1!'1''1-~ you or your "'elic'btions .<>nd Prrr,:,c~;:,t,ior. o ... -:r"'ir e~fort in tr e F"'sent b<>ttle. ~ve17one ~l'J. f;fertt i-ieart nYJ.d deter!"linn.d f'·'.nic;h onf thn CPIDfl"i[;n , Tl~e f-':rst pl'"Se of nl., ch.\ PS 'JC' snccesci ' ..1:1_ tmd~r VCPu· ccrJn"nc· l"'st :rer:r. 'nc,c;!'' 0 ,A 1 Genor('l rrrucmtr.-r S"nt tl0 .::'ollo·•ir,;todt=>y: enorrrc:.1u1 to rP.,.erE"l :1'1 riid-mornini:i; ''1 . I t11ll(0c1 to Ger,Prr>l 'fr-rrli:'1F' "'!""[11,n r few TlrJ onts (''";O . Ge110r"l flcxnric '"-'r hes 'ec'J.ed to 2'l'1fOrir t 1,e tnn0·mceront o+' .Lr,.,, "18U bounlnry until r,...ter :ii q cov,_ ... _re:'1"e ,, · tr you. Hn['r1'·hilo T ,,, ve '10t ifieo U e Fre11.cl~ of Ge11.""'rti.l ~lexander 1s tentr-tive oec~sion so t~Pt +,reir O'f'errt::or.s cnn 'ie concltcted in tre lirht o' +r,·t in~c,r1~<1t.,_on. ~ou, of course, ,,,ill "':Ve c'etc,iled iYJ.f'tructiors t0 G"'lri"TPJ Juir. vl•en you see l in tl is mc,rn:rg . Jn my c''<1cuss~ors witl' irprd~rig +,}e J01nt •rp not f'ettl0c' to ,.•ve us ]:l, -t l " :,o lcl me reP 1 ly amou,,tec! t},e ..-r-=e•1 boundr rv l>ey0ncl. tbe 'T' i vc li rrer . tot'"s: "'h,t Fll d' t, 3 r>r<>p to -1,l e :--rt r f th, roe' 1 ·De rtr.,,,-t-.;_np ,ri_t½ the Ii ,:l •rpy 6 roFd jul"'c-l;io:-1 ·-oPlC' he cv~i. 7 ,,11le +o us . In :: 1 "tPr di ,cuss::.on 1 e jrcl-icBti=>cl tkt ~;igl,tJ,1 Army w0ul<l :'1PCd s re ror>d'l -'-;o tre 1e':'t 0~ the r;reen line �_,vl e 019:""Elt· .. 7 · _,_ 1.OTlA._ 1·0n1.c:::,.r9renvS O ~ .._, e -r.i•r-1-,. JAr,.,..·r lt- ,., d been"' t·,..-"~ed • I took ,, ~ 1.,r I'.'. ofl J ,:,.L-' -that -i-,c- ner..n thl"t, he "rris prer-u·.:.1g " 'PG~e c;o ·!:,J-.-:-t t:1e Eighth frny bourdrry cculd ,1fl sriStnd clo'1'1l' townrd t:19 ori[":im:il on' Pt suer time PS r:ip-1 t be exr-=erH i:-rt "'er '.iP"l~t· Arey. I djn rot ,'iYl rflr0j11 g c1o::'1 on tH_s roint bec,.,use t't tl'·e time 'he brouP-l·t it ur- ::: ·mew t: --t Ge'1ert1l Ale:xrnr'er n>..s going to see you +,oday, Pnd :r f'elt thRt it VTas n ratter t11r>t you coul'l 30,ttle quite ersil y wit:~ him as yo 1r co'1 'e:rerc1-; developed . : rry he e'1+;:·rely wrong in estir.rtino- r9rclir>" 1s ;ntention in tl-:i f' rnrtter but I r>m incl.;neC:: to regf'rd hi"l motive w-i_tl; •·usric·ion . 'fril·e my o"'inion for v1hrt 1t rP.y be rort''l . .L' 1 n3 . vn1e1 I tol(l TT~-;_•"i11P- ti-js morn.;nr tb=it the AleXcnrler bounr'<iry does not r-.;ve vo11 the n-,cessai·y room to TW'1E"1Ver tre T-'re11cl1 he +,cld rn th!'t GenerPl AleJmnder ray ru ·ge"t [lt t1--1P. con{'erenc8 tod<:i.:, tl-wt ~le T're'1ch Gorrs t!'J<:e ()Ver some o:' tl'e nreP. ~.on occup.:.Ad by II Corrf' .;'1 thP vicin~tv of v~Ln J::.'( -C . 'T'l is s}ift ·muld P,T'"lble t'1e II Corpri to co"lcentrri.tP P. h:,!J.v:lPr ef~ort in tl,e ::-tte.ck on '::olli LE'z:.flli . re furtl,er strted tr--it -1-; i_,, rrrri11-;e"1t'nt r-~ ,c;ht enr'ble vou to const.:.tute an Arry reserve ,,hicr •rou.Ld ~er!"lit you to hPve cont'nuity o-n ntt11c'c. I [''lSUl'ed l'i.I'!l t1 ,.,t you T ere nt..11.r aw::i.re o:" t 11e imrortPYJ.Ce of' C1-1f't11rjw tle Colli lFziPli ;"'ea·;:.ur8 nrd Urt you 11ere :;ush:n: th;:,t Pttack rd th alJ. o,.. ti,e vi ~oi- vou t assess . "IA ,~urther sbted th, t G•;nernl A::.eXBncler consj derHd t,' 1at , f' 1 tl-iough our trooT.>s l r"/8 '1."de a J "'netrntion of tl e er.eriy de fsr"'e ;-,osi.tio11 , ·t } rs not y9t bee"! (eer ,,...,_OUP"1 to ~1'..sure tl1.c-t 4:.l:-'3 enemy ,1ill not be Pbl.e to sel'l ·t o·n"' • : ~nterrrP-t d t',js ...,i1 ... se 0 • ~l·e diocus-:;ion PS an rttA"1pted .,..,e:r talk on t1e necessit·..r ~f e.xrloit.;ng c11rrent S'lccesses in t17.e Cori Laz-'al i erea . 7 mn cr,11"'-idert t'1rit ;,rou ·.rill be :>ble to 'l1r'ke en ader,uate pref' 1=mtRt:i.on on +,l is ;i1b5"lct 1 /!'e"l Gerierr 1 J\le,canc' er arrives . 0 0 11 4. I told you lnst nir'l t trlf't G2:-1.err-i 1 Al8XFnder w.ill rrobMbly A.rri V':l "'bout 12 : 30 n . ri . too.:ciy. : <>rc'U.nr; now st,.,tes th~t Generrl U9XFr er is hr>ving SO""A Polish di.f'+'1.c·1.lt11-;s Pr.d th'1t l'is arri.v<>l 'rill rrobr,hly be clelnyAd . :re bas -:~ve:1 an -;TA s:10rtly r>:t9r 1:00 r .m T shell k"e:r in cny,stant touch ,fith . ldm, bec,.,use I rep li.ze how this lmcertnin arrivrl ti::''e "Till t 4_e yoG to your o 'f~ ce . -r ,·ill send you a nl.? sl. -~· ~ inute - c:m g:i ve you .?-. 111ore ·i ntelli r;ent esti. w-2te . 11 0 Ge:rierrl Clrrk sent tl-,e +'ol 1.ovr~ng ne111or1>n<lW1 to Gener, 1 r..rt..enthsr this qfter11.oon : "Received yo·rr r',rr:or11r. :u-1 of ::.015 h'JUJ'S encl 1·rr-<1 ,.,.7_,Mr1 : rr>cl. :5t ')P.fore Alex and Fn•rlinf" Prri ved . A'1 sn0r es ":.l e,f CF:'1P. 1 l!PVe Al PX tl e situRtiot1 , ,r} icl rle1?s8c< M.n gree.tly, ard he indicrted conrlete "Ccod 1?nr1 P.Y1thusiN1m 1it'1 ri:v emrloyme11t of II Corr3 , r,ar+.ic·J.1.rr·l y , A.nd o:" +,: e effort of the "'"1th Pivision ·in the VI Gor:is . r.:re rrtrer ~'1<l: ctitec'1 V1"'-+:, i" I did riot ;,,rih:i 11 ro of tri s ~1ot to •r0rry, thrt t,},e ~;iphtr frri.v "'oul1 <>gc~in C()re tn r·r rescu"l . I let t~1 P"1 lrve :lt pl,ntv rt -!:,l1Pt-ti"18 . I tol~ then t} rt J} l'IG_ 'hr r Ju:in lerR , WPS rutt"'ne; }1im in e11.1:,t o+' V:1 lnontone <ind nort' of R011te ·16, t;irt le •· oul<l trlre the h-' wJ-, -~L•011.rc" in the Palestrina ernP 1:-ecriw·e +}-,e Jritish 1 :oulrl n"t be tr ere . Tie ::;a-:d 1 ri_u~te rill r~ght 1 jus~ so-:" got out o+' th3 wFy :i.n thRt Rrea wlien trey did come un . He su-;r·ested I us9 the I'rench nflrt w2 r soutr of R011te t6 . I to 1.d h-i m "I ,oul.d rt8 0. mv mm corps bounrl-"l.r-i "~ "c; tri.P sit urtion r"eve:.oJfi<:'l '-,,lt thr-~, qssuredly the Fri:mch rro""bly could rele 0 9e -':.re ?rd D:ivision to me for oth0~· use . 1 1 �139 11 '.::'hP~r as:V.-ed "'IY r-rrrovF>J. on a IRC relee.se on the rews of Rome. I quite arrr0ed Tiiti1 lt pnc,_ nrir,e tre 111.tin tl:'At 0'1. "'IV \'lord to t} em they would relerise 1hnt :. '1'11red f'or. 1 11 Ju::..n v•as t·11e n.nd tr.oroughly tmd0.rstoof.. my rosition. I told Mm ~·e uould conf:irn my instructions to hiT'l in an CI and th t as re found it necessary to go nortl: into tre Br-i_tisl' sFictor l,e ould do so in accordance with t 11e si tun.tion. "fart of tl' e 7t:1 In..fantry is goin~ t0 ?ttr:-c1r PPlest:d.no t'ris ;,fternoon. AnotbAr lx>ttelion is go:ng to .:-ttac1 Cnve. "'hey rire cl_ose to t ose two roi:1ts Pow. Howze ras been directed on t:re road junction on ~.oute J1,S at 01.,.. 5 5 5. 7. ~en I t h10w d en h"' ni 11 get there, hut s ,e no rearw11 uby he sboulc' not be t1'ere by :1ovr. ~in.lker I s two re,:,·mo11ts iu.n.,..ed o,..f frir Racer; J.; I flrr t½.is norn" ng f't rbo 1 1t 0()30, and they l:rd '""'de slovr rrop-ress accord::r.,; to t'·e ::.Pst rerort, du"' to difficult terrain. Heve i'u:t +,H~ed rith r-r,ruscott who .Jays ·;alker -· s con~ident he rill rePc1 ½_js obj~ctive • .,. ½ore '1e i'1 rir,l,t. Still stjcky witr tre '34th and !/>th. 1-re1TM prepElred tr go bflck in wl1 qn the 4'5th hr:is nc.Vfmcec:1 ri little bit fnrt:""'r• "'1 ere 1 s too much +'fr:inr corfre; fror ~t. 11 T ?ddresserl tl-e '361st Conbat r"enm t} is r10rr. ·nr·. H2ve about decided to £!~.ve -;:,} en tc Luci,m to be ·n a ce-f'enr;j ve role ·11ortr of Velletri while tre r:bole 36ti1 poes 011 its vray. "'hrt leaves =8 ~p;r :in Fi.tr. Jon, Chr-ncy F.nd Fal as riy l\_rrrv reserve. , ., 11 Sure will be p.:lrd w}f'l"' we p.;et tof$etbr.ir. It ,d 11 ei.ve r1e an orrort1 mitv tc, n!'ly you the '10 w~li cb yo'l 'lPY I owe you flnd w' ich I, as a cif~Di .:ied rer,,1a11ent Ge~er2l, could not 11:ford to c<eny. IJm1 l P s consnnted to ½e riy aide P fter tr e vmr ,: en 1-" ,.,.oes b.<1 ct to heinf a rer~~rent I~jor. Keep up th ;cor ucrk! 0 11 F. S. I LPve jmrl, reBd ·•nrc1.:-~· 1 s directive to ··,e - tuhject, -ress RP leP ses - Cart ure of Ro"'1e - Ar. send · np; you a cor. - of it. You cnn l r:, ve [' corv Il1f'c'e "or ;vourse 1 :::· nno retur 1 this vre tc me. You T,rj 11 riote in f'BTt>P_;-.caph ld i e P"'nounces that 1fl.o~·,e is ro r ~J,. Alliec.. Lnnds 1 • } 9rpgi'1.phs b and c rAad I Cur P.dvancec< eleren+ s I etc. I 2 s1':ed LnrdinF anrl ;\ 7 c:irender i.:' ~.;hey meant thflt tl1e '11'1"'1e o:f the /Jrrv ·vras not to be rAle.0 s,t', anc they "aid 1 0h, no I fine told rr thet ·, woulri. send in a stt.te"10nt to th~ effect t'l-i.nt adw rce elerte11ts of the ';>j ftr Arr-y nre nou j n Romo, A.l1l' lA.ter, Ror '1 is 11r1vr in F · fth Arr1y r111nfs. The r ni.--rPed t},1t Fi t1-, !'lrriy vroulc-1 be used. roTrever, in this rar,r yoll no+,e they cn.re+',1Jly flVo:~c tlP use o!' 1:::-'ift: Arrry 1 n.ml ,r,v 1Allies 1 • You en 11_ r. rclinr . ; rL"": •d.iP+,Bly, tell him :- r' on I t "'r-rree to -!-;his rcrer .. . ; tb regflrd to rrir8g:rqrl 1, nnl9"'S +,hey nre, -'.1::.~n/'; to ·nclur'e in +J:9ir stn~omrnt t 11rt t' e advrnce 0ler"';nts 1,elonr, to Fi :'tr· Arr1y. Yo·, ':row I don 1t l nve m1...ch cc:rfj/ence jn :iim re1d wulr r.ot ')e surr:ri.sed ·1 f tl-ey oPJitted tl-e .:-i"'tli Arny. ""'Kl -!;}is ~)oi_v;'- clear +,o •1;.,,; tl[t TTrnr. Fi"th Army nfvcnce elA"19i'ts e-rpror-c-r, er.tP.r a'1d SF'C'll'~ R0,..,, e '"1e giv011 t'1e full credit :'..n t',e ~irst stRtenrrnt rr,d no orriittinr, Fi "tL Arr)". 0 1 0 · 11 ~ou •il::. P.l"'o ..,cte n ~9.rr ;rql? it i='f'Yf 1 rc "1"':rit5or w:ill 'e elloved oft'~ A:::•rl'T, r'l.tior lity ••.•.•.•• until r ler ed b_r r,~ t' E rec01nrl ½ c 1 ;ronrd'. ·•,,,· n ~1U'e thPt 1h')11 ::- •o-,d t:ier1 t"'E" +'~.Y' "t ·r ~orr-Ptior r 3 ' o·• -1-1 n ., ncor- · 0 0 0 1 �bac,:ground anc1 sb.te t'e:;ri. J,-:ly th.rt Arosr:'. C' 1 ,,::;,_e,,,e:1ts · e:~" t: e :ir-,-+;, t:1"y be -twm +,1 e crPd;t. 11 :t. Cl.81+ to Gru0 nthor. T " tlf>r~c~al · , :cv~LCe Force' 0. t to Colle Ferro. Too'• 200 pri.,0•1f-r.; w " bAve jc ~ v • 'rencl_ t' ·r ,. T9" l Juin to us} ~ e·•or+,spbnrt 'it'1 r Jl ~r00 l ·11i R.0•1' 0 () tcvrrrrl. VPl.1110,1tone. •Te tcrw lr ,,.., le:.r E "ert : ned~Ptely. ,., '"'V"l .1..<i.'·0r ••o mt CPr9.so ..,'1, F~or0 1-::,t· oen 0'; rr' 00 erst_· bs rrC::. 0354 rc.,..tri::1 s. ~5t>1 i'Tl 1es or ~ro'i1 +; "".'9 on Lr ..o tP''Ylcla 0.456 "':-o::-·i ·rt. :1nn8n':.s 351 Pnc' 1,,99 astrirJo :lout,:;'> bPtW""'n ()') EYi.c' C,~ 8a-,t·rgs. TPn 1 'S be1- j11.' -i-; -:n. :f-;qve d-t..rectod Troyes -i-,0 rus', · "'st v~ c-nrourl:~ ,i.lc"~ "'cute 6 tc'7orro • r•rve citor<'.3: '3rcl :5":·'"'~o'.'1 1 _.. ~usr on CPve A. r" r~:ns ...,ri·· . . . ill :et '3rd cort··nuc 4:.'1'lt. 1 0 Clfr1 • 4io l"'r1...~ntlor. l' 55. •r•r.,ve ':Ve1 ,,,>l CIT' to "\TT Cor1 s to hld "irn he se "rtr- -~t("'"'i ·1 01 ld.le Y'>th "d*!7C8S. ~St 1 [T ro--~r-"tely 1., ~-f'way Ero ... tl~re to Roccn I•: }A.pi.• ''o"'e ~o --;"'"':. '".l•no:1 ·n PP.;ri..11. tono-r•:..·ovr if 4')t: r'1W'nces. ,t:icky the:ce to 'ay. J <:ive ~01,1 r C"Pr": 11.0', to -<11-e any 11'(.:r-c rB pests 1 withort rrr R,1t' or~ty. ,:1rn I r 1 ' -"o= the.i r:iref':ter, yo1... tel: ·:.,: 3m T want trcr a:r prove(. ·tr r•ques4:.s 11ill ~e fe r nrc: far )Gt\ "E'n . J"' e .cr1y not reir norcod i'' ~-,,v·t 16 ro·u·s ·i:J. 1°or'"' tc crt"'!'- '1~n h,re. If 1," :.s "e~11?0rced ,1 ii::. err c:. \-' :"l arrywe.y. 11 0 ~ 'J:u1 r·al Gru.entLer ..,c :. t1·e folloni_ng r omorandnr to Ge~1or11l ClPrk late t):iis evening: 11 ·1any thanks for yo'IT 1520 r:,er;-:o tM s c'ate. of your corference -:r.i. th Alo:>."Ul'lc1er nm Hr :n1 'ne. It ga"'c'1 ' r ,_::(; :rL ·t. T :tc-' ·.:.. - "Len brought rie a cop:r of tre ' rress role:,se--copture of Ror,e I rarer tl·is Pfternoon. :rt is quite n coincidence t1 2t I raised the sane c::uPstion: 1· There is riftr ArP1y r:.~ntioned? ' Le~1 has s:5.J"Ce ndvised re th:ot the Fifth Array refere'1ce w~ 11 1')e T"'ndA. 1beyonc1_ t, n sh~dc' · of E doubt 1 • Ye says tht Paimvarin-,; 1·/I'ote tre raper, e·1d was a bit dizzy--not m<'llicious --at the time. L9r ~ s qui tc certr, in thrt tr.e lett0r hri s G1 renlv gon0 out, but he i3 ch0c1<inr,. I can 1t get F2rd:i n(l' no1 T, bi1t ~ sl1nll talk to him later toni~ht or first thin[ in tri=, rnorn:'nr: concerning tr is rmtter . 11 Fard1ni:; cellPd r~e sh,rtly a.(>t0r t'e returnnd fror H.r Anz:1 o vis~t rnd str>tef th.nt GenPr1:,l Alexander hrc1 notrj nq but the } : vhest rrEJ~ se :'or the v;r~y in ,,.,HcJ~ t 11e Anz··o or"'rntjons are 1,ciritt co"'ducted. Ve 3t:-'ted it \··t1 suer a s~ncere tonn thrt I :>m certein hP r-eprt w}rt Lo "kid . l'o" could ::i.t 1Je c,trer'Yi.se? To'1~ght :- a'r~ reell7 most opt·ir'!:istic . ~ t}in}--tkt tr9 success ,•,.ich ne h9ve )wd vesterday r>rid torlay has "11 rkcd tre t1rrninr: rofo.t ~:n tl~in bf'ttle. For ri:• p.-,,rt I ['m th~011~ 1~"' r~y }-['tin tre 'l:i.1~ r,nr' vellin- 17 Tip Mp roorey '. ··110th9r T an unrhf'L:r optin~ st:i c or not, tle nAxt feu do -,,, ~·~ 11 tell. JTorr0ver , I rust tell ;ro11 t'. 2t I '"'"'Ve r,b,ol1 tte Cr'11f'i,1 ,:mce tl·,,t you b,ve d~rectec1 the bPttle ·n n r1astorful fashion . I 1;:no·.. th· t G"rr-rn rA;i.1~f'orcomm1ts ar0 on tl e vm-r nrd j t :ls 'Y'O..,r>bly a tcuch-rnd-go •;•tt:r ,, tl r tlA' ":..lJ. rrriv9 in tine or not . Fo•1ever , n7 r:onn~r is on ~.?r1· · 9Jrne Gon"'lrPl Clt:,r'= first, 111st trd alnavs, and I rm only one of tlousarcls who ere ;:,inp~ng yo1Jr yrr>:'se. :: note vd th pl,-,asure thPt the 1st Arr.ored Di vii=;ion is r bout reM':r tc, go bac1( 'n tJ~o 0 ray. "?ro:-1 t'lis detrch,d t'lP.d inaderiu:=i.te observri.tion rost I nm �J:,op·· ng tb=1t th0 cc nclitions "rill be suer as to "'[Irr rt y0l1r :---uttinr Harmon in on tl c richt fl;:,nk . I feel thr>t -· s ,1}1 er0 ,rnin c11n 11 'mch the kr.ockout blou . 111 e-;.7'."ect to f'ly to our n ,,~ c0r'""Fnd }'O,t tnno~·row ev9ni.n · nbout 8:00 rrovj r1.ed co' rn.m-i crit-' ans are F<'•r'dn~ et that tine . e sb:i l l h_.-,ve everytr:'vict -'n rearl:'ness for ',ou by noon on Su,vic'n7. Yonr v, n nill :'_e[lve SPtnr dfl" P1orninr;, Pnd sllonld be instrlled ·n.ot later thnn 7 : 00 tor1orro 7 evenjng. \'9 s1- all Rll be mrn:it haprr to be to1ether o::;;ein. It has been a rather he ctic t"TTie but our 11gony hRs been noth-'nry conp;:-rec1 to yours . 1 11 T note th t you :u•e hu~lding ur a defense :'n connection w:th the py-:""·:mt o+' th1:1t '10 bet . I 1-:no'T tkt it ust be c,wbarr[iss;ng tc- ;;ou to contenp1tte t',e nonotonous refJ'ularH,y ·-rr,icl marks tl~e success of rlnost fill of •w P,Amblin': venturDs . In ~ 1 is ccse I r-u.~t ric1nit that I r:=>c' P v:i!'tuti.l c:.nch . Hitl• the F1ith Prrn:r C['I1f"'i.gn r,oing so 'ell ~t was .;n<wit""bJ.0 tl,,,t you s}•ould 1·,e conf~ rned prior to Ju"lc? 15th , so :rrc con scit=mce really botlvTs ne . I 1 11 .. te 1 l ~rou ·-rhPt we'll do . Orie of Colonel ru.nt~nf,-ton 1 s friends brought a J'l'lCh:-p.;e ;ve-=itcrdr-r sa~dnrt, ' I ' ve brourht soT 1 0 linuor for Generl:'1 Cl::irk and you '. ''h0.p I orn:med the fPC 1 :cge I fourd t}.-,c-t tl-~re ,... ere three bottles of bourbon . 1 ror1 1101 1 in +l'f~ ~wrld can ,,e divide up t}u·ee bottles anoru5 t•"'o people? ~,fter cons:.derable coi;itation I hnre "rr·· ved rt U 1e solution tb1t one ½ottle ~-rill go tr you , one bottle njll cto to ne (a:_;:,:=-;, :tt h~s n.lrord;t bee-,1 c( nsur.1ed ! ) rind tre t 1 ird bottle vdll he 11s0d "'or c cel9brat7 on- -let I s say on f'-onr:a~r n:l ,.,.ht , then "e ' 11 cancel all bo~s . Ho'' about it?" * * * A'TZTO--,JTPP. 3, 19/.;,L,.-- Aft er sturl~·inG bP.t,tle rerorts [Ind crrfcrring w:th Gene ral Brann , Gerern.l CJ.ar 1' left to visit e.11 di. v:sion coI1!'le.ri(1ers of the VI Corvs . At 0010 he 3tor,J eel at the lot Arl'lored :Jivision conFmd rost r:rd tall:ad v :lt}1 General :I8r111on . Gen0ral Hr>;rmon he.d "SSer1 bled his unj t cori1Yn' ers arcl '"Jas prep"r8d on ver-r short notice to coI11nit },j_c; di vj sion on the left of t}1e /,5th Divj_sion sector . Generr 1 Clrrl· disc11ssecl his r 1r ns c nc1 emrhrisized with Ge 11cr2l r:'rron He necessity -ror ri;,,-rensiveness , tl 1 "t t,nr1 ry ·,p~ th"' clry th;-t ·~o mu'1t TTP 1"9 nn all- out ef'fort lv:if orP tl 8 Bocl e co ult' br' n 'I UJ l,~::; re i1:."orcemcnts . Aft0r .b8 7 e+'t t is cor rnncl rost h:., "ent to tJ10 !~5th D~ vision COFman.rl. rost p·'>( t:11)-0<'1 •;Ur Grneral Br ;r;les . } e [ [;l' in er rhr si?:ec1 the n0ces1=:d ty of ~-us1,,ini:.~ all - out , bri.nging out, th~ fact t1crt jt, was ;mperFtivR thrct t}·e :1.dvn.nce CC'ntinue to +1 9 1orthrrest. Fro.,, the ., :;th i1ivision commr,,-y:i rost ~10 ,-,e.-1t to tlw Cf o.c> the 'ii.th Di vision -here J-e conferred ni th Ge'1er£' 1 Ryder :=i.nd ::ipr·in enpk1s, zod tb:~ nece--;sitv ..,or nn all -out attrck toce_y. The rords wern v;;,rv c',,sty, f"1C t,} r,r<; ,.,:,s rnuch !trtillcir;,r ·f'~rirg throughout tb0 division arert·s . 7 :'ron t},e 111-th I'ivision GP he rroc8er]ed irr.""ediritely to trc 16th Div:i.sion rost norti·, of VelletrL T'nrout~ to tr P, -;:6th Di vision ttere 1,ms "'Virlence of nucl· clestrnction of Boche rr.et0r" '".ll. Bocl"A Pnrmnition mis left ,'long t}'e ron(1s-' de , rnd tr ere "'ere ,tj 11 so-·1e G-ernnn deivl tr",t rP<.:i not been dis posed o"". At th" Y)th Division corr•''"'Pnc post h'=l trilked · jt,11 Ger,er"l 'r,l1 ~er concern-inc• th~ 8Xcell8nt •Tof'!'CSP t 1 1rt Ve ·~6th Division hN1 rrde . "}1ey hed secm·ed pr act icri lly tre entire sout11err, ::--ortj on of the Co111 Laz~ r li and r ere pus 1·ing ahee.d to t.11e north~;est . He enphr,sized ;:'.th GenF!rPl FPlkt?r the comror;·nd 1 �necessity of rushing ahead vir,orously and at the sano ti.."le ·wiping out all Boche pockets of resistance between Lave Albano and L ke de 'fomi. Gencm=il Clnrk then rroceeded from the 36th Division co!'lm~nd y:ost back to his cvm cor1ma.vid rost at Fett1m.o. Be arrived thArc nt obout 1330 and conferred brjefly Tith Generr,l Barr, Chief' of Staff to General Devers. At 1430 GenerP-1 Sevill9 caF!e in to see him and talk about tbe air effort that was being "lade. Tac R had reported heavy GPrrnan '"1thdrmw1s to t1,e northwest toward Rome. Our artillery fouJ'ld rany lucrative trrgets on '-{j ghvmy #6 and plnced nurderous co:"lcentrat-ions on c0pn;Aste;d Gorr<-r, traffic on th"t Mr-,h my. The ~ gl-'ter hornhers rnre also ",rking on thi"' tr1:.'''fic. After GenerPl Savil19 left, Ge'leral Clrir;r cor+>crred i.1i+, his G-1, G::rv,or;:11 BrPnn, for the balP.nce of tl e afternoon. 1 Colo'1el Clr>1' 1 , Fift!, Ar-my l RO, CR.me in on sever::i 1 occ8:1io.,.1s to corf er with Ge:r8ral CJrr 1• reference on-tJ1 9-record hncb:::round cOTrr u..n.i me:=- to bo role1: s9d ~nr n 1 so to ...,~ 'ce arrcnP-e:-r-9nts for r 11otot',--raph3rs [ind c, rresponde'lts to acconpan;r qeJ'1f"'>i'r> 1 C1Pr1· -into 1.or.ir> 1,;hen the Fiftr Arr1y enters the city. After surror Go''i?ral Cl['r' · con+>erred son8 r,oro w~u, his G-3, General '9rann, and Ms G-?, Color el Hana.rd. Ge,1ernl Cl_prk was a little Pnrehensi ve "'bout th0 right nortl ern flr>n 1,. of' II Corrs, and he taU·od \"~th Generel Y.oyes on several occasions concernin?- t},is r;-atter. He wanted General Keyos to be co,~tinuall y m'l11re o ... tbis threat. BA al.Jo tr 11':ed vrj t, G "'Oral Gruenth,.,,r and ··anted tl c Frenc}- Corrs to s1oed up t}1 e 1rd DIA to add Pdditionrl ,rei1.:(1t to t'ri s t}-!re;:-t to tr e nort), f1Pnk. 0 1 1 I-Tigr]j d1ts of torlay 1 s bEittl9 rros=rress indicr-te thPt tl e p-ercrrl brerikthrough t0nard :,.ome vfit}, all of t}'e Colli L."l.zia1i in our lwnds a"ld the Bocbe in a prec['rious rosition. He still offered cons~ derc>ble resistrnce :in the /+5th and ~4th rnvision sectors sout}, of L.-=1ke AJ.bc no. 'f'here wa,; tre y-rob_ .,_1,il~t" thrit t>1 0 encny 1 s commu11ica.tion syst0-m had fDiled co:rny1etely and thrt these isol2.ted i:r,i~oups in the south vmre U..""l[1rmre o-f' t• is brePk-through to t' o north o•" LaJro AJ.b0no. Tndicctions are that tl is resistance on the noutl wil1 witrdra':i- tonid·t r-nd trvt our o,dvnnce to Rol'""e .rill be fast. Important messages 0f tho day Pre as ro11o,,,s: AAI to All Concerned. W-J O.?851. 11 To enable Fiftl· Army t(' dovelor its operatio'1S in trA Prea. west o:' Vn J.Jnor:.tone the inter-arr(, bcund['ry , i 11 be r,oved '1ortrwerds to t''A fo1.loniri:; i:ren0ral line inclusive Fiftr Arrny ro;,d junction 2634q2 exclus 4 ve Fift), Arr-:r rc::id jru1ction 2':,?L.82 exclusive Fifth Army ro::1-d Fnliano - Csve - F· e:.::trfori - GPll ~ ceno - Ro::i/l junction cnorn2. Fi.-:.'tr /-rr:yv,ill howr;ver hnve tnrninf" rji:;}·t 011 rc,rrl C·vo - In1-1strina GP 11; cr-,no till "":ighth Army troors ree ch tb~ c~vc 1.rct1 \7t An th1t roPd ui11 poss to complete c0c1trol of "'ir;rth ftrny. If CG, F 4 +'t}, P,.rm'r f-in,'s : imself unPble to drive thA ener.w off th0 Colle I!"lziali fe;:,tu.,..e c1l,r.;11g the next few da;,rs h~ ·-•ill rer,ort tl'iS fc>ct b-· most imr~0d' "t'-1 s:: p,nal to ti is reN qm,rters reronti.,.r; to Eig},th Ar'"!Jy. In th.'."t P.VeY,t ~i~},th Army Fill trlrP. over the front dmn to the originrl tn+,0.r-Arl'ly boimdrn~,,,. fl'1.C1 " coribfr,~d r-tt1" cl' by botr Arr'l"' es ,1ill be ctP "'ed. I:1 1:1ny ovon.t wheri the '"''19ry hr· s 1)e<>n north of tro roPd 1lome - Tivoli t} e origi.,.11A.l ~nter frny bound ry "ill be ro·n.,.tituted to "mal,le r~ r.;rth Arny to r1['~ ntriin its form,,,tions in th,,,ir 110v"11ce northvmrr's." 1 �Gruenthor to Clark. R'I 361g. "Your instructions delivered to DeMontsabert by Juin. Jrd DIA has eler1P.nts 011 re ilror d bet, ·een 15 and "0 castings. Repu 1 s~d strong counter fl ttack f'rori east on M Ii sso but lost 5 ligl,t tr- nks . AdVl1nce rrill be res·tnod 1:1t first 1 :i F;rt to ,r>rd Valno:rtone to nnk0 co'1t;:-,ct with 0 1:raniAl. 11 Gcnr,ral Gruontrer tr-is mornjng sent the followinf r.1nr1or;:,ndum to General CLnrl-s: 11 AAI received the follo"ing telegr, rn from AFHQ tris nornin.c!': 1ItequAst li.£ s been r.r de bv r oli sr' Co:t1tG;-:ir,der-in-Chief in London ancl indorsed by GIGS that a d~trchTient of the II Polish Corps p1rticiprte in tl~e Emtr;,.r into Rome. Please conf:irn th,t rtecessary action "fill be tn.ken 1 • I told u~rding that you werA not planning on any formal entry into Rorie; thrit you were r,..~marily conc'3rned w-:th the r,,il1.ta.r7 situn.tion, and thrt suer entrance o:£' troops into RomG ns ··rill talre rlrce ·'fill 1,e dictated b:r the tactical situPtion. I also told him thrt 7hen it cPrie to tre ri.uest:_on of r,uerding Ror1e thnt you will rut part of An An:erj can dj_vision tbere so that tl e necessflr:,r transrortf'tion and other facilities which HAT0USA cannot rrovic'le will be avail~ble to tre Area ConnPnder of Ro~e; trat it is your pl~n to also rttach to t},is force a battalion of "'rencr troors and a oottalion of British trriors. AAT rrefers thn.t tl is battalion be t1;1um f'ro!'l 1st f'ivision if rracticable. tJprding is not insistent . Advise Don if you concur '30 tJ:-pt on"' can be tent~tively earmarked . 0 npardj ng strted thrt your J'll'-1'1 is exr.ctly in Pccordance with General Alexanr'er Is desires . Hovrever, J-io ½elieven thrt Ger,eral Alexander has in mind a formal parade o:f' allied tr0op3 at sone later dnte. Fe conteripli-tes a ceremony similnr to the one vrrich vms held in Tunis. The r~rade there was held about a wee 1r a.f'tor Tunis was captured. I told Farding tri['t I would p;:iss tris informntion on to you. 11 Hy recoy,T"',:indDtion is thrt you jnstruct r:ie to tell A.A.:. that you definitely do not desire to l1 ave any r1isce llPneous detr> chments ( the Ind inns enr1 the ~revr Ze11lcinc1ers ,;jll f'lso put their bids in, T an sure) entBr·YJ.g Rome during +re early days; that if General Alexander c,esires a formal rarade some days after Ro"!e is cartured th.,t you will subrdt a pl;:,n vrl'ich rill rrovide for the inclusion of allied troops.n General Cln.r:V rerl; cd to General Gruenthor I s memorrndum as follons: "Sure enjoyed your note of 1030 I.·-. ve..,terda~r pre dion 1 t enjoy so ruch your one of' this Forninr r£~:f'erenco the T'or1;. See if ;,rou crin -:et me a courle of thou.sand Swedes to rnn tl,rcugb t}0. ,~coos :h1 Rome, then I'll be :,11 set. You roli tely tell t},er 1 th,t T 11r not "'reminr; the tri.cti CP 1 entrn.nce of troops jnto Rome. God and the 13oche ::re dictPting tl;::,t. : wouldn't lcnou wrere the hell to plt anybody to ~et t 11ere first, the chPnces :ire so even 11etween VI rnd II Co..,y;s :vitr m:r mon-,y iust ::i. shade on II Corps. Tell Alexa:rrler I co11e11r in his idea to bwe e big pri=ide about i=i weal· ll"ter, but 1 et I s p;et through ar..d exr lo1 t our success to t1-ie nortr r>nd Civiteveccl ia before re thinv- of rarndes. �Also , tell Pt1rding and Alex if necJssary and Lem to please shut off jmportnnt f j remen who want to run up here as soon es the capture of Rome is irrnninen.t . I insist ths.t I be f' sked fir st . I don't want to cause l'my more trouble nnd kno'.'r you CR.n do it diplornntically. 11 Got it SP.Wed up a million :rer cent g11Prn 11tAed tb::it the first comrmnique which :indicates troops ~ n t'be outskirts of Rone :includes tbe stPtement that the;,r are Fifth Arr~;r troops. Also , the first stA.tement tb2t they have occupied Ron"'l must include Fiftl Army. I ',vill ste.ke everyt:bing I have got in cor>1batting any ne.rrov-minded individual who will not :=igree to tlis . 0 1'Tfow , in order that vou can yell 1 uhoopee 1 , the news is great . I hPve just come f'rol:l visiting ever:v division in the VI Corps up on the high ground north 0f Vclletri with Walker and all. over . 7/elker hP.s the high ground at Rocca Di Fe.pa firm. Ee is continuing the attack in the cUrection of Rone from Hnrino . One of Ms battalioris should now be firn betueen t:be two lakes on H. Gent iles . Howze tas1{ force is on Route 1/6 under Ti'rederick nith two batfo.lions of infantry and 100 tanks nbout ;phere the 97 easting crosses Highway 1/6. 85tb Division is abreast of J6th Division. A French battalion is in Falostrino and a French battalion in Cave . The 1.rill is here, and I have just i•:;sued instructions to all of my subordinate cor,nnnders to rursue relentlessly and destroy the enemy and not think of Rome . 'T'here is still tough figliting , parM cularly on the front of the !,5th Division. Harmon is in the act of being corrritted no'7. Flease do not com1m1nicAte tM.s over-optiJ11i'3tic news to AAI under :my circ1 mstl'lnces; on the other licnd, indicate we rire rnaJdng ourselves firm on the high ground on bot}, sides of Rocca Di l'l"rn and thPt the Fov,ze Force is pusring out on Route -/i6 against oprosition. Let them know I consider the goini:; satisfP ctory, but you knovr hov, rerred ur they get, l'!rd I mriy be a little overl;r OJit:i.mj stic myself . 11 By all Jlleans come to the new command rost knight if it is hwnanly possible . I will fly over and meet you there . If communications 2re in it will be f::'i ne to hflve you there . If ,.re sho ld enter tre out skirts of Rome tomorrow, remeriber you Pre to go vd tr> r1e . 11 11 Remenber the young bu 11 vrho j tunned the fence? Re 11, I t 11 g: ve you tr1e :tlO and drink both bottles of booze if tM..s i1orks out like I think it will . " t}, is General Gruenther sent Gem,rnl Clnrk the following memor,?ndu,'TI at 1615 rours D fternoon: "The Command rest hr.i s gone to ,hell . 'fo one is doing 2.ny wor1r here tr is eSternoon . .4.11 semblr>nce of ,~focipline has broken dmm. Although the G-3 Vfor Roor1. r,urposely shovm only a noder;:itely conservative 1,icture , every pilot-ever,rone in fact--vrho has cc.rte from A'TZIO since 10:00 o 1 cloc1r tris norning has brought back a prd.r of' pants full of snts with the result th;:it this unsuppressiblc wave of optimism l'nd exrect.Dncy hP s swept t1~roug} the headqurrters . I try to wear a loni:; +>8ce riyself but I Pm hevirw H devil of a time dojng so. 'w picture to FPrding hPs been: •The condition is favorable . Generrl Clrrk is quite happy mth the situr-tion but he vdll make no rredictions . His big Prnbition is to kill Germrns and then more Gcrmrms . 1 General Alexander made several complimentary stPtements in his r.1orn~ng conference ebout the way you Pre conducting t:re bettle . �"Yonr 11.15 lettP.r just rirrived. It cont1c1ir1s suer verv fine ne rs th"t I ':lP.lfi 1hly goinr, to ceep it to T'i;fSAli". I quite q,;ree l:"~th you tl1"'t H j s "i nadvisabl9 to rns3 on r>ny of that inform::ition to AAI yet. DI'1 11 'l'he directive on rress release wl ich :rou discussed nith Geri 0 rr>l l-fr•rd:tn~ yesterd~v ,..Rs r~ceiwid here officiall;r this nornjn1:;. Lem hrid told me lPst evening th"t he "m.s quite sure it had Plre:::>dy beer> i ssu0,d in the f'orn sho·•:n to vou. T hrv'3 p tl oro,ir;hJ.y cler:r undcrstr:nding ·•it:li Gen0rril Pr:rd-'ng thAt any cor~rr.1-mique wM er i e; j c;suP.d rnnouncj nr- the entry of Fift:l'' A:r'f'ly troops :l nto n0 1 ~ or into the outsldrts of Jl.O'E will g:i ve cr'3dit to Fifth Army. Hrrd:ing stntes thfl.t he l'"S r-iwm :instructions to tl is ef'""'ect to '1n.ini-rr-ri.ng. :r hrive co'1f'i:rm d. thrcu ;J. Lem thflt " c}~ instructioris have bPen i su c'1, l'H"'C1 th,,t there i, r.o evidence o<' D'1:v t~ndcmcy to g::p the Fifth Ar1n:r in Hs our o"' triumph. The com:nmique writers, ;nclui4inr: Goneral '"upper, Arnric"'n t'RO at •TAT0USA, aro tr;v-inP" their hr>nd at r> few dri.ft cor·,.,unjques this 8fternoon. They will be suhmitted to us -Por our co,..,mff•1.to. At tJ,is v:ri ting three J-i,we heen suggested: 1 1 0 1, (2) R.rT"' ?.i\LLS "'O FITTP ARl'Y "Len teJ.ls r,e thFt there rire Plso soverr-1 lon~er v9rsions -in tl e rnill. '!'he ehove e:xpmplPs v~ s 1pl :i zo rin unexp~ctedly r.opid entry. Lem thinJrs u,,.,t i_t j s ~r1rrob,.,ble thr>t sucb a sho,...t flas!1 ,ffill he issu0d. T ri:ove sent you P l"lessat:;8 sw•p;estinP" t},"t Ven O]Frk rrepare P drrift. Len sa:vs thrit such a drnft will 1,e "BlCO""'?d by AA1. You riny rest "'""·~u:recl trat it wil) be tioorougl·ly vmr 1~8d over, by everyone in the HeAdqu...,rters ns rell rs by the AFR~ cro rd, but it won't do any },arm to rut in our idePs and it rir>y do some good. 1 Pfrrdinr- st,,tes tl~"t ;,rou rm.r count on Ge,..,errl Alexr>rtder 1s PulJ cooperation in 1:eepirg visiting husv-hod7 brass hats +>rom tl e R( f"E areP.. I PT'l ~onvinceo Uwt he Hill do evor:rtMng he can to cnntrol this l"love:"ent. Yesterd:-,y, for examr:J.'3, ;v-our ver,r close .c,r-irmd., on-re f''t~D, sent p stn.+'f officer to AAJ mith lll'gent request th,1t the staf"./" off.; c0r bB allovrerl -1:.o enter RC ~!F. shortly fl "'t~ its capture in order to select sdtf-lble 0,..f'jc9 "nd livinr- 9cc01-:r'"od11tjo1'1s +>or the crrc r=n staff• The 0ffic0r CHJ'18 pr9p'."•red tc l"lOVe to RC''E ir "'1edit>tely. rr~rd:ng sent him 1:-Eclr to tT'J T.J~S •r'tr a 1 no sottp 1 Ri'\Svrer flnd r1e hrsn 1 t been herrd ~rorn sin8e. Of co'.irse t 1 ere 11re go~n<; to be lervs, hocruse the rressure of VPrious ind~vidua1s tr;r~ng to enter vd.11 be terri.,,.;c. vo,;ever, I belfove thrt tle sitll.3,tion is gen°re.lly rretty "ell unrler control. As a ,r\f'tter of ~ntr:,re.st, th"" Greek Arm;l has npr l:i ed for rermission to c• c:nn n Greek detr er nent for the ~ ni ti.- 1 occupr1tion o:' P 'IE. As I told you ~ n my letter tJ, is r orn~ ng th~re is "OV' a thorough meeting of tl e mi.nc1 s at AAI that no detr>crir'lents of Greeks, I oles, IndiPns, New Zef:l.lrmr'ers, 0r what-nots will enter Rome until tLe f'orrml t,:irade is rield. Gen°rrl Alexi:mc1 er will consult •rou concern-' n<; the -"'orMnl l f-lrnde. A ft-3r I sent you ny morn;nc- letter he mPcle tbe remPrk: rrn1,e formal n-...,r11d.e May not ta 1,o r)pce untjl as lrte as t"'O '1 ePkS rifter the Cc'Tture of"<('"'";. I am convinc~d tt"t the dr>te must rlepe'1d eritirclv on tr·c tPctic~l ~jtu tion. 1 I v.nora- t}Pt t1,,is er-resses ,r01ir roin+. o" view exe ctly, A.nil .,. do rct believe th~t ·r8 shRll li...,ve :-,ny trr-uble on th8t score. 0 0 1 0 1 11 I expect to 7 ePve here 1:w c11b at about 7 :00 o I clock tonj P'ht. I 1 11 tele- ��phone you as so0n r-s I arrive trier'). Jt is quite ro""s.;ble, of cnurse, thr.it .'.'lt the last rrdnute I rn'Y r1ecide not to CC>'""8 if I feel th,<>t I PPl n0eded ],ere. 11 Clar, to Gruenther: iJ 57 . "In .'.'ln OI today l'lm setting ur 3rd Di v5 sion less one coTrJ.1-iat terom ,,,.,.jth the ,..,rench battRlion you }'PVC designrt9rl rlus one British brttalion from th<=J 1st British Division 11s tr1e troops to garr~ son Rome. Both seprate hottRlions 'Till b<=J ottnched to the 3rd Division and all under the command of Johnson . He has been notified . J lease inform Brnnn o+"' tre bat talion selected ½y French to <=JntAr Rone. 11 General CL~rk sent the +"'ollowinp; menorwdmn to Genc--rrl Gruenther ,iu'3t 1)efore <ljnner this even"ng: "A Lt . Col. Olson, rr. S . , from AAI h,.,s rrrived r-t ny J-endqwrtors with five Yugoslavian officers vritl' ~:1structio:1s fror'l Brigndier P'!Pnn0ring thrt they rre to tour th'3 front. ''hy A.TI I not cons1 ·ltecl, an" -rhy "rP. peor1e thrust upon ir1e ·•t such 1'1"'1 im1 prropriatA tine? They brouf"ht, food And bl."nvets w1.tr them and ""'rP- told to sta:r as long PS they 'Fished . Due to the hectic sto.te of traffic Pnd tl'e munber r·"' M.en. involved, I am unR.½le at tM s time to p::irnit these officers to wP.,,Hfor rt '-rill tl rou;rh my ·'\--,r,rrd r-rea. This throws t ·e burden o<' findjnr sleepj"'11". flccorioclet 1 ons .. or tris mo½ t>'> well E's r~~edinr, thPr.1. 11 ':ou roust m;:,}re it clear to Jhnnr➔rjn<; thrt h9 has no hl...sjrwss tc, do tliis rrithont 1ett~np; l'le 1rno"', a.. 111:icl he s 1:ec mo, ~ '""Oulr; r;ro~ntly hnve t 1.rn"d it '1.d do '\TD as tl A nost inr>ppropriate tfrn trrt :f l'tlo l o.(' to bn.ve tl 0111 CC'I:Je here. Tre r;rst +,ri'nr; you 1"110''' +,1,e claiM ·ill be tht tl'e Yu17oslr-:virins ''er0 trie first to ont9r Rr•me . 0 1 TTJ ar, 1;oing to tell Lt. Col. C'1son trr>t r1e can look f-'rounc1 the old 1-JriC.ge- herc t'rea t 'is evenin.r, <i. ' ,.,13 v•ill tr" to [ ccomod;:ite trer r-orr1"'r lrce, hut I 11 'tot P'1thorize then to r-c forvmrc . nf my Any "'ref' r-t tl ; s tiI'le. 11 '7~ Cl:=irk to Gruenth-,r. 11"T 53. 11 Referenc,:i MI ·o. ')851 on ass; r;ri:1 ng nff" bouncl11T'ies, rlArse not:ify AAT thc1t I rn hrtpf'"T to str-te that Fi+'tJ, rmy occurios the lnl"k: of Colli Laz5 ali t Lus rif'kinc:- it unnecessr1ry for AAI to re~:nstnte the old ho1mdPrv as indj ctcited . n Gruenther to ClRr"k. RT 3643. "Rardinp- w<1nts to vnow whetber time hns ~rAlso to i"'1struct these resistrmce groups by radio broRdcast tonight • 11 rived to drop 1eRflets to resistance groups in Rome . Gem'lral GlPrk gave the "go ahead 11 sigmil to tris request imrnedL tel~r. Gruen+,her to ClArk. R~-r 3644. 11 AleX13.nder desires to relea3e srecial comrnuniq11e no1"1 th"'t Ji_fth Arny tr"ops hPve broken tl·rough enony d9fenses l"lnd flre appro:::i chinp; outskirts of Rorne. Do you concur? Rerly. n Gencrr-1 Clark denied tbis request ;:,11d sent tre follo•,,ing rrorosal: "Fifth ,rmy troops hrwe hro rnn through the G<=Jwan deferses southeast of Ror1e in sever11.l plrces . Fi "th Army troops 11.o~' occupy t. e bulk of' Colli LA.ziali wriich doni.nrites tre <1t'T'rnPCh8S to Ro"le. 11 Total battle C8surlties since the openin~r of the Anzio o"'fensive rrmou..YJ.t':ld to C'J,1q5 A"ler~cr>n 11.nc: 1,001 British. ��sri::m1n'JSTA--JTJNE I+ , l '1L~4- -Goneral Cla.rk left s.t 0830, a ccor,1prmied by Generf' 1 Brann, l"is G- 3 , and tvro Rides , Lt . Col. Draper and Cartain kmpson, for Rone . Colonel /Jlar}- and renresentatives of tho nress and GJC personnel nlso accompanied him. 'T'he rest of the convoy, wM.ch rnov~d from Nettnno vir-i Cisterna, Velletri , Artena , Valmontone and nort}1 1·;est on EiD",lnrn.y ;!J6, consisted of two rr>11ored C-"rs and six jeeps . About five mjles :f'rori Rome General Clerk Met GenerPl }<,:eyes on the roeo, and the co"'!voy continued to the outskirts of Rome. Just nrior to arriving qt, the outskirts of th9 city, General Jlrrk ,'1et General Ii'redorick of' the Sreci:-i.l Service Vorce ,-rho alread:r hPd elerne11ts jn the Pester'") 'Jdge of tl e c.;ty. The Gsrmflns }wd a11.ti-tank q;,1:J.s 0~d r>bout ?00 infantry w110 were opposing our entrance :"nto the city. The resi..stance o"'fered WPS stron.P' 01101J;=;h to delflv additionPJ elonents from going into the city. There wa,:; shP.rp fighting in spots, and it wes Avir1 ent tlKt the entrance into Rome tociay would not be rossible. 7 VI Corps, on tl· e left, had made "'9me PdVP11ces past LR go Albano, but the II Corps had pushed wel 1 to the north ·rest e 1c1 ''ere on the outskirts of Rone. Elements of the 3rd Divisio11 and 88th Division ,· er9 waiting outside and were clerloying to pusl out tJ,e enennr pcc 1"ets of' resistlince '71 ich "rere orgr-rnized in the outskirts . GenPral i";lrrl' p0rsonally ··nsrected t:be frc'1t-line elements thPt ,rere rus1~ing into tl)e cit:v. Snall arrs f':ire was plainly hen.rd, and tlere rere ,;till snipers in t:re vicin-i ty. F0ws pl,otographers Rnd wr-r correspondents took pictures of GenPrril Glark, General Frederick r,nd Ge11er11l Ye;res discussing the opposition conf'ronting our troops Antering the city. 0 0 1 The French hP.d made satisfactory advr-i.nces to the :north of II Gorps and were in a posi..tion to protect the Army's right flr:mk . The exact locatfo1ts of units is not exPctl:v lmovm . The advance command post r1oved f'rom Anzio and joim,d th8 forward con:'land post, ct Sermoneta . CoJ1nunications with front l 7ne divisions is lackinp;, due to their raphl advances. }Iovrever, it is lJelieved thet b;-:r morn~ ng vre 1'7ill undoubtedl~v have rost of our advanc8 elements in t:re c:i ty. General Clerk flew hwk :f'rol'1 the outskil~ts of Rome bY cub a1,,d landed et his cub rdrfield at the new conrnana post . He immedj 2 tely went into conference with Ge11eral Gruenther ,n >:d nade his plan for his entrance into Rome tomorrow. rracticr:. lly tr1 e same arrangel'lents thn.t 'Tere ',et up for today will be CflPried out tomorrow . u • * c...., * * SERMliP,TA --JUN1~ 5, 1944--General Clark left his cov1mand post at SermonGta at 0730 fly bv cub to Rome . At Rone he met the following convoy •,rhich loft the comma:nd post at 0530 this morning: Gen0rals Johnson and Hume in one ,jc~ep, General Beucler and Colonel Britten in anotJ,Ar, three pl,ot,ographers and Colonel Clark, r1n, two counter-intelligence officers 8nd an officer of the G- 2 Section, two armored cars and four of the Gen"'rnl I s personel guards. ' l' to ~' 1 '· As soon 11s General Gle.rk lnnded tJ,e cc,nvoy started out and entered the City of Rome . Th,.w entered on Route #6 and proceeded rast tbe Coliseum to the Campidoi;lio and up to Capitoline Fill . From there the convoy rode through w,rious str:ets in Rome and were accla.irv=id by the :i.nhsbitants who lim,d the streets , wav1.ng f'J.Bgs, cheering and entrusiasticelJ.y rrel_comir,r; GererF'l ClRrk, tl~e Army Gori:rnanoer , t0 the ci t;-:r. The scene '"as rem:iniscent of Arri st ice Day in 1918. mhe crowd seemed carried e.way 1r 1 t:r <1motjon cnr" was hysterj cally hn.pry. ��~ 1-t e I>'t .. ~;)- ¼ rr-r ....-v r ,.J,' H, 1: ?( ~,~ ~ " ql ~~ ~~~~l --~~ v-r»- ~ yr-~ ~ 1 u.Qr-~ /i;;. ib- P "¢. ~t\ At 1010 GenorRl Cl0r 1, r'9t his Cor'f' Co"lrl8'11'1 Prs r-t Cnritoljvie Hill in the . ~ OS f.l'eadquRrters ,.,, icl-' "7ere in thP To"m ·1 p11. At t!-'"s reet:inp; "ere Gennrrls ~~ 1 'rro'1c ott , Yn~r.es a'1d (}r>n rP l J.uin . P,ach one ri~cussed } is situetion prr1 roint~ed~ out the artvances nnde b'T t1'0ir +,roops . All bridges across the "'iber had been ~ secured n11.c1 adv, •1ces rr>d bnen rricle r .,,.ff' miles .,cro"'s tre ri,mr . ThA Fron.ch Corps l'"<l been rkcef1 jn a r1 , "fic1 1lt ..--.ositj on in th"t triey rir>cl bi~en +'creed off ut(l'J:i•m.y 1/:t; +>or ro·rar,,mts of tl oir tronps . TMs s.; tnrtion ·as A llev;a ted by req11iri;1<; II Corrs to clef1.r th~ir ror>d·., b;-r to!"orro"l' .('or use of th0. Ti'rerich Corf':.:- . "'he ol<l ½onndriries botve<Jn 'ighth and Fift1 Army "ent into ,f.c>ect , •},j ch f'"VG F 4 rth q,w S to t} P, -r;; rl tr Ar"IYJV r "'ter Fift1 Arny troops hfl, f'"' ssed tlie·~r trf'op-. thrm O'h +1 P city nnd on •~he c-tr"'r sjde of tl 1 0 Ttber . r<1ny r:boto graph0.rs nrid vmr corre:=ipo"a•=mts 1·mr,9 rr0s,..nt talc'nr rictures on tl':is ri~toric mPeti'1a; o.,.. <1"''1"'r9l Clrr1' r>11 • his Corps CorTr.irinrers in HoTfle. 0 AftPr tl'e conf'err=mce on Cr-ritol.:ne Fill Ge,:,r.rrl Clrrk ::i:rd rd s Coe.TS Comrvnrl:rs 1e11+, tc t:bc, -r::"c3l cior rotel ·'~c,re f19y,,,ral Glor\:. v;-ill set up ri terpora ~ r•r C("·nand post 1mt~ 1 t}->9 ar'lv.s:r1ce COT1."'f'l1rl 1'0:"t is set ur "Il the v~ 1111 Srvoia . }- 1/ "'he fol 1.ouj ~g wgre th=J l1incheon '""'1?sts of' t110 Co.,.,,rrnrl.; ng Grneral : Geri0rFls ~}°' ,.,, Keyes , .Tuin, Johnson , Hure , Beucl9r , Rrnnn , Cr1rpe'1ti0.r , Gruenther, Bro·m end /' Colonels Brj ..,ten , Kn.m~"'rPr <1nr ::)r3p~r. Aft0r l11ncl1 GonPr01 CfarJ· rl" scusned ~j1 edrl.:n· s-1-r,.,ti..vc nritters ~d_th Genrirp,J.s Hm 1 e ~md Jol~nson . Ge"1ArPl Jobnson ill )I be mil"tr>rv c"rnrPi-ic'or of th9 dty, ;:1nd Genr,ral Hurne is I'ifth Army Ar·G o"fjcnr . /)'/ 'f'l,e :;-ror1lens r-f' trkj n g OVPr -':,hn ['( J:'l~_n~strPt:1on of thP cit;r "Till t)") r:,any; feed ~ in; tre civili•n1~ , get ti:ni:; uti.litiP.s in order, recrr>rition,il +'pciljt"cs +'or tr 0 o:;-'1 rnd o+'ficP-r s . All of -1:,~ese ·roble;rnq 1 ·Are 0•:c;cn-:;sed. '(} 1 1 1 At five O I clock G9J:'(~rP 1 Clrr'· .c,7 el b,, C1' tr r.i9 CO"'"':' c' ro'"t 8t S rmonet~ A,nd di"'cti.rised ; 4J1 1 is Chief of ctr,"~ thi "'OVcmw1t 0f' h:: s c0-rrn11. :;-ost from q,~rmrnetP to Ro..,e . It rill talre rlrce ~n -1-re ·•0r nerir +'1,t.lU'e, -rob·1hly t}>e dr> v 11 -<'ter tcriorrC'V' . 0 1• r.rigl•l i~hts of th., hatt1e rroF;ress centered r>ro,,nc1 e] enientc; hr v~vig "P c;sed c5t:r ::incl Vie estri 1li.M' -,,11t c,f' l' 1 )rir'i-;el'e:0 d c,, +J~e 0th r ""de . L~-'-tle n.1=>tr~L, 0 ' 4ib"l -+;roop ""0v0~ 0rnts were 1 TO'm 0r PXPCt rositiore; . • 0 1 ever , it 1nis r>scertn.in'"-'d thr1t th,~y rrd "dva11ced aho11t trro r~ J.es I rist 4;110 city. Thi:: dav in i tseJ f rri s 8 ,,orinnto11s m 0 pnc' ,.. 0'"Te '"'rted "11 e>1orrou'1 v~ ctory +'or the •if>t), A.rrv-y •·11 ich h,d hrvm so Fbly led 1,y Geryirnl r:a~r1r . Tres;cient Roosevelt crnveyen } :.s rers,mril C"ngrnt11l"Vo...,·'"' to G1=moral Cl:,,rk jn P verv sincere rianner , str-i.t: nr- thn.t t}·e AnAr5 ca n reople -,ere V9r7 PJ.•nt9+'uJ. for t'· is rnornr-r tnus "'Ve>1t in t,]:v, Cf ftUre o':° :1.omr; . ~;:--.::·011,c:l the 0 G- 1 todn,r r"3rorted t:re fc llo,,,rinr; crisu<1lty f'ipures for the orerc1tion: Yilled in nctjon founded 1 "i '1Sing 'T'otfl 1 1.. , L.68 ?l , 045 ? , J~?2 V ?7, 035 GrnAral H"rding s9nt tJ:,e :'ollow-inp- r:emorflndmn to Grmern 1 (:lr:irk to af'f[lirs •;.:-+:,], the V,tican: j_th rogrird '1 "'h8 C-:ln-'.:!, AAI hns r0ceived tr9 'ol.loyr~n,... ,.,ror. Ami • It js rass0d to yo,, .,..or such ['ction as van r1n7 C"Yk,ider rlesirri.bl9 or 110cess,,,ry. �•VaticB.n Aut,},orities hrv8 Axrressed r,nxi9ty over ir1tervrl thrt will elarse hetween Gerrir>n PV'1CU<"tion n.nr1 'lli8d occup1 tio"' of Rf '"E. Thwr stress rece-::it;r for efft•li.0::t rossible ,1 9Spfltch of smf'll All::ed force to s"r 0·1 Hself r>t central roi11.t of town. They believe such action -,,ou1d rlel"'onstr?t,e irrirenclinr; Allied control rnd '1dministrr-tion, and serve to rvert d:1 sorderG. 'H. "• J\nbr s::irdor sur-~0sts errl;r r:esture of resrect to Vrticrin ···ould ~e "'ir,l 1.7 n-•'yrecjnterl, for ~rstrnce i.., British Pnd J\T"'9ric::>n officers could bri trihC?n ~iv l im rinc his Arri.eric"n c0lle;:.r;i1e P s soon n.s JO"'Sible to see Cr"rd~rn1l Secr,")to.r;r r.f' Strto, ~n ,,rcer tr cr,nvey l""essr-i_ge from All.;ed Cor1nrmrlers to tr.A rope, and to info~·m Vrticr>n Autloriti,,,s of contemrl[lted A1 lied rier>res (r1oves?) i.n c011.11~ction ·;rith J.( J'E . 111 * * n,-1i~--Jl;'IE 6, l 0/i-L~--Gerier~l Clr,rlr r9tnrn°d to Ro=8 ':r cub r fter confcrrint; the r:reatPr rrxt of t•,e T'lorn~riP- ,7ith liic; Chief of 3t..,""f, G.-::nerel Grw=mt'her. re "ms arconrf'nied by r'iS G-3, Gen ,r[,11 "lr::,nn' arirl Colon8l )? ltzrrfln anc'l C!'lne directly tC' trP ~~'"celsior '"hAre; corys 1irison o"ficers l'rd rerorted 'vith 7, test in"'ormntio-r.. on tlie rror;ress of th--ir ~ort s Pcro,s t ,p, :riv9r. P.dv, ce r-lPP"ents had :rPPCh"'d P Doin+ "bout trelw~ 1'1il8s_rpst 4-,110, citY, Fr_intri:ring contr>ct r.ind in sor<: c11ses h"v;n(1' cr•nsidernble resiC"t~YJ.ce tc tl,e~r f'dv::mces. GA"1PrPl Clerk cr-·1.f'err')CT r•,t,h h1s G-1, Gen9rP1 Brann, Genercol Johnson, Co •1'JAnr1er of -'-,) 0 city o+> Rone, C:P'l.d f}p· er,.,1 r11m0 , hi.~ Fift!:' Army A'~G officer. Colonel Tully of the '"ili trry RP il, ay S0,rv; ce r0:r,,ort0d to 'renerPl ClPrl< ancl qtntec' t},f>t reconriaisfTncA 1artiPS bd nlrerrl;v flrrivl"ld ~n t1 1 e city P"ld 11 AY'n str,rting tor1orrow to rut ··nto onAr:ition tl e r::,, 7 .rwds. Colonel Tu1ly r8C0r'"' nded tl rt hi9", Triority hr> J""ade PS "'r'on ~s possible to orfmin': the r~ilror-ds from !Wzio to Rol'Y'e. In abo11t 11 nol"t}1 ro · lro110 7_: nAs continn~d from the G~rj r;liano to t 9 Ro,.,.c rrea couln '1-)e comr leted. · 1 1 0 1 G<"'rerfll 1<,.,:res, II Co~ps So"=Pndcr, c[lr,1"' to ~P,e G<=>n~rfll Clnrk e:r1d di.-;cussed '"'Tith 1'"!'1 +,h'3 c;itn.,,tio11 o"l. his corJ,3 ...rort. Ge·-iaral 0 1 J'lniFl1, Co=lllE'nrler of the 1rcl Div~ sion, Plso cnl"e !;o er i-"er "it}, Gem,ral Clrr1·. Bis riv:i 1io11 hr.s l'ttnn.red f' Frencl t'nd Brjtisr brtt~lion "'or r:r--.rr' r,onin-; .+J1e dJ,y. Th8 site +'or the new ro::.-t in t],e Vjlla q;cvoi'< hrrl l,eeri ric'lreri, rinr1 ~tPrtin'; iPJJ\'18d:.r-tel;:r ~,itr rreprrPtio-1s -for tl,.e Y"!ovcment of trie ric'lvr,nce 9ln• ents of the conrrnc1 r ost tor·orro· • COT"Jl'J.PJ"'0 tre lfeMlri,un.rtl"lrs CoririPnr1,9.'1t ·1qs G8nAral Cl,,r'· bad as dhiner ruests Gem~rrls Johnson 11lly. * * :'Dr~ F11.r11r; 11.nc' Colonel * ROTE--JU' ; 7, lqM~--Gcn"'rPl ';lr,rk -x n-"0rr"d 1 rith Genrrril Brllnn, his G-1, .-,tn 'yin.a; pro,c,-ress T"'Pcle 'h,r c-u~ trooi s 1orth o ... Ror-0. llr1 v,nces Yl9re r?J ic1 • Civitavecc~,i_<, on '"'le cot<st l·2e1 +>allen to our trnor s, and they ·Are r1rnhi~~ rri.st t},is jnpo:"'+,Pnt rort nrea. /It 1010 Gen0rrl C1Pr 1, /'111(1 h.;s G-3, Gow,r,il Brc nn, lef't by ,ieep to vjsit IT Co,..ps rnrl. VI Corr'> wr8re t,}·e•r cc'l."'r-rrec'l ·jt,1-, erch Gorrs Com'1"nder and r0vie '<3rl +r" '1itu"ti0n on ~bc.ir .('rent. I rior to re+,urnini; to t: 9 .,,xcelsior, +J-1 ey c:topred rt the non c0T'lnrnd rost rt Yillri c•,voir wl icli ·'lp~• being �set up tcdny. After Gen"r.nl Clnr returrP.d to tf'p i'YJ. to conf',.~r i"iti-, hiM. II Corrs ancl VI Corps "PTj 11 ccme in wi.tl1 :'ranch Corrs oY\ its ri grt. II and VI for a lonr- ti..rie, VI Corrs l·n.v.;np; b9en "n since thn ; 0tol, G0n0,r['l Truscott cr"'le ru7 l ou.t, :-ind IV Co-1"} s ,1ill Cor~,s hf'Ve been in brttle 1.nndinr- ;:it, Salerno. G0,n0r.'lJ. Gr119nthr>r Prrivcd from t,1-ie for,r9rc1 copr>f:lncl post rit Serrnonetn and hn.d lunch v,ith Ge'1er;ql ci..,rl,;. Gener8l m.nte, the G-4, Plso +'lew up on sur,ply ,..,,,n-tters. "'h0 rar:id 11rhr"'nces of tho Arny 1'.?Ve extenr<ed our '>urply lin"'s, rrk..,king the suppl r rrohlem di 'ficult but not w1t} out .n solution. 3urrlj0s ··•ill be brcu<?"ht into Anz~ o n11d trucked ur to tr9 front, nnd in th, nenr f 1 1tm~e sor:,e nrill be tRkm from lfriples to r.::1vit;:iveccL.ir- and brou~ht forw rel ovr-rlr1 nc +'ror:1 therA. Tre des tr, "tion of the rri ilrou1~ b~r tr e GeTI"rns will rrr-1m it :'. nr,oss i blc to extend Ue railroad 1-inns i7'I"'Pdirtelv up to the PttFcri~o; -<"ront from the renr nrec1. ~•n. io,,. G9.,.,·,..r-l Greri;so 1-,.,llj "l of' tl A Stri Rrit,j s\ rivisio', Cf'rn0 :i.n t0 sn,y f'Ood1:>;re to Ge110 r:ol Clrr~:. r•;s Djvi<:ion ... ill be detrcr'ed -<>ror,,, Fj4"tr l.rrw and r,:.1..Pcecl under cnrJ~r0l cf 4.. I. 1 Ge110.rc1ls ,To 10 1son A.rc1 F1me cri:r.e in ·ust r,rior to luncr m.r1 r-i "'cussed .,.,,iF!tt~rs riertoininr; "'::.o t}v:- ci-sv o::' Ro"1c w~ th Generrl Cl."rk. GenPrPl Furi.e hrs arranp-ed for R visit to t},f~ Vaticm1 torriorroT witl, Pore J ius XII. mhe /1udj once "'ill tck-e plri.ce at n-i..ne o I c1ocl• in the • ort'i.nr:. 1 At noon DAW i. 11.:_;tructio11s rP.ceivod -"'rori AAI HeE1dqur-rters required tre Arry tr rusr <'~,rwircl rA.r-ic:'ll~r rmd c::eize r, li'1<; r1ur:''1,: AP.st-west trrou£,11 ris2... Th:is d1rective is quoted below. r, Ge11erals Clar Gru~mtlrr a11.rl Rrf'.nn n·1 "'c1i-:1sed the I!'"rr.P.r j r. wt· i.c" tli:Ls direceive ,;;oul.o be ca-ri8d out. It req,lires f'nri->'t nnd nggressive rirrs·1it to trke dvantage of' t1 e • ·eav,med G~rni:in ,1ho fr rithrrawing rP-ricly to tre rortr. 0 Arol'nd f<,ur o 1 c1ocl: Gc;neral Crittcsnberger ri 1rl. GenorRl Cr, . . P. err" to confer "i.th Ge'leral Clr>rk rA+'erence th, rr Corrs takirf" over bot}~ the II rncl 'II Corrs fr('"\nts. GenAraJ. Cb:rk rlmmc,d tn tPJr0 tre l.5th ';ivision out c.,.. t:re line a>1d place it in Army res~rve. All Divisio~s ,.,ill ·,e given ~' ch'U'ce t0 tn 1c'" nlv;:,nt1:1f"e 0:f t',13 new rAst center ·r' : cl1 yrill be set ur ~11 Rol"le • It .-rill he ablA to ta1·e CPre o-1" <'Ver lC,OOO soldi0rs Pt a tirv~. ~rou,1d -"ive o 1 cloc1: G rerril "pc.,.,<>rlBne o-" ACC came in ~~o co•1.,.er .,;_+,}-, +,J...e Arrw Corr:.ander. Ju ,t rri.or to d~ rner GenPrf'l Cl r 1• 'Y'P,C"iV"-'d pn A er..\c,-,ri '1()1"'9D •rho h,'lG. rrrriod r.n It91-l__;:,n, r,drrse ·u,..c} esa de Bon-Is. '1ro ...,rintGd to "~et Gen"'rl'l J. CJ.0r}· r>11.c1 c<'>1':7'Ptul[lte 1-:lim on 'his "hilit;r as v great nilitar:r leader. 0 0 ri., For dinner Ge11.orl'll CL<lr1· ]:-,pd Generi:>ls Sulliwn, his T~ o-"'ficnr 8....,d ':'cte, G-1+, ris p-,1ests in ac'ldition to hjs r0~ 1 lPr r1ess. A.AI to A11 Co>1c0r'1ed. "?_H O?OOCJ. 11 ':'he ener,iy hn s h~en r;rer,tly v.ren 1'ened. by tre _,..if"ht:i nn; since 11 I!ay c:nrl ::.;J non tl orc,ur;•1l;r ,1 4 sor'".'.'l'lized. I'e is certr inly in no position rt rres0nt t, l111 nci1 /1 s~ri.oun cmmter ettrick. re ..,~ 11 ccrtinue to su,..f"')r n9r~ ously d11r-inr his r"trert fror rttackr, b,, 0ur 8 :Lr -l'orces £inc' adv, ncir,r• c0lurnns. 1 �l :> I THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY ***** From tra Gennan viewpoint it is incomprehensible why the 34th Division on the evening or 7 Jtme and the F.irst Armored Division on the evening of 9 June were withdrawn from the front. Whatever were the reasons, it is sure they all accrued to the benefit of the Gennan high cormnand. ***** The middle am the east wing of the A:rm:, was forced back further during the period 12-14 June due to the superiority or the enemy. As a result of the commitment of the 26th .Armored Division and parts of the 3rd Arraored Group or the 4th Parachute Division, in the area of the 356th Division, it was possible to hold the Orvieto Bridge open long enough far all units of the XIV ~ored Corps and its attachments to reach the western shore o£ the Tiber. Qrvieto itself was lost on the 14th of J~• The French Expeditionary Corps, newly committed, and at present on both sides of the Bolsener Lake, which at the beginning of the Allied May offensive had so distinguished itself and so greatly contributed to the first successes, was now not so overpowering. This can probably be attributed to the fact that the Corps lmew that in the not. far distant future they would be withdrawn for the invasion of Southern France and that they wanted to con"Berve their power for use in combat in their homeland. This is psychologically self evident, but it is questionable if it was necessary or suitable to relieve the .American ___ j II Army Corps by the French Expeditionary Corps. *** ** Signed/ Wolf Hauser Major General • �Rode u~J in jee, •-:i:,'1 ':en. Gruentber (Catholic)--saw priest walking across street who carre up an1 said in '"::rglish "'"elcome to R.ome. \',hat can : do for you? 11 1rfuere is Capotiline 1 il1? 11 ' 111J'e are certainly proud of the A·· er.icar. 5th Army. ?,y name is 11 !y nar.,e is Slark'' m"'l1at di.i you say your name was?" -- - -" Little crowd had iathered. A youn~ rran on bike. Priest toid people i~ :talian it w~s Clark. The young man ,zot on his b-ike and a.::inounced all the v~y along to the crowds that it was Clark. Dig crowds, ;;;reat excitement, 0 irls, flowers in muzzles, et«. Jeep got stuck in crOYrds dowr by usscl.i.ni 1 s baL uJ'.. TLe:: wen:, t1:J Cap , ill --r1s;uc...i.,,r tl1e:re. It :s ~~r,ind '1eif ,..olossiewn--cit:r :~:::l} :,r. to1J, \":as a-~et.:.11~ corps commanders there. -··as the :Jlace wl ere '1eneral Roberto ...,er.civcnto--[reat cooperator--held forth. Pounded on door--finally ope:ied a c-rack--::talian __,eneral came out--great patriot on American side. T }IOTEL EXCELSI0R: , ere somevrhat. afraid of :err-.an traps, and investigated before they went tl-iere. It had been .:esselring I s hdos. took over as 5th ar ~ !'es-:. center for officers. took over 1Lsso 1 s sports forum for erlistcd men--2O buildings-indoor and outdoor pools, one upsta~_rs on second floor with slidin_; ceiling 1· asso 's special pool. 3-4- square blocks '.Jig. "very sol:iie!' -vrho .?artici?ated in the long drive for Rome vrc_1,1 __,et several days furlough in Rome. At the Sxcelsicr Clc,r1< v;er t in the bedroom o~ ~he suite--knelt riown t" s'3.y _?::'ayers, th_:__rJdn'"' :e Y,9.s , 1 0'1e. ~'elt a hand on hi.s shou Jer. Gen. Jo·1in in bathroom said "I just lid t•.e sar:1e tl-iins. 11 Glark-s hclqs. ··1ever in b 11i1Jin..:,s d•,r ir:__, the -rrar. :~::J:IUO: 'Jer2r ucll i,r._Jresse<l--rather youn'"', concerneJ about wife and children who 17ere in Switz. 'Sx1)res[ •1 rezt ._,ratit 1de .for liberation of Rome without darr.ac.;e • .1antecl to cooperate. 0 1 PCP'"': Jrove up tc Vatican :..n jeep and G.I. clothes. Swiss ,1uards, etc. ?ope wa::-ited to see Clar 1c alone--711 ch lrr,pressed--::>ope ove:r:·wLE:.1-ied. wLti: '---'ratitc:.dde-eYt6nded invita.t·i rm to all sold.iers to visit hirn--'::la:rl{: said w-o..:ild make arran ements-•T)c•p ~e smr tr-er.: every da:r--tho·1sards of tl-em. 11 ::::: ·m..ierstard your hdqs. will be :1ere in Rome. ]ow lont r::..11 you tc tr'-.i.K here?" I ar f'ear:'ul it will brin re percuss Lons from the Germans." Clark diJ riot think so, bit couldn't help it ar.-:;,··way. Pope ,asked if Clark ad ha i any contacts witr the Russians--dic11 1 t krow ar..ythin...r except they were £'i.;htint, like mad. "li'xpressed at one time reat concern over communism. Two or tl rce clays later wdnt to see Pope a<->ain. Still wor1:·ied about hdqs. bein.::; in Rome. how v;as tre bnt.+,le .;cir.g--our locat:..on-when WJ uld w-e move? Story about Pope thinkin.; American soliders didn't likl him. Rt. Rev. , ans.· .. alter s. Carroll, secretariat of state, vatkan city, had been liason man with t 11e 5th ., l}. thro..1gh the figLting 11;, throurn ~taly. 0 0 0 June 9-story about Clark's narrow escape in a plane -inspecting Sevida. Vegg-5...?J., wtich had just been captm.•ed. It was the port of Ror & , _nd needed for s .19plies, which t:1c.l previc., s\>- haJ -to be 'Jrougl.t '.iYJrland all t,he re. ~r.::,::- "aoles. He and pl.lot Jo .• lookir,1;:; out w'~er :=;u :den c:-.:.sL. :.a.i run iato cabie suboo:ntir.~· bar-::•a:-re balloon w; icl:. had. ju13t been put up. uas leaYin.;, cable slidin__, alon:, etc: .;~cku pulled throttle wide open, cable tiroke. shut off ..1otor and gli1ed intv o v7'1eatfiel:i. Plare tJroke tl:e cable. Sur.)rl.s~r,g t:iat tM lethal device under eacn a'olloon o.iJ.11 1t go off. Probably because tLe3· were :,oin6 slowly and in a li__,rt ?lane. i?robably circled around cabl3 tow or t".ree tirr.es. r~all~a:r.s or southern fra."lce, etc. Toid :l.rsl'-811 ::e ·.ad .:.nte,:-1:'ated team sj--.ich t.::i.o. dE. velopeJ the L3.rd --.vay. 'J-ermans were smas1~., :.tc. air S'.;"~rt w.:m.Jerful. Sasr"i wr0r__, t.o break up this -!:.earn m:cn it ·ras ---◊i . . , s, , ~11. T'lk;c.d a0out landing .i.n southern /ranee ar, · w0:1 ~"'red r::y it ·--~S:IALL: �Td:S :?IFTH ~P..:.("'.[ 'S •.'!HERE ''Y. Hr.ART IS - by Irving Ber lin (Introduced in the overseas edition of "This is the Army" Verse: I met her in f· merica about a month ago She asked me if ~ 1 d give her love to a certain GI Joe . She said when he returns I 1 11 be his bride I asked her where he was and she replied: Chorus: Not the First, not the Second, not the Third, not the Fourth , But the Fifth Army ' s where my heart is . Ee 1s somewhere on a beachhead which must be lots of fun. I can see him in a bathing suit basking in the sun . From a cute signorina he's been learning to talk like a real native of Rome. She I s a very tasty dish, but my baby 11 :Io capish" til the Fifth Army comes home . Chorus: Not the First, not the Second, not the Third, not the Fourth , But the Fifth Army 1s vm.ere my heart is . Vfo landed in Salerno and kept right on the go, As we fought our way through Napoli into Anzio . ~ile by mile we've been soldiering The hard way it s eerns On the road leading to lror..e . And wit r1out a single doubt There ' ll be things to shout about ~vb.en the Fifth Army comes home . • �To take full advantage of this situ,,tion Eighth Arny vrill ac1wmce TTj th a 11 possible sreed dire ct 0 11. tl"e general areR F isR - LuP ca (?) - r istoia. Armies vrill T1aintain gener:.:, 1 contP ct on their inner flanks but will not "'ait on each othr}rs advPnce. Eneny resistance will 11e by t'R.ssed vfrerever possible in order to reach above vitPl 11reAs quickly. Ei~l1 th Army vd.11 be respons'ble for any protection that may be necessary on its right flrmk. 11 11 '.l'o save transportl'ition resources r>nd bridging rrRt9rinl 5 Corps will not f'ollow up t1"e ,3nemy on tl~eir "'ront. If the Pdvrnce of Eighth Army f'eils to fo-rce the onemy tc abr,ndon An conn r olish Corps will be novod form:ird later on Eio:hth Armys rear Prmy ,:,astern axis to take Arcona from thP \'Jest. "CJ ITC aut' orizes Arm7 Cornnenders to te1(e extrAJ11e r5 :' 1 to secure the vital <s strHtegic p,.reas nentio-r-:ecl in paragraph 2 rbove before tLe enemy cPn reorg;:,nize or he reinforced . 11 * Hr1 r'.!E--,JU'1E 8, 10Mi---T>;f"rly tl,is rnorn~np; tho liaison o-"'ficer from Eig;hth Arny CHITtG in -;rith a personal nessPge Prom General Leese to Generrl Clrr1c, askinr rermission to use t}·e road Vall,erano-Viterbo-F,acborep-io. 'I'h1s request by the 'i;j r-ht:b Arr,y moPnt the virtur 1 stoppR ge of II Corrs sector upon relieving II Corps j n the~ r zone of action . Gen oral Cl&rk Is reply' yrh_j_c} is riuotod belorr' 0~ covers h:i:s answer to GenPral Leese's request. At Ofil,O General Clnrk, accompan:iec1 by Gen.r'rals Gruenther, Jo],nson, Hun1e Beucler, and Colo11el:; Rri tten And R;ran 'ryent to tho Vatic,"n where tlrn:r htd an i:n1die11ce w~th Pope nus XII. Gen?rel Clnr1r hac1 a :::;erarr>.te -!ntArview ,.,-jth the rope :f'irst and tren ~ntroduced tho ctrer menbers of }1is ye,rty to the Pope. D11r1np: his -interview with the Fop:, tl'e latter aslrnd Gereral Clr}.~lr to 3end a messar:e to }resident Roosevelt express::'.np: to Mn l is most sincere regard. :F'roll' the ,Ta ticnn Gener,, l Clarl' proceeded inl'lod:; ate ly tc h :is neF cor:imanc1 po st et the 'lilla SAvoia . 0 Shortly Pfter Ms nrrival here General .Alexander flnw ur frori Caserta to see General Clark:. He was accorir,::,ni0d by Generrl Robertson, his G-4. Gen"'ral Clark d:i scussed with Genernl Alexander the Eighth Army's request to use a road in II Corr,s sector r-md othsr ml:ljects leading to th9 fu:rtl~er offorn=:ive northward as well as natters concerrdni? llor:e. 0 At l/;,30 Gener8.l Ckrk had a fecorrtion cererrior1y Rt his new cor1r1end post. Du.ring- this decoration cerenony Genr,ral A1.exr,nder presented t} 0 Conf'l.Pnd of the B/'lth to Ge'1Prn ls Juin and Xey""s in t}ie nr->me of Eis r12.,jest;v Kj_ng George VI of Englc.nd. Ge:rnrnl C1Pr1, thi:m rreseYJ.ted two r,edals o'' ronor, one to Ifc. Knappenberger of tre 10th Infantry Regfr,ent Plnd Staff Sgt. Huff of the 50Qth Faracr,ute Bf'ltt::ilion. He also rresented Legion of r 1orits to Ge-re.rel Dod;r, General flrosset o.:nd Gensra.l Carrentier. Legion of nerj_ts were a1so rreeiented to Gene..,,..A.1s '1 r->rtin, Sulliv<>n rmd other officers and er,lj st0d men of tl 1 e :r1rt}1 Arny ::'taff. In ri ddi t ion., DSC I s, one DFC, one 3oldier' s :kldal r~nd enc Brcnze Star ,·,ero also presentod tc o:f'ficers and sold·ers of his comne.nd. The ceremony was q 1 dte i· 0pressive. A compos~te ?'oup of' two Al'lericr,n, one ' 1'rer1ch and one British plPtoon coriros"ld the revj_0v7~n~; troops. '·'rench, British and Jq.,,ericen .,...lPf;S were included· in th0 cclor vuerd, "nd all thTne national c1ntherm were 0 er 1 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, May 25-June 7, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from May 25-June 7, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1634 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/91daa1dc6425ec62f434935157c325f5.pdf?Expires=1787184000&Signature=mW87UfDofR%7EbKeO1URGYetNbsQvy894-muRZ1ORP8WW%7EgWeC4HzzM5yOdhCBTnsTftv8YMwuoXuF3kxLuTvfncDSbIqo7AQxDdG-xqSn4wCdZ4q1evMLIvJQ3L%7E6iDdw6JJKrVH%7EidyuiHHStdqlhXSHBk%7E1LoJzPDsqv68vokx5xmDZxJ4sGdAkq-8dkuD0QUxHtDCeExa4bw5cD8tvRPJPgqx5pydtNJT0ULgVOux2UvkZRRnvbp7gs8H9hoyMGLJCe43%7EqftHRegEStSvCnRogAdzgS3WWanERy9JObvN%7ElkM2PRrvDpb9Js28bLU5MUkHLods5VmfKz2Vz5Vrg__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 88feed208ede6fb0e32344327f77fcfe PDF Text Text :)) ,. 1,A. and thnt he does not consider that any other attacks will attain 1orthwhile results. He advised ne to concentrate on rlans for that atfock and said that if and when he ordered the attRck, he would give me ever;r support that I considered n"cessary. He also said trP,t he was most anxious to give me the '36th Division. I stated to General Alexander thAt my greatest concern was the timing of the attack ·"rom the bridgehead and the object to be accomplished; that is, vliether the object was to be accomplished with T'l"tms now existing in the bridgehead or wit}, the additional division. He informed me he had re/ _.,, served to him'1elf the decision as to tbe time of ln. 1 mching the attack from ~ the bririgehead. Since I believe there is P rossib~lity thrt the Sezze operation may be desirable, I nm continuing all out preparation for that operation. In view of' General Alexander's statement, I a,,, concentrating as first priority preparation for the Cisterna-Cori attack. }lease advic,e me if this meets your arproval. I rissune that you l'.re fully cognizant of General Alexander's ideas on this su"l:>ject but I want you to know whr-t '1.e has told me today. If you desire a.ny action on !'W part oth"r than ~ ndic<ited here, please ndvise me bl'lcause you lmow -thn.t I am with you all the way. 1 I I wnited until Alexander 1 s return and then had Gruenth~r call Lemnitzer. Lemnitzer stated that Alexander was calling Me t't nine o'clock. He did not phone so :r phoned Lennitzer 1md told 1 irn how cieepl;r I resented Alexander's issuing instructions to my subordinate com.~anrjers, particularly those which are in conflict with mine. Lemnitzer told me trat there was some justification in the radio which mruscott sent me. I then asked thAt he bring Alexander to tre phone. When Alexander came on tle phone I told him I ri.a.d received a radio from Truscott which thoroughly astounded me because Truscott repor-, ted thn t he had issu"d instructions to h:i m which were contrary to I'line, and Tru~cott, being confused, asked me for cJJ;i.rification. I told fllexander th:=it if 7ruscott 1 s report was correct I resented deeply his issuing any instructions to r,y ;:iubordinat'1s; that if h1'3 did not lik~ the manner in which I was carrying on the functio11s of the VI Co111s Ln should issue ariy orders to the contrary through me and thPt uncler no circ11r1stances would I tolerate his direct dealings· with suhord.:innt~s . It was rerfectly appn.rent that Alexander had a guilty conscience, and he assured m, thRt he had no intention of resc:indjng "lY order; thPt he thought we were in oonplete agreement and th,,t if, efter I talked rith ':'ruscott tomorrow, I ./"elt that there hrid been any underhanded dealings, I ms to tell him frankly o: my oonclusions - wlicl I ~ill do. This is a small matter, for it hn.ppens that my rlans for the l'ltta.ck from the heachhead and my views 1'1S to the v1ny thrt battle shoul<t be run coincide exactly with those of Alexanrler, but it is vell that I 1 t him know nm, as I have in the past, that h"! will deal directly witli me and never with a subordim:1 te, wl~ ~ c:r he is· so prone to do. I lmow factually thAt there are -:nterests brew:ing for the Eighth Army to take Ro"le, and I might as well let Alexa.nil.er know now thrt if he nttempts any thing o~ that kind he will have anothl'!r 1111-out battle on his hands; m1melt, with me. * * * SAN 1~RCO--T1AY 6, 1944--At 0900 General Clark had a small decoration ceremony \ I I I �'{ .,,,f,,::-·~ "'. .-'} ,• for two mer.,bers of his staff. He pinned th~ D::istinguished Service Eedal on General Brwn, his G-3 . This e.warcl was ver;t deserving 1,ecause General Brann carried a terrific load in planning the operations for the landing at Salerno and th1' subsequent crossing of the Volt1-irno. The next officer to be decorated was Colonel arker, Army Ghef"ical Warfare Officer who received the Legion of 1erit Hedal . Colonel Barker is to leave srortly for the United States to take over co:mmnd of the 1':dgewood Arsenal in New Jersey. After the ceremony General Clerk returned to his van and confer ·ed with Gene~al Gru~nth~r. He left tl:e command post Pt 1010 for Lago field. This was done in an L-5 cub and from Lago field e took off in a C-78 for the beachhead. He :irrived at ~rettuno field at 1145. Fe was rccomprnif"d hy Lt . Col. Drarer, his aide. Imr1~diately upon landing l't the .airport, General Clar}:: •rent to the VI Corps command post wh"'!re he oonferred and had luncr with General Truscott. A~ter lunch, accompanied by Colonel Hine and Colonel Draper, he visited the 1st British Di vision, oommPnded by Gener~l m~wkesworth •. _ He went over the division I s dispositions and pl ans for the next big attack. After . leaving tre 1st British Division , he proceeded to the 5th British Division where he had a similar conference with General Gregson-Ellis, Division Corunander . After leaving the command post of the 5th British Division, General ClArk, aceoripanied by General Gregson-Ellis, Colonel Hine and Colonel Draper, went up to the front lines and visited the co"'1Tl\and post o~ the 2nd Carneronians under the corunand of Colonel Graham. General Clark was very happy to Pleet Colonel GrahaM, for his father, General Graham, had served under General Clark during the Salerno landings. General Graham corunanded the 56th British Division during th:it or,eration . 1 After visiting the 2nd Cameronians, the party proceeded to the 2nd Inniskillings . Here he met Lt. Colonel Slene, Cor'7anding, Pnd discussed the situation immediatel;v confronting th is battalion. Vis1bility was poor, and there were very little inco!'ling shells during the visit . A.fter droT•ping off General Gregson-Ellis at the 5th British Division command post, General Clark, Colonels Hine and Draper, proceeded directly to the VI Corps oornmand post where they pick~d up General Truscott and proceeded to a demonstration area in tl:ie vicinity of the 1st Armored Division where they saw tank retrievers pull out tanlcs , that had b~en stalled and broken down in minefields. The tank retriever consists of a tank with a front cram" 1.'lb ich drops and hooks onto a cable in the rear of the stalled tank. ~he whole process takes very little time and quickly moves th~ tanks back rearward frori the minefield. The next part of the cemonstration was what is knovm as the "snake" . A tank pushes forward whn.t looks like a huge boa constrictor . It is really a long segmented piec~ of metal tubing bolted in the center with each side capable of rr-icking 'l.'IJT. A guide runner is out in front of this linked metal tubinr, so tht>t it follows the terrain quite readily as the .trnk rushes it forward . The snake is 100 feet long. One the tank has plrced it in the minefield, it detonf!tes tte snake by firing one of its machine guns into a target detonator in the rear end of the snake. The last 20 feet of the snake :is lor-iiled with sand so thAt no harm is done to tre tank. As soon as the snake is detonl'lted H destroys all mjn"s .<as deep as 5 feet e.nd clears a pat}, wide enough f'or a tflnk to go tlirougr. Follow up tanks witJ:, additional srwkes pusr. through lllltil eventU81ly a gar has been made through the entire minefield . ... After witrn ssin~ tr is demonstration, Generals CJ.e.rk and Truscott left to �53 visit the evacuation hospitals. They visited the 11th, 94th, 15th and 38th. All commanding officers of these hospitals 1mow General Cl1cr1<- and received him enthusiastically. General Clark went through tr,e battle casualty wards and talked with each man that was physically able to talk. They all seemed cheerful, and it was appArent that they got a big kick out of talking to the Army Commander. The G"neral a(ldressed all of these men in a very f'riendly and infernal marmer, wiflhing them all good luck and saying thl"t our hospitals were rivinv them the best ana thPt they would soon be well. After visiting the hospitals, GenerPl Clerk returned to the Fifth Army Advance Command Post between Anzio and Nettuno, }:md a before-supper drink with the members of his staff there, l1ad supper and retired erirly. General Gruenther dispatched the following cable to General Clm-k today: RN ~804. "Operation order received this afternoon from AAI gives Fifth Army mission for main Pront PS previously known. For bridgehead it prescribed attack on general axis Cori-VPlrnontone to cut hj ghway #6 in Valnontone area.• No alternative direction is innicated. Attack from bridgehePd ~~11 be ready to be launched on ?4 hours' notice flt Pny time from D plus 4 day inclusive. 36th Division to be comriited only o.f'ter reference to AAI. 11 * * * SAN MARCO--M.(1.Y 7, 1944--General Clark nrose early flt 0615. The night was At 0700, accompanied by Colonel Draper, General Clark went to have hreakfast with Colonel Marvin, Comma.nding Officer of the 540th Combn.t ~ngineer Regimcmt which maintains and runs the port for 1mloading the Liberty ships. After breakfast General Clark •inspected the port installritions. The rort personnel }-,ave done an excellent job in unloading supplies by dukws and laniling craft frow the Liberty ships in the harbor, and they have done this type of work uncer most adverse conditions, including weather, hostile shellings n.nd bombings. After inspecting the rort, General Clerk then met General Truscott at the VI Corps command post nnd proceeded directly to the 3rd Division. This division is now in a rest area, and General Clark made a general ::nspection of a battalion ) bivouac aree. Her: he saw several m~del tents for enlisted rie~ ~rhich <:'m'listed of a pup tent dug in to the grouno with only the top part sh owing. This gtwe the men protection from hostile shelling vn1ile they slept. After going through the battalion bivouac area., General Clark discussed with General 0 1 Daniel his plans for the next attack. He discussed the BUFFALO and GRASSHOPP'i.ll plans. The BUFFALO plan is the one vmich AAI hi=1s directed to be worked on in oonjunction wit!-· the attt>.ck on the mm n battl~front. Thi.s calls for an all-out drive toward the direction of CISTFRNA. ':'he GRASSPOPfffi plr->ne is an alter·nate plc'ln which attacks in a direction to the left of the B lFFALO plan. V rather quiet +>or the bea.cbhead with very f~w incomjng shells. General Clark then left with Generals Truscott and 0 1 Daniel to go to a demonstration area where he sav tl'e brttle sleds that' the 3rd Division will use during the next attack. The br1.ttle sled consists of what looks like ordfoary hot water boilers cut in half, linked one behind the other and placed in d0uble rows. There- P.r~ l? sleds, 6 on each side, which are hooked on to the back of a tank. The r..an lies prone on the sled with a small amount o+> armor protection in front, P .nd as the tank now•s forward it pulls a oomplete infPntry squ11.d behind �SY it . When viewed from the distance, the s1eds 11re scarcely noticeable , e spe cially as they go through any grass , at all. By tr is means , men cfln quickly follow up and hold terrain features which have been t11ken ½y tnnks . The next part of the c" emonstration sh owed what was known 2 s a "mangle buggy" . This was what looked like en old farr, bayrack ay,.le vtith a jeep motor on it and a trail gurrd in bac:k-. This arrangement towed in rear of it a long strip of primer cord, and as the clriverleu~ contraption went over bnrbed wire it towed the primer cord tail. The ~.§:.i~ cord is detonated, thereby leaving a space for infantrymen to go through . It would ro.ve some e~fect on anti-personnel mines , in addition to clea,ring a rassage through barbed wire . j After tbis demonstr[ition , Generals Cl£ rk and Truscott and Colonels Hine and Draper left for the command rost of th~ Special Service Force . There they met General Fredericks, his staff and regim~mtal cornrrmnders . General Clark talked to them informally for about 10 minutes :md left immediately for the 34t h Division . Gen~ral Ryder was in Sorrento for a rest, so General CJ.ark discussed dispositions anr rlans for the next attack with Colonel Sherman, the Assistant Divis i onal Commander . While there he also met General Tate , the new Division:11 Artillery O""ficer , who flew back from the Stl.'l.tes vrith him. He also met Colonel Boatner and Colonel Childers , regimental commanders . From the 34th Division the party proceeded to the 45th Division. Here General ~ruscott left , and Gener~l Clark tal~ed for quite a period of time with General Eagles , the Division Commander . The tt>lk concerned principally the replacem~nt a s Division Artillery Commander , ,romotions, Legion of Merit cases and pl ans for the next offensive action. Toward the end of the visit , General raschal , Assistant Division Cornnander, brought in the three regimental commanders ; Colonels Dul:mey, ·iy~rs and Church . Af'ter talking informally with the regimental commanders , General Cl8rk left for the 1st Armored Division where he had lunch with General Harmon . He tnlked briefly with General Harmon concernjng the next attack. Genern.l Clark witnessed demonstrations of three types of treadway brir1 ges to be r l eced e cross sl'l'all streams or dry creek beds . The first one was improvised by tlie division engineers and consisted of a tank with a crane on tl e front holding the bridge and rlacing it where desired . The next was the reeular issued type of treadway bridge with a trnck and crr-ne . The difference between these tv 10 "IRS trPt tl1 e one w:itr t}-,1') truck left the operating personnel much more exposed , not having the rrmor r,rotection of tre tank. rrihe third was th\"! :'loat tYJ'.'e on rubber rontoons . The nl'lxt ff! rt of the demonstretion consisted of a 60mm mortar firing a h~rroon into a minefield . This harpoon carr~ed in jts flight through the air 3 rrimer cord rope which , when it fell to the grolmd aril was ignited, quickly cleP~ed bot}, tne grass and vegetation and , in addition, any anti- personnel minl'ls . lhe rath thus creeted was strv.ight anc1 went for a a: stence of Pbout 5r, feet . In tl'is way, by firi.ng successive harpoon prirn"'r cord snakes , a treil for single columns of' nen to go tl rough r,inefil'!lds A.nd high vegetation v1as quickly mPde . Next t},e General saw tanks fitted wit11 growsers whicl gave the tank 1J1ore :"lotation and grip over difficult tl'lrrain . From t l'lre he -nroceeded to a tBnk rrrich mounted an 81mm r ortar and fired out a lanced harpoon, taking w:t', it tbrougr tl,e air .a cA~le wMch W8S quickl:r relt'l8sed from sprockets on t;he front rart of tre tenJr . 1 he idea of t}1-ts was th.,,t the cable would lodge itself in bn.rbed wire ; and by the tank movinr, to the rear it could easily dreg wi+,h it the bnrbed wire a11d clear a place for cttac1r· rg troops to pass through. In acdition to tris ,,,ortar 0 1 0 �harpoon method of pullinr: out b2r~ed wire, ther~ was Anotr:r t~nk rigg~d v.rit~ a three-prong~d anchor tyyc hook. 1 he tan1· n~gotrntes the vnre 1.tself, arops l,he look over tre barbed wire and tren turns around a"'ld comes forwarc , pulling along wit it the barbed wire remaining on the ground . I General Clerk ie~t the demon;tration and proceed~d immediately to VI Corps to a decoration ceremony. He r resented four Dj stingi1:l shed Service Crosses to three of'ficers and one e,,:!..:sted man : Captain \'Tilson of the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment , 1st Lt . Hodgdon of the 15th Infantry R~girient, Capt . Kimball of the 135th ~n~antry Regiment am Sgt . Broriley of the 133rd Infantry Regiment . He prese!ltod letters whicl. he had brought bacl< from the Stetes personally to Major Austin of the 645th TD Battalion, Lt . Kile of the 69th Field Artillery Battalion and Captain Ballantine of the 33rd Field rospital . He talked briefly with these offfoers saying th t he was glad to have had the opportunity to bring t} em letters from their families . 0 A:.'ter the e1ecoration cereno:"lJl, the '!,and t'lryed t½e Jrd Dj vision song ,;rhj ch has a very catchy tune. General Clark, accomranied by Gener~l mruscott rnd Colonel Draper left immediately for t11.e 'Jettuno airfield wher~ General Clark and Colonel Draper took off in a C-78 . At the airport also wer"'! Generr>1s Br11.dshPw , Sullivan and Bowman, who also flev1 back to Lago fi~lcl. An additional C-78 was sent· to the 'fottuno airfield. for this purpose . After landing et Lago field , General Clark v,ent directly to his villa at Hondragone and relaxed on the beach after a very diffic,1lt two days at the beachhead . He invited some of his staff to supper, and a::ter supper they returned to th~ command post wbere General Clark \·:orked on some adJ"'inistrative papt'rs end retired . General Clark today received the following letter fro~ General Truscott: 11 1. I am prepared to do the BUFFALO Operation under conc'i.tions now existing on the ·1eacl head on 7 days notice . 0 ,g . r1.ans have been drawn and preparntioris are noV' under Y!ay. Upon comrletion o" these prep~rritory steps everytring virill be set ur and reac'y to go except for tbose things that can be accompl5 shed only j_r, the l1:1st L,8 hours pri.or to D day. 11 2 . When present work has been finished I will be prf"pared to lPunch not only BFFFALO but P,ither GRASSHOFPER or Tlffi'rLE within 48 rours . However , if definite preparatory cornmittment js made to either G.B.ASSHOPF:::R or BUFFALO and I am required to launch TUR,.,,LE I will need 72 hours in which to Make the necessary shift and launch the attack. 11 3 . I do not consider trat any operation :now envisaged will product worthwhile results with the troops now under my cormand agE> inst t1 e enemy ros; tion as I know it and in which I expect no chringe prior to D day. 4. I feel thr,t I must have at least one additional InfPntry Di vision and that that Division or Divjsions must beein rnoverient to tl--is erea "TitMn the next two days . 11 11 5. In undertaking the preliminary work outlined aoove Pnd tabulA.ted in ~ , �the attached, it is to be pointed out th2t secrecy is sacrificed! or. at least jeopardized. In addition, artillery coverage of t~e.Beachhead_l~ne is gravely jeopardized if artillery is noved from p~esen~ position to pos1t1.0~s for t~e attack and then remains therein necessarily silent, for a long period of time awaiting announcenent of D day. 11 * SAN MA.RCO--N!AY e, J...- * * 1944--General ClRrk worked on administrative matters and conferred with GenerAls Gruenthe,r and Brann prjor to leaving by cub for Caserta for a co'1.ference with General Alexander,. CDJC, AAI. Details of the conference are covered in General Cui.rk I s notes for the day. He returned frori. AAI at 1045 and went back to his van where he received Gemer21 Larkin, Supply Officer for SOS at Oran, and General Stewart in charge of shipping in the Mediterranean area. He lunched nt 1230 and depa.rted by cub for F.ighth Army TAC field for inspection of Fifth Army artillery units. He was accompanied by General Lewis, A.rtillery Officer, and Colonel Draper. General Clark's jeep met him at Eighth Army TAC field, and the party proceeded to the 194th Group command post at San Vittore wbere they were met by Colonel Banks, 13th Field Artillery Brigade Commander, and Colonel Cook, 194th Group Commander. He inspected the command post and talked with Colonel BPnks with reference to a replacement as Division Artillery Commander of the 45th Division. He explained to Colonel Banks that he had several officers in mind, two of whom were Colonel Cook and Colonel Meyer. He wished to see Colonel Meyer at the 17th Field Artillery Group oommand post later on. He also told Colonel Banks that he had submitted his name to NATOUSA for promotion to Brigadier General and that NATOUSA had approved it. In d.i.scussine with Colonel Banks the 194th Field Artillery Group's participation in trie next attack the latter confirmed that after the pre-arranged fires for the Eighth Army, mostly counter battery, .had been completed at H hour, the group wouid honor only those requests for fire that had been cleared through the French Corps with one exception. One battalion of 155 g1ms would answer calls for fire direct from Eighth Army providing they were not firing for the French at that time. The Eighth Army has more artillery than it had a week ago and is even in ,a better position to fire. contingent missions for the Fifth Army. From the 194th Group command post, Colonels Banks and Cook accompAnied the pa.rty to the 698th Field .A rtillery Battalion oommand post. This is a 240 howitzer battalion and is commanded by Lt. Col. Clifton. lf'hile at the command post the battalion fired a counter battery mission requested by Eighth Anny. General Cfark found this very interesting and had the map location of the target pointed out to him.· Upon leaving the 698th command post, he met three AMG officers who were in San Vittore arranging civil affairs natters and looking into the possibility ·of opening the schools. This to~m is still subjected to enemy artillery fire . The General inspected a 240 howitzer gun position on his way to the 633rd Field Artillery Bc'l.ttalion oommandeo by Lt. Col. Halliday. Upon arrival he inspected the command . post and chatted with enlisted personnel present and shook hands with them all. ..._,I From tbis comma...11d post he went to a 155. gun position which was just about �to fire a mission. GenerPl Clark stnyed while the mission was fired. He talked to the gun crew and told them that they would chanee positions soon because the attack was going forward. From this gun position the pl'lrty proceeded over a long, dusty, tortuous road to the 17th Field Artillery Group oommand post. He was r.et by Colonel Meyer who had a small honor guard w},ich was presented to General Clnrk. He went up to Colonel Meyer's oomr,and· post and discussed with him his dispositions in preparation for the attack. He also told him that he had selected him to becone Artillery Officer for the L;.5th Division; thet hP could make plans to go there soon and trike with him one additionEil j1mior o-f'ficer who could become his ajde vihen he received his star. From the 17th Field Artillery Group the ra.rty rroc eeded to the 17tr Field Artillery Battalion, stopping enroute to see a 155 howitzer brttery of the 933rd Field Artillery Brttalion. At the 17th Field Artillery Battalion, Gene- · ral Clerk walked to a battery position, passing through the battalion area which, at the time, was busy vdth cannoneers getting their supper. Having inspected the battery position, the party then rroceeded to the 13th Field Artillery Brigade command post at Sipiciano. There General ClPrk was presented to the staff and enlisted men of tr,e Br:igHde cor1 man0 r,ost. He insrected the fire direction center and counter battery section and the command post proper. The coruna.nd post is in a building which has an excellent view of the major terrPin features on the brttlefront. From there he left Colonel Banks and, accompflnied by Genercl Vmis and Colonel Draper, proceeded back to the Fifth Arrn;:r command. rost, Prri ving there at 1800. General Cl::i.rk dusted himself of'f nnd received William Randolph Hearst, Jr., a war correspondent now in Italy. Mr. Hearst was accomp1mied by Colonel Clark, Fublic Relations Officer. Generril Clark dis cussed with him Ms recent visits to all Fifth Arny troops and of his beach installation rit Morrlraf;one whic'r is available to Headquarters officers of the Fifth Army. He also tnlked about the l"lnlisted men's beach at Bagni ninerali. Fe told Mr. Hearst that he could come to his :rress conference whicr he was holding the next day at 1600 for war correspondents attached to the Fifth Army. He stated that t},is was an (ff\ off-the-record talk and that he was going to explain to them the forthooming ~ attack. 'l.r. Hearst and Colonel Clark were jnvited to supper where conversRtions cnntjnu~d concernjng Fifth Army activities. '-l. ~ ;; l ' ~ 0 \JJ'\ After supper Generfll Clm' 1r conferred brj efly with General Gruenther and worked_ on administrative J"'1attt'lrs 1mtil he r~tired at ?200 hours. "',J>I c,._V ~ V,.P I' \I"~ \\! ' fr,( eneral Clark dictated the following notes for inclusion in his diery, "As a result of riy vi sit to the /\nzio benchhead for two days I learned rom General r•ruscott that General Alexander had conveyed to the fact t~at he was to run directly the VI Corps attack; thrt J~e would reinforce it with anyth:ing Truscott wanted and would set tre tjr,e and cH r ction of Pttack And the troops involved. He also conveyed to Truscott the fr'ct that the instructions I had issued for alt errn:i. te 2 ttacks were not in accordance w.; th his h~r/ 0 �53 . ' '),t '~1,, ~ ;.,(t·t"~ • ,;' ,,,.!!"':·~·1"Jli'.'-~ . . . desires and that there v,as only one .<1.ttack envisaged tma.rd Cori-Valrwntone; that to preprtre other alternate plans tovmrd Sezze and to the north along the l\.lbano-Anzio road was sheer waste of time. In other v'ords, General Alexander, before a civilian mP-mb<;r of rarliament, and to General Truscott, with General Lernnitzer present, embarrassed m~ by in~icating thRt he was not in accord with the instructions I hBd issued. "Upon my return I asked to see Alexander and had a conference with him this morning. I told him he h,id embarrassed me. He replied that h0 h8.d no intention to do so :md was surrrised that Truscott +'elt thP-t he hP.d countermanded my instructions. ''I told Alexander that, pursuant to his latest instructions to attack on 24 hours' notice, we could not do so - 1,,g hours vms the rnnirmm. I also told him thPt if we complied w5t'r his D plus 4 att8ck orders from the beacl1 heAd, tl e '36th Di vision would rn vc to move tomorrov,. 11 Alexander immed:i.Btely jumped to tre conclusion thPt I ,vrs 11ot all out for the attack; t},nt I did not e,rprove of his plans. I assured him tru1t the Fi~th Army attack would )('!) as aggressive as any rlan or ~ttrck he had ever been in or read of. "I told Alexa11der that I wanted to Rttack out of the beachheRd with every- \ thing I ha0; thPt if conditions v1 ere rigl t I wanted to attack towards Cori but , I that what I was guarding agriinst vras pre-conceived ideas as to wh..,t exnctly was to be donP. and thPt ri1e felt tht1t he Rnd Hl:i.rdine hrd such pre-conceived ideas. I told him that I thought there was ri crnnce for a great victory if l i we played our cnrc1 s right and did not attack rrem!"turely. He kept pulling on me the idea that "Ve were to annihilate the entire G8rmrm Army and did it so many times thflt I told hi.m that I did not bel:ieve tlrn.t we hnd too many clwnces f '" f to do that; thA.t the Boche WA s too snart. He HgP j n seized the orport, ni ty to .~. J accuse the Americans of lack of aggressiveness. T vras c'i sgusted vnd disap\J pointed with my conference. He has a pre-conceived idea to do something to v" avoid criticism at borne. This was brought out in the conference. I told Mm thr>t inasrnucr as the attac}· was to be Pll-Americnn I would strongly recoml:"end /\ thPt we sit t:i eht, maintain our +"lexibility and under no conditions should we § permit the main attack to be stalled and tr.en try to save our face by a rremature attack out of t}le beachhead. I told },im that I had d:irected Truscott to give first rrfori.ty to tre Corj attack but th, t he would contj nue plans for the attac · t0 tre west of Colli Laziali. I wanted to have rbns rr8pared to meet any eve11tuFility, keeping ny m·nd free of Finy d0finite cc•mnitment before tl~e battle started. JI I I fI "I em thoroughly d~sgusted with him and w:itr h.; s Pttitude but hnve tre satisfaction of knowing th11t I told him exactly the fFi cts as I see then. 11 * * * SAN HMCO--MAY 9, 1944--General Clark started the day by working on administrative matters. Due to pressing duties at t!-ie col"IIJland rest he decided not to visit troops under bis commnnd tocl ay. He received a classlTfl te of his, Colonel Wooley, Signal Officer of Sewmth Army who dropped in to say hello. Shortly �after Colonel Wooley left, Gen rals Gruenther and Brann conferred with General Clark brfofly concerning ma.tters wrich were discussed between General Gruenther and General Harding, Chief of Staff to GenerRl Alexander, the CINC, AAI. General Harding came to see General Gruenthcr with reference to GenerRls Clark and Alexander's talks the day bef'ore ruid to button up staff rrocedures concerned with decisions of their talk. Shortly after this conference, GenerPl Clc.,rk stepped ont of his van and -rinned ?nd Lieutennnt bA.rs on t •,o Air OP sergeant pilots, Sergeants Holle and Bergf'lan. General Lewis Rnd his r,rtillery section were rresent, and all congratulated the two new 2nd Lieutenants after this ~nformal ceremony. Shortly after this General Clark conferred with Colonel Gray, his Fifth Army Judge t dvocate, who rresented 26 court ma.rt:ial ca.ses to General Clark. This ~cessive backlog of cases has built up due to General Clerk's visits to his troops prior to the attack. He just didn't have time to fit in everything. After Colonel Gray left, General Clark ~orked on decoration cases which also have accumulated in the aides' office. After lunch General Clark received General Saville, XII Air Support Command Gomnander, and conferred with him brjefly concerning close support air miss:ions to be given durinq; the attack. General Clark desired to assure himself that General Saville hrid :ironed out any rnisunderstr>nding and had coordinated his air efforts. He then vrorked on adrlinistrnti ve matters and, in addition, his talk to war correspondents which would take place at 1600. Details of this conference follow: General Clark entered the hut at 1555 and the conference strirted. 31 correspondents had already arrived and were seated. General Clark opened the meeting by stating that in the forthcoming operaHons the beachhead forces would not be irn,ediately involved. He stated that he wished the rress to be familiar with all plans and to have a complete understanding of the objectives of the operation. He emphasized that no quotations would be permitted, r,nd the information to he disclosed was secret. The General pointed out that the Eighth Anny is now concentrated in the Cassino area. The Fifth Army is concentrrted along the GariP,liano. Courses of action open to the Allied planners are: (1) to attack from the bet1.chhead (2) to attack :'rom the ~io:hth Army area first and follow up by an attack from the Fifth Arf",y area later. Both Army Commanders, however, agreed that this should be an all-out simultr>neous P.ttack of both armies along the entire front. General Clnrk emphasized tha.t the situation on the beachhead vras excellent. The morale o+> the troops is hif'ti, and all Pre eagerly awaiting coming operations. He furthP-r stated thl'lt the supply situ1>tion in t1 is sector is in very good shape. The General outlined the enemy order of battle, stating thPt there were 23 German divisions available in Italy and furthP-r rointed out "'here these divisions are now located. The General asserted that his discussions wj th General Leese and the Eighth �1"''-'' 1' • Army staff were most cordial. on details of the operation. ~~~(fl~:-,,~ ... ~-" , , < " ' '1'"" The two Army Commanders are in complete accord In the French Corps 4 French Divisions · are available. In II Corps 2 divisions are available, the 85th and 88th. The 36th Division is in reserve, but the General pointed out that this division is r.. ctm1.~ly in MI reserve and May not be comri.itted without the autl ority of GenerPl Alexander after consultation with him. 1 4 Divisions are available to Eighth Army :in 13 Corps plus 2 divisions in Polish Corps and 2 Canadian Divisions in reserve. The immediate objective of / French -Sxy,editionary Corps is the capture of Mount Majo feature; the first objective of II Corps is Haunt DaJ11iano. The General st11ted that while each corps has sub-divided the operation into tl-.ree phflses, the units are instruct- ( ed that immediately upon aqcomplishing the first phc~se of the mission they 11re to immediately rroceed with tri~ second ~.nd third pl ases of their mission regardless of vh~ther or not flanking units have reached th~ir objecti'les. The 1 Fifth Army, it ~ s planned, will rove un the Ausonia Valley to D1 0ro, Pico and Itri. On the beachhead we have six divisions, including one armored. Here there are three possible axes of attack: (1) North +,oward Rome (2) soutrieast (3) northeast in the direction of Cori-V~lmontone to cut Route #6. Of these courses General Clark prefers the third. He emphasized that the bridgehead attack must depend on operations on tre main rant. Soon after operotions comnence the coITll'.'land echelon of the Fifth Army will be transferred to the beachhead '1h",r it lrunches its attack about 15 Hay. General Gruenther will rennin here Ls GenerRl Clark's Deputy. G~neral CJFrk ras prepRred a letter to all troqs in the F:ifth Arny to be released immedietely be~ore operations get under way. General Clark stflted. · hat we are in eYcellent shape with respect to Army artillery witr 240mm ho vitzers and 155mm rifles [lnd 8 11 howitzers. He also emphasized that we are in an excellent position Yrith rl'lspect to our reserves; i.e., we will be in a position to employ them amphibiously if this course proves to be best at any point along the main front. The Army Cornriander disclos~d to the press his recent visit to the United States and stated that he had an excelle"lt opportunity to discuss with the Fresident, with GenerDl ·!arshall and vTitr various members of Congress, all phases of the Italian operation. After General Clark had concluded tis expos:ition of the plan, severnl questions were asked by the correspondents. The conference ended at 1700. After the war correspondents had departed, Gerteral Clark worked on more administrative matters and correspondence and received na,ior Duncan Sandys, Under Secretary of Surply for British Ground Forces, and Colonel Post, one of his T-lr:i tish Army representatives. He had invited -~hese two Britishers for supper. Friar to supper, Genernl Gruenther, Colonel Galtz!l18n, Colonel ✓ Draper and Captain Lampson were present with General Clnrk and his 'Jrit ish �Col guests for a before-dinner drink. Generals Clerk and Gruenther talked ¥'ith Major Sandys concern:ing the big and over-all picture of British supply. In addition, other small, -informal talks centered around vrrious other subjects from the 3rjtish viewpoint; such as, women workers in war factories, women ATS and the British lik.'"l.npower problem. After supper had finished and his dinner guests depPrted for CE'serta, Gener~l Clr,.rk visited wrious staff sections in his command post, returned to his van and retired. * * * SAN MARCo--r:AY 10, 1944--General CL<>rk worked on important dispntches from the time le a.rose until he hf!d Generals Gruenther and Brann in his van for a short conference. The C-in-C, Gener~l Alexanr1er, was to arrive at the command post at 1030, and there were last-minute details thrt Generf'l Clrrk wanted to discuss with •his staff concerning the attack before he talked to Genernl Alexander. General Alexander arrived at 1045 a,nd talked briefly with General Clark before leav1'1g to inspect Fifth Army units. Gener8 l Clark accoMpanj_ed General l le:xander in his cpr to the French Corps. They arrived there at A ,hout 11 o I clock and were net by General Juin tmd the usual p-uard of honor. mhey went up to Genern 1 Juin I s office where they djscussed briefly Frencr Corps' partjcipation in the Attack tomorrow. General ,Tuin gave ti brief surnmnry of his rart in the operation. A small point arose which caused some discussion. General Juin had heard that General Ke;res '"las moving :in sore tanks from the &m Lorenzo nrea tonight. This would, of course, obviously be against security and tre cover plan. After consulting with General Keyes, Generrl Clnrk found th,:it they were movipg in some tank destroyers, wrich were rract1CAlly t\-ie same AS tanks, and he requested General Keyes to call it off. From l<'rencl> Expeditionr>ry Corrs the two GenerPls went imTiediately to II C9rps. General Kt"yeS rresented General Alexander to all members of his staff. This took r.;bout 20 minutes, as Gl'mcral Alexander shook hPncts with eacr of them and questioned them briefly concernjng their function :in the comman<l rost. Immediately from II Corrs Gen~rals Clt1rk and Alexander left for the e5th Division and after thrit for the 88th. At both divisions General Alexan<ler met merely the ~enernl staff officers 1:1nd discussed briefly witl1 each di vision commander his operAtiom11 plan for the attRck tomorrow • . Generals Clrrk and Alexander arrived rit the Fifth Army command post At about 1330 where they had lunch and cont:inued discussing briefly and inforr.ially activities of tre troops on the Rttacking front. After General Alexnnder left, Generl'll Clrirk work~d 011 snr1e importn,nt dispatches and also on some decoration cases. He left nt 1500 by L-5, acCol'lpanied by Colonel Draper, for IV Corps. He vrns met Ht IV Corps cub field by General Crittenberger vrho took h:im il'lmedfately to the comJMnd rost r>t Pozzuoli. After conferring briefly with General Crittenberger, General Clark met the entire staff of IV Corps. He tRlked to them briefly but quite significRntly. He reminisced thrt a year ar;o tJ, is Mrne his Fifth Army str>ff hnd �not entered combat. They had worked on many plans and were impPtient to g t into battle. Finally the chance came on the Saforno landing, and they became indoctrinated fast. He assured IV Corps that it would not be far off before they would f1mction as a staff in combat and not to lose heart because they were in a rear area and just working on plans. After his tnllc, Genernl Clarv i.nsrected the command post proper, going through all of the G sections, AG, Engineer and company Preas. Fe returned to General Crittenberger 1 s tent wht'!re he wrs served a refreshlng drink. Present were: G"neral Crittenberger; Colont"'l Harrison, G-.3; Colonel Sims, G-1; Colonel Gillette, Engineer Officer; Colonel Nance and Colonel Draper. This little gathering brought forth manY interesting points, and GeneralCL"lrk corimented thPt it was now practically the twilight before the battle and that naturally he was anxious for it to start; thr-t he was sure it was to go, but he wasn't too optimistic ~hout the Boche not standin~ up to fight. He felt certain that they would do so; thot Here wasn't any indication of any withdrt1wal at ·rresent. He stated thrit it was his prime desire to vindicPte the beachhead, Pnd if it vms the last thing he did, he would do it. After this informel conference, Generr->l Clark left imriedi, tely for MondraP.'one where he, Colonel Draper and the tviJO r,ilots went in for rin evening dip. The water vms col<l but refresM_ng and rTde everyone feel very alive. The Genernl returned to the com~and post rit 1845 ~nd met his dinner guests whom he took into his win. They were: Generals ~•oran, Tate and Brann. A-"'ter supr,er they tnlklll<l informally ;Jut side, walkinP' l~isurel;r riround t,he command post. General Clt1rk ret:ired early t1fter a rather strenuous day. General Clark rec11ii ved the followinP, cable from General Freyberg, Commandin~ the 2nd }Tew Zealand Division: RK C/1?66. 11 0n eve such important bA.ttle we of 2nd New Zealand Division send our best wishes to your Army in which we were privileged to serve." * * * 1 YlRC0--~1AY 11, 1Q44--Genernl Chirk worked on rilitnry disratches until 0900 when he l("Jft +-or the 16th Division cub field accom:rrinied by c~ptain Lampson. He arrtv"'d there in 2bout tw"!nt:v n-lnutes 11.nrl W:"lS tr1cen over to tr e ceremonial <"i.eld wrere ab0ut 1,000 r1~n of tl'e 16th Division were in :r-iass formation facing General Clark. In front of the mass -l'orl""f1tion were the decorees. General Clark rresented thf'? 1isti:ripnished Service rnedal to Genernl .. alker, three Dist"inguished Service Crosses and twenty one Silv"'r Sbi.rs. He ar'ldressed the troops and decorees br:i,-fly and prnised Ge111'\ra1 Walker 1 s efforts as Division Co:rimander for t,},e pnst two yenrs. A.ftl'!r the decorations h;d been awarded the decorees rlaced tl~emselves to the right "lank of Gen.-ra.l Clar}·:, and the troops passed in review. Af'ter the last p:roup rad p1ssed in review, General ClPrk left imrn"!diately to tr.e cub fi.-ld where e took off' for CPpo--lichino airport and arrfved there at about 1015. He was guided to the 509th I 2rachute Battalion 1 s ce:ceT'!onial fielrl where +,h~ entire battalion was :ined up in r'iass formation in front of hiM. The decor.,.es :vere rlaced in f'ro"l-1:. of tt,e battalion, rind prj or to the a rarding of the decora.tio-1s, Gl'lneral '.Jh1rl<: sroke warmf.y of the battalion 1 s ,fforts in battle and rraised tr""n for their exrloHs. He then awarded tre decor2tions, af'ter wl ich the decorMs p1£ced tremselves on the le ..t o-"' Gent"'ral ClP.rk, Pnd tr e bt-,ttalion nt1ss.e d in review. He awarded five SAN �Dist3nguished 3ervice Crosses, five Bronze Stars. O'Yl_. Legion of Perit, twelve 3ilvl"r Stars and Il'!lmediatl'lly after tl e ceremony G"'"'l'''ral Cl"1rk and Captain Lampson returned to Capodichino, from vr.icb point -1;,hev flew bRck to the Army command post., arriving fit 111+5. Gl'lner, 1 Clark went to his van ['ncl confl'lrred with Genl'?ral Gruenther. At 1'345 Gen~ral Jevers nrrived ot the cor-!'J.a:•1.d · post, nccompanied by hls pilot-aide, Lt. Col. ;rormel . Gen~rals Clnrk and Devers conf1"'rred in the confl"rence hut f'or ~bout half an flour rmd then had l1mch together. At lunch G~neral Devers iscussed th~ r1P..npower shortr ge in the United Stntes nncl stated that as :.'ar as his administrative functions were concernl'ld, in the Mediterranean Theater he was going to adhere strictly to Vlar Depirtment requirements and inactivate provisional units. If the nl'led required, they would be reactivated not as provisional 1.mits but as T/O orgF1nizations, and other units would have to be de-activnted to tak~ care of th,.. new act::vation. General Devers also stated th:_-,t re h8d tal 1i::ed to G y, Jral V7ilson, who had just returned from England, and he said that Ge11:eral ~: se>1hower was very optfristic concerning OVF:P.LORD; that he thought it would definitely go and th.Pt we would have a complete victory. Genernl Dev,..rs -1-1- en discussed the rossibilHies of Operation ANVIL taking place and went ~nto some of the rari~icctions of ~he French political and military oorunand in !fortP Africa. Initially they would not ~llo 1 a French Army during the initial stas:;es of the operation, but eventually, for the rayoff, a M'rench Army Co!"mander would 11e in romM~nd of fa o French Corps. The .\rny Co,'!mnnder might be Gen,..ral DeL..,tte. In all probability Gen~ral Juin culd not be chosen because he was not in very ~ood :avor with General DeGnulle, due to his :l nitial stanrJ on the landint: operations in :rorth Africa in 194?. The conversation then centerJd Around the n.ttack tris evenjng. After luncr Gemeral Devers lf".!ft "'or II Corrs, and GenerA.l ClPrY returned to his vim whl'lre he worked on r,ore rilitr>ry fjsrrtches. The rest of tre afternoon General Clark ,rorked ir. Lis va.11. ar d confer:ced with }l"'neral Gruenth"'lr. For dinn r gu..,sts the General entertflin'°'d Major Knjp-ht ~..,a Lt. Col. iorter. Aft..,r dinner GenerPl CL<irk wor}-..,d on ad,.,,~nistrn.tive nf1tters Pnd left 11t 1000 for French Corps where :he vif',wed fror. the observation tower in the castle at the French Corps comman"l. post t're beginnings of tre great offMsive to he launched against German positions along the Pront . Ee return..,d at nbout idnight nnd retired. General Clark cabled ~"-'""ral Leese today as follows: RTI 7523. "Best·wishes fror. FFtl, Arr'ly ror complete success in the COT'linr, operation. I an. deerly grat"'ful to you f'or wholehearted ccoperatio:'.1. in planning rhase. 11 General Leese resronded as follows: R:J 794. 11 Greatly aJ precit>te your kind message. It ras been a great plea.sure to work w:i .L}1 you throughout, ~nd we very mucr. apprecfate the concessions you al"d General Juin made to concert tirdng. We all in Eighth Army send your Fi.f'tr Arri.y 0 1Jr cordir•l eood wishes and look confidently forwal"d to advw cing shoulder to sl1 oulder together . 11 ', ��\/1;-POfi"-. fa;:;. Ii f~a.__ ~ / ' ~ l °"'.;;.-. sA1~r1A.Y l? , 1944--Tre British Eigrth and the AIT'"lrican Fifth Armies , ) lamched treir hi~ offensive at 1100 hours last evening . General Cln.rk arose early this morninr, to receive rerorts concerninr· rrogress rnerle . The French Corps inade some rcr-o~ress durinrr thl'l nigbt rind increased its rositions towa.,,..r1 tbe west somewi1at . i~ount Fa-:to was tRl,.en ancl h!"!ld after bitter +"ighting . By l40C tl,.is afternoon r~ount Frd.to ·ms firn, end the ?nd 1~oroccan Division was rontinuinp; its r-ttack on otrer objectives . Tre 1st Poroccan Division on the rii:;ht at the hridgehM.d WPS ri?kin.t:s no progress . It rad a couple of trnk companies nortJ, of its r,res"nt lin"'s tut f'j ghting was bitter tind enemy oprositi.on to(\ great to ronsidl."r any progress as havin~ been Made . To the soutr in t}:e Frencl sector the 4th r:ountain Division was having mnch dif:'iculty in mn iri~ rroP,ress toward Mt. Ceschito . On the left of tlie Frencr Gorps, II Corps h~d taken rractic,...lly all of its initial o½jectives. Th~ 150th Jnfa~try of th~ 8~h Division had taken and held Da!'iin.no fir"'l . They were in V"ntosa and ready to go on as soon as the Francl,. had nroceedea south toward C"'scr·to to Rotundo . I Company of the 350th ht'!ld Cer:icola . ':'he 151st Inf'antry hRd 1110ved f'orwRrd about 1 , 000 yards find was stopred toward t! e entrance of' Jantn "r,1·i.r, Infante . They had -ianaged to ~et a few tarks .-:D.to the tovm anrl sorie infl'ntry +, .... oops . A coordinated attack to teJ" the town is ·r. rrep1,ration, 1-,ut th~ to 1m PS yl"'t has not fallen . F,lements o.f' the 139th Infantry ?dva:>1ced -f'orward as far P.s Gan !'artino and the two hill masses /t66 anr #69 , known as the Clle. San •;artino . There was ri~ tter f'-': ghting tr ere duri. 11f" the riorn-i ng. .Arou.11d noon ·:~ 11 #?.;q was tri.ken and an attack planned to ,vrest Hill #66 from the Gl'!rm..,ns. B-itt(')r counterattacks were lmmched by the f}"rrans t.l.l'oughout th~ dav on th"'se positions . Further south a'1c'1 to the coast other eleT"ents of the 85th Di vision had rroceeded for ward about 1,000 yards and were lam1.ching aggressive combat ratrols to feel r out ene'1y res~ ,;-::;&nee . In ;~enerrl t},e tempo o:: the attack shortly r,fte:r daybreak slowed down considerably, 8S the 1oche was putting ur bitter resistance . He 1 ad accepted battle as had · "'!e11. anticipated , t:1us rreventing tl," seizure of all objectives as anticipat~ : . Up on t,e -r::~_ghth Arny ~rant the Folisr , Corrs proceeded southwest from rositions nortl of the ncnastery and rrad" soTl'le -rrogress , hri.vi11.g !'laced el..,r'lents on FrantoT'l B.idge whicl~ underwert var:..ous 1 cr-·D.terattad~s all c ay lorg. In so. r:2ses nP-~ther Ue 7oche nor the foles actually possessed rarts of ~f''"' rid ;A. . To tbe S0'1tJ-,, across th,. ~-EJ: ldo, the Eii:;hth Arrny had pushed 8bout eir;r.t 1 )at~r>lions e cross this river eith r by n,eans of' class 30 ferries, r,qfts er bridges . South of ::;an J\.ngelo two 1,r:idges ht:1d been constructed across the lZaJ ido n.nd triree sq1.1adrons of tanks, in addition to infantry troops , had been rushed in+.,o the vr-tll"'Y• Tr.e:ir advance .-:n c'epth was lim:tted to ariout 1 , 000 yf'rds . Reportg continued to cor,e in durinP, the day, some confirmed and some not confirmed, indicating t:b1.t this ev~ning ard tmorrow would clarj fy 1'1any sit1.W 4~ions w:hich rlevelop!"ld durin~ th~ ...irst dey o; tre attack . ! Ge'1.,.ral 8lrrrk co11.ferr~cl w:i th Ge'1.ern.l Gr·1enther, his Chief of Strff, arrl General Brann, ½is G-3, on nun~rous occasio11s . :~ajor Gen"ral "Tate Twin:irc, Cor:rrnanrii11rt, Gen rel o-f' the ~trater;ic Air Force, v;as -tnvi.ted to l1mch. qe discussed 1:r-il'lfly the Strate1:;ic Air Force I s role in hi ttin~ targets in central Gen~ny a~d int~~ ree~ arees o.P It~ly rnd in ~oumania and Bulgaria . He nlso dj scussed sr:ri1' of t1 e h,ly that h,. ,res gjvi~g to the XI! Air 3U:i:,J.ort Com_,and, under General S::i.vHJ.-,, w{th l'il.rts of the Strategic Air Force. 1 G"lneral Clark co:1ti'1ued to o llow th~ battles closely throuJrout t:1e ef- ~ ~ •" • !llt/l-ft< - - �ternoon and evening. The lack of rrogress ~n the French sector might require the 3rd Algerian Division to vr,ry its rol~ in trie rrorosed rlan rnd pass through eler,ents of the 4th to accomplish obj"' cti ves north and nortl:.cast of Castelforte to seize end hold Ceschito, Reali, Rotundo and Siola. Orders of th"! day irsued by Genl'!rals Clark and Alexander are quoted below: General Alexander ' s messrge is cs follows: "Soldiers of the Allied Arnies in Italy. "Throur-hout the pest wjnter you 1rive fouapt hf'rd r,nd vnlfrntly end killP,d many Ger~ans . 1~rrinrs you Pre disarpointed that re h~ve not been abl~ to advance faster Pnd .('arther, but I rmd tl:'ose wl-'o knou, realize full well how !Il8gnif'icently you h~Ye fow~ht amonr;st these Plmost insur ,oPntable obstccles of . rocky, trac1·less ~ounta.:L-'l.s, deep i.n snow, and in valleys blocked by river::; ri.nd rud, against a stubborn foe . "The results of tr•ese prist months may not ny:penr srectaculPr, but you have c1rawr into Ttnly Pnd mauled rmny of t:b~ enemy's best divjsions "1Mch he badly '1eeded to stem th"? ad.vnnce of tre Rmsfan Arr,i"s in the East . Hitler l as Bd.mitted thE't Ms defeats in the East were lrirgely due to tre bitterness of t:i-,~ fiP-hting and is losses in Italy. This, in itsel""', is a gr"'ct 8 cl ievement and y0u ma~,r well be ri s proud of ;vout scl ves Rs I e rn of you . You have gafoed the rdmiration of +.he v10rlr'l Pnd th(> i:,;ratitude of our Russir,n Allies. 0 0 ''Today trie bad tmes are behind us and to"llorrow we crin see victory ahead . TTnder the ever increr>si11cr blo"'ls of the 1c1ir -f'orces of tre United Nations, which are mount~ ng every day in intensity, the Gerr,an war r.a·cliine is beginni"l:lg to crumble . The Alli"'d Prmed forces 8re nm1 ~.ssembling ·"or tre fjnal b0ttles on sea , on lrmd, P'1d in the air to crush the enemy once and for all. Fror the East and the West, -f'rol:' the Nortri and tl· e South, blows are Bbout to fa.11 which will result in th~ final rlestruction of thfl" •·razis and brirg freedou once n.gain to f>:irone , 1md hnsten reace for 1m all. To us jn Italy, las heen given the honom· to strike tre first blow . "We nre going to destroy tr~ German Armies in :;:tnJ.y. The fiishtjng will be lwrd, hitter , a.vid p~rhaps long, hut yon 1.1re warriors and soldiers of the highest order , who for more t1 r,n n. yeay, ~ ve kn01·11 only victory . You have courage, <1eterrni11.Ption enn skill. You ,-ii 11 he sur-rorted by overwhelming air forces , and in ,C!1.ms and tn.rks ue far outnumber t:re Gl'?rrrans . No Armies rave ever entered battle before with a more just t'1nd rig! teous cause . 11 80 vrith God 1 s ri~lr and ½lessjng, we tnlr~ the field - confident of: vic- tory • 11 The text of G"'n~ral ClFirk ' s 11 TO: ~ ssage is as follows: The Officers and Men of thl'! Fifth Army. "During the ei.r,ht months th..,t have pt>ssed sj nee your inv11sion of the -·-,. .l:J. �Italian mainland you have accomplished results of majqr strategic e.nd tactical importance to the United Nt>tions . The entire world , including the Axis , lmovrn the success and significance of your Salerno landing against bitter opposition , and of your subsequ\"nt capture of Naples :in the fact of the enemy' s deterrnination to deny to us the port ,t, ich was indispensable to sup~ . port our further operations in Italy. After tbe fall of Naples you pressed your attack relentlessly and without delay, forcing the GerrEns to continue their retreat until they had reached crrefully prepared lines, where the exceedingly difficult mo1mtainous terrain provided extreme advantages to the defender . Notwithstanding the obstacles of nountnins, lack of rce ds , bitter weather '111d concrete defensive fortifications, you have in your various wellexecuted nttacks forced the enemy to reinforce heavily his 1:1dvnntageous position at the expense of other comrlitments and have hs rassed him continuously. "At the san,e tiMe you ha,re established firmly a strong beachhe2cd in the Anzio - Nettuno area, where you hav"! provided a·serious threat on his lines of communication which he is attemrting to neet by the diversion of a large force from other operations . 11 It may appear to you, s:i nee the Fifth Army ' s progress in terms of territory gained during the past few months has been slow·, that our campaign is no longer a major one or that it is not having significant success in the war es a whole . rfothing o:rnld bl'! furth~r from the truth. You bave :c:/'."de n conspicuously successful invasion of the continental fortress which the Germans · boasted was impregnable . You have required the G.e;rBPns to devote more than twenty divisions to the costly and losing task of reta.rdjng the Allied progress to tJ,e north . You have inflicted heavy losses upon their troops and have taken more than 13, 000 prj_soners . You 1:mve plPced the enemy in his present distressing' positj_on of trying hopelessly to hold back the Allied forces, which he knows will eventually overrun him from two directions . nr have direct personal knowledge the.t the accomplishments of the Fifth Army are understood and Appreciated by tr e governments 8nrl. peoples of the United Nations • . They apprec:iE te not only th.at you have accomplished n.s much as was possible witr. the strt'!ngth of your force, but also that you hPve co,1tained in this campa.ign many thousands of German soldiers whom the Nazis have needed desperately in their attempts to stem the Russian advance and to prepare themselves age.inst inva.sion in other µirts of Europe . 11 For some weeks there has been a period of comyiarative cr-ilm, during which therA has been opportunity for replenishment of men and equipment . We shall soon fl gain resume the offen si ve and lPunch the 2ttacks which our appre hensive enemy expects and dreads . You have what you need to strike smashing blows and to follow them through to conpletion: thorough training, superfor equipment , heroic courage and the knowledge that we can and will destroy the German armies . ttI have full ,confidence that, as in th" rast, the men of the Fifth Army will meet the tests to come Ps true soL:iiers anr thct with God 1 s guidance and help you will press on to great and decisive v.i.ctories . 11 \ \ �SAN r,.V\.RCO-- MA.Y 13 , 19/44- -Reports concernin;;, the prodess of the battle came in during the en.rly hours of the morning 11,nd continued to come in throughout the day. - General Clark studied his map and progress rede during the past night . He had General Brann up in his v~m and conferred with him concerning th~ Attack. He talked to Gener9.l Saville on the telephone and later saw him personally concerning the air effort . He vlishod to have the air abandon part of the effort on battlefield isolAtion and attack targets that he considered more important . Some difficulties were involved with AAI and TAF on calling of'f battlefield isolation objectives allotted to the medium bombers. ) Shortly after lunch G-eneral Clerk, accompanied by Colonel Drarer , left for the forward areas . · They first visited the 85th Di vision advance command post at Minturno where General CJErk discussed with Genernl Coulter , the Division Conmander, the progress made by the division . He reviewed briefly the seizure of hills #66 and #69, known as Clle San Martino; the fact that the Division had two companies in Cave d 1Argilla, and the dj sposition of the Division in front of Santa Marfa Infante . The minor change in the Division boundary, as ordered by General Keyes, was alsci discussed . GenerPl Clerk asked about the casu.H.lties in the Division and was told thPt.. about 956 passed. throur-h clearing stations, but General Coulter trought that probably there were a little over a thousand . However, th~se figures could not be considered accurate, and JEter developments will cfarify them . From the 85th Division command post General Clark then vrent to visit Gene- · ral Sloan I s oommand post, the 88th Divis ion. There he reviewed the 88th Division I s efforts from the beginning, which included the capture of Damiano and Caracoli and the Division I s efforts north toward Santa Marfa . General ') Sloan WA.S disappointed vnth the lack of aggressiveness HS shown by the tank commander who was hesitant to take his tRnks off the road and really push theI!! forward, helping the infantry. General Sloan assured M.Jn that he was going to require the tanl'::s to work closely with the 351st InfHntry, corrJ11anded by Colonel Champeny, in the preparation of their next attack. He discussed briefly the atta.ck nol::'th from Damiano with the ultirn.te objectives of Bracchi and Cerri . · · After leaving the 85th Division oornrnand post, General CL'lrk proceeded immedi ately to the French Expeditionary Corps where he conferred with Generals Juin a.rid Carpentier . While there he learned thP_t the French had taken Majo and Rinchinso and had rroceeded south and held Ceschito and Rotundo . At all command posts General Clark expressed satisfaction to comm-anders for_ the excel-) lent work that they had accomplished so far and was very pleased with the Aggressive action of the French in reaching their objectives . Upon his return , to his command post he learned later on that the 1st DMI had rroceeded northward and had rre,de a, junction with other elements of the di vision where the Liri and the Garigliano met . · The French esMmeted thRt thev would have about 1 , 000 German prj_soners b:r night . As soon as Genernl Clc.,,rk i:-eturned to the command post he issued orders to Gener.al Keyes , II Corps ·Commander, to speed up attacks tonight , regardless of previous schedules or plans . He desired the R$th to attack tonight , regardless of previous schedules or plans . He desired the 88th to attack ;hunt Bracchi tonir,ht .from three directions P.nd to rush fa.st for the town of Spigno in order to take advantage of the Gerrrans being off balance from Fifth Army successes tocl ay. �After supper he conferred with Generals Gruenther a.nd Brann concerning new developments of the offensive which he.d apµ,ared• after tod_ry's sucpesses . After this conference he retired early. * * * SA~,T HARCO--HAY 14, 1944--Last night enemy bombers bit Naples and strafed Highway #7 . A few bonbs were dropped in the hosnital areas in the vicinity of Carinola. General ClHrk r>rose early, acquainted himself wit'b early morning dj spatches and progress made on the Fifth Prmy front. He conferred with General Brann concerning future actions of th('.l Fiftr, Arny, specifically II Corps . They dis cussed in brief the 351st Infantry assisting the 349th in takin~ Mount Bracchi and then continuing vrestward to take and hold Spigno . The 34gth wos to take Mount Bracchi and thr~n go westward to seize and hold Mount Civita . II Corps was to speed vigorougly west nnd cut the AusoniaScauri road nnr'l prevent mP-my withdrawals from the area or reinforcements being pushed in . - During th is conference General Gruenther brought in Colonel Zeller, Deputy Chief of Staff of French Expeditionary Corps . General Clark rendered a decision to allow the French to use the road Minturno - S. rJarfa. Infante - Ausonia, part of which is in the 88th livision sector . This 'could allow the i:;trench to :iove in their supplies to Ausonia by this road . He discussed br:iefly the 1st DrIT sweep westward , seizing and holding dominating terrain and assisting the 3rd DIA in taking Mount D1 0ro . · The 3rd DIA is pushing up toward Esperfa. to attack and' seize Hount D1 0ro. The Gou:r1s will be pushed westward, by-passing Spigno and filtering in to the mountainous Petrella mass ~ ~ General Seville came to confer with Gener<Jl Clark immedie tely A.fter this conference, and they discussed air support. General Cl11rk ,.ranted the Esperia area bombed to complete isolPtion of tj e battlefield and to dislocate enem:r concentratim-1s fi lterjng back m1d forth tr rough the to '\'n. He also discussed f'uture reguirernents f'rom the [;,ir f'or ground_ support . After General Saville had left, General 01:9.rk went to lunch . General Cannon carie to see him 5n the early part of the afternoon and discussed briefly with him the effectiveness of' the air support being gi1.ren by the Tactical fdr F'orce . After l}eneral Cannon had left, General Clark worked on adnd nistrPti ve matters unbl General Alexander, cnrc, AAI, came to see him. Generrils /\lexander, ClRrk, Gruenther and Brann went to tr e conference hut, wr ere General Clark oriented General Alexander on Fifth .Arr-iy results to date . General Ale~ander was very rleased with the results and so ~xpressed himself. He also said he believed the Boche were esta½lisbing a (efemsive 1" ne from Cassino - Pignataro . He hoped t:bey did, as rositio11.s gained by tbe French would out-flank this position. The subject of novine; the %th Division to the beachhead was brought up by· General Alexander ~or an all-out 'lttacl, from there to the cne"'V 1 ~ flank . General Clark d:i ssuaded Ge11eral Alexander from reaching a decision at this time as to exact dates to nave the, ?,Sth Di vision to the beachhead. P-e said he would like to rlefer a ,lecision as to tre e•ract time for tJce nover,ent rending later developr1ents . After General Alexander l~ft, G-;yieral Clark went to bis van and worked on �more administrative matters and continued to receive dispatches from his forward elements . After dinner , the movie nnoly Hatrimony" was shown in the conference hut to sonc rierbcrs of the Fifth Arrr1y staff. Gtmeral Clark dictated the following notes for inclusion in his diary : HThe Fifth Army ettack has bPen characterized by great aggressiveness and dash on the rart of 4:,Le "?rench ~xp~dltionar:r Corps . Our plans were well conceived nnd have been executed as previously planned . French units push on, passing by isol11ted Gerrien troops leaving rear Frencl' elements to nop them up. By so dojnri_:, the:r have not lost the inpetus 0 1~ their surp;~~~ ... \. :-t-. ~ r-cvJ tack. \ ;t,lP -~~ , 'The situation on the II Corps front hns been somewhPt <'1ifferent, for our attacv was not initially :in tle J:J.ountains, but as vie adv~nced we approached the mountains . The French att·ack str-trted in the P1ountn.i11s, their ::irst objec1 tives being the highest pea}s . I arn c :: sappointed in the rigidity of II Corrs plans . They hs.ve not shovm n flexibility of m'nd and an aggressive r,ttitude. In !'1Y· opinion, with the strenr:th we had 1".vailable a~~ Santa til'lria Infante that resistance should have been elininated by-mid-day yesterday. As it was, tanks ( and the 351st Infantry, again in.my opinion poorly commanded by Colonel Champ8ny, permitted thenselw•s to he held up e'1d pernittcd G8rnans to withdr·aw from the Bracchi pocket during the n:i-ght . If it had not been for my intervention last evening to speed up th"'.l r-ittack on Rotlmdo imd to mntinue it on to Bracchi and tc- speed up the attack by the 3/,qth on Bracchi, we probably would still be sitting further back thj_s morning. I r,nve oomrnnnicated with General Keyes and sMn both Division Co1'1me.nders yesterday at their forvmrd command posts and urged sr:eed of action . I hPve directed Keyes to use the 349th to attack immediately this mornjng fron Scmta i'1aria in the direction of Civita, t:be higr; r:round north of Spigno . During the disruption of the enemy we must break into his ljnes and g~t -thet high ground . v "Again, I am greatly dj sappointed by t're lack of aggressiv.,,ness of II Corps . I am also disappoint1'd :in the apparent timidity of the tank commanders to shoot their tanks in an all-out attack. Fractics.lly p.one have been 1':l'l.ocked out by enem;r action but 1'y indecisive piddling around in rear areas, throwing tracks and, in one or two cases, hitting mines . nsent the following messr,ge of <X'nr-;ratulAtions to General Juin last night acconpanied by two bottles of, whiskey: 111 My sincere congratulations on your important accomplisriments in the present offensive . The capture of essential and dominotfog terrain hy the F'rench troops is of naj or VP lue in tl is ore ration vti ich the Fifth Army is carrying out so ··igorously. I know that you will continue to rress on witl-ollt pause in this phase of our c2.r1paign for the destruction of our enemy and tre ultimate liberation of France. You are proving to an anxiously awaiting F'rance toot the French Army has retained sacred its finest fj ehting traditions . It is e.n honor to have your troops in the Fifth .Army. 1 0 11 1ile should have Spigno b;v tonight . 11 - ' -.,: ; '"\.}-'~' .J • • ~' ' ~,i: ' ) / �General Juin today issu ,d the follow· 1 ng order of the day: ''After two days 0 1: -f'ip.-hting against positions tllet the enemy thought were impregnable end in spite of "ierce r~sistance he is retiring, disorganized and beQte~ . ''A large orea J:,ns bMn conquered. A position of vital inportence the rt. ~lAJ0 is jn our hnnds . Hore tr an 1000 rrisonP-rs hrve been taken including 18 offic~rs . Our edvance continues. "I call upon all for a r~doubled effort [lnc' renewed vigour . YesterdA.y1 s r-D,,-iificent success is t} e rl"!dee of assurance for tnr,o~row' s victory. "Forward." * * * SMT HA.RC0--HAY 15, 194/+--General ClPrk :-rose Mrly and r;tunied disrrtch~s from th"' "'ront l:ine units. .Action durinf; tJ:,e night and rrcceed-inr, throughout the day by the 88th Division res•1lted in Srir,;no, the high hill I".a.ss of nount La Civita a.rr1 southwarcl +'ailing jnto our hPnds. A II Corps B.ttack in th~ r,+'t~rnoon, el"\rloyino; tlie ~5th Divir:ion, southward cau.,.ed Cestellonoroto to fall in our hands . Trt"- ?~d and ,ra. Battalions of the ,17th Inf'antry hrv~ establ:'°L'''h""'d them"'elv"'s ...- 4 ,,.m ~n t}-,e to·m P'1d on t},e higr ground to tl">e south of the tovm. T:1e 'llst Rt"!connaismmce 3quedron, r1ttaclred to tbe 85th Di vision, will pass throur,1· -1:.1,e 1st Battalion of tre 1'3Qth anc. gp, in contact ~ith enemy eler-ents in Scauri a11.d, ½y ~ggressive actior, push the~ out. This wil] be ci 4 multa'1e0us 1"':.th Pn attac'I{ "by tb•· ':\J~th southwest to the rorid junction at San Croce. It is felt thnt not many Gern..,ns remain in th~ town of Sca,ll'i . By tomorrow tlie Scauri area should Hlso be in o•u- hands • . General Clin.. k c0nferred wi tr Gent""rr ls Grul"::rr+;h"'r r nd ~re"'.n trrour,hout tlie '7ornin,;. Later 011. they Tient c1 o' m to th"' G-3 Section to discuss .:-uture operations by Fifth Ar...,y on the rnu<l relief P.!ap which dericts the no..mteinous t"lrrain in minit=ture as it is. Af'ter this conf~re11ce Gtmeral Clark had lune •• Dur 4 nr, luncr Gereral Keves came ar.1 conferred ½r" +'ly with General CL~rk. ~ot"Js concerning this conference are discussed belo. Dur:!.ng ....,he ['fternoon General CL"rk ..,t,udied closf'lly the progress of the battle. Incor-ing dispatchAs continued to come -ln shovring our successful efforts to take ancl c,eize Castellonoroto . The Fre~1eh Corrs continu,..d to follo11 up wi~h r>.ggressive f'ctions throughout tr~ day. mhe Gou"ls hac'l pP..ssed westwar•l and were into t}-,e mo'mtains in and north of Spigno . Ele,.,ents of the 3rcl Algerian Division were pushing p11.st Ausonia on the road to Esperia. Elements of the 1st DMI were rroceeding southward from San Giorgio on the road to Esperia . Details concerning f')Xac·1:, location of these Frencr elements are not ::i.vailable du~ to difficulty of maintaining coruiunict'tions through this ountainous terrain. ��11 1......4 After supper General Clark visited -.rarious staff sections in the com!'l.and· post and retired early. General Clark dictated the following J111:>.t"rial for inclusion in his diary: "My fears that the enemy might react to our lack of Pggressive attitude toward Spigno did not develop . We hove occupi..,d Spigno and the key terrain to the south known as La Civita . Our good fortune does not minimize the fa.ilure on the part of someone in the g8th Division to carry out orders with energy. General Keyes is investigating this delinquency and when I get the whol ~ story I n.ust take r>.pproprfo.te action . I have congratulated General Keyes and his tT"O new Di vision Commanders as follows: 111 ·congratulations on the success which the forces under :rour command have acr-foved dur:rng past three da~rs of intense fighting . I especially desire to co"!linend the 85th and ~8th Divisions which are engaged in of"'ensive combat f'or first time and which bave conducted ther,sebres in a glorious manner, true to the traditions of the United States Army. J leasy congratulAte Sloan and Coulter not only for their current successes but also for tle mann~r in which th~y have trained their divisions in prepnration for these eventful days . Great victories are in store for the Fifth Army when it is composed of troops of the caliber of the II Corps . ' ~ "I am also sending a message to Genf'-ral McNair, telling M.rn hm1 prouc, I am to be the first comrm.nder to employ his new civisions ill combat . It has proved' the method by which thl')y W('H'e originally fornl'.'d and later trained . I, o,.. course, am delighted with the great punch, initintive P_nd l'bnergy displayed by the French. They are really carrying- the weight of tbis battle . I am ~ disappointed in the effort of' the Eighth Ar1-..y. The Fifth having taken the \ Apollinare - San Giorgio area should permit tt~rr. to advance without opposition at least as far as Pignetaro . I am tole' tney rre commiting parts of the Canadians and of the 78th Division , which should help ., "I am delighted with our efforts to get into the mountains. The Fifth Army 'mows how to operate in the :iountains and is trnined for it . The Germans dislike the mountains , and I prefer to work jn tl em to the valleys where the German has prep2red defens1's , mines and other delaying obstecles . 1 11 I hffve directed Keyes to push with all the en~rgy ;md speed he mm muster from Spieno directly across the mountnins to Itri, en.ploying the 88th Division for this purpose; at the same time to attack with the 85th to capture Castellonoroto which , in turn, should bring ribout' the collapse of the Scauri area . I have authorized Keyes to use the 85th in advance of these areas as far as Nount Campese but no further . I have told him the.t I anticiprite the 36th Division will move to the bridgehead , cor,nencing in about 72 hours, that it will take another five days to complet~ tl1e move . At the end of this eight- day period I desire to start the mov..-ment of tbe ~5th Division at full strengtr to the bridgehead, together with sufficient command and conmn~~ication ell!"Ments of Keyes' II Corrs ~ Hence, the 85th Division must be ·employed in limited objectives from now on, with the 88th carrying on towards Itri. "I will put Crittenberger 1 s IV Corps in when I take Keyes out . Gritten- ) berger is already with Ke~ecoi'ning familiar wjth the situation ra- �7J pidly. It vrill give Cri ttenberger an entry into combPt under favorable conditions . 11 By moving the II Corps with me into the bridgehead, V:hen I do attack I can attack first with the VI Corps , followed immediAtely by the II Corps with the British, 85th Division and 1st ArP1ored Division, after I -pull it out of the VI Corps attack. This should have decisive results . " * * * SAN 1 ':ARCO--MAY 16, 1941+--General C~ark arose and studied :military dispatches . Operations during the night were a little disappointing in that elements of the 85th Division had not been nble to gain the hill mass of Scauri and trap the few remaining Germans left there . At .0900 the GenerBl left the command post to visit the ew:1 cu.ation hospitals and see the wounf1ed from the 35th and 88th Divisions . He first visited the 56th Evacuation Hospital where he awarded 21 Bronze Stars to hospital personnel, including nurses, for bravery during ah eir raid at the beachhead . 11.fter this ceremony he went througl1 the various 1i< ards am• talked to the wounded . Leaving the 56th, he went to the 95th Evacuation Hospital where he decorat ed four medical personnel with the Bronze Star for bravery during the initial landings at Salerno. After the ceremony he went through the casualty wards . Following this visit , he went to the 93rd Evacuation Hospital and awarded one TJistinguished Service Cross to Captain Stone for his courageous actions while accompanying a front line unit Ht the be2chhead . He also awarded two Bronze Stars to medical personnel for bravery at the beachhead . In all of the evacuation hospitals that he visited, he found the wounded cheerful and with their chins up. 1 After leaving the 9Jrd Evacuation Hosp1 tal, he went to the 175th Engineer area where he awarded five Bronze Stars . Upon returning from thj_s tour of the evacuation hospitals rrnd engineer unit , he v;ent into immedia.te conference with Genera.ls Gruenther r,nd Brann. After lunch General Clark, Pccompanfod by Colonel Draper, left for the front . He went directly up Highway #7 through the town of Scauri. Thj_s was bej_ng occupied by the 339th Infantry. Vlhile the General was there , one sniper prisoner was being passed through the town to the prj_soner of i'lar cage to the rear . From the town of Scauri the General proceeded further along the highway to the vicinity of the crossroads at San Croce . While there , a plAtoon of light tanks of the 91st ReconnHissance Squadron passed along the road but were forced back by antj_-tank gunfire $ General Cli:irk stopped the platoon leader and inquired why he was withrlrav1dng his platoon, and he stated that one tank was put out of action by four well-sip;hted anti- tank guns l'lnd Also thPt scattered Germans were throwing anti- tank mines on the road '1S they passed by. He stated that he was brin--:jng his tanks back to snfety prior to pushini:; forward so that he could call for artillery fire on the anti - tank guns . While in th~ vicinity, thl'lre was considerable small a.rms fire up ahead and both hostile and friendly Artillery fire in the vicinity of Mount CRmpese . After seeing everything thrit had te1<~n place in the vicinjty of this �crossroad, General ClBrk proceeded back to the ~8th Division command post southeast of Minturno. 1Vhile there he conferred with General Sloan and discussed positions of the elements of his Divis:ion proceedjng forward over the Petrella hill mass. After leaving the 88th Division, the General went to the 85th Division to see General Coulter where he verified disposition of el~nents of t}1 is Di vision in their push westward to Hount Campese and cleaning up operations in the Scauri hill area. From the 85th Division, General ClRrk went to the II Corps co~ma.nd post , ,hich had r,oved the night before from theJr location east of Minturno to a new location northeast of Minturno. The coMmand post was Moved to a quieter place and to get away from the congested traffic in and around Minturno. While at II Corps he discussed with Gensral Kl'lyes and General Crittenberger of IV Corps the rrovisions of Onerations Instruction #18 which had just been issued. This Operations Instruction confirmed the verbal instructions issu~d the day before by GenerBl Clark to General Keyes. rrovisions 0f this Operations Instruction were discussed in the Army Comrnander 1 s notes of yesterday. In brief, II Corps was ordered to attack and capture Castellonorato without delay and push the t1dvance westward to Itri. The 88th Division was to be employed rapidly tl:1rough the Petrella mass, pushing the German forces from Campese and moving on to Itri. The 85th Division vras riot to be employed in operations west of Campese without approval of this headquarters. -Sffective at 1200 hours 16 May the Commanding General, II Corps, was to he prepared on 72 hours' notice to begin withnrawal of the 85th Division from its present zone of action preparatory to a water movement to Anzio. Tentative plans for the withdrawal and movement of this Division wcire to be made so that the coMplete Division could be closed in Naples stagjng area?'? hours after the vdthdrawal began. The Commanding General, II Corps, was directed to prepare the following plan: (a) To turn over to the Commanding Gen~ral, IV Corps, the present zone of r>ction of II Corrs. (br PlPnS for the movement of the following units from the present zone of action to the Anzio beacJ-1 h~ad on 2L~ hours 1 notice on or after May ')2nd: Hq. and Hq. Co., II Corps; Hq. and Hq. Btry., II Gorps a.rtilhiry; Military P r,lice platoon, II Corps; 53rd Signal Bn.; 54tr. JITedical Bn. 1 After supper the GenerPl workeid on adninistrative w.atters and military dispatches a.nd retired. General Clark today received the following reply from General Keyes to his congratnlatory ceble of yesterday: "II Corps is appreciative of your fine congratulatory message which will inspire all to contribute their full share to the victories destined for Fifth Army. 11 * * * SAN MARCO--MAY 17, 1944--Aftcr havinf; dispensed with early morning dispatches from the front, General Clark conferred with General Brann, his G-3, artd his �Chief of Staff, General Gruenther, concerning future F:ctions of the battle . Following this conference, General ClArk r~ceived Colonel Gray, Fifth Army Judge Advoc~te,and reviewed nine general court martial cases. After Colonel Gray had left his van, GenerPl Clark walked down to the G- 3 Section to see General Brann. v) o.1r, At three o'clock General Alexander, his Chief of Staff,,GenerrlrHarding, and his Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, Genernl Robertson, came to see Genera.l Clark. General Clark brought, ther1 into the conference hut, where his G-3, GenerA,l Brann, his G-2, Colonel Howard, and his Chief of Staff, General Gruenther conferred concerning progress o~ the battle . The actions of the Eighth Army to date were discussed, as well as the movement of the ,6th Division to the bridgehead and the attack from the bridgehead. General Clark also brought up the point th-:it he vmuld like to have the ,French Corps attack from fjco toward Ceprano to cut off 2s much of the German Army ) facing the British Army as possible. In order to do this, he brought out that it was necessary to change the present boundary as t:re Fifth Army would necessarily have to go beyond its limits. Details of this conference are covered l)elow in +..he Army Comll18,nder 1 s notes. In the l.<>tter pRrt of the afternoon GenerAl DeGaulle, Head of the French \ State, accompanied by his Chief of Staff, Genern.l Bethouard, General DeLattre \ de rriassigny, Corunander of the ?nd French Arrriy; Mr. Dietholrn, Commissioner of' War; and General Juin, Cornnanoer of the French Sxpeditionary Corps, came to pay their respects to General Clark. General Clnrk and Generrtl DeGAulle, accompanied by r1ajor Ridgway Knight, interpreter, went up to General Clark's van, where they discussed the 2ctions of the French Corps and the situation on the Fifth Army front toget:ber. Genera.l DeGaulle was very enthusiastic and pleased with the progress of tre battle. The remainine;GenerPls . were in the conference hut ,1rhere General Gruenther, Colonel Snltzman, Colonel Porter, Colonel Draper and Lieutenant Bajenow talked with the visiting French Generals while Generals ClPrk and DeGaulle conferred alone. Hews photogrPphers took pictures of Generals Clark, DeGaulle and Juin together and, after a very brief stay, the visJ ting French Gr-merP ls left for the French Exr,ecH tionary Corps commanc1 rost at Sessa. Battle reports today found the French Corps pusl ing northwestward Y'ith advance tank elements reported in Honticelli. The G01,m1s, with other elflnents of the French Corps, wer0 pusMng westward and passed the Revole hill mass, leading elements reported Ps hrvfog cut tl-ie roAd Itri-Fico. In the south, II Corps reported RS unconfirMP,d that leading eleT'lents of the 85th Division were in Formia where they r,et sligrit resistance. Hostile f'rtillP,ry which,hacl been firing from the vicinity of Gaeta had lifted, indicqting prcp2rations for enemy w2thdrawals this evening. The 88th Division had reported eleJ11ents past Mount Ruazza anc pusbi11g down toward the direction o~ Itri. Where::i s all of these reports were nnconfirned, it inc'lj cntes, hovrever, th.<>t the Fifth Arny is on the move and th"'t they have forcl!'ld the Poche into a gen"lrPl vd thdrawal. General Clerk's notes on trie day's acti,rities are as follows: "Generals Alexander, Harding and Robertson ceme o call on me at three o'clock as pre-arranged. Su'½ject of conf.,,rence was current battle and roove- �ment of '36t,.,, Division to bridgehead . I ·explained thnt we v;ere in the outsldrts of Fornia; thet J hoped to have Itri by tomorrow ; that we had captured Ti:speria and leading t2nk el0ments of the 3rd DIA were reported at Uonticelli , to all o:' which Ge:vieral Alexander srowed great elution - as he should. I told hin that we Lad 3, 000 prisoners in the Fifth Army. 1'TTe theYl asked ahout the 36th Divisio,.,. I told him I had vdthr}rawn its artillery from the battl e , was moving it to the rest of the Division and it would be prepared to load on his order . He gave no order to load but indicated that 1-;,e ,•rould na1rn the decision , probably tomorrow or the next day. He indicated that hn felt the time was rapidly approaching 1'Then we should get ready for the attack out of the bridgehead . He thought when Cassino foll he would order the 36th to start its movement up . He seemed to think that the Gernans would not stand on the Hitler Lino . I Pgree , but the only reason it will not is because of the flanking action cf th~ifth Arl"ly_on_!11e south. 11 I ------ - then brought up the subject of direction of attack out of the bridgehead on Cor:. and VP lnontone . He remains ada.rant that that is the corrl"!ct and only direction of attack, regardless of the enemy sitUFtion. I drew a circle on the map , projecte-d my VI Corps into the high ground southwest of Valmontone and ask,"'d him where I would go fror1 there; to which he replied that fast , r1obile patrols '.'muld operate to cut the routes to the east. I rP-plied that in getting to iTplmontone I had gone over the mounta.ins, ha.d ab,.,,olutely no roads and i'!culd only have foot troops and pack equipment . He brushed this Aside . I poj nted this out ''ecause I want him to evalw:1te the situation v,hen th~ time to attacl~ approaches, in order that we can attack in the right direction , and the Cori-Valmontone t1.P:1' be the wrong direction . · tr:::- then pointed out to h:m the rles:Lr£1bilHy cf Fi+'th Army attacVing from Pico on Ceprano in order to cut -in 1Jehind the Eighth ttrrny at the narrowest point in the Liri Valley. He was cleli;;hted and told me he would issue instructions accordingly. "I hn.ve issu".!d instructions to my Chief of Staff and G-3 to hold the 85th Division in its present position in the Fornia area , to push the 88th first on the high ground northwest of Itri anr:1. then to the northwest on Lenola . It will then be prepared to push either to the west or to the north, if the latter - to protect the left flank of the Frenct Corps in its advance from Pico to Ceprano . I certainly would like to join my II Corps up overland '!lf~_tb the bridp:ehead . I may i:;et the opport1mity. I talk~d with General Alexander about ANVIL. He thinks it is not "hot 11 • I am told otherwise by Colonel Jenkins , AFHQ planner." 11 General Clark today received the following cable from General Alexa.no.er: "If, as seems likely, Bighth Arr,y have not been r_ble to draw level with Fifth Army by t:ime lntter reach Fico P-rea, CP\fC directs Fifth krmy to strike northwards by San Giovanni on Ceprano to cut off v,_;thclrawal by Highway #6 of enemy forces still opposing Eighth Army irrespective of existing jnter-Army boundary. In thet event , boundary will be adjusted by this Headqwrters in consultation with Armies to suit result:lng situation. 11 �. ~ r \,~•"i . t,, \~; . Gen~ral Clar.k disratch"d tl e "oll0w~ ni:i; lett":lr to General Tu''-'rshall today, reportin, upon the initiA.l action of the 85th and 88th Divisions: 11 K"lowing your r;reft interest in tl 13 new. dj visions t hie}, wer!'l created in tre TTnited StRtes , I an writhg you brfoPly to tell you of th .ir debut in offensive conhrt wi. th the Fift"' Arny. 7 "The ~5th a"ld 8Af-~ Inft:i.ntry .Jivisions ~nt"'recl con.brt un·ler ideA.l conditions . Upon thrdr assi~nmPnt to Fiftl• Arrny, "I pli>ced th~:ri in the new Fifth Arr1y s1'ctor alonr, the GarigJ iano Riv r . The sitwtion was c;tetic "n0 the 1 fro'Ylt rclrtiv ly qui~t . Botl1 c jvisions hnd ari opr'ortunity to heco:"e rccustom~d to trP.~ r battla, sectors grri.dually. -)'urinr; t: 1 is r!'lrioc' they executed extensive ORY l'nd ni~ht rA.trolling . 'T'he, r soon becare P11mili "'r vri th the tl'lrrain over wl-iicl' they are now A.ttacld.no;. On the night of ~!B.Y 11th, at 2300 hours , they jumped off . They "lave dnne rell arid hnve r->ttained all thedr objectiyes . FiP-htjng !1rs been severe in r:aces . Casurlties in these two divisions for the fj.rst four days of -f'j r;hting arn ti.s f ollous: W01mded Killed 107 87 1316 658 194 85th Division 88th Division 1974 ':'reir Morale is rigl-' . In one ::instance , an inff!ntry regiMent of the 85th Division was driven of" its objective three times . "'::2.ch time it counterF1ttacked find. finally re- took the hill with teavy losses to the enemy. The tenacious , deterr~::ined sort or fightinr· wrich trese a;visions hqve shovm speaks well of thejr tr8ining 11t hone. I lmew you anil Grmeral ircnair would be interested , as I am, to see the result of' the War DepPrtment I s e-r-fort to build nev, divisions ·"c.:r battle . They hDve met their f'nal test in corbat with complete success . Unfortunately, it was necessary for the division cor,manders to reco"'1mend the relief of four o<' the regir,ental corunanders - -for a corbination of Ag~ and rhysical reasons . They were replaced by yotmger M'9n prior to tee stArt of the current b?ttle . "The brj dgehend is poised for an nttnck 't't'P1 tirrdnf" SM"S appropriflte . I shall first reinforce it . Prior to th?t attack I v ill move my r>dwmce headquarters into tie _-i,ridgehead where I feel our efforts r1?y be dedsive . There will 1-le considerable tanlc nction , An<i , in order that infantry nay follow pro!'lrtly behind +,1,e ti:-nks , v1e hi:i.ve devised whrt we. call an "infantry bl,ttle sled 11 • "':nclosed are photograplrn to illustrate its emplo;ment. Fifth Arny ornnance naintenance coupanies hrve bujlt enour;J:-, to tow 30 <:-1U."'r1 s bP-h~na Bttacking -1:.imks . He have experimented vdth then and feel thf't the fjrst time they nre used, with tre elenent of surprise , they should be extrAnely helpful . I will rurnish you more Jnformation on them r>ft~r we h(lve trind the:-1 in conbrit . 1 "I saw Captain Clifton Brown tre otr-er dny. He is fine , in good spirits and ~nt' usinstic over his wor'k here . He sends his vmr!"" regr•rds to you am' Hrs. Marshall. I hc>ve already v.ritten !'h's. rbrshnll about Lt . Allan Brm,m • .... . ' �"I want to thank you -f'or ,1nkinr.; ~t poss5bl~ f'or me to r~turn for ny short v~ sit . It gave me a werit 1~ ft to see my fPmily rg:,in . I know it m~ant os ~u~r to them. 11 I am deli.r;hte-c with tl e five - day results of our Fiftr Army attack. We hr,ve brok!:!n the Guc;tnv Line jn several pl8ces by attecking over the mountains . "re have ren tr<ited to n distl"nce of fourtr-,en rniles on both the II Corps and French Corps fronts . Fifth Army has capt'Ul'~d appro:irim~tely 1 , 000 pr:i soners to of'te . The Fren_ch are ,..j_g},t;ng splendidly 11i th our U. S. equipnent . We will continue to m(-lke progress . 11 * * SA"f\T r~JIJWO-- MAY 18, 1944--After dispP-nsing with earlJr morning disprtches , Gener1"1 l Cl0rk had Genert1 l Brann, his G-3, t:ind General Gruenth"'r, his Chief of Sb.ff, in his van to discuss present developments of the bPttl~ -rrfor to the arr:lvl'll of GenerPl 7,Jilson, CTWC, AFHQ .and GenArPl ::Jevers, :JCI:JC, AT<'H'), . Gen~rels Hilson a.:ri<l. Devers nrriv0d at 0910 and were accompanied by General Alexander , CI 11C, AA.I , end General Lernnitzer , DCS, AAI. Genernls ·c1ark, Wilson, Al~xander, Devers, Gru~nther, Brarm and Lemnitzer went into the conference hut where Gerieral Clnrk outlined the progress riade by the Fifth Army since D day. He coMpletely orient~d G~nPr~l Wilson on the Fifth Arny front . The discussion also 1.nvolvP-d 8ctions on thB Eighth Arr.y front and present GcrM"n re~ctions to the nll-out attack. One o~ the highli~hts of the meet;ng wap Gen""rE>ls GlR.rk end /llexander 1 s request thrt they did not wont the Ah 'orce Tran'3port Group to be ta1ren awry at this ti!'1r-, for they vere needed for supply5 ng troops "nd also a contemplated pl'l.rachute drop . General /jlson immediotely put ~n a telephone cell to ~ake certain that the Transport Group was not triken a.vmv for operr>tions r-ilsewhere . After the conference the v~ sj_ting Ge11erels broke off into small groups and Gereral Clr-irk received General R"rrnon , Co~"nding General of the 1st Armored Division at the l:>eac1'head, in his van where they a~scussed the .Armored Division ' s conte'"'lplated cf+'orts in tre t>ttf'ck f'rom the beachhePcl . Later on in the morning, Genr>rsils ClP.rk, Gruenth"r and Brann revj ewed t:re Plan BUFFALO . General Cbrk desires to see General ,,,rucicott at };is comnand post tonorrov, and sent him the radio v1hich is quoted at the conclusion of' today ' s diary. This cnble sumrnarizes the results of the conferonce on the rlan BUFFALO , which is the attrck from t1'e be8chhead jn tre direction Cori-Valr1ontone . General Clark had as his guest for lunch Generrl Sr>wbricge, G- 1 of NATOUSA . During l1mch General S:=>wbridge spoke of his recent visit to th0 United States and talks thPt he had with General 'larsh~ll concerning G- 1 matt~rs . Shortly after lunch Generel Clnrk left by cub pl1:me for the II Corps 1-=drfield southeast of' Minturno "There he conferred ni th G,eneral !f eyes concern:i ng future offensive R.ction on tJ-,e main Fifth Army front , the att.nck from the bridgehead and movement of the '36th Division and elements of II Gorps to the bridgt9head prior to the attack. Jn the latter part o+' the t1fternoon, General Clrir}- rec.,,.ived GenPral Loevren wl.-io is to replace General J-fawkesworth , Comnanding the 1st British Division at ' �the bridgehead. Genc-:ral Clark had as supper guests Genernl Brann, his G-3, and General Lewis, . his Artillery Officer. A brief sUJ11mary of the day's events on the rrogress of the battle w11.ged }>Y both armies is as fallows: 0 The Polish Corps took the monastery in the latter part of the morning, and elements of the 1st Guards Brigade were mopping up in Cassino town where all organized resistance had ceased. The Eighth Army front surged ahead somewhl'lt throughout the day when German resistance slackened considerably along the whole front. The French Corps had taken Mount D'Oro around noon and occupied·Monticelli and were pushing elements to the north and east beyond the tovm. The GoUJns had raided the Itri-f ico road dur:ing the night and withdrew during the day into the mountajnB astride the road. Elements of the 8E!th Division had maintained contact.and pushed to about 800 yards east of the Itri-Pico road. Their advance over this difficult mountain terrain had caused them, according to unconfirmed reports, to be short of amnunitjon, food and radio batteries. Lqter on in the day they received necessary supplies, 2.nd the 350th and 351st Infantry Regiments ,7ere prepared to launch an attack acro8S the ro2d with th!'! objective of sej_zing Haunt GrHnde to the northwest of Itri. Elements of the 85th Division had reached Formia and by afternoon the 338th Conbat Team had completely occupied the tovrn. Hostile enemy artillery fire frorn Gaeta continued to harrass columns along the ScauriFormia road. By late afternoon counter-batter:r Pnd navr:i.l gunfire had silenced most of the artillery nre comini:; from Gaeta. The 337th and '338th Regiments of the 85th Division had maintained contact and were on a north-south line about a mile west of Marinola. The following important messages were received and dispatched today: . AAI to CG; Fifth Army. RN 247. 11 CINC considers the time has come to \ move 36th Division into the bridgehead. He therefore directs that the move J should begin forthwith." . Clark to Truscott. RN 5791. "Movement 36th Division to bridgehead starts immediate:j.y. Shipment will be made in four lifts. Expect to move six LST 1 s tonight. Further details later. It now appears probable that Operation BUFFALO will be launched in nbout six or seven days. Time is only an estimate. I will keep you advised of developments. Progress continues to be satisfactory on main front. We have Mt. D10ro and Monticelli. Cassino anc1 monastery have been taken. 11 Clark to Truscott. RN 5792. 11 I desire that you be at r1.y headquarters by 0930 Fridny morning for conference concerninl." future operations from briqgehead •. C-78 plrne will be on Anzio field at 0800 Friday morning to bring you and ty,o stnff officers, returning after conference. Be prepared to discuss feasibility of continuing 3rd Division in Operation BUFFALO to take objectives #1 and 1/2 instead of passing the 36th Division through." Eighth Army to Fifth Army. RN U 312. "II Polish Corrs to cor:iplete clearance of area of monastery hill and west of it and to push towards Villa S Lucjp.. �13 Corps and I Canadian Corps to •,pke contact uith Hitler Line end break trrougl1 if possible without '"'elay or if strongly held to tap in along front to discover 11eak poim,s . All inform1?d . 11 Clark to Truscott . RN 5822 . 11 Wl1 "t tirm vlill you ~rrive on Friday? At conference please be prepared to discuss feas~bility of following operation as an alternative rlan. BU'''FALO att~ck to he launched es now planned to "nclude capture o~ objectives }l q~d ¥2. Special SArvice Force would continue toward Artena and Velmontone. Ac-~ter cnpture of ob,iectives '1 1 ~rnrl '.'2 regroupin½ woulc take place and new attack :::..r,mched north~1est -f'roI'l. Cisterna area . " * * * SA ..J fVJlCO--Jffi.Y 19 , 1944--Genere.l Clark :rose enrly nncl studied militery dispatch s cc11cerning irogress ri,..,de by Fift}, Army 1.mits during the nj ght . At oq10 General Truscott, VI Corrs co~,.nanrler, P.nd Coloni;l CPrlson, his Crief of Staff, and nn Assistant G- 3 arrived Bt Fifth Arr,y forvmrd co"'rriand post by C- 78 from the bridge'beA.d to confer vi tr Generf'l ClPrk on Flan Btr'FALO, t7l-iicl-i -is the attack at tl e bridgeheaa in the direction of Cori-Vn.lmontone . In addition to Gcn--ral Clr->,.:r'c nt t 1n conf ,rence \crere GenerPls '"'rann, Tate rind Colonel Howard . :'rior to di.scu.-,sirig Pl1m '"llITTALO, Genernl Cl1>.rk outlfo" ~ tr Gen,~ral '.I'ruscott thP, rrogress to d<itc r ade by the Fift}-, Army 1:md the implications trat c: t would hn.vc conce:;_~ning the ettc.ck fron t'r e briclgehoad. After orienting Genoral T1~c1scott, Gemrfll ClRrk stAted thPt Gcnere.l Alexander .ad, -rror,, the beginning, a rre-conceived rlan of the e.ttPck from the 1-)ridgehead to <;mt Route //6, harrass the enemy r~s.r with ligr.t colurms avid ev·wtually annihilo.te the Gernan -rorces. Generr>l Clark emphvsi zed thFJ.t he, in his planning , wanted to naintain flexibility; that the Plan BUFFALO would be carri~d out as plan"lod but the.t he wanted General Truscott to be flexible in 1'is plans and e prepared to change the direction of the attack north frori Cori- Valr.ontonE' to ar attack to tl---~ riorthwest toward Rome. Huch dep ,nded upon tl 1 e Gern1an reaction to the attack on the main Allied front . If the Hitler Linc 1•rere pierced and th0 rmemy with(lrevr to the -:Jnction Line just soutr of :tome , then there would be -¾:.he possibility thrt the 8ttack to the northwest ,vculd "l)e successful. He said that he :r·:'lself was gojni; to the )Cachhead wi tl, a snaller , conposi te staff group, begirn~ ng to move probably tomorrow ?nC completbr; it Sunclay. from there Fiftr Army v,oulc1 ta}-e under tl eir corm:anc.· tr e two Br5.tish dj_vj sions anci leave VI Corrs the -ri::rnion o" carry:1 n1 out the l'lan TJFFALO . In the very near -r.'ut1ire },e rad pln.nnec1 to nove up II Corps He8dquarters and 8Ccor,panying troops as ordered in Operations Instruction '18. I: Corps, once established jn the briclgehend would then Lave undi:,r its comriand the two Br~ t ish di visions and the 85t Di lision, if moved up to th~ bridgeheaC. All plans :'or, tiie necessary lifts of' trese dj visiors · ·m,e completed, a:r1d bP- directed his G-3, Ge 1er1'1 l Brann to -"'ix up a dP ily schedule sl o :1:i ng J'10Y11ments of all units until they had coi,.pleted trcir ~ovcments to tr.e ')ridgel el?'d . , This would enable Ger. iral Cl-~1·· to rlan tr is diversionrry etta.ck by. II Corrs and thFJ troops under it . G0PPr[ll Clark, in t8l'-dr~ to Ge'10ral 'I.'rua,cott, also 1 ' �srPd hj_n to ,,,..,}:-ri rlri11s for a 1,,,racrutc <irop by the 509th Sep"'rr'te Frrachute ,,, Battalion south 1est o:: Littoria . Imr edinte plPns to hr.ve tris rrrachute ✓ drop a r-:a1·ty wouln hri.ve to be clelr.yed due to c~ "+'iculties !'THh the Air Corps in obtaining tre necessary tr1:insport plan s . In discussing the time for th,~ attack , Gcr,,ral Clr>rk risked Gcn,.,,ral Tru,,cott v1hen ·,•rould -..,e the earliest re coulrl attac 1r if be were told to e.-ttack t0nj P-rt . G~neral Truscott sa-i rl thn.t the ea.•liest he could n.ttacJ, ,1ould be Moncln;v norning and. tb'1t H lour woulc1 be ah0·1t 0630 . General Clar·~ told G<>ncrPl Trw·cott thr>t at the beginninf th ,{)th Division woulr' have a strine tied on 5t by Arrn.y; thRt he vmnld k~ep it in Arny reserve rt <-'5rst . GenerrJ. '"ruscott stPted thnt GcnerPl 1 Frec'ler: cks of Special Jervice Poree would like to c ror by p>racrute sorne "'ield artill.-,ry observers on the r:igh gro1.mc east of S('rnoneta :ln order that trey could observe artillery <-'ire for trA rttack. G·~'1.er11.l Clark st..,tcd that if tl·.e necessary transport planes co11ln. not 11e mere available by the Air Corps , re would release his tv,o C- 47 1 s ~or t fa purpose . Genercl ':'ruscott . le-f't ",..,riv~d~atel-.r after t,'1e conference for tlie br;d,o:e>head to call a comrnandersj mP,eV 11.:t anc to complete Pll nrrangrirul')nts for ar erirly attPck fron the brj dgehead . .._____ w~ 0 In th1 11-"ternoon General Clark left for the French :'xpeditionary Corr,s co"lriand post at Sessa . Fro::" tr.ere , re , .<iccomranied by Genere.l Juin , went by jeep via Castel"'orte, Corene , Ausonia to "s11erifi.. At Esper:ir:: tbe rarty mP.t General De,1o'1.tsabert , Garrand i ng the .3rd A lgori.an Division, who was dj rectinr, advance el rments of r is division from ifonticelli to Mount Delrmndrone . The latter f eature had bee;1 occupied y eleM~nts of thP, '3rd DIA after severe fightin~ . rresent with General De;'Io11tsabert nas Gemiral DeLarmjnat who was acti..>1g as a deputy for General Juin . General DeLP.rminat has only two staff officers in Italy at tte present moment . General Clnr 1r d-i s'cussed ~,-:th G~n~rri.ls Juin and De:irontsabert the A.ctions in progress toward F ice . :"ro!" :srorfa. Gen~ral Cl8rk went to San Giorgio , where he flew 1:>ac'k- b~r cub to the Fifth Arr'ly coMmn.nd post . Dur:'. ng the ri. "ter noon it h1cl ra~.ned quite J:ieavily, and Gener1=a.l CJ.Hrk I s / 1 return to the adV'ance cor'l..™and post was c'1011.n with poor v:: sibility e.nd during a dull drizzle . Whnn GenPral Cbrk returned to the commnd post, all arrangements hRd been nr>rte to move his co!'lposite st,ff eroup to the hridgehead on SPturday a'1r1 completing the r1ove on Sunclay. A<'ter supper General Cll".rk went to Naples to see Colonel Tully, his classn9te , anrl severPl oth0rs of his class 8t West Point who were f.1sser,bled in Colonel Tully' s apartMen~ . Hir,hlights of tor'r.y 1 s -rrogress showf'd th"' 3rd DIA and 1st D:.lI rushing past Mou.rt Delmandrone to 1T1rd Fico . G~ner['l Guillaune I s Group of Goums hP.d taken the town o-" C:-impodjmele nnd had cut the Itri- Fico road . Other elements of Lis Gouns were pusMng northwar d froM · ~iount Croce and r'ount Fotttan~no . "'hP- Groupement Lonchet had taken ·rount V le west of the J.trj -1 ico road . The 350t h 8nd 351st U. S . Infantry Regi"'lonts of tre 88th :!)ivision .had taken ;,Jonte Grande . The 34%h In+>~mtry of the S38th was cleaning up the torm of Itri. The 33'1th InPantry of the 85th Division had bken ;.1ount Cefrla west of the Itri- Formia road . "'he 138th InfPntry had· taken F,Tount DragonP- FJouth of r1ount �Zl Cefala, f't1d some of its elements were nlready in the town of Gaeta. In the Eig:bth Army sector it h:>d advr,nced to a genP.rPl line I iedmonte-Aquirn,Pontecorvo which j s in direct contact with the Adolf Hitler Line. Operations Instruction # 19 is quoted below, as vrell as fl personal telegram frorn Gcn(>rf'l Leese. Operations Instruction #19 follows: 11 1. Upon t:be compl0tion of the mission given in Field Order f}6~ Fifth Army on the main +'ront rer;roups its forces and prepPres for further offensive action to destroy the enemy forces oprosing it. 11 2. a. II Corps vtl~~: (1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5) b. FEC will: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) c. Consolidn.te 38th Division positions in the Ml' GR.A IDE - Ml' LARIGNO HiU Hs.ss. Regroup its +'orces nnc'l be rrepnred, on Army Order, to: (a) Continue the adwmce on the J"'P:'.: (!1 6098)-FC 'IDI (G 5106)-'1'.,'1:RACI'~ (P 3698) Axis towards the AUSONI Hill Mass, or (b) Advn11ce tc the 'M on the ITRI - FONDI - 1·~:NC!,A ( G 5411) CAS'l'RC D~L VCLSCI (G 5023) Axis. Complete plans for dthclrawal of tre 85th Division and accompanying troors a.s directed in OperRtions Instruction No. 18. The 85th Division, less one RCT, will not be employed ,1est of vnmrrA (V 6795) wHhout permission from tM.. s Headquarters. One RCT, 85th Division, may be used for Mopping up the ITRI - GAT'JJ'A (M 6390) SF'FRL(' {GA (r.1 5?95) Area. Protect the left flank of Fifth Army. iSaintain contact with FEC. 1 Continue the P-+,tack to the 11w to secure the righ ground in tre vicinity of PICO (G 6116). ConsoHdrte its positions ~n the PICO area. f'Jaintain contact witl· ,;i8rth Army. Protect the rigut flank of Fifth Army. Regroup its forces and be prepAred, on Army order, to: (a) Advance to the '1W to cut l'ighrmy 6 in the vicinity of CEFRA!ro (G 5926), or (b) Advl'nce to the west to secm·e the GISERHO Hill mass. VI Corps will: ConMnue the mission assigned in Field Order No. 6. d. The 509th Paracrute In"Pntr:,r Battolion ·rill rreprre plans to drop, on J.rmy Or er, in the AU3flNI Hill Hass anr' facilitrte the l'!dVPnce of the II Corps via the I'1'RI - F0'11DI - TERRA.CI!~ Axis. "3. 36th Division, in Army resArve, will be pro}Tred for moverient to the AHZIO Beachhead on e~ght hours' notice. �11 4. Boundaries: See ovGrlay. 11 Leese to Clark. RN 70. "Thank you for you.r kind congratulPtions which I appreciate very much. He all realise how much our success a.t Ca,ssino is due to the hPrd fighting n.nd the rapif advances richieved by the II U.S. Gorps and the French under your command. The previous hard fighting of your troops in that area paved the way for t},e final capture of Cassino and thus its fall is a symbol of our joint Anglo-American effort. The progress of our two Armies side by side as a result of' the close cooperation there ha.s always been between us ,7ill, I feel certain, lead to even greater successes in the future. We look forward to great results wl,en your decisive push from the bridgehead comes in. I send to you and the Fifth Army the grateful thanks and good w:i,shes of the Bighth Army." Keyes to Clark. RN NR8A. "Enemy resistance overcome and our troops took M. Grande. Enemy resistance · sli~bt to our capture of Itri. The ridge M. Dragone (611932) - M. Cefalo (6o9956) taken without resistance. Unconfirmed reports indicate that S!Tk'lll groups of enemy were captured on Gaeta. 'Snemy road block 1500 yards south of Itr:t }v-,.ld up our advance. Pw 1 s from 7th Co. 620 ·o st Bn., and 1 Bn., 194th Artill 1ry Regiwmt were captured west of M. Mola." - Yesterday General Clark sent the following cable to Admiral Hewitt: RH 5786. 11 Understanr1 that you would like to visit the French ;J.1rine Cannoneers now serving with the CF.Ji,. Hould be most happy to mal-ce necessary arrangements if you will notify me when you desire to come. 11 Admiral Hewitt replied today as follows: T\JRN. 11 .1\ppreciPte your message. 1:'lould much like to visit you as 1vell ~ s CPnnoniers sor1etine later when I can arrange return Haples. ~lhilc it would have been highly ~nteresting to me, I did not feel thPt last week was a · proper time for you to be bothered with outsiders. Congratulations on your successes." * * SAN MA.i"lCO--"~AY 20, 1%4--Gt"lneral Clr'r'ir rer,p.in'°'d ~ n tr!'! co1,mand post during the entire day. 'L conferred :':n t'he morning at greet length wit!1 GenerPls Gruenther and Brann. The J"love to th"' hr' dgehead of adv[lnced el~r,ents o.: General Clark's staff continu-,d e::-cept that selected war corresrondents, Section Chiefs and GenerPl Clark will not Move up, as plannl"!d, tomorrow, Sunday. Jetails of General Clark's decision to delay the attack at the bridgehead and to have II Corrs continue its ~fforts on up through I'ondi are covered :i,n General Clark's notes of the day. Tl-ie Army Commander conferred YT.:i th Gen ·,ral K,-,r.. s at noon PJ1d j mri ted him to l1mch. After Genernl K~yes depart~d, he worked on administrPtive Matters and studied II Corps progress up to Fondj and French Corps advances toward Pico .. At six o I clock Gl"lneral Alexander, acco ",pani~d by his Chief of Staf+', General HP..rding, cam~ to conf' 7' with G""n'°'ral Clar:!<. D~tt=dl2 of this cc nf rence are cover"d in General Clark's notes of today's conferences. ~ �Highlights of today's battle reports fou;nd the French on the outskirts of Pontecorvo and abcut 1,000 yt'lrds northwest of Fico, which had fallen . All of the high ground dominating tbe Liri Valley un to Tice is now in Fifth Arny hands . On u,e II Corrs +>ront eler,l'lnts of -the 349th Infantry ht=1d taken Fondi and elements of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron v-:ere edvPnc::i ng dovm mghway //7. Exact locations of tht""se ""1.e1'ents Pre not kno1•m at this time. C Troop of tr.e g1st TI.econ vm s reported ,just nortl, of Lrk" L, 1ngo, rue south of Fondi. GeMral Clark r'iictated the following notes for inclusion in his diary: u t S , ~ . Q u,... ~+J, ,,;x-.,>-f1 . 11 Yesterday General Le:mitzer/\delivered the folJ.owinf.; !"lessage: 1. The C-in-C directs tJ,,.-,t the P.tt11ck from the ANZIO bridg-,herid on CORI and VAUif'\TC NE is to b~ lmmched on thi"! night of 21/22 Mt=!y or on tr,e mornlnf'" of 22 May according to wheth~r you hPve decided on a night or day attack. 11 t ✓ 2 . Will you rl ,ase rerort for the ~nforr1ation of the C-in-C the hour and date on w} icr.. the attack vrill be li,u.nched, and r,t the same time inform Co:mnander Eighth Army by letter . This H.1. will inform C.G. M.J\.'T'.A.F. 1 1 3. rlease acl::no Nledge receipt of this order'. 1 1 11 T was shockl":d wren: received it to think tht a riecision of this i~portance would have bl"'en rnac1e witl10·t't reference to l"'e. I sent trPt word b~ck to Ge11.ernl Ale:1."llnder, who r.,pde the weak excuse thnt he felt thAt we h~d discussed it f'or the past thrM days. "General Lermitzer said that the decision was !'IP de Pt the ten o I clock rn.eeting in th,_,. mornjng when a rerort hPd cone in thrit the British had broken 1 the Eitll'lr Line at Aquino . I am sure thnt this vas erroneous, and General AJexander now knows it . Also, so~e air officer at the meeting had indicated conf'lSion in rear of the G"rnan f'orces sirdlar to that wtich pr"'vnHed at_ T1mis. These over ortjr:'listic reports resulted in this nomentous decision. I replied that the 22nd was the earliest d8te that I could ~ttack out of the bridgehead . I \ ( "I had been in conference with General mruscott, whom I had sent for, and issued jnstructions accordingly to hi111.. "Today the wel'lther "orecast is bad for air operations on the ??nd. I feel that en all-out air effort must r,ccompany the ground Attack. I also COM.rmnicated with General Lenmitzer, sayin~ thrt th"' d/11\cision handed r,e in writing yesterday should be carefully reviewed each day in view of' the fact that the BrHish were not attacking Rnd had failed to r.en~trate. the Hitler Line. In fact they had oeen push1'!d:-ttrck at 11:q~uina and Piedmonte . I also indjcat~d that the air outlook was bad for t,he ,22nd. As a result, Genl"rnl Alexander is coming to see re tJ,,is afternoon when .I will tell him thet in my opinion the decision to attack fror1 the bridgehead is prem0 ture, based on erroneous information And wishful thinking; thrt the soonest we should attack is ;>rhen both Fif''th and Eighth Arrnies are in desperate grips with the 1 �Hitler Line, at whic:b time the German troops on this front would be so heavily engaged that they could not withdraw to influence tr.e bridg1'heatl battle. The mere fact that the 26th Division has noved do m is no justification for tJ,,is premeture attack. It should be given a ch~nce to get heavily committed on this front. I will also tell him that I must have air support, which the weather forecast seems to preclude at the present tirne. 1 nuave just conferred witr General Keyes. I am torn between two desires: To let his Corps with all its present nea.ns push on to try to penetrate t h e \ ~ Hitler Line in thf'l vicinity of Fondi; or to rush up to the Hitler Line at Fondi without an attack withdrawing tl:ie 85th now and other corps troops with possible movement to the brj_dgehead. I have decided to do the forrner - to pnsh on, and ha~re so directed hin1 wj_ th all the effort he can muster. If I cen crack the :Hitler Line in the Fondi area with airborne trooris north of Terracina and perhaps a small amphibious landing in Terracina coupled with a · small task rorce pushing out from the briclgehead, I may join ur. 11 FollowinFY, General Alexande:r:'s visit, General Clark dictated the following material: .~t "ti ,_,.,..; 'ff'" 0\// r / l /"' r ,,-.1 n.rl. \Ud 11 rf".11) (I'.~ ~efr- ~ ! ( .," .f' ~ IF~-· c . if}., ~~ , - . , • I ttGeneral Alexander just came to see Me with Harding. Fe told ne that G ,neral Leese would not be able to attack until probably the nj ght o.,. the 23/~th and then with one divjsion - the Carno.dians. He asked me hesitatingly if I could l'.lttack and outflank tre Germans, "'laking it unnecessary for the Eighth ArT"iy to attack. He said he desired tc conser·;re losses. I told him to con, serve losses in one r,lace we would have them in another; n.f!mely, the Fifth Army sector nnd that I strongly recomMended that Leese speed ur his attack and that both a.rmies attack all-out at the same tj_r,e, but if the attack was at night as Leese wanted it, lt would conform to the Fifth Army riain front and thnt the bridg"!head attack should r;o the follm'Ting rnorninr;. agreed, although convinced that Eigrth Arrny will hold their attack and let the French carry the ball for them es they have done so far in this battle. He l I a,, ttAlso told Alexander thnt I had come to the conclusion to delay the bridgehead attack ?4 and possibly 48 hours, for the weather outlook arpears bad for their effort in support o"' the bridgehead attack. I told him that I must accompany my attack from the brj_dgl'lhead with strong air effort. I also told him.that each aft~rnoon at five o'clock I must lmow for the ~econd mornj_ng follovnng for the bridgl"'head attack. He agrieed. I also told hJrn. of the progress t ~ 1 north of Fondi. Twas going all-out and w1'1S goinr, to join ur. He has always ¥ J> /. been opposed to MY southern effort, and he apologj_zed today, l'!tl'lting thR.t he /V J ' ~ never drearned that we could make tre progress that we have through the moun- . tains. He congrntulated T'ie on tr,e progress of the Fifth Army. I e.lso told (JV~ l him of r,y possible plans for use of the airborne 50Qth Farachute BPttalion on ,ti,. r· the Mgh ground north of Terracina. .l#~ lJ . . ,,r["1 pl". "I believe j_f the Eighth Army will attack the Hitll'lr Line in the Fontecorvo .fo region in the next two days; we hit it north from fico all-01.1.t with all our forces and the br:i.dgehead tre next mornjng, we will fold up the German Army in S-,1 / ·1 Y ~ 1A-'·r "' ,,.i.Y p-° Italy."~ d'--. ~C\.,.,!~ ~~•if~ _,.~,.,,.,-~ .-~ ~ I~ wv• - - ~ - ~ 6V\. v-,>.r ~ p ~ ;_7- ~-_,1 Oil :lo &oJ_+~7J - u fq- ~,At"' it\. ~ ~ h . . ~ . -~ - . ; ; { A , .. I.A.~--t. ,.,. ~~ t ~ ·~ r ~ ~-,,~. c> . . M-t> - ~~ ~~t ~ ~ . - �Followini:; :Ls a cable recei-ved by Gener.sl Clark from General Truscott: RN. T052. "All scheduled movements last night coripleted without incident li f·reparations continue according to plan and on schedule . Ever::r indication that cover plan working successfully. "Reference your 7701, will have task force organized and prepPred for operation on east +'lank after H hour . Did not understand your '1lessage concerning Yarborough . Will he be availDble to drop any ti.r•~ af.t"r daylight or s1'1ould plans disr~gard r,ossibility or hi~ ernploymen+; ~ntirely? ur hope- progress on south front, particulPrly Eighth Arny continues satistactory. Do not heli~ve NY attack should be launched until withdrawal definitely ½~gins . Any delay after preparations of' tonie;ht will 1,e hazardous." General Clark cabled General Truscott today as follows: RN 3073. 11 Attack from bridgehead is postponed 24 hours. There is a strong probability that it .-,ay ½e postroned an additional 24 rours . I shall advise you .'.'urther on this r,ojnt rrior to 1700 hours on :'1st. Acknowledge. 11 General r1cGreer:r, 10 British Corps Co,.11mander, wrote G~neral Ch1rk today as follows1 "My most sincere congrat J.lations on the P,J.·ea-: victory ;;mu have Pcri1"Ved with F:Lt"th Army. 10 Corps, t:':t"'t"'Jr our long , r,ncl harp:r association w:lth your Arny, are really delighted Rt tris great success. As you can imt.:igin~ the ex:rloits o.-:'. II Corrs and FEC these last eight dr17s hrve rind an exceptional ::iY1t1'rest for ~1e, know:in'; the lower Gl'riclieno sector so we 11. 11 11 TJ~ tlirnino: of tJ,,e Hitler pos-ition will :~ed to big results, imd your rapid progress soutr of R. Lfri has undoubtedl:-, helred Eighth Arny to a very large extent. "We in 10 Corps ",,..el now tht"t th('I bridgehead position e cross th"' GPrigliano which we put in JanUr'J_ry anc' early Febru,qry has nov• priH a handsol"'-i divid"lnd, which ii,ore thPn makes up for th~ disaproint""lent felt nt the time that we were not a½l" to exploit further. "I know rm•, thrilled both TeY'lpler am' Hawkeswortr , rill be at tris Fifth All best "'ishes for your future operations, and ny kindest regards to Al anc1 oth~r old f'riends on your sta-Pf .n · ArMy victory. np1ease do not dream of answering ti'is . 11 The Array CoME>ander replied to General ~TcCreery as follows: ttYour letter hr> s .iust h,,..en deli vercd to me by :rorr liaison officer, and . I read it to Al and Don Brann, who hRpf1•med to be w,ith me in conference. We �can 1 t tell you l.ow muc:b 'Ve A.;_1rrecirit"" yom~ ttougrt~l11ess in vrriting, and prirticu1<>rly the C'in1' trings you SAY ...r the Fifth Arry. .,. "ant you to mow that RS T "'lew ov,..r t½rt area ;v:esterc'ey on y r"'turn Prom a vi.sit to the Frend- mmr Fsperia, I could not re lp but gi Ye a rrF f"'r of thanks Por the fine pfonMr work w1~ic. 10 Corps did for Fifth Army ~n obtaining the rir~eriead fro "lh~ cL we de ouched . As I Ple I alon'; the Gf!rigliano River , y tho11ghts went back to t':le hr"'d "i.ght:in,:; wh~ er your 3ritish troops perforl"l."'d under your cor:~1and in crossinp; thnt rjv"'r and ,stabl:i hing tr..,mselves on the heights beyo 1d, in th" face of s·1cr ,ne:r1y r~si~tr-nce. You gaY1' us t:re c;pringbo:ird fro11 r1hicl. we were Abl,.. to launch our successf'ul attack. 1 "This Y'lorning II Cor}"s troors ar(" about four m:iles northwest of Itri , o inp; on Fo:rdi . French trooJs pre eeting incrensed .,..es::stance nortrwest of San Oli va . We will keep on r,oinr.;, however, and, of cours", the riridgehead is no source of cc11fort tc the Boch..,, for it i.s strong imcl rearly when needed . nl:: you n.r;aih Per your good w:i.shes . Al and Don and : send onr war re~rrds to you a'1d 111f'lb~rs of' your staff . TTe hor~ anoth~r opportunity comes for us to be associllt"d together in battle . J-leas, ~ive our esrecial regards to Cooki.e . " 11 T} * * SAN r~ARC --~flAY 21 , 19'11+--Gen~ral Clnr'c sp..,nt a 1;ood rortion o:f tre day v:i sitinp; forwarc1 ele ents of the Fif't'.r Ar y. At 0900 re left f'or ·the --:ir,hth Army ~AC by'ris L-5 light ~ll'lne . At Bighth Ar~y ~AC re conferr~d with General L~ese, Co 't:>.nrler of th, Eighth Army. Fror, ~i..grth Ar.,.,y TAC he flew to a cub field due west cf S . Giorgio where he was, i,t by General Juin . He ~cipferred with Generel .Juin rt teie r~ l'lld and tren made A short side trip befond Bsreria . ,ihile tr ere he saw 0oncrete e icence of the eff~cts of our Prtillery fjr~. Elenents o~ the 90th Panzer Grentidier Regiment were cPu~ht on the road nortrwest of '3speria by our P.rtillery fire . mhere were trucks , tanks, guns and perso11nel carriers whic1" wer• conr:-letely cte1"l0lished. Tliey },nd evidently b"!en r,oinp, dovm the road at closed intervnls whim cau17,ht in successive artillery concentrations frorn our guns . In order to clear tre ro8d, the Frenc}, had to bulldoze ehicles 8nd Gerrmn dead, sweep5ng theJ11 over to the side in order to let French ,.lements pass by. A Fr.encl' cartain, who },rd been R Gem,an prisciner <'or two days, told o how the Ge:rrans were very s:~ort on aMrrun~ tion; ti ~t sol"\e divisions were only a11.ow-t'1.g 10 rounds per indivjdual ~r day, anc ot},1'rs only 5 . From French Corps General Clark flew to tr~ II Corps cub field in th~ vicini t;r o~ Argenta. Fro. t 1ere he took ri s j~ep, storped riefly At n Corps comf'!and post nort½ of Arg"!nta anc thl"!n proc,eded do rrn '..r~ 11rway ;i/:7 to Forl"'ia where he conrerred with General Coulter, 85th Division Co. manrler . Frnm Fori,fa he continu-,d down Fi rrhway #7 up toward Itri . 011 tris rm:1.d Rhove For ,ia a oobv trnp exploded at a'l,out t},e sru ~ t~ Me that the General I s j~!"lp passed . Troo:rs were cleaninr out part of t½e road where an anti-tank gun 1 as . Anparently on~ of tre soldi"'rs worki11g Freund t e p;un had srrunr: a booby trap causinr, a violent. ~xplosion just ~s th~ General's ieep went hy. One soldier was killed and two ,.,ounded. The ~nerril f s jeep escriped unharrn~d. General Clrr~ storped bri"'~ly at the gpth Division cornnand post just north of Itri , but General Sloan, the Division Co~~ander , was not in so Gen~ral Cl~rk �/" proceeded on towards Fondi to find him. While in Fondi he talked to Colonel Jacobson, Division Artillery Executive for the 88th Division, who pointed out the direct support artillery positions in the vicinity of Fondi. General Clark then proceeded up the road from Fondi toward San Biagio - a small village at the foot o:f.' Monte S. Biagio. There he met Colonl"ll Hughes, Commanding the , 137th Inf'antry, ·vhich was in the process of attacking this higJ:-, ground. - He discussed the situation with Colonel Hurhes, who said thrit his troops were receiving sone opposition which he estimated to be P..bout 100 Germans who vrere dug in in the hills. Colonel Hughes was coni~iclent thflt he would have the high ground in a few hours and was Pt this tinte fY,Oing beck to see his Division Co:m:Mander to push on f'urt1->er up the hill mass to the northwest. General ClPrk, after conferrine; with Colonel Hughes, retraced his steps and rroceeded bt>ck down Jfip;hway #7 to Gaeta. Enroute h!"! l"let General Coulter of the 85th Di vision going up to his forward el~"'ents and discussed with him briefly his conversation with Colonel Hue;hes. General Clark thoui:1,rt that Colonel Hughes 1 desire to pusri on forwa.rd was excell,,.,nt nnd told General Coulter that he could discuss the matter when he saw Colonel Hughes up the road. In Gaeta General Clark went dciv.11 to the point where he met Colonel Safay, Corn:Mandine- the 338th Infantry of the 88th Di vision. Colonel Sa.fay's regiment was about to begin a movement by water in dukws to Sperlonga. Genern.l Clark went down to the beach from wh,,.,re they would depart and saw Rn engineer company svreeping the beach for M~ nes in order to make a safe lane for the dukvvs to p;o down to thi'? water. Quite a f'.ew rnines were found in this pr-irticular beach. General Clark said he was glad to see the 1-,each because he had planned at one ti1"11.e to send in a Ranger Battalion at this particular point in the beach to scal"l tre r.eip;hts and take GAeta. From there General Clark went back d 1 ri"Jctly to the cub fjeld where he took off in his L-5 to return to his command post. During his trip ur P:i<shway #7 the militRry traffic was very congested, ,vith .,,,any 1"1.otor vehicl""s and Italian pack units noving up toward the front. Gaeta and Itri had suffered quite heavily· froll\ our artillery fire and bombing. At five o'clock ~Tiss Curie, daui?:hter of ~1aclame Curie who discovered radium, ca!"le to call on General Clark. Sr e is now a French WAC o.i:'ficer and j s over here in Italy on an inspection trip. At six thirty Genera.1 Clark had as dinner r:me sts Mr. Irving Berl in, of the show, 11 This Is The Armyn, Major Holmgren, his business r.anager, 1md Wri.rrant Officer Wasser, his Fublic RelAtions Officer. After supper ~'!r. '3..,rlin came down to the conference hut where he played J11any of th , tunes thnt he had written for Gener~l Chrk. He also rla.yed the Fiftr Arny song thet he had written, a new infantry song and other ,,,ar ballPds which were very good. Hip;hlj t;hts of the day's battle news were increasing rrogress by the French northv•est of Pico and Pontecorvo. On the II Corrs front Monte S. Biagio l"a.d fallen, whicl\_}'Vas abont three miles west o':' t1,e tovm of Fondi. Also, elements of the 91st R connaissance Squndron had reached the outskirts of Terracina. Notes concernini; General Clnrk 1 s visit to General Leese nnd General Jv.in will be quoted in the diary for tor-1orrow. · �In the lRtter part of tl"e afternoon Geri~rol ClPxk, accompanied by Brigad:i.er Goodbo<ly, went to tre 1st Bri.tish Division to confer with Generril Hawkes-· wortr, Division CoMmander, and GenerPl Gregson-Ellis, ConMander of the 5th JiTision. Also present was Brigadi~r Loewen, who will tnke over c~n~and from Gen"'ral Hawkeswort , who is leav~ ng to take CC"ffland of the 4t>th British Divi, sion w}'ich is in Egypt at the present rnonent. General Clrirk made arrangements for General Hawke sworth to leave tonorrow and turn over the conm111.nd to Brigadier Loewen. He also d-iscussed wi.th these British Commanders f'n attack plan for the two British di,isions i.n conjunction wi..tr attack by our 45th Division and 1st Armort"ld Division. The ~--neral scope of the plan is to h(.lve t:he British 5th Division, w:it1, the TJ. S. 517th Farachute RCT, the 551st F11rPchute Bn., and the 55oth Glider Bn., take over tre entire British -f'ront, Makinr: fl holding t1ttack, whil"' Ue "qritish 1st Division, with the U. S. 45th Di ision on jts rigrt, attackin~ in a northwesterly direction toward Rom,. In Co"1junction with tris attack-, t},e 1st A:i."mored Division will make an t'lrr,ored thrust to the right bf the 1T. S. Li.5th Di vision. J l;:,..11s for tJ-,is Rtt[\ck Hre being made in detailed form, b11t the exact time is not definite. ',!fuch will r1erend upon tre progress of the rrese"1t be~clhead attack in tre rirectioP Cori - VPlJ,,ontone. If this attack bor,s dmm in tP.e Cori area, or i-(' the Bo ere falls back to defend its Unction Lin<'"!, t!1en U·is combined Brjtisr and AMerican attack riigl.t take place. This attack is in conjunction with G~neral Clark's desire to be flexible and meet any contingency that tlo Boche might offer. Tht"l Arer:ican p~rac},ute and r,Hder troops contemplated to be used on the present British front will rrobt1.bly 11.rrive flt t:1e beachhead by 3 June. Later in the eTening General Clark called all Hs djTision coM::mners on his field rhone to discuss witr th"'Tl\ the situntion j n their zones of ri ct ion. He retir-,d Ft ~130. The -f'ollowing are tbe i:rrportant messages recei"'fed and cl:ispatched during the course of the day: Gruenther to AdTance CI • 'q_M 152. "French rl'ly,ort their attack jumped off on schedule. No locrtions y ,t. Heavy fiehtfog in Lenola area during nir,ht." Gruenther to Aovance CF. Rt{ 153. 11 Eigrth Army jillllped off o630 rreceded by forty r·1 nute artilJ ery prerr-r['tion. Attack prog.ressjng accordinr, to :rlan. They rraintajred co':'ltact vr~.th eneMy throughout nigl t and state that enef'l.y shows intt'!nt:i.on o-f' holding. 11 Clark to Gruenther. RN l4lQ. "Situ::-tion looks good. Co bat COI"I" nd A just srort o"' railroad. B pro -T .:.; -~ni;; ,.,ell tl-r011gl minefield l?OC yarcss in rerr. 45th Division Pbout on i.ts limited objective. Otherc; rrog:ressing slowly. Reference Eighth Arny's proposed new boundr>ry, 111Pke no cori:mitI'lents. Do not lik~ it. It ,ives us absolutely no ro,d. I ould like to do a little purs11ing too. Detailed answer to you this 1d'ternoon. t1 1 Ch.rk to Gr11enther. RN 1424. 11 Bo·mdr->ry proposed by 'jighth Arny is unacceptable. It is Pbsolutely necessf!.ry for the French Corps to hr>ve a rorid north of tlie Lepini r·ountains. Frorosed boundri 1~.~ 0·1ld force ,..,e to pincl out Frencr Corps and hr,ve them ::'allow :::I Corps throu ,h AT"'k<i.seno Vrilley to route 7. �I do not bt"'Ueve 'Sighth Army could o<lV."lnce throug1~ Liri Vnlley unless French cover the nounta-ins on the Eighth f..rmy le-"t. IIighwt=>y 6 nrid tre !!'.any routes north thereof should meet Ei~hth Arny need. Make strong representation that present boundnry be changed as follows, all points exclusive to Fifth ArMy: · From present boundary at strerim j,mction (369182) - hill 215 (265461) - hill ?69 (09850~) - hill 773 (Q50556) - point (~90610) rnd then continue on present bou.ndPr~v- as set forth in op ,rrtions order number 1, AAI, 5 -rtay 1944." Clark to Gruenther. RN 1443. ttHave just visited ravrkesworth, GregsonBllis, Loewen and w~s ~cco pani~d by Goodbody. The l~mited objective attacks by these two d~visions have bee~ completed 8nd no~ is t~e time to let Hawkeswortr return. I will send him bqck in one of MY C-78 1 s tomorrow unless General Alexander desires otherwise. Acvi 8e. t-rove me e it rlnin to trese conrnanders t!'lrt the Bri tisJ~ Divisions will re1·ticjrate in the next Pttack. They are i.n accord n11d we f'.rl'l . nlcin11 pl1rns accordinr,ly and will outline t1'em to you at a lt1ter t-ime. ttUp u11til 1600 11.ours to,1ay 7-qq bP-ttl,.. crsualti~s hrve bl'!eTI admitted to eTacuation hosT':tals. This "'ncludes 98 Brit~ sh casualti~s. 11 Gruenther to Arlvance GP. RN 165. "II Corps news good. Our ta'1.ks and troops now fighti.nt; in T .rracina. 350th bes tvo bE1tt,,lions r,ener< lly in Mount Curio area. Eir,hth Arny now stnte tl-'"lt sirns 0f enemy withdrawal have not b~en confir ~d. Canadian ar~or will 11ot be nassed trrour,r toni~rt ~s prev:5 0'1sly pl.a n..1ed. 11 Ger~ral CL.,rk this afternoon dictated th11 f ollowj ng men:orandurn. to Gerierol Grul'!nther: 11 Hansborou ,1 is here and rill return this to yo·1. Th~ nr,s seem to be going well here. T r.:ot up at 4 A.f~., vnd went to a forFard or under cover of darkness and. :atched tre rr ,rt>rPti.on anc1 tJi- ~niti,,l t,., 11k n.ttt>ck. Th" rreprPtion was srlendic. ~fo reply from t:re ene y. I h-1.ve t~lked with J-r.r-r,:,on, ,n1,ose Con-bat Col" r-md B, 'on tre r.1 ght, has htid ,u ffic·1lty w:;t~ r~nl"'s. He hf's lost ten tanks on min~s. His Combat Conmand A, on the left, lwd :nore success r>n<' Pt ~bout ~: 30 had covered half tre distnnce to tre rn·· lrord ,., anrnent. :::t 1-iad ,,sed snelces success+'ul1y. n7 Combat Co~Rncl B did not use then i."1-itinlly ::: do not know, but ~t .i.s Mo· inr; t:1el? up now ~n t'l'1 effor-1:. to clePr tre nines. Tre 45th Division arp:ir~y,tly has reac1'"'d -.;ts :~rniterl object-ivt"'. '3rd D-i ision and ~,ecial Service Force rave eacl' advenced 1,000 to 1, '500 yrrds. I'a-1:.urally, reports Rre mear;er rt th, present ti.e, hnt I wo,1ld s~-.~ it -is '?"lror:r,ssing ~n good shape. "':'here ~s R nrinll tas,· +>crce o+' a reconnf'lissance unit, sonto: TD 1 <J ,nd ~Y'r;ineers, prep?-rec' to ,ovi, 0'1t on +J,e south flan¥, but : ,rant to hold thPt until it can ,e coord:natec'l vitr an e"fort o-" tre II Corrs anc'l perh:::ips P 11 rop b7 '\'.'nrborouv}•, if •e decide to do t at. ::: am reluctant to C0""111it Y,;.rboro"1r,h now, althour,h the rlan B wMch Don h~s v:ror'\reil on looks +'E'irly proris~ng. .7e have told Yarborougl' to be vr-erart"'d -"or thr-t Thursday rorn~nr,. I won 1t rull -it unfoss conditio'1.'3 are r-i.1;ht. "A . delir,½ted w: .J.;l +lie rrc- ress of tl "'l 9 8tr ""ivisio'1 orito Mow"lt Alto. Looks as tr•ou;;-r tr"'r"' is a ros,:;i b::: lity of bPgging so""e Ge-1--mens tc t,._(I\' soutl, tfereof. - '' Y??Z . ·~ . �9D Your radios are cor11ing in well. of that II CorJs . Be sure and keep Ml'! rested on the progress Havl'l not had a r"ply from you on t'bis censorship b,1siness . You go allout in set"\inP- trflt ti-,~re is no restri~tion rlacf'.'ld on v.y whereabouts . I have always trav~lled rit .,.Till in rry Fifth Army sector , and, when appropriate , it has be~n arno'mcr".d, and ::: do not i11tlimd to 1, ave any restriction p1Pced on that now. Y01.:. tear anybody to pieces who r,ttl':npts to c½.ange tb,; s . The censor here , due to soMe damn fool idea , tl1in1,rs th<"t r-iy presence in t},e bridg~head can not be rn_~ntioned ,. Yo11 riust ? ct on t} j_s pro""'T't ly.. I am wond l"rinr; v·hy I ½ave not receiVl"'d a reply. 1r"'dt},nr 'have we received the co:rmunique . ;Je sure trat trat is properl7 word ,d and tl"9_t it ~ s a Fif'tr ,\rrrr shovr . I do not want t'b"" first a"lnouncement r,f this to come out to the e-'"'f11;:ct thPt Alexander's troops hav"" attaclred fron +he bridgo}'ead. This all should have been straightened out 1:iefore I car1e up here . j ki1o"i you can handl,. tl-is ~iploratically. 11 11 General Gruenther sent General Clark a neno:..·andun wit]:, regard to the witLdrawal of certain troops from FiftL Arny. The Arr1y Commander plans on taking up this r1atter ·after he has accomplished whfat re set out_ to do ~ Clark to Gruenther . R;J 1429. "I agrE'e that l:":ly~s 3 s r11 1shing ris ettack to th~ utmost . Fn.:i""!r no c:'rci_nnstances do I d""sire to div~rt his Httac'\c in trie direction of Ceccano . On tl-ie contrary, it must be pushed along the h1.gl· grotmd in the direction o.~ t:lv b:;.•idgl".!Lead with all spl"ed possible . 11 v General Clark sent Gen1'ral Grurnther th"' following note with regard to tr e coordin,'1.tio11 o-"' the :'r1'nch Corps and II Corrs attack: "Sending this by courier . Just rt'!ad thl" r:..a.ns c-1"' tl e FT::C with 4th Mountain Di11ision going +'rom Lenola ,.,,fa the m.01mt;,,ins to C1'1stro di Volsc, vritr the II Corps moving in the direction oi fip~rno . You ce.n see th?t .the two corps F<re diverging from each other, leaving a W'T 'Lt"reen . I an, worried for fear the right flan"l.:: o-1"' II 0orrs Y"'ay beco,..e or~m . It seem to me that 88tr Division sho11lc co11,s0Hdate its position in the Tlount Alto region , pushin[" on to the no-rtbwest so tei.at it controls the rig}, ground just south of' the F . Amaseno 1~iver , wi.th its tail echelo11ed in, the direction of the F"'C . Tl•,,t woald rerr it 85th Divi;,:;ion on t}-,e soutl, to continue on to tl1~ Li,;h 1yound ,,est of r iperno and rerhaps on to Sezze . If you draw this out on th~ mar you will see th.Pt the II Corps t1: en is f"i 11 ~ ng th"! ;ar between the Frencl, and VI Cor-rs and any advance by Special Service Poree to its area #3 south of Cori will put us in fine position to join up . "I~ow ;vou are watcl:ing this . this . n 1 lease let ;;e -:now vhat you are doing Pbout General Gruenther rep lied to the 13 boi-re as :'allows: 11 T have spei1t 13 ccmsiderable amount of tlne toclay in order to !"Void the creation of' thriJ gap wl icr you referr~d to in -your riote thet car,,e tonic;r>t . I do not claim that we lave 11rrived at tLe rerfect solution , but I ari quite certF<in that botl: the EC and the II Corps are aware of th•• :r-roblem, and thRt botr of them Dre doin[; evervtr j_ng possible to [',void our beine :rlaced in a position where t:r"' gap ~Jill embarrass us . · 0 �9/ "The Frencl. plan of advnnce is as follows: 4 nm~ wil1 advance on the axis LENDLA-VALLF.Cr,RSA-:''OP.1T SISER'JA, ?nd DIM on axis FASTEHA-CASTRO DEI VOISCI, 3rd DIA on axis FICO-SAN GIOVA\fTTI, 1st DMI protecting the rir;ht flank of F-r;C 1mtil the Ei~hth Arr1y arrives, 11-ft ,r wrich it will rr-sv!'"-rt to corps ,reser'V'e. "The II Corps plan is as follows: The f'"P:th Division to capture tre mtmr CTJRIA-FO'JTA DE Gf.J~I area; then advance to the northwest cutting the AMASENO Valley road. The ~5th Division to capture the high gr01md v,est of PIPERHO (I RJVERHC on so~e naps) ; th..,n nd.,rance to the northwest on S~ZZE and 'IORiffi.. "'l'hr, Frencri operations are proceeding accordin.i-; to plan and no gar has developed yet, but t'ris ·is chiefly bec~use th relief o:f' th~ 351st Infantry on HC'U rri CHIAVI'JO has not bMn completed y,t. 'l'he Frfl'lncr (General Carpentier·) insist that it has taken -place and th~y ar~ c}eckinp; vigorously tonight to prove trqt a battalion of the 4th DMH occupies that hill, but Porter hftS convinced m('l that tre:ir lnformation is viot t>b"'olutely- correct. It is tr,1"'! thrt th, French this aft!")rnoon had troops on T'fTNT VO'JA and M01Nl' r:zzUTO, but the enemy sent in sore troops between :num VC '{A and r:'.OTJl''T CHIAVINO ur ich prevented the relief, and the troops - l::>oth Am~rican and :::-'rench - are attempting to clear up that sitmition tonight. Rega:;.-r1less of the stnte of confusion - end it is only minor - which exists in that part5 cular area, tr e fact remP ins that no ga.p has developed and the II Corrs is rrotectinp; ~ ts ovm flt>nk es well as assisting the French. The reason one can say th1:1t the II Corrs is rrotecting its fhmk is because it 1w s the 35oth Inf entry genl"rally in the MOUilT CURIO area; the 349th Infantry gen~rally in the f'f0tnl1T ROTFNDC area. (Exact location llllkno,,m. Crawford has ;nstructiohs to nove an fffl'J:'A I''::: CAHFI, but he has b~en delayed in arriving there). 11 m1at the II Corps want to <lo now, and they have pushed r,e vigorously all day on this point, is to free their 351st RegiM.ent in order to be P.ble to rlace it in corps reserve. 339th will attack northwest regardless of 351st; Ps will the 337th and 338th as soon as they take TFJffi.ACINA. In thPt event they would then continue the attack of the '339th fro'lt f.ONNINC' toward the northwest toward PIP"":RNO. The 337th and ,3gth, still fighting in the TF.RRACINA-r-'DUW LEANA area, would proceed toward FifF.RNO while the 151st would be held under corps control in a central position to be used as the situl'ltion demands. I believe thr,t the entire problem will be solv~d as soon P s the siturition in the CHIAVINO-VALLE CORSA area clears. The French are not at all worried thn.t there is any danger in the so-called gap area and I 1u1 inclined to ~gree with them. Howev-er, I can a.ssure you that we area, not being conplacent about the matter, and thBt I am · followinr, it up relentlessly. rood is thoroughl7.r cognizant of the problem, and he is givin1; it hi3 very careful 8ttention. "It seems to me that we should now cons:ider extending th .. boundary between the FF,r, and the II Corps. I have not had a chance to discuss it vrlth either headquarters yet, but I suggest that the present boundaries be erlended to the northwest so that the road FIP'"RNO-Tf'YI'"SIANICO be given to II Corps. I realize, of course, thnt the boundary derends on the use you intend to make of the II Corrs when :it reaches the brjdgehead, but J believe that this boundary will at least orient both corrs in the correct direction. I will talk to G~nernls Keyes and Gr,rpentier tomorrow on this subject in order to ascertain their views. 11 �SAU MARCO-A •;crc--r:A.Y 2?, lq/44--General ClFrk this rnorn:ng dictated the following notes regardin~ his trip yesterday for inclusion in tr.c diBry: "Yesterday I flew to see Ge'1"ral Leese in [ln effort to coordin.'1te our ntAlthougP he professes tlwt Ms Pttack will be all-out, it is eing r.l"de by one di ision. I .cor.m:ented as well as I could on the weakness of the attack, but +,hroui:i;h qnick talk he indicated a great massing behind. All t:beir ections are always dictated b:, their rlesire to SP.Ve mnnpower and let someone else do i.t. I pointed out the a Jsolute necessity of eTl"lryone attacking all-out at tre sane time. He agrMs in pr--:nciple but will not do it in fact . I then flew to Juin. He is r'!ost eap;er to Rttack on tre ?3rd "ut will not let up his attacks in the nM.ntine. He exy-ressed surprise nt th..,. weakne9s of' the British attack. ne told Me ti-mt Fontecor-ro was rmoccupied and tht1t he was in th'-" outskirts, yet tre Canadfrns would not go in. He hPs born~ th~ brunt of tJ:,e Liri Valley battl'-"'. I am issuing orders co11.firl"l.-'ni,; M.Y 'Conversation with him in order that his r>ttack toMor:cow, in conjunction witr the Eighth ArMy, will a,,.,.. i.tsel" felt over pnd above trose t1tta~ks of the past few dl'lys. tacks <'or t ,e ?3rd . - "I visited a battle~ield west o~ Esp~ria witr Juin. It was ~s concentrPted n destruction of G1'rman rerso1mel a'1d T"l'l.teriel as I hA.ve ever seen. It ,,as nat;ni~5cent. Froba~ly 100 vericles, r,ostly vrmored, were destroyed. J tren flew to Scauri Rnd vi.sited in turn Ferr ia, Itri, Fondi and several riiles west of Fon:ii wrer" tl e 11attle , as taki.nr, place east of 'fonte San Bfap;io. II Corps is rnak'tr,rr vood rror;ress. I tl-i,-n w~nt to Gaeta an,, observed a lx=\ttalion of the 138th a)out to take off Por Sperlon,a in dukws. I urged II Cor~s to be allout in their forward move. e'1t. He . ust r-et the M. ;r ~ound '1orth of T~rrr>cina rrer~ratory to join;nv, up. "Upon "IV return by air I phoned Ge:reral A7evanil"'r, told hi1'1 of my trip and of rny plans to rush the II Corps to t!- e hi.gh rrro1md nortr of Terracina." General Clark c0nf~rr~d with G"'neral Gr,1entr~r Pnd GenerPl i'.lrl'lnn duri.nr, tre rnor.~n~ rr~or to his Move to ~re ½eachhe~<l. At 1100 re, G~ner~l Brann Pnn Colonel Drapl'!r f'lew to tl e beachrMd. Tpo'1 hfr Arri wi.1, Ge'1erel Cl.,,rk Fen+, ,im- . redirtely t0 hi.s Arvrnce Co:r,T"rntl Jost, had lunch flrr1 l~"'t with G~n~rl'll Bra"U'l. ror VI Corps wr"re hJ '.!onf'err'-"'<l 'fl'~th Ger"rE-1 '1' 1-uscott. Fro the VI Corps COl"'Mand post he :sited General Harl"l'Jon ()"" t1", 1st llrnored r-;vi.s5on, General 0 1 I1a'1i.el 0$' tl e '3rd Di.vic:;ion, rr~nerel Ryder of tl"' 14th Division and Gl!'n"'rrl 'tilker o" tre 1/,tJ:- Civision. All co and"rs wer~ .;n 1'1'0od ½eart ~'1d were ,., ,er Pn<l fl..nxious to jUMl'.' off .;n t1-_ 0rn~n-; nt 063C' lmmc:'Yi"1f! tle Dt°'PChhead attack. r-Po'1 h--1 s ,,..e+.urn to his co;-, and rest, (},•:nl"'rP 1 Clnrk, f'renerr>l Bra:r.:1 e"ld Colc..,e:' Yoward disc'rnsed br•-',..f'ly th• en ..my si.twtion. Tl·e fact +rrt t}-1"' G-errrrm 2i::,t:r Di vi.sion · '1 the Cori ?rea bid ee:>1 brcurrl t so1 t1· and tr~ q('t}, aTJ.d 29tli Divisions nortl of" Rn to the 'li' :rtl~ Arrw fl~fl front FJ.m so el mf'lnt trri Tl1.v1 ... siono on t e Adrir-tic s~c'le op 1 ositfl! the Fritis}:, 5tr Div!.sion v"ere discussed. ~1--at U e Gei-.an reac+j on would he, to t", contimlP.tio:r. of nn all-out attf,c:k from tr~ ~a·n :ront 8nd from t~e beachhead could not be defin~~elv v,lwted rt tlis t-· e. :Jo '-"' i:'."ldicP.tions were th.<i:1., th" Gernan was wi+,hilraw~r.,.,.: Oth,..rs indicPted th-it h"" in+~11c1 d to a~~ ,pt bF.tt1e P'1d d"'ren.rl v•-.-y ~lose tr- h-' s present J os: tions a3 of tc:-r1ay. �93 hnurs. At this confer"'r.ce he gave a.n off-the-record talk on "'V~nts thFt were to take plac/1! to""1orrow. In brief he exrlainl'"d row the attack on the Fifth Arm:t main t'ront was to b~ cortinued tomorrow 2nr1 rt 0630 the beacrhead forces ~ould lr 1 nch its attacv jn the djrectjon Cori - Valnontone . He emphesized that th is attack was planned to cut n r:hwa;v /16 r rid to 1 1.sh ro lu""ns nor-':.h a11rl Pouth wit} the ultirir>te obj1-ctives of r1 estroy~ng es l"'l"DY Gio-r:":Pl1.S as possible . General Clark stated that he. was not rrepl"red to say exactly wfo:,t the G6rr"E.n reaction would be and that he had a flexible mind, e11c , dere':.C::.ii.~ upon what tl:>e German did , was prepared to r,eet sev~ral "!Vent .mlities ••••• on~, a chanie in the direction of attack f'rorn due nortt to northwest. :L "ncicat~d thnt the beacr'head attack did not have as its p~ll'pose to capture Rorre . He explained }-ow the 45th Division ,·rould launch a li, ited obj~ctive attack on the lef't wit}. the 1st Ar:r,ored on jts right, leadin:r ler-ients being its tanl:s and its infantry f'ollowin,; up . On ti1e 1st Ar:"ored Di vision's right, would be the 3rd Division , trhicli w011lf Pttaek +re CisternP Pren which would -rrobably be heavily def'ended . "'he 36th Division ,ms to be prepnred to pass through the 3rd Di v5 sion if it was necessa1.7 to re-gi~oup and clean out the Cisterna area with the 3rd Division. He emphe.sized that the 36th Division, however, would not pass thrN1.~h unless the situation warranted it . There would be a thirtyminute a.rtillery preparation y.rio:r· to the attact:-, concentrated on the front of the 1st Arnori"'d and 3rd Divfoion in addition to count"'rbattery. The air also would play a heavy role, '1otr light, ,.,.,.diun end hea11:r borAb,.rs of the Strateq;ic Air :"ore~ . 'rhe weather forecast appeared ':'avora~l-,, and General Clark was corfident tLat rlans had been well prepareri and thPt the attack should go . He e:q,lai'Yl~d tret tl-e t rm Britisli Divjsfons on the hft were 1 mder Fifth Ar111 y control ar.c1 would hold t! eir positio!'ls with linjt Jd attacks only. The question arose as trJ vfrether or not tl-ie Ari y's left flank ms vulnera1:Jle to a l}"'rr:an attar::k +"rom t: e S'JUtl, since he had a1railable sev~ral divisions thPt could be b:>'01 1r,;J-it down with:in 24 hours . G~ner2 l Clark saic. trat this was always a possibility but that he tJ-iought thet if such an attsc},;: did take place we could hold it because we had done so before . He answered several questions fro;"' correspondents ,,ho wer('a, very entJ:,usiastic and pleased tC' be ½rieferl on -':.he attack taking place tomorrow. After U,e conferf"!nce General Clark saw Ge1'1Lral Horan, Signal Cf'ficer, and Gen"ral Bradshaw, AA Officer , after wh:5~h he r~tired early. 1 1 An estimated total o: prisoners of war as of 0625 this morning was 4,748. The following irportant mess~ges were received and dispatched today: Gruenther to Clarko TI.N' 142. "Eighth Army Stratton reports that Canadian progress in Fortecorvo Prea procl'leding satisfactorily. Believes that Canadians may be 8ble to 0 1t"'lank fixed defenses Pontecorvo area todr,,y. They consider it likely that enemy may start withdrawal front Hitler Line toniglit . So entr,usiastfo are they that they are discussing pursuit plnns and have s116 gest"'d boundary J'llodification a·"ter -':.he;-r net b'°'yond Cerrano . We have Jl'l.8.de no comr,itments . Will keep you advised . " 1 Gruenther to Clark. R'·J 14/ ,i-. 11 rren ::h re:rort thHt German withdrawal frol'I. Fico and Fontecorvo areas continues tc :increase. Brosset Division observer states that G~rnans appear to be in .confusion. Saville is sending out heavy armed recces . t•reather deteriorating . French occupfod :.enola. Now :rushing towards rastena and Snn Giovarni . 11 �CL"-1.rk to Gruenther . RN 8033 . 11 Your weathP,r message received . We will attack as s,heduled . Mnke every effort to carry out fighter bomber and light bomber missions at tjmes agreed upon. Weather ,iay look bad there but be good here . ~1issions cancelled should be mede available w en weather perr,its . " FiftJ; , Ar□y to Fifth Arm:.r Afhrance er. · RN 148. "Eight:b Army has requested AAI to adjust boundary forward o"" Cecca.no as follows . 'All incl Eighth Arrny Patricia 3833 - Supino 3535 - r1orola 3337 - Scurgolfi 2941 - rd junc ?242 thence Sei::;ni and your orir,inal bo1.U1dary. Both Fifth Army and ~ighth Army will probably be interested in routes through Ceccano 1 • AAI has been requested to rnake no cl ange for the present . ti 1 * ANZIO--M.AY 23 , 19/44--General Clark arose at 0430 , had a quick bree..kfast and went to a forward observation post to be on hand at the front rrior to the artillery preparation . He was .o:nided to the OP by General Butler , Deputy Com- · mander to General. Truscott . The trip out was quiet Rnd continued to be so until 0545 when more than 5CO guns opened up on the half hour's preparation preceding the attack. Soon after th"' cannons started firi:n.<:;, visibility -became very poor , due to smoke and morn:ing hn.ze . Little could be seen, but through the din and roar of the g1mfi1~e, tanks could be heard ~oving up into position ready to attack. At 0615 the dull rul'llble of our aircraft proceeding to drop their bornb loads on schedule could also be heard . At the forward OP , in addi- tion to General Clark, were General 'i'ruscott, VI Corps Commander; General BPehr , Corps Artillery Officer; and General Lewis , Arny Artillery Officer . General Clark remained at the forward OF 1.mtil 0730 when-he started bnck t'o his adYance command post. The return trip was mA.de in a dull drizzle which lasted for about fifteen ainutes . Upon his return· to the advance comme.nd post , General Cl.8.rk remained in :bis office the entire mornj_ng, receiving reports of the progress of the battle , both on the beachhead front and the Min Fifth Army front . He conferred fre quently with General Brann, his G- 3, concerning future plans . Copies of messages sont to General Gruenther , Chief of Staff, report hlghlights of today ' s events and future actions . 1n brief, reports of rrogress made came in rather slowly during the day. The 45th had rractically taken its limited objective . The 1st ArMored Division had ·passed the railroad north of 0111' front line , and the 3rd Division had advanced its position about 2 , 000 yards , and the Special Servjce Force had pushed elenents across Highway //7 but ,,ere driven back lPte in the day and evening. From the main front , II Corrs had still not taken Terracina, but the 337th Infantry had takeP Mount Croce to the nort1' of the town and was planning an enveloping maneuver from the north to take it . Other elements of the 85th and ~8th Di.visions were Naking rarid rrogress through the mountains to the northwest . F..arly this afternoon elements of the 88th Di vision reported that they could see motor Movements on the east-west road north of Ir.iverno . These elements were probably on Pount Curio . The French Corrs was having sm-1e tough fighting , and the report that they had captured Mount Cerreta was not correct . They were still fighting for tM.s high ground . The attack by the Canadians on the Bighth Army front had no aprearance of being all- out and WHS rather disappointing. Gonf~rPll'ld reports of any progress they had n2de have not been received . �As of r,idnight tonight casuPlties in th!" Anzio area ran up to JJ1-90 . * * * A' 1ZIO--t'!AY 24, 1944--General Clark arose early to study communiques concern:1 ng progress of tl-i."'l battle on botl:i fronts . Inforrn,.-,tion concerning the beachheail. was r1eager in the early r-orning hours. G"'ner81 rarrnon I s 1st Armored Division had passed some ele,..ents e cross th"' railroad who held their positions 0'1ring the night . The only point wherir: enemy counterattacks · push1'd our e 1e:'le'1ts back were in th~ Specfa l Service Force eree in which 'mi ts were forced back of Hi~hway #7. Durin,o; tJ,,e d2y, however, the 1st ArJ11.ored niv1sibn had 0dvrmced past Fi ~hway }7 and h"l.d rrflct1cally reached its fir st phase -1ine, the TI line, by nightfall, nort.h of Fig,.'1way ,¥7 . The 3rd Tli_vision, ,vhile not D ctuD lly occupying Cistern2., 1-iad :~us1..,1-d elel""1'nts on botr Jtc1 -'s of jt •ell nor-tr- of righway /17. On +,}- e naJn Fiftl- ArBy front Terracina liar'l fallen, ard m.otoriMd reconnaissar:ce elements were fay,:ning out fro., Terrac':na or I'ighway ¥7 and on lateral roacs toward the bridgehead . Frogress j s slov: 1,ecause of !:'any der:.olitio:ris encmmtered. Ac'~mnces were -Ede along th'!! entire II Corps front., 6 iving us practicall:t all of tbe h~_gJ., rrouna east of th!": ljne fjperno 'T' r:::-acin11 . Frer1 ch Corps ~1ad , so, e :r.,...or;ress on th"' rigl•t Jlnnk, · :nota'l-,ly 1 aving- cr'1W_11.r::ed as far as Vall~corsa . On th,..ir r::gl"t pr0gess was slo".r be cause of bitter res:Lstence . aeports indicrted that t:1e Eighth Army had rushed "'iooil,... 1:"lements as far as the Mel.fa River. At 0840 General Clerk left for the Srecial Service Go~rnand Post where he decorated Genl'!ra1 Frederic 1-:: vlith the T.listinguished Service Cross . Prior to t':11'! awarding of the decoration, General ClPrk d:lscussed with General Frederick diff>iculties thPt L" had encountered the preceding afternoon and evenin ,. ;::)eterrnined counterrtti:icks by 9.r:nor fo:-ced General ""rederick to w~ thdraw his forces sontr of Hi,.:;hway #7 . I.i'ror, th" Special ~lervice Force, General Clark went to the 1st .Arn1ored Dbrision where be co"lferred with General Harmon . He first learned here that tank elenents had crossed Hic:,;hway #7 . Upon leaviw; the 1st Armored Di vision comr'land post, he Met General 0 1Daniel, Cormanding General of the 3rd Divj_sion , and acconpanied him to the 3rd ::Jivision corm.and post, where te discussed with him condjtions on the 3rd Dh'ision frcnt. Their progress was slower , due to heavy defenses in and around Cisterna. After leav5-ng Genl')ral O'Daniel , General Clark went to the Y~tL ·:va.cuation Hospital where he visited his Fifth ArM.y soldiers that had been wounded withi:'1 the last two days . He cr,a t ted .. with many in tLe casualty wards i:rnd elso visited one of the operating rooms . From the J"J;th I'vacue.tion Hospital he went directly bacl: to the Fifth .Arny advance com:"land post ,il::ere he went into c011ference with Genl"r-al Brnnn. Faramount in his discussions Fith his G-J was the possibility of joinjng the bridgehead forces from the west with II Corrs +:'orces aprroac1'ing fron the east. He took the 16th T'.::i-igineer Reg:i rent frorn unde:r VI Corps control and took them under his co1 mand, allo~ving General ':'ruscott to ·1-:eep his eye straight ahe1id toward 1-lis ob.i~ctives in the vicinity of Cori . The 36th l~ng~neers had attached. to it the Brett Force , combination of a British recce unit e.nd sore American tank destroyers . mhe 36th Engineers vdth its attaclun"lnts under corn:r1a.nd of Colonel �Stanl-,y will jur::p off early to:-ior-row "'orn~n with elements of II Corps . Important erstwerd, e:;.'T-,ctinr; to join ·,1p essages of the day are as follows: Gru~nther to Clar'• . R'' 167. "Tio,rracina is ours" . General Gruenther this morning sent General ClFrk the followinr, rl, e orl."n- : "I h'l e just 'lert you a ,..lr:tsh thflt T~HRACPIA is now in our rossession . We hav~ rad th., wh~els reased sine, last nir,ht that as soon as it ea.r1e into o•ir i:ossession word would bJ piven to e i ediately. The ressR.ge was on its way to you within five minutes of the -ti.me tht-1t II CorJ s learned of the carture . "':be exact position of t'1e 1313th on Monte Leano i.s not !c"lO\m but it is helieTl'!r" to be ot1 tor of th!" M.11 oving west to cut t, e ro::irl and bottle 1 1r any Ger :'l.ns still i.n +,re a.rel:'. , · •v~e~s entered town w-:tr the i.nf'·rntry &d are ull-dozing a path throu11;h . GenerPl Keyes w:i.11 ress so I'." artille:r-y tlu-ough first hecause he hA.S snre positions just vest 0f the tow:r w'r ~ er he is T"'ry t"ag~r to occupy. 3;.,,.111ta"11.eously !'!ler •r.ts o:' th"' 91st R~cn . Sqmidron will ;ass throng}, in an l'!J"Ce[lvor to dash on to th.- 1-)ridr,ehead area. Get11'!rt': l'"'yes has thorour,hly j hued J,,js troops wit tr" ~rlea o-f "rescu~nr; trl" ½r-td,ahead" anrl ~twill not surprise me to refl.r thfl·t c0!ltact o+' A. sort is ar'e wi th:in tl-il"\ next 24-36 hours . T'/an'11.a bet? 11 T'n "The 330 :n..,antry has <Jent a :force t0 cPrb.1re the western end of the r~onte ORSr tunnel . J+' the -tmml"l can be used it will g.reatlv facilitate tre mov"' eP-t 0f troors and supplies to t,e FIP~RNC' area . "Gen ,ral Ori tt"'nberger :has askfl!d for autrority to .ov" his command post to t},l" area :.'orm~r:i.y occupii,d by II Corrs . I hav~ a-nprovfl')d his r"'qu-,st and the ~ove fill be ade within a few days . Gfl!neral Critte11r- ,r ,er told e thrt h., has just rec1'iVl"d newspar-,r clip r-in ,s 4"rom t:1e States f'ron Hay ll anc l? n.,wsrap~rs ard thiot the universal attitude is one of extr~ne corf:ldence in th~ rbiE.ty of the Fifth Arny to accomplish its ~ission . 11 G-,!'11!ral Alexander is most enthusias+,ic- over the rrogress of tre Fifth tr e brid,,ebead yester,fay. He has as'.<ed e to extio,'1d h5.s best wi.shes to you . GenerPl Alexnnder will dehi.y his decoration of General K.,yes and General Juin until you can be present.11 11 Army and esrecially th"' advc.nce mane 1n A r,risoner o-f' war report as of 1 :30 t1,is afternoon showed the li'ifth Ar ,y as takinn; a total of 7 , 304 nri soners anc' tre ::a ,hth Army taking ,., , '3 50, aking a to+,al of 0, 654. ~his .Piriru:re rerresents the total prisoners taken since the egjnninp, of the all-out offensive on the night of r!ay 11- 12 . This l'.f'ternoon General Clark sent the .c>ollowing rnernorandum to General Gruenther: �ii/(' ~ ~ .3 "The joininr, ur of II Corrs and Fifth Army bridg"hMd forces may take rlace at any time, Ps you know. Witri the thr"'at of the II Corrs in the rear of 17tr Division, ·1:,11,., Boche will be reluct;:int to kMr iraport~mt <Xl~""itments south of Littoria and south of Route #7. "As you know, tre joininr, up of ny two Fifth Army forces will be one of tlie 1'-' ,..,lir;hts of' tJ:,e Fifth ArMy 1 s career . rt is rrimnrily a Fifth Arr.y M.tter, nnd I want you tot 11 Generfll Alexander thr-t I want autl::ority given me i .ediPtel;v to -issue n sil"\ple oomri~m:ique +>ref'! rere as soon as II Corrs t~oops have moved overl11ncl into the bridgehe['.d . "'he rebuttal they may ii;ive you that a teTipornry joinin~ up noes not ~ean a permanent one - is unimportant, for tl'e story, arrl the big arrunent, is ·1hen Fifth Arny main front troops Move ov""rla.nd into the hrideehead. The bri<l~ehead is entitl~d to this story, and if we have tc wnit .,,.or a commmique .~ro. A.AI, Alr;iers, Naples and all the r~st get the story before tre ~en do rer,. All I ,culd g;ve would be a simple st~te~ent in a coJ!l?llunique that troops o~ t 1 main Fifth Army hr:i.ve broken into the bridgehead ovt""r1Fn<l . As soon as thr-t stnte nt is r;iven, I would radio to you in order tl:-r>t AAI could rut out ?. siT'lilar co. unique . J lease hA.nclle this +>or me and ins~ st, i+' you cnn, upon riy request being ~anted . "I hn.ve visited advance cp ' s of '3rd I)ivision, Special Service Force ['nd 1st Ar,nored Division this morning , and, in addition, talked to Truscott . The "ight ing is se-ver"' on l--oth sides of Cistena. Special Service Force had a tough time last evening. Tanks Pttac1cl'lri it and "nf'l.icted rathl'lr seY"'re casualties . The 133rd Inf'antry took over 1ts f'r-0nt w~ich hrd been r-ushed back south of Route #7. S~cial Service Force wrs bl'ling rMrg1:111.ized and by this t.;_,,,e should have juriped off in thP- attr:i.ck again, for tre 3rd Djvision has rusred ur across Route //7 on its left . I wa<J et '":rnie r~rmo:'1 1 s CP tris norning ·,hen news cane in th,... t two of hts 1st Armored tnnk comprmies were astride Route #7. Tr.l:'t was ITOod news. I exrect ~ore to follow . The 5th Division's Sl'l!flll effort yesterday on tl.e left "'lnnk rnet wit}, a counter attack last nir;rit which pushed it beck across the river. Tt is bi:>ck wh"'r~ it str,rted. ITren I r,et additional parachute troors, u.s., I will lwve 5tr. Rritish Division take ovl'!r the entire sector of the two British :::)ivisions rlus fPrachute troops and perhnps the %th En ,.;neer, if we close in with VI and II Corps. Then I am prepering y,J.ans to use the 1st British Di.vision with the 45th for an att ck northwest astrice th"' railroad track. This is j,1st r plan, but if eTentue.lities require :tt, ~.t is well to ha e it in hen1 . :: e0uld support it with tanks . "I would say tl ere are about ? , OOO battle cti.sualti""s to date. I visited one evflcuation hospital tr:! s nornin1;, and fro, reports I would sny th:::i,t is about tre score . It May run as high as 2,500, including.dean and wounded . 0 "I arn wonder-:11~ where HG Division will go. If he is s"'.art, he r.ill put it in the Vflll'lontone area, or he a;r brlng it in southwest of' Velletri for a co•mterattack. • 11 Vlith re-rerenl:"e to t e comnmnique referred to jn tJ-,"' sec0nn p:::iragrarh, if, f'or any reason and : cnn t 1 1Jnk of none whi..cr is justifiable, A.AI will not r;rant :re thPt [l 1tl·orjty, you r:a,<"' fflrnn sur,. thf't their commmi<J_ue is prorerly worded, making it cl, Fifth A-.cn.y s>-iow, for thrt is exactly whPt it is. 1 "Have Stanl"'Y of tr~ 3bth .,Tt,r'reers ;n lier~ now, so as to talk over ways �and means thf1t he might move out of the bridgehead if required to meet II Corps .. I would pref\")r that II Corps ca:r,e in. HReceived your notes' on detachments from Fifth Army at a later time,. will think about that e fter we hmre accomplished whet we · set out to do. "Delighted the way Keyes is pusring his II Corps. which you give him. 11 I I know the impetus Gruenther to Clark. RN 171. "Keyes has just returned from cub reconnaissance west of Terracina. Denolitions are extensive. Improbable th8t reconnaissances squadron ca.n start north today. Western "'.'nd of Monte Orsa tlmnel blocked.. 349th in contact south of Mo1L'lt Rotundo." Clark to Gruenther. RT-I H-19.. "Reference your NR 171, reconnaissance squadron should not wait to Move north. They should go as fnst as the~r can go, stopping only as demolitions ere encountered. Your message indic8tes that they will vrait unt-' 1 tomorrow or s0J11e other t:i me to start. Get them going and let the demolitions dictate tl-eir rate of speed. Our cub reconnaissance ov~r Route through Bergo Grappa does not indkate heavy derwlitions. 11 At 1650 tl is afternoon General Clark sent tte fallowing e:-1orandum to General Gruenther: ';I have taken Jt8.nley 1 s 36th Fngin1'ers snd its sector defense over to Army control in order to further relieve Truscott from lookiYJ.g over his shoulder. I want his eye on tr e ball ont in .,.ro11t - Cori - Valmontone WJY. I have put the so-called 11 Brett 11 force under Jtanl~~~. Stenley will still have his sector defense responsibility, whic~ ~ill gradually dissolve as the Boche pull out of the Littoria area. As Keyes• advance elenents advauce Littoria way, I will shoot Stanley out. Stanley thinks it will be a pushover. The Boche has fired a lot of ammunition on that sector today - I think, getting rid of it. As soon as the 85th Di vision has secured the high 6rol.md in the Sezze area, I will bring II Corps Headquerters and corps troops complete into the bridgehead. The faster Key..,s cen gnllop his hors,, the ',etter I will like it. By that time the Frencr should have pushed up, pl'rr:.itting 88th to push up, relieving th~ 35th. 85th will then come into the bridgehead. I will ass'ign the 45th Division, the $5th, the two British Division, 16th Engineers and tanks, perhaps some from ITarmon but not if' his going is good the other vray (Herman Goering w!.11 help c1 "'cide tJ:,is), and II Corps will prepare "plans for an all-out ol.:ensive to the northwest astricle the newly gained railroad ernbenl:ment which is outside o.,. thdr principal !'lined area. rJ Coll)S will take over the Sezze - Fiperno sector. Just want"d to let you know what I s in my mind., "If things M.ove as raridly as I tr.ink they will with regRrd to the joining up, I see no excuse for moving the rear elef'lents of our F5+'th Ari y CI into the Itri area. I ha"'te just talked with Uoran, who 11.grees. We might go to Littoria. I 1'>.1\1. a::'raid that 1 s pretty well smashed. and probflbly a heavily nined area which would not facilitate our spreading over the countryside. Dick is working on it and will let you ::now. nr hope we will eet Cisterna tris ev-ening. ~ ~ ' - Ernie I s Cor"lbat Gol"inand A is on �the Ti line and B is approa cl ing it . As I told you, his reconnaissance eler,ents e.re work:i.nf!, slo·,vly northward. He is pushing some light t.<mks to the east. I mn optid.stic. I estii"'l8.te 1500 p'.r'isoners haV'c been taken up here since the beginning of the attack. It may run over that. 11 Enc1osed is a note for Lem, as you suggested. u The Army Chie~ of Staff sent the following Memorandum to th~ Army Commander: "I hHve your letter written at 1/410 hours this date. 11 I have just been cble to reac:b Lem '7i thin the -rast few :r::inutes and I • discussed the special coro:m.mique request vr~ th him. He is i:;oing to get the feel of it w:ithin the next two hours Pnc< call ne back to give rne the reaction. :rt is h~s belief thnt there will he oppositfon to the issuing of a special comnnmique direct fro,., tre Bridgehead. He do~s, however, feel con!'iclent tlk"lt we can probably write our· own communique in r1dvance so that it can be released simultaneously here ano at the Bridgehead. t shall hold out for the issue of a simple comrimiq11e .,..rom tre Bridgehead couched in such lengu_.qp~e as will +'it t_ e siturtion wrich occurs. rowever, I suggest that :rou l,ave Ken Clark draft a suggested cor,,rnunique and senc1 it alo11g by th1&, 8 o I clock poucr tornorrow norn5 ng. It arpears n011, I regret to say, thrit the Reen Squadron ni 11 :not pet to LITT0RIA as soon as vre bP.d roped this morninr,. Gene:;.~el Yeyes reports thrt tb•, (' enolitio:n wori< has tl1'en very th0roui:;hly dont:. He has sent more eng'ri~ers up to pusr the wor'k: energetically and he will g,.,,t tl1rou:;! Ps fast as he possibly can. Fov'ever, P.t this writin · l e can not gun.rantee thEt the Reen U..."1~ts wil1 be stf1rted by r.iorning; in fact, h~ is alnost certain thPt they w:n: not. I Br following this matt"'r u:r ccnst?ntly and I s½all k~er v-0 11 advis"'ld of the rrogress of the rerair work, b~ca.use I know how r-uch this join-up Means to the Brjdeehead forces and to t½e entire Fift ArMy. 0 0 EXTRA SFBCIAL FL.ASE~ "G"neral Carrentjer just telerronl"ld (1705) to sta.t~ tr.at V1>llecorsa is ours. I aJ,, hapry about tr~ s in nore ways thari one, because now Generril K"'y~s should be satisfi"'d thflt the Chi.avino-P1zzuto a:cea is secure. He will now be a'l-:Jle to rove ris 351st aro·md to tre west•rn flank to give extra ~!'Ip ,tus to }ris rus1' th~re. I sent you a r,essage 15 m~.rn1tes 1:>go tl 2t the St, ArI'l';y has reported whPt 0 mounts to a break-ti:--rourh of tan1,s to the Vi'LFA River. Tl-iey clai,;i t},at there is e ~ai:.-·l~f 1£.rr-e ~nl"!!'1Y .('orce ., n the A'),FHTO-r:rn-r•~o'IT:C area a~1c Hey now h--,ve hopes of a r,ooc~-size G•r,,on bag. : jl"""ediately got in · touch with Gen"ral Car·entier to give him tl·e news. Ht" checl'ed ,,:th the 3rd DIA and th""?y r~ported that there has ')e"'n no decrease in 1'ne1::- r4'sistance in the SA'-J GIQ1Tfi>JNI area. However, wit}' t!1e news o-P the ''l'ri'LFA River- brer.k-thro'_1gh, tLe French are now go:.n: to pus} nort 11 W"th r"r,l')wed v:l p;or. Unfortun/0 tely, of course, they are 11ot at all certain +.l1nt t]1e ?th Arry r-•port is correct. C':i.·d~11arily, :r wouldn't bet a nickl, 01 that ""~tl·er, but in t!1is case I believe tLe report is e"ccurate. -..le shall see! 0 doubts that ,,e will be able to get the parachute battalion and the glider battalion ir1 addition to the parachute 11.CT. '.'"! tr irL',,:, ,.:,hat AfH,i will 11 Lem 'td) ;· /~ ,"'., .,,½:_ "',,. ,'," \ '~ /i ~;y,, >~· �100 insi.st ~n si-nding on~ or +,:1e ct,h\"'r of th1'8 1111.its -C') tr e Airborn~ "'rchl.ing Cert\"'r ·,.., ediately. 'fowevl"r, I told '1 4 t:r11.t JOU rac!. t-- hEve bc,+h of tre. now and that AAI should not cons.::d"r a co J..,.c r.:s\"' wr-ile th" b1:ttle is in its pres1•nt critical stage . He says they wil:.. rusr the atter for all their worth . "He are all 1: ,hly alrted v,.: t·1 t>~ st'r'Cl"SS o~ th~ R:"'idg"':bead etti=wk • t~.a-:. , e ca 1 gi e yo,:;. t' e necessary ass.:s+ance from this end • .- .,. on";.v 'op\"' '"!11:'.rk to Gr·w-.ther- . RT· 8j_C7 . 11 R~fer~>1~e sped al co ,,,,mique , I R~ w-"Ui•1~ ·r ·)e;r -'ns··s~ to a si u:.to.~.-.ous iss...1e . I s-..1t~gest "';he fo:lo1ing com-·mique: ' Jlimaxing F srectact l8r d •tmce 0f 6o iles in pnly blf:·nk days , Fi"th Ar y ~roops f"':co -'-;l e ain fron.t j a.: r\"'d ur tc 'r- y vri. th F:'...ft. Ar y All;"'d fcrces w1--,~~· r" · 1:'l~oken out o"" th, l)ef>chhead . 1 1Tr~ -!;roo1 s -"ro tl e ::::-•1t' , ov rcom-i 1r, ro "'rful erl"ny rl'lsistance , . ave +'ou~ht th~ir way sin~e t11e ·1i l + c. f ::a- :2 J'iay over so e of tb"' most <liffic-ul-:. 0·1'1-:.ain ter1·ain of the wrole Palinn . carirpai -n . ' Tle c'r. ati.c .~urcture of the t~o :'-:l.-l"tl Ar ~,-,..r0rts riccurrl"d a '"',,.w ,iles soutl east c" t'1.- 11eachhead on -+;l,t"' '"!O, str 1 ·h: gl war ru.nr::..n ~-:.wei,r. T\"'rracira ~nd A~zio . ,,.,.. e jun.c4:.ur~ o., the two f'orces i:;iv1's riftL Ar y •m.:.nterrupt\"'d lard co _ _ , :>1:;..caticns "or the "· rst t · , si 111"' th"I '1c£' chreac O;' ,rp+,io11s 1i,gan on 22 .Ta'luA.ry. ""'•ir·n" +,'1e • rt"'r-;--:.. '3.11 t,~oors; equip ~11t e"lr' surrlies hr-d to e tra""sr 01·ted ov..,_,__• : czardcu3 sec. r0•1t-,s . 1 1 11 You will note thrt I lav,,. left blan" ~1 A number o~ days i.t took to ~oin up . Each readqwrter<i cc"tld '"'i --nire th:i-:, s+,artj n, "rom -!;r.., nigrt 11-1? ~n<1 co mti.., tl I" 12t"h es +ne fir·st day enr'l t1·-, c F.' ~ nf ~oi.'1.~r -1p t 1 ,e l.<tst day. Re sure thf1t ·nstr,1~tioris Eir~ i<1sued :i edia... •ly to censors here to pass stori,.s "lasec1 on t: is speci · 1 corir·unic:'1• whfllln I ci.v" tl" authority to re:..e1'.lse them . After joinin.~ · r I would f 1 P sh r !'I ssage to yo'J. and giv" yo·.1.the ti e t '1pt we wofrd r~lerse here, p·obably an hour's not.!ce. I a stRrti.'l y '°'rec' al task fore.., •md"'r 3tanLy o·lt 0f tre br ~ c1 ,1"'1-iePd at di:' li 1~t tc. o.,,. ,cw rnornir . -~ K~yes r,ets on ris horse, junction Rt lePst 'y ~oot l"'le~ents srould take J lace befo-~e roon tomorrow . C:orfi rm thPt +,I-- ese "rran ,enents ar'!! sE'tis factory. '' Lat"' t1,~ s e ',n_:nc General Grul'lnt'ber sent GenerPl Cl;:ir'k- tr~ following e~o.ranclu!'l: h.'"'Yfllls call1'd tonight to flC.Vl"'e us of th"' -!; ·,....ing !'or the next phase or ri.-:; O}. eration . He rill attacl-': on ?6 nay - prob~ )ly l'!arly orning on thPt da. · - to capture th, ~'T . 3AIA'JO hill ass (;:H~-18) . Tris mir;sion will l)e ~.: "'e'"1 to the '1t:;tr Di~·ision. The "339th In-"Pntry -: ,-:; in t11e [.0~"'·:-·m area YJ.ow and. will lean tPe attack. T' e 13ntr. Inf~ntry will be ov~d tonorrow so it crn i"'l'rV c ~rat~ , P7.trour(1 G~rP.ral Yeyes is not certr:i:in thrt -it will be t} ere in t · m~ -l"o:r th-, jl.ll'lp-off . The ".<37th wi.11 1e used .:r "l.ecessary. Yo·1 l'rf~rsta11rl , o:: course , that th• ,37-t.!1 t=:nd tl1' -:i3'1-1-,h A.re still 'r the T•?ffi}CIFA.-f'T. :..C,A..TC area . Tl-i~:-r will be oved nortr +,ornorro • Aft .r rrr . ,AIA 'IO 1.r.s b ~~n se~ured the ~5ti D7 Vi.sion wil: car~ure t~e r~~ r,rotn~ in the 1~ZZ~ area. Tr~ ~8th 11 G"'n•ral �lDI Divisioy, will assist the 85th on 26 '1ay - in a oo.nner which Generril Keyes has ·'lot indicat~d yet - find will be rre:rrired to attnck on corps order in the direction ~'IT'. CT1RIA-R0CGAC'i0RGA . Gen~ral Keyes does not n.nticiprite tlm.t the. SSth Divisio11 will arivance across the A1·1ASI:NO Valley on 26 May unless the French are abreast of hi!!! at thrt ti, e - a:r1 faprobabl~ situ:otion . Gen~ral K~yes is sorry thFt he cannot launch this attack until the ?6th, but a consiclernble anount of regrouping has bt"!en necessary as fl result of t'1e f"ighting in the TERRACINA area . HoreOirer, he has h11d to displace his artillery in order to support the attack . A considerflble pRrt of it wilJ. bl") placed just west of T1?.RRACI 1~ . As I expla:.ned to you in the n~ssage ton:i ght the 91st R-,connaissnnce Squadron started this mornjng ~n the direction of LITTORIA . Hm1ever, the' demolitions have hpeded progress to such r-i.n extent th?t in my earlier !"!essage today J f'elt it rdse to indicate that the advance to t:re north had not yet started. Actually, of course, it has be~1m, and your 4 nstructions thr..t th~ rate o:' advance should be determined by the denolitions are being followed implicitly. The 117th Tteconna'i.ssance Squadron is also available for this assir,nr!IP!nt i"" :!t is n"leded . As it sfrrds novr no inffantry has been assigned for the reco"lna:i ssanc~ , a..'1d 11one will be unless it becomes necessary, since General Keyes f'eels th,.,t h~ t,ill probably need all of his infantry in the attack toward SEZZE . General Keyes does not admit th-it his divisions are tired , but some of our staff officers who hPve seen the 137th and 318th indicate thPt thev are quite tired. 11 I told you in my 23 May letter the 4th Dr 1M is attacking :in the direction VALLECOB.SA-IR.OST~EDI . General Juin visitl"d the 4th DMM today, and rt,P.Ve then hell because the:v hav~ b~en :l!oving so slowly. Gen rel Carpi-.ntier predicts that we shall see a fast1'r rete of advance tomorrow., 11 As "I told you that j would let you know further f bout the rrorosed e:x-tension of the II Corps- FEC bour1dary. This is our suP-gestion: Brlend the rresent bo,m<lnry- to Ml'. s. '',\HTPJO (32-?6), thence west to rrr . GASTc;11or.JE (26- 27), thence northwest to HI' LUPONE (16- 38) . This boundary is agreeable to General Keyes . It also has the concu:t'rence of General Carpentier, but he has not had a chance to discuss it with Gen~ral Juin yet. He will let me have General Juin ' s comments in th,.. morning . I ~xplained to both General K~yes and General Carpentier that trie boundary had not b!"!en referred to you ttnd thr-,_t it m1 -:;lit not fi. t in with your r lans . "Speaking of boundar:i ,s , General Juin sent in Colonel I<arnr~erer to se"' me this Hfternoon to suggest to you that you con sider tl rl ndv-isability of proposing a change in tre AAI maneuver . He belj eves thAt the sector assir;ned to the Fifth Ar:riy is too restrjcted for the mmber of di visioris in the Pr~y. He believes thl'lt the boundary should b"l 111odif:ied t0 give t o t1'e F ift h Army the road: GEFRANO-F'1.03IN'ONE-STTPIACO-RC'VIA~TO-TIVOLI . Uith such a zone of a,ction the French Corps could swing wide to the rir;ht anrl execute an ~nveloping attack in the direction RrVLti.rro-rr,IVOLI. Under this yianeuver the Fifth Army would avoid a frontal attack and should. secure d~cisivl'l results . Oh yes, I forgot about the ~ighth A:rmy. It will sv1ing very wide in the direction ARC~AYEZZA'm-RIETI- TBRNI. (I rather suspect thAt there is some r0 ~thod in his Madness in send ~_ng the Eigbth Arny on this ,vide end run . The CanadJans fj red a 0 �lOJ. few ~hells i~to th~ Frencr today, killinr, severr! m,nbers of tre Brosset Division). I told Colonel Kam..,,erl'lr to advise Ge"lerPl Juin thrt I would present an out1 i.ne of the plan to you. I und~rstand tht 1 ~fapoleon I Br~mn and his planners are in a lull at the mommt, ·and I f'm s·rre t Pt they will be more than ear.er to play with thj_s latest scr ,rne. 11 Genl"'ral Juin still has C'EIRANO as his object~ve. re hRs no evidence of any wei:ik1•mjng or t11.e eneI'ly resist~!lce in th~t sector. If, howe er, it should col1flpse anrl the 'Sir;hth Arey rroMed up t'1e Vr>lll'!y before the French crossed j>1to tre r.ig'1tr Army zrne, Generr:.l Juin will stop tre 1rd DIA and plRce it in corps reserv"'• Be is ,oin~ to place thl"' Bros3fllt !Jivision in corrs reserve tomorro ,, any.how. '!'he Ti're!'lcli would trif"n rave two divisions e"vr-ncing to the northiest, the Dody Division in t1e direction IAS':'t:NA-CAJTRO DEI 'CLCESI, and the /¥th flMM in the 1rection VALL~ CX'RSA-PRO'lSEI'I. "I feel th"lt evt•n·;vtJ..ijnP" is rrop;ressi'r1g sati.sfa.ctorily on this Pront. I re~ret that the Ke-yes attack could n0t e made fll!~rl~er, but I believe trat his l~-hour lmlt was necessnry i'1 view o+' the scr-tt.,.red co11.dj tion of '1-ij s two di visio11.s. f P,rsonally .,. ha e ;"ly dnubt'1 whethflllr fl' will 11e ahle t0 attack fro!'l so•;HJNO on t norni::1.r, of trie 26th as 11e now rlr-ms. If. he esti, n.tes thi:--t tl e attack requires two RCT I s attecldr..~ si.TT1ltanl'!ously, I am almost certain that he cA.nnot do i.t e,t thPt tjme . He will submit his rlr-n tomorrow, and as soon P.S it arriv.as I shRll fo E!rd it to you. 1" 11 ! just talked to W lsh, Ei,hth Arffly, to brin~ to his attention th~ erratic artiller.r fi.re of tl·e Canadians. He l'a"' rro isf"d tn takt".! proMft C<'"'l'rective action, and has request'°!d t 1nt I convflly sincere r ,r;rets to the Frenc' • It 'is true ~hat tre Canadian armor res reached the !~LFA RIVER. However, i Boche st~11 holds on to A rrrm, and Ge"l.<"lral Leese ;s i.ncl"ned to b~l~evfll! thnt tl·e ene-rny will delay at t.1t·r•ro as 1onr, ['S rossible-, l'lnd ill tr,..n ease out via t e CAS?RO CT~LO-RC'CCAS":'iCA ROA") to tbl'l north test . 'lf,lsh is not at all certein thc,,t the Ei,,.rth Army can rrfllvent tbis o,re. 1Ie says tJ-rnt trie tanks are havi"lg hard going -tn tr!'! r .LFA VAIJ,F.Y, nnd t},rt . 8!1Y of the ?re bogged do m. 11 The total m: ber of rr · soners t 'ken dm·ini-; this oreration as of eleven o I clock tr is even: ng is 10,715, or w},icr 2, "3 50 }',9.ve been tak"'n by Eighth Army ancl the reminder by Fift Army. * * * A11lZIC--MAY 25, 191.4--Generi=il Clerk lert · h::s cc nil rost at 08'10 to r,o to VI Corps here he conferren brie ly with GenerFl "'ruccott concerninr, tre progress of the VI Corps attack E1nd possibility of div"'rting the 45th, 34th ~nd 36th Diisio"'ls to a+tack in a nort}, restf';rl v direction. towErd Vfll1-letri and to its south, while at th,.. sam~ time the 3rd DivisioB, Sp,..cial Service Force c0ntinue north to Valmo11.tone, t' e 1st Arrored Division to support both attacks witr its bulk goi"l.g to the attack tom.rd V,.. l.1etri. He returned to the F-;.fth Army Advance col"'Pnd post where he co:i1."'errl"'r'i. brieflv ·rri tJ- Ge:1err.l Brann anrl left irmediEtfllly -/"or the Y-i.cin-14:;y of' Borgo Gran"'a h~r"' he was to se,.. the overland juncture of II Car-rs a11n bridgehead forces. He was Pcco panie-d by 8bout 25 correspondevits and photof"'l'.'Ftphers . "'he juncture of' th-, br~cg~head fo:-cces vith tre . a.in Fifth Army front w:ci.s a ITOMento,1s occr-,sion. It occ,ll'red fourt"'en days ::i:."ter tre l""'ain F" fth Arny .i:-rcnt wr-i s unmched on tre 11th of I ay. 1 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, May 6-24, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from May 6-24, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1633 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/5a7b8464869c97d27466539e4fb78253.pdf?Expires=1787184000&Signature=hjKWrYaKvSIly4snjj0PiiaaNy69%7EpsWel7yLAHaaK8e8SISGEJvzgaZ-X19snWVlSbSIw9C6LzluGZlT060Sp1xl7VHDcsVh1ratNcPrckXSad5VuClFqPgJkels6jtF5WHpWRyeStAFeQBaraK25JSCFqd-6Vo-L%7EXHq5gzx1zsXrlL9UqDKubWsh-CS-Cc2Dy7vr2wnrk%7ECtWAMSa3IP3ohHGjYthioy1gWPkHMyP82t01PxaNxzsw0PbSpzhn5SiVKxo1zP6Lu3OQH-SMJIQXWSAeGR4Ypb0R0bUEe8eZTUZW8w3IvWN6T8UQZh7dr9jjSDa0Oh0g9whcymLtQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 739923eff63ac52106369f459d3390ac PDF Text Text l :'.:) I TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER ll, 194/t·•General Clark walked this morning for about two hours in the gardens of his villa with General Keyes. At eleven o'clock the Army Commander drove back to his command post in Traversa. Upon M.s return he conferred with Generals Gruenther, Tate, MacGruder, G-4 of Ml'OUSA, and General Coffey, Ordnance Officer of Ml'OUSA. Notes of this conference are quoted at the conclusion of today' s diary. Generals Tate and MacGruder were guests of General Clark for lunch. General Clark spent the afternoon in his van. Lt. Col. Blackford of the 8th Evacuation Hospital called to see General Clark. In the evening General Clark entertained twenty-five of his staff officers at a buffet supper on the occasion of the Army-Notre Dame football game. The notes on the conference today are as follows: "General Magruder explained that the purpose of his visit to Fifth Army Headquarters was to outline the ammunition situation in view of the information contained in Message No. LX-51825, received yesterday from the War Department. The ammunition situation in the United States is so critical that it has been necessary to resort to the scheduling of current shipments direct from loading and production lines to docksides. ' The War Department expresses grave doubt of its ability to meet the demands of ETOUSA and l\ITOUSA, especially during the next three to six months. Considering 105 Howitzer M-2 ammlll1ition, the War Department estimates its supply potential in rounds per gun per day as follows: January - 15; February - 17; March - 20; April - 20. "General Tate explained that when he prepared his ammunition analysis of 31 October, he considered that the total available 105 ammunition from 30 October to 10 January would be 1,054,000 rounds. After deducting a reserve of 200,000 rounds to be held for emergencies, there remaj.ned 854,000 rounds available for expendlture during the period 30 October to 10 January. Ammunition expenditure rates have been based on this premise. As a result of information which was brought by General Magruder today, General Tate now finds that the figure of 1,054,000 is too optimistic, with the result that if present rates are continued the reserve will be reduced to approximately 6o,ooo rounds at the conclusion of the 15-day attack now planned for December. 11 General Magruder stated that if we should cut our ammunition expenditure during the quiet period to ten rounds per gun ,er day, we would be ablA to have on hand a reserve of 200,000 rounds at the conclusion of the 15-day offensive in December. "General Clark outlined his plan for the December attack to be made in conjunction with Eighth Army. He stated that he was determined that this attack would be carried out if Eighth Army is ready at that time, and if higher authority considers that it vd.11 make a contribution to the winning of the war. He issued a directive to the Chief of Sta.ff to have a study made whereby ammunition expenditure rates will be reduced immediately." �TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 12, 1944--Today was a clear cold day. The General spent the morning in his van and at ten o'clock saw staff films in his conference hut, after which he drove to the 91st Division to see General Livesay and to the 34th Division to see General Bolte. Returning to his command post, General Clark stopped enroute at the 8th Evacuation Hospital to see General Bowman who was in bed with pneumonia. The General spent the afternoon in his van and in the evening Generals Brann, Bradshaw and Tate came for dinner. After supper they played cards in the mess hut. At the same time, the General had a movie in his conference hut for the members of his staff. * * * TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 13, 1944-•Today was a clear cold day, and the General spent the early pa.rt of the morning in his van. At eleven o'clock the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee arrived, headed by Admiral Richardson and including Rear Admiral K. M. F. Schoeffel, Maj. Gen. H. L. George, Maj. Gen. w. F. Tompkins, Col. F. T. Davidson, Captain Steele, Captain Hoover, Captain Rees, Captain Cole, Colonel Theis and Lt. Col. Robinson. General Clark oriented the committee on the over-all Italian situation, after which he was interviewed by the committee. During the conference a spark from the fireplace caught fire to the camouflage net over the hut, and General Clark and his guests were forced to leave the hut while the fire was being extinguished. No serious damage was done. General Clark gave to all members of the committee an autographed copy of the "Advance on Rome 11 • After lunch the committee left the command post, and General Clark, with Generals Brann, Tate and Colonel Saltzman, left for his villa in Florence for dinner and the night. Following are the notes on the conference General Clark held with the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee: "Admiral Richardson explained that three plans were under consideration for the reorganization of national defense, namely, organization with two departments, with three departments or with a singlE3 dep8rtment. The committee would like to hear General Clark's views on these plans and ask him a few questions. "General Clark stated that he f eels that there should be a single department with one man responsible f or all the armed forces. His main interest is that such an arrangem ent provide unity of command which would flow down to the lower echelons. Although unity of command exists in principle in this theater it is exercised only by the Supreme Commander. He apparently exercises little control over the Royal Navy. There have been several instances, chiefly during the Anzio operations, when the commander on the sp9t should have coJTJmanded both the naval and ground elements in that area. "General Clark stated that air cooperation with the Fifth Army had been excellent, because the Fifth Army has its 0 1:1111 air support unit. However, General Clark believes that the effectiveness of this support �would be improved if there was unity of command rather than cooperation. At the present time, for example, it is extremely important that Fifth Army receive more air sorties daily because of the critical shortage in artillery ammunition. There is a pull between making sorties available for close ground support and using them to cut communications in the rear. "General Clark closed these remarks by expressing the belief that with a central control and unity of command, operations would be improved. He realized the difficulties this system would present, but in general that is his belief. "When asked for his recommendations regarding an j_deal air-ground setup, Gen~ral Clark stated that he was in favor of an air support com• mand with an army which is prjmarily for the direct close-in support of the army. This air group should be under the operational control of the ground commander as an attached unit, not organic in the army. Should the a:ir be needed to support other operations, elements of the air support unit could be turned over temporarily for such operations. However, the air operations staff should ordinarily remain with the ground commander. General Clark stressed that his relations with General Cannon and General Chidlaw have bAen most favorable. There is a constant exchange of a:ir officers and ground combat officers so that each group will be familiar with the air and e,:-ouno problems. "The question arose as to how much of the air would be an integral part of the ground commander's forces, .and Genera1 Clark made it clear that he meant only to have as an integral part of the army the artillery liaison cub planes. General Clark believes that the tactical reconnaissance planes which are used for reconnaissance, photo coverage, and artillery spotting should be under operational control of the army ground commander. Under the system now employed in the Fifth Army area the Tac R squadrons, in effect, function under the operational control of the Fifth Army Commander. 11 It was pointed out by members of the committee that the recommended relationship of the air support unit is contrary to the doctrine published by the War Department but is based on actual experience in this war and appears to have worked. General Clark stated that the present system will work. All concerned have cooperated effectively to insure that it works. However, he stated that he still believes that it will be a more efficient system if the principle of command is substituted for cooperation, and that it should extend down to include the 11_ rmy. "On inquiry by the committee General Clark stated th1:t he believed that in a single department of national defense the Air should be an equal component to the Army and the Navy. Upon being asked his conception of the staff of the head of the armed forces in a single department, he said that he thought it should be generally small and tht:1.t there should be larger staffs for the Army, Navy and Air respectively. He recalled that in the March 1942 reorganization of the War Department an a.ttempt was made to place the larger staffs in the Ground Forces, Air Forces and SOS respectively, reducing the War Department General Staff. �"Admiral Richardson pointed out that under the proposed plan no assistant secretary was specifically assigned to the Army, Navy or Air, bu-'-, all were to be assigned to the single department as a whole. It was hoped that this would tend to make them all pull together. The U. s. Chiefs of Staff would be composed of the senior officers of the Army, Navy and Air respectively. The plan provided that they would present the budget directly to the President, in a body. If disagreement occurred the dissenting member would be able to present his views to the President in company with the others. In answer to a question from General Gruenther as to the position of the Secretary of the Armed Forces respecting the budget, Admiral Richardson explained that the President, as Commander-in-Chief would, under the plan, deal directly with hi8 military chiefs in this regard. "Upon inquiry General Clark stated that he believed that if the single department idea should prove unrcceptable the plan witb three departments would be rreferable to the plan with two, pointing out the present size of the air forces, and stated that he assumed the other two services would retain certain essential air elements. When asked the same question General Gruenther said that he preferred two departments to three, but was enthusiastically in favor of a single department. Admiral Richardson observed that today, although General Arnold is a. member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he is a subordinate of General Marshall's so that now our air power has not coordinate power with the ground and the sea in presenting things to the President. He mentioned that an objection which can be raised to the single department plan lies in the fact that it would give more power, responsibility and influence to one cabinet officer than to any of the others and would therefore tend to throw the cabinet out of balance. General Clark pointed out that in time of peace the Air has many planning and proparatory activities involving civilian aviation and would have a vast amount of work to do. "The subject of the use of marines to make the assault a.nd develop the beaches and then turn the operation over to ground troops was discussed and General Clark stated that he had not worked with marine forces but was of the opinion that this procedure was not desirable, as it takes too long to relieve units and there is the possibility of confusion on the beaches. "When asked whether the Army is capable of conducting the training and development of amphibious and airborne troops in time of peace, General Clark gave as an illustration the situation in North Africa in 1943 when, incident to the preparations for the Salerno landings, the question arose of who should command the amphibious training involved. Finally the Navy took it over after a species of joint operation of the training just prior to Salerno. He is inclined to think that the Navy should do it. Admiral Richardson stated th~t one distinguished witness before the committee had recommended a change in the role of the fleet ihrine Corps, so that the marines would make no effort to develop assault troops of the Army passing through them. The marines would handle landing craft training, and army units would be sent to them from time to time for training. �"Along this line, the question was raised as to whether or not the marines might not take over the duty of Rangers and Commandos. General Clark was of the opinion that this plan had many merits, explaining that he had had Rangers, Commandos and the 1st Special Service Force under his command, and althougb they had performed marvelously well with him they were too hard to maintain. Finding replacements for these units is a serious problem. They require an especiRlly high caliber type of soldier and sustain heavy losses due to their aggressiveness. "A committee member inquired whether General Clark agreed with the marines 1 contention that for the period of the assault of a beach more small arms and fewer vehicles are needed than in a normal army division. General Clark replied that more machine guns were desirable but could be arranged by the provision of extra ones for a particular operation, and that excess of vehicles had not been a worry to him as they had always been limited by the available craft. At Anzio he had sent in over 500 extra machine guns. "Admiral Richardson stated that the committee felt that initially the marine setup should be left as it is and be permitted to develop later. "Upon being asked by Admiral Richardson whether supply procuremP.nt should be unified or separate, General Clark said that it was a difficult job for one man and that it might be desirable to start out with one man doing the common items. General Gruenther agreed thnt this is as far as they should go. "Generals Clark and Gruenther in reply to a question stated that they thought the several services would be more apt to drift apart in peacetime under the two or three-department system than under the plan with a single department, and said that they thought a joint secretaryship and joint chief of staff, charged with coordination by law, would facilitate cooperation. On inquiry General Clark had no additional ideas to suggest for improving the single-department organization. When asked whether it would be desirable for the chief of staff to be responsible directly to the President on military matters concerning theaters and the home forces rather than reporting through the cabinet officer, General Clark said he thought it might be better for the armed forces but wondered whether the American people would like such an arrangement. Neither General Clark nor General Gruenther had additional suggP.stions concerning the three-Hepartment or two-department organization. "The question was put to General Clark as to whether the command relationships had been satisfactory on the amphibious flagships during the various landings in wh:i.ch he had participated. General Clark replied that in his experience the cooperation had been excell8nt but recommended that in the case of an amphibious landing the naval commander be in charge of orArations until the ivound com!lk~nder reaches shore and indicates his readiness to take over the command of the land operations. The ground commander would decide when he was ready to take over. As �an example General Clark cited the SalP-rno expedition, in which he had coordinate authority with Admiral Hewitt of the Navy and Air Chief Marshal Tedder of the Air. He felt that there should have b9en one commander. The first of fie er who had single command was General I:isenhower. To illustrate the need on that occasion of unity of command, General Clark mentioned the fact that he had had a floating reserve which the local naval commander (a British officer) caused to be unloaded while General Clark was in the process of determining where it could be landed with maximum effect. "In response to the query as to whether or not there was any trouble regarding loading arrangements prior to landings due to the dual control of operations, General Clark replied that instances had occurred where the Navy would refuse to load certain items required in the operation, and the first the Army Commander heard of it was when the material was already on the docks ready to load. This further illustrated the lack of coordjnation where the command is divided. As an example he mentioned a situation which arose at Oran just prior to the Salerno landings. Air fields were vital at the beginning of the landing and the air forces needed machinery, netting, bombs, ground personnel etc. The initial air lift was always an issue in the planning. The Navy refused to load bombs at Oran. A single responsible commander would work everything out ahead of time, making his decisions and taking his calculated risks. 11 Upon being asked whether he had 0A'Jlerienced any difficulties with communications resulting from lack of unity of command, General Clark said that he had not and stated that the command ships in amphibious operations had been excellently equipped; that their facilities had been his only means of communications at the beginning of landings, and that there had been no trouble. "Admiral Richa,rdson inquired whether there had been any cases of naval commanders being loath to take ships in close to shore for fear of their running agr01md. General Clark said that there had been no holding back of any kind at Salerno, but thA.t after the capture of Naples it was decided to make one or more amphibious landings in the form of close end runs. At this time the Navy turned down some of the projects for naval reasons, notably because of the hazards due to coast defense guns and mines. The Navy at this time was under British command. "There was discussion of the joint education and trainjng of personnel of the various branches of the service and of whether, for example, officers should spend six months training with another service; also of whether West Point and Annapolis students might spend a period of study at the other academy. General Clark approved the idea of the various branches of the service working together to better understand each other's problems and cited the Fifth Army policy of having Air Corps personnel working with front line units and infantry and artillery officers working with the Air Corps." General Clark today wrote the following letter to General Alexander regarding the ammunition situation in Fifth Army: �\51 11 1. On 11 Uovember I learned that the U.S. ammunition supply situation for all theaters is critical and will remain so for several months. Allotments to be made to Fifth Army for December and subsequent months for the most important types are listed below in rounds per gun per day: Jan, Feb. Mar, ~ 21* 15 17 43* 15 14 16 15 20 15 15 20 15 16 ~ 105mm Howitzer 155mm Howitzer 155mm Gun 9 * - Bulk arrives in theater after 20 December. 11 2. When Fifth Army discontinued the attack on 28 October, expenditures of the most critical typos of artillery amnnmition were reduced to the following quantities: Rounds per gun Rer day 105mm Howitzer 155mm Howitzer 155mm Gun 27 17.5 16.5 11 3. Upon receiving word of the critical ammunition situation throughout all theaters, I reduced Fifth Army allotments on November 12th to the following: Rounds per gun per day 105mm Howitzer 155mm Howitzer 155mm Gun 15 17.5 (no change) 9 11 4. My Corps artillery is very limited and, as you know, the 105mm howitzers of U.S. Divisions are only 1/2 the strength of the 25 pounders of the British Divisions. This reduction is a drastic cut and will affect adversely the morale of my troops, but I was obliged to put it into effect in order to save for my offensive operation. All runmunition in this theater has been allotted to Fifth Army, and there is no hope of securing more. There is no treater reserve. For that reason I have set up the following amounts of the most critical types as an army reserve to be held for emergency use only: Reserve 105 mm Howitzer 155mm Howitzer 155mm Gun 11 5. 200,000 45,000 9,500 By reducing the expenditure rates during the defensive phase �t58 to those enumerated in paragraph 3 above, and deducting -the emergency reserves enumerated in paragraph 4 above, there will be sufficient ammunition for an all out offensive by Fifth Army of 13 to 15 days. This estimate is based on a daily consumption rate slightly in excess of 25,000 rounds. It conforms to Fifth Army experience for offensive operations during the past 14 months. It does not allow for ammunition expenditures to repel enemy counterattacks during the defensive phase. "6. J have ma.de a thorough c;tudy of the enemy situa. tion on the Fifth Army front, including Ms strength, dispositions and probable intentions. I have considered the recent operations of Eighth Army as they have af'fected the sitm tion of Fifth Army. It is my esti ,..,ate that it is / improbable that a combined attack by Fifth and Eighth Armies will result 1 in the capture of BOLOGWA in a 13-15 day full scale attack. Upon completion of such an offensive it will be necessary to resume for several months the low rate of fire of approximately 15 rounds per gun per day for the 1O5rmn weapons. This reduced expenditure will preclude the continuation of the offensive. 11 7. I am bringing this matter to your attention in order that you may know of Fifth Army's reduced capabilities in view of the drastic curtailments in ammunition. I shall continue to give the matter my personal attention to determine whether or not further economies can be made in our ammunition expenditures." * * TRAVERSA--~OVEMBER 14, 1944--~oday the weather was cloudy with light rains. The General spent a quiet morning walking and resting. The Army CoPnnander lunched at the villa. At one o 1 clock General Bowman arrived with Lt. Col. Blackford. General Bowman, at General Clark's invitation, came to spend a few days at the villa to recuperate from his recent illness. General Clark inspected a mobile dentistry unit and had his teeth cleaned. G~nerals Gruenther, Tate, Bowman and Colonel Saltzman were guests of General Clark for dinner, after which they played cards. A brief summary of operations for the •veek ending November 14, 1944 is as f'ollmvs: Relief of 88th Division and elements of 85th Division by 1 Br~tish Division was completed. 34th Division was reljeved by 91st Division. New sectors of responsibility became effective and scheduled reliefs to rest areas were carried out. Positions along front were maintained and some advances on the right of 13 Corps were made to conform to those made 0y elements of 2 Polish Corps. Local improvements in positions i.n left sector were made by 92d Division. Contact with enemy was maintained along entire front hy active patrolling throughout period. ��ln°I TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 15, 1944--Snou began early this morning, but the : k ~ ~ cleared later in the afternoon. General Cla.rk left his villa at 0900, arriving at his command post at 1000 hours. At 1100 hours General Sousloparov, Russian Representative to the Allied Commission, arrived, accompanied by Lt. Col. Savco and Lt. Col. Lapkin. Th8y were greeted with an honor guard, after which General Sousloparov presented General Clark with the Russian Military Order of Suvarov, First Degree, the highest Russian military decoration. General Clark briefed GAneral Sousloparov and his party on the current Fifth Army situation, after which General Clark entertained Generals Tate, Brann, Howard and Colonel McMahon and his Russian guests for lunch in the hut. The party left at 1500 hours, and the General drove to his villa in Florence. Generals Gruenther, Brann, Tate and Bowman were guests for dinner and the night. * * * TRAVERSA--NOVEl!BER 16, 1944--Tbe ""ather today was cloudy with inte~~ tent snow and rain showers. General Clark took off by L-5 from the . Florence cub strip for Montecatini where he larded on the autostrada. The General was met by Lt. Col. 'Elam, of the G-4 Section, Fifth Army, and driven to the para.de grounds where the Army Comman:'ler was greeted by Generals Bolte, Keyes, Crittenberger, Almond and Kendall. General Clark received honors of ruffles and flourishes and the General's March. The 1st Battalion of the 16~th Infantry was formed in a gm.rd of honor, as well as 135 officers and enlisted men of various Fifth Army units who were to be decorated, promoted and appointed by the Army Commander. After honors had been given the Army Commander, General Clark spoke briefly to the assembled group, commending the 1st Battalion of the 168th Infantry who were to receive the War Department Unit Citation for outstanding combat performance. The Army Command er also addressed the officers and men who were to be promoted, decorated and appointed to commissioned grades, expressing his deep appreciation of their fine service and how proud the Fifth Army was of the outstanding job these men have done. The Army Commander also explained the important part the Allied Armies in Italy were playing in the over-all picture, containing and cutting up twent:r eight of the Germans best dj_visions. After GAneral Clarkts few words, he decorated a.nd made combat appoi11.tments and promotions to the follow'i ng person 1el: From 2nd Lieutenant to 1st Lieutenant; Elizabeth J. Smith, Robert E. Bowker, Helen B. Zasedil, Jacqueline E. Samuels, Urho V. Harvinan, Al Gutterman, Edgar A. Lyon, John 'T'. Sugrue, Thomas H. Randall, Hal'ry B. Muske, George H. Moore, John F. Mihocik, Kenneth Jorjorian, Benjamin F. Graham, Roccard A. Ferrante, James A. Cochrane. 1 From 1st Lieutenant to Captain: From Captain to Major: Joseph W. Walton, Jr. Charles C. Siegling, Jose A. Andino. Appointed to 2nd Lieutenant: 1st Sgt. Alexander A. Szymanski, T/Sgt. Donald R. Sprow, T/Sgt. Dewitt H. French, 1st Sgt. Peter DeAugustine, �S/Sgt. Robert c. Osborne, 1st Sgt. Joseph F. Tucker, T/Sgt. V.verett M. Flanders, 1st Sgt. Joseph B. Bracy, T/Sgt. Wm. S. Hicks, T/Sgt. Jos. W. Fry, 1st Sgt. Gilbert Bootho, T/Sgt. Frank Whisonant, Sgt. Luther C. ,Tones, 1st Sgt. Frank J. Rodrigues, T/Sgt. Clarence E. Ripley, T/Sgt. Frank A. Drazkowski, Jr., T/Sg'",. Mnrtin L. Gnemi, T/Sgt. Haskell H. Hu~hes, s/Sgt. Stanley F. Dosey, s/sgt. Eugene A. Borg, T/Sgt. James E. Mc11anus, '1'/Sgt. Boydell Hoffman, S/Sgt. Frank E. Smith, S/Sgt. Chester Loss, '1'/Sgt. Hughes B. Bennett, Sgt. Lewis L. Millett. 'T'he Army Commander pinned the Air M8dal on Brigadier General Guy O. furtz, and the Oak Leaf Cluster to the Air Medal was pinned on 1st Lt. Ralph O. Oglesby, ?nd Lt. Walton C. Schoonover and 1st Lt. Earle I. Coleman. General Clark presented the Dist:inguished Service Cross to Fvt. Edwin Lemke, Ffc. Jack E. Green, S/Sgt. Walton C. Westfall, s/sgt. Sam McGowan, S/Sgt. Wm. H. Eastland, T/Sgt. Herman Ledford, Capt. Wm. B. Fulton, Capt. James M. Doyle, Maj. Thomas L. Cussrms and Col. Gustav J. Braun. The Legion of Herit was pinned by General Clark on Col. Henry S. Blesse, Col. Kenneth F. Ernst, Col. Lewis W. Kirlanan, Col. FrRnk Y. Lef!ver, Col. Lee R. PiArce, Col. George 'T'. 1'food, Lt. Col. Caleb J. King, Jr., ~"/Sgt. Pete G. Cl8rk, T/Sgt. Harold 1:i . Branum, T/Sgt. Whitney W. Frost, T/5 Harold C. Brmwart. Genere.l Clark also pj nned the Silver Star on Capt. Francis J. Kenyon, Capt. Ian F. Turner, 1st Lt. James R. Blount, Capt. Cleo W. Buxton, Capt. Alvin T. Colbus, 1st Lt. James E. Henderson, 1st Lt. Irving B. Fesetzky, :?nd Lt. John F. Mihocik, 1st Sgt. Thomas E. Zukauskas, T/Sgt. Robert D. Wt:1.goner, S/Sgt. Ralph D. Baker, S/Sgt. John H. Czuk, S/Sgt. Lealen R. Martin, S/Sgt. Sa1vatore G. Viselli, s/sgt. Vade G. Cash, Sgt. Chester S. Gutkowski, Sgt. raul N. Kemmler, Sgt. John W. King, Sgt. BenJamin F. Lambeth, Sist. James D. Susalia, Ffc. Er1ward Shadd, Cpl. Murcilio Juiz Finto, Sgt. James R. De~ton, Ffc. Clarence E. Dickinson, Ffc. Joe H. Hoogerheide, f Pc. Joseph Pucek, Fvt. G. Vf . Bulkin, Fvt. Robert D. Gerstenecker. 'T'he Oak Leaf Clw:;ter to the Silver Star was awarded to T/5 Louis L. Schafer and Staff Serget:mt Douglas M. Dickerson. General ClArk presented the Bronze Star to IV!aj. Arthur R. Schmidt, Maj. John M. Walker, Capt. John L. Kay, 1st Lt. Ralph H. :Major, 1st Lt. Ravmo'1d Arriza'l-ialagB. Jr., ?nd Lt. Cunningham C. Bryant, T /5 John F. Flahive, rr/5 Andrew J. Gi:rolami, Fvt. Edward Jaeger, 1st Lt. Cora i1. Foster, Capt. Brmani Airosa DaSilva, Cpl. J'1etro Re, Ffc. John S. Downer, Maj. Harris J. North. The General also pinned the streamers on the guidons of the 1st Battalion of the 168th In"'antry and presented them with the War Department Unit citation. After the ceremony Gent"lra 1 Clark gave a luncheon at Montecatini for �for approximately 100 officers and enlisted men who had been decorated, appointed and promoted. General Clark sroke briefly to the luncheon guests, telling them that he had rmde arrangements for all of them to spend three days at Montecatini before returning to their units. After lunch General Clark, with Generals Gruenther and Brann, drove to the air strip on the autostrada where they took off in L-5 1 s for Florence. General Bolte and Colonel Braun, with Colonel Wood and General Bowman, dined at the villa, and General Clark and Colonel Saltzman dined at the Hotel Anglo-American. * * TRA.VERSA--~10VEMBER 17, 1944--The General spent a quiet day at the villa. In the evening the General dined out with General Brann. * * * ~RAVERSA--ijOVEMBER 18, 1944--The weather was clear today with scattered clouds. The Army Commander left the villa at 0930, arriving at his command post at quarter of eleven. At 111~5 Genert1.ls Harding, Clark, Gruenther and Lemnitzer conferred for about an hour. Generals Harding r-md Lemnitzer had lunch with General Gruenther. Mr. H. V. Kaltenborn arrived at 1230 and was briefed by General ClHrk in the hut and remained for lunch. The General spent the ~fternoon in his van, conferr,ng w:ith Generals Keyes and Crane, Artillery Officer of AFHQ. In the evening the General dined with the regular memb~rs of his mess and after dj nner played bridge w:i th General Gruenther, Colonel Eberh.<ird and Colonel McCall. * * * TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 19, 1944--'l'he weather today remained clear with scattered clouds. 'l'he General spent the day in his van conferring with various members of his staff and working on administrative matters. In the morning General Cllll'k was interviewed by Sergeant Derry And Sergeant Scott of Yank Magazine. The General spent the remainder of the afternoon in his van and dined wi.th the regular members of his staff mess. General Clark today sent the following letter to General McNarney regard:i.ng the Fifth Army situation: "Received your letter of Novemb,~r 11th and aprrecinte the efforts you have made to secure additional heavy artillery for Fifth Army. I hope later on you can /:t ~t some 240 howitzors. We need them badly. �"I am thoroughly f-amiliar with the o.mmunition supply and appreciate that if 11ny effort is to be made later on, oonservations must be made now. To that end we have been firing approximately ten rounds per gun daily of 105mm and m.11 continue to do so until we attack . I can fire no less . If 105mm ammunition arrives as per schedule, and holding out a minimum reserve, I can attack for from thirteen to fifteen days and might, with luck, be a'hle to go on for four or f'ive days longer without touching the reserve . "I had a long conference with Harding yesterday. I have been worried, as I indicated in my letter of Novemb~r 5th, concerning :Sighth Army activity. They seem to be coming up slowly, and I do not know what shape they will be in to launch an offensive in early December. I get indications that they will not be ready quite a-t that time . However , we will see the results of their forthcoming attack and then be able to make better plans . I am most anxious to attack on Bologna in conjunction with Eighth Army. I feel their attack in the valley should precede mine, and my wallop should be turned loose at the a-r,propriate moment. I am meeting with Alexander and McCreery in a few days, at which time we can better work out the timing . The main thing is to get an agreement that both armies will attack with all their might. r am delighted that you are getting the loth Mountain Division for Fifth Army. I think the arrangements you ho.ve made are fine . We can give them the additional trainin~, and they will be better off motorized than all mule . 0 "Am also pleased with yonr efforts to obtain special critical items of equipment which we need . With what is schr~dul 1'od to come and with some minor improvisations, we will get along nicely. "Received your letter with regard to errors in reporting men "missing in action" . Am F;etting all the dope and will reply shortly. "All your asJista.nts have been most helpful . we are delighted to have them. Many have heen up, and "Will be glad to see you any time, and I will keep you posted as to the timing of the attack and my plans . I run trying to work it out so that I will have some continuity to my attack, for it will be a tough one . In the meantime, will start my attack with the Brazilians for limited ob,iectives which will help the big push later. 11 co:~ '!'RAVERSA--N~MBER 20 , 1944• -~he "eat:er today was rainy and Gene- \ ral Clark saw Colonel Johnson and Colonel Gray of the Jui:Ige~e ' s Office and 8,lso saw Major General Rooks, Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ, with whom he conferred for half an hour . After lunch Generals Clark and Brann drove to 13 Corps at Scarperia where they conferred with General Kirkman . The General then drove to his villa in Florence, stopping enroute at ��,q liovember 23rd . Jtf Following personal Mai~ !:'i~ t , from Prime :,.:inister to General Mark Clark . It gives me the greatest pleasure to te11 you that the ?resident and his military advisors regard it as a compliment that d . ,1 . Government should wish to have you command the 15th Group of armies under General ALEXf':NDBR, who becomes supreme commander owing to the appointment of Genera 1 VITI.SON to succeed Sir JOHN DILL in WASHINGTON . I am sure we could not be placing our troops, who form the large majority of your command., in better hands, and that your friendship, of which you told me, with Gen eral ALEXA1DSR will at once smooth and propel the course of operations . When I saw General EISKifHO'JER last week at his headquarters I spoke to hi;n about TRUSCOTT succeeding you in the conuand of the 5th Army . He promised to release him if in due conrse he is approached by the U.S . aut~,ori ties . I expect this will be agreeable to you and General ALEXti..NDER specially desires it. Every good 1,vish in your new command . We have the utmost confidence in you and in the goodwill which has alwa ys guided your conduct with your Bri tj_sh comrades and Allies . Time of origin 231800 receipt- 232325 Decode - 240020 �I will be deeply honored to command the 15th Army Group . I fully realize the responsibility this assignment entails and the compliment ll . ,.; . Government has paid me in 9onsenting to place your glorious Eighth Army under my command . Please rest assured that its welfare vrl.11 be carefully guarded . I ar.1 proud to continue my happy association with Generals Alexander and :cCreery . 15th Army Group 1vill be eager to resume the all-out attack at an early date in order to destroy the Cerman armies here a~d prevent tmr intervening in battles in the East and "lest . Please accept my great appreciation for the confidence you have always placed in me . �the 24th General Hospital to see Colonel McMahon, G-1 of the Fiftb Army, and Colonel Roberts, AG, MI'OUSA, who hr-i.d been injured in a motor accident this morning. General ClF1rk entertained at his villa Colonels Smith, Nygaard, W alker and General Bowman for dinner. The Army Commander r etired early in the evening. * * ,,,RAVERSA--NOVEMBER 21, 1944--The weath"'r today was fine. The General remained in bed this morning with a head cold. Major Brandt of the 15th Evacuation Hospital, ear, nose a,nd throat specialist, came to attend the Army Commander. General Sullivan and Colonel Bruce came for dinner. General Clark today received the cover plan for the attack, scheduled for the first week in December, from AAI. A summary of operations for the week ending November 21, 1944 is as follows: Some small gains were made as patrols continued active operation, defensive positions were maintained and enemy efforts to penetrate our front lines repulsed. Reliefs proceeded according to schedule and units in the rear continued a program rest reha,bilitation and further training concurrent with the absorption of new replacements. * * TRAVERSA--WOVEMBER 22, 1944--The weather today was cloudy. The General's cold was much improved today, but he was advised by Colonel Bruce and Major Brandt to stay in. General Brann came to see General Clark this morning and also General Hume, who has just returned from France. General ClRrk lunched at the villa with General Brann and his aide and rested in t he afternoon. General Gruenther arrived At 1700. General Cle.rk gave a small dinner with Generals Gruenther and Brann and three sr,uests. The Army Commander rl"ltired shortly after dinner. * * TRAVERSA--NO'\IEMBER 23, 1944--'T'he weather today wa,s rainy. Genera,ls Gruenther and Brann spent the morning conferring with General Clark. General Clark, with Gen , rals Gruenther and Brann and his aide, lunched at , the Anglo-American Hotel. Generals Clark e,nd Gruenther after lunch drove to the command post at ~raversa. This evening General Clark gav~ a Thanksgiving dinner at which the following were present: General Howard, Lt. Col. Iorter, Major Houston, Captain Crawford, Lieutenant Bajenow and Lieutenant Berenson. After �dinner the General retired early 'n the evening. * * * TRAVERSA--NOVE:tv'IBE:11. 24, 1944--The weather today was drizzling and rainy.) The General spent the day working on papers and conferring with membe~s of his staff. After lunch Gen~rlll. ClRrk jnterviewed ten field grade offfoers who had just arrived from the United States to be assigned as replaceMent battalion commanders. · Gimerals Brann and 'T'Bte came for dinner, and after dinner General Clark played carrls wjth Generals ':'ate, Brann, Gruenther and his aide. * * * TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 25, 1944--The weather today 1ms rainy. This morning Brigadier General John M. Greeley, Office of Coordinator of InterAmerican Affairs, who had just arrived from the States, called to s~e General Clark. General Kirkman and Brigadier Archibald, G-Ops of 13 Corps, camP- to confer with General Clark and stayed for lunch. General Chidlaw called to see the Army Co1'!1r:1ander this aft~rnoon. The General left for his villa in Florence at 1600 hours. Generals Gruenther, Bra.nn and 'T'ate dined with the General and after dinner play"'d cards. * * * TRAVERSA--N()VEMBER 26, 19/"4,--Today it was raining. The Army Commander spent the early part of the morning at his villa, conferring wUh Generl'l.J s Gruenth""r and Bra'1!1. In the early hours Colonel La.due, Chief of Staff of IV Corps, came to report to the Army Commar:rler concerning a repulsed attack of th~ ~nd Battalion of the 370th Infantry, 92nd Division. At 1145 hours General Clark attended a conference held by the ComTl'\ander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in Italy, General Alexander, flt the Florence CoMmand. The following officers atten0ed the conference: Gen~rals Alexander, Harding, Lemnitzer and Robertson of .l\AI; Gen~rals Clark, Gruenther, Brann and TR.te and Brigadier Divers of Fifth Army; General McCreery and Brigadier Floyd of Eighth Army; Generals Cannon and Chidlaw of the XII Air Force; A:ir Vice Marshal Dickson of the Desert Air Force. Following is the gist of Gimeral Clark' s comments at th is conference: "The Fifth Army will be r8ady to launch its attack by 7 December. Never has the Fifth Ar-rrJY been faced wi.th a more difficult ta.sk than that presented by the coming a+,tack. Enemy strength on the front o~ the Fifth Army is proportionately i;;reater than ev('l)r before. He has excellent roads which give him great flexibility and permits him mov~ng reserves to meet any threatened ar('l)a. Bis units are well up in strength, �rested and in as good condition for battle as my own. The Fifth Army has ammunition for a 15 day all out attack, and it is possible that the p~rjod may be extended about three days by the arrival of additional ammunition due approximately 20 December. I am ready and willing to launch this at.tack and will throw every man that I hav"' into the battle in the hope of capturin~ BOLOG!IA. nwhen asked whether 13 Corps should operate under Fifth Army or Eighth Army in the coming offensive, General Clark replied: 'In my opinion 13 Corps must continue to operate under Fifth Army. It is true that the operations on the right flank of 13 Corps are cl0sely allied with the operations of Eighth Army, but logistical reasons, such as the necessity for Fifth Army to furnish 13 Corps U.S. transportation and U.S. 'Enginc,ers in order that the divisions in the Mount GRANDE area be maintained, it is desirable that no change in command be made. I run / ready and will:ng that 13 Corps do ev~rything within its capabil1ties to assist the ~dvance of Elf;hth Army and will direct that Ge11eral Kirkman comnunicate direct with General T-flcCreery on the arrangement of details for operations to assist Eighth Army. I hope tha.t in a later stage of the operation I shall be 11bln to use rart of 13 Corps to assist the advance of the II Corps.' "The Gimeral was aske<l for comments concerning air support for the com1n~ offensive and stated: tit I nMd all air thtit I can possibly ~et for this coming event. By that, I mean "'ightr,r bomber attacks, Medium attacks and heavy attacks to begin possibly one day before the offensive -ls launched and to continue throu~hout the period of the attack. We h~ve prepared an air program for the initial attacks of the first two or three days and will continue to search for suitable targets for continuous air support. In this coming attack I consirler that the air is our only great Emperiority and that it must oe used to its maximum carabilities. I have notice<l that in France they are using as many as 1,200 heavy bombers to precede an assault in that theater and desire that the same t;vpe of air support be given Fifth Army in this offensive.' "Gimeral Cannon commented th~t the fi ~hter bombers and medium bombers would be mare available and that he anticipated no trouble in getting the heavies if proper targets could be produced. He further st~ted that the air was ready at ruiy time to support the o-f'fensive whenever the ground troops were prepnred to follow up the bombardment. Gen(",ral Clark stated that his troops were always reacy to follow up the bombardment and would do so in the comin~ offensive. "General McCreery Mncurred with General Clark. It wAs mandatory thi:i.t this of'fensiv~ be supported by the maximum air effort a'1d thnt, in his opinion, the air should not be too selective in the selection of targets because in many instances targets which did not appear to mAet all the requirements <lemanred by the Air on air photos were, in fact, quite sui tR.ble targets when examined on the ground. 11 �After +,he conference General Clark gave a luncheon for Generr-1 Alexander and fifteen of the off'ic"'rs who attended the meeting at the An~lo-Am~rican Fotl'!l. Just bef'or"'l lunch, Air ir-tce Marshal Dickson, before the assembled ~roup of officers, prAsP,nted the DFC to Lieutenant Jones, Co-Filot of General Clark 1 s C-47. General CltITk af'ter lunch bade goodbye to General Alexander nnd other officers anc returned to his villa. General ClPrk dined in Florence with General Brmin this evening. General Clark today wrote General McWarney as follows with regard to battle casualty reports: "I have received and given cnreful study to your letter of 13 ~-rovember regarding corrections of battle casualty reports of men initially reported as mi1sing in action. !'I fully realize the seriousness of the requirements of speed and accuracy where battle Cc'\Sual ty reports a:re concerned, ann appreciate our responsibility to next of kin. As you know, successful action has been taken in the Fifth Army in recent months to improve the general efficiency of our battle casualty reporting. I run undertaking at once to improve the situation mentioned in your letter. "In accordance with your instructions, tl1is problem has been discussed with each of my division commanders, who have been directed to discuss it peirsonally with their subordinates along indic::ited lines. Jn pc,dition, my G-1 and Adjutant Gen~ral have <liscussed the problem extensively wit}; division staff officers and regimental commanders, in an attempt to disclose the fundamental elements of the problem and to develop remedies. Small unit commanders will he impressed vri th the seriousness of corrections in this type of report nnd will impress upon their men the unfortun.Ate results which flow from their unauthorized absences. Stops will be taken to locate more promptly indivic~uals who become separated from their units during combat. In addition, ,,.,e a.re studying actively practical means of improving the general orientation of rP-placements before they actually go into combat, as it is belie.ved that straggling and AWOL is not infrequently due to new men not having had proper opportunity to become sufficiently a.cquainted with and known by their units and leaders. "Achievement of accuracy in the report-ing of men who are missing in action is, to some extent, oomplicated by a conflict of the needs for speed and accuracy. Units have been disposed to submit these reports soon after the c"isappearance of the indivinu.al, not only to insure that the casualty report is forwarded promptly, but also to be able to obtain quickly replacements of men actually lost to the enemy. The solution to the problem appears to lie not only in improving the initial dia~nosis of absence, as between actual missing-in-action cases on the one hand and m~m who are stragglers or who have gone AWOL on the other hand, but also in adopting measures which will reduce the number of ille~itimat~ absences. �nr have given instructions that battle casualty reports of men believed, but not confirmed, missing in action will not, in the future, be submitted by combat units until nine days after their disappearance, as it is believed that a considerable number of corrections will be obviated thereby." * * TRAVERSA--ijOVEMBER 27, 1944--The weather today was fair with clouds scattered over the sky in the early morning. This morning BBC prematurely announced the news of General Clark's new assignment as Commander of the 15th Army Group and of General Alexander's appointment as Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, and General Wilson's appointment as British Military R~presentative with the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington to replace Field Marshal Sir John Dill. General Clark returned to a very excited headquarters this morning. At lunch today Gen~ral Clark told Genc~ral Gruenther that his new headquarters would be a tactical rather than an adm::1ni_stra.tive set-up and that General Alexander had agreed that the biggest part of Eighth Army administration would go directly to AFHQ rather than clear through the new 15th Army Group Headquarters. The General also stated that he would probably move the headquarters from Siena to Florence. Th:ts afternoon the G~neral entertained members of his staff at a movie and also showed the Battle of San Pietro film. Misses Moen and Berney, Fifth Army Red Cross girls, came to supper. The General retired early this evening. General Clark today sent Field Marshal Alexander the following cable: RN 6897. "I express to you my most hearty congratulations on your richly deserved promotion to Field Marshal. It has been a privilege for me to serve under your command here in Italy for more than a year now, a...~d nothing could give me greater pleasure than to see this fine recognition of your outstanding ability. I wish you continued success in your nevr and more important undertakings. I am happy and proud to continue under your command in my new assignment." * * * TRAVERSA--ijOVEMBER 28, 1944--The weather is clearing today. At 1000 hours a guard of honor was held for General Bencivenga and 14 Italian officers and men who had come from Rome to be decorated by the Army Comm:mder. General Clark decorated General Bencivenga with the Legion of Merit, Degree of Commande~, with a citation from the President of the United States. General Clark also spoke br:iefly as follows: "Welcome to the Fifth Army. I am glad to have you at my headquarters today and to have this decoration ceremony where, in the name of the j �110 Pres~ dent of the United States, American decorations for ~ritorious service in direct support of Allied operations and for valorous conduct on the field of battle \"lill be conferred on Italian personnel. "The knowledge thrit this ceremony has taken place this morning will give little consolation to our hated German enemy 'l'tlo will realize the collaboration and close cooperation which exists betwn,en the Allied Armies in Italy and the Italian Armed ForcM. "General Bencivenga: You and your assocfa tes assioted rreterially th"' Allied Forces in the battle for Rome and :in our occupation of your great cj ty. Your continued increasing assistance will help to bring the complete defeat of the Gl'lrmans in Italy and bring the peace which the Allied world deserves. "I want to take this opportunity to express my apprec:iFtion to General Cortese, Commander of the ?10th Itali~n Infantry Division which has been with the Fifth Army for some time. His comma.no has assisted the Fifth Army materially jn our advance to the north. 0 we will now read the citations." General Bencivenga responded as follows: "General, gentlemen, "You will excuse me if, owing to my lim:ited knowledge of your language, I am not able to tell you in person the feelin~s of myself and of my collaborators. "My speaker will be my former executive who possesses, to the highest degree, the qualities of a ~allant patriot and of a fine diplomat, your friond Colonel Count Della Rocca. "I am an old soldier, on whom the Goddess fortune hns frequently bestowed honours and awards. But I will tell you frankly thtit never before have I known greater happin1'ss and pride. Pride, because this high award, graciously bestowed upon me by your great President, is handed to me by you, Gen~ral, the gallant and genial leader whose name is lmown throughout the world for having preserved with brilliant tactics, the City of Rome a patrimony of mankind, from the horrors of the struggle a.nd from final il.estruction. ttHappiness, because by these awards and b;,r this memorable military ceremony you have given us a testimony of your feelings toward us, the feelings of comrades - in - arms, representing a ne~ step towards a full alliance and towards the closest cooperation in the war e-f'+>ort. "To you, General, and to your valiant troops we express our greetings: We know that you will lead your "'P..mous Fifth Army a.s well as all the warriors of your new high command to new victories, and that new laurels will be added to the ma.ny battle honours you have already achi,.,ved. �11 I "Good luck to you, Sir and to your gallant soldiers in this epic struegle; good luck to all those who are engaged in this historic fight for the ideals of freedom and democracy." After the ceremony General Clro-k entertained General Bencivenga and the oth-.r officers in his conferen(!-, hut, serving them cof:ee, sandwiches and drinks. The party left 3t 1100 hours. General McUarney and his aide arriven. by car at noon. Gen•'lrals Clark ::ind McNarney conferred for an hour before lunch. After lunch the Army Commander, with General Mci{arney, drove' to the II Corps Headquarters in the vicinity of Pietramala where they met and conferred with General K~yes. They then drove to the 34th Division command post in the vicinity of Loiano where they met and talk~d to General Bolte for about a half hour. Generals Clark and McNarney returned by jeep to General Clark's command post, arriving at 1730 hours. Upon entering the command post, a JU87 flew cHrectly overhead and dropped on~ bomb in the Heac,quarters Company area, wounding several ana killing one Italian civilian. Several bombs also fell along Route 65 adjacent to the commann post. Before djnner General Clark dfacussed with Genf:'!ral McNarney the question of soldiers marrying Italian civilians. The Army Commander told General MclJarney that he felt strongly, and has dictated thE'\ policy wi.thin his Army, that American soldiers should not marry civilians. General McNarney agreed with General Clark and said tha.t he would issue a theater order on this point. The Army Commander entertained General McNarney ford.inner, and after dinner G~nerals Clark, McNarney and Gruenther an0 Major Elliman, General McNarney1 s aide, played bridge. AAI Operation Order No. 4 was issued today and reads as follows: INFORMATION 11 1. 'T'he Enemy cont1nues to contest every inch of the ground, and although he could shorten his front considerably by w-i.thdrawing his left flank to the VAIJ..I DI crr,JA.CHIO, he shows no signs of doing so except under heavy pressure, much less of carrying out any g~n~ral withdrawal voluntarily, though plans and preparations for sucli action have probably been completed. "2. It is appreciated that the enemy will continue to carry out a fighting withdrawal with his left wing until he has been farced back to the position he has selected as his main line of defence connecting his present positions south east o+> BOLOGNA and the VALLI DI CQr'!Iv'!ACHIO; that thereafter he will give battle with all his available r~sources in the hope that he will be able to wear down our offensive in those positions, and so retain his hold on BOLOGNA. "3. As regards our mm troops Eighth Army have sufficient resources to continue o+'fensive operations for another 1 - 4 weeks according to the :J.ntensity of the fighting. Fifth Army will be ready to resume the offensive after 7 Dec, but their offensive capabilities will be limited to about 15 days intensive fighting. INTE"r:t'ION 11 4. To afford the greatest possible support to the Allied winter �t7 2 offensives on the Western and Eastern fronts by bringing the enemy to battle, there~y compelling him to employ in ITALY manpower and resources which might otherwise be available for use on the other fronts. ME,,,HOD "5. Eighth Army will:(a) Continue their present operations to drive the enemy west of the SANTERNO, and SP.cure bridgeheads over that river; and th!'.!reafter (b) Develop their main thrust on the general axis IMOLA BUDRIO; with a subsidiary thrust on FERRARA by ARGENTA, if the condition of the ground on that axis is found to be favourable. The date on which operations we stwards from the SANTERNO are to begin will be left to the discretion of Commander Eighth Army. Hq. AAI and Fifth Army \"ill be given as much notice as practicable of the date selected. 11 6. Fifth Army will:(a) (b) 11 7. Develop operations on their right flank to assist Eighth Army1 s Advance to the SANTF.'R.NO and subsequent thrust on BUDRIO. °'tailed arrangements for th~se op~rations will be made by direct liaison between Eighth Army and 13 Corps, Fifth Army being kept fully informed. Plan and prt'!pa.re their main thrust on BOLOGNA by the axis of Route 65. This operation to be ready to be launched on order of C-in-C, AAI at three days notice from 7 Dec 1944. Conditions for attack. In view of the limited o~fensive capabilities of both e.rmies it is particularly important that all attacks are launched unner the most favourable conditions possible at this time of the year. Full account will there.fore be taken of the condition of the ground And the weather, and no attacks will be launched unless the ground and weather conditions are favourable. "~. Air Support. Fifth and Eighth Annies will continu~ to be supported by XXII T.A.C. and D.A.F. respectively as heretofore. In addition C.G. M.A.T.A.F. has agreed to arrange a0ditional support by medium bombers, and if necessary heavy bombers as well, when the armies nre actuAlly attacking and the targets are suitable. Annies will continue to submit their requests for air support of all natures to their respective support~ng Air Force, and will also notify Hq. AAI of any special requests. In cases of conflicting requirements· priorities will be decided 1)y crrc, AAI. A•--,,_,,·.- ,tvi\-~~- . . •. .. ' �t73 Amrri:rrs"'RA,,,IVE .ARRA ~JGEM'r.:'J'l's "9. The instructions contained in this order involve no change in existing administrative arrangements. IN'1':SRCOMrlU'!\TICA'T'!QN "10. Hq. MI will remain in its present location until the new 15 Army Group Hq. has been forrred and is in a position to undertake the day to day conduct of the battle. 11 A brief summary of operations for the week ending November 2R, 1944 is as follows: During this period the relief and novement of 85th and 91st DiviAion to rear rest nreas was completed, their sectors being taken over by the 88th, 34th and 1st Armored Divisio~s. Advances were made in the 8 Indian Division sector to conform to advances of Eighth Army units on the right flank. Limited objective attacks by TF 45 were partially successful but resistance was sti~f on the right of the sector. Active patrols maintained contact with the enemy across the entire ~rant. * * * TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 29, 1944--General McNarney left after breakfast this morning. General Clark was interviewed by Mr. William King of the Associated press and later by Mr. Dawso:1, ~ditor of -:he Johannesburg Times, and Hr. Decock. At 1130 the Army Commander held a conference of' his corps commanders, General Keyes, G:meral Crittenberger and General Kirkman. Also present were Generals Gruenther, Almond, Brann, Tate, Brigadiers Divers and Archibald, G-Ops 13 Corps, and Colonel Ladue, Chief of Staff of IV Corps. After the conference General Clark entertained these officers for lunch. Before leaving for Florence this afternoon, GonerRl Clark saw Major General Mccoach, EnginP-er Officer of AFHQ, and General Bowman, after which General Clark and Colonel Saltzman drove to the villa in Florence. Generals Gruenther and Almond dined and spent the night at the villa with General Clark. The General plaJP.)d cards in the evening and retired early. Notes on the conference held today are as follows: The Army Commander stated thPt he wished to discuss the ground plans for the forthcoming attack; that the air was not represented at this meeting because plans for the air were not yet complete but would be developed in the near future. 11 "He said that th'3 prospect of the offensive being planned was as difficult as anything yet undertaken in the Italian campaign. He has had comparisons made of previous o:P'rations, including Salerno, Anzio and others, from the standpoint of enemy strength, terrain, etc., and �that this appeared to be the toughest task yet attempted . 11 Both the Eighth Army and the Fifth Army will make all-out attacks . Commanders must think in terms of going as far as maxinrum use of available means will permit . The mission of both armies is to keep as many German Divisions as possible here in Italy end to effect the maximum destruction on these enemy forces . "D-~ is 7 December . 'l'he attac1< will not be launched unless we get a spell of fine weather. The timing problem in the operation rather resembles the one experienced at Anzio; i.e ., a decision will lave to be made as events develop as to the most favorable moment to launch successive phases of the offensive . This offensive will consist of a series of impulses from east to west with the Eighth Army assisted by the 13 Corps opening up, followed by the II Corps attack. "Corps commanders must take strong steps to conserve ammunition. Beginning with 7 December the American troops have available ?7,500 rounds per day of 105 ammunition. There will be 200,000 rounds in reserve and 116,000 rounds at the ports . The Army Commarrler believes that he will consequently have about 20 days' supply available. Brigadier Divers confirmed that the British forces in Fifth Army will have about three weeks' supply. The Army Commander mentioned that the 34th Division has had some success in salvaging ammunition. "As to the scheme of maneuver the Army Commander Eighth Army will start the attack on 30 November or 1 Canad jan Corps, the }Jew Zealanders, the 46th Division line . This is to be a vjgorous attack which is hoped Eighth Army to the Imola area . He has offered to the possible assistance from the 13 Corps along the Imola is desired . stated that the December with the ancl the Poles in to bring the Eighth Army all axis as soon as it 1 "General Kirkman described :in some < etail his contemplated operations in support of the Eighth Army, to start about 2 December. Parts of the 7'1th , 6th Armored aml 8th Jndian Divisions will be used. "General Cl~rk pointed out that Pfter the Eighth Army attack gets under way means will 11 sought for the best use of th~ 13 Corps to aid e the Bighth or Fifth Army. "The Army CoITlil1a.nder stated that it has been agreed th~t the attack will be made on three days 1 notice . ttHe stated that the II Corps attack will be preceded and accompanied by considerable air support and that the CG XII Air Force he.s told hjm that he hopes to be able to furnish 500 f:ighter-bomber sorties per day. "In the II Corps attack a C.T . of the 92d Division will be brought over to aid the II Corps; it will be unoer the 8~h Division and take over a defensive sector . "The first phase of the II Corps attack will fovolve a lim7ted �objective attack by B8th Division. General Clark pointed out that there is to be no prearranged stopping between phases but that all units are to go as fast as possible. One C.T. of the 8~th Division will be held in reserve for any use the Army Commander may wjsh. He described the first objectives of the 34th, 91st, 1st Armored and 6th South African Armored Divisions and stated that simultaneously the Brazilians will make an attack to their northeast. "General Keyes expanded the details of employment of his units. He stated that instructions have been given for conservation of ammunition and stressed the need of air support. 11 The Army Commander instructed the commanders present to take special pains to have all their subordinate commanders talce positive action to combat a feeling of futility on the part of troops who may f0el that this is a tforgotten theater'. There must be impressed on all personnel the extreme importance of our present mission of oontaining and destroying German forces which might otherwise face the Allies on other fronts. He used~ football simile, comparing our forces here to guards and tackles who enable backs to score. "General Ori ttenberger presented the present situation and the plans for TIT Corps stating that the IV Corps operations would involve three phases. The first phase, now in progress, incluiles securing of the Belvedere-Costello ridge which must be occupied in order to secure communications and to open up the operations contemplated for the South African division. He mentioned that the last battalion of the Brazilian Division comes in tomorrow and that General Mascarenhes ,vill thereafter assume responsibility for an indicated sector. The Brazilian attack which began this morning is progressing. The second phase to begin on J December involves an attack in difficult terrain for the Brazilians. In the third, the South African division will attempt to secure the Sole featurA by D-Day. ttGeneral Brann queried General Keyes about timing and was told that IT Corps estimates that it will be eight days from the jump-off until the first objective line is secured. 1tGeneral Tate staterl that rockets and 10,000 rounds of ammunition will be available for the operations. "On -inquiry as to the status of' 48 25 -pounders of Italien artillery, General Brann stated that a conference on the subject is being held today. "General Howard said that indications are that the enemy will hold tenaciously a.nd perhaps bring in additional troops, mentioning that the 71st Division may be brought down from the north wher~ it has b en resting. 11 The Army Command er mentioned that he would like if possible, in later phases of op~rations, to move the 92d Division farther to the east to make an attack of its ovm in oome sector. He said that ·'n these operations re proposes to make any adjustments of any kind which he �thinks might favorably affect the battle. "Relative to air support General Clark said that air efforts must be closely coordinated between the Fifth am Eighth Armies. Activities to locate good air targets have been in progress for oome time and certain targets will be given the XII Air Forc,, at once. Medium bombers as well as fighter bombers will be available as well as heavies if necessary. "General Kirkman asked for the services of Rover Joe before the II Corps attack and was told that they would be furnished ~nasmuch as practicable. "General Almond was told that the C.T. of the 92d Division which will aid II Corps should be ready to move as soon as possible but that it should not show up in its new area ahead of time for security reasons. "The Army Comman::1.er said that a confjrming O.I. will be issmd covering the operations. The Operations Instructions (#36) referred to above was issued today and is quoted below: 1. Since the beginning of the operations of Allied Armies in Italy, the mission has been to destroy the enemy forces in this theater.· That mission remains unchanged, but in addition, it is imperatlve at this time that operations be executed irunedia tll!ly to engage the enemy forces to prevent the withdrawal of any IE,rt of these forces to strengthen the German 0efenses against the major Allied offensives on both the Vlestern and Eastern fronts in Europe. 11 2. Eighth Army continues its attack generally NW along Route 9. If weather conditions ar~ reasonably favorable, it is estimated that it will reach the SAH'lT,RNO River about 7 December. 11 "3. On or about 7 December, exact date to be determined by the advance of Eighth Army and predicted weather conditions, Bighth Army and Fifth Army will la.unch a major offensive to capture BOLOG'iA. 11 4. Fifth Army operations will be divided into phases as follows: a. Ihase I - Objectives. PhRse line and bou:rrlary, see overlay. b. Phase II - See overlay "'or directio11 of principle efforts of Corps. Phase lines and objectives later. c. Phase DI - The objective of this phase will be the capture of IDLOONA. Details of execution will be issued later. �"5. 13 Corps will: a. Assist the advance of Eighth Army as follows: (1) As soon a.s possible launch an attack astride the CASTEL del RIO - IMOLA Road directed on IMOLA. (2) After the attack on IMOLA has been launched b" prepti.red on Army orders to launch an attack generally astrico the S. CL~MENTE CASTF.L S. PIE~RO Road directed on CASTEL S. PIETRO. b. Capture objectives sho1m on overlay. c. Maintain close contact with Eiehth Arn.y. tion between 13 Corps and Eighth Army is authorized. d. Direct communica- Protect right flank of Fifth Army. 6. II Corps will: a. Capture objectives sho.vn on overlay. b. Initially hold 35th Division in reserve. c. Hold one infantry regiment 88th Division in reserve; not to be employed until released by this Headquarters. d. 7. Haintain contact with 13 Corps. IT Corps will: a. Capture objectives shovm on overlay. b. Maintain contact with II Corps. "8. 92d Division (less one ROT) will: a. 1'19.intain pressure against enemy forces in its sector. b. Maintain contact with IT Corps." * * * 'T'RAVERSA-•N'OVE:MBER JO, 19/44--The weather today was rainy. Generals Clark and Gruenther left the Florence cub strip by L-5 at 0845 for Pistoia., arriving at 0900. The Army Commander was met by his frickard and jeep and drove to IT Corps headquarters where he was met by General Grittenberger who orient~d him and General Gruenther on the current situation. Gen~ral Clark, with General Crittenberger in his jeep, drove to inspect a battalion of the BEF about to go into the line. Here he was met by Generals Jbscarenhas and Zenobia and General GrAeley. General Clark reviewed the troops an<l shook hands with many of the o"ficers and men. Th~ Gen -,ral commented to · General r;Jasca.renhas on the light clothing 'l)eing worn by these troops. General Mascarenhas explained that they had �come from Brazil without the proper warm clothing. G~r, l'lrDl Clnrk immedf diat,.,.ly ordered combat jackets, winter underwear and shoe picks be issued to all Brazilian troops and to be delivered to th~m tomorrow. General Clark w· th G"mt'!ral Mascarenhas and party then drove to an OF, but unfortunately the terrain could not be observed due to the heavy fog. The party was met by Colonel commanding Task Force 45. The Colonel explained his situation to General Clark, pointing out on a map the location of his troops and their activities. Returning from the OP to the Brazilian headquarters, General Clark stopped to inspect tanks of the 751st T,mk Batta.lion now being used as artillery in support of the Brazilians and Task Force 45. General ClPrk shook hands and talked to many of the men, telling them of the fine support and the important part they were playing ·n the big picture. Generals Clark, Gruenth~r and Crjttenberger were th~n PntertainP-d at lunch by General Nascarenha.s at the 73EF Headquarters. After lunch General Clark, with GenerRl Mascarenhns, visited another Brazilian OP where the General had a good view of Mount Belvedere and the vicinity. General Hascarenhtis pointed out on the ground his next plan of attack on Mount Belvedere. General Clark made suggestions to him and encouraged him in his mission •• The General then drove to inspect Brazilian units, returning to IV Corps Artillery Hea,?.quart~rs where he was met by General Crane and Brigadier Haunsel, Commanding the 6?nd AA Brigade attached to IT Corps, and several artillery staff officers. The General had a warm drink, bade goodbye to General Crittenberger and members of his staff and drove with General Gruenther to Fistoia where he and General Gruenther took off by L-5 for Florence. General Clark entertained Grmerals Gru~ntht"lr, Brann, Mr. and Mrs. Charini and Mrs. Sartori for dinner. * * * ~RAVBRSA--DEqEMBER 1, 1944--The General spent a quiet day at the villa. Colonel Johnson, JAG, called on the General to discuss several outstanding court martial cases. The G~neral lunched with his aide at the Hotel Anglo-American. This evening the General spent a few minutes at a party given by G-3 at a villa in Florence. * * TRAVF.RSA--DECBMBER 2, 1944--General Clark left the villa at Aleven o 1 clock, arriving for lunch at his command post. Afte};:_ lunch the G·m eral conferred with Generals Keyes, Gruenth~r am :rrann. At 1700 hours the Army Comrnarrler drove back to his villa in Florence and this evening gave a buffet supper for forty members of his staff on the occasion of the Anny-Navy football grure. General Coulter, Commanding General of the 8 5th D1v1s1on, and G · · · eneral Livesay, Conmanding �119 General of the 91st Division, spent the night at the General's villa. * * * 'T'RAVERSA--DE0EMBER 3, 1944--This r.iorning the Army Conm,ander was to have flown from Florence to Rone in General Cannon's C-47 but due to heavy fog in the Florene~ area the General, with his P,Uests Colonels Grogan, Smith, 1rygaard and Saltzman, Captain and Mrs. '3avary, drove to Siena. At 1100 hours the General and his party took off from Malignano Airport, arriving l'!.t the Littoria airport jn Rome at 1230. Alexander Kirk, American Ambassador to Italy, and Bri'5~dier G~n"ral T. K. Brown, Cornrm.nding the Rome Area, met the Army Comrna.nder at the airfield and drove with him to the Hotel Excelsior. Major John Boettiger lunched with the Arrny Commander ,md conferred with him privately for an hour. Major Boettiger, son-in-lA.w of the President, n.elivered to General ClPrk a personal verbR.l messrge frorn the Cor.imnder-in-Chief of his appreciation and the apprecir"l.tion of the ATJ1erican J'!'!Ople for t he outstanding accomplishments of General CL-'lrk and his Fifth Army in ItR.ly. At 1700 Mr. rnyron C. Taylor, l !"!r sonal Repre srmta ti v"' of the Fre sident of the Tfnited States of A~ri~a to m.s Holiness the Pope, and Mrs. Taylor gave a tea in honor of General Clark. During the tea General Clark told the Brazilin.n Ambassador that he hRd issued to the Brazilian troops warm winter clothing. The Ambassador expressed his deep thanks but explained to General Clark that he was r.iost indignant at the shortsightecsnese of soMebody i n Braz:i 1 not having this equipment for Br~zili~n troops before they cane overseas. He told the Army Conmvmder he would make an issue of this with his goverMent at home. General c1~.rk told the Ambassador that he did not wish Mn to do this; thPt the troops were now well taken care of by the Fifth Array and to forget the issue. The AMbassador promised that he would. This evening General Clark was entertained by Arnbassador Kirk for dinner at the }alazzo Barberini. Sir Noel Charles, British Ambassador, and many distinguished lsllests were present. * * * TRAVSRSA--DF.:CEMBER 4, 1944--At 1100 hours this morning Gen~ral C:18rk was int-.rviewed by TTi,. Durrance of TIME and LIFE Magazines on his MW appoint, ment as Co"T!manding G1'n~ral, 15th Army Group. At 1200 hours Adllliral Morse flew in from Leghorn to call on Grm"'ral Clark. The G~ne·ral spent a half hour conferring privately with Admiral Morse. Admiral Morse offert'ld any assistance he could possibly render Gen~ral CL..,rk :in his new f'.ss:1gnrnent. The Generl"l said that he might call on Admiral rlorse for craft to help cross the Po when the time crune. In addition, he asked the Admiral if the Navy had any guns with ammunition which were mobile and could be used as artillery. Admiral Morse said he would look into it and advise. Ambassador and Mrs. Taylor entertained General Clark n~d Prince Hntberto f'or luncheon. �After lunch, the General was interviewed by Herbert Matthews of the NEVf YORK 'T'!r-l!P,S and ln ter by Reynolds Packard of' the UF. General Clark gave a small dinner this evening with Colonel Saltzman, Frincess Colonna, l'larchese f"arconi a.'1d her brother and child. * * * TRAVERSA--DECEMBER 5, 1944--This morning Gen11Jral Clark went shopping and bought Ann two angora sweaters and a pair of gloves and also visited the fa:mous jeweler, Bulgari, who showed General Clark through his shop and displayed for him his ~ost precious jewels. General Clark with Colonel Saltznan, Harches"'l Marconi and Princess Colonna made a short ~ight-seeing tour of the cjty. General Clark wn.s entertained at lunch at the Villa Medici by Genere.l A gui,rd of honor was held for General Clark upon his arrival. After lunch Gen-,r8.l de Couteulx de Gaumont and the French A"b!'tssador, Mr. Henri Coure de Hurville, walked through the gardens of the "iTilla. Medici, during which time the band played in honor of the Generel, de Couteulx de Cn.unont. At 1700 General Clark, Colonel Salt zmnn n.nd his aide called on General Souslopnrov at his villa. 'T'he Gll!nereJ. told Gl"'lneral So-qsloparov that in his capacity as Commander of the 15th Army Group he would do everything possible to contain the German divisions on his front, "Vhich he hoped would greatly assist the !llagnificent nussian arl:l.i-'S in their drive through the Balkans, as well as Gen~ral Eisenhmrer on the we::,tern front. The G~neral also mentioned that he was most anxious to M~et ood excha.nge ideas w:ith the Russian Commander commanding the troops in the Balkans. General Sousloparov said that it could be arranged at any tine. General Clark explained to General Sousloparov briefly his plan of operations in the m~ediate future. General Clark gave a sma.11 dinner this evening with the members of his staff who accompanied him on his trip; namely, Colonel Smith, Lt. Col. Nygaard, General HU111e, Colonel Saltzman and Colonel Grogan. A brief summRr7 of operations for the wee:< ending December 5, 1944 is as follows: Good advances continued on the right of 13 Corps sector and limited \ gains were made in the Corps sector by Brazilian troops. Heavy enemy: counterattacks on the left flnnk of 13 Corrs res11lted in tl•e loss of M. CAS':'ELLARO and forct'!ld a withdrawal from M. B"'";LVEDERE in the center of IV Corps sector. Otherwise defensive positions were maintained and aggressive patz:ollin~ continued. Resting of combat troops was completed and regrouping for future offensive operations was in progress. rr * * * TRAVT1tSA--DECEMBER 6, 1944--General Clark telephoned Mr. Taylor and Ambassador }(irk this morning to thank them. f'or their kindness to him while in �IZ( Rome . He then drove to Champiano airport where he took off by General Hune and Hr . Van Lear ·woodward of the U. s. Conmercial who is visiting the war fronts . Due to heavy fog and rains in Florence arl'!a , the Array Conmander was forced down in Siena and Florence , arriving at one o'clock . B- 25 with Council the drove to He lunched at th~ Angl o- American Hotel end after lunch went to the villa. . At six o 1 cl ock General Sir J"aitlnnd Wilson, Surreme Allied Commander , Uer'iiterranean , the Governor of Gibraltar and Brigadier Gort arrived at the Anglo-Araerican Hotel and conferred with G~..neral ClRrk for two hours . The Gen•ral din~o qui~ tly tonight ~t the villa with Col onels Saltzman and Smith and two guest~ . BBC today announced that Lt . Gen . Lucian K. Truscott would take over the coI!Ulla.nd of the Fifth Army upon the departure of Gen . Clark to take up his duties ~s Command i ng Generttl of the 15th Amy Group . * * * TRAVERSA--DECEMBER 7 , 1944- -The General left the villa this morning at 0930 , arriving at his conunand post at 1030. The Army Commander conferred this morning with General Berardi , Chief of Staff of the Italian Army. After lunch Mr . and TJ!rs . Tompkins, Regional Directors of the Red Cross , 12..nd Mr . Stevens of t~ Fifth Army Red Cross carne to see G neral Clark. Mr . Woodward came in this eveninE; to say goodbye to General Clark before his departure ~rom the Italian theater . General mruscott arrived in Florence this afternoon and called Gene ral Clark to say that he would arrive at the Fifth Army command post toJllorrow . * * * TRAVERSA--DECEMBER 8 , 1941+--'::'he weather today \ms rA.iny and misty. Gene ral Clark and General Brann droYe by jeep to the Headquarters of the 6th South African Armored Division where they were r.:et ·,y Generals Poole and Crittenberger . General Clark , with Generals Foole and Crittenberger , • drove to an OP from which they could clearly observe riount Sole , the immedfate objective of the 6th South African Division. Thl'l party then drove to the cornrnand post of th, 24th Guards Brigade where Genrral ClArk was introduced to Brigadier P . D. =:rskine and ne nbers of his staff and had a cup of -':.ea . General Clark spoke briefly to t:1e officers eX} laining to them tl,e important role that the 6th South African Armored Division was playing in the over- all pictur..,. The General \Vi th General Poole then drove to the command post of the 12th Brigade where he net i3rigac1ier R. J . Palmer and rn.1'mbers of his staff and talked to them briefly. He th•~m drove to a battalion command post for six miles over a road which was completely under enemy observation where h,, could observe Mount Sole from a.11 possible angJes of approach . �At the battalion headqilllrters General ClP.rk spoke brif'lfly to tl•e officers, encouraging them on th~ir next mission. The Army Commander was then "'ntertained at lunch at the lieadquartcrs of the 6th South African Armored Division. Before lunch General Clark promoted Lt. Col. Clark, Cot'l!!l8.nding Officer of the 1108 Enginner Combat Group to the grac~e of full colonel. General Clark also presented Generru. }oole with a carbine. After lunch the G"'neral drove, with General Poole, to the rear headquart"'rs of the 6th South African Arnored Division in Castiglione, where General Clark met Brigadier Thurstenberg, Cor,~anding the 11th Brigade, and several of his staff officers. After this General Clark departed for his headquarters by jeep and as a bridge had been washed out over the short route, the Army CoJ1Ul'l8.nder was forced to take a three-hour detour in r:eavy rain and fog, arriv·ing at his cormand post at 1830 hours. Upon his return Gen"'ral Clark met GenerM Truscott who had just arrived at his headquarters. Gen~rals Truscott and Carleton were guests of the Ar~y Commander for dinner. * * * TRAVERSA--DECEMBER 9, 1944--The weather today \"f1=1S cloudy. General Clark conferred with General "'rus cott over maps in the hut during most of the morning. Genernl Chidlaw, with Colonel Wise, his Operations Officer, carse to confer with Gen,1rals Clark 1md Truscott. At 1030 hours Gen~ral Theron, GOG Administration Union Defense Force, called on General Cla.rk and conferred for a~out half an hour. After lunch Gemra.l 7an Deusen, of the Signal Corps, called with Gen"ral rv:oran to see General 01.."l.rk. At 16oO hours the Aray Conmander drove to his villa in Florence and had Generals Gruenther, Brann, Lewis and Bradshaw. for dinner and cards. * * * TRAVERSA--DECE!,1BER 10, 1944--The weather today was fine and clear. The Giimeral ,.,ent to see Colonel McMahon at the 24th General Hospital, after which he walked with his aide for two and a half hours around Florence, sight-seeing nnd looking in shops. The G1'nertl lunched a.t the Anglo-American Hotel with Colonel Smith and his aide. He spent a. quiet afternoon and h~.d three guests for dinner. * * * TRAVERSA--DECEMBER 11, 1944--General Clark left his villa this morning at 0900 hours, arriving at his headquarters at 1000 hours. This morning General Clark prol'ioted Colonel Duff, Assis ta.nt Divisional Corarmn< er of the 10th Mountain Division, to the grade of Brigadier General. �l8 3 At 1200 hours Air Minister of Brazil, Mr. Salgado, and a pRrty consisting of Brigadier Aplmar Mascarenhas, Major Genfll>ral Wooten and five other officers arrived. A guard of honor was held for the Air Minister, after which General Clark briefed the Air Minister on the current situation a.nd entertained he and his party at a buffet lunch at which the Ch:a's of Sections of the Arny Corafflander 1 s Headquarters were present. In the h.te afternoon the General drove to his villa in Florence where he spent the night. General Clark today sent the following cable to General Mascarenhas, Comna.nder of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force: "Best wishes for success in tor.101Tow' s operations. Have every conf idence that good leadership and the fighting qualities of the Brazilian troops will carry ob.jecti ves. 11 General Clark also today sent the following cable to General Alexander regarding the food situation in Italy: 11 Since exchange of telegrams regarding civilian food si tua.tion in Fifth Army area ending with yours undated Reference #CAO 341, there has been virtually no inprovement. The ration is still 200 grams of bread per day per person supplemented by 600 grar11s per :month of flour for spaghetti or the equivalent. Besides this AMG has been distributing 250 grl-ln!s of dehydrated soup and 400 grams of dried peas per month but only in cities of 50,000 or more. However telegram froa ALCOM #6898 date<l 23 November orders that there be no distribution of these la.st items during December except occasionally in newly occupied villages. This insufficient amount of food will not support a normal individua.l. Chronic undernourishment is givlng rise to unrest. There have been recent demonstrations demanding a minimUJA of 300 grams daily per person. That amount is now being distributed -i n the south of Italy, a fact well known to the public in the Fifth Army area.. The Italian. press be. s widely quoted a Washington dispatch dated 3 November that President Roosevelt had given instructions that Italians throughout liberated Italy receive at least 300 grB.11.s of bread per persqn per day. I am infol;'nted that the continued failure to provide adequate food is likely to cause militarily serious unrest particularly as the weather grows increasingly cold. The whole sitW1.tion is much aggravated by the acute shortage of transportation. It is appreciated that SAC MED has made specific recormendations to Con.bined Chiefs of Staff to obtain necessary minimum ration. Inforlllation is requested as to the prospects of finding n,.eans of providing .300 grams of bread daily per person. 11 * TRAVERSA--DECElffiER 12, 1944--General Clark lw.d a meeting at the AngloAmerican Hotel at which the following were present: Gener~.l Harding, General Mccreery, General --::'ruscott, Brigadier Flo;yd, Genl'!ral Gruenther a.nd General Br~..nn. After the meeting the General lunched at his villa and drove back to the command post at Traversa. The Gen~ral dined with General Truscott and retired early in the evening. �A brief summary of operations for the week ending December 12, 1944 is as follows: Some gains continued to be made on the right of 13 Corps sector as forward positions in other sectors were rna7ntained, enemy counterattacks and aJ,tempts to infiltrate were frustrated, training was continued in rear areas as plan.red reliefs and resting of front l:ine troops Wl'Jre also accomplished. Local attacks comrn~nced as the ]:)'riod ended. * * * TRAVERSA--DECEMRER 13, 1944--General Clark deµi,rted from his command post by jeep early this morning to make a farewell Will' of the II Corps area before relinquishing command of the Fifth Anny. The General first stopped at the S~th Division Headquarters where he spoke briefly with Gen~ral Kenda,11, Division Commru1der, and members of his headquarters staff and presented a Distinguished Service Cross to a member of the division. From. the 88th Division the General drove to the command post of the 91st Division where he presented two Silver Sta.rs, four Legion of Merits and coamissioned an enlisted man in the grade of 2nd Lieutenant before saying goodbye to the Division Commarrler, Generru. Livesey, and 111embers of his staff. From the 91st Division the Army Comma:rrler proceeded to the command post of the 34th Division where he lunched with Gen~ral Bolte and members of his staff. Following lunch the Arny Corn.rtander presented seven decorations to members of the 34th Division before taking off for the 1st Armored Division. At the 1st Armored Division command post General ral Pritchard, Division Commander, a:rrl members of his one Distinguished Service Cross and one Silver Star. also coaaissioned two men of the 1st Armored Division 2nd Lieutenant. CJ.ark spoke with Genestaff and presented The Army Commander to the rank of Moving along to II Corps Headquarters, General C].p,rk was greeted by Maj. Gen. Keyes, Corps Comm.arrler, who he presented vr.i. th a Bronze Star. The Army Comm,:mder took this occasion to make a few remarks to Gen(")rnl Keyes and his assembled staff officers, thanking them for the fine cooperation they had given Amy Headquarters during th-3 entire period that they had been with Fifth Army, congratulating them on the succe§s they- had achieved time and again j_n taking objectives assigned them and finally expressing his regret at leaving Fifth Arny but indicating the satisfaction he would feel in still having the Fifth Army with him in his new command. The General departed from the II Corps coriuM.nd post and headed for his command post, stopping at the 8th EvacU:~tion Hospital on the way back to say goodbye to Col. Kirkman and Lt. Col. Blackford. The Army Commander had dinner with the regular members of his mess and retired early in the eve · �General Ma.scarenhas today iITote General Cl:-i.rk as follows: 11 It seems appropriate to me in the delicate situation through which we are now passing, to get in touch with my illustrious chief, in order to focalize certain special aspects of the action of the Brazilian s~peditionary Force on ItaliP.n soil. nAs a commander and above all as a soldier, I will carry out, at whatever sacrifice it may cost, all the orders emanating from rny superiors, allies and friends. "But the situation of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, as you well know, involves a political problem, of the gr("!atest inter~st to the present and future constant and friendly relntions beb 1een our countries. Under these conditions, if missions were given us, thnt were in a certain sense precipitate, which might bring about a premature expenditure of our forces, it might, p~rhaps, bring about a situation prejudical to the political aspect of our activities. \ "We wish to be employed, and we must fight for the common ideals of our countries, but with our eyes upon tomorrow, for our continent, and upon the Peace Conference. "These are the considerations which have brought me to write you these lines, ronfident in the esteem and confidence in 11,rhich I hold your decisions. "Certain that you will understand my position, I am. 11 * * * TRAiffiRSA--DECEMBER 14, 1944--General Cle.rk rlep:."-l.rted early tr is morning by jeep to make a last trip to 13 Corps before taking over command of lSth Army Group. He arrived at 13 Corps Headquarters at 0900 and was met by General Kirkman, 13 Corps Commander. After talkiiig for a short while with the Corps Com:mander, General Clrir·k departe0 with General Kirkman for the 1st British Division where they w,,re met by Maj. Gen. Lcewen, Division Conmander. General Clark spoke to Gen. Loewen and several of his sta.ff off·' cers, e:xpressing hi::1 regret at leaving Fifth A-.rmy, thanking them for their fine cooperation and congratulating them on the succ~sses th~y had achieved in the past and which he was sure they would continue to gain. Before leaving the Divisional oorm.and post, General Clark presented Gen. Loewen with the gift of a carbine. Generals Ciark and Kirkman departed for the 78th British Division and upon their arrival were rll'Jt by ri!aj. Gen. Arbuthnot, the Division Cornrn.ander. The Army Commander also spoke to the members of the division staff and presented Gen. Arbuthnot with a carbine before departing for the 6th British Armored Division. �General Clark had lunch at the 6th British Armored Division with Maj. Gen. Murray, Division Comma.mer, and after lunch talked hriefly to members of the staff and presented Gen. Murray with a cnrbine suitably inscribed. Just before departing for his own headquarters, GenAral Clark presented General Kirkman with a carbine also. General Clark then drove back to his oomman<l post at Trav'3rsa where he spent the remainder of the afternoon and early evening working on administrative matters. The Army Commander dined with the regular members of his mess and retired early in the evening. General Clark today wrote the following letter to General McNarney on the subject of the 92nd Infantry Division: n1. It appears appropriate at this time to submit a report of impressions which have been obtained to date of the battle efficiency of the 92nd Infantry Division during the period in wti ich it hP_s been in combat in Fifth Army. The approxirre.te lengths of combat service of the division1 s regiments to date are: 370th Infantry Regiment, three and onehalf months; 371st Infantry Regiment, one month; 365th Infantry Regiment, twenty days. "2. Given the fact that the various elements of the di vision have been going through their first period of actual combat, they have performed excellently in supply and administrative rra tters end in such tactical operations as do not require sustained demonstration of' initiative and aggressiveness on the parts of junior leaders and of the rank and file. In these latter aspects of combat certain sho:ctcomings have arpearfld which will bear close observation in the ::'uture oporRtions of the division. "3. '!'he ma,jority of the junior of'ficers of the di vision have -~ailed so far to show the <legree of leadership, init:iP tive, responsibility a.nd aggressiveness which is requisite if infa~try units are to achieve their objectives in offensive combat ngainst determjned opposition. SimJlarly the majority of non-commissjoned officers have appeared un~ble, due to the same nefici'mcies, to lead their men successfully under fire in the absence of forceful officer leadership. 11 4. Enlisted men of the division m ve exhibited more nervousness and less aggressive will to fight in the face of danger than do white soldiers in comparable circumstances. These cioaracteristics af'fect adversely their ability to conduct successful patrolling activities, and in particular to hold ground against counterattack after they have taken it. They appear in many instances to be lacking the mutual oonfidence a.nd team-consciousness which is essential to successful offensive com- bat. "5. The division commatrler and his senior subordinntes have found that it is necessary, in order to induce vigorous team action, for them to lead and supervise their troops much more in detail than is normally the case. Experience so far has shown that unless the men are under the immediate control and guidance of effective leaders they are apt to shrink �187 from danger and to fall away from their units as they close with the enemy. The more flagrant cases are malingerers who, in several instances, have been found to have hidden rather than go forward. In the period between 2 October and 18 November there were fifty cases in the division which requi.r8d general court martial action for offenses involving misbehavior before the enemy. In this connection it .is of interest to note the experience of one of the Division's infantry battalions in an attack on 24 November. This attack was made over moderately difficult mountainous terrain with open sloping hillsides and comparatively good roo.ds and trails. The battalion entered the attack with 411 enlisted men in three rifle companies. Twenty-four hours later there were 70 enlisted men left available for duty in the three rifle companies comblned. During this one-day period the casualties of the three rifle companies consisted of one killed, fifty-nine wounded and four exhaustion cases. By 1530 hours on the afternoon of the 25th there were left a. total of approxi mately five officers and twelve enlisted men in the three rifle oompanies. Three wounded passed through the battalion aid station on 25 Povember and three on 26 November. The total wounrl.ed for the three dnys was ®5, including 2 officers. This battalion entered this engagement well equipped and 1Jriefed and appropriately supported by artillery. A report by the Inspector Gen,::,ral of IV Corps, from which the data given above are taken, indicates that investigation disclosed a lac1c of desire on the part of this personnel to advance under artillery or small arms fire or to close with the enemy. 11 (fu. 7. This division received mitted to battle. It had a long careful indoctrination, and each relatively quiet sector. I feel no handicaps. 0 excellent preparation before being comtraining r,eriod, O)mplete equipment and unit has been init:ia ted to combat in a that the div:ision entered combat under 8. It is appreciated that the division's combat experience is s till so brief that impressions gained thus far are not conclusive, and that the division has still to demonstrate its combat value. This is necessarily in the nature of a preliminary report. The Division Commander, General Almond, is very alive to the capabilities and cha.racteristics of his personnel, and is working continuously to improve the leadership, training and performance of his unit. It is my intention to give the division increasing opportunity to assume combat responsibility and to demonstrate its ability to carry a full load in offensive operations. A further report on this subject will be submitted on the basis of future experience." 11 Major Walters, General Clark1 s personal representative with the Brazilian Expeditionary Force,today submitted the following report on the recent action of the Brazilians: "The recent attack of the 1st Brazilian Division against Mount Castello in the Reno Valley was thrmm back by the Germans, as were the two previous ones. During this attack, I observed it both from the Division command post and Vat'ious observation posts. Like the two rcr:-evious attacks, it seemed almost to have achieved success when suddenly the attacking troops fell back to the line of departure. In the latter stages of the �183 attack, I was in the divisional command post and carefully followed the messages coming in, which gave no hint of any strong Gernan reaction until the Germans put down their artillery and mortar barrage. "The Brazilian attack seems to have been r'riven off almost entirely by mortar and artillery fire. During all tho ti m I was in the obsere vation posts I heard no German machine gun fire, while ours was plainly audible. The reserve battalion vras not ey,.gaged, inasmuch as General Zenobio stated that he could only have gotten into a position to act at about two o 1 clock, which would have made it difficult to secure any definite result starting from the line of departure again before darkness. The attack originally scheduled to start an hour before dawn e ctually got under way very shortly before dmm. "The signal communications during the latter stages of the attack apparently did not function as well as might be desired, and t here were frequent long gaps with no inforl1'f!tion. 11This attack, with some variations, was almost a carbon copy, with regard to the result, of the previous attacks, with the exception that in this attack there were four battalions in the attack; two in the attacking echelon, one in local reserve and one in division reserve. ""'he failure of these attacks seems to be due to a variety of causes: 1. The junior officers do not seem to be able to hold their men together under mortar and artillery fire. 11 11 2. Orders not to withdraw are not obeyed. General Zenobio told me he had refused permission to the battalion commanders to withdraw, but that the withdrawal had been carried out any\Vay. 3. It is my impression that there exists a psychological feeling of inferiority in the Brazilian soldier with regard to the Geroo ns . 11 "4. In spite of having been in training for many months prior to embarkation, these men do not appear to have hD.d more than basic training and do not appear to know how to use Arrerican weapons to the best advantage . "5. In the previous attacks the troops arriv~d on the position at night and attacked the following morning without hav:1ng had a chence to familiarize themselves with the terrain nor even to have a hot meal prior to the jumping off. This was also the first occasion these troops have been in combat . 11 6. The difficult climatic conditions - much colder than anything known in Brazil - appears to have an adverse affect on the morale of the troops. 11 7 . The Division Cornrnarrler does not appear equipped for the position which he holds. He is very mercurial in character, passing from \ I \ ) �periods of great optimism to moods of great depression. Arter the previous failures, he, in my opin5on, had already lost faith in his troops and was beaten before he started the attack. Th5B lack of confidence on the part of the Division Commarrler is transmitted down through the junior officers, and to me the similarity of the Division command post on the eve of the attack to an undertaking µi.rlor was striking. ns. One of the basic reasons for the failure to remedy other defects is that it ap:r;ears to be an accepted custom for a junior officer or non-commissioned officer who fails to carry out a task or mission assigned to him, to present a long sDries of alibis and excuses which are listened to by his superior, and a prolonged discussion then follows. I have heard lieutenants interrupt full colonels to make excuses. After the failure of the attack of December 12th I heard the battalion commanders giving excuses to General Zenobia, Commarrler of the attacking group. I heard General Zenobia giving excuses to General MascareILhas, and the three Brazilian Gen ,rals then went to IV Corps Headquarters where they proceeded to give the Corps Commander a series of excuses. "9. Verbal rebuke seems to be almost the only accepted form of punishment for failure to comply with orders, and there is great reluctance to relieve officers of their command - especially officers of field grade. 11 10. The Brazilians, as a whole, do not auparently yet have a correct perspective on cor.ibat. lOq~ losses seem exceptionally heavy to them. "On the evening of December 12th General Mascarenhas and General Zenobia and General Cordeiro went to IV Gorps oomrmnd poot to see General Crittenberger. They explained that the failure of the attack was due to the intense mortar, artillery and machine gun f:ire of the GC;!rtmns from weapons deeply dug in on Mount Castello in positions that could not be neutralized by the artillery they had. General Crittenberger then asked General T:Tascarenhas if he could attack again on the following day, and the three Generals emphaticaJ_ly said that they oould not. General Crittenberger then asked when they could attack, and General Nascarenhas said that his division would not be any better than it had been on the eve of Mount Castello. Genera;L Mascarenh~s f1nally stated th8t he did not believe there was any offensive capacity left in his division. The Commanding General, IV Corps, then asked General Ua.scarenhas whether he would not rather consult with his staff officers and check on the condition of his troops before committing himself to this definitely. General Mascarenhas said that it was not necessary and that he could state that with his present front and means, his division was not capable of any further offensive action. The Commanding General, IV Corps, then requested the Commanding Gernral of the 1st Brazilian Division to give him his suggestion as to the employment of his division, which General Mascarenhas promised to do on the following day , after consulting with his staff. "On December 13th Gemral Mascarenhas called me into his office and stated that he was now going to trust me with the grave responsibility, as Genernl. Clark's representative, of conveying to him the situation of �l4o ~ 'V"J the Brazilian Expeditionary Force. By implication he admitted that he did not think his troops were capable of much in the way of offensive action . He said his di vision ~ nfantry was nearly a thousand men under strength and that if the division was 'annihilated' it would be a disaster not onl:, for Brazil but for the TJni ted State'3 . He said he h,=id no complaints against General Crittenberger , who as a Corps Cow.marrler had used his division properly from a strictly military point of view . However , his division was of greater political and military importance . He said to me , 1 You know we crune over here for victory and prestige, rather than to be cut to pieces'. He stated he lmew how difficult it was for the Allied Commarrler, due to the shortage of troops in Italy. He stated that the German propaganda regarding t.he Brazilian Exped~tionary Force had had such a disturbing effect that the President of Brazil had sent a special emissary to see him. He stated tl-iat if the Brazilians lost prestige or were disgraced in Italy this might provoke Argentine aggression against T3razil. Fe stated that Brazil, if it were to lose military prestige, would be a useless ally to the United States at the peace table and that a disastrous crunpaign for the Rrazi lien Exred ·'tionary Force would be so much fuel for the campaign of those anti-American elements in Brazil seeking to draw that country away from the United States . He stated that he felt sure that General Clark u.rn erstood the political importance of the 1razilian Expeditionary Force and requested me to convey his appeal to General Clark that the Brazilian Division be so used that it not have any repetition of the previous failures and, :lf possible , in a quiet sector and that if this were done for some time and he was able to rebuild the morale of his troops and get in his replacerrBnts, he felt sure that the Division would eventually be able to take its share of o~fensive action. I)" "To quote General T-1!$scarenhas: t We are in a training course here in Italy, and the course is going too fast . If the course vrnre a little slower and less arduous, I run sure rve would learn more by the end of it'. "General Mascarenhas req'llf:! sted that I speak to General Clark in the greatest confidence, as he knew that the Army Commaro.er was a friend of Brazil and would understand the serious position in which the Brazilians found themselves." * * * TRAVERSA--DECEtffiER 15, 1944--At 1000 ho1lrs GenerPl Cl~rk drove to the headquarters of the ~5th Division where he decorated And promoted several officers and men. 'f'he General made a short farewell speech to General Coulter and hj s staff on his departure to 15th Army Group. After the ceremony the General returned to hjs command post. In the afternoon the Gen9ral had pictures taken with his chiefs of sections on the occasion of his cleperture today for 15th Army Group. He then decorated and promoted approximately 100 members of Fifth Army Headquarters staff. The General spoke to the assembled officers and men of the headquarters telling how p;rntified ann rroud he was to hrive hnd the opportunity to comm,md such a wonderful team as the Fifth Army. After the ceremony the General drove to Florence and spent the night at his villa. ~ \ \ ��SIENA--DECEMBF:R 16, 1944--General Clark f'lew to Siena this morning w i t 9 General Gruenther to open his new 15th Army Group headquarters which officially opened today ?.t noon . General Clark was met by General McNarney and a guard of honor was held for the new Army Group Commander. After visjting Ms office, W"8ti ng members of the staff, the General drove to the Comm~d:ing G e n e r a ] . ! . . . s _ _ ~ from Siena, for lunch, after which he flew back to Florence, landine on the Florence rjrport. There he met and greeted the House Military Affairs Committee who arrived in C-47 1 s from Rome. General Clar1< was introduced to all members of the psrt:,r, spoke to them hr'efly tellinr, them that he would take them on a tour of the front tomorrow. The Generrl then returned to his villa in Florence and had as his dinner guests General Sullivan and Colonel Saltzman. General Clark today sent the following memorandum to Gen. Truscott: "1. As soon as J have had A.n opportunity to deterrrine the ac'lministrati ve procedure which should be followed in the 15th Army Group I shall send you a letter covering the matter in more detail. Pending receipt of this communication I desire thnt the following mP.tters be referred to Headquarters 15th Army Group: R. All recommendRtj ons for promotion to the grade of general o~ficer, to reach my headquRrters byte 10th of each Tionth. b. All transfers of general o:ficers or officers occupying position vacancies which call for genflral o"ficers, excert in emergcincies when time will not permit. In such cRses ass1.gnments will be made temporary, pending my approval. c. Recommendatj ons for the Rward of the Medal of Honor. d. Recommendations for the award of the Distinguished Service Hedal . e. Recommendations ::'or War Department unit citations. f. Requests for allocRtion of P-dditionel units, and requests for changes in priority ~or equipment o" units. g. Requests for ·nactivation, disbandment, or activation of uni+,s; or for reorganizatio'1 of units under a di~ferent T/0. h. Recommendations for changes in T/0 and E. n2. In general, supply and edministrative matters will be handled directly between Fifth Army and UJ'OUbA, with information copies .i:-urnished 15th Army Group. This is substantially the rxocedure which is already in effect. I am esp8cially desirous, however, thP.t e.11 subjects which hee.r in any way on tactical operatio"ls 1 e referred to TIY headquarters." �SIENA--DECErEBER 17 , 1944--This morning the General left his villa at eight o'clock and drove to San Fiero where he met the House Military Affairs Committee party who arr::ved in a convoy of arproximately 40 jeeps . Congressman John Costello of California, Acting Chairman of,the Committee , with Congressman J . P . Thomas of 'Jew Jersey and Congressman Overton Brooks of Louisiana, joined General Clark in his jeep, and the party drove over the Mount Altuzzo road . At the summit of Mount Altuzzo Congressman S:p3rkrnan of Alabama, Congressman Paul Kilday of ':r'exas and Congressman Cliff Davis of Tennessee Joined General Clark in his jeep , and drove to the Fifth Army command post in .,,raversa . Enroute over Altuzzo General Clerk stop:ped several tines , point1ng out key terrain features , explaining to the congressmen how the troops of the Fifth Arr,r;r overcame this heavily defended mountain barrier . Upon their arrival at the Fifth Army Feadquarters, the congressmen were greeted w:ith a guard of honor . Mr . Costello , Acting Chairman of the Committee, stood on General Clark's right side, General Truscott and other members of the Committee to his left . After the honors had been given , General Clark introduced the party to General Truscott, General Cannon , General Keyes and General Chidlaw and then took them into the conference hut where he 1~riefed them , giving them the over - all picture and explaining the tremendous problems of the Italian campaign. Among other things , General Clark mentioned the possibility of unrest in the rear area,~ due to shortage of food which might force h:im to take troops from the front lines to quell any such uprising. He stated that anything that could be done to increase the food ration for the Italians would be a great asset to the Italian campaign . After hot coffee and doughnuts , General Clark , with Congressman Sheridan of rennsylvania and Congressman Winstead of Mississippi and Congresswm Rooney of Few York in his jeep and accompanied by the rest of the party drove forward to Uonghidoro where a church service was held in an old bombed-out church . After the services, the General, with the Congressional party, had a K ration lunch . During the lunch, Generel Cb.rk talked to all members of the party. After lunch the General asked ongressman Schaeffer of Michigan, Congressman Elston of Ohio and Congresswoman Luce of Connecticut to join him in his jeep . The rarty then drove on to Loiano, which had been under heavy shellfire the day before . The General did not think it advisable to go any further forward , so the party turned around at Loia.no and drove back to Monghidoro where they stopped, and General Clark invited Congressman HPrness of Indiana, Congressman Farrington of Honolulu to ride with him. The General then escorted the party to the 8th Evacuation Hospital in the vicinity of Pietramala where he bade goodbye to the Congressmen . 'l'he General then drove to his villa. in Florence and spent the night . * * * SIEIIJ'A--DEOEMBER 18, 1944--General Clark, accompanied by General Brann, left \ �by rofld at approximately 0830. General TAcCreery, Corm1anding :3ritish Eighth Army, met General Clnrk at Castrocnro on Route #67. Genertl Clark drove with General licCreery to a ~)ui ldine in Forli where they conferred on forthcoming operations. After this, the Corps CoT'lmanders of Eighth Amy; Lieutenant GenPral Kei~htley, Commanding 5 Corps; Lieutenant General Foulkes, CoT'l!nanding 1st Canadian Corps; and Lieutenant Geni:>,ral Ander,=,, Commanding 2nd ?olish Corps, arrived. They were introduced to General Clark And talked to him for a few minutes before luncheon. General McCreery then entertained General Cl~rk at a light luncheon. Generals C1Hr1< and Brann left by road at epproxirrR tely half past two and drove back to Florence where they dined and retired early in the evening. * * * SIE'TA--DECEMBER 19, 1944--This morning the General left his villa in Florence nnd drove to Siena, arriving Bt his headquarters at 1045. General Hamblen carrte to call on General Clark this morning. General Mn.scarenhas caMe with Mnjor Walters to call on the General and stayed for lunch. At 1700 the General gave a cocktail psrty for his Chiefs of Sections of his new 15th Army Group Headqunrters. Approximately 40 guests were present. Generals Brann imd Tate stayed for dinner and after dinner the General played cards w~th his guests and retired eArly. * * * SIENA--DECEMBER 20, 191+4--This morninf, General Clark worked in his office on administrative matters and oonferring with officers of his staff. After lunch the General, with General Gruenther, Colonel McMahon, Colonel Grogan and Captain Bajenow flew in a B-25 to Rome. At 2030 hours the General gave a broadcast over CBS on the occasion of WAC Week. The General also made A BBC recording about the Allied effort ~n Italy to be used at a lA.ter date over BBC together wi_th record·;ngs by Field Jt,arshal Alexander and GenAral Mccreery. General ClPrk today sent the following letter to his two Army Commanders, General McCreery and General 'T'ruscott: The time is rapidly arproaching when I shall give the signal for The primary mission of the attack is to bring to battle A.n<l destro:r German forces in Italy and thereby prevent the withdrn.wal of Major enemy elements to other theaters. It is evident that the mission can be accomplished only by an all-out o~fensive by both armies. The specific military objective of our coming battle is the city of BOLOG''1A. You are hoth familiar with the ammunition situntion e.nd other factors that limit th9 period during which we can wage an all-out battle, and of the gren.t importance to the AlHed cause of our capturing the city of BOLOGNA 1Jefore we are forced to st0p. 11 1. a comb:'..ned all-out attack of Fifth and Eighth Armies. �2. The factors which fix the date on which my decision to launch the attack fo Illf!de Are three: favorable weather, the disposition of the enemy f'orces, and the location of the main forces of Eighth Army. Eii;hth Army, b:,r its successes of the past few days, hes drawn to H from the FFth Army front and from reserve positions in the 30100-NA area suffic: en~ enemy forces to permit Fifth Army reasonable chances of success in its attack. 11 "J. It is my desire that Eighth Army clear up the area between the LAJ\.~o~~ River and SENIO River and be prepared to launch its attack to cross the SE1JIO River at the time Fifth Army launches its attack. I consider a simultaneous attack of ·:;i--eat importance but I }1!' ve decided that favorable weather to permit an all-out attack by the heavy bombers of the 15th Air Force ::c.nd all medium and fighter bombers available to ~!JAmAF to be of greater importance. It is therefore directed that: §;• The CornrnFlnding General, Fifth ArJriy, will: (1) Be prepared to launch his attack on 48 hours notice after 22 December. (?.) Direct Fifth Army's main attack o~ BOLOGNA West of Route 65. (J) Direct that a+,ta.cks be launched without delay astride the routes Castel Del Rio - Imola ands. Clemente Castel S. Pietro to assist the advance of Eighth Army. (4) Direct 9?nd Infantry Division to execute limited objective attack in conjunction with the main effort. ,h. That the General Officer Commanding, Eighth Army, will: (1) Proceed with current operations with the object of launching an attack to force a crossing of the SENIO River in conjunction with Fifth Army's attack. (2) Drive the enemy thereafter West of the SANTERNO River, secure bridgeheads over thRt river and develop a main effort on tbe axis IMOLA - BUDRIO. (J) In conjunction with the main operation, to force the JA~IT~~NO River, make a strong secondary effort on tbe axis LUGO - ARGF.'JTA - FERRA"U . Plans for this operation will include provisions to develop this attack as the prir1ary effort if the sitwtion so dictates. ,g. That D Day for the attack will be the day on which Fifth Army launches its attack to secure M. SOLE. ,g. The inter-Army boundary will be extended by my headquarters in accordance with the development of the operations. In general, until Fifth Army can cut Route 9 wjthin its zone of action, Eighth Army will con- �tinue NW on that route with suPficient operational areas to the South of it. 11 4. Every effort hPs been made to convince the enemy that Fifth Army was so exhausted bv its recent offensive thPt it is not carable of Attack in the near future: It is directed, therefore, that information concerning Fifth Array's attack be considered TOP SECRET and not disseminated except as required for the operation. "5. I ru:ive discussed in detail with you both the great importance of the comj ng battle and the slight superiority in men and Arms available to our nrmies . We do have a great air superiority and the Air Force has plec'l.ged its full support in making this powerful weapon availHble to you. But even with the full cooperation of the air it will require the maximum effort of every officer and mnn of our combined armies to insure success." * * * SIENA--DECB?.ffiER 21, 1944--General Clnrk spent the morning in Rome and in the afternoon returned to Siena by B-25, arriving vt his headquarters at 1530 hours. The General spent the rest of the afternoon in his office conferring with members of his staff and working on an accumulation of papers that had been held pending his return. The General returned to his villa at 1800 hours and dined w1th the regulAr members of his mess . Brigadier Packard, British Deputy Chief of Staff of the new 15th Army Group was the General's guest for dinner 8nd cards. General Clark's radio sreech of yesterday is quoted in full below: "In the Fifth Army we 8re proud of our WACs. They joined us in Italy a little more than a yeAT ago--the first oontingent of WACs to serve overseas with an Army in the field--and they have marched straight up through Italy w:.ith us, through some of the worst weather nnd over some of the rou(shest terra,in that hns been encountered by any Army in this war. "To 011r VlACs, just ['S to our fighting men on the "'rant lines, this war is a deadly serious business, and they are fully aware that they are in it to see it through. Although working under the most difficult field conditions, their enthusiasm coupled with their ability has enabled them to perr.orm efficiently the varied administrative duties of a l~rge Army. 11 Fifth Army WACs do just about everything tmit a soldier does around Fi th Army Headquarters except heavy physical labor . Mainly they serve as stenographers and clerks in the various headquarters sections, in perso:1nel, intelligence, plm,nin1; and operations and suppHes. Many of them work vdth our conmunications staff, helping to orerate a telephone and teletype network that would do credit to a good-s:i zed American city. And those with whom they work will tell you, as they have often �told me, that the WACs here are very nearly indispensable. "All of us admire them for the ch9erfulness with which they go about their work. And we respect their ability to 1:1 ccept field conditions, reg~rdless of the season or the weather. "Fifth Army thinks so hi.a,hly of its HACs that it hns presented the entire detacr.mAnt the Fifth Army Plaque in recognition of their valuable contri1,ution to the campaign in Italy. And our WACs have received a high quota of awards and rromotions. "Fifth Army is deeply indebted to its WACs, for the inVPlu.able help they have ~iven us, ~or their good spirits - which have infecter us all, for their rdgh standards of discipljne - and f'or their earnest determine.tion to participate in the actua 1 winninF; of this war. I hope thHt I shall 1,e a½le to have a WAC detachment in my new 15th Army Group headquarters. We could use many more. They are worthy soldiers." * * * SIE"TA--DECEMI3ER. 22, 1944--The General spent the morning at his office and after l 1 mch flew to Florence to meet General 'T'ruscott 11.t the Anglo-A0 :e:rican Hotsl. G3:.1.eral I3ran·1 was also present at the conference. The General then went to his villa where he spent the evening quietly with Genernl Drann. * * * ~IE'JA--DECEr.iBER 23, 1944--7he General spent the entire day i:it his villa, working on papers and resting. In the evening Generals Gruenther, Tate, Brad.Jhr,w, Lewis, Colonel D1 Orsa and Lt. Col. Walker came for dinner and cards. General Clark today sent the following letter to General HcT{arney: 11 I am inclosing a report which I directed Critten:)erger to r:-ia.ke to me on the last action of the Drazilian Expeditionary Force. It :Ls quite complete, as you will see, and should give you a fair insight as to their offensbe capabilities at the present time. I am sending this to you persunally, for obviously it must be gjven only very restricted circulation. I believe it will substantiate -';:£ .'._ilf 01'r.ia tio:,. I ba ve a1r eady given you. 11 The :Jrazilian Divisio"1 now has little real 0L1..ensive combat value. It has been given every orportunity rmd nursed alone, so there are no alibis. Their troops just cannot slug it out and take the heavy punishment which is so necessary for successful offensive action. fe must, therefore, give them a defensive mission for the time being, as we have requirements f'or them in that role. There they will have an opportunity to gradually develop such of'fensive capabilities as they may have and dur~ng the forthcoming attack be prepared to follow up aggressively as our main effort succeeds. I \ �"I have had a long ~rsonal talk ni th i."ascarenhas since his last attack. He thoroughly understands the necessity for his troops to attack when the occasion demands, and although he is not a top-notch fighting soldier, there is no point in trying to replace him at the present time. Tinless you desire to send this file to General Iv'.arshall, I request you retm·n it to me. 11 11 * * * SIE'.JA--DECEMBt'STI 24, 1944--General Clark drove back to Siem this morning. The General spent four hours at the office and returned to Florence with General Gruenther for Christmas Eve. * * * SIE~- A--DECEMBER 25, 1944--The General returned to his headquf'rters in Siena J about noon. After lunch the General, with General Brann, went partridge shooting. The General and General Brann managed to shoot one partridge and one rabbit. This evening Brigadier Packfl.I'd and General Brann came for Christmas dinner. * * SIEHA--DECE!1IDER 26, 1944--The General spent the entire day in his office in Siena. The General returned to his villa at about 1800 hours and retired eadly. * * * SIENA--DECEJ,ffiER 27, 1944--The General spent the morning at the office and at noon flew to Florence. This nvening the General, with General Gruenther and Colonel Saltzman, dined at Mr. and Hrs. Arturo Grassi' s home. * * * SIENA.--DECEMBER 28, 1944--This morning the General was forced to cancel a scheduled trip to Polish Corps, due to severe stomach trouble. Colonel Bruce called to see the General and confined him to bed for the day. * * * SIE~JA--DECEMBER 29, 1944--The General's stomach was considerably improved today. However, Colonel Bruce advised him to stay in bed. General Brann came and dined with the General this evening. * * * SIE!JA--DECEMBER 30, 1944--The General was feeling well again today. �Generals Clark, Brann and Gruenther drove to the Anglo-American Hotel where they met GenAral McCreery, Brigadier Thomas, G-Ops Eighth Army, General Truscott and conferred for abou-1- an hour. After the conference the General roturned to his villa and rested in the afternoon. The General hc'l.d Generals Brann, Tate, Lewis, Colonel D1 Orsa in for dinner and poker tonight. * * * SJENA--DECEr- 1PLR 31, 1944--The General spent the entire C::ay at his villa, 1 resting and walking. For 1:ew Year's Eve the General had General Gruenther, General Brann, Mr. and L'<rs. Sartori and Mr. and Mrs. Charini a.nd five other guests for dinner a.nd to celebrate the Uew Year. Shortly after midnight the General retired. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, November 11-December 31, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from November 11-December 31, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1640 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/d9130c69de7bfa9caab36912eaca26d4.pdf?Expires=1787184000&Signature=H9Gu4wrj5Qydgz9EYVjVUPXUe9tJV7zmf8BNBHYPpFIpHHEmM7%7EvSyLyR9N72TCLCCihBVM6sgWaKNvj-kk8xB4Pz1N9Ume2o9sZP9TjxoE0vC8pVHOonZwWQT2TdWWUbmx1fGDTDBKhfZ%7EyQ39Ag1WMIF026w8iG6uin3lFW%7ETYXhm3f8nUXJ9id797gBQ4qFsneCO0Py2jCNEZckUq5sQ6brNKlViNE6JHMlhlTuqjC64Tzk8FSUStZj7tTuDDfRq7FdiZSAy7qGMMZE9aq5sisGyK12WBFWImyNRPzuOsfroAELepJqbJbq9pc%7Ei0MUsJg8Zx6bOvARegF1ZWIg__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 8f79b7cff236a9838e462678d6719f64 PDF Text Text l O[ PASS, '.'fas occupied but the twin pea.ks M FRF.DDI - M BENI and M GOGIOLA, M CANDA a.nd M CnLORETA surrounding it to thf"l North also had to be cleared. The 88th Div was employed on the riP,ht flank to drive toward !MOLA and reached M BAT"'IGLIA where repeated counterattacks and stiffened enemy resistance m,:,de further adv~nce verv difficult. The weiP,ht of the attack then shifted from the axis of the FIRF.NZUOLA - IMOLA Rood to Route 65 directed on BOLOGUA. M CA IDA was outflanked and :later secured, all these key features end m.'9.ny others were in our hnnds with the ~dvance continuing to rush forward as the period closed. 13 Corps relieved elements of II Corps, taking over the zone occupied on the right by the 88th Div, while continuing to attack Northeast l'l.long its front nnd genernlly conforming to the ma.in advance. In IT Corps sector PISA was occupied and the fKlt~ PISANO hill nnss cleared when the period opened. During the month ~·nilTE ft.IJ3A'N'O and the important tovms of PISTOIA, LUCCA and VIAREGGIO were ceptured. IV Corps continued to engAge light enemy forces by aggressive patrol action and constant forward rz-essure along jts entire front and preptJred to a.ssist the main effort by a strong P.dvnnce up the PRATO BOLOrrNA Road. ~he first BraziliAn troops to fight overseas entered the line in a sector near the coast durinR September. ]• Air Supwrt: A totel of 11~ mi~sions or 7416 individual sorties •~ere flown durin1; the rionth of September in direct support of Fifth Army operations on virtually every oonceivable type of rern.merative target. Despite much poor weather and ba.d visibility very ~ood results w~re obtl'lined. A total of 129 missions, 638 sorties, wer('! handled by "Rover Joe" on c~ll targ.ets request-) "'d by forward units for close support with excellent results f!nil much vriluable . time saved. . . ..R. 4 "-Qw--'t ; - . ~ -:lo q~ ~ t- ~r i.;'-' * ·~~~--~~- 'Pt., * * FLOR.ENCE--OCTOBER 1, 1944--General Cl~rk left his command. post shortly Rfter hi.s early morning conference and flew into the Futa Fass, lPnding on the road on Route #65 where he was met by his jeep nnd driven to the 91st Division in the vicinity of Sru1ta. Lucia. General Clark also visited the 85th and 34th Divisions. At 1/..30 General Clrirk met GenerRls Alexander, Harding and Lernnitzer on Route .%5 . The General returned to his command post at 16oO hours and entertain-,d members of his staff in the conference hut with n movie. General Cl.ll...rk today received the folJowini; messAge from General rv~cCreery upon his assumption of command of F.ighth Army: ",1'any thnnks for your kind message. It will be a great pleasure to me to work i.n the closest cooperation with Fifth Army during our r>dw.nce. 11 * * * FLORENCE--OCTOB'SR 2, 1944--Generals Cnnnon, Lernnitzer And Chidlfl.w came for bren'kfast this morninr,- and conferred w1th General Clark. The G"nerel spent the morning in his va.n ,,vorking on papers and conferring with rnembr-rs of his staff. General Yroner called to see General CL~r'k at 1500 hours and conferred �with him for an hour. Generals Lernnitzer And Cannon, after ri trip to the forward areA., cs.lled to see GenerAl Clark for a few minutes before they returned to Siena.. The General d:ined with the regulrr membern of his J!'ess, and after ninner played bridge with General Gruenther, Colonel Gray and Major Hunter. * * * FLOREHCE-..OOTOBER 3, 1944--General Clark, nft"'r his 0830 oonference, flew to the 91st Division cub strip in the vicinity of San Fiero, where he was met by his jeep and driven throu~h the Futa Pass up Rout,e #65 to the 91st Division CI- located in Fietra.mala, where he conferred with General Livesny. After oonfening with General Livesay, G"!nerA.1 Clark drove to ffonp;hi<loro which the q1st Division had taken from the enemy the day before. There General Clark got his first view of the Po Valley and the snow-capped Alps in the distPnce. GenerAl Clark spoke to m,my of the men of the 3r12nd and 161rd Infantry Regiments, congratulat-/ ing them on their fine accomplishments. He storpa,d at the regimental oommand posts of these t,,-o outfits, ooMmand~d by Colonel Cotton and Colonel Mangill respect1. vely. /i l In Monghidoro General Clark stopped at n collecting stntion \mere he spoke to many of the wounded men who ht'!d just been brought in from the ba.ttl"lfleld. He then returned to the 91st Division cub field and took off in his L-5 for his Headquarters in Florence. At MJO hours General Dutra, Brazilian Minister of War, came with Generals Kroner and Wooten to bid goodbye to General Clark. A guard of honor was held for General Dutra. General Clark presented General Dutra with the gift of a carbine. Genernls Clark and Gruenth~r dined out with friem.s in Florence. A summary of oi:;erations for the week ending October 3, 1944 is as follows: 'l'he direction of' the ma.in attack was shifted from the axis of the Fii.ENZUOLA IMOLA road to Route #65 on RGLOG\TA. Relief of II Corps units on the right was being accomplished by elements of lJ Corps as II Corps attack to the North was continuing to ma~e sntisfnctory progress despite adverse weather conditions t>nd stiff resistance ns t}e period closed. IT Corps was advancing well along the PRA'l'O - BOL0<1°t'UI. Road nnd Northwest towarc1s PIF.VF:PF.LAGO wb ile vigorously pa.trolling along the entire front. * * FLORE1TCE--OC"'OBER 4, 1944--'T'h"' General i:ipent the entire day in his van. General Almond, Commanding General of the Q2nd Division, crone to see General Clark. · In the evenin~ General Cl.ro-k was greatly elat~d by the capture of Mount ~ ~1enere, the last high ground before the Po Valley. Genl'lrA-1s Clnrk and Gruenthe: \ attended the Antiaircraft Pnrty given by General Bradshaw at a villa in Florence. General Clark remained until 1030, at which time he return....d to his oomrnand post. �General Clark today received the follo,ving reply to his request for naval gunfire support: "All cruisers at present fully employed ~md Jater required for projected events. "One may be Availllble a.t a Jater date but not accertahle to operate in water between '7 - 10 fathoms wtthout necessary S\-veeping which is not at J res• ent poc.isible with Mine sweeping force available. 11 * * * FLOR-;;;tTCE--OOTOBER 5, 1944--General ClP.rk saw Lt. Col. Gre.y, Fifth Army Judge· Advocate, this morninR shortly after his 0830 conference. At 1100 hom-s General Savin, French representative to the Allied Control Commission in Italy, calleo to see General Clark. General Clark spent the afternoon in his van conferring with members of his staff. The Army Commander presented the Bronze StAr to Colonel Lyles of the G-1 Section who was le1:i.ving today for the United States. In the evening Generals Clark, Gruenther and Colonels Saltzman ~nd Porter attended the play 11 0Ver 21 11 at the rear echelon theater. Operations Instruction #35 was issued today and reAds as follows: n1. The nim of the Allied Armies, which have now penetrntt'!d the GO'T'HIC Line positions, continues to be the destruction of enemy forces in Italy. F.ighth Army cc1>1tinues the attack against forces opposing it on the Adr:5 atic coast. ' Fifth Army, upon the successful accornpl:i shrnent of its current operntions, will debouch into the PO Valley on a wide front, generally extending from ,just V1est of BOLOGNA Enstward to the vicinity of FAEWZA. At the same tjrne, elements of Fifth Anny on the Mediterranean coast flre :in position to capitalize on enemy withdrawal in that area. 11 2. It is still necessary to consider two different types of r-ction for the Fifth Amy forces which reach Highway 9, the BOLOGNA - FARNZA road: a. Assumption 1: Enemy forces still rema.in facinp.; Eighth Anny in the pocket formed by VAIJ,E DI er MACCHIO ~md the APF.t:itJINBS. b. Assi.JJm)tion 2: Enemy forces have withdrawn from t r is pocket and the main forces of Fifth and Eighth Armies A.re in contact. "3. Under e:Ither assumption, when Fifth Army troops first debouch on H:i ghway 9, the i.mmeqia.te oreration will he to e stabl:i sh a bridgehead in the FlOLOG~JA area (See overlay) of suffic:i ent sizl'! to cover the buildup of· sup... plies and the exits of' the roads through which these suprli"s must oome. Fif'th Army f0rces on the nediterranea.n will rush on GRNOA and FARHA in order to destroy any enemy rear guards remaining in thos" are1,.s anri op~n a rort and road to the Vnlley throw:;h ,-vhich supplies must come for subsequent or~rations • �in Western TtEily. 11 4. After establishment of the BOLOG~m. bridgehead: a. Unr'er A<lsnmption 1, Fifth Army troops which r~ach the Valley will push on rapidly, ma.king their main effort towards FE~RARA in order to block the withd:rawt-il of ent,my forces "rom the VALIE DI C0H.ACCHIO pocket. At the s~t'! time, elements '\'ill turn f'est -"ron the bridg~riead rnd push out nlong H:ighwny q towe.rds PAR?'!A to block the withdrawal of any enemy forces "'till facing J Corps. Sinultaneously, elem!'!nts debouching on Highway g in t'he D'OLA. - FAJ.:N7,A area will force the ent'lmy -into unfavorable terrciin v:hich will necessitate his withdrawal through FERRARA. ]2. Hnder Assumption 2 9 Fifth Anny units which reach tre Valley, usin~ light forces, will mnint8in contnct w:i.th the ,.nemy to c'leterrnine his intentions. Reconnaiss·•nce eJ.,ments wil 1. be d'irected Westwards tcwPrcls JAR.HA and ~orth to the PO, advancinr; only whJre r~sistrmce j s l~g 1t ti.nd m1nir.rum forces need be employ"d• ·'la.jor units of the forces rlebouching in the V~lley will be prepared to Rtta.ck from th hridp:ehead on Army order. If the enemy v.itl1r1rt:1w to the ''orth bn.nk of the PO, reconnaissance ,·111 devl'llop the rivl'lr to rletermine suitable cro"'sing sites. Fifth Arny's ,~ ssion contemrlates securing "A ~rroVA ar,d 7EB.G' 1 A a,rter t"!rossing in the area between BORC'iOF(I'{T}.; and CSTIGLIA but Engineer sturlies indicate that, At this season or the year, sue 1 a crossing is likely to r,e impracticable with equipnent available. It r.ay e nocessary to seek anoth"'r area. .,,he rl'lsults of f'urth~r studies v:ill be J11ade lmo"m ns they become avaiLqble. 11 5. Detailed missions under Assumntion 1: a. (Enemy still in pocket). 11 Corps will: (1) Screen the right flank of Il Corrs elements directed on FEF.RARA, relieving II Corps troops which nPy be rerrorming this mission j f they have de1nuchfl!id 1"irst into the Valley. (2) Advance rapidly to destroy enemy "'arces within :t ts zone of action. (3) Gain co11tact with the left elements of Eighth Army's main forces. b. II Corps, employing a maximum of one 1:irmored di vision nnd three infantry divisions, will: (1) 'Establish a hridge~ad in the ICLOCHJA area (SM over]py). (;,) rush rRpidly on FERRARA to block the with,}rmval o: enemy forces opposing Ei~hth Army and destroy them. (3) Protect its own flanks unti 1 relieved by adjacent elerients. c. Army tr.oops: (1) 6 S0uth Africr>n Armoured Division will: (a.) Assume responsibility for thr-t portion of the bridgehead i/est of OOLOGNA (SM Overlay), relieving II Corps troops which may bl"! perforn:i.ng this mission if they have debouched f:i.rst into the Valley. (b) FrotMt the left fl~nk of' II Corps' farces rr.oving on FRR.RARA. �to5 (c) Tu'T"n ""!est on the genernl nxis of Highway 9 nnd push rapidly towards Fl\RMA. to block the withdrawal of any "'nemy forces reJM.ining in the AFENNI~~s. (2) 1st Armored Division, staging forward as rar,idly as the situPtion rermits, will prep~re plans ror employment under II CorJlS in an exploitation role with the forces direct ...d on FF.RRARA. "6. Detailed missions under Assumption 2: (Enemy wi thdravm from pocket). a. 13 Corps may revert to Eighth Amy~ ortly ~fter r~ntact between Fifth anrl Eighth Armies is gained in the Vall,y. b. c. 11 '7 . IT Corps.~: (1) Establish a bridgehead in the BOLOGNA area (9ee overlay). (?) Using li~t forces, push ri-connaissance el--~ ts forward towards the PO Rjver to maintain oontact with the enemy rnd detorm;ne 1 ~e plan of action. (3) Tn the event the enemy withdrnws to the Jorth b0nk of the PO, conduct reconnaissance .,.or crossing sites ''lhi ch will facilitate the advance on "lAN"'OVA and VERONA . (4) Be prepared on Army order to resum"' the attaclr in fO'l"ce. Armif tromOP§,: 6 South African Armoured Di vision will push reconnaiss:ince towards PARf'fA to determ:ine enemy resistance anCi to gain contact vith IV Corps. (2) 1st Armored Division v1ill stage f'orward ns rapidly ::is the situation p"'rr:dts to the IDLOGNA bridgeheri.d where it will be initially in Army reserve. (1 Under e1 th•~r a R"Umptl on, a. rr Corps will: Push forward to seize nnd/or occupy 1,.\ SI-EZIA and AULLA. ·b. Subsequ"'nt ly, send forces to open the roads IA Sf H ~ZIA - GEHOA ancl AULLA - FARMA. c. Gain contact with 6 South African Armoured Division in the PARMA d. Mop up any enemy elern--nts r!'lmaining in its nrea of op'°!rations. area. 11 8 . 01mdaries: * Later, depending on the situPtion. 11 * * FLORENCE--Qcr"OBF.R 6, 1944--Follo,,ing the early morning conference, General Clark drove in his ,jeep to Lofano, stopping enroute at II Corps Hea.dquarters to talk to General Keyes. General Pritchard, Commanding General of the 1st Armored Division, was also there and conferred with General Clark . After conferring with these two comna.nders for ha.lf an hour, General �Clerk drove to th~ 85th Division in the vicinity of Carpinaccio where he lunched with Gl"!neral Coulter a.nd members of his staff. After lunch the General drove to the 91st Division, one mile oouth of Honghidoro. General Livesay joined General Clark :in his ,jeep, and they drove to the comma.nd post of the 362nd Infantry where G"neral Cla.rk decorated Colonel Cotton, Commanding Officer, with a Legion of Merit, and made a combat appointment to Sergeant Brooks to 2nd Lieutenant. General Clark then drove back to his headquarters in Florence, and en.. route met General K~yes and talked for a few minutes. General Cla.rk dined out with General Gruenther and Colonel Sal tzrnan. '1"he Arrrr:, CoMmander today sent the following calSle to General Devers regarding replacements: "Infantry replacement situa.tion in Fifth Army is so critically serious that current operation may be l'¼ndangered. Supply of infantry replacements and infantry overstrength in divisions only sufficient to maintain divisions at T/0 strength through 9 or 10 October. Losses in my four infantry divi• sions during pa.st five days have averaged 550 i::er day over and above returns to units. Heavy fighting continues with enemy appro-ently rushing all a.vailabl~ forces to halt our advance on BOLOGNA. W ithout additional repbcements infantry strength of the four infantry divisions will be reduced by approximately 5,000 for each ten days of fighting after 10 October. Infantry rifle compani•!S will thereby be reduced so seriously as to crePte an extreme opera! tional ha.ndicapG All divisions have been engaged in heavy fighting 23 to 26 days under anverse weather conditions. Continuous supply of infantry replacements is imperative. This situation has already been presented orally to your headquarters. I urgently requ~st thitt it be brought to the immediate attention of War Department as a rrattt,r of operational emergency. 11 \ Regarding the above cable, General Alexander sent the following cable to General Gammell who was at SHAEF at the time: "Grateful if you would show Fifth Army signal number 8839 (above) of 6 October regard.:ing n. S. infantry replacements to Genero.l Alexander and ask him to discuss with SAC-in•C any further possible action to support General Clark's request." General Clark today received the following memorandum from General Mar- shall: am 5.nclosing pages 10 to 14 of the Surgeon's statement regarding the prevention of loss of manpower from psychiatric disorders. I am taking this direct method to reach you because I know how deeply immersed you Rre in the conduct of actual operations a.nd their log.i sties as well as relRted administrative matters. Please. read these }'Ages. 11 I tir ha.ve formed no conclusions myself except thRt I am much impressed with whatever can be don,, to break the Atra.in of too long employment of the individual in active operati.ons. \ \ �11 I nm sending these same pages to Eisenhower in France and to 'lacArthur. 11 The Army Commander today replied to G~neral Marshall's memorandum as follows: "Thank you f'or your memorandum of 22 September. I have read with great interest the Surgeon Genernl's report which discusses the prevention of the loss of ma.npm,er froM psychiatric disorders. "The p:roblP-ms involved in psychiatric casualties mve been of great concern to me since l1lst winter. The i.ncidence of manpower loss from psychiatric causes began to be felt in Ja.nURry, when the oomh=it forces availt=tble to the Fifth Army were so limitl'ld thnt i_ was necesaa.ry to keep infantry units in the t line for very extended periods. As you will remember, our assaults against the fortifications in the mountainous Cassino region were made with divisions which became materi~lly understrength and could be given little respite as we pressed forward on our mission. As a. result, our casualties from psychintric causes were fairly high. 11 A similar situation confronts us to day in our current offensive in the Apennines. My troops have been m gotiating the most difficult mountainous terrain we hav~ hRd to face in Italy, involving the bitterest fighting since we landed at Salerno. As you know, I have four American inf ntry divisions in the II Corps and they are making the main attack on Bologn_'l.. We are attacking on a broad front against heavy resistance, and it has been necessary to keep all four <livisions constantly in line. Our only chance to rest t},e troops is within the divisions th~mselves, where we utilize every opportunity to pull out a battalion or a regiment 1henever thn.t is possible. ':'he decision which hns faced me is onf'! of halting our attack in order to rest, or of pushing on in an all-out effort to g~in our objectives before winter catches us in the Apennines and thus contribute to the shortening of the war. To me th~re is only one answer to that choice, and I am proud to be ~ble to tell you th~t the Fifth Army troops rmve :made sif?'}ifica.nt advances ev,,ry day for more thnn two weeks. The enemy is movin~ every unit he can make avai lrtble to the II Corps front in order to halt our pro~ess. Speed on our part is abr-'.olutely essentie.l. That action is especially necessary when one realizes that the gighth Army has been practically stopped in its tracks for the pti st ten days. 1, "I _ not yet know the answer to the psychiatric rroblem, but you w:ty rest do assured T shall continue to study it.. It apy-ears clear from tre report which you sent me, which was based largely on Fifth Army experience, that susceptibiBty to psychiatric breakdown is directly related to length of time in combat. I shall continue tn tA,ke every practjcable met-isure to give my troops tre opportunity for rest. At tho present Hrre we are operating tv·o rest centers for enlisted men, one in Rome and the other in Florence, and they have been extrerrx,ly beneflcie.1 to the thousands of Fifth Army soldiers who have visited them. "You will be interested to lmow thiett in spite of our si,vere fighting under extremely ndverse weuther conditions, we have hqd few psychjatric casualti"s \ sjnce our attack on the Gothic Line began. I attribute this condition largely to the hieh morale of our troops. Although the Gflrman is still fighting well, our men know thPt we can whip him wh,,rever we rind him, :mr' that lmowledge buoys them over many difficulties wh:ich might oth-,rwise nrrear insurmountable. I �realize, o~ course, that the strAin on the individual must be eased soon, nnd I hope that some reHef will be possible. "No doubt you have rend the ne ssages sent to the War Departrrent by ~rATOUSA outlining the critic~l shortage of Infantry replacements for the Fifth Army. 'JA'T'o·rsA has available for Fifth Army only 2,200 inf'antry replrc,.,ments, an<l th1'y have n/ivised us that no further shipments P.re oontemplated from the U. s. I now have n slight ov~rstr~ngth in each di vision, but if the present caswu ty rate continues (net loss 500 per day ) the f'i.c;hting stren!Y,th of my four divi\ sions will be down to T /o strength nbout October 10th. Thereafter, the four infantry divisions will be re0uced in strength Rbout 5,000 infantrymen every ten days of f'iP;htin~. This !"'cans that each rlfle compnny will be reduced, on the average, Aboul; 40 men every ten days of combat. Such n reduction represents ~ serious op4'ra.tional handicap which will be most difficult to overco'l'1.e. Three of my divisions have been in the line '?4 days, the fot:rth 16 days. Naturally the men are becoming tired. I oon9ider -it absolutely essenti~l that we receive a conUnuing supply of infantry rern cer:ients or else we sr all be in grav" danger of' being unA. lr- to accomplish our Mission. For yo·u· informntion, the casualtiM in the four infantry divisions since 3epten1ber 10 ha.ve been 9,000 ba'Jtle and '"",1~00 non-battle--a total of 16,L;00. "The Brazilian troops hn.ve given a i:pod account of themselves in their lim::.ted de,..~naive role. The:, have hnd 45 battle Ct'sual tiP-s thus far, ond have learned a great deal. ~~neral Dutra expressed r;reat sat~sfaction with tre wny the "3razilia.ns have en handled by us. You rriay have 11ot::.ced Yihere I plrced him in commnnd of the \V!"!st.ern sector f'or e few days. He derived a g.ri,at thrjll from that assignment. 'T'h,. balanne of tl1ii, division will start unloading in Leghorn on October 10th. 11 ,,,he 370th RCT of the g2nd Division hns been in line in ::i. quiet sector on the western flank f'or 5 weeks. I l~ve placed General Almond in oommnd of a \ task forM consistin~ of the 170th RGT and an American-Br:i tish AAA force nith I I the mission of atta.~king along the western coast to carture HASSA and to advrmce to tl-ie northwest in order to hold every Gerwm r,lement in tbat area. The attack jumped off this ~orning. I'll hove a good idea of the offensive capabilities of the color'"!d troops within a few days. ~,sed on treir rerform,mce in the defensive phase I anticipate th-it they will do an average @on job, but not up to the standard of "lhite troops. 11 I have ju~t he~..rd over the radio of your arrival in France. I am s~nd ing thi.s letter to you tr·ere in order that you may know of our sitm tion. I sincerely hope that you will come here and ray us a visit. It would mean a lot to all of us in the Fifth Arrny, and only can one understand our real si tuntion by see'in~ it. I consider the fi'{hting we have had for the past month as difficult as any in Fiftr Amy experience. Mhe 1~en have rerformed miracles in crossing the Apennines. There is nuch good you could do for us by A. short visit, nnd perhnps we can show you Bologna. 11 * * * FLORE~CE--OCTOBF.R 7, 1944--Genernl Cl-,..rk he1d his 0830 conference tr, is morning, following which he snw Dr. Peter Odegard, Assistant to the Secretary of' the �\ 09 "'rea.sury; Mr. Harbold Thomas, Chcirmn of the WPr Advertj sing Council; Frrink Isbey, Chairman of the Y1nr Finance Division. Genernl ClA.rk or:tenten these eentlemen briefly on the cm-rent Fifth Amy situation. Tli~ Generd s~nt the rernni nder of the day oonferrinf'{ 1i th various staff members, dining in the evening witb the regu1Fr members of his 1:1ess and retiring early to his van. * * FLOR'S1ifCE--OCTOBER 8, 1944--General Clnrk was ronfin~ tn his v:,n tcxlny with a head cold. The Generl'll spent most or the day taking care of an accw.ulation of paper work and conferring on the phone vri th his various subordinate conunAnders. General Cl,"1rk today received the follow.i ng cable from GenerAl Vasiliev: "I oongra.tulnte you with the reward of the Soviet Government which decorated you with the Order of Suvarov, f:ir st class for your · outstanding military work in conducting operations of the Allied troops in Italy in the struggle against Hitlerite Germany. Wish further successes." * * FLORENCE--OOTOBER 9, 1944--Th~ Army Commander was still oonfined to his van todny. However, the General din confer with Lt. Gen. Lloyd, GOC of London District and the Brigade of Guri.rds. The r~mainder of the day was spent in conferences and Rdministrati.ve work. General Clc'U'k dictated the followin~ random notes for inclusion in his dia.ry: "The first plan o-f' GenerRl Alexanner was that Fifth and T:ighth Armies crack the Gothic Line at the saMe time, side by side, from Florence to Bologn,-.1 trnd slightly to the east thereof \7here the mountaj ns are not as yTecipitous as in the west. '1eneral Leese, ]mowing the wenkened condition of l' ifth Army due to its losses to Seventh Army and knowing that Fifth Army would cnrry the ball as usual and beinr, rnrticularl;r v,ell trai~d for mountain +>j_ghting, decided that Eighth Army could not attempt this crossing of the rnonntnins. Alexander agreed and shifted the Eighth Army to the east. A me~t.ing was held 1-1t Leese I s headquarters on Aurrust 10th where this nt'lw plan was discussed. I aP,reed, but when Alexander tol<l me I ,vas to crack over the mountains ru.one with 13 British Corps in the Bologna area cooperatinp;, I deMnded thnt 13 Corps be E> ssigned to Fifth Army. I Jmew full well th:i.t it would be of no offensive vnlue to me, but if T wns to mnke the rmin wallop over the mountains I could not be 11 cooperAtin~" with a British force immediately 11.djncent to me find 100 miles from its oommnnder. Leese objected but finally gave in, a.nd 1'3 Corrs was assigned to me. It has been of littl~ value to me since. "Hy ori~innl in.en wns to m1'lke my direction of nttack g "'nerally from Flo'.l'"ence to Bologna, but due to the fact that I env1'loped the Altuzzo resistance by an effort through Mount Acute to the north, I found weakness and rushed to get Mount La Fine and Mount Battar,lia. This proved a ~rent thrert to tb e �\ \0 Germans, as it P,O.Ve ne a secondary route to move on in the directj.on of Imola. I might have sent two divisions thr,t way, had I had more troops [ind h~d the rains not interfered. The Firenzuola - Cast~l ael Rio ro~d has been under water since the heavy rains came on many occasions. At one time during the past two or three days it has been 4-l· feet under water, and we were forced to supply our troops to the north nnd bring back our wounded by a cable thrown over the river . "It hns always been apparent with the bad weather that I must stick to t},e main road, Route #65; it being a two-vmy, all-weather rord to Bologna. J "I hnv~ re~eived little support in this orera.tion from AFHQ, particularly Devers and his cohorts. Devers, due to his dual capncity,- has diverted troops badly needed in thls theater r'or his own use in France, guided entirely by a selfish interest, in my opinion. The Japanese-American troops should never hnve b~en taken. He tried to tA.ke all my heavy artillery, and only throur.;h the greatest rrotest throup;h Wilson was his plan circumvented. No, I am confronted with a shortage of replacements. In t:br~e days f'roM now there will be no infantry replacements availnble for Fifth Army, and I will lose from my four infantry divisions approxi.mitely 5,000 infantry for ev(')ry ten dr>.ys. It is inconceivable how such a disgraceful situation could confront a oomriander in the heip;ht of his battle when success is almost at hnnd after weeks of i:r,reat sacrifice and brilliant fighting. After all, I was directed across the Apennines but am not backed up in many respects. I feel thnt the American side of AFHQ has no interest in thj_s operation, have failed to sup:rort it and the true facts are not known in the War Dep(lrtment. In desperation, I am rndioing direct to Eisenhower, appealing for him to take over Seventh Arrrzy- requirements in order thnt some 5,000 infa'1try replncements now in the t,!-,eater but wr.ich Devers has earmarked for himself can e released to ~e. ' I I I 11 In the midst of my battle I received a letter froM General Ml"rshn.11 on psychirrtric cases, quoted in full in the diary notes of October 6th, indicating 1 the necessity of resting troops. rt is hnrd to see hmv I can rest my troops when J have f'our attacking divisions. I have attacked w:i. th them every day for a month and will do so for another month. We must take the consequences. I ha.ve had 10,000 casu.'31ties in this month. There is no &oice for me but to go on. I would not consider any other f,8th. It would be frightful to even consider stoppin~ in the Apennine Mountains for the winter. My only opportunity for resting troops is to rotate regiments with in divisions rmd batte.lions within regiments. I consider a fresh regiment now one thnt has hnd four nights• rest in this pouring rain in the mountains. "I am movin.g my command post into the mountains, notv,d thstanding the attendant difficulty in communication. I must get my headqur-irters set up with all its attendtmt faciHties in the mountains where they will aprreciate the ha.rdships bei..ng enn.ured by the other troops. I must also be as close to Bologna as possible when the reak-through does occur. "I have the South African Division on my left. Althour;h they indicate that they are more like the Americans than the British, they fight exactly like th~ British. 'T'hey got kicked off of ~~ount Stl:l.nco last night. It was vital that ~e hold it. They kept a ooy up on the mountain in order to rest the remainder of their troops. We don't do th~t. The 1st British Division �got ki ck"d of'f' Mount Ceco f 0r the same reason - a boy doing P.. man I s job. They th1n1< nothinlY of i t. A gln.nce at the mar will show hov far b""hind they art" on eac}, flank to the main American effort . The Americans hA.ve carried the ball every inch of the way in this battle, dragging the British troops on their flank up by their boot straps . ·ote the Ei~hth Army ' s irn.ct ivity for days upon days . They relieved Leese nnd put in a washout lik!'! M cCreery. He is a f eather duster type . I hPd him under r1y command for eight months . F.e held the ball on eve~r occasion. Vie nre exreriencjn~ the sn.me kind of fightin~ by RighU Army as w~s eirr1enced nll throua;j, the battle for Rome . 'T'hey were nlways miles ..,i:,~ nd, le:wi.nr.; my ri P,ht f'lrink unrrotect1a.d . They ha.ve verv T'Oor leadership. It is not the !"'en, -"or .;ndiv · aually they are brave an<l will fight co1 lectively i r mnde to clo so . General Alexander exercises absolutely no lnl'luence over the F.ighth Army. He :is not a driv"'r and is un.1.ble to make them go into an all- out attack. "I hnve P bout three kilomt"!ters to go and T _ will have tre last of tre hi~h a,round . When +,J:iis ·is secure I know J 1vill go into tJ-,e Fo 7alley, althouP'h it m:'1.y tnke r1e a little tirre to rest my troop:; for the f'inn.l drive . :-1ue to BrltiGh in,<>ctivi ty on tre Big},tJ:, Ar'f'ly -"ront , sev~-ral divi sions have bMn takt'!n away .f'rom that n.rer, and brou~ht to oprose me . Still thl'l -::i1hth Army does not nttac~ . I I I I v "I have wdtten to Gen!'lral r::1.rsliall 1rrr,ently r~q111'!stinr, th<1t he come here from France . I hn.VP- told h.: m th~t ]_--,,. Ctln l'lot be~in to realize the condi..tlons whicJ:, confront us without sedng trem. I hope to be nbl~ to cti..scuss tr,e,iter -problems with him w Jn he comes . ""here ~ s no excuse f'or hrivin~ a. 'IA"'OTTSA, an P.FU1 , ~ COJ'l"'11U'1ication ::>..o'l.e nnrl r,n AAI. I r.01 ,1-<1 e9tim~te thrt 50,ono military snuls :ire tied up tn trese actjyities con+ ,ributin~ 7 ittl,.. to the t,tl~ . ..!'!Ver were so few commA.nded by so many. 0 '"!y re'1uests ~o G neral C nnon f'or m"di.um air suprort hnv~ been r.,.f'used rereatedly. I have mn.de '10 iS'3U~, but yesterdny whim I received the follow~ n~ letter +"rom Gereral F~ker I went to bat . ' One or two of my o-Pficers were rresent at your rress co..,f~rence y"r;terdn.y and hnve told r'l!'! of t},. v~ry -Pj ne thi'lf"'J you h•c~ to st'ly about Chidlaw ~nd A.ir coorerntion in .c;eneral. ile rpprecinte wh:-it yo'-1 said t>n<l you cn.n rt":st assurerl tl-i~t y:iu will CO"ltinue to r-t all th"' a::r support we 'h.r>ve, inclt.ding the :1~diums anr'l. Vie H~avies ~s re1uired . 1 I am r'eli ,.htec1 that Chi0lnw is wrrkin~ nut so well . I hav rr.ce"'t confidence in riim 'J~C"'use, thou.qi not as exr-erienced ns Cannon a.nd Sriville, e is V1'ry l,ri !ht '1.n ' R 1ert and I "el t h" ha, su-l'f tciert under study of t11P. (,ld boys to e ~hle to do an effective n.:-1d satisfactory .job . ' ' T tr:at Ca nnon has moved be.ck over to tr is sire , I am sure you ftr"' going ow to :;,,t their undivided a.tt~ntion lmt i , by 1.;han ~"', you sh0,1lct get s-1;,uc 1c at any tire n."ld -"~Al you ne.,d more air l1elp, be c;ure to let me know . ' Give "7 ',i,st to Al l}ruent ,..r ar1c' A.11 your rardworkini-:; my el'lrn"st conrvatulatior1s on your 1·t,cent successes . 1 oys, and accept ��medium and entire fi~hter bomber a:i.r ~ffort he brought into the battle in clos~ support of my troops for our final attacli:: towards Bologna. Ia.mas= sured by Eaker thrit I will f;et this support, rmd Ale:x."'8.nrler has guaranteed to bnck up my requ"!!st. 'T'here is the constant reluctance of' most Air Corps commanders to use anythin~ 9ut fi~hter bombers in support of a battle. They resent any ~ound comrnrmder indicating any possihle employment of air. 'T'here is no question but that after the war there will be a sepnrate air force, and 1myone who hucks this "Villi. have his head cut off. 1 Jev!'\r will air forces be S'1bordinated to - g.r-ound conrnand. Un:::.ty of command, in my opinion, is lost -"orever. It is a i:;reat mistnke., 'T'hfll British bwe tl'lught us that bPd lesson. r could write for hours on the lack of cooperation by the Royal Navy in support of my ~ound efforts since Royal 1-Tavy forces in the Mediterranean came under Adm:iral ,Tohn CunninP,ham. His cousin coop1'ra.ted, but this man has stood on his poop deck end rl'lf'rained from ever doing anythinrt, th~t wns not accordinr; to the .best interests of the ~ravy. I hav• asked for n.aval gunfir;(, support on my west coast. It has been r~fused re~atedly, yet the Eighth Armv has it all the t:i.me." , * * * TRAV8RSA--OCTOBER 10, 1944--After the norning confer~nce, ~nerPl Clark decorn.ted ~;l~.jor Kendall, of the G-3 Planning Section, with the Bronze Star. r.1a,jor Kendall is return:i.ng to the Stl.3.tes for a new P.ssignment. Gi•meral Clar'k :<ilso bade g;oodbye to P.r:i.gadier Stayner, Chief of the Brjtish Incr~iment, who is being transferred to the Ei1:;hth Army. Lt. Gen. Clark, Brij;ish, Chil.'Jf Administrative Officer of 1\FHQ, ar:r:i.ved at 0930 and conferred with Genern1 Clark. 'i'oday G1•meral Clark moved his cormnand post to Traversa_ in the heert of the Apennines. (}l"neral Clari- srent the night 1:1t the Hotel Anglo-Americnn with Colonel Saltzman. 'T'he summery of battle progress for the week endini.; October 10th is ns fol- ct_~ tr~-' lows: -...... &i,\.~•·w,, 11 'i'he d1·ive continued r'luring the week against very d~~rm:inl.'!d t"!nemy resi~tance and hrmdicapped by unfavorable 1venther e0nditions, but_at the close our most adwmced elements were f'j ghting in the vicinity of J,<vergn~ astride H:rghway #65 less than fifteen miles from Bologna. 13 ~ . s s u m e d responsibility for the zone on the rip;ht of II Corps borderlng the Firenzuola-Imola. road, .<md :<irmored elements were assisting the main effort by pushing north on the left of Tr Corps. Re!Y,roupin~ of IV Corps units was completed and attack launched in the coastal sector. * * * TRAVERSA-... CCTOBER 11, 1944-.. r..enernl Clark arrived flt his new command post at 1230 and spent +,h~ nfternoon in his van. In the evening he din~d with the rei:sul:-i.r memb..,rs of his mess. �TRA"IJ'TI:RSA--0C'T'0BER 12, 1944--General Clark drove to Loia.no and enroute picked up General Keyes. The Army Commander and General Keyes <lrove to an OP north of Loiano where they could obtain a fine view of terrain f~atures. Artillery and fighter bomber missions could be observed. Gener1-1l Clark made special reference to Mount 'xrtmde to the northeast, which is the last importrmt high terrain feature before the Fo Valley. Generals Clark and Keyes then drove on through Loiano to a point on Route 65 just south of Sabbioni wher"' th~y could observe 11ount Rumici and r1ount Castellari on which the troops of the Qlst Division were fighting. Generals Clark and Keyes observed a heavy bomber missi on (npproxirnr-t~ly 200 B-17' s) flying townrds ob,jl"lctives in the Bologna area a.nd although they could not see the targets, they could hear bombs explode and observe clouds of smoke in the distance. General Clark then returned to his oommand post for lunch. Major General Peterson, Inspector Genl'!r~l, l'fo.r DepPrtment; Brigadier General Clarkson, In~ctor General of NATOUSA; fi'ajor General Sdwards, Deputy to General Eaker; Lt. Col. Van Zsso, Inspector General I s 0f'fice, War Deprirtment, arrived for lunch. Aft.•n" lunch Genernl CU"Jrk, with General leterson in his jeep, and Genernls Edwards, Clnrkson and Col. Van Esso follov,,in((, drove over the sa.me road t,hn.t General Ch.rk hnd passed this morning. Genernl Clark pointed out to General Peterson and oth"r of'ficers key terrrlin features. There was a great deal of air Activity, heavy and fighter bombers, ltl1 afternoon. General ClRrk and party returned to the Fifth Army c0mm<:i.nd rost where General Cl.,rk entertained the perty in his conferenee hut e. few minutes br,fore they took off by car for Florence. * * ~R~~r:;;nsA-~OO~OBER 13, 1944--General Cl~rk spent the entire day in his VRn today. At 1730 the Army Commander met with 1,lajor Neville, ed:i:tor of the Stars and Stripes and four reporters in hi"! conf ere nee hut and presented to J\'fajor Neville the Fifth Army Plaque and Clasp. General Brann came for dinner. Brann played cards. * After dinner, Generals Clark, Gruenther and * * ~B.AVSRSA--0C~0BER 11~, lQ4/¥- After the 0830 conference General Clark saw Major Brant of the 8th ;;;;vacuation Hospital, an ear, nose and throat specialist. 0 Maj. Gen. Royce, Air Corps with 6th Army Group; Maj. Gen. Walsh, with the American Air Force j_n Russia; and General Chidlavr, of the XII Fighter Commrind, came for lunch vrith G-,neral Clark. Before lunch General Clark oriented the Genera.ls on the Fifth Army sitmtion. Generals Royce and '1 1Jalsh left directly after lunch for Florence. At 1700 Genera.1 Clark held a conference with General Kirkman, 13 Corps Commander; General Keyes, IT Corps CoMnander; Lt. Col. Freston, G-1 of 78th Division; Lt. Col. Beggs, G-3 of 88th Division; Col. Willems, Chief of Staff of 1 �II Corps; Col. Porter, Derut:v Ch:ief of Staff of II Co?T, s; G1'nernl Gruenther and General Brann. A.fter the conf'"'r1mce General Clrci.rk served tea in the con .. ference hut to his F;tiests. Following are minutes of the conference mentioned above: nGeneral Howar(l gave th~ enemy dispositions opposite the most 11ctive sector of the Fifth Army front, and said that enemy infantry in this area were estimated as totaling 72 battalions with 16,200 men. "The Army Commander said that the Germans had been massing their troops to meet the main Fifth Army drive, which has now rrogressed for 50 of the 60 miles \ from FLORENCE to BOLOGNA. l 11 He said that at the present time the Fifth Army contains 133,000 U., s. troops and 152,000 British troops; thRt the II Corps has been making the main Fifth Army effort; thAt in the current offensive, which has been going on for more than a month, u. S. troops have sustain!'!d 13,082 bnttle crsualties in the four TT. S. infantry divisions \mich are available and A.11 engaged, while British troops hav" susto.ined 2,451 battle cas1»1lties in the same period; toot the four American divisions in the period ha:ve taken '7,087 prison~rs, while the British and South l.frican troops have captureo 596 prisoners. Be sl'l.id tha.t ther("l had been and coulii be no let-up in the attack which has been going on day and night. It has boien possible to attack without pause due to replacements which have been ava.ilable to the A?1'ler:tcan di visions up to the present tj me. The 9Upply of replacements >'rill run out on 15 October. From then on it is esti-mated that losses in the four u. S .. divis:i.ons will occur at a rate of 500 infan• trymen, net, per day. No more repl.eicements are expected for arproximately twenty days, which means that 10,000 infantry losses in twenty days ere Pnticipated. "The Germans have been engaged in sideslippinF; their divlsions from ot,her\ . ) parts of the front to meet our main attack~ "There has been little advance in the 13 Corps sector, vrhere admittedly the terrain was difficult. Sim:1.18.rly, we have made little advimce in the vicinity of LJVF.RGNANO. "General Clrci.rk said that General Alexander had assigned the 78th British Division to the Fifth Arrrry, saying thrt it must fight in an all.,.out attack and not be merely leaned up against the enemy; however, the Army ComM<'!nder thinks it better not to mix a British division with the TT. s. divisions in the u. S. sector, but to leave the 7~th Division with the 13 Corps f'or use in the latter's sector. · "Troops of the 1st Armored Division have been given a sector in the line to be occupj.ed by :its infantry. Most elements of the 34th Division 8re now coming out of the line, to return in a few· days to the attrcick. At that time an attack will be made in the TT. S. sector with five TJ. s. diitisions abreast, disposed as follows from west to east: elements of the 1st Armored Divisj on; 91st Division; 34th Division (two combat teams); 85th Div-:i.sion; and the 88th Division. "The Army Cor1mander said he did not believe thnt the 13 Corps would be a.ble to make a. breakthrough to the northeast and thP.t even if this were possible such �a.n operation could not be supported, in his op:i.nion.. Accordingly, he d:irected a new boundary between the 13 Corps and II Corps, and directed thRt the 1st British Division be moved northwest toward the 7~h Division sector. 11 '1'he four TJ. S. infantry divisions will oontinue their attack horth as long as they ar~ able. Meanwhile, the 13 Corps will conduct operations to provide a strong defensive flank. A critical and current objective in these operations would be the taking of M. SPADURO. 'rhe 13 Gorps should take over GESSO; it should make its ma.in effort on its extreme left next to the II Gorps, which will make th~ main Fifth Army effort. "The .Army Commander invited C'zen"'ral Kirkman to state his reactions and to bring up any dif'ficulties he foresaw. General Kirkman said he saw none, but mentioned thnt in sideslipping divisions to the northwest it is difficult to move mules except by taking them on roads to the rear and then doubling back to the front. General Clark said that the G-ermans had accomplished the same thing, and that means should be found for overcoming this difficulty. "General Kirbnan agr~ed that the Army Commander I s plan was the best one availt.1.ble. "General Keyes made no comment. 11 * * TRAVP':RSA-...QCTORER 15, 1944--The General nttended the usual oonference at 0830 tld s morning and. at 1030 bade farewell to four WACS of the Fifth Army WAG. T'latoon who "'.re leaving for home, two on rotation and two on temporary duty. At noon the Maharajah of 1 atiala a..rrivfld with his ADC, 8nd a fsU.t:trd of honor was held. At 1230 Alexander Kirk, Ambassa.dor to Itnly; a.nd 1\/fr. Cnrmel Of fie, American J'olitical Arlvisor to AJi'HQ; Mr. Horn, Ass:istrnt to Ambassador Kirk, arr1ved, and n 1;Uard of honor was held. Gen"ral Clark briefed the rnharaja.h, Ambassador ¥irk and other gu~sts on the Fifth Army situntion. General Clark exr11'1ined to the 1 hhara,jah his satisfaction with the splendid performance of the IndJan troops under his command. The Mnharajah presented General Clark ,v:5 th a letter from General Auchinleck, Comrnander-in-Gh1.ef :in Indfa, which General Clark read aloud to the assembled ~ests. Genl!lral Cl. rk entertained the Maharajah, his aide, Messrs. Kirk, Offie, Horn and Brigadier Divers for lunch in his mess hut. The guests left directly after lunch. 0 r General Clark WA.S still having trouble with his throat And retired to his van where he spent a quiet e,1ening. He, however, held a. movie for his staff office:rs in his conference hut., General Alexander today radioed General Eisenhower as follows regarding the replacement situ~tion: RN 942., 11 I know you rer:dise and apprecirite what we have done And rire doing here to keep German divisions from being transferred to the western front, but the time h11s now arriv""d when my armies will not be able to oontinue the o+>fensive much longer. 'T'his is mostly due to the fact that all di visions are very �tired and completely lack rresh replacements. Esrecially is tl is the case with Americ n Fifth Army. I have done everything through officin] cknnels to get r,aplacements, bu.t I hA.ve not succeeded. !vi'y :last chrince is to appeal to you personally. Anytl--iine you can do to help Clark will 1)e to our mutual ndw.mtage. Lemnitzer has left today by air for General Devers' Headquarters with full details of Chrk I s requirements." General Clark today dictated the following random notes for :inclusion in his dfary: "Further ..2.U..!!"&.le c~ents: l't,r efforts to br:i ng to th!" o ttenti on of the Har Dep~rtment my replacement situ.0 tion appirently w"'re futile. I am positive trnt Devers never properly represented my case to General Eisenhower. I am continuin~ to attack with ny four U. s. in+~~mtr:r divisions. They have had over 13,000 battle casualtie~ jn approximately one month. They hnve attacked every day. My only alternative is to discontinue the attack and remf' in in tl•e Apennine r·ountni.ns for the winter. Sue], a. solution is entirely unsatisfactory to me. Besides, my directive sends me to Bologna. Germ~n r~inforcenents ~rom tre Ei~hth Army front continu" to nood i..n front of my II Corps. Eighth Army does !lnthin~ to stop :it. Whl"rea.s the British strength i.n the Fifth Army is 152,000, as nga.inst TT. S. strength of 133,000, their b:"ttl~ casua.lties Wt"re 2,451 as against TT. S. casualties of 13,032 for the period 10 September to 13 October. Tlurin~ this s~,me period the TT. s. troops ~.ptured 7,og7 pr:isont'!rs, ns rgninst British rrison~rs a:r.iounting to 5, q86. ,.,,hese _figures indicate who is doi.nft the fighting. With tJ"1e present <le~ee of resistance the II Corps is encountering and with no repl~cements :wailabl~ "or nr:rroxirntely 20 days, the outlook i.s for me to lose at the rate of 500 per day a~ proximately 10,000 more infantry out of these four divisio'<s. J am faced with the necessity of r-lmost destroyi.n1-7, the future usefulness of four infantry divisions. "There was n. solution wrich T r.resentec1 to General Devers in the following radiograms: 8839, dated 6 October 1944: 'Infantry rerlrcement situA.tion in Fifth Army is so critically serious th~t current o~r~tion may b~ end?ngered. Supply of jnfantry replr>cen~nts rmd infant.•7 overstrength fo divisions only sufficient to maintain rlivisions nt T/0 streneth throuf'sh q or 10 October. Losses in iny four infantry divisions during pnst "ive days h .ve riverai:r,ed SSO per day over and above returns to units. Heavy fighting continues with enemy aprrrently rusld.nr, all avPilable forces to r1 a1t our advanc~ on BOLOG1-TA. W:ithout nddi tional r~placements ~ nf'antry strenf{'.:;h of the f'our i. nfnntry di vis .i.ons will be redu~ed by approxj"'ri.t!"!ly 5,000 +"or ePch ten drys o.r fighting after 10 October. Inf'antry rifle ccrr~pan.ies will there'~:, be reduced so c;eriously as to create an extreme operationnl handicap. All di visions lave b"en engnged in heavy f'ightin~ 23 to 2t, days un1ler adverse we,ither conditions. Continuous supply of infantry replrcements js imp rative. This siturtion has already been presented orally to your 1,eadquarters. T urgently request th,,t it be brougrt to the immed fa.te :i.ttention of War DeJ)<.,rtl'lent as f" IT' tter o+> opern.tional emeri:;ency. 1 11 'lN' 11 R',T 8937, dat~d 9 October 1944: 1Sripnent schedule infantry rey,lr--cements contained j_n VA'T'C'tTSA F35i¼S provides rel1ef early ro•,ember hut v•ill not alleviate criticA.l sPorta~~ j n :present vital battle r·o,.. '1ologna. 1.'.::::ti r,['t~ PJY four infantry Givisions will be 1own to assir,ned 'T'/0 str~nr.rth by October 14 and �\ I '7 that infantry srorta~e b:r rovemb"'r L:;t will 1)e ~,ooo. I urgently reco:rrrnend thnt ~ ~T0TTSA shipm .nts no•¥ scheduled for 3e·rn-rith Arny be r~lt'!nsed +.o FiftlA:rmy iMmediPtely. If these <1hipml'!nts htc1ve Plready 1-iMYJ. m"'l.de, J r.:tron~ly urge trat you procur~ 3,000 infantry r~rla.cerP-nts from SITAEF and ship them by air or f'ast wnter t.rRnsrortation to ...,iftt Army at r.prljest possi l" date. 1 11 Genernl 11 :1.'I Devers rir;plied as follows: FJ554/+, cleta,d 7 October 1944. 1Conffrn:inP, conVl"!rsation :vi t}, Colonel '\7erner today the following is sumnary of' ':7ar I:eJ)flrtnl"nt 1 s r ply to our teletype insistenc"' thrit Octo"J""r E>'1d "o'J"!mber i.nf'antry replrceT'!ents '.JJ shipped to us. "Decision t0 sMr no ;nfan.L,r;-, rt'lplr: ceronts g inst your Octob~r and 'Tovemher req11isitions ms h sed on rollowinCI' fnctors: (a) 11,000 v Jr"tren,crth in infantry rHvisions whlcr must e a sor :ied 1r,1c not r"!f l"";~ec1 • U~) ,.::.,000 general a:=;siP;nment enlisted m~n on }'Pnn in the tJ,ea:tor including 21 ,000 inf~mtry. Thes" figures RS of 1 Sept JTihe:·. CP sual ty roports do not ~ 1dicnte l.'1.i'G~ lo::;ses tc t,1,,.., tr'"'!f'..te1· since th ,n. ...rippinE; for r r,J.acements is not avai 1P 1Jle to now, any larf~e nu.ql1"!r to "JATO prior to 1 ~·ovemb~r. Fron your uessnge it is E1ssum.-ii t11P~, f'ftl'.lr that tir-" ETO will supply Sewmth Army a.YJ.cl VTill :"'nrtuisition r .plncements t:,~r~for. Alti10U~'1 v e do not accept tie di>ta presented in your "'\TIC as justification "or CC'ntj nuinr, r.-rlrcernent requirements e ar" s .ippinr, lv,000 infantr;r ri,:r lacemen ts on UG.:3 58 on bnsis of o~rational ,.mergency .- W:m t <lesti.n.ntion do you 1leair,; "or tr ece L~,000? Flease ans11er now. Request you su mit y cr>blf'OJ de~!'liled jnst~"icr-tion on which v1 can plan your continuinp_: replacel"i"mt requir~r ents . 11 1 t11Your gg39 of <i Octoher rersonPl to Devers \ as repeated ver ·atiJ'l to Vfo:r D ·F" rtment )Y teletyr,-l"l . 11 ' ''R?{ FJ5845, datr?d S October 1°44. '.Su•,sequ"'!nt to our FJ5'544 to you, reference repbcements, WF!r Dep['rtment hvs reconsider"'r1 tinr chinged its decision. 11le have cable t},is norning parP.phrA.s"cl ris "o llows: "Regardinf; the acditiom,.l sl-iipm•nts of -lnf'nntry rfl'Jsulting from coni>~rl'lnce o,.. n October, shipments will je wde as follows: '!'he l+,000 rerlf'lcenents cor1mitted jn tr at conference are cnncelll'ld. In t~ t"!jr stead ''le nre rihipping during October '5,300 as f'ollows: UGS 57, 1, '300; trGF 16, ?,?00; 'C'GS 5g, 1,800. ,,SOO of t>1ese s:rould arr'i ve on or before 2 iTovenber. le cr-i n furnj sh 7, 500 infnntry in addition to the 5,300 departing in Octobt')r, the 7,300 to arrive in tl eater durin~ last t~n days of Nover·ber, provided sh ipnent of equipment n.nri supplies can he c'efl'lrrl'\<l by you to m,'Jke q}lippim; ~r-ce :w'1.ilnbl~ for tr;e '7,500 replac!"!m,.,nts. If the .-dditionl"l 7,500 are n"eder' i:tive us c1estinations ilesi"t-"'Jd and numbers to h~ -:;~mt to e~ch. i'le are ~nr'envoring ~t once to obttiln "rom '":MO a f·ty-m dt'te <is to when they wi.11 take ov"":r r"'nronsibiljty for replacements to the Seventh Army''. 11 'We a.r" havinr; ?nd '"'.IX C(mf'er"'nce "Vi th 1 frir D'°'~rtr·ent oq1 SJOA and clnd fy the situation "urther, but t'1e sh i.pmt':lnts now rror.ise1l rri.<i terinlJ.y improve the picture.' 11 R'l'{ :Xl7/i,C/O', dated 10 Octohi•·r 19//+. 'Fully apprecfr•te situ~tion v;i th rerp-,ct 1·~rlncements 3flwmth Army is worse -tr an trnt oonfr0nt;ng Fifth Arny 9' nee Seventr Army's divisions arl" o.Jready we11 b~low T/o str~mi;th. Jn vie v of Co,,,,,h'ned Chi-.,fs ot' Staff priority to DRN'i'O'T Oper;;.tion, I c,o not �feel justi fi"'d in r"lel'ts; nf; to you the shipments set up for Seventh Army. However, I am asking ETOUSA vrheth"'r it is ready to tflke over ~t tbis time the replacement support of the Seventh Army -instead of rs of' l.Yovember 1944. If' it is ~,bl~ to do so, T will thl'ln cancel all f'urther shipments to Sewmth ~rmy frorn 1lAT(Y(TSA nfter the D /, 60 convoy except for R'T'U 1 s. 1 11 Tnstead of carrying the ball with force to Eisenhower rind representing my picture, Gi,neral D~vers has misrepresent"'ld the facts, in my opinion. The only solution wr:s to give me the two or three thous11nri r~lacements in Itnly which he hnd eRrmarked for th" Seventh Army, calling upon F,fa enho,yer to furnish Seventh Army rephcements. Without doubt they are PVnilable in the UK or F-r>ance. I ha.ve likewise reported triis situation to th,, Inspector Gen~rr,1, Gen~:ral Peterson, when he visited rere. I indicnt"'d it in a letter to General Vo.rshall, but he WP..S trnvellini?.; in France, and I have no wny of knowing if he i:; aware of trie si twtion. I t:>Jll "I have telephoned to General Alexaro er today to give him the si tuntion. confirming it 1n another ra.cliogram which is quoted below: 11 'R.~J 9002, d;q.ted 15 October J.Q44. 'Confirming m;r conversation with you tM s mornini:;, I consider it is important thnt you renliz "l situation in Fifth Army concerning infnntry r~placement shorta~e.. My four jnfantry divisions were reduced to sHghtly below strenc,th in .;nfantry on 13 October. Approxima.tely 500 usable infantry repl<"cements expected within next three dRys. Shipment of 2200 sched:uhd tn arrive Naples f'rom States on 28 October with 1300 mor" on I+ TITovember. B"liev-e October 28 F.troup can be pla.ced in line tibout 2 Povember. By thP.t date I estimatP my four d-ivisions will be short 8,000 infantrymen which means shortage of' 75 men per rifl~ company. This r~duced strength during critical period facing Fiftb Army rtlll seriously lm1er the operational ef'ficirmcy of my divisions. '<.:ven when ? ,200 r~placements arr:i ve :i.n errly November thl!':y will have,. ;to be absorbed by divisions which a.re al ... ready well diluted by new men. l'or exnmple, 91st Divi<Jion hc~s received 1,200 replacem,mts 13jnce Septemh,r 13, bulk of which have gone to infantry rif'le companies. "'In :ny rnessR.ge 8937, dated 9 October, to Genera.I Dever':!, I ureemtly ~ r!'lcommend\"1d thl'lt sh5.pments of" rl"lpla.cements from Naples for Seventh Army b-., diverted to Fi f'th Army but my requinst W?S not favornbly considered. I feel that if nenernl r.:isenhower ret'tlized the urg,mcy of tr is lTl,"1 tter and the influence it may have on M.s battle he might be able to furnish iffi1'1edi.Ptf':ly the 3,000 infantry replacements which I re'luested in my 8937 from SllAEF sources., I recommend thnt you present such a request to him. t nr have also intima.ted to Alexander that I am oontinuing the !'ttrick but. thnt if he pllllrm1ts W.ighth Army to sit on its tail with at least f'our British divisions out in reserv~ not attacking, I Jl18.y be u!1'ei.ble to go on. I told h:i.m he must require 1action by the !i~i1;hth Army which will keep the ;?f\th and 20th German Panzer Divisions on F.:ighth Army front. If they too come in against my II Gorps, I will probably be st,0pred. V "Yesterday I sent for Kirkmnn, Keyes rmd representatives of the 78th and Inasmuch as :Kirkman' s Corps has contributed rracM ca.lly nothing offensively to my battle and :in spite of my repeated screams -f'or at- 88th Divisions. �tack without ::mccess, J h,,ve dl"cided to utlliz,.. B Corps almost in a deflllnRive role, l;I'ttdually tnking over :mo holdin~ key terrtln features wrich the Americnn troops ce.ptur"", i.n order thr,t I cnn r:n ss tr·.- Arri"'1"ictm troops who will fight f'or the clecisive hlo~7 on a narrow front. I minced no words r>t this conference. I E;ave them the er sualty and prisoner -rigures and my rep]p cement situation as indic.'l.ted above. .,. told thrim tht'!y hnd to get into the battle in a more effecti1re wny. It is ahsolutel3r nppallinP,, anr1 only one crin know the situation who comm.ands British troops, thRt they wilJ. not att!'!ck ngf{I'essively and in ~-n ru.1-out manner, nor will th"'Y take the cr>sunlties. It is thf.l snme old manpower proposition and brittle weariness thnt n:f'fects thn entire -l"ighting m chine of the "3ritish F,mpjre. "After having tl'l.ken the Li vergtino escarnment feature, which w'4c s rui extremely touish nut to crt1.ck, the Formiche feature and the 578 Hill Mass, I have three more important terrain features to takl'!; namely, /')55, 62'2 ana Mount Grande. I htive recirled to ooncentrate on thest"! nne rit a time - put all my fi~hter bomber support on ,.,22 tomorro Y-, mass ,:ill tl-1e nrtilJ ery, ~ploy all the infantry 1vhich I ce.n rossibly brim{ to beP....r on it rind over rhelm and hold th~t feature. J will then next divert my nttention to Grttnd"'• W~th reference to air, I SJ!l p,ettini:; fine cooperation f'rom Ger."'lr['l Ch:idlnw. In -l'act, Ira El'l.k!"!r ,ma Cannon came in effectively to support me with th!"! Tcctic 1 and Strs.tegic Air Forces. I sent CFtnnon a mesSc'lge of appreci..-'"' tion wh i.ch is quoted below: "RN t.,297, dated 11 Oc+.ober 1944. 'Desire to express to you my appreciation of splendid air support of our operations yesterday. }le~se convey my thanks to General Enker 1 • "As an item to indicrttl'! furth"'!r lP ck of understan<ling of tl>f, Itllli.il'ln C11m•) pai~, all brou~ht n.bout, in my opinion, by Gen..,ral Devers' misrepresentP.tion of our picture, every gun of my heavy artill~ry is bein~ tAken away on the 17th to 1;0 to France." * * TRA'RRSA--OCTOBF.R lt>, 1944--FolJ.owing the 08'30 con-rerence, the General srent most of the morning :i.n hi.A vnn working on tidministrri.tive rm t.:ters. GenAra.l Alexander n.rrived ~t 1?15 "'ml conferred wit.h G~nerals Cl:eirk and Gruenther, a.ftl'!r wh:i.ch Grmeral Clr->rk entl'!rtrdn"d Gener"'l Alex:1.nder, Tiajor Grh1sley, his ide, for l1mch. Grm.,.rnl AlexFtnc~r J.t,,-f't <'11r,.Jctly nfter lu11ch. At 1710 ('~nernl Goodmnn of r-r;rBARK ,ma (l.enernl rrrite, with Colonl"!l l,lcCrnry, SOS N'A'1'0TTSA, called to see General Clr-rk. General Cl ..,rk hriefed Genernl Goodman on the current Fifth Army situ.,,tion aril ,xplained his greri.t sntisfaction in the wey the supply o-r his nrrny h"'S been handled. Colonel f'c hhon was the G,.neral 's JsU1'St -ror dinner t}, is evening. Gt'!nernl Clark tonif.:rht dictated the followinP, randoM notes for inclusion in his dj ary: �TIWe have indications tht!.t, the 2tSth Panzer Division is coming over from Eighth Army front. Already one regiment f'rom the 2Qth Prnzer Grenl'!.dier Division a.s com"' -l"rom tre ~; grth Army front to our front. It is perfectly disgraceful - tre im cti vi ty of ti'" T•:ighth Army. There is no will to -l"ight indice.ted. Over the phone yesterday I trl<l AleX23nder tl l"t 1 c id not understand how }1e could k4'ep four infantry divisions and one R.rr11ored division :in rest'!rve behind tr·e Eighth Army rt l'l critical time Hke this when the Fifth Army is fip;hting witr evl'lry m~m. Fis Fmswers were evt'lsiv~ but to tre effect that } e would job Mccreery. He did, t'lnd McCrMry rhoned m"', but th"'r"' was nothin~ I could say to r~ccreery. The l oles are to attrick on t'he left fll'lnk of Eigrth Army. I requested tha.t they SP'ed up t},eir attack, even if to the extent of makin:::; daylight movements in order to n.ttrnct tl--e 2!Stb Frmzer Division to it. There is no question in my mind but tliA.t 'Sj ghth Army and AAI as well will do "'verythinf; i.n their poY1er to bring 21':,tr h•nzer Division nnd 29th Panzer Division to my rront in order to give l<~ 1F;htl Arr,i.: tr e oprortunity to advance. If Finyone is to advJ1.nce into tr.e Fo ~hlley, th y much pre.f'er that) t11e Brjtisr Eiehth Army gi,t the cr~dit, ratr er thr-m the Fifth Army. 11 AleX!!.nder is coming to see me t noon, and lth1ugh I can indict3te ny disnppo:i.ntnent on the bck of activity by t}'e Eighth Arrri,y, T g~t nowhere. Vle are caught in the British Empir~ macJ,in/0!, ~nd to try to speed t''em ur rroduces no results. 0 11 ! sent r:tnotr1'r rl'l.diogr~m to Alemnder on r"'rl~cements, anrl le has ~ppi,a.led to ,isen 0"'1er. It is too lr:,te, for wl en t},ey sPipred t}ie last r~rJFcements out or Ttaly !>or France 1•1e missed tre boat. It is anott1er indiCllltion of AFHQ failing to back up the Fifth Army in its most critical situation in the Apennine Vountains. I run even nov1 confronted with curtA.iling n.rtillery runrnmition,) lO"i Fow·tz""r, bt">ca.use of lnck of credi.ts be~n~ ,..urnish1'd Fifth Arrny "or the next mont~ or two. "I m g'l"!'!atly disn.ppoi.nted in the 34th Division. The attPck of tre 135th on Monterumici is evidence ~f th~ir l~ck or will to slug it out as the new d5.visions ~r" do:i.ng. Gener~l Bo1te is a. surerior leader, but he h s inr erited a dise::-sed division; diseRsed bee, uc1e of the F'lmpering General Ryder gave it. I did not know this, nltl ou~,- I Wl'I.S soT:lewhn.t suspicious o:' it at tJ,e time Ryder left. "'here nre m:'\ny old m~n in the 34th Division who '.M.ve een witr it overse~s f'or t,.,o "l.nd a. half years. They ar~ h ttle-wise and btt+,le-weary. Tris \ is the di vision vrhich ras lonr' clamored to e sent :bome. T} e,y do not undersfarnd w y trr.v should be required to -<'ight one battlt'I after ~nether. Their small unit lenders ar""l poor, and it is a TM.jor tPsk -l"or P Division Co~nander and one or two ~ood leaders to crange tr e wl ole division. New men entering Vt'°! diYision as replncernl"!nts jmmedi~tely succumb to tris disease. I would relieVI"! hnr ~rt f'rom t1 e com>nl"l1<1 of the 135t}I Inr-l'!ntr:r except tJ,-,..,t I have no one to tnke his pltice. Fe r1i.s fn_iled miserably .in his l'!ttack on Mont"'rumici. I h.~ve evidence tbnt the 168th li'k-.ewise } tis no zip. The bt-st regiment in t• e division is tr~ 133rd, i:1nd this i ci onl:, 1 ecause Colonel r11un, wro is ,. nritural born leaoer, ras een put in command. As soon a.s this battle is over, I must take steps to clean rouse in thnt outfit,. 11 * * �TRAVF:RSA--OCT0ilr.R 17, lq44,--Tre Gen"ral ru:in is usunl 0810 conference-and at 1)00 went tvith his personal pl'ysician, r~~jor rA.nt, to the 8th Ev~cu~tion Fosrital flor X-r~ys of his ~rest, throat and teeth - a.11 of wl'ich \Vere nega- tiv~. TJ:,e Arm.r Cornti.nder spent t],e rest of the day in liis van and had Major rP.nt as' is dinn~r rruest in the evening. A suml"l1'l"Y of t} e battle progress for the week ending October 17, 1944, ollowa: is as Continued ~ains W(!lre made, alt',ough every effort to f!dv~nce w,i,s i--.itterly cont"'ste bv } eavr concentr, tion of en~m'V -i-orces. Rel L-f's And regrouping of cert in units wrs carried out by II Corp~ and 13 Corf'9• In Ii/ Corps sector enemy contact was maintain~d bv active pa.trolling and surre a.dvt>nce was achieved townr s "assP and Castel Uuovo. Gener11l Cbrk dictated the following materia.l for inclusion in ris diery: "Tl· e ?9ti Div·ision is ::i.11 coming to our froat. Eighth Armv could not hold it. '1e received a severe counter-~ttl"ck frori it in the Belmonte Pren \ toda v w' ere- tl " le!!ni 111 batt, lion of t1 e "!..1'3rd In.f'aT1tr~r had advanced to l;11st night. Our position wns held in spite of t e cou.--It.er-nttr:1ck. He r:. y be able to get through wi tr ·',' ,.dd"'d ?9tr Division, h1~ 'i ~ is touc'1 and go. General Fowl'!rcl ht:1s just rhoned i"e thr,t it looks as thougl 90 Ligr t is coming over from tl ~ Ei~r,th Ar11v fror+. TM_q is about more than we cPn htrndle. Our "Y" servj ce rns :ind::crted t· "' lead' n~ at talion fa now l".lnroute and will go into the Grande n.r~n. W attack th•t tomorrow. I o.m nf'raid tl is indicates thttt ·+) .- r.-at o~ the division will come. This see:,s more thm we can stanil.. "Eightr Army is not attncking, nnd, although trey are mE>king a feeble effort wit11 the Polis} Corps wl ich was scr"'dul"'d for attack tonight artd which I rad reperitedl,r urged be made l'lt nn earlier dnt", T receiv~u inc1icPtions f:rom General Gru"nth~r, a./"'ter his talk 'Vith General Farding, that the Folish Corrs was ~oing to again postpone its attack. This is outrageous and again indicl'.'ltes to me that Ei.grtr Army And AAI are perfectly willing to 'have tie additional German divisions come my vray in ordt",r to permit Eighth Army to ~Ake an adv~nce nt my expense. 0 "I telephoned to Gen!"!ral Alexander and told 1-iiin I understood t},ere was a dela:r in the folish Corps attack. re told me probablr there vwuld e bec~use it vrns r _inin~ over tr ere. : told rim it i ad een r11ining l'ere for a month, yet we a.ttacked every de:r and ever~, nigl t nnd tl 1 at someL'Ody b1tj. to \ \ make a cfocision as to wr etrer l e wrrnted us to ~o on, and if so t},e Zi.ghth Army must attack. I received the usual apologetic r,.rlies - no satisfaction no action. He finall,v said, 10f course, if "OU think you had better stor the attack, ~'OU do so 1 • There is no guido.nce from above. He will not tell the Zighth Arny to attr- ck. He will not tell the roles, so it is up to ?"le to carry on as '!,est I ca.n. I told him I would not stop, but there is a limit to our endurance And it soon will be renched if 3ighth Arrey does not show some signs of tictivity. re told l"l" he would re-study tJ,,e s::tuation in the morning and get in touch witl-1 me. In the me"1.ntime, we v:ill conti"1ue to attack." ' ��TRAVERSA--OCTOPER 18, 1944--F'ollowing tre 08'30 conference, Gener 1 Clark was interviewed Ht O ?30 y lillia1'l King of AF and Jack Bell, rerres-,nting the i~inmj Herald, Akron p,..ncon-JourMl A.nd the Detroit Free Pres"'. G"!nertl ClPrk left b:r jeep at 1130 for II Corrs FeadqU!.lrters in the vie· nity of Piamaggio . At II Corps General Clark net Gener ls Ke·res, C nnon, L1'mnitzer and Chidlaw . General Keyes entertained Gener:-.1 Cl~rk a.nd the other ofric~rs for lunch . General Clark then drove to the 91st Division two mil~s sout, of Loia.no where he conferred with Gen,.,ra.l Lives~y. The Army Conr:iander then drove mrer terrible roads to the 34th Division in the vicinity of Quin,::ano where he conferred with General Bolte. From tl,e 34th Division General Clnrlr drove to t1"e 85th :)ivision in the vioinlt r of Gragimo, where he conferred with Gener 1 Coulter, Division Commander. The Arm,r CoIT.1mt1.nder decorat1'd Colonel O1Hughi,s, CoT"'llt nding Officer of' the 337th I11fantr.·•, with tr e Legion of Merit. He !'.lso deco:rc.ted Colonel nruss, Corr,r,1a.nding Offic'""r of the 752nd Tank Datta.lion, with the Legion of Merit. i\t this s1~ll ceremony Genernl Clnrk oon,ended the 85th Division for their magnificent ~ccompl1 shments in t eir difficult battle. The Armv CommRnder U 1l"!n returned by jeep to his cor.unn.>1cl post, arriving at 1800 hours . He dined dth the reguh.r members of his mes'3. General Clark today received the following cable frorr Gl'"neral Imtr~ , Drazi litm 1 inister of w~...r: "In a fl"!w d:i -rs I will he ag:rl.n in Br zj_l, trucing with me the pleasant memory of h~ving been in your company. I take thin opportunity to thank you for the many personal favors you have shown me ~nd the party which ac- companied me . " * * * TRA1TERSA- -CCTOBER 19, 1944-.-General Clark attended his regular 0830 conference this morning ~nd shortly thereafter , at 0930, R"'rresentative Bdith 7-Jourse Rogers , Congres'Jwoml'l.n from t!assachusetts, arrived w·ith CoM.rrander Mutter and Colonel Forsythe of the Surgeon's Office NATOUSA, Captain Whnrton, Fifth .4rmy Hurse Director , and General Martin, F:i.fth Army Surgeon. General Clark briefed Congresswoman Rog"rs :vho showed great interest in the Genernl I s difficulties in eetting repL~cemen:ts. She offered to do nnything she could to help. A decoration ceremony was held at General Clark ' s h"adquarters shortly thereafter at which General Clti1rk decorated the following members of his staff: The followin~ received the Legion of Merit: Lt. Col. Thomas A. Lane , Col. Kenneth P . Zitzma.n, T/Sgt . Glen L. Wilson, T/Sgt. John C. Hrunmond, WOJG Basil 1 . Bodge, Maj . Elmer N. Holmgreen, Col. Stanley Grogan; the following received the Air Medal: Capt. Michael J . Strok, Lt . Col. John T. Walker, 2nd Lt . Raymond H. Porter , 2nd Lt . c~.rl A. Bio,rgman, 2nd Lt . !alter A. Holle . Generl'll Aaron Bradshaw received the British CBE, tmd the Bronze Star was pinned on Captain Paul Savary and Cnrtain ,James F. Graha.m. �\2 3 The General spent the afternoon in his van. came for dinner . * * Genl",ra.ls Brann and Lewis * TRAVERSA--CCTOBBP.. 20, 1941~--Gener 1 Clnrk left his oomma.nd post at 0840 fer his cub strip in F:irenzuola where he left by L-5 for the 92nd Division three miles south of Viaregeio . It was a flight of a hnlf an hour, and a ftne clear dti.y which enabled. the Gen~ral to observe the Alps to the north, Corsica to the west and the coast of France to the northwest . At 0945 the General landed at the 92nd Division cub strip south of Viareggio r,here he was met by Generals Crittenr.ierger ~ntl Almond . GenerP.l CJ.Erk and party drove to the command post of the 92nd Division in Viareggio. A guard of honor was held for Generul ClP.rk, consisting of one company from the 370th Regiment . G-.n~ral Clro-k decorated the following with the Silver Star: Capt . Allen L. Johnson, 2nd Lt . Millard L. Sullivan and s/sgt. Charles J . Patterson. Colonel Sherman, Regimental ComJMrrler , was rresented with the Bronze Star as were also Ca.pt . Jesse E. Jarman, Jr ., 1st Lt . John W Log11.n, . T/Sgt ~ J:1-rion G. mans nnd T/sgt. Frnnk 1hisonnt . Major Lor'-"nze , G- 2 of the 92nd Division, and Major Mac'iillie, G- 1+ of the 92nd Division, were both promoted to the grade of Lt . Colonel. The General then spoke briefly to the officers and men, congratulating them on the:ir fine ecco:r1plishments and explnininr, briefly the big picture and the important part they were playing in it. After the ceremony, General Chrk gr"'eted General Fhscarenhtis anr1 members of his Brazilian staff, and together the part ;r were oriented on the current situation in the 92nd Division area by the Division G 3, '~jor Shepard . - General Clnxk then drove with Gener~l Almond to en OP in the vicinity of Pietra Santa . From the OP Gen,..,ral Clark could plnjnly obs"-'rve ~~ount Gau.a.la , the immedi<'te objective of the 370th Infantry, and to the northwest the city of Passa , which is still held by the enemy. From the OP General Clr-rk and party returnf'!tl to the 02nd Division Headquri.rters where General Almond entertained Generals Clark, I~ascarenhns , Crittenberger and :rrr.mbers of the 92nd Division staff for lunch . Genl"ra.l Clc-:trk spoke briefly at the luncheon p rty tellin'; how proud he was to hr,ve the 92nd Division in the Fifth Army and how for tu.rr1te the Division wns in hPving such a fi.ne leader as Gen"'ral Almond . After lunch General Clro-k bRde goodbye to General Almond and his staff and drove with Gen"rnl r.rascarenhas and. Gereral Crittenberger to the staging area of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, two miles northwest of Pisa , wh~re he wns isreeted by a. guard of honor . General ,la.scarenh.'ls introduced Generrl Clark to staff members of the t ro new regiments of the Ih'a.zilian Expe<litionary Force . General Cle.rk trooped the line , reviewin~ 11, 000 newly- arrived Brazilian troops . After trooping th!'? line , Gen"""r'al Clerk ,:iro•re ·'.n hi"' jeep past the troops agnin and wns greeted enthusiastically by Brazilians singing their r1!leimental sonis . General GlPrk, accompanjr>d by Generals '1ascarenha.s and Crit tenberger , drove to the Pisn airport where he took off in his 105 for the Florence airport to meet GernJral Eaker . Upon ro~rivin~ ~t the field, Generrl Clnrk rnt Congresswoman Rogers and �l2 Y her :rnrty who ,.,ere nbout to take off for Gnserta rfter Dn extended tour of the Fifth Army sector. Genernl Chrk br-ide goodhye to Congres"'"omnn Rogers and her p:l'lrty and then ioinJd General Eak"'r in his C-53 where he oonferred for three quarters of an hour . General Clr-rk b11de goon bye to r.reMral Eaker ~nd left in his L--5 for the Firenzuola cub strir, arrivlng at his oommrmd post at 1700 hours. The General dined r.i th thA regular members of h:i..s rre ss rind r~tired enrly to his van for the evening. General CL,,rk dictat~d the folloV'r.ine notes for inclusion in his dfary: "I hnd quite a frank b.lk vr.i th General Bak ,r today in his plPne at Florence. I told him that we h~.d received no backing from Devers, and described the replacernt"lnt sit~tion to him, which he lmew about. J wanted him to get this 1nform~tion back to the Str-.tes. He is returning for a few days' visit. "From information he brought rre, Generals White r-md S wbridge, wrile at \ Devers' P'eadqunrters, sent i.nformation fo Eisenhower •rl- ich made it a.ppe:eir as though our casualties had been entirely too hea ry here. In th-is oonnP,ction, see Devers rndio to me E' nd my reply to him, both of which ('re quotAd elo 1. One only has to see this country, ronlize the mission, the ferocity of the fighting and tre degree of enem:r resistt>nce to undersknd it cnn not be do11e \'lithout hen-vy loss~s. 11 "Following is Genernl t·evers radio of 19 Dctober "'nth rc:gm-d to rer ]✓.,-. cements: 'I have ·juc"t seen your rtlported dnily crsunlty list. Suggest you rest a division or rAgiments '\'dthin Ft division ns is being done here, as yot.r casualty rate will break dovm Pny replncAment system. Fnve stopped any replrcements coming to Fr~nce ns of' October 15 rnd ~m trying to s~cure ro~ SHAEF 3,000 replt>ce~ ,nts, to ~e ...lo·m to :rou 'y nir nurn:i.shed by AAI. Your rro lem is one of usin•"; .?vt1·:.lr1 le troops to best Ddvrntage 11n1~ is th~ sa..'T!c rro 1~m you hr,d lrist FebrU,~ry.' "General Clark repli •d ris follous: 1 Yom· rrrlio ooncerning rerlncements inrHcr>tes r lack o" nrr-recirtion of our tnctic~l sitmtion, the t.-errPin, enemy resistPnce .-.,nd my mission. •,nfortTu"V"tel. • .rou '-,-,v,... ,-wt bP.en t' ½le to visit th· s f'ront in ap1,:--otlmotcly two months. I h1we b~"'n keenly aware of my crisua.lty rate and I hn.ve taken every rossibl ✓ opportunity to rAst regiments within div:isions consist"'nJ., w.tth Lhe urgP-ncy of my m·:ssion. ,..,1· ✓ rotation of regiments within di visions end battalions within rE'lgfr. nts is L1.bltu~lly prec+,iced in Fifth Army. In spite of these measures my casu[lltfos have 1~l"'et1 11ir,h because we are engag~d in Rn all-out. effort to c'l.estroy Kesselr::.ng 1 s Arm:i es so th~t they can not apyier>r :igainst Genertil 'j;"'isenhowor. E1emy is rushing a.11 available r~inf'orcements to meet •:;_s nnd lock us in the mount~ins for the winter. We r-ust nttack 'Vith all possibl vigor and t..hnt is ex.."C~ly ..,mt l:,h~ Fi.-"th Army is aoing. Our success no -r hnngs i.n th" bcll'!.nce, i•nc: our r,rowing l:runntry shortr~~e m y prove the decisive hnndicap. General AlP-xame1' took up directly with General Eisenhower c reques-1~ f'or 3,000 replr>cements. Generel Eisenho"er hns not:if:i ed us th·1 t they nre avaiL-"lbl0, r>nd m-rn.ngcments "l'~ under ,wy to fly all or r:irt of them to this theater, balonce to cone by wrter. I regret that you d:i.d not SM ..-i..t to release to Fifth Army the Seventh Arrw repl~ cel'lents ; n �I,ATOUSA Depot as requested in ny radio 89,7, dated October o. m:id you done so ond arrnrw:ed for Seventh Army supply from SHAEF sources it would have saved r:iueh tiFJe and obviated necessity of shipring replncepcnts fr-om Ifoly to France n.nd shipment bnck of "n equivalent number to Itnly. 111 * TRAV::::P..SA--CCTOBER 21, 1944---The weathl'lr tod8y wns 1.'S follO\rn: clouds throughout the day nnn rains in the lc1.te afternoon. / * ~3cnttered Shortly a.fter his early Fiorntng <Xmference the Amy Commrin::ler left by jeep for Firenzuoln. where he met General 1 irkmAn, 13 Corps Commarrler, nnd Briga.dier Lambert, Brigadier Generr::l Staff of 13 Corps. Gener1=tl l(irkmnn join1'd Genert-1 CJ.nrk in his jeep, and together they drove to the '78th British Division Main Headqunrters in Castel del Rio. There, Lt. Col. Preston, Division G-1, met G<,r..P!rnls Clark, Kirkmr>n and Brigadier V1 Tiber-t rind oriented them brfofly on the Division's cm·rent situation, nfter which Generals C1r1rk, Kirl::man an.d Brigadi,•r La:r.1bert drovo to the 78th Di vision Advnnce Hl2 in the vicinity of San Apollinare. TMs Hea<iqu,.,rters servl'?s 7Hth Division both as a TAC Headquarters nnd a.s nn OP and is urrler enemy obsl'lrvrtion. 'i'l·ere, General Clark was grMt"'d '·)y Brignd1.er Arbuthnot, Acting GOC, 78th Division, who explained brfofly trl"J currP-nt situation. Brigadier Arbuthnot, Tith Gererals ClRrk, }'j.rkman and Brigadier L'lmbert, viewed tr. e terrain from the OP, and Brig- dier Arbuthnot pointed out their objectivo hill features of i.1onte Spaduro, r~onte Del Vero, '"onte Slntn. and Monte Penzola to the norther st. . The Brigadier also pointed out n fin, view of Ivlonte Grrurle to the north in the 88th Divi ion sector. Il Genernl Clnrk bade goot'l1)ye to General Kirkman, Brigadier l.r:.mbert nnd rigadier Arbuthnot nnd drove in his jeep to the 88th Division oorrunand post in the vicinity of Villa di Sasserono wher~ he was met by Brigadier Genernl Kendall, ActinP, Division CorrirnRn::ler of tho gs-th Division. Genernl Cl.n.rk n.nde a combat promotion to 1st Lt. Dr>vid L. m.lson of the 351st :Tnfantry, pronoting him to the grade of Captain. Mer:ibers of the Division staff mre present at the promotion ceremony, and General Clark sroke briefly to them, telling them the outstanding .., chievenents the R8th Division h,_-, ve accomy lished in the Battle of the Apennin~s. Genf'}rnl Cl.'.':rk lunched ,-,~th Genert'l Kerrlall and members of his staff. Gcn".lnJ. Kend~.11 told Gener. 1 Clnrk that he hnd lost nine battalion cormnand ers in recent operations - three killed, two wo1mcted, one captured and three in hospitals. After lunch, Gener, 1 Clqrk oonferred with Gen~rn.l Kerrlall in his vnn for half an hour, after "rhich they drove to the regimentA.l command post of the 340th Infantry in the vicinity of Monte <1rande. Colonel Crmvror ,, Comm".l.ndin.1 Officer, rP-viewed his current situation with General Clnrk n.nd pointed out to the General the dffficulties he! W8.s having, due to the shortage of personnel. Colonel Crawford stA.ted th.nt in recent operations h~ hnd lost between three and four hundred enlisted men and forty of'ficers, including his three battalion commanders. Officer A.nd HCO replacements were not avtiih•ble, nnd h~ was running dry of oi"ficer ond ~JCO leaders to promote to h:i.[11er grades. Gen ~r~l CJrrk assured him th..,t reph.cenents were forthcomine rmd err.ph11sized th.nt, where possible, Colonel �Crawford should appoint good rrco I s to commission~d grac'i.es. Gen er- 1 Cl.., rk, wlth Gen~ral Kendall, then <"rove to the 35oth Infantry rngimental corunend post, where General Clark pt•esented the DSC to Colonel }ry, Regimental Comm~nder, in the rresence of sever~l members of his staff. Gen~rn.l Clark spoke to Colonel lt'ry and ris staff, telling trmn of th~ !TI1'lgnificent job they had been do~ng and how fortut1t1te they ,.,ere to hnve such a fine lender as Colonel Fry. Genl'!r~l Clr,,rk, 1:i th Genr>ral Kt<!rr:1 nll, drove then to the 351st Infantry Regiment, now jn reserve. GenP.rr,l Clark conferred briefly with Colonel Chnmpeny, Regimental Cof'Jmander, a:-'ter which Gr:neral Clark bade gt)odbye to General Kendall and Colonel Chrmpeny and returned to his oornmand post by jeep over Route 6520, the 88th Division supply route. General Clark dined w~ th the regulnr members of his shortly thereafter. * l'1' ss and retired * TRAVERSA--OCT0BER 22, 1944--The weather tcxlny was as f'ollows: and fog all day. * Light rains Gen..,rfll ClEirk did not ettend the 0830 conference th is morning but conferred in his van with Gen~r:ils Gruenther, Brann tind Howard. !\.t 1000 hours the A:rmy Comr,nnder met with General ffr-cGruder, G-4 of !1A""0tTS.A, Genernl Gruenther and Gener:-il "'ate, Fifth Army G-4, in his oon·"erence hut. At 1100 hours General Clnrk left by j"'ep with Captnin '~n Dyke, South African Linison for Headquarters of the 6th South African Armored D:!vision in the vicinity of Castiglione, arr1vin~ Rt 1230 hours. General GL.,rk wns met by Genernl Poole, GOG of the Jivision; Colonel De,,e.lf, Conrn~nding Cor1bat Comnand D of' th~ 1st !lxmored Division, now 1-1tfoched to the 6th South African Armored Djvision a.nd on their left flrmk; c.nd Colonel Eaggs, G-1 of the Division. Colonel Dewey ask9d Grmerril Clnrk for some infnntr;,r help, and Generrl Cl:1r 1 : told him he would try to get him a battalion of infantry as soon as possible. Gener 1 ClPrk conferrl"ld for hrilf .,n hour w·tri Genl"rnl Poole in GeMr"ll Pool~ 1 s van. GenersJ. Poole then entertrd n"l<l Gen0rr-l Cl,.rk nnd Colonel Dewey for lunch at his headquarters. Just hefore lunch, Generr·l Clrr}- explained to G,1nernl Poole's staff tJ,e over-nll picture on the Fifth Arm:r f'ront, pointing_ out the important pArt the f1th South Africi:m Armored Di vision were plPying in the battle. Genernl Clark p:-esented G~ner~l roole with a p8ir of the new U. d. Army issue shoe packs. Due to the low clouds and drizzly rriin, Goner"'l Poole could not show General Cl.,rk the hill features over wli:tch the 6th South Armored were fighting which could be observed fror1 Genern.l Poole I s He.<idquRrters on a clenr day. During the discussions betv een General Cll'rk nnd Gen':lr?l Poole, General Poole recor.mended trf!t Brjgn_dicr Cljve, Commandinr; the 24th Gu:=irds Brig1:de, be rel 1evad. Gnnernl Poole also re1111"sten more nir rhoto cover ge rnd nir support U' possible. Gen<?ral 1 oole also "'"-T'ressP,d his thr>nks to Gener:-1 CJ:,rk for nrrangin · to release to the 6th South A:rican Armored J)j vision one nrule �company. At 11~15 Genern.l Cl.,rk br-de ~oodbye to Generr.tl Poole and Colonel Dewey n.nd drove to the bend'1u"'rtArs of the 1st l\rmored Division in SFln Anr1rea. · Upon Ms arrivn.l, General ClPrk w, s riet by Generril Pritchard r>nd his Ch:i.ef of StPff, Colonel Howse. Gener11l Cl-1.rk, before an ass ,mbl~a group of the 1st Armored Division staff rresented 1st Lt. Rowe •ith .the D~Btinguished Service Gross. G.,nerr-1 Cbr also rresented L~gion of' Mer:i.t awards to Lt. Col. rovming, nrdnance Officer of the 1st ArMored Division, and ~t. Col. Edwin Russell, Comm.,nding Officer o" the 31st Recon. The General also mn.de the following rromotions: Sgt. Swri.rtzlnnder ot' t}-,p,, 1st "'nn"k Bnttnlion to 2nd Lic,uten'lnt, Sgt. Fuglett 0f the 14th Arrnoren ""'ttalion to ?nd Lieutenant, Cript. 1 /hitsit of the 701st Tank Destroyl'!r Bnttrili.on to Pnjor, ?nd L:t.-:uten~nt Pntter o+"' the 1st Tank Battalion to 1st Li'"lui;enn.nt, ;'.'nd Lfoutenant Riley of the 1st Armored EP I lntoon to 1st Lieuteiw nt. After the ceremony Gener.21 Clark spoke briefly to the stn -rr of the 1st Armored Division, col"1J1ending them on the fine _job tt e:r are doing in their defensive role a..."'l.d thrit h.., hoped shortly t},ey •vould be able to get sol"le reA.1 armored ~ction. Gen-..:r['.1 Cb.rk, v1ith Genert;l Pritchard and Colonel HoV1se, then confer:red in General Prit C:bnrd I s office. Gt""nAral Pritchard. requested ' Genernl Clr,r 1 c to Sl'Jnd Colonel J'owse to F'rnnce f'or ['nroximately ten d3ys to sturly armored tactics :i.n France. Genl'!rnl Cl~k agreed. Afti,r conferring il'ith Genernl FrHcha.rd for h,ilf nn hour, Gentirnl Clnrk too· of'f in his j~er over tr,e miserr>ble San Andrea - feJ.m"'ggio ro..,d to Route 65 nnd then bnck to his benr1qunr·ters. The G"'nernl arrived bAck nt his headquarters at 1730 and ht1.d "our ~uests for dinner, after w~ich he enterta~n~d Members of his striff at 8 Movie in hjs conference hut . * * * TRAilr:RSA--OCT0BE"R. 23, 1944--The we11thl'lr today wt>s overcast, cle"ring towar·d th~ l~te a~ternoon. GP-nernl Gl:'lrk spent the mornin~ i.n his van vrorking ::1nd conferring with members of' M8 stnff. At l:.>00 bours Lt . Col. Grr-y, Armv .TACr, c1>me to confer with Genern.l Clrirk. At 1600 hours G"'tl~ral Cl,,rk left f'or FlorPrice with Colonel Saltzrnnn and his AlC. Enroute to Florence, the Generrl met Gener!"l_l Lemnitzer :1ho a5 on his wa::r up to Army Headquarters. (}~n .r".l Glrir'l< t,-11{:ed to Gen~rrl L"'lrinttzer "or t"YJ. Minutes on the ro~c', and tren continut'ld on to the Fit"'th Arm:, Officer's Rest Fotel in Florence. At 1~10 (}"'!neral CL,,rk entertl'lined for cocktails ~/Ir. & Mrs. Guthrj e YcCljntock (Katherine r,ornell), Er. Bri:m /1.herne, l.liss rncy rnd :mother rnem,r of the cast of "'T'he Barretts of Wimpole Street 11 now rlaying for }'ifth rmy troops, and !1isees Elli, Logan anci ::Ulriney, , lso onterfoining Firth Amy ~ roops. ('ren~ral Cl<ir d-tned with Colonel Saltzoen 'l.nd his ADC, retu.cninfs shortly therer-tfter to 1is comru'md post j n mrnv~rsa. �i'R.AVF:RSA--OCTORBR 24, 1q44• ..t}i,ner11l Clark },ad hj_s usual 08JO conf"rence t:r.:.s morning, rit which General Lemnitzer was also rresent. At 1000 hourr:; ri;r. rancis I. ~ratthews, Supreme Knight of the Knigrts of Colut'\bus, cti.lled wit:i G•n~rnl Gruenther to see t'1•en'"'.!rnl Cll'l.rk in the con-<'erence hut. Gen,..rnl Cl"'.rk oriented 'r. ifRtthews on the cnrrent ifth Arey situation. At 1?30 r1r. Basil O'Connor, Chnirmm of +,he Red Cross, .. nshington, D. G.; Robert Allen, ~Tice Cba1rmnn of tre R~ Cross ; r.1:r. Sterling Tomrkins, Delegate o" th~ Red Crans in l, shiiv-;ton; Mr. Vf. W. Jeff,..rson, D:irector of' Ci. vilfon W!il' -:'lelief in the ttalfon ,,,h,..nter; n•lr. R ymond Healy, D·:rector of' Facilities in the Italian Theater; and Th:-. James ""e, ls, R"!gional Director of' t're It linn Theat"!r were G.-n"'rnl Cl~rk I s lund1Mn guests. Before lunch General Clnrk revie red the tacticnl situation on the Fifth Army front. 'r. G~me:.~a1 Cl.s-,r' · srent n qu.:.et rf'tel"noon 1n h's vrui until 1600 rours, at which t'i.me h1' l~r0 - _ to TI Corps HeAdqU:"rters in 'Dif-J•1nggio whi-re he conf err~d for three quart~rs of an hour with Gen":r:<'ll K,oyes. "'he Army Comrnnnder returned to his headquaFters ~t 1730 and entertained two rNests or 1inner, retir_i "lf; eE!rly to his VA.n. A surnwi.ry of battle rrogress +~or t},e week endinE; October 24, 1944 indicat~s +h~ followin~: Steady 1 ut cilo"1 advances ci:mt.;nued to 1-)e m,"¼de along the lin.., o" the main / effort in II Corrs, t1:tth flPnk uni.ts in 1J Corps ~nd () SA Armd :)iv seizing control of such tmportnnt ·"'eatur~s as M 3J Attmo on t:i,e right nnd Hill 826 and M / TEm.1nrr: on the left. The oo mmanding f eatur~ of M GR.A'[:; in r-i.~ht I of II ~ Corps sector v:as seized and "urth..,r .<1dvaYJ.ces rnt1d~ towArds Route 9 ir tr e FO Vtil ley. 'T'h"'J s~verely--f'ought for M rr~1r,~0·rrB feature El'l_st of Fi gr1wP.y 65 in tre left sector of n Corrs fell to our troors nenr th"'J end of the period. Enemy resistance cont· m1"'Jd •,tiff -in froi1t or the mP.in effort l'li tl~ many severe counter attacks bei~~ rerulsed . In the r1 Corrs sector activ~ rntrols continued to maintain contRct witt1 ~nerny el"m"'nts, with no indications of enetn:v withdrawal in sector front. -tr"" * * * ,..,RAV'!-::RSA--0'.;l'l'OBER 25, 1944- -The yreather today was rniny r-ind cold. G~nerR.1 Chrk n~t"'Jnr1ec Ms 0830 conference rnrl at 1000 hours drove cio m Route 't~5 to th~ junction of Route #~5 nnd the Imola ron~ wrere r.e met Lieutenant General Jfolfo_rney, T'a,jor Gen"'r<Jl ' 1ill"r Yihite, G-1 ·iATC'TTSA. G~'tlernl Cl~rk, with General r~c'Tarney, dro~.-e over the Altuzzo mountain pn.ss. Rnroute (1-{'nernl Clnrk poi-•1ted out key terrain features r-nd enemy forti-f'ications . ,,,h" ptirty arrived at Arm:, Feaclqunrters at 12?.0. G-n""rl'lls Grul"!n~her, Ft>r<'lin,:, Lemnitzer, Cannon rnd Chitll~w ret Generl'l nc·,:arnev, and then C'r~n~ral Cl11rk brit'lred General ·rcr--Tarney on t're over-nll. picture on 'Sighth n.nd Fi-l"'th Armv fronts, r fter which the ent5-r~ f'll'\v 1'!10 lunch. At l/~00 hours Gen,ral A1ex,nc'er :--rriv~d, at'--1 +,re entire f{roup co"t"errer• in th"' co>1'"er nee l ut. n~nerr1ls J\.l<"lxar.r er, rnrcinP:, LPrmitz"r nnn Cannon left at 1530, ~nd rr~n ,rals 'Jlr,rk n.nd r•c•·arney co-rif'erreil ~loYJ~ in the hut until 1700. �Gener al Clrrl.;: entt-rt aint'ld Ge11r,rals Nc"rarnt"ey "nd White for dinner . ral !'c·rarnr-y spent the n~ ,;ht in G~neral Cbrk I s ~est van . * * Gene- * ✓ 6 , 1944--The weather today was very poor with a heavy rain falling durin~ the entire course of the day. TRAVERSA--OCTOBER In the no;rning General Clark, witJ-, Gen~rals M cNarney and White , drove to II Corps where they were ~et by GenerPls Keyes ano Prit ch~rd ~nd members of the II Corps staff . General Keyes briefed tre JY.rty on tbe current situation . The pnrty tr en drove to tl-e 91st Division, wJ-,ere they met and conferred with General Li vesay. The Army Cornmi:mder and y:-arty returned to t1"e FiftJ-, Army command post direct from t:be 91st Division, arriving back at noon . Genersls McNarney and Vfhite departed shortly after lunch , and General Clark spent the remainder of the afti,rnoon in his van , working on a.dministrative roo.tt~rs and conferring with v,irious staff officers . In tbe evenini:; the GenAral had Generals Brarm A.nd Lewis for dinner . Gener al Clark today received th~ following memorBndum from his G- 3 with regard to resting, refitting And training Fifth .4rr.ny troops: " I. In order ments Absorbed a.nd be rested to areas accomplishing this 1. that Fifth Army troops be rested, re- equipred and rerhicegiven soJ'lle tr,dning, it is necessary to move t he units to "'ell bl'l.ck from tJ-,e front line . There are two met:bods of project . To move out complete divisions to rest areas. a. AdvantaCTes . (1) When o+'fensive operRtions are resuned , there would be availAblA possibly two divisions - with all personnel rested and best rrepared far a strong attack. (2) This method would give more flexibility to any plan to resume the attack. b. Disadvantages . (1) II Corps zone of responsibility is so wide and the enemy ~lon~ tbis ~rent is so strong th~t it is Most difficult to cover this zone witr two tired divisions . f2) All +>our of our infantry divisions are very tired . I believe that if any complete division, or even all of the infantry of a division , is withdrawn , it would 4ffect adversely the morale of the divisions left in line . ✓• mo move infantry regiments or battnlions and an appropriate percentage of othar units of all divisions in turn to rest areas. �a. "II. Advantages. (1) The enemy can be more easily led to believe that we ro-e in strength across his f'ront. This, it is hoped, will cause him to continue his withdrawal from in front of Eighth Army. (2) By leavin~ all divisions in line, tre responsihili t;v of th"} generl'l.1 zones they now control will be much easier th1m it ,vould be if two divisions held the entire sector. (3) W are in better position to follow up any e enemy withdrawal with parts of all divisions forward. Location of rest areas. 1. Our troops are both physically and mentally tired of fighting. They need :rest, but trey- ,ilso m~ed recreation, tre opportunity to walk on a sidewalk, see picture shows nnd relax. 2. Troops in rest areas must be under heavy tents or in buildings. AFHQ hRS recently announced the policy of using buildinrrs for troops whenever possible to save tentage. I am informed tha.t several thousand men can be put in build-lngs in f1 0~ECA'T'INE. It may be possible to find additional housing in PIS'T'OJA or FLCR'SNCE. 3. Any rest areas selected in high ground will be very cold and muddy. In addition, my bivouac personnel can not find any area into which a large number of troops can be concentrated in a tent caMp, except the FI'.1I'OIA - PRATO - SESTO area. 4. Troops bivouaced astride Route 65 interfere with the movement of supply trains and their w,hicles running out on to 65 carry so much mud on to the road that a ~eat number of men w.ill be required to keep it clear. 5. Class I, II and III supply dumps ::ire in the FLCRENCE area. heaV;r maintenance repair stores nre in the FLORENCE area. All 6. mhe a.dditional time requ:ired to move troops from their forward position to the FLOR.ENCE area over that require-d to move trem to some pl."!ce along 65 South of FU'J'A PASS is only a matter of a few },ours. This is more than compensated for by the fact that tr- e troops in rest areas will be very near Rll supply and JM.intennnce establishments. "III. Timing. 1. The date on which Fift1, Ar_my resumes its offensive to capture B0LOGNA must oepend to a great part on the German oper~tions during the next few dayfl. UnM.l Eighth Army carries approximately ebrt':last of CASTJi:L S. PIETRO, and, until some G'1rman strength is withdrawn f'rom our front, I do not believe we liave t},e capability of capturinE.; BOLOGNA. It is estimated t}•pt our troops, after a short rest, will be capnble of Pn effective attack for A. yeriod of about 8 to 10 days. Ava.ilabb nrnmunition will not support a strong a.ttnck �l 31 for a longer period. 2. It aprears t:ra.t once we begin resting our troops, it is to our t:idvantage to rest ns long as possible, cont~ngent on tre date Eighth Army is to cease opRrations to prepare +'or tr P,j_r next commitment. I will, of course, be~in at once to plan for a resumption of tre attack, but trese plans must be revised daily in accord with Gi?rma.n action. The only tring that rnust be completed in the near future is a plan to follow up any German withdrawal. "IV. Additional Troops. 1. Shortly a+'ter l!ov('!r,ber 1, additionA.1 troops of tr e 92d Division and BEF will become available for combat. Exact dates of t1vailability are difficult to determ-lne because tl--e status of equipment on bents now unloa.dinP, and some yet to come is not lmmm. I was informed tr-is morning thAt tre 371st ROI' of 92d Division would be ava.ilnble by November 5. It will probably be near 1rover.ib,,,r 15 before BEF can complete tl"e minimum training of one RCT and haV'3 i.t reRd:,r for combat. 2. The 6th RCT of the BEF, now in action, could be withdrawn at once from its present Eirer and attFJ.ched to II Corps. 3. The area in whic1' troops of either of t} ese units are employed must he carefully selected so that any withdraw<tl would not endanger a critical sector. 0 "V. Recom.~endations. 1. That troops of' Fifth Army be withdrawn to tre FLffiENCE area for rest. 2. Thflt personnel from all divisions be withdravm for rest. The number to he based on a careful study by division conrnandors o+' the necessary strength required to hold their respective zones of action • .3. That the withdrawal of troops in t he M. GRANDE area be based on our determining the Ger111c~n's intentions in thnt sector. 4. ThA t wren possible infantry regiments, plus A.n appropriate percentai;;e of other units of tre division, be withdrawn. When it is impossible to reduce the strenrrtr of any division sector by one infantry regiment, that one or r>1ore battalions be withdrawn. 5. That, in so far as facilities r,ermit, troops withdrawn for rest M quartered in buildings. 6. That as soon as certtrl.n operat:i ons now be·i ng conducted by British troops of Fifth Army are completed, they be directed to conforn to plan for resting II Corps troops. 7. That tre 6tri RCT of tre BEF be attached to II Corps and the remainder of t hat division brougr1 in as soon as possible. t �8. That the 92d Division continue rressure along t!-,e West coast. 9. That t}-,e A:rmy Commander and tre undersigned whole },eartedly perticipate in the rest period recommended Above." * * * TRAVERSA--OCTOBER 27, 1944-~neral Cl~rk had a conference with Generals Gruenther and Brann at 0930 in the conference hut and was joined at 1000 by Gen"'ral Keyes and Colonel Porter of IT Corps. The remainder of the morning General Clark remained in his van. At 1400 in the afternoon Gereral Clark h,ld a small press conference which was Rt tended by Colonel Grogan, Fifth Army PRO; Milton Br'ncker, New York ~imes; Frank Conniff, INS; and James Roper, UP, in the conference hut. ~he remainder of the afternoon Ge~eral Clnrk spent in his van. The G...,n~ral hRd dinnt"lr in the evening with .the regular members of his mess. In the evening General Clark dfotated the following random notes for inclusion in his diary: "I have received tr e following letter from Gen~rnl Alexander: 1 1. With reference to my CGS/4~9 of 10 Oct. 44, it is now possible to go a stage further in the developm~nt of future plans. In the f:irst place it is quite clear that no additional A.llj_ed forwtions will be avaiL.,ble for operations in this t'beatre now or in 1945. On the contrary 4 Ind Div nnd the Greek Bde haYe b~en taken for duty in GRr.;:E:CE, Hnd Rre not likely to r~turn to A.A.I. In addition 1 Br Armd Div and one British inf'a.ntry div will have to be dlsbande<l to provide su·"ficient repL-=i cement personnel to maintain the remaininr- British forMRtions in a 191+5 campaign. None the less it is the C-in-C's intention to carry out A. sustained offensive in 19!~5, a.nd he has rece~ved instructions to rnRke plans f'or a campaign on the ~ener~l 1:i ll"!S indicc1ted in para 6 of rrty CGS/429 . 1 1 1 2. Plans which will now be ttiken in hand will be based on the aseumption that durin~ the next two nr three months the advance of the Russian Armies in HTH1GARY, combined vith the opera.tions of our light f'orces ?nd the Farti~ans in Y1TG0SLAVT.A, ~ill force the enemy not only to ~ive up the ports on the DalmatiA.n coast o.t least as far nortl as ZARA inclusive, hut to withdravr from the mountains in trie hinterland of' trose ports to a line between the SAVA and the coast bet :"Teen ZARA and Filn£ • 1 3. It is the intention of the SAC -in-C to occupy the rorts of SPLIT, SIB~NIK and· ZARA with COJ'lll"lA.ndos and other ljp;ht forces as they are evacu.,ted by t},e enemy, and to develop operRtions in conjunction with the> Partis1ms to gain control of the roads running inland over the mountains. If these opera.tions nre successf'ul it should be po ·sible to develop the ports t=ind the road and rail communicntions from t'.rem, under the cloak of openinr; up the country, and under the protection of our li,:;ht forces nnd the Partisens. As soon as �l 33 these prepnra.tions are sufficiently advanced our mnin ho<lies '"ill be brought in as quickly t:i.n<l secretly as rossible f'or nn advance on L.nJBLJANA and Fim.£ . This is a g1m-3ral conception , the actual rlan will of course re'1Uire a gr/lla.t deal of detailed '1tudy, i=ind its final form must rwturally der,end on the situation at that time . This oreration will be the task of ~ighth Army whose H. Q. "'ill be reljeved of opArntional resron.sibility in tir1e to :plan it, rrobably by placinit n. corrs H. Q. directly u.mer A. A. I. in command of the Eighth Army front . 4. '!'he first object of Eit;hth Army ' s operr-tiorn will be to cut the enemy ' s road and rail comM1.mjcations through LJUBLJANA AS ri step towards the destruction of KESSBIBPTG ' s Armies . Th~ capture of' the port of FIUME ·rill be esciential f'or the rn11.interumce of' the tirmy." At the si:rr'\e tirrie these operr>tions will have to he coord1nated yrith those of' It,,rsh;:il 'T'ITO 1 s forces , a.nd. rossibly with those of the Russfa.n southern Pr'f"!y e.s well . 1 5. Suffident cra.f't <'or Pll MSA.ult 1:.1-f't of one di11ision for ferrying troops to the Dal:MP.tion ports, l"nd therenfter for Pmrhibious operations in conjunction with the advance up the coast will be R.vailable for Eighth Army. 1 1 6. 'l'he task of Fifth Arrrry' will be to continue the offensive on the main front with the obJect of holdinv, the enerey- +>orce"l in I'T'ALY and driving them north eastwards . EventuAlly the two rtrmies would complete the pincer riovement by conver~inl',' on GORIZIA nnd 'T'RP'S"'E f:Teparetory to a combined r-idvance into ATT'3TRIA . Even if this conception rrowis too ambitious f'or the f'orces llVAilable it will At least serve to contain the mRx:i.mur:1 enemy forces on this front which ,\Till be a very valll.ll.ble contribution to the overall Allied strategy. 17 . 'l'hfl target date for the openini:1, of this CPJnfaign is the beginning of FebruPry. .If it cPn he launched earl ~er so much the better from the overall point of' vievr . '1'he reli:itive tinin~ of' the orerations of the two Prmies , and the final allocAtion of troops nnd other re,.,ources t'lre matters f'or discussion nearer the time • .,,here Pre ho~ever certain qmstions which must be decided in the very near f'uture . 'T'hese flre cliscussed helovr . 1 B. .,,o o-ive f'ormi=itions time for essenti~l rest, reorganization Pnd trnin:inq- before embr-trking on another protrt.Jcted offen,.,ive campair;n, it is estir.iated that it will ,e necess:iry to "'Uspend the current of'fensiv~ about 15 Nov . More over rra.ctic1> 1.ly all formations in both Prr.iies h~tve now hrd long periods of continuous fiphting , and rnPny ha .. rea.ched the stage ,,,hAre "'urther effort without rest is rm unecononical rropositj on. On the other hrnd f'ailure to se cure BOLnGnA and RAVENHA before settlin~ down on 11 winter 7 in1J , will h11ve the most serious ndverse effect on rr"pr-trPtions ,...or re.,.,1..Tlling the offensive on thP. mn.in Italian front :i.n 104'5 . With B0LOGHA and ~VF?TNA in our hpnrls rinr1 suffic ent spP.ce beyond them to n~ke it rossible to use the +>ormer fl_S " rorid nnd railhead , Pnd thP. lntter PS .<i const\vic:e port , we should be Abl13 to huild up c:uf'ficjent sup:plfos north of the A~nnines to suprort r-n 11ttack on the ADIGE position ns 1 art of a contj nuous mover1ent . Inr-> bili ty to use th".lse Preps rind the co:mriru.n:iotitions of which they f're the term·nals for "dm5nistr2tive build up durin~ the vdnter mr-ty, and rrobrhly 1•rill necessitate P nel-,y of' two or r.iore months betw~en the capture of BOif'G!~ and an attack on the ADIGE rosition . The immedirite rroblem therefor~ is to oolPnce the advantages of' sncuring BOif)GNA and RAVRT\THA a~a-inst the need of' the troop~ f'or rest . ,e �T '9. The best way of iMprovin, our chances of' CApturing BOLOG11A ·vould s seem to he to ~rsuade th~ rmemy to "'love somn of his troops -rrom ~ ts defence. The following plan to thnt en<l ha.s befm su~gestect:- a. Fiftr Army to suspend t1 ctive opP.rl'ltions; :i thctraw sry two di visions to rest in the FIDR~tTCE AREA; and simulate to the wi thdrawAl of a third div ?nd prP,parations for defence. ]2. A cover plPn to be ini tinted to tho effect that Fifth /1 rmy had been compelled to i:;o on the defensive owj.11~ to exhaustion and he1wy casualties. £• EiP.:hth Army to continue their o-rfensive w5.th all avl'ilable resources at least t5.ll 15 1Tov, to draw enemy f'orces off Fifth Army f'ront nnd to capture RAiF?r»'A. g. Fifth Army t0 pr~pro-e n pl11n f'or 1:1 f'inl'l 1 all out i:,+'fensive to capture DOT.OGNA, and th('ln to move the divisions withdrawn to rest in the I'LORF,NCE area back to the f'ront +'or th~ purrose as quickly and secretly as possible as soon as the enemy hRd moved troops away and the weather was rropitious, or P .t any rate not later than 15 tTov. ~- E; g:hth Army to concentrate on the capture of RAVEtJNA. , If this plan f'::,ilP.d it is considered th::>t the disadvHntagP.s of not holdini:; Bf\LOCP·l'A and RA~WTA must be accepted, ano th~ best •vint!'lr Une exclusive of those r-JEcM should be held. Tr0ops jn ti,e lin" shouln t}-,en be t1'i:r.ned ,cind rest, reorP,Rnization ,rnd trniniri!Y ffi'1 ould begin An<l hPve rriority. If it is not rossible to capture Bf•LOGNA and RAVE!HJA before calling a hPlt in the present offensive it will be o:"' o-reat jmportrmce to secure FORLI to open up Route 67, 11.nd r"Cl!J'l'E SMT MURE (L 873q) to cover· the northP.rn F.lxi t of the t-flllimE AOO!: ~ tunnel. 1 10. 1 11. ":'h.-, ~ajor problcl'!ls to be settlr.n At once are therefore:- (a) r-row cHn BClL()(}NA and RAVEF TA be captured before 15 ~J'ov'? (b) If thnt proves impossible whnt is the best wj nter line to hold? (c) "fu.A.t assistance or further jnformation do Armies want +'rom A.A.I. at this stage to enable them to go Ahead ':'T.ith planninp; a campaj_ on the lines indicated in this lett~r, anrl 0esif-;ned to gn be~in eA.rly in Febrmiry 191~5? •va11 you please examin!'l these questions and any others connected vrith the pla.ns outlin~d herein trat occur to you Pt tri is tage. mhe C-in-C ,;,rill holr. An Army Co..,ma!Y1er's mect:'ng rit this H.Q. at 1100 1-i.rs on 2() Oct to a~scu"s these and anv other connected questions. VT ill you please inform mP. by 27 Oct if you have any points not covered by this letter trFJt you rish to discuss e..t this meeting, also whether the rroposed time find date a.re convenient. Army Commanders r.,p_y brin1: two staff officers with them to this meeting. 1 nr have dj scu<1sed this mtter with General Alcxand er, l'md it hApp")ned thBt ��135 Genernl McNarney vras here Pt the Sl'lrr.e Mme. T told .Alexander I was not in fa• vor of abrmdoninf!, our attack on Boloenl'l but that due to the lnck of all-out effort h;v the BiP:hth Army, the German hnd been permitted to mss his defenses opposj te Fifth Army to close the ej ght-mile gar b"fore Bologna And the fourmile r;ap to Route #9 in the Fo Valley. '!'he Germtm hPs removed his best divisions at will from the F.iP,hth Arrrry +"ront, Pnd Eighth Army has done nothin~ to help us except lean aga1-nst the enemy. The -;;;ighth Army has never, in my year of nssociation with it, indulged in an all-out attack against the ~nerny, nor will they ev~r do so, in my opinion. Had they borne the5r just burden of this Fifth - Ei£;hth Arrrry pnrtnf'!rship, we would ht>Ve been in Bolor,in. Th"l enemy woul<l not have found it rossi..ble to take al 1 the d:1visions from Eighth Arrrry front Rnd plt1ced them agi:iinst us. 11 ! agree ,,rj_th the proposal to launc}-, an AY!lJ2hibiqus operation into the Balkans by ~ighth. Arrriy"w.r-Ui.r'rrth Armyrefnrorced by Poles f!nd British troops attFJcking nf'!xt sp:rin(; across the Po pist Yenice and tovrnrds the Ljubljana Gap. As a prerequjsite to this a.ttack in the sprini:;, I must htwe Bologmi this winter in order to build it up as a. base for thes,., future operl'ltions. AAI ,•u1n"t,s to withdraw Sip;hth Amy by ~ovember 15th in or<ll'lr to rrepere f'or their 11r,phibious operation wrich will be nothing but a ferrying exercise without oprosition. My troops Rre so 1':x:hn.usted now that they J'!lUst rest ~or at least t}-,ree weeks, in order to absorb new replace.ments rind rerfect sm~ 11 unit teamwork. I Pm ~oina to a reeetin~ the day after tomorrow at AAI with the following proposal: (a) That r::ii:;hth and Fifth Armies carry out an 11.ll-out desrerA.te attnck ) on or about 1\Tovember ::>oth on Bolognl'l.. Eighth Arrrry nrust put rill resources into the ettack. (b) least H '!'hnt all air suprort, includjng strategic, is mHde availn.ble for at week -in adwmce and during the attA.ck. ( c) Th,.t the l oHsh Corps be mde avFlilable to me to attack on my left ,. fl1rnk to op~n up Route #64. / 'l'hRt if bnd vreath~r slows up the attack the Britfoh Eighth Army be ~ ~~~~~:: to remRin in this area a'1 late as December 15th in order to secure ~~~ ~ (d) "I11 the meantime, I am stopring the attAck on MY front, will move 13 Corps \ \ to the north to take over Mount Grande, thereby rel-leving desp('lrately tired 8~th Division for rest. "Amrnmition will be crit~ cal for the oottle, but by r[-ltioning during this lull until '1ovember ?oth, I will ruive enough for about two weeks I all-out effort. By -r-rovembP.r :::ioth my replacem~nt situation will be suf'fici.ent to bring rne up to overstrength and to me.intain r,e in a desperate battl" for approximately two weeks. If ~i~hth Army will attack, and they n1'V~r hr>ve yet, I will attack up Rout~ !!65, and "e have ~ood chances of' cartur:ing Bologna." 11 * * �TRAVERSA--OCTOBER 28, 1944--Genertd Cl..,rk did not have his usu.el 0830 conference this mornini:; but did confer for a short whil~ w:i th Gem~r11ls Gruenther 11.nd Brann. At 1030 the Army Cornnnnr'ler, a.ccompanit"d b;v GPneral Brann, depl'l.l1ted for 13 Corps Headquarters at 'licchio, where he conferred w~th General Kirkman . Follow;n~ this conference, GenP.ral Clark drove on to Florence. At six o'clock in the evenin~ the ~neral enterteined mrious of his section chiefs +'rom the renr echelon And a few nddi tional f'riends at the J\nglo-AmeriC8n Hotel for dinner. * 17 * TRAVERSA--OCTOP.ER 29, 1944--The Amy Commander left for AAI Headquarters at Siena, accompanied by Generals Gru"nther t'lnd Brann, to confer at eleven o'clock with GenerRl Alexander. The GenerAl returned to the hotel for lunch and drove back to his commRnd po~t, arriving at About 1615. In the evening the Army CommAnder entertRined memb~rs of his st11ff '"ith a perform1mce in the hut by Miss Rlltt Logan 1md her u.s.o. Show. The performance Yrns f'ollowed by a buffet supper for approximAtely thirty guests. * * TRAVffiSA--OC'T'OBER 30, 1944--Gener,i.l Cl11.rk srent the early part of the mornin~ wor'ld.ng: in his van and at !'!lev~n o I clock oonferre<l with Generals Gruenther and Rrnnn jn his conference hut. Previous to this conference Glllnerl'll ClArl<" conferred with Lt. Col. I'fllh.off and Col. Ellison of the Inspector General I s Depirtment. At 1430 the Army CoTm"lAn<ler held a conference in the hut rit which the follovr~ni; vrere present: Generals CJ.Rrk, Gruenther, Kirkman, Keyes, CrittenberD'.er, MascFJrenhas, PritchArd, Poole, BradshPw, Lewis, Brann, Tate, Bowr1an, Fow11..rrl, Chidlaw, Bri~. Divers, Briis. Roe, Colonels McMahon, Saltzman, Zitzml'ln, Ladue, Brayner, Lt. Col. Cooper, Maj. i'lalters, 1-\:'1.j. Th".!unisson and Capt. Case. Follovring /'l.Te notes on the conferenc"! compiled by Colonl"ll Saltzman, Army Deputy Chief of Staff: llThe Army Corinmnder stated that he had convoked this conference to describe the new picture which confronts Fifth and Ejghth Armies. He h~d received ., direct:ive from Ge~ral A lexarrler purs1mnt to which th~ bulk of the Ej /:;hth Arny will und.ertA.ke another mission during the latter pl.rt of December. General Clark stressed the necessity of CRreful security in this connection. l I 11 He stated thAt another Bttempt vrould be made to take BOLOGNA and that \ such rt drive by the Fifth Army nn1st he carefully timed Vl.r~th th1' efforts of the EiP,hth Army. "C'renE"rFil Clark c;aid that the Fifth Army has advanced to rositions on a 14ne generally throui:,;h LIVBRG"TAN'O and Tir1I'. GRANDE, wh"re it has been �13'7 stopped. The four divisions of the TI Cor s could not press the att11ck further without l"lnormous c.nsualties, e.nd it is doubtful if it would bl'! possible now to ret=i.ch BOLOG1-TA on account of' the lRrge r-i.mount of Gerynpn re inf or cements which hnd bP-en throvm opposite the II Corps sector by hringinr,; units from other parts of the +'ront, particularly from the Bighth A:rmy front. "It had been R.ssurned by Qf!!nerAl Alex~urler that f!S "re threatened the principal Germ1m lPteral highway the enemy vmuld not let us cut behind him. He therefore ht:id two alterm:1.tives: to 17ithdraw or to stop our attack. He chose the latter And put l'!leven divisions in the area of the II Corps. General ClRrk had planned a new effort with II and 13 Corps but decided agri inst it when the 1st German Pt:irRchute Division was brou~ht in. "The Army Comrm.nder explPined thAt it is now necessP.ry to devise the most effective mea ns o+' resti . .ng our troops in time to mAke nnoth~r nttnck on BOLOGNA) before the rleparture o+' the bulk of the Eighth Army. It has been decided in conference At Fer.dqmtrters AAI that 11 coardin-"ted nttack to secure BOLOGNA "''ill be launchP-d A bout 1 December. We mu"'t rest the troops wh.ich will rrovide the spea.rhead of the next Pttn.ck, ,,,.,mely, the four tT. s. divisions. Means of getting them out of the line would be discussed hy G,,nerRl Clark lPter in the meeting. r~erimrhile, General r~cCreery will continue to push h::i.s "Sighth Army of'fl"lnsive. "It is difficult to judge where the Germans will try to corie to rest; there ar4' wrfous rossibllities, and the 'Rii;hth Army ,,,jll have to find out in the course 0f its A.dwmce by drivinr: the G~rJ'TFns bPck and stabjlizing the Hne. This is :fully understood hv General Mccreery. As the Germr-n rulls back to a new line he becom-.s rrogr~r,sively stronger, ann if later PI'fePrs to be su "ficfontly stron~, there is a possibil ;ty thPt the coord~nated FifthEii:;hth Army attack miP,ht not be l"lP.de. "G~nerPl 0111.rk ciaid 'thAt in order to get the TJ. s. <livisioris out of their pr-.sent positions +'or r ,u rposes o+' rest, it had been decide<'1, nft~r P consultation with Genern.ls Alexander a.nd Kirkrnrin, to r"quire the 11 Corrs to take over the terrriin in the ,,icinUy of the MI'. GR.A1IDE feature. ,r,h" Army Co:r.nn,i:inder understPnds thi:it the 13 Corps '"ill have some transportation require:rients to Rccomplish this m:ission. Pe told Ge>:rieral Kjr1~n several da'Ts arso thtit F:ifth Army is prl'!pe.rP.d to assist 13 Cor:rs to the Brnit of its Pbiljt,, in rrmriding the additiorutl transrortRtion necessnry for rnaintenr>nce durin~ this mission. 11 'T'he Army Commander believes thf't the Germflns have hrid the cqiabili ty of MA.king P stronrr, cou.ntArPttt=ick in th is Prea but does not believe he will do it. He stated thPt seven b:<ittalions ::>re required for the defense of this sector, And th~t this comnitrnent must he ~ade b:v the 11 Corrs. He stated also tht:it if lPt ,r our r>ttack shouln go toward the lest, it is rossible th~t the 13 Corps mri.:v have to trike airer more terri tor:,. 11 '1'he 88th n;vision should be rel il'!Ved as soon as possible, the t!:'rget a~te for completion heinrs a week. Geni..ral K:i.rkmrm said he hr,d !!lreadv scheduled the relief for November 2-8, rind Agreed to do it os soon as possible. 11 �✓ Genernl Clark stated t ht=it th"'! 8~th Division had unrerisone 4 , 800 battle ca sualties; thAt the 85th ,ind ,4th would stA'' ~n the line "'or the rresent, and that the 91st Division hRs .t'l Jread" two COJ'llbat tePms out of the Hne . The 1st Armored Divi'3ion vrill take over a. larger sector than rit pres"'lnt . "Gtnnera.l Clark .':JtPted thi>t the 6th South Africi>n Division h11s been fi1;hting in hifsh mountl'lins , and thPt he understnnds General foole is still plannini:; to attemnt to take SOLE . 'l'his nas confirmed by General Foole . The Armv Commnncier said tha.t it ,,.,ould be v~r· helpful if SOlE could be CAptured; otherwise fewer batt.<1.lions cnn ,:,;et out o-i:- th~ line . 11 Gener<>l Clark ~uiid it was rlanned to brinf" thei BraziHPn Division into the Un"' alonr hii,;h:<1nv 65, one conbn.t tePJ'll to rto ;nto position ri.r;ht P.wa-:r Pnd the other 11s soon As pos'3ible, probnblv· tirouna tre 10th 0r l?th . The ?3?nd Germ~m Division is opposite this rart o'"' the lin~ , Hnd the Army- Commander felt thnt rro~ess could he rm.de there . He stated l"lso that he planned to bring the IV Corps ~arther to the East . I) · "General Poole stAted that SOLE is ti very strong position, stronger than CA.SSPm; th11t it is w,ry difficult to att,-ck. The min:ir.rurn scale r,tta.ck to tak"' it And hold it T'fould htive to be n two-bnttalion attack. He does not have two available battalions at the moment . The 24th Guards Brignde is tired nnc'I must hold a certRin shoulder with one battali on. He could make an attack '7ith one battalion and :i:-ert of Another . If the situr'tion stabilizes he coulcl add nnother oottFilion to the Guards Brigade . This opern.tion would be versr costl:v; the ground is hP,ld b;v two battalions of the SS disposed AS indicated by General Foole on the map . The seizure of SOLE would not be valUAble unless exploited to th~ northeast down a difficult mountain feature with R ni:f'ficult Ma~ntenrmce problem. To be effective this rrogress should be coordinat~d with the adv;:ince o~ the division on his flnnk . GeMral foole would like to r,~'ke the attack w~th three battalions but cannot r,aintain three battalions . General Clnrk said to hold the project in abeynnce for the rresent. 11 r~neral Clark said that he desired General Poole to ~et some of his units out for rest if possible, reAlizj_ thRt this would be difficult if the diving sion sta_rs in its present position and takes over the territory to his norrwl • boundA.ry. "'T'he Arny Comander invited Gen~ral YirkrlPn I s coTTJn~nts and su~gestions from anyone present as to any improvements in the outlined plan. He stated tha.t on" of General Kirkman' s divisions may leave the 11 Corps during ~fovember, and toot some of General Kirkman 1 s units ~ill probably be pinched out as the new line devia,lops, thereby affording rm op:nortunity for restin~ such units . General Ch.rk hopes to get 18 battalions out of t}1e line . "G•meral Yir1-:rnA.n dj scuss1'd roan difficulties Hnd pointed out thAt many vehicles of British divisions are u~eless umer th~ roAd situntion confront ing the 13 Corps . H~ had nA,de a roup:h e stimate thnt :in order to ~Aintain troops in the Hf' GRANDE c;ector he would n~ed 120 a.ddi ti onal 6 x 6' s a.nd that he woul<l need an additional 100 for six dA.ys to get his units into position . General Clark said thRt we would furnish thl'lm. General J{irvrnan stated that this estil"l:=tte includes no allowrmce for bringing up res~rves , replA.cing motorcycles which cannot he u2ed , etc . If he coulo get any more je~ps they would �-be ver;r u s eful for the Frovost, dispatch riders and signal re:rairs . taking awny jeeps from other divisions for use in this '3ector . l39 Re is "G~neral Kirkmnn asked what work can be done on roads b~r the Fifth Army, and ~n~ral Bo,'frnan discussed the work which will be undertaken. General "'ate stated thPt the U. S . vehicles which will b-e turned over temporarily to 13 Corps may use Route h5 and the RADICOSA-SKSSA IF,ONE Road (65.,9) . 11 Grmeral Kirkman said a. res,,rve would be provided from the '78th Division, and that the battalions on th"" east of the 13 Cor:rs sector vlill make such progress as nay be rossible . General Clr1rk said that General Keyes ' corps wj_ll assist th"" 13 Corps es much as rossible . He also stAted thr--t this hendquarter s ,vill prescribe a main line of resistance and a regimental reserve line . "General Crittenberger stated that the Fifth Army requirenents present little difficulty for th" IY Corps; thAt General ~~scar~nhas hl'l.s one conbat tea.m ready to move Pt once ; that ~ntiaircraft units will take over their sector promptly startin~ their reconnaissa.nce on the day following the meetinp;; thRt the availabil-ity of more Brazilian units depends on equipment; that he knt,w he was exrressi.ng General Mascarenhas ' sentiments in saying that the Brazilians a.re Vf!'lry anxious to get in action . "General Vascaronh.<1.s reJ')eRted that his ability to act depends on delivery of equipment; that his units would be ready five days after such de livery. "General Clark sai d General Alexander had indicn.ted th.<it he could m1>ke some Itl'l.lian combat units RVailable , and that hA had told the C- in-C that } 1 e would he glad to take them. "~neral Chidl1m said th1.t the XXII TAC has certain training problems and problems with respMt to tre Eighth Army d1n:-ing th~ reriod betwe.en now and 10 t!ovem ber . "The Army CoP1M.ander stated t.,_,A.t thl" date for t1,e next attack mtueit not be too ri;,;idly set as tre army rmst be in a position to tak"' advimtage of any (;'ood weRthAr , but tha.t December 1 was the deadline and speed was the watcl->word . He stated that the bulk of the artillery must be left in, though soMe of' the personnel r,ay bt'! talnm out f'or rurposes of rest . " General Cll'rk this afternoon dictated the following randon notes for inclusion in his diA.r:v: "In going to General Alexander ' s conferenr,e I intended to dernnnd an all- out effort by Fifth And Eighth Armjl'! s to capture Bologna before Eighth ArMy moves out in prepA.ration for 1ts other mission . 11 Bnroute to Ale:x,:i.nder ' s conf er•mce I visited Kirknmn hecause an essential }:flrt of my plan jnvolved 11 Corps' taking over the Mount Grande fea.ture. Thi.s requires the better part of an infantry division . By so d9ine. I would rnat""ria 11v help in the re lief of U. S . troops f'or rest , r"organizA·faon ~nd \ \ ��trAining prior to the next offensive. I was sl-iocked to },enr Kirkman tell me 10~1.sticall:r tjt was not on'. He could not r,n5nt'fl.in troops on Gra.nde. The fallac;v of his stAtement lies in the fact thnt we are alrtl!ad;v maintaining over a. <B vision up there in hell:i.sh weather. His argument is that his transportation does not havf"J the SA.me mobility as ours. He is somewhat correct. \ I went on to Al~,m.nder ts meetinf; wh-.r"" I talked •Tith Mccreery ahead of the conference. I was pleased to find trat he could not t=1ttack in an A.11-out effort for Boloi:;mi. until !lovember 30th. This, I thoui;ht, was the latest date thRt F.i~hth ArM~r could rem,.,in in this HreH. I r~nd jt ca.n remain until Decemb~r 15th and possjbl;v A little longer. This will ~ive me more opportunity to rest mv troops. Alexander, Stayner, Robinson Pnd Hardini; were mn-prised at Kirkman I s A.ttitude. With their backing, I ha.ve decided to or<ler Kirkman to occupir Grande A.nd '\"1'ill tell him so at rny conference this r-ifternoon. I will bring in tre Brazilil'ln Division to relieve the P,5th. I will use the 1st Armored Division, e!'lplo;-ring all its tank crews as jn.f'ant:r", and believe I can get out practica.lly f-lll of the ~5th and 8%h and the 91st, perh,i.ps less a cornbA.t team. 34tr will have to remain in the a.rea witr A. narrow sector and as reserve. One other division, probably the 91st, will be kept in the Futti Pass area, for the German, with 11 divisions massed on the II Corps front, r11s the capability of embA.rrassin~ me by limited obJective, strong countl"lrattA.cks eit},er to regain Mount Gra.nde or the Livl'!r~ano feature. I must li~wise see that Brit.; sl1 ,lernents are rested, but not to the extent of tre American units, for t} ,e U. s. troops rave had between fotn:' and five to one casualties over tre British. 11 "Althoug} J h~we told Toole of the 6tr South African Division tliat he did not ht'lve to take Sol~ if he thought it was beyond his capabilities. I Understand hi'! intends to attempt it. If he is successful, it will }-,elp considerably. ~fr i ..e,...::t' ~ t ) 1 I;-)~~ 7 ·,._,._ ... -1. ~ - ~ ~·~- "I will tr:v to get most of my U. S. regiments lm.ck to Monteca.tini under cover. "At the AleXA.nder conference it was decided that Eighth Army iiill continue its attack, pusr•in1; nn alrea_ withdrawing enemy in [' north,~esterly d,r rlirection up the Po Valle,,. I will let 11 Corys assist tre Polish atti:i.ck by makin~ a.n tl!ffort on their right. I hope that ~ighth Army, by continued stroni; pressure and attacks, will force the enemy hack to a line r,cross tre Po Vallev generally in the CA.stel S. Pietro area. McCreery wants to make his r,,rd n effort in the attack on Bologna around November 30th astride Route 119. ThA.t precludes the possibilit"T of m•; using at least one <livision in the Po Valle·,. 11 '1'h1' c0nference also decided thflt both flrmies v1ould Attack All-out for Bol01;!1fl And thA.t Fi.round December 15th, after f'ifteen da7S of further effort, if we },ad fail"d, all rernr>ininir P-lements •rould he turned over to me, and Eighth Arm:r pulled out f'or its new venture. "Mv schene of :Ma.neu,rer for tre November 30th attack is undetermi:na ble at tre present time. rtr m,dn job now is to rest the American units And then, dep~ndin~ upon enemy reactions dur5nt; the next montr, tre westrer, I ��progress of Eighth Army, I will decide \Tr1et~er to make my at ta.ck along Route #65 and to tPe west t0ereof or to demand th8t I come into tre Po VAlley astride Route #9. I have indicated this latter possihility to Alexander. "When I do attack , it will he my last venture for Bolognn. . I will deml'lnd all the P.ir support possihle . There is a <::;rowin~ tendencv flowing ge nerall·r from Genert1.l Cannon that the:' know how to eriplo~r tre air better trian 'l'fe do. There is a reluctance to accept our targets . I feel thl'lt '"" must blitz ,1ith Stra.te~ic, Tactical and Fighter Bombers right in front of the troops astride Route .J65 ••• just spra.7 in a line on either side of the rond . I will carry that all the way to Washington in order to get it . ttr am havinf', a. neeting of corps and division commanders and my key staff officers At 2:30 this a.fternoon in order to notify them of my plans for the future and to discuss a plan for puttinP- into effect the temporarv relief of u. s. units . " TRAVERSA- -OOTOBER 31, 1944-- Genl'lral Clt:irk spent t },e entire morning in :bis van workin-; on an accumulation of pl'l.pers nnd conferring with various staff offi- cers. At 1445 in tre nfternoon General Clark, accomptmied by Colonel Saltzman and rrent"lral 'Rrann, drove to Florence, riaturning to his comm:md post at 1700 hours . · The General dined \Vith the r.-,gu].(lr Mem"1ers of his mess and in the evenin~ played hridge with General Gruenther, Lt . Col. Eberhard end f;1r-ijor Hunter. A SUJ'nmary of operations for the vreek endin~ Octoher '31, 1g44 is as fol- lows: Advances continued durim~ the enrlv part of the reriod aga inst increasin~ enem;v opposition and adverse ,::ren.ther conditions with the supply of forward elements becomin~ A. difficult pro'l,lern due to v:irtuall;r impassable, muddy ro!'lds . Du.ring the latter pa.rt of the period some withdrawAls were r.-;ade in II and 13 Corps sectors to More favorable, less exrosed defensive positions; reliefs wer"l effected to rest Porward unjts and rehabiljtate equiprn~nt; en;;ineer efforts to improve routes of supply were intensified . On the extreme right of 13 Corps, in the 6 SA Armd Div :md in IV Corps sectors our forces continued to successfully Rttack and gain local objectives. Results of operations for the month of October, 1944 are as follows: Ground forces: Stead:-, advances continued along the front of II Corps despite stubborn enemy oppos·ition and terrain very favorable to the defender . Key points were captured or by- passed and , at end of period units were firmly astride Route //65 , M BEUDNTE was secured along with the important high . ground running generally east along M FAN'O to M. GRANDE and Hill 568 to the . north of M. GRANDE . 13 Corps continued pressure and secured the important feature M. SPADURO and the high ground to the southeast . On the right 6 SA Arrnd Div seized Hill 826 and M. TERMINE while IV Corps maintained contact and secured local objectives. All ge.ins were consolidated and determined �counterattacks were successfully repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy forces. At end of month reliefs ~ere in progress and elements were enroute to rea.r rest areas. Heavy rains throughout month handicapped operations considerably and maximum effort was required to keep supply routes open. Air Suppo1:t: Weather was generally bad during month and air operations were hampered considerably. Fighter bombers flew 685 missions with 31'76 sorties and li 6ht bombers flew 6 day missions with 72 sorties. Operations on a large scale were conducted on 12 October when approximately 6(:l) heavy, 300 medium and 177 fighter bombers attacked targets near BOLOGNA. * * TRAVERSA--~OVEMBER 1, 1944--At 0900 this morning General Clark decorated Colonel Guild and Colonel Hutchinson, Chemical Warfare Officers, with the Legion of Merit. At 0915 the Army Commander met the new infantry field grade officers who reported to Fifth Army Headquarters upon their arrival in this theater from the United States. General Clark left at 1015 to go up to II Corps where he conferred with General Keyes, Corps Commander. Following this conference, the Army Commander proceeded on to the 91st Division command rost where he had lunch with General Livesay, Division Commander. Following lunch, Generals Clark and Livesay went on to the command post of the 361st Infantry Regiment where General Clark promoted Sgt. Crafton A. Palmer and Sgt. Walter Werner to the rank of 2nd Lieutenant and presented Silver Stars to 2nd Lt. la.lmer, Major Eli Black and T/5 David C. Steinman. Following this ceremony General Clark briefed Colonel Broa.dlmv, Regimental Commander, and members of his staff on future plans of the Fifth Army and the 361st In"'antry in particular, after which the Army Commander inspected a QM area and then departed for the 34th Division. Enroute to the 34th Division General Clark met General Bolte, who continued with the Army Commander to the Dbrision corirnand post where they conferred briefly prior to the neparture of General Clark. Enroute back to his command post, the General stopped in at the 8th Evacuation Hospital and talked with several of the wounded men. General Clark had dinner with the regular members of his mess and played cards in the evening before retiring. * * * TRAVERSA--'tfOVEMBER 2, 1944--General Clark remained in hi'3 van durin<=; the entire da~, working on administrative matters and conferrin~ with various staff officers. The General had Generals Brann and Lewis for dinner and for cards in the hut later in the evening. �l43 General Clark today issued the following directive to his subordinate commanders: 11 1. a. It is apparent that the enemy has regrouped his troops to place his maximum strength astride the Southern and Southeastern approaches to BOLOGNA and thereby deny to Fifth Army the accomplishment of its Phase II mission as envisioned in O.I. #34, and amended by subsequent verbal and radio instructions. b. It is also evident that Fifth Army units, particularly those of IT Corps, after more than six weeks of continuous all out attack, during which infantry casualties have been extremely heavy, are sorely in need of a period in rear areas to absorb and train replacements, rest and re-equip. 11 2. Fifth Army will therefore: a. On the mnin axis of penetration, using minimum forces, consolidate present positions, withdraw maximum number of troops to rear areas for rest, absorb replacements, and carry out tr~ining program. b. On the right flank, maintain pressure Against the enemy, withdrawing troops as pinched out by advance of Eighth Army. c. On the left flank of the penetration, improve positions to secure a sound defensive line, thereafter withdrawing to rear areas troops vrhich can be spared. d. On the coastal sector, continue to exert pressure, nrvancine as means and conditions allow. e. tTtilize the -f'ortJ,corrdng reriod of active dAfensjve to regain combat efficiency ana be prep~red to launch a major offensive in conjunction ,rlth Eighth Army on or about 1 Dec 44. II 3• a. lt Corps will: 1) Relieve troops of II Corps on the M. GRANDE hill mass to include M. CASTELLARO (L 9933) and M. CUCCOLI (L 9832). Corps Comiw.nders will arrange details of relief and of boundary and forward agreed recommendation to this Headquarters. (2) Assist the advance of Eighth Army. (3) Continue ratrol action to follow up enemy withdrawal. (4) Submit rlans for relief and resting of troops pinched out by advance of Eighth Army. (5) Maintain contact with Eighth Army and protect the right flank of Fifth Army. b. II Corps will:• (1) Using necessary minimum troops, consolidate present positions. (2) Facilitate relief of 88th Division by units of 13 Corps. (3) Maintain crmtact and follow up any enemy withdrawal. I �Plans for offensive action prior to maj_n attEJck which involves more than 1 infantry company will be submitted to this Headquarters for approval. (4) Rotate units so as to w:ithdraw as many troops as possible to rear areas for rest, re-equipring, absorption of replacements and training. PlRnnen schedule for relief and rest periods of units and other personnel will be submitted to this Headquarters (Attention G-3) with the least practicable delay. ( 5) Provide every facility for comfort r>nd welfare of troops in reserve positions in forward areas. If practicable, mess buildings and heavy tent sleeping accommodations will be utilized . c. 6 South African Armoured Division (with CC "B" attached) will: (1) Continue preparations to capture M. SOLE (L 7829); attack to be on Army order. (2) Assume responsibility for defense of division zone of action, relieving II Corps troops now in the area as soon as practicable. Contact will be maintained with minimum troops, as many as possible being withdrawn to rear areas for rest and recuperation. (3) Be prepared to follow up any enemy withdrawal. (4) Maintain contact with II Corps. d. IV Corps will: (1) Establish small command group of Corps Headquarters in position to facilitate movement, reliefs and subsequent assumption of command of new sector . Corps Comrnanilers will notify this Headquarters when he is prepared to assume command. At such time, IV Corps will assume responsibility for incompleted missions indicated for 6 South African Armoured Division under c above. (2) Concentrate 6 RCT (BEF) in area n';;w held by CC "B" (1st Armored Division). As soon as practicable, relieve CC 11 B" and attached troops . On relief, CC "B", less 2d Battalion, 370th Infantry (92d Division) reverts to parent unit control. Movement to II Corps sector will be accomplished by mutual arrangements Corps Commanders. 2d Battalion, 370th Infantry reverts to control of 92d Division and will be moved on IV Corps orders. (3) After relief of CC "B", press forward along Highway 64 to narrow zone of action of 6 South African Armoured Division. (4) If, on assumption of command, M. SOLE is in enemy hands, prepare plans for its capture and submit same to this Headquarters (Attention G-3). e. 92d Infantry Division will: (1) Operating directly under Army control, assume command of new sector and troops therein (less 6 RCT (BEF)) with least practicable delay, coordinating such action �with IV Corps. ~otify this Headquarters when connnand assumed. (2) Coordinating with PBS, make ev8ry effort to ready remaining elements of the division at the earliest possible date. (3) Hold maximum enemy force in coastal area; continue to exert pressure, occupying any areas the securing of which is deemed within capabilities. (4) Protect the left flank of Fifth Army. (NCfl'E: Attachment and detachment orders of troops now in IV Corps and 6 South African Armoured Division sectors will issue separately). "4. Security - Every effort will be made to conceal from the enemy any movement of troops away from the front. Road movements of troops will be initiated during hours of darkness. The Army Engineer is charged with the necessary coordination of camouflage and dummy instalJJ:itions. The Army Signal Officer will issue necessary instructions to insure radio deception. 11 5. Bivouac Areas: a. 13 Corps - Corps zone. Troops will not be moved South of the ARNO River without express permission of this Headquarters. b. II Corps and 6 South African Armoured Division: In general, area SESTO - PRATO - PISTOIA - MONTECATINI. Assignment of bivouacs in this area will be the responsibility of Fifth Army City Command Detachment, operating under Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, which will open Headquarters in MJNTSCATI~rr at once. Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, will coordinate selection and assignmP-ht of training areas. Training directive will issue separately. c. 11 6. IV Corps - Corps zone Boundaries: • a. II - 13 Corps: 3 ~ (1) above. b. To be submitted for approval (See paragraph II Corps - 6 South African Armoured Division: No change. c. II - IV Corps: Present II Corps - 6 South African Armoured Division boundary will become II - IT Corps boundary when IV Corps assumes command of new sector. d. IV Corps - 92d Division: 250 E~sting. Effective when Commanding General, 92d Division assumes comMand of new sector. 7. Operations Instruction #35 is cancelled. fensive will be covere<l by separate instructions." 11 Resumption of the of- �TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER J, 1944--There was a heavy fog over the entire area today, and a slight drizzle fell during the day. Just before leaving the command post, General Clark conferred with General Cerica, Corunanding General of the Delegation, Italian Army General Staff in Florence, who came to the command post to pay his respects to the Army Conmander. General Clark left the command post at eleven o'clock for Florence and went dire tly to the Anglo-American Hotel, where he had lunch at 16J0 hours. Generals Gruenther and Lewis drove in from the command post in the evening and had dinner with General Clark. * * * TRAVERSA--N'OVEMBER 4, 1944--The General arose at about 10'30 hours and walked with General Brann to the Anglo-American Hotel whe~e they had lunch, returning to the villa at 16oO hours. General Clark and Colonel Saltzman stopped in at a small reception at the 13 Corps Gazelle Club in Florence in the late afternoon where they remained for an hour before returning to General Clark's villa. Generals Gruenther, Brann and Lewis had dinner with the Army Commander this evening. * * * TRAVERSA--NOVEUBER 5, 1944--General Clark arose at 1030 this morning and spent the early part of the morning walking around the grounds of the villa before going down to the Anglo-American Hotel for lunch. He returned After lunch in mid-afternoon and took a short nap before dinner. Generals Gruenther, Tate and Bradshaw were General Clark's guests for djnner, and all played poker in the evening. General Clark today wrote the following letter to General McNarney regarding the Fifth Army situation: "Thank you for your telephone call to Gruenther yesterday in which you expressed the hope that you might be e.b le to procure for us a few 240mm howitzers. As you well know we have an urgent need for heavy artillery in the Fifth Army, and I shall be extremely grateful to you for anything you can do for us. If the 240mm howitzer is not available the 3 inch howitzer is our next choice, with the~ inch gun in third place. However, we are in the position of beggars ann not choosers, and we'll be extremely happy with any heavy caliber. "General Alexander h8ld an Army Commanders meeting at AAI on October 29 to discuss future operations. In spite of the logistical difficulties of launching an attack in the Apennine Mountains in November or December, I urged that an all-out attack be made on Bologna by both armies before Eighth Army is withdrawn for its new mission. McCreary indicated that he could not make a full-scale attack in conjunction with Fifth Army until approximately December 1st. That date suits me, for it will give me an opportunity to rest my American troops and f!bsorb replncements before another attack. • "The plan, as a~eed upon, is for Eighth Army to continue its at- 0 �l L{ '7 tack along Highway 9 to drive the enemy back to a line generally through Castel San Pietro, and extending from there to the northeast. Once the German has come to rest on whatever line he has selected to defend Bologna, both armies will square up to it and attack with every ounce of strength they have. You know, I know, and Alexander knows that Fifth Army will do this. However, based on an experience of almost 14 months association with Eighth Army, I am doubtful that McCreary will launch an all-out effort. I fear that hls attack will be made with a battalion here and a battalion· there with the inevitable danger that progress will soon stall. ) I expressed my views privately to Alexander and urged him to have Eighth Army attack vigorously now so that there will be time for Eighth Army to readjust and make a strong effort in conjunction with Fifth Army on December 1st. In my opinion the German is willing to pull back on the Eighth Army front now if pressure is applied. "I have directed 13 Corps to relieve the U. s. troops on the Mt. Grande feature and the relief by the British 1st Division is now in progress. General Kirkman has expressed doubt that the condition of the roads leading to the position will enable him to support the div~sion. However, I am determined that we can solve that problem. "I am now carrying out a plan to hold my front with about half of the present strength. U.S. troops are being sent to Monte Catini, where we have buildings and bathing facilities. In thAt way I hope to have my divisions in fairly good condition again by December 1st. "My scheme of attack for the December 1st effort has not been determined yet, but it will probably be generally along Highway 65 and to · the west thereof. I nmst be able to support my main attack along an allweather road. "I have now moved Headquarters IV Corps to Highway 64. It has under it the 6th South African Division and the Brazilian Division. The Brazilians will attack along Highway 64. Almond, operating directly under Army, has been placed in command of the coastal sector west of the 25 Ea~ting. "We sent your headquarters lViessage #6566 dated 1 November, in which • attention was called to shortages in certain critical items of equipment. I have listed these items below with a tabulation showing the allowance per infantry division so, that you will see at a glance the significance of each shortage: NUMBER mM 6omm Mortar 81mm Mortar BAR Cal. 30 YG (Lt) Compass M2 Telescopes M4 Grenade Launchers Ivr? SHORTAGE 112 85 1,134 289 207 181 3,370 ., AUTHORIZED PFll DIVISION 81 54 405 121 103 41 1,598 �I know that you realize the urgency of filling these shortages before the\ December 1st attack. I' 11 be grateful to you for any assistance you can / give us. "I am proceeding with plans for the formation of an infantry regi- \ ment by disbanding AAA units, as I discussed with you when you were here. j From our understanding of the equipment situation in the theater it appears probable that it may be necessary to delay formation of the entire regiment. If the shortage is not alleviated in the near future it seems to me that we might be able to start with the organization of one infantry battalion and complete the regiment as equipment becomes available. I shall send you a message soon nominating the AAA units-to be disbanded. "I am glad to learn that the 366th Infantry will be turned over to us soon. Your speedy action is greatly appreciated." * * * TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 6, 1944--The weather today was foggy, but there was little rain. This morning General Clark, General Brann and Colonel Saltzman walked down to the Anglo-American Hotel for lunch. General Clark returned after lunch and took a nap in the afternoon. In the late afternoon General Brann held a cocktail party in his apartment, after which General Clark returned to his villa and spent the evening playing poker with his guests. * * TRAVERSA--NOVEMBER 7, 1944--The sky was overcast most of the day today, but there was no rain. General Clark spent the day at his villa with members of Ms stnff. Generals Gruenther, Brann, Tate came for dinner and after dinner the entire group played cards. Operations for the week ending Uovember 7th wer0 as follows: Forward defensive positions were maintained wjth some local improvements resulting, numerous enemy counterattacks were repulsed and a rotation system of scheduled reliefs to rest units was begun. * * * TRAVERSA--T,J'OVEMBER 8, 1944--The weRther was cloudy today with light rains in the afternoon and evening. The Army Commander remained at his villa in Florence all day today, taking care of an accumulation of papers th~t were sent down to him from his headquarters by courier. In the evening the General dined with General Brann. * * * TRAVERSA*-NOVEMBER 9, 1944--There was a steady drizzle in the air throughout the morning developing into a foggy and cloudy afternoon. General Clark left his villa this morning and tirrived at his command post for lunch. He spent the afternoon in his van working on papers and conferring wjth members of his staff. The General had General Tate and Colonel Niblo for dinner in the evening. Colonel Niblo left Fifth Army Headquarters this evening enroute to the United States for twenty-one days' leave. �TRA"\ITTR.SA--NOVCMBER 10, 1944--General Clark spent the morning in his van conferring with his various staff officers. After lunch the General drove to his villa in Florence. Generals Keyes and Pritchard came for dinner and to spend the night . General Clark entertained General Keyes and Pritchard and three Red Cross girls for dinner . General Clark dictated the following random notes for inclusion in his diary: "I spent several days at the villa which has been fixed up in Florence. It gives me an opportunity, while we s,re resting our troops and preparing for the next offensive, to get some needed rest and also a. place where :r.iy commanders and senior staff officers can meet with me for relaxation and for visits to the Florence area. "Upon my return yesterday, I checked with G-2 and G-3 on the situation, and based upon information which reveals the enemy intentions to cling to his present positions, I made the following decisions: 11 (a) To continue to rotate U. S. elements of the II Corps into the Montecatini area to rest and absorb reinforcements . The best I can give the 34th and 88th Divisions is about ten days' stay at f/fontecatini. Afterwards they must go back into the line in order to get 15th and 91st out for an attack which I hope will take place on Bologna the first week in December. 11 (b) That the earliest day I can attack is approximately December \ 5th and this, of course, is predicated upon two assumptions - first, that the Eighth Army has attacked and progressed, and secondly, that they have withdrawn by the weight of their ettack German troops now massed on my front . "(c) I have directed G-3 to prepare orders for an attack along our west coast in the direction of La Spezia in coordination with Fifth Army's attack on Bologna. I discuss < with Captain Gray, my British nflval rep1d resentative, naval gunfire support for this effort. "(d) I directed that orders be issued IV Corps to have the Brazilian Division attack to the northeast on or !'I.bout the 20th of November in order to capture successively Castelnuovo and Mount Pero - this to facilitate the attack by the 6th South African Division on Mount Sole . Both of these attacks must precede my principal effort on Bologna. "(e) I directed G-.3 to prepare plans for the Fifth Army attack, main effort by II Corps generally west of Highway #65, utilizing Routes 64, 65 and the Prata road, and that 13 Corps, depending upon the position of Eighth Army, attack generally towards Castel San Pietro from astride the San Clemente road in order to draw enemy forces in that direction and away from the main effort . 11 As I see Eighth Army's effort, I am convinced that their heart is not in their attack. I have repeatedly represented my views to General Alexander and in a letter to General McNarney copied in the diary notes for November 5th. �lSO "I am preparing a letter to General Eisenhower in answer to two from him which will let him know our eagerness to attack, how we appreciate the contribution we are making to his effort and my worries with regard to the Eighth Army. I still believe that my e~xly December attack will never take place because Eighth Army will not exert the pressure they are capable of doing. The Germans have 15 divisions on my Fifth Army front 13 massed in front of II Corps. Their infantry strength is greater than mine. My restrictions on ammunition and replacements make a prolonged ___attack out of question. I must get superiority at one spot, and this cfa.n only be accomplished by forcing the enemy to divert divisions massed there now to the Eighth Army front or elsewhere. I am convinced that / Eighth Army and Alexander are more interested in a Balkan operation than in the capture of Bologna. A Balkan operation by the Eighth Army would permit a landing behind Tito's forces without opposition. Great ballyhooing would follow for the British Empire, leaving the bulk of Kessel- \ \\ ring's Army opposing me. The withdrawal of the Eighth Army without combining in an attack with me may permit the German High Command to move divisions to meet Eisenhower or Stalin. This might be fatal to their efforts. Our mission, as unglamorous as it may be, is to keep the 28 German Divisions here and gradually chew them up. They must not be permitted to intervene in the battle of W estern Germany. "I am pleased with the prospects of getting another American division. 11 If the Eighth Army is withdrawn and does not attack, there is nothing to do except hold my present position, rotate my troops, build them up and be prepared for an early spring offensive or to follow up or attack in the event the German starts relieving divisions on my front. I still feel that Eighth Army should continue to attack with more effort and both armies square up and smack him in early December in order to capture Bologna. Then Eighth Army would be free for a Balkan venture. "I am not entirely satisfied with the air support we receive. General Eisenhower masses heavy bombers in support of his ground attacks. There is great reluctance in this theater to do so. It stems principally from General Cannon. There is reluctance on his part repeatedly to accept targets in the Bologna area for his medium bombers. I am convinced, and will so demand, that when I attack in December my assault be preceded by all air medium, heavies and fighter bombers directly in front of the main effort and that this keep up every de.y. I will accept the responsibility for bombing my ovm troops. No more important targets exist in Italy. For over a year the air people in this theater have felt it more important to go after German communications than to support directly the ground ) troops during my important attacks. It is perfectly obvious from the results that their efforts on communications hc~ve been more or less futile, for the German has moved divisions at will, maintained them in battle. and fought tenaciously. I will go to McNarney and demand all air on my call for at least ten days prior to and during my attack. I know the air won't win battles, but it will do more good in supporting me directly than by being employed on Strategic missions far remote from the battle for Bologna. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clark, Mark W. Diaries Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984. World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns. United States—History, Military—20th century. Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Relation A related resource Mark W. Clark Collection Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Mark W. Clark Diary, October 1-November 10, 1944 Subject The topic of the resource Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984 World War, 1939-1945 World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American Military campaigns United States—History, Military—20th century Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Description An account of the resource Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from October 1-November 10, 1944. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CP Clark Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives and Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Text https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/822e6990c96688659d8bc89acb9ab9f4.jpg?Expires=1787184000&Signature=CBFqr6kqT0KBe1Vu6U-kSnpUw3O3HUbZY9fbrDm-R8MiEpbNTIMSXtgMFz6SI2L3Zd-lvWYoMaK-WH1ypO0NqN15IRLoztIy8fin%7Exi72y7ARV29wHI8tQG5vHwluhP4mhEQ8nh6rcJAFUmuZWK%7EeBssdXGJIP5o1mmh%7EWMXb9zAiUipwwiAtWfndmilU45vStUdXs%7E%7EqdGTWcZCn36Ut%7EM02oZ8ilc-FIYYJIVDV2oc8TJ56-n1yKPHlDJId7Qo5ESsyzTG8xOHOwPAJUWFlghmEJLSJFliaqrH0NuxtHR3A8km6eJ1nJroxnEF%7EFraPvHBrYkoezYXaHvKDZ1oGg__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM fc997aa3fbbc676fb42da8fa5a46819e Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Fyffe, John A. Collection Subject The topic of the resource The Citadel Military College of South Carolina Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Language A language of the resource English Description An account of the resource John A. Fyffe matriculated as a cadet at The Citadel in the fall of 1942. He received an honorable discharge in January of 1943 due to the draft. After his service, Fyffe returned to The Citadel as a veteran student under the G.I. bill in January of 1946 and withdrew in June of 1947. Our collection for Mr. Fyffe in The Citadel Archives includes letters sent to his family while a student at The Citadel and during his military service, as well as photographs and other documents related to his education and service. Contact The Citadel Archives at archives@citadel.edu for more information and to view additional items from this collection. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/67 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource World War II Photograph from the John A. Fyffe Collection Subject The topic of the resource Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina World War, 1939-1945 Description An account of the resource Photograph from the John A. Fyffe Collection dated November, 1944 with the text "Our tent - I made the windows and door." Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Citadel Archives & Museum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource image/jpeg Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Still Image