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https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/39779/archive/files/8f28043f2c8972ad9ef108470f770c5c.pdf?Expires=1784764800&Signature=C3o1vC1PG%7EcvUf-zOWicrQE4YQcKa7m6Wt7jtfHpj263DO7GCauLJev2lOAcDLc-A3ZGIVbcJEIw5x9%7EmF0nvVoLtsm3ozSY5L4vUhQJt6VHuk9Zq%7ErT52bs7fU5C%7E3sIU7OD2qSqw-gqITVg386uQfsTf5KbNur-KRSN17E4FnQybMf10HShEBice3Zg4N01345EZB-FTGAucAAWPJglO5Ed2r3cTTIUl-cLTasL7BPfY9-U4-YP-EmcYcPp4fBq18owtrd-D9xVgxM0fdrd7Dp%7EZ07zC7dGVQUgMb8jdtRC17D2LKQHXszosOTkw7fZXeSClLK-ve5ZZcAMzDu3A__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
647a4f32bb91a4b21d345ed328f66178
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THE CITADEL
ARCHIVES AN D MUSEUM
ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE
BOARD OF VISITORS
OF
Tl-IE CITADEL
.
THE MILITARY COLLEGE OF
SOUTH CAROLINA
FOR THE YEAR
1943-44
PRINTED
UNDER
JOINT
GENERAL
THE
DmECTION
COMMI'ITEE
ASSEM BLY
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�ANNUAL REPORT
OF T HE
BOARD OF VISITORS ·
.
OF
Tl-I~ CITAD~L
. THE MILITARY COLLEGE OF
SOUTH CAROLI NA
FOR THE YEAR
1943-44
PRINTED
UNDER
JOINT
GENERAL
THE
DIRECTION
C01\11\Il1.'TEE
ASSEMBLY
OF
ON
OF
THE
PRINTING
SOUTH
CAROLINA
��THE CITADEL
THE MILITARY COLLEGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON
September 30, 1944.
To •the State Superintendent of Education, C9l!wmbia, South
Carolina:
Dear Sir:
I have the honor to submit the following annual report of The
Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, for transmission
to the General Assembly.
The enrolment for the year ending June 3, 1944, was 793. Registration by classes was as follows: First Class 3, Second Class 27,
Third Class 187, Fourth Class 576. Cadets from South Carolina
numbered 335. These were distributed among the various counties
as follows:
Abbeville --------------------------------·-------·-··---------------Aiken ----------------------------------------------------------------··
Allendale ----------------------------------------·------------------Anderson ------------------------···--------------------------------·
Bamber~ -----------------------------------·-----------------------Barnwell ------------------------·-··--·---··-------·-·······-------·
Beaufort -------------------------------·-----------------------·---Berkeley ------------------------·--·-------------------------------·
Calhoun ---------------------------------------------------------··--Charleston -------------------------------------------------------Cherokee ----------------------·-------------------------------------·
Chester -------------------------------------------------------------·
Chesterfield ------------------------------------------·-----·--··-··
Clarendon ----------------------------------------------·-------·--· ·
Colleton --··-----------··---------------------------------·----------Darl1ngton ----------------------------------··----···-----·-··---Dillon ----------------------··------------------------'-··-·-----------Dorchester -------------------·-----------·-----------------------· .
Edgefield _________________________________ :__________________________
3
17
4
1
0
0
9
5
0
59
0
3
3
1
4
2·
6
7
Fairfield -----------------------------------------------------------Florence -----------------------------------------------------------·
Georgetown ·----------------------------------·------------------Greenville -------·--------------------------------------------------
2
16
4
24
3
�4
~·
Greenwood ........................................................
Hampton ............................................................
Horry .............................. ,...................................
Jasper ................................................................
Kershaw ............................................................
Lancaster ..........................................................
Laurens ..............................................................
Lee ......................................................................
Lexington ........... ,..............................................
McCormick ........................................................
Marion ................................................................
Marlboro ............................................................
Newberry .............................................. .............
Oconee ................................................................
Orangeburg ......................................................
Pickens ..............................................................
Richland ............................................................
Saluda ................................................................
Spartanburg ......................................................
Sumter ................................................................
Union ..................................................................
Williamsburg ························:···························
York ............................................................ '........
3
9
16
0
2
6·
3
1
4
1
4
6
7
1
13
2
33
1
20
16
5
0
9
Total .......................................................... 335
Other states had the following representation:
Alabama ............................................................ 15
Arkansas ··························································"· 10
California ..........................................................
3
Colorado ............................... :............................
1
Connecticut ......................................................
8
· Dela,vare ............................................................
1
District of Columbia ........................................
7
Florida ................................................................ 24
Georgia ......................0............................ .... ....... 76
Illinois ................................................................ 28
Indiana .................. :...........................................
3
Kansas ................................................................
1
Kentucky ........................................................... 14
�5
Louisiana ---------- -------------------------------------------···-·
4
Maryland -···-··-·-··········--·--·········----·--······-···-·-···8
Massachusetts -·---· ---- --------------------------·--·---·-··-·8
Michigan --·-----·---.- -·-----·-·•-·-···--·-···---·-··-·--····-·-··--4
Minnesota ··-··--··········-----······-····-·-·········-····-·---···
1
lVIississippi ·········--··--···--············-·-·················-···
4
Missouri ·-·-······-··--··-·············-··············--·····:.... -...
4
Nebraska --······-····-·-··-··---·····--•············----····--·-·-·2
New Jersey ·········-·-··-···-··--······-·········--·--···········- _ 14
New York ···--··-··-·····--···-···--··--·--····----····--···:·-··-· 45
North Carolina -·---············-······----·-·-····-··-·----·-· 100
Ohio ·-·-·······----···-·--·-·-··-·---·-·····---·----··-··-·-·----·-·-·-• 8
Pennsylvania ·-·-····----··········-····-----·····-·-·-········-- 21
Tennessee ··-··········-··--···-·-·-··-····-···-··-·-·-·-·-·-······- 10
Texas --·-········-·---······-·-········-···--·· -·-··--·-·-···-·-····-·· 12
Vir ginia -··-·-·-·-·-··-···-·-··--·-·····-·-·····---·--· -·-'--·-·-···-·- 12
West Virginia -·--···········-········-·--···--·--··-·--·-········
4
Wisconsin ··-··-·--··•--·----·············-·-·-·--··--····-·-··-·--1
Bermuda ·········-·-···-·-·-·--··--··-·····----··-·---·-···--···-·-1
Canal Zone ····------·---·-·-·-·---···-·····················------·
1
Puerto Rico ····-···-·---···-···----··-······-···-·-····-····-·-··-·
3
Total ······-··-··--·····················-···--·----·-·-····
458
The reduced attendance from the previous year is, of course,
due to the draft of boys at eighteen years of age.
SCHOLARSHIPS
The City of Charleston supports six scholarships of the value
of $250.00 per annum each.
The Crouch Scholarship has a value of $150.00 annually and
the William States Lee Scholarship of $150.00 per year.
The Fifth Field Artillery and the First Field Artillery Brigade
Scholarships have a value of $833.50 each, or full payment of all
fees. They are donated by Colonel Robert R. McCormick and are
limited to the State of Illinois.
Mrs. Jesse H. Metcalf, of Providence, R. I., donates three scholarships for cadets from South Carolina which are full paid, or
have a value of $693.50 each.
Mrs. Anne Jones Geary, of New York, donates two full-paid
scholarships for South Carolina cadets with a value of $693.50
each.
�6
The Bernard M. Baruch Student Loan Fund of $IO,00O has
been used to enable deserving cadets to complete their course.
All such loans have been repaid.
Friends of the college have donated sixteen awards and the
college donates nine awards for excellence in different fields.
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
The instructional staff for the year 1943-1944 numbered 104,
distributed as follows:
Professors ..........................................................
Associate professors ........................................
Assistant. professors ........................................
13
9
82
The administrative staff numbers 13, two of · them being also
on the instructional staff.
ARMY SPECIALIZED TRAINING PROGRAM
During the year, the War Department sent 1,902 soldiers to the
college to take the A.S.T.P. course and 8,735 soldiers to be processed and classified.
This program was terminated March 31, 1944 by reason of the
need of the men for active service. The only Comparative Achievement tests published showed the standing of The Citadel to be as
follows:
Term I.
Term II.
Chemistry-3rd among 46 institutions.
English-3rd among 45 institutions.
Geography-33rd among 47 institutions.
History-1st among 42 institutions.
Mathematics~lOth among 47 institutions.
Physics-3rd among 4 7 institutions.
Chemistry-7th among 31 institutions.
English-2nd among 30 institutions.
Geography-10th among 30 institutions.
· History-1st among 32 institutions.
Mathematics-7th among 32 institutions.
Physics---::-3rd among 31 institutions.
A report of the receipts and expenditures for the fiscal year
1943-1944 is appended hereto.
�7
The college has been very much handicapped by the reduction
of the student body and the withdrawal of the ff S. Army students. This has necessitated a large reduction in the faculty for
the coming year. Notwithstanding this, General Summerall,
President, and his faculty are to be commended for the fine way
in which they are carrying on the work of the college under these
trying circumstances.
Citadel men by their pre-eminence as soldiers are making the
name of The Citadel known around the world, and we are expecting that our Cadet Corps will be larger than ever as soon as the
war is over.
Respectfull~ submitted,
JOHN P. THOMAS,
Chairman.
�8
THE CITADEL
REPORT OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS
JULY 1, 1943 TO JUNE 30, 1944
Receipts
$290,420.47
155,000.00
923,710.54
391,797.67
Balance July 1, 1943 ---------- ---- ---------State Appropriation ___________ ____ ______ ____ _
U. S. Training Programs _____________ ___
Pay Fund~ -------- ------ --- -- ---- -------- ----------Scholarships:
1,499.95
1,481.41
725.66
644.95
1,698.04
86.09
177.49
817.50
557.04
Charleston City ------ ------ ----------- ---- First F. A . Brigade __ _________ ____ __ __ _
Fifth Field Artillery __ __ ______ _______ _
Laura Summerall ------ -- -------------- -Mrs. Jesse H . Metcalf ____ ____ ________
William States Lee --------- ------------J. R. Crouch ----- --------- --- --------- -------Anne Jones Geary ------------- ------ ----Augustus Horatio Jones ____ ____ _____ _
6,949.84
3,486.00
112.50
U. S. E. R. C. F\md ---------------------- ---U. S. Uniform Commutation _______ _
Col. Clark Williams Fund ___ ____________ _
Miscellaneous :
Rental of Quarters ---------------------- -Faculty and Miscellaneous ______ __
7,688.13
21,127.10
34,376.63
55,503.73
Whitehall Rent ----- --------------- ------------
900_00
Total Receipts --------------- -----
$1,835,568 .88
Disbursements
Administration:
A. Personal Service :
A-1. Salaries (including rent) __
A-3. Special Payments:
Chapel Exercises --------- ----·---Emergency Help _______ __________ _
63,712.91
590.00
696.15
1,286.15
64,999 .06 .
l
·'
�9
B. Contractual Services :
B-2. Travel ................................... .
B-3. Telegraph and Telephone ..
B-5. Printing and Advertising ..
2,689.85
1,741.10
2,305.67
6,736.62
C. Supplies:
C-4. Office Supplies ................... .
C-10. Dry Goods ......................... .
10,401.21
9.16
10,410.37
D. Fixed Charges and Contributions:
D-1. Rent ..................................... .
D-2. Insurance ............................. .
D-3. Contributions ..................... .
D-10. Victory Tax ....................... .
. 3.60
1,320.26
372.00
53,956.58
55,652.44
G. Equipment:
G-1. Office Equipment ............... .
1,472.91
Total Administration
$139,271.40
I n8truC'tion :
A. Personal Service :
A-1. Salaries (including rent) ..
251,479.56
C. Supplies :
C-7. Educational Supplies ......... .
165.51
G. Equipment:
G-7. Educational Equipment ....
2,186.70
Total · Instruction ................. .
$253,831.77
Library:
A. Personal Service :
A-1. Salaries (inch1ding rent) ..
6,252,53
C. Supplies:
C-7. Educational Supplies ......... .
1,649.84
G. Equipment:
G-7. Educational Equipment ... .
7,688.56
Total Library ....................... .
$15,590.93
�10
Infirmary:
A. Personal Service:
A-1. Salaries (including rent) __
A-2. Wages ---------------------------------C. Supplies:
C-6. Medical Supplies _______ ______ __ _
C-10. Dry Goods ----- ---------------------
9,131.53
"2,258.64
11,390.17
767.71
210.87
978.58
223.20
427.70
650.90
G. Equipment:
G-2. Medical Equipment ___________ _
G-3. Household Equipment _______ _
$13,019.65
Total Infirmary
Subsistence:
A. Personal Service :
A-1. Salaries (including rent) __
A-2. -wages ------------------------------------
11,125.06
140,705.38
151,830.44
B. Contractual Services:
B-3. Telegraph and Telephone __
B-4. Repairs ---------------------------------B-5. Water -----------------------------------Light and Power ---------------Gas ---------------------------------------Laundry
80.74
8,003.64
447.04
2,071.20
1,512.30
7,603.35
19,718.27
420,441.25
1,474.50
6,25.6.81
12,776.96
440,949.52
C. Supplies:
C-1. Food -------------------------------------0-2. Fuel ---------- -----------------------------0-10. Dry Goods -------------------------0-11. Other Supplies ____________ __ ___ _
G. Equipment:
G-3. Household Equipment ________ .
Total Subsistence _______________ _
12,253.91
$624,752.14
�11
L(Jf/J/J1,dry:
A. Personal Service :
16,607.86
A-2. Wages ---------------------------------- ·
C- Supplies:
C-5. Laundry Supplies _______________ _
5,480.43
G. Equipment:
G-3. Household Equipment: _____ _
384.77
Total Laundry ____________________ :_
$22,473.06
General Plant Expense:
A. Personal Service :
A-1. Salaries (including rent) __
__A2. Vv ages -----=------------------------------
18,890.88
73,960.67
92,851.55
B-4. Repairs ---------------------------------B-6. Water -----------------------------------Light and Power _______________ _
Gas _______________________·________________ _
96,144_28
4,012.82
. 10,672.06
2,422.43
113,251.59
C. Supplies:
C-2. Fuel Supplies _____________________ _
C-8. Motor Vehicle Supplies · :__ _
C-10. Dry Goods -------------------------0-11. Other Supplies _________________ _
27,073.80
822.77
926.40
8,427.43
37,250.40
B. Contractual Services:
D. Fixed Ch-a:rges and Contributions:
D-2_ Insurance -----------------------------G- Equipment:
G-3. Household Equipment _____ _
G-4. Motor Vehicles and Equipment ________________________ :______________ _
G-8. Other Equipment · _______________ _
Total General - Plant -Expense __ :_____________ :____________ _
19,492.32
12,980.90
2,836.16
4,395.40
20,212.46
$283,058.32
�12
Permanent Improvements :
H-2. Buildings ............................. .
Bond Funds ....................... .
Cushion Funds ................... .
4,429.37
15,026.58
3,070.68
Total Permanent Improvements
$22,526.63
Store Room:
A. Personal Service :
A-1. Salaries ............................... .
3,656.90
C. Supplies :
C-7. Educational Supplies ..........
C-10. Clothing and Dry Goods ..
21,645.31
58,877.64
80,522.95
$84,179.85
Total Store Room ............... .
Student A ctiviti.e·s :
Y. M. C.A .................................... .
Class Fund ................................... .
Publications ................................. .
Dance Fund ................................. .
2,350.65
4,500.00
1,000.00
376.77
Total Student Activities ....
Miscellaneous ST AR and ASTP
Acc-ounts ................................
Faculty Defense Bond Funds ....... .
Whitehall Account ......................... .
$8,227.42
TOT AL ALL ACTIVITIES
Balance ................................. .
$1,557,668.95
277,899.93
83,064.84
3,913.75
3,759.19
Balance Distributed:
Reserve Fund ............................... . $180,000.00
64,595.57
Cadet Fees ............................. .-....~.
21,897.91
Accounts Payable ....................... .
11,153.95
Unfilled Orders ........................... .
252.50
Miscellaneous
.
$277,899.93
�I
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Annual Reports of the Board of Visitors
Description
An account of the resource
Annual reports for the Board of Visitors from 1885 -
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
The Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Citadel Archives & Museum
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
Language
A language of the resource
English
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Annual Report of the Board of Visitors, 1943-1944
Subject
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The Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Annual report
Description
An account of the resource
Annual report of the Board of Visitors, 1943-1944
Creator
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The Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Citadel Archives & Museum
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
Format
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application/pdf
Language
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English
Identifier
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1796
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Museum Ring Collection, 1895-2000
Publisher
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The Citadel Archives & Museum
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
Subject
The topic of the resource
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Description
An account of the resource
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">The oldest known Citadel Class Ring dates to 1895, and features a dark stone with the year '95 inscribed in the center. Early rings changed design from year to year until the design was standardized in 1940. A special war ring was made for those who had been called to active duty directly from The Citadel at the close of the 1942-1943 academic year. This war ring was unique in that it did not have class numerals.</span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">Citadel Class Rings for the Corps of Cadets feature an oval crest with a Palmetto tree and the South Carolina State Seal with the graduating class numerals. The words “The Military College of S.C. 1842” wrap around the oval. The right side of the ring depicts the United States and South Carolina flags, cannon balls, and a star representing the Star of the West steamship that cadets fired upon in January of 1861. The left side depicts a crossed sword and rifle with oak leaves and laurel wreath.</span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">For more information, visit <a href="http://www.citadelalumni.org/s/1674/alumni/index.aspx?sid=1674&gid=1001&pgid=391" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">The Citadel Alumni Association's Cadet Ring History & Symbolism</a> website.</span></p>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Museum Ring Collection
Relation
A related resource
Museum Ring Collection
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
image/jpeg
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Physical Object
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/23
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Charleston (S.C.)
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Citadel Class Ring, 1944. Emmett H. Venning
Subject
The topic of the resource
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Citadel Archives & Museum
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/701
Description
An account of the resource
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">The oldest known Citadel Class Ring dates to 1895, and features a dark stone with the year '95 inscribed in the center. Early rings changed design from year to year until the design was standardized in 1940. A special war ring was made for those who had been called to active duty directly from The Citadel at the close of the 1942-1943 academic year. This war ring was unique in that it did not have class numerals.</span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">Citadel Class Rings for the Corps of Cadets feature an oval crest with a Palmetto tree and the South Carolina State Seal with the graduating class numerals. The words “The Military College of S.C. 1842” wrap around the oval. The right side of the ring depicts the United States and South Carolina flags, cannon balls, and a star representing the Star of the West steamship that cadets fired upon in January of 1861. The left side depicts a crossed sword and rifle with oak leaves and laurel wreath.</span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">For more information, visit <a href="http://www.citadelalumni.org/s/1674/alumni/index.aspx?sid=1674&gid=1001&pgid=391" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">The Citadel Alumni Association's Cadet Ring History & Symbolism</a> website.</span></p>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
A1967.066
Relation
A related resource
Museum Ring Collection
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
image/jpeg
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Physical Object
Date Valid
Date (often a range) of validity of a resource.
1940-1949
Audience
A class of entity for whom the resource is intended or useful.
Citadel Class of 1944
-
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5775c9d14a97f128137ff28c286047e9
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Museum Ring Collection, 1895-2000
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Citadel Archives & Museum
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
Subject
The topic of the resource
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Description
An account of the resource
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">The oldest known Citadel Class Ring dates to 1895, and features a dark stone with the year '95 inscribed in the center. Early rings changed design from year to year until the design was standardized in 1940. A special war ring was made for those who had been called to active duty directly from The Citadel at the close of the 1942-1943 academic year. This war ring was unique in that it did not have class numerals.</span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">Citadel Class Rings for the Corps of Cadets feature an oval crest with a Palmetto tree and the South Carolina State Seal with the graduating class numerals. The words “The Military College of S.C. 1842” wrap around the oval. The right side of the ring depicts the United States and South Carolina flags, cannon balls, and a star representing the Star of the West steamship that cadets fired upon in January of 1861. The left side depicts a crossed sword and rifle with oak leaves and laurel wreath.</span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">For more information, visit <a href="http://www.citadelalumni.org/s/1674/alumni/index.aspx?sid=1674&gid=1001&pgid=391" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">The Citadel Alumni Association's Cadet Ring History & Symbolism</a> website.</span></p>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Museum Ring Collection
Relation
A related resource
Museum Ring Collection
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
image/jpeg
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Physical Object
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/23
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Charleston (S.C.)
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Citadel Class Ring, 1944. Everett R. Lashley
Subject
The topic of the resource
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Citadel Archives & Museum
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
image/jpeg
Description
An account of the resource
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">The oldest known Citadel Class Ring dates to 1895, and features a dark stone with the year '95 inscribed in the center. Early rings changed design from year to year until the design was standardized in 1940. A special war ring was made for those who had been called to active duty directly from The Citadel at the close of the 1942-1943 academic year. This war ring was unique in that it did not have class numerals.</span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">Citadel Class Rings for the Corps of Cadets feature an oval crest with a Palmetto tree and the South Carolina State Seal with the graduating class numerals. The words “The Military College of S.C. 1842” wrap around the oval. The right side of the ring depicts the United States and South Carolina flags, cannon balls, and a star representing the Star of the West steamship that cadets fired upon in January of 1861. The left side depicts a crossed sword and rifle with oak leaves and laurel wreath.</span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">For more information, visit <a href="http://www.citadelalumni.org/s/1674/alumni/index.aspx?sid=1674&gid=1001&pgid=391" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">The Citadel Alumni Association's Cadet Ring History & Symbolism</a> website.</span></p>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Museum Ring Collection
Relation
A related resource
Museum Ring Collection
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Physical Object
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/702
Date Valid
Date (often a range) of validity of a resource.
1940-1949
Audience
A class of entity for whom the resource is intended or useful.
Citadel Class of 1944
-
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af5ed591272f3f0d48eeaed333b33581
PDF Text
Text
.
~
This is Volume VII of the War Diary of Lieutenant General
Mark
w.
Clark.
Volume I, covering period 28 June, 1942 to Sep-
tember 24, 1942; Volume II, covering period 25 September 1942
to 5 January 1943; Volume III, covering period 6 January 1943
to 6 June 1943; and Volume IV, covering period 7 June 1943 to
29 August 1943, are held in safekeeping at the Army War College,
Washington, D.
c.
Volume V, covering period August JO, 1943 to
December 31, 1943; and Volume VI, covering period January 1,
1944 to March 31, 1944 are being held in safekeeping in the Commanding General's safe.
�3
SAN MARCO-•APRIL 1, 1944--An early morning promotion ceremony was held at the
Forward Echelon, Fifth Army. It began e.t 0900. General Clark addressed the
45 officers,who were to be promoted1for a few minutes and then passed down
the line and pinned on their bars, leaves or eagles. The ceremony lasted
about half an hour. All of those promoted were Headquarters Fifth Army per•
sonnel. Immediately after the ceremony Eric Severeid, CBS broadcaster, visited General Clark. General Clark was astounded at his lack of understanding of the situation and problems on the Italian front. He talked to him for
about 45 minutes.
After a few Headquarters visits, General Evetts, Assistant Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, conferred with General Clark. Shortly after General
Evetts departed, General Clark went into conference with Generals Brann,
Gruenther, Tate and Keiser reference offensive operations of the Fifth Army
and the coordination necessary with the Eighth Army. Shortly after the conference General Brann went to the Eighth Army command post, submitting proposals for coordination between the Eighth and Fifth Armies. He returned
with the•. fu.11 concurrence and approval of the Eighth Arey of this plan, which
pleased and surprised General Clark inunensely. During the afternoon, General
Clark worked on administrative nntters and conferred with General Gruenther
on several occasions.
Major Metcalfe, PRO Section, was invited for supper. Generals Clark and
Gruenther discussed at some length with Major Metcalfe the correspondents'
viewpoint of the Cassino situation and criticized Correspondent Sultzberger's
over-estimation of the tonnage dropped on Cassino by the Strategic Air Force.
General Clark was very desirous that Sultzberger be straightened out on this
matter in case he might make any further statements on the .bombing of Cassino.
*
*
*
SAN MARCO-•APRIL 2, 1944-•The first Sunday in April turned out to be a very
spring-like day. General Clark worked on administrative mtters and held a
conference with Generals Gruenther, Brann, Keiser and Tate prior to attending
a meeting at AAI Headqua.r ters in Caserta.
At 0930 General Clark left for the Caserta conference preµired to spend
the following three or four days in Sorrento. The conference in Sorrento is
covered full7 at the end of this day's diary.
After the meeting, Generals Clark and Brann proceeded to Naples where
they had lunch with General Wilson, new Commanding General of the Penin~1lar
Base Section. After lunch the General oontinued on to Sorrento where he was
going to take a much-needed rest after the gruelling and trying days during
and following the Cassino attack.
The following notes pertaining to future operations of the Allied Armies
in Italy, covered at the meeting in Caserta, were compiled by Generals
Gruenther and Keiser:
"1. General Alexander opened meeting by calling upon BGSI Airey for estimate of the enemy situation. This was given as we knew the situation existed.
�The BGSI's conclusions were:
a. That the German 90th and 29th Divs would be utilized to defend
their switchline.
)2.
That the enemy will defend strongly routh of Rot!le.
,2.
That the ma.in .front (Cassino) will probably not be reinforced.
"2. The C in C then went into a general discussion am reading of the
directive •Future Operations' 48/G (ops) 25 NE.rch 1944.
'
"He covered the tasks for each Army a?Xl V Corps as in Par. 1, and
the breakdown of tasks as in Par. 2; stating that these tasks 1110uld not neces•
sarily follow in the order as arranged in the directive.
"In summation and deducing a time for the operation he stated that
due t-o troop movements, regrouping of the armies particularly the Eighth :Army
and V Corps that it was evident that it could not occur prior to the first
week in May. He asked the Army Commanders a.bout this timing to which General
Clark answered that the Fifth Army could do it any time ~fter 25 April; Gene•
ral Leese said Eighth Army oould not do it prior to 10 May.
"3. The C in C then discussed the phases of the moon which eventually
wound up in referring to an air drop (sabotage operations in mind) and the
)
availability of air transport. General Eaker replied to this that the air
transport oomma.nd had steadily been required to transfer its ships to other
theatres and that the chances of having more than one squadron (30 ships) were
remote. Those are all the transport ships available here.
"4. Next subject mentioned by C in C was the 'Timing of the Attacks' by
the Main Front and the beachhead forces. Would they be simultaneous or one
precede the other? The C in C stated he believed the main front attack should
be first. Reasons that this would draw troops from beachhead where the enemy
is strong and then when enemy has drawn troops from beachhead area the breakout from the beachhead could follow when the opportunity was evident.
"Both Army Comnanders agreed to this, GenerAl Clark stating that the
lead off should be on the main front with both the Fifth and Eighth Armies attacking simultaneously. General Leese also a.greed to that view.
"5. General Alexander next mentioned the date for the attack as probably
10 May and upon being questioned General Clark stated that the Fifth Army is
ready at any time; that is after 25 April, whereas General Leese, Eighth Army,
replied that he needed time for rehearsals and that the 10th of May was still
the earliest he oould be ready.
"6. The C in C then stated that he believed the main battle would no
doubt last a.bout a week before the position lossens up and that if the ma.in
front opens up on the loth that Anzio should be ready to push out four days
later. General Clark said that the beachhead forces could be set to go with
24 hours' notice and that he had not yet decided on extra divisions to go in·
there.
·
/
1
�s
"7. General Alexander then decided that D-day therefore was to be set
tentatively for 10 May; that the main front attack was to be delivered first
and that Anzio was to be prepared to push out on 24 hours notice any time
after 14 May and that the decision on extra divisions into the beachhead would
be given later.
tt8. General Eaker then said that in regard to the air he considered
both these fronts together as one battle and that the air could support both
fronts. He stated that it must be known that their attack was now going on
against the communications and that one month from now their effectiveness and
value at the time of our attack would be im. terially reduced. This would be
due to •war weariness' of personnel as well as probable future losses to OVERLORD and other theatres.
"9. General Clark next stated th~t he had been to Anzio two days ago and
that he had discussed the timing of the attacks with all commanders there and
that they (the oomrnarrlers) were all agreed that the timing plan (main front
attack to be first) was correct. He further stated that he wanted to place
CCB in the beachhead at an early date. That he had not yet decided on whether
to put in the 88th or 36th Div there and that he would reserve decision on that
matter until around 15 April. He further stated that if the beachhead attack
goes well it would be practicable to reinforce it at once with an RCT from the
main front with little trouble and thAt he would draw plans to do so.
"10. Admiral Morse next discussed the shipping situation and the Elba
mission. He stated that 26 new LCT 1 s were arriving soon with JO additional
ones now at Anzio (these need repair soon). There are also 50 LCI(L)'s in
the area end plenty of LCA 1 s. They have lifted for. 6000 personnel end 100
vehicles. The difficulty with Elba 190uld be a:fr cover which the Navy badly
needs for the operation.
"General Eaker replied air could not give the support. That air cover
now over the beachhead was a drain on them and even though reduced from 28 to
8 missions that they would not take on another air cover job such as Elba
even from groups in Sardinia or Corsica.
"11. Gen. Gammell said Elba planning was still going on et AFHQ.
not be undertaken unless the a:fr objection was overcome.
It would
"12. General Clark then stated that the 509th Para. Bn. was now coming
out of the beachhead and that plans were to be drawn as to its probable drop
to help Fifth Army operations. He indicated that they would need a little
training if possible and General Eaker remarked that only the one group would
be availRble and then only if it was not being used on other transport missions
or training missions now going on in Sicily.
General Alexander said go ahead and pJ.t.in to use them.
"13. General Leese stressed the importance of making the Allied troops in
Italy feel that they were a rart of the OVERLCRD force. General Alexander said
he would issue an Order of the Day covering this point.
"14. General Alexander next took up the 2d phases of the attack as stated
·~
�in the directive.
He talked about 'Speed and Punch'.
"15. General Cannon next asked if ANVIL was on or off. To this General
Alexander replied that he had no knowledge of it, but General Gammell, on
being questioned, inferred that from his impressions it appeared to be off.
"General Cannon remarked that if ANVIL is on then from D-47 the
AAI loses 2/3 of_its air support.
"Also, that if the armies are south of Rome we will lose
our air the next month and 60% of it within 6 weeks.
30%
of
\
}
"The present air plan to include 10 Mly is to:
"Cut lines of communication. The air is all out on this now. The
light and fighter bombers only to be used south of Rome. There is no need for
mediums oouth of Rome. They must go beyond. Air forces will be weaker on D
day than now.
"He believes the lirt for the 509th Par. Bn. can be handled. He
brought up the Elba situation again. The air can support the initial landing
l;>ut can't continue defense. May be coastal command can do it. Beyond Rome-control reverts to original plan, i.e. XII ASC to Fifth Army.
"16. Admiral Morse then remarked about the difficulties in defending
Anzio port because of:
~•
Increase in Limpits
]2.
Human torpedoes
,g.
Mines
"They do not want to man too many ports bece.use it is costly in
ships and personnel overhead and they haven't the defending craft necessary.
"17. General Robertson then discussed Q matters. He spoke of congestion
in the areas and to have armies agree to keep troops back until they actually
move in to attack.
"Also to get all unnecessary paraphernalia out of forward zones
such as laundries, bath units, etc.
"He stated that casualties are necessarily heavy in first few days
of attack and that for pla:rming purposes the A:rrrry Surgeons should be advised
of this and to have them plan accordingly. Camouflage of dumps etc. to be
done to hide direction or area of attack. Also have troops get rid of the
junk they have been collecting. He stressed the necessity of a drastic reduction in equipment to be carried wheh the pursuit actually begins.
"Support of air forces a major problem."
*
*
*
�SAN MA.RCO--APRIL 3, 1944--General Clark enjoyed a very restful day at Sorrento.
During his absence, General Gruenther hB.d as dinner guests Maj. Gen. David
Barr, Chief of Staff to General Devers; General Tate, Fifth Army G-4; Col.
Barron, War Department Assistant G-4, OPD. General Barr and General Gruenther entered into a general discussion concerning the Cassino operation. General Barr stated thPt he knew the u. s. wa.s disappointed in the failure of the
Cassino attack and that he did not think the attack was followed up aggressively enough; that the casualty report did not indicate this. General Gruenther
cited the total casualties a"i about 2100, which surprised General Barr, who
did not think that they were tha.t great. The discussion brought out the difficulty facing General Clark in that all the troops involved were either British, New Zealand or Indian, with a few American troops part1cipating, such
as Engineers and Tanks. It was also brought up that General Clark could not
have relieved General Freyberg, due to his reputation and the political complications involved. General Barr asked if the Divisional Commanders went
forward to actively direct operations, and General Gruenther stated that to
his knowledge he didn't think that General Parkinson, Commanding the New Zealand Division did. As to the others, he was not sure, but in any case the re~
sults of the operation would not indicate that they did.
General Barr then discussed how in the last war when an important objective had to be taken it necessarily was costly in men and that in the Cassino
attack in order to capture the monastery heavy casualties should have been
expected. General Gruenther then pointed out the difficulty in replacements
for British divisions and other empire troops and said that that particular
subject would, and always has, come up when these troops a.r e employed.
*
*
SAN 111.ARCO•-AI'R.IL 4, 1944--General Clark remained at Sorrento and visited and
spent the night at the Isle of Capri. During his absence General Gruenther
had as his dinner guests General li:tartin, Anrty Surgeon; General Bowman, Army
Engineer; Colonel Avery, ~.rmy Inspector General; and Colonel Weaver of the PWB
Section.
General ATartin had just returned from Anzio and told how they were really
digging in the hospitals on the beachhead. The question of malaria control
was also discussed, and General Bmman brought out the fact that they would
get four of the seven pumps going in the Mondragone area to drain out the
marshy area. General Martin also explained that he would powder spray with
airplane this swampy area and then oil spray the ditches and other areas where
the plane spray would not be effective. He said that atebrine would be taken
by all personnel as of April 15th.
Colonel Weaver brought some samples of German propaganda with him and
pointed out that some of them were very well prei:itred and with a keen insight
into American psychology. Others, however, were completely ineffective. He
stated that our policy was educating the German with facts, with no t . ndency
e
to emggeration or bold statements. This policy is being pursued so that
when we oontinue our efforts, in increasing intensity, our propaganda will be
able to greatly affect German morale. He pointed out that the Russian type
of propaganda was so fantastic that German prisoners indicated that they
placed no concern nor belief in it. Colonel Weaver pointed out that we
wouldn't want our propaganda to be so oonsidered by the German •
..
,/'
�SAN MARCO--Al'RIL 5, 1944-•General Clark was still enjoying his rest a.t Sorrento and Capri. The following is a compilation of the casualties incurred
by the New Zealand Corps from 0600 hom:-s 15 March 1944 to 060o hours 26
March 1944: 26 officers and 261 enlisted men killed, 108 officers and 1474
enlisted men 'l'IOunded, 6 officers and 231 enlisted men missing.
The following letter 1VI'itten by General Clark to General Eaker is quoted
in full:
ttI understand that there has been some comment in the press that the unsuccessful outcome of the recent Cassino battle was due to the failure of the
Air forces to perform properly their tasks in the combined operation. I do
not share that view. I feel that the results obtained by the air bombardment
of Cassino were those predicted by General Saville, and I can assure you that
if there is any tendency to blame the Air Forces for the result of the operation, it has not been inspired by my headquarters.
"As I have told :vt,u before, it is my conviction that no aerial oombard•
ment can be expected to clear any fortified area of determined infantrymen
who are occupying well covered emplacements. In the last analysis our infantry must close with the enemy in order to achieve final victory.
"I desire to take this opportunity to express deep appreciation for the
excellent cooperation which the Fifth 'Army has always received from the Air
Forces under your command. They have already made a notable contribution to
our successes, and I am confident that we shall continue to receive effective
support in the battles to oome."
*
*
*
SAN MARCO-•APRIL 6, 1944--General Cle.rk flew back by cub float plane from
Sorrento to Caserta lake where he transferred to a cub land plane and arrived
at the forward echelon at 1235. His total f'.l.y:l.ng time was about 42 minutes.
The General appeared completely rested, and it clearly showed that his three
days' sojourn at Sorrento did him worlds of good.
General Clark had as his guest for dinner General Forde who is being
transferred to the United States for work on ordnance matters.
General Clark's day was spent primarily on reading the accumulation of
dispatches, personal mail end other important administrative matters which
would bring him up to date after his short visit to Sorrento.
Colonel Robinson made a brief call on the General. He was formerly the
AA officer of Fifth Army and has been transferred to the 34th AAA Bri.gade in
the II Corps sector. After Colonel Robinson le:f't, General Bradshaw who had
returned from the beachhead called and paid his respects to General Clark.
He was invited to supper after a short conference with General Clark in his
van. After supper General Clark continued work on administrative matters and
retired early.
General Clark this afternoon received the following cable from General
Truscott:
)
�RN 044. "The average strength of British infantry battalions is a.s follows: 1st Division, 31 officers, 582 other ranks; 5th Division, 26 officers,
6o2 other ranks. The War establishment for Br:J.tish ba.tta.lfons is 36 officers,
809 other ranks. General Alexander stated, a.:rter the 56th Division was relieved, that battalions would be ma.intained at 30 officers, 700 other ranks.
In my opinion, the battalions are already dangerously low. Within a few days
hard fighting they will become so reduced in strength as to be ineffective,
just a.s happened to both the 1st and 56th Divisions dur:l.ng previous fighting.
Recommend that you take this latter up with the C-in-C a.nd advise me a.s to
the possibility of bringing these units up to strength."
*
*
*
SAN MARCO--APRIL 7, 19M.-- General Clark worked upon important military dispatches during the early morning, clearing the way for a da.y of appointments.
Spring-like weather prevailed today. General Clark received Genernl Dody at
1045. General Dody is taking over temporary connnand of the French Expeditionary Corps and ca.me to pa.y his respects to General Clark. They discussed
briefly General Juin 1 s absence from the Corps and the date of his expected
return. General Clark asked General Dody how his 2nd Moroccan Division was
getting a.long, particularly as to replacements, training and French junior
officer and non-commissioned officer personnel. General Dody stated he was
up to strength; that he had units undergoing srecialized training in mine warfare, special operations for river crossings and a.tta.cking in mountainous
country. General Dody complimented General Clark on the progress that he was
making in speaking French.
r
At 1300 General Leese and four of his staff officers, Ma.j. Gen. Walsh,
Brigadier Stratton, Lt. Col. Kent and Maj. Verney, came to a luncheon 'Which
was arranged in the Eighth Army Commander's honor. General Leese and General
Clark sat in the sun near General Clark's van so they could discuss together
future operations. The remaining officers and guests from the Fifth Army
Headquarters, General Gruenther, General Tate, Brigadier Stayner, Colonel
Britten, General Keiser, General Lemnitzer, Colonel Wood and Lt. Col. Draper,
went into the conference hut where they studied a SJSCial ma.p prepared by G-3,
showing genernl directions of attack, l:xnu:rlaries a.nd schemes of mneuver.
After this short discussion luncheon was served and was oompleted at about
1430.
A:rter luncheon Generals Clark and Leese came outside the hut where pictures were taken of the two together. At this point Colonel Darby, Commanding Officer of the Ranger Force and formerly of the 179th Infantry Regiment
of the 45th Division, carrie to pay his respects to General Clark prior to leaving for the United States with his Ranger veterans. It happened that Colonel
Darby's British decoration, the D.s.o., had arrived, and General Leese presented this high British award to him.
After the luncheon guests had departed for a visit to the Fifth Army
front, General Clark began immediate preparations on his speech for the Jewish
service of the Passover mich he was attending at Caserta at 2000 hours this
evening. During Genernl Leese's tour, Colonel Wood, Fifth Army G-3 Executive
Officer was wounded by a shell fragment.
�General Clark dined early and, accompanied by General Gruenther, left
for Caserta where he attended the Jewish Seder Service and made a very inspiring speech. Upon leaving the service General Clark noticed about 100
enlisted men who were unable to get inside. One or them asked if the General would address them, as they had not been able to hear his regular speech.
The General agreed and led the group to a vacant lot, spoke a few words to
them and then shook hands with all the men. The soldiers were impressed by
this thoughtfulness on the General's part, and some were heard to say, "Gosh,
I shook hands with General Clark, I won't wash my hands for a week."
General Clark returned and retired early to his van.
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Important messages of the day are as follows:
Clark to Alemmer. RN 8247. "Reports from VI Corps show average
.,,.
strength British infantry battalions as follows: 1st Division, 31 Officers,
582 other ranks; 5th Division, 26 Officers, 6o2 other ranks. In my opinion
the battalions are now dangerously low, and within a few days' severe fighting would become so reduced in strength as to be ineffective. Urgently recom\
mend serious efforts be made to maintain battalions war establishment strength."
Harding to Clark. RN CGS 3.30. "Your 8247 of 7 April. General Alexander
recently reviewed the whole question of allocation of British infantry rein•
forcements and decided that even with resources becoming available this month
it would not be possible to do more than make infantry battalions of land 5
Divisions up to 26 officers and 700 other ranks. Regret that at present this
cannot be done but draft is expected from UK shortly vm.ich should enable battalions of 1 and 5 Divisions to be mde up to above strength by about 20 April."
Truscott to Clark. RN T-005. "I need information a.s to oontemplated
operations as basis for planning here. Do you expect to come here by 9th?
If not, I would like to fly down and discuss this matter with you. Situation
continues relatively quiet, limited to patrol activity and artillery harassing fires. I am making strenuous effort to reduce enemy artillery fire on
beach a.nd port areas. So far we are making some ~gress and damage has not
been excessive."
*
*
*
SAN MARCO-APRIL 8, 1944-Up until 0945 General Clark worked on administrative
matters. At 0950, accompanied by Lt. Col. Draper, he took off by an L-5 plane
to Bagnoli where he bade farewell to tte 504th Parachute Regiment which was
leaving for England with an attached artillery battalion and composite service
group battalion. He decorated two chaplains of the regiment with bronze stars
and presented War Derartment battle streamers to the Jrd Battalion of the
504th for outstanding performances in the beachhead. He gave a farewell speech
to the regiment and conunended them arrl their Cornmarrl er, Colonel Tucker, for
their outstanding work with the Fifth Army. He also announced that Colonel
Tucker had been E\wa.rded the D.s.o. by His Majesty the King of England.
Before taking off at 1055, the General looked over the Bagnoli replacement
center with the Commanding Officer, Colonel Tenney. General Clark returned to
�l1
the forward command post and arrived at ll20. At 1155 General Devers, accom•
panied by his British aide, Colonel Campbell, arrived at the Headquarters.
Generals Clark and Devers conferred far about one hour before going to lunch.
The following points were discussed at lunch.
(1) The complicP-tions of the French political situation, with General
Giraud being replaced by Generf',J. DeGaulle as Head of the French Army and what
General Giraud's status will be in the future. No definite statements were
ma.de.
(2) The fact that General Devers was beginning to clear up some of his
base section hospitals in North Afr5.ca and that all hospital patients would
be returned directly to the United States. The long range plan was for
General Devers eventually to move his Headquarters from Alders to Italy to
relieve trans-shipping difficulties.
(3) The question of whether ANVIL was on or off. Specific answers were
not given, but the general trend was that ANVIL was not off but was dependent
upon the date set for OVERLORD, shipping that muld be available such as LST's
LCI's, etc., and the successes made by the Allied Armies in Italy in their
next offensive operation. The general opinion was that there would be a 45day delay after D day of OVERLCRD before a sufficient amount of shipping could
be sent down the Mediterranean for ANVIL or for further needs of the Fifth
Army for future operations.
After lunch General Devers left to visit the 85th Division oommand post.
Shortly after General Devers left, General Clark made immediate pl.ans to
take off for the United States for a ten-day visit. He had received a letter
from General Marshall, requesting that when the time presented itself he would
like to have General Clark oome to Washington for a brief stay. General Clark
plans to leave at 0900, 9 April, in General Eaker 1 s plane. He plans to take
with him Colonel Saltzman, Lt. Col. Smith and Sergeant Chaney.
At 1500 Lt. Col. Gray came up to review pending general oourt martial
cases. General Clark oompleted his ~rk with Colonel Gray and at 1700 General
Juin flew up from Capodichino on his return from Algiers to confer with General Clark. General Clark had in his van at the same time Generals Gruenther,
Brann and Colonel Saltzman. Generals Gruenther and Brann left, and Colonel
Saltzman remained with General Juin and General Clark. A general discussion
of the plans for future operations took place, and General Juin was told that
the Fifth Army staff and his staff would start w
ork immediately on the details
of the coming attack. General Juin then discussed what had taken place in
Africa. General Giraud's responsibilities will be nnterially reduced. General
DeGaulle has ta.ken over the duties as Army Commander with General Bethouard as
his Chief of Staff. General Giraud will be given some title which will oorrespond to om- Inspector General. He will be oonsulted on all planning for the
employment of the French troops. General Giraud does not like his new title
but it was perfectly clear that he w
ould be reduced to a minor role. Howeve;,
General DeGaulle did make it clear that he did not want to lose General Giraud
completely but would use him in some sort of an advisor capacity. Gmeral
Juin stated that he had General DeGaulle 1 s oomplete oonfidence and would re- )
main in command of the French Expeditionary Corps. After General Juin left
�ET
General Saville of the XI I Air Support Command conferred briefly with General
Clark.
Shortly after this conference, General Truscott, who had just arrived from
the beachhead, had a conference with Gmeral Clark. General Clark told General
Truscott that he was !J)ing to Washington and discussed with the VI Corps Commander the sitttation at the beachhead. General Truscott wanted to know when it
was expected that his beachhead forces would attack; that much of his planning
was based on this decision. General Clark said that he couldn't give him a definite date but that he thought it would be around May 10th, but certainly not
before May 3rd. The date May 10th was given because thAt was the earliest day
that General Leese of the British Eighth Army would be ready for any coordinated {
attack. General Clark then told General Truscott that whatever the date of the
attack was, he was assured by all Commanders, British and French, that it would /
be an all-out effort and that it would be successful. General Clark emphasized
that the Eighth Army, under the oonnnand of General Leese, would throw in everything they had. General Clark then stated that it muld be possible that the
beachhead forces would not attack before the 2oth of May. He asked General
Truscott what his plans were. Gereral Truscott then stated that his planning
group was considering a limited objective attack to capture Cisterna, which he
thought that he could accomplish within three days. This attack would be SJ:earheaded by the 1st Armored Division under Gereral Hannon. He also mentioned an
attack to take Carroceto. The point was brought out that such an attack should
wait until after the main Fifth and Eighth Anny front had pushed forward in an
all-out effort. General Clark asked General Truscott specifically if he thought
any limited attack in the beachhead would be profitable prior to this all-out
offensive on the ma.in front. General Truscott said that he had considered such
attacks, but he agreed with General Clark that the beachhead should hold now and
conserve its forces. Then when the opportune moment came to attack it should be
done also with an all-out effort. General Truscott said that he would like to
put the 3rd Division back in the lines about 10 April and withdraw it so it
would be in reserve when he did attack. By direct questions to General Truscott,
General Clark managed to draw out from him all possible plans of attack available to the beachhead forces. General Clark stated that when he went back to
Washington he would emphasize the fact that the morale on the beachhead was
high, and he asked General Truscott if he concurred in the statement. General
Truscott replied that he did 100%. General Truscott said, however, that he was !
very disappointed in the decision to withdraw the 56th Evacmtion Hospital and
that he thought that it had a very poor effect on the morale of the beachhead
forces. He added that he didn't think the hospital itself wanted to leave.
After conferring in the hut, General Clark and General Truscott went to
supper. After supper, General Clark began packing his personal things in preparation for his brief trip back to the United States.
General Clark today cabled General Truscott as follows: RN 6011. "Personal representation has been made to the CINC, AAI, regarding your 044, and he
has replied as follows:
'The entire problem of disposition of British infantry replacements has recently been studied by the CINC, and it is his decision that even with the availability of replacements this month, it would be impossible to do better than to
make infantry battalions of 1 and 5 divisions up to 26 offi~ers and 700 other
E
��ranks. Am sorry that we can't do this now, but draft should arrive soon from
UK which, it is believed, will make possible battalions of 1 and 5 Divisions
increasing to above strength by appr~ximately April 2oth. 1
I understand fully that their reply is not satisfactory and will keep on
doing all I possibly can to s:, lve the problem."
General Clark also cabled General Truscott as follows: RN 6o24. "Recommend that you fly down as soon as oonvenient, as I do not plan on visiting you
by 9th. Let me know when you plan to arrive."
*
*
*
SAN MARCO--APRIL 9, 1944--General Clark and his party, which is leaving for
)\
the United States in General Eaker's B-17, piloted by Captain Smith, took off
\\
from Marcianise airport at 0850. General Clark took Colonel Saltzman, Lt. Col.
Smith and Sergeant Chaney with him. General Clark flew by cub to Marcianise,
delaying his departure time in order that he might confer with General Gruenther.
General Truscott was invited by General Gruenther for lunch:
TMs being Easter Sunday, a special service was held in the daisy field
adjacent to the command post. General Clark being unable to read the Easter
story, General Gruenther substituted for him. This service was broadcast to
the United States.
General Gruenther invited for dinner General Moran and General Coulter.
General Coulter is head of the Maintenance, Researcr and Development Section of
the Signal Corps. The topic of the conversation centered ma.inly around equipment and personnel problems. The question of the security of the Sigaba code
was brought up, and when General Coulter was asked if when a set was captured '
by the enemy it would compromise the code, he said that he thought not. However, he asserted that we should make every effort to make sure that a set does
not get into enemy hands. This code system has enebled us to maintain complete
secrecy of messages from Washington to the various theaters and within the
theaters themselves.
After supper the dinner guests attended a movie set up for Section Chiefs
of thA Forward Echelon in the conference hut.
*
*
*
SAN MARCO--APRIL 10, 1944--The command post missed the personality of General
Clark today, this being his first day's absence during his trip to the United
States.
General Brann held a G-3 conference at which attended General Tate, G-4;
Colonel Howard, G-2; General Bowma.n, Army Engineer; General Moran, Army Signal
Officer, and General Saville of the XII Air Support Command. General Brann
discussed in detail the attack by the Fifth Army. He completely outlined the
objectives and directions of attack contemplated by the French and II Corps.
The 2nd DIM would attack in the direction of Majo, which it planned on taking
by the first night, to proceed down into Ausonia up to the high ground south
�of Esperia. This attack would be closely timed with the 3rd DIA, proceeding
on and taking the high ground in the vicinity of Mount D1 0ro. The 4th DMM,
especially trained in mountain warfare, would follow through with a small
part of its force proceeding toward Itri. General Brann does not favor this.
He would rather have II Corps take Itri. The remainder of the 4th DMM would
consolidate in the Mount D1 0ro region and push on to Pico. This plan would
place in our hands the high ground dominating the Liri Valley, which would
forcefully enhance the attack of the Eighth Army up that valley.
The II Corps, at the same time, would attack with two divisions abreast,
the 88th on the right and the 85th on the left. The 88th would have as its
initial objective the commanding terrain in the vicinity of Castellonorato,
and the 85th the commanding terrain on Mount Scauri. Simultaneously II Corps
would rroceed along the coastal road, wresting the commanding terrain overlooking this route from the enemy toward the direction of Formia, Gaeta and
Itri. This would be accomplished by small turning movements as the advance
progressed.
General Brann then stated that the 36th Division would be held in reserve;
that its employment depended on whether the Army Commander wanted to use it on
this front or on the beachhead. If used on the Garigliano front the 36th
would follow through and exploit successes of the 85th and 88th. If used on
the beachhead, it would be used to exploit any successes on that front. He
also stated tha.t the 91st Division, which had not yet arrived in this theater,
would be available to the Fifth Army around June 1st. It should arrive here
around the 1st of April and would be ready for battle in 4 or 6 weeks.
General Saville was then consulted as to how the Air Corps would closely
support this attack. Their particular objectives would point toward isolating
the battlefield in the Ausente Valley, paying particular attention to the rear
slopes of Mount Scauri, which at the same time would be rounded with a terrific artillery bombardment of at least 400 guns and also the road junctions terminating bot}-, entrances to the Ausente River Valley. General Saville posed the
question of conserving his air might to facilitate the second phase of the attack which would concentrate on the high ground and to the west of Spigno.
However, General Brann thought that it would be important to go all out during
the initial stages of the attack so that it would facilitate the isolation of
the battlefield on both corps fronts; that is denying the enemy any withdrawal
routes on the road from Ausnnia down to the coast. If this bottleneck was offered to the enemy, only infantry soldiers would be able to withdraw and force
any effective resistance later on, makin~ it impossible for transport or artillery to escape.
General Gruenther represented General Clark this afternoon at the Polish
Corps dinner.
*
*
*
SAN MA.RCO--AFRIL 11, 1944--The appointment that General Cl~.rk made with the
Duke of Aosta was not cancelled. The Duke arrived at the command post an hour
earlier than 10 o'clock, the appointment hour, and was taken immediately over
to General Gruenther, who discussed with him Italian units, their loos.lity and
the type of work they are doing. General Livesay, Com1mnding General of the
; .: it '·.
'
.
:-~·~J_,): :..-:{
�15
91st Division, and his Chief of Staff, Colonel Donovan, also reported in to
the Commanding General, Fifth Army, and was received by the Chief of Staff,
General Gruenther. These two officers were invited to lunch. General Livesay
discussed some of the POM difficulties thet the Division had in the States;
such as, wh8t was the meaning of the term "combat serviceable" as pertaining
to their ordnance weapons? Staff officers from III Corps indicated that they
should be very strict, so all weapons were turned in that were shiny, regardless of small defects. Later on, ASF representatives said that this interpretation was too strict and th8t they should turn all those weapons in for
bluing only, to eliminate the shine. It eventually turned out thnt they got
back the weapons that they had turned in, blued and with minor repairs accom•
plished.
.
The 91st Division did not lrnow where they were going until they reported
in to the staging area at Fort Patrick Henry. They lrnew they were coming to
the European Theater, but the exact destination was not known. About two
months prior to getting alert orders the Division received a considerable number of replacements of German, Italian and Austrian parentage. This led them
to believe that they would probably go west and to the Pacific. General
Livesay ha.d extreme confidence in the Division's ability and commented on its
past performances. General Gerhardt who now commands the 29th Division
"brought up" this Division from its activation date in #43.
The Mondragone Villa project has started on 1ts way and should be completed in about 15 days.
Lt. Col. Sutherland, former aide to General Clark, and Colonel Porter
were invited to dinner by General Gruenther. Colonel Sutherland is leaving
for Algiers to determine whether or not he is going back to Washington or
will remain on duty with OSS in this theater.
At 2130 a cable came in relieving the 91st Division from assignment to
the Fifth Army, stating that it would not be unloaded in Italy but would be
staged in Arzew and would be under the command of AFHQ. When General Gruenther saw this he said that he didn't like it, but there was nothing he could
do about it so he was going to bed.
*
/
*
*
SAN MARCO--APRIL 12, 1944--General Keyes, Deputy Army Commander, flew up to
the beachhead and decorated Brigadier Generals Ramey (Legion of Merit),
Fredericks (Silver Star) and Baehr (Bronze Star) and Colonel Bauchspies,
(Legion of Merit}. The purpose of General Keyes' visit was to make a personal reconnaissance of the beachhead while assuming this temporary title.
Mr. Bob Murphy, U. s. Ambassador-at-Large in North Africa, came to call
on General Gruenther and have supper with him. He was accompanied by Mr.
Reinhart and Mr. Offay. Mr. Murphy and General Gruenther had a grand time
reminiscing about past events in North Africa. Mr. Murphy answered a number
of questions regarding U. s. reactions to the Italian campaign, and, in substance, stated that he didn't think that there was any criticism in the States \
of the Fifth Army or any of the operating troops, but that he believed that
)
there was serious doubt as to the grand strategy of the campaign - what we
...
I
�were trying to accoMplish here and the reason for not giving the ~herewithal
to accomplish this mission. He brought out also that the State Department
was well a.ware of the Russian situation and possible menace - that a.t the
present moment our policy was to be extremely friendly toward the Russians that their efforts on the eastern front were necessary to our success and
that future problems would have to be dealt wlth as they a.rose. He also
mentioned the fact that the Russians wanted an airfield in Italy but that,
as far as he was concerned, he wasn't going to give it to them.
General Gruenther then outlined on the map in the hut the Fifth Army
dispositions as of today. Mr. Murphy was extremely interested in what General Gruenther pointed out, and the discussion developed into practically a
map study of the entire Italian campaign, bringi.ng up action in the Volturno
crossing, the Camino, Lunge and Cassino battles. General Gruenther thoroughly acquainted Mr. Murphy with the true facts of Cassino, emphasizing the fact
that this battle was conducted with an American Army Commander and heterogeneous British troops; that the attack was not vigorously pushed. However,
General Gruenther did bring out that as long es we are fighting with British
divisions, the replacement problem will hamper operatfons inasmuch as the
British fear sui'fering too many casualties and are unwilling to attack in
force. He also pointed out that many Br1tish troops have been fighting for
four or five years and are in soJ'le cases pretty tired.
Mr. Murphy said tlwt he would stay with General Wilson's Headqm:irters
and that when they moved here he would move with them.
After supper Mr. Murphy, accompanied by Lt. Col. Draper, went up to the
French Expeditionary Corps CP to pay his respects to General Juin. Mr. Murphy
got quite a kick out of passing the "light line" and knowing thRt he was
within five or six kiloMeters of the enemy. He had a delightful talk with
General Juin, at l'kiich time they discussed General Giraud's position with the
Liberation Committee. Neither one seemed to know more than what the radio had)
announced.
~
Mr. Murphy returned back to the Fifth Army Forward CP am. left for Naples
f
at about 11 o'clock.
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SAN MARCO--APRIL 13, 1944--General Gruenther flew to the beachhead in General
&lville's C-78 and spent the day conferring with General Truscott and visiting
units. The 3rd Division had relieved the 45th Division in the line, and things
were generally quiet except for daily shelling. General Gruenther discussed at
some length the whereabouts of the 28th Centimeter Gun the.t hl'ld been regularly
adjusting in the vicinity of the Fifth Army Command Post at Anzfo. He brought
out the strong possibility that this gun was located near the Pope's Palace at
Castel Gandolfo. As yet no definite location had been arrived at, and the Air
Corps was trying to knock it out.
Colonel Ladue, Chief of Staff of General Crjttenberger's IT Corps, had
lunch with General Keiser.
d-
beachhead at about 1600.
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SAN Mf\RCO--APRIL 14, 1944--Administrative natters were carried out by General Gruenther. He had General Keyes and Colonel Nygaard for lunch.
At 16oo General Juin, accompanied by his Chief of Staff, General Carpentier, came to d1 scuss future planning with General Gruenther. General
Juin left at 1715 for his Headquarters at Sessa.
General Keiser is !Ping to present the Fifth Army plaque to the Allied
Railway Military Service at a ceremony given in General Gray's honor at
Naples tonight. It harpens to be General Gray's birthday.
General Gruenther this evening attended a G-3 i::arty in Naples, leaving
the comma.nd post at 1900.
*
*
*
SAN M\RCO--APRIL 15, 1944--Activity for the last ten days at the front has
been confined mainly to ·patrol action and artillery duels. However, in
some cases the German artillery has increased in intensity, and his patrol
probing action indicates that he is getting very curious about activities
on our side.
General Gruenther received General Tate, Army G-4, for about 20 minutes.
There were a number of v:isiting ~iremen in the Fifth Army command post:
General Brittenham, Artillery Officer of Seventh Army; Generals Warrock and
Vanderveer, Assistant Division Commander and Artillery Commander respectively
of 5th Division; Colonel Franson and Lt. Col. Dickens, Chief of Staff and G-3
of the 5th Division. Colonel Black, Tank Destroyer Officer, also called.
Generals ~artin and Blesse, Fifth Army and AFHQ Surgeons respectively, con•
ferred with General Gruenther, as well as Colonel Ryan, Fifth Army Chaplain,
and Captain Moore, new Catholic chaplain for the for ward echelon.
General Gruenther and Lt. Col. Draper went to Mondragone at 1700 to make
a personal inspection of the villa project now under way there. The villa
project has possibilities of getting involved in a Fifth Army recreation and
rest center. The beach there, known as Alido, is one of the best beaches
along the coast, and G-1 has already recommended that parts of the beach in the
vicinity be used for officers and nurses for mixed bathing facilities, as well
as a beach for enlisted Fifth Army personnel. This would require zoning off
areas along the beach, and as yet no definite decision has been made. General
Gruenther has as his supper guests General Brann, General Bowman and Colonel
Howard. Colonel Howard conferred for about twenty minutes with General Gruenther before dinner, br:inging him up to date on the latest G-2 inform~tion
available.
*
*
*
SAN :WARCO--APRIL 16, 1944--A week ago · today General Clark took off for Washington. This past week routine activity at the forward echelon was carried on.
General Keyes, the Deputy Commander, has remained at II Corps Headquarters, and
General Gruenther, Army Chief of Staff, has carried on for the Army Commander.
General Gruenther oonferred with the following people:
Colonel Berry, War
�..
Department G-1; General Wilson, Commanding General of PBS; General Patch,
Seventh Army Commander. With General Patch were Colonel White, his Chief
of Staff, and Colonel Daly. Colonel Daly is a classmDte of Genera.l Clark.
After supper General Patch and several of the Fifth Army Section Chiefs
witnessed the movie "Meet The People", starring Dick Powell and Lucille Ball.
Follow~ng are extracts from the Fifth Army Camouflage Plan issued yesterday:
The object of this plan is to ensure complete surprise for the main
Fifth Army attack. If complete surprise is Achieved, the German units on the
Garigliano front on D day will almost certainly be overwhelmed by the weight
and surprise of our assault. If surprise is lost the 17 German Bns at present on the main Fifth Anny front between the Liri River and the sea will be
considerably reinforced between now and D day and our attack may consequently
lose its momentum and eventually bog do,m without achieving decisive results.
Surprise will undoubtedly be the most powerful weapon in the hands of the assaulting units of Fifth Army.
Centralised planning and control are necessary. Responsibility for the
execution of this plan will rest with II Corps Pnd the FEC, and, in the case
of Army troops not attached to Corps, with the heads of sections concerned at
Hq. Fifth Army. If one unit fails and thereby alerts the enemy of the impending blow, the harm done cannot be localized. Corps and Divisions will organize
from this date forward to D day small "camouflage patrols", which should contain one or more trained camouflage officers. Eng:i neer Officer, Fifth Army,
is taking action to provide the nece ssary camouflage personnel for this purpose.
Normal activity between now and D day must be evident on our front.
Nothing must be seen or heard which might lead the enemy to believe that we
have anything other than defensive intentions. An impression of "normal f!.ctivity11 will not be given if:
~•
There is a sudden increase in the mlume of artillery fire.
]2.
Infantry patrols become more (or less) active than they have been up
to now.
£•
There is an increasing volume of radio activity.
g. The number of supply, engineer etc, dumps obviously increases in the
forward area.
~• Gun positions, dumps, infantry positions, etc., already obvious to
the enemy, Are suddenly camouflaged: i.e. do .Nm: try to cover up or improve
camouflage of existing installations.
Normal relief of units in the front lines will oontinue. No offensive activity on the Fifth Army front, other than normal patrolling and shootjng, will
take place. This precludes any preliminary attacks being made without the
prior approval of the A
rmy Commander. As many units as possible will remain
�in their present training areas until the last possible moment. Normal
radio activity must be maintained while these units are in their present
training areas until they displace forward, at vhich time strict radio
silence must be maintained.
Corps will submit their plans for forward concentration of units at
present training in rear areas to Hq. Fifth Army. These plans should show
proposed dates and areas of forward moves.
plan.
The above extracts are hi~J.ights on this very detailed camouflage
Details are omitted.
*
*
*
SA1'l' MA.RCO--APRIL 17, 1944--The coming and going of visiting offj_cers at the
command post oontinued. After oonsulting with General Tate, General Gruenther, accompanied by General Brann, went to the Eighth Army command post in
the vicinity of Venafro for a conference.
General Keiser took General Devers to the G-4 Section before lunch and
after lunch ,vent to Artillery, G-2, G-3 and the Engineer Sections. General
Devers spent the entire day in these various sections to e.cquaint himself
with their daily duties.
At 1815 General Gruenther had as his supper guests Generals Devers,
Patch, Crittenberger, Keyes, Lewis, Brann, Saville, Keiser and Colonel White ,
Chief of Staff to General Patch. They had before-dinner cocktails in the conference hut. Small groups of officers chatted together before they went up
to supper. They retUl".ll'Jled to the hut after supper and had liquers, oontinuing
in piecemeal talks the conversations of the evening. They left the hut at
2100. Generals Patch and Devers are staying in the C-in-C camp area near the
PRO Section.
*
*
*
SAN r1YI.RCO--APRIL 18, 1944--General Devers continued his visits to sections in
the forward echelon. He stayed with Colonel Niblo, the Ordnance Officer, for
about 30 minutes. He discussed mainly vehicular maintenance and ammunition
stocks and studied recent rr.raphs of ammunition levels just oompleted by the
Ordnance Section. When he finished with the Ordnance Section, he went over to
see General Moran, Signal Officer, and spent about an hour looking over the
entire Signal Section, including its forward echelon radio monitoring section,
radio station, encoding and <lecoding sections, transmitter locations and switchboard. General Devers then returned to General Gruenther's office and after a
thirty-minute conference left for the rear echelon where he talked with Generals
Martin and Sullivan. He then proceeded to II Corps where he had luncheon with
General Keyes.
In the afternoon General Gruenther saw General V/olfe of the Invasion Training Center and Lt. Col. Hare of the Air Support Control. Colonel Hare is leaving for a new assignment as yet undetermined.
�General Gruenther had as dinn8r guests Brigadier Stayner and Lt. Col.
Hare, two British officers very well liked and thought of by1his Headquarters.
*
*
*
SAN MARCO--APRIL 19, 1944--Word has been received that General Clark will
proceed back from the States on or about Friday, April 21st. The routine
and daily business has been quickened a bit by the Tentative Field Order
for the next offensive operation. All sections have been busily occupied
in working out the details and also preparing annexes to the Field Order.
General Vanderveer, Artillery Officer of the 5th Division, is dovm
from F.ngland and called on General Gruenther. General Keyes of II Corps al so
came to the command post where he discussed with General Gruenther forthcoming operations and in particular the fact that he didn't want to lose the
77th Artillery Group to the beachhead. General Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of
Staff of AAI, came up to talk with General Grnenther. He arrived in time to
see the Chief of Staff taking his exercise on the volleyball court.
General Lemnitzer took General Gruenther 1 s place and continued the stellar
playing of the general officers.
General Chevillon of the 3rd DIA, who has just been promoted to a general officer's rank, called on General Gruenther and vras invited to supper.
General Sullivan also had supper with the Chief of Staff, in addition to the
regular members of the Army Commander's mess.
*
*
*
SAN t~RCO--APRIL 20, 1944--General Gruenther received in his office this
morning the following officers: Brigadier Stayner, who is soon to les.ve Headquarters Fifth Army; General Tlartin, Fifth Army Surgeon; General Brann, P.:rmy
G-3; and General Tate, Army G-4.
1
In the afternoon the Chief of Staff went to II Corps to confer with General Keyes. Later in the afternoon he received General Beucler of the French
Mission.
During the afternoon General Clark's new trailer arrived and, with the
assistance of the Ordnance, Engineers and the Utilities Plrrtoon the trailer
was installed and made ready for occupancy.
General Gruenther had as his dinner guests this evening Generals Elliott,
AFHQ Engineer, and General Bowman, Fifth Army Engineer. After supper he went
immediately to Santa Maria for the premiere showing to Fifth Army personnel of
Irving Berlin's nThis Is The Army". Mr. Berlin, the well-lmown composer and
singer who heads the show, came up to General Gruenther's box before the show
and greeted the Army Chief of Staff. News photographers took several pictures
before the curtain went up.
The show was warmly received by the audience, which was composed mostly
of combat troops which had just been relieved from front line duty, a great
many being 36th Division troops now in the rest area. After the show General
�Gruenther went backstage, cut a piece of the welcome cake and expressed appreciation for the fine performance. He explained that General Clark's absence
from Army Headqwtrters prevented his presence at the opening of the show but
added that he was certain the Army Commander would attend a subsequent performance upon his return.
*
*
*
SAN MARCO-QAPRIL 21, 1944--Generals Gruenther, Brann and Carpentier, Chief of
Staff to General Juin, conferred for about an hour this morning concerning the
French plan for the next big attack. The French were submittjng important
changes to their preliminary tentative plan. General Gruenther had Colonel
Scobi, Special Services Officer from AFHQ, for lunch. The main subject of
discussion was the availability of a radio station for the beachhead. Colonel
Scobi said that he would arrange to have one sent up and thAt it probably
could be there j_n about ten days. The question of the power of the station
came up,. and General Gruenther was to check to see that a station of 250 to
500 kilo,mtts could function under the existing power system up there.
General Gruenther saw General Cannon, CommPnding General of the Tactical
Air Force, as well as Colonel Harding of AFHQ and Colonel Pulliam, OPD War
Department.
GAneral Gruenther had as his dinner guest General Bradshaw, Antiaircraft
Officer of Fifth Army. General Bradsh11w djd an excellent job as Antiaircraft
Officer of VI Corps at the beachhead. He told of his organization at the
beachhead and of the difficulties antiaircraft encountered there. The German
considerably outnumbered our forces in the air when he came over in force and
so it fell to the antiaircraft to make it as costly as possible to the Luftwaffe. They tried all sorts of tricks, such ti.s using one plane as a decoy
with special type of transmitters to lead us to believe that a flight with as
many as 15 planes were approaching on one direction, and the actual attacking
force would come in from another direction. The German was not successful at
pulling this ruse at any time 100%. At the beginning they did confuse the
plotting room temporarily, but they soon caught on to the German tactics.
The antiaircraft at the beachhead has downed over 120 planes. It is rather
difficult to give a particular battery credit for a plane because so many
claim the same knockdown. General Bradshaw had a system whereby he djstributed them equitably among his batteries. He also explained how he thought
the radar might be used in locating the 28 Centimeter Gun. He proposed having
Beaufighters in the air at night. As soon as the big gun flashed, these
planes would fly straight for the area, the radar would pick up the line plots
of this flash, should intersect and with additional intelligence this gun
should definitely be located and taken care of.
*
*
*
SAN MA.RCO--APRIL 22, 19Li4--General Clark's van was completed nnd ready for occupancy by him upon his return from the StRtes tomorrow. General Gruenther
conferred with General Saville, of the XII Air Support CoMmand, in the morning
prior to leaving for Fompei where he attended a ceremony sponsored by the 3rd
Algerian Division, at which ceremony several units of the division were decorated for their excellent work on the Fifth Army front during February and
�March. The ceremony was very colorful and was attended by Generals Gruenther and Brann who represented the Fifth Army at the ceremony.
This evening General Gruenther attended a dinner given by General Devers
at the Palace in Caserta. General officers of the Eighth Army and Fifth Army
were present as also was General Alexander, CINC, AAI.
*
*
*
SAN MARCO--AFRIL 23, 1944--General Clark arrived at Fornigliano field at 1845.
The total elapsed time since he left Washington was 43 hours and 25 mjnutes.
Accompanying General Clark were Brigadier General Foster Tate, who will replace General Mclain as Artillery Officer of the 45th Division, Colonel Saltzman, Lt. Col. Smith, General Tate's aide and Sergeant Chaney.
General Clark rode back to the command post with General Gruenther and
did not utilize his cub plane which was waiting to take him back. He and
General Gruenther took this opportunity to talk of the many things which
General Clark had to say. General Clark christened his new van by opening a
bottle of Scotch and Bourbon and invited several of his staff officers in for
a drink. Genere.l Clark unpacked, read some letters, important dispatches and
retired early in the evening.
*
*
*
SAN MARCO--APRIL 24, 1944--General Clark spent the entire day in his new van
going over dispatches, conferring with his various general p,nd special staff
officers and receiving visiting officers. Col. Howard, the Army G-2, started
the morning off by spending an hour with the General in his van. He was followed by General Moran, Army Signal Officer. General Brann and General
Gruenther then spent the remainder of the morning vri th General Clark.
At noon Admiral Rogers, USN, and Captain Simpson, USN, came to pay the1r
respects to the Army Commander. The latter had just returned from the IndiaBurma theater. They had recently been in contact with Lord Louis Mountbatten's
staff.
In the afternoon General Bissell of the W Department G-2 paid his rear
spects to General Clark. He was follovrnd by General Saville, XII J, ir Support
Cor1mander. In the latter re,rt of the afternoon Lt. Brown came to see General
Clark. General Clark ~ished to deliver to him a few rersonal messages from
his mother, rrs. George C. Marshall. Col. Nygaard and Colonel Bruce conferred
with the General during the latter part of the afternoon.
At 1800 ~T. Bob Jl(urphy, an old anrl intimate friend of General Chrk from
his 'North African days, came for supper. Mr·. Murphy was accompanied by Mr.
()ffay l'lnd spent the night at the command post under field conditions.
*
SAN MARCO--APRIL 25, 1944--After lest night's diary had been written Kraut
planes appeared over the Naples area, Capodichino and Aversa. The night fire-
�-
'
works were brilliant and evoked amazement and r'dmiration from Mr. Murphy.
The German effort was apparently not effective. On their return home some
German planes passed over the Army command post and were met with intermittent ackack in our vicinity.
This morning Mr. rmrphy awakened eRrly, had breal<-i'ast and left. General
Clark worked on dispatches until General Juin came to see him prior to General W
ilson's visit.
General Clark discussed with General Juin primarily details concerning
the proposed French Corps Headquarters'coming to this theater with General
DeLarminat in col"1l11and. General Clark wanted to know first what General Juin 1 s
reaction was to a spare French Headquarters. General Juin stated that General DeGaulle was very anxious for it to come and, as far as he, General Juin,
was concerned, under the conditions stated, he recomr1ended th11t it be accepted.
The Corps Headquarters was to be under his command and to be used for tactical
purposes only. His proposed use of this Corps Headquarters was to coordinate
action of two divisions on his right. He emphasized that General DeLarminat
was to be under his command and not to be used as an additional separate corps.
General Clark told General Juin thnt he wanted to speak to General W
ilson
first and see General DeLa.rminat before he expressed his desire to have it
included in the Fifth Army.
The second point of discussion ~as the over-all French plan for the forthcoming big sea.le operation. General Juin pointed out on his map briefly his
proposed plan of action. This discussion brought out two points (1) That
General ClPrk did not want General Juin to enter into any agreements or understandings with the British that they would delay agrsressive offensive action
until French Corps had seized dominating terrain adjacent to the Eighth Army's
left. General Clark enphasized that under no conditions did he want the British to feel that Fifth Army had to achieve certain objectives prior to their
advance; that he had had previous experience with this particular type of
understanding. (2) That the 88th Division attack to seize Damiano must be
coorcljnated simultaneously with the French attack on its ri.ght. General Clark
stated that this would be definj_
tely settled by staff conferences immediately.
Shortly af'ter General Juin left, General Clark went down to the conference
hut where he discussed the Fifth Army's plan for attack with Generals Brann and
Gruenther. General Wilson, Cor.unanding General of AFHQ, arrived, accompanied by
Generals Devers and Rooks, the latter having just turned over his duties as G-3
of NATC1USA to General Noce. General Clerk then personally outlined to General
Wilson the Fifth Army's plan for its next offensive action. The conference hut
was well decorated with maps to facilitate this explanation. Gern=~rals Clark,
Gruenther, Brann, Wilson, Devers and Rooks then had lunch together. After
lunch General Devers returned to Casert~:i and GenerRls W
ilson and Rooks proceeded to visit French Corps and II Corps.
At 1645 General Clark took off in a cub plane to fly to Caserta. where he
went into conference with General Alexander. He returned at 1g15 and invited
General Gruenther and Colonel Saltzman to his VHn. Colonel Saltzman will replace Genern.l Keiser in the General's Mess.
After dinner General Cl.Ark visited General Brann 1 s van and took a short
walk before retiring.
�'
~
SAN MARCO--APRIL 26, 1944--A heavy spring rain which began at 0400 ma.de a
quagmire of the Fifth Army front. General Clark worked with military dis- (
patches, conferred with Generals Brann and Gruenther and was visited by
Colonel Howard, his G-2. At 1030 he went by jeep to Mondragone where he inspected a project already begun for an officers' beach and rest area. He
inspected a villa which has been very modestly set up for him in the vicinity of the beach. From there he proceeded to the II Corps beach at Bagni
Minerale which is used for enlisted personnel only of the II Corps. From
there he went to the II Corps command post at Piedmonte where he went into
immediate conference with General Keyes, II Corps Commander; General Sloan,
88th Division Commander; General Coulter, 85th Division Cornnander, and General Walker, 36th Division Commander. After the conference General Keyes had
a luncheon for General Clark and his Divisional Commanders. After luncheon
General Clark went to General Coulter I s command post vrhere he inspected installations and met General Coulter 1 s staff. He returned back to the Fifth
Army command post and worked on administrHtive matters.
During the day's journey through the Fifth Arrrry area, he was greatly
impressed by the improvements accomplished on road maintenance, signs and
general discipline nnd appearance of troops and bivouac areas. General
Clark had supper and conferred with General Gruenther and Colonel Saltzman.
*
*
*
SAN r~RCO--APRIL 27, 1944--Despite overcase and threatening \'leather the
ceremony for the presentation of theater ribbons with battle stars to selected WACS and the Fifth Army Plaque and Clasp to the WAC platoon serving with
Headquarters Fifth Army was accomplished. The ceremony went extremely ,,ell
and was very colorful. General Clark gave an excellent speech which is
quoted below:
"Lieutenants Foster and Butler, Members of the Fifth Army Women I s Army
Corps:
"I am delighted to have the opportunity this morning to greet you again
to tell you and the world how rroud we are of the splendid work you have performed during these last eight months under campaign conditions; how delighted I am to be able to award the campaign service ribbon with star to
certain of your members and to be able to give to your platoon as a whole the
Fifth Army Plaque and Clasp for outstanding meritorious service.
"I well recall, and most of you do too, our last meeting nine months
ago in North Africa when you had just arrived from the United StRtes. At
that time I forecast brilliant service on your part. I well remember, during
the hectic days before our Salerno landing, how excited some of you were because you knew that important preparations were in progress but did not know
whether you were to participate or not. Many of you worried that the Fifth
Army was running off and leaving you, but you now 1mow how impossible that
was, for we needed you too badly•. So when the Fifth Army captured Naples,
sent for you to resume the splendid work you had started.
we
"I am pleased now, after these nine months, to be :=tble to tell you how
you have lived up to our hopes, expectations and standards. You have fulfilled
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"Now for a glimpse of your record to date. You have released an equal
number of men for more arduous duty. You have brought a bit of American
womanhood into our midst which has helped us tremendously. You know that
the protection and sanctification of our American women is one of the things
which ,,e of the Fifth Army are fighting so hrird to preserve. Your presence
made us spruce up. We were more careful of our appearance and of our language, and for my part, when I pick up the telephone now and hear one of your
courteous voices I am much less impatient than before. Two officers and fiftyseven of your group came to us nine months ago. The same two offict1rs and
fifty-five of that original group are still with us. W have not had a single
e
disciplinary case. Your appearance and conduct have been exemplary, and your
contacts have always been courteous and considerate.
"Your families and friends at home have every ri p:ht to be proud of your
accomplishments overseas. I hope many more young American women will follow
your fine pioneering example and join your organization and come to the Fifth
Army, for we can use two or three hundred more throughout our Army organization. W have appropriate jobs for them, and they will relieve a corresponde
ing number of able-bodied men for other combat duties and at the same time
materially assist in our manpower problems back home.
"Again, I want to tell you how pleasP-d I am to be with you this morning
to note your fine appearance, to make this award to you and to congratulate
you on the splendid work you have done and will do in the future. I am sure
you will keep up your splendid record."
Among the witnesses to the ceremony were selected F:nglish women of the
ATS and French WACS. About 200 people witnessed the ceremony, and it was drawn
up with the idea in mind of helping out with W recruiting in the United
AC
States. During his visit to Washington, General Clark found that the manpower
problem was becoming critical, and he felt that this ceremony here would help
in attracting women volunteers to this meritorfous organization. General Truscott, who was down from the beachhead, accompanied General Clark w
hen he inspected the W platoon. After the ceremony Generals Clark, Truscott, GruenAC
ther and Brann went into immediate conference in the hut.
General Clark discussed with General Truscott the enemy situation at the
beachhead and General Truscott 1 s plan for his attack during the next operation.
General Truscott stayed for lunch and left for Naples w
here he will rest for
five days.
At 1430 Generals Clark, Brann and Gruenther rode up to French Corps in
General Clark's jeep. At French Corps he was received by a guard of honor
which he inspected and went immediately to Gener,iJ. Juin's office. At this conference were Generals Juin, his Chief of Staf'f General Carpentier, General
Keyes, II Corps Commander, his Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel Porter, Generals
Clark, Gruenther and Brann. During the conference General Clark coordinated
the II Corps attack and seizure of Damiano with French action on its right.
Dtlmiano TTill be taken on the first day. The boundary between French Corps and
I+ Corps was definitely settled. As the conference drew to an end, General
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�Clark made the statement that it was one of the most pleasant and shortest)
conferences that he had ever attended in that nobody argued with anybody
else and everybody seemed to be in complete ~greement with everything discussed. General DeLarminat was introduced to General Clark. He commands
the 1st French Infantry Division - a crack outfit that will see action on
the Fifth Army front. It jncludes a brigade of the Foreign Legion. After
the conference the entire group proceeded to General Juin's OP on top of
the castle where an excellent view of tbe entire Garigliano front can be
seen.
From French Corps General Clark went to the 88th Division where he conferred with General Sloan and ma.de a detailed inspection of his staff sections at his new command post. General Clark was very much il"lJ)ressed with
the neatness, protection and camouflage discipline at the command post. He
congratulated General Sloan for this very fine command rost installation.
From the 88th Division General Clark went to the rear echelon where he
met General Sullivan, the Army f'),unrtermaster. He went through the QM, Surgeon, G-1, Officers' Bar, Officers' riless, Colonels' Mess and Chaplain's
Sections. From there he returned to the forward echelon and had as dinner
guests Generals Bo1·'!llan, Sullivan and Colonel Howard. After supper he worked
on dispatches and signed some decorations that will be presented tomorrow
when he visits the 36th Division.
*
*
*
SAN r~RCO--APRIL 28, 1944--General Clark took off by cub plane, ~ccompanied
by Lt. Col. Draper, for the 36th Division. They landed at Fomigliano field
and were met by General Walker, Division Commander. They proceeded by car to
the Division area in the vicinity of Ferina. The first stop was at a ceremonial field where the Army Commander gave decorations to members of the J6th
Division. He pinned on four DSC I s and nine Air Medals. The ceremony, while
simple, was very impressive. General Cla.rk gavA a very stirring speech to
those who had accomplished deeds of bravery on the battlefield.
After the decoration ceremony he visited the 141st Infantry Regiment,
cormnanded by Colonel Fannony. All three battalions of t:re 141st Infantry were
out on either plRtoon, company or battalion exercises. General Clrirk v1ent
through the area a.nd visited several kitchens. He then went to the 143rd Infantry where he inspected the area and found all battalions engaged in a showdown inspection. As General Clark walked through the e.rea, he questioned many
of the enlisted men as to how long they had been in the Division and what combat experience they had. He was keenly interested in finding out how the replacements were being fitted in and comparing their statements with those of
veterans. After the 143rd Infantry, he went to the medical battalion of the
Division. He then went to a luncheon which was attended by Division staff officers. After luncheon he went to the 142nd Infantry and visited the various
battalions which were also having a showdown inspection of clothing and equipment. He stopped by briefly at the reconnaissance troop. }~ om the reconnaissance troop he proceeded to the Division Artillery. He and Colonel Draper
then took off by Division Artillery cub plane and landed at Fomigliano, where
he transferred to his own cubs and went directly to the Eighth Army TAC CP.
He conferred vTith General Leese, Eighth Army Commander, for about an hour and
returned b;1r cub to the Fifth Anny Advap.ce GP •
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He had as dinner guests General Tate, his G-4, and one of our many American
Cross voltmteers. After supper General Clark walked down through his command
post to confer with Generals Brann and Lewis and returned to the Chief of Staff's
office before retirjng for the night.
Red
The following letter was received today from AFHQ regarding security of information:
"1. Inf'orma tion of a secret or confidential nature will only be given to
\
the French if it is necessary for them to have it in order to carry out planning )
and operations. It is the responsibility of the originating headquarters to determine whether or not information or documents are to be transmitted to the
French, considering each case on its own merits. If there is any doubt as to
whether the information should be transmitted or not, this headquarters should
be consulted.
11 2.
In all cases where documents are given to the French, the orieinating
headquarters transmitting such documents will be responsible for the careful
scrutiny of the material contained in them, a.nd for assuring that no more infor•
mation of a secret or confidential nature than is necessary is transmitted. The
greatest possible care will be taken in the case of Top Secret material.
11 3.
No particulars whatsoever , having l'!ny bearinr; on projected operations
from the United Kingdom, will be conveyed to the French.
11 4.
All documents given to the French will carry the following WP.rning
clearly printed or stamped on them:
'No information contained in this document is to be divulged to any
person except in the oourse of duty. No reproduction, either whole or in
part, will be made without permission from the chief of t h e * - - - - - Section, ~ - - - - - - - -•'
11 5.
The foregoing ~nstructions hRVe equal a.pplication to informRtion given
or transmitted to personnel or hea.dquerters of other nations. 11
*Insert designation of originating section.
~Designation of headquarters."
General Clark today received the following letter from General Juin regarding the use of the 194th Artillery Group:
"During our conversation of 27 April you were kind enough to assure me that
thP fire of the 194th Artillery GroupMent would be placed exclusively at the disposition of the CEF for the beginning of the next operation.
"On the morning of the 28th, General CHAILLET, Cormanding the C.E.F. Artillery, broached this subject to General I.EWIS. The methods of employment of the
194th Artillery Groupment could not be settled during this conference since
General LEWIS had not as yet received from you the necessary directives.
For the action planned, it is indispensable for me to have a.vailable a powerful reinforcement of heavy artillery fire. In fact, the terrain will make the
forward displacement of Division .Artillery very difficult, and it is essential
�to the success of the first phase of the operation that the CEF benefit from
the support of powerful and long range Artillery fires.
"Since the developnent of the plan for Artillery employment should be behonor to request that you be so kind as to give
all necess~ry instructions concerning the 194th Groupment to the proper authorities."
gun immediately, I have the
*
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SAN MARCO--APRIL 29, 1941~--This day from the outset had promise of being a
very busy one. General Clark worked on military dispatches and plans for future operations. At 1000 he received General Juin and also met GenerRl Brosset who comma.nds the 1st French Division now training in rear areas in Italy.
At 1030 he went down to an open field where a very picturesque decoration
ceremony took place. General Alexander, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in
Italy, arrived for the ceremony to decorate Generals Clark, Gruenther, Truscott, Harmon, Hartin and four other officers of krmy Headquarters. General
Clark met General Alexander at the entrance to the field. As they approached
the decorees and honor guard troops, "To the General" and "Ruffles" smmded.
Facing Generals Alexander and Clark were one company of French ~foroccan troops,
one company of MP 1 s, color guards with the three Allied flags (French, British
and American) and the decorees. Generr-ils Alexander and Clark reviewed the
troops, and General Alexander then rroceeded to p±n on General Clark's chest
the ribbon designating him a Knight of the British Empire. After thr-it he decorated Generals Gruenther, Truscott and Harmon as Companions of the BBth, and
four other officers, General T•-!artin, Colonel Saltzman, Col. Smith Rnd Major
Connor, received the Order of the British Empire . Following this presentation,
General Clark then decorated five French officers and soldiers, one of whom
received the Distinguished Service Cross and the remaining Silver Stars, one
British officer with a Soldier's Medal, four Legion of Merits, of which one was
General Bradshaw, Fifth Army Antiaircraft Officer, one Silver Star and three
Air Medals.
After the ceremoriy General Clark went irnmediately to his van where he conferred with Generals 'l'ruscott and Harmon concern:i.ng future operations at the
beachhead. After that he received General Beucler of the French Mission and
General 0 1Daniel, Commander of the 3rd Division. Genernl 0 1 DPniel stayed for
lunch. After lunch General Clerk went out to inspect ordnance units, accomp1mied
by Colonel Niblo, Fifth Army Ordnance Officer, and Colonel Artamanoff. The
itinerary included a visit to the followin>1, units: 109th Ordnance CornpPny, ?630th
Ordnance Group, 188-th Ordnance Battalion, 94th Ordnance Company, 3485th Ordnance
Compa,ny, 86th Ordnance Company, 93rd Ordrumce Company, 477th Ordrnmce Company,
29th Ordnance Company, 42nd Ordnance Battalion and 3488th Ordnance Company. All
of these ordnance compr-inies except the ?9th Ordnance Company support Corps and
Army troops. The ?9th supports the 88th Division.
As they visited these various ordnance units, most of them were busily engaged in rna.intenance and repairs. Two of these outfits, the 901st and 94th,
were celebrating overseas anniversaries. The others could be seen working on
various types of field artillery rnajntem:mce such Hs, packing of equiliberators
for our big guns. 'T'he Ordnance has quite e problem in thllt they need repacking
every two weeks and just recently they have been bringing the equiliberators
�back to the ordnance repair areas rather the.n doing j t ,=it the gun position,
believing that this will be more satisfactory. When a tube requires ch~nging the whole gun is brought back nnd a re:rleceT'lent is sent up so thr-it at
no time is a battery minus one of its guns or howitzers. At the 3485th
Company mechanics were busily engaged in repairing motors and tanks. At this
company the General witnessed an experiment in the mounting of one of the infantry 105 howitzers in a dukw. This improvisation is being done to rrovide
some means for giving effective fire support in assr-iulting beeches. GenerPl
Clark was very interested in this project and said that he always thought
that it we.s feasible and that he thought it WPS a tremendous advantage for
troops assaulting a beach.
At the 93rd Ordnance Company, wM ch supports Army antiaircraft troops, the
General went through the small arms section where 50 caliber mA.chine guns were
being worked on. The GenerPl asked whPt seemed to be the greatest dH..,i culty
and was told that extractors caused the Most trouble. He then went over to
where the men were preparing dj~ectors for qo mm guns, and he stopped for some
period of time to look over the multiple 50 caliber machine gun mount, the M51.
The M51 has a ,lower silhouette than the former one anr appears to be a good
weapon. It packs four 50 calibers.
At the 477th Ordnance Company he saw sorne of the big t~nk retriever trucks.
This is a truck tractor rrime mover wjth a huge silhouette. The carriage mounts
1/2 inch armor plate. The tank retrievers can go up in forward a.ref's and bring
out damaged tanks. At the ?9th Ordnance Company, which suprorts the 88th Division, General Clark remarked on hoi:r little activity seemed to be taking place
there. He was told thAt the ordnance company of the 88th Divfaion is a very
good company and, in addition, they had practically finished up with third
echelon maintenance for that division.
'---
I
The entire trip entailed much walking. Colonel Cabelle, Orommce Officer
of T'lBS accompanied General Clark, until he WPS too tired to carry on. After
I
the ordnance inspection General Clark returned home, worked on d7srt1tches and
prepared to attend the Army show, "This Is The Arny" which was gjven in the
Allied Military Theater at Santa MCJ.ria. There he met Hr. Berlin, who came up
to his box just rrior to the start of the s},ow. General Clark enjoyed the show
very much and t1fterwards went backstage to congratulate the cast. He returned __I
home at 10 o'clock and retired.
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SAN MARCO--AFRIL 30, 1944--General Clark had H meeting in the hut at 0930 to discuss preparations for the Army Commanders I meeting at AAI Headquarters on tomorrow, Nay 1. Present vrere Generals Gruenther, Brann, Lt. Col. Hansborough,
✓ Colonel Howard, Colonel Saltzman, Colon~l Paxson and Lt. Col. Draper. At this
conference the first discussion centered on the air plan for the attack. General Clark wanted to make certain that on D day large headquarters of the Boche
such as Arny and Corps would receive cnreful attention by the Air Coryis. Also ,
General Clark emphasized that he succeeded on having the air effort on a 50-50
basis and not 70-30 in favor of the highth Army, as previously planned. This
caused considerable controversy and bickering. General Clark jnsisted that the
air effort be divided between the two arrdes.
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Colonel Hansborough pointed out that the air pll}.n was divided :i.nto four
phases . In the f'irst phase the first priority would be tsolation of the battlefield by sustained attacks at the road center at Itri-Pontecorvo-~spcria
road and to deny the use of the San Giovanni - Pico road . The second priority
is counter battery targets as requested by corps , priority being given to FEC .
The third prjority is close support targets as. requested 11y corps with the
priority going to FEC . The second phase gives first priorjty to the continuation of isolation of the bAttlefield . Second rriority will be close support
targets in the vicinity of La Civita , Spigno and Ausonia , witb the rriority
going to FEC . The second phase gives first priority to tre continuation of
isolation of the battl~field . Second y,r:i ori ty will be close support tArgets
in the vicinity of La Civit a , Spigno and Ausonja , with the rriority going to
II Corps . The third priority goes to counter battery targets . In the third
phase the first priority will be a continuation of isolAtion of the bA.ttlefield . Second nr:i ority will be counter battery targets, :md third rriority
will be close support targets . A parachute drop night be undertPken during
tris phase. This would take prfority over all other tasks . In the fourth
phase the first priority will be continuation of isolation of the battlefield .
Second priority will be counter battr:iry targets , Pnd the third rrfority will
be close support targets . General ClPrk brought out thPt we will not nsk the
air to do what the artillery can do . Targets within our rPnge will not be Pttacked by the air except rossibly soMe counter battery missions . Col. Hans- /
borough briefly discussed the counter battery missions thnt the Air Corps
would accomplish , cb1efly concentrating on larger caliber guns out of our artillery range .
I
The artillAry plan was discussed next. General Lewis stated th1=1t until
he received the divisions ' fire plan and the boundary limits were settled he
could not rresent his complete Prtillery plan . He showed General ClPrk fire
possibilities for various cal i bers of the artillery with the Army. This f1re
possibility chart was genernl in scope , showing the sectors of fire of 155
guns , 8" howitzers, 240mm howitzers , 155 and 105 hovrit zers . The artillery officer stated there would be no rreparation prior to H hour and that our fire
plrm cai bs for Artillery fire to start as soon as our infantry cross their
line of r'eparture at H hour . General I ewis then brought up the contrbversy
concerning the 194th Artillery Group which occupies rositions in the Ejghth
Army's zone of action . This group has two 155 gun battalions, the 633rd and
985th , one 21..0 battalion, the 698th less one battery, and one 8 11 howitzer battalion , the 995th . General Lewis brought out that the only support at H hour
given in Eighth Army zone of action cornrrised counter battery, whic}, is, in
rMlity, support for the Fifth Army, becAuse these hostile rieces can and do
fire in the Fifth ArMy zone of action . This counter battery is desjred by the
French also , who agree that jt is necessary for their ovm support . All F.ighth
Arrny' s calls for fire for the 194th Group are to be clMred through the ti'rench
after the injtial pre- arranged fires agreed on at H hour are fired. The ?.40mm
howitzers of this group have an Army string tied on them in that Army has
priority on their use for special missions such as bridge busting. General
Lewis bronfsht out the fact thr-t the only battalion of this grou:r th11t the British can expect is the gu battA.lion, the 985th, which has its center 15ne so
fixed that it can rMcl 1 out and tAke targets under fire on the reverse slore of
Monastery Hill nnd that vj cini ty. He empha.sized thl't all calls for fire from
Ej gbth Army will be cleared through the French. General Chaillet , Artillery
Officer for FEC , wanted one 155mm gun battalion to change its center line so
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�31
that it could reach Ausonia and answer calls for fire :in that vicinity. This
has been done. As it stands now, the 194th Group is prepRred to furnish complete support to Fifth Army requirements, specifically the French. General
Lewis stated that the Eighth Army Artillery Officer was agreeable a.nd easy to
do business with, but the artillery officer of 13 Corps was not. Much of the
difficulty arose between tre artillery of'ficer of 13 Corps not being able to
(
coorerate and coordinPte wjth the French. This was due mostly to the fact
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thrit the French did not completely understPnd our neaning of the word attachment, mean:ing th~t the 194th Group being attached to them is at their disposal and also they entertain some distrust of the British. The British,· in
turn, were trying to get all the support that they could expect from the 194th
Group and even riore. Much of the difficulty lies in misunderstanding of the
term attachment. In any case, where artillery can fire beyond the limits of
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its boundarfos, it is normal that they fire such contingent f'lissions in order
to strengthen this possible weak point, and if it were not for the fact that
discussions involved British, French and our troops, there ·,ould undoubtedly
J
be no difficulty. It would consist merely of cooreration bl'ltween adj?cent divisions, corps and armies, a.nd artillery carable of firing outside of those
boundaries would natural.ly give support outside of the boundary when asked for
if it did not interfere with primary missions in its own zone of action. One
advantage of th~ 194th Grour's present position, as brought out by General Levris, was thPt l'lS the advl'lnce continues and cHsplacement becomes necessary,
there are many excellent positions up the Liri Valley for the 194th Group from
which it can better support the continued action of the French up the mountainous terrain. General Lewis stated h!'l felt conficent thr,t after the meeting
toriorrow between General Chaillet, Artillery C'fficer of the FEC, and the 13
Corps Artillery Officer all difficulties would be solved and flny bickering as
to where the 194th Group was to fire during the attack would be eliminated.
I
General Clark then discussed w:i th General Brann and General Gruenther
specific questions and decisions to be answered and decided upon at the meeting at AAI Headquarters tomorrow; such questions as D day, H hour, further
plans as the attack progresses which would involve oommitment of reserves or
water-borne troop movements for attacks inland. General Clark studied air
photographs of numerous beaches. These were assembled and explained by Colonel
Paxson, Rngineer Executive. General Clark stated that any new beachhead established would be within supporting distance or oommitted with the certainty of
its being quickly merged in with the attacking front. He wanted no P3rt of any
repetition of an Anzio beachhead. Likely defensive lines that the Ger:rrens
could or might establish were discussed as well as general lines of action
open to the Fifth Army as the attack progressed. General Clark brought out
that at the meeting tomorrow he didn't want to be pinned down as to what his
intentions would be or how he would ciispose his farces at any specific time
or when any specific line was reached. He emphasized that any such questions
'directed to him along those lines he would answer that they all would depend
on the enemy situation and where his forces were disposed at tre time. Anything that required getting out the crystal ball to answer specific questions
of this sort would be dealt wj th in thl't manner.
Colonel Paxson was asked about opening up Highway #7 to Rome. He said
it would be merely a matter of putting up Bailey bridges w!:f re thJ permans
knocked out any along the road. He emphasized that the~ wt\i/"iand along
�both sides of the road precluded any troop movements or operations except on
the road. General Clark then examined the maps that were to be taken down
to AAI Headquarters and pointed out changes that he desired to be made. The
conference closed with Generals Clark, Brann and Gruenther conferring alone.
When General Clark returned to his van, he received Generl'11 Kingman, Chief
of the French Rearmament Committee, who was accomponied by Colonel L'Huillier.
After General Kingman left, General Cl1'1rk received seven officers sent down
from UK to observe on this front.
~
At 11+00 General Clark had two war correspondents, Graham Hovey of International News Service, and Jim Roper, of United rress, plus Colonel Clark and
Captain Reardwood into the hut to discuss a censorship matter that arose yesterday in connection with the decoration ceremony. Hovey, Roper and George
Tucker of the Af' all ,1rote terse stories on tr, e decoration ceremony because of
the fact that the names of three of the people receiving awards were not releasable: Generals Harmon, Truscott and Bradshaw. All of them attached notes
to their copy, letting their offices know thAt the brevity was caused because
of their objection to censorship restrictions. General Clark felt that he
should 1mow when such matters were disturbing the correspondents, so he had
Hovey and Roper in for a discussion of the matter. Hovey said the.t he felt
there was no reason why the names of Truscott, Harmon and Bradshaw could not
be released. He saio that he felt that the censors had been picayunish concerning many matters, and General ClPrk told the two correspondents that he
would do everything he could to help them if they would only bring their problems to him. He pointed out, however, that censorship matters were under AAI
and AFHQ, but he was willing to swing his weight when tbe cause was just.
Hovey and Roper said that they had no quarrel to pick with Fifth Army or the
PRr set-up; that they felt they had been very well treated in that respect,
but that there were man:r censorship natters that caused cnnsiderable concern.
After discussing censorship with the two oorrespondents, General Clnrk told
them that a large scale attack by Fifth Army was imminent and · that he planned
on having all the correspondents up f'or P buffet supper, probably Thursday
night, at wrich time he would give them a 1lriefing on the proposed plan.
After concluding his talk with Roper and Hovey, General Clark went to his van
with Colonel Clark and Captain Beardwood and said that it was imperative that
they keep their fingers on the press pulse so that he ·would know if anything
was disturbing the correspondents. He pointed out that in the case of the
closing of' the Anzio radio he car-ie in for a lot of criticism when he had had
nothing to do with it, and he felt that the actions of Hovey, Roper and
Tucker might also result in criticism of his handling of censorship - a matter
which is out of the Fifth ArMy bailiwick.
Later in the afternoon General Clerk saw General Bradshaw and left at
1845 for General Eaker•s Headquarters at Caserta where he had sup~r. General
Spaatz, Commander of the Air Forces in the Mediterranean Theater, was also
present. General Clark returned back to tre conmwnd post and visi tcd General
Brann, a.s well as General Gruenther, prior to retir:ing at 2245.
*
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SAN MARCO--MA.Y 1, 1944--General Clark was awakened today, his 48th birthday,
by the Fifth Army Band pla.ying a medley of songs depicting his life in music.
�33
Just as soon as the General had buzzed Chaney, the band, fbnked by most of
the officers in the forward command post, blared out with the songs. By the
time the band was playing "Over There 11 to denote the General's service overseas, the Fifth Army Commander came out of his van. Over his trousers and
underwear he was wearing a raincoat a.nd had on his· slippers. He made an extemporaneous speech to his officers and men, telling them how much he appreciated their loyalty and the fact that they would so thoughtfully remember
him on his birthday. He added that there was still much to be done in this
war, and he felt that some day before the war ended a great many of the Fifth
Army would see action in the South Pacific. He said that he knew there were
many of us who desire this. As the General came out of the van the band
played "Ruffles, Flourishes and To The General", e.nd as re storted to re-enter,
they opened up with "The Old Gray r.Tare, She Ain't What She Used To Be". General Clark grinned, knowing that this was an idea of General Gruenther's, since
the same piece was played at General Clark's 47th birthday party in Oujda last
year.
Following breakfast, General Clark conferred w:ith Maj. Gen. Hawkesworth
who is taking command of the 1st British Division. General Hawkesworth already
knows General Clark, as he had h.ad command of a division under General HcCreery
in 10 Corps. Gener2l Clark then conferred vrith General Gruenther to straighten
out last-minute detajls prior to his neparture for Caserta to attend General
Alexander's staff conference.
At 1020 Generals Clark and Gruenther left in General Clark's car for Caserta. Generals Brann and Tate had left a ljttle earlier. Following a thorough
discussion of the coming concerted drive by the Fifth and Eighth Armies, General
Clark and his staff members attended a luncheon given by General Alexander. The
Fifth ~my Commander then went to the road landing strip just north of the castle
at Caserta and took off in his L-5 for his command post.
J
After going through his papers, he flew to Mnndragone v·here he h2s a seaside villa. General Clark spent the latter part of the afternoon dovm there enjoy-lng rela:xation on his birthday. Guests at the villa were Generals Sullivan,
Brann and Lewis, Colonels Saltzman and Draper and Misses Moen and Berney of the
American Red Cross. The more hardy people, including General Clark, nent swimming in the Tyrhenian Sea, despite the fact that it was rather cold.
General Clark returned to the command post at 1800 and went to his van
where he got ready for the birthday party being given in his honor by the headquarters officers. At 1850 he went to the hut where all the guests were assembled and a huge buffet supper had been spread. The guests -included the heads
of all the sections in Fifth Army, plus other more or less close friends of the
General. Following cocktails, the General and his guests had a cold buffet and
vrere entertained by members of a USO troupe who had also been guests at the buffet. General Clark retired to his van at about 2230.
General C:!.;o.rk received the following letter from his staff o+-'fj_cers:
"On the occasion of your birthday today, we the heads of your staff sections not only wish you the many happy returns of the day vrhich we all desire,
but seize avidly- this opportunit:,. to express to you, as a group and as indivi-
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duals , some th~_ngs which we all feel very strongly.
" It gives us great pleasure to have such e chance to tell you v1hat an
honor j_t is to serve under you on your staff and how proud we are of you ,
of the Fifth Army and of its Headquarter·s. It is a rare l onor and rrivilege to work under your foresighted and vigorous leadership in a headquarters
which, under your euidance , has a rerutation throughout the Arny for extraordinary harmony and efficiency. Our pride is equally great in being members of a field force which has sho,.,m itself to be so effective in battle .
"This occasion provides us also ·6 th a v'elcome opportunity to express
to you our deep appreciation of the consideration and loyalty which you unfailingly show to your staff officers as individuals . One of the harpiest
aspects of serving on your staff is the knowledge each of us has that our
Army Cornnander is our personal friend who , in tbe midst of his heavy responsibilities and eY..acting and time-consuming duties , is never too busy to
be thoughtfully concerned with the welfare of the individuals composing his
staff . The 1mowledge that this is so cements our personal loyalty to you
and inspires us with the desire to give to .you and to the Fifth Army the
best of v,hich we are capable in the busy da:rs that remP.in between now end
complete victory.
1
"We erlend to you our heartiest birthday congratulations and express
to you our conf:i dent wishes that your future undertakings may continue to be
outstandingly successful and that you and your family will enjoy a full measure of health and happiness . "
General Cl a:t"k tode.y received an jnformation copy of the following cable
from General Alexander to General Wilson :
mr 0 , 2632 .
As you know it is an essential feature of my plan for DIA DEM that Fifth Arny should hold 36th u. S. Division in reserve ready to operate
on the main front or in the bridgehead According to the Vff'Y in which the battle
develops . It is impossible to fix precisely when the decision whether to commit 36th U. S. Division can be tr-ken. It cannot in any case be before DIADEM
D plus 2 but it may be any day after that . If decision is to employ 36th U. S.
Division in the bridgehead it is most important from surprise and security aspects that it should be moved there at fastest possible rate . The necessary
craft to lift 36th U. S. Division should therefore be standing by at Naples
from DIADEM D plus 2 until decisj_on where to commit 36th U. S. Division has
been taken . I understand that this may def er date at which brassard can be
launched , but I consider that must be accepted. It has always been a cardinal
condition of BRASSARD that it should not in any way interfere with resources
required for main battle . I therefore request that arrangements be made for 15
1ST and 18 LCI(L) to be standing by in Naples from DIADEM D plus 2 until decision where to commit 36th U. S. Division has been taken . DIADEM requires maximum support by naval bombardment . It is understood from FOVJIT that this may not
be forthcoming unless 3rd Divi sion mine sweeping M/LS are retained and not sailed
for BRASS/\RD on 15 May. I shall be glad of earliest confirmation tha.t the lift
for 36th U. s. Division will be available as indicated above and that the minesweeping M/IS will not be wi_
thdravm. DIADEM D and H hour follow by special lett er by hand of Liaison Officer. "
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SAN MARCO--MA.Y 2, 1941,--General Clark left the command post early to make an
inspection visit to the 85th Division. He proceeded to the junction of Highway /fl and Rout e #?14 where he was met by General Coulter, the Division -Commander . The party consisted of two jeeps . They proceeded forward across the
Garjgliano at increased distances and visited the 328th Field Artillery Battalion command post , comnanded by Lt . Colonel rerkins . This battalion is in
direct support of the 337th Infantry. General Clark visited the command post
proper and the fire c1 irectio:n center . He met there Tiaster Sergeant Reed who
had served with General Bolles . General Cll"rk immediately recognized Sergeant
Reed as he reported to the Army Commander outside of the command post . After
leaving the command post Genere.1 Clc1rk went to C Battery posi tion area and
inspected all gun pits and questioned the cannoneers . From C Battery he went
to the comnand post of the 337th Infantry commanded by Colonel Ollie Hughes .
General Clnrk immediately asked for a map showing the regimental dispositions
which were explained to him by Colonel Hughes . He also asked to be shown
briefly the regimental plan for the next attack.
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From the comrnmd post of the 337th, General Clark proceeded to the command post of the 3rd Battalion colTll'l.anded by Colonel Smith , where he reviewed
again battalion dispositions and future plans for offensive action. From the
battalion coMmand post he went to K Company corunand post where he discussed
company dispositions and counter attack plans . From K Company he walked cross
country to Tufo . On the way he passed by a machine gun platoon of Company M
and talked with the platoon commander , Lt . Hughes . In Tufo he visited the OP
of the 2nd Bn., of the 337th and also the OP of the 913th Field Artillery Battalion, a direct support battalion of the 88th D:ivision which was furnishing
general support to the 85th Di vision at this particular time . General Clerk
then proceeded to the command post of the 138th Infantry where he talked to
Colonel Safay, Regimental Commander . They d1scussed regimental dispositions ,
future offensive action of the regiment and also , General Clark particularly
asked to what extent the regiment could make use of tanks . He stated that
he wanted tanks to be used wherever feasible , regardless of losses , because he
has plenty of tanks and has 100 replacement tanks .
From the 338th Infantry General Clark and party left for the Division command post where they had lunch. After llmch General Clark proceeded to the
rear area of the 85th Division and was met enroute by Colonel Brady, Commander
of the 339th Infantry which was in a rest area west of Mondragone . The regiment was assembled in an open field . As soon as General Clark arrived he
mounted a speaker ' s platform and gave a very inspiring talk to the 339th Infantry in which he welcor.1.ed then and the Division to the Fifth Army, stating
that he was very proud to have them; that they were very fortunate to have
undergone the excellent training thct they had had in the United States and
that this additional combat phase in a quiet sector could also be considered
as excellent additional training. He felt certain that the Division was ready
for combat and asserted thet he had no fears whatsoever in committing them for
hard, offensive and aggressive action. After the short talk General Clark proceeded to a demonstration where he witnessed a platoon in the attack against
bunkers and a i'ortified house . After the demonstration General Cla.rl•· was
guided by General Sullivan to the 98th Railhead Company. This railhead company
was operating a truckhead for ration breakdovm. The truckhead company is assisted by the 3062nd Labor CoJilpany, whose company area was also inspected by
�the General. He was very pleased to find the Fifth Army Plaque for excellence
displayed . From there General Clark proceeded to the 815th Sterilization and
Bath Company vrhere he sav, the complete cycle of where a man comes in dirty,
takes off his clothes , gets a good hot shower , co!'1es out , dries M mself off
and gets a complete new outfit of clean clothes . A tired and dirty soldier
comes out a clean and presentable looking soldier . This unit can handle 1600
men a day, but on Easter Eve it handled 2100 . From there the General visited
the 110th QM Bakery- Company cormanded by Captain ~nest . He inspected installations and commended Captain Ernest for his initiative . He also se.w the Fifth
Army plaque for excellence which was displayed with three clasps for January,
February and March .
From the Bakery Company he vrent to the 230th Sl'l.lva.ge Collectine Company
commanded by Captain North . This salvage collecting company has done excellent
work. General Clark -inspected every phase of its £Jctivity and commended Captain North very highly for his initiative and judgment in handling this most
important function of salvage collection Rnd rerair of all ty-pes of clothing
and equipment which , in some cases , had the appearance of being hopelessly unusable forever. During the past months this conpany has salvaged and repaired
over $13 , 000, 000 worth of equipment and materiel.
General Clark then proceeded to the 86th Depot Compe.ny commanded by Major
Lazarus where Class II and IV supplies are stored and issued . The last quartermaster installation, the 3839th QM Gas Supply Company, comnanded by Captain
Hiller , was then visited by the General. This is where gt'soline and oil are
placed in conta.iners from pipe lines and are ready for distribution forward .
General Clark returned to his command post where he worked on dispatches and
had as his dinner guest General Adcock, G-4, NATOUSA, and General Tate , his
G- 4 . After supper he worked some more on important papArs and retired .
The Army Commander today received the follovring cable of congratulations
on his birthday from the Prime rflinister: "Many Happy Returns of the Day. 11
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SAN MARCO--MAY 3, 1944--General Clark left the command post at 0830 to fly by
cub to the II Corps cub field . J-ie made the flight in a total elapsed time of
five minuteft . At the cub field he was met by General Keyes , II Corps Commander , and General Sloan, 88th Division Commander . He inspected a cub plane
which had been improvised to drop supplies to maintain troops in isolated
spots and a cub ambulance arrangement. The plane had a separate attachment
for dropping supplies . The general principle is that the pilot pulls a release and m8.kes a slight brink to the right , causing the :rackage to slip off
rollers out the cub door to the ground. There is a baffle plate on the left
side preventing the package from Mtting the wing struts . To use a cub as an
ambulance this device is removed and the patient pl~ced on a flat pa'.nel board
with his feet toward the tail. In order to pick the patient up , a special
canvas ty-pe litter is improvised . It is only an experiment, and further
tests will be made .
From the II Corps cub field General Clark and GenerPl Sloan, accompanied
by Colonel Draper , left for the 88th Division front line units . Two jeeps
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were in the par ty, and t hey crossed the ferry over the Garigliano at about 0915 ,
the time generally reserved by the Boche for shelling. The crossing was made .
wit hout incident except t hat the motor failed to start on the ferry at the beginning. Cnce a cross the G;:irigliano , the jeeps were taken ?S far for ward as
allowable . The road is under obser vation from the Boche frol'l severHl directions . The jeeps were parked in an old stone house , and the party continued
on foot to the 350th Infantry command post , a walk of about two miles . General
Clark dis cussed wit h Col onel Lynch, regimental commander , his regiment al dispositions and plans for the next attack. General Clark emphe.sized again the
fact that he wanted tanks used and discussed with Colonel Lvnch his tentative
plans for their employment . Col onel Lynch called in Colonel Frey who is attached to the regiment and was formerly w:th the Prmored force . Colonel Frey
briefly Axplained to Gener.<il Clark how he would recomriend the t,-,nks be used .
In general , they would att ack in platoon strengt}1 find, where terrain permitted,
in company strength . They would assault a M 11 , gain the p:round , and the infantry would quickly follow up and hold . The tanks , in the meantime , could be
used to assist other infantry units attacking up precipitous terrain to the
flanks , b~ infil aded fire . After leaving the 350th Infe.ntry command post
General Clark proceeded dovm to a detachment of the 351st Infantry which is
attached to Colonel Lynch. This consists of L, Hand K Companies under the command of T:a.,ior T':a:vrokas . Re has K Company rrotecth1g a l ikely avenue of approach
by the Boche with three platoons in line . P Company h2.s its machine guns
sighted for close sun,ort . L Conpany was in the reRr in reserve . In f'..ddition ,
this cetabhment has three tanks spaced at about 200 yard intervals along the
road ready to oppose any counter-attack. General Cl?rk vrent up to the nost
forward elements rmd viewed Castelforte and the interven:ing terrain vrM ch is
"No rran I s Land1t at the prese'1.t tine . He discussed with Hajor f'!avrokas pe.trol
activities and f 01.md that lj ttle information has been deter mined with regard
to enemy activi ties in the vicinity of Castelforte . He met Colonel Coleman,
Commander of the 3rd Battalion, which is held in reserve of the 350th Infantry.
He discussed with him his role as a reserve bRtt e.lion . Gener 2l Clark continued
his discussions w:tth Col. Lynch, and when he found that the 350th was planning
to attack Damiano in column of companies he desired thPt this plan be reconsidered . Pe wanted an attack rnflde on 2 broader front and with more strength.
At 1130 the party proceeded bacl< to the 38th Division command rest wl ere
luncheon was served for General Clark, General Keyes e.nd members of the 88th
Di vision staff. Aft"?r hmch GenorP-1 Clark left for a decoretion ceremony and
also to address t '!0 regir1ents of the 88th Division in reer areas . On the way
he inspe cted an improvised dental laboratory devised from a salvaged 2- 1/? ton
truck.
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As General Clark approached the assembly area of the two regiments , the
349th and 351st with other divisi on att achments , the troops were assembled in
front of a reviewing platrorm. The troops were in command of Generfll Kendall,
Assistant Division Commander , who called them to attention, anc , as General
Clark stood on the reviewinr platforn "Ruffles and To The Generali' were rlayed
by the band. He was introduced to the troors by General Sloan . In his introduction , General Sloan presented the Army Cor:unander to his men and , in turn,
his men to the Army Commander . He mentioned thet General Clark nas one of his
students at Fort Leavenworth, and that fa.ct gave him added pride in presenting
t o his men General Clark. General Clark, in acknowlerging General Sloan ' s introduction , also mentioned the fact that be:ing his instructor, if he did nake
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�any tactical mistakes he had en out because of this fact. After bis talk
Gen8ral Clark presented the DSC to Lt . La.mb - the first DSC to be given to a
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member of the 88th Division. Lt . Lamb's citation indicated his bravery and
courage while leading a sri.all patrol into eneJ11y territory . The assembled
mer.1 of the 38th Division were a very enthusiastic audience and cheered after
General Clark ' s very stirring talk to them . As General Clark left , the troops
were called to attention, and he left imnediately for Mondragone vrhere he had
about an hour I s relc'lxation on the beach r>nd then worked on some hundred odd
decoration cases .
While f1t Hondragone , General Crittenberger arrived to confer with General Clark for about half an hour . General Clark left by cub plane for the
Fifth Army command post at 1800 v,here he conferred with General Gruenther and
Colonel Saltzman. After supper he vTOrked again on administrative matters and
retired at about 2200 .
General Clark today replied to the Prime Minister ' s cable of birthday
congratulations as follows: RH 8723 . "Your kind birthday message deeply appreciated . "
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SAN MARCO- -MAY 4 , 1944- -General ClErk left the command rost at 0830 for a full
day ' s visit to the French Expeditionary Corps . He arrived at Sessa at 0855
and was presented with a guard of honor which he inspected with General ,Juin
and immediately started for the 4th iiountain Moroccan Division command post at
Cescheto . Colonels Draper and Kammerer accompanied Generals Clrrk and Juin.
At the 4th Moroccan Division they were met by General Sevez who presented General Clark to his staff . General Clark renewed his acquaintance with Colonel
Bauffre , Chief of Staff to General Sevez, whom he ha.d knovm in Africa . Colonel
Bauffre speaks English quite well and had been to the United States where he
had called upon General Clark's son at West Point . General Sevez then conducted the party to his observation post on some commanding terrain near his command post. The visibility was poor, but an effort was m11de to point out the
terrain over v1hich the next attack will be conducted . Such features as Mount
.Cairo , San Ambrogio , Hount r~ajo , Pount Rotundo and Damiano were pointed out .
The party then returned to the command post where General Clark went over
the troop dispositions under General Sevez' command. He pointed out th11t he
had under his command at present elements from the 1st rloroccan Division which
were in their place in the ljne on the right . This Division r•rill be under the
command of General Brosset . In the center were el~ments of the 2nd Moroccan
Division under the command of General Dody. On the left were elements of the
4th Mountain Moroccan Division under tr e OOillPln.nd of General Sevez . Elements of
these three divisions were actually occupying the line so that on the day of
the attac1<: these troops would be familiar w:i th the terrain in their zones of
action from the line of departure.
General Clark then vrent into detail as to tb e direction of attack and the
maneuvers J'l"cessary to capture initial objectives Pnd follow up action s. This
was done so that General Clark could rersonP lly familiarize himself with all
details of the French Expec1itionary Corps efforts in the attack. Colonel Bauffre
acted as 4 nterprt"!ter for General Clark. Geri eral Cl9.r1<: wanted to point out that
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the entire front, both Eighth and Fifth Army, were going to attack simultaneously
and aggressively. Jt was rointed out that once the French had attained Mount
j•ajo, speed and surprise was necessary to capture objectives in the vicinity of
Ausonia and further developments from that point northwest to ri(ount D'Oro. General Clark also dj scussed the coordi netion required with actions of the French
Corps as concerned the .Attack on Deniano by the 88th Division and thP-ir further
actions in seizing the terrain in the Yicj nity of Spigno . He w:i shed to point
out that the II Corps was not attacking according to any schedule but thnt they
were going to pusl~ aggressively forward so tl at all troops would not be waiting
for others to grdn certain objectives. He also dj scussed with General Sevez the
employment of tanks in tl·e ettack and indicated thflt he desir~d tanks to be used
aggressively and wherever terrain permitted, regardless of losses, because he
would have replacements . He also discussed artillery dispositions and verified
the fact th8t any British requests for fire in the Eighth Army zone of action
from artillery with the Frencr.1 Corps would be first cleared through French Corps.
These discussions finished, the party then left for the front, crossing the Garigliano at wrat is knoin as the Pont Jaguar.
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In approaching this bridge, the party traveled over~ ro?d mAde by French
eng:ineer trnops. It was an excellent engineering job and was very well camouflaged. After crossing the Garigliano, the rarty nroceeded to the right flank
of the French bridgehead ::-cross the Garigliano where Generals Clark, Juin, Sevez
and Colonel Draper visitP-d a company occupying the front line. This company
belonged to the 4th Regiment of General Dody's 2nd rbroccan Division. It had
attached to it some American tanks which were well camouflaged and sheltered along
a side mountain road very close to the front line. This company e.nd the tanks
were so disposed as to react immediately to any oounter-attack down this road of
approach by the Boche . The visibility was not very good, and very little terrain
could be viewed. The party went as far forward as was pos~ible without breaking
too much defilade. German posts were only nbout 300 yArds from their position.
General Clrirk paused a few minutes ·to talk to members of an American tank crew
and renarkl'ld that the terrain was good for t::inks ·and wished them good luck, sayinP' thrt re knew th,'lt they would do well.
The party thlcln proceeded over a raid, which hA.d recently been opened for
trucks to the ?nd Regim"'nt of the 4th Mountain Moroccan Division. This road was
a rmle trail when the sector was occup:ied by the British and was improved by the
French to a ,jeep trail and then to a rDl:'d passable for trucks. This also represented excellent engineerjng work. At the :?nd R~giment there was a small guard .
o~ ronor which was presented to Gener~l Clark, and he talked w:ith Colonel Buot de
L'Epine. He was also introduced to Colonel Tolle, ComMander of the 8th RTM of the
2nd Moroccan Division. Colonel Molle is considered R fj ne col11rlander and has been
given a difficult sector to attack over. At tMs point Generel ClRrk inspected an )
advance surgical unit which was rrepared to hPndle seriously wounded rnen who needed il'llJ'lediate at tent ion before being taken back to the rear. The French had planned
an evacuation by cub plane from t} is point. From there tr e rart~r vrent forward to
one of the battalions of the 2nd Regiment and inspected dispositions and routes
used in the mountai_ns.
The party proceeded back to the Go.rigliano by a different road wr ich had recently ½een improved for trucks ½y the French. It made P comylete circuit of the
Frenc1 bridgehead over the Garigliano. On reac} ~ng the Garigliano Gen"lrRl Clark
was conducted thro 1gh tl--ie ~h ~•edical Batta lion I s insta] lation. He viewed the
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�operat:i.ng rooms and wards ,,,here wmmded were kept prior to being sent back to
the evacuation hospital . This bnttnl:ion was the org~.nj c nedical battalion of
the L~th }fountain Moroccan Division.
Fror, here the party proceeded to Sessa where they had lunch in General
Juin ' s P1ess . The lunch was quite ~laborate, as is customary witr the French ,
cons:i sting of f:i_ ve courses . Those present were Generals Clark, Juin and Carpentier, Colonels Kammerer and Drap~r and Lieutenant.s de Noblee, Vrois:3art
and ratrico .
After luncl1 the party we:nt to visit the Gouras . They were met by General
Guillaume , Commander of tl'e Goums, who had lim,d up as guard of honor mounted
elements of the Goums . Bugles r:ind drums rendered the necessary honors as
General Clark inspected the tr,~ops . Genere.l GuillauJne then introduced to Gene ral Clark three of his Group Commarders, Colonel LeBlanc of t},e 1st Group of
Gourns, Colonel Soulard of the 2nd and Colonel ~~assiet Dubies of the 3rd Group .
Thi'! 4th Group Conmander was not m·esent, Colonel DeLatour. G"3neral Clrrrk explained bri"'fly to these Group Commanders tre situation as it now exi_sted on
the Garigliano front and at the beachhMd. He told them that rie had recently
visited the ';~r and 85th Divisions and fennel that they were eager and anxious
for the 0>1~0..,.,-ing attack, and l'.e assured everyone trat it was going to be an allout effort, nnd he was confident thn.t the Gou.TJ1s vrould carry out their rart
well . He also ri-ma.rked that while he was in the United States he had talked
with President Roosevelt ancl thet the latter was very :interested to know how
the French were doing and that he , General Clark, told the President tha.t they
were mngni:!:icent ; thnt they were excel l~nt ffrrhters .nnd had done well and, in
addition , he told Fres:i.d ent Roosevelt that General Juin was do.:ng a sr lendid
job; and that in his opinion there was and could not be a better choice as a
col"lmander of the French troops than Gener/31 Juin .
After inspecting the Goums the party then proceeded to the 6th Regiment of
the 4th 1,101mtain Poroccan Division, Colonel Cherriere commanding. Genl')ral Clark
knew Colonel Cherr:l ere and was very pleased with t,,e arrangemt"nts rn.de for his
visit . Colonel Cherriere had a Moroccan drum and bugle corps and a band and a
battalion lined up in parade ground fashion . As G1imeral Clark approached, the
drum and bugle corps rilayed 11 Sur Les ChaJr1ps 11 and thl'ln th" hand played the "Star
Spangl~d Flanner" wh:: ch was followed by the 11 rtarseillaise 11 • Generri Clr.irk tben
inspected the battalion of the 6th 1r:oroccan Regiment ruid congratufated Colonel.
Cherriere on the excell~nt anpe2.rRnce of his troors and explD ined to hin that he
was sure thct this reginent would play a big role in the ettack to come and that
he was confident that they were ready. H~ remarked on itieir alertness and enthusiasm and was very rleased with the recertion accorded him.
The party then left for Sessa v1here Gen~ral Clark left Genernl Juin and
Colonel Karrnnerer and nroceeded to the Fifth Army command rost ~ith Colonel Lraper.
On his return to the corunand post Gener.<>l Clrirk i rnmediately worked on administrative n£1tters and later received General Martin, Fifth Army Surgeon, and Colonel
Barker, I<'ifth Army Chemical Warfare Officer, who is to leave shortly for the
United Sfo.tes to tall:e over conmand of the CheMicel ~rrarfere School at Edgewood Arsenal. He had these two o"ficers as dinner p;i1ests . Gen~ral Cfark excused himself and said thPt he hnd quite a b:it o+' work to do j n preparation for the conference witb his Corps and Division Commanders tomorrow Morning which will take
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place at 10 o I clock. During this
Army plan of nttack and make sure
part that they are to play in the
planning, timing and coordj m-i.tion
after a very busy day .
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conference J:,e will go over jn detAil the Fifth
that all comlllEl.nders understand thoroughly the
over-A.11 plan and settle any questions as to
of the attack. He retir ed at n.bout 10 o I clock
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SMT MARC0--MAY 5, 1944--General Clark, preparing for the launching of the tremendous offensive on the Fifth Army front vd thin the next week, called a conference of all his nain Fifth Army front corps and division cornmanders today,
and the entire plan of attack was gone into during a 2- 1/2 hour conference that
was followed by a buffet llmcheon at which Genernl Clark vms the host .
Upon arising, General Clark disposed of administrative work and then conferred with General Brann to button up last - minute details on the conference .
'l'he various commanders , P.11 of wron were accompanied by tl·eir Chiefs of Staff
and G- J ' s , began to arrive at 0945 , and motion pictures were taken for use in
short subjects and newsreels in the United States . Those present included:
· GeneraJs Juin, Harding, Crittenberger , Dody, Brosset, deMontsabert, Sy_vez , Carpentier , Y,'al',;:er, Sloan, Coulter , dalsh, Saville , Guillaume, Chnillie:r, Johnson,
Hume , Lewis, Poran, Bradsh~w, Brann, Sullivan, r.1artin, Tate , Beucler and , of
course Generals Clark and Gruenther . The lf1.st man to arrive was General Juin,
Cor.imander of the French Expeditionary Corps . General Clark met him and accompanied him into the hut , and t!-i.e conference got undervmy. Because of the fact
thnt all remarks had to be translated either from English to French or French
to English , the conference proceeded ratl-ir--r slowly. Following is a gist of the
conference taken from stenographic notes:
GENERAL CLARK : 11 We are going to have various officers t:Iiscuss their plans
this morning and will have interpreters for the French .
"Gentlemen, I called this me.eting in order that subordinPte oommanders
might meet each other here and discuss their plans briefly so that everyone
will know what the other fellow is going to do . The Army Plan will be outlined
in its br oad form , and corps and division comm~ders will likewise give us a
brief orientation of their plans. If there are any loose ends or discrepancies this is the last chance to clear them up .
ttin addition we have a fine plan - it has been developed by General
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Alexander ' s headque,rters whereby both the Fifth and Eighth Armies attack at
the same time without on~ holding back and waiting for the other to do some thing toward the attack. We are attacking over ~ vridc front in grePt strength.
There are eight divisions attacking simu1taneously on D- Day. These troops are
fresh . We have reserved , both infantry an'd. artillery. It is the f;irst time
that the total resou.rc.- s of both armies. have been thrown into the attack at the
same time . These remarks I have ma.de rpply to the majn Cassino - Garigliano
front . At the same time we }1.a.ve the bridgehead force of the Fifth Army which
is prepared to attack at the opportune time either with or w:ithout reinforcements .
"Now I want to sa;v a word as to over- optimism. I have every confidence in
the success of this a ttack but I must emphasize that we must not let ourselves
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look into the crystal ball and by wishful t~inking realize that we are going
to join up or capture Rome within a few days . We should join up - we will
join up - and we will march on to the north in reasonable time . I mention
this because during the last Cassino attack there were some who thought that
we would join up in a matter of a few days , and the.t over- opHmistic estimate
a ctually got back to the United States . I was confronted with that when I
returned on my recent visit to the United States , and it took me some time to
explain and straighten it out . If the enemy delays us , as he did for many
months before we attacked Cassino , by demolitions and delaying action, he can
delay us materially. He cPn delay our advance so thet we will be fort unate
to make two miles per day in my opinion. So let us realize thP-t we bave a
battle ahead and that we are not going to wj_n it the easy way or by his pulling out . There a.re no indications of that . We have f,I'and air support in
this attack . It is the first time that we hnve joined up, with good weather
to operate in , the many groups thPt will support us directly in this battle .
11 low I vrant to emphasi ze that for my subordinate co:mnanders there are no }
time schedules. No one plans ahead of time that they will wait to do something after someone on his flanks acts in order to accor1plish some objective . \
In the Fifth Arny we are basing the success of our att..,ck largely on surprise ~!
We must not lose the impetus of this attack if we do secure surprise. We must
push on or out with everything we have without delay.
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"Another point wM.ch I want to emphasize is the use of tanks :in this
battle . I want no holding back on the use of tanks . We have tank superiority; l
we have some terrain where \"Te can use t hem, so use them in mass and throw all \
of them at thr? enemy after you get the oprortunity. 'l"e have arranged for 100
reserve tanks right b"'hind the Fifth Army on this front and 100 reserve tanks
up on the beachhead . Now the great problem whi.· ch confronts me is how I would
like to use my Army Reserve , the 36th Division - whether to put therr on the
main front or in the bridgehead . In that connection a decision must be mnde
as to when the attack from the bridgehead will be launched and in what direction . The bridgehead is a dangerous threat to the enemy and he recognizes it
as such a threat - a threat whicb will do , in the early stages of our attack
here, as much as an actual attack. I am most gnxious to launch an attack out
of the bridgehead with all the force I can put into it , but it must not be premature and it nrust be done with adequate forces to break throue-Ji once'we start .
I am going to be subjected to pressure both from above and below to use that I _
36th Division ahead of time . Now I know that the II Corps is planning, and
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should hnve planne~, use of the ,6th Division , and I don ' t want tc get premature
urging from that source as to the early corunitment of that division because I
will not do it . As I see it, if the attack goes as we have a r:i ght to exrect,
it would be premeture to move the 36th Division either to the bridgehead or to
this front tmtil at least n week after tre ettack has started , and once it has
been decided to put it in the bridgehead I hope to be able to put in additional troops for either the 88th or 85th Division. Our position ,. ill be difficult
until we find out what will be the enemy ' s reaction - · how he reacts to this attack , and we will have to maJntain flexibility and be prepared in either direction once we find out hovr he is reacting to tliis attack.
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"I wanted to explain this ribout the 36th Division so it would be thoroughly
understood by subordinate commanders . We have a great opportunity here if we
play our car:d_s and do not permit it to become premature.
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COLONEL HOV'rARD: 11 The enemy sitw~tion in general js indicated on the situation rr.ap. On the oouthern or main front of Fifth Army the enemy has· two P.nd onehalf divisions facing us on the GUSTAV LINE defending th<>t line. In the rear he
has the AIOLF HITLER LINE, a well prepared position. He has e.bout one-half of
the 15th Greru:idier Division in the general 8.rea of ITRI in reserve . On the
Eighth Army front, north of the LIRI River he has Pbout two and one-half divisions as indicAted def ending the forward lines. In the rear he has about onehalf of the 15th Division wbich is in position there to defend the ADOLF HITLER
Line in case it is desired to do so . Certain st::itistics are indicated on the
chart concerning enemy strength and disposition. North of the Eighth Army_position the 5th British Corps is opposed by a force whose strength is indicated on
the chart.
"In the bridgehea'.d the enemy has five divisions defend:i11.g the rer-'imeter of
the beach wit}, one division in irnmediF t~ reserve. In ardition he he,s a di vision in the general areA south of RCTJ!E with re,rt of it south of the mouth of the
TIBER River and re.rt of it ooutheast of ROVIE, and two divisions in this general
area of CIVITAVECCHIA. He has also been v-.rorking diligently on a new defense line
defending south of ROHE. In northern ITALY he has five divisions in addition to
the ones I have mentioned , three of which ere defending the coastline in th is
general area as indicated. As to the enemy's capability, he is capable of defending the GUSTAV tine or fighting delaying action on thRt line and on successive
positions in the rear thereof. He may defend the AID LF HITLER Line /'IS soon as
that line is reached, and is carable of fighting delay-ing e ction on thet line and
delaying action on successive positions in rear thereof until the line south of
ROrE is reached. Of oourse, he cen mass his reserves from up north and launch a
counteroffensive but this is not considered feasible because he would not have
much of a chance of success. It is possible that he could bring down about five
divisions, but the number he could brin2' dovm wculd be fofiuenced by the sea.le
and t:im:i ng of the attack j n the beachhead.
11 The lfoe of riction the enemy is nost likely to adopt is indicated by
what he did in the CASSINO battle - th:1t is, to defend the GTTSTAV Line with the
force he has on that line without reinforcing it, but he is likely to reinforce
the ATY'LF RI'T'LER Line when we reach it. If we push him out of the GUSTAV Line
he is likely then to delay by successive rosjtions and contesting each 7mportRnt
tactical locality tmt:i 1 the AIDLF HITLER Line is reached. If pushed out of t:bat
line, then I believe he will defend along the prer,i1red line south of ROME.
GP-JGRAL BRANN! "General ClDrl< and gentlenen. The nission of the Allied
Armies in Italy on tl-e next oT"erntion :is to join forces with the briqgehead and
drive the enemy north of ROT~. There is a cover rl~n now being conducted for
this operation. Th:is plan was desi~ed to make the Germans believe thrt there
will be a landing in force at CIVITAVECCFIA. (Informr>tion that there is a concentration of three divisions in the NAPIES-SAIBR.NO area training in ITC designed to make the Germans think we are going to load in thrt area.)
"On the east of the AJ'PENTN'ES the 5th Corns, operating under AAI, has
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the mission of containing as J11any Gorr.inn troops as rossible in the erel'l, and
at the slightest withdrawal to follow them up raridly. On our right th'e Eighth \
Army ha.s the rdssion of breaking into the LIBI Valley and acvancing r;-,.pidly
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vrest via Highway 6. The Eighth Army consists of' three corps, the 10 Corps on
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the right , the Polish Corps in the center r.nd the 13 Corrs on the Eighth Arny \
left . Th~ 10 Corps , which consists of the New Zealand Division and certain
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other separate troops, will cover a ,dde rent. This corrs has a deception
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plan designed to make the Germans think there will be an attack in force in the\
direction of ATIHA . The PoHsh Corrs consists of two divisio11s, ea.ch division
with two brigades. The;r have the mission of first, frol"l a position in the CASTELLONE area, drivjng soutb tonard the critical area around Hill 593 and cutting
the highwa:, west of the •!(l';.,\STERY. ':'he second phase of the Polish Corps is to
turn to the east and take the :~'JASTBRY. Having accomplished that they turn
northwest toward F:Fnnrn:rrE, protecting the rigl-·t of the 13 Corps and getting
as much high ground toward RC'CCASECCA as possible . The 13 Corps consists of
four divisions, three :infantry divj_sions and one armored division. The plan
is to force a crossing of the RArIDO River end Bdvance rap5 dly northwest through
the LIRI Valley. The Eighth Army has the 1st Canadian Corps jn reserve , consisting of o:rie j nfantry $.n<l one armored division . That corps will be used
either to pass througl tr e 13 Corps After they have come to the HITLER Line
and start up Highway 6, or second, if the 13 Corps bogs down on the HITLER
Lin~ , to assist in the break-through of the HITL :::R. Linf1 . They may rn ve to
move in and assist in driving forward to the HITLER Line . The riission of the
Fifth Army is to secure the ATTS(PifIA Defile, advence via BSFERIA to the south
o~ the LIRI and SACCO Rivers .
"The Army Plan for the French Corps Vfit' four divisions on thP. right
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ano tl-ie II Corps with tvro d- ivisions on tre left , is separated into phases :
First , capturing the hir,h ground in the V" cinity of 11A.JO and cut the FORMIA ATJSC""ITA Road nortr of AFSOtITA . The f:ir st phP.se of II Co1ys is to take DA''IANO
and the S Ridge , move down the S Ridge tavarA.s CCIJ.E MARTINO, thereby cutting
the road in this area (vie. CDLLE f':ARTrm)
"The second phase for the FrP-nch is to advance with additional troops
and close tre AUSENTE Valley •• • • Here in the south the II Corps t~kes critical
features :in th~ foothills of the PBTREIJ..A Hill Mass .
"The third rl'ase or principal action will be for tl'e French Corps to.
move general on r~ fi 1 C'iRO area assisted by ti,~ troops th t }1a.ve P1oved into the
hills by a flanking attack, this being the critice.l feature for the third phase.
11 The third J,hase -f'or tre II Corps is to r,ove for ·mrd througb the hill
·riasses vTith the mission of gettfog jnto the ITRI area with or without the assistance of the 36th Division, to be decided at a lPter tjme, the F'rencl: having
established a firri base in this gtmeral area, operat:i ng in the direction of
FICO and cutting the road directly west o:' the M REVOLE Hill I'hss in conJunction wi tr the attack on FICO . The artillery opens nt 2300 for forth (40) minutes
and fires genern.lly on known positio11s and counterbattery. In general, there
will he a large force of Hrtill0ry w;th the principal mission of maintPining
the blocks already established across the LIRI River and the area west of those
blocks on the critical roads in the ITRI and fICO areas . 240' s and Long Toms
will be used on this Mission and consioerahle force will have to be used in
that wav. Plans are being prepared for an airborne drop generally in the vicinHy
of M R.T.;VOLP. . Decision to make this drop will be r-F<le nfter the second phPse.
The 509th Parachute Battalion will be dropped in tI-ii:i.t .<irea to secure a firm
position and operatini:; toward the French in this direction (:~) or toward the
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II Corps in that direction · (SE ). In the coming operations rriority in the
employment of e.ir for Fifth Army will be given to isolating the battlefield .
"There are few roP-ds lee.ding to the combat area. W hope by establishe
ing and Faintaining blocks in the S 0LIVA and JTRI areas to isolate the bBttlefield using our artillery to J'llaintain t} ose blocks already established. Ad. ditional blocks will be estahljsh,-,d along l ::nes at critical points es indicated b:,r those three red dots (S OLIVA, S GIOVA 11H-lT, PASTENA). These blocks
are established not only to prevent rdnforceMent of the battle area but to
prevent bringing in troops to man the HITLER Line. The Navy will assist by
establishing a block in the ef1rly phase in the T"':R.RJI.CINA area and along the
flank of the II Corps .
"The P.rmy Commander told you of his concern over the timing of the beachhead attack. We not only have the tim~n~ but have the direction to con- ·
sider and thP, -forces that will be required to su,:;cessfully attA.ck from the
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beachhead. At present there hove been three plPns prep11red. , Each w:i 11 be
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t used depending upon things we don't know at this time. One attack is toward
CARROCETO and west of COLLE LAZIALE. The second attack is in the direction
of CORI P.nd after the canture of CORI and advancing north cutting Highway 6.
-.;J,... A~ The Army Commander thinl:s it necessary that rt least one di vision go in to
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ar,sist either of these attacks f'nd probably more vlill be n°edecl. Time does
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not rermit goir EY, over the conditions under ,m,·, ich each ,":i 11 be le..1 ·nched. t , r. '
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"The third attn.ck :is probably the easiest attack to accoMplisp. success- ft
fully. The attack is ; n the direction of ~EZZE, gPining this high ground. Assu~
ini:; that we have arr:ived At t:be initial Army 0bjective, tlv·t the Eight}, Army
has had hn.rd fighting and may need some t:i me for regrouping in the ARCE-CEFRANO
area, one plan mie;ht be, hav:ing gained tre Hill Hass (SISERNO) with the French
Corps, drjv-ing in this direction dovm the natural corr:idor toward SEZZE in
conjunction with th") hridgehead attack on the same objective . Such 8n i>ttHck 1
would turn thj s ent:i. re nrea P
.nd permit drnvr.i ng of the re1'!1a:i ning troops of the
II Corps off this line and giving more flexibility to tlie ie>.ttacJr- clesired in
the br:idgehead . 11
GENERAL JUIN: General Juin explained ·the action and maneuvers of the French
Corps in French. Lieutemmt Patrice, aide to Generril Carpentier, ..;nterpreted in
English. The interpretation was very broken and not easily understood . General
Juin brought out that the 2nd DIM would attack, triking '5ount Majo And proceeding
over to Ausonia . The 1st DIM would attack j n a northerly direction and proceed
to the Laguardia hill, rbunt Croce and the San Ambrogio region. Elements of the
3rd Algerian, Division would push into Castelforte as soon es the 88th Division
had taken Damfano and the 2nd Froroccan Division ha.d pushed into Cescheto , along
with elements of the 4th Mountain Moroccan Division. It would then push up through
to Ausonia and pass on taking the high ground Mount D1 oro - Pico. In the meantime,
the 4th DMM would rush across the mmmtnins and continue over the mountainous mass
of Petrella - Revole, cleaning out any German elements holding out in the mountains . General Juin's Map had numerous arrows point~ng out rPgimental objectives,
and it would be confusing to include them in this accourtt.
General Juin was followed by General Dody, Commander of the ~nd Moroccru1 Division, who explained tMs Division's action in its pusr to take Mount Majo and
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�its subsequent fannini:; out to the north and west. He brought out the point
that supply wns going to be difficult in tr,e mountains for his division and
that he would like to consider the rossibility of air drops for his troops,
especially the 8th RTM, col"lJ!landed by Colonel Molle. Lt. Fatrj co interpreted
for General Dody.
Gem=iral Sevez, Commander of the /+th r~ountain Division, was the next
speaker and used as his interpreter Colonel Bauffe who s:renks some English.
H~ explainerl the actions of the 4th Mountain Division, their push toward
Mount Faito and south to Ceschito and, in conjunction with II Corps, action
to take ~Tolmt Rotundo, thus isolating the C?stelforte area. Again coordinating with II Corps, to proceed in a westerly direction and quickly negotiating
the hj_ll masses toward Mount Fetrella - ReYole and to the r ico - Itri road.
General Brosset, of the 1st Voroccan Division, spoke in English which
was quite understandable. He brought out how his Jivision vrould push north
in a flanking diversion from a French bridgehead across the G~rigliano. This
diversion would seize and holrl the high ground west of the Gr,1rjgliHno and
just south of the Liri so as to facilitate the advance of tl-i e Eighth Army up
the Liri Valley.
The next speaker was General deMontsabert who used Colonel Bauffe. as his
interpreter. He expl::dned t:re,t the 3rd Algerian Divj_sion would ent~r Castelforte as s"'on as the 88th Division and the French had seized their objectives,
Damiano, Siola 1Reali and Mount Rotundo and as soon as the artillery bonbardment in Castelforte itself had ended. In other vrords, his division would
entP-r th~ town when ordered to do so by higher hea<lquart.ers after these previous actions had taken place. This p1-1rticulc-tr statenent caused some controversy because it appeared as ·if there were too many factors der,ending on other
circumstances a.s to when th~ 3rd AlP,erian 7!ould push into Castelforte. However this entire question was settled. after the close of the conference.
General deMontsabert then continued the action of the 3rd Algerian Division
from Ausonia northeast to secure and hold the high ground south of the Liri
Valley from ~".cunt D1 0ro up to Pico. The French discussions were a little
drawn out, due to the interpretation necessary, and it was impossible to get
stenographic notes from the interpreters becAuse none of them spoke well enough
for the stenographer to take dovm full sentences.
GENiffi.4.L KEYES: "General Clark and gentlemen. The mission given to the II
Corps is to cut the AUSO'JIA road toward tJ-,e lower AUSENTE Valley, gr-iining a
foothold in the mountains in order to push troops tr,rough to cut the ITRI-PICO
road in the vicinity of ITRI, and eventually to open up the FORMIA corridor.
We have for our means two divisions plus one in reserve. We haw, l '3 bAttalions
of corps artillery including two pack battalions. We. heve one group of tanks.
Our front is 16,000 yards long--will be increased to 20,000 and leter reduced to
11,000. The enemy on our front consists of elenents of the '71st and 94th Divisions with an estim..,ted seven battalions in the front lines. We understl'lnd he
hP s reserves in the vicinity of ITRI. He· has a selected ancl stronf!.,ly prepf:.red
position. He will be expected to put up strong resistance. Our maneuver must
necessarily be broken dovm into phases because of the extent of our front by
the divergence of the directions in which the Corps must attack, and by the necessity of regrouping and concentrating our means behind each other. Broken
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down 'into three phases: In the first pbP.se we shP.11 cut the AUSONIA road,
capture DAMIANO and initiPte the second rhase. The capture of DAMIANO will
assist capture of these hills north of our sector by the French; assist the
attack of the CEF on M. MAJr. The second phase ,rill consist of cleaning up
the lower AUSENTE. Valley by the capture of BRACCHI and CF.F.RI. With only
the delay thrt is imposed by the necessity of displacing artillery and regrouping the forces of the 88th, which rre to lead the attack, the third
phase will be led off by a strong tank and infnntry attack supported by air
and the naximum artillery. Once this phase will be culminated by the capture of CASTELWORATO this will definjtely block for the moment the FC1RMIA
corridor. Once the heights to CASTELNORATO are secured it is planned to
pass the %th through to gain rapidly a base in this vicinity fror, which to
pass on and cut the TI'RI - PICO road, and at the same time by action from
the south to assist the 85th Division which is constantly pushing through
the lower valley. There is no deloy contemplF.ted betv,een phases other than
that imposed by the necessity of displ11cing artillery and regrouping troops.
We may expect the enemy to react strongly, especially on our left and to
either reform or regain his rosition, to disrupt our attack or impose a delay. We may expect him to resist in this position since thrit is the covering position wJ,ich has been built up in a.nd Around Colle San na:r-tino.
Every effort will be made to effect speed in the execution and cut dovm the
overall time between steps as I have outlined them. Few if any can be
omitted nor can the sequence be readily changed. For air support we are
confining that to the :rreventjng of enemy reinforcements from being rushed
in and reaching the battlefield, and for coverage for opera.tioro through the
mountains. During the attack on SCAURI we hor,e to get close support to reinforce artillery fire; getting 'faval gun support to reinforce Corps artillery targets beyond Corps artillery range, primcrily in the ITRI area.. We
have in r~serve initially the 36th Division. Its oontemplated employment
is in the mountains, for wM.ch H js specially trajned. If it is not used
in this manner obviously the results to be obtained from the II Corps will
be limited.
GBNERAL CLARK: 11 I want to add one point. ':'he 16th will be put in Army
reserve right away. I want those jnstructions issued. It probnbly will be
moved into the heachhead ""irst--that is :i.ts most likely employment, so that
you must plan for that movement into the ITRI area by either the 38th or 85th
or parts of them. I know there will be limitations, hut if they have punch
left, they will keep on moving with elements other than the '36th.
GE~IBRAL GOFLTER: "General Clr,rk and gentlemen. In describ:ing the operation of the g5th Di vision T shall discuss trie three pm, ses a.s covered by my
Corps Cornnander. In the -f'irst ph;i se the mission of the division is to seize
that part of the San r!art:i.no ridge within its zone of action, holding ::t and
the highway in its sector and being prepared for strong counterattack and
prepared for advance to t e west in its zone of action. Formtion--rP-giments
a.breast. The J ine of 0ep13rture--the prese'.'1t -"ront lines ;inci the boundary be- _
tween regh1ents as yon see here. The right regiment with two battalions in
the assa.ult will nave at 2300, seize and hold S Ridge rnd a part of SANTA f'ARIA
with the division assault, to cut the highway in its zone and be prerered for
counterPttack and for advance. The left reg:incnt vdtr one bPttalion of the
trird reg:iMent nttac:bed l"'lp 1ring its nair oqffort on its right to seize irnd hold
C. HARTrJO, the high r;rou.nd 1700 yards uest of s. i:J\.RIA, and to obtain the
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�town of S. LIARIA; to .c ut the highway in its front and be prepPred against strong
counterattacks nnd for furtrier adwmce. Tho remaining regiment less the battalion will be in division reserve prepared to counterattack to the southwest or
to the northeast.
1'The di vision artiller:r, reinforced by the 602nd Field Artillery Battalion,
Pack, the 776th TD B,attalion and the '36th Division Artill,ry to support the Rttack. TL.e 756th Tank Battalion to be employed as follows: One company, less
ono platoon, directly supports tre right regiment. One conpany plus one platoon directly supports the left regiment and [>SSists it in the capture of S.
PARIA. The battalion less the two companies to be prepared to support either
regiment or o destroy counterattacks. In the second phase t:te dj_vision to aid
the 88th :Jivision on its rjght b:,.r fire and to patrol f(l'.'eparatory to the capture
of CASTELLO K'RATO and Ir:OlTTiiT SCA URI. The third phase to advance and link with
the attack of t:be 83th Division on Eount CIVITA; to capture CA~T:SLLONORATO a.nd
Pount SCAllRI, continue the pressure to the west and in all three phases to protect the left flank of the Corps and Army.
GENERAL SLOAN: "General Clrirk and felloTT officers. In orc'ler to accomplish
the task assiened the 38th Division b;,r the Corps Cornnander it will be desirable
to initiate it in three separate rhases. The fo~·ti..al objf!ctive vlill be S Ridge,
which is actually in my zone of action, Cericoli and Damiano. Attack on those
objectives will be launched At 2300 and we e).-r,ect ·to take all three by daylight.
This will ~nvolve a concentrated effort of the 350th end 349th including flemethrowers. The second ph2se will be established by an attack of tr.nks in the zone
of action w:.th support by tank fire fror the front of tre 350th Infantry. For
this purpose the division lms one group of tanks less one b~ ttalion. Immediately
follow::tnis the tank attack the 351st attecks in tl' is direction assisted by the
349th Jnfantry attack. The ultimn.te objective of this phase will be taken in
coordimition with the 4th French D:i.vision. B.qfore rroceeding to the third rlwse,
due to the fact thnt we must make a change of direction of 90 degrees it v~ 11 be
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necessary to regroup. :nitiatinry that phase will be a mass tan} action in the
zone of action of the 34Qth and trv~ 351st Infa.ntry to close out Spigno and exploit the slopes opposite. The ~nfantry '1:1ttack follows the ta'1k rt tack, the
riain attack on the north fl::mk by the 349th Infantr;:r tnking CIVITA by fl1mking
action from the ·:orth. The 341st nill assist thrt attack by taking the south
bank of RIO CAPO d 'AC 1TTA by flanking action f'rom the soutl1 and '7 assisting the
85th Division to take CAST~LI.£'NORATO. Immedietely that this area is opened up
the 351st less one battalion will rass t},rough 2.nd rroceed toward the fi.nal obj~ctive. '.:.'hroug'1out this operation the division is rrotecting the right flank.
'l'he third phase will involve the movement of the CEF into the mountains.
G0'i'.SRAL S.1WILLF.: "The opening rhases of this b11.ttle started for the air
arm after the battle of CASSPJO. Since thnt tine the entire Jlediterrnnean Allied
Air Forces have been devoting their attention to direct support of the coming
ground offensive. The 1~nes of communication--r,specfall;v rnil lines between
IT.OF-:.:WCE and the ba.ttlefield--hiive been and are cut. This map shows the main
bridge blocks th1Jt are out and the rail cuts that are relE'tively quickly repaired.
For t:be :rast two weeks no trains have moved eYcept over very short d5stances on
sliuttle trips between this point and the battlefield. In tre coming campaign
of the ground forces this air effort will continue. At the srnall rate of expenditure that has been made by both farces in the past month tr is interdiction crnnot be e:,,.,'J)ected to be coMplete. The notor transport of the Germans is now
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stretched to the rm.ximtm . Viewing tbP- coning bnttle es a preBminPry to a
campaign to capture ROHE , it is apparent thc,.,t thifl cont-i.nurtion will be of
material overall assistance to both armies . This will be the principal effort of the Air Forces in general or ~irect sunport of both the Bighth nnd
the Fifth Arrnies . Close support will not , however, be neglected . Our problem on the Eighth Army front is creatod as A res•1lt of the ground feature of
CASSINO and the RAFII:O RIV'"ffi. Frol'"' an ajr stan0pojnt that makes the Eighth
Army problem largely one of artillery because it is the enemy's artillery
that can hurt the Eip-,hth Arrw ,more th~n anytbing else . On the Fifth Army
front , however , the situation is somewhPt different . The problem there is ,
as previously stated , the isolation of the b?ttlefielrl, the r,erformance of
the rrovement of reserves thereto and the breaking up of counterattacks formin~ therein . In preparation for close support operation~ jn the comjnp, battle ,
fiP:hter controls ?re beinp; set up on the Eighth Army front , on the main Fifth
Army front and in the bridgehead. With these instaJ_lr>tions Pnd with the force
available we feel confident that we can give effective close support to all of
the forces engaged . We feel that it is necessary for everyone to appreciate
the fact that the Air Forces are looking upon the coming ground battle as a
part of a, campaign to capture RC f!!E .
GE {!<~AL HJ\RDING : "I am quite sm~e thet t:re plan thot i.s being unfolded
this mornin~ is in line with General Alexander ' s intentions . I am , lso sure
that General Alexander is in full agreement with the Corm1anding Gern~ral of the
Fifth Army in his remarks about the 36th Division , in tb, t it is most essential
not .to com.l"lit it rrenaturely to the battle . And I lmow that I am speaking for
General Alexander when I say that he also agrees trat the same applies to the
attack from the bridgehead. I think I am right in saying th::it GenAre 1 Alexander regards the attack from the bridgehead as a nost important weapon of opportunity to be launclPd when the situation is fluio , ?_ncJ which nay well be decisive in cutting o""'f the supply n.nd preventjng the withclravuil of the enemy force
then opposing the advance of the main armi~s on the main front . In conclusion
I am sure that he would wish me to add his emphasis to your reml"'rks about the
need for all forces pushinP, on ancl not waiting on each otb~r .
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GENERA!, CLARK : "Gentlemen, it has been a great privjlege in planning this
battle to have General Leese , the Cornrrander of the Eiehth Army, by our side.
There hns been absolute understanding and cooperPtion given by General Leese
and his staff . , General Ualsh , his Chief of Staff , is here and I will ask General Walsh if he has any remarks to P1ake .
G'";' RAT, ...,ALSH:
I think the -point that General ClPr_k has brought out; thAt
we have had si1ch close cooperation between the two armies , is well fa.ken . Fe
have worked side by side , and we have received, over and above all in this
question of zero hour, the greatest consideration and help , and I know I will
express General Leese ' s gratitude for that .
11
GF,NT.RAL CLARK :· "Notes have been made by General Gruenther :ond other staff
o.,..ficers of all these little controversir> 1 points that lmve been brought out in
this conference, and they will pursue these points 1mt:i 1 they are satisfactorilyworked out . There is just one point I want to emphasize and thPt is air supply
in the mountains . · It is very difficult , as ne know fron our experiC)nce at CAS8P!O . Try to plan on your supply by means other than air . It takes a great
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• number of our A-36 Fighter-BombArs to take CB.re of even a battalion. As I remember we had 40 or 50 to take care of that one battalion that was up on Hangman's Hill. To take care of a combt->t team or di vision would exhaust the entire
supply of Fighter-Bombers. However, •ve have planned it and should there be an
emerg~ncy which would dernnd it, we can supply to the best of our ab:ility. Now
during t:be last few days I have visited all of the divisions jn tM.s area-French and Americans. I have seen their sector which they Bre holdj ng rt the
present time and from wiich they will Httack. I am delighted to lmow the
thoroughness of planning and the enthusiasm of everybody concerned for this attack. And I Hm completely satisfied that with the team-play and the determination of everybody
vTill have a great victory. I wish corps and divirum commanders would assemble their princ~pal subordinates 1md impress upon them the
essential elements of this attack. It calls for sreed end all out . with everything we have. Th::ink you, gentlemen. 11
we
After the conference had enderl cr>terers immediPtely rushed in and set up
a cold luncheon. General Clr>rk also served beer - an unusual bevera~e in Italy to his guests. Genern 1 Clark and his subordin~tes Hlso cong-regated outside
around a map for close-up shots for the newsreels.
The guests departed at 1345, and General ClPrk went up to his van to take
care of papers that had accrued during the conference. Later in the afternoon
General Clark received a visit from Cartain Lowden of the Medical Corps, an officer who had been General C1Pxk 1 s rr:othin,r I s prysician for twelve years. Captain Lowden told General Clark that he had· been on hospital sM.ps for the past
18 months, ret:µrning to the States with the vmnnded, spending a few months back
there and then r~turning with the ship "or More wounded . At present he is stationed aboard the hospital ship Seminole. Captain Lo~den vm.s rlso accompanied
by Ca.ptain Kojas, nlso of the Se!'linole. Both officers said they would like to
have continuous service overseas and. thr.t they would apprecfr1te being trrnsferred off' the Seminole to some Fifth Army hosrital. Genl'lral Clrrk saw this as
a goon. opportunity to give Fifth Army medical o..,fic~rs 8 chRnce to return to ·
the States without going through the rotation process, and he intends to investigate the witter further.
General Clark also received a call from Captain Cliff Brown, an of'ficer
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with Allied Force Headquarters who is the son of r'frs. George c. Marshall. General Clark told Captain Drovm of his r~cent visit to the United States and gave
him various messages that 1frs . f.1rirshtll had asked him to deliver .
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Following dinner, Gen~~al ClPrk retired quite early, since he will leave
tomorrow for the beachhead with Colonel Draper. He will r~main there overnight,
returning to h1s headquarters Sunday.
General Clark this evening dictated the following Material f'or inclusion
in his diary:
"General Alexander visit"d the beecl,head today. I received the following
radiogram from General Truscott: RN T037. 1 Gen,.,ral Alexander nrri ved tr· is
morn 4 ng. Yfhen I informed him of the f'our plrms on which I an vrorking, he stated
that I was pnyinr: too ruch A.ttention to alternate rlans. He said that the only
attack he envisages from the beachhead is the Cisterna-Cori-Arrqij (?) attack
rv~tS\~
�:))
,.
1,A.
and thnt he does not consider that any other attacks will attain 1orthwhile
results. He advised ne to concentrate on rlans for that atfock and said that
if and when he ordered the attRck, he would give me ever;r support that I considered n"cessary. He also said trP,t he was most anxious to give me the '36th
Division. I stated to General Alexander thAt my greatest concern was the
timing of the attack ·"rom the bridgehead and the object to be accomplished;
that is, vliether the object was to be accomplished with T'l"tms now existing in
the bridgehead or wit}, the additional division. He informed me he had re/ _.,,
served to him'1elf the decision as to tbe time of ln. 1 mching the attack from ~
the bririgehead. Since I believe there is P rossib~lity thrt the Sezze operation may be desirable, I nm continuing all out preparation for that operation.
In view of' General Alexander's statement, I a,,, concentrating as first priority preparation for the Cisterna-Cori attack. }lease advic,e me if this meets
your arproval. I rissune that you l'.re fully cognizant of General Alexander's
ideas on this su"l:>ject but I want you to know whr-t '1.e has told me today. If
you desire a.ny action on !'W part oth"r than ~ ndic<ited here, please ndvise me
bl'lcause you lmow -thn.t I am with you all the way. 1
I
I wnited until Alexander 1 s return and then had Gruenth~r call Lemnitzer.
Lemnitzer stated that Alexander was calling Me t't nine o'clock. He did not
phone so :r phoned Lennitzer 1md told 1 irn how cieepl;r I resented Alexander's
issuing instructions to my subordinate com.~anrjers, particularly those which
are in conflict with mine. Lemnitzer told me trat there was some justification in the radio which mruscott sent me. I then asked thAt he bring Alexander to tre phone. When Alexander came on tle phone I told him I ri.a.d received
a radio from Truscott which thoroughly astounded me because Truscott repor-,
ted thn t he had issu"d instructions to h:i m which were contrary to I'line, and
Tru~cott, being confused, asked me for cJJ;i.rification. I told fllexander th:=it
if 7ruscott 1 s report was correct I resented deeply his issuing any instructions to r,y ;:iubordinat'1s; that if h1'3 did not lik~ the manner in which I was
carrying on the functio11s of the VI Co111s Ln should issue ariy orders to the
contrary through me and thPt uncler no circ11r1stances would I tolerate his direct dealings· with suhord.:innt~s . It was rerfectly appn.rent that Alexander had
a guilty conscience, and he assured m, thRt he had no intention of resc:indjng
"lY order; thPt he thought we were in oonplete agreement and th,,t if, efter I
talked rith ':'ruscott tomorrow, I ./"elt that there hrid been any underhanded
dealings, I ms to tell him frankly o: my oonclusions - wlicl I ~ill do.
This is a small matter, for it hn.ppens that my rlans for the l'ltta.ck from
the heachhead and my views 1'1S to the v1ny thrt battle shoul<t be run coincide
exactly with those of Alexanrler, but it is vell that I 1 t him know nm, as I
have in the past, that h"! will deal directly witli me and never with a subordim:1 te, wl~ ~ c:r he is· so prone to do.
I lmow factually thAt there are -:nterests brew:ing for the Eighth Army to
take Ro"le, and I might as well let Alexa.nil.er know now thrt if he nttempts any
thing o~ that kind he will have anothl'!r 1111-out battle on his hands; m1melt,
with me.
*
*
*
SAN 1~RCO--T1AY 6, 1944--At 0900 General Clark had a small decoration ceremony
\
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�
Dublin Core
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Title
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Clark, Mark W. Diaries
Subject
The topic of the resource
Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984.
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns.
United States—History, Military—20th century.
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950.
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The Citadel Archives & Museum
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Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
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CP Clark
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Mark W. Clark Collection
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application/pdf
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English
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Text
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20
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Title
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Mark W. Clark Diary, April 1-May 5, 1944
Subject
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Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns
United States—History, Military—20th century
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from April 1-May 5, 1944.
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CP Clark
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The Citadel Archives and Museum
Date
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1944
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Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
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English
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1632
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5D
Though I am tellinP: the senior members of my stPff and r.w Divisional Conmander s of the new arrangements , I am issuing orders thr>t for the rresent no
one else is to l·no'1; I think you will agree th~t it '"ould compromise securit y
j_f it was to get about that we were cominis under your commend, as it "rould be
an indication to the enemy th1,t the main effort of Eightr .Arr~y was t o be made
elsewhere."
*
*
*
CECINA.--AUGUST 1 2 , 19/44- -At 0900 General Clark conferred with Generals Gruenther and Brann, studyipr~ or0rn.tional rriaps in front of Gen0ral Clark ' s van,
for approxirratel y an hour ., At ten o 1 clock Genern.l Sulliv:m, with GenerPl
Ramsay, 11.FHQ and r,rt1.TOUSA 111JwrterrnAster, called on Grmerel Clnrk. Lt. Col.
Newton calJ.Pd to say s:i;oodbye to General Cl;c:,rk and vra.s rresented with the Le gion of Merit . General ClBrk also conferred vd.th severe.l ether of l,is staff
of'ficers , including Colonel McClain, new Fifth Army Judge Ac~vocate, and Colonel
Ryan, Fj fth Army Chaplain..
At 1215 Genernl F:i.rkman, C'·OC 13 Britjsh Corps , i:-,rrived f!ccompr-mied by Brigadiers L"'mbert, Roe , ·7111.tle;r and 1.nJJdey, his G- Ors , QM, Engineer rrnd Sii:p1Pl
Officers rospect:i vely. General CL.,rl<: gr-eetea GenerP 1 Yirkman nnd Brigndier '
Lt>mbert end took the~ to his van with General Gruenther whPre they conferred
studying operational mars for half an hou-r . After this co,nfer,,nce , Generel
Clark escorted General n.rkmr 11 a.nd his . staff to a gua.r,1 of honor for the Brj_ tfah visitors . After tbe f,'Uard of honor General Clark entertained at lunch
these British offie er s , several rnembers of ris staff and Gener~ 1 Lemnit zer ,
who had just arrived at the command rost . General Kirkm..'1.n and st2Sf left at
1445, after which Genernl Clerk rnd Colonel Saltzman left for Gerieral C1Prk 1 s
villa at CAstiglioncello . General Clarlc had Genernls Hume, Gruenther, Sullivan Pnd Colonel Saltzne.n for a swim and riupper . General Clark srent the night
at the vj_lla .
Genere.1 Clark today received the following letter from General Leese :
11 You asked me to ,..,,rite you a short note on the state of tl:e divisions
that come to you in 13 CorrJs .
n HO 13 CORPS
Is an extrernely ef'ficient Corps in every wB.y. General Kirkman is an excellent Corps CoI'lmander; M.s h.,., c kground mil ite.ry 1<novrledge is of a hi':';h order .
Fe plans well e.nd his tactic....., 1 ht:',ncling of formations in the field is excellent . mhe dj_visions✓ work ,extremely harmoniously in the Corps . I rove been
extremely satisf'ied with 13 Corps as a 1diole throughout the operc.tions . They
have borne the brunt of the f'ightjng .
11 6
S. AFHJGA r,J J\Rf~011RED DJV
Joined the Bip;hth Army Pt the beginnin? of J1me , a newly f'orried division .
It hns fought mflgnificently throup;hout the entire ndvr>nce from ROlE to FLORB?JCE .
It has had some 2 , 500 casuelties, including the crisualties (some 700) in the
�5}
24th Gun.rds Brigade. It }111s lost 105 tr-mks destroyed beyond repair, by enemy_
e.ction. It \"ill be made up to strenf;tJi in men and vehicles; but it must have
a rest of 3/4 weeks if 1t is to give of its best ?gFin jn the near future~
If it has the requisite rest it will continue to ½e a mep.;n:ificent fighting
machine. '!'hey rre very well commended by Haj. Genert'11 Foole.
tt6 BRI'I'TSH
AR!T()UPJ~D DIV
Has been continuously in action since the beginning of Mey. They have
had some 2,000 casualties, ancl have fought extremely ,vell. They should he.ve
a short rest if they are to give of thoir best. There is no Commander there
at the moment. Brj gadier Andrew Scott is in temrorary corrrrnand. He is on
experienced officer, but this is the f:irst time he has hPndled the divfa:ion.
A new oorimrmder will be arri vjng shortly.
::;7::.
:D:PIIO battle and continued in action to the beginning of \
July, vrhen the:,r were taken out for three weeks I rest. They have had the
best rart of J,ooo c1c1sUc'llties. They 1.'rA ::i first-class division and if they
a.re not ove:r-t:ired in the next few weeks, will heve extremely good of'.fensive
power. Like all Indian troops, they are slovr and deli berr.te, but get there
in the end. They are very v1ell commanded by Maj. Generfl l Russell.
11 1
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BR.TI' INF' DIV
You will remember this division in the bridgehead. Generol Penney has
i:sone home and lms been replnced by Maj. Generr.l Loewen, whom I think you
also knew in the bridgehead. 'T'he di vision has had two months' rest out of
the line. It hns re-organised and tro.ined 11.nd is in excellent shape* I
have had to t;,ke away the 18th Bde Bnd give :tt bPck to tre 1st Armoured
Div., where it belongs. It bc"ls been replaced by a new brigPde, tvm of whose
battP.lions hr~ve not been in action. This hrigr:de will therefore require
battle inoculetion. Until this brigade ms done this, the division must be
com'ddered a.s a two-brigade division.
11
\
1 CA"'JADIAN .I\..RWv TI\.NK BDE
Has been :f'i~htinr, on and off since the beginning of r1Py. It therefore
should have n sbort rest. It is r first-class brigade, ver;r highly trained;
e.clmowledged by all to be the most exnerienced in the Army."
*
*
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*
CT~CINA--AUGUST 1.3, 191.4--Genernl Cl11rk left the villa a. 0845, returning to
t
his comrmnd post. At 1000 hours General Clark, vri th members of his st11ff,
attended '.Protestant church services held in the command post area. Genere,l
Clark read the scripture. After tl->e service the General returned to M.s villa
a.t Castiglioncello ;vith Colonel Saltzman rind speht a. quiet efternoon with members of' his staff. fl.fter supper Generr-1 ClB.rk returned to the co:rummd rost •
�CRCINA. --AUGUST 14, 1944--At 0900 GenerPl ClRrk met at t:r,e Fifth Army nirffold
Under Secretary of Far Patterson, General Somervell , General Lrrkin and Colonel
Connor and four other members of the rarty. General Clark had a guard of
honor for the visitors , after which he briefHd the narty on tre current situa tion and future rlans .. At 1000 hours Gene:r1'11 CJ.ark, Sol'lervell, Lar'kJ_ and
n
Colonel Connor accompanied t:r,e Under Secretary in L- 5' s leaving for the II
Corps air strip.
'l'hey were J\'let by General Livesa;r ancl drove to the 361st RCT i"rhere one
battalion "taS formed $ After visiting the regimentsl command post the party
drove to the qlst Division comr1J.ond post where they 1unched . Generals Keyes
and Crittenberger were also rresent. /\.:fter lunch the r,art;v drove to the II
Corrs cub str5:p where they left by L- 5 for the Leghorn F'rea . The visitors
were met by C',enerals Tate nnd Fume , Colonel Oxx of PBS and Cnptain Hr>ckenzie ,
1J0IC Leghorn . General Clark and rarty then rroceeded through the tovm of
Leghorn to Favy Fouse where they were briefed by Ca.ptain •Tackenzie on the
naval side e.nd Genera,l Tate and Colonel Oxx on the Army side of the development and problems entailed in the operation of the port of Leghorn.
Follovring the briefing , General CJprl- and ra,rty inspected tbe port for
forty minutes and then proc(~eded to a 240 Jfo,-,,itzer battery of the 697th FA
Battalion where they were met by General Rutledge, Commanding Genern.1 of the
/;.5th AAA Brigade . Lt . Col. Christian, Cor,manding Officer of the 697th,
pointfld out to General Clark and rarty a_ bridge target north of Jisa which
they would take under fire ., The ~n fired six rounds for the Under Secretary,
after which the ~-rty proceeded on to the 45th AAA Brigade where General Rut ledge briefed General Clark and guests on the current situation. GenerP,1
Clark nnd party left the /;.5th A.ti.A for Leghorn cub strip where they took off
in L- 5 ' s for General Clark's Hee.dqur:irters.
Generp,J. Clerk anrl Colonel Saltzman went for a swim on the beach nt the
command post . After dininl'!, quietly with the regular members of his rness , the
General retired for the evening.
Today General Cle.rk sent the following ca_
ble to Gener~ 1 Leese:
"Date 0001 hours 18 August suggested in your Sll for passA.ge of comr1r->nd
of 13 Corps to Fifth Army is agreeable to me . I shall be i1'eljghted to have
you address 13 Corps officers on 21 August and also on ony futuro date you may
desire . Please consider that you e.nd your staff will be '"elcome to visit the
corps at any time . ti
General Cl.8 rk ca.bled General Alexander tod11y as follows:
"The boundary outlined in your 0-4111-2 will j_mpose a rlefensive burden on
13 Corps which ma;,r seriously hamper the Fifth Army in its offensive mission.
I urgently recom111end that the 1xmndnry be placed along the 5 EP sting grid as
prevj ously sui:;gested by you so that riaximum forces of Fiftl,, Army can be employed in attack. If additional troops ere ne_de PVAilable as stPted in your
message I suggest that they be placed under 10 Corps to assist in its defensive
role. Although 10 Corps will be stretched its stntus in that respect will be
no worse than IV U. S . Corps . n
�53
CECINA--AUGUS'f 15, 1944--F'!r'. & F,'!r's. I'fyron Taylor and Hr. Be Mrs. Harold Tittmann and two sons arrived at General Clark's Headquarters by C-47 at ten
o'clock. Generr,.l Clr>.rk greeted the party in his conference hut and generally
briefed them on the current situl'ltion e1t the front for appro::d.m-<i.tely hali'
an hour, after which the Taylors and Tittmrnns left by cer for Leghorn where
General Clark had arranged a visit for them to the port nnd also for them to
see a 240 artillery battery fire. 'I'he Generl'll spent the <lay working on administrative matters and conferring with various staff officers.
'l'he Taylors Rnd TittTTlBnns returned to General Clark's Hendqunrters l'lt
16.30 and were met by Generals ClP.rk and Gruenther. They chatted for about
an hour. The party left by C-47 for Rome at 17.30a
Genernl Beucler came for dinr,er with Generf."ls Clerk, Gruenther, Brann
and Colonel Se,ltzman, after which the Genernl. retired to his van.
I
General Alexander today replied to General ClA.r}·•s cable of yesterday
a.s follows:
11 Your 5365 of 1/, August, I hr->ve been lnto the bound1:1ry question very
carefully and am afra.id it must stand as laid dovm in my 0.41./42 of 13 August.
10 Corps have got to release 4 Indian Division for Eighth Army's offensive
and I am satisfied that they cannot take over More grotmd in consequence.,
13 Corrs offensive effort will come later and in my opinion they hnve enough
troops to carry out th=dr defensive tasks up to tl1e boundary given in my
0.411}2 and get their fOrmations rested before their offensive can begin.. 10
Corps already have a large number of unbrige_ded units to handle, en.d I am
therefore lontr1 to add to their burden in that respect. Moreover even if an
additional U..'1it can be found it cannot reac}1 the forward area before the new
boundary must become orierative.. These are the reasons why if rm additional
unit can be produced I propose to allot it to 13 Corps. I sympe.thise with
your dir'ficulties rmd nm sorry I cr»1not accede to your request. However I
am telling ~ighth Arrny thd if when their chain of reliefs has been completed
they find trm_t 10 Corps ca.n possibly take more ground to their left they must
do so in order to release the maximmn number of troops of 13 Cor!:->S for your
offensive. I .will keep thnt question under close review. 11
1
General Leese cabled c.s follows today with regard to the cable Genernl
Clark sent him yesterday on the subject of 13 Corps:
11
I greatly appreciate your a.greement on these two points. 11
*
*
*
CECIUA--AUGUST 16, 1944--At ms/~5 General Cli:-,_rk bade fe.rewell to Lt. Col.
Luther of the G-1 Section rmd p:·esented him w:ith H Legion of ;'erit . At 0900
Generrils Cl.ark and Gruenther left by cub for 13 British Corps command post
in the vicinity of San Casciano, apy.;roxirrately ten miles south of Florence. \
The General <lrove to the command post where he was met by GenerB l Kirkman
and a small gun.rd of honor. Generals Cla,.rl, and Gruenther conferred with GP.ne-}
ral Kirkman for approximately an hour. Gene:r:11 Clark W!"' s anxious to drive
;
into Florence, but was ,_, - , , ag, 1 11 ,:,v -it 'y Gm1era1 .i:'\:Lr. rnan 1
"'("Vised
• , ,,.+ -~
rr • k
·
·,
,)eceuse or r10 t s
0
�between the ratriots rnc1 the 1''ascists the rrevious evening.
Generals Clnr'k- and Gruenther flew from 13 Ccrps. cub strip tov;erds Montelupo on the Arno River nnd then east ulon~ the river to Florence. General
Cla.rk ci:c-cled the to,7n where he could observe the terra:in around Florence and
the situation with regard to l1!'idges in that riren. He then flew to II Corps
Headquarters :in the vicinity of Castel Fiorentino v:hcre he and Generr>l Gruent!1er conferred and barl lunch with Gonerr>l Keyes 8..nd r:en.bers of the II Corps
staff. After lunch General Clark r0.turned by cub to his cori''"'and rost.
General Clar./" enterta:ined a fe '1 "tem'·,ers of M.s st;:iff for dinner, rfter
which a novie vms shomi. in the conference hut.
General Clark today received the followin£1' letter from Generr-1 Crittenb,=,rger with regard to the ciwtilability of tl·e 1st Armored Division to IV Corrs:
11 1.
A atudy of the situr--tion on our front and Ue d1srosition of the
troops rresently f'Vailahl9 to r.e for the execution 0f' th~ rrorosed IV Corrs
defersive r,ission ;_ncF cates th[it these troops e.re adequr.te. As you lmow they
are noTI srread tbinly along the AR~IO River Hne with a frontage of app.·oximntely 7,000 - ~,ooo y,1.rds per battalion. Sh0uld future rlans require any increase in IV Corps frontnge, it sill be YJ.ecessar~ to provide ~clditioPal troors
for the IV Corrs in order that a light river screen w,y be er;trhlished., and
tJ,at essential :,o1Yile reserves, y-refPrrJ1ly e.r"1or, riry be beld availr-ble.
"To attemrt to cover the sixty nile front f'rorl FLORF:l\fCR to tl 1ci ser- -dth
trie troors rresently n.vailable to tr1e r Corps wo11ld, in ny op ·n:ton, be drmgerous, ar"J!l rdr;rt possibly· b8 tre cause of SP,rious enbE>rrassmrmt to our :<1rms
should ony hostile counter-thrust be na.de :in trij s sector.
"3. Assum:i.nr trrt arditional "'nfantry r' J1t be 1,r<'e PVGilnble to us to
take over any incre~sed front, th~ need for stron~ nobile reserves becomes
more impArative as the front lengthens. To rrovide these strort-; nobile reserves, it is requested tm-.t the 1st Armored Divisi.on be cont1nu.,3d rvrilrble
to the IV Corps in the execution of its defensive mission, and not considered
for other enployment olsewhere. 11
*
*
CECHfA--AUGUST 17, 19/j,4--IT"lhe Generrcl srent the
with merb0rs of Hs stAff'. Tl'e Army co~1n1.:..,n0er
i7ith Colonel •rygc.3rd. The Generri.l hno Generc.1
Division; Colom~l Braun, Chief of Str-iff of the
·1yp.8ard for 8 swim a11d suprer at the villa.
*
morninr, jn his vt1n conferring
left for l':is villfl at 15C'O
Bnlte, Cor'J'l..'lndfog the 3/+th
3/~th; rind Colorels l'orter r,rd
Generrl Clrrk received t:re followini:; lettP.r from G,merrl Rooks, ::1e uty
Chief of Stn ff, i 11 i ed Force Hendqur-rters:
11 GP.n.errl l ·evers, ,iust bPfore 1.e~ving for Corstcr 7est0rdry, c irPcted ~e
1
to ··.Ti.te to you in the ~nterest of eett·inr; the lBading el,:irnents of the g''nd
Divisior c.nd the Rraziliavi Division into action as early P s rossiblB. While
f
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�s5
,I did rot see tr,e rne::;sagP. , jt ,rpears th,t Gener::il Dev.,rs is under rressure
from Gener~l i':,rshl' 11 in this rlr'tter. I gather thrt he has exrressec1 to
Gc>ner~l Dew~rs the roliticnl ur~ency of' rett-5.r~ tr0se troors into the line
anc-1 blooded ri_uickly. Generril Devers , rnc1 J y,remme Flso ''.reneral ;1"rsh1:1ll,
are aware of t he unsnt::Lsfactory state of train:ne; of' t1'1e Brt>.zilfan -infr>ntry.
rev~rtheless , I believe Gen0:ral P"rshc 1 1 r;11s su~gested thr>t some of tbe required training could be accomplished by givfr1g trern rractical e:xrerience
in a quiet sector where they f!re not likely to coP1e to r,rief .
"In resrect of the 92nd Divi:::ion , it 1 s len.ding RCT is now in the Narles
area , receiving ;ts equipment . It was to r1ove to Civitn.veccl 1a several d,ys
n"'o , rmt this arrears to hn.ve been delayed for some reason with which I a.m
not -1",-,miliar . I have instructed Drn ·•oce to rush the r,atter and get it up
to you as quickly ris possible .
0
11 : shoulc'l be ri:lad to },ear fror1 you , after ;vou hrive had an orrortunity
to insrect trPm, of ;vour estim<ite of vlhen you cnn put th"'m in the line to
get their initial ha.pti sm of ffre .
:fow if I may pass to another subject , I must npologize for our Stnff
nction i.n the rin.tter of R Signal 138.ttalion to be ·,j_thrrf'wn frof'.1 your Army.
That cable Wfl s r1 i spatched by a .Junior Staff Officer oi' G- 3 ( org) without
the 1mow1odr,e of GAnertJ.1 Foster, Gerieral Foce, or myself . 1 Te recently lost
the r,ead of th.t sub- section , ColonPl Vittrup, to AFHQ Advr.nce Detachment ,
'1"1r1 ch rm.y exr lain the very stupid error i-1 a Matter of hj ~hest policy 7:i. thout reference to G- 1 or :.he Chief of Staff . At t},e :-1oment, :priority of
available resources has been n:iwm to t'f,e Seventh Prmy ,~or its orerations ,
as you know, but no such priority hr>s been estrbl:..shed in respect of the
Sixth Arrny Group . Thrit is a rn.?tte.c trnt will hrive to be cecided by Generrl
m lson and I very much doubt th11t ns betTieen tre orerrtions of' tre Fifth
Army nnc'l. the formntion of an Army Group , tht't he ,.,; 11 give 1 r-tority to t'be
latter . G has been instructed to CE>ncel the telegram.
-3
11
"Drn 11• oce hrs just Cf' lled me to sr;-r th1t the RCT of the 9?nd Division
has 1 eft the •rapl<>s aren and is due to close in the Civit.-vecchifl aron between the 1/.,th and 16th of August .
"It vms a r,reat pleasure to see you lrist ;rondriy rml to le~rn of your
plans for renew~ ng the offensive . i 1y boss went up to see Harding :resterdr.y
and returned wjth the inf'orm1=1tion that the XIII Corrs TT8s to be placed under
your Comnand . I was sure thrt was the rrorer setup.
11
:at h vll best wishes , 11
Genernl Cln.rJ~ replied to General Rooks as follows:
"Your letter of Aur;ust 12th has been received . I ns'1ure you I rm completely in accord w~ th General i'nrshnll 1 s desire to get the Brazilicns and
elements of the 92nd Division in combat at tl e earliest practicable r1oment .
I have already taken steps to see that this is done .
0
"The Brnzilie.ns should have their equipnent in a day or two .
I Y'ill
�then move them up this wa.y, give them P couple of weeks' training - they
need n:ore than that - and gradually slide them into the defensive sector.
"The 370th RCT does not have its equipment.
We hope jt will get it
by the 25th, when it will be moved into the front line immedfa.tely.
"Am gled the removal from Fifth Army of enother s-i gnal battalion has
been straiehtened out. I hPted to send the messe.ge I did, but under no
conditions can the Fifth Army participate in its forthcoming scheduled attack if this battalion is removed. This same statement Ppplies to the remov8l of any of our coJ11bPt troops.
"It was nice to see you. tt
General ClPrk today sent the following letter to General Marshall:
I delivered to GenerPl Juin the Distinguished Service Medal citation
which you siened. Re was 0eeply touched by tris evidence of your esteem.
Fe told me that he would,never ce~se to be grateful to you. The enclosed
letter from him eloquently portrays his feeling townrd you. I am enclosing a copy cf his letter to me uron the depPrtu.re of the French 1<..:;xpeditionary Corps from Fifth Army conmmnd. General DeGaulle told you of his intent:i on to appoint Ge:ner21 ,Juin as his Chief of Staff. Gcmeral Juin was
given th8t assir;nment about two weeks ago, but I tmderstand that he is uhhappy there. .Juin had stated as a conrl:ition to his acceptance of the poe:ition thet he must be free from politj C8 l interference by the SecretFlry of
War. Apparently he is not experi.encing this freedom, and he told one of
our French "riends the other day th11t he feared he might soon.return to an
inactive status. I certai...vily hope tbat he will be able to resolve his difficulties satisfactorily. T condder that his ret5rement from active service at this time would be a great loss to our cause and would represent
a serious injustice to an outstanding military leader.
11
11 Until about a week ago, General Ale:xr:rider rmd plannAd that the main
attack of the Allied Armies in Italy '':ould be made on 18 Au~st by the
Etehth Army on the BCLOGNA - FLffi''.FCE axis, with a secondary ettack by
Fifth Army toward PISTOIA. However, the hea~J enemy force in the a.ree.
north . of FLmEHCE and the strong enemv positions in that a.rea caused General Alexander to revamp his plan. The new 1,hm is shown schematj crilly on
the enclosed map. The Eighth Army w:i 11 -ittacl· on the ADRIATIC Coast on 25
August to strike behind tbe APP'i?.fINE position. Fifth Army will attack at
a later date in the d:i_rection FLOR:-:HCE - BOLOGNA when the enemy strengtb
in the FLCRr;:NCE aren has been '"eakened suff:i.ciently, either bec:omse of the
Eighth Army attac1: or from othnr causes, so as to rerrnit Fifth Army, ,'Tith
Hs reduced strength, to d:rive over the mountains to BOLOGNA. 13 Corps
(British), under Tieutenant General KirJ~man, has been ~~siip:1ed to the Fifth
Army. It consists of the 8th Indian and the 1st British Inf1mtry Divisions,
and the 6th South African Armored nnd the 6th Britj sh Armored Divisfons.
'T'he IV Corps w:ill hold defensively the line of the ARNO River from the sea
to a point five miles west of FLCREHCE, while the II Corps, consisting of
four United Stetes infantry djvisions, and the 13 Corrs "till mass on tJ narrow front just east of FLOR!-;;FCE to attrick over the r101mt~dns toward ll'LOGNA.
�51
I shall be :prepPred to attccJr, ~',rhen condjt-j ons arP- rire, on tbree drys' notice aftnr the ,..;i_p-htr /i.rmy jumps off. I ·tl 1_1 use Pritchrrd I s 1st Arr:ored
Divisi.on :md the 6th South Africcn Armored D: vision, one combat team of the
q?nd Division anci. vRrious odes Pnrl rmds to hold ny 6O-mile defensive fll'l..nk .
Altrour;l both Prriorcd cljvisions rust be ernployed defensively in the jnjtial
phase, they w~ll not be dispersed unnecessarily, but ,., ill be E'VniL..,ble for
rronrt employr'lent in the FO Valley.
"The GP.rn:-ins dicl rm extrenely tricrough joh in m-ecking the rort of IBGHORN - T'JU.Ch more effective than in r>ny of our p-ev~ ous rorts. JI'. everthe less
the reconstruction wor'k- has rrogressec rrridly enr yesterday th8 first liberty sJ,ip entered the port. i"le have hc(1 no hostile t1
rti llery f1.re in the city
during the r,nst ten days althougr it is vrell v.ritriin Gern-m medium ri:::nee nrtillery. The reason for this inrictivity 5s rroh-bly ca.used by our extremely
1
effective c01mterbattery rrogram. Durinf, th8 'tist thirty c ays our heavy
artillery (811 Howitzers, 2/+0mJ!l Powi.tzers) has knoc. ed out forty guns in the
area north an<l north8PSt of' PLSA. 1Je lose t>J.l of our 8-inch 1u1c' 2LOmm ho·•itzers enrly in Sertember so it i.s :-robnhle trrt tl'e Gernpn r ay res11m,~ the
shelling of the rort at that time.
0
"Since the Fifth Army ca:rtured V :GErR J all n. S. divi<;ions hinre X3An
rested. "le rre using four r-utonrttic "let'lpon Pr,tjp ircrE> ft bntteries in an infantry role; for the rast two ,,eeks they l1 ave held a ten-mile front nlong
tre ARNO River in t:be FISA area. 1fe borromed ~o.,,.tarfl, rnrchine 01.Jns, BAR 1 "'
and the nece::;snry rPrlio SE'ts .,..rom the d-ivisj ons \·l~ich have been re~t~ r,g to
enable the ,\A batteries to carry out treir 5nfantry missions. An antiaircraft 1-,rigade headquarters, unr' er tl' e conmrind of nrig~.d ~ er G0.,.,,er:-, 1 Rutledge, i.s in comril"nd of tl1j s sector. I likewi 9e co.1verted, d th Gonerr 1
Alex:...'l.nder 1 s rermission, a British AA regfr1ent ~nto j_nfantry, ~1d they "re
holdin1 E defensive .,.ront in thie s:.:.re sector. I nm usirg t?n1~ rlestroyers,
tank battalions, 1.7 1ritisJ, a"l.d 90mm antiaircraft g-i_m9 to ~urni~h the artillery surirort in tMs area. Altr-0110-}, it is rin i.mT'rov~ sec1 '"'etur it is
'-7orkini::; ·;ell, aN1 nll of t},P, rermnnel r-re 8ntl1m,;r-stic over t, ei.r new role.
It is prob.'1.ble thrit r-~ter thA ~ntiaircraft ba.ttclions in thei.r infpntry
roles li.rve1 hnii closer contPct ,·,-'t11 tlie enemy, I s•1cll recor'!"P.nr' to the ':nr
Derartr-ent thl"t cert..,in rer~onnel of tl 1 ese octtnlions s ."l"' receive t:bo Contx'lt I11fantry Badge. Incidentally, our c"011,:i;:bbo:rs are v9ry rrourl of tl1 rit
0adr;e. I con3ide:r tl at ·!jhe award of tre b~dge "nd the e}:trri .,,ay for tr ose
,rho hn.ve errneri it hrs given the infa"l.try a gi"eat lift in morn.le. 'i'he!'e is
some sligH; wir:ing f'ror, some of the other hrarches vho feel t:bat they J:,Pvc
been di;::,crir1inated r,gainst, but on bn.lrnce T definitely co11s-:c1 er th1.t the
mea ur9 ici a ,.,.i ... e one. T 1:im, ho rrever, hrving a study rode now to det9l'rn5ne
·1hat recor"'lcPdntion sJ,oulrl be suhrl.1tted to tre ~.'ar De:r[lrtmP-nt t0 cover the
P-11.~ib:ility of infa11trymen who are transferrerl to other brrnches to contin,1e to receive extra }1!:Y. As trri r8gulrtion now reads tre r.,Y continues
if a man is transferred to the Collst Artillery and serves at Fort Dliss,
Tex.rts, ,;hereas, i.f he is trar,sferred to tl e Divis:i.on Signnl Comy,pny in a
front ljne rHvisi_on or to a 4 . 2u Chc!'licril ' 1ortar Batt:ilion in nction the
extra pay ceases.
1
0
1
11 Due to a srortage in s.rt:Dlery and engineers caused by w1 thdrc.wals
from tl-i.is Ari:iy for the Sout'1r>rn 171'[;.nce or""r~tion, I ½ave borrownrl scme sixty
�58
ri·~cellrmeou'1 artillery yjeces from tre 1r~tish, rJ1c rlso t"o battf\lions
of Royal Enp-lnABrs. It -is an i.nteresting task vmlr:Un~ tog')ther tl e miscell8;1eous assortm8nt of u'1j_ts 10, in tre Fifth ArM.y. vie are raking excel lent nrov,ress, and I mn cc,nfident t1-u>t ··e ·rill 17ive r' ~oo<l nccount of
ourselve'.:l ,rhen we finally rttn.ck.
1
"Judge Patt,e1--r:;on and Gen~ral Somervell 1n~re here yesterday. m ~y
were shovm sr-me C'f our activ~ties in tr e f'ront linr:? ru'fHJ s, ~nd botl1 seeJ11ecl
greatly rlease1.
Genernl Somervell to lr-1 ire of your views rs to the P,r'rly employl'1ent
of the '9razilian Comb~t TP8m, nrr the cnmbat ·ean o~ t~n 02nd Division. I
can r>SS11I'e you tli.at this r1i:d:,tPr is r9e~.dvinr"; my close per'30nal attention.
I "'Pa1 l do everytl1inr; poss-lble to get both of t.}•ese 1 mits into action at
ti,e cvrliest rossi le J'loment. The e1uipro•1t t'or th~ 170th RCT of the g:1nd
n~vbion vrlll ar~i V9 here A.bout !rn£;Ust 25th. T rl"n to use tJ,,i.s unit in
t'1e IV Corps defensive s9ctor r 1itM.n r ue131'· r('tm· its e1uipr1cnt arrives.
Lf'tr>r j t 1--ins r"n l'l. suitahlA oprortunity to ol:>tPin ',attle i.nnoculr,tfori in
t·1e defensive sector , T sl·all em:rlo:r it 01"' en°ively. "'he Brrzj liPn Co"TIbat 'T'emn ,,,Ii U 110 eriuipr~d s: ortly r,fter Au 0;u,t l~. I am pk cirri; i.t in nn
rrer about, f'i"t8en 1"1;1es -:,ehind tl--iFl "rant li.'1e to coJ11plete it.-: trairiing.
"' esti~te tk:,t Pr-ter n p9rior:' of Rbout tivo v,p,..,lr~ it 1"ill ,e ro"si.ble to
nio·1e it into a rosition in our nefensive '1ect0'1··. :3~sr>d on its p'3rforr:mnce
thnre T s1-i.~ 1_1 rletermirie ~~he er>rliest dr-te it "'f'-J be erirlov9d o~fi::ris ively.
Hean,rh~ le, somA of the Rrnz-': li!\n of'ficers fl".ld e"'llisted ren i1ill be '"'ent
to our front 1 ine units -l"or brttle ·nnocult1tion. T rm ·~ 1rea0y fo1J.o,ri.ng
that rrocedure with the c0lored RGT.
11
11 .,.. trust tkt the -nnhlic~ty for the 100th Batt.fl Hon Anet the /~2nd Infantry has b0en sritisf':--ctory to you. The 100th 1lnttPlion :bns nc•"le F T'l~gnifice11t job, a11d ••re Pre vr·ry rroud of it. T consicer it most tmf'ortu.r1rite
thr,t rresent A'TTTJL phns crll for Jts -r-erovAl •"rom Fjf'th Ar:~y e11rly in Sertember. TMs battclion bs )ecoine A.:n ~nteP,'.('al part of' the 14th Division,
:mrl P stron~ feelinr:; of rrutur,l r<'!s1,9ct Pn<i '"'0I":irt1tion hris ooAn estf'l1J.i9hcd
between -'_t, .,-, -id ,Jv"l rr-"1t of' th, ('j_vi s:i on. I re?.li?.e thPt nreration P""'TIL
should 'it ve over-r:id;n'?: ,..r·or:lty. For thnt rea"'on I crin tmc1erstand why th'7
44?nd :nfcntry rP.giment sl-1 culrl prom bly be tP ]nm from us. r o,vever, I do
feel that the 100th Battalion should ref"Pin ,fith tr e divisj on, iWe:n though
i.t is rctufllly ri. :r:u-t of the U;?nd R,-,girient. U dcubtedly flll of these factors ,1ere co11sidereii by the 11/'[t!' t'e~_rtment vrhen the dee~ sion ,.,,, s l'1J'H~e to remove the 1not1-i Bntt1s,lfon -rrom the 14t:b Division.
·evertt1eless, .,. ti-ii~t thr->.t
you vrill -f'ordve "'le i.(' I oontinue to bop,'" tl•rt tre South9rn "rPnce orer"'l_tion
dll he so success+"ul th:'1.t -tt r'if1Y 11ot be nece~sary to take tre lOoth B<>ttalion after :ill. I wns sorry to see tre ''J.-,r Depqrtr11 ent orgrnizo the Jt>rr'neseAmer:i can battl=ilions ·into a r9giment. It see"Yls to mP th--t •re would get a
mucb o/Rater rropaganda effect if they could be employr>d ?S ,-,ey,rrrtte 1::1.,,ttr>lions in as ~any the?ters as possible.
m•Je Pre c".eliri;hted with th~ progress thr:.t ,;s 1?ei", mde ~n ff0R"1J\"DY. I
believe tl1 'lt the 3outh0.rn Frrnce oreration · j_ll brve r f,1rther r:levnstrting
ef'fect upon the enemy. I ho e that it May re~ult in a looseninr; on our
"'ront, so thPt the Fifth Army Cfln ret poi.ng <1nd therebv continue our con-
�59
tribution to tl1e bi'!
ri cture.
11 Genertl ~1c~Tr>.ir I s rlePth
rari n o-reat s,,_,ock to mo, for I ht1d ~rorked ::,o
clo:::ely "ti th h; m thP.t : ht1d nn excell<mt op1)ort1m:ity to learn first-hand
op his outstandh1i:i; q11rliVes. He hrs left tl'e arny 8 soinp- concern in
the AJ.~my Ground Forces; T sincerely hopA th,.,t tr :is setup "'ill be continued
after the war. Tts size could be nd i'usted to tl1 e streni::;th of the rea ceti.me army. 1 have h[ld nn excellent oprort1.mity here to observe the T.'ro- /
duct "1liicl1 it h!l.s developed, and :: o..ri c0nv-ir1ced that tl1 ere js no ·:nr Dep.,r-tr-ent at?mcy •,iy,foh ca11. ta'ke its plr-ce in standrrd"zir.r; and oonrl.ucting j
the train:i ni:; of our army afte1:' the war.
"I w2s well pleased to learn of G811ernl Stillvell' s promotion. He
cert~inly deserved it. To my mind J,e is one of our fjnest +>folrl officers.
11 I learned only a f'ew da,vs "r;o th<>t Allen "9:rovm hrd been awr-rded the
Bronze <'.'<tar. ::ill vou rlet1se extend MY conPTntul..,tions to f"rs. ·•..,rshnll,.
Tlie of'fici 'll noti fj_crtion has r lready been :'0rwarded to the '.'Iar Department
throu~h channels, but for -rer:>r that there may be s0P1e deltiy, I t'TT! enclosing copi.es here,,,ith.
"I lwve tak-An -she lj berty of wrjt:i.ng you a rnthAr lonn; J.ettl"lr in order
that you nin;}1t 1
mow irst hn.nd of our situ:' tion 1-iere • 11
Operations Jn2truction ,'!32, issued today, reads rs follows:
11 1.
This Orer~tions In··tructi..on SU;>9rcedes so riuch of O.I. 's 29, 30
m1d '31 as o ;tlines plans for the Arny attac1< and rrescribes ",t,t9 c1 riissions
'
for -;ubord-i_nE'te tmits.
11 2.
Allied Armies in Italy :-re rAgroupin·; in prepar~tion for nn assault r:, ~n.inst tre r/'1THIC Line with the m:is sion of c"1 estroyinr, thP- enemy rrned
forces in Italy.
\
3. F'if'th Army, within its new zone of n.ction, 1il1 attac1,: on D Day
l'lith Corps abreast, ma1·inCl' -its l!k'lin effort in FLffi1="', CE - FC'':'I'Jl.3SIEVE (Q Ol68)
arna to:
11
a.
In Phase I, secure a bridgehen.d ncross the River ARrm.
b. tn fhase II, conduct further orerrtions to t}',e North to penetrate the GOTHTC Line.
4. a.
lr
Corp_s will:
1) Protect rir,ht flank of Fifth Army.
(2) Paintdn con-'-.act with Eiv,rt}, Army a..11.d II Corrs.
(3) Facilit2.te the movenent of the 6 SA Armourer! n~ vision to
.IV Corps r-i.rea. (<-:ee :rnra, 4c (/{,) below).
(4) Arrange muturilly "rith II Corrs for relief of elerients \'est
o-1: FLORVJCE and esta.bl:i.shrent of temporary boundary. (See
para 4b (1) beloVT).
( 5) Within its zone of action, rrio-r to D J~y, riri intr.in con-
�tact ,-,ith the enemy by ratrol r ction rnd be rrepared at
nny time to follow up enemy w-'lthdrmml with all possible
sreed.
(6)
Hold present rositions from FLORENCE tnclusive to Ft
Q 900704 until passed through by II Carps. Troops in
city of P.LOR ,!TC:S will be relieved by sepl'lrr.te order at a
later date.
(7)
In Phase I.
(a)
(b)
(8)
b.
Force crossing of the ,~t~O River mrkin~ its m~in effort between the II Corps boundary and l-ffITAS ;If:VE .
Coordi:ratine its effort ·,ith II Corps, cepture t1nd
secure M. GIOVI (q <)51797).
In Phase II, be 'Preprired on A:rmy order to continue the attack to tlie "'"orth, astride the roac'I S. PIERO (Q 8589) IHOLA (\I 1833). D:irect CO!'L'-:nmicfltion for planning purposes
is a,1thorized bet 7een 13 and II Corps.
II Corps, vrill:
(1) Relieve 13 Corps units in the sector between tre rresent
lJ Corps - II Corp3 boundary and FLORE 1'l"C...-: (exclusive). A
nen temporary lxmndf'ry necr Western exits of 7 Lffi~'JCE
will be determined by PJutul'tl agreement ,, ith 13 Corps and
reported to th is Headqur->rters. Relief v.1.11 be effected
not later than 0001B August 20.
(2)
DesiP,nate one :wT, 88th Division, to be rrep"red, fron
bivoun.c area in the general vicinity of 1".f"i'J'/IIONE {Q 50/,.5)
(movew=mt from rresent b:i.vouac is not n0cessary) to move,
on Army order, to repel enemy oPfensjve action in the IV
Corps sector. ROT selected rill rrepare :rl1Jns f'or such
nction in coordin-:-tion with IV Corps. Direct oor.wnmication a11thorized.
(,)
Desi~ate a second RC~, 88th Division and move same to
v:icin.:ty il'GFOR'f prior to the movement frow present bivouac
of the last RCT, 34th Division. (See pP.xn 5a belo•Y). RCT
selected '::i.11 rrepare rl,,..ns in coorr'l:i.nation with IV Corps
to move, on krmy order, to repel enemy offensive E>ction in
IV Corps sector. Pl,,,ns prepared wj 11 ; nclude rrovisions
f'or r1ovenent of one bntti=? lion on ? hours I notice Pnd tre
RCT, less one battrlion, on 8 hours' notice. Direct commmica.tion authorized.
(4)
Within its zone of nction prior to D Day, maintain contact
with th9 eneny b;v patrol action and be prept1red flt any
time to follovr up enemy vr1 thdravrtl ·7j_U all possible sneed.
(5)
In Phase I:
(a) Cross the raver AR:;O with the main effort bet,IITeen the
'":astern outskirts of FLORF.'\JCE and the 13 Corps boundriry.
�(b)
(6)
c.
Ca:rture nnd secure P. CALV'i.'ifA (Q 893799), M. SE"l'ARIO
(Q 859820) and M. MffiBLLO (Q 776808).
In Phase II, be prepared, on Army order, to o:mtinue the
attnck to t11e Tforth and f'orth·vest astride 1-Tifshvmy •o. 65,
FLCR~UCB - 00100 ,TA . Direct co111nunicr-tion for planning purposes is aut1 orized w;tl· 13 and IV Corps.
rr
Corns, will:
(1) Protect t:be left no.nk of Fffth Army.
(2)
naintain contact with II Carps.
(3)
Assume cornro.nd of new sector (See para 8a below) at
August 20. 85th Division Qnd attrched troops, less
RCT (- 100th Bn and AT Co) :ire a.tt~ched to IV Corps
th is rhase of the operation. The M~2d RCT ( - lOoth
AT Co) remains under II Corps.
(4)
Relieve 85th Division and nttachP.d units utilizin~ 6 SA
Armoured Division uith ntt~ched troops. Direct comnunication with 13 Corns and 6 SA Arnoured Division is n.uthorized.
The 6 SA Arnoured Division is avrilable ?? Au~st.
AttRchMent or<lers '!ill issue. Relieve will bA accorrplished
by 27 Au,gust. Upon relief, 85th Division ill move under
1>rranger.1ents to 11e ro ne direct with II Corps.
(5)
In rhase I, in conjunction
ith 13 and II Carps attack,
simulate ,, crossini:; o.r- the River At1.'TO betvreen r:. :-'ISAIIO
r>nd SIGNA (n 6670) wit}, Major emphn.sis f'ocus0d <'t FUCECCHIO (q 1~365) • (See PlP.n AR'IO Two).
(6)
Vfithin its zone of nction, majn+:.ein contact with tl'e enemy
by patrol action nnd be prerared, at Pny tir~ ~fter the
in:i.tir 1 attr:ick of 13 CTJ.d II Corp'1, to follow up any enemy
withdravml.
0001B
442d
-f'or
Bn nnd
5. a. 34th Division, attr.chod II Corps by sepnrrte orders this date,
will remain on missions risslgned by rrevious directives unt.; 1 mov,0 to II
Corps zone of vction, 8t ··bich ti.me i.t is relieve<l o.r- snch m~·ssion.s.
b. '37oth RCT, (q2d Division) attriched IV Corrs by seyir>r"'te oriJ.ers
this date, vrill he r10VP.d to .r-orwPrd "'reas on rr Corps or<ler, :-:is soon as
e11.uipped f estim1'l.tec:1 d11.te 25 Au~st).
6.
0001B
D Day - Units vdll be rre-r~red to r-ttrck on 72 hourr,, noti.ce r+>ter
AU'!USt 25.
7. Instructions for coordination of ..-rtillerv -fires will 1e is-ue<l sernrt">tely.
8.
Bou.nd11.rie s.
�r·
(1)
(2)
II Corps - l"3 Corps :
(a) Effective 0001~ Pu.eust 20 Fnd until D Doy - Tempor~ry
boundPr;v indj crted nbove (See prrn 4b (1)) .
(h) ~.!•fBctive D Day - Incl 13 Corps - 8IP."'TA (Q ~3Hs) CAST:LL-'Jft (801!~) - J,t 823/,30 - RJ at GR'<;VE (813/.72) thence incl II Cor:rs s. F0L0 (8757) - I t o00667 Ft 900704.
('Jcrr"": : Fs~ble ronrls .,-lth~n 13 Corps zone of "Ction
as prescr:i Jed rerein t're inade1u... te . II
Corps i"i 11 gr .. nt l-:, Corps nBcessn.ry running
r;i::;hts vjthin its zone . Detoils byngreer'lent
Corrs Co~n~nders . )
(3)
h.
Corps - II Corps (effective OOOlB Au.r01st 20) .
Incl II Corps , road U. COLOTI/\ ( ~ 7108) - C0IJ,E Di VAL d 1
ELSA (6630) - P0GGID0;TSI (6835) - RJ 710430 - It 710456 J t 680500 - thence ro'ld to Pt 6755'-'\0 , thence to Cro ssro'ld
nt CRR11'1.IA (685592) ·,r,ere road "Till bfl co·rrr10'1 to bot h
Corps , thence incl Pl Corps Pt 7?0630 - Ft 6Q0710 BI. "';'TZIO River.
Inter-Army -· (e"'fective 0001B August 18) .
Incl Fifth Arm;v - ~r,•r.~ S . SAVPIO (Q 151180) - CI rL''";LIJ..
(q 16?8) - Tncl ~ir,hth Army - LI\.TRI'JA ( 1 l !518) - s rau~nro
(Q H/43) thence Horth along 15 ,ast.in-;.
North of River ARNO .
, e Overlay.
q•
Security - See Flan ARr10 Trro.
10.
S · gmls - Issued separately. 11
*
*
*
C'":CI'l'A --ATTGTJS,,, 18, 1944--Gener~l Cl:>rk returned to Ids COf1Tlv"-lnrl. nost at ten
o 'clock tl-J.:i 8 P'orni.nr: , oonferred rlth },j s ChiPf of St:uf "'nd tre~ left for
Rome ['t 11'30. The GenerRl arr:ived in Ms C- 47 with Gener"l r3rann ['"Y1c1
Colonel Saltznnn , t the Rome 11.irf'ielcl ~t 1245 . The pnrty lunched in the
Gern~rnl I s npartment i.n the Excelsior Hotel in Rome . After rest · ng i..n the
enrl:v r~rt of' tJ,e Pfternoon , the Ge',er-nl r rove "ronnc1 the city "8.th Ge11er"l
Brann a11.d Colonel Saltzrrn . Tlie Ge""nrril ertPrtr-ined a -f'e,·r guests +>or dinner.
General Cl.ark today received the following cablegram from AAI Headquarters:
"The C-in-C has been informed by British Legation to the Holy See
through Commanding General, Rome Allied Area Command that his Holiness the
Pope bas expressed his appreciation of the fine example, bearing and conduct
of Allied troops in Rome. This reflects greatest credit on all members of
Allied Armed Services in Italy, and C-in-C thinks YoU would like to know
that he has received such a message."
�CEOINA--AUGU&-1' 19, 1944-General Clark le~ Rome at 0845 in his C•47, ar•
riving at Fifth Army Headquarters at 0945. At 1110 General Cls.rk and
General Gruenther drove to the Cecina airfield to meet Prime Minister
Churchill who arrived at 1120 with party, consisting of Lord Moran, per•
eonal physician to the Prime Minister; Commander Thomson, ADC to the
Prime MinisterJ MB.jor Grimsley, ADC to General Alexander; and the Prbte
Minister's personal detective.
I
General Clark, with the Prime Minister, drove in General Clark's
command car from the Cecins. airfield to General Clark's Headquarters.
They were greeted enroute by British officers and enlisted men of the
Desert Air Force. Upon their arrival at General Clerk's Headquarters a
guard of honor we.a held for the Prime Minister and a large attendance of
the Fifth Army Headquarters officers and enlisted men were present. At•
ter the guard of honor, General Clark brought the Prime Minister to his
hut with Lord Moran, Comnander Thomson and General Gruenther, where he
briefed Mr. Ch~ohill on the current situation and fut~e plans. Art.er
a ten-minute briefing, members of Generel Clark's staff were brought
into the hut to be introduced to the Prime Minister. Mr. Ch~chill
spoke briefiy to General Clark's assembled staff, congratuls.ting them
on the fine record Fifth Army' has set ~ the important role this Army
has and will continue to play in the final defeat of the enemy. General Clerk and the Prime Minister then walked to General Clark's van
where they conferred alone for ten minutes. While in the van, General
Clark presented the Prime Minister with the first British flag to be
raised over Rome after the Fifth Army entered the city. Mr. Churchill
expressed great appreciation to General Clark for his thoughtfulness
and remarked that it would be a great trea~e to him. General Clark
and Mr. Churchill then drove off in General Clark's jeep, acoanpanied
by Mr. Ch~chill's party and General Gruenther.
At 1230 General Clark and the Prime Minister arrived at Vada where
they were met by Major General Bolte. Here they reviewed one RCT of'
the 34th Division together with composite units of the Brazilian Expe•
ditionsry Force, members of the u. s. Army Nurse Corps, members of the
Women's Arm,- Corps. Art.er the review Prime Minister Ch~chill gave a
ten-minute talk to· the troops.
At 1300 Genersl Clark, Mr. Churchill and party left the review
site at Vada, arriving at the 34th Division command post at 1310. They
were met by General Kirkman, 13 Corps Commander; General Mascarenhas,
Brazilian Expeditionary Force Commander; General Keyes, II Corps Com•
mander and General Crittenberger, IV Corps Commander. General Bolte,
Commanding General of the 34th Division, entertained the party for
lunch.
Art.er lunch General Clark, Mr. Churchill and party proceeded b7
jeep to Leghorn. Enroute they reviewed the 168th Infantry of the 34th
Division, the 134th and 135th Infantries. In reviewing these units,
General Clark and Mr. Ch~chill dismounted from their vehicles, trooped
the line and talked to many of the officers and doughboys of these regi•
ments.
��At 1430 the part,- arrived at Leghorn where the Prime Minister was
greeted upon his entrance into the cit,- by many miscellaneous British
units from the surrounding areas who stood in formation on either side
of the road leadin~ to the port. General Hume joined General Clerk and
the Prime l!inister in General Clark's jeep upon their arrival at Leghorn.
General Hume pointed out the civil problems and the progress being made
in the development or Leghorn. General Clark and party drove directly to
the port in Leghorn where they were greeted by General Tate, G-l► of Fi~h
>.nr,-, and Captain Mackenzie, Naval Officer in Charge of' Leghorn, and members of' their staffs .. General Clark, Mr. Churchill and pi.rty boarded a
Royal Navy patrol boat, and for 45 minutes inspected the pert, Captain
Mackenzie and General Tate e:xplaining to the Prime Minister and General
Clerk the problems and progress in the developnent of the port of Leghorn.
At 1520 General Clark, Prinie Minister Churchill and i:e.rty drove from
Leghorn to a 240mm battery of the 697th Artillery Battalion in the vicinity
of Nugola, where they were met by General Rutledge. Lt. Col. Christian,
Battalion Commander, oriented his auITent situation briefly to the Prime
) \
Minister and General Clark, showing them a bridge target north of Pisa on
.,,,
which they would fire. Prime Minister Churchill pulled the lanyard firing
the first round. Arter the battery fired six rounds, the observation
plane reported the target had been hit. General Clark and the Prime Minister then departed by jeep for the Cecina airfield, arriving at 1740.
1
There General Clark bade goodbye to the Prime Minister and his party who
departed by C•l~7 for Caserta. General Clark, with General Gruenther, returned to his command post.·
General Clark worked on papers for about an hour before leaving for
his villa at C&stiglioncello where he dined quietly and retired early.
The complete text of Mr. Churchill's speech to Fifth Army troops is
quoted below:
"General Mark Clark, General Bolte, officers and men of the 34th United
States Infantry Division; officers and men of the Brazilian Expeditionary
Force; officers and men of the United States negro troops; Americans of'
Japanese ancestry and ycur American officers; I greet ycu here this morn•
ing with feelings of pride tha.t the honor should have fallen to me to in•
spect these units of the Fifth Army, one of the great armies of the United
Nations, which are everywhere advancing victoriously upon the roe.
"The 34th u. s. Division was first, or among the very first of all
the United States troops to leave the new world and carry by their sacrifices and their valor the precious blessing of freedom e.nd justice to the
lands enslaved by Hitler's tJ'l"8.!Ul7. That tyranny we shall break. We
shall shatter the sources from which its evil powers are derived, which
will be so obliterated and blasted that f'or many hundreds of years none
will dare to do the like again.
"Officers and soldiers, and the representatives of the Women's Artq
Corps, Army Nurse Corps, we have here in Italy one of the finest armies in
the world. The combination of the Firth Army and of the British Eighth
Army bind together tllO veteran armies in a bond of brotherhood and com-adeship
�in arms, and in the sense of mrcbing and fighting shoulder to shoulder for
a righteous cause. You have done deeds which will long be remembered. The
earliest landings in Italy, the long fighting at Anzio beachhead, the battle
of the Cassino front, and the capture or Rome and Leghorn• all of these are
episodes which have played a. fruitf'ul and an invaluable part in the entire
scheme and design or the Allied Armies. No operation oould have been more
fruitful in this theater than the work which you have done by drawing awayj )
perhaps two dozen or more divisions dmm into Italy where they have been
torn to pieces. You have aided notably and most effectively the great
battle now proceeding to its victorious climax on the fields of France.
though you have done great deeds in the past, and may well be proud of what
has been achieved, I come here to tell you today that greater ventures and
greater achievements now lie ahead of you, and that you will be playing con•
stantly an absolutely vital pert in the long, hard struggle for whose speedy'
end we all strike, and for whose speedy end we all pray.
"I wish you • all of you - all the units represented here and the Bra•
zilians - 1. wish all of you all good fortune; I wish you God speed; may God
bless you ill."
*
*
*
CECINA-AUGUS'r 20, 191+4-The General spent a quiet day at his villa. In the
evening he entertained members of his staff; including General Gruenther,
Colonel Gray, Colonel Eberhard and General Brann.
*
*
*
CECINA••AUGU&'T 21, 1944--General Clark le:rt his villa at 0900 for his command
post, arriving at 0945. Generals Gruenther and Keyes conferred with the General in his van for an hour. At 1230 Generals Devers and Barr called to see
General Clark with General Gruenther. They confe?Ted for approximately thirt7
minutes. General Clark spent a quiet a.:rternoon working in his van, conferring
with members of his staff.
General Clark today received the following letter from General Alexander:
"I bad hoped to come and see you to discuss the coming battle, but yesterday the Prime Minister specially asked me to accompany him on his visit to
13 Corps, and today the C.I.G.s. arrives and will, I expect, keep me fully oc•
cupied for a day or two. I am therefore writing instead to make quite certain that we are in full agreement about our plans.
"As I think I explained when we le.st met at Oliver Leese's H.Q., our
margin of superiority over the enemy is in my opinion suoh thtit we cannot af•
ford any detraction from our main effort. That is why I have included in my
orders a statement to the effect that Eighth Army is to be given priority
where requirements conflict. It is also the reason why I have laid insistence on your simulating preparations for attacks along the whole front from
PONTASSIEVE to PONTEDERA, even it that entails some disadvantage from the
point of view of your own subsequent operations. I am confident that I can
rely on you and all your commanders to carry out that vitally important part
�of your task, and to hold the enemy opposite you by continuing to simulate
the mounting of a major offensive on a broad front .right up to the time at
which you actually latmch your own attack. The longer we can kP,ep the
enemy's attention and formations on your front the greater will be the mea•
sure of our overall ultimate success.
"As regards your own attack I do not intend to ask you to latmch it
1D1til I am convinced that the enemy has been forced into a position in
which you will have a really good chance of getting over the APENNINES.
I need hardly emphasise the importance of pressing it with the gre~test
determination when it is launched.
"During the past two days we have had meetings here with the Air
Force, including Cannon and his staff, and I run now satisfied that we shall
get all the support that they can give us. At the same time, we cannot
for obvious reasons hope to have the same amount or support as we did before operations in the South of France began. D •Albiac and Dickson will
do everything they can to meet the air requirements for your attack, but
at that stage the air support for Eighth Army must continue simultaneously,
and they may not always be able to give you all you would like. I will
howewr watch this aspect of the matter carefully myself, and I must ask
you to accept it at that.
"It is, as I am sure you will agree, most important that we should
be in full agreement about the way in which these operations are to be conducted, and I hope I can count on your wholehearted adherence to the principles I have laid down in my orders, and which I have amplified in this
letter.
"I shall certs.inly be seeing you again bef'ore your attack begins, but
I want to take this opportunity to wish you and your fine Army ewry success and the best of good luck in our coming battle. The Prime Minister
enjoyed his visit to you immensely and was most impressed by all he saw.
Thank you very much for making such excellent arrangements for him."
General Clark replied to General Alexander's letter as follows:
"I have just received your letter of
you that I am in complete accord with the
the forthcoming operations. I assure you
of giving priority to Eighth Army and the
tions for an attack ftlong my whole front.
out your instructions to the letter.
August 21st and hasten to assure
way in which you have outlined
that I understand the necessity
reasons for simulating preparaI have issued orders which carry
"I have seen Kirkman and Keyes, and the two of them met this afternoon
in order to work out some of the complicated details of their coordinated
attack.
"Am glad you are arranging additional air to support both the Fifth
and Eighth Army attacks. I appreciate that the Eighth Army air support
must continue when my attack starts.
"Please dismiss from your mind any misgivings you may have as to our
�desll'e to push this thing with all our enr,rgy.
The only thing I do not like
I
is the waiting. We are anxious to get going, and the sooner conditions will }
permit our attack the better we will like it. I will be ready any time you
say the word 1 go 1 •
"Devers was here today and proposed taking one of my signal battalions;
which I naturally objected to. He had an alternate plan which would take
some signal personnel, officers and enlisted men, to whioh I agreed. I can
do this without interfering with our forthcoming operation.
"I am glad the PriJne Minister was pleased with his visit. It was a
great pleasure for us to have him with us, and all the troops were stimulated
by his presence.
"Please remember me to the C.I.G.S. I hope we may have the pleasure of
a visit from him while he is in this area."
*
*
*
CECINA--AUGUST 22, 1944--General Clark worked on administrative matters in
his van until 10: . 0, at which time he departed by L-5 to visit II Corps and
3
IV Corps, at which points he presented decorations to various members of II
and IV Corps.
Arriving be.ck at his command post in mid-afternoon, the Army Commander
departed shortly thereafter for his villa at Castiglionoello where he took
a short swim, returning to his command post later in the evening.
General Clark today sent the following cable to General Mascarenhas,
Commander or the Brazilian Expeditionary Force:
"I send greetings from the officers, the men and the women of the
Firth~, to their gallant comrades of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force,
on the occasion or the second anniversary or Brazil's declaration of war
against the German enemy. Fighting shoulder to shoulder with troops of the
Fifth Ar'f111' from the United States or America and the British Empire, the
Brazilian Forces will play an important pa.rt in the defeat of Hitler and
the Nazi war machine. Good luck to every one or you."
General Mascarenhas replied to General Clark's message as follows:
"Officers and men of Brazilian Expeditionary Force are filled with
satisfaction at receiving your greetings on the second anniversary of
Brazil's declaration of war on Germany. Your words strengthened us and
reaffirmed the sentiments of confidence and friendship which tmite our
countries. The soldiers of Brazil are proud to belong to the Fifth Army.
They will do all in their power to raise even higher the level of courage
and efficiency of the troops under your command. We send to the troops
under your oommand and to ow comrades of the Fifth Army our thanks."
�A brief SUlftl'll8l7' of' tactical operations for the week ending August 22,
1944 is as follows:
The 2nd New Zealand Division sector was taken over by the 85th Division.
Fifth Army asSUJ1ed command of 13 British Corps, thereby extending its sector
to the Rl5 easting. The 442nd RCT (looth Battalion) ·(attached to the 88th
Division) relieved left brigade of 1st British Infantry Division am assumed
responsibility for the sector. On all other sectors, regrouping continued.
*
*
*
CECINA••ATJGUST 2.3, 1944•-General Clark left at 0845 by L-5 for. 13 Corps
where he was met at the 13 Corps cub field by General Kirkman, Corps Comman•
der, and .M!ljor General Poole, 6th South African Armored Division Commander.
General Cl.erk conferred with General Kirkman and General Poole at the field
for f'if'tee1,1 minutes, a.fter which General Clark Bnd ·General Kirkman bade good•
bye to General Poole and left for the 1st Infantry Division British where
they were met by Ml!ljor ,General Loewen. A guard of honor was held for General
Clark. General Clark and General Kirkman conferred for fifteen minutes with
veneral Loewen, after which they drove to the 8th Indian Division where the7
were met by General Russell who introduced General Clerk to members of his
staff'. General Clark, General Kirkman and General Russell drove by jeep to
within a mile of an observation post or the 8th Indian Division where they
dismounted from the jeep and walked up the mountain to the OP. Here they
could observe the terr.ain to the east towards Pontassieve over which it was
proposed that General Russell's 8th Indian Division would attack, and to the
west into the valle7 immediately smTounding Florence. While Generals Clark,
Kirkman and Russell were at the observation post, it was reported to an officer at the OP that a shell had landed in the road which General Clark had
been over appro:ximatel7 five minutes previously. As the road was completely
under enemy observation, it can be assumed that the enemy observed the passing ·
vehicles and opened fire, thinking there might be considerable Allied move•
ment on that road. After spending fifteen minutes at the OP, Generals Clark
and Kirkman bl.de goodbye to General Russell and proceeded on to the 6th
Armored Division British where they were met b7 Major General Murra:, who in•
troduced General Clark to members of his staff and entertained General Clark
for lunch. During lunch General Hornby, Artiller7 Officer of AAI, arrived
and joined General Clark and p,,rt:, for lunch. After lunch General Clark was
escorted by General Kirkman to the 6th Armored Division cub field. General
Clark then flew to the cub field near Rosigna.no where he was met by Colonel
Wood, Commanding Officer of the 38th Evacuation Hospital who escorted him to
the hospital.
General Clark visited wards where he talked to patients. After visiting
the wards, Colonel Wood assembled all members of the hospital staff. General Cl.erk spoke to them, commending them on their fine work and giving them
encouragement in remarking that the Fifth Army-would once again be on the
move soon. General Clark then returned to his command post by L-5. Upon
his arrival at the command post, General Clark, with Colonel Saltzman, went
for a swim, after which he dined with the regular members or his mess.
*
*
*
��I
CECINA••AUGUSI' 24, 1944--General Clark left at 0900 by L•5 and landed at the
45th AAA cub strip at 0915 where he was met by General Ramey. He then drove
to the 45th AAA Headquarters where he was met by General Crittenberger.
General Clark spoke to Major Lyle who is returning to the States to accept
his nomination to Congress from the state of Tens. General Clark then vi•
sited the looth Infantry Battalion and decorated and promoted personnel of
this be.tte.lion. General Clark then met General Pritchard, Commander of the
1st Armored Division and visited several be.tta.lion command posts and talked
to officers and men of this division, observing their training. General
Pritchard entertained General Clark for lunch at the 1st Armored command
post.
After lunch General Clark visited the 2nd Battalion of the 3':Q.~ Regiment of the_9~nd Division, _pow attached to the 1st Armored Division. General Clark welcomed the .37U1, Regiment to the Fifth Army, and his talk is
quoted in full at the conclusion of today's diary. At 1600 General Clark
returned by L-5 to his command post and dined with the regular members of
his mess.
General Clark's speech to the men of the ·37aj{ Regiment was as follows:
"Officers and men of the 37oth Regiment of the 92nd Division: I have
eome here this morning to welcome you to the Fifth Army and to tell you how
genuinely pleased we are to have you, as members of the 92nd Division, in
the Fifth Army.
"Let me tell you a little about this fine Fifth Army which you have
joined. It has been fighting for almost a year at Salerno, Naples, Cassino,
Anzio and Rome to the Leghorn-Florence Line. We have captm-ed over 47 ,ooo
of the enemy; killed and wounded several times that number, destroyed 10 to
15 German divisions; pursued him for .300 miles through this mountainous
telTain, and ha.ve, with severe fighting, beaten him wherever we have found
him. The Fifth Army is made up of old and new divisions - new ones like
yo'ln"'s - and they have all performed magnificent deeds on this Italian field
of battle.
"Now to say a few words about your Division. I lmow how carefully you
have been trained. I lmow of yo'ln"' fine leadership, of your discipline, and
of your proficiency with yom- weapons. You are better equipped than any
other army in the world; you have now joined the big leagues. You are with
professional fighters, and with your be.ckground of training and your desire
to close with the enemy, you have every opportunity before you to JDAke a
great name for your 92nd Division. You are receiving the same battle inoculation which has been given to other units of the Fifth Army. You will find
that when you meet the German you have notMng to fear from him. In fact,
he will be A.fraid of you. You will defeat him and you will annihilate him
every place you find him.
"You will prove to yourselves that he is inferior to you and that you
are superior to him in every way.
"What could be a finer setting for an entrance into battle than with
the German wobbling on his last legs, with the Allied Forces in France a.11d
j
�Russia closing in on him, and we ready again to bloody his nose here. Take
this opportunity, as I know you will, to cover yourselves with glory. You
men of the 92nd Division will be in on the final battle when we oompletel:,
crush our enemy and thereby bring victory to our great nation.
"Good luck to you and God bless you."
General Clark this afternoon sent the following letter to General Leese,
Commanding the British Eighth Army:
"On the eve of your attack against the Gothic Line I desire to express
to you my heartiest good wishes for a great success. The Firth and Eighth
Armies have fought side by side for almost the entire length of the Italian
Peninsula and all d'l.ll"ing this time the greatest feeling of respect and cooperation have existed between the two forces. Together our Armies struck
the first great blows at the continent of Europe.
"Now that we have reached the last great enemy bastion in Italy and all
preparation has been made, our attack is to be launched. I am certain that
the gallant troops of the Eighth Army who bear the initial weight of the as•
sault will add to their already glorious history. You may rest ass,n-ed that
as always the Fifth Army will give its utmost in its attack.
"Best of luck to you, your commanders, and your troops."
The Arrq Commander today received the following messa.ge from Field Mar•
shal Sir Alan Brooke, British Chief of the Imperial General Staff:
"I em so sorry that during my short 48 hours• visit I have been une.b le
to call on your headquarters. I should so very much have appreciated the
opportunity or meeting you again and of congratulating you personally on the
wonderful successes of the Fifth Army. Best of luck and all good wishes for
the future."
Operations Instruction #33 was issued today and reads as follows:
"l. Par 6, O. I. #32, is deleted and the following substituted:
D Day - II Corps from present bivouac areas and 13 Corps from
rear areas, will be prepared to move into final assembly positions and launch
the attaek on 96 hours notice. In the event of heavy rain after movement has
been initiated, the Anny Co:rnmander will decide by 1600 hours D - l whether or
not the attack will be delayed.
"2. Par 8 a (2) is a.mended in accordance with the following:
Effective D - 4, II Corps will take oomma.nd of that portion of the
II Corps attack sector from the Corps Rear boundary forward to include the
assembly areas of the 34th and 91st Divisions and Corps Artillery. Corps
Commanders will arrange mutually for a temporary boundary whose left limit
will follow appropriate part of the temporary boundary now in effect and whose
right limit will follow appropriate part of inter-Corps boundary for the attack.
Commanding General, II Corps will notify th is Headquarters result of mutual
\
�arrangements and exact hour of assumption of oomma.nd.
,
Effective D - 2, II Corps will assume ootnm8nd of the forward area.
of the II Corps attack sector at whioh time the remainder of the II - 13
Corps attack boundary will come into effect. Corps CoMmanders will arrange
mutually for exact hour of change of command and Commanding General, II
Corps will notify this Headquarters. 13 Corps troops other than forward
screen1.ng elements will be relieved and moved under mutual arrangements to
13 Corps sector. Screening elements will remain in position under temporary
operational oommand of II Corps unt\l passe4 through.". ~ ,M" ~ ~ J"-"
' ~ a.-v~~ Co\ -'6 .. J
O ~
s~
(>
*
gef ~
A
*
-1""-ir 0-0-0
/~'
I
~ - ~ u;-crf"'
*~
C •
~
etCINA--AUGUST 25, 1944--General Cla.rk left his villa at 1100 for Vada to
fh1-!
inspect an RCT of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force. Upon his arrival at
Y' }!
the field, General Clark was met by General Masoarenhas and Captain Walters,
'-''-.J" t/'L interpreter. General Clark drove to the reviewing stand where he was greeted
10_ .A
by members of General Masoarenhas' staff and members of the Fifth Army staff.
- if'/ Af'ter the Brazilian and American national anthems, General Cla.rk, with Gene/4- ral Mascarenhas and General Zenobio, Cornrn:mding the Division, trooped the
x ft' 1 line and reviewed the troops. The General then returned to the grandstand,
oJ:, at which time he was introduced by General Mascarenha.s to the Brazilian
troops. General Clark then gave a ten-minute talk to the Brazilian troops .rV"
whioh is quoted in f\111 at the oonclusion of today's diary. The General's
\"
speech was translated into Portugese by Captain Walters. After General
,~
Clark's speech, Brazilian troops passed in review before the grands~and, ar- 1uty>'
ter which General Clark met officers of' General Mi.scarenhas' staff and mem• ' 1:l p..,
bers of the Br-azilian Nurse Corps. General Clark and General Mascarenhas
;,,,,then drove to the Brazilian Expeditionary Corps Headquarters where General
~
1
Clark and members of his staff were entertained for lunch. General Maso~ren'
has in a toast at lunch expressed how honored and proud he personally and all
Brazilians were that the Brazilian Expeditionary Force oould serve with the
Fif'th Army.
r
t
r"1/
Af'ter lunch General Clark bade goodbye and drove to his villa at Castig•
lioncello where he spent a quiet af'ternoon swimming and resting. At 1800
General Clark gave a cocktail pi.rty and buffet supper in honor of General
Beucler and members of the French mission on the occasion of their departure
from Fifth Army. Approximately fifty guests were present, including members
of General Clark and General Beucler 1 s staffs. During the evening, betore
all guests present, General Clark presented General Beucler with the gift of
a carbine and a letter of' farewell. General Clark expressed at this time
his deep regret in losing General Beucler and his staff. General Beucler,
with deep emotion, bade farewell to General Clark.
General Clark's speech to the Brazilians -is quoted below:
"General Masearenhas, General Zenobio, officers and men of the Brazilian
Expeditionary Force, I have oome here this morning to greet you - to weloome
you to the Fifth Army - and to tell you how genuinely proud we are to have
you by our side. You have joined a fighting organization, the Fi~h Army. I
want to tell you something about this Fifth Army that you are a part of at
the present time.
�· "In a few days, September 9th will me.rk the first anniversary of our
landing at Salerno. After Salerno, as you know, we had desperate fighting
and defeated the enemy's effort to drive us back into the sea. We then
fought up the coast to the great port of Naples. After that we fought our
way through mountains, snow, mud and rain and finally landed at the beachhead in Anzio where again we defeated his efforts to drive us out. We won
a great victory at Anzio and killed thousands of his troops. At Anzio we
were constantly a threat to his flank. This threat, in conjunction with our
push of May 11th, finally helped us to liberate the first of the European
capitals under Nazi domination. We captured Rome.
"We then continued the advance some 200 miles, and now are on the line
Pisa - Florence. We captured 47 ,ooo Germans; we wiped out as many more.
We annihilated many of his divisions and have defeated him on every field
of battle where we have foum him.
"Do not think that the Fifth Army is through now. We are just beginning, and you will play a great part - you of the Brazilian Expeditionary
Force - in the great victories which are to come. Your presence here today
is but another indication of the solidarity of purpose which exists between
our two great nations. You represent the cream of the Brazilian Army. You
are well led; you have fine leaders in General Masoarenhas and General Zeno•
bio. Your junior officers are well trained. You a.re well equipped. With
your fighting spirit great days lie ahead for you.
"I like what I saw this morning. You mve a look of determination
about yau. From what I ha. ve seen of you as I passed through this area you
are well disciplined. Do not forget that discipline is a most important
factor in the winning of battles. You ere receiving the same battle inoculation course which has been given to other llllits of the Firth Army. You
will find that when you meet the German you have nothing to fear from him;
in fact, he will be afraid of you. You will defeat him, am you will anni•
hilate him every place you find him. You will cover yourselves rlth glory
and write a fine, brilliant chapter in the history of your beloved oountry,
Brazil.
"What could be more appropriate than on this great national holiday of
yours, Caxi.as Day, that you should take your pls.ce on the fighting side of
the Firth Arrrry, and renew your pledge to destroy your hated enemy.
"Great days lie ahead of you.
Good luck to you and God bless you."
Genertl Clark today replied to Field Marshal Brooke's message of yesterday as follows:
"I deeply apprecinte your thoughtful message. I would have been highly
honored and extremely pleased to have had you visit Fifth Army and sincerely
hope that another opportunity to visit us will present itself before too
long."
General Leese today replied to General Clark's letter of yesterday as
follows:
�'73
"We are proud that our 13 Corps is serving under your command and feel
sure that they will add to their fine reputation during your advance.
"We shall all be watching your own operation confidently and with the
greatest interest when the time comes.
"I send to you and to the Fifth Army m::, very best wishes. All good
luck to you."
*
*
*
CECINA-•AUGUST 26, 1944--General Clsrk spent a quiet morning at his villa
working. Colonel Bruce came for a swim and lunch. After lunch Generals
Gruenther, Brann and Howard arrived with tactical mps and conferred for an
hour with General Clark. General Cl.ark left wi. th Generals Gruenther, Brann
and Howard for his command post at 1600 hours, and conferred with these
officers in front of his van for another hour. The General dined in his
mess with the regular members of the mess and retired ear~.
General Clark today wrote the following letter to Maj. Gen. Russell,
Commanding the 8th Indian Division:
"I enjoyed m::, visit with you the other day. It was an extreme pleasure to meet you and have the opportunity to talk with you.
"I should like very much to visit you at your headquarters, and to have
an opportunity to talk to the troops of your fine Division in the same manner
in which I have addressed the troops of the American Divisions of the Fifth
Army on the eve of our important battles. I hope it will be possible to arrange fr1r this in the next few days.
"May I again express my pleasure at having your Division, and the other
fine troops of the lJth Corps with us. I feel sm-e you will add even more
to the brilliant record which your troops _
have established throughout the
African campaign and here in Italy.
"With best wishes, I am"
General Clark today sent the following cable to General Eisenhower:
"M:r heartiest congratulations on your outstandingly brilliant maneuvers
in Northern France which resulted in the liberation of Paris. The whole
world is deeply indebted to you for your leadership in this magnificent
battle. Please convey my congratulations to Generals Bradley and Patton fr1r
the superb job they have done. We of the Fifth Army will continut to do
everything in our power to contribute to the final victory."
General Cl.ark also cabled General Patch today as follows:
"I extend to you my s:incerest congratulations for the successes whioh
your troops have achieved in Southern France. Your amazing advances are
daily contributing to the doom of the German enemy. Please give m:y best
wishes to Truscott and De Lattre de Tassigny."
�CECINA-AUGUST 27, 1944--General Lemnitzer and General Gruenther came to con•
fer with General Clerk this morning at llOO hours. At 1245 Messrs. Murphy
and Of'fie arrived. Before lunch General Cl~.rk spent several minutes alone
with Mr. Murphy in conference, after which Generals Cl.P.rk, Lemnitzer, Gruenther, Mr. Murphy and Mr. Off'ie h,id lunch in General Clark's mess. Arter
lunch Generals Clark and Gruenther played lridge and went for a swim with
Messrs. Murphy and Off'ie. Mr. Murphy told General Clerk he was leaving
Friday for Washington, there to take a new assignment. Messrs. Murphy and
Offie left for Caserta in General Clark's C-47 at 1730, after which General
Clark, with Colonel Saltzman, drove to his villa in Ce.stiglioncello to spend
the night.
*
*
*
TAVERNELLE-•AUGUST 28, 1944--General Clark moved his coJl'lmand post from Cecinh l
to Tevernelle. At 1000 General Cl~.rk flew to a cub field up forward where he
was met by General Pritchard and Colonel Ladue. He then drove to the col'lll!l8.nd
post of the 1st Battalion of the 37oth Infantry of the 92nd Division. Gene•
ral Clark reviewed the troops and presented ten combat infantrymen's hedges,
after which he gave a speech of welcome to this battalion, welcoming them to
the Fifth Army. After the ceremony General Cle.rk returned by plane to Castiglioncello where he entertained members of his staff for dinner.
*
*
*
TAVERNELLE-•AUGUST 29, 1944-•At llOO hours General Cle.rk left by L-5 for the
56th Ewtcuation Hospital where he visited wards, spoke to patients, met mem•
bers of the hospital staff and presented Purple Hearts to wounded. The Gene•
ral arrived by L-5 at his new comme.nd post cub strip and drove to his headquarters, arriving at 1245.
In the afternoon, Mr. Tompkins, newly appointed director of the American
Red Cross in Italy, called to see General Clerk. The General spent the rest
of the afternoon in his van conferring with various members of his staff.
A brief summary of tactical operations for the week ending August 29th
is as follO'fls:
Normal relief's and regrouping or units continued to be carried out. Active patrolling in defense of their sectors was maintained by II and IV Corps
while limited objectives were secured by 13 Corps.
*
*
*
TAVERNELIE-AUGUST 30, 1944--At 1000 hours General Clark made two recordings
- one for the War Department and one for troops of the Fifth Army commemorating Salerno Day, the full text of which is quoted at the conclusion of today's
diary. At 1045 Sir James Griggs, Secretary of State for War, General Alexander, CINC, AAI, Lt. Gen. Weeks of the War Office, General Lemnitzer and Maj.
Gen. Theron arrived. General Clark greeted Sir James Griggs with a guard of
honor, after which he introduced him to members of the Fifth Army British
Increment. General Cle.r.,_ with Sir James Griggs, General Alexander and party,
proceeded to the outside of his van where the General oriented them on the
�I
current Fifth Army situation and proposed plans. Sir James Griggs, General
Alexander and part1' left by- car for lJ Corps at 1200. At 1315 Generals
Clark and Tate drove to Florence where they were met by General Hume and
Colonel McMahon.
The Ar'JfrY Commander visited the ?1st Garrison Headquarters (British)
where he met Colonel Alston (British), Florence Area Commander, end Brigadier Blucher (British), Commander of Florence Defense Troops. General
Cl.ark tom-ed the city, visiting Palazzo Vecchio, Duomo Cathedral and walked
over the Ponte Vecchio, where he could observe the enemy demolitions to the
approaches to the bridge. Before leaving Florence for his Headquarters,
General Clark drove to the Bailey bridge over the Arno under construction
by the 337th Engineers and congratulated the men on their fine job.
Arriving back at his headquarters in the early evening, the General
dined with the reguJAr members of his mess.
General Clark sent the follOffing message to Field Marshal Smuts today:
"I am particularly pleased and proud to have the 6th South Af'rican Ar- )
mored Division under command or Fifth Army. These gallant troops have
played a highly important role in the battles of Italy and have distinguished themselves in their relentless pursuit of the German enemy north or
Rome to his present strong defensive positions. I am sure that they will
take advantage of future opportunities to add even more glorious pages to
their already superb record. It was a great honor for me to have had the
opportunity to see :you on the occasion of your recent visit to Italy. The
Allied cause has indeed been fortunate in this present war, as in the past,
to have had the benefit of your wisdom, com-age and inspiration. I hope
that I YM.:Y once again have tho pleasure of meeting you when the final victory, for which we have all striven so long, is ours."
*
*
*
TAVERNELIE--AUGUm' 31, 1944-•At 0930 (:'reneral Clark met Major Homer Roberts
(negro) or the Public Relations Office, War Department, and Mr. Moss, photographer for colored press, and Lt. Col. Dollard of the Morale Division
or the War Department. General Clark briefed them for twenty minutes on the
situation mainly with regard to the 92nd Division. He also commented on the
fine work colored service units have been doing with the Fifth Arm:, and re•
marked on the good discipline generally throughout colored troops under his
command.
At 1000 hours General Cl.ark was photographed bye. color photographer
with Miss Horn and other WACS - these pictures to be used by the War Department. The pictm-es were taken under the supervision of WAC Captain Moilhenny,
Public Relations.
General CJArk flew to IV Corps at 1200 hours to see General Crittenberger, ret~ning to his command post for lunch at 1300 hom-s.
At 1415 General Clark took off in his L-5 for 13 Corps, where he called
to see General Kirkman. After spending an hour with General Kirkman, he
�new to the II Corps strip at San Casciano where he was met by his jeep and
driven to the II Corps command post 1n the vicinity of Impruneta to see Gene•
ral Keyes. ~Emeral Clark confe?Ted for half an hour with General Keyes and
drove from I Corps comrnand post to his headqoorters, 8.ITiving at 1730.
The General dined with the regular members of his mess.
The following operational orders were issued today:
"1. In view of indicated withdrawal of enemy forces on the Army front,
follow up action as directed in O.I. #32 will be initiated without delay.
"2. Specifically ~•
IV Corps will, prior to first light 1 Sept:
(1)
(2)
,!?.
Reconnoiter 1n force 1n the M. ALBANO and M. PISANO
areas employing not less than one company of infantry
in each area with the mission of developing the enemy
strength in each area.
Be prepared to follow up at once in either or both
areas if the situation so warrants, using sufficient
strength to occupy the hill masses concerned.
II Corps will:
Conduct strong and active patrolling with a view to developing the enemy strength and disposition in its sector.
g. 13 Corps will:
Continue active patrolling and follow up any enemy withdrawal
within its zone of action.
"3. Additional eng:i.neer bridge facilities will be made available to
IV Corps by separate message.
"4. Necessary artillery support will be coordinated by the Army Artil..
lery Officer."
The results of operations during the month or August:
A• Ground Forces: Contact was maintained with the enemy throughout the
month by agpressive patrol activity on both sides of the ARNO River along
the entire front. Artillery, tank and mortar firing was employed to harass
and inflict maximum caSUE1lties on enemy personnel and destroy such equipment.
Training was carried on in rear areas and infantry units were rested by utilizing other troops to occupy forward positions. Regrouping or forces we.a
accomplished under a detailed cover plan devised to screen future intentions
from an alert, sensitive enemy. In 13 Corps zone the city of FLORENCE was
cleared and a bridgehead secured across the ARNO between FONTASSIEVE and
FLORENCE, and an attack was launched up the SIEVE Valley toward the end of
the month.
�b. Air Force: In direct support of Fifth Army, Desert Air Force planes
total of 652 sorties for the month of August. Following the Army Di•
rective targets attacked included artillery positions, supply installations,
bivouacs and command posts. Bomb damage assessment sholled truit good results
were obtained with the minimum effort available.
new;
*
*
*
TAVERNELLE--sEPl'EMBER 1, 1944-0eneral Clerk left by L-5 at 0900 for the Headquarters of the 6th South African Armored Division, landing at the Castel Fio- )
rentino cub strip. Here, the Army Commander was met by General Poole, Commanding General of the 6th South African Armored Division• . After spending an
hour with General Poole, General Clerk flew west along the Arno where he observed elements of the 370th Infantry, 1st Armored Division and 442nd Infantry
crossing the Arno River. General Clark landed at a cub strip north of Leghorn
where he was met by his jeep and driven to Pisa. Here he was met by General
Rutledge who briefed the Arm:, Commander on the current situation in his area.
Returning to the cub strip, he took off for his command post, arriving at 1430
hours.
General Clerk spent a quiet afternoon in his van conferring with various
staff officers.
ajor Hunter, of the G-3 Section, and General Moran were guests at General Clark's mess. Art.er dinner Generals Moran, Clark, Gruenther end Major
Hunter played bridge.
*
*
*
TAVERNELLE-SEP!'EMBER 2, 1944--General Clark spent the day at his headquarters
working on administrative matters and conferring with memb0rs of bis staff.
He played badminton with General Gruenther in the late afternoon.
Brigadier General B. o. Davis (colored) of the Inspector General's Office,
Wer DeJ)8.rtment, and Colonel Bertholf dined with General Clerk in his mess.
General De.vis is making an inspection tour or negro troops in the European
theater. General Clark bade farevrell to Colonel Bertholf who is leaving Fifth
Army for a new assignment with the War Department, Washington, D. c.
*
*
*
TAVERNELIE•-sEPTEMBER 3, 1944-At 0900 General Clark confen-ed with Generals
Gruenther, Brann and Howard. At 1045 Mr. Clement Atlee, Deputy Prime Minister
or England, arrived with General Lemnitzer. They were met by General Clark,
and a guard of honor was held for Mr. Atlee. After trooping the line, the
General escorted the Deputy Prime Minister to his van where he briefed him on
the situation on the Fifth Anny front. Mr. Atlee left for 13' Corps at 1200.
General Lemnitzer remained and conferred with General Clerk.
At 1210 General Alemnder arrived to confer with Generals Clerk, Gruenther
and Lemnitzer. Air Vioe flsrshal D1Albiac arrived at 1230 and was asked to join
the conference. Generrls Alexander and Lemnitzer left for II Corps at 1300.
�Air Vice Marshal D'Albiac lunched at General Cla.rk 1 s mess.
General Clark and Colonel Saltzman lef't by L-5 for Pisa, arriving at the
Pisa airport at 1330 where they were met by General Crittenberger and General
Rutledge. General Clark and party toured the cit,- of Pisa, visiting points
of interest, including the Leaning Tower.
The General returned to his command post a.t 1730. General Sullivan,
Fifth Army Quartermaster, came for dinner. Af'ter dinner the General entertained officers of his staff at a movie in his conference but.
*
*
*
TAVERNELLE•-sEPTEMBER 4, 1944-•General Clark went b,- oub at 0945 to visit the
34th Division. Arriving at the Castel Fiorentino cub strip, he was met by
General Bolte, Commanding 34th Division, and General Tate, 34th Division Ar•
tillery Commander. General Clark decorated seven artillery flying officers
with Air Medals. After a short ceremon,-, General Clark and General Bolte
drove to the command post of the 168th Infantry where General Clark presented
decorations and made combat promotions to officers and men. The General
spoke briefiy to the troops, oommend1.ng them on the fine job that the 34th Di•
vision has done and briefing them on the part they would play in the coming
operations. After the ceremony, General Clark observed the training program
of a platoon in attack.
General Clark lef't the 168th at 1330, arriving at the 175th FA Battalion
where he made four combat promotions. After a short ceremony, General Cla.rk
observed a training gun drill. The General then drove to the 133rd Infantry
where he presented decorations and made comoot promotions, after which he ob•
served training of tank and infantry tactics. General Clark and J:E1,rty then
drove to the 135th Infantry where General Clark presented decorations and
made combat promotions. The Army Commander spoke briefly to the troops. General Bolte entertained General Clark for lunch at the 34th Division Headquarters ..
After lunch General Clark briefed staff officers of the 34th Division on
the over-all plan of the 5th and 8th Arm,- attacks, pointing out the important
part this division would play in the attack. General Clark then left for the
Castel Fiorentino cub strip where he took off by cub for the 91st Division cub
strip in the vicinity of San Gimignano. He was met by General Livesay. The
Army Comma.nder decorated and promoted field artillery personnel on the cub
field. General Clark and General Livesa,- drove to the 348th Field Artillecy
Battalion where they observed the training program. Following this, the General drove to the 362nd Infantry where he spoke to a battalion in review and
presented decorations and made combat promotions and appointments.
General Clark visited the 363rd Infantry where he presented decorations,
made comba.t promotions and appointments and spoke to the troops. General Clark
then drove to the, 36lst Infantry where he presented decorations, made combat
promotions and observed a training exercise consisting of an attack of a fortified position. Leaving the 361st Infantry, General Clark drove to the com•
mand post of the 91st Division where General Livesay introduced him to members
of his staff. - General Clark spoke briefly to members of the staff, giving the
over-all picture of the Fifth and Eighth Army fronts.
�General Clark then departed for the 91st Division cub strip, from which
point he new be.ck to his headquarters. The General dined quietly with the
regular members of his mess.
General Kirkman today sent the following note to General Clark:
"I have discussed the time of H hour with Maj-Gen. Russell, Commander
While it has not been possible to go into the question
in detail, I am satisfied that 0200 hours will be suitable.
8 Indian Division.
"Should it be necessary to alter this time, I would prefer it to be
earlier rather than later."
Operations Instruction #34 was issued today and reads as follows:
"l. German withdrawal on the Fifth Army front has permitted advances
of Fifth Army elements in contact with the enemy. Such advances have therefore accomplished part of the Phase I plan envisioned in o. I. #32.
"2. Eighth Army oont1nues the attack to debouch into the PO Valley and
advance to the north and northwest.
".3. a. Fifth Army continues its current follow up action to maintain
contact in the event of further enemy withdrawals.
b. Phase I: Fifth Army attacks on D Day to complete Phase I by
securing the general line of the hills M. GIOVI - M. CALVANA - M. SENARIO M. 1,{)RELLO (See Overlay) or such parts thereof as may remain occupied by
enemy forces.
(NaI'E:
Prior to initiation of Phase II, action to capture
MONl'I DELLA CALVANA, or parts thereof, will be undertaken with minimum forces if it appears imperative
that the hill mass be occupied to facilitate further
advance).
c. Phase II: Thereaf'ter, Firth Army attacks with the mission of
penetrating the GOTHIC Line and debouching into the PO Valley.
"4. a. IT Corps will:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
( 5)
(6)
Regroup its forces to hold the M. PISANO and M. ALBANO
hill masses with a minimum of troops.
Make every effort to withdraw to Corps Reserve as great
a portion of the 1st Armored Division as possible.
Maintain contact with the enemy and follow up any withdrawal with all possible speed. No advance in strength
beyond the line PISTOIA - LUCCA - BAGNO ( U 9977) will
be made except on orders from this Headq~ters.
Continue to simulate a build up in the M. ALBANO area
and on D t 1 demonstrate in the PRATO and PISTOIA areas
to indicate an advance to the North and Northwest.
Maintain contact w:i.th II Corps.
Protect the left flank of Fifth Army.
�(7)
b.
Be prepared in the event of enemy collapse, to advance,
with one infantry division, reinforced, on LA SPEZZIA
(P 600120).
IZ1) Maintain contact prior to D Day and follow up any enemy
Corps will:
withdrawal.
Begin immediate movement forward to attack positions,
assuming command of the southern portion of its new
sector at 042000B September and of the remainder at
o60001B September (See par 8 below for boundaries).
13 Corps elements in forward area of II Corps zone of
action after o6oOOlB September pass to operational control of II Corps.
(3) Phase I: On D Day, attack to the North and Northwest
within its new zone of action to capt~e and secure M.
CALVANA (Q 893799) - M. SENARIO (Q 859820) - M. l.DRELLO
(Q 776808). Then, if necessary, continue the attack to
secure MONTI DELLA CALVANA (or parts thereof) using
initially one RCT onl;r.
(2)
(4) Phase II:
On Army order, continue the attack to the
North making its main effort along the axis FLORENCE FIRENZtJOLA (L 9006) to penetrate the GOTHIC Line and
debouch in the PO Valley.
c.
lt Corns will:
1) Maintain contact prior to D Day and follow up any enemy
withdrawal.
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Cover the movement and assembly of II Corps troops and
hold forward positions until passed through by II Corps
assault elements or relieved by Army order.
Regroup its forces for the D Day attack.
Phase I: On D Day, coordinating its effort with II
Corps, attack to the North to capt~e and secure M.
GIOVI (Q 95rt796).
Phase II: On Army order, continue the attack to the
North and Northeast along the axis BORGIO S. LORENZO FAENZA to penetrate the GOTHIC .Line and debouch in the
PO Valley. To facilitate the advance of II Corps initially 13 Corps will make its ma.in effort on its extreme left.
l'mintain contact with II Corps and Eighth Army.
Protect the right flank of Fifth A:rmy.
"5. It is contemplated the BEF will be attached to IV Corps on or about j
12 September. Attachment orders will issue by this Headquarters.
"6. II Corps will prepare plans for the employment of a strong mobile
force in an exploitation role to the Northwest on reaching the PO VAlley.
For this p~ose the 1st Armored Division will be made availl!ble. Direct
communication is authorized for planning purposes.
"7.
In the event of enemy withdrawal prior to 052400B September, re-
�sponsibility for pin-suit in the II Corps attack sector remains with 13
Corps. Effective 06o001B September, this responsibility passes to II
Corps. In the event of collapse of enemy resistance, instructions for advance into the PO Valley will be issued by this Headquarters generally in
accordance with Excelsior Plan 'A'.
"8.
Botmdaries:
a.
(See OVerlay).
Effective 042000B September:
(1) II - IV Corps: No change.
(2) II - 13 Corps: Incl 13 Corps - RJ at GREVE (833472) •
thence incl II Corps - s. POLO (870571) - Pt 900667 ·thence incl 13 Corps - Pt 90Cfl04 - Pt 901741 - Pt 903750 Pt 870750 - Pt 870710 - Pt 750710 thence North along 75
Easting.
b. Effective 060001B September.
(1) I! - IV Corps: No change North to Q 720630 - thence all
incl II Corps - Pt Q 750710 - Pt 66o795 - Pt 66o830 Pt 688862 thence along road to L 725100.
(2) II - 13 Corps: No change North to Pt Q 903750 thence
incl 13 Corps - Pt 916793 - Pt 912808 - thence along
T. FISTONA (incl II Corps) to 917870.
c.
Phase II, effective on Army order:
(1) II - IV Corps - No change.
(2) II - 13 Corps - Pt 840790 - thence incl II Corps•
Pt 838776 - Pt 840790 - thence incl 13 Corps - RJ
845823 - thence incl II Corps - RJ 852845 - Bridge
872889 - RJ 882892 • RJ 911931 - Pt 436 (92596o) Pt m991 - Pt 1171 (L 967030) - Pt 995067 - thence
all incl 13 Corps - Pt 1031 (M Ol6o98) - Pt 756
(038124) - Pt 514 (081162) - RJ 138241 - 208302.
(NOTE: To facilitate initiation of Phase II, II Corps
will clear the road FLORENCE - BORGO s. LORENZO
(Q 905885) and the area East of the Phase II
bo'lmdary with all possible speed.)
"9. D Day - Corps will be prepared to attack at any time after 080001B
September.
H Hour - LRter.
10. The Army Artillery Officer is charged with necessary coordination
of artillery fires.
11
"ll. Security - Plan ARNO TWO, having accomplished its pin-pose, is no
longer in effect. Every effort will be made to conceal the direction and
strength of Fifth Army's main effort."
*
*
*
TAVERNELLE--SEPTEMBER 5, 1944--Genera.l Clark spent the morning in his van conferring with members of his staff. At 1130 he flew to see General Keyes at
��~
~
p.~e- fib- ~
II Corps where he remained one hour. Upon his return to his command post,
he bade farewell to General B. O. Davis.
After lunch Generals Clark and Brann and Colonel Saltzman drove to FloUpon their arrival, they went to the Fifth
Army Officers• Rest Center at the Hotel Anglo-American. General Clark and //
General Brann, with Captain Croft-Murray, AID Fine Arts Division, as guide,
went for an hour's sight-seeing tour of the city.
rence in General Clark's jeep.
At 1700 hours General Clark went to a bridge across the Arno which had
just been completed by the 337th Engineers. The General congratulated the
officers and men on the fine job they had done and decorated the commanding
officer, Colonel Hooper, with the Legion of Merit.
After the ceremony at the bridge, General Clark went on a shopping tour
with General Brann, General Gruenther, Colonel Saltzman and Lt. Col. Porter.
Returning to the hotel at 1830, he entertained members of his staff for
dinner and spent the night in Florence.
During the week 13 Corps continued to progress in the area north and ~
east of Florence. II and IV Corps maintained their positions along the general line of the river and following a reconnaissance in force crossing operations were begun on the first of September. As the period closed, II Corps
was exerting strong pressure all along the Monte Albano mass end IV Corps had
occupied Pisa, cleared Monte Pisano and advanced to the general line of the
Alto Paschio - Lucca road (including both towns), thence along the Serchio
River.
*
*
*
TAVERNELLE--SEPTEMBER 6, 1944--Generel Clerk left Florence by car at 0930
and drove to his headquarters, arriving at 1030. The General spent the day
in his van working on important papers and conferring with members of his
staff. He played bridge in the evening with General Gruenther, Lt. Col. Gray,
Judge Advocate General of Fifth Army, and Major Hunter of the G-3 Section.
*
*
*
TAVERNELLE--SEPTEMBER 7, 1944•-Generfll Clark spent a quiet day in his van
conferring with members of his staff. In the evening Generals Clark and
Gruenther, with General Hume, went to dine with Duchess Torriginani. Other
guests at dinner were the Duke of Aosta, cousin of the King of Italy', and
Admiral Mariano, his aide-de-camp. The General returned to his headquarters
after dinner at about 1030.
General Clark today wrote the following letter to General Marshall:
"In order to keep you informed of certain importBnt conditions in the
Fifth Army, I am sending another letter.
"The 370th Combat Team of the 92nd Division (colored) has done well in
combat. They have had no severe fighting. However, they have had an opportunity to cross the Arno River against slight opposition, take the high
�V
ground northeast of Pisa and conduct active patrolling against withdrawing
enemy elements. Their morale is high. From August 26th to September 4th
they had eight killed, seventy-eight wounded and two missing.
I
"With reference to the Brazilians, I found thBy had much to learn.
Their officers were not trained to assume command responsibilities for
such items as motor maintenance, sanitation, care of their enlisted men
and their equipment. They were woefully lacking in small unit training.
I have he.d my best tra:tners - a large group of selected, battle-trained
officers and enlisted men from all our divisions - working ori them. We
tried to condense their training into a two weeks' period but were forced
to extend it to a third week. That third week ends in three days, when
they will be put in the line. I intend to give them their battle inoculation in the IV Corps sector in the vicinity of Lucca. Here they will have
an opportunity to patrol, to follow up if there is any retrograde movement
and to come under the enemy fire. As soon as they have completed this
inoculation satisfactorily, I will try to give them an opportunity in our
attack.
)
"The fate of the Fifth Army is tied up with that of the Eighth Army,
which is not progressing any too well at the present moment of writing.
They seem to be bogged down on the east coast. They are trying to get off an
attack today, and if they put the weight behind it that they have available
it might go. I hope to attack about forty-eight hours later. We are all
set for the thrust over the mountains toward Bologna. It is ha.rd to wait,
for we are quite ready and eager to go. General Ale::mnder is holding the
lanyard, and when he pulls it we will be able to jump off with less than
twenty-four hours• notice •
. "I was distressed to note in recent press stories a statement, attributed to me, that I intend to retire immediately after the war and go fishing. I desire to assure you that I have no such intention. If the retirement story was brought to your attention you may have wondered why a
relatively young officer who has received so much in the way of promotion
and excellent command assignments in this war should throw away that experience if it can be used. It is my fervent desire that I reJM.in on the active list until I reach the statutory retirement age."
The Army Commander today cabled the following to General Ma.scarenhas
on the occasion of the Brazilian Independence Day:
"General Mascarenhas, officers, men and nurses of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force: On this day when Brazil celebrates the anniversary of
its establishment as a free and independent nation, I send you my personal
end official greetings, and felicitations of the Fifth Army of which you
are a member.
"120 years ago today, 7 September 1822, Brazil severed the ties that
bound her to Europe and proclaimed her independence. To the citizens of
Brazil, this day is as sacred as is the 4th of July to the citizens of the
United States of America.
�"This year, Brazilian Independence Day finds you far from home. Yours
is the first expedition ever to leave your homeland and cross the ocean,
to join in the battle against those who would oppress freedom and independence.
"Just as your forefathers fought to establish an independent Brazil,
so too, you are fighting to restore freedom and independence to other nations of the world.
t•we of the Fifth Army rejoice w5th you on this glorious holiday, d~dicated to the independence of Brazil."
*
*
*
TAVERNEILE--SEPTEMBER 8, 1944--General Clark ma.den Salerno Day speech recording to be sent back to the War Department. This is quoted in full at
the conclusion o~ today's diary notes.
Prince Umberto, Lieutenant General of the Realm, the Duke of Aosta
and Admiral Pitu-ia.no arrived at noon for lunch, and General Clark held a
guard of honor for them. Prince Umberto and pirty left immediately after
lunch, and General Clark drove to the Hotel Anglo-American, the Fifth Army
Rest Center Hotel, arriving at 1630. General Clark had a conference and
dinner for the II Corps Commander, General Keyes, and the 13 Corps Commander, General Kirlanan. A total of eighteen guests were present, including
Generals Gruenther; Bolte, Commanding 34th Division; Livesay, Commanding
91st Division; Coulter, Commanding 85th Division; Kendall, Commanding 88th
Division and the Chiefs of Staff of these divisions. General Clark briefed
the group on the plan of attack. The guests left at 2130, and General
Clark returned to his command post, arriving at 2230.
General Clark's Salerno Day recording reads as follows:
ttJu..qt a year ago, on September 9, 1943, the Fifth Army - with the
first American troops to land on the continent of Europe in this war launched the opening assault on Adolf Hitler's impregnable European fortress.
"In the year tha.t has elapsed since our landing at Salerno Bay, great
things have happened. The German Army, though thoroughly beaten in North
Africa and Sicily, was still - a year ago, one of the fighting forces of the
world. Almost the entire European continent then was suffering under the
German heel.
ttBut now - a year after the Fifth Army struck the blow for liberation
of Europe - the entire rotten Nazi structure is shaking. The German Army
is reeling from attack after attack from the West, the South and the East,
from the a.ir and from the sea. Nazi satellites are deserMng the foundering
ship. Hitler is striving desperately to hold together his beaten and disspirited people. The Germans today know that the end is approaching, and
that it is only a matter of time now before they Fire defeElted.
ttThe roe,d for this drrunA.tic turnabout in the fortunes of this war was
�paved - in part - here in Italy. Here the joint Allied effort of the Fifth
and Eighth Armies proved that Allied troops could land on enemy territory
and not only stay there, but press the Germans back.
"This drive has cost us heavily in men and materiel. Thousands of
American, British and French soldiers lost their lives fighting in Italy,
and thousands more were wounded or taken prisoner. From Salerno Bay through
Rome and to the North, the Fifth Army was literally fighting its way up hill,
over some of the most treacherous battlefields in the war. At all times the
enemy was able to select his own ground, with the result that at virtually
every stage of the campaign, the enemy was looking dmm our throats.
"With a few men he oould - and often did - delay our advanoe by weeks.
But in spite of every obstacle, these gallant soldiers of the Italian campaign did advance - across the Volturno and the Garigliano, through the Gusta.v and the Hitler lines; over the Maggiore and Cairo hill masses. The names
of Battipaglia, Naples, San Pietro, CA.ssino, Formia, Velletri, Leghorn these are names which will live in the history of warfare; communities, now
barely recognizable as such, where Allied soldiers fought gloriously and with
surpas<ing courage, so that Fifth Army could go forward.
"Anzio was an operation which will stand forever as a monument to the
tenacious fighting quality of Fifth Army soldiers. Here, hemmed in on a narrow beachhead by the Nazis best troops, for week after week the beleagured
forces withstood massed armored and infantry attacks, incessant air raids and
continuous shelling.
"The great viotory march of the campaign began May 11, as the Fifth Army
on the Garigliano, and the Eighth Army troops further East, broke through
German defenses snd drove North. Less than two weeks later the main Fifth
Army in the South had jojned the Beachhead forces and together they continued
on to Rome - to seize our first enemy capital in the war. Never before in
all its tumultuous history had the Eternal City been taken .from the South.
/
And thA speed with which our forces pressed on, then, to the ·Arno lfiver was
perhaps unprecedented.
"For what has happened in the year since the Salerno Bay landings, all
of us are proud and grateful. To the American, British and French soldiers
who made this great Fifth A:rmy victory possible, we give our thanks and undying appreciation. But let us pause a moment in respect to those Americans,
who, with their Allied comrades, made the supreme sacrifice in order th~t we
might continue on. To them the free world of tomorrow will forever be indebted. Their deeds will never be forgotten. To the soldiers of Salerno now
in their homeland or in combat in France, Italy or elsewhere, the Fifth Army
renders a salute on this Salerno Day."
*
*
*
TAVERNELLE--SEPTEMBER 9, 1944..-At 0900 Maj. Gen. Partiger, AFHQ AA Officer
called to see General Clark with General Bradshaw. Air Vice Marshal Dickson
of the Desert Air Force arrived at 1230 to see the Army Commander. At 1300
General Clark decorated and promoted some 100 members of his staff.
�At 1430 General Clark attended the USO show and concert at his headquarters. At 1500 the Army Commander watched exhibition boxing matches at
which he met Joe Louis who was appearing on the day's schedule. At 1445
General Clark drove to the Fifth Army mobile radio station where he was introduced to Lieutenant Carstensen, Manager of the station, and members of
the station staff. At 1700 Salerno Day program went on the air, and General Clark gave his Salerno Day speech. At 1730 General Clark gave a cocktail party for 500 officers of his headquarters, at which time he promoted
Lieutenant Carstensen to 1st Lieutenant. General Clark shook hands with all
members of his staff.
After dinner Generals Clark and Gruenther and Colonel Saltzman attended
a band concert given by the Grenadier Guards Band, after which General Clark
retired.
General Clark today received from General Mascarenhas the following reply
to his cable of congratulations on Brazilian Independence Day:
"I acknowledge receipt of your honorable message, concerning the date of
Brazil's independence.
"At present we E1re not only allies but true brothers in Arms, united by
the same ideals in the struggle against the oppressors of people; your mes•
sage demonstrates unmistakeably the bounds of sympathy and friendship as well
as the identical sentiments which bind our country to your great country.
"I am grateful then to you and to the Fifth Army in both my name and
that of my staff for your affectionate expressions of cordiality and friendship which you expressed for our country and our troops."
*
*
*
TAVERNEUJE--SEPTEMBER 10, 1944--At 1000 hours the Right Honorable Mr. Amery,
Secretary of State for India, Maj. Gen. Burch, Indian Army Lia5son and party
arrived to visit General Clark. A guard of honor was held for the party.
General Clark briefed lllr. Amery on the current tactical situation, after which
the Secretary of State for India. and party left for 13 Corps.
At 1115 Genera.ls Alexander, Harding and Lenmitzer arrived for a conference
which lasted approximately one hour. Air Vice i~rshal Dickson arrived shortly
thereafter for lunch with the Army Commander. After lunch ·General Clark flew
to IV Corps where he decorated General Crittenberger, Corps Commander, with
the Distinguished Service Medal. General Clark returned to his headquarters
at 1700, played badminton with General Gruenther and dj_ned with the regular
members of his mess.
The Army Commander today received the followj_ng cable from General Alexander:
"Confirming recent decisions g1.ven by C-in-C verbally, Fifth Army will
develop their operations with a view to launching their maih attack on the
Gothic Line on 13 September or as soon as possible efter. Meantime Eighth
�Army will drive enemy north of the MArana. River and be prep~red to lFl.unch
their main attack against the enemy position running southwest from Rimini
approximately '24 hours A ter Fifth Army launch their attack on the Gothic
.f
Line. Fifth Army will signal the date of their main attack direct to
Eighth Army repeated this headquarters imMediatel~ it is firrn.
"Priority for air support is given to Fifth Army up to end inclusive
15 September, but C-in-C looks to Fifth Army to restrict demands to the
essential minimum for 14 a.nd 15 September. In that WAY C-in-C hopes that
sufficient air resources will be available to meet the essential requirements of both Armies on those two days. Priority for air support subsequent to 15 September will be decided later by C-in-C according to the way
in which the sit'UE!tion develops."
General Leese, CoMma.nding Eighth Army, sent the following cable to
General ClP.xk today:
"My very best wishes to you and the Fifth Army for a great success in
your forthcoming operation. I look forward to our joining hands in the Po
Valley. The best of luck."
*
*
*
TAVERNELLE-•SEFTEMBER 11, 1944--At 0830 Generals Clerk and Brann flew to
the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in the vicinity of Vada. The P.:rrny Commander was met at the airfield by General Mascarenhes, Commanding General
of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, and Colonel Brisach and Captain Walters, Fifth Army liaison officers. General Clark observed a training program, visiting ROT Headquarters where he was met by General Zenobio, Commander of the 6th Brazilian Combat Team. With Generals Mascarenhas and
Zenobio, Generals Clark and Brann visited artillery battalion headquarters
and infantry ba.ttali.on command posts where they observPd combat training.
The Arrrry Comander returned to his headquarters at noon and at 1230 Lieutenant General Anders of the Polish Corps, with General Lenmitzer and Lt.
Col. Szymanski, Polish Liaison Officer, arrjved for lunch. A guard of
honor was held for General Anders. General Clark spent the afternoon in
his van following the departure of General Anders, working and conferring
with members of his staff.
*
*
*
TAVERNELLE-..SEPTEMBER l?, 1944--General Clf'l.rk flew to Florence et 0800 and
was met by Colonel Smith, Headquarters Commandant, Colonel Hooper of the
337th Engineers and drove to see the site of the proposed new command post
in the park in Florence. At 0830 General Clark drove in his jeep to the
II Corps Headquarters in the vicinity of Pratolino where he was met by
General Keyes with members of the II Corps staff and General Coulter.
General Clark presented General Keyes wUh the Oak Leaf Cluster to the Silver Star. General Clark then spoke to the II Corps staff, telling them how
confident he was of the prospects of the battle. General ClRrk then drove
with Generals Keyes and Coulter to the 338th Infantry command post. Gene•
ral Clark spoke to several of the officers and men. He then drove to the
91st Division command post where he was met by General Li.v esay who br:i efed
�him on the current situ1'tion. The Army Commander then drove to the II Corps a.rtill"ry observation post in the vicinity of Snn Piero where he could observe
mountain features rmd terrain of the Gothic Line to which the 85th and 91st Di~
visions were committed. He also could observe fighter bomber missions working
on objectives just ahead of our front line troops. General Clark then drove to
Florence to the II Corps cub strip where he took off for his headquarters.
L
I
At 1230 the Anny Commander held a press conference and lunch for forth newspaper corresrondents. General Clerk briefed them on the plan of his attack a.nd
what we could expect. After lunch General Clark returned to his van where he
rested and worked during the A.fternoon.
General Sullivan, General Hardig~, of the Office of the QuartermA.ster General, Genervl Chidlnw, Air Vice Marshal Dickson were guests of the General for dinner.
During the week ending September 12, 1944, determin"d, aggressive y:etrol work
was successful in maintai.ninp; contact as the enemy genernlly withdrew to_ his Gothi)
position and our troops i;;ained considerable ground north of tbe Arno River. The
attack by II Corps to penetrate the Gothic Line was launched "nd wns neveloping
favorably ns the period closed.
·
*
*
TAVERN'"~LLE--SF.FTEMBER 13, 1944--General Clark flew to the II Corps cub strip in
the vicinity of Pratolino, arr:iv:ine at ninl"! o'clock. He was met by Colonel Wil•
lems, Chief of Staff of II Corps, and briefed on the current situation. The Army
Comman<ier then drove to the 1st British Infantry Division where he was met nnd
briefed by '·~ajor General Loewen. The Army Commander then drove to 13 Corps Headqua.rtl'!rs where he conferrt'ld with ~neral Kirkman. After 13 Corps General Clark
visited the 8th Indian Division, where he wRs met and briefed by C~nernl Russell.
Ee then drove to II Corps Headquarters where he tA.lked to Colonel Forter, Corps
Deputy Chief of Staff . The General then drove to the 85th Division where he conferred with General Coulter and from here :ent·to the 34th Division where he
lunched with General Bolte. After lunch the Army Commander drove to the 91st Division to confer with GenP.rtl.l 11.veso.y. General Clark then drove to Florence where
he took off in his L-5 from the II Corps cub 3trip for his command post. The
General dined quietly with the rl"gulnr memb"'rs of his mess.
*
*
*
FLOR~NCE--SEPTEHBE~ 14, 1944--General Clark moved his command post this morning
to Florence. Frior to the move of the commRnd post, the Genernl se.w members of
M.s staff. in his van. Maj. G<"'!n. Nace, G-1 of AFHQ, arrived at 1030 and conferred
with General Clark for hnlf an hour. General Clark then took off by L-5 for the
1st Armored Division in the vicinity of Alto r>aschio. He was met nnd conferrt'ld
with Genernls Crittenberger and Pritchnrd. After oonferrlng a.n hour, the Army
Cornma.nder flew to Florence, arriving nt 1230, and lunched .nt the Anglo-American
Hotel. After lunch General ClPrk flew to the II Corps air strip in the vicinity
of San Piero. General Clark visited the 85th and 91st Divisions, met and talked
with Generals Keyes, Coulter And Lives~y tind return~d to the hotel at 1700 hours,
din:i.ng with Colonel Saltzrum and other guests.
�FLORENCE--SEPTEMBER 15, 1944--General Clark arrived at his new headquarters
in Florence at 0900. The Army Commander flew to the II Corps cub strip in
the vlcinity of San Piero where he was met by his jeep and driven to the
85th and 91st Division command posts and II Corps Headquarters where he conferred with Generals Coulter, Livesay and Keyes. The Army Commander returned
to his headquarters at 1630, dined w:i.th regule.r members of his staff and retired early.
General Clark today cabled General Devers as follows:
"I urgently request that in forwarding to the War Department current
recommendations for promotion to the grade of general officer you follow my
priorities. Your disregard of my recommendation in the case of Jay has embarrassed me considerably. The officers whom I recommend have served under
my direct command and under the close observation of Corps Commanders, and we
know exactly the priority in which these officers should be promoted. Your
selection of Jay, .who was the last man on my list, has created a. difficult
situation for me and for the II Corps Commander. If you are unable agein to
follow my priorities I request that my views be sent with yours to the War
Department. I urgently recommend that Colonel Niblo be included in the next
list. You will remember he was approved by the War Department several months
ago. He is the most deserving man in the Fifth Army for promotion. 11
The Army Commander cabled the following congratulatory message to General Kirkman today:
"I am delighted w:tth the progress which has already been made by 13
Corps. Please accept my gratitude for the substantial contribution by your
troops to the Fifth Army attack. 11
*
*
*
FLCRF.NCE--SEPTEMBER 16, 1944--General Chirk conferred w:tth Genera.ls Gruenther,
Brann and Howard in front of Ms van at 0830 this morning before leaving by
L-5 for the II Corps cub strip in the vicinity of San Fiero. Here he was met
by his jeep and visited the 34th, 91st and 85th Divisions. The General confe?Ted with Generals Kirkman, 13 Corps Commander; Keyes, II Corps Commander;
Bolte, 34th Division Commander; Coulter, 85th Division Commander; and Livesay,
91st Division Commander. General Clark returned to his command post at 1730
and dined with the regular members of his mess.
*
*
*
FLORENCE--SEPTEMBER 17, 1944-eAfter the 0830 conference with Generals Gruenther, Brann and Howard, General Clark attended church services at 1000 hours.
He spent the rest of the day in his\ van working on papers and conferrjng with
members of his staff.
At
At 1900
Grassi,
General
1730 he called on the Umberto Colleti's for tea with General Gruenther.
General Clark d1ned at the home of Mr. & Mrs. Arturo Grassi. Mrs.
an American lady from Indianapolis, is a mutual frjend of many of
and Mrs. Clark's friends.
�FLORENCE--SEPTEMBER 18, 19/44--After the conference at 0830, General Clark
took off by L-5 for San Fiero. He was met by General Keyes and ~riven to
the 85th Division where he talked with General Coulter. Following this
conference, he drove to the 91st Division to see General Livesay and then
to the 34th Division to see General Bolte. General Clark returned to the
command post for lunch and spent the ti.fternoon in his van. This evening
the General dined with the regular members of his mess.
General Clark today sent the following message to General Mascarenhas:
"Upon a previous occasion, when welcoming the Brazilian Expeditionary
Force to the Fifth Army, I remarked th,it we expected grea,t things of an
organization which displayed such ability and enthueiasm in training.
"The performance of the BEF during its in1tial commitment to combat \ \
in a Fifth Army sector indicates that our expectations will be justified.
Your troops, under your leadership, entered the line confidently, seized
the ini.tiative, and moved forward with determination, occupying successive \
key terrain features in the course of their initial advance.
"Despite the presence of demolitions and heavily mined areas and of
hostile observation from commanding heights which permitted the foe to direct artillery fire against. men of the BEF, your troops went resolutely
forward. Not only has the BEF started out in combat with a commendable
spirit, but it has already shown ability to coordinate its operations with
adjacent troops, indicating good leadership ana sound knowledge of combat
technique.
"Within a matter of hours after L."l.11nching your first attack, you captured the town of Massarosa. I am confident the.t this is but the first of many
military objectives which subsequent operations will list as 'captured by
the Brazilian Expeditionary Force 1 • 11
*
*
*
FLORENCE•• SEPTEMBER 19, 1944--After the 0830 morning conference with his Chief
of Starr, G-2 and G-3, General Clark saw Air Vice Marshal Dickson in his van
to bid him farewell. At 1000 hours Mr. Antonini, Vice President of the
A, F. of L., Mr. George Boldanzi, Vice President of the C. I. o., Messrs.
Thomas O'Brien, Lanthor of the British Trade Union Congress, Colonel Smith,
Director of Labor Sub-Commission ACC Rome, \~jor Siccula, British officer with
the Labor Sub-Commission ACC Rome, and Major Grimsley, ADC to General Alexander, crune to see General Clark. General Clark oriented them briefly on the
current situation, after which the British Labor representatives drove to 13
Corps, and Mr. Antonini and Mr. Boldanzi drove up to the cub strip in the vicinity of San Fiero where they met General Clark who flew in after spending
fi~teen mjnutes enroute from his cormnand post with General Kirkman of 13
Corps. General Clark and party then dro,re to the command post of the 85th Division on Mount Altuzzo where they were met by Generals Keyes and Coulter.
After a short briefing by General Coulter, the party proceeded up the mountain to an observation post overlooking the town of Barco and the terrain north
toward Firenzuola.
On the summit of Mount Altuzzo, which had only been taken the day before,
there were still a great many dead Germans and fantastic devastation to be seen.
��9(
Artillery fire could be observed and targets were in clear vie\v. General ClA.rk
E!.nd party then droYt'! to the II Corps strip :in t~e vicjnity of San Piero, stopping
enroute to eat K rations near a prison~r of war enclosure. General Clark, with
an interpreter, jnterviewed several of the Gr.rm~n rrisofll'!rs. The General then
flew to an a:ir strip north of Pisa •vhere he was met by General Cr1ttenberger,
after which he visited the 45th AAA Headquarters and decorated General Rutledge
with the Legion of r,nerit. He then drove to the Brazilian Expeditionary Force
Headquarters where he talked with Generals Mascarenha.s and Zenobio. He returned
by plane to his c0mmand post at 1700.
General Clark gave a birthday party for Colonel Saltzman at the AngloAmerican Hotel. Gen~rals Gruenther, Brann, Moran, Colonels Wood and Saltzman
and six other euests were rresent for dinner.
The progress of the bA.ttle for the week end:tng Septemb~r 19th 5s as follows:
Excellent progress was rrade along the entire front. The enemy position was
weakened on the r-i ght as our forces drove a deep wedge into the heavily defended
Gothic Line, CApturing the strong points - Mount Altuzzo and Mount Patrone in
the Apennine wall, and accelerating the drive toward the Firenzuola area as the
period closed. On the left, contact with the enemy was mro ntained 1rn unrelenting pressure forced his outposts further north ge_ nerally beyond the 90 northingil
The Sixth CoMbat Team of' the Brazilian Bxpedi tiorw,r_y For_ e enteri,d the lin..,. nort
c
of Pisa as the ~irst South American troops fign~ing on overseas soil.
*
*
*
FLORE~ICE--SEJ,TEMBER 20, 1944•-General Chldlaw came to see C'reneral Cuirk jrnrnedit=i.tely following his staff conference this morning. At 1100 General Alexander
and Mr. Oliver Littleton, Minister of Production oP Great Britain, arrived, and a
guard of honor was held. General Clark briefed Mr. Littleton on the sitUPtion
and conferred with General Alexander. Generals Alexander n.nd ClPrk, Mr. Littleton and General Chidlaw then drove from Gener~l Clark's Headquarters to the command post of the 85th Division where they were met by Generals Keyes, Coulter
and Kendall. Generals Alexander, Clark and Coulter drove to an observation post
on the SUJnmit of !fount Altuzzo. Enroute Generals Clark and Coulter rointed out
terrain features nnd ~enerally oriented General Alexander on tte situation. On
the summit of Altuzzo, Colonel Grogan, with severnl newspaper reporters, appeared
and interviewed Generals Clark, Alexan::ler and Wir. Littl~ton.
Enroute to Florence, General Clark and re.rty stopped in the field for a K
ration lunch. Returning to Fifth Army Headquarters rt Florence at 1530, General
Alexander and Mr. Littleton left immediately for AAI Headquarters at Siena..
General Clark spent most of the a~ternoon in his van and went to the AngloAmerican Hotel for a hot oo.th and returned for supper at his command post.
*
*
FLORENCE--SEFTE11!3I:R 21, 1944--Imrnediately follovr.i.ng the 0830 conference this
morning General Clark saw Maj. Gen. ~. C. Conch, Engineer General, AFHQ, with
General Bowman, Fifth Army Eng:i neer, in his van. The r~st of the morning the
General spent working on papers and conferring wjth VArious members of his staff.
�After lunch Gl'!neral Cl~rk, with General:') Gruenther a.nd Hume, drove to Pis•
tois. where they made a. sight-seeing tour of t},e city, after wti ich they drove to
Montecatani wherl'! they 5nspected a suggested rest c11mp for Fifth Army personnel.
The General returned to }1is headquarters nt 17'~0 and dined wit} GenerAl
Brann in Florence.
General Clark today issued the f ollovring directive to his subordint"te
commanders:
"1. Fifth Army operations in the PO ~,alley may fnll into two quite different types of action. The first of these possible or1erations is based on
the assumption that Fifth Anny will debouch in the PO Valley in the vicinity
of I~10LA while major German formations are still engaged with the Eighth Army
generaJly Rast of CESENA (M 6007). The second is based on the assumption
thRt the enemy troops now facing Eighth Army on the East oot'lst w.ithn.raw from
that area prior to the time Fifth Army debouches into the !MOLA area.
11
2.
Assumption 1.
a. General - It is no 1 most probable that the 88th Infantry Di vision
of II Corps, operating on the FIRE iztrOLA - !MOLA rood, will be the first Fifth
Army division to break out into the PO Valley. Units of 13 Corps, operating on
the right of this division, should break out shortly after the 88tr Infantry
Division. 13 Corps plans call for the debouchment of units of this Corps generally in the vicjnity of FAENZA. It appears from terrain studies thet the best
defensive position against a n thdrawal of G"JrmA.n forces facing Eighth Army
would be gen~ra7ly along the LAfvOrJE River to the confluence River RF,NO and VALLI
Di COMACCHIO. If units of II Corps thnt ha.ve d.ebouched in the IM01A are.-i. are in
contact gen~rally along t}, is selected line, it may be necessary for 13 Corps to
debouch f'rom its present maJn axis by lateral roads North nnd West of FAf~UZA. As
rapidly a.s tJ-,is Corps can be debouched, it sl1ould be employed in tl e right sector of this possible defensive position.
b.
IT Corps tasks.
(1) If GermAn troops A.re still facing the Eighth Army, generally
East of C'ESE'•TA, it is important that II Corrs i111P1ec'iiately estnblfoh a bRse in
the vicinity of rr:nLA and rom that base dispntcl , forces as far East as possible to ~in contact with the re,:ir of the German elements, demolish roo.ds and
cover other Fift}, Army units that must be immedjptely sent out to take rositions across the maj_n highways to prevent the withdrawal of German forces. The
forces required for this operation depend entirely upon enemy forces engaged
with the Eiehth Army but plans should be ma.de to debouch at lea.st two U. s.
D:i.v:isions heavily reinforced with artillery, tanks and tank destroyer units as
rapidly as possible a.nd rresent pla.ns should include the adjustment of our
forces now in contact to make possible tl,e early release of additional infantry
units to sup}'ort the 88th In.,.antry Division when it-oomes out into the valley.
The total number of u. s. troops thPt CA.n be broup)lt forward to reinforce troops
engaged in this opl"lration will rlepend to a grent extent upon the condjtion of
the road over which sup:rlie s must be moved.
(2) As soon as possible after U. s. forces have come out into the
PO Valley ;n the vicinity of IMOLA, a task f'arce will be immediately dispatched
to the vicinity of' BOLOG 1A.
his task force must include tanks, tank destroyers
�and self-propelled artillery (Ind be sent there with the mission of blocking
the routes of wi thdrl'l.vtal of nny German f'orces facing the center of the Fifth
Arrrry forces.
(3) 0 ome forces will have to be dispatched as far as FERRARA as
protectjon against enemy troors threatening the left and rear of Fifth Army
units fncin~ East.
c.
13 Corps task:
(1) Depend1ng on the situ~tion when advance units reach the
FA'EtrZA areR, debouch into the PO Valley either directly North of FAENZA or
sideslip to the left over lateral roads North and W
est of FAENZA.
(2) Occupy the :rj ght sector of the Lf\.MONF, line.
3.
Assumption 2.
a. General - In the event the enemy ~rmed forces now engaged on
Eighth Army front have disengPged and withdrawn prjor to the deboucM.ng of
Fifth Army forces into the PO Valley, Fifth Army will advance as rap-:dly as
possible to the North to cross the FO River with the mission of securing
T'!A11JT0l!A and 'mRO',TA and preventing the· movement of enemy f'orces Eastward.
In tM.s cA.se, II Corps will:
(1) Upon debouching into the ro Valley in the vicin:tty of
IMOLA immediately send a task force to the OOLOCPTA area to block the routes
of wj thdrawal of any German i'.' orces f'acing the left and center of the Fifth
Army forces. This force must include tanks, tank destroyers and self-propelled
arti111'ry.
(2) Continue the attack, seizing crossings over the :ro River
between BORGOFCF.TE and SBRMIDE.
(3) Capture WUOVA and ,!El.O'TA.
(4) Tnke up initial defensive positions along the Rivers mncro
and •,lTZA.
( 5) Employing necessary minimum f9rces, refuse its left flank
South of the PO River generally along the River E~TZA.
(6) Be prepnred to exploit to the West.
(7) Maintain contact with Eighth Army.
b.
!lO'!'E: All plans :made will be based on employment of not
more than three infantry divisions and one Armored division.
c. l '3 Corps will, after debouching into the PO Valley, revert to
Eighth Army at a time to be announced later. There nriy be some delay in moving
the 6 South African Armoured Division from IV Corps a.rea and returning it to 13
Corps but it wil] be accomplished at the Mrliest practicable opportunity.
4.
Under either assumption IV Corps will:
a.
Continue to advance to the iJorth.
b. Release 6 South African Armoured DiVisio:1 to 13 Corrs at the
earliest opportunity.
�c.
Prot"'ct Fifth Army left flank.
d.
Maintain contact with II Corps."
General Alexander today wrote General Clark as follows:
\
"I have just heard that having cleared up the FORTtTNATO ridge, lea.ding
troops of Eighth Army have reached RIMINI and the 1,1i.RRECHIA river with little
or no opposition. Leese I know intends to launch the 'Jew Zealand Div and 5
Canadian Armd Div to follow up as soon as he can get bridgeheads across the
river. As l Br Armd Div have b~en heavily engaged and have had considerable
losses, the launchinF-; of N.Z. Div and the Canadinn Armd Div will leave Eighth
Army without any fresh armoured formation to sustain their advance, which
they will neii,d more than ever now that 90 P.G. Div has bngun to aprea.r on
their front. I am therefore extremely anxious to as•}emble an arnoured division in reserve behind Eighth Army as quickly as possible.
"I had originally l1oped that it would have
Div over the mounta:ins to join in the battle in
roads so hea:rily demolished I think it will now
by the East coast, where they will also he most
and reinforce, or go through the lfew Zealanders
been possible to pasr; 6 .Armd
the PO Valley, but with the
be quicker to move them round
suitably ple.ced to follow up
and Canadians.
"I realise that you too will be hard rressed for reserves, but as the
battle hns d!'lv"'loped I think Kirkman should be able to do all that is possible
on his front to assist your battle with l Br and ~ Ind Div. In fA.ct I feel
sure he will not be able to maJntain all of those two divisions forward. As
the front loosens up, which it shovrs signs of doing now, it looks very much a.s
if 6 Arrnd Div will be 11.utomntically pinched out anyhow. Moreover I doubt if
the armoured bri1:ytde is making any useful contribution to the battle now.
"What I woulrt like therefore is to begin to move 6 Armd Div over to the
East coast, startinP, with the armoured brigade and Div H.Q. as soon as Eighth
Army can assemble the tr,msporters which will takl'! a few days, nnd following
with 61 Inf Bile as soon as Kirkman can release it without detriment to your
battle. 1 Gds nde which you hnve already very nobly released for 10 Corps
could then re;join its divfoion in the F.ast c0c:'1.st sector as soon as tre enemy
really begins to pull out on 10 Corps front, of which there r,re signs this
morning.
"I would like r, Armd Div H.Q. to be relea.sed At l'lbout the same time as
the armoured brigade so that they can organise the move of the division and
its assembly ln the Eastern sector, and I ~uggest that g Inrl Div could wHhout
any diC'ficulty take over command of 61 Inf Bde as long as th;it formation rema.ins in th!'l line.
"I
me know
out the
me Know
should be very grateful if you would examine these proposals and let
as cioon as you can if you agree in principle. '"he staff can then work
details. I shall be in all day so rerhaps you will ring me up and let
what you think as soon a.s you have had time to examine the problem.
"As you know, I am most anxious to avoid doing anyt'bing thvt would j_n any
�95
way pre,judice your battle, but I run sure you will agree thr>t it will be to
ev~ryone 1 s ndvantnge if we can get another ~rmoured division into reRerve
during the course of the next week or so and into country where it can be
used, and this seems to me to be the best rim quickest way of a.chievin~ that
object.
"I nm delighted to hear tlrnt your lea.ding troops are acrof-1s the SA""ITERllJO
river. They have done mal;!lificently. All the best of' good luck today."
*
*
FLOR'ENCE--SEJ'TEMBER 22, 1944--General Clark flew to the II Corps cub strip
at San Fiero where he was met by his jeep and driven to the 85th Division
command post i.n the vlcinity of Barco on Mount Altuz?..o. Here he wr,s met by
Generals Keyes ~nd Coulter and conferred with them for B. short time. From
thf'l coMmand post of the 85th Division, General ClElrk cPlled General Gruenther
to order f'iP,hter bomber missions on thrM targ..,ts northwe"'t of Firenzuola.
Thirty mi nut es lat~r General Clark could observe the bombers perform:ing their
missions. Gen"rnl Brann arrived at the 85th Division Heedquarters and joiMd
Generals Clark, Keyes and Coulter in oonference.
Gen~rals Clro-k and Keyes then dro~e to an observntion post overlooking
the valley of Pirenzuola where they could observe the enemy held hill features
of Mount Bene, Freddi, Sasso Di Castro to the northeast, Canda to the north
and La.fine to the northv,e 3t, as well as enemy and our mortar and artillery
fire. Genernl Clark then left General Keyes and drove to the 88th Division in
the vicinity of San F'ellegrino, just three mil"s southea.st of Firenzuola where
he met and conferred with General Kendall. General Kendall stressed his rroblem of supply for the 349th and 350th Regiments, all of which had to be transported by nru.le on twelve-hour runs.
Generi::1 Clnrk returned to the fi.-,ld at San Piero where he return"'d by
L-5 to his com:r.iand post in Florence.
Mr. Amberg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Vfar; Brigadier Gener,:il
Greenbaum, Executive to the Under Secretary of War; Lt. Col. Knowles, Office
of the Secretary of War; and Col. Mricon, clnssmate of GenerRl ClArk :>t West
Point and also of the TTnder Secreta.ry of War I s Office, were the General's
guests for dinner.
*
*
FLORE??CE--SEPTET1BER 23, 1944--Following his 0830 conference this morning,
General Clark conferTed for half an hour with !i'aj. Gen. Almond, Comnanding
General of the 92nd Division. The Army Commander flew in his L-5 to the cub
strip at San Piero at ten o'clock where he was met by Mr. Amberg, General
Greenbaum, and Colonels Macon, Knowles and Grogan. Mr. Amberg t'lnd General
Greenbmlm drove v~ith GenerRl Chi.rk in his jeep to the 85th Division in the
vicinity of' Barco on 1."ount Altuzzo. Enroute GenerPl Cli:irk pointed out terrain features Rnd enemy fortifica.tions which the Fifth Army had overcome.
At 85th Division headquarters General Coulter briefed General Clark and
party on the current situation, after which General Cl.l'.lrk took the party to
�an observation post overlooking the vn1ley of Firenzuola, pointing out key terrain features held by the enemy. Enemy artillery could be observed, as well as
our artillery.
Genernl ClA.rk returned to the cub strip at San Fiero, where he took off for
his headquarters in Florence. The General spent the afternoon in his van, conferrinP, with members of his sta.ff. At 1730 n,1r. Amberg, General C'.rreenbaum and
Colonels Macon, Grogan and Knowles came to say goodbye to General Cl.Rrk.
After havinP, dinner with the regular members of his ness, General Clork
took an hour's walk wjth General Gruenther and Colonel Saltzman and retired
early to his van.
General Clnrk cabled Genernl Uexnnder ns follows toda.y: "This heanquarters has been a.dvised that disembarkAtion of remainder of Brazilian Di vision
will take place at Naples because Navy objects to Leghorn for reasons which
are not clear. I urgently recommend that strong representations be mede to
have these troops unloaded at ti,ghorn. Training can then be supervised- by my
headquarters and entry into battle will be expedited by at least two or three
weeks."
*
*
*
FLORE'flTCE--SEP.rEimER 24, 1944--Genere.l Clark remained in his van today, working
on administrative matters ro1d conferring wj th VA.rious members of his stPff. In
the evening h"' din~d with General Gruenther, Colonel SaltzmA.n and Mr. & Mrs.
Grassi in his mess at the oomffl!3-nd post and then snw a movie in his conference
hut.
General Alexander today sent the following cable to General Wilson regarding the disembA.rluttion of the BraziliA.n Division at Naples:
"I understand thRt for naval rensons disembA.rkA.tion of remn:inder of BrA.zilian Division is pl nned to take place at ~aples instead of Leghorn. It is
most :important to get this division up quickly to oomplete its training under
Clark and to get it into battle at earliest opportunity. As you know my mArgin
over the enemy is narrow. By disembarking this division at Leghorn it will affect the hattl~ two to three weeks sooner and this mAY make all the difference.
Incicl1imtally this would avoid serious loss in maintemnce tonnage causen by a
rail move. I hope th~t you will be able to arrange mtters accordingly with
C-in-C ~led. 11
General Leese sent General ClArk the following congratulatory cable today:
11 ~any congratulations to you and your Fifth Army on your great achievement
in breaking throUP,h th!' mountains. The best of luck and may we join up soon."
*
*
*
FLOREl{GE--SEf'TF.JIDER 25, 1944--Follo,,ing his 0830 conference, the Army Commander
remained at his oommand post all day to<1ay, working on an accumulation of papers
and conferring with his staff.
�In the afternoon he received ~nerAls Chidlaw and Cannon And discussed
with them the employment or the Strntegic and Tactical Air Fcrces in support
of Fifth Anny operations.
The General dined with the regular members of his ness and retired to his
van early in the evening.
General Clnrk today replied to General Leese' congratulatory cable of
yesterday as follows:
11 I deeply apprecinte your CP.ble of oonp:ratulrttions.
The ta"'k of Fifth
Army was made much easi"'r by th" splendid accomplishments of the court1geous
troops of Eighth Army."
*
*
FLORRNCE--SFJTEMRFR 26, 1944--GenerAl ClErk srent the mornfop; working in his
van. At 1::no General Dutra, Brazilia.n Minister of War; Gimeral Mascarenhas,
Commanding the Rrazili.a.n Expeditionary Force; General 7,enobio, CoillI!l1lnding the
Brazilian Regimental Combat Team; Colonel Machado, Secretary to the Brazilian
Minist•r or War; Maj. Gen. Wooten, Commanding TJ. s. Army Forces, South Atlantic; Brig. Gen. Kroner, n. s. Military Attache to Brazil arrived and were
greeted by General Clark. A guard of ho~or was held for Generrl Dutra and
party. General Clark then briefed General Dutra and other guests on the current Fifth Army situation. Generttl. Clark expressed to General Dutra the great
honor and privilege for the Fifth Army to have Brazilinn troops fight1ng by
their s:i.de. General Clnrk entertained Genernl Dutr~ and p>.rty at a buffet
lunch in his conferl'!nce hut. r.~ny members of Genernl Cl:>rk' s staff were present.
After lunch Genera.l Clnrk bade goodbye to Genern.l Dutra and party and
spent a quiet afternoon in his van. In the evening the General dined with the
regular members of his mess nnn retired early to his van.
A summary of operations for the week ending September ?6th is as follows:
Fifth Army cont:i nued its offensive to brenk through the enemy's defl"lnse
positions and debouch into the IO Valley. TI Corps committed the 88th Division
on the right and succeeded in breaching the Gal'IHC Line, seizing key features
on the Tforth slopes of the APF. 1TI'ITNF: watershed, and, assisted by 13 Corrs attack
on the rii:;ht, was threatening to slash cor,munications 11nd plug the escare
routes of en.-,my forces engaged before F!jphth Army to such an extent that numerous counterattacks were being hurled recklessly across our front. The enemy
was frantically shifting troops pi.ece-meal from qujeter sectors in nn effort to
slow further progress toward the end of the period. On the left JV Corrs
troops continued to aggressivelv r~trol, rn._q1ntaining oontact wjth the enemy,
closel•r folloVJinf; up w~~
thdrawals along its front nnd attacking at some oints
to gain local oryjectives and drive the enemy ~urther North. The 1st Armored
Division(-) was detached from IT Corps P.nd rlaced on an alert status, under
Arm~ control, for possible use in a rapid e:xrloitntion role.
General Clar~ received the followin~ message today from General Alexanrler's
Headquarters:
�11 General Alexander has received the following messt-,ge from General Wilson:
'Please accept f'o:r Yourself and convey- to General Clark and General Leese my
oongratufations on the operations of the rast week~ which hRve r1t least resulted in the brea.king of the Gothic Line and have pt!'lved the wav for further
great victories. The skill and speed with which the Eighth Army was regrouped
once more completel~, surprised Kesselring. This fl"l.ct and the determinrition of
the advance resulted in the earlv breAch of the enemv 1 s most easterly defences
and coupled with the bitter fighting which follows has forced him to use up
more and more of his reserves on that flank. 'T'he determined ottA cks the Ameri•
can and British troops of the Fifth Armv in most difficult country have now
breached the Gothic Line at its strongest rlace and Fifth are ready to push
forward into the plains. All this reflects the grePtest credit on the leader•
ship of commanders, but it cnuld onlv hl"lve h~en achieved as a result of the
grMt courage tmd skill displayed by officers e,nd other ranks. I hope that
the crossin~ of the Rubicon will leed, as with a f'A.mous commander in the past,
to decisive }Tictorv and the destruction of Kesselring' s Army. 111
*
FLOR~NCE ... -SEPTBI'!BER 27, 1944--Following the conference, Genernl Clark flew at
0900 to the II Corps cub strip in the vicinity of Scarperia where he was met
b;r Generals Dutra, Wooten, froner, Mascarenhas and Ke;ves. General Clark, with
General Dutra and Ma.jor v:alters his interpreter, drove over Mount Altuzzo I ass.
General Clark pointed out terrain features to G.neral Dutra, explainin~ the
enemy defenses and relnting the difficult task in eaining this ground. He then
drove to an OF overlook:tn~ the vane,, of Firenzuoln. ;.Jhere General Chi.rk pointed
out to General fiutra and other 1s11ests the mountain featm·es over which 1'~ifth
Army troops wer~ not" fiP,hting. Enem~v as well as Fifth Arm;r artiller;v fire and
nllied fi~hter bomber missions oould be observed rrom the OP.
General Clark then bade Bt)odbYe to General Dutra and pl'l!'ty and drove in
his jeep down a roa<'l entirely under- enemy observation. to the 85th Division, two
miles east of Fir"nzuol/3. where he conferr"'d with General Coulter. Having srent
half an hour with General Coulter, General ClArk then d.rove to the 88th Division in the vicinity of San rellegrino where he was met by General Kendall, Acting Division Commander, and was briefed on the current sitootion. General
Clark lunched with General Kendall at his headquarters.
After lunch General Clark drove to the 88th Divis1.on cub strip two miles
north of Ti':irenzuola where he was rnet b:v his cub plane, nnd he flew back to his
headquarters jn Florence. The (}eneral dined with the regular members of his
mess and spent a qujet evenjng in bis van.
Genenil Clark toda.~, replied to General Wilson's cable of yesterday as
follows:
General Alexander has conveyed to me your congratul~tions on the operations of' the past vreek. I deeply appreciate your kind message and hope that
we may shortlv 'succeed in destroving. the German armies in Italy."
11
*
I
�FLOREN'CE--SEFTEMBBR 28, lq/+4--Aftt'!r the early morninP, cxrnft'!rence Gl"!neral Clark
flew to see General oole of the 6th South Afr:t can Armored Division, returning
for lunch at his headqWlrters. G"'neral Almond, Comnnnding Genernl of the 92nd
Division, luncht'!d with G1mera1 Clark. The Genl'!ral spent the af'ternoon in his
van. He conferred for ::in hour with )fajor Gent'!rnl ~'looten, Commc.nding U. S. Arn1y
Forces in the South f,tlantic.
At 1600 Mr. Eown.rd of r-mc, who was givinP, his fi..rst Army Hour rndio broadcast from Florence tonight, came to see General Clark. The Gen~ral briefed Mr.
Howard on the current ?ifth Army sitmtion.
The Gt'!nernl d-1 ned quietl:r with the r~gulEi.r members of his mess this evening and retired earl:v to his mn.
General ClArk received the following cable from General Leese upon his
departure from command of the ~ighth Army:
''I ~.m so sorry that time is too short for me to see you to say goodbye
before lea,rin~. I haw, i;reatlY ttppreciated our corrHal coo:reration throughout
the carnrai~ and hope we mav m"!et again in another theater. The very best of
luck to :vou. Hv hest 11ishes to Al Gruenther."
*
*
*
FLORF.NCE--SEFTBMBER 29, 1944--The General spent the entire day, following his
earlv mornine confert'!nce, in his van working on administrative ml'1tters and conferring wjth various staff officers.
In the afternoon General CL~rk went to the Anglo-American Hotel for a hot
bath, after which he entertained Generals Gruenther, Sullivan, Bradshaw and
Colon!'!ls Saltzman and Nygaard for a drink. Generals Clnrk and Gruenther, with
Colonel Saltzman, dined with flr. anrl Mrs. A.rturo Grassi at t},eir home in
Florence.
General Cl.Rrk today replied to General Leese' message of ~,esterday as
follows:
"Your message deeply appreciated. I nm very sorry to see you leave. I
have enjoved and apprecfated our nnr.;ocfrtion in this .joint campaign. Good
luck in ~rour new assignment. 11
General Clark today received th~ following letter from Lt. Gen. Harding,
Chief of Staff, AAI, regarding Allien Occupation of '1estern Italy:
"Referenee this Feadqunrt~rs letter v1A/5Y, of 11 Serternber.
"1.
APJ1row1.l has now been given b;v A.F .H.Q. to the rroposals in Jf:1ra-
graph 7 (a)
&
(b) • .
2. As regards the quecition of the attitude to be Pdopted towarns the
VFtrious poHMc~l rArti.es in We<1tern Itttl:V, the Supreme Allied Commander has
directed thAt the poli?Y of the A!lie~ Corym~nd will be to suprort the ~uth~rjty
of the Government of Signor Bonomi which incluAes r~presentrtives of the six·
11
�loo
principal parties in the State .
because it is pursuing a policy
effort, and in internal affairs
and influences. ~he Government
tion of the future constitution
people are in a position freely
The Allies are supporting this Government
of ma.ximum Italian pt1rticipation in the war
is pledged to the abolition of Fascist methods
is also pledged to postponement of the quesof Italy until such time as the whole Italian
to express their opinion.
"It should be pointed out to the various political elements in Western
Italy thtit it is their duty to cooperate to the full with the Allied Mj litro-y
Government officials, who will seek to restore civil administration and public services; and that they will be expected to refrain from any political
or industrial action which would hinder military operations, or undermine the
position of the Italie.n Government · of Signor Bonomi. This will not prevent
free expression of political opinion to the ex.tent which considerntions of
securjty allow.
"Contact between the political leaders of Western Italy and the Italian
Government should be encouraged."
*
*
FLORENCE--SEP'I'EMBER 30, 1944--'J'he General spent the · early part of the morning
in h:ls van. At 1000 ,hours the Army Comr,1ander held a press conference for forty
newspaper correspondents in his conference hut. General Clark explained to
the coITespondents his future pl8ns and the prospects of the battle.· The General placed particular stress on the fine air support he has had and explained
in detail to the corrfl}spondents the "Rover_ J2e" set-up. After the conference,
General GJ;:i.rk talked to many o.,. tlie cor1~esponden-fs. Lt. Col. McCreary, PRO of
MAF, told General Clark that his orientation on air-ground support was the
clearest and most concise exrlanation he had ever heard and that he would mke
a full report to ~neral Eaker on General Clark's press conference.
17
After lunch General Clark d.ro ve to 13 Corps in Bol'go Lorenzo. Enroute,
he met General K~yes who joined him in his jeep. Generals Clerk, Kirkman and
Keyes conferred for an hour in General Kirkm,m 1 s van, after which General Clark
drove back to his oommand post 1n Florence. Brigadier and Mrs. Stayner and
Brigadier Divers came to dinner with G~neral Clark this evening.
Operations for the month of September may be summarized as follovrs:
~ • Ground Farces: A crossing in force all along the ARNO West of FLORENCE
was begun to maintain contt1.ct at the beginning of the month as 13 Corps continued
to gain ground rorth and Northeast of the city. Elements of II Corps ~ssed
through the left of 13 Corps but enemy defensive positions were not fully developed nor a full-scale attack lt1.unched for severnl dnys until the 85th Div was
committed on the right flank . While outer defenses of the GOTHIC Line were
cracked and a penetration shortly begun a determj nedly fighting enemy made excellent use of rpugh terrain to prevent a rapid Pdvance or break-through.
Strongpoint after strongpoint was taken but each successive feature was just as
stubbornly defended though perhaps not as heavily fortified as the main positions . M. CALVI and M ALTO were captured but the form.tdable mass of M GAZZARO M' FAGGIO - M CAS'T'BL GTTERRINO lay ahead . M. ALTUZZO was won but the heights of
M PRATmlE and M ACUTO next had to be scaled. FIREl!ZUOLA, Northeast of FUTA
1
��l O[
PASS, '.'fas occupied but the twin pea.ks M FRF.DDI - M BENI and M GOGIOLA, M CANDA
a.nd M CnLORETA surrounding it to thf"l North also had to be cleared. The 88th
Div was employed on the riP,ht flank to drive toward !MOLA and reached M
BAT"'IGLIA where repeated counterattacks and stiffened enemy resistance m,:,de
further adv~nce verv difficult. The weiP,ht of the attack then shifted from
the axis of the FIRF.NZUOLA - IMOLA Rood to Route 65 directed on BOLOGUA. M
CA IDA was outflanked and :later secured, all these key features end m.'9.ny others
were in our hnnds with the ~dvance continuing to rush forward as the period
closed. 13 Corps relieved elements of II Corps, taking over the zone occupied
on the right by the 88th Div, while continuing to attack Northeast l'l.long its
front nnd genernlly conforming to the ma.in advance. In IT Corps sector PISA
was occupied and the fKlt~ PISANO hill nnss cleared when the period opened.
During the month ~·nilTE ft.IJ3A'N'O and the important tovms of PISTOIA, LUCCA and
VIAREGGIO were ceptured. IV Corps continued to engAge light enemy forces by
aggressive patrol action and constant forward rz-essure along jts entire front
and preptJred to a.ssist the main effort by a strong P.dvnnce up the PRATO BOLOrrNA Road. ~he first BraziliAn troops to fight overseas entered the line
in a sector near the coast durinR September.
]• Air Supwrt: A totel of 11~ mi~sions or 7416 individual sorties
•~ere flown durin1; the rionth of September in direct support of Fifth Army operations on virtually every oonceivable type of rern.merative target. Despite much
poor weather and ba.d visibility very ~ood results w~re obtl'lined. A total of
129 missions, 638 sorties, wer('! handled by "Rover Joe" on c~ll targ.ets request-)
"'d by forward units for close support with excellent results f!nil much vriluable
.
time saved. . . ..R. 4
"-Qw--'t ; - . ~ -:lo q~ ~
t-
~r
i.;'-'
*
·~~~--~~-
'Pt.,
*
*
FLOR.ENCE--OCTOBER 1, 1944--General Cl~rk left his command. post shortly Rfter
hi.s early morning conference and flew into the Futa Fass, lPnding on the road
on Route #65 where he was met by his jeep nnd driven to the 91st Division in
the vicinity of Sru1ta. Lucia. General Clark also visited the 85th and 34th
Divisions.
At 1/..30 General Clrirk met GenerRls Alexander, Harding and Lernnitzer on
Route .%5 . The General returned to his command post at 16oO hours and entertain-,d members of his staff in the conference hut with n movie.
General Cl.ll...rk today received the folJowini; messAge from General rv~cCreery
upon his assumption of command of F.ighth Army:
",1'any thnnks for your kind message. It will be a great pleasure to me to
work i.n the closest cooperation with Fifth Army during our r>dw.nce. 11
*
*
*
FLORENCE--OCTOB'SR 2, 1944--Generals Cnnnon, Lernnitzer And Chidlfl.w came for
bren'kfast this morninr,- and conferred w1th General Clark. The G"nerel spent
the morning in his va.n ,,vorking on papers and conferring with rnembr-rs of his
staff. General Yroner called to see General CL~r'k at 1500 hours and conferred
�
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Title
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Clark, Mark W. Diaries
Subject
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Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984.
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns.
United States—History, Military—20th century.
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950.
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The Citadel Archives & Museum
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Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
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CP Clark
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Mark W. Clark Collection
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application/pdf
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English
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Text
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20
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The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Mark W. Clark Diary, August 12-September 30, 1944
Subject
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Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns
United States—History, Military—20th century
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from August 12-September 30, 1944.
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
CP Clark
Publisher
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The Citadel Archives and Museum
Date
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1944
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
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application/pdf
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English
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Text
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1638
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lO l
normal radar machines out of adjustment and brings a number of anti-aircraft
protection difficulties. General Clark immediately sent a cable to General
Gruenther telling M_m to get this equipment on the next boat to Ando.
The Army Commander then conferred with Lt. Col. Wells, G-2 at the Ad•
vance Command Post, and later General Moran, before going to bed.
General Clark dispatched the following cables to General Gruenther who
had remained back at Fifth Army Main Headquarters:
RN 9796. "Situation relatively quiet with sporadic artillery fire, mainly in forward areas. Second battalion, 157th, being relieved tonight by British. When completed will give 157th Infantry, less one battalion, as additional reserve. One battalion, 30th Infantry, being committed to strengthen
position in vicinity of 9431. Will leave Anzio harbor exactly 1100 hours tomorrow. Saville requests you arrange air cover. Have two cubs at Capodichino
1500 hours. Have Packard and other transportation at dock at 1430 hours.
Clear return PT trip with Navy. Don't let Spadger browbeat you. Acknowledge."
RN 9798. "Eagles hopes there may be a vacancy in OPDWD for Churchill.
Can we take him off his hands? Acknowledge.''
RN 9799. "Bringing Johnny back with me in the morning with two aides.
Issue orders by direction of the President in Truscott•s case. They should
confirm my verbal orders I have issued tonight. Send on my PT Boats on 24th
Brig. Gen. Fred Butler, to be Truscott•s Deputy. Also send Colonel Shepard
at same time if he is not sick. Request NATOUSA to send Brig. Gen. Ramey to
me immediately by air. I intend to make him VI Corps Anti-Tank Officer. Have
extra car at dock for Lucas. May send him direct to Sorrento for rest. Issue
orders announcing Lucas as Deputy Commander, Fifth Army. Acknowledge.n
RN 9800. "Bradshaw has urgent need for three SCR 1 s 584. Robinson familiar with this requirement. They must be shipped by LST tomorrow."
General Gruenther dispatched the following cable to General Clark re the
situation at the Cassino front: RN 3712. "Bombing attack on Cassino scheduled
to end noon 24th. Ground attack follows immediately thereafter. Weather prediction starting afternoon 24th is unfavorable and continues unfavorable for
thr~e days. XII Air Support estimate thAt 7 heavy groups and 7 medium groups
will be required and have submitted request for thnt number. Spadger says that
this force is not enough. He feels that the maximum effort must be placed on
the target and that no whittling down can be permitted. He has expressed his
opinion rather vigorously and there may be a minor crisis developing. I believe I can handle the situation."
Total Fifth Army battle casualties as of today are 72,982.
*
*
*
PRESENZANO-•FEBRUARY 23, 1944-•General Clark left the command post and went to
VI Corps Headquarters where he again conferred with VI Corps staff officers.
At 0800 he left for the 56th Evacuation Hospital. He was accompanied by two
American war correspondents, Reynolds Packard of United Press and Edward Ken-
�nedy of Associated Press, and a pool photographer, Sammy Goldstein of Acme.
At the 56th Evacuation Hospital, General Clark decorated 1st Lieutenant
Donald E. Knowlton with the Distinguished Service Cross. General Clark had
acted particularly fast in decorating this man, since Knowlton had performed
his deed of valor only two days previously. General Clark was accompanied
by General McLain, Artillery Officer of the 45th Division.
Following his visit to the hospital, General Clark went to the 1st British Division where he conferred with General Penney.
Returning to the Advance Command Post in a heavy rainstorm, General
Clark looked over last minute messages and found that chances of the FT Boats
returning to Naples were remote because of a heavy wind. General Clark drove
to the dock and after some discussion with the PT Boat Comnanders decided he
would put four members of his party on each of the boots and try to make the
trip. General Clark, acconpanied by Lt. Col. Brit~on, Captain Beardwood,
Sergeant Holden and Sergeant Chaney got on the PT and headed out into the
harbor. It was soon apparent that the FTs could not make the trip. Within
a few seconds everyone on board was soaking wet, and the PT #216 was alternately standing on its bow and then on its stern. The FTs turned around and went
back into the harbor. After a conference with the Port Commander, General
Clark arranged for part of his party to return to Naples on the U.s.s. Davis,
a destroyer escort. General Clark went out to the Davis aboard a sub-chaser.
The Davis departed for Naples at 1230 P.M., and General Clark arrived at the
Navy House landing stage about 1900. He was accompanied by Generals Saville,
Hawkins and Sergeant Chaney. Because of heavy swells, high winds and rain
squalls, the return trip was extremely rough. The remainder of General Clark's
party departed from Anzio at 1600 aboard two LSTS, the #63 and #64.
Upon arriving in Naples, General Clark was met at the dock by his Packard,
and he returned innnediately to his command post at Presenzano.
Important messages received and dispatched today are as follows:
RN 3745. Gruenther to Clark.
this afternoon.~
"Three radio sets for Bradshaw were shipped
Clark to CTNC, AFHQ. RN 3749. "Desire that Brigadier General Ramey report
this Headquarters earliest date possible. Advise when he will arrive."
Gruenther to Clark. RN 3748. "Have asked for Ramey. Orders will be issued as directed in your 9799. Extra car will be at pier for Lucas. Will advise about Butler and Ramey later."
Gruenther to Clark. RN 3752. "Have sent message to NATOUSA offering
Churchill for OPD assignment as directed in your 9798. 11
*
*
*
FRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 24, 1944--General Clark remained at his command post holding a series of conferences. General Keyes of II Corps called. He discussed
the relief of II Corps and the withdrawal of organizations, their reorga.nization, re-equipping and training as provided in Operations Instruction #16 is-
�lo3
sued this day. Thereafter General Walker paid a short call on the Army Com•
mander, who spoke of the fine work the 36th Division had done and of his confidence that the Division, by rest, reorganization and training, would soon
be restored to full combat efficiency.
The next caller was General Freyburg, who came to see General Clark with
the Chief of Staff. The Army Commander feels that General Freyburg has been
rather spoiled by the British Arrrr:,, due to the somewhat unique position occupied by the New Zealand Corps. Because it is not desired to offend New
Zealand politically, the Corps and Corps Commander have been treated with a
certain deference which has caused -Spadger to cavil at orders unless they
are to his liking. Latterly, the question of the taking of Cassino by the
New Zealand Corps has been an important project of the Fifth Army, but Spadger has been stating that he will or will not attack, depending upon the extent of the air support being to his liking. An attack by Spadger to definitely take the town was planned fo:r today but was postponed, as the weather
was unsuitable for air operations. In the meantime, General Clark has arranged for 900 tons, in place of 600 tons, of bombs to be dropped on the tovm
in support of the attack. During the conversation with Sradger today, G~neral
Clark told him of this favorable development but was quite blunt in express- \
ing the idea that as long as Spadger was serving with the Fifth Army he would
have to comply with Fifth Army orders and not argue about them.
At lunch Colonels Sullivan and Elllott, both of the Class of 1917 at
West Poir..t, were General Clark's guests.
Today Operations Instruction #16 was issued from Headquarters Fifth Army.
This Operations Instruction modifies Operations Instructions #14 and #15 in
certain respects. It provides that II Corps will be vrithdrawn to the Alife
area for rest and re-organization. 'T'he front will be taken over from right to
left by the CEF, New Zealand Corps and 10 Corps. The CEF' will be allotted
that part of the front down to a point immediately north of Cassino. The New
Zealand Corps will take over that part of the line running south from Cassino
to a point just north of the junction of the Garigliano and the Liri Rivers.
10 Corps will take o,rer the interval from the New Zealand Corrs to the sea.
Reliefs b~r the CEF and New Zealand Corps of those portions of the II Corps
front to be relieved by them respectively will be arranged by Corps Commanders
between themselves, and the relieving commanders will notify the Army Commander
when the relief is completed.
In the meantime, VI Corps, consisting of the 1st, 56th, 3rd and 45th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Armored Division, less Combat Command B, will restore its forward positions and prepare then for defense.
General Clark's notes for the 22nd and 23rd are as follows:
"Visited the beachhead on the 22nd and 23rd, going up by PT boat and returning by destroyer after PT 1 s found weather was too rough to negotiate.
"Took Generals Saville, Hays, Hawkins and Craigie in order to see firsthand air conditions and to discuss with VI Corps their problems. Also took
up Colonel Ma.ck, who will stay with VI Corps and advise them more fully on air
��matters.
''Visited all units and talked with all commanders. Personally went to
Darby's Headquarters of the 179th Infantry. I continued to be disappointed
with the follow-up by VI Corps of work on their final beachhead position.
Apparently Lucas thought it had been done, but neither himself nor his subordinates had checked. Am likewise dj_ssatisfied with the coordination of
anti-tank means within the corps. I am sending Brigadier General Rufus
Ramey, Cavalry, to the VI Corps for that purpose.
"Was disappointed with the infiltration which continued to take place
through the British units. I am convinced that they have lost a good many
men by being cut off, yet they feel quite happy about it and take no steps to
strengthen their lines. I brought that to Truscott•s attention, and he had
a meeting with Templar to straighten it out.
"Upon my arrival, found that Lucas was about to pull the 179th Infantry
out and commit the 6th Infantry. I felt that was a mistake and so indicated,
but did not direct it. The 6th Infantry, due to a success, has its chin up,
is motorized and works with armor handily. It should be kept during these
tense times to be used as their counterattack agency. The 179th, in its de•
pleted condition and in absorbing some 900 replacements, would not be ready
for a counterattack role for ten days to two weeks, whereas, I verified personally with Darby, it can hold its present position with one battalion up
and two back.
"I discussed with Truscott his taking over from Lucas, for I had told
him on my last trip that I would do it when things stabilized a little bit.
Truscott thought it best that I leave Lucas there, for it would hurt Lucas'
feelings. After hearing Truscott 1 s story and realizing that one motive which
might be guiding him was that in the event of a reversal Truscott would prefer to be second in command rather than in command, I then sent for Lucas,
having come to the conclusion that I would have to take h:i.m out. I laid a.11
the cards on the table. Told him that Alexander had demanded his release,
that General Devers, without talking to me, had visited the VI Corps and had
come to me and recommended that Lucas be changed. Both thought that he was
tired, mentally and physically, had had too much time in combat and needed a
rest. I told Lucas he had done a grand job but that, inasmuch as he was not
in mental or physical condition to carry on as well as someone else, my
course was clear. It was my duty to take him out; that I would make him my
Deputy Army Commander.
nr,therefore, directed that the orders be issued appointing Truscott, relieving Lucas and making him my Deputy. Brought Luca.a back with me out of the
beachhead the following day. I directed that General Butler be sent as Truscott1s American Deputy - Butler being Truscott 1 s choice. I also sent Colonel
Shepard into the beachhead to be second in command of the 3rd Division under
0 1 Daniel.
"Visited Templar's Headquarters and discussed the situation with him,
also Harmon, Eagles (twice), Penney and 0'Daniel. Pinned the DSC on a Lieutenant Knowlton for heroism in battle - this at the 56th E.,,a.cua.tion Hospital.
�105
"After talking with General McLain, I continued to be disturbed on the
losses of tanks and anti-tank guns. I am afraid that some of our personnel
abandon their equipment unnecessarily, and that, in some cases, it falls,
undamaged, into the hands of the enemy. I have sent a radiogram to Truscott to correct this situation. Also, have directed that ammunition dumps
be dug in and piles be farther spaced. 11
Following are the Army CoMill8.nder•s notes on today's activities:
"General Freyburg visited me this noon and still complains a.bout the
a~ount of air which he is to get. We have bent all our energies in arranging for air bombardment of Cassino. I told him I would take no further steps
because I have satisfied myself, as had General Alexander, that this is an
air matter - they were the experts and were putting enough on it to do the
job, in their opinion. General Freyburg is writing me a letter to get it in
the record. I have reported this to General Alexander, through General Harding. The more I see of Freyburg the more disgusted I am with his actions.
He may be an extremely courageous individual, but he has no brains, has been
spoiled, demands everything in sight, and altogeth~r is most difficult to
handle."
General Clark today dispatched the following cables to General Truscott:
RN 3781. "Give me your intentions for strengthening British position
just west of Anzio-Albano highway. When do you plan to advance British so as
to secure terrain dominating that highway? Keep me advised of situation and
your intentions by frequent personal messages."
RN 3783. "Your 9291 indicates accumulative loss of 68 tanks. Was told
during my last visit that a considerable number of TD 1 s have likewise been
lost. Consider these losses hieh in proportion to number of similar enemy
co~bat vehicles we have destroyed. Under no conditions should our materiel be
abandoned to the enemy without destruction. Please follow up on this matter.
General Ramey is expected here wjthin next few days. He will be sent to you
as soon as he arrives."
'*
*
*
PRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 25, 1944--This morning General Clark went by jeep to the
command post of the 4th Indian Division where he called on Brigadier H.K.
Dimoline who was in tempora_ command of the di vision during the illness of
ry
General Tuker. On the road from Route #6 to the 4th Indian Division the General stopped and made a careful examination, through his glasses, of Cassino
Monastery Hill and the heights surrounding it which could clearly be seen
across the intervening flat ground. The General also stopped at the New Zealand Corps Headquarters and had a talk with Spadger about the attack of his
corps on Cassino which is still held up because the weather has prevented the
all-out bombing of the town which Spadger considers essential. A further dif•
ficulty arises out of the fact that if the bombing of Cassino occurs it may be
necessary to withdraw from the town the American troops which have occupied a
third of it after a bitter and protracted battle. Once the bombardment ceases
it will not be certain that the Germans will not at least attempt to reoccupy
�part of this ground which would thus be vacated. This problem is being
studied by the Fifth Army staff and the XII Air Support CO!'IIllAnd staff in
an effort to arrange the bombardment so that it will not be necessary to
vacate the area.
(Note:- The solution of this problem, ultimately decided on, was
that as two things can not be in the same place at the same time, the
Fifth A:rmy troops would have to be withdrawn from the town before the
bombs could be dropped there. To reduce to a minimum the chances of German re-occupation, this withdrawal is to be carried out at the la.st possible moment before the bombardment. This in turn requires some expert
weather forecasting, as the actual recurrence of the ombardmcnt must be
assured long enough in advance to pr:rmH the distrihution of orders.)
At lunch General Clark entertained Generals Spaatz, Cannon, Saville
and Lucas. General Cannon, during the meal, made some interesting statements about the air cover over the beachhead. He said that it had diminished from a start of 28 planes continuously in the air du.ring daylight
to 8 continuously in the air, and that even this was difficult to maintain, due to the impossibility of using the strip at Nettuno as a base
for planes at the present time because of the enemy's artillery fire.
General Cannon further said that if at any time Germany was 'nilling to
make the sacrifice of planes involved he thought they could accumulate
the necessary number and conduct a damaging attack on the port. At the
present tj_rne he said that the 8 planes on standing patrol were so much
more aggressive than the Germans that they were successfully defending
the port against recurring attacks by 20 or 30 planes which they drove
off and forced to jettison their bombs .
General Eagles, Commanding General of the 45th Division, was hospitalized
today as a result of an attack of faintness, and arrang~ments were made to
have an electro- cardiograph shipped up to the beachhead to determine whether
or not he hns a cardiac condition. In the meantime, General McLain, Artillery Officer of the Division, has been put in temporary command.
Important messages of the day are as follows:
Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 675 . 11 1 am making strong effort with
artillery on front of 56 Division. Have requested cruiser gunfire support.
Some delay owing to mines . Please do what you can to expedite ava.ilability
of cruiser for this purpose."
Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 678. "Principal enemy activity yesterday against 2/6 Queens , London Scots , in front of 56 Division. 2/6 Queens
beat off strong attack late yesterday. 1 Advanced Company London Scots at
845507 driven out by surprise attack. Ternplar has ordered brigade commander
to reestablish situation today. Enemy patrols active on remainder 56 Division
front . Need for British replacements immediate action, relief of Irish Guards
by 1st Division accomplished, DVIR reached 858298, Penney has laid on aggressive
patrols in that area . Remainder of front relatively quiet except for 1ntermittent heavy shelling of front line areas , especially on British front and in
�vicinity of Carano. Enemy air active during night 2300 to 0100, dropping AP
bombs on forward troop areas 1st British Division and 1st Armored Division.
Casualties reported slight. Am attaching RCN Bn, 1st Armored Division to
Frederick on Harmon's recomnendation. Will withdraw remnant 2nd Bn., 157th
to rear area for 2 or 3 days to absorb replacements. 11
Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 174. 11 Reference your 3789, Keiser desires to accompany Lucas. He does not desire to remain with me on same status as Butler. States that he would prefer to start elsewhere. Suggest you
relieve him from assignment to VI Corps at once. Colonel D. H. Galloway
also desires to accompany Lucas. I would be glad to have him as Deputy
Chtef of Staff, but there is some embarrassment since he is the oldest staff
officer with VI Corps in point of service. I believe Galloway has deteriorated physically and recommend his return to the United States as soon as
possible. Suggest that he remains here for another week."
Personal Clark to Truscott. RN 3412. "Instructions issued by ACMF direct me to have 24 Guards Brigade return to Naples area by March 2nd unless
another full scale enemy attack is launched on the bridgehead before the
Brigade leaves, in which case they may be retained in reserve until the attack has been repulsed but not longer. Let me have your comments as to effect of this withdrawal. Also those of the appropriate British Commanders.
Do not move the Guards Brigade until specific instructions are issued by me."
Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 680. "Eagles yesterday had an attack
of faintness and a physical examination at 56 Evacuation Hospital indic8ted
low blood pressure. Surgeon recommends thPt he go to Naples for electrocardiograph to determine if condition due to cardiac condition. Can you
send a plane here for him? 11
General Clark replied to the above cable, advising that he would send
a medical officer and an electro-cardiograph up to Anzio to examine General
Eagles.
Clark to Truscott. RN 3420. "In view of enemy's present defensive attitude you should plan limited objective attack to retake all or part of
salient north of 29 grid and between Anzio-Albano highway and 92 grid. This
should be done before enemy has adcUtional time to prepare defenses. What
are your intentions and capabilities along this line?"
Clark to Truscott. RN 3421. "Orders issued this date relj eving Brigadier General Laurence B. Keiser from assignment to Headquarters VI Corps and
assigning him to Headquarters Fifth Army. Instruct him to proceed without
delay. 11
Personal to Truscott from Clark. RN 3422. "Orders nre being issued
today assigning Keiser to this Headquarters. I desire that you retain Galloway since I do not have an appropriate assignment for him now."
Clark to Truscott. RN 3423. "One American cruiser will be on hand
morning ?6th to furnish gunfire support. Time when it ecm start firing will
depend on clearing of mines. Your naval liaison officer will be able to
give you the hour. Navy here has suggested that you may be able to utilize
(
�lo8
Navy radar in locating hostile batteries firing on harbor .
discuss w1-th naval liaison officer."
Suggest you
HQ ACMF to Fifth Arrrry and Eighth Army . RN 914. "Reference 48/G(OFS)
dated 22 February. In confirnation of t1'1ephone conversation, CINC's meeting will take place at this HQ. at 1100 hours on 28 February. Lunch will
be provided as it may be necessary to continue the meeting in the afternoon. Please notify number of staff officers accompanying Army Commanders . "
Personal Clark to Devers . RN 3397. "Because of lack of replacements
rl'!organization and return to combat of 34th and 36th Divisions will be delayed . At present there are no effective infantry replacements on hand, all
available in l ersonnel Center i/6 having been sbipped to beachhead ~ncluding
approximately 1400 infantry arriv"d 20 Februe.ry. Approximately 1600 new
replacements are expected any day but will probably all be needed for beach~
head divisions whose total infantry deficiency was 660 as of 22 February.
Expected to arrive Naples from 2 J\:'arch are shipments totalling 3877 U. S.
general assignment replacements and 4518 specific assignment personnel. It
is improbable that these replacements will be enough to fill up infantry
deficiencies of 2581 in 34th Division and 3722 in J6th Division as of February 21. Furthermore very important for these divisions to receive their
replacements at once in order to give theM maxinnnn training with units . To
expedite arrival and increase number of infantry replacements in immediate
future shall appreciate any assistance you can give . "
Personal Alexander to Clark. RN 918 . 11 My staff have issued orders
that 24 Gds Bde is to be withdrawn from the bridgehead so as to reach the
Nocera area at about the same time as 201 Gds Bde . I am told that your staff
rave expressed doubts about the practicability of releasing 24 Gds Bde at
present . It was however arranged that 18 Infantry Brigade should rel.ieve
24 Gds Bde and it is essential to reorganize 24 and 201 Gds Bde into 1 brigade with adequate reinforcements without any further delay. I must therefore
insist that all arrangements are made for 24 Gds Bde to join 201 Gds Bde in
the Nocera e.rea by 2 A-arch at the latest unless another full scale enemy attack is launched on the bridgehead before 24 Gds Bde leaves in which case they
may be retained in reserve in the bridgehead unMl the attack has been repulsed but not longer . I should be glad to know that these arrangements have
been made . "
*
*
*
PRESENZANO- -FEBRU.ARY 26, 1944- -General Clark remained at his command post
today engaged in administrative work. He received a call from Major Blom, of
the Fifth Army CIC , who brought a report about the use of the Abbey at Monte
Cassino . The substance of the report was that the Abbey was not used in a
military way by the Germans . This justifies the position taken by General
Clark with respect to the bombardment , as contrasted to that of the British.
Today the command post of the II Corps was moved to a point just west of
Raviscanina. The 34th and 36th Division command rosts will be in the immediate
vicinity, and the II Corps will thus have An opportunity to rest and ref:i.t.
General Lucas and his aides , Major Renne and Captain Eyston arrjved at
�C
�the Fifth Army command post today, where General Lucas is taking over the
duties of Deputy Army Commander. General Lucas has been established in a
caravan with tents for his aic•es and staff near the Chief of Sta.ff area.
Late in the afternoon General Clark left by car for Caserta where he
picked up Colonel Sullivan and then departed for Naples where he dined
with Brigadier General Edgar Erskine Hume, recently promoted from the rank
of Colonel. General Hume today presented General Clark with the personal
flag of Mussolini, flovm only when the Duce was present. This particular
fanion was picked up in Sardinia and given to General HUMe, who made a
present of jt to the Army Commander.
General Clark's notes for toda.y 1 s activities follow:
"Evidence continues to accumulate that Admiral Cunningham and his Navy ;
are in no way cooperating with me. He does not come direct to me but insinuates to everyone he sees that he has been hoaxed into the position which
makes it necessary for him to maint8in my forces in the Anzio bridgehead.
He not only does not cooperate in the supply set-up but with his naval gunfire. He imposes so many restrictions and makes it so difficult, that it is
easier, in most cases, to do without his naval gunfire support than to accept the restrictions he imposes. He continually screams about gunfire in
the harbor, knowing full well that there is nothing that can be done on this
situation that is not already being done. With reference to supplies, he
has set an arbitrary limit of 2500 tons per day, which not only is not suffjcient to maintain my forces but thereby precludes the essential build-up
for any counter-offensive.
e~ I'-'(
~ ~ ~c.t... ff" ' \
c~
.J..-h-
~
...er.
M", )
"I have received the following letter from Alexander which Robertson,
who is in complete cahoots with Cunningham, has prepared:
1. The situation at ANZIO has developed in a manner very different
from that originally conceived when the operation was planned. Instead of
maintaining there a force of 2 - 3 divisions for a limited time until junction with our main forces could be made, we are now committed to the maintenance of a force equivalent to 5 divisions for an indefinite period.
1
2. This throws a heavy strain on our naval resources. C-in-C Mediterranean has, however, said that the Navies can, though not easily, sustain the
force in the bridgehead for some time longer at an average rate of 2,500 tons
per day, unless sor1e major disaster in the harbour or great increase in casualties among craft occurs.
1
'3. I feel it necessary to emphasize, firstly, that we must do everything possible to lighten the Navies ' task, secondly, that we must economize
our resources in order to conserve them for the essential task of driving
the enemy back.
4. With these objects in view I ask you to take all possible steps in
the following directions:1
(a) The strict control of ammunition expenditure to enable us to build
up ample reserves for the renewal of th~ offensive. If the enemy attacks us,
�l ID
heavy artill ery fir e must of cours e be brought down to stop him , but at other \
time s every r o1md expended should pay a dividend in proportion to the investment which it represents .
(b) Grent care in the lay- out of dUr1ps of all kinds to minimize damage
from bombing and shellfire .
(c) Cl ose supervision of forward dumps to prevent loss of ammrmition
or stores by hostile raiding parties or local successes .
(d) An austere standard of living among the troops in order to d:l.spense
with many accessories , such as laundries , canteens etc ., which we normally consider proper and necessary to provide .
(e)
Rigid check on pilfering and all forms of waste.
(f) Full use of all means made available by the Navies for getting additional stores into the bridgehead, including the use of LCI's for the trans port of stores .
' 5. I am confident that the troops will accept these measures cheerfully
if the reasons for them are explained to them.'
11
I hB:ve replied as follows :
1. Reference is made to your letter dated 23 February 1944, subject ,
"Maintenance ' SHINGLE ' " • As directed in paragraph 4, thereof , steps have been
taken to eliminate non- essentials from maintenance tonnages , to keep ammunition expenditures to the minimum consistent with tactical needs, to :insure
maximwn dispersion and supervision of dumps in order to minimize losses due to
enemy action , and to dispense with accessories normally considered proper and
necess ary for the col"tfort and well- being of troops .
1
2. The need for limiting maintenance to essential supplies has been
recognized by r1e froM the beginning of Operation "SHINGLE" , and wherever it
has been found that reductions or elim~nations could be made in quantiti~s and
types of supplies I have ordered this done . I shall continue to give this
matter my personal attent ion.
1
1 3.
After making such reductions and el iminations in maintenance asappear to be desiral1 at this time , I found that the daily maintenance requirele
ments of the beachhead force (British and American) amount to 2700 long tons
and that over 50% of this tonnage is amr.nmition. Thjs is based upon operations to date . Since it is planned to launch offensive operations from this
area as soon as possible it is necessary to build up a reserve of supplies
\
for this purpose . I feel that this reserve should be not less th,-,n 20 days .
The building up of such a r~serve is nov1 underway, and for the next six weeks
it will be necessary to put into the beachhead area 3750 long t ons of supplies
da ily to maintain the force there and to provide the reserve I consider essen- \
tial for planned offensive operations .
\
4. The attached analysis of the ATfZIO beachhead supply requirements v,as
prepared at my direction and was discussed hy General Tate , Fifth Army G- 4,
1
�Il I
with General Robertson and navy represent atives on 18 February. (See anal ys is in General Clark ' s SHIN'GLE file) . TM.s analysis shons that if we are to
ma.inta in the force now in the beachhead and be pre pa.red to launch an off en\
sive , the tonnage discharged da i ly m
ust be increased considerably beyond t he
2500 tons r efer red t o in paragraph 2 of your letter .
' 5. Commander- in- Chief , r~editerranean recently suggested the use of
LCI's as a means of increasing the daily tonnage into ANZIO. Thi s type of
craft is now being used in shuttle service between NAPLES a.nil the beachhead,
and we are using 10 to supplement the LCT 1 s in unloading cargo ships at Anzio .
We are prepared to employ 10 LCI I s daily in the NAPLES -ANZIO supply shuttle
service if the 'N'avy can make this number available . This will increase our
tonnage input by 400 tons daily during periods of good weather .
•6. In order that I may continue to supply the forces at ANZIO and
also provide the buildup of supplies required to support planned offenoive
action, I feel that the means must be provided to place the requisite tonnages
ashore . I ask your support and assistance in accomplisMne this end. Should
operations in the near future consume less supplies , requirements for maintenance will be revised dovmward. 1
nr have exercised great restraint in not taking a swing in writing officially at the Adniral, but hate to cause any more friction which would hinder the war effort .
"Cunningham acts as a completely independent agency. He knows no laws
from any higher a.uthority. Apparently the GING , General Vrilson, vrill not go
against his will under any conditions . This situPtion emphasizes the need
for unity of command , which is impossible under the British system of complete
independence of the Air Corps , Navy and Army.
"The replacement system for British troops in the bridgehead is bad.
have sent the following radiogram:
I
'Personal to Alexander from Clark. RN 3409. 11 Fresent reinforcement deficiencies for British units in beachhead excl uding guards are 26oO. Only
450 reinforcements are on hand, and it is my understanding that only 700 vvill
be available each week for all British units in Fifth Army. If present wastage rates continue the strengths of the British 1
)eachhead units will continue
to decrease even considering receipt of 700 replacements weekly.
"General Truscott reports that the depleted strengths of British battalions has reduced materi~lly the defensive strengths of the two British divisions and greatly reduces the offensive value of these divisions . My own observations confirm his estimate . The v,eakness of these units is causing me
considerable concern. I urgently request that you do everything possible to
bring the Anzio units to full strength without delay"
"There is a delay in the American replacements , and I have sent the follow ing radiogram to Devers .
Personal Clark to Devers . RH 3397. 'Because of lack of replacements reorganization and return to combat of 34th and 36th Divisions will be delayed.
�I lJ..
At present there are no effective infantry replacements on hend , all available in rersonnel Center No . 6 having been shipped to beachhead including
approx:i.mately 1400 infantry arrived 20 February. Approximately 1600 new
replacements are expected any day but will probably all be needed for beachhead divisions whose total infantry defici~ncy was 66o as of 22 February.
Expected to _arrive Naples from 2 March are shipments totalling 3877 U.S.
general assign~ent replacements and 4518 specific assignment personnel. It
is improbable that these replacements will be enough to fill up infantry
deficiencies of 2581 in 34th Division and 3722 in 36th Division as of February 21. Furthermore very important for these divisions to receive their
replacement s at once in order to give them maximum training with units . To
expedite arrival and increase number of infantry replacements in immediate
future shall appreciate any assistance you can give.'
7
I
"I am to attend a rn"'eting on the 28th with Alexander to discuss reorganization. It brings the Eighth Army into this area north of the Liri Valley
and puts the Fifth Army into the bridgehead area; the Fifth Army to be composed of all Americans and French. I am willing to accept any tactical role
for the Fifth Army if I can get all Americans and French consolidated jnto my
Army, allowing British, New Zealanders , Indians, etc ., to go to the Eighth
Army where they can be better handled . "
General Clark dictated the following memorandum to his Chief of Staff
today with regard to the proposed reorganization:
"Returned herewith are th~ pap1'rs on the reorganization. Please screen
the requests from the various staff sections for additional troops and give
me your recommendations . Also , have G- 3 prepare a letter to GOC , ACTuF stating that I have studied his plan, am in favor of it , list items upon which I
need decisions , list the additional troops which I need from NATOUSA , both
French and U. S., and finally state my requirem~nts for 12 LSTS for a given
period.
"Also, in my opening concurrence paragraph you might state that I can
see my w cl ear to relieve only one British Division jn the bridgehead by
ay
U. S., giving as a reason inadequate number of U. S. Divisions, together with
the casualty rate in the bridgehead and our difficulty with replacements
similar to theirs . "
Personal to Alexander from Clark. RN 3838. "In my 3409 to you I stated
reinforcement deficiencies for first and 56th Divisions as 2600. That figure
was in error and should have read 36oO. Deficiency is now increased to 4100
with shortage of 3100 in 56 Division and 1000 in 1st Division. DP-ficiency of
Guards Brigade has not been included in above figures . "
Personal to Truscott from Clark. RN 3839. "Information here indicates
deficiency 3100 men in 56 Division and 1000 in 1st Division. What is your
estimate of present combat effici~ncy of 56 Division? I share your concern
over British replacement situation , and I am doj_ng everything possible to
solve it . 1000 American replacements arrived here today. Infantry portion
will be shipped to you on 28th . "
Truscott to Clark.
RN 704.
"I believe enemy's present defensive attitude
�\l 3
covers regrouping for final blow against bridgehead. I do not have capabi- ·)
lities for immediate attack to reduce salient on account of weak strength
of infantry battalions. 56 Division are inadequate to hold present front
and cannot stop determined infiltration. Regrouping in progress in 1st
Division. Will make 2nd Brigade available by 29 February unless something
unforeseen interferes. Depleted battalions of 157 and 179 should be in
be+ter condition by that time. Have directed 1st Division to advance Links
tonight to vicinity of M-28 on Anzio road to permit moving anti-tank guns
forward to control the road. Will launch limited objective attack as outlined in my messages yesterday as soon as the situation permits. Meanwhile
I run making every effort to improve defensive organization. 11
Truscott to Clark. RN 703. "Reference your 3412. Everly, Penney and
Templar believe 24 Guards Brigade should be relieved because further operations will result in loss of key personnel who cannot be replaced. In my
opinion this brigade is so weak as to have little value for any oth~r than
stop gap purposes. Brigade Commn.nder hns received orders direct concerning
his relief. British units, particularly 56 Division, are so reduced in
strength that the loss of this brigade will of course be felt. I believe
we can expect entire 56 Division to be in similar state very soon unless
drastic measures are taken with regard to replacement. There is an urgent
need for a full brigade group or American infantry regiment immediately."
*
*
PRESEUZANO--FEBRUARY 27, 1944--Early today General Clark received a cvll
from Brigadier Stayner who had come to replace Colonel Jones in performing
the G-/+- work in the British Increment. Thereafter, General Seville called
to discuss with General Clark the question of air support of rending operations. General Clark then received a call from Brigadier General Clarkson,
Inspector General of NATOUSA, who had been directed to investigate an alleged
order made by Brigadier General Wilbur of the 36th Division that the troops
of that division crossing the Rapido should go over with weapons unloaded
and with only 25 rounds carried on their persons . General Clark is having
the matter looked into.
General Clark next received visits from Brigadier Generals Bronn and
Ramey who had been newly assigned to Fifth Army. General Ramey is being
sent to the bridgehead as anti-tank officer, VI Corps. Genl'lral Brovrr is to
be assigned to the 88th Division.
At 1645 General Giraud arrived at the command post for a call on General
Clark. The General went into the hut with General Giraud and, using Lt. Col.
Sutherland as his interpreter, discussed operations on the whole front with
partjcular reference to employment of the French. General Clark said to
General Giraud that he would speak frankly with him but requested him to receive whatever General Clark said in complete confidence. General Clark said
that he felt that the attack of the French Corps should be directed on Atina.
General Giraud said that that was clearly the proper course. General Clark
said that he had so recommendl'!d but that the British High Cornnand, which had
the last word in such matters, had insisted on an attack for objectives farther south; namely, Terelle and Roccasecca. General Clark said he disagreed
with this employment but had been ordered by General Alexander to follow it.
�\ l L\
/
General Giraud said that he too felt that this was a bad mistake . General
Giraud spoke of the urgency of an attack on the Germans in France this year .
The French have been holding up their spirit during the occupation , but they
are weakening. General Clark said he quite understood their predicament .
He asked General Giraud if he knew of ANVIL and who had been slated to command it . General Giraud grinned and said "Yes" . "Then" , said General Clark,
"You will realize not only my understanding of the need for such a move , but
also of its difficulty and of the considerations which might prevent it . "
Shortly after 1700 General Clark called together his principal staff officers , including Generals Gruenther , Lucas , Brann, Tate and Colonel Howard ,
Brigadier Richardson and Brigadier Stayner . A conference was held by all concerned about the subject matter of the meeting at General Alexander ' s Headquarters at Caserta tomorrow·. The proposal in question involves a shortening
of the Fifth Army front to that now occupied by the 10 Corps and a side-slip
to the left of the Eiehth Army to take over the intervening area . This also
involves the relief of British units from the Fifth Army so that the Fifth
Army will ultimately be conposed of Americans and French only.
After dinner this evening, General Clark invited a few of his staff section chiefs to the recreation hut to see a movie shovm by tht'! Special Service
Section.
Colonel Howard today dispatched the following cable to Lt. Col. Wells,
G-2 at the Fifth Army Advance Command Post at Anzio : "Following message from
Colonel DeMa.rco : Very ureent fron B. L. Z. 27 Feb . L~4, 0940- M 77 fror1 A. On
night of 27th or thereafter , an attack attempt on C. P. of ALEXAlIDER ~nd CLARK,
as well as nearby workshop . The agents will land from sea near C. P. Agent
with cut hand is our confidence man. At the time the blow is effected and
the mjnes, which shall have been laid are exploded , a very violent German
attack may be unleashed . In case of failure , Germans may withdraw to defend
COLLE LAZIALE . 11
The following nre the important messages of the day:
Personal Clark to Alexander. RN 3460 . "General Truscott reported to me
last night that the strength of 56 Division is inadequa.te to hold present front
and to prevent determined infiltration. He is attempting to compensate for
this weakness by regrouping within 1st Division in order to make 2nd Brigade
available . Truscott believes that 56 Division r ill be almost completely ineffective if reinforcements are not received in the immediate future . I realize fully that you are doing everything possible to procure reinforcements
for this division but again I must invite your attention to the fact that I
consider the situation so serious that drastic action must be taken without
delay."
Personal Truscott to Clark.
RN 723 .
"I do not believe tha.t exchange of
5 Division would be able
to do little more than relieve the 56th Division. I need infantry djvision
strong enough to relieve 56th Division and 36th Engineers and consolidate that
front . When this has been accoriplished , 56th Division must be withdrawn and
refitted here or in Naples . Your suggestion to return them by LCI seems workable
56 Division for 5 Division would solve rroblel"l here .
�l 15
if other troops not available. Hov1ever, consider American Division with its
higher infantry strl'lngth preferable."
Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 722. "Reference your radio 3839 deficiencies infantry and artillery British divisions as of 26 February: 1st Division
(less 13 Brigade) 2486; 56 Division 2520. Great bulk these deficiencies in
fighting i"lfantry soldier. In the case of 56 Division each battalion consists
of not more than two very weak companies, mostly replacements. Few have any
experienced junior officers and NC0 1 s remaining estimate present infantry
combat efficiency 56 Division at approximately 25%."
Clark to Truscott. RN 3863. "In view of another possible strong attack
developing from north, can eastern part of 3rd Division sector and 504 Para
Regiment and SSF sectors be lightened so as to make ndditional resources available to you to meet such an attack?"
Yesterday the Arm:l Command.er received the following cable from Adriiral
Horse, Flag Officer of Western Italy: Nrt:J. "Am so very sorry that the weather
has broken to add to your worries. However, the book says 'Whom the Lord
loveth he chasteneth 111 •
Today the Army Commander replied to Admiral Morse as follows: RN 3461.
"Thanks for your kind thoughts. Chastening already ample. Surely tir~e has
come to spare the rod. 11
From CG, NATOUSA to CG FIFTH ARLfI. RN 57059. "Your situation fully understood. An effort is being made to forward replacements as fnst as received.
Reurad 3397 Feb. 25 earliest arrival dates DUKO of infantry replacements in
nunbers needed is 1\TS'F 17 on 14 March with anticipated 120 officers, 5221 enlisted and UGS-34 on 18 March with 150 officers, 3500 enlisted. Further information our 56572 Feb 24 refer. 11
*
*
FRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 28, 1944--Barly in the morning General Clark recorded a
message to the Red Cross to be used in connection with the current drive. The
'lffiC made an exception to their usual rule and broadcast this recording over
its full network February 29th. Shortly thereafter the General, with Generals Gruenther, Brann, Tate, Saville and Brigadiers Richardson and Stayner,
left for Caserta by car where they conferred for sev~ral hours with General
Alexander and his staff officers concerning the re-erouping of the Allied
forces in Italy. General Clark's coMm~nts regarding this conference are as
follows:
"General Alexander called a conference today of General Leese and myself,
members of our staff, his staff, General Cannon and some of his staff. The
purpose was to discuss the reorganization of the two armies. Briefly, to get
the Fifth Army with American and French troops and the Eighth Army with all
the British. I have welcomed such a move for a long time a.nd have advocated
it. It puts the Fifth Army on the south, or coastal flank, including the
beachhead. It is going to take sore time to execute because of lack of decision from AFHQ on additional troops. In other vJOrds, it may result in more
command of fewer troops. However, anything that will divest me of the terri-
�l If>
fie responsibilities v1hich I have had in trying to command McCreery' s Corps
and Freyburg ' s Gorps will be welcor'le to me .
''Following is quoted a memorandum which I took to the conference and
which I delivered verbally to the assembled group:
'l.
Troops in the bridgehead are depleted Pnd need to be built up to
The depletion occurs
almost entirely in British elements .
effective strength to maintain their present position .
1 2.
General Truscot t reports that the 56th Division is unable to hold
its present position at its present strength, to say nothing of having any
offensive power .
5th Division , at full strength, must be moved to the bridgehead to
1st brigade must start by 1tJ!arch 3rd
or 4th at the latest .
1
3.
relieve the 56th Division immediately.
come .
'4. 24th Guards Brigade must remain in the bridgehead for some time to
It should be built up to effective strength there .
' 5. Infantry reinforcements must be taken from the 56th Division to
fill up the 1st Division before the 56th Division returns to the Naples area .
1 6.
I have been directed repeatedly by General Alexander to retake Carroceto and Cisterna . In his agenda for today ' s meeting one of the immediate
steps is to take these two points. This will require a major offensive operation by the VI Corps which it is totally incapable of doing with its present
strength or even if present units in the bridgehead were brought up to T/O
strength. Troops are tired and fresh units must be moved in and an additional division provided for the offensive action. The 34th Division is the only
division in sight to be moved up . I will direct that it coI'1l"lence moving by
combat team with the target date of the 1st CT , March 15th. It is badly in
need of replacements which do not arrive in this area for several days .
1 7.
ACfr~ and the Navy must accept this additional responsibility and
whole-heartedly support present troops in the bridgehead at full strength,
plus an additional U. s. Infantry Division. Craft to maintain this increased
force and to move the additional division commencing t~rch 15th must be assembled at once . Some additional LSTS , probably 2 per day, will be required
to build up in advance some maintenance supplies to take care of the 34th Division.
1 8.
With respect to reorganization on this front , I am ready to proceed
with General Alexander ' s plan immediately, relieving the 5th Division at once
by the 8Sth. I will continue my efforts on Cassino and to get a bridgehead
across the Rapido . The start of the relief of the French should commence
without deThy. II Corps Headquarters is available to take over from 10 Corps
Headquarters at such time as that may seem desirable . In the meantime, 88
Division to come under the orders of 10 Corps . If any continuity is to be
provided U. s. troops on its new Minturno front and to provide a division to
relieve tired units in the bridgehead, the 85th U. S. Division must be dispatched here imnedfately. 1
�"I made it extremely plain that I must have more whole-hearted support from the
Navy and ACMF in maintaining the present f orce, in laying in reserve supplies
and in building up for another division. I told Alexander that his thought of
offensive action was entirely out of the auestion until tired troops had been
reinforced, brought up to strength and one new division put in.
"I would like to put in the 88th now but ar,1 tmable to do so because of
lack of craft to make the move. tty only solution, therefore, is to put in the
5th British Division at full strength without equipment to relieve the depleted
personnel of the 56th Division. As soon as craft is assembled, and I have made
the demand for it, I will send more troops in.
11 1 am rather disturbed at the whining attitude of Truscott' s radios.
He
knows full well that I fully appreciate the situation. I believe he is trying
to put it all on the record. When I see him, in a day or two, I will jnform
him that he need not do that, for I accept full responsibility.
7
,,
1
11 The question of air support of the two armjes came up at the meeting, in
which I djsagrMd with Cannon's solution. Leese concurred witb me. \le will
have further discussions.
"General Giraud called on me a couple of days ago a.nd is quite perturbed
over the situation. He feels that if we are not successful in the bridgehead
it means no attack in southern France. I quite agree. He feels there must be
an attnck in southern France soon or else all hope of rescue by the French
1
people will have been lost. He decried my calling off · the attack of the French (
Corps on Atina. I likewise regret it, and it was only done on the direct orders
of General Alexander over my protest. I have always felt that an attack in the J
direction of Atina would outflank the Cassino position."
Following that gathering, General Clark returned to his command post where
he met Major General John E. Hull of the Operations Division, War Department.
General Clark conferred with General Hull 1n his van for some time. General
Hull spent the night.
General Clark today received the following cable fron General Truscott:
RN 750. "Situation on front of 56 Division critical because weak strength of
units render them unable to stop enemy infiltration and loss of ground little
by little. The condition is a natter of grave concern to Generals Evelegh and
Templer as well as myself. While I consider the situation critical, I cannot
alleviate it without grave risk entailed by comr.1
itting the two battalions of
the 18 Brigade which is P1y only British reserve. Committing these battalions
now would be only a stop gap and would seriously impair my capabilities for
counter attack against a major German effort.
"Substitution of the 5 Division for the 56 Division v1ill not correct· the
condition because the 700 British replacements allocated weekly will not cover
the attrition from casualties, and I shall be faced with a similar problem for
both divisions within two or three weeks. Therefore, I recol'1!1end that you send
one brigade of the 5 Division ~ithout vehicles et once to reinforce the 56 Division in the present critical situation. Instead of sending the remainder of
the 5 Division, I recomnend sendj_ng the 88 or other full strength American Division at the earliest possible time, for the following reasons: (1) American
�\ 18
units are larger and capable of longer sustained effort without replace~ents;
(2) Our replacement situation, while bad itself, is still better than the
British; (3) On that section of the front the crying need is more men; (4)
Unless such a solution is adopted, I see little hope for collecting troops
for counter attack when the Boche is stopped.
Evelegh concurs in these recommendations. This situation is so critical that urgent and immediate action is essontial."
11
In this connection, General Clark replied to General Truscott as follows:
RU 5050. "Reference your 750, critical situation in 56 Division is appreciated here. I have represented the situation personally to General Alexander
this date, and it r,as been decided that 5th Division at full strength will be
sent to you without equipment, 15th Brigade Group leaving here Uarch 4th.
56th Division, as relieved, will be returned without equipment to :lfaples area.
You must realize in making your demands for immediate shipment of additional
British and American units that availability of craft is the limiting factor.
Every effort is being made to increase suprly of craft. 88th Division is not
available for you but relieves 5th. Plan to send 34th Division by combat
team to you, commending betvreen March 15th and 20th. Delay caused by lack of
replacements and necessity for assembling craft for move. Am also recommending that such personnel as is required for replacements be taken from 56th Division to fill up 1st Division. It is essential that you impress General Templer vd th the absolute necessity of holding his ground in the event of an attack in his sector. Am planning, if weath~r rermits, all out air effort in
your sector j;~arcli 1st. Please assist us by submitting suitable targets. Guards
Brigade remains with you until after 1st Brigade Group of 56th Division has been
relieved. Details later."
The Army Cornnander sent the following memorandum to General Alexander regarding this situation:
"Attached hereto is a copy of a radiogram I have just received from General ':'ruscott and my reply thereto. I failed to take up with you this morning
the question of reinforcl'!ments for British increments .in the bridgehead. Prospects for arrival of British reinforcem~nts in this area will not meet the requirements of the VI Corps. I recommend that such personnel as may be urgently
required to fill up the 1st British Division be taken from the 56th Division
prior to its return to the Naples area. I am assuming that the 5th Division
will go to the bridgehead at full strength. Otherwise, additional personnel
from the 56th Division should be taken to fill it up also. I realize this is
an extraordinary measure, but if British reinforcements are not available from
other sources, the drastic steps reconm
ended above should, in my opinion, be
taken. Gen. Truscott fMls, and I concur, that British units in the bridgehead
must be maintained at full strength.
"I hope my position with respect to added craft for maintenance requirements
and for the movement of 34th Division to the bridgehead beginning on or about
Harch 15th have been cleared with the Navy."
General Clark today received a copy of a cable from General Alexander to
General Hilson, the complete text of which is quoted below: RU DCAO 202. 11 I
have had full discussion on tactical and maintenance position at Anzio with
�Clark and his staff this morning. Daily maintenance requirements of troops at
present in Anzio beachhead are 2700 TFD. I am satisfied that this figure is
approximately correct. CINC MED is unable to assure me a higher average discharge than 2500 TFD although actual discharges to date have averaged slightly {
more than 3000 TPD. Reserves at Anzio now are not adequate for defence security if present arrangements are not substantially improved there is no chance
of increasing these reserves to the point vrhere we can rass to the offensive
and gain the extra ground the importance of which you have so correctly emphasized. To avoid collapse of present front must relieve immediately one tired
division by a fresh one. To conduct an offensive successfully General Clark
considers that he must put one extra division into the beachhead. I consider
therefore that we must face the fact that our average daily discharge must be
raised as quickly as possible to 3200 TfD for maintenance plus 800 TfD to
build up reserves total 4000 TPD plus additional draft lifts for troop movements mentioned above. To put in the extra division alone will require 39 LST
lifts during last two wMks of Parch. Discharge at the higher rate of 4000
TfD must start ten clear days before the extra division goes into effect necessary improvenent in present weak reserve position. Hovr these things are to be
done is not for me to say, but I am sure that they are necessary. Nothing I
suggest could be worse for OVERLORD than a catastrophe at Anzio."
*
*
FRESENZANO--FER:1.UARY 29, 1944--This morning there arrived Gener111 H. D. Cri ttenberger, Colonel Ladue, J'.'ajor Lodge, r.73.jor Collins and Lieutenant Case, newly
assigned to Fifth Army. After a conference with General Crittenberger in his
van, General Clark met the other officers at the hut, and General Cr5ttenberger returned to Caserta with the plan of going to II Corps tomorrov,.
General Clark remained at his command rost during the balance of the day,
receiving his staff officers and going over dispatches. At dinner tirrte news
arrjved that the enemy had opened an attack on the positions held by the 509th
Parachute Battalion. General Clark personally went over tto air targets for the
succeeding day with Lt. Col. Hare of his Air Suprort Control Section and kept
General Hull, General Brann and Colonel Hare with him for dinner.
In the evening the General sent for Lieutenant Devol, Hho commands his two
PT boats, and discussed with him the arrangen"'nts for a proposed trip to Anzio
tomorrow.
General Clark 1 s notos on the day's activities follow:
"The Boche attacked today on the 3rd Division front. Although sorie small
penetrations have been mad~, from the information I have received to date the
situation is in hand.
"Word has been received that heavy and continuous shelling of tLe port area
has continued all day, with the result that two ISTS receiv~d direct hits, killing my Captain Haverty of the Medical Corps \'Tho was handling th~ evacuation there.
As a result of this shelling the Navy has again issued high-handed orders w:i.thout
reference to the Army. These include: ~- No trucks to be loaded on top decks of
LSTS, which will seriously curtail our maintenance of supplies. E• Discontinuing
the evacuation of wounded by LST. I am asking the Surgeon what this will amount
�to . I mention this to
Admiral Cunningham and
their shipping vrHhout
upon the grom1d battle
illustrate again the high-handed methods pursued by
his subordinPtes . They take drastic action to protect
giv5ng the least thought to the results of such action
in the bridgehead .
"Another example of lack of Navy cooperation arose when I had notice
given to the Navy that I would be flying by cub on a prescribed route to the
bridgehead tomorrow , requesting that shipping be notified ecause yesterday
one of our destroyers , without provocation, fired on our courier cub . Although three officers in the Navy Department were told that I was flying in
the plane , they have all replied that planes must keep their distance or be
fired upon .
11 Due to my pre-occupation with the Italian cnmpaign , I have received
word that I am relieved of all further responsibility for the operation or
)
planning of ANVIL. This is a great relief to me , for I have no tine to give
any thought to any other subject except the battle of the l'idgehead . Quoted
below are the jnstructions on this subJect :
1 1.
The Italian campaign has assumt'!d such importance that tl'e Commandern-Ghief is loathe to risk a change in Cor1manders of Fifth Army either now or
in the near future .
j
1 2.
Fir directives
from the Col"lbj ned Chiefs
Your responsibilities on
the added resronsibility
perv.i.sed from now on .
concerning Operation ANVIL have now been received
of Staff which require immediate implemi"lntation.
the Italian mainland are too grave to burden you with
for continued ANVIL planning which must be closely su-
1 3.
For these reasons decision has been reached by Genera]. Wilson and
concurred in by General Devers , that you shall remain in command of Fifth Army
and be reliev~d of responsibility for the Seventh Army and ANVIL planning effective this date . Hence the instructions forwarded you y cable and letter
1 January on this subject are revoked . 1 11
c/s ,
General Clark today received the following letter from General Harding,
ACMF :
"In reply to your memorandum dated 28 February 1944 addressed to the C-in- C
personally, I am directed by the C-in- C to inform you that after the nost careful consideration of all the factors involved , he cannot in any circumstances
agree to the transfer of personnel from 56 Division to replace deficiencies in
5 Division or 1 Division.
·
"Every effort will be made to · make and keep 1 and 5 Divisions up to a
strength of 26 officers and 700 0.Rs per infantry battalion, but the transfer
of personnel from one division to anoth~r , especially in the circumstances which
exist in this case , is rightly or wrongly contrary to all the principles on which
the British Army is trained and j nspirea·, and would certainly lead to the most
serious loss of morale , if not to disastrous results .
"The C-in-C considers that the remedy lies in the rapid replacement of 56
Division by 5 Division , and the rearrangement ,. if necessary, of the 6 Corps
�front so that the tasks of the two Dritish divisions are as nearly as practicable
related to the s·'-.rength at which they can be maintnined with the flow of reinforcements available .
"In this connection will you please forward for the information o~ the C- in-C
your programme for the r1ove of 5 Division to the bridgehead, and for the return
of 56 Division and 24 Guards Brigade.
"As regnrds additional craft , the C- in-C has taktm the question up as a
matter of the utmost urgency with the Supreme Allied Cornnander and the C- in-C
Mediterranean. Authority has been obtained for the I.STs due to leave NAFI.ES
today to b~ held for the moment , and the question of their further retention has
been taken up by the Supreme Allied Corniander with C- in- C Mediterranean today,
and you will be kept informed of the situation. In the meantime the C- in-C directs me to emphasise the vital importance of ensuring that not one man , or vehicle , or pound of stores is put into the bridgehead that does not make a direct
contribution to its security. I am to ask you to continue to give this a spect
of the matter your closest personal attention. 11
Following are the important messages of the day:
Personal Clark to Truscott:
RN 7509 .
"Medical reports show alarming inEvery effort must be mnde to
stop this waste of manpower . Assure yourself thPt existing instructions for
prevention of trench foot are being complied with . "
crease in trench foot in 3rd and 45th Divisions .
Personal Clark to Truscott: RN 753() . "To support you this afternoon,
started 3 sn_uadrons of fighter bombers at about 1300 hours to support you in
your defense against the attack on tht'l front of the 509th. Leading brigade 5th
Division scheduled to leave here Harch 4th. Fastest it can be done. What is
status of 24 Guards Brigade? Of course it is available to you for combat and
will not be withdrawn until my further orders . What is status of 157 and 179
Regiments? I feel confident of your ability to stop this attack with heavy
losses to the enemy. Vlill see you soon . ETA later. All out air attack your
front being planned for tomorrow if weather permits . "
Personal Clark to Bowman. RN 7539 . "I expect to arrive with 2 cubs Nett.::::-J
airfield tomorrow morn:i..ng at rbout 0930 . You be at field with jeep from 0915 on. /
Fire pyrotechnic signal from middle of field as cubs aprroach if fielri is not
operational and I can not land there , in v,hich case will land on a road . Will
\
return same afternoon . Weather nay rrevent trip , in which case will notify you.
Inform Truscott . Have AA warned of my arrival . Vlill come in low. Acknowledge .__,
"
Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 775 . "Strong t,nemy atb=icks all along front
between 93 and OJ eastings . 3rd Division heavily engaged by entire 362 and Herman Goering Divisions . Elements 715 Division and 1028 R~giment also identified.
Intense fighting in progress . TAC/R reports 50 tanks in Cisterna and 20 addi tional tanks entering tmvn . It is most essential thnt heavy air bombardment be
placed on this target tonight . "
Personal Truscott to Clark. W1 777. 11 I anticipate heavy- enemy air attA.cks
tonight ag;:dnst our artillery positions , and the port area . Recommend steps be
taken to provide maximum night fighter cover . "
�l 22
Personal Clark to Trus cott . RH 7545 . "Reference your 775 a.na 777, maximum night fiF,hter cover will be provided tonight . Two dive oomb bomber squadrons ti.ttacked tanks at Ci sterna this afternoon . Results not yet known . Air
advise s against Attack of Cisterna tonight , due to the necessity of using heavy
bombs in close proximity to friendl y troops . Roans leading into Cisterna wil l
be covered tonight by night bomber s , and all targets in this area covered in
t omorrow ' s progran. Am sending you two British Commandos , total strength approximatel y 600 . Hope to get them to you in the next two or three days. They
should help . 11
*
*
*
PRESENZANO--MARCH 1, 1941~--Today General Clark remained at · his comriand rost all
day. He had jntended to go to the b~achheHd today and made arrangements for
transportation by cub . However , the weath ,r deteriorated throughout the morning and by noon it was aprarent that the trip would not be possibl e . Accordingly, General Cl ark directed that the sam"' arrangements for the succeeding day,
March 2nd, be made .
In the small hours of the morning today there arrived two cables which
greatly annoyed General Clark. One numbered 02158 was from Headquarters ACMF
t o Fifth Army with a eomplete distribution through the milit8ry ~stablishments
in the Mediterranean basin. The other , #605 , came from FRO , ACMF and was directed to the Commanding General , Fifth Army. The first cP.ble , RN 02158, is
quoted in full as f ollows : "The formation of Allied Troops now fighting in the
A'!IJZIO Bridgehead will he known as the "Allied Brlngeh&nd Force" on order of the
Prime Minister WEFQ 0001 hours 2 March, This term will be used in sitreps communiques and tre press . Ho change will take r l ace in normal signE>l address . 11
That rortion of #605 , which is here in question , reads as follows : "As
from 0001 hours 2 Maren, formation of Allied troops now fighting in beachhead
will be known as "The Allied Beachhead Forces" for all purposes less normal
Army s:.gnal aarlress . 11
G~neral Clark discussed these documents at length with General Gru.enther ,
his Chief of :: ta ".'f , and with General Hull of the Orerations Division of the ,Jar
Department , who took lunch with the General . 'T'he General then drafted the fol low.'ng radio to General Alexander covering this su')j,.ct :
R J 5117. 11 T-teP""rl'!nce is Made your 02158 and my conver sation with you today.
In view of the progr"ss by the Fifth Ar1:1y over a P"riod of six months in developing Allied relations , and of the F'ifth Arny "sprlt vrhich has been built upon a
dirficnlt a+.tlefield , I r"quest that the order ot the lr5Me f.i:inister b<!'l riodified
to r"'ad "The Fifth Arny Allied Br:'Ldgehead Force" . It is my considerec' opinion
that the use of the modified title , espl')cially at this critical thne , will contr:.bute materially to the maint'°'nance of the hj g}, state of r..oral~i of' tbe Jrj tish
and Anerican troops of the Fifth Army now in the Anxio bridg..,head . 11
The General feels that this is rart of a steady effort by the British to in-\
crease th~ir rrestiee :in the r·~~di terranl'lan area and to exalt j n the ru.blic nind
the part that the British, as contrasted to the Americans , are , rlayjng there .
)
�123
At the conference with the CITJC , AC!'F on the 28th, one of the questions
arising was the system of air support which would bl"' used when the Eighth
Army should side-slip to the left and should j_
ncorporate w~thin itself the
British elements jncluded vTithin the Fifth Arny. Gen~ral Clark has had close
perso11al and staff relationships with General Eouse and with his successor ,
General Saville . He has 1mmm the latter since boyhood. Accordingly, Gen6ral
Clark feels that it would be desirable to 1-:t"ep the XII Air Support Cornmand with
Fifth Army rather than to have it occupy a position in wrich its attention
would be divided 1:Jetween the Fifth and :2ighth Armies . A cable from General
Leese , Commanding the Eighth Army, to General Harding, of which an information
copy was furnjshed General Clark, makes it evident that General Leese heartily
agr""es with General Clark 1 s feeling in this matter: RN COS 49. "SASO has re •
ported to me the proposals promulgated after the air force meeting which followed the GP.TC I s conferf'!nce . Understand XII ASC would have orerotional control
of DAF Squadrons less 239 and 7 wings and that our needs will be met by XII ASC
through the medium of a small operatiom1l headquarters DAF attached to our Hq .
Regret cannot accept this situation. Must insist that Eighth Army orerations
must be supported by DAF under direct command AVM Broadhurst in the same way
as Gen. Clark insisted that his operntions must be supported by XII ASC under
General SRville . For speclfjc operations of course either air force would give
whole- hearted support to the other accordjng to w0ich Army wAs the predominant
partner in that phase . Cannot believe tht>t agreement on these lines cannot be
reached . Request thnt f~nal decision be postponed until return AVM Broadhurst
arproximately March 10th. "
General Clark has been greatly concerned with the necessity for frequent
reports from the beachhead concerning unloading. Because of his not receiving
such reports with satisfactory sp~ed, General Clark dispatched the following
radio to Colonel Bowman : RN 5087. "I am not kept rrop~rly foformed on the
status of unloading jn the beachhead. General Tnte has sent several messnges
calling for reports from Colonel Newton , yet they fail to come . "
Colonel Bowman replied as follows : RN 9926 . "Cable 5087 received . Initial request by General Tate for reports by his cable 3878, dr,ted 272238A ,
called for full report four tfoes daily progress of unloacUng and tYres of cargo being unloaded . It is impracticable to furnish this detailed information
at such frl"lquent intervals without materially jncreasing the port and naval
staffs and communication facilities . TM s was cxr lained by radio 9375 , drited
290003 , and memorandum Newton to Tate , dated 28 Feb. Cable 7531, dated 291440,
modified request by General Tate to require 3 rerorts of a more general nature .
Since receipt of cable 3878 the following reports have been made ; Cable 9981 ,
dated 291530 - Cable 9887, dated 291725 - Cable 9905 , dated 010025, CRble at
0800 , 1200 and 1600 as to whether unloading is or not - Memo Newton to Tate
dated ?9 February sent by courier , Cable 9909, date<l. 011025 . In addition 4
cables daily will be sent giving detailed reports of rrogress of unload"ng and
unloading operations of interest . "
General Clark today wrote a long personal letter to General Devers, giving
information on the latest developr1ents here . This letter , which was sent to
General Devers b:r his pilot , is quoted as follows :
11 I am sending you this information in order that you may know the latest
developnents here . You probably have tht'! news from the bridgeh!'!ad . The trird
�attack is developing but bejng held in good shape . Some minor renetrations
have been made , but the situation appea.rs to be well in hand . We are killing
a good many Boche , and our casual ties to date have not been unduly heavy.
"I am perturbed about the British sector . The 5()th Division, in parti cular , is not doing well . It has lost a lot of men in the "mi ssing" st atus
and has been more in the nature of infiltration by the enemy. They have
given ground which is vital to our left flank, and some of their small units
have been cut off . ACMF is unabl e to rrovide me with British rt'}pl11cements
as requ:ired , which has led to the necessity of taking th~ 5th British Division,
which is in comparatively good shape , out of the line here and send:ing its
personnel up only to take over the equipment of the 56th Division . I am insisting that the 5th go completely filled up , although I am not sur-e the British can do that . Its leading brigade will leave here on the 4th of March .
Am also sending two British Comr~andos , strength about 600, who leave here this
afternoon . The pl'!rsonnel of the 56th Division is scheduled to leave for Uaple s
j_mmediately upon being relieved by the 5th. Inasmuc}1 as the British can not
fill up the 1st Division in the bridgehead, I requested that some men of the
56th, rather than being pulled out of the bridgehead, be turned over to the 1st,
particularl y those new replacements whlch the 56th has just received . General
Alexander turnl"\d we dovrn on thi s request , stating that it was " contrary to all
the principles on which the Briti sh Army is trainr-id and inspired, and would certainly lead to the most serious loss of morale , jf not to disastrous resultsn.
General Al exander SU[~gests , as an alternative , to contract the British front
and have more front and mor e responsibility given to the U. s. troops . That is
impracticable , for we do not have enough U. S. troors for thAt purpose . I am
makine repeated requests for British replacements , and they must do everything
they can to assist .
"I have been ordered to relieve the 24 Guards Brigade from the bridgehead,
and , although it has a fighting strength of 1400, it must come back in a very
few days . I have resist ed its return so far and rray be able to continue to do
so . Until the situation settles dovm definitely trere , I am reluctant to bring
out any troops who can still fieht . I am sure I can handle this situation.
"I attended General Alexander ' s conference where Leese , Ct>nnon and I , and
some of our staffs , were present . It was to discuss the reorgan:1-zation with
which you are :"amiliar . I concurred, f'or I ari willing to do most anything in
order to get all U. S. and French troops in the Fi-rth Army . I certainly hore
that you can expedite r,ettin8 the 35th Division over here , followed by the 91st .
When I 7 et trose two and anoth~r French Division, with the brideehead stabilized,
I assure you we \vill join up .
"~eneral Alexander has instructed me repeatedly to take the o"fensive in
the brJdgehead and cap~ure Cisterna and Carroceto . You can arpreciate that with
the enemy str('!ni;th against us and with our weakened condition there at present ,
I am unabl~ ~o. do ~his nov,. ~fter the Boche has spent his attack, I plan to rut
the 34th Division J.nto the bridgehead . I am grMtly worried by tbe Navy's attitude on limiting the amonnt of suprlics v/rich they will send into t},e bridgehead .
I must say that Admiral Cunningham ' s attitude has not bren ~trill helpful :in this
respect . I h~ve presented this .in writing to Alexand~r , and he , in turn, has
sent our requirements on to Gt"!neral .Jilson. I am satisfied that General Alexander is going to bat and will force the Havy to meet my minimum requirements now
�1.:25
and provide some reserve for a future offensive and a hec1ge against bad r1eather.
I figure the leading ccmbat team of the 34th Di vision can go in bet\'Teen the 15th
and ?0th of this wmth ; that i', , rroviding I can get snrne rerlacements to it in
the next day or two .
"T . Y.. Brovm is here , and I have attach~d Ur,1 as an extra brigadier to the
88th Division which , jncidentally, is going in to relieve the 5th British Division and whicl , will e t're beginning of the reorganization plan . Crittenberger
is here also. I will facilitate his seeing and doing whrt he nost desires with
coribat units . I am keeping reople out of the bridgehead right at present but
will give them all an opportunity to go up later.
11 I am rather surpr:i sed toclay to receive the following radiogram fror1 ACMF:
The formation of Allied troops now fighting in the Anzio bridgehead will be
'lrnovm as the 11 Allied Bridgehead Force" on orders of the Prime Minister. This
term will be used in sitreps , communiques and the press 1 • Th:i s rather disturbs
me , for it is all a part of the Fifth Army up there. The men have b~en with it
a long time and are proud of their Army organization . I do not know what I can
do about it, but it seems to me tha.t if they want to emphasize Allied unity, and
that must be the only reason underlyine this change , they could include Fifth
Army in the title ; such as, 'Fifth Army Allied Bridgehead Force 1 • I am taking
this mat t~r up with ACJ.:lF .
1
"I want to thank you for your surrort . I will kMp you posted from time to
tine wj_th these personal lett"rs. I know that I can handle all these natters in
a diplomatic way without in any way jMpardizi'1.g our Allied unity but f ,el it
will help if you are informed as to my rroblems anrl how· I am attemrting to solve
them in order that you may be ln a better position to assist."
Today 1 s operations on the beachhead w~re r:1arked by th-; progress of the third
of the German riajor attacks . This was opened by two battalions abreast Pgrinst
the 509th Farachute Battalion position, and tbe assault wave was followed by a
force in considerable c'epth . In all , the Germrms w~re tliought to have used three
Divisions for the attack. In the course of the oa.y the enemy penetrated the VI
Corps position to the extent of 1500 yards, but later in the day General Truscott
counterattacked and durinp.; the ni,3ht regajned all i,} e p;round v;J,L::h the Germans
had temporarily won. A large factor in stopping the Httack was a heavy concentration of our artill~ry. Air support was not effective because of weathr--r .
General Clark entertain,.d for d~nner this evening General Beucler , Colonel
Saltzman and Lieutenant Colonel I orter .
*
*
*
FRESENZANO--MARCH 2, 1944--Today General Clark rleterrninP,d to v:isit tb!'! bridge- \
head, desrite the v,eath""lr wh1ch was somewhat threatening . Accord:",ngly, he made
t e followine; plans : A cub on floats was sent to take up a rosition between Hondragone and Zannone . The two FT boats were sent up to take their position at
regular intervals between ronziane Islands anil Nettuno . General Clrrk arranged
to leave w:i.th General Hull in two L- 5 1 s and fly over the course thus m10rked out ,
spendine a few hours on the'! beachhead , retm·ning n.t 1400 or 1500 hours , derending
on the weather .
�...
Accordingly, the General vrent to the cub field at 0830 and was in a cub
ready to take off with Gen~ral Hull in th~ following ,cub , but rio air cover appeared. A series of calls to G("meral Saville got the information that the original air cov~r had been ordered by General SAvill , but that due to a failure
of staff work h1 the XII Air Support Command had never been actually ordered to
leave the field . General Saville promptly ordered up an escort of four planes
while Gt'meral Clark wait ,d . These four rlanes lost themselves in the fog and
haze , and after General Clar"k- had waited 3/4 of an bour and made a few calls to
General Saville., Gl'lneral Saville then ordered up four more planes . These too
lost thenselves . In trie meantine the day was wasting away, and General Clark's
important mission at the bridgehead was unfulfilled. From tjme to time the
lost planes would cone into sight flying to and fro at a distance and then would
be lost in the fog again . Eventually, they were guided to the Genere.l I s cub
strip by General Saville who telephoned continued ~nstructions to i'iarcianise ,
from which point the message was relayed to the planes by voice radio . The Gene ral left at 1030 , instead of 08.30 , but no s0oner had the trip started than the
e.scort needed to refuel, and General Clark ,•·as obliged to descend at an air
strip j ust south of f'iondraeone while the escort took on gasoline . Finally, after
this exasperating delc.y, the journey startec·, and the General reached Nettuno
air strip without incident at about 12.30 .
On this trip to the bridgehead, General Clark had a close shave from enemy
shellfire . He was going up a road near the .3rd Division CP and following him
was a jeep in which was riding Mr . Reynolds }ackard of the United }ress . The
jeeps had just cleared a crossroads when a salvo of four enemy shells landed
exactly at the intersection . Had the vehicles rassed n second or two earlier ,
some or all of the party would undoubtedly have been killed.
I
The General left Ncttuno air strip at 1400, protected by air cov~r which
had been arranged by XII Air Support Conunand for 1400 or 1500, d~pending on the
hour of the General I s departure . 'l'he return trip was with out j ncid ent , and the
General arrived at his cornnand post at flbout 1600. He was well content with the
situation at the bridgehead and on the Cassino front and had his cub fly him to
rriarcianise , v,hence he went by automobile to the Officers 1 Rest Center at Sorrento
in order to get a good night ' s sleep.
\
General Clark last night dispatcl1ed the following c~ble to General Truscott ,
with a copy to Colonel Bowman: Wi 5118 . "The 1nstructio'1s issued by you in a
letter dated 27 Februo.ry, subject "Improvement of Dump Conditions " , has just bee}
brought to my attention. You will refrain from issuing directives of this kind
to Advance Headquarters Fifth Army. Fersonnel at my Advance Command Post are
there to assist you. We realize our responsibility with r(')gards the improvement
of these dumps . I have personally issued instructions on tris subject on severa
visits to the bridgehead . If you have recoTI1T1endations to make , you will submit
them to my senior representative in the form of a recoMmendation , at the same
time advising my headquarters of your desires . Instructions issued as of February 27 will be revoked . AcLnowledge this message . I hope to see you tomorrow if
weather will permit rne to fly in. 11
•
General Clark today sent the following cable to General Truscott . RN .3917.
I congratulate you , members of your staff and the Brjtish and American troops of
VI Corps on the magnificent manner in wriich the strong German attack of th., rast
11
�(
�few days was repelled . Fighting wit h great tenacity and skill your troops have
rnade the enemy pay dearl y for his temporary offensive role , and have furt her
/
diminished any waning hope for victory the German sol dier may still imprudently
cheri sh . I am confident that in the heavy fighting yet to come the Fifth Army
will further demonstrate in a most effective manner the superiority of Allied
arms . "
·
General Clark today received a copy of the following cable from General
Alexander to General Truscott : RN MA.1128. "My heart iest congratulations to you
persohal l y on·the abl e way you have handled this most successful battle and
please convey to a ll the troors under your comi:1and my admiration and thanks for
the magnificent display of courage and soldierl y qualities which they have shown
during these last few days of bitt er fighting . They have held firm everywhere
and repulsed the enemy vlith bloody losses . Well done boys . 11
General Cl ark today received the fo l lowing reply to his letter of yesterday
to General Devers :
It w s very helpful for P1e to lrnov: what you are doing and thinking and I
a
greatly appr eciate the letter wrich you sent to r1e today. I talked to Gi-!neral
Wilson at length about the situation on the Fifth Army front concerrdng command
and , incidentally, have had inquiries from General Marshall along the same lines .
I am gl ad that you have now agreed to the new line- up in order to get the U. S.
and French troops together in the Fifth Army. I am sure this i s better for everybody.
11
.
"With reference to the 3/,1,th Division , we have sent a consi<lerE:ble number of
repl acements to you, r1any of them belongi-,.,g to the 34t h Division . I am hoping
that there are not only enough replacements for this Division, but also for tbe
36th. In any case , we are trying hard to get replacements to you in sufficient
numbers to take care of your needs in this matter . In this connection, Stayer
has arrived and he has already started the work on the doctors to cut dovm on
the number of sick and non- operational casualties , and also to return men from
the hospitals sooner .
1 am sorry about the name for the All ied bridgehead force . I , of course ,
do not like this any more than you do , but after all it is a name and cannot have ·
much to do with winning the war . It was one of those things which I class as destructive , unnecessary and unessential . I elieve we have Allied unity more than
ever , and I an sure this hnd nothing to do w:ith this theater , ut had more to do
with tre politicians in England .
11
"Patch has arrived and has been assignll!d to the Seventh Army. He js going
right to work to build a staff . I do not 1':now just what the .r'uture of A.r1VIL is
at tre riontimt but 1 1e hope to have H firmed up :in the next few days .
"He are hr' nging pressure on tbc 'favy to give th, oriel gehead all the supplies necessary, ut ue are havjng a great deal of,trou1)1 .. with landing craft.
I think it .:.s v ry inportant thnt H('} do not put too "~
ucL r1aintenance on the
br:irlgehead . There is not room tl.er-: to attack it and :n my opinion invites loss .
If we coulc, push the brirlgehead out far enougb so that we are reaso1.a,)ly sure
that the port canno~~ he :'ired on by artill ... ry fire , I elieve v1e could get along
with seven days 10.:1-ntenance.
11
�11 G"'lneral ';;ilson is making every effort to get replacements for the British uni ts . We :have hid to give a limi tine date with r~fer~nce to the RCT
of the Airborn~ Division, in order that we r~ay carry out our orders and get
it back to its division by a certain date . I am hoping that this will not
affect you too much . We are also J11aking efforts to get th~ battalion of the
34th Division to it as soon as possible .
"I hope to be up there in the next week or so , when I will E;\'.'lt closer
to your problerris . Lots of luck, "
*
*
*
PRF.SENZANO--MARCH 3, 1944- -Today General Clark spent the entire day at the
Fi fth Army Officers I Rest Center , the first day of recreation which he has
had for a long time . The qu:i_et situation at ~he beachhead 1md the relo.tive
inactivity of affairs on the Cassino front gave him this opportunity for repose . Throughout the day a series 'of cables were received from Anzio concerning the progress of unloading there . Unloadtng has proceeded all night and
continu!'!d until 1300 today when it ceased because of rough weather .
General Clark had planned a little celebration this evening in honor of
General Gruenther 1 s birthday and , in order to return from Sorrento, had his
L- 5 plane go down to a landing strip near Pompei. General Clark left the Rest
Centt"ir at about 1600 to find the landing strip , but the roads leading to it
over and across thl'! partly destroyed autostrade were very confusing, a,nd eventually General Clark turned ba ck to the Rest Center .
In the meantime , at the CF 40 officers , representing the various staff
sections of the Fifth Army, gat hered in the General's Recreation Hut and had a
buffet supper , watched the remarkable performance of a sleight- of-hand artist
and listened to two Special Service nusicians play the piano and accordion~
General Gruenther was presented with a huge birthday cake , everybody sang songs ,
and the evening w s a great success .
a
The replacement s ituation still being critical, General Gruenther wrote the
follovring letter to General Sawbridge , AFHQ G- 1:
"I am reluct ant to continue to bring to your attention the subject of replacem s . However, I feel that yc,u should know of a misunderstanding on our
ent
part which has developed as a. result of the exchange of the following messages :
Yciur 52933 , 57079 , 57996; and our 3397 and 4 7/.,6 .
Based on thes e messages , we obtained the distinct impression that on or
about March 2 we would receive approximately 3800 general a ss ignment replacements
and 4500 RTU ' s . For several months now we have been stressing the necessity of
infantry replacements - s o much ao in fact that , rightly or wrongly, we have come
to consider the term 11 replacements" as meaning 11 infantry replacements" . our ·
shortage of infantry replacernents has been so critical during this period that we
have , for all i'l"ltemts a.nd purposes , practj cally disregarded the question of other
types of replacements . For that reason we made the assumption that of the 8300
" replacements and RTU I s expected on March 2 , the proportion of infantry replacement::; would be low. It is true that in your 57079 you warned us that "infantry
replacements in th~ number we required would not be available until March 1411 •
11
�Howev~r, in no way v,ere we prepared for the shock that fBS gave us yesterday
wh"'n ...,hey told us that on r~
arch 4th we shall receive 3063 enlisted replacements with 753 infantry and 526 RTU's with ?63 infantry. I feel tha.t your
//57079, answering mu· 3397, might have given us the bad news then.
11 As you know we have a serious personnel problem in connection with the
beachhead . The casualties there have been .;airly heavy and have thus far
absorbed all the infantry rerlacements which we have received during the past
two weeks, and there is still a shortage . The 34th and 36th Divisions are
now out of the line and are eagerly awaiting their infantry replacements. In
order to resune the offensive in the beachhead it will be necessary to ship
another division there . General Clark decided on February 28th th11t he would
se:?.1.d the 34th, shipping one RCT about 1'.1'arch 20 . I gave rim every assurance
that out of 8300 reflacements and RTlPs expected on or about March 2, we would
surely l;e able to f:i nd enough infantry rerL:-:i.cements to make good the losses at
the beachhead and also to fill one infantry regiMent of the 34th Division. On
that assumption we rmde a strong apreal to tbe Navy for the shipping to start
the movement of the division about March 20. Moreover a tactical plan has
b"'en forrmlated involving the use of the 34th Division in the beachhead early
in April which may now be of doubtful value . Had we realized that of the 8300
RTTJ 1 s and r~place rients, there vrould i..,e only 1000 infantry our picture would
have been very much different .
"It was , of course , an error on my part to indicate to General Clark that
any proportion of the Farch 4th shipment would be infantry, although he ha s
not placed that blame on me . In order to rrevent :'uture errors of tris character, I should like to urge that you, Ben Sawbridge , send us messages for the
next two weeks advising us of the infantry (I repeat infantry) shipments which
can be expected and their dates of arrival here . This message will be in addition to the routine message sent to FBS for each shipment . After two weeks
we'll probably be out of the woods and we won't bother you any more .
"Please realize that we understand thoroughly that your headquarters is
doing everything in the world to get us the replacements that we need . My only
request is that we be kept in the picture concerning the jnfantry end of the
game. · It is often necessary for us to deal in individuals; we are usually that
short .
"Our troops have junt had a fine victory in repulsing the third strong attack by enemy forces . We killed a great many Germans, and I feel quite confident that the situation there is r.iore than under control."
*
*
FRI":SE',JZANO--MARCH 4, 1944--General Clark returned to his command post by cub
today, arriving at about 1210 . He immediately began disposing of those matters which had accumulated during his absence and cleared his desk by early afternoon . In the afternoon General Kenneth N. Anderson , formerly coP1ma.nding the
British First Army in Tunisia and now in charge of the Eastern C01mnand in England
(having been removed from his Army comnand by Gent'!ral fontgol"lt'!ry as soon as the
latter took over in Enr,land) paid a visit to General Clark. General Clark was
very courteous in his treatr.ient of General Anderson who appeared somewhat mollified by his recent experiences .
�Following General Anderson's visit , General Clark received a call from
Generals Cannon and Saville and J3rieadier Mainwaring, who discussed problems
of air support control .
General DeGaulle arrived today at Capodichino for a visit to the Fifth
Army area and went to Venafro to the command post of General Juin. By prearrangement with General Clark , he arrived at 1800 at the Fifth Army command
post and went at once to General Clark ' s van where the two commanders had an
interesting conversation, ·rith Lt . Col. Sutherland act:ing as interpreter .
General DeGaulle started the conversrtion speaking soMewhat laborious English
but later lapsed into French.
General DeGaulle had two points to nake . One was that France should be
invaded during the current year or she would be so drained of strength and
resources of every kind that effective resistance by the French would be impossible . The second was that if because of a lack of shipping the Allies
were unable to invade southern France and jnstead had to adopt as an alternative the placing of all French resources in Italy, the French authorities ,
in order to preserve the psychologict=il well being of the French people, should
be tnken into the complete cnnfidence of the Allied leadership and should assist in the plannjng of whatever operations were in store . It was evident ,
when General DeGauJ.le sroke this way, that he thought he had been coldshouldered by the Allies , and this further appeared when the General remarked
that he was somewhat surprised that no French divisions had been allotted the
task of joining in the cross- channel invasion. General Clark was quite frank
with General DeGaulle , stating that he , General Cle.rk, knew that~ southern
France operation, termed ANVIL, had been in contemplation but that the shipping
which had been short enough to cause great concern in the Italian operations ,
had been still further shortened in order to support the forthcoming ovri:nLORD
Operation. An jnvasion of southern France had become a practical impossibiUty.
There was no use trying to invade southern France with one division or two .
"Why not , " said General Clark, "put whatever resources the Allies have available in the Mediterrant1ian basin into the Italian campaign where a great victory
might be won?" "Very well, " said General DeGaulle, "I will agree wjth you upon
a certain hypothesis . Let's suppose that the Allied High Command intends during
the current year to launch a major offensive ncrof's the channel into F'rance or
into Holland or somewhere else in Western Europe and , assume further that there
is not enough shipping for an invasion of southern France; then I will agree
with you that it would be desirable to take all the French Divisions now disponible in the Mediterranean and put them into the Italian c8mpaign to the end
that a major diversion might there be made and the Germans be contained there."
Hovrever , General DeGaulle asb,d if General Clark had available the necessary
shipping to maintain the French and American Divisions now in North Africa .
General Clark said he had . A quantity of shipping here novr is being utilized
to support the air preparations and the other steps being taken to lay the foundations for ANVIL in Corsica and Sardinia. If ANVIL were abandoned then that shipping could be available to support the Italian campaign. General CJBrk added
that if the French and Anerican Divisions in Africa were brought in echelons to
Bizerte , the shipping could be used to ferry them to Messina, and. they could then
come north over the road by automobile , saving shipping time to a large degree .
The conference was as amicable as it could be in view of General DeGaulle's
extremely phlegmatic personality. General Clark took occasion to rraise the ·
�dash and esprit which characterized General Juin and to exrress his great
satisfaction at havJng General Juin in the Fifth Army. General DeGaulle
expressed gratifjcation at this mutufll confidence and said that he was
glad to be at the front among soldiers, but that he would like still more
to be in Paris among the French people.
At 1900 General Clark and General DeGaulle went to the hut where a U
shaped table had been set up and aperitifs rrepered for 17 guests. After
a short time General Clark seated his guests and entertained them at dinner.
DeGaulle was a curious dinner guest, courteous, at all times making the polite responses, but with a peculiar, flat, uninspired manner which contrasted strangely with the affable, pleasant manner of General Juin, who
sat on the left of General Clark, while General DeGaulle sat on his right.
However, the dinner was a great success. In addition to Generals Clark,
Gruenther, DeGaulle and Juin there were present Generals Sevez, deHontsabert,
Keyes, Dody, Chaillet, CPrpentier and Beucler, Brigadier Richardson and
Colonels Kammerer, Saltzman, Billotte and Lt. Col. Sutherland.
General Clark today djspatched the following letter to General Leese:
"With the coning Movement of Eighth Army to the west of the Appenines,
I believe there will be need of closer liaison between Eighth and Fifth
Armies than has been necessary while our comJ'!lB.nds were separated by the
mountains.
"I propose, therefore, sending two of my staff officers to your headquarters for this purpose and would appreciate a similar arrangement on
your part. I believe one of these offjcers should be particularly qualified
in Operations (G-3) and the other in Supply (G-4).
nrt would be particularly desirable if you vrouln approve my retention
of Lieutenant Colonel George Britten as your liaison officer for operations.
Colonel Britten is an outstanding officer, known and well-liked by all with
whom he has cori.e in contact. He has been a most dependable member of Fifth
Army's BrHish Incr~ment and J would like to retain him on my stAff as your
representative.
"General Alexander has told me that Brigadier Charles Richardson, who
has been with me during all of the Italian camraign, is to be given another
assignment.
"I have no suggestions for a
mination.
11
11
Q officer and would appreciate your no-
"As for thia. American offic~rs to cone to ·your headquarters, if you lmow
of any by name which you would like to have, please let me knov1. If tht"!y
can be made available, I will eladly detail them.
"i"lith fullest expectations for our joint march on Rnn; and to the north,
I am.''
General Clark today sent the following message to crrc, ACMF. RN 5194.
"Paraphrase oi' message 9941 (Five Army to AC'l.F from Clark) dated 040040A from
�Fifth Army Advance CP follows : ' Fort and .naval personnel held confer~nce
with Fifth Army r~presentatives this date rel~tive to unloading of Lih~rty
ships . Considered opinion of all ' that small craft situation must be improved
with least practicable delay. Have operational following craft : 4 American
and S British LCTS , 2 additional American LCTS in poor shape are being utilized on hospital carrj~r run, and sev~n LCIS . LCIS are a help but are limited in capacity and ease of unloading . 12 LCTS are definitely insufficient
to efficiently unload five Liberties . Navy personnel cooperative to fullest
extent and doing everything possible to keep craft operational. New subject:
2 hospital ca'rr:iers arrived at 0945 this date rmd insisted on leaving at 1430.
No information received that they were to arrive . In view of late carrier
arrivals and distance anchored from shore due to shelling, only 2 LCT loads
were able to reach ship side in time . Furthermore , although LCT loaded with
patients was alongside st . Andrew, the Captain refused to take on the second
load . The LGT was then sent to the St . Julien, and the Captain was prevailed
upon to accept this load which he did . Request that action be taken to preelude refusal of hospital carrier to accept ratients who are alongside ship
in an LCT after having been transported approximately 2 miles to get to ship
siae . Request ETA of all hospital carriers sent Anzio . In order to assure
maximum loading recorirnencl that this he not later ogoo if possible and sailing
time be not earlier than 1500 hour-s . 1 I shall be grateful to you H you will
assist us to solve these probleris . "
!?
j
\
General Clark cabled General Truscott as follows today: R!J 5190. "Your
request to retain two field companies of 56 Division is approved . I have
asked General Alexander to secure Admiral Cunningham I s cooperation in raising
naval morale . Keep me t~dvised if unfavorable attitude continues . "
*
*
*
FRF.SEHZANO-•MARCR 5, 1944--In the morning General Clark flevr by cub to Caserta
where he conferred with General Alexander . The General returned to his command
post shortly before 1300 hours .
He spent the afternoon in administrative work at his van. At 1730 the
General, with his Chief of Staff, his Public Relations Officer and Captain
B~ardwood, met in the hut with five American newspaper correspondents: Lynn
Heinzerling of Associated Fress , James Roper of United rress , Graham Hovey of
International :Jews Service , Lee McCardell of the Baltimore Sun and William
Shadel of the Infantry Journal. General Clflrk told the correspondents that he
was having them in merely for a drink and a chat . However , before long the
General was discussing, off the record , the re-grouping of troops in the Italian
campaign.
He revealed to the correspondents that the Fifth Army would becone a Fr['ncoA111erican Army and that British troops eventually would no longer be part of his
command . He told the correspondents thot the Fifth Army would control the west
coast sector of the main Italian front (that sector now ht'lld by the 10 British
Corps) and the Anzio bridgehead . He said that the Eighth Ar"f'iy would shift westward and eventually would ½e the force driving up the Liri ·valley.
Hovey asked the General how he felt about the new make-up of the Fifth Army,
and the Army Commander said that h(') felt the move would be beneficial in that
it would give him troops equipped exclusively with American mat~riel and that
�133
this would facilitate administrative and supply -rroblems . He said that his
relations with the 'r;ritish were most anica,"le 1)u-t, explained that some times
it was particularly difficult to order a British Corps Commander to execute
certain operations . Such action with British officers entailed longer discussion and a certain amount of debate .
The correspo'1d~nts also brought up the matter of replacements , and General Clark said that the replacewmt probleri, , while bad enough for Anerican
troops , was extremely difficult for hoth the '3ritish and the French. He said
that he hoped to get two more American divisions in th" Italian caMpaign the 85th, now in Af'rica, rind one other division.
G1meral Clark also revealed to the correspondents that !:,he leading ele ments of a brigade of the 5th British Info.ntry Division had almost net with
a disaster while moving by LCIL.S from Haples to Anzio . Through faulty navigation the vessels started to put in at Circeo and had been fired upon by
German gt.ms . They pulled out without suffering any casualties and moved up
to Anzto . 11 If you think I have been confused by this action" , said General
Clark, "Think what the confusfon of the German High Corimand must be . \le are
wondering if the German comm1mique tonight will say that they rerulsed an
attenpted Fifth Army landing at Circeo'!
Hovey also 1 rought up the qu~stion as to why higher headquarters had issued the directive that a dateline referring to th~ bridgehead forces must
read "Allied Bridgehead Forcesu . Hovey said this action had left the correspondents somewhat cnnfused . He asked General Clark what was the reason for it ,
and General Clark said that he too was confused but that he had made strong
reprosentations to General Alexander and. the Har Department . Hovey said that
riost of t},~ correspondents vrere continuing to write of it as the Fifth Army
Bridgehead but that he noted that tr e censors were inserting the vrord "Allied 11
in the Fifth Arrny dateline . General Clark said that the Fifth Army had fos tered an Allied feeling and that he felt tl-at the troper dateline was "Fifth
Army Allied Bridg~head Forces" •
rffcCardell brought up the subject as to who was the father of the rlan for
the amphibious operation at Anzio . General Clark anrl General Gruenther explained that there had been several rlans for amphibious operations , that the
first one was in tr e i:;lanning phas~ three days after our initial landing at
Salerno . General Clark said that three othl"r anph1bious plans had b~en laid
down before proper craft was available and the Anzio operation executed .
Roper then brought up the question as to why the Fifth Army bridgehead
had not been e:xploi ted , and General Clark pointed out that by dusk on D day
all that the Fifth Army had ashore on the bridgehead was tbe 3rd Division and
one brigade of the Bri tish 1st Division . Both of these organizations had about
1/5 of their vehicles . The Germnns , however, had lnnd supply lines and had 16
battalions ranged around the briclg~head perimeter bytthe night of D day. The
General said that } ifth Army forces probflbly could have driv~n onto the Mgh
ground doninating the Anzio bridgehead but that such a move would have greatly
endangered the rear areas at Anzio and Nettuno and thnt the troops right have
easily been cut off from all supplies hnd they moved too far forward and left
thl'!lir flanks and rear thinly held .
1
�13Y
Sitting informally around the stove in the hut, General Clark chatted with
the correspondents for over an hour.
In the evening General Clark invited a number of his staff officers from
the headquarters to a movie in the hut.
General Clark today sent the following cable to General Devers with regard to the replacement situation: RN 7696. "In your March 2nd letter you indicate that you are under impression that replacement situation is satisfactory for 34th Div. and probably so for 36th Div. Sawbridge message to Gruenther
lists replacements scheduled and I realize you are doing everything possible.
However, I desire to bring following facts to your attention. 34th Div. short
1500 infantry enlisted exclusive of lOoth Battalion. 36th Div. short 2400.
Both Divisions now under new T/O. Total shortage of 3rd and 45th Divisions
approximately 1500. Shipment of 3391 enlisted replacements which arrived March
3 included only 469 infantry and this is total infantry now available. Since
movement of 34th Div. to bridgehead nnist start about March 20th, I am forced to
convert to infantry approximately 1500 replacements from other branches as authorized in your W/9832/26661 dated 10 January. I consider the conversion an
unsatisfactory expedient but in view of the urgency of getti.~g 34th Div. to
ANZIO in immediate future, that solution is forcod on me."
\
Today the Inspector Gen~ral's report was received on the investigation con- /
ducted relative to the allegations regarding the insufficjency of ammunition
and the carrying of unloaded weapons by units of the 36th Division in the Ra/
pido River crossing. The conclusions reached are (a) that all personnel started on the operation carrying at least one extra oondolier of ammunition, and no
general shortage of ammunition existed, (b) that although orders were issued
that assault companies in the 141st Infantry would make the crossing of the Rapido River with weapons unloaded, no disastrous results occurred from this procedure; that all personnel of the 143rd Infantry crossed the river with loaded
weapons; the 142nd Infantry was in Division Reserve and was not engaged, (c)
that orders of the 141st Infantry directing that assault companies would carry
weapons unloaded a.re not ascribed to General Wilbur, (d) that any disastrous
results which may have occurred during this operation, were not due to insufficiency of ammunition or the procedure followed by some companies of the 141st
Infantry in crossing the river with unloaded weapons. It was recommended that
no further action be taken in the case.
General Clark received the following cable from General Truscott today:
RN 907. "Front quiet today except for small attack a.gainst third battalion,
7th Infantry last night which was repulsed. I am continuing aggressive reconnaissance. Begin tonight regrouping to make first division and 2 regiments 45th
Division available for attack which I am planning to reduce Carroceto salient.
Should complete regrouping by 8th and be ready by 11th or 12th enemy action and
weather permitting. Will coordinate date with operations on southern front and
will give you complete details of plan later."
*
*
*
PRESENZANO--MARCH 6, 1944--Today was the birthday of Sergeant Dow one of General Clark's Headquarters Detachnent, who has bAen an efficient an! devoted soldier in General Clark's imnediate entourage for many months. Sergeant Dow had
�been wounded by an enemy bomb at the beachhead but has recovered a.nd is back
on duty. This morning General Clark pinned a purple heart medal on Sergeant
Dow, to the sergeant's great delight and pride.
At about 1030 General Clark flew by cub to a field near Headquarters 10
Corps where he conferred with General Mccreery concerning the proposed ch,=inges
in his corps nispositions involved in the re-grouping of forces on this front
and the transfer of the British 5th Division now under General Mccreery to the
beachhead.
Thereafter, General Clark went on to visit General Sloan, Col"l1llandjng the
88th Division at his comr.,and post which js located where the present 5th Division CP also is, at a place called Carano about three miles southwest of Cessa
Aurunca. Following this talk General Clark returned by cub plane to his command post. While at the 88th Division, General Clark noticed that the division lacked sufficient shower bath equipment, and, as General Moran happened
to be there, General Clark asked General Moran to see that an additional mobile shower unit was sent to this division. General Moran had the Quartermaster take the necessary steps in the afternoon.
The following important messages were received and dispatched today:
Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 907. "Front quiet today except for small
attack against 3 Bn., 7th In:'antry la.st night wM.ch was repulsed. I am con•
tinuing aggressive reconnaissance. Begin tonight regrouping to make 1st Division and two regiments 45 Division Rvailab1e for attack which I am planning to
reduce Carroceto salient. Should complete regrouping by 8th and be ready by
11th or 12th enemy action and weather permitting. Will coordinate date with
operations on southern front and will give you complete details of plan later."
Personal Clark to Truscott. RN 5220. "Reference your 907, am delighted
with your plans to retake Carroceto salient. Keep me posted as to timing of
attack. Hope to launch Cassino attack just before yours if weather permits.
Heavy rains here have inundated large areas on the Rapido involved in this attack. With 3 or 4 days good weather , will launch it. Will see you in me~ntime. 11
Personal Clark to Alexender. RN 5229. 11 Will be gratoful to you if you
will inform me whether or not craft will be available for shipment of 34th Division to Anzio on March 20th as requested by me at your February 28th conference. If shipment is to start on 2oth craft for shipment of supplies should
be availRble by March 10th. New subject. I am still concerned over shortage
of LOTS for unloading of Liberty ships at Anzio. I hope that you will be able
to arrange for additional craft for this purpose."
Personal Alexander to Clark. RN MA 1134. "I have received following message from the CIGS. 'Please convey to Clark my admiration for wonderful defensive fjght put up by his troops. Very best luck to you all.'"
Personal From ClArk to Brooke.
and is deeply appreciated."
*
RN' 5250.
*
"Your message has been received
*
PRESENZANO--MARCH 7, 1944--General Clark left his command post at 0915 by jeep
�for Spa.dger Headquarters where he conferred with General Freyburg about the
proposed attack of his corps on Cassino. He then went to the Headquarters
of Combat Command B, where he ma.de a short visit and then returned to his
command post.
The two naval officers who had been on General Clark's PT boat the day
it was fired upon are still in the 118th Station Hospital but have recovered
sufficiently to engage in a decoration ceremony. Accordingly, following
lunch General Clark flew to Capodichino where he was met by his Packard and
by Lt. Col. ~ygaard. The General went to the 118th Station Hospital where a
brief ceremony was held and where Lieut. (j.g.) Patterson and Ensign Benson
received the Silver Star at the hands of General Clark. Benson was able to
stand, but Lieutenant Patterson received the decoration in a wheeloh~ir, as
one of his legs was still in a cast.
Following this ceremony General Clark had dinner with friends in Naples
and returned to his command post by car.
The following are the important messages of the day:
Personal Clark to Alexander. RN 7721. rtGeneral Mccreery has recommended
that 88th Division be provided with one additional U.S. infantry regiment in
order to furnish reliefs considered absolutely necessary if difieion is to be
capable of offensive action in April. It is necessary to employ all 3 CT's in
line at present. I have checked to djspositions of 88th Division, and I concur in General McCreery's recommendation. Since I have no U. s. regiment immediately available for this purpose, I request that 1 regiment of infantry of
85th Division less organization equipment be shlpped here from North Africa by
fastest means possible. Hope that air transportation can be at least partially
employed but if that is not practicable request that this regiment be ~iven
priority to insure its arrival i"ithin the next 10 days. Shipment of U.S. and
French replacements now scheduled for 14, 18, 24 and 29 March should not be
changed. However, these replacements total only 16443 against lift of 29349
allotted for March on your priority list 4. Equipment of regiment should fol•
low with least practicable delay. Desire balance of 85th Division arrive prior
to April 1st. Request this division be given priority above remainder 6th
Armored Division. In the event additional replacements are not available for
shipment in March personnel lift for division should be ample. Lift allotted
of est1mated 1300 vehicles for 6th Armored Division can be credited to 85th
Division."
*
*
*
PRESENZA.NO--MARCH 8, 1944--At 1000 General Clark received the new arriving
group of War Department Operations Division officers, 19 in number, at his hut.
General Clark talked briefly with these officers concerning the present situation and the course of operations which have led up to it in this theater. He
said that on the Cassino front the Fifth Army was faced · by enemy superi.or in
numbers to the Fifth Army forces opposing them and enjoying the advantage of
commanding ground. As a result, the Fifth Army, after advancing up to its
present positions, had found itself unable to advance even with heavy losses.
Accordingly, intelligence estimates of higher authorities had been furnished
to the Fifth Arrrr:, to the effect that if a landing were made in the Anzio region
it would oblige the enemy to withdraw a substantial force from the Cassino front,
�as he was unable to rejnforce himself by bringing troops from the north. Upon
the basis of this estimate the Fifth Army had been directed to make a landing
at Anzio and Nettuno, and this it had done efficiently and successfully. Unfortunately, neither estimate proved to be correct. The enemy had not withdrawn any considerable forces from the Cassino front, and, on the contrary,
had reinforced himself up to a strength of 10 divisions on the Anzio front by
bringing troops down from France, the Balkans and northern Italy. So equipped,
the Germans had made a series of strong attacks upon the bridgehead, all of
which had been thrown back by the Fifth A:rmy forces which now amount to about
5 divisions. Various armchair strategists in the United States and elsewhere
are now criticizing the Fifth Army for failure tn seize the Colle Laziale or
to take Rome immediately after the landing. General Clark said that any one
of the visiting officers was at liberty to quote him anywhere as saying that
such a course would have been reckless at the extreme and that undoubtedly
would have resulted in the cutM.ng off and capture or destruction by the increasing enemy of the troops attempting such a long advance without a secure
base.
The General gave the incoming officers a hearty welcome and said that they
would be assigned to duties with the Fifth Army of a nature which would give
them the most useful experience and instruction.
Follow:i.ng this General Clark returned to his van and spent the balance of
the day in disposing of administrative matters and working at his desk.
General Clark dictated the following notes for inclusion in his diary:
"On my last trip to the beachhead by cub I particularly wanted to discuss
with General Truscott some of the radiograms he had been sending to me. I have
known Truscott for a long time, and he is a difficult subordinate to handle.
He makes many demands, knowing full well that many of them can not be granted.
I had the impression that many of them were being recorded for the record. He
had issued peremptory orders to my G-4 at the Advance Fifth Army Headquarters
with reference to Fifth Army dumps. I told him to discontinue such instructions and that if he had any idea of writing for the record to discontinue it,
for I would back him up to the limit and would accept all responsibility for
difficulties at the beachhead.
"He has since written direct to General Devers on the question of lack of
effectiveness of tactical air reconnaissance. I will tell him on my next visit
there to discontinue writing official letters to higher headquarters but rather
to send all such matters to Fifth Army. He also took up direct w1.th General Devers the question of assignment of personnel. This must be stopped.
"Visited General Freyburg yesterda.y and met his subordinate commanders.
Checked his plan for the attack on CRssino. Urged that he not wait for ideal
weather, for that would take a week or two, but that if weather permits aerial
bombardment on the 10th, after four days of drying weather, for tanks to go
ahead. His tank experts recommended four to six days. The 10th would give us
four days of drying weather. I fully realize that we are not going to completely break through, and the tanks will play only a small part in this attack.
nAs I reflect upon the situaM.on today, I am convinced that ·Alexander is
�floundering in his effort to solve the tactical situation here. He has built
a fine picture on paper which ostensibly masses the Fifth and Eighth Armies on
a narrow front, whereas actually the only Eighth Army troops which are coming
this side of the mountains are the Headquarters Eighth Army. We will still
have a maximum of 11 Divisions attacking on this side of the mountains, opposed
to 8 German, and a maximum of 6 Allied Divisions in the bridgehead, opposed to
10. In this difficult terrain, with weather usually bad for long periods of
air activity and with the time that the German has had to prepare his defensive positions with wire, · mj_nes and other defensive works, I do not feel that
we will have the continuity of effort to drive through if he decides to stand. /
The best hope we have is the jnfluence of the Russian situation or that the
German feels that he must withdraw troops from here to block a channel threat I
or unless long periods of fair weather permit our ajr to effectively work on
I
his communications.
(
The following important messages were received and dispatched today:
PRO, ACMF to PRC', AFHQ (Copy to Fifth Army) RN 842. "As long as weather
remains unfavorable towards full Air Support, no major actions by our troops
due on any front. This off record background. In view some apparent doubt
that exists over expression "Allied Beachhead Force", wish stress this only
title to emphasize Allied effort and that VI Corps troops - both British and
American - are still integral part Fifth Army. No new command jn beachhead
has been formed. There is no objection to stating on record that beachhead
force still integral part of and still operating under command of Fifth Army. tt
Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 963. 11 Gen. Ramey j nforms me there is 1
TD Bn (tov1ed) now in Naples area available for use here if desired. Could
this be with personnel guns and absolute minimum of transportation be infiltra.ted to beachhead. I will attach to uni.ts in defense position to relieve
M-10 units that have been dug in front line positions for some time and in
need of maintenance."
Personal Truscott to Clark. RN 965. 11 14 11/:arch earliest cfate 1st Di.vision
will be ready for offensive operations. 5 Division should be complete in area
at that time. Propose to attack 14 March or as soon thereafter As approved by
you with 1st Division and 5 Division to clear enemy from rough country west of
Anzio road and reestablish western shoulder of salient in vicinity RJ at $64314.
When firmly established and regrouped there, to attack with 45 Division and 1st
Armored Div:l..sion from east shoulder of salient to seize the area Macchia del
Casale - Carroceto. Maximum air effort for day preceding attack and continuing
while attack actually in progress. Cover plan objective Littoria. Detailed
\
plan in preparation. Owing to advantage that would accrue to enemy with annihilation of Anzio bet:!,chhead, I do not believe that he will forego another effort if he can find sufficient force. Having failed twice with present forces,
it is doubtful that he will undertake another major effort wjthout 3 or 4 additional divisions.
"My capability for reduc:ing the Cerroceto salient with forces now available is contingent upon no material increase in enemy strength oprosite the
beachhead. However, I believe that I can reestablish western shoulder in any
case. We should be able to hold present position against attacks materially
stronger than previous ones. However, such attacks launched in great depth
and continued at maximum pressure regardless of loss will wear :infantry holding
l
�13°1
elements and result in great attrition. With shortage of infantry reserves,
such an attack is the greatest danger to the beachhead; if events indicate
material increase in concentration, additional infantry here will be an urgent
need."
*
*
*
PRESENZANO•-MARCH 9, 1944--This morning General Clark left his comr1B.nd post
at 0815 and went to the cub field where he took off with M9.jor Walker for the
Nettuno airfield. At Lago strip he was picked up by an escort of four planes,
and he arrived promptly at the beachhead. He made visits to the Corps and
3rd Division CP 1 s and gained a first-hand idea of the situation. The enemy
shelling of the port, while annoying, has had no really damaging effect. The
General left the Nettuno strip for his return flight at 1500 hours and arrived
at his own field at Presenzano at 16oO hours. On this trip the General's escort consisted of two Australian and two South African pilots - testimony to
the Allied character of the war.
Today Lieutenant General Crerar, who is relinquishing command of the Canadian Corps in the Eighth Army to take command of a Canadian Army in England,
arrived at the com.~and post to be a guest of General Clark overnight. General
Gruenther entertained him at lunch, together with General Sawbridge, Colonel
Duncan and Colonel Bertholf. In the afternoon General Crerar went to visit
Spadger for tea, with a guide furnished by General Clark.
In the evening General Clark entertained at dinner in the hut Generals
Crerar, M
cCreary, Hawkesworth (who was leaving the Fifth Army with his 46th
Division) Kirkman, Conmanding the 13th British Corps, together with Brigadier
Lambert, his B.G.s., and Brigadier Roe, his "Q" Brigadier, Brigadiers Richardson, Stayner and Cooke, together with the regular members of his mess, Generals
Gruenther, Lucas, K
eiser and Lt. Col. Sutherland.
General Gruenther sent the following two messages to General Clark up at
the beachheact today:
RN 7772.
"All set for Spadger on zero day. 11
RN 7774. t•In order to supplement air for zero afternoon and one day,
Saville proposes to reduce fighter cover over bridgehead by withdrawing fighter
bombers. This would result in reduction from 18 to 8 fighters over area at one
time. Suggest you discuss with Truscott."
Word had been received a few days ago that the Boche was plotting to blow I
up General Alexander and General Clark's CP at Anzio. La.st night the operation I
actually took place and three Italians w
ere caught on the beach with explosive ~
These Italians caused no damage as their attempt failed, and they are being held
at the beachhead.
*
*
*
PRESENZANO--MARCH 10, 1944--II Corps is now entirely moved back to its rest
area. The headquarters is at St. Agata. The J6th Division is just northwest
of Maddaloni, and the 34th Division is ,just northeast of Benevento.
�The beachhead is quiet. General Clark feels more content about the situa.tion there than he has at any time since the landing. Spadger's attack on Oas-'
sino has been waiting from day to day for sufficient good weather to permit the
air. to operate and to permit the ground on Cassino fL~ts to dry sufficiently to
conduct ground operations. The weather varies a good deal locally. Some times
there have been a few clear hours here, while at Foggia or other bases rain has
prevented all bombers taking off.
This morning General Saville called on General Clark and discussed the air
support of the Spadger attack at some length.
At noon General Clark entertained at lunch Gene:rals Eaker, Cannon and Crerar. General Eaker spoke of the recent successful bombardment of Germany by
the air force. He said that yesterday there were 1800 Allied planes over Germany, 1,000 of them fighters and the rest bombers. He said that after a little
Berlin will cease to be an asset but will be a liability to the Germans, and we '
can stop bombing it. He spoke of the recent successful bombing of the ballbearing factories, stating that OSS reported that after the last raids 80 German buyers of ball-bearings had turried up in Sweden, trying to buy up odd lots
of ball-bearings in little shops. With the coming of good weather, General
Eaker said that he was confident that aerial bombardment would go far to cut
off the supply of the troops now facing Fifth Arrny.
After lunch General Crerar said goodbye to General Clark and left. He had
visited the G-2, G-3 and G-4 staff sections and investigated their workings,
and Major Walker had taken him on a cub flight over Cassino.
General Clark spent the afternoon in his van disposing of administrative
matters. At dinner be entertained General Bouscat, Commanding all French Air
Forces, together with Lt. Col. Harteman, one of his staff officers, and also
General Srwille and Col. Darcy of the XII Air Support Command. General Bouscat
said that he had been dismissed from the Army by the Vichy regime and, as a civilian, had taken to journalism in Africa, and at the time of General Clark's
landing of October, 1942, he had been one of those who had been in touch with
the pro-American French officers. He had, he said, djsmissed all the French
Aviation Generals when he came in. Gt\neral Bouscat spoke interestingly of
General N'ogues; saying that early j_n the vrar he had been a great friend of his,
but General Nogues' trimming ~tttitude had disgusted General Bouscat, so that he
ceased to have any friendly feeling for Nogues.
By Operational Instruction #1, Mediterranean Allied Tactfoal Air Force,
the responsibilities for air support were re-stated and it was asserted that
the XII Air Support Command would be responsible for all air support for the
Fifth and Eighth Armies. When requirements for air support for the Fifth and
Eighth Armies exceeded the resources at the disposal of XII Air Support Command,
the Comnanding General thereof was to refer these requ:i.rements to MATAF. Liaison
representatives were to be exchanged between the various air elements and 11 if
XII Air Support Command become separated from Fifth Army they will detach a small
operational liaison section to work with Fifth Army".
Today General Leese sent the following cable to General Clark and to General Cannon, Commanding the TAF. 11RP-f erence MA'rAF Operational Instruction f/1,
dated 7 March, I take great exception to issue of this in view of agreement to
�lL!l
defer final decision on air force set-up until return .Air Vice Marshal Broadhurst. Latter was recalled and is due Algiers today, see COS 251+ to ACMF only
of 5 March.n
The agreement to await the return of Air Vice Marshal Broadhurst is described in cable COS 49 from General Leese to General Harding, dated March l
and quoted in the diary for that day.
It is apparent, therefore, from General Leese radio, that he still feels
strongly that the Fifth and the Eighth Armies should have their separate air
support commands and should not have to comrete for the intentions of a single
air support conmand.
Following are the jmportant messages of the day:
Fifth Army to CG, l\TATOTJSA, RN' 5347. "Ranger Force now consists of 50 officers and q59 enlisted men present for duty or in hospitals, all assigned to
4th Ranger Battalion. Reference your 59018. Of this total 19 officers and
137 enHsted men joined in Ireland in June, 1942 and ps.rticipated in all campaigns. They are classed as veterans and should be returned to United States
on emergency rotation. 30 officers and 419 enlisted men are cl8ssified as experi.enced and 11 officers and 282 enlisted men as comparatively inexperienced.
In general, value of special trained forces is not considered worth the efforts
expended in special organization and training. Most unsatisfactory obstacle.
to overcoMe with special forces in Fifth Army has been procurement of suitable
replacements. Fifth Army desires to continue · Spedal Service Force as outlined in February 17th letter, subject: "The Rangers.n
Personal Truscott to Clark. Rl'T 1002. 11 7791 your Headquarters asks availability Colonel Donald H. G
alloway for assignment Deputy Chief of Staff, Seventh
Army. If General Lucas to command Seventh Army, Galloway desires to accept, and
I will make him available. If not, Galloway desires to remain with me, and I
would like to retain him. Will you advise me on this matter. 11
Personal Clark to Truscott. RN 5380. "Lucas not to cornmr,nd Seventh Army.
Reference your 1002. Galloway remains with you."
Today General Clark received a reply to his letter of M
arch 4th to General
Leese as follows:
· "Thank you very much for your letter, which I was delighted to get. I
quite ageee with you about the need for very close liaison, and General George
Walsh, my Chief of Staff, wi.11 get in toucri with your Staff about this question
directly we come over.
"Most certainly keep Lt. Colon"l George Britten with you; I feel sure trds
will be a good arrnngement. I hope very rnuch also that all Branches e.nd Services of our two Armies will be abl~ to keep a very close liaison together. In
this way we should maintain permanently a very close and friendly co-operation
which will, I am sure, lead to very high effjciency in battle.
11 May we offer you our "1ost sincere congratulations on your srlendj d defence
o±: the ANZIO bridgehead during the last week. Everyone here is full of admiration for your splendid fighting. We all look forward very much to our joint
�march on RNn:E and to the Horth with you.
"Thank you ver~r much for your telegra,ri about the Italian Brigade. They will
help me a lot as my Polish Divisions have only got two Brigades each. They are,
therefore, short of men on the ground.
"Best of luck.It
*
*
*
FRESENZANO--MA.RCH 11, 1944--At 0900 General Clark mmt down to a clear space just
beyond the Chief of Staff's van where there had been drawn up a guard of honor of
MP's and a band ready for a decoration ceremony wherein officers and men to receive a DSC, four Legion of Merits, nine Silver Stars, two Soldiers Medals and
two Air Meda.ls were to be decorated. Gen~rBl Bowman was present to receive his
new Silver Stars as Brigadier General, at the hands of the Army ComMander. At
this formation, Lt. Col. Alphonse Van Hecko of the French Army received the Letion of Uerit for his outstandfog work in Ali<:iers 1 cooperation with the Allied
.n
landings in Operation TORCH. General Lewis and Ms.jor John T. Walker receivP-d the
Silver Star for their flight to Anzio on D day. The ceremony was also noteworthy
because the band played a newly-composed Fifth Army march for part of the ceremony. After the formation GenAral Devers and GenerBl Rooks arrived, and General
Devers talked with Gener8l Clark in his van for about half a.n hour. Afterwards
General Devers left for a visit to Spadger. General Rooks stayed for lunch with
General Clark. There was a general discussion of the rrogress of the war. General Rooks expressed the opinion that the Russian progress was bona fide and most
encouraging.
Discussing the recent order of the Frime Minister concerning the change in
the dateline from the beachhead to read, "Allied Beachhead Forces", General Rooks
told of receivin~ a message fron TROOPERS recently saying that hereafter all dispatches sent personally to the Prime Minister should spell "theater" - "t-h-e-a- \
t-r-e" and should not spell "through" "t-h-r-u11 •
_ ,,,,.
At 1325 General Clark left his com~and post by jeep for the cub field and
flew in a cub to an improvised landing strip near Maddaloni where there had been
drawn up representative battalions from the 36th Division. The Gener~l landed
here with a tail wind and had little space to come to rest by the assembled troops.
He was annoyed with the arrangements for his landing which he felt savored of a
stunt rather than a proper landi.ng. The ceremony went smootl:ly, and he conferred a Medal of Honor on Technical Sergeant Kelly, 2 DSC I s, 135 Silver Stars
and a War Department unit citation on the 3rd Battalion, 141st Infantry for its
gallant work at Salerno. During this ceremony, General Clark, at one point,
made a brief talk to the assembled troops. He emphasized the fine part played
by the 36th Division in the Salerno Operation r.nd since then and stated that the
persons being decorated were the natural battlefield leaders who had shown their
capH city by their courage against the enemy.
Following the ceremony, the General took off and return"'d to his command
post. In the evening he drove to Caserta with Generals Lucas and Gruenther and
had dinner as the guest of General Eaker.
One of the annoying developments of the day was the necessUy of still furth~r
�\43
postponement of the Spadger attack on Cassino. Repeated prophecies of bad
weather have made it necessary to put this operation off from day to day. It
was confidently expected to stage the operation 12 March but can not now be
held until 13 March, if then. One reason for these dehi.ys is the local variation in weather in the theater. It js sometimes clear in Presenzano, foggy in
the Naples Plain, raining in Foggia whence many planes take off, and still different in Corsica, Sardinia and .North Africa.
An interesting situation has arisen from time to time at various points \
on the front concerning truces held for burial of the dead, etc. The GE'lrmans 1 /
frequently send emmisaries over under flags of truce, and in a couple of recent instances General Hawkesworth has detained the emmisaries rather than al\
low them to return because of the military situation which rendered this necessary.
Memorandum of 1 March 1944 from O:eneral Mccreery indicntes that during recent fighting on 10 Corps front in a number of instances the enemy requested
local truces to collect wounded and dead. In several such instances the Germans were thought to have been using the Red Cross flag in order to withdraw
snipers or othervvise obtain military advantages. On 20 February a Division
Commander, 46 Division, directed that no further truces could be considered
and stated tha.t any further deputations coming over under white flags of truce
would be considered prisoners of war, although the collection of wounded by
11 Red Cross personneln would always be respected if not abused.
On 21 February
a German officer, Oberlt Herman Schmidt of the 129th Panzer Grenadier Regiment,
came over to the French lines with the white flag, accompanied by an jnterpreter, requesting to be allov,ed to remove dead and wounded. This officer was
treated as a prisoner of war, but General Mccreery in his letter of 1 March to
Fifth Army, recommended that after an appropriate advance had been made the officer be returned with his interpreter to the·German lines. Accordingly, 'on
10 March a letter was sent from Headquarters Fifth Army to the G.o.c., ACMF referring to the enclosed correspondence stating that instructions had been issued to all F5.fth Army units that no truces would be allowed without prior approval from Army Headquarters, requesting authorization to return Oberlt Schmidt
and his interpreter to the German lines as soon as security conditions permit on
the ground that in the opinion of the 46th Division Commander they were not familiar with the message ending all truces. This letter also recommended that a
Lieutenant Roland Weiser, 10th Parachute Regiment, who entered 56th lines in
the bridgehead requesting a truce to remove wounded, but held as a prisoner of
war in North Africa.
It was decided today by General Clark that no truces for the purpose of removing dead for burial would be requested by any Fifth Army unit, and so a telegram to this effect, reference #7841, was sent to all Corps of the Army, reading
as follows:
"No truce for the purpose of removing dead or wounded will be requested or
granted by any Fifth Army .u nit. Detailed instructions will follow."
General Clark today issued a letter to all subordj_nate commanders on duty
on the Cassino front, explaining in detail the ACMF Reorganization Pl~n as a
guide for future planning.
�Important messages of the day are as follows:
Personal from Clark to Port Commandant and NOIC, Anzio. RN 7836. "During
the past few days I have watched carefully port operations at Anzio. The excellent work done by you and your men has resulted in a record unequalled to
date. The discharge of over 5 ,ooo tons daily for the pa.st 3 days indicates a )
.
high degree of organization and willingness of your men to rerform under most
trying conditions. For this outstanding performance I congratulate you and
your men. 11
From Fifth Army Adv OP to CG, Fifth Army (G-4). RN' 632. "Request you
send another ship to arrive 130600 in addition to Fletcher and 1 additional
ship requested for 120600. Cresop will finish tonight and Grey sometime tomorrow. LCM 1 s foun~ to be impracticable cannot he utj_lized at Xray beach and
tie up berth space in harbor. Both port and navy personnel recommend against
furtrer use of LCM's and return of same to DUKO. Concur in recommendations.
Read General CLARK'S personal nessage to assembled port and naval personnel
at port meeting and gave copies to Port Commandant and NOIC, Anzio personally
on behalf of General CLA...llK. h1rsonnel expressed pleasure in no uncertain ·
terms, thanks."
*
*
*
PRESENZAN0--MARCH 12, 1944--General Clark today remained at his cornmand post
engaged in administrative work. The attack on Cassino was still deferred because of weather, although it was hoped to get it off on Tuesday.
At 1030 thj_s morning Colonel Sullivan arrived at the comJ11.and post, at
General Clark's jnvitation, and General Clark pinned his new Brigadier General stars on his classmate's shoulders.
Shortly thereafter, General Templer, Commandjng the 56th Division, arrived and had a brief talk with General Gruenther and later with General Clark.
In the evening General Clark showed a r.10vie film at the hut called "The Miracle
at Morgan's Creek". The fj_lrn was preceded by a buffet supper at which the
General entertained. a number of staff officers and also Lt. Col. Daly of the
16th Evacuation Hospital with some of his staff.
General Clark sent the following cable to General Truscott today. RN 5454.
"Shall be glad to see Butler tomorrow. Weather forecast and expected ground
conditions for March 14th unfavorable. I am willing to have you attack on March
15th, and I desire that you prepare plans on that basis. Weather permitting all
out air effort will be given your front on March 14th. However, it should be
understood by you that Cassino attack has top :r:riority and must take place as
soon as weather permits. This means that ff weather prediction at 1800 hours
any day indicates favorable weather for Cassino attack on following day entire
air effort will support Cassino attack even though your attack is still in progress. Moreover, bulk of air will probably be needed for Cassino attack for two
days after Cassino D day. If Cassino attack starts while your attack is in
progress I will do everything possible to give you some air effort, but it will
probably be light. Your comments and recommendation desired. New subject 168
CT scheduled to leave Naples March 20th. If you desire I will delay until March
22 in order to give more time to absorb replacements scheduled to arrive Naples
March 14th. 11
�PRESENZANO--MARCH 13, 1944--The bad weather again deferring the Cassino attack,
General Clark this morning remained at bis co:rm:1.and post disposing of administrative matters. Just before lunch he pinned the Silver Star on lVfaj. Gen.
Lucas who is about to leave Fifth Army for the United States. Following lunch
the General flew by cub to the 34th Division cub field north of Benevento
where h('l presented 3 DSC I s, 54 Silver Stars and 4 Soldier's Medals. He returned from this flight at 1600.
\
This evening Generals Clark and Gruenther and Lt. Col. Sutherland vmre
entertained at dinner ·by General Juin.
The weather forecast for tomorrow is again bad, and the Cassino attack has
again been deferred, to the great annoyance of General Clark. The weather here
j_s perfect today with sunshine, a diminishing wind and unrestricted visibilityo
However, the XII Air Support Conmand reports that conditfons at Foggia yesterday were such that bombardment planes could not get off the ground at all. The
cons:ideratfons which defer the Cassino operation must obviously be those applicable to tl1e area. as a whole and not to a small part of it which can be seen
from any one position. The planes for the attsck come from as far away as Foggia on one side and Sardinia on the other, and good weather in one Italian valley is not indicative of good weather in all areas concerned.
Today, by letter, "Relief of Remaining British Troops in 10 Corps Sector~"
the details of the relief of certain units of 10 Gorps by French Expeditionary
Corps between 19 and 29 March were set forth.
Today the following cable was received from AFHQ relative to the departure
of General Lucas, Deputy A:rmy Commander, from Fifth Army:
RN 63886. 11 Upon General Lucas arrival in Algiers orders will be issued
for permanent change of station to the United States vdth travel vi.a United
Kingdom. If aide or aides are to accompany General Lucas request names and serial numbers so that they may be placed on the same order. You are further authorized to issue appropriate orders transferring an enlisted man with General
Lucas baggage to the United States via water transportation."
General Truscott cabled General Clark as follows today: RN 1055. "My attack not practicable under conditfons stated jn your 5454. I consider all out
air effort D-1 continuing through attack to be essential owing to relative combat strength, enemy organization, and difficult terrain. Yiith adequate support
I hope to complete operation on D-2; thus I feel that a:ir effort should be allocated to this force for approximately 4 days to begin operation. I do understand that Cassino attack has top priority; however, every day's delay here increases enemy ground organization and makes the attack more difficult. If weather forecast indicates unfavorable conditions for Cassino for 3 or 4 days I
recommend you allocate air effort to me and let me proceed v;rith attack. Butler
is enroute by cub. He has air plan and can amplify my views. Recommend no delay in shipping RCT 168. 11
�fRESENZANO--MARCF 14, 1941~- -This norning General Lucas , together vri th his two
aides , Major Renne and Captain Eyster, left the Fifth Army con.'7and rost enroute
1
to Algiers , UK and the lrnited States, pursuant to the orders of cable ~ 63886 ,
quoted in yesterday ' s diary.
The General receivo.d a brief call fror.i Colonel Tully, who cane in w-ith a
quantity of in+'orl'l1ation about the errployP1ent of some Italian railroad artillery pressed into service of the Fift]:, Army and was now being fir'3d against the
Gerr:ians .
General Clark spent the day jn his comancl rost engaged in aclrnj_
nistrative
Matters . In the aftr:irnoon Lieutenant General Leese, who had just arrivod ,
storped to pay a short visit of courtesy. He was acconpanied by Lieutenant
General Kirknan , Cor'nanding the British 13 Corps .
Late j_n the afternoon word was received from General Cannon that the wea ther reports for the followinf! day were favorabl/3 anc'l thRt tho Cassino attack
was definitely scheduled . Generals Clark and Gruenthl'lr trereupon planned to
go up to Headquarters New Zealand Corps , frol"" whicr they would be taken to an
OP to observe the attack .
The following are the jmportant nessages of the day :
Fron HQ AAI to Fifth Army. RN O 2275 . 11 4 Div on vrithdra.wel fro,· 10 Corrs
will pass to Corid 5 Corps v,here it will relieve 1 CDN Div vrhlch in tu:rn will
pa.s s to Cond CDN Corps . Withdrawal of 4 Div from the line Yrill be as follm"S .
10 BDE GF 22 Iinr . 12 BDE GP 25 MBrch. HQ 4 Div Div Sigs Iert Div TFS 25 Mar .
Balance Div TFS ?6 Mf'r . 28 BDE GI, rpprox 30 TJ'iarch to be confirmed by Fiftr Army
later. :,3 Arrnd BDE GP less 46 RTR will be i:rithdrawn c'l1trin 6 this p:!riod and will
pass to cOJ11d 5 Corps e.nd will relieve 1 CDH Arny Tank BDE whicr will revert corid
CDN Corps . Fifth Army will Brrancre c1ircct v;ith 5 Corrs for the required Reece
parMes to rove in advance to ensure no deley jn take over on arrivnl. A meeting will be held at this Hq Ht 1030 hou:rs 18 !1arch to decide all detBils o.f' the
reliefs and l"loveP1ents in the above regrouping. This Hq 1aill arrr->.ngc nccn for
rep or reps 5 Corps night 15/16 t-~circh . Reps Fifth Arny Eigtth /\.rrny 5 Corps
F'lrmbo nill cit tend . 11
Personal Truscott to ClPrk. R\T 1075 . 11 I expect to rnlease Gen<>rel Evelegh
about 0 0 r~arch. I h'3lieve hi.s r~placerent should be here by 18 flPrcJ,, to be with
hin for a day or so prior to his departure and he here during rroposed attack .
Cl'm ~rou nake Richardson available by that date? 11
Fersonal Clar}- to Truscott . RH 5493 . "Brigadier RichPrd Goodbody llAs been
selected to replace Evelegh . He 1rill arrive here tomorrow and will be sent to
you within next few days . "
Clark to Truscott . RN 5490 . 11 There is a cr:i ticP 1 shortage of l05mn 2mriunition ju this tr>eatcr c1 espite riy nost urgent arpcals which have been sent directly t0 the War Departnent . Recent shirmnts of tJ:,is type of anr.iunition have
been reduced helow al"'ounts prevjously aut:borized ana expected . Future a.llotr1ents
n1av be reduced hecause of higher priorities for otPAr theaters . Exrenditures on
the ri1ain army f'ront ha.vc been reduced to the Pbsolute riinimu.rn to rrovide cdditional anounts for the bridp:ehead .
i
�"Fron this dete until April 6 inclusi vo thA followinp; l"nmunition will be
avn ilr1b1_e in thr- bri..dgchead: On hand rt A:nzj_o Arny ASP I s 111800 tre sun of
137927 r01mds; on hand at Anzio '<Im rositions cv~185 rounds; rlue to be shiprcd
by 12 narch but not shipped as of 101800 hours q4074 rounds; to be shiprcd
d11rj n~ :1r>rioo 12 Harer to h April ;:,q5000 rounds; total on hand or due in to
6 Aprj_l 6211~6 rounds.
11 Bffective irmcdiately fill previous allocations 105nm howitzer aJ'l1l'1unition to VI Corps ere cancelled. In order to provide for enem" counterattac'rn,
losses b'r shipping, unfavorable lm,.ding poriods an<l sorie reserve for a T'!ajor
attack after the 14th Division t1rrives in the beachhead, you trill fi_y your
rates of ~xp:ind-ltures, includinP," yonr ettack cxrcnditures, so thAt on April 6
there i::ill be 2goooo rounc'1s in the bcacl~heed. It is estinatcd t:rat this will
leave · approximately 130000 rounds at gun posHions and 150000 rou_m'1s in Army
dllJ"lps.
"There cen he no further allocations -ror the period. It ~s regretted
that tLis restriction is necessary but only after careful ccnsideration and
study this decision has been riade. Ac1~nowledge receipt of tbis ressage. n
Hews carrie through toray thrit G('nerA 1 Gira,10 1 s dauglitcr rad died in a Ger!"lan concentration camp. General Clark dispatched the follo-\'Jing C[lble to the
French Col"t!"'ander-in-Chief. RN 5517. "You rave ny sincer" r>nd ceep syripathy
for your sad loss."
*
*
*
fP.ES"~l,TZANO--MARCH 15, 1944--The Jonrs-av10ited but oft-postponed P..ttack on Cassino too}: rl11ce tor'Py. At 0700 Gcnerril Clerk, r>cconran~cd by Generr,l Gru"nther,
left Ms commancl rost rind rlrove to the Feadqurrters o+" the \Tew Zealand Corrs
near :3an pjetro. There he vms net by Generril Freyburg, Genor2l Alexen<l0r, General °SPker, GenerE'l Dcv"'rs a.ncl a Dost ..,ore hj_gh ranlring officers. Guided by a
Now Zea.lend Corps o-"ficer, General ClA.rk drove to Cnrvaro whr>re a special observation post had been set asil'e for him. It was located in an old battered
stone house on tre nortl' side o:f' Ccrvaro, and +'rom thl"1 second floor Crssino is
little less than three niles eway and plainly vjsible. Othsr o"'ficers who used
G-.nernl Clark's OP nere General Devers, General Gr11anth0r, Gr:merP 1 Chr11~ncey,
General Devers 1 Chief of Staff, and Colon0l Harrison of Gcncrri.l Dcv0rs I Staff.,..,_
--::;- l .._,._,._.J ~ I
•.t. ~ ~ 4-- ,,.._..,.:t P"' ~ t ~ - ~ + t. .,.k.... ~ .........
General Clark ::-eached the OP at 08?0 -:>nd rroriptly at OPi~O tre first wave
of bot!bers carri0 fl y:i.ng diroctl ,r over Cerwro Pnil thP✓n 0'mred their load on Cassino. Gener<>l Glrr 1r tood o:n th~ brlcony of Ms OT Pnd wrtched tb~ bor1bing
I
thronr.:h field r,:lasses. The first bombers were B-26•s, and they la.id 80% of
{
their bombs in the heart of the town. A few bombs were short, landing just on
our s5de of the Rapido River. VIhen the bor1bs hit, they sent quicl , stRbbine
flashP,s of nran1;e fln.11~, ri"'d t}~is W8S fol]_..or.rcd b~r n joint ernption o-r srio'k:~
and debris. By the t:inc tre first mwe of ho:1bers had rassed ('Ver Cassino,
tLc to'm rms alnost oblitcrt1ted 1) . ' sroke ancl dust. At 08/~5 the sec0nd vmve of
bor,bers, Flying Fortresses, droy:p:-.d t'v~jr load, and General Clark's OT- :.,hoo-k
v~ obntl7 ,'ncer th~ i.,.,pact of t11e bfo.st. Tr~ bor:ibing continu~d on an almost
uninterrupted schednle 1mtil noon. There were two untoward incirlents . One
wave of bonbcrs dropped a stic1, near San f.!jchele, which is well within our
\
0
�lines. This stick landed arprox-iriotely two riiles north~ast of' the Gl')nArA.1 1 s
On9 b0nber i-., anoth,..,r wave unloaded its bo,-,bs aprrovinatcly one mile
vrest of' the Gen~ral I s OP and killed severa 1 rc9n in a NeVT Zealand artill ~ry
battery. General Clark was extrer,,elv d~ sturberl by t11ese two occurrences,
and General Cannon, who also had co,..,e to General Clark's or, got on tre rhone
to the XII Air Suprort Com~and, in an attenpt to nak~ sure that no bonbs
1imulo ½e dropp~d unless the crews v1ere sure that they were over the target .
Th~ first tno waves ret absolutel:,r no enemy fighters !1.or ener:iy flak. V1ter
in the '"'Orninrs bo,..,bers trat turned vrest after },itting Cassino ran :nto re.ther }
light flak soril') ten niles west of' Cassino . 1Jot cne rlane was stJen to crash.
nr.
Between tre v:aves of bonbers, fifth Army artillP-ry lobb~d occasional
shells into Cassino .
A total of 1320 tons of hor:bs were c'1rorped on_ th") tovm of Cassino during
the day. 'i'l'~ attackincr ships :l ncluc'ed 134 Heavies, 255 Fighter Bo,.,bers, or
light boribers , and t}-,9 renainder Medium Borib"!rs. Durj n[; tY,e day the Air Corrs
flew 820 sorties over Cassino and dispritched a total of 1150 rlanes. The Hediur,., Bor:b0rs Wt"lre by far tre rost accurnte, and Gen~ral Clark was extremely
pl'3ascd \Ti tri their vrork .
\
rronptly at noon, whem t1-,e last borbers had du..nped their bo;1bs on Cassino, Fifth Arny artillery openF-d ur w~tr. a trc11endous barrage thn.t literally
shook the grouni:1, Bnd Fifth Arr,y 5nfantry and ~ng; necrs, \"1'0 },ad been wa-i ting
in th~ flatlands behind the Bapico River, began r;oving forvm.rcl j nto Cassino.
Th~ r:;tms k~pt up their barrage until 1420, thrm j ng tons of 1~ igh exr losi ves
into Cassino and into tre rtont1stery as well. Durini:; the bo'ibing and thn artiller;r barrage Gen"'ral Clark r10.de trips to various oth0r buildinr,s in Cervaro nrh~re oth~r OP 1 s were situated. He also vm.lked approx5nritely 1/? mile
farth")r clmm tbeJ road toward Crissino so he could better see t},e effect of
t1~is trenendous assault . On his return he stopp"ld in at the observation rost
wh,,re t},e war correspondents vere watching th~ hattle, aY1.d 1"e chatted with
them for several ninutes . Gen0ral Clnr1r R lso ··,ent down to the :'J0v1 Zealand
Corrs Adve.nce CI, about 200 ynrc.;s f'rom G~n~ral Cl8rk 1 s or, rind got reports on
trrJ f'ip;hting. By l"1id-afternoon th"l troops 1·er~ well into Cassino. and they
had taken Hill #1q3, a rise that overlooks the entire town. Through his
fil"lld glasses Gen"lral Clar1,, cm1ld see our tanks rioving into town, but rcrorts
cane back that the tanks ,,ere having difficulty because of the tret1cndous
craters J"'lade ~ n +.he roads by tr e boT"bers . General Cler1r riade four trips Pcross
the field to tte Jfow Zealand or. Dud ng the afternoon the Germans threw a few
shells into the -:·enaral area , th1 closest landing about 400 yr'lrds frorn the
ClA.rk OP. During Most of the e.fternoon Gen~ral Clark sat on the ed~e of the )
balcony, his legs hanging over the edge , 1,eeping his ffold v,lasses on tr"l torm
of Cassino and chatt-inr; '"ith the GcnE'!rnls w·ho were with rim.
1
By 1600 it was appRrcnt th~t the ettock ,ms 17,oing fairly '7ell but tl1at the
bo,,..bing and qrtill")ry !:ad not driven the Gernans frorn Cassino and that they
rrere putting up rath~r stiff oprosition. The Indian Gurl..ras uere to have at..
tacvnd late tonif;ht up t1"P. slopes .,,.roM t:re town of Cassino to the Abbey. Aft'1r a final chec 1: at G~ncrnl Freyburg' s OF and a brief talk ,-,~th General Gallov ay, Cor1rio:r1.0er of the l+t} Indfon Di vision ,-ho rad cone be ck to the nevr Zealand Corps or, Gnneral Clark, still acconpanied by Gen9ral Gruonther, drove
.
I
�lY9
back to his coMP1and post Pt Presenzano, arriving th0re at 1650 ..
G8neral Clark this evening cabled General Truscott as follows: RN 7961.
"Attack on Cassino took pl2ce today vrit}, all out air effort from 0830 to noon
and heavy fighter bonher effort this afternoon. Bonb:i ng appeared to be effective aJ.though tanks hwe not been abl"o to rass through tmm yet because of
debris. Attack to take Monastery Hill will he mode tonight. Progress generally satisfactor7 although slower than ant:icipated. TAC R spotted heavy
rioter novenents from Frosinone area tovmrd Cassino late this afternoon. 19th
is earliest date for your attack. fiill k8ep you advised. 11
The Air Support Control Sectfon reported today on the bombing of our
troops by our own planes. Their report may be sUTir:1arized as follows:
On the 15th the first bonbs dropped on Allied troops on the Cassino
front fell on 0930 hours, and this "friendly11 bombPrdl"'lent continued until
1130 hours. The bonba.rdr1.ent was quite indiscriminate, as the Folisl1 Corps,
the New Zealand Corps, tho French EYfPditionary Corrs at Vl'.lnafro anrl. Eighth
Army Headquarters in Venafro were all, turn and turn about, the objects of
this bombardment. In all, the Polish Corps lost 3 r1en wounded, the Bighth
Army Headquarters lost 7 men wounded, the French Expeditionary Corps lost 1
officer and 5 men killed and 52 wounded, the New Zealand Corps lost 11 nen
killed, 2 offj cers killed and ?.4 mi:in wounded.
l
I
\
\
l
General Juin turned in a separate report for Ue French vfr•ich can not be
entirely reconciled wj th tho Air Support Control report. According to General Juin, on the 15th the first bar.bing of the :F'rencb occurred at 1000 when
one or two Fortresses dropped B bombs on Macchia d 1 Isornia, causini; no casualties, and tvrelve hombs were dropped on Vemtfro and vicinity, two of wt1ich fell
on the 1-1 ills overlooking the cor:1nand post and ten on the town itself. The
Venafro bor,,bing caused two sold51;r and q1Jite r-,. few civilian casualties. At
1020 one or tno Fortresses drorred about thirty bombs in the J'ozzillj_ area,
killing 4 French, including a battalion cormander, and woundJ ng 34, includj ng
two officers. At 1125 about 15 Fortresses bonbed the Volturno valley from
Macchia d I Isernia to a point just south of Ven~fro, re,sul ting j n one French
soldier killed and eight wounded. The total casualties come to~ killed, including one officer, and 52 wounded, including two officers. GonerF,1 Juin also
reported that at Eighth Army Advance CF 10 British 1vere killed and the losses
among the civilians at Vena.fro are esttnated at 40 killed and 100 wounded.
(The General adds a footnote to his report that on the 16th of March six New
Zealand fighter honbers bombed and strafed tl1e Frencl1 at Belvedere and dropped
leaflets inviting the Germans to surrender.)
*
*
*
FRESENZANO--MARCH 16, 19/i/4--Today the rrincipal subject of interest Y1as the
rrog-ress of the attack on Cassino. General Clark received frequent bulletins
throughout the day, and in the afternoon nont by j~ep to Sradger 1 s OP where he
checked for h·iMsolf tho gains being nade. Irisonr,rs of war indicated that tbe
bonbardri.o:nt had caused considerable casualties c.nong the Gernans. One difficulty arose througl, the trouble the attackers had in rJ'etting tanks across borb
cratc~rs and throup;h the ruhblo filled streets of the town. One crater had to
be bridged by engineers before it could be crossed. Dt:irjng tho course of the
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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Clark, Mark W. Diaries
Subject
The topic of the resource
Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984.
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns.
United States—History, Military—20th century.
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950.
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The Citadel Archives & Museum
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Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
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CP Clark
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Mark W. Clark Collection
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application/pdf
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English
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Text
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20
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The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Mark W. Clark Diary, February 23 - March 15, 1944
Subject
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Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns
United States—History, Military—20th century
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from February 23-March 15, 1944.
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CP Clark
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1944
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Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1569
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s
~
This is Volume VI of the 1/ar Dirry of Lieutenrnt General r~rk
W. ClPrk.
Volume I, covering p0.riod 28 Jun~, 1942 to September 24,
1942; Volum~ II, Covcrin~ reriod 25 September 194? to 5 JanuPry 1943;
Volume III, covering period 6 Jimun.ry 1943 to 6 Jun"? 1943; and Volume
IV, covering period 7 June 1943 to ?9 AuRUst 1943, rre h~ld in safekeeping Pt the Army 1!ar College, ·foshi"1gton, D. C.
VolUJ'le V, cover-
ing period Augu~t 30, 1943 to December 31, 1943 is being held in
safekeeping in the Commanding Genarn1 1 s safe
�OFFICERS ' REST CErT-r:;R, SORRPiIITO--JMWARY 1, 1944--NErr YEAR 1S DAY--General
ClPrk r,pent the day r>t the Officers I Rest Center. In the evcninp; he dined
with some of his sta.ff officers who ,,,.r~ rre3ent . During thi"' dr_y, motor messengers brought dispPctches do m fron the GenerA.1 1 s commnnd rost, and he discussed various r1atters by telerhone with his Chief of StPff. AMong the day's
messages ,.,ere n.n acknowledgment by General Clrirk of Gener:, 1 Leese I s greeting,
besides th~ following rnessr:tges from Gencrnl Gruenther who " rs still in Afric;:i;
Persnna.l for Clark fro,,, Gruenther . RN 22103 . "My guess js thPt SHINGLE
v'ill be cancelled . Rooks and '""hiteley feel thrt Alexander is bf'dly off bflse
in this instance ."
Personal for Clark from Gruenth~r. RN 22104. "Informe.tion from AcimirP 1
Cunningham indicates nen.rly all LSTS must be released on Febru:c>ry ?nd at latest . Concert h~re is th"t force must land with suprlies for eight dRys with
no dependence on re-supply by ,wter. No craft can be furnished for subsequent build-up. General 1'~isenhower has r sked Combined Chiefs to Pllovr 504th
to remain for SHINGLE . 11
Personal for Clork from Gruenthcr .
RN 22354.
11
Concensus here is thnt
SH:It'(\LE should be cr-ncelled unless AleXPnder and Clark can show that there
Tiill be no interference with ANVIL. I assume th:ot you now hPve telegrl"'m reference Seventh Army. Suggest you hnve Ga;:r or Harkins report to you immediately to explain status of Seventh Army staff . Part of stnff will start to a.rri ve here .!orldny. 11
Personal Clark to AloY..ander . RN 6037. "fosition regnrding ll"ndine craft
nov: clear . It is understood 20 LST 1 s -.rill be released for Feb 5 convoy Pnd 13
more LST ' s 10 dr:iys lriter . J lanning is proceeding on allocation of 88 1ST I s
(14 - 6 davit) , 60 LCT 1 s , 90 LOI (1) 's, 6 LSI (1) 1 s, 2 LSI (M) anc' 2 AGC 1 s.
Urgently request additional 12 - 6 davit LST's of ?6 destined for er-irly departure TJ . K. be allotted for OperAtion SHrJGLE . Alterm1 te rlrin being prepPred
using these additfonPl 12 - 6 daYit LST I s • 11
*
*
*
CASERTA--JJ\.NUARY 2 , 1944--Gcneral Cl.Ark left ~
,orrento Rt 1100 a.nd arrived at
his command post two hours later . Shortly there11fter Generr•l Gruenther arrived
from Algiers , and Generals Gruenther and Brann immediately met -•-i th General
Clark to discuss the jnformRtion w'lined by General Gruenther in Algi11rs Pnd its
effect on future operPtio:r1s . A great rector in this discussion WP :" a cable,
R'J' 22218, received at General Clark's commPnd rost this morning PS 11n jnformation copy of n cable from FR'?.EJ"Xlf" to 15th l\rmy Group . This crble, conpletely
to General Clark ' s surprise , radically altered the nunber of crpf't :;ivrilRblc
for SH:f'TGLE and so limited the time when they 1"ere avrilr-ble PS to render re supply P..nd reinforcement of the SHIJJGLE force iT'lpossible . This c~'!._')le re:.=id as
follows :
"At the Tunis conference on 25 December it ''IPS P greed thrt SHIJJGLE could
be undertal,:~n on the follo"dng basis: !,. Thrit nothing should be allowed to
interfere vrith the target d[lte of OV'i:JlLORD or ANVIL. ]2 . ThPt the build- up .
into Corsica should b"l safeguPrded . Q. Thero vms no riuestion of r1r>intenrnce
of tr~ force over the beaches . ]2. There wes no question of A subsequent buildup of the initial force.
�"The following are full details of l"nding craft r>vailability: s_. 1ST.
At the Tunis conference it was decideo thnt 88 WP.S the T1.Rximwn thrt could be
mP.de awiilable. Since then: (1) Doubt hrs arisen r>s to ,~hether 8 of these
will not have to proceed to UK at once to enable the r8fitting progrP.m for
OTIRLORD to be completed. (2) 3 fast LST heve been ordered to return from
India, and it is hoped thr>t they will arrive jn time. Thus in the best case
91 LST will be avajlable e.nd in the worst case 80. In l'my crse, ho1'Tcver, you
should not plnn on more than 95% of the avPilRble LST being service8ble at
the time of the operation. 15 of the 1ST allotted are of the six-drwit type,
and it appears proh-'lble tht>t this will be increased to 16, which is the mnximum possible. ]. LCT. 35 T'!a.rk V and 25 rhrk II, III or IV are expected to
be available and serviceable. Q. LCI(l). A total of 90 are expected to be
aveilable t1nd this figure Plip;ht be increPsed slightly. ]2. LSI(l) 6 and LSI(m)
2.
"It r.mst be clearly understood thrt the LST scheduled for return to UK
must be releA.sed no ln.ter tran 3 Februriry reg,.,rdless of 3HINGLE D day, P lso
that 16 LST must be relen.sed no bter thr-n 3 Febru~ry to be b"ck on the Corsica run by 5 February re-gr.rdless of SIIPJGIE D d11y. Certnin otr"'lr LST must be
released ir.imediately after the Pssault for ov"'lrhriul, Pnd vm AstimPte thP.t tr is ,•sj 11
leave you 6 serviceable LST for ell ms intennnce rurnoses in Italy ;,ftcr D./2. It
is estimated thAt 24 serviceable LCT v:ill be rvailA.ble for all mainten:rnce purposes in Italy after D/2.
11 All above (1 P,Toup corrupt) concernin~ landing craft do not tPke into
account 'battle losses from present time onwards.
"It is emphasized thPt there must be a return to the ngremnents of the
Tunis conference :md if acceptabl~ pl::>ns c::>nnot be drarn on thPt hrisis the
GOCI!JC 15th Army Group must so stPte in orcl.er th::i.t the recoP1nendrition to ce.rry
out SHPTGL.Ti: can be recons5 dered. n
General Gruenther informP.d Gencrrl Clark thPt a Comr.iander-in-Chief 1 s conference nas now being held in Tunis cnncerning th9 mounting of SHINGLE ::>nd ANVIL;
that General Alexander WAS there and vms discuss;ng the avAi]p'l:>ility of shipping
with AdT'liral Cunningham.
General Clr,rk, therefore, dispatched thn fol::!..oninr; cr-ible to G"lncrril ~lexander. RN 8281. "As I stated to yo1 l rhon you rere here several days a.t;o, I am
enthusiastic over outlook for Operation 3HITTGLE provided thnt nece"'sary meAns
are made available. Conditions proscribed in Fr~edom message ??2rn, requiring
release of ell but six 1ST by "'ebru~ry 3rd, ..rill probt->hly rflsult in situ tion
which 'l"'ill :make oy,ern.tion extremel;.r hnzarcous. I urgently request thnt you m11ke
every effort to hold Adequate number of crP.:i"t for SF=:'JGLE 1mtiJ such time "'S
success of the opere.tion is assured.
0
"Vlith the optimum number of LSTS which :vill be avn.ilr>ble the two jnf8ntry
divisions ;vill lPnd vrith grel'ltl;r reduced vehicle strenr;ths. For exnmple, the
British Division will have 1?00 vehicles le~s thrn assr,ult r-c,.los. Ancricrin
Division and all attached surporti11g units both divi"'ions Hil1 be correspondingly
reduced. Corps troops with acequatc trnnsr,ort and eriuipment will be prricticrilly
nonexistent.
1
"Another unfrvorable fa~tor is thnt smPll number of Assault cr11ft will permit lPndin1; only five 4 nfantry h'lttnlions Enrl one ranger h1tt2lion assPult
~
�loaded. Reserve battA.lions w1.ll not be Pble to lrind in assnult crnft. It was
for this reRson thnt I sent you ce.ble 6037 (quoted in yesterday's diary) asking
thP.t l? PdditionPl LSTS with six davits be r1ade avnilRbL. The alternative is
to use LCILS for the reserve units. The NElvy co'Ylsiders this on unsl'!tisfPctory
method in view of lmown beach conditions, and I concur. In spite of these difficulties I have bi,en willing to 12.nd the corps At r(~duced str ,ngth on the assurription thRt ue ·aould be able to retain P reasonRble nunbcr of LSTS for resupply purposes and to trnnsport the necessary v~hicles needed by the ass:rn.lt
forces. Freedom nessage 22218 hr.s ruled out thPt assumption. Minimum nunber
of LSTS 1•rhich must be ret8inod is 20. Ten are needed for Rn indefinite period
for re-supply purposes a.nd. ten for a reriod of t 1To ,,,eeJrs for tr'-"nsportc'ltion of
vehicles. If lJo. vy Hill not remove loading lir1itRtion of 400 tons per LST P.
total of 24 LSTS will be re0uired.
1
"rt is my conccptfon of Oporrtion 3HI1IGLE th;:it vre r-mst coun.t on "'.upplying
by sea for P. minimum period of 15 days rind probebly longer. The 0xr,.,cted location of the Fifth Army 11hen SHIJGLE is lP.unched is such thA.t it is highly improbeble that the two forces rill be able to gain confo ct in less than, thet time.
I intend att1=1c'k in. gre<>test rossible stren<rth in L-i.ri Valley severnl days in
adwmce of SHT'.JGIB ~,fitr the object of draving r1axin.um mmbcr of enemy reserves
to thPt .,.~ront iind fixing then therP-. In thrt vm.;r and in thPt way only CB.n the
SHFJGLB Force exercise a decisive influence in the operPtion to carture Rome.
11 If r~y idea of the opern.tion is sound it is essentiol that ··,c make rrovision to re-surPly the force ?S indicrted above. rry estimntc of ?O LSTS makes
no allonance f'or craft to rrovide a build-up although it :is quitr-; conceiwible
thPt the ener-iy situntion mP.y mPke thl'lt <>ction necessary.
"Present estirr£tte is th~.t D Day will be Jrmwiry 25, Although T Pm making
ever:r effort to adv"ncc thet sevoral days."
Gener.:>l ClR.rk felt th'1t he was genu:inely e1'1~er to engrige in SHH-TGLF:, to
\
the point of' committing in it units -hich he rroulrl suhsequently hnve to utiJ.:ize
in K~NIL, but thrt, in effect, a. pistol was being held Pt his head becruse he
was told, totally t0 hj" SW'prise, thrt if he wns to engage in '3HINGLE it must
be done '"ith inadequate craft, thet the craft ,..ould be ev<>ilable for only two
de.ys after the l.nndini:; rnrl thPt no re-supr,ly or rr~inforcement thereafter i7ould
be awiil2.ble. In effect, therefore, he WPS Psi:0d to land two divisions et a
point where a junction vith the h=iln.nce of Fifth Army was impossible for e
)
long period, thereby leavinr-; tho t,ro di visions :i.n question out on a very long
limb.
L
r2
Later in the afternoon Generr:tl IfoCreery called on General Clar}!- Pnd discussed the f'uture operations of 10 Corps. He also spoke of P conversation he
recently had had vdth the General Co·1m~n.ding the 5th British Division, "hich
is About to become part of the Fifth Army, and in particular rbout thrt officer's comment concerning the caswltics of thrit Division. Gener'l.1 ncCreery )
was struck by the comparativ~ly trifling c.nsualties vrhich h...,rl been suffered
and by the light chPracter of the fightinp; on the Eighth Army front which this /
indfoated.
The follovrjn~ cnblo was srmt to VI Corps rind the Fr~mch Exy-,"Jditiom1r;7 Corrs
todr-i.y. rm 6051. 11 Effective 031200 JanuPry French r.:xpca~tionary Corps riill relieve VI Corps find CG, F~C wi11 assur::1c coriT1r-ind of present VI Corre sector n.nd
�..5
responsibility for current ~ission of VI Corps.
"Assignmr,nts rnd 'ltt::ichmrmts ncntioned in Fifth ~rmy letter, AG file
11 Troops rrssignrnents ,nd PttPclir1<>nts1t
become effective 031200 J::,nuRry 19f+/h
322 .1-Y dated 2 J,r,.nunry 19M+, "'Ubj0ct
11 VI
Corps ·vill reconnoiter the flre::i uest of I\VsRSA-HAILES rord 2n south of
10 Corns reAr boundrir;r for bivoun.c are;:-~ f'or Corr-~ CI' n.nrl Corps Troops. Areris
selected will be clearoa ~i th G-3 Pnd G-4 this her'dqurrtors , ·ho will arrringe
contact"' rith FBS ''Ih~re necessary.
"Effective 040001A January, 3d Infrntry Jivision ,.,nd rtfrch d 441st AAA
A'"l Bn rnd 601st TD Bn is ntto.ch~d VI Corps."
*
*
CASTillTA--JANUl\RY 3, 1944--Gen"'rn l Clerk tod::,y confl"lrrod j n the morning concerninf, pmnin,:,- operAtiori.s with Gcm~r"l J:9yes, Gen0r"l Gruenthrr, GPner~l Brrinn
nnd G~n9r::i_l L9mnitzer. Gent'lr~l Keyes r>nd Gener~l L'jrnnitzer st~y"'d for lunch.
In the pfternoon G9nOr"l LuCPfl cnr,c rind r1 jccuased J.j_s rrorosGn rll"n for the
rount. nP, of SHIITGLr.;.
On Jrinm1 ry 1st, by
Gen"'r:' 1 Pattnn =rs relieved)
fron cor1mf'nd of the 3cve'1th ArT"ly, r>nr Gcn9r~1 C1,,rv:: "'PS r,l2c..,d in comm"nd of
it, in arldition to his cor,"lnnd of t}1e Fifth Army. The di:' y "f11'm h0 ,,;ould lay
do 11m c6mnc'nc1 of the Fifth Army was left to 0ir> cleterrrdn.,,tion. Fart of the
Seventh Army PlPnning Staff vr:'s r>lreaily on the wr,ter on its "'A.Y to Alfti-rs <>nd
the Chief of StRff, Seventh Army was on his w>y to confer vi th G ,neri= 1 Clrr1r.
The Grin~rrl I s int,,ntion vras to send Gemr,r il Brann ir:1I1cdirtely to Alir' ers to
take charf{e o+' the I'lo.nninr, Grour anrl rt n:r eArly <lat9 he rropos9d to set ur
his Army HePJ'l.quartcrs in Itn ly, ro· sibly nt Salerno, derending uron b ce of
mountini; and tr" inint:; for A'nfIL. It would be di f'f'5 cult for him to retain
more them ri few li::(ly reorle from his rresent sbff, - tentPtivcly his four G's
and bis Sip;ml Of'fj cer, rr~ th & fc ,r junior officers "no, of course, his Chfof
of Staff. The nio11nti:>1a of ANVIL vmulc'I be mr-de by four American Jjvisions
and five or six -'rench Divisions. The /1.nericP..n Divisions would l110k>" the initifll 0ssault, and the rench Divisions tb..,n come in. The GenerAl is seeking
to get nn airborne division in arldition 11.nd is seeking nn a.ppropriate Air Commander .
0
At noon today GenerRl Lucas rcl:i.nquished comMand of the sector in ,•·hich
VI Corps had been oper~ting, and Generel Juin 1 s CEF took over the com.~and of
the 2nd Norocctm Division rind the 45th Division. The 7th R.T.n. of the 3rd
AlgeriPn hRd already start0d thc relief of tho 179th Inf,-,ntr;'{. GenerPl Lucas,
following a ceremonial relief by Gennr.11 Juin at Prata, caml'! to t:be confero.nce
with GenerPl ClRrk ri ✓ ntfoned r-bove rinc1 tr"•n '7ent on to set up his new HePdquarters at f"addaloni.
The Prmy Co"1mrmder received r- cable f'rom G0nernl Alexanrler, !RN, stPting
that General Alexander trill arrive Cap()dichino at 1130 to"':lorrow r>nr' plP.ns to
return to B::iri th0 samn Pftr:?rnoon, 11nd 1-rill hPV3 ffcrty of' four.
The fol lo"ri ni:s excerpt is f'lade of Cosi tintrop Ll78 frori 15th Arrriy Group,
�RN o . 848 :
"Fifth P,rmy French ~x:reditionrry r:orps (FBC) CF open".ld Prata Hl614 at
031::>00A hours . Relieved VI Corps . CG FEC ass11mnd comrr,"nd rresent VI Corps
Sector a!lo resron::::ibilH;r for current m.i'>sion 0f VI Corps . 3 Al!'.;erinn Div
movement to 45 Div Ar~P continues . Relief of 179 Inf :in are& Fl4,?6 by 7
.Alger Inf started todey. 2 1 'oroc Djv. r;e,,,thnr li~jt~d operf!tions . Security
patroll5_np;. 4 Div Sno'" ext,r-;rie cold "'nr' rurrg,,0 t11rrrin hl=impering r>dv<>nce 180
Inf Patrols located enemy in Acquafondola H05?6. Ene!'ly still holding at
G9727 9725 . II Co1'J)s . 1/i.2 Inf security ratrols only. No contact TFA strong
combP.t patrols to G9L,16 - g515 met hewvy enemy resistt:>nce . 1 Armel Div less
Hq One Corbot Comnand relieved nttrichl"lent II Corps 020001A hours reverted to
Fifth Army Control. Povinp; vicinity Aqul'llirmo 1'Jl357. X Corrs . 56 Div. 168
Bde to M8798 found enemy. I'r.trol to bridge M 8594 niade no contact . Army 'I'f'S.
3 US Div less 15 Inf' reverteo to /irmy Con+,rol ::>921401\ Decl"):riber now closed in
Area 2 rTiles T-Torth of Pozzuoli NlOL.6 . ~i.fth Army cr>sualtiAs to 1 Jan. Ameri can killed 2673 wounded 11010 r1issinP, '3366 . British killed 1682 ~rounded 7112
missing 2884 . Fr -nch 1-::illed ?28 wounded 144g missing 89 . n: by Ari.ericnns
2g95 . British 1686. French 118 . 11
*
*
CASERTA --JA~-lU~RY 4, 19l+L:---This morning G'"'n""rRl Gl2rk l"P.cejv~d calls from Brigcdier G"mor11l Sr•;1bridge, G- 1, A'.'Iq , rnd Brigadier Genernl Arthur Hilson , Comm""nd:ing ,13s.
Tith Gener[il Srivrbridge he oiscussed the transfer of certnin rersonnel
from Fi.r>th Arrny to Seventh Arr1y a:111 also the riuestions ;:,risinp; out of' certP in
Legion nf T<irit 8 .,,,rds . JIG took up vr>rious ~upply problems in his ciocussion
with GAnPrPl il3on . Shortly b~fore noon J::,e held 11 mr-,etinP ~t th"" hut Pt
which tb~ro "'ere present Generr>l Luca" , G,~ncrr-1 GruP.nthP.r , Ac1r,irel Lo'"rry, Captain Le...,ds , Generc>l Truscott , Genf:'lral Brr>.nn and vnrious st<iff officers . Ge-neral Cl,,,rk stAtcd thr-t he '.7PS e-,rpectin?, P visit "'roT'l Gon'"ral Alexo.nder j_n A few
minutes "nd th"'t the pre3c-,it mr~etine hr-d been cRlled r-s ~ preliminnry to the
w:iet5.np- with GAneral Alex;:,nder . T-fe r1entioned the :mrpri~c •ri th vrhich he hPd
received the message from <\FHQ (mr 2?;::>18 , quoted jn the dir->ry of Jf!nunry ?nd)
r,lacinrr l:i r-d to.tions on th8 "mount of crest 11 VPilP bl': for SHINGLE and on the
tir,e ,rhen the crPft ' ere awil,,ble could b"; US"'}c1 , Pnd stc t8d th['t under tho
c0nditions of this messe.ee re-SUT'Pl:V r>nd rei f'orcerl\ent vras imross:ible . After
1
sone a; sc;1ssion of v::irious c et:clilP , the G~ner"l 1mr,1T'l11rizcd his nosition '"'S follows: "'"19 are supposed to go ur tbere , r1 ump t•."o di visions P shore '<ri th V.'hrt
corps troops we C<'.n s~t ~ n, with r1 n indeterr1j na to nunber of craft without re suprly or reinforccT1cnt, and 1"[\i t for the rest cf the Arm:r to ;join up . n He
then adned , 11 I am trying to find wPys to do it , not -rpys in which "''e con not
do it . I ari convinced that -re r> re r;oing to do it, P n,1 thn t it -i s going to be
a success . n
The P s ser:ibled o:f'fj cers left uron the r rri vr l of G0nern 1 Alex~11.der , ,·,ho
cemc with I"ajor G~nr:rR.l Rich.i:;rc'lson :::>nd Lt. Gen . HPrcl:i ng. Gen°rPl Robr:,rtson
also came , a.nd these officers , ·rith Gencrl"l Grur.;nth,r E>nd G")nerrl Brnnn, discussed operntion rmI:TGLE .
1
General Cll"rk statPd to (km~rnl J\lexP.nder thl'lt th"} messae;e RN 2;)218, had
corie P s r' cor,plete ourpri se n11d shoc1· to him, as no pr~vi ou'"> suggestion from
General Ale7ander had rdnted at the linitrtions of riv,ilnb1e shipping ~1hich
this nessage imposed . Gencr::i.l Clnr}r stnterl to General /\.lexrmder 1 s surprise
/
�thPt he , General Clark, had l'.11o"rn for three '"eeks th"t he hNl b0en selected to
cormFind 11 1 1VIL and new~rthcles-:: , ,lesrite J,-,is nrtur2l interest jn conserving
force for thrt blow , he r<1d "c'lnt.busiristjcnll:r ,nter d into C-:HI'mLF. rlP.nning and
hPd nronosed to nut his 1JI Corps staff "nd .bis 3rd Infrntry Division , t",o of
his fin~st rin;J T"!~st useful orgr>nizatio·'ls , ~ :nto the SVPTGI:~ Operl'ltior, ,=hicr 'WS
one of c0ns::.dereble hazard in ,·:hich t.beir usefulness f'or .11.TIVIL nip;ht be considerably iripnircd . Gener;il Cl['rk furtblr ,tr>ted to Gennr"l AlexPnder thet he
W"'S fully deter:riined on p-oi>-1g into jHr'GLE end puttinr, fortl1 evcr-::,r effort to
rna1,:e it n. success , but it could not be done nitl1out tro cr;of't, originally Agreed
on . Gen"rnl Almmnr1er then unrlertook to drn'·' r c.--ble to the Fril"le f'inister
exnlE1inin1:,- tho. rer.Jnisites of srirr:inr.; for the successful confuct of r.;IUNGLE and
had a difficult tin<:'! vi th the fr cts "nd figures unt:i. l G"!n<lrf' 1 Clnr], "'Ufplied
him .,j th P copy of' cnble P.H 8?81 of Jl'lnw ry ?nd (quoted in thcit dey ' n diriry)
~•rhich General Ale-v:r-inder hRd hrc1 for tno dP;TS . GenerP l t lext1nrl~r , r0c0gnizing
th,.,t all th0 n9cessrry datr. wa" contain,.,cl in Gen0rril Cli=irk 1 s c11ble , c'lrew a
cab] e o,.. his m;ri tr, the Prime r~inister ndortinr; the subst1mce of' Gnnerfl l
mm cable .
lo
,l
0
1
(J
G
C
Gr-meral ClE<r1'- tcld Generrl Alemnrler th::-t he rroposed to continue plflnning
for 3HI rm,s onrl , cs 8 rossih1e c lternntiv8, 1rP.cp in riinrl r shorter ~nd run just
north of Gaete Ioint to be pi<:rforned with one djvision only. However , G0nerr-il
Cl..,rk further strted thrt in his estiMPtion :lt "TPS thP- ('unction of G<>n,,rrl
Alexander to determine v;hother the number of Gern;:in Divisions prepPred to oppose tr1e lrirdinR; in 3HHTGLB ',ms too grer>t to per>"~-t r succcss,,.ul or'"rr tion Pnd
that hr-i , G<>ner8l ClnrJ:, dic1 not rropose to rrirc-~ this question ::,ny further . He
poj.nted out to GrmerRl Alexander thrt he understooc" thc-t the '.)qth P;inzer Gr0nr> dier Regj ment hPd just be(m noV!3d by the German cor,mand from the Fifth Army
front to a position near Rome , •7hich n,dded rll.oth~r division to those in rosition to oprose the opr,ratfon under discussion. G"!n9rnl AlexrindP-r anc'l the throe
officers riccomrnnying hin then left the cor.in;ind post by cub for Crpodi.chino
airport nnd returnod by plP..ne to B2ri.
/
\
GencrPl Cle.rk ,,.elt thPt l't tho :nr:ietinr with the Prime I'fj nistqr in Tunis
on Christnas D;:iy -·hen Gnneral Eisenhormr , Gener11l Alexander anc'l others \7ere
I
present , the Trime f'in:: ster had been :Lnrpircd --Ji th a desire to CPfture Rorie and
bad determj ned thr>t 'HI'TGLS v;ould ta ·e plrice , Pnd GeniJra 1 Sisenho·· er "nd G0ne - 1
rel Alexand0r , ·ritrout detn:tled l:nomledge of the rro½l9l7!S involver , had r-greed /
to it . n'1fortunrtely, in General Clrirk 1 s estimation, none of those rrho thus
lip;ht hcartedly de c id.ed on tho SH:nTGLE Operation understood the detPils of shippj_ng end of loar'linf'" nl'"Jcessary to rut rshore the requisite .,,.orce 2nd nri"ntain
it when once Pshore . The Genornl felt thrt G0n,,ral Alexnnder, even ,oft0r re ceiving GnnerPl ClPrk ' s 7JT 8?81, still did not n.rrr0.cirte the re,1uisites f'or a
successful oper:=i,tion auch as SPIJ-TGL'"' , Pnd h11 had been hamper0d rt a Comm~:inder in- Chief 1 s con:'ercnce ulth Admiral Clmn:inp.;hPm on Janur>ry 0 nd by this lr>ck of
informRtion.
Gener8,l ClBrk felt thr-t ,•rhcn Gen(1r;:a 1 ft lexnnder hPd b0tm br,clly dis.s.prointed
1
at not gettinP' the 1•"'n.iterrPnean CoJ11Jnand , vice Grmer, 1 EisenhoT'T(')r , Pnd at not
being selected to fo l low G'.mcr a l ~isenho"er to UK for a. comriand there , the
Frir,e Hinistcr had ->ttcmpted to sr,othe his feelings by p,-j ving h:i.m the high
s01mding ,,mt somevrhat empty title of Cor:imnnr1er- in- Chicf , Itrly, Bnd b;v ~iving
him Lt. Gr:m . Harc1 ing as his Chief of :3taff , to G0neral Harding ' " oiseppoint ment cs he hrd hopcn to cor~111and his Corps jn OVT'JtLo-qn . ~lith tJ-,'3se other conc essions , the Prime r'inister kd 2lso , in Gener al Cbrk ' s estil"lr-tion, given
l
�General Alexn.nder P'"rmission to riount Ororntion ~HI TGLE vrithout proper consideration of the f,,ctors imrolvnd in the or'"rf1tion. The r,ritter 1c'as rendered
more coJTJplex hy th~ fRct tr.Pst the crr-"t of ·7J-•:Ich the FriMe ' 1inister -r:1 s disposinr, "ere in large rrJeasure American ere ,...t And r>ot subj net to his control. _,,
This evening P now phr,sc of the Fi th Army attn k "ms jnstitut'3d nhen
the 3/+th Division, the Speci"ll Service Force rn~ th(') t)th ~rmorr:id Division
pushed forvm.rrl. By thA close of the d<>y our troops ·;ere in S<Jn Vittore nhere
street fi~hting hed occurred. Some -.,iw,nces hrd been r1c-ide on the M gh gr01md
to the northeast.
General Clark today rlispatchnd the follo 1'linr cr)blc to crrc, JFH'.}. RN
R37?. 11 1. Decision by r,L I'130 precludes the loacing of cr.>rgo sJ-,ipr.ing at
Fantaloon "or Operation SHil GI.E e:rcert for fPrt of shirrfog to :'3.ccorn.p.?ny assault convoy. This ruling nn.de because loading of ar'ditional shippi11.g would
interfere rith rlrmned incorrtng tonnPr;es throui::h fort of f rnt.<:iloon.
?. Contemplate loading 4 fjtt~d Libcrtfos v7ith British Pnd Am~ricrm
Ground Force Stores r,ric. 1 Cor-:ister .,..d.th Air Force supplies rt Fnntnloon because of the selective loading required anc because of non-avPilBbility of
certain supplies in !forth Africa.
11
3.
'ill require 8 Fitted Liberty Ships eAch to he sprerirl loaded TTith
BritisJ:, and Americn.n Ground Force supplies l'lnd ? Co9sters to be lof-1.ded with
Air Force supplies in P 1forth A""ricPn Port or Forts cesignated by you. Am
pr':lparecl to. Sl'!nd rGpresl'mtr,tjves ..,ith reriuisitions to 30S IJATCUSA and AFRQ
(British And TQI"'s to fort or I-orts of lonning.
11
"Li-. It is required th-it four fitt"d Liberties rncl 1 CoPster loaded in
North Africa a.rrive Pantaloon not later than ?3 Janwry and the brilanc" of 4
Liberties and l Coaster to arrive Pentaloon not ln.ter thnn 1 Febru,.,ry.
5. Request thA.t the Liberty 8hi:rs anr Corister be Ylomin..-ted n_nd port
or rorts of loadh1g be designrited. forts selected f1ust be carabl•~ of lo::iding
British rnc American supplies on the sr>me ship. Also re~uest deadline drtes
for arrival in North Africa of reriuisitio11.s rnd representPtives.
11
11
6.
New subject:
Rerpv~st eXPrrdn1:1tion of Pdequ"'CY of stocks to be loaded
on above shipping in t,rorth Africa for brilance supplying for ?O dAys of 1 Am1-,ricn.n , nd 1 Britisl Division uith supporti.n~ troops Fith particulr>r ref19rence to
0
ammunition of following calibe rs:
British TyJ)es 5~ 511 G,m,
4. 5 Gun, ?; po1.L.'1der, l '7 pounder, 25 pounder,
3 11 nortar.
Arnericr>n Types:
75 mm Gun
3'1 Gun
105mm Tfovri tzer, ft-2
155mm irowitzer, fi'-1
155mm G,m, M-1
57mm i\nti-t~ink Gun
L~. 2 11 r 7ortn.r 11
�9
CASERTA--,TATTTTARY 5, 194L~--GeMr<>l Clnr 1{ re!7lainl')d at his cori:'lanrl post throughout th'-' day, stuc'vinrr, rlans for Opelr"tio11 s SHriGLE nnd A'TTJIL. ,7ork-i'1IT to fi.nd
the nece"'sarv nunb~r of cr:i.ft for Operr>tion "HrrGIE, Gener:--1 Alexander sent a
radio messaP"l'l to Gl'!nP.ral Clrrv, IHI 533 , telling h"m th"t he i"' pressing Trime
T-'inister Churchill (By prl'l-errRnr;ement, the lril'1~ T~inister wes referred to :in
this e.nd subse1mmt messr>ges as "Colon.el \r:=trdcn") very hPrd to get ur the necessary craft wanted for the expedition, and Us maintenrince . Gener,, 1 Alex::inder in-l"ormed Genernl r:lark thrt he hri.d suggestr-d r,oin~ by air to see the
Prime l~inister Pnd asked thl'lt Genernl Clrrk be reridv to s~nd nn 8dequ.-.,te small
st11ff , both i:\rmy and N11vy , armec1 with full plrin Rnd lording tabl.-,s in simple
form so they can be expl11.ined to I'r. Churchill.
During the nfternoon Gnnerr>l Alexander rgrin rt">dioed Generrsl C1Frk, R~r
n. t'.'Jlegrrim -l"rom rrirne '1inister Churchill 1hicr indicates that .re r,r,y get thl"l crr.r-t re quired . He c sked Gener£1l Clark
to nle?s~ continu~ to plan Opcrfl.tion "FJ"GLE on th·~ nss,;mption throt r full
amount of craft uill b~ avn.ila½l" • He ask~d Gener'"'l Clnrk to fly his spec:ial,
small SHrTGLE staff to r'Rrrrikech, rhere "Colonel V
iard.en" is now staying . General Clark then issu~d instructio.,,.s to his Chief of St, ff to hPV" a smP 11 group
of o-"f~_cers alerted for t,~e journe;r. A rrelin5n,"'ry discussion by the staff
with Gener 1 Alexandor will be held Janu'c'ry 7th in 'arrakech, e.nd then the ma:in
conference vith the Prime t'inister ,!!ill be held the following day.
:'A/9~6, telling him thnt he had rccei ved
0
In A.nswer to GcnerRl C1Pr1,. 1 s cable of yest~rda.y, //8372 (quoted in yesterday ' s diPry) , l\."'FT:1 todn;r instructed FLf I"BO R ,J 23997 , to fly to Algiers immediate ly a r-"presentriti ve ,,,1.tr r8quic;i tion.s for th8 r.:ooo s of both ground 1'1.nd air,
British anrl American, needed to lrn:>c1 the 8 Liberty ships rind the 2 Consters in
North AfricPn ports . ',pott-in.p: P"ld loading 'ere to connence at once, Pnd officers · 1ere to be sent to arl.vise on loadj -rig methods .
Anoth~r cr>bl0 receiv:~d f'rol"! Ali;iers, R'J 23999 , in reference to GenerPl
ClPrk 's ;18372, Psks an urgent reply from 15th Army Group PS to vrhethAr or not
the Comrnn:ider of the 8th A··phibious Force (Admiral Lorrry) h2.s Rgrecd to trike
cars::;o ships in on the assault or if they nre to be in t}·e iIDI'lcdiPte follo :-up.
Gcnerril r.ruenthr,r indic,,t0d on a notJ on tris messaw~ thr-t the Connrin er of the
8th Ar1phihious Force 1111d ~greed to ta. 1re the shirs in on the nsseult .
0
In the evenine n~nerRl ClPrk ha.cl rs his dj n•1er rue st r:iss Pnrge.ret Bourke
White, the f'n.mous woman photogrApher . She h~ s 1),->,en t:oJ,:ine pictm·es for LIFE
r~agazine along the Fifth .Arn;r front . She discussed her imrressions of fight inp; j n the Fj_fth Army sector ancl sr·id tkt sre, , rbo hPd been r-in eXDornmt of the
tough life of the Air Corp'"' , h2rl learned from watch:i n1 vround troors how really
tough war can be . General Levd s was nlso £J P,Uest .
Other important messo.ges of the da7 ,·ere as follo.,s:
For General Alexander ' s (')yes only from Clr>rk . R 1J 6203 . 11 A group of two
Army Rnd one NavPl officer has been set up to accompany you to see Colonel
Wardrm. I trust thnt the mettAr ,n1 be settl~d firmly within next 4g hours . 11
To crrc from Cln.r}'- reference your 23499 BIGOT . RH l:,215 . 11 Airborne divi·sions should b<3 orr;anized with three rarachute regir,~ntc1l combet terns 1rnd no
glider reginent . Irt vievr of nrture of Oneration MI'TIL, I con ·ider it essential
that airborne division l'.!ontain some battle-trained airborne el..,'1lent"' , 13.nd I
�l()
again urgentl y recomri~nd th<1.t 50/..th RCT remr in here to c onstitute nucl"'us
a.round which to build new airborne combnt terns to be brought f'rom United
Stnte'"' .
Your directive to rne for Operntion AFVIL indic2tes two airborne RCTs
will be rvailablP- in addition to four TJ . S . infantry divisions . I am count ing on four infr>ntry di visions . If I am forced to choose betvmen the fourt h
infantry division and an s.irborne division , I definitely VTPnt the infnntry
division . In that event :tt would be inperative thrit the 504th RCT be re t ained here "-l.nd th, t rt least one additionr.l prrachut e RCT be brought from
United St ates ."
11
*
*
*
CASERTA --JANUA.RY 6, 1944-- This morning at 0900 Genr--ral Clr>r], c111led e moet ing of officers prelirriinrry to the cl eparture of the Sm" 11 str ff wi..ich vm s
to discuss 3HHTGLE with Generr,l Alexa.nc1er nnd Col onel Vhro.en . The meeting
was held at the G~ner1:il 1 s conference hut , and thP,re "ere present , be'3:ides
Genernl Clark, General Gruenth~r , Admirnl Lowry , Gcnerr>.l Luc3s , Genera l
Brann, Cay,t ain Lewis , TTSTJ, Colonel T;,te , Col onel Hill , Col onel 11illiPms Pnd
Lt . Col. O' Neill. GenerR l Glark told tJ-,e o"'ficers thrt when Gemral Alexander vms present he , (}enernl Clar1-::, had insi sted thPt he needed a l'linimum
of ?.L. LSTS aft er t he Assault , 14 for n.n indefinite per; od 1rnc1 10 for rit
least 15 days . These ·!ere needed for ri build- up in troors and r1nteriel.
En snio that +.he o"'ficers who wer e 1soin~ to the conf'erence must stick to
their figu:t' As in the conference ''Ti th the Fd.me i':inister r>1c'1 not be ca jolcd ·
into retrenting "rom them, as the de c ision must he ,.,rrived rt bn.sed on the
a ctual meds . The GcnerPl said thrit the Fresident Pnd the Combined Chiefs
of Staff ,·,ere hcsitPnt to t~ke any ster Til~foh M:i f:;ht i rip~ril A~ IL and OVER LORD , v1hile the I-rime l!inister felt t hnt it vas c1 es:i.rPble to toke Rome at
almost any c ost . GenerPl Clark: rereatea thPt it wAs r'lso necessary to appraj_s" the i:memy situ.,ntion at the b.st no!'l'mt to detArmine -rhether enemy
build- up was too large to be overcome .
Admiral Lowry stA.t~,:i th;:it the necessary cr:1f't, for SITIITGLE must start
at once :for this area - that it .,..rould be impos3:ible to \"'ait +'or Fl conference
on the ,qth 7lith Col onel 'larden , a de c ision on tl e 10th rnc'l then stPrt the
craft . Gcnf'!rP l Clnr'l{: str>ted thr>t th0re nust be n T::iv['l of-f'ic~r ct the conference , and Admiral Lowry stated thA.t CPptain Le"1is was needed hero for
planni nr; ,·,ork. I-T owr'v'3r , it was decided that Ce.ptR fo Le'7i 'J could go to Algi P-rs ,
trlk over the situntio11 ,·rith Capt-in Olds , of /\.dmiral rr~,~itt 1 s stPff , and
Captain Olds could then ~o on to the c0n:"'er'1nce nnri exple in th,q situr tion ,
while Captain Lewis return9d to Feedqunrters Fifth Army.
0
Colonel Tate reported th:=•t the rroblem of loadinr; Liberty shirs ve_s well
in hand . Generel ClRrk then asked Lt . Col. O' Neill whrt his ri:nswer vrould be
if he ,,,ere asked why ~4 LCT3 would not do as Fell as LSTS for re- supply.
Co l onel O' Neill j mmedfo.tely saF thrit t1'e Pnmvcr "ould be that rn 1ST rnuld
hold 36 trucks and an LCT ·rould hold 8 , a11d Goncrr l ClPrk r~minded him ag"in
t het tr~ fnctors of weather , spel"d rn,.d turnrround of th~ different vessels
were also important . Genernl Cl..,rk rcrent<;d th!'t the o"ficers v1'o go to the
con:ference should mrike it vorv cler-r thrit uithout th"l 24 LSTS thP, oper2tion
was not feasible; thPt Fore it frrrossibl'-' to rrocure them , 1-ic could try the
landing just north of Griet::i Tith one division , if his staff found i t ro"'sible .
�l\
Colonel Tate then cor;1mented on the fr,ct thrt the roRr1 net to Gaeta was
hazardous , as it could be easily blocked by demolitions .
As the General ' s plri_ne , piloted hy Captain 0 1 Neill , was waiting at Capo dichino to take off Ht 1100, the conference broke up shortly rifter 1000 , and
Captain Lewis , Colonels Hil l and WilliPms and Lt . Col . O' Neill , who were the
Fifth Army representatives , left for Capodichino and North A.fr ice. .
GEmeral Clark spent the rest of the dEJY studying preliminary drafts of
plans for SHINGLE and f ~TVIL .
In the evening General Olrrk entertained Pt dinner Colonel Mickelwait ,
Co l onel l,jndner , Colonel Saltzman and Lt . Col. Porter . At about 2200 G- 3
reported thrit a II Corps message rmnounced th1=1t tho vill<>ge of Srm Vittore
had been cleared of the enemy.
The following
j
mportr•nt messages vrere received rincl dispatcht")d today:
Person8l for Clark from Alexander . RN MA./973 . "I hPve received follow ing sign;::il from Chief of Combined Operations . ' try directive a.s CCO includes
the study of the tactic.?l rnd technicGl prohlmris of amphibious opertions Find
advice to the Chiefs of St aff . This cPnnot be done from 1:ifhi tehall Pnd re quires my stAff to keep in dir e ct touch with operat:i.ons . Therefore wbile
realizing thrt spe ctators are usually a nuis11nce , I rr9quest your 8pprow:s 1
for Co l onel Langley and Commander Scott Miller of COE!'.~ to ,',itness operetion
SHil'TGLE , including fina l rehearsals if possible in SNOL or HQ ships . Gener a l Yiil son has aprroved this request. If you concur request joining instructions . They wo11ld of course be avnil,.,bl e for nny duties you nm.y require . 1 I
hA.ve ccmcurred Pnd ~ nstruct,~d these represente.tives to report direct to you . 11
Patton t o Clark. RN 822 . trif agreeabh t o you , desire visit your Head quarters Prrivinp; Pt Capodichino airport 1000 SRturday, Jan11c-iry 8 . 11
Per sonal to Patton from Clark. RH 8482 . "Delighted to see you S:1turday.
Car will meet you a t time P.nd plac e specified . 11
Gruenther from Hill . RN 2/+899. "After talk with Rooks and Lenis , best
estima.te SHP1GLE i s off as additional IBTS are not available . tr
*
*
*
CASERTA--JANUARY 7 , 1944--The situation alo_ g the front , particularly in the
n
area between Highway //6 and I?ilignano continu3d to go well today, with cle ments of the Special Service Force occupying t'tount Majo , one of their principal objectives . Dbvm by Highway //:6 the 135th Infantry Regiment of the 36th
Division continued to move forwarc'l t,,.,yond San Vittoro, and the Fifth Army now
holds the crest and tbe south and en.stern slopes of Mount PorchiP , one of
the principal land blisters l ying in the Liri Velley just south of Cassino .
The fighting continu"ld to be extr emely bitter , P.nd the Germ"'m:1 Aro put ting up
exceptionP lly stiff resist ance . The Gerrnens countcr-Att Pcked Porchia last
night , us i ng artillery and nort2.r fire , but the Attack failed . A drive hris
also been started for r~o1-mt Chiaia , north of San Vittore , And it has progressed
well despit e heavy machin('J gun and rifle fire from the slopes of this vita.l
�hill. In generrl, curing the pst two dry::i, hePvy losses hrive been jnflicted
on the enemy, P..nd nPny prisoners hPve boen t.,.,ken. Mount Chiaia shoulrl fall
to us tomorrow.
GPncrrl Cbrk received ,,err,_ early tr·:is 1orninp; th·· t Lt. Gen. G:-,orge latton,
former Cor1mnnn.er of the 3ev"nth Army, would visit him tomorrow. Generals Clark
and Patton nill discuss Sev-:inth Army IIeri.dquPrt".'lro ersonriel.
G··m~ral FarI'!on, Commander of the 1st Arr,or"d 1Jivision, conferrer during
tbe dn.y with Generr>l Clrirk concern::ine po,-;sible enrloyr,..,nt of armored forces in
the progress of the Fifth Arny attack up Route '/6. Some arnored elements A.re
already fighting in the San Vittore, '.cunt Iorchia, flaunt Ch:i.aia region and as
17e progress farthP.r up tbe Liri Valley, there "Till be r: chance to use some armor, but this j_s cerendent, to some e:rt~nt, upon th1; vreath~r. TJnlcss we h ... ve
a long dry p•iriod, and sun a11d wind to dry 0 11t the muddy f'ields, the use of
tanks will be restrict ,d since th~ir r,ovemcnt will be con: inecl to roads. General HBrmon told General Cb.rlr th11t he was most eager to commit as much of the
1st Armored as possible into combat. The 6th Armored Inf'antry Regiment is Already fightino-, but the tank groups have not been cbl~, As yet, to go into full
STTing.
The speciel VI Corps Plannin~ Group, under Gen~r"l Lu,~t>s, is ~oinr, ahead
with detrils of Operation '3HITTGLE. The Fifth Army group thrt Generril Clrrk
sent back to f, fric1:1 so jt could pnrticipete in discussions with Gener11l Alexander, th"n v1ith rririe Yj_nister Churchill, T•ras due in Marrakech this r:iorning.
General Clerk is eagerly avaiting word from this group as to "hether or not the
necessary number of lA.nding crR-ft vdl1 be availPblc. Genl"lral Cl11rk reccivl')d
todav a rlirective to the Naval CoF1mander of Operation SHIFGLE. It names Admiral
F. J. Lowry e.s the 'Tavril Corn1'1ander of t:bc SHINGLE Task Force.
As his mHin dinner P,Ul':'!st GenerP.1 Cbrlr had Colonel SullivPn, Army nuarternaster, vrho is celebrating his 50th birthd1:1y. Alto8ethcr the Generr-il had
seven guests.
General Cl<irk dispatched the follm1ing Cflbl<J to Generr,l Alexander tocl8y.
R°t\J 6?67. 11 As part of main land attack by Fifth Army, 10 Corps wi 11 cross
Ggrigliano on 17 ,Tenuary, s~cure Uinturno area and attA.ck north toward S Giorgio
nith h!O rlivisions. Important T'ert of Uis plan is smrill amrhibious operation
to carturc area Ponte Scauri (rnl,.94) with three Corimrndos Pnrl to secure beachhead just north of Garigliano ·7ith infHntry force. Tan}::s And supporting erris
will, if practicA.ble, be l,:,nded on this bench same night. me val bonbPrdrncnt
will be required.
"Frovisional estimate of craft a.fter ex11P1ir>.Ption of operation with FO'HT
is tvo LSI (1:1) tvumty LOTS and thr~e LSTS with six dr-ivits. If Oreration SI"DJGLE
takes place it ,·rill not be practicrble to P.llot more thnn three or four LOTS
to the Scauri operfltion. However, it is desirable that detailed rlnnning be
ini tinted so that plan may be executed on short notice in event SHINGLE should
be cancelled.
"Request you errange v:i. th c:n,JC nl'!ed for allotnent of necessary crPft 11.nd
bomb<i.rding force both to be avrile,ble until end of Jrnu;:,ry in case of' bad weather. Full requircnents of croft and bnmbarding force vrill be sent by FO~'iIT
�after detailed planning completed.
F \iIT concurs in this message.
Planning for Operation SHTHGI.E progressinp; well.
operation will not interfere with SFPIGLE. 11
11
*
*
F lPnning for Scauri
*
CASERTA--JAi:TTJt\.RY 8, 19/+4--0p~ration 3HINGT.E is onl This word wris received
this morning from r~arrakech. At least ?.5 LSTS will be avr ilr:lble for the follow-up, thus assuring an opporbmit:,r -"or re-supply and the bringing in of
supporting corps troops. The '"10rd fron Parrakech alno in.eluded a declPration that January 20th is the target drtte thrt I rime f,'.inister Churchill desires.
General Patton visitAd Gcnernl Cl,,rk this morning and cliscussed with
General Clark the division of Fifth Army and Seventh Army staffs. General
Patton declAred that his Seventh Army staff vm.s a fine one, and he gave G!'lnerPl Clar1':: a number of documents sho7inr; that h~ had recomnended a lArge number of his off:i.cers for proP1otion to generP 1 o-rficers.
General Patton nsked GenerP.1 CJ.Ji.rk ;·1hat ho thour;ht h'"!, Gonernl Fatton,
wa.s going to be arsi(?led to do in the future. Genern.l Cl11rk replied thet
Genl"1rn.l Fat ton, in General Clark's estimn.tion, 1·ras going to corune.nd a fol] owup Army in OYSRLORD. Gen~ral Fatton said tb..,t thrt was a poor cornm1md for
an officer of his experi.ence, but thnt if he did not p;nt sorne Army comrn.rmd he
intended to resign.
Genoral C:lark loaned Gemerr 1 fat ton his CP.r, and th9 former Seventh \rmy
Comr1ander visited II Corps HeadquPrters anrl. the +>ront in the II Corps region
durin~ the afternoon.
General Cl,,rk also conferren toc1 a;)' uith G'3nerals Gruonther, Brann and
Ca+'fey concerning General Caffey 1 s becoming G-3 of the Fifth Army, relieving
General Brann so that he could begin work in Al1;iers on Operation ANVIL.
Genern.l Caffey has already mov~d to Fifth A.rmy Headqu;-,rters r-md is world11g ...,.i th
the G-3 Section. Generrrl House hiter joined thA conference rcgrrrdin~ Caffey 1 s
assumption as head of' the G-3 Section.
,Just prior to the arrivr>l of General Fritton, Gen0rPl Clrr1r niscussed wjth
General Lucns the new phases concern-ing Orerntion '"'.JIPTGLE. The Specirl flnY1.ning
Group at Fifth f rmy near is no~, wor1.ring night ann dn7 to rcrfr"Jct rlans for the
amrhibious end run just south of 11.ome. ·
Anoth1'3r visitor clnring th'9 day ,·as Bri@.d:ier Genernl Theodore Roosevelt who was
called in by General Clnrk to r1 iscuss the innbility to obtri.in certain supplies,
includinz lumber Pnd overshoes, :"'or French troops.
The following T11essa~e WflS received this morning -"ro,IJ Colonel Fill. RN.
SCC 602. "Shinr,le is on. At least 25 LSTS will be r:1vr:i~ lf'ble for follow-up.
Prime f~jnister desires JRnlli"ry 20 P.s target d2tc.n
Late in the evening G~nerrl Clnr1r drove his Buicv, v,ith Lt. Col. Suthr;rl~nd,
to Sorrento "rhere he spent the night.
�CAS~RTA--JANUARY 9 , 1944--General Cltirk left f.)orr~nto P.nd drovo his Buick himself back to his cor,rrv:anrl rost . He had lu'1ch dth Gen'.'lrRl Grurmthor , nd discussed with him the progress being r,ride in the prepflrfltions for SHINGLE . Immediately after lunch Gonern 1 Lucn.s , 1 d:"!iral Lowry, CArta in Leid s , General
Brann and Colonel 1fo•-rard conferred 'rj th the GrcnP,rn.l about the preprrations for
SHPrGr.F. . Immediately aftf'1r lunch Generril Lucas , AdmirA.l Lorry, Captr>in Lewis ,
Genernl Brann and Colonel Howarrl conferred d.th the Gen~rril Fbout the rreparfl tions for SHI rGLE , in order thnt all information night be 2vr->ilrble for a conference with Grmerrl Alexander ..,hose arrivPl was '"hortly expected .
11
At 1500 Genernl /\lexandP , Generrl }:r,rding, GP-nmrr,l Clrir1-c , G ,nerel Gruen✓r
ther, Adr1iral Lowry, G"'lnerl'l Robertson , Gennr,"l Brann , BrigPdier Foster , Captain Fower of thl:l Royal Navy acK' a menber of .A dmirPl Cunnlngh mI s staff , and
Lt . Col. Suthl"lrlrnd met in the hut +'or 11. conference . Genernl Alexander stated
that thf~ meetin~ on the 7th nm~ 8th v ith the Frime fiinister had fiyed all 1uestions
of craft r-ind oth"lr details ,71-tich rrd 0een settled to make ':Fr GLE possible .
The fi~es ho.d now becone definite , and th~ Fifth ~rmy vms to get more craft
thAn it asked for . AUVIL was affect,d by this . Of course , the Fresident of
the United States ·rould have to be consulted, for PS a result of this rnP.tter ,
A11JVIL miisht be much smaller or might be merely a threat . The reason for all
of this was that th8 entire Allied position was prejudiced by the succe1s of
the GerrnPn defense south of Rone . Turkey "las thinking twice r-ibout her entrance
into the war , and SpAin was harc<eninf; . 1' ccorc1jn~lv, it "r,s necessnry to make
every effort to capture RoT'le . Craft on their ,,P..v from India for C'Vi~RLORD may
hr-ive one av:,j 111.ble trip for us . Fifth Army needs r. follO'IT-up aftnr establishing
a brir f;'"lheA.d for exploitation , P.nd the a<lditional craft mPy serve for this purpose . Gen&;ral ClHrk stn.ted tbPt for this f·,nction he hnd already alerted a combat teRM of the 1st Armored Division A,nd Pnoth"r combnt teri.m of the 45th Division. G~ner8l Al ":Xander st, ted that he hrcl. the 11 •-rew ZeAlanders 11 (The 2nd tfow
Zealand Division) but thri.t he ,·muld like to keep them in his ovm hand to use if
General Cl:1rv could m""kc a break through Pt C2ssino . Generr>l Alexrmder then
str-ited that the tPrget date for 3I-TT 11rGIB was to be Ja.nur>ry ?2nd - not Janurry
25th - reg<>rdless of the e+'fect of this upon a rehearsnl. GonerPl Clrrk responded to this th.,t J:,e wn.s strongly orposed to a lnndinv, P~thout a. reher>rsP.l and
reconMended against it . He ,-rould rather put trie lrmc.ing off until the 24th , if
necessary. The miscella.11.eous craft assembled for tho rmterprise h: d never
, orked to1;ether , and a r~heRrsal was necessar to coord.inste their efforts .
Colonel '1',e,te sfateil. in this connection thr>t if the target drite 'WS the 22nd , a
rehearsal ,1ould be impossibL~ . The lo11ding of the vessels "ould :r,rev•=mt . Gene ral Alexander rejoined thPt if the ,, e11.th"r should defer the trrget dr>.te +'or
several driys after t.bA ?5th the oper"tion would ncvAr come o.,,.f ot ell , as it
,vould interfere '.'dth rVJ1.IDRD , and a.greernent hrid been reri ched bet,·rcon th=~ Prime
r~inister , the President and '3t:1lin that nothi_ 11.g rit P 11 would ever i nt"lrfere with
OVBRLORD . GenP.ral Alexander ,..tPterl. tkt somo other di "ficulties hnd to be faced;
thPt fewer n.ir resources vro,lld be PV"iL.,bl":l frori nm' on 11nd the air would concent-rate on breeking up enemy communicf'tions . He v:arnec: against tPking too m1'1ny
veriicles , st8ting th11t the L nding in the Azores lwd been planne;d ·1.th nore ve h~ cles thPn could actufllly be hPndled on the roRds . If any r1ore '!1ere needed he
would see thdt they "mre made Pvailr>bll"l . He "urther said thPt up to four Liberty
sl"'ips could be ben.ched for brePking "ratars "nd trePted '"'S exp ndPble . Arlrniral
Lo TI';T coMment9d thrt the shallor; · ,at~r made this dj ffj cult, • s the Liberty ships
would beach too far out .
0
0
General Alexander st"ted thnt rs
r 0 uch
e:ir supply
PS
pos'"'ible wo 1Jld b8
�utilized . Colonel Tate stati;d thf't it oidn 1 t Pdd up tc a grerit deri l. Gener;-,1
Cl8rk a.id thPt thorough o:z:pi=Jrinents hnd bPen crrri9d out -<>or 1:1 long tiJ:1e to
exploit air suppl y to t~e grentest possible extent .
GenerPl Alexander then rsked .,..rrien the frontal nttrck Pris going to be de liver c<l . Gcmerrl Clark answer ef1 that it ':7~S to occur on a. series of days . On
the 12t h the r>rench would attrck in tlie vicinit•r of S . •Jlia . On the 15th the
34th Division , r>nrl on-9 RCT of the 36t Division (no"" -rut in to reliev0 the
6th Ar""'ored) "ould attn.ck to tali::0 'I'rocchiP . On the 16th 10 Corrs '"'ould at 1
tack across tl1e Gari.[C;Urmo Riv0r with the L6th , 5th end 5Sth Divisions . Cn
the 20th it vm s plF111.ned to lnmch an Pttr ck hy tho II Corrs ,,or a bridg0head
across the '9.apido . General Clark esthr.tccl thrt it v,ould re 7 uire four dP.ys
of attack up Route 16 to clra•·r tb0 GF>rnsn force off tl 0 b<Jrichhead , pnrticulnrly
the 29th PPnzer Grenadier Djvisio 11. , rn.-1 hence ho vrould su.rmcst th.-. 24th ,
r ather thrin the ?;Jnd , 'lhic}l is tr'3 rror:osed rnte of PttPck. Grmorrl J\.lexPnder
them stated thn.t the ?6th ,w.s the e2rliest cP.te t11,.,,t trie i:'.e" zer,lan 1:lors could
arrive , and Generril Clrrk corw1entn.d thrt he br->clly 11oedec'l Pnotl-'or rljvi"lion to
pass throw,;h the 36th ; that +,hoy ··nuld ½e b:o.dl,r wo:r11. r'loi:m by thci" c:r·r,,,~'7 "' nf'
the Rripido .
1
Gener11 l J'lexRrn~er theY\ r.aid , "I t1r1 fri~htfully k-con for a diversion rnd
for a Conmr-inr:"o to crac1r into t 11~ outskirts jnto Rorie . " Generr,l Cbr]r sdd trr t
1
P.. c iversio'1. by n.,,v, 1 f;unfir e hPd ')eon rlmmed but thPt J.11ndinrr of nny T'lore
t roo:rs os suggest ')c , ' "0 1 Jld <c i T'lpl y d~ ssiprte tr,e err ft ..,vr ilPble for t r- main
push . l}encr111 Alex, nder P sked whether j t could be done the next nigrt , "'s he
felt thr-i t it \-muld frighten Kesselring anr'l keop Rori,,., g::irrimned by trie G':':rnl"nS .
G~nerrl Cl..,r1c said thn.t he vronld exnmin~ this question -very c<>refully.
All tre o.,,.ficers t17 .,n left excert G"'nerr,l Clr-rk , Ge'1er.., 1 Alexanc1er '"'nd
two or three senior Generr>ls . Grm~r"l Clrrk Psked GenerAl Alexnndr,r '-rhrt Gene rr>l Al ex:mner nctu::i lly tl:ou<;ht <'bout ~ 'TVIL , rinc1 Gen8rl Alexnnrler srio he
triouo:ht it rnic;ht never occur . He •~r>jcl tr:rt in his estiT'1rtion it was n great
nistn 1re not t o exploit the Tt'llinn success . Genern 1 Alenmder brought to Gene ral Clnr k a porsono 1 letter froPJ the Frir,e r'inist"lr . tr . Churchill congrPtulrited Goner'l l Clnr'\.c on his c~ corntion from t},e Fresident 0 '1.d on Ms "'Chi1;Vr::>l'1"Jnts
in Ital y . Tl--te Prime E': nister , 'ent on to sr-y he sinc':lrel v hared th0 SHIPGLE
rmeration could be riounted by ?2 ,fanu"ry, ewen if some of tho forces hrd t o be
dir1inishod , ris jt wonld be disnstrous to J-,r, ve c. c"elr,y rec::ult in t:re crncellation of the operPtion.
General Chrk thon,r;ht to h::ms!")lf th"t po"sibly G~nerrl "Sisenhower 1 s move
to '"':uro:re nnd the re-exaMin.,tfon of the '"hole P~ 7IL proje ct might result in a
rer,lizi,=ttion of t}1e •·rea1m~~s of the forces involved rnd <' reconsiderP.tion of the
whole r:'fair . T-J:A did not wish to be withdrann fror, his Fifth .'\.rrny comnrnd Pnd
be Ieft in s0T11e rlanning cornJ:1Anrl "bm th<:! •rnr rmded ~r:r tli~reby niss e c}lr>nce
to mare}-, into GerT'lan;v at trie h~ad of his Arr11y.
Gen~ral .Alex::md r 1'111d G~nerr-1 R"rc'1inr; le-ft a,"ter the conf'0rnnc~ n.nr re turnPCl at 1845 for n drinl.: with Gen~rol Clrr1< anc1 GAnerrl Gruenth"lr . Gen0ral
Al exander os 1
red Gm1er..,l Cl.nd: •;hetri'3r t11e Ge::nerPl ··,ould consider tf'l-cino; him
a l ong in his JT boflt in Crerrition ·1rrJHGIE , nlthouf;h Qr::merEl Alex?nder did not
· ish to ~ ntrude . Gnr er'll Clrrl· said t:ba t , on the contrary, ric "ro,, ld be de lighted .
0
~
�Aft13r,1ar0s,
repec tedly had
ther fluster.
j
•hen Generr,l l\..lcxr1nclcr h"r1 ~nne, Gencr··l Cl..,r1-:: S""id, RS he
n the J'P st, tbrt Gon'"rr 1 Alexand0.r ~19 s a pc11nut and a +-ea1
Tho fo11o,:li-rirr cable, 'R.N 25773, ,vas receivAd +'rom the CPTC today:
,r'ncob L. Devers, Lieutenant G0n9r,.,l, o.r the Unit8d StPtes /\.rny, assumed
corimand t orth ffrican Theater of Or<orrtions, United 5trit,3s }rmy, 1?00 hours
8 Janur>ry :r0r.r present. 11
11
"-
Crble RJ'J 0 .1878 also was receivC'd f'rom 15th Army Grour ann is quoted
below:
"Target date for opening HQ now adwmced 48 hours to 1~ Janwry."
The follovdng message , RH 6381, was dispatched tod, y to 15th Arrn.y Group,
pass to AFFQ for Gir::md:
11 2 DHt sector quiet, normal e:<rchenf;e ~.nfordictor;r 11nc: hnrressing fire,
one of our 1:,r,trols found enemy rt LA fl\.I'Ji•'P..f''S 992347, 3 DIA took command e,t
090900 of 45 Div sector. 3 RTA relieved troors of' II Corps on nr '•lc'\.,JO night
e/9. nne Bn L, RTT ri.rrivryd staging r>reD lPst n:lp-rt ,·;ill reinforce 3 RSA toni~ht on TT/I.JO . Frc11ch losses for S JRnw,r;v, lzilled 1-S , 7ounded 73, missing
3 . TANK STAT,; - No changA . 11
The :lnrlicetion by,Gcn"c'rPl .Alc:xand~r thrit A' 1'VIL YToulrJ proh..,bly never ·trike
place caused Gc:merPl Clrir to r~flect tririt h..,d it not been for the AUVIL plrn,
he vro11lr1 unrlo11bt~dly norr hPvc hrd the !T~iTrTTSA commarn' which ,Gencr~l Devers
hPs in his pln.ce. Fo~vever, offered the choice, Genernl Cl.nr 1,;: would certAinly
h1cnre chosen his Army cor:inand r11th0r thnn go to rm ;,dninistrritivc rost . Furthcrmorc, he rronld '"'Ot ·ish to rclinqu,sh co,.,mnnd of Fifth Army Bnrt tal<A up
h t , rluties "ritr a small pLrinning str+"f rnr pr.rh, ps hPve the ,-mr CC'IT'.C to ::sn end
wh:i le he 1·r11s so "}nG" ~er!, lePvinC'l' so11.,,bocly "1se to lead tlie Fifth Arny north
into G"!rri;, ny.
r
*
*
*
Ct\SF.RTA--JA..lITJA'9.Y 10, 191+4--GAnerPls Alex.?nder and ratton both r'ernrted from
the Fifth 4.rny CO'"lmr>nd post errly this riorning.
At 0900 G~ner;::,l Cl,:,r met ·dth G""ncrl ror:=m to dj scu,s the sigffl features of SHITTGLE . ThcrcPftcr he hrd.., short conference v:jth Colonel Ryrn,
Fifth Army Chaplr>:.n, anc r1onsignor Carroll v.rho h11.d recently co!'1e from Rorie
and who tolrl the Ar'fl1.y Comrnanrler of conditions thf"re. Follo1crj ng tri is conference, Gener-=il Clark h2d a cell f'rom M"l.,jor Gnnert"l Corell, ~PH1 Surgeon,
-;ho cane 'vith Colonel ·"artin, Pnd hriefly cliscussed thJ Fi:'th i'lrmy r,edicel
problems.
At 1000 Generpls T,~ogles and m,rmon c2me :in e.nd 0iscussed tb!') employri~nt
of' the 45th fl.nd 1st J'rnored Divisions in the com~nr, op"lrn.tions of the Fifth
Army on the present ":'ro-rit flnd in 3HJ'TGL'8 . Follo"jnrr this, BrigrHU'"r G,~nerPl
Donovrin cnllcd 2nd cliscussed prosrcct5.ve oper- tions from the OSS anelc . At
1130 Lieutcncnt GenE'lrtd I'cCreery arriwid rmc'l discussecl '.1ith Generol Clr"rk
the nmrloyricnt of 10 Corps in the comi"'lg , ttPck .
�At 1200 the Gen~r"'l held 11 conference in his hut mith GFmer,,ls rcCreery,
Juin, Y ,yes, Lucas, l}ru~nth~r ri;'ld Fouse, AdmirPl Lo,,TY, G~nerrls Roosevelt,
Carpentier, Cri ~..,f~y, Bronn, Bri <;ndi. rs Cool·'.)~ e nrl "..iChP rr1 so>1, Colonel Keiser
ancl L:i9utem.nt Colonel P.obnrt Forter, Derutv Chief of Stnff ('ractic- 1) of II
~or:rs, And Lieuten.-·mt Colonel Suth0rlnnd. The Gtm,ral outlined Oper."tion
qprrr;.r.,E for the assenblecl offic')r~, roinV_ng out th"t the Rssnult '78S to be
rnRde bv the British 1st Division, t'l7o bRtt?lions abreast, Pnd the American
3rd Divir:ion, thr-;e battelions "'hrer>st, ,·rHh three bettr>lions of Rr-ngers "nd
one battalion of the 509th going in Pt ~nzio, and th1~ 50L~th Inr~ chute Regiment r12kinfs a drop inland to th<1 north of Anzio to :rr;"lvent GArrrn forces
coming do•m on the beR cJ:-, bef'ore ri ".leachheed w1s established. Alterru tc reinforcer1ents by the 45th Div:i.sion or b;r a cnmb~t team of the 1st t\rmored Division "rnre r>rranged, cencnd:ing ur,on t:r,, situ..,tion. Admiral Lowry wr>s to be
the over-1-111 n!"VDl conrrian<"er a11c'1 under him fldrnirnl Troubridge of the British
~b,,y is to cor~me.nc'l the n;:,w,1 force effect: nrr tre British landing. Due to
the I rime fl} nister I s i-ritcrvention, ')P, LSTS were to be ma' e aw i L0 ble. A
feint vas ci.rranged by n;:,w,1 gunf'ire <>t Cjvitr>vecchio. Cme Cor1rrndo WPS to
land on tre night of D day just soutli of the Tiber 1'1.nd strike north to•7ard
Rone. In the nrea of' the landing of the 21th J l'.'nzer GrenRdier R!'.lgim~"lt is no'.''
asser bled. lart o+' the Gerr19n 3rd Division vrill be there and t,~o brttnlion- of
a Fleger Corps. It is est·mPt0c'1 thPt ~t the tjr1e of our l~noing Germr>n forces
numbering 17,000 1"ill be in the are.,., , and at the e11d of 7? hours, 34,000.
0
1
0
In the meantime, a direct attack on the present f'ront is to be mBde in
order to contain Els large a G9rnPn force as possible. On the 12th the French
Corfs is to A..ttr>c 1, a.11 out towe.rd S. 'SliEl. Three dc-vs l::iter II Corps goes on
to attacl: Trocehin, using the 34th Division, an J.CT of the 16th Division and
P lso s 0"1P- P rnor.
10 Corps on the 17th or 16th will l'1 t tn ck Rcro s s the Gr, rigliP no
wHh the 4{,th, 56th and 5th Divisions.
Generql Fnrmon and the ArnorArl Di vi ~io"' Penoqu.,'<rt~rs, with one Co!'lbPt
Corimanrl, pL1s the Qlst Reconnaissance ,qu"'dron Rrc to be rer>d;v to be used on
SFrrGLE. Gen<1ral Alexander st.-.ted 111st night thrit t'berc might be still more
troops Pvailr>ble.
There nust be ~ood werther for SFIITGIE. If it is b.-:id, the Fifth Army vdll
hPve to sit it out, but tht'l targ0t datl"! T'lust be the ?2nd, so th"'t a wait for
good re2.ther nill 1"lot no.ke the attack too ll'lto. r~ jor G0nernl Crf1ne hns been
set up to plan for the occupation of Rone. Fellington bombers ·'i 11 be set up
for h38V'J n:l ~ht ?tto.cks in support of the ln.nding rnd also of the direct -cttAck.
The G9ri.errl :!')Ointed out thnt he hr-id been requested by cable to sr-'re . 11 apr.l
propnrtirrn, 1,nt, +,}'pt, there vrere n. o-re.nt n, ny brfr'p;es "cross tJ-19 Tib8r .; n the
j_-•1.ediPte vi cin.;t;r of' r1r,ny :rripf1l rror,ertiRS ·7hi_~h would hA the onl:v c:br-nnAlc:
h;T 11 r1.cl' Gernnn r9;n~... orceny-i:ritc; could c0rx~ rip;r:i!1St Y'j_"') on YrT"GLE:. The Generrl,
nccord.;nr.;lv, sent a cnble ns 1dnr; pArn; ssion j f' necessi::iry to r-ittnc 1- thn Germnns
"ll'Arewff +,re,r ·,ere, r9~"rc'lless of c0nse1uenc9s to fl"pnl rronBrties.
Follo"'i"1/'.; tliis conf'9renc0, tlie G9>1er::i.l (mtertnined GP,n0r"ls f,icCr9er;,r, Juin,
Keyes, JT01lse nnr Lucas, witr t-. a,1iral Lo"TY, f'or 1uncl'. f. t lnnch t r, Genern 1
sro l(e of the Oj f+'·· culty o: corrs -"'l::i,., 1r O'U" rd s' n.s efl ell CO'Y'nS 1--ir>.d di f'f 9rPnt
nnt:i onri 1 i -':.ies on its f'lpn1i.:s. In fr>.ct, +,he G n9r0 l Sllf{fY,8Sted inster>d of hr,v; ni:s
liPison ,.,,... ,"'icers +'rn'rfJ corrs to corrs, it ''loulri b8 "'referable t0 hr>ve nmb::>ssf'c1 ors.
0
�Gener11 l Prl:'mn 9ntP.rtrd:n.0 J..,l,0 re3+, r"" t1'8 o·'"'ficrrs · rho rrn attroYld9' the
c0nferr:mce n:t th9 GeYl"3rrl Of'ficers ' Pe, . In -':..9 1<<'t8rnooY1 Ge"lerPl Cl:lr:V re ceivecl c,cills fron tno 'r)riti:"'}1 .l11r Gorr9"'rondents '"r . F'l.lls , o"' the Ti7r::s, r,nd
•·r . Gordon of the C'unda;v Sxpress . In tbe lPte af'ternoon Gen'°'rrl Clrrk received n er 11 +>ron Colonels J".-,rl,oe , Tully and Hyr::-ard, clnssnr.t':3s of }'is at
·rest Fo-Tnt, and t),ese o:f'ficers stn.7ed :.:or dinner .
As soon ns thr8e d;visioYJ.s shil] hrvA been lPndec' , Gener"l Clnr1r rroroses
to now~ 11 S"'11'111 [ldv:,nce headqunrters to the be::ichhead, ~"lcludin~ hi:riself , his
G- 2 , his G- '3 , an aide :~nrl rossjbly one or two others .
GenerP 1 Cl::ir}r dispBtcr9d th':3 follovri ng er bl9 to Gen9rRl j lson , CTNC ,
tod::iy : R'·T gg5g _ nFor Orerntion sr:-w}L"; urgently r,questnd th~t vr•ter trr,ns fortc1tion be r:iri.de r-i.milribl0 for sreci· 1 orer['tio'1 .; 11v0lving -i"l.fj ltration of
egents vicinity Rf'l'19 . :1oon rhrse requires use of' suhnnrine "·Mel· should be at
B1rnti11 Corsicri b:r noon of Janu::--ry Vi.th for in:it:i.Pl operrtio11s nnd sho 1ld continue R.vailri'1le dnr-inr; cnntjnu::::.nce of ::lHUJC',L~ O:;errtio11s . If no suhr1"rine crn
be rrJPre ~rilrible ther t,,·ro }T borits s'hould he subdituted but they ~7ill not
be r0cpJJ.r9d until ,fonu..,ry l t,th since moon rhas9 'ill not -rermit use of.' f'i' bo:-it
rr-ior to thPt drte . I+' rrr borts !']re srmt they should be continu'"d r>vriilnble
until orr>r:otio11s corrirleted . 1~rinhPsize agr,in hr1rortance o:f' subnrrine f'or this
operntion and ur~e you do utmost to fr1rl3ment my rAquest .
1
11 Cartrin FrcRtte , this F.er>f'l_u::irter" , now in Bc1stia to mPhi detriled rr rn.np;ements and ··ill be '•rrdti n~ :,t 'rival J-l'eBr1qurrters there for ::iuthorization. "
Gener~l Clnrk today -issued ('rerntions Im+.ruction /JlJ +'or tre continwi.nce
of' the n.ttRc 1r 1mr'ler th"l gener.,l ril"'n for OrerPtions Tnstruct ·i.on tll. This
Oper.?tjons Jnstruction CC'Wlrs Vie nttacJ,. );r the '?rencb EYfc,djtiom1ry Corps , II
Corrs n.ncl 10 CorT's, /'J.S 8A.'1'.'lni11ed by Grmerrl Cl.,rk nt the conf'Arence tor1Py.
*
*
CAT~RTA --.JAr'TJAP.Y 11, 1 <)/;,4-- G0ner, 1 Cl qr Jr. tor:py irect<Jd Gener81 'lrr'nn to nA.ke
prerPr::i.tions f'or tre l:mding of An Prld:itional cor,brit tePr1 nortr. of the Tib8r to
strjke tm·•8rd Rora9 f'ron tre sr>me position v·her9 th0 Comr1nnc1os "re to lrnrl r,s
pPrt of tbe rP.i"1 rl1rn of wrrGIJ~ . I nrt o<' tre rePson fer lnndinr: this c0,,.,b~t
teAn at the ros.i tioYJ. :1 n ,1unstion. i o thP. rossibilHy tl ,..t tl•e G"'rrirms riry 0efend
aloni:; the lj nP of' the ':'j '10r, ; ncJ.i.1dJ'"lg P nefense of tre city of Row=? its elf .
Thi:1 ',vnu1.d ma're necessary eitlnr fl nire~t rittac'r 0'1 th~ cit;v , "itr c0nsequent
outcrsr on all sides thnt srcren srrinris ",er9 being violr>te,1 , or else GOP19 sort
o:f' rrneuver to force the GerTT>-"'11S to eV['CUPte . J\ccorclin1;l:,, the lnnf'ng o+' a
coribn.t team 17ell north of thr~ Tiber is to be :rrer:.rect rs A ossibility. The
Co:rrr-1rndos, "rho 1-,re to coJ'1e ~.n nre to hr've e goon '3Ufply of jeers ::i.s vell rs
arr1ored ieeps . Genernl C11'1rk toilP:r co·,yf'erred vri-':,h 'Rr:1gRrlier C11urchill '''ro commrinr'l.s the t""ro Co"'!mannos in riui")stion P!lrl unr1ertoo'k to rr-; ve },j ;n a lr>rge nuT"her of
jeeps, i '1c1u,1i. nr "'rrior~d j "GPf' tr>1rnn f'rom another lmi t . Witr tr esA Vie Cor1rrir,nc1os , nnrnberin.o; about .~oo, '"lll n['}rG P nu-=:h tO'"ard Rom9 on tP9 ":Venin.c:; of D
dP.y , creatinP," as much ntir pnrl disturb,,nc~ as r.ossibl e . ·n,P.n thr>Y crin /?'et no
furtJ--- r,r, th 0 ~r nrorosA to tr- 'P, tC' tJ--,9 )7j lls no:rth·7est of Ro"'le "Yl(1 rrerrire to defend trenselves until r0liP-V9~ . GenerPl Cl~rk hns Pl~o rlirected rrepGrrt;ons to
be mride -:'or nr1 w"1.ces to th8 hiP'h PT01i:nd to t}~9 e"st a11d southerst of Ro"le with
0
�the irlea o~ se1z1ng the pro~inent terrAin ~eritures jn th~ re?.r of trose forces
v1hich will be onr,os:i n1; the CEF, the II A"lericrin Corps rnrl the 10 British Corps
i:i s they rusl~ forwqrr1 to·7arcl Ron0 fro,.,, th" ir prese>1t nosi tions .
Gf:meral Clrri• spent thP da7 T"or1
dn~ on rlans for C,TTPJGLB . ThR Genercl
has rlet8rrd ned tr visit tte 'WI',Tl}L'~ fron.t 0'1 1) da;r, c-oin1; up 1-:Jy TT borit . He
has also directPd Grmerril Br.<1nn to rrepArG -for rn errlv nove of' r c:1releton
heRdau,_9rters to the c;r J'TGLC front .
In the <-fternoo"l r~ajor CrenerPl. Kenyon A Joyce , HSI\, ,...,ho is hein~ replrced
as hei:id of' the {l.llied MjJ_itrrY Control. Conri"sion by G0n~ral Pr,son I1<ic"rrlf'ne
of tre 'Ariti~h Army, caJ"'le in to have r tr, ll:. In th,.., evenj_n?, G"lnernl c1~r1,. enterta4 n-~d rt rlinner 'r . :::'nlls of the LovtrJon "'~Mes , ··r . Gorrso 11 of' the Lon.don
Sundriy F>::nress , l'Rjor n;p;el Do11gc\9le , J~ of 10 Corrs and Lt . Col. CJ..--rk ,
Fi f'tb ArMy PRn.
GenerRl Cl2rk rlisp."tcl rid the fo:. lo'v1.nc- cr>1-ile to G~nerri 1 Ke;res +,o<fay:
11 Congrotn1Ation-, on t,},9 successes you haYe Dtt~d.nec. in ~rou.r recent
offensive . T nT'l esrn:icir'lly rleRsec ·Ti.th t 9 rron:re"'s :mR(e by t:re 14th Db.rision ~en s11ch rl i ffj e11 l t tt:irrn.in R.nd r "'.:t1.i.nst -SU';r' deterrni ned res ~stn.nce , rrrticulrrly in view o+> th9 short t·ime tr0 Divi."ion ·· rs ::1.:-ile to bo, 011t of the 1 :ine
to recnrerPte Pnd re-fit . IJea"e esrtend ry co"1P'r..-,tulf'+ions to Generril Ryder .
J rar1 1i.1cewis8 f;J'f'ti,,.i"ld " ith tre cont-inw=id ::-ucce">s o+> the SpeciAl S8rvice
Force 1mrer Colonel Frederick. Plen.se tell h;m conf'~ dentiA lly t:brt I have
recor "1e.1rled hin f'or r,ro,.,,otion to tr,e arr,cle of' Bri';nrl~ er GP-v,r£> 1. Also extend
to Gern=,ral l'i.1len my conisratubtions on the ucce"''3 l1is f'orce has ntt;:iined jn
its ;_nitiA1 rJebnt in the Ttfllirn c'l.rnrrii~n . Unner vou.r s:rfondid J.ePdership
::i.nd c'ir8ct io1-1 Yo11 hn.110 mo11ln.ed these thro.e orf'.;f'.ni7,ntions into "'n o~fensive
+'orce ;r}lj ell the enern7 "'ill haw, r;rer>t cH f'f:l cult:r in '-"toprinr:r. Good luck for
your future oper11. tio11 s . 11
R1T 64?1.
1
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The i'rny CoT"\mPncler crbled CG , ',t>'f'nUSA ns follorrs: RF 64?5 . "In view of
impendinr; orernV011.s, T cnnsi.r'er trnt 01:ir infrn~r;r rerlacement s}1ortar;e i"' cri tically serj ons . I-s is not rocssih1 e to rrov:tr.le nece"-'sary numher of -i_n:.-.rntry
rerlacenients by cnnversion ".S ,.,,1thoriz9d jn ,ro 1 1r 0 ~1StSl , drited Jr,nuriry 10 . 1 e
estirnrte th.-.t 9n r-i.dd:itional !, , C'OO 1 nr,mtr:r rer111cen,mts "rill be r9111.irei!., rrtbar
thr>n '3 , 000 e:1tiP1rited hv ;vou in last PDTPf;rPph vour messPg9 . I 1rr_r:;8ntly recomrnend -1-hPt ?500 1n+>Pntr;r renlricerrienta be obtP:ined from ~5th Pnd 89itr Divisions
anr1 shipped to Fifth Arn-r:r 11.t FlnrUest ross:i..hl d11te . They will not be used to
fil1 re,p1isi tio>1s unl11ss Pbs,-,lutel1r 11ecessriry. rur orer.--ti on.s to dr>te have
fr8'l'1.entlv bee'1. J~qn_rlicripred bv inFC'e1u11te c•urrlv of inf'nntry rerl?ce1cents ' ;,ind
I +'13el thRt :tt ..muld be [l fQ.'"lVG 8rror j f ,e +'nj_lrd to reve on f1P>1d tre 0 500
re1uested . !\nrroxinPte rercentri r,-es of' spec:i fi_c,,t:i.on nur'11
"lers requirecl a-re "'s
follows: 721, Sp,c JBR 7!~5 , 71, CnP,C 'JFR 746 , 5 1 Srec ·rnn 60'3, 5~ ST'eC ";JR ,S05 ,
1 ~ Srec 'JBR 60!,.,, 6"~ 3pec 60'7 , 4; Sp9C ifBP. S04 .
0
Gener::il tad.Py wrote " lett9r to 1 ~<ij. Gen . L . 'I . P.ooks, G- 3 , A,.,IY2, in
nhich 1,e rnade three in1portrint no~ nts: !1 • He ,-·;,, s 1mr ')19 to s<>"1.rl SPner::> 1 BrP nn
to A"'PJ to coorl~ n2te Al"l.,.L r-ltmn4 nr; r>t t)-ijc tirie, bu.J. hrd sent Pirj r:;..-:idier Gener"'l Ca+>fey 5nste:ad . !?• Fe rw1uw,ted thnt tl'9 l;,,test ~n"o:rm~tion on ~FVIL be
T}lP
�forwarded him, as he hi=1-d received the impression from Genr':lr"'l 1\lexander th2t
t},is operation was son01r~hr-1t of P "dying dog" and "'ir;r,t be relegPted into the
re.<1.lm o:P a feint in that areP, rmd cert;:dnly not r,ore than e very smPll lPndinp; . c . He re7uested that Genern.l Rooks fpc:ilitr:d:,e :bis tP 1-iinr; severPl of bis
'ke~r st~ff officers 11ith him to the 3eventh l\rrriy; nPmely, Gener."ls Gruenther ,
Brann , Vornn , Lewis and Colorn~ls Tate Pnd Fowarfl , along with a fe,c; other
junior officers .
Genern.l Clark today receivAd the. following letter fror1 frime Pinister
nhurchill:
11 I was very ;:;orr;:r not to see ;rou at the conf0,rence yesterday , but I feel
vou ,,,r3re so closel7 e11g2p;ed vrith the eneny thet jt "'2'3 irnpossible for both
.Alexander ,ci"l.rl you to be away- Pt the '3/'J'Tl"J t:ir1e . Your of'ficers idll tell JOU
about the bro ""earci,.,in'{ discussions we hAve h,..,d , nnd I 1--torie "'ill reassure you
cor1pletel:v about the aauatic suprort our gre.?t oner,.-,tion 1rrill receive . It
may even ")e roc::sible to throv in ths eci.nivr'leYJt o+' Ft third div:1sion, "lhich
ought to clinch nntteri:, . I Am deeply con:ocious of the : mrortr-nce of this
brittle , withont "Jl'ich the cPrnp;:dgn in Ital::r ·viU be regnrrled PS h1wing petered
out inglorjously.
"nne thing I ½eg yon , n,..,mel;;r , to do evei~~rthing in -ronr pov,er to stnrt off
on the ??nd if the 11eather is good . ~ver;r day ge :tned incre 0 .sed the use you
will have o+' these invPlueble lrinc'li·'1o;-craft . If you R.re eble to begin AS
ePrl:r as thPt, not 011ly r"laintenance but P lsrp;e build - up would be in sii-;ht .
It 1
-,,-,uJ_fl even be hettsr to start vith three- 1uPrters on the 2?nd than ·ith
full nur1bers on the 'Jfsth or later . Tt is inti-mden thPt ci 11 the lronding craft
shall noJ.nq severn 1 vo:rages be+'ore they rlepart . The eorlier the7 strrt, the
more they c:1.11 nt?Jce . Yo11r rerresen.tative , Colonel Hill , Viill tell ~rou the
grea.t 5nportn.nr,e ,·re attnch t,,-, t'ris . I 1rnow you ''Jill 00 everythb.g h1 hur:1an
power .
1
11 ! hnve been merming to write to offer you my sincere cr:mgrf\t,·lrotions on
t11e signal hononr raid ;rou by the Fres-i.c1 ent jn c'lecorP+,jng you for vour :rerso11Pl
bravery in the p-re t battle of Salerno . I have heard f'rom British c'-01..1.rces of
the wpy in nhich you e~,,..,,.,osed :1rourself jn the "orw,.,rrl rositions to sustain Dnd
P ninPte ;rour troops, And it is vnry l:i.l.r:ely th0t vour v:ir-;onF l intervention 1'"as
decisive in ,.., bl=ittle of' which jt night rrell ½e snic'', as the Dulce of ''ellin,c;ton
i.n efter J.ife S8id of the Bettle of '"Dterloo, tt:rt y,r,:,s .~ O-''Yined c l ose-run trdng 1
J
0
ThG Army CoT"!m2:nder r8plied to }rir:1e r"in~ st2r Criurchill as follous:
rryour letter of ,January 8th was (1 elivered to me by Generrl Alexander . He
and my represe:1.tr-itives wl-}o ottendec 701Jr conference P-;PVe r4e full deteils es to
the decisions wf'ich vou arrived nt .
U::r: PY~ deligr>ted vrith tre orrortnn~t;rr of 12.unching '3HPTGLE OrerBtion. I
hPve f'elt .,.,or P long ti"le thr.t j_t WPS the decjsive ,m7 to Pprrorch Ror1e . This
is the f'irst tir e the reans , incJ.udinr.; extra clivisions "nd cr9ft, hnve bee11 assenhled Jn sufficient qmmtitfos to do the job . I 2r, fully conscious of t're
necessity for lPunchi· 0; the Pttf"cl: rt the e;,irUest ro'rnible drte rnc1 ½ave set
J muc1ry ??nd PS the target dete . ''TeA.th'er permjtting, ~·e sl·01·lcl mnke ~t et thPt
tir:e . There "'re many dif'fic,:lties coY1frontinr; us, but ,·e "re tirAl•e3sly 'm0
1
0
�deavorinr; to overccr .e tbem .
0
nr,ry rlans jnclu.de a third division rs <'.'1'1 j7nedirte folJm1-up . It r1ry be
L'll-i11f'nntr7 div5sion, c)r ;:- c01 11)ir:ied ..,rnor-i·flP"'ntr · ta.s 1: fr:irce . Bot}, COJ;lb:l .,,-tioYJ.s vill be reoc':· to sciil, Pnd I ,'Til l make the decision as a result of my
observation of the lnnc1:inr; , +>or I :i nt9'nr; to 1 r,r 1
)e
::n<;n.t At t'v, 7..r·nrl_ino; o-r the
'.l'.)nd, nrtc1_ "rt0.r vis:.ti,,o; t'."0 ,_""_" co,,,r rio.0r':l rsl orA, ..d_ll trr,nsrdt the orrl.0rs
·"or the P 1Tror,:ri:---te ·"·orcc; to +'ollo·, ur .
en
1
0
0
I wns d:1 stressec1 to h92'r cf srmn' illness
15 r;hted 2.t tho fi YJ.C, rrogress· ;rou P::c·e r"'k~_ng .
11
"ThPnl· y01..1 ·"'or vour cr'1rz.rr·ti1l..,tio 11s on the :Jictin.'7,11:i sred Service Cross
presr-mted r,8 b:r tr,e } resident .
"I C:'1,n n0ver e:,.::pTes:=; ~n Yrorcs my rleer 1=;rrtrtude nt the orport11,,j_t;,r 1,1}-ich
I hriv0 h'7d to crnrrm=rnd Br·itish trcops. I 11i:,ve ,-1.evc;:i.:- sr;en f:i.ner "'en of f'll rnnks .
The:-r f'r9 0 1 1tstr,.ndinp-ly c01ITPf'Gous , 2'.nd their "'lorrfo js high . The orTcrtunity
for _An,3ric2.n D"1d Britisr_ scldiers +o S9rV8 iYJ. cnr1b"t nloy,~side of e0_ch other
hris dev"'loped betvreen thr;m an 1mderst2nding of ea~h othPr "hich h'".S engendered
notl--i~ng but T'iutual adniration .
1
t1 I hnve ev,er7 cm·S-i rl.ence U1r1t ve vri.11 procuce the rr~s11lts in this ne:zt
o:rernt::1-on rhich ~rou so r:mch desire . Thr.nk you for "",P Jdni:; the ne2n s ri vailable
to l"!e . I hope ~rou ' 1Till visit tre Fifth Army in Ro,.,,e bc:ifore returninR; to the
1
TT• 'fC • !t
CA3~RTA --.T!~'T1F.RY J.? , 191/~--General Cbrk spent todP,y rt the co11mPnd rost and
�1:1.t the office of' th0 nlanninp; ~our j_n tro rr-irir echelon ,orking on ~:rnnmu; .
In the afternoon ro receivea :-i csll -('rom Lt . Col. 1,Jyr;nard 11ho hrs just been
rlrced j_,1 clr1ri:re o{' Fift}, ~rTTJ.y v,rir )on.d s.:iles, n.ry1 0iscussed this s 1J.bject
,-,jth the Colonel.
Gi:mernl Clnrk .£'>eels thr1t sPti 1fP ctory rroeress is bA-trr: Ic['de in the
plenninr; for GFJ"TGLB ~nd th,.,t one by ono the necessr-ry rletPj lP rire bej n~
huttoned up . Tn the evening ('.:mer"'l ClRrk Pttended n cinner gj_ven by the
Fifth Army chaplein for B out 20 ~rmy chaphi.ns .
Todn.y the Army Cot'1"1Pnder r1isprtched n cnble to the crrc, AFH1, RI 8676,
reouestinrr th,,t Brig . Gen . Holmes he assigned ns Chief Civil Ar-fPirs Cf'fi cer for Operntion A~TTTIL ancl th.t jf he mre not r>VP.' lable th11.t Lt . Col.
Gerry h=i mac1 e Actjng Cl ief ..,ith tr,e 09finite unr1 erstn.nding thr,t an officer
in chrrge , preferably Colonel T-fuT'le , be r'nsir;nn.ted e.t a l"ter dPte .
0
Genernl CL r 1< yesterdry received "ror<'l , PN '3125 , th 0 t Grm.er"l ·F'reyburg
of the ')nrl 'T9yr Zealand Di.vision woulrl lil-:e to vi:3lt li'ifth Arrriy Pe--:d1uPrters
0·1 t're ll+th 1mr'i to<lP.;T cPblPd A re ,ly, PlJ 86B'3, ridvisi::-i~ h~.T'l. to ln.rid Pt Capodi.chino and to ::,c'lvis':1 ETA .
'J'he folJ.0·1-'"'lfl' c?b1e w11s receivoo from 15th Arriy Group tocJav, :N CGS
11 Gen':lral Frc:vbur.:; will probnbly ask for (1) ::i.n rirmorr;c1 cr,r unit and
(2) a mP-dium arty regt to be rln.cerl unrler his cnmr1r1 nrl j f' rind :hen he is
loosed on Pn exploitPtion tDsl'.: in frvmi.rRble cfrc'J_nstnnces I think (1)
woulrl fP'T a rlividi::mt Pnr· (?) \·rould be necess11.rv for al"'lost 'lny tasks he might
he piv<m hut these two 1mits could only be found hy drP\7inr; on 10 Corns .
Hill cl-' scuss this -Purther with you •vhen next we rieet . 11
192 .
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CASE'1TJ\- -JA'.TTJA.RY 13 , 1941.--Genernl Clnrk tbls morn-'n-s left his c0P1rn.Pnd rost
hy cub plane :md fle 1 ·1 to Irat"l , ':rere he vislted the ffeA.rkpt"'rters of the
Frenc}1 ~xp=;dj tionr-i.ry Corrs . A. t frn. ta. he t0 J.1u:1d t o Genera 1 J11in "nr'1 noted \Ti th
satisfActj_on thl'J prop;ress the :Frencr Corrs ,·as r,r,lr-ing :in tre ,,ttricl,- v·hich had
been lmmched on the previous day. He then flew to the II Corps lrrnr1 j nr; field
in Iresenzano, "IrerA be ''let ·vi th GenAral Kqyn,s r nc1 -,ent ov8r ·•ith him the arrnng8ments +>or the r~ Corns attacv v}'ich w:=is to be lrnnched on the evening of
the 14/15 .
At lunch G9nerr,.l Clr rl.r entP-rtained GenerR 1 Penney , the Commnndj nO' Gener:11
of' the 1st ".ritisr ;)iv-ision and c1T'liral 'T'rouhridr;e oP t½e H.m1<,l TJrvy. ·,ith
this or>ficer , h8 r'iscussgd r'etrii], of th9 nrorosed operPtion 3PT7f"rlvc; , as Acl mire.l 'l'rou'l)ridge is ~o comI"!Rnr'l thRt r,ortion of the n.av::il force ·1hich will support the British operation in SJII 11 TGL""; . In tbe r-:>ver,inq; Genorr>l Clr>rk rec0jved
for dinner Grmeral TloX1rel1 T'lylor of the 8?rod Airhorne Division , "rho has re centl:r bee 1 on r'letR ched s0rviM ""i tr tte Allied Mili tn.r;r Control CoT'lriission.
1
Grmerq 1 ':!lr,rk torh,r r ispritched the following two cPhles vith rPg,rn to re cent successes of Frencl-i troops on the Fi Pth .rny front:
�bers o:f the C-STi' on vonr Sf'l9nd 4 d successes in ~~1rie oper"tio-'1S no•rr in rrogress .
In spite of stu½r,o~n onen;tr resj strince n.nd counter"tt" c 1's you br;ve <7ined Pll
of YO'lr ~nitiPl objnctives n_r,_(1 f're coY1ti11uing to r1r1 1m eyc0Jl9nt rro~ess to
the north . The courP~e , det8rrn4nrtion rinc1 s 1·ill derionstratecl by All members
of your cmmrind Pre f1ildirii:; ::1.nothnr gloriom· chPrter j n th'3 long r-inil noble
historv of -,-,ren~h nrr1s . France mav ''T8 ll l)e eternr>ll;sr ~rn.t')ful for th8 rnrt
you are non -nlnyin<; i1 secnrj_nr; her l i b~ffrtion -f'r,-,,,,, t e GArT1rn foe . 11
"fi'iV8 A:rny to AFHQ Pass to G8nerf11 Giraml FersonPl fron C1Pr 1< o.nd Info
Cor,r to t;BF I er on<> l +"or Juin frol'1 Clar le. "I desire to congrrtulrite you on
the successes of the c·":F in its rresent operrtio"'s . Fightjng in PdV9rse
1•reather Pnd over the nost di ~ficult terrra in , th9 Corrs hns succGeded in cr-1.p tL,ri.nv all of its ::i_nitir-1 obj"'!ctives R;:t,riinst r1et0rnined GerT!lPn resistance
nnd :is continuin'; to nrike eYcell ent rr0e;ress to tJ,q rorth . GenerPl Juin ,.,_nd
his co,n:r1!:'.n0 p_re daily e.dcti:1g to the finest trp.r,itio
of' Fr/'.mcr fifshtini:; men ,
and I am rrou0 to heve t,1--_qn n.s members of Fifth Arny. 11
0
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CASER.TA- - JAJUAEY 14, 191~4- -This ';Jorni ''1/'.; GrmP,ral Clnrk conferred with his Chief
of Staff, his G- '3 and G- ? concerning the rrogress of flP.nning +'er 01 eration
SH:'" rr.LE . The prospect continues to b<=i fFvorPblo, Pnd there is evo,ry indica tion th<1t suhstn.ntjBl Gorrmn forces 'lhi ch r,ight heve been pulled a\'Jr>y toward
the v-i cini tv of Rone wer8 beinP- conto ined on th3 J resi:mt +'ront by tl,e vip-0rous
froYJ.tril thrust now in r,rogr9ss . Genernl C1Pr1• then recejved Colonel nurf'e ,
1
with ';'Thom he c iscussed the mi lHPry ~overnf'lfmt rroblP-'"'1S in .... respect for Operr tion A''":TIL. Gengral Clrrk desires to hPve Colone) Fune r- ssir;ned to hean up
this section, j f it cen be a.rranfl'ed , as it Ppperrs thrt General Tfolmes is una vail<" ble •
G,:,neral Clr-rk c1lso discussed wHr· Lt . Col. Clr,rk pr,nc in~ pubHc rel,tioYls
proble 1q anc wit], Colonel '3nltzrnrn quest-i.ori"' concernin<:; unit citatioY\s 11nd the
award of' the new service unit plaque . At 101,5 thri Gencir~ 1 left his conmEnd
post and ,·,ent to tre cuh f'ielcl , wbere }19 tooJ~ off ·dth 'k•jor 11'\lker for the
beach just sonth of' the T"louth of the Volturno . FiAre he trn.nsferred to R cub
on floats 1111.d flew to t} e b0ncJ.-, just south of th9 Tusc:ir>no, storrin<; on the
1 re vms J11et rit tr>e beach bv n, j .
V!P.y at the >?.est Cent3r fl.t '1orrento for lunch .
Ge-1 . Tenn9'T 0nr insp9cted tl')e trr<in:ing o-1' the 3dtish 1st Division. The G9neral t 1en r9turn0d to his coro.nnnd -r,ost by cub rlrne .
0
Tre /,rmy Gortr'1fl nder ent9rtrdnn.d for dj 11."'er th:i.s 9VGrii n~ G9ncrp 1 Freyburg
of the ?nd '•'(,,'l Zealrind Jivbio11 ~ncl Rrip; . Gen . IB,is , Fi.,.th ,,rmy Artilbry Of+'.
"icer.
G")nn.r[' 1 Glr-rk discucised -;ith GonnrP1 Pre;•1,urr; tro rrosr9ctivA 8r1rloyment
o-1' thn 'Jnd 'Tnvr '',o"11flnd Djv:i.sion cor1mfinded by Ge11.Arnl '.F'reyburo- riDd rrro:nged -rith
Ge,1ernl Le'·ri s to P!Ake E'V,,.,i bble for Ge1-1er;1]_ Freyhurg n cub pl"" ne to r-ssist his
reconnaissl'1nce of rosi tio11s ['''1,-1 J-,j s ,risit t0 units on this front .
-x-
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CA9,_,,;,,.,~ --JA'JUi'P.'·' 15, 19/J~--GenR:r::i.1 Clr-:rk left his co·1r1r-nc1 fO"lt by cub rl1me at
C'8SO nnrl <'l"'W to the 10 Corrs f'ie1d ner.r ()pF1rnnise, hero hri wrs ff,t 1::>y e
�stRf'f' of'ficm' anr1 -l:,pv9n to 10 Sorps He11drJ_1trrt8rs. Fere General Cl::irk tAlked
to the rrinci P' l o·nficer"' of' 10 Corrs ,. ho hr;r1 eo11 :, c:sernbl9d by Genernl
~c';reAr;r. G'"'ner1.l Clrrk, spea}:inr- f'rom P r1°r ,~hjch he hnc" hr>c1 prer-rec l,y
0-3 nn0 hro11 '"'ent uy-, bv GnptAin Vn!lrson, 011tlim1d the rror,osed --;pr T(}L Orerati.on a11d t,}-,1; nro"'ltal or0rations jn cnorc1iri8tion " 7 th it ['nd emrh,,sjzed the
irrportPnce o+> the lC' Corns role. Fe nlso .,,..end to t,},e 1>ssembled o+'fic1~rs
some letter, ""ro1"1 A'7ericnn solrFers rr,rorted in a p:->pi:ir "1hich he hr>d, 'Jrich
inr':ic...,ted an e~·cellent +'eelin()' 011 the r"'rt of' t:re Aniericf'lns +>or their British brothers in ~rms.
GenerAl Clrr}· lef't 10 Corr,s co!",.,,Pnd ro"t "hortly l,ef'ore 1or,o 1>11d returned
to the 10 Cnrps cuh Airf'iel.11 where h:! •;c,q J"'1et by T,t. Col. ·utherl --ir7 wJ--o had
bee11 ou+, b,r cub to locnte n lan11;n"' ,..,..,,.ounr'l close to U 0 lrr: Division cor'lrn['nd
post. ,,.,he G,1-v1riT'n.l f'lcivr to +,J~j s f'j A 1.cl, th,t of' the '10th Arr ored Arti llciry near
fozznoli, "rhere he wrs ririt by rr,m0r.,ls I,ucPs Pnrl Truscott. T--Ie \7RS 1>ccomrPnied b;r +,h':'lS9 o-"+>ic8rs to n nerr 1)y l"'i9lc1 wher'J, ~n t},e rr9srinc0 of the entire
ass9rnhled lrd Divirion, he mR~e ~ short arldress nnrl decor1>ted ?l officers.
FolloTing tris cer9,·1onv the Ge,p-ri:il returner! to 1-:ls C0"'1Jl1Rnd :rost y rl:>'t'le.
01
0
At lrS1O Genern.1 r:lnr'k receivnd Lt . Grm. "lerPro:i, Chief of' '3faf'f of' the
Tt.,linn Ar"~', '"ith Colo11el ] nll.Pvj cjno f'"l_ti rne of i,~ s <-t,"'l+>f' of'f':i cers who
srokA ....,n!":;lish. The l"]-ci11erf'l r1 isc 1 1~sed ··,ith Colonel T-Pllmricino the errirloynent
o+> Itn-1.i<>n unHs on th9 Fif'th ArmY front. He told G0n0rril P,0rrr0i thrit the
It? l i_nn ~otorized nr:tr::>rle hd not clone we 11 or Inn.c;o, its f'ir.st orerr1tion,
n.nrl t½Pt th9 rnn.-n,-yir ~ n ,.,,,i ch +,}-,9 t-roors l-11:,0 riled out unrer r.,,..cssure from the
TTermPn rroeril"J.P,' TJivisio:ri. ri"CT ref'lectA- no c.,,..e0i+, on th;::,vn, thoncrr, to he sure,
rrtPny Ttril:i.r>n solr1j 0 rs in tht Action }, 0 <1 r'ier o:rill'""·.,_t1,r. Gen"lr"l r:1Pr1c further S.?ir' thr,t he hr>d P'iW~n thA Br~<;"'c1e f'IY10th0r cl rnc8 r,nn t,1-yt it r'?O 0one
fnirly- \"'ell, ..-,1t1,o,1gh not rerll:r wel enou,a,}, to T""9t'it tb=i co~r~enrlrition v;hich
he h:->r ,·TH,te11 tC1 GAn'"rPl 0rid.no in orc1er th1 t h9 rniP'rt ~iv8 encou.,,..11,a,erient
to the Itriljan troors. Shortly the:r9a+>ter Gener.,l Cl,Mr 1r J--nc1 r"irected Gen0rrl
I'nri..'1.o to tr> 1'e ov r t"1 rpli9t r1 ef'ensive sector ""'rAre n. Ger'"'lnn Ptt1ck on I? hill
WPS ro"'s::ible ut 1'1ot likely, and Genc.;rf'l Darino I,r, 11 rerlied by letter, st11ting
thrt his rrro1rr c011ld not rlo th:i job, t},qt he was },,wing heri,,y- des 0 rti0'1s 1:1n.d
thr-t 19 shonld h 0 ~ent to the T'APr to reorr;r>n · ze. Generf"'l -Pe.,,-.Mrcl;_ s, id tht:>t
Generel Darino ~,..,,,., he tho 1li'"½.t, A. def'eati..st in outlook rinr1 thrt he intended to
relieve hi.TYJ.
1
0
Ger9r<1l ~1P-r 1r -1-1 r,n ,,..eceiw~d P c::tll ,~rom 1.nbbi 11ric 1'Tler of' tre ,Te,:risb Jelf<1rA '9orrrl anrl Chrln.-in t'l ior Lev o" thA C+"fice c" t•19 Chief of ChPrla~ns, u:ro
was al'.!co,1rn11.yinc- noctor Br~ c 1'1v~r on ,"' t011:r ,.,<> the P-':,tl0f'ielr's. These officers cMrne to visit 0"'"1Gr£'1 Ckrlr w;tl-i GnJ.on,l Rvrn.
fl"'t8r r1~n11n,·•, 11'-mrerrl Glc-,rlr ,,rent r'o"n to t 1 e o+>PiCA'3 of' t:re Iln1.ning Grour
Pt the FM1...,ce ·~th G9rPr.?l GruAnt 110r, 1:1here Ge'19rPl Clark n/0ress9ri tJ,,e officers o-'"' ' 7I Gorps stfl "'f nho w0r, [I c;q9·,"hlPrl tlvY"'e c0·ncerni n.g th=i im 'ort,,nt r;"Jrt
to 1,0 plri:,r<=Jd b•r 1TI Corp', in Or,9,..."tion srr GL--;.
'l'her0.""'t9r, th8 G-ori0rnl, f99li 11a- trr-at tris 'N/lS +,he last orrortn:rdty he
~LV9 f'or ., lor,_P- t•i179 to P-et "'1;' r 1st rv,ay Prori tre cc,n_-1-,inuous rressure
of' 1,'tsiness rt Ji.is CO"'l""P.,,.,r1 rns+, -inv-ite,i Colon9l '"inltzr,rn .<i.nd Lt. Col. '>uth,--,r7_-,,nrl to orive ,,dth M.m ~n hi.s B11i.c"k- to ti--0 .,..,ifth Arriy C'""f'i.cers 1 Rest Center to
,·rnul.d
�f',,,., ',n,1.r'"l . T:be rr'rt•r 10ft, Ge 1v,r"l r~l.<>Y' 1,c c'r·· v.,,,.,cr, r.nr'l I""ce very
P'OOcl t,-':r,n 1111.til r>hout '18V8'1 rdl93 frorr ~orr9nto, wh0n th
Blic1~ 1111..,ccountribly
r9Pnsnrl +,o ro [tY\17 "'2rtrnr . Lt . Col. cut],,--,rlrnc1 \T"''"' r-',~r..,tcl-9cl to '"iorrAnto f'or
helr on fl rr-i ,,c;i11.r1 Itrlinn truck , but ,.,hi.19 thr-i Gonerr>l riw,.,it0r! his return 9
i0Ar Pror~ +,h9 I ,=m:i'1<JU1flr Bn.s9 Se::r':.io11. Re"lollnt 0 9rvj ce , rri ve,1 , driv0,11 by S9rf:;er>rt n. . "estor~ 'H\ .., YJ.d t ct int:; SerP-A"YJ.t P.. . } lo1 rnher . 'T'hese t·im non- comriis,,,ionod
o""f-i cers c;to1"r9d nn 'W'ffY ef'f'ici.e11.t •r nttP ched f' chr i11 to tr0 Generr>l I S CPr rind
+,o••refl hi,.., to tre ( ff~ cors I P.est S011.ter . The G"'"'C'\T, 1 "P s c;;-ref.ltl y .; M:r,ressed by
the ch0e~01l eff.;c1encv nP thes0 t~o non - con~i.s,..ionnd of'ficers nna a.;rgct~f
th"t ,, l_9t,+,or ho -rrritten "'or 1-ii" si ,.,.n.,ture, cnr...,0nr1i.nr:r th9rri f'or their rtnod ror 1c.
stf-l7 f'o,~
P
0
T e n.911.~r.,1 sr,9nt th9 11i ,-,.ht, ,,~,1 f'ollo"inC; dE'y resti mi: rit ,orr0nto nnd retnr11Ad to -1-,:r,9 com1...,n 1 rost on tt A ev9nin"" of the lhth .
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CI\SF,"R.T.f\ -- J4.'J1Tf, .. Y 17, 194L~--Grm9rPl r:l"r 1• to,'"'Y .,...ec9iV"'d <i crll f'rom G0,ri 0 r11l
K9V8'1 nho ' 01 SCUSSP,( "itl-i hiri th9 rroc'res-:; of' +:,r, II Gorrs Of9rntio'1.~ rr,_c :its
9mrlo:m•,'1t . Hri t -,p rec9jvecl A. C9ll ·"ran G,"3r""rPl Luc"s ·rho ,rs joined
(}911';rrl TJrnnn , <>nrl th(Yl9 o,,.Pi.cer-:i ,H r;c 1.ssen t,>19 .,,-rop;r9ss in mP 1dn--; thA f'in~J l_;=ms f'or Orer<Jtion ·:rrrGL.~ . Q9:rr..rrl CrPne, v~o is -rlanY\inp; f'or th8 nd mini strr-tivn rr0hle"l in tr9 ~it,r o-" no"9, tJ-,en ..,ic1 ,, 'hri0f' c..,11 on G<;nerr,l
C7 rr1-::, r,110 , "'ol 7 o-••-iYJ.F; t 7•-is , Colonel '1ic 1
.relwrjt cn 1 led to rli--;cuss rend~nf.; co11rt
<>rti." 1 C," SAS .
-",1tiir9
bv
1
V9gt,9-rr "Y "10rn-i ,,_~ t 8 f'ollo"'jrir; cn 1,19 vms sert to 15th l\rmy l',rouy, f'ron-i
t,h9 ~ilitnrr n.ssi.on •rith th8 Tt,nl-l1m AY'-r1y ,,1th P"l. -':nfor'Tintion cor;r to .,..,if'th
Army:
P,.'·T ClRO . "'irirr . rrt,; 1 i TTmh 0 rto tn'ms rver coMrn...,nrl of' 1 ·,otori Z"'r! Bde
15 .J"n yice T'lri . • Tl..,ni.no ·r~ncenzo . "
3b 1 YJ.l'.l'le Ty,+,911i,...9nce su,
tio11 or er,e""Y t::r-oonq, " 1lil. it,
Djv-isioY\ rnd tre ')Gth rnn7,er
f,..ont:-1.l i:1,sr-i 1l+, of' th::i 7i->'tl-i
t ion to ->.:r-.,_r~r---: .
1
0
..,...,F
mnr~r 'Q "'A.S is::;11.9r' torn,r c;11!""1°r17,1no- the 1iqrosj,,...,s ""9}+, tl-i.rt ,. ., n'T'8"t nnr+, of' the F9rrrirn Goeri11.g
r,rerv,01er n·vis-ion rniv1-,t b<::i contr>jned in the
Arn 7, tbus en.~i1·v:1 tbe pr9~qur9 o-F> eneny orrosi-
r,., 501.th Cor1hrit "'9PM ,.,i9ld r rder ,tq v1r, s issw::id tocl::i7 nescrihing in detri il
tre r';,'lrt ,., ,; ci,, the 5C:/.1-th Cof'lbnt Ten"! ,rill ::-1.r'y 1n nyer11t:ion C-:.HPiGIB .
11 T hr>ve been +><>vorribl7 im:8,T,J ;073 _ PArso'1<1.l "'or rrcGre8r;r f'rori ClPrk .
ress<;r1 ');T tl-'e tl1orour:h119ss of' vo 1r lnnn~n1 for f'orthcorojna op9rat:ion. I .'l"'
con-"ir19nt 70 1.1 'ill b9 -;uccessf'ul. Gond lu~ 1, to you . 11
0
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r:~s:SRTA-- -JA1' JAR'( 1~ , lqLi-4- -In t,he ...,,orn;n:; tJ-,e G'~ner11 l r13crdved n er 11 f'ror
r:o,.,,\'1A nrl i:ri P" t 19 !+5th D:5 vj -; j_o11.. mhe Gener/l 1 ,'i ~cu,s9cl -'-,he ross-:1-,79 enrlovrnAnt, n:' r" . . . t, of' th9 Li/5th Division to r0inforc9
~ t 1·oors l'"'rrlirp;
i:r +.h9 "irst rhrse of' n:,°"rn:tion JI'I'Jr;.LS . Th8 C"¼e'7.err, 1 next rec9 i V8rl n. "r 11
(1011 <::Jrn 1 T;r, rrJ.e s,
v,
�fror1 GenArr-1 Le"lnitzer ho discu~10rl i-iri0fly th~ iJ11!"l;n°nt FrrivPl of G0n°rtil
Alexri.nrler 9nrl -+:,J:-0 0stohl ishrri0nt o 1-iis •lead 1ur:>rters nt CA.sertl'l. ~nstern of
Bnri . mber9P Pter G~ner"ll V1r r; n ri.nd Gen°.,...'1 J. i= PYJ.C 0 en '1A to c, 11 on G,meral
0,lprk ?11(1 d1'1CUS9 tJ.-e 1uestio'1"l o+' suprly +'ro'1 tre ro-lnt 0{' ,,.:<JV[ o-f' the 1 Jorth
Africrri establisrment"' cic; w9ll rs tJ,0 r,.,ninsulRr Rase '":ection.
At 1 ')45 '}eneral Slr-rk- 1-i?d nn o-"+'-th0.-,,.ecorcl "Te3s cn.,,+'9rr.mce in +,re ½ut ,
9.t ,..,11i.c"i he .:11r1 • cri.ted to 17 1vrr corr0sronr113>its , rh0+,or~P;hers R!'ld rnhl:i c relrt~ ons o"fjcers +J,.,,t c1 ne•,, bl_o"T '71"1'1 to he struck rit the Germr·ns . These corresronr1en.ts r8 1ervi nn- toniorrow to jc-.: n c-utfits rrrtj cip[ltini; in 01 erfltion
,PI'VH..E . ""'he G0'1eral rlid !1ot ;_,,1:Ucnte '7h9re OT' when th8 orer.,tion r,,oulrl take
plPce h1t exrl, ·in")r to t O COT'r0.r;rondey,ts t'1,:,+, tre ...,if+,h AT''1Y w;.s rrepnring
to 1tri"k:':l th<1 h rr'e3t ½low it }--,.ns y0t .?tr1u::: --;~nee the 1.rindinf; .,t Sr>lerno .
Tr'.) 0en':i'"l out1in'"'rl +re ~j ➔,n'ltion 8.'3 it no'"' C''ists, e·"TlriinAr.l that tre ,..,rench
l'Jorrs "'nrl str11cl• 11lon"' the r·i"'l1t f'l,.,nk ~n fl.n ef'fort to dr-o "l Merri GPr>,rn troors
. +,o t ,,t E1roe, t'1Pt tbe T-lritish Corrs lrnnched 1.r o"'f'cmsivo ,,cros<J the Grri -~, i Dno ln.st nir; 11t i'1 ,,n e+'+"ort to Purther »re11.'\rnn the Gerritins I Cr ssino rosi t-i on rn rl 4:,hPt n 1 tb-~11. fl. c;hoT't t~·,0 the tr Corrs "1011lrJ P,''9rt more rr 0 '1sure in
t,he c911ter c--f' the lir,<> . mhes": trree r1oves , 1-,0 sPi..r, 7err, P ~n~lude to rinother
or-orntion th,t ho WPE' ;:orry he could not 9,crln 1 n ~n c'letPi.1. The,e thr•w corr,s
o-reT'<itions "''3re designed to bririr; Yoore Gr::rl"'r n ::;+,renn;th dum to the 'l<'ifth !\rmy
f'rc.11t cinc'l to tl1in out, if' ross~1--,7..e, l}err,rn -rorces th;t T".• P,ht orrose tre sreci.ri l operDtion . Fe s<i.id
rc".d "1.j'J't' hor0s of the t'encli'1P' orer[ltion, '"'nr ,,hen
1
::i.s 1(ecl if' this or0rrition 'ms not c esif{l1ed to J.ir, sten the f'r 11 of Ro ,
the ii'ifth
PrMy Corrir~ppr]er renli8d thrt ever7 orer.?.tion th0 ,..,j_ftr J.rmy unrlertco 1• WRS de'<if;ned to sr,eed thP rlPY " en Allied troors ·011J.d erter Rorrl9 . Fe outHned to
thA Co"'rec;nondents "O'M', n-" t,hn c°-l "r'i("''ll~ rn·i l-lt,:-r7 "' 11c'I '10n Pl: litn.ry rroblems
thrt vro 1 1ld qr~<Je ,,~tJ, tre +,[-l 1ri'Ylf"" nf the ItRli Pn ~r~·-itrl.
0
0
0
"'e
0
,
Ge.,,8rP 1 81 "'r,, no" ril"rs to 1-i'"'ve one> o+> 011.r corr.e,..ronde'1ts ri.ccornr"'ny him
on the rm hcnt hen he dw,hes ur to the 8'111 rPn QSS"nlt Prea on :;' fr V . Tr is
c0rrPsro11dent rrobr->"117 "rill be '"yron Snlzberr,er of the 'iew York T:im<=>s .
,_~
Th"' G0YJ.eral, Pfter cn 1 1tjouc:;l'r ;_-,,c'i.cnt-ina; thnt rin i.rriportrint str.<-te~ic
"10Vel""mt WRS i1"1m:inl'-mt , tJ-re1•1 the cc-n-:errmce oren to qw=igtions . The corres ronclo.,,ts , -"ror,, t 11"':i r ci_ue-.:it ~ ons , "ere YCJost : -,,tere"lted in 'Then Rone won 1d be
tri 1~en "'nr "'hRn the l}ener.n 1 exrected ,, juncture bet ·:een th<o tJ-,ree corrs now in
cnP1bPt r,nd tre srec" n.l force (<1TIT TGJ:E). Th3 G,mera1 "n.id he ropec1 thrit this
juncture •m111.cs 1,e "'1,,de '7itr.:n t,rn ·7ee 1rs ?+'+,er +,J-n [nsnult . Tre corresrondents
r>lso ·•0'1(~8red i.,.. this srecii=il ii'i.f'th Arr pr oy,er.,,tion vrr,s i~ n.n:v 'il";l ticid in ··fith
onerPti.o~s c,lsev.,here . The (}Pn9rr 1 tol-1 them thrt f'or <1c11e time hc, hnd been
wn.ntinr>; to 8Xecutr:, '>11cJ-· r-i.11 orer,,tjon but thn.t until now suf'f"ici<mt crnf't hRc!
not bnen rvn.ilrible . Th9 cr-"r"nr811ce ;::inded ,.,-J,cin G3n8rr-tl Clrrk hr>d to hurrv to
"'noth9r :"'9eti11f m~th Gen0:rnls nouse 211,, Gr>11non . P;::i""or9 1.eriving, ho1ever,
G8nerr>l C1."r 1,. F>lso to1,1 tl:-e corres-ron/lents th"t onc, of tre ..,ost ~l"!Jx·,rtrint +',9ctors th~t '!onld P-overn the Rssrult "•oitlrl he tre werther rnd th-,,t p;ood 11er>tber
would hpve to nr9vPil +'or th, r:rerc1tion . He '"laid thrt , <>s yet, hCJ had received no lorin; rc1nP,'e rr11r'iction on h"t the weather ·1011.ld be on the 11lr.nned
day.
1
1
1
rT'}i9 s11bjAct of his con.,..errmce ·ith Gcmernl Uouse a'1r1 Gener, 1 Cn.nnon VIf>S
ti,9 rro:--oscid drop o+> the 50l+th . nrad ute Jn+'..,ntry 11egim0nt . Generr 1 Cl,,rlc WR s
�worrieil by t"Jo c0nsir1errtio,...s "Tfectinr; this o erntio"l . In the f'jr--;t :lace ,
thA r.res"'nr:<J of r, force "ell +>cT''l,":rd of tr 0 1 rndi'1gc3 tc cut off the f'"'rrooch
to the rieach by rr0rT11r>n +'orces is 'hifl'hlv desirri>:>lc "nrl , if' eff'r>ctiv"' , 1-:ould
greatlv f'Pci litr>te the whole S:irTGL'":: Ororn.tion . On tr•, otl 0r 11;-,nc", ti-,9 two
g,:i r r-onerc ls ro-i '1ted out tJ,~t no r -heAr,[il "0r the orer,-,tj o'1 hc=>d been T'O"' sible ,
trrit tl-io :iirborne troo:rs hrrl 11ot _rect.; cec r lr''1r1int; "'or a '1umh=,r of r1onths
Fnd t,hn.t ti- n1°019 !l f'frd r, +>ror. t'he -roi'1t o+' v.; e· r o"' the r> ir , hnc'1 the n'1.ture
o"' P'1 "mrrovi:v1.tio11 . -t F9.S ro~sP1le th.:t t. n prr cJ,utists r.iip,ht be '7idely
sc,.,ttrired upon ln.ncHn"', b9 j,,,,P,ff9ctive as n delr>yinrr force 11.nd be rendered
ther0nf+,er useless i'S ri forr:e for A-ny rurpose . Th9y nlso roi11ted out th,-,t
th0re ~"011l_d ")e no T'\oon nt U'is ti:me .
0
The General , r,fter be2ri.ng tre r•ros ~1;_d ccns 0ecid0cl to ,:,-ive tl1 8 rn?tter
14ttl9 -"F"'t '?r c1'ns-irl0rrtjon .
~vrmt,1rll:'r be decider' to eljr~innte th9 dror
11d lonr1 th9 50/1,th from the sea . At 1330 G9r0rnl Alev:D 1d9r ,,,.,,.rived "lith
Q,m9rnJ. ford4nr; rn0 Gonerrl J,e"1nitzer . G")""lernl lil9x:Rnder t"rowi his o',n jeep
ur tl 9 rath to a po 4 nt in f'ront o,-, tre n j r1es I t,mt nnrl cnne to r da;;;hi ng
halt . In th~ co-.-,f0rence ·Tith GA:>111rn1 Cl~r4 1 the Genernl di -::cussed the ::trtus
of Or11rqtion r;rrr 1GLP. and the 10 Corrs o ~f'P.ris" V8 no,·, in rrogress which ap1
yier>rs to be mn l::~ n,, o;ooc. ·,rogres s c esr; te count8r rt tr c r:::; ner r th 9 T"louth of
,thFJ G~rir.:7 j nno jn tho vi.cinit7 o-" the villPge of' ''inturno and 4rgento . The
Rr-itish "re berdnninp- to f8rr;r trin1rs :'Cross, :rnc Ui9 0 1 1tlook -':or ri rerosonr-l)ly
s11ec13ssful op9r Ptio:r -ts 1,right .
p
1
0
G,~"10rn.l Clr,rlz saic1 to GenerP1 Ale·-:and"'r, fl"'lonr; oth9r trh1gs , th:-t the
t:iT118 would con.1~ ·+0n he hnd to ,fo so~rithjr,Q' Rbout th'3 number of visitors nho
"ere descFJnrli·'1i:r uron him , 11sin1; hi,s C,'"rs , J- 4 s 1'llc'l:..~t9rs r>'1rl tn 1·::ln~ up the
time of h:i""self' anc: bis stp+'f of'f'-icers hen they ,·;ere eng:-,p;ed in orer,-,tions .
HA sn5d th,,t this rlid "lot Ap ly to Generrl J\lex11nr'er ·1ho , Pfter rll , 'ms ris
direct co"111ar.r1 er, bnt he t ·ougl·t GsmerP 1 ~ l 3xr-nder should tr> ke tre onus of
r,rotecti11.r him f'roJY> othr:ir ~,-wursions . Gennrril c1~rk r-dder ti,,.,t, PS G3ner2l
\lexancler knew , re hnr'l thus f13r been extr emely r8certi ve t0 visitor~ , 1 mt tbe
r1ooc1 hfld -"e.'.'lch'Jd tJ:.r" poi11t '7},8re c;ow,th 4 nfJ' J.-i,:,d to he do11'3 riho11t ·'t . Gener~l
Alex8.11der sa ir1 ths.t he wo 11ld do 0ver:yth:; nP, he co 1lr1 t0 keep Gen9r"' 1 C}Prk
frorn br,ino- ov,rburrl9ned .
0
1
A+'ter nn , ho11r I s cnnfercmce, Gener"' 1 Ale'm.nder left 1i.tr r r'1J.ide :rrovided
by General Clark , to 170 to 10 Corrs TAC Fendqur'rters nerr Sessr ~runca to d5.scuss ,d_t}:1 General ,,cCreery the rroi;;ress o-f' t,119 10 Corrs nttl'J.clr .
At 153C Achir11l Cunn'nP-h['m, P. 1,
s- 1·c,
~~:r , nrr:tv~d ..,nrl <liGCll8S8d. v1ith GAn'Jral
/
:·editerrPnean , nn''i Captnin I o"er ,
Glrr 1~ the sea 1sr,ects 0~ the r}l-IItTGL:~
Oreration .
Today ~t noon the 'Prenc'r Bxredj tionary Corp, rrovr>d j ts col"1r1r>11rl_ rost from
1 ratf1. to enpf'ro , thus r,utting it -in r J11ore fn:ror0ole rosition to control t},e
r~ovris of th0 ?nri l'oroc c'ln Pnd 1rd Plr,eri:,n Divisions .
At 171C Gener~l Clr-r 1r '.7ent r'1o"m to -'-,he r~l,,,ce ;-,nd h:-d P blk vrith Lt .
G8n . Devers , Americ..,n Cor~l"'J"'.'1der-in-Chief ~n t½e treater , rep;-,rf;_nr" pro!"lotions
,..,_nd necoratio11s , urF;inF; upon G8nernl Y'evprc the fflct t rt o'1ce " quote of
decorntions wns ceterT'J~ ned re , Q,:merPl Clerk, sho11ld h::"Je the decidinq voice
�1
as to who sroul d b0 c ecorrted vri t hin Fifth Army. Gener.? 1 Dev-1rs was ~ost
corrli['l one sta.tecl th 0 t he intended t0 rocomF1end G8nerril Clrr 1,,. .('or the commr>nd of' Op9r11tion A TTTIL . Ge,,,0rri l GlnT' sriic~ th,-,t ho FP s grrtef'11l for G1=me ral Devers I c0nsii4eration b,,t tl "t be br-td bee11 notified severnl ··reeks be fore thE1t he h:-:id been selected ·"0r th"t conm.ond .
Gener11 l Cl11rk recrd VArl tr8 fol 1 o..:in'; rP.nio from GenerP 1 O::isenho ver
yesterday :
1
1tr 7078 . w tre11. I '.31"' irl p•oor'l.by0 to you in ifrirlos : still held the hore
th11t I rii ,.,.ht ~et to s0e :rou once More b9fore I left th:i tre.oter . r:;j nee
thj s hn.s rroved impo"'sihle I an senilinr: this tPl0~ram just to c,n.y ag.oin
ho •r f'leeplv grat8"'ul I r>m to you "'or tl-ie nPgnificent servi C8S you h1we per f'ormed trrou,.,.l~out the year r>nd n hr- lf th-ot hn.s 0l1>rs0rl. sirce you rnd I
lef't lashing-ton . 1\11 A11iPd -"-ip:1tirio- '"1en nrA rrond of vou nnd ::i.re looking
form.rd to a rerform~nce iri. your next grec't tris}r thnt will equal your rPst
accompl i shm,,11ts . t'\r 1-i8st to yo11 , to Grue:o.thAr r>nf'l to :1y otht=Jr friends 011
Your c;ta"'f ancl in your Army. Goorl luck on CjJ:-TIFGLE . n
0
!!Yo'U' rn.c1jo re'lch0d ~ 0 vesterd"y, nnd I "ms del ip:htec1 to herr from you ,
1
alt 011R;h c :isanroi nted that I m:ii:,ht not baV8 r-n orrortunity to s?e and tRlk
vdth you f'or f' fei-r minutes . I h1'1rl hop3d to "'et -::O·1e 11'1te ·:ord on an:,r
chRnl!es in f 1lt1U'e ev'3nt s, +>or thA -:nrlicrtio"'s I r: t hero , trrou~h Alex,.,11cier,
arP. thfl.t mv tas 1• is on 'l ,rre:,tly reduced sc8l9 . 4o"mver, ··e ,ill do it,
whntev"'r it is . J h, ve h2r1 no timA to r,-j_ve r:ucl· thouqht to thPt, for I h:.ve
"l;T Pye on :1noth0r little ti'"'f::ii.r rc,re, wit•1 1
r1-ich ;rou are verv fF>mil-:Pr, r.nd
bv tre til'lA tliis letter reaches yo1 1 '·e wi 11 -non th'" resnl ts . I rm goin~
alonp; on trn.t OT'8ration in order to obtl'lin +'irst-hrnd -:nformntj_o,,,_ as to its
injtinl success, jn order tr<it ~ r~r7 t.<>l·e rc1vt1:nto[>'e o" orrortunitfes to re in.i>orce tb2t "ront in exrloitRtio11 of Pny orrortm1ities '1-iicl-J. might co:r1e to
11s .
(
"I 11:no-·r yo11 must 1:)e husv. I hope tJ-,,-,t this otrcr ri. "fr, ir /?OAS t},rour:;h
as you h"'d nnt:i cip~ted nnd ti,:cit I rnay have t},e orrortunity be"ore lo1tg to
fl f5A
in cnr,e unr1er ;irour conT'l.and.
rrry r0qFrds to B9d91l r,nrl. the rest of my l'rlends . 11
A l1"1nni.,1ri; 0x,~rcise o+' tbc, 1rc1 Dlvision r.,ris scher1 11l80 for tl1 0 n:t 0 lt, b11t
durinr, the late cwr=q1:i ni re; orts bep;" in to re:::• er Gener/' 1 Clnr}~ th,,t fl n' 1 rnb9r
of losses o-: c,u101s nnrl. 105mm field guns hr'd occurred . The Gr:m<:Jrel rr-- s grertly
concerned .
*
x-
CAS P.TA-- .Jt'ITJARY 19, 191..4-- This nornjno; l}-9mr l Cl:cirk dictate6. the following
to be :inserted in t11e dif'ry of today :
0
"LA.st nip-ht at
'T'ruscott .
l' bout ten o I clock I r0cei ver1 the .ottr> chec'l from Grmernl
\
3hortly there"' fter , rlurh11s the n:l 1;ht , ne n trickled in -d.th re-
�garcls the losses in equipment and JT111teriel ..rhich t e 3rd Divjsion Pd suf-l'ered j n ;ts r0hCJ<1rsal. The" nni.ounterl. ron ;hly to 1.3 dulcNs , 19 105 1 s includi n!'.{ f'ire control e1uir"'1ent , '7 57rim rmti- tronk f;'l.ms 11nd ? 37 1 s . Fre sumn.h1y s0rici co""munic"tion equirnent '8.s lost, but r1et.nils h11ve not yet
been +'urni"hed me . l)11r5.ng tre nir,1-it :r directer'l that Goner" 1 Luer> s, General Tru~cott , '1."'vrl representn.tives , GenP-rr-1 ·olfe "ncl otrers be '1SS9mbled
h0re in order th,,t ,te night discuss, roint by roint, di+'ficulties encountered and b.1,8 the necessr>ry ster"' to see tri"t the;r ,·,oulG. not recur in the
oreration.
"It has 9.lunys been my t} our-'1t in roherirsing +"or these oper~tio11s th.,t
tl 0 dr;,r r'm srould be b,qd , rnri thrt r1i -:;tr :es occurring b8 correctecl before
the final O:'er 0 tio'1 . Th9 overFhelming r,-i "'T'1!1nPgeri(mt by the "Jrwy in this
cn.se arra71~d ne . I.,~ convjnced t½rt Dost o+' the ni"'ficulties encountered
nere due to ln.clc o"' rroper plrnn~ng, ½uttoninr; 11r ~nc' b·rinin--; on the vrt
o+' Vie r"'-vy.
0
'Thi, rnorninr I hPve c'iscnssed tris r"-"tter ":th Gener~1 Lucr>s, Gener...-1
Truscott l'nr-1 otl·9rs ['11( qrrrnr,r;n "or t':1°ri to con"ront the ildrir, 1'3 ~Ylrl th0:5.r
a~rnistants (Lo··ry) ;n order to ov"rc01;'} tlvv:·e di"ficulti",s . ::: hPve just
tr>.lkod on the telepr one ~Ii th Ar,riirr-1 Lo-··r;,r nnd ~r.formed him tr,~.,t I am ri sto ni S ed ri.t sud· ,.,,-; ~M..,1'1.aP,P,r1r,nt • '.!:'i·u. ,Cott ~ 0 I UC" S "'T0 on t 8 :,,,,- "o,-.
confer9nce ,vjth hiri .
1
r
11 '.!:'he ,...A-;--1...-coment o"' f'l,1,li.fT'lA..,t nf trA "rc'l Div; sj on h ~ er1bP 1·r~q:.Jer' m8
17e...-tly. It "n~ n"'ce::>s"r7 "'or ~,e to t,rl,9 t"rese ri1.1~·rs .;-ro7 thA lC Gorrs ,
'll'o n0er10r~ them bfldl:r in the G'rigliano River crossing . It rer:nr· thrt I cr>n
not "11rn~sh the '3")th Dj_vision ··;ith tre ,_,, duhrn ·<-r•:ic11 they need so brdly in
tho-ir cross~ne: o+" t}1e R:cipido. I h~ve hnd to t1> 1<:" m11toriel from the 45th Div~sion '-rr·i_cl, ":ill 11e hf-1rd to r9plcce .
I N1 r9cord-l11r: t' -is hrief outl:ino of nction tr ken ~ n orr1er t 1rt it roy
be in r7 p9r:io11al record . •Uso 11otified Ge11eral Alexanc1 er . 11
11
Q,:,neral Truscott sent in r,n offici.,l rerort on the rehe8rse.l ;:,nd also
sent a brief note to General Gruenther . Botl-i of these 2re quotec' belo tr:
1
The note to Gennrr,l Gruenther: 11 1 ,"'T'1 ta\ing the liherty o:' ;:,endin;:; this
to you so th;:,t you "ill lrnol' how .;-rincy this ev·ercise re0llv W"S . ::'urtt9r,
1
tine is so short thPt senr:li'-iF tl-ii~1 to you c irect rrir>~f pive you 1>ncl tr9 Boss
1e
time to CC'nsjder i.t before you roceive tl- o<'f'jcfrl copr thrt I'r -forwarding
tbrough proper chr.nnels .
"I believe thrit you 1mow r1e v,e 11 enour;h to -mov1.' th, t I ,muld not r.[l ke
such a point unlecis I n ctur1 lly f'i:~ lt stronrrlv 1:1 bout it . J+" this is to be 8
"forlorn hope 11 or a 11 suicir1 e s.oshnyu tl-•=m o.11 I rrr-nt to 1mo i1 t},f't f11ct I./'.' so , I ' m ro~itive t¼rt t'1ero ::.s no outfit in t 1-10 rrorld thR.t ci:m do it better thri".l ne - even tl"ou~h I reserve :!"ir;J.t (personally) to believe we :-:iight
deserve a better fate . u
1
1.•
GenerR.l Truscott I fl official report follons:
11 1.
To m-i1:ttarv f'orce con hop8 to f'ssault r. ' of011ded bench rrith prospects
1
1
�of succes s 1mless it cnn be l 0 nc1 ed on sl:>ore in tacticr-1 order rind rroper
co·'ldition to onga~e j n coT'lb"t .
•,- ercise ,just conclud9d t ; '" dnte disclosed
so "'lnn~r rlefJ ciencies in thes'J 1"9'1rects t l."'t t11e neec1 for ::ic'di ti.on"'l fr1v£1l
train-' 11g and ;,~proved orgr,··izrt,ion i'1 r9rfectl:,r ohvio1w . This exercise hnc
been plArmed for the JalP.rno beacres in +,he vicinity of' Faest1 1r1 and this
area h1:1c'l been Hccepted by th0 ·Tnv7. Les 0, th:m 16 hours prior to the exerci 1e the areP 1·r s ch...,nged to British bePches nortl-i of the Sele River for
Uaval reasons , in spite of' tl1 e -f:Pct th:->t t½.e Pre11 inlirnd wi:1s entirely unsuitable +'or rel1enrsing the militnry orerrition involved in the 3d Division's
part in the 11 3f.I'TGLE 11 operfltion .
0
11 2 .
nut of 37 LCTs assir,ned f'or t e opern.tion, only 11 ,rent on the
exercise; q srec:iPic LCTs sreci1:1lly rerp1ested, cPrrying tanl•s , cornmunication.s equipr1ent, anr1 Di.vision hnadquR-rtors , "mre not 1:1vrilr1 ble; 1 LJT car rying one <J.snai1lt coTT1rany ·ras not Pv;:;.ilnble .
Son8 of th9 rnore sed ons poh1ts noted in the execution of the
e--::ercise ~re:
(a) 'Jo si.m;lo hattr>lion Jrndod on time or in formPtion . 1 aer1ents
of the bePch P,sanlt hrttn.Hon o.c> tl,e 15th Infrntry ·rere lrndod rs "'allows:
0/i.L,5, L Compl."'ny "''1d hnlf' of HeQdriu;:irtors Company; 0500 , K ComrPny and hPlf
of 1· Company; 0800 , hrl-r:' be...,ch nssPult l,d,tP}ion , ·ps lPnded first , between
the hours of 0405 Pnd 0/,50 . Tbe 1st BPttPliM , ··11 ic°!" srio11ld have been the
lr st bPttnlion to lr>nr , wos l~ndec'l b8t•-reen 0/,?5 Pnd 0610 . Corironies were
l11nr'l.ed 11+, Pll points on Green Beacr , "S ell PS to the north r>nd south
thereof .
(b) Tr"ne::norts 1;,ere so ,~t<r o f sl- ore thrt rssrult crrift re-mired
fron 3 to 4- 1/2 hours to reach the beach .
(c) DHK"lS required 4 to 5 J:>ours to 1J.3rch anc1 , further, s-t le11st
1
/, TFKFS carTYi'Y1.g ? 17nm P'1d 2 57"'lm AT runs, were sw11mred . rres"mt indications Pre tr.rt Pt least 5 others, cnrryin,r; 105mm Ho7 1 s 1·ere 1."'lso lost .
(rl.) ?o single 9le•i1cmt 1 'Ir>s lr>nded in hPnd and on its correct be11ch .
BeAchcs '''ere n:issen b:r as much as l,OC'O yards .
(e)
Iracticallv no b:"irntry trcticnl vehicles ·vere lcnded .
(f) Ho :inf<>ntry anti-t~nk mnrons , rirtiller·r, or tr:mv-destroyer
.a,,.:ms rere l'shore by daylio;ht Pnd in position to mP.et enem:r iwtion.
(g) Assnult crri.ft hench8d nt ,,J.ow sp~ed c1nrl stonr<ed ·crl,en g-.ronnded,
forcinq, troops to diserbrirv in deep water unnAce--;sriril;r.
(h)
v-:rs .
'In tan1rs ·, ere ln.nded .
(i)
Crp_ft f'::, j lnd to report to tc.ke rn~iT"1rmtril commm,r ers from
Ci)
Prnct-i ca 1 .ly no use '7f' s nJ?de of LCWs or LCA.s to ferr:r troops
ashore "rom LGis , nlthouo;h t1,-~_s rrocofur9 is includ0cl ~n the plan 'ln,, will
\
�3\
undoubtedly be essenti/"l 1 in the oper.otion.
(k)
Ship-to- shore conmunic."V ans were ••efed,i ve , if not tota.lly
(1) Th9 r9h9rirsRl rrovidnc no test +'or CCH'1l1Unicnticns , r11rticmlr1rly with reference to 1'nvn.l P,11.n+'ire .
(T'1) Troop o<'ficr,rs 111_...,rt 01·s not "r iJr ble to Army personnel.
Army of'f:icers in so.,1e en.sec PS 1'8d to use e 11list0d mens ' l"trine n.YJcl vrore
barrec .,,.r()Jn r.... rrlroon .
"3 . Tl e ·r.,,vnl sjoe of the 0.~srult orerrtion ras controlled .,..ror.1 the
Risca me by the 'T[' v'11 Cori11n.nrler . The Di vision Co:1r.:n.nder, ···ho P ctu.-, lly
conrrncls the ::-sseult troops , is A.ssig"l d a nritis)1 L<,I as He2d111.rrters
ship . TJ-,e so-cPlloc Derut-r to t,}-,9 ·rrv~1 Coruri..,n'ier (vrho J,<>s never been so
desirn~ted in · ritin1Y) hfls Y10ither stP,...,... , n.or
cilitiT'~ , nor co·~r-n.micn. tions "or control o"' t,1-,,. c;lyi_~-ninr: involver:'l . ~o -rr,r r,s 1::>~Htv to ~Ylfluence
the nssr>ult oreration, the •):ivi'1ion Co,.,,r nnder, is , :in effect , rierely ~ F'3senP'er .
1
0
0
00
1
0
0
11 1, .
To lrncl trds Divi.sion on "SVI'Tl}:r,Ett 0eaches 8S it ·ras lnY1neo during
this rel-iearsnl !O'lld be to i'1vite rl:i_s~ ster i.(' tre i:mom:r sl 011lrl counterr-ttack
at dr-iylight wHh /,0 or 5C' tnnk, . There is no doubt thrt the -=:uccess of the
operation "rould b"'l jeopnrclized nor t.hr>t t},e loss o+> l.i+'e "nd mnteriel 'lOuld
be excessjve .
0
11 5.
(a)
In my or1nion, ti,ere is i:;rPVe ne~d +>or 11cdition"l trr>i"d.no- to
insurr, tJ, 0t AS'"'ault troop, ··ill be lPnded in cc,nc1 4 tion to "'Ccor1pli::ih their .
m:isslons . I ,..ecOT'1.I'l8nd a r8herirsal.
1
(b) 'Pre corriwmd orgrni,rn.tion ~ s obvio1rnl;,r c efecti ve . The comnanrler of' the as"lm"lt T'ivioion hns the respons~bility f'c,r the assn.ult; he has
nr-i:.it .or cow1unicr1tions, -1' 0 cil~ +,ies, nor :iccess to ,TP.vr l cor~mr>11d "'or j_nfluencinr the onoratj on rrior to landinfs. 11
1.r-'ni:; the nir;ht Gener"l ";lr,rl,: decider1 thrt hn "mnld not put on the pro rosed drop of the 50l;th Inrn.chute !n"rn+,ry Reg~rnent "n thA ·e0rlv 'iorni.m; of
D day anc1 thPt insteocl h,., ·muld drop it ,·,jth:1.n our o•;n l:ines on th8 riight of
D da.y. The rlecision to "'/"1 1·e the 0:ror i:rith:in our o·:n 1i113s v'lP.S sub,i ct to reconc;iderPtion i-1. crise the G-=mer;:-1 kter considerecl it un..,ise .
0
/1. t 0~30 GerierR 1 Luc::i s arri vx1 , in res:ronse to Gr.mArR 1 Cln.rk I s surrimons .
GenerP 1 Dev"?rs , Gen0ral G.9rrJTI0ll and Generr 1 Roo}"1 nl,:;o E>-rri V8cl . nd hPd a brief
tall: "Iith Gener"l Clrir1c. Ge11errl . Dev9rs tivm lef't -~ith Colon0l Hrrrj son rind
Lt . C:ol. C"mphell o+' 11is r.ePC1qu~rtqrs to visit T.'rench Corrs , nnd Grmer<>l
GR"'1"1Cll vrent with Cantain L"mpson of General Clrir:V 1 s stl:!f'f to visit 10 Corns .
/1.t 1030 G0119rri1 Glar 1c c ecorr>t-,c1 '"'2 rien ,rith tGC I s, L<~gio·"s of "erit rnc1. Silver
3tRrs . Th8 cerewon-r trok r lac9 in the I'1endo1·1 in f'ront of the Chief of Str f'f I s
V'ln ,,;j th a 1ruPr~ of honor , i;onsi sting of R co"1p1rny of th::i 101st MP Br>ttn.lion
and the Fj_fth ArT'ly Band . ':'h9 o"'+'icers "'1d n"m to b"'l r1 9corrted included Colonel
"lutler, 'Jnn in commnnc;. of th9 1/.i-th Di-rision , Lt . Col. Denholm, Bri~ . Gen . :ilb11r p7.rl Color,el Krimmerer . 1 I},en tJ--9 off·i ccrs [" ·'lrl 119n to b8 rricor..,ted v10re
1
�assembled General Clrr'lz, icrho vms About to go to his rositfon in front of the
men, saio to Captain Be/'.1.rcvrood in P cor,m::cncl tone, fl Get dovm there E>nd strmd
up with tl-•ose men to be decoroted. 11 Ca.ptt ~n BeRrdwood rlid not \,n.0 ·r thPt the
eve11j ni:; before papers hP.c b9en comrleted to 1T''Jard him r,nd Cpl. Tn-,,nenbaum
Silvnr 3trirs t:'or rr.olle.ntry At the Selerno lenr1 ing for bringing ashore vitally
needed signAl eauipment . · He sair to GrmerPl Clr-rk, "'1JhPt did you say, sir?"
'i hereupon Genriral Glarl,c said, flDo as you r>re told" .
C::i.ptain 13e~rdwood went
do·m and stood with the men to be decorPted Pnd received his Silver Stnr at
the h~nas of the Army Commander.
1
1
In the eveninFt, Grmeral C:l11rk hr,d t,·rel ve dinner guests. They included
most of the hi~her militPry leac'ers o.f tre r1e0Uerr,.,nean the.?ter. Before
going to d.:i nner the !'.:;nests met at the hut. Tresent ,-,t th0 dinner, in 11.ddition to Generals ClRr\: 811d Gruenth8r, were: From IY'J, AC 1 lF, Generals AlexPnder,
Harding and Lemnitzer; from the Perliterranean Fenfquarters, Gener2!s Wilson,
1'evers, Gammell and Hooks; froq the Air :F'orce, Ge11er~1s Eaker, Crnnon o.nd
House . The dinner, 1 rhich was s0rvr;d in Gen,ernl Clnrk 1 s unpr9tr-mtious mess
shnc}i::, l8st8d over P'1. hour and si..,ortly therePfter, · Pfter returnin~ to the hut,
the guests ,1 eparted.
*
*
CA.)~RTA--JAHUARY 20, 1941.- -GenerPl Clark depPrtecl from ris ac~w,nce corn.mrind
post at 09.30 this morn 1 ng and flew to II Corrs Heac1 ri_uflrters, where he conferred crith GenerPl }(r,yes, the Corps CommRnder. Returning by cub, General
Clnrk arriv':!d bac1.r at hi:., Heaclqunrters at 1130. Instend of us:ng the sm11ll
Caserte artillery a.irffold, Q9nernl ClPrk utilized n n11rrow roR.d in the comFrand post area as his t2l:e-off end landine; strip.
TJpon his return, he conferred with Colone 1 rhillips, Public RelF1tions
0fficer of Allied T.'orce Feadqw,rters, rind Lt. Col. Clark, thE:i Fifth Arm~r FR(.
~rot Jrno,virlP; the stPtus of tbsi co:rnn.and o.c> Oreration A"TVIL, Col. Phillip:: had
,-.rr.:itten asking th~t Colonel Clork's services be turned over to him for a special operP_tion . GenerRl Cl11rl:, lmowinc; thrt Colonel Fhillips "!PS referring
to A~flIL, the vory operetion thnt he is set up to comrr1rnr1, t."lked over public
rel8tions plans ,·•ith the t.-,o public relPtions officer"' Pnd agreed to detach
Colonel /J1Pr 1" for sp8cial plr-rnninr: for Op:"r"tion A',TVIL r,bout Fehrl1?r;r 15th.
The Fifth t rmy Gomrnr>.nner i:i lso dj scusserl i: ith Colon8ls rhillips Pnd ClR_rk the
release of informetion concernin<; the irrmirn:mt Operation ::mr'TGLE . He stressed
th"'.t it must be brought forcibly to thP- rnblic I s attention thPt this is a
Fifth Arny oreration, an integrnl mil.itr-1.r7 pnrt of the rusb Plong the, present
front. Colonel Fhillh,s P greed to :3tre::s this f,:, ct in "'n on-the-recorc b,, ckground press conf'en=mce thAt ,fill be h0ld tomorrow. Generri 1 Clr,rlc noYr ['lens
on takin:; two correspondents vrith him r.boPrc' the FT bo."t on D dny, one P.merican c1nd one British .
1
Generr:il Glrr 1 hr;d Colonel,:, ihill"ps Pnd ClArl,
,
flC'.'
,1is luncheon r-;,J.ests .
Pollo,,inr llmch, G/'.mernl Clark went -into A. co>1f'8rence ,·,ith Q~ia~rrls
Gruenther end BrRnn, and lPter they "rere joined by GfmerRl Luces. G'en8rP1
Luc8s had COJ'l1e f'or a lnst TT1jnute '-:ord from Grmer-:;1 Clr>rk before r;oi11g jnto
"TA.plGs to board the vessel th11t ri1l tAke him on C'rerrtion 3IIrfGLE .
1
�"As " rr:sult o-f' tho J.rmy--~f:'VY ccnf8r'"3nC'3 ye'1t8rr!ry tc i1'1V:c,t:i.g:c.te misr,rin~P""Tf1Gl1t ci,..,f'l loss o+> 8auirra9'1t nn.rinO' r9herrsr>l of "r' i)iv~"'ion, rrPcticrlly f:11.1 ro:i.nt'1 ;n il_1.J.8Stio'1 ~mr9 r1 ~"'CUSS(➔(1 0 n/ srtic-f.-,ctor;r ,olntion'"' Prrived
c>t •rrereby these S8.'."19 errors . ouJrl 1-ie r1in-'mized 0 ,1r-'11p; tr9 orer:>tion. I lir->ve
t:'llked with G""nrir·l T,ucPc; tJ.i-'s rintr>, r:dor to 1 js r1 er'1rt1J.re +>or the "3hip, "nd
l e is rtis.-.i0d tJ,-,f't evnryt1-1 ~nr; h"s been rlnn9 b-r the •·pvy to fr,c~.litrite the
l::i.n,li nP' . GenPrP 1 Truscott has bee"' ~0ver to t 9 Biscr->yrY3 --~th f' sn°ll nurnber
of ris :::tn"f . I hn.-re ~n:f'crwid Gennrr,l Luc"''"' tlrt I "'ill <1.rrive rt r1 out oqoo
0'1 D clay at tho
iscn.'1'19 ·"or cr-ri.+>ere'1ce yd or to go~ ng ns'10re if tho tr> cticnl
situr>tion p9,,.nits .
1
0
1
tt'l'h:i fr ilure o+> tl-i.0 .,ttP c1 0-0 t 1,e /"iStJ~ "'i.v-' don to reacb its obj octive
r
acrO"S t e Lir~ Riv'"'r t0Hr.rr"' tli8 Sr-ri .Ar11,,,.o,...,.io ,ms ri.11itr:i [1 ½lo"!. J '."'A.'1 +>e8r+'ul th'lt Gr:me:r~1 ·'rT1'8S"\"!Orth hric a "'9ntr1 .,,..93n>•vntio>1 ~s tc t)l() or;sjb-ilities
o+> ciuccess o+> bi.f> or9rr-tion. Tt "08'llc to 1e r.n inh"r9rt nrr>ctj ce ,•j th liim to
ttPc"k ·lith r1;nirn1m •·orc9s, ··itb the -,...esrlt ti~,t 9 ~3 re 11lserl ··ith 7o,ses,
0111 11 to "1£1 1,,.e :'.t '1.ecessPr~r to se<1d ;n r·erviPr "orcgs 1Rt"1r to do tl-iA c-,9r1e ,ioh.
It is thfl 1uestion n+' "si::nrlino-.., ½ov tn r1o £1 "'l""n's ,job". Ie id tie <:!p"lp
t},-·'1.,.. i11 +,he ratt,,c'· on ..mmt Gedro, ••·l--,-,re 0n9 or t· o cornp nies Fere se"lt, re:rulserl, anrl a l<>rger "orce sent in to c'o the job. ~ flP.n to TI Cori's, +'0elinF th,.,t ' t vrPs necessPr;r to d;sc1
.J.S" "!~th G'"n,.,...,,.,l i' 0 ye:s -1::,},P. results o+' this
+'pilure, for " 7 +,1101 1 :~h t A 1,Sth Affort •-rc11lc Pot e11.+,ir9l· 1 "VA ·n rotect9c• ris
lef't f'l['nlc, itci f"i1ure •·oul•' l_9r•ve :it Antirel·r uncovP.rerl r1ur:i. o- his crossi,,g
o.o tl·e R"pj do Pi vnr . As e. res11lt o+' ny con+'ereYJ.ce 1 1~ tb K•Jyes, J h;:iv9 r;ent
thP- -"ollo d·1p- clirectiV9 to Generrl r·ccr0er;r.
1
"I s0nt !}-"n.er"'l Gr119ntrP.r lw rlPne to see ''cCrnery, ho feels th"t the
<>ttn.c 1 ' o-1' +ho Y)th .,.,ivi::don } ~ci little chm1ce of rucce"s on. ncconnt o+' tl--e
'19nv r ,,ef',msj ve riosi tion of ti·1e A1:l.8"':r ..-•est o+' trr:i Re...-i_do. t rr iDt" in ti,,,.,t ~ t
·s 0SSA'1tiqJ_ t}v,t, T T•r 1 th..,t rtt'1C +'11lly A:;mect~_nr: }19QV" losses in order to
11.0 lr1 ,, 11 -':,] e trooyis on n:r ~rn'1t Pnr7 c rr.,. roor0 tn .· t, thPre i...,; cle~r-' nn- t},,, •·1ey
f0r
pr;GLB. The Pttn.c'r -~ S ori . 11
ri,
_r
"l. ::n orclAr to .c,rici.1~t<"lte th:i nttrclr o+' tre ''\J: ,0 P,iv9r ,, jch 'ill be
eP11n b•r 1) 'J II Gorrs rt ')oro 1 cnrs +,l'is rnte H i"' di.rc➔ cterl i:,l,..,t the !"1S Divi cio11 bo ~ ssued ., n--;trur:t:1.0'1S '3 Pollo S:
r
!!• rro ½rvr:i t,.,o PC\ P.ri.p;Pd8 f'ni,.,:, .., cross~,,.1 0-!' the G'?IrrLIJ'PO Riv,9r
to11icrJ,t 0 0/0 1 ;rn-ri1rr:r, in tb'l 1rrne Pren"" t,J-,nir rrs~ul_t o·" tlii:1 r:vor ·-r0
C'''11111.ct9rl ri rht 10/')o ,Tqnurry.
..--,V9-.CY effnrt . ; 11 be, 1"1'"08 to ; ,,, iC' +,c, thPt
th;s ·•ill 11e q lrirse-scn1e oro ·sing .
]2. Fold onP brtt;lio<1 0f t'1<=i l . N Bri~"de rPndy on c"ll f'rom the
Co 17 nin.n. inn; Gener"l, II Gorrs, to ''K'VP, i.11to tl-e ::>re" ''et •e9n ''a-'vcrr LIRI ~nd
•i ver G".,,..igHano ( c,:_,nter of r>reR. GO.>S71?7) tC' -rr0t9ct ti,,,, left of II Corrs.
'],is 7,n-':,tnlio·1 1 ✓ill not 1-ie usAr'l to r::-:;s.nult tl 's locriljt•r, but •·•i.11 br:i mow1d
thGre tr relj e~_r9 r battalion of the II Gorrs vrhich will heve prcw5 ously occupied the area.
�£• Be pr epr r ea to surport by .(>ire the II Corps f' t tPc:lr . netr,ils of
this supportine; f'ire to be arrrnw~rl betv"A"1 the Cor1ririnc1 -i11p- GPr10r~1c;, '<')th
J)jvision (rJ. 3 . ) rnd /~6 Divi:::io11 ( 13r) .
"2 . II Cor:rs hrs hnen ,-:i11.t,l orized to ''moke 01:Jser v'l-<-ion south of the
T{iver LTRI in zonn o+> 10 Gorrs . 11
FolJ.o•ri11r' tln ri-ieti:np; ··it:-- G"'nGrrl Lucr>s , Gr-,'1 errl Cl.,rk n,ceivnc1 his
Jude;e l\rJvocr>t9 , Colonr:il ' 1ickr:1Yr::-iit . A dert' "'Ant0nce 1"'or t 1"0 Tt...,li"n::: -Pound
r,1:lty o.,.. 9SfiO"f'C'9 hrs b,9e11 decrP.ed hy G"'ner'l Al0·,cfl 1Y1 nr, "'1d G·3rter 0 l Clrrk
is crPrP,'Gd ·ith r.in. 1dn't -nl.!'.!'1:0 .f'or t:1e e:recutior . Th0 t•'T() :rt~l~pn, nre to go
be+>ore a f':i_rinO" sound !"t 1000 tomorrow . T11ero 'ill be no rictu:re-:; ::--nd no
WEIT corre.sronc011t~ pre::;9·'1t, b11+, r y11hlic relr -J:,j ons o"""icer vri 11 brief the
corresr,ondents concerning tb11 e'recu+ ion .
Lnte 111 t,J-,e ...,.r-t0rnoon Gen0rPl IJL..,r 1..- ::>lso co:nferred ,.,.•th Ge,..,nrr1 ''or,qn
C0'1.Cern:in17 s~ rtnF 1 rr0hl 0"']', on. Crer,n+.ion <"'FI'.GLE .
*
*
*
GA::r"'-qTA-- .JArWAR.Y ?l, 19/J~- - Aln1ost bAfor0 be '7'1S out o+> b8d tris "lorri~ng,
Genern l (a.,.r1 rece5 vecl P JFte · ,.,te 7.lj "9nc..., ;~ei ort 'from Colo11el HonPr'' . The
,;:
·ertl er todr.y is C;Oorl , •ritb orily 8 "'ll:ir,ht t,!:lzo nt nbout 10 , 00C' feet, ~no
the i•y1 ic· t~cns Pr<'.J t'y,+, the •19pt,]-,nr <ill bP ,~it]:-, tl A Fifth Prrrr:/ nhrm OrerA t70'l. "",JPJGTZ'a i..s lannched ePrlytomorro" nor.,..,~11P". Colonel 1io•rird 1 s rr,Tort
1
sho'l''S th..,t tLe G0r'1[1ns nra d,il1 r0,i11.forc:lnr: c c:n ~n the Cr ssino-Rer-ido (}r,r:i.p-l.in.no "'eeion, nnr'l t js ~s f'l1. -;.,,.c]jc"ti.011. th£'t tl-e GPr"lPns ,<-·.-.e -f'rlE:nr;
+>o:r tl is ""ove to dra:v troors "rorr. tl10 ·ireR. ~hPr8 the 'T J"'11,... ~ .-orce ·d 7.1 inv"d8 .
0
'::;hec1{in[l' ovnr 1'.' t rn~ nute rlr'ir ' Gencr<' l s1~r1✓- cori-f'errPC' "nr ~ O"'" trnn
>1onr cluT.; '1c- the morn-; 11. c- ·-ith Gnnnr"t. ls (}ruenther f111.cl Brr nn. GrmAr~ 1 :'r nn
y•ill he PCCOT"P<'D;T7 n (1-c,nr>rrl GlPr 1 r tn tl1 e ·in•TGL~ hP"crread -~0P1orro , "nd
G"'1er"l Gru,.,rither 1ill b<3 rnr."in·nr rt "'·ftl1 Army J'e-vlqu..,,rtnrs .
"l,..,
I
G0nerrrl Cl..,r~ receiverl GenPr''l Gu 7 llnn!'lA, Co,.,"'",..,ri'1P' C1n'1ertil of th'3
'1-ouris . GenerPl Gu"lltur1, ?rriv"!rl. in Jtrly v03tercry , "nrl 1,11 ·ill be ioinin~
G nerPl ,Juin 11 stRff . G0ner,l c1~r'r rl~CCTY'ed ··iti /}011errl Guillruri9 , vrho
FPS r· r>cor'lpr>n-i.9(' to +,\-i9 Grmerql 1 9 '/"1n hy Gc:ine-r"l 1lc:il1Cl9r nnd Colonel Sr ltzr1Pn ,
tl-e emplo~1T1ent o-f' Go1mc; R.lonp- the I'i fth Arrviy fro11t .
0
Follo•·i11'1 the G11jllR' 1 "'1P c,~n.-"r"'·1ce , G"-'ner..,l Cl"rlc r0cejvocl his Iub1ic
P."ll[lt1011s f .(>f'icer , Lt . Co • Cl..,,...,,, to obt, in , r9J ort on tr•e nr9s"" cor,.-9rence
thrt G';'18rPl ~1il-,on held tl ~s =orn~11:-: ~n th,=i Crsertn. J.-,Jpce . Colonel Cl::irk
rero-rt9r t},nt r'ren.er; 1 11 :i lson €;[''!'< t 1'19 corresronr1 P.nts 8. I101'8 or le" '3 detr- ilAd
• .t:> •
•
"T,.,
b rl.P.Llng on n perP +ion ,,•T '"•-'·' ,qnc, + l' T,[C))'J tbn+, trjs "'lPS a h'ifth ~rPly,., OVl vn ( ,
fl. (iff\T9lor,,,'3rt o-"' th9 rres'3nt r'l"'t' UT' trn Liri Vr 7 l8y tow1rrl Ro-,,,9 P.'1d th.ot the
f'j c.rhtj ng cnmmanrler 0 .. tri ':: S-r:9ci,"l or0r"tion "OUld be C'w1er;, 1 c1,~rk. G9rerr 1
CJ "r 1r '1 l"lo 8rrrovod [' srec~.., 1 C01"JT"U'1"; QU') OY\ CDP.rev on sµ::• GL~ th['.t Hill be re19,'lSecl tor.1orrow at "hPtev9r t 1 ''IA ~.s r1 0cic1 e0 ur,011 '1y G"'neral C1Pr1c.
Anothr,r Morn.; 11,,. caller 11:-i.s GoJ . f'-i c 1re 1· r it , •·rJ:-o 00'1-r'i=~rrerl , rj th (},3r.0rP 1
Clur r c~ncer~~ nr: r-:mr:l D'' con-rt ,.,.,,.,rti --1 er ses . Th8 t •ro It" liPn -=-pies mentio11ed
yesterdn.·r '7ere e'recut'3d rt 1100 l'01lJ'S th:i~ "1(Tni'1.P,. As Ms lunchPOYJ. ';Uest
�General Glor· had r:S j. Gen. La-~ell ! • Rook", G-3 o+> ITeorlqurrt8rs CentrPl
1'.edit9rrR.n3.'1"' Forces (h0re:1,yf't,'3r T'P,ferrerl to r.s rn J\CMF, Gsmorrl r11s011 1 s
1
He'l( qu.,rters 9nd t]:,9 --;ncces::-or to A'i'Fn) • Ge>Y>r-:il Clnrl, c i sc11.'1s9d Yith
f}nnor91 11.ooks the or"['niz~tio'1...,l l·iero.rcby E'S jt <'rrlies to TtPly. Gener9l G-rwmther ioi.n8d n-~11._.,r,.,ls 'Jkrk [Pl.rl Roc 1'"s ~-'1 r r i.scussion of orgnnizntionnl ~-,,.o')l8"1S "t th8 l1J_ncheon table.
Durj"'f" the d'1.V Lt. Col. Sutho.,...1,-.nd .,,,erle J.rr::t r,innte rlrn2 for the depf'rt·1re nt 05(1C'A to~,orrff' of' the Fifth ~ rm:r C0"1ffi:'1nr1 er rn0 l1j ~ str>ff -f'or
th9 re,a,jon of np0rPt·on t·TT,GLE. (}0ner...,l C;l,..r1· 'rill r;o b7 c~r to t}on to'm
o+' CPstel ,Tolturno, borird a stor~ i--iort tr"re rnc' 0'() a~rroyj,11,ntely 1,000
V'f'rr's ·r,-,st the TTJOUt}, of' t}ie 'lolt11r'1.o 1-iere re "ill bo,rd the TJ • .-. • ·r!""IV'r rT
llo"'t 1?01 ,nnd thAn speed nortli unler" --irec-i,-,1 t'1"r cover to the 'iT-ITJ\Tf'rL"L~
corriP-rv'l. s1,·r, the T"3isca:me.
In th""J ln.te ,;1J't ,rnoon th8 G,..,nr,rri 1 receiv8d . ., cnll .('ror" Joe r;. Bro :m,
Lefty Gor9z, '""rer1 Corcor;,n, Jrcv Shrr '--9Y ::ind 1, jor "ovotn;v. TrP Pirst four
rnu1ed r,..0 t011ri'1!! tJ19 t,rcPter 9n_t9rtr-irdn-; <1oldi9rs. ThA Gr,ner8.l "8.S photogrFnhecl ·jt,h ti is grour w} osP vi--iit ""'PE' rP.nder9cl so~,-31;,hr-t r1 rf'mrt--:c hy t!-·'"e
fPct t1'rit 'r. Bro..m's son h,ic-1 bf=Jen k:il --id i11. "ction jn th8 South T rc:fjc,
wrirl "r. 'lrovm hrs cont~nuou::,ly devoted !-'in ti""e s_.11ce thrt v0nt +,oh-is rerform::,,·wes "s 9. ,~or~cl:i.nn for m0Vih"'rs of the nrriec' forces.
1,
0
:-:r the enrly eV8'1.iPr -1)18 A.rny Co"'lr-i,.,nder
for :'1.S9rt::1on ~n his d"Pry:
11
fj
ctr>ted the follow~ng r1 rt.,.,ri<>l
:•atters "cc11.pyin,r. my Ptte'1.tion ,ri,...,rr:llv tor<>y ···ere
[IS
follorlS:
t1As ·ws P 1t-iciyiR.t8d, henv•r resistrmce ..,.rs 11co·mtn.-rec1 to th8 '.3'1tr Divisio11 cro·1si11u cf' tl e Rrrido R:'...vor. ~cc1;1.rqto rme!'ly Prtjller'r .t>-'r0 destroyed
brirlp;9s PS thwr ·nr9 9r9ctAr'. It 19c,.,r,., nece3sPr;v, 71:ter in the c'ry, tc ··it},r1ra,·r t,i1 e l/,3rd, but tl, 0 lL,lst, north of '3Pn ~1,~010, I"['--:nt,.,iY1.e0 its -rcsitio1;.,
nn.,1 r,·"'fOJ~ts to r0i11"'orce i+, 1••pr8 t~ tr ,.G r 1 rce t ~s rf't"'rnoon. ThA lL~Jrd v•As
to an across ::-c;r"n r-it 1600. T hr>VA tr-i.l1'9d -,it,J-, I eyns prr.1 :rot o'1ly ~resterdr>y
but tode:r d:irecteo h':n to be11d e1nry e·"f'ort +.0 ~et tn:•., 1·s ",-,a knl: cle~tro;trers
across rromrtly.
0
11 Sorie "('VnJ1~03 118re nrr1o north [''1<'1 south.
I look t0 t,i-.,..,t rittr'C 1 " to hold
U 1 8 1rd J ;:,nzer G-renN1 i8r J!j_v:ision on thrt +>ront. :'." t'l sn looJr to co1 tinuf'ti.on
of.' tl-ie attf'c'· b•r 10 Cor:rs to l107 cl the !-0rm11n Go9ri'1g, 'J9th f''1d 'l/"th Div=.sio'1.s
:in pl"C9. It is o1,viou;:: to re rio7 tb,t t e he0,ry 0-.ie111y r0i:"l"orcer1ent o-f' the
1
Gnetn area ,fls c ue to ~~ s :rnp~essio,1 tl:['t t 0 f!ros::,inr; o-"' the Gcir:i ,.,.liFno Rjvnr
io1 1ld bo cnrnb 4 riad ·ritl·, 9'1 Pmfhi.1)io11s lrnd:nr:- i"1 stren~h in GPeto Bty.
111 Te hrve no ind:.c" tio,-,,~, !1.S yet,
+,r t t 1y, 0 Pernr l,f'V8 cl i ,3cover<;r1 tbem. In
·"?ct, there n~p no 4 nc'icntioriG o"' "1"1'T 1rind thrt rn 1·no·"J~ of our ~v~'TGLE lrndj_l'}P'.
T 9Xf8Ct dur;1,s:i; -1~1 8 n.;(;rt 1 '18 will i:u,t SOJTI': ·rord of A. sl·ift in riG c'lis0
1
�rosition tc mnet this attP c1r
-Jj
th r1ore stren~h .
TPl1'ed ,. :ith G- 4 rritr r81s~r<1s is ..,b~ ljty to urrlv the lrn_ ~ effort of the
1i'-ifth A.rViv shnulrl r-i rr,-,ic7 one'"'ly 'lith rP"Tf'l tnke rlri.ce .
0
"I hrve Put}1 orized hi:n to ~:i..-,n to trike truc 1:s +>ror, all units not directly enr-;"' ged :in t11e fo llo"-UT' .
TrJlced 'Iith Brann ,,jtJ1 rem'1rc1 s the r>ror.Tess of hj_s,. 1;lnns for :i raricl followup of ·"''1 enemv ,rithr1rR.vrnl Pnr· t},e rossible utilizntion of 7 revburft 1 s 'Tew
Ze:=>1'1nd Divisio·1 Fhen we rercb .tho Soprrino ~'rea .
11 Routo /!7 anroers to be out of the qur>st:ion, r>s the "'lnin rur~uit route .
Innunr1 ['tiorts jn the rirl"shos anr' tl,e m['ny c11Jvert3 Pnc l:lridr;es in th['t Rre.o,
,·rill ,,.enr:ler it unusn.ble . Ho'·•ever, •··e 1,71.ll use it if possible .
I hRve directed the Chief of Stnff , in m;v nbsence on SHINGL"S , to direct
corrs to fo110'"l up V1.e P.l1.8T'1;T relent1essl ,r -i_n the 8V9nt of [' nithdrnyml.
Discussed vrith r•tt the :'irct comf'!uninue .
it clearod by 15th Army Group ,s -"ollovrs:
11 Har•
I
1lritisli r11.rl ~rnericrn troops of {}e-ner'"'l Clnrk 1 s ?if'th Army lPnded eRrly
t,his r,1orning on tb0 vrest COP st of ItP ly d9ep in -the rear of rresent eneriy
"'ront l 4 ne ros:i.tions . ·raw 1 l"lnd -:i;_r -'-'orces c1re :mpnorting the ground troops.
1
1
7
1 The l· nc1ini was coordinf"'ted vrith strong rttricks ½y other n..11its of the
ifth Army, :incl,1ding Briti"'h , •--rcmch and ,.,,,,3rfoan , in the LIEI Van,,iy.
'The nm-r.hibious r.ttncJ,. began before da·:m vrith Allied troops o+> the Fift],,
Army ~o5_ng ashore fror.1 landi'W crroft nlong a beach front extending severPl
mil9s fro '1 north to south . Br 4 ti"'h Corimrmr1os and AViericrn R;:ingars , re pPrtj_cjpntj 1r in tris assault .
1
1
' The operations in It8.l~r are under the clirection of GAner::>l Alexancer ,
Cor'lmander o:" tl~e Allied Ce-ritrril 1".editerrrnerin Force (fornerly 15th ,~rriy Grour) .
HI will try to rr>0io bf1c1" Ford to relerose H by 1000, rrovidi'1P' s::.tmition
is sr>t:i.sfactory in :-WIIJGLE . If no v:ord. j s receiver1 from me , Pnd othr;r indj cations rece;_ved by the Grief of 3taff indicnte th..,t the lrmc1 jng is successful,
he will release i_t pt, 1000 .
Discussed ·1itr G- 3 tre build-up f'or SHJTGI/~ .
rrvr Corns hrrn sent in th,:dr priorities for tu_rn riround of LSTs . Their
pl?n Ppnears to be too hePvy ·i_n servi0e troo~ s . Ho,·mver , 7,,,. tre sj_tm tion
p,rr its, I "rill adhere to their re1uest, u+, '"'nould conditions aeem criticrl ,
I ''ill substitutt"! the 179th Comb,.,t Tew~ of the 45th Division for certoin ser vice 1mits . 11
0
*
1
�f
.J..
>
.
;:.,.. . l:l.,
\ >'
....
~~
C,
,,
" .....
.
,
u
�311
~
f'<'-°'Ji.s,.{.;
~
Ci SERTA -- JJl'TF~RY ?:1 , 194/+--In the snnll ho 11rs of
J"lo rn _,
"'
land~nP' bep;nn to come in by rar'io . A courl8 of' rAr-rP.s'3ntritive on
quoted:
t:: ,,,_
At ()1C'5 t}ie ·' "'ollo"1in~ :r,essrige C"J11e in from GeY\eral Luca~ , Con,rrr-,nding VI
r:orrs . As ['_ c iriosity , tl e orip;h1[' 1 of th" cr--,wmtional code bet"'een the
GenArrils is quoted:
1
1
\
\
I
\
I
11 "7eE'.tb,r clei•r , sea calm , little '"'inrl , our presence not discovered .
inr.:s in prop-ress . no reports fro.,..., lA."'Jl i ngs yet . 11
11,nd-
At 0'310 the -f'ollo T1.'1P' arHJ.tio 1Pl w~ssnge crrme in:
1
1
11 La.11dino-s '1fper,r to he rroc8cd 4 rir-; on schP-duJ.e .
First troops hnvr., hit beach .
'To reports fron lf'nrPn("s yet . TrooT'S lrve 5tnrted to lr:.nd o~ yello·v 1,en.ch , red
beach rind green beach . n
At apnroxi"TJfltel:,r 0S00 the Generr>l left Ii.is co1°mr>nr1 T'OSt ::>nc1 joined G8ner1:l
Alex8nder nnd. other stnff of'ficers nt the ralPce a11n w:mt to Castel Volturno
-rhere the rest of tre pE>rty hacl n lrP-:>ny embarl-ceo. f'or the ITs . The rr-irty consisted of Gen8rPl GlRrl-c, G'meral A.lexa;1der , n-e,19r} :fouse, GenerPl Lemnitze,,. , Gener::il Brann, GFm"rril Do11ovnn , Lt . Cr;l. Lazqr , T"t . Col. 1nt~9rlnnd , Lt . Col. ells,
~'n ior .Tack-son, GA.rt~in Portunr•to nnr1 Lt . "9erl, USllT. T}1e rPrt-r ,.,,,mt to +,he fT
T-loPts JJ')0l , ')16 P'1d ;::>1~, w•1d tb9 +'lotiJ la stnrted north -f'or Anzio nt 0630 just
as thAr0 1 ·'AS liP-h_t enoucrh to 899 th9 ·,1ay. r-. ~-rit-"ir9 escort of -f'our flf'nP-s had
b0An rrovided by the YII Air Surrort Cor m11nr1 , P11d thP- flotilh ,rps not molested
by enemy nir attr,1cks o>-i tr9 w<iy. Of'f Gercio Joint tho e>1g:ine on 0Y\9 0·"" the es cortinp; SpiV'ires ...niler'l, r>nd th.8 T'ilot ntternpt0d to lr,nd on t½e sen . rrn.,c,ortu11r1tely h:i c11J1;e in rt n.11 [P-letle thr>t was sliri:rtl:,r too stee:i:, dove intc tl-e water
:md 1-iis rlnn8 irnrri.0di.'.'telv sank . On9 of' the 1T 'RoRt'i 11'1n the otrer three Sritfires soArched tre rir9[', l111t no sii:;n of' the rilot or r.l.'.'''le w:=i.s seen e•,:cept for
A. pool of oil .
As the Arrw Cori,.,,nnder »roceer1 erl toward ,'\nzio, he received a number of' bullet:!.ns f'rom G9n9rP.l Gruenther, relryinp; to Generr> 1 Cl;:ir1r nessoees sent
by General Lucas . i\t 0735 G9ner"l Gruentrer rPdioed to Generril GlPrk, 11 r0 AT Gr.:LS
Y,:,~T, G'l'J'J' <;J/1 JnE'I''l'~ , 11 "1h:i.ch , being tr9.nsl11.t0d mes.nt , 11 1-'o tn.n1-cs :,et ::,cro<Js the
Rarido but th9 '3ril Div'si_on q,,d 1st Jivision att,,,c1<s 11,...e oini:; ~ ell." At Of-550
Gerr,rp 1 Gruent]-;"'r rr,c1 ioed thqt tre 15th r>11r1 7tr 111.,rintry Ref;i"1ents we:re r lmost on
their ol-:l_jectives 11nd trrit tl1 ere wa:, no enemy orrosHion.
0
I
I
I
l
Th8 flotilla continuer1 to tre nc-,...tlmest Pnd ,,;t]o11t inc:ic1 e'1.t re~ched the Biscry,-ie 11.t 0900 . There , (}nn9rnl Glark "rent r s,.,ort t.;~e in the nrerotfon_s Room ['nd,
;vas n1er-ised to hear thflt tl·e Jrrl ;"livision 'JPS cor1pletelY ashore, n.nd one Brigrde
of' the Br:;ti.sh 1st Divisio11 "fl.S .o.shore on its "-Vm heRches . Tbe RPni:;ers h-"'d successfully lrinded rind U8re occupvino- A'1zio 'fl; ch vms receivinq '"p0r9r ic ~hellfire .
Ge11erri 1 Cl/'.lrK tl" ~n left the 'RfacAyn~ on h-i s l T r.nd ~rent ri s f'nr j nshore fl s the
derth of m.tor ,··011ld nermit . Lt . } atterson , skirr,9r of' the t?0l , hniled 8n LCI(l)
,•rhicl1 continued OY\ toward ::ihore untj 1 it ri;ro'mded on r b['r . Grm9rr,l c1~r1r then
\
hR5 led .ri r;:i.s:=d.11.rr d11"l(!v, tre rrrty trAnsferr8d to t 1 ;_s vehicle and so cr,rne ashore
drvshod at trie junction of R9d 2.nd Gr8en Beciches v,here tre 3rd Division hf'd
�1Pnr1ed . 'I'he br,rbor Tif'-l.S "ill9d 11 -ith -hirdnf)" o"' <ill 1dnc1 s , wit Li':I ' .3 c'i'='ChRrgina- "'+,111:1dv ·":iles ()n solr'l.ierc •nho ",er e VT'"'r1jn'; "Sl·or3 , t}·.-,i 1~ r-i-"l11s b-=ild "hOV8
tJ19 ,mter .
Du};:,·1s pnrl oU ""lr vehicles ·1-re ''"'9in-o- 1 ml o:<>, 1 ed, qrir 9 on r"rnr s rind
"'O'll•" directly into tre F ter, !->er"! t ey !'"n f'C'l-o-,,,e, ·t),,.,n1rs to t}.")ir Yl"t9rrroof inn; . ''\1e rie"ch YIPS nnt C' 11f.,.,st<>rl . -~i.r8 netti.na rPd lv"en 1R-ir7 dovrn on P :coqd
le'"ld:i.nr :across ·!)1n c;n>y1 rhnss -l_:.o· '":Y' l t,h':l 1rd .,. ivisio'1 CO"'lM"n.d ro---;t . The (}r:ner87 C0T"M-nr1Peren. r j8PT', r:1r', it11 (1':)'1f't''ll T"nn, ,"'"ent '"'bo11.t n riilA ,--'1d 'l fl lf
::inlnnrJ. to •ris-it the 1rr1 r··visio'1. C0"1IO'"tnd ror;t ,~ere]•'") ccnf'9,-r~r 'ith l}r-nerPl
Tr•rcott . Genor"7 t!ou"'A, r;.,,nArri.l Do"O'/"'TJ. . r r1 ot)1<>r -trf'-f' o-"fic r.s nrited fer
tre GAn.9rri.l on tl"e ·he<>ch . Tiro 1-io.,..1:i-i11"' rn-:c s occurred, onA .iu"t before <>Y)d one
dnr-;_ncr tre Gen0rrl ' s vici.t F,hore - 0'1.9 rAruJ.tjnr, ~_n bo,.,,h r1PT'lf'!"l'P tor f'lor,tjng
r"l""fl r.nd anoth0r estroyinr P.n LC: . The G,.._,,y,rrl ' s i 0 ep r:-s bit hy a lPrge r,ntj a ;_r~r" ·"t 91-11:i 71 f',,..q rr,ent , ""'o-,,,ti111."tol:r ~,~ +,hout dr mR ;., to 9'1'T0"1e in the Ge11er"' 1 1 s
pnrty. At a>Jou-l::. 1130 tre f10ner"l rr:turncd to tl e conu-rnrl shir, Riscr-yne, 'here
he rnet GA"!.errl Lucas anri Ad1'"1irrl Lo'TI'Y l'l~r' conf""lrrcd ·7it1,, tiv~m for "or,,,, tiT"le .
G<=m9rr,l D0nov<>n le-f't ..,ith 1 T .11?18 011 "'1 1.ndependent :r1.i."'sion, "'1d nt ll.OO G0ner"l
Cl11rk arirl GenerPl Ale;:21n0er, ... ~tr tbPir -resr·ecti,re rnrt-ie", left on 1· 0 01 rnd
·216 .
0
0
At lL.07 Gene:;rPl r:1_.,,,.1.-, -f'rom h~s I':' BoRt, r1 isprtch,d tr:e f'ollo"i'Ylg '7essPr;e
.,,ic'~ ~ms received ½y G0neral Gr1_1~11trer ['t 1515: 11 3rd Divis:ior r-,11 '1shore on
initial obioctivc . OnP hrir,;"de l"'t British .:'ivision wi.th ci.rtillery "nn tPn}:s
rsl'ore . Losses ljght . 504th JE>rac' utA In-r~11trv lr-11.r:B11g Pt trR -rort of nzio .
Port of' Anzio co'1dition unkn.o"m. ChP'1.nel "Iill be sFept bv 1600 . 'Qeecr O'Ood
for LCT onl;,:r. Irior·ities for fol10 1 v-ur: 1 to 11; then, ??; then , ?I+; followed
by/_/~ to 54 inclusive . "
At 1700 rours the pPrtv renc','3d tr11 r"outh o-r the iTolturno , here they were
picked u h:,r tre storm bort3 r-11.r1 t,-,ken ashor0, ,-rr 0 n0e they return9d to the comm,cp1r'1 '""nst
y ~11tomobile .
Rm orts co---.ti '1U9d to rer cl' G0 11Pral Cl11rv c .. tJ-,e continu0d ~,icc'3ss of' ': 1 P'GL
r.:,
½ut the G~mer"l -relt t½at ria::dmum pre?sure '!lust 1 1e e"ertnd ')y t:be Frenc11 Corr..,,
II Corns r1 nd hy 10 Corrs ~11 orrler to ~ontnin, insof.nr r>s Y'Ossjble, th0 f'orces -ric'"J
onprs-in!'.; tne Fif't"h Armv """- ~ts lo·,,9r "ront .,11,' rer'""jt t½e T"r-rirmm P~'nloitrtion of
tre succ0'1s of :'-'I'rGL'E . If +.l1 e r:rw311ire si-ould ~JA relaxed on the CH~sino front 1
A.11d the GPrmP 1s sronld be..--r')J· 1itted to dis9,-,g['ge substr>11tio 1 forces, their orro\
sitio11. to c)p.,..nar.,~ '''onld t'l9CO""e rnucri heavior, ci r-1 the di"fi cult;t o-" cuttini;,; off ,
/
1rillin("J' or cn.rturi11.n; r-, lR.rge part of the GerM:on ... orces orrosi>1r, tie Fifth Army
would he f'T"lP tl7 ~ "lcre." sen .
1
General Clnrk , upon l i c; ret,1.rn, co lled in (}enArR 1 G-ruentl,,er to exnl2 in to
him ·-,1,,,t o h"n '""'.le,,, oTJ. th9 '11"01p·ir 1 r>nc1 to ,..et tr.e l.:"test ~,,.,-"orrrtio11 thr>t GP'1.e ral G-rucntl:ler rqrl received .
0
The Army Comr1Rmlcr r1urjn!"J' tl'e evening received ._., copy o+' the follovrinP- cr>ble
to Ge110r" ls TH son and Alexander f'rorn t1-\e Co'"'lh,; ned Chiefs of StPff . RH 7779 .
e
are wr,tcl in~ yo11r hrirrl. b:1.ttles in :r:'ALY nith 1.mc1e-rc;tr'nc1 i'1J:; interest p,d 'li"h you
1
ev0.,,.v success in the c ririnr:; operr>tion (" r-rrrG1-i:~ 11 ) ,,iiicl you ."re undert,,.,Jrjnq; . 11
(},:mernl r.lerk '"'lso r9co-ivAd a cory of TT 71'5? "'ro,,.., Ge11~rnl ·-::isenho· er to
Ge 11T'"l Ale~rr>nder '1 ich ren.o ns f'ollo:vs: ttl}oor1 luc 1( to you ,n0 (;VRY. I ~'ill
)e wn.tchinrr tho r9y;or-ts "or tJ--,o r,:rePt ~,F:c8"S you dese,rve RY\cl ,rill obtl"in. 11
1
�CAS~RTA--JA~TTJAPY ?3 , 1944--Follo-:ini:; ri11. early rnorni-ri.g conference ·vHh GenCJrPls
Gr11rmth0.,... .<J.nd Br2nn , Generr 1 Clar1<: le+'t his cor:mR'10 post to confer rersomlly
\
,Hh his Cor·p:=; Co'1nn.nders nlon1; th0 FFth J·rny front to str0ss to them th.<it
I
they riust continue strong -rressure "'f;C.i11.st tho 0nemy at nll costs, tr·us engagj_np: n r1rtxirmm number of' ,-ernrin troops nlon~ the rer;ulPr -l"'roYJ.t "'nd rrevent r->ny
reinforce'Dent by the Gormrins f'rom the south ag" ir1st the SPI 1 TGLE beachhead .
The Gc11.er21 1 s own notes on t}-iese conf'ercnces are rerorted n.t ti-.e end of today ' s
cinry.
I
He ceF1rterl :roJ'1 hj s rnn1·e - ;.;i-:" +'t cub ruffcr['_y - th.0 ro['d in fro::1.t of his comrnr,nd -,~ost :_ r>t 0915 rmd +'low ..,~t1, 1 'Pjor 7.-,,prer to the II Corps comnr>nd rost
near } res,:mzano .
her0 ho co'1-/'.'errr,d -"ith !'1l.,jor Gen"r~ 1 Keyes cu-,_cern:ing the
situr>tion on the II Corps fro 1t . RAtnrnir<:T to tl-1e II Corrs cub field Generfll
Clrirk too 1<:: off f"'or VenP+>ro, anc' tl· we conferred with GeYJ.er, 1 Juin . He then
flew hr> ck to tho II Corps +'ield 811.d left b·r car -rcr the 1":>th Division co!11l'1rtnd
post northeast of 'i.r..;n:=mo . TTe rrirrle the trir "rith Ge'19r"l J<'eyes who jojn9c. hjrn
qt the :d.rf'i9ld . Arr-tvi11P- nt tlie l?itr :Jivisfo,, com!'J.:-,nd post Gr>11.ernl Ch'r: ·;ent
into crnf'er,,mc8 vith Ge110r.,ls fnl1':er , r; lbur and Keves ccncerning the sitUc..,tion
alonn- the 11':,ti,, Di•rision nroYJ.t . Qc-,"lAr"'l Clnrk- had the rlensure of i11.""ormh1r:t
ColoriP.1 Hess , ''rtill9r7 O"fj_cer o-f' the '26th Divjsion, th"t his YJ.f1"1e h::,_d been
sent to +1-,9 "An,,,te f'o-y, con f'irr,irtion ?S P. '9rignc1ier Gener" 1 . G"}ner-il Clark- then
h<rl lune½ Pt the 11Sth Divi..sion mess ~nd c;er,art,-,a Pt l:"'15 f'or the 14th Division
CO:rJT'Jf:lnc'l post . Just rs +,he G9n.Arnl 1 s jeer, con:-riining Grm"'rol Key0s Pnd CPpfain
Bearrh10od, VP"l nprroAchin,o; the ,j11nction of Firi;hm:i_y #6 and the road cuttin~ o"'f
to S8n Pietro on the r· i;ht , t -ro lPrge forwtions of nl<>nes vmre see'1 flfrror>ch inr:; "'roc1 the souther-ist . T.111') cr w of ::>n A.nti-eircrnft P,1m •r::is looking the r-l~ne
over l'l'j ➔~h b~noculrrs, "ncl Gen9rr>l C1Pr 1• wi1:1r>r1<:ed thr->t the AA crew didn ' t n':3ed
to "orr7 ::i.bout b0nb:' nr; becm1'1e the G9rmr•ns rrobably were concentratinr- their
effort'J on +,re 'HJ •n1E beachhead . Just B+>ter turning on thtJ rond to s,-,n I fotro,
se,mrA.l 1-,or1b3 lit on a ridge just northwest of tbe tom . The boT1bs 'mre rlrorred
by AJ"'ie:ricrm B- 0 t) 1 s, ~11.d Gc'1.ernl Cl::ir1,. -:vas hi ,,.hly in ignant . The bcm1bs lnnded
rbout f'. mile from Gr=mer1"'1 Clrr1r 1 c:; jeep , but they sent ur such splFl.tterings of
roc'k and cebris trr>t •\ jor Prout , GA'19r<>l Ryder ' s aide, ~,ho "A..s ·1aiting .,,t a
cro-srorr'l apr:ro::rim:itely n hr.lf-mile awa:,, ''lf'S rit j_n th"."l J-,11."'ld b;r rock f'rag:cnnts .
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Arrivi11.c; nt the 31.th D5•dsion conir1n.nd po::;t , G·"nerPl Clrork rer1'rked, 11 ·hr-it ' s )
the mn+,ter , Doc , I 1 TYJ entitfod to a 17-gun sr-ilute, "'Pd tho,e bl-.., steri bcmhers only
gavs 1"'0 Pbont 8? 0 Gener"l Ryder rerorten tl-i::it th9t r>s th8 sec0nd time tor'lpy
thnt Americrn ')ombers hr>d crorped t½ejr lo::in ½e 11~_nc the /1rir;ric"n li.rn:is . The
slopes of •~ount Limi:;o hPd been lrmbed enrlier in the norn1np; . Ge'ternl Cl,-,r1<.
sici.irl thr>t he vrould take tl1 e mritter ur upon his return to the Fifth Army col"!mnnd
post .
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Genernl Cl'"'rl< t·hen 'vent into conferenc9 nith GenerB 1 Ryr'iP,r nnd Gener" 1
Keyes . Colonel Butler , AssistRnd Divisional Gofll'1,"'11.der , ...as cnlled over , Pnd
Ge118rnl ClPr'k i.n+'orTYJ'Jd birri t11at his ni:ime hnrl b0en ~9rit to the Senrte for confj_rriation r> s a 'Rri e::idier Gener::i 1 .
G-:i11erril Clnr 1z then c'lrove 'v, cl· to thP- II Corrs ri irfj_r~ld '7:ith GenerF 1 K9yes
and tool,,;: off Rt 11+05 ':'or a 1Pnc1 inP, st"l"'ip at Sessr Jlurunca nerir the 10 Corps TAC
Hee.rl.·:pwrtArs . GenerRl Clerv.: then rlrove to the ~1ritish Co.,,.ps Ferirlqu"rters Pnrl
con"'erred with GenerFl r?cGr9ery. Follo"l . . nf' this con+"erence '"Jith Genornl r'cCreery,
GererPl Cl~rv.: orice np;r>in rrot into hi.s cub pl"ne Pnd +'le": br>ck to Fiftr Arny ::end-
�qw=trt ers Rt Caserta, errivi_ng at 1505 }·ours .
Fpon returning , Go"leral Cl"rk- irnmediFltely took ur wjth Gen'"lrfll House the
matter of' the B- ".>,,) 1 s bonbi.np; beMnd our ovm 1~110s ::ind issued instructio!ls to
assure that tr.9re rou1d not be f:' r9c1i.rnmce of such P 1:>rientrble incident .
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The siturition -<: n the T<'i+'tr. Arr~:r ' s ne- 1 br:'.dgeheod nrea remr ins '3trictly
in our fRvor . General Cl.<>rk's troops ,..,.,ve f"'nned out tc '"'~den the beachhead
and , r.s yet , the enemy has mride no counter "tt;:ic1, . Air activity is on the incre"se . _The 1,0_ Corps briop;AheacJ F1cross t"be Gnrir:tliano Tliver i,:, secure ., Pltbou~r there fo despernte "'.p'G,},tjng juc;t north of r inturno . The II Corr,s front
}s r1ost ACtiV.£_ ··,itl· t1ie 11-errnrns thro-rinr_: ver~rthing theY h...,V8 in nn ef-i'ort to
y,revent Pny sizeable cro~s:i.n"' o th9 n_,,,:-ido River . TherP :is ::>lso 0xtenc;jve
?ictJvity ,.,Ion~ th9 French Cfo171sfront .
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G8110r., 1 Cln,.lr confe,.red in t½e late 11 ft8rnoon vri th Generril Gruenther to
in-'.'orm him of' t½e nrranr~eme11.ts thrt h:-ive been !'1Prle for ti--e flttl"'ck nort}, of
C:->ssino by the lrd Alr;erinn ::,nd JI.th Aw~rj cnn f'ivido11s . The G8rn,ns along
the Cassino line hflve not :ret sro"rn irny indicr->tion thr>t trey intend to ,·,ithdraw sizeoble numbers of' troops because of our 1-ie~chhePrl closer to Rone . Undoubteol~r the cmemy is wa~ting to cou- ter :-ittrcJ,. tJ-,e bddg,=ihe8d ·1hen he h:-as
b11:i.lt ur sni'fjcie"lt str<':mrt h to attrcl: with po"'er .
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As lriis dinner ruPst GenerCJ.l Cln· 1-c h9d Colo11el Trte , his G-4 .
It WRS sonevrhat of a celebration , since Colonel Tnte hris ½0en recomr11ended for a Brir,Rdier
GenernlcY.
The Germrm co"1Yl11mique at 1600 today s~;y's ·1 n rr,rt: 11 In the evening rours
of yesterda~r An::i;lo - Ar:iericnn troons lRnded on ½oth sides of t•j nturno on the Tyrrh8nfan coast . ~ountAr missions Pre in rrofI'ess . ThA Luf'tvmffe successfully
rcided the c.,,emy lr nr1.j ng f'l ~et ••• 11 The Anc;lo J\.JJericr11. cori'7unique strtes tor"ny,
n In ~~he lrr~e scA.l':l aniph5 bious operrtion in '7r'ich British ?nd" Arr.ericrin forces
of t½e ,.,ift h Arm? were lnnded south of Romri , a ,mbst::>11.ti::il beochhead WAS seized.
This ber>crhePi1 11P'"' ber-m •-;id-:med rind deepened . The thrust S9riously threatens
the enemy l ines of communicRtion lecr'j no; south <JTIC e"'st to t e mfJ i.n bPttlo line • ••
Arrnricnn troor s l,nve enlrirged their R<irido Riv"'r hridp-,:,}•epr'J. .
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GeYJ.ernl Glnr 1 todav c ispr1 tchec' th~ f'ollo 1·1 inrr cri½le to Gener'l.l rr.ccreery.
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R'T 751+ . "In view o-" success of' Orer:.,,tio;" "FT""GU::: E' 1-:wlut l-r essentir'l 10 Cor,..,s
co"l.tinue attac 1-c tc secure objActjyes p~,w:tcusly r'esi';n, ted .
'1:i.11 try to see
you this aftnrnoon . Tine later. 11
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General '::lar1c I s
Hre the f'ollowinp: .
Nm ·1.ot8s 011. torlny' 3 nctivi+,iPS, n.ncl th8 conferonces. he h;:,d ,
~1trough dictoted thA ?/~th . ':'hey refer ririinly to the ;1Jrd :
nyg:-;T"11.DfY 1 0 TR.TI - 'te"'tewl"'y, 011 the ?3rd, <>fter h"'vi;i.rr rAtu.,...n0d tl"e night
rief'ore "ron Jhzio , ·,· fl9w· b·r cub to t11.e throe corr-s cor:1rnr1 ers E'nrl to the 34th
r>nd 36th Divisions -"or conf~rerces . I iPJ:T3ssed ~ro·:1 tb<1 corr~ commP.riders pers011r'·1.l•r tho vitnl 11ec3,sity for their rJrivinP" •r>or11Arcl co11tinuosly in the , ttri.ck ·
north to ,.,.iVP the enemy no rest :..n 1:.~_s ro'"'sihle ·•r-i·';hr raw",.l rnd -in order thrt the
two 8lenonts of t},9 Ti'ifth /\rr:1.y ...,,ir,-ht jo-i.n h9rids rit tbe sarlir-,st rossi'ble mor{)nt.
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from a north,··e,terly r'irection to the ..,sst f'roP" t1 G i,_..; r:;h r;round nortr o"' Srn
F,li11 to crr,turFJ tho '3eb,,.,der3 ol:ii8ctive '"Jec;t of tJ->e :ilnpido River . Jui 1 , ril'73-;T> coorer,,t:..ve <''1cl "'-~:X1.0ll8 to do all
e crl'l to furtr er the Fif'th Arr v ricture , renlied thr>t he could T1Ph~ r cliv j sioY1.<1l coordint=>ted ,ntt1°cv thG Picrning
of tre ?5tl--1, or a h,c1J.:f'-nssed onP c0"'s i '"'tinr; of O'.18 r0gj,.,,ent on t'1e f"!orninP' of
tle ':/i,th . Altho11gl-i. speec1. ~s essent-i"l , J .. ,_,..-:; ~''climid to p;:l ve 1-dm the delrl.y,
A.nd .,,hrm T r1 erarted told him I would ,..,P_,,.~ rw decj 3ion r>ft er t11.l1-d.ng with the
II Corrs CoT"rn'111c'ler pn_rl 11yder of the '3L~th, f'o:c I r1 esir"ld t'y,t the 1r-itt8r divisio11. r.tt~c'< to tbe "est on the bi½b F{round north of Cr- s,ino in conj:mctfon
•'Jith t 11e Frencl' 3rd f lo;r,ri.'7.n l'i7i3io 1, attrck on Belvedere .
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"cn•Tf',.-:R...,'rr,B . IJ'.2H G•~:...,..,.., '\L,... yr:•~~;, ' 1ALPR ~ ~m ~'CJSR - I hrd rreviously
flo 1-rn to !<'eyes I Hen.c1riu,:,r~-::; t.N 'T!ornino; r'Y1 (li ... cussed this "'ith hirn . I
then +>:.ew br c 1 to Xey9s R"l th0'1 ~ ent to c-;ee R:rrhr , vrho could h,c,ve ottr>.c 1crid
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last nj~J.it, but "n orlditio11ril ?!; hours r-111 p·_}v8 him r> better oprortunity to
coordinate 11~::i Pttrick •·Jit:1 thA ~rench . ::: thrm rne(e the decision thrt the 34th
Divisio11. ronld rttacl, the hir, 1 r:rou11d north of C1<ssino ton' r t , r.ionda._r the
?/1-th , anrl the Fre11ch tivision on its 11.orth to attoc1· t:re ne:':t norning t 0500 .
I o.ir9ct0d the t,·:o cor.,..>s commc1 richrs !lnr' 'i i vis ionr 1 co!"lmano.ers co11cerned to
·7or1.r out 211 of' the necessrrr c'etails bot ·een t'rernelves . A.t t 1'is f'O'lI' , 1000 ,
tM_s has been done . Also directed GeYJ.i=,r9.l Keyes , i':t9r the conference vr:ith
Gener, 1 Tel}cer a.t hio 36th Division co11na11d. rost , th.-t :Y,th Division r'1.'> 1.,.e c1'.e r10··1str1:1tions and ·"ei YJ.t crossino;s o·~ th0 "R.ar ido , both ln.st nir;ht and toniD'rt ,
and support bv fire the r.ttac,. of t're JL~th . ·hilr-, at 'lP1 1:er 1 s T{end1_urrters,
h·1-d the co,.,,me,Y'0ers co,,c,:_irn9c p;jve !1"' brio:f' Accounts of thdr unsucce.ssfnl efforts to esta½lish nrl rn11-i ·1tr_i'1 br~c1 isehen.ns OV'Jr t.h9 ~.,pido. In decid:i_np; upon
thAt nttack SOY'le tir-e A";o , I '·nR'7 it ·-roulrl be coitlv 1:iut ,ras -:.nipelled to go
ahead •,,i. th the E>ttncl• in 0rnAr tri"t :r co11ld draw to tH s front all ro "sible
Germw1 rev~rves -iri order to clFiar t1 e -.;n~r for PI rm::: . Thie:: WE'S 8CCorn:;:lisred
i.n , rn."8'J'1ificent T"rnner . Somr; b1ooc1 h"c1 to be S!)illed 0"1 °·th9r tho lnnd or
tlD "TI".'JGL-C::: -"ront, ;.nd I grortl-r ~referred t 1
1"t ;t he on thn Ra ir:o, ..,here -7e
"rere sec rre , rrt!~er thrn <>t ~nzio ..,.:t,h t110 seri ..,t our bncl: . I r,lso directed
Ke-res to rom•p-criiv~ tl-ie 3?'.ith Divfrion P.ml nt "n n.n.."opri ,..te t 4 "18 to be rre ~-rireo. to f1ttnc1c across the F.nrido north of 81:m ~--1pel0 ·,hen th9 '3/+th hnd 11ccor1pl:i hed their ""i.ssion o-:' seizi11r; tre Cassino l-i.jgh ""round . ·,e nust ~0t A
bricl.n-0hefld. over the R[mirlo i:1 ortier to r"'r--i t ti-,e debouch9ment of our tnnk
f'orc'3s i-ri.to t!:-ie Liri V"lley.
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~F'r'',\L C0f'r."TT'f:C•'rn,n• :r:'R0;1 'FT 1 GL~ A"?.EA - I <Jm a little r'isturbed ,.,t the
lPck of r1 etn5lec1 norcl f'ro'7 Lnces . Co11rnunicrtj_o11s +>ror the '1isc"";me J:-,nv9 been
overlo. dRd ,,nd hnd . ~To•• thAt Lucns i~ estr'½li,c:hr-,d. fishc a , ,..e hPVe good coT'1T1unicr-i.ti_ons, and I h<ive sent 1-ii"l th,:; follovrLnp; "'lessp·ro: mr 427. 11 Ioor communic"tion hRs result0d in my 1rno";in[f li+tle of :ronr ::::.iturtion. FleRse ans"mr
th9 fo, lo·•rinr, riuesti 0'1S at once . Hor• fElr hflVP. your n,"trols "mrh'3d? fh<it <:ire
vour ~ntentio'tS "or imr1odiPte operRtions? 'lhrt is 70'1r est~r,hte of ener1y
siti..wtion? }Y'CJs0nt ,,rid rr9dicted unlondi'1r; cn.racity o+> Fort of Anzi.o? Cn.n
r;-;"'S unloa0 dryshod et Anzio? Is won.th<)r effectjng nnlord~ng? 11 Luc[\_s r1urt be
c1g""ressive . He r11nt ta 9 ...,m,o chrnces . lie nust 1.ic·e the 3rd Division to rush
out .
11 1,oon.
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"E'-Ff'l'{ IT1'1'f.'":"IO' 3 - I still hrivA no rositive -inc"icr,tions of enemy -intentio"ls . Heather is brirl . J hrve no Pir reconnaisnr'1ce. Hence, I do not know
the clegree of' his retr0r;rrde movements lr~t ni~ht . I have r:Urect0d PttPcl·s
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flnd r9cn:rnn.issn1t~e in force in order thr>t 1 0 may 11ot get rwoy 11:itrout o;i.r 1rno"119dp;e . I feel t,-,rt h9 is; ,rreakeninv, the line 4 n +'ront of us i..n order to na.ss
troops to nr~et SFJ',TGL.B rmd destroy ~t i.f r:o ~sible . Anoth9r 0 4 hours , r9rhl'rs ,
rill give me a better ricture of is incications .
"!ITH G ~TRt.L ·i;ccR~'EJ.Y, GOG, BRITISH 10 'J0RTS - After cons11ltation with II Corps ;rest0rdn.,, I "'lew "'or n. ccn"'9rence ·1ith Gew,r<'ll ncCreery.
Fe was in the r-ror;ress o-" r,R1"inr; rm ,-,_ttack .
I vms stprtled ··hen he told me
thPt the Sth Division needed a 1"eek 1 s rest . It hlls bee-n borne out V,.,e nnc1
ti,.,,c., f'f::c in tJ,flt the British Co!"lrinnders require more :rest f'or treir troops th1 n
are --:;iv9n the P erican units . Ther9 'ig no ti"le -ro:::- restin{s nt this crit:1cfll
r9T'iorl in this all - out bnttle . Fe rn1rnd !"le +,0 cbrn~e tre bnundrirr b~~tween II
Cor"'s and 1() Corps in r."trolling the Liri and the G,"'rigli£ino arer, . I denied
1--iis request but did autror:i.ze him to mov9 the bulk of the 4iSth Division to thP.
soutr, but ;t must be resro'1s-ibl9 +'or the rrotectio'1 of its entire Pren .
11 CrT~~r:;·•rGi<;
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r;.-;;;· 'ltl\1.9 ""'R ~ ':IHT A''ffl "OTlJ\ N, cnr.o'T'":L I3C "T'!I\_ ·r pr--;, LT. COJ;;.
crrifer--mcP., th~-,; r1>1.te, ' rith Brrnn, r~orPn, 'imitr, i:Ir-1_ . CoMr1f1'1da11t, ai1d Bo'·ma11 , "":nf'{i.neer, , j th rep;rirds to nirvinr, m·r forir•;:ird corwnanr1 rost
to 1 resenzn.no . I hri.ve so much "',ressu.rA fror1 h-1 P'hP.r 1--ienrqun.rters to the re::ir
and p= aetting so frir ~rom the b:ittlefield tr.nt I feel it essent:rl to move up .
I hrive rli.rected th:,t th9 co!'ll11anr1 ro~t Of'9D in the '.'1.0"r loc.,,tion by l?CO noon on
Thursdn.y, t}-,e ')7th . I hrvP- decided to reinforce S]P'11LB to t 8 mRxj'n1L'11 consistent ..,; th its surr ly. I vrill move the e11tire /,.5th Di v2-sion nround tog0ther
·· ith HP.rmon I s Divisio11 , less one cninbat com~Dnd . I 1111.Ve d::i_rected th.-,t the
Speci:il Service Force be alerted for imM8dinte "'1ovement . I have rr':lrrred my
O"Tn TA'J Headqurrters , consisti11P' of m:rsel"', G-3 , G- ? and a Pev sii=;nn.ls, to be
rreprired to "lOVe on ')/,, l101 irs I notice to tbe Anzj O Area . Thnt is Vll0 8re the
bnttl9 1·Till be , 11,11d thPt is ·,rhAre I -int,=md to be locPted when our huild- ur in
thPt Are;::1 is su..+-fici9nt to take tre on+'ensjw~ . I may ro~s~bly h1::mdle 1fc1rmon
as an exploi ti:ri:: +"orce wit}-, ex:trfl :lnfn.ntry, tPr1·s ond trnk destroy9rs under
rlirect ,:,ifth l\rri~r corunand , 1·rhile VI Corps '70V9S on its objective to•·mrds Rome .
t1 Gr?'F''rl_~NSB
Sf'TTf! - }Tqve hrd
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11 0,.,FTGTAL ' 7TSIIT'CR.S PJ FC'fW~T:lT) !\Rt,~A.S - Bvery rlrice I r,o, I f:ind rw subord'nate cornJnrinders, r,ostlv corp:i , ::ire 1)9-111.,,. both,::rerl ½7 11 brriss h.,ts" fro'7 ArF~ ,
Air , Fq . AC'F (15t:b l\.rrw Grour) , ·r'1v
etc . Trere h"'i.ng no otlv~r bPttle in
the i'~di terrane'ln are::i, , r>ll hePr()uPrters , including General 'Tilson I s, Adl"liral
C:::unninghArri 1 s , General ·,.,,l,.er 1 s, Gr:m.er.,l flev~rs 1 , Genrir8l AleYa'1cer 1 s 011d rr:Rny
le~ser 1 i rhts h-'lve noved into Crs9rta on top of "'IJT henrlrp1::irters . 1 evPr ;)rifore,
in th0 istor:r of' ,,,.nrfare, ~ e ::::o !_evL bP-:£!1 comprr11ded b~{ ,o "'L:'ln;y:. It does "'l.e
no p-ood •-rhen : stic" to my g,ms A."ld rJ.9I"Pncl th"l.t ""Y 1ear1111rrters be the 'huffer
between '7Y cinborr.:: nflte uni ts 7itr resp9ct to tr9s9 v~ 1 · t:i nr-; d i.gni tr-:d.ec; . I
hr>ve requ,v~ted that in no case s 0 11lrl they be i,errriittecl to v; sit forwq_rd units
in fl desperate battle without "l~v .,uthority.
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11 ROTA'l':rn~r FnR. "": 1·!LISTT~D ''::::'T - I Prn imrr<JssGd ·1it'1 th9 nece"sity of soT'!e
r,lan h8inr; ',orl::od 011t l-i:r tre ·rRr r-ep"rt;1~mt h5 c, will -rrovide " rotntio11 f'or
more rmli"ted men af't8r r1n.:rrr "'trll1t,hs of comh t bn ck to t}-,9 United Str-ites . I do
not 1mow ·vlirt the 'lOlution is , but I dll studv ~ t cnr9-f11lly to sRe j f some plnn
ca'1. not be wor 1~od o,1t . 11
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CM?m.TA--,JAinJA'><.Y '?!., , 19411---Exr;a1.1sion of' the bric1 i:;9head south of Rome continued
to 1;0 17ell , but thf"'lre fire inrlicrtfo,,~ thr>t tl-io Germrin is coilin[". hir,s9lf to
strike RQ'.ainst General Clark ' s troops 'lho mPde tJ,-,.e 11mrhibious lr>ndinp; .
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Reports received from VI Corps indicate that t},e Ariericnn and Brjt i sh
trooris ~re no7r well inlnnr! and thPt trey Gre co'l.solidPtinp; themselves while
the ~up'" lies A.re 1 ng 'orcur:1ht in . The weather torh.y is bi:i.d , with rn in squri 11s
)8~
anrl heavy swells thr,t -rreve'l.t unloadinP" orernt;ons excert from li=mdjnp; craft .
The seo. j s too rou,sh for tl e rlnkTs to cnrry o'1 treir ~huttk: service, ½etween
s'.ore nnc-1 corF;o shins . There is conr-:-jderr- 1,10 r,ir r-ctivity toduy in tho An zio
a,..ea . Dtrrin...,. tbe rl~y t·~o iles+.roy0rs ·Terc M.t by r=memy boT'!b9rs , fl.nd rit night a
rerort cn.r,o in th8t tr0rc hPs h"len a he:wv aerif'l n.ttacJr .?go.inst shipring rnd
thrit t,·,o hos ital srirs hrve 1Jeen Ii.it .
Gen8ral t;ru"3ntb1r 'lnd sever,,, eotnf-P of'f'ic'3rs Ptterpted to r;o to tr,e bridgehen.<1 areP 'W } "' bor t this morn:i ng , ~ut they 1'lere +< arced to ·1urn around "nd go
~
bnclr to ·rarles 1-x;crmse of th9 !)9/lv·r S88S .
There is rePv,r .co;_p,J,t:hr: n 1_1 "lo11n- the Fifth Army ' s c;r.utlrrn front . The
bPttl'3 j s rPrt; culPrly vii:;orous riround San Croce on the Ti'rench CorT'2 sector,
rtnrl Generf' 1 ,J lin re-r:orts he::>vy losses "hen the '7tl-:i. .f lger:'c.nn .,.n"':=mtry R0r;iri':nt
was rriven o.,..f r~o,mt CnrAlla. .Jlrtillf;r'r ·"i.r0 • r>s '.riole11t in this Prep troughout the dny. Th9 II Corps re ortAd tr"lt 34th ::Ji.vision 1v1 trols ~ronsin,i; the Rr)
p-i rlo River received stro11e A1 1torintic 7er>pon rnrl. sn1r ll nrms f'ire . 36th Division
pPt:rols also cro 0 sed tre river but •rr=;re piat ·~i th J,en.vy mrc}1 ~ ne ITT.Fl 11.nrl n9be ]_vrerfer
+'ire . II Corrs b"'] j m,e +,h,.,t the eneriw is :bolrinP", the P.rnido Riv0r 1~ ne j_n
,,
strr-mP"th .
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1,7 er \ r;. ~
~
10 Corns reported tJ~r,t enerw rctivity was conf.;nei1. to she 7 linp- of +'orwnrd
positio•1s ~n +, 11'3 3~th Division 8Y'e" . 5tSth :Jjvision rntrols "'ent to Cflstel :i'orte
and found it strC'nR;l, r held by G0rrrians .
0n the VI Corrs ~ront tJ,e 1st Br~tish n~rntry rivision rnoved to the high.
r:;ro11110 so J_tJ:, of the r:010tta 'tivcr , rnd elerirmts of tbe 5C4th :'\.meric"'1 I:--r~chute
Tnfantr:, ffl"'ned out as ·"'3r rs LittoriB ,., 1,l re:rorted no confrct . The 179th Infantry ~ep;ime:v1t o.<> the l+5tl1 TJ . , . '1ivision -i_s now , shore at tre b9f1Cl'hend P11d
is !"s,e:nbli11n- to ::,o 111to action . F.ner, r ~,..,+,:r0lc; , co·1.si3t;nf; of" ric to '?5 rien in
}'p]_f tr..,cks , ['Ccor1p.<tni_ed b•r ;:> or 3 c::el+'- prorelled mms or tr>n'n:; vrere rero,,.ted
active 'lrour1r1 th"3 nP.rjy,v~ter of' tre cn'1Pl north of t e Anzio S'3Ctor . The enemy
j_s rlso rer.orted to he h"stily dj_gp;in~ 0rnrlPceT19nts . Th0re 1 "ri-=; "cne rrtillery
.,.,5 re rnc1 shells dror:red spor<i.dic" lly into Anz.; o . l? ener,y pln.nes "'9re reported
drorpinp.: +.roops or sup11 l" PS •iy 1,,...,ro.c1,ut9 to r'.):i_r?orce G,9rmRn e lnnents ; n the
bridi:;0reail Pren . fr9nerril Clnrk , "+>tor "rendiYJ.t:1 tJ:,e niorn-l np; lookinp: O''Gr tre
situ:-itiovi , hn..d Grn0rnl Pc.oaks PS h.;s l mcheo>1 rn1est . Ve d:tseu:,sed wjth G-=,'18I'fl
Rooks once apniri ~1,e ora-..,n_jzation.. of i\",1'1 in Itnl:,r. Gencrnl Cl..,rlr 1:lso r-3ceived
a vi.sit +>ror, (Jp::,tain Le,·Jis o+> the n . 1. ~r..,v·•, and he exnressed to him t e deep
tl1 an1rs of tbe Fift!, Arriy for tiv~ fi.11e ,y,rn.l surrort g·1 ven to t e forces lrncl;ni:r
Pt ti..,e br-i.dgehend .
Gf'rtain Lewis is r l)o1 t to rqturn to -!:;l1e rrnHed "t~tes .
1
1
Ge:rern l ClRr1• th n received n visit f'rorn Colonel3 E•vprt Pnd Dnvirl . Both
'Y!en rre S::,ec..: al S,.,rvices O"ficers . Colo 1el ~"A.rt :is P ssc-cirtc,d vdth frrnerri.l
nsl)or''le ~n tho d:i.vjsion of troop r1orPle rnd c,ri mtntion. Genernl Clrr1<: di"'cw·sed
,···i.tli Colo11el Ew['.rt t 1'P 1 l9,+, n0tl-1orls o+' 1·9erh1g Aniericrn sr,J_rli9rs ..:nform3d of' the
0
�c::-lobrl situ...,tion ,<1ry'l ''OW th<:v CPn 9 ··,y,-':,i1l,..,d ·dtl~ r1efinite ir'e'"'s crw1cern~np;
t1'ose tb"'1f.S +>or ,~iricr th-3 r Pre ,....;glt·h.r; . G0nt:Jrrl C7 ·r'~ 'n9-r Coloriel T>ert
from f'orr:t:Jr ;--C"'soci_..,tions ,r11en t. e Fif'tl' Arrriy f;o'7r"'1r<er ' '1 S ~tn.tj_on8d rt t'1e
',r>r Crll9~9 in ·"s:h:in.crton .
1
G8n9t'nl 01f'r1rl s 119xt ~n_ller '7"S ('.-,.'1.-,rE 1 Utili who -i '3 '"'11CC99d.;nr:r G"n"r"l
:Car~ no rs the C.o··,..,-,,1r3.Ar of' t'-le lf't --1:,,,_1-' '1.".l • oto 10 ized Group . Th-' s Itr li"n
)
f'orc9 -', no..r r"'or;;:"·1.i..zing in ::i reP'~ ''r9ci., rnvjn,; '1-ic-.en +,r- 1
a~n out 0f' tl--i.e line
t:'ollm-ring t'1e-Lr rH sastrou"' "-tt,,c1: E gr-:•·1st TTount Lungo 'JOl'F) VPJe "'l;O . GnnerPl
Utili •·m.s r.0compan-i0d. b• 1~is c·,:2e"" of 8tr>:' . . . , Colonel Lo,.,.,1rr~j . 'i'l,o '70eting
betvreen t½e F-L"th Arny Go~,,rrcJ9r an~ ·"1 c, -n'3vl ItR.lirn G-,•,errl ,·ras l·rgel~r one
1
G"'"'Gr"l Clrr}- tole Generel ctili t½et
roynd the It"'lirms
0 -r - ,--,troduction .
W01'ld ½e EJ½lc to ta 1re ., "!Ore ective J1f1rt in bringing r-bout the oe"Art of Ger r,r-11;,r. G9ner" 1 'Sue 1cnP 11 , Conriander of" the British 5t11 .:)i vis ion cnlled on
GenfJral GlArk to say fare•·rell. He is bei'1g S'lt::Ce8dec1 bv G<:n"rrl G:rerson-Ellis .
Gt:Jne~rtl Bncknall is uncle.,..tP l'irt , rinothPr co:rirr.ri11.d .
0
"'e
A lr:i.te r'fter11oon cnrfer8rice wris ½alc1 111 t'np Generr1 1 s vs.11. bet,"een Gffrterr--1s
Glrrlr, RobPrtson , Gr1nnth,.,r E>nc1 =:renn . T11 e oi'rnussion c ent8red ::,ro11.nd the ~uprbdn~ of troors, r"rticulrrly :in the ne,-rly-"on hridp;ehead rrea. The extent to
,7' icl' th8 ne17 posj+,io11.s c,n be explo~ted r"erends on "lll 7 nten~ncP Hrich must be
atte11rled to vrith every d~liR"erice .
*
CASffiTft - -,JAJTTARY 25 , 191~4--Today Gen°rril Gl11r'' +>J.ew to t},e 1-ie 0 chheP,1 1)y cub ,
:r~loted by •~::i.jor ';a1 1rer . Tbe Grmer~l •s ovrr Bcco1nt of his rlqy 1 s "ctiv~ties
f'ol1ov1s:
11 I TA i AGKC'l nv G-,., Ju L PL~"rrr -;,,. '.:'L .~ ccc" TA1w TT}T 0" A DD :;ri::oY~R TC' VI ,IT
THR VI CO;:,.} S - 't!e PFfE'.,..E"ntl,r f'eels PS +,ho1 rrl ro is r11nn~!if:!: thrt "how. ?Jot much
: CPn rlo "b0ut it . T)ur; t-- the f'orecast of bnd ... ,e?t}v~r , T _esitn.torl. to go vith
him bec,,,use :: W8.S ree.rful t .n.t T coule' not go asl;ore on acco,mt o~ the 0 ea . I,
theref'ore, c'1ecid.ed to fly 1-,,r cub, ,·,rich I cJid . It -is 1.11it':l r ;trip, "'hout Pn
ho1 ir :1110 fl. h;-,l_f' ' 011t ever t}1e PerliterrPnen.n ur -;:,} '; cor st . Altbougr I hac'l requested air cover , t'"ro11o;r "iO'T~ ,..,i-v:-up in Air CorT s Nlministr0tion, none ..;rs
furnished . I lrmcecl about 1C'10 <\.nr1 irnm0di,,,telY corrnr>rrl.ecred <i jeer L'rom the
Jhore "Sngin 'ers rnd 1ent to the VI Corrs, ascertf"ined tl,e situRtion th~re nnd
then 'rent to tbe conil'1rnr1 rost of Q911eral Pe-1,,,ey, Conimr>ndin/:; tl e 1st Brit-i sh Division . '"et Luers trere . Ant"'r fl.SCertn.ininrr sitwtion , nent to tl 8 rort , 'here
I intervie"!ed Ca:rtr.in Turner , 7 ritish 'Ji:iv;-,1 ('f'f'icer in chRrge. Tre rort j"' c
snlenc'1;ii asset, .?n,.:i -it, muct bA rrotected J~· more anti- Pircr0+>t . T will e.rr'lnge
ti• t . By bulldozi11.s anc' 3CrP.f 1.:; son9 0f tle .jetti.s , ~ LJTS C"n :)e unlo<iclecl
sirmltr:>1eo1.wly ::>t t'1e rnte of ~ L ;'T'S every 3 hnurs . T'h-i s requ~re;s r,erf0ct coorr1i nation, n.rd -in a ')4- h)"r reriod 1·1oulr1 give you 64 L::Ts . Surrose •-re cut
thr•t in hal:"' -r>or s,.-r8ty 1 s sr 1'e, v-;e still could mPintf'in through th0 port t 11e
force of' I+ r"ivisions, whi..ch I conteJ11plri.te '·;uildin~ up to .
1
1
0
1
1
R0turned to VI Corn8 Herrrlriuarters in ·'ettunf' r11.r1 t>-1en ,-ent to tb9 corn~and
rost of the 3rd D~vis-ion . ,'3itu"tio1'1 is s.-,,V sf,,ctor7. '3rd D;visioYJ. is odw·l'lc~ ng
on C1 "'ternP , ··rhile one Flri,c;::>tle Grour wi ti- t'·1e 1st Pr:. tish ;Ji visior is advrncing
11orth to the junction o+> t:re Anzio ro.c1c1 "Hl~ t},e m9in r··i lroPr1 at q?339 . The
179th Pr.T ·.g_s rsho::.·e ond esseribled . TJron "'lY rstur11, T c'irocted thr-t tbe hnl<>nce
\
I
�,,-,J
of the 1st Armored Division, 1'nown a.s CombAt Comnn.nd A, and "lh1ch js novr with
the II Corps, be alerted for a movement j_nto '"JFT'tGLE. I hPve Plso alerted the
180th RCT for sh:,ilar moVGT"ient, r1lso the Specie l Service Force . Th:is, within
a '7eek, should give me three infPntr:r r'l:ivisions, one Rrmored division, the
Rangers, Jpecial Service Force, 5O1.th I'arnc·hute 11.esiment rnd 509th fprachute
)
Bf'lttAlion. I '"Jill thfm strike out and cut the German lines of communicPtions,
forc:i.-r1g hiR withr.'ravml out of the CPssino area. ~'hen, I "'ill turn my Pttention to Rome. I propose to move in my advn.nce comrnFJ.nd rost, very srv:1 11, ''lith
Brann, Howard and Signals Pnd set ur in a fevr dr;ys . I cen tlnn fly back r;nd
forth, or go by lT boat, and direct the rsrincipal operPtions of the Fifth trmy.
I probably will hold Harmon I s Division with S0"1e pt,tached :inf'1mtry as e.n exrloiting force directly under army control while VI Corrs goes after its objective .
Due to the rapidly deteriorating weP.ther indicrtio'1S in thPt areP, I hristily took off et B?O, rmd in ,m hour ancl tl,irty minutes lPnded on the r,alnce
pond.
ncr 'JF'7 'lR'';D · fJTH G'~~n::RAL BR!drN - Upon my return cnnferred with BrPnn and
called II Corps 5n order to ascertein progress o"" their Crssino attack. 'lhere as tl1e 14th Division has one br>ttPlion acroc:;s tl--e RP-rido, the 3rd AlgeriPn Division (French) to the north has just rhoned in thPt they brve t£>ken Belvedere,
w},ich is a great success . "Te T'lny turn the G,"!rrrnn out of his Cr>ssino rosition
froT'l the north .
*
-x-
CASERTA--,JANU!>tY 26, 19M~--Gen<Jral Clrrk spent tocl.a:r in A series of conferences
and in e.dministrrtive 1 rnrk Pt riis con1m2.nd post. His notes on the dPy 1 s P.ctivities t1re the following:
"I attended a neeting this morning '"Tith GenerrJ. ~'ilson , GenerrJ. 1\le"-Crincler,
Adriiral CunninghaM, Gener8l EHker ·1nd "lhout ?O to ?5 other officers, r1ostly Bri1
tish. Th8;' have two meetings a cay. :svery subject ciscu.ssed pertBine0 to the
Fifth Army, whereas I arn the first Fifth Army officer who hrs ever r,ttended one
of these meetjrJJ;S . AppArently nonA of these hearlarn=irters hPve ny other mission
in life th::m to :i nterAst theJ11selves in n+'f1:1irs pertaining to Fiftr, Army - ''!hetrer
a mrt should be taken in for the Pirfield? 'dhAt its priorities should be? Hh2t
should be the build up? '.That sho11l0 be the tacticPl plan? All of ttese r"etn; ls
were discussed. r,iy opinions wAre 1=1sked on none of these subjects. I T'lerely record this to sJ-iow how several heH~qurrters h"Ve ,..,,oved in on top of Fifth Army Pnd,
having nothj_np; else to do, Pro grP'lU'llly tekin.c; over mrny of :its f'unctj ons .
Again I n~peA.t, nevP.r "rere so f'ew corrimi:mderl by so rmny.
0
Aft8r the meetin~ I stPyed +-or PD.othc.r c0nducted by Genernl 'Nilson on tho
subject of /1 HlfIL. AppA.rently Generri 1 ':isenrorrer has cl e~idecl thPt P·TTJIL is on in
full swing . ::'.: 1.vas shocked to see how All of the British Com.menders '-rere sabotag- I
ino: this :r 11:m. None of them are for it, n nd a 11 still feel thr' t it wi 11 not be
executed. Hence, p11J.ling of units out of th.ts th.enter is r;o; ng to be ext'.f'em~ly
difficult And will nlr•ce me in 1>.n emb1=1rrassing position ''!rile I a.m both conmAndin('j'\
the Fifth Army and pla,nn:inr for Pnother orera.tion.
Admiral Cunninrhmn suggested thPt if tvro divisions v1ere used in the PP.SR.ult
v:e could solve our trou1iles by hPv:ini- a French And U. '~ . Division from 'forth
0'
�Africn used, neither of ··•}'j ch vrou]/l ever have b8e-ri in combat. :;: strongly rrotested , r'le,.,,<1ndinr- t}i:,t the 3rd nnd /+5th nt ler<st be t 1··0 of these to bA used .
I foresee p;reri.t r1i"fj c'1ltv in ex~·,,.icati11.~ in t:i ne -"rm'! t1 ::..s tr enter the units
•vl ic P.re to he set up . T recom·,enc'len. thnt t'1<=> 85tr Division , ne"' fr0r1 the
TJnited Strtes, be trained in 'Torth tfricr. ri.t A:rzew "'nil t11~t the 3rd erd the
45+,h he withr'ra,m , co::'ne11.cj nn; [' xmt the ,..irst rvee',: ~-n ·•,..rch, to the Salerno
area here I ··:ill set ur the 1nw1sion TrriininfJ' Ce,,t-,r r,.,,/ conduct nrererrtory
traiYlinq; . It is '3SS9Ptirl tJ.i,-,t the 'iav r ..1orlr ~nto this .,.,lP"', r.lthoucrh Admiral
Cunn:' n--:harr stro'1p;ly objected to novino; the •r~v1.l AT'1phi1Jious Tr ininC; Center to
thPt area .
"The II Gorrs P-tti'lc , f'ttn.ck.:in~ tre eRstern fAce of c,-,ssino hPs been held
up . T cr>ll.ed KeyRs ;:,nr1 n.s 1
n"'!o. Mm if he con1n. AXPloit t,0 "uccess oc> tre 3rd
Al~erj~n I"ivision by "lOVin.G' H. > Tr'"'ODS in behind the1"1 ['nrl att""c 1dnr:; to the
•
sc-uthwest. Fe is doino; thr't, co.,,.,rn~ncinr; to11~P-rt, "ut t}1e Ptt.c-cr cA.n not ~o
1 e ,.,ust bror, 1 t}·;rouR;r into the C;:,s oPf until tl1e d v o;:'tr:.,.. t0"1orro·r 111orni11P' .
r
s i.no :1 .ren .
0
';leath0.r is lrmprffi,w; our unloenin~ in trfl 'r,ttuno bridgehen.d Prea, altl:ough
I feel 1Prfectly sR.f'e in tl~? brid.~"he::od ,,i.th tre number of troops in there Pt
t 11e nreseY\t -1:,; me . Hflrmon I s +'orce sh011ld be unloprli;,r soon, "nd ti-19 rest o~ the
45t11 Divi :ion, less th·, l8OtJ1 Comb"t '.::' ,Pn, rril'ly <""et ;_n th,re tonorro1 1 niD'rt .
r7ith them in tb:irP. , riur hridr,;eh9,1.d ~hould be secure, "r'"1 j_+' the Germrm 1-mild up
is not t/")o stro:rio- '"le "'il1 s11cceed in punr~no; out . 11
11
Gener:il ClA.r,. toc":.v 9rt':lrfoined r"'s c1"ssr,,r>te Brip;. Gen . ..0ce rit l1mch . In
tr,e p·"'t9r110on r,e receivPd,., c"ll f'ro~11 Ge:rierr-1 Gir,.,ucl, 'me. Cr-t:roux (w o is }1Gre
0·1.., tour of Fre11.cl-i hosritnls) .,,,,.r1 Gener...,l DP.V'nck, G8nerrl Gir,,un 1 n CriP..,.. of
StP"f. rrjtr Ge11Arsl GirP.ud, tl,e f',J-r1.-r Comnrnrler discussed r:iuestio11.s o.c:> the French
forces i'1 :!°tR.ly rnr' the brhr;ing ~n of oth"r"' . GeY1erPl Girnud srid he vro·1ld "'end
tre /,th ('•ountain) Divisfon nt once iP 09n0rnl Cl"'r1 i:isJ.:ed for it but th,.,t the
r
mules -Por ct1rrvh1p- its e,U~f"'1Ant 170'Jld be [1P1"( to fi"'ld chir:rinP, for - it rould
require mo11.ths ..,5 ti, 4~re rresent ::i 'l" il" hl0 cr::i.ft . Grmerri 1 Cl:, rk sd_r1 ho I d be
gl<>cl to rave t e Di. v:i.sion r-,~.d v ould st,1r'ly the .,,.,ul8 questj on . I erh"rs the 4th
cculd r9ljev3 Rnoth8r c1ivision 11wl use its trqnc;port .
G8nernl :,ucas se11.t in the follm•in~ cr>.ble "rit}' rr>gr' rrl to th 0. sj tur tio'1 j n
the fort of' 11.nz~o . R'T 39. ff] revriilirif{ •me1tlii=;r , r,en.v;v r« ·n, sleAt, li,:,;rtning
ri'"d stro--i.p; .,.; d.s . "TnJ.013.rli"lf, c f' Liberties Pn<l over benches ;~possible . Fo eir
rc.iids durino- ni.rht but Anz:i.o J:iprbour «>nlled ½v ho-;t·;19 70'1~ rnnr;c rirtil11;ry.
CnrturAd rloc11me11.+, incl icrites ,meny d13fr,nsi V".3 t" tti tune 0'1 +>rent of 1 '3t Di vi:1ion .
J:o i=;vir1ence PS vet o" l}err1an couY1ter,:ittacv r>g"inst e['st +'lnnk. Flan to continue
n 7P'ressi. ve !'econnn. i ssr>Y1ce "l'lr' loc" 1 attacks to i=;n ln.rge beF cl1hew' . Fire o:ri 1.'T
4,:,2 ·"T"'('r'3ntly r0sulte0 in sin1 "'lC ,:r-j oY• to 1mlo"c f 11c:. T" 1ill rP.:rort e"r ct f 0m,, re
·i
lriter . tt
1
General Cl.Pr'\.:: tod;:,y cnbbd Adriiral Lowry, Co~'unn.nder of the Eiphth Amphibious
Force, and General House, of the XII Air Support Comriand, expressing },is appre ciation for the fine '>Ufport tb 0 j_r respective forces hP.d given the Fifth Army in
thoi.r recent l.ondinf;S at A"'1zio .
*
*
*
CA~~?.TA --JANU(IRY ?7 , 19li4--The Army Conimander ' s notes on todey ' s f'ctivities fol -
�low:
"Flew to 1:'rench ~xrer itionr>ry Corps this morni'1P' in order to encourri ge
further atto.c 1rs b;r tl1e 1rd Al1seriAn Divj sion B 1d to chec1r on the coordinetion
of thi:it 11ttrick ·1 itr t 1 e 14?nd Coribrit ':'ear'l. 'Jext "ent by air to Presenzano
17hore I went b•r jeep to the '31+ th ri vision 0f '"!h0re I observed the 168th Infantry in its attack acro:·s tre Rnpido River . It seemed to he going vrell.
I imrressed upon botb tbe Fr1:mch Pnd the II Corps Co ,rnanc'ers the obsolute
necessjty for rill out ePfort, th=•.t I hn.d s}:iot my wod nnr'l this 'ras my last
chance to bre:i 1r throuph into the Cassino posit; on anc th'1 t I 1'new the Germans /
were equally deter..,::.11.ec'l to 1teep us out. Upon rriy r0turn to my cornm:,nd rost at
A.bout 1700 , I tele'Jh0'1ed both ar;A·n to inpress upon trmri the all-out nn.ture
of this Ptt- c1< . I thfm nent from trie 34th Dj_vision or to the command rost of
tbe B5th Jn-n~n:1try f"cing Cn.ssino .
1
Upon rw return , Gr-meral Alexander asv;:ed to see r10 . He is worried. Pbout \
the slo1 mess of the Pttac1,;: in t 11e north b~r the VI Corps . I "'m too, and 1,ave
been ... or flt least 43 hours . Al tliour;li I did 11.ot tell J,irri, I 1movr thnt he has
received a rerson, 1 telegre.m from the Iri~,e ri~.nister 'rho , from his rlesk "'t
#10 Do.ming Str8et , is going to direct the bettle here in ItPly. The Frime
wants an attr-ick , Rol"e f>nd fl vj~tory, not'"rithstanding- tncticf'l or logistical
\
reasons to tlio cn'1.trary.
!hen I told AleYr11,,er that I ·, s going ur personr'lly
torno 7ow and woulc:1 stay up f'or severn 1 0a;rs, he H"-=; coripletely srtisfied for
I told him it 1.'TP.s my ideA. to lay on an all-ou+, coor(lj n, tea corffl .'.'lttack support9d by tan1·s .
1
Gen9r'l.1 "'i lson A.sb::id 11n to comri to s9e him. After exrlainjn,;; the situation on both fronts , h~ told rie the rurpose of my vi'"'it "as to c'liscuss rith
him ATTTTIL . Tnasnuch rs I am to co•i"'l<inrl tl1 •1t op"'rr>tj on, he -r~nts to deR 1 directlv wit11 rre and tc; P,et m:1 vie''TS . It was a r.ost s11tisf.-,ctory m9eting . I;e
asked f'irst when 1 thought I riu,_.t leaV8 this battle in order to devote my full
attention to A"lVIL . I rerlied sor~o tine Aro1md ; 1ar ch 15th or perhrrs later .
He told me he was anxious for T"\O to remr in '1S lonr; [' s ro:--s; 0le, rJ.iich fits in
exactly ,Tith my ic'leas . T tole him J ',anted to speA 1{ frankl7 , tririt the Fifth
Army had lPnded rit 'ialerno , ta 1cen 'fanles rt11d h.,ttled its way to tre north
tl ro'1r;h re 7 lish terrain ann with hlood,r los, e,; n..11d th..,t it was eY1titled 1mder
s
my conr1, nd to tA.ko Rome - th,.,t if on Vie 15tJ1 of 1 '~rch J ,,,as battlino; Pt the
gn.tes of ~{0""e, under no c; rcm,st'lnces shoul 1 I be r,ulled. out . H~ nssured rne
t hat under no cond ·tions would he do no . I f'\lno told hi m t h,.,t if 1mder certB.in conceptions that A'liJIL should become a "fart 1.n the dark" of one division
spavmin the ~~erl.iterrn.n0rn ..,ith no intention of lying /:my place, I wanted no
part of it . Be nssured "'le U-..,t it ·:vas hj s desire thrt I stay .<J.l''J[ly,; vJit], the
Fi.fth Ar-my and never even look Pt A. JIL . ·-;e discussed t},e tr:>ining of the divisions, thPt I ••rould get the 3rd anrl the 45th, th-rit I ·rould get the French
battle - trEl ined d.i visions th, t I ·ranted . m=i told me trie only difficulty 'ms
thPt Robertson said two divisiorLS co 1ld not be mounted out of T;,ples . I told
hiP1 thrt I hesit11tecl to challenge sucli 8 loo;istical ex:rBrt r>s Gener;:il Robertson, but thPt I Wf'S dan.n sure t:1at two could ,,,ithout interferjnu; with the
Italian cPnipaii:~n. He expressed a desire to help me get such embers of my
staf-1" as T .,,anted , t "t he · oulcl fly here rigcin soo'1 to discuss A'TVIL nith ne
and. 11 s sured r1e of 1-ijs complete cooperation in , s sist~ :ng me in my effort.
0
0
1
GenerAl ClArk too.a:, '."ll'ote to Genorn.l Juin , of the French E'Terlitionary
Corps ; Gen':!r[:ll Keyes, of the II Corrs; and Genernl PcCreery, 10 Corps, thrin1-::-
\
�ing them for the spl8ndid J11anner in wh·:ch thPir c_or s carried out tl'eir role_
in facilitati11g t}19 success-1:ul lD.nclings of' our forces in Ue vicinity of
\nzio.
The Arm;! Com1"1Rnder has bee'1. disturbed by the too infrequent sitwtion
rer,orts coming from 7I Corps rnd for this reason C"'bled Genern.l Luers, RN
53?, askinr; tl:1'."t brief reports be submitted f'reqnentl v, 0 n estirn:ite as to
when Cister11r> would be ta1 :on, short stnte·"'lent bis ;rrrregsions nnd '~lans and
the rr0o-ress of unloadin1;.
Ferso"1al Luc"'.S "ror, Clark. RP 555. "If po.~s1 ble I desire thAt your rl"n
involve coordinated r>.ttac"k '·itr use of f'rmor 0'1 Jrnu<>ry ?9th. Hill discuss
details to'llorrow. 11
*
*
*
FR~ >i.~rzA 10--JAl'Ul\1:.Y ?q, lq/i/4--Gemr:s.1 !Jlrirlc 1-rs felt +>or some tjTie thnt the
force at Anzio is not 1Jr:>i11i:s pushec'l for,"r,1 -rith suffic-i_ent r <;rre"'Si veness and
thrit orr-ort, n.;ties to "!a1rr-i JX'Orr'9'3, 11.orthF11rr! ''1j le the (;.9r]'1'1r n troors 'were as
y9t disoro;"njzo.d rt t e ti'!"le are beino; lost. ./\ccorr'inn-lr, 1.e rietermi.ned to
P'O at 011ce to tl e An.z~ o -"'ront Pnrl urge Generrl Lucas to 1njtiate rggressive
action at once .
~~
He arose at 0345 this morning , breakfasted "Tith General Brnnn,
Sflville B"l'' h:i s aides rnr1 lAft hJ ca:r- for tl e :rnoutl1 of the Volturno .,here he
harl. arr1mp;ed to meet TT Borts /,hOl and , 1')lt;. His cwh r1:rtion by storm boat
VTP.s very <ljf"ficult, as tl-te 1•,9.ves 1ere l"-ir;r, Pn' V1e orer.,tcr of hi.s boflt,
unf8.mil"i.r,r ,,ith t},e chPnnel at the !"lout of' th9 riv""r, 1 it R bnr anrl shirred
a greqt deal of ',2ter, 11etti'1,.,. t e Gonerfll '"'nr1 evr;r ro,9 ,.,-i+, him. -":ventu...,lly,
mmver, the ho, t, wm·e r,ic 1red un, P.nd the r<irty -;ot 1mrler 'l!'iV c1t 06::>0, 35
"lirn1te•3 lriter th,nY' t:1ey li.c1.d beer ~chedulc:,cl to 1 enve. Gr-mer/'11 Clerk rncl General T3.,,..2nn, Colonel T-l'01;ar"', Colonel Bo•rrnpn, l;e:rit'1.in Pef rd ··ood qnd i 1r . Gerw'si,)
of' Collier's, vrere 011 I"' oc1t (?01, 9nd on}"' 'R011t f?16 were Ge'1er11l '-i'"'Ville,
,,,.. /'JoJ.onel Fhr 1·er, Colo>1n,l Jjblo, CPpt~in Le' ;s, r. Fo rle of CBS, ri1d CPrt"lin
L~rpson. The tri , rmt "noothly nntil Pbo 1 1t ,even "1:i lPs c,.outh of An.z:· o, "'hrm
the :vr ''"C)l nas cha lJ engect b:r a nij nesweRrer, the A:1 l?C, then r bout ;::, , oc,r
yPrcls to t,i-9 north. :St. Irtterson, ,..n17l"k"r.di'1,.,. the '1')('7 , 4 r,nedintel,r Cf"Used
r:;reen '"'nr' ello•; -Plrires 2nc1 11 ,i11 on the blin1'er to be f'ircd PS 'mrn:inr: to the
mi '1.es nerer trrt tre rrr ror> cM np- 1,o.,ts ·-,r-re Alli8d , hiit tre minesueer,or,
supposing tl-ie t· o r'T' Bont-, to be Ggr,,,Pn.,.., boPts, orened f' 4 r0. fl. nu,..,,,ber o.,..
l+O·'l:'1 srAll w10 '5--inch shell -,8r8 firer., Pnd on8 ~hell struc1' thn deckhouse
and GYrloded Phont 5 feet f'ror, Grmert:'l Clrrl'.
0
1
I
I
I
All three r,,,,...,l o.,...,..icers on th9 sr.ip vmre hit, al3o tHo n"V'l rrn "s.
one n.t the, ,--heel of' thP V8"''3el. T'113~Lr.r:n Rr-mson, 11ho hrd been hit
I
in the legs, nl"'-;110 1 1,,.1,, no orie 1->ut Ben'3on 1me" j t Pt t½n, tirne, ~ot to h'is feet
P,11,n tool.• tl"C) 11-ir:iel o+' the bort .
The rm 11 ?01 swuni:r 1.er ,:;tern tow11rr' t},e firin.g
vessel n.nd, ~ "ter ;,one el<>y, sped a·vay _,.,rom tl-i8 shir. The IT t?l6, , hich was
bring Frrroxim;::it11ly 1 SO :mrrls t'lstern ::tno to the stPrhoPrd of tl--ie '1 201 nlso
turned and hegqn to 'T!a1 '8 P.. run for it. .All o.,.. the fire fron tbe vessel that
wes shellini:; t. e F':' Bo-'lts ""S directed at the FT 1201. Poth-inq hit the lT ?16,
,vhich n.J.so brd br:ien
blinkinP' tlie corrAct recogni-
�49
\
rPr,onn"'l F1.bor-1rri t'be J T ''?Ol imn180i~tely p;ot out a fj.,.,;'t r, :i.rl 'rit Pnd rut
sul:l:anilimide i:1to th9 munds o" th0 five n' vr 1 "t0n ::1nd triPd to tr 1•C<3 ct.re of
t1'18rri. H'our o-f' th0 r11:m "T8rA on dPc ", and they ''mre 1:Jl8ed i_ng T rofusel v.
t. lmost
h<il+' of the deC1 " WA..3 COV8red 'ith r)lood. or tr'P -"j_VP, r.10'1 'ho 'TP,r8 hit, four
were ~Jj_ thi:a 6 f0et o+' '}enernl Clark. ThA -"j_fth mrin "1rs belo v i;.1 tre tiny mess
hri 11.
he t r10 rT BoRts srcirl to-·mrd r; ve T"ines-·,eerers thrt hFd been se,gn to
the soutt· r h"H' an hour be-f'orP Genl'lrPl Clrrk's t" 10 sh-:.r-s i:tot ,·,it},i"1 r~m;"l of
the :-,ines\'leeper 1 s PUn. A-"ter "o e Pnxious ro,..,Gnts, dur::i'1f; ·-rrich the IT '90:1.ts
7ere .,l,le to iilent·:"'r tben"elves sat~_sfri.ctori_l•r to tre ninesweep3rs, the J·T
1?01 nulled 11lo110'side the Dritish r,-inesweer9r IT''S Acute. The vessel fortunntel.7 hRd A.. rloctor q1Jor-rd, A."'lrl, ,-,-"ter srrv1p j "f~ culty, t)-,e ·"ive ~101mded -;ere
tr"'nsferred in l:ltters f'rom the l ':' "01 to the Acute. It '7rs discovered Pt
th:i s t~rne thPt ~nsign Bfmson hi,d hrndled V1e : T Bo"'t desritc 10rious ·shell
fra"'r,ent t'ounr1s in his leF;s. ':'he doctor, Pf'ter look::.np; quickly rt -,Jl tho
mf'm on the shir, decided tb.t the .,ir'Jt '"lf'n to be ,..,e"'loved "'hould be F.nsign
~ori~lr'l, si.,....ce O11.e o+' 1-ii_"' leg ~rterios h'ld heen "'0V9red. Lt. Jr-l.tter2on, Com1?01, hnd su"f1;red seriou:-> shcill 10unrls in both le~s .?nd "11")!" ncer of the i T
so hnd n -"r" r.tm~ed l 80'. '::'he rian do"-rn in th, nie:.;s room hAd been hit in the
sto"1ACh rind Also had a fr"ctur"3d n<:Jlvis bone. The oth9r enlisted man h d b,d
his lmce cri.p blo·m ,·r:-:i·r rind •".Tns in ITent rain. The skipper of the H. M. S. Acute
is Cmdr . Andrew Edward Doran.
hile the T1e11 ,-9,.-,e ½ein~ tr, 1ren off the Vi' hOl Pnd moved to the hosr 0 t,l
Abo~ra t,h9 H1 B AcutA, Gener:-il Br:-,nn and 0,ri.. -tsin Ber>rcrood tri9r1 to ·erS1wr1e
Gonernl C1Pr1" thrit re should "lot :::i.ttempt to 1:'f;f'in go :into Pnzio. Generrl
\
Clr>r 1 decl.,,red thnt he hr>d to get in and thr>t )19 "'P s ~oing to tl,1,:e the chPnce,
r
ev<1n tl--i.011gb the l"-i.nesweeper Plir'ht ~ P'P in shell the two } T Bont"'. After instructinr: +,he Acute 1 s sk:ipper, CornPnder Doran, +:.o get tre men to '3. }osritP1, Gener"'l CJark ordered the t,·10 PT's to head once ag11in for fnz~o . Upon reqcrjn~
th9 aren "here they hfld heen shel1.ed before, th1; fT ; 1?01 agnin sent ur the
proper recognition flr>res f'nd ½linked the sri'lle correct letter on its blin1rnr
liP"0t . After soroe time tbe ship reco~nized the t -;o Aneric~11 boats and P,rPnted
the 1"' /f?Ol nArrnission to cor1e alono;side.
1
\
1
"hen tbe J T 11?01 '7aS vrithin haili11,,. distance, th~ skipper of the torpedo
bo"'t, who hr>d trpnc;ferred roT'l the IT l/:'?16 to the FT 11 ?01 ?s she ''83 lylng
alonr;sid e th !'\.cute, :i nforriPd the CaptP i 11 o+> the Ar" l "0 th~ t he hacl fired
upon an Arierican 2hip ann thrit he hPd eUb1r 1 rill<.3d or '"ounded five Hn.vy nen.
T½.e skipper, shouting t½roug} a negr>phone fro;ri the bririge o-" his s ip, decl"'red
thRt 11e bad believed the two vessels 1·1ere Germa11 r: bor-ts, th"'t becPuse of' the
slantjn_q rays of the errly Morn:inr; sun, do m which the two IT boPts vere trA.velinrt, he ~;:id bAen unoble to 0-i stinruish any- rAcognit1on sign, ls. •Iencc he had
f'ired upo:1 tr ship . Tie r1ec}f'rl'Yl Unt b~ trcmght he · RS doi'1f; his cluty. J\130,
be sRiri thet at the ti:18 he h d -r-:.r0d upon t 10 0 sl--i:-c's r r1011vy enemy f'ir rf'id on
Anzio ·1as in rro ress, a;-1d he ind:ic~ted tbflt h'3 t 1"ought :rerhnps the bonbing
had beAn ti:1"3d to coincide ''lith an attri ck upon hipr•ing h~,r enemy E bor=>ts •
0
0
0
0
.Af'ter snne rrgmnent bPc 1,;: A-nd forth, the IT //'201
to :,ard. A'1zio.
Rnd heflded
tt4
1
t:(
,,
.Tu:-:t RS the Fm ½orts ~ot ~_nto th0 l1rrbor, the third enem:r nir rnid of the
l"lorri:l ng strrted, "l."'ld t,l10 TT '1?01 Pncl / 1'21-S cru:i.sed ~rou>1d the }·qrbor 1rhile the
enemy unsuccessfullv bonbed shipping. 11.t PlO the FT f'201 ~nil rT /!?16 drff'l up
Plone;side shippine; tied "t i'11zio dock, '1.nd Q-9nerr-l ClnrJr nnri. his r"rty debrrked.
rrr;:msnortntion ,"'3 rustled ur, flnd Ge'1err 1 Clrirk ···ent im..1119dirtely to the corrnnd
~
�50
post of Generi=tl Lucas . General Clri:'.'k conferr9d with the VI Corps ConnP.nder Pnd
~rged upon him the necessity of .sn ir,1mediate attP ck which he fixed for Sux1dny
morning. He pointed out to Gc:merrl Lucas the fPct thPt full ridv2ntage of the
landing could only be tAken by bold Pnrl aggres"1ive action,ay,rl thPt delAy now
•rould only perr'lit the enemy to build up forces orrosite the Fifth Army amphibious force .
0
Following this conference GenerPl Clr,r1c re-ernbPrkAd rnrl returned to the
Volturno mout h, transferrinsi; to storn boat and crir successively Hnd reaching
h·is comnHnct post ~,et from sprry anc1 waves v1hich he.d been shipped in the storm
boats .
Today the N 1 v;cmce party for Gen0rn 1 012 rk I s personal section at the TP c tical GP a.t the new beachhead was embarked . This consisted of Sgt . Don, CpL
Shusteric and Cpl. Yermolovich, with the General I s jeep, on MP ;jeep, a second
living van and the radio jeep with two operators . S MP 1 s were also taken
along as a personal guard for the Gener81. This p8rty accompanied a group of
officers and men selected frol'1 each section in the 1-TeadquJJrters necessary to
the operPtion of a small Tecticn,l Conmnnd Fost . GenerPl Clrrk plA.ns to divide
his time between the regular command po,;t end the be2 chhead comwnd post.
At General Clark ' s direction ris conmancJ rost ras moved todriy from the
palace gro1Jnds at Caserta to n hillside Just south of Presenzano-., The r,1oving
W,9S done in the absence of GenerPl Cl'="rl~ on his trip to Anz:i.o , a,1;d was largely
completed by the time he returnecl .
I
'T'he following important messRges were received anr1 dispatched today:
For Lucas fron Gruenther . RN 2005 . "CIFC, T'!F'.D believes coordination be tween Arm.~r and 1\dmiral 10,n·y not close enough . :sspeciall;f as regerds 2bility
to receive shiDping . See Lowry and 8dVise . u
From Lucas to Clark. RN 72 . 11 Recent inform<>tion incHc~tes 45th Division
enroute . In accordance with my messe,ge 60 , will start corps attack tomorrow . 11
From Lucas to Gruenther . rJRN . "Armored counterettack force from 1st Arrnorecl
Division now available . Consists of 2 br.ttali.ons tanks , one bPtt a l ion of 0rtlllery, one battnlion of infrintry. 11
Gener2l Clrrk today received a short note from General VJilson , Comrr;:,nrier-inChief, Allied Force Heec3']unrters , thanking him for his many courtesies during the
latter's visit to Fifth Army Headqurrters rnd extending his best wishes for the
present campaign.
*
*
*
FRBSE 1,TZANO--JA11JUARY 29, l 9M.1---Today General ClArk re!"la ined Pt his command post
except for a short trip by jeep to hnve a discussion with GenerPl Welker, Cof'ln°nd.ing the 36th Division , concerning the pror;ress of that oj vision in its rittack. l\.t
1130 General Devers rrrived, conferred 11dth Gener11l Clark Abont t}'ie org1rnization
of the ~rnerican forces in the theater Pnd about the rro1sress beiri.c; nr->.de in planning
for /\. 'f\iIL rmd OVV:RLOR.D .
Throughout the day the General received f'reqmmt r1 essar;es concernin~ the
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Clark, Mark W. Diaries
Subject
The topic of the resource
Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984.
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns.
United States—History, Military—20th century.
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Citadel Archives & Museum
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
Source
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CP Clark
Relation
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Mark W. Clark Collection
Format
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application/pdf
Language
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English
Type
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Text
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mark W. Clark Diary, January 1 - 28, 1944
Subject
The topic of the resource
Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns
United States—History, Military—20th century
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from January 1-January 28, 1944.
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
CP Clark
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Citadel Archives and Museum
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
Format
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application/pdf
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English
Type
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Text
Identifier
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1565
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Text
50
post of Generi=tl Lucas . General Clri:'.'k conferr9d with the VI Corps ConnP.nder Pnd
~rged upon him the necessity of .sn ir,1mediate attP ck which he fixed for Sux1dny
morning. He pointed out to Gc:merrl Lucas the fPct thPt full ridv2ntage of the
landing could only be tAken by bold Pnrl aggres"1ive action,ay,rl thPt delAy now
•rould only perr'lit the enemy to build up forces orrosite the Fifth Army amphibious force .
0
Following this conference GenerPl Clr,r1c re-ernbPrkAd rnrl returned to the
Volturno mout h, transferrinsi; to storn boat and crir successively Hnd reaching
h·is comnHnct post ~,et from sprry anc1 waves v1hich he.d been shipped in the storm
boats .
Today the N 1 v;cmce party for Gen0rn 1 012 rk I s personal section at the TP c tical GP a.t the new beachhead was embarked . This consisted of Sgt . Don, CpL
Shusteric and Cpl. Yermolovich, with the General I s jeep, on MP ;jeep, a second
living van and the radio jeep with two operators . S MP 1 s were also taken
along as a personal guard for the Gener81. This p8rty accompanied a group of
officers and men selected frol'1 each section in the 1-TeadquJJrters necessary to
the operPtion of a small Tecticn,l Conmnnd Fost . GenerPl Clrrk plA.ns to divide
his time between the regular command po,;t end the be2 chhead comwnd post.
At General Clark ' s direction ris conmancJ rost ras moved todriy from the
palace gro1Jnds at Caserta to n hillside Just south of Presenzano-., The r,1oving
W,9S done in the absence of GenerPl Cl'="rl~ on his trip to Anz:i.o , a,1;d was largely
completed by the time he returnecl .
I
'T'he following important messRges were received anr1 dispatched today:
For Lucas fron Gruenther . RN 2005 . "CIFC, T'!F'.D believes coordination be tween Arm.~r and 1\dmiral 10,n·y not close enough . :sspeciall;f as regerds 2bility
to receive shiDping . See Lowry and 8dVise . u
From Lucas to Clark. RN 72 . 11 Recent inform<>tion incHc~tes 45th Division
enroute . In accordance with my messe,ge 60 , will start corps attack tomorrow . 11
From Lucas to Gruenther . rJRN . "Armored counterettack force from 1st Arrnorecl
Division now available . Consists of 2 br.ttali.ons tanks , one bPtt a l ion of 0rtlllery, one battnlion of infrintry. 11
Gener2l Clrrk today received a short note from General VJilson , Comrr;:,nrier-inChief, Allied Force Heec3']unrters , thanking him for his many courtesies during the
latter's visit to Fifth Army Headqurrters rnd extending his best wishes for the
present campaign.
*
*
*
FRBSE 1,TZANO--JA11JUARY 29, l 9M.1---Today General ClArk re!"la ined Pt his command post
except for a short trip by jeep to hnve a discussion with GenerPl Welker, Cof'ln°nd.ing the 36th Division , concerning the pror;ress of that oj vision in its rittack. l\.t
1130 General Devers rrrived, conferred 11dth Gener11l Clark Abont t}'ie org1rnization
of the ~rnerican forces in the theater Pnd about the rro1sress beiri.c; nr->.de in planning
for /\. 'f\iIL rmd OVV:RLOR.D .
Throughout the day the General received f'reqmmt r1 essar;es concernin~ the
�.:)
\
situation on the VI Corps -"'ront .
In the pf'ternoon Gen0ral Clrr1 r r!et<Jrnineo th~t h':l "0" 1 ld go in the 1'1orninp;
b7 plane or y lT bof"t to the Anzi.o front i_n order to 1'1A.ke sure thnt P grePt
effort to push +>or,vard "es b0inr: r.arl.e by the VI Corrs . As the lrnding strip
a.t Anzio wris reporterl unf1V, j_lrble , tre Gener~l deter,.,.,irv':lc to ~o by fT bort Pnd
al9rted the ti"o era t sta•1dj n~ 'ri:r at Ic-;ch:i n. to be rePr'y for a trip the fol l o !'1; nr: day .
DurinCl' the n;r-r-t , a st;:,ff o+>:::'icAr froT"l tb, II Corrs brought :in P mcssag8
to Gen8rnl Clnrk thn.t the 1rc" Alrreri i:in Di vision 1° 0. ,,..8., ched P roint cc 1 s~_der P bly in ar1 wince of' tln 14th D"vision on ·:its 18ft And thnt the Algeri"'n Division hrid this uncovP-red its le.,..t flnnk . It '7ould ½e nn.,bl to hold thPt position unless th0 3/_th ::-i:tvision vras rble to "dv•1 nce to r correspoYJ.ding eYte 11t.
Thj_s SR."1':l 'n.f'ormr-ition had ril-ren.ry, hour0ver , hAen rn.ssed on to tb.e Arny G-3.
1
0
0
To remove th-i R thrent to t, e left fl1:nk of' tlie 3rd Alrseri, n flivision , the
1/}?nd Roginentn 1 Corr bn t 'l'ean is orrlered to r~ove "'ronnrl the b- ck of the 34th
Division , pass ow~r the RP"Y"Jjrlo Bt the French br-id'"ere:=id rmr'I tPke ur 8 rosition
to nrotect tl·e left flar 1~ o.,. ➔;he 17rench Pnc" fill ~n the rossjblv d.8n15erous W'P
bet ,,.,een the 3rd P lp;8rir>n ;,.-,,c" t}'c, 34th 1 ivisions . BecPuse o:.' the concentration
of' t r oops in f ront of Cnsaino , the l4?nd cl'ln be spi.red to alli=ivir,te tl--iis
thrert and also give g-.ceater rmnchi.n1r ro,nr 011 tr8 drive towPrd Cairo 1:nd
Vaunt Corna .
Th9 follovrin½ if"rortant r1 essaP-es vere receivod
P11d
r'isp1 tched today:
I'ersonPl to Clar1-c +>ron Lucas . R.J R5 . 11 All r.vnilrble L..;T 1 s unloPded by
lf:~00 . Exrcict othFJr 9rrivP1s .r.-roT'l ·rarles br 0 ?00 . )T'lendid. resiilts i.n nnlo:or'ing
are c'ne to nArfect c0orc'H m"tion bet·veen Army :1110 !Ta·ry. I p3rsonn lly con "'erred
"'it,h Lowry v0sterdr, , and ·re £'re :!n troro 1g' nccord on R.11 c- 1,ir:;-ing detrils .
F~v·1l str--"'+> .<>11d my rerrese11tati.ves nre in .,nti,.,,8.te rJaily contrct n."lcl 10r7, in
close hr>rrnony 1111d close coor0ration nt '111 tir1es . 11
Pers0·111.l to L11c1>.s f'ror1 Clnrk . R'' 59ES . 11 lhve t·,m jPers f'nrl nn offjc9r
mlic'1 e rnet lt-A'1Arn 1 Dev8rs r, nd Ge11ern 1 F.;,:,ker R nc" t ·ro ot:b =:r offic9rs r> t LCT A.lonps ide ½ertr in port of Anzio m~oo hours Sundriy, 30 J9nu~ry • 11
1
}ersorn~l to ~1""rk -f'rorq Lucas . nr>y . 11 ,;P,rithP.r clenr . Sef"> cr,lm. Lerdjng
elements !+5th Divis'i_o~ (le3s 1'7qth Tn-"rintr,) st9rtin°, to debnr1· . Good proi:;ress
in unlondh1G buU· carP·o -rrom Lib8rties duri11(1' ni~ht . ::neJ11y 9ir ti-ds !'"lor11iYlg
fail8d to dam., n-e Dort . 11
Perso11Al. to Clflrk fron Lucas . R r 05 . 11 In furtr0r0nce of Corns coordinrted
attn ck, 30 ,Janunr:r , O"'e aivision nttPc cs tonif~:bt to secure line of Ro"1e - Ci sternr,
r11ilroad so ::i.s to n'ain roan fo:r f\9ssnr;e of Armor .
,ituntion bein~ developed on
the 11est flPn 1<:: . TTarmon in:ttfotes pctjv., r~cmmnissance tHs rfternooYl north,,est
of Gorrocr-ita 8601'30 .
/ill rro all m t toF>o,,..rov or nt nnce j f co 1di·~io·'ls warr<Jnt . 11
1
1
fer.sonr,l to ,1cA.s "ro~ Clnrk . 'JR' . 11 Ho,e yo,1 "l0re ::-ble to jni.tirite n.r,gressive r>ct~on by 1st 11nd 1rd Divic:ions rursur-i'"t to my ·'"""'+;ructions esterr'!ny. Reports from ~rou i. 1dicrite li.ttl8 nr no rrlv!lnce . Adv'i,"'0 . "il1 see you tnmorrmr .
~T lr-iter . 11
1
�5J
Jer'1onp l f'rori Lucas to Cl rk. -i:p qa .
r lease 1~ef Pr my 0 5. 11
HAp;~0sc;iV9 Pction Plre11d
initinted .
Re f,=n •9nce yo'J.r 577 ,
ferso'1al f'ron Luc'l.S to ClPrlr . R'T 101. 11 2L, L~T ' s 1J.11loP.'1ed this dnte . I1Tr,v-_r
re-rorts these :,re the onl y "hi_ns of' th.is t .mo in the An z i.o aren . Im-r9r2tive tl,rt
the remrind.er Li.Sth Div'si~11 2nd oth9r rPrrin~ni'lP' Co"'b t troors be '"or»rrded ,Jithout r1 el.?y . Request th t ou -rush sbjf""' 0 nts -"ro,., 1 Tarln.s RTA" ,·hile ..,e, th'3r ,nd
sea cnncl ~t io11.s renPin f'rivorr½le . 11
0
Ge>1rm'< l Four-e , CoT"mrndi.ria the I.II Air Support Co"""'Pnd , clisratched th3 f'ollm" :inr. cPl) 1_e to th.e Cor:..,,,, ndinn; r--"ficer , '7Qth '}roun , P'1d '1ent 0 cor,y to Grm0rPl ClArlr .
11 }leRRe
co11.vey to Co~..,11.11.d ~nP" r·"f'_•cer , 9Crth Sf.lnrdron , 1--iis ilots 11"" mechrirics
tr e /ln z io ~re., . Srlondid . K0ep
~ac1-i en9n, r rlrn~ sbot rin'-:-n '1f88 's the reirrf'orcerP>1t rnd ridvn.nce o" the
mv conc;:r11tu1°ti_ons -f'or r,-,sul ts obtr i.ni:ic1 OV/"3l"
shoot~n~ .
Fifth Prry. 11
Tod.ay, i'1 rec1ronse to Fl CF1 1,l8 f'ro 111 Lt . Gen . Frrr1 :::ry•, Chief of Jtnff of tre
All ied Cent ral ~edit8rrD110A.n ""'orces , G,..,'1'=Jr."1 Clr-rlr c,ent ' 1 long lettAr to Generr,l
!\.le:,rnnc'ler in whi.ch 1'8 descri'bec! tlie -nifth ~r,,,,~r C'iturtion 011 n.11 f'roritri , the Pnemy
situr>ti.o::i , Fi+'t h ! r ny nlnns "':or tl e f'11ture , rrobrble 3nemy int".mtio'"'3 Pnd his
.,..ecomrn9ndnti.ons .
*
*
*
r 1P.'31~ T'3ll. ·JO- - TA. TTT!\.P_Y
JO , 1 "4l. --~" rly in t}-,e ,..,ornirw , rs soon "S flyi11.r; WPS ,~ossil-le ,
Ge-nerP 1 Clr>rk sent Lt. Co l. Suth,~rlrnd by cub rl."ne ~o fhd. out tr e st:-te of the
sr-,2 flt t',e r 0·1th of the Volt11rno , in or der to decide 'Jhetb3r wa'b:>r1r,,tion T:-os ros S"hle i.'1 stor;;, boPts . Tr•is report beinr; "avorRble , th8 G"'terMl rnr1ioed his t"ro
T,,., 1s to '":,..,et hi.m o-F'f tJ,e T"outr o:' th," ri V9r Mt l? o I cloc 1 noon . At 0900 th0r0. :,r {
ri ved V!> ior G "1.,:irfll Slo0n , Co"''nnnc'Jar o+> tJ-,9 B8th Division no"T in 'forth Afrjcp ,
"nd P.ric;,,.,ciier Ger.9r;:,l Kurtz (}-,j_.-, rrtillery cor-~rnr1er) . The Q,9nerql riscu-=-sed
t ese o<'fic,-,rs V"'r i o' JS 1 1 nstj 0'13 co'1c8r11~ n.c; t e .>3,'th Dj vision ond jts co"'cH tion
"\'T i t rGsr8 ct to e'7lr7oV'"'J.e'1t . At noo tr0 G-fm8rF1 le£'t J-ijs cnrw1."'11d rost '),r cub
p l P.11.e ::i11.c" +>J.,= to r. s t Al Volt urno , ,-,}i9re he 1~nd8il. 011 . ., roFd tnct ·ms riGt by ri C"'r
n
find trilrrm to tl-ie r~V'3r '~i.il.e . ' TerP , r,.9~0rMl Rr"nr , r t. ~ol . Sutr9rl..,nd , r:r . ,er>cb ,
Sp;t s . 'I'½o'"'9" , Cb...,ney and Tfolden hr>cl "lI'9'lrl.' Mrrivor-1 •inc" ·r0re JT9rr·red to e"bqrl: .
':'he :rnrtv "e-i.t cfo=n to the :ci.ver mouth -in stor·, ho!>ts rncl T~et the I'l' 1 s Rt l "05 .
1
'"'jt},)
0
0
GenAra1 Cl:or1i: "'rriYPd ;-,t ,hzi_o Pt 1515 n.nrl Pt once weYJ.t to th,-, new }'j+'tr l1r,-.,_y
4.dvnnce Co111~ .,y'J rost , '-jc1 h:-id beGn 1ricl out th9 rrececti..n,:,; n-"t9rnoo-i. flnd in the
\
8"'rl~· -rqrt of tod1.·r i.n A. p-i:r9 ,..,,.ove. 7'1 t e rrrc1i.rd, of' t,l--o r...,1PC'3 of Jrince Bo_rP'hese ' ju ,t nortr. of Tett, 1 no . .;-Pn°r 1 r:1r-,-,l• rt 0nce '9''t to vj -;j_t Vt Corrs ·1.nd
ti,en the 1st frmorer'l T:ivi.sion . •·e f'onrd t},o orro"'~tio,.., +o tr0 VI Corrs st,~oni:-rer
-tl-1 an , '1d hren ~nrJic·ted ,,v ti.,,A re'"'ort~ se11t +,o . :::-osenznnc , ncd r0. f'lso fo'u1_,_ th['t
tJ,13 z""•~l'1"'1 1)u-i lrl-up liad not Ci rii. 11i 3},9rl t118 .,..orC8S OTTO' ., r '": the Fi {'tr ArrriY OP the
Cn.ssino {'rant ['S 1 .,~ been hope , rs thP ~e~M..., n -"orcos orr0~i"a tl-ie he:ocrhe,.,d rere
lrr~el~.r -"rr~ ,..,·~or~ elsff·l--i rn .
0
0
Generrl CJ.n,~', rirnCTt"'C1 C,,hle '!°Cl0 to +,;1 e F'ift JrMV r,~ ,.:tirecVrvr 4:,h.-,t f' ""8(~1. cr 1 of'f'j C P,' ~ nitb '11.l.i'l'.';rJ"'nt nnc1 h0lr be ,e11t +,o ti10 AdV..,'1C'3 ':I 1~y .,..irst "Vr il" le
tr'"'.11srort rtion .
0
�53
Cable J1006 +>roT"' Fiftt Ar-m..y CJ to CG, VI Corl s not·i f'i<>c< rll c0,.,c9r110. t'1rt
the 16Sth Br'1e Gro,1.r ·ri lJ i:1ov9 to ST"C'rI.I', "''1'1 corie under co,.,,rrv:ind r/' VI C0rrs
rrovisjo'1ally 011 the rii17ht 1/2 .,.,Phru~r:r. A s;-1,,,ll "nrnce :r"-rty, ~ncl1 J.di11g the
Bri gacle Cor1N1'1d0r, "l.rri ves S":::Hr,.L]~ 1 r~ 31 Jan1 1Pr7.
G9nArA l C:!.rirk 1 s o
f'
Pl.
notes -"'nr toda;v "'ollow:
go:
' All i_,1+>or:"'~tion ~ncic<>t0c t'-,~t tb, c,ne,..,,., is hivjnf-: ci•rr~c,11ty -ln P'"1senbli.ng forces 0'1 "'ront of' 71 Corrs. r,:;-,·c con'>~ rl0rs it o.o v~ tr 1 ·i m:•ort· nee to t'l 1~e
eve,..,, Pdv-=:intr ":9 o"" tl-~ s f~ct by pres1i11r, 011r 11rlw·nce •·dth th9 utmost enerr;;7 so
r,s to estroy tl e rmeri;v forcc_;s in c'letPil "'S t"l'\'l rrrive in t e 1).qttlA r-irea nnd
to r.reve11.t :r---~n1 "'ro1'"1J. hold:inC' ur our r-tt11C 1'S vrith cor:irer~t:ively ,renk f'orces behinr1 Hl icb he c~n co11ceritrrt9 +>or E' r!'ljor cou'1t9r "'ttack. 1 Tith thn, rosp')ct
o"' th8 b::iJ.ance of /1,5 Div . Rrrivi.nP' in the bridg9heaii sbortly, r,:;:nc C()l'nicJ.9rs
sorie .,,.isks c::,n 1 trik9'7 [ r-d re s11f"F;ests thrt r.Jll ef'forts srould now be ur.::-ently
Je
c011centrnted on +'ull seal:: cror--:i1111-l:.ed Pttrc 1rs to cPrture C1..,Tffi'IA a"YJ.d CA~TOL ~Ql-r<; -rollo-red hy A. rpr-id nc'v"nce o'1 V"'LLSTRI. CI'TC nuld liYe G9nerrl Clrirk 1 s
PpfrAciA.tion on rres8nt situ~tio11. c,·rc is c~ncArned Pt l"'.C1' o.t> up-to-c'lt:1te in+'or~~tion fron th9 hPttl9 nren esrec~::illy in r9g~r0 to tre stren1th and nrture
of tre o-r:rosi.tion "nrt th9 5q,ressio11.s ,,,nr:i rlPns of Cof'1m9nder VI Cor's 'Vithout
wrich ~t js dif .. ic 1lt to dfrn,ct and rlr11 o:;erPtions c'1 the r~st of the f'ro11t or
to ensm~o the T'1ost ef'fective use of th.e sir f'r,rces PV'.li.lflble to surrort tre
oper1.t10:1"' . 1
0
1
11 T
1
1.
repliAd
['S
+>oJ.10•7s:
.,.,,"· f''Y '1'.I'R'.."TG';'H Al'ZIO rECT'I' .
En9r•y f'orces ~n the ANZ 7 0 D.reA. Are e1 11-iw·lent to 3-rlus riivi~ior<' ,·,i..th
c>bout 175 knvs . Tt is esti'11Atec1 tr"t the enemy c"n incr2~se tris "'crce by r,p:rroxinrtely thr'":e :>ck!itio'1,"'1 cliv·1 sio1.s ry 5 rebruPry.
1st Tn+'r,.:ritr,r :8iv:ision (Dr)
1rd Jn+>R.ntr~r :Division
1 Rc.nr8r 7311.s rlus SC' 0 th J'rcht Bn.
5C'/¥th Ircht ReO'irvmt
1st Armored Division (less CoTT1½nt Co1'11['ncl
170th RCT
11
B")
_"b . n.y 1800 bours, 30 ,Tam1r>ry it is expected thrt ½r lnnce of 4 5th Division ,,,~11 1-iflve l0nded . VI Corr<' nill have 1t thnt tiriP the 0quiwi.lent of alr:'O ;t 11- <liv 4 sions, •·rith Pl•rroxiro'ltely ?L1-r, tnnks (150 tCJ.n 1rs ''ith 1st .'\rmored ;)ivision) .
Six divisions.
('£'
these all but
0118,
i:,he 71st Division ,
CFr..
be ex-
�pected to hPVP
.§. .
o 1"10r9 thn11 t\· o-t i_rrl c; "'tre-1.clh •
TI Corns :
3/4-th Division. (short l/-1,00 in°">ntry)
,~th Division (short 3~00 inf',ntry;? regts . 141st
bPdly C 1.t ur)
Comb:o t Co,..,rriand "B"
R11d
143rd
3rd DIA (short lC1CO in-f'pntr:r)
?.rid nn~ (short ?000 ..: nf'r -ritry)
5 Division (short 1700 i11f'nntr7)
1()()0 in-f'"ntry)
56 l1i vision (short 11.00 in:"i'ntry)
"3rd Ar 1o'~ed Bri o;ade
/1-f) Division (short
f.
"nd \Je ' Zealrmd Di visio-ri (ACFF Reserve) .
~ • .hile th9re rre flrrroxiy,,ntely ~-1/2 All -i 8d division.s orro;:}ing six
e119ni;,r nivisions on +1-,..: s .,.ront , t},e AJ.li9c'I Ji ,,i_sio"ls }irve lo'"'t c011-:;:i.derPble of
t 1 r:ir effectivoness beCP.llS8 o+' s'l.ort..., r,es in erso"lne 1 <1 nd b9c1,1 re of th8 long
; 0riocl of c~nti.nuous henv:~ -f'i,-.htj n~ .
All inrlicPtio11s ojn.t to tre enerw 1 s .lrn to bold RC- rit "11 costs .
The orip;innl est..; •·ate th,.,t h9 ·1culd weah:,11 tr,9 GAR!GLI.A 1-ro-rtAl WO front to meet
the a"'lphibious lrnd..; YJP' , to ~-n 9xtent ,·,hic1-, "1r01·ld n0r,..,it t 11e n.c1vnnce o +,re
t"i +'th ArrY to t 8 FR(" r•0nP A.re~ , lr 3 not y9t m"'tP''in liz9d . :rrn:rber>d , the -:me1
1w '~as dee~ c P-C1 to li.olrl t1'e G~F ,-GJ ,- no-R '\} Iff .,..ront ( s; v dj vi ,:dons) end rt the
sam9 V ··e h.9 l'P- 3 rei nforc9d th9 r JZIO 1:1ren b7 ..,.- thdrn V"' ls ""ron the GAP.IGLIAIJOR } T'"
a 11d U:irrhth P.rriy f'ron.ts, nnd 1:Jy r""inforc0-rmts "'rom th9 north . There
h"'s bee11 nn 1in1.v0idPble delf-l~T in "'ttrc1d1'1"; the COLLI-L~ZI!\LI +'Aature C"11Sed bunf'p.vorahle we..,th'"'r rrich res,1lted in a dele;r in thA I Corrq build-up .
1 ) ,
(
VI Gor-ris Pttac1·s 30 ,fanunrv to c,spture 7 1~LL~rn11:-~LBfl ro-"'R/1,,;CATI.
The '3rd Tnf"'ntr • Divisi.on ·,iJ.1. centure CI T~RJII/1 anr then r:idvrnce on V 'LL•;TRI.
1'1t Ir1+>r1ntry Div' sion (Br) · ill cnrture birrh ri;ronnc' 301,tJ:-,,rest o-f' GT~·rzA O nncl
then ndv..,nce to ALB~~H() . 1st r.,.ored Div:i s..;_on (less Cor1br-t Comro..,nd nBtt) will
,..,.,_ss thrornrn t1'9 1st n.,.r-i_ntry Division a"ter it hrs cnrt,1r9d CAI'EOLT~O-IB r,nd
vill c·,:ecute r, fl,,,nking '70V9n9nt to t1,e left of 1st Division r+,tnckino; FR!\.JC''T'J
.,.ro11 the ·rest . Reqm'lsts h;:ive b?en ·mbrnitted +'or n.11 "'Vf':: Ir.bl'.) air rA"'ources
1
,
�to support this att:,,ck .
The "'rench Bxpedi tionrr;r Corps, 168th RCT and 142nrl RCT Pt tacked
early tod8y (?9 Januflry) to cnpture tJ1e high ground north of CASSINO . fresent
inclicritions 2.re thr,t the att1rnk is encountering strong resistAnce . 10 Cor:rs
attac1r is in progress to extF>nd its bridgehead over tl~e lower GIIRIGLIAT'JO River
and to advance north in the direction t,TJS0 1nA - .S. GIORGIA . Combat CoVir and 11 B11
is in II Corps reserve 8VAilr1 hle to cross the R/IIIDO River RS soon as the
enemy position at CASSIT1TO is outf'lanked .
0
17 .
C01'JCLTTSI01JS.
,2.. Although a fully coordinPted Att8ck, employimr all PVail2ble armor,
and all other means, will be lrnrnched on Janur-1.ry 30th b~T the VI Corps, the
strength of the enerw force in the COLLI-LAZIALI B.re11 n,-,y be such thet rrogress
will 'be slow . AnticipPting the Prrival of a British 13rirsRde Group in Italy, · it
is planned to re:l.nforce the 1st InfAntry Di vision (Br) ni th one British Brigade
Group from the 10 Corps . If practicrible logisticP lly , one RCT (US) will also
be taken -"'rom the II Corps for use as VI Corps reserve . The nrrival of these
groups in the 1-:iridgehe;:id will bring the VI Corps to the maximum strength th2t
can be maintained .
]2 . If the enemy is able to bring j n suffj_cient reinforcenents to rre verit the VI Corps from securing its objective, it 7il1 p:rob,::;bly be necessary
to assum8 the r'efensive in the Ai,TZIO area until fl hrei:fr-trrough c:cin be effected
on the GAR.:"CrLil\.FO-F~/\J IDO front . A rl.efensive line of r>ction would be indicated
unless means are found to T'laintain r> lRrger force in the A~;zro area .
1
£ · The attack tc secure tbe J1igh ground north of Cl\<'.:'.'3INO njll rrobPbly
req1 lire all availab19 -"'orces in the II Corrs and French Corps, with the exception of Corih"lt Connand "Bn Pnd weak elenents of the 36th Division . There •-rill
be no sni table unit remrdning for furt:ber sustP ined ef'fort "Jest o.c, the RAI IDO
River unless the ~nd new Zealand Division is usec1 for this :rur:rose .
£1. If the ?nd 'Tew Zealand Division is used PS indicated e,boV8 H is
estinnted tlint r•r1ditional troops 11:ill be needed for e:x:rloitation in the LIRI
Valley and to gain contPct with the VI Corrs .
~ - The 88th In-0 antry Division "rill not be ready for conbr,t rrior to
Marer, 1 , lGLi,L; •
.§1 • It is r,:,conmended that the followinp; pdditional troors be rnPde
able to the Commnnding General, Fif'th Arrriy , iMr,ediBtel;r:
0
vriil-
(1)
One British Division ·"rorn Jighth Army.
0 " rrenc h t · · · .
ne '
;1v1s1on
(3) One British Brigade Group to rerlace the group to be taken
fron the 10 Corps .
1 ,-.,
\ ?... )
]2 .
It is recomnended thPt the Bighth Army lPunch as strong an :ottAck
PS
�roris~ bJ.8 nt t ,3 '3r>rliest rossible clP.te in ord8r to hold trie mrizi,~um
on that +'ront . 1
en8 □Y
+>orce
"I l8+'t +'or the Rome fro,1t wjthnut, contecti11r; Gs110r~l t.levp,1d8r i,ut J-,r,ve
juc::t rFJceived word f'rom Gruenth0r to t11e effect t11...,t Alexander is tr,ri11i:i; bis
best to conirl:v "it}, all o+' rw r "''1uests .
1
"I c,:ir,9 1-)•r FT bor-it to Anzio tocln7. '-1°F.d horecl to f'l;r in my C- L~7 , but due
to short rrnT'TaV 011 nevr Pirfield , G8 1errils ··01re :.:inrl CP11non pc'vised "P'Pin"'t it .
Tio·'"'e to bring the phne ln Tucsdr>y in order to fly br>ck. The trip here to<"ay
,ras uneventful , in P,TePt contr:ist to our hectic trip t"m 0 r.ys nl"f'o . Incide11ta1 ly, two o+> th0 five 1 1}'0
'ere \101mcled. on th· t trir <'lied of wounns . I 2!"1 cor1m1.1nic~ti nr; '1/ll'ith~ tl1A A.....,9ricr111 •·.rr;-.V"r , P-j~1i11P, ttlen the fncts in the cn..se ~.s I SPTIT
theri, and StRtinR' +'ror /l lr-i:vr~r-in 1 ~ point o.C• V"erJ thrt it .ris rs '"'lagr:=>nt PD error
of iu,lgrnent on th8 pirt o"' n commPncler P s I have evr-ir seen.
1
"I left th8 s0u-L}v,r:r1 frrmt i'1 " eotnte of ~ ndec' sion . It i '3 lilr0 t"o ',oxers
in thA r:inr-, ½0th qbot1t to collRrse . I hrivo c01mnit,ted my lrst res9rve, r.11d I Pm
s1rre tre Bocl~e hPs don-3 the srrae . I P7 o-rentlv rl 1.s1:1rroint od in Gr,nernJ Keyes '
ef'fort to coord:i.nato the ntt nck of t he 142nd C01 h.,t Ter-T11 vrith thr,t of the 3rd
P.l,,.~r~"n Dhrjc;ion . For four c'ry"' no1'T, V·is rttnck ½Rs been neleved . The :'."rench
,.,re criticrl o-" the -initiritive o+' tl-ie l4?nd Co"1b'"'t TeP'1 and of the 34th Divi3ion
on its sc,uth . So am
I hPd intonclP.c to r9in:force success , rl"'ther th1m fn.ilure <J.nd rir, r-1 4 sarroi11ted thrit r, •1ore coord:inl."'ted Fr;:,nco-1',.r1ericr,n e "fort could
not "'.fl'Te tn. 1rnn rl0ce . I vm.s rpd.te h11rsh '7 7 tb Keyes todriy P11d hope th8t H 1rill
rrod11ee th8 res•ilts tl-i.Pt the Pttricl,;: "'8S rusb0d ho''le v,itb vigor toc!P..y.
nr have b8en cl 4 sri-rpojnter! for several days b7 the lrc 1,;: of Pggressiveness on
the rert o+' the VI Carr's, 2.lthouP"h it wo11l' h"vo >y,en VIT0"1? , 4 n .,...y opinion, .to
attack to cP..r.ture 0 1 fi.nal objective oJ'l this +'ront . :::l8CO"l'1"' 1 "c'r-nce in force
J.r
..,j-1:,}, tanh; slould 1-irve bee11 r:ore rio;gressivA to crrture GI ·rri,;R :Jl , nr G'\'}(LFO'~.
~l.epe::-itedly I hn.vo told Jue.rs to rush v~i:;;orously to g9t those locrl objectives .
Ye hns 11ot i.11"'-lsted uron thic; rrith the Divisi.o·ri Corr-iqnflers . TTi,0 11 my arrival
here -l:,oc'l"'Y, I --1As oisrp} ointed to "'~11rl th<>t nbnnt J:-,ql f o-"' our :1vribble errior
o+' the lot !trJ"lored D·ivis 4 on 1 '.ld b0en cori!"·tter1 to the rrotection of the 1st Briti3h Di vj sion I s left flrn 1' . I 'I-Jone to e'·tric0te these coEnj tments in order to
launch ::i. "'ull-out rrmor8rl. "'ttnck to th8 northuest f'rom CPrnpoleone to"1orrow. I
v!n.s likewise distrec;sod to +'ind tb,t th8 '3rd T'ivision h':d led with tr e R"n:::;er
force in jts ::ittrc1' on CI ;rn-:;n•rA . Thi, -v :=is a c"efinite error in ,jur·P'JY"ent , f0r t'he
'!:?t:ngers do not hrve tre surrort '"'8"]"0"18 tr ov~rcn'"'lr; tJ--e resiGtPnC8 .;nnicrtec'!.
Tlie fq_J_J_ncy of' t11i..3 co:--w•itrn,'3nt ),,:is been horne out by -1:,be 1Pc 1c of results toc1oy.
I hP.Ve been ht>rsh vdth Lucns torla;", rruch to ny rei:;ret, 1---,1t in ?'1 e+'f'ort to energize him to grenter effort .
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11 I r,_ri wr,tchinv the 1 or-;.;_<"Jtic"' l huild-ur, clo ely, 1ith thA bore tr."t r;ood
•:e,-,tb,r na:r -n,,r:,~_t U'> to l"l.7 in rm oxtro stor0 o" surrlies . If I cn.n gr;t "her>d
·11t}, t•18 H"'l;ted sMprino- 11vaibble to rr.e, ·1 hor8 to bring 4 n rm f-lr"ditionPl
2t,..H:i'"P' Poree +'or
.,..,eriod of ton d::1v•,, in ord0r to obtr in rlecisive results.
At t}e er1r1 o+' thrit V"'lc, I cou1-d rryove it b,c,,. to +,'-Jo, otrAr front. It <>11 dep1=mds on 0 1 rr r-i."bility to ciuc;troin it v-},~le 1, 0 re . It rouc-;t be unr'erstood thrt tho
port cr11acit7 h3r8 1-i_.os a def;nite cejlinP;, end ·e crn ""rintn.in 0'11,r 'lT'rrovir,,,tely
"'our divis".ons . P-nv cxtn1 I im"ort for a sn{3ci~1 :,ission rmst bA wdntPinr"Jd out
of surrlus store;d up dur~nr; p="riods 0 ➔1 good wer:tl:v"r. 11
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�FREs,-;,•r7,AIJO-- J:'I eITJ~'llY 31 , 1 g4L,---r:-,rly this morn-i ni:r Gc"1err J. Clrrl· .. e'lt to the 3rd
Divi ion er, n):-,fo}1 is locrt8d "t Bor~o 1 "ontello on tre ror.d f'rom ·rettuno to
';isternr>. . Her8 he t8l1
red ,·fith GPn9r':l mru"'cott , Genernl fawns , Gr,n~r-il T~:--P'les
:CJ,"').(1 Colo-1. 1 Dnrb ~.
}fe :'.:Ol'"J.(1., to his ('lj stre'-'r,, thr>t t 10 b11ttA lions of DrrJ.:i;· 1 8
Rrngers ·:rl·ich hrrl. n+,tf'l.cl.;:ed Ci -,tern:-- vesterd:,,.y mor'1.i np; lirid been cut off an~. rnu"lt
be crmsidered 8S entirely lost . Tb.e 1rd Division rerort'3cl throt it 1·ms rl()eting
heav r res·:str>nce, not merely 3cntt0r~nl1' or:nosi_t~o11 . Gr·1.0r"l Clr-r1, then went to
the Feadriuarters 1st .A,,.P'-0•'ed Di ric:ion 71--t-,re kl net Ge'1"'rr 1'1 Jinrrion rnd I enney.
Gen'"r:il J 1cns "llso C".me to tJ, is rnreting . G0·1."r,"l I',--rron wrs rl,out to lrunch PD
attPck ton11rd Str7.ione di Cai-oroleorn~ . f.f'tpr Ge'1.9rnls H"r~on ann J enn9y hf'd
11'1-ree0 betw e""1_ theriselves 0"1 certPin 1.uestio·,1S rl.eelinr:; with Generr>l µ,.,rf'on 1 s
re.ssn.P"e thrru':h the l'.lri tis!l l st ,·Yvis ion, t]~':l col1.f'ert=mc"' enr1ec'l and Gen9rc- 1
Cl;:,r 1 rGt1rrn°d to >1is Corrmnnr'l Foc-t .
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Lnter in Vie r,+'ternoon G0n9rPl Clrir 1:: le'1rnnrl thrt Gen~rrl Prr~·on ½Ad ""et
heavy oproc;ition ,:,11cl m['.ffT "'1nns . I'is effort wr> s U'1.S 1cc9ssful, Rncl i,., Pd withdra:rm.
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"T½e situ... tion \-ii;rn ~"' -U+'fjcult . Th9 9'1.emy l'1 rolrP·'1_q bis rrP.S8'1.t f'ro:it
i.n co::::rtnct n~t 11 our troo s ·":ith tre /,th Pirborne Divisi.o,... , the 1r~1 .:)ivi::;ion re~nforced r,-ir] ,. "th tre rer""rn f;.oerin:" D:ivi '4on . ':'r'1.1rs nrA A1cmint9red on all
front"' .
heprcl. , +'or t;e f'irst ti..,e tr~c; ,-orniyr, thrt 3rd J:iV'J..sion hr>rl em:ilo;ired -'::.wo Ranger bn.J..,talions --: n t1~0"r 2ttr,cl' r.i_.-1--,t before 7.nst on Ci-.ter'1.c .
Roth o:-~ tl ese bn.ttalio:11s 'T8re "nn-:.hilated . I thin1' thP.ir pL.<>nninr; wrs frulty,
altho11r,J-, Luc;cis , tru::;cott and f1r,r1Jy e.11 e~Tressf')d their op~nions t o ne thAt the
plans ',.'er0 •1ell thou½ht out. To enploy li.<;ht forces in such an rttPck , in r,y
orinfon , was 1msound . 3rd DiviGion attacked Ciatrirnn tJ,is ..,+'ternoon ' ithout
Rir ::mp,..ort , rl.11e to brd v1en.thr:ir (Ps a1Jeged by tr·e Air Cor s) .
!eather vms
,ntirely -~-vorahlo h9r9, r>nd :'.n e ,.,.,ess"W' .,..rom Gru9ntr.9r to ·e , he rerortecl
m11ther cle .... r ri.t ot1·1;Jr end . f..t 190( toni,..,.it Tru,cott rnrorti'ld to ,.,.,e tl. . Pt the
si.brt:i.o'1. '7f'S '"tfo':y ancl progr0ss ,...o,..t cUf'ficult PP;.' i 11,..t heavy r0sist<'nce . He
told r,r:; ti,-' G morn~ '1."' t-:,...,.,,t th., +'::_O'ht-i nr: tl'e 3r :;-li vi"lion h"c1 n, 1countered ·,,,,s the
-r:iost dj: .,..ic·1lt it 't d e:x:1."'91~ienced d1
1rins the rr9s,=mt wer . For tre 1rd Division
to maJ·e th-is p('lr~-i ssi on ~ s i11.r'~ crtive o+> tlie rlet9rl'1in, :.ion o" the enem-r to hold .
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Due to +.he lf't9n.8S'3 of tl10 dPte of' rttnc 1 ri]l el8rrtAl'ltS 0~ t: e 1st A.rr ored
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[' 1rl the f'n ct t',r t ·\l1ey G"1Cl"Ul1.f:.Arcc
i.ne 3 in th0 I",rir o+' t ·. . ri 1st Br·• tic· h
f"'v·ision, their efforts tn burst fr ::--th Pnd hrrfass the n,11.eny cid ·-iot reP.ch "'irst
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I a.ttcnrl,,rl a co11fer9rce "bcut noon i>.t 1st Ar,.,,ored D:lvision, ··,here :,ucas
discuc;sed th9 situ."'tio"1 •ritl--i Ten:n--:Jy and ;·ar" en. I w.,,s 'orri"c' ever t o. enerv
hu~ ld-up 011 0 1 1.r "8St "'l:i.n1• :inr1 tre odge od½9 s~tu"ti.ori in the VI Cor-::.'s on tl 5 s
front . 3;;t}i ~n()'incors , rf[1r, on 1 s ~n.c>p,,rtr:~ rYJ.r1 so~·e Brit-i.sh ·rr>r3 J::olcl-i11; tre line
a;<>:::"s·t, "'ti ~f resistance . T-:le'Yf'"mt--: o.t:> trc '~>5th "nrl ·n 5t½ G9rr•on '"livisi on hflve
)Oen iclent:i -ri8d on t 11 :i.s ·"'ro11.t . These, with -l:,1---A Li.th f 0 rn.chute Divis::_o'1., int1.ct
0"1 t},r,t f'ro'1.t i'Y1 ic-"'te to J11e tre -r:oss:i.b~lity of a GAr,- n trrust f'':;"i.n~t tris
'19Ctor. --r sucl• shoU 7 '1 occur, •;9 hrv-, li.ttlo to orrose it . Lucns jg re-ori;n~1.iz~hP'
8nd lias ,.., ,_.., cod the 157th Coribrt Te;,_m ~ n th' t , rec' . The 170th is beini:: "Ii trdr[~•m
:'rorn the east f'l11nk ."nCi r,.,, 1,~c,~r'l by the 1Gth ~11C'~r1°ers. TH'3 rrill -ut the !,,5th
Divjsion, l9ss 0 1e co~l-)pt ten,, i'1 Corrs reserve .
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�11 It is ny est i , te, Pnrl I hrve "nriic· ter, to Lucn.s tJ,-,,,t ,·,hen Cistornr is
reR.Ch'3d and tl'e l:1t 1riti c.ih Di vision J.:t..-,v · YJ.P: reR.cred CE1r-:ro leon8, ~nrt]r,r offensive eff'oc:t by the 'TI Corp"' is out o:f' the nivrntion -Por t'1e t2..rr0 bi=dn ,;. There
r-i.~e t, 10 e-rieri.y· rlj vi .-;ions on e ·.tr "'r c;j rie cf' the road 7 ,,r c -; n~ north "'r m,, nzio .
If tlLse struc 1r sir:ultn.neously t 1 1e situ, t,; on 1 10uld hCJ rlFficult . It is rw be lief th..,t ·e r,ust tpl,:e a rosition in rerd; ness, ""i.nirnizing the dcneer 0·1 the
east f'1Fm 1· , enphPsizin"' it on th"o "Ost -"l..,11 1• ·rit'.1 tb, '3rd Jjvision in dertr in
tJ1e Ci~tA1~r..p rrCJr ~,r r,,•"nr1 tn cou-'lter,,ttrcl.c to the 'ec;t, ·•:ttJ-· f;J,e 1st Britisl-1
11iviflion in r~e,·t11 in tl'e Cr- ,olAnne ['T'(Jf' nrepr:~e,1 tc COU'1t r'-'tt"c1· in either
r1 ire ction with t},e /i,5th Divi,:;ion bss ::i. cor1rt te/lo in cor:rc.i resr,rve nell 11.orth
of Anzio enr1 ·1ith rarnon just ~n th9 rear n""' the 1st British Div~sion pr"T"red
<'or a li,.,,itecl o"fe'.1s;vc t !'1-1',t to r"~,orr--orjze tJ-,n oro'7y l"'nrl :in a co1 mtGrettacJr
role to Aith9r fl.~nk . llSt<>r t e '1ffct Jritisr. br-'g.,.-,,'e r,;roup comes in , I rrorose
to brin~ in on9 ~,or3 British br-i 2:, de ';!'our rnd :m Ji;r1 e:l"icPn. co"'!bnt tean . This
..ril1 rPke the hri ip;"hn.rc1 more secitre, altl-ioup;h ov rt1-1z its sur,nly crir,bility
flnd 0;ive us a cl-:trnce for offensive Pction.
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"The ~e;r~"Pl 'h<'S ~rrro•ri,,,ntel, "~ve d-'vi:-iors cnnf'ront-inc; us no", with
c,·1other j'YJ. q-: r-11t, P";<-in~t our four .
le hrv9 1.0 C'l"nce , in 1-riy op~nion., to re2ch
Colli L2zi,'-'1i rire'1 Rf:;Hi'1e;t the orrositi.on "'a::sec1 jn th-t vidn"'ty. Should U~e
enemy r8.:'1.ize 011r ~nr 1ili.ty to re2cr this ob,jective , Pnd ·:ith ris i:-rr,nrent
c> 1)il~t:v to "10ve c1ivisio"1S f'ro11'l tJ.ie ....,ort]~ .. h never r quired , b~ r ay c'lecide tl~"t
t 110 onort'mitv :is present to ri;ive tlie Alli9s R. r"lvArse. Should . e r,ovn., rnc' I
an s1-tre he hns the CP"''l.b:iljt:r, t 1'!0 or t},ree r1ore divisions i'7to this ~ren , ,'e
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·vwild h;:,ve d:t-'"ficulty r,<>j·1tri::nic1~ mi.r;;CJlves . : hr've r· sol11tio>1 ',hich I nf:ill
.,..res9nt to GenAr" 1 7 ex2nc'er toriorro" t}, t 9n-,:: S[' ~es ., celn.y in fa'TVJL bec,.,use
it i'"' rerfectl; 2pr"r9nt t'ht thA VI Co:r''"S TreRc1 ·1u11rt9rs My' th9 3rd P'1ri /,5tl" Divisions C"'11 not b9 evtr1crted i11 +,i.me. It brinn;s 1 1S f''lce to ""2ce FHh tre rerilization thrt '70 n"'ve n. co"!r itnent en om· hrnds ··r1Jic'1 ""ust ½e "'urrlied rnd •_p'YJ.trined
throu,:,}, l 81:111S o-"' crrft :f'or sone t~"l8 mtil tr0 Cr:::-sino +'roYJ.t is built ur sufficiently to bren k t~1rourh . A better pl" n , in -,v or~ nio;1 , ~ould be to l"!ass I" 11
me"ns jn thn l'ed.itc~rn..n1;ri.11 - 11, D11 il;~ou1, n"V"'l anri Pir - "nC lr,uncl" rnother Cor:;-s
rmnhibious [lttaclr of' t 10 cl-ivision.s , 1ref2rr½l, t,J~e /~t}, Tnrlif'n, or~ Britis}, div:isio11, n..nd tre 155th 11ot 1<>ter tl"Yl Ti'e1,rurr· 15th in 11n rttPck on C:.vitr-ivecch:La .
It 'l01J. 7 rl 1-:ie "'racticr71y- unoprosec . I should r" 1<9 fl lrmc1 in1s on the b81lches at
ei.th0r side . One clivision could hold tl e rort, wr:118 anothor noved rr~idly on
Rorie to 1,J.oc1; the vri.thr1 rPwal of troor, orvosin/"1' tre VI Corns . In 1'1:V orinion it
hn.s sreRt rossibilHiAs rind shou 7.d be dnne . ThA 'Javy '"Jill sr>y, 11 imro~si'Jle 11 , but
:it caY\ ')e rlcn-. "n( 10 1li ';iife us F clrnce to tr['r t' 9 Q9r,nrns on t1--e Cr ssino f'::-cmt.
I '1Pve iust tro'1--;ht o·r +-,ri:1 } lan and "lill ~ive it norCJ st1 1d r torri~ht , r11d if I
r:nr11101'.nsurmo·ntn.ble obstPcles wil1 prese11.t it to AlexRnrler to orrow . FRir
• eather ;''Ve us 0 noth9r orport11'1~t - to U'110P.C1 [' J.pr~e l'I'l0·1nt of "urrlios .
e r,re
i'1 .ctoorl. shRne, e-rcept f'or pr~mun5tion.
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Perso11::>l Cl"rk to r:ruenth9r . fl.~T OQl{. 111 101"1 crn Spadgor Corr>s o+> ? Divisio·1s
Cl".lrT'V' 0-1 tl--ie jmp9tU3 of /~~ roes ~l8X,"11('9r unrlPrstn.nr1 thP. no.,,ible nece sit;,r of
,ls:lvi:-: ro;,,e of trj_s force if' :;,resent 1:tt11 c1c1 "re ui1succe3sful? 11
i'erson11l Gr 1ent)1er to Cl. rk . R1J 657 . tt1Ar,,.nitzer i·1dicr1tes thf't 'l.lexa11der
•1ill rrobn.bly be rl:llucta"'lt to coT 14 t rr->rt of Spac--;rir Force rs surrr;ested in ~'our
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i·'p'essio"l is t 1r t \leYDnder visu:--lizes fl sit1rtio·, ,..,,1ereb;r Jrad½"'r Corrs
rjF-;ht 1,e forcec to trih? over sector no'r occupfod by 3rd J1I>'\. and 1/,.t:t I"ivj sion .
''ill niscuss r0ints r::,isefl in :ro'n~ rries::1pa9 -1l'en Lerrinitzer cones J-,ere U is Rfternoon . Your GOJJ.. ccr10 sl5 r;},tl:r garbled but : believe 1 nnderstr>nc_ your c1e-:,ire.
See rw next ""8SS"C:8 reference TndiPn Jivjr;ion f'or non p9rsonr>l flddress .
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Frorri Fi"t:1 "..rni;,r to FFth rr-iy Pdv Cl - R'T 65? _tt}'0urth Ind1n.n Division has
been ordered f'rom T~j_r,hth Army to Sradger Force . rove,.,,ent \"ill be1dn t(might . tt
rersonnl Glnrlr -fron Qrmmt},er - R' 701 - 11 Ler'l Y,88 'ln"bln to throw •ouch
1:-l l"ht 011. Ale".'1nder rlrin e"'CP-,t to co..,f';,,..r ,,..eluct,.,nce to use pr rt of :;rndi:;er
Corrs . In f8rsorv11· riesseg8 to I eese, l\lexP.nd r st,-,ted , 11 1 r1J:in to er-rlov Jew
?:ealancl D.;vision north of C:Rssino r1~rect8rl on /lrcGtt . LeM sq-r--:; tbere h::-s 1)een
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no rlisc1rsion o-"' S''.Cf' a rJr>n . He bel iPves th"t Ale' rinrler his no c efiY1ite plrn
but is w 1..,::ti11g d8VeloF1P.nts rn 'Till triH· to you rnc' f'l'rlger . Srrdger v-isit8d
..-,rench Corn" n.nr1 II Go,,.rs tod::i y . 'IP. sa"' Juin but 1ot Keyes . ft presfmt he ar T'9"T'"l to be coy,rluetinr- recc:--•1n1:1~<1scnce only f'nd hris o-ivon no i11,"iCPtion of' hjs
in..,entions . Alexandc,r 1 s decj sio11 to gc- to /lnzio to,,i rht ''f1S n SU(1den oYJ.e , but
he [l ssur"'ld 1811 ~ t /1.S notr; nr to clc vr~ t}, s lowne'1s of VI Corrs a,1 v:-,nce . }Te S" id
h0 ,just wn.nted to tPl 1,,. to G nerPl ~lriri• .
He l'F'Y re.-,"in rit Anzio Tuesday nig t .
He js •,rina-i-no; h"'"' 1,it J unc'erstr1r1d . }le v:isited T'cCreerr this e~"ternoon. I
w1s 1 11jte pess:iristic ov1c1r s;tuqtion here lrst nip½t ,,.Pter I returrn~d fro1"1 Juin
Keyes conference . T feel Jetter r-bn' t ~t tonight . -,nem7 )'"S everyth"np; cornr-dtted , Pnd : bcilieve "le will tri.1'.:e CAssino . Vo '9VP..,.., no blitz is 1ndicrted .
Keyes "Ji 11 p;iwi no 9S-Si~Ate . "'ine j s Febru,.,ry 6tJ- - I J-,ope . 11
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1 RSS~F'l,A'TO-- F~B~TT~RY l , 19/)j.--G ,n~rnl J\l ,:Pnd,.r .nrriv d b;r destro.r0r pt, the con•rorinc' ro"t 11.t Anzio at about 0730 ancl cr "l Pt once to Gener,.,l Clar'k: 1 s co· r-nn'' post .
'7ith hin uer"l ~e'lt"!ral }'nrding rrir1 his 1--.i1it8TY Pnd nRV/'.11 rides . Cr .n~r"l Cl,,,rk
at once hr>d t:1 S"lrious cnri.versetiori. "-"Tith ,...,..,nerPl Al-:ixBndl')r rbout th"' J.-,tt ... r 1 i:- sup-
rosition thrt '31-T 'G-LE hnrl not 1,,"'n e:,._'T'loit"ld n.s rnrinl'r "S icir: t h~·ve b"'!en the .f
C"se . G"rJ.~rt:'l Clr-rl' noint~d ont ti--,..,t s""ri0us orrosition hAd b en m,t b·,. thn VI
Con1s , r>n-1 +,hrt there '"8.S no vrlid. r;ro1ryi -"'or rli_ssqtj_;;':'Pction ,,-·th th, rrocrress \
""ade . 'I'h"l G,..n")rr l nent on to outlin~ +'or C'r ,n,,r" 1 A1,,., ~AnJ0r tbe rro•,osed o:--erc ti.on At Civi.tn.vecc ~iP descri', ,cl in ycst"lrcl.<'Y ' s diRry. G"lnerr, l /1 lev-::md""r nnd
G~neral P..,rd"-nq; ap.,..,,a,,..,d to l,e tri1·cn nooc1· by tre sur;p;"'!stio'Yl ,-ind cc,uld only state
thA.t it :nres"nted 7 or-i--:;ti.c,:,-il dF'ficnlti~s . ·.ro this G~·v"r:> 1 Cl<>r 1r.: sa ~a , "C v .rco!"e
tJ-, ... ! 11 P'"l fl" id trnt ,., 11 tr"t , 0,1lc' ~ n111cess"r r ,.,.011ld be for Gen,,rr 1 Alexenc'"lr
to P'1"t fn,...iral Cunnjn'"'·r.,"' nnd ttrub his nose ·h11 tr,e rroposAl nntil the l'r11-1irr-il
coll,:,ct'1d th, n,cessrir" crnft tc lrnd ,:it th~ ro-5.rits ~n r:pJ.estion . Th'1 results,
G':)rt"'!rol Slsr'· said , wnnl.rl. ITT'~Rtl:r ,ri.hnnc"' Gn 1."';rP l ·"..l~'':Elnd ,r Is r~ru+ntion n s ".
il~tary co .....,..,n.nrll')r . G"YJ.ernl Clr,...1 "'u.rt'h r srirl -t-;J-,rat r,, hed no ennc""rn ris to ·vho
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cor--,...and,d th~ or,r'-'tion or vho <;ot the cr,oit +>or it; wh~t h~ · :~bed to s"e WP.. S
th, r ."''llts . "o ,,,.v,r , Qn11,-..r~l C1Pr 1". snjcl ... ;..,,...,t i.f G,..-1.r'lr,.,l ~lJ-~pnr er ·ish"d hi to
t'lk"l th-is n~1 r,r0i ,ct i1e 011ld do it "rrl 1cu1 r1 sncc~ed in it . In "'nY 9V"'YJ.t ,
frl"n"'rRl c1...,,~,, s.'."'id 1 df'y sro·1lil. b" Febru"rv JSth "n.d ,wt lrter , "'S til'le i_3 rrecious ,
and t. 11'~ op,..rntio11 ~ruln b" ~ onrit"'ld b. th"t t~r r'; ~ {' s•1f'f'i_c~ "'nt ,n ,rr:y 'l re, •~isrl "V~d .
l
G~n rPl !le"Ca ,dP.r P'1(1 Gl')n~r"l ;r.. rdiri,-r ½otr sric'l th"l.
th"'l r ,<itter v0rr '1"')rio1rnl~·.
1
7r 1 1ld
hf'V
to ccris5cPr
�Fol,_o"".;1'10" t11-t.s tr11( , G~nf:}rr>l Cl,r1r , G"lner'1.l P.l~'rancer rind G·,nl"lrRl rrrding
vi"'it~d the CF o"' VI Cor,..,•c,, '3rd D.;vi<,ion ,,,...,,~ the 1st Ar11ored Divic:ion. Th ,,'f
th "ll return"ld to lllYlCt"' [: t t½, CO"''•qn,i rost . \ +'ter lw1ch G~n4'rE' 1 Cl nrlr, ; ho bnd
S1lJ11"'oned .; s G-/,,7 to t 1'1" '11"J' ly-coT rl~t~a lPnr'-'1,,.,. 9+,,...ir rt r . . ttuno , -int .r"'fl. 1°:i s
rl~'1e Pnd set oPf f'or 1 '""rc·ir'ni~r; , JSCorted hy f0ur Sr"tfirf'.'!s ,v'~ich ,..,,d been on
t ., lrm.ding strip ""nd lrd b"'l1"'1 hci tily ordered to t,"'ke off . Thfa '111.provised
escort ·ras Dl"Jcecgrir rs t " ,"'Cort -:-r"lvinusly, 1•rpnr,ed ·ritl: th"' •rI= J\ir ~urp0rt
C0"1""Pnrl h-1d. f'n.:lE'!d to nrriv~ , (lll~ tot!-:~ "'urrositio'1 ('"'1 tt,.;r r~rt thPt the
weath"lr 1.ade .(>lyinr; .:rrrPcticaol,~ . G.n ,rel Cl""r1r "'i"lC. r~s escort lrnd"lrl S"::r-ily
£'t Parc;"'n1se ,..i~ld , ri11.c G.,n"lr,l Cl<>r1 G"mer;-,} :,~'7 7 8 '1.nd Lt . Col. 'intJ:-11•rlrnd
::,
r,t,n·n"<l. to tlie co """Pnr rost jn cnh~ . I ... ,d-'..,t,ly uy;on ri8 r"lturn t1"3 G n r"'J.
c1-ir;cu<1s d ,,.;th '}~r.rPl ,rU"''1+r.,r +,i-, •·ln.n ·rH-;h f'"' hrcl proroq,c_ to G,n,rP.l
Al~~-ann".lr '"no. obt . . ~1,d .-,ro·• G "nrt=il Gru,ntl~ r the J~test r~rorts on tre C,ss:i.no
oper"+,-tons .
0
r
-rsn"1nl to l\lexanc'l"r "ro"' Clrirl:. :?.'I 1117. "}reSPF1t '"'(1 -icrot~cns .,..," -'.:.rot
CasJi'10 h i··h+,s -,;_ll ,~ -;~;:-'t1T:' v~r;r soo,, . :;:+, "u,c ;1,si--;t 'l'" T"<>terfrlly ir,
-ror-ul"'ti."'<"' ,T'f "'nt11••p ;- 7 "'"'8 i+' .ro11_ C0'1 1.ci ~,,,,q-i_cr-t, no r -1) ,.,,~ss'o·1 'ric1 you cont •11 1 ,t'.'.l for tJ-,"l >m1 r;- .r "'ore, . I d,-,~r, to rit:ov V1ic; "'ore~ to --1v""nce nortr·:rest i·1. +,},~ Llri V- ll~y 'l;'~'W tlie II Car:-''' to Jl'"'tect t'1~ r~ c"}-t -r:::_nnlr of tr,
0DPC1 ger Fore~ .
II Corrs ·,ill rirlvsYJCC -: n th" r'~.rectior T"re 7 l4'-Ro°C'1. )~CCP <>·1d
"t . C<>st ,llo "'J - I~'°'d~~0·1t ,-Rocca ;l"C'CA. .
·r 'ncl• Co:,,r, J.:;o Pdvrnce 011 ttirn Pnd
t r--·1c~ on ..;o:-P . JJec-·<:.-:o- nn ':•r,d'=-~r Fore~ 3}'0'1ld ,..,, rcr·ched Ft 1d rut i.11to "f'f~ct
fr'"J'A'J.i,:,t~ly 1.11 order t:1rt l'T}'rit "'Y"f' ,t'J.s t 11~r"' 78 l,..ft to Fi::'th Arc;/ s011tli')rn e.ttrlc'r sJ,-,011ld not b" lost ."
1
1
-x-
*
*
Pr~s /'1ZA'J(~--1<"8BF.Uil.RY 2 , J_0/,4--'ft ,r t8 1-:::::i_ 1 ,.p; err' o·r 8 hervy p CCUT"UlF tio'1 o+' Fr .r
•s10r'r r·-yl b:l.c"cl-i"1.0' ...,.ooc'by, to 1 "j . G~n . ro11,:; ,,
is r-,turni11rt to the 'n:te<1 Str-tes
rp,cl to Drii:;('l.diF-r Geri, ral ''ax
ro ~"
,ro
p-oin,: to join tlie 8:-'11.d 1\.ir1,orn, Division iJ'l ,n'1'1Pnc1., f}nn"'ral CJ,.,r'" l~+'t 'is ·!"'a-1 ,..,u,•~'t,rs ~.t lJ.C'() iours to ,,~nit t·,o
o"' 1·.::'s Corrs Co~J1rincfors . At the II Corn:: CI, G"l"'erf'l Cl.<>rk con±:'"lrrec vritli 'rij .
G...,n . Kcy~s C0'1C i·nin<:; tl • si-SUA.tion Pl0'1P' t½"' II Corr::. -"'ront, A.nr' rlrinr for tJ e
i'"-~ediPte +'uture . The situFti.on is -reirly gr,od, fllthougl· tre Ger,.,,nns rre still
resi-tinrr stuhhornly, r2rtic 1lPrlv 'l.rO'P1r th-· lr~y c1P-f ... nse roint of Cassino .
(}rm ,rn l Clrr 1 told G"!·-1 ral Y~:ns thr>t r'~ nrofos~d to r-ov
:
th"" TStri Di vj si.on f9rthe:~ to th~ nort'') so tJ.i.rt 5t could strik, west alonn; t 1 e r ~ g0 p:round nc.rth of
C:::;_ssino . GenJrPl ~"r<"}•rb11rg 1 s 'Jew ZeA.lr-ncl Div-: sion ,.,.ould tl "''1. h us~r' to c<ttack
alono- th~ Liri River 1o rl.<>nrs . The _3/{,th Division ·roulc'l join th, 16th jn this
vest"'rn thrust north of Grssino . G"ln""r·1l C1Pr1c l1incr."'c1 with G.. n~r"l 1:~_.,..s .,nd
sc"'- of ~-"' stn.-rf o"'fic"'rs r>nd th""n left -"'or the Fr~nch ":Xf"lditionrr.r Cor::--,s corr, r..,n'i :~o-:it iust rl-iove V""r"-rro . l\.r·,,.iv~nr; ~t t1-l"! '"rrincr Cor-rs , G~n.. rPl ClFrk '7Ps
rn ,,t h G~n"rnls Juin , 11d il.oosev 1 t, nnd '1"'! ,.. ,nt · r , ~ai~t~ly : nto tJ, , corps ap
room to i1~ SC'lSS plflns rith G"!'1 .rel Juin . Th., t"7o :-'re11c1- djvisio-1S ·~ill no i turn
t'h jr R.ttack northvmrd striking e lo:rig the :riorth- soutr ronf ler.di'1': to ·prd J\t:: nD .
G.... n rr>.l Jujn -:mirl th1t ;~e hf\d rec.,,.iVeQ l , 000 '1ntive replPc ,~ent::; ,~rort TTorth
A"ricP r.ind t11r>t r_,, wns r')ady tc-, jur-r off 0n tle 9+,tac1, at i=my Vye . G,n~rnl
Clrir-: sa~.d tl1""t th. otr r divis:lo:ris jo-inil'lP- .;11 .l,:,h, ntb.cl: conld not bt'l Y'c<JPCY
1uite so quickl:,. In fnct it rrobrhly '1011lrl be :cm·· or f·'.ve cfavs bP-+'or~ the
ne' offrmsivc co 12ld ,~ lf'·mch~d . Tn1n~::--inq 11bout •-.rencl-i r ,fl"ce "nts , G"'n"'r~1
'P<i rl_or ,
1
J
�Clerk learn ,d thn.t 0t!1r-r nntives nrn rca(v to sriil +'ror "orth 11:fric<"' but thrt
the rrincinal -r,,r"'net' rl'lrlr..c~r ~nt nrobl~n ''P'S in Fr ,nch o•~f'ic"rs r,y' non-corwission~d
o.c>fic~rs . T11"•ir" nr~ -rew r~rlrocem.nts for t 11es~ '""l")n , nio"'t of \-'orn hnve J.rd to
sca·0, fro fr;~nce . G~n~rc1 l ,Tuin rromj sed t rt his Gonr11s v;culd take r1011nt c.- :ro
nnd that tre"T 11ro11ld rln11t the '1trrs n.:r-cl ~tripes n.nd the French Tricolor on the
crest o:' the 'll01A7.ta;n . G~n..ral c1~rt: SP.id tbrt if' 7,he Gourns took t..,e !"ountain
he want~d the ricolor t0 fly f;,bove tre Jters anc. 3trip,s . G"neral ,Tuin c greed
vigorously nith G~n"!rn.l Clprlr tbnt 11 He .,..,rt 1reep the ½riyonet f'°!rr~tur lly in tl·e
r·un ' s behind" , if 1e r1r~ going to s ove 1--d r:- bn ck raridl Y . Gen .ral Clnrk also
lenrn .d thr>t "' Gnn rnl of th~ /~th I"ldinn Divisio:-1 WP. s in thf'! French a::..·en torlay
lookinc- oveir the t~.,..rn.in to see if Tndi"'n trr,ops could Pight in th':l countr;v Fh~re
the French di.visions nre now rushing +'orw[lrd . G,.,n~rril Cl;,rk l"\;{fTessed ris objec tion to tres" o-"'fi_c ,rs goi11r; ~ nto th., section whrm "t ms not his :;1:-n to employ
eith"lr th~ /!,tr- ·~"ldfan Divi3iori or t11c ~ evr ZP,[llPnd Divi ~ion in this f'IOuntPinous
country. G~n~ral Clar 1• 1.-,ft th-, Fre11cr Corra reric.quarters n'1.rl :,--etnrn-n.d to his
0'7n advPnc~ co r "'nd post Pt Fr~se'1zr-no .
Upon returnin-,, he ~nform0d GencrPl 1ru,nth ,r of' ris d"scu-::sio'1s with G ner<>ls K"'Jy ,s R"'.(' Tuin a11r• t.11 ,n cnri.ferred br:i~f'ly 'Vith Colon~l Sul7_:ir11, th"? Arry
';ut=1 rterr,,ns~ ~r , · ho 11r d cone up "'ror~ th : r~nr Jche lon, ri bout nro hl~ s of t rr;•y
sur l·r.
*
}-ff-; )r; T7A'Tf' --Y ~3FFFIRY 3, 1944--G"'"l rnl ClPrk too1<- off +>ro~, tl"e ;:;'ifth 11 r,,,.,y- co' rand
rost strip 1-:Jy cul) t>t OR/!,5 t is r orn1ng. B:19 arr-:v~d nt th, JO CorJ s striT' 11t
£> bout 0900 l 1ours wher" ' ~ , JI? s r•"'lt ½y G.rin~r" 1
cC:r er;r th , Corr s Cor '"lntl.-,r rnd
proc .,dee! tn T{ePri.'JU"'rt ,rs 0 01 Gu:-.rds BrirrR.de 1h .re 11, ,1_,,t F2j . Gen . Gr")gson-Ellis ,
Co.,.rrnd-:na th., Sth British Divjsio"l , Ms Brirr::idJ Co"'!"a11r1,,rs ,-.-rir1 oth r o+'fic~rs .
P.-"ter ::i )ri"l-r c0·1,:_rnltE'tion ,jt11 thes~ o""''ic,rs, the A.rrv Cor anner rroc~ccled to
Tufo wher~ h~ sp ,nt snT'l, ti,•e in two OP 1 s o½s,.rvi'1P' th, terr['in rind discussi'1n'
tr e 10 Corps Ptt;:, c'r ..,:i tr +,he Corrs Com•!J.nc,er . G~11~rr 1 ClPrlc took of'f fro'! th~
sb· ip , r~turn-inF to >1,s co.,.,,,.,,Pnd post Rt 1175 .
1
1
G .nern.l Alexrind"'r hr>c1 exrresscd n _,rish to r -i<::cuss '7it11 G".!n rrl Cl"r 1,.,. t11e \
VA.rio11s "'rohl ,l:13 fpcirir.; tl1 "'\ ~.rrriy Co :r2nder on tre nz-i.o and Cr>ssino :ronts. Accorc'l-i•1r;l:0, ..,t RP_ roxill'atelr l//)0 G .n r l Cl"'r-!{ fl"li•r by cub rlr->nl'l to CE>sertP ,
"'h ,re le lPnded b~• tl-i"' Hat .. rfr 11 ::rnrl "ent b~f CQr to Genl"Jrf11 Alex3.nr1er I s hMd q11art..,rr1, •1rh,r"l h, co11f~rrt"lil -"or aqrox" "t,ly i=i.11 hour ·ith Gen~rals Ple'Cf'1,ler
and ,-,re; v.rp· b ,-"ore l'')tnrnj nrr to ris CO"'r•pnn post by Cllb .
0
The frr,.y Cor'"Pnoer re-c•')ived t h , f'oll◊'·;'1ro- T"CS ra') "'rori }1js Chief of -·taff
tl-Jis r>ft rr:oon ''Tho W"S up Pt the new brir'geheRd rre8 checki.,,,g 0;1 the ituation .
Rr . 18°. 11 Fnve seen Lnc:Y, . H~ feels .,,£'irlY cw·fortnblr, r>bout ,~resent situr> t"on. ~Jo 1 nd:cr>tio11s y~t o-r- rajor attnc\: . Does not nlen to ·-,~thdraw 1st Div.,
but ''il] be n"'cessn:c,r to ,dthdrAvr '.lrd Div . JiouP'hnuts r>ml linuor h"'V"'\ hnd v'oncerful ~"".l:>ect . 11
0
TTpon l'l"!C"lip+. of .._,r~ 8 bove C' bl~' th~ ~r1117 Co•'1~,nnc1~r disr:>tc1~~r1 the .,..ollm inr- cicr)l., to Gn,n~rr.l Lueras .
PJ 14/,/!, . "Gru~nth~r r~rortq sitw tion ·rell in
h<Pnd . .,,"{r.: .ct to fly up cAturc'.~y riornjnr- nnd loo1·' the ciiturition ov~r . Arn 17,lPd
3rd Division is b~i'1'; orrr,rin-1zed nn_ T'l"ced in ri P1orJ coi"p"ct situr+.ion 'h<1r~ it
can ~ith"lr rep ,1 collnt.,rattack or later, at Pn ar ropriat~ ti , , ,.,1{e Pn ::ill out
e.ssr-mlt O"l Cister'1.a .
'ir- 11'\a}~in~ r,lnns .ror "JJ out w·srult h~re.
ill "'ivc you
1
1
�the details
0.,1
Sr-turda'r.
lt .~r-rds . 11
G~n rl'l Clf'r1" .,..,iceiv d r- C"rile +>ror, Adnirnl Lo'TY th 1 Con•.an<ler of 'I'i:,sk
Force ;¥81 in , hich r"' ~}.Tr~ssed rd.s ple,,sur~ f't norldnP, ,.,jth tl,e Fifth Army
P.nd :bis hop'"! for R aui ck junction :l n Ror ,e .
G~n~r!':'l Tl'te , Fi+'th ArPly G- k , todPV subf'!itt1'd a rl"'rort to
Corr~anrl'!)r r,-,p;nrfli.na trc '~ur,pl "';_turition Rt Anzio . The rerort
th-, suppl • 9itw,tion in g ,n"'rl' 1 -is Sl'l.t:i.sfr- ctory for the troops
excert for E>rtiller:, RP"'mnition . Ad justT'lcnts in the surrly of
nition ar, ~i11~ ca.de driily 'by tht"! 1c;rr - trucv n<1tror .
the Fifth l\rr y
.<>sscrted th0t
no ::r in th.._, ar1'P
nrtill .r.r Br rm-
The ~ nfnntry r"'rl::> c"..,,~nt sj tuntion -in Fifth Army is b"'cor,inrr r11or, :, cute
ev .ry rla.y. A+.'ter co-1siderf'ble ,tuc1 y o+' the nrobl ,ni, G('mernl Cli:irk c..,1-iled
G,Jr~ral Dev~rs as f'ollff1s: 'R,'T l/~09 . 11 Inr~r>ntr rePl'"'Cr)T ent s-itu0 tion in Fifth
rr,y is ~xtr(Y el-r s~rio11s . Fresfl:l'1t srortar s i 11 6 i. vi sio'1s nm· ,Yceed <S , 00C' .
Nunh•·r rr"s~ntly f'W,~ lPbll"J in r'"°'rot is 800 , whicri ~ncludes '3CC ..l ich hrve been
co werted to i nfPnt:r-y from. oth"'r bro.nch ,s . CP sun lti,,,,s j n tl-ie 3rd Di vi 1ion c1.lone
totnl ?L,00 of 7},-i ch only 900 c1re non- bri+,tl'1 . Total United Stftt~s er sunlti~s in
VT Corps nre rro . In-~rntr:r "'hortn½e :n '3L.th liv:5sion is 1'300 . In '36tr Division '3000 . J r~sent o-r~r tions involve sirnultn.n~ous U"e of' all di.visions "nd re q,1-i.re tbrit T /o str na;ths b"l • a.:ht.., in":!d .
1
1
0
ttr urgentl:r r1'corari~nd BS n ,..,,,.,tt"'r of Of"!rPtj onn 1 n~Ce"'sity thrt 1000 infrn tr~r rP-plncl':l'llents ')~ t.ri}cn f'ror, 85th T)ivision r>nd "'r~rm .d h"lr~ b:r f;:,stest nvnilnble r A1ns. I 1-iPvc fllr'"lndv r'lir~c+,cc1 that infantr:r r,.,.rlrcer ~nts b, t£1k"'n ~rm~
88th Divis-ton "n~n :t nr-rjves , ½ut I desire to liriit thPt nu.,...ber to minirnu,'ll Pbs0lutcly n~cesser·r. Th,re rr~ rlso shorter;es in artill~rv, P"!d;_ccil l'nd enr;in"!ers,
but t "'Y P.r"' not y"\t r.rjtj cal.
0
"I ;-, lso 1 1rt-:~ thr,t cverythhi.r• rossihl~ b"' dnn~ to ~1ove u-r th~ F~bru"ry r>nd
~•o;_rch li f'ts o+> r~r'lncer-~nts fr01., th~ Un:i tcd Jtc1tes rim' +,o e'r.-,edite shipPent to
Itn ly of RTUS fro, ·rorth l\fricr . } leP s~ E>dvj se ~ct-ion t<i 1,.""n• 11
*
*
L,,
1'1'"'cE,gA' 0 - -Ti'.,..,B,'tF~qy
1944- -At 0G00 tMs ,...or11hw G,')l•"lrrl Cl;-,r 1,. r~ceiv1'd G•n~r, 1 I
Ke•r~s, .Tu jn f''1d R")11Clt"lr i.n J.-,~s hut . Th") '":ll[)j~ct ().(> tris conf""r"'1C~ ,~<>s thr. rro- \
ro:;,d r"'nrrl'nr,~:--.-int oft},,. forc~s on th~ Cr>ssino front, in vi~·~ o+' -:.he Rrdw·l r+>
th~ 'L' '.fonln.nd Gorns, Cor n_,yl..,d b· G~n~r,,l Fr~•hurr, . Bri~f'lv ,t.-.t"'rl, G.. 11,rnl
Clrr1" 1 '3 tl-io110'ht, n,3 ror0s~d to G,n,rPl .Tuin, ''PS ti-nt 1-ir-i 3J.-,oulrl Ce'"'S') to ,....0ve
1-ii s Corps on At.-i.n;:, 8 nrl r .-ori_Pnt T-ii s e+>+>ort to-erd Ter~lle - 11.occa .,.eccr . GPvi~r;, l
Glar 1( propos"?d to reJi ,v~ th, -:i;t11 DivisioP fro,.. ~t:J rr .s..,11t ro"itionP ['3 soon r>s
;os~ibl"' 11 '1rl disrhc~ :it. north of th, '3/i-t • JT_ th"!n T'ropo'l"'f to rut the ·rew ~eelrnG D-ivision in jnst s011th on trc Crssi.no +'')<1t11r~ FITJ.d b8Vt" ~t strjk~ north,·est,..,~,-.i1 up ti-ii'\ I ir-i iT:,11.-n. Gen~ral Juin ir .,.,~dilltel:v '7'!'8Sn"'r t'fi~ fnct t1-i_nt this
rlrn i.nvolv"?d P r1 esir11.})l_~ CC'"lC ,ntr['ti.0'1 of' norc rl'1t'h"'!r· trJ:1'1 1licr~rsi.011 of jt.
H"' st;:ited, ho ·•w ,r, thrit h, .,.nst 1-irv~ r-rot, ct-i.on on tr~ nort'fi 0f l,i s rr~s~nt
position ·h":\r~ ~_+, :=i.r•join .d the ";-iP-}'th t\rllly. G~n~ral Glrr1' rrordser1 to lnok into
tlie 1Jucstion of' Its. 1 "irn. n.'1.c: ro'"'s-ibly so e .l1 m"ricr'1 troors to h lr the si'1~le co,.,,bat t,.11 , 11.i er f'}~,ii-r<- 1 Juin ·,rps ri hl , to l""f v . 011 tl c n0rtr.
�G
3
nu ,st-ioYJ.s -j,-wolv"'d :i11 th"! ~r,,rlo~:fl'.'lt'mt o.,.. th, l,T"'w 7,en 1 r'nd Corps. G~n"'lrr:l Fr,.,yburg )
stater thrt 'r:i:, r~conneissorice 'R.S in proP-r~ss ,110 thrt i11 two cir '3 he could get
th'3 'Ie·'T 7,e" lanc'lers -in rosi tfon r;outri of Cassj rio to 11:oVl'; north'"'"'st ur the Liri
Vr,l 1 J.T .
At luncl1 GenP-rnl Cler1c r-ece:i.vcd nn.ior G"ln rr>l r·cI"n.hon Rn,'l. ;h,ior G•nerc>l Rob"lrtson , Co....,'""Pn<'F"'P: the ~th and "nd TT . S . Jnfnntrv Divisions r1'spectiv.,.ly.
Thl"lse o+'f'icers, ·•hose 11.11i.-':.s r>,re 'lo.., in th!'! lritish IslP,s, hn.v"-' co""e wjtr '1°rue of
their 0°"fiCC"Y'8 to Itrily to studv actual or~rp-'",~ ons . G... ri~rn 1 01::T"lr "'urnishcd
t},eTII w'th ,je"lt'S ['''.\d recor'1[-)7"'Si1.'1Ce CATS Awl <J.rrflnrr.~d for tri~ 1 1 to visit II Corrs
where tr"l~r would o-,,.t experience ~ n actual ,mrfare 11s c0nd11ct~r "'.:,oca.r.
In the r-> "'t,.,r-r1oon GenPrnl Juin r ,turn~d yrj_t}, G1'YJ.l"!r,l CPrpl'!ntier f1ncl Colon~l
Cherriere . G~ner a l Cl Arl,. to l d G~n"lrnl ,Tuin thnt "' hprl fcund r flllw rundred
Itqlirn troops to reinforce G~ner'11 .Tuin 1 s north~rn flPnk . G .n~rr,l J,1in erir:erly
strotecl thrt YJ.f"! 'WS renrlv to ta," ur the n,w r>ttnck Terclle - Roccasecca . G.n~r~l
Clr:- 1r, rr"'n"!r::il Gru.-mtr~r and Gen ,rr> 1 TPte P 11 v~ o;orousl7 a::rner-tcn , howeve r, t hr-i t
thl"?rc , •ust b" econoni.~r exerci s~d by G"'n rn 1 ,Juin in tl-i~ cc11c;u~ption of artill~ry
11.n11,unition , as r, hrd h~en b 1 1r'1in½ nor"'l thFr ::>n;r oth ,r nn:'t . Genr.,r"'l Juin s11.id
thf't i-,.., 1rn ':V it , ')ut' ,~1-i"'l'1 his soldiers su":erec1 hePVY cr"'!urltj~s r·1r'i 9till hnd
to hold on , the onl-r rr-y 1 1, 1
,m~',r to ricco·-:rlish it ·'Tpc; to use artillery on t:re
G~rr-Pns .
0
At din'1cr G"'n~rr l Clnrl~ ""'1t"'!rtr-i in"'d Gonerri 1 P~uclAr, Golo'1el S? ltzri>n and
Lieutenant Colonel }orter .
I>1.rl7 in the ev~n:inp.: Generl?l Clrirk clictoted th~ f'ollm1iY1g +'or
in ½is dia:r:
llVj sited 10 Cor·· s yest':lrrln:r 1w cub, ,~ns """lt by G ,n~rrl , ccr--er7 :1nc tqJ·en
to the Hint11rno Pr•r1, -rhr>rc I visited thll! Sth Divinio'1 ::ind ...,,"lt its ne·.,. co~"'nYJ.cl"r,
T½.j . Gen . Gr,o;,0'1-ElliP. Pe ?nd his prLncip~l s bord 0 nrt~s i~nr s~"')d ~~ A.s being,
h-i P,'hly er-ficient 1:i->1.d likeable ch'"lfS . I 11is:i.ted tre Tu:"'o Prer> -::bere, fr/")'l\ an OI
I hnd P onoc'l. loo c flt thl"!ir '1~xt ob,ject5v"' • TTrg ,rl l'cGr•cr~r tr lnimc" an rttrc1~ 2t
the earliest possibl, drte . He fP-els hl':l r,ny not be r>ble to do it b~forl'" th.e ?th.
,rq~turned 1 cub to my co~, ,1n<i rost . Flew 1"'t 14 30 to R confr!rance v,j th
;y
G~n~1~91 l\.l,xRnd~r rl.l1d G~n1'rr>l Fr~:~ourg r>t Cf1sertR. G-,n~rr1l :!:"revhurg had been d~rected by Alexr,nder to rrep::1rP reco.,.,,Pl"lndi;tions fer h-i s e.,,.;-lo; ent -: n tJ-1~ Fi f'th
I
Ar:-.,.v frr.nt . Frevburp; hPd do'1."l tr is ·ajtl'out re-1:er~nce to Jll-,. Ji le~rrinrler hd like·11is"' :mnr'1c nlr>ns, n.11 of v;},ich emit~ un"'Jtric;.-,11-r, f'or .,-,f't~r r>ll it is T"Y job to
pr~rrre the tPcticP>l '"'lnns PYJ.c conduct the or.•~rr>tions of tre li"ifth Jrrn:y. It ·,7i;,3
EJr.rar'!'1t at th~ ½eqi11n; n,~ o ~ tbe ,.,. eti '10: thrt 15th l\:r:rr.y Group P':.d """revburg 1~re
p;oil"J.P' to tell m~ ,just Po', ni-r n xt [lttrrc 1.,. 1 ould b~ r 11de . ; ob.j ,cted rs dirlo:niF' t~callv PS no_:si~lP- . D-iffe,...~rl ~ntir.~l • 1it. h rre:rburr, 1 s end ~1.,,rmncle.~ 1 ~ v:ie1 s on
ti"'~ er•rlo, e-110 01 the YITevt lealand Corns Rnd told ther, th"t, in my orin10'1 , the
Few '3-,13. la."lriers and TndiA.ns ,-rould not get to f'irst bn.so 1wrH no; in tre Cr ss5 nof"o1n,:t Cniro "ou~1tr>inr;, t½r-t the II Corr,s 11.nd Frrmch sho1 1ld r,imin in th')re Pnd
the 'ew z~olanders car~ i.tt!'d. to thri Liri VRlle:r ,,hen tl,,,y could .,.~t "Cro"s the
Pqrido without too ""UC½ .:'ir:;htj ng . I nrg"'d thst Freyburo Rnc1 hj s co, "0 n.d be f'.lc>Sed
to 1':V control ir,,difltel,r . Thr,v fina11;,r Po/~er- to y rl<'ns, n.nd Fre.rburg VPS
pl,,ced unc1 ,r rrrr C'Y"", ,;i_11d .
I
�i,
had in handling the t.revr Zealander
Bx-plaining thPt they -rere territorial
troops, responsible only to their 1?overnnent a.nd v;e ht:'d to get Along rri th
them. I assured r.im our relations wouln. be happ:r and th::it "'e =ould T'i8.ke a
go
0
1
'
"In view o:"' certain intelligence·I had r11ceived th'.'l nir:ht before on enemy
intentions in tl10 FFth Arny l\.nzio bridgehcHd, I sent the following rad:i.oo;rRfl'I
to GencrPl Lucas:
issued to you to :=i.dwmco ;,rour left and to cr1pture Cisterna
11re hereby rescinded . You sh011ld novr consolid2.te ,·rour bePchhead and mrke
suitable disrosjtions to neet Rn attrw 1-:: . You PP~T withdraw 1st Division far th~r to south if vou consider thRt Action nclvisable . Ar<vance on ow objectives
will be r~suri'"ld later . "\::if'th~r v~rf'li tting Gru"'11th0r rill r ee ch your HePdqm1 r ters nt 1130 tor1orrow to give furth?r d"tails . Ackno··rledge . 1
1 I nstructions
11 T also sent Genornl Gruenther th~ following cl,'-'y to give hirn T'Or(~ detPils •.
I hav"" felt .Por sor•? ta no thHt it '78.s foolish for us to co11tinue to 1.raste our
stren~th on an Ptt"" ck 011 Cisternr. G8nl'JrP 1 l\.l~xanr:"r has co•1trar;7' views. I
told G'merPl Al".)xandt"lr yesterdPy -ift0rnoon th:-,t I }v .d storped th~ att~ck on
Cisterna, <>.nd h~ uas gre2tlv clisturbed . Ifo urg,:;d w, to bf>, rrep"T':ld to attack
with that division in an all- out effort to F•~t •:isternP on 48 hours 1 notice
and tolcl '"'l.e a,c,;ain that the Gtirr 1 2.ns '70uld not P.ttack in force . I differed agr in
and told hirn thnt I would not i"'astc tbe 3rc1 Division, which hPs P.lreBci.;,r hr-,d
?L~OO losses (500 losses for the entire VI Corrs) , but th"'t I would dispose the
entire corps to Peet P co1 mter1;ttack in stren~;, nnc thrm bA rrcpered to advance .
0
"Last niirht additional corroborating enemy intelligence indic~ted strong
General
Alexander received the sm,r~ infor:r",'."tion ,ond lvd hia Chief of .;t,e:,ff t,·lephovie at
1"'idnight, to "rnrn ne of ·7t. I tnl1"ed '"•ith Alexander this T"orn:ing , Fmd he vras
delighted th:-,t I hHd ta\:en the defensive rttitudo t~nporaril;,r, and hrid chrnged
his •vhole opinion .
1i "l.(r:,lj hood of a.n ~ner,1y attack j_n force FE< inst r,.y bridgehe8d rosition.
ur j,1fornf3d Pl~xand~r th2t J had heri "'revburg Pnc liis stef'f in confer~nce
1
this r·orn~_ng 1 1ith Juin , K,;y,es and my stpff rn.C: bad c irected Freyburi:; to rr"1m a
r~lief in the 16th Division sector to"1orro nio;ht A.nd thnt toraorrovr, Pt a tir~e
to b0 mutun.lly n r,;rccd upon bet,,,.,en II Corps and Fr3yburg I s Corrs the cor'T'!and
\
vmuld pass to the latter . Ti'r~yburg is sort of e 1 b•111 jn a chirn closet 1 • He
feels h~ is ~oing to win th::i 1·:nr , r>nd ''lith his 15 , 000 V'?hiclcs is going to
clutter up the rmtir~ Liri Vf'lley c1rea . Fe inr"diately clash""d crith K'3yes ,-hrm
ho 1 ndic2ted wh·c;re he ·-res '""OVinr,; artill~ry , his rrew je.<>lcnr~rs, his In6irms Pnd
other ir11p,dimenta . I turn,~d it ov,;r to r,y st2.ff, tellin'{ ?rl'lyburg that he
could noYe :into no areas until he had coordjnatcd ,-,it)~ Pll Fifth Arriy activiti ;S .
I WPS disappointed in K iyes I Attitude tov.ercl P-re:rburg r'nd sent hil" th~ follor,ing
~
J_e ~~ !
1, ver
1: '
1
' I tried to
1r,ic1.te to you tris "'lorning the i"~oortence o+> +'ri·mdly Pnd coopcrntive reJ.r,t:: ons 'Tith Gencr~l Vrcyburg .
1I
j
1
arn constrain~cl to tell ~rou thr:t I ..-as
2
littb r'lisaproj·,"ted in your
\
�scTJJ.,'"'hPt br-ll-1g~..,,,,rt .?i:.titude to-.arr:1 h~•• t 1,j"' nrn:l'l'lr; . T '1.0.i. .d "'t , n.nd G '11"rP1
Fr, rburg s:;ok, to
of it , "'1.d lrit ,r r;ro 1c to G,,.n,.r~l Gru-,ntb r conc,..rnin<" it .
T arrr .ci t, 4:-11 "rl,n( id job r011, >1riv~ b"!e'1 rloj'"'t , th ... 10·7...,. 'hc•l'r" u,pt
OU "re
7 "' -fo'Y" Cr>.ssino , rirc'I thrt tl , rov .... _,n~~ of tl·is Sft<:Cial out rutt··n3 i11. yo ·r , att
""it on to of you rr~~~11.ts rm co~~ l ,'ci'1.g r.,..-o½l"'PlS .
A
1
tl e ott ,r 1--Ja.nd , .c,: ~'le '7:··~ rlo -j nion .i..1~oops ',}- 0 a:,:·'") V ry j Aq_lous o~...
th~ir pr·,rogativcs . The Br itish hav~ -fo 1 md th~m di:"!.'ic11lt to . [>nc'le . The~r
h11v, al 'a.rs b,,'c'l "'.-''7"''1 ::::rec,;i.al -::0•,L;:lcie:~.-, ·tjon ..i:ic"' e r1· 7 c' 'lot r--'v, t0 cur ovn
troops . rl~?Se ) nr '·,',-' S :'.'..'1. -' "1_(1. I -',-.t,,.,.,,, ":,r .,,.,,. ,fl")"'r r ,lat-' ('•T1", ritli the
1 l';C'Y'"'.,..'ll e1·~cl
-niftl, Arr,o . "r· 'lrl
harry, P'1d -ol' "'U"t h~lr r11~ ell ,·ou ccn . I,
ther fore , loo 1r: to ·on -t.o ~o ,,11 01 1 t o,.. .·orr "lf' iri orc'"'r tc r•,c,1r" y jo "')<isier.
}1.erise see tre1t .ro1n• =-te1+'f (1 0~S 1,:1{,ris~ .
1 On
r, "'
' You cen ,,,,,crt ssnr"'ld t½."t · rrill
1,r•s Pr:'! r-ive'l "ull ,,.ei,,ht 1 ,re .
0
-"'ir~ ~rd ju t :'1. '11o,...i· g t'.',t yonr rrob-
1-:,
0
0
UPnt to [' ,"in tell yn:.i ' 1 0'"" c'e~, ly I arrr"'C~qt, ",re srl",'1did ;·cr1 : :·ou,
~•ell'~ ~ta·"'" anc ·our ~orJ s ' 1riv, 'on, on t' ~ Cassino ..,ront 11 11c1 ~r l"xtrP.r-el,:r t ~y:::1g
corrl~ t io11:J . 1
1:
0
11 Todn~, ::
n stec' Jl'in to c
, t~ s~"l "f l ., cc-ulrl c i.rect h:.'...s Fr nch Corr s
1 i11 the c'ir ,c";ion f"f T"'"-"' 1 "!-'tl,occ1,,secc11, inster-r' of' .;n th, direction o"'
:J.tt"IC ?"
B l·onte-Ati"''l . I }1"V~ ius t m"'t 'H'1 Mr• r,o-qjn , ·nc1 re },qv~ P.rrn1.g"'C' tris . Py
t--"'fort :is to conv~rc; tl·.,. F-r nc Gorrs , t 11~ II Cor,..," , Fr ,ybure; 1 s Corrs and the
10 Corrs into tl~e Liri VaJ.ley f'or P :'inal rune, • (See OD0r tions Instruction
'11, nl1 ic will be publisher1 to""torrow) .
0
"I no'-r ly•ve •'ive corrs under ,..,y cor"'k'l:1d , 0·1lv two of v:li.ich r>re Arn9d cr·n,
all othnrs o+> diff'0r8nt rtioneliti '"s • I t}1inv ''f1po1Pon wn.s rie;ht ·rJ,en he C'"'1e
to t 1e conclusion thP.t it was better to ::'if,1-it Allies thl'in to h=~ 011.e of them . "
*
*
*
FR"';,S'RHZf\. ~ro--F ~BB.TT-\R-l
5, 19/i/4-- In t e rnorni"lg Gen9rPl C:l"'r'-: ·rent by ;jeAT' to vi sit
tli.e Co'1I'1anrl post of' tl-ie 34th Division r-it Serv2ro anc1 gPi'1'3d a +'irst hn.nd .:def' of
the rro/7:r'ess o-r tli.8 brittle "or Crc:sino . Troop'> of' tre P3rd Infontry bve
reo.c>1Ad the outs\:irts of tt ci to· m but ri.ro m0etinq: bitter P nd det0r,.,,; ned resi s tPnce from the Gerrrns rr o r-re dug in in th0 tovm . On tl e road U:e Ganer-1 net
anrl t al1 :ed for a ·vhiln FHh Ge 11erel Yeyes 'Tho h0 hrs directec1 to re- group his
forces as decided in 'Teste ·driy 1 s co 11:f'erence , puttinrr the 30th Division in north
of Cassino to tri. 1re tre ,-1ountrin Vir-iss trer,3 .
1
::;:n the rtfternoon the '1'1n"-r 0 l rer1dned <>t t½e ccr.n~r· d ro""t, c isr-,osj11.p; of r-id rrinist~at:lve 1"1a·\,t9rs . The Qqnerl rietermined to flv to /\.:"lzio i11 tre M.orn:inr- rind
tissure M.nself' thrt th-i•10's fl.re ,:i;oi"l.g rrorPrly ti,0rc . I1:1 the n"'t9rnoon re went
by jAer to the 3Rth 1.~v~cur-tion Por;pH::i 1 , · h<1re he visited m;:iny pPtirmts wounded
on the Cn.ssino f'ront i'1 recent or9ratio-1s . At rlinYJ. ,r J-,0 0ntertnJned Lt . Col.
Wood , r.:o,,:,Pnd 4 y; (V'ficer o-r the ''103ritrl , Pn<' ~hree of h:ls of'ficers , togethPr
"lith t•r . & Trs . tltev0nso·1 of the ''7eric"'n Fed Cross .
()r,erntior,s Tnst::1uction 1tl/1- wc1s i '3sued toc'IPy ::i.nr' is 7Hoted b~lo.r:
�1. Upon t 11e c11ptuse o;-~ GA,)cTfO J-,nj_ghts Pnd the occupr>tion of n bridgehead j n LJJU V::- Uey sonth of Ci' S 1rro, Ti'i +>tr ArY'ly on the G.A.RJG-LIAJJO-~./1 I IDO front
continues tb~ -ittn.ck to the north '-''1.d .,,.,orth,vest .
11
9.. F,.,ench "':'T;ed:i tj_onPrv Corns , cons· r:tinr;
3d Alp;erj"'n Divisions , :.~einforced, will:
0""
the .,nd :!orocc::m and
(1) Attack to the ·rest, within i..ts zo 11e o-" Pction , riwJd np; its
r1n.in e,:,"'ort aloni:; the m-,'P.-SIJ,1';-n()CG ~ crr,;ccl\ tY'a il , seize RO"iGA. '3ECCA A.riri the high
gro1mr east o.(> the '"Alfa River .
n tt1e~ d~_rectfo·1 of ATrrA.
(2)
Cont~nue pr9~s1,1.r0
(3)
Vin.int<> in cont"' ct ..;j th F:ishth Arri:r.
2• II Oorrs , co11si st.; rig o.c-- tfle -~/4,tr nnO 16th Divisions nnr1 Combc't
Cori1"1P'1d n'9" , 1st frrnoreCi I'iv, .... 9~7.+'orced, 1ill:
(?) Assi,.,t t 1e "ey 7.ef"l'\11Ci Co1~·r:,s jn its cros2111f" of tbe B..t} IDO
and debonc11•--,ent "nto the LITIT V"lley.
(3)
r";ubseriurmtl~r att13clr to
t}-•9
r1orth"est vri trin its zo'1e of' l'ction.
c. ,Jrr:r Ze,-ilrmd CorDs , consistina; of' 2d 'Tew Ze'"land anr L,tb I"1dfon
DjvisionB, r'3~n"nrced , '·rill:
(1)
A<,<,enblG -in the "T TP.C'(!CTTIO fl.re:> er'>t of tre R!J IDO .
(?) Be '"'repnrec, on Army ord0r, to debouch into the I.I11I Vr:i lley,
t}1 ro 1 1_r,h oleri1ents of IT (!orps, 8.'•.ri rn0k'y ~ts rrin e+>fort n.lo,1g -.;f"-;[1','l['Y 6
attac 1c to t},e 11orthwest ,-,ithin its zone of act·o11 .
J)R"lS
,d.
10 Corns , consistir,c,; of' the 5, 1/i, ".11r
56
Divisi.o"'l.s (less 168
Pr:i..g) vrill:
(2)
CC'r stP 1
ljr-ht forcAs , r:1n..;nt1=dn cont..,ct vdt
rand .; n tJ...e direction o+> 1-,vw IA.
1 J2i'1P"
(3) rrpo"1 cnrtw·e of' 7 GTO"P.GIO bo prep['rerl.
to the nest 1:1nc1 '1o.,...tr"est . (netr ils 1 rter) .
011
th,=,, 9neriy on the
Arr1y orrer to e:;.,..,,.lo:t
�U+)
11 !~ .
l rotect
le:':t f}.[1n}r of ::'jf't'- Army.
+,"l"'l
Iristructio''.'3 f'or coorr1in"tioYJ. c,f ['rtillerY f':ires 11ill be isr:ued sep-
nrately. "
*
*
fR.,,'"'F.'•IZAJJ0 --""'-;:9".U~'R.Y (, , lr:J!i/4,-- Gem:rA.l Glnr 1 " 19ft f'or tJ-i9 be.,chherid h:r C-/+7 from
l"arc;;,nir;e Pirroy,t, to ,-,l icr h9 flew 1)y ~ub . Fe "'PS accor-r~·ni0d ')y Crrtriin
LRmrso11., 'r· . Peach, c;ergennts rolr1en An' ~;uitte:1-nen anc1 triA frdtbful ,J~rg1;ant
Chr,ney. Jn thr:, rlane '7ith the r.,rty there also 1ent G,~nerr,l Brpc,shaw rn/ his
1:1.ide, Lieutenent Re'1le'r, a.:nn ·~a.jor Ross, of the G-1~ Section.
1
Soon Rf't0:r- arrivii:1i:; Pt tre .,,j +'th Armv A1'w1 nce Crrrir>Rncl fost r>t AYlzio, G9vie1
ral ClPrk c enPrtnrl to visit VI Corrr--, 3rd Divisio'1 , 7-st :9rittsb D:vision, 1st
rmorPr Divi:--:i_on a'1a the Speci~l '~nrvice ..,orce, T'r:,turnj•1.o; to hi-c:; comfl['nd rost
jn m~d-.,+'ternoon <>-"ter rriv:i 1'"' dj,c,Fsed t)113 sjtiction vrith the vrrious COl'll"!Pnr18rs o+> t 1 ,e'V3 1m~ ts r>ncl "1emb9rs of' tJ-,e5r st8 ffs .
At 171. 5 G(m--ir" 1 Clic-rk clrove by jee to thA VI Corrs co,~~"nd r 03t "rl---erA he
hE>d d:l nner ;7ith GP:riciral'1 Lucas and Feiser, rP.tllrn1'1r to } is corrr.f1nc1 r,ost pt,
riooo rours .
0
T'ris AVG"l-ing GeYlPral Clarr receiv d th9 -"ollorjn,:,· s:itu,-,tion rero·~t on the
\
Gn.ssino ,.--.ro11t +>rori G0neral Grwmtrer . E~; 1533 . "H9RVY f-i .c:;hting c011tirn19s in
the Ccissino nr8n . 115 P,e.aimeYJ.-1; ~s ner:.r "':C''11 stnry·. :1_;7c"er i-,~s hopes of surrounding it thfr aft9rnrovi . XeyRs esti.,, tes ti.~t 1/, Tlivi'1ion ,-rill not be strorP,
eno11p;h to t,R1:e Cnssj_no nn-1:,il trr-o-r;:; ;n Tere 1 .l8 RT"lr Cf'n be relieveil rm' tJ:,ereby (
be f'r9e to 13c;sist i·1 Gassinc, "rer nttack. 3(, Div~ sion "'trrts relief' i·'1 Terelle
areri toni P,ht . Frenc'.1 sector ,7uiAt . A-',r reports r Jtrn:1 rby. Res11lts rill be
1movm l nter . ()" e:i 11 wi 11 ry~et you oq30 :'on,l2v r,orniric- . ll
0
1
0
1
ThP /\r ;' Corirr1nnc er to,1 rY recejv 0 n P P1r>mor nc1nn from 1,~, G-/, rointi11r out
tre crjti~Pl slortP~8 i·,1 prruTm~tioYJ., r.<'t1o"S qn,1 "'1:ir·oline . 0-" ec:r--:;cinl note is
the -"pct t:>-ir-it evr enrn tuT0S of cr'1T7Ul1ition "l!''-3 now res+,ricted to ?5 T'OU'1c1S p dRy
poncHnp- tJ-,e Prrivc1l_ of ,'l ,,rec;;:iJ_ sh-"r,nent Prom the tT . S. ,r:rich is :1ched ilecl to
2rrive i~nrc'1 1rd .
Ge'19rrl G1Ar 1• t',~s riftr-rnoon rl;spqtcher; ti,e :'ollo·I:ivi~ cl"ble tc G-e'1or~1
Gru<>nthor . R r '"J5.S2 . n:-rnrn i:1,::; 8Cter1 entirA "ro'1t, iric7.udj:nr '"', 50L"th, 1rd,
/~5th , 1st \rr,or9d rrrl 7.c:t Brit~sh Divis 4 o-'1s. •ro Pct'on torlr-iy. · :i+urtion i:ipr9rr, to be ----rirlr,ell in rPnC -,i.th th;n srotc; bet•Aen ~:cm·cott A.DC' }enne~r.
'-ipd not rtrlizec'l Y1ur1½Pr of' Prtj-tp11-1 • P,l:'.1S lo"'t ½y Jenne" • ThBSR rrnnt bf1 mr de
up i•1rner'-i_rtel' 7 • A"! cr w·1 -1cerl_ -'-,i-,~t, ·re T1u~t c-et in rnotber Br~_tisl:, briri-,,r'e p:rour
or TTn:i_tecl :t~tes c"nk·t te.?m, rr9f9r 11ly t' e -"or 1 er. TH s ''l; 11 ;1'1r;0 i t 8 more
7
·,ui)sf:.a:rit:i.nl c e,~en-:e l'lP"P inst a stroYJ.P' a ttr c '~ P -ric• ~; ve us •7or0 n "·"'9'1 si ve ro·--er
lpter.
e ""U"t hrve :>rotl r l.'55 PUn b<>-':,t~lion. r;:'ruscott "'11ort ?/.,,00 nen. 111
rossibl·'"> .-,+,"-'r2 ru.,,t b9 tr 1:en t0 9Xp9d~te th3ir rrriV''l h'1r 0 , j'1cludi'1f YO'tr investi,,.etion 0f seri":inp; th8n -in b" d_r +,rnns:-iort, r-erhn-rs ?O f 7 "'nes ~ dey each
ri-i1•i"',[l' t ro 1~r:i:-s rt ~.,,tArV ls. re~~i.-nr"' thi" j s not } r,:,ctic~l_ . r-rrv0 <"1 ~c-nsed
"ifi1.l,tenn:rce ,·it 1-i D 1C'rsa l"n o-1:,h"'r"', ~ri/ ·e rre crnvincec1 \78 C, n •nint:-i.in these
1
1
0
1
�a0rlitio11Al unit'>. r,:;_~11 "'t, Y•ust be T11:-1.r1e "VE'il"'h1"" for th"'>Vi "rid for th,,dr "c'ded
'orley
'1Ri 1.ten"'nce. rJill r9turn 1-:iy C-/"7' 1,_y"J~no; r0r0 ,,t 1000 hours tor-10,,,ro 7.
~Oll C ec \r -for ""'-i P:hter COVP,r • n
has heen inf'orm00.
1
1
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:rn
;c-rFZ..A."'0--..,.e:BR Tr.RY 7, lq/v"--This nc.,,.n:'ng Gen0r11l Cl"r 1 lnft his Anzio cor~rnP.11.rl
rost by j er, in thn c"Jmr"'ny of' Colonel Fu0 nleston, VI Cor.,.,., --;urr-eon, Pnd visitr.:id the sSth, 03rd Pnrl. 95tri BV"ClJntion Hosr;tn:..~, t"l1 r:i11.1?' to m'ny Vjftr Prmy
solriiers rho :b d b':3en 'ounded i11. r>ction dur-i 11.p the 9,were f':: ghtino; in the i:rr;Giz~
c re~.
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"4:9 hrd S1JT1T'J011.8d Gen9rel rnr11<"'cott to '"')';0t J.-,jr, rit the ::.irrort, nn iu"'t before leaving t11.e f'-ieP ,~i'1.nod on <1011c,r'l Tr1 rcott 1 s jricket tre f\ist'ni:;t.11shnd
<:erv-ice Cro"'s. '1en0r"'l. Clrr', '1ric'l 1':no ·11. of t"is ,"'·nrd +-or"' 11.u:nber of' c1riys but
S"'Ved tl-ie act1rl_ r--,,.esfmtrition ·mtil hn -f'el +, +,} <>t i~ ''oulrl de, tre n·ost r-oorl.
Gennr[' 1 'T'rtl"'Cott hP'i bAeri. snm0, 7h"t n9r,rAsser, '·w +,} 9 l_0'1S o+' +,"A two Pr:inp-or Batt9 lfors r>ncl, ."""'to-r ,,.:vi11rt J-,jr1 the Cross, Gr;n9r::>l Cl...,r1· tc·ld l-i'm 11.e thought J,i~h1" o·" ½i"' n-~on ,·rorl• r11r1 11ro-An l'il'l t,n P-o b,,c•- "'1.C' n-iv9 t,11_9 G,rrr"'11.s ri be..-tinr,.
The Ge-11Pr:--l f'le"l bric 1: in ri~ nl'l.YlP, to ~··rci""l~S"J "h9Y'9 he "'PS n10.t b~r flrjor [..,_l1rer 8.nc'l rP.+,,rrn9r{ to } i.'1 coM~,r,nd rost lr cub, "rriv:::1,,. ,.,t Pb"ut 11 O. E9 ')11.tertri ined •r11 -io:r G9rnrf' 1. ' c '.j"1.l1on j'.l.t lnnch.
Yn tli.9 :ifternnon tr9 G""n"'r,;l r cA,v '4 ,, cnll :'ror" G9W-'l'.'C,_ V,syes rnd oyr,lnined
t0 1
1~..,, C"ref'ulJ..,r ,r},..,t hn ev-~"ct,•"d o+' r:- Corr.,. TTe to]rl th0 Gpn_crrl trrit re 1mew
tl e troors 0~ ·•,h~ lL,t' ~11(' l\t11. D5vi-,ions VJ9-~ Prnrl o.f' Touc', -;:-· r,1,t~n,.,., bnt he
S"id tl- e '3/<J'lP, '"Jfl s t.,..U9 o+' rll ::'ifth t l'T'JV troc,Y•<"'. F9 tolr' Gr>nrY "nl Ynyns r,ot to
~,orrv .bout tr 1ri•r Fiednont9 1,ut to cr'1.C9"'t"['te O"' trki11."' t11e ri-;11. g1"onncl inmedi"t"l:r north r,f C<F·sino. T;if,J.-, th~~s crcint,1r9d, t},9 cro"s of t e Ro··ido bv the
'>:ri=i.cr-;er 1·'orce i--itc tli.e Vri Vrllev b9lo'7 Cr-;;:;i·10 "01 1lr'l be !'.Te"'tl:v- fec-i".;tPteri,
anc' tbe IJ Co;•--f' "10·11 -J. !lP7e :=i.cri0verl i+, i· T'!P.di::ite l'li sion. Geriel"'l Gln~l
nt,,rta-inAd Ge'1.r>rPl ·nr:=i.11., thA Ar'1.y 3·iannl ('-l"'ficer ""er dinrer.
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Th:_s -ft8rnnon General Clark c ictA.ted the follovri"lg natAr~al fer ;'1.elusio,~ 111
nir.ry:
"'JisitAd Anzio brid~0ree..r1 , est0rc1 n • "'nd SfP.rit tr,, d· y visiting all forward
units nnrl c'iscu•:ni'1.n- tl-v'.3 s1tu.,tion ·•:'tb COT'1"1Pc'1dAr • Conc'.~_cerrr ') "111rroV<,"'ent
hqs tPk8n nlpce 'n the r,e.,''-,,yy,jve ciet-u. • 'r ,l'Ae }-!r,n P1'9 '"i"l" JT8f"'r9d - the
pre,e11.t f'ro"l.t 1 in°, t,}•9 . '1.tc::r"18di te 8.11.'1 t,ly, C"n£ 1, tl P, l8ttar 1y,~inr: ,-,,i nerl f'""ld
prnp<1r":lc'l -,;th bn1~hed ---ire. "':-c, '3rd J~.Vi'"'it'n ""> n;et,e,"Ylf" '°'trfiahten:,;d out, ,.,,lthourth
it ,s thin on its ''lest ..c,1ri'1.1 .
r
· "It ··s rinly after -':,"11-~YJ.P ·ith GA:1,PrA.l 1enYJev thrt T b0.,c;r11. ,~r: 1~r; u, ,0'" 0f
t e lo<1ses li8 lnd usta-1~130 i_r try-i11.,,. to frctr"c.cite his 11 te,1t frc-"" t,br, --1riYJ.';er 11 •
I J:y·cl '"'U·..,~este")i'.' tr TuCMl to ··ithdr~i,•r th"t sA.liPnt. Jeri-ney "'FIS rAluctrnt to do
so becflu"e nf I l9YPn• er', jnf'J 1ence, trn l,.,tter hrvi,1"' "'e7.t th~t the "'1871l could
11.ot attn~'-. :'n.wt"'-r lo<;t rhcut 700 or 8rn '"191", 7 " tr,--. 1 - , 'P1.rl 11 '3iY-rou'1.C1 8r r'1.titQn1< l'.;ll'1S. :re S"er1,:,d 1uite cor,rlacent f 11.cl +'9lt tbrt '18 ..,,.,3 111:ite l_11e'cr not to
'1rve 1o9t 'l •}olG b:rjrride.
D:~cu.Jserl siturtio11. --ri.th r.;..-.~~es "'n'l 'Trrr'Jn11., rinc1 -it ~s
a sou,...ce of srtisf- ction to 1-no r tlcrt tl,ose t•m .nhl0 co-m,.,,pnr1ers f'T'O -in re·n·,-.ve
cJ1.'1 r-pJl~na t0rrotle3r.
�HLucris nes not r:ro ~nt-:; detriil., . I 111'P-8d h;m to rl1:n"1n"te HFlrrnon rs his
'h.n .. llesty,o-rer rinc, 'T'qnl· O.f.'fi ':!<Jr .1..,0 c orcl7 '1Pt9 th9 11019 d0f911se . Fe rrr"'rently
r''l'3 no '"'!Oh;le trn'· c'est,r1 -r9r un;t tc r 1 1"h ""ror-i '"'lace to Pl"Ce t:"3 thr' sit11rition
rerpire" ; t . :r t,07.11 Lucris +,o use ~r"r1 shf1., 4n -t,},,-_,t co ··1n°ctic'1, +'oy, 'lnti- r>ircr~ft
mms c::iri hr: used ; n an rintl - tfl'1l:: role . Al 7_ the o;non I .c;ot +'rom thAt su,.,.P-0,tion
V-8.S p crihl" -<>ro,.,, 111.l;I to qf,mrl 1,;., an.oth~r 'lnti-8.;_rcr.-,f't P-1.m bc+,t,lion. I know
it, r,r-n not be ~1p4nt. ;n90 4 n t 1y,t rire"' .
It rou:r1 1Jc e~si!"Jr to send hil'l a ':'D
Dr>ttPlion , and I P!"'l s,r-i:1cHng h 4 'f'1 t 1·m C0"1"r'rni<;"' '1'1'1 r>10tJ,nr hatklion of 155 ~uns
for co mt0r-battery "rJor • A.r-i '1.lso r:etti>1p; r 4 T"' hi3 rerl,,c0rirmts ~mm0dirt9lv 8.nd
setti"rJP ur +,'·0 ·"i,-,.,.t co,..,,brit +.erim o-" the R~th rnvi"'ior>· tr r,c 4 ntr -'.:,},9 bridP"0h0ari .
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11 Dur~--i~ mo"t o"' :resterdP.v- ,,..-..t".lrnoon tbor0 vnc; lo11r, r-:inrr9 r:hn 7 ljnr-• of the
Anzio- 'Jettu.no flr9ri. , i·-icl,ir1 ; r>~ om· CO'"""'J, ·10 poc::t . ~ev9r[l l r;l ,-, , 1, 7 ...,11cled 4 n the
comr~8:1.rl nost . A4 r
r:!tion ..ms spor-:.c'lic , 4 r!clurl""l.;J' loF-level bo"'l,J7YJ.g flttr-c 1' in
N9ttuno t1-i;s "10rn.;.,,,g , destrov;r1 r;ev'3r!11 P"'lrnun"tion truc 1·s r>'7.d C"'ls:ina C"SUPlties .
Visit0rl '3St•1 anc'I q5th r•vec11.r-tion i{os-ritrls , "9lec;s0 rinQ •.,uer r sr0ct~w~ly, end
t8l 1rer1 ,·th tl e ,.,r,m,fod .
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rriP.et ~,e p+, 4;h~ 8.ir+"'" 8ld nt o0 LS in orc'ler -:.o c'H 'C 1 1ss lflst- minute
rn~~o+,t rnd a fr; 17 c-+' his ,,t,:,f'f officers rres0:r-rt ~ncl finned the
Dj_qti·1 ,; hed ...,PrV" 0e Cross on ,..,ru'"'co+.t .
117 Tpr1 T uca,
detai ::' s .
T-fr1d
t:rnhe nlaht wes ;_~et.J1n:·~ r0c+,; c, +'or ·re h...,d r0~9jy9c7 , fron rT'es11~,...,bl7 T'Ol i"hl9
so1rces , i'1c'ic-.:"ti0ns o~ "'n all-out a+,+,..,cl• ti,; ..... o,:-ni..,_,..,. _ -t r'irl rot r'evP-lo;, '111.t
t,"o 'lrn"~ 7 er 11tt11c1-~ r1 ev loy,ed rhrri.nrr tl-ir; 11~ r, t on tl 0 "'ro11.t o tl e l S7th I'1.-f'r-.ntry
<inrl 0-1 thn +'r 0 nt nf th~ 1st 1'.1r.;t:i,1-i Div"-;ion . :30+,1 •,nrq .,...0.,.111,ed .
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'l'Y\f'3n.Y'ls .
' 1 1 ...,I" r1 4 S'l.fro··11.+,0d ;n tl-iP. flir ef'fc~t .
I foel t.het rlerrnds c;ho1 1ld be nirde
for t½.e ::i+,r.<>te ic h~mh0rs to h0 us0d -:n clo e b::1ttlefi,,,ld ,urrort; it ...,ny do
snmo, gooc1 ti,9re, n.1tho'1P'h strPter,ic bn:'lb..,rr1m81t m'
b0 c1 c~·1 so;~e r;cod h1 c ttjn17;
:_•q-': l CC'J"'1rimicPtio,..,s, "or si X 'T\O"'l.ths 0'1 mY r,ro11t 1. t l1n S :not nr0vented the r>nerny f'rctm
mov~ 1~ in addit 7on.n l trOO;'S p ni sur-cl:1 8S fl. t , d 11.
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"Di -rect 0 rl. rrr ri.clir-:in0e co...,, 1 a11.d
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ost ')O "lC''•c,d t0rlay. n
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PK,c..r,:~nA 1 TO-- 1.:9RF'RY q, 191+/j,- -Genernl Clnrlr sp=mt the dry rt the CO'""TTJRncl rost
in conferen.ces ":i th v<>.rious ~•:me1~.., l o.,..""'icers 11nc st1-1 ff offi.cers . Fe j s suffer_i.np- fr0'"1 a. verv ½nc. cold r,rr1;rrv:-:ited by hi~ eino; ur ell njisht O'1 his lP-st visit
to the 11enchhead. 1 rhen tre shellin~ 1-:as co-n_tinuons n11d heRvy . He '7r>s visited to dn.-r by Colone l DRly of the 16th r:v11 cuation Hospital ,.. ho '{"Ve him thA necess,- ry
treatJ"11811t .
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Gr 1eral 3.'.'. v::Ule , Co":·~prd. · ''11 the XII /\ ir Sur-rm~t , cn..ne in ancl r'li8cussed the
. lnns -"or !15_:;:- su:rrort on tJ:,e main ""'ro11t and tre bel'chhead front .
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Gener,,l Tate v:i sited l}e'1.8rnl Cl11r -c and discusser1 t:he amrmnit ion situ,,tion)
It had alread;,r ' ee>1 necessar;r to curtA.il tris rA.te of fire of' 155'11ITl ;rowitzers ,
l"lncl now 105mm 11rnmunition 8.frenred to be setti11.7 s1-0" t,- n S3rio1 7 situntio1 ,
R)
�this aTI'7unition is used by the direct infn.ntry sunnorti'1.g battrlions .
At JJ.30 General flexanrler , G9n~.:::--rl Fardj'1,..,, ris Ch;ef of _,fa.ff , ~nd Gener['l
G<J.,..,r1ell , Gnnernl r;1son 1 s Gh;_ef of 3t<J.f.r-, ce~ri to c8ll on GenerMl ClPrk. T1'ey
djsc,1ssed the rlr>n'3 for th0 rrospect·'.ve em loyment of' tre vrriou'> corps y-,pking
up the Fifth Arrriy, ,ri th r8rticulnr refer'3nce to · t)y~ F-w1 Ze" l<>YJ.d Corrs under
G9n9rc1l F'reybu.rg ,.,hich is ri1701 1t to go into Pction. After o,J.<-cu~sin'?; the stubborn
defense the Qgrmnns w~re putting up in rnrl ['ro ind C2 ssino rmd the wer>r:i.ness r>nc'l
derletion t 11£1t ''rere ::f'fecti:1g the 34t}-> Div"sio11., it "ff' clec~ded thPt t]:-,e di·~posi tio"ls of' the :e•;r Zealand Corpe, would he cr:inr·e0 so 8 s to 'ut .f'resh troors jnto )
the Cassi110 ?ttaclc. The 1/,.th Division is to '"J8' relieved in jtg :rresent nosition
b tl,e 4th IndiPrt Divisfo· ''Thier "rill continue tl'e rresent attr>ck of the 34th .
The 34th i ill h0 displaced "lo ~t1· 1arrl to the rj -;l-1t of the 4th Indi".n . The fow
Zealnnd Wvfoion Pill continue in its r,ositio'1 at the '.1ead of t11.e Lfri Vrlley
rerdy to push ',estward thro 11gh thPt corridor .
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:'ollo"d11o; t! is co11.fer<:mce, G2nerP 1 Keyes r>nn Ma ..,e ··ut;'T Cr-i ef of Jtpf'f , Lt .
Col. forter, stopped to see G81'1"'.,..l11 CJ"r r .,-1d briefly r'-iscussed t},9 -·ror:res"' o:
10 Cory-,s 1n its Pttac 1,. on C,., ssino nc'l tJ.,9 hi f"l- r;ro mcl controllinc; :20 1t9 '1?; beyo"ld
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rnoday Genr;r<1l r:i.-,r 1o:: '.'lr"'l , ~ePtl;y cc11cernr>d to "..ef'rn th:ct t e GPr'72.11s b&c'
h,ribed thP r:istr. ;vric'1rtion rosp-itn 7. w~st9r, ":r inst pfter he ly,d left the be::chhePd
end A½out three ho1 rs rfter 9 h d loft tre 10s1-'tal. Colcnel '"uer ,,..,d been
wo1r-1c1ed, 0 3 pff•·· so'1S "rir1 1,9e-n '•:i lled, · ·,0luc'l ir~ r 11 of:"-: Cl';~, three '1Ul'se s, , Red
Croc;s fJ'--'_rl, ')Oy ., corr-s r1en Rn.cl r"t:rmts, /1'1C 'S 0 .-.c1 been ··01.,n.dod . Th=i hm b b'.d
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fa 7- 8"' on t 11 9 JTos1 5tri.l r0criTl"rters' 'l 1 1 ' 'v,s--' r ec ·H,0 , 03"1 O'n f'3l'S0'-'1f'9l, m10h of
the l osritnl "'1uirT'1e11t, -':11cJ1e'·,,,r; "{-ra.y i.'1~t&'1Pticr"', ra( b0e-r 'estroyed .
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Toc1 n.y +/10 t rmv Comriander rece:i ved tr e -"ollo-rri_r g 1 e;t ter -"ror'l tre GOC, 'Jew
Zenlrnd r.:orrs, Lt . Ge·1. F'reybi1.rg:
:~"bl5sJ--,:h.p yoiir letter ::n fl ... recir>l rrr r,r tc •\11 rr,-,lrr (\.c> t e 'J9rr
ZeRl/:nid no:r.,· s . I 1 .1 'Your wn-,,,, riessq gP o: · ·e 7 cc · e n.'1rl ,...ood --fishes dl:'.. 1--ie
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re. d uitJ--,_ a sen,·e of ;r"r1.e n.11r' E:fTreci~ tio'1 l)Y ev,:iryone .
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nsince "Te r·ave bee'1 }19re no l1'=ive seen your brttlefields ,..,., s0~G f'f t1.e
"if'"ic'tlt-Le--: :rm, h·we ha.d to f'pce . VTe re1"life VThr.t the 'UV, f.rr y h9s r-crjeved,
pnr'l tre C "fic rs fTr' 10 en of tl1e Leth Indio.11. Divis:i 011 rnrl the 'Jnd ·re~J ~8/llrnd
Iiv;s1.011 ·1ill bP r,roud to f'ii:(1t elonr~side the Arericrn, :::>ritisb r'1d .,.rench
troops under your co,.,,;1a'1.d . I '70l'l<' also 1~1(8 yo1 to 'enc ro---r much we r"v0 ap1
rreciated t. e "riencly cooperrition and helr ·e iia.vP hr.d from your sk f'f Rnd ;11
t"'9 :."'ormntio'1S 17itr vrrd ch ·,re hP.Ve been i.n touch .
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w 'e hore thrt , ·e -rill be f'l:JlP, to plri~r -, 11seful part i·'1 tre di""'icult bFttle
lies
~1!T·~c
8h8t:\C~ . f!
The folloir-1_ng cr>ble,
.'J ;,011, vr s received tod?y .(>rorri E'2 P.Cl'F:
."r-
r;r.rc has c.ecicJed tr,.,t -if' ::=i. recisio11 on l'i.,,th
y ni1 in front c, nnot be
~btri11ed. 5.~ ·1 ny <::_th9r ,.,.,r-r 'ie ''lill .,...:ui('r'1,r 71 Divisio'1· ,"'ror, l::ighth Army n.nr use
:it to r9in'.orce '.ew Zen.l1mcl Corrs. As already arranfs"d by ~i~l,th .Army, 7g I)jvj 11
�1/
sion -rill t!1ere;fore be kert ot '21~ hours notice to !'1ove to Fi·"th Army ,-1r0° Pnd.
nll"ns will be coF leted flt O'1ce to e'1f'bl8 such l:'. move to t~ke rlr,ce R.'> '"l 1 1ic 1 ·ly
as -cossiblo j f orrler9c1 . To rmsure 70: Div:sion is fully in touci1 •ith •r.z.
Corps pln.,..,_s Cor1d 7g Divisio"1 rind :recce ::-,,rties will report .z . , Division
C{eedr:n1rrters <>t G qc~o1 '30 errliest rossibl8 IJ'll.(1 ·i:!..l th9r9r.c,tcr "'K'l.int in closest
touch ith situ tion on '\Z. r:orrs front ,o th t the '1-ivic,ion crn be emplo;ved
if.:' required .,~th lenst rossi 1 lle c1eleY. '~ighth Arriy will sif718 l -~TA N. Z.
Divisio11 r;:eadaur.rters of Co,.,,rl rnd recce pcrties 78 ::Ji.vision . crm h::,c: also
r1ecided that .:my 1.tlditionrl stE1P-f or sianr1 l rerrniren:mts of T Z. Corrs ,-ill be
.
Y"\et es 2 t0T1pc-,rar;,r meesure fro'TI -.ifth Cor'"'S r1 rind sipnrils. :?F'th Army w-I.11
noti y rll sucb re1 lfrerents to thi~ i:.r'1. who mill ..,rrPn[:r:i for ~revision c'irect
with Fifth Corrs 1-::eepi11"' -:1 O'hth rmy f illy i 11-t>or·w~c . tr
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}R SE'TZA.' 0--F~BP..lTAF.Y 9 , 194!;.--Gener~l Cl:ark spent t},e d'\'T Pt hjs conm nd ~ost
in a series of ccn+'erenc,1s . GcmerA.l r,:,y 11r,,. ·i th a number of str ff o ficers ,
errived ot 1030 r ric1, ·rith GP.118rc-ls CJ.rr 1r rricl Gruen·~}-ir.r, rl:Lscussr:id nt lenr:th
tJ-1e qission o.., t'1e 'Ten ze..., lri · 1d Corr s fl'1'1 t.re arr,.,nr:rments -"or er:rrloyine; it
aro,md Cassino . Gener;-,1 Fn:-iy',urg , rmon~ other th~rn;s, e::s, ,ressed sc'ne arpre hensio:ri thPt the TTJO'1-" st8r;T bvj lrlin,~s ·ould , e used by tre G-9rmrns "'ncl "'t"ted
t):,nt in ris opi'l.~on , i ~ J19Cessr.Y''y, the r s½ould b': ')lo'm do '1 hy artill'3r.r +'ire
or hoT'!k.rdnent . Gen0rFl Cl,.,rlr decidecl to P'~Ve him ri written directive to tr..e
effect thnt if in his judgment milit"r" necessity rlictated it, he wes erected
to fire on tl e p10 11.rtster1r 1,uildinf.
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After Gener"'l Fre~rht.1.J'.'f, h<>d t2lv:Ad for ~on, t-:r,e ,,,tri GPn9r"l Clr-rv- jn his
vDn , G9nerf'l Vrevburg "ent to t;l·ie conf'erence hut nhere n long coriversr-ition W"S
hAd bet !Veen General Fre r1mrg ::ind his stnf:· orf'icers ;-,nrl treir corresrondh1.g
Fifth Ar-y ster'f o-l>fic8rs . I·1 -:.J,o T")eant~nie, G9ner"l Clrr 1' in his V"11 rec•~ivarl
the nembers of a 'J9tt1P.rbnc1 s Armv mi c:sion vi:=dting the bA.ttle+'rorit - r '1.,j . Gen .
Phnff, Colonel Vnn Der F- l ssche end c---..tr in Dr-dtenstein - to(J'eth'3r ,. ith e.
TJnited >tPtes acco-mpAnyi.,..,_F: oc>ficer , f'njor Rr>nc1 olnh .
AL'tor trese c::in-..,er9'1CeS , Generr J. (;lrrk c' pn in Ciscu.::sed the 1)ric1 p;ehorid
sit,rtion with Gen9r"l l}r-1enther . Tri-=3 G rnrins Pre nttrickinc; 0Y1. th0 rirlr;r,hePd
in SC'~1") norce, £'nc1 '}rrn0r"l Clnl", is nrrt~c,ilrrl:r desirous of r;ett··nr, <'ll the
air support rossible , not onlv +'or -'ts r3sults on tr.e Q9rr1Pns but becriuse of
the ' oral_ supr,ort ~;1
,j_cl -it '"ill. f;~'lO to c-ur troOJ'1. ':'o h lr ::-ttr>in tJ--is (1'1.d,
be invited /}e'19r~1 ;. v:il_le to ta1 :e lun~J-i ·-ri+, ri·1 rnd Gevinrr,l Gru9nther, nr,d
at l_unch YFJS verv emrl1ritic rith G0·1er:0 ] ,2ville o'1 tJ,e necessity of' i"'lmedi~tely
suTPrnoni·F; the '>trri.tegic Air Force tc, riic' i_·1 tr9 brttle r>t the br~ dgr:ihend . Generc l C1Rr1? srdd t}-r,t re lrn8W V""rY 17el.l tirt concen.t,rrtiors d' G-;rrn.an troors "nd
r1Pteriel "ere not trn,'iti.cri:=il targP.ts f0r t 1-e _;tr"te-;ic Air Force but thrt 11t
tre rresent ti,.,1 0 bnmb<'.'rdnent of ball- be£>rin(J' fRctories or r<'.'il junctions in the
nortl:i of Ttaly hAd no 9ffect at 1111 on tre bridf,ehead battle . The nermRn troo s \
were 8.l'~CJRd'r jn tJ,9 'er>cl,heP0 11re" , l'.nd t'~•"'li.r e1uiprn9rit vr, thr,r8, rn/1 -·t WPS
tre Ge11nrc 1 1 s r es~re to cnncentrat0 every "V<1il"11le .?jr bor1brrdr1ent resource,
h9t}v"r str"te<;ic or otb0r ri-;e, OYJ tPrget"' within th9 ~11z-:_o --ren . Ge118r ls
G:ruenthnr ;:i11d S"ville sr,~d thnt they ···Are hendinfl' tbeir effort-: i-ri tl'.nt dj_roction . Ganer,l Cl:ork r<;re,-,ted t rt -1-,1,e ;-r,ntter 17"S e:xtremol:17 si.,.,,nle in his ;11ind;
re siriply ventod f'l] qvril,,hle 9.ir -..o·rel" C"PCentrrtec'l 011 the Gcry,,r,ns i.n the
Anz-i o b,ttle ;;,rea .
0
0
0
0
�A little l.nter in tl~e [':i"t8r100·'1 tbe Generr,l
Sup:rort Co,,m.,Y1c tbnt t½i 9rK1 t'Pc'l berm P chieved .
1
VT"S
;nforn9d by the XII Air
C"
G0ner..,l Clrrk r't tl e clo~e o·~ the ,-:,fternoon ct~ctnterl the '..'ollo-:ing
rend1u0 for hi"' r i ..,ry:
1
t 0 eno-
HJ hE>ve b8en some'vhr>t .,-,0rtur x~d torfr,~r bv tre ne 'TS -"'rom the Anzio beP ch:heed .
Gene::::-::il LucBs "ent I'lR the -"'ollmri"lP' message:
1Fressu:re 11,crei'tlst Prit-"c-;J. 1st 'livisio·1 cnntL'1u~n~ .
Enr:my rP.Tortec1 at CR
873'3 . Sitiwtio•1 not cl'3nT and e:xect loc.'ltion of lin':l undeternin0d . ~ppenrs
necessPr r to er:irloy e.rditional ~orce2 to T"Jrint::iin front .
li11 keer you advisec1 . ~eriuest 811 avnilrul0 n~r in1d nr:v..,J suprort on nort rind north"Test
fronts of sector . Request iT"L'"'!ed·i_pte r-l2ns 1)e niride for tr0 shipment o-1" P'1 <1dditionr,l jnf'11ntTy division Pt the eA.rliost rossihle ·noncnt . 1
1
11
1 rePlied as ~allows:
1101.1.r ?'18 received .
Keep T1e -ro,:;ted O"l the sjt,urtion . I f'eel yon C"'n stop
T'1ost "nyt1-,··nr '7ith the 35n t11n1·s you hwe .
hen you r'?,uest ~ir , try to gi'-18
loc1.t~o11 and n"'ture of ts:;rr;Pt-, .
'e1cthP.r -n9rnitt~1,r , entire '-'-tr effort of' XII
Air Suy.;rort TPct5 C" 1 and Str..,ter;;ic ,ill be concentr,.,ted on your front Thursdry.
'le h;::ive a.lerted 1 rr-ivy. } res1me ~rou ri.P'~e your rer:i. 1ests "or nRw 1 su1
:rort tr.rouc:;h
Lo..1.·;r. You T"lUSt reri]:i ze tl e 1•• -r,r.,cticPbilitv of' 38ndin~ ;v-011 Pn pr'ditionPl inf211try di vision ..,t 0'1ce . Shipping, TT\f' i -1:.enr>nce ririd "V":.i 1r>bi litv o cliv~ sions
.,re fn.ctors to be considered . I :1:-ive 01·dered this rl~te Another British briP,Pde
group to irour front . Everv e-l"'f'ort vill be ,.,,,,de to e:x edite its R.rrivnl in your
area . ~ wo 1lrl 3A.Y vou crin eJ'""lect it in P'lou~~ Le or 5 days . :::t · il1 b8 167 Bri<;Pde fro"1 the '56th D-lv:lsion . Tbj 1 vdll r;jve -rou t,,o ri<?'F19s of tl1js divi,ion,
and ,.,t .-1n e::irly dPtc I conld ""OVe in t'1e 56th D:ivision T-J:en.rlriuPrters . Keep ne
posted on your R. )il-i.t7 to SUTP1' ac'ditioml troops. I PT'l "'till ';'11:inninP' on "'ending E'notl:or crrnhPt te,.,T1, 9itl1'?r '1riti h or Amer:l.crn , ::i ter the 167th. Ani "s1dn~
G r,era2- "c'"nhon to rw1r.~r 7ith yo 1 tenporf"rily to act :cs vo 1r ~)eruty. "'0el 1-ie
will be of gre,.-,t ""'s-~stance to you . Fleese '"lo r",snrec1 of' mv comrl.c>te of'.,..ort to
suTJrort :rou jn ever r no'1s;bl9 r.:r.v. I 11n19 ~ull cc.,.,r.;r'ence : 1 succec,C)f'ul outcoc-1e . 1
0
1
1
1
0
7
1
1
"He shoulr 1
rnon etter trPn to derrnd <inothor :'11.fflntrv divi~ion, realizing
f',111 7e11 tl,nt
co not 1F1Ve t½9 div:i sion, e~·cert t' ose t½Pt Ar8 tired "nrl comnitted to b~ttle; nor do I kwe tl'e sM.rri·1a, nor co11lrl it be .1r·i_ntd.ned loi;,;ic:tiCP' ly in t'~e 'JeP chh .ad .
n In coming to t'1e cr'nclus;_on tly,t , Bri ti '"'h by,ir;ade p;roup sbould be <>ent, I
vre~ p-hed crrefully th, Y'ARuJ.t<> on tJ·,e 10 Corrs A.tt,..c1: . Thrit corr" hr•s ..,,pr'e J.ittl8
pro'!ress, so t:c'l<inf; "'nothr=ir rio-,qc1,e fror1 it '"'roulr' m::iJre littlA c.iff9rence. It ~o
0·1t of the li Y1e , ~ nd, "'ccm~d1110- to the Chief' of Staff I s rerort (1'3ri.g?r3.ier Cooh~)
H 5s in pretty cor' si,"T''1 . Ro.,,lizin" thP. implic.,tio11 o~ t.-,1dnp; this '!Jrjf;;:-de and
its r9percussions 1 dt 1 lexA."lrler , I phon~d hh11 t0 +971 him of my decirion, rnr1 ,
l'l.lt½o 1~h it tno\:: him bv S1l.Y'T'rise, h8 ren(ily "gre':!o . I r"'l kkj11; tro ]_()7th Brigr,ce, "'or tri:i lfAth or the c,r-17e '56t1, ni.visio,, is ..,lr0"c'y :in t11e be,,crbe . . ThP.re.,d
fore , I cr,n se 11c1 the 169th up bter , hi~', ,Jill 1 rt t 0 •·· ol9 rF vj "'j 011. ::n.
1
"Gwv,rn.l J\Je'"'ln( er rho11'"Jc'! TJI';) /1 +'0,,, m~nutes rwo , 1"r0SU."'1rblv influ0'1ccc' by
Harc1 ino- '1.YJr ,fteT tel~:'..11g •·ritr "cCreer7, to t87l "'1e tlr>t he horied ':Y sendin"' the
I
�1-S?th in ;rs to renlnce i}1e :nost tir8d rme of t 11e bt British Division F"lC tbr>t,
trerefore, only the rersonnel neec1 17,0 U;", tn 1ce ovnr t e 1st British l'ivision
e:mirl"l9nt And thrt rerso'u"'lel come out, o':' tre berchhe?.d. I infornecl him thr-t
this was ent:i:!. el'v contrrrv to my i'1r:ia'1 -"n•l thr>t I clirl not r-roro"'e to do jt thr>t
vmy, th"t ~ ,-,as se11di'1g anotror bri.:-ade "'.rou:r up because I f'elt thnt I needed
thf't extra i'1surance :in thflt aren. r,nrl thrt lrter, Hhen tre s-·turtion "lPS nell
in l,;:ind th,:,re, I 1oul(l ',e P'lR.d to rota,te f8rsonn.Pl out o tho ½riclgehead. He
insisted, rmd ::: strermously olJjecterl r>nd tol(1
thPt -· f rny of the 1st B:dtish
rivisio11 wns to c0:"!A out of tlrie 1::Jr-ir:gAhe,:i,,d nor' : t ",ts ov9r I'lY trongest obji::>ction
rnd thet he v1011l•' bnve to g-iv0 me rin order in ,•rr.iti-'1IT. ·re told ~ e tJ:,e British
1st Div~ sion W,"3 tired. I tolrl h:i'1 so
the '<rd Division but tJ,,,t if the situPtlon f;Ot crit:i crl thRt all V:'nulc1 hr.v':l to +'i ;ht nri9th'or theY r:ot tir9d or not. I
tnl0 l1im none o+' tl7 e troors '!ere OS tirec'l 93 tl1e French or t're :::r Corn, . :re also
told me thrt h9 hPd cPlled 'cCreery, o- 'e of I'l7 cubordinntc co~··r·~-:ers, ,..,nrl ok 1d
-my orrlors. I told H~·' thn~ I obiAct9d to thi", f'or I hrve tli.e Putbority, ns an
Army Cor:, 1r11c'er, to i,sue the order th"'t I hrd c,j•ren . Fe r"h:)d for '19 to 1119et
h-tm at ;1oon ~t r·ccr9ery 1 s VeridquPrters toTTJorro' • I 1 1il1 strenuousl1 ob_iect to
b:ringi,1p- qny troo~s 0 1 1t o" tr'A l1r:ic.c;ehePrl untjl t1 P s 4 tu,..,tion :s ,.,,nre cl,..,ri+'ied
there . I '1'"'\ [;orrv this (:iif'f'ere-0co of orinion l-i;:is l"r~se11, f'or it onl~r [lclds rcdition::il IO;~ric,s tn t'rie rwnv I pJ..:~e-"'1 Y lyv':l, ½11.t I 11il: rec:ist, "ith .?11 t\-ie energy
I hrvo, 1-is co,.,,---;rnc i:r£; r.iy Ar'"!.y.n
0
1-,~,
0
0
0
F~-"
1
1
1
At q•)o11t lTlO GAn9r>1} ClrY•k 4 nform,:v' J:,is rideq ,~1,,:,t /1 trir to GenPr<1l 1 'cCrAery 1 :
Feridro'JP-rtr>rc; ½y r,ub ·~as to ,e Elrrrnc·er.1 tre follo ,~--y, r1 "7r ~t 11c0n :n orc'er to r~rr,jt
hh,1 to flttc.md A con"'erence l7~ -':.L Gener~ ls Ale:x-Hnder rinc' ·•ccreerr.
Sbortly tl-ier1y1 "'ter, G8·•1 ')r'll -.- 0.m11-i tzer C'l 7 l'"~cl Q9n0r~ l Gr 1 1enth"'r ,J10 sr if tr•<>t
1 e Ut1('9rstoorl +,hrt +,be er '1f'erenc9 to..,orro'"' '"n s to 1,8 r r:, ln to ;,ett le +,},P, question
ns to •h_et11,3r tr'e l'S?th Br~_p;rrle , ,0,,1 d rnr J_r1ce troors of' tl'e 1st Brit-L"'h Division
or ',011lr' ')1: rin <>dn~tion to tPP"". G,.,ner"l Clr>-·11 • cr• 7 1":ld Gen0.r"l T--1'rrc1in~ to reF<::sert
thrt 1 e hrrl m·i •e ap l: s m:'.nd th"t t 1-r:_s Pou1c1 b9 "'1 'rlrJjtion "'nc: -,,_ot r re1 lnce"'!0YJt .
G:rriP.ral ".rr11r, "Tho -is no .1 rt the Fi i:-t,h ,\rr'ly !\dv<>nce ConnPnc F ost, sent tr8
f'ollowi:1P- cq_bl9 to G<:"erril Gruenther tor'":>r rer;"rc1~11p- t,h3 s~t,.1ntion on the fnzio
f'r0nt:
1
m·. 051. 11 ""'119J11Y cont:inU•')S reM :r ,79r3•.1.,~e cr""~'1-t 1st D-ivisio'1. Th5s ,njt
h"'S s1r''fer9d i1e~ V'"J losses, r nrl Corr"nder rer orts 1-Je c' n not holrl ~rese11t front.
180th Inf'rntrv i beinn; put i'1to lino 1J1:lt'YeAn 1st Div~ sion ri:rv:i lrd Divi -iio,,,,
trkinr; over :r 0 rt of rresent 1st Division +>ront. ·-rrrrr:on will e""lrloy t"m COT'lfPnies
0i:- l:5_rrrt Pnd one ;)Pttqlion of "0rliu:1s this' r-"'ternoon to rssist on reestrblishing
front in 1-st Div·sio11 sector. ~:verv effort ~1101 170 be 1'1'\M'e to 0-:r'3dite RGT o-;: 8Pth
r-i,r:i,sion . T,on~ r"'DP'9 r,.,.t:111,..,r;r ' 1it ~nothcir "',1nu11;tion rlm1r Pt 1100 bonrs. 1'
0
G3n9r2l (;Jnr1r cnb]Pd 6r1P'lirrl ~>1nn;11r-J.vr1 ti j _ , ~ft9r'1oon, F'J 1143, thr") ·in,;
\ jyn -"er t,l;,9 rrnT1rt st9--,,.. t~ l,911 to ,,-rc-v:i_de 'Y' Vr' 1 ,~m-~irA snrr ort f'or pj ft}, f rrn:r
oper.?tions.
*
*
�noon ~· itl'l Gennr;:,ls ~lexrn-v'er ['Ylr'l r~cCreerv ,-,t 10 Cor:;s re'lc1 r;u"rters at Sessri,
ceciaec to flv ,-'O'T. to Car-;ert'l by cub •n1cl ccnf8r ,-,.;th C'r9n9r"'l A.lexrnder th8re.
rre cen1Jrtcd +'ro"'l ·\hp '";"'" 71 C"'t\ -"i9:d 11ertr t "e '"'i ~~tl ArT"i.y Cor,.,,E>n l ! ost at Pbo-ct
0900.· . :t8 l"'nded :in the old 4'erriil.;nr ror'l .;n f'r0nt c,.c- t½,9 forJ'!ler Fifth Ar'"'ly
for rarc1 Coram.., n,1 F Ost ,-, 11(' rirove Oo··rn t0 tr 8 c-=i c:t le ,-,]-,ere he i rnmer j ..- tely 'ient
irrto c0nfer"mce ,,.;th Gen,..,rnl Ale:z::-'1cler.
Genernl ra,-,r 1r1 s
0 1 ·rn
notes
t½is con"erenc8 follow:
0>1
=
' 1Th-ic; rnorn.;n--:..,. nhonec1 G,mer,.,1 Al8':"n'er, telljng 1~jM th,,t
VIPS reluctrnt
to ·-rai t ,mtil p O I cloc, to '17 'JCUS'1 ...,;th !'1"' U·e build-ur :i.n ths briclw hP,tVl. T
d.;d tl~is h,c.n1we l ~,e.s relnctnnt to r2V8 t'~.," w,+,t9r di scussec with J"'P, before
.. cCr8er7 vrl:iA'1 -'-,:,0, lA.tter h"d no+,'hi.,,_c- to rlo yr-ith .;t. J fle-' to Alexrnc1e:r- 1 s
1
Heerl'l_11<1rtr.;:rs on,' +,0ld rini, l,ef'o-,-.9 ·:rir"inr [')1'1 L8"'nitZ8T', 1 0 l unaltPrnbly I 'c!PS
OF"OS.(' +,o ru+ti·1,.,. '1r.;t~.:::'1 51'.'>th Division 1"1"its .;nto t 1 e hrirl.ctnherrl ri:vl '"TithcrP'Ii"lr "''1 ,s111.r'l m::i.nber o-1: 1st Britisli Di,1isio·1 u,1-lts. 1'.:r~.,.,..9ntly 1'9 h d '"leen
tl,e i sdoT" d1iri11~ t~·e 11-i __, +,, -"'or T 1"rd •10 dif-"-l r,ult•r -in putti'1~ ovqr =y 1 lrn.
'To dou',t L 0 "'1nitz8r 'ircl contr 4_',uter' to 1.'·r-rr1 -it.
h '1n-:J:•eed to ·-ut ~n t e e-·1tire
S'Stb Divisior :=pvi_ : 9PV'3 t"e 1st 1iT'; t~ sl: "'1ivision; tl-irt wo11lJ c::::ve r~e t-m P.ritish .,..,ivisio11s 4 11 th-=, hrid.gnlerd ,nr two /\meriCPn In.c,'ntry I,ivisions, r,1'1S :rarmon1s "ore<> !J.VJ." m~sc9llL.YJeous units . I sent the follovring rar :iocram to Luco.s:
0
1
0
1
RN 1816. ",fill senrl -~e.,,,r ·i. nr' er o+> S S Brit isl' ::Ji vis :.'.o"l M f'r st :1.3 sh:Lpring
7
is rvc1il:>bl i . TJ-,is :)-'.vis.;on :,.;1_1 then cor,sist of 167, 163 [inr: lSq Brir: c es.
1
1 c-ut o': 1 ere 'by tor1orro" 17.0r"irr;
l'J7 1!'i1ar e "roup sho'11d be cor-rlntel,r lordec
a...,,l .;r "Our ::incls by tomorroF 11.; <t}•t. 169 lr.; r-rcJe rrc~ :iv.; sion r..rerdrp1r:cters
,·::1.1:::. folJo-' it 7..'7:'19di,-,tely es en ft r,3-t,,ffns. •re "'ill '1..-,n 011 t'ro Briti3h In"A.:1.t'"'•r err +,,;o r~~':,sd ·t~t s Jryf'pnt::-,, Divi;:;·'.or, ~'1. 1)riclgeh8ac1 plus ·: rr.10'1 1S
"o:---ce :nc1 in Pdclit~o'l to ,.,,.;sce11,meoue 'lni+,. I"' l_o?i;tics · -lJ: rqr-,'t, ~ ,rjll
add i11""l.C 'l' 11,,· t,r ,~rJT"t1i·1d ,~ 0" the ::..st fr·1or1xl '. 4 -ri.r:i.on ~r;tVP'"" :~r.;:w",- " T n-f:e11.sivP. r>ctio--i. ~r '"'1lt rjr "),..,..ort on 70lJ:' ~r,,nt todPI • • r8C1U'"" Tl)U 11PV9 nrw1.l
f"1mf':i--,-.e su-:-1.·or+, •ro 1 1 ri9S~r8.
Co1 1l" ',('tn9 +;p,,,_:,,~ be ro·c>-itr-t')J.y e""ploy9rl, rlu~ .;i1 -in
sur,-,c:rt cf .,.,rort roc-iVLOn..J? A."i snro /i,5 l].'Tis·io11 ·-yill star 0np:1r R.C'l,'n.ce."
0
0
0
0
7
"AftA::.~
hnd
"'"'1'1.0"9T'J911t
·1
·,½n "'18t 11od
for ld Y1 to
1·1 ~V9, "c•r
'1!rri
'IG
v--.; '1
r'c_<'c•i_ssi.on :;: f'T0 '•'3 , Jith '}911erc 1 AJ.ex,"n~rn• T "'I'3011P llJ rind told
to ½e f'rr11l- 9.-i_d th·t l rrt,,.,<;r ',ac} .~,,,lt sr:nrY: ~t rr:n+,"l"'j Ct";d jn rriy·
o+' t}e l<'i·"'tl, Arrri:r 1-iscriuse nf hPv~_ ":O ·~A.ny \11 iAI'.' Cor-0-i. T told. 1,.,5,.,,
1w
07, 1,-; ,:;1 1 '; <1c;sirrn°f tl--9 1•9,., Ze,"lrnderJ t,h9 7g WO, :V'119i"h~t •muc:url te 1..: Tn9 ";~:ri ctly ro , to 8''1 -ilo;r tri0m. : rut cvcir rw } o·· r,t "':~11, I beh=i 1m 1 erstoocl. n
1
G8nerril Clrr 1 '" retur'"l=ed to 1-i, l-ier1d,iurirtcrs <=>t 10/;5 rw1 , ~-"tor ~.,forF:i'1p;
Genorf' l fi-rll<"nt118r ('+' 11,ad h<>d oc~ui••n~d ,,t t I} r:ieet: 11[' ,- ~ t' /"}0°1.'"'r[' 1 II l ';'cE' nder'
'i1J"911t to n13 VP'} ;1.r1 ·-ror 1"00. OP fE'""'9l"'S un"t,il ]110, 'Jh"ln Colonel'1 T'";.r'!zo9 ;,n_n '~y7nrc,
·1ho hail. 0 1~ 0 -✓ ~'1 up "T"C"' 'rA.r l"'s, 1/1['( 8 [' :re;r'~On"l_ C, 71 011. ri.n, st?yi"lg "or l1 1nch.
1
Ge>1ff'r>"l (:1_,:,r•)r i'1 -=:;u""'e,-.-i 1g ",-.o,
rf'th0:2 01'"' C'1lr'' '1.11(' ],8 "')<;n-1; thA rP.st of
the E1.,.,t9rn00'1 ,,r,r1:-irip on pt'pi:,rc; cnrl lrri vrr~ous section c½iPfs in.
r,
�The hecV1/ ni_:~ rroCT'>J" ~cl--_9(:>-1led irest0rr1p7 t0 b:---e,, 1• 11r Gerr'l,nn
tl-ire,,+,eni11r:- the Anzio beBc1
1hen.d '7as ,lmost totGllV ~trillnc:1 ,,.,y -'-,r"
rP l Sl,,rk raa n crv, "9rrmce let9 ·in t, 1,9 R +'ternoo'1 --i tr G8'19r"' 1 '"'nv
to ri~TTJ thf1t hePV7 C0'1C9ntrr't~.on of' n-ir rnu~t stri(e p 7 ni:r1:·t ~- lzio
'
4 t is c7irri'lti-::ri117 nossible .
I
ccnceritr<>tioY\S
,·e2th0r . Ge'1e- \
llo ~n ",tressed
U"t [!S roon PS
1}0ner1.l 0,l<ir1, toda:r ''eceivnd 9 criblA -"ran ArlmirPl Lo ::;:-y, R.n '355/10, stating
tl,nt, the PT ?(ll l''lS b09n sent to Pi_?;9rte -"nr r13rairs Bnrl tJ,~t " rerl-,cei7<'mt ,•rp,3
bPi"'P' Se'1t to • P'""llAs ;.,,111.,di..,+~1:r ['8 p rer 1~c0,..,e'1t .
1
Ger8r.2l T,ucas cahl90 toc1Pv, '"'.F '3/,1, thr-1:, furth9r siell:i'1C;' 0f lio~rit"l 11re"S
1-wd occui~rc;d ~n tl19 1\'1z-io brjcrrerer.icl ,,reP. As ri. r8s11lt 0.., tl-i~s , 11.e rps decided
to riove +,}·, • cs-.. ~+,P.1s to +,be ef'st f'l~ ,1• C'.., +,J,., sector tn"10-r•ro1·' •
R • '3?? . "Yon,,. r1 ec~ sion cc"'c8rn-inrr l'S7 Bri;rrde
fAr3011fll Lncr,s to 0,lPr 1- .
Group c0nc11rr9d ;_ri . Th~ "l 'lriP'rrlo r:roun "hon1r1 ccvn3 i.,, -Jquipped r"1·l J'9r>cly ·"'or
COI""bat . T'fo hrin-n.de '-'l'.'om1 to 7 eave 1-ieri,c her,d . 11
Per Pn"l C]prv to Lucri-:i . P'J unr,. !IT'fill se11c't -r'AT'1.."iYJ.cler of' 50 Brit, sr f'~vjrir; fR,t '0 s1'-i_r:j11F· is rv·,-ilrhl9 .
T11ic; 1ivision "I-ill thc".l C"'1sist o-"' 7(,7,
V,8 <>nd 1(;g Brio-rdes . 1S7 Rr-irrtde Grom"' sionJrl 1:)9 cnr1rl,.,tr,ly 7.orred out c+> her0
')y t,,'10rrcn mnr.,,.,,,~~
7"'1, Y01U' 10 ,nrls lyr tomorrrwr Y\~r·l·t . 1/)q Prig'lcl9 [1'10 .)-ivi'3ion Fe c'l1uart"'rs ·-rill follo~1 iJ~ in;1edir1 ,..el· PS cr<>ft retur'1s . •:e "'ill plPn on
-L,vm Rr'tis}1 In PY1tr7 l'W~ t ro 'Tniter1 ft.cites :n+>rintr•r T)-ivisioY\S jn l,rj('lr,:~horir1_ nl•1s
'!rir'"0'1 1 S +'01~cA P'1d in Pr!c-itio·1 to n·1cA11"'19ous units . P' lo.,.istics vlill nr:,:rr1it,
I ~-,ill r-ild rrri<ln,.,Jl~r th"l ,,,erin.5nclor of t,ho 1st rr,,or8d ··1vi~-ion .o;ottinr; reP<'1V for
o-:'fensive net-ion . All 011t 1.ir eff'ort on .7O1 rr f'ront torlr•r. 1res1•ne vou i,,., ,13
nr-v::il mu,f-ire ,,,,lrpo-,,,t von des-tr0 . Conlri 80m8 tnnJrf'l be rrof'• t hly emrl oyecl , dug
i11 -ln surrort 0f +>rant roc;itjons?
Am sure 1~5 Div 4 sion 'ill stop 3llA'TIY flrV" YJr;e . "
0
sion
,..,_a
1
The llrny CoP1mR 11der todnv dict8tocl tl-9 +'ollo,·r,rf'" ,.,,87"or.?ndrn'l for hi'.3 Chief of
3tri+>f ~ ith ret;"rcl to f ltu.r9 off,=msi ve oper~tions:
1
"l.
'jt}, the remov'"'l of tr0 S/)t), Divi -;in'"l P,,,o,,.., t,½9 ]_() Sorns f'ront n11c0 trio
exchf''1<";8 o,,. t,l•e !/,t11 Br~·':/ sh Divi3ion by the !,th Divis:i.on , we rnu--:t mor1ify our
rJrrns . } l0Pse hrvr::. G-3 ,-,.:.9r::-r 0 r nr,w set of' i11s+,.,..uctio>1s .,t j ch · 1ill rrovide +>or
tro fol 7 0 17~ 11rr:
~
§; •
,-,,he t<> 1-~n'; o-"' C'l.Ssi·10 f-lnd tJ~e hi r,', f"""('OU 11r nortk10st t'1.,..r<>ff.- b•r t e
9vr ZeRland ".Jo·•TS in the PVCJnt t 1 P.ttriclr toJ11orro= bv the V+t1' Ji vision fail.-. .
1e
2•
'T'he co-ritjnuPtion 0-" the <i.ttMck 'w t,hp French 011 tre e-:ds T0relle ~oc0Aseccr , Pssist0c'l l;y th9 II Corrs jn 'l nrirro•r zo11,e routh thereof Att1:1c1ring in
colurm of' rivisicw1 s . Th:i.s will n-ive the II Corrp ~n o'~porbmity to ··•Hhc'lrPw
one c:li.visior frorl\ tl-i"'i~ li'19 +'or r9st P.'1C r9f'ittin~ .
c . Tl-ie rittnc1r 1y tl·e 'Tow ZeP1'l'10 Corn:?, ross~bly re-li-i+'orced by
,..jvision- (British) i'1 tl'9 Lfr 4 V1:l10y.
f.
t}-P,
7qth
A holc1 :ij7f; ottcic'r i-nintA.ininf" stron~ rrer-mre by +,h8 10 COTf'3 i'1 thP
r•;rtiir110 1:1re:1 '"Ii.th on0 d~v:iRion, th"l otrA"' r1~vi3ion b0i11q ,-,~tr.0rr ..,11 f'or rest c'nd
�for ult,rriPte emrloyr10nt ir th0 Liri V8ll3y.
~•
VP. lley .
':'o hold tre B'~tb Division i"l rrr1y re-:;nrve f•or
GXI
loitctio11 in th0 Liri
f . To holrl · t½e J 8t,b "RY'iti sh Br~ r;Mde Grour out o+> the li:ri.9 for ro~sj ble
eT11ployment for rel_ief n.t thr1 brirlp2hearl or lrter ev-r-loitation nros1 ects .
"Let I s try to o;et :., pla11 v: . : cl1 -,~rovic1es ,~or P".l P 11-out .,.,i f'th A.ryiy effort
i'1 one vi tn.1 a re 8,, ·-,hile ,old~ •1p in others. l le11se e-vTedi te this. 11
Perso"lrl Lucf's to Clrir1•• R" 3rig . 11 1119 to r.rese: t Rl ortrge of infn'l'ltry to
::::ur:;ortinrt arrs in B:d.t:i..s T'i7isior. reco-,-~,,,1c th:;t 167 :n~rntr:r Bri;:;~l'e '7ove to
t, is sector at lj_p-rt scr> le onl~r c'1d not Bd_f~de Group . '"a"~_mun r mr mjtion should
be brou1;i1t . Otber c111its o""' Drii:,;<'<le Group crn ',e c<'lled forurird later. 11
0
1
1
*
*
*
IR.Er;~,~;TZA1'0--P~B7.TTJ\RY F, 19/_)~--Because 0 f' his cold, Gci,,,,,erfll ClPrk did not Jer->ve
the w=-vi tb-,.,our,b011t th9 entire rriorn:: ~e1 . ne r0mf'jned 8t '1:is des', "10r1dnr- on vn.rio11~ 1JJ~v,ertt r.intt9rs , :i ncl..11.ci11p; str ,,_ctl1eninr of' the A:r>zio be?.chherd ·;ith P
British Br~g~de Group .
0
0
At 1110 he receivec1 n,, jor GenP-rrl F cH['ro11, CorJnrncler of' tbe ~tr A..,,ericrin
J11.""~F1try D~ vision , ,·,ro is in It" lv on rn in3rection tour . Th0 Division "'t rresent is in ~nr,land . Later, Gnnerr ls Gbr"lr rnd Mcf''-1.hon ·•rorc joined bv I'r,jor Genern.1 Robertson, CoT'1mander o-':' tre ?nd An2ricrin Inf'rintr;r D-i vision, "rhich is P lso
in F,nglnvid . Gew:ir1:1 l •~ci.'lP.hon returned yest9rd'l~T froT"'l the Anzio bridr;ehe'-"'d, rincl
he f;PVe (},=mrmcil Clarl,c a f:irst kmd re1 ort on hi3 :i11rressio"ls of the situntion up
there . Gennr,9.l Br1:inn n lso returned from the hr-i d1;1>he:id yesterdr.y. The si tu"'tion
up t:iere hrs j_mproved a great deel d'1.ring the p 0 st ?/.J. hours , Pnc1 the German
thren.ts hrve been beateri bn.clr . Lnter in tl· ~ cfay Ge 11erri 1 1wille n.nd Air Vice
Fa:rshrl Dl' lbiac conferred witb tl1 e Ge;1erPl. Genernl Clrrk clictr>ted the followini:i; with regf:lrd to air support oi' the l<'i.fth Arrriy:
vrns only as P -result of my P 11-out ef'fort to conce!ltrr>te n 11 tre P ir in \
this therter on my -'"'ront th::it tho CP'C rutl·oriz9d tbis the dny before yesterclr:>y.
I 1"\a·1 ntained that for six T'JOnth;:; the Str:=i.tegi c Air hri s been j nterrupting eneT"y
lines of corirrunicPtion bnt not su+'fi c:i.cmtly to r•revent h~ s oringj n; down wrirtever
di visions hn neeclec'l , suppl~ : nr; them and -'::l gr tine; with thoP1 . Never yet has air
preventecl 11ove11ents or sup,lies beinr- riwiiln.blG in ordAr to rerri:it suffic~,mt
-f'ip;htin£; on the pirt of the e!1e17y to stop us .
11 It
I
As r rGsul t of trie cecision to use r> 11 tre 9.~ r, my stP ff, , ror"kinf, wHri XII
Air Support , lri:i.d on £' fine rrogrrm for Stl~ategic , TPc 0 nc1 YII Air ..::u: r,ort in
clirect sup:;ort of' the Anzio brittl0f::ela. _,..or JTester(;"'Y. TTn..,ortun,,tely, weather
closed in ['t 11 o I cloc 1 , ;:i_nd 011],, rt out 1/1.~ o+' the 1 roP-r'lm n.s pit ; nto effect.
:
TTord fro1TJ +,he bridrreheecl s 11ow9d bov1 it b osted thP.jr riorale enc how ent;.usfactic
the troors ~;ere to see i11cicc1tion8 of close •·ir nur,,·ort. ';8 r,:,·;ri"l l"id on yrrntGrdGy-1 s incomrleted pro~rn.n ""or ~~od'ly , l,1.1t v!et1thlr J-,as not fAr1,,itted its execution .
11
0
HTod.s.v, J.ir Chief n'lrSh£'1 D 1Albi1.c , TrP i>,h,~r ' s Depu+,y /\ir Co•~r,,r>nr1'1r, 8ncl
:::MvillC:l ,iu,t called on ''IP., nnf in 2 cr>s1J1"1l_ co:'1.v0r2ntjon, told rie th t the r,eci- ~
sion b1<'1 1"'9en r1tirie t'·d s ~,orni11o; b~r t}-,9 .?ir , ·7ithout r~ference to m<-), th"t the
)\
0
�Str::1tegic,
I told t1'e
nrese1ct my
reriuest to
or h0aviP-s , would. ~o br-clc on their old co:-imu11icn.tion job to,..,.orrow . \
ldr ··arsbn l tb.Pt I v1r>s l0C' ~ opposer.. tc this rila11. ,ind hoped he would \
vir=ns to E8 1rer 1111d <"\lessor , trirt I mnde t1-rour;r rin 2.n official
lay on one d"'y ' s <ill-out air pron:r:,m -i_n snrrort of' riy bric!1.;-'3heed .
nr nr r0cordi11r-- t}-1: s to 1ndicnte thA +>8ct thPt teie 'pj_r oftent~_nes run
their Om -mr, ,-rbic: is not ,"'l"JP'fC conrletely coor!i:l.nrted dth tre ITT'.'ound . I
L"e.i,1triin thPt O11e 0ny 1 s 811- ont ~Jr effort in close surrort o+> the bridgehe"d
on 1·11011m enemy concentrE1tio11s , nrtillerv- rirori s , c'u,1rps 01 nc'l cor,~unic'-ltion centers will cert,,,inly slow nr Pr.ri r<j~courrp;e his +'urth9r P1.ll-out nttr,c'c nhich re
is bound to make . At len st we s:~oulrl r:-j_ ve ::1 t a try. I doubt if the.· wi 11 comply vlith rrn request . u
1
7
At 1530 G"mer"l Fre:rburg rinrl menbers of h"s taf'-f' nrriver:'l, c>YJ.d G,mern.l
Cl11.rl;: V'ent ~YJ.to co:r.feronce rit 1'1 tr.en jn t},-3 con+>errnce hut . Tbe t:;rour · hj ch
al,30 i11cluded G,.,11eral Gru,-=mtJ~0r f'nd ~3mi,0rs o.C: w-rious F-i Pth Army ::;ectio11s , discuc;sed tJ,9 co"lin~ srirloynent of +.re ,.,nd ~i8'1 Ze[llr11rl DivisioYJ. Elnri the Li-th Indian
Division, wh.:ch conrrise Gener<>l ..,reyhur~ ' s 'Jew 7,ealf'nr1 Corrs . Followin,s the
co 1<>erence , Q9rerrl Clnr1r returned to ris vn.11 to n.g,,jn nork on lo ,isticrl rrobl"'l:11s v·1 ii le GFm8rri 1 Gruonth"r refl" ~ 'lr>d i.n tl~e l ut to act P s host to Goner 0 1 :::"reyburg nt tre t:raditio'19l British late cfternoo11 te8. .
0
1
GenerqJ Clr-r1c fllso receiv0rl in tre late pfternoon P.n intollifence report
from Colonel Howard. . Colonel Ho'-ra.rc1 sqid thPt tre siturtion i11 the bridgehead
area V't=>S rruch i-proved . For dinr,er Ge·'le}~Pl Clri.r r had Lt . Col. :Port0r, SecretFry,
Ganer"'l 3t2ff , as his guest .
General Lucr>s rAnorted 011 1'is situ"'tio'1 2s f'ollo'rs this morninP": 1m 353.
En°my comrrirntively -i n,,ctiv0 r'•.1.rinP' r.ig'~t . B.elief of Gur,rds Bri p;1=1de by BBttri lion
179th aCCOT'lpHshed ::.--TI10othl;y. EP.rly r9rort on ."'tt,,c'r of 45 Diviecion Pfperr sot::isf-"ctorv, rilthoug]-, heavv f'j_r,hti---i-,_; is in rroF,res-, . At 08'30 h.ours lenling cor:p:,nv- 179tl1 Inf:rntrr hPd reoch9d fPctory . '7 tc:.,-,~·, '"J9r8 puPhed through olc. rrilronrl. 1mderrrss, ? knocked out ut 5 co:-1tinue ~n cJose surrort . Con"icerrble German act::vit;r, co•1position rnd strcn::rtJ-i un'ri~o"m re:rort9d north"•est of f"ctory .
Porrion 1 s trin'rs c1~sroserl to surport f'DY act5on "S rirti..ller,r -f'rol"' rr0.rri.rerl ro'"'ition
or to f'Ssenble C1'1icJrly to r1eet r t,=m1,• threrit . 11
11
A lriter report frorr G9rerA.l LUC!" c, r' i"' closer' thA f'ol lm~inG -in "'orr1" tio11: 1N
3rSl. 11 Frogress o-f' !1-5 "1ivision c1ttac 1 cn,1ti"1ues -f, vorF.1bl0. . F..,ctory Pf]Y'rentJ.y
set 1'1fir9 by our :=i.rtillery n. 1d tr111rs, eltho'F';h erri,,1.::i..1 :imount of r""'CI'ine ~m rind
rifle fjre still comjn['. from thnt Pre? . Cur ten','1 on 1'111 sides o:' -"':::i.ctory rositioYJ. , b 11t m.<>in bod;r o:' ene"1Y Prpears to bP to tl1e YJ.orU . ''fo furthr:r h1-f'crr1r->tion
co·1cern~nn; :;nef'17 force rrevio'1s1-.- rerorterl to t 1· e no:..•th ·est . !}5 :8i.vision 1:i ll
c011tinuP to rusr to trie "lortl' . Rough r-·1r1 he11vv- scris r,rev9nt Pll iinlorriin~ ~-1cl'1J.inr; L ~TS in 'lzio h<'rbor . rr
r
1
*
*
Il'ES '."V P0- - '2~RRT'Al.7.Y l? , 194/,;,--G'3nerP 7 f;lrrk left hi o. COTY\m nr· ro"t !"t 0,..,50 houl's
'Pld le,_-.+, the cu', "ield :i.t ()()00 , "lvin,,. to Pqrc~rni,.,e ··~th Lt. Col. utherlf'·'ld.
T:r-iere lv~ met i' "'j. Gen . Crnnon .nnil le"t by Hs C- L.7 , riloted 1,~- 'r io.,... lorle ~, f_'or
the n.~rro:rt ['t "8ttuno . Tre v,l,.,'1A ~rr::iVA0 th,:,re e"'ter "n 1 mevent:f'ul journe;r Pt
1035 .
I
�General Clrr1r hnl"'edi::i.+,ely ni:mt t0 the rePcl.ou; rt0rs VI CoP'IS 'VP c:re ho hPd )
lorig talk ''Tith GP110rrl L11cn.s. VI Corps l.e"'il'1_urrter3 is 110w loc"ter' jn the
cellrtr c,f q 1uild-'ng in Nettuno. Foll◊"'"n,,. tM.s, tho Gi:mer:ol 'rent, ;:-uided ,,,_,y
r"a.i. Jr cl:,on, to tre c0r,"'1r'1d r,of',t o.,,. tbe lc-Sth ...1jvj sion, 1
crricl is locnt0d in r
f· rr:thonse ju t to t,i,e 11ortJ, o ~ tho ro' d ..r} icl' P.083 f'ro"l ~Tr,ttuno to ll'rGc<>ncelli.
On the "Pl.Y GPn,srrl C:!.nr 1, T'fl.SS<;d !l err crrt..,in:in,.,. Gonerrl 'T'rurco~t e11rl -to:rred
+'o-~ R sl-iort t1.ll•. fiurinP- ths r"rive t-,c p-rrn-n::: o"' '8-17' 1 s ~ere ohc:-erved bombing)
tarp9ts +,o tl-i.e nec;t of tbe b"l~cl-t"l9"ti• The G-er""Yl .!>7r 1 v•ris iiecvy, rnd "t lorst
r
one B-17 wns '388"1 s11ot dovm.. \t the /.,S "-'~vis·ion Cl Q9rv,r"l Clnrlr }cd n t::1lk
vd th G"'nern 1 r.:r 1les ,:n,o_ G.::,nerP 7 .,.._.., SC"' 1. The 179th Tn.t'.>rintry }1r,d successfully
tA.hm thro tob..,cco -'-'::i.ctor'T r t Cnrrocetc· t½e PVeni"1 7 bPf'ore, but t 0()0(' t~js
morni'1r_; tre Gerrrnrs "P,£1iTl re-too 1~ ··t. Colonel }'Prrerer -rrorosed t0 p;o ½Pc'r
1.11cl try O ,.,.q in.
0
R
0
0
Follo·,in<:; t}1i =- cn'l.,..GrA11".le G8·'1erf'l Clc-rl· •qent on -1:.o tJ-A '9:en(111 rrters of
tl19 1st /\r"'lor8c Div-l sio11, locnte<i :,,bout .:-.:ve ..-,i les nort):, o-"' 'Tettuno -in a ine
woorl s. Hr--re G8ri9r'17 8 Cl" }~1.;: arid C'1 <1no11, r nc1 ~1'8 nc>,-.icers r ccornrn nyi nr, th8ri,
h8cl lunc11 'rith G9"19l1"1 irf'rrno11. rmi c1.:scussed hi.c- s.:turt-1..on. Tl,e G0n0r.<>l hf'd
11Pd '30"!9 cnqupl_+, 4 1"''3 tJ.--8 r-i~'-t ""3·"'cY"8 k r rip'1 ·111rs-l:.~YJ.g '1bell2 ne2ar r5s CI but
··[;'', in P'OOd ''ifj.,..-lts "l'1d CO"\p~c e 1 t. ~f'tr')""" l0,vi.·1p- (}''1~r:ol J,rr!'Jon 1 S CO"'lmRnd
rost, Go,1er"l t;l[lr1:, · 14 th Gr>nnr"l "" 1v1on "'nrs t, e cth-,r o.,.,f'icers, ,~ent to t e
Ci o+" tho :SrH:1.sJ~ 1st I'5.visio,., "1lier9 Ger...,rnl Clrr 1c tnlh,d w:ith G-8nor"l Tenn0y.
ThA 1st Jivis~on su"fer8C1 hervr }oc- es J'8S'llV'1", nt l8n'3t in rrirt, fro' i'lfiltrPtion of '.}0rm"11S h9t'ree11. Prit·;_sr 1 mits so t11,-+, t},9 British ·r,r9 +,r"lr"'YJ. jn t:1e
-"1P'1 'S prd •9nr ""lrl '·:..Jled or cn.rturec". G011.9rnl Gl·r1· r'ecided to pull this clivir;io"l out :"lc1 i·•1rlrc9 it b:r a-iothr;r r':;V)',1.('r'' rcrr}•<irs thr, 5r,th, "S soon fS
por-;s:..ble. 'r2ne,,..A.l Cl"r': t 1
19n lrove to t'1e ,,.,-j·"th A_rmv ~ hr 1~e C}, ·10 loc1-1.t9d
1
jn .i.,,,e h::sorr;:nt o'., the "Borr,.hcse I'P)-nce 9.t 'Tett,_mo . TbAre he c iSClLBsed su;11~
~ro',-1 er,s r1ith Colon8l D 1rrsa. At : hout 1530 110 lPft tl~Cl cor>"l/'T,d post p:•-irl ·rnnt
to tl·e P.~r.,,.hld ,T1 s9re be tal 1 r,d ,,ith Genernl Lucas Yho hed met him there, and
also with GenerPl Templar , Co1'mn.nd:Lng the Brit:i.sh 56th Division, who h'.c1 just
arriv9d b:,- pl,ne ·7ith :::;cno of · ~::; str "f o"fic9rs to lool: ov0r t,J~e ,70 ,,,,c' -.,i...-': ch
t11e 5/)tr vas to occur;t. ?ol10"":1n, ti is th9 G(3'1.8r'l::.. :.~ turmd to h~ .... SI- h;/ S-4"'
an.r c1 11, , ~rrivt11~ ~t p'l-.,01,t 1700. }TPre 118 w,t G'"''1Pr''l'3 "lexrn.der rnrl :•rr,1 ~11c;
ncl ,-c=J r h:-~9:' tPl''". '.:'here,f'ter, -:e9li.n~; -i,.,r'lsnos8c1, Qr,·-ier'"'l ClPi~ 1 , r9·~:I.red
1
1
1
t,J
11'q
V8D
1
-r'o-r
t11e
0
9V9n~'1C; .
1 RE i-r:TTZ\ 'TO--r \ ~,r~r~ [ 13, 1:4/,--i'C'<hy GnYJ.er" l r,1, r 1 - , 1or-"'':1l-<-t in, :;.sposed, rer,c.: nPd
in 11is V"r, qll ''lPY. He recoiV'3d H nu,~'Y,:t 0~ crll J~s, ho·;·9ver, 1v10. r+,t3 1cled :,o A.d..,icr:str.'.:'tive ,,,,rtte-r-. 3ennrnl Cn"'11on, Co~·•cinr1-i--p; t½e 1°tt fir Force, v5 ,i:.9c1 tho
t\.T'",r Con...
::i.nrler T ( -"'·'.~-.,13S'30. .. ~-'.:.r i-,..;"l t,h, ,ro·,1,-,ms ('~ , i.:r suprort o.(' t}'e "'iftl
Arri. activ··t 1 es. It. :::ol. Dal:r, Co•1n:.:rr'~nc; +,11_9 l':>t', -r:v~cu· tion nos;itel, G;one:ri::il
''nrti:ri rnd Lt. Col. "lrnce e.lso cPllecl 011 Gn 1110r, 1 Clrrk . :}9nrir,,ls "cl rhon A.:rid
"oh9rtso11 ~+.o:;red in 01•-i_9.r>l;, -l-,o s:p- <;oou.11 re to GenPr' 1 Cl<ir 1z, a,; tl 3y ·nre 01c
4:.1 si.r ·v::.,_r ·-.,ec1· to the Unitec1 K..;,,, ...,-r om P ~t'"r the~_r visit- tr the Ft .,..tl Arr1y :ro>1t.
0
0
(1"1"9r' 1 'Jl' r 1: ~ s ;-;rentl~,r concerrn}C. ow~r t,; e ~robl8IJ 0f' 1,r;~bir"" the Ably') r "'.t \
Cess..;no. Q,9r1D,_~q~ ,-,re;rb,,~g ..;'3 co•m-'·0cer1 tl·"t t}•9 (}'1r""rnc, "rP •1,:;·'1y,· tl-18 ~bb9'r for
nr::_lit,,..,.,r p 1 1.r-"'oses. G8rerrl ,,ru<mthPr, ,t G-"YJ.Pr.,, Cl,,rk 1s c'irAct-·on, ,:1ct,qt,9d the
.,..olJ.017 ·n[l' ""'P,f1C)"'P11,1l1J'l 0'1 -:,Jiis c;ub·'.ect:
�;:,½011t lQOO :~ours on nt1u•rl:;, -, i"'0br·•nrv 1.?th , Qr,nAr"l Fr9•>-i11r,..,. t9leJ:,on9d -n-. '1'1cl sti terl, ' T resi:re J.J «t ::: he ';ive,,., 0 :•~ "'Hf"Ort to,.,,orro\·1 ln orr1 er
to 'lC:ft~r t'19 c.r19....,,r Y'OGit50vi .!.1th~ CA'3'>: . ,.,~ ::--ren.
: "rrit t1.1~t~e 'l:ljc s~o'Y'ls of
l? rJ..r n'=>'l e2c]
tl,e l;:,n91 to he ::.;_+,tv For1')9:c·, C"'rr-r:i.,,'s 1000 rou.nr1 b0mbs 1•
1
I tnlr r'ronc,ral .,.,,reyburg tb·-t t,}-,9 nr•1r C0''1'11'"'1r13r hf'n rl::lr9ct9d tr:, M 0 in <>ir eff'o··t .Pnr to,.,,orro''i be CC1'1CP Ttrrted on th·-i ··rzro hf'+,tlc,"'ro11t, ~,,_r' tb')t J ' [ l f '10t
;urA ·l <>th0r or r(Yt, •-re ·1011lc he ·1 1'ln, tc pi.•re .,.;,~ t},,,t r u-:11 «ir on the 13th. I
told ":n trat tl1 P Arr1y Cor '"nr'er ·,0ulc1 rn.q·•r, P.V •r" '3+'+'ort to coricentr-=i.te ?:lr in
surrort of t',e T11r1:La·1 J'ivisioP ..,,:;trc: 011 tre ll;.tr . Gr-i-r1A'l""l --,reybnrg 8m:;--h.,sized
t ..,t .e vo11l 1 l iJr0 to }1 :c1ve 811 ·!:;hP ~ 'r ,,,., co11-1, ';9t O'"' +,h.-, 13th in order to
"'ofte•1 th=; 01Ymy, Ancl thPt b8 boJJ.everl th9 th:res ni S"'ions r<:? i.u •sted ·18rA the
T')-i_n .._:rmrn l {~('111i.re.,,,sntci .
I r9r l~Ad t 11~t T . ,.,,, 7 " '1'0 ~nto thJ mrtt0:c rt OPCfl .
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"I then crec1·ed ,,::tt} Go'1cr;-,l P.r['17Yl n,~..:i Lt . Col. ·r,nsbc-r011~1i to detsr"1i·1e
t e '1,ntu.t'e 0f thP trrn;At : s1nerits 'ltlich t]:-.9 t'S" :39,lA.'1d Cor "3 1--::cl 911bnitted
t'1ro11v½ n.lr snrrort C}''1'1J1C 7 s. I ,.ounrl. t,h t j t m1 17.rl be rossiblr-i to f11' 1:'3 one
;".; r:}'t.9r- ½0"'1hnr S Jll,'lr'lron ['V" ., l·- ':ll9 ":o cur"0rt t t'E') tT9vr '3e~. "nrl Cor· S •
I Cf' lled
Ge11.9r,l 4 'rsvb1n•n; snc t0lc 1 ~"'1 that i.t ;1ould ")9 rossihJ.,, to P-iv0 rj.,,, C''1e s11 w.dro.., 0.,, A- 1-S ril" nP s carr ·i. ir 5or. ro1111d hor'lbS for Cl19 o<' -1:,l·v:i rn~ -sioYJ."1 7J.1~cl' he
hMl subri~tted .
I "sved h-i11 to rlesir;r1"te •rrich trrr;et !'e de irec' ,.,tt,,cksd. Pe
rA....,lied 'T W'l."l+; the Corvont Pttr c 1n:id I• I tolc rim thr't .,. '"'rssunec1 },9 ' [ ' ~ re-"9rr-in; to +.hn f'o11.Pstsr
bl,t ti1i=t th;c, -,.,~" not O""t '1-is list of tnrr,9ts . He
rerli.ed , ' I r->rr1 r:mite sure it ,w-; 011. :r 1 ~st o+' tn~gnts, b1't in nn~~ r:rise I 7r>'1t
~Lt b0:ribed . rn1-,.9 otr r tarrt9tc; f'~e l'n~rrrnort;:,nt, hut tl-,'3 0'10 ~s vit['L ~h8 diviz:i_o11 conm"nrier ·-rl-o "S ""~ 1cinn- t1'8 nt,t11c f"e 7 .S th"t i.t i'"' f'n e ,-;ent; ... 1 tr get
~ind I Voro•1cthlv "qr'Ge r·rjt}' 'ini '. ::: tolrl Grn,:,rnl ~r.-,ybu.:r~ t A.t 1 )0C"USe of restr~ ctions in co'1n9ction ·7ith t},iG t['rcret I rroulrl h,VP to "',fl'rn a fw:·th'".)r ~heck
to d0tern-:'18 the ~rny Co'~¥v,,nr"er 1 s "AsirP .
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ClP:r 1• ,;ri:is 11.ot «v?ilPble . .,. called Gen0rrl ~'frc'i'1rt B'"'C tn)f hiri
1 Ge'1errl 'reYbnrc; • qc; p-:;knd +,i,.,t the fbbe r o+>
su1x,t-int.;~1Jy tl e f'ollo,;~ng:
F~onte CH$Sino be bol'1 b9d toY'lorro-7 . GPn9r" 1 C}r .,.,,. ,.,~ 11 not be r Vf' :· L" ble for , ';out
an 1~o·n·, so h') does not 1-no-r. 0~ t]~is rec1uent . Gr-in . 8J.Fr'- hR3 r.ir0Jr9n to Gr:n .
Fre7h1 rro; on -it le:1.st t 'O or:~R'liO''S co'1r:Prn;ni:; th9 1<rl,Jj sal;i l·"ty c+' boMbino- the
t"omist 0 ry. J:e to l cl G9n . k'revburg thPt r"ter co'1s1 11t~'1g Gen . Y:>.ye", tl::0 Cor'"'s
Co~r1 nnc'ler, ?nd Gen . Ryder, the Sor.,,,rnder n,.. +,i--.9 11,th ~iv . , },p ccn::-ider.c>c1 tJ-,E't no
militriry necess:itr existed "'or its clestruct~.on . '1en . c"reyhuro- e·0-re· sed tc Ger.
c1.~r 1' 1 :i ,~ cr·ns~ r'91~9d 0 ·in.: 011 thrt th8 C.9TGru~Von o~~ tJ19 "on-- '1tr-,rv ~s r ,.,.il it,_,•,..y
;y!ces-;-ity, nnr' t11.rt .:t, ''!1.S unfrii.r to ass~~'1 to f1'1.'T M~L1it.-ir~r cor1r1rnr"0r the ~ic;si.on
of trl'i'la ti1e hill , P'1rl pt, t.},., s~me t-ime not PTP'1t rPr'""'jp;s"on to bc,;nb tle rionR.story. ro·mver , in vjrn o" tre nrtur9 cf t' 8 t'"rr;et, r-11.r' i~}i'} i11~~"'r'1R.tiom1l Pnd
r, 7 '/:;ious inrrlicPt:i.0 11s '>rrrlv8c1 , T c,h01,:.r l-"Y-'1 to f"nt 0 n e;q,rcssioYJ. o+' or·"nio11.
-"ro.,,, Ar,r}' a.s to t',e •1rli1isabjlit•~ o" ... ,1t' or::lz·inp; t 11e ½cr1binq: 1 • G<m . 'I•rr··n,,.
stRt90. h. ➔ m1 il l t[' 1 :0 tbe ,._,rtt9r ur ·ri.tl G9'1 . A.l8XP'1c1Gr, 1'1'1(' ·ro•11J' l 0 t "18 1rnm
!}rm . Ale,~"'1rler 1 s vjG'·', shortlv-.
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n"e"llTYhile I got i'1 touc" with Gen ~ Cl- r -, --,h0 tolrl n tl-1rit he consi.c1ered
t 11e dest~ 1 1'"!ti.0'1. o+' tho ro1ri"t9"'r "RS not n ,,,,~litrar•r necessity, 'l'Yl tlYt I s:rnuld
P!Pl,e tr'l.t r9rrr:;"'e-'1tE1tion to G0r . T'r -,..d,no- n 1 0n he c'>lled lrtor to g:Jve Grm . Alo·
:varder 1s vi9 1 • Gen . Cl,,r'r ::>}so :=;tf'ted +;r"t t',~s Y'"3 a p,rttsr, l icb caus9d h:1"'1
so"19 P.m')f'rr<:13'"'· ,'3nt 3.n vi.9'V o-P the extremel7 str01.,0; vieT3 of G<:m . 1<'rr,vhurr; t 1~t
t,1113 r estructio11 nf t>o "nnast9rv is R "'!ili trr•r necessit,r .
G~ne:~'1.l c1,,r 1, +>e 1t
th<lt 'illl-32S C'ren . Frtwburg recGder fror1 tris ror~tioYJ. ~t "0Uld rlPce Gen . Clrr1r
1-'1 2 very dj ~r~ cult ro-iti.or in tb2 ':;Vent tl1 r t tJ.,.~ rtt.., C1' ~11 0'11 cl "~j_J..
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�ttr crilled Gen . K0sreq rit Rbout 0 11-5, ·rho tolcl me t],l='t, he cjd not co11s:lder
the rles-!:.ruct1on o+' tl'e ffonasterv to be r mi.li+,Ary D")CessitJ. Fe -f'1.JTtrr::;_n stnted
thrt t},e bomb:ir1re o-"' t} e ]'0'1R,3terv "'Olll' rrol-i·0 ½1~, "'Phnnce its v~11 1.e ns R militar- obstacle, hecnu:-;e tre (}0rm:::-11s ronld t½e'1 f'e0l free to 11,e it '"'S " b?rricade . Gen . Yey0s !=Jtr>ted thc:it Gem . lty,~er , G0YJ. . Butler f''1d Col. Bortnnr were
nn,c,YJ.·imons in treir opi nioYJ. tret the destru"!t:ton of' th-; building ·p11s not necess<iry.
BT r,,a !}9n . K-Jves s"dtcl
""'1 to lis 0-'"', T.,t. Col.
iElter, -1:-,o f'jnd 011t ;vbrit
in.tell~r"'1Ce re-roy,ts h0 ½rid nn -1::,}•e b11-i.ldj11.,..,. . Co10110l ·;c•ltc,r ➔;old r9 tl,,.,t -Prom
two civn.~r-m so~.i.rcec; re hNl rea;'O'1 to ½el 1 '"'Vo th['t t1-;_ere T3re r'>+'11P-nes in th0,
t,1,1jld1-Yl<=;, 0ne re·,-,ort st.,ti"1.,. +,J.-int trere ·rere proly,bly a.3 ""any as ?Oro. Colonel
'Ir lter st ter' thrt f'rtill ..,ry CI I s h"l.d suh- 1 tted sev9rP: r0rorts concerninr, the
u·::e o ~ the ..onr st8·~v as ,.,.'1 C'I , ½11:. thrit '1e }1r>d no r0, orts of rn;r P ct 1° 1 fire
com-irr: from t,,13 build~ng . He stPtod thc:it the rwidence pointed to tho f,-,ct thrt
there w'°'re :memy strongro:: nt2 vr=,r-r close to th':! ,"D lls of' the 1-:ll1" ldin'$ .
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"At ?130 I telhod to /}e"1 . FPrc.~r>f" ·r~c ,trted su0stP'1t-i.<>1l;v rs follO'"S:
li}e11'3r[' 1 l\lrn:ander r,f' s decided th~t tr e r'o>1r-> sterY sr 0'1 lr'J. lie 'JC""nbed if GP'18N 1
Freyburg consirfors 1 t as P militr>r~r necessity. He rer;rets thnt tl-e building
sho11l rl h,, c' estro•red, but th t he hP s f'r, Hh :.n Gen . Fr0yrmrg I s .iun[;T'lent . If
th9re is PYJ.V Y'eD.'3011.able "•robqbil itv thr>t t,lie ,,,,1il,H11_-; is bei11n- usec'l for · rilite.r • nnrro"'8S G""n8rP1.flexam'"lr believes tl'f,t its clestruction ::s 1Vf1rrant9d 1 •
I tho'1 tnld Ge:-1 . r·,rcl~nP- th~t I }y,d leen ahl0 to tnlc to G8nerP1 Clf"rl, siYJ.ce
my first telerhonr:, C"nv0rsrition. wi.th Gen . Fardinr- P'1c thr,t Gen . Clr>rk ' s view
1 Gen. Clr>r , does not thin"" thrt tr e '1,uilding
was substri11.tif' lly P s .Pollo"IS:
.sho11ld be 1,(1..,berl, 8 d trPt ;r- tJ,-,9 cor "'lrnrler of tl~e 1.:JPW Zet1lrnd Gorps 'Vere an
Ani0ri":1.n cor;1n.:<inder ho •7ould c;ive sr-eci+'ic orriers thPt it vrould not ')e bombed .
Ho"P.Ver, in vie,v of Gen . l?r9-r;)nrp; 1 s posjtio'1 in tbA British .,.,ynrire forces , the
sjtu"'tion "'1S n. r'elic...,te one, P11c: Gem . Cl."rlr hAsit,-,ted tr f;ive hin snch qn
order '7~thout first re+'errinr; the r:1-,"'",ter to Gen. AlezA.nrr,r . Gen. Clrrk is
still o-"' tl 0 o. infon tr'lt no r1.il-'tprr YJ.ecessity e~'~ sts >'or th" ceRtr11::::tion of
the f!'onr,PtArv. H':! ½eli9V'")':: it nill '3'1dR.n[;er +,J,-,r:, liYes of' rnr,nv c-'vi.linn refuisees in th8 1:iuildi.YJ.o;; '1'1.d tr· t P bo;1binfs r-ill not r'estroy its v~lue r>9 a forti -"icPtion +'or t 1 1e A11em;ir. In fact Gen . Clr-r1 •"eels tl nt tl 1: bo ,b~ ng "rill rro "
br-1blv 8nh1.11ce j_t,s \}'c:i:!_,_rn . I Gl")'1 . FPrn5nr; st,.,tnr', ' Gen . fleYnnder h"'S mrdP, h:s
position ri_uite clePr en t11is point . He rer;-.cets very T'J.Uch thrt the lonaster:· s' ould
be destrove,:-1 , hut re !'l88S no other choice . If Gen. Cl"r:V r'esires to tP11-:: J=Ar sonr>ll•r to Gen. Ale~<rinu,r Pbo11t t,t,e --:u'lJject , J <">rrl ::11JTP. thr>t Gen . Ale~~ander "'ill
be pleR'3"')d to dif'cu"s it T:tl- hin . 1
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J rerorted [' S11mffi.'lr:; of' mY cnnvers"tion with Gen . I'"rdi.11; to G 11 . Cl,r1
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'7ho told T"e tr tell Gen . r'reyb11rp; thrt ,,11il"' h8 still c1-;d not co11.:;irler trrt it
Y'9.S ri rnilitflr.' necessity to boT'lb tl e r'o•1rstery, he , Ps vr.i ll 1ng to defer to Gen •
..,re·rbur~ 1 s iud,vient i +' Grm . Fr8:rburg han evidence thct -' nr1:i c~ted tb1'1t the ''onn s ter.r shoulc! be bonbed .
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I CPlled Gen. Frevhurr; R.t ::>prrox"'r~tel•r 2?00 :ond prlvised ~"'1 as -"ollo"'s:
Gen . Clar1" does not be 7 ieve thr1.t ri raili t'l.rir nece,si t. ~ e:vi st~ +'oy, tl-:te destruction o"' the 'On.,...,ster;,r. He :ls reluctf''1.t to ruthoi~ize its bomb-ing unless you nre
cert1:1in th~t -'ts lestruc.tio 1 -;s 11ece"'Scl.''Y•' GenP.rf'l Proybure st,,tec' th"t re hPd
ri:onn, ~nto tl1e natter t'hoY"01 1 Yh]y n-'t,r t,J,,9 cljvision coromp'1r'Or OJ"' the; /,th Indirn
Dtvisio·1 8'1d tl "t t;1G '~vision coT'1T"rnder "'as riuite co•Wi'1ced thrt tl'e borribjnr:: of
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�the r~omistery is necessPry . Gem . P1·0ybur~ furth9r st ter1 +,b,,t h9 d-id not be1 ieve th.nt it ~r0111c1 be SO1Flr1 to v:ve "11 ord9r to cn:rtu.,..e '011rsterr T':ill pnrl
f't t},e SP"'l9 t; me den7 tl10 CO' rr,rny'pr ti 9 ri ;it tC' r8nove PD -i "'!Tortnnt ob·,t::i.'.:!le
to tbe success o-" tris mission . Fe stPterl thrt ri'1:r hip-her cor:1nnnc1 er who re+>,1sed tc ::i.uthorize the l;o"'Jb-i nv, would hnv9 to be fT9p"rec' to take tre resr,onsib:'..1-i tv ""or P. r>ailure of th0 rttr>c}· . I told Gen . Frr,yburg tlvt the Arny Co,,.,>Jnander '''P q repnroc: to A11t'1or-i z9 tt e h----mbinr; o" tl-e tPrget i +> it WPS Gen. Frevburp.; 1s
conc-;:lr1ered 0;1in-io·-1 trnt it WPS A nilitar r neces,jty. Gen . Fre·irurf! "ns·vered
thPt i.t "l:'lS hj s co11sHer'.Jd opjnion thnt H is e rd lHr->ry neces1:it7 . I t11-=ir> told
rren . Fre7b11r--:- t]'.1',t the fljr .;;ssion VIPS f1Uthorized, end th"t he sr.011 1.c'l A.rran1;e
vrith Gen . Ke-res for the rernov'll o-"' II Corrs troo.,...,... ~i-io would be e11dri11vered Y
t,hj s boJ11bing , ond th~t Grm . ~reYbur~ \Joulrl iet9,~1,ri.11e "'1 l1 om· "lhFJn t:re area v1ould
be safe f'or th bombing .
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11 I t1 en CP lled Gen • Brann [' nd to l rJ. !' ~ m to P rr<> nge 'Ti th tr O "ir +>o:r- t>1e bo'"'Jbin;r of' tre rI011r-istery c'1 thci r1or11i11e- of 13 Febru, rr; the exact ti"1e to bA riven
later, b11t i:ri. no cnse should Ve born1,inr· be executed ,rior to 1000 hours on 13
FebruPry.
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"At Grm . ra.crv ' '"' rer11J_p<;+, I (![' lled Ger, . Fn.r<"~ no; <>t ?l/,O 1-rnc: told 1ir1 substPn1 G-en . Clrr1 w·11 trH· to Gen . \leX'l'1.dP.r ~n tre n-:crn~ng contj ,::ill, r as f'olloirs:
cernin's +,rFJ c,"'11,i'1's o-~ t} 9 ~011;-,st')r,r. T{e still +>,,,els th~t :Jt ~ s n11 '3rror to br;-nb
it . He does 'Wt think th"'t there i"" suff':i.cient evir' nee to PrrPnt the> stntemP'1t
th"t ~t -is n '"'lilitrir;r nece9s~ty to bo"1½ thFJ ~'.onastcrv , nnn -l:h~t -in vi"''"l o" tre
~9l 4 .c-io1 1s nnd int9.,,.n~tio11rl :imrlic,tio~s 0P -i+, e fni=lls th·0 t le shoulr1 discuss
it wjth Gen. AleYander i'1. tl e r,r,rni."v: . ~-A"'1"hil8 ti, e 1x,7Y'1'~ mi<:>c,jon h"S been
l'lid on . It will not be sch=irh1led before l0Gn rn' ~t can he cr,ncel1ed. ThP
Ge·-1ernl f'Ae1s t.nt s-ince (}en • ..,r9T1 "U'f; +>:i0l ~ sc strc,,,r1·} - nbout it rnd -in vir:iw of
G9·1er<>l .,..,re~rhc1rr 1 s 1-ositio he 1ouln li 1r'3 to t"llr. to G8n0rr-l Ale7°nr'er ·"')out it .
Jf' it v1ere [lr,, i~er~ cPr corin"'n ler his c'eci.c::ion V'o 1ln be r-n easv oYJ.e n.11r1 r would
not bother G9'1nrrl Plexrinder Pbci1t it, but he :ill tn.l{ to him in tre "'lorni11r.tt
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rrcun le"'le11V,,"' Ge'1Gral G·eu9'1t 3r 1 , r,'eco::-cl o+' eonver::mtio"1., ('n ::"re ·blP'P: 1 s
re111est to hnmb tre J'o·rirstPrir, Gener8l Ale"rinrer r11onP0 T'l8 tii--; '"10rriinc; abcl't
0015 . Fe told ">8 i1e 11nrl0r:?tond I did not .,.8el the r:,O11ri sterv ,..~1ould b8 bo"'lbGd.
:::: co11+>ir"'1ed J,;_c:; belief on t e ,vo1mds th~t 4TTJ.ericPn Co,,,m9nders <'or soTfje ··,eeks
now •rrl not -"'ound it "lAce~sarv. " h,:,r1 rio .;rlic"tion +,h-t tle rnonr->stery ·•1rs
bei11,.,. user r-iy t1'e G0rn'1ns; t1,,~t our m::i.ny ""'rev~ o-;,, e "-fort~ to bnnl; f' bui lrl~ ng or
locpljt,,,. to rrnvent its use hY t},e GFJr~wns hu' Al'7Pys "~iled, 2nd "f' ;t -;rs
bombed it Wf'S a better def'e,1sive ~r>strl l <>tior, tl'an befo"e . I +.old ,-i"'l thrt if
the GArriiins WAre 11ot in P'1C' :1e t,l·mu;lt tJ:-ev '7ere ~n, ti,eJ certf'inly "'cnlc1 go ~-n
it ,.,f'ter our bo.,,bin"· . Trese r,,.re th9 m~l:itrry r9rir;or2 .
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11 or rel:tr•j_o,1s P'1r' sP,rit,-iro9·1t87 re!l<;cw1c:;, H, is tno ½nrl unnecessrrily to des+,ro~- o.,,e o" the Prt +:.rA"S1IT99 of'+, e world. Bedrles, ·e h<>ve indjc~tioYls tr"t
JT''l".lJ c-i,vili:in "/'Omen P'1<1 ch~ ldr9'1 ['T'e t" 1r:;.rip; .,: elt~r ther i11 .
Tre eyhrit of our
'"ir 9f'fort ,.,'~ici, we cr111 rut on it ri 1 7 ;-,ot rlestro"T th9 builc i r, r ',,1t ,~ ll rrierely
""iVe t},e G0 rr,r'l, 11'1 8'CCUS9 -1:.o USP, it .
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Al8X1"rr]9r '7P.S 1111it0 i.n'l~strmt th,-t -it ½e boni'ben if "'rp-burr; WP:r>tec. it Pnoth9r evi. ➔ enr,'3 o,. ris undul·r ~ntc:;rf'8ri11 w't½ Fif'tl-i Ar~.· Activit-ies _qn' rlo~n,.,.
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�business direct '.Vi th my subordinn.tes . It s:rows th::=it he is most reluctr->nt , even /
over my objection, in doi11.1s A.nything in disspr,rov:i.nr; Pn Hction of' Freybur,q; for
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political reasons . I told AJ.exA.nder t1Y t j f ~t ,,,as en A·~ericB11. Conmwr'J.der, PS
j t had been in the ;)A.St , I would re:'u se to give the PutJ-.ority, but du2- to the
noliticnl daintiness ,,,jth vir•ich "re h.rd to bmdle the 't>Jew ZePlanders and ?reyburg, I was reluctR.nt to cause a. najor issue Pt t½e present tir e . 11
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Last even-in[' •srorc. cc=nne thDt G·enerel 'r;'re:,hurg h['.d re lli''JSted t 1
Y"'t the bcw']_>)r-rdrnent he de+'errecl tenporar-i l:;, r<ue to the f2ct thr>t r, oiscu.:;sion bet1 rnen him and
General Ye;/AS hAd developed th rrobP.bility thrt II Corra troops "mule'. be injurec' i:" the bc~11);::.rdnocn1t - rprr; cr> ried out ~t t 11 is t~ me . Hm1ever , the rrospect
of bor'l1:>"rdme~:1t is still il'.'.lFtinent .
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Today a nessage frori tl~e beachhead announced thPt f-'. jett:isoned Germrn bornb
harl_ s~L1 1'..c1r in t)· e other r:r -.;ound: '1F; ~9r,1e,~ nt Do'7' the rPdio orerator 8.'10 r1 r:' ver
o'"' tr,e rr-Ldio j,)er r:.--y' +1·,ree o,... tl1r-, eic-;]1 t T'.F 1 s ;1.0 J-,r,,1 been taken up to the
br~ dceher,_d last 1veek P s ri. p;uard for General Clt1rk I s imnedlnte C} . T1.--o of the
Gcmerr,1 1 s jeeps h9d been dameged by i'ra~r,rmts, anc1 his van, r>.lt'-i01rnh rlaced in
a tnnnel near +,he r0Jazzo Por 0 :hese hrd been dnmager1 1,-;; blR.st .
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Gener.s 1 Clark +,oda r rGcei vr:,cl tre follow5 nc:; cA blr-; fro"! G--i1P.rP 1 J\le-'rn.nu.er .
T'A 1007. 11 I have rt'eceived the +:'ollo 0 "in,q; r;1essag fror:·1 General -~isenl 0 1 19r .
1 All
rorr last ;,rear I s terT'l'T!etes now 7 n the United 1~i n.-=;dori. Pre follo"ring :lour
operAtions 1.'ii th 1 :een r9ri J.ization of the innurnere hle o bstP. clec. you Rre encountc~rj ng rnd with comrJ.ete +>p:ith :i11 ~¥"c:..:: ahilHy to remove them .
The unbre8h1ble
solidPrit:r of the '"eciiterrono,c,n "'.rounr1 , navnl, P5-r cornr'lflnd ·,ill win through to
total victory just as it emerged triur'1phant :f'ror,1 tre discour::i-:;ing cJjfficulties
of Jast winter I s Tunisian car,'paign. We dPsire especially to conve;r to :rou Pnd
to GenerPl Cl.,.,r 1" our lasth1e; con+'5_clence ln your leac:er•Jhip a 1d our :rride j n
your FJap;n:ificent troops . Cunnin1=;h2m , Teclder, Srdtr Gnc1 P.11 the oth0rs here
share m;r regTet that we can novr be with you only jn spirit 1,ut r,11 of us send
2.. rroud salute to :rou 8110 to all the Allied o·~f:i cers 8nd men that mak:e up your
great f'ir;ht:i ng co:ri:riaml. 1 n
n.r-r
0
1
1
111:~ ..:•-r:; 1·JZA u0--F1 :rrnJ.A :,:y 14, 1944--Genern 1 Clnr}:: toctwr, still :;:·,c;cow,rin~ "'rori his
cold, remained at his comrr1.'.,."lr1 rost vc:-n nnd Pttsrrideo to Pdr1 4 n.:istr,,tive ,~Ptters
and held a number of' conferences . At lCCO in t 1"e norni'1.p; r,9 tPlked ui tJ--, Colonel
Hj ckel1r1ait and reviewer] '7ith him n number of r8cords on court mn.rtir..l cases .
At 1100 L~ entenant G8nernl Pnders o-f' the -Jnd Folish Corps and BrigPdier
:c'rith, British Liaison ( Pficer , togeth<;r ,,uh Lt . Co1. Szym<"nski, c"lled on General Clark. The GarpPthian Division o-f' the Fol:ish Corns adjoins the Fiftt, Army on
the rj ,·ht, ½einG the left :lan], 0lement of the 1-;;iR:hth FTFJ.:f.
<\ f'ter lunch the C,AnerP 1 received P call ,:>rorn GenerR 1 ?rev1,urg v ho cl-i scussed
at sorre len-rth thA rrobl0m of bomGing the Abbey l"t Cassino . GenerP.l Frevhurg
sa:ic1 thrt if he was to tRl:e the r~onr ster:,r Fill the \bbey- •'To11ld hn.ve to be f'lAt tened; h8 conld not be responsible :or the cnrture or fRilure to C"pture ·if tl e
.A½bey 1vere left as Rn obstPcle . As 1
';:ener,:il Freyhm·g was le,.,,ving, Gnnerc1l Jnin
arriV8d , Pho the t"rO had a short tal1(. Gener2l ,Juin expressed t};e ide2 thRt
fla+,ten5no; the Abbe;r wns unnecess,g_r,, n.s troors co111d by-rass :it nno tlvm smoke
0
1
0
I
I
�it ,·he'1 tJ1e +>·-.,11.1 rlcc-':s 4ve
7
n,,.,tt9r ·rqs rll c ec 4 dec1 .
""UC\
rn_q
r-ut
GP.nerrl ,;,.,,,,, ·bur,.,.
0"' .
"'['j_('
tJ'1rt tbe
Generel Juin 7, Pll ·ent u-~ 81Y1 1-~d fl t.nl1" ·:itl-i r',<;n9rrl c1~rk . Qr>'1 ,rrl
•vr,•, jYJ. f'rvor of ST'eer1·• rit,tp0i- . F9 3w·c1 "''1Ce l O"'Rstery Fill wrs rer1 ced
a', ~.l'1"1CJdi,-,te rush +>or•Aro ,.,.' 4 1,, ... , 9 r9T""<l'1'1 ·ere -till ',roren "1 4 P-1,,-1- rrocuce
sr10 '1cl4n re""ult::; . T·e sP~c1 , h0 ever, ' e nul'i 09:'.:'lor0 " lcY'"' r:-=,riod of orw 11.~ i.nt4 011. ·"ollow" nr: t} "l ottr"c1· 0'1 t e h 4 ll before tl"e ~ :ri~ral atk c 1c 11ent
""OT'"/U'O..
G9;1e:Ml Cln.r1r S"'id to G0;,"9rnl Ju-'..n tl-iPt h-"' ','T"S t"c 0'18 bri~ht srot
jn R tou,c:;'1 ('!'1 a"1(1 tr<>t he, C're>1crPl vlRr'r , '""S iu~t "'S rn..xious to att8Ck %"It
tre e,rlies+, 1o~s::.'1le mo nnt f!S Qr,119r~,1 Ju:;.n '"'A.'J .
.Tuin
I
I
G"'nerrl CJ.'•rlr t 1~11 ''rent clc m • _.t G0n0r"l Juin t0 tl 8 but "''1.rl wve hi.n
t•m '~ottles o.c> c' "'"T ~'lfl, "lld nll hpnrls hrid a 1 rin1• o+> "'herry to thn s,wcess
o" the f'rrt co·ina rttRck.
Gon.9r<>l crville tb9n cr>mc tc s9e (}nnArR 7 Cl-or1r, P'1C t ey hPd a t~lk ::-bout
F1jr surror~ f'cr +he -i'ortrco"!~ri • op"r:1Vo11s of t e -nifth trn:r.
*
*
*
PRESENZANO-•P:EmUARY 15, 1944-Today the Anr:, Commander remained at his command
post attending to administrative matters. The air program JrOT.ided tor bombing
Cassino monastery with tour groups of "Fortresses" beginning at 0930, and the
large tormtions passed directly- over the comnand post. As the planes were
eoming over, 16 bomba were released by mistan. One or these hit near the com•
•nd post, sending a number or fragments through the Commanding General's area.
Fortunately- no one was hurt.
The ••sages f'rom the beachhead during the day- indicated that the night
14/15 was fairly quiet bat that air activity- b7 the Germans built up towards
the close of the da7 and finally- caused considerable damage in the port. At
0230, RN 5860, VI Corps radioed that the night
quiet and that there we.a
nothing to report.
•s
RN 5886, from VI Corps, reported patrol actions at various points bat a
quiet night in general.
By VI Corps message RN 443, an air attack south of Garroceto was reported
by 12 ME•s and n•s with only slight damage.
A message f'rom General Lucas at 1750, RN 452, reported three bombing end
strafing attacks on front line troops with one rE 109 shot down.
At 2055 the following dispatch was received: RN 461. "Air raidl!I port
tonight destroyed one LCT with gasoline. One Liberty, Yale, had ,,.o ne hold damaged
by fire, other re,rts of Liberty may be damaged but are under control. Air activity of enemy noticeable during the day. Several ME'a shot down. Frederick reports enemy front lines closer in and more strongly held on his front. Power reports our artillery and mortars have caused man:, enemy casualties in factory
area."
*
*
*
�PRESENZANO-•FEBRUARY 16, 1944•-General Clark's notes of today's activities follow:
1
"This morning I attended a conference with General Alexander. The first
subject to be discussed was his disa~int~nt in the way Lucas was handling the
Corps Commander's job in the Anzionr:ldgehead. I knew this was mming, for he
had discussed it with me previously and, to be perfectly frank, I am not 100%
satisfied with the hold Lucas has taken on that situation. When Alexander told
me he was dissatisfied, I asked him to tell me why, and from what sources he ob•
tained his information. He told me that Lucas was older than hie age, he was
old physically and mentall,-, was tired, had no flash and was not at all familiar
with the deta.ils of' the situation. I had found Lucas, on my many- trips there,
unfamiliar with many details, and I had urged him to send out members of his
staff' and to go out himself' and satisfy himself with conditions as they were.
Alexander had to admit to me that moat ot his inf'orma.tion came from General Penny,
Commanding General or the let British Division. I told Alexander that as long as
we were discussing personalities and being perfectly !rank, that my trip up there
a few days ag0 had revealed from Lucas, Truscott, Harmon and Eagles that none or
them had any confidence in Penny. This shocked Alexander, and he repl1.9d that he
had confidence in him, to which I replied, "Nature.117, tor you appointed him".
I told him I was making no request for Penny's relief' but that I did believe that
a change in Lucas would be advisable but under no oircumstanees would I hurt Lucas, for he had performed well as CoJllllanding General of the VI Corpe from Salerno
north and in the initial landing at Anzio. He had la.eked some aggressiveness
after the landing, al.though allegations that he could have gone to his objective
or to Rome were ridiculous, for had he done so with any force he would have been
cut orf from his bridgehead.
•r told Alexander t~t I would put Truscott in aa Deput7, 0 1Daniel to commam
the 3rd Division, Sherman to be second in eomnand of 3rd Division a!!rl Darby to
command Shermn•a Regiment, the 7th Infantry. Alexander asked what staff' l would
provide Truscott with, and when he appeared to dictate this, I told hi11 that that
ns a matter that I would handle.
"I haw sent the following radiogram to Lucas:
RN 1741.
'Orders issued this date as follows:
Major General Truscott re-
lieved from command of 3rd Division and assigned as Deputy Commander, VI Corps.
Brigadier General O'Daniel to command 3rd Division. Colonel Darby transferred
trom Ranger Force to 3rd Dinsion. All assignments to take etf'ect 17th February.
I desire that Colonel Sherman be designated as Acting Assistant Division Comtllfimer
and that De.rby be placed in command of Sherman's Regiment.
Acknowledge.'
"I told Alexander that l would not relieve Lucas in the middle of the battle )
which is currently taking pl.ace for, while a change seemed necessary, it might
make matters worae to do it at the present moment while the Germns are attacking.
"I urged Alexander to release the 169th Brigade of the 56th DiVision to me
immediatel,-, and told him again how I disapproved of hia ~equirement that it have
7 da711' recreation before moving to the bridgehead. He t.1.nall7 gave in.
•r
told Ale:xamer that 1n the current situation 1n the bridgehead I was taking all Ill Air SUpport off of Frey-burg's Cassino af'f'air and diverting it to the
\
\
�bridgehead in aeoordance with Lucas• request. He was displeased, but I told
him that it was 1IY' f'irm desire and that as Army Commander I would indicate m7
priorities to the air. I also asked that tomorrow, the 17th, an all-out air
ef'fort be made in the bridgehead, including Strat•a, Tactical and llI Air Force,
aa well as the Desert Air Force. I told him I was desirous of maintaining the
impetus of the attack in Cassino and 110uld attempt to put some Desert Air Force
on the Cassino front this af'ternoon, which I did to Freyburg'a satisfaction. I
also have arranged for Freyburg's missions to be continued tomorrow in the Cassino area by some of the Desert Air Force, the balance being added to the all•
out air attack in the Anzio area.
"I told Deirers, who happened to be here, of my prnpoeed changes in personnel
He agreed that it waa a good idea.
1
in the Anzio area.
I..
-1
•I want to record m:r definite feelings that Admiral Cunningham has been as
uncooperative as possible in this SHINGLE Operation. Yesterday- Lucas asked for
cruiser gmf' re support am did not get it. Today he asked again. Admiral Cun- 1
ninghu will give it onl,7 if' it comes from Lucas through his liaison of'fioer, not
honoring 'lfl1' request.•
In the af'ternoon General Cl.ark received a call from Brigadier General Sewez
the French Arnr:, who commands the 4th r.oroccan Mcuntain Division. The first of
the division personnel is coming in, but its mules, which are an essentiel part
of' its equipment, will be very slow in arriving. However, General Juin proposes
to put the first combat teem, with General Sewez in command, under General DeMontaa.bert as soon as it gets in.
·
or
General Clark today received a copy of' the fb llowing cable from Admiral Morse
to the British Naval Liaison Officer of' VI Corps: "Following received from Nava.l
Officer in charge Anzio begina: 'Shelling or town and port has increased. More
than one gun ta.king i:art and firing more accurately-.' Request you will bring
this to personal notice of G.o.c., VI Corps. Should shelling of port continue the
maintenance of Army will decrease, am that the only remedy ia action by our own
forces to silence these guns and thus prevent your vital line of' snppl.,- being
jeopardized."
General Clark cabled General Lucas as follows: RN 1740. "If you will eub111it target requests thru your Naval Commander 1ilich justify second cruiser, Ad•
1tiral Cunningham states it will be sent. Advise action taken."
Personal to Lucas from Clark. RN 1738. •weather permitting an extremel.,heavy all-out air program will be executed on Anzio front tomorrow. Let me lmow
earliest possible time the natur8 of request you made for naval gunfire support
for today. CINC MED of'f'ice here sa)'S that no request tor cruiser was received
from Naftl Task Force Col!Dll&.nder in Anzi.o area. Possible that Commander estimated
that he could provide necessary support using destroyers only. I shall follow up
this failure as soon aa further information is received from you. One cruiser
surely will be aftilable tomorrow. Am endeavoring to arrange for second one."
*
*
l
*
PRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 17, 1944•-This morning at 0930 General Devers arrived by cub
plane which General Clark had sent to Mareianise for him. Gemral Devers conferred
�all morning with General Cl.ark and sta,ed to lunch, together with Generals Keyes
and Crane. General Clark's notes on the conference with General Devera follow:
"Had a long talk with General Devers this morning.
Items were as f'ollowsz
UJ..IEF OF LUCAS
"He feels as Alexander does - that General Lucas should be relieved. His
estimte of Luca.a ia that he is extremely tired, mentally and physic&lly, and
should be taken out. I told him that I bad already initiated steps in that direction. I will assign Lucas as lff1' Deputy, but Devers will attempt to have him
returned to the United States without in any wa-r hurting him.
l
INTERFERENCE FROM ACMF
"Told Devers of the increasing interference I was receiving from ACMF in
operational and logistical mtters pertaining to Firth Army affairs but that I
could handle it.
m.§CU§SIQN OF A ~
"H• indicated that, whereas no decision had been arrived at on ANVIL, it
looked aa though it would not amount to much a.?Xl feels that I should remain
with the Firth Arrq, whioh, of aourse, suits me. I told him that was a matter
tor det9l"lllination by the 1t'f: Department. I had no other desire than to command
the Firth Army in bsttle and to the successful 00ncl.usion of this war.
"I explained to hint the difficulties in this allied command or having Bri•
tish subordimte commanders do exactly what I desire. I told him in man)" cases
it was almost impossible to handle them like Ameriaan oomma?Xlers where orders
were giV9tl and compliance demanded.
ACW TAKING OVER MANAGEMENT OF ANZIO BRIDGEHEAD
"He indicated to me that there was a feeling that ACMF might take over the
management of the beachhead. He did not feel that it should be done and asked
for my opinion. I told him that was a matter for higher headquarters to determine, but later, after I had thought over the matter, I told him that from the
administrative point of view it would be most difficult for Alexander to handle
the American units in that area. I think it is the desire of Alexander to disassociate Fifth Army from those troops in the Rome area. It might be a good
solution to do it that way, for I feel that Alexander is not using all the
means available - namely the Eighth ArJey'. Either a solution of Eighth Army
taking over this front and Fifth Army the bridgehead, or ACMF taking over the
bridgehead might be a ePod solution. I can state that it certainly is a tremen•
dous burden which I am carrying with five corps, one of which is isolated by sea
some 100 miles away. I :feel that we can do it, end hope to keep it up, but if' a '
change is ma.de I have no objection.
"De,rers assured me of his desire to assist in all ways he could. He seems
to understand the difficult position which we rl?Xl om-selves in with the entire
Mediterranean now in British bands. I explained to him my difficulties with the
New Zealand Corps. I also told him that, although the replacement situation was
�getting better, it was still far t.rom satisfactory• that I have the 34th Division with approximately 4,000 replacements required which S1ould go to them
today, and I won 1t be able to get any to them for probably a week, resulting in
a week's delay in the return or that unit to oombat.
"I urged Devers to get the Fifth Army 111 th all American units in it, with
none other except perhaps French, and that when the French can bring in enough
to form an Arra:,, there should be three armies - The British Eighth with all
British Units, a French Army and the Fifth All American and that with those
three armies, forgetting ANVIL, with the 85th and 91st Divisions added, we
could drive up to northern Italy. He agrees with me heartily', but let• a see
what ean be done."
In the afternoon General Cl.ark received a call from Colonel Eddy who is
the officer in charge of development at Aberdeen Proving Ground. Colonel Eddy
is making a tour of the battlefront to exhibit to American officers new items
of equipment which have been developed. He put on a demonstration of various
weapons this morning and a motion picture for selected officers this afternoon,
showing the technique of emplo,ment of the new developments.
During the
tomorrow.
L•5 cub planes,
making the trip
head
evening General Clark determined to make a trip to the beach•
For this trip he set up his PT Boa.ts, his C•47 and his two new
in order that he might select the most appropriate means for
in the morning.
*
*
*
PRESENZANO-•FEBRUARY 18, 1944-•By 0530 General Clark was examining the latest
dispatches from the beachhead. He determined to make the trip by cub and left
the cub strip piloted by Major Walker, with a stand-by plane following him, at
0830. He arrived at the beachhead approximately an hour later, landing on the
Nettuno airfield. The airfield was un:ler shellfire, but no shells hit on the
strip as the General was coming in, and he landed safely.
General Cl.ark's notes on the trip follow:
"The situation was tense in the bridgehead, so I flew by cub to that area.
I was escorted by two Spitfires up and four be.ck. It was about the only way
to get in there fast, for the airfield was under heavy shellfire, and I had to
go in some plane in which I could come down on a road if the field was being
shelled or damaged at any time. The trip was uneventful. Went immediately to ~
Lucas, where I soon met Harmon, Eagles, Truscott, Eveleigh, Baehr, Keiser and
Lewis. The situation was confused. Lucas is tired - very tired - but I did
not take him out because it was in the middle or a be.ttle and although Truscott had reported the night before he was not sufficiently into the western sector picture to take over. It would have been a great mistake, in my opinion, to
have me.de the change in the middle or this p1,rticular fight.
"The situation was confused. The 179th Infantry had not performed well - \
Eagles admitted it. I suggested that he relieve Kammerer and that I would put
Colonel Darby in oomnand. This was done. In the western sector a heavy German
attack had carried the line to the final bridgehead position, where the British
were apparently in good shape, but the 179th was disorg8nized. The 180th Infantry stuck out like a sore thumb to the east. The leading battalion of the 157th
�on the west was out of contact with the rest or the regiment and was short or
food and ammunition. Efforts of the 3rd Battalion, 157th, to join it had been
f'utile. I was afraid that it had been cut off. One battalion or the 6th
Armored Infantry had been committed at the underpass to ease the situation.
l
"At the conterenoe, Lucas and Truscott wanted to mke a counterattack and
decided that Harmon shot1ld counterattack that afternoon. I felt that a proper
counterattack could not be coordinated in that short time. It was then about
1030. I suggested that they hold the shoulders on either side or the penetration readjusting in the 180th sector; that all commanders go forward to their
front line units and take hold of the situation and make it plain that they
hold to the last man on the final bridgehead position; that Harmon's 6th In•
rantry, less one battalion already committed ( that made only two weak batta•
lions or his - 550 men in each) reinforced bya battalion or the .30th Infantry in reserve and supported by tanks, attack from the general area 9128 to
the northwest with the tanks along the road and the infantry veering more to
the west, and that plans be mde for the .3rd British Brigade and 169th Brigade
to make similar counterattacks from the underpass area to the northeast,
should this become necessary. This plan was adopted. Lucas issued the instructions., and the commanders lef't.
"I discussed with Lucas the possibility of a parachute drop in his rear
area and that careful planning should be made to break up any nuisance raid
like this without alarming any of the bridgehead personnel.
"I checked carefully on the organization of their final bridgehead position
and am of the opinion that it was not thoroughly followed up by Lucas or his
staff. I may be wrong on this point.
"I discussed with Keiser the necessity of organizing other units, anti•
aircraft and what not, for possible reserves in an emergency - this they had
thought or.
"I went with Truscott to the 45th Division commnd post where I saw Paul
Pascal, second in command of the division. He con.firmed the situation on the
front of the 45th Division and had already taken steps to readjust the front of
the 180th Infantry to conform to the withdrawal or the 179th.
"I then went to Harmon's command post, where he was calling a conference
of his commanders to prepare the plans for a counterattack in the morning.
Harmon told me that two companies of his tanks had operated on the road running northwest from 9128 earlier in the day and if it had not been for his tanks
there might have been a minor crisis in that area, for a battalion of the 179th
had withdrawn precipitously to the rear when confronted by superior German
forces. He told me his tankers had killed about 125 Boche. All during the af• /
ternoon, f'rom latest reports, his tanks operated successfully in that area. I
then returned to Lucas command post.
"I did not go to see Templar because Lucas and Eveleigh
and at such a tense period I felt it unwise to inject myself
post at the same time. I again discussed the situation with
and told Truscott or m:, plan to put him in command of the VI
Lucas into my Army as Deputy until something else developed.
were visiting him,
into his command
Lucas and Truscott
Corps and to bring
I told Truscott
�that I would take out Keiser and Hill at the same time, and he could take Carleton as his Chief of Staff and his 3rd Division Deputy as his G-3. He asked for
Campbell as his Artillery Officer, and I denied him that reqmst temporarily.
I returned by plane to T'ltY command post in the afternoon. That's quittl a lone•
some trip in a cub, but it is a quick way of getting up and be.ck.
"At night I discussed plans with General Freyburg. He oould not continue ~
his Indian Division attack on the monastery until the night of the 20th. I
urged him to speedier action, knowing it would be to no avail. You can •t hurry
these Britishers."
The General returned to his command post at 1515 and innnediately summoned
General Gruenther, and after discussing the tactieal situation at the bridgehead and on the Cassino front, he called in General Saville and General Brann
and went over the situation with them. The attack of the Germans against the
beachhead is in considerable force and is potentially very dangerous.
General Clark today dispatched the following cable to Admiral Morse. RN
3590. "Fully appreciate present difficulties of port of Anzio 110rking under
enemy shelling. We are doing all we can now by counter battery and air attack
to deal with enemy batteries and intend to resume offensive and enlarge bridgehead at earliest practicable moment. I am deeply grateful to the British and
American personnel who are performing difficult tasks efficiently and cheerfully.
I am especially appreciative of the work of the port parties under the leadership of Captain Turner."
Later in the day the following reply was received from Admiral Morse. RN'
1175. "Message is tremendously appreciated, most grateful. It is being passed
to all concerned. Good luck."'
*
*
*
PRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 19, 1944--General Clark remained at the command post throughout the day where he held a number of conferences.
General Clark's notes concerning the activities and conferences of to dny are
as f ollolvs:
"I received the following letter from ACJF:
IDST SECRET
STJBJEC'l':
Regi:ouping.
TO
Fifth Army.
:
H.g. -1,
A. ••C. M,F.
1.
Now that N.Z. Corps has been comrni t ted 1.t is essentiitl to carry out
further regrouping to provide a fresh reserve with which to continue the battle.
2.
The main factors in the solution of this problem appear to be:-
�96
(a) 88 U.S. Div. is the only formation not yet committed. It has, it is
understood, one R.C.T. fully equipped now and the rest of the Division
should be complete between now and the end of February. It has had no previous battle experience and should therefore be put into a reasonably quiet
part of the front to start with.
(b) 34 and 36 U.S. Divs. have had a period of very heavy fighting and require first a period to reorganise and then a per1.od in a quiet pa.rt of the
front.
(c)
46 British Div, will very shortly
be i.n the process of being relieved
by 4 British Division, which must also be given a period in a reasonabl.7
quiet sector before being committed to offensive operations.
(d) 10 Corps Fro~~ will for physical reasons remain the most quiet sector
for some time to come, and offensive operations there can be confined to
brigade attacks with limited objectives without detriment to the general
plan.
(e)
No more troops can be withdrawn from Eighth Army front.
(f)
5 Br,
Div, hes not had a very arduous time since the fighting around
rAINTURNO died down, and, after a short period out of the line, should be
fit for offensive operations.
3.
After full consideration of the factors set out in para 2 above, the
C in C suggests the following as perhaps the most satisfactory way of creating
a new reserve:(a)
General Intention,
(1) 88 u,s, Div. to begin to relieve 5 British Div at once. Reli.ef
to continue as fast as the components of 88 Div can be equipped.
(ii)
5 Br. Div. to come into A.C.M.F. reserve on relief.
(iii)34 U.S. Div. to relieve 46 British Div as soon as the former
can be got fit to take its place again in the line.
(iv) H.Q. 2 U.S. Corns to relieve H.Q. 10 Corps, command to pass with
relief of 46 British Div by 34 U.S. Div.
(v) 36 u,s, Div, to be withdrawn into Fifth Army reserve as soon as
its extraction from the line can be effected as a result of the converging advance of N.Z. and French Corps.
4.
The C in C wishes to discuss the above proposals with Commander Fifth
Ar1If1 as soon as General CLARK returns from the bridgehead and has had time to
study the problem. Please report by telephone when General CLARK is in a posi•
tion to discuss the matter. Meantime the C in C suggests that plans be prepared
to put regrouping proposals into effect in the shortest possible space of time
once a definite decision has been reached. It is vital to the maintenance of
the momentum of the battle that any relief to be effected should be completed
�91
without loss of time so that the troops required for further offensive operations
get the maximum time for reorganization out of the_ line.
/s/ A.
F. HARDING
Lt. Gen.,
C.G.S.
PWM/gb
~9 Januy, 1944 (Changed by yhone call from
18 February, 1944
ACMF /s/ Wood)
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
M.A.
P.A.
P.A.
Gen.
to C-in-c
to C.G.S.
to D.C.G.s.
ROBERTSON
B.G.s.
(G(Ops)
"It really shocked me. There is nothing in it that I agree with. It is
indicative or ACMF's willingness to delay this operation indefinitely. In compliance with its le.st pers.graph, I called General Lemnitzer and told him I was
ready to discuss it at any time - the sooner the better - and requested that
General Alexander, who was visiting Freyburg this morning, to drop by this
afternoon. I later received word that he would come to see me tomorrow morning.
"I am convinced that we must do something now. I have been so hamstrung
and jockeyed by higher headquarters that the Firth Arrrr:, has lost a great deal of )
its power to control its own tactical operations, but I will insist, as long as /
I am Comnander, on presenting my views and demanding their execution as far as
possible.
"I intend to recommend that the French attack toward Atina, the II Corps,
leading with the 88th Division, making a holding attack in the direction TerelleRoccaaecca, with the Indians attacking from the Monastery towards Piedmonte, with
the New Zealand Division and the 78th Division attacking abreast across the Rapido
up the Liri Valley and with 10 Corps attacking from the Minturno area after re•
grouping in the direction of S. Giorgia. This will meet opposition by Alexander,
but I am convinced if we are to get going it must be done this way. It is abso•
lutely impossible to mass for an attack doffll the Liri Valley without first se•
curing the commanding elevation on one fiank or the other, particularly in view
of the heavily defended defenses prepared after months of German occupation in that
area.
"I called Keyes and Sloan, Commanding General of the 88th Division, for a conference, and they agreed, as do my G-J and Chief of Staff.
"I conferred with Air Marshal Slessor and Major General Joe Cannon, of the
TAF today, urging all-out air support of the battlefield in the bridgehead. I
&eked these air experts if they could make it possible, through air power in direct support or my Army, to go down the Liri Valley without securing the elevation
on at least one side. They agreed that they could not.
"Gener&l Wilson called on me this morning, and I had a very frank conversation with him. He is always considerate, and I feel wants to be helpful. I
�explained the situation in detail in the bridgehead and told him that he, the
Navy, the Air and the Ground had a. commitment there which they must appreciate )
and support. I told him the Navy had not given me support and had acted in
many high-handed ways, particularly in trying to cut my tonnage when I must
have a certain tonnage there to support the necessary troops to hold the bridgehead and to build up some small reserve. As an example of interference, an I.ST
loaded with equipment for the 169 Brigade, which I had rushed into the bridge•
head, was in the port of Ando last night when a mine scare was raised by the
Navy. The naval officer promptly closed the port and sent this I.ST with its
valuable cargo· out to sea. I told General Wilson that I needed the 85th Divi•
sion. He said he would send it early in March. I told him that this theater
was being criticized for not massing our means. I asked him where my means were
with which to mass. I explained my entire plan of maneuver in this area - the
Liri Valley attack versus the Mount Cairo attack, coupled with a Liri Valley effort. He agrees that it is necessary to secure the high ground before sticking
one's head into the Liri Valley trap. I told him of General Alexander's propo•
sal as contained in the re-grouping letter referred to above. I rather felt,
although he did not say so, that he did not agree with those proposals.
"General Wilson asked me what I thought of General Penney's handling of
the British 1st Division in the bridgehead. I told him that I was not too satisfied with it, nor were the other American Division Commanders with whom he
worked. General Wilson indicated that he did not think Penney had handled his
job well. I told Wilson that I had so reported to General Alexander.
"Word from the bridgehead today has been increasingly cheerful. The counterattack arranged for yesterday by the Armored Division apparently has produced
results. The "lost battalion" of the 157th is in contact with the rest of its
regiment. Appt.rently the 179th has been relieved and is holding fast on its
final bridgehead position. Harmon reports his tanks killed about 400 Germans.
This is probably emggerated, but it must have been good shooting.
"I told General Wilson that as long as the German kept six or seven divisions in the bridgehead area it would be futile for us to attempt to attack to
gain our final objective at Colli Le.ziali, for we can not build up sufficient
force in the bridgehead to overcome that much resistance; that I would lay in
some extra supplies and import extra troops to regain more elbow room in the
bridgehead and then dig in, relieving troop unit personnel to take over equip•
ment of units going out and to build up in the Cassino area to join up with the
bridgehead force.
·
"I have sent Colonel Bowman, my Engineer, up there to start advising on
putting amnrunition dumps underground and on securing a bridgehead which can be
held by defensive works by the minimum of troops."
The following important messages were received and dispatched today:
The Army Commander received the following cable yesterday, RN MI.479, from
General Eisenhower; "Dear Wayne: In all the years I have known you I have never
been prouder of you than during the past strenuous weeks. Despite every diffi•
culty you are obviously doing a grand job of leadership with your chin up. I
read the fine message ;rou recently" sent to your troops. Together with men like
Al and Truscott you are writing history that Americans will always read with
pride. Signed Ikett.
l
�General Clark today replied to General Eisenhower as follows, RN 3257:
ttNothing in the world could have given me more encouragement than your message
received during the last hectic night. I had just conferred with all comman•
ders and visited units in bridgehead. British and American troops are fighting as usual with their chins up. I believe the Boche has shot his wad today, )
although I may be wrong. We are holding today and inflicting heavy casualties
upon him. Air and Navy supporting us admirably. Thanks a million for your
thoughtfulness. Al sends regards."
Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 538. "Last night have closed port Anzio because of mines. I immediately contacted Captain Turner and notified him equipment of 169 Brigade on 3 ISTS's was vital tor today's operation. LST's mean•
while had put to sea, and Turner reports despite all attempts to this hour he
has been unable to reach LST's to bring them into port. If certain equipment
does not reach 169 by 0900 hours this brigade may be unable to counterattack
today."
From AFHQ to CG, Fifth Arm:y. R1f R/35-3919. ttpart 1: Following under•
water explosion l LST sank off Ponxa Island on 16 February. Part 2: Cruiser ,,,...Penelope sunk in same area morning- 18 February probably by U-boat. Hunt in
progress. Penelope was returning from giving fire support with Dilo in Ageio
area morning 17 February. Part 3: Destroyers pa.trolled in Vis channel off
Menders Point and off the Albanian coast during night 16/17 February, but
nothing was sighted. Part 4: PT boats intercepted the enemy destroyers or ·
minelayers off Capraia during night 17/18 February and delivered torpedo attack results unobserved. Part 5: m&S/M on patrol off' French Riviera attacked
escorted M/V on 8 February 1 escort vessel believed sunk. 60 ton schooner
also sunk by gunfire on 15 February."
Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 539. "In your 3629, anti-personnel mines
have been installed on final beachhead position and also on positions forward
thereof held by our forces. Final beachhead position organized by continuous
line of coordinated strong points with dug in positions protected by weapons,
mines and wire except on right flank where Canale Mussolini is defended as
continuous obstacle covered by weapons and by mines and wire at likely avenues
or approach. Work continuing on this line and reserve line shown on overlay
Field Order 22 this headquarters, 17 February. See mine data on overlay "Location of minefields 162400 Februs.rY" file Engineer, Fifth Army. Right flank
canal mine installations not recorded at time above overlay published."
Personal Clark from Lucas. RN 542. "Absolutely essential all-out air effort today. Have identified elements of at least five German divisions in
salient. All roads into salient must be constantly bombed to prevent further
reinforcement. In addition, enemy artillery must be constantly attacked. I
believe heavy bombers must assist mediums and fighter bombers. Have made request for this support thru air officer."
Personal Lucas to Clark. R?f 543. "Request you have sipply agencies give
priority on shipping to 155mm gun and 81mm mortar (light) ammunition. If you
can find some extra ammunition for 155 Howitzer M•l would certainly appreciate
it."
Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 544. "Situation as to progress or oounter•
attack still indefinite. However it appears to have lessened pressure on beach-
�head line. Will advise you when aco~ate information available."
Personal Clark to Lucas. RN .3246. "7,000 rounds 81 mortar and 10,000
rounds 155 gun anmunition being shipped today. Have asked Newton to explain
to 0 1:Yeill ammunition status which is improving. At any time that you feel
your operations are being hampered by ammunition siortages be sure to let me
know."
Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 548. "Harmon's f'oroe making progress slowly
having advanced about 2t kilometers on arc from point 90328.3. Several hundred
prisoners taken. Our artillery, air and weapons fire has reduced enemy fight•
ing strength considerably according to PW reports. Situation on 56 Division
front remains generally satisfactory but some enemy infiltration has made con•
tact with some companies obscure. Would like inf'ormation on Cassino front
operations if' available."
Personal Clark to Lucas. RN 3254. "Am pleased that counterattack has
eased your situation. Apparently 45th position has stabilized. What is status and position of 169 and 3rd Brigades? Hope air eff'ort has helped. Feel
you have done exceedingly well in today's fighting. Still struggling at Cassino where severe fighting oontinues."
Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 551. "Essential that 54,580 rounds 105mm
Howitzer &mmUnition originally scheduled f'or coaster but deducted from Liberty
David Terry cargo arrive without delay and preferably by truck so that unload•
ing may be assured regardless or weather. It is likewise essential that allocation and shipment this type ammunition be materially increased for period February 22 to March 3 due to heavy expenditures of past 48 hours and expectation
that similar expenditures will be necessary in the near future because or tactical situation with which you are familiar."
Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 452. "Counterattack by Harmon force highly
successful. Pressure on beachhead line relieved. Estimated large number
enemy casualties and at least 250 PW 1 s taken. Majority expressed f'ear our
artillery fire and bombing. Will outpost line 887282 - 898295 • 903300 - 902.312
tonight and withdraw bilk of H force vicinity 915280 prepared to counterattack
tomorrow to northwest or north as sitmtion warrants. 169 Brigade being moved
vicinity 8430 prepared to counterattack to northeast tomorrow. Situation at
present more favorable but all out air effort will be essential to check and
break enemy renewed attacks expected."
Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 553. "Due to S1ortage or infantry in beachhead and looking to accomplishment your fut~e offensive plans, I strongly recommend despite arrival of 18 Brigade, 24 Guards Brigade remain in this sector.
The Guards, although depleted, are still a splendid fighting unit of great
value in emergency. Suggest replacements forwarded here where brigade could be
refitted and utilized in an offensive."
Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 561. "Situation at present generally quiet
and stabilized along front. Small air raid on port, no damage reported. Enemy
artillery on both forward and rear troop areas increased during late afternoon.
Advance of one ,oompany of Harmon's tanks north of underpass on Albano road
caused approximately 150 prisoners. Small company attacks with some tanks one
�95
let't flank of 3 Division, all repulsed. Air effort today accomplished superb \
results that cannot be simply expressed. Please inform all air personnel of
the troops appreciation. 3rd Brigade remains corps reserve. 169 Brigade baa
all troops and equipment ashore. Prepares to relieve two battalions 157 and
second battalion 6th Infantry west of Albano-Anzio road tomorrow night, prepared to counterattack to northeast. Appreciate your news from Cassino front.
Express our regards to troops there."
Personal Clark to Lucas. RN 3276. "Thoroughly agree with your 553.
Will do all in my power to comply with your wishes. Am expediting arrival of
lB Brigade all possible."
Personal Clark to Lucas. RN 3278. "Reference your 452, congratulate
Harmon on his success today. Again I want to tell you that your accomplishments today have been outstanding. Keep it up. I think your proposed dis•
positions of Harmon and 169 Brigade for possible counterattack roles tomorrow
are exactly correct. We have laid on an all-out air program for tomorrow,
the success of which is dependent on good weather. We are praying for that."
Personal Lucas from Clark. RN 3279. 11 105 ammunition referred to in
your 551 will be shipped by truck beginning 22 Febru.a:ry. Ship with 95,000
rounds due Naples tomo1Tow and will be moved to Anzio immediately. Will do
everything possible to insure that you do not run short of ammunition."
*
*
*
PRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 20 1 1944--General Clark's notes of today's activities are
as follows:
"Called a conference at 0900 with General Juin, GenerAl Roosevelt and
General Carpentier this morning in order to discuss the French Expeditionary
Corps capabilities in the Fifth Army attack from the Cassino front. They are
most anxious to go to Atina. I had always known this but knew that it was a
divergent attack which may or may not contribute to the main effort. I also
knew that General Alexander was opposed to their attacking in that direction.
Juin indicated that he did not have the capability in his weakened condition
to attack to the west from Terelle on Roccasecca. I find so many details had
not been worked out by my staff I broke up the meeting, deciding I would see
Juin later in the day.
Met with General Alexander at 1030 with Harding and with Gruenther. Took
up his proposal for regrouping and told him I was opposed to it. Whereas I
had anticipated a stormy session, it worked out alright. I pointed out why
the Americans should not take over from 10 Corps, mainly for logistical reasons. General Alexander had not thought out his plan very well. When I asked
who would take over the Campoleone area, he did not know. He astounded me
by being worried about an attack on the Eighth Army front by the Germans, positively beyond their capability. He further astounded me by indicating that
if the bridgehead should be lost, Kesselring would bring all his divisions
down here, and we could not hold them. There is no question in my mind that
we could hold them under those conditions after a little regrouping. However,
the bridgehead probably will not be lost.
·
It was finally decided that the French will hold in their present posi-
�tion and take over Castellone; that the New Zealand Corps with the New Zea•
land Division, 4th Indian and 78th will take out the Abbey Cassino obstacle
and cross the Rapido into the Liri Valley; 10 Corps to regroup for pressure
from Y~nturno on San Giorgio and an attack as San Giorgio is threatened by
the 78th Division; II Corps will be withdrawn into Army reserve, consisting
of the 34th, 36th and 88th Divisions. I will direct an intensive training
and rehabilitating program for the two tired divisions."
General Clark invited a number of staff officers and guests to come up
to his hut in the evening, have something to eat and see a movie. The
party numbered 2.3 in all, including General Bronn, General Tate, Colonel
Saltzman, Lt. Col. Porter and others.
The following important messages were received and dispatched today:
Personal Clark to Lucas. RN .3654. "When the impetus of enemy's attack
has slowed down, you should promptly retake some of the terrain lost on the
45th Division front. The extent to which you are able to do this is for
your determination but can more easily be accomplished the minute his attack
bas spent itself. Please advise me of your intentions. Another attack
scheduled for tonight in direction of Cassino Monastery."
Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 567. "Enemy relatively inactive during
night except for aggressive pitrolling on front of 56 Division and light
harrassing artillery fire in other sectors. At 0500 hours today enemy force
not exceeding two companies supported by artillery fire attacked 1st Division.
Attack repulsed. Greatly appreciate your understanding attitude toward our
problems."
Personal Sawbridge to Clark. RN 54011.
for duty with a division in UK which has not
matter bas not yet been presented to General
you concur in release of Roosevelt. We have
replace him."
"Bradley wants General Roosevelt
had battle experience. This
Devers but in case he agrees will
a Colonel Landis available to
Personal Lucas to Clark. RN 569. "Situation quiet. Enemy artillery ac•
tive on front of 1st and 45th Divisions, heaviest being on 2nd Battalion, 157th
Infantry (85.30). Work our Air Corps continues splendid but in several instances p:i.lots apparently carelessly briefed have bombed our ground troops. Instances reported through air liaison. Damage not yet evaluated. Prisoners of
war taken yesterday total 500."
Personal Clark to Lucas. RN .3672. "All possible steps must be taken to
further strengthen and coordinate the defenses on your final beachhead position,
reinforcing with mines and wire. Has your sitmtion permitted your pushing out
on the front or the 45th Division as suggested in my .3654? Believe one important factor contributing to the success of your stopping his penetration was
that you held the shoulders. These must be strengthened against another attack.
Regret exceedingly bombing of our own troops. You can rest assured I Mve made
strong representations to air."
Personal Lucas to Clerk. RN 584. "Every possible step has and is being
taken to strengthen beachhead position. Reference your 3654 and 3672, situ.a-
�tion today prevented our
oughly agree this should
be made to do so. Enemy
in 1st and 45th Division
pushing out in front lat and 45th Divisions. Thorbe done as soon as possible and every effort will
artillery is now aetive age.inst front line elements
sectors."
Personal Clark to Sawbridge. RN 3687. "General Devers has been advised
that Roosevelt is available. Landis is not desired as replacement. Shall
submit name of recommended replacement for Roosevelt shortly."
*
*
PRESENZANO--FEBRUARY 21, 1944•-General Clark spent the day at his command post
engaged in administrative work and conferences. In the morning he received a
call from three British military commentators: Lt. Gen. Martin, Ret., of the
Daily Telegram; Mr. Brandon, of the Sunday Times; and Mr. Woodham, of the Kemsley Press which publishes the Daily Sketch.
In the afternoon the Chief of Staff held a staff conference in the hut to
explain the latest developments to representatives of ea.ch staff section. At
the close of this meeting General Clark came in and made a short talk. The
General said that he had not had as much chance to meet some of the staff offi•
cers in the rear echelon as he would have liked during recent weeks, due to
the pressure of operations which kept him at the front most or the time, but
that he was conscious of and grateful for the fine work that they were conti•
nuously doing.
Today orders were received for General Roosevelt to leave Headquarters
Fifth Army and report to Headquarters U.S. Forces in United Kingdom where his
services had been requested by General Bradley. General Roosevelt had shortly
before been cited for the Legion of Merit, and on his la.st visit to the Headquarters General Clark pinned the ribbon on General Roosevelt's tunic.
General Clark's notes of today's activities are as follows:
"Visited General Sp=idger I s Headquarters this morni.ng and discussed with ,
him and his Chief of Staff plans for future operations to take Cassino. He
has weakened from day to day in his ability to take the monastery. We now
propose to bomb the City of Cassino heavily a.nd then to attack it with fresh
New Zealand troops. If successful, this will be followed by a push directly
across the Rapido River in the direction of the railroad station. I urged
that he expedite in every way possible this attack. He hopes to get it off
on the 24th, but of course it may be delayed.
1
"I discussed with Freyburg, and directed my G-3 to prepare, the necessary
alternate plans in the event this attack on Cassino failed.
"Visited II Corps Headquarters and told General Keyes to plan for a withdranl of his Corps into Army reserve prepared to follow up the New Zealand
Corps attack when it gets started in the Liri Valley."
In the evening General Clark had as his guests ror dinner, Brigadier
General Gar Davidson and Colonel Maddox of Force 163.
General Clark today received the following letter from General Juin with
�98
regard to :future missions of the CEF:
"I have received notice of the new purely defensive mission assj_gned to
the French Corps.
"You wjll not overlook that this mission, undoubtedly imposed by serious
necessity, is going to have the effect of prolonging the immobilization of my
divisions - principally the 3rd DIA in very exposed positions, the occupation
of which, to tep. you the truth, can be justified only by offensive intentions.
"I do hope then that it is only a question of a momentary holdup to faci•
litate the regrouping and putting in position of new forces, and that the offensive conception of the army maneuver will be taken up again as soon as
possible.
"Yesterday I had the pleasure of subnitting to you my point-of-view concerning the action of the C.E.F. in this maneuver. I feel that I have to consider again that it seems to me more and more impossible, with the new extension of my front, to continue alone in the direction of TERELLE-ROCCASECCA;
"I should be required, in effect, to push out from a very pronounced salient at the extremity of my front and in prolongation thereof because they
are dominated on all sides by the new position of the "Adolf Hitler" line,
today well organized and strongly held by the enemy.
"My" action cannot be started mtlesa it would be possible to oover it
from the north by simultaneous operations, and the multiplicity of tasks
which take up the means left at my disposal leave little to devote to the action of breaking through in the direction of ROCCASECCA. The intervention of
the C.E.F. on this flank will be without force and without effect and the army
maneuver might be impaired.
"Not enough importance is attached, in my humble opinion, to the role
played in the ATINA region by the defensive maneuver of the enemy.
"This region is a vast hollow from the rear of which roads lead to ROME
which are not at all menaced by the attacks of the Fifth Army.
"From ATINA, the focal point, lead out communications which permit easy
supply to all the enemy front from META to ROCCASECCA. The concentration of
artillery which the enemy has emplaced in this region fires just as well on
ROCCASECCA as in the plain of CASSINO - S. ELIA and on the COLLI road.
"Thus the region of ATINA will provide a constant menace to the flank of
the army. In neglecting it one definitely limits the success of the army
maneuver and would always have to cover this flank under adverse conditions.
"Therefore it is necessary to take ATINA and the C.E.F. alone is in the
position to do it.
11 I also feel that there is some misconception on this immediate sction of
the C.E.F. towards ATINA. There is some feeling that it is a movement which
is divergent rather than convergent with respect to the principal effort that
has been chosen.
�"This action in itself can, in effect, appear to be divergent but the net
result of the effort is what counts. My precise intentions thereby in directing my effort toward ATINA would be to shorten my front by anchoring it facing
west (the north flank anchored to the high ground of META and consequently more
easily defended) for a subsequent action truly converging in the direction of
ARCE-FR0SINONE region.
"This region being the true objective envisioned by the army maneuver, it
is my belief that this is the converging point of all the army efforts and not
R0CCASECCA, which is only a secondary converging point.
"I restate my recommendations of yesterday, that is:
1. That it would be advisable first, while waiting, to permit me to
execute the ATINA maneuver which will necessarily bring about, as you
will have seen, a relief of pressure on my western defensive front.
2. If this is impossible at present, to give to another division
when offensive action is retaken, the mission to advance in the direction of TERELLE-R0CCASECCA, my role being limited to covering this action
from the north by simultaneous attack. It must be understood that I cannot, in spite of the best intentions on my part, assume all tasks on a
front abnormally extended (almost half of the entire army front).
"I am sending you my purely personal thoughts which may be of some value
in subsequent decisions."
General Clark received the following cable from General Lucas: RN 586.
"Enemy artillery active during night on fronts of 3rd, 45th and 56th Divisions, particularly in the sector 179th Infantry. Up to this hour no attacks
by German infantry. Considerable activity oonsisting of gunfire and flares
at sea off peter beaches about 0120 hours. Navy reports small engagement with
several E boats driving them off."
Personal to Lucas from Cla.rk. RN 3299. "Do not return 24 Guards Brigade
until specific orders are received from me. I am doing everything possible to
arrange to have Brigade remain in bridgehead. I am reasonably certain it will
remain at least temporarily. Replacement problem for this brigade still unsolved."
*
*
*
PRESENZAN0••FEBRUARY 22, 1944•uGeneral Clark left his command post at 0815 and,
in company with General Saville of the XII Air Support Command, rode in his L-5
to Capodichino airport at Naples. The General's two pla.nes landed at 0850,
making the flight from Presenzano in 20 minutes. Generals Clark and Saville
got into General Clark's Packard and drove to Pier Bin Naples harbor where the
two PT Boats, the #216 and #217, were waiting to leave for Anzio. The Anzio
group was composed of 22 officers and men, including Generals Clark, Saville,
Hawkins, Hays, Craigie, Martin and Moran. The trip up to Anzio was almost
without incident. General Clark's boat swung shoreward in the Gulf of Gaeta
so that a suspicious looking craft could be investigated. It was found to contain four Italians. While the F1' 1 s machine guns were trained on the Italian
�lOO
boat, the men were forced to pull back the tarpaulin covering _their cargo,
which turned out to be nothing but sacks of lima beans. Just as .the two
PT Boats were about to enter Anzio, "Moaning Mamie", believed to be a
170mm railroad gun, began to pitch shells into the harbor of Anzio. The
PT Boats waited until the firing had ceased and then sped into the docks
where the party and its equipment were loaded into vehicles.
General Clark, accompanied by Generals Hays and Saville, went imme•
diately to VI Corps Headquarters where General Clark conferred with Generals Lucas and Truscott. The remainder of the party went to the Fifth
Army Advance Command Post, now located in a castle overlooking Anzio harbor, finding that the situation in the Anzio bridgehead was relatively
good and that a German concentrntion, apparently aimed at a new offensive,
had been broken up yesterday evening by artillery fire. The General then
went to the 3rd Division command post where he talked with Brigadier General John W. 0 1Daniel, newly designated commander of the 3rd Division.
From there General Clark went to the 45th Division, where he conferred with
General Eagles.
Following this conference the Army Commander departed for the command
post of the 1st Armored Division where he discussed the situation with General Harmon. He then decided to go to the command post of the 179th. When
General Clark neared the command post, a German tank some distance away
laid four shells along the road down which General Clark and his party was
driving. One of the shells was within 50 yards of the jeep. After talking
to officers at the regimental command post and finding they felt quite confident of their ability to halt any further German attacks, General Clark
/
then drove to the Headquarters of the 56th British Division, where he conferred with General Templar. He found that the 2/6 Queens had replaced the
179th Infantry Regiment in the "hot corner" south of the 11 factory" and that
within 24 hours the 2/7 Queens would go in to assist and ultimately relieve
the 2/6 Queens.
General Clark then went to the Fifth Army Advance Command Post, arriving there at 1620. After looking over cables that had come in, including a
cable from General Gruenther saying that it was relatively quiet on the Cassino front, General Clark conferred a..t some length with General Truscott.
Next he had conferences with various officers at the Advance Command Fost,
concerning the particular problems they faced. Last night the Germans staged
one of their heaviest air raids against Anzio. One bomb struck an armnunition
dump and destroyed a considerable a.mount of 105 ammunition. General Clark
instructed G-4 to get all ammunition pits below the surface of the ground as
soon as possible.
General Clark ate at the regular officers' mess, having as his dinner
guests Generals Seville, Hays, Craigie and Hawkins. Following dinner, he had
a conference with General Lucas, discussing with him the general plan for
General Lucas' new assignment as Deputy Commander of the Fifth Army.
General Aaron Bradshaw, Commanding the 34th AAA Brigade, which is charged
with anti-aircraft protection for the beachhead, was the next visitor. He
told General Clark that he was particularly in need of some special radar
equipment to counteract the dropping by Germans of "window" which throws the
�lO l
normal radar machines out of adjustment and brings a number of anti-aircraft
protection difficulties. General Clark immediately sent a cable to General
Gruenther telling M_m to get this equipment on the next boat to Ando.
The Army Commander then conferred with Lt. Col. Wells, G-2 at the Ad•
vance Command Post, and later General Moran, before going to bed.
General Clark dispatched the following cables to General Gruenther who
had remained back at Fifth Army Main Headquarters:
RN 9796. "Situation relatively quiet with sporadic artillery fire, mainly in forward areas. Second battalion, 157th, being relieved tonight by British. When completed will give 157th Infantry, less one battalion, as additional reserve. One battalion, 30th Infantry, being committed to strengthen
position in vicinity of 9431. Will leave Anzio harbor exactly 1100 hours tomorrow. Saville requests you arrange air cover. Have two cubs at Capodichino
1500 hours. Have Packard and other transportation at dock at 1430 hours.
Clear return PT trip with Navy. Don't let Spadger browbeat you. Acknowledge."
RN 9798. "Eagles hopes there may be a vacancy in OPDWD for Churchill.
Can we take him off his hands? Acknowledge.''
RN 9799. "Bringing Johnny back with me in the morning with two aides.
Issue orders by direction of the President in Truscott•s case. They should
confirm my verbal orders I have issued tonight. Send on my PT Boats on 24th
Brig. Gen. Fred Butler, to be Truscott•s Deputy. Also send Colonel Shepard
at same time if he is not sick. Request NATOUSA to send Brig. Gen. Ramey to
me immediately by air. I intend to make him VI Corps Anti-Tank Officer. Have
extra car at dock for Lucas. May send him direct to Sorrento for rest. Issue
orders announcing Lucas as Deputy Commander, Fifth Army. Acknowledge.n
RN 9800. "Bradshaw has urgent need for three SCR 1 s 584. Robinson familiar with this requirement. They must be shipped by LST tomorrow."
General Gruenther dispatched the following cable to General Clark re the
situation at the Cassino front: RN 3712. "Bombing attack on Cassino scheduled
to end noon 24th. Ground attack follows immediately thereafter. Weather prediction starting afternoon 24th is unfavorable and continues unfavorable for
thr~e days. XII Air Support estimate thAt 7 heavy groups and 7 medium groups
will be required and have submitted request for thnt number. Spadger says that
this force is not enough. He feels that the maximum effort must be placed on
the target and that no whittling down can be permitted. He has expressed his
opinion rather vigorously and there may be a minor crisis developing. I believe I can handle the situation."
Total Fifth Army battle casualties as of today are 72,982.
*
*
*
PRESENZANO-•FEBRUARY 23, 1944-•General Clark left the command post and went to
VI Corps Headquarters where he again conferred with VI Corps staff officers.
At 0800 he left for the 56th Evacuation Hospital. He was accompanied by two
American war correspondents, Reynolds Packard of United Press and Edward Ken-
�
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Clark, Mark W. Diaries
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Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984.
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns.
United States—History, Military—20th century.
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950.
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Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
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CP Clark
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Mark W. Clark Collection
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English
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20
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Mark W. Clark Diary, January 29 - February 22, 1944
Subject
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Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns
United States—History, Military—20th century
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from January 29-February 22, 1944.
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CP Clark
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1944
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Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1568
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Text
\
This is Velume VIII of the Wa:r Diary of Lieutenant General
Mark
w.
Clark.
Volume I, covering period 28 June, 1942 to Sep-
tember 24, 1942; Volume II, covering period 25 September 1942
to 5 January 1943; Vol,me III, covering period 6 January 1943
to 6 June 1943; and Volume IV, covering period 7 June 1943 to
29 August 1943, are held in safekeeping at the Army War College,
Washington, D.
c.
Volume V, covering period August .30, 1943 to
December 31, 1943; and Volume VI, covering period January 1,
1944 to March 31, 1944; and Volume VII, covering period 1 April
1944 to 30 June 1944 are being held in safekeeping in the Com•
manding General's safe.
--------..
'
�ROCCASTRADA--JULY 1, 1944--The General spent the early part o~ the morning
conferring with some of his staff officials, including Colonels Saltzman,
Smith and Bruce while preparations were being ma.de to move the command post.
At 1000 General Clark, accompanied by Colonel Saltzman, flew to the General's
villa at Marina di Grosseto and spent the remainder of the day there. General Clark also spent the night there. The command post was moved today to
the vicinity of Roccastrada.
*
*
*
ROCCASTRADA-•JULY 2, 1944--The General spent the day at his villa at Marina
di Grosseto conferring there with Colonel Saltzman, ~is Deputy Chief or
staff, and other officers of his staff. In the afternoon General Clark returned to the new command post in the vicinity of Roecastrada and there received several staff officers, among them General Brann, Colonel Saltzman,
General Hume and Colonel Smith, his G-2.
*
*
*
!.9CCASTRADA-•JULY 3, 1944--Early in the morning today General Clark drove
to the 34tfi Division command post in the vicinity of Gecina and conferred
there with General Crittenberger, IV Corps Commander, and Genera.1 Ryder,
Commanding General of the 34th Division, and various members of their staffs.
He discussed forthcoming operations with them and the progress of the fight•
ing then taking plaoe. He also disaussed with them the detPils of the forthcoming visit of Secretary of War Stimson and arranged with them that a good
show of artillery be put on for the Secretary in the vicinity of the command
post and also arranged for the Secretary to drive,past an infantry battalion
on the road. General Clark stated that he did not want them in anyway to
interfere with the tactical operations because of the visit of Secretary
Stimson, and they stated that this could be arranged without in any way interfering with the carrying out of operations.
General Clark left the 34th Division command post and drove forward to
the fork of Highway #1 at San Pietro in Palazzi north of Cecina and about
two miles from the German lines. General Clark also spoke to a number of
soldiers of the 34th Division and returned through Gecina. The Army Com•
mander stopped in Cecina and spoke to a number of Italian partisans there.
\
They were wearing red stars and other communistic insignia and greeted the . \
General with clenched fist salutes. The leader of these partisans was a
very small club-footed man, and he informed the General that there were 29
partisans in Gecina. General Clark asked them whether they had killed very
many Germans, and they stated that they had but were unable to give the
number. General Clark then asked them how many partisans there were between
Gecina and Livorno, and they stated iibout 200 and that they were under the
command of a Captain Testa who was operating out or Marina di Cecina. General Clark then thanked them for the aid the partisans have been giving the
Allied forces a..nd stated that he believed Livorno would soon be taken. The
partisans agreed that it should be liberated soon. The General then asked
them if they needed anything, and they replied that they did - that they
were trying to bury the dead and essure the policing of the city. They requested some medical suppli.es and food 1 and the General stated that he
would send an officer up to look into ~he matter. The Army Commander then
��drove off, and the partisans presented arms in an amateurish vray. General
Clark then proceeded to the 34th Division cub strip near Bolgheri and returned by air to the Firth Army command post.
The General then received General Hume, Colonel Smith and Major Roberts
and shortly thereafter proceeded to his villa by air, where he gave a reception for a number of officers of his staff. After the buffet supper
General Clark returned to his command post and rP-tired early.
*
*
*
ROCCASTRADA--JULY 4, 1944-•The General spent the morning in his van conferring with his staff and taking care of accumulated paper work. Shortly after lunch the General took off and flew to Rome where he met Secretary Stirn•
son at the station and attenc~ed a flag-raising ceremony, returning there•
after by L-5 to his command post. In addition to Colonel Saltzman, General
Clark had as his dinner guests Captain Walters and Lieutenant Pedley.
*
*
*
ROCCASTRADA-JULY 5, 1944-•This morning the General had a conference with
General Brann, Colonel Saltzman, Lt. Col. Clark and Lieutenant Berenson, at
which time plans for the arrival of the Secretary of War were discussed.
At 1130 the General departed for Siena, accompanied by Generals Brann and
Beucler. He arrived at the airport at Maligns.no and drove to the Excelsior
Hotel in Siena.. There he met General Carpentier and then went for a sightseeing tom- or Siena.. He visited Chigi Palace and ,ms shov.rn over the pa.lace
by Prince Chigi himself and then returned to the Excelsior where he met General Juin and lunched with him, Generals Carpentier, Brann, Beucler, Hume,
and Major Noiret. The General also met General DeMontsabert who took his
leave of the General. General Clark congratulated him on the fine work done
by the 3rd DIA. General Clark then visited the to,m hall with General Juin
who showed him some paintings of historical interest. General Clark then
returned to the airfield and took off for the command post.
Upon his arrival at the command post the General conferred with General Saville and Colonel Tully. The General this evening entertained General
Brann, Colonel Saltzman, Lt. Col. Porter, his two aides and several other
guests at dinner and then retired early in the evening to his van.
*
*
*
ROCCASTRADA-•JULY 6, 1944--General Juin arrived at the command post at 0845
and was met by Generals Clark, Brann and Saville in the conference hut.
Generals Clark, Brann and Saville walked from the hut to the airfield to
meet Secretary Stimson who arrived at 0915 with General Kirk, Chief Surgeon;
General Sm-les, War Department PRO; Mr. Bundy, Special Assistant to the Sec•
retary; and Lt. Col. Kyle, ADC to Mr. Stimson. The rarty drove from the
field to the hut where General Clark gave Mr. Stimson a short briefing of
the current Fifth Army tactical situation.
Shortly thereafter General Clark called for all Chiefs. of Sections who
were brought into the hut and introduced to Mr. stimson and his party these
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General Clark, Mr. Stimson and pa.rty ·left the hut for the airfield where
they took off in L-5 planes at 0956 for the 34th Division. Mr. Stimson flew
in General Clark's plane, piloted by Major Walker, and General Clark was flown
by Lieutenant Holle. The party was escorted by eight Spitfires. Immediately
upon landing at the 34th Division cub strip near Bolgheri the party proceeded
to the 8th Evacuation Hospital where they were received by Lt. Col. Drash and
General Martin, Fifth Anny Sm-geon. The Secretary visited some of the wards
and spoke to the wounded. The party then retm-ned to their cars and proceeded to the road junction north of Gecina at San Pietro in Palazzi where they
were met by Generals Crittenberger and Ryder.
From there they proceeded to visit field artillery batteries and then
left for the 34th Division command post where General Ryder presented officers
of his staff and discussed the situation with the Secretary of War and General
Clark. The party then had lunch and drove back to the 34th Division cub strip
from where they took off for the Fifth Army command post.
Arriving at the Fifth Army command post field at 1400, the party imme•
diately transferred into Mr. Stimson's C-47 and departed for Tarquinia airport
at 1405. Enroute General Clark talked at length with Mr. Stimson, Mr. Bundy
and General Sm-les. Arrjving at W5 at the airport in Tarquinia the party
was met by General Keyes, General SloR.n, GenerAl Livesay and Gener11l Coulter.
An honor guard of the 351st ROT of the 88th Division rendered the customary
ruffles and flom-ishes. General Sloan introduced Colonel Champany, Commanding
Officer of the 351st RCT, to Mr. stimson and General Clark. General Clark,
Mr. Stimson and. General Sloan rode in the first jeep, followed by a large party
in jeeps, and reviewed the troops, after which Mr. Stimson spoke brjefly to the
officers and men of the 351st. At 1455 Mr'. Stimson said goodbye to General
Clark, and he and his party departed at 1500 from Tarquinia airport. General
Clark talked for about ten minutes with GeneraJsKeyes, Coulter, Livesay and
Sloan and departed by L-5 at 1510 for the villa at Marina di Grosseto where he
swam for .about an hom-, retm-ning by L-5 to the command post at Roccastrada.
at 1715.
*
*
*
ROCCASTRADA-JULY 7, 1944--General ClPrk spent the morning in his van and shortly before lunch received General Devers. He conferred with Genera.l Devers who
remained for lunch with General Clark. The General spent the afternoon in his
van, taking ca.re of administrative matters and conferrjng with officers of his
staff.
*
*
*
ROCCASTRADA--JULY 8, 1944--After breakfast the General flew by L•5 to the 88th
Division command post in the vicinity of Poma.ranee and there decorated Colonel
Champeny, Commanding Officer of the 351st Infantry Regiment, with the Distinguished Service Cross. From there General Cl.ark flew to the 34th Division command post where he conferred with General Ryder and decorated the cotnM.ander of
the 133rd Infantry Regiment, Colonel Schildroth, with the Distinguished Service
�Cross.
General Clark then flew to his villa at Marina di Grosseto and went for
a short swim. He then returned to the command post and conferred with a number of his staff officers • .
General Clark today sent the following letter to General Devers:
"Confirming our conversation this morning, I am furnishing you herewith
my estimate of the capabilities of the Fifth Army to cross the Appenine position alongside of the Eighth ArTrty in order to exploit in the PO VALLEY. I am
writing this letter personally to you, for it contains certain information
and statements which obviously would serve no useful rurpose if they were
brought to the attention of our British Allies. I, therefore, request that
you handle them in this confidential manner. I will furnish AAI a separate
letter giving my views on this subject.
"When units now on the ANVIL troop list, are removed from the Fifth Army
(and I estimate that all will have left by August 1st) there will be remaining in the Fifth Army the following major units:
2 - Corps headquarters (each with Hq. Co.
MP Platoon, Signal Bn and Hq. and Hq
4 -
1 -
4 2 2 -
2½ 3 5 -
51 -
Btry Corps Artillery)
Infantry Divisions
Armored Division
155 Howitzer M-1 Battalions
155 Gun M-1 Battalions
Signal Battalions
Engineer Regiments, Combat
Engineer Regiments, General Service
Tank Destroyer Battalions
Tank Battalions
4.2 Mortar Battalion (Chemical)
"Service units to support the above force in the contemplated offensive
action against the prepared PISA-RIMINI line are inadequate to the extent indicated bel,ow:
1 - Engineer Maintenance Co.
2 - Engineer Bridge Cos.
1 - Chemical Maintenance Co.
12 - Surgery Teams
8 - Truck Cos.
1 - Engineer Depot Co.
(less 2 platoons)
1 - Field Hospital
3 - Shocks Teams
4 - Mule Pack Cos. (Italian)
1 - Graves Registration Co.
"As you know, the Fifth Army is meeting increased resistance along its'\
present front. There are nine German Divisions opposing Fifth Army at the }
present time, three of which are the new ones brought into Italy from the
German strategic reserve. These enemy divisions are the equivalent of approximately Jt u. s. divisions. The 88th Division is being committed to battle
tomorrow and all of the 91st Division will be committed within five days.
The 1st L
Armored Division is being withdrawn within the next two days after
�5
rather heavy losses in leaders and in equipment. I plan to reorganize this
division as soon as it is withdrawn. It will take a.bout three weeks for the
reorganization. The present mission of IV Corps is to drive rapidly to the
ARNO RIVER. FEC is to conform to the advance of the IV Corps, protect its
flank and maintain contact with Eighth Army. I hope the situation will permit a rapid crossing of the ARNO without pause, and plan to accomplish this
crossing and seize a bridgehead if I consider it possible without extremely
heavy losses. If however, the enemy elects to defend in strength in the ARNO
and the Eighth Army is not abreast of my troops, it may be necessary to stop
when I reach the ARNO. If I am forced to stop, FEC will be withdrawn for
ANVIL and the-entire situation will have to be reviewed. If I am fortuna.te
enough to force a crossing of the ARNO, secm-e the high ground northeast of
PISA, a period of at least fifteen days will be required to rest the troops,
bring in replacements and build up supplies using the port of LEGHORN as a
base for the attRck into the PO VALLEY.
"In order for the Fifth Army to participate in this PISA-RI:MINI attack
with reasonable chances of success, the following requirements should be met:
a.
in
Additional trained combat units should be made ava.ila.b le
the Fifth Army area by August 1, 1944, as follows:
92nd Infantry Division (colored)
3 - mnginner Battalions (Cgrnbat)
1 - 4.2 Mortar Battalion (Chemical)
l - Battalion FA 8" Howitzer
1 - Battalion FA 240mm Howitzer
2 - FA Gp Hq and Hq Btrys
,
]2. An appropriate and greatly reduced sector for the crossing of\
the APPENINF.,S must be assigned Fifth Army - this sector to be a one-corps J
front with two divisions plus in the attack, three infantry divisions assigned to the corps with one armored and one infantry in Army reserve. The ~~
92nd Division will be used to protect IEGHORN and Fifth Army's left flank.
,,,.
As I told you this morning I will employ the 92hd Infantry Division (colored)
in appropriate combat. I do not feel that it is wise to count on its offensive ability in a slugging mtch with the Germans to the same extent as a
;
white division. You can rest assured that I will give it every opportunity
to develop its full 10m offensive power if it has the inherent capability
of doj_ng so.
"The object of crossing the APPENINES is to go into the PO VALLEY, and
exploi.t our success there by capture of the key centers such as VERONA, MILA.N,
TURIN, GENOA and LA. SPEZIA. Arter occupation of these points, to be prepared,
depending upon the over-all picture, to push either with both armies into the
VALLEY of the DANUBE or to split armies, the Fifth turning to the west over
the MARITIME ALPS to assist the Allied effort in France.
"There is every indicPtion that the Germans will prepare the APPENINE
position in depth and attempt to hold it to the last man. The Fifth Army effort, with only four infantrz divisions available, will be costly and without
doubt will lea~ese divisions ""f n~pli'B~furth.er effort without rest after the PO VALLEY is reached. It is, therefore, necessary that additional
�/
u
u. s.
divisions be brought from the United States with their appropriate
sea.le of reinforcing auxiliary and service troops and be ma.de available for
battle in the Fifth Army by the dates indicated below:
First division
Second division
Third division
- September 1, 1944
- September 15, 19Lil+
- October 1, 1944
"In order that chances of success of the Fifth Army's Appenine effort
may be increased, adequate air support, both close and strategic, must be
ma.de available.
"On the logistic side, we cannot count on the railroad to supply the
Fifth Army. It will be 31 July before the railroad reaches GROSSETO. This
is roughly 100 miles away. Supply must be through ports. PIOMBINO can be
used to support the Army until it. reaches the RIMINI - PISA line, provided
25 unloading craft are left at.that port. When this line is reached, it will
take at least two weeks to · build up supplies to support the at ta.ck. LEGHORN
port must be developed prior to the attack on the RIMINI - PISA line. Fifth
Army must be assured necessary supplies and replacement equipment from Base
depots to support its operations. As the line extends northward from the
RIMINI - PISA line, additional truck units will be required to move supplies
from Army depots over the APPENINES to truckheads in support of forward troops.
"I he.ve had considerable experience, as you know, in having Bt-itish
troops under my colllI!la.nd. A natural solution, which will be suggested by General Alexander, will be to build the Fifth Army up by a Bt-itish corps. Naturally this must be accepted if the Cpmbined Chiefs of Staff desire to go back to
the complex situation which existed during the time that the 10 Corps we.s in
the Fifth Army. My r.ecommendation is against using British combat troops in
the Fifth Army~ If the decision is to leave the Fifth Army in the Italian set- //
up, every effort should be made to make it an all-American Army.
JI
"I fully realize the extreme importance of exerting pressure e.gainst the
enemy in every conceivable :place. Certainly Italy is one where the pressure
should be kept up if it is humanly possible. There is doubt in my mind that
the Eighth Army will be able to era.ck the PISA - RI?vITNI line without the as•
sistance of the Fifth Army, and I mean a Fifth Army composed of American divisions. The Fifth Army should not, under any conditions, be put in a position
where it has in.a dequate means to accomplish its assigned mission. If we Rre)
to go along into the PO VALLEY we must be given the tools to do the job. I
have indicated above my minimum requirements. I fully appreciate that ANVIL
is the main effort. I believe tha.t the decision to execute -ANY.llc..was .wi§e
and I feel that all u. S. means 1n the Medrterranean should be used to back it
up. Now if we are to do the APPEND~ job as well as ANVIL, additional mea.ns
are necessary. Given these needs, I assure you the Fifth Army will go where
it is directed.
•
"In conclusion, I recommend that if the additional U. S. troops as indi- ~
ca.tad above are not made available at· the time specified, the Fifth Army not be
directed to cross the APPENINES and that it be removed from Italy a.s fast as it
can be assimilated in the ANVIL sector of opera.t ions. Under such a condition,
�1
by an all-out effort of the British, I believe they have the means to . contaJ
the German divisions now in Italy."
*
7
1
*
*
ROCCASTRADA--JULY 9, 1944•-The General spent the morning in his van conferring
with Colonel Smith, his G-2; Colonel Robinson, Commanding Officer of the 34th
AAA Brigade; and General Bra...,m, his Acting Chief of Staff.
At about 1130 General Clark, accompanied by Colonel Saltzman, drove to
his villa at Marina di Grosseto. The General had lunch there and spent the
anernoon with a number of ·guests. A buffet supper was served, after which
the General returned to the command post by car.
*
*
ROCCASTRADA--JULY 10, 1944--The General spent the morning in his van conferring with officers of his staff and at 1000 hours decorated Colonel Kidwell,
Executive Signal Officer, with the Legion of Merit. Colonel Kidwell is leaving Army Headquarters a.nd returning to the United States.
u
At 1145 Ambassador Myron C. Taylor, personal envoy of the President to
the Holy See, and Mr. Tittma.n, Charge d'Affairas to the Vatican arrived and
lunched with the General. The General received them in the hut and discussed
the tactical and strategic situation with them as well as the over-all war
situation. After lunch these officials left with General Hume, and General
Clark spent the remainder of the afternoon in his van.
General Clark today received the following letter from General Truscott:
V
"I am deeply grateful to you for the sentiments expressed in your letter
dated June 21st relative to the VI Corps and to myself. I hardly need tell
you that leavj.ng the Fifth Army was for me and for VI Corps very much like
uprooting an old oak tree - not an easy thing to do. We will always remember
the consideration we received at your hands and the hands of your staff at
all times and we will always be deeply grateful for the complete and invaluable
support which we always received. That this corps accomplished anything is
due to the complete support given it by you and your staff.
"At the present moment, these sentiments are rather underscored, so far
as I am concerned. Breaking into a new operation with the experience we have
had presents so many difficulties because of the necessity for establishing
new relationships with those who have not had similar experience. However,
personal relationships are extremely pleasant and I feel confident that all
problems will be solved to our mutual satisfaction.
"Remember me to Al Gruenther and Don Brann and the other members of your
staff. With all best wishes for your continued success and the hope that I
shall have the pleasure of serving with you again in the not too distant future, I run."
The Army Commander today wrote the following letter to Mr. Robert
Murphy:
�"Your letter or June 29th with its enclosed copy of a letter to Alexander has been received. I would say that the stand ta.ken by the State Department is sound and one that can be carried out. I am particularly interested
in the rest center problem, for, as you know, I hRve maintajned the position
that the officers and men of the Firth Army who fouf,;ht, died and bled to capture that city have the right to visit it. I have arranged for them to do so
by the establishment of Fifth Army Rest Centers. I have done all in my power
to see that the discipline is correct. Natl.ll"ally, at the beginning there were
some minor difficulties which were to be expected under the circumstances.
The behavior of my men has been splendid. I intend to insist that these rest
center facilities be maintained.
"I understand, and I may be wrong, that Mr. Kirk reported this situation
to the State Department. Do you know anything about it? I took the matter
up with the Secretary of War when he was here, explained my position fully,
and Mr. Bundy, who was with him, assured me that the Secretary approved of my
views 100%.
"Next time you are.up this way T want to talk to you; have a little question about Italian decorations. Please do not discuss this with anyone until
you see me.
ttKnow you are always welcome, so come on up and pay us a real visit."
*
*
*
ROCCASTRADA--JULY 11, 1944--Af'ter breakfast General Cl.A.rk flew to the 34th Division airfield where he was met by General Ryder. He proceeded to the 135th
Infantry Regiment where he pinned the eagles of a full colonel on the Regimental Commander, Lt. Col. Ashton H. Y.anhart. General Clark then proceeded to the
91st Division command post where he conferred with Generals Crittenberger and
Livesay. He then returned to the Fifth Army command post by .air, spending a
short time in his van and later flying to his villa at Marina di Grosseto.
There he went for a short swim, after which he returned to his command post
and conferred with officers of his staff, including General Brann, Colonel
Saltzman and Colonel Bertholf.
*·
*
*
ROCCASTRADA--JULY 12, 1944--The General conferred in the early morning with
General Brann and Colonel Saltzman and then proceeded to the air strip where
a promotion ceremony was held for fifty officers of his headquarters, including
Colonel Bruce, Colonel Smith, Lt. Colonel Vlalker a.nd Captain Lemaux. Shortly
after the conclusion of the promotion ceremony, General Gruenther and his party
returned from a short visit to the United States and was received on the field
with a guard or honor by General Clark. The band played "The Gang's All Here"
as the General received his Chief of Starr. General Clark returned to the
confer~nce hut with General Gruenther and shortly thereafter Generals Alexander
and Harding arrived for a conference with the Army Commander and his Chief of
Staff a.long with General Lemnitzer, General Alexander's American Deputy Chief
of Staff.
�9·
In the afternoon General Clark worked on administrative matters and conferred with various staff officers, including Generals Gruenther; Howard, Bradshaw and Hume.
*
*
*
CECINA--JULY 13, 1944-•In the morning General Clark flew to TV Corps to confer with General Crittenberger, returning later to the col"ll'll8.nd post where he
conferred with Gener~ls Gruenther, Brann and Howard. In the afternoon the
Army CoMlltander flew to Rome while his connnand post was being moved to the vicinity of Cecina. He was accompanied by Generals Gruenther, Brann and Lewis
and Colonel Saltzman. The party was met at the airport by General Johnson
who escorted them to the Hotel Excelsior. Immediately upon their arrival at
the hotel, Generals Clark and Gruenther went into immediate conference with
Mr. Murphy in General Clark's suite. General Hume all'lo called on General
Clark late in the afternoon.
At eight o'clock General ClPrk, accompanied by Generals Gruenther, Brann,
Lewis and Colonel Saltzman went down to a dinner given by General Hume. Among
the guests were Mr. Myron Taylor, Mr. Robert Murphy, General Hume and several
important military and civilian Italian guests.
General Clark sent thA following letter to General Alexander regarding
the capabilities of Fifth Army:
11 1.
Confirming our conversation yesterday morning I run furnishing you
herewith my estimate of the capabilities of the Fifth Army after LEGHORN is
captured and our troops occupy the high ground South of the ARNO River.
11 2.
When units now on the ANVIL troop list are removed from the Fifth
Army (and I estimate th8i all will have left by August 10) there will be remaining in the Fifth Army the following major units:
2 - Corps Headquarters (each with Hq Co, MP Platoon, Signal
Bn and Hq and Hq Btry, Corps Artillery)
4 - Infantry Divisions
1 - Armored Division
4 - 155 Howitzer M•l Battalions
2 - 155 Gun M-1 Battalions
2 - Signal Battalions
2½ Engineer Regiments, Combat
3 - Engineer Regiments, General Service
5 - Tank Destroyer '98.ttalions
5 - Tank Batta.lions
1 - 4.2 11 Mortar Battalion, Chemical
11 3.
As you know the 34th, 88th and 91st Infantry Divisions are ~t
present heavily engaged and are progressing, but very slowly. In fa.ct, increased resistance indicates it may be necessary that I commit the 85th Infantry Division in order to secure IEGHORN. At best, after the capture of
LEGHORN and the high ground South of the ARNO, 3 of my U.S. Infantry Divisions will be tired and in need of rest. The 1st Armored Division is now
�\0
. in the process of being withdrawn from the battle for a complete reorganization
which will require 3 weeks to a month to complete. Several units of this Division must remain committed to battle until our immediate objectives are gained.
This may delay the reorganization of this unit.
"4. After the capture of LFnHORN and the high ground South of the ARNO
River by the Fifth Army and FLORENCE by the Eighth Army, it will, as you steted
yesterday morning, be necessary to review the entire situ,ation in order to decide what the futtn"e operations of your forces will be. In order for Fifth Army
to participate in any further offensive operations after the capture of the immediate objectives, the following requirements should be met:
a. Additional trained combat and service units should be mde available
in the Fifth Army area at least a week before the offensive is initiated as
follows:
(1) Combat Units.
3
1
1
l
l
(2)
-
Engineer Battalions, Combat
4.2 11 Mortar Battalion, Chemical
Battalion FA, 811 Howitzer
Battalion FA, 240nnn Howitzer
FA Group, Headquarters ano Headquarters Battery
Service Units.
l - ~ngineer Maintenance Co
2 - Engineer Bridge Cos
1 - Chemical lblintenance Co
12 - Surgery Teams
8 - Truck Cos
l - Graves Registration Co
1 - Engineer Depot Co (less 2 platoons)
1 - Field Hospital
3 - Shock Teams
4 - Mule Pack Cos (Italian)
]2. An appropriate and great~v reduced sector for offensive operations
North of the ARNO must be assigned Fi:fth Army - this sector to be a one Corps
front with two plus Infantry Divisions in the attack, one Infantry Division in
Corps reserve and 1 Armored and 1 Infantry Division in Army reserve.
5. If the enemy defends in strength on the ARNO River, a crossing in the
zone of action of the Fifth Army would be a most difficult end costly operation.
The river within this zone is a serious obstt-icle and the high ground East of
PISA appears almost impregnable to frontal attack or close-in envelopment. In
my opinion operations by Fifth Army to cross the ARNO River must be secondary to
major attack by the Eighth Army to capture ~~ount Albano and the bigh ground east
of FLORENCE. rnce over the ARNO, the att:=i.ck should be continued 'llithout priuse
direct ag1dnst enemy positions on the RIMINI - PISA line. The continuation of
the attack, once the ARNO is crossed, is considered necessary because the flat
, terrain imnediately North of the river is dominated by the heights along which
enemy prepared positions are known to exist.
�ll
"6. Please note that I have stated my capabilities and requirements for
additional supporting troops for a ~ Corps front. If it becomes necessary
that in addition to this offensive front I hold defensively additional ground,
my requirements of course will be increased accordingly. It is highly desirable that I have thP- 92nd Infantry Division (Cld) awiilable prior to any
offensive a.gainst the RIMINI - PISA line. If this Division is available when
the offensive is launched, an appropriate assignment for it would be to hold
defensively on my left flank and protect the Port of IEGHORN. There is every
indication that the German will prepare the RIMINI - PISA line in depth and
attempt to hold it to the last man. An attack by the Fifth Army with only
4 Infantry Divisions available will be costly and without doubt will leave
these Divisions unable without rest to progress after reaching the PO Valley.
It is, therefore, requested that at least two U. s. Infantry Divisions in
addition to the 9?nd Infantry Division be brought from the U.S. with appropriate auxiliary and service troops and be made availr-1ble for battle shortly
after the major offensive agpinst the RIMINI - PISA line is launched.
"7. Unfortunately I have little infornation on the supply situ,:ition from
command channels but I have been informed through administrative channels
that the supplies for future offensive operntions of Fifth Army are to be furnished on the basis that Fifth Army conducts an active defense. If this is
true, it will have a most adverse effect upon any future operations.
11 8.
I fully realize the extreme importance of exerting pressure against '
the enemy in every conceivable place. Certainly Italy is one place where it
should be kept up if it is humanly possible. I fully appreciate that_Operation AWIL is the main effort and that such Mediterranean resources as 08.n be
employed effectively there should be used to support it. However, in view
of the weakened position of Fifth Army, additional means and a reduced sector
are necessary. Given these means and a more narrow front, I a~sure you Fifth
Army will do its share in conducting any operation you may direct. 11
*
*
*
CECINA--JULY 14, 1944--At 1030 this morning the General conferred with Mr.
Murphy, and the General asked he and Mr. Offie to visit the Fifth Army command
post and also accompany him to the French Expeditionary Corps in the afternoon.
General Cl~rk also conferred durin~ the morning with General Brann and Colonel / /
Saltzman. The party left Rome for the new co~nd post at Cecina, arr1ving
there Pt 1400. General Clark, Mr. Murphy anaMr. Offie had lunch at the command post and departed for French Corps at Siena at 1615.
J..;,~ ~(}, The~ arty arrived at f,1a.lignano airport at 1645 and met with Generril Ale:xan/ f~(der who was already on the field. Genernl Clark then drove to the Piazza del
Q_Or- ?a.mpo in Siena where he was greeted by General Juin. Shortly thereafter General Alexander arr5ved. The three Gener8ls then took post, and the national
anthems of Great Britain, United States, Soviet Russia and France were plnyed.
The three Generals then reviewed the French troops massed in the square. The
party then proceeded to the terrace of the Municipio where Generals Juin and
Alexander made short speeches. General Clark chatted briefly with General Juin,
General Carpentier, Mr. Bogomolov and other dignitar:ies. The General then went
down to the second story of the building wpere the ' representatives of the various
quarters of Siena dressed in their medieva! costunes performed the flag dance in
�his honor. General Clark then returned to the airport and took off for the command post. The Genere.l had dinner with Messrs. Murphy, Offie and Genernl Gruenther shortly after his return a.nd rP-tired to his van after conferring briefly
with Mr. Murphy.
*
*
*
CECINA--JULY 15, 1944--At 1030 Air Vice Marshal Dickson, Commander of the Desert
Air Force, arrived and conferred with Generals ClP.rk and Gruenther in General
Clark's van. General Clark then said goodbye to Mr. Henry Griffir1, AP photographer who was to leave shortly for another theater. At 1130 M9.jor Generals
Pritchard and Bolte reported for duty with Fifth Army and conferred briefly with
General Clark, remaining to have lunch with the Army Commander.
After lunch the General worked on important papers in his van until the arrival of General W
ilby, Superintendent of the Military Academy at West r oint,
at 1715. General Clark talked at length with General Wilby and then retired to
M.s van where he had dinner alone before retir:tng for the evening.
The following are the important messages of the day:
Fifth Army to AAI. RN 69f!:7. "l. This hea.dqtwrters is considerably disturbed over the implications of paragraph three of AFHQ message FX 136700. We
have made every effort to release promptly all units required by Seventh Army
and will continue to do so regerdless of the effect on our operations. AFHQ
message appears to have been dispatched without rAference to previous messages
on same subject.
"2. 501 Truck Battalion is attl'lched to PBS in Naples and not under Fifth
Army control.
501 Field Hospital was authorized by AFHQ FX 70378 July 9 to arrive
Naples by 30 July. It will arrive there by that date.
806 Signal Batta.lion was authorized by AFHQ FX 70478 July 9 to leave
Fifth Army by July 20. It will be dispatched so es to arrive Naples by that
date.
1st Battalion 201 Pioneers will arrive Naples by July 17. It had
not been ordered previously because AFHQ number 67534 ordered one bl'!ttalion
(blank) pj_oneers. This headquarters suP,gested (our 3073' July 8th) use of 2/8
or 4/8 Pioneers due in Naples for FEC's. No reply was received.
323 Gestion de subsistence authorized to close Naples on 30 July by
AFHQ FX 70378 July 9. It will arrive by that date. It is needed here to
feed French until major units a.re relieved.
Groupe d 'Artillerie of 4 DMM has been ordered to accompany Gourns to
Corsica. It is awaiting e_
vail.Pbility of craft to carry it from Civitavecchia.
See our 7680 July 131400.
101 Engineer Regiment and three sections, 521 Traffic Regula.ting Group
�l3
are expected to close Naples area not later than 17 July.
"3. The su~gestion to use Headquarters II Corps to replece FEC will not
solve any of the difficulties created by withdrawal of units referred to in
AFHQ 136700. Headquro-ters II Corps has already been stripped. of essential
corps service troops including signal battalion in order to continue IV Corps
operational. If u. s. troops had been available this headquarters would have
furnished them to FEC. 422 Evacuation Hosr1tal departed 13 July."
Cl.B.rk to Devers. RN 6994. "Although there is a.t present no vacancy for
a Major General in the Fifth Army, in view of Gener~l Eisenhower's recommendation, I shall be pleased to have Major GenerEil William c. McMahon assigned to
Fifth Army as an extra genert1l officer. I have knovm General Mctt3.hon for many
years and I have formed a high estimAte of his ability. If assigned to Fifth
Army I shall probably use him as a special assistant for eyes only missions
pending occurrence of a suitable vacancy."
General Clark today sent the follovdng letter to General Ju.in:
11
1.
It is absolutely imperative that the units referred to in our radio
Po. 3132 (101st Engjneer Regiment; 3 Platoons Regula.trice Routiere 521; 1st
Battalion 201 Regiment Pioneers), dated 14 July 1944, Rrrive in the Naples
area not later than 17 July 1944. Similarly 806/1 Signal Company and 806/3
Signal Company must arrive in the Naples area not leter than 20 July 1944.
11 2.
If the removal of these units from your comMand makes it impossible
for you to execute the offensive mission which has already been assigned to
you, you are authorized to assume the defensive.
11 3.
My instructions from higher headquarters wjth respect to the dispatch of the above mentioned units are so definite thE1t their movement can be
delayed no longer. I regret, more than you will ever knov,, the necessity of
depriving you of means which mPy be crjtically necessary to enable you to accomplish your mission. However, I ~m sure thAt you will realize that our failure to meet the prescribed dates may prejudice in a most serious manner future operations which might have a djsastrous effect on the outcome of the entire war. I run certain that I can count on your whole hea.rted coopere.tion in
this matter."
*
*
*
CECINA--JULY 16, 1944--At 0830 General Clark bade goodbye to General Wilby
and worked on adninistrt=ttive mntters in his van until the arrival at lll5 of
Lt. Gen. Giles, Chief of Staff to General Arnold of the Army Air Forces;
Major General John E. Hull, Assistant OperPtions Officer of the War Department; Major General Clayton Bissell, G-2 of the War DepP-rtment; and Major General Franko. D. Hunter, of the 1st Ai.r Force. GenerRl Cl~rk greeted these officers with an honor guard and then briefly oriented them on the tacticel situa.tion on the Fifth Army front. The party then drove to the cub strip and took
off for IV Corps command post, arriving at the landing strip south of Saline
at l'J.40.
General Crane, IV Corps Artillery Officer, greeted the party and guided
�them to the IT Corps command post situated two miles northeast of Laiatico.
General Crittenberger and members of his staff greeted the party, tmd the
Corps Commander gHve a short briefing of the situation to General Clark and
guests. The party had lunch while being briefed e_ the IT Corps command
t
post and left IV Corps for the 88th Division, arriving there at 1305. They
were met by General Sloan and members of his staff, and briefed on the
situation on the Division front. Upon their departure from 88th Division,
General Sloan received a message that German column was moving along a road
north from Palaia, and General Clark assured him that he would have immediate action taken. Enroute to IV Corps cub strip General Clark sent a message to General Gruenther as follows: 11 At 1315 German column 5,000 yPrds
long moving north from Palaia.. Get Hansborough busy. 11
Arriving at the IV Corps cub strip the r,a.rty took off for Gecina airport to join their C-47, while General Clark return9d to the cub strip Ht his
command post.
Upon his return to the Fifth Army command post, the General went for a
quick dip in the sea behind the corunand post and returned to his van where he
conferred with Generals Gruenther and Brann and Colonel Saltzman. He then
had supper and attended a movie in his conference hut before retiring to his
van for the evening.
General Clark today sent the following cable to General Devers: RN 7711.
"General Prjchard will assume command of 1st Armored Division on 18 July.
General Harmon can be released for return to United States immediately. I
understand that there was some comment in War Department as to reason for reliefs of Harmon and Ryder. As you Jmow they were releRsed at your suggestion
jn order to return to United States Division Commanders with battle experience.
I hope that you will make it perfectly clear to War Derartment that I have
been reluctant to lose these officers and that I strongly recommend each of
them to be a Corps Commander."
On June 19th when General Clark called at the French Expeditionary Corps
and spoke to General CPrpentier, as well as on June 20th when General Juin visited General Clark, General Carpentier on the former occasion and General
Juin on the latter occasion had stated that they had received orders that certain supporting units were to be withdravm for Operation ANVIL. At that time
General Clark had stated that he would do his best with what supporting units
were left over to assist the French in the difficulties in which they would
find themselves due to the lack of signal and engineer personnel particularly.
On July 15th Fifth Army received a message from AFHQ, FX 136700, regarding the ,•fithdrawal of these supportjng units. General Cl?rk sent a message to
AAI informing them that every effort had been made and would be rnBde releasing
units for Seventh Army.
•
On the evening of the 15th at about eight o'clock GenerAl Carpentier,
Chief of Staff of the French Corps, called and asked to speak to General Gruenther. Generel Gruenther was in the hut attending a, movie and cmne to the aides
tent vrhere, with Captain Walters acting as interpreter, he discussed the withdrawal of these units with General Carpentier. General CP.rpentier stated that
��· r1·1/
2
upon the withdrawal of these units the French ~ i t i : y Corps could n ~ l
longer continue its offensive mission and requested permission to go on the
/
defensive. General Gruenther stated that if this was the case permission v1 s
granted. Carpentier replied thet orders would be given to tha.t effect but
that nevertheless the French would attempt to take adva.ntage of any local
conditions which might develop. He then stated that these units would be
withdrawn from the line the following day end would be in Naples on July 19th
(after the deadline set by AFHQ). General Gruenther then asked him if it
would not be possible to have these units in Naples by the 17th, and GenerA.l
Carpentier stated that this would be impossible - that they would be there on
the evening of the 19th.
General Gruenther then urgently requested that every effort be mHde to
expedite the departure of these units, and General Carpentier promised to do
this. General Carpentier then also stHted that a letter had been sent from
General Juin to General Clerk stating these facts in ,,riting and that the
letter should reach us shortly. In this letter General Juin stated that
against his will he was compelled to stop the a.dvance of the 4th mm and the
2nd DIM and establj_ a defensive situation ,mtil relieved by the 8th Indian
sh
Division.
*
*
*
CECINA--JULY 17, 1944-General Clark flew to the 34th Division and returned
just before lunch. After lunch he received the militery attaches to the French
Provisional Government. These attaches were as follows: Lt. Col. Ebbesen,
Norway; Maj. 1!ontjoie, Belgium; Lt. Col. Pamanes, 1~exico; Maj. Cayo, Peru;
Col. Colocotronis, Greece •
.
The General later conferred with General Gruenther in hjs van and then
went to the beach where he received General Mast, Resident General of Tunisia. Generals Lewis, Tate, Gruenther, Horan joined the rarty at the beach and
later had dinner with General Clark.
*
*
*
CECINA--JtTLY 18, 1944--Immediately after breakfast the General attended a formation and guard of honor for General t1ast, Resident General of Tunisia, who
then left by car for the French Expeditiomiry Corps. General Clark, at the
same time, pinned 2nd Lieutenant bars on two we.rrar1t officers of his headquarters; Chief
�Warrs.nt Officer Wandel of the Quartermaster Section, and Warrnnt Officer ( j'g)
Hughes of the Ordnance Section.
Shortly thereafter the Army Commander drove to the ~4th Division where he
conferred with General Ryder and proceeded from there to the 363rd RCT. At
regimental headquarters General Clark was briefed by Colonel Magill. After a
mort briefing General Clark in his jeep drove towards the front lines to observe a battalion of the 363rd on their way into the line. The General spoke
to the battalion commander, several of the officers and enlisted men as they
marched up the road going into battle, encouragin~ them to drive on to Leghorn.
Colonel Walker landed on the road for instructions from General Clark. General
Clark instructed him to fly back to the 34th Division cub field to wait for
him. The Army Commander then visited the command post of the 135th RCT of the
34th Division where he was briefed hy the Regimental Commander. General Clark
told the regimental commander of the 135th Infantry that he had just visited
the 363rd RCT who vrere well on the road to Leghorn and that it was a race to
the finish as to which one would enter the city f:irst.
General Clark then returned to the command post of the 14th Division where
he conferred with General Ryder with whom he reviewed the situation as he saw
it. He then took off for the 34th Division cub strip and flew back to his command post.
In the afternoon the General remained in his van working on administrative
matters. At about 2030 General Ryder called on the phone to advise thet elements of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron had reached the outskirts of Leghorn.
General Clark today sent the following cable to General Alexander:
Ov.J-(
-J
1',
r'
,v
JI
RN 7031. "I have examined carefully the question of continued pressure by
the French raised in your 1504 to General Juin. I instructed Juin to release
units specified in AFHQ BX 13670 on dates prescribed even if their withdrawal
would force French to adopt defensive role. General Juin decided that removal~
of these units and character of resistance on French front made it necessarv
to assume defensive vdth provision for follow up of any enemy withdrawe,l with
light forces. I consider that Juin is doing all he is capable of accomplishing.
The Army Commander today received the follow:ing letter from General Devers:
"Reference your cable 7711 of 16 July, I do not know who your informant was
but any statement that there was so~e comment in the WP..T Department as to the
relief of Harmon and Ryder is loose talk. Both of these officers were highly
recommended for corps commands with your concurrence, and General M
"rshall has
been so informed.
"I do not consider the position you suggested for Major General McMahon
justified. However, I have informed Eisenhower that I could use him in a staff
position as a. brigadier general. If Eisenhower approves, I will assign him as
Deputy Chief of Staff, NATOUSA.
"For your :information, the following cable, classi.f ication secret, wa.s re. ceived from GenerAl Marshall today:
�At my suggestion, General Eisenhovrer released in series
the names of Corps Commanders and then Division Commanders
whose Units have been identified. It h~i_s created very favorable publicity here at home with considerable \'Vriteups on each
ind:ividua.l. He has now agreed to my suggestion to have General
Bradley propose every few days the name of some Unit Commanr er,
Company, Battalion or Regiment, whose organization has done
especially well in some current operation.
1
'This will be released in the Theater as Pn item of news,
referring specifically to Commander, Organization, end incident.
Further, Theater Public Relations will send Wa:r Department Public Relations a detailed account of the specific opere,tion in
order that more extensive writeups can be managed on this side
than are acceptable over communication channels from the
Theater.
'Please institute such procedures in your Theater but due
to smaller size of your United States Forces, rele,,ses as frequent as indicated Pbove would not be appropriate.•
I rropose to institute this procedure just as soon as possible and would
welcome riggestions from you." ,
+
,
11
~~ ~r'" i'tc ~
9 9'y
o ',
0
LJ~
"'1
.t
;;~~*~; ~
~r'
lr
c,q
1V
ki \ *
CECINA--JULY 19, 1944--General Clark left the command rost at 0630. and flew to ,,
the 34th Division cow.mand post where he stopred for a moment and then flew on
to a road northeast of Livorno. He landed on the road and rroceeded into town J
in a jeep and spent part of the morning looking over the city ot' ,Livorno which
had fallen to American troops. In Livorno he spoke to General Williamson end
also to a number of the reporters and cameramen. The General then return~d to
his plane on the road and took off, circling over the port of Livorno, examin~ng the conditions in the harbor.
The General returned to the command post at 1010 and went immediately to
General Gruenther's office, where he met General Chidlow, executive Officer to
General Saville of XII TAC; and Air V:i.ce Marshal Dickson, Corr.manding the Desert
Air Force.
At 1300 Generals Juin, Carpentier, Sevez, Beucler and Keyes arrived for
lunch. A guard of honor was held for General Juin and his party. General Clark
gave a lunch for the above French o~ficers and guests and also had General
Gruenther, General Brann, Colonel Saltzman, Colonel Kammerer and Lt. Col. Porter
as additional g"Uests.
After lunch General Clark presented General Juin and other general officers
of his staff with letters of farewell. General Juin was greatl3r moved by General Clark's letter, embraced him and expressed his gratitude for the many kind
things General Clark had to say and his sorrow on leaving General Clark's command. The French departed from Army Headquarters at 1500.
Afterwards Generals Clark and Gruenther drove to Castj_glioncello to look at
�the proposed new Fifth Army rest center. The party was met by Colonel Smith
who showed General Clark several villas, one of whjch General CL~rk picked for
his use in the near future. He then rettn'ned and retired to his van.
General Clark sent General Marshall the following cable today:
RN 7740. "As requested by you when you were here in June I have taken
measures to increase publicity given Jepanese-American troops. 442 Infantry
will be mentioned in connection with capture of Leghorn. 100th Battalion will
be used to garrison Leghorn. Also, in accordance with your suggestion to General Gruenther, I have today awarded War DerBrtment citation to 100th Battalion
for distinguished service in Leghorn campnign. Release of that award will be
made to press July 20th."
General Alexander cabled General Clark as follows:
RN UA.1519. "My heartiest congratulations to you and your fBmous IV Corps
whose brilliant fighting during these last days has led to the capture of the
port of Leghorn."
General Alexander sent General Clerk the following letter with regard to
future operations of the Allied Armies in Italy:
1. Nmv that the skill and hard fighti.'1.g of your troops has resulted in
their reachin~ the ARNQ at P0NTEDERA anr to the east of thAt place, the time
has come to decide how the task of driving the enemy back to the GOTHIC line
on that part of the front west of FLORENCE can best be divided between the two
armies, and what the inter-P.rmy boundary north of the ARNO should be.
11
"2. As you know my intention is to proceed with the destruction of the
enemy's armed forces in ITALY. The next step to that end must I consider be
to drive the enemy back to the GOTHIC line as quickly as po-::sible, so tha.t we
can bring that line under fire; interfere with further work on it; and obtain
detailed information about it prepAratory to an attack.
3. As I have also previously explained, I intend to penetrate the GOTHIC
line roughly between DICOMANO and PISTOIA. In fact the general areas of which
these two places are the centres will form the outer pivots of the attack. It
is therefore essential to secure them quickly, especially the very important
road centre of PISTOIA. Once that place is f'jrmly in our hands the front between it and the west coast can become defensive, provided of course that the
high ground north east of PISA, which I refer to hereafter as f,1DNI'E PISANO, is
also held by us to cover the approaches to the port of LEGHORN.
11
"4. From a stud;r of the map it has struck me that unless the enemy holds
the line of the ARNO very weakly, in which case I hope you may be able to rush
THE MTNTE PISANO feature, an attempt to force the passage of the ARNO west of
POtn'EDERA would be both difficult and costly. I therefore suggest that the best
way of developing operations across the ~"i.NO would be to force a passage somewhere betw en EMPrLI and PONTEDERA, and then to develop two thrusts, one on PISTC'IA and the other on LUCCA which would have the effect of turning any enemy positions on the high ground south of those two places. Possession of PISTOIA and
LUCCA would give us control of a good lateral road and a line on which we would
0
�\9
constitute a sound defensive flank whereby to economise troops for our offensive against the GOTHIC line. rworeover the line of the ARNO between PONTEDERA and the west coast could be held vT:ith comparatively few troops, while
the bulk of the forces available were concentrated for offensive operations
to secure PISTOIA and LUCCA.
"5. Apart from the fact that Eighth Army alrearly have a very long front
to hold, and will have as much as they can do with the forces at their disposal to drive the enemy back to the GOTHIC line between the east coast and
PISTOIA, the configuration of the country really makes the area between a general line from LASTRA - PRATO to the west coast one tactical area, and separate
from the area to the east. It would therefore suit me best from every point
of view, if as your next task you could undertake the capture of PISTOIA and
LUCCA, and the establishment of a defensive front on that general line.
11 6.
I fully realise how much your army has been reduced in strength, )
and I have made a personal request to the Supreme Allied Commander verbally
and in writing to supply the supporting and ancillary uni ts you have asked
J
for, and to accelerate the arriw1l of 92 Div and the Brazilian division. So
far I have received no specific reply but I understand that the first R.C.T.
of the Brazilian division has already arrived in ITALY, and that another R.C.T.
is expected shortly.
11 7.
I also realise and deeply apr..reciate the fact that three out of your
four remaining infantry divisions have had a great deal of heavy fighting, and
that ycur armoured division is in the process of reorganisation. At the same
time I feel that the enemy is in no stete to launch a serious counter-offensive,
and that on defensive parts of our line we can and must accept the risk involved in reducing our front to little more than a line of observation backed
up by mobile reserves. If you agree that that will be possible on the line of
the ARNO between POH
TEDERA and the sea, I have A feeling myself that it will
leave you sufficient troops to force the passage of the ARNO east of FONI'EDERA,
and to capture the very important road centres of PISTOIA and LUCCA, thereafter
establishing a defensive front between PISTOIA and the sea.
11 8.
I should very much like your army to play a part in the attack on the
GOTHIC line by launching an attack on that position in the area north of PISTOIA
in conjunction with Eighth Army's attack further east. I realise however that
we cannot make plans for that stage of the campaign until we can foresee more ~clearly in what strength you will be when ycur troops reach the GOTHIC line.
"9. For the present J would be most grateful if you would examine fully
whether you think you can, with your present forces, undertake the capture of
PISTOIA and LUCCA. If you think ycu can then I suggest that the inter-army
boundary should be re-drawn so as to make the town of tDNTELUPO, the hill mass
MYNTE ALBANO, and the city of PISTOIA inclusive to you, at any rate until we
see how your operations north of the ARNO develop, and whflt your losses in the
recent fighting have been.
1110. I have put these problems on paper to enable you to consider them
fully before we discuss them. If it will be convenient to ycu I should like
to come to your H.Q. about 1100 hrs to-morro~ 20 July to settle the matter.
Will you please let me know if that will suit you. Meantime I am confident
�you will do all you can to secure the pass~ge of the ARNO, end to press on
north of that river irrespective of boundaries. It is of supreme importance
I am s'l.ll'e to go all out to get PISTOIA and LUCCA before the enemy can recover from the heavy blows you have given him in the fighting of the past
few days. By to-morrow the situation may of co'l.ll'se have developed f'l.ll'ther,
and other factors may have been introduced. I will however come and see you
in any case to discuss future plans unless I hear from you that tomorrow is
not convenient to you."
*
*
*
CECINA--J1JLY 20, 1944--Today General Crittenberger arrived a.t 0945 and conferred with Generals Clark, Gruenther, Brann and Tate, using the G-3 situation and tactical ma.ps to clarify his points. Gem~ral Cri ttenberger left at
1030, and shortly thereafter Generals Alexander, Harding and Lerrmitzer arrived to confer with the Army Commander and key members of his staff. This
conference continued until 1210 when General Bolte, new Commander of the 34th
Division, arrived and was introduced to General Alexander and party just
prior to their departure.
The General lunched with Generals Bolte and Brann and then worked on important military dispatches d'l.ll'ing the entire Rfternoon.
At dinner this evening General ClPrk entertained Generals Gruenther, Sullivan and Colonel saltzman for dinner and efter dinner saw Pathe and Paramount
newsreels of the Fifth Army's triumphant entry into Rome which were brought
back from the States by General Gruenther.
General Clark this afternoon dictated the following notes for inclusion
in his diary:
"The following letter on future operations was received from Genert:tl
Alexander yesterday with the request that he see me today. (Letter referred
to in the preceding sentence wa.s quoted in yesterday's diary).
"When General Alexander came, I told him of the situa+,ion with regard to
Fifth Army troops after the capture of Leghorn; namely, that the three infantry divisions, the 34th, 91st and 88th were somewhat used up, particulPrly the
34th, as results of the last three weeks' battle. I told him I would take on
the mission he requested of the Fifth Army; namely, to cross the ARNO River
and as a first phase, preliminery to crossing the Appenines, to capture the
line PISTOIA to LUCCA.
"General Alexander's letter to me in no way indicPted the intentions of
the Eighth Army. I made it plain that the old French sector would be occupied
in the next two days, but British Eighth Army troops must rush up and sec'l.ll'e
for the Fifth Army a line of departure for crossing of the river in the EMPOLI
- SIGNIA area - that there were absolutely no American troops avPileble now to
do this job. He agreed to this. As a further requisite to Fifth Army's attack
across the ARNO, I made it plain that Eighth Army must have already captured
FLORENCE and be prepared to attack abreast of Fifth Army to occupy the area
from DIC0MANO to PISTOIA exclusive. In other words, Eighth Army must skirt
the high ground north of FLORENCE and towa.rds PISTOIA as Fifth Army cro,· ses
�between EMPOLI and SIG NIA.
He agreed to tli is.
"I told him that I had a dirty job ahead of me yet in cleaning out the
pocket between the caml north of LEGHORN and the river near PISA. This
must be done immediately or work on rehabilitating the port will be hampered
by all types of enemy fire. I have di.rected IV Corps to do this job with
the 34th and 91st Divisions. I ha.ve spoken to General Bolte, who will take
command of the 34th Division tomorrow, and he feels thAt his Division, reinforced with the 363rd CT, has that capability. IV Corps has been somewhat
remiss in failing to start this task sooner, for I had repeatedly given direct orders to Crittenberger that 34th Division was not to be rermitted to
be drawn jnto I.EGHOR~ but after its capture to rush up into LEGHORN within
its sector. This, I am afraid, Ryder has failed to do.
"As to the future zone of action of Fifth Army a.cross the Arpenines,
this will depend upon the stPte of my troops when I reach my first objective
on the PISTOIA - LUCCA line.
"General Keyes I corps 111ill relieve IV Corps within the next fj ve days in
order to tackle this next job.
1 will be unnble to cross the AROO in force until my troops have had
about two weeks' rest. This, in my opinion, will be before Eighth Army is
ready to do its share of the job.
11
"I told General Alexander, and I had rrev:ously notified my staff, that \
every improvisation possible would be resorted to in order to m~ke up deficiencies in the Fifth Army. These include use of Italian troops where practicable, the use of tanks, TD 1 s and anti-aircraft as supporting artillery,
the use of British artillery and engineers. I do not want British divisions, /
for they do not fight like American troops.
\
I realize that this next phase of the operntion will be a difficult
\
one for the reduced Fifth Army, but I feel it should go on and that we should
contribute our worth in view of the pressure wrich is being put on the enemy 1
from all directions. He is fighting under severe hendicaps. Fis morale is t
low. The end of the war approaches in my opinion. We must take chances and
pound him from all directions. I am heartily in favor of continuing on with
the means at my disposal.
11
"I told General Alexander of General Devers I prognostication of the
date of reaching the Po. He agrees with me that it is lack of battle experience and understanding on Devers' part. It is pure crystal gazing."
General Clark sent General Devers the f ollovring letter today:
"I have your two letters of July 17th and lgih. T"fith reference to the
July 17th letter, most of the subjects contained therein are comrond matters
which I look to General Alexander for solution. He is fully aware of my
minimum requirements and will make every effort to obtain them. After knowjng what means will be a.vaiJFble to the Fifth Army, I will be better able
to inform him of our capabilities. It is natural, from where you are you
�can not know exactly what we need and whPt we do not need. For example, your \
statement that we have adequate artillery to support my army in the offensive
contemplated is incorrect. I have alrea.ay arranged with General Alexander to
get the additional artillery required to do the job.
11 With reference to conservation of supplies, I assure you that I and my
staff are fully allergic tu this necessity.
"With reference to the German wea1mess, we who have been in close contact
with him in battle are well able to evaluate his defensive ability. It rather
surprised me that you should urge the Fifth Army on to bolder action, for we
have always demonstrated just that in our many months of campt=dgning and our
willingness to tackle things on an "adhocll basis. You need have no worry on
these scores.
"I am wondering upon what you base your statement thet the Allied Armies
will be on the Fo River by August 15th. Certainly it can not be based upon
the facts as we know them in the field. When General Alexander was here today,
at which time we decided upon future orerations, I e.sked him if by any chance
you could have obtained this date from him. He was as surprised as I am and
was in complete agreement with me that no such schedule as you have in mind is
ca.pa.ble of accomplishment. He thought perhaps you had seen the old estimetes
which he submitted to General Wilson based on conditions, none of which are
present at this time.
"With reference to the publicity on comm~mders of subordinate units, I
think it is a fine idea to release the n~mes of smaller unit commanders, together wjth the successful job they have accomplished. We have done that in
the past and are prepared to send stories on to your headquarters on any
schedule which may seem desirable. I will discuss this further with my PRO
and give you additj_onal comnents.
lfSawbridge told me of your decision on Grogan. I regret this exceedingly,
for I do not know why you are exceptionally interested in officers I desire on
my personal staff, particularly when they have demonstrated their ability as
Grogan has, and when their transfer here is agreeable to the VIar Dep::irtment.
Surles is anxious that he get a break with a combat unit after his long service in the W Department and is glad to exchange with my man Clark. I rear
quest that you reconsider this rratter. 11
*
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*
CECINA--.nJLY 21, 1944--The General conferred in the early pecrt of the morning
with staff officers in his van and at 1000 decorated a number of French officers with the Bronze Star at a ceremony hald at his command post. After the
ceremony the General received the officers in his hut ;:ind lAter conferred
with Generals Gruenther, Keyes and Ryder, all of whom rern,~ined for lunch.
After lunch General Clark pinned 1st Lieutenant bars on his Aide-decamp Lieutenant Robert L. Berenson. Shortly thereafter GenerAl ClP-rk flew to
Rome in his C-47, accompanied by Generals Brann, Bradshaw and Colonels Saltzman an<l Bruce.
l
)
�Operations Instruction #29 was issued today A.nd is quoted below:
11 1.
When Fifth Army troops have rePched the ARNO River across the entire Army zone of action, anoth9r phPse of operations will be concluded.
11 2.
The mission of Allied Armies in Italy continues to be the destruction of the enemy's forces in Italy. Future operations to accomplish this
mission are divided into rrwses, the first of which is to drive the enemy
back to the G0THIC Line and the second, to penetrate that line roughly
between PISTOIA and DICOMA.NO.
11 3.
Operations to drive the enemy back to the GOTHIC Line will begin
after Eighth Army has captured FLORE1'JCE and reached the ARNO River West of
FLORENCE. Fifth Army's mission in this operation will be to force a crossing
of the ARNO River with its main effort generally in the vicinity of NDNTELUPO,
capture M. ALBANO and secure PISTOIA and LUCCA. Simultaneous with Fifth
Army's attack, Eighth Army will capture the high ground generally Earth and
Northwest of FLORENCE. The proposed bounda.ry between Armies for this operation is stream and road junction 637695 - CR 633739 - thence Rout~ 66 to CR
601770 - thence 60 Easting grid. Fifth Arny will take over that part of its
new sector now held by Eighth Army after Eighth Army reaches the ARNO River.
11 4.
Instructions for the second phase - the penetration of the GOTHIC
Line - will be issued later.
11 5.
It is d:rected that Headqunrters II Corps relieve Headquarters IV
Corps without felay. Date and hour when Commanding General, II Corps will
assume responsibility for IV Corps zone of action will be determined between
Corps Commanders and reported to this Headquarters twenty-four hours before
effected. Assignment and attachm0.nt of troops will issue in sepl:'rate orders.
rr6. Pending movement of troops into positions for attack, the entire
Fifth Army zone will be the responsibility of II Corps. Decision will be
made at a later date whether or not it is advisable to relieve II Corps of
responsibil:i.ty for a portion of the Vlestern part of the Fifth Army sector.
"7. It is est1mated that the D day for operr-tions to cross the ARNO
will be between 5 August and 10 August. In prepnrPtion for this attack, it
is directed that every effort be ~ade to rest the troops. To accomplish
this, it is desired that forward positions be held with the absolute minimum strength, using troops other than those of our dlvisions wherever possible. If requested, the infantry of the 1st Armored Division and the 39th
Engineer Combat Regiment can be m=ide aw>ilable to fP.cilitate the resting of
infantry units. Tanks and tank destroyers will be sited as artillery as
far as possible. The tanks of the 1st Armored Division mRy be mde available if desired on completion of present reorganization and maintenance
period.
"8. II Corps will rcr:-epare the necessary plRns for the first phase attack and submit same to this Headquarters as soon as practicable.
"9. IV Corps will make every effort to expedite the completion of
34th Infantry Division's present mission in order to facilitate the early
�relief of this unit. As soon as the Division has reached the ARNO River, it
will be relieved and :r:ass to Army control. 11
*
*
*
CECINA--JULY 22 , 1944--General Clark returned to the Fifth Army oommand post
from Rome at 1700, had dinner with General Brann and Colonel Smith before retiring.
The two following messPges were received today from French Corps:
11 At the time when staff of CEF ceases to exist are renewing our feelings
deepest sorrow to be separated from staff Fifth Army with which have been in
closest cooperation in atmosphere of friendship and trust dur5ng over 6 months.
Common victory has indefectibly sealed links of mutual liking formed during
this campaign . Will never forget material Find morRl help you gave so heartily
to our work. Are forming wishes of neeting you again soon. Rendezvous for
final victory of both our countries closely associated. Long live Fifth Army.
Long live the United Sfotes of Arrerica. 11
"The present message - last to be delivered to Buffon by Annibal - is
carrying to you once more tokens of friendship. Au revoir, Sir, may God one
day restore this splendid Franco-American team, on the rath to victory respectfully yours."
*
*
*
CECINA--JULY 23, 1944--The General left the conmand post for Castiglioncello in
the morning where he spent the morning reading, swimming nnd resting. At 1600
hours the General received twenty-five guests in his beach villa for a swimming
party and buffet supper. The guests included most of his Section Chiefs and
ten guests from the 8th Evacuation Hospital.
*
*
*
CECINA--JULY 24, 1944--General Clark spent the entire morning reading and swimming. At 1500 hours in the afternoon General Brann and Colonel Saltzman arrived
at the villa for a short swim and supper.
*
*
*
CECINA--JULY 25, 1944--The General left the villa at eight o'clock for the command post, arriving at 0830. At 0945 Generals Clark and Gruenther left for a
naturalization ceremony at the rear echelon. General Clark spoke to 90 enlisted
men and l nurse after they had been administered the Oath of Naturalization by
Mr. Horrell, American Vice Consul in Naples, congratulnting them and rraising
them for the way in which they had earned their citizenship. After the ceremony
the General returned to the oomma.nd post.
ArchMshop Spellman arrived at the oommnnd post at noon tmd was greeted by
General Clark. Generals Clark and Gruenther, Archbishop Spellman talked in General Clark's van for an hour after which they lunched in GenerAl Clark's mess,
the other members of the Archbishop I s party, Colonel O1Keefe and Major Moran and
�Colonel Ryan, Fifth Army Chaplain, lunching with them. The archbishop presented
General Clark with a letter he had brought from President Roosevelt. After
lunch General Clexk took off for the villa at Castiglioncello where he had as
his dinner guests in the evening General Brann and Colonel Saltzman.
*
*
*
CECINA--J1JLY 26, 1944--General Clark spent a quiet day resting, swinrrning and
reading at his beach villa. Colonel W
ood, Commanding Officer of the 38th Evacuation Hospital, another officer Pnd three nurses came for a swim and dinner
with the Army Commander.
General Tate sent the following memorandum to the Chief of Staff today with
regard to the allocation of ammunition:
1. The limited administrRti ve means availa.ble to Fifth Army in the fu- )
ture will not support the actions contemplated for IV Corps in paragraphs 4 ~ /
and g. Operating Instructions !v'\unber 30, dated 24 July 1944, and at the same
time carry out the action contemplated for II Corps, as outlined in paragraph 5
of this Operating Instruction. There axe not sufficient Service troops; notably,
Signal and Engineers, to support an A.dvance on a two-corps front. Also, the future supply of Artillery ammunition makes it necessary that fires be concentrated
on a narrow front. Strict allocation of ammunition is to be applied by SOS,
NATOUSA beginning l Au,,~ust. We cannot expect Pn increase in monthly P.rmnunition
allocations in view of priorities estabHshed for other operations and the limited production output in the United States. NATOUSA and SOS, NATOUSA have
stressed this point.
11
2. Adm.i.nistratively (Service troops and supplies), Fifth .Army now has \
only sufficient means to support ow~ corps of three divisions--two divisions
operating offensively, including pursuit, with one division in reserve. Artillery ammunition supply in the future will not be sufficient to continue the
heavy artillery concentrations employed in the pa.st in support of adwmcing
troops."
11
The following , report on conditions in Livorno was received from General
Hume soon after the city's occupation by Allied troops:
"l. First AMG officer, Major Carl Kait, Civil Affairs Officer, 34th Division, entered Livorno v,:i th adve.nce patrols of infantry troops at 0630 hours
19 July 1944, and establ:i.shed military government at 0700 hours at the temporary headquarters of the Committee of NRtj_
onal Liberation in Ardenza.
"2. Preliminary surveys were oomrnenced at once, in cooperation wjth officials of the Committee of National L:i.beration, to determine the prhnary necessities of the remaining population of the city. It was estimated on questioning civic offfoers that only 35,000 constituted the population of Livorno, a.
city which usually numbered 138,000 persons.
11 3.
At 1100 hours Brig. General Edgar Erskine Hume, Senior Civil Affairs
Officer, Fifth Army, his ADC, and Ma,jor Elmer N. Holmgreen, designated as Civil
Affairs Officer to replace Major Knit when he moves forwRrd '"itJ-1 the d:ivision,
entered the city of Livorno and, after a reconnaissance of conditions within
�the city limits, went to Ardenza to rreet with Major Knit and the officials of
the Committee of National Liberation.
n4. It was discovered, on conversatj on with Avv. Adolfo Agus, Secretary
General of the Commune and acting mayor, thPt three-fourths of Livorno, comprising the area around the port and extending inlend, had been evacuated of
civiliHns by the Germans in November and had been designated the "Zona Nera",
or "Black Zone" by them. This section was blocked off by demolition of
houses around the line of de:rmrcation in such a way as to make streets impassable. Barbed wire had also been erected, and signs posted in German and
Italian warning civilians not to enter. No civilian had been in the Black
Zone in almost a year and had no idea what conditions existed there. Committee of 1-rational Lfberation officials said the area had been mined for many
months and was said to be the most heavily mined area in all of Italjr.
"5. It was decided to keep the evacuated zone free of civilians until
such time as military A.uthorities permit reoccupatfon, but that the name
"Black Zone" was not to be applied. Although retreating Germ,<>ns had taken
down the warning signs in the hopes that Allies ~~uld disregard the blockades
and enter the mined areas, Committee of National Liberati.o n men had printed
posters in English and Italian which they had affixed around the perimeter of
the zone. They had also prepared an extensive map of mined areas.
"6. The majority of civilians thrown out of their homes by the Germans
had fled to the Provinces of Pisa and Lucca, and it was thought probftble that
they would attempt to move back into the city, thus creating a serious traffic and refugee problem. Consequently, AMG officers dn-ected the Carabinieri
into the city to prevent the return of the tovmspeople until such time as permission should be extended by military authorities. The Committee of National
Liberation volunteered to send messengers to nearby communities to advise Livorese to remain in their temporary quc'lrters until they should be allowed to
return, and posters were put up forbidding the return of civilian f11milies.
7. The food situation is not acute, PS supply now exists for at least
three days and 200 gre"ms per day of bread had been distributed to the remain;.
ing population, so that no particular problem exists. Ration cards ere sufficient until l August 1944. Major Ka1t reported that enough grain for ten
days is in the warehouses, and that a saw mill is being converted for grinding
the grain into flour. The Alimentazione system of food distribution had been
functioning efficiently until two days before the Allied occupation.
11
8. Greatest ANG problem discovered was the lack of water, for two of
the three city aqueducts bringing water are in territory still in German
hands. These two water lines are not operating, and the remai.ning acqueduct
has been severely damaged. There is no acute suffering for lack of drinking
water, as cisterns and wells are still supplyi.1:g the population with their
minimum needs. Not enough water exists for washing and other uses, hm'Tever.
The .last water Il'.ain was blown up five days ago. The city engineer of Livorno
has promised an adequate supply of water from the remaining water line within
several days, end MJG engineer officers Pre working with him to effect this
as soon as possible.
11
"9. General health conditions are excellent, being in keeping with the
minimum of good water supply. Some 450 patients are under trei:ttment in the
�large Ciano Hospital which has 11 cr,pa.city of from 1500 to 2000 beds. When
the Germans evacuated the city, they took much hospjtal equipment, including
bedding Rnd linen, tlS well as surgim~l jnstruments, microscopes, P1edicines,
etc. Chlor1.nation is planned for the cistern and well water now being used
by the civilians. Uo enemy or Allied wounded were found to be jn the hospitals.
10. The city itself has suffered from shelling find bombjng, a.nd all
brj_dges were mined ti.nc'i blown up before the Alljed ontry, trius hindering
transportation a.s r1ell as repair of water lines, for m11ny pipe conduits were
affixed to the bridges.
11
11. Fublic order was satisfactory, in spite of the fact thPt the only
city police force, The Republican Gw.rd, left Livorno with the retree.ting
Germans. A force or 150 AMG CArP-binieri hes been te.ken into the city by M~G.
There is also an American Military unit engegecl in Military Police duties.
The Civic Police Chief nnmed by the Committee of NPtional Liberation said
several hundred Carabinieri were in hiding and shortly would return to their
posts. They will be vetted by C. I. C.
11
12. All remaining stores Pnd shops were opened and looted by the Germans before they left the city. When the Germans had taken what they wanted,
they turned the Fascists loose in the shops and took motion pictures to show
how well they were treating their coll,qborators. This report was made by
the Committee of l!ational Liberation.
11
13. All banks Rnd post offfoes were closed twenty days ago, and it was
said that many of the funds were hidden from the GerTWns. AHG Finance Officers !118de an immediPte reconnaissance with a view to opening the benks as
soon as possible.
11
"14. As most of the active Fascj sts And Fascist collPborators left the
city on 20 June, only a minor political problem exists. The Committee of
National Liberation recommended the keeping in office of Avv. Agus, for fourteen years a civj_l servant and Secretary General of the Commune. He is now
acting as Mayor in the absence of other appointments. A committee was named
prior to the Allied entry, consisting of a city engineer, publfo hoolth officer, firemen, civil works officer, etc., to assist AMG officers, and both
~ ajor Kait and Major Holmgreen have been working with them. A fine spirit of
.'
collaboration and assistnnce has been discovered and put to good use by Allied
M
ilitar~r Government. Appointments remain to be rmde of Prefect, Federale and
Permanent Mayor, for all such officials left w:ith the Germns.
"15. Telephones and electricity Pre not functioning, although it is believed thet the;T can be 1.n operation in several weeks. All tE'lephones were
disconnected ,r,nd the apparatus removed by the Germans last fall, but noserious damage was done to the main offices.
16. The prj sonars in thP jails were removed to Fisa, thus ~ivjng no
problem to AMG such as was found in }Tap lf'ls ru1d Rome where the GermAns released
all civil offense prisoners to rrey on the cormnun:i.ty.
11
11 17.
In sumrnar;r, the sit1mtion in Livorno is not as serious as has been
found in other c1ties of similar populations. Flans arc already in oreration
�to halt the possible move of refugees back to the city, and AMG officers speciaB zing in the various Public >relfare and Utilities are on the. scene to assist the city in returning to normal.
"18. The representatives of the 'Patriots I and 'Partisans I are numerous
and wh:..le they offer every assistAnce individually a.nd collectively, it is
feared that they may Cl'l.use trouble in not being willing to surrender their
arms. The;r were promised certificntes of merit ~md expressed pleRsure at
this. Such documents are way ov0 rdue and hP.d not arrived by the day the city
was occupied."
*
*
*
CECINA--JULY ?7, 1944--The Genernl left his villa and drove to the command
post where he conferred briefly with his st~rr officers. At 1015 he drove
to Vada where he conferred a War Department citation upon the 100th Battalion
composed of Hawaiian-American troops of' Japanese descent and Also decorated
Sergeant OhAtP of th:i s unit with the Distinguished Service Cross. In a brief
speech at the cererrony, General Clark ,varned against the belief that the Germans are about to throw in their cards and cited the recent stubborn fighting
as proof thAt there is still fight left in tr e Boche. General Persons accompanied General Clark to the ceremony and reme.ined there when the General
returned.
The Army Comman(1 er returned to his command post !'lnd spent the Afternoon
in the area. Admiral 'forse, Flag Officer We .,,tern Italy, camP. to ~ee General
Clarl<: and talk rnatters over with him. The remainder of the 11fternoon was
spent in a series of staff oonferences. Ju"lt before dinner the Army Commander went for a short dip at the beach ..-.i_ th Colonel Saltzm~m and returned in
time to have r1inner with Archbishop Spellman. Following dinner General ClPrk
conferred with GenerHls GruenthAr a.nd Brann before ret 4 ring for the evening.
*
*
*
CECPJA--JULY 28, 19/+4--In tJ:,e early rert of the morning Genera.1 Clark went
over thFJ prepnrations for the visit of King George VI and then went out to
the RAF field near Cecina. At 1110 the King arrived by plane accmnpanied by
General Alexander. A review of RAF rersonnel was held at the field and the
party then proceeded down the road lined with troops to the Fifth Army cub
strip and airport. Here General Clark, accompanied by the King and General
Alexander, trooped the line of soldiers massed there for the occasion.
At the conclusion of' the playing of The Star Spangled Banner, which
marked the end of the ceremony, the party proceeded into the connnand post to
the area immedfately adjoining General CJ.Ark's van. The Kini:,; then took his
place in the receiving line with GenE~rals Clark B Alexander, and GenerJ:11
.nd
Clark presented all of his genAral officers and section chiefs to King George.
British personnel in Fifth A:rmy HeadqUBrters were also rresented to the King
as well as the press. The King then :i.nvested General Clark vrj th the K.nighthood of the British Empire and Generals Gruenther and Keyes es CompPnions of
the Bath.
The King and Gener::i.l Clark then entered the GenerAl I s van f'or a sJ:, ort
��~
G IL ; /
~
Q;
e;"" -#
I
~
;
9 ,r-~/>p,. ,,l.,..,
talk and were joined by General Alexander a few minutes later. The three conversed brfofly and then came out of the wm and sat down to lunch. They
were joined at lunch by Archbishop Spellwan and Generals Gruenther, Grittenberger and Keyes.
After lunch the Gimeral accompanied the Kjng to his plrme and saw him
of'f, returning subsequently to his comrri~nd post. He then conferred vrith General Gruenther, bade farewell to the Archbishop and then proceeded to his villa
at Castiglioncello where he spent the remainder o-f' the afternoon, returning
late in the even:ing to his oommand post.
General Clark today received the followin~ cablo. from the King of EnglPnd:
"I sincerely thank you for my enjoyable visit to your heAdqunrters todey.
It was indeed ~" pleasure to me to see detachments from units which h1we so dist5nguished themselves in this theatre of war. V/ill you please convey my good
wishes to all ranks under your col"'!mand. 11
*
*
*
CECINA--JULY 29, 1944--Genera.1 Clar'\r rece:ived Mr. Schoninger, m,tional Cor:mPnder of' the VP-terans of Foreif$!1 W:--rs who conferred w;th him for three-quarters of
an hour in his van. Following the dep?rture of Mr. Schoninger, GenerAl Sosnko~ski, Polish Commander-in-Chief, arrived Pccomp~nieo by Lt. Col. Szympnski,
American Liaison Officer with the Polish Corps, Pnd Hajor Miszke and Lt. Lubanski.
These f;Uests had lunch with General Clark. In the afternoon the Axmy Co:mrne.nder
conferred with Genernls Gruenther Pnd Brann. Colonel r.~cM::,hon, classmAte of the
General, called on the Army Commander in the 8-f'ternoon.
Lily Pons, well known f"etropoljtan Orera artist, and her husbrmd, Orchestra Leader Andre ¥ostelanetz who ro-e m~k.ing a tour in the Fifth Army areP, called
to pay their respects to the Army Commander. Generel Cl,irk received them in the
hut and spoke with them at some length. Miss Ions then sang "Estrellita" for the
General and his guests. The re.rty, consisting of those mentioned previously and
General GruP.nther, Colonel r~cMahon, General Hume, Colonel S8ltzman, Lt. Col. Porter, Lt. Col. Clflrk, Cartain Walters and Lieutenant Berenson, then had d~nner in
the General's mess hut.
General Clark went for a short swim in the early evenin~ before retiring to
his van for the night.
General Cle..rk replied to King George's cable of yesterday as follows:
"The Fifth Army jg most apprec 'aMve of tre sj gn.1-11 bonor which your Majesty
bestowed upon it by visiting its command post yesterdriy. Your Mt1.jesty' s grPcious
message is being colllJ'l'lunicated to all troops of the Fifth Axmy 1md will be deeply
appreciated. Your f-'!ajesty may rest a.ssured that vre will neither rest nor relax
in our efforts until the col"'lmon foe is decisively defeated."
There has been a great deal of question as to the roqsibility and pra.cticabilit:r of the enemy's using the Tower of Pisa as an obserw:1 tion rost. Following
are a few memoranda submitted to the Army CommF!nder on the subject:
��Report from General Crittenberger, IV Corps Co111mander, reads as follows:
"The following facts regi:irding the report thrit the enemy has been using
the Tower of Pisa as an OP are submitted for your inform11tion:
11 1.
Lieutenant Colonel Long st~tes he wns J11isquoted in the •sters and
Stripes•.
11 2.
Observers with field glasses were seen by two officers in the tower
on the Mornjng of July 25. Although a close observation has been kept on the
Tower sjnce then, no further observers heve br>en seen in it, and it is considered quite po~sible thAt the observers origj_naJ.ly sighted mPy have been in
civilian clothes.
11 3.
A partisan yntrol last night (July '27/28) crossed the river jnto
Pisa and reported only 40 to 50 Germans in that rart of town.
"4. Brige.dier General Raymond E. s. Williamson, Commr-mding troops in
\
south Pisa, does not believe it a.avant11geous for us to shell the Tower at tre
present time.
11 5.
The IV Corps Artillery Commander, Br:i. ge.d ier General W. C. Crane, investigated the observations of the 77th Artillery Group, 34th Division Artillery, 91st Division Artillery, Air OP' s and 15th Field Observation Battalion,
and found from them no definite innication thrt the Tower is being used as an
OP this morning. Two field artillery observers only, have within the ra st few
days noten unidentifiable persons in the Tower.
"6. According to General Crane, the Tower is in no ""ense an essential
artillery OP, as there are !"!any points both within and without the city from
which better results could be obtained.
11 7.
I have been in the Pisa area every da.y for the last three days during
which visits there has been no unusual hostile shelling. In ~Act, during the
times I was there not n single Germfln artillery shot was heard. Although there
have been three oott~lions of our infantry in the fire,,, one in the town rind the
other two outside but within range of GermPn artillery, none had received concentrations at the time of my last visit.
"8.
The casualty report for troops in the area is as follows:
Ml!
26 July
27 July
28 July
KIIJ,F.D
2
0
1
WOUNDED
3
4
7
"9. This Headquarters is in close i:>nd const1mt touch with the sitw,tion:J
Nothing hrts occurred so far to justify shelling the Tower of Pisa. If in my
opinion, shelling the Tower subsequently becomes justified for military reasons
I shall so recommend. 11
G-3 prepared the following memorandum on this same subject:
�3l
11 1.
On July 25, 2 Germans with binoculars were seen in the tower by 2
officers. ('T'he nt=1mes of these officers are bejng secured by IV Corps). The
tower has been kept under close observation And no one has been seen in there
since that time.
11 2.
Col. Ladue sttites thnt IV Corps hBd instructed 34th Inf Division
concerning restrictions of' firing on Lea.ning Tower of PISA. 34th Inf Division felt there was no necessity for fjre. The feeling in Task Force Williamson is thBt it is not necessary to shell PISA. Yesterday• s CflsURlties: 1
killed, 3 wounded (TFW). IV Corps does not believe there is any reason to
change their policy.
11 3.
Col. Ladue further stated there is no ~sis for believ~ng the toTTer
if used as an observation post, would cause fire And resulting casualties any
more than the use of hip;h buildings or the high terrain to the Northeast. At
:rresent there hns been no lmovm casualties from fire thet could be attributed
to observational control of fire from the tower.
"4. The story in Stars and Stripes WAS written by an enlisted man on
the staff of Stars and ctrires by the name of Al Cohen. This man writes human interest stories and jnterviews given are personel only and neither Division, Corps, nor Army have any control over them. The field censor with Stars
and Stripes is final authority on what is rrinted. Col. Lang was ~isquoted by
Stars and Stripes - he did not see any observers in the tower. (Written stA.tements to this effect are bejng secured by IV Corps).
11 5.
Partisan parties into PISA across river think Germans heve eVRCUPted
J)flrt of the town and estimate only 20 to 30 remain. Gerrmns are still to the
East and West of town.
11
6. Col. Burrill 1 s report on arty reaction is being prepRred.
11 7.
Reco!'lmend that any decision to shell or bomb PISA Pincl/or the tower
be deferred unMl further evidence is P.Vailv.ble to ind~ c~te the military necessity for so doing. 11
A.s
The report of Colonel Burrill, referred to in paragraph 6 Pbove, is quoted
follows:
11 1.
All the field artillery forward observers, Air OP's and TD forward
elements in the IV Corps were in~tructed at 0()()0 hours, this mornjng, to observe high buildings in Pisa, especielly the Tower, with the o~ject of determining whether or not the GermHns were using them P.S observation posts.
"2. At 1600 hours, today, All observers, except two, reported toot they
had seen no evidence of buildings in Pisa being used as observation posts.
11 3.
Two observers reported thAt they hl'ld seen unidentified people in the
Tower of Pisa during the course of the day. Their rerorts a.re in no way conclusive evidence of occupation of the building as an OP by the Germrns. The
detailed reports of these two observers are as follows:
~-
A forward observer from the 125th FA Bn stPted th~t he sl'!,w some
�movement Rt one of the win<foY'S in the Tower but could not tell whether or not
they were civiliPns or military personnel. The observer was stationed At 123627
and was using field glasses.
b. A forvrard observer from the 347th FA Bn, using a BC scope at a distance of-600 yards from the Tower saw unidentified people in the building between
1300 and 1400 hours. He also reported that something resembling w:ire could be
seen on the outside of the Tower.
11 4.
Lt. Col. Casey, Artillery Section, WEts orderAd to rroceed to the farthest forward TD OP to determine whether or not observRtion from buildings in
Pisa was troubling our foremost elements. He mPnaged to contact an outrost position at C. Ghignoli BadiP at 15-6?.5. He states that there Pre two church
steeples nearly as high as the To1•rer Pnd mtrny buildings in the tov,rn thr>t could
be used as good OPs. He observed the buildings continuously for a reriod of
four hours ;:ind could see no indication that they were being used. He stated
that the troops contacted on the outpost line djd not believe that the Germ,ms
were observing from the tovm but that they were utilizing the hill mflss to the
northeast for obserw.tion posts.
11 5.
Captain Wilson, /lrtillery Section, was sent to the outpost line and
got as far north ass. Lorenzo alle Corti, about 1000 yards due east of Lt.
Col. Ca.sey's position. His report is su,bstantiFilly the same as Lt. Col. Casey's.
11 6.
I flew in an L-5 along the Arno River from CepronA over Iisa to the
sea.. I saw no indication of any milita.ry installPtions, such as wjre, radios,
observing instruments or personnel on any of the buildings. The country around
Pisa is very flat and the only worthwhile observ8tion from a military view
point is the hill mass northeast of the town of Pisa.
11 7.
I had 11 conference with General Crnne, Artillery CoJ111nander, IV Corps.
He stated that he does not believe the Germ:ins hPVe installed observation posts
in Pisa but believes that they t=ire f:111 located on the hill ll'aSS northeast of the
town. He :further reported that he hqs received no reports of locations of enemy
guns, supplies or targets in the tovm. He further st11ted thrt he does not believe it would be worthwhile, from the inform:i.tion he now has, to f:ire on buildings in Pisa..
11 8.
The Deruty Chief of Staff, IV Corps, stated thPt both officers quoted
in the Sta.rs and Stripes claim that they were misquoted by the rerorter Pnd both
claim that they have no evidence to rrove thRt . the Ger!l'f?ns Pre using buildings
in the town of Pisa. as observation posts.
tt9.
From my investigation I have arrived at the following conclusions:
§.•
The build:ings in the town of Pisa. vrould not be good observation
posts.
]2. The Germans have not installed rermanent obserwtion posts in the
town.
There may be a few scattered OPs Ill8nned by Ttr>lian Fascists or German infantry units to overlook the imrnedia.te front in their vicinity.
,Q.
"
I
�,g. Thet the main observation posts are installed on the high, 1."ooded
mountain nF.Rs to the northeast.
10.
Recommendations:
~• That the buildings in the tovm of Pisa be not teken under fire by
our Rrtillery.
]2. That IV Corps be instructed to keep continual observ11tion on the
town and immediately report any in0ication of German OP instAlletions.
c. That the hill mass to the northeast o.,. the town be searched by air
OP observers, Tac?R pilots and ground observers for fORsible locations of OPs.
g. That if it is decided to fire artillery in Pisa, 4 t be coordinated
with a heavy air bomb8rdment so that the entire tovm is leveled. If one high
build 4 ng is demolished by artillery, the Gernnns h11ve Access to many others
that would serve as just as good an OP. In other words, if the decision is
made to knock out OPs in Pisa, the entire town would have to be leveled. 11
The Engineer report on this subject is quoted below:
"In reply to your verbal reqrest, the following roints in nnd rround FISA
(see ettached Maps) appear from a study of me.rs and air rhotos to be suitable
O.P's, looking to the south and southwe~t for the enemy. This HeadqUPrters
has no infornation on sites which are l'lctually beinp: used by the enemy.
I.
II.
III.
Q096658 •••••••••••••••••••• C1:ithedrel w:i th high dore.
Q097658 •••••••••••••••••••• Museum with belfry.
Q698658 •••••••••••••••••••• Leaning Tower of Fisa.
These three, buildings are in an east-west line tind A.re
of approxinfitely equal heights, four stories higher than
any other building in PISA. There are numerous four and
five story bujldings in PISA that line the north bank of
the ARNO River. Buildings of equr.l hei~hts on the south
bank neutralize any effective observation.
IV.
There fire numerous small hills in the PISANO HILLS tru:it may
The best of these is rt Q208635. LA ROCCA
is an old fortress on a rock ci:ir of M. VERRUCA with Pn elevation of 1824 feet."
be used as O.P 1 s.
*
*
*
CECINA--JULY 30, 1944--In the mornjng General Clark conferred with various
of his staff officers. At 1430 in the afternoon the General rent with General Gruenther and other of his staff officers to the speci~l concert given
at Fifth Army Headquarters by Lily Pons and Andre Y:ostele.netz with the 1st
Armored Division Band. After the concert, which lasted About rn hour end
a half, Generals Clark and Gruenth8r "'nd Colonel SaltzM~n drove to the General's villa at Castiglioncello. GenerA.1 Lewi,., Colonel Burrill and Colonel
�Q'Brien came for a swim and for dinner. After dinner Genertils Clark and
Gruenther went to a dance given by the WACS at th9 Enlisted Men's Rest
Camp Villa at Ca.stip;lioncello. He spoke to 1'18.ny of the WAC officers Pnd enlisted WACS , srendini:; ~bout three-qul'l.rters of an hour Pt the party. At
about ten o'clock the Generr 1 returm~d to his commend post.
*
*
*
CECJNA--JULY 31, 1944--General Clark left the cormn11nd post at nine o 1 clock,
accompAnied by General Lewis, arrivjn~ ~t LorenzPno cub strip at 0910 where
he was met by General Rutledge. After cnni'erring briefly with Genf'.ral Rutledge, the Army Commtmder proceeded to Task Force 45 where he was oriented on
the situation. He then c'lrove from Task Force 45 command post to IV Corps,
arriving at 1030. The General spent about half an hour at this point conferring with General Crittenberger, IV Corps Corr,r,pnder. GenerAl Cl/'lrk then left
for Task Force Raml'ly v,here he srent fifteen minutes, After '.'rbich he rroceeded
to 10 AGRA in the vicinity of Cevoli. He was r.iet by Brigadier r•axwell and
conferred with him for About fifteen minutes. The General drove to the IV
Corps cub strip from which roint he flew to the II Corps eub strip. Generrl
Cll:irk lunched at II Corps with Generel Keyes end returned to his command post
by air at 1400.
The General oonferred et 16o0 hours with Generals Gruenther and He.rding
for about half l'l.n hour. Shortly thereafter the General went for a swim, conferring upon his return wjth Gereral Moran. Colonel St1-unps of the Milita.ry
Academy at 11fest Point, Colonel McMahon and Captain Cfay, son of r::ajor General
•Clay, had dinner with General ClRrk this evening.
G-3 today issued PLA.N ARNO which is a camoufmge plan to conce:::il the
movement of troops and to give the impression of a defensive build-up in the
west rather than an offensive build-up in the east flank. The plan in full
is quoted below:
"1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this pl1:in js to gn.in surrrise by Fifth Army
in its attack agA inst the ARlJO River line.
11 2.
RBSFONSTBILITY. Within Corps zones, Corps Commanders e.re responsible for the execution of this plan. Between the Corps and Army rear boundaries Unit Connnanders are respondble within assigned areas. CamouflBge troops
have been attached to Corps to give technicHl advice and assistance . Full
use will be made by Corps and separate Unit Commtinders of the advice of the
Army Staff. This particulrirly applies to the Army Engineer, Artillery and
Signal Officers and to Camouflage and PRU experts.
3. GP.HERAL FLAN. The general plan is to gRin surprise hy concealing
the transfer of units from present locations to new areas preparatory to the
attack, by giving the impression of a build up of the West rather tran the
East flank and by creating the impression of a defensive rather thnn an offensive attitude.
11
11
4. DETAILED
1!• Reliefs.
PLA.N.
�(1)
Routine reliefs will continue in the same manner as
now carrje d out.
(2)
Reliefs incident to the atteck will be executed w:ith
the utmost secrecy. The following steps will be
taken:
(a)
(b)
(c)
b.
Reliefs will be imne at night.
Ch,-'1nges in gun positions will be kept to a
minimum, and when made, will be thoroughly
camouflaged prior to daylight.
Hormal sounds and activity will be maintained
durjng reliefs. This vtill necessitate such
measures as moving heavy noise making equipment while artillery concentrations are fired
and Making reliefs in small j_
ncrements.
r,,~ovement of Units.
(1)
(2)
Hovements to jndicate a build up of the left flank
will be made during daylip;ht.
(3)
c.
!1ovement of troops to new areas preJ)(lratory to the
attack will be made as far as possible at night
without lights except lights may be used in rear of
Corps light lines unless red alert blackout restrictions are in effect.
Direction and other signs indicflt:ing movement and location of units will not be displa.yed.
Signal Comrmmications.
(1)
(2)
d.
"'formal radio activity will be maintained in an area
from which a unit has moved by leaving sufficient
radio equipment and personnel to simulate routine
operations.
Radio silence will be I'laintained in the new location.
Artillery.
(1)
Corps Cor.unimders will coordinate Rrtillery a.ctivity
to insure th~t there is no general increase in the
volume of artillery fire on Corps fronts, (except to
repel a counter attack). Artillery in battle positions prior to receipt of this order w
ill continue to
expend a normal number of' rounds per day.
(2)
Division artillery not in position by 1 August will
he gradually moved forward into position.
(3)
M
ovements to new positions will be made at a.s lAte a
�date
as
possjble.
(4)
(5)
Registration from new bA.ttle positions will be limited to one
(1) gun per battalion 11.t HS late 8 . date Rs po~sible. The remainder of the guns will not fire unless srecifically authorized by Corps Coml"nders to rerel R counterr:ittack.
(6)
Battalion::; now in attack positions will register one (1) gun
daily starting 1 August. This will in no way restrict normal
registration.
(7)
New gun positions and neV'r ammunition dumped in bc-1ttery rositions will be carefully camouflaged. In old positions camouflage will be left in plD ce and activity will be sjmulated.
(8)
Reconnaissance parties will be restricted to essential personnel.
(9)
e.
Units now in rest areas will move directly to their firing
positions.
Advice and assistance in soun0-and-flash simulation at dummy
positions will be obtained from the Army Engineers.
Administrative Moves and Installations.
(1)
(2)
Camouflage of dumps in, and in rear of II Corps zone, will be
such as to T'laintain the same appearance as on 1 Auisust.
Dumps in rea.r of IV Corps, especially along Highway 1, will be
made to show a gradual build up. The advice of the ftrmy Engineer will be secured in this connection.
(3)
When possible, newly constructed roads to dumps, artillery pos1tions and other similar installations will be built along
covered routes.
(4)
f~
Adminj strati ve moves which jndica.te changes in location of
troops will be made at night without lights except thr..,t lights
may be used in rear of Corrs light lines except during red
alert.
Hospitals will be displaced forward of rresent positions at
the latest possible tine prior to D-day.
Control of Civilians.
(1)
Civilians will not be allo Med to pass through our positions to
the Germans.
(2)
Civilian movement in Corps areas will be restricted to the
minimum.
(3)
Civilians who interfere with operations will be evacUPted.
�g.
General Security Measures.
(1)
All personnel w:i.Ll be thoroughly instructed in security measures.
(2)
Operational plans will not be divulged to anyone who does not
need such information to carry out his assigned mission. This is
espec:t ally applicable to tj_me, date and place of attack.
(3)
Corps Commanders will decide when units will be br1.efed on the
details of the operation.
h. Smoke. IV Corps will maintain a smoke screen between LEGHORN a.nd the
PISANO Hill Hass to aid in creating the impression of Rctivity on the left
flank and to keep observed artillery fire from IEGHORN.
i. PRU. Fifth Army FRU will photograph the entire Fifth Army zone on 1
August or as soon thereafter as possible and will repeat two or three times
between then and D-day. Results of interpretatton vd.11 be furnished to Corps
and to the Army Engineer. The latter will then advise Corps Engineers 2nd
Army units as to cnmouflage r:ieasures which should be taken to conform to this
plan.
j. Camouflage Projects. No major c11mouflage rrojects, other than routine
maintemmce of old artillery Bnd unit positions, will be unrertaken without
consulting the Army Engineer to insure that Corps plPns conform to the general
Army plan. This particularly applies to the use of sreciBl dummys and of
sound-and-flash simulation on a larger scale th1rn routine simulation of 11ctivity at old positions.
k.
Patrols.
(1)
Patrolling by front liw::, units will not be increr-sed.
(2)
Reconmdssances in force will not be undertPken without approval
of this Headquarters.
(3)
When a unH is relieved from front line duty for movemFmt to a
new location for the attack it will leave sufficient rersonnel
to conduct patrolling in the old sector.
1.
m.
5.
Preliminary Attacks. No rreljmjnpry attac"k:s will be mrde without tipproval of this Headquarters.
Present Defensive rosjtions. In order to create the impression of a
defensive attitude present defensive positions will be improved by
continuing digging in of weapons and preparing foxholes and laying
wire and dummy mines.
SUPPLIES.
Additional ctimouflage materials necessary to execute this plan may be
obtained from Army dumps. Requisitions for this materifl 1 will be submitted to
the Army Engineer."
�CECINA--AUGUST 1, 1944--At ten o'clock a decor11tion ceremony was held at the
command post at which General Clark pinned the Distinguished Service Medal on
General Tate and the Legion of Merit on General Brann. Three other officers
were decorated with the Bronze Star and sixty six men of the 61st MP Company
were awarded the Good Conduct Medal.
After the decoration ceremony Generl'11 CJ.Ark received General GaT'lI1lell,
Chief of Staff to General l':ilson, and oonferred with him for about an hour
in his van. During the afternoon the General mrked on administrl'ltive mtters requiring his attention and later in the a.fternoon went to his bee.ch villa accompanied by Colonel Sal tzm~n And Lieutenant Berenson.
The lull oontj nues along the Fifth Army sector of the front wj_th patrols
from both sides µ:-ob:ng the Arno Line as wBjor elements of the Fifth Army continue to move eastward in preperation for the Arno crossing.
*
*
*
CECINA--AUGUST 2,-1944--Gencral Clark spent a quiet mornjng at his villa in
Castiglioncello with Colonel Saltzman. General Bolte came for lunch and a
swim. General Clark rested after lunch and in the late afternoon GenerP.1
Gruenther and his aide, Lieutenant Bajenow, Pnd two other guests came for dinner.
*
*
*
CECINA--AUGUST 3, 1944--Gereral Clark spent a quiet morning at his villa
swimmin~ and reading. The General returned to his oommancl rost after lunch
where he conferred with General Pritchard of the 1st Armored Division and
several of his staff o.i:>ficers. At 1900 hours General Clar:k- v1ent to "Accent
on Fun", a stage show starrjn~ Jack Haley ~md Mary Brfan, after which the
General gave a btL:fet supper for the entertainers plus eighteen of his ste~f
officers.
General Clark today received the following ~ble from GenerAl Devers regarding the change in Fifth Army PRO :
11 In view of important assignment, will you pleA se order Colone 1 Clark,
PRO, to report to this headquarters not lrtter than the 6th? I assurie that
there is a second in command who cAn carry on for you until Grogan arrives."
*
*
*
CECINA--AUGUST 4, 1944--The General spent a quiet morning in his van conferrin~ with General Keyes, II Corps Commander, at noon and durinr, lunch. In
the early arternoon General Royal, carrying~ ~essage from Assist~nt Secretary of War McCloy to General Cl~k, arrived at the command post and, together
v:ith General Tate, called on General Clark.
At 1600 Air Vice Marshal Dickson, Commander of the Desert Air Force, CP.me
to discuss a:i.r support problems .,.ith General Clark. Shortly after the Air
Vice larshal' s departure, Genernl Clark 11nd Gener1:1 l Brann went down to GenerP-1
�Clark's beach for a quick dip before dinner. General Clark had as dinner
guests, in addition to the regular me:r1bers of his mess, Gener~l Brann and Lt.
Col. Porter. The Army Cormnander conferred br1efly with these officers after
dinner and retired to his van early in the evening.
*
*
*
CECINA--AUGUST 5, 1944--General Clark spent a large pn.rt of the day in his
van working on an accumulation of papers requiring his personal handling.
During the course of the day the Army Commander conferred with General Elliott,
AFHQ Engineer, who was accompanied by General Bowman, Fifth Army Engineer.
General Larkin, SOS NATOUSA, also called to see General Clark and discuss various supply problems with the Fifth Army Commanding General.
At 1600 Generals Alexander, Hardj.ng and Lemnitzer, who were scheduled to
arrive at 1530, arrived and conferred with General:3 Clark, Gruenther, Brann
and Howard in the conference hut. These officers departed shortly after 1630,
and the Army Commander departed immediAtely for his beach villa, accompanied
by Colonel Saltzman.
*
*
*
CECINA--ATJGUST 6, 1944--General Clnrk spent the entire day at his beach villa
at Castiglioncello working on papers and resting in the sun. There was little
activity at the command post today, the front being relAtively quiet.
AFHQ today sent the following cable to the War Department with regard to
additional battle stars for the Italian campaign:
Battle participation award is subject. See your W71734, 28 July 1944.
This headquarters agrees on date proposed, termination of first campaign on
21 January 44, second campaign to start on 22 January. Request that later
consideration be given to award of third star for servjce in Anzio beachhead
where conditions were exceptionally difficult and hazardous."
11
*
*
CECINA--ATJGtJST 7, 1944--General Clark returned from his villa at the beach at
1100 this morning. Major General Harrison, Chief of Procurement and Distribution in the Office of the Signal Officer, Washington, D. C., called with
General Moran on General Clark. Major General Rooks arrived at lunchtime and
had luncheon with Generals Clark and Gruenther.
After lunch General Clark conferred with General Rooks for hAlf an hour
in his van. At 1530 General Leese, Eighth Army Commander, arrived and conferred with General Clark for one hour in the General's van.
At 1630 Colonel Sarnoff, Signal Corps, former Presjdent of RCA, called on
General Clark with General Moran and conferred for li.alf an hour with the Army
Commander at which time General Clark asked Colonel Sarnoff to accompany him on
an inspection tour of front line units tomorrow.
�General Clark today sent the following letter to Generril Devers regard-
ing the release of sw,11 unit commenders to the rress:
"As I e:xpL-.,ined to you in my letter of July 20th, we have already in
operation jn Fifth Army a system for the release of units And their commanders, as su,rrgested by Gimernl Marshall in his July 18th ce ble to you. Under the existin~ a.rrt=u,gement, when I determJne thf't a unit end its corn.mander should be released I obtain a clearr,nce from the AFW1 Chief Press Censor. A story of the mer:itorious actions of the selected unit and its commander is then :prepared by my PRO. A copy of the story, carryj ng an advance
release date, :is sent to AF'HQ so tl,at it may be distributed to the rress representatives a.t AFHQ ancl other points in the thePter at the same time that it
is given to rress representatives servjng ~t Headquarters Fifth Arny. Copies
of all released mater:l i:,l 2re P-lso for"Iarded to the :· rr DepPrtj,lent througl1
AFHQ for additional use by the Bureau of Public Relntions.
1
11 Your PRO called Gruenther triis r1ornfrg and lnd:i cated that the foregoing arrengement is setisfactory to your he2dquarters.
"I run having rE1ler-tse JTI,;'lterivl prepAred on three units nov· -- two regiments and a battnlion - ... which will reacri you wj_thin a few dAys. I rlan to
rrn.ke a sjmilar release each week. 11
Operations Instruction 1tJl, J.ssued today, reads
1'1S
follows:
11 1.
~• The mission of the AlH ed t,rmfos continues to be the destruction of the enemy armed forcf'ls jn Italy.
]?. Fifth tirny has developed the enemy rositions alonr, the ARNO River and in pr8pAratj on for the attac1r contfoues the movement and resting of its
troops as outlined in O.I~ •s 2() 8nd ".JO, which instructions contjnue in effect
until D-Day of tJ-,:i.s order.
_g. Eighth 1\rmy cont::inues operations to secure tl,e Mgl, ~ound north
and northwest of FLORSNCR and therenfter, sj multAneously '"Ti th Fifth Army's t:>ttack, to attrclr to the north and north,"est Pnd secure the h~ gh PToun<l northeAst of rRATA.
11 2..
Within jts new zone of e,ction Fif'th Prmy, on D-Day, :ria'tdng its nain
effort on the ri~ht, attacks with Corps abreast, II Corps on the right, to force
a. crossing of tbe ARNO River and t>r1vance to the north and northvrest.
Vlithin its zone of Fl.ction II Corrs v1ill:
•
(1) Force a cror~sing of the J\JlNO River in the vicjnjty of
J't' liTBLUPO.
(2) Coordfnating jts effor-t V"ith that of 13 Corrs, capture
riff. ALBA,,,JO and secure the arfm vfoinity Hill 493 (Q 4781).
(3) Subsequently, be prepnree1, on Army order, to attAcY to the
northwest from the FUCECCHIO - PONTE DI '".ASINO Prep and
secure M. PISANO. For this oper<"tion, the 1st Armored Divj sion and the 3/~tb Infantry Division wjl1 be T'lPde avP ilable.. I ]..Hn8 will he coord j n1=1ted with IV Corps ano chenge
in inter-corps boundary for such an operation will be re-
�l-f{
co:mmPnded. Direct communicPtion for rlannjng rurposes
is authorized between II Corrs, 1st Jsrmored 1ivision
and 34th Division.
(4)
!hintain contact vrth enemy forces and b0 rrerrired, at any
time pfter the successful completion of the M. ALBANO operation, to follow up a withdrawl action vdth all possible
speed.
( 5)
Protect the right flank of Fifth Army.
(6)
Maintain contact vrith Eie:hth Army.
]2. Within jts zone of ~ction IV Corps will:
(1)
In conjunction with the TI Corps foitfol attack, sirnulPte
crossing of the ARNO in the t1rea FO'ITEDERA - CASCI"TA.
Frotect the left flank of Fifth Arm_y.
Hain't.c"l.in contact with II Co:rrs.
Jaintain contAct by ratrol l'lction nnd be rrepnred, at nny
time a-f'ter the in~tial attack of II Corps, to follow up any
enemy TI1thdrawal with all possible speed •
t=.:
(2)
(3)
(4)
.£.
Army Reserve:
(1) 34th Division will be att8ched to II Corrs by sepPr~te
orders at the prorer tj me. : ending such orders, present
instructions on coastlll :ratrol t>.nd alert of units for
possible movement to IV Corps area reri!'in in effect.
(2) It j_ planned to make the /~2d RCT (less AT Co) Pvailrble
s
to IV Corr,s when tre 1st Armored Division is withdravm.
(3) 37oth RCT (92d Division) wilJ be J11Rcle avriilable to IV Corrs
on arrjval in t~e Army area, estimc~ted 2bout 20 August.
4. Instructions -f'or coordint>tion of nrtillery fires will be i ·~sued
sepArl9.tely.
5.
Boundaries:
~•
J"nter-Corrs: No change •
Tentative Inter-Army - Effective D"."Day: All ··nclusive to Ei~hth Army,
FnCCAS'T'RAnA - thence Route 73 to LA COLO'JNA road junction Q 706089 - thence road
to COLLE DE V~L D1F:L8A - thence Route 68 to FOGGIBONSI - thence rll inclusive to
Fifth Army, roe<'! junction Q 676352 - thence road to road junction Q 656380 road ,junction Q 663389 - road junction 698420 - '710456 - 680500 - crossror,cl
Q 6q2528 - thence road to q 675580 - crossroad to CERBJ\IA (Q 6855q2), where
roP.d junction ,vill be cormnon to bnth armies - q 7:?0630 - junction of R. rrIBRONE
with R. ARNO at Q 636696 - thence R. OMBRONE to roriero (Q 6374 - thence rord to
Q 570820 - thence north along 57 Easting Grid.
.£2•
6.
D-Day:
Irepnratiohs will be oosed on 19 Aui:;ust; conf1rm..,tion leter. 11
�42
CECINA--ATTGUST 8, 1941~--General Cle.rk took off, accompPnied by Colonel Sar ..
noff, at 0845 in the morninP,', proceed:1ng to II Corps, IV Corps find 91st Division. He arrived at the rr Corps strip and was rnet there by Generl'll Crittenberger. He then went to the IV Corps command fost where he conferred with
General Crjttenberger who introduced sever~l of his staff members to Colonel
Sarnoff. GenerRl Clark also pinned insirrnia of nmk on several IV Corps staff
of'fjcers who had been recently promoted. The Army Commander then returned to
the cub strip and flew to II Corps where he was met by Genernl Keyes. He conferred at II Corps with General Keyes Pno other Members of his st8ff, introducing them to Colonel Sarnoff. Then, accompanied b:r General Keyes, the pPrty drove to the 91st Division command :rost where Generr-1 Livesay introduced
several members of his staff to Colonel Sarnoff. The party then returned to
the II Corps cub strip from which point they took off for the Army command
post at Cecjna.
Immed~fltely upon his arrjval back in the commPnd post, GenerAl Clark had
lunch w:ith Colonel Se,.rnoff e.nd then spent the remainder of the l'lfternoon working on important papers in his van.
The General had a quiet djnner with the regulrir members of his mess :<>nd retired early to his van for the evening.
The following cable was received from AFHQ yesterdPy afternoon:
"Secretary of Navy Forrestal will be jn Rome tomorrovr 8 August~ Would
If agreeable please a.r vise where and when he
should land.u
1 ~ke to fly to you on Wednesday.
�43
Genera.l Clark replied to the .ceble mentioned on the preceding page as follows today:
"Delighted to see Secretary Navy Forrestal on Wednesday. If he is Able
spend most of day here and visit forward elements suggest he arrive 1000 hours .
I will arrange suitable itinerary. If his time is more limited sursgest he arrive 1130 hours and reID':l.in here for lunch. In either event he should le.nd on
our strip which will take C-47 and is located west of highwe.y #1 and is 11 miles
north of Cecina air field and 1 mile south of town of Gecina. Advise plans and
number in party. 11
The Brazilian Expeditiona.ry Force has arrived in Italy and is bivouacked inlril ,.
the vicinity of Civitavecchia. General Clark sent the following memortmdum to
General Gruenther with raga.rd to these troops:
11 1.
I have told Captain Walters to have the Division CoJY>Jrtander and RCT Commander, with two additional Brazilian officers , here for lunch on Friday. Wal ters will go in my plane and bring them here. Handling of the Briizilian Expeditionary Force is a very delicate subject and must be done right. I do not wrnt
the JRC Training Team tb exercise any training control over these troops . I
want Colonel O 'Br1.e_ , with a selected group of assistants , to absorb this JRC
n
Group and to conduct the necessary training. I do not want all the inspection
team to come from the 34th Infantry Division but to be made up of exceptionally
well qualified and selected officers from all our j_nfantry divisions.
11 2.
As soon
Training Group to
ing and readiness
spection, we will
as the RCT has received its equipment, I want the F'ifth Army
conduct a thorough inspection to determine the state of trPinfor combat of this RCT. Based upon the results of this inthen prepare our nroper training program.
11 3.
Please expedite the setting up of this inspection group in order that
I can explain it fully to tte Division Commander when he comes Friday."
*
*
*
CECIN'A--AUGUST 9, 1944•-After breakfast General Clark went out to Cec1na airport
to meet the Secretary of the Pavy, Mr . Forrestal. However, the Secretary landed
by mistake at the command post field. The Gener~l and his Chief of Staff met
the Secrete.ry here and took him immedjately to the command post area where they
inspected the guard of honor and then rirocoeded to the hut v1here Generr11 Clark
oriented the Secretary on pla.ns for future operatjons .
The party then returned to the cub strip and took off in L-5 's ,.ma flew to
IT Corps where they were net by Generflls Keyes ann Crittenberger an<'l then drove
to the 91st Division where they had lunch with GenerPl Livesay. They also visited an artillery position ana then returned to the II Corps cub strip whence they
took off and flew to Leghorn. At 1405 the party arrived at the cub fjel~ three
miles north of Le~horn where the:,r were met by Generrls Tate, Hume and Rutledge,
of the 45th AAA, Captain MRckenz1.~, RN, NOIC of LAg._horn, and Colonel Grogan, new
Fifth Army Fublic RelaM ons r·fficer. General CJ.nrk ancl :rarty drove from the cub
field to the Navy Fouse in Leghorn where they were briefed by Captnin MPckenzie
and General Tate on the conci tion of tl1e rort of Leghorn from the first da.y the
Allies entered the rort up to the present date, and future plRns for the . development of the rort. Captain f:Bckenzie stated tbPt by tbe 28th of August there
�would be six liberty berths in the rort am'l by the 15th of September there
would be twice thAt amount. Captain r1ackenzie explained the tremendous
problem of clearing mines and sunken ships in order to make a che.nnel
through which vessels could be brought ~nto Leghorn. Generr,:,l TPte discussed the problems of port clenr1'mce, the developr0 ent of dumps and <"erots
in the Leghorn arel'l and i:;enerally brfofed General Cll'lrk and the Secretary on the -rroblems with regi3rd to the re storr,tion of light, water, telephone
in the city proper. After this fifteen m-inute briefing Generrl Clark, with
Secretar;,r Forrestal, CEptain Mackenzie and General Tate 1n one jeep, followed by rort offjcials and staff o"ficers, thoroug},ly inspected tre rort.
The part~r stopped at several Britj sh anti-a:ircr2ft b2.tterfos in the rort
area, and Gener,:,l Clar}- introduced the Secretary to the commAnding officers.
i:.:nroute between the old port of Leghorn ['nd the new, o matter of two
miles, a company of the 100th Infantry wr>s forned, and Generr-1 Clnrk rmcl
the Secretary reviewed t},e troops ancl :interviewed several of the soldiers
who had been decorated. The Generr-1 introduced Secretary Forrestal to the
Commanding Officer of the 100th In:f'entry nnd th,·m rroceecled on to insrect
the new port of LAghorn. After completing the 1nspection of the port of
Le.c;horn, General Rutledge joined the party, rmd they all returned to Leghorn. Genere1 Clark's pnrty cont 4 nued on to the 4Sth AAA ~dtuated on high
ground overlooking the frno VaJ ley - fifteen miles from Leghorn. Gener:.:, 1
Rutledge 'i.ntrorluced Secretary Forrestal and General Clark to several of
his staff of'ficers and briefed Gw1er~l ClHrk's rarty on the current situetion explaining tbe problems of conversion of artillery troops for use as
infantry troops. General Clark ex_rl::dned to Secretary Forrestel his reasons for pu.ttirig AA outfits in the line at this time in order to relieve
bis well-deserving infantry di,risions so th::.t they could rest. Aft0r the
briefin~ General Clark and Secr, -tary Forrestal returm"d to the cub strip two
miles north of Leghorn where they took off for the Fifth Army command post.
0
Upon arrival at the command post, General Clark, Mr. ForrPstal, Captain Roper and stof'f officers went for a swim .. The Genernl entertnined
the pa.rty for dinner and conferred after dinner wjt,h the Secretary for an
hour before· ret:ir:ing.
*
*
*
CECINA--AUGUST 10, 1944--General Ch.rk had breakfast with Secretar;v Forrestal, CA,ptain Roper nnd his staff of'ficers. Due to brd flying weather, Secretary F'orrestal, i"Tho vras due to leave at 0930, could not te1<e off and so
General Clark su,,,.gested thHt he visit the 8th Bwcuation Hosp5to.l. The
Secretary vfoj_ted this unit with Colonel Bruce and "lCS met by Gener~tl Clark
at 12 noon upon hh return to the coilll"!and post.
General Le:rnnitzer l'l.rrived at 1200 and lunched with Generril Clark, Secretary 'F'orrestal and others at the comrriand post. After lunch Generrl Ch.rk
escorted the Secretary to the airport nnd bade him farev.rell. At 1420 the
Army Co:mmander, with Generals Gruenther, Lemnitzer an~ Brann, left l:i;, 1-5
for T.roC Eighth Army for a conference with Generals Alexander, Leese and
Harding, returning at 1700 hours.
�At lB00 hours Genernls Clerk, Gruenther and Br~nn left for General
Cle.rk' s beach villri where they sw:-:im and dined, r~tiring errly in the
evening.
General (}ruenther submitted the follovring notes ref;r>rding the conference at Ejghth Arrriy Headqur>.rters today:
"Last night General Hardini:Y, called to ~my tht1t Generr-1 Alexnnder desired to have a meet~ ng .,..j th the t rm Army Comnanders Pt the Eighth Army
TAC Headqurirters at 1700 hours today. He '1tated that L.:irmitzer would be
at our l·eadquarters by 9:00 o 1 cloc'k- tJ,-,is morninl! to tell Gener"l Clark of
the subject to be di~cussed Pt the conference. He said trnt 1no drastjc
chnnge is contemplrted; it will be chiefly a oiscussion concernjng timings 1 •
"TM s rnorninp: nt 7:15 Harding called to strite t:rr-t, Gererr:il Alex.'111der
now desj red thrit the reetinr.; he held at 1500 hours today, insteRd o-r the
1700-hou:r tiMe rreviou~ly arrnnged. It ,Ps r:,injng very hArd rhen he
rhoned, £i.nc1 T told him that Lem should check vr 4 th us before he derrirted,
because I was quite certain that our cub f'fold 1..,.ould e unserviceable until
at least 10:00 o'clock.
"The rain continued to fall 1.mtjl nbout 9:00 o'clock. At 8:3C' Lemnitzer I s aide called to advise that Lem had left A.AI by nuto at S: 15. He
reached our headquarters at 11:45. I called Don, and the trree of us rroceeded immediritely to Gern:iral Clark's van.
"Lem tol<l us t},at the rlan which Ge11eral Alexander woul<l a; scur,s at
the 1500-hour conference tM s aftArnoon v:rould be nlon~ the folJ.owinf!, ljne:
The Eiehth Amy attack will jump off on Aurrust 25 e.s rreviously rlanned.
P.o"ever, under General A.lexander 1 s new rlan it lill ;crecede the Gttack by
Fifth Army rnd 11 Corps from the FLCRF: TCE area. Furthermore, GenerD.1 Alexnnder considers that the attack towaros LUCCA is inndvisPble. G0nerPl Clrrk
should be r,reprrE!d to recommend the direction of' ::ittack by F:i!'th 1 rmy northward from tl-ie F IST0TA area, or -"rom the TRATA - FL0RE~rcE rirer-.
"This concept :ls an 1-mtirely new one ::.n tvro ir.:rortrmt asrects: First,
it clwnr,-es radically tJ->e timin,t; and secondly, it chnn~es the objectives
preYiously rrescrj bed for t 1 e Fifth Arrriy. The Secretf'xy of the Favy, lr.
Forrestal, ws a r;1-1est oP Ge 1erE1.l Ch.rk 1 s Tihen Lem r-rrived. revertheless,
General Clarl{ studied the plan PS tr0roughly as possible, under the circUJTIstances, and left by cub rl~.ne -ror the conference shortly after 2 :00 o I clock.
He ms accompanied by Brann, Gruenther and Lermitzer.
1
"We arr-'ived at Genercl Leese's TAC Hea0quarters rromrtly at 3:00 o'clock.
(}eneral Leese f;I'eAted General Chrk with the '"'tn.te,.,,ent: 'I am r;bd to see
you, Clark. I thought it would be nice if e hnd our meeting in the dell'.
Vle foi.md thPt the conference lmd been (lrrr-nged in n very pleasant grove.
rresent were: General Alexanc1 er, GererPl Clnrk, Gener(ll Leese, Ge"1er11l Harding, General Lemnitzer, General Gruenther, General I3r nn and L:'eutenant
Colonel Kent. General Ale:iroJ'1det opened the :rr0eting with the following surn\
mary: 1 You fire aware of the change in plans wl1ich occurred sever11l days ago
whereby the Main attack of the Allied Armies in ItA.ly was shifted to the
Adr·iatic coast. I am quite satisfied thPt this is the correct solution. At
)
/
�4c,
the same time jt was dec:i ded thrt Fil"th Army should EJ.ttack to gain the
FISTOIA area, and the LUCCA area. Upon further consideration I have decided that the atta.ck to gain the LUCCA area is an error, in that it
will dissipate the already reduced resources of the Fifth Army. I have
also come to the conclusion that the attack by the II Corps U.S. and the
13 Corps British, as now planned, will be launched Pg8 inst a very strong
Germa.n posj_tion,. and that it has little chance of success with the German
strengtb disposed as it is nt this time. I believe thrt a better plan is
+>or the "Sighth Army IM' in attack on the ADRIATIC Coast to rrecE!<l2. the attack by the Fifth Army and the n Corps in the cent.er. Jt is my idea thnt
the ~ighth Army mair:i attack should be launched on August 25 as rreviously
planned. The.n the attack in the center by Fifth Army and by 13 Corps should
be launched on my order rt a later date - say about September 1st - when
the enemy has reduced his strength in the center . In that way we would
have a boxer's 'one-two runch'. The direction which the 2ttack by Fifth
Arm;iT a.nd 13 Corps shoulr! t,a.ke is a matter for later dj_scussion. I should
now like to inquire of the Fifth Army Commander whether he agrees in prindple to my ne\7 plan' •
·
"General Clark repl:ied: 'General Alexander, I think thnt your change
in plans with respect to the timing of the two attacks is sound. If we do
not take the PISANO Hill Nhss it will mean that the Fffth Army will have a
very long and somewhat exposed f'lrmk alone>' the ARNO River. Hov:ever, I am
quite willing to accept that responsj bility. I believe thrt we will be
able to hold that front derensively., As to the direction ·in which the attr-ck by the Fifth Army and 13 Corps should be made, I feel that it is essential that the t,zo attacks should be launched as one combined effort. If
we attack northwest or northeast from PISTOIA, flnd the 11 Corps attPck
nortJ, from F;LORBNCE or FR.A.TA, vre will be separated by a considerable d~ stance, and our .i o:l nt effort will not be mP.de in tr,e nost decisive mirnner.
It f'urthermore seems to me that the two forces should be under single opera-tional control. In that way, and in that wtiy only, can '"e strike an effective blow. I believe that the direction of 2ttack should be in the direction FLOR.F.NCE - BOLOGNA. 1
"General Clark further sfoted thnt the increased length of flank under
such a plan would rrobably necessitate the use of an additfonal British division along the ARNO in order to rrotect the left flank of the Fifth Army.
"General Leese stated that he agreed completely with General Clark;
that if Grmeral Clark would only indicate the sector along the ARNO to be
held b:r British troops, he would make every effort to make them avr-d lable
for that purpose. He furthermore stt1ted thnt he planned to make GenerF>l
HcCreery a provisional group commander commandinp the 13 and 10 Corps; tht:1t
General HcCreery would be on the same level with General ClFtrk, and that
C,ew'!ral Kirkman would 1-ie on a level with General Keyes. Under thf't plan
General Clark would deal with General McC:reery as regr-:rds the operations by
the 13 Corps. There ITould be ve1~;.,r little need for General Clark to confer
'lldth General 1'"ese, who would have his heA.dquA.rters on the ADRil\TIC side .
While General Leese pledged complete coorer~.tj on on severe 1 roints during
his talk, he was very ca.reful to avoid any reference to the rlac:L-1.g of
Britfah trooyis under Fifth Army command.
�"General Clark stA.ted th·t this arrangement would involve many complications; thnt the opnr8tion by thP- II and 13 Corrs wr>.s one wrich must be controlled by one commander. The nrrnngement wherehy General r 1cCreery would be
on hand to represent General Leese would at best be compara½le to a 1 half
interest in a wife'. General Leese repljnd that h~ understood Generrl Clark's/
point-of-view, and that from a strictly nilitary considerPtion it wrs probably\
correct that the 13 Corps should pa. '3S to tl~P. control of Fifth Army. Hmrever,
\
Eighth Army had been split on sever.til occasions, and it was only ,Iith the
greatest difficulty Uat General Leese had been able to rebuild a real "'ighth 1
Army esprit. To spl:i.t the Army again at tr-is time vrould undo a grer->t deal of
\
the riard vork trrt hRd been spent in welding the Army into a unified group.
/
He believed that the snmc :i:ractfoal effect could be obtained under the pll:"n
(
whicJ,, he a<1voc11ted. He stated that Genernl Clrirk would always be considered
\
as the predominant p:1rtner of thE> center force, and thn.t General r,1ccreery
would be expected to follow General Clrrk I s "1ishes. He stated thnt instead
of considering it ns a case comrnrablf! to havjng a 1 half interest in a wife',
he felt that Generel Clark would have at least 1an 85~ interest in the wife. 1
"Gener8l I.eese 1 s fiMl plea was that it was quite i9)ortant that he 'control the ultimate destinies of the d-ivisions of the 'i!ighth A:rrn.y 1 •
"General Alexanr'er stated thnt he understoo<l the two points-of-view;
trrit it was extremely important tJ,,..,t the matter he dj scussed +"r;,nkly "'ithout
either inferiority or superiorit:,, comrlexes, rnc completely •ithout recrimiw,tions. He said that he would tf'lke the r,atter under a<lvj sement and would
give a decision on the follo7inr, day. The situation apreAred to him that on
the one htmd we hnd a case of cold logical military reasoning, balRnced
a~:=d nst a strong psycholop;icnl sentimental vriluf!, which could not be neglected.
/
I
":::1urjng most of the Leese-Clnr'k-Alexander discussion Gcnerr,l Leese was
ly:i ng on the gr01md stretched full length d th his Fms e kimbo behind his
head, facing General Clerk and Gener~l Alexander. General Cu,rk mDde his final point by stating: 'General Ale:,mrrler, you have heard my argurrient; you
have heard General Leese's. It is a mfltter of considerabl,.., enbarrassment for
me to suggest tJ,,at a British corps should rass to commPnd of Fifth Army. I
make this recommendation only because it is my sincere belief that it is the
onl:,r loP,'ical and correct decision in tr is situn.tion. I shall say no more A.bout
it; the decision is yours. I shall cheerfully abide hy any decision which you
reach. 1
"Genernl Leese replied: 'I run inclined to believe you ere right. I em (
willing to pass the 13 Corps to your comnand. However, I would like to think \
the matter over for a few hours and let Gener,11 Alexander hwe my recoJ11II1endation in the morning.
"General Alexander agreed the.t the delay "rould be sat:i sfactory.
"Casual conversation tren took place, during rrich General Leese and
Lieutenant Colonel Kent withdrew from the conference. They returned a few
minutes later, and General T..,eese Announced: 11 heve decided that for the be:::;t
interests of all concerned the 13 Corps should rass to control of the Fifth
Army. I am therefore will:inr, that the decjsion should be 1T1nde nov.r, e.nd I reco~mend that 13 Corps pa·~s to Generel ClB.rk's cornnE.nd for tris or,er"'.tion. 1
�"General Alexander r-nnounced thf't sh1ce Pn rgreement hrd been reached
on this point, such would be the decision.
"General v~ese stnted thnt he desired to have a clenr und-erstPnding
that the 13 Corps would revArt to ~iv,hth Army control RS soon as the BOLOGNA
area had been reached. GenerPl Clro-k ar1 swered thnt this was entirely jn
accord with M.s underst11nc'1fog, and thet he h11d no desire to ret~in control
of' the 1_1 Corps indefinitely. Generel Ale:xancler strteil. thrt this rlso was
M.s under::,t, nding.
"General Alexander rinnounced thn.t 13 Corps would rs ss irnriediately to
control of Fifth Army f'or planning rurposes; trat tJ-,e dnte when it would
pass completely to Fifth Army control would be 0ecided lDter, but that it
would probably be between August 15 and August 18. General Clark had rreviously mentfoned a serious ndministrative difficulty which would confront
the Fif'th Army in the new rlt"n of attack in that the rort of L"'"':GH0RN would
probably not be operrtive, nor would J-fir,hway 67 be useable. In that event
supplies would have to continue to oo received tr-rough the port of PIOMBINO.
As the a.ttac1'" yiroceeded over the AFI'E TINF.S this arrengement "OUld involve
rn extremely long line of communications, 1hich would rrobcbly requ:ire more
trucki:- than those nm-" avnilable to Fifth Army. Pe estimPted that he rrould
probably need rbout 200 trucks, and that he saw very little hope of being
able to rDise those from Fifth Army sources. GenerPl Alem:inder asked General Hrirding to examine this matter 'lith a view to determining vrhat trucks
could be made available for the Fifth Army from British resources •
.
"General Alexander stated that tre qw:!stion of ooundary between the
Fifth vnr'l Eighth Armies should be discussed mutue lly bet'\':een the two Army
Commrnders. In case of cHsagreement he would make the decision.
11
Tea vras then served and the meeting rdjou:rned at 1635.
"It was my impression that the meeting was A most successful one.
Gfmeral Clark h"ndled his case very E>droitly and rresented his argur'1ents
in an extremely logical mmner. ,..,hey ··ere "irrefutable. On the other hand,
it was quite clear to ne thnt Genernl Leese was T:"'ost cooperative i.n his approach to t1 8 rroblem. He ree.Hzed early that his PrP,Ument was largely
sentinenta.l. Fe readily receded from his roc:ition and rledp;ed Generrl
Clnrk 100'~ support. As e were ~bout to leave, GenAral ClrrJ.r \''armly thE>nl{ed
Gen'3rRl ,eese for hi.s unselfish arpror-c}, to the •roblern.
7
"From this conference there developed a rlFin whicb is fnr more e-"fective t}wn tJ-,e one which hP..d yreviously been decidl'ld upon. The ir; clisadvanta~e in the new plan is the delay. It is too early to ewlmte the
advantage 1·1h:i..ch the German will be able to take of that relay."
The following ceble was received today from .A.AI Headqurirters~
1. Confirmjng decisions ~iven v"lrbally b;,r the CrlC tod"'~~ 13 Corps
will come 1mder cori.m~,nd Fifth Arny for rlanning 'urroses VlEF 11 AuF:Ust r>nd
will rass to comn:and Fifth A:rrny for orerritionfll [n1d FB-i.ntenr,nce :rurposcs
between 15 :-ind 1~ Auo;ust rt -i tine to he r1 ecided by rrutur'l f'rrangnment betv1een the ~ Armies. Instructions r~gard:in~ the administrr>tion of 11 Gorps
11
I
I
I
I
I
�1
when lt passes to orerotionri 1 corrm1"nd of I<'ifth Arny wi:J-1 be issued by CAO
later.
11 2.
The Inter Army Bound:,ry suggested by this Hq to come into effect
,hen 13 Corps pqsses to operational command Pif th Army is the R 05 Easting
Grid 'forth of the r;o North;n~ Grid. Ar1'1ies will s:ign~l tl1eir agreement or
comment. 'J'he J ater Army Boundary in ReRr of the BRttle Fr01,t will be
settlec1 by direct a; scussion bAtween Arm:i es onc'l rerorted to tr is Headqur.rters."
*
*
*
CECINA.--AUGUST 11, 1g44--Genernl Clark returned to his commrnd rost this
morning et 1000 hours. He o~fici? lly r.,-eeted Colonel Grognn as his new
Fubli c Relations Officer nnd spoke to several of his ste ff officers j n his
van.
At 1210 Genernl Pascarenras de Poraes, Generr>l Zenobio da Costa, Colonel
Limn Brayner and Lt. Col. Freitas of the Brazilian Exped:itfonrr:r ::.-'orce :,rrived rnd were received hr Gen~ral Clnrk with a , 1ard of 1'onor, ofter which
they rroceeded to the hut where Gener. 1 Clark oriented them on th~ situt'tion
and pres,=mted Vl'lrious mmnbers of his staff and chiefs of section. Following
this orientation, Gener:1.l CJ.ark- e-ritortr>.ined the :3:razilian offic( rs l'!t llL'1Ch
together with G0nerol C'rruenther, Genert>l Br?nn, Colonel 3nltzr-m.n nnrl Colonel
~TcVa.hon. Captain Wn lters acted ns interpreter. After lunch the Brazilians
visitnd the G-2, G-~ and G-4 Sections, af'ter w1 ich thAy took their lea.ve of
Gen,cirr-1 Clnr1r anr1 returned to their crunr at Tr.rquinfo. :iJi1r..,ng t .e conversation Ge"eral Clarlr sfoted t}· at he woulr1 do ev.<rr;rtli-1 nr, possible to speA<l the
Rrt'.zili::>ns I entry into trie line. "'he~~ replied t:rrt thA~y were ri0st rnxious to
get · nto combat as soon t" s rossiLle. GenPro 1 Cl:lr r strited thc,t if th~ war
looked as th0ui:;J it rere .., 1xrnt t0 "'nc'l, he :vould sAnci ht' ck sorne trucl{s r-.nd
brlnp; up tlie Drazilfrns so tlif't they could r.i;et ~nto t e fiP,"ht before it w?s
\
over. ,,,he nr[l zilit1ns inforl'lm, Ge11<:rr 1 Clf'r-1<" trat they exrectec Generr 1 Dutrr,
the 11raz11 bn Var r.1in~ ster, tn visit tl· em i.n the ner-.r future. They st:- ted
1_
they •rere very satisfied wi tr tre Wf';r tr e:r vere receiving tJ-,eir equirment and
hoped to 8Ve n 7_1 of' it b•r the e:':1d of t1 e coming week. They e.::pressed sr:>tisf8 ct ion at the va-:,r they },~a been treated f.lnc1 spoke wrrrtl.y of t, e genert1.l admiration i.n Brazil of Genernl Cl;,rk.
0
Gemirals Keyes r-.1,rJ Crittenberger arrived r>nd conferred witl1 G'"lrer~l
Cbr1, "'or an hour. The Generf'l srent the rest of the afternoon in his van
and d-tned with General Gruenther.
General Clark to<l."'~Y received the f'o llovring letter from GeYJ.eral Kirhnnn,
General rfficer Commanding British 13 Corps:
"I saw General Alexcndr➔r today :>nd he and Generrl Loese told re of tl-ie
new rl.nns end t1-H1t '.:r Corps •·,as shortly to cone under your coTnT"n.nd. I look
fori•m.rd wlth confidence to t! 1 :t.s arrangement o..nd telcorne the oprortunity of
fh;ht:ing in close cooperation v:ith your gallant troors.
"'J'houi:;h stiD f\t the r:1omer1 t tec},nically under Ej vhth Army, I f'.m of
, course entirely .?t your disrosal from now onwarns f'or plflnnh1e; rurposes.
�5D
Though I am tellinP: the senior members of my stPff and r.w Divisional Conmander s of the new arrangements , I am issuing orders thr>t for the rresent no
one else is to l·no'1; I think you will agree th~t it '"ould compromise securit y
j_f it was to get about that we were cominis under your commend, as it "rould be
an indication to the enemy th1,t the main effort of Eightr .Arr~y was t o be made
elsewhere."
*
*
*
CECINA.--AUGUST 1 2 , 19/44- -At 0900 General Clark conferred with Generals Gruenther and Brann, studyipr~ or0rn.tional rriaps in front of Gen0ral Clark ' s van,
for approxirratel y an hour ., At ten o 1 clock Genern.l Sulliv:m, with GenerPl
Ramsay, 11.FHQ and r,rt1.TOUSA 111JwrterrnAster, called on Grmerel Clnrk. Lt. Col.
Newton calJ.Pd to say s:i;oodbye to General Cl;c:,rk and vra.s rresented with the Le gion of Merit . General ClBrk also conferred vd.th severe.l ether of l,is staff
of'ficers , including Colonel McClain, new Fifth Army Judge Ac~vocate, and Colonel
Ryan, Fj fth Army Chaplain..
At 1215 Genernl F:i.rkman, C'·OC 13 Britjsh Corps , i:-,rrived f!ccompr-mied by Brigadiers L"'mbert, Roe , ·7111.tle;r and 1.nJJdey, his G- Ors , QM, Engineer rrnd Sii:p1Pl
Officers rospect:i vely. General CL.,rl<: gr-eetea GenerP 1 Yirkman nnd Brigndier '
Lt>mbert end took the~ to his van with General Gruenther whPre they conferred
studying operational mars for half an hou-r . After this co,nfer,,nce , Generel
Clark escorted General n.rkmr 11 a.nd his . staff to a gua.r,1 of honor for the Brj_ tfah visitors . After tbe f,'Uard of honor General Clark entertained at lunch
these British offie er s , several rnembers of ris staff and Gener~ 1 Lemnit zer ,
who had just arrived at the command rost . General Kirkm..'1.n and st2Sf left at
1445, after which Genernl Clerk rnd Colonel Saltzman left for Gerieral C1Prk 1 s
villa at CAstiglioncello . General Clarlc had Genernls Hume, Gruenther, Sullivan Pnd Colonel Saltzne.n for a swim and riupper . General Clark srent the night
at the vj_lla .
Genere.1 Clark today received the following letter from General Leese :
11 You asked me to ,..,,rite you a short note on the state of tl:e divisions
that come to you in 13 CorrJs .
n HO 13 CORPS
Is an extrernely ef'ficient Corps in every wB.y. General Kirkman is an excellent Corps CoI'lmander; M.s h.,., c kground mil ite.ry 1<novrledge is of a hi':';h order .
Fe plans well e.nd his tactic....., 1 ht:',ncling of formations in the field is excellent . mhe dj_visions✓ work ,extremely harmoniously in the Corps . I rove been
extremely satisf'ied with 13 Corps as a 1diole throughout the operc.tions . They
have borne the brunt of the f'ightjng .
11 6
S. AFHJGA r,J J\Rf~011RED DJV
Joined the Bip;hth Army Pt the beginnin? of J1me , a newly f'orried division .
It hns fought mflgnificently throup;hout the entire ndvr>nce from ROlE to FLORB?JCE .
It has had some 2 , 500 casuelties, including the crisualties (some 700) in the
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Clark, Mark W. Diaries
Subject
The topic of the resource
Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984.
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns.
United States—History, Military—20th century.
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Citadel Archives & Museum
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
Source
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CP Clark
Relation
A related resource
Mark W. Clark Collection
Format
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application/pdf
Language
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English
Type
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Text
Identifier
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mark W. Clark Diary, July 1-August 11, 1944
Subject
The topic of the resource
Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns
United States—History, Military—20th century
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from July 1-August 11, 1944.
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
CP Clark
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Citadel Archives and Museum
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
Format
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application/pdf
Language
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English
Type
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Text
Identifier
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https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1637
-
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Text
To take full advantage of this situ,,tion Eighth Arny vrill ac1wmce TTj th
a 11 possible sreed dire ct 0 11. tl"e general areR F isR - LuP ca (?) - r istoia.
Armies vrill T1aintain gener:.:, 1 contP ct on their inner flanks but will not "'ait
on each othr}rs advPnce. Eneny resistance will 11e by t'R.ssed vfrerever possible
in order to reach above vitPl 11reAs quickly. Ei~l1 th Army vd.11 be respons'ble
for any protection that may be necessary on its right flrmk.
11
11 '.l'o save transportl'ition resources r>nd bridging rrRt9rinl 5 Corps will not
f'ollow up t1"e ,3nemy on tl~eir "'ront. If the Pdvrnce of Eighth Army f'eils to
fo-rce the onemy tc abr,ndon An conn r olish Corps will be novod form:ird later on
Eio:hth Armys rear Prmy ,:,astern axis to take Arcona from thP \'Jest.
"CJ ITC aut' orizes Arm7 Cornnenders to te1(e extrAJ11e r5 :' 1 to secure the vital
<s
strHtegic p,.reas nentio-r-:ecl in paragraph 2 rbove before tLe enemy cPn reorg;:,nize
or he reinforced . 11
*
Hr1 r'.!E--,JU'1E 8, 10Mi---T>;f"rly tl,is rnorn~np; tho liaison o-"'ficer from Eig;hth Arny
CHITtG in -;rith a personal nessPge Prom General Leese to Generrl Clrr1c, askinr rermission to use t}·e road Vall,erano-Viterbo-F,acborep-io. 'I'h1s request by the
'i;j r-ht:b Arr,y moPnt the virtur 1 stoppR ge of II Corrs sector upon relieving II
Corps j n the~ r zone of action . Gen oral Cl&rk Is reply' yrh_j_c} is riuotod belorr'
0~
covers h:i:s answer to GenPral Leese's request.
At Ofil,O General Clnrk, accompan:iec1 by Gen.r'rals Gruenther, Jo],nson, Hun1e
Beucler, and Colo11el:; Rri tten And R;ran 'ryent to tho Vatic,"n where tlrn:r htd an
i:n1die11ce w~th Pope nus XII. Gen?rel Clnr1r hac1 a :::;erarr>.te -!ntArview ,.,-jth the
rope :f'irst and tren ~ntroduced tho ctrer menbers of }1is ye,rty to the Pope.
D11r1np: his -interview with the Fop:, tl'e latter aslrnd Gereral Clr}.~lr to 3end a
messar:e to }resident Roosevelt express::'.np: to Mn l is most sincere regard. :F'roll'
the ,Ta ticnn Gener,, l Clarl' proceeded inl'lod:; ate ly tc h :is neF cor:imanc1 po st et the
'lilla SAvoia .
0
Shortly Pfter Ms nrrival here General .Alexander flnw ur frori Caserta to
see General Clark:. He was accorir,::,ni0d by Generrl Robertson, his G-4. Gen"'ral
Clark d:i scussed with Genernl Alexander the Eighth Army's request to use a road
in II Corr,s sector r-md othsr ml:ljects leading to th9 fu:rtl~er offorn=:ive northward as well as natters concerrdni? llor:e.
0
At l/;,30 Gener8.l Ckrk had a fecorrtion cererrior1y Rt his new cor1r1end post.
Du.ring- this decoration cerenony Genr,ral A1.exr,nder presented t} 0 Conf'l.Pnd
of
the B/'lth to Ge'1Prn ls Juin and Xey""s in t}ie nr->me of Eis r12.,jest;v Kj_ng George VI
of Englc.nd. Ge:rnrnl C1Pr1, thi:m rreseYJ.ted two r,edals o'' ronor, one to Ifc.
Knappenberger of tre 10th Infantry Regfr,ent Plnd Staff Sgt. Huff of the 50Qth
Faracr,ute Bf'ltt::ilion. He also rresented Legion of r 1orits to Ge-re.rel Dod;r, General flrosset o.:nd Gensra.l Carrentier. Legion of nerj_ts were a1so rreeiented to
Gene..,,..A.1s '1 r->rtin, Sulliv<>n rmd other officers and er,lj st0d men of tl 1 e :r1rt}1
Arny ::'taff. In ri ddi t ion., DSC I s, one DFC, one 3oldier' s :kldal r~nd enc Brcnze
Star ,·,ero also presentod tc o:f'ficers and sold·ers of his comne.nd. The ceremony
was q 1 dte i· 0pressive. A compos~te ?'oup of' two Al'lericr,n, one ' 1'rer1ch and one
British plPtoon coriros"ld the revj_0v7~n~; troops. '·'rench, British and Jq.,,ericen
.,...lPf;S were included· in th0 cclor vuerd, "nd all thTne national c1ntherm were
0
er
1
�\ 55
,played at the conc7 usion of the cerenony.
Af+,er retr1rn-tnp; -f'rom t!- e decorPtion ceronmy, Genort>l Clrrk, rAving sP:ld
goodbye to Genere 1 Alexender, 1crent to t}1 e l ort11 l io whore }10 reviewed a h., ttalion +'ron tl"e Duke of' '';ellinr:~ton 1 s 1.egi1"'1snt r:1 ,.'ch is attachxl to thA 1rd Division RS garrison trnors of RcE1A . This h=sttalion rassed by a sm,-,11, hastilycorstructed rev:lewing stand_ wl ich W['S erected for General Clark. LeaclJnp, the
battRlfor> ·,m.s a ScottisJ~ Fife aJtd Druri Corps .
After Ger1eral Clrrlr hrid reviowec1 t}- is b::=1tt0 lion he wr s met by Colonel Fisk
,.f t11e ACC and v,P.s cnnducted on or hom~ 1 r, si p;ht-see-·,..,g· trir of Ror1.e at tl'e <;nd
of v•l,:l ch he vm.s taken to lrince TJnh3rto I s } !"lrtee in tl~e iUir:l.nel. Tris vj sit
w~t,J-, fr:ince "mh:orto, v+o is no"r Iirmten::,nt Gs11oral of the "~e2,lm, lPstecl for
n.hout 1/0 PD hour. Gennral C1Ar1' proceeded irnr-ec'iatel;r brc1, to his cor>:n2nd
post Fhere he worked on ad.min:' strative n2tters r>.nd studied latest battle reports .
JT:i.gbl.; gbts · 0 r> tl1 e kttlo fTorrr3~s tor Py Fee, a furtl 1 •'r rushing to tlvo rorth
of all elements of t}P Fifth and Eighth Arr,1ies . To date tho:ir edvance hes met
VJ" th very little oprosition .
J.occnna5_ssance "-ilr-w,ents h2ve proceeded consirlerably
a}:ea.d of the rpin hod:ies f'D(' are "'ell to tbe north ge:n9re,lly in Pn east- ,rest line
through Viterbo .
General Clark today received a cor:irr.tmicPtion from GenerA 1 Leese asking tr Pt
"':-ie;hth Arn;r elements be peTir1itted to use the ro[ld V11llerano - Viterbo - Bsgnoregio.
He rerlied to General Leese as follows:
11 T hPve your lfa_:i son officer here vr:l th your last ,nessag,~.
I see no solution
excert to hri l t n'y II Corps in pln.ce rind po.rmit you to use the ror·d VAIL' :RANO R,J
J.,,,94'?211-, eastern route through VJTPJrnr. - BAG"·JQDr.:GIO 1.348. An intolerrble ~itu21
tion would dev9Jop if both Yir 1anan I s "'orce and J:eyes I II Corrs troor,s reachec1 tl'·e
road .junction Pt f+0./4221,, as tho·r ::>re rir:)()ut to, at the sAme tiP1e end .;f both Pttempted to use the roPd 1erid"ir,e- .~rom thnt roe.d junction to VJrr>ERBO.
11 Klrkman, Y'eyes nnd n:r rorreGentatjve hrve b9er, torsether.
~ lBve just
talked vrith Yirkman on t1-1e pJ~one , :ond also to Keyes , 1=1rcl told them both that
Yeyes "'ill halt in rlace. Yirknan '•ill be p:iven the road VALJX::RAN'O - VIT:~I?.BO PS
;rou desire, hit I do beseecl- 7011 -t:.o speed up Y:i:r1°T"!rn I s use of thrt rs rmch ro s
po·0•sihle so th,,,t II Corrs can r,:et c:cing :in rompli"nce rd.U1 our directive to ,·,ush
vigor ously to the r.rrth . T hope '"irkman cm f~ nd suppl', rc•utes rfter he he's
pass0d his comh'lt elements throue;h VI,,.,·~RBC v:rhich will tfl1(0 him on roM1 s to the
east, thereof .
11 Do not feel disturbed tl1 8t you rove bothered me.
I ,·ant you to 1'no,· 011r
interest is to fac:il:itete ,;,l,ir,ping th: Boche in his demoreHzc,r1 conditjon , re gnrcJess nf who does H . I ·"'ill arprec3Pt0 it if :rou "!"•ill h2 ve Yirkman keer
Ye3res advised '1J~en he "rill. terminn.te his use of' 1r1.,., ;nnr . 11
General Leose re:rliGd to General Clark as follows:
11
.
TharJ: ;mu for seeinp: Green- 1 :ilk:inson tbi~ norninr; and for your' ~elp.ful
reply.
11
1 u.nd0rstand thrt A..4.I hf'1Ve issued rm order , asking you to help us to get
��to Orvieto.
"I am sure that our noves Jceep ePst of any suprl;y routes of yours. The
only renl difficulty seems to be Vi terbo, find on the 50,000 r1ap there nre two
red roads - one movinn• ea.st of it and one nest. So I do hope ,:re can reach
ar,;:reenent over th is.
11 It seems to me so terribly important for us bot]~ to drive on, wr ~ le the
GerJ11ans Pre split jn tvro anrl before he brings dovm the expected further divisions fror.1 the north. And p, s I saic' in rny last letter, it ,,,ill s:we da;:rs if
B Corrs cnn operate west of the Tiber.
"As soon as I get the 'Tnrvi - Orv:ieto road clear - we '"rill of course
s"dtcl, our supply PXis back to the route east
the Tiber. A rnpid advRnce
to nrvioto will do '"'!Ucr· to help clenr this area - and I hore we sliall !'1.ake
rrogress 'vith 1~ Corps to 1711rds Terni - which wj_l1 help at the other P.nd.
0=
HHith many apologies for giv5ng you tr is trouble - and my most ePr:ne st
hopes thr,t ,ye mR;T cooperate togethr:ir in t'·is problem, to gain positfons ,·,herefrom we can both nnintain the impetus of ;rour p;rent "'dvance on Rome. fl
*
*
*
R0 11E--JU'JE 9, 191✓+--General Ckrl• received Gerieral HpcFarlane of ACC at nine
o'clock. After GFnorel rracFnrlane left, he conferrAd V'5.th GenerPl Grurmther
bis Chief of Staff. I1e ''!BS ver:v enxious to go and cnnf'er nith G,=iner1:1l Harmon,
Coni~'"nder of' tbe 1st Armored Di~ sion, but telephone commun:icetions "mre out.
- Our units ::ire r,ush'ng so fast to tr•e north thnt 11s forward r1 e2dq1mrters advance 1t :is clJ "f-; cult to mai"ltr.in sati sfR ctorv telephone comrnmj c• tion. It
was not lmtil Rfter llmch that }'is cub pilot, nhjor TTalJr..er, inforP1sd him that
J,e cnul,1 tri lre him to th1 1st !\.r"lored Divis ion cub field which Yras very close
to t.he commpnd :nost. Gener0l Glrrk +,h::Jn flew to the 1st Armored Div,; sion comrnan.d post whire hA conferred 0·,ith GenerA l HPrmon conc0rning t}·,e situr1 tion on
his front. Armored reconnaisscnce elmnents had r,assed t}'rough Vj_tc.rbo, 2_nd
the city '7as now an 2ur h::-:nds.
-a,~;... t.-~~J... ,2.,.:,.t:tL fo-.l:- .t:-;Jf "}~ J.<M ~~ t;. 4
~~ - 13..~ "3 V4 2-v-ti#4 ~ - 1.,J,,J- O'"W',\ .e,.....t.~ - () .....+ f.-...,..1 'ti After leH,rinr: Ge'.1.8ral Hr>rnon 1 s comrn1::m,-1 post, Gener;::,l Cla:r+ flew OV8r Civit.svecchia to insnect the r,ar1,or jnstaJlPtions and terrein surrounr1 ing the
area. ''hil,:i flying ow,r +,} e 112rhor, M,., rlr>ne bit Ft bRrrF,ge h"lloon 1 rire
wl 1 ch might hrve ended in ri. ver;r ser:ious r ccident. ,,,he lx1r b r,ttached to trie
bnrrage bRlloon did not exrlor'1e, 0 nd the T,].r,ne hed r;re 0 t c!inf'iculty in breakinr: P''!P~· :f'rori tl 0 "'~rp ,,J,5 ch ,,,as i.,el,1 triut h:,r th0, buoyn.ncy of the -inflr<ted
belloon.
0
0
Generr-1 C1Pr1, 1anr1 ec1 nt I i-"tori0 Pir""ield wl-icb is close to bis corin.3.nd
post s.t Phout 1730. AftPr he landed, be ccnferr,:,d hr~ ~"'fly "'ith GonPrFi1 Wilson, Cor· r1>1nder n.o IBS, rrl:1 0 hen. j1x1t Prriv'9d back frorri Rmns to fly br<ck to
Hap19s. GenorPl t'filson •·rj_'"hod to d'scuss "Titl, him briefly P'rted:it:ious means
of routine; surr,ljes to di .r:isions vrho Fore edw,nc"r:g so re:~cllv to tl1e north.
r:re ,-ranter: to send true}: corvoys dir9ctly to t,roors from Anzio by-passing llrrny
clumps. Gen,"r~l Slar1- told b:hn to ,;ork closely V'ith his G-4, Generel Trte,
PYJ.cl sol•rn the rrnblem.
1
0
A new bound.~ry has bc=ien °:et between II nnd VI Corr,s today.
TM s bon1dr•ry
�'..ill b0co•n.e on 11 Jtme tJ.8 botmdrry betv1een Frend, Corrs r nd JV Corrs r'fter
II n°1d 1TJ Gorps l~Ft,re been reU9Ved .
Battln nrocTer;g tor1qv "-i:rcls rmr troors -in rossession of VitF~r1:io and '2'Pr~111L"Y1.n . 01.n"' p(1·vrrce to tl-1~9 nortr ,,1ns 1J,qen r8.J):i_r1_ nnc' Yins de 11eloued into the
pursuit sbQ'.A .
The Gorr1P.ns are fp llin~ bac 1c rPridly.
nurin·· the ''1.0on hour GAneral Clerk cr;nf9rred ,·,-ith ·-~T . Tucker , n. WP.r corresyio11l(mt, ir}10 ".sv.:Jd for in-'. onrir--tion concerning his nurUence '.·?ith the rope .
Generq 1 Clark rern:i ttPd nr . muc1mr to "ri~·it8 ur hi!-, Purlience witb the Pope .
Col . Clark, 10 is rublic R9lntio 1s l "'ficer, submitted it, to tre V..,ticrn for 2p:orovel r-mc1 rmbsequAntbr reler.sed it to Ari,=,ricrin corresponfents. '1'he ::interview , as de:'3cribed by General Clark , ,~as submitt"'d to the F'ope who approved
it pract ically as ,7Titten and autroriz9d its release to the corre,,pondents .
0
The P'tO Corrim1-mique releasing Gener~l Clnrl;: 1 s interview
quot8d below:
11 'T'hB
follow:ing r1ay be f!ttr:ibutcd to General ClnrJ<-, but
11it}1
the Pope is
may not be quoted
d3.rectly: Hir-hlic:hts of the "nterview of' Ge11er1:'l Clrr\: ·-,,.; th the Pope, P June,
follow:
11
1. Generc> 1 Ck.r1: was deeply impressed, as were oth~r members of his
staff , Ar1"lr:i can, British 8nc1 French officers, .,,~ th trsi interviei:r with His Holiness . The rope "ms ~ntGrested in all mankinn;, regardless of' nPtionnlit,r, rn.ce
or creed. It wn.s the Tape ' s interest to J,9J.p nny onn "rho ",as in difficulty.
11
11 2 .
r2he Pope e:xpresc;ed streot Sf'tisf'action i"'itJ-, the sreed wj_t}, ·+jch the
Allied ,Jil:itar;,r GOi.rernnent rwcl elre:,dy mP.de rre:rwrator;r relief arrrngements in
cooperation rith the relief ag,mci "'S of' the Vr-itican.
n3 . 'T'h0, Fop9 renhi~ seed ·Iith GeYierr,l Cl•cs1~\: at ,r,.ceat length on his visit
to Amer:' ca , hou lovely Arier~ en TTns, how mv:ielfish "ere its peopl,:,. The Pope
spoke 0 1" hi, vjsit in LotF' :slanr1, and of ri" f:1-tght to the ·est .Gorst.
"4. The rope !1S 1rnd Genertll Cl.Rr> tc, C'""'•ve:r his warri regf'lrds Pnd :•·j ;,h0s to
!'resident 1foosevelt . f fter the ~nterview , GenPral Glr.r1'" sent :c ce½l,,,. to the
?resident, to cnnvey the Fope ' :, messer;e .
"5 . As Gener,.,l Gl'-"rk rras rbont to leave, rin attendPnt tclr1 tl•e Fop0 that
th=)re ,~ere 800 Fi.,..th Arriy solc'iers nn~ tin~ in nne of' the rcons o:'.:' th,1 Vrtic:on,
hopinp; to 3ee the } ope . t lthoncrh Uce I or:e had ni~ny engqg,3rnents, he ir1Y~0d:t~tely
renl:ied thct },o "'ould see tl..,em. General Cl,,,.rk ~mJ-i.cated to Fis EoJj_ness · h t
a .,..,1easure :;t, was tJ:--,-,t he WP s takfr,g so rnucb of' his ti:'le to s,~e our Fi "tr Arn·v
Allied mm", .c>or the Fopo hr>.s seen r1~ny troops ra:x1 p;ivc,n them his bless;ng. 11 "
0
0
Ge111'3ral ClPrk received a letter ""rom G'=)n9ral Dev,,,rs toc~ny v,' t}1 regard to
Fi+'th Arm:v troops f'or other or,srntions . IIis rerly is quoted
belor1:
t,l,r-, 'Ti thdra1-ml o!'
�\ 53
11 Your letter of .Tune l+th hns bPen received, and J. v,ent to tell you ho=
deeply I apprec~ ate the 1-:ind t1 ~ 1r,;s you say of' tl,e F'ifth Arny. Your message
'"·ill be ['pfr8ciroted b:,r 8Ver·sr riember of the :F'i""tb Arrw. :.': can ass11re you thrt
''e will k3ep up ou.,,. relentless rressure :\ga:iJ:1c:t t},9 '"lnemy and fight him
,=ireever ""re f':' nd him in strenp;th.
1
11 In rmticipntion of oth --r req11ireT'le11ts, T hr,d ordered iJI Corpt:1 rel.; eved
by TV Gorps effective noon Jurv':! 11th . An;r tine 2ftm"' t1--i;:;t hcmr FePdquqrters
and Headqw1rtP.rs Conpany, vr COJ'.'f3, is c,vailn.blc, for movement elseuhore. I
am leav·' ng Butler w: t}, YI Corps HeadquPrt8rs. You }::no· l·on highly I regard
him , but I hf've no im.."!l.edinte job in sicht . I am attach:ing the li.i+?nd Infsntry
to Doc B.yder 1 s D::vision and c'ill riut Rare;r as an extra Brigndior in that Division . I hr,ve been 1meble to f-i nrl P suitable job for T. K. Brown. If there ; s
no assif\'n,·~ent for him in the:! ,)eventh Army I s1w;gest thrt re ')e rerorted to tr;e
'.lar Denm~t:rnent P s o.va ilable -!:or 2 rn:iw P ssignne:nt . He has hc,en :i.n the tbeatre
sj nee Februer;r ? , J_q/,/t 11.nr' he 11"' s done well. He was '·ith the '~8th Dj vision
clurinp; its recent B.dv<1nce "rom tho CradgJ.:iano 'liver . I believe he will bo of
p;reat v11.luc in a new djvision.
"L!-5th Division is out o'"· the line . 3rd Division is likerrise out but is
n0eded fnr r> ,,rMle lonr;er in Rone to holp control the situetion here . /4.5th
Division can go at n.ny time you want it . I g;:i.ther th2t t1'e 36th Division hris
been selected as tlie third division hecause a requo st v;as received from your
hendquarters to desi,0;nate two nembers of the 1 6th Division staff to go to U. K.
:: had u.nderstood that you 'ryanted ,'8 to select the third division, but if you
want either the ? ')th or the qlst T shall h'l ve no objection . IIo1Yever I should
like to "know of the decision soon . n
In this conn°ction Genornl Clark wrote the fol1owin,,; to Ger1eral Ryder:
nr am attachinr t11'1 .442nc'l Inrantrr to tho "34th Division. Hm; long I will
keep it there , I do not 1 --no''', but I have no o+,h0r plru1.s than to leave j t with
you for the time be:; ng . You liave h2d such success in hr.ndling the othGr
H.A.w11iian- r,.r18r"ic.sn 11nit tbnt I feel qu:_ te secure ~n rlacing it in your good
hinds .
"I hcve 7rigadier r'reY1err,J. :-l:• rr:r nho is assirr,nr-'d to tr e FF't}, ;1rrny. I },eve
no job for him . I Pm asrdgnj_nr; him to :~our TJ:'.vj sion :sc, a.ri extre '3G . Fe "'ill
not bA the Assistant Division ConrPnr1 er ')Ut will be sn e-;::tra on-' "or you te use
PS you see fit , '"12.rticula.rly l.n view of the fact that :you will 1-T ve four regir1.ents . T desire yon to cooperate -i_n tl is matter ')7 riaking use of him , wl:,ich
will r;5 ve hi· eYperience wl'.'en I do need r,r10thr,r .Assistont J1i vision Corimr>nder.
0
0
11 You
have done
P
errand job, n:nd J
Qm
looldng forward to see;ng you real
soon . If
In response to a request by th'! rope, General Clnrl- sent the follm;"ng
nessRge to the ]resident:
11 It ""Vas my rleRsure yesterday to he received hy the Popo v1ho asb"d , bout
you Pnd •·equested r1e to convey to you J-,is bless~•-,g and vrr,rm- regarc;s. He reculled
,rith pleasure bis visit with you Pt Hyde rark . FP. expressed s2tisf,. ction at tre
way Allies aro distri' utin.p: fooc'l in Rone e.rea . He is of course greatly c'istressecl
over tl,e horrors of' rar . Fe appeared t0 oe :in eYcelle:nt heelth. u
�l59
ROME-•JUNE 10, 1944--The General spent the day in his van conferring with mem•
bers or his starr and in the afternoon proceeded to the Excelsior Hotel. Late
in the afternoon General .Clark gave a reception at which approximately fiftymembers of his staff were present. The General spent the night at the hotel.
*
*
*
ROME--J'tJNE 11, 1944--At 1000 in the morning General Clark drove to the Church
or Santa Maria degli Angeli in the Piazza Esedra where he attended a solemn
high mass or thanksgiving for the fall of Rome. This high mass was celebrated
by Chaplain Ryan with a French military chaplain as Deacon and an English
military chaplain as Sub-Deacon. Cardinal Tiesserand, Librarian of the Vatican,
was present, as were all general officers of the Fifth Arrrry. Nearly all
French Generals and high British officials, members of the diploma.tie corps of
the United Nations accredited to the Holy See were present and were introduced
to the Army Commander. Approximately 10,000 officers and enlisted men of the
Firth Army attended this mass. General Clark then returned to his command
post where he had lunch with General Juin. General Gruenther and Colonel
Saltzman were present with Captain W
alters acting as interpreter. General Juin
then left and the General received a number of visitors in the afternoon, among
them Colonels Gray and Bruce, General Shekerjien and Colonel Barker, General
Mason MacFarla.ne and Sir Noel Charles, British High Commissioner of Italy.
The General then visited his new villa, accompanied by Lt. Berenson and
returned to the command post.
General Clark today sent the following letter to General Crittenberger,
Commanding General of IV Corps:
"I am delighted that tomorrow you will assume command, with your IV Corps,
of activities of the Fif'th Army on our west flank. It is my desire that you
push the pursuit of the enemy with the utmost vigor. He must not be permitted
to regroup. Please do not use 34th Division at this time. It must have at
least a week's rest unless some emergency requires its use, in which case
please advise me of your intentions.
"Intend assigning to you in about two days the 517th Parachute Regiment
fresh from the United States. This will give you five regiments plus reconnaissance elements and auxiliary troops. I assume that you will employ the
bulk of your strength in the western part of your sector while using a task
force in the eastern part of yom- sector, thereby maintaining close contact
with French Expeditionary Corps. Perhaps I am wrong in these assumptions.
Please advise me earliest of your plans. Will see you soon."
*
*
*
ROJil!:--JtJNE 12, 1944-Arter breakfast General Clark drove to the command post
of the IV Corps and conferred there with General Crittenberger and his Chief
of Staff. General Clark then drove to the cub strip where he met General
Wilson, Commanding General of the Peninsular Base Section and conferred
briefly with him. General Clark then returned by cub to his command post in
Rome and spent the afternoon and evening in conferences with various staff
officers.
�General Clark this afternoon dictated the following notes for inclusion
in his diary:
"From time to time I have received indications that the German might,
when pressed sufficiently hard, employ gas. Realizing that his best op~tunity to do so would be when large numbers of troops were compressed into
a small area like our Anzio bridgehead, I directed before the attack there
that all troops carry their gas masks. Also brought into the Anzio area
protective clothing, boxes unlabeled, and stored them with the knowledge of
but a few officers.
"Real:i.zing that it would be very foolish for the Boche to use chemicals
but that he might be forced into it by a fanatic Hitler, I gave instructions
to my two Corps Commanders in contact yesterday that they would require all
troops in contact with the enemy to carry gas msks. I told them this must
be done quietly with no written orders of issue, and they both thoroughly
understood. I called General Shekerjien and Colonel Guild, my Chemioal Officer, and asked for advice on protective clothing, my idea being to keep
it in forward dumps readily available; told them that I had ordered 'troops
in contact to carry the gas masks but that others in rear areas would not be
required to do so but must have them so they oould get them between thirty
minutes and an hour. These Chemical Warfare officers agreed with the measures I am taking.
"One of the projects closest to my heart;· upon the capture of Rome, was
to secure adequat. rest center faeili ties f'or both officers and enlisted men.
e
I StL'llmoned all my activities connected with these and directed that .suitable
places be found immediately and started up. Th~gsollni Forum has been
taken over for enlisted men and starts receiving 2;roo-enlisted men tomorrow.
The Excelsior Hotel has been taken over and is receiving officers now. I
told both Generals Robertson and !la.cFarlane what I was doing, e.nd neither
interposed any objection but apparently they went to work on Alexander who
has indicated that he wants no rest center facili.t ies in Rome. Neither MaeFarlane nor Robertson had the guts to tell me but casually mentioned it to
my General Johnson who, tmder me, is the Rome Area Commander. General Harding is here today, and I told him what I had heard and for him to tell General Alexander that if he interposed objections to these rest centers I would
resent it deeply; that they were already started, their establishment had
been published to the troops and that the men who captured Rome at great
cost of life should have these facilities, and I intended to continue them.
I made it as strong as I could, and Harding understood the seriousness with
which I view Alexander's attempt to close them.
"Yesterday an officer came here from AFHQ with regard to
list. They had indicated by numer:f.cal designation some uni ts
involved. I protested; saying that the numerical designation
me; that I will make available any troops desired, but I must
ing. This has been agreed to by NATOUSA and AAI.
"Am glad to get VI Corps out of the line.
ANVIL troop
which would be
must come from
do the select-
It was the most difficult corps
rrr:, staff had to work with, for Truscott is not a cooperator, nor is his Chief
of staff. As a result of the1.r Anzio experiences, the whole gang have become
a gang of prima donnas. I would sooner release that corps before any others.
�"Gave certain instructions to Crittenberger by letter yesterday as quoted
in yesterday's diary and confirmed them today during my visit to his sector.
He appeared to have the situation well in hand."
*
*
*
ROME-•JUNE 13, 1944--General Clark spent the morning at his van and after
lm1ch General Robertson called and conferred at some length with General Clark.
After General Robertson's departure, General Clark drove to the Foro .Mussolini
where he made a speech a.nd opened the enlisted men's rest center there. He
was accompanied to this by Generals Gruenther, Brann, Poydenot and Colonels
Britten and Saltzman. The General then visited the installations at the rest
center accompanied by Colonel Bertholf and went for a short swim in Mussolini's
pool. General Clark then returned to the command post and shortly thereafter
proceeded to his villa where he had dinner, having as his guests Generals
Gruenther, Brann and Saltzman.
After dinner General Clark proceeded to the Grand Hotel where he pinned
the stars of a Major General on the Commanding General of the 3rd Division,
John w. 0 1Daniel and the eagles of a full colonel on Colonel Johnson, Chief of
Starr of the same division.
General Clark's notes on the day's activities are as follows:
"There has been considerable discussion by British senior officers concerning the Fifth Army Rest Centers. Knowing there would be this pt"ejudice,
I told Alexa.mer, Harding, Robertson and MaaFarlane of my intentions. I told
them immediately after I entered Rome so that if there were objections I could
be advised. They did not challenge me, but I heard rumbling of their disfavor
which finally appeared in orders which have never come to me. I told Harding
that I heard orders were being issued denying me this pt"ivilege and that if
such orders were issued without my having a chance to discuss the subject with
the Commander-in-Chief, I would resent it deeply, and it would cause me great
embarrassment~ SU1"e enough, the orders have been issued denying the right to
have rest centers in Rome.
"When I heard this, I sent for Robertson and gave him my views very forcibly. He assured me that the Commander-in-Chief had no idea of embarrassing
me nor of changing what I have done for the time being. I am continuing to
run my rest centers and w;l.11 not give them up without a terrific mttle. The
order also prescribed that no enlisted men can come in town at night. I have
challenged that and issued orders that my men can stay in until eleven o'clock
and will not be severe on those who remain in over night."
*
*
*
ROME-JUNE 14, 1944--During the morning the General conferred in his van with
vs.rious staff' officers, and he continued this into the early afternoon. Later
in the afternoon the Army Col!'.!Jn8.nder went to his villa where he had dinner and
played bridge after supper, having as his guests General Gruenther, Colonel
Porter and Captain Jones. Major Roberts also called and discussed the pictorial history of the Fifth Army with General Clark. The General spent the night
at his villa.
�ROHE--JUNE 15, 1944-After breakfast the General drove to the 45th Division
command post west of Rome where he was received by General Eagles. The
General then proceeded to the area of the 157th Infantry where he presented
battle streamers to the guidons or the 2nd Batte.lion of that Regiment. The
General then drove back to Rome. During the ,afternoon the General co~erred
with officers of his staff in his van and at 1630 General Juin called and
conferred with General Clark, Captain Walters acted as interpreter during
this meeting. The two Generals discussed at some length the General's per· sonal future, General Clark stating that he would speak of it to General
Marshall in his forthcoming visit. General Juin seemed a little bitter at his
fate and said he expected. to retire to his farm. General Clark told him how
much he appreciated the fine cooperation and the work of the French Expedi•
tions.ry Corps and General /uin in particular and how eager he was that that
cooperation should continue. General Juin then left and General Clark attended a party given in his honor by the British Increment on the occasion
of their departure from Fifth Army Headquarters. At this party General Cl.ark
was presented with a table and engraved plaque by the British Increment.
General Clark dictated the following notes this afternoon for inclusion
in his diary:
"I have known, of course, for many months of the impending ANVIL Opera-tion. I have known of it for I was its commander for a long time. It was
indicated to me that the VI Corps with the 3rd, 36th and 45th Divisions,
which I nominated, would go as soon AS we bad captured Rome. I had planned,
of course, on it and am prepared to release them immediately. I also knew
that the French Expeditionary Corps would leave me. I Assume that the Combined Chiefs of Staff ma.king these decisions know what they are doing and
if ANVIL is launched feel that it will contr1bute much to the invasion and
the second front more than our continued effort in Italy. I am convinced
that the CCS are wrong, for they ma.de their decision to prepare for this
operation without realizing the great success the Fifth and Eighth Armies
were to ha-ve in Italy. The' morale of the Fifth Army is sky high. The Boche
is defeated, disorganized and demoralized. Now is the time to exploit the
success. Yet, in the middle of this success I lose one Corps Headquarters
and five divisions - three immediately and two within another two weeks.
In other words, to prepare for the eventuality of ANVIL they are sacrificing
a great victory here. It just doesn't make sense. I am convinced that the
Fifth Army, with its present means, with its high esprit and with a great
victory under its belt can march into France overland sooner than any amphibious operation can be started.
"The depressing part of this is the case of General Juin. He is a
superlative commander and leader. He has performed magnificently in combat,
has cooperated 100% with me, and we each have mutual admiration and respect
for the other, as do all our troops. This egotistical DeGaulle, impelled by
ambitions and guided by political feuds, is ca.sting Juin aside. Juin has
heard nothing f'rom his government, but he has received indications as to his
fate. He and his whole_staff are depressed. His state of mind is bound to
reflect on the battle, so again we are losing the battle we have won so
dearly.
"General Marshall is coming Monday to see me.
I will spare no words in
�telling him of this deplorable situation which now confronts the Fifth Army
and its French troops.
"I have direeted Juin to keep on pushing as hard as he can, forgetting
the clouds which threaten him and that I am sure that things will work out
soon. He has promised to do so.
"This evening I attended a farewell cocktail party given by the British
officers who have served on my staff so long and so loyally. They brought
up the enlisted men who had made up a ca.rd table out of metal from a German
plane and the wood and glass from materials taken from the battlefield. It
is beautifully engraved, and I appreciate the sentiment it expresses."
Captain Walters, aide to the Army Commander, was the interpreter at
General Clark's conferenoa with General Juin, and he made the following notes:
"General Clark received General Juin in his van in the Fifth Army command
post at the Villa. Snvoia in Rome today at 1645. General Gruenther, the Chief
of Staff, and Captain Walters, the interpreter, were the only other persons
present. General Clark began by stating that he had received some information
that he wanted to impart to General Juin. He stated that he had been informed
that two divisions were to be withdrawn from the FEC for use in other operations. He stated that he had seen General Devers earlier in the afternoon and
had endeavored some definite information concerning this from hiin but that
General Devers did not have anything definite on it. General Clark stated
. that he did not believe that a definite decision had been taken regarding the
carrying out of these operations but that he believed that a definite decision
to prepare for them had been taken. General Juin indicated that he had had indications of something or the sort. General Clark then stated that two or the
Frenoh Divisions were to be withdrawn from the line and sent to Naples where
they would pass under the operational control of the u. s. Seventh Army.
"At this point General Gruenther specified that they would be infantry
divisions, and that this would exclude the mountain divisions. General Juin
stated that he had not had any instructions and that naturally he would have
to communicate this information 'to General DeGaulle. General Juin expressed
strong disapproval of the idea and stated that this would be tantamount to
withdrawing four divisions, as when the FEC arrived on the Appenines, the two
divisions would be tired and would have to be withdrawn to rest and that there
would be no units to replace them and this would be equivalent to withdrawing
the whole FEC. General Clark heartily concurred and stated ths.t he thought
it was shameful. He stated that he also would lose some American units as he
had already been notified or the withdrawal of the VI Corps, the 45th Division,
the 3rd Division end the 36th Division and other supporting units whose phased
withdrawal date he would be notified of later. He then told General Juin that
one or the French Divisions was to be withdrawn on June 24th and the other one in
the first week in July. General Juin reluctantly stated that he could do this .
and then discussed with General Clark the details of movement.
"General Clark expressed his regret that art.er this great victory in Italy
they be not allowed to exploit it fully and thought the whole thing shamef'ul,
he added that he had tried to obtain more details but had been as yat unsuccessful. 1Very secret' comented General Juin drily. General Clark stated
�that some definite decision would have to be reached soon. He then stated
that he was getting the 9ls.t Division from the u. s. and possibly the 92nd.
General Juin stated again that ~e would have to notify General DeGaulle
for after all, in the final anal:,sis, it was his (Juin 1 s) government that
controlled the troops. He stated that he had heard rumors to this effect
some time ago and bad written General DeGaulle expressing his opposition.
General Clark then stated that he believed that General De Lattre de Tassigny had been designated as Commnder of the French lmits in this operation. General Juin nodded and asked w
hether there would be a French Army.
General Gruenther, stated that he did not think so at the beginning but
that there probably would be later. General Gruenther also asked whether
there were any other French troops available. General Juin stated that
there were not to his knowledge, there had been a Third Corps, but it had
been dissolved. He stated, however, that it might be reconstituted, as
'after all, the:, have got to hRve Army Corps'.
"General Clark then told General Juin in great confidence that General
Marshall would arrive in Ital:, shortly, perhaps Sunday- or Monday, and that
he was coming from a visit to General Eisenhower. General Clark added that
he would bring General Marshall to visit General Juin at his headquarters,
or if General Marshall did not have time, General Juin could see him at
General Clark's headquarters. General Clark stated that he thought that
until he had spoken to General Marshall that they (He and General Juin)
should continue to push on just the way they bad in the past along the
established bolmdarias. He stated that he knew that the proposed withdrawal of troops would leave the FEC with too wide a sector and that he would
also find his American elements in the same position and that in consequence
he would have to ask General Alexander to reduce his sector in conformity
with his capacity to advance. General Juin stated thRt he also felt that this
would be necessary as all he would have left would be two divisions and the
Goums.
?
"General Clark then told General Juin thBt General Alexander did not yet
even know of this decision, and that he (General Clark) had just spoken to
General Harding about it. General Juin expressed his surprise at this and
asked whence came the information. He was told that it came from AFHQ and
General Clark added that even General Wilson was opposed to it. General
Juin stated that in his opinion it was a great pity that a tentative operation against the Mediterranean ooe.st of France in perhaps September, should
paralyze the exploitation of a great victory now. General Clark stated that
he believed that General Eisenhower was holding this other operation in case
he needed it. General Juin replied that this precaution would ca.use us to
lose the battle or Italy, and that it was too bad as it was in the 'plains
of the Po' that we must destroy the German reserves. General Juin stated
that there the enemy would have diffioulty in supplying his troops due to
the passes in the mountains. General Juin stated that history would judge
this decision severely-. General Clark agreed emphatically and stated that
he had protested, but that now as a good soldier he would obey orders and
release the units as requested. General Juin commented cryptiea.11:, 'well,
events will turn out as they do'. He repeated once more that he would have
to tell General DeGaulle about this decision, and stated once more that
this was a 'be.d plan'.
�"General Clark then stated tha.t General Carpentier had given him to
understand that General Juin would not serve under General De Lattre.
General Juin shrugged his shoulders and stated 'No, it would be impossible'.
General Cl.ark then stated to General Juin that if they were allowed to con•
tinue they would get to France, Berlin or anywhere else thRt they would
buy them a ticket to faster than anyone else. General Juin agreed. He
further said that he wouldn't stay with two divisions, but would turn over
the command, perhaps to Larminat who had a big staff. 'I will retire to
my farm' he said. 'I'll buy a farm alongside of your_• said General Clark.
s
General Clark further stated that he had not given up fighting and would talk
to General Marshall and tell him that we wanted General Juin alongside of
us as our relations had always been very close and most friendly. General
Ju1.n said that they should do what was possible against the plan but not to
worry about it; that they were interested in him, and General Clark added
that in. war personalities do co'llllt.
"General Clark then stated that it was too be.d that the exploitation of
this great viatory should be interfered with by politics and so forth, adding
that General DeGaulle saw this operation as the quickest way back to France,
with consequent liberation of a portion thereof. General Juin nodded his
head in agreement. General Juin then said that he would always be happy
that he had fought the Germans in Italy with General Clark and he had fought
a war of movement, and that this was all a General could dream of. General
Clark then stated that he felt that until he had seen and spoken with General Marshall they proceed e::matly as before along the newly established
bo'tllldaries. General Gruenther then stated thRt these bo'tllldaries would go
into effeat at 0800 tomorrow morning. General Juin agreed.
"General Juin then asked some questions concerning motor transportation
that he desired to have to move some of his troops, and General Gruenther
stated that unfortunately motor transportation was causing a minor crisis.
He stated that three hundred trucks had been borrowed from the -45th Division
to move supplies but that the trucks had to be returned today. General Juin,
who had an appointment for a ptrade then rose to leave and was accompanied
to his ear by General Clark and the two Gem,rals parted cordially."
*
*
*
ROME-..JUNE 16, 1944--General Clark spent the morning in his van, conferring
with various staff officers and taking care of an accumulation of administrative matters. In the afternoon Generals Keyes and Harmon called on the General to discuss the pending assault of the 1st Armored Division.
General Clark today received the following letter from General Crittenberger:
"I am taking this means of reaching you because of the pi-esent i.mcartainty in telephone connections.
"The 36th Division as you know, has been fighting continuously now since
it broke out of the ANZIO beachhead May 23rd. Since the capture of ROME, it
has advanced more than eighty miles, and still has considerable fight left in
�it. However, with a view to maintaining the present impetus of the advance,
the relief of the 36th Division by the 34th Division, sometime in the future,
deserves consideration. The 34th Division has benefited much from its stay
in the rear area since June 9th. By June 23rd it will have ha,d two weeks of
refttting, rehabilitation and recuperation. Therefore, it should be ready
sometime next week to replace the 36th Division. The exact date of such a
passage of lines will depend to a great extent on the situation at that time,
particularly with reference to the hostile strength which we may or may not
find in our immediate front.
"In the meantime, the 1st Armored Division has been directed to be prepared to reenter active operations on June 18th under command of this Corps.
As a result of a conference this morning with Harmon, it would appear that
the 1st Armored Division, if it is to be used, could start its narch up to
the front by separate Combat Commands either Sunday or Monday, June 18th or
19th, closing in the forward area the night of June 2oth or 21st. If there
is no greater urgency resulting from the hostile situation than now exists,
this "'rmored march forward might be delayed until Monday the 19th, in which
case the division would be closed up here by Wednesday night, June 21st.
"In considering plans for the employment of the 1st Armored Division
and after consultation with Harmon, I am of the opinion that once we break
through whatever hostile resistance we may find on the GROSSETO - ORVIETO
line, the lat Armored Division reinforced by some additional reconnaissance,
self-propelled artillery and infantry might be shot forward through the gA,p
made by the infantry, and with a fair chance or making rapid progress to
the NORTHWEST. It would be the plan for the armored advance to be made in
two or more columns on roads inland from the coast, where it is believed
there will be fewer demolitions. As the advance to the NORTHWEST gains momentum, sharp hooks down hill toward the coast might very well result in
cutting off hostile troops along Highway 1.
"Following the 1st Armored Division and also on at least two or more
roads, would be the 34th Division, which by that time could employ the Japanese ROT and also the 517th Airborne ROT.
"Such a plan would be bold, and should increase the tempo of the advance. In order to succeed, preparations for it should be made in the
greatest detail, and coordination should be as near perfect as possible.
This means that the French Corps on our right, informed of the plans, might
find it possible to make corresponding gains by closely following our armor
in their own zone. Also it might be possible to incorporate in the plan a
short quick amphibious operation as you described.
"In event it is not desirable to employ the 1st Armored Division at
this time, it would then appear appropriate to relieve the 36th Division by
the 34th Division sometime during the period Jmie 21st - 24th, again depending largely on the hostile situation on our front; and continuing the employment of a mobile, hard-hitting force in the right of the IV Corps zone.
This mobile force might be made up of one Mechanized Reconnaissance Squadron,
one infantry ROT, one battalion of self-propelled artillery, one tank ba.t talion, and engineers, etc. If the hostile resistance does not increase as we
advance northward, it would be reasonable to expect that such a plan would
�result in an advance at approximately the same rate as that of the American
troops since crossing the TIBER.
"The above plans in tentative form are submitted to you for your consi•
deration. Within the next day or so, I hope to be able to see you and learn
of yo'ID." desires."
The following cable was received today from General Alexander:
"l. I fully realize that the withdrawal of divisions as ordered by
AFHQ from your command at this stage must create considerable difficulties
for you. At the same time we should lay ourselves open to a very serious
charge of impeding the overall war effort if we continued to press for the
retention of formations which in my opinion we cannot fully employ during
the present phase of operations.
"2. When we have captured Florence and Leghorn and have driven the
enemy back to the Rimini - Pisa line we shall I consider be in a strong position to press for the return of all the divisions you are now being asked
to release to enable us to complete the destruction of the enemy's armed
forces in Italy by another all out offensive. I have already represented
this view strongly to the SAC-in•C and will continue to do so. I am also urging
that the instructions for the release of the second French division should be
mod1.fied so that that formation will not in any case have to begin to leave
the battle area before 8 July. By- that time a decision may have been taken
which will render the move back of the second French division unnecessary.
"3. Pending a decision on the proposals for future operations which I
have made to SAC-in-C I must ask you to meet the requirements of AFHQ as regards releases, except in regard to the second French division, and at the
same time to press on with the pursuit of the enemy and the capture of Leghorn as fast as you possibly can with the forces that remain with you. No
action to effect the release of the second French division during the first
week of July will however be taken without reference to me personally."
General Clark replied to General Alexander as follows:
"I am in agreement with the views expressed in your MA 1421 with regards
the ultimate retention of Fifth Army formations now scheduled for relief. I
am afraid, from reading your message, that Harding misunderstood me yesterday and carried back to you the thought that we needed urging as a result of
these withdrawals. I can ass'ID."e you that the Fifth Army will continue to
push forward with the same determination and vigor which has always characterized its operations, and this in spite of the scheduled relief or units.
"The point I tried to make to Harding was the disgraceful manner in
which Juin is being treated, which has cast a cloud of doubt over his headquarters, and which, I am afraid, may dim the enthusiasm and ardor with which
the French have always fought under Fifth Army command. I conferred with
Juin last evening and made it cl8f\r to him that the all-out advance continues.
"I am glad you have taken steps to hold the 2nd French Division at least
until July 8th. That will help."
�TUSCANIA-JUNE 17, 1944-•After breakfast General Clark flew to IV Corps and
visited that organization as well as the 36th Division, retm-ning thereafter
to his villa in Rome where he hRd lunch. Arter lunch the General drove to
the Hotel Excelsior where he conferred with General Ryder and Colonel Bruce.
The Army Commander then retm-ned to the villa where he had supper with some
of his staff officers. The command post today was moved from the Villa
Savoia to the town of Tuscania, 72 miles north of Rome.
*
~A
Jf
i.?~
:r
rr1:.
~
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T._USCANIA--JUNE 18, 1944--After breakfast General Clark drove to Littorio
airport where he met, upon their arrival, Generals Marshall, Devers, Handy
and Colonel McCarthy and also saw General Arnold prior to his departure with
General Cannon. The whole pa.rty then drove ~round from the airport to the
new Firth Army command post in the vicinity of Tuscania where they proceeded
to the reception hut. Here General Marshall was introduced to the Divisional
and Corps Commanders, both American and French. General Marshall then gave a
short orientation talk and refreshments were served. General ~~shall then
pinned the Distinguished Service Medal on Generals Juin, Sloan, Coulter, .
7 Eagles and o•Daniel. General Clark then presented to General Marshall other
officers of his staff and Section Chiefs. The party then left by car and
drove to the IV Corps command post where they were received by General Crit-·
tenberger. Changing to jeeps, the party drove forward to the ,6th Division
where they were received by General Walker. The party then visited forward
elements in the vicinity of Grosseto, returning to the 36th DiVision cub
strip. From there General Clark flew back to the. command post at Tuscania
and the other members of the party retm-ned to Rome.
·
/-
*
*
*
TUSCANIA-•JUNE 19, 1944-General Clark spent the morning at his command post
conferring with his staff officers, and after lunch he went by car to the
command post of the French Expeditionary Corps to confer with General Juin.
General Juin was out visiting his divisions, had not yet retm-ned, and the
Anny Commander c0nferred instead with General Carpentier, General Juin 1 s /
Chief of Staff. General Carpentier received General Clark and showed him
through General Juin 1 s trailers, Captain Walters acting as interpreter.
General Clark, also accompanied on this trip by General Gruenther, discussed
with General Carpentier the effects that the removal of service units for
Operation ANVIL would have on the operations of the French Expedjtionary
Corps. Generals Clark and Carpentier also spoke at some length regarding
General Juin 1 s personal future, and General Carpentier explained that while
Juin and De Lattre de Tassigny were of the same class ~t military school,
Juin had always been senior, and he had always been promoted before De La.ttre.
This would make it impossible for Juin to serve under De Lattre. General
Carpentier stated that General Juin had been about to send him (Carpentier)
to Algiers to see DeGaulle when General Juin had received news of DeGaulle's
impending visit and had decided to wait until then to see what the futm-e
held for him. General Carpentier apologized profusely for General Juin's
absence, and General Clark returned to his command post where he spent the
remainder of the afternoon and evening working on administrative papers.
.
��GeneTal Clark today dictated the following .notes for inclusion in his
diary,
"Yesterday I met General Marshall and General Arnold at Littorio field
in Rome. I drove with General Marshall for two and a half hours to my com•
_ mand post. · During that time he oriented me completely on the Pacific
y,
situation and Eisenhower's cross-channel operation. He wanted me to know
~
the complete background and what the big picture looked like in order to receive from me my recommendations for future operations in Italy. Eisenhower
✓i
is most anxious that a landing take place in southern France--ANVIL-•as soon
\ 1 )~ as possible, preferably early July, with the mission of cutting across France
d t" 1 /'I to capture the port of Bordeaux in order that additional troops can be
,,.,(. t'
brought in from the United States. Knowing Alexander's views - that all
;' JJ;jl') 11
Firth Army resources and Eighth Army push on in Italy into the Po Valley - I
/~, .t,.,
wanted to get General Marshall and General Eisenhower's views before stating
r f my own, Once I knew that it was all-out on Ike• s part to land in southern
France, I threw my weight in that direction, for I knew I couldn't change it.
tt"'I told General Marshall that taking troops from me now for ANVIL threw a .
crimp into the victorious advance of this army. I just wanted him to under/~'./,./, stand it. I told him that with my Fifth Army complete and without the Eighth
if t./v Army I could go across the mountains at Florence into Bologna - that I knew
,j f}7 A
the Eighth Army could not do it without the Fifth Army.
r
1'
/VY
~ "I told General Morshall ~retire rather than servein which Juin was
the disgracerul manner
~~~ being handled and that he would
under DeLattre de
Tassigny. General Marshall asked me why Juin 1 s FEC couldn 1t make the landing in France, backed up by an American airborne division, all under Patch's
command initially and using u. s; landing era.ft and augmented by certain u. s.
service and auxiliary troops. His fln•ther suggestion being that all u. s. ·
troops be left in the Fifth Army until we entered the continent - that he
~ ~"?'_,.;-- would demand tha.t Juin command the landing of French troops rather than De
_,_JJ- \:,I, tattre de Tassigny o:i:i the basis that they needed a battle-proven leader such
t ·'« ✓
as Juin - that once the landing had been effected, DeGaulle could place a
Jf 6 'f.
French Army in the field under the· commander he named when the time seemed
~ :~
appropriate - that then all U. s. Divisions in the Mediterranean would follow
~v
into southern France and go into the Seventh Army. At that time a group of
Q" "\ ~ arm1.es would be set up under American command to control the U. s. and Frencl\
,:r-t"'
Arrrry'. I told him I believed that was a solution whereby he could have his
"cake and eat it too". However, the French are not fully trained at landing
and it might not work out. Nevertheless, I am full out in support of Ike's
desire for this landing, knowing that we will follow in at an early date.
~
. , r_
"Already demends for service units, auxiliary troops and artillery are
being made upon me in addition to the VI Corps, and I have instructed my
staff to give them everything as fast as we can and speed up this next operation.
"This will be a great blov, to Alexander, who wants to keep the American
and French troops, knowing that they will fight and preserve his reputation,
for we made it for him by the conduct of the Firth Army in the last battle
for Rome. His Eighth Army contributed absolutely nothing but grief for him.
I must tell Alexander thet in the light of these withdrawals, he must have
the Eighth Army carry the ball from now on; that he must give the Fifth Army
�l "7 o
a narrow sector of responsibility commensurate with its means and that we
will conform until such time es all troops a.re taken out. This will never
work, I lmow, for Eighth Army is incapable or carrying the ball.
"General Marshall was high in his praise and gratitude for the conduct
of the Fifth Army."
*
*
*
TUSCANIA-JUNE 20, 1944-General Juin arrived in the morning and conferred
with General Clark, Captain Walters acting es his interpreter. General
Clark and General Juin conferred at s~me length on the withdrawal of service units for the ANVIL Operation from the French Corps. Genera.l Clark
assured General Juin that after these withdrawals he would give careful
study to the service units remaining and would distribute them in such a
manner as to support four divisions he hoped to keep in the line - two
French and two American. General Clark then informed General Juin that he
had previously discussed General Juin's personal future with General Marshall and stated that General Mershall had expressed great admiration for
General Juin. Juin said he was mst grateful but that victory end not
personalities was his main interest and begged General Cl8rk not to bother
about him.
General Juin left, and General Clark remained in his van during the
afternoon and conferred with various of his staff officers. Genere.l
Alexander arrived dur5ng the course of the afternoon and conferred with
the Army Colllill8.llder.
General Clark's notes for today follow:
"I received yesterday an appreciation from General Alexander for the
Firth and Eighth Armies to cross the Appenines and capture ,Bologna. The
study was based upon Firth Army retaining all its troops and not losing
any to ANVIL-a very improbable situation. However, a zone running generally
northeast from Florence towards Bologna. was given as the most desirable
terrain over which to make a penetration of the mountains and capture Bo•
logna. and enter the Po Valley. Practically all of the favore.b le terrain
zone was given to the Eighth Army as was Bologna and the principal road
that Fifth Army was to use to approach Bologna was ta.ken away from it
five miles from the city. Fifth Army was then assigned the role of turning
to the west in the Po Valley end protecting the flank of the British Eighth
Anny as it went into the Valley· of the Danu\>e. Later, Firth Army was authorized to attack into Germany through the Brenner Pass. The pla.n was so
lopsided that it was ridiculous.
"I telephoned to Harding and told him that an appropriate assignment
had not been given the Fifth Army. He told me he would come up and did so, ·
bringing Alemnder with him. We thrashed the thing out. I told Alexander
the Firth Army should advance into France over the mountains rather than
remain idle in the Po Valley. He agreed. They also reluctantly indicated
they would change the boundaries between Armies crossing the mountains so
as to run jt through the middle of Bologna. I told him a little competition between armies would be a go9d thing.
�111
"The rest of the discussion dealt with the merits of ANVIL versus the
Po Valley Operation. That decision rests in the hands of the Combined
Chiefs of Staff, and it is disgraceful that some word has.not yet been received, for the pulling of troops away from Fifth Army to mount ANVIL is
seriously affecting my ability to move north. I am convinced that ANVIL
will be put on, and in order that Fifth Army in some capacity get into the
French picture under Eisenhower I have directed that all units of the Fifth
Arm? be turned over to the ANVIL Operation as rapidly as possible."
*
*
*
TUSOANIA--JUNE 21, 1944--General Clark spent the morning in his van taking
care of accumulated paper work and at eleven o'clock received Ambassador
Murphy and Mr. Offie and had them to lunch.
After lunch Messrs. Murphy and Offie left, and Genere.l Livesay, Commanding General of the 91st Division, called on General Clark. Generals
Keyes and Shekerjian also called on the Commanding General during ·the afternoon.
In the late afternoon General Clark went fishing on Lake Bolsena with
Colonel Saltzman, Major Riggs and Lieutenant Berenson and returned in time
to have dinner with these officers.
General Clark today sent the following letter to General Harmon, Commanding General of the 1st Armored Division:
"I was very muoh disturbed to learn yesterday that your representative introduced at an air•gro,md conference at Fourth Corps Headquarters ·
a memorandum purporting to represent your views on the ability of the Air
to furnish close support to an armored di vision. While I have not seen a ·
copy of the memorandum I understand that you requested that no attempt be
made by the Air to furnish close, support to your division.
"I talked to your Chief of Staff, Colonel Dewey, this morning and he
assures me that you are in thorough agreement with the procedure which Saville is attempting to perfect, and that it will have your wholehearted
cooperation. I ·sincerely hope that Dewey has correctly represented your
attitude. I consider that the introduction of your memorandum at yesterday's
meeting was most unfortunate. It was certainly not conducive to the development of the close relations which must exist between the air and the
ground elements if we are to have effective close air support.
"I strongly urge that you personally see General Saville at your earliest convenience in order to correct any erroneous impression which may
have been created by your note. Please understand that Saville has not com•
plained about your memorandua. However, from my long a~sociation with him
I know that it can not help but have a harmful effect. That situation must
be cleared up as soon as possible.
"I hope to see you within the next day or two. General Crittenberger
tells me that your plans are in excellent shape, and I am looking forward to
the usual fine performance from your division."
�TUSCANIA--JUNE 22, 1944•-In the early part of the morning General Clark new
to IV Corps Headquarters and conferred there with General Crittenberger, returning late in the morning to the command post. Arter lunch the ambulance
donated by the Mornings of Diversion Club .(the money for which was raised
through the efforts of Mrs. Clark) was brought up for the General's inspection and photographed. The General oonferred with staff officers during the
afternoon and conferred with Colonel Kirkwood. Later in the afternoon the
Army Commander saw General Rooks, Deputy Chief of Starr, AFHQ, and conferred
with him at length regarding various operational matters.
*
*
*
TUSCANIA-JUNE 23, 1944--During the morn1ng General Clark held a conference
of his staff officers in the conference hut, discussing rnB.tters he was to
take up later in the morning in his conference with General Alexander at AAI
Headquarters. Immediately after this conference, General Clark flew to AAI
Headquarters at Frasca.ti accompanied by Generals Gruenther, Brann and Tate.
The General's car met him at Frasca.ti after the conference, and General
Clark drove to Rome immediately after the meeting, spending the evening and
night at his suite in the hotel.
*
*
*
TUSCANIA--JUNE 24, 1944-General Clark remained in the hotel today, conferring with various city administration and MinOT officials concerning the
handling of various civic problems entailed in the administration of the
City of Rome. During the afternoon General Brann arrived and conferred with
General Clark. The General gave a dinner in his private dining room in the
hotel for Generals Tate, Brann, Lewis, Bradshaw and Colonels SaltzrnB.n, Nygaard, Tully, Captain Walters and other guests.
*
*
*
TUSCANIA-JUNE 25, 1944--General Clark remained in his suite at the hotel,
taking up administrative matters with his G-J, General Brann. In the a:f'ternoon General Clark visited Marshal Smuts a.t the Grand Hotel and had tea
there. Marshal Smuts introduced General Van Ryneveld, his Chief of Staff,
and other officers of his staff and his two sons who are acting as his aides.
Marshal Smuts then recalled the last time he had seen General Clark in London in preparation for the landings in North Africa. General ClArk stated
that he recalled that meeting with great pleasure and satisfaction. General
Smuts congratulated General Clark on the fine achievements of the Fifth Army,
stating that he had been the tower of strength. General Clark then stated
that the fine showing maoe by the two new di visions i.n the Fifth Army, the
85th and 88th, had, he felt, had a most beneficial effect on the new American di visions waiting for the invasion in England. These two di visions hed
shown that the new American divisions were more than a match for the German
veterans. Marshal Smuts replied that he had heard that the new American divisions had acquitted themselves very well in Normandy, and he was sure that
this morale factor had played a considerable part in their success. Marshal
Smuts stated that he had visited the Normandy front with Prime Minister Churchill and had found that visit most satisfactory, and everything proceeding
�exceedingly well. He stA.ted that losses had been far below expectation. MB.r shal Smuts stated that the fall of Cherbourg would have a most far-reaching
effect. General Clark concurred, stating that it would then be possible to
bring fresh divisions direct from the United States. General Clark also added
that it has been our experience here in Italy that the Germans had lost the
art of the counter attack. They have launched counter-attacks piecemeal.
General Clark recalled that at Anzio on one occasion the Germans staged an attack with six divisions using two battalions of each division. He stated thet
he believed this was due to manpov,er conservation. Marshal Smuts expressed
his admiration for the stand ma.de on the beachhead under most trying conditions. General Clark then stated that although he was losing divisions here
in Italy, he was doing everything possible to help General Eisenhower's opera•
tion. Marshal Smuts stated that he felt that the campaign in Italy had been
of very great value to the success of OVERLORD, both a.s regards morale and material factors.
1
General Clark then drove directly to the Littorio airport and returned to
his ·command post where he had dinner. During the dinner he informed Sergeant
Holden that he was returning to the United States tomorrow morrdng on a furlough.
General Juin today issued the following memorandum regarding the attitude
or French soldiers toward Italian civilians:
Certain Commanding Officers of American Units which were attached to
during the offensive, have · been very d5sagreeably impressed by the attitude of some of our men toward the Italian population. They have complained
about it to the Commanding General, Fifth Army.
t•1.
F.E.c.,
"2. Unfortunately, it is exact that a certain amount of regrettable incidents have occurred. The Commanding General, F. E. c., is aware of the drastic measures taken by the l~ge unit commanders in compliance with instructions
issued to that effect (memo 5911 CEF/1 dated 27 May 1944). He is aware also
of the efficiency of these measures.
"3. However, these additional complaints require that Commanders of all
echelons do not decrease in any way their surveillance. It must particularly
apply to small isolated detachments."
*
*
*
TUSCANIA--JUNE 26, 1944--The General spent the morning in his van taking care
of accumulated paper work. At 1100 the Soviet Ambassador to the French Committee of National Liberation and Member of the Advisory Council to Italy, Mr.
Alemnder·Bogomolov, and the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Mr. Vidia•
sov, called and were received by the General in his van. At 1130 the General,
accompanied by the Ambassador and the Secretary of the Embassy, proceeded to
the cub strip where a decoration ceremony was held. Ambassador Bogomolov presented Soviet awards to two Fifth Army officers, and General Clark presented
American decorations to a number of other officers and enlisted men. General
Clark, the Ambassador and the SecretRry of the Embassy then returned to the
command post and had lunch. After lunch the Soviet officials departed and General Clerk conferred at some length with General Brann.
�General Lenmitzer called in the afternoon to confer with General Clark.
Colonel Gray also called to discuss some court martial cases, an~ later in
the afternoon the theater cha.plain, Chaplain Beebe, accompanied by Chaplain
Ryan, Fifth Army Chaplain, was rece:tved.
General Clark today sent the f'oll<>wing letter to General Eisenhower:
"I know you are busy these days and don't have time for long letters,
so this will be short.
"We are all pulling f'or you and tremendously pleased with your progress
to date. Hope we can help. You are the only one who knows how we best fit
into the big picture, so get a decision and tell us what is wanted. You can
rest assured you will get our full support. Lack of decision now is slowing
us up and not helping you. You know you can have every single unit I have,
and they will leave here the minute the request is made. I have told my
staff to give you the best we have, but don't forget the rest of us, if you
take _most of my outfit, for we want to get back with you and wind this thing
up as fast as possible.
"Thanks f'or your radio. We were all delighted with it.
"Secured, through Hap Arnold, a C-54 to send twenty of' my oldest people
back home for two weeks with their families. Al headed the list, and officers and men are now enroute.
"Best of regards to Bedel."
*
*
*
TUSCANIA••JlJNE 27, 1944-•In the morning General Clark flew in his L•5 to IV
Corps. He spent the morning a.t IV Corps and returned to his command post at
1400. At 1500 General Donovan of OSS called and was received by General
Clark. The Army Commander spent the rest of the afternoon in his van and
conferred with various staff officers.
*
*
TUSCANIA-•J'UNE 28, 1944•-General Clark spent the morning in his van taking
ca.re of a large a.mount of paper work that had accumulated.
Shortly after 1300 Major General Henry, USA, Ret., arrived by air and
had lunch with General Clark. General Henry arrived alone and left after
lunch with General Keyes. General Clark conferred with General Brann after
this meeting.
Shortly after 1800 General ChBrles DeGaulle arrived, accompanied by
his Chief of staff, General Marie Emile Bethoua.rd, and General Juin and
several other officers. All of the party except General DeGaulle and Gene•
ral Clark went to the hut. General DeGaulle and General Clark went to the
Army Commander's van and conferred there with Captain Walters acting as interpreter. After exchanging greetings, General Clark expressed to General
DeGa.ulle his admiration forN
the magnificent part p~yed by the French troops
�l15
in the victorious advance or the Fifth Army and stated ths,t they had earned
a well-deserved share of that victory. General Clark recalled that the
last time he had seen General DeGaulle, the French General had said "You
must win a victory", and, added General Clark, "Now we have won it". General DeGaulle stated that victory had now been won and still another one had
been won when the forces that had been in the bridgehead broke out.
General DeGaulle then discussed the ANVIL Operation. He stated that
the French had agreed to the campaign in Ital1 but had always felt that af•
ter the Battle of Rome they would like to fight in France. He said he believed this was quite natural, and he felt General Clark would understand
this feeling. General Clark stated that he understood it but believed that
in the case of the ANVIL Operation speed was of the essence. General DeGaulle replied that the plan did not seem to be too speedy, and although it
had been somewhat accelerated recently, it was still quite far off. General
Clark then asked General DeGaulle how soon he intended to withdraw the two
remaining French Divisions. General DeGaulle sta.ted that he did not know
and that it depended largely upon the ANVIL Operation but that if the order
came to withdraw them it would have to come very quickly. General Clark
then stated that with what would be left or the Fifth Army he did not believe that we could m-oss the mountains. General DeGaulle agreed that he did
not think this was possible either. General Clark then expressed the belief
that General Wilson might try both operations ••••• ANVIL and the continuation
of the pursuit in Italy. General DeGaulle stated that he did not think both
operations could be carried out successfully, and General Clark conc~red in
this.
.
General DeGaulle then stated that he was taking the liberty of asking
General Clark some personal questions because they were of great interest to
the French. He asked him what part he personally would play in the ANVIL
Operation. General Clark replied that he felt that eventually all the American troops here would be put into the ANVIL Operation. He stated that be believed initially there would be the Seventh Army, commanded by General Patch,
and the ·French troops would constitute eventually a French Army and that they
would probably be formed into an Army Group but who would command this he did
not definitely know, and General DeGaulle nodded without replying.
General Clark then stated that he would like to ask General DeGaulle a
question but did not want to give the appearance of interfering in any way.
He'stated that he felt sure that General DeGaulle knew the great esteem in
which we held General Juin. General DeGaulle stated that he was aware of
this fact and that he personally had a great regard for General Juin, but he
said, "As you must lrnow, I wanted to give General Juin his chance in Italy,
. and he has certainly taken magnificent advantage of his chance. We also have
General De Lattre de Tassigny, and we want to give him his chance also. We
only have one Army, and it is a small one, but I am sure that within a few
months we will be able to give both of them a command worthy of them. As the
operation progresses we will be able to build up our forces so that they will
both have a command befitting their ability."
General· Clark then asked whether he was going to take General Juin out
of Italy immediately, and General ,DeGaulle replied quickly, "Oh, no! He will
�remain here as long as he has troops fighting and after that I will take
him with me for a while". General DeGaulle hinted but did not state
plainly his preference for General Juin over General DeLattre de Tassigny-.
He added that he felt sure that the ANVIL Operation would be carried out,
in which General Clark concurred - the latter stating that he desired to
do everything possible to help General Eisenhower. General DeGaulle then
stated that he believed that after the landing things would go quite rapidly,
adding "The Germans are very tired".
·
General DeGaulle spoke of his visit to Normandy, stating that things
were going quite well there and gave the impression that he was very satis-
fied with his visit to the western front. General DeGrulle then stated
that he intended to present some decorations tomorrow to some American
Generals and hoped General Clark could be present, adding that he hoped to
have the honor of pinning a decoration on General Clark. General Clark
added that he would be very proud and pleased to be there. The two Gene•
rals then left the van together and went to the hut where they joined the
other members of the party. On the way over General Clark asked General
DeGaulle in French whether he did not expect to go to the United States
very soon - some time in July. General DeGaulle stated that probe.bly that
would be the ease, but he was very vague about the date.
Shortly thereafter General DeGAulle and his party left for the French
Expeditionary Corps. General Clark then had dinner with Mr. DeRochmont of
the MARCH OF TIME and Carl Mytlans of LIFE, after which he retired to his
van.
*
*
*
TUSCANIA--JUNE 29, 1944-In the early morning the General remined in his
van and at 0930 took off in his L-5 and flew to the French Expeditionary
Corps field at Sasso Ombrone. The General drove from the field to a parade
ground where he was decorated by General Charles DeGaulle with the Plaque
of Grand Officer of the Legion of Honor (This plaque belon~s to 88-year old
General Priowc and was borrowed for the ceremony, being returned e.fterwards
by General Clark). At the same time General Clark was decorated with the
Croix de Guerre with a Palm. The General then expressed his regrets to
General DeGaulle at being unable to remain for lunch and flew in General
Juin 1s plane from the parade ground back to Sasso Ombrone. He proceeded
from there to IV Corps in his own plane and conferred with General Crittenberger. Ge~eral Clark then proceeded to his villa at Mirina di Grosseto.
He took a quick dip and then returned to his command post.
*
*
*
T~SCANIA--JUNE 30, 1944--General Clark spent the morning in his van conf'erririg with General Brann, Colonel Smith, Colonel Bruce and Colonel Lee, the
new Finance Officer. At 1030 General Alexander, accompanied by his Chief of
Staff, General Harding, arrived by air and conferred with General Clark.
They departed shortly thereafter and returned to AAI by air.
At 1130 Generals F,aker, Cannon and Saville arrived by air and lunched
with General Clark, conferring with him ·during the lunch hour. They left
�•
early in the afternoon, and at 1330 General Clark took off for the 85th Division command post at Castel Porziano near Rome where he decorated personnel of that division. Upon the completion of the ceremony General Clark
returned to the command post by air and spent the remainder of the afternoon
in his van conferring with various officers of his staff, including Generals
Brann and Moran and Colonel Bruce •
General Clark today sent the following letter to General Crittenberger,
Commanding IV Corps:
"l. There are elements of eight German divisions on the
of Fifth Army. It is estimated that the combined strength of
sions equals a.bout. that of three divisions of full strength.
that the intention of the enemy is to create maximum delay on
defensive position.
present front
these diviIt is clear
every suitable
"2. Through the splendid efforts of your Corps it appears to me that
you are in a position to break through to the ARNO River with great speed
and with luck you might secure a bridgehead over that difficult military
obstacle and seize the hill mass east of PISA. The high ground north of
the GECINA River between the roads CECINA-PISA and POMARANCE•POMEVERA is
the critical terrain feature that you must seize to assure the rapid success
of this operation.
"3. To accomplish this break through I believe that you should make
your main effort on your left with the 34th Division and the 442nd RCT. I
plan on withdrawing the 361st RCT from your command within the next day or
two. I will replace it•with the 362nd RCT on or about July 2 but desire
that you use this fresh combat team with the 34th Divjsion rather than the
1st Armored Division. I think the operations for the past few days have
shown that armor is not appropriate for exploitation forces and that we can
accomplish more with infantry in this type of terrain. I believe the 1st
Armored_with its organic infantry only should be employed on the right of
the , 34th Division to conform to the movements of that Division and protect
its flank. I propos.e directing FEC to conform to the movements of your
Corps.
"4. I would like your comments on the suggested operation as soon as
possible."
General Crittenberger replied to the above this evening, and his letter
is quoted below:
.
"In compliance with your request for comments on the contents of your
letter which was received tonight the following are submitted: .
"1. It is hoped that the further advance of the IT Corps to the ARNO
River may be continued with speed and effectiveness.
"2. The possibility of a rapid advance to the Northwest with the subsequent securing of a bridgehead over the ARNO is recognized. To that end,
plans ere being executed to seize the critical terrain features between the
CECINA-PISA and POMERANCE-PONTEDERA roads. In this oonneotion every effort
�is being made to facilitate the rapid advance of the IV Corps. Subsequent
plans for the crossing of the ARNO and securing of the hill mass East of
PISA are the subject of the minutest study by this headquarters in view of the
importance of 'this pending operation.
"3. Only this morning, plans were well underway for e quick thrust
around the hostile flank and rear by a task force composed of infantry with
some armor. However, the developments duri ng the last twenty-four hours
have made this unprofitable inasmuch as elements of the 1st Armored Division
mov~d up to the CECINA River and crossed it to the North last night.
"4. Your desire to accomplish a break through to the North is well
understood by all ranks of this command who are devoting their greatest effort to this mission. When the 362 RC'l' is made available, it will be attached for initial combat experience to the 34th Division to make that effort. Following what I believe to be your desires, both the 34th Division
and the 1st Armored Division will drive to the North with the latter conforming to the movement of the former. In this advance it is hoped that the
FEC on the right will be able to conform to the pace of this Corps.
"5. The ARNO River presents a difficult obstacle but not one thnt is
by any means insurmountable in the attack and crossing of the rlver. It is
believed that two :i.nfantry divisions should be employed. Ma.y we therefore
expect that a second infantry division, possibly the 88th Division because
of its expE".rience, be made available for that operation. With this fresh
division, it is felt that our plan to seize the objective North of the ARNO
as indicated by you, will be entirely successful."
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Clark, Mark W. Diaries
Subject
The topic of the resource
Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984.
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns.
United States—History, Military—20th century.
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark (1896-1984) was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in World War I and World War II, and was President of The Citadel from 1954 to 1965. <a href="http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/Clark_Inventory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">This finding aid describes Clark's archival collection at The Citadel Archives</a>, the bulk of which covers Clark's World War II career and his time as Citadel President.<br /><br />This collection features diary entries from June 1942 to December 1950.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Citadel Archives & Museum
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
CP Clark
Relation
A related resource
Mark W. Clark Collection
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
application/pdf
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/collections/show/20
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mark W. Clark Diary, June 8-30, 1944
Subject
The topic of the resource
Clark, Mark W. (Mark Wayne), 1896-1984
World War, 1939-1945
World War, 1939-1945—Personal narratives, American
Military campaigns
United States—History, Military—20th century
Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina
Description
An account of the resource
Mark W. Clark's World War II diaries were kept by an aide. These entries are from June 8-30, 1944.
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
CP Clark
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Citadel Archives and Museum
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Materials in The Citadel Archives & Museum Digital Collections are intended for educational and research use. The user assumes all responsibility for identifying and satisfying any claimants of copyright. For more information contact The Citadel Archives & Museum, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, 29409.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
application/pdf
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
https://citadeldigitalarchives.omeka.net/items/show/1635